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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Carla Wright ) Docket No. 2015-04-0181

)

v. ) State File No. 95090-2014

)

Cookeville Regional Medical Center, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims, )

Robert V. Durham, Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded - Filed March 8, 2017

This appeal involves an employer’s challenge to the trial court’s grant of a motion to 

continue the trial date to enable the employee to take additional expert medical testimony. 

On the eve of trial, the employee argued that she needed an opportunity to re-depose a 

treating physician in light of the employer’s misrepresentation defense, which was one of 

numerous defenses asserted by the employer. The trial court granted the employee’s 

request to continue the trial date, which the employer contends on appeal amounts to an 

abuse of discretion. We find no error and remand the case.

Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in 

which Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.

Fredrick R. Baker, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Cookeville 

Regional Medical Center

Kelly R. Williams, Livingston, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Carla Wright

Factual and Procedural Background

 

Carla Wright (“Employee”), an employee of Cookeville Regional Medical Center 

(“Employer”), alleged suffering a back injury while pulling a cart in the course and scope 

of her employment. Mediation efforts were unsuccessful and a dispute certification 

notice was issued on January 5, 2016, on which Employer’s defenses to the claim were 

identified as “applicability of the ‘escape clause,’ TTD overpayment, impairment rating.” 
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In addition, the dispute certification notice reflected the following disputed issues and 

defenses: (1) whether Employee sustained an injury that arose primarily out of and in the 

course and scope of her employment with Employer; (2) whether Employee’s injury was 

idiopathic in nature; (3) whether Employee suffered from a pre-existing condition that 

was aggravated by a work-related injury; (4) whether Employee sustained an injury in the 

course of employment with Employer; (5) whether Employee was injured while engaged 

in a significant deviation from her work duties; (6) whether the Employee was an 

independent contractor, casual employee, or volunteer at the time of the alleged injury; 

and (7) whether Employer had adequate grounds to deny Employee’s claim based on 

intoxication, willful misconduct, intentional misrepresentation, or voluntary participation 

in a non-work activity.

Following the addition of the Second Injury Fund (“Fund”) as a party, the parties 

again attempted to mediate the claim, this time with the Fund’s involvement. The 

mediation attempts were unsuccessful, and a second dispute certification notice was 

issued indicating that Employer’s defenses to the claim were “applicability of the ‘escape 

clause,’ TTD overpayment, PTD, impairment rating.” Employer submitted a list of 

eighteen “[a]dditional disputed issues and defenses,” one of which was misrepresentation.

After a post-discovery mediation, a third dispute certification notice was issued on 

December 16, 2016, identifying Employer’s defenses as “applicability of the ‘escape 

clause,’ PPD, PTD.” Employer submitted a list of additional disputed issues and 

defenses identical to the one submitted with the second dispute certification notice. Thus, 

four days before the trial date, Employer had raised twenty or more issues and/or 

defenses.

On the day immediately prior to the scheduled December 20, 2016 trial, the trial 

court held a telephonic conference with the parties during which Employee requested that 

the trial be continued.1Employee asserted that she was unaware Employer was relying 

on a misrepresentation defense until the post-discovery mediation conducted on 

December 8, 2016, and that she needed to re-take the deposition of one of her physicians 

in order to respond to that defense. The trial court granted Employee’s motion and 

continued the trial. Employer has appealed, asserting the trial court abused its discretion 

by granting the continuance.

 

1 The record contains a motion to continue the trial date signed by Employee’s attorney “on this the 19th

day of December 2016.” However, the certificate of service is dated December 26, 2016, approximately a 

week after the trial court granted the continuance. The motion was filed by the trial court clerk on 

December 28, 2016. Thus, we are unable to determine whether the trial court had this motion before it at 

the time of the teleconference on December 19, or whether Employee orally moved for a continuance at 

the teleconference, or both.
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Standard of Review

A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a request for a continuance is reviewed 

under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friendship 

Home Health Agency, LLC, No. M2007-02787-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 

262, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2009). An appellate court may “find an abuse of 

discretion only if the [trial] court ‘applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical 

conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or 

employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.’” Wright ex rel. 

Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011). In reviewing a trial court’s 

exercise of discretion, we presume the trial court was correct and consider the evidence in 

a light most favorable to upholding the decision. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 16-17 

(Tenn. 2013). “[W]e will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely 

because we might have chosen another alternative.” Johnson v. Walmart Assocs., Inc., 

No. 2014-06-0069, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18, at *17 (Tenn. Workers’ 

Comp. App. Bd. July 2, 2015). That said, such decisions “require a conscientious 

judgment, consistent with the facts, that takes into account the applicable law.” White v. 

Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tenn. 2015).

Analysis

A.

Employer asserts that the trial court erred by continuing the trial date for several 

reasons. First, Employer claims that by waiting until the day before trial to move for a 

continuance, Employer had already incurred the expense and inconvenience of preparing 

for trial. Second, Employer contends there was no legitimate reason to continue the case 

because misrepresentation had been identified as a defense in each dispute certification 

notice and, therefore, Employee had notice of that defense. Third, Employer points out 

that Employee never submitted written discovery requests and, therefore, failed to act 

diligently before moving for a continuance.

The law is clear that trial courts have wide discretion when deciding whether to 

grant or deny a motion for a continuance and, in resolving such a motion, the trial court 

should consider: “(1) the amount of time the proceedings have been pending, (2) the 

reasons for the continuance, (3) the diligence of the parties seeking the continuance, and

(4) the prejudice to the requesting party if the continuance is not granted.” Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co., 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 262, at *9. The law is also clear that “appellate courts 

should not second guess a trial court’s decision on a motion for a continuance unless the 

record, reviewed as a whole, shows a clear abuse of discretion or that a clear prejudicial 

error has been committed.” Nagarajan v. Terry, 151 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2003). The decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is fact specific, and such 
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motions should be considered in the context of the totality of the circumstances that exist 

at the time the motion is filed. Id.

In the present case, the parties participated in three separate mediations and, after 

each one, a dispute certification notice was issued that listed numerous disputed issues 

and defenses. For example, as a part of the dispute certification notice issued on 

December 16, 2016, Employer asserted defenses that were stated as follows:

 Date of injury;

 Notice;

 Medical causation/aggravation of preexisting condition;

 Extent of permanent medical impairment, if any;

 Extent of permanent disability, if any;

 Second Injury Fund apportionment;

 Misrepresentation;

 Subsequent intervening event;

 Whether injury occurred while working for different employer;

 Intoxication;

 Self-inflicted injury;

 Willful misconduct;

 Willful failure to use a safety device;

 Willful failure to perform a duty required by law;

 Voluntary participation in recreational activity;

 Idiopathic;

 Employee’s noncompliance with medical treatment; and

 Employer asserts all defenses allowed by statute, regulation, case law, or Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

This extensive listing of defenses was in addition to those identified on the dispute 

certification notice as “applicability of the ‘escape clause,’ PPD, PTD.” Accordingly, as 

recently as four days before the trial was to occur, Employer had raised at least twenty 

separate defenses, plus all other “defenses allowed by statute, regulation, case law, or 

Rules of Civil Procedure.”

A party may assert as many defenses as it deems appropriate consistent with good 

faith requirements.

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 However, when a party elects to assert a host of wide-ranging 

defenses, it runs the risk that the course of the litigation will be delayed or extended by 

 

2 A party’s claims and defenses must not be “presented for any improper purpose,” must be “warranted by 

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 

the establishment of new law,” and must have “evidentiary support” or be likely to have such support 

after reasonable discovery. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.02.
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the need of the opposing party to prepare for each and every defense. This case is a 

prime example, and we conclude the trial court’s decision to grant a continuance did not 

fall outside an acceptable range of alternatives given the myriad of defenses Employee 

faced. See Lee Med, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010) (Appellate 

courts “should review a lower court’s discretionary decision to determine . . . whether the 

lower court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.”).

Employer correctly points out that Employee submitted no written discovery. 

Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that Employee’s failure to do so was sufficient, under 

the circumstances presented, to warrant a finding that the trial court abused its discretion 

in delaying the trial. Employee was faced with the daunting task of having to respond to 

a multitude of defenses Employer continued to press as recently as a few days before the 

trial date. While doing so was Employer’s prerogative, it was the trial court’s prerogative

to grant Employee additional time to prepare. Again, trial courts have broad discretion to 

grant or deny a motion for a continuance, “and such discretion is ordinarily respected in 

the absence of clear, prejudicial error under the circumstances.” Turtle Creek Apartments 

v. Polk, 958 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Further, we note that Employer likewise requested, and was granted, a continuance

of the trial date. Although Employer requested the continuance approximately six weeks 

before the trial was scheduled to occur, the fact remains that Employer was granted the 

same relief it now opposes. Employer complains that Employee’s motion for a 

continuance prejudiced Employer “by causing undue delay in a case that has already been 

pending for quite some time.” While it is true Employee’s request for a continuance 

prolonged the case, the same can be said of Employer’s earlier request for a continuance.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we have no difficulty finding that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Employee’s request to continue the 

trial.

B.

Employer also faults the trial court for pointing out to Employee an inadequacy in 

her medical proof during the teleconference the day before the trial was scheduled to 

occur. Specifically, according to the statement of the evidence approved by the trial 

court, the trial judge

sua sponte reviewed the statutory requirements of [Tennessee Code 

Annotated section] 50-6-242(a)(2)(B), notified the parties that these 

requirements had not yet been satisfied because no written certification had 

been obtained, advised the parties that the written certification form was 

available on the Bureau’s website, and indicated that the record would be 

deficient if the proper written certification was not completed.
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Employer argues that the trial court thus “took it upon itself to effectively educate the 

Employee about this defect in [the] case, and then [gave] the Employee the opportunity to 

correct the mistake.” 

It is fundamental that trial judges are not advocates and cannot offer legal advice 

to a party in a case being adjudicated before them. See State v. Riels, 216 S.W.3d 737, 

747 (Tenn. 2007) (“[T]rial judges should always use restraint and not interject themselves 

into a role in a trial which may be perceived as that of an advocate rather than an 

impartial arbiter.”). While courts must be mindful of boundaries regarding educating a 

party and/or effectively advocating for a party, our conclusion that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in granting Employee’s request for a continuance obviates any need 

for us to address this issue at this point in time.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in granting Employee’s motion for a continuance. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision 

is affirmed, and the case is remanded for any further proceedings that may be necessary.
 

 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Carla Wright ) Docket No. 2015-04-0181

) 

v. ) State File No. 95090-2014 

) 

Cookeville Regional Medical Center, et al. )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the 

referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service 

on this the 8th day of March, 2017.

Name Certified 

Mail

First Class 

Mail

Via 

Fax

Fax 

Number

Via 

Email

Email Address

Kelly R. Williams X krwattorney@yahoo.com

Fred Baker X fbaker@wimberlylawson.com

Patrick Ruth X Patrick.Ruth@tn.gov

Robert V. Durham, 

Judge

X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, 

Chief Judge

X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, 

Court of Workers’ 

Compensation Claims

X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

 

Matthew Salyer

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov