1

Filed 3/18/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SHANNON EYFORD et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JIM NORD, as Trustee, etc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A157962

 (Napa County Super. Ct. 

 No. 17PR000071)

Shannon Eyford and Erin Johnson appeal from a judgment entered 

after the trial court denied their petition to invalidate their grandmother’s 

trust, which disinherited them. Appellants contend the court should have 

invalidated the trust pursuant to Probate Code section 6100.5, 

subdivision (a)(2),1 because their grandmother had delusions that negated 

her testamentary capacity. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Catherine Pearson, known as “Kay,” died in December 2016 at the age 

of 90 years.2 In a trust instrument she executed on February 24, 2016, she 

named St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital (St. Jude) the sole beneficiary 

of her estate, which was worth approximately $2 million. In that trust 

1 All further statutory references are to the Probate Code.

2 The decedent was referred to simply as “Kay” throughout the trial court 

proceedings. We will refer to her in the same manner here.
2

instrument, she disinherited her surviving son and her two granddaughters 

(appellants Eyford and Johnson).

In April 2017, appellants filed a petition contesting the validity of the 

trust instrument on the ground that Kay had a mental disorder with 

symptoms including delusions or hallucinations that allegedly caused Kay to 

devise her property in a way she would not otherwise have done. (§ 6100.5, 

subd. (a)(2) (“6100.5(a)(2)”).) As relevant here, the petition named St. Jude 

and Jim Nord, in his capacity as trustee, as respondents.3 The matter was 

tried before the court. Ultimately, the court found that appellants failed to 

carry their “burden of proving that Kay was suffering from a delusion within 

the meaning of . . . section 6100.5(a)(2) at the time she executed the [t]rust.” 

The following is a summary of the trial evidence and proceedings relevant to 

this appeal.

Early Background

Kay was born in September 1926. She had two children, Cathy Noyes 

and John Noyes, Jr., with her first husband, John Noyes, Sr.4 In the early 

1960s, after about 17 years of marriage, Kay and John Sr. divorced but 

remained friends and in contact for the rest of her life. In the 1970s, Kay 

married Robert Pearson, known as “Bob.” 

After her divorce from John Sr., Kay and her son became estranged. 

Kay, however, remained close with her daughter, Cathy, who married Buzz 

3 The petition also alleged that Kay lacked testamentary capacity on 

grounds of undue influence by her accountant, Joan Sturges, and claimed 

that Sturges had converted trust assets. Nord, as trustee, settled the 

conversion claim against Sturges. The trial court’s rejection of the undue 

influence claim is not contested on appeal and will not be discussed further. 

4 For the sake of brevity, and clarity due to shared last names, we will 

refer to Cathy Noyes as Cathy, and John Noyes, Sr., as John Sr. After initial 

reference to Robert Pearson, below, we will refer to him as Bob.
3

Kane. Cathy and Kane had two daughters, appellants Eyford and Johnson. 

Bob and Kay frequently visited and corresponded with Cathy’s family in 

Washington state, where they lived. Various witnesses described the 

relationship between Kay and appellants as close and loving. 

In 2013, Cathy was diagnosed with cancer. After undergoing surgery, 

Cathy lived with Eyford, who helped care for her until her death from cancer 

in June 2014. Around the time of Cathy’s death, Kay told numerous people 

that her estate was going to appellants. But the day after Cathy’s death, Kay 

told a longtime friend, Roberta McCully, that appellants had caused Cathy’s 

death by repositioning her in bed the night of her surgery against a doctor’s 

orders. Later in 2014, Kay also told her friend Vicki Barrios that appellants 

caused Cathy’s death by repositioning her in bed. At trial, appellants denied 

moving Cathy in her hospital bed contrary to doctor’s orders. 

Bob’s Death and Kay’s Hospitalization

In August 2014, Kay and Bob moved to a senior living community in 

Napa called “The Meadows.” The Meadows offers different accommodations 

to residents depending on the level of care they might need, from independent 

living, to assisted living, skilled nursing, and memory care. One cannot live 

in independent living with a diagnosis of dementia, and Kay stayed in 

independent living until her death in December 2016. Eyford visited Bob and 

Kay for the Super Bowl in 2014 and in January 2015. Appellants both visited 

in 2015 for Mother’s Day. Johnson and her son visited in August 2015.

In September 2015, Eyford visited while Bob was ill and staying in a 

rehabilitation facility at The Meadows. Bob died on October 1, 2015. Within 

weeks, Kay called John Sr. and said she was confused and alone. She also 

said that she did not know what she was doing and that Bob had taken care 

of everything. Indeed, during their marriage, Kay had little or no knowledge 
4

of her financial affairs, including where she banked, and she had never 

signed a check.

Believing Kay was acting irrationally, John Sr. told her to go to the 

hospital and asked appellants to help her. On October 22, 2015, Kay was 

admitted to the hospital and treated for anemia and a urinary tract infection 

(UTI). Kay’s medical records indicated she presented with confusion likely 

secondary to the UTI, and the confusion had “cleared” in the hospital. 

Johnson spent two nights at the hospital with Kay and later testified that 

Kay was combative and disoriented at the hospital and that she pulled out 

her intravenous lines and said she saw Bob above her bed. In the hospital, 

Johnson suggested that Kay put Bob’s contacts in Kay’s phone, then turn off 

Bob’s phone. Kay did not like this idea and seemed attached to Bob’s things. 

Johnson realized Kay “wasn’t ready.” 

The Days Immediately Following Kay’s Hospitalization

On October 25, 2015, Kay was discharged from the hospital, and 

Johnson drove her home. John Sr. and Eyford were present when Kay 

arrived at The Meadows. After Kay expressed concern about her finances, 

with Kay’s consent and in her presence, John Sr. and Johnson (but not 

Eyford) went through Kay’s records. They shredded outdated checks and 

records, and found documentation of an account worth $2.4 million, which 

Kay said she had no prior knowledge of. 

On October 26, 2015, Eyford took Kay to Ole Health Clinic for cognitive 

testing. Eyford testified that the hospital had scheduled the appointment 

because The Meadows required an evaluation to determine if Kay needed 

changes to her living arrangements. At the clinic, Kay underwent a “mini 

mental status exam” which indicated she was experiencing mild to moderate 

cognitive impairment. Staff at the clinic scheduled another appointment to 
5

fill out paperwork for The Meadows and to determine whether Kay needed to 

move from independent living to assisted living. That evening, Eyford went 

out alone in Napa to get some food and a drink, and Kay became very 

agitated, pacing and stating that Eyford was acting like a “ ‘floozy’ ” and “ ‘no 

woman should go out in town alone.’ ”

On October 27, 2015, appellants, John Sr., and Kay went to Kay’s bank, 

and Kay put appellants on her account so they could help with her banking. 

On the same day, Kay also signed a will and a power of attorney that 

appellants obtained from the internet. The notarized power of attorney form 

named Eyford as Kay’s attorney-in-fact, giving her power to make financial 

decisions for Kay, and it named Johnson the successor attorney-in-fact. The 

will Kay signed named appellants as Kay’s sole beneficiaries. Concerned 

about the validity of that will, John Sr. advised Kay to consult an attorney.

On October 28, 2015, Johnson and John Sr. left town. Eyford stayed 

and took Kay to an estate planning attorney, James Watson, for purposes of 

preparing a trust naming appellants as her sole beneficiaries. Watson 

planned to have the documents ready for signing by November 9, 2015. 

Eyford and Kay returned to the Ole Health Clinic that day. Eyford told 

medical staff that Kay did not recall being there two days prior. Eyford also 

expressed concern about Kay leaving The Meadows unassisted and 

uncertainty whether Kay truly needed assisted living. Kay’s records from 

that visit indicate that she presented as confused and disoriented, that she 

was unable to leave the facility unassisted, and that she was unable to 

manage her own cash. Another appointment was scheduled for midNovember for further mental health testing. Around this time, Eyford told 

Wayne Panchesson, director of The Meadows, that she did not think Kay 

should be driving. Eyford testified she told Kay to “please not drive the car,” 
6

to which Kay responded by begging to keep her right to drive and becoming 

paranoid about where her keys were.5

During a dinner on October 28, 2015, Kay accused Eyford of being sent 

by John Sr. and Johnson to do the “dirty work,” i.e., take away her 

independence, put her in assisted living, and take her car. Kay also accused 

Eyford of never visiting her at The Meadows. Kay pleaded with Eyford not to 

take her car or make her leave her apartment. Eyford tried to explain that 

she had in fact visited, and also that they “would let her maintain as much 

independence as [they] could.” The next morning, Kay had no recollection of 

leveling these accusations at Eyford and affirmed her intention to keep her 

estate in the family. Eyford obtained Kay’s permission to record part of this 

conversation. This was the last time Eyford saw or conversed with Kay.

Kay’s February 24, 2016 Trust

On November 2, 2015, John Sr. returned to Napa and drove Kay to see 

attorney Watson without an appointment to try to move up the signing date 

for the trust. At that meeting, Kay told Watson that appellants had been 

“barging” into her home, and that she did not want to give her estate to them 

though she did not talk about any other potential beneficiaries. Watson felt 

uncomfortable executing Kay’s trust and said he would follow up in a month.

On December 16, 2015, Watson again met with Kay. This time, Kay 

was accompanied by her accountant, Joan Sturges, and she expressed 

concern about appellants taking her money. Because this was the third 

meeting in less than two months, with different companions accompanying 

Kay each time, Watson was uncomfortable executing documents without a 

5 Kay’s friend Roberta McCully testified Eyford called her and told her 

she was taking Kay’s car. It is unclear when exactly this call occurred, but 

McCully indicated this was one of the bases for Kay’s complaints against 

appellants after Bob died.
7

capacity declaration and was concerned about protecting both Kay and his 

office. Kay dismissed Watson after this meeting because she did not like him. 

After dismissing Watson, Kay retained attorney Lori Hunt. Before 

seeing Hunt, Kay told Sturges she wanted her estate to go to “sick babies,” 

but did not mention a particular charity or institution. On February 10, 

2016, Hunt met with Kay and suggested St. Jude as a potential beneficiary; 

Kay loved the idea. When asked why she was disinheriting appellants, Kay 

replied that she felt she and Bob had given them enough through the years, 

that what she had was attributable to Bob, and that Bob loved helping sick 

babies, so she wanted to leave her estate to a charity that benefited sick 

babies to honor him. On February 24, 2016, Kay signed a trust that named 

St. Jude as her sole beneficiary and expressly disinherited her son and 

appellants. In July and August 2016, Kay signed amendments to the trust 

concerning the successor trustee, ultimately naming Jim Nord, a professional 

fiduciary, as the first successor trustee. Hunt indicated that at no time 

during her meetings with Kay did she form the impression Kay might have 

cognitive or mental problems. 

Kay’s Accusations Against Appellants and Other Evidence of Her State 

of Mind

Multiple witnesses testified that starting in November 2015, Kay began 

making accusations against appellants.

On November 4 and 5, 2015, Kay told Cole Hornstein, staff at The 

Meadows, that Eyford was trying to sell her car and had keys to her 

apartment, threatening to come in. Kay stated she was afraid of Eyford. Kay 

said that appellants were interested only in her money, that they were trying 

to say she had cognitive issues and could not handle her own affairs, and that 

Kay did not want to associate with Eyford. Kay also reported that someone 

had closed her bank account which had a zero balance. Hornstein, a 
8

mandatory reporter, filed a report with an ombudsman in Napa, Adult 

Protective Services, and the police. Kay later told Hornstein that she had 

closed the bank account.

Officer Jarett Haggmark of the Napa Police Department interviewed 

Kay. Kay said that after Bob died, appellants went through her paperwork 

and tried to take her to an attorney and doctor. Kay also stated that Eyford 

was still in Napa staying with her. Officer Haggmark called Eyford who said 

she was at home, in Washington state. Officer Haggmark told Eyford it was 

best not to further contact Kay. Officer Haggmark testified that Kay seemed 

“out of it” and that Hornstein said he thought Kay was in the early stages of 

dementia. At trial, Hornstein denied saying this.

Johnson spoke to Kay over the phone several times in November 2015. 

During these calls, Kay called Eyford a “floozy,” and said Eyford was no 

longer welcome at The Meadows because Kay did not feel safe and Eyford 

stole money and a bracelet from her. Johnson eventually tried to challenge 

Kay and explained she shredded Kay’s papers, not Eyford, which caused Kay 

to become argumentative and end the conversation. During their final phone 

conversation, Kay accused Johnson of being in “cahoots” with Eyford and cut 

off contact with her as well. 

In early November 2015, Kay saw her long-time accountant, Sturges, 

for the first time since Bob’s death and accused appellants of stealing cash 

that Bob had stashed around the apartment and a bracelet. Sturges testified 

that during this first visit, Kay was underweight, nervous, paranoid, afraid, 

and confused. After November, Kay did not discuss appellants a lot. That 

said, Kay was afraid of “everything.” She would not allow handymen into her 

home and was afraid of appellants being in town. Around June 2016, and 

once or twice before, Kay said she thought appellants were back in town or 
9

back at her door. In June 2016, Sturges, who was unsure if Kay meant “at 

her door” literally, asked Hunt for a referral to an attorney to get a 

restraining order.

In spending time with Kay, Sturges observed Kay had memory issues. 

Of about 30 visits with Kay, Sturges noticed Kay having good days with no 

memory problems about six times, bad days about six times, and the 

remainder were somewhere in between. Sturges testified the day Kay signed 

the subject trust was a “good day,” and Kay was clear-headed and expressed 

things to her that caused Sturges to believe Kay knew what she was doing.

In November and December 2015, Kay began making similar 

accusations about appellants to her friends Sharon Steele, Roberta McCully, 

and Vicki Barrios. Steele testified that during five separate visits she had 

with Kay after December 2015, Kay talked about appellants’ misdeeds. 

During one visit in February 2016, Kay told Steele she changed her will 

because of their misbehavior, i.e., she believed they stole cash and a bracelet, 

took and waved her keys in her face, and wanted to get rid of her car. Once, 

Kay told Steele she was afraid she would be pushed over the balcony. 

McCully, who spoke to Kay by phone every day, testified that for about six 

months after late-2015, Kay said numerous times she believed Eyford wanted 

to kill her.

In addition to accusing appellants of taking cash and a bracelet, Kay 

told Barrios, whom she usually saw twice a month, that appellants 

“ransacked” her home looking for cash and that Eyford caused a disturbance 

while drunk in the lobby at The Meadows. Kay also claimed that when she 

confronted Eyford after finding her shredding documents in Bob’s office, 

Eyford allegedly tried to lead her out on a balcony, causing Kay to fear for her 

life and to think that appellants wanted to push her off. Kay believed Eyford 
10

took Bob’s keys and could access Kay’s apartment, and she was afraid Eyford 

might harm her. After December 2015, Kay repeated these stories to Barrios 

from time to time. 

Kay also told Barrios after Bob’s death that she changed the 

beneficiary of her estate to St. Jude because Bob always wanted that, that 

she had been the one to talk Bob into giving the money to family, and that 

she changed her mind. Kay said Eyford and Johnson came around only 

because they wanted money, and while she was sick with an infection, they 

took her to a doctor to deem her incompetent and also took her to a bank and 

to an attorney with “a very tight agenda around her assets.” Moreover, 

although Kay was sick, grieving, and tired, Eyford kept trying to bait her into 

talking about money, and at one point Kay thought Eyford recorded their 

conversation. Kay told Barrios that all appellants had to do was be patient, 

but they got greedy, so they would get nothing and “[s]he didn’t want them to 

have one thin dime.”

Steele, McCully, and Barrios all testified that Kay always dressed very 

well, that her home was always clean, and that she never displayed 

confusion, disorientation, or memory issues after Bob’s death.

Kay’s doctors testified in accord. Dr. Margaret Poscher, Kay’s internist, 

testified that she never noticed Kay exhibit delusions or paranoia, and that 

she never formed any concern that Kay might have dementia. Dr. Yelena 

Krijanovsky, Kay’s hematologist/oncologist, also never noticed any cognitive 

decline or delirium in Kay.

The parties presented competing expert testimony concerning Kay’s 

mental condition.
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DISCUSSION

Appellants argue principally that the trial court erred in rejecting their 

claim of testamentary incapacity under section 6100.5(a)(2) by wrongly 

selecting a single false belief Kay had about appellants—i.e., that appellants 

“wanted her out of the way in order to get her money”—and then wrongly 

determining it was not a delusion. Instead, appellants claim, the court 

should have found that Kay’s multiple false beliefs about appellants all 

constituted delusions negating Kay’s testamentary capacity. Appellants 

contend that but for her delusions, Kay would not have executed the 2016 

trust disinheriting appellants. 

A. Governing Law

“As a general proposition, California law allows a testator to dispose of 

property as he or she sees fit without regard to whether the dispositions 

specified are appropriate or fair. [Citations.] Testamentary competence is 

presumed.” (Estate of Sarabia (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 599, 604, italics added.) 

Section 6100.5(a)(2) provides that “[a]n individual is not mentally 

competent to make a will if, at the time of making the will, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . 

[t]he individual suffers from a mental health disorder with symptoms 

including delusions or hallucinations, which delusions or hallucinations 

result in the individual’s devising property in a way that, except for the 

existence of the delusions or hallucinations, the individual would not have 

done.”6

6 By its terms, section 6100.5 applies only to wills. Relying on Andersen 

v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722, appellants contend section 6100.5 also 

applies to trusts or trust amendments that, in content and complexity, closely 

resemble a will or codicil. (Andersen, at p. 731.) We agree and see no reason

why section 6100.5 should not apply where, as here, a trust amendment

reallocates the trust estate by disinheriting one set of possible beneficiaries 

and giving the entire estate to another beneficiary. (See Lintz v. Lintz (2014)
12

In this context, a delusion “has been defined to be the conception of a 

disordered mind which imagines facts to exist of which there is no evidence 

and the belief in which is adhered to against all evidence and argument to 

the contrary, and which cannot be accounted for on any reasonable 

hypothesis. ‘One cannot be said to act under an insane delusion if his 

condition of mind results from a belief or inference, however irrational or 

unfounded, drawn from facts which are shown to exist.’ ” (Estate of Putnam 

(1934) 1 Cal.2d 162, 172.) “If there is any evidence, however slight or 

inconclusive, which might have a tendency to create a belief, such belief is not 

a delusion.” (Estate of Alegria (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 645, 655.) “Capricious 

and arbitrary likes, dislikes and mistrusts are not evidence of unsoundness of 

mind.” (Ibid.) “Care must be taken to differentiate between mere 

unreasonable opinions and mental derangements. Testamentary capacity 

does not depend upon the testatrix’ ability to reason logically or upon her 

freedom from prejudice. A belief may be illogical or preposterous, but it is 

not, therefore, evidence of insanity.” (In re Estate of Perkins (1925) 195 Cal. 

699, 708 (Perkins).)

“The presumption is always that a person is sane, and the burden is 

always upon the contestants of the will to show affirmatively, and by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the testatrix was of unsound mind at the 

time of the execution of the will.” (Perkins, supra, 195 Cal. at p. 703.) “[T]he 

standard for testamentary capacity is exceptionally low.” (In re Marriage of 

Greenway (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 628, 642.) “A person challenging the 

validity of a trust instrument on the grounds that the trustor lacked capacity 

222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352.) Respondents do not contest Andersen’s 

applicability here. 
13

to execute the document . . . carries the heavy burden of proving such 

allegations.” (Doolittle v. Exchange Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529, 545.)

B. Standard of Review

As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of 

review. Respondents contend the substantial evidence standard of review 

applies to the trial court’s determination as to whether Kay had a mental

health disorder and an associated delusion sufficient to invalidate the trust. 

Appellants argue the de novo standard applies because the trial court 

referenced only one disputed issue of fact in its decision, “i.e., whether or not 

the name of St. Jude’s as the beneficiary of the trust came from CPA Joan 

[Sturges] or attorney Lori Hunt,” and the court’s resolution of that disputed 

fact is neither relevant nor contested on appeal. 

Generally, “the application of a statutory standard to undisputed facts 

is reviewed de novo.” (Harustak v. Wilkins (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 208, 212.) 

That said, “ ‘[w]here the ruling that is the subject of appeal turns on the trial 

court’s determination of disputed facts, the appropriate standard of review on 

appeal is “sufficiency of the evidence.” ’ ” (Cochran v. Rubens (1996) 42 

Cal.App.4th 481, 486.)

Here, the ruling upholding the trust’s validity turned on the trial 

court’s determination of whether, at the time she executed her trust, Kay had 

a mental health disorder with symptoms including delusions or 

hallucinations that caused her to disinherit appellants. There appears no 

doubt that the relevant facts concerning Kay’s mental state and mental 

condition were in dispute, and the parties presented conflicting evidence over 

the course of trial. For example, witnesses Hunt, Steele, McCully, and 

Barrios testified that Kay never appeared disoriented or confused or to be 

having mental trouble in 2016, while witnesses Sturges and John Sr. testified 
14

differently. The parties also presented competing experts who provided 

different opinions about Kay’s mental condition when she executed the trust. 

Under these circumstances, we decline to conduct a de novo review. Instead, 

we will review the trial court’s determination for substantial evidence.

C. Testamentary Capacity

Section 6100.5(a)(2) provides that an individual is not mentally 

competent to make a will “if at the time of making the will,” the individual 

has “a mental health disorder with symptoms including delusions or 

hallucinations.” (Italics added.)

In its statement of decision, the trial court found that Kay was not 

experiencing delusions within the meaning of section 6100.5(a)(2) at the time 

she executed her trust. Thus, the court implicitly determined Kay did not 

have the requisite mental health disorder at the time she executed her trust. 

Although the court acknowledged that Kay had delusions in late October 

2015 while hospitalized for UTI, it determined her delusions ended shortly 

after her discharge from the hospital and were not operational when she 

signed the trust. The court further indicated that the medical experts opined 

Kay had moderate cognitive impairment, but “[o]ther than that, there is no 

evidence that Kay had dementia or any other mental condition that becomes 

worse over time. The only evidence regarding Kay’s cognition, in addition to 

the mental health status exam at Ole Health, is that she had acute confusion 

in October 2015 secondary to a urinary tract infection and again likely in 

April and June 2016. Many of the witnesses . . . testified that they had no 

concerns regarding her mental capacity from November 2015 through her 

death a year later.” 

The record discloses substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s 

determination. Dr. Angelone, an expert in neuropsychology, testified there 
15

was no objective evidence that Kay had a mental disorder as required by 

section 6100.5(a)(2). Both Dr. Angelone and Dr. Cheyette, an expert in 

psychiatry, testified that Kay did not have delusional disorder. Likewise, 

Dr. Angelone testified there was nothing in Kay’s medical records indicating 

she had dementia. Dr. Poscher—Kay’s internist who saw her once in 2011, 

three times in 2012, twice in June and November 2014, and then the last 

time in October 2016—testified she never formed any concern that Kay might 

have dementia. Similarly, Dr. Krijanovsky—Kay’s hematologist/oncologist 

who saw Kay about a dozen times from 2011 to November 2016, including in 

March and September 2014, and October and November 2016—testified she 

never noticed signs of cognitive impairment and never formed any concern 

that Kay might have dementia.

Even Dr. Spar, appellants’ expert who opined Kay had delusions 

arising from a mental disorder when she signed her trust, testified the 

“second best” explanation for why Kay changed her estate plan did not 

involve any delusions: specifically, it was possible that appellants upset Kay 

when they “swept” into her life after her hospitalization, and that she did not 

want to give her money to them.7 Dr. Spar acknowledged, after hearing all 

the evidence in the case, that a trier of fact could reasonably reach a different 

conclusion than the one he espoused.

Dr. Cheyette opined there was evidence that Kay had “mild cognitive 

impairment”—which is a slow decline of memory or other cognitive functions 

common among older people—but he testified delusions are very rarely 

7 Indeed, Johnson herself testified about her concern that all of the 

things they did in October 2015 might have been too much for Kay at that 

time, given Bob’s recent death and her medical condition. Kay’s estranged 

son, John Noyes, Jr., similarly testified that Eyford and Johnson overstepped 

and did too much.
16

associated with mild cognitive impairment. Similarly, but more strongly, 

Dr. Angelone testified that mild cognitive impairment means a person has 

memory issues, but that delusions do not result from this condition. 

Dr. Angelone also testified that “mild cognitive impairment” is not a mental 

disorder in the “DSM.”8

The record does establish that Kay had delirium in late 2015. Both 

Dr. Cheyette and Dr. Angelone opined that Kay developed delirium, which is 

a transient mental disorder, around the time of Bob’s death and her 

hospitalization for UTI.9 Both of the doctors indicated that delirium typically

continues for short periods and clears with proper treatment. Both testified 

there was no evidence that Kay had recurrent UTIs.

This and other evidence, such as the testimony of Kay’s long-time 

accountant, Sturges, and her attorney, Hunt, supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that Kay’s delirium was not ongoing when she executed her trust 

in February 2016. Sturges, who witnessed Kay sign the trust instrument, 

indicated that Kay had good days and bad days with regard to her memory 

and her mental state. Sturges testified that the day Kay signed the trust was 

“one of her good days,” because Kay was clear-headed and had expressed 

things reflecting she knew what she was doing. Hunt—who had many years 

8 While Dr. Angelone testified that “mild cognitive impairment” is not in 

the DSM, he acknowledged that “minor neurocognitive disorder” is in the 

DSM. But Dr. Angelone never opined that Kay had a minor neurocognitive 

disorder. When asked about the mini mental status exam Kay took at the 

Ole Health Clinic, Dr. Angelone said her score showed she was experiencing 

moderate cognitive impairment. He explained, however, that this just 

captured her mental status on a particular day and was not a diagnosis of a 

mental disorder.

9 The expert testimony established that infections, such as UTI, in 

elderly people commonly lead to delirium. 
17

of experience in estate planning and experience with clients with 

questionable mental capacity—met with Kay both before and when she 

executed the trust and the two subsequent trust amendments. Hunt never 

observed Kay to be forgetful or confused or cognitively impaired. Kay never 

exhibited paranoia or having delusions about appellants, and Hunt never 

believed Kay had a mental deficit. (Estate of Hansen (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 

99, 115 [when an attorney who draws a will and becomes a witness to the 

instrument testifies that the testator appeared to be of sound mind and 

memory, such testimony is entitled to serious consideration though is not 

conclusive when other witnesses have testified to the contrary].)

Other witness testimony, including testimony from Kay’s longtime 

friends Barrios, Steele, and McCully, also generally supports that Kay was 

lucid in the period when she signed her trust.

On this record, substantial evidence supports the determination that 

appellants fell short of establishing that Kay was living with a mental health 

disorder at the time she executed her trust. In reaching this conclusion, 

which is dispositive, we note that in their opening brief, appellants never 

argue Kay had a “mental health disorder” at the time she executed her trust, 

and they omit all mention of Dr. Angelone. But in their reply brief, 

apparently in response to respondents’ argument that Kay had no mental 

health disorder, appellants argue that “[c]ase law does not require a specific 

finding of mental disorder; the determinant factor is whether the trustor was 

delusional at the time the testamentary document was signed.”

This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, arguments made in 

a reply brief for the first time are too late. (Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc. (2012) 209 

Cal.App.4th 62, 80, fn. 7.) Second, even if we set aside its untimeliness, we 

are not persuaded by appellants’ sole authority in support of the aforequoted 
18

argument, Goodman v. Zimmerman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1667, which never 

examined whether section 6100.5(a)(2) requires a finding of a mental health 

disorder. (See Goodman, at pp. 1674–1678.) Third, appellants’ 

interpretation would render the portion of the statute requiring that 

delusions stem from a mental health disorder mere surplusage, contrary to 

fundamental precepts of statutory interpretation. (Bay Guardian Co. v. New 

Times Media LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 438, 453–454.)

Before concluding, we briefly address appellants’ other arguments. 

First, appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding Kay had 

testamentary capacity by selecting a single false belief Kay had about 

appellants—i.e., that appellants “wanted her out of the way in order to get 

her money”—and determining it was not a delusion. We see no error. 

Reading the statement of decision as a whole, the court found that Kay had 

several false beliefs and that such beliefs were tethered to facts and therefore 

not delusions,10 and also that Kay had some delusions in October 2015 or 

10 Specifically, in the part of its decision preceding its analysis of 

appellants’ testamentary capacity claim, the trial court discussed Kay’s 

various beliefs regarding appellants, observing: “[t]here was little evidence 

Kay’s negative thoughts and claims about [appellants] were true. In fact, 

most of her claims were demonstrably false. [Appellants] did not steal her 

money or jewelry. They did not make any transactions on her bank accounts. 

They shredded outdated documents only with her consent. They did not 

shred photographs. They put their names on her bank account only with her 

consent. They prepared powers of attorney only with Kay’s consent. 

Shannon did not push her on the balcony or any other place. They did not 

pressure her to name them as her beneficiaries and agents against her will. 

They did not want her dead. They did not show up in the parking lot or at 

her apartment trying to get in. They did not attempt to have her deemed 

incompetent. They did not try to sell her car. They did not do anything to 

cause the death of their mother Cathy. They did not harass her in any way.” 

Following this recitation of Kay’s beliefs regarding appellants, the court 

nonetheless rejected the testamentary capacity claim upon finding that Kay 
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shortly thereafter which were not operational when Kay signed her trust in 

February 2016. While the court specifically addressed Kay’s belief that 

appellants “wanted her out of the way in order to get her money” and 

whether it constituted a delusion, it is evident that the court was not 

indicating this was the only false belief or alleged delusion at issue.

Second, appellants argue the trial court committed reversible error by 

not specifically addressing whether each alleged false belief was a delusion as 

they claimed. This argument, however, is unaccompanied by citation to 

authority. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785.) 

Respondents cite to Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 

1106, which provides that “[a] statement of decision need not address all the 

legal and factual issues raised by the parties. . . . [A] trial court rendering a 

statement of decision is required only to set out ultimate findings rather than 

evidentiary ones.” (Id. at p. 1125, citations omitted.) Appellants do not 

disagree with Muzquiz, and instead explain that “[w]hat they are 

complaining about is the trial court’s complete failure to recognize that there 

was no evidence supporting a dozen or so of Kay Pearson’s oft expressed 

beliefs about facts—not motives or attitudes, but hard facts for which there 

was zero evidence in the real world. These imagined facts influenced Kay’s 

decision to disinherit her granddaughters.”

Understood as an argument that the court erred by failing to find that 

all of Kay’s false beliefs about appellants were delusions (including the false 

belief that appellants “wanted her out of the way in order to get her money”), 

we need not and do not address that argument. As discussed, there was 

substantial evidence that Kay did not have “a mental health disorder” as 

had “irrational and false beliefs” but they could be accounted for by a 

reasonable hypothesis. (See Estate of Putnam, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 172.)
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contemplated in section 6100.5(a)(2) at the time she executed the trust 

instrument. This is dispositive under the statute and renders unnecessary 

further analysis of whether her false beliefs were not delusions because they 

resulted from “ ‘a belief or inference, however irrational or unfounded, drawn 

from facts which are shown to exist.’ ” (Estate of Putnam, supra, 1 Cal.2d at 

p. 172.) For the same reasons, we also decline to address appellants’ claim 

that, as a policy matter, the court should not allow appellants’ actions, done 

with good intentions to assist Kay, to support a “reasonable hypothesis” to 

preclude a false belief from being a delusion. 

In closing, we recognize the result here is likely a very disappointing

one for appellants. Nevertheless, we are bound to apply the law (People v. 

Mowatt (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 713, 720) and, under the substantial evidence 

standard, our role is circumscribed. We cannot reweigh the evidence; we 

determine only if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted, which will support the judgment. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 

Cal.App.5th 86, 104.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on 

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
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_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Petrou, J.

_________________________

Jackson, J.

A157962
22

EYFORD et al. v. NORD et al. (A157962)

Trial court: Napa County 

Trial Judges: Hon. Diane M. Price

Attorneys: 

Stephen H. Fredkin for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

Tara L. Cooper; Epstein & Holtzapple, Robert F. Epstein, Robyn B. Christo; 

Bien & Summers, Elliot L. Bien for Defendants 

and Respondents.