J-S50031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.B., JR., 

A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER

No. 174 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree November 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Orphans' Court at No(s): Adoptee 27 of 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER

No. 175 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree November 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 28 of 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER

No. 176 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree November 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
J-S50031-16

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Orphans' Court at No(s): Adoptee 29 of 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF D.S., MOTHER

No. 177 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree November 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Orphans' Court at No(s): Adoptee 30 of 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER

No. 178 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree November 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 31 of 2015

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JULY 08, 2016

Appellant, D.S. (Mother), appeals from the November 30, 2015 

decrees involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor children, 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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A.B.1, a female born in May 2002; J.B., a female born in July 2003; R.B., 

Jr., a male born in July 2006; A.B.2, a female born in September 2008; and 

G.B., a female born in December 2009 (collectively, the Children).1 After 

careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this 

matter as follows. The Children were removed from Mother’s care in July 

2014, due to concerns with respect to Mother’s housing. N.T., 9/10/15, at 

35-42. Mother’s home was cluttered, dirty, and potentially dangerous due to 

exposed wiring. Id. at 35-40. Mother also continued to associate with 

inappropriate people. Id. at 40-41. For example, Mother was allowing a 

known sex offender to visit the home. Id. at 41. The Children were 

adjudicated dependent on July 17, 2014. CYS’s Exhibit 1 at 2.

On July 28, 2015, Children and Youth Services (CYS) filed petitions to 

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children. A 

termination hearing was held on September 10, 2015, and November 30, 

2015, during which the orphans’ court heard the testimony of CYS 

caseworker, Walter Yadlosky; CYS caseworker, Jennifer Edwards; A.B.1’s 

emotional support teacher, Nicole Hicks; CYS caseworker, Cathryn Baker; 

and psychologist, Robert J. Meacham, M.S. On November 30, 2015, at the 

conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court entered decrees involuntarily 

____________________________________________

1 The Children’s father, R.B., Sr., relinquished his parental rights voluntarily. 
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terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. Mother timely filed 

notices of appeal on December 30, 2015.2 On February 22, 2016, this Court 

consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 513.

On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review. 

Did Appellee [CYS] meet its burden in proving by 

clear and convincing evidence that the termination of 

Appellant Mother’s parental rights would not cause 

irreparable harm to the [C]hildren pursuant to 

subsections (a)(5), (a)(8) and (b) of 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§[]2511?” 

Mother’s Brief at 2. 

We consider Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the 

factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error 

of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. 

____________________________________________

2 We note that Mother violated Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by failing to file 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal at the same time as 

her notices of appeal. Mother later filed concise statements on January 8, 

2016. Nevertheless, as we discern no prejudice in this case, we decline to 

deem Mother’s issues on appeal waived. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 

748 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that a mother’s failure to comply strictly with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) did not warrant waiver of her claims, as there was 

no prejudice to any party).
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We have previously emphasized our deference to 

trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In the instant matter, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide 

as follows. 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

...

(5) The child has been removed from the care 

of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency for a period of at 

least six months, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue 

to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy 

those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

...

(8) The child has been removed from the care 

of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more 

have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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...

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

Here, Mother argues that CYS failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that terminating her parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the Children. While Mother references Sections 2511(a)(5), 

(a)(8), and (b) in her statement of questions involved, Mother makes no 

further mention of Section 2511(a) in the summary of argument and 

argument sections of her brief. Instead, Mother focuses her argument solely 

on Section 2511(b). Thus, we conclude that Mother has waived any claim 

with respect to Section 2511(a), and we proceed to analyze the termination 

of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) only.3 See In re 

____________________________________________

3 We observe that Sections 2511(a)(5), (a)(8), and (b), each require a court 

considering a termination petition to assess the needs and welfare of the 

relevant child or children. However, the needs and welfare analysis required 

by Sections 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8) is distinct from the needs and welfare 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 

(Pa. 2011), quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(stating, “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim 

with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived[]”). 

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b)

does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the 

term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case 

law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered as part of our analysis. While a 

parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors 

to be considered by the court when determining 

what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial 

court can equally emphasize the safety needs 

of the child, and should also consider the 

intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, 

and stability the child might have with the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

analysis required by Section 2511(b), and must be addressed separately. 

See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (stating, 

“while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate 

the ‘needs and welfare of the child,’ ... they are distinct in that we must 

address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b)”); In re Matsock,

611 A.2d 737, 748 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating, “[t]hus, in termination 

proceedings based on paragraph (a)(5), such as the one here, the needs and 

welfare of the child must be considered twice; once under subsection (a), 

and if all five requirements of subsection (a) are met, then again under 

subsection (b)”).
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foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and 

whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the 

child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

Instantly, the orphans’ court found that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would be in the best interests of the Children.4 N.T., 11/30/15, at 90. 

The orphans’ court acknowledged that Mother and the Children are bonded. 

Id. However, the orphans’ court reasoned that Mother’s bond with the 

Children is “[n]ot a parental bond, but a bond of familiarity.” Id.

Mother argues that she has maintained a strong bond with the 

Children, that the Children know her as their mother, and they want to 

return to her care. Mother’s Brief at 8. Mother contends that severing her 

bond with the Children will necessarily sever the bond that the Children 

share with each other, as the Children do not reside together in the same 

____________________________________________

4 Mother’s parental rights were terminated by the Honorable Anthony Rosini. 

According to an opinion filed on March 8, 2016, by the Honorable Hugh A. 

Jones, Judge Rosini is no longing serving as a judge on the Court of 

Common Pleas, as he was appointed only to serve out the unexpired term of 

former Northumberland County President Judge, the Honorable Robert B. 

Sacavage. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/8/16, at 1. In the opinion, Judge 

Jones directs our attention to Judge Rosini’s remarks at the conclusion of the 

termination hearing in support of the termination decrees. Id. at 5-6.
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foster home, and that the loss of these bonds will have a negative impact on 

the Children’s emotional well-being. Id. at 10. Mother also stresses that 

the Children do not reside in pre-adoptive foster homes, and that 

terminating her parental rights will not necessarily provide the Children with 

permanent caregivers. Id. at 10-11. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination 

hearing, psychologist, Robert J. Meacham, M.S., testified that he conducted 

a permanency evaluation of Mother and the Children. N.T., 11/30/15, at 7. 

During his evaluation, Mr. Meacham interviewed Mother and each of the 

Children separately. Id. at 10-11. Mr. Meacham also observed two visits 

between Mother and the Children. Id. 11, 41. As a result of this evaluation, 

Mr. Meacham prepared a report, entitled “Psychological Evaluation for 

Permanency,” which was admitted into evidence as CYS’s Exhibit 7.

Concerning the existence of a parent-child bond, Mr. Meacham 

acknowledged in his report that all of the Children, with the exception of 

G.B., stated during their interviews that they would like to be returned to 

Mother’s care. CYS’s Exhibit 7 at 7. However, Mr. Meacham testified that 

the Children’s preferences were not well-reasoned, as the Children wanted to 

return to Mother’s care for reasons that were irrelevant to any emotional 

connection to Mother. Id. at 10. R.B., Jr., stated that he would like to 

return to Mother’s care because “I will share a room with my brother,” 
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meaning Mother’s older son, D.S.5 Id. at 7. A.B.2 stated that she would 

like to return to Mother’s care because she will be able to “play with her 

toys, set up her doll house and sleep in her own bedroom.” Id.

With respect to the two oldest Children, A.B.1 and J.B., Mr. Meacham 

testified at length during the termination hearing concerning their preference 

to return to Mother’s care. Mr. Meacham noted that both girls stated during 

their interviews that they would like to return to Mother’s care so that they 

could assist Mother in caring for the other Children. N.T., 11/30/15, at 18-

19, 26-27. Mr. Meacham explained that Mother rarely engaged the Children 

during the visits he observed. Id. at 18. Instead, A.B.1 and J.B. took it 

upon themselves to supervise their younger siblings. Id. Mr. Meacham 

believed that A.B.1 and J.B. have been “parentified,” meaning that they 

have adapted to Mother’s neglectful parenting style by taking on parenting 

responsibilities themselves. Id. at 33-35; CYS’s Exhibit 7 at 6-7, 9.

Ultimately, Mr. Meacham provided the following description of the 

bond between Mother and the Children.

There is clearly, ... a bond of familiarity. They 

know that that’s mom. They enjoy playing with her. 

They’re also aware that they have spent a significant 

portion of their individual lives not living with her. 

As I mentioned, the older two children -- the older 

____________________________________________

5 At the time Mr. Meacham interviewed R.B., Jr., Mother had already 

relinquished her parental rights to D.S. Agency’s Exhibit 7 at 1, 7. D.S. was 

removed from Mother’s care in February 2014, due to allegations that he 

had sexually abused his siblings. N.T., 9/10/15, at 30.
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two girls appear to have a desire, and part of their 

attachment to their mom is their desire to help out in 

the parenting role with the younger children.

I did not see it as a bond that’s dependent 

upon any of the children having significant 

experience with their mother providing them with 

safety, security, acceptable living conditions, stable 

living conditions. They look to their foster parents, 

really, more for their everyday needs and their longterm stability and safety than they do their mother.

...

I think it’s appropriate for the status quo. It’s 

appropriate for the history. I think that they --

that’s their mother. They know that that’s their 

mother, but they don’t talk about her personally in 

longing terms. They don’t talk about having a 

memory of what they’ve done with her. They talked 

about either wanting to do something for her or 

living in their room that they know is at mother’s 

home, or playing with their possessions. Again, very 

much a bond of familiarity as opposed to safety, 

security, consistency. 

N.T., 11/30/15, at 22-23. Mr. Meacham concluded, in his opinion, the “bond 

of familiarity” between Mother and the Children “should not be the primary 

consideration when it comes to determining future permanency of the 

[C]hildren.” Id. at 27-28. 

Mr. Meacham further opined that severing the Children’s bond with 

Mother would not cause them any emotional damage. Id. at 29-30. Mr. 

Meacham explained that he did not believe that the Children were being 

emotionally damaged by not currently being in Mother’s care. Id. at 28-29. 

To the contrary, Mr. Meacham opined that Mother likely caused the 
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Children’s behavioral and emotional problems. Id. at 29. Mr. Meacham 

explained that the Children have been removed from Mother’s care on 

multiple occasions, and that the Children have experienced considerable 

instability. Id. at 9, 13. Mr. Meacham stressed the importance of providing 

permanency for the Children, as continued instability “may cause behavioral 

and emotional reactions that would actually reach a diagnostic level. 

Meaning that their behaviors or their responses to caregivers and others 

would be so significantly impaired that their emotional well-being is 

jeopardized.” Id. at 13-14. 

Thus, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights will best serve the needs and welfare of 

the Children. The record confirms that the Children do not share a parentchild bond with Mother, and that the Children will not suffer irreparable harm 

if the “bond of familiarity” that they share with Mother is severed. Further, 

the Children are in desperate need of permanency. Preserving Mother’s 

parental rights will merely prolong the instability that the Children have 

experienced throughout their lives. 

While the record indicates that the Children do not presently reside in 

pre-adoptive foster homes, our Supreme Court has instructed that the lack 

of a pre-adoptive resource does not necessarily preclude the termination of 

parental rights. See T.S.M., supra at 269 (explaining that, while parental 

rights generally should not be terminated in the absence of a pre-adoptive 
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resource, “termination may be necessary for the child’s needs and welfare in 

cases where the child’s parental bond is impeding the search and placement 

with a permanent adoptive home”). Further, while it is true that terminating 

Mother’s parental rights may impair the Children’s ability to maintain a 

relationship with each other, it was for the orphans’ court, not this Court, to 

weigh that consideration against the other evidence presented in this case. 

It was proper for the court to conclude, given the facts of the instant matter, 

that the Children’s need for permanency outweighs any emotional harm they 

may suffer by remaining in separate foster homes. See C.D.R., supra. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

See T.S.M., supra at 267. Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s 

November 30, 2015 decrees. 

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/8/2016