COERCIVE AIR STRATEGY


FORCING A BUREAUCRATIC SHIFT 

JOHN I. PRAY, JR. Major, USAF


School of Advanced Airpower Studies


THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF 

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, 

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR 

COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, 

ACADEMIC YEAR 1993–94. 

Air University Press


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


January 1995 
Disclaimer 

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of 

academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views 

expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position 

of the Department of Defense or the United States government. 

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for 

public release. 

ii 
Contents 

Chapter Page 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

2 ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON NATIONAL 

DECISION MAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

3 AIR STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 

4 THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CRISIS—A CASE STUDY . . . . . . . 23 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 

Illustrations 

Figure 

1 Decision-Making Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

2 Internal Support Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

3 Air Strategy Comparison Construct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

4 Expanded Air Strategy Comparison Construct . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

5 Internal Dissension-Resolve Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 

iii 
Figure Page 

6 Desired Internal Dissension-Resolve Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16


7 Coercive Strategy (Theory) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19


8 Coercive Strategy (Applied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


9 German Internal Consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25


10 German Internal Dissension-Resolve Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . 26


Table 

1 Comparative Analysis Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


2 Proposed Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


iv

Abstract 

The purpose of this work is to provide the air planner with an air 

strategy that may, under certain defined conditions, be more likely to yield 

success than current air power theories. Our current stock of strategic 

ideas tend to rely on a unitary, rational actor assumption to describe the 

decision-making environments of our potential adversaries. We believe 

reliance on this simplistic assumption may skew the counterstrategy 

development process. We propose an alternate decision framework that 

identifies the importance of consensus decision making and the central role 

organizations often play in this complex process. This characteristically 

divisive environment presents many new opportunities to apply military 

force selectively in a compellent situation. To take advantage of the 

vulnerabilities created by these internal divisions, we propose a strategy 

that uses air power to surprise policy advocates in an opponent’s domestic 

coalition and force a bureaucratic shift. By targeting key organizations 

during windows of coercive opportunity, air power may be able to shape a 

new consensus and produce a policy change that furthers our interests. 

Central to our effort is the use of the Czechoslovakian crisis that gripped 

Europe in the summer and fall of 1938 for it highlights many of the same 

situational characteristics we see today and can expect to see in the future. 

Britain’s failure to know their opponent resulted in a missed opportunity to 

take advantage of a split in the German internal consensus that left them 

vulnerable to a coercive effort. 

v 

About the Author 

Maj John I. Pray, Jr., graduated from the US Air Force Academy in 1980 with a

Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering. Operationally, he has been

deeply involved in both airlift and special operations his entire career. Following

graduation from pilot training in 1981, Major Pray flew C-141s at Norton AFB,

California, for five years. While at Norton, he became qualified as a Special

Operations low level, formation lead, air refueling, wing-level flight examiner. In 

1986, he was selected for an Air Staff training assignment at the Pentagon where he

worked in the Airlift Division of Operations and the Western Hemisphere Division of

Plans. Following this one-year tour, Major Pray returned to flying C-22s and C-137s

at Andrews AFB, Maryland. During this assignment, he upgraded to flight

examiner in both aircraft and ultimately became the squadron assistant operations

officer. Academically, he earned his Master’s degree in Aeronautical Science from

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 1987. Professionally, he attended

Squadron Officer School in 1984, the Army Command and General Staff College in

1992 and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) in 1993. Upon

graduation from SAAS, he was assigned to the J-5 directorate at US Special

Operations Command at MacDill AFB, Florida. 

vii 

Acknowledgments 

I am deeply grateful to Lt Col Mark Clodfelter for his patient guidance and 

year-long counsel. His insight, experience, and advice undoubtedly made a 

significant difference in the quality of the final product. 

I would also like to thank Dr Robert Pape and Col Ken Feldman for their vital 

contributions. Their unique expertise kept the project focused and on track. 

ix 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Therefore I say: “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will 

never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your 

chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of 

yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” 

—Sun Tzu 

The Art of War 

Although the world has changed considerably since Sun Tzu wrote this 

passage well over two thousand years ago, much remains the same. Todays 

loose conglomeration of interdependent societies only appears highly 

advanced by comparison. Even a cursory review of history suggests that many 

of the same political, economic, religious, ethnic, cultural, and ideological 

differences that drove people to fight in Sun Tzus age still prevail. Friction 

and conflict, it seems, are inevitable facts of life. Consequently, the seemingly 

innocuous term “peacetime competition” is simply a euphemism that 

describes the low end of a very real conflict spectrum. 

As individuals tasked with employing the military instrument across this 

spectrum, we must constantly remind ourselves that the dynamic, 

unavoidable nature of conflict not only defines the playing field, but dictates 

how rivals play the international political game. Within this highly 

competitive environment, international actors pursue objectives and 

implement policies defined primarily by what they loosely describe as “in 

their best interests.” As each nation maneuvers to obtain these often fleeting 

positional advantages, leverage, or what is commonly called coercion, 

arguably plays the key role in deciding many outcomes. Coercion, when used 

properly, acts as a lever giving one actor an edge in his efforts to persuade, 

pressure, or force another actor to adopt policies that further the coercers 

interests. Simply put, coercion is a tool used to influence an opponents 

decision-making calculus either to prevent a policy action from occurring— 

deterrence, or force a policy change after execution—compellence.1 

This paper examines the role coercion plays in compellence. By narrowing 

our focus, we can concentrate on a specific set of circumstances where our 

opponent has the initiative and openly commits himself to a particular course 

of action. It implies our opponent has completed an internal decision-making 

process, determined that the potential benefits of a particular policy outweigh 

the expected costs, and purposefully embarked on a course that he thinks he 

can win. This action decision effectively draws a new line in the sand and 

1 
places our opponent in the role of the defender—confident in his ability to 

maintain his ground. Given our cultural proclivity to relinquish the initiative 

to our adversary, how should we respond? 

Turning again to Sun Tzu, we note that “what is of extreme importance in 

war is to attack the enemys strategy.”2

 While developing a strategy to counter 

or defeat an opponents strategy seems fairly straightforward, our search for a 

solution lies deeper within the concept of strategy itself. Strategy, for our 

purposes, is “a complex decision process” that connects ways and means to the 

ends sought.3

 In other words, a strategy links the what and how to the why of 

a policy action. 

Unfortunately, most strategists, by focusing on the more concrete ways and 

means aspects of the strategy “equation,” often overlook the importance of the 

linking process. These capabilities-based approaches characteristically 

assume a decision framework based on Graham Allisons much simplified, 

unitary rational actor model.4

 We believe reliance on this particular model 

may, in some cases, skew the counterstrategy development process. 

Consequently, this paper suggests an alternate decision framework based on 

an integration of Allisons more comprehensive organizational and political 

consensus models.5

 In addition, it introduces a coercive air strategy to exploit 

the vulnerabilities inherent in this decision environment. The central idea is 

that the military instrument can force a bureaucratic shift that will upset an 

opponents current domestic coalition. By targeting key organizations, air 

power may be able to shape a new internal consensus and thereby generate 

the desired policy change. 

Accordingly, we will use a building block approach to present our case and 

define the conditions that suggest the application of our proposed 

counterstrategy. Chapter two uses Allisons three decision models to lay the 

intellectual foundation by introducing differing views of how governments 

determine policy. To capture each models unique strengths, we propose an 

integrated decision framework that highlights the central role organizations 

can play in a political consensus environment. Using this framework, the 

chapter concludes by describing four general types of internal consensus that 

we can use to help direct our air effort. 

Chapter three builds on this foundation and seeks to answer the question— 

how can we use a coercive air strategy to affect the proposed decision 

framework. The recommended strategy seeks to capitalize on the 

psychological effects of air power-induced surprise during “windows of 

coercive opportunity” to undermine the internal confidence in an opponents 

original decision. However, contrary to the unitary, yet ambiguous national 

leadership favored by other theorists, we believe those specific organizational 

leaders who control key facets of the consensus process form a more lucrative 

and meaningful coercive target group. Using a simple lever analogy, air 

power is focused against what these key organizational leaders value to 

produce a favorable policy change. 

Chapter four acknowledges the difficulty of assessing the “value” of a 

strategy simply on its theoretical merits and uses the Czechoslovakian crisis 

2 
that gripped Europe in 1938 to ground the proposed approach in a realistic 

scenario. This past episode reflects many of the same situational 

characteristics we see today, underscores the political need to apply military 

force selectively in a compellent situation, and highlights the danger of the 

unitary actor assumption. It suggests that the British leaders failed to know 

their German opponent and missed an opportunity to take advantage of the 

conflicting organizational pressures that left Germans vulnerable following 

Hitlers decision to solve the crisis by force. 

Chapter five briefly summarizes the preceding discussion and identifies 

those conditions that suggest the successful application of this 

organizationally oriented coercive air strategy in the future. 

Notes 

1. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 

1966), 71. 

2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 

1963), 77. 

3. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air 

University Press, 1988), 13. 

4. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 

Mass.: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), 10–38. 

6. Ibid., 67–100 and 144–84. 

3

4

Chapter 2 

Organizational Influences on National 

Decision Making 

Given the importance of the process aspect of strategy described in chapter 

one, how do we structure our effort to force our opponent to change his 

original decision? More specifically, is there some part of an opponents 

decision process that may be particularly vulnerable to a coercive counterstrategy action? One seldom considered aspect invites further study and 

involves the pivotal role organizations can play in a decisions outcome. 

Our investigation necessarily begins by developing a broad sense of how 

governments determine policy. Although much has been written on this 

subject, Graham Allisons analysis of the Cuban missile crisis provides several 

insights to help guide our investigation. Each of his three conceptual models 

frame government decisions from a fundamentally different perspective.1 

In his first model, the government acts as a unitary actor making rational, 

value maximizing decisions between competing alternatives. This view, 

adopted by many political scientists and strategists, predicts a nation will act 

as a single entity and “rationally” choose the option with the most favorable 

outcome or highest expected value. The following formula commonly serves as 

the analytical basis for this approach by expressing expected value (E[V]) as a 

function of expected benefits (E[B]) and expected costs (E[C]). 

E[V] = E[B] – E[C] 

where: E[B] = PB x B and E[C] = PC x C 

Although not necessarily designed to produce a numerical answer, the 

equation, when we examine its parts, highlights two critical points. First, the 

expected benefit and the expected cost elements require a value judgment 

concerning the actual benefit (B) and cost (C) of a particular alternative. 

Second, both elements also require a probability estimate that particular 

benefit (PB) or cost (PC) will be obtained or incurred. These four subjective 

components combine to confound what initially seemed a simple exercise. 

Furthermore, they uncover a potential source of internal conflict as 

individuals, organizations, and interest groups tend to bias these judgments 

and estimates to support their views. As Dr James March, a distinguished 

behavioral theorist and author notes, “Competition for policy support pushes 

advocates to imagine favorable outcomes and to inflate estimates of the 

desirability of those outcomes.”2

 Consequently, Allison argues the unitary, 

rational actor model, when used alone, fails to address the often subjective 

5 
and possibly irrational organizational and political pressures that usually lie 

at the heart of most complex decisions.3 

To compensate for these additional decision pressures, Allisons second 

model addresses the organizational factor. Although commonly construed as 

simple conduits through which policy decisions flow, organizations and the 

people who lead them come to develop unique, “institutional” views of the 

world based on their assigned responsibilities. These views naturally shape 

the organizational need to divide complex issues into manageable activities 

through the use of standardized operating procedures and established routines. 

These set ways of doing business, unintentionally (or possibly intentionally), 

filter incoming information, bias interpretations, and channel the search for 

suitable alternatives. The simple fact that “self interested manipulation of 

information is a palpable feature of institutional life” often predisposes 

recommended options to favor organizational needs or objectives.4

 While 

bureaucratic needs such as survival, growth, budget share, internal morale, 

or autonomy may not seem to be the fundamental determinants of policy, 

they often dictate the objectives of senior officials.5

 Dr Robert Gallucci, a 

noted foreign policy authority, believes, 

Of central importance to those actors associated with the large bureaucracies of the 

military services, the Departments of State and Defense, and the intelligence agencies is the maintenance of the stature, role, and budgets of their organizations or 

organizational subunits. . . . Their perspective on matters of foreign policy is 

strongly influenced by their bureaucratic affiliation.6 

High-level organizational leaders, it seems, tend to see a strong correlation 

between national and organizational objectives. In other words, they often 

view something that is good for the organization as being good for the nation, 

although they may not believe the reverse to be true. Gallucci adds: 

It is, however, neither a tenet of the bureaucratic perspective nor a real world truth, 

that political actors consciously choose to maximize their perceived organizational 

interests at the expense of what they perceive to be the national interest. Actors 

tend to take stands on issues that are consistent with their “seats” in the bureaucracy because they really see the world from the vantage point of their position.7 

As these competing organizations present “their” alternatives, differences 

of opinion concerning costs, benefits, and probabilities frequently occur. 

Allisons third model underscores how political compromise reconciles these 

bureaucratic differences.8

 Allison and many “first wave” theorists, such as 

Roger Hilsman, Samuel Huntington, Richard Neustadt, and Warner Schilling, 

see governments as a loose collection of competing individuals and interest 

groups who bargain to gain decision consensus. Dr Robert Art, a professor of 

politics and former Guggenheim fellow, summarizes their collective view on 

foreign policy-making: 

[It] is a political process of building consensus and support for a policy among those 

participants who have the power to affect the outcome and who often disagree over 

what they think the outcome should be.9 

6

Yet, it is important to note that “although commitment to a policy or 

program in its own right may be important for some coalition members, few 

major policies could be adopted without some supporters for whom the policy 

is relatively unimportant except as a political bargain.”10 As a result, 

uncertainty, subjectivity, and lack of commitment characterize the political 

consensus model and form major impediments to unified action. 

While Allisons three models are powerful analytical tools, the real value of 

his work lies in an attempt to explain why governments change their policies. 

He concludes that the rational actor model and its corresponding reliance on 

expected value calculations fails to address a particularly disturbing fact— 

nations never “change” when the expected value equation turns negative. 

They change some time after the equation shows costs exceed benefits.11 His 

organizational and political consensus models attempt to solve this riddle. He 

offers two key propositions that shape the remaining discussion: 

•	 Quite often from the outset of a war, some members of the government 

are convinced that the war effort is futile. 

•	 Surrender (or change in policy) is likely to come as a result of a political 

shift that enhances the effective power of this opposition group.12 

What the preceding discussion means to the strategist is that those 

theories based on the unitary, rational actor assumption may, at times, be 

fundamentally flawed. Nations rarely operate as a unitary actor and because 

of the need to bring competing factions together to form a consensus, they 

seldom act rationally. While Allison acknowledges these limitations, many 

strategists do not. Therefore, we need to take Allisons analysis a step further 

by blending the strengths of the three models into one interrelated structure. 

Conceptually, we assert that decisions often occur in an environment where 

the political consensus internally adjusts to organizational pressures and 

externally adapts to rational actor constraints (fig. 1).13 Upon closer 

examination of this environment, two key points emerge. 

Figure 1. Decision-Making Environment 

7 
First, organizations often play a central role in the decision process. Those 

few leaders at the top of an organization can greatly influence national policy 

outcomes. When given the opportunity, “responsible officials feel powerfully 

moved to recommend their solutions.”14 As shown earlier, their 

recommendations are often inexorably tied to the needs of the organization. 

For, as Gallucci notes, “There is no evidence that as the stakes rise actors 

remove the tinted glasses through which they view everyday matters and 

begin to see issues with new objectivity.”15 The bottom line thus becomes 

“although crisis decision-making may be removed from organizations, the 

effects of organizations cannot be removed from these decisions.”16 

Second, policy decisions result from a political consensus. Although we 

cannot expect to understand fully individual motivation within this 

consensus, we can do more than simply lumping opposing decision makers 

together as a unitary actor. Allison states, “thinking about a nation as if it 

were a person neglects considerable differences among individual leaders of a 

government whose positions and power lead them to quite different 

perceptions and preferences.”17 Gallucci agrees: 

Senior actors try to shape foreign policy outcomes so that they will be consistent 

with what they see as the national interest. They will do this by bargaining and 

compromising, by forming coalitions, and by using whatever leverage is available to 

them.18 

With the compellence scenario in mind, we often find a major source of internal conflict results from differing estimations of the expected outcome. 

Interorganizational conflict is therefore likely in both the pre- and postdecision phases. As March asserts: 

Adopted policies will, on average, be oversold. Inflated expectations about programs 

that are successful in gaining support from policymakers make subsequent disappointments likely. Thus great hopes lead to action, but great hopes are invitations 

to disappointment. This, in turn, leads both to an erosion of support and to an 

awareness of “failures of implementation.”19 

As a result, what seems like a coherent team, may, in fact, be what one 

prominent researcher describes as an “illusion.”20 An awareness of these internal differences and doubts forces top decision makers to try to maintain, 

“leeway until time clarifies uncertainties.”21 Thus, consensus decision makers 

often try to keep as many options open as possible by avoiding firm commitments that bind them to a particular decision. 

It is this division of support that ultimately may prove useful in determining 

an effective target for a coercive air effort. Although the possibilities may 

seem limitless, four basic descriptions—strong, mixed, split, or weak— 

categorize the level of internal consensus concerning policy decisions (fig. 2). 

Strong internal support (Type 1) focuses on a shared image outlook. All the 

primary actors tend to see the decision from a common or shared perspective 

in terms of the situation, the alternatives, and the expected consequences. 

Mixed internal support (Type 2) describes a condition where the majority of 

key players are not fully committed for or against a particular course of 

8 
Figure 2. Internal Support Categories 

action. This approximates a standard bell curve where most of the players are 

somewhere in the middle. Split internal support (Type 3) reveals a definite 

rift between the major decision makers. The primary actors may have a 

common view of the situation, but decidedly differ either on the chosen 

alternative or expected outcome. Weak internal support (Type 4) depicts a 

minority within the decision-making body driving the final choice. This 

minority sponsors a decision without significant support. Although these four 

types do not consider the relative power among the major actors, they serve 

as a basis for our attempts to “know” the enemys internal situation. 

In each of the above cases, we can tailor our response to maximize our 

impact on the internal consensus. We may seek to surprise advocates or 

support opponents of a particular policy to take advantage of these internal 

differences and the resulting uncertainty. As March notes, “As a policy 

unfolds into action, the different understandings of an ambiguous political 

agreement combine with the usual transformation of preferences over time to 

become bases for abandoning support.”22 This lack of support often leads to a 

search for alternatives. William Jones, a Rand consultant, states, 

Many of our serious, responsible functionaries, continuing their strong belief that 

the course of action selected is likely to result in undesirable consequences for the 

nation, are likely to exploit many of the channels available to them to influence 

future decisions.23 

If their search for a suitable alternative ends with one favorable to us, we 

have achieved our coercive aim. 

In summary, “It was Allison who made everyone conscious of the potential 

benefits of consistently viewing events in foreign and security policy from the 

vantage point of competing domestic governmental elites.”24 Building on the 

9

strengths of his three models, we extended the analysis to show the central 

role organizations often play within the political decision process. We 

conclude that threatening organizational imperatives may, under the right 

circumstances, exert enough influence to force an opponent to change or 

modify his original policy decision. 

Notes 

1. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 

Mass.: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971). 

2. Vicki E. Baier, James G. March, and Harald Saetren, “Implementation and Ambiguity,” 

in Decisions and Organizations, ed. James G. March (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1988), 

158. 

3. Allison, 246. 

4. James G. March, “Introduction: A Chronicle of Speculations About Decision-Making in 

Organizations,” in Decisions and Organizations, 6. 

5. Stephen D. Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important?” Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972), 

165, 169. 

6. Robert L. Gallucci, “Neither Peace Nor Honor, the Politics of American Military Policy 

in Viet-Nam,” in Studies in International Affairs (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1975), 138. 

7. Ibid., 142. 

8. Krasner, 165. 

9. Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy 

Sciences 4 (1973), 468. 

10. Baier, March, and Saetren, 158. 

11. Allison, 261–62. 

12. Ibid., 263. 

13. Robert Pape, a professor at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, presented his 

integration of Allisons models during a lecture on 8 November 1993 at Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

14. William M. Jones, On Decisionmaking in Organizations (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand 

Corporation, March 1964), Rand Memorandum RM-3968-PR, Air University Library, Maxwell 

AFB, Ala., File No. M-30352-9-NC, No. 3968-PR, 18. 

15. Gallucci, 142. 

16. Ibid., 141. 

17. Allison, 254. 

18. Gallucci, 138. 

19. Baier, March, and Saetren, 158. 

20. Ibid., 159. 

21. Allison, 177. 

22. Baier, March, and Saetren, 159. 

23. Jones, 19. 

24. Gallucci, 137. 

10

Chapter 3 

Air Strategies 

Armed with a conceptual decision framework that identifies the importance 

of organizations in consensus policy-making, this chapter addresses the 

question, How can we use a coercive air strategy to affect this framework. By 

using a comparative construct that mirrors the systems analysis paradigm 

(fig. 3),1

 we will start by examining how several prominent air theorists and 

strategists attempted to tackle this problem. A brief description of each 

component should help the reader understand the practical methodology that 

underpins our approach. 

Figure 3. Air Strategy Comparison Construct 

Beginning at the end, the outcome is quite simply the political result the 

strategist seeks to achieve. This desired endstate (or what a systems analyst 

calls the objective) can range anywhere from formal acceptance of an 

unconditional surrender demand to an informal apology. Although the use of 

military force usually indicates that vital interests are at stake, the desired 

effect, in a compellent situation, equates to an enemy policy change that suits 

our best interests. 

Following a clear statement of the objective, the strategist continues to 

work backward to develop an overarching concept of how he expects air power 

will achieve the desired outcome. This concept, in essence, is the mechanism 

that ultimately permits the strategy to work. Returning to our systems 

analysis paradigm, we see the mechanism and the model perform very similar 

functions. Generally speaking, they both represent a simplified view of what 

should happen in the real world. According to Edith Stokey and Richard 

Zeckhauser, authors of A Primer for Policy Analysis, all models have one 

common feature. “They aim at reducing the complexity of the problem at hand 

by eliminating nonessential features so that we may concentrate on the 

features that describe the primary behavior of the significant variables.”2 

11

A models value, then, lies in its ability to balance our desire for simplicity with 

the often competing need to forecast actual outcomes accurately. Extending 

this line of reasoning to the mechanism, we see that it is nothing more than a 

strategists model of governmental action. It contains a tightly defined assumption of how a particular government should make a policy change decision. 

This last statement sparks a key question, Does ones assumption concerning 

the nature of governmental decisions limit or expand the mechanism’s 

applicability? Simply put, Is there one mechanism that, if discovered, works 

in all situations? How we answer this question is critical to the strategy 

development process. If the answer is yes, then we should tailor all situations 

to our mechanism and strategy. If the answer is no, then we should tailor our 

mechanism and strategy to the situation. Intuitively, we should be highly 

suspicious of any statement that includes the word “all.” Stokey and 

Zeckhauser believe the choice of a particular model depends heavily on the 

particular situation we face.3

 Reviving the mechanism-model analogy described 

earlier, it stands to reason that our choice of strategy mechanism depends on 

the character of our opponent’s decision process. In other words, while it is 

highly unlikely that a single model is appropriate for every situation, it may be 

equally unlikely that a single air strategy mechanism is universally applicable. 

Unfortunately, while most analysts understand a models central 

importance, many strategists fail to appreciate fully the importance of clearly 

defining their assumed mechanism. As a result, strategists often fall into one 

of two traps. They either dogmatically assert their strategy applies in all 

situations or fail to define the mechanism adequately. Regarding the latter, 

many simply assume a causal link exists between the destruction of certain 

targets and the desired outcome. For example, many allege that bombing 

produced the peace treaty that ended the Vietnam War in January 1973 

simply because peace negotiations began as a result of the Linebacker II 

campaign in December 1972. To avoid these pitfalls, air strategists must 

make a concerted attempt to define their operating mechanism for the entire 

strategy rests on this foundation. 

Once the strategist defines the mechanism, he can turn to the targets and 

timing components. These two variables, when combined, form alternatives, 

or an “air campaign.”4

 These alternatives provide the strategist with different 

ways of accomplishing a particular outcome (objective) given an understanding of the assumed mechanism (model). This suggests that the air 

campaign is not a separate or subordinate military activity, but an integral 

part of the larger strategy. 

Various strategists define the “air campaign” portions of their strategies 

quite differently. Concerning targets, four basic types eventually emerge.5 

• Leadership 

• Economy 

• Population 

• Military forces 

12

Clearly, the relative value of each of these target types can vary considerably 

from one adversary to another; however, the strategist cannot afford to underestimate the importance of the leadership set. If we expect a coercive air 

strategy to compel an adversary to change a particular policy, it can only 

happen as a result of one of two fundamentally similar events. Either the 

current government concedes or a new government comes to power and concedes. 

Although Col John Warden, as the architect of the Gulf War air campaign, 

and the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) lecturers, as the architects of the 

World War II strategic bombing campaign, differ greatly in their approach, 

they both emphasize the importance of the leadership angle. Warden 

concludes that the “most critical ring is the enemy command structure 

because it is the only element of the enemy—whether a civilian at the seat of 

government or a general directing a fleet—that can make concessions” 

(emphasis added).6

 Nearly 60 years earlier, lecturers at the ACTS warned: 

When it is considered that an air attack upon a nation in the future may well be 

expected to produce, within a relatively short space of time, a sufficient impression 

upon national morale to bring about a condition where the general bulk of the 

population would be opposed to the continuation of hostilities, the attack upon 

government centers must be given careful consideration, as the political establishment must remain intact if the attitude of the people at large is to be rapidly 

sensed and given appropriate expression. (Emphasis added)7 

The preceding quotation uncovers another issue the strategist must 

address about targeting, should we take a direct or an indirect route to induce 

concessions from our opponent. In other words, although a strategy may rely 

on punishment or denial, the economy, the population, and the military target 

sets are predominately indirect attempts to evoke concessions. The national 

leadership, on the other hand, presents a very different situation. Due to its 

unique status as a legitimate target set itself, we may be lulled into thinking 

we can only attack these high-level leaders directly. However, as we shall see, 

we may be able to target what key organizational leaders’ value and thereby 

indirectly force a concession. 

The other air campaign variable concerns timing. Although outside the 

normal systems analysis paradigm, it deals specifically with a strategys rate 

of application of force to enhance its overall effect. The strategist can vary 

this rate anywhere from an almost instantaneous response to a more 

deliberate or gradual effort. By incorporating the notion of the air campaign 

into the construct, we now have the foundation necessary to conduct an 

analysis of several influential air theorists (fig. 4). 

Giulio Douhet, an Italian air power pioneer, believed the morale of the 

civilian population was the weakest link in any national defense effort. If 

bombed using a combination of high explosives, incendiaries, and gas, he 

believed the populace would stop supporting the war effort. He writes: 

A complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in a country 

subjected to this kind of merciless pounding from the air. The time would soon come 

when, to put an end to horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the 

instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war.8 

13 
Figure 4. Expanded Air Strategy Comparison Construct 

Seeing popular revolt as the mechanism that compels governmental concessions and the civil population as the preferred target, he completed his strategy by stating the need to “inflict upon the enemy the greatest amount of 

damage in the shortest possible time.”9 

Although essentially agreeing with Douhets conclusion that civilian morale 

would motivate governmental decision makers, the ACTS took a slightly 

different track. Since they considered a direct attack on civilians morally 

reprehensible, they sought a more subtle approach to accomplish the same 

ends. Using the United States as a model, they concluded that modern 

societies relied heavily on an economy composed of interdependent linkages, 

“the industrial web.” They maintained that 

modern industrial nations are susceptible to defeat by interruption of this 

web, which is built to permit the dependence of one section upon many or all 

other sections, and further that this interruption is the primary objective for 

an air force. It is possible that the moral collapse brought about by the 

breaking of this closely knit web will be sufficient, but closely connected 

therewith is the industrial fabric which is absolutely essential for modern 

warfare.10 

In essence, they searched for key industrial targets whose destruction would 

degrade both the will and capability to resist. While they expected a rapid attack 

on an opponents economy would undermine civilian support, they reasoned 

any economic damage would invariably hinder their overall war effort. 

Thomas Schelling, Harvard professor and author of Arms and Influence, 

breaks from the two approaches described above and introduces the idea of 

risk manipulation. His punitive approach, while similar in many regards to 

both the Douhet and ACTS strategies, seeks to impose a gradual increase in 

costs (civil damage) while threatening to inflict even greater costs.11 Schelling 

expects rational enemy leaders to appreciate the high probability of future 

pain and concede. 

Col John Warden offers a far different approach by focusing on direct attacks 

on the enemy leadership. Operating under the old adage, “if you cut off the head 

the body will die,” he believes, “the essence of war is to apply pressure against 

the enemys innermost strategic ring—its command structure.”12 He reasons 

that if one can kill, capture, or isolate the heads of state, either a change in the 

government or strategic paralysis will occur.13 He expects “hyperwar,” a massive, 

14

near-simultaneous attack against strategic targets, to produce the desired 

results. 

Using the construct identified earlier, table 1 summarizes their views. 

Table 1 

Comparative Analysis Summary 

THEORIST TIMING TARGET MECHANISM OUTCOME 

Douhet Immediate Population Lower morale Policy change 

Revolt 

ACTS Rapid Economy Social Policy change 

“Industrial web” disintegration 

Schelling Gradual Population Future costs Policy change 

Warden Instantaneous Leadership Decapitation Policy change 

Strategic paralysis 

The previous discussion sets the stage to readdress the question posed at 

the beginning of this chapter, How can we use a coercive air strategy to affect 

our integrated decision environment? Broadly speaking, our recommended 

solution seeks a policy change by undermining organizational confidence and 

support for a particular consensus decision. From the standpoint of an air 

campaign concerned primarily with targets and timing, this strategy targets 

what key organizational leaders value during windows of coercive opportunity. 

Table 2 diagrams the key elements of our strategy. 

Table 2 

Proposed Strategy 

TIMING TARGET MECHANISM OUTCOME 

Rapid, during windows Key organizational Undermine policy Policy change 

of opportunity leaders in Model III consensus 

consensus 

Each of the three major strategy components—timing, target, and 

mechanism—requires further elaboration. We will examine the timing 

component first by addressing two different aspects—when and how. If we 

accept the idea that there is no universally correct air strategy, the first 

question is, When should we use the proposed strategy? As mentioned in the 

previous chapter, internal support for a particular policy may, at any given 

time, vary drastically. In fact, during the inevitable ebb and flow of resolve 

and doubt during any crisis, an opposing government may lack the support of 

the competing internal organizations necessary to pursue the original policy 

decision to a successful conclusion. Reviving the second of Allisons 

propositions, these internal shifts can indicate the approach of a potentially 

useful window of coercive opportunity. 

Unfortunately, an estimate of the internal consensus does not provide, by 

itself, enough depth to serve as the basis for our window of opportunity 

calculation. We need to balance a lack of consensus against another critical 

factor—resolve. Although difficult to measure precisely, resolve is an 

assessment of an opponents willingness to see a decision through to the end. 

15 
This willingness has an emotional impact far beyond a simple commitment to 

“stay the course” in spite of new information that challenges the wisdom of 

the original decision. It also implies an acceptance of the fact that in an 

uncertain world the present situation or crisis may get worse before it gets 

better. As Schelling notes, “the essence of the crisis is its unpredictability.”14 

Therefore, it is this interaction between internal dissension and resolve that 

defines our window of coercive opportunity (fig. 5). While only an example for 

illustrative purposes, the figure shows that a combination of low resolve and 

high internal dissension suggests a favorable opportunity may exist to coerce 

our opponent. 

Figure 5. Internal Dissension-Resolve Pattern 

At this point, some may expect the introduction of a set of mathematically 

precise formulas to complete the y-axis of the graph. Others might like to see 

a corresponding numerical threshold that triggers the selection of a coercive 

approach when a predetermined dissension-resolve difference is reached. 

Unfortunately, those calculations are beyond the scope of this paper. 

However, we can reasonably assert that a more complete knowledge of the 

inner workings of our enemy may provide ballpark estimates that allow us to 

predict the approach of these key points and tailor our strategy accordingly. 

Ideally, our coercive strategy would serve to drive the internal dissension line 

upward and the resolve line downward thus increasing the chances for 

successful coercion (fig. 6). 

Figure 6. Desired Internal Dissension-Resolve Pattern 

16 
The second aspect of timing involves the how question. More specifically, 

how fast should we apply our air strategy? Our response must be rapid for 

three reasons. First, the conditions favoring the coercive opportunity may be 

brief, thereby strengthening the “window” analogy. As an example, consider the 

German situation in early 1943. After their catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad, 

the existing conditions might have been favorable to build consensus against 

Hitler. Unfortunately, the Casablanca Conference declaration calling for 

unconditional surrender quickly stiffened German resolve and served to solidify 

the consensus. This action effectively closed the coercive window. 

Second, incremental pressures often do not warrant a serious review of the 

cost-benefit calculus until a point is reached where the cumulative costs have 

become too high. In other words, a series of small steps often gives the enemy 

enough time to adapt to, or counter, our efforts. In addition, since a gradual 

response may appear nonthreatening, the level of commitment may actually 

rise. As Jeffrey Pfeffer, author of Power in Organizations, warns: 

When confronted with the fact that the behavior has failed, was unnecessary, or in 

some other way has produced unpleasant results, a process of justification apparently ensues. This process frequently results in even more commitment to the 

chosen course of action, which leads to more resources, effort, and more favorable 

attitudes being expressed toward something that has not worked out.15 

While we all can cite examples where a group backed a decision to the bitter 

end, Pfeffer cites other sources that stress the central role free choice plays in 

the commitment process. He quotes a prominent researcher, 

Volition is essential to all commitment. It is the cement that binds the 

action to the person and that motivates him to accept the implications of his 

acts. . . . Without volition, a behavior is not necessarily committing, for the 

person can always assert that he really did not cause the behavior himself.16 

It seems that commitment and resolve are powerful unifying forces when given 

freely. In our consensus environment where a bargain is the medium of exchange, 

commitment, as mentioned earlier, may be an “illusion.”17 

Finally, if engaged in a particular air or surface strategy, we must be ready to 

adopt a coercive strategy when a promising situation develops unexpectedly. 

In spite of a concerted effort to “know our enemy,” unlikely events do happen. 

One particularly critical development would involve a change in the 

decision-making pattern that our strategy mechanism is designed to counter. 

If we blindly adhere to our original strategy, we could be directing our efforts 

inefficiently; worse yet, we could be directing our efforts ineffectively. This 

need for a rapid and flexible response tends to favor some use of air power. 

Turning from timing to targets, we see that organizational elements within 

the consensus environment contain the key to a successful application of 

coercive air power. Our goal is to establish the proper conditions for a new 

consensus to change the policy. The key target, as mentioned earlier, is not 

the unitary, yet ambiguous national leadership, but more specifically the 

leaders of those organizations who provide swing votes or dominate voting in 

the political process. Depending on the type of internal consensus, we may be 

17 
able to influence the decisive individuals indirectly by threatening or 

attacking items they see as vital to their survival or relative influence. 

Finally, we need to define the mechanism that will cause the opponents key 

organizational leaders to press for a policy change. Lt Col Pat Pentland, a 

practitioner of chaos theory as it applies to strategy, offers four requirements 

for change to occur: 

• an anomaly (difference) must be present and perceived, 

• an alternative choice must be present, 

•	 the proposed change must fit their internal demands (cultural) for 

coherence, and 

•	 the proposed change must meet the external requirements of the 

environment.18 

While all four factors are important, the first two—the anomaly and the 

alternative—deserve special attention. 

Since an intelligent opponent has considered our probable responses, the 

coercer can take one of two approaches to split the consensus. We can surprise 

advocates of a particular policy within the consensus with an unanticipated 

response hoping to stimulate the uncertainty that remains suppressed 

beneath the surface. The psychological effects of surprise, many assert, can 

result in “success out of proportion to the effort expended.”19 ACTS lecturers 

went even further when they stated, “Air forces possess, to a greater degree 

than any other military force, a flexibility which empowers them with the 

greatest capabilities for surprise.”20 What we hope to achieve is a decrease in 

the relative power of those supporting the policy by showing their inability to 

predict future consequences accurately. The resulting shift in the power base 

within the consensus, according to Allisons expectations, might be sufficient 

to compel the decision-making group to take an alternate course of action. 

This mechanism reveals two additional demands needed to fulfill Pentlands 

requirements for change. 

First, the magnitude of the surprise must exceed a certain perception 

threshold. This threshold is simply some situation-dependent level that allows 

our opponent to distinguish our response from the surrounding noise. That is, 

the “surprise” must be significant enough for our opponent to notice it. If 

noticed, surprise provides a shock to an adversarys decision system that 

challenges the probability estimates embedded in the expected value formula 

discussed at the beginning of chapter two. Essentially, surprise can affect 

both variables by increasing the probability of costs (PC) being incurred and 

decreasing the probability of success (PS). Consider the Japanese situation in 

August 1945. The twin surprises of the atomic bomb and Russias entry into 

the war undermined the militarys confidence in their ability to defend the home 

islands (PS) and increased the emperor’s belief of increased civil cost (PC). 

Second, a surprising turn of events provides top decision makers with new 

options or alternatives to consider. While we have seen that leaders could 

dogmatically stick to the original plan, a more likely political consensus 

response would be to address the validity of the old decision in light of the 

18 
new information. Harrison and March note that “empirical studies of decisionmaking in political institutions and organizations indicate that surprises are 

often negative, that realizations from decisions tend to be disappointing.”21 

We hope to encourage this feeling of dissatisfaction with the present 

conditions for it is “the major variable affecting the initiation of search” for 

alternatives.22 March agrees, stating that “in periods and domains of success, 

search is reduced. In periods and domains of failure, search is increased.”23 

From a practical aspect, we need to induce a feeling of failure, a feeling of 

an inability to predict or control the future accurately. If we respond as expected, 

we only strengthen the feeling of success and strengthen the position of those 

within the consensus that support the policy. In such cases, alternatives, 

particularly those favorable to us, stand a poor chance of being considered. 

The other coercive approach designed to split the consensus seeks to 

support the predicted outcome advocated by the opposition. This approach is, 

in many ways, simply the reverse of the surprise-oriented approach. By 

responding in a way that seemingly proves those who doubted the policy 

predicted its consequences, we hope to strengthen their position within the 

consensus. From their improved internal standing, we hope to see 

alternatives adopted that support our best interests. 

Both of these approaches are subtle variations in the strategys application. 

Either can be viewed in an expansion of the simple lever analogy identified in 

the introduction. Our strategy, in its most basic form, involves nothing more 

than the application of leverage to overcome an opposing force (fig. 7). In 

international politics, the opposing force is another actor’s policy. Two 

components make up the framework: the fulcrum and the lever. 

Figure 7. Coercive Strategy (Theory) 

19 
The central feature is the fulcrum. It is a hinge point that imparts a 

multiplicative effect on the entire coercive process. This sliding scale, 

represents, in a broad sense, our knowledge of the enemy. It is a composite 

appraisal of many factors that include, but are not limited to, key leaders 

attitudes, interests, stakes, and cultural biases in a particular course of 

action. While an in-depth knowledge of an opponent cannot guarantee 

success, it can make us sensitive to the state of the enemys internal cohesion. 

Consider, for example, a journalist preparing a story concerning how US 

representatives might vote on a particularly contentious piece of legislation. A 

foreign journalist, not well versed in US internal politics, could only offer the 

most obvious conclusions. An experienced American political journalist, on 

the other hand, could write a much richer article. He could identify the key 

players, their relative influence, values, stakes, commitment, and resolve. He 

could offer comment on subtle linkages where conflicts or differences could be 

a factor. These are precisely the same questions we need to answer to make 

coercion work. 

The second major component is the lever. The coercer, on the right, can use 

the three classic instruments of national power to apply pressure on the 

various aspects of the opposing structure. The lever is further divided into 

four elements each representing one of the four primary target sets— 

leadership, economic, military, and population. While the other instruments 

of national power have a somewhat limited use, air powers inherent 

capabilities of speed, range, flexibility, and lethality enable it to influence 

targets rapidly across the entire spectrum. 

The left side of the lever represents an opposing governments key players. 

Each major player calculates the effects of our pressures on the same four 

general categories of targets. We need to ask several important questions in 

an attempt to determine the internal consensus typology, gauge the level of 

resolve, and gather data on target vulnerabilities and importance. Who are 

the key players and who are the decisive players? Are any of these individuals 

particularly vulnerable? Will any of these individuals respond to 

organizational pressures? What does each of them expect to gain or lose from 

the policy decision? What does each organizational leader value? Is what they 

value vulnerable to attack? Answers to such questions should provide the 

strategist with the knowledge of the enemy necessary to select the most 

effective strategy mechanism and then design an appropriate air campaign. 

Successfully applying this coercive strategy, under the right conditions, 

should tilt the entire structure (the bureaucratic shift) and result in a policy 

change in our favor (fig. 8). In this example, we have determined a split 

consensus exists, assessed the presence of a favorable coercive window of 

opportunity, and selectively applied air power against military and economic 

targets that several decisive organizational players value to shape a new 

internal consensus. 

Considering this alternative air strategy, the next chapter will study a 

historical case to help determine the unique circumstances that might lead 

one to consider the use of this approach. 

20 
Figure 8. Coercive Strategy (Applied) 

Notes 

1. Dr Robert Pape and Col Ken Feldman, professors at the School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies, developed this construct. Colonel Feldman helped Dr Pape integrate the systems 

analysis concepts. 

2. Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis (New York: W. W. 

Norton and Company, 1978), 13. 

3. Ibid., 17. 

4. Col Ken Feldman, a School of Advanced Airpower Studies professor, developed the idea 

that the timing and targets aspects of the strategy model equate to an air campaign. 

5. Colonel Warden believes “every state and military organization will have a unique set of 

centers of gravity—or vulnerabilities.” Some vulnerabilities are more important than others 

and take the form of five concentric circles. The most important vulnerability is the enemy 

command element located at the center. Moving outward essential production is the next ring 

followed by the transportation network, then the population, and finally the fielded military 

forces. The ACTS lecturers envisioned three highly interdependent spheres comprising an 

enemys national structure—the social sphere, the economic sphere, and the political sphere. 

Attacks against either the spheres of the national structure or the armed forces formed the two 

general categories of Air Force objectives. Blending these works and several others, four basic 

types of target sets emerge—leadership, military forces, economy, and the civil population. 

6. John A. Warden III, “Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century,” in The Future 

of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Robert L. 

Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, July 1992), 65. 

7. Air Corps Tactical School Lecture Text, “Air Force Objectives,” ACTS Course “Air 

Force,” 1934–35, 204, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., File No. 

248.101-1. 

8. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: 

Coward-McCann Inc., 1942; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 58. 

9. Ibid., 60–61. 

10. Air Corps Tactical School Lecture Text, “Principles of War Applied to Air Force Action,” 

ACTS Course “Air Force,” 1934–35, 178, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala., File No. 248.101-1. 

21

11. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 

1963), 172. 

12. Warden, 68. 

13. Ibid., 69. 

14. Schelling, 97. 

15. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Marshfield, Mass.: Pitman Publishing Inc., 

1981), 293. 

16. Ibid., 291. 

17. Vicki. E. Baier, James G. March, and Harald Saetren, “Implementation and Ambiguity,” 

in Decisions and Organizations, ed. James G. March (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1988), 

159. 

18. Lt Col Pat Pentland, a School of Advanced Airpower Studies professor, presented these 

unpublished notes during lecture on 10 November 1993 at Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

19. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 

13. 

20. “Principles of War Applied to Air Force Action.” 9. 

21. J. Richard Harrison and James G. March, “Decision-Making and Postdecision 

Surprises,” in Decisions and Organizations, 245. 

22. Julian Feldman and Herschel Kanter, Organizational Decision-Making (Santa Monica: 

System Development Corporation, 30 December 1963), Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala., File No. M-40408-5, No. 1357, 13. 

23. James G. March, “Introduction: A Chronicle of Speculations About Decision-Making in 

Organizations,” in Decisions and Organizations, 4. 

22

Chapter 4 

The Czechoslovakian Crisis—A Case Study 

The previous two chapters presented the conceptual background and 

theory for a coercive air strategy aimed at undermining an opponent’s 

internal support for a particular policy decision. While this theoretical base 

forms an essential part of the entire proposal, it is difficult (if not 

impossible) to assess the “value” of this strategy solely on its theoretical 

merits. We need to make an assessment of the strategys practical “value” 

to define the conditions that suggest its future applications. 

The Czechoslovakian crisis that gripped Europe in the summer and fall 

of 1938 highlights many of the same situational characteristics we see 

today and might expect to see tomorrow. Germanys status as a 

predominately land-based regional power, guided by a dominant leader 

with expansionist desires, has many parallels with the existing situations 

in Korea, Iraq, and other parts of the world. In addition, Britains position 

as a world power with global interests and a fiscally constrained forward 

military presence approximates our own current situation. 

The use of this historical episode addresses three specific questions in 

regard to our search to define the proposed strategys operative conditions. 

First, what were the nature and cohesiveness of the German 

decision-making process? Second, were the British aware of this 

information? Finally, how could the proposed strategy have helped the 

British counter the German strategy of bluff and intimidation? 

We begin our study by examining the nature and cohesion of the German 

decision process. This effort encapsulates the “know your enemy” theme 

that runs through this entire project. As we explore this situation with 

regard to a decision consensus, we find that five potentially powerful 

groups existed in Germany during this critical period: 

• Hitler and the National Socialist (Nazi) party 

• the military 

• big business and finance 

• governmental bureaucracy 

• civil populace.1 

While all the groups were important, Hitler and the army came to dominate internal foreign policy concerns. As a result, we will focus on how the 

armys conservative organizational views eventually clashed with Hitlers 

more radical expansionist desires. 

23

Hitler enjoyed unexpected diplomatic success during his rise to power in 

the 1930s. He denounced the military clauses in the Versailles Treaty 

(1935), reoccupied the Rhineland (1936), and consumed Austria (1938) as 

the rest of Europe simply stood by and watched. While these events 

unsettled the international community, they had even a greater impact on 

the domestic political power balance. “In each one of these cases Hitler 

threw the warnings of the Army command to the wind” which “increased 

his self-confidence enormously and undermined the authority of all those 

who sought to oppose him with their ‘old fashioned ideas.”2

 Emboldened, 

not appeased, by these “easy” diplomatic victories, Hitler turned his 

attention to another rich prize— Czechoslovakias Sudetenland. 

At a time when Hitlers influence and power were rising, the armys 

political fortunes were setting. The army, as the primary defender of the 

continental German empire since Frederick the Great, historically exerted 

tremendous influence over state policy. However, in the zero-sum game of 

political influence, Hitlers seemingly clairvoyant ability to predict the 

future directly challenged the armys traditional preeminence. Three 

politically significant events, all occurring in early 1938, rocked the 

service. In rapid succession, the army experienced the forced resignation of 

Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, the minister for war, suffered 

through the dismissal of Col Gen Werner von Fritsch, the commander in 

chief of the army; and witnessed Hitlers assumption of personal command 

of the armed forces.3

 Together, these events underscored a disturbing 

decline in the armys organizational influence. 

We can trace this decline back to the “Hossbach” conference in November 

1937. It was here that “Hitler revealed for the first time in the presence of 

the Foreign Minister, the War Minister and the Commanders-in-Chief of 

the three Services his resolve to settle the question of German ‘living space’ 

by force.”4

 Objections were immediately raised and intensified over the 

next several months. General von Rundstedt described a spring 1938 

meeting at which all the major commanders sought to dissuade Hitler from 

his aggressive course of action.5

 As summer approached, it became clear 

that “the leading figures in the Generalitat saw things differently [from 

Hitler] on almost every point. None of them shared his racial fantasies or 

dreams of wholesale eastern expansion.”6 

These differences came to a head when Hitlers 30 May 1938 directive 

officially and unequivocally stated, “It is my unalterable decision to smash 

Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.”7

 Senior army leaders 

vehemently opposed this decision. As a group, the generals predicted an 

invasion of Czechoslovakia would pit an ill-prepared Germany against the 

major European powers in an unwinable two-front war. In spite of Hitlers 

previous diplomatic triumphs, they collectively felt military action against 

an alliance protected Czechoslovakia was tantamount to committing 

national suicide. The army chief of staff later stated, 

When it became clear to responsible military circles that Hitler was determined to 

bring about military intervention on the issue of Sudeten Germans, patriots in the 

24 
German army decided to prevent what they felt was inevitable catastrophe to 

Germany by removing Hitler.8 

Obviously a serious difference of expectations had developed. Where 

Hitler professed complete military and political success, the generals saw 

complete failure. Hitler believed the Western European powers would not 

intervene militarily. The army was not convinced. Organizationally, they 

would be the first to suffer the consequences from any diplomatic 

miscalculation. Army leaders knew they did not have the capability to fight 

against the combined might of the Czech, French, British, and Russian 

armies. The German western frontier was inadequately manned as troops 

were moved east in anticipation of the upcoming Czech invasion. Both Gen 

Alfred Jodl, at his trial at Nuremberg, and Gen Wilhelm Adam, in his 

memoirs, describe the ability of the Germans to withstand a French 

invasion as “sheer lunacy.”9 

To the army, Hitlers decision represented a foolhardy gamble. 

Organizational survival, couched in terms of national survival, was at 

stake. Consequently, several groups, with the army leadership at the 

center, came together to form a conspiracy to prevent the gamble from 

occurring. 

Soldiers opposed war in 1938 not merely because it would be disastrous 

for Germany but because, in facing and fighting against this danger, they 

seemed to have an opportunity of overthrowing a criminal regime and 

returning to the concepts of national and international decency which were 

in closer accord with genuine military and aristocratic traditions.10 

Clearly, Hitler and the army held widely disparate expectations 

concerning the consequences of the decision to use military force to resolve 

the Czech crisis. Each was strongly committed to their own particular 

projections. Recalling the internal support categories introduced earlier, we 

see that a split support condition most closely describes Germanys internal 

consensus in the summer and fall of 1938 (fig. 9). We can also chart how 

the pattern of internal dissension and resolve evolved from the Hossbach 

conference (1) to the Munich summit (2) (fig. 10). Although the actual crisis 

only lasted for five months, a potential coercive window of opportunity 

Figure 9. German Internal Consensus 

25 
Figure 10. German Internal Dissension-Resolve Estimate 

rapidly opened until slammed shut by Neville Chamberlains diplomatic 

mission to Munich in late September. 

Thus at the moment when the British Cabinet and the French were about to call 

Hitlers bluff, Chamberlain sold the pass. If Britain had stayed firm, Hitler would 

either have been defeated in the field or the German generals would have overthrown him. Hitler had staked his reputation on occupying Czechoslovakia by 1 

October, and failure would have left him vulnerable.11 

While an analysis of the German internal situation is an interesting 

academic discussion some 56 years after the fact, the key issue for our 

purposes hinges on whether the British were aware of both Hitlers action 

decision and the internal resistance to it. The number and variety of 

German opposition attempts to secure British support strongly suggests 

that the key British officials had a clear picture of both conditions. Hans 

Rothfels suggests both the British foreign secretary and prime minister 

“were completely conversant with the attitude and plans of the German 

opposition in the summer and autumn of 1938.”12 They simply discounted 

the fact that “a conspiracy had been arranged by Field Marshal von 

Witzlenben with the support of some of the leading generals to have Hitler 

arrested and an announcement made to the German people that Hitler was 

trying to lead them into war.”13 In any case, “At the peak of the 

international crisis there were clear signs of a severe crisis of confidence in 

[Hitlers] regime.”14 

What could the British have done differently to end the crisis on more 

favorable terms? The split support condition in Germany offered an ideal 

coercive situation for the British. According to the wishes of the opposition, 

they could have staged a small military demonstration that would have not 

only surprised Hitler and his few supporters, but strengthened the 

opposition by confirming their predictions that further aggressive action 

would lead Germany into another world war. The opposition, in fact, 

“Counted on a reverse which would either force the dictator to give in and 

so lose face, or else, if he continued on the road to catastrophe, make it 

26

possible to arraign him on a charge of war-mongering.”15 “The general trend 

of public opinion in Germany was very favorable to [removing Hitler to 

avoid war] as the idea of war filled everyone with horror, and the feeling 

about Hitlers genius in the political and diplomatic field only emerged after 

the Munich agreement.16 

Although the state of the British land and air arms precluded a 

large-scale response, a naval demonstration was quite possible given that 

most Germans, including Hitler, respected British sea power.17 One 

German diplomat describes an attempt to have the British conduct naval 

maneuvers in the North Sea as a warning of British determination.18 This 

may have been all that was needed for the opposition to depose Hitler. 

We can use this crisis as a guide for future action. We dominate the air 

today in much the same way as the British dominated the sea in 1938. 

Unfortunately, because they failed to know their adversary and 

themselves, they missed an opportunity to apply sea power 

selectively—and successfully— in a compellent situation. Their 

counterstrategy, relying on a unitary, rational actor assumption, 

eliminated any chance to take advantage of the uncertainty and conflicting 

organizational pressures that made Hitlers “split” government particularly 

vulnerable to a coercive effort. Under similar circumstances, we should 

consider the selective use of naval or land-based air power as a 

demonstration to compel a change in an opponents policy decision. 

Notes 

1. Fritz Morstein Marx, “The Effects of the War on the Government of Germany,” in 

Government in Wartime Europe and Germany, rev. edition, ed. Harold Zink and Taylor Cole 

(Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942), 101 and Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of 

Hitlers Power (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), 41. 

2. Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, trans. Lawrence Wilson (Chicago, Ill.: 

Henry Regnery Company, 1962), 68. 

3. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1960), 320. 

4. Rothfels, 56. 

5. Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch issued by the Military 

Intelligence Service, US War Department, by combined personnel of US and British services 

for use of Allied forces. Information obtained from Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the former 

German CinCWest, 6 September 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala., File No. 170.2281-21. 

6. Harold C. Deutsch, “Military Planning and National Policy: German Overtures to Two 

World Wars,” in The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959–1987, ed. Lt Col 

Harry R. Borowski (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 568. 

7. Shirer, 365. 

8. US Strategic Bombing Survey, Post-war Interview with General Oberst von Halder, 

Interview No. 52A, 30 June and 1 July 1945, published 24 July 1945, 2, Air Force Historical 

Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., File No. 137.315-52A. 

9. Richard Lamb, The Drift to War 1922–1939 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1989), 262. 

10. Rothfels, 79. 

11. Lamb, 258. 

12. Rothfels, 125. 

27

13. Combined Intelligence Committee, interrogation of General Oberst von Halder, 25 July 

1945, 2, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., File No. 119.0412-197. 

14. Rothfels, 58. 

15. Ibid. 

16. US Strategic Bombing Survey Post-war Interview with General Oberst von Halder, 2. 

17. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon (New 

York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1965), 94. 

18. Ibid. 

28

Chapter 5 

Conclusion 

This paper has discussed strategy—coercive air strategy. Although other 

definitions exist, strategy is a decision process that links ways and means to a 

desired end. Many modern air strategists tend to concentrate solely on the 

ways and means side of the strategy equation. However, we have used Sun 

Tzus know your enemy and yourself axiom, and his attack an opponents 

strategy corollary, to propose an approach that seeks to influence the decision 

process aspect of strategy. 

From the outset, we contended that there is no single, universally 

applicable approach that will always yield success. With this proposition in 

mind, we introduced a possible alternative strategy that seeks to undermine 

an opponents confidence in a prior decision to produce a bureaucratic shift. 

We expect to accomplish this aim by exploiting how uncertainty and 

organizational pressures influence decision making in a consensus. Our effort 

focused on identifying the conditions that are conducive to the successful 

application of the proposed air strategy. 

We began our study by examining the methodology of government decision 

making. Using a framework developed that blends Graham Allisons three 

decision models into one interrelated structure, we concluded that 

•	 the value maximizing, rational actor model fails to consider fully the 

often subjective and possibly irrational organizational and political 

factors that lie at the heart of most complex issues, 

•	 policy decisions often result from a political consensus where decision 

makers share power by bargaining for support in an uncertain 

environment, 

• organizational leaders, biased by their “institutional” views and 

expectations, often play a central role in this consensus process. 

Consequently, we focused on how organizational leaders form a unique subset 

of the classic leadership target set. In addition, we explored how their divergent expectations may make them particularly vulnerable to an “indirect” 

coercive air effort. 

Building on this foundation, we sought to develop a coercive air strategy to 

affect this governmental decision framework. We concluded that a strategys 

mechanism, that aspect that allows it to work, contains a key assumption 

concerning how governments make decisions. As a result, we noted that when 

a strategist fits a particular strategy to a particular situation, that person is 

actually making a choice between competing mechanisms. Where most 

29 
theories assume the opposing government operates as a unitary rational 

actor, our strategy sees a complex combination of competing organizations 

within a political consensus. 

Our proposal uses the speed and flexibility of air power to exploit the 

uncertainty and organizational pressures inherent in this consensus decision 

environment during what we call “windows of coercive opportunity.” These 

windows stem from an interaction between an opponents internal dissension 

and the resolve shown for a particular policy. What we hope to achieve within 

this window is a shift in the consensus significant enough to produce a policy 

change. We can tailor our response either to surprise policy advocates or to 

support policy opponents. In either case, we expect to achieve a decrease in 

the relative power of those supporting the policy by showing their inability to 

predict future consequences accurately. In other words, we hope to induce a 

feeling of distrust and internal failure. To achieve this goal, we must know 

our enemy. 

The British clearly failed to know their German opponent in the 

Czechoslovakian crisis that preceded World War II. Hitler and the army held 

widely disparate views of the consequences of the decision to solve the crisis 

by military force. Hitler expected total political and military success, while 

the military foresaw complete organizational failure. A definite schism 

developed and British leaders were acutely aware of it. A naval exercise to 

demonstrate British resolve may have provided the missing ingredient the 

German opposition elements needed to oust Hitler. Unfortunately, the 

Munich Agreement that promised “peace in our time” closed the window of 

coercive opportunity and put Europe on track for the Second World War. 

Considering the previous discussion, the following are the key conditions 

that might suggest the use of the proposed air strategy: 

•	 Our opponent makes decisions where organizations influence the 

consensus. 

•	 A split within the consensus exists concerning the wisdom or consequences 

of a particular action. 

•	 The competing organizational expectations offer the opportunity to use 

(or threaten to use) air power against vulnerable targets. 

• A suitable coercive window of opportunity exists. 

•	 We have the political will to use the military instrument (particularly air 

power). 

• Our desired outcome is a policy change, not a change in government. 

• A rapid response is required. 

The above list is only an initial attempt to define many of the likely 

conditions that would suggest the use of this particular approach. Additional 

research is necessary to refine these conditions further. For example, how 

well does the proposed strategy apply to other historical situations or likely 

future scenarios? How well does this approach support a deterrent situation, 

rather than a compellent one? More research should also enhance the coercive 

window of opportunity concept. 

30 
In conclusion, we must reemphasize our belief that proper strategy 

selection is highly situation dependent. We must resist the tendency to follow 

“proven” strategies as universally applicable, and concentrate on the more 

difficult task of matching the proper mechanism to the situation. The 

proposed approach is only one of many possible alternatives, not the 

alternative. In todays highly competitive world, we need a wide range of 

strategy options to employ the air power instrument successfully. 

31


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