U.S. Naval War College 

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons 

CMSI China Maritime Reports Reports & Studies 

4-1-2020 

China Maritime Report No. 6: Djibouti: China's First Overseas 

Strategic Strongpoint 

Peter A. Dutton 

Isaac B. Kardon 

Conor M. Kennedy 

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports 
qt 00 #i$li)f �p)r 

China Maritime Studies Institute 
Series Introduction

This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas 

strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition, 

but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with 

special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese 

firms.1 Each case study examines the characteristics and functions of port projects developed and 

operated by Chinese companies across the Indian Ocean region.2 The distinctive features of these 

projects are: (1) their strategic locations, positioned astride major sea lines of communication 

(SLOCs) and clustered near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) the comprehensive nature of Chinese 

investments and operations, involving coordination among state-owned enterprises and private firms 

to construct not only the port, but rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure, and further, to promote 

finance, trade, industry, and resource extraction in inland markets; and (3) their fused civilian and 

military functions, serving as platforms for economic, military, and diplomatic interactions.

Strategic strongpoints advance a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership objective to become a 

“strong maritime power”3(海洋强国)—which requires, inter alia, the development of a strong 

marine economy and the capability to protect “Chinese rights and interests” in the maritime domain.4

With the notable exception of the sole overseas People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Djibouti, all 

of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial. Even the Chinese presence in 

Djibouti has some major commercial motivations (addressed in detail in this study). However, 

China’s strategic strongpoint model integrates China’s various commercial and strategic interests, 

facilitating Chinese trade and investment with the host country while also helping the PLA establish 

a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs across the Indian Ocean and beyond.

1 For an overview of this concept, see Conor Kennedy, “Strategic Strongpoints and Chinese Naval Strategy.” Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief 19, no. 6 (March 22, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-strong-points-and-chinesenaval-strategy/. 

2 Currently planned case studies include Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in 

Myanmar. None of these other commercial port projects has any PLA military facilities to date, but Chinese analysts 

discuss each as a potential strategic strongpoint.

3 This objective is enshrined in the 18th and 19th CCP National Party Congress reports (2012, 2017), as well as the PRC’s 

13th “Five-Year Plan” for Economic Development (2016). See: 胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告

[“Hu Jintao's Report to the 18th Party Congress”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 8, 2012, 

http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151.html; 习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告

[“Xi Jinping's Report to the 19th Party Congress”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], October 28, 2017, 

http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1028/c64094-29613660.html; 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规

划纲要 [“Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for PRC Economic and Social Development”], 新华社 [Xinhua], March 17, 

2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016lh/2016-03/17/c_1118366322_11.htm.

4 习近平在中共中央政治局第八次集体学习时强调:进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海洋 推动海洋强国建设不断取

得新成就 [“Xi Jinping at the Central Committee Politburo Eighth Study Group, Take a Step Toward Considering 

Maritime Consciousness, Maritime Strategic Management, Promote the Construction of Maritime Power, Constantly 

Reaching New Achievements”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], July 31, 2013, 

http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c1024-22401311.html.
2

Summary

This report analyzes PRC economic and military interests and activities in Djibouti. The small, east 

African nation is the site of the PLA’s first overseas military base, but also serves as a major 

commercial hub for Chinese firms—especially in the transport and logistics industry. We explain the 

synthesis of China’s commercial and strategic goals in Djibouti through detailed examination of the

development and operations of commercial ports and related infrastructure. Employing the “Shekou 

Model” of comprehensive port zone development, Chinese firms have flocked to Djibouti with the 

intention of transforming it into a gateway to the markets and resources of Africa—especially 

landlocked Ethiopia—and a transport hub for trade between Europe and Asia. With diplomatic and 

financial support from Beijing, PRC firms have established a China-friendly business ecosystem and 

a political environment that proved conducive to the establishment of a permanent military presence. 

The Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission that justified the original PLA deployment in the region is now 

only one of several missions assigned to Chinese armed forces at Djibouti, a contingent that includes 

marines and special forces. The PLA is broadly responsible for the security of China’s “overseas 

interests,” for which Djibouti provides essential logistical support. China’s first overseas strategic 

strongpoint at Djibouti is a secure commercial foothold on the African continent and a military 

platform for expanding PLA operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Introduction: A Foothold in the Western Indian Ocean

Image 1. Major Indian Ocean Shipping Lanes5

China’s most important SLOCs run from the mainland across the South China Sea, through the 

Malacca Strait, and across the east-west trunk route of the Indian Ocean. Passing into the western 

5 Source: MarineTraffic vessel density 2016-2017, showing tanker and cargo vessels over 75,000 tons gross tonnage. 
3

Indian Ocean, China’s “maritime lifeline” (海上生命线) splits in two.6 One route heads northwest 

through the Strait of Hormuz and into the Persian Gulf, the source of some 40 percent of China’s 

imported oil;7the other continues westward to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, with Djibouti at its 

entrance—and beyond it, the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and major markets of the Mediterranean and 

Europe. With rising demands on the PLA to “protect the security of China’s overseas interests,”8

especially these vital SLOCs and chokepoints, the requirement to sustain out-of-area operations has 

made some form of foreign basing posture virtually inevitable.

China is steadily enhancing its ability to project power and secure the western end of this lifeline.

Since it began regularized, U.N.-sanctioned anti-piracy escort task forces deployed to the Gulf of 

Aden in December 2008,

9

the PLA Navy (PLAN) has developed experience in conducting and 

sustaining limited operations in the “far seas.”10 Not long after Japan established its first overseas 

facility in Djibouti in 2011 (joining the U.S., France, and Italy as military tenants of the tiny, former 

French colony on the Horn of Africa), China seized the opportunity to augment its own presence.

11

Beginning in 2012, with construction of a commercial port in partnership with the government of 

Djibouti, and culminating in the development of a military base adjacent to it, China developed its 

“first overseas strategic strongpoint” in Djibouti.12

While the circumstances that led to the establishment of a formal, dedicated military base at Djibouti 

are unlikely to be replicated at other sites, that base should be considered as one critical node in an 

emerging network of overseas port facilities that serve both strategic and commercial purposes.

13 As 

a lone base unsupported by other Chinese bases or allies, Djibouti does not yet offer the PLA

6 This is a common designation for this critical SLOC in Chinese strategic writing. See, for example, 肖晞 [Xiao Xi], 中国

国家安全面临的挑战与战略选择 [“China’s National Security Challenges and Strategic Choices”], 薄贵利, 主编 [Bao 

Guili, ed.], 强国宏略: 国家战略前沿问题研究 [Grand Strategies for Strengthening the Nation: Research on the 

Forefront Issues of National Strategy] (Beijing: People’s Press, 2016), p. 505; 胡冬英, 黄锐, 蔡广友 [Hu Dongying, 

Huang Rui, and Cai Guangyou], 推进潜艇兵力走向远洋的几点思考 [“Several Thoughts on Advancing the Submarine 

Force to Distant Oceans”], 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering], no. 1 (2017), p. 2.

7 Tim Gould, Tae-Yoon Kim, “The world can’t afford to relax about oil security,” International Energy Agency, 

September 19, 2019, https://www.iea.org/commentaries/the-world-cant-afford-to-relax-about-oil-security

8

“Protecting the security overseas interests” (保护海外利益安全) is one of eight “strategic tasks” (战略任务) outlined in 

the 2015 PLA White Paper. See PRC State Council Information Office, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 27, 2015, 

http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm

9 十年, 中国海军护航编队执行护航任务 1190 批次 [“In Ten Years, the Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces has Carried 

Out 1,190 Escort Missions”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], December 24, 2018, 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1224/c1011-30484891.html.

10 See Andrew S. Erickson, Austin M. Strange, “No Substitute for Experience,” CMSI Red Book, no. 10 (2013), 

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/12/

11 Vice Admiral (ret.) Michael Franken, then in command of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, recounts that 

the PRC Ambassador to Djibouti and PRC defense attaché to Ethiopia approached him at a social event in late 2011 and 

requested a visit to the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonnier, where they hoped to tour the facility and discuss how the 

United States had helped Japan establish its military presence in Djibouti (Author interview with Franken, March 2020);

Alex Martin, “First Overseas Military Base Since WWII to Open in Djibouti,” The Japan Times, July 2, 2011,

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/07/02/national/first-overseas-military-base-since-wwii-to-open-indjibouti/#.XmlonqhKiUk.

12 刘琳 [Liu Lin], ‘一带一路’ 沿线战略支点与军事外交建设 [“Strategic Strongpoints Along the ‘Belt And Road’ and 

Building Military Diplomacy”], 世界知识 [World Knowledge], July 26, 2017, http://m.dunjiaodu.com/waijiao/1562.html.

13 For a detailed discussion of the establishment of the facility, see Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick DeGategno, 

“China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base,” 

Center for Naval Analyses, July 2017, https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1038215.
4

significant wartime capability.14 Instead, it serves largely as a supply, logistics, and intelligence hub 

for increasingly complex peacetime military operations across China’s Indian Ocean lifeline, now

anchored in the east by China’s cluster of artificial island bases in the South China Sea.

15 The PLA 

Academy of Military Science’s authoritative 2013 Science of Military Strategy advocated for such a 

pattern:

[W]e must build overseas strategic strongpoints that depend on the homeland, radiate into the 

surrounding areas, and move toward the two oceans [i.e., the Pacific and Indian Oceans]. 

[Each strongpoint] will provide support for overseas military operations or act as a forward 

base for deploying military forces overseas, exerting political and military influence in 

relevant regions, and forming a posture with the homeland strategic layout that accounts for

both the interior and the exterior, links the near with the far, and mutually supports the 

other.

16

Chinese officials and analysts are quick to distinguish PRC “strategic strongpoints” from traditional 

military bases, contrasting a benign PLA overseas presence with the bases owned by other 

countries—especially the “hegemonic” system of U.S. military bases on foreign soil.

17 According to 

Chinese officials, the Djibouti “support base” (保障基地) is intended to “fulfill international 

obligations,” by providing humanitarian relief, supporting Chinese peacekeeping in Africa, assisting

ongoing anti-piracy missions, and “maintaining peace and stability in Africa and the world.”

18

14 A leading Chinese maritime strategist offered the analogy of Imperial Germany’s naval base at Qingdao, which was also 

isolated and thus quickly seized by Japan and the United Kingdom in World War I (Author discussion with Hu Bo, 

Director of the Centre for Maritime Strategy Studies at Peking University, February 2019). Section V below offers a fuller 

assessment of the military capability provided by the base.

15 侯昂好 [Hou Anghao], 超越马汉: 关于中国未来海权道路发展的思考 [“Beyond Mahan: Thoughts on the Future 

Development Path of Chinese Seapower”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 3 (2017), pp. 45-54; 陈贞国 [Chen Zhenguo], 三

沙: 打造海上丝路战略支点 ["Sansha, Creating a Maritime Silk Road Strategic Strongpoint”], 世界知识 [World Affairs], 

no. 12 (2016), pp. 52-53.

15 郑崇伟, 高成志, 张仲, 孔洁, 万勇 [Zheng Chongwei, Gao Chengzhi, Zhang Zhong, Kong Jie, Wan Yong], 岛礁跑道

设计中的风候特征分析 [“Wind Climate Analysis Under the Demand of Reef Runway Construction”], 海洋预报

[Marine Forecasts] 34, no. 4 (August 2017), pp. 52-57; Zheng Chongwei, et al.,经略 21 世纪海上丝绸之路’: 综合应用

平台建设 [“The Strategy of Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century: Construction of Integrated Application Platform”], 海

洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management], no. 2 (2017), pp. 52-57. 

16寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy], (Beijing: Military Science Publishing, 2013), p. 

254.

17 According to several well-placed Chinese analysts, “the Chinese government is very cautious in representing its 

strategic strongpoints, and takes pains to distinguish them from American bases overseas, stressing that as a prerequisite 

they do not threaten the security and sovereignty of the port country, building only necessary security and defense 

capabilities, building strategic strongpoints at key areas, coordinating the construction of a regional security system, and 

ensuring the smooth and secure trade between the host country and China. This is the necessary national security 

connection for overseas-invested Chinese firms, although this goal is still a long-term one.” 国观智库政策研究中心“一

带一路”课题组 [Grandview Think Tank “Belt and Road” Research Group], “一带一路”中国海外港口项目战略分析报

告 [“‘One Belt One Road’ Chinese Overseas Port Projects Strategic Analytical Report”], 国观智库[Grandview 

Institution], (2019), p. 3. See also 吴敏文 [Wu Minwen], 大国海外军事基地地图 [Map of Great Powers’ Overseas 

Military Bases”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], June 6, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018-06/06/c_137212406.htm.

18 国防部谈中国驻吉布提保障基地:为了更好履行国际义务 [“Ministry of Defense talks about China’s Support Base in 

Djibouti: In Order to Better Fulfill International Obligations”], 人民日报 (People’s Daily), November 30, 2018, 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1130/c1011-30434450.html; 吉布提军事基地是海外扩张第一步? 外交部回应

[“Is the Djibouti military base the first step in overseas expansion? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Responds”], PRC 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfgx/zfgxdfzc/t1477374.htm. The facility is 
5

Benign or not, the emerging PLA support system overseas is unlikely to mirror America’s. Instead, it 

will follow the PRC’s commercial presence to support its expanding portfolio of military missions. 

PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli described this process even as the base in Djibouti was 

being built. At a navy seminar held on the eighth anniversary of the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission

(December 2016), he explained “overseas strategic strongpoint construction provides a new support 

for escort operations.... [W]e must give full play to the supporting role of the overseas support 

system to carry out larger scale missions in broader areas and to shape the situation.”19

This report examines the development of this “overseas support system,” tracking China’s broader 

efforts to “shape the situation” by establishing a robust overseas commercial, diplomatic, and 

military presence in Djibouti. While the military base appropriately attracts the lion’s share of foreign 

scrutiny, it cannot be understood without examining the role of the Chinese firms that preceded it. By 

building and operating the necessary infrastructure—both physical and diplomatic—these firms 

established the PRC’s position in Djibouti and paved the way for a major Chinese strategic footprint 

in Africa.

Section one introduces Djibouti’s strategic geography and the Chinese “Shekou Model” of 

comprehensive development of trade and industry at port sites. Section two describes the 

characteristics of the Chinese-operated port and free trade zone at Djibouti. Section three takes stock 

of the transport infrastructure built to service the port and expand its economic and strategic impact. 

Section four analyzes the inland markets and resources that this transport network intends to access. 

Section five assesses the functions and capabilities of the new Chinese military base in Djibouti. The 

case study provides a detailed examination of Chinese military and commercial operations at 

Djibouti and provides a template for future analysis of other potential “overseas strategic 

strongpoints.”

A New “Shekou” in Djibouti

Chinese firms see Djibouti as a major transshipment hub and a key to unlocking the economies of the

Horn of Africa—most notably, landlocked Ethiopia. The managing director of the leading Chinese 

firm in Djibouti, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Ltd. (CMPort), explains this vision, 

noting that Djibouti “is very close to the major Asia-Europe shipping route and is an important 

gateway port for the hinterland countries within the region.”20 Together with the China Export Import 

Bank (Exim Bank), CMPort and its parent company, the central state-owned enterprise (SOE) China 

Merchants Group (CMG),21 have established a platform of finance, infrastructure, and trade that 

enables many Chinese firms to pursue business in a once unappealing economic environment.

22

sometimes called a “logistics and supply base” (后勤补给基地), a “support base” (保障基地), or simply a “military base” 

(军事基地).

19 梁庆松, 王元元 [Liang Qingsong, Wang Yuanyuan], 海军召开亚丁湾护航 8 周年研讨会 [“The Navy Holds a 

Seminar on the 8th Anniversary of the Gulf of Aden Escorts”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 30, 2016, p. 1.

20 Julien Wagner and Oliver Caslin, “‘Investment is not limited to ports’: Jingtao Bai, director general of China Merchants 

Port Holdings,” The Africa Report, March 20, 2019, https://www.theafricareport.com/10475/investment-is-not-limited-toports-jingtao-bai-director-general-of-china-merchants-port-holdings/

21 “Central SOEs” are the 95 firms under the direct supervision of the PRC State Council’s State-Owned Assets and 

Administration Commission (SASAC). See PRC State Council, 企业名录 [“Central State-owned Enterprise Directory”], 

November 8, 2019, available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/index.html.

22 Prior to the influx of major investment, there were very few private Chinese businesses operating in Djibouti. The 

Ministry of Commerce’s 2018 guide on investment in Djibouti stated there were only two Chinese restaurants, and a small 

Chinese grocery store for the 2,000 Chinese nationals in country. See 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 – 吉布提 (2018 版) 
6

With an estimated $15 billion total Chinese investment in development of the port and its 

hinterlands, China is the largest external commercial player in Djibouti.23 The relatively large PRC 

commercial presence reflects, at least in part, Western absence. Western analysts have repeatedly 

questioned the feasibility of the Djiboutian government’s proposed infrastructure projects,

24 and 

expressed concerns about its large government debt load.25 China, by contrast, has not balked at the 

financial risk inherent in investing in Djibouti and has fast become the nation’s principal economic 

partner and creditor.26 Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, said in April 2017 that, “no one but 

the Chinese offers a long-term partnership in Djibouti.”27 China-Djibouti relations were upgraded to 

a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” when Guelleh visited China in November that year.28

Djiboutian authorities hope the partnership with the PRC will transform Djibouti into the 

“Singapore” or “Dubai of East Africa.”29 The CMG President touted his firm’s success in 

Guangdong as a “template for development in Djibouti,” where they seek to leverage the 

“transformative power of ports.”30 This transformation entails building transport infrastructure, 

industrial parks, free trade and export processing zones, and developing commercial services and 

residential areas adjacent to the port. CMPort markets this style of comprehensive development as 

the “Shekou Model” (蛇口模式).31 This business model derives its name and inspiration from 

[“Guide to Foreign Investment Cooperation by Country (Region) (2018)”], 中华人民共和国商务部 [PRC Ministry of 

Commerce], 2018, p. 3, 6, http://obor.sh-itc.net/article/fxffnew/gbznnew/201903/1467957_1.html.

23 “‘One Belt One Road’ Chinese Overseas Port Projects Strategic Analytical Report,” pp. 10-11; “Strengthening Djibouti 

Port’s Strategic Position,” Port de Djibouti, July 4, 2015, http://www.portdedjibouti.com/strengthenin-djibouti-portsstrategic-position/

24 An aspirational Djiboutian government report from 2017 lays out an ambitious aim to become the logistical and 

commercial hub for East Africa. Republique de Djibouti, “Vision Djibouti 2035,” http://www.ccd.dj/w2017/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Vision-Nationale.pdf.

25 The IMF reported in December 2018 that “The Djiboutian authorities’ strategy of investing in infrastructure to transform 

the economy and position the country as a logistics and commercial hub offers great opportunities for economic growth 

and development. However, the financing of this strategy through a build-up of debt has resulted in debt distress, which 

poses significant risks. Public and publicly guaranteed debt is expected to be around 104 per cent of GDP at end-2018.” 

See: “IMF Staff Concludes the 2018 Article IV Consultation Mission in Djibouti,” IMF Press Release No. 18/486, 

December 19, 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/12/19/pr18486-djibouti-imf-staff-concludes-the-2018-

article-iv-consultation-mission; Monte Reel, “Djibouti Is Hot: How a Forgotten Sandlot of a Country Became a Hub of 

International Power Games,” Bloomberg, March 23, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-djibouti; Mary

Harper, “Can Ethiopia's Railway Bring Peace to Somalia?” BBC, November 23, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-34871074.

26 International Monetary Fund, “Djibouti, 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report, No. 19/314, October 

2019, https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2019/1DJIEA2019002.ashx; John Hurley, Scott Morris, and 

Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” Center 

for Global Development Policy Paper, no. 121 (March 2018), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debtimplications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.

27 Francois Soudan, “No One but China Offers a Long-term Partnership in Djibouti: President Guelleh,” TesfaNews, April 

11, 2017, https://www.tesfanews.net/president-guelleh-only-china-offers-long-term-partnership-djibouti/. 

28 Guide to Foreign Investment Cooperation by Country (Region) (2018). 

29 See also Edmund Blair, “China to Start Work Soon on Naval Base in Djibouti—Guelleh,” Reuters, February 2, 2016. 

http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-djibouti-china- idUKKCN0VB1Z6; Frank Kane, “The Man Who Wants to Make Djibouti 

the Next Dubai,” The National, March 17, 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/business/the-man-who-wants-to-makedjibouti-the-next-dubai-1.46688

30 Deng Yanzi, “Building the Shekou of East Africa,” China Daily, March 27, 2017, 

http://www.chinadailyasia.com/asiaweekly/2017-03/27/content_15592240_2.html.

31 林佳铭, 章强 [Lin Jiaming, Zhang Qiang], 招商局港口‘前港—中区—后城’模式的海外拓展之旅 [“The Overseas 

Expansion of China Merchants Port’s ‘Port in Front–Zone in the Center–City in the Rear’ Model”], 中国港口 [China 

Ports], no. 3 (2019), pp. 25–29. Author interviews with CMPort managers, Hong Kong, June 2019.
7

Shekou, once a tiny fishing village in China’s Guangdong Province. CMG developed a seaport and 

export processing zone there in the early 1980s, propelling neighboring Shenzhen’s growth into a 

world-class commercial, financial, and industrial hub.32 The firm is now promoting this model in the 

small east African nation of Djibouti. The core of this effort is a cluster of ports and associated 

railway, pipeline, and road infrastructure that are designed to “make Djibouti the Shekou of East 

Africa—for regional shipping, logistics, and trade,” in the words of CMG President Li Xiaopeng.33

This phased development model is also described in shorthand as a “port-park-city” model (前港, 中

区, 后城). This signature CMG approach to port development is designed to facilitate not just the 

transportation of goods, but to foster a wider business ecosystem that supports broader 

development.

34 By clustering industrial, logistics, and business service facilities adjacent to the port 

of Djibouti, Chinese firms hope to replicate the extraordinary success of Shenzhen.35 The CMPort 

managing director calls attention to his firm’s “past the pier” development efforts that “are not 

limited to ports but [include an] international free trade zone and urban development called the 

Shekou ‘port-park-city’ comprehensive development model.”36

Djiboutian authorities are enthusiastic about the “innovative model implemented by China 

Merchants” and quite naturally seek the same extraordinary growth.37 Yet Djibouti manifestly lacks 

most of the advantages enjoyed by Shenzhen. The Shekou port complex on Shenzhen’s western 

periphery is nested among the massive population centers of Hong Kong and Guangzhou. It sits in 

the heart of the Pearl River Delta, the commercially vibrant zone at the center of the PRC export 

miracle,38 where it enjoys the benefits of a massive labor pool, productive export-facing industries, 

and growth-oriented, technocratic governance. These benefits are largely unavailable on the Horn of 

Africa. Still, Djibouti is a vital gateway to a large part of the African continent with a rapidly 

expanding population, which may be poised to develop robustly with sound investment and 

economic planning. What Djibouti lacks in terms of pre-existing economic development may be 

partially compensated for by serving as an especially important ocean access hub for the Horn of 

Africa. 

32 Deng Yangzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou’,” China Daily, March 7, 2017, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2017-03/07/content_28455386;for detailed discussions of the model and its 

applications, see Lin and Zhang, “The Overseas Expansion of China Merchants Port;” 孔晓青[Kong Xiaoqing], 招商港口

发展“蛇口模式”的形成 [“Formation of the China Merchants Port 'Shekou Model' of Development”], 国家航海 [National 

Navigation], (November 2017, pp. 39-54; 何继江, 刘宁 [He Jijiang, Liu Ning], 蛇口模式:一种社会技术创新 [“Shekou 

Model: A Type of Social Innovation of Technology”], 特区经济 [Special Economic Zone Economies], no. 12 (2014), pp. 

53-57.

33 Deng Yanzi, “Building the Shekou of East Africa.”

34 余舒虹 [Yu Shuhong], 招商蛇口:“前港,中区,后城”蛇口模式加快复制 [“China Merchants’ Shekou: ‘Port in 

Front, Industrial Parks in the Middle, City in the Back’ The Shekou Model to be Quickly Replicated”], 经济观察网

[Economic Observations Net], October 24, 2016, http://www.eeo.com.cn/2016/1024/292959.shtml

35 Deng Yanzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou’,” China Daily, March 7, 2017, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/07/content_28455386.htm; Wagner and Caslin, “Investment is not 

limited to ports.”

36 Wagner and Caslin, “Investment is not limited to ports.”

37 Aboubaker Omar Hadi, chairman of the Djibouti Port and Free Zone Authority, quoted in 高江虹[Gao Jianghong], “蛇

口模式 4.0” 落地吉布提, 招商局雁形出海 [“‘Shekou Model 4.0’ Arrives in Djibouti, China Merchants ‘Flying Geese’ 

Model Goes Abroad”], 21 世界经济报道[21st Century Business Herald], July 5, 2017, 

http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2017-07/05/content_65726.htm

38 See Ezra Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
8

China’s approach to Djibouti takes advantage of hundreds of other Chinese firms, private and stateowned, which are clamoring to do business in the growing African market.

39 PRC policy fosters and 

advances such overseas investment. CMG, for instance, enjoys substantial backing from Beijing in 

the form of access to a large pool of loan capital from central policy banks (like Exim Bank) and 

local financing,

40 including targeted Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lending from the “Silk Road 

Fund” and other central- and local-government external trade and investment initiatives to promote

the project.41 Further central support for Chinese firms to build a commercial presence in Africa 

comes through the diplomatic and political boost provided by government programs, particularly the 

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the BRI.

42

Li Guofeng, director of the Overseas Business Department of CMG, explained how his firm is 

positioning itself with respect to the BRI, for which the firm’s leadership has been a leading 

proponent:

43

[T]he situation in many developing countries along the “Belt and Road” is similar to that in 

Shekou at the beginning of reform and opening up, such as the advantages of low labor costs 

and low land costs. But the reason why companies are unwilling to invest is because the 

infrastructure and soft business environment of many countries is still relatively poor.

Therefore, China Merchants hopes to provide a platform for Chinese-funded enterprises to 

feel a similar investment environment in China in this region, and to allay their concerns 

about going global.44

This comprehensive approach—in which Chinese financing, expertise, and labor are poured into 

integrated port, infrastructure, and industrial projects—is driven in part by China’s ongoing need to 

shed excess domestic industrial capacity. Vast investment in domestic industry, especially during the 

stimulus following the global financial crisis of 2008, yielded a surplus of labor and capital in several 

39 A detailed accounting of Chinese firms’ commercial presence in Africa, including data and analysis on trade, 

investment, and construction contracts, is available on the Johns Hopkins University’s China Africa Research Initiative 

website at http://www.sais-cari.org/other-data. See also Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China 

in Africa, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

40 The Belt and Road Initiative has created incentives for local governments and SOEs to pile into infrastructure 

investment by providing cheap loan capital. See 孙丽朝 [Sun Lichao], 中欧班列挤‘泡沫’ [“Crowding into the ChinaEurope Rail ‘Bubble’”], 等深线 [Depth Paper], July 26, 2019, cited in Ryan Manuel, “Twists in the Belt and Road,” 

China Leadership Monitor, Fall 2019, no. 61, https://www.prcleader.org/manuel-belt-road.

41 According to the deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the PBOC and other central organs are 

supporting special funds and rates for Chinese banks and other lenders to facilitate BRI priorities. See 陈雨露 [Chen 

Yulu], 书写 ‘一带一路’ 投融资合作新篇章 [“Writing a New Chapter in ‘Belt and Road’ Investment and Financing 

Cooperation”], 全球商业经典 [Global Commerce Classic], no. 6 (2019). For analysis of which firms are getting BRI 

loans, see Li Xiaojun and Zeng Ka, "To Join or Not to Join? How Chinese Firms View the Belt and Road Initiative," 

Pacific Affairs, 92, no. 1 (2019), pp. 5–26.

42 姚桂梅 [Yao Guimei], “一带一路”建设下的中非产能合作 [“China-Africa Production Cooperation in Construction of 

the ‘Belt and Road’”], 中国共产党新闻网 [Communist Party of China News Network], July 18, 2017, 

http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0718/c191095-29412141.html.

43 CMG President Li Jianhong gave a keynote speech at the fifth anniversary party for the BRI, joined by Politburo 

Standing Committee member and State Council Vice Premier, Han Zheng. See 黄玥, 张敏彦 [Huang Yue, Zhang 

Minyan], 共建“一带一路”,习近平提出从“大写意”到“工笔画” [“Jointly Build the Belt and Road: Xi Jinping proposed 

moving from ‘large freehand brushstrokes’ to ‘meticulous detail’”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August 28, 2018, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2018-08/28/c_1123341344.htm.

44 Gao, “‘Shekou Model 4.0’ Arrives in Djibouti.”
9

key sectors.

45 This surplus is now directed toward foreign markets through a series of policy 

measures, of which the BRI is only the most widely promoted.46 Overcapacity in traditional heavy 

industries, such as steel, cement, and shipbuilding, and in infrastructure construction sectors, such as 

ports, roads, bridges, and railways, has been a policy concern for PRC economic planners for nearly 

a decade. 

The agenda for the 2012 Central Economic Work Conference, for instance, included discussions of 

ways to productively employ this excess industrial capacity to bridge the growing demand-supply 

gap while policy makers undertook structural adjustments to the national economy.

47 Thus, when the

CMG President noted that “China’s port industry should export its capacity to overseas markets 

where the demand for port construction is strong,”48 he was voicing one of the principal domestic 

rationales for China’s investments in the Horn of Africa. Alleviating this overcapacity will be 

essential to avoid economic headwinds created by the many structural ailments in China’s national 

economy, including debt over-accumulation, bankruptcies, lay-offs, and continued damage to the 

environment.

49

The success of the Shekou model depends on more than pouring surplus capital and excess industrial 

capacity into building and operating a port and adjacent free trade zone. Like the Pearl River Delta in 

China, these projects must be connected to the broader economic region in order to achieve anything 

like the economic dynamism of Shenzhen. Accordingly, if Djibouti is to become a regional transport 

gateway and transshipment hub, it will do so largely on the strength of its links to the continent.50

Ethiopia in particular is an attractive market for the possibilities it presents for long-term 

development. Though Djibouti itself has a tiny population with little economic potential of its own, 

its geographic position provides the opportunity to unlock youthful, fast-growing Ethiopia’s potential 

in global markets.51 Djibouti’s ports are well situated to provide commercial access to land-locked 

Ethiopia, and as a transshipment hub for cargo moving from the west across the Indian Ocean to 

markets in South and East Asia and from the east through the Red Sea and Suez Canal to markets in 

45 Most notable among the sectors and products with overcapacity is the construction industry. There is also noted 

overproduction of aluminum, cement, chemicals, coal, coal-fired power, paper, plated glass, shipbuilding, solar power, and 

steel. See International Monetary Fund, “People’s Republic of China: 2017 Article IV Consultation, Staff Report,” IMF 

Country Report, no. 17.247, p. 18.

46 An authoritative statement of this objective to actively undertake major infrastructure and industrial projects abroad that 

would further facilitate the export of various Chinese products can be found in a 2013 directive, State Council of the 

People’s Republic of China, 国务院关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾的指导意见 [“Guiding Opinions of the State Council on 

Resolving Serious Production Overcapacity Conflicts”], 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [The Central People’s 

Government of the PRC], October 6, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-10/15/content_2507143.htm

47 张前荣 [Zhang Qianrong], 我国当前产能过剩的现状、原因及应对政策 [“The Current Status, Causes, and Policy 

Responses to China’s Current Production Overcapacity”], 经济预测部-国家信息中心 [Economic Forecasting 

Department—National Information Center], July 16, 2014, http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/455/3068.htm

48 Deng Yanzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou.’”

49 He Yafei, “China’s Overcapacity Crisis Can Spur Growth Through Overseas Expansion,” South China Morning Post, 

January 7, 2014, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1399681/chinas-overcapacity-crisis-can-spurgrowth-through-overseas.

50 “Construction of Djibouti’s third sea port begins,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 28, 2012, 

http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=989990683&Country=D

51 Ethiopia made peace and restored full diplomatic relations with Eritrea in July 2018, and the two vowed to open their 

borders for trade, giving the nation another potential access point to the oceans. The infrastructure and economic 

relationships for such a development are possible over the medium- to long-term. See Bob Koigi, “Somalia, Eritrea and 

Ethiopia seek economic integration,” Africa Business Communities, July 7, 2018, 

https://africabusinesscommunities.com/news/somalia-eritrea-and-ethiopia-seek-economic-integration/.
10

North Africa and Europe.52 Building the modern infrastructure to do so will be a long-term endeavor. 

However, the implementation of the Shekou Model in East Africa has already achieved significant 

progress, leaving China poised to take advantage of the market potential and resources of the Horn of 

Africa.

Port Capacity and Characteristics

The ports in Djibouti consist of several facilities surrounding the Gulf of Tadjoureh, which cuts into 

the east African coastline just southwest of the Bab al-Mandeb. Several of them were in place well 

before the Chinese appeared on the scene in 2013, and were formerly operated under an exclusive 

2006 concession to the United Arab Emirates’ firm Dubai Ports World (DPWorld), which Djibouti

disputed beginning in 2012 and terminated in 2018 (discussed below).

53 Since then, China’s active

development of Djibouti’s transport sector has positioned Chinese firms to continue expanding their 

role in Djibouti’s port- and military-base dependent economy.

Image 2. The Port of Djibouti

52 Edith Mutethya, “Djibouti Launches China-built Free Trade Zone,” China Daily, July 6, 2018, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/06/WS5b3f03d0a3103349141e12a9.html.

53 DPWorld took the government of Djibouti to the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) in 2018 after 

Djibouti nationalized the Port of Djibouti in February of that year. DPWorld has received five orders from LCIA in its 

favor, including monetary compensation and restoration of their concession. The government of Djibouti has rejected 

these awards, physically seized the asset, restructured its management, and passed legislation that allows it to “terminate 

all contracts relating to strategic infrastructures which are deemed to be contrary to the fundamental interests of the 

Republic.” DPWorld has also brought CMPort to the Hong Kong Court of First Instance, which is still being tried. All of 

these facts are presented with documentation in “Decision,” DPWorld Djibouti FZCO, Dubai (International) Djibouti FZE, 

Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, High Court of the Hong Kong 

Special Administrative Region, Court of First Instance, Action no. 1951 of 2018, December 20, 2019, 

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=126220&QS=%24%26%2340%3Bdji

bouti%26%2341%3B&ID=AAAB73AAIAAAXpuAAC&TP=JU.
11

Doraleh Multipurpose Port

The Doraleh Multipurpose Port is the centerpiece of China’s economic position in Djibouti. It is 

owned and operated by a joint venture between CMPort (with 23.5 percent equity) and the public 

port authority of the Djibouti government, Port de Djibouti, S.A. (PDSA), finalized in December 

2012.54 The facility went into service in May 2017,55 shortly before the formal opening in July of the 

PLA base that abuts its western flank.56 The joint venture gives CMPort a stake in ownership and 

operations across all the dispersed facilities of the Port of the Port of Djibouti, comprising not only 

the modern container terminal formerly operated by DPWorld (the Doraleh Container Terminal), but 

also the Horizon Oil Terminal, the “old port” in the city of Djibouti, Tadjourah Terminal across the 

Gulf to the northwest, and Ghoubet Port, a salt terminal in the far west of the Gulf.57 See Image 2 

above.

The port was the culmination of a 4-year, $590 million project financed by China’s Exim Bank.

58

China State Construction Engineering Corp and China Civil Engineering Construction Corp designed 

and built the port between 2013 and 2017.

59 The port has six 1200 meter ship berths, from 15.3 to 

15.5 meters deep, that take container, dry bulk, breakbulk, and RO/RO cargos.

60 They accommodate 

100,000 deadweight ton “Capesize” vessels too large to transit the Suez Canal, which must offload to 

smaller ships at a transshipment hub before cargo can travel to the Mediterranean and beyond. 

Supporting the berths are a 23-hectare container terminal, a 57-hectare cargo yard, a 20-hectare bulk 

terminal, a 15-hectare vehicle yard, and 3.5-hectare warehousing area. The total capacity for noncontainerized cargo is 8.8 million tons.61

 

The port’s performance, at least measured in terms of container throughput, is not currently trending 

toward “Dubai” or “Shekou” status. In 2018, the Doraleh Multipurpose Port moved only 49,000 TEU 

of containerized cargo out of a designed capacity of 220,000 TEU.

62 The CMPort 2018 annual report 

attributes this 7.5 percent year-on-year reduction in container throughput in Djibouti to decreases in 

54 招商局国际有限公司 [China Merchants Holdings (International) Company Limited], “Acquisition of 23.5% interests 

in Joint Venture in Djibouti,” The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, December 30, 2012, 

https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2012/1230/ltn20121230025.pdf

55 “Djibouti’s Doraleh Port Officially Opens,” Xinhua, May 24, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-

05/24/c_136312120.htm. 

56 张庆宝 [Zhang Qingbao], 我驻吉布提保障基地部队进驻营区仪式举行 [“Ceremony for the entry of our troops into 

the Djibouti Support Base”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], August 1, 2017, http://www.81.cn/hj/2017-

08/01/content_7699505_5.htm.

57 Port de Djibouti, S.A., https://www.portdedjibouti.com/

58 International Monetary Fund, Djibouti Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation—Debt Sustainability Analysis, 

February 7, 2017, 3, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2017/dsacr1787.pdf; The Export-Import Bank of China, 

中国进出口银行与招商局集团有限公司签署战略合作协议 [“The Export-Import Bank of China and China Merchants 

Group Sign a Strategic Cooperation Agreement”], 中国进出口银行 [The Export-Import Bank of China], December 16, 

2016, http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/Newlist/index_343_29632.

59 “Djibouti’s Doraleh Port Officially Opens;” 亚吉模式: 铁路全产业链成功实践 [“The China-Ethiopia Model: A 

Successful Framework for End-to-End Railway Construction”], 中国土木工程集团有限公司 [China Civil Engineering 

Construction Corporation], May 22, 2017, http://ccecc.crcc.cn/art/2017/5/22/art_7609_1136232.html. 

60 Except where otherwise noted, data on port characteristics and capacity are from IHS Markit, “Djibouti,” Seaweb Ports, 

World Port Number: PO1478, UNLOCODE: DJJIB

61 IHS Global Limited, “Djibouti (World Port Number PO1478)” Sea-web Ports (accessed March 17, 2019); “Doraleh 

Multi-Purpose Port,” Port de Djibouti, S.A., http://www.portdedjibouti.com/doraleh-multi-purpose-port/. 

62 TEU is twenty-foot equivalent units, a measure of port throughput based on the average volume of an intermodal 

container. See: “Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast, Annual Report 2019” Drewry 

Maritime Research, p. 165
12

transshipment volume to Ethiopia—that is, precisely the opposite effect of that anticipated by the 

business model.

63 Despite reductions in service prices after the opening of the Doraleh Multipurpose 

Port, Ethiopia is pursuing a policy to diversify its international trade routes and is in discussions with 

the Republic of Somaliland to develop Berbera Port, where DPWorld is active after being jettisoned 

from Djibouti. Such developments could weaken the virtual monopoly Djibouti currently holds on 

Ethiopian trade routes to the sea.64 Nonetheless, the CMPort Interim Report for 2019 (the latest 

available as of April 2020) reports increases in container throughput of 11.1 percent and an increase 

of 23.4 percent in bulk cargo volume in the first half of 2019.65

Tadjourah

Across the Gulf to the north, the Tadjourah bulk terminal is another of the assets in CMPort’s joint 

venture. Djibouti’s port authority anticipates traffic of 4 million tons of cargo per year,66 but there is 

little reporting in Chinese or industry sources on its operations. The terminal’s construction was 

contracted to a Hubei-based company and was designed to export potash from northern Ethiopia via 

rail from Semere. Construction at the port began in December 2012 and was completed in 2017. 

However, the anticipated rail connection was never completed, and the port has no major road

connection, so Tadjourah port appears to sit idle.

Ghoubet 

The Ghoubet mineral terminal was built by China Harbor Engineering Corporation between 2013 

and 2017. With $64 million in preferential loans from China’s Exim Bank, this terminal was 

designed to export 5 million tons per year of processed salt from Djibouti’s nearby Lac Assal, 

reported to contain around 2 billion tons of salt minerals that had previously been harvested only in 

small quantities through traditional methods.

67 China Communication Construction Company 

purchased 65 percent of a local salt developer and established the Djibouti Salt Investment Company 

Ltd. to industrialize the scale of extraction and export. China Communication Construction Company 

has exclusive rights for 50 years to develop the local salt and bromine resources.

68

63 “China Merchants Port Holding Company, Ltd. Annual Report 2018 (Summary),” China Merchants Port Group Co., 

Ltd., 2019, http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN201903291311713389_1.pdf. 

64 Birhanu Fikade, “Djibouti Offers 45% Price Cut in Services of Newly Built Multiuse Port,” The Reporter, December 7, 

2017, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/djibouti-offers-45-price-cut-services-newly-built-multiuse-port; 

“Economic Transformation in Djibouti—Systematic Country Diagnostic,” World Bank Group, October 2018, 

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/437351549918326165/pdf/djibouti-scd-english-version-final-approved-vlogo02062019-636852600790519539.pdf. 

65 “China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Interim Report 2019,” 2019, p. 8, 

http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2019-09/20190923043626360.pdf

66 “Port of Tadjourah,” Port de Djibouti, SA, https://www.portdedjibouti.com/port-of-tadjourah/

67 PRC Ministry of Commerce, 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南–吉布提 (2018 版) [“Foreign Investment Cooperation 

Country (Region) Guide—Djibouti—2018 Edition”], 走出去公共服务平台 [Go Out Public Service Platform], 

https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201902/201902010334033.pdf, p. 21; PRC Ministry of 

Commerce, 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 – 吉布提 (2013 版) [“Foreign Investment Cooperation Country (Region) 

Guide—Djibouti—2013 Edition”], 驻吉布提经商参处 [Economic and Commercial Counselor in Djibouti], August 21, 

2014, http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/201408/20140800705794.shtml.

68 中交吉布提盐业投资公司获吉阿萨尔盐湖溴化钠项目特许经营权 [“China Communication Construction Company 

Djibouti Salt Investment Co., Ltd. Was Granted Special Operating Rights for the Djibouti Lake Assal Sodium Bromide 

Project”], 驻吉布提使馆经商处 [Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy in Djibouti], August 25, 2017, 

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201708/20170802633341.shtml; “Djibouti: Small Country, Big Stakes,” The 

Africa Report, August 21, 2018, https://www.theafricareport.com/541/djibouti-small-country-big-stakes/.
13

None of these bulk terminals is operating near capacity, moving only 4.4 million tons in volume in 

2018 out of a capacity of almost 20 million tons across all of the facilities.69 However, this volume 

was increasing at a rate of 23.4 percent year-on-year at the time of CMPort’s last official report in 

2019. The firm attributes the growth to “increasing import demand for relevant raw materials driven 

by small-scale infrastructure projects in Ethiopia.”

70 Still, given that the ports handled 6.52 million 

tons in 2016, the new facilities do not appear to be spurring the desired cargo volume.

71

Non-PRC-operated Ports

Prior to CMPort’s arrival in 2012, the DPWorld-developed Doraleh Container Terminal and the “old 

port” were the principal Djiboutian ports. The old port is currently being renovated by CMPort and 

the Fujian branch of a British real estate firm, with designs on making it a residential and retail

zone.72 The Doraleh Container Terminal opened in 2008 and initially served as Djibouti’s only 

modern container port facility, with a designed capacity of 1.5 million TEU. Since the government of 

Djibouti dissolved its joint venture with DPWorld and nationalized the facility in 2018, there has 

been some controversy as to what rights CMPort’s joint venture grants it in this new entity. 

The ongoing row between Djibouti and DPWorld raises the question of how much influence China 

exerts on the Djiboutian government. It seems more than coincidence that relations between 

DPWorld and the government of Djibouti soured as CMPort entered into a “Strategic Partnership 

Agreement” with the Djiboutian port authority in December 2012. This issue is part of litigation 

currently underway in both Hong Kong and London.

73 DPWorld alleges that in November 2012,

CMPort began negotiating “substantive terms” with the Djiboutian port authority to remove 

DPWorld nominated directors from their joint venture with Djibouti. In 2017, Djibouti’s legislature 

passed a law allowing it to renegotiate strategic infrastructure deals and by February 2018, Djibouti 

had terminated its joint venture with DPWorld. Djibouti then seized the port assets under a newlyformed public port operating company, Société de Gestion du Terminal à Conteneurs de Doraleh 

(SGTD).74 Despite some reports that CMPort is “asserting control of operations at Doraleh Container 

69 Great Horn Investment Holding, “Maritime,” http://www.ghih.dj/maritime.

70 “China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Interim Report 2019,” p. 8.

71 “China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Annual Report 2016,” p. 15.

72 CMPort is set to lead the Djibouti Old Port Reconstruction Project, but has made no announcements since April 2019. 

招商蛇口、招商港口与吉布提签署吉布提老港改造项目合作框架协议 [“China Merchants Shekou, China Merchants 

Port and Djibouti Sign Cooperation Framework Agreement for Djibouti Old Port Reconstruction Project”], April 26, 2019, 

https://www.cmsk1979.com/news.aspx?type=9&id=7684; 邵轶菁 [Shao Yijing], 招商蛇口发力非洲市场,Savills 荣获

吉布提老港项目策略顾问委任 [“China Merchants Shekou Powers African Markets, Savills Appointed as Strategic 

Advisor to Djibouti Old Port Project”], Savills, August 22, 2019. 

73 See “Decision,” High Court of Hong Kong; the London Court of International Arbitration hearings and awards are not 

public, but it has issued no less than five awards in favor of DPWorld, including monetary damages and restoration of 

operating rights; Djibouti has rejected all of the awards. See, Costas Paris, “Djibouti Rejects Court Ruling to Hand Back 

Container Terminal,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/djibouti-rejects-court-ruling-tohand-back-container-terminal-11579296713. The Hong Kong case is also the first instance of a Chinese SOE being sued 

in Hong Kong by a multinational firm. For details, see 高锋 [Gao Feng], ‘带路’公案:跨国公司告国企 [“‘BRI’ Case: 

Multinational Firms Vs. State-Owned Enterprises”], 自由亚洲电台 [Radio Free Asia], February 11, 2019, 

https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/jingmao/gf1-02112019095745.html; see also “Decision,” High Court of Hong 

Kong.

74 For an agreed timeline of the various stages of DPWorld’s feud with the Djiboutian government, see “Appendix,” 

“DPWorld Djibouti FZCO, Dubai (International) Djibouti FZE, Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. China Merchants Port 

Holdings Company Limited,” High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of First Instance, 

Action No. 1951 of 2018, October 2, 2019, 

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=126220&QS=%24%28djibouti%29&

TP=JU
14

Terminal,”75 the firm is not operating the facility at present and Djiboutian officials deny it will do so 

in the future.

76 There has been speculation CMPort will take over operations based on its 16% stake 

in the former Doraleh Container Terminal joint venture (through its 23.5% stake in Port de Djibouti, 

S.A.), or as part of a renegotiation of Djiboutian debt to China’s Exim Bank.77

The status of that container terminal remains obscure in the midst of ongoing litigation in London 

and Hong Kong. However, CMPort’s joint venture partner is the Djiboutian port authority, the public 

entity responsible for port policy and granting concessions in the ports sector. According to the 

World Bank, “there is no clear chain of command or collaboration” for the port authority, which

“falls under the direct supervision of the President [of Djibouti].”78 Chinese leaders and managers 

have forged close connections with President Guelleh,79 who has been enamored of Chinese 

investment since visiting CMPort’s Shekou facilities in 2012.80 His daughter is a Mandarin-speaker, 

and his top economic advisor, his half-brother Saad Omar Guelleh, is the head of the Port de 

Djibouti, S.A.

81 In displacing Dubai, China is plainly the preferred partner for Djibouti’s ports and is 

likely to continue to consolidate its dominant commercial position in the years ahead.

Horizon Djibouti Fuel Terminal

This terminal lies west of the Doraleh Container Terminal, and serves as the conduit for some 95

percent of Djibouti’s hydrocarbon needs, including those of the various military tenants of the 

country.82 It was developed by the Emirates National Oil Company (with public and private 

investment from Djibouti and Kuwait) and consists of a long jetty out to two deep-water berths that 

accommodate tankers of a maximum 80,000 DWT with up to a draught of 18 meters.

83 Ashore it 

connects to a tank farm for storage and limited processing of petroleum products (including aviation 

75 Costas Paris, “China Tightens Grip on East African Port,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2019, 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tightens-grip-on-east-african-port-11550746800.

76 Djibouti inspector general Hassan Issa Sultan stated that "there is no China option and no secret plans for the Doraleh 

Container Terminal." See “China Merchants Consolidates its Hold in Djibouti,” The Maritime Executive, February 21, 

2019, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-merchants-consolidates-its-hold-in-djibouti.

77 Julia Louppova, “A new plan: Djibouti to build another container terminal with CMA CGM,” Port Today, March 29, 

2018, https://port.today/djibouti-new-container-terminal-cma-cgm/; Mercy A. Kuo, “China in Djibouti: the Power of 

Ports,” The Diplomat, March 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/china-in-djibouti-the-power-of-ports/.

78 Martin Humphreys, et al, “Port Development and Competition in East and Southern Africa: Prospects and Challenges,” 

World Bank Group: International Development in Focus, 2019, 

https://olc.worldbank.org/system/files/Overview%20-%20%20Port%20Development%20and%20Competition%20in%20

East%20and%20Southen%20Africa-2.pdf.

79 Just in the past year, Guelleh met with Xi Jinping in Beijing in April 2019. While in Beijing, he also met with Zhao Leji, 

a member of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee who directs China’s Belt and Road leading small group. The 

following month, Guelleh met in Djibouti with the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi. See: Li Xia, “Xi meets 

Djiboutian President,” Xinhua, 28 April 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/28/c_138018385.htm; Li Xia, 

“Senior CCPC official meets Djiboutian president,” Xinhua, April 28, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-

04/28/c_138019082.htm); Wang Yamei, “Djibouti president meets with Chinese FM, eyes enhanced cooperation in blue 

and digital economies,” Xinhua, January 10, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/10/c_138691879.htm

80 吉布提的中非自贸区 [“China-Africa Free Trade Zone in Djibouti”], 新华 [Xinhua], July 30, 2018, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018-07/30/c_137343110.htm; High Court of Hong Kong, “Appendix.”

81 Jeffrey D. Becker, “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Implications for the Global Maritime Supply Chain,” 

Testimony to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, October 17, 2019, 

https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Becker%20Testimony.pdf, p. 7.

82 Remy Darras, “Ethiopia’s oil supply constrained by Djibouti logistics battle,” The Africa Report, February 21, 2020, 

https://www.theafricareport.com/23719/ethiopias-oil-supply-constrained-by-djibouti-logistics-battle/.

83 IHS Markit, “Djibouti,” Seaweb Ports, accessed March 2, 2020. DWT stands for deadweight tonnage, the measure of 

how much weight a ship can carry. 
15

fuels), chemical and vegetable oils, and liquid petroleum gases.84 Capacity limitations for growing 

hydrocarbon demand have led to a new agreement with Ethiopia to build another oil terminal. No 

PRC participation in this project is reported.85

Free Trade Zone

To the southwest of Doraleh Multipurpose Port is the 48.2 km2 Djibouti International Free Trade 

Zone, a trade and logistics park intended to attract firms to the area to use the port and its connecting 

infrastructure (see Image 3 below). This zone was formally established in March 2015, when CMG 

and the Djibouti Ports & Free Zone Authority signed the “Djibouti Free Trade Zone Project 

Cooperation Framework Agreement.”86 Three Chinese firms (the Dalian Port Authority, CMG, and 

IZP Technologies) are partners in operating the zone. The Dalian Port Corporation began 

construction of the Free Trade Zone in January 2017.87 This initial phase is confined to a 2.4 km2

“pilot zone” that accounts for $370 million of a planned $3.5 billion investment in a 48 km2zone, 

claimed to be Africa’s largest.88

Image 3. The Djibouti Port-Park-City89

China’s stake in the Free Trade Zone is controlled through two joint venture entities established in 

January 2017 (Lac Assal Investment Holding Company Ltd. and East Aden Holding Company Ltd.). 

84 Horizon Djibouti Terminals Ltd., https://www.horizon-terminals.com/services_existing_terminals_h-djibouti.html

85 Angeline Mbogo, “Ethiopian & Djiboutian Governments to Build Oil Terminal in Djibouti Worth $220m,” The Kenyan 

Wall Street, July 11, 2018, https://kenyanwallstreet.com/ethiopian-djiboutian-govts-to-build-oil-terminal-in-djiboutiworth-220m/.

86 中非合作吉布提自贸区开工 [“China-Africa Cooperation Begins in the Djibouti Free Trade Zone”], 中非合作论坛

[China-Africa Cooperation Forum], January 24, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfgx/t1433191.htm. 

87 中企参与的吉布提国际自贸区正式开工建设 [“Chinese Firms Formally Begin Construction at the Djibouti 

International Free Trade Zone”], 新华社 [Xinhua News], January 17, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-

01/17/c_1120327873.htm; “Construction begins on Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ), Reuters, January 19, 

2017, http://www.zawya.com/story/Construction_begins_on_Djibouti_International_Free_Trade_Zone_DIFTZZAWYA20170118131616/. 

88 Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority, “Djibouti International Free Trade Zone,” http://dpfza.gov.dj/facilities/diftz

(accessed March 17, 2019).

89 Image from Silk Road E-Merchant’s Website depicting the Ports, Parks, City overview of Djibouti. (Labels and yellow 

graphics created by authors. Silk Road E-Merchants is a joint venture of China Merchant Group and IZP Group 

established in 2016 to facilitate trade through big data and overseas financial services. See presentation containing image 
16

At the time of their creation, CMPort granted a loan of “up to $150 million” with an aggregate term 

not to exceed 10 years, yielding 40 percent and 26.7 percent equity interests in these joint ventures.

90

Both joint ventures are also involved in upgrading port facilities and planning and building 

surrounding industrial zones.91 According to CMPort, these ventures initially invested $12.3 million 

in the two Free Trade Zone joint ventures.

92 Then, in January 2019, CMPort and two other CMG 

subsidiaries (China Merchants Investments Limited and Cheer Signal) announced they would inject 

an additional $30 million in capital.93 

The Free Trade Zone is divided into four “industrial clusters.” One is focused on the logistics 

industry and will support provision of transport, bonded warehousing, logistics and distribution

capabilities. Another will focus on “business industry” functions, such as bulk goods transactions, 

merchandise display, and duty-free retail. A third cluster will focus on the “business support” sector 

and cater to financial services, information services, hotels, office buildings, and training. Finally, a 

manufacturing cluster will support packaging, light processing of raw materials, food processing, and 

auto parts assembly.94 The idea, in short, is to generate trade to enable the port to prosper.

The Djibouti International Free Trade Zone remains in early Phase I and no major facilities or 

operating industrial sites appear to have been constructed.

95 However, 21 companies are reported to 

have signed agreements to operate in the zone.96 Prior to its limited opening, energetic promotion of 

business opportunities was underway in China, with Djiboutian officials and Chinese executives 

touting the convenience and market access that the unfinished zone is to support.97 The Chairman of 

at: 吉布提自贸区推介会材料 [“Djibouti Free Trade Zone Promotion Conference Materials”], 丝路亿商 – 项目简介

[Silk Road E-Merchants—Project Profile], 

http://www.eportalliance.com/resources/frontend/down/INTRODUCTION_DJ.pdf, (Accessed August 29, 2019); Details 

about company can be found at: http://www.eportalliance.com/en/about.html#profile. 

90 招商局港口控股有限公司 [China Merchants Ports Holdings Company Limited], “Annual Report 2017,” 2018, 

http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2018-04/20180426042934273.pdf, pp. 4, 89.

91 非洲吉布提多哈雷多功能港口正式开港 [“Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose Port Formally Opens in Africa”], 中国一

带一路网 [One Belt One Road Web Portal], May 25, 2017, 

https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/pdjdt/14581.htm#p=undefined; 吉布提多哈雷多功能港首航船靠泊 [“First Ship 

Berthing at Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose Port”], 招商局港口 [China Merchants Ports], April 24, 2017, 

http://www.cmzd.com/xwzx/info.aspx?itemid=2396. 

91 China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, “Annual Report 2016,” 

http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2017-04/20170427050724234.pdf, p. 18; China Merchants Port Holding 

Company Limited, “Annual Report 2017,” http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2018-04/20180426042934273.pdf, p. 

87.

92 China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 199. 

93 Katherine Si, “China Merchants Port to Increase Investment in Djibouti Joint Venture,” Voice of Djibouti, January 23, 

2019, http://voiceofdjibouti.com/china-merchants-port-to-increase-investment-in-djibouti-joint-venture/. For an 

explanation of the ownership structure of the joint ventures, see “CMPort Formed Two Joint Ventures in Connection with 

Investment in the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone,” China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, January 17, 

2017, http://www.cmport.com.hk/enTouch/news/Detail.aspx?id=10007165. 

94 Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority, “Djibouti International Free Trade Zone,” http://dpfza.gov.dj/facilities/diftz

(accessed March 17, 2019).

95 Based on open-source satellite imagery, accessed March 2020.

96 Edith Mutethya, “Djibouti launches China-built free trade zone,” China Daily, July 6, 2018, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/06/WS5b3f03d0a3103349141e12a9.html. 

97 For example, the free trade zone hosted conferences in Guangzhou to promote business opportunities in 2015. See: 吉布

提自贸区广州论坛:吉布提,您进入非洲市场的最佳门户 [“Djibouti Free Zone Guangzhou Forum: Djibouti, Your 

Best Gateway to the African Market”], 境外投资 [External Investment], December 7, 2015, 

https://www.chinainvestin.com/index.php/en/china-offshore/opinions/2935.
17

Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority stated in 2017 that the zone would become a flourishing 

business district “in the next few years,” and other officials have said the port can be expected to 

handle $7 billion in trade during its first two years.

98 The business operations have not yet met 

expectations, but the infrastructure to support such development is increasingly intact.

Inland Transport Infrastructure

Chinese firms have plans to develop extensive infrastructure to connect Djibouti’s ports to key 

elements of the Ethiopian economy. This emerging transport network is fundamental to the long-term 

viability of Chinese investments in the Djibouti ports and free trade zone. These include rail, road, 

and pipeline networks extending westward to Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and southward to 

Ethiopian oil and gas fields, principally the Ogaden Basin. Some infrastructure has been constructed

and put into operation, but much remains uncompleted.

Railroads

The Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway is the flagship component of China’s push to connect Djibouti

with the Ethiopian economy. China Railway Group (CRG) and China Civil Engineering Construction 

Corporation (CCECC) built the railway connecting the Ethiopian capital to Djibouti between 2011 

and 2016.99 Exim Bank furnished 70 percent of the capital for the Ethiopia segment of the line ($2.4 

billion out of the total $3.4 billion). The remaining 30 percent was funded by the Ethiopian 

Government. 100 Fifteen percent of the Djibouti section, costing $578 million, was funded by the 

Djibouti government, with the rest financed by Chinese banks.101 The 756 km rail project officially 

started commercial operations in January 2018, allowing freight transport from Djibouti’s port to the 

Ethiopian capital.102 Some 90 percent of the total activity at Djibouti's ports is Ethiopian import or 

export trade.

103

This new railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti represents the first major project of this type 

since the French built a rail line in the 1890s. It is also the first fully electrified rail on the African 

continent and the first outside China to use exclusively Chinese standards.104 It will reduce the travel 

time for cargo from three days for trucking to less than 10 hours, and is projected to eventually carry 

98 Ibid.; Abdourahim Arteh, “Djibouti breaks ground on massive Chinese-baked free trade zone,” Reuters, January 16, 

2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/china-djibouti/djibouti-breaks-ground-on-massive-chinese-backed-free-trade-zoneidUSL4N1F649H. 

99 “IMF Staff Concludes the 2018 Article IV Consultation Mission in Djibouti,” IMF Press Release No. 18/486, December 

19, 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/12/19/pr18486-djibouti-imf-staff-concludes-the-2018-article-ivconsultation-mission, p. 22. Midway through the process, the government of Djibouti contracted with Exim Bank for an 

additional loan of $490 million (85 percent of the total) for continued work on the standard-gauge electrified railway.

100 “The Djibouti City-Addis Ababa Transit and Transport Corridor—Turning Diagnostics Into Action,” United Nations, 

2018, New York and Geneva, p. 5, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldc2018d6_en.pdf. 

101 “Foreign Investment Cooperation Country (Region) Guide—Djibouti—2018 Edition,” pp. 15; 21.

102 “Chinese-built Ethiopia-Djibouti railway begins commercial operations,” Xinhua, January 1, 2018, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/01/c_136865306.htm. 

103 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 - 埃塞俄比亚 [“Country (Region) Guide for Foreign Investment Cooperation -

Ethiopia”], 商务部 [PRC Ministry of Commerce], 2019, p. 25, 

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/gbdqzn/upload/aisaiebiya.pdf.

104 从坦赞铁路到亚吉铁路:中国基建与非洲经济走向共赢 [“From Tanzania-Zambia Railway to Addis-Djibouti: 

China’s Infrastructure and Africa’s Economy Going For Win-Win”], 贸易救济调查局 [Trade Remedy and Investigation 

Bureau], May 15, 2017, http://trb.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zuixindt/201705/20170502574877.shtml.
18

8.5 million tons of freight annually.105 CRG and CCECC inked a 6-year contract to operate the 

railway in 2015, but encountered a variety of obstacles, from electricity outages to cattle collisions.

Sinosure, the central state-owned Chinese insurance firm, wrote off $1 billion in losses on the project 

and Exim Bank halted funding to construct a second track.106 Nonetheless, Chinese firms anticipate 

the railroad’s freight capacity will expand after Chinese firms build an additional 1,500 miles of rail 

line in Ethiopia.107

Recent reports confirm that the final sections of rail connections to the Doraleh Container Terminal 

and Multipurpose Port are now completed.108 Precise figures are not available regarding how much 

cargo is still being trucked or conveyed by new railway. However, according to one report, the 

railway was heavily used over the summer of 2019 to ship approximately 70,000 tons of fertilizer 

from Djibouti’s ports to Ethiopia.109 The report indicated 75 freight trucks would have been required 

to move the equivalent of a single train trip. Rapid delivery of more fertilizer is reportedly a boon to 

Ethiopian farm productivity—especially cotton cultivation, which helps feed its budding textile 

industry.

110

Some progress has been made on connecting the new railway to the northern areas of Ethiopia. A 

Chinese-built industrial park in Kombolcha, a city in Ethiopia’s northern Amhara State, will soon be 

connected to the rest of Ethiopia’s national rail network and, through it, to Djibouti.111 The first phase 

of the Awash-Woldiya Railway, contracted to the Turkish firm Yapi Merkezi, runs from Awash to 

Kombolcha and is currently being finalized. At 97 percent completion, the line will likely be 

105 “Chinese-built Ethiopia-Djibouti railway wins acclaim for driving Ethiopia’s import-export needs,” Xinhua, July 24, 

2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138251826.htm; “Railway development in Ethiopia,” Embassy of 

Ethiopia in Brussels, January 6, 2017, https://ethiopianembassy.be/en/2017/01/06/railway-development-in-ethiopia/

106 Yunnan Chen, “Ethiopia and Kenya are Struggling to Manage Debt for their Chinese-built Railways,” Quartz Africa, 

June 4, 2019, https://qz.com/africa/1634659/ethiopia-kenya-struggle-with-chinese-debt-over-sgr-railways/

107 China Public Private Partnerships Center (CPPPC – Ministry of Finance): http://www.cpppc.org/zh/ydylal/5269.jhtml; 

see also this explanation from a Chinese project manager: “From Tanzania-Zambia Railway to Addis-Djibouti: China’s 

Infrastructure and Africa’s Economy Going For Win-Win.”

108 埃塞拟通过亚吉铁路运输化肥 [“Ethiopia Plans to Transport Fertilizer through Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway”], 驻埃塞

俄比亚使馆经商处 [Economy and Commercial Office of the PRC Embassy in Ethiopia], November 10, 2019, 

http://et.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201911/20191102915422.shtml; 声音: ‘一带一路’ 合作符合世界各国发展利益

[“Voice: Belt and Road Cooperation is in Line with Development Interest of Countries Around the World”], 人民日报

[People’s Daily], April 8, 2019, http://news.cctv.com/2019/04/08/ARTI7VkPZfKoiERdkLibiklV190408.shtml; “Foreign 

Investment Cooperation Country (Region) Guide—Djibouti—2018 Edition,” p. 17.

109 “Chinese-built Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway Wins Acclaim for Driving Ethiopia’s Import-Export Needs,” Global Times, 

August 2, 2019, 

http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/westernasiaandafricareport/201908/20190802887221.s

html.

110 Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia Bets on Clothes to Fashion Industrial Future,” Reuters, November 21, 2017, 

https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKBN1DL1WH-OZATP.

111 “Chinese Built Industrial Park to Start Operation in Northern Ethiopia,” Xinhua, December 7, 2017, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-12/07/c_136806571.htm.
19

electrified and in operation sometime this year.

112 Official reporting from the PRC Ministry of 

Commerce indicates that in the north, the Mekele-Tadjourah rail line remains at the proposal stage.

113

These developments are exceptions, however, and the Ethiopian logistics sector largely lags behind 

projected requirements. The state-owned Ethiopian Shipping & Logistics Services Enterprise 

monopolizes the multi-modal transport system from Djibouti to Ethiopian regions. The system is 

inefficient and expensive, which stymies Ethiopia’s import and export sectors. According to some 

studies, restrictive licensing practices have further increased shipping costs by 30-50 percent.

114

Currently the main railway is only used by a few big export companies because of high rail-rates 

relative to trucking and the lack of branch lines to Ethiopian depots and industrial zones.115 This 

could change, as the rail line has recently completed its connection to the Doraleh Multipurpose Port 

in Djibouti.116 The lack of rail service to Tadjourah port further limits Ethiopia’s development.

117

Highways

While the growing rail capacity will eventually supplant some trucking, there remains high demand 

for roads connecting Djibouti’s ports to inland markets. Road construction, however, lags even rail

development. Some Ethiopian analysts suggest this is purposeful to encourage increased use of the 

rail line, allowing Ethiopian railways to reduce debt incurred by such rapid expansion.118

The primary roadway connecting Djibouti to Ethiopia is Djibouti’s route nationale (RN-1), which 

runs from the capital to Galafi, through Awash, and on to Addis Ababa. Approximately 1,000 trucks 

move along the road per day, carrying mostly fuel and other liquid bulk.119 Some sections of this road 

are so severely degraded the actual paved roads are untraversable and trucks are forced to create 

bypasses across stretches of the desert.120 China’s Exim Bank provided financing for Ethiopia’s first 

modern highway from Addis Ababa to Adama, which in 2014 linked the capital to Mojo dry port,

112 “Project Overview,” AKH Railway Project, http://www.akhrailway.com/, (Accessed August 29, 2019); “ERC 

Finalizing Awash-Kombolcha Railway Project,” Ethiopian Press Agency, January 31, 2019, 

https://www.press.et/english/?p=2017#.

113 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 吉布提 (2019 版) [“Foreign Investment Cooperation Country (Region) Guide –

Djibouti – 2019 Edition”], PRC Ministry of Commerce, 2019, p. 18, http://images.shitc.net/202001/20200113134901375.pdf. 

114 Tom Gardner, “Ethiopia Opens Up Budding Logistics Sector,” The Africa Report, March 20, 2019, 

https://www.theafricareport.com/10463/ethiopia-opens-up-budding-logistics-sector/.

115 Ibid. 

116 “Ethiopia Plans to Transport Fertilizer through Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway.”

117 Ethiopia has been constructing a rail line connecting to the Addis-Djibouti railway that runs northward from Awash to 

Woldiya as part of the nation’s long-term railway infrastructure development plan. Fasika Tadesse, “Semera–Tadjoura 

Railway Tender Postponed Again for the Fifth Time,” Addis Fortune, January 26, 2015, 

https://addisfortune.net/articles/semera-tadjoura-railway-tender-postponed-again-for-the-fifth-time/; 湖北宝业乔迁新址,

再次喜获(国优)鲁班殊荣 [“Hubei Baoye Moved to a New Location and Once Again Won the (National Best) Luban 

Award”], 集团新闻综合办公室 [Group News Comprehensive Office], February 22, 2019, 

http://www.baoyehb.com/webFrontNews/show?id=43263b13-77d9-4037-bafc-9ddc7f39f3d8.

118 Yohannes Anberbir, “Running Out of Steam,” The Reporter Ethiopia, January 28, 2017, 

http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/running-out-steam.

119 “The Djibouti City-Addis Ababa Transit and Transport Corridor – Turning Diagnostics Into Action,” United Nations, 

2018, New York and Geneva, p. 5, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldc2018d6_en.pdf. 

119 “Foreign Investment Cooperation Country (Region) Guide—Djibouti—2018 Edition,” p. 3.

120 Ibid., p. 4.
20

one of the areas where Chinese companies have constructed an industrial park.121 Other Chinese-led 

road projects are also organized around industrial parks in the region. Running from Mojo dry port 

southeast of Addis Ababa to the flagship industrial park in Hawassa, the Hawassa Expressway is set 

to be completed in late 2020.122 China’s Exim Bank is financing the fourth phase of this project, 

which will be built between Negele and Hawassa.123 Increased traffic from industrial development is 

creating demand for improved routes, which could lead to enhanced trucking capacity to the rest of 

Ethiopia and Djibouti’s ports.

Pipelines

Running parallel to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway is a Chinese-financed water pipeline, another 

infrastructure project vital to allowing the “Shekou Model” to take root in arid Djibouti. Since June 

2017, the water pipeline has transported groundwater pumped from wells in Ethiopia to Djibouti’s 

key towns of Ali-Sabieh, Dikhil, Arta and the capital, Djibouti, some 320 km away.124 Djibouti’s 

ability to develop into an industrial and trading hub requires a stable and sufficient water source to 

support a growing population and sustain economic activity, even in periods of drought. Once fully 

operational, the pipeline should provide 100,000 m

3

of water per day.

125 Some 95 percent of the 

capital for the $340 million project was provided through concessional Exim Bank loans with a 

seven-year grace period and a 2 percent interest rate.126

A key aspect of China’s strategic and commercial interest in the Horn of Africa is the potential for oil 

and gas development in the Ogaden Basin, located in southeastern Ethiopia along its undefined 

border with Somalia. Chinese energy developer Poly-GCL signed an agreement with the Djibouti 

Government in 2013 to invest $4 billion to build a natural gas pipeline and additional port and other 

facilities for gas exports. If the pipeline is completed, Ethiopian natural gas would travel from the 

Ogaden Basin to the port of Damerjog, southeast of the Djiboutian capital (see Image 2, above).

127

121 This highway reportedly uses Chinese standards of highway construction with six-lanes, thereby reducing the time 

between these points from 2.5 hours to 45 minutes. See: 走进非洲 – 进出口银行的埃塞俄比亚足迹 [“Enter Africa—The 

Export-Import Bank’s Presence in Ethiopia”], 中国进出口银行 [The Export-Import Bank of China], 

http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/info/ztzl/fzzt/fzxm/201810/t20181012_6937.html, (Accessed August 29, 2019).

122 “Ethiopia–Modjo-Hawassa Highway Project—Phase 1,” African Development Bank Group—Data Portal, July 25, 

2019, https://projectsportal.afdb.org/dataportal/VProject/show/P-ET-DB0-018; “Modjo-Hawassa Expressway to See 

Completion in Three Years,” Ethiopian Press Agency, February 8, 2019, https://www.press.et/english/?p=2296#.

123 中国经济网: 进出口银行与埃塞俄比亚签署优惠出口买方信贷贷款协议 [“China Economic Net: Export Import 

Bank and Ethiopia Sign Preferential Export Buyer Credit Loan Agreement”], 中国进出口银行 [The Export-Import Bank 

of China], May 17, 2017, http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/info/circus/201806/t20180610_3509.html.

124 “Ethio-Djibouti Water Pipeline Inaugurated,” Capital Ethiopia, July 7, 2017, 

http://capitalethiopia.com/2017/07/07/ethio-djibouti-water-pipeline-inaugurated-salt-port-opens-business/. 

125 Addis Getachew Tadesse, “Djibouti to Drink Ethiopian Water for Free: Ambassador,” Anadolu Agency, December 4, 

2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/djibouti-to-drink-ethiopian-water-for-free-ambassador/989462.

126 “China funds cross-border water project in Djibouti, Ethiopia,” AIDDATA, http://china.aiddata.org/projects/30888, see 

also IMF report p. 3. Regarding Exim Bank’s $1.1bn loan portfolio in Djibouti, the IMF further reports that “[t]he average 

grant element on new external borrowing (disbursements) is expected to reach 36 percent in 2016, reflecting low 

international interest rates and generous terms, in particular on the large water pipeline project, but is expected to gradually 

decline to 12 percent by 2023 in line with the assumption of tightening financing terms for Djibouti in the longer term.” 

See International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation—Debt Sustainability Analysis,” 

February 7, 2017, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2017/dsacr1787.pdf, p. 3.

127 埃塞俄比亚和吉布提签署建设天然气管道协议 [“Ethiopia and Djibouti Sign Natural Gas Pipeline Construction 

Agreement”], February 19, 2019, http://www.sinopecnews.com.cn/news/content/2019-02/19/content_1734881.htm.
21

There is currently no indication construction of the pipeline has begun despite official Ethiopian 

projections that production would start in 2020.128

Despite some obstacles, China’s investment and construction have driven major improvement to 

Djibouti’s infrastructure and its logistical capacity to support the development of the regional 

economies of the Horn of Africa. According to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

for international trade, Djibouti shot up in the world rankings from 134th in 2014, to 90th in 2018.129

However, the long-term utility of this improved transport connectivity will depend on the strength of 

inland markets and resources.

Inland Markets and Resources

Chinese investments in port and intermodal infrastructure in Djibouti are premised on the theory that 

the inland markets and resources of eastern Africa will make the projects economically viable.

Djibouti itself has a GDP of only $2.96 billion (in current USD), albeit growing at 5.5 percent as of 

2018.130 The small nation has an estimated population of slightly less than a million people, some 75

percent of whom live in the capital.131 Services compose 76.1 percent of Djibouti’s GDP, most of 

which can be attributed to freight forwarding to and from the country’s ports.132 It has little to offer 

world markets other than its strategic location and its capacity to connect to other, more substantial, 

economies in the region. 

Demographics

Without other economies in tow, it would be untenable to tether major economic investment to such 

a slender demographic profile. However, the Horn of Africa contains almost 130 million people, with 

over half the population of each nation under the age of 24 years.133 As Horn of Africa economies go, 

Ethiopia is the main prize. It has a much larger population base (nearly 110 million, second after 

Nigeria on the continent) that is growing at nearly three percent a year (11th fastest in the world).134

Over 80 percent of that large and growing population lives in rural areas and some 65 percent of the 

population is 24 years old or younger.135 According to the IMF, Ethiopia’s GDP in 2018 was $85.36 

billion. It grew at nine percent in 2018/2019, making it the fastest growing economy in the region.

136

Despite very low per capita income ($790), it is expected to sustain high growth rates into the 

2020s.137 From the Chinese perspective, conditions are ripe in Ethiopia for the kind of economic 

128 Ibid.

129 “International LPI,” The World Bank, 2018, 

https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global/2018?sort=asc&order=Infrastructure#datatable. 

130 World Bank, “Djibouti Country Profile,” World Development Indicators Database, 

https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&d

d=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=DJI (accessed March 15, 2020).

131 “Djibouti,” The World Bank—Data, https://data.worldbank.org/country/djibouti (accessed March 15, 2020).

132 “Djibouti,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/dj.html (accessed 

March 15, 2020). 

133 Figures located in each country profile (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia) of the CIA World Factbook, 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.

134 The World Bank, “Ethiopia: Country Profile,” World Bank Development Indicators Database, 

https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&d

d=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=ETH (accessed March 15, 2020).

135 “Ethiopia” The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html. 

136 World Bank, “Ethiopia: Country Profile.”

137 International Monetary Fund, “The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” IMF Country Report, No. 20/29, 

January 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/01/28/The-Federal-Democratic-Republic-of-Ethiopia2019-Article-IV-Consultation-and-Requests-for-48987.
22

development enjoyed in the PRC during its reform and opening period. Some Chinese analysts 

consider it “China in Africa” and believe the Chinese model is uniquely suited to its demographic 

and economic conditions.138

China’s investments in Djibouti will likely succeed or fail on the strength of Ethiopia’s markets and 

resources. Given that Ethiopia, as a land-locked state, relies on Djibouti’s infrastructure for its own 

prosperity, this bet may pay off over time. The PRC Ministry of Commerce reported that “Africa’s 

young population, low labor costs, coupled with low raw material and energy costs, as well as tariff 

preferences given to African countries by the European Union and the United States” make Ethiopia 

in particular “one of the most promising destinations” for Chinese capital.139

Reflecting its own vested interest in this, Ethiopia agreed in 2018 to take a stake in the Port of 

Djibouti after Djibouti terminated the DPWorld contract.

140 Recognizing its over-reliance on 

Djiboutian ports, Ethiopia is seeking to diversify its access to global markets, and recently undertook 

investments in other regional ports to expand its avenues of access to ocean transport. One such port 

is DPWorld-run Berbera in Somaliland, where Ethiopia took a 19 percent stake in a 30-year 

concession and also secured rights to develop a Berbera Corridor of links to Ethiopian markets.141

After reaching a peace deal in July 2018 with neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia also began actively 

seeking to develop road and rail infrastructure and potentially port facilities in its northeastern 

neighbor to export potash.142

Hydrocarbons

China invests in a range of high-profile projects in Ethiopia, including a signature effort to develop 

and connect the Ogaden’s Calub and Hilala gas fields in Southeast Ethiopia to liquid natural gas 

(LNG) facilities in the Port of Djibouti. China’s Poly-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Ltd. began

developing these fields after it signed a production sharing agreement with Ethiopia in 2013. It 

drilled its first appraisal well in the Calub field in September 2015, and produced the first barrel of 

oil in June 2018.143 To date, no investors have attempted to export the Ogaden’s oil and gas 

resources.

144 However, in November 2017 China’s POLY-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Ltd. 

signed a $4 billion memorandum of understanding to build a natural gas pipeline, liquefaction plant, 

138 唐晓阳 [Tang Xiaoyang], 埃塞俄比亚:复制中国模式?[“Ethiopia: Copying the Chinese Model?”], CarnegieTsinghua Center, August 29, 2014, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2014/08/29/zh-pub-57083.

139 吉布提国际自由贸易区:打造“一带一路”在非建设支点 [“Djibouti International Free Trade Zone: Building the Belt 

and Road Initiative in Africa”], 中华人民共和国商务部 [PRC Ministry of Commerce], October 29, 2018, 

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/dxfw/gzzd/201810/20181002800804.shtml.

140 Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia to take stake in Port of Djibouti, its trade gateway – state media,” Reuters, May 1, 2018, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-djibouti/ethiopia-to-take-stake-in-port-of-djibouti-its-trade-gateway-state-mediaidUSL8N1S81QA. 

141 “Ethiopia acquires 19% stake in DP World Berbera Port,” Gulf News, March 1, 2018, 

https://gulfnews.com/business/ethiopia-acquires-19-stake-in-dp-world-berbera-port-1.2181403.

142 Nizar Manek, “Eritrea Mulls Port as Ethiopia Rapprochement Spurs Investors,” Bloomberg, August 23, 2018, 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/eritrea-mulls-new-port-as-ethiopia-rapprochement-spurs-investors. 

143 第一井开钻 埃塞油气步入准投产时代 [“The First Well Drilled and Ethiopian Oil and Gas Enters the Era of QuasiProduction”], 埃塞油气 [Ethiopian Oil and Gas], September 9, 2015, https://eip.gclpower.com:9090/apps/news/_layouts/15/EIP.Moblie.Portal/DisplayForm.aspx?newsId=O1-T0-936&uu=&kk=; 中企为埃

塞产出第一桶原油 [“Chinese Enterprises Produces First Barrel of Oil in Ethiopia”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], 

June 28, 2018, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0628/c1002-30094502.html. 

144 Kaleyesus Bekele, “Oil in Ogaden,” The Reporter, March 24, 2018, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/oilogaden.
23

and export terminal in Damerjog, Djibouti.145 The pipeline is projected to transport 12 billion cubic 

meters of natural gas a year from Ethiopia to Djibouti, of which 10 million cubic meters is expected 

to be exported to China.146

China is not a stranger to this hydrocarbon-producing region of Ethiopia. In 2007, workers from 

Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau working in an oil field in the Ogaden region came under 

attack by 200 armed Somali separatists from the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Nine Chinese 

nationals and 65 Ethiopian employees were killed and another seven Chinese workers were abducted 

and later recovered by the Ethiopian Government.147 The Ogaden is home to ethnic Somalis and the 

border in the region remains disputed between Somalia and Ethiopia. Despite previous conflict in the 

area,

148 peace deals were signed between the Ethiopian Government and local separatists in 2010149

and again in October 2018.150 If the more recent deal holds, stability in the Ogaden would bode well 

for Chinese energy development there.

Industrial Parks

Chinese investors have launched a number of industrial parks throughout Ethiopia to leverage new 

logistical capabilities as infrastructure development emerges. The resources and labor are abundant, 

but “what Africa lacks is precisely the supporting infrastructure and industrial parks,” according to a 

PRC Ministry of Commerce report.151 Echoing China’s “Shekou Model,” talk of an “Ethiopia 

Model” swirls in Chinese business reporting. The plan entails “national investment, Chinese 

construction, [Chinese] management for three years, and promoting this across all of Ethiopia,” 

according to Ethiopia Industrial Parks Development Corporation President Sisay Gemechu.152

The flagship model industrial park is at Hawassah, and it focuses on the textile and apparel 

industries. Completed by the CCECC in July 2016, it is operated on a three-year lease by the PRC 

firm Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone, during which time it is training 

145 Abdourahim Arteh, “Djibouti signs preliminary deal with China’s POLY-GCL for $4bln gas project,” Reuters, 

November 16, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/china-djibouti-gas/djibouti-signs-preliminary-deal-with-chinas-polygcl-for-4-bln-gas-project-idUSL8N1NM2BV. 

146 中国,埃塞俄比亚,和吉布提将联合启动天然气输送项目 [“China, Ethiopia, and Djibouti Will Work Together to 

Begin a Natural Gas Transportation Project”], 中非合作网 [China-Africa Cooperation Net], July 28, 2016, 

http://www.zfhz.org/plus/view.php?aid=14725. 

147 “9 Chinese Workers Killed in Ethiopia,” China Daily, April 24, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-

04/24/content_858956.htm; 中资公司埃塞遭袭事件 9 名遇难者遗体运抵郑州 [“Remains of the 9 Victims of a Chinese 

Company Attacked in Ethiopia Delivered to Zhengzhou”], 新华网 [Xinhua], April 30, 2007, 

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/p/2007-04-30/040112899262.shtml.

148 “The Rise and Fall of the Somali State,” Stratfor, December 8, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/rise-andfall-somali-state#/home/error.

149 “68. Ethiopia/Ogaden (1948-present),” University of Central Arkansas, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadmproject/sub-saharan-africa-region/69-ethiopiaogaden-1948-present/. 

150 Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia Signs Peace Deal with Rebels from Gas-rich Region,” Reuters, October 21, 2018, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics/ethiopia-signs-peace-deal-with-rebels-from-gas-rich-regionidUSKCN1MV0YO.

151

“Djibouti International Free Trade Zone: Building the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa.”

152 埃塞首个国家工业园正式运营 [“Ethiopia’s First National Industrial Park Officially Opens”], 人民日报 [People’s 

Daily], June 21, 2017, http://ydyl.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0621/c411837-29352829.html. 
24

Ethiopian managers.153 Chinese investment in Hawassah and other industrial parks is motivated by 

the availability of resources close to the industrial plant. As one manufacturer put it,

Chinese textile companies are moving closer to their raw material base, the cotton producing 

countries such as Ethiopia. This is part of its value chain repositioning, a strategy most 

Chinese companies are adopting. Companies are also using Africa as a gateway to emerging 

markets on the continent and to the European market.154

Investment in the industrial parks is not limited to Chinese firms, and the logic of locating production 

facilities near the source of essential resources is not lost on others in the manufacturing industry. 

PVH Corp, owner of the Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein brands, moved some of its clothing 

manufacturing to Hawassah in 2016.

155 By 2017, at least 16 companies produced clothing at 

Hawassah. One such company, Hydra Mani, reportedly was exporting $1 million of product a 

month.156 Indeed, Ethiopia explicitly markets its industrial parks as an integrated solution “aimed at 

coordinated production along value chains,” by virtue of their locations “along key economic 

corridors” and connection to ports.157

Ethiopia is also a highly valued location for major truck manufacturing companies, including the 

Africa branch of state-owned China National Heavy Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. (Sinotruk). Its 

representative explained in 2017 that “Ethiopia is a strategic market for Sinotruk.” The company 

jointly runs an assembly plant in Addis Ababa with the Ethiopian manufacturing company N.A Metal 

Industry & Engineering Co, which Sinotruk touts as “an example of China-Africa production 

capacity cooperation.”

158

Ethiopia seeks to diversify its exports beyond textiles, currently its principal export. CCECC won a 

$125 million bid in May 2016 to assist this effort by constructing Adama Industrial Park focused on

manufacturing heavy machinery.159 After Hunan provincial officials announced a joint venture with 

Ethiopia during the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum, this became the first industrial park developed 

by a PRC provincial government.

160 With government support in place, Sany Group and other 

153 中国公司承建埃塞首个国家工业园正式运营 [“Chinese Company Builds Ethiopia's First National Industrial Park”], 

国务院新闻办公室网站 [PRC State Council Information Office], June 21, 2017, 

http://www.scio.gov.cn/31773/35507/35510/35524/Document/1555651/1555651.htm.

154 “AGOA: Just 1 Reason Why China Loves Manufacturing in Ethiopia,” Africa Insider, April 16, 2017, 

http://afkinsider.com/138881/agoa-just-1-reason-why-china-loves-manufacturing-in-ethiopia/. 

155 Matthew Newsome, “PVH prepares for Ethiopia production,” Just-Style, May 6, 2016, https://www.juststyle.com/news/pvh-prepares-for-ethiopia-production_id127781.aspx. 

156 Birhanu Fikade, “PVH et al begin export from Hawassa Industrial Park,” The Reporter, June 3, 2017, 

https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/pvh-et-al-begin-export-hawassa-industrial-park. 

157 “Extensive development of industrial parks,” Ethiopian Investment Commission, 

http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/investment-opportunities/strategic-sectors/industry-zone-development. 

158 中国重汽埃塞俄比亚组装厂开业 助推中非产能合作 [“China’s Sinotruk Ethiopia Assembly Plant Opens, Boosts 

China-Africa Production Capacity Cooperation”], 中国日报山东 [China Daily Shandong], November 26, 2017, 

http://sd.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-11/26/content_35023001.htm.

159 中土集团承建的埃塞俄比亚工业园介绍 [“Introduction to CCECC’s Under-Contract Industrial Parks in Ethiopia”], 

中非贸易研究中心 [China-Africa Trade Research Center], January 11, 2017, 

http://news.afrindex.com/zixun/article8278.html; “Ethiopia to inaugurate 2 Chinese built industrial parks,” Xinhua, July 

11, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/11/c_136433206.htm. 

160 埃塞俄比亚湖南工业园 湘企借 ‘一带一路’ 抱团出海 [“Ethiopia’s Hunan Industrial Park, Hunan Enterprises Use the 

‘Belt and Road’ to Go Abroad Together”], 湖南省人民政府门户网站 [Hunan Provincial People’s Government Portal], 

January 19, 2018, http://www.hunan.gov.cn/topic/kfjq/zxbd1/201801/t20180119_4928872.html.
25

Chinese manufacturers quickly signed MOUs to produce construction machinery, wind energy 

equipment, automobile parts, and other equipment there.

161

Chinese promoters now pair the “Shekou Model” and the “Ethiopia Model” as a composite 

“Ethiopia-Djibouti Model” for regional development. This model, of course, relies largely on 

Chinese labor, capital, and expertise. According to the Deputy Director of the China Enterprise 

Reform and Development Society (a body under the State Council's State-Owned Assets Supervision 

and Administration that supervises central SOEs), the model envisions increasing roles for Chinese 

enterprises in financing, design, construction, equipment and materials, and operational 

management.

162 Ultimately, the purpose of this Ethiopia-Djibouti model is to form new international 

production chains to redistribute production capacity globally for the future transformation of the 

Chinese economy.163

Image 4. The “Ethiopia-Djibouti Model”164

161 “Ethiopia to inaugurate 2 Chinese built industrial parks,” Xinhua, July 11, 2017, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/11/c_136433206.htm.

162 李锦 [Li Jin], 亚吉模式为 ‘一带一路’ 建设提供新样本 [“Ethiopia-Djibouti Model Provides New Example for Belt 

and Road Construction”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], October 11, 2016, 

http://inews.ifeng.com/50081349/news.shtml?&back.

163 Ibid.

164 袁立 [Yuan Li], 亚吉模式–“一带一路’”的实践 [“Ethiopia-Djibouti Model: Practice of the ‘Belt and Road’”], 中国土

木工程集团有限公司 [China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation], May 21, 2017, slide 32. The image comes 

from a China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation presentation and shows planned or under-construction industrial 

parks in Ethiopia. The red line is the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and the blue dotted lines are planned railway routes. 

The industrial parks outlined in red are those built by this corporation. White are those built by other contractors and those 

in grey have not yet begun construction. English text and red highlights provided by authors.
26

Finance

Securing financing from China remains the first and most urgent priority if these projects are to be 

viable. Several Chinese banks have made concerted efforts to make capital available to firms 

working in far-flung locations.165 One example is the Silk Road International Bank, established in 

Djibouti in November 2016.166 This bank is a joint venture with the Djibouti Ministry of Finance, 

which funded 25 percent of the endeavor, and two Chinese companies—the IZP Group, which 

provided 25 percent of the funding, and the Silk Road E-Merchants Group, which provided 20

percent. It represents the first instance in which a Chinese commercial bank has obtained a banking 

license in Africa. 167 According to the Vice-Chairman of the Silk Road International Bank, the new 

venture “will provide a package of financial solutions for China-Africa bilateral trade and the 

investment of China in Africa, [and] provide safe and convenient payment and settlement service for 

numerous Chinese enterprises in Africa.”168 The bank provides commercial and retail banking 

services to facilitate cross-border payments and enable Chinese firms to transact locally for much of 

their business operation in Africa.169

The Silk Road International Bank also apparently performs a number of core functions for the 

government of Djibouti. The Chinese State Council Information Office reported that the bank “will 

primarily provide services for the Government of Djibouti’s revenue and expenditures, such as 

handl[ing] civil servant wage distribution, pension payments, and business taxes. It will also serve as 

the main bank for trade settlement and capital transactions for local Chinese enterprises.”

170 In effect, 

this bank, which is substantially controlled by Chinese entities, has taken over several of Djibouti’s 

treasury functions. There are plans to expand these financial services across the continent. One 

Chinese official stated the PRC is considering whether to establish a second African branch of the 

Silk Road International Bank in Togo.

171

Chinese and African banks enjoy access to a variety of funding sources for their work on the 

continent. China has two funds for development in Africa: the China-Africa Development Fund, 

established 2006, and the China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund, announced by Xi 

Jinping during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg in December 

2015.

172 The new Fund was officially registered in January 2016, when $10 billion was made 

available for investment in African manufacturing, high-tech goods, energy, mining, infrastructure, 

165 Chen Yulu, “Writing a New Chapter in ‘Belt and Road’ Investment and Financing Cooperation.”

166 吉布提丝路国际银行正式成立 助力“一带一路”金融基础设施建设 [“The Djibouti Silk Road International Bank was 

Formally Established to Support the Construction of the Financial Infrastructure of the ‘Belt and Road’”], 国务院新闻办

公室 [State Council Information Office], November 17, 2016, 

http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/slxy/31208/Document/1519779/1519779.htm.

167 Gu Yang, “Silk Road International Bank set in Djibouti,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of 

South Africa, December 29, 2016, http://za.china-embassy.org/eng/znjl/t1427483.htm. 

168 Ibid.

169 “Chinese-funded Silkroad [sic] International Bank opens in Djibouti,” China Daily, January 19, 2017, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-01/19/content_27999949.htm. 

170 吉布提丝路国际银行正式成立 助力 ‘一带一路’ 金融基础设施建设 [“The Silk Road International Bank in Djibouti 

Officially Established, Will Assist in Financing One Belt One Road Infrastructure Investment Projects”], 国务院新闻办公

室 [State Council Information Office], November 17, 2016, 

http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/slxy/31208/Document/1519779/1519779.htm. 

171 Gu Yang, “Silk Road International Bank set in Djibouti.” 

172 “China and Africa industrial capacity mode of cooperation,” China Daily, April 18, 2018, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201804/18/WS5ad6a8c0a3105cdcf6518fe2.html; “China-Africa Development Fund,” 

China Development Bank, http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/ywgl/zhjryw/zffzjjyxgs/, (accessed March 25, 2020). 
27

and finance. It enjoys the backing of the Exim Bank’s foreign exchange reserves and Xi Jinping’s 

imprimatur as a BRI-facilitating venture,

173 which enabled the Fund to participate in a $60 billion aid 

package that specifically targeted the African market between 2016 and 2019.174

Such initiatives give Chinese firms increased access to African markets and resources beyond the 

Djibouti-Ethiopia corridor. Continent-wide PRC efforts to court African leaders and businesses are 

ongoing. One such example is the construction of the African Union Headquarters building in Addis 

Ababa in 2012. This $200m project was paid for entirely by the PRC government and was 

inaugurated by the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jia 

Qinglin.175 The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, also spoke in June 2017 to African 

Union leaders to laud China’s successes in east Africa and market them to other African states. 

China’s growing influence on the continent allowed Wang Yi’s pitch to extend beyond purely 

economic matters, touching on security cooperation and PRC military aid to African Union 

nations.176 These military overtures mark a new direction in Chinese foreign policy, manifested most 

concretely in China’s military presence in Djibouti.

Naval and Military Component

Djibouti’s position astride major SLOCs at a critical chokepoint for global trade endows it with 

considerable strategic importance. Its proximity to ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the 

presence of American, Japanese and European military forces on which the Chinese would like to 

keep tabs provide additional purposes for the PLA’s presence. Still, China’s decision to establish an

overseas military facility in Djibouti marks a decisive break with many decades of vehement official 

disavowal that China would take this path.

177 China’s former reluctance to establish an overseas 

military base reflected its broader foreign policy orientation, well-summarized in Deng Xiaoping’s

173 “China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund Starts Operation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 27, 2016, 

http://www.mfa.gov.cn/zflt/eng/jlydh/t1335472.htm. 

174 Yao Jianing, “China-Africa industrial capacity cooperation fund starts operations,” Xinhua, January 7, 2016, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2016-01/07/content_6848552.htm. A Brookings report notes that “the 

China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund...started operations in January 2016. However, after 18 months of 

formal operation, the fund only approved six projects with a total investment of $542 million, among which only four 

received disbursed investment of $248 million. According to its officials, the fund prioritizes risk management and mid- to 

short-term equity investment over speed and volume of investment. In particular, the fund cited the dropping investment in 

sub-Saharan Africa and the plummeting interests by Chinese companies due to the domestic economic slowdown as the 

key factors influencing the pace of the fund. At the current rate, the China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund is 

unlikely to achieve the goal of $10 billion financing by the end of 2018. China might play the word game by pointing out 

that the capital is indeed disbursed to the fund, yet that hardly counts as funding provided to Africa.” See: Yun Sun, 

“Foresight Africa Viewpoint—China’s Engagement in Africa: What Can We Learn in 2018 From the $60 Billion 

Commitment?”, Brookings, January 30, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/30/foresightafrica-viewpoint-chinas-engagement-in-africa-what-can-we-learn-in-2018-from-the-60-billion-commitment/.

175 “China’s top political advisor back home from Ethiopia,” China Daily, February 1, 2012, 

http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-02/01/content_14517833.htm; Kingsley Ighobor, “China in the heart of Africa,” 

Africa Renewal, January 2013, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2013/china-heart-africa. 

176 王毅谈中国与非盟五个优先合作领域 [“Wang Yi Discusses the Top Five Areas for Cooperation in China-African 

Union Relations”], 中华人民共和国驻文莱达鲁萨兰国大使馆 [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara

Brunei Darussalam], June 21, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebn/chn/zgxws/t1472160.htm. 

177 For example, the 2000 National Defense White Paper plainly stated that China would not station forces or establish 

military bases overseas. See 2000 年中国的国防 [China’s National Defense in 2000], 国务院新闻办公室 [Information 

Office of the State Council], October 16, 2000, http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2000/Document/307949/307949.htm; 

The shadow of this longstanding policy is long. Chinese authorities have attempted to downplay its first overseas base, 

insisting that the facility is only for logistical, support, and humanitarian purposes. “Overseas Bases an Act of 

Responsibility,” South China Morning Post, July 18, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/2103014/overseas-bases-act-responsibility. 
28

admonition to keep a low profile and focus on developing China’s economy, since China largely 

enjoys a secure international environment.178 The base in Djibouti represents a stark break from 

Deng’s policy line.

The functions and missions of the base are becoming clearer as it develops. PRC officials insist the 

facility is intended as a resupply base for the PLAN “anti-piracy task force” deployment to the Gulf 

of Aden and is not intended for further projection of military power.179 However, official PRC media 

has also reported,

The base will ensure China’s performance of [additional] missions, such as escorting, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia.... will also be conducive to overseas 

tasks including military cooperation, joint exercises, evacuating and protecting overseas 

Chinese and emergency rescue, as well as jointly maintaining security of international 

strategic seaways.180

Perhaps gradually unveiling the full extent of the base’s role lessens the immediate impact of the 

strategic shift, but as then-PLAN commander ADM Wu Shengli stated in 2016 the base will clearly 

enable China’s military to “carry out larger-scale missions in broader areas.”181

Observations of China’s recent operations in Djibouti (see below) further underscore the base’s

mission creep. The base marks a significant step toward a more global PLAN. At a minimum, these 

facilities will help the PRC provide security and emergency evacuation for Chinese nationals 

working in Africa and the large volume of Chinese investment on the continent provides powerful 

justification for positioning some security capacity in proximity to these expensive projects. This 

section examines the development, characteristics, and current utilization of the Djibouti base.

Base Development

The first reports of a PLA base in Djibouti emerged in 2013, when the PLA National Defense 

University drafted a study for the Central Military Commission promoting the idea.182 Xi Jinping 

approved the report and by February 2014 then-PRC Minister of Defense, Chang Wanquan, visited 

Djibouti to sign a “Security and Defense Partnership Agreement.” The agreement allowed PLA 

access to Djibouti and offered Chinese support for the Djibouti armed forces. In November 2015, a 

high-level military delegation led by the Central Military Commission Chief of Staff General Fang 

Fenghui and PLAN Chief of Staff Admiral Qiu Yanpeng met with Djibouti President Guelleh to 

finalize details for the base.183 Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf explained that 

China was given a 10-year lease at $20 million per year, with an option for another 10-year 

178 冷静观察、沉着应付、韬光养晦、决不当头、有所作为 [“Soberly Observe, Calmly Handle Problems, Keep a Low 

Profile, Never Take the Lead, Make a Difference”], China Communist Party News, October 28, 2012, 

http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1028/c350803-19412863.html. 

179 “Commentary: China’s Djibouti base not for military expansion,” Xinhua, July 13, 2017, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/13/c_136441371.htm. 

180 Ben Blanchard, “China sends troops to open first overseas military base in Djibouti,” Reuters, July 11, 2017, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-sends-troops-to-open-first-overseas-military-base-in-djiboutiidUSKBN19X049. 

181 梁庆松, 王元元 [Liang Qingsong, Wang Yuanyuan], 海军召开亚丁湾护航 8 周年研讨会 [“The Navy Holds a 

Seminar on the 8th Anniversary of the Gulf of Aden Escorts“], 人民海军 [People's Navy], December 30, 2016, p. 1.

182 “PLA’s first overseas base in Djibouti,” China Military Online, April 12, 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-04/12/content_7002833.htm. 

183 “Djiboutian President meets with PLA chief of general staff,” China Military Online, Nov. 9, 2015, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-11/09/content_6761210.htm. 
29

extension. Youssouf emphasized that “the terms of the contract and agreement are very clear and 

they are the same for each and every country that requested military presence in Djibouti.”184

There is very little Chinese or other open source reporting on the specific terms of the basing deal

between China and Djibouti. A lecturer at the PLA’s Space Engineering University described the 

status of forces agreement as follows:

According to the “China-Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement,” the troops stationed in 

Djibouti enjoy a series of privileges, exemptions, and conveniences. These privileges, 

exemptions, and conveniences are concrete manifestations of state immunity, including: 

inviolability of personal safety; inviolability of the camp, facilities, equipment, and property; 

jurisdictional immunities; convenience in the areas of exit and entry [of the country], 

taxation, customs, health, and quarantine; freedom of movement, freedom of communication, 

and freedom of travel.

185

There are still too few details to accurately appraise whether the terms of the China-Djibouti deal are 

indeed similar to those of other countries, as Youssouf claims. At minimum, the disclosed details 

guarantee the basic operations of the base, including personnel movement, radio frequency usage, 

and the flow of supplies. 

Construction began in February 2016, and by July 11, 2017 the facility was formally opened with 

substantial fanfare in the PRC press.186 Foreign commentators have long referred to it as a “naval 

base”—and its inauguration was indeed led by two PLAN senior captains, base commander Liang 

Yang and political commissar Li Chunpeng.187 The first PLAN vessels to visit the base in Djibouti 

were the Type-071 amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan and the mobile landing platform 

Donghaidao, which delivered the first troops and personnel to be stationed there.188

Capabilities

From the first delivery of troops, China has augmented its security presence very gradually, thereby 

muting potential alarm concerning its change in posture. Now that the base is operating, some limited 

assessments of its capabilities and purposes are possible. First, its position southwest and adjacent to 

the Doraleh Multipurpose Port (see Image 5 below) gives the base a potentially larger capacity, as 

commercial berths could be made available for all but the largest PLAN vessels. Even excluding 

184 俄媒看中国在吉布提首建海外基地: 正成全球海洋大国 [“Russian Media Analyzes China’s First Overseas Military

Base in Djibouti: Officially Becomes a World Maritime Great Power”], 参考消息 [Reference News], August 25, 2016, 

https://military.china.com/important/11132797/20160825/23376183_all.html; Katrina Manson, “China Military To Set Up 

First Overseas Base in Horn of Africa,” Financial Times, March 31, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/59ad20d6-f74b11e5-803c-d27c7117d132. 

185 丰松江 [Feng Songjiang], 现代海外军事基地发展呈现新特点 [“New Features in the Development of Modern 

Overseas Military Bases”], 世界知识 [World Affairs], no. 11 (2018), p. 61. 

186 我住吉布提保障基地部队进驻营区仪式举行 [“Opening Ceremonies Begin for Troops Stationed at China’s Military 

Support Base in Djibouti”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], August 1, 2017, http://www.81.cn/hj/2017-

08/01/content_7699505.htm.

187 韩国贤, 汪娜 [Han Guoxian, Wang Na], 立起练兵备战的鲜明导向 – 军队代表委员热议新时代我军练兵备战新气

象新风貌新作为 [“Set Up a Clear Guide for Troop Training and Combat Readiness—Military Representatives Discuss 

New Style and Conduct of PLA Training and Combat Readiness in the New Era”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], 

March 6, 2018, http://www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2018-03/06/content_200971.htm. 

188 中国人民解放军驻吉布提保障基地成立暨部队出征仪式在湛江举行 [“Chinese People’s Liberation Army Support 

Base in Djibouti Established, Departure Ceremony for the Troops Held in Zhanjiang”], 新华 [Xinhua], July 11, 2017, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-07/11/c_1121302146.htm.
30

these potential dual-use facilities, the military base alone is capable of supporting a wide range of 

PLA operations well beyond logistical support. 

Image 5. Doraleh Multipurpose Port and PLA Support Base (December 10, 2018)

Open-source satellite imagery shows facilities for fuel, weapons, and equipment storage and various 

maintenance facilities for ships and aircraft.189 There is no dry dock, floating or fixed, visible at the 

facility, but there are locations to the south of the main pier available for such a facility. As noted 

above, its proximity to the expansive yards at the Doraleh Multipurpose Port provides for significant 

augmentation of base operations. Some estimates suggest as many as 10,000 personnel could be 

stationed on the base.190 At 4,000 personnel, the U.S. military presence is currently the largest of the 

seven nations with military facilities hosted by Djibouti.191

Open-source descriptions of the base’s facilities are trickling in over time. The October 2017 issue of 

Naval & Merchant Ships, a Chinese publication, included a graphic of the base that marked, among 

other structures, an armory, equipment support area, subterranean entrance, barracks, heliport, oil 

depot, reinforced bunker, and pier (see Image 6 below).

192 Official sources confirm an organic PLAN 

189 Lin, Jeffrey and Singer, P.W., “China just deployed to its first overseas base,” Popular Science, July 13, 2017, 

http://www.popsci.com/china-deploys-first-overseas-base-djibouti#page-2; Shaul Shay, “China Opens First Overseas base 

in Djibouti,” Israel Defense, August 2, 2017, http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/30570. 

190 Laura Zhou, “China Sends Troops to Military Base in Djibouti, Widening Reach Across Indian Ocean,” South China 

Morning Post, July 13, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2102422/china-sends-troopsmilitary-base-djibouti-widening.

191 Commander, Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central -Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, 

https://cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti.html, (accessed March 27, 2020). The 

other nations with military facilities or bases in Djibouti are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain. 

192 中国人民解放军驻吉布提保障基地功能与作用浅析想象图 [“Concept Graphic of Analysis of the Functions and 

Roles of the Chinese PLA Support Base in Djibouti”], 舰船知识 [Naval & Merchant Ships], October 2017. 
31

petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) transport detachment is deployed on base, likely to carry out

future refueling operations.193 Analysis of satellite imagery found “at least 10 storage barracks, [an] 

ammunition point, [an] office complex and a heliport.” The report also noted two entrances to the 

base (one connecting to the main road and another connecting to the container terminal) and four 

layers of defensive works.194 The heliport includes several hangars and a 400-meter (approx. 1,312 

foot) runway with air traffic control.195 Thus far, no aircraft have been reported deployed to the 

installation, nor could combat or transport aircraft use this short runway.

Image 6. Naval & Merchant Ships depiction of activities at Djibouti Support Base

Construction of a dedicated naval pier is a key development in the base’s ability to support PLAN

operations. In May 2018, China began rapid construction of a 330-meter long (nearly 1,100 foot) 

pier, which is now largely complete.

196 When asked whether the pier could accommodate a Chinese 

aircraft carrier, China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian did not deny the possibility, stating, 

“the relevant facilities are progressing as planned. The construction of this facility is for China to 

193 刘文平, 王铁刚 [Liu Wenping, Wang Tiegang], 后勤保障: 伴随战舰挺进深蓝 [“Logistics Support: Going to the 

Deep Blue Alongside Warships”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], April 15, 2019, p. 4.

194 Col. Vinayak Bhat (Ret.), “China’s mega fortress in Djibouti could be model for its bases in Pakistan,” The Print, 

September 27, 2017, https://theprint.in/security/china-mega-fortress-djibouti-pakistan/11031/. 

195 Open source satellite imagery from Google Earth and EV Digital Globe.

196 Jeremy Binnie, “China building pier at Djibouti base,” Jane’s 360, May 23, 2018, 

https://www.janes.com/article/80271/china-building-pier-at-djibouti-base?from_rss=1. 
32

better carry out escorts in Somali waters in the Gulf of Aden and humanitarian rescue missions.”197

Draught considerations are likely the biggest constraint on the types of ships that could berth at the 

Chinese base. Nonetheless, with a total of 660-meters (2,165 feet) of berthing, the pier has significant 

space for the PLAN’s surface combatants, especially if similar types nest alongside each other. Water 

depth is not an issue at the nearby Doraleh Multipurpose Port, at least. Its 50-foot depth was 

sufficient to moor a Type-071 LPD there in July 2018.198 

Station security is provided by a battalion-grade PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) unit that first 

deployed from Zhanjiang on July 11, 2017.199 Initially led by Major Jiang Zhichao, the battalion 

comprises three mechanized infantry companies, based on a battalion-wide field march exercise in 

January 2018. During the exercise, one third of the battalion sortied each day, rather than en masse. 

Video footage of the exercise shows company-sized infantry units marching in the field.

200 These 

infantry companies are reinforced by an unknown number of wheeled combat vehicles, including at 

least eight ZBL-08 infantry fighting vehicles and two ZTL-11 assault vehicles.201

Such displays offer some idea of the combat strength present at the Djibouti Support Base. Chinese 

media coverage of the 2019 Lunar New Year greeting showed approximately 180 standing 

personnel, two ZTL-11 assault vehicles, four ZBL-08 infantry fighting vehicles, and two Mengshi 

light vehicles.202 This likely reflects the battalion command staff and one mechanized infantry 

company, although it is unclear whether each company is supported by the same number of combat 

vehicles. Other support elements, such as artillery batteries or aviation units, have not been observed 

at the Djibouti installation. The addition of PLAN or PLANMC rotary wing aircraft would greatly 

enhance the battalion’s mobility and range. 

Recent reports also indicate the presence of a PLANMC special forces detachment on base. Base 

commander Senior Captain Liang Yang oversaw related counterterrorism and law enforcement 

197 2019 年 12 月国防部例行记者会文字实录 [“Transcript of the Regular Ministry of Defense Press Conference in 

December 2019”], 国防部 [Ministry of Defense], December 26, 2019, http://www.mod.gov.cn/info/2019-

12/26/content_4857590_2.htm.

198 “China Djibouti Base: Type 71 LPD Docked,” Twitter Account of @rajfortyseven, posted on September 4, 2018, 

https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven/status/1036827304033284096.

199 我军驻吉布提保障基地成立 暨部队出征仪式在湛江举行 [“The PLA Support Base in Djibouti is Established with a 

Unit Deployment Ceremony Held in Zhanjiang”], 新华社 [Xinhua], July 12, 2017, 

http://www.cnr.cn/gd/gdtt/20170712/t20170712_523846250.shtml.

200 For video coverage of the training exercise, see: 张庆宝 [Zhang Qingbao], 中国驻吉布提保障基地全员全装野外徒

步行军 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti in All-Personnel, Full-Gear Field March”], 央视军事农业高清 [CCTV 

Military/Agriculture High-Definition], January 11, 2018, http://www.chinanews.com/m/shipin/2018/01-

11/news750999.shtml; Also see 张庆宝, 檀龙龙 [Zhang Qingbao, Tan Longlong], 我驻吉布提保障基地开展全员全装

野外训练 [“China’s Support Base in Djibouti Conducts Field Training of All Personnel in Full-Gear”], 人民海军

[People’s Navy], January 15, 2018, p. 1.

201 This assessment is based on Lunar New Year greetings recorded by base personnel in 2018 and 2019. See: 过年啦 官

兵送祝福啦 驻吉布提保障基地官兵给祖国人民拜年啦 [“It’s the New Year and the Troops Send Blessings, The Troops 

Stationed at the Support Base in Djibouti Wish the Homeland a Happy New Year”], 解放军新闻传播中心融媒体 [PLA 

News Broadcast Center Integrated Media], February 15, 2018, https://v.qq.com/x/page/s0553v19jd2.html; 驻吉布提保障

基地向祖国亲人拜年! 祝祖国繁荣昌盛, 人民幸福安康 [“The Support Base in Djibouti Wishes Loved Ones in the 

Homeland a Happy New Year! Wish for a Prosperous Motherland and a Prosperous People”], 好看视频 [Haokan Video], 

February 5, 2019, https://haokan.baidu.com/v?vid=9028898073727101039&pd=bjh&fr=bjhauthor&type=video.

202 Ibid.; Dongfeng CSK-131 light protected infantry vehicles have been seen at the Djibouti Support Base. 我驻吉布提保

障基地开展战备拉动演练 [“Our Support Base in Djibouti Conducts Combat Readiness Mobilization Exercises”], 当代

海军杂志社 [Navy Today Magazine], July 10, 2018, http://www.yidianzixun.com/article/0JVNZoQh.
33

training for Djiboutian Coast Guard personnel in early February 2020. Members of the PLANMC 

special forces detachment conducted training exercises such as boarding, anti-piracy, and hostage 

rescue using rigid-hull inflatable craft equipped with 12.7mm Type-89 heavy machine guns.203

Image 7. Djibouti base opening ceremony204

Combat training involving the PLANMC began less than two months after the base’s opening. This 

training appears geared toward conditioning the troops for operations in Djibouti’s harsh desert 

conditions. Appendix A details all reported combat training events. These exercises provide some 

insight into the combat capabilities and levels of readiness of the PLANMC troops defending the 

base. In large part, tactical weapons training is focused on small unit rapid response against threats to 

PRC personnel in Djibouti and the base itself. Satellite imagery suggests there is an urban-warfare 

training facility in the southeastern corner of the base, perhaps for this purpose. However, there has 

been no specific mention in open source Chinese-language materials of any role for this unit to 

conduct such missions within the region.

203 吉布提当地电视台报道的我海军驻吉布提保障基地特战分队与吉布提海警 [“Local Djibouti Television Station 

Reports on Our Special Operations Detachment from the Naval Support Base in Djibouti and the Djiboutian Coast 

Guard”], 新浪网 [Sina Weibo], February 13, 2020, 

http://k.sina.com.cn/article_1896058141_m71038d1d03300kzm5.html?from=mil; 我军驻吉布提部队为吉方培训海警

颁发中文证书 [“PLA Unit Stationed in Djibouti Trains Djiboutian Coast Guard and Issue Chinese Certificate”], 新浪军

事 [Sina Military], February 6, 2020, https://mil.sina.cn/sd/2020-02-06/detail-iimxyqvz0671802.d.html?from=wap.

204 孟凡礼, 张建华, 梁蓬飞, 张能华 [Meng Fanli, Zhang Jianhua, Liang Pengfei, Zhang Nenghua], 吉布提: 见证中国

红、和平蓝 [“Djibouti: Meet a Red China and a Blue Peace”], 解放军画报 [PLA Pictorial], no. 9A, 2017, p. 58.
34

Functions and Missions

Since 2015, the PLAN has been tasked not only with “near seas defense,” its limited historical role, 

but also the more expansive mission of “far seas protection.”205 This entails securing strategic 

SLOCS, protecting citizens and investments overseas, and conducting military diplomacy.206 The 

anti-piracy mission preceded this doctrinal shift and has now given way to a range of actual and 

potential roles for the PLAN units operating outside of China’s immediate backyard. Non-combatant 

evacuation operations are plainly a priority, after the hard lessons of evacuating 35,000 Chinese 

nationals from war-torn Libya in 2011.207 Another smaller-scale operation involving three PLAN 

ships evacuated PRC (and other) citizens from Yemen to Djibouti in 2015.208 Djibouti is ideally 

positioned to support PLAN operations in those hot spots. 

Logistics Support for the PLAN 

Supporting anti-piracy escort task forces was a major justification to construct the Djibouti Support 

Base. The PLAN has relied heavily on the port of Djibouti for quite some time. Beginning with the 

4

th Escort Task Force’s port-call in January 2010, every escort task force to date has stopped in 

Djibouti for replenishment (补给), rest, rehabilitation and training (休整), inspection and 

maintenance (检修), and other diplomatic, goodwill, and cultural activities (see Appendix B).

209

PLAN ships almost always moor in Djibouti’s old port area where they are greeted by PRC embassy 

staff and nationals brought to welcome each ship. Since construction of the base, senior officers and 

personnel from the installation have also been on hand to greet each ship entering the port.

The PLAN spends a significant amount of time in Djibouti. Escort task forces, comprised of two 

surface combatants and a replenishment ship, conduct their in-port rest and replenishment in rounds. 

The vessels in each three-ship task force typically take turns entering port, while the remaining two 

continue performing escort missions. Since ships most often remain pier-side for five days, this 

means a PLAN ship will be in Djibouti for much of the month when each task force visits.210 Some 

task forces visit twice during their deployments.211 This time adds up. According to senior leaders in 

the PLAN Logistics Department, the cycle time for rest and replenishment of escort task forces in 

Djibouti will be greatly shortened as conditions mature, particularly conditions at the support base. 

Improvements in berthing, material supply, medical support, and repairs will also reduce reliance on 

in-theater replenishment ships.212

205 PRC, State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, May 2015), p. 

13.

206 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century (Suitland, MD: Office 

of Naval Intelligence, 2015), pp. 7-11.

207 “35,860 Chinese nationals in Libya evacuated: FM,” China Daily, March 3, 2011, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/03/content_12105999.htm. 

208 “Spotlight: China completes evacuation from Yemen, assisting 629 nationals, 279 foreigners,” Xinhua, April 7, 2015, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/07/c_134130679.htm. 

209 中国海军护航编队 ‘马鞍山’ 号抵达吉布提港进行补给休整 [“‘Ma’Anshan’ of the Chinese Navy Escort Task Force 

Arrives in Djibouti Port for Replenishment and Rest”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 25, 2010, 

http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t653660.htm.

210 Escort task forces usually include destroyers, frigates, and Type-903 or Type-901 replenishment ships, although Type071 landing platforms docks have also taken part in a few anti-piracy deployments. See Appendix A.

211 Some escort task forces make multiple stops in Djibouti during their deployment. For example, ships of the 13th,19th

, 

22nd, 23rd, and 30th escort task forces called on Djibouti twice. See Appendix B.

212 刘文平, 王铁刚 [Liu Wenping, Wang Tiegang], 后勤保障: 伴随战舰挺进深蓝 [“Logistics Support: Going to the 

Deep Blue Alongside Warships”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], April 15, 2019, p. 4.
35

The Djibouti base can also facilitate longer duration deployments of PLAN escort task forces in 

theater. PLAN escort forces spend up to 40 percent of their three-month deployment cycles underway 

across 6,000-7,000 nautical miles to reach the Gulf of Aden, requiring their destroyers and frigates to 

replenish twice on route.213 Although experience and training in underway replenishment was sorely 

needed when escort operations began in 2008, after more than ten years the PLAN has matured 

enough that it now seeks to optimize its far-seas escort operations. At least one Chinese analyst 

believes Djibouti could serve as a shore leave location, allowing deployment times to the Gulf of 

Aden to be extended by about 20 percent.

214 The base has medical facilities, dormitories and athletic 

facilities that could provide improved rest and relief for naval personnel.215 While Djibouti’s 

inhospitable climate is not an ideal place for shore leave, base facilities may compare favorably to 

life aboard smaller surface combatants. A PLAN medical survey conducted on the 4th Escort Task 

Force reported high numbers of sailors suffering from mild to moderate depression despite measures 

taken to alleviate such effects, such as short-term shore leave.216 The need to sustain morale could 

explain the relatively frequent stops in Djibouti by PLAN frigates, since task forces include 

replenishment ships that should satisfy replenishment requirements and keep combat ships on station. 

Security is a big concern for PLAN forces when in port. Personnel on shore leave must undergo 

security and diplomatic briefings, and staff must carefully plan leave events ahead of time.217 Chinese 

reports also indicate concern over ship security when in close proximity to other international navies

at the Djibouti old port. In December 2016, the 25th Escort Task Force reported sighting divers 

approaching a PLAN ship in port, accusing a Japanese naval ship moored nearby.218 The Djibouti 

Support Base provides a far more secure environment for PLAN forces operating in theater. A longterm lease on the facility permits construction of underground or otherwise hardened facilities that 

better protect military personnel and assets. Once the naval pier becomes operational, fueling, 

replenishment, and shore leave will become even more secure.

PLAN medical, logistics, and equipment support staff stationed on base began providing support to 

task forces immediately after opening in August 2017, starting with the 27th anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force’s stopover in Djibouti. Over the next year, it provided support and repair services involving 

nearly 1,000 parts to four escort task forces. 219 This underscores the ability of the base facilities to 

213 博文 [Bo Wen], 海外基地支持中国海军远洋护航升级 [“Overseas Bases Support Upgrade of Chinese Navy's Ocean 

Escort”], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships], no. 4 (January 15, 2019), p. 51.

214 Ibid.

215 One chief petty officer 4th class that accumulated 827 days at sea over four anti-piracy escort task forces emphasized to 

reporters the importance of having the base for shore relief of escort personnel. See 吉布提基地政委: 我海军护航编队将

转为以海外基地保障为主 [“Djibouti Base Political Commissar: Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces will Shift Over to 

Support Primarily from Overseas Bases”], 央视 [CCTV], December 27, 2018, https://www.guancha.cn/militaryaffairs/2018_12_27_484806.shtml.

216 The 4th Escort Task Force included two Type-054 frigates. 金昊 [Jin Hao], 吉布提: 人民解放军首个海外基地

[“Djibouti: The PLA’s First Overseas Base”], 凤凰军事 [Phoenix News – Military], April 11, 2016, 

http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160411/48414276_0.shtml

217 中国海军第九批护航编队 停靠吉布提补给休整 [“The Ninth Chinese Escort Task Force Stops at Djibouti for Rest 

and Replenishment”], 中新社-海南频道 [China News—Hainan], October 6, 2011, 

http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2011-10-06/178791.html.

218 日本蛙人侦察吉布提港中国军舰? 国防部: 我海军进行有效处置 [“Japanese Frogman Scouts Chinese Warship in 

Djibouti Port? Ministry of Defense: Our Navy Handled It Effectively”], 环球网 [Global Times], August 4, 2017, 

https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1752605.

219 “Djibouti Base Political Commissar: Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces will Shift Over to Support Primarily from 

Overseas Bases.” 
36

store prepositioned key materials to supply PLAN forces operating in the region, such as armaments, 

equipment, and logistics materials needed for timely support for far-seas operations.220 In addition to 

naval forces, the base is well-positioned to support China’s large peacekeeping forces on the African 

continent (some 2,021, with 1,390 in east Africa), though no such support has been reported in open 

sources.221

Intelligence Collection

Protecting China’s overseas interests will require the PLA to anticipate and rapidly respond to 

emerging crises. There is little open discussion on this subject due to the sensitivity of intelligence 

matters, but the base will naturally facilitate early warning and intelligence gathering activities. PLA 

analysts note that intelligence collection is an important role for strategic strongpoints,

222 and others 

cite the U.S. military’s facility at Diego Garcia is as a useful model.223 The base’s location in 

Djibouti is conducive to collect intelligence on other international military activities in Djibouti—

most significantly, U.S. AFRICOM’s Camp Lemonnier, the main hub for U.S. military operations in 

Africa. But the base’s position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait provides perhaps its most important 

intelligence function—a favorable vantage to observe military and commercial traffic through this 

important global chokepoint. 

HA/DR and Military Diplomacy

The PLA has also highlighted the base’s ability to support regional humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response operations. Similarly, military diplomacy is quite visible in Djibouti. Prior to the 

construction of the base, PLAN escort task forces made a number of goodwill visits to local 

Djiboutian communities.224 The PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark visited Djibouti in 2010 and 2017,

offering free medical care to local residents in order to foster political goodwill with Djibouti’s 

leadership and socialize the PLA’s in-country presence.

225 Shortly after its opening, the base 

220 李守耕, 陈铁祺, 王丰 [Li Shougeng, Chen Tieqi, Wang Feng], 战备物资预置储备模式研究 [“On Preset Reserve 

Mode for Combat Readiness Material”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 7 (July 

2019), p. 59.

221 United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping,” Data, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

222 郑崇伟, 高占胜, 高成志 [Zheng Chongwei, Gao Zhansheng, Gao Chengzhi], 经略 “21 世纪海上丝路”: 战略支撑点

的构建 [“The Strategy of Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century: Construction of Strategic Strong Points”], 第八届海洋

强国战略论坛文集 [Proceedings from the 8th Maritime Power Strategy Forum], October 21, 2016, 

http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=EGVE201610001003&DbName=CPFD2017&D

bCode=CPFD.

223 董珊珊 [Dong Shanshan], 中国在印度洋的海上通道安全和战略支撑点的建立 [“China's Maritime Passage Security 

in the Indian Ocean and the Construction of Strategic Strong Points”], 中国水运 [China Water Transport], no. 12 

(December 2015), pp. 51-52; 许可 [Xu Ke], 构建“海上丝路”上的战略支点 [“On the Establishment of Strategic 

Fulcrums for the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’: A Reference of Diego Garcia Base for China”], 亚太安全与海洋研

究 [Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs], no. 5 (2016), p. 12.

224 These included a number of visits to local elementary schools. For a few examples, see: 海军第八批护航编队慰问吉

布提小学 [“Eighth Naval Escort Task Force Greets Djibouti Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in 

Djibouti], May 13, 2011, 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t822350.shtml; 第九

批护航编队给小学赠送慰问品 [“Ninth Escort Task Force Donates Gifts to Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC 

Embassy in Djibouti], October 8, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t865663.htm; 海军第十一批护航编队给吉

小学赠送慰问品 [“Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force Donates Gifts to Djibouti Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆

[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], June 9, 2012, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t939834.htm. 

225 跨越大洋的友谊 ‘和平方舟’ 号执行医疗服务记事 [“Friendship Across the Oceans, A Record of the ‘Peace Ark’s’ 

Medical Services”], 新华社 [Xinhua], November 26, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-11/26/content_1754569.htm; 中
37

provided medical materials to the Djiboutian Military Police. PLA sources have indicated that the 

base hospital will also provide medical services to the local Djiboutian people.226 In this capacity, the 

base launched “Bright Mission” in cooperation with Djiboutian health authorities in December 2019 

to provide cataract surgery to local citizens. The PLAN Second Military Medical University in 

Shanghai dispatched ten personnel to support this effort.227 The Chinese base also responded to a 

Djiboutian request to assist in a multinational effort to extinguish fires that broke out in Djibouti 

City’s landfill.228

The base hospital provides opportunities for international military engagement. PLAN forces in 

Djibouti conducted their first joint exercise with a foreign military on April 25, 2018, when base 

personnel teamed up with Italian forces to conduct medical rescue exercises.229 They performed two 

more medical evacuation training exercises with the European Naval Forces in the Gulf of Aden in 

2018. The first involved responding to a merchant ship distress call and dispatching a team aboard an 

Italian frigate in Task Force 465. After rendering assistance, the exercise team returned to base on the 

frigate’s SH-90 helicopter with a patient in severe condition.230 In a second joint exercise, a Spanish 

amphibious ship focused on disaster relief, again dispatching medical personnel and coordinating 

foreign helicopter transport to the base’s medical facilities.231

These “soft” functions continue the gradual socialization of China’s military presence in Djibouti, 

paving the way for incremental expansion over the coming years. Senior Chinese diplomats have 

already suggested, for instance, that Chinese troops could mediate border conflicts in the region.232

While visiting Ethiopia in 2016, a high-level PLA delegation hinted at the military’s potential use of 

the vast PRC-built civilian infrastructure networks connecting the two African nations.233

国海军 “和平方舟” 医院船访问吉布提 [“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship ‘Peace Ark’ Visits Djibouti”], 驻吉布提使馆经

商处 [Economic and Commercial Office of the PRC Embassy in Djibouti], August 27, 2017. 

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201708/20170802633862.shtml.

226 “PLA’s Logistics Base in Djibouti Donates Medical Materials to Djibouti Military Police,” China Military Online, 

September 12, 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-09/12/content_7752981.htm.

227 我驻吉布提保障基地启动 ‘光明行动’ 专项医疗服务 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti Launched Special Medical 

Service ‘Bright Mission’”], 新华网 [Xinhua], December 6, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-

12/06/c_1125316327.htm.

228 苏治宏, 邱浩翰 [Su Zhihong, Qiu Haohan], 我驻吉布提保障基地参与当地灭火救援 [“Our Support Base in Djibouti 

Participates in Local Firefighting and Rescue”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 16, 2019, 

http://www.mod.gov.cn/diplomacy/2019-08/16/content_4848295.htm.

229 张庆宝, 檀龙龙 [Zhang Qingbao, Tan Longlong], 解放军吉布提保障基地首次与驻吉外军开展联合训练 [“The First 

Time the PLA Djibouti Support Base Conducts Joint Training with a Foreign Military”], 中非合作论坛 [China-Africa 

Forum], April 28, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfgx/zfgxrwjl/t1555449.htm.

230 我驻吉布提保障基地与欧盟 465 编队开展联合救援演练 [“China’s Support Base in Djibouti Conducts Joint Rescue 

Drills with EU Task Force 465”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], October 15, 2018, 

http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-10/15/content_217800.htm.

231 张庆宝, 檀龙龙, 吴忠洪 [Zhang Qingbao, Tan Longlong, Wu Zhonghong], 我驻吉布提基地: 与欧盟 465 编队开展

联合演练 [“China’s Base in Djibouti: Conducts Joint Exercise with EU Task Force 465”], 中国军视网 [China Military 

TV], October 13, 2018, http://www.js7tv.cn/video/201810_161126.html.

232 “China offers to mediate Djibouti-Eritrea border row as it expands military presence in Africa,” South China Morning 

Post, July 25, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2103947/china-offers-mediate-djiboutieritrea-border-row-it. 

233 Fan Changlong’s delegation in November 2016 included Central Military Commission Chief of Staff Sun Jianguo, PLA 

Army Deputy Commander Long Haitao, PLAN Deputy Commander Ding Yi, and PLA Air Force Deputy Commander 
38

In sum, the PRC’s base in Djibouti and growing military engagement in the wider region represent an 

important change in the PLA’s overseas posture. Given China’s economic commitment to the Horn 

of Africa, its growing political and military connections to Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the 

demonstrated capacity to quickly scale up port facilities, PLA exercises, trainings, and deployments 

in the region will likely increase significantly over time. 

Conclusion

China’s growing engagement in Djibouti is a combined commercial and military undertaking to 

establish a strategic position for China in the western Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. China’s

comprehensive approach to first developing a commercial transport and logistics hub is characteristic 

of the strategic strongpoint model. Party-state priorities to access emerging markets and protect vital 

state and civilian interests in the region drive this process forward. 

Chinese firms have so far provided a robust platform for a wide-ranging PRC diplomatic, economic, 

and strategic presence in Djibouti, wrapped in the narrative promise of future local wealth through 

the “Shekou Model.” The consolidation of China’s strategic position in the western Indian Ocean and 

east Africa depends on complementary efforts to construct and operate road, rail, and pipeline 

infrastructure to connect inland markets and resources to the greater maritime economy. China 

appears to be counting on the success of its economic development efforts in the region to translate 

into a long-term military presence, with the strategic influence that comes with it. But how successful 

have these efforts been to date?

Commercially, despite optimistic projections, China’s investments in Djibouti and Ethiopia have not 

lived up to the hype as yet. The changing political environment in Ethiopia, its diversification away 

from sole reliance on Djibouti’s ports, and a weakened global economy all serve as headwinds to 

making Djibouti and the greater Horn of Africa a successful example of the “Shekou Model.” That 

said, if the PRC is able to patiently play the long game, its commercial investments in this region 

with many promising attributes may well pay off over time. Further, China’s early investments give 

it an advantage over latecomers who will find themselves having to adjust to Chinese standards,

practices, and influence already embedded in the region. 

Politically, China has developed a close relationship with the Djiboutian government, to the extent 

that Chinese entities are involved in government-like functions through the CMPort joint venture 

with the Djibouti port authority, and the treasury-like role of the Silk Road Investment Bank. This 

augments already-close PRC relations with the Guelleh family that sits at the top of Djibouti’s 

political structure. Through its naval diplomacy and other public relations measures, China seeks to 

portray itself as a positive force for the people of Djibouti, but it has clearly aimed its most important 

efforts at maximizing access to existing political power. 

Militarily, the completion of the strategic strongpoint with the construction of the naval base further 

augments Chinese power in Djibouti and in this strategically important part of the world. In China’s 

model, the military follows its economic investment. The base is becoming a useful asset for 

intelligence collection, regional power projection, and to sustain the PLA’s growing regional 

presence.234 The new base also marks a strategic shift in PLAN support methods for far-seas fleet 

Chen Dong. See: 范长龙访问埃塞俄比亚 [“Fan Changlong Visits Ethiopia”], 新华社 [Xinhua], November 23, 2016, 

http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1123/c64094-28889500.html.

234 For analysis of China’s broader military presence in the region, see Joel Wuthnow, “The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s 

Growing Military Presence in the Red Sea Region,” INSS Strategic Corum, no. 303, Jan. 2020, 

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-303.pdf
39

operations. The Djibouti Support Base political commissar explains the shift in these terms: “support 

methods for China’s far-seas escorts are gradually adjusting away from a focus on accompanying 

replenishment ships supplemented by mooring in foreign ports, into a new model focused on 

overseas base support supplemented by other ports abroad and domestic support.”235 Those overseas 

bases and “other ports abroad” are of critical importance to analysis of China’s growing military 

presence abroad.

After all, this first strategic strongpoint is not designed to stand alone. By itself, the base is 

undefendable during conflict with another major power. From the PLA’s perspective, the lone base 

in Djibouti cannot be the only PLA safe harbor west of Fiery Cross Reef. More strategic strongpoints 

will need to be established to support China’s out of area operations. This suggests China will be 

looking to develop additional, mutually supporting strategic strongpoints that better connect the base 

in Djibouti to the bases in the Spratly Islands. Djibouti’s strategic value emerges as part of a network 

of strategic strongpoints spanning the Indian Ocean to support expanded Chinese trade and 

investment and to enable the PLA to better protect China’s growing portfolio of “overseas interests.”

Looking ahead, the formal military base at Djibouti is probably not the model for how other Chinese 

strategic strongpoints will develop. The unique national status of Djibouti as host of several foreign 

militaries (most significantly, Japan) and the site of a multinational anti-piracy effort made the 

opportunity to set up a military base there an unusual opportunity. The remainder of the case studies 

in this series will examine other ports that fit the strategic strongpoint model and may form the 

backbone of the PLA’s expeditionary operations in the coming decades as China seeks expanding 

influence across the Indian Ocean region.

235 “Djibouti Base Political Commissar: Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces Will Shift Over to Support Primarily from 

Overseas Bases,” December 27, 2018.
40

Appendix A. PLA Combat Training in Djibouti (2017-2018)

Date Details of Combat Training

22 Sep. 2017 First reported use of Djibouti’s national ranges. Dozens of troops aboard ZBL-08s traveled to 

the National Gendarmerie Training Range. Exercises included use of various small arms and 

vehicle mounted weapons.

5 Nov. 2017 Series of exercises at an unknown location to mark the 19th National People’s Congress 

report. Involved combat realistic hostage rescue and live-fire exercises, as well as training in 

combat readiness patrols in full gear and emergency mobilization.

23 Nov. 2017 Live-fire exercise with heavy weapons (two ZTL-11s and three ZBL-08s) at the Arta firing 

range. Combined assault maneuvers meant to test tactics and emergency response 

capabilities. Troops practiced with assault rifles, crew-served machine guns, sniper rifles, and 

vehicle-mounted weapons.

9 Jan. 2018 Base organized an “all personnel tactical field march in full gear” to train the troops in 

conducting missions in volcanic desert conditions. Over the course of three days, three 

groups of personnel marched 15 km in full gear across uninhabited areas of the desert, 

encountering blue force harassment and overcoming challenges in combat, countering enemy 

surveillance aircraft, and pursuing terrorist threats on foot.

12 May 2018 Live-fire training involving ZBL-08 and ZTL-11 vehicles at the Arta firing range, focused on 

rapid maneuver combat and counter-terrorism response. Assault maneuvers, multi-pronged 

pursuit, coordinated light and heavy fires, and precision strikes against “terrorist” targets 

were conducted during this exercise. This exercise was reportedly conducted during the hot 

season to test the high-intensity limits of operational command, coordinated communications, 

logistics support, and equipment support. Troops deployed from the ZBL-08s also conducted 

ground combat tactical maneuvers.

7 Jul. 2018 A combat readiness exercise was conducted to test the rapid response capabilities of the 

troops at the Djibouti Support Base. Troops were seen rapidly dismounting from their 

Mengshi vehicle in combat gear. 

PRC press ceased reporting on combat exercises in July 2018, but such exercises almost 

certainly continue to present. 

Appendix A Sources: 中国驻吉布提保障基地首次组织实弹射击训练 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti’s First Time 

Organizing Live-Fire Training”], 澎拜防务 [The Paper-Defense], September 23, 2017, 

http://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1803823; 张庆宝, 蔡吕良 [Zhang Qingbao, Cai Lüliang], 驻吉布提保障基地官兵 -

不负重托, 担好首任首责 [“Officers and Soldiers of the Support Base in Djibouti Bear Great Trust and Take on the First 

Assignment with Responsibility”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 6, 2017, p. 1; Zhao Lei, Zhou Jin, “Live-fire Exercises 

Conducted by PLA Base in Djibouti,” China Daily, November 25, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-

11/25/content_34966883.htm; 张庆宝, 周致远 [Zhang Qingbao, Zhou Zhiyuan], 我驻吉布提保障基地组织火炮实施射击训练

[“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti Organizes Live Cannon Fire Training”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], November 28, 

2017, http://www.81.cn/jmtt/2017-11/28/content_7845356.htm; 张庆宝, 檀龙龙 [Zhang Qingbao, Tan Longlong], 我驻吉布提

保障基地开展全员全装野外训练 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti Conducts All-Personnel Field March in Full Gear”], 人民

海军 [People’s Navy], January 15, 2018, p. 1; 张庆宝, 陈平, 张振凯 [Zhang Qingbao, Chen Ping, Zhang Zhenkai], 我驻吉布提

保障基地开展实兵实装实弹演练 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti Conducts Live-fire Training Exercise with Real Troops 

and Equipment”], 央广网 [China National Radio], May 16, 2018, http://military.china.com.cn/2018-

05/16/content_51336435_2.htm; “Our Support Base in Djibouti Conducts Combat Readiness Mobilization Exercises.”
41

Appendix B. PLAN Port Calls to Djibouti (2010-Present)

Date Mission Vessel

24 January 2010 4

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Ma’anshan

28 January 2010 4

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Wenzhou

10 February 2010 4

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Chaohu

3 May 2010 5

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052B destroyer Guangzhou

10 May 2010 5

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Chaohu

23 August 2010 Friendly Visit Type-920 hospital ship Heping Fangzhou

24 August 2010 6

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

13 September 2010 6

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan

20 September 2010 6

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Lanzhou

13 December 2010 7

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

20 December 2010 7

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xuzhou

21 February 2011 7

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

29 March 2011 8

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

10 May 2011 8

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Wenzhou

15 May 2011 8

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Ma’anshan

6 October 2011 9

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052B destroyer Wuhan

12 October 2011 9

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yulin

19 October 2011 9

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu

1 January 2012 10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yuncheng

12 January 2012 10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou

7 March 2012 10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou

24 March 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

11 May 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yantai

20 May 2012 Circumnavigation—Friendly Visit Type-679 training ship Zhenghe

23 May 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

5 June 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Qingdao

13 August 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yiyang

19 August 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Changzhou

1 December 2012 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Huangshan

8 December 2012 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengyang

14 December 2012 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu

31 January 2013 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Huangshan

9 February 2013 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengyang
42

6 June 2013 14th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

25 July 2013 14

th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin

30 July 2013 14th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-053H3 frigate Mianyang

7 October 2013 15th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Jinggangshan

14 October 2013 15th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

21 October 2013 15th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengshui

22 February 2014 16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-053H3 frigate Luoyang

13 March 2014 16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

1 April 2014 16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yancheng

30 June 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Changchun

5 July 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Changzhou

10 July 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu

30 July 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Changchun

8 September 2014 18th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Changbaishan

13 September 2014 18th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yuncheng

3 November 2014 18th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Changbaishan

26 January 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Linyi

31 January 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Weifang

13 February 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

30 March 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/NEO

Type-054A frigate Linyi

31 March 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/NEO

Type-054A frigate Weifang

1 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-051 destroyer Jinan

7 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yiyang

12 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

30 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-051 destroyer Jinan

Mid-July 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yiyang

6 September 2015 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Liuzhou

12 September 2015 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Sanya

17 September 2015 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu

8 February 2016 22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Qingdao

6 April 2016 22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

12 April 2016 22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Daqing

29 April 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

15 May 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xiangtan
43

10 July 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

16 July 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu

3 October 2016 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin

9 October 2016 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Handan

15 October 2016 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu

12 January 2017 25th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengyang

Mid-March 2017 25th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Honghu

22 March 2017 25th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yulin

1 May 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Huanggang

7 May 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yangzhou

13 May 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Gaoyouhu

28 June 2017 Task Force 150–Long-distance 

Friendly Visit

Type-052C destroyer Changchun, Type-054A 

frigate Jingzhou, Type-903A replenishment ship 

Chaohu

1 August 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force 

(base opening ceremony)

Unclear - personnel from 26th Anti-piracy Escort 

Task Force present during base opening ceremony

23 August 2017 Harmonious Mission-2017 Type-920 hospital ship Heping Fangzhou

6 September 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou

Mid-September 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yueyang, Type-901 

replenishment ship Qinghaihu

6 November 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou

Mid-November 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yueyang, Type-901 

replenishment ship Qinghaihu

8 February 2018 28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

19 February 2018 28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yancheng

25 February 2018 28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Weifang

14 May 2018 29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xuzhou

20 May 2018 29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Binzhou

26 May 2018 29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

9 September 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Wuhu

14 September 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Handan

19 September 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu

10 November 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Wuhu

16 November 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Handan

26 January 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xuchang

20 February 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Luomahu

10 March 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan
44

14 May 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Xi’an

22 May 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Anyang

21 July 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Anyang

26 July 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Gaoyouhu

24 September 2019 33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052D destroyer Xining

30 September 2019 33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Weifang

6 October 2019 33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Kekexilihu

20 January 2020 34th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

25 January 2020 34th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052D destroyer Yinchuan

Appendix B Sources: “‘Ma’Anshan’ of the Chinese Navy Escort Task Force Arrives in Djibouti Port for Replenishment 

and Rest;” 海军护航编队‘温州’舰抵达吉布提港 [“Naval Escort Task Force ‘Wenzhou’ Arrives in Djibouti Port”], 驻吉布提使

馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 29, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t654689.htm; The FFG Chaohu joined 

the fourth escort task force earlier in late 2009. 中国海军护航编队 ‘巢湖’ 号抵达吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort 

Task Force ‘Chaohu’ Arrives in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], 

February 10, 2010, 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t657510.shtml; 海军第五批

护航编队首次停靠非洲港口吉布提 [“Fifth Naval Escort Task Force Stops in the African Port of Djibouti for the First Time”], 

新华网 [Xinhua], May 4, 2010, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_05/04/1482421_0.shtml; 驻吉使馆经商处积极参与海

军第五批护航编队靠港后勤保障工作 [“The Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy in Djibouti Participates in 

Logistic Support Work of the Fifth Naval Escort Task Force Stop in Port”], 驻吉经商参处 [Economic and Commercial Office in 

Djibouti], May 26, 2010, http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201005/20100506932117.shtml; 中国海军和平方舟医院船时隔

七年再访吉布提 [“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship Peace Ark Visits Djibouti Again After Seven Years”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August 

23, 2017, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2017-08/23/c_1121531941.htm; 海军护航编队 ‘微山湖号’ 抵达吉布提港 [“Naval Escort 

Task Force ‘Weishanhu’ Arrives in Djibouti Port”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], August 24, 2010, 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t726542.shtml; 驻吉布提大

使张国庆率使馆及中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 “昆仑山” 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing 

Leads Staff from Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome Escort Task Force ‘Kunlunshan’ to Djibouti for Rest and 

Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 13, 2010, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t752046.htm; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率使馆及援吉医疗队人员欢迎护航编队 ‘兰州号’ 来吉补给休整

[“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Embassy Staff and Medical Aid Team Personnel to Welcome Escort Task 

Force ‘Lanzhou’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 21, 2010, 

http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t754225.htm; 海军第七批护航编队舟山舰完成首次靠港休整补给 [“Seventh Naval 

Escort Task Force Ship Zhoushan Completes its First Stop in Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 凤凰军事 [Phoenix News 

Military], December 21, 2010, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_12/21/3613026_0.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率使馆

和中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 ‘舟山’ 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Staff from 

Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome Escort Task Force ‘Zhoushan’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 

驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 13, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t777810.htm; 驻吉布提大

使张国庆率使馆和中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 ‘徐州’ 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing 

Leads Staff from Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome ‘Xuzhou’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉

布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 20, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t779570.htm; The Libya NEO 

reportedly caused the Zhoushan to cancel leave and rest in Djibouti to take over escort operations for the Xuzhou FFG that was 

diverted to support the NEO operation. See ‘徐州’舰 26 日已航行至红海北部海域为撤侨护航 [“Naval Ship ‘Xuzhou’ in the 

northern area of the Red Sea on the 26th to Escort Evacuated Overseas Chinese”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government 

Portal], February 26, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-02/26/content_1811338.htm; 刘一伟, 唐诗峰 [Liu Yiwei, Tang 

Shifeng], “舟山”舰停靠吉布提休整补给 5 天 中资机构欢迎 [“Naval Ship ‘Zhoushan’ Stops in Djibouti for Five-Day Rest and 

Replenishment, Welcomed by Chinese-funded Institutions”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 25, 2011, 

http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2011_02/25/4851610_0.shtml; 海军护航编队 ‘千岛湖’ 号停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Naval 

Escort Task Force ‘Qiandaohu’ Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], 

March 29, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t810533.htm; 海军第八批护航编队慰问吉小学 [“Eighth Naval Escort 

Task Force Visits Djibouti Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 13, 2011, http://dj.china-
45

embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t822349.htm; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我护航编队 ‘马鞍山’号再次到吉 [“PRC Ambassador to 

Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Another Arrival by Chinese Escort Task Force ‘Ma’Anshan’”], 驻吉布提使馆

[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 16, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t822766.htm; 中国海军第九批护航编队 停靠

吉布提补给休整 [“Ninth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 海南频道

[Hi.Chinanews.com], October 6, 2011, http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2011-10-06/178791.html; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率

队欢迎我第九批护航编队 ‘玉林号’ 到吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome 

Ninth Chinese Escort Task Force ‘Yulin’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 央视网 [CCTV], October 13, 2011, 

http://news.cntv.cn/20111013/117274.shtml; 驻吉布提使馆欢迎青海湖舰到吉休整补给 [“Embassy in Djibouti Welcomes 

Naval Ship Qinghaihu to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国领事服务网 [CS.MFA.GOV.CN], October 24, 2011, 

http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/zggmzhw/lsbh/lbxw/t870133.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆元旦率队欢迎我第十批护航编队运城舰到吉补

给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team on New Year’s Day to Welcome Tenth Chinese Escort Task 

Force Ship ‘Yuncheng’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 1, 2012, 

http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t892146.htm; 海军 ‘海口’舰停靠吉布提进行第二轮补给休整 [“Naval Ship ‘Haikou’ 

Stops in Djibouti for Second Round of Rest and Replenishment”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], January 12, 2012, 

http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2012_01/13/11939836_0.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我第十批护航编队海口

舰到吉补给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Tenth Chinese Escort Task Force Ship 

Haikou to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 12, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t895007.htm; 海军第十批护航编队慰问吉布提小学 [“Tenth Naval Escort Task Force Visits Djibouti 

Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], March 9, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t912449.htm; 海军第十一批护航编队开始首轮靠港补给休整 [“Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force 

Begins First Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], March 25, 2012, 

http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_03/25/13430028_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军烟台舰到吉补给休整 [“Chinesefunded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Yantai to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆经商处 [PRC 

Embassy in Djibouti Economic and Commercial Office], May 11, 2012, 

http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201205/20120508119523.shtml; “郑和” 舰环球航行: 停靠吉布提补给休整 [“Naval Ship 

‘Zheng He’ Circumnavigation: Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中广军事 [China National Radio Military], May 

20, 2012, http://mil.cnr.cn/ztl/zhjhq/zxxx/201205/t20120520_509656458.html; 驻吉布提使馆欢迎海军第十一批护航编队微山

湖舰到吉补给休整 [“Embassy in Djibouti Welcomes Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force Ship Weishanhu to Djibouti for Rest 

and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 24, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t934677.htm; 中国海军护航舰艇停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Stops 

in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], June 5, 2012, 

http://mil.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2012/0605/44947.shtml; 中国第 12 批护航编队 ‘益阳’舰首次靠港补给休整 [“Twelfth Chinese 

Escort Task Force Ship ‘Yiyang’ In Port for Rest and Replenishment for the First Time”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], 

August 14, 2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_08/14/16787648_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军常州舰到吉补

给休整 [“Chinese-funded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Changzhou to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 吉布

提经商处 [PRC Economic and Commercial Office in Djibouti], August 19, 2012, 

http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201208/20120808292252.shtml; 中国第 13 批护航编队首次靠港补给 [“Thirteenth 

Chinese Escort Task Force Conducts In-Port Replenishment for First Time”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], December 3, 

2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_12/03/19780766_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军衡阳舰到吉补给休整

[“Chinese-funded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Hengyang to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 吉布提经商处

[PRC Economic and Commercial Office in Djibouti], December 8, 2012, 

http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201212/20121208473286.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我护航海军青海湖舰到

吉补给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Chinese Naval Escort Ship Qinghaihu to 

Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 14, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t998175.htm; 驻吉布提大使张庆国率队欢迎我海军第十三批护航编队 570 舰来吉补给休整

[“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Thirteenth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship 570 to 

Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 3, 2013, 

http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t1010571.shtml; 中国驻吉布提大使馆与中国海军第十三批护航编队 568 舰共度新春佳节

[“Chinese Embassy in Djibouti Celebrates Sprint Festival with Ship 568 of the Thirteenth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force”], 驻

吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 10, 2013, http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t1013258.shtml; 中国海军第 14

批护航编队停靠吉布提港补给 [“14th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中

国广播网 [China National Radio], June 8, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/hd2011/2013/06-08/212040.shtml; 我海军哈尔

滨舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Ship Ha’erbin Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC 

Embassy in Djibouti], July 25, 2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1061795.htm; 海军第十四批护航编队慰问吉布提

乒乓球协会 [“14th Naval Escort Task Force Visits Ping Pong Association in Djibouti”], 中华人民共和国外交部 [PRC Foreign 
46

Ministry], July 30, 2013, https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJBzp9; 我海军绵阳舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval 

Ship Mianyang Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 30, 2013, 

http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1062686.htm; 我海军护航官兵与海外侨胞共同庆祝建军节 [“Chinese Naval Escort 

Troops Celebrate PLA Founding with Overseas Chinese Compatriots”], 中国海军 [Chinese Navy], August 3, 2013, 

http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-08/03/content_5428710.htm; 第十五批护航编队井冈山舰停靠吉布提开始第二轮补给 [“15th

Escort Task Force Ship Jinggangshan Stops in Djibouti to Begin Second Round of Replenishment”], 中国海军 [China Navy], 

October 8, 2013, http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-10/08/content_5569719_4.htm; 我海军太湖舰到吉布提休整补给 [“Chinese 

Naval Ship Taihu Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 14, 

2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1089228.htm; 我海军护航编队衡水舰到吉布提休整补给 [“Chinese Escort Task 

Force Ship Hengshui Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 21, 

2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1091330.htm; 中国海军护航编队洛阳舰停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval 

Escort Task Force Ship Luoyang Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Online], 

February 22, 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2014_02/22/34083485_0.shtml; 建佳, 李秀林 [Jian Jia, Li Xiulin], 第

十六批护航编队太湖舰进行舰体安全探摸作业 [“16th Escort Task Force Ship Taihu Conducts Ship Safety Inspection Work”], 

中国海军网 [China Navy Online], March 15, 2014, http://navy.81.cn/content/2014-03/15/content_5812204_6.htm; 在护航中成

长 – 海军太湖舰入列一周年纪事 [“Growing Up in Escort Operations – Chronicling a Week of the Naval Ship Taihu”], 中国新

闻网 [China News Network], July 11, 2014, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2014-07-11/202130506942.shtml; 李晓, 胡全福 [Li Xiao, 

Hu Quanfu], 海军第十六批护航编队盐城舰靠泊吉布提补给休整 [“16th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yancheng Stops in 

Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Online], April 2, 2014, 

http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140402/40000508_0.shtml; 李晓, 胡全福 [Li Xiao, Hu Quanfu], 海军第十六批护航编队盐城舰靠泊

吉布提补给休整 [“16th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yancheng Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网

[China Military Online], April 3, 2014, http://photo.81.cn/pla/2014-04/03/content_5838714.htm; 第 17 批护航编队停靠吉布提

港开始第 3 轮补给休整 [“17th Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Port to Begin its Third Round of Rest and Replenishment”], 

中国海军网 [China Navy Online], June 30, 2014, http://ocean.china.com.cn/2014-06/30/content_32812555.htm; 我海军护航编

队常州舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Changzhou Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and 

Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 5, 2014, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1171818.htm; 

我海军护航编队巢湖舰来吉补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Chaohu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and 

Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 11, 2014, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1173818.htm; 第 17 批护航编队开始第 4 轮靠港补给休整 [“17th Escort Task Force Begins Fourth 

Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], July 31, 2014, 

http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0731/c1011-25374303.html; 中国海军第十八批护航编队首次停靠吉布提港 [“18th

Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti for the First Time”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government Portal], 

September 9, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-09/09/content_2747108.htm; 中国海军护航编队运城舰到吉布提补给休

整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yuncheng Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中华人民共和国外交

部 [PRC Foreign Ministry], September 15, 2014, https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJFyC1; 肖永, 甘俊, 孙海潮 [Xiao 

Yong, Gan Jun, Sun Haichao], 中国海军第十八批护航编队靠泊吉布提港休整 [“18th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops 

in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], November 4, 2014, 

http://www.81.cn/hj/2014-11/04/content_6209968.htm; 海军第十九批护航编队停靠吉布提补给休整 [“19th Naval Escort Task 

Force Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], January 26, 2015, 

http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0126/c172467-26453396.html; 我海军护航编队 550 号潍坊舰停靠吉布提港补给休整

[“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship 550 Weifang Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC 

Embassy in Djibouti], February 1, 2015, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1233282.htm; 海军第十九批护航编队在国外开

展学雷锋活动 [“19th Naval Escort Task Force Conducts Leifeng Education Activities Overseas”], 中国新闻网 [China News 

Network], March 7, 2015, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2015/0307/c1057-26653494.html; 中国海军舰艇编队顺利完成撤离在

也门中方人员任务 [“Chinese Naval Ship Formation Successfully Completes Evacuation Mission of Chinese Personnel from 

Yemen”], 新华网 [Xinhua], March 31, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2015-03/31/c_1114821991.htm; 第二批撤离也

门的中国公民抵达吉布提: ‘终于可以回家了!’ [“Second Group of Evacuated Chinese Nationals from Yemen Arrive in 

Djibouti: ‘Can Finally Go Home!’”], 新华网 [Xinhua], March 31, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2015-

03/31/c_1114827585.htm; 我海军第二十批护航编队济南舰来吉布提补给休整 [“20th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship 

Jinan Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], June 2, 2015, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1269452.htm; 中国海军第二十批护航编队首次停靠吉布提补给休整 [“20th Chinese Naval Escort 

Task Force Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment for the First Time”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], June 1, 2015, 

http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/06-01/7314753.shtml; 我海军第二十批护航编队益阳舰来吉布提补给休整 [“20th

Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yiyang Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy 

in Djibouti], June 7, 2015, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1271057.htm; 我海军第二十批护航编队千岛湖舰来吉布提
47

补给休整 [“20th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Qiandaohu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提

使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], June 12, 2015, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1272711.htm; 第二十批护航编队官兵

举办庆祝建党 94 周年联欢晚会 [“20th Escort Task Force Troops Hold Gala to Celebrate the 94th Anniversary of the Founding 

of the Chinese Communist Party”], 央广军事 [China National Radio - Military], July 1, 2015, 

http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2015-07/01/content_4600203.htm; 驻吉布提使馆妇女小组与海军护航编队女兵举行交流活动

[“Women’s Group at the Embassy in Djibouti Hold Exchanges with Female Sailors of the Naval Escort Task Force”], 驻吉布提

使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 12, 2015, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1280643.htm; 海军第二十一批护航编

队停靠吉布提补给休整 [“21st Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 央广军事 [China 

National Radio - Military], September 8, 2015, http://www.81.cn/hj/2015-09/08/content_6670205.htm; 海军第二十一批护航编

队三亚舰来吉布提补给休整 [“21st Naval Escort Task Force Ship Sanya Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉

布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 12, 2015, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1296202.htm; 海军第二十一

批护航编队青海湖舰来吉布提补给休整 [“21st Naval Escort Task Force Ship Qinghaihu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and 

Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 17, 2015, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1297394.htm; 海军首次包机万里救助重病护航士兵回国治疗 [“Navy Charters a Flight to Rescue 

Critically Ill Escort Soldier and Return Home for Treatment for the First Time”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government 

Portal], February 18, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-02/18/content_5042870.htm; 海军第二十二批护航编队来吉布提

补给休整 [“22nd Naval Escort Task Force Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in 

Djibouti], April 6, 2016, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1353555.htm; 彭海, 张海龙, 黄亮 [Peng Hai, Zhang Hailong, 

Huang Liang], 第二十二批护航编队开始第四轮靠港补给休整 [“22nd Escort Task Force Begins its Fourth Round of In-Port 

Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网-中国海军 [China Military Online – Chinese Navy], April 12, 2016, 

http://www.81.cn/hj/2016-04/12/content_7001869.htm; 海军第 23 批护航编队停靠吉布提港开始首轮靠港补给休整 [“23rd

Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti to Begin First Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 人民网 [People’s Daily 

Online], April 29, 2016, http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/mil/20160429/1145275.shtml; 海军第二十三批护航编队湘潭舰来吉布

提补给休整 [“23rd Naval Escort Task Force Ship Xiangtan Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆

[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 15, 2016, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1362131.htm; 海军第二十三批护航编队舟山

舰来吉布提补给休整 [“23rd Naval Escort Task Force Ship Zhoushan Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布

提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 10, 2016, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1378949.htm; 海军第二十三批护航

编队巢湖舰来吉布提补给休整 [“23rd Naval Escort Task Force Ship Chaohu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 

驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 16, 2016, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1382122.htm; 海军第二十四

批护航编队哈尔滨舰来吉布提补给休整 [“24th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Ha’erbin Comes to Djibouti for Rest and 

Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 3, 2016, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1403415.htm; 海军第二十四批护航编队邯郸舰来吉布提补给休整 [“24th Naval Escort Task Force 

Ship Handan Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], October 9, 2016, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1404440.htm; 海军第二十四批护航编队东平湖舰来吉布提补给休整 [“24th Naval Escort Task Force 

Ship Dongpinghu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 15, 

2016, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1405980.htm; 第二十五批护航编队靠泊吉布提港 [“25th Escort Task Force Stops 

in Djibouti Port”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 14, 2017, http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2017-01/14/content_4769943.htm; 

海军第二十五批护航编队洪湖舰和玉林舰前后离靠吉布提港 [“25th Naval Escort Task Force Ships Honghu and Yulin Stop 

Djibouti Port One After the Other”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], March 22, 2017, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1447734.htm; 海军第二十五批护航编队洪湖舰和玉林舰前后离靠吉布提港 [“25th Naval Escort Task 

Force Ships Honghu and Yulin Stop in Djibouti One After the Other”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], March 22, 

2017, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1447734.htm; 海军第二十六批护航编队靠泊吉布提 开始修整 [“26th Naval 

Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti, Begins Rest”], 央广网 [China National Radio], May 2, 2017, 

http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/mil/20170502/1949733.shtml; 我海军第二十六批护航编队扬州舰来吉布提补给休整 [“26th

Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yangzhou Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC 

Embassy in Djibouti], May 7, 2017, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1459423.htm; 解放军护航编队停靠吉布提军港

[“PLA Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Military Port”], 多维新闻 [DW News], May 16, 2017, 

https://www.dwnews.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/59815282/%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E5%86%9B%E6%8A%A4

%E8%88%AA%E8%88%B0%E9%98%9F%E5%81%9C%E9%9D%A0%E5%90%89%E5%B8%83%E6%8F%90%E5%86%9

B%E6%B8%AF%E5%9B%BE%E9%9B%86; 中国海军远航访问编队抵达吉布提访问 [“Chinese Naval Long-Distance 

Friendly Visit Task Force Arrives in Djibouti”], 新华社 [Xinhua], June 28, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-

06/28/content_5206489.htm; 我驻吉布提保障基地部队进驻营区仪式举行 [“Ceremony Held for Unit Stationed Arriving at 

Chinese Support Base in Djibouti”], 央视新闻 [CCTV], August 1, 2017, 

http://m.news.cctv.com/2017/08/01/ARTINg4Sb0GFpqKdkJbkpcLK170801.shtml; 中国海军 ‘和平方舟’ 医院船访问吉布提

[“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship ‘Peace Ark’ Visits Djibouti”], 驻吉布提使馆经商处 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti – Economic and 
48

Commercial Office], August 27, 2017, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201708/20170802633862.shtml; 和平方舟为

我第 26 批护航官兵提供暖心服务 [“Peace Ark Provides Heartwarming Services to Troops of the 26th Chinese Escort Force”], 

国防部网 [Ministry of National Defense], August 19, 2017, http://www.mod.gov.cn/photos/2017-08/19/content_4789326.htm; 

中国海军第 27 批护航编队海口舰抵达吉布提港 [“27th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Haikou Arrives at Djibouti 

Port”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], September 7, 2017, http://www.81.cn/hj/2017-09/07/content_7746734.htm; 刘鑫, 李

昌寰 [Liu Xin, Li Changhuan], 海军第二十七护航编队开始首轮靠港补给休整 [“27th Naval Escort Task Force Begins First 

Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], September 8, 2017, 

http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2017-09/08/content_4791161.htm; 刘鑫, 李昌寰 [Liu Xin, Li Changhuan], 中国海军第二十七批

护航编队海口舰靠泊吉布提港补给休整 [“27th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Haikou Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest 

and Replenishment”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], November 7, 2017, http://www.81.cn/hj/2017-

11/07/content_7815422.htm; 我海军第二十八批护航编队太湖舰来吉布提补给休整 [“28th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force 

Ship Taihu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 8, 2018, 

http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1533072.htm; 我海军第二十八批护航编队盐城舰靠吉布提港补给休整 [“28th Chinese 

Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yancheng Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in 

Djibouti], February 20, 2018, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1536270.htm; 我海军第二十八批护航编队潍坊舰停靠吉

布提港补给休整 [“28th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Weifang Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻

吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 26, 2018, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1537554.htm; 我海军第二十

九批护航编队徐州舰停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“29th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Xuzhou Stops in Djibouti Port for 

Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 14, 2018, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1559283.htm; 我海军第二十九批护航编队滨州舰停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“29th Chinese Naval Escort 

Task Force Ship Binzhou Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 

20, 2018, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1560824.htm; 我海军第二十九批护航编队千岛湖舰停靠吉布提港补给休整

[“29th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Qiandaohu Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆

[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 28, 2018, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1562962.htm; 张海龙, 来永雷 [Zhang 

Hailong, Lai Yonglei], 我海军第 30 批护航编队开始首轮靠港补给休整 [“30th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Begins First 

Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], September 11, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2018-

09/11/content_4824620.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 30 批护航编队邯郸舰、东平湖舰来吉布提补给休整

[“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes the 30th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ships Handan and Dongpinghu to Djibouti 

for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 25, 2018, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1598646.htm; Ibid; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 30 批护航编队芜湖舰来吉布提补给休整

[“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 30th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Wuhu to Djibouti for Rest and 

Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], November 11, 2018, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1612062.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 30 批护航编队邯郸舰再来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador 

Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 30th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Handan to Visit Djibouti Again for Rest and 

Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], November 17, 2018, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1614044.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 31 批护航编队许昌舰来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador 

Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 31st Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Xuchang to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉

布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 28, 2019, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1632870.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接

中国海军第 31 批护航编队骆马湖舰来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 31st Chinese Naval Escort 

Task Force Ship Luomahu to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 21, 

2019, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1639827.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 31 批护航编队昆仑山舰来吉布提补

给休整 [“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 31st Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Kunlunshan to Djibouti for Rest 

and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], March 12, 2019, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1644786.htm; 驻吉布提使馆迎接中国海军第 32 批护航编队西安舰来吉补给休整 [“Embassy in 

Djibouti Welcomes 32nd Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Xi’an to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆

[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 15, 2019, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1663380.htm; 驻吉布提使馆迎接中国海军第

32 批护航编队安阳舰来吉补给休整 [“Embassy in Djibouti Welcomes 32nd Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Anyang to 

Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 22, 2019, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1665509.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 32 批护航编队安阳舰再来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador 

Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 32nd Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Anyang to Djibouti Again for Rest and Replenishment”], 

驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 21, 2019, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1682291.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎

接中国海军第 32 批护航编队高邮湖舰再来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 32nd Chinese Naval 

Escort Task Force Ship Gaoyouhu to Visit Djibouti Again for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in 

Djibouti], July 28, 2019, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1683906.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 33 批护航编队西宁

舰来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 33rd Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Xining to Djibouti 
49

for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 29, 2019, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1703764.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 33 批护航编队潍坊舰来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador 

Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 33rd Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Weifang to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布

提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 1, 2019, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1704722.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中

国海军第 33 批护航编队可可西里湖舰来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 33rd Chinese Naval 

Escort Task Force Ship Kekexilihu to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], 

October 7, 2019, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1705530.htm; 驻吉布提使馆举办 2020 年新春招待会 [“Embassy in 

Djibouti Holds 2020 Spring Festival Reception”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 22, 2020, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1734812.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 34 批护航编队银川舰来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador 

Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 34th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yinchuan to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉

布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 27, 2020, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1736516.htm.
About the Authors

Peter A. Dutton, JD, PhD is professor of strategic studies at the China Maritime Studies Institute at 

the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Dutton's research focuses on Chinese 

views of sovereignty and international law and how those views are shaped by geostrategic and 

historical factors. He advises senior officials and military leaders across the government and has 

testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services and Foreign 

Affairs Committees. Dutton is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and former Naval Flight Officer. He 

holds a J.D. from the College of William and Mary and a Ph.D. from King’s College London. He is 

an adjunct professor of law at NYU School of Law and a Research Fellow at the US-Asia Law 

Institute.

Isaac B. Kardon, PhD is assistant professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute. He 

researches, writes, and teaches on China’s foreign policy, with a focus on maritime disputes, 

Indo-Pacific maritime security and commerce, and China-Pakistan relations. His book, China’s 

Law of the Sea: Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction, is forthcoming from Yale University Press. 

He holds a PhD in Government from Cornell, and M.Phil in Modern Chinese Studies from 

Oxford, and a BA in History from Dartmouth.

Conor Kennedy is a research associate at the China Maritime Studies Institute. He received his 

MA from Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American 

Studies.

The authors relied on invaluable research and writing support from Terence Nicholas and 

Christopher Mirasola.