alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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FREMONT

CARBON

SWEETWATER

ALBANY

NATRONA

SUBLETTE

LINCOLN

CONVERSE

CROOK

UINTA

LARAMIE

WESTON

PLATTE

GOSHEN

NIOBRARA

§ ̈¦25

§ ̈¦80

§ ̈¦80

§ ̈¦80

§ ̈¦25

§ ̈¦90

Rawlins

Casper

Rock Springs

Kemmerer

Pinedale

Newcastle

Yellowstone

National Park

Lusk

Yoder

Hanna

Baggs

Afton

Hulett

Glendo

Casper

Douglas

Bairoil

Rawlins

Laramie

Superior

Sundance

Saratoga

La Barge Guernsey

Pinedale

Kemmerer

Evanston

Cheyenne

Wheatland

Wamsutter

Cokeville

Chugwater

Big Piney

Newcastle

Torrington

Rock River

Pine Bluffs

Green River

Medicine Bow

Fort Laramie

Elk Mountain

Rock Springs

Grand Encampment

0 25 50 100

Miles

0 25 50 100

Kilometers

Wyoming Sage-Grouse RMP

Amendments Planning Area

o

NO WARRANTY IS MADE BY THE BLM FOR USE OF

THE DATA FOR PURPOSES NOT INTENDED BY BLM.

RMP Amendments Planning Area

Recreation Areas

Field Office Boundaries

Counties

Interstate

State / US Hwy

# Recreation Sites

Cities

Map 6: Developed Recreation Sites
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Barbara Tubiak, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[834 NYS2d 355]—

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed April 22, 2005, which, inter alia, ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

Claimant briefly worked as a receptionist at a doctor’s office. After she was reprimanded concerning the manner in which she was handling patient calls, claimant abruptly left her job. On her application for unemployment insurance benefits, claimant represented that she was discharged. Although she initially received benefits in the amount of $1,017, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board subsequently ruled that she was disqualified from receiving benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. It also charged her with a recoverable overpayment of benefits pursuant to Labor Law § 597 (4) and reduced her right to receive future benefits by eight effective days on the basis that she made a willful misrepresentation. Claimant now appeals.

We affirm. Criticism by an employer has been held not to constitute good cause for leaving one’s employment *(see Matter of DeCarlo [Commissioner of Labor],*6 AD3d 1003 [2004]; *Matter of Roawden [Commissioner of Labor],*263 AD2d 658 [1999]). In the instant case, the employer’s office manager testified that after she overhead claimant having extended telephone discussions with patients, she reminded claimant of the proper protocol for answering calls and that claimant left her job immediately thereafter. Although claimant maintained that she was fired, this presented a credibility issue for the Board to resolve *(see Matter of Giustino [Commissioner of Labor],*11 AD3d 803, 804 [2004]). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that claimant left her job for personal and noncompelling reasons. Moreover, inasmuch as claimant incorrectly represented that she was discharged when applying for benefits, the Board properly concluded that she made a willful misrepresentation to obtain benefits and charged her with a *993recoverable overpayment *(see Matter of Krisher [Commissioner of Labor],*34 AD3d 894, 895 [2006]).

Mercare, J.P., Crew III, Spain, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
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Exhibit 31.1
                                  CERTIFICATION

I, John Kehoe, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form 8-K
containing distribution or servicing reports filed in respect of periods
included in the year covered by this annual report, of MS Structured Asset Corp.
on behalf of SATURNS Trust No. 2002-3;

2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a whole,
does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of the
last day of the period covered by this annual report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information required to
be provided to the depositor by the trustee under the pooling and servicing, or
similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in these reports;
and

4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the depositor and
the trustee under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement and based
upon my knowledge and the annual compliance review required under that
agreement, and except as disclosed in the reports, the depositor and trustee
have each fulfilled its obligations under that agreement.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: LaSalle Bank National
Association and its officers and agents.



                                                   By: /s/ John Kehoe
                                                      ----------------------
                                                   Name:  John Kehoe
                                                   Title: Vice President
                                                   Date:  February 27, 2004
### **CHAPTER 41—TRAINING**

Sec.
4101.
Definitions.
4102.
Exceptions; Presidential authority.
4103.
Establishment of training programs.
4104.
Government facilities; use of.
4105.
Non-Government facilities; use of.
[4106.
Repealed.]
4107.
Academic degree training.
4108.
Employee agreements; service after training.
4109.
Expenses of training.
4110.
Expenses of attendance at meetings.
4111.
Acceptance of contributions, awards, and other payments.
4112.
Absorption of costs within funds available.
[4113.
Repealed.]
[4114.
Repealed.]
4115.
Collection of training information.
4116.
Training program assistance.
4117.
Administration.
4118.
Regulations.
4119.
Training for employees under the Office of the Architect of the Capitol and the Botanic Garden.
4120.
Training for employees of the Capitol Police.
4121.
Specific training programs.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

**2004**—Pub. L. 108–411, title II, §201(b)(2), Oct. 30, 2004, 118 Stat. 2312, added item 4121.

**2003**—Pub. L. 108–7, div. H, title I, §1010(b), Feb. 20, 2003, 117 Stat. 360, added item 4120.

**2002**—Pub. L. 107–296, title XIII, §1331(b), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2299, substituted "Academic degree training" for "Restriction on degree training" in item 4107.

**1995**—Pub. L. 104–66, title II, §2181(c)(2), Dec. 21, 1995, 109 Stat. 732, struck out item 4113 "Agency review of training needs; annual program reports".

**1994**—Pub. L. 103–226, §2(b)(2), Mar. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 112, struck out item 4106 "Non-Government facilities; amount of training limited", substituted "Restriction on degree training" for "Non-Government facilities; restrictions" in item 4107, and struck out item 4114 "Non-Government facilities; review of training programs".

**1982**—Pub. L. 97–346, §1(b), Oct. 15, 1982, 96 Stat. 1647, added item 4119.
<PAGE>
[ARTICLE] 5
[MULTIPLIER] 1,000
<TABLE>
<S>                             <C>        <C>
[PERIOD-TYPE]                   12-MOS
[FISCAL-YEAR-END]                          JUN-30-1997
[PERIOD-END]                               JUN-30-1997
[CASH]                                             414
[SECURITIES]                                       000
[RECEIVABLES]                                    3,246
[ALLOWANCES]                                     1,197
[INVENTORY]                                        000
[CURRENT-ASSETS]                                 1,408
[PP&E]                                           5,490
[DEPRECIATION]                                   3,196
[TOTAL-ASSETS]                                   6,945
[CURRENT-LIABILITIES]                            2,612
[PREFERRED]                                        810
[COMMON]                                         2,515
[OTHER-SE]                                     (4,722)
[TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY]                     6,945
[SALES]                                          1,838
[TOTAL-REVENUES]                                 3,771
[CGS]                                            1,004
[TOTAL-COSTS]                                    1,968
[OTHER-EXPENSES]                                   829
[LOSS-PROVISION]                                   551
[INTEREST-EXPENSE]                                 685
[INCOME-PRETAX]                                  (263)
[INCOME-TAX]                                         2
[INCOME-CONTINUING]                                000
[DISCONTINUED]                                     000
[EXTRAORDINARY]                                     62
[CHANGES]                                          000
[NET-INCOME]                                     (327)
[EPS-PRIMARY]                                   (.090)
[EPS-DILUTED]                                   (.090)
</TABLE>
#### § 195.14 Implementation.

The Secretary of each Military Department shall submit regulations implementing this part to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower).
### §3612. Availability of appropriations

Funds appropriated to an entity of the Federal Government other than an element of the Department of Defense that have been specifically appropriated for the purchase of cryptologic equipment, materials, or services with respect to which the National Security Agency has been designated as the central source of procurement for the Government shall remain available for a period of three fiscal years.

(Pub. L. 86–36, §14, as added Pub. L. 97–89, title VI, §603, Dec. 4, 1981, 95 Stat. 1158.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified in a note under section 402 of this title prior to editorial reclassification as this section.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1981, see section 806 of Pub. L. 97–89, set out as a note under section 1621 of Title 10, Armed Forces.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YEVGENY EUGENE SELIVANOV, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

XAVIER BECCERA, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 18-56214 

D.C. No. 2:18-cv-05200-RSWL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 19, 2019**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 

Former California state prisoner Yevgeny Eugene Selivanov appeals from 

the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus 

petition for lack of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a),

and reviewing de novo, see Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010), we 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 22 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-56214 

affirm.

It is a jurisdictional requirement that “the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ 

under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” 

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) & 

2254(a); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)). It is undisputed that 

Selivanov was no longer incarcerated or subject to post-release supervision at the 

time he filed his § 2254 habeas petition, but he contends that he is “in custody” for 

habeas purposes because he is prohibited from holding public office as a result of

his California state conviction for embezzling public funds. Selivanov’s

contention is foreclosed by controlling precedent: the inability to hold public 

office is a collateral consequence that is not itself “sufficient to render an 

individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack[.]” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 

491-92; see also Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Selivanov cites no authority to support his argument that this court should 

recognize an equitable exception to this rule in his case. 

AFFIRMED.
#### William E. Sharp, appellee, v. Charles Cohn, appellant.

Gen. No. 29,465.

Suit on agreement to pay for repair of automobile damaged by defendant’s minor son. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Lupe, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed March 9, 1925.

Bulkley, More & Tallmadge, for appellant.

Adams & White, for appellee.

Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.2

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

    We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 No. 33-44337) pertaining to the Employee Stock Purchase Plan of CTC
Communications Corp., the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-17613)
pertaining to the 1996 Stock Option Plan of CTC Communications Corp. and the
Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-68767) pertaining to the 1998 Incentive
Plan, the 1996 Stock Option Plan and the Employee Stock Purchase Plan of CTC
Communications Corp. of our report dated May 19, 1999, except for Notes 7 and
10, as to which the date is June 30, 1999, with respect to the financial
statements and schedule of CTC Communications Corp. included in the Annual
Report (Form 10-K/A) for the year ended March 31, 1999.


                                      /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

                                          Ernst & Young LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
July 14, 1999
#### § 2103.21 Definition and application.

Derivative classification is the act of assigning a level of classification to information that is determined to be the same in substance as information that is currently classified. Thus, derivative classification may be accomplished by any person cleared for access to that level of information, regardless of whether the person has original classification authority at that level.
From: Christensen, Joel

To: SFI Stakeholder Meeting

Subject: Potable Water Storage Facilities Inspections

Date: Tuesday, November 11, 2014 4:21:19 PM

This is in response to the solicitation of comments in the Water Utility Insider November 7 Issue:

Nebraska requires inspection and cleaning, if needed, every 5 years. Records are produced during

sanitary surveys. From our experience, this seems like an adequate, workable requirement.

Joel Christensen

Metropolitan Utilities District of Omaha

402-504-7774
### **CHAPTERS 1035 1** THROUGH 1047—RESERVED

1 So in original. Chapter 1035 added by Pub. L. 114–289 without corresponding amendment of heading for reserved chapters.
### §7102. Employees' rights

Each employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right. Except as otherwise provided under this chapter, such right includes the right—

(1) to act for a labor organization in the capacity of a representative and the right, in that capacity, to present the views of the labor organization to heads of agencies and other officials of the executive branch of the Government, the Congress, or other appropriate authorities, and

(2) to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment through representatives chosen by employees under this chapter.

(Added Pub. L. 95–454, title VII, §701, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1192.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 7102, Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 523, related to right of employees to petition Congress, prior to the general amendment of this chapter by Pub. L. 95–454. See section 7211 of this title.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective 90 days after Oct. 13, 1978, see section 907 of Pub. L. 95–454, set out as an Effective Date of 1978 Amendment note under section 1101 of this title.

#### Partial Suspension of Federal Service Labor-Management Relations

Par. (2) of this section suspended with respect to any matter proposed for bargaining which would substantially impair the implementation by the United States Forces of any treaty or agreement, including any minutes or understandings thereto, between the United States and the Government of the host nation, see section 1(b) of Ex. Ord. No. 12391, Nov. 4, 1982, 47 F.R. 50457, set out as a note under section 7103 of this title.
### §5521. Definitions

For the purpose of this subchapter—

(1) "agency" means—

(A) an Executive agency;

(B) the judicial branch;

(C) the Library of Congress;

(D) the Government Publishing Office; and

(E) the government of the District of Columbia;

(2) "employee" means an individual employed in or under an agency;

(3) "head of each agency" means—

(A) the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with respect to the judicial branch; and

(B) the Mayor of the District of Columbia with respect to the government of the District of Columbia; and

(4) "United States", when used in a geographical sense, means the several States and the District of Columbia.

(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 479; Pub. L. 90–623, §1(10), Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1312; Pub. L. 96–54, §2(a)(31), Aug. 14, 1979, 93 Stat. 383; Pub. L. 113–235, div. H, title I, §1301(b), Dec. 16, 2014, 128 Stat. 2537.)

| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5 U.S.C. 3071. | Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. 87–304, §1, 75 Stat. 662.June 24, 1965, Pub. L. 89–47, 79 Stat. 171. |

Statutes at Large

June 24, 1965, Pub. L. 89–47, 79 Stat. 171.

In paragraph (1), the word "agency" is substituted for "department". The term "Executive agency" is substituted for the reference to "each executive department of the Government of the United States of America; each agency or independent establishment in the executive branch of such Government; each corporation wholly owned or controlled by such Government" in former section 3071(1)(A)–(C).

Paragraph (2) is added for clarity and in view of the fact that the definition of "employee" in section 2105 does not include individuals employed by the government of the District of Columbia.

In paragraph (3), the term "department head" is omitted as unnecessary.

In paragraph (4), the words "of the United States of America" are omitted as unnecessary.

Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface to the report.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1979—Par. (3)(B). Pub. L. 96–54 substituted "Mayor" for "Commissioner".

1968—Par. (3)(B). Pub. L. 90–623 substituted "Commissioner" for "Board of Commissioners".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Change of Name

"Government Publishing Office" substituted for "Government Printing Office" in par. (1)(D) on authority of section 1301(b) of Pub. L. 113–235, set out as a note preceding section 301 of Title 44, Public Printing and Documents.

#### Effective Date of 1979 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 96–54 effective July 12, 1979, see section 2(b) of Pub. L. 96–54, set out as a note under section 305 of this title.

#### Effective Date of 1968 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 90–623 intended to restate without substantive change the law in effect on Oct. 22, 1968, see section 6 of Pub. L. 90–623, set out as a note under section 5334 of this title.
Order entered January 17, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00444-CR

CORTNEY WOODS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F16-76149-Y

ORDER

Appellant’s counsel has moved this court to extend the time to file the opening brief in 

this case, counsel’s third such motion in this case. That same day, January 14, 2019, counsel 

filed substantially similar motions in four other appeals. 

Specifically, the motion includes a paragraph discussing counsel’s recent completion of a 

paper for a continuing legal education presentation. Counsel has given insufficient basis for this 

to be the primary reason for his failure to complete the appellant’s brief. Preparing for a 

continuing legal education presentation, while laudable, should not preempt a lawyer’s 

preparation of work due to the court. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Cond. R. 3.02, cmt. 3.

Counsel cites one other case to justify the extension request. In that case, counsel 

represents he is preparing a motion for panel rehearing due on first extension January 18, 2019. 
But two of the three panel members who decided that case have departed this court, and 

counsel’s motion for panel rehearing “must be denied.” See Tex. R. App. P. 49.3. This provides 

insufficient basis for extending the time in this case.

Finally, in his prayer, counsel cites rule 68.2(a), which sets forth the considerations in 

determining the due date for a petition for discretionary review to the Court of Criminal Appeals. 

This rule is inapplicable here.

The court GRANTS the motion in this case based on counsel’s representation that he has 

spent significant time preparing briefing, that he has identified and articulated specific issues,

and that the brief “should be” completed and filed on January 19, 2019. Work on a single appeal 

alone will not ordinarily satisfy rule 10.5(b)(1)(C)’s reasonableness inquiry.

The Court ORDERS Appellant’s brief in this case due January 22, 2019.

/s/ CORY L. CARLYLE 

JUSTICE