THE KOREAN WAR

THE UN OFFENSIVE

16 September–2 November 1950
Introduction

The Korean War was the first major armed clash between Free

World and Communist forces, as the so-called Cold War turned hot. The

half-century that now separates us from that conflict, however, has

dimmed our collective memory. Many Korean War veterans have considered themselves forgotten, their place in history sandwiched between the

sheer size of World War II and the fierce controversies of the Vietnam

War. The recently built Korean War Veterans Memorial on the National

Mall and the upcoming fiftieth anniversary commemorative events

should now provide well-deserved recognition. I hope that this series of

brochures on the campaigns of the Korean War will have a similar effect.

The Korean War still has much to teach us: about military preparedness, about global strategy, about combined operations in a military

alliance facing blatant aggression, and about the courage and perseverance of the individual soldier. The modern world still lives with the consequences of a divided Korea and with a militarily strong, economically

weak, and unpredictable North Korea. The Korean War was waged on

land, on sea, and in the air over and near the Korean peninsula. It lasted

three years, the first of which was a seesaw struggle for control of the

peninsula, followed by two years of positional warfare as a backdrop to

extended cease-fire negotiations. The following essay is one of five

accessible and readable studies designed to enhance understanding of

the U.S. Army’s role and achievements in the Korean conflict. 

During the next several years the Army will be involved in many

fiftieth anniversary activities, from public ceremonies and staff rides to

professional development discussions and formal classroom training.

The commemoration will be supported by the publication of various

materials to help educate Americans about the war. These works will

provide great opportunities to learn about this important period in the

Army’s heritage of service to the nation.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military

History by Stephen L.Y. Gammons. I hope this absorbing account,

with its list of further readings, will stimulate further study and reflection. A complete listing of the Center of Military History’s available

works on the Korean War is included in the Center’s online catalog:

www.army.mil/cmh-pg/catalog/brochure.htm.

JOHN S. BROWN

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History
The UN Offensive

16 September–2 November 1950

Following a surprise North Korean attack on 25 June 1950, Lt.

Gen. Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army fought desperate battles to

halt the invasion before finally establishing a defensive line to protect

the vital port city of Pusan on the southeast coast of the Korean

peninsula. By August the Pusan Perimeter stretched about one hundred miles north along the west bank of the Naktong River, west of

Pusan, and, after turning east near Naktong-ni, about fifty miles to

the coast above P’ohang-dong. As the fighting ensued along the

perimeter, more American forces entered Korea to stem the

Communist tide.

From the first days of the Korean attack General of the Army

Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United Nations (UN)

Command, perceived that the deeper the North Korean People’s Army

(NKPA) pushed into South Korea, the more vulnerable it would

become to an amphibious envelopment. MacArthur naturally thought

in terms of an amphibious landing in the enemy’s rear area to win the

Korean War. In World War II, after Bataan, all of his campaigns in the

Southwest Pacific had begun as amphibious operations. Such operations took advantage of American control of the sea and the enemy’s

weakness in his rear.

Strategic Setting

Even as the first U.S. Army units arrived in Korea, MacArthur’s

staff began planning for the amphibious assault behind North Korean

lines. The best site was Inch’on, a Yellow Sea port halfway up Korea’s

west coast. To the east lay the capital city of Seoul, where the main

roads and rail lines converged. MacArthur reasoned that a force landing at Inch’on would have to move inland only a short distance to cut

the NKPA’s main north-south supply routes. A secondary but significant consideration was Seoul’s psychological importance as the traditional capital for all of Korea. MacArthur believed a landing at

Inch’on, combined with the Eighth Army’s northward advance, would

blunt the enemy offensive. As a result, the retreating enemy would be

either cut off or forced to make a slow and difficult withdrawal

through the mountains farther east.

The nature and location of the planned landing dictated that it be

directed by a tactical headquarters separate from Eighth Army. To that
Unsan

38° 38°

T a e b a e k M t s

MANCHURIA

Hyesanjin

Ch’osan

Hagaru-ri

Hungnam

Iwon

Wonsan

Sinuiju

Chongju Sinanju

P’YONGYANG

Kaesong

Ch’orwon

Munsan-ni

Uijongbu

Ch’unch’on

Hongch’on

Suwon

Osan

Ch’ungju

Wonju

Chech’on

Samch’ok

Ulchin

Andong

Yangyang

Kansong

Kosong

Kumhwa

P’yonggang

P’ohang-dong

Taegu

PUSAN

Miryang

Masan

Mokp’o

Kunsan

Taejon

SEOUL

Inch'on

an gjin

Ch R

CHANGJIN

(CHOSIN) RES

Ch’ongch’on

R

Taedong

Taeryong

Kur

R

R

yong

R Yalu R

Yesong

R

Imjin

R

Han R Naktong

R

Kum

R

YELLOW

SEA

K O R E A

S T R A I T

SEA

O F

JAPAN

KOREA

High Ground

Above 200 Meters

0 50 MILES
end, MacArthur created the X

Corps headquarters from members of his own staff, naming his

chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Edward

M. Almond, as corps commander.

The X Corps was activated on 26

August 1950 as a separate command under the General Headquarters, Far East Command.

Although pressed in meeting

Eighth Army troop requirements,

MacArthur was able to shape a

two-division landing force, consisting of the 7th Infantry Division

and the 1st Marine Division. In

Japan, performing occupation

duties, the 7th Division had contributed key personnel to the 24th

and 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry

Divisions as they loaded out for

Korea. MacArthur rebuilt the vastly understrength division by giving

it high priority on replacements from the United States and by assigning

it eighty-six hundred South Korean recruits, known as KATUSAs, from

the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army program. The 1st

Marine Division, which MacArthur acquired from the United States,

was augmented by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade from the Pusan

Perimeter and by a Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Corps regiment.

With these two divisions, along with artillery, engineer, and other support elements, the X Corps was to make the landing at Inch’on. Except

for the ROK 17th Regiment, which was reassigned from the Eighth

Army to the X Corps, no reinforcements were available.

Naval officials and MacArthur’s superiors judged the Inch’on

plan as dangerous. Navy planners considered the Yellow Sea’s

extreme tidal variations, sometimes as high as thirty feet, and the narrow channel approaches to the port as major risks to shipping. Marine

planners saw peril in landing in the middle of a built-up area and in

having to scale high seawalls to get ashore. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

were concerned that MacArthur was committing his last major

reserves at a time when no more units in the United States were available for deployment to the Far East. Four National Guard divisions

had been federalized on 1 September, but none was yet ready for

5

General Almond 

(National Archives)
combat duty; and while the draft and the call-ups of Organized

Reserve Corps members were substantially increasing the size of the

Army, they offered MacArthur no prospect of immediate reinforcement. Should the landing run into strong opposition, no help could be

expected. But MacArthur was willing to accept the risks. In light of

the uncertainties, his decision was a remarkable gamble and, given

the results, one of exemplary boldness.

Operations

As D-day for the Inch’on landing approached, General Walker was

busy marshaling his forces for the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter.

At this time, Walker had under his direct command the 2d and 25th

Infantry Divisions and the I Corps. Under the corps’ control were the

24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions; the 5th Regimental Combat

Team (RCT), formed from the 5th Infantry; the British 27th Infantry

Brigade; and supporting troops. Earlier, on 17 July, MacArthur

informed Walker that all ROK ground forces would be placed under

his command, pursuant to South Korean President Syngman Rhee’s

expressed desire.

Walker planned to have I Corps forces break out of the perimeter’s center near Waegwan, with the main effort directed northward

along the Taegu-Kumch’on-Taejon-Suwon axis. Initially, the 5th

Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Cavalry Division would seize a

bridgehead over the Naktong River near Waegwan, allowing the 24th

Division to drive toward Kumch’on and Taejon. The 1st Cavalry

Division would follow, securing the attacking division’s rear and lines

of communications. Concurrently, the 2d and 25th Divisions on the

Eighth Army’s left flank and the ROK I and II Corps on the east and

right flank would attack and fix enemy troops in their zones, exploiting any local breakthrough.

The plan had some problems. To supplement the 5th RCT’s

Naktong bridgehead mission, Walker wanted the 2d and 24th

Divisions to ford the river below Waegwan and the ROK 1st Division

the portion above the town. However, the plan for multiple crossings

was fraught with difficulties because the Eighth Army lacked the engineer troops and bridging equipment for simultaneous river assaults. In

fact, it had only enough equipment for two ponton treadway bridges

across the Naktong.

In addition, Walker was unable to concentrate a large force in the

Pusan Perimeter’s center for the breakout effort. Attacks by NKPA

units had pinned down all of the divisions under Walker’s command

6
except the 24th. Only on the eve of the offensive was he able to move

that division in increments from the east to the perimeter’s center.

Essentially, the Eighth Army offensive constituted more of a holding attack, allowing the X Corps to make the main effort. Walker’s

forces would then need to link up quickly with the X Corps to cut off a

large body of North Koreans in the southwestern part of the peninsula.

Walker anticipated that the news of the Inch’on landing would have a

demoralizing effect on the North Koreans while boosting the spirits of

his troops. For that reason, he requested that the Eighth Army delay its

attack until the day after the Inch’on landing.

The Inch’on Landing

The invasion of Inch’on, code-named Operation CHROMITE, began

on the morning of 15 September, the objectives being to capture

Inch’on and then to liberate Seoul. The X Corps invasion force, numbering nearly seventy thousand men, arrived off the landing beaches

one hundred fifty miles behind enemy lines—the effort marking the

first major amphibious assault by American troops since 1 April 1945

at Okinawa during World War II. The initial phase called for the

seizure of the fortified Wolmi Island that protected Inch’on Harbor.

The assault force, consisting of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st

Marine Division, and a platoon of nine M26 tanks from Company A,

1st Marine Tank Battalion, hit the island at 0633 and moved rapidly

inland against little resistance. Within a few minutes more troops landed and moved across the island to seal off the causeway leading to

Inch’on. The reduction of Wolmi continued systematically and was

completed at 0750. Marine casualties were 17 wounded. Enemy losses

were 108 soldiers killed and 136 captured. Preinvasion intelligence

about Wolmi Island proved accurate. Enemy prisoners indicated that

about four hundred soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 226th Independent

Marine Regiment, and some artillery troops of the 918th Artillery

Regiment had defended the island.

While the initial fighting had gone well, the battle was far from

over. After the capture of Wolmi an anxious period prevailed when the

tide began to fall, stopping further landing operations until late in the

afternoon. Although the North Koreans were now fully alerted, they

had few troops in the region. Moreover, American aircraft covered the

countryside during the day, isolating the port to a distance of twentyfive miles, and naval gunfire the closer approaches to Inch’on.

Late in the afternoon assault troops of the 1st and 5th Marines

headed for separate landing areas, designated Red and Blue Beaches,

on the Inch’on shoreline. The 5th Marines’ first wave arrived at Red

7
Beach at 1733. Most of the men had to climb the seawall with scaling

ladders, although some made their way through holes in the wall created by the naval bombardment. Two objectives, Cemetery and

Observatory Hills, lay in front of the assault force. On the left flank of

the landing area an intense firefight ensued when a marine platoon

encountered North Korean soldiers in trenches and a bunker just

beyond the seawall. Nevertheless, Cemetery Hill was taken just twentytwo minutes after the landing, with many of its defenders throwing

down their weapons and surrendering. By midnight other marine elements had fought their way against sporadic resistance to the top of

Observatory Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Marines’ first wave reached Blue

Beach at 1732, and most of the men also had to climb a high seawall

that fronted the area. Fighting through the evening and into the night,

the assault force had taken its final D-day objectives by 0130, 16

September. Marine casualties were 20 men killed, 174 wounded, and 1

missing in action.

The Inch’on landing had come as a complete surprise to the North

Koreans. Consistent with preinvasion estimates, enemy prisoners relat8

I I

3

I I

3

I I

2

I I

2

I I

1

I

Recon

III

1 Mar

III

5 Mar (-)

I I

3 5 Mar

X X

7

6 NK tanks ambushed,

dawn, 17 Sep

BHL

BHL

5 Mar

III

1 Mar

0633

1732

1733

To Kimp’o Airfield

Ascom City

Cemetery

Hill

Observatory

Hill

RED

GREEN BEACH

BEACH

BLUE

BEACH

Wolmi-do

Sowolmi-do

INCH’ON

To Seoul

THE INCH’ON LANDING

15–18 September 1950

Marine Landings, 15 Sep

Marine Positions, Night, 15 Sep

Marine Positions, Night, 16 Sep

BHL Beachhead Line

ELEVATIONS IN METERS

0

1 0 1

1 0 1

20 100 AND ABOVE

KILOMETERS

MILES
9

ed that the Inch’on garrison consisted of about two thousand men. As

garrison reinforcements, elements of the 22d Regiment had moved to

Inch’on before dawn on the fifteenth but retreated to Seoul after the

main landing that evening. Prepared defenses had been minimal and

resistance uncoordinated.

By the morning of 16 September the 1st and 5th Marines had

joined forces and were advancing rapidly against light resistance. By

evening they had reached a prearranged beachhead line, six miles

inland from the actual landing area. The line, which included the

port as well as the high ground east of Inch’on, was deep enough to

prevent enemy artillery fire on the landing and unloading areas, and

served as a base to seize Kimp’o Airfield, the next objective, about

halfway between Inch’on and Seoul. The 5th Marines reached the

edge of the airfield by 1800 on 17 September, taking the southern

part within the next two hours. The airfield’s four hundred to five

hundred defenders appeared surprised and were easily brushed aside.

Several company-size counterattacks struck the airfield’s perimeter

positions during the night, but the North Koreans were repulsed, suffering heavy casualties and finally fleeing to the northwest. The

Americans secured the airfield during the morning of 18 September.

As a result, the United Nations Command gained its first ground air

base north of the Pusan region, which greatly eased its ability to support not only the attack on Seoul but also interdiction operations

throughout South Korea.

By now, the remaining X Corps elements had arrived to join in the

battle for Seoul. Ships carrying the 7th Division from Japan reached

Inch’on Harbor on 16 September. General Almond wanted the troops

disembarked as soon as possible to cover the area south of Seoul from

any North Korean units that might have been sent north from the

Pusan region. The 7th Division’s 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, landed

during the morning of the eighteenth; the remainder of the regiment

went ashore later in the day. The next morning the 2d Battalion moved

up to relieve the 1st Marine Division’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,

which was occupying positions on the right flank south of the Seoul

highway. Meanwhile, the 7th Division’s 31st Infantry came ashore at

Inch’on. Responsibility for the zone south of the Seoul highway

passed to the 7th Division at 1800, 19 September.

The Battle for Seoul

With Inch’on and its harbor secured, the X Corps now faced the

daunting task of retaking Seoul itself. Seoul, twenty-five miles to the

east, had been reinforced after the Inch’on landings and now held
over twenty thousand NKPA soldiers. Protecting Seoul to the south

and southwest was the wide Han River. The city was heavily damaged

and presented a formidable obstacle, with numerous street barricades

and enemy positions on the hills dominating its approaches. The

assault on the city would be aided somewhat by the recapture of

Kimp’o Airfield and its subsequent use by American close air support

aircraft. But indications were that the battle for the city would be far

greater than had been the action at Inch’on and the advance to the

Han River.

As the 1st Marines fought its way east along the Inch’on-Seoul

highway into Yongdungp’o, about one and a half miles west of Seoul

on the south side of the Han River, the 7th Division protected the

marines’ right flank and engaged enemy forces moving toward the battle area from the south. Seeking to cut the Seoul-Suwon highway, the

32d Infantry attacked southeast toward Anyang-ni, about five miles

south of Yongdungp’o, until 20 September, when its advance was halted by an extensive minefield. Exploding mines damaged three tanks of

Company A, 73d Tank Battalion, completely blocking the narrow dirt

road the column was following. After engineer troops removed more

than one hundred fifty mines, the 32d Infantry resumed its advance

toward Anyang-ni, capturing Tongdok Mountain and part of Copper

Mine Hill.

The 32d Infantry took the rest of Copper Mine Hill the following

day, 21 September, and captured the high ground northeast of Anyangni. When night fell, its 3d Battalion held blocking positions astride the

Suwon highway, two miles south of Anyang-ni, and its 1st Battalion

the road east and the high ground northeast of the town. In the meantime, seven miles northeast of Anyang-ni, in the vicinity of Hill 290,

enemy forces ambushed the lead platoon of Company B, 1st Battalion,

and seriously disorganized it. Closely pursued by the enemy, the company withdrew two miles southward toward the 1st Battalion’s lines

and halted the NKPA force. On the twenty-third the 1st Battalion

resumed the offensive, seizing Hill 290. Situated three miles below the

Han River and seven miles southeast of Yongdungp’o, Hill 290 dominated the southern approaches to the Han and to Seoul. 

While the X Corps’ southern flank was being secured by the 7th

Division, the heaviest fighting in the battle for Seoul began on the

city’s western edge on 22 September and lasted four days. The NKPA’s

defensive line on the west side of Seoul was fixed firmly at the north

on Hill 296, just south of the Kaesong highway and west of Seoul’s

Sodaemun Prison. The NKPA line curved from the crest of Hill 296 in

a gentle half-moon sweep eastward and southward down spur ridges

10
two and a half miles to the Han River, the concave side facing west

toward the UN troops. Three hills, known as Hills 105 North, Center,

and South, formed the greater part of this uneven ridgeline. Hills 105

Center and 105 South, through which the main Pusan-Manchuria rail

line and road coursed into Seoul, completely dominated the area and

contained a variety of field fortifications capable of quick organization

for defense. Two miles east of these positions, in the center of the city,

were the Government House and main railroad station.

The principal NKPA unit manning this line was the 25th Brigade.

Formed a month earlier at Ch’orwon, it had begun moving to Seoul

on the day of the Inch’on landing, with most of the unit arriving in

the city on 19 September. The brigade numbered about twenty-five

hundred men and probably consisted of two infantry battalions, four

heavy machine gun battalions, an engineer battalion, a 76-mm.

artillery battalion, a 120-mm. mortar battalion, and miscellaneous

service troops. Along with the 78th Independent Regiment, it defended both the military and topographic crests. The slopes contained

defensive positions—deep foxholes, which offered protection from

overhead shell air bursts; and concrete caves, which stored abundant

supplies. More than fifty heavy machine guns, with interlocking fields

of fire, dotted these slopes.

Starting on 22 September, the 5th Marines fought a series of hard

battles as it attempted to clear the North Koreans from positions west

of Seoul. The 5th was soon joined by two other regiments, as

planned, but the enemy’s stubborn defense had begun to worry the

American commanders. On the twenty-third General Almond

expressed to the 1st Marine Division commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver P.

Smith, his dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the marines’ progress,

giving him twenty-four hours to gain ground. Otherwise, Almond told

Smith that he would change the division boundaries and bring the 7th

Division’s 32d Infantry into the battle to envelop the enemy’s defenses

from the south.

On the morning of 24 September the North Koreans were still

holding the marines in check west of Seoul. After conferring with the

7th Division commander, Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, Almond changed

the boundary between Barr’s and Smith’s units. Early the next morning

Barr’s forces would attack across the Han River into the southeast portion of Seoul.

To support the 7th Division’s crossing, the X Corps reinforced

Barr with the Marines’ 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion (minus one

company), two platoons of Company A, 56th Amphibious Tank and

Tractor Battalion, and the ROK 17th Regiment. The division’s 32d

11
Infantry would spearhead the attack, with the crossing taking place at

the Sinsa-ri ferry three miles east of the main rail and highway bridges

over the Han River. The main rail line and highway on the east side of

the city passed about a mile beyond the northern base of South

Mountain (Nam-san), its nine hundred feet making it the highest point

in Seoul.

For the crossing the 32d Infantry had a strength of over forty-nine

hundred soldiers, of which slightly more than eighteen hundred were

South Koreans. Its mission was threefold: take and secure South

Mountain; secure Hill 120, situated two miles southeast of Seoul; and

seize and hold Hill 348, a large high mass five miles east of the city.

The battle opened at 0600 on 25 September, when the 48th Field

Artillery Battalion began firing a thirty-minute artillery preparation.

Soon the heavy mortars joined in to hammer the cliffs that lined the

opposite side of the river. At 0630, under the cover of ground fog, the

2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, crossed the Han. Upon reaching the other

side, the soldiers scurried across the narrow riverbank and scaled the

thirty- to sixty-foot cliffs. The river crossing apparently surprised the

North Koreans, whose defenses were lightly manned. The Americans

met only moderate resistance as they reached and cleared the summit

of South Mountain by 1500.

Meanwhile, the 32d Infantry’s 1st Battalion crossed the Han at

0830 and moved east along the riverbank toward Hill 120. Its 3d

Battalion made its way to the other side of the river a little after noon,

passed through the 1st Battalion’s ranks, and took up positions on Hill

120 itself. The ROK 17th Regiment followed immediately behind the

3d Battalion and moved farther east to the 32d Infantry’s extreme

right flank, where, at 2150, it commenced an all-night attack against

Hill 348.

Occupying a tight perimeter on top of South Mountain, the 2d

Battalion’s soldiers waited quietly but tensely throughout the night for

the enemy’s counterattack. The early morning hours passed slowly,

without nearly a sound. Finally, at 0500 on 26 September, an NKPA

force of approximately one thousand men charged Company G on the

mountain’s higher western knob and Company F on the lower eastern

knob. Company G held its position, but F was overrun. After two more

hours of fighting, the Americans restored their positions and forced the

surviving North Koreans to retreat down the slopes.

The same morning the 1st Battalion, to the east, also found itself

heavily engaged while the 3d Battalion moved from Hill 120 to Hill

348. En route, the latter’s Company L, commanded by 1st Lt. Harry J.

McCaffrey, Jr., observed a large enemy column on the highway leav12
ing Seoul. Seizing the opportunity, McCaffrey ordered his men to

attack. Using surprise, the infantrymen destroyed or captured five

tanks, more than forty other vehicles, three artillery pieces, and seven

machine guns, as well as seized two ammunition dumps, clothing,

and other supplies. About 500 NKPA soldiers, possibly members of a

corps headquarters, were killed during the battle. American analysts

believed that those killed constituted the principal enemy command

defending Seoul.

During the 32d Infantry’s assault on South Mountain, the marines

ground down the hill defenses on Seoul’s west side and entered Seoul

proper on 25 September. By that time, the NKPA’s 18th Division commander had decided that the battle was lost and began withdrawing his

unit, which had been fighting in the Yongdungp’o area south of the

Han River. To cover the division’s northbound retreat, the North

Koreans struck with desperate counterattacks at every point of the X

Corps’ advance into the city. Day-long street fighting ensued on the

twenty-sixth. With snipers firing from houses and defenders manning

barricades, each city block became a small battlefield. By nightfall X

Corps soldiers controlled approximately half of Seoul.

13

Captured enemy weapons (National Archives)
Earlier that day General MacArthur had announced in a dispatch

that Seoul had been completely enveloped and held by the ROK 17th

Regiment and elements of the 7th Infantry and 1st Marine Divisions.

Day-long street fighting, however, continued throughout the twenty-seventh. The defenders in the center of Seoul built chest-high barricades

across the streets, from which they fired antitank guns and machine

guns. Rocket attacks and strafing runs by U.S. Navy and Marine aircraft,

mortar attacks, and fire from tanks were used to reduce the barricades.

In some cases, a single barricade held up a battalion’s advance by as

much as an hour. During the night the last defenders, except for snipers

and stragglers, finally withdrew from the city and all enemy resistance

ended the next day. In a brief ceremony on 29 September General

MacArthur returned control of Seoul to President Rhee.

The victory achieved in the fight for Inch’on and Seoul was not

without cost. The X Corps’ casualties totaled some 3,500. The 7th

Division had 106 killed, 409 wounded, and 57 missing in action (these

totals included 166 KATUSAs), and its 32d Infantry alone lost 66

killed, 272 wounded, and 47 missing. The 1st Marine Division suffered the heaviest losses—364 killed, 53 of whom died of wounds;

1,961 wounded; and 5 missing in action. Enemy casualties were estimated at 14,000 killed, and prisoners of war were confirmed at 7,000.

14

Tanks passing through a demolished barricade on the outskirts of Seoul 

(National Archives)
Breakout and Pursuit

In the south the Eighth Army’s battle line, at its closest point, was

one hundred eighty miles by air from the X Corps’ landing area in the

enemy’s rear. The winding mountain roads that lay ahead of the army

made that distance even farther. After a slow start, however, the

mileage was quickly covered as the American forces linked up south

of Seoul.

As the X Corps secured Inch’on on 16 September, General

Walker’s Eighth Army pushed out of the Pusan Perimeter. The Eighth

Army began its breakout on schedule at 0900. The offensive, however,

was not simultaneous; many Eighth Army units were still repelling

enemy attacks. The momentum of the breakout built slowly in the face

of strong enemy resistance, centered on several hills that controlled the

Eighth Army’s main avenues of advance northward.

South of Waegwan, Hill 268 represented a critical terrain feature,

for the main highway ran along the east bank of the Naktong River.

The NKPA’s tank-supported 3d Division defended this southern

approach to the Waegwan-Taegu road. The hill was important tactically because of a gap in the enemy line to the south. The British 27th

Brigade held vital blocking positions at the lower side of this gap, just

above strong forces of the NKPA’s 10th Division.

Moving along the east bank of the Naktong on 19 September, the

5th Regimental Combat Team, which was attached to the 1st Cavalry

Division, began a full regimental assault against Hill 268. After a hard

day of fighting the 5th took the hill, except for its northeast slope. By

nightfall the 5th Infantry’s 3d Battalion was on the hill; its 1st

Battalion was pushing northwest toward another enemy position; and

its 2d Battalion had captured Hill 121, one and a half miles north of

Hill 268 and one mile short of Waegwan.

The battle for Hill 268 continued the next morning as more than

two hundred NKPA soldiers in log-covered bunkers fought the 3d

Battalion. Three flights of U.S. Air Force F–51 Mustang fighters

dropped napalm, fired rockets, and strafed the enemy bunkers.

Following the air strikes, the 5th Regimental Combat Team again

struck at the bunkers, where, in many cases, the North Koreans fought

to the last man. By noon the 5th controlled both the summit and slopes

of the position.

With the loss of these key positions, the 3d Division’s defenses

around Waegwan broke apart and its troops began a panic-stricken

retreat across the Naktong. Aerial observers estimated that fifteen hundred North Koreans crossed to the west side of the Naktong just above

15
Waegwan. Further reports indicated that the roads north of the town

were jammed with enemy soldiers in groups of ten to three hundred.

On 19 September the 5th Infantry’s 2d Battalion traversed the

Naktong River, took Waegwan, moved through the town to the southwest slope of Hill 303, and secured the hill on the twentieth. By the

afternoon of the following day the entire 5th Regimental Combat

16

ROK 3

XX

ROK CAP

ROK II

XXX

ROK I

 ROK 8

XX

ROK 6

 ROK II

 ROK I 

XXX

ROK 1

1 CAV

XX

XX

I

XXX

XX

2

2

XX

25

24 1 CAV

XX

NK 6

XX

NK 7

XX

NK 10

XX

NK 30

XX

NK 13

XX

NK 1

XX

NK 8

XX

NK 15

27th Br Bde

24th Div

100

100

500

100

100

500

1000

100

500

100

500

500

500

500

100

100

100

 







174 178268

303 300

Sangju

Naktong-ni

Naktong R

Kumch'on

Tabu-dong

Waegwan

TAEGU

Chinju

Chungam-ni

Masan

PUSAN

Miryang

Yongsan

Kyongsan

Kyongju

An'gang-ni

P'ohang-dong Kigye

Andong

Naktong R

Nam

R

To Taejon

The

 Notch Battle Mt

P'il-bong

Sobuk-san KOREA

STRAIT

BREAKING THE CORDON

16–22 September 1950

Forward Positions, Evening, 15 Sep

Forward Positions, Evening, 22 Sep

0 5 10 15 20

Miles

Elevations in meters
Team was on the other side of the Naktong, and in a span of five

days the 5th had crushed the 3d Division’s right flank and part of its

center. The enemy’s advance positions on the road to Taegu, where

the 1st Cavalry Division’s 5th Cavalry found battle, were thus rendered indefensible.

Meanwhile, along its defensive line on the western edges of the

Pusan Perimeter, the 25th Division was still fighting the NKPA’s 6th

and 7th Divisions on 16 September. The enemy appeared stronger than

ever on the heights of Battle Mountain, P’il-bong, and Sobuk-san. The

24th Infantry, positioned in the center, faced the brunt of the enemy’s

daily attacks. The 27th Infantry was on its left and the 35th Infantry on

its right, astride the east-west Masan-Chinju road. To counter the

NKPA’s offensive, the 25th Division’s commander, Maj. Gen. William

B. Kean, assembled a composite battalion-size task force to attack the

enemy-held heights of Battle Mountain and P’il-bong. Heavily supported by fire from the 8th and 90th Field Artillery Battalions and by

numerous air strikes, the task force attacked these heights repeatedly

on the seventeenth and eighteenth. However, automatic weapons fire

from well-prepared enemy positions drove back the Americans, who

sustained heavy casualties. Company A, 27th Infantry, alone suffered

57 casualties in a period of twenty-four hours.

On the eighteenth, after failing to drive the enemy from the peaks,

Kean dissolved the task force. The next morning he found that the

North Koreans had abandoned their positions on the crest of Battle

Mountain during the night, and the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, moved

up and secured the area.

On 19 September the 35th Infantry on the right, or northern, flank

met light resistance until it reached the high ground in front of

Chungam-ni. There, in cleverly hidden spider holes, enemy troops

fired on 1st Battalion soldiers from the rear. The next day the 1st

Battalion captured Chungam-ni, and the 2d Battalion took the long

ridgeline running northwest from Chungam-ni to the Nam River. To

the south, heavy fighting on the 25th Division’s left flank kept the 27th

Infantry busy as it tried to move forward. On the twenty-first, three

miles southwest of Chungam-ni, the 35th Infantry captured the wellknown Notch and then moved rapidly west eight air miles without

resistance to the high ground at the Chinju pass, only to be blocked by

6th Division elements protecting the unit’s withdrawal across the Nam

River and through Chinju some six miles to the west. At the same

time, the 24th Infantry in the center and the 27th Infantry on the left

advanced, slowed only by the rugged terrain. By the end of September

the 25th Division had seized the west coast port of Kunsan.

17
On the right flank of the Pusan Perimeter, in the mountainous

region of the ROK II Corps, ROK 6th Division soldiers advanced

slowly against the NKPA’s 8th Division. After four days of battle the

8th Division was destroyed as a combat force, suffering about four

thousand casualties. Enemy survivors fled in disarray north toward

Yech’on. By 21 September the ROK 6th Division, meeting little opposition, was advancing northward toward Uihung.

Farther to the east the ROK 8th Division found little opposition

from the NKPA’s 15th Division, which had been practically annihilated. On 16 September, in the ROK I Corps sector, elements of the ROK

Capital Division fought their way through the streets of An’gang-ni.

The next day, advancing from the west in the ROK II Corps sector, a

battalion of the ROK 7th Division linked up with elements of the ROK

Capital Division, closing a two-week-old gap between the ROK I and

II Corps.

The NKPA’s 12th Division waged a series of stubborn delaying

actions against the ROK Capital Division in the vicinity of Kigye as

the North Koreans retreated northward into the mountains. Kigye fell

on 22 September. In the harbor village of P’ohang-dong fierce battles

were fought between the ROK 3d Division and the NKPA’s 5th

Division. The ROK units finally captured the village during the morn18

A river crossing via an underwater bridge (left) and a makeshift ferry

(National Archives)
ing of the twentieth. They continued to attack aggressively, forcing a

disorderly withdrawal by the enemy toward Yongdok.

As MacArthur had anticipated, the North Korean Army was cut

off and in retreat. By 23 September the enemy cordon around the

Pusan Perimeter had been destroyed. The North Korean soldiers in

the south had disintegrated as an effective military force; while some

escaped to the north and others became guerrillas in the south, most

were casualties. The breakout from the Pusan Perimeter cost the

Eighth Army 790 killed and 3,544 wounded. But X Corps and

Eighth Army soldiers had captured 23,000 enemy personnel and

killed thousands more.

Crossing the 38th Parallel

As soon as UN leaders digested the allied success, they began to

debate the advisability of crossing the 38th Parallel into North Korea.

The National Security Council advised President Harry S. Truman

against moving north. The council’s position was that the expulsion of

the North Koreans from South Korea was a sufficient victory. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed, however, claiming military doctrine

demanded that the North Korean Army be destroyed completely to

prevent renewed aggression. President Truman, on 11 September,

19

Infantrymen helping a wounded comrade (National Archives)
ROK II

XXX

I

ROK 1

1 CAV

XX

1 CAV

XX

24

18 Oct

16 Oct

15 Oct

18 Oct

17 Oct

19 Oct

19 Oct

19 Oct

18 Oct

17 Oct

16 O

17 Oct

ct

16 Oct

17 Oct

19 Oct

ROK 1st Div,

Night, 14 Oct

15 Oct

1st Cav Div (+)

XX

XX

X X

ROK 7

X X

ROK 1

X

27 Br

III

5

III

5 (+)

III

7

P'YONGYANG

Kojo-dong

Sunan

Hwangju

Hukkyo-ri

Kyomip'o

Anak

Chaeryong

Sinwon-ni

Haeju

Yonan

Paekch'on Kaesong

Kumch'on

Hanp'o-ri

Namch'onjom

Nuch'on-ni

Ch'ongsoktu-ri

Sariwon

Hungsu-ri

Sohung

Sinmak

Miu-dong

Suan

To Sukch'on To Sunch'on

To Sibyon-ni To Seoul

Mujin R

Taedong

R

Yesong

R

YELLOW

SEA

THE CAPTURE OF P'YONGYANG

15–19 October 1950

Areas Occupied by UN Forces, Night, 14 Oct

Axis of UN Advance, Dates Indicated

High Ground Above 500 Meters

0 5 10 15 20

Miles

XX
adopted the arguments of his military advisers while heeding the

National Security Council’s call to avoid provoking Communist China

and the Soviet Union.

Thus, on 27 September, the Joint Chiefs directed General

MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel for the purpose of destroying

North Korea’s military forces, providing that no Chinese or Soviet

forces had entered, or threatened to enter, North Korea. They further

decreed that UN troops were not to go into China or the Soviet Union

and that only ROK soldiers should operate along these borders.

Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, on the twenty-ninth, sent

MacArthur a personal message that confirmed his approval for tactical

and strategic operations north of the parallel. This message,

MacArthur was told, had been personally endorsed by Truman.

MacArthur received a secondary mission to unite all of Korea, if possible, under President Rhee.

The responses to this decision were immediate and strong. On 1

October Premier Chou En-lai warned that China would not tolerate or

stand aside if UN forces invaded North Korea. This was a clear threat

that China would intervene if that should happen. On the second the

Soviet delegate to the United Nations proposed that a cease-fire in

Korea be called and that all foreign troops be withdrawn. The following day the Indian delegate expressed his government’s position that

UN forces should not cross the 38th Parallel.

General MacArthur, on 1 October, sent a message to the commander in chief of the North Korean forces, demanding that the North

Koreans lay down their arms and cease hostilities under UN military

supervision so as to avoid further loss of life and destruction of property. The message also called for the release of UN prisoners of war

and civilian internees. But North Korea ignored the proposals.

MacArthur issued a last chance ultimatum for North Korea to surrender on the ninth. While North Korea did not respond officially,

Premier Kim Il Sung rejected it the following day in a radio broadcast.

Meanwhile, on the seventh, the UN General Assembly had passed a

resolution calling for the unification of Korea and authorizing

MacArthur to send troops across the 38th Parallel.

With the IX Corps positioned to protect the lines of communications south of the Han River, which flows east to west south of Seoul,

General Walker ordered the I Corps, with the 1st Cavalry, 24th

Infantry, and ROK 1st Divisions, to assemble in the vicinity of

Kaesong, northwest of Seoul just below the 38th Parallel. Upon

receipt of orders, the ROK II Corps, composed of the 6th, 7th, and 8th

Divisions, moved to the area between Ch’unch’on and Uijongbu in

21
central Korea and the ROK I Corps, which consisted of the Capital

and 3d Divisions, to the area between Yongp’o and Chumunjin-up on

Korea’s east coast. While these forces prepared to attack northward, X

Corps elements boarded ships at Inch’on and Pusan for an amphibious

landing at Wonsan, a major port on North Korea’s east coast one hundred ten miles above the 38th Parallel.

On 29 September a message, dropped from a light plane by an

officer with the Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea,

was delivered to the U.S. adviser to the ROK 3d Division, Lt. Col.

Rollins S. Emmerich. According to the message, the ROK 3d Division

was to cross the 38th Parallel and proceed to Wonsan as soon as possible. The next day the division crossed the parallel and advanced up the

east coast. The ROK Capital Division followed. After establishing

command posts at Yangyang, eight miles north of the parallel, on 2

October, both divisions proceeded to Wonsan and captured the town

on the tenth, well before the X Corps had landed.

At Kaesong the 1st Cavalry Division was ready to cross the line.

The 8th Cavalry, in the center, was to attack frontally from Kaesong

to Kumch’on, fifteen miles north and along the main highway axis;

and the 5th Cavalry, on the right, was to move east and then swing

west in a circular flanking movement, designed to trap enemy forces

south of Kumch’on. In the meantime, the 7th Cavalry, on the division’s left, traversed the Yesong River; advanced north on the road

from Paekch’on to the small town of Hanp’o-ri, six miles north of

Kumch’on, where the main P’yongyang road crossed the Yesong

River; and established a blocking position. Defending the Kumch’on

area north of Kaesong were the NKPA’s 19th and 27th Divisions. Its

43d Division, to the west, defended the Yesong River crossing and the

coastal area beyond the river.

At 0900 on 9 October the 1st Cavalry Division struck out across

the 38th Parallel. Initially, the advance was slow. Along the main highway the 8th Cavalry stopped repeatedly and waited for engineer troops

to clear mines from the road. Halfway to Kumch’on on the twelfth the

regiment was halted by an enemy strongpoint, defended by tanks, selfpropelled guns, and antiaircraft weapons. In spite of a sixteen-plane air

strike and a 155-mm. howitzer barrage, the strongpoint held.

The 5th Cavalry, which also ran into trouble at the start, failed to

cross the parallel until 10 October. The next day its 1st Battalion

encountered an enemy force holding a long ridge with several knobs—

Hills 179, 175, and 174—that dominated a pass fifteen miles northeast

of Kaesong. The infantrymen drove the defenders from the ridge during the afternoon of the twelfth, but the fight was fierce. In the battle

22
for Hill 174 1st Lt. Samuel S. Coursen, a platoon leader in Company

C, observing that one of his men had entered a well-hidden gun

emplacement, thought to be unoccupied, and had taken a bullet, ran to

his aid. Without regard for his personal safety, Lieutenant Coursen

engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand combat in an effort to protect the

wounded soldier until he himself was killed. When his body was

recovered after the battle, 7 enemy dead were found in the emplacement. Coursen’s actions saved the wounded soldier’s life and eliminated the main position of the enemy roadblock. For his actions,

Lieutenant Coursen received the Medal of Honor posthumously.

After much fighting, the 1st Cavalry Division captured Kumch’on

on 14 October. With I Corps soldiers moving through the enemy’s principal fortified positions between the 38th Parallel and P’yongyang, the

North Korean capital city, enemy front lines as such ceased to exist. On

the nineteenth Company F, 5th Cavalry, entered P’yongyang, followed

shortly thereafter by ROK 1st Division elements from the northeast.

The next morning, the fifteenth, the ROK 1st Division reached the heart

of the city and took the strongly fortified administrative center without

difficulty. The entire city was secured by 1000 that day.

On Korea’s east coast, the X Corps’ 1st Marine Division went

ashore at Wonsan on 26 October and its 7th Division landed unop23

1st Cavalry Division troops pursuing the enemy north of Kaesong

(National Archives)
posed at Iwon, eighty miles north of Wonsan, on the twenty-ninth.

Once in place, X Corps forces began to secure key industrial and communications areas, port installations, and the power and irrigation

plants in northeastern Korea.

On 24 October General Walker took personal command of his

advance Eighth Army headquarters in P’yongyang, located in the

same building that had been the headquarters of Premier Kim Il Sung.

In retrospect, the Eighth Army had accomplished much in a short period of time. Less than six weeks had passed since the army had fought

desperately to hold its lines three hundred twenty miles to the south

along the Pusan Perimeter. Likewise, the Inch’on landing was less than

six weeks in the past and it was four weeks since the recapture of

Seoul. Having broken out of its embattled perimeter and pushing

northward, the Eighth Army was now one hundred sixty miles north of

Seoul and one hundred thirty miles inside North Korean territory.

After many hard-fought battles between the perimeter and

P’yongyang, it had succeeded in overrunning the enemy’s capital city

and was about to breach the last important river barrier south of North

Korea’s northern border.

24

Soldiers of the 5th Cavalry advancing on P’yongyang

(National Archives)
The Yalu River

With the North Korean capital city secured, the Eighth Army continued its push northward toward the Yalu River, Korea’s traditional

border with China. The Ch’ongch’on River and its tributaries, the

Kuryong and Taeryong Rivers, all flowing from the north, formed the

last major water barrier in the western part of North Korea short of the

border. At this point in time, the Ch’ongch’on River was the principal

terrain feature in the Eighth Army’s field of operations, and it largely

dictated the army’s deployment and tactical maneuvers.

The Eighth Army’s operations above the Ch’ongch’on River were

essentially a continuation of the pursuit that started with the breakout

from the Pusan Perimeter. Moving northward, the I Corps, with the

24th Division and the attached British 27th Brigade positioned on the

left, proceeded to the Ch’ongch’on; the ROK II Corps, with the ROK

1st Division, advanced on the right. To the east the ROK 8th Division

reached Tokch’on, forty miles north of P’yongyang, during the night

of 23 October and then turned north and arrived at Kujang-dong on

the Ch’ongch’on, about ten miles from Tokch’on, two days later. The

ROK 6th Division, meeting little opposition and traveling fast up the

Ch’ongch’on River valley, reached Huich’on, nearly sixteen miles

north of Kujang-dong, on the night of the twenty-third. Passing

through Onjong, twenty-six miles from Huich’on, during the night of

the twenty-fourth, the 7th Regiment, ROK 6th Division, turned north

and advanced toward Ch’osan, fifty miles away on the Yalu River. A

reinforced reconnaissance platoon from the 7th Regiment entered

Ch’osan the next morning and found the North Koreans retreating

across the Yalu into China over a narrow floating footbridge.

In the meantime, on 22 October the 24th Division, having been

relieved by the 2d Division, moved northward from P’yongyang, its

mission to push the North Koreans against the 187th Airborne

Infantry’s blocking position, thus cutting off the enemy’s escape route

and, it was hoped, rescuing prisoners of war. Elements of the 24th

Division continued to press northward, and the 1st Battalion, 21st

Infantry, reached Chonggo-dong, just southwest of Sinuiju on the Yalu

River, the northernmost penetration of the Eighth Army.

China Intervenes

Late in October, in the mountainous region above P’yongyang,

the Eighth Army was poised to cross the Ch’ongch’on River in full

force. On North Korea’s east coast, across the formidable barrier of

the Taebaek Mountains, X Corps forces were landing and beginning

25
their drive to the Yalu. Morale among the American and allied soldiers was high, for many thought that this river crossing would be the

last brief phase of the war. But then the unexpected happened: China

entered the war.

On 25 October, in the ROK II Corps sector, the 3d Battalion, 2d

Regiment, ROK 6th Division, started northwest from Onjong, about

fifty miles from the Yalu, toward Pukchin. Eight miles west of Onjong

the 3d Battalion encountered what was thought to be a small force of

North Koreans but was, in reality, a Communist Chinese forces (CCF)

trap, in which CCF troops destroyed the 3d Battalion as an organized

force. On the evening of the next day the division ordered its 7th

Regiment to withdraw south. Before it could do so, however, it needed

supplies, which were airdropped on the twenty-eighth. As the 7th

Regiment headed south the following morning, it ran into an enemy

roadblock about twenty miles south of Kojang.

More attacks followed on 31 October as CCF troops broke through

the sector of the 16th Regiment, ROK 8th Division, near its boundary

with the ROK 1st Division. By the next day the Chinese had pushed the

ROK 7th Division back to the vicinity of Won-ni. The series of attacks

forced the ROK II Corps to pivot facing east, causing a gap between its

left flank and the U.S. I Corps. Walker quickly assembled the 2d

Division in the Sunch’on area to meet any possible emergency in this

gap. Within a few days of the first battles the CCF troops had driven

back and severely crippled the ROK II Corps and had moved south of

the Ch’ongch’on River to the U.S. I Corps’ open right flank.

In the far west, the story was the same. As part of the U.S. I

Corps’ general advance on 25 October, the ROK 1st Division was

spread out on the road that ran from the Ch’ongch’on River to

Unsan. The division’s 15th Regiment passed through Yongbyon and

continued toward Unsan without opposition. In the lead were elements of Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion, which also

passed through Unsan without incident. Just before 1100, as the

tanks approached a bridge one and a half miles northeast of the

town, enemy mortar fire blew the bridge. Engaging the enemy force,

the South Korean soldiers reported a half-hour later that three hundred Chinese troops were in the hills just north of Unsan. Second in

the division column, the ROK 12th Regiment turned west when it

arrived at Unsan. It, too, ran into the Chinese just beyond the town.

The CCF’s attacks against the ROK 1st Division continued on the

twenty-sixth but eased up the following day.

As reports from the front reached the Eighth Army headquarters

that prisoners captured by ROK soldiers were Chinese, General

26
Walker became concerned. On 28 October he relieved the 1st Cavalry

Division of its security mission in P’yongyang. The division’s new

orders were to pass through the ROK 1st Division’s lines at Unsan and

attack toward the Yalu River. Leading the way on the twenty-ninth, the

8th Cavalry departed P’yongyang and reached Yongsan-dong that

evening. The 5th Cavalry arrived the next morning, with the mission

to protect the 8th Cavalry’s rear. With the arrival of the 8th Cavalry at

Unsan on the thirty-first, the ROK 1st Division redeployed to positions

northeast, east, and southeast of Unsan; the 8th Cavalry took up positions north, west, and south of the town. Meanwhile, the ROK 15th

Regiment was desperately trying to hold its position east of the 8th

Cavalry, across the Samt’an River.

During the afternoon of 1 November the CCF’s attack north of

Unsan gained strength against the ROK 15th Regiment and gradually

extended to the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry. At nightfall the 1st Battalion controlled the northern approaches to the

Samt’an River, except for portions of the ROK 15th Regiment’s zone

on the east side. The battalion’s position on the left was weak; there

were not enough soldiers to extend the defensive line to the main ridge

leading into Unsan. This left a gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions.

East of the Samt’an the ROK 15th Regiment was under heavy attack,

and shortly after midnight it no longer existed as a combat force.

The ordeal of the 8th Cavalry now began. At 1930 on 1 November

the Chinese attacked the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, all along its line.

At 2100 CCF troops found the weak link in the ridgeline and began

moving through it and down the ridge behind the 2d Battalion, penetrating its right flank and encircling its left. Now both the 1st and 2d

Battalions were engaged by the enemy on several sides. Around midnight the 8th Cavalry received orders to withdraw southward to Ipsok.

As of 0130 on 2 November there were no reports of enemy activity

in the 3d Battalion’s sector south of Unsan. But as the 8th Cavalry withdrew, all three battalions became trapped by CCF roadblocks south of

Unsan during the early morning hours. Members of the 1st Battalion

who were able to escape reached the Ipsok area. A head count showed

that the battalion had lost about 15 officers and 250 enlisted men.

Members of the 2d Battalion, for the most part, scattered into the hills.

Many of them reached the ROK lines near Ipsok. Others met up with

the 3d Battalion, the hardest hit. Around 0300 the Chinese launched a

surprise attack on the battalion command post. Hand-to-hand fighting

ensued for about half an hour before the enemy was driven from the

area. The disorganized members of the 3d Battalion formed a core of

resistance around three tanks on the valley floor and held off the enemy

27
until daylight. By that time only 6 officers and 200 enlisted men were

still able to function. More than 170 were wounded, and there was no

account of the number dead or missing. Attempts by the 5th Cavalry to

relieve the beleaguered battalion were unsuccessful, and the 3d

Battalion, 8th Cavalry, soon ceased to exist as an organized force.

The enemy force that brought tragedy to the 8th Cavalry at Unsan

was the CCF’s 116th Division. Elements of the 116th’s 347th Regiment

28

I I

2 ROK 15

I I

2(-) 8

I I

3(+) 8

I I

3 ROK 15

I I

1 ROK 15

I I

1(+) 8

I I

Elements, CCF 115th and 116th Divs

Samt’an R

UNSAN

Yonghung-dong

Obong

Mt

“Bugle

 Hill”

Turtle Head Bend

Kuryong R

As of 2400, 1 Nov

1/5 Cav

To Ipsok To Myongdang-dong

Ford

Camel’s Head Bend Nammyon R

Maebong-dong

THE UNSAN ENGAGEMENT

8th Cavalry, Night, 1–2 November 1950

ELEVATIONS IN METERS

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 AND ABOVE

8th Cav and 15th ROK Positions, Evening, 1 Nov

CCF Blocking Position, 1 Nov

CCF Attack, Night, 1–2 Nov

Principal CCF Blocking Positions, Night, 1–2 Nov

1 0 1

1 0 1

KILOMETERS

MILES
were responsible for the roadblock south of Unsan. Also engaged in

the Unsan action was the CCF’s 115th Division. The arrival of the

Chinese was obviously now going to have a dramatic impact on the

course of the war.

Analysis

For the United Nations forces, victory was in the air by early

October 1950. The Inch’on landing and the breakout from the Pusan

Perimeter had destroyed the North Korean units operating south of the

38th Parallel. With the return of Seoul to the South Korean government, the Republic of Korea regained the status it had enjoyed before

the 25 June invasion. To stop at this juncture would have been consistent with America’s policy of containment. However, substantial reasons existed for carrying the war into North Korea. An estimated thirty thousand NKPA soldiers had escaped over the border, with an additional thirty thousand in northern training camps. Combined, these

numbers represented enough troops to fill six divisions, and South

Korea’s military forces were, if anything, even weaker than they had

been before the invasion. At best, a halt would have compelled the

United Nations Command to maintain a presence along the 38th

Parallel indefinitely or risk another invasion of South Korea.

By all appearances, a complete military victory was within easy

grasp. However, the decision to cross the 38th Parallel appears, in retrospect, to have been the turning point in the Korean War. Communist

China had warned that it might intervene if foreign forces crossed the

parallel. The warning had gone unheeded. In response, nearly one

hundred eighty thousand CCF soldiers secretly crossed the Yalu River

between 14 October and 1 November. General MacArthur, unaware of

the full extent of Communist China’s commitment, believed that the

attack on 25 October was a token gesture rather than a serious intercession. But, by early November, intelligence officers had amassed

undeniable evidence that the Chinese had indeed intervened in

strength. Eighth Army troops found themselves once more on the

defensive, being pushed southward. The course of the war had

changed again.

29

31

Further Readings

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

(June–November 1950). United States Army in the Korean War.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1961.

Sandler, Stanley, ed. The Korean War: An Encyclopedia. Military

History of the United States, vol. 4. New York: Garland

Publishing, 1995.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. Korean War Almanac. New York: Facts on

File, 1990.

United States Military Academy, Department of Military Art and

Engineering. Operations in Korea. West Point, N.Y.: United States

Military Academy, 1956.

———. The West Point Atlas of American Wars. Edited by Vincent J.

Esposito. Vol. 2. 1900–1953. New York: Frederick A. Praeger,

1959.
CMH Pub 19–7

Cover: Men of the 32d Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, marching 

through a village near Inch’on (National Archives)

PIN : 077984–000