Air University

AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

On the Fly

Israeli Airpower against 

the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000–2005

Matthew M. Hurley

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Research Paper 2010-2

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112–6026

June 2010
ii

Disclaimer

The analysis, opinions, and conclusions either expressed or implied within are solely those of 

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) papers and Air University Monographs are occasional studies written by 

Air Force researchers at large and military defense analysts assigned to the Air Force Research Institute at Air 

University and beyond. The purpose of the AFRI papers 

is to provide useful ideas and independent analysis of 

issues of current or potential importance to Air Force 

commanders and their staffs. This monograph and others in the series are also available electronically at the 

Air University Research Web site (https://research

.maxwell.af.mil) and the Air and Space Power Journal

Web site (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil.
iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Right Weapons, Wrong War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Finding the Right Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Finding the Right Weapons—Aircraft . . . . . . . . . 6

Unintended Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Finding the Right Weapons—Tactics, 

Procedures, and Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Right Weapons, Wrong Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Right Weapons, Right Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Wild Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Looking for Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Appendix

A Reported IAF Attacks in the Occupied

Territories, 2000–2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

B Evolution of IAF Mission Priorities, 

2000–2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

v

About

the Author

Lt Col Matthew M. Hurley is a 1990 graduate of the US Air 

Force Academy, where he earned a bachelor of science degree 

in history and political science. As a distinguished graduate 

with the highest academic standing in both fields, he was 

awarded the Franklin C. Wolfe fellowship to study Russian and 

Middle Eastern history at the University of Washington, earning 

a master of arts degree in 1991.

Colonel Hurley completed intelligence officer training as a 

distinguished graduate in 1992 and served operational tours 

as an intelligence analyst at Dover AFB, Delaware; Camp Red 

Cloud, Korea; and Aviano AB, Italy. He was then selected as a 

staff instructor for the Allied Air Forces Central Europe Tactical 

Leadership Programme (AIRCENT TLP) in Florennes, Belgium, 

from 1997 to 2000. He subsequently served as a staff intelligence officer with the 11th Wing, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, 

and as chief of North Korean Air, Air Defense, and Ballistic Missile Analysis for US Forces Korea, Yongsan Garrison, Korea.

After completing Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) as a 

distinguished graduate in 2005, Colonel Hurley remained at 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama, for an additional year as an ACSC 

instructor. He was then selected for a three-year Air Force Institute of Technology advanced degree program at The Ohio State 

University, where he earned his doctorate in military history, 

modern European history, and African history in 2009. He currently serves as chief of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Branch; Global Vigilance Capability–Based Planning Division; Directorate of Operational Planning, Policy, and 

Strategy; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements; Headquarters USAF, Washington, DC.



Introduction

When asked to name one defining episode in the chronicles 

of the Israeli Air Force (IAF),1 historians and professional airmen would likely recall the opening salvoes of the Six-Day War 

on 5 June 1967. By the end of that pivotal day, the outnumbered IAF had effectively destroyed the air forces of three hostile 

Arab states, enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to overwhelm their foes and triple Israel’s territorial holdings within a 

week. The IAF called this impressive accomplishment Operation Focus—an appropriate moniker for such a determined application of aerial force against a numerically superior foe.2

Equally appropriate, the IDF refers to its participation in the 

antiterrorist campaign of 2000–2005 as Operation Ebb and 

Flow3—a term that not only evokes the seesaw level of violence 

characterizing the al-Aqsa Intifada4 and the IDF response but 

also describes the IAF’s changing fortunes since the conflict 

began in September 2000. In contrast to the nearly legendary 

accomplishments of its past, IAF operations during Ebb and 

Flow may be best remembered for accusations of disproportionate force, controversy over “collateral damage,” and very public 

debates over targets and tactics. The 1967-vintage IAF knew its 

enemies and had trained, literally for years, to fight against 

those refreshingly familiar foes. Its twenty-first-century successor, however, proved unprepared to face a new kind of opponent 

in a new kind of war. Not until 2004—more than four years after Ebb and Flow began—had the IAF adapted itself sufficiently 

to overcome these obstacles in an operationally meaningful 

way. It did so, literally and figuratively, “on the fly,” continually 

improvising its tactics, equipment, and doctrine to fit the new 

reality. Virtually every aspect of the IAF’s counterinsurgency 

(COIN) effort correspondingly underwent radical revision, at 

times more than once—mission emphasis continually shifted 

across roles, new weapons designed specifically for urban operations and counterterrorism experienced accelerated development, and the service as a whole found itself faced with the 

daunting prospect of learning a new way of warfare while Israel 

faced its gravest threat in decades. The IAF’s efforts were by no 

means uniformly successful; some, indeed, proved disastrous 
in the context of a war dominated by perceptions and politics. 

Nonetheless, the IAF did implement enough of the right improvisations to make increasingly significant contributions to the 

IDF’s overall COIN campaign. That it did so with even middling 

success is an achievement of note for airpower historians; that 

the US Air Force is currently facing similar challenges—in the 

same part of the world—suggests that the hard-won lessons 

drawn from the IAF’s painful experience may be relevant to the 

USAF’s ongoing COIN and counterterrorist efforts. 

Right Weapons, Wrong War

The IAF has traditionally placed its operational and acquisition priority on fulfilling the service’s core missions: achieving 

air superiority, conducting long-range strikes, and executing 

surface support operations in the context of large-scale warfare 

against a conventional foe.5 Each of these missions, and the 

IAF’s resultant force structure, foresaw the service erecting an 

aerial barrier around Israel and its surface forces while taking 

the fight to enemy territory. As intermittent diplomatic progress between Israel and “frontline” Arab states had resulted in 

a more distant sphere of anticipated operations, the IAF correspondingly forecast its wartime focus on increasingly longrange operations. Accordingly, it committed the preponderance 

of its funding to antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses, long-range 

strike aircraft, and strategic intelligence collection platforms, 

including reconnaissance satellites.6 However, as the al-Aqsa 

Intifada developed in late 2000, the IAF found its next enemy 

rising from within the elaborate barrier of defenses it had begun to assemble against more distant foes.7 While the IAF had 

expected to wage its next war over Iranian nuclear facilities or 

Iraqi missile sites, it found its new enemy throwing Israeli soldiers from windows in Ramallah, bombing buses in Tel Aviv, 

and launching homemade rockets from Gaza. Rather than savaging Syrian armor columns or cratering Egyptian airfields, the 

IAF found itself trying to hunt individual militants hiding among 

civilians in the “rabbit warren” of Palestinian refugee camps.8

As one combat helicopter pilot observed, “This is a different 

kind of war. Instead of attacking armored personnel carriers 
and missile batteries, as we were taught, we are forced to operate inside towns and cities, among our neighbors, people who 

work in our fields.”9 Another lamented, “We were built for much 

more massive and serious things.”10

Finding the Right Mission

That latter pilot had spoken in November 2000, following six 

weeks of aerial operations in support of Ebb and Flow. The IAF 

was first called into direct action against its new and unanticipated enemy on 2 October 2000, just four days after the intifada began.11 More attacks would follow, and by January 2005 

regional media and international defense sources had reported 

over 550 IAF attack sorties against Palestinian targets.12 Though 

a relatively small tally by US standards—roughly equivalent to 

a single day’s attack sorties during the major combat phase of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example13—the IAF’s evolving mission emphasis has revealed several parallel evolutions in Israel’s air campaign against the Palestinians. 

During the initial phases of Ebb and Flow, from 2000 to 

2002, the IAF focused its operations against the most “traditional” of targets, as well as the simplest to strike: the security 

infrastructure of Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority (PA) and 

affiliated organizations.14 Strikes against PA–associated facilities accounted for fully half of all reported IAF strikes in 2000 

and 75 percent of those conducted the following year.15 These 

attacks often involved relatively large-scale assaults against 

multiple facilities following particularly lethal terrorist incidents—missions intended to “signal” Israel’s demand that the 

PA assume a more active role in preventing additional terrorism. For example, in February 2002 then-IAF chief of staff Brig 

Gen Amos Yadlin listed “sending messages” as one of the service’s three primary roles in combating Palestinian terror.16

Other Israeli officials made similar assertions: in the wake of a 

two-day air offensive against 15 PA–affiliated targets, including 

Arafat’s helicopters at Gaza International Airport, an Israeli 

spokesman asserted that the attack “was intended to send a very 

clear signal that either Arafat . . . will fight terrorism or we will 

have to do it.”17 Likewise, following an F-16 strike against six 
PA–associated targets in May 2001, prime ministerial spokesman Raanan Gissin described the strikes as “a serious message to stop suicide attacks. This more serious attack is a message to the other side that the deteriorating situation, caused 

by the suicide bombing, will not be accepted.”18

These first two years of Israeli air operations, however, did not 

stop Palestinian terrorist attacks, and by mid-2002 the Israeli 

government appeared to accept that its strategy would not 

achieve the intended results. Its focus subsequently shifted 

from retaliation to the disruption of terrorist planning and execution.19 The IDF and civilian security services correspondingly 

intensified their efforts to prevent rather than simply punish 

terrorist attacks, while operations designed to pressure the PA 

to do the job itself declined. A senior official in the Israeli internal security service, Shin Bet, summed up the new operational 

concept: “Anyone defined as a terrorist or as one who handles 

them must be neutralized. If you have good intelligence, do not 

wait—strike immediately. Not as a reaction but with a continuous, steady initiative, all the time. . . . Every time you find something, you have to go after it.”20 IAF operations in support of this 

preventive effort included an intensifying effort to strike 

weapons-related facilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.21

Reported attacks against weapons production and storage sites, 

for example, doubled between 2003 and 2004, while preemptive 

strikes against suspected rocket launchers, mortar teams, and 

Palestinians emplacing bombs increased tenfold during the same 

period. However, the most significant—and controversial—IAF 

contribution to the overall preventive effort involved its increasing participation in the IDF’s “targeted killing” campaign.22

Although Israel resumed targeting leading Palestinian militants and suspected terrorists within six weeks of the intifada’s 

initiation,23 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon reportedly gave the IDF 

and Shin Bet a “green light” to embark on a more comprehensive 

assassination campaign in October 2001.

24 The effort intensified 

further in 2003 when the IDF received orders to “completely wipe 

out” the most lethal and rejectionist of the Palestinian groups, 

HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyyah, meaning “Islamic Resistance Movement”), using “whatever means necessary.” Simultaneously, the IDF progressively expanded its definition of so-called ticking bombs—those Palestinians targeted 
on the presumption that their deaths would interrupt planned 

attacks. For example, the 2003 order against HAMAS proclaimed 

that “everyone from the lowest member to Sheikh Ahmed Yasin,” 

the group’s founder and spiritual figurehead, was considered a 

legitimate target.25 The oft-updated definition of “ticking bombs” 

eventually included even Palestinians engaged in suspected militant training, such as the 15 alleged HAMAS members killed 

during an air attack against a field in the Gaza Strip.26

The IAF’s role in the assassination campaign correspondingly 

intensified during this period. In fact, its operations against individual Palestinian militants and activists accounted for more 

air strikes than any other mission in 2003 and ranked a close 

second in 2004.27 “The marriage of combat helicopters with special ground forces has become our ‘dream team’ for targeted killing operations,” an unidentified Israeli general remarked in 

2003.28 By that time, “targeted killing [had] been transformed 

from a rare, almost one-time occurrence into a lethal, quick, and 

painful routine,” according to another Israeli commentator.29

Yet those missions, intended to protect Israeli citizens against 

a worsening maelstrom of terrorist attacks, still comprised a 

secondary effort in the IAF’s overall activity. In terms of “operational” sorties, whether employing ordnance or not, ground 

force support consistently ranked as the most frequent IAF 

mission, particularly among helicopter and remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPA) units.30 Throughout Ebb and Flow, attack sorties 

to support Israeli troops in contact accounted for 20 percent of 

all IAF missions during which ordnance was employed, with 

thousands of others flown to assist ground forces in other 

ways.31 Then-IAF commander Maj Gen Dani Halutz emphasized the ground support role, commenting that “we have to 

give [the IDF’s Ground Forces Command] the maximum we can 

provide as an air force in order to enable them to accomplish 

their mission.”32 As one helicopter pilot explained more pointedly: “When you are sent to assist a force in trouble, you react 

with very great force. We are no longer speaking of ‘surgical 

treatment,’ there are no intermediate steps. If [Palestinians] are 

firing from a window, the entire floor will fall, and the whole 

house will burn.”33
Finding the Right Weapons—Aircraft

As the IAF’s missions evolved throughout Ebb and Flow, the 

range of platforms and weapons employed to accomplish those 

missions correspondingly expanded. Initially, the IAF relied exclusively on the use of attack helicopters to provide aerial support to ground forces, express Israeli displeasure with the PA, or 

assassinate particularly troublesome militants.34 As the IAF’s 

target set began to expand, however, it found that helicopter 

missile and cannon fire could not effectively engage certain facilities, resulting in the first use of fighter aircraft to attack targets in the Occupied Territories since 1967. As explained by the 

IDF Operations Branch chief following the first F-16 strikes 

during Ebb and Flow, “I know the F-16 was not designed to 

attack targets in Palestinian cities, [but] the targets were big 

enough, strong enough or solid enough that attack helicopters 

were not effective enough to penetrate or to hit these specific 

targets.”35 The targets in question, struck on 18 May 2001 in 

response to a HAMAS suicide bombing, included a PA security 

compound and prison in Nablus as well as five other PA–

associated facilities.36 From that first fixed-wing strike until 18 

December 2004—the last reported F-16 combat sortie of Ebb and 

Flow—fighters drew nearly 20 percent of the IAF’s attack missions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including some of its most 

lethal and controversial missions. Then-IAF commander Halutz 

attempted to dismiss such controversy, remarking that “there is 

nothing mystical about a specific type of plane. If we send a Cessna 

with a bomb, would that make the action more gentle or pleasant?”37 However, the political and media uproar following the 

deaths of 14 Palestinian civilians in a July 2002 F-16 strike highlighted the complications of unloading a 2,000-pound bomb in an 

urban area—a weapon that could not have been delivered by any 

IDF asset other than a fixed-wing fighter.38

Although IAF fighters and helicopters received the greatest 

attention, the IDF also made extensive use of remotely piloted 

aircraft throughout the course of Ebb and Flow.39 For the bulk 

of the conflict, this task fell exclusively to the IAF, following a 

2000 IDF directive to transfer all RPAs to IAF control. The IAF’s 

sole RPA operator, the 200 Squadron at Palmachim Air Base, 
increased its operations tempo accordingly. “Events in the territories have made [200 Squadron] the busiest squadron in the 

Air Force,” the Israeli Air Force Journal reported in October 

2001. “[It] has been operating almost non-stop. . . . Urgent operational orders arrive at the squadron at an unprecedented 

frequency, and the number of flights is increasing at significant 

rates.”40 Between 2001 and 2002, for instance, the number of 

operational RPA sorties flown by the unit jumped from 395 to 

557.41 Even at this elevated pace of operations, however, the 

IAF’s inventory of RPAs and operators proved insufficient, leading to calls for a new class of RPAs and an expanded pool of 

personnel trained to operate them.42

The IAF relied on indigenously produced Scout, Searcher, and 

Hermes 450 RPAs to perform the surveillance, damage assessment, target tracking, and laser-designation missions allocated 

to 200 Squadron.43 However, the unit was most often tasked to 

provide situational awareness to ground forces during incursions into Palestinian strongholds. Applying lessons learned 

during earlier Israeli operations in Lebanon, IAF RPAs monitored 

operations areas, provided ground force commanders with nearreal-time information on potential threats, and cued attack helicopters for support.44 As Ebb and Flow evolved, 200 Squadron 

also found itself tasked with more specialized roles, such as IED 

(improvised explosive devices) detection and militant tracking 

during targeted killing operations.45 Regarding the latter, Halutz 

acknowledged, “There is no such operation that was carried out 

without [RPA] assistance. Not only the aerial assassinations, but 

also the ground ones, were conducted with their escort.”46

Numerous eyewitness and analyst accounts suggest the RPAs’ 

role in targeted killings was not limited to “escort” or “assistance.” By mid-2001 the IAF reportedly began investigating the 

feasibility of developing unmanned combat air systems (UCAS), 

and by the following spring was said to be deep into the development of a UCAS based on the Israeli-designed Heron 450 highaltitude/long-endurance (HALE) RPA.47 By the latter half of 

2004, the IAF had apparently translated this developmental 

technology into an operational capability; that July, Israel reportedly conducted the first of at least 15 suspected UCAS strike 

operations reported during Ebb and Flow.48 Although official 

Israeli sources have not yet acknowledged such operations, 
Palestinian eyewitnesses have repeatedly offered testimony indicating Israeli UCAS employment. “I saw a small plane and 

then a flash of light, then I heard a huge explosion and a car 

went up in flames,” said one Jenin resident, recalling an alleged 

UCAS strike on 13 September 2004.49 The target of that attack, 

al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade commander Zakariah Zbeidi, also 

claimed to have witnessed “an Israeli UAV launching missiles” 

against him.50 The mounting reports led the editor of Jane’s AirLaunched Weapons to declare, “The Israelis almost certainly 

have armed UAV programs on the go right now.”51

The impetus for fielding such systems is apparent, given the 

operational scenario that confronted the IAF. On the one hand, 

a UCAS offers its targets less warning of an imminent attack, 

increasing the odds of success in targeted killing operations or 

other missions dependent on surprise. Further, an effective 

UCAS capability represents the ultimate shortening of the 

“sensor-to-shooter loop”; when the sensor itself has the capability to engage the targets it identifies, the delays inherent in 

the data dissemination process are dramatically curtailed. Additionally, RPAs generally boast greater endurance than their 

manned counterparts, permitting more persistent surveillance 

of potential targets and greater opportunity to attack in a fleeting, unpredictable strike window.52 While the IDF has not publicly acknowledged the use of UCASs, it has certainly praised 

their potential. For example, Halutz, by then the IDF’s deputy 

chief of staff, observed in an August 2004 interview, “As current and future warfare requires endurance combined with 

precision strike capabilities, the solution is UAVs and autonomous munitions, which will produce the targets and destroy 

them precisely.”53

Unintended Consequences

The IAF’s operational evolution throughout Ebb and Flow 

was mirrored by the progression of its troubles, including declining confidence in the wisdom of its tasking and the consequent impact on morale. The service first encountered criticism 

from within its own ranks in the early “signaling” days of IAF 

operations. Just one month into the intifada, several Israeli of-
ficers privately expressed their belief that IAF operations had 

been ineffective and hamstrung by restrictive rules of engagement—including a requirement to fire warning shots before attacking PA facilities—to the extent that “such attacks cause no 

real damage, and therefore have no deterring effect.”54 Even 

senior IAF commanders expressed their disapproval of so-called 

“real-estate raids,” which destroyed individual buildings but 

posed no risk to PA personnel, thus negating their deterrent 

value.55 Such perceptions had apparently filtered to the squadron level, leading one veteran AH-64 pilot to remark, “I, in fact, 

suspect that improper considerations, which are not necessarily operational, are creeping into our missions.”56

While combating Palestinian militants on an increasingly fulltime basis, the IAF was also expected to continue preparing for 

major conflict with hostile states such as Syria or Iran, and to 

do both in an era of increasing fiscal constraints.57 The resulting budgetary pressures and inventory shortfalls proved potentially crippling to both missions. As early as July 2002, IAF 

weapons expenditure in the Occupied Territories had forced the 

IDF to relay an “urgent appeal to the U.S. Department of Defense” to supplement its dwindling inventory of air-to-ground 

munitions.58 The following November, shortly after receiving the 

first of 100 new F-16I long-range strike fighters acquired in a 

$4.5-billion deal, the IAF quite literally ran out of gas, having 

exhausted its fuel budget for the year. Consequently, Halutz 

ordered the cancellation of all unit proficiency flights, reserving 

remaining fuel stocks for operational missions and basic flight 

training.59 By the beginning of 2004, IAF commanders expressed 

concern over the impact of this decision. “We haven’t flown for 

over a month and a half, and I’m scared about putting a pilot in 

the air,” one helicopter squadron commander observed.60 Fiscal 

constraints also forced the IAF, for the first time, to outsource 

an operational capability—specifically, RPA flight operations—

to a civilian contractor, in a move one IDF official referred to as 

“visual intelligence by the hour.”61

Meanwhile, public controversy over unintended civilian 

deaths—in IAF parlance, the “uninvolved”62—led to increasing 

morale difficulties within IAF units. The issue intensified in 

July 2002 after an F-16 strike against an apartment complex 

housing HAMAS’ Gaza commander, Saleh Shehadeh. Following 
10

revelations that 14 Palestinian civilians were also killed in the 

raid, including nine children, some IAF pilots reportedly began 

to feel “uncomfortable” with targeted killing operations.63 Halutz 

attempted to defuse the controversy by explaining matter-offactly: “Weapons are not pure. They are not intended to be pure. 

. . . By the same token, I am sorry to have to announce that 

there are no clean wars.”64 The issue persisted, however, and 

climaxed in September 2003 with the public refusal of 27 reserve IAF pilots, including nine on temporary active duty, to 

participate in operations over the Occupied Territories.65 Among 

the signatories was Iftach Spector, Israel’s second-leading fighter 

ace and one of the 1981 Osirak raiders.66 Halutz, who called the 

public letter “a totally improper phenomenon,”67 dismissed 

Spector from his post at the IAF’s flight training academy and 

grounded the other pilots on active duty who participated in the 

so-called “pilots’ mutiny.”68 The incident received worldwide media attention and exacerbated the moral debate within the IAF, 

particularly among the helicopter crewmen most often tasked to 

perform assassination operations. As a veteran helicopter pilot 

recounted after publication of the “refusenik” letter, “We are not 

convinced of the missions’ justness, of their proportion, [or] of 

the frequency.”69

The impact of mounting civilian casualties was felt beyond 

the ethical realm. As Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chairman Haim Ramon observed after the Shehadeh 

strike: “This is not only a moral question. It is a substantive 

question in the struggle against terrorism. Without international support in general and U.S. backing in particular, we 

don’t have a free hand to act against terrorists.”70 Even more 

damaging was the impact of civilian deaths on domestic popular support for Ebb and Flow. “Israel’s democracy is particularly sensitive to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict,” 

Halutz acknowledged in February 2003, “There are limits on 

the force we can use. . . . [I]n these types of conflicts the weaker 

side has a kind of strength.”71 His attention to the issue was 

warranted by dwindling public support for targeted killings: a 

poll conducted the following June revealed 58 percent of Israelis wanted the IDF to halt its assassination campaign, at least 

temporarily, representing a 33 percent decline in the public’s 

approval of targeted killing operations in less than two years.72
11

Finding the Right Weapons—Tactics, 

Procedures, and Ordnance

To ameliorate the deleterious effects of collateral damage, 

the IAF continually modified its tactics and operating procedures to account for the congested urban environment. “Our 

fighting norms have changed,” an AH-1S squadron deputy 

commander noted. “We are carrying out missions with the 

understanding that what is important is the day after. One 

errant missile has an influence on the entire arena.”73 Following a three-month hiatus in air operations during the winter of 

2000–2001, the IAF acknowledged placing stricter limits on 

operations “as a result of the bad media publicity surrounding 

the use of helicopters.” As Halutz revealed in April 2001, “The 

change is expressed both in the use of helicopters in the later 

hours of the day and in their use for shorter periods of time.”74

The Israelis also integrated RPAs more tightly into attack helicopter operations in hopes of further reducing the risk to 

innocent bystanders.75

The development of procedures intended to limit unintentional deaths occurred simultaneously with the evolution of urban warfare tactics, which an Israeli AH-1S pilot described as 

something “we never really trained for.”76 By 2002 the IAF had 

accepted the notion of a “saturated battlefield” in which the 

requirement to accurately employ ordnance outweighed a platform’s opportunity to maneuver, given the low risk of surfaceto-air fire compared to the negative impact of excessive collateral damage. The saturated battlefield concept led to a further 

modification of engagement procedures and more extensive use 

of precision-guided munitions (PGM).77 Those munitions also 

evolved throughout the course of Ebb and Flow, including a 

modified variant of the indigenous Gil/Spike family of airlaunched antiarmor missiles to replace the more powerful US–

built Hellfire missile.78 Several of the features built into the 

Spike-ER (“extended range”), which can equip both AH-64 helicopters and armed RPAs, appear to have been driven by the 

requirement to reduce collateral damage. These attributes included a smaller warhead and a fiber-optic link that allowed 

the operator to adjust the aim point, change targets, or even 
12

destroy the missile after launch—a capability deemed “critical 

when the terrorist target is moving among civilians.”79 Remarks 

by Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz suggested these weapons had entered operational use against HAMAS targets by 

September 2003 and, in “several cases,” were diverted after 

launch to avoid collateral damage.80

For fixed-wing aircraft, the IAF began procurement of the 

joint direct attack munition (JDAM) in October 2000, shortly 

after the al-Aqsa Intifada began, and in January 2003 declared 

the capability operational with the “Northern Knights” F-16 

squadron.81 The following October, this same squadron conducted a retaliatory strike against an Islamic Jihad training 

facility at Ein Saheb, Syria—the first IAF attack on Syrian soil 

since 1973—leading to speculation that the first Israeli JDAMs 

had been dropped in anger. “We chose very accurate munitions,” the squadron commander commented. “We . . . flew with 

the knowledge that we’re going out with the best aircraft and 

most suitable armament for the mission,” further suggesting 

that the IAF had employed what its fighter pilots considered an 

atypical and exceptionally precise weapon.82

IAF leaders have also discussed the development of nonlethal weapons. “We need to start talking about ‘no kill’ ammunition,” Brigadier General “Ilan,” commander of the main IAF helicopter base at Palmachim, declared in 2001. “This is a different kind of war where you do not always want to injure to the 

point of death, especially in combat within civilian areas.”83

The following year, the IAF submitted a request to the Ministry 

of Defense to procure nonlethal weapons for urban operations, 

specifically to equip its attack helicopter units. Among the nonlethal options requested were air-delivered tear gas canisters 

and stun grenades, which would “allow us to conduct operations 

and flush out terrorists in an urban area without killing people 

or destroying property,” according to a senior IAF officer.84

While the IAF grappled with the complexity and requirements 

of urban operations, the IDF’s Ground Forces Command (GFC) 

sought more efficient and effective ways to leverage airpower in 

the same operational environment. Among its more significant 

conclusions was the need to acquire an airborne reconnaissance capability organic to the ground forces and tailored to 

their requirements. In January 2001, as the fighting intensified 
13

and shortly after the IAF assumed control of all Israeli RPAs, 

the GFC first outlined its requirement for a tactical unmanned 

air platform which could be “easily operated by at most a 

brigade-sized force.”85 In 2003 the GFC opted for an indigenously developed system called the Skylark and by the following September began limited operations in the West Bank and 

Gaza Strip. The Skylark, which boasts a 10-km range and endurance of 60 minutes, weighs only 6 kg and can be shoulderlaunched, rendering it truly man portable.86 The intelligence 

“take” was downlinked directly to the ground unit, providing 

real-time awareness of close-in threats or target tracking during arrest or liquidation operations. In 2005 the GFC announced 

plans to acquire 70 Skylark systems, enough to equip each infantry battalion.87 One officer assigned to the project proclaimed 

it “a real revolution. The airspace belongs to the infantry fighter, 

too, and now he can get, on demand, an online image sent to 

his laptop computer by a UAV which flies wherever the company commander wants it to go.”88

Right Weapons, Wrong Way

The continual shifts in mission emphasis and platform employment, the domestic and international sensitivity to IAF operations, and the internal debates regarding targets and tactics 

demonstrated the challenges confronting the IAF as it attempted 

to apply airpower in the new context. Part of the difficulty 

stemmed from the realization that the IAF—which had expected 

to receive over 50 percent of the Israeli defense budget throughout this decade—had been relegated to a secondary role in Ebb 

and Flow.89 Accustomed to functioning as the sole or decisive 

element in past Israeli operations, the IAF found itself scrambling for the right mix of roles, weapons, and platforms to reassert its relevance in what was, by its very nature, a groundcentric campaign. Although the IAF’s leaders have recognized 

that “this is a complex, multidimensional conflict, and the IAF 

is only part of it,”90 uncertainty regarding the nature of the 

enemy and the most effective way to fight him resulted in the 

adoption of missions that had a limited, or even counterproductive, impact on the campaign as a whole. 
14

One of the earliest examples of IAF ineffectiveness involved 

the initial focus of its offensive operations: attacks against the 

PA’s security infrastructure which, according to Ariel Sharon, 

were intended to exact “a price from those who were supposed 

to maintain security . . . and didn’t.”91 Following one of the largest IAF operations of Ebb and Flow, a two-day aerial offensive 

against PA facilities in retaliation for a HAMAS suicide bombing 

on 3 December 2001,

92 an IDF spokesman explained that “the 

purpose was to impose sharp military pressure, more than we 

allowed ourselves to apply up to now, at [Arafat] and at the PA’s 

political leadership, with the message: Folks, we are sick and 

tired, take responsibility for foiling terrorism.”93 However, these 

attacks against the PA’s security and political infrastructure—

over 200 of them by March 200294—severely degraded the PA’s 

ability to do just what the Israelis demanded. The IAF’s operations “took a serious toll on the capabilities of the PA security 

forces,”95 leaving its personnel to “roam the streets, stay at 

home or work from tents.”96 The Israeli government attempted 

to justify the intensifying attacks against the PA by declaring 

the organization “an entity which supports terrorism” due to its 

“incapability or irresponsibility” in stopping it.97 Perhaps the 

real reason, however, lay in the fact that the PA’s facilities were 

static structures whose locations were known to the IAF. As the 

same IDF spokesman admitted after the December 2001 attacks, “The main reason that direct HAMAS and Islamic Jihad 

targets were not attacked is because their military organization 

is secret or semi-secret. Therefore, they are not the type of targets that can be attacked in these kind of attacks.”98 Several 

IDF officers had earlier voiced their suspicions that another 

purpose lurked behind the aerial effort against PA facilities, 

namely, “the government’s need to placate domestic public 

opinion rather than any military goal.”99

Regarding the publicly stated purpose of such missions, to 

send “messages,” the results proved equally ambiguous. However, one episode in December 2001 might have proven illustrative. “We are not afraid,” a Palestinian policeman remarked 

that month as he sat at a café, shortly after an Israeli F-16 

strike destroyed his station. “This is normal, this is easy,” he 

continued, indicating that the IAF’s “message” had not been 

received by at least this member of the PA.100 That the pace of 
15

terrorist attacks and the resultant tally of Israeli deaths continued to climb—finally peaking in “Black March” 2002, when 136 

Israelis lost their lives—suggested that the message had not 

been received by the Palestinian militant groups either.101

Increasing attacks against the Palestinian weapons infrastructure produced similarly disappointing results. IAF strikes 

against weapons depots, production sites, and suspected entrances to smuggling tunnels rose steadily from 2000 to 2004, 

ultimately accounting for the third-largest share of IAF attack 

sorties.102 During that same period—and despite the intensifying IAF effort—Palestinian mortar and rocket attacks continued to increase each year. Mortar shelling, for example, more 

than doubled between 2001 and 2004, peaking at 1,139 incidents, while rocket attacks nearly doubled to 232 between 2003 

and 2004.103 Though significantly less lethal than suicide 

bombings, Palestinian mortars, rockets, and roadside bombs 

accounted for one-third of Israeli fatalities in 2004.104

Right Weapons, Right Way

Despite the setbacks, embarrassments, and outright failures 

the IAF suffered during Ebb and Flow, the successes it achieved—

albeit belatedly—testified to impressive improvements in mission areas that will likely remain valid in any future conflict. 

One of the most profound IAF achievements resulted from its 

years-long quest to shorten the sensor-to-shooter loop. Although the IAF relied heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT) 

for the initial identification and location of targets, particularly 

individuals,105 RPAs proved themselves critical during operational execution. “[Finding] that small amount of time when the 

guy qualifies as a target, that’s what RPAs are all about,” 200 

Squadron’s deputy commander remarked in May 2002.106 However, that “small amount of time” often expired before weapons 

could be brought to bear against the target. As Ya’akov Amidror, 

the former head of the IDF’s Intelligence Branch, remarked in 

2005, “Since the shelf life of every report is very brief, you have 

to get the report very fast to someone who can do something 

with it—arrest, kill, set an ambush, whatever.”107 The situation 

was complicated by the IDF’s initial methods of disseminating 
16

RPA–acquired intelligence: the RPA downloaded its video to a 

ground station, which then forwarded the data to the IAF’s command center for further forwarding via voice transmission to 

IAF fighters or attack helicopters.108 To correct this deficiency, 

the IAF began to equip its combat helicopters with an indigenously developed data link to deliver real-time RPA video directly to the helicopter crews, reducing the time required between target acquisition and destruction in confined urban 

areas.109 A similar effort to relay real-time RPA imagery to ground 

units, spurred by difficulties encountered during the fierce West 

Bank fighting in the spring of 2002, reached fruition in mid2004.110 Shortly thereafter, Israeli UCAS operations had reportedly begun over the Occupied Territories, representing the ultimate shortening of the sensor-to-shooter loop.111

The initial results of the Israeli effort to shorten the loop promised dramatic improvements in IAF mission effectiveness, particularly when engaging Palestinians “caught in the act” of preparing or conducting attacks. From 2000 to 2003, for example, 

the IAF successfully struck a mere seven Palestinian snipers, 

roadside bomb teams, or rocket and mortar squads, either during or immediately after conducting operations. In 2004, thanks 

to Israeli sensor-to-shooter innovations, that number jumped to 

27 (see appendices A and B). During one such mission in August 2004, the IAF for the first time successfully identified and 

destroyed a Qassam rocket launcher prior to launch, leading 

the new IAF commander, Maj Gen Elyezer Shkedy, to proclaim 

“the IAF is ‘paving the way’ in integrating intelligence with offensive actions.”112 Streamlining the sensor-to-shooter loop has 

also enabled the IAF to shorten its planning and execution cycle 

for targeted killing operations, a process that once took “long 

weeks, sometimes months” but by late 2003 required only “several hours” from target selection to engagement.113

Perhaps the most compelling testimony to the success of Israel’s efforts to integrate operations and intelligence, however, 

is the Palestinian response. Recognizing their worsening prospects for successfully evading Israeli surveillance and targeting, HAMAS members in particular began taking active measures to foil aerial observation. Said HAMAS leader Nizar Rayan 

in November 2004, HAMAS operatives “must walk under a 

cover of cloth or any protection to avoid being seen by the 
17

Israeli UAVs.”114 In fact, entire streets in the Jabaliyah refugee 

camp were reportedly covered with canopies to prevent RPA 

surveillance. “HAMAS squads today calculate their moves not 

only to avoid falling into an IDF ambush,” one Israeli observer 

commented, “but also to avoid being spotted from the air.”115

Improvements in intelligence and dissemination have contributed to another IAF success story: the tighter integration of 

air assets into ground operations. While Israeli officers on both 

sides of the air-ground fence have advocated “combined combat” operations since the 1973 war, the term remained “merely 

a slogan” until the latter stages of Ebb and Flow. Prior to then, 

in fact, the IDF’s Ground Forces Command had jokingly referred to the IAF as a “foreign but friendly power,” reflecting an 

inherent distrust and stubborn autonomy resulting from past 

disappointments on the battlefield.116 These concerns were reinforced during the first test of the IAF’s evolving urban warfare 

doctrine during Operation Defensive Shield, the March–April 

2002 offensive against Palestinian militant strongholds in the 

West Bank. The air force’s contributions appeared piecemeal 

and “old school,” according to one observer, partially due to the 

IAF’s unfamiliarity with operations against mobile targets, often individual Palestinians, in concealed and congested areas. 

Brig Gen Shlomo Mashiach, commander of the IAF’s Helicopter 

Division, acknowledged that urban operations in support of 

ground forces “involve a change in doctrine and training, as attack helicopters weren’t built for urban warfare.”117 While helicopters and RPAs maintained constant presence in support of 

the ground forces, the Israeli infantry still took the lead and 

bore the brunt of any Palestinian resistance.118

That model had changed by 2004, particularly by October 

when the IDF initiated Operation Days of Penitence to clear suspected rocket launch positions in the Gaza Strip. This time, the 

IAF took the lead—literally—by sending attack helicopters ahead 

of the ground forces to prosecute sources of resistance identified by orbiting RPAs, rather than reactively employing them in 

support of troops in contact. In effect, the IAF erected an aerial 

“bubble” that moved over and ahead of the ground forces, identifying and engaging hazards before the ground forces encountered them. The end effect, according to the IDF, was what it 

called a “thin medium”—a ground operation that elicited a 
18

militant Palestinian response, which was then destroyed from 

the air before it could threaten the Israeli ground forces.119

The difficulties involved in this level of integration proved immense but not insurmountable. The IAF and the GFC had to 

learn to combine their planning and intelligence processes 

while working out the complexities of truly joint execution. In 

preparation, senior IAF commanders began regular liaison visits to ground force headquarters, while newly assigned ground 

force commanders were put through a “thorough” training program at IAF headquarters. In practice, by October 2004 the 

Gaza Brigade commander had a direct communication feed to 

both the IAF command center and the squadron commander in 

charge of the assets supporting him.120 Ultimately, the two services both had to make “real adjustments” to a split-command 

arrangement which gave the ground forces commander tactical 

control of air elements supporting him while the IAF command 

center wielded veto authority over those decisions. The results, 

however, spelled a pair of firsts for the IDF’s Ebb and Flow experience: helicopter gunships inflicted half of the losses incurred among Palestinian militants during Days of Penitence, 

while Israeli ground forces did not sustain a single fatality.121

The Wild Card

Despite its increasing effectiveness in ground support operations, the IAF continued to draw considerable heat for its most 

controversial mission—the so-called targeted killings. Like Palestinian suicide bombings, Israeli assassination operations had 

been a gruesome, albeit infrequent, aspect of the Arab-Israeli 

dynamic since the early 1990s.122 That changed in November 

2000, when Israel began a systematic campaign to hunt down 

and neutralize individual Palestinian militants. “When we say 

that we will punish the murders and we will prevent terror attacks, we really mean it,” Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim 

Sheh announced the following month. “The most effective and 

just way to deal with terror is the elimination or incarceration 

of the people who lead these organizations.”123

Since then, Israeli authorities have consistently claimed the 

assassination component of Ebb and Flow served a preventive, 
19

not punitive, purpose. In September 2001, for example, Halutz 

noted that “Both the Bible and the Old Testament say: First slay 

him who would slay you. This rule was formulated against the 

terrorists of ancient history, and it remains valid to this day.”124

The IAF ultimately became the “service of choice” for such missions, and it conducted the majority of successful assassination operations through March 2004.125 By that September, IAF 

commander Shkedy even described targeted killings as “our 

main mission.”126 Not only had the IAF assumed a progressively 

greater role in the targeted killing effort, by its own account the 

service had grown better at it. In January 2005, Shkedy claimed 

that the IAF had achieved an 80 percent success rate in aerial 

assassinations during 2004, compared with 50 percent the previous year. Furthermore, these operations reportedly resulted 

in only one civilian casualty for every 12 militants eliminated, 

which Shkedy described as an “effective surgical level.”127 IAF 

precision reportedly improved still further in 2005, with only a 

single civilian fatality for every 28 targeted killing operations 

conducted by the IAF during that year.128

Official Israeli sources—and some Palestinians—claim the 

liquidation campaign has severely constrained the terrorists’ 

ability to conduct attacks.129 One Israeli analyst, for example, 

claimed that the primary reason behind the decline of HAMAS’ 

capability to conduct suicide bombings within Israel proper 

owed to the ongoing arrest and assassination campaign. “Their 

rotating leadership is expending all its energy hiding. They are 

afraid of Israel hitting them which makes any sort of sophisticated planning difficult,” said Dr. Shimon Bar, a senior research 

fellow at the Israeli Institute for Policy and Strategy.130 A senior 

HAMAS official, Ishmail Haniyeh, indirectly agreed by acknowledging, “HAMAS might have a crisis on its hands after losing its 

leaders,” referring to the successive assassinations of Sheikh 

Yasin and his successor, Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Rantisi.131 Additionally, one of the leaders of the underground al-Aqsa Martyrs 

Brigade (AMB) indicated that both his organization and HAMAS

had been badly hurt by Israel’s liquidation of key personnel, 

particularly their most experienced bomb makers.132

If the Israeli government’s measure of success was “prevention,” however, the effectiveness of the overall liquidation effort—and the IAF’s part in it—could not be accurately gauged, 
20

as Ebb and Flow began to more or less permanently ebb in 

early 2005. The oft-cited decline in suicide bombings and Israeli fatalities since 2002 could be attributed to any combination of additional factors, including improved border and “seam 

zone” security, more aggressive ground operations in the Occupied Territories, and general war-weariness among the Palestinian public. What could be easily assessed were the negative impacts of the aerial assassination campaign, given the 

collateral damage inflicted during the course of these operations. According to one report published in 2003, more than 

two-thirds of all unintended Palestinian fatalities inflicted during Ebb and Flow resulted from the IAF’s targeted killing efforts.133 In particular, “the bomb in Gaza that killed 14 innocent people left a very profound impact on Israelis,” according 

to one Israeli political scientist.134 Such self-examination has 

certainly contributed to the weakening public support for the 

IAF’s targeted killing campaign and the internal friction that 

resulted in the “pilots’ mutiny.” 

Even so, IDF officials continued to regard targeted killings “a 

valuable counter-terrorist tactic that cannot easily be replaced.”135 Since it often appeared impossible to bring the terrorists to justice, some Israeli officials contended that “justice 

must be brought to them. For Israel this means killing them—

not as punishment or revenge, but to prevent future terrorism.”136 Moral arguments aside, the IAF certainly did make 

considerable progress in perfecting its ability to prosecute this 

option against identified militants and terrorist leaders. This 

ability, in turn, derived from improved intelligence collection, 

an abbreviated sensor-to-shooter loop, and innovative weapons that permitted greater operator control until impact. As 

incremental as those innovations might appear, their aggregate 

effect on the course of Israel’s counterterrorist campaign helped 

determine the conditions for its eventual—though relative and 

imperfect—success. 

Looking for Lessons

At the end of the day, everyone wearing a uniform, anywhere, 

understands that “what worked last time” is merely history. To 
21

truly understand what will work this time, in this conflict, 

events typically must first go wrong in epic fashion. The lessons of one conflict do not always—in fact, do not ever—translate wholesale into the conduct of another. However, even if 

history does not repeat itself, it sometimes rhymes, and the 

IAF’s hard-won experience may offer some lessons of worth to 

the American airpower community. 

First, airpower will not always enjoy first billing despite past 

successes—however spectacular—or institutional expectations 

of primacy in future conflicts. Most observers of COIN recognize that the military effort represents only a small part of an 

overall campaign, and an insufficient one by itself; airpower, in 

turn, comprises a relatively thin slice of that military effort. I 

prefer to discuss this reality in terms of what I call the “martini 

metaphor.” The liquid refreshment at the core of the drink (and 

Military Force

Air-delivered

Firepower

Good governance,

basic services,

law and order,

relative prosperity, etc. C O N T E X T

Airpower in COIN—the “martini metaphor”
22

the key reason most customers purchase one) is composed primarily of nonmilitary tasks, end states, and intermediate objectives, such as good governance, relative prosperity, and the 

like—all aimed at addressing valid grievances within the relevant population. The olive swimming in a typical martini represents the relative contribution of military force in its most familiar role of force application (as opposed to supporting civil 

authorities, for example). As for air-delivered firepower, one 

may equate that to the pimento in the olive. The glass itself 

bounds the context of COIN; contextual factors may include 

cultural, physical, economic, environmental, demographic, legal, and political realties and/or limitations, for example. The 

point to remember, however, is that no two martinis are ever 

exactly alike. Glasses vary in shape, size, and capacity. Gin, 

vodka, and variable amounts of vermouth or worse may take 

up most of the volume. Olives, and pimento, are optional and 

often displaced by a pickled onion. It all depends on the customer’s preference, the bartender’s skill, and whatever is available on the counter behind the bar. However, although no two 

are exactly alike, some truths have evolved in the long history 

of both martini-mixing and COIN. 

For example, when supporting a campaign whose success 

will likely be decided by popular sentiment and facts on the 

ground, most counterinsurgent forces have recognized that 

ground forces achieve the most productive effects of any armed 

service. Airpower’s most significant roles in COIN have thus 

historically derived from its support to those ground forces, for 

when the grunts lose, everybody loses. Additionally, airpower’s 

most predominant and essential contributions to COIN have 

typically not been measured in the amount of ordnance delivered or the number of insurgents killed, but in the freedom of 

action provided to ground forces and civilian elements involved 

in the COIN effort. Thus airlift, psychological operations, ISR, 

and medical evacuation—rather than airpower’s more kinetic 

manifestations—have been repeatedly recognized as the most 

significant air force contributions to successful COIN operations from Malaya to El Salvador. Conversely, overreliance on 

air-delivered firepower has plagued COIN operations throughout the postwar era, from the French in North Africa to current 

American efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.137
23

Though the IAF initially disdained its “secondary” and relatively unglamorous support roles early in the intifada, by 2004 

its attitude and capabilities had matured to the point where it 

could play a critical part in ground-centric operations, however 

contributory that part remained. The IDF Ground Forces Command may have called the shots, but the IAF eventually learned 

how to deliver them—literally and figuratively—and to do so 

with decisive effect. First, however, the IAF had to recognize 

that even in an emphatically “ground theater,” airpower’s supporting role did not necessarily translate into “irrelevance” or 

“ineffectiveness.” The IAF’s institutional challenge lay in figuring out where and how airpower worked best, often against a 

steep and painful learning curve, and then getting it done. 

To get it done, however, airpower practitioners must first 

know what to do it to. In counterterrorist and COIN operations, 

that “what” is often more accurately a “who.” As former Israeli 

intelligence chief Amidror correctly observed, “The objective in 

the war on terrorism is people—the main weapon of terrorist 

organizations.”138 Considerable moral debate will continue to 

complicate operations explicitly intended to target specific individuals, particularly given the risks of collateral damage when 

such individuals are to be found in heavily populated areas. As 

one Israeli commentator noted bitterly, “Once the IDF adopted 

the stupid method of shooting missiles into densely populated 

centers, the writing was on the wall that children would be 

killed. It’s not that they were killed by accident. It was inevitable from the start.”139 Sadly, unintended civilian deaths will 

likely remain an inevitable fact of warfare for the foreseeable 

future, particularly when enemy personnel deliberately put civilians at risk by operating in their midst. Nonetheless, the IAF 

experience has demonstrated that the combination of responsive and flexible attack assets, precision weapons tailored to 

the urban battlespace, and real-time intelligence dissemination architectures affords airpower practitioners the capability 

to strike the right people—and a reasonable chance of striking 

only the right people. 

That last point is significant and warrants additional emphasis. As forms of asymmetric warfare, terrorist and guerrilla operations are often undertaken in hopes of provoking a disproportionate response from government forces. But excessive 
24

force in its own right, as well as the collateral damage it often 

causes, can result in very real, practical, and negative effects 

on future operations. To apply the minimum required force 

against precisely the right targets, COIN practitioners need intelligence—not just intelligence on the right subjects, but the 

right kind of intelligence on those subjects. For example, RPAs 

may be useful in tracking and fixing tactical targets, or identifying snipers on the next rooftop, or spotting an ambush around 

the corner in a crowded refugee camp. Reconnaissance satellites are likewise useful in gathering information about what 

was where, when said satellite last passed over a given area. 

What neither platform can provide is an actionable prediction 

of what will be where at a given time in the future. For airpower—or any power—to be effective in the COIN fight, a fight 

against people, its operators need people to provide the initial 

tip-off. Unfortunately, the United States’ HUMINT resources, 

though dramatically improved since 2001, still lag far behind 

those of an insurgent holed up in the apartment building he 

has called home for years. Ours may never be as good as his, 

but it does not have to be. We do not need to know the layout 

of that neighborhood as well as he does—we only have to know 

which door to kick in, or which window to put a missile into, 

and whether or not civilians might be placed in harm’s way in 

the process. Unfortunately, no technical solution is likely to 

provide us with that information. If anything ever does, it will 

typically come to us on two legs. 

In the end, however, the emphasis on weapons, platforms, 

strategies, and doctrines—along with many other potential assets in the COIN toolbox—must take a backseat to a more fundamental concern: namely, that it is not as important to scramble for “answers” to immediate military problems as it is to ask 

the right questions. This does not mean that urgent tactical 

and operational needs ought not to be met, particularly when 

soldiers’ and civilians’ lives are at stake. It does mean that to 

win a protracted struggle, the kind of fight that most appeals to 

insurgents, the architects of any COIN effort should invest the 

time and skull sweat to look at the whats, the whys, and the 

hows, even if the who and the where are well known and the 

extent of the when is unknowable. 
25

The first questions relate to an often overlooked reality: 

namely, that all insurgency is theater, regardless of the methods 

and tactics the insurgents employ. They seek to exert a psychological effect on the population, the government, COIN forces, 

and the “global audience” (the international media, international 

organizations, potential or actual allies and sponsors of both 

sides, and so on). The savvy COIN architect must consequently 

ask, “Who is the audience?” This includes collateral audiences 

who do not initially have a stake in the contest but may acquire 

an interest as a result of subsequent events. One should next 

ask, “What is the message I wish to convey to that audience?” 

Both questions must be satisfactorily answered before one can 

even consider the method of delivery because, to some audiences, the delivery itself supersedes the intended message. Indeed, in some contexts the delivery is the message, whether intended as such or not. The Israelis may indeed have intended 

their initial air strikes to “signal” the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to rein in HAMAS and similar-minded groups. 

The message received in the Palestinian camps, however, was 

that the Israelis have no qualms about bombing and strafing 

helpless refugees, and for no apparent military purpose.

When developing the message and deciding on the method of 

delivery, it is crucially important to ask, “What does my enemy 

want?” This is a question the Israelis manifestly failed to consider throughout their campaign in the Occupied Territories, 

particularly where airpower was concerned. Granted, at a broad 

strategic level, Israel understood that its enemies wanted to 

dismantle the Jewish state and replace it with an Arab or Islamic polity (depending on the group in question)—something 

Tel Aviv could never be expected to countenance. That, however, was the extent of Israel’s apparent understanding. If the 

course of the subsequent military campaign is any indication, 

Israel and its armed forces failed to consider the operational 

and tactical outcomes those groups sought to advance their 

goal. Only belatedly did they realize that groups like HAMAS 

and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad wanted “martyrs”—civilian 

as well as militant—which the IAF did much to provide. They 

wanted a weakened PLO and Palestinian Authority, which 

again the IAF eagerly handed them. They wanted visible evidence of Israeli military activity in crowded, predominantly 
26

civilian urban areas, and few things are more visible than a 

bombed-out city block. They also wanted to provoke a disproportionate response, and what could be more disproportionate 

than an F-16 dropping a 2,000-lb bomb on an apartment building? The IDF—and the IAF in particular—still grapples with 

these and similar considerations, if the 2006 war against Hezbollah and the recent campaign in Gaza are any indication. The 

Israeli military, and its air force, continue to give their enemies 

exactly what they want whenever bullets fly and bombs fall. 

Given that those forces have demonstrated their skill, bravery, 

and intelligence in countless past operations, the only conclusion can be that they are asking the wrong—or at least outdated and irrelevant—questions. 

This may represent the most important lesson of Ebb and 

Flow, one which militaries accustomed to victory have learned 

to their detriment throughout history: it is dangerous at least, 

and fatal at worst, to organize, train, and equip one’s forces to 

fight the wrong war. For the bulk of Israel’s history, its enemies 

have ostensibly sought to drive its people into the sea through 

the employment of numerically superior conventional forces. 

Consequently, Israel traditionally won its wars by destroying 

enemy armored columns, strafing and bombing enemy infantry, knocking enemy airfields out of action, and shooting down 

enemy planes before that enemy could do the same. Fifty years 

of martial experience had taught the IAF that the F-15I, the 

F-16I, and the Arrow ABM were the tools required to wage twentyfirst-century war. In its first conflict of that century, however, the 

IAF found itself relying on 1970s-vintage helicopters and homegrown RPAs to mount something approaching an effective response to an enemy employing positively medieval methods. 

The degree of that enemy’s motivation can be characterized 

in the same historical light, for Saladin’s self-proclaimed successors today fight with the same vigor and sense of righteousness as their predecessors who battled Byzantines, Crusaders, 

Mongols, and more modern would-be conquerors. The Israelis 

face a daunting task if their continued intent is to kill or deter 

anyone who acts—or may someday act—on that impulse. It 

would prove almost as difficult to take away enough of the tools 

of the trade to make a real difference. The Israelis may destroy 

as many rocket launchers or IED labs as they can find or seize 
27

as many weapons caches as they might be fortunate enough to 

uncover. Perhaps they might even find ways to effectively 

staunch the flow of weapons into insurgent coffers. As yet, 

however, no counterinsurgent effort in history has succeeded 

in locating, destroying, or interdicting enough insurgents or 

insurgent “stuff” to cripple an insurgency itself. Insurgency is a 

form of warfare waged by and for minds, and those of Israel’s 

enemies have proven to be distressingly crafty, resourceful, 

and exceptionally resilient in their angst. In that kind of fight, 

any military organization conditioned to thinking of success in 

terms of enemies killed and assets destroyed automatically begins from a position of profound disadvantage. Stubborn persistence in such “conventional” thinking, in which both objectives and results are measured by the most elementary and 

irrelevant of metrics, only compounds the initial handicap. 

For air forces in particular, such thinking is regrettably close 

to second nature. Blowing things up, or shooting them down, 

is what air forces do, and some do it exceptionally well. However expert their execution of such activities, the sad fact remains that they alone will not serve the ultimate objectives of 

any COIN campaign, except perhaps one of utter annihilation. 

Once again, insurgency and its opposite are more about perceptions than PGMs; more about understanding than overmatch; in other words, more about minds than might. Consequently, an air force that seeks evidence of “success” in 

transitory overhead images or snapshot gun-camera footage, 

rather than in the indirect and maddeningly gradual developments that herald true progress, will inevitably face a learning 

curve not only steep, but vertical. Regrettably, no amount of 

thrust can be sufficient to overcome the crippling weight of 

such intellectual and institutional inertia. 

Notes

1. In transliterated Hebrew, “Heyl ha’Avir.”

2. Lon Nordeen, Fighters over Israel (New York: Orion Books, 1990), 71. 

3. Sometimes translated from the Hebrew as “Changing Tides,” but official 

English-language IDF publications use the term “Ebb and Flow.” See, for 

example, “ ‘Ebb and Flow’—A Summary of 2004,” 2005, http://www1.idf.il/

sip_storage/dover/files/6/37876.pdf.
28

4. Translated from the Arabic as a “shaking off” or “awakening.” “Intifada,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition, 2000, http://www.bartleby.com/61/15/I0201575.html. Within Israeli 

circles, the second intifada is sometimes referred to as the “Oslo War,” an accusatory allusion to the 1994 Oslo Accords that granted the Palestinian Authority a modicum of autonomy in matters of governance and security.

5. “The IAF’s Missions,” 2003, http://www.iaf.org.il/iaf/doa_iis.dll/

Serve/item/English/1.3.2.1.html. 

6. David A. Fulghum and John D. Morrocco, “Israeli Air Force to Grow in 

Size, Power and Range,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 April 2000, 

63–64. 

7. This “barrier” included the Arrow ABM system, declared operational in 

2000; the F-15I Ra’am (“Thunder”) strike fighter, declared operational in 

1999; and the F-16I Sufa (“Storm”) strike fighter, ordered in 1999 and delivered beginning in 2003. Ibid.; “F-15I Ra’am (Thunder),” 2004, http://www

.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/f-15i.htm; and “F-16I Sufa (Storm),” 

2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/f-16i.htm. 

8. David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Israel Refocuses on Urban Warfare,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 May 2002, 24–25. 

9. Of note, the IAF controls all helicopters, not the IDF ground forces. 

Tzadoq Yehezqeli and Anat Tal-Shir, “I Have No Problem with Their Agonizing, 

but the Soul-Searching Ends When They Take to the Air,” Tel Aviv Yedi’ot 

Aharonot, 26 September 2003, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

(FBIS) report GMP20030926000213, https://www.opensource.gov.

10. Anat Weschler, “War of the Gunship Pilots,” Bit’on Heyl Ha’Avir, 1 December 2000, in FBIS report GMP20001228000099, https://www.open

source.gov.

11. David Eshel, “IDF Gets a ‘Wake-Up Call,’ ” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11

October 2000, 36. “TV Reports Israeli Helicopters Bombed Houses in Rafah,” 

Gaza Palestine Satellite Channel Television broadcast, 2 October 2000, FBIS 

report GMP20001002000296, https://www.opensource.gov. 

12. The number of IAF attack sorties is derived from the author’s compilation and analysis of multiple reports from Israeli, Palestinian, and international media. Primary sources include The Voice of Palestine radio network 

(Ramallah), The Voice of Israel Network B (Jerusalem), Gaza Palestine Satellite Channel Television, The Voice of Palestine (Bethlehem), Israel Television 

Channel 1 (Jerusalem), Israel Television Channel 2 (Jerusalem), Israel Defense Forces Radio (Tel Aviv), Tel Aviv Ha’aretz (Internet version), Israel Defense Forces News (Internet version), Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot, the Palestinian Information Center (Internet version), Gaza WAFA Palestine News Agency 

(Internet version), Agence France Presse North American Service, London 

Quds Press (Internet version), Jerusalem Post (Internet version), MENA Cairo 

News, Al-Birah Palestine Media Center (Internet version), Tel Aviv Ynet (Internet version), Tel Aviv Ma’ariv (Internet version), and Ramallah Al-Hayah alJadidah, as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, https://

www.opensource.gov. Additional information included in the author’s analysis of IAF activity was derived from multiple editions of the following English-
29

language sources: Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report, 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, The Journal of Palestine Studies, AirForces Monthly, 

Flight International, Israel Insider (Internet version, http://web.israelinsider

.com), London News Telegraph (Internet version, http://www.telegraph

.co.uk), British Broadcasting Service News (Internet version, http://www

.bbc.co.uk), World Tribune (Internet version, http://www.worldtribune.com), 

CNN World (Internet version, http://www.cnn.com), IPR Strategic Business 

Information Database, Israel Defense Forces News (Internet version, http://

www1.idf.il), Yahoo! News (Internet version, http://news.yahoo.com), USA 

Today (Internet version, http://www.usatoday.com), STRATFOR (Internet 

service, http://www.stratfor.com), Guardian Unlimited (Internet version, 

http://www.guardian.co.uk), Washington Post (Internet version, http://www

.washingtonpost.com), and EBSCO Host (Internet service, http://ejournals

.ebsco.com). 

13. “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Quick Facts,” 23 April 2003, http://www

.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/iraq/quick-facts.htm. 

14. These included such organizations as the militant Tanzim wing of Arafat’s Fatah organization and his elite bodyguard unit, Force-17.

15. Again, this characterization of IAF attack sorties is derived from the 

author’s compilation and analysis of multiple reports from Israeli, Palestinian, and international media. Primary sources include The Voice of Palestine 

radio network (Ramallah), The Voice of Israel Network B (Jerusalem), Gaza 

Palestine Satellite Channel Television, The Voice of Palestine (Bethlehem), 

Israel Television Channel 1 (Jerusalem), Israel Television Channel 2 (Jerusalem), Israel Defense Forces Radio (Tel Aviv), Tel Aviv Ha’aretz (Internet version), Israel Defense Forces News (Internet version), Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot, 

the Palestinian Information Center (Internet version), Gaza WAFA Palestine 

News Agency (Internet version), Agence France Presse North American Service, London Quds Press (Internet version), Jerusalem Post (Internet version), 

MENA Cairo News, Al-Birah Palestine Media Center (Internet version), Tel 

Aviv Ynet (Internet version), Tel Aviv Ma’ariv (Internet version), and Ramallah

Al-Hayah al-Jadidah, as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, https://www.opensource.gov. Additional information included in the 

author’s analysis of IAF activity was derived from multiple editions of the following English-language sources: Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jane’s Terrorism 

Watch Report, Jane’s Intelligence Review, The Journal of Palestine Studies, AirForces Monthly, Flight International, Israel Insider (http://web.israelinsider.

com), London News Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk), British Broadcasting Service News (http://www.bbc.co.uk), World Tribune (http://www

.worldtribune.com), CNN World (http://www.cnn.com), IPR Strategic Business Information Database, Israel Defense Forces News (http://www1

.idf.il), Yahoo! News (http://news.yahoo.com), USA Today (http://www

.usatoday.com), STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com), Guardian Unlimited 

(http://www.guardian.co.uk), Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost

.com), and EBSCO Host (http://ejournals.ebsco.com).

16. Amos Har’el, “Defending the Force,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 20 February 

2002, in FBIS report GMP2002022000061, https://www.opensource.gov.
30

17. Ellis Shuman, “Yasser Arafat Grounded after IDF Strikes at Helicopters 

and Airport,” 4 December 2001, http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/

security/articles/sec_0153.htm. 

18. Ellis Shuman, “Israeli Jets Strike Palestinian Territories for First Time,” 

20 May 2001, http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/security/articles/

sec_0046.htm. 

19. David Eshel, “Israel Refines Its Pre-emptive Approach to Counterterrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2002, 20. 

20. Shmu’el Gordon, “Coping, from a Security Perspective, with the Palestinians,” Tel Aviv Ma’arakhot, 1 December 2001, in FBIS report GMP2002020 

6000223, https://www.opensource.gov. 

21. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons 

from the Israeli Experience,” March 2003, http://www.homelandsecurity

.org/journal/articles/tucker-israel.html. 

22. Or “assassinations,” or “liquidations,” depending on the reader’s point 

of view. The author prefers to use these terms interchangeably in recognition 

that the result is the same regardless of terminology. 

23. Michele K. Kjorlien, “Chronology: 16 August–15 November 2000,” 

Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 2001, 213; and “Helicopter Fires at Palestinian Car with Armed Al-Tanzim, Kills 1,” Voice of Israel Network B, 9 November 2000, in FBIS report GMP20001109000065, https://www.open

source.gov. 

24. “Chronology: 16 August–15 November 2001,” Journal of Palestine 

Studies, Winter 2002, 184. 

25. “Israel Declares All-Out War on HAMAS: Army Radio,” Paris AFP North 

American Service, in FBIS report GMP20030612000065, https://www.open

source.gov. 

26. Arieh O’Sullivan, “IDF Changes Definition of ‘Ticking Bomb,’ ” Jerusalem Post, 13 September 2004, in FBIS report GMP20040913000143, https://

www.opensource.gov. 

27. In 2004, support to ground forces accounted for a few (four) more reported IAF attack sorties than did targeted killings. Data is derived from the 

author’s review of regional and international media, as described in note 12. 

28. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israeli Gunships, Troops Team for Pinpoint 

Strikes,” Defense News, 21 April 2003, 28. 

29. Ben Kaspit, “Liquidating Ourselves to Death,” Tel Aviv Ma’ariv, 5 October 2003, in FBIS report GMP20031005000079, https://www.opensource

.gov.

30. Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, “IAF to Modify Helos to Fight in 

Cities,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 May 2002, 27; and Yehezqeli 

and Tal-Shir, “I Have No Problem with Their Agonizing.”

31. Yehezqeli and Tal-Shir, “I Have No Problem with Their Agonizing.” Additional data is derived from the author’s review of regional and international 

media, as described in note 12.

32. “Briefing by Maj Gen Dan Halutz, Israel Air Force Commander; Mr. 

Danny Ayalon, political advisor to the prime minister,” 6 April 2002, http://

www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01gz0. 
31

33. Anat Weschler, “War of the Gunship Pilots.” 

34. Jim Hedge, “Middle East in Free Fall,” AirForces Monthly, December 

2000, 54. 

35. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Briefing by Major General Giora Eiland, 

Head of the IDF Operations Branch, to the Foreign Press Association,” 20 

May 2001, in FBIS report GMP20010521000217, https://www.opensource

.gov. 

36. Edward Pilkington, “Israel Admits F-16 Attack Was Flawed,” Guardian, 23 May 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Israel/Story/0,2763,4950 

18,00,html.

37. No’am Ofir and Li’or Schlein, “End of the Conflict Is not Near,” Bit’on 

Heyl Ha’Avir, 29 October 2001, in FBIS report GMP20011029000175, 

https://www.opensource.gov. 

38. “Israeli Military Officials: ‘Mistake’ to Drop Ton Bomb from F-16 to Kill 

Shihadah,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 24 July 2002, in FBIS report 20020724000181, 

https://www.opensource.gov. 

39. “Israel’s UAV Makers Set Sights on New Horizons,” Interavia, March 

2001, 63–64. 

40. Roni Winkler, “Broadcasting from the Field,” Bit’on Heyl Ha’Avir, 29 

October 2001, in FBIS report GMP20011029000168, https://www.open

source.gov. 

41. Barbara Opall-Rome, “IAF Blends Reconnaissance, Targeting,” Defense 

News, 3 March 2003, 21.

42. Fulghum and Wall, “Israel Refocuses on Urban Warfare,” 25.

43. Nick Cook, “Out in Front,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 January 2002, 

25; and “Israel’s UAV Makers Set Sights on New Horizons,” Interavia, March 

2001, 64.

44. David A. Fulghum, “Israel Plans Expansion of Military UAV Use,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 4 September 2000, 72. 

45. “Israeli Military Successfully Detects, Neutralizes IEDs from Air,” Middle East Newsline, 9 July 2004, in FBIS report 20040609000201, https://

www.opensource. 

46. Gil Meltzer, “War by Remote Control,” Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot (Magazin Yon Ha’atzma’ut supplement), 26 April 2004, in FBIS report 

GMP20040426000146, https://www.opensource.gov. Attributing the term 

“aerial assassinations” to such a senior IDF official is unusual, suggesting a 

translation bias in this case. 

47. Michael Puttre, “The UAV Is Poised to Strike,” Journal of Electronic 

Defense, June 2001, 28; and Steve Rodan, “Israel Pursues Combat Drone 

Programmes,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 March 2002, 16.

48. Michael K. Esposito, “Chronology: 16 May–15 August 2004,” Journal 

of Palestine Studies, Autumn 2004, 184; and Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, 

“A Failed Assassination Attempt against a Group of Al-Qassem Mujahidin,” 7 

July 2004, in FBIS report 20040707000173, https://www.opensource

.gov. Additional data derived from the author’s review of regional and international media, as described in note 12.
32

49. “Israeli Surveillance Drones Are Thought to Be Armed,” International 

Herald Tribune, 15 September 2004, http://www.iht.com/articles/538914

.html.

50. Alon Ben-David, “Israel ‘Deploying More Armed UAVs in West Bank,’ ” 

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 October 2004, 14. 

51. “EU Report Says Israel Leader in Combat UAV, Unmanned Surface 

Vessel Technology,” Jerusalem Middle East Newsline, 6 December 2004, in 

FBIS report 20041206000223, https://www.opensource.gov; and “Israeli 

Surveillance Drones Are Thought to Be Armed.” 

52. “Israeli Surveillance Drones Are Thought to Be Armed.” 

53. Alon Ben-David, “Inner Conflict,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 September 

2004, 26. 

54. Amos Har’el and Amira Hass, “IDF Officers Criticize Helicopter Attacks,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 1 November 2000, in FBIS GMP20001101000105, 

https://www.opensource.gov.

55. Amos Har’el, “The General Staff Has Not Given Up on Arafat,” Tel Aviv 

Ha’aretz, 16 December 2001, in FBIS report GMP20011216000126, https://

www.opensource.gov. 

56. Anat Weschler, “War of the Gunship Pilots.” 

57. Arie Egozi, “Urban Warfare,” Flight International, 16–22 July 2002, 82. 

58. Steve Rodan, “Israel Wants to Replenish West Bank Weapons,” Jane’s 

Defence Weekly, 10 July 2002, 18. 

59. Yosi Yehoshu’a and Arie Egozi, “Air Force Buys Planes but Has No 

Money for Fuel,” Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot, 16 November 2003, in FBIS report 

GMP20031116000101, https://www.opensource.gov. 

60. Yosi Yehoshu’a, “Flying, but Scared,” Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot, 5 January 2004, in FBIS report GMP20040105000139, https://www.opensource

.gov.

61. David A. Fulghum, “Spying by the Hour,” Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, 16 June 2003, 144. 

62. Amir Rapaport, “The Risks of Targeted Killings,” Tel Aviv Ma’ariv, 16 

June 2006, in FBIS report GMP20060616754001, https://www.opensource

.gov.

63. Eytan Rabin et al., “IDF Decides No Need for Military Police Investigation of Pilot,” Tel Aviv Ma’ariv, 25 July 2002, in FBIS report GMP2002 

0725000110, https://www.opensource.gov; and “Israel Probe Reveals ‘Intelligence Failure,’ ” British Broadcasting Corporation News, 2 August 2002, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2169531.stm. 

64. Vered Levi-Barzilay, “The High and the Mighty,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 23 

August 2002, in FBIS report GMP20020823000137, https://www.open

source.gov. 

65. Amos Har’el, “Halutz: Pilots Refusing to Serve in Territories Will Face 

Law,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 25 September 2003, in FBIS report GMP2003 

0925000148, https://www.opensource.gov. 

66. Samah Jabr, “Israel’s Refusenik Pilots: Heroes of a Different Kind,” 

The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November 2003, 17. 
33

67. “Commander in Chief of the Israel Air Force (IAF): Political Objectionism Endangers Our Nation,” Israeli Defense Forces News, 25 September 

2003, http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?cir=1&sl=EN&id=7&d

ocid=22007. 

68. Jeffrey Heller, “Israel Reels at Pilots’ Refusal to Go on Missions,” Yahoo! 

News, 25 September 2003, http://story.news.yahoo.com/nes?tmpl=story&cid

=578&ncid=578&e=8&u=/nm/20030925/ts_nm/mideast_pilots_dc. 

69. Yehezqeli and Tal-Shir, “I Have No Problem with Their Agonizing.”

70. “Israeli Military Officials: ‘Mistake’ to Drop Ton Bomb.” 

71. Maj Gen Dani Halutz, “Jerusalem Issue Brief: 21st Century Threats 

Facing Israel,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, in FBIS report GMP2004 

0204000080, https://www.opensource.gov. 

72. Molly Moore, “Israel’s Lethal Weapon of Choice,” Palestine Media Center, 30 June 2003, http://www.countercurrents.org/pa-moore300603.htm. 

73. Anat Weschler, “War of the Gunship Pilots.” 

74. No’am Ofir and Li’or Shlein, “The Air Force Will Be Used Wherever It Is 

Most Effective to Accomplish the Mission,” Bit’on Heyl Ha’Avir, 26 April 2001, 

in FBIS report GMP20010426000181, https://www.opensource.gov.

75. David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “UAVs Validated in West Bank 

Fight,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 May 2003, 26.

76. Wall and Fulghum, “IAF to Modify Helos to Fight in Cities,” 13.

77. “Centre Stage,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 May 2002, 26. 

78. “Israel Reportedly Using New ‘Lower Collateral Damage’ Missile against 

HAMAS,” Jerusalem Middle East Newsline, 4 September 2003, in FBIS report 

GMP20030904000164, https://www.opensource.gov; and Ran Dagoni, “Israel Air Force Introduces Rafael UAV-Launched Missile,” Rishon Leziyyon 

Globes, 3 June 2004, in FBIS report GMP20040603000200, https://www

.opensource.gov.

79. Dagoni, “Israel Air Force Introduces Rafael UAV-Launched Missile.” 

80. “Israel Reportedly Using New ‘Lower Collateral Damage’ Missile against 

HAMAS.” 

81. Israel began discussions to acquire the JDAM in 1997, three years 

prior to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada. “Israel Places First Non-US 

JDAM Order,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 October 2000, 15; and Ran Rosenberg, “Air Enterprises,” Bit’on Heyl Ha’Avir, 1 February 2003, in FBIS report 

GMP20030217000214, https://www.opensource.gov. 

82. Ran Rosenberg, “From the Cockpit One Could Clearly See the Lights 

of Damascus,” Bit’on Heyl Ha’Avir, 28 October 2003, in FBIS report GMP2003 

1028000205, https://www.opensource.gov. 

83. No’am Ofir and Roni Winkler, “A Window of Opportunity for Combat 

Helicopters,” Bit’on Heyl Ha’Avir, 29 October 2001, in FBIS report GMP2001

1029000182, https://www.opensource.gov. 

84. Steve Rodan, “IAF Seeks Non-Lethal Options,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

15 May 2002, 20.

85. Steve Rodan, “IAF Seeks Tactical UAV,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 January 2001, 16.
34

86. “Rafael Conducts Successful Trial Flight of the Skylark ShoulderLaunched Mini-UAV,” 17 February 2004, http://www.rafael.co.il/web/raf

new/news/news-190204.htm.

87. “Israel Military Deploys Mini-UAVs to W. Bank, Gaza; To Provide 3-D 

Terrain View,” Jerusalem Middle East Newsline, 24 September 2004, in FBIS 

report GMP20040924000225; and Amir Buhbut, “A UAV for Every Infantry 

Battalion—Not a Pipe Dream,” Tel Aviv Ma’ariv, 28 February 2005, in FBIS 

report GMP20050301000019, https://www.opensource.gov.

88. Buhbut, “A UAV for Every Infantry Battalion.”

89. “Centre Stage,” 26.

90. Quote by then-IAF chief of staff Brig Gen Amos Yadlin. Amos Har’el, 

“Defending the Force,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 20 February 2002, in FBIS report 

GMP20020220000061, https://www.opensource.gov. 

91. Michele K. Kjorlien, “Chronology: 16 February–15 May 2001,” Journal 

of Palestine Studies, Summer 2001, 181.

92. “Chronology: 16 November 2001–15 February 2002,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 2002, 175. 

93. “IDF Says Military Pressure on Arafat, PA to Escalate until Act against 

Terrorism,” Voice of Israel Network B, 4 December 2001, in FBIS report 

GMP20011204000212, https://www.opensource.gov. 

94. Data is derived from the author’s review of regional and international 

media, as described in note 12.

95. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Actors in the Conflict: The Palestinian 

Factions Aligned with the Palestinian Authority,” chap. 7, Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War, 23 February 2005, 4, http://www.csis

.org/features/EscalatingToNoWhere/Ch07.pdf. 

96. Megan K. Stack and Rebecca Trounson, “Peace Plan May Hinge on 

Security Force in Disarray,” Los Angeles Times, 3 June 2003. Cited in Cordesman, “Actors in the Conflict,” 5.

97. Alan Philps, “Grounded Arafat Besieged by Israel,” News Telegraph, 5 

December 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/ 

2001/12/05/wmid05.xml. 

98. “IDF Says Military Pressure on Arafat, PA to Escalate until Act against 

Terrorism,” Voice of Israel Network B, 4 December 2001, in FBIS report 

GMP20011204000212, https://www.opensource.gov.

99. Amos Har’el and Amira Hass, “IDF Officers Criticize Helicopter Attacks,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 1 November 2000, in FBIS report GMP20001101

000105, https://www.opensource.gov.

100. Dan Beaulieu and Guillaume Bonnet, “Effect of Israeli Bombing on 

Gaza Residents,” Paris AFP North American Service, 13 December 2001, in 

FBIS report GMP20011213000012, https://www.opensource.gov. 

101. “ ‘Ebb and Flow.’ ” 

102. Data derived from the author’s review of regional and international 

media as described in note 12.

103. “ ‘Ebb and Flow.’ ”

104. Ibid.
35

105. In September 2004, for example, a Palestinian Security Agency member was arrested for, and reportedly admitted to, meeting with IAF officers “to 

pinpoint the locations of some Palestinian targets the Israeli Air Force was 

planning to raid.” Imad al-Ifranji, “PA Security Agency Member Charged with 

Collaborating with Israeli Intelligence,” Jerusalem al-Quds, 8 September 

2004, in FBIS report GMP20040909000063, https://www.opensource.gov.

106. Fulghum and Wall, “UAVs Validated in West Bank Fight,” 26.

107. Maj Gen Jacob Amidror (lecture at Tel Aviv University, 22 February 

2005), in FBIS report GMG20050310000137, https://www.opensource.gov. 

108. Fulghum and Wall, “UAVs Validated in West Bank Fight”; and Arie 

Egozi, “UAV Datalink Gives Israeli Helicopters Combat Edge,” Flight International, 6–12 April 2002, 20. 

109. Egozi, “UAV Datalink,” 20. 

110. “Israeli Military Successfully Detects, Neutralizes IEDs from Air,” Jerusalem Middle East Newsline, 9 July 2004, in FBIS report GMP2004 

0609000201, https://www.opensource.gov; and Fulghum and Wall, “UAVs 

Validated in West Bank Fight.” 

111. Michael K. Esposito, “Chronology: 16 May–15 August 2004,” Journal 

of Palestine Studies, Autumn 2004, 184; and Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, 

“A Failed Assassination Attempt against a Group of Al-Qassem Mujahidin,” 7 

July 2004, in FBIS report 20040707000173, https://www.opensource.gov.

112. Alex Fishman, “Don’t Hear, Don’t See, Don’t Know,” Tel Aviv Yedi’ot 

Aharonot (“Leshabat” supplement), 6 August 2004, in FBIS report 

20040806000103; and Arieh O’Sullivan, “We Should Send Another Astronaut,” Jerusalem Post (“Up Front” supplement), 15 September 2004, in FBIS 

report GMP20040915000269, https://www.opensource.gov. 

113. Ben Kaspit, “Liquidating Ourselves to Death,” Tel Aviv Ma’ariv, 5 October 2003, in FBIS report GMP20031005000079, https://www.opensource

.gov.

114. “HAMAS Reportedly to Develop First Palestinian Anti-Aircraft Missile,” Jerusalem Middle East Newsline, 17 November 2004, in FBIS report 

GMP20041117000142, https://www.opensource.gov. 

115. Ofer Shelah, “Dilemmas in the Air,” Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot (Leshabat supplement), 22 October 2004, in FBIS report 20041022000152, https://

www.opensource.gov. 

116. Ibid.

117. “Israel to Draft Air Doctrine for Urban Warfare,” Jerusalem Middle 

East Newsline, 26 April 2002, in FBIS report GMP20020426000215, https://

www.opensource.gov. 

118. “Israeli Urban Warfare Doctrine Assessed,” Jerusalem Middle East 

Newsline, 11 April 2002, in FBIS report GMP20020411000266, https://

www.opensource.gov; and David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Israel’s Future Includes Armed, Long-Range UAVs,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 June 2002, 83.

119. Shelah, “Dilemmas in the Air.”

120. Ibid.
36

121. Amos Har’el, “IAF Role Grew during Days of Penitence Operation,” 

Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, 19 October 2004, in FBIS report GMP20041019000108;

and Shelah, “Dilemmas in the Air.” 

122. Ed Blanche, “Israel Uses Intifada Informers to Abet Assassination 

Campaign,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2001, 23.

123. Deborah Sontag, “Israel Acknowledges Hunting Down Arab Militants,” New York Times, 22 December 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/ 

2000/12/22/world/22ISRA.html. 

124. Yo’av Limor, “If Attacked, Iraq Might Try to Protect Itself,” Tel Aviv 

Ma’ariv, 28 September 2001, in FBIS report GMP20010928000056, https://

www.opensource.gov. 

125. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Targeting ‘Ticking Bombs,’ ” Armed Forces 

Journal, May 2004, 29. 

126. Pe’erli Shar and Karmela Menashe, “IAF Chief Views Antiterror War, 

Iran’s WMD, Ofeq/Arrow Failed Tests,” Voice of Israel Network B, 11 September 

2004, in FBIS report GMP20040911000157, https://www.opensource.gov. 

127. Alex Fishman, “Putting Out the Fire, Gaining Time,” Tel Aviv Yedi’ot 

Aharonot (Leshabat supplement), 21 January 2005, in FBIS report GMP2005 

0121000149, https://www.opensource.gov. 

128. Hanan Greenberg, “Officials: Civilian Deaths in IAF Attacks Down,” 

Tel Aviv Ynetnews, 7 March 2006, in FBIS report GMP20060307614007, 

https://www.opensource.gov.

129. Ed Blanche, “Hamas Successor Assassinated,” Jane’s Intelligence 

Review, May 2004, 5; and Patrick Bishop, “Has Israel Beaten the Suicide 

Bombers?” News Telegraph, 22 May 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/05/22/wmid22.xml.

130. Arieh O’Sullivan, “Is Israel Winning the War on Suicide Bombers?” 

Jerusalem Post, 3 June 2004, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?page 

name=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1086230749997&p=1078027574121. 

131. Paul Martin, “ ‘Crisis’ in Hamas as Leaders Killed,” Washington Times, 20 

April 2004, http://washingtontimes.com/world/20040419-093634-6705r.htm. 

132. Ibid. 

133. Moore, “Israel’s Lethal Weapon of Choice.” 

134. Ibid. 

135. Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, “JTIC Exclusive: ‘Targeted Killings’—A Military Assessment of Israeli Assassination Operations as a CounterTerrorist Tactic,” 17 December 2002, http://www.janes.com/security/

international_security/news/jtic/jtic021217_1_n.shtml. 

136. Jacob Amidror, “Israel’s Strategy for Combating Palestinian Terror,” 

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002, 122. 

137. For a discussion of French missteps in this regard—particularly the 

bombing of Sakiet in 1958—see Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 

1954–1962 (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006), 249–50, 265–69. 

138. Amidror, lecture.

139. Gideon Levy, “Shqedi, Go Home,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz (Internet edition), 

25 June 2006, in FBIS report GMP20060625746005, https://www.open

source.gov.
37

Appendix A

Reported IAF Attacks in the Occupied 

Territories, 2000–2005

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

1 2-Oct-00 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter assessed firing position

2 2-Oct-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA position

3 2-Oct-00 Netzarim Gaza Strip Helicopter PA position

4 3-Oct-00 Netzarim Gaza Strip Helicopter firing position

5 3-Oct-00 Netzarim Gaza Strip Helicopter Palestinian crowd

6 4-Oct-00 Al-Shuhada Gaza Strip Helicopter firing position

7 5-Oct-00 Al-Shuhada Gaza Strip Helicopter firing position

8 9-Oct-00 Hebron area West Bank Helicopter firing position

9 11-Oct-00 Nablus area West Bank Helicopter Palestinian crowd

10 11-Oct-00 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter? possible firing sites

11 12-Oct-00 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Gaza Port

12 12-Oct-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA admin compound

13 12-Oct-00 Nablus West Bank Helicopter PA police station

14 12-Oct-00 Hebron West Bank Helicopter PA police station

15 12-Oct-00 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA police station

16 12-Oct-00 Jericho West Bank Helicopter PA police trng fac

17 12-Oct-00 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter VOP station

18 12-Oct-00 Gaza West Bank Helicopter PA police station

19 19-Oct-00 Jabal Aybal West Bank Helicopter Palestinian gunmen

20 20-Oct-00 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter firing positions

21 20-Oct-00 Bayt Lahiyah West Bank Helicopter assessed firing position

22 22-Oct-00 Bayt Jala West Bank Helicopter firing position

23 22-Oct-00 Bayt Jala West Bank Helicopter firing position

24 22-Oct-00 Bayt Sahur West Bank Helicopter firing position

25 22-Oct-00 Aida r. c. West Bank Helicopter firing position

26 23-Oct-00 Hebron West Bank Helicopter assessed firing position

27 27-Oct-00 Bayt Jala West Bank Helicopter firing position

28 30-Oct-00 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 fac

29 30-Oct-00 Al-Birah West Bank Helicopter Fatah bldg

30 30-Oct-00 Nablus West Bank Helicopter Tanzim HQ

31 30-Oct-00 Al-Birah West Bank Helicopter Tanzim HQ
38

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

32 30-Oct-00 Nablus West Bank Helicopter Tanzim HQ

33 1-Nov-00 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter firing position

34 1-Nov-00 Jericho West Bank Helicopter firing position

35 1-Nov-00 Bayt Jala West Bank Helicopter firing position

36 9-Nov-00 Bayt Sahur West Bank Helicopter sr. Tanzim cmdr.

37 12-Nov-00 Ayidah r.c. West Bank Helicopter building

38 12-Nov-00 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter building

39 12-Nov-00 Al-Birah West Bank Helicopter building

40 12-Nov-00 Al-Khidr West Bank Helicopter building

41 15-Nov-00 Hebron West Bank Helicopter Fatah office

42 15-Nov-00 Salfit West Bank Helicopter Fatah office

43 15-Nov-00 unknown West Bank Helicopter add’l PA facility

44 15-Nov-00 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter Fatah/PA police sta.

45 15-Nov-00 Jericho West Bank Helicopter wpns depot

46 20-Nov-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Fatah HQ

47 20-Nov-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 fac

48 20-Nov-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Gaza PA HQ

49 20-Nov-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA TV station

50 20-Nov-00 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter prev. Sec. Svc. HQ

51 20-Nov-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter prev. Sec. Svc. office

52 20-Nov-00 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Tanzim HQ

53 20-Nov-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter TV station

54 20-Nov-00 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter VOP station

55 23-Nov-00 Nablus West Bank Helicopter HAMAS activist

56 24-Nov-00 Nablus West Bank Helicopter PA security facility

57 4-Dec-00 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter firing position

58 13-Feb-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter senior F-17 cmdr.

59 28-Mar-01 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facility

60 28-Mar-01 Jabaliya Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facility

61 28-Mar-01 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facility

62 28-Mar-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facility

63 28-Mar-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter Force 17 facility

64 2-Apr-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ activist

65 3-Apr-01 Ansar II r.c. Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 complex

66 3-Apr-01 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA targets

67 3-Apr-01 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter PA targets

68 3-Apr-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA targets

69 5-Apr-01 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA Mil Intel
39

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

70 5-Apr-01 Sudaniyah Gaza Strip Helicopter power station

71 6-Apr-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter PA security posts

72 16-Apr-01 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 HQ

73 16-Apr-01 C. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 HQ

74 16-Apr-01 C. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Gen Intel Svc HQ

75 16-Apr-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter PA naval facility

76 28-Apr-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter F-17 trng facility

77 28-Apr-01 Ansar r.c. Gaza Strip Helicopter F-17 wpns depot

78 28-Apr-01 Jabaliya Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facility

79 28-Apr-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter PA armored vehicle

80 28-Apr-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter Force 17 HQ

81 12-May-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter Tanzim leader

82 13-May-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter PA armored cars

83 16-May-01 Jabaliya Gaza Strip Helicopter PPS compound

84 16-May-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter PA mortar factory

85 18-May-01 Nablus West Bank F-16 PA prison

86 18-May-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA forces HQ

87 18-May-01 Ramallah West Bank F-16 Force 17 facility

88 18-May-01 Ramallah West Bank F-16 Force 17 roadblock

89 18-May-01 Nablus West Bank F-16 PA forces HQ

90 18-May-01 Tulkarm West Bank F-16 PA security fac

91 18-May-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter Force 17 fac

92 19-May-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter Force 17 offices

93 19-May-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter Gen Intel Svc HQ

94 19-May-01 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter PA forces HQ

95 19-May-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter PA forces HQ

96 20-May-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter wpns prod fac

97 1-Jul-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter 3 senior IJ mbrs

98 17-Jul-01 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter HAMAS cmdr +2

99 27-Jul-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter mortar factory

100 30-Jul-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA wpns prod fac

101 31-Jul-01 Nablus West Bank Helicopter HAMAS cmdr +5

102 4-Aug-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter Force 17 member

103 5-Aug-01 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter key HAMAS activist

104 5-Aug-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA security HQ

105 8-Aug-01 Nablus West Bank Helicopter F-17 position

106 8-Aug-01 Salfit West Bank Helicopter F-17 security fac

107 8-Aug-01 Salfit West Bank Helicopter PA intel post
Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

108 9-Aug-01 Ramallah West Bank F-16 PA police HQ

109 19-Aug-01 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facility

110 22-Aug-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS leaders

111 23-Aug-01 Nablus West Bank Helicopter senior Fatah mbr

112 26-Aug-01 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip F-16/F-15 PA MI facility

113 26-Aug-01 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip F-16/F-15 PA police buildings

114 26-Aug-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16/F-15 PA police HQ

115 26-Aug-01 Salfit West Bank F-16/F-15 PA police HQ

116 26-Aug-01 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter PA police HQ

117 27-Aug-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PFLP Sec Gen

118 3-Sep-01 Dura West Bank Helicopter PA Gen Intel Svc fac

119 5-Sep-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 HQ

120 5-Sep-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police station

121 6-Sep-01 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter senior AMB mbr

122 8-Sep-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter Tanzim HQ

123 9-Sep-01 Jericho West Bank Helicopter PA security facility

124 10-Sep-01 Tammun West Bank Helicopter PA security facility

125 12-Sep-01 Jenin West Bank F-16 Force 17 offices

126 12-Sep-01 Jenin West Bank F-16 Force 17 offices

127 12-Sep-01 Tammun West Bank F-16 PA security facility

128 12-Sep-01 Arrabah West Bank F-16 PA security facility

129 15-Sep-01 Al-Zaytun, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter PA Civ Def HQ

130 15-Sep-01 Tal al-Hawa Gaza Strip Helicopter PA MI HQ

131 15-Sep-01 Al-Sudaniyah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA Naval HQ

132 15-Sep-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police HQ

133 15-Sep-01 Al-Nusayrat Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police HQ

134 15-Sep-01 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA Pub Sec Dir fac

135 5-Oct-01 Hebron West Bank F-16 unknown

136 5-Oct-01 Abu Sunayah West Bank Helicopter PA security fac

137 5-Oct-01 Hebron West Bank Helicopter unknown

138 5-Oct-01 Hebron West Bank Helicopter unknown

139 15-Oct-01 Nablus West Bank Helicopter HAMAS activist

140 18-Oct-01 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter Fatah-Tanzim cmdr

141 20-Oct-01 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter Palestinian position

142 31-Oct-01 Hebron West Bank Helicopter HAMAS activist

143 1-Nov-01 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter suicide bomb team

144 4-Nov-01 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter workshop 1

40
41

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

145 4-Nov-01 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter workshop 2

146 4-Nov-01 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter workshop 3

147 23-Nov-01 Nablus West Bank Helicopter HAMAS leader 

148 25-Nov-01 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip Helicopter Fatah / civ def fac

149 25-Nov-01 Al-Sudaniyah Gaza Strip Helicopter naval police post

150 25-Nov-01 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter PA MI facility

151 3-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank F-16 PA governate bldg

152 3-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank F-16 PA prison

153 3-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank F-16 Police HQ

154 3-Dec-01 Gaza IAP Gaza Strip Helicopter Arafat’s helos

155 3-Dec-01 Gaza IAP Gaza Strip Helicopter fuel depot

156 3-Dec-01 Gaza IAP Gaza Strip Helicopter hangars

157 3-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PSF barracks

158 4-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 Force 17 offices

159 4-Dec-01 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip F-16 PA Nat Sec Svc HQ

160 4-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA Prev Sec Svc HQ

161 4-Dec-01 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter F-17 trng fac

162 4-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 HQ

163 4-Dec-01 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter Force 17 HQ

164 4-Dec-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA Intel Min bldg

165 4-Dec-01 Salfit West Bank Helicopter PA Intel Svc fac

166 7-Dec-01 South Gaza Gaza Strip F-16 PA training fac

167 7-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA police HQ

168 8-Dec-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 bldg

169 8-Dec-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA mil intel HQ

170 8-Dec-01 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police HQ

171 10-Dec-01 Hebron West Bank Helicopter senior IJ leader

172 11-Dec-01 N. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter electrical grid

173 11-Dec-01 N. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 HQ

174 12-Dec-01 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip F-16 PA naval police

175 12-Dec-01 Gaza IAP Gaza Strip F-16 radar

176 12-Dec-01 Ramallah West Bank F-16 Arafat’s helipad

177 12-Dec-01 Al-Birah West Bank F-16 PA facilities

178 12-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank F-16 PA facilities

179 12-Dec-01 Qalqilyah West Bank F-16 PA facilities

180 12-Dec-01 Tulkarm West Bank F-16 PA facilities

181 12-Dec-01 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 bldg
42

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

182 12-Dec-01 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 bldg

183 12-Dec-01 Gaza Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police fac

184 12-Dec-01 Nablus West Bank F-16 wpns dev fac

185 13-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 Force 17 HQ

186 13-Dec-01 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip F-16 PA naval police fac

187 13-Dec-01 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip F-16 PA police fac

188 13-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PSF/Fatah offices

189 13-Dec-01 Ramallah West Bank F-16 PA headquarters

190 13-Dec-01 Ramallah West Bank F-16 PSF/Fatah offices

191 13-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank F-16 PSF/Fatah offices

192 13-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter Fatah office

193 13-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter PA Interior Ministry

194 13-Dec-01 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA police station

195 14-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 Force 17 HQ

196 14-Dec-01 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA security facility

197 16-Dec-01 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police station

198 25-Dec-01 Jordanian 

border Jordan Helicopter Palestinian gunmen

199 26-Dec-01 Jenin West Bank Helicopter Palestinian gunmen

200 18-Jan-02 Tulkarm West Bank F-16 PA admin compound

201 18-Jan-02 Tulkarm West Bank F-16 PA Interior Ministry

202 18-Jan-02 Tulkarm West Bank F-16 PA security offices

203 24-Jan-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Local HAMAS cmdr

204 25-Jan-02 Gaza Gaza Strip F-16 F-17 armored vehs

205 25-Jan-02 Tulkarm West Bank F-16 PA security fac

206 4-Feb-02 Rafah-Khan 

Y rd Gaza Strip Helicopter 5 DFLP mbrs

207 4-Feb-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter 3 wpns prod facs

208 5-Feb-02 Bethlehem West Bank F-16 Force 17 HQ

209 7-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 PA ammo depot

210 7-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 PA prison

211 7-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter PA Nat’l Sec fac

212 10-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 Force 17 facilities

213 10-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter mortar factory

214 10-Feb-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter mortar factory

215 11-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA general intel ofcs

216 11-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facilities

217 11-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA MI facility

218 15-Feb-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip F-16 PA Nat’l Sec Svc HQ

219 15-Feb-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip F-16 PA Nat’l Sec Svc HQ
43

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

220 15-Feb-02 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip F-16 PA security fac

221 17-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 One of Arafat’s ofcs

222 17-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 PA HQ

223 17-Feb-02 Ramallah West Bank F-16 PA security facility

224 17-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter One of Arafat’s ofcs

225 17-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter PA police cmd post

226 18-Feb-02 Rafah Gaza Strip F-16 Force 17 HQ

227 18-Feb-02 Rafah Gaza Strip F-16 PA MI HQ

228 18-Feb-02 Ramallah West Bank F-16 PA special police HQ

229 19-Feb-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS info office

230 19-Feb-02 Rafah Gaza Strip F-16 PA security facility

231 19-Feb-02 Ramallah West Bank F-16 PA security facility

232 20-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA police HQ

233 20-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 PA police checkpoint

234 20-Feb-02 Jenin West Bank F-16 PA security fac

235 20-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA security fac

236 20-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter presidential office

237 20-Feb-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA intel compound

238 20-Feb-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter PA police checkpoint

239 20-Feb-02 Jer-Ram road West Bank Helicopter PA security fac

240 20-Feb-02 Al-Birah West Bank Helicopter PA security fac

241 20-Feb-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter presidential office

242 21-Feb-02 Rafah Gaza Strip F-16 F-17/PA MI fac

243 21-Feb-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA naval police fac

244 21-Feb-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip F-16 PA security fac

245 21-Feb-02 Nablus Gaza Strip Helicopter multiple PA sec fac

246 21-Feb-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter Arafat’s helipad

247 21-Feb-02 Al-Birah West Bank Helicopter Force 17 bldg

248 21-Feb-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter presidential office

249 3-Mar-02 Al-Birah West Bank F-16 PA security fac

250 3-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter PA gov’t bldg

251 3-Mar-02 Al-Birah West Bank Helicopter PA security fac

252 3-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter wpns workshop

253 4-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank F-16 PA Gen Intel Svc HQ

254 4-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank F-16 PA gov’t compound

255 4-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank F-16 PA gov’t compound

256 4-Mar-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA MI facility

257 5-Mar-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter 3 AMB members
44

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

258 5-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA police fac

259 5-Mar-02 Tulkarm West Bank F-16 PA police fac

260 5-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facilities

261 5-Mar-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter PA Nat’l Intel HQ

262 5-Mar-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA police fac

263 5-Mar-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter PA police fac

264 6-Mar-02 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter rocket launch site

265 6-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 Gaza Public Sec HQ

266 6-Mar-02 Hebron area West Bank F-16 PA police/F-17 fac

267 6-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank F-16 PA/Fatah offices

268 6-Mar-02 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA sec svc HQ

269 6-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA security fac

270 6-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA security fac

271 6-Mar-02 Hebron area West Bank Helicopter PA police/F-17 fac

272 6-Mar-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA sec svc HQ

273 6-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter PA/Fatah offices

274 6-Mar-02 Halhul West Bank Helicopter Tanzim-Fatah ofcs

275 7-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA police fac

276 7-Mar-02 Bethlehem West Bank F-16 PA security facility

277 7-Mar-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police station

278 7-Mar-02 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police station

279 8-Mar-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 PA gov’t bldg

280 8-Mar-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter PA Nat’l Sec Svc HQ

281 8-Mar-02 Dayr al-Balah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA security facility

282 8-Mar-02 Yattah West Bank Helicopter PA Gen Intel Svc HQ

283 8-Mar-02 Halhul West Bank Helicopter PA police fac

284 9-Mar-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter senior AMB mbr

285 9-Mar-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 Arafat’s local HQ

286 9-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Force 17 facilities

287 9-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police station

288 9-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA Pres Sec Forces

289 10-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 PA police HQ

290 10-Mar-02 Al-Sudaniyah Gaza Strip F-16 PA police HQ

291 10-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Arafat’s offices

292 10-Mar-02 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA intel offices

293 10-Mar-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter PA orgs’ HQ

294 10-Mar-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter PA police station

295 11-Mar-02 Qalqilyah West Bank Helicopter Force 17 offices
45

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

296 11-Mar-02 Al-Sudaniyah Gaza Strip F-16 PA police station

297 11-Mar-02 Al-Zaytun, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter Wpns factory

298 14-Mar-02 Anabta West Bank Helicopter 2 IJ activists

299 14-Mar-02 Anabta West Bank Helicopter Key AMB activist +1

300 2-Apr-02 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter armed Palestinians

301 2-Apr-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter PA prev Sec Svc HQ

302 2-Apr-02 Baytuniya West Bank Helicopter PA sec svcs WB HQ

303 3-Apr-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter “various targets”

304 5-Apr-02 Jenin West Bank Helicopter “various targets”

305 5-Apr-02 Hebron West Bank Helicopter IJ activist

306 8-Apr-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter armed Palestinians

307 9-Apr-02 Jenin West Bank Helicopter “various targets”

308 9-Apr-02 Nablus West Bank F-16 Qassem-2 factory

309 10-Apr-02 Jenin West Bank Helicopter 2 activists

310 23-Apr-02 Hebron West Bank Helicopter 2 senior Tanzim mbrs

311 20-May-02 Tulkarm West Bank Helicopter unknown

312 8-Jun-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

313 19-Jun-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 wpns prod fac

314 19-Jun-02 Jabalyah Gaza Strip F-16 wpns prod fac

315 19-Jun-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip F-16 wpns prod fac

316 19-Jun-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter wpns prod fac

317 19-Jun-02 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter wpns prod fac

318 24-Jun-02 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 HAMAS mil. ldrs

319 26-Jun-02 Hebron West Bank Helicopter “various targets”

320 28-Jun-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter “various targets”

321 5-Jul-02 Dura valleys West Bank Helicopter armed Palestinians

322 7-Jul-02 Nablus hills West Bank Helicopter armed Palestinians

323 14-Jul-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip F-16 HAMAS explosvs lab

324 17-Jul-02 An-Nusayrat Gaza Strip F-16 HAMAS wpn prod fac

325 22-Jul-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 Saleh Shehadah

326 24-Jul-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter 3 HAMAS members

327 5-Aug-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons factory

328 6-Aug-02 Jenin West Bank Helicopter 2 AMB members

329 21-Aug-02 Jenin West Bank Helicopter suicide bomb team

330 30-Aug-02 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS activist

331 31-Aug-02 Tubas West Bank Helicopter 2 AMB mbrs (1 KIA)

332 6-Sep-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter bomb-making factory

333 20-Sep-02 Ramallah West Bank Helicopter presidential compnd
46

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

334 24-Sep-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

335 26-Sep-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS mil cmdr Deif

336 5-Oct-02 Al-Zahra Gaza Strip Helicopter “various targets”

337 7-Oct-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Palestinian crowd

338 4-Nov-02 Nablus West Bank Helicopter HAMAS member

339 11-Nov-02 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter mortar factory

340 13-Nov-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter same tgt as 11 Nov

341 16-Nov-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons factory

342 17-Nov-02 SW Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter prev Sec Svc trng fac

343 17-Nov-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons factory

344 26-Nov-02 Jenin West Bank Helicopter HAMAS & AMB ldrs

345 27-Nov-02 N. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter mortar position

346 27-Nov-02 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown (PA: school)

347 28-Nov-02 Yaqinton/Qatif Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

348 30-Nov-02 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

349 1-Dec-02 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ activists

350 4-Dec-02 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter senior IJ bomb mkr

351 7-Dec-02 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter 5 HAMAS members

352 2-Jan-03 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter firing pos. (houses)

353 2-Jan-03 Al-Nusayrat Gaza Strip Helicopter firing pos. (houses)

354 5-Jan-03 Asqulah, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter mortar factory

355 12-Jan-03 Rafah-Khan Yrd Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 HAMAS members

356 14-Jan-03 Jenin West Bank Helicopter “residential bldg”

357 23-Jan-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons factory

358 24-Jan-03 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter firing positions

359 27-Jan-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter senior HAMAS mbr

360 6-Feb-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter open field

361 16-Feb-03 Gaza Gaza Strip Helicopter 6 HAMAS activists

362 19-Feb-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Palestinians in field

363 27-Feb-03 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

364 3-Mar-03 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

365 6-Mar-03 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

366 6-Mar-03 Tal al-Za’tar Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

367 6-Mar-03 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

368 7-Mar-03 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

369 8-Mar-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter sr HAMAS police off

370 13-Mar-03 Hebron Hills West Bank Helicopter Israeli guards (frat)

371 27-Mar-03 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter PA security post
47

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

372 2-Apr-03 Tulkarm Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

373 3-Apr-03 Al-Salam/Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

374 3-Apr-03 Al-Barazil/Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

375 8-Apr-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter sr HAMAS mil cmdr

376 10-Apr-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ military ldr

377 11-Apr-03 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter “house”

378 11-Apr-03 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter “cemetery”

379 29-Apr-03 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter PFLP-GC Gaza cmdr

380 8-May-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter sr HAMAS activist

381 10-May-03 central Gaza Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns depot

382 10-May-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns depot

383 13-May-03 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

384 10-Jun-03 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Q rocket crew

385 10-Jun-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Al-Rantisi attempt

386 11-Jun-03 Al-Shuja’iyah Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 sr HAMAS mbrs

387 12-Jun-03 Gaza Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 HAMAS activists

388 12-Jun-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 sr HAMAS mbrs

389 13-Jun-03 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS Qassem team

390 13-Jun-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS member

391 13-Jun-03 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpn depot

392 25-Jun-03 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS Qassem team

393 8-Aug-03 Askar r.c. West Bank Helicopter trapped HAMAS mbrs

394 21-Aug-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS ldr/spokesman

395 24-Aug-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 sr HAMAS + 2

396 26-Aug-03 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS activist

397 28-Aug-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS activist

398 30-Aug-03 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 sr HAMAS mbrs

399 1-Sep-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS activist

400 6-Sep-03 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip F-16 Yasin & HAMAS ldrs

401 7-Sep-03 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns depot

402 10-Sep-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 HAMAS spokesman

403 18-Sep-03 An-Nusayrat Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS mbr’s house

404 25-Sep-03 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS mbr’s house

405 4-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS mbr’s house

406 4-Oct-03 central Gaza Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ mbr in open field

407 4-Oct-03 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ member’s house

408 5-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS /IJ house

409 5-Oct-03 Ain Saheb, SY Syria F-16 IJ training r.c.
48

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

410 5-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ wpns depot

411 5-Oct-03 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ wpns depot

412 10-Oct-03 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter Unknown

413 20-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 HAMAS militants

414 20-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 HAMAS wpns factory

415 20-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns depot

416 21-Oct-03 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS operatives

417 21-Oct-03 An-Nusayrat Gaza Strip Helicopter infiltration team

418 21-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 HAMAS wpns factory

419 21-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns depot

420 22-Oct-03 An-Nusayrat Gaza Strip Helicopter Infiltration team

421 22-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter wpns transporters

422 22-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip F-16 HAMAS rocket depot

423 22-Oct-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS weapons fac

424 25-Dec-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ commander

425 30-Dec-03 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter sr HAMAS mbr

426 7-Feb-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ military cmdr

427 28-Feb-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 senior IJ mbrs +1

428 3-Mar-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter 3 sr HAMAS mbrs

429 7-Mar-04 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

430 15-Mar-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

431 15-Mar-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

432 16-Mar-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 IJ activists

433 16-Mar-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 PRC mbrs, 1 sr 

434 17-Mar-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

435 17-Mar-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

436 17-Mar-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

437 22-Mar-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Ahmed Yasin + 3

438 25-Mar-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

439 15-Apr-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

440 17-Apr-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter A.A. al-Rantisi + 2

441 20-Apr-04 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

442 2-May-04 Nablus West Bank Helicopter AMB Balatah cmdr +2

443 2-May-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS radio station

444 2-May-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Fatah radio station

445 2-May-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter newspaper offices

446 4-May-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

447 11-May-04 Al-Shaja’iyah Gaza Strip Helicopter U/I activists
49

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

448 12-May-04 Al-Zaytun, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter house w/gunmen

449 13-May-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

450 13-May-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

451 14-May-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS prop. center

452 14-May-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ leader’s HQ

453 14-May-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ research center

454 14-May-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ explosives lab

455 16-May-04 Asqulah, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter DFLP offices

456 16-May-04 Al-Shuja’iyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Fatah cultural center

457 16-May-04 Asqulah, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter Fatah offices

458 16-May-04 Al-Nasr Gaza Strip Helicopter NSP-affiliated paper

459 17-May-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

460 18-May-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter Palestinian crowd

461 18-May-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

462 19-May-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

463 29-May-04 Al-Zaytun, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter U/I activist

464 30-May-04 Al-Zaytun, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS mil cmdr + 1

465 8-Jun-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS workshop

466 8-Jun-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS workshop

467 11-Jun-04 Gush Katif Gaza Strip Helicopter infiltration team

468 14-Jun-04 Balatah r.c. West Bank Helicopter AMB Balatah cmdr

469 18-Jun-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons factory

470 18-Jun-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons factory

471 19-Jun-04 Al-Maghazi Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

472 28-Jun-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS C2/prop fac

473 28-Jun-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

474 1-Jul-04 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

475 2-Jul-04 Tal al-Za’tar Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

476 5-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS workshop

477 5-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS workshop

478 6-Jul-04 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

479 6-Jul-04 Nablus West Bank Helicopter PFLP Nablus Cdr

480 7-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip UCAV 3 HAMAS militants

481 8-Jul-04 Tal al-Za’tar Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

482 8-Jul-04 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

483 8-Jul-04 B. Hanun fields Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

484 14-Jul-04 Asqulah, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS rocket fact’y
50

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

485 19-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Pop Res Comm cmdr

486 20-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter house of above TK

487 22-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ regional cmdr +2

488 22-Jul-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

489 25-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter senior IJ militant

490 25-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS workshop

491 25-Jul-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter restrike on above

492 28-Jul-04 Gaza coast Gaza Strip Helicopter Palestinian crowd

493 29-Jul-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter Abu-Rish cmdr & dep

494 30-Jul-04 Al-Zaytun, G. C. Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

495 3-Aug-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter U/I - civilians hit

496 4-Aug-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassem launcher 

497 8-Aug-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter U/I - electricity out

498 11-Aug-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

499 15-Aug-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter U/I

500 16-Aug-04 NE Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter rocket launcher/team

501 17-Aug-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip UCAV Sr HAMAS mbr (3 K)

502 18-Aug-04 Al-Zaytun, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS explsv fact’y

503 18-Aug-04 Asqulah, G.C. Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

504 19-Aug-04 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassem launch area

505 26-Aug-04 Tal al-Za’tar Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

506 26-Aug-04 Al-Sikkah Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

507 26-Aug-04 Nablus West Bank Helicopter unknown

508 26-Aug-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ activist

509 27-Aug-04 Tal al-Za’tar Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

510 27-Aug-04 Al-Sikkah Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

511 27-Aug-04 Al-Kaff Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

512 27-Aug-04 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

513 30-Aug-04 Jenin West Bank Helicopter AMB cmdr

514 2-Sep-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Explosives squad

515 3-Sep-04 Al-Burayj Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS workshop

516 7-Sep-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS trng fac

517 9-Sep-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

518 10-Sep-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassem launch area

519 13-Sep-04 Jenin West Bank UCAV 3 AMB activists

520 20-Sep-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS mil cmdr

521 20-Sep-04 Tal al-Hawa Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS rocket team

522 23-Sep-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown
51

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

523 25-Sep-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

524 26-Sep-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS workshop

525 27-Sep-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter PRC cmdr (1 KIA)

526 29-Sep-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassem rocket team

527 29-Sep-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassem rocket team

528 30-Sep-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip F-16 unknown

529 30-Sep-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Antitank rocket team

530 30-Sep-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter Elanazar Cmte ofcs

531 1-Oct-04 Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassem rocket team

532 1-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip UCAV U/I militant

533 1-Oct-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons factory

534 2-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Explosives squad

535 2-Oct-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 HAMAS activists

536 4-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

537 4-Oct-04 Al-Shaja’iyah Gaza Strip Helicopter 2 HAMAS activists

538 5-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip UCAV armed Palestinians

539 5-Oct-04 Al-Shati Gaza Strip Helicopter IJ Gaza cmdr + 1 mbr

540 6-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter HAMAS wpns factory

541 7-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassam rocket team

542 9-Oct-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter Armed Palestinians

543 10-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

544 11-Oct-04 Bethlehem West Bank Helicopter Palestinian gunmen

545 11-Oct-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter Sr IJ leader

546 14-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

547 15-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

548 22-Oct-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter sr HAMAS ldr + 1

549 22-Oct-04 Jabalyah Gaza Strip Helicopter Pop Res Cmte fac

550 24-Oct-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter armed Palestinians

551 24-Oct-04 N. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter unknown

552 26-Oct-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

553 2-Nov-04 N. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter mortar position?

554 6-Nov-04 Qatif Bloc Gaza Strip Helicopter explosives squad

555 1-Dec-04 Bayt Hanun Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassem rocket team

556 7-Dec-04 Al-Shaja’iyah Gaza Strip UCAV IJ activist

557 7-Dec-04 E. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip UCAV IJ activist

558 9-Dec-04 S. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip UCAV sr Pop Res Cmte mbr

559 9-Dec-04 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip UCAV weapons facility

560 13-Dec-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip Helicopter weapons facility
52

Date Location

Gaza/

West Bank Platform Target

561 16-Dec-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Unknown mortar shell depot

562 17-Dec-04 Rafah Gaza Strip Helicopter bldg w/ tunnel entr

563 18-Dec-04 Rafah Gaza Strip F-16 bldg w/ tunnel entr

564 19-Dec-04 N. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip UCAV HAMAS weapons fac

565 19-Dec-04 Gaza City Gaza Strip UCAV HAMAS weapons fac

566 22-Dec-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip Helicopter antitank rocket team

567 28-Dec-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip UCAV mortar/rocket team

568 30-Dec-04 Khan Yunus Gaza Strip UCAV explosives squad

569 2-Jan-05 N. Gaza Strip Gaza Strip Helicopter Qassam rocket team

570 13-Jan-05 central Gaza Gaza Strip Helicopter suspected car bomb

571 16-Jan-05 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip Unk Qassam rocket team

572 16-Jan-05 Bayt Lahiyah Gaza Strip Helicopter rocket /mortar prod fac

BREAKOUTS

TYPE

AIRCRAFT: Fixed-Wing Helo UCAV

99 458 13 (2 poss)

LOCATION: West Bank Gaza Strip Jordan

187 383 1

TYPE OF

ATTACK: Preemption Warning/Retaliation

Ground

Support Weapons-related sites

38 237 110 74

 YEAR: 2000 2001 2002 2004

57 142 152 143

ATTACKS/

MONTH: 2000 2001 2002 2004

19 12 13 12

Sources: Derived from the author’s compilation and analysis of multiple reports from Israeli, Palestinian, and 

international media. Primary sources include The Voice of Palestine radio network (Ramallah), The Voice of Israel 

Network B (Jerusalem), Gaza Palestine Satellite Channel Television, The Voice of Palestine (Bethlehem), Israel 

Television Channel 1 (Jerusalem), Israel Television Channel 2 (Jerusalem), Israel Defense Forces Radio (Tel Aviv), 

Tel Aviv Ha’aretz (Internet version), Israel Defense Forces News (Internet version), Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot, the 

Palestinian Information Center (Internet version), Gaza WAFA Palestine News Agency (Internet version), Agence 

France Presse North American Service, London Quds Press (Internet version), Jerusalem Post (Internet version), 

MENA Cairo News, Al-Birah Palestine Media Center (Internet version), Tel Aviv Ynet (Internet version), Tel Aviv

Ma’ariv (Internet version), and Ramallah Al-Hayah al-Jadidah, as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service (https://www.opensource.gov; user account required). Additional information included in the author’s 

analysis of IAF activity was derived from multiple editions of the following English-language sources: Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report, Jane’s Intelligence Review, The Journal of Palestine Studies, AirForces 

Monthly, Flight International, Israel Insider (http://web.israelinsider.com), London News Telegraph (http://

www.telegraph.co.uk), British Broadcasting Service News (http://www.bbc.co.uk), World Tribune (http://www

.worldtribune.com), CNN World (http://www.cnn.com), IPR Strategic Business Information Database, Israel Defense 

Forces News (http://www1.idf.il), Yahoo! News (http://news.yahoo.com), USA Today (http://www.usatoday.com), 

STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com), Guardian Unlimited (http://www.guardian.co.uk), Washington Post (http://

www.washingtonpost.com), and EBSCO Host (http://ejournals.ebsco.com).
53

Appendix B

Evolution of IAF Mission Priorities, 

2000–2005

Sources: Derived from the author’s compilation and analysis of multiple reports from Israeli, Palestinian, and 

international media. Primary sources include The Voice of Palestine radio network (Ramallah), The Voice of Israel 

Network B (Jerusalem), Gaza Palestine Satellite Channel Television, The Voice of Palestine (Bethlehem), Israel 

Television Channel 1 (Jerusalem), Israel Television Channel 2 (Jerusalem), Israel Defense Forces Radio (Tel Aviv), 

Tel Aviv Ha’aretz (Internet version), Israel Defense Forces News (Internet version), Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot, the 

Palestinian Information Center (Internet version), Gaza WAFA Palestine News Agency (Internet version), Agence 

France Presse North American Service, London Quds Press (Internet version), Jerusalem Post (Internet version), 

MENA Cairo News, Al-Birah Palestine Media Center (Internet version), Tel Aviv Ynet (Internet version), Tel Aviv Ma’ariv

(Internet version), and Ramallah Al-Hayah al-Jadidah, as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

(https://www.opensource.gov; user account required). Additional information included in the author’s analysis of 

IAF activity was derived from multiple editions of the following English-language sources: Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report, Jane’s Intelligence Review, The Journal of Palestine Studies, AirForces Monthly, 

Flight International, Israel Insider (http://web.israelinsider.com), London News Telegraph (http://www.telegraph

.co.uk), British Broadcasting Service News (http://www.bbc.co.uk), World Tribune (http://www.worldtribune

.com), CNN World (http://www.cnn.com), IPR Strategic Business Information Database, Israel Defense Forces News

(http://www1.idf.il), Yahoo! News (http://news.yahoo.com), USA Today (http://www.usatoday.com), STRATFOR 

(http://www.stratfor.com), Guardian Unlimited (http://www.guardian.co.uk), Washington Post ( http://www.

washingtonpost.com), and EBSCO Host (http://ejournals.ebsco.com).

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Title of Paper: On the Fly: Israeli Airpower against the Al-Aqsa 

Intifada, 2000–2005

Author: Matthew M. Hurley, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

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On the Fly

Israeli Airpower against the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000–2005

Commander, Air University

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Director, Air Force Research Institute

Gen John Shaud, USAF, Retired, PhD

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