CASE STUDY N O. 6

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

A Penny for Your Thoughts, a Nickel for 

Your Heart: Buying Popular Support

for Counterinsurgency

Justin Gorkowski

U.S. Army

KAREN GUTTIERI

SERIES EDITOR

Naval Postgraduate School
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of

irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability operations frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including

establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social wellbeing, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive

approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental

and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community

or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different

components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach.

Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives

to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development

of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States

Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the

need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought

argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the

pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the

problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed

this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need.

In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships

among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the

production and distribution of learning about complex operations, including supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 

Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the

research direction and overall leadership for this project.

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.

© 2010 by National Defense University. All rights reserved. Published 2010.

Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or 

National Defense University. Material in this case study may be used with approriate citation.
1

CASE STUDY N O. 6

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

A Penny for Your Thoughts, a Nickel for 

Your Heart: Buying Popular Support

for Counterinsurgency

Justin Gorkowski

U.S. Army

“I’m not going to give you anything because every day I drive by, someone

shoots at me! Next time I drive by and no one shoots at me, you get something.”1

As stated to tribal and civic leaders by a Marine commander in Iraq, 2004

A fountain flows in front of the Caravan Hotel at Baghdad International Airport. 

Photo by Staff Sgt. Luke Koladish, 114th Public Affairs Detachment.
2 Justin Gorkowski

“This event [the handover of the Caravan Hotel to the Iraqis] is much more

than a simple transition of a building or facility,” said Colonel Franck T.

Trainor, 364th CAB [Civil Affairs Brigade] Functional Specialty Team chief.

“This is a transition that validates the process that we have emplaced to ensure

long-term sustainability and success in this venture.”2

“If you are staying at the Caravan Hotel, your security will be similar to that

of BIAP [Baghdad International Airport]. With close proximity to the airport,

and military installations, you will have the assurance of exceptional security.

The Caravan is the newest addition to the BIAP area. Soon to be completed,

this modern, secure accommodation is bound to become a preferred lodging

location in Baghdad. 

“With a 2.5m fence surrounding the compound, 2 entrances (1 guest, 1 service) fully staffed by Sabre Security 24 hrs per day, illuminated parking area and

compound, and management company providing additional internal security,

Caravan Hotel guests rest comfortably with peace of mind and close proximity

to the event.

“You will enjoy a safe, relaxing stay and experience a truly historic exhibition. With exceptional airport, expo, and accommodation security.”3

In August 2008, construction on the Caravan Hotel in Baghdad International Airport’s “economic zone” was completed. The hotel features one

hundred rooms and offers potential investors and other guests $255-a-night

lodging in the heart of the zone dedicated toward improving the economic

future of Iraq. The price tag: $4.2 million of the Commander’s Emergency

Response Program (CERP).4 The hotel opened to the public in September

2008 but was not officially turned over to Iraqi management until August

2009. 

On July 15, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates received a letter

(see Appendix A) from Representative John P. Murtha (D-PA), then Chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, stating that “[a]

fundamental review of CERP, its purposes, use and scope, is long overdue.”5

Murtha wrote:

Proposals for multi-million dollar projects are being thrown together with less

thought given to the urgency or usefulness of the project than to a desire to

ensure all funds are spent . . . over the last five years, CERP has grown from an

incisive counter-insurgency tool to an alternative U.S. development program

with few limits and little management. It is well-past time for better oversight of

this program from the Department of Defense.6

This letter arrived on the coattails of news that the Caravan Hotel had

been looted of its computers, flat screen televisions, and furniture. U.S.

forces had attempted to turn the operation and maintenance of the hotel

over to the Iraqis upon project completion, but as had been the case with

numerous other reconstruction projects, the hotel was nearly closed after
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 3

employees and locals discovered the riches of the spoils. U.S. forces quickly

resumed control of the hotel and operated it for eleven months before once

again entrusting it to Iraqi authorities. On August 19, 2009, upon the

assumption of stricter control measures, the hotel was finally turned over to

the Government of Iraq to maintain. The goal of building the hotel was to

provide investors a place to stay near the proposed economic investment

hub and to demonstrate to the Iraqi people the efforts the government was

taking to promote economic development and prosperity. Actual results

may have varied. 

WHAT IS CERP?

The funds used in the construction of the Caravan Hotel were drawn from

the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was

developed in fiscal year 2003 It is currently available to commanders in Iraq,

Afghanistan, and the Philippines.7 The program began following the discovery of millions of dollars of stockpiled Ba’athist cash by U.S. forces in Iraq.

As of July 2009, Congress had appropriated a total of $5.25 billion to CERP,

with $3.63 billion8 and $1.62 billion9 to Iraq and Afghanistan respectively.

CERP is funded through the military’s Operations and Maintenance

account rather than as a part of a reconstruction aid package.10 The original

intent of CERP was to enable commanders to “respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi

people.”11 However, some have noticed strong ancillary benefits. The title of

the May 15, 2008, CERP Standard Operating Procedures book is Money as a

Weapon System, which alludes to the ability of cash to influence hearts and

minds. If a population is economically challenged, as they almost always are

with insurgencies, then lining their pockets is likely to have a leveraging

effect—but to what extent, and for how long?

THE POWER OF MONEY

A direct correlation existed between the level of local infrastructure status,

unemployment figures, and attacks on U.S. soldiers . . . the choice was to continue to attrit through direct action [minimally successful hunt-and-kill-type

operations] or shape the populace to deny sanctuary to insurgents by giving the

populace positive options through clear improvement in quality of life.12

Major General Peter Chiarelli

In his analysis of what was contributing to the fertility of insurgent recruiting

in 2004 Baghdad, then Major General Peter Chiarelli determined that he

could deny insurgent influence by creating visible progress through essential

services construction, increased employment, and perceived government

progress/involvement.
4 RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING: LONG–TERM DEVELOPMENT VS. SHORT–TERM PAYOFF

Similarly, authors Todd Helmus et al. argue that U.S. forces can use Civil

Military Operations and CERP funds to encourage peaceful civilian behavior.13 They state that projects may be allocated or strategically withheld

based on local adherence to U.S. operational norms and the promotion of

stability. 

Yet others, such as Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, believe reconstruction has essentially no effect on insurgency. “There is no direct correlation between the well-being of a population and its propensity to support

insurgency. People living in abject poverty may remain loyal to their government while more-affluent people rebel against it.”14

Similarly, Stephen Biddle argues: 

Economic aid or reconstruction assistance cannot fix the problem: Would Sunnis really get over their fear of Shiite domination if only the sewers were fixed

and the electricity kept working? This is not to say that Washington should not

provide reconstruction assistance or economic aid; the United States owes Iraq

the help on moral grounds, and economic growth could ease communal tensions at the margins and so promote peace in the long term.15

Biddle’s argument was based on 2006 Iraq, where the high state of ethnic

tensions portrayed the conflict as more of a civil war than an insurgency.

Thus, the heart of the problem as he perceived it was historical ethnic rivalries rather than a grievance-oriented insurgency. Nonetheless, is $46.7 billion appropriated for all major Iraq reconstruction an appropriate amount to

spend on marginal support? Is the support even marginal? Further, are there

legal or moral implications to buying support or victory?

RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING: 

LONG–TERM DEVELOPMENT VS. SHORT–TERM PAYOFF

In Afghanistan and Iraq, there are several types of reconstruction funding,

macro to micro in scale.16 Critical infrastructure reconstruction, utilizing

appropriated funds such as Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF)

and the Economic Support and Development Assistance Funds in Afghanistan, provide macro-level examples that typically would be controlled by the

U.S. State Department,17 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As of October

2008, 97 percent of the congressionally appropriated $20.9 billion IRRF

funds were obligated for various macro-level projects.18 Such projects primarily include infrastructural necessities such as water, electricity, and sewer

systems for one or more provinces. These macro-scale projects provide

much-needed services to as many people as possible. The only shortfalls of

macro-level projects are the bureaucracy or resources required for project

completion and consideration of the security situation. 

At the micro-level, as of July 2009 Congress had appropriated a total of

$5.25 billion to CERP. What is unique about CERP is that it is available with
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 5

wide discretion at the company command level. A U.S. Army or Marine captain has the authority to spend up to $500,000 with the approval of a battalion or brigade commander.19 As of September 2009, there were twelve

combat brigades in Iraq and six in Afghanistan.20 The total number of

deployed brigades will remain near the same as the transition to Afghanistan

continues. One brigade typically has three to four maneuver battalions21 for

a total of twelve to sixteen company commanders. Strategies on how to

spend CERP vary considerably at all levels based on command guidance and

personalities. As stated by one brigade staff officer, “The reality is that company commanders generally spend money as they see fit, with minimal interference from higher [levels] as long as the project fits within the stated

guidelines.”22 In Iraq, approved CERP reconstruction expenditures range

from basic essential services to playgrounds, swimming pools and, in one

case, a health club.23 Approved nonreconstruction expenditures range from

company-level bulk condolence payments to operating funds for the Sons of

Iraq, day labor projects, and civic trash cleanup projects. Finally, individual

project costs span from $54 to $11.7 million.24 With over thirteen thousand

individual CERP projects completed in Iraq, it is difficult to show the details

of each project, and there are no data collected to show the effectiveness of

each project after completion. However, Figures 1 and 2 summarize the

number of projects completed and the respective dollars spent by sector in

Iraq from February 2004 to October 2009.

Figure 1. Number of CERP Projects by Type in Iraq
6 CAN SUPPORT BE PURCHASED? Justin Gorkowski

Figure 2. Money Spent on CERP Projects by Type in Iraq

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, many government institutions are now

able to deliver projects at the local level. However, Mark Ward states, “With

the international military still building schools and clinics, it is delaying the

day when Afghans can govern for themselves.”25 Ward believes CERP

should be reserved for projects that the governments are not yet capable of

completing. He argues CERP should not be used on smaller-scale projects

through which the government can potentially gain legitimacy upon project

completion. Ward concludes by saying, “‘Cutting ribbons’ on quick impact

projects has to stop being an indicator of success for our military

commanders.”26 While generally easier to acquire, micro-level funds have

numerous pros and cons as well.

CAN SUPPORT BE PURCHASED?

“Any condition or event which can be shown to have an effect upon behavior

must be taken into account. By discovering and analyzing these causes we can

predict behavior; to the extent that we can manipulate them, we can control

behavior.”27

B.F. Skinner, 1953

As Louis Kriesberg states, “The conventional understanding among many

partisans and observers of conflicts is that [violent] coercion is needed to
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 7

induce an adversary to change its will.”28 This

type of thinking does not recognize the importance of the population in insurgent environments. Kriesberg posits three types of

inducements or incentives: coercion, reward,

and persuasion.29 As stated previously, coercion is the most common method of choice

among security practitioners. Reward inducement can be realized through programs such as

CERP if commanders use CERP to reward

positive (peaceful) behavior. Finally, the

incentive created through the completion of

CERP projects can be persuasive in nature if

the surrounding neighborhoods and villages

change their behavior in order to receive the

same benefits. Kriesberg argues that all three

forms of inducement can be used to change

the will of an adversary, but coercive inducement is often the only form used. 

As the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad in 2004–2005, then Major

General Peter Chiarelli “operationally divided

the populace into three categories that help

define the battlespace: anti-Iraqi forces, supporters, and fence-sitters.”30

The first group, defined as insurgents (and terrorists), were those who cannot

be changed; who cannot be influenced; and who, although politically and ethnically different in scope, had essentially the same desired endstate—to perceptually delegitimize the current Iraqi government and drive a wedge between the

Iraqi populace and coalition forces. Direct-action killing or capturing the terrorist was (and is) the only option to immediately mitigate their strategic effect.

The second demographic consisted of supporters who represented the

coalition force base of support throughout neighborhoods, districts, and the

government. The supporters see the future of Iraq through cooperation with

the currently established Iraqi government and coalition forces. The reality is

that, when queried, most supporters preferred the removal of coalition forces

from Baghdad and Iraq, but they simultaneously recognized the relative importance of the security provided and the flow of funding from these contributing

nations to the short- and long-term future of Iraq.

Chiarelli convinced Task Force Baghdad to turn its attention to the third

group—the “fence-sitters.” 

We considered the fence-sitters as the operational center of gravity for both

Task Force Baghdad and insurgent forces. They are the bulk of the populace,

“Behaviorism”—Burrhus Frederic Skinner

B.F. Skinner was the Edgar Pierce Professor of Psychology at Harvard University from 1958 to 1974. Skinner’s

long-running goal from when he first began graduate school

in 1928 was relating behavior to experimental conditions.

He invented the cumulative recorder, through which he

determined that the response rate of his subjects (rats) was

not affected through stimulus as previously thought; rather,

it was influenced by what followed the stimulus. Subsequently, Skinner dedicated a large part of his life’s research

to the study of behavior-consequence relationships. In his

book Science and Human Behavior published in 1953, Skinner was concerned with the causes of human behavior and

examined why humans behave as they do. There, Skinner

states that the practice of looking inside a person for an

explanation of behavior has tended to obscure the variables

that are immediately available for scientific analysis. These

variables lie outside the person, in its immediate environment and in its environmental history. Skinner argues that

to predict human behavior, every possible external variable

must be considered to develop the most comprehensive

and accurate prediction possible.
8 CAN SUPPORT BE PURCHASED? Justin Gorkowski

and they are waiting to decide who will get their support. From the intelligentsia

to the poor and uneducated who have little or no hope, the fence-sitters are

waiting on clear signs of progress and direction before casting their support. 

The fence-sitters become the base from which power is derived. Strong evidence exists that suggests Muqtada Al Sadr’s attacks against coalition forces in

early August 2004 were initiated because of the visible signs of progress manifested by the number of projects and local labor force hires that threatened his

scope of power and ability to recruit fighters within the Shi’a population.

Insurgents can clearly influence the fence-sitters by attacking visible symbols of government services and provoking government repression, both of

which discredit the legitimacy of the government. In a further demonstration of

potency, the insurgents then step in and provide a shadow government.

In one example, insurgents attacked electrical distribution nodes outside

the city of Baghdad and severely limited the already overworked electrical grid,

knowing the Iraqi populace abhorred attacks on infrastructure. The insurgents

deftly placed blame for the “lack of power” squarely on the impotence of the

fledgling Iraqi Government and supporting coalition forces, citing the historical

truth of power always being available under the Saddam regime.

During the coordinated insurgent uprising in April 2004, Muqtada Al Sadr,

as one of his first acts, gained control of the electrical substations in Sadr City.

By providing uninterrupted power, something not seen since the fall of Saddam

Hussein, he was able to sway support. A shadow government able to provide

services, with governance by religious decree and enforcement by Sharia courts,

Muqtada Al Sadr was able to provide a viable, attractive alternative to the coalition. Together, the Iraqi Government and the coalition must send clear signals

of their own, directly targeting those waiting for direction through a full-spectrum campaign that mitigates the insurgent base with visible and tangible signs

of progress within a legitimate context.

Right or wrong, the fence-sitters (and the population as a whole) believe

that because America put a man on the moon, it can do anything—and do it

quickly. When we fail to produce because of lack of authority, shortage of

resources, or bureaucratic inefficiencies, they believe it is because we, as a coalition, do not want to fix it. Therefore the alternative becomes clear.

From Task Force Baghdad’s perspective it was clear: shape operations for

decisive results by optimizing the support of those who see through the coalition a future; kill, capture, or disrupt the insurgents and terrorists by denying

influence and sanctuary; and, finally, decisively engage the operational center of

gravity for insurgents and coalition forces—those on the fence—through promotion of essential infrastructure services; establishing a capable, legitimate

government; and creating opportunities for economic independence through a

free market system.31

The battle for the fence-sitters is fundamentally dependent on numerous

factors: One of the most prominent is governmental legitimacy. Bruce Gilley identifies legitimacy as one of the most important public services a government can provide in gaining the support of its constituents. 
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 9

Legitimacy is a particular type of political support that is grounded in common

good or shared moral evaluations.32 Citizens strive to engage the state as moral

agents, and a state that reciprocates will see its standing enhanced. Likewise,

most rulers [states, coalition forces, etc.] prefer to be esteemed rather than

feared by their citizens: it is inherently desirable, and it minimizes the time they

spend worrying about their positions. One of the greatest public services they

deliver is rightful rule itself.33

General Chiarelli and his staff noticed a direct correlation between the

location of enemy activity and the location of poor or inoperable essential

services. In most cases in Sadr City, the cells from which antigovernment

and violent action were originating were the same cells where raw sewage

ran down the street, electricity was intermittent, and water was nonpotable.34 Additionally, unemployment continued to increase in these areas, and

healthcare was virtually nonexistent. Task Force Baghdad directly targeted

those areas through a concentrated infrastructure repair effort—focusing

first on those public services most important to health and survival. 

The restructuring effort of already programmed funding moved swiftly to effect

immediate local results across the most desperate areas of Baghdad, coupled

with hiring local labor. This effort achieved a two-pronged result: it provided a

job alternative to the locals who had no job, and it produced visible signs of

progress in their neighborhoods. Earning from $5 to $7 a day to feed your family became a viable alternative to $300 a month, payable at the end of the

month, to fire rocket-propelled grenades at U.S. forces. And, there is no sewage

running through the streets of your neighborhood.35

During the ten-week period from early August to mid-October 2004, the

average number of violent acts in Sadr City dropped from 160 to 10.36 While

Chiarelli acknowledged that Muqtada Al Sadr or his lieutenants would probably attack again, he firmly stated that popular support for the attacks would

be waning and would not last if infrastructure improvements continued. “He

[Muqtada Al Sadr] will have to go elsewhere to find true support. The people just will not support a resumption of large-scale violence in the face of

clear signs of progress.”37 There were other factors at play, such as job creation, but General Chiarelli stated that “infrastructure repair became the

immediate impact theme that set the stage for security.”38

Violence per Dollar Spent

Analysis of another part of Iraq, the At Tameem (Kirkuk) Province, depicts

an interesting relationship between the expenditure of CERP money and

violence. As shown in Figure 3, there has historically been a weak positive

relationship between the amount of CERP money spent and violence.39
10 CAN SUPPORT BE PURCHASED? Justin Gorkowski

Figure 3. Correlation Between Violence and CERP Expenditures in Kirkuk

From February 2004 to October 2009, analysis of 168 provincial villages

shows that on average there has been one violent act per every $49,000

spent.40 The sum of $156.8 million has been expended on CERP reconstruction projects in the At Tameem Province alone. Of interest is whether

the remaining provinces in Iraq follow this same pattern.

Contribution to Violence Reduction

As U.S. forces began to venture out of their concrete cities or Forward Operating Bases in the postsurge phase of the Iraq War in late 2007, they inherently became more ingrained in the dynamics of the local population.

Money was spent based on their increased understanding of popular needs,

and freedom of maneuver was enhanced. The number of overall significant

actions dropped tremendously in late 2007, as shown in Figure 4. The trend

continued in 2008.

An increased understanding of the operational environment enabled

coalition forces to provide more effectively for and protect the local population. Fatalities also dropped considerably across the board. The number of

American soldier deaths dropped in kind from 904 in 2007 to 314 in 2008.41

Americans soldiers wounded in action followed suit, along with Iraqi deaths.

Clearly, CERP reconstruction was not the lone contributor to violence

reduction. In fact, fewer CERP reconstruction projects were built in 2008

than 2007.42 But as mentioned by Skinner, any condition or event that can

be shown to have an effect on behavior must be taken into account. 
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 11

Figure 4. Iraq Daily Significant Actions (SIGACTs) in 2007

Visible Progress

As CERP projects continued to be built with increased speed and efficiency,

visible progress was enhanced in the same manner discussed previously in

the example with General Chiarelli. The more the local population was able

to see that the government was actually trying to help satisfy Iraqi needs, the

more stock was placed in governmental legitimacy. According to an Iraqi

Army officer, the quality of life for the Iraqis was also improved. The average

number of hours a household received water and electricity gradually

increased throughout the country.

The process of CERP fund procurement is extremely fast. Approval of

projects under $500,000 can be achieved within a week. This has become

slightly more complicated with the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but comparatively, the time it takes for a commander to envision a project and procure

CERP money is exponentially faster than the process of procuring other

funds for reconstruction. With CERP, a commander has the ability quickly

to provide visible reconstruction in support of operational necessity. If popular support is the center of gravity for the achievement and maintenance of

security when faced with an insurgency, a commander appreciates the flexibility quickly to draw on all resources available. In the early part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of the most common complaints by Iraqis was the

lack of essential services. Iraqis could not understand how Americans could

put a man on the moon, but not provide running water or electricity after

more than a year of U.S. presence. 

Source: U.S. Army Topographic Engineer Center, now known as

the Army Geospatial Center. www.agc.army.mil. 
12 SHOULD SUPPORT BE PURCHASED? Justin Gorkowski

SHOULD SUPPORT BE PURCHASED?

It quickly became apparent to Iraqis that Americans had money and were

not afraid to spend it. Similarly, it quickly became apparent to Americans

that money innately possessed an incentive value. In an interview by Peter

Helmus et al., an administrator of the local CERP program stated that [i]n

counterinsurgency you need to spend money on your friends as well as

those you want to be your friends.”43 The interviewee went on to say that

“compliance should have been rewarded from the onset—that money

should have flowed into Kurdistan and areas in the south.” Similarly, sheikhs

would often approach Iraqi and U.S. commanders in pursuit of reconstruction spending in return for a promise to report and chastise suspicious activity. The incentive value of reconstruction spending is transparent. 

“U.S. ‘Money Weapon’ Yields Mixed Results: 

Review of Military Program Sought”

By Ernesto Londoño

Washington Post Foreign Service

Monday, July 27, 2009

BAGHDAD, July 26—Shortly after the U.S. Army turned over

control of the business center and a restaurant of a multimillion-dollar hotel it built near Baghdad’s airport to the Iraqi government last

year, flat-screen television sets, computers and furniture vanished.

The looting unwittingly kept the military in the hotel business

because officers were concerned that the rest of the hotel would be

stripped bare. As the U.S. government is ceding control of hundreds

of projects and facilities to the Iraqi government, the conundrum

raised questions about the sustainability of billions of dollars worth

of projects funded through the Commander’s Emergency Response

Program (CERP) that encourages commanders to think of “money

as a weapon.”

U.S. lawmakers and the Office of the Special Inspector General

for Iraq Reconstruction, which has released a report about the Caravan Hotel, are increasingly scrutinizing the use of CERP and urging

the Pentagon to be more vigilant in its selection and oversight of

projects. . . .

“Ultimately when you transfer a property to someone, it’s theirs

and they use it for their purposes,” Bayer said. “That’s a decision the

government of Iraq makes.” 

Brig. Gen. Peter Bayer, the chief of staff of the

U.S. command that oversees CERP projects in Iraq.

Accessed June 15, 2010, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/26/AR2009072602833.html.
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 13

CERP spending is widely viewed by U.S. forces as a nonviolent method

potentially to influence popular support. One brigade staff officer who was

involved in the approval of CERP projects said, “If the money is available

and it’s possible that spending the money will decrease U.S. casualties and

overall violence, then I’m going to approve every project that makes logical

sense.”44 If this method can be used to contribute to the diffusion of an

insurgency, then it presents a nonlethal alternative to rooting out and killing

the insurgents themselves. Seth Jones states:

Afghanistan Ambassador Ronald Neumann was briefed in the summer of 2006

by the U.S. military on the interrogation results of over 100 Taliban and other

fighters where the findings showed the critical reasons why these fighters supported the Taliban had little to do with religious ideology. Rather they had to

do with bad government and economics. The government could not protect

them or deliver services, and they were often simply better paid by the Taliban.45

So, are governance, economics, and the reconstruction of essential services

the answer?

In Iraq, even the successful reconstruction projects are not trouble free.

Questionable payments, incomplete or missing paperwork, and weak contract

management marred the building of a hotel near the Baghdad airport, stated a

new report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

Investigators acknowledged that the Caravan Hotel was “successfully completed.” But they found a bundle of problems that, if avoided, would have

greatly lowered the risk of U.S. tax dollars being wasted.

In one example, U.S. authorities paid more than $1 million in cash to the

Iraqi company doing the construction work, even though the contract stated

that payments should be done electronically to prevent the money from being

lost or stolen during the transfer.

Six payments totaling $4.2 million were made to TAMA Design Consultancy and Construction. Four were done by electronic fund transfer. But twoC

one for $421,706 and the other for $778,965Cwere made in cash. Investigators

found copies of signed invoices but no explanation for the switch. An unnamed

contracting official told them the situation was “unusual but predated his arrival

in Iraq.”

In comments printed at the end of the report, U.S. military officials said all

the payments were handled properly. “It does not matter how we pay vendors as

long as we pay them correctly and it is correctly documented,” they said.46

Protection of Assets

As massive amounts of money are spent on visible projects that represent

progress and legitimacy, vulnerability to insurgent attacks grows with every

dollar spent. In 2007, CERP money was spent on repairing an electric
14 SHOULD SUPPORT BE PURCHASED? Justin Gorkowski

substation near Haweeja, Iraq, that had been inoperable for four years.

Insurgents realized the value in preventing the Americans from promoting

progress and attacked the substation with such ferocity that the contractor

paid by the Americans to conduct the repairs quit the job and refused ever to

take a job in that area again. The U.S. brigade responsible for this region was

forced to hire another contractor quickly and provide nonstop security

throughout project completion. Following the completion, the American

forces handed the responsibility of security maintenance over to local Iraqi

forces. The substation was subsequently repaired with CERP money two

more times due to further attacks. Muqtada Al Sadr conducted similar

attacks in Sadr City in 2004Cplacing blame on the inability of the government to protect and provide services to the populace.

When insurgents destroy economic or essential service-related targets,

the governmental response has profound diplomatic corollaries. The characteristics of governmental repression may actually cause more harm than

good. During the early stages of the Iraq War, a popular target among insurgents was the oil pipelines. Such attacks have decreased significantly over

time, but an attack on the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline on November 24, 2009,

demonstrated the continued vulnerability of Iraqi infrastructure to violence.

With the recent signing of the first major international oil deal, the spotlight

has been focused on the central government and its ability to contribute to

the world oil market.47 The manner in which the government responds to

such attacks is extremely sensitive. Inexperienced local security forces are

often accused of using harassment as a form of scare tactic. In the At

Tameem Province, 49.4 percent of 168 villages where interviews were conducted across the province do not trust the local police.48 The ancillary

effects of an insurgent attack met by a weak police response can create a

trickledown effect that can further harm governmental legitimacy and control. The extent to which the media participates in the event itself and the

ancillary negative effects can determine the spread of negative popular opinion. 

The Promise of Progress

With the building of each CERP project, popular expectations are elevated.

Expectation management is difficult in an international arena where numerous contributors shape the environment. Those who are in need and see visible progress develop an increased expectation of assistance. Such a scenario

obviously contributes to an increased potential for disappointment. Additionally, the more money that filters through the hands of local contractors,

the higher the potential for corruption. Numerous types of corruption strangle the ability of the United States to complete a CERP project without generating negative feedback. This final thought portrays the frustration of an

Iraqi Army officer with American CERP spending in 2007:
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 15

It is impossible to hire a contractor for a project without contributing to corruption. Every Iraqi contractor has a hierarchy of sub-contractors. The guy who

actually does the job is the sub-contractor of the sub-contractor of the sub-contractor of the contractor. This guy is poor and will do anything to make money

for food. The amount he is paid does not allow him to buy quality materials to

build the project. The result is a poorly constructed project that cost 10 percent

of what the original contractor was paid. Meanwhile the contractor drives a

Mercedes and has three houses.49

Regardless of whether the targeted spending of CERP can actually be

used as leverage to influence behavior or sway support, there is debate over

whether money should be used to buy support? Will there be unintended

consequences? Does blood, or treasure, have more value? 

ENDNOTES

1. Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue:

The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Santa

Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), p. 139.

2. Operation Iraqi Freedom, official website of the United States Forces—Iraq,

“Hotel Presented to the Government of Iraq,” August 20, 2009. http://www.usf-iraq.com/

news/headlines/hotel-presented-to-government-of-iraq.

3. Accommodation Security. http://i-acci.org/Security.php.

4. As of July 30, 2009, $46.7 billion had been appropriated in Iraq for major reconstruction funds. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, July 30, 2009 Quarterly

Report to Congress. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/tables.aspx.

5. Ernesto Londoño, “U.S. ‘Money Weapon’ Yields Mixed Results: Review of Military Program Sought,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/26/AR2009072602833.html. 

6. House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense. John P. Murtha,

Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, July 15, 2009. Sent to author by

Ernesto Londoño, Washington Post, January 3, 2010.

7. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Management of the

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006. http://

www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-006.pdf.

8. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Tables: Iraq Reconstruction

Funding Sources and Uses.

9. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 30, 2009

Quarterly Report to Congress. http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/pdf/

Report_-_July_2009.pdf, p. 34.

10. Christopher Griffin, “A Working Plan: Hope Isn’t the Only Strategy for

Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal (April 2007). http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/

2007/04/2587549/.

11. Mark Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Forces

Quarterly 37 (2005): 47.

12. Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement

for Full Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (July-August 2005): 10.

13. Helmus et al., Enlisting Madison Avenue, p. 139.

14. Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003–2006
16 ENDNOTES Justin Gorkowski

(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 86. Pirnie and O’Connell’s comments were

the result of a RAND study prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense on

improving U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities.

15. Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2

(2006): 2.

16. For definitions of reconstruction, see the World Bank, Post-Conflict

Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank (Washington D.C.: The International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, 1998), p. 14; and Robert Orr, Winning the Peace: An

American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington D.C.: The CSIS [Center for

Strategic and International Studies] Press, 2004), p. 11.

17. Apportioned funds such as the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds, the Iraq

Security Forces Funds, the Exchange Stabilization Fund, and CERP are restricted to six

departments or agencies: the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S.

Agency for International Development, Treasury, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), and

the Department of Health and Human Services. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/

quarterlyreports/jan09/pdf/app_e_-_january_2009.pdf.

18. U.S. Department of State, Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction,

October 2008. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/115549.htm.

19. Multi-National Corps—Iraq, “Money as a Weapon System,” Standard Operating Procedures, May 15, 2008. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/jcchb/Contingency%20Model/Contract%20Actions/Funding%20Docs/MAAWS_May_2008.pdf.

20. Spencer Ackerman, “Army Data Show Constraints on Troop Increase

Potential,” Washington Independent. http://washingtonindependent.com/wp-content/

uploads/2009/11/BCT-Deployment-Dates-12-Nov-09c.jpg. Troop levels in Afghanistan

have since increased significantly.

21. Maneuver units consist of those that are actually responsible for battlespace. An

Infantry Brigade Combat Team consists of two infantry battalions, one cavalry battalion,

one field artillery battalion, and two support battalions. The support battalions are not

typically responsible for the security of a designated area of operations.

22. Brian Mellen, interview by the author at the Naval Postgraduate School,

Monterey, CA, November 30, 2009.

23. Total cost for the health club/pool complex was $249,765. 

24. These statistics were collected from the Iraq Reconstruction Management

System. Further information can be obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

25. Mark Ward, “Quick Impact Projects Slow Progress in Afghanistan,” Boston

Globe, October 15, 2009. www.bostonglobe.com.

26. Ibid.

27. B. F. Skinner, “Behaviorism,” in Science and Human Behavior (New York: The

Free Press, 1963). http://www.iupui.edu/~philosop/skinnerbehaviorism.pdf. 

28. Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,

2007), p. 95.

29. Ibid., p. 96.

30. Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” p. 5.

31. Ibid., pp. 5–7.

32. Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009),

p. 5.

33. Ibid., p. 140.

34. Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” p. 10.

35. Ibid., p. 11.

36. Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” p. 12. 

37. Ibid.

38. Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” p. 12.

39. The correlation value is 0.201. 
A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart 17

40. Justin Gorkowski, “A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart”

(master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009).

41. ICasualties.Org, Iraq Coalition Casualty Count. http://www.icasualties.org/.

42. In 2007, 3,962 CERP reconstruction projects were built as opposed to 2,674 in

2008.

43. Helmus et al., Enlisting Madison Avenue, pp. 139B140.

44. Mellen interview by the author.

45. Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires (advance copy) (New York: W. W.

Norton & Co, 2009), p. 231.

46. Richard Lardner, “Weak Oversight Mars Success of Iraq Hotel Project,” ABC

News/Politics. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=8179814.

47. Ahmed Rasheed, “Bomb Attack Halts Iraq-Turkey Oil Pipeline,” Thomson

Reuters Foundation. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/GEE5AN1DM.htm.

48. Gorkowski, “A Penny for Your Thoughts.”

49. Zyad Junade Omar, interview with the author at Forward Operating Base K1,

Kirkuk, Iraq, September 2007.

WORKS CITED

Ackerman, Spencer. Army Data Show Constraints on Troop Increase

Potential. Washington Independent. http://washingtonindependent.

com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/BCT-Deployment-Dates-12-Nov09c. jpg.

Biddle, Stephen. Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon. Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2

(March 1, 2006): 2–14. http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/.

Chiarelli, Peter, and Patrick Michaelis. Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations. Military Review (July-August 2005):

4–17.

Gilley, Bruce. The Right to Rule. New York: Columbia University Press,

2009.

Gorkowski, Justin. A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for Your Heart.

Master’s Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.

Griffin, Christopher. A Working Plan: Hope Isn’t the Only Strategy for

Afghanistan. Armed Forces Journal (April 2007). http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/04/2587549/.

Helmus, Todd, Christopher Paul, and Russell Glenn. Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of

Operation. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007.

ICasualties.Org, Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/.

Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires (advance copy) New York: W. W.

Norton & Company, 2009.

Kriesberg, Louis. Constructive Conflicts. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

Lardner, Richard. Weak Oversight Mars Success of Iraq Hotel Project.

ABC News/Politics. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=

8179814.
18 WORKS CITED Justin Gorkowski

Londoño, Ernesto. U.S. “Money Weapon” Yields Mixed Results: Review of

Military Program Sought. Washington Post, July 27, 2009. http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/26/

AR2009072602833.html.

Martins, Mark. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Joint

Forces Quarterly 37 (2005): 46–52.

Mellen, Brian. Interview by the author at the Naval Postgraduate School,

Monterey, CA, November 30, 2009.

Multi-National Corps—Iraq. May 15, 2008. “Money as a Weapon System.”

Standard Operating Procedures. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/

cc/jcchb/Contingency%20Model/Contract%20Actions/Funding%20

Docs/MAAWS_May_2008.pdf.

Parchomovsky, Gideon, and Peter Siegelman. Bribes v. Bombs: A Study of

Coasean Warfare. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Law School,

2007. http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181&context

=upenn_wps.

Pirnie, Bruce, and Edward O’Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003–2006.

Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008.

Rasheed, Ahmed. Bomb Attack Halts Iraq-Turkey Oil Pipeline. Thomson

Reuters Foundation. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/

GEE5AN1DM.htm.

Skinner, B.F. 1953. “ehaviorism.” In Science and Human Behavior. New

York: The Free Press. http://www.iupui.edu/~philosop/skinnerbehaviorism.pdf.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. July 30, 2009

Quarterly Report to Congress. http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/pdf/Report_-_July_2009.pdf.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. July 30, 2009 Quarterly

Report to Congress. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/

Jul09/tables.aspx.

———. Management of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in

Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-

006.pdf.

———. Tables: Iraq Reconstruction Funding Sources and Uses. http://

www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/tables.aspx#Section2.

U.S. Department of State. Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, October 2008. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/115549.htm.

Ward, Mark. “Quick Impact Projects Slow Progress in Afghanistan.” Boston

Globe, October 15, 2009. www.bostonglobe.com.

Zyad Junade Omar. Interview by the author at Forward Operating Base K1,

Kirkuk, Iraq, September 2007.
19

Appendix A

Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates by John P. Murtha



Center for Complex Operations

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Dr. Karen Guttieri

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