BIOCRUISE: A CONTEMPORARY THREAT

by

Michael E. Dickey, Lt Col, USAF

The Counterproliferation Papers

Future Warfare Series No. 7

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

Michael E. Dickey, Lt Col, USAF

September 2000

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of

mass destruction. Copies of No. 7 and previous papers in this series are

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 7

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm
Contents:

Page

Disclaimer ..................................................................................................i

The Author ................................................................................................ii

Acknowledgments....................................................................................iii

Illustrations...............................................................................................iv

Tables........................................................................................................v

Abstract ....................................................................................................vi

I. Introduction...........................................................................................1

II. Biological Weapons ............................................................................3

III. Cruise Missiles...................................................................................9

IV. Employment Considerations............................................................17

V. Conclusions.......................................................................................21

Appendix A.............................................................................................23

Appendix B .............................................................................................29

Notes .......................................................................................................33
i

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the

U.S. Government, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.
ii

The Author

Lt Col Mike Dickey commands the 421st Ground Combat Readiness

Squadron at the Air Mobility Warfare Center (AMC), Fort Dix NJ. He

served six years as a security specialist before being commissioned

through Officer Training School. Past assignments include a variety of

security and force protection assignments, from nuclear security flight

commander to MAJCOM staff in USAFE and ACC, command of security

squadrons in Europe and Saudi Arabia, contingency deployments to Cuba,

deputy commander of the 820th Security Forces Group, and site

commander at Doha, Qatar for operation Desert Fox. A graduate of the

Air War College Class of 2000, he is an AETC Master Instructor and a

specialist in antiterrorism and force protection operations.
iii

Acknowledgments

I gratefully acknowledge the wise counsel and encouragement of

Dr. Barry Schneider, whose challenging course first sparked my

interest in this subject. I also need to thank my classmates and friends

who listened to my musings and ramblings and helped me keep focused,

and my brother Dr. Robert Dickey for his counsel and concern about the

alarming proliferation of open-source information on the subject. Finally,

to MSgt Greg Rhoades of the 820 SFG intelligence shop, for his review

and “sanity check” of my writing, and Ms. JoAnn Eddy of the CPC, for

her help and eternal patience as I labored with this effort, many thanks!
iv

Illustrations

Page

Figure 1. French Apache--Storm Shadow Variant.................................... 15
v

Tables

Page

Table 1. Ballistic Missile Categories ........................................................ 10

Table 2. Cruise Missile Categories ........................................................... 12
vi

Abstract

The specter of intermediate and short-range missile proliferation and

their employment by rogue regimes to deliver weapons of mass

destruction munitions has troubled the international community and

particularly the United States for some time. The prospect of an

“irrational actor,” either state or non-state, in possession of such a missile,

coupled with current proliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons opens up frightening scenarios for future attempts at U.S. and

international community intervention or involvement in regional conflicts.

Recent innovations in cruise missile technology pose a new, and

potentially greater problem than that posed by ballistic missiles. Cruise

missiles are far easier to obtain, maintain, weaponize, and employ than

ballistic missiles. Given the greater ease of production of biological

weapons compared to nuclear or chemical weapons and the ease of

acquisition of a cruise missile delivery system compared to ballistic

missiles, several operational scenarios may prove inviting to states or nonstate actors intent on influencing the United States or attacking its forces.

This paper reviews proliferation and ease of weaponization of biological

agents, as well as the extent of proliferation of cruise missiles, along with

their general capabilities. Finally, it reviews constraints, which may be

inhibiting the use of biological weapons, and poses plausible employment

scenarios that could have significant impact on United States decisionmakers as well as on USAF Air Expeditionary Forces. This paper seeks to

raise the level of awareness of a threat, which is not “emerging” as much

as it is already a clear and present danger to the United States and USAF

expeditionary operations.
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 7

Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

Michael E. Dickey

I. Introduction

Emerging from the Cold War as the sole remaining superpower, the

United States faces regional stability challenges in several places around

the world. The loss of a bi-polar superpower world has led to the

emergence or resurgence of numerous regional conflicts, which threaten

regional stability and potentially impact global economic stability. In

order to meet those challenges the U.S. military has become more

expeditionary in nature than ever before. As the world’s predominant

military power, both in nuclear and conventional terms, state and non-state

actors have abundant reasons to avoid meeting the U.S. military in a “head

to head” action in order to achieve their goals. The 1990-91 Gulf War

efficiently highlighted the conventional warfare capabilities of the U.S.

military and the foolishness of attempting to prevail against it in open

conventional combat. The result of that preeminence in U.S. conventional

power, however, has been the emergence among potential adversaries of a

distinct asymmetric threat, which could have major adverse impacts on

deployed U.S. military forces as well as on the U.S. homeland unless

adequate steps are taken to counter this threat.

Not new to the world’s conflict stage, the ongoing proliferation of

both biological weapons and cruise missiles is alarming. While it appears

that biological weapons have not been employed against an opposing

armed force since World War II (North Korean assertions that the United

States employed biological weapons during the Korean Conflict were

proven in 1998 to be a fabrication,1

 and United States’ claims that the

Soviet Union employed a “yellow rain” biological or chemical agent in

Cambodia were never proven), they have been used in numerous smallscale criminal acts, and recent improvements in biotechnology have made

them both easier and cheaper to produce than any other weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). Although prohibited from manufacture, stockpiling,

or use by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), numerous nations

are known to have biological weapons programs and others are strongly

suspected of having them. Further, the relative ease of manufacture and
8 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

8

weaponization of biological agents (compared to other WMD) makes

them a threat-in-being as opposed to one that may emerge in the future.

Closely coupled to the proliferation of biological WMD is the

proliferation of modern delivery systems, which could enable a state or

non-state actor to attack the U.S., or deployed U.S. forces with potentially

devastating results. While the proliferation of ballistic missiles has drawn

much public attention over the last several years, the ongoing proliferation

of cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and remotely piloted

vehicles (RPV) presents an even greater threat. These delivery systems

have enjoyed several successful engagements in the anti-ship mode,

notably by Argentine forces against the British during the

Falklands/Malvinas conflict, as well as their more recent land attack

variant successes in the Gulf War. Their capabilities and ease of

acquisition or manufacture make them an ideal attack platform for rogue

states, emerging nations, or non-state actors. Additionally, UAVs and

RPVs have several salient characteristics that make them a much better

delivery system for biological agents than any other.

Although biological agents have not been employed militarily in

recent times, there are indications that they may well be the next of the

three WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological) to be used. The wide

availability of cruise missiles, UAVs and RPVs, along with breakthroughs

in navigational and propulsion systems make them an ideal delivery

system. Additional factors in the nature of sub-state conflict, emerging

non-state actors, and transnational terrorists only enhance the possibility

that these two systems will be mated and employed against the United

States.
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 9

II. Biological Weapons

The use of biological warfare to prevail in combat is not new. Early

recorded uses include the hurling of plague-infested bodies over the walls

of the besieged city of Kaffa (modern-day Feodosia in the Crimea) to

subvert its defenders in the year 1346 AD. The tactic not only worked, but

is suspected of having contributed to or possibly begun the bubonic plague

epidemic that swept through medieval Europe during the “dark ages” of

the 1300’s, killing an estimated 25 million people.2 Often confused or

lumped together with chemical weapons, biologicals are, in fact, easier to

acquire and employ and can be many times more deadly. Labeled the

“poor man’s atomic bomb” because of their relatively low cost and ease of

manufacture, a report by the Congressional Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) estimated the cost of a large biological arsenal at as

low as $10 million. Compared to a conservative estimate of the cost to

develop a single nuclear weapon at $200 million, the BW option can look

very cost effective to rogue states, emerging states, or non-state actors.3

The United States unilaterally abandoned its offensive BW program by

Presidential Order in 1969, and was fully disarmed of BW weapons by

1972. This led to wide acceptance by the world community of the

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which commits

signatories to “...never in any circumstances develop, produce, stockpile,

or otherwise acquire or retain any biological weapons.”4 While some key

officials have disagreed as to the actual ease of manufacture and

weaponization, evidence exists that several nations, notably Iraq, Iran,

Libya, North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Cuba, Taiwan, China, Romania,

Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, South Africa, Syria, as well as Russia, are either

known or suspected of having pursued BW development and stockpiling

efforts.5

Proliferation

The relative ease with which biological weapons can be acquired has

been identified by multiple sources. A 1993 report by the Congressional

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) states:

“Biological warfare agents are easier to produce than

either nuclear materials or chemical warfare agents
10 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

10

because they require a much smaller and cheaper

industrial infrastructure and because the necessary

technology and know how is widely available.”6

More recently, in the Spring 1998 issue of the Journal of

Counterterrorism & Security International, a former FBI Chief of

Counter-Terrorism stated:

“Biological and chemical weapons are certainly available

to sophisticated terrorist organizations, especially those,

like many of the Middle East groups, that operate with the

support of governments. These weapons are both relatively

easy to acquire and lethal in their application.”7

Those desiring to acquire a biological agent can pursue them by

several routes. They could acquire it from a pharmaceutical supply house,

steal it from a laboratory, or if sufficiently trained, skilled and equipped,

they could grow the agent themselves. While this might prove difficult for

most it is not beyond the capability of any nation or group with access to a

pharmaceutical laboratory.

It has been confirmed that several rogue states, notably Iraq, Iran, and

Syria, as well as known terrorist groups such as the German Red Army

Faction (RAF) and Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, have possessed

biological warfare capabilities. Several other terrorist organizations have

expressed interest in acquiring biological agent as far back as a reported

attempt by the radical underground Weathermen organization in 1970.8

Post-Gulf War United Nations inspectors from 1991 to 1995 were

able to identify a biological weapon production capability in Iraq, but they

were never able to definitively link it to a biological warfare program.

Iraq repeatedly denied any BW capabilities, and then suddenly recanted.

In 1995, following the defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel

Majeed, the Iraqi General who ran their WMD program, Iraqi officials

admitted that they had a biological research and development program, but

claimed that all biological weapons had been destroyed. 9

Subsequent investigation revealed enormous production of biological

agents. Iraq had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 8,500 liters of

anthrax and 2,400 liters of aflatoxin. They had also produced quantities of

other less well-known but still deadly agents, and had conducted field

trials employing anthrax and botulinum toxin together in aerial bombs.10
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 11

Clearly, Iraq had a well developed, aggressive program, but one which

could not be detected or verified through outside means. It took a defector

or Iraq’s fear of what the defector would reveal for the world to have

definitive evidence.

While it appears that the German RAF group never attempted to

employ the Clostridium botulinum they had acquired,11 and the Aum

Shinrikyo organization had difficulty with the potency and delivery

methods of their biological assets, it was likely a matter only of time

before the latter group solved their challenges had they not been stopped

in 1995. Aum Shinrikyo was later found to have possessed both anthrax

and Clostridium botulinum. More disturbing is Aum's was attempt to

operationalize an anthrax capability—a biological agent with a near 100

percent fatality rate.12 Their 1995 chemical attack on the subways of

Tokyo using nerve agent Sarin followed nine separate attempts to employ

aerosolized bacteriological agents between 1990 and 1995, including one

attack using botulinum toxin against the city of Yokohama and the U.S.

Navy’s Yokosuka Naval Base. While the biological attacks were

unsuccessful, the subway chemical attack killed 12 people and injured over

5,500 others.13

Advances in medical technology, which have benefited mankind in

many ways, have also complicated the BW environment. The same

technologies have made the production of BW agents much simpler. A

nation with a “modest pharmaceutical expertise can develop BW for

terrorist or military use.”14 The Federation of American Scientists has

reported that:

“Any country having pharmaceutical, cosmetic, or

advanced food storage industries will have stabilization

facilities similar to those that could be used for biological

weapons. The ability to disseminate the biological agent

over a wide area would be limited to those countries having

cruise missiles or advanced aircraft. Even the smallest

country or a terrorist group, however, has the capability to

deliver small quantities of BW agent to a specific target.”15

Numerous nations have taken up the mantle. Open-source estimates

indicate that between 10 and 20 countries have, want, or are considering a

BW capability.16 Disturbing among these figures is that of seven countries

identified by the U.S. Department of State as supporters of terrorism, five
12 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

12

(Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria) are reported by the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency to possess biological warfare programs.

The remaining two (Sudan and Cuba) are reported by other sources,

including British Intelligence, to have biological warfare programs.17 A

U.S. intelligence source indicates the belief that Osama bin Laden funded

a research institute for chemical and biological warfare for the Sudanese

government. This led to the United States’ conventional cruise missile

strikes against a pharmaceutical facility in Khartoum, Sudan in August of

1998.18 The prospect of a non-state actor such as Osama bin Laden

acquiring a biological weapon is distinctly unsettling.

Weaponization

The actual weaponization of biological agents is undoubtedly the

most challenging phase in the development of a biological weapon.

Developing or growing a biological agent is only the first step, and is the

relatively easiest part. However, weaponizing it, producing sufficient

quantities, achieving the correct “formulation” of the agent, milling it to

properly sized spores of agent, and microencapsulizing it in the correct

storage or transport medium or mixture is extremely complicated.

Although a biological agent is potent once developed or grown, unless it is

properly weaponized, it will not be useful as a weapon. Weaponization is

necessary if it is to be able to incapacitate or kill on a large scale.

Formulation

Once produced, the biological microorganisms or toxins must be

milled to between 1 and 5 microns in size, stabilized and packaged until

dispersed. Failure to achieve the correct formulation will cause the agent

to lose its toxicity in storage, to clog sprayer nozzles during dispersal, or

to fail to be absorbed properly into the human body. Agent spores smaller

than 1 micron are too small to lodge in the lungs of the human target and

will be exhaled. Conversely, if larger than 5 microns they become too

heavy to achieve a good aerosol cloud and tend to fall to the ground before

they can be inhaled.19 If not properly stabilized the microorganisms will

deteriorate quickly in the atmosphere. Each microorganism will

deteriorate at a different rate, making some more valuable in weapons.

Reportedly, Q-fever agent will decay at a rate of 10 percent per minute;

yellow fever at approximately 30 percent per minute. Disturbingly, the
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 13

decay rate for the plague and tularemia agents is only 2 percent per

minute, and anthrax decays at only 0.1 percent per minute.20 Although

obviously highly technical, and requiring special milling equipment and

refrigeration systems, the procedures and equipment to perform these tasks

are the same that are required for commercial pharmaceutical

manufacturing, and are easily within the reach of most states.

Dispersal

Dispersal of biological weapons via aerosolization of the agent using

spray devices is the delivery method of choice. While the agent could also

be sprayed from a motor vehicle or boat, such sprayers may not achieve

the optimal downwind results or cover as wide an area.21 On the other

hand, a crop duster type dispenser on an RPV or cruise missile/UAV

carrying BW munitions, gravity bombs or spray attachments might be

other methods of dispersal. Delivery using explosives is probably the least

efficient of all options, since heat and blast effects may “inactivate the

biological agent.”22 Also, delivery via ballistic missile may be ineffective

since the speed and heat generated by the reentry vehicle or warhead could

render biological weapons harmless. Effective use of ballistic missiles

with BW warheads is a technical challenge, difficult to engineer.

Interestingly, Iraq reportedly experimented in December 1990 and January

1991 on an unmanned aircraft, which could deliver biological agent via

spray nozzles, and with a biological weapons spray tank developed from

an aircraft "drop tank." Iraqi officials claimed to United Nations

inspectors that the experiment did not work; however, UN inspectors

found evidence the Iraqis had subsequently modified and stored three

additional drop tanks.23 Under favorable weather conditions, with a

properly sized aerosol dispersal system, an aircraft, cruise missile, or UAV

could deliver BW weapons and cause mass casualties in densely populated

areas. For example, it has been calculated that 100kg of anthrax sprayed

over a 300 square kilometer area, theoretically could cause up to 3 million

deaths if the targeted population density is 3,000 to 10,000 per square

kilometer.24 The effects of each biological agent will be different,

however, depending upon its resiliency to the environment. An additional

consideration in the type of agent employed is persistency. While most

biological agents are sensitive to heat, oxidation, and desiccation, once

stabilized through the freeze-drying process for effective weaponization,
14 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

14

their persistency is increased dramatically. Notably, live anthrax can be

persistent on the ground for up to 40 years.25 Obviously, weaponization is

entirely feasible.

Given that anthrax or a botulinum toxin is openly available, and the

physical infrastructure needed to weaponize involves available "dual-use"

technology also employed for legitimate pharmaceutical production, it is

understandable that the proliferation and weaponization of biological

agents is difficult to detect or halt. All that remains is a reliable means of

delivery and the will to employ this means of creating mass casualties.
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 15

III. Cruise Missiles

Much attention has been given in the international and national press

about the scourge of the proliferation of short and intermediate range

ballistic missiles (BMs). However, in spite of the apparent capabilities

and threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation, the greater threat to the

United States, and specifically to USAF assets may be the proliferation of

cruise missiles (CMs).

The technological complexity, cost, challenges in development, and

complexity of employment of ballistic missiles make them harder to

acquire and use. Conversely, the relative ease of acquisition, operation,

and employment of simple and even some relatively advanced cruise

missiles makes a much more attractive option. Cruise missiles are

essentially small, lightweight, unmanned aircraft. They are much less

expensive and easier to acquire than ballistic missiles, either by purchase

from another country, through independent development, or by acquiring

and modifying an existing UAV or RPV.26 Cruise missiles are much

easier to weaponize, test, and employ. The successes and worldwide

publicity of U.S. cruise missiles during the Gulf War (admittedly at the

“high end” of the cruise missile family) illustrated their capabilities and

utility. Future opposing forces could well look to a cruise missile

capability as a better way to challenge U.S. interests rather than the more

costly, harder-to-produce, more-difficult-to-operate ballistic missiles.

Argument Against Ballistic Missiles

As the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues, several factors

make the acquisition of ballistic missiles a significant challenge to

developing nations and sub-state actors. Ballistic missiles, while capable,

are increasingly difficult to buy outright due to the Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR) efforts to limit their proliferation. They require

an enormous effort to develop autonomously due to controls placed on the

transfer of critical technology by the MTCR. Further, BMs require

extensive testing to perfect the propulsion and guidance systems and can

be difficult to weaponize due to the challenges involved in developing an

effective warhead.
16 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

16

MTCR Restrictions

Established in 1987, the MTCR is not a formal treaty, but is a

voluntary organization of 29 member states that prohibits the sale and

export of certain missiles and missile technologies to other states. While

the provisions of the MTCR apply to both ballistic and cruise missiles, the

main emphasis of the Regime has been to restrict ballistic missile

proliferation. The effect of the MTCR has been the significant reduction

in export of ballistic missiles and critical ballistic missile technology.

However, proliferation of missile technology continues. Both Russia and

China continue to contribute technical assistance to some countries, and

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) continues to

market its missiles and related technologies.27 Additionally, Iran (also not

a member of the MTCR) is reported to have recently sold or transferred an

undetermined number of Scud-B IRBM systems to the Democratic

Republic of the Congo.28

Table 1. Ballistic Missile Categories

Type Missile Maximum Range

Short-Range Ballistic Missile

(SRBM)

<1,000 km (621 mi)

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

(MRBM)

1,000 – 3,000 km (621 – 1,864 mi)

Intermediate-Range Ballistic

Missile (IRBM)

3,000 – 5,500 km (1,864 – 3,418 mi)

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

(ICBM)

>5,500 km (3,418 mi)

Submarine-Launched Ballistic

Missile (SLBM)

Any ballistic missile launched from a

submarine regardless of maximum range

Source: Federation of American Scientists, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat

National Air Intelligence Center NAIC-1031-0985-98,” National Air Intelligence

Center, 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 5 October 1999, available from

 http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nie99msl.htm.

Challenges to Developmental Programs

In spite of challenges involved in purchasing or creating a ballistic

missile program, the prestige involved in owning such a “high-tech”

weapon system seems to be a continual lure to developing nations.

Several are pursuing their own indigenous developmental programs. By
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 17

limiting the ability to buy systems outright, the MTCR has forced nations

desiring ballistic missiles to create their own developmental programs.

These programs have multiple impacts themselves. First, they are

expensive and technologically complex. In addition to the costs involved

in developing an adequate rocket motor and airframe and guidance

system, the ballistic missile is a challenge to weaponize. Developmental

programs themselves tend to telegraph a nation’s intent to those other

nations who may be observing. Static (ground) test firing of a rocket

motor to ensure its ability and reliability can be monitored by U.S.

national technical intelligence means.29 Satellites orbiting overhead can,

for example, detect and measure the “thermal bloom” or heat signature of

the rocket test or of a test flight. Additional technical systems can

intercept and monitor telemetry data from the test rocket. The effect of

testing is to telegraph a nation’s ballistic missile development intentions,

giving the international community the warning and time to either

persuade the developing country to curtail development or prepare to meet

the challenge militarily.

Developing the reentry vehicle and warhead alone has been estimated

by some experts as one of the major challenges to emerging ballistic

missile programs, particularly when dealing with more exotic

weaponization such as chemical or biological warheads. The payload or

warhead must be stressed to survive the high “G,” or force of gravity

loading on launch, as well as survive the extremely high speeds and

resultant heat caused by air friction during the warhead’s flight.

Additionally, the timing of detonation or agent release in order to achieve

efficient agent dispersal is critical to a successful program.

Finally, even once a nation develops or otherwise acquires a ballistic

missile capability, the system is vulnerable. Requiring fixed launch sites,

or large trucks for mobility the ballistic missiles of a nation will be

targeted by an opponent’s aircraft and special operations forces throughout

a period of conflict. The Coalition Forces’ “Scud hunt” during the 1990-

91 Gulf War is an example of such “seek and destroy” operations which

would increase the vulnerability of ballistic missile assets. On launch, a

ballistic missile is visible to national technical intelligence, its flight can

be predicted and warning can be provided to its intended target area,

making it less effective through loss of surprise. Finally, the direction the

ballistic missiles will come from is somewhat predictable, and as more

effective tactical ballistic missile defensive systems, such as the Patriot
18 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

18

PAC-3, come on line the ballistic missile is increasingly vulnerable to inflight interception.30

The Case for Cruise Missiles

Cruise missiles are defined as “an unmanned self-propelled guided

vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight

path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload

on a target.” While most often associated with the jet-powered cruise

weapons of Desert Storm fame, this definition also includes unmanned air

vehicles (UAVs) and remotely piloted helicopters or aircraft (RPVs).31

Cruise missiles are generally categorized into three types: strategic

cruise, anti-ship cruise, and tactical land attack missiles based upon range

capabilities.

Table 2. Cruise Missiles Categories

Mission TYPE MISSILE RANGE

Land Attack Strategic Cruise 2,000-3,000km

Land Attack Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM) 180-600km

Anti-Ship Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) 50-500km

Source: Tara Kartha, “The Rationale of Cruise Missiles-I,” Institute for Defence

Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India, 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 29 September

1999, available from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-9.html.

The National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) refers specifically to

two “types” of cruise missiles: anti-ship cruise and land attack, using

their intended mission instead of their range or capabilities. For the

purpose of this paper we will acknowledge the “mission” categorization,

with the land attack divided into strategic (range up to 3,000km) and

tactical (maximum range of 180-600km). Strategic land attack missiles, in

the Tomahawk (U.S.) class, are expensive and complicated for the

developing world, employing larger, more complicated engines as well as

more complex guidance systems such as the U.S. terrain contour matching

or TERCOM system. Anti-ship cruise missiles in general are shorterrange and normally carry a lighter payload than the land attack missiles.

There is general agreement that the tactical land attack cruise missiles are

the “ones to watch out for” in the area of future proliferation. (Note: A
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 19

TLAM could easily be used to strike a strategic target and a strategic land

attack could be targeted against a tactical objective, hence the designators

are purely reflective of their relative range capabilities.) While the TLAM

is the apparent focus of research and development for both producers and

aspirants alike, conversion and upgrade of anti-ship cruise missiles or

UAV/RPV is entirely feasible.32 The TLAM, if not purchased from an

exporting country, may be an indigenous development item (difficult in

the near term – 5 to 10 years), a modified anti-ship missile, or it may be a

modified UAV or RPV. The NAIC, in a 1998 assessment reported that:

“The majority of new LACMs will be very accurate,

conventionally armed, and available for export. The high

accuracy of many LACMs will allow them to inflict serious

damage on important targets, even when the missiles are

armed only with conventional warheads. U.S. defense

systems could be severely stressed by low-flying stealthy

cruise missiles that can simultaneously attack a target from

several directions.”33

There are reportedly some 130 cruise missile types in the world,

spread among 75 different nations. Of those 75 nations possessing cruise

missiles 19 were “producers” and of those 19 only six (India, Japan,

Taiwan, South Africa, Iran, and Syria) were non-exporters.34 Lieutenant

General Jay M. Garner, former commander of the U.S. Army Space and

Strategic Defense Command, summed up the cruise missile proliferation

problem when he stated:

“Interestingly enough, cruise missiles are cheaper to buy

or produce than ballistic missiles. Improving cruise

missiles’ accuracy (e.g. by adding precision navigation

devices) is not nearly as expensive or technologically

challenging as improving ballistic missile accuracy.

Visit any international air show to see how a number of

nations aggressively market cruise missiles and UAVs. We

are convinced that our soldiers will face this very real

threat in the near future.”35
20 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

20

Purchase

While cruise missiles capable of carrying 500kg payloads to ranges of

300km or more are subject to MTCR restrictions, several nations are

producing cruise missiles which fall just below the parameters and others

have modified missiles to produce a “less capable” variant of a proscribed

missile.36 In fact, the United States is one of the world’s largest

proliferators of cruise missiles, having sold the Harpoon ASCM to some

23 nations. The Harpoon has already been reverse-engineered by Taiwan

and is reportedly for sale as the Hsiung Feng-2 or HF-2. Significantly, the

Harpoon has a land-attack variant known as the SLAM, in service with the

U.S. Navy.37

In an effort to circumvent MTCR restrictions, presumably to generate

hard currency income, Russia, at the 1992 Moscow Air Show, offered a

modified, shorter range version of their 3,000km-range AS-15 cruise

missile for sale, advertising it as a 410kg payload with just over 500km

range. Disturbingly, the missile reportedly was equipped with the Russian

equivalent of the terrain contour matching (TERCOM) guidance system

supplemented by the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System

(GLONASS), an equivalent to the U.S. global positioning system (GPS).38

While technically meeting the restrictions of the MTCR, the fact is that

“upgrading” a proven missile airframe to extend its range and payload is

not considered an insurmountable or even major technical challenge.

Virtually any country with an active aircraft production or major aircraft

maintenance capability could accomplish the modifications.

The French also are marketing a disturbing product in the form of

their Apache stealth cruise missile.39 The Apache is being developed in

several variants, some for export and some for domestic-only use.

Displayed at the Paris Air Show in June 1993 and in Singapore in

February 1994, the export variant Apache is reported to have terrain

following millimeter wave radar for guidance, with a GPS option, and

capable of a payload of 400-500kg and range of 150km.40 The prospect of

marketing the advanced stealth and guidance technology is of concern due

to the high probability of follow-on reverse-engineering and further

proliferation.
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 21

Figure 1. French Apache – Storm Shadow variant

Indigenous Development or Conversion

Alternatively, any nation with at least a fledgling aircraft

manufacturing or enhanced maintenance capability can either build from

scratch, or modify an existing UAV or RPV. In the past, availability of

effective guidance systems and engines has stymied indigenous

development of cruise missiles. However, with the current level of

development and proliferation of the U.S. GPS and the Russian

GLONASS equivalent, the navigation challenge is solvable. A significant

impediment was the small, lightweight jet engine requirement, but this can

be offset by acquiring the engine through normal aircraft manufacturing

channels. Russia, China, France, and the UK all produce and market

suitable turbojet engines, and the U.S. has sold turbofan engines to China

for use in jet trainer aircraft.41 Alternatively, an engine could be acquired

by stripping it from an anti-ship missile or modifying an anti-ship missile

for a land attack mission. Iraq appears, for example, to have used the

Italian turbojet-powered Mirach 600 RPV to develop its 450km-range
22 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

22

Ababil land attack cruise missile, which reportedly possesses a 250kg

payload capability.42 The Mirach 100, also turbojet-powered, has been

exported to Iraq, Libya, and Argentina, and is capable of transporting 70kg

up to 900km. The United States has also contributed to the proliferation

challenge, having sold the Teledyne Ryan Scarab RPV to Egypt. The

Scarab boasts a turbojet capability of transporting a 100kg payload over

2500km.43 Should this system, which includes an inertial navigation

system and GPS capability, be further proliferated the potential adverse

impact could be tremendous.

Critical capabilities that cruise missiles possess are that they are

accurate, survivable, difficult to detect, and relatively inexpensive. The

emergence of low-cost GPS systems in the 1980’s has greatly improved

cruise accuracy. With widely available satellite imagery and computer

graphics, terrain mapping, previously reserved for “high end” U.S. and

Russian cruise missiles, is now available to the Third World. Cruise

missiles can be launched from aircraft, from shipboard or from land with

minimal ancillary equipment. Capable of being stored or transported in

metal “Sea-Land” type containers to both protect them from the elements

and reduce their visibility, cruise missiles are highly mobile and thus very

survivable. With their ability to fly a pre-determined circuitous route to

target they are less predictable, can attack from any direction (unlike

ballistic missiles) and their small size and low radar cross section make

them a challenge to air defenses. Finally, their relatively low cost not only

makes them affordable to an emerging nation, but for a given amount, that

nation may be able to buy many more cruise than ballistic systems. The

advantage is that even if detected by an air defense system they may be

able to attack in numbers and so saturate defenses that at least some of

them get through.44

Having reviewed the prolific spread of these weapons and their

capabilities, of significant concern, is the final capability that makes them

attractive to a rogue state or non-state actor. The inherently stable,

aircraft-like performance envelope of the cruise missile, with its relatively

low G-loads (force of gravity), and low operating speeds (especially when

compared to an SRBM or IRBM warhead) makes it an easier and cheaper

delivery system for chemical and biological weapons.45
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 23

IV. Employment Considerations

Biological weapons and cruise missiles have been around for several

years now—why haven’t they been employed together yet? What is

constraining states that have this dual capability? And how long will these

constraints last? How and when might these weapons be employed

against U.S. military personnel, the U.S. homeland, and military

expeditionary forces?

Constraints

Since Iraq possessed BW during the 1990-91 Gulf War, why did they

not employ them? While the Coalition Forces feared and prepared for a

chemical or biological attack by Saddam Hussein, none ever materialized.

The Aum Shinrikyo cult obviously had no qualms about employing their

BW capability—they failed only because of technical shortfalls. Given

Iraq’s significant stockpiles of BW, such weapons could have had a major

impact on the course of the Gulf War, yet they were withheld.

Just prior to the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein received two very similar

and very stern warnings about the implications of employing BW should

the pending crisis result in armed conflict. Secretary of Defense Dick

Cheney, during a 23 December 1990 news conference, cautioned publicly

that should Iraq employ weapons of mass destruction the “U.S. response

would be absolutely overwhelming and it would be devastating.” Not

three weeks later, President George Bush reinforced Cheney’s statement in

a letter to Hussein, warning that the American people would “...demand

the strongest possible response” and warning that Iraq would pay a

“terrible price” if chemical or biological weapons were employed.46

Presumably, this implied threat of a nuclear retaliation in exchange for

Iraq’s use of chemical or biological weapons kept Saddam Hussein from

ordering their use.

Jeffrey D. Simon, in a 1989 RAND report on “Terrorists and the

Potential Use of Biological Weapons, A Discussion of Possibilities” put

forward several plausible reasons which may help explain why neither

Saddam Hussein nor any other state actor has employed biological

weapons. Mr. Simon submits that terrorists have had several reasons to

defer using biological weapons:
24 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

24

 To avoid a backlash or loss of support from their supporters

 To avoid an overwhelming or devastating response from the target

of the attack

 To avoid the personal risk inherent in biological weapons

 Due to reluctance to work with "unfamiliar" weapons

 Due to a belief that conventional attacks are meeting their needs.47

While each of these is a valid reason, he goes on to state in his paper

that these constraints may be weakening as religion-based terrorism grows

and as terrorist groups acquire support elements which may be able to

justify to themselves the magnitude of the horror of biological warfare.

He further warns that once there is a first-use, others will follow (the

"copycat" phenomenon).48 Mr. Simon's report written over 10 years ago

in 1989, presents an ominous prediction for the future, having had a

terrorist "first-use" in 1995. With the current state of proliferation of

biological weapons and the publicity surrounding Aum Shinrikyo’s

difficulties with their delivery systems, the inhibitions against using

biological weapons may indeed be down. There are several scenarios

where terrorist groups might use BW weapons. One is if a group felt that

conventional attacks were not getting their message across. If they felt

their supporters would accept the magnitude of the attack (or decided that

the opinion of their supporters didn’t matter). Also, they might act if they

believed they could safely execute a biological attack and do so

anonymously, so as to avoid retaliation. Might a group or state attempt a

biological attack? Possibly only two things are deterring governments and

non-state actors: the lack of an effective delivery system and plausible

deniability.

Effective delivery systems are available now. We have already

examined the huge proliferation of cruise missiles and their related UAV

and RPV cousins that could be easily modified to deliver BW. Their low

signature means that a nation or sub-state actor could be carrying out

experimentation and proof of concept testing in some remote region of the

world today and we might have no way of knowing, making clandestine

attacks possible, coupled with plausible deniability.

Presuming a nation wanted to inflict major damage upon the United

States or U.S. forces and escape a retaliatory attack, they would need to

find a way to deliver the attack without leaving “proof-positive” evidence

of from whence it came. For while the threat has been made and is ever-
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 25

present, it is very doubtful the United States could or would execute a

retaliatory nuclear strike even when faced with “smoking gun” evidence to

present to the rest of the world community. While some type of advanced

retaliatory strike would no doubt be called for, the use of a nuclear weapon

with its resultant collateral damage to infrastructure and noncombatants,

even in response to a biological WMD strike against the United States or

U.S. forces would bring a huge outcry of world opinion against the United

States. In order to maintain influence in the community of nations, the

United States would likely feel inhibited in the use of nuclear weapons,

but undoubtedly a hue and cry would come from the American people,

demanding justice against so heinous a sneak attack. The full

conventional weight of the U.S. Armed Forces would no doubt be brought

to bear. So the question is how to use BW weapons without being blamed

for it!

Several terrorist groups have the funding, worldwide contacts, and

anti-American zealotry to take on the task. The Osama bin Laden

organization has a following that appears to support all methods of attacks

against the United States. With a history of U.S. cruise missile attacks

being used against his organization, the opportunity to reply in kind could

seem very attractive.

Possible Employment Scenarios

Two possible employment scenarios present themselves: one against

the United States homeland and the other against USAF expeditionary

forces. The first objective would be for a hostile nation to locate a transnational terrorist group, such as Osama bin Laden’s organization, willing

to carry out the attack. With a state sponsor to provide the delivery system

(cruise missile, UAV/RPV), the biological weapon(s), and necessary

training, all that would be needed would be the logistics support and

training in use of the system.

One employment scenario could be to acquire three to four merchant

freighters to transport containerized cruise missiles to waters off the U.S.

coastline. Freighters are often hijacked by pirates in the South China Sea

and adjacent waters, and not located for months, if then. The ships with

their containerized cargo of cruise missiles in the short range category—

150 to 300km—could be sailed to within 50km or closer to the U.S.

coastline, just off shore from major cities or desired military locations,
26 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

26

such as Norfolk, VA. Released in the early evening and programmed to

disperse their cargo while the sea breeze is blowing towards shore and the

crowds are still out, with a persistent form of anthrax or other bio-toxin,

these missiles could cause a major catastrophe. If flown at low-level to

the target areas, and programmed to dispense the agent, then to turn back

to sea, the missiles could conceivably disperse their agent without notice

and cause a biohazard with no apparent explanation of its origin.

A second scenario would be a similar attack, but against an airfield

and surrounding town or city designated to receive a deploying Air

Expeditionary Force (AEF) in the event of an increase in regional

tensions. Since the USAF AEFs routinely deploy to the same locations in

Southwest Asia due to equipment prepositioning and good relations with

host nations, anticipating which airfields to attack should not be difficult.

By attacking the installation before tensions increase and the USAF AEF

responds, the biological weapon would have time to incubate and

breakout. While this could trigger supporter backlash because of

collateral Islamic civilian casualties, an organization such as bin Laden’s

might feel the public relations storm worth weathering if the attack

sufficiently halted United States deployment or degraded their ability to

launch combat aircraft. If executed carefully, as in the continental United

States attack scenario, identifying the responsible organization or nation

could prove extremely difficult, thus avoiding both public and United

States backlash. The idea of deploying troops from the United States into

an airfield known to be contaminated with biological weapons could cause

the U.S. National Command Authority to reconsider the value of the

mission. At the very least, such an attack would massively complicate and

slow the U.S. response.

The worrisome aspect of these scenarios is that biological agents and

weapons are available now. The cruise missile/UAV/RPV technologies

are available now. The hostile feelings and intent towards the United

States and U.S. forces are there now. The only missing element is an

organization or state willing to fuse and employ them.
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 27

V. Conclusions

It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not

come, but rather to rely on one’s readiness to meet him; not

to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one’s

self invincible.

--Sun Tzu

The information on cruise missile proliferation and capabilities is

overwhelming. The Internet itself is almost a cookbook on what kind of

missile to go shopping for, and what or whom one would need in their

program to ensure it works. Likewise, the Internet is replete with

information on the proliferation of biological weapons, their ease of

manufacture and weaponization, and their enormous ability to take lives if

surprise can be achieved.

Given that some terrorists will seek a “bigger bang” than the last

event perpetrated, in order to maintain shock effect and adequate publicity,

a cruise/biological attack may well be the next step up the ladder of

escalation.

In light of all this however, several key people or agencies continue to

acknowledge the threat is out there, but they “feel” it is not “probable.”

What is certain is that:

 Acquisition of cruise missiles is spreading, making standoff CM attack

feasible for more nations and substate actors

 Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive WMD and are within

the technical capability of Third World States and possibly by

sophisticated and well-funded sub-state groups.

 The potential for an attack employing a land attack cruise missile

armed with biological weapons increases each year.

What has not been examined and discussed in this paper, i.e., the next

logical step, is to review current and planned capabilities to stop an

inbound cruise missile at a safe distance. And failing that, it will be

imperative to review preparedness to survive an attack on the air base—or

the nation—by biological weapons.

If the USAF is to continue to project power forward it will need safe

and secure operating locations, both abroad and in CONUS. The threats
28 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

28

posed by cruise missiles armed with biological weapons must first be

acknowledged as a present day threat. They are not a “sometime in the

future” threat but are a current “clear and present danger.” The threat

posed by CMs carrying biological weapons needs to be dissected and

analyzed country by country and group by group. Adequate defenses

and/or recovery methods must be developed and promulgated. To do

otherwise exposes the United States, its forces, and its allies to a terrible

new threat without an adequate response.
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 29

Appendix A:

Past and Present Biological Weapons Programs

The table below describes the various past and present biological

weapon programs, as well as the countries' status as a supporter or sponsor

of terrorism, according to the Monterey Institute of International Studies,

Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the U.S. Department of State

“Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998.” While by no means all-inclusive,

the table serves to illustrate the wide proliferation of past and current

biological programs and correlates the states currently labeled by the

Department of State as sponsors of terrorism.

COUNTRY PROGRAM STATUS POSSIBLE

AGENTS

SPONSOR OF

TERRORISM

Algeria Research effort, but no

evidence of production

Unknown No

Canada Former program -anthrax

-rinderpest virus

-botulinum toxin

-Rocky Mountain

 spotted fever

-plague

-tularemia

-ricin

No

China Likely maintains an

offensive program

Unknown No

Cuba None/Unknown None/Unknown YES

Egypt Research program -anthrax

-botulinum toxin

-plague

-cholera

-tularemia

-glanders

-brucellosis

-melioidosis

-psittacosis

No
30 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

30

-Q-fever

-Japanese B

 encephalitis

-Eastern equine

 encephalitis

-influenza

-smallpox

-mycotixins

France Former program Unknown No

Germany Former program -plague

-cholera

-yellow fever

-typhus

No

India Defensive research

program

Unknown No

Iran Research with possible

production of agents

Unknown YES

Iraq Previously active

research and production

program; under UN

inspection; retains

elements of its program

-anthrax

-botulinum toxin

-gas gangrene

-aflatoxin

-trichothecene

 mycotoxins

-wheat cover smut

-ricin

-hemorrhagic

 conjuctivitis virus

-rotavirus

-camel pox

YES

Israel Research program, but

no evidence of a

production effort

Unknown No

Japan Former program -anthrax

-tularemia

-plague

-botulinum toxin

-small pox

-glanders

No
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 31

-typhoid

-typhus

Libya Research program Unknown YES

North Korea Research program -anthrax

-cholera

-plague

-small pox

-botulinum toxin

-hemorrhagic fever

-typhoid

-yellow fever

YES

Russia Defensive research

program; some work

beyond legitimate

defense activities may

continue

-anthrax

-tularemia

-brucellosis

-plague

-Venezuelan

equine encephalitis

-typhus

-Q-fever

-botulinum toxin

-small pox

-glanders

-Marburg infection

-Ebola

-Machupo virus

-Argentinian

 hemorrhagic fever

-yellow fever

-Lassa fever

-Venezuelan

equine

 encephalomyelitis

-Japanese

 encephalitis

-Russian spring-

 summer

 encephalitis

-psittacosis

No
32 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

32

-ornithosis

-rinderpest virus

-African swine

 fever virus

-wheat stem rust

-rice blast

South Africa Former program -anthrax

-cholera

-botulinum toxin

-salmonella

No

Sudan None/Unknown None/Unknown YES

Syria Research program -anthrax

-botulinum toxin

YES

Taiwan Possible research

program

Unknown No

United Kingdom Former program -anthrax No

United States Defensive research

program

-anthrax

-brucellosis

-botulinum toxin

-Eastern and

Western equine

encephalitis

-Venezuelan

equine

encephalomyelitis

-Argentinian

hemorrhagic fever

-Korean

hemorrhagic fever

-tularemia

-Q-fever

-Lassa fever

No
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 33

-glanders

-melioidosis

-plague

-yellow fever

-psittacosis

-typhus

-dengue fever

-Rift Valley fever

-Chikungunya

disease virus

-ricin

-rice blast

-rice brown spot

 disease

-late blight of

 potato

-stem rust of cereal

-rinderpest virus

-Newcastle disease

 virus

-fowl plague virus

Sources: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Chemical and Biological Weapons:

Possession and Programs Past and Present,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, n.p., online, Internet, 1 January 2000, available at: http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm;

and U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 3

February 2000, available at http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/rpt1998/sponsor.html.
34 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

34
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 35

Appendix B:

Cruise Missile Proliferation/Possession

The table below depicts the wide possession of cruise missiles among

selected nations. It is not intended to be an all-inclusive list, but illustrates

the wide variety of cruise missiles available from various nations, as well

as domestic development programs.

Country/

System

Origin

country

Type

system

Launch

method

Max

rang

e

(km)

Payload

(kg)

Status

ARGENTINA

Exocet MM38France AS Gnd/ship 42 165 In service

Exocet AM39France AS Air 50 165 In service

Exocet SM39France AS Submarin

e

50 165 In service

Exocet MM40France AS Gnd/ship 70 165 In service

MQ-2 Figua Domestic Lnd Atk Air/gnd 900 70 Development

CHINA

SY-1/HY-1 Domestic AS Gnd/ship 50 513 In service

HY-2

Silkworm

Domestic AS Gnd/Ship 95 513 In service

HY-3/C-301 Domestic AS Gnd/Ship 100 500 Development

HY-4/C-201 Domestic AS A/G/S 150 500 In service

FL-1 Domestic AS Gnd/ship 40 513 In service

FL-2/SY-2 Domestic AS A/G/S 50 365 In service

C-101 Domestic AS A/G/S 50 400 In service

C-601 Domestic AS Air 95 500 In service

YJ-1/C-801 Domestic AS A/G/S 40 165 In service

YJ-2/C-802 Domestic AS A/G/S 95 165 In service

C-802

(modified)

Domestic AS/Lnd

Atk

A/G/S 180 Unknown Development

INDIA

Exocet AM- France AS Air 50 165 In service
36 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

36

39

SS-N-2c Styx Russia AS Air 85 513 In service

SS-N-2d

Styx

Russia AS Air 100 513 In service

SS-N-7

Starbright

Russia AS Submarine 65 500 In service

SS-N-22

KORAL

Domestic

/Russia

AS Ship/

Submarine

110 500 Development

SEA EAGLE United

Kingdom

AS Air/Ship 110 230 In service

LAKSHYA Dom Lnd Atk Ground 500 200 In service

IRAN

AS-11

KILTER

Russia AS/Lnd

Atk

Air 50 130 In service

AS-9 KYLE Russia AS/Lnd

Atk

Air 90 200 In service

YJ-2/C-802 China AS A/G/S 95 165 In service

HY-2

SILKWORM

China AS Gnd/ship 95 513 In service

SS-N-22

SUNBURN

Ukraine AS Gnd/ship 110 500 In service

RGM-84A

HARPOON

USA AS Ship 120 220 In service

HY-4/C201 China AS A/G/S 150 500 In service

SILKWORM

(modified)

Domestic

/North

Korea

AS Gnd/Ship 450 500 Development

IRAQ

YJ-1/C-801 China AS A/G/S 40 165 In service

AS-11

KILTER

Russia Lnd

Atk/AS

Air 50 130 In service

EXOCET

AM-39

France AS Air 50 165 In service

FAW 70 Domestic AS Gnd/Ship 70 500 In service

ARMAT France AS Air 90 160 In service

HY-2

SILKWORM

China AS Gnd/Ship 95 513 In service

C-601 (Nisan

28)

China AS Air 95 500 In service

FAW 150 Domestic AS Gnd/Ship 150 500 In service

AS-6

KINGFISH

Russia Lnd Atk/

AS

Air 180 1,000 In service

FAW 200 Domestic AS Gnd/Ship 200 500 In service
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 37

AS-4

KITCHEN

Russia Lnd Atk/

AS

Air 400 1,000 In service

AS-5 KELT Russia Lnd Atk/

AS

Air 400 1,000 In service

ABABIL Domestic Lnd Atk Air 500 250 Development

ISRAEL

GABRIEL II Domestic AS Ship 36 100 In service

GABRIEL

III

Domestic AS Air/Ship 36 150 In service

POPEYE Domestic Lnd Atk Air 100 395 In service

AGM-84A

HARPOON

USA AS Air 120 220 In service

RGM-84A

HARPOON

USA AS Ship 120 220 In service

UGM-84A

HARPOON

USA AS Submarine 120 220 In service

GABRIEL

IV

Domestic AS Air/Ship 200 240 In service

DELILAH Domestic Drone Air/

Ground

400 54 In service

DELILAH

(modified)

Domestic Lnd Atk Air/

Ground

400 450 Development

JAPAN

ASM-1 Domestic AS Air 50 150 In service

ASM-2 Domestic AS Air 150 150 Development

AGM-84A

HARPOON

USA AS Air 120 220 In service

RGM-84A

HARPOON

USA AS Ship 120 220 In service

UGM-84A

HARPOON

USA AS Submarine 120 220 In service

SSM-1 Domestic AS Gnd/Ship/

Submarine

150 250 In service

NORTH

KOREA

S-N-2a

STYX

Domestic AS Ship 43 513 In service

HY-1/SY-2

SILKWORM

Domestic AS Gnd/Ship 95 513 In service

SILKWORM

(modified

Domestic AS Gnd/Ship 160+ Unknown Development
38 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

38

SOUTH

AFRICA

SKORPIOEN Domestic AS Ship 36 100 In service

EXOCET

AM-39

France AS Air 50 165 In service

SKORPIOEN

II

Domestic AS Ship Unkn

own

Unknown Development

SKUA Domestic Lnd Atk Gnd/Ship 800 100 Development

TAIWAN

HSUINGFENG1Domestic AS Air 36 100 In service

HSUINGFENG 2Domestic Lnd

Atk/AS

Air 170 75 In service

HSUINGFENG 3Domestic Lnd

Atk/AS

Air/Ship 300 Unknown Development

Source: Centre for Defense and International Security Studies (CDISS), “Capabilities &

Suppliers,” January 2000, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 2 January 2000, available from

http://www.cdiss.org/tabanaly.htm
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 39

Notes

1. Regis, The Biology of Doom; The History of America’s Secret Germ Warfare

Project, (New York, NY; Henry Holt and Company, 1999), 143, 144, 228.

2. Terry N. Meyer, Lt Col, “The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nations Weapon of

Mass Destruction,” Battlefield of the Future, 21st Century Warfare Issues, edited by

Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,

Revised Edition No. 3, September 1998), 207.

3. Robert P. Kadlec, Lt Col, “Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare,”

Battlefield of the Future, 21st Century Warfare Issues, edited by Barry R. Schneider and

Lawrence E. Grinter, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Revised Edition No. 3,

September 1998), 255.

4. Terry N. Meyer, Lt Col, Op. Cit., 208.

5. Ibid., 215.

6. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Proliferation of

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 38.

7. W. Seth Carus. Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, The Illicit Use of Biological Agents

in the 20th Century, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research,

National Defense University, August 1998 [March 1999 Revision]), 30.

8. Ibid, 157, 161-168.

9. Schneider, Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation, U.S. Military

Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers,

1999), 14-15.

10. Ibid.

11. W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, The Illicit Use of Biological Agents

in the 20th Century, Op. Cit., 157.

12. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Medical

Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, Third Edition, (Fort Detrick, Frederick,

Maryland, July 1998), 17.

13. W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, The Illicit Use of Biological Agents

in the 20th Century, Op. Cit., 56.

14. Robert P. Kadlec, Lt Col., Op. Cit., 227.

15. Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “Biological Weapons Delivery,”

September 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 29 September 1999, available from

http://www.fas.org/ nuke/intro/cm/index.html.
40 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

40

16. Terry N. Meyer, Lt Col, Op. Cit., 215.

17. W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, The Illicit Use of Biological Agents

in the 20th Century Op. Cit., 31-33.

18. Ibid, 163-164.

19. Raymond Zilinskas, “Assessing the Threat of Bioterrorism: Congressional

Testimony by Raymond Zilinskas,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, October

1999.

20. W. Seth Carus, “Biological Weapons: The Threat Posed by Terrorists,”

testimony at the Joint Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and

the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government

Information, 4 March 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 February 2000, available from

http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/wlterm4.htm.

21. OTA, Proliferation of Weapons of Mas Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Op.

Cit., 40.

22. FAS, “Biological Weapons Delivery,” Op. Cit.

23. Kalpana Chittaranjan, “Iraq’s BW Programme: UNSCOM Stays On,” Institute

for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India, 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6

February 2000, available from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul8-9.html.

24. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction: Assessing the Risks, 54.

25. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Medical

Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, Third Edition, (Fort Detrick, Frederick,

Maryland, July 1998), Appendix H.

26. Tara Kartha, “The Rationale of Cruise Missiles-I,” Institute for Defence Studies

and Analyses, New Delhi, India, 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 29 September 1999,

available from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-9.html.

27. Bob Walpole, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat

to the United States through 2015,” National Intelligence Council Paper, September

1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 1 December 1999, available from

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nie99msl.htm.

28. Bill Gertz, “Iran Sold Scud Missiles to Congolese,” The Washington Times,

November 1999.

29. K. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, Controlling the Spread of LandAttack Cruise Missiles, The AISC Papers, No. 7, (Marina del Rey, California: American

Institute for Strategic Studies, January 1995), 59.
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 41

30. Ibid, 17.

31. Federation of American Scientists, “Cruise Missiles,” September 1999, n.p.; online, Internet, 29 September 1999, available from http: //www. fas.org/ nuke/ intro/ cm/

index.html.

32. Tara Kartha, Op. Cit.

33. Federation of American Scientists, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat

National Air Intelligence Center NAIC-1031-0985-98,” National Air Intelligence

Center, 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 5 October 1999. available from

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nie99msl.htm.

34. Tara Kartha, Op. Cit.

35. Robin Ranger, et al. “Cruise Missiles: New Threats, New Thinking,”

Comparative Strategy, Vol 14, pp 255-275, 1995, 256.

36. Dennis M. Gormley, “Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat,” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, Non-Proliferation, n.p. On-line Internet, 5 October

1999. Available from http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/gormley%20survival.htm.

37. K. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, Op.Cit., 12-13.

38. Dennis M. Gormley, Op. Cit.

39. K. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, Op. Cit., 14.

40. K. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, Op. Cit., 51.

41. Ibid, 18, 25.

42. Dennis M. Gormley, Op. Cit.

43. K. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, Op. Cit., 48.

44. Ibid, 15-17.

45. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Technologies Underlying

Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 244.

46. Terry N. Meyer, Lt Col, Op. Cit., 214.

47. Jeffery D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons, A

RAND Report (Santa Monica, CA:The RAND Corporation, December 1989), 11.

48. Ibid, 20.
42 . . . Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

42
Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat . . . 43

USAF Counterproliferation Center

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