Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 3 / Wednesday, January 6, 2021 / Notices 533 

1Section 4(d) of E.O. 13920 defines ‘‘foreign 

adversary’’ to mean ‘‘any foreign government or 

foreign non-government person engaged in a longterm pattern of serious instances of conduct 

significantly adverse to the national security of the 

United States or its allies or the security and safety 

of United States persons.’’ 

2 85 FR 41023, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ 

pkg/FR-2020-07-08/pdf/2020-14668.pdf. 

3Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 

Responsibilities for the Joint Tactical Operations 

Interface Training Program (Aug. 13, 2012), https:// 

www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/ 

Instructions/6240_01.pdf. 

Members Appointed by the Speaker of 

the House of Representatives, Nancy 

Pelosi, With Terms Expiring September 

30, 2026: 

• Kathleen Sullivan Alioto, Ed.D., 

Strategic Advisor, Fundraiser, and 

Consultant, New York, New York, San 

Francisco, California, and Boston, 

Massachusetts. 

• Roslyn Clark Artis, Ed.D., President, 

Benedict College, Columbia, South 

Carolina. 

• Jennifer Blum, J.D., Principal, Blum 

Higher Education Advising, PLLC, 

Washington, DC. 

• Arthur E. Keiser, Ph.D., Chancellor, 

Keiser University, Fort Lauderdale, 

Florida. 

• Robert Mayes, Jr., CEO, Columbia 

Southern Education Group, Elberta, 

Alabama. 

• Robert Shireman, Director of Higher 

Education Excellence and Senior 

Fellow, The Century Foundation, 

Berkeley, California. 

Members Appointed by the President 

Pro Tempore of the Senate at the Time, 

Orrin Hatch, With Terms Expiring 

September 30, 2022: 

• Jill Derby, Ph.D., Senior Consultant, 

Association of Governing Boards of 

Universities and Colleges, Gardnerville, 

Nevada. 

• Paul J. LeBlanc, Ph.D., President, 

Southern New Hampshire University, 

Manchester, New Hampshire. 

• Anne D. Neal, J.D., President, 

National Association for Olmsted Parks, 

Washington, DC. 

• Richard F. O’Donnell, Founder and 

CEO, Skills Fund, Austin, Texas. 

• Claude O. Pressnell Jr., Ed.D., 

President, Tennessee Independent 

Colleges and Universities Association, 

Nashville, Tennessee. 

• Steven Van Ausdle, Ph.D., 

President Emeritus, Walla Walla 

Community College, Walla Walla, 

Washington. 

Electronic Access to this Document: 

The official version of this document is 

the document published in the Federal 

Register. Free internet access to the 

official edition of the Federal Register 

and the Code of Federal Regulations is 

available via the Federal Digital System 

at www.gpo.gov/fdsys. At this site you 

can view this document, as well as all 

other documents of this Department 

published in the Federal Register, in 

text or Adobe Portable Document 

Format (PDF). To use PDF, you must 

have Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is 

available free at the site. You may also 

access documents of the Department 

published in the Federal Register by 

using the article search feature at: 

www.federalregister.gov. Specifically, 

through the advanced search feature at 

this site, you can limit your search to 

documents published by the 

Department. 

Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1011c. 

Betsy DeVos, 

Secretary of Education. 

[FR Doc. 2020–29236 Filed 1–5–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Prohibition Order Securing Critical 

Defense Facilities 

AGENCY: Office of Electricity, 

Department of Energy. 

ACTION: Prohibition Order. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Energy (Department or DOE) gives 

notice of this Prohibition Order 

prohibiting the acquisition, importation, 

transfer, or installation of specified 

bulk-power system (BPS) electric 

equipment that directly serves Critical 

Defense Facilities (CDFs), pursuant to 

Executive Order 13920. 

DATES: The effective date of this 

Prohibition Order (Effective Date) is 

January 16, 2021. This Prohibition 

Order shall apply to any Prohibited 

Transaction initiated on or after the 

Effective Date. The Department shall 

notify each Responsible Utility of the 

applicability of this Prohibition Order 

no later than five (5) business days after 

the issuance of this Prohibition Order. 

Notice under this section shall be 

deemed made when personally 

delivered or when mailed, three (3) 

calendar days after deposit in the U.S. 

Mail, first class postage prepaid and 

addressed to the Responsible Utility at 

its applicable address. Actual notice 

shall be deemed adequate notice on the 

date actual notice occurred, regardless 

of the method of service. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Charles Kosak, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary, Energy Resilience Division, 

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of 

Electricity, Mailstop OE–20, Room 8G– 

042, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20585; (202) 586–2036; 

or bulkpowersystemEO@hq.doe.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Rationale for the Order: Executive 

Order No. 13920 of May 1, 2020, 

Securing the United States Bulk-Power 

System (85 FR 26595 (May 4, 2020)) 

(E.O. 13920) declares that threats by 

foreign adversaries 1 to the security of 

the BPS constitute a national 

emergency. A current list of such 

adversaries is provided in a Request for 

Information (RFI), issued by the 

Department of Energy (Department or 

DOE) on July 8, 2020,2 seeking public 

input to aid in its implementation of 

E.O. 13920. The Department has reason 

to believe, as detailed below, that the 

government of the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC or China), one of the listed 

adversaries, is equipped and actively 

planning to undermine the BPS. The 

Department has thus determined that 

certain BPS electric equipment or 

programmable components subject to 

China’s ownership, control, or 

influence, constitute undue risk to the 

security of the BPS and to U.S. national 

security. The purpose of this Order is to 

prohibit the acquisition, importation, 

transfer, or subsequent installation of 

such BPS electric equipment or 

programmable components in certain 

sections of the BPS. 

The PRC has a military rationale for 

its disruption capabilities. Broadly 

speaking, it is targeting operational 

systems that can be undermined as a 

way to degrade an opponent’s 

capabilities or to coerce an opponent’s 

decision-making or political will. China 

calls this ‘‘system destruction 

warfare’’—a way to cripple an opponent 

at the outset of conflict, by deploying 

sophisticated electronic warfare, 

counter-space, and cyber-capabilities to 

disrupt what are known as C4ISR 

networks (command, control, 

communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance), thereby disrupting U.S. 

military logistics required to defend the 

homeland, support Allies and partners, 

and protect key U.S. national security 

interests.3

Such attacks are most likely during 

crises abroad where Chinese military 

planning envisions early cyberattacks 

against the electric power grids around 

CDFs in the U.S. to prevent the 

deployment of military forces and to 

incur domestic turmoil. Underscoring 

this, the Department of Defense’s 2018 

National Defense Strategy assessment is 

that the homeland is no longer a 

sanctuary and that malicious cyber 

activity against personal, commercial, or 

government infrastructure is growing 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
534 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 3 / Wednesday, January 6, 2021 / Notices 

4U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Summary of the 2018 

National Defense Strategy of the United States of 

America, at 3, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/ 

Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-StrategySummary.pdf. 

5Coats, Daniel R., Statement for the Record, 

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 

Intelligence Community, at 5 (Jan. 29, 2019), 

https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019- 

ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. 

6U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity 

and Infrastructure Security Agency, ‘‘Potential for 

China Cyber Response to Heightened U.S.-China 

Tensions,’’ Alert AA20–275A (Oct. 20, 2020), 

available at https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/ 

aa20-275a. 

7U.S. Dep’t of Defense, National Security Agency, 

Cybersecurity Advisory: ‘‘Chinese State-Sponsored 

Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities’’ 

(Oct. 20, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/ 

Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_

EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF. 

significantly, ‘‘while increasing digital 

connectivity of all aspects of life, 

business, government, and military 

creates significant vulnerabilities.’’ 4

U.S. intelligence analyses validate 

this growing threat from China, 

concluding that ‘‘China presents a 

persistent cyber espionage threat and a 

growing attack threat to our core 

military and critical infrastructure 

systems,’’ and ‘‘has the ability to launch 

cyberattacks that cause localized, 

temporary disruptive effects on critical 

infrastructure—such as disruption of a 

natural gas pipeline for days to weeks— 

in the United States.’’ 5 Indeed, 

according to the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and 

Infrastructure Security Agency, opensource reporting indicates that 

‘‘offensive cyber operations attributed to 

the Chinese government targeted, and 

continue to target, a variety of industries 

and organizations in the United States,’’ 

including energy firms.6 The National 

Security Agency has determined that 

‘‘one of the greatest threats to U.S. 

National Security Systems, the U.S. 

Defense Industrial Base, and 

Department of Defense information 

networks is Chinese state-sponsored 

malicious cyber activity.’’ 7

Furthermore, China’s laws, 

specifically the National Intelligence 

Law and the National Cybersecurity 

Law, authorize government officials to 

exercise control over individuals and 

companies to conduct national 

intelligence work and access private 

company data, which provide 

opportunities for China to identify and 

exploit vulnerabilities in Chinesemanufactured or supplied equipment 

that are used in U.S. critical 

infrastructure that rely on these sources. 

For example, the National Intelligence 

Law compels individuals and 

organizations to comply with and assist 

PRC officials in carrying out intelligence 

and national security objectives. 

Specifically, Article 7 requires 

organizations and citizens to support, 

assist, and cooperate with the state 

intelligence work in accordance with 

the law and to keep confidential the 

national intelligence work known to 

them. Article 14 gives authority to state 

intelligence agencies to require citizens 

and organizations to support, assist, and 

cooperate in intelligence work. Article 

16 authorizes government officials to 

‘‘enter the relevant areas and places that 

restrict access,’’ where they can examine 

and retrieve files, materials, and articles 

related to intelligence work, potentially 

including sensitive information. Finally, 

Article 17 allows Chinese intelligence 

agencies to assume control over an 

individual or organization’s means of 

transport, communication tools, sites, 

and buildings and to set up workplaces 

and equipment in those facilities. In 

sum, Chinese entities providing goods 

in critical supply chains may be 

compelled to conduct intelligence work 

on behalf of the PRC and provide 

sensitive information to PRC officials 

related to the security of U.S. critical 

infrastructure that rely on these sources. 

In addition, the National 

Cybersecurity Law requires 

cybersecurity protection measures for 

critical information infrastructure and 

compels companies to report and 

provide assistance to the PRC state 

security and intelligence services. 

Article 31 identifies power and water 

resources, among other sectors, as 

critical information infrastructure. 

Article 38 requires critical information 

infrastructure operators to conduct an 

inspection and assessment of their 

networks’ security and risks that might 

exist and submit a cybersecurity report 

on the circumstances. Additionally, 

Article 39 requires state cybersecurity 

and information departments to conduct 

spot testing of critical information 

infrastructure security risks and 

promote cybersecurity information 

sharing among relevant departments, 

critical information infrastructure 

operators, and also relevant research 

institutions and cybersecurity services 

organizations. Finally, Article 28 

requires network operators to provide 

‘‘technical support and assistance to 

public security organs and national 

security organs that are safeguarding 

national security and investigating 

criminal activities in accordance with 

the law.’’ Thus, provisions within this 

law provide PRC officials access to 

information on cyber vulnerabilities 

across a number of sectors and thus the 

opportunity to obtain data potentially 

impacting the security of U.S. critical 

infrastructure companies. 

Authority and Determinations 

Order of the Secretary 

Under authority delegated to the 

Secretary of the U.S. Department of 

Energy by the President in E.O. 13920, 

I adopt the findings in this Prohibition 

Order and order and direct the 

following: 

Prohibited Transactions 

A Responsible Utility under this 

Prohibition Order is an electric utility 

that owns or operates Defense Critical 

Electric Infrastructure (DCEI), as defined 

by section 215A(a)(4) of the Federal 

Power Act (FPA), that actively serves a 

CDF, as designated by the Secretary 

under section 215A(c) of the FPA. Each 

Responsible Utility is hereby prohibited 

from acquiring, importing, transferring, 

or installing BPS electric equipment 

identified in Attachment 1 (Regulated 

Equipment) that (i) has been 

manufactured or supplied by persons 

owned by, controlled by, or subject to 

the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC, 

and (ii) is for use by the Responsible 

Utility as a component of its DCEI 

serving the CDF at a service voltage 

level of 69 kV or higher, from the point 

of electrical interconnection (at a service 

voltage level of 69 kV of higher) with 

the CDF up to and including the next 

‘‘upstream’’ transmission substation. A 

transaction that meets the conditions set 

forth in the preceding sentence is 

referred to herein as a Prohibited 

Transaction. 

The term Regulated Equipment 

includes software, firmware and digital 

components that control the operation 

of Regulated Equipment and are 

manufactured or supplied by persons 

owned by, controlled by, or subject to 

the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC. 

Priority Loads, Load Shedding, and 

System Restoration Plans 

By this Prohibition Order, each 

Responsible Utility shall work with 

DOE to assist in the identification of 

DCEI and any load shedding and system 

restoration contingency planning 

required to assure the energy and 

missions of CDFs. 

Each Responsible Utility is hereby 

directed to designate (or to take all 

action reasonably available to it to cause 

the relevant regional entity to designate) 

each CDF as a priority load in the 

applicable load shedding and system 

restoration plans. The term ‘‘regional 

entity’’ is defined at section 215(a)(7) of 

the FPA. 

Effective Date 

The effective date of this Prohibition 

Order (Effective Date) is January 16, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 3 / Wednesday, January 6, 2021 / Notices 535 

8NERC Alert ID R–2020–07–08–01 (July 8, 2020) 

(NERC Alert). 

2021. This Prohibition Order shall apply 

to any Prohibited Transaction initiated 

on or after the Effective Date. The 

Department shall notify each 

Responsible Utility of the applicability 

of this Prohibition Order no later than 

five (5) business days after the date of 

issuance of this Prohibition Order. 

Notice under this section shall be 

deemed made when personally 

delivered or when mailed, three (3) 

calendar days after deposit in the U.S. 

Mail, first class postage prepaid and 

addressed to the Responsible Utility at 

its applicable address. Actual notice 

shall be deemed adequate notice on the 

date actual notice occurred, regardless 

of the method of service. 

Executive Order 13920 

On May 1, 2020, the President issued 

E.O. 13920. Actions authorized under 

E.O. 13920 are rooted in its finding that 

‘‘unrestricted acquisition or use in the 

United States of bulk-power system 

electric equipment designed, developed, 

manufactured, or supplied by persons 

owned by, controlled by, or subject to 

the jurisdiction or direction of foreign 

adversaries augments the ability of 

foreign adversaries to create and exploit 

vulnerabilities in bulk-power system 

electric equipment,’’ and that ‘‘the 

unrestricted foreign supply of bulkpower system electric equipment 

[therefore] constitutes an unusual and 

extraordinary threat to the national 

security, foreign policy, and economy of 

the United States.’’ By declaring a 

‘‘national emergency with respect to the 

threat to the United States bulk-power 

system’’ in the E.O. and under the 

National Emergencies Act, E.O. 13920 

invokes the President’s authority under 

the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (IEEPA) to direct responsive 

measures. 

Section 1 of E.O. 13920 authorizes the 

Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to 

prohibit any transaction by any person, 

or with respect to any property, subject 

to the jurisdiction of the United States, 

where the transaction involves any 

property in which any foreign country 

or a national thereof has any interest 

(including through an interest in a 

contract for the provision of the 

equipment), where the transaction was 

initiated after May 1, 2020, and where 

the Secretary, in coordination with the 

Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget and in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, the Director of 

National Intelligence, and, as 

appropriate, the heads of other relevant 

agencies, has determined that: 

(a) The transaction involves BPS 

electric equipment designed, developed, 

manufactured, or supplied, by persons 

owned by, controlled by, or subject to 

the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign 

adversary; and 

(b) The transaction: 

(i) Poses an undue risk of sabotage to 

or subversion of the design, integrity, 

manufacturing, production, distribution, 

installation, operation, or maintenance 

of the BPS in the United States; 

(ii) Poses an undue risk of 

catastrophic effects on the security or 

resiliency of United States critical 

infrastructure or the economy of the 

United States; or 

(iii) Otherwise poses an unacceptable 

risk to the national security of the 

United States or the security and safety 

of United States persons. 

Section 2(a) of E.O. 13920 authorizes 

the Secretary ‘‘to take such actions, 

including directing the timing and 

manner of the cessation of pending and 

future transactions prohibited pursuant 

to section 1 of this order.’’ Section 2(a) 

of E.O. 13920 also authorizes the 

Secretary to ‘‘adopt appropriate rules 

and regulations’’ to implement E.O. 

13920, and DOE has initiated 

rulemaking proceedings. 

Notwithstanding the pendency of such 

a rulemaking or the adoption of any 

such regulations, the Secretary has the 

authority at any time to prohibit 

transactions in order to effectuate the 

purposes of E.O. 13920. 

For the reasons noted above, the 

Secretary has determined that this 

Prohibition Order is reasonably 

necessary to address the threat posed to 

the BPS by the PRC as a foreign 

adversary within the meaning of E.O. 

13920. Because the equipment 

identified in this Prohibition Order as 

Regulated Equipment could serve as 

instruments or tools to threaten the BPS 

and the national security of the U.S., the 

Secretary is taking the protective action 

set forth herein to prevent Prohibited 

Transactions. 

This Prohibition Order is in addition 

to other action that the Secretary may 

undertake pursuant to E.O. 13920, 

including, but not limited to, 

rulemaking and further orders of the 

Secretary. 

BPS Electric Equipment Subject to This 

Prohibition Order 

This order addresses a subset of E.O. 

13920 BPS electric equipment (listed in 

Attachment 1) identified by the North 

American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC) in its 

Recommendation to Industry.8 The 

Regulated Equipment falls within the 

definition of ‘‘bulk-power system 

electric equipment’’ set forth in Section 

4(b) of E.O. 13920: 

Items used in bulk-power system 

substations, control rooms, or power 

generating stations, including reactors, 

capacitors, substation transformers, current 

coupling capacitors, large generators, backup 

generators, substation voltage regulators, 

shunt capacitor equipment, automatic circuit 

reclosers, instrument transformers, coupling 

capacitor potential devices [expressed in the 

E.O. as current coupling capacitors and 

coupling capacity voltage transformers], 

protective relaying, metering equipment, 

high voltage circuit breakers, generation 

turbines, industrial control systems, 

distributed control systems, and safety 

instrumented systems. Items not included in 

the preceding list and that have broader 

application of use beyond the bulk-power 

system are outside the scope of [E.O. 13920]. 

Section 4(a) of E.O. 13920 defines 

‘‘bulk-power system’’ as 

(i) Facilities and control systems necessary 

for operating an interconnected electric 

energy transmission network (or any portion 

thereof); and 

(ii) Electric energy from generation 

facilities needed to maintain transmission 

reliability. For purposes of [E.O. 13920], this 

definition includes transmission lines rated 

at 69,000 volts (69 kV) or more, but does not 

include facilities used in the local 

distribution of electric energy. 

Certification by Responsible Utility 

Not later than March 17, 2021 and 

once every three years thereafter for as 

long as this Prohibition Order is in 

effect, each Responsible Utility shall file 

a certification with the Department, 

under penalty of perjury, that since the 

Effective Date: 

(a) It has not entered into a Prohibited 

Transaction; and 

(b) It has established an internal 

monitoring process to accurately track 

future compliance with this Prohibition 

Order. 

Not later than February 15, 2021, each 

Responsible Utility shall file a 

certification with the Department, under 

penalty of perjury, that since the 

Effective Date: 

(a) It has designated (or taken all action 

reasonably available to it to cause the 

relevant regional entity to designate) each 

CDF as a priority load in the applicable 

system load shedding and restoration plans. 

Certifications may be delivered to: 

Charles Kosak, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary, Energy Resilience Division, 

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of 

Electricity, Mailstop OE–20, Room 8G– 

042, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20585; (202) 586–2036; 

or bulkpowersystemEO@hq.doe.gov. 


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536 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 3 / Wednesday, January 6, 2021 / Notices 

Individual Waiver 

The Secretary may waive any term of 

this Prohibition Order with respect to a 

Responsible Utility for good cause 

shown. 

Penalties 

(a) Penalties. 

(1) Civil Penalty. A civil penalty not 

to exceed the amount set forth in 

Section 206(b) of IEEPA may be 

imposed on any person who violates, 

attempts to violate, conspires to violate, 

or causes any knowing violation of this 

Order. IEEPA provides for a maximum 

civil penalty not to exceed the greater of 

$250,000 (subject to adjustment under 

the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation 

Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended) or 

an amount that is twice the amount of 

the transaction that is the basis of the 

violation with respect to which the 

penalty is imposed. 

Notice of the penalty, including a 

written explanation of the penalized 

conduct and the amount of the proposed 

penalty, and notifying the recipient of a 

right to make a written petition within 

thirty (30) calendar days as to why a 

penalty should not be imposed, shall be 

served on the party or parties that the 

Secretary has determined to be in 

violation hereunder. 

The Secretary shall review any 

presentation and issue a final 

administrative decision within thirty 

(30) calendar days of receipt of the 

petition. 

(2) Criminal Penalty. A person who 

willfully commits, willfully attempts to 

commit, or willfully conspires to 

commit, or aids and abets in the 

commission of a violation of this 

Order—and thereby a violation of 

IEEPA—shall, upon conviction thereof, 

be fined not more than $1,000,000, or if 

a natural person, may be imprisoned for 

not more than twenty (20) years, or 

both. 

(b) Adjustments to penalty amounts. 

(1) The civil penalties provided in 

IEEPA are subject to adjustment 

pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties 

Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (Pub. 

L. 101–410, as amended, 28 U.S.C. 2461 

note). 

(2) The criminal penalties provided in 

IEEPA are subject to adjustment 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3571. 

(c) The penalties available under this 

section are without prejudice to other 

penalties, civil or criminal, available 

under law. Attention is directed to 18 

U.S.C. 1001, which provides that 

whoever, in any matter within the 

jurisdiction of any department or agency 

in the U.S., knowingly and willfully 

falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any 

trick, scheme, or device a material fact, 

or makes any false, fictitious, or 

fraudulent statements or 

representations, or makes or uses any 

false writing or document knowing the 

same to contain any false, fictitious, or 

fraudulent statement or entry, shall be 

fined under title 18, U.S. Code, or 

imprisoned not more than five (5) years, 

or both. 

Rehearing 

Any person aggrieved by this 

Prohibition Order may petition the 

Secretary for a rehearing no later than 

March 2, 2021. The application for 

rehearing shall set forth specifically the 

ground or grounds upon which such 

application is based. Upon such 

application, the Secretary shall have 

power to grant or deny rehearing or to 

abrogate or modify this Prohibition 

Order without further hearing. Unless 

the Secretary acts upon the application 

for rehearing within thirty (30) calendar 

days after it is filed, such application 

may be deemed to be denied. Until the 

record in a proceeding seeking rehearing 

of this Prohibition Order shall have 

been filed for judicial review in a court 

of competent jurisdiction, the Secretary 

may at any time, upon reasonable notice 

and in such manner as it shall deem 

proper, modify or set aside, in whole or 

in part, any findings or this Prohibition 

Order. 

Signing Authority 

This document of the Department of 

Energy was signed on December 17, 

2020, by Dan Brouillette, Secretary of 

Energy. That document with the original 

signature and date is maintained by 

DOE. For administrative purposes only, 

and in compliance with requirements of 

the Office of the Federal Register, the 

undersigned DOE Federal Register 

Liaison Officer has been authorized to 

sign and submit the document in 

electronic format for publication, as an 

official document of the Department of 

Energy. This administrative process in 

no way alters the legal effect of this 

document upon publication in the 

Federal Register. 

Signed in Washington, DC, on December 

22, 2020. 

Treena V. Garrett, 

Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. 

Department of Energy. 

Attachment 1—Regulated Equipment 

1. Power transformers with low-side 

voltage rating of 69 thousand volts (kV) 

or higher and associated control and 

protection systems like load tap 

changer, cooling system, and Sudden 

Pressure relay. 

2. Generator step up (GSU) 

transformers with high-side voltage 

rating of 69 kV or higher and associated 

control and protection systems like load 

tap changer, cooling system, and 

Sudden Pressure relay. 

3. Circuit breakers operating at 69 kV 

or higher. 

4. Reactive power equipment 

(Reactors and Capacitors) 69 kV or 

higher. 

5. Associated software and firmware 

installed in any equipment or used in 

the operation of items listed in 1 

through 4. 

[FR Doc. 2020–28773 Filed 1–5–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

Combined Notice of Filings #1 

Take notice that the Commission 

received the following electric rate 

filings: 

Docket Numbers: ER10–1276–013; 

ER10–1292–012; ER10–1287–012; 

ER10–1303–012; ER10–1319–014; 

ER10–1353–014; ER18–1183–005; 

ER18–1184–005. 

Applicants: Consumers Energy 

Company, CMS Energy Resource 

Management Company, Grayling 

Generation Station Limited Partnership, 

Genesee Power Station Limited 

Partnership, CMS Generation Michigan 

Power, LLC, Dearborn Industrial 

Generation, L.L.C., Delta Solar Power I, 

LLC, Delta Solar Power II, LLC. 

Description: Triennial Market Power 

Analysis for Central Region of 

Consumer Energy Company, et al. 

Filed Date: 12/29/20. 

Accession Number: 20201229–5384. 

Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/1/21. 

Docket Numbers: ER10–2211–007. 

Applicants: Vandolah Power 

Company, L.L.C. 

Description: Triennial Market Power 

Analysis for Southeast Region of 

Vandolah Power Company, L.L.C. 

Filed Date: 12/30/20. 

Accession Number: 20201230–5178. 

Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/1/21. 

Docket Numbers: ER10–2570–036. 

Applicants: Shady Hills Power 

Company, L.L.C. 

Description: Triennial Market Power 

Analysis for Southeast Region of Shady 

Hills Power Company, L.L.C. 

Filed Date: 12/29/20. 

Accession Number: 20201229–5366. 

Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/1/21. 

Docket Numbers: ER11–2508–026; 

ER19–1415–002; ER19–1416–001; 

ER19–1414–002. 


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