THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

By

Lt Col Jeffrey D. Neischel, USAF

The Counterproliferation Papers

Future Warfare Series No. 54

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Lt Col Jeffrey D. Neischel, USAF

June 2010

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF Counterproliferation Center 

to provide information and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers 

and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. 

Copies of No. 54 and previous papers in this series are available from the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-7530, phone 

(334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 54

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Table of Contents

Page

Disclaimer.....................................................................................................vii

Acknowledgements.........................................................................................viii

Author.............................................................................................................ix

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ...................................................................... 2

History ...................................................................................................... 3

Structure ................................................................................................... 3

Current Status .............................................................................................. 4

U.S Role in the Comprehensive Test Ban Ratification ...................................................6

President George H.W. Bush, President Bill Clinton, and President George W. Bush

Administration’s Efforts .................................................................................6

President Barack Obama Administration’s Efforts ................................................... 8

Pros of U.S Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Ratification ..............................................9

Impact on Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Non-Proliferation ................................ 10

Link to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ...................................................... 14

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Monitoring and Inspection Network ......................... 15

Cons of U.S. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Ratification ........................................... 18

Stockpile Stewardship Program ...................................................................... 18

Life Extension Programs ............................................................................... 19

Reliable Replacement Warhead .......................................................................19

Impact on U.S. Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation ............................................. 20

Conclusion .................................................................................................... 23

Bibliography ................................................................................................. 25
Figures

Page

Figure 1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Annex 2 States..........................................5

Figure 2. Nuclear Weapon Test Sites..................................................................... 13

Figure 3. CTBTO International Monitoring System Sites................................................ 16
[vii]

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government or the Department of Defense. In 

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the 

United States Government.
[viii]

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his gratitude to Dr. Barry R. Schneider for his valuable his 

guidance, assistance, and professional expertise on early drafts. He would like to thank his wife 

for her tremendous support, understanding and dedication to the Unites States Air Force.

Jeffrey D. Neischel Lt Col, USAF
[ix]

The Author

Colonel Jeffrey D. Neischel is the Assessments Division Chief at HQ USAF/A10 (Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration). He is a 1989 graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 

University where he earned a Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Studies and a USAF ROTC 

commission.

He graduated from pilot training at Laughlin AFB, TX and attended the B-52 Combat Crew 

Training Course at Castle AFB, CA. He served B-52 operational flying assignments in the 23rd 

Bomb Squadron at Minot AFB, ND and the 20th Bomb Squadron at Barksdale AFB, LA as a 

standardization and evaluation co-pilot, aircraft commander, squadron safety officer, instructor 

pilot, and weapons and tactics flight commander. As an aircraft commander he and his crew 

were awarded the Air Force Association’s 1999 General Curtis E. LeMay Award for actions 

during Operation Allied Force. He then served as a USAF Weapons School B-52 instructor pilot 

at Detachment 2 and Detachment 5 at Barksdale AFB, LA. After graduating from Air Command 

and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, AL he was assigned to HQ USAF as the Requirements 

Policy Branch Chief, B-52 Program Element Monitor, and Global Strike Branch Chief. He then 

became the 49th Test Squadron Director of Operations at Barksdale AFB, LA and prior to 

attending Air War College, was the 340th Weapons Squadron Commander at Barksdale AFB, 

LA. Col Neischel is a command pilot with more than 3,600 flying hours in the T-37, T-38, B52G and B-52H with over 130 combat hours.

Col Neischel holds Masters Degrees in Aeronautical Operations and Management (EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University), Military Operational Science (Air University), and Strategic 

Studies (Air University).

[1]

“There are some who believe that failing to invest adequately in our nuclear deterrent will move 

us closer to a nuclear-free world. In fact, blocking crucial modernization means unilateral 

disarmament by unilateral obsolescence. This unilateral disarmament will only encourage 

nuclear proliferation, since our allies will see the danger and our adversaries the opportunity.”1

Introduction

Since 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been open to states for 

signature with a goal of ending all nuclear testing. While it has had moderate success, several 

key states have not yet ratified it and brought it into force. To date, 181 countries have signed 

the treaty and 149 have ratified it, with ratification being the sticking point with China, Egypt, 

India, Indonesia, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States. If President Barack 

Obama’s administration follows through with its stated goal of ratifying the CTBT, what are the 

pros, cons for us national security, and specifically what are the associated impacts on the U.S. 

nuclear stockpile, its deterrence capabilities, and global nuclear arms control?

The Comprehensive Test Ban should be ratified if three conditions are satisfied if is 

determined that:

• The US nuclear weapons stockpile can be reliably maintained without farther nuclear 

explosive test;

• The US extended deterrent to the 31 allied States that depend on it for their security is not 

harmed by a lack of testing;

 1 Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Richard Perle (former assistant secretary of Defense), “Unilateral Obsolescence,” Air Force 

Magazine, (September 2009), p 60.
[2]

• Treaty compliance by the signatory states can be adequately verified.

It is also important to understand that the CTBT is limited instrument that can aid US 

nonproliferation efforts but cannot stop determined proliferation since some states may 

choose not to sign, ratify and/or comply with its terms. Other measures will be required to 

cope with such threats in addition to treaties. Before arguing this, it is useful to first review 

the CTBT history, structure and current status will be reviewed to form a working

foundation. Second, the United State’s CTBT role and ratification efforts will be examined 

through President George H.W. Bush’s, President Bill Clinton’s, President George W. 

Bush’s and President Barack Obama’s administrations. Third, the essay will examine the 

pros of United States CTBT ratification pertaining to nuclear arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the CTBT monitoring and inspection 

network. To conclude, the cons of United States CTBT ratification will be evaluated with 

emphasis on the nuclear weapon Stockpile Stewardship Program, Life Extension Programs, 

the Reliable Replacement Warhead, and United States deterrence and nuclear proliferation

impacts.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The main goal of the CTBT is to outlaw global atmospheric, surface, underwater and 

underground nuclear testing. Through denial of nuclear testing, the treaty’s intent is to obstruct 

initial development of nuclear weapons by states that don’t have them, to thwart states that have 

nuclear weapons from designing new variants, to prevent public health issues and to stop 
[3]

environmental damage.2

History

Ratification of the CTBT by the United States is also a means of 

pressuring other hold out states like China to do likewise.

Since the world’s first nuclear explosion on July 16, 1945 (the United State’s Trinity Shot),

through 1996, the United States performed over 1, 000 nuclear tests: Soviet Union (700+), 

France (200+), United Kingdom (45), and China (45). Significant international and domestic 

pressure to ban nuclear tests resulted in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty which halted nuclear 

atmospheric testing. While signaled by some as a breakthrough, the true end state of the Partial 

Test Ban Treaty was as a public health measure. While it stopped above-ground nuclear fallout, 

it did not stop testing as it merely drove nuclear testing underground, and the Cold War arms 

race continued.

3

Structure

 Between January 1994 and August 1996, representatives from the member 

states at the United Nations Geneva Conference on Disarmament negotiated the CTBT and on 

Sept. 10, 1996, the General Assembly adopted it (158 in favor, 3 opposed, with 5 abstentions).

The body in charge, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 

Organization (CTBTO) headquartered in Vienna, is chaired by Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth 

from Hungary. The CTBTO was open for signature in 1996 and is staffed by 250 members from 

180 of the signatory states.4

 2 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “CTBTO Fact Sheet,” (Oct. 3, 2009), www.ctbto.org.

The primary task of the CTBTO is to promote the treaty in order to 

get states to sign it, ratify it, and thereby bring the treaty into force. Once the treaty is in force, 

the body will formally become the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Organization comprised of 

3 Daryl G. Kimball, “Learning from the 1999 Vote on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” (Oct. 5, 2009), www.armscontrol.org. 4 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “CTBTO Fact Sheet,” (Oct. 3, 2009), www.ctbto.org.
[4]

a Conference of State Parties, a Technical Secretariat, and an Executive Council responsible for 

implementing the CTBT’s requirements and international verification measures.5

Current Status

As previously stated, the CTBTO is currently a preparatory body because the treaty itself has

yet to come into force. The reason behind the 13-year-plus gap between September 1996 and 

December 2009 is due to several key states either not signing the treaty, or failing to ratify it. 

Signing the treaty is the first step, with ratification (a state’s formal government approval) 

occurring next. There are 195 states the CTBTO currently tracks, and 182 of those have signed 

(13 have not), 151 have ratified (44 have not), and those 13 that haven’t signed the treaty are also 

ones that haven’t ratified it. When the CTBT opened for signature, 44 states were listed as 

having the technological means for nuclear reactors or nuclear research reactors, and it is these

states that must sign and ratify the CTBT for it to become enforceable. Those states are referred 

as CTBT Annex 2 States (see figure 1).

 5 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “White House CTBT Fact Sheet,” (July 20, 1999), www.state.gov.
[5]

STATES SIGNATURE RATIFICATION

1 Algeria Oct. 15, 1996 July 11, 2003

2 Argentina Sept. 24, 1996 Dec. 4, 1998

3 Australia Sept. 24, 1996 July 9, 1998

4 Austria Sept. 24, 1996 March 13, 1998

5 Bangladesh Oct. 24, 1996 March 8, 2000

6 Belgium Sept. 24, 1996 June 29, 1999

7 Brazil Sept. 24, 1996 July 24, 1998

8 Bulgaria Sept. 24, 1996 Sept. 29, 1999

9 Canada Sept. 24, 1996 Dec. 18, 1998

10 Chile Sept. 24, 1996 July 12, 2000

11 China Sept. 24, 1996

12 Colombia Sept. 24, 1996 Jan. 29, 2008

13 Democratic People`s Republic of Korea

14 Democratic Republic of the Congo Oct. 4, 1996 Sept. 28, 2004

15 Egypt Oct. 14, 1996

16 Finland Sept. 24, 1996 Jan. 15, 1999

17 France Sept. 24, 1996 April 6, 1998

18 Germany Sept. 24, 1996 Aug. 20, 1998

19 Hungary Sept. 25, 1996 July 13, 1999

20 India

21 Indonesia Sept. 24, 1996

22 Iran (Islamic Republic of) Sept. 24, 1996 

23 Israel Sept. 25, 1996

24 Italy Sept. 24, 1996 Feb. 1, 1999

25 Japan Sept. 24, 1996 July 8, 1997

26 Mexico Sept. 24, 1996 Oct. 5, 1999

27 Netherlands Sept. 24, 1996 March 23, 1999

28 Norway Sept. 24, 1996 July 15, 1999

29 Pakistan

30 Peru Sept. 25, 1996 Nov. 12, 1999

31 Poland Sept. 24, 1996 May 25, 1999

32 Republic of Korea Sept. 24, 1996 Sept. 24, 1999

33 Romania Sept. 24, 1996 Oct. 5, 1999

34 Russian Federation Sept. 24, 1996 June 30, 2000

35 Slovakia Sept. 24, 1996 March 3, 1998

36 South Africa Sept. 24, 1996 March 30, 1999

37 Spain Sept. 24, 1996 July 31, 1998

38 Sweden Sept. 24, 1996 Dec. 2, 1998

39 Switzerland Sept. 24, 1996 Oct. 1, 1999

40 Turkey Sept. 24, 1996 Feb. 16, 2000

41 Ukraine Sept. 24, 1996 Feb. 23, 2001

42 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Sept. 24, 1996 April 6, 1998

43 United States of America Sept. 24, 1996

44 Viet Nam Sept. 24, 1996 March 10, 2006

Figure 1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Annex 2 States6

 6 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “CTBT Annex 2 States,” (Oct. 3, 2009), www.ctbto.org.
[6]

The U.S. Role in Moving Toward the CTBT

Korea, India, and Pakistan have yet to sign the CTBT, with China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 

Israel, and the United States signing but not ratifying the treaty. The CTBT will enter into force 

180 days after the last of the 44 Annex 2 states ratifies the treaty, with the Secretary General of 

the United Nations receiving all signatures, and ratifications.

7

Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush Administration’s Efforts

 On Sept. 24, 1996, United States

President Bill Clinton was the first world leader to sign the treaty.

In 1992, President George H.W. Bush established a moratorium on all United States nuclear 

testing that holds to this day. While the United States was involved in the 1994 development of 

the CTBT, and although President Clinton signed it first in, it has still not been ratified by the 

United States. For ratification the United States must get a two-thirds majority vote, at least 67 

of 100 senators, in favor of the CTBT.

8

One year after signing, President Clinton sent it to the Senate on Sept. 23, 1997, for 

deliberation. In October 1997 and 1998, Congressional CTBT and nuclear stockpile testimony 

was presented to the Senates Armed Services Committee and the Energy and Water 

Development Appropriations Subcommittee. In between, the Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services had hearings to 

discuss the CTBT in context of the U.S. nuclear stockpile with Under Secretary of State for 

Arms Control John Holum testifying for President Clinton the treaty was verifiable.9

 7 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “White House CTBT Fact Sheet,” (July 20, 1999), www.state.gov. 8 Nuclear and WMD, “Status of CTBT Ratification,” (Oct. 9, 2009), www.basicint.org. 9 Ibid.
[7]

During this period, the Republican Party headed by Sen. Trent Lott had the majority in the 

United States Senate and did not allow hearings or votes to take place based on South Asian 

nuclear tests, questions over the Stockpile Stewardship Program, potential negative impacts on 

the United States nuclear laboratory infrastructure, and doubts whether the CTBT was truly 

verifiable. President Clinton called the CTBT “the longest-sought, hardest fought prize in arms 

control history.”10 With U.S. political lines drawn, the republicans in the Senate held an

unplanned vote for CTBT ratification on Oct. 13, 1999. Voting went along party lines 51 to 48

against ratification (one senator voted “present,” which equated to an abstention). This was the 

first time a state’s legislature failed to ratify the CTBT when it was put to a vote.11

When President George W. Bush took office in January 2001, his inauguration speech made it 

clear the CTBT was not a high priority when he said, “We can fight the spread of nuclear 

weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties.”12 His nomination for secretary 

of state, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, also stated in his 2001 

confirmation hearing the United States would not seek CTBT ratification.

13

 10 Daryl G. Kimball, “Learning from the 1999 Vote on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” (Oct. 5, 2009),

While President 

George W. Bush did uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing, the CTBT did not get ratified 

during his tenure from 2001 to 2008. The 2008 U.S. presidential race led to the election of 

Barack Obama, who favors CTBT ratification and who has declared that step to be part of his 

nonproliferation agenda, Ratification, however, is something only the US Senate can do and 

getting 67 votes for any measure in the Senate is a difficult political task, especially in an 

atmosphere marked by partisan gridlock.

www.armscontrol.org. 11 Nuclear and WMD, “Status of CTBT Ratification,” (Oct. 9, 2009), www.basicint.org. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.
[8]

President Barack Obama’s Administration’s Efforts

Early statements by President Obama reversed the United State’s vector concerning the CTBT

by vowing to actively pursue ratification once the administration is convinced it has the required 

67 Senate votes. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton also pledged that the administration “would 

work intensively with senators to reassure them on such technical issues as the verifiability of a 

test ban.”14

On Oct. 13, 1999, the CTBT ratification vote was 48 for, 51 against, and one present. If the 

vote went strictly by party lines, the vote would have been 45 for and 55 against since the 

“present” vote was cast by Sen. Robert Byrd from West Virginia (a Democrat), and four 

Republicans voted for ratification (Senators Gordon Smith from Oregon, Arlen Specter from 

Pennsylvania, Lincoln Chafee from Rhode Island, and Jim Jeffords from Vermont).

 Based on the previous United States Senate CTBT ratification rejection on Oct. 13,

1999, and its January 2011 composition, clearly President Obama’s administration indeed has 

some intensive work ahead to win the support of 67 U.S. Senators.

It is unclear how the newly elected U.S. Senate, seated in January 2011, will act on the CTBT 

if and when it comes up for a ratification vote. The United States’ financial contributions to the 

CTBTO are also an issue for President Obama since the Bush administration opposed it and did 

not fully fund it. Funding for the CTBTO is an issue since a state’s voting rights are tied to 

contributions (those states not paying contributions lose voting rights). A look at the U.S. dollar 

contribution over the past two years shows $12.1 million due in 2008 ($1.2 million paid, $10.9

million outstanding) and $11.3 million due in 2009 ($4.6 million paid, $6.7 million outstanding). 

 14 Cole Harvey, “Obama Sets New Course on Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, (March 2009), pp 35-36.
[9]

The next two highest programmed contributing states are Japan ($9.2 million in 2008, $8.5

million in 2009), and Germany ($4.7 million in 2008, and $4.4 million in 2009). Surprisingly, 

China (slated for $1.5 million in 2008 and $1.4 million in 2009) and Russia (slated for $0.7

million in 2008 and $0.6 million in 2009) pay significantly less when considering their nuclear 

weapon history, stockpile and gross domestic product. Of note, each country makes contributions 

in both U.S. dollars and Euros, but China’s and Russia’s euro contributions do not change the

disparity when compared to the United States euro contribution.

15

In Secretary of State Clinton’s words, the difference between the previous and current 

administration was the Bush administration did not agree with arms-control treaties because they 

believed “good people don’t need them and bad people won’t follow them,” but they are 

“passionate concerns of President Obama”16. Secretary of State Clinton stated this stance on a 

formal nuclear test ban exactly 13 years after the CTBT was open for signature when she said 

“as long as we are confronted with the prospect of nuclear testing by others, we will face the 

potential threat of newer, more powerful, and more sophisticated weapons that could cause

damage beyond our imagination.”17

Pros of U.S. CTBT Ratification

Many believe it is imperative for the United States to ratify the CTBT, and to ratify it as soon 

as possible. Nine of the 44 Annex 2 states required for the CTBT to enter into force have yet to 

ratify the treaty (China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and the 

United States). China and the United States are viewed as key players with the most CTBT 

responsibilities yet to be met, and some believe the remaining eight Annex 2 states will follow

 15 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “CTBT Assessed Contributions 2008 and 2009,” (Oct. 7, 2009), www.ctbto.org. 16 Cole Harvey, “Obama Sets New Course on Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, (March 2009), p 36. 17 Meri Lugo, “Clinton Makes Case for CTBT at Conference,” (Oct 14 2009), www.armscontrol.org.
[10]

their ratification examples. Pro-CTBT individuals feel the delay in bringing the treaty into force 

has not allowed the world the full security benefits the treaty affords. While the politics of who 

should sign the CTBT first has existed for more than 13 years, a wider perspective of the 

remaining nine states warrants discussion.

Impact on Nuclear Arms Control

The United States, Russia and China have nuclear-weapon stockpiles, and have not tested 

them since 1996. Of the remaining six Annex 2 states, Iran’s, India’s, North Korea’s and 

Pakistan’s intentions with regard to nuclear weapons are less clear (Indonesia and China stated 

they will likely ratify once the United States does). Three of the four states have tested nuclear 

weapons since the CTBT was opened for signature: India in 1996, Pakistan in 1998 and North 

Korea in 2006 and in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Obama stated in one of his first foreign 

policy speeches of his wish to “seek the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons, 

and as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective 

arsenal.”18

While the United States and others have nuclear stockpiles created during the Cold War, other

states are trying to acquire new nuclear weapons. Advocates of the CTBT argue that a test ban 

will inhilibit the development of new and additional nuclear weapons. Understanding President 

Obama’s thinking helps explain his desire ultimately to rid the world of nuclear weapons, yet 

keep them in the United States’ stockpile in order to deal with old, current, and possible future 

threats as required for deterrence. As Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottenmoeller stated 

during an August 2009 Weapons of Mass Destruction conference, “ironically, now 20 years after 

 18 Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottenmoeller, Remarks to the August 2009 USAF/DTRA Conference “Confronting 

Global WMD, Threats – New Direction of a New Administration”, The Long Road from Prague – The Administration’s 

Views on Nuclear Weapons Reduction and Arms Control, (Williamsburg, Va.., Aug. 14, 2009), p 2.
[11]

the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, and despite the implementation of arms 

control agreements between Russia and the United States, the chances of a nuclear detonation 

somewhere in the world seem greater than at points during the Cold War.”19

Ultimately, can the United States and China, along with the CTBT ratified states of France, 

Russia and the United Kingdom, convince Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, North Korea and 

Pakistan to ratify and abide by the CTBT? The United States recently held its first formal talks 

with Iran in over 30 years, and India made a pledge over 11 years ago to not be one of the states 

to stand in the way of ratification. If India ratifies, Pakistan is expected to follow.

20

Another factor impacting CTBT ratification is the other nuclear treaties on the world’s 

agenda. The START treaty with Russia expired in December 2009, and the New START Treaty 

that follows it was signed in April 2010 and awaits reification by the US Senate. The November 

2010 elections have changed the composition of the US Senate, probably making near-term 

ratification less likely. Failure to ratify ti New STRAT could delay or prevent CTBT from 

ratification, since the Obama Administration come up for a vote unless they had 67 votes. This 

lowers the number of nuclear vehicles and associated nuclear warheads. Without nuclear testing, 

and depending on the number of s warheads and delivery vehicles allowed by the terms, the 

CTBT becomes an integral part in future nuclear-arms discussions.

In the end, 

Egypt, Iran, Israel, and North Korea may be the last of the 44 Annex 2 states to hold out from 

ratifying the CTBT. If that becomes the case, the CTBTO could propose an amendment 

allowing it to enter into force without these four states.

 19 Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottenmoeller, Remarks to the USAF/DTRA “Confronting Global WMD, Threats –

New Direction of a New Administration,” The Long Road from Prague – The Administration’s Views on Nuclear 

Weapons Reduction and Arms Control, (Williamsburg, Va., Aug. 14, 2009), p 4. 20 Jessica Mathews, “This Time, Ban the Test,” International Herald Tribune, (Oct. 21, 2009).
[12]

The United States is also working toward a treaty to reduce the fissile materials, plutonium 

and uranium, required to produce nuclear weapons. This treaty, called the Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty, will fall under the United Nations Committee on Disarmament, and is considered 

vital because “as nuclear arsenals come down, it will be increasingly important to have 

limitations on fissile material that could be used to produce new weapons.”21

Also at the May 2010 United Nations meetings will be a review of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), which is held every five years. The synergy between the START 

follow-on negotiations, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, NPT and CTBT is crucial for President 

Obama’s administration because he has the unique opportunity to link long-term nuclear 

policies. Since these nuclear treaties are being discussed/negotiated at roughly the same time, his

priority is likely to reduce warheads via the START follow-on treaty, and then use that as a 

foundation to show strengthened United States resolve for reducing nuclear capabilities at the 

NPT review (and to give the United States credibility and leverage for keeping states desiring 

nuclear capabilities in the NPT regime).

Currently, the 

Committee on Disarmament agreed on Aug. 11, 1998, to create a committee to negotiate the 

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, with further discussions scheduled at the May 2010 NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons conference in New York.

 21 Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottenmoeller, Remarks to the August 2009 USAF/DTRA Conference “Confronting 

Global WMD, Threats – New Direction of a New Administration,” The Long Road from Prague – The Administration’s 

Views on Nuclear Weapons Reduction and Arms Control, (Williamsburg, Va.., Aug. 14, 2009), pp 8-9.
[13]

Figure 2. Nuclear Weapon Test Sites22

At the core of the CTBT is the positive belief that by banning nuclear testing, established 

nuclear states will be limited in their ability to create new and, or more sophisticated nuclear 

weapons. This essentially attempts to prevent an arms race where one country competes with 

another country’s newer designs, capabilities, and stockpile quantities. The CTBT also takes aim 

at those states with no nuclear weapons by making it much more difficult for them to go through 

the same technological development cycle. With nuclear testing, states like the United States

and the former Soviet Union were able to detect nuclear design problems, incorporate changes, 

test the new weapon, and then add to its stockpile. Figure 2 shows displays where the United 

States, the Soviet Union, and other countries performed these tests.

 22 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “Nuclear Weapon Test Sites,” (Oct. 3, 2009), www.ctbto.org.
[14]

Link to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was created in 1968 among the five states with

nuclear capabilities (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) and entered into 

force in 1970. The purpose was to ban NPT members from transferring or aiding other countries 

to obtain nuclear weapons. It also committed those five states to eventually eliminate nuclear 

weapons. Currently 189 states are members of the NPT, and the CTBT links to it through these

three key articles.

23 Article I: each NPT nuclear weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear 

weapons, or nuclear explosive devices, and to not assist non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear 

weapons. Article IV: parties to the treaty have the right to pursue research and production of 

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Article VI: NPT states will pursue negotiations in good 

faith on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 

disarmament.24

Impact on Nuclear Proliferation

There are 189 NPT member states. Unfortunately, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan are 

not NPT members. Instead, they have joined the ranks of nuclear weapon states. North Korea is 

an exception to the rule. It joined the NPT in 1985, but withdrew in 2003.

Many believe that historically, more countries would have acquired nuclear capabilities had 

the NPT not been negotiated and served as a legal barrier to proliferation. But after the 1991 Gulf 

War when Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program was discovered, this served as a clear 

example of a nuclear power program being used as a cover for a nuclear weapons program. 

 23 George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History & Current Problems,” (Oct. 14, 2009),

www.armcontrol.org. 24 Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, (Oct. 14, 2009), www.state.gov.
[15]

Cheating on the treaty limits allowed Iraq to covertly develop nuclear weapons while 

simultaneously enjoying the nuclear power program benefits provided by NPT membership. This 

same path to a nuclear weapons program was followed by North Korea and, now, Iran. 

Libya was in the process of acquiring a turn-key nuclear program, but abandoned it, and more 

recently Iran was caught with nuclear enriching facilities not declared to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (and therefore not previously open to inspection). These cases of NPT 

violations and clandestine proliferation programs by Iran Iraq, and Libya show the difficulty of 

treaty verification the CTBTO must also address how to verify member compliance in order to 

enforce the CTBT.

25 When the U.S. Senate voted against ratifying the CTBT in 1999, a limiting 

factor in the eyes of anti-CTBT United States Senators was the perceived inability to accurately 

monitor and verify the world for nuclear tests. That was highly debatable 13 years ago, but 

today the CTBTO’s verification system is more robust due to modernization and and 

augmentation of the system as shown for example, by its success in monitoring the North Korean 

nuclear tests.

CTBT Monitoring and Inspection Network

In order to detect a nuclear test, the CTBTO will depend on an International Monitoring 

System which consists of 337 global facilities (see Figure 3). Of these 337 sites, 249 are 

currently certified to send information to the International Data Centre in Vienna, 26 are being 

tested, 29 are under construction, and 33 more are planned. The International Monitoring 

 25 George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History & Current Problems,” (Oct. 14, 2009),

www.armcontrol.org.
[16]

System is composed of four parts to detect a nuclear explosion: seismic, hydroacoustic, 

infrasound and radionuclide.

Figure 3. CTBTO International Monitoring System Sites26

These stations are able to detect a nuclear explosion as small as one-tenth of a kiloton (200,000 

lbs)27 and of note, China has yet to allow International Monitoring Stations on its border to 

transmit data to the International Data Centre.28

The seismic portion has 170 sites, 50 primary and 120 auxiliary, to monitor and detect 

shockwaves below the Earth’s surface.

29

 26 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “CTBTO International Monitoring System Sites,” (Oct. 3, 2009), 

 These sites detect thousands of events a year, mainly 

www.ctbto.org. 27 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “CTBTO Fact Sheet,” (Oct. 3, 2009), www.ctbto.org. 28 Meri Lugo, “Clinton Makes Case for CTBT at Conference,” (Oct. 14, 2009), www.armscontrol.org..
[17]

from earthquakes and mining explosions, but have proved effective in detecting past nuclear 

tests. In October 2006, 22 International Monitoring System seismic stations detected North 

Korea’s underground nuclear test, including one 4,350 miles away. In two hours, the data were 

received, analyzed by CTBTO headquarters in Vienna, and then sent to CTBT member states for 

review.30

The 11 hydroacoustic monitoring stations detect sound waves in the oceans, and the 60 

infrasound stations detect above ground, ultra-low frequency sound waves emitted by nuclear 

explosions. The last piece is 80 radionuclide stations able to detect radioactive particles in the 

atmosphere, with 40 able to detect noble gases which are odorless, colorless and with a low 

chemical radioactivity. To highlight this capability, the United States and South Korean 

International Monitoring Systems detected radioactive gases from the October 2006 North 

Korean nuclear explosion and as well as one in Canada 4,600 miles away.

 In May 2009, 61 seismic stations detected another North Korean nuclear test, proving 

the International Monitoring System credibility. In the last decade, especially since the October 

1999 United States Senate vote against CTBT ratification, the seismic array of the International 

Monitoring System has advanced technologically, and along with the two detected North Korean 

nuclear tests, should help dismiss doubts world-leaders might have about detection capabilities

and relevance.

If International Monitoring System stations detect a nuclear explosion, a CTBT member state 

may seek an on-site inspection. This derives a final assessment and assists in making a decision 

with regard to CTBT violations. However, on-site inspections are only an option after the CTBT 

 29 Ibid. 30 Jessica Mathews, “This Time, Ban the Test,” International Herald Tribune, (Oct. 21, 2009).
[18]

enters into force.31

Cons of U.S. CTBT Ratification

 While ratification of the CTBT by the Annex 2 states, and entry into force

would be a positive step toward a nuclear weapon free world, there are drawbacks.

From the U.S. perspective, the lack of nuclear testing since 1996 has left an aging nuclear

stockpile. Some nuclear weapons lack the most current safety features, and the downturn of the 

nuclear infrastructure technical knowledge required to maintain it goes directly against our goal 

of having safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons. Established in 1998 by the National 

Defense Act, the Stockpile Stewardship Program was created in order to deal with an aging 

stockpile without nuclear testing.

Stockpile Stewardship Program

The Stockpile Stewardship Program “is the implementing strategy of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration to ensure a credible United States nuclear deterrent without underground 

testing.”32

 31 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “CTBTO Fact Sheet,” (Oct. 3, 2009), 

In the past, testing and constantly upgrading the nuclear stockpile gave a high-level 

of confidence to the United States and its allies. Since that is no longer the case, and the United 

States has not fielded a new nuclear weapon since the early 1990s, the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program strives to use a science-based approach with advance simulation and modeling tools as 

a substitute for actual nuclear weapons testing. The biggest doubt raised among the nuclear 

community scientists responsible for the weapons design is the lack of empirical test data. The 

hopes are that new capabilities will arrive, allowing scientific simulations to be more accurate 

than actual underground testing. That time has not come, so Life Extension Programs are how 

www.ctbto.org. 32 Office of the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Matters – A Practical Guide, Washington D.C., p 

51.
[19]

the United States presently deals with an aging Cold War nuclear stockpile at the core of its 

retaliatory capability that hopefully creates substantial deterrent effects.

Life Extension Programs

With the end of the Cold War and the self-imposed ban on nuclear testing in 1992, the United 

States outlook on world affairs was much different than it is today. Since then India, North 

Korea and Pakistan have all tested nuclear weapons (and have not signed the CTBT); China, 

France, Russia and the United Kingdom plan to modernize nuclear arsenals;33 rogue states like 

Iran attempt to obtain nuclear weapons and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology is 

wider than ever before. This leaves the United States in the undesirable position of trying to 

maintain a dominant position with a Cold War designed, focused and aging stockpile. This 

leaves Life Extension Programs as the only measure to keep the nuclear stockpile relevant for 

years to come. Recent Life Extension Program efforts have met with criticism based on 

budgetary constraints and the perception of “new” capabilities added to the stockpile. One of the 

most recent heated debates to take place revolves around the Reliable Replacement Warhead.

Reliable Replacement Warhead

The Reliable Replacement Warhead effort has taken many turns and was cancelled in 2009. 

The goal was to create a safer, more secure and more reliable nuclear warhead than what is 

currently in the United States stockpile. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently stated that a 

“congressionally mandated review of U.S. nuclear strategy is likely to recommend developing a 

 33 Bill Sweetman, “U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy,” (Sept. 3, 2009), www.aviationweek.com.
[20]

safer and more reliable warhead design as part of a broader effort to modernize and maintain the 

nation’s nuclear deterrent.”34

A new warhead, which has already shown to be very politically sensitive, will also come at 

the price of obtaining a much needed upgrade to our nuclear deterrent without actual testing. 

John Foster, a veteran Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory nuclear weapons specialist,

states, “If the labs are not permitted to practice design, then the development of any warhead 

can’t assume competence and proficiency, and a credible deterrent cannot be maintained.”

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (or a similar program under a 

different title) is a positive step toward modernizing the stockpile, and is an essential offset to 

ratifying the CTBT.

35

Impact on United States Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation

 

While Foster’s opinion may not reflect an official Department of Energy position, it does

underscore the associated risk of fielding a new critical nuclear capability without actually 

physically testing its reliability.

The goal of deterrence is to have a credible and visible means to alter an adversary’s behavior. 

Our Cold War stockpile was built to counteract and deter the Soviet Union, not the rogue state 

and terrorist threats of today. When India, North Korea and Pakistan tested their nuclear 

weapons, it sent a clear message the non-proliferation intent of the NPT did not stop them and 

along those lines, neither will the CTBT. One of the worst cases of nuclear proliferation came

from the nuclear black market sales of the former scientific leader of Pakistan’s nuclear program, 

A.Q. Khan.

 34 John Fleck, “Gates Hints at Call for New Warhead Designs in Nuclear Posture Review,” (Sept. 23, 2009),

www.globalsecuritynewswire.org. 35 Bill Sweetman, “U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy,” (Sept. 3, 2009), www.aviationweek.com.
[21]

A.Q. Khan’s black market illegal nuclear proliferation operation proved extremely detrimental 

to the attempt to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons and showed how a non-nuclear state can 

relatively quickly and easily obtain all the parts necessary to become a nuclear weapon state. 

Iran acquired significant nuclear weapons technology through the A.Q. Khan network, including

enrichment capabilities for nuclear weapons material designs, and the nuclear technology for 

both gun-type and implosion-type weapons. Iran has also concentrated on configuring nuclear 

warheads for use on medium-range missiles, and, as the world recently discovered, has several 

dispersed facilities capable of enriching uranium.36

Even if the United States and China join the other permanent members of the UN Security 

Council in full membership of the CTBT, there will likely still be other improvement States not 

in agreement to a test ban: Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel. Of the group, only 

North Korea is presently actively testing nuclear weapons but Iran may be doing so in the future. 

If true, this poses a major threat to international non-proliferation as efforts since Iran is a radical 

regime whose President has publicity denounced Israel’s right to exist and whose government is 

the leading State sponsor of terrorism in the world. The CTBT will be important in preventing 

such a regime from developing and testing nuclear weapons and, unfortunately the Iranian and 

North Korean nuclear programs may spur their neighbors in the Middle East and North East Asia 

to develop their own nuclear weapons to counter them. Determined nuclear proliferation may 

therefore undermine the nonproliferation efforts of which the CTBT is a part

States like Turkey, South Korea or Japan may feel threatened into creating nuclear capabilities 

based on North Korea’s and Iran’s actions, and the potential for a new nuclear arms race in the 

Middle East or East Asia exists. What the United States has done in the past to prevent countries 

 36 Anthony Cordesman, “The Iran Attack Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, (Sept. 25, 2009), www.online.wsj.com.
[22]

like these from creating nuclear weapons is to extend a nuclear deterrence “umbrella” to them in 

exchange for abandoning nuclear weapons programs. The United States needs a safe, and secure 

and nuclear retaliatory force marked by nuclear stockpile that is reliable and perceived to be 

reliable in order to deter potential adversaries. 

Other than military airstrikes like Israel’s airstrikes against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear plant in 

1981, and the U.S. 1991 Gulf War where International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors found

Iraq. President Obama stated “if the governments of Iran and North Korea choose to ignore 

international standards; if they put the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of regional stability and 

the security and opportunity of their own people; if they are oblivious to the dangers of 

escalating nuclear arms races in both East Asia and the Middle East, then they must be held 

accountable.”37

Russian President Medvedev said, “Sanctions rarely lead to productive results, but in some 

cases, sanctions are inevitable.”

It sounds good, but sanctions through United Nations resolutions have not

stopped determined rogue regimes from proceeding toward a nuclear weapon capability. North 

Unfortunately, how poorly sanctions have worked to stop them from acquiring, testing and 

proliferating nuclear weapon technology, stands as a good example for other bad actors to 

follow. 

38 If North Korea and Iran don’t “end their excuses and negotiate 

on significant issues,”39

 37 Helen Cooper, “Obama Makes Gains at U.N. on Iran and Proliferation,” The New York Times, (Sept. 24, 2009),

and abide by the treaties they have signed (Iran is a NPT participant, and 

signed the CTBT), military action or regime changes may be the only way to stop their nuclear 

weapons programs

www.nytimes.com. 38 Ibid. 39 Ali Sheikholeslami, “Iran May Quit Nuclear Treaty,” (Sept. 29, 2009), www.bloomberg.com.
[23]

Conclusion

Distressing nuclear proliferation has occurred despite International Atomic Energy Agency 

and United Nations efforts. States willing to covertly develop and test nuclear weapons, despite 

their treaties obligations and world-opinion, have continued without severe consequences. 

Treaties like the CTBT are necessary but not sufficient nonproliferation elements. They must be 

accompanied by other measures to make sense.

Since 1996, the CTBT has successfully curtailed nuclear tests of all but four of the CTBT 

signatory states have curtailed their nuclear tests. What the CTBT has not done, and may not do, 

is convince states like Iran and North Korea to join the regime and to stop nuclear weapon 

development and testing. If President Obama’s administration is able to accomplish its goal of 

ratifying the CTBT, it would be a huge accomplishment and will provide international legal 

barriers to nuclear testing. US ratification also should add pressure to other states like China that 

is still unsure about a commitment to ban nuclear tests without a similar pledge by the United 

States.. While politically and diplomatically significant, ratification of the CTBT without 

additional measures could increase United States security risks in a number of key critical areas.

First, security and reliability concerns continue to rise with aging nuclear warheads and 

weapons. The lack of actual testing is only mitigated, not eliminated, by the Stockpile 

Stewardship and Life Extension Programs. We are at a crossroads where we will have to rely on 

computer designs and modeling in order to establish an acceptable level of confidence regarding 

current and future nuclear weapons if we ratify the CTBT. If an issue arises with the United 

States stockpile, and we determine testing is required to maintain an effective and credible 
[24]

deterrent, the value of the CTBT could be erased, opening the door for other states to do the 

same.

Second, the combined impact from the previous risks has states like Egypt, Japan, South 

Korea and Turkey reviewing again whether they need their own nuclear weapons. If the United 

States nuclear stockpile is in question, or nuclear proliferation cannot be stopped to their 

satisfaction, these sovereign states may feel the extended deterrence provided by the United 

States is no longer adequate.

Third, the CTBT verification regime must be able to detect cheating by member states. 

Fortunately, the multiplicity of seismic solution that now surrounds the globe appears able to 

detect nuclear test explosions with a great deal of fidelity

While a new warhead for the United States would address the first security risk, the others 

will not be solved by the CTBT and its supporting organization alone. The CTBT, if augmented 

by a reliable Stockpile program, a sound extended deterrent to dissuade our non-nuclear allies 

form going nuclear, and a continued robust verification program is an asset to US security and, 

therefore, should be ratified by the US Senate. As the first to test and use nuclear weapons, the

United States has the obligation to lead the world toward a safer and more secure environment 

regarding nuclear weapons. The comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will put legal limits on testing, 

and a test ban will be an added inhibitor of development of additional or new types of nuclear 

weapons. For those reasons the CTBT, given certain conditions, is in the US national interest

and deserves ratification by the US Senate. 
[25]

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