Boots on the Ground: 

Troop Density 

in Contingency 

Operations

John J. McGrath

Global War on Terrorism

Occasional Paper 16

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OP 16
Boots on the Ground: 

Troop Density 

in Contingency 

Operations

by

John J. McGrath

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OP 16
 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

McGrath, John J., 1956-

 Boots on the ground : troop density in contingency operations / by

 John J. McGrath.

 p. cm. -- (Global war on terrorism occasional paper ; 16)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. Deployment (Strategy)--Case studies. I. Title. II. Series.

 U163.M392 2006

 355.4--dc22

 2006012720

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed 

in this CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can 

be found at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp.
Foreword

John McGrath’s Troop Density is a very timely historical analysis. 

While the value of history is indeed timeless, this paper clearly shows the 

immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most 

common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few 

troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is 

no standard against which to judge. Too few troops compared to what? 

Too few troops compared to which historical analogy? Too few troops 

compared to which policy maker or retired general’s book? 

A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned as the standard, but as McGrath shows, that figure was arrived at 

with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations from the last 100 years, he arrives at an average number of military 

forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would 

generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out 

a variety of important factors affecting those numbers–from geography to 

local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, to the use 

of contractors–among others. 

A segment of the American military historian population and policy 

makers have been and are enamored with a genre of military history which 

seeks to quantify war, reduce it to known variables, and posit solutions 

to future military conflicts based on mathematical formulae. It would be 

tempting to seize upon McGrath’s analysis and brandish it as a club with 

which to beat one’s opponents. This study should not be looked at in that 

light. 

The practice of war contains a strong element of science and social 

science, but in the end the practice of war is an art. This study cannot be 

used to guarantee victory by simply putting a certain number of soldiers 

“on the ground” relative to the indigenous population. The percentages and 

numbers in the study are merely historical averages, with all the dangers 

inherent in any average figure. One would do well to remember that old 

adage about the six-foot tall statistician who drowned in the river, which 

was on average only five feet deep. 

Policy makers, commanders, and staff officers should use the numbers 

in this study as a guide, a basis from which to begin their analysis of the 

particular campaign at hand. They will still have to apply their understanding of the objectives, of the nature of the conflict, and of local and regional 

culture and conditions to the analysis in Troop Density to create a winning 

military plan. It is our belief at the CSI that this kind historical analysis 

iii
iv

will inform and educate today’s military and civilian leaders as they carry 

out our nation’s most important policies. CSI—The Past is Prologue.

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute
v

Acknowledgments 

This work marks my first GWOT Occasional Paper and my first foray 

into the field of quantitative analysis of military history. Like my previous 

topic selections, Dr. W. Glenn Robertson, US Army Combined Arms Center Chief Historian inspired this effort. Dr. Robertson discovered a void in 

the historical analysis of troop deployment size and he gave me the ball to 

run with and to develop such an analysis. Despite the quantitative nature 

of this work, I must advise the reader that the mathematics used is of the 

elementary level, familiar even to most historians like myself.

I must acknowledge the pioneer of quantitative analysis of military 

history, the late Colonel Trevor Dupuy, US Army retired. Through his 

many books and articles, he virtually created the genre to which this work 

is but a humble addition. While the execution of military operations is 

clearly an art, Colonel Dupuy illustrated how historical analysis of such 

operations may also be a science. I would also like to acknowledge other 

recent contributors to this field including retired Command Sergeant Major Robert Rush of the US Army Center of Military History and Niklas 

Zetterling of the Swedish National Defense College. 

Research and Publications Team Chief Lieutenant Colonel Steve Clay 

provided outstanding guidance and support to this project. Colonel Timothy Reese, Director of the Combat Studies Institute, also provided continuous support, guidance, and advice. Mike Brooks, my editor on previous projects, provided critical guidance concerning the graphics on this 

project. Each colleague at the Combat Studies Institute has contributed to 

some extent the success of this effort. 

Contributing greatly to the successful completion of this project is editor and OIF veteran Angela Bowman, whose skill at wordcraft is evident 

in every line of this work. 

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the soldiers of the United States 

Army, whose superb efforts will hopefully be helped in some small way 

by this work.

John J. McGrath

Combat Studies Institute

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Contents

Chapter Page

Foreword............................................................................................iii

Acknowledgments ..............................................................................v

Figures ................................................................................................x

Tables.................................................................................................xi

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1

Factors Involved in Determining Troop Density ............................2

Mission and Roles...........................................................................2

External Factors..............................................................................4

Methodology...................................................................................5

II. Historical Examples............................................................................7

The Philippines, 1899-1901............................................................7

 Situational Narrative..................................................................7

 Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density ................8

 US Troop Deployment and Organization ..................................9

 Indigenous Support..................................................................13

 Conclusion ...............................................................................13

 Postwar Germany ........................................................................13

 Situational Narrative ...............................................................13

 Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density .............16

 Army-Type Occupation Force ................................................16

 Police-Type Occupation Force................................................17

 Organization of the Occupation ..............................................21

 Austria.....................................................................................23

 Indigenous Support.................................................................24

 Conclusion ..............................................................................26

 Postwar Japan..............................................................................27

 Situational Narrative................................................................27

vii
Chapter Page

 Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density ..............28

 Troop Deployment and Organization ......................................28

 Indigenous Support..................................................................31

 Conclusion ...............................................................................31

 The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 .........................................33

 Situational Narrative................................................................33

 Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density ..............38

 British Troop Deployment and Organization ..........................39

 Indigenous Support..................................................................43

 Conclusion ...............................................................................45

 The Balkans: Bosnia and Kosovo ...............................................46

 Bosnia ......................................................................................46

 Kosovo.....................................................................................50

 Balkans Conclusion .................................................................56

III. Police Departments...........................................................................69

 Introduction .................................................................................69

 New York City.............................................................................69

 Geographical Area and Terrain................................................69

 Population Density ..................................................................69

Ratio of Police Officers to Population.....................................70

 NYPD Organizational Structure ..............................................70

 NYPD Operational Successes .................................................70

 Other Major Police Departments.................................................71

 Chicago....................................................................................71

 Philadelphia .............................................................................72

 Boston......................................................................................72

 Los Angeles .............................................................................72

 US Major Municipal Police Force Troop Density Summary......78

 State Police Force Troop Density................................................82

 Police Density Conclusions.........................................................83

viii
Chapter Page

IV. Analysis ............................................................................................91

 Troop Density Theory .................................................................91

 Factors Affecting Troop Density .................................................95

 Area .........................................................................................97

 Population Density ..................................................................98

 Troops Available .....................................................................98

 Troop Rotation.........................................................................99

 Troops Recruited....................................................................100

 Duration/Intensity..................................................................100

 Substitute Forces....................................................................101

 Indigenous Forces..................................................................101

 Review of Factors......................................................................102

 Gulf Between Planning and Execution ....................................103

Raw Troop Density Size Conclusions.......................................106

Organization and Troop Density in Contingency Operations...106

Police Forces..........................................................................106

Operational Forces.................................................................106

Summary ...................................................................................108

V. Iraq, 2003-2005.............................................................................. 113

 Situational Narrative ................................................................. 113

 Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density................120

 Troop Deployment and Organization........................................123

Indigenous Support...................................................................128

 Iraq Operation Analysis............................................................132

 The Force Size Debate...........................................................132

 Troop Density in Iraq.............................................................133

 Analysis of the Factors Affecting Troop Density ..................134

VI. Conclusion .....................................................................................147

About the Author............................................................................149

Bibliography...................................................................................151

ix
Chapter Page

Appendix A ....................................................................................163

Appendix B....................................................................................169

Figures

1. Deployment of US Forces in the Philippines, 1899-1901 ...............10

2. US Forces in the Philippines, 1899-1901.........................................12

3. Organization of the American Zone, July 1946 ...............................18

4. US Occupation Forces in Europe, 1945-1947 .................................20

5. US Occupation Military Districts, June 1947 ..................................22

6. US Troop Deployment in Japan, August 1946.................................29

7. US Troop Strength During the Occupation of Japan .......................30

8. Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya, 1951-1960 ....................38

9. British, Commonwealth, and Indigenous Forces in the Malayan 

Emergency, 1948-1960 ....................................................................42

10. The Balkans......................................................................................47

11. Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia, 1996.....................49

12. Number of Troops Deployed to Bosnia, US Sector.........................51

13. KFOR Organization, 1999 ...............................................................53

14. Geographical Organization of the New York Police Department....71

15. Geographical Organization of the Los Angeles Police Department 74

16. Municipal Police Department Densities by Population ...................80

17. Municipal Police Department Densities by Area.............................81

18. California Highway Patrol Geographic Organization......................82

19. Comparative Troop Density: Troops Per Number of Inhabitants....92

20. Comparative Troop Density Per 1000 Population ...........................93

21. James Quinlivan’s Model of Troop Density .....................................94

22. Troop Density Variations of Selective Troop Deployments.............96

23. Area Density of Selective Troop Deployments................................97

24. Population Density and Troop Density of Selective Troop 

Deployments....................................................................................98

25. Available Indigenous Forces in Selective Troop Deployments.....101

x
Page

26. Adjusted Troop Density Variations of Selective Troop 

Deployments..................................................................................104

27. Troop Dispositions in the Initial Occupation of Iraq, 

May-July, 2003............................................................................... 114

28. Unit Rotations in Iraq, 2003-2005 ................................................. 116

29. Intensity of Operations in Iraq in Terms of US Soldiers Killed 

in Action......................................................................................... 118

30. Population Density, Iraq 2003........................................................121

31. Minimum Planned Coalition Occupation Force ............................125

32. US Troop Strength in Iraq, 2003-2005...........................................126

33. Actual Brigade Deployment for the Occupation of Iraq................127

34. Organization of Baghdad by Sector...............................................128

35. Iraqi Security Forces Strength During the US Occupation, 

2003-2005 ......................................................................................130

36. Location of Iraqi Army Units, 2005...............................................131

Tables

1. Types of Contingency Operations......................................................3

2. Troop Density in the Philippine Insurrection................................... 11

3. Troop Density in the Occupation of Germany and Austria..............25

4. Troop Density in the Occupation of Japan.......................................32

5. Troop Density in the Malayan Emergency ......................................44

6. Troop Density in the Balkans Operations........................................57

7. US Municipal Police Force Vehicle Density....................................76

8. US Municipal Police Force Officer Density ....................................79

9. Comparison of Factors Affecting Troop Density in Selective 

Troop Deployments........................................................................102

10. Troop Density Variation in Terms of Key Factors.........................105

11. Planning Versus Execution.............................................................105

12. Operational Forces in Contingency Operations.............................107

13. Troop Density Planning Factors.....................................................109

14. Demographics in Iraq Provinces, 2003..........................................122

xi
Page

15. Planning Factors for Iraq Occupation Force..................................124

16. Troop Density in Iraq, 2003-2005..................................................133

17. Iraq and Troop Density Variation in Terms of Key Factors...........136

18. Applying the Planning Factors to the Iraq Deployment ................137

19. Planning Factor Summary..............................................................148

xii
Foreword

John McGrath’s Troop Density is a very timely historical analysis. 

While the value of history is indeed timeless, this paper clearly shows the 

immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most 

common criticisms of the US plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few 

troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is no 

standard against which to judge. Too few troops compared to what? Too 

few troops compared to which historical analogy? Too few troops compared to which policy maker’s or which retired general’s book? 

A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned as the standard, but as Mr. McGrath shows, that figure was arrived 

at with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations in the last 100+ years, he arrives at an average number of military 

forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would 

generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out 

a variety of important factors that affected those numbers – from peak 

troop levels, to geography, to local forces employed to supplement US 

troops, to the use of contractors – among many others. 

A segment of American military historians and policy makers has 

been and is enamored with a genre of military history that seeks to quantify war, reduce it to known variables, and posit solutions to future military 

conflicts based on mathematical formulae. The practice of war contains 

a strong element of math, science, and social science, but in the end, the 

practice of war is an art. The numbers and percentages in this study are 

merely historical averages, with all the dangers inherent in any average 

figure. This study cannot be used to guarantee victory simply by putting a 

certain number of soldiers on the ground relative to the indigenous population. One would do well to remember that old adage about the six-foot 

tall statistician who drowned in the river that was on average only five 

feet deep. 

It would also be tempting to seize upon Mr. McGrath’s analysis and 

brandish it as a club with which to beat one’s opponents in the current 

debate over troop levels in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This study should 

not be used in that way. As the author notes in Appendix C: A Special 

Note on Iraq, there are several reasons not to jump to definitive conclusions in the midst of this ongoing war. The number and effectiveness of 

Iraqi Security Forces have been steadily increasing since the summer of 

2004. This creates a continually increasing troop density ratio in a struggle 

whose outcome is not yet known. Appendix C was added to this study as it 

iii
iv

went to print precisely to include the very latest numbers in this complex, 

evolving conflict. Poorly reasoned, presumptive judgments may very well 

be proved wrong by events.

Policy makers, commanders, and staff officers should use the numbers in this study as a guide, a basis from which to begin their analysis of 

the particular campaign at hand. They will still have to apply their understanding of the objectives, the nature of the conflict, and local and regional 

culture and conditions to the analysis in Troop Density to create a winning 

military plan. It is our belief at the CSI that this kind historical analysis 

will inform and educate today’s military and civilian leaders as they carry 

out our nation’s most important policies. CSI—The Past is Prologue.

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute


Chapter 1

Introduction

Recent Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) operations in Iraq have focused attention on the issue of the number of deployed troops needed to effectively conduct contingency operations. While pundits, military observers, and serving officers frequently address this issue, there seems to be 

no concise, systematic approach to this subject. Planning factors appear to 

be either extremely vague or nonexistent. Since historical analysis can be 

used to seek out examples from past similar operations to determine trends 

or estimates based on historical precedent, this work fills that gap with a 

brief but intensive study of troop strength in past contingency operations. 

While there are no established rules for determining troop density, 

since 1995 several military observers, analysts, and civilian journalists 

have promulgated general theories on troop density. Most theorists generally cite historical precedent when proposing ratios for troop density 

levels. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 25 soldiers 

per 1000 residents in an area of operations (1 soldier per 40 inhabitants) to 

20 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants (or 1 soldier per 50 inhabitants). The 20 to 

1000 ratio is often considered the minimum effective troop density ratio.1

However, are these estimates supported by historical data? This work 

will study a selected sample of successful military contingency operations 

to answer that question. Scenarios, like Vietnam, that were not clearly defined as either a conventional or a contingency operation, and the success 

of which is still debated, will not be considered. Several smaller operations, such as Haiti, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, and other similarly ambiguous operations like Algeria, Panama, and Somalia will also 

be excluded from this analysis. In addition, since many of the activities of 

military forces in contingency operations are similar to the daily functions 

of civilian police forces, this work will also consider size and density factors for police forces. Accordingly, a review of the organization and deployable strength of several large municipal and state police forces in the 

United States will determine if there are any discernible planning factors 

used when deploying these forces. 

Finally, a comprehensive analysis of all areas will be conducted to 

determine trends and commonalities. The analysis will then provide a recommended planning estimate for future contingency operations based on 

this review of historical experience in similar operations. The current operation in Iraq will be analyzed using the recommended planning estimate. 
Additionally, this analysis will look at US troop strength planning estimates made prior to the Iraqi operation in relation to past similar operations. 

Factors Involved in Determining Troop Density

The size of an area where troops will be conducting contingency operations and the population density of the area are key factors in determining 

troop density. For example, the greater the number of troops and the smaller 

the geographic area of responsibility, the greater the likelihood a contingency 

operation will succeed. In this work, historical examples will be examined to 

determine if this logical assumption is accurate and to determine any trends 

in troop deployment strength based on geography and demographics.

Various types of geographical settings may affect decisions regarding troop density. For example, while the land mass of the Philippines is 

115,000 square miles, this mass covers an area of 700,000 square miles and 

consists of over 460 islands larger than one square mile and 11 islands larger 

than 1000 square miles. The noncontiguous nature of the land area of this 

archipelago would, therefore, require more troops and more separate detachments than a contiguous area of similar size not separated by bodies 

of water. While densely populated urban and suburban areas will require a 

greater troop density (and will be analyzed both as part of a larger example 

and separately), large, underpopulated areas with covering terrain such as 

jungles, forests, or mountains may require more troops than an analysis of 

the population density alone may indicate. Covering terrain provides ideal 

assembly areas and sanctuaries for insurgents, terrorists, and foreign adventurers. For the purposes of this work, however, geographical variations 

(except for population density) will be studied by exception and only as 

necessary. 

In addition to population density, specifics of demographics may play 

a significant role in troop density considerations. Dr. Richard Stewart has 

rightfully pointed out the number of young adult males and the unemployment rate may be key factors to consider when determining troop density.2

However, detailed demographic analysis is beyond the scope of this work. 

Nontraditional demographic models will be analyzed in this work only by 

exception, as necessary, to help explain anomalies in the analysis.

Mission and Roles

Major contingency operations are a bundle of closely related operational, civil affairs, and police-type activities. Table 1 lists the functions of 

contingency operations as outlined in US Army Field Manual (FM) 7-30, 

The Infantry Brigade:3
Table 1. Types of Contingency Operations

Type Missions

Peace Operations Peacekeeping: employ patrols, establish 

checkpoints, roadblocks, buffer zones, 

supervise truce, EPW exchange, reporting 

and monitoring, negotiation and mediation, liaison, investigation of complaints 

and violations, civil disturbance missions, 

and offensive and defensive missions. 

Peace Enforcement: separate belligerents; establish and supervise protected 

zones, sanction enforcement, movement 

denial and guarantee, restoration and 

maintenance of order, area security, humanitarian assistance, civil disturbance 

missions, and offensive and defensive 

missions. 

Operations in Support of Diplomatic 

Efforts: conduct military-to-military contacts, conduct exercises, provide security 

assistance, restore civil authority, rebuild 

physical infrastructure, provide structures 

and training for schools and hospitals, 

and reestablish commerce. 

Foreign Internal Defense Indirect Support: military-to-military 

contacts, exercises, area security. 

Direct Support: civil-military operations, intelligence and communications 

sharing, and logistical support. 

Combat Operations: offensive and defensive missions. 

Support to Insurgencies Show of force, defensive missions, raids, 

area security, employ patrols, and provide Combat Service Support.

(continued on next page)
Table 1. Types of Contingency Operations

Type Mission

Counterdrug Operations Liaison and advisor duty, civic action, 

intelligence support, surveillance support, reconnaissance, logistical support, 

and information support.

Combating Terrorism Conduct force protection, offensive and 

defensive missions.

Noncombatant Evacuation 

Operations 

Attack to seize terrain that secures evacuees or departure area, guard, convoy 

security, delay, and defend. 

Arms Control Seize and destroy weapons, convoy escort, assist and monitor inspection of 

arms, and conduct surveillance.

Show of Force Perform tactical movement, demonstration, defensive operations, and perform 

training exercises.

Domestic Civil Disturbance 

Operations

Assist law enforcement activities and security operations.

The above figure illustrates how the functions of contingency operations are varied and often specialized. However, for the purposes 

of determining general troop densities in such operations, this analysis 

presumes a troop deployment will primarily consist of general purpose 

forces that can be either retrained quickly or reoriented to conduct specific functions.

In addition to the various missions soldiers conduct during contingency operations, a deployed force includes troops employed in command and control, and administrative and logistic functions. As with the 

varied demographic factors, these supporting elements will not be discussed in this analysis unless required by exception.

External Factors

This work will use past military and civilian police experience to 

develop planning factors or estimates for troop densities in contingency 

operations. However, in many cases, external factors affected troop densities and the result was deployment numbers either greater than or fewer 

than ideal. For example, political considerations may affect the size of a 

deployed force. In the Philippines from 1899 to 1901, for instance, the 
number of deployed troops was twice reduced, based not on military 

considerations, but solely on the desire to expeditiously return volunteer 

soldiers to civilian life at the end of their enlistments. In this work, the 

role of external factors will be discussed as necessary as part of the analysis of the historical record of troop density in contingency operations. 

Methodology

In order to determine the number of troops needed for future contingency operations, this analysis contains five sections. First, past successful 

contingency operations are analyzed based on geographical area, terrain, 

population density, troop deployment and organization, and indigenous 

support. Second, the size and organization of various municipal and state 

police departments in the United States will be reviewed individually and 

then in comparison with each other. Third, the accumulated data will be 

analyzed using several factors including population density, troop availability, recruitment and rotation, intensity and duration of the conflict, 

police versus military troop densities, and the relative importance of indigenous and substitute forces in the conduct of the operation. Fourth, the 

above information will be synthesized to identify trends in determining 

troop densities in past contingency operations and to formulate recommended troop levels for estimating deployment densities in future contingency operations. This is a brief analysis of a complex issue. For a more 

in-depth study, additional research would be required. However, this work 

offers an immediate answer to the question of how many troops should be 

deployed for successful conduct of a contingency operation.

Contingency operations are complex and vary in intensity and scope, 

making comparisons between past operations possibly problematic. However, for the purposes of this study, the historical examples used are considered equal in scope and intensity, although intensity will be analyzed 

as one of the factors when the various historical examples are compared 

with each other. Additionally, troop quality can vary among regular serving soldiers, indigenous forces, substitute forces (such as contractors), and 

police. For the purposes of this study, soldier quality is assumed to be 

equal for all operational forces serving in a full time status. 
Notes

 1. Stephen Budiansky, “Formula for How Many Troops We Need,” Washington Post, 9 May 2004, B04 [article on-line] available at http://www.spokesmanre

view.com/breaking-news-story.asp?submitdate=2004510151143; Internet; accessed 

13 January 2005; Daniel Smith, “Iraq: Descending into the Quagmire,” Foreign 

Policy In Focus Policy Report, June 2003 [document on-line] available at http://

www.fpif.org/papers/quagmire2003.html; Internet; accessed 9 November 2005; 

Kevin Drum, “Political Animal: Not Enough Troops in Iraq?” Washington Monthly, 

9 January 2005 [article on-line] available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ar

chives/individual/2005_01/005422.php; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005; James 

Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” 

Rand Review, 27 no. 3 (Summer 2003) 18 August 2005 [article on-line] available 

at http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html; 

Internet; accessed 14 September 2005; James Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in 

Stability Operations,” Parameters, 23 (Winter 1995), 59-69.

2. Richard Stewart, “Occupations Then and Now.” In Armed Diplomacy: 

Two Centuries of American Campaigning (paper presented at conference sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

5-7 August 2003), (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 

272.

3. Department of the Army, FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigade, change 1 dated 

31 October 2000 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 3 October 1995), 

Table J-7, p. J-34. FM 7-30 uses the term stability operations when describing 

what this work refers to as contingency operations. The current dictionary of 

Army operational terms (FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, September 

2004) only contains the term stability operations. For the purposes of this work, 

stability and contingency operations will be synonymous.


Chapter 2

Historical Examples

The Philippines, 1899-1901

Situational Narrative

In May 1898 as part of global operations in the Spanish-American 

War, a small American naval force under Commodore (later Rear Admiral) George Dewey defeated a Spanish naval squadron based in Manila 

Bay in the Spanish colony of the Philippines, an archipelago in the Pacific 

Ocean off the East Asian coast. Following Dewey’s success, Major General Wesley Merritt led a 5000-soldier expedition to secure the base at Manila. Merritt subsequently received reinforcements and his command was 

designated the Eighth Corps. With these reinforcements, he attacked the 

Spanish position at Manila and captured the city in August 1898. Meanwhile Filipinos, led by former insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo, who the 

United States had recently returned from exile in Hong Kong, revolted 

against the Spanish. Aguinaldo’s forces played a supporting role in the 

capture of Manila. While the American forces, now led by Major General Elwell S. Otis, held an enclave around Manila throughout the last 

half of 1898 awaiting the results of peace negotiations with the Spanish, 

Aguinaldo organized an “army of liberation” and an independent Filipino 

government. 

When the 10 December 1898 Treaty of Paris ceded the Philippines 

to the United States, conflict with Aguinaldo and his forces became inevitable.1

 Hostilities between the Filipino forces and Otis’ troops formally 

began in early February 1899. The conventional phase of operations lasted 

until the end of that year and primarily centered on the largest and most 

populous island of Luzon. While early US successes included securing the 

area around Manila, the redeployment in mid-1899 of almost half of his 

force, most of whom were limited-term volunteers, hindered Otis’ ability 

to execute offensive operations. 

Over a period of several months, an expanded Regular Army force 

and a newly raised force of 24 US national volunteer regiments gradually replaced these troops. With these reinforcements, Otis renewed offensive operations, focusing on Aguinaldo’s stronghold in northern Luzon. 

These successful actions from October through December 1899 forced 

Aguinaldo to declare an end to conventional fighting and revert to a guerilla campaign. Simultaneously, under the terms of the peace treaty, the 

remaining small Spanish garrisons prepared to leave the outlying islands 
of the archipelago. Fearing the void, which had already been filled in many 

areas by Aguinaldo supporters or allies, Otis deployed forces throughout 

the archipelago in early 1900, extending the geographical arena for operations across the full 7100 islands and 115,000 square miles of the former 

Spanish possession.2 The War Department and Otis formalized the shift to 

contingency operations in April 1900 by discontinuing the Eighth Corps 

and setting up a geographically based Military Division of the Philippines, 

with four subordinate departments, each containing multiple districts. Department and district commanders and their subordinate commanders had 

both operational and civil affairs functions. Otis was both the commander 

of the military division and the military governor of the Philippines.3

With this new structure, stability operations were conducted on a decentralized, local level with great success in 1900 and 1901, continuing 

after Major General Arthur MacArthur replaced Otis in May 1900. During 

this time, the insurgency gradually declined, culminating in the capture 

of Aguinaldo in March 1901 and his subsequent appeal for a cessation 

of hostilities. By mid-1901 major resistance was limited to the Batangas 

Province of Luzon and the island of Samar.4 At about the same time, a 

smaller, Regular Army force replaced the national volunteer regiments 

that then redeployed and mustered out of federal service. Major General 

Adna Chaffee replaced MacArthur in July 1901. Limited hostilities continued until President Theodore Roosevelt officially declared them over as 

of 4 July 1902. 

Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density 

In 1899 the Philippines was an archipelago of over 7000 islands, with 

460 islands larger than one square mile and only 11 islands larger than 

1000 square miles. The land area was 115,000 square miles. At that time, 

over 90 percent of the population lived on the largest 11 islands and totaled about seven million.5

 Most of the 11 large islands contained at least 

one large urban area; Manila on Luzon was the largest urban area. Terrain 

away from the cities varied from rugged mountainous areas to forests, 

jungles, open plains, and agricultural areas where rice and hemp were the 

predominate crops. Overall, the climate was tropical.

In 1899, 2.8 million people, or approximately one-third of the Filipino 

population, lived on Luzon, the largest, northernmost island.6 Aside from 

being the most densely populated island, Luzon was also the most militarily significant, containing the city of Manila and the heart of the Filipino 

insurgency. The leaders of the insurgency were predominately from the 

Tagalog ethnic group on Luzon. Filipino population density throughout 

the islands was about 61 persons per square mile. However, in the more 
densely populated regions of central and northern Luzon, this rose to 67

persons per square mile.

US Troop Deployment and Organization 

Otis, then US commander in the Philippines, wrote to the Adjutant 

General in Washington in August 1899 stating he felt no more than 50,000 

troops could successfully quell the Philippine Insurrection and conduct 

occupation duties. Otis felt an additional 15,000 troops would be needed 

if the insurrection spread to the southern islands of Jolo and Mindanao. 

His force at the time numbered about 30,000, with projected reinforcements of 10,000. This total included 12 US national volunteer regiments 

recently raised specifically for service in the archipelago. To meet his demand for more troops, Otis requested and received approval for the creation of an additional 15 regiments of national volunteers for garrison duty 

in the islands.7 Otis based these figures on his military knowledge, garnered from his career, which began in the large mass armies of the Civil 

War and extended for decades in the frontier Army. At the time of his 

estimate, Filipino insurgents still fielded a substantial conventional force, 

so Otis based his figures on defeating that force, the need to conduct any 

subsequent guerilla operations, and garrisoning the archipelago. 

While the southern regions would, to some extent, ultimately join the 

insurrection, Otis and his successors would deploy far less than the projected 15,000 soldiers to those areas, giving the departmental commander 

of Mindanao and Jolo at most 2600 soldiers.

8

 However, theater-wide, peak 

deployment would exceed Otis’ maximum estimate of 65,000, reaching 

68,816 in October 1900. Troop strength would remain above 60,000 during the peak months of the guerilla campaign from January to December 

1900.9 Additionally, the troop strength numbers were greatest following 

the defeat of Aguinaldo’s conventional forces. Figure 1 illustrates monthly 

US troop strength numbers.

Even though a large component of the deployed force consisted of 

nonprofessional volunteers, these troops proved to be very effective. Their 

high level of training and professionalism meant, in practical terms, there 

was no distinction between their operational deployment and employment 

and that of the recently expanded Regular Army. However, unlike the regulars, the volunteers had a limited tour of service. Table 2 depicts troop 

density, geography data, and troop strength numbers for the Philippine 

Insurrection.

As can be seen from table 2, US soldiers were spread thin throughout the archipelago, averaging slightly more than one soldier for every 

two square miles of territory, and 1 soldier for a little over 100 Filipino 
10

inhabitants. However, US commanders did not deploy these soldiers evenly 

throughout the islands. As previously cited, the majority of the garrison was 

deployed on Luzon, specifically in the northern Luzon area, where the troop 

density averaged more than 1.5 soldiers per two square miles and about 10 

soldiers per 1000 residents. In fact, the relative importance of Luzon is apparent in the deployment of 35,000 US troops, a little over half of all US 

forces deployed to the Philippines, to the island at the peak of US troop 

strength.10 Figure 2 illustrates the troop deployment allocations of the Military Division of the Philippines in 1900.

Figure 1. Deployment of US forces in the Philippines, 1899–1901
11

Table 2. Troop Density in the Philippine Insurrection

Area Military Forces 

(at maximum)

Population Area

(square miles)

Population Density (per square mile)

Soldier Density

Per Area (soldiers per square mile)

Per Population(one soldier per x residents) 

x=

Soldiers Per 1000 Residents

P h i l i p p i n e s 1899-1901 68,816 7, 000,000 115,000 60.90 0.59 101.70 9.80 Northern Luzon 1899-1901 25,000 2,000,000 30,000 66.70 0.83 80.00 12.50 
12

0

8070605040302010

Eighth Corps 

discontinued 

April 00

24 national volunteer 

regiments raised

Mar-Sep 99

24 volunteer 

regiments

mustered out

Feb-Jul 01

1901 1899 1898 1900

Guerilla war 

phase begins

Dec 99

Thousands of Troops 2d battle of Manila Feb 99 Spring campaign Luzon Mar-May 99

Northern

Luzon 

offensive 

Oct-Dec 99

State volunteer 

regiments

redeploy

Jun-Sep 99

Aguinaldo 

captured 

Mar 01 

Treaty of Paris 

with Spain 

Dec 98

Hostilities

officially 

end

Jul 02 

Total

V

o

ul nte

ers

Regulars

MacArthur 

replaces Otis

May 00

Chaffee

replaces 

MacArthur

Jul 01

US forces 

occupy 

archipelago

Jan 00

Figure 2. US forces in the Philippines, 1898-1901.
13

The initial estimate for the number of troops required as garrison 

forces during the post-insurrection phase was 40,000 Regular Army 

troops, including 30,000 infantry, 9000 cavalry, 8 companies of coast 

artillery, 2 field artillery batteries, and 3 mountain artillery batteries.11

However, despite the outbreak of a new insurrection among the Moslem 

Moros of southern Mindanao in 1902, the size of the US garrison in the 

Philippines soon fell below the 40,000 figure to approximately 23,000 

by 1903.12

Indigenous Support 

The recruitment of Filipino forces to support US stability operations 

during the insurrection began slowly in 1900 when MacArthur expanded 

the role of the preexisting Filipino police and established a force of native scouts. These forces together numbered about 3400 in May 1900.13

Though relatively small in numbers, the friendly Filipino forces often 

spearheaded or assisted in US counterinsurgency operations, particularly 

in the latter stages of the insurgency.

Conclusion 

While operating with minimal indigenous support over a period of 

less than three years, American forces subdued insurrection in the Philippines by employing an area troop density of 0.59 soldiers per square 

mile throughout the archipelago and a population troop density of 9.8 

soldiers per 1000 inhabitants. In the sections of Luzon where insurgent 

activity was most intense, US forces were more concentrated, and the 

troop density ratio for the area equated to 0.83 soldiers per square mile 

and a population to troop density ratio of 12.5 soldiers per 1000 Northern Luzon inhabitants. 

Postwar Germany

Situational Narrative 

As early as 1942, Allied staff officers began preparing for the postwar 

occupation of Germany, a projected mission made an operational necessity 

when the Allies demanded Germany’s unconditional surrender at the January 1943 Casablanca Conference. After the presumed surrender of Germany, the Allied powers (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet 

Union) intended to occupy the entire territorial expanse of Germany until 

civil German government was reestablished. The Allied powers did not 

identify an end date or duration for the occupation. The amount of resistance expected from the German populace and former military elements 

was unknown, but Allied combat troops would be available initially in 
14

sufficient numbers if such resistance appeared. At the Yalta Conference, 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated the United States politically could 

only field an occupation force in Germany for two years. However, most 

planners considered five years to be a more realistic minimum duration 

estimate.14

Not anticipating future animosity from Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, 

US planners intended to leave the minimum necessary force in Germany to 

conduct stability and reconstruction operations. The remainder of the force 

would redeploy from Germany to the Pacific to help defeat Japan or back 

to the United States for discharge. Operation Plan (OPLAN) ECLIPSE 

detailed occupation responsibilities and national sectors of those forces 

remaining in Germany. At the end of the war, US troops occupied large 

areas of the projected British, French, and Soviet sectors as well as the entire projected US sector. This necessitated a US troop withdrawal into the 

American sector by July 1945. The redeployment of US troops from the 

Soviet sector was delayed until the Soviets agreed to withdraw from the 

portions of Berlin previously designated as British, French, and American 

occupation sectors.15

Even though 780,372 soldiers quickly deployed out of the theater for 

service in the Pacific, over two million troops remained to conduct occupation duties. This, coupled with the complete defeat of enemy military 

forces and the destruction of the Nazi government apparatus, resulted in 

US forces adopting a system of blanket or “army” occupation.16 Under 

this system, US units deployed throughout the American sector to conduct 

occupation duties, and corps and divisions assumed responsibility for specific German counties (Landkreise). 

With the surrender of Japan in August 1945 and the subsequent rapid 

demobilization of troops, it soon became apparent the Army could not 

continue to support the army-type occupation; military government officers preferred a less dense style of occupation. Therefore, beginning in 

October 1945, the US forces in Germany gradually adopted a style of occupation similar to that implemented in Japan, the so-called police-type 

occupation. In this kind of occupation, the preexisting Japanese police 

force remained in place to conduct law and order operations under American supervision, backed up by US tactical units consolidated in regimentsize cantonments.17

In Germany, where the police force was nonexistent or was tainted 

with the brush of Nazism, converted American units formed the equivalent 

force. By 1 July 1946 the 4th Armored Division and the remaining mechanized cavalry groups in Germany reorganized as the US Constabulary, with 
15

a total strength of about 30,000 troopers. The Constabulary was designed 

specifically for policing postwar Germany and guarding the new border 

with the Soviet zone. Apart from the Constabulary, by September 1947

the Army retained only one infantry division and several separate infantry 

battalions and companies in Germany with a total strength, including the 

Constabulary, of 117,224 soldiers. From January 1947 until November 

1950, the strength of the US ground forces in Germany remained between 

91,000 and 117,000 soldiers.18

Different authorities cite various time frames for the actual duration 

of the occupation. Officially, it lasted until March 1955 when the Treaty 

of Paris formally established West German sovereignty. However, after 

the 1948 Berlin Airlift, the nature of the occupation gradually shifted into 

a defense of Europe against the Soviets, as opposed to oversight of the 

German recovery, and the Constabulary gradually transformed back into 

a standard tactical organization. The political and economic unification of 

the French, British, and US sectors into the Federal Republic of Germany 

in 1949 was the next major step. However, the communist invasion of 

South Korea in June 1950 marked the real beginning of the end of the 

occupation. The subsequent American troop build-up in Germany, which 

began in November 1950 with the reactivation of the 7th Army headquarters, clearly marked the shift away from occupation to defense. For the 

purposes of this work, therefore, November 1950 will mark the end of the 

occupation. 

The occupation of Germany posed unique problems not generally 

seen in other occupations or contingency operations. While there was no 

insurgency, troops not only had to police large areas of Germany, they also 

had to fight black marketeering, and support, guard, and process hundreds 

of thousands of prisoners of war and 2.5 million displaced persons (DP).19

Additionally, millions of dollars of American and captured materiel had to 

be guarded and disposed of. During the occupation, the United States had 

to redeploy a large contingent to fight the Japanese, and then later redeploy 

a significant number of soldiers to the United States for discharge and return to civilian life, while maintaining a suitably sized occupation force. 

Simultaneously, a large portion of the occupying force had to be retrained 

and converted into the Constabulary. 

Another unique aspect of the occupation was the arrival of American 

dependent family members beginning in May 1946. The arrival of families 

meant the creation of permanent quarters and garrison posts and was a 

key indicator the occupation was transforming into a permanent defensive 

force for Western Europe.20
16

Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density

The initial sector of Germany allocated to the United States for occupation purposes consisted of the German state of Bavaria in the east, and 

what later became the state of Hesse in the north and the northern portion 

of the state of Baden-Württemberg in the west.21 Original US planning 

figures estimated the US occupation zone of Germany to be 45,600 square 

miles and to contain a population of 17.8 million.22 Thus, the proposed 

occupation zone had a population density of 372.8 inhabitants per square 

mile. While the French assumed part of the original zone in July 1945, 

later figures, including prisoners of war, refugees, and DPs, estimated the 

population to be about 19 million, or a population density of 416.7 persons 

per square mile. The US zone also included a sector in Berlin and a small 

enclave at the port of Bremerhaven in the British sector. Bremerhaven 

provided the main port and supply hub for the US forces in Germany. The 

US occupation zone in Austria will be discussed separately.23

Army-Type Occupation Force

On V-E Day, 8 May 1945, there were 1,622,000 US troops in Germany 

organized into 59 divisions, 15 corps, 5 armies, and 2 army groups. The 

total theater force was 3,069,310.24 This force had been assembled to defeat 

the Germans. However, only a small number were earmarked for subsequent occupation duties, while up to 1.5 million were designated for immediate transfer to the Pacific and another 600,000 to be sent back to the 

United States for discharge as excess. By July 1945 the two army group 

headquarters and one army headquarters had been disbanded and 1 army 

headquarters, 3 corps headquarters, and 11 divisions had redeployed to the 

continental United States for service either in the invasion of Japan or as a 

strategic reserve.25

As originally conceived in OPLAN ECLIPSE, the occupation force 

would be a strong force capable of responding to all contingencies, later 

referred to as the army-type occupation force. The required strength of this 

force, called the Occupational Troop Basis (OTB), was determined to be 

404,500. Originally, this would include 2 army headquarters, 3 corps headquarters, and 10 divisions that would be in place within a year and a half following the German surrender. The army-type occupation force would rely 

on conventional tactical units to serve as the occupation force.26

The sudden defeat of Japan in August 1945 resulted in the reduction of 

the OTB for the occupation of Germany long before it could be implemented. The projected strength was decreased to 370,000, and eight divisions. 

Three divisions would be in Bavaria (which later became the Western [then 
17

First] Military District), four in Hesse and Baden-Württemberg (which 

together became the Eastern [then Second] Military District) and a division (minus) in Berlin with one of its regiments in Bremerhaven. One 

armored combat command and one paratrooper regiment were earmarked 

as a mobile reserve. The rest of the OTB force would be concentrated in 

regiment-size units at various posts. The deadline for OTB implementation was shortened from a year and a half to one year.27

In addition to the OTB, an additional 337,000 troops were designated 

to be in place by July 1946 to guard and liquidate over six million tons of 

excess and captured materiel located in the American zone. By July 1946 

the total force, including the OTB and those soldiers designated to liquidate materiel, was projected to be 707,000. A clear indication this required 

figure was not seriously considered is the fact that as early as the end of 

December 1945, total troop strength in Germany was 93,000 less than the 

614,000 projected for July 1946. New projections counted the number of 

divisions rather than the total number of troops, with the total projected 

force reduced from eight to less than five divisions by the end of June 

1946 and further reductions after that date. However, even these projections would prove to be overly optimistic because concurrent with these 

reductions, the Army was adopting a new theory of occupation force size 

in Japan that would require even fewer troops.28

Police-Type Occupation Force

Within several months following the Japanese surrender, the OTB 

would be radically reduced. A new occupation theory, called the policetype occupation, was developed to cope with both the lack of a strong German resistance and the fact that concurrent rapid demobilization would 

soon result in the unavailability of a large force.29

The theory behind the police-type occupation was for a highly mobile, 

highly trained police-style force to maintain primary control of the occupied area. Once formed, this force, the US Constabulary, would patrol 

the American zone and the border with the Soviet zone much like police 

forces in the United States patrolled cities and states. A mobile combat 

force of three divisions stationed in centrally located, regiment-size concentrations would back up the Constabulary. Military government planners determined the authorized size of the Constabulary at 38,000 by using 

the rough estimate of providing one Constabulary trooper for every 450 

Germans, using prewar census figures to determine the German population. This provided a ratio of 2.2 Constabulary soldiers per 1000 German 

inhabitants.30 The projected end-strength of the OTB for the police-type 
18

occupation force was 203,000, including the Constabulary, one army headquarters (Third Army), three divisions (1st, 3d, and 9th Infantry Divisions) 

and the previously excluded occupation forces in the adjacent US zone in 

Austria.31 The police-type occupation was projected to last five years and 

the Constabulary was scheduled for inactivation by 1 July 1950.32

By 1 July 1946 the 4th Armored Division and the remaining theater 

cavalry groups reorganized into the Constabulary, made up of three brigades of three regiments each. One brigade was responsible for one each 

of the three German states located in the American zone based on area. 

Constabulary squadrons deployed across the zone and along the border 

with the Soviet zone, while the three-division tactical force deployed in 

regiment-size concentrations across the American zone. Figure 3 depicts 

the organization of the American zone in Germany in July 1946.

Concurrent with the adoption of the police-type occupation force, 

demobilization and drawdown rapidly continued. The 316,000-member 

closeout force, whose mission it was to liquidate stocks of surplus or captured equipment, redeployed over the first half of 1946. The Constabulary 

would never reach its target strength of 38,000, attaining a maximum size 

of only 33,076 before demands for an even smaller occupation force affected its strength.33

Figure 3. Organization of the American zone, July 1946.
19

Upon becoming operational in July 1946, the Constabulary’s 27

squadrons were arrayed throughout the sector with a brigade of three 

regiments (nine squadrons per brigade) in each of the three states of the 

American zone. The three-division tactical force was consolidated primarily into regiment-size groupings, with the 3d Infantry Division in Hesse 

and northern Baden, the 9th Infantry Division in southwestern Bavaria and 

northern Württemberg, and the 1st Infantry Division in western and northern Bavaria. A separate infantry regiment garrisoned Bremen and Berlin. 

However, the continued downsizing would soon transform this scheme.

After July 1946 the pace of the drawdown slowed. In September the 

OTB for July 1947 was reduced to 117,000, including the Austrian occupation force. The three-division mobile combat force was reduced first to 

two and then to a single division.34 Completing the move from a tactical to 

a police-style system, Third Army headquarters was inactivated in March 

1947 and the Constabulary headquarters assumed most of its functions.35

By June 1947, two years into the occupation, actual troop strength stood 

at 117,224, including 11,345 troops in Austria.36 The Constabulary was reduced in size soon after its establishment. As part of a revised strength authorization of 18,000 by September 1947, the Constabulary was reduced 

by 1 brigade, 4 regiments, and 11 squadrons. The remaining elements were 

reorganized and spread out even farther across the US zone.37 Figure 4 illustrates the reduction in force strength from 1945 to June 1947.

Concurrent with these reductions, the nature of the occupation began 

to change from police-type operations to defense from external threats. 

Tensions increased between the former western Allies and the Soviet 

Union, culminating in the Berlin Blockade in March 1948. The shift to a 

defensive posture began with the consolidation of a regiment of the 1st Infantry Division at the Grafenwöhr training area in late summer 1947. The 

1st Infantry Division had served as the American tactical reserve force and 

had been widely dispersed across the zone after the departure of the other 

two divisions. At the same time, the increased role of the German police 

in local law enforcement allowed the Constabulary to function as an emergency reaction force or to provide police coverage for areas not under the 

German police. As a result, the 5th Constabulary Regiment consolidated 

at Augsburg simultaneous to the 1st Division’s regimental concentration 

at Grafenwöhr.38

The 1948-49 Soviet blockade of West Berlin and the subsequent Berlin Airlift marked the beginning of the change in the mission of the Army 

in Europe from occupation to defense. This completed the reorientation of 

the Constabulary from a police to a tactical force. In December 1948 the 
20

Figure 4. US occupation forces in Europe, 1945-1947. 

May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Sep Jan Jun

1945 1946

9 May 45 

Strength 3.069 million

3.53.02.52.01.5

Millions

1.00.5

May-Jun 45

780,372

Redeployed for 

the Pacific

1947

Redeploye Oc dcupation

1 Jul 46

Strength 299,264

11 Jun 47

Strength 117,224

15 Aug 45

Japan

surrenders

Force

May 46

First US 

dependents 

arrive

Jul 46

Constabulary

established

Nov 50

Increase in 

troop numbers 

begins 

Jan-Jun 46

Surplus

materiel

liquidated
21

Constabulary was accordingly reduced and reorganized into a two-brigade 

force. Under the brigades, three former regiments and nine squadrons converted to three armored cavalry regiments. The Army retained only two 

Constabulary squadrons, one in Berlin and one near the border with the 

Soviet zone. The Communist attack on South Korea in June 1950 finalized the shift from occupation to defense. The Constabulary headquarters 

converted into a reactivated Seventh Army headquarters on 24 November 

1950.39 This new defensive mission required a build-up of combat forces. 

Two corps headquarters, V Corps in June and VII Corps in October, and 

four divisions deployed to Germany from the United States between May 

and November 1951.40

Organization of the Occupation

Apart from the tactical units, a military community structure developed in Germany based on two decisions made in the fall of 1945: the plan 

to restation US forces in larger, regimental garrisons, and the decision to 

allow the dependents of occupation soldiers to live in the occupation areas. 

In April 1946 the construction of military communities, including family housing, commenced. Additionally, a system of schools for dependent 

children was established and various support facilities were created. 

Following stateside practice, the communities were initially called 

military posts and sub-posts.41 Each post command was responsible for 

a certain geographical area, and included all US installations in the area. 

With a small headquarters staff, colonels, typically the commander of the 

senior tactical unit in the area, commanded the military posts, which were 

similar in size to US counties. The post command conducted all administrative functions, leaving the tactical and Constabulary units free to execute their primary missions. Following German practice, several military posts were organized into military districts. In 1947 there were two 

military districts, one in the states of Hesse and Württemberg-Baden under 

the Headquarters, US Constabulary, and another in Bavaria under the 

headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division.42 The districts controlled the 

military posts in their areas operationally, while European theater staff 

and units worked with each post directly to provide logistic and administrative support. Initially, there were 19 military posts in the American 

sector, illustrated in figure 5. The post of Frankfurt, staffed by the Army 

theater headquarters, US Forces, European Theater (USFET) and the 

post of Wiesbaden, staffed by the Army Air Force theater headquarters, 

US Air Force, Europe (USAFE), did not fall under any district. As the 

drawdown continued, posts were consolidated and the district headquarters were eliminated.43
22

Higher organization in the theater initially included two army headquarters, an army theater headquarters, and a parallel military government 

structure. The USFET commander was also the US Military Governor of 

Germany. As such, he commanded a separate military government organization, the Office of Military Government for Germany (US) or OMGUS. 

USFET was redesignated the European Command (EUCOM) in March 

1947. EUCOM was a joint command, and in November 1947, a separate 

Army theater command was created under EUCOM called US Army, Europe (USAREUR).44

While initially soldiers in units who had fought the war together conducted the occupation, the demobilization process, based on individual 

replacements rather than unit replacements, soon transformed the occupation force units into a mix of individual fillers who had the lowest 

priority for demobilization. Over time, individual replacements refilled 

the force. While conceptually the Army’s elite soldiers were to fill the 

Figure 5. US occupation military districts, June 1947.
23

Constabulary’s ranks, it too was filled with individual replacements who 

received no special training or selection.45

Austria

US forces also participated in the occupation of Austria. As in Germany, the United States occupied sectors, one around around Salzburg 

and one in the capital city of Vienna. The US zone in Austria covered an 

area of 6200 square miles and contained a population of 1,297,700.46 Unlike Germany, occupation planning for Austria was initially marked by 

uncertainty concerning participation and troop levels. Initial estimates for 

Austria consisted of the projected deployment of a corps with one armored 

and two infantry divisions totaling 73,000 soldiers. This force would be 

in place for a period of time between 4 and 12 months after the end of the 

war, and then be downsized to a force of 28,000 with one division and a 

regimental combat team. Despite the projected requirements, the OTB for 

the Austria occupation was soon reduced to a starting figure of 28,030 soldiers and included a corps headquarters and one or two infantry divisions. 

This was further reduced to an occupation headquarters and one infantry 

division, still with a maximum strength of 28,000.47

In the first six months, the occupation troops deployed to Austria were 

in a state of constant flux. Initially, the XV Corps was responsible for the 

projected US zone in Austria, but in July 1945, the II Corps, with the 42d 

and 65th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Armored Division, replaced XV 

Corps. The XV Corps, part of the original blanket occupation, contained 

about 70,000 soldiers and included at various times the 101st Airborne 

Division, the 14th Armored Division, and the 83d and 26th Infantry Divisions. By the end of October 1945, the 83d Infantry Division had become 

the main element of the occupation force in Austria, with the 4th Cavalry 

Group attached. By early 1946 the occupation force was roughly 41,000 

in size. 

The 83d soon redeployed to the United States for inactivation, replaced by the separate 5th Infantry Regiment (April-November 1946) that 

was then replaced by the 1st Infantry Division’s 16th Infantry Regiment 

(reduced to only two battalions). Concurrently, the 4th Cavalry Group 

was converted into the 4th Constabulary Regiment with two subordinate 

squadrons (the 4th and 24th). By June 1947, two years into the occupation, 

actual US troop strength in Austria was 1345 soldiers. In June 1948, the 

1st Infantry Division was concentrated in Germany, and the 350th Infantry, formerly of the 88th Infantry Division, was reactivated to become the 

chief occupation force in Austria. The 350th remained in Austria until 

1955 when the US occupation ended.48
24

Indigenous Support

Initially, civilian support to the American contingency operation was 

nonexistent in Germany. However, the revival of the German border police force in 1946 and the expansion and increased role of German police, 

both locally and along the zonal borders, released American forces for 

other missions or inactivation. 

New German border police forces were established on a state basis in 

early 1946 to assist US forces in controlling the borders between the states 

and zones. The planned total size was 4000, a strength figure which was 

almost achieved by July 1946. With the activation of the Constabulary that 

same month, the border police were under the control of the new organization, instead of local civilian state governments as originally planned. The 

border police and local police gradually expanded as the Constabulary 

downsized.

 In March 1947 the border police were rearmed and placed under the 

operational control of the US military government. The Germans soon 

assumed complete control over border patrol operations, culminating in 

August 1948 with the complete withdrawal of the Constabulary from the 

border.49

Concurrent with the development of the border police, the local police (Landespolizei) were organized on a state-by-state basis in 1946. The 

downsizing of the Constabulary in August 1947 led to the expansion of 

German police authority as the Germans assumed all local police functions 

for German nationals, while the Constabulary continued as an emergency 

reaction force and as the police force in areas not under German police 

jurisdiction. DPs and other foreigners remained under the jurisdiction of 

the Constabulary.50

In Austria the situation contrasted greatly with the situation in the 

American sector of Germany. The Soviets had established a civilian government almost as soon as their forces captured Vienna. This government 

was retained when US, British, and French forces subsequently joined the 

Soviets in the occupation of Austria. It ultimately evolved into the neutralist Austrian government, which attained full sovereignty in 1955. 

As part of this civil government, federal and local police forces, established from the start, played an important role in local law enforcement 

from the early days of the occupation. The local Austrian forces numbered 

about 6000 police officers in the American sector in 1947.51
25

Table 3. Troop Density in the Occupation of Germany and Austria

Military Forces (ground forces)

Population Area 

(square miles)

Population Density (per square mile)

Soldier Density 

Per Area (soldiers per square mile)

Per Population (one soldier per x residents) x=

Soldiers Per 1000 Residents Germany, 1945-49

19,000,000 45,600 416.7

Army occupation projected (maximum final size)

285,000 6.25 66.70 15.00

Police occupation projected (maximum final size)

203,000 4.45 93.60 10.68

Constabulary (projected) 38,000 0.83 500.00 2.00Police occupation actual one year

299,264 6.56 63.50 15.75 

Two years 117,224 2.57 162.10 6.16 Constabulary actual 33,076 0.72 574.43 1.74Austria, 1945-49 1,297,700 6200 209.30Planned (maximum) 73,000 11.77 17.78 56.25Actual two years (maximum) 11,345 1.83 114.39 8.74 
26

Conclusion

Initial occupation planning estimates for one year following the German surrender projected a force of 21.28 soldiers per 1000 German inhabitants. The large army-type occupation plan was never fully implemented 

due to the adoption and implementation of the smaller, police-type occupation plan. At its maximum, the total force size of the police-type occupation was projected to be 203,000, or a ratio of 10.68 soldiers per 1000 

inhabitants, roughly half the size of the army-type occupation. At the heart 

of the police-type occupation was the US Constabulary, whose projected 

strength of 38,000 was based on a rough estimate of 1 soldier-policeman 

per 450 German residents, a ratio that would deploy 2.2 troopers per 1000 

residents. 

Actual deployment numbers were lower than the planning estimates. 

The total one year after the German surrender of 299,264 was slightly 

higher than both the planned police- and army-type occupation final figures, but was soon reduced within a year to 117,224, a figure that remained 

constant for the remainder of the occupation. The actual maximum Constabulary strength of 33,076 provided a ratio of 1.74 troopers per 1000 of 

population. 

Originally, the occupation forces in Austria were counted separately, 

but were later added to the total for the entire occupation. The initial armytype occupation planning estimate for Austria of 73,000 troops equated to 

a high ratio of 56 soldiers per 1000 of population. However, the original 

planning figures were based more on geographic area than population, as 

the area soldier density ratio of 11.77 is similar to the army-type area density estimate of 8.87 for Germany. 

The initial uncertainty about the size of the US occupation zone in 

Austria, part of which was later added to the French sector, and the mountainous terrain of some of the territory may account for the initial, higher 

planning estimates. In any event, actual deployment numbers were much 

smaller and within two years, there were only 11,345 US forces in Austria 

or 8.74 soldiers per 1000 of population. This lower, actual figure provided 

54 soldiers per square mile. See table 3 for the projected versus actual 

troop densities for the US occupation of Germany and Austria. 

Indigenous support to the occupation forces only became a factor in 

the later stages of the occupation. Initially, occupation forces counted on 

no local support; however, as the occupation continued, indigenous forces 

were capable of providing support, allowing occupation forces to redeploy 

or to assist in the reconstruction of the new democratic Germany.
27

Postwar Japan

Situational Narrative 

In contrast to the situation in Germany, at the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the enemy government and armed forces remained 

largely intact. The surrender occurred suddenly as an immediate result of 

the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet invasion 

of Manchuria. The United States had been assembling forces for a projected two-phase invasion of the Japanese home islands. These assembled 

forces formed the initial basis of the occupation force. 

By October 1945, 15 divisions, 7 corps, and 2 army headquarters had 

deployed to Japan.52 These units were spread across the three major islands 

and the 46 political subdivisions referred to as prefectures. In the initial 

stages, multiple divisions were concentrated in urban settings, while in rural areas, divisions had responsibility for much larger areas often containing multiple prefectures.53 This initial occupation force was almost immediately downsized to a more permanent force of four American divisions 

under one army and two corps headquarters, and a division equivalent of 

British Commonwealth troops who started arriving in February 1946.54

Despite the Commonwealth presence and unlike Germany, the Allied 

powers did not divide Japan into zones. The occupation was firmly under 

the control of American General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who governed Japan through 

the existing government structures. One of the primary goals of the occupation was the democratization of the government while removing the 

vestiges of unbridled militarism.55

In addition to occupying Japan, the US and Allied forces were responsible for securing the overseas territories occupied by Japanese forces and 

demobilizing the Japanese armed forces. The latter was a challenging task 

as there were over six million Japanese servicemen in uniform at the time 

of the surrender. Overseas, soldiers and Japanese civilians totaled six million, and all required repatriation. This mission was completed swiftly and 

by the end of 1945, all 4.3 million Japanese armed forces personnel in the 

home islands had been demobilized and all but 700,000 overseas personnel had been repatriated.56

The occupation force soon stabilized as a force of four American divisions and the division-size British Commonwealth Occupation Force 

(BCOF). While this structure continued through 1947 and 1948, the Commonwealth forces began downsizing as early as February 1947, with 

BCOF strength below 16,000 by the end of that year. The BCOF area of 
28

responsibility was adjusted accordingly. Though the US force structure 

remained intact, most of the divisions were somewhat skeletonized.57

By late 1948 MacArthur and his staff felt most of the goals of the occupation had been accomplished and executive policy officially sought to shift 

responsibility from the military government to Japanese civil authorities 

as soon as possible. As tensions in the region increased resulting from the 

communist victory in China, the orientation of the occupation forces shifted 

to tactical training. The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 effectively 

ended the occupation, although the official end would not come until the 

1952 signing of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. 

Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density 

Excluding Okinawa, which was occupied separately and ultimately 

converted into a US forward military base, the Japanese islands consisted of a total area of 142,859.73 square miles. The population in 1945 was 

72.147 million, providing a national population density of 505 inhabitants 

per square mile.58 The Japanese archipelago consists of four main islands 

referred to as the home islands. From north to south, the islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu extend 1300 miles from end to end. 

The island of Honshu takes up over 60 percent of the land mass and is 808 

miles in length and 143 miles across at its widest point. Three-fourths of 

Japan’s major cities including Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, Hiroshima, 

and Sendai are on the island of Honshu. The Japanese population is not distributed evenly across the home islands, largely because 73 percent of the 

land area is mountainous and, accordingly, far less settled. In 1945 therefore, 

most of the population was located in the less rugged coastal regions.59

Troop Deployment and Organization 

Original planning estimates for the number of troops needed to occupy 

Japan called for a total of 600,000 soldiers, 315,000 American forces and 

contingents from China, the Soviet Union, and the British Commonwealth. 

These planning estimates were soon reduced to 340,000, of which 145,000 

would be American forces.60 As late as August 1945, MacArthur estimated 

a force of 500,000 would be required initially but he projected that number 

could be reduced to 200,000 within six months.61

Despite these planning estimates, the occupation force reached its peak 

strength in December 1945 with 354,675 forces deployed. However, demobilization and downsizing rapidly continued in early 1946. Despite the 

deployment of 40,236 British Commonwealth troops, total occupation force 

strength in August 1946 was roughly 192,236. Figure 6 illustrates how US 

forces were arrayed in Japan in August 1946.
29

After August 1946 the occupation force stabilized as the units that 

would remain in the islands were identified. However, the American 

divisions lost roughly one-third of their authorized strength, while the 

Commonwealth forces were also reduced, resulting in total strength numbers in June 1948 of 132,828.62 This was approximately the troop strength 

in June 1950 when the start of the Korean War resulted in the deployment of all the major units in Japan to the Korean peninsula. Because the 

local government and police were still functioning, the American forces 

did not set up a new national, geographically based, military government 

structure as in Germany. Instead, divisions and regiments were stationed 

in the major cities in each prefecture, usually at former Japanese military 

installations. 

Initially, the standard chain of echeloned headquarters was retained 

from division to corps to army to theater command. For most of the 

Figure 6. US troop deployment in Japan, August 1946.
30 400

350300250200150100

Thousands

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950

Jun 48 Strength 148,828

Winter 48-49

Eighth Army

units refocus 

on training

Jun 50

Korean War

begins British Commonwealth forces 

deploy to Japan

Feb-Jun 46

Dec 45 Strength 354,675

15 Aug 45

Japan

surrenders

Aug-Oct 45 US forces occupy Japan

Figure 7. US troop strength during the occupation of Japan.
31

occupation, the Army retained two corps headquarters, one controlling 

the forces in the south, the other in the north. Early in 1950 on the eve 

of the Korean War, both corps headquarters were inactivated and almost

immediately reactivated for deployment to Korea. 

At the local level, the division was the basic occupation unit. Each 

subordinate element within the division was typically responsible for 

several prefectures based on population density. Then each of the subordinate regiments and the division artillery command delegated area 

responsibility to their subordinate battalions. This force structure continued even as units were downsized, when most regiments lost their 

third battalion and most division artilleries lost two or three firing batteries. As in the occupation of Germany, the rapid demobilization at 

the end of the war and the implementation of a peacetime individual 

replacement system resulted in the high turnover of personnel in most 

units. See figure 7 for the US troop strength during the occupation of 

Japan.

Indigenous Support 

While the Japanese armed forces were quickly disbanded at the 

beginning of the occupation, the civil police force of 94,000 was allowed to remain intact and would continue at that level throughout the 

occupation period, although it was organizationally decentralized to 

the local level. No Japanese armed forces were raised during the occupation.63

Conclusion 

The police-type occupation eventually implemented in Germany 

took its cue from the occupation of Japan. However, initial troop projections for Germany were slightly higher proportionally than projections for Japan. In terms of actual numbers deployed, the size of the 

force for the occupation of Germany was proportionally greater than 

the size of the force for the occupation of Japan, even if the Japanese 

police are included in occupation figures. The size of the Constabulary 

in Germany, as planned and executed, was also proportionally greater 

than the size of the existing Japanese police. 

When considering the population of Japan, the occupation there 

was the largest ever executed by the military forces of the United States 

and the largest such operation analyzed in this work. However, despite 

the large Japanese population, the troop density was proportionally the 

lowest of any of the operations examined. Table 4 contains the population, area, and density information for the occupation of Japan.
32

Table 4. Troop Density in the Occupation of Japan

Military Forces (ground forces)

Population Area

(square miles)

Population Density (per square mile)

Soldier Density

Per Area (soldiers per square mile)

Per Population (1 soldier per x residents) x=

Soldier Per 1000 Residents 

Japan Occupation 72,147,000 142,859.73 505.01Projected (maximum size) 600,000 4.20 120.25 8.32 Occupation actual size maximum (Dec 45)

354,675 2.48 203.42 4.92 

Occupation size (Aug 46) 192,236 1.35 375.30 2.66 British Commonwealth Forces (Aug 46)

40,236 20,000,000 22,000 909.01 1.83 497.07 2.01 

Japanese police 94,000 72,147,000 142,859.73 505.01 0.66 767.52 1.30 
33

The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60

Situational Narrative 

Between 1948 and 1960, British and Commonwealth forces fought an 

extended, successful campaign against communist insurgents in the former colony of Malaya, which, in 1957 in the middle of hostilities, gained 

its independence. The Malay Peninsula is located at the southern extremity 

of the Southeast Asian mainland. Its strategic maritime position between 

India and China and its proximity to the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) had become of British colonial interest late in the 18th century. In addition to its strategic importance, the peninsula’s natural resources made it 

a major supplier of tin and rubber. 

Before the beginning of British interest in the area, Malaya had been 

divided into a number of smaller states. Throughout the 1800s, British influence grew, built upon the establishment of the trading city of Singapore 

on an island at the southern end of the Malay Peninsula in 1819. Singapore 

quickly prospered, and in 1867 that port as well as Malacca and Penang, 

two small port enclaves on the western Malay coast, formally became the 

British colony of the Straits Settlements. Between 1874 and 1914, the independent Malay states north of the British colony developed into a federation of states under a loose British protectorate known as the Malayan 

Union. In the 1930s the British began initiatives to unite the Malayan 

Union and the Straits Settlement, excluding Singapore, into one state with 

the intent of eventual independence. Internal Malayan politics and World 

War II delayed this process.64

In late 1941, during the early days of the war in the Pacific, a Japanese 

force of about 30,000, moving on foot and on bicycles, invaded and occupied Malaya in a rapid, 10-week campaign, forcing the surrender of over 

100,000 British and Commonwealth troops at Singapore. This marked the 

greatest British military defeat of World War II. The Japanese occupied 

Malaya and Singapore until the end of the war in mid-1945.

After the Japanese surrender, the larger of two former anti-Japanese 

guerilla forces, the Communist Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army 

(MPAJA) attempted to fill the government void and, with its 10,000-

man army, take control of Malaya. However, a force of 100,000 British 

Commonwealth troops, originally earmarked to retake southern Burma 

and Malaya from the Japanese, moved in and soon restored the prewar 

colonial government structure. Most of the guerilla forces, which had 

been largely ineffective against the Japanese because they had spent the 

war years primarily fighting among themselves, were demobilized after 
34

the British retook control of the peninsula. British administrators moved 

quickly to unify Malaya and establish the Malayan Federation under a 

British governor on 1 February 1948, despite Malay resentment of the 

Federation government that took powers away from the rulers of the local 

states. In the postwar era, the British, primarily for reasons of economy, 

sought to grant independence to most of their colonies. However, in Malaya, the growing communist threat among the Chinese segment of the 

Malayan population delayed this until the security threat could be eliminated or substantially reduced.

Though for the most part demobilized immediately after the war, the 

communist guerillas were quickly back in action, this time opposing the 

British and British-supported Malayan government. The Malayan communists were primarily ethnic Chinese, and soon gained support among 

the large Chinese portion of the Malayan population because of fears of 

ethnic Malay domination in the new federation. Additionally, Soviet support spurred the Malayan communists into action in early 1948, coinciding 

with communist initiatives in Berlin, Italy, and Greece and the pending 

communist victory in China. 

Initial acts of violence soon escalated to the point that, in June 1948, 

the Federation government declared a state of emergency. This condition 

would continue until July 1960, three years after Malaya gained complete 

independence. The former MPAJA initially renamed itself the Malayan 

Peoples’ Anti-British Army (MPABA), and then, in 1949 as the Malayan 

Races’ Liberation Army (MRLA). The Commonwealth forces knew their 

enemy simply as the communist terrorists. The insurgent forces fluctuated 

in strength between 3000 and 10,000, generally averaging about 6000, 

until the success of counterinsurgency operations reduced their forces to 

less than 1000.65

The Malayan campaign can be divided into three general phases, an 

initial, disorganized phase (1948-50), a middle phase (1950-57) in which 

the British forces systematically destroyed the insurgency, and a final, 

mopping-up phase (1957-60).

In the initial phase from approximately June 1948 to June 1950, the 

British, expecting swift success and underestimating the insurgency, executed a disorganized, nonsystematic approach to their counterinsurgency 

operations, depending primarily on large-scale sweep operations executed 

by multiple battalions. However, such ponderous operations too often allowed the enemy to merely slip away and reappear elsewhere.66 In spite 

of this, early triumphs over an equally disorganized insurgency fed the 

British expectations for a short campaign.67 Initial British success resulted 
35

from the availability of a relatively large force in Malaya, after British 

withdrawals from India and Burma caused a reshuffling of their forces in 

Asia. Early successes included a July 1948 raid that killed the communist 

military leader, Lau Yew, and a September 1948 sweep through Johore 

province that destroyed 12 insurgent camps.68

Nevertheless, late in 1948, after a minor terror campaign against Europeans and Malays working in the rubber and tin industries, the MRLA 

withdrew to regroup and retrain. When the insurgents reemerged in force 

towards the end of 1949, they were operating in smaller, more self-contained groups. Renewed insurgent offensive operations began in Pahang 

province and spread throughout the country including attacks on rubber 

plantations, tin mines, railroads, convoys, and police and government officials. Counterinsurgency forces could not respond fast enough to prevent 

the attackers from melting away into the jungle wilderness. Instead of destroying insurgent forces, operations in this phase were merely driving 

them into the jungle.69

The middle phase (1950-57), when the counterinsurgency effort transformed into a highly successful, systematic approach, arose from the situation at the end of the initial phase. In early 1950 the insurgents seemed to 

be gaining the upper hand. The number of insurgent-led incidents increased 

in February by 80 percent, and continued to increase over the next eight 

months, demonstrating a higher level of coordination than ever before. At 

this point, the British command realized something had to change. While 

continued pressure on the insurgents had forced the MRLA to operate in 

smaller units, operations on both sides were resulting in almost equal casualties, a situation obviously unacceptable to the British.70

In response to this crisis, the senior British official in Malaya, High 

Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, established the new post of Director of 

Operations. In 1950 the British government appointed retired Lieutenant 

General Sir Harold Briggs, an officer with extensive Asian experience, to 

the post. After assessing the situation, Briggs adopted a methodology, referred to as the “Briggs plan,” that outlined the general counterinsurgency 

blueprint and would ultimately bring success to the British and Commonwealth forces. 

In essence, the Briggs plan was a systematic approach designed to provide security for the rural population while simultaneously removing the 

primary sources of MRLA supply, food, and recruitment. Security forces 

would concentrate on completely removing the insurgent threat from a specific geographical region then move on to the next region. Briggs persuaded 

Gurney to set up coordinating committees comprised of representatives 
36

from all civil and military agencies involved in the campaign to formulate a 

coordinated response to the terrorists. Civil and military authorities would 

work in tandem and with complete coordination at all levels. A systematic 

approach to intelligence gathering was similarly adopted, with the civil 

police agencies and military intelligence agency taking the lead and working closely together.

The first major policy implemented as part of the Briggs plan was 

the resettlement of 500,000 Chinese squatters into more secure areas and 

settlements called New Villages. Gurney had already started resettling 

the squatters, but Briggs systemized and accelerated the process. The insurgents had long depended on the passive support of the squatters for 

supplies and recruits, using both persuasion and coercion. Resettlement 

proved to be a successful attempt to split this segment of the population 

from the insurgents. The New Villages provided proper sanitation, housing, 

schools, and hospitals, as well as security from insurgent encroachment. 

This resettlement project alone took until the end of 1952 to complete.71

Another key element of the Briggs plan, designed to work in tandem with 

the resettlement, was Operation STARVATION, a comprehensive program 

implementing strict controls on food distribution to prevent the smuggling 

of foodstuffs to the insurgents. Food control operations were initially conducted in phases and decentralized in coordination with military operations, but were eventually centralized and executed countrywide.72

Operationally, instead of the haphazard assignment of missions and 

areas of operation seen in the past, beginning in July 1950, Briggs implemented a program of clearing Malaya state by state from south to north, 

designating each state in turn as a “priority area.” Eventually, areas freed 

of insurgent activity would be designated “white areas,” and all emergency 

restrictions would be removed.73

The Briggs plan took over three years to implement and encountered 

several obstacles along the way. At one point in late 1950, Briggs believed 

the situation had so deteriorated he flew to London to plead his case directly with the prime minister. It would take the arrival of a new High Commissioner for Malaya to maximize the effectiveness of the Briggs plan. 

Nevertheless, once a systematic, coordinated approach was implemented, 

providing security for the populace while at the same time concentrating 

on insurgent strongholds one at a time, the insurgency soon declined.74

After Gurney’s death in a non-targeted MRLA ambush in October 

1951, followed by Briggs’ retirement for health reasons a month later, 

their posts were consolidated in February 1952 when the new Conservative Party government under Winston Churchill appointed General 
37

Sir Gerald Templer as the new High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya.75

 After the setback caused by this personnel turbulence at the top of 

the British command, Templer reinvigorated the Briggs plan, adding more 

energy to its implementation through the unified, coordinated command 

structure his appointment created. For the first time, this new leadership 

unified military and civil functions of the counterinsurgency operation 

under one commander. Even more so than Briggs, Templer emphasized 

winning the support of all ethnic groups among the population of Malaya, with projected independence as the major incentive.76

 He continued 

Briggs’ systematic approach to combat operations, but modified the original south-north axis approach after the southern state of Johore proved to 

be a difficult first step to take. 

The MRLA was firmly entrenched in Johore and progress there was 

slow. In fact, Johore would not ultimately be cleared until 1958. Accordingly, a new approach was adopted which designated priority areas designed 

to divide areas of active insurgency in half. Once divided, a combat division 

would be concentrated each in the northern and southern sections to clear 

the now isolated insurgent strongholds. The first white area was declared 

in Malacca in September 1953, followed by four more areas over the next 

year and a half. By April 1955 the insurgent area had been successfully divided into two smaller sections, further degrading the communists’ ability 

to coordinate their operations. This insurgent partition would be solidified in 

August 1957 when most of the state of Selangor would be declared white.77

As early as May 1954, when Templer departed Malaya, it was clear the 

British and Commonwealth forces had defeated the insurgency and Malaya 

was ready for self-government.78 However, the insurgents remained a dangerous force and Templer strongly recommended the continuation of the 

emergency status in Malaya until the communist threat was totally eliminated.79 In July 1955 the Malayan people held their first nationwide general 

elections and the chief minister selected from the electoral results, Tunku 

Abdul Rahman, soon sought surrender from the MRLA through peace talks. 

However, these talks ended in failure in December 1955 and the insurgency 

continued. 

By the time Malaya gained independence in 1957 and Rahman became 

the country’s first prime minister, over 60 percent of the national area had 

been cleared of active insurgents. In the final phase of the Emergency, from 

1957 to July 1960, British, Commonwealth, and Malayan forces concentrated on the two insurgent strongholds, first in the south in Johore and then 

in the north near the Thai border. Former insurgents surrendered en masse, 

while terrorist incidents and contacts were reduced to only a handful by 
38

1959. The last major operations in the southern states of Johore and Perak 

ended in mid-1958, leaving a cadre of about 1000 MRLA stalwarts in 

the north near the Thai border. Cooperation and coordinated operations 

with the Thais cut this force in half by 1960 and on 31 July 1960, the new 

Malay government officially declared the Emergency over, retaining only 

emergency restrictions in a few isolated areas along the Thai border. An 

MRLA remnant of approximately 500 insurgents took refuge across the 

Thai border, awaiting better conditions to return to Malaya, effectively 

ending the insurgency.80 Figure 8 illustrates the British and Commonwealth 

forces counterinsurgency operations in Malaya.

Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density

Malaya extends 500 miles from the border with Thailand to the islandcity of Singapore. At its maximum width, the peninsula is 200 miles wide. 

The insurgency was nationwide, consuming the entire 50,850 square miles 

Figure 8. Counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, 1951-1960.
39

of Malaya, an expanse of slightly less than half the size of Italy. The mountain range in the center of the peninsula reaches 7000 feet in elevation and 

is covered by thick jungle. Numerous streams and rivers flow east and west 

from the mountains. Away from the mountains, most of the rest of Malaya 

consists of a lush, trackless, evergreen rain forest and undergrowth. The 

jungle consumes four-fifths of the area of Malaya, and the remaining onefifth is the area along the southern and western coasts, where during the 

time of the Malayan Emergency, the majority of the population lived.81

The Malay people are the original population on the peninsula. Economic prosperity in the 19th and 20th centuries brought thousands of foreign laborers and settlers to Malaya, resulting in the establishment of large 

ethnic Chinese and Indian communities within the Malayan population. 

In fact, by 1948 the Chinese population in Malaya was 1.9 million, while 

the Malay population was only slightly larger at 2.4 million.82 This sizeable Chinese population included the more than 500,000 squatters who 

lived and farmed land to which they had no title along the edge of the jungle. The communist insurgency in Malaya during the Emergency worked 

among and recruited almost exclusively from the Malayo-Chinese population. The squatters provided a fertile population base from which the 

insurgents could draw and given their remote locations, a security problem 

for the counterinsurgency forces who had to defend those areas. 

Combining all ethnic groups, Malaya had an estimated population of 

4,856,000 in 1948.83 Given the land area of Malaya and the extensive size 

of the jungle areas, the relative population density of 95.49 inhabitants per 

square mile may be somewhat misleading since large areas were virtually 

uninhabited. However, because the insurgents worked among the populace and moved around the entire country, this relative figure will be used 

here for comparative purposes. 

British Troop Deployment and Organization 

For the Malayan Emergency, the British government initially deployed 

a force of 16 infantry and armored car battalions and later a maximum of 

30 battalions. Once the full force was assembled in early 1952, its size, 

in spite of unit rotations, remained roughly between 26 and 28 battalions 

until late 1956 after which the deployed force was gradually downsized to 

21 battalions by the end of the Emergency. Including a force of about 5000 

support troops, the peak British and Commonwealth strength was about 

30,000. At any given time, three deployed battalions could be expected to 

be refitting or retraining in rest areas in Singapore, while the rest would be 

conducting counterinsurgency operations.84
40

The British force package in Malaya consisted of three major components: a group of British Army battalions, which rotated in and out of 

Malaya during the Emergency, a large force of Gurkha infantry battalions 

deployed for the duration of the conflict, and battalions and smaller units 

from the British Commonwealth, including Malaya. The non-Malayan 

units rotated in a manner similar to the British battalions. 

The British infantry battalions and supporting units formed part of 

the regular establishment. However, as the British had adopted its firstever peacetime conscription, or “National Service,” in 1948, many of the 

soldiers and officers of these units were non-regular National Servicemen. 

The maximum term of service for National Servicemen was two years.85

By 1951, with the deployment for the Emergency in full swing, British and 

non-Malayan Commonwealth units deployed for tours of approximately 

three years. For the British units, this meant, given the short periods of 

service for the National Servicemen who made up to 60 percent of the 

enlisted strength of the infantry battalions, and the longer three-year troop 

rotations of the battalions in which they served, these battalions had to 

endure internal turnover during their tours in Malaya.86

Early on, the British deployed an elite force of three Guards infantry 

battalions under the command of the 2d Guards Brigade. However, these 

battalions, after serving tours of less than two years, were replaced by 

regular infantry units that did not have ceremonial duties in Britain. In addition to infantry and armored car units, the British employed a battalionsize special operations unit, the 22d Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment. 

The SAS, a former World War II-era unit was reconstituted in Malaya 

from a combination of smaller special operations units and a British Territorial Army (i.e., reserve component) unit made up of war veterans of the 

original SAS. After Malaya, the British would retain the SAS as their elite 

counterterrorism, special operations unit.87

While the British rotated their own regular units of conscripts through 

Malaya, they also employed the only remaining portion of the former British Indian Army still serving the Crown: eight battalions of a combination 

of Gurkha enlisted men and British and Gurkha officers. The Gurkhas are 

descendents of fierce tribal warriors from Nepal, the mountainous kingdom situated between India and China. In the days of British rule in India, 

Gurkhas formed a large component of the British-run Indian Army. During 

World War II, there were 40 Gurkha battalions, totaling 112,000 soldiers. 

After Indian independence in 1947, an agreement with the Kingdom of 

Nepal divided the Gurkhas between the new Indian Army and the British 

Army. The Indians retained six regiments of two or more battalions each, 
41

and the British incorporated eight battalions in four regiments directly into 

their army for the first time.88

The redistribution of Gurkha forces was effective 1 January 1948 and 

the British Gurkha units were stationed in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong 

Kong when the Malayan Emergency began. For the most part, all eight 

Gurkha battalions spent the majority of the next 12 years in Malaya conducting counterinsurgency operations, although two battalions later garrisoned other posts in the Far East. Gurkha soldiers served initial four-year 

enlistments, although most stayed for standard 15-year careers.89 Therefore, the Gurkha units in Malaya ultimately provided a large part of the 

continuity and stability in the British forces stationed there. The generally 

superior efficiency of Gurkha units in counterinsurgency operations was 

clearly indicated in statistical analyses maintained by the British command.90 The British command formed larger Gurkha headquarters units, 

including a division headquarters and four brigade headquarters. These 

units usually controlled other units, not just Gurkha battalions.

The Commonwealth contingent included battalion-size elements from 

East Africa, Fiji, Australia, and New Zealand. These units, like the British battalions, rotated through Malaya for tours of one to three and a half 

years. The British chain of command considered the Fiji battalion to be the 

best unit to participate in the Emergency, followed closely by the East African units.91 In addition to these overseas nations, Commonwealth forces 

included an expanding force of Malay soldiers.

The Malay Regiment, a force recruited only from men of Malay ethnic 

background, had been formed before World War II but was destroyed in 

the 1941-42 Singapore campaign. After the war, the regiment was rebuilt 

with two battalions. In 1948 a third battalion was formed. Starting in 1952, 

another four battalions were formed in succession. All seven would be 

committed to counterinsurgency operations. In preparation for Malayan 

independence, the British authorities formed a new organization, the Federation (of Malaya) Regiment, which did not have the ethnic restrictions 

of the Malay regiment. 

Despite the inclusion of the other ethnic groups in Malaya into the 

new regiment, recruiting was slow and only one battalion had been raised 

by late 1953. Nevertheless, once this battalion deployed, it marked a significant event in the Malayan Emergency. For the first time, Malayan battalions formed the majority of the units engaged in counterinsurgency operations. After Malayan independence in 1957, the battalions of the Malay 

and Federation regiments would form the backbone of the nation’s new 

military forces.92 See figure 9 for a time line of force deployments in Malaya.
42

Figure 9. British, Commonwealth, and indigenous forces in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960.

0

403020

Number of Battalions

10

Malaya granted full 

independence

31 Aug 1957

1 KOYLI 1 Manchester 1 RSF

1 Seaforth 1 Gordon Highlanders 1 Queens Royal

1 Devonshire

4 Hussars 12 Lancers 15/19 Hussars

26 RA 25 RA 48 RA

1 RIF 1 Green Howards

3 GG 1 Suffolk 1 Somerset 1 Lincolnshire

2 Cold 1 Worc 1 West Yorkshire

2 Scots Guard 1 West Kent 1 Hamps 1 Rifle Brigade

1 KOSB

2 RWF

1 SF

1 Loyal

1/3 EA

1 Cheshire

1 CAM 1 East Yorkshire 1 SWB 40 CDO (RM) 42 CDO (RM)

45 CDO (RM)

13/18 Hussars 11 Hussars 13/18 Hussars 1 Kings Dragoon Guards 1/2 GR

2/2 GR 2/2 GR

1/6 GR 1/6 GR

1949 1948 1950 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1952 1951 1953 1960 1959

2/6 GR 2/6 GR

1/7 GR

2/7 GR

1/10 GR 2/10 GR

4/Malay Regiment

3/Malay Regiment2/Malay Regiment1/Malay Regiment

1/KAR

1/ Fed Regiment

7/ Malay Regiment6/ Malay Regiment 5/ Malay Regiment

2/KAR

1/Fiji

3/KAR

2/RAR 3/RAR

1/NZ

1/RAR

Emergency

declared

16 Jun 1948

Director of Operations 

post created 

Apr 1950

Briggs Plan

adopted Jun 1950

End of Emergency

declared

31 Jul 1960

2/NZ First general election Jul 1955

Sixty percent of 

country declared 

cleared Jul 1957

First ‘white 

area’ declared

Sep 1953

Abortive peace 

negotiations

Dec 1955

1/NRR
43

Organizationally, the British command in Malaya was separated initially into a decentralized, colonial civil government and separate police 

and military functions. Eventually, a director of military operations was 

appointed to coordinate all operations against the insurgents using all 

available forces. However, civil government remained separate until, under Templer, a completely unified command was adopted.93 

Initially, the counterinsurgency effort was divided into three area commands called subdistricts.94 However, as troop strength grew, a more conventional division/brigade structure was adopted. In its mature structure, 

the British and Commonwealth forces employed two division headquarters, the 16th Gurkha Division in the north and the 1st Federation Division 

in the south. Under these two divisions, there were up to eight brigade 

headquarters to control the battalions engaging the enemy.95

Paralleling the standard military chain of command and as a coordinating measure between civil, police, and military authorities, Briggs had 

formed war executive committees (WEC) at the state and district levels, 

which were responsible for all decisions and actions related to the Emergency in their respective districts and states. Later, members of Templer’s 

staff regularly toured the WECs with the authority to make on-the-spot 

decisions in Templer’s name.96

The British employed about one soldier for every two square miles 

of Malaya and 1 soldier for about every 162 inhabitants, equating to 6.17

soldiers per 1000 of population. Because operations against the insurgents 

were primarily focused in remote, sparsely populated areas, the geographic 

figure may well prove to be more significant than the demographic figure. 

Table 5 charts deployed troop density in relation to population and geographic area for the Malayan Emergency at maximum deployment. 

Indigenous Support

From the start, the British depended on extensive indigenous support 

in their counterinsurgency effort. As mentioned above, eight regular battalions of army troops were organized from Malayan personnel. In addition 

to these soldiers, the British command also established large paramilitary 

and police forces. A new Malayan police force, initially 10,000 strong, 

was organized in August 1948. This force ultimately grew to 40,000. The 

large police force eventually freed military forces so that the latter could 

be massed to eradicate the guerillas in whole areas. However, while the 

police were less expensive to equip and train than units of soldiers, statistics collected by the British command showed that army forces had a 

comparatively better performance in counterinsurgency operations than 
44

Table 5. Troop Density in the Malayan Emergency

Military Forces (at maximum)

Population A r e a 

(square miles)

P o p u l a t i o n Density (per square mile)

Soldier Density 

Per Area ( s o l d i e r s per square mile)

Per Population (1 soldier per x residents)

x=

Soldiers Per 1000 Residents 

Malaya 1948-60 30,000 4,856,000 50,850 95.49 0.59 161.87 6.18 
45

the police did. This meant the police, while valuable for specific types of 

missions, were no substitute for soldiers in counterinsurgency operations.

To provide local self-defense, in 1949 the British formed a force of 

30,000 Special Constables and 15,000 part-time village Home Guards. 

These forces would ultimately grow to 44,000 and 250,000 respectively. 

In particular, the police forces provided intelligence and participated in 

counterinsurgency operations. By 1952 a 4000-member federation police 

field force was operational. The Special Constabulary was organized to 

guard vital installations, plantations, and mines, and to enforce the food 

control operation. This force’s became vital when the relocation of Chinese squatters forced the insurgents to turn to the mines and plantations for 

supplies. The Home Guards, sometimes called the Kampong Guards, were 

designed purely for local self-defense.97

The primary intelligence agency in Malaya was the federal police 

force’s Special Branch. After a slow and disorganized start, under Templer 

this agency took the lead in gathering intelligence on the insurgents, and 

during the later stages of the Emergency, was a highly effective organization. They were particularly adept at gaining information from captured or 

surrendered insurgents and from locals in areas of insurgent activity. By 

1954 most counterinsurgency operations were based directly on Special 

Branch intelligence, and Special Branch officers were attached directly to 

higher army headquarters. As Templer’s policies began to take effect, the 

flow of information increased substantially.98

Templer increased the involvement of the local population in the fight 

against the guerrillas. He strengthened a preexisting, unarmed Chinese 

Home Guard force designed to defend the New Villages by arming them 

and increasing their size so that, by 1954, 150 New Villages were able to 

conduct their own defense. Additionally, he implemented a three-phase 

plan for the overall improvement of the Home Guard which ultimately resulted in that force taking over for the police in village self-defense, while 

even providing some offensive capability of its own. This latter element, 

the Operational Home Guard, functioned in areas where military or police 

forces were in short supply, and provided local expertise to military units 

conducting nearby operations. Templer also reorganized the Special Constabulary for offensive operations by forming them into an effective local 

patrol force called area security units.99

Conclusion 

The British operated in Malaya with extensive indigenous support 

and executed counterinsurgency operations for 12 years, defeating the 
46

communist insurgency while granting Malaya independence. The period 

from 1952-54 was the most decisive for British operations in Malaya. It 

was at this time that a unified, systematic approach to counterinsurgency 

operations broke the back of the insurgency. 

For military forces, at the maximum, the British employed an area 

troop density of 0.59 soldiers per square mile throughout the country and 

a population troop density of 6.18 soldiers for every 1000 Malayan inhabitants (or 1 soldier per every 161.9 inhabitants). While the insurgency 

existed nationwide, most counterinsurgency operations were conducted in 

remote, underpopulated areas, and, over time, indigenous forces became 

available to provide local security for the populated areas. 

The Balkans: Bosnia and Kosovo

Bosnia

Situational narrative

With the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, most of the former, ethnically based states of that country became independent entities. 

However, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a mixture of three ethnic 

groups: Catholic Croats, Moslem Bosnians, and Orthodox Serbs. These 

factions came to blows after a referendum in early 1992 resulted in a Bosnian declaration of independence. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum and then began an armed insurrection, with the goal of partitioning 

Bosnia along ethnic lines and annexing the Serbian area to neighboring 

Serbia. The three ethnic groups warred against each other from 1992 to 

1995, supported by Serbia and to a lesser extent by Croatia. Serbia later 

merged with Serbian Montenegro to create a new Yugoslavia.100

In March 1994 the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Moslem inhabitants 

joined forces to form the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in opposition to the Bosnian Serbs, who in turn formed their own state called Republika Srpska (RS). On 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, the warring 

parties initialed a peace agreement, which was implemented the following 

month. The Dayton Agreement (also known as the Dayton Accords) layered the Bosnian government so, at the highest level, there was a national 

government for external and fiscal affairs. At a secondary level, the two 

warring factions, which were about equal in geographic and demographic 

size, retained specific control over internal government functions in the 

areas they controlled. 

As part of the Dayton Agreement, the UN appointed a new agency, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), to oversee the 
47

implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. Additionally, 

to implement and monitor the military aspects of the agreement, the UN 

established, under the auspices of NATO, an international peacekeeping 

force called the implementation force (IFOR). IFOR consisted of 60,000 

troops that replaced a weaker, UN-sponsored force that had not included 

American participation. IFOR existed for a year and, in December 1996, a 

smaller, NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. SFOR carried out the same mission begun by IFOR, continuing the deterrence of renewed hostilities. Planning estimates for SFOR troop strength was 30,000, 

roughly half the IFOR strength. However, this reduction in strength occurred only over time, as SFOR maintained a total strength of 32,000 as 

late as 1998. Initially, SFOR was to exist for 18 months. However, it remained operational until December 2004 when European Union peacekeeping forces (EUFOR) replaced it. 

Figure 10. The Balkans.
48

Throughout the SFOR deployment, units rotated in and out of Bosnia 

and the strength of the force gradually declined over time. For example, 

the American contingent, which had started with 8500 in 1996, was reduced to 3900 by February 1999 and to 1400 by December 2002. SFOR 

total strength was 18,000 in 2003. EUFOR was 7000 strong when it took 

over at the end of 2004.101

Throughout the mission, the peacekeepers strove to maintain security as the civilian government was reestablished and to demobilize the 

armed forces of the two warring factions as much as possible. By late 

2004 all participating countries determined the mission of the IFOR/

SFOR had been a success. These successes included the restoration of 

most infrastructure, general area stability, and employment opportunities. 

Additionally, the SFOR restored law and order and well-trained Bosnian 

police officers, not ethnically based police or military forces, assumed the 

responsibility for maintaining it.102

Geographical area, terrain, and population density

The area of Bosnia is 202.62 square miles. In 1995 the population 

was roughly four million, about 300,000 less than the previous census 

conducted before the civil wars.103 Internally, Bosnia was divided into 

two territories, one controlled by the joint Bosnian Moslem-Croat Federation (about 51 percent of the country) and one controlled by the Bosnian 

Serb-led RS (about 49 percent of the country). Except for a small strip of 

coastline along the Adriatic Sea surrounded by Croatian territorial waters, 

Bosnia is mountainous and land locked, surrounded by Croatia in the north 

and west, the Yugoslavian republic of Serbia in the east, and the Yugoslavian republic of Montenegro in the south. Herzegovina is the designation 

generally given to the southern portion of Bosnian territory.

Troop deployment and organization 

Both the IFOR and SFOR were organized around three multinational divisions, Multinational Division-North (MND-N) under a rotating 

American division headquarters staff, Multinational Division-Southwest 

(MND-SW) under British command, and Multinational Division-Southeast (MND-SE), under French command. While staffs from these three nations commanded the divisional sectors, units from various NATO countries and several non-NATO nations, such as the new Russian Federation, 

the Ukraine, Egypt, and Finland, also took part.104 See figure 11.

The three division commands deployed subordinate brigade- and battalion-size forces into specific geographical sectors. Each division typically had three brigades during the IFOR period and deployed from 9 to 
49

Figure 11. Deployment of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, 1996.

Gorazde

Srebrenica

Tuzla

Bihac Banja Luka

Sarajevo

Mostar

XX M

M

N

N

D

D-N (US)

-SW (FR)

XX

M

N

D-N (U

S)

M

N

D-SW (U

K)

0 25 50 75 100

Brko

XX

US

X

UK

X

CA 1st AD XX

UK 3d AD

X

RU

XX

FR

X

FR

X

SP

Airborne

X

TU IFOR

XXX

X

IT

X

US

X

X US

NO

XX

MND-SW (UK)

MND-SE (FR)

Muslim

Federation of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina

Serb

Croat

Republika Srpska

XX

X

IFOR

XXX IFOR

Headquarters

Division

Brigade

US—United States 

UK—United Kingdom

FR—France 

SP—Spain 

TU—Turkey 

RU—Russia

NO—Nordic/Polish 

CA—Canada

IT—Italy 

2d/ 1st AD

1st/

1st AD

Garibaldi

6th

4th Arm

2d Mech

11 infantry, tank, or reconnaissance battalions. During the SFOR period, 

these forces were reduced initially by half and then over time to about a 

quarter of the original force size. 

In addition to these forces in the field, the IFOR headquarters in the 

Bosnian capital of Sarajevo retained a small mobile reaction force. For 

peacekeeping duties, the IFOR/SFOR established and operated from a series of base camps, a system repeated in Kosovo and Iraq in subsequent 

years. In Bosnia, one base camp was established for every 536.34 soldiers 

deployed in the US sector and one base for every 682.15 soldiers for just 

the US contingent. Base camp density is an important consideration in 

contingency operations. However, information concerning this subject is 

only readily available in the case of the Bosnia deployment. 105

NATO organized the IFOR headquarters using the staff of a preexisting NATO command, the Allied Command, Europe, Rapid Reaction 

Corps, commanded in 1995 by a British lieutenant general. The major US 

command, US Army, Europe (USAREUR) (Forward), was located outside of Bosnia in Hungary and orchestrated both American support to the 

peacekeeping mission and the required logistic support, most of which 
50

operated out of Hungary and Croatia. The American force package in Bosnia was also known as Task Force Eagle.106

At its peak, IFOR troop strength totaled 60,000 soldiers. This provided about three soldiers per square mile. Demographically, the IFOR 

deployment provided 1 soldier for every 66.7 Bosnian residents, a ratio 

of 15 soldiers per 1000 of population. The reduced SFOR deployment, at 

its maximum of roughly 30,000 soldiers, provided about 149 soldiers per 

square mile and 1 soldier to 133.3 residents, a ratio of 7.5 soldiers per 1000 

of Bosnian population. Figure 12 illustrates US and MND-N force levels 

in the Bosnia operation.107

Indigenous support

Initially in Bosnia, indigenous support was minimal. Each of the two 

warring sides had its own armed forces and each of the three major ethnic 

groups maintained its own police force. In 1995 these various forces totaled 45,000 members.108

In December 1995 the UN authorized a 1721-member international 

police task force (IPTF) to oversee the activities of the local ethnic police 

forces. Though it took almost eight months before the IPTF was operational, in the four years following its implementation, the force trained 16,000 

Bosnian police officers. This, coupled with the establishment of stable 

local government, resulted in an increasingly effective role in local law 

enforcement. However, there was no nationwide law enforcement agency. 

The Dayton Agreement allowed the continued coexistence of ethnic police 

forces and as of 2005, Bosnian-Serb government officials continued to 

hinder efforts to create a nationwide police force.109

In addition to ethnic police forces, the warring factions fielded sizeable armed forces in 1995 when the Bosnian mission began. The BosnianSerb army, Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS) totaled 80,000 troops organized 

into six corps. The opposing Federation fielded its own Army of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina (VF), also about 80,000 strong with seven corps. The VF 

had distinct Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Moslem elements, representing 

the two groups in the Federation. Both armies downsized and the VRS lost 

most of its heavy equipment. By 2005 the two armed forces combined 

fielded 12,000 soldiers, with 8000 in the VF and 4000 in the VRS.

110

Kosovo

Situational narrative 

In addition to Bosnia, other areas of ethnic conflict existed in the former 

states of Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. Kosovo, a province in southern Serbia 
51

86420

201816141210

Thousands

1996 1997 2000 1999 1998 2001 2002 2003

US Contingent

MND-N

MND-N Commands

IFOR 1995-99

1st Armored Division

SFOR

1st Infantry Division (Mech) 1996-97

1st Armored Division 1997-98

1st Cavalry Division 1998-99

10th Mountain Division 1999-2000

49th Armored Division (TX ARNG) 2000

3d Infantry Division (Mech) 2000-01

29th Infantry Division (Light) (VA/MD ARNG) 2001-02

25th Infantry Division 2002

28th Infantry Division (PA ARNG) 2002

35th Infantry Division (KS/MO ARNG) 2003

Figure 12. Number of troops deployed to Bosnia, US sector. 
52

with a predominantly ethnic Albanian population, became the next flashpoint where a multinational force would be needed to keep the peace. 

Under the former Yugoslavian government, Kosovo enjoyed a relatively autonomous status. However, under autocratic Serbian president, 

Slobodan Milosevic, this changed so significantly that by 1998 the Kosovar Albanians were in open revolt. Milosevic’s subsequent heavy-handed 

response, using Serbian military and police forces to remove over 400,000 

ethnic Albanians from their homes and killing more than 1500 in the process, escalated the crisis to the international level. While NATO pondered 

a military option, diplomacy initially averted international intervention in 

October 1998, when Serbia agreed to a cease-fire and the withdrawal of 

most of its security forces from Kosovo. The agreement also allowed a 

NATO-sponsored mission to observe the situation and compliance with 

the cease-fire. However, the situation deteriorated again in early 1999 as 

Serb forces initiated a renewed offensive against the Kosovar Albanians. 

This time diplomacy failed when Serbian representatives refused to sign a 

peace agreement in France in March, immediately intensifying their antiAlbanian operations in Kosovo and deploying even more troops in defiance of the October 1998 agreement. 

The crisis deepened as tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians fled. On 

20 March even the NATO detachment in Kosovo withdrew. Three days 

later, after last minute diplomacy failed, NATO and UN forces commenced 

a 77-day air campaign against Serbia. The air campaign ultimately persuaded Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo. As Serbian forces withdrew 

on 12 June 1999, a UN-sanctioned multinational security force, called 

KFOR, immediately began deploying from staging areas in Albania and 

the Republic of Macedonia into Kosovo.111

Planning for the KFOR had been ongoing for months. As originally 

envisioned, the multinational force was to consist of 28,000 soldiers. However, recent Serbian actions had created a significant refugee problem and 

the size of the projected force was increased by 17,000 to provide security 

for the return of the displaced.112 KFOR completed its deployment by the 

end of August 1999 with an on-the-ground strength of 41,618.113

KFOR command moved into the Kosovar capital of Priština. As in 

the initial operations in Bosnia, the force headquarters was structured 

around the Allied Command, Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps, in this case 

augmented with the staff from a British division. Under the headquarters 

were five geographically based brigades, each commanded by a major 

NATO power: Multinational Brigade-North (MNB-N) initially under the 

French 3d Mechanized Brigade, Multinational Brigade-West (MNB-W) 
53

commanded by the staff of the Italian 132d “Ariete” Armored Brigade, 

Multinational Brigade-Center (MNB-C) under the British 10th Armoured 

Brigade, Multinational Brigade-South (MNB-S) staffed by the German 

12th Panzer Brigade, and Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) under the 

US 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). See figure 13. KFOR 

headquarters also maintained a small military police and maneuver force 

under its own control for special situations.114.

While the forces deployed to Kosovo rotated, the headquarters and 

five-brigade structure was maintained. US forces on average rotated every 

six months. After the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, mobilized Army National Guard headquarters and troops played an increased 

role in the US contribution to the KFOR, replacing several active Army 

units designated for operations in Iraq or elsewhere.115

Analysts consider the Kosovo operation to be the most successful operation of its kind in the post-Cold War era. This success has been marked 

Figure 13. KFOR organization, 1999.
54

by the disarmament of the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army, strong economic growth and the implementation of local and regional elections within two years.116 As of this writing (2005), the operation continues, though 

KFOR has been downsized to four brigades and an overall strength of 

17,000.117

Geographical area, terrain, and population density

Kosovo is a region of five river valleys surrounded by mountains. Its 

area of 4204 square miles is roughly one-quarter the size of Bosnia. The 

1999 population figure of approximately 1.9 million was almost half that 

of Bosnia, giving Kosovo a population density of 469 residents per square 

mile, more than double that of the previous Balkan peacekeeping mission. 

The population was predominantly Kosovar Albanian (88 percent), the 

majority of whom became refugees in the months preceding the NATO 

intervention. 

Most of the remainder of the population was ethnically Serb. Despite 

its current predominant Albanian ethnicity, the Serbs consider Kosovo an 

integral part of Serbia because it was the heartland of medieval Serbia 

and the location of a significant Serbian defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 1389. In 1999 over half of the Kosovar population lived in 

towns or villages; only five cities had a population of over 50,000, the 

largest of which is the capital of Priština, with a population of more than 

500,000.118

The Kosovo war prior to the arrival of the KFOR was a nightmare for 

the Kosovar population. About 863,000 ethnic Albanians had fled Kosovo 

for refuge in neighboring Macedonia, Albania, and as far away as Bosnia. 

Another several hundred thousand were displaced within Kosovo. Upon 

the departure of the Serbian security forces and before the arrival of the 

KFOR, roughly half of the 137,900 ethnic Serb population had fled to Serbia proper, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Other Serbs within Kosovo fled 

to ethnic Serbian enclaves, most of which were near the boundary with the 

rest of Serbia.119

Geographically, Kosovo is located in the extreme southwest of Serbia with the mountainous Republic of Montenegro (at times joined in 

federation with Serbia) to the northwest, Albania to the southwest, and 

Slavic Macedonia, an independent state formerly part of Yugoslavia, to 

the south. The Montenegrins speak a dialect of Serbian, while the Macedonians speak a Slavic language closer to Bulgarian than to Serbian. The 

predominantly Moslem Albanians, both in Albania and Kosovo, speak a 

non-Slavic language not directly related to Serbian or Macedonian. While 
55

the Serbs are predominantly Orthodox Christians in religious heritage, the 

ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are predominantly Islamic, a relic of the several centuries of occupation of the region by the Ottoman Turks in late 

medieval and early modern times. 

Troop deployment and organization

As previously cited, the Kosovo operational element, KFOR, deployed a maximum force of 41,618 soldiers organized into a headquarters 

element and five brigades. Each brigade was assigned a sector of responsibility that provided approximately a brigade of peacekeepers for every 

394,000 inhabitants. In terms of population, the KFOR maximum troop 

strength provided over 21 soldiers per 1000 of population and 88 soldiers 

per square mile of the relatively compact Kosovo region. Fearing KFOR 

would be required to combat the Serbian security forces and provide security for the return of refugees, this comparatively large force was deployed 

to the region. 

Contingents from 38 NATO and non-NATO nations were represented 

in the KFOR organization, with the command rotating among the most 

prominently represented nations. The initial large size of the force was 

somewhat tempered by the short, six-month rotation periods. For example, 

between 1999 and 2005, the US contingent alone had 13 commanders. 

Other contingents were similar. Even KFOR commanders rotated frequently as different countries assumed the KFOR command. In 2001 the 

tour of duty for the KFOR commander was extended to one year.120 The 

lack of continuity in KFOR did not seem to have any direct affect on its 

operational capabilities. By 2002 some US units were even returning to 

Kosovo for a second tour of duty. KFOR was reduced in size over time to 

32,000 by the end of 2001, 30,000 in 2002, and to 17,000 by 2005.121

Even while the KFOR troop reductions were beginning, trouble flared 

up in the city of Mitrovica in the French sector. Mitrovica became the 

focus of ethnic clashes throughout the KFOR operation, as extremists on 

both sides rallied to the city. This flashpoint required frequent reinforcement, as British, German, and American forces aided the French, resulting 

in a regular rotation of forces from other sectors to this particularly hot 

spot.122

Indigenous support

In June 1999 when KFOR became operational, there was no available indigenous support in Kosovo. Serbian civil administrators, who had 

exclusively held all such positions for a decade, had fled. Police and military forces in Kosovo in June 1999 were all Serbian and were ordered to 
56

leave the country as part of the cease-fire agreement. The ethnic Albanian 

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) attempted to fill the void, but was part of 

the problem and not an element capable of providing support to KFOR; 

the KLA was disarmed by September 1999.123

In early 2000 NATO authorities transformed the former KLA into 

a new civil defense/emergency management organization, the Kosovo 

Protection Corps (KPC) or in Albanian, Trupat Mbrojtëse Të Kosovës

(TMK). The KPC strength initially was 5052, recruited primarily from 

the 20,000 former members of the KLA.124

While the KPC provided civic support, KFOR initially had sole law 

enforcement responsibility. An international police force, under the auspices of the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was formed, eventually 

reaching a total strength of 4450 by the end of 2000.125 Also in 2000, 

UNMIK formed a local police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), 

which started with 842 officers and expanded to a size of 4933 by September 2002.126

Balkans Conclusion

The two peacekeeping missions in the Balkans share certain characteristics. The concept of multinational place-keeper organizations where 

a unit has responsibility for a specific, geographical area of responsibility and through which a series of units rotate over time was developed in 

Bosnia and applied on a smaller scale in Kosovo. In both cases, indigenous support was practically nonexistent at the beginning of the mission, 

requiring the deployment of large forces in proportion to the population 

and area. In Bosnia NATO deployed a maximum area troop density of 

three soldiers per square mile, while in the more compact Kosovo, there 

were 10 soldiers per square mile. Clearly, however, the deployment size 

of the force was determined based primarily on demographics rather than 

geography. The force deployed to Bosnia at its maximum had a population 

troop density of 15 soldiers for every 1000 inhabitants (or 1 soldier for every 67 inhabitants). The ratio in Kosovo, with a population density almost 

two and a half times higher than that of Bosnia, was 21.13 soldiers per 

1000 residents (or 48 residents per soldier). Table 6 displays the density 

statistics for the Balkans’ deployments.
5

7

Table 6. Troop Density in the Balkans Operations 

Military Forces (at maximum)

Population Area 

(square miles)

Population Density (per square mile)

Soldier Density 

Per Area (soldiers per square mile)

Per Population (1 soldier per x residents)

 x=

Soldiers Per 1000 Residents 

Bosnia 4,000,000 19,741.00 202.62IFOR 1995-96 60,000 3.00 66.67 15.00 

SFOR planned1996-99 30,000 1.52 133.33 7.50 

Kosovo 1999 1,970,000 4203.60 468.64

41,618 9.90 47.34 21.13
58

Notes

1. Congress did not ratify the treaty until 11 April 1899.

2. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines. United States Army in World 

War II: The War in the Pacific, CMH Pub 5-2. (Washington, DC, US Army Center 

of Military History, 1953), 4-5.

3. Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898 

to July 30, 1902. vol. 2 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 

1993), 1070, 1077, 1154-5; Brian Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 198-9.

4. Linn, 215.

5. Morton, 5-6; Linn, 15.

6. Linn, 255, 277.

7. Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, 1053. Only 13 regiments were ultimately raised. 

8. Linn, 226.

9. Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, 1217-8. Strength figures 

are based on a combination of Otis’ and MacArthur’s monthly returns and their 

reported sick rate (which was given as a percentage of total assigned strength.)

10. Linn, 255, 277.

11. Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, 1275.

12. Stewart, 274.

13. Linn, 204, 210.

14. Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: Van 

Nostrand, 1957), 352; Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation 

of Germany 1945-1953 (Darmstadt, Germany: Historical Division, Headquarters, 

US Army Europe, 1953), 121.

15. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-

1946, Army Historical Series, CMH-Pub 30-6 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1970), 321.

16. Ziemke, 320; Frederiksen, 46.

17. Ziemke, 320, 339.

18. Frederiksen, 50; Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 

“The First Year of the Occupation” in Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-

1945, vol.1 (Frankfurt, Germany: US Army, 1947), 65. Also available online from 

http://www.history.hqusareur.army.mil/Archives/First Year/the first year 1.pdf; 

accessed 10 February 2006.

19. Ziemke, 354-5.

20. Frederiksen,121.

21. Pre-occupation Germany was organized into a patchwork of large 

noncontiguous states (Prussia and Bavaria) and smaller political entities left 

over from the 19th century unification of Germany. Before being reorganized into the present Federal Republic states (Länder) of Bavaria, Hesse, and 
59

Baden-Württemberg, the territory that became the American sector consisted of 

Bavaria, the northern half of the states of Baden and Württemberg, which were 

organized into a new state, Württemberg-Baden, and Hesse, a new state formed 

by consolidation of the portion of the former state of Hesse-Darmstadt not in the 

French sector, the city of Frankfurt-am-Main and the former Prussian province 

of Electoral Hesse, (Kurhessen) and portions of the former Prussian province of 

Nassau not in the French sector. These new states were officially organized in 

September 1945 with German state governments. (See “First Year,” vol. 1, 99.) 

In 1952 Württemberg-Baden was merged with two states from the former French 

sector, Baden and Württemberg–Hohenzollern, to form the new state of BadenWürttemberg. For a good map of the provinces and their relationship to the American sector, see Map 3 inside the back cover of Ziemke. 

22. Ziemke,118, 396, 417. The 1939 German census counted a population 

of 17,864,000 in the US zone. See Donald R. Whitnah and Edgar L. Erickson, 

The American Occupation of Austria: Planning and Early Years, (Westport, CT: 

Greenwood Press, 1985), 91-2. 

23. Frederiksen, 12; Historical Division, European Command, “The Third 

Year of the Occupation, First Quarter: 1 July-30 September 1947”, in Occupation 

Forces in Europe Series, 1947-48 (Frankfurt, Germany: US Army, 1947), 2. The 

19 million population figure includes 500,000 DPs, although up to 2.5 million 

DPs were in the American zone in the early days of the occupation.

24. Ziemke, 320. Frederiksen, 50. Ziemke gives the total theater strength 

as 3,077,000. Frederiksen’s figure of 3,069,310 is used in this work because he 

supports the figure with accompanying tables and other statistics. A listing of the 

divisions in Germany on V-E Day is found in table B-1, appendix B. References 

for this table are: European Theater, US Army, Order of Battle of the United States 

Army, World War II, European Theater of Operations: Divisions (Office of the 

Theater Historian, Paris,1945); John Wilson, comp. Armies, Corps, Divisions, 

and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series, CMH Pub 60-7(Washington, DC: 

US Army Center of Military History, 1999).

25. The disbanded army headquarters was the 9th. The army headquarters 

redeployed was the 1st, the three corps headquarters were the III, VII, and XIII, 

and the 11 divisions were the 2d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 44th, 86th, 95th, 97th, and 104th 

Infantry Divisions and the 13th and 20th Armored Divisions. See Shelby Stanton, 

Order of Battle, U.S. Army, World War II (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1984). 

26. “First Year,” vol. 1, 52-3, 122; Ziemke, 334.

27. Ziemke, 320-1, 334-5, 339. The designated occupation divisions were 

the 1st, 3d, 9th, 42d, and 78th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions, with the eighth division equivalent made up of several separate regiments 

and battalions. See “First Year,” vol. 1, 133. The original OTB numbers included 

Army Air Force elements. Actual ground troop numbers were 285,000, of which 

only 144,000 were tactical troops, the remainder were headquarters, service, or 

administrative troops. See “First Year,” vol. 1, 142.

28. Ibid.; Frederiksen, 84. Over five million tons of excess and captured 

materiel had already been liquidated following the German surrender.
60

29. “First Year,” vol. 1, 121-2, 128, 133.

30. See footnote 22; Ziemke, 341. A force of 38,000 US troops at a ratio of 

1:450 Germans gives a rough population estimate of 17.1 million. The prewar 

(1939) census was 17.86 million. Actual population estimates for the American 

zone, including DPs and prisoners of war (POW) in 1945 were 19 million. Planners presumably estimated the DP, POW, non-German, and wartime population 

would decline resulting in a decrease in population of 1.9 million. Approximately 

38,000 constables in a population of 17.1 million locals produces a ratio of 2.2 

troopers per inhabitant. One source claims theater planners used an area basis 

for force size determination, estimating one 140-man unit for every 225 square 

miles of occupied territory. But the math for this estimate is not apparent. With 

a zone area of 45,600 square miles, this estimate would require 203, 140-man 

units. Presuming these units equate to a Constabulary troop, with five troops per 

squadron, this indicates a requirement for 41 squadrons; only 27 were deployed. 

Including the companies and artillery batteries in the three tactical divisions to be 

retained, this only adds about 36 more units to the 135 of the Constabulary, still 40 

below the 203 figure. See Robert Cameron, “There and Back Again: Constabulary 

Training and Organization, 1946-1950” in Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of 

American Campaigning (paper presented at conference sponsored by US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5-7 August 2003), (Fort 

Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 120-1. These planning figures are discussed again in the conclusion to this work.

31. “First Year,” vol. 1, 136, 143.

32. Historical Division, European Command, US Army, “The Third Year 

of the Occupation, First Quarter,” in Occupation Forces in Europe Series, vol. 1 

(Frankfurt, Germany: US Army, 1947), 9. The logisticians and personnel specialists were the ones who estimated the duration of the occupation. Supply stocks 

were maintained with a projected end date of 1 August 1947. After the projected 

1 July 1950 termination date of the Constabulary, it was projected that an infantry 

division would be retained until the end of the occupation.

33. Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, “The Second Year 

of the Occupation” in Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946-1947, vol. 1 

(Frankfurt, Germany: US Army, 1947), 136.

34. “Second Year,” vol. 1, 23-4. By spring 1946, there were only four divisions remaining in Germany, the 1st, 3rd, and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 4th 

Armored Division. On 1 July 1946 the 4th Armored Division and the remaining 

cavalry groups were reorganized as the US Constabulary. The 3d Infantry Division rotated to the US in September 1946 and the 9th Infantry Division was inactivated in January 1947. This left only the Constabulary, the 1st Infantry Division, 

and several separate infantry battalions and companies in Europe.

35. “Second Year,” vol. 1, 63.

36. Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, “The Second Year 

of the Occupation” in Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946-1947, vol. V 

(Frankfurt, Germany: US Army, 1947), 18.
61

37. “Third Year, First Quarter,” vol. 1, 6.

38. Ibid., 3-4.

39. Kendall Gott, Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 11 (Fort 

Leavenworth: Combat Studies Press, 2005), 26-28; Cameron, 120, 131-3. Although the Constabulary had used the cavalry terms squadron and troop for unit 

designations, the new armored cavalry regiments used ‘battalion’ and ‘company’ 

until 1960.

40. As of 31 December 1951, the US Seventh Army consisted of the V 

Corps (1st and 4th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division) and the VII 

Corps (28th and 43d Infantry Divisions). A new command, United States European Command (USEUCOM) was established to control all US forces. The 

former EUCOM, an Army organization, was redesignated US Army Europe 

(USAREUR). Additionally, US forces in Germany were placed under a new Central Army Group which included both the Seventh Army and French forces. This 

group corresponded to the Northern Army Group, which included the British, 

Dutch, and Belgian units in northern West Germany.

41. The military post organizational system was adopted along with the police-type occupation plan. During the army-type occupation period, a system of 

military communities had been used, where the local tactical units were in charge 

of the communities.

42. During the early occupation there was an Eastern District (Bavaria) and 

Western District (Hesse and Württemberg-Baden). Seventh Army was in charge 

of the Western District, and Third Army was in charge of the Eastern District. The 

districts were later converted to Army Areas and then eliminated completely by 

early 1946. See “First Year,” vol. 1, 53, 149.

43. “Second Year,” vol. V, 3, 5, 13.

44. Frederiksen, 195, 32-33, 35.

45. Gott, 15.

46. United States Armed Forces Information School, The Army Almanac: A 

Book of Facts Concerning the Army of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 763.

47. Historical Division, European Command, US Army, “The Evolution 

of the Occupation Forces in Europe,” in Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 

(Frankfurt, Germany: US Army, 1948), extract found at “The Immediate PostWar Period, May 1945-June 1946,” USFA-History website, available at http://

www.usfava.com/USFA_History1.htm; Internet; accessed 7 October 2005.

48. Second Year,” vol. V, 18; “USFA Timeline,” USFA History; online; available 

at http://www.usfava.com/USFA_Timeline.htm; Internet; accessed 7 October 2005. 

The 88th Infantry Division which had been garrisoning Trieste in Italy until 1947

and one of its regiments, the 351st Infantry, remained there until 1954.

49. William Stacey, US Army Border Operations in Germany 1945-1983

(Heidelberg, Germany: US Army Europe and Seventh Army, 1984), 13-4, 33.

50. “Third Year, First Quarter,” vol. 1, 3, 9.
62

51. William Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria: An 

Analysis of Soviet Policy in Austria, 1945-1955 (Bonn, Germany: Siegler, 1961), 

59.

52. A tabulation of the initial troops deployed for the occupation of Japan is 

found in table B-2, appendix B. In addition to these troops, the XXIV Corps was 

in Korea with the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions.

53. For example, initially near Tokyo were the Americal Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 43d Infantry Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regiment.

54. For more information on the British Commonwealth forces see “Brief 

History of Australia’s Participation in the Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952,” 

British Commonwealth Occupation Forces National Council [document on-line] 

available at http://www.bradprint.com.au/bcof/history.html; Internet; accessed 11 

October 2005. A tabulation of US troop reductions in Japan is found in table B-3, 

appendix B.

55. James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie 

Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, America’s Role in 

Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. MR-1753 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

2003), 27-8, 38-42 [report on-line] available at http://www.rand.org/publications/

MR/MR1753/; Internet; accessed 27 January 2005.

56. The Army Almanac, 770-71; “Brief History of Australia’s Participation 

in the Occupation of Japan 1945-1952.”

57. “Brief History of Australia’s Participation in the Occupation of Japan 

1945-1952.” The remaining US force structure included the Eighth Army headquarters and two corps headquarters (I and IX), which were inactivated in early 

1950, and reactivated for the Korean War, the 1st Cavalry, and 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions. In 1948 the 7th Infantry Division was shifted from South Korea 

to Japan to replace the 11th Airborne Division which redeployed back to the United States. During this period, the 24th Infantry Division replaced its 4th Infantry 

Regiment with the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment. The 1st Cavalry Division 

eliminated the command echelon of brigade and one of its four infantry regiments, the 12th Cavalry. By 1949 all the infantry divisions, (except the 25th where 

the segregated 24th Infantry had all three battalions and a full strength direct support artillery battalion) were short a battalion each in their three organic infantry 

regiments, and lacked organic reconnaissance elements and a firing battery from 

each organic direct support field artillery battalion. See John Wilson, Maneuver 

and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, 

DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998), 239.

58. The population figure is as of 1 October 1945 as calculated by the 

Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Government of Japan. 

Area is interpolated from the same data via population density figures. See Selected 

Demographic Indicators for Japan, http://www.ipss.go.jp/p=info/e/S_D_1/Indip.

html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005. 

59. The geographical description of Japan comes primarily from A Country 

Study: Japan, Library of Congress Country Studies, [document online] available at 

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jptoc.html; Internet; accessed 12 October 2005. 
63

60. Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New 

Deal, Herbert Passin, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), 60.

61. Howard Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of 

Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989), 48.

62. Dobbins et al., 34; “Brief History of Australia’s Participation in the Occupation of Japan 1945-1952;” The Army Almanac, 633. For a breakdown by division 

of the downsizing, see note 52. For a discussion of the size of the US divisions see 

note 55.

63. Dobbins et al., 42-3.

64. Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth’s Wars 

1948-1966 (New York: Routledge, 1991), 10-11.

65. John Scurr, The Malayan Campaign, 1948-60. Illustrated by Mike Chappell. Men-at-Arms series (London: Osprey, 1982), 4; Jackson, 12-13, 25, 59.

66. John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 37, 149-50, 159.

67. Ibid., 35.

68. Jackson, 28-9.

69. Ibid., 30-31, 37.

70. Coates, 80.

71. Jackson, 20; Scurr,14. 

72. Scurr,19; Coates, 156.

73. Coates, 84, 129; Jackson, 22-3.

74. Scurr, 14; Coates 96.

75. Coates, 186; Jackson, 24.

76. Coates, 118-9, 186; “The History of the British Army: Malaya 1950-

1957,” National Army Museum website, http://www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/

pages/malaya.html; Internet; accessed 9 September 2005. Templer is reputed to 

have coined the much-repeated phrase “winning the hearts and minds.”

77. Jackson, 23, 47, 57; Coates, 94.

78. Coates, 185-6. As early as December 1952, Templer himself recognized 

the end was in sight. On the cover of the 5 December 1952 issue of Time magazine 

he was quoted as declaring, “The jungle has been neutralized.”

79. Templer is reputed as saying: “I’ll shoot the bastard who says that this 

Emergency is over.”

80. Scurr, 30-1; Jackson, 53, 57, 59-60.

81. Coates, 143-4; Jackson, 1-2; Charles Hirschman, “The Society and Its 

Environment” in Malaysia: A Country Study, Frederick M. Bunge, ed. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1984) 70-1, 74.

82. Scurr, 3.

83. Ibid.

84. Jackson, 18-19; Coates, 168. British and Commonwealth brigade and 

battalion deployment for the Malayan Emergency is indicated in table B-4, 

appendix B. Unit abbreviations used in figure 9 are defined in that table.

85. “National Service and the Post-1949 British Army,” The History of the 
64

British Army; available at http://www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/pages/natservice.html; Internet; accessed 6 September 2005.

86. Jackson, 45-7; Coates, 33.

87. Scurr, 25.

88. “Brigade of Gurkhas History,” The Brigade of Gurkhas [documenton-line] available at http://www.army.mod.uk/linked_files/gurkhas/The_World_

Wars_and_the_subsequent_hisory.doc; Internet; accessed 6 September 2005. 

(Editor’s note: The word ‘history’ has been incorrectly spelled in the web address 

for this citation. The web address is correct as listed here.) 

89. “The Brigade of Gurkhas-Background Information,” The Brigade of 

Gurkhas [document-on-line] available at http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_

gurkhas/history/brigade_background.htm; Internet: accessed 6 September 2005.

90. Coates,166-7. The Fijian and East African units, made up of volunteers 

and regular officers were the only Commonwealth units with a performance superior to the Gurkhas. The British battalions, with their conscripts and rotational 

schemes, while still performing at a high level of efficiency, were relatively speaking, the least effective of the various types of Commonwealth forces operating in 

Malaya. 

91. Ibid., 166.

92. Ibid., 122; Jackson, 49. The one battalion in the Federation Regiment 

as of May 1954 was composed of 50 percent British officers, 25 percent Chinese 

officers, while the remaining 25 percent were Indian, Malay, or Eurasian officers. 

The enlisted ranks were 43 percent Malay, 33 percent Chinese, 19 percent Indian, 

and 5 percent other. See Coates, 139. 

93. Coates, 100.

94. Scurr, 8.

95. Jackson, 44, 54.

96. Ibid., 85, 116.

97. Scurr, 6; Jackson, 17-8; Coates, 92, 123, 165.

98. Jackson, 25; Coates, 49, 124-5, 157, 183-4.

99. Coates, 120-1, 124; “The History of the British Army: Malaya 1950-

1957”; Jackson, 20.

100. In 2003 Serbia and Montenegro formed a new, looser union to replace 

the new Yugoslavia. The new state is called simply Serbia and Montenegro.

101. Army in Europe (AE) Pamphlet 525-100, The U.S. Army in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina (Heidelberg, Germany: US Army Europe, Seventh Army, 2003) 

22-4 [document on-line] available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ae-pam525-100.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 October 2005; Dobbins et al., 98.

102. Jim Garamore, “Ending War, Enforcing Peace in Bosnia,” Defenselink 

News, 2 December 2004, [article on-line] available at http://www.defenselinknews.

mil/news/Dec2004/n12022004_2004120208.html; Internet; accessed 17 October 

2005; Dobbins et al., 97-98.

103. Central Intelligence Agency, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” World 
65

Factbook, [document on-line] available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

factbook/geos/bk.html; Internet; accessed 13 October 2005.

104. For example, while MND-N was always commanded by a US division 

staff, as part of the IFOR it initially included two American brigades, an American aviation brigade, a Russian brigade, a Turkish brigade as well as a brigade of 

troops from the Scandinavian countries and Poland and support troops from Hungary and Romania. Due to downsizing, these contingents, as part of the SFOR, 

were reduced in size over time but contained contingents from the same nations 

throughout. See US Army in Bosnia, 23. The British division (MND-SW) typically contained a British brigade, a Canadian brigade, and battalions from the Czech 

Republic, the Netherlands, and Malaysia. The French division typically included 

a French brigade, a Spanish brigade, and an Italian brigade, with battalions from 

Portugal, Egypt, and the Ukraine. For a snapshot IFOR order of battle from September 1996 see “IFOR: Participating Forces,” The Balkan Conflict, http://home.

wandoo.nl/tcc/balkan/ifor_forces.html; Internet; accessed 17 October 2005.

105. US Army in Bosnia 23, 27, 33. The reaction force was known as the 

Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) and was used primarily to clear mines or 

other special missions related to public security beyond the present capability of 

local forces. Base camp density in the US (MND-N) sector is found in table B-5, 

appendix B.

106. Ibid.,16.

107. Ibid., 27.

108. Dobbins et al., 97.

109. “Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU,” International 

Crisis Group Europe Report, no. 164, 6 September 2005 [report on-line] available 

at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3645&l=1; Internet; accessed 

18 October 2005. 

110. At the height of the Bosnian conflict, out of a total population of four 

million, as many as 430,000 troops were armed. Both forces, based on the example of the former Yugoslav army, did not have a divisional echelon of command. Accordingly, brigades reported directly to corps headquarters. “Army of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Order of Battle 1995,” October 2004 [website on-line] 

available at http://www.vojska.net/military/bih/armija/orbat/1995/default.asp; Internet; accessed 18 October 2005; “Army of Republic of Srpska: Order of Battle, 

1992-1995,” September 2003 [website on-line] available at http://www.vojska.

net/military/bih/vrs/oob/1995.asp; Internet; accessed 18 October 2005; “Bosnia’s 

Next Five Years: Dayton and Beyond” November 2000 [document on-line] available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr001103.html; Internet; accessed 

17 October 2005; “The Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” EUFOR: European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina [website on-line] available at 

http://www.euforbih.org/bih/tchapter4.htm; Internet; accessed 18 October 2005. 

111. “Background to the Conflict,” Official Site of the Kosovo Force 

[website on-line] available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/intro.htm; Internet; 

accessed 19 October 2005. 
66

112. “Briefing by the Defence Secretary and Mr. George Robertson and the 

Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments), Air Marshal Sir John Day,” 

(press briefing at the London Ministry of Defence, 26 May 1999) [press briefing on-line] available at http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/brief260599.htm; Internet; 

accessed 19 October 2005. It has been estimated that over one million ethnic 

Albanians, or about half the population, had fled their homes by June 1999. See 

Dobbins et al., 113.

113. “KFOR Press Update,” (press briefing by Major Roland Lavoie, KFOR 

Spokesperson in Pristina, Kosovo, 30 August 1999) [press briefing on-line] available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990830a.htm; Internet; accessed 

19 October 2005. For other strength figures see Dobbins et al., 115 and “Operation Joint Guardian, Kosovo Force (KFOR),” March 2005 [website on-line] available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_guardian.htm; Internet; 

accessed 19 October 2005.

114. “Robertson Briefing,” 26 May 1999.”

115. For the original planned rotations, see “Army Announces Updated Balkans Rotation Schedule,” 4 December 2000 [press release on-line] available at 

http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=1761; Internet; accessed 20 

October 2005. US forces deployed in support of KFOR and MND-E from 1999 

to 2005 are listed in table B-6, appendix B. The force package was known as Task 

Force Falcon. 

116. Dobbins et al.,126.

117. “KFOR Headquarters,” September 2005 [document on-line] available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor_hq.htm; Internet; accessed 19 October 

2005; “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,” 

(press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Pristina, 

Kosovo, 13 May 2005) May 2005 [press briefing on-line] available at http://www.

nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050513a.htm; Internet; accessed 19 October 2005.

118. “Kosovo and its Population,” [document on-line] available at http://

www.sok-kosovo.org/pdf/population/Kosovo_population.pdf; Internet; accessed 

13 February 2006.

119. Dobbins et al., 113.

120. KFOR command by nationality is listed in table B-7, appendix B. This 

information was culled from “Kosovo Force (KFOR), Official Website of the 

Kosovo Force,” [website on-line] available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.

html; Internet; accessed 19 October 2005.

121. “KFOR Headquarters.”

122. Also see Note 116. “Press Club, October 10, 2002,” Task Force Falcon website, [website on-line] available at http://www.tffalcon.hqusareur.army.

mil/Media/PRESS_CLUB/PC10oct02.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 October 2005. 

There were some initial problems with US force commanders not wanting to cross 

sector boundaries, but these issues were soon resolved. See Dobbins et al., 118.

123. Dobbins et al., 113, 116. 

124. Ibid., 118-9; “Kosovo Protection Corps,” [website on-line] available at 
67

http://www.unmikonline.org/1styear/kpcorps.htm; Internet; accessed 19 October 

2005. UNMIK is the UN Mission in Kosovo, established in June 1999 to administer Kosovo until a stable civilian administration could be established.

125. See endnote 122.

126. Dobbins et al., 119-120.
68
69

Chapter 3

Police Departments

Introduction

This work will now discuss civilian police departments in the United 

States and determine how they are organized in relation to the population 

density and geographical area in which each department maintains law 

and order. Additionally, the rationale behind the size of the departments 

and their effectiveness will be analyzed. For the purposes of this study, the 

police precinct (or equivalent) is considered the equivalent of the military 

battalion and the police division (or equivalent) will be considered the 

equivalent of a military brigade. 

New York City

The New York Police Department (NYPD) was established in 1898 in 

its present form, when the merger of the city of New York (Manhattan and 

the Bronx), the city of Brooklyn, the various towns, and localities of the 

county of Queens and the county of Richmond (Staten Island) formed the 

greater city of New York. 

Geographical Area and Terrain 

New York City sprawls across 308.9 square miles and is located on 

two islands (Manhattan and Staten Island), part of a third (Long Island), 

and a large area, the Bronx, on the New York state mainland. 

Population Density

According to the 2000 national census, the population of New York 

City is just over eight million (8,008,278), making it the largest city in the 

United States. The population density for the whole city is 25,925 inhabitants per square mile. While this citywide average is by far the densest of 

any major US city, certain parts of New York City are more densely settled 

than others. For example, the borough of Manhattan has a population of 

1,537,195 (19.2 percent of the city’s total population). However, the land 

area of Manhattan is only 23 square miles or slightly less than 8 percent of 

the total land area of the city. This gives Manhattan a population density 

of 66,834 persons per square mile, more than twice the population density of the city as a whole. In contrast, the borough of Staten Island has a 

population of 378,977 (5.2 percent of the city’s population) in 58 square 

miles, more than twice the size of Manhattan and has a population density 

of 6534 residents per square mile.1
70

Ratio of Police Officers to Population 

The New York Police Department is the largest municipal police department in the United States and, as of 2003, had 39,110 members.2

 This 

large size enables the New York Police Department theoretically to deploy 

126.7 police officers per square mile of city and to provide 1 officer for 

every 205 city residents. This also reflects the unique characteristics of 

New York City where the overall population density is double the population density of the second and third most densely populated cities, Chicago 

and Boston. A large population in a relatively small area results in a high 

level of congestion, making rapid movement around the city by motor 

vehicle impossible at certain times. The low ratio of motor vehicles to 

police officers is reflective of this congestion and the long tradition of officers “walking a beat.” The New York Police Department operates roughly 

4656 patrol cars.3 This provides approximately 1 car for every 8.4 police 

officers. Assuming officers on the traditional three eight-hour shifts (0800-

1600, 1600-2400, 2400-0800) share the vehicles, the ratio decreases to 2.7 

officers per vehicle, leaving about every third police officer on foot even 

under optimum conditions. 

NYPD Organizational Structure 

The basic unit of the New York Police Department is the precinct, consisting of between 200 and 500 officers and commanded (in rising order 

of seniority) by a police captain, deputy inspector, or inspector. Under the 

current organization, the New York Police Department operates 76 precincts and 12 additional transit districts roughly equivalent to precincts. 

Thus, across the force, an NYPD precinct has an average 444 officers. 

Precincts are geographical commands responsible for a specific territory. 

This area varies primarily based on population density. The smallest precinct area has less than one-half square mile (containing 35,500 residents), 

and the largest has 8.12 square miles in area. Grouped within eight patrol 

boroughs, the precincts are roughly equivalent in size to Army brigades. 

Patrol boroughs control between 8 and 13 precincts, except for the Staten Island Patrol Borough, which controls only the three precincts on the 

relatively less densely populated island. Assistant chiefs (the grade higher 

than inspector and the highest grade to command a precinct) command 

patrol boroughs.4 Figure 14 shows the geographical layout of the NYPD’s 

organizational structure. 

NYPD Operational Successes 

In the 1990s the New York Police Department enjoyed great operational success as the New York crime rate and murder rates dropped 
71

dramatically. During these years, the department adopted a decentralized 

operational plan where each precinct commander fought crime in his own 

precinct using trends, statistics, and other data compiled by a computerized tracking system called COMPSTAT.

Other Major Police Departments5

Chicago

Long referred to as “the Second City,” the city of Chicago, as of 2000, 

is the third largest city by population in the United States with 2,896,016 

residents. However, in population density it ranks second, with an average 

of 12,746 residents packed into the city’s 227.2 square mile area. Accordingly, the Chicago Police Department, with 13,423 officers, ranks second 

only to the New York Police Department in size, fielding about 59 police 

officers per square mile of city and providing 1 officer per 218 city residents, or 4.6 officers per 1000 population. Organizationally, each of Chicago’s 25 police districts is divided into three subordinate patrol sectors.6

Figure 14. Geographical organization of the New York Police Department.
72

Each patrol sector contains between three and five beats, totaling 280 beats 

citywide. Each beat has eight or nine patrol officers assigned to patrol the 

area on foot, by bicycle, or by vehicle. Overseeing the 25 districts are six 

area headquarters, including a special command in downtown Chicago.7

Philadelphia 

The city of Philadelphia, with an area of 135.1 square miles and a 

population of 1,517,510, has a population density slightly less than the 

population density of Chicago. The Philadelphia Police Department has a 

deployed strength of 6728 officers. This gives the city a ratio of 49.8 officers per square mile and 1 police officer per 217.9 city residents, or 4.4 

officers per 1000 people. The city is divided into 24 police districts, a park 

district, and an airport district. Six geographical divisions oversee the operations of the districts.8

 Police patrolling in Philadelphia have traditionally emphasized foot and bicycle patrol, with specialized bike units of 10 

officers patrolling particular areas around the clock.9

Boston 

Boston, as densely populated as Philadelphia and Chicago, is unlike 

most major US cities because it did not annex most of its inner suburbs. 

Therefore, the Boston city proper has a rather small area of 48.4 square 

miles and a population of 589,141.10 Despite the small population, the 

city’s density of 12,172 residents per square mile is similar to the density 

of Chicago and Philadelphia. The Boston Police Department is, accordingly, smaller, with 2044 officers. This deployed strength gives Boston a ratio 

of 42.2 officers per square mile and 1 police officer per 296.7 residents or 

3.5 officers per 1000 population.

Los Angeles

The Anomaly of Los Angeles

Los Angeles is the exact opposite of the previously cited cities. Los 

Angeles has a large geographical area, but a low population density. The 

city’s 3.6 million population sprawls out over 466.8 square miles, giving 

a density of 7915 residents per square mile, half the density of Chicago, 

Boston and Philadelphia and almost one-quarter the density of New York 

City.11 The 9195-member Los Angeles Police Department provides a ratio of 19.7 police officers per square mile, and a deployed force of 1 officer per 431.2 residents, a proportion of 2.49 police officers per 1000 

city residents.12 Both geographically and demographically, these figures 

are far smaller than any other major municipal police force in the United 

States. While the population of Los Angeles is slightly less than half 
73

the population of New York City and the area is one and a half times 

larger, the Los Angeles Police Department is less than a quarter the 

size of the New York Police Department. Chicago has three-fourths 

the population of Los Angeles and slightly less than half the land area 

and has a police force 70 percent larger. Philadelphia has an area onefourth smaller, less than half the population, and deploys a police force 

almost three-fourths the size of the Los Angeles Police Department 

(LAPD). Why do public officials in Los Angeles feel they can deploy a 

police force substantially smaller proportionally than the police forces 

of other large American cities? In fact, police officials in Los Angeles 

have noted the proportionally smaller size of their police department, 

but a variety of factors has contributed to the LAPD’s size. 

LAPD Organizational Structure

The first key factor is the LAPD’s organizational structure. Based 

on the population distribution and area of the city, the LAPD’s 19 organizational subunits called area divisions are roughly equivalent to 

the NYPD precincts.13 Division geographical size varies from 4 square 

miles to 65 square miles, based primarily on demographics. Large sections within the LA city limits are either undeveloped parkland or upper or middle class suburban neighborhoods. The geographic area of 

these divisions is larger than the divisions found in the more densely 

populated inner city sections of Los Angeles.

Typical area division strength is about 350 officers, which includes 

three major subcomponents, simply called divisions: detective, traffic, 

and patrol. The patrol divisions are divided into patrol districts. Each 

patrol division has from 5 to 13 patrol districts. For each work shift, 

or watch, each patrol district is assigned one patrol car. Overall, as of 

2005, the Los Angeles Police Department operated 170 patrol districts 

throughout the city. At a minimum, each district operates a dedicated patrol car, usually manned by two officers. This patrol, operating on three 

shifts, or watches, is on duty 24 hours a day. A senior police officer, usually in the grade of sergeant, commands several patrol districts together. 

Above this sergeant is a lieutenant who leads the entire patrol watch for 

the specific division. 

The size of patrol districts depends on the population density, the geography of the terrain, and the crime rate in the area. Citywide, the proportion of patrol units to population is one patrol unit for every 21,734 

residents. District by district, the ratio can vary plus or minus several thousand residents from the citywide figure. Since patrol units are 
74

usually two-officer teams, this gives a proportion of one officer to 10,867 

residents at the point of the police spear, or one-tenth of a patrol officer 

per 1000 population. While patrol areas vary in size, the average size of a 

patrol area citywide is 2.7 square miles. In places where the population is 

Figure 15. Geographical organization of the Los Angeles Police Department.
75

more dense, such as the Rampart Division, the patrol districts are smaller, 

an average of 1.6 square miles.14 Figure 15 illustrates the geographic organization of the Los Angeles Police Department by bureau, division, and 

patrol district. 

Mobility and the Los Angeles Police Department

Another key factor affecting the size of the Los Angeles Police Department is its high rate of motorization. Los Angeles is both large in 

population and in geographical area. As previously referenced, the city’s 

population density is far below the densities of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston.15 However, even in areas of Los Angeles where the 

population density is equal to that of other cities, the ratio of officers to every 1000 residents remains relatively low. For example in the Rampart division (43,750 residents per square mile) and the Newton division (16,666 

residents per square mile), the ratio of officers to 1000 residents is 1.0 and 

2.3 respectively. This compares to other cities with rates ranging between 

3.4 and 4.9 officers per 1000 residents. 

A major reason for the smaller ratio is the LAPD’s dependence on 

motorized vehicles. As of 2002, the LAPD’s fleet consisted of 4180 patrol 

cars, 1376 unmarked vehicles, 359 motorcycles, and 17 helicopters.16 This 

number of vehicles gives the Los Angeles Police Department an average of 

one vehicle for every 1.6 police officers. In contrast, the New York Police 

Department has one vehicle for every eight officers. Counting the marked 

and unmarked patrol cars together, the Los Angeles Police Department 

has a pool of more patrol vehicles than the New York Police Department, 

a force whose personnel strength is 77 percent larger. Despite this large 

number of vehicles, the sheer geographical size of the city of Los Angeles 

has resulted in the Los Angeles Police Department deploying an average 

of about 12 police vehicles for every square mile of city area, less than the 

averages in each of the five major cities in this study. For example, New 

York, even while providing only one vehicle for every eight officers, still 

deployed 15 vehicles per square mile. 

A population sprawled over a large area gave the Los Angeles Police 

Department a traditional appreciation for conducting patrol operations primarily from vehicles. Even though Los Angeles had an early tradition of 

police walking beats in the downtown areas of the city, the demise of the 

city’s extensive trolley car system after World War II left Los Angeles 

without an equivalent of the rapid transit subway and elevated railway systems found in the other cities.17 The motor vehicle became the Los Angeles 

equivalent. Even while police departments nationwide adopt a generalized 
76

doctrine of law enforcement strategy called “community policing,” which 

emphasizes foot and bicycle patrols, the Los Angeles version of community policing still depends on the patrol vehicle as the primary mode of 

transportation for police officers making local contact with the public.18

Table 7 shows a comparison of the motor vehicle deployments of the 

five municipal police departments studied in this section. From this table 

it can be deduced the Los Angeles Police Department has a proportion of 

vehicles per officer almost three times the average. This disparity in the 

number of officers per vehicle may provide a rationale for the proportional 

size difference between the Los Angeles Police Department (2.5 officers 

per 1000 people) and the average size of the other four police departments 

(4.35 officers per 1000 people), which, on average deploy almost twice as 

many officers (a difference of 1.85 officers per 1000 residents).

Crime Rates in Los Angeles 

Subsequent to the 1950s, despite rising crime rates in Los Angeles 

and across the nation, the size of the Los Angeles Police Department 

only increased as the population increased. It was only during the 1970s 

the police department reached its current staff level of 2.5 officers per 

1000 city residents.24

Though the crime rate in Los Angeles did increase, it remained low 

relative to other cities. The relatively low crime rate in Los Angeles seemed 

to indicate the size of the Los Angeles Police Department was adequate. 

Although the police force was proportionally smaller than most other 

Table 7. US Municipal Police Force Vehicle Density

Size of 

Force

Number 

of Patrol 

Vehicles

Ratio of 

Officers 

to 

Vehicles

Ratio of 

Vehicles 

per 1000 

Residents

Ratio of 

Vehicles 

to Area 

(square 

miles)

New York 39,100 465619 8.3 0.58 15.07

Chicago 13,289 298220 4.5 1.02 17.61

Philadelphia 6728 150021 4.5 1.01 11.10

Boston 2044 69822 2.9 1.18 14.42

Los Angeles 9195 555623 1.6 1.50 11.90

Averages 4.4 1.06 14.02
77

major cities, the LA crime rate was lower than the crime rates in cities with 

larger police forces. In 2002, for example, of the five cities studied here, 

only New York had a lower crime rate. In fact, of all large American cities 

(over one million in population), in 2002 only New York and San Diego 

had lower crime rates.25

Coupled with low crime rates, a belief existed, prevalent among municipal officials and senior police officers, that the high level of professionalism in the Los Angeles Police Department made it possible to do more 

with fewer officers, something not possible in other cities. LA public officials and police commanders prided themselves on using their resources 

proactively and creatively. For example, former LAPD chief Daryl Gates 

boasted in his memoirs the department, per officer, averaged 3.1 arrests for 

violent crime per year in contrast to a rate of 1.8 for the New York Police 

Department.26

Additionally, while their police department was proportionally smaller than similar departments elsewhere, the people of Los Angeles still believed their government was excessively large and needed to downsized. 

This was most apparent in proposed secession movements in Hollywood 

and the San Fernando Valley in 2002, and as far back as 1978 when the 

passage of State Proposition 13 actually cut LAPD personnel strength for 

a period of time.27 Even Gates, while acknowledging the small size of the 

force, stated the public should not be expected to allocate any more funds 

for police than those already budgeted.28

LA Police Officials and Police Density

Traditionally, Los Angeles has never deployed a police force much 

larger than its present 2.5 police officers per 1000 residents. While many 

LAPD officials pride themselves on the ability of the department to do its 

job with a smaller force, many believe the low proportion of police to LA 

residents resulted in the force providing the public minimum service while 

working at maximum capacity at all times.29

In 2004 the Los Angeles Police Department, led by Chief William 

Bratton, who had been highly successful in Boston and New York, began 

pushing for public funding for modest personnel increases. As outlined in 

the Los Angeles Police Department Plan of Action: Book II, written to support a November 2004 sales tax increase to fund additional law enforcement measures, LAPD officials proposed a 35 percent increase in the size 

of the force to 12,500 officers.30 This increase, if implemented, would have 

resulted in an increase in the ratio of police officers to residents of 1 officer 

for every 296 residents (3.3 officers per 1000 residents). While still below 
78

the levels of most other cities, the LAPD ratio of officers to residents 

would be a lot closer to the average (4.4 officers per 1000 residents) of the 

other cities studied in this work. The higher rate of motorization of the Los 

Angeles Police Department could then compensate for the difference in 

size without a loss of effectiveness. However, the referendum authorizing 

the sales tax increase to pay for the personnel increases was defeated at the 

polls in November 2004. City officials immediately began to look for new 

ways to fund or otherwise increase the size of the force.31

US Major Municipal Police Force Troop Density Summary 

Table 8 outlines a comparison between the officer densities of the police departments discussed in this section in terms of demographic, geographic and organizational density. Including the figures projected by LA 

officials, the average police density is 1 police officer per 248.12 residents 

or 4.1 officers per 1000 population. Average geographic density is 60.9 

officers per square mile.

Organizationally, each police department is divided into smaller subunits, roughly equivalent to an Army company, referred to by various 

names (precinct, division, or district). The number of subunits seems to 

be based primarily on demographics, rather than geography, as they vary 

in geographical size but overall, average 333.2 officers. On the average, 

these departments organized one of these subunits for every 50,137.5 residents.

What general conclusions can be drawn from this sampling of troop 

density for municipal police departments? Municipal police departments 

appear to base their strengths primarily on the size of the population they 

are supporting rather than on the geographical area they patrol. The more 

densely populated the city, the higher the police density. The range of densities is between 3.3 and 4.9 police officers per 1000 of population, with 

an average of 4.1 officers per 1000 residents.32 To summarize, the higher 

the population density, the greater the number of police officers per 1000 

residents patrolling designated areas. Inversely, the greater the number of 

motor vehicles operated by the police department (motorization), the fewer police officers per 1000 residents. Figures 16 and 17 depict this inverse 

relationship.

In terms of geographical area, the range of police densities runs from 

the LAPD’s 19.7 officers per square mile to the NYPD’s 126.7 officers 

per square mile. However, unlike population density, police area densities 

do not necessarily increase as area increases. Los Angeles has the largest 

area in the sampling but has the lowest number of officers per square mile. 
79

Table 8. US Municipal Police Force Officer Density33

City Population Area

Population Density(per square mile)

Police Force Police Density

Size

Precincts/ Equivalents (average size)

Per Area (officer per square mile)

Per Population (1 per x Residents)

Police per 1000 Residents

Boston 589,141 48.4 12,172 2044 11 (180) 42.2 296.7 3.5New York 8,008,278 308.9 25,925 39,110 88 (444) 126.7 204.8 4.9Philadelphia 1,517,550 135.1 11,233 6728 24 (160) 49.8 225.6 4.4Chicago 2,896,016 227.2 12,746 13,423 25 (532) 59.1 217.9 4.6Los Angeles

3,694,820 466.8 7915 Current 9195 19 (350) 19.7 431.2 2.5

Projected 12,500 21 (350) 26.7 295.6 3.3

Average (LA projected figures used) *(333.2) 60.9 248.12 4.1*1 subunit for every 50,137.5 residents
80

87654321

LAPD BPD PPD CPD NYPD

Police Density per 1000 Population

Mo

ot

r zi

at on i

Lower

H

gi

her

Population Density Higher Lower

Average

Figure 16. Municipal police department densities by population.
81

9575553515

115

LAPD BPD PPD CPD NYPD

Police Density per One Square Mile

Mo

ot

r zi

at oi

n

Lower

H

gi

her

Figure 17. Municipal police department densities by area.
82

However, as in population density, the greater the rate of motorization of 

the police department, the fewer officers it deploys per square mile. 

State Police Force Troop Density

All US states, with the exception of Hawaii, have state police forces 

of various sizes. These forces are responsible for conducting statewide 

law enforcement and traffic control functions beyond those conducted by 

the local (municipal and county) police. Accordingly, the sizes of state police forces are substantially smaller than police forces in the largest cities. 

Even the largest state police force, the California Highway Patrol (CHP), 

with 6678 officers, is exceeded in size by the proportionally small Los 

Angeles Police Department with 9195 officers.34 Nevertheless, a brief examination of this largest state police force will provide some insight into 

Figure 18. California Highway Patrol geographic organization.
83

the overall issue of troop density because the California Highway Patrol 

is responsible for a large geographic area and a total population roughly 

comparable to Iraq. Additionally, Army planners studied the California 

Highway Patrol, as well as other municipal California police forces when 

they determined force requirements for stability operations in Iraq before 

the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.35

The California Highway Patrol augments the law enforcement activities of local municipal and county police forces in the state of California 

by providing specialized services that transcend local boundaries and by 

providing traffic control and other activities related to the highways of 

California. Accordingly, even though it has the nation’s largest state police force, the California Highway Patrol is, in proportion, substantially 

smaller than the average municipal police department. Based on the 2000 

census, the population of California is 33,871,648, making it the most 

populous state. The area of the state is 163,707 square miles, the third 

largest state after Alaska and Texas. Statewide population density is 206.9 

persons per square mile. With trooper strength of 6678, CHP troop density 

is 0.20 officers per 1000 state residents, or 1 highway patrol officer for 

every 5,072.12 inhabitants. In terms of area, there is one highway patrol 

officer for every 24.51 square miles of the state. 

As with other police forces, the California Highway Patrol is organized into subordinate units and as illustrated in figure 18, is subdivided 

into eight geographic divisions. 

Between 500 and 1000 officers staff each division. The geographic 

size of the division and its staffing is dependent on demographics. For example, the largest division in terms of personnel is the Los Angeles area. 

Statistically, an average division size is 834.75 officers. There is an average of 1 division for every 4.23 million state residents. 

Police Density Conclusions

From the sampling of the largest municipal police departments in the 

United States, police density at the municipal level averages 4.1 officers 

per 1000 of population, 60.9 officers per municipal square mile and 1 

police subunit (precinct equivalent), averaging 333.2 officers, for every 

50,137.5 residents. The higher the number of motor vehicles deployed by 

a police force, the lower its density, both in relation to population and to 

area of responsibility. Augmenting the municipal forces are state forces. 

The California Highway Patrol, the largest state police force, adds an average of 0.20 officers per 1000 people, 1 officer per 24.51 square miles, 

and one additional police subunit (district) with 834.75 officers per 4.23 

million residents. 
84

What does this mean for troop density in contingency operations? 

From this sampling, it is apparent the police density, even for the largest 

municipal police departments, is far smaller than the densities of the sampling of military forces employed in successful contingency operations. 

Therefore, it can be concluded routine police operations, even in times 

of heightened crime, still require a proportionally smaller force than is 

typical of a contingency operation. However, it can also be concluded that 

even in a contingency operation, routine police operations will be required 

and a portion of the troop force roughly equal to the average proportional 

size of municipal police forces will be necessary to provide minimal police functions during the contingency operation.
85

Notes

1. New York City Department of City Planning, “Population Division: 

2000 Census Summary,” [document on-line] available at http://www.ci.nyc.

ny.us/html/dcp/html/census/pop2000.shtml; Internet; accessed 25 August 

2005.

2. “New York Police Department, “Frequently Asked Questions,” [document on-line] available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/misc/pdfaq2.

html; Internet; accessed 25 August 2005.

3. Jon LeSage, “Cutting Car Costs,” Police One.com, 21 April 2005, 

[document on-line] available at http://www.policeone.com/police-products/

vehicle-equipment/articles/99939/; Internet; accessed 25 August 2005.

4. Table B-8, appendix B contains a listing of the NYPD precincts and 

the relationship between them and demographic and geographic size. The table was compiled from the individual precinct web pages found on the NYPD 

website (http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/). Unlike other police departments, 

the command grade of an NYPD precinct varies, although no apparent criteria 

for this variation are discernible. The grades of precinct commanders in order 

of seniority are inspector, deputy inspector, and captain. 

5. This section provides a representative sample of the police densities 

of other major American municipal police departments. Police departments 

were selected because of a combination of city size and perceived professionalism/success. Table B-9, appendix B lists all other cities larger in population than Boston. See “Officers per 1000,” [document on-line] available 

at http://www.policepay.net/officersper.asp; Internet; accessed 23 September 

2005; and “2000 Census: US Municipalities Over 50,000: Ranked by 2000 

Population,” [document on-line] available at http://www.demographia.com/

db-uscity98.htm; Internet; accessed 23 September 2005.

6. Originally, the Chicago Police Department subunits were called precincts as in New York. Before the 1960s, the Chicago Police Department had 

as many as 41 districts, which was eventually decreased to 21. With the advent 

of the ‘community policing’ approach to police work in the 1990s, the Chicago 

Police Department expanded its districts to the present 25. See “Brief History 

of the Chicago Police Department,” Chicago Historical Information, August 

1997 [document on-line] available at http://www.chipublib.org/004chicago/

timeline/policedept.html; Internet; accessed 28 September 2005.

7. Chicago Police Department organization is listed in table B-10, appendix B. See Chicago Police Department Annual Report: 2004 Year in Review, [document on-line] available at http://egov.cityofchicago.org/webpor

tal/COCWebPortal/COC_EDITORIAL/04AR.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 September 2005. 

8. Philadelphia Police Department organization is outlined in table B11, appendix B. See Philadelphia Police Department 2003 Annual Report, 

[document on-line] available at http://www.ppdonline.org/pdf/hq/Phila%20Po

lice%20Annual%20lowres.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005; and the 
86

Philadelphia Police Department website available at www.ppdonline.org, accessed 22 September 2005. Inspectors command patrol divisions, and captains 

command patrol districts. A patrol district is staffed by up to four platoons, each 

consisting of 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, and approximately 40 officers. Accordingly, districts range in size from about 100 to 160 officers.

9. Philadelphia Police Department 2002 Annual Report, 8 [document online] available at http://www.ppdonline.org/pdf/hq/2002report_low.pdf; Internet; 

accessed 19 September 2005. 

10. The Boston Police Department is organized as follows: 

Four Police Areas (A, B, C, D) and 11 Police Districts, the latter commanded by police captains. Districts are as follows:

A-1 Downtown/Beacon Hill/Chinatown/Charlestown 

A-7 East Boston 

B-2 Roxbury/Mission Hill

B-3 Mattapan/North Dorchester

C-6 South Boston 

C-11 Dorchester

D-4 Back Bay/Sound End/Fenway

D-14 Allston/Brighton

E-5 West Roxbury/Roslindale

E-13 Jamaica Plain

E-18 Hyde Park 

The areas are insignificant organizationally and the districts each report directly to the police headquarters. The relatively small number of districts makes 

this a manageable structure. To add to the confusion of terminology in relation 

to other police departments, districts are also called patrol districts and were formerly known as divisions. See BPD website at http://www.cityofboston.gov/po

lice/district.asp; Internet; accessed 30 August 2005; also Donna Wells, (Archivist, 

Boston Police Department) telephone interview by author, 20 September 2005.

11. Los Angeles had an ordinance limiting building height to 12 stories until 

1966. See Daryl F. Gates with Diane K. Shah, Chief: My Life in the L.A.P.D. (New 

York: Bantam Books, 1992), 300.

12. Dave Krajicek, “The Crime Beat: LAPD Thumbnail, Ch. 1,” Covering 

Crime and Justice, [document on-line] available at http://www.justicejournalism.

org/crimeguide/chapter01/sidebars/chap01_resources.html; Internet; accessed 15 

September 2005. Current figures vary slightly on the exact strength of the Los 

Angeles Police Department: from 9022 reported by Krajicek to 9241 found in 

the reference in note 24. The figure of 9195, between these two other figures, is 

cited at policepay.net, a website devoted to providing consult to police unions on 

pay issues. See http://www.policepay.net/zmainlinks/swornframe.htm; Internet; 

accessed 22 September 2005. 

13. Table B-12, appendix B, shows the organization of the Los Angeles Police Department geographically and demographically.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
87

14. As part of the LAPD’s version of “community policing,” since the mid1970s, its patrol districts are now referred to as Basic Car Districts and several 

such districts under a sergeant as a Basic Car Area. See “Basic Car Plan,” [document on-line] available at http://www.lapdonline.org/community/basic_car_plan/

bcp.htm; Internet; accessed 14 September 2005 and Gates, 308.

15. The only comparable major cities with both a large population and a large 

land area are Houston, Texas, with an area of 540 square miles and a 1990 population of 1.6 million and San Diego, California, with an area of 324 square miles and 

a 1990 population of 1.1 million. However, the population densities of these two 

cities, 3000 and 3400 per square mile, respectively, are half the population density 

of Los Angeles. Proportionally, with a police force of 4786 officers, the Houston 

Police Department had a ratio of one police officer to every 334 residents, about 3 

officers for every 1000 residents, and 8.9 police officers for every square mile of 

area. This places Houston roughly between the lower figures for Los Angeles and 

the higher figures for New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago. However, 

Houston’s ratio of 8.9 officers per square miles is far lower than any other major 

city except San Diego, at half the area density of Los Angeles and only seven percent of New York. San Diego’s 1190 police officers yield the astronomical ratios 

of 1 policeman for every 924 residents, about 1.1 (1.6 in relation to the current 

population) officers per 1000 city residents. This proportion is less than half of 

Los Angeles’. San Diego deploys 3.7 police officers per square mile of city area, 

proportionally equating to three percent of the force deployed by the New York 

Police Department. At least some of the reasoning behind the small size of the San 

Diego police force may be politically motivated. See “Thin Blue Line: San Diego 

needs more police,” San Diego Tribune 12 December 2004 [article on-line] available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041212/news_lz1ed12top.

html; Internet; accessed 16 September 2005; Campbell Gibson, “Population of the 

100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990,” 

(Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, June 1998) [document on-line] available 

at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027.html#taba; 

Internet; accessed 16 September 2005.

16. Krajicek.

17. Gates, 59. A good discussion of the Los Angeles trolley system and its 

decline can be found at “The Red Cars of Los Angeles,” Los Angeles: Past, Present and Future, 15 January 2002 [document on-line] available at http://www.usc.

edu/isd/archives/la/historic/redcars/; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005.

18. See note 14 above.

19. LeSage.

20. Chicago Police Department, Annual Report, 2004.

21. Lieutenant Eamon McWilliams (Commander, Tow Squad/Fleet Liaison, 

Philadelphia Police Department) telephone interview by author, 22 September 

2005. The Philadelphia Police Department deploys roughly 1000 marked and 500 

unmarked patrol vehicles.

22. Boston Police Department. Annual Report, 2003; Wells.
88

23. See note 15.

24. Los Angeles Police Department Plan of Action, Book II: For the LA that 

Could Be, 11, 2004 [document on-line] available at http://www.lapdonline.org/pdf_

files/poa/b2_plan.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 September 2005. Gates, 21, 105, 178, 

203. According to Gates, the Los Angeles Police Department was 4300 strong in 

1950 when Los Angeles had a population of 1.9 million, a proportion of one police 

officer for every 441 residents, or a ratio of 2.3 per 1000. In 1965 these ratios were 

1 officer per 561 people and 1.91 officers per 1000 residents. By 1978, however, 

when Los Angeles’ population was about 2.9 million, the proportions were 1 officer 

per 387 people and 2.6 officer per 1000 residents.

25. “Crime Rates for Selected Large Cities, 2002 (offenses known to the police per 100,000 inhabitants),” [document on-line] available at http://www.info

please.com/ipa/A0004902.html; Internet; accessed 16 September 2005;“Table 1: 

Annual Estimates of the Population for Incorporated Places over 100,000, Ranked 

by July 1, 2004 Population: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2004 (SUB-EST2004-01),” 

2005, [spreadsheet on-line] available at http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/tables/

SUB-EST2004-01.xls;Internet; accessed 22 September 2005. According to Gates, 

in 1991 Los Angeles ranked 35th in crime rates among major metropolitan areas. 

See Gates, 302. See LAPD Annual Report 1996, [document on-line] available at 

http://www.lapdonline.org/pdf_files/1996_annrprt.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005. This report stated crime rates had dropped over four consecutive years 

(1992-96) and during that same time period violent crime had dropped 11 percent 

and homicide, 34 percent. Despite the low crime rate ranking in 2002, LAPD publications cite a 10.4 percent increase in violent crime in Los Angeles between 1999 

and 2002, making Los Angeles and Washington, DC, the only major US cities to 

show increases during the same period. See LAPD Plan of Action: Book II, 13.

26. Gates, 34, 302.

27. Ibid., 308; Ronald Oakerson and Shirley Svorny, “Rightsizing Los Angeles Government,” The Independent Review 9, no. 4 (Spring 2005):513-528 [journal 

on-line] available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_4_3_oakerson.pdf; 

Internet; accessed 22 September 2005. 

28. Gates, 303. Gates felt the criminal justice system, rather than the police 

themselves, were most responsible for increased crime rates towards the end of the 

century.

29. Ibid., 233; LAPD Action Plan: Book II, 14-15, 23.

30. The figure of 35 percent was derived arbitrarily, based on LAPD officials’ perception of the professionalism of the force would allow it to “deliver 

sustainable low levels of crime in every Los Angeles neighborhood” with such an 

increase, even though the LAPD strength would still “remain well below those 

of most other large cities.” See LAPD Action Plan: Book II, 23. The Los Angeles 

County voters defeated the sales tax increase on 3 November 2004.

31. Los Angeles Police Department Plan of Action: Book I, LAPD Plan of 

Action, Book II: For the Los Angeles That Is, 4, 2004 [document on-line] available at http://www.lapdonline.org/pdf_files/poa/b1_01_mandate.pdf; Internet; 
89

accessed 22 September 2005. For an opinion from a Los Angeles resident and 

observer of public safety issues, see Russ Quan, “Los Angeles’ Safer Communities Proposed Measure,” The Back Page, 17 January 2005, http://nitewriter1.

blogspot.com/2005_01_01_nitewriter1_archive.html; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005.

32. These figures use the projected size of the Los Angeles Police Department as even LAPD officials consider its current size inadequate. 

33. Police force size figures are from the respective forces’ public websites, 

their most recently available annual reports, and policepay.net. 

34. Gary Cordner, “State Police in the United States-December 2003,” 

[document on-line] available at http://www.csg.org/NR/rdonlyres/ex4lwhthmp

cxm4pldsgebvlym4nlyprx4lg3wajkuzsoa4omqkxlt37bctcqp2kc7fdqr5qttjnu

bt5gcuhr6mpknjb/State+Police+stats.pdf;Internet; accessed 26 August 2005; The 

New York State Police, with approximately 5000 members, is less than one-fifth 

the size of the New York Police Department. See the “Letter of Introduction,” 

New York Division of State Police [document on-line] available at http://www.

troopers.state.ny.us/introduction/; Internet; accessed 26 August 2005.

35. Benson, 187. 
90
91

Chapter 4

Analysis

This work has reviewed historical case studies of successfully executed contingency operations and large police forces to provide a baseline 

and analytical data from which can be devised basic estimates for troop 

density. While formulating these estimates, the author recognizes each 

historical case study depicts a unique situation with its own specific set 

of factors contributing to the number of troops actually employed in the 

operation. In this section these factors will be analyzed along with a comparison of the various troop densities. As a starting point, troop density 

theory, as it currently exists, will be analyzed in relation to the statistics 

produced by this study.

Troop Density Theory

As mentioned in the introduction, since 1995 military observers, analysts, and civilian journalists have promulgated general theories on troop 

density. Most theorists to some extent cite historical precedent when proposing ratios for troop density levels. Most density recommendations fall 

within a range of 25 soldiers per 1000 residents in an area of operations 

(1 soldier per 40 inhabitants) to 20 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants (or 1 soldier per 50 inhabitants), while the lower figure of 20 to 1000 is considered 

the unofficial standard (or minimum requirement).1

A cursory look at the statistics (figures 19 and 20) from the case studies of successful past contingency operations shows that, with the exception of the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, none of the operations studied 

here come close to the recommended ratios of 20 soldiers to 1000 population or 1 troop to 50 population. 

These numbers, while based on maximum deployment strengths, do 

not include totals for indigenous troops, local police forces, or contractor 

support. This point will be discussed and analyzed separately. Occupation 

force size planning estimates are also included in the graphs where available. These graphs also visually illustrate the lack of a standard for determining troop density as well as the haphazard nature of these estimates in 

which some operations had a greater number of troops actually deployed 

and others had fewer. 

Between 1941 and 1997, the US Army produced, and periodically updated, a manual of historically based planning factors, FM 101-10-1/2, 

Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical 

Data Planning Factors. This comprehensive compendium of tables and 
92

charts was last updated in 1990 and discarded in 1996. While the manual 

contains detailed tables covering planning factors for support of various 

operations, the focus is clearly logistics and not operations. For example, 

the personnel section contains planning factors for projecting casualties 

and providing replacements. However, it does not provide any general 

planning guidance on how large the force should be for different types 

of operations relative to the opposing enemy force size, the geographic 

size of the area of operations or, in the case of a contingency operation, 

the size, and density of the local population. In a telling passage at the 

beginning of the personnel section, the planner is clearly advised he will 

be working within the parameters of an already specified force size, in 

which the “...planning normally conforms to the personnel strength ceiling authorized by the theater and subordinate commands.”2 Unfortunately, 

no US Army document provides specific operational planning factors and 

guidance equivalent to the combat service support guidance in FM 101-

10-1/2. The rationale behind this may be alluded to in the following excerpt from that manual: 

Troop basis planning is not absolutely predictable. Planners must consider an infinite variety of operational 

15

35

55

75

95

115

135

155

175

195

Planned Actual

Population per One Troop 

Philippines

1899-1901

Northern Luzon

1899-1901Germany

(Army Occupation

One Year

Germany

(Police Occupation)

Two Years

Austria

1947

Japan 1945

Malaya 1948-54

Bosnia IFOR 1995

Bosnia SFOR 1996

Kosovo 1999

Fewer Troops More Troops

1:50

Recommended 

Guideline 

Mean/average of 

Actual 

Deployments= 

113.44

Figure 19. Comparative troop density: troops per number of inhabitants.
93

environments and the vital role of human factors, which 

may complicate analysis and/or their justification.3

Accordingly, except for general operational planning concepts and 

guidance, the US Army provides no guidance or planning factors to use 

when planning the size of a force to engage in contingency operations. In 

addition, during the post-Cold War era, the logistic planning factors were 

also discarded.4 The US Army historically has not and currently does not 

provide specific planning information for troop levels in various types of 

operations. The Army has probably done this deliberately in line with the 

old dictum everything in combat “depends on the situation.”5

While the Army has not provided any extensive theory on troop density, civilian defense analysts have. Rand Corporation mathematician and 

military analyst, James Quinlivan, promulgates the most comprehensive 

theory. Quinlivan espouses a spectrum, or sliding scale, of troop density 

in contingency operations. 

In his model, Quinlivan classifies operations into three levels of intensity. As the intensity of the operation increases, the size of the force proportionally increases. (Quinlivan uses the term stability operation instead 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Troops per 1000 Population

Philippines

1899-1901

Northern Luzon

1899-1901

Germany

(Army Occupation)

ONE YEAR

Germany

Police Occupation)

Two Years

Austria

1947

Japan 1945

Malaya 1948-54

Bosnia IFOR 1995

Bosnia SFOR 1996

Kosovo 1999

More Troops Fewer Troops

20:1000

Recommended 

Guideline

56.3

Planned Actual

Mean/average of 

Actual 

Deployments= 

10.76

Figure 20. Comparative troop density per 1000 population. 
94

of contingency operation.) According to Quinlivan, typically operations 

at all levels are of extended duration and are executed by troops and units 

rotating in and out of the operation. According to Quinlivan, the ideal tour 

length is six months. The highest level, major insurgency or unrest, requires a minimum troop density of 20 troops to 1000 population, a figure, 

as mentioned above, usually cited as the standard level for all contingency 

operations, including Quinlivan when he discusses the operations in Iraq. 

Quinlivan’s model is depicted in figure 21.6

While Quinlivan posits an interesting model for troop density, a critical analysis of his work identifies several points of concern. First, many of 

the numbers Quinlivan uses in his examples are higher than numbers used 

in this study for the same operations. Second, he inconsistently includes 

indigenous forces in his accounting of the total number of troops deployed 

in support of specific operations. For example, in Quinlivan’s analysis of 

the Malaya Emergency, he correctly cites early 1952 as the apex of British 

troop deployment in that operation. He rightfully cites a force of 30 battalions and an overall troop strength of 40,000. However, most sources place 

this number closer to 30,000.7

To reach the ratio of 20 troops to 1000 inhabitants, Quinlivan then 

includes the 71,000 members of various Malay police and home defense forces in his calculations. Therefore, he tacitly equates all types 

of forces as equal in terms of troop density, this in spite of contemporary British insistence that police forces were no substitute for soldiers in 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Troops per 1000 Population

More Troops Fewer Troops

Lower Operational Intensity Higher

Peaceful Population

Typical Police Density Medium Police Density High Density 

Characteristics of Stability Operations

-Extended duration

-Rotation of troops (6 months ideal)

Examples

-Iraq

-Malaya

-Northern Ireland

Examples

-Dominican Republic 

-Punjab

Examples

-Typical City Police Force 

-Germany

-Cambodia Troop Density

Major Insurgency or 

Unrest Civil Unrest 

Figure 21. James Quinlivan’s model of troop density.
95

counterinsurgency operations.8 Despite the British reluctance to equate 

indigenous forces with their own operational military forces, it will be 

discussed here that Quinlivan was right to include them. However, in later 

versions of his theory, Quinlivan includes only “international forces.”9

Troop density figures from the various case studies will be shown to vary 

far less when operational indigenous or other forces are included. 

Quinlivan’s theory provides a good analysis, particularly his scale of 

intensity levels of the operations as it relates to troop density. However, 

while Quinlivan places most of the operations in the mid- to high-intensity 

level, the figures produced in this work will place most operations in the 

low- to mid-intensity level. This implies his ratio of 20:1000 is too high a 

benchmark for troop density in contingency operations.10

A final analysis of troop density theory is found in another Rand study, 

America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, completed by 

James Dobbins and his team in 2003. While the focus of Dobbins’ study 

is nation building not troop density, its compilation of troop densities for 

past examples of contingency operations reflects the troop levels found in 

this study rather than those found in Quinlivan’s.11 While Dobbins’ team 

did not prescribe any specific troop density levels, they did observe higher 

troop densities resulted in decreased friendly and hostile casualties, meaning the greater the proportion of troops used in an operation, the less intense the resistance.12

Factors Affecting Troop Density 

Ideally, the troop densities in figures 19 and 20 would be identical or 

close to the same proportional level. However, as can be seen in figure 

22, this is not the case. Figure 22 depicts how the various case studies are 

grouped around the mean or average. The average troop density of the 

various case studies in this work is 10.76 soldiers per 1000 of population 

(or 113.44 residents per soldier). The disparity in density among the examples is 16.20 soldiers per 1000 residents from the least dense operation 

(Japan) and the densest operation (Kosovo). 

What caused such a wide spread? There must be mitigating factors. 

Each historical example has specific factors possibly affecting the actual 

troop density for the operation. Therefore, a brief review of these factors is 

now in order. These factors are interconnected and can have a modifying 

effect on troop density, requiring greater or lesser densities. The following analysis of troop density factors is based on the maximum number of 

troops deployed for the contingency operation, as are all troop density 

statistics in this work.
96

Figure 22. Troop density variations of selective troop deployments.

-2-4-6-8

86420

1210

Deviation from the Mean

Philippines

1899-1901

Germany

(Army Occupation)

One Year

Germany

(Police Occupation)

Two Years

Austria 1947

Japan 1945

Bosnia

IFOR 1995

Bosnia

SFOR 1996

Kosovo 1999

More Troops Fewer Troops

Zero represents the 

mean of 10.76 soldiers 

per 1000 population

(One soldier to 113.44 

residents)

Below mean–

less troop density

Above mean–

greater troop density

9.24 represents

1:50/20:1000/1:50

“standard”

-0.96

1.74

4.94

-4.56

10.34

-5.86

4.24

-4.58

-2.06

-3.26

Northern

Luzon

1899-1901

Malaya 1948-54
97

Area

As illustrated in figure 23, the size of the area into which the troops 

deploy seemingly has no actual impact on troop density. That planners 

based troop deployments in contingency operations primarily on population density rather than patrol area is a point this work has discussed 

previously, particularly relating to the Germany case study. In addition, 

as discussed here, the size, organization, and structure of police forces are 

based primarily on population rather than area. 

A key issue to consider when planning for troop density is the density 

of the local population in relation to the geographic area. In such instances, 

where the geographic area is small, the soldier to area ratio and soldier to 

population ratio will be disproportionally high, even if a small force is 

employed. Kosovo and Bosnia are good examples of this. In such areas, 

fewer forces provided high troop densities. In this respect, the relatively 

small size of the operational area clearly affects the troop density. 

This factor should also be called the “sense of proportion” factor. In 

a smaller contingency operation, deploying a higher proportion of troops 

can still yield a relatively small total force package. The extra number 

of troops remains minimal enough not to have a major effect on national 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Area in Thousands of Square Miles

Baghdad

Kosovo

Austria

Bosnia 

Northern Luzon 

Germany (US Sector) 

Malaya 

Philippines

Japan 

0.3

4.2

6.2

19.7

30.0

45.6

50.9

115.0 

142.9

Troops per Square Mile

Philippines

1899-1901

Northern Luzon

1899-1901

Germany

(Army Occupation)

One Year

Germany

(Police Occupation)

Two Years

Austria

1947

Japan 1945

Malaya 1948-54

Bosnia IFOR 1995

Bosnia SFOR 1996

Kosovo 1999

197.6

More Troops Fewer Troops

Figure 23. Area density of selective troop deployments.
98

security elsewhere. Accordingly, the cautious use of more troops than 

necessary would have a minimal effect on national priorities or missions 

elsewhere. This provides smaller deployments with a margin for error 

in terms of appropriate troop density unavailable in larger deployments. 

Therefore, density figures from small deployments should be taken with a 

grain of salt, particularly if their sums are disproportionately higher than 

average densities of larger historical deployments.

Population Density

Figure 24 shows comparative figures relating population density to 

troop density. This work has already established that troop densities are 

based on population. However, there appears to be no readily discernible 

correlation between population density and troop density. Contingency 

operations with similar population densities, for example Austria in 1947 

and Kosovo in 1999, do not have the same troop density. While Japan 

had the second highest population density in this study, its troop density 

was proportionally the lowest. While population density is a key factor in 

determining the number of troops used in a contingency operation, there 

must be other mitigating factors affecting the actual density of the troops 

in proportion to the population. 

Troops Available

The overall availability of troops is a factor in determining troop density. Following the defeat of a conventional force, it is likely there would 

Figure 24. Population density and troop density of selective troop deployments.

30

130

230

330

430

Population Density

Troop Density

Philippines

1899-1901

Northern

Luzon

1899-1901

Germany

One Year

Austria

Malaya

Japan

Bosnia

IFOR 1995

Kosovo

505.01

Fewer Troops More Troops 

More Population Less Population

Population Density per Square Mile

One Soldier per X Population
99

be a large number of troops available for occupation duty. Conversely, 

successful campaigns conducted as economy of force operations may result in a shortage of troops for follow-on contingency missions. Operations 

where there were a large number of available troops at the start include the 

occupations of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II, Malaya, and 

the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. In Malaya, 

the British had recently shifted a number of Gurkha units formerly stationed 

in India to Malaya. The Malayan example is a special case because the British command required even more forces as the operation continued. Otherwise, in most such cases, troop density is greatest early in the operation. The 

operations in the Balkans clearly show the relationship of a dense area to the 

troops available. For example, in Kosovo, the US Army was able to deploy 

the equivalent of a brigade-size force and still obtain the very high troop 

density level of 21.1 troops per 1000 of population while actually utilizing 

a relatively small force.

Inversely, there have been operations, such as those in the Philippines 

in 1899, where there was an initial shortage of troops because the preceding campaign required fewer troops than the subsequent contingency operation.13 In such operations, additional troops not involved in the original 

operation were deployed to provide a larger force. In the case of the Philippine Insurrection, the troops used initially had been raised to fight in the War 

with Spain, but fought Filipino insurgents instead. When the term of service 

of the war volunteers expired, national volunteer troops recruited specifically for use in the Insurrection replaced them. When the term of service of 

the national volunteers expired, regular troops, in turn, replaced them. 

The regular troop allotment had been increased specifically to meet the 

requirements in the Philippines. Even in campaigns with an initial dearth 

of troops, certain areas may have more troops available than other areas because of the way the campaign ended and where the troops were 

when it ended. For example, in the Philippines, the initial deployment 

of troops centered on Manila and central Luzon because the force was 

deployed to secure Manila. 

Troop Rotation 

A factor closely related to available troops is troop rotation. If the 

expected duration of the operation is long, units and individuals may 

rotate through the mission. The effect of an individual rotation plan on 

an army which rotates its soldiers as individuals has little affect on troop 

density. For example, the US Army troops rotations in Germany, Austria, and Japan provide a good example of this. However, for a force 

conducting a contingency operation with rotating units, the total number 
100

of available units across the total force could affect the number of units 

actually deployed at one time (i.e. an equal force would have to be available 

to replace the deployed troops). Additionally, the lack of continuity inherent 

in unit rotations could affect the success of the operation. Sometimes unit 

rotations can be unplanned, as with the US forces in the Philippines where 

personnel turned over twice during the Insurrection, and where the final replacements were long-serving regular troops whose numbers were increased 

just for their role in the Philippines. In Malaya the British employed a combination of unit rotation and long-serving troops. While British battalions 

and those from most other Commonwealth nations rotated on average every 

one to three years using soldiers on short enlistments or draftees, Gurkha 

and Malay battalions were basically in-country for the duration of the conflict, simultaneously providing the British forces with a combination of fresh 

troops and experienced troops.14

Troops Recruited 

Another factor related to troop availability and rotation is troop recruitment. While most contingency operations use troops already available, in 

some cases, forces were recruited specifically for the contingency mission. 

As previously stated, the best example of this is the Philippines Insurrection 

where 24 regiments of national volunteer troops were raised specifically for 

duty in the islands. Additionally, the Regular Army was expanded several 

times during the period, the last time to replace the departing volunteers 

upon the expiration of their terms of service. 

Similarly, during the Malayan Emergency, the British government enacted a conscription system called National Service to provide adequate personnel to meet the military needs of the postwar era. While this draft was 

not adopted specifically for service in Malaya, the forces in Malaya were 

ultimately composed of a large number of National Servicemen. 

Troops recruited specifically for an operation may not provide operational continuity, adversely affecting the outcome of the contingency operation. In the operations studied in this work, a combination of troop rotation 

overlaps, recruitment of veteran troops, and a combination of rotating new 

troops and retaining longer serving veteran troops minimized the affect of a 

lack of continuity.

Duration/Intensity

Apart from personnel, demographic, and geographic factors, the nature 

of the operation itself is an important consideration. While every contingency operation studied in this work lasted at least several years, only certain operations retained a high level of intensity for most of the duration. 
101

For example, both the Philippines Insurrection and the Malayan Emergency 

were counterinsurgency operations rather than peacekeeping or occupation 

missions. Troop density in such intense operations often is at its maximum 

not at the start of the operation, but at some point in the middle, often about 

the time the tide turns against the insurgents.

Substitute Forces 

In most cases, military forces, including support troops, are composed 

of regular serving troops. However, there is precedent for the use of substitute forces such as Gurkha troops in Malaya. At any given time, the British 

forces included up to eight battalions of Gurkha personnel recruited from 

Nepal to fight for the British crown. These forces deployed in conventionally organized military units and served under the British command. Gurkha 

troop numbers are included in British and Commonwealth strength figures 

for the Malaya campaign. Apart from the Gurkhas, the most common use of 

substitute forces is the employment of civilian contractors. While the use of 

such contractors was not significant in the case studies analyzed here, they 

will be discussed later in this work in relation to the operation in Iraq. 

Indigenous Forces

In addition to contractors, the availability of any operational indigenous 

forces (army or police) would naturally affect the number and density of 

troops employed for a contingency operation.15 (See figure 25 for numbers 

of indigenous forces deployed in the selected case studies.) While local 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Indigenous Forces

Nonoperational

Indigenous Forces

Thousands

Philippines

1899-1901

Germany

Japan

Malaya

Bosnia

IFOR 1995

Bosnia

Kosovo

SFOR 1996

Austria

Figure 25. Available indigenous forces in selective troop deployments.
102

forces were present in almost every operation studied in this work, many 

of these forces were not yet capable of taking over responsibilities from the 

deployed forces (Philippines and Germany,) or were unemployable because 

they were hostile threats either to the occupiers or to rival forces (Bosnia and 

Kosovo). In three cases (Austria, Japan, and Malaya), there was a sizeable 

indigenous police force in place at the height of troop deployment.16.

Review of Factors 

Table 9 lists the factors affecting troop density by each case study.17 The 

last row of the table compares the table with the values expressed in figure 

22, i.e. whether the particular operation was above (less troop density) or 

below (higher troop density) the mean troop density values of all the studied 

operations.

As the information in the table demonstrates, the one common factor in 

all the less dense (above the mean) troop deployments was the presence of 

operational substitute or indigenous forces. This would seem to indicate that 

Table 9. Comparison of Factors Affecting Troop Density in Selective Troop 

Deployments

PhilippinesNorthern LuzonGermany 1 yearGermany 2 yearJapanAustriaMalayaBosnia IFORBosnia SFORKosovo

Dense geographic 

area/pop density ● ● ●

Troops available/

initially on hand ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Troop rotation ● ● ● ● ●

Troops recruited ● ● ●

Intensity/duration ● ● ●

Substitute forces ●

Indigenous forces ● ● ● ● ●

Troop density 

(+/- mean)

+ = more troops 

— = less troops 

— + + — — — — + — +
103

planners and commanders of the deployed force included the availability 

of such forces when determining the number of troops required. Figure 26 

is a revised version of figure 22. The adjusted number of troops deployed 

derives from the inclusion of the number of operational indigenous or substitute forces (including police) into the total number of troops counted at 

the time of maximum deployment. 18 The inclusion of available operational 

substitute and indigenous forces adjusts the mean troop density from the selected case studies in this work adjusts to a figure of 13.26 soldiers per 1000 

inhabitants or 91.82 inhabitants per soldier.

The data displayed in figure 26 shows that when the adjusted figures are 

considered, the least dense contingency operations are Japan and Germany 

during the Constabulary era, and the densest operation is the Malayan Emergency. Using personnel numbers as a baseline for troop density, the mean 

figure of 13.26 soldiers per 1000 of population (or 1 soldier per 91.82 inhabitants) provides a good raw planning factor. All of the adjusted densities 

fall within a range of plus or minus 18.60 soldiers per 1000 of population, 

as depicted by the darker bars in figure 26. As it relates to the factors previously discussed, this variation, equal to a range of between 7 and 25 soldiers 

per 1000 of population (or 41 and 161 residents per 1 soldier), is illustrated 

in table 10. 

An analysis of the factors in relation to the relative troop density of 

specific operations depicts no glaring patterns to account for the disparity of 

troop density levels. With the exception of Malaya, high intensity operations 

over extended periods of time tend to be grouped around the mean value, 

while operations where more troops were available tend to also employ proportionally more troops. Such variations likely reflect a combination of the 

unique qualities of each operation and the “fog of war,” i.e. deployment 

sizes based on an unknown situation. This variance can also be seen in the 

planning for these operations. 

Gulf Between Planning and Execution

Figure 19 represented the difference between planning estimates and the 

number of troops actually deployed in support of a specific operation. Table 

11 illustrates the difference between the planning estimates and actual troop 

deployments in the operations for which planning figures are available. 

Again, the numbers show no discernible pattern. In three of the four cases, 

troop numbers were overestimated. Two factors account for the differences 

between planning estimates and the actual number deployed in both Austria 

and Japan. First planners feared significant resistance that never materialized, and second a sizeable force was available to execute the operations.
104

Figure 26. Adjusted troop density variations of selective troop deployments. 

-10

-5

50

1510

ation from the Mean i Dev

Philippines

1899-1901

Northern

Luzon

1899-1901

y rman e G

upation c Oc rmy A

One Year

y rman e G

n patio lice Occu Po

o Years Tw

Austria

1947

Japan

1945

a Malay

1948-54

Bosnia

IFOR

1995

Bosnia

OR SF

1996

Kosovo

1999

More Troops Fewer Troops -0.96 1.74 4.94 -2.06 4.24 10.34 -5.86 -4.58 Adjusted -4.56 Adjusted -2.86 Below mean– less troo

p density

Above mean–

greater troop densit

y

9.24 represents

1:50/20:1000/1:50

“standard”

-4.56

Adjusted

-4.38

-3.26

Adjusted 2.61

Zero represents

the mean of 10.76 

soldiers per 1000

population

(one s

oldier t

o

113.44 residents)

Adjusted mean (2.50)

=13.26 soldiers per 1000 

population (91.82

residents per one soldier)

Adjusted

13.94
105

Table 11. Planning Versus Execution

Operation

Planned Size

(troops per 

1000 pop)

Actual Size

(troops per 

1000 pop)

Difference (planned 

vs. actual)

(troops per 1000 pop)

Germany 

1 year 15 16 +1.0

Germany 

2 years 11 6.2 -4.8

Austria 56.3 11 -45.3

Japan 8.3 4.9 -3.4

Table 10. Troop Density Variation in Terms of Key Factors Troop Density (+/- adjusted mean of 13.26 soldiers per 1000 population) Dense Area Troops Available Troop Rotation Troops Recruited Intensity/ Duration

Substitute Forces

Indigenous forces

Malaya

Fewer Troops More 

11.44 ● ● ● ● ● ●

Kosovo 7.84 ● ●

Germany 

1 year 2.44 ●

Bosnia IFOR 1.74 ● ● ●

Austria 0.11 ● ●

Northern 

Luzon -0.76 ● ● ●

Philippines -3.46 ● ● ●

Bosnia SFOR -5.36 ● ● ● ●

Germany 

2 years -6.88 ●

Japan -7.06 ● ●
106

Raw Troop Density Size Conclusions

Based on the above analysis, this work proposes the figure of 13.26 

soldiers per 1000 inhabitants or 91.82 residents per soldier as a basic planning factor for determining troop density in contingency operations. This 

recommendation comes with the caveat that any variations in troop density 

are because of specific issues arising from each situation. This planning estimate includes numbers of all available operational indigenous and substitute 

(contractor/mercenary) forces, as well as deployed soldiers.

Organization and Troop Density in Contingency Operations

The previous discussion concerns basic numbers of troops. However, 

types of forces to be deployed are key to any analysis of troop density. Planners do not plan using just numbers of soldiers but also the need for specific 

types of military units. The major two categories considered are police-style 

forces and operational forces. 

Police Forces 

This work contains a detailed discussion of police density in various 

cities. From this analysis, clearly even the police density of a city like 

New York, with its ratio of 204.8 residents per police officer (4.9 officers per 1000 of population), is considerably smaller than the proportion 

deployed in most contingency operations. However, the average police 

density of 248.12 residents per police officer (4.1 officers per 1000 of 

population) employed by the most successful major municipal police 

departments in the United States for daily operations leads to the conclusion that forces executing a contingency operation need to dedicate a 

proportion of their force equal to the above ratios specifically to police 

duties. Therefore, of the recommended planning figure of 13.26 soldiers 

per 1000 of population planning figure, at least 4.1 (30 percent or almost 

one-third of the force) should be devoted specifically to police duties. 

Operational Forces

Pundits and other observers often ignore the fact that military forces 

do not determine their troop densities based on numbers of individual 

troops, but rather on the number of operational units needed to accomplish the mission. (Table 12 details operational forces deployed in contingency operations.) Based on the scope of the contingency operation 

and the army’s organization, divisions were used in Germany, Japan, 

and Austria as the operational unit, brigades and regiments in Kosovo, 

Bosnia, and the Philippines, and battalions in Malaya. The number of 

headquarters and support troops would then be devised based on how 
107

Table 12. Operational Forces in Contingency Operations

(a)

BrigadeEquivalent Size

(b)

Maximum No. of Brigade Equivalents(actual brigades deployed)

(c)

Maximum No. of Bde Equivalent Total Force(actual brigades plus other operational forces)

(d)

Population Density/Bde(pop/b)

(e)

Population Density/ Bde/ Total Force(pop/c)

(f)

Area Density/Bde (square mile)(actual brigades deployed)(area/b)

(g)

Area Density/Bde (square mile)(total force deployed)(area/c)

Philippines 3583 19.20 19.20 368,421 368,421 5990 5990Germany 1 year 11,971 25.00 25.00 760,000 760,000 1824 1824Austria 5673 2.00 3.00 648,850 432,567 3100 2066Japan 7389 48.00 60.72 1,503,063 1,188,192 2977 2353Malaya 3000 10.00 40.00 485,600 121,400 5085 1271Bosnia IFOR 6000 10.00 10.00 400,000 400,000 1974 1974Kosovo 8324 5.00 5.00 394,000 394,000 841 841Police Forces 1333 200,550 200,550Average 5909 595,061 483,141 3113 2706
108

many operational units they would be expected to command or support. 

The US Army’s reorganization into the modular Army structure in the 

early 21st century is, in fact, an attempt to create more operational units 

(brigades). Civil municipal police forces, also organized by operational 

units, deploy based on the area and the population they support. 

Using the operations studied in this work, deployed operational forces have been divided into brigade equivalents; their individual 

force numbers and proportions are determined based on population and 

area. Including police department organization, the average size of the 

brigade-equivalent element in organizations for the operations featured 

in this work is 5909 (column a, table 12). This sum includes support 

troops, headquarters troops and an equal slice of all separate elements 

not assigned to any brigade. The average population density per brigade 

is one brigade for every 595,061 inhabitants (column d). These figures do 

not include any indigenous or substitute forces operationally deployed. 

If substitute and indigenous forces are included, the average population 

density per brigade equivalent is 483,141 (column e). 

Operationally, deployed forces typically set up a number of bases. The 

troop density of bases could also be a key factor in overall troop density. 

However, further research on base distribution will be required to determine 

planning estimates for this dimension of troop density. The only available 

figures are those from the Bosnia operation, in which there were 536.34 soldiers per base camp. Given the brigade-equivalent size of 6000 for Bosnia, 

this equates to a rough estimate of 12 base camps per brigade equivalent, but 

this figure cannot be extrapolated across all operations because it is based 

solely on the experience in Bosnia. 

Summary

The general planning figures for troop density as determined in this work 

are in table 13. These are general guidelines based on the mean from past 

military operations. Each operation will have its own unique circumstances 

and situational factors requiring adjustments to the planning figures. Nevertheless, as recommended here, these historically based guidelines will be 

useful as planning factors for future operations.

These planning figures do not include the ongoing operation in Iraq. In 

the next chapter, the Iraq operation will be analyzed using the same criteria 

as the previous case studies and then will be compared to the above planning factors to determine how it relates to those factors. 
109

Table 13. Troop Density Planning Factors

Troop Density:

(including indigenous forces 

and substitute forces)

13.26 soldiers per 1000

91.82 inhabitants per soldier

Proportion of Troop Density 

Devoted to Police Operations

4.1 per thousand/

30 percent of force size

Brigade-equivalent Size 

(including support slice): 5909

Brigade Equivalent to 

Population Ratio One brigade per 483,141 inhabitants
110

Notes

1. Stephen Budiansky, “Formula for How Many Troops We Need,” Washington Post, 9 May 2004, p. B04 [article on-line] available at http://www.spokes

manreview.com/breaking-news-story.asp?submitdate=2004510151143; Internet; 

accessed 13 January 2005; Daniel Smith, “Iraq: Descending into the Quagmire,” 

Foreign Policy In Focus Policy Report, June 2003 [document on-line] available 

at http://www.fpif.org/papers/quagmire2003.html; Internet; accessed 9 November 

2005; Kevin Drum, “Political Animal: Not Enough Troops in Iraq?” Washington Monthly, 9 January 2005 [article on-line] available at http://www.washing

tonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2005_01/005422.php; Internet; accessed 14 

January 2005; James Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of 

Stability Operations,” Rand Review, 27 no. 3 (Summer 2003) 18 August 2005 

[article on-line] available at http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/

summer2003/burden.html; Internet; accessed 14 September 2005; James Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, 23 (Winter 1995) 

: 59-69.

2. FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Organizations, Technical, 

and Logistical Data Planning Factors vol. 2, change 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 17 July 1990), p. 6-0.

3. Ibid.

4. FM 101-10-1/2 was formally rescinded by the October 1997 edition of 

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 25-30, Consolidated Index of Army 

Publications and Blank Forms.

5. Army publications relating to contingency operations, including Interim FM 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations issued in 2004, and FM 100-23, 

Peace Operations, published in 1994, only address troop density in very general 

terms. 

6. Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory”; Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations.” See note 1 for references to sources which use the 20:1000 as 

the standard level for troop density. In “Burden for Victory,” Quinlivan seemingly 

contradicts both his previous writings and his own comments earlier in the same 

article when he codifies the 20:1000 ratio as only including “foreign troops” when 

discussing the Iraqi operation and in a figure accompanying the article, which applies the same standard to various other recent operations as well as Iraq.

7. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations”; Jackson, 18-9; 

Coates, 168. Quinlivan’s population estimate for Malaya is about 700,000 higher 

than the figure used in this work, probably due to a 1948 figure used here [this 

work uses population estimates from the beginning of operations] and a 1952 

figure used by Quinlivan.

8. Scurr, 6; Jackson, 17-8; Coates, 92, 123, 165.

9. See note 6 for further discussion of this point.

10. Using Quinlivan’s Malay methodology and adding the 124,000 members 

of the Iraqi security forces to the 184,500 deployed Coalition troops in January 

2005 yields a ratio of 12:1000, still far below the 20:2000 level, while, however, 
111

just surpassing Quinlivan’s threshold of 10:2000 separating his mid- from highintensity troop density requirement categories. 

11. Dobbins et al., 150-1.

12. Ibid., 153.

13. The 2003 Baghdad campaign is another example.

14. While Quinlivan considers six-month troop rotations to be ideal, there 

are very few such short rotations utilized in the case studies examined in this 

work. The Kosovo peacekeeping operation has been a six-month rotation and 

some nations used shorter rotations in Bosnia. But in Malaya, British forces deployed for two to three years, and US Army forces in Iraq have been on one year 

rotations, although US Marine forces and coalition troops have rotated in shorter 

intervals. In the case of the Marines, a seven-month rotation is used, but Marine 

troops are eligible for another tour after seven months out of Iraq, while Army 

policy is a minimum of one year between Iraqi rotations. 

15. Especially in counterinsurgency operations, local forces are of particular 

importance to successful operations. See John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with 

a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, revised edition 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xiv-xv.

16. In Kosovo during the SFOR deployment, a small international police 

force was organized.

17. Definitions of the categories used in the table can be found on page 111.

18. This chart is based on the raw data found in the table in appendix A, 

where it is listed as adjusted in the first column.

● Indicates factor was present in operation.

Dense Geographical Area/

Population Density

A compact geographical area with a high 

population density.

Troops Available/Initially On 

Hand

A large number of troops available at the 

start of the operation.

Troop Rotation Troops rotated through the operation as 

units.

Troops Recruited Troops were recruited specifically for 

participation in the operation.

Intensity/Duration

Throughout most of its duration the 

operation continued at a high operational 

intensity level.

Substitute Forces

Mercenary (i.e. Gurkha) or civilian 

contractor forces were employed as 

operational substitutes for regular forces.

Indigenous Forces Locally recruited forces or international 

police forces were operationally employed. 
112
113

Chapter 5

Iraq 2003-05

Situational Narrative

The contingency operation following the March-April 2003 Baghdad campaign continued through October 2005 while troop numbers remained at relatively the same level as at the start of the operation. However, there had been indications the first major operational downsizing 

would soon occur, as Iraqi forces replaced American and Coalition forces 

in certain areas and contexts.1 Since July 2003, the on-the-ground troop 

strength of Coalition forces in Iraq has remained at roughly 176,000, as 

US force numbers fluctuated between 108,000 and 160,000.2

Similar to the Philippine Insurrection and the Malayan Emergency, 

forces used in the contingency operation exceeded the numbers required 

for the preceding conventional operations. In the case of the Iraq operation, those forces originally earmarked for the conventional campaign 

that had not arrived in Iraq at the time of Baghdad campaign, served as 

occupation forces. 

Between April and July 2003, occupation forces were deployed as 

illustrated in figure 27. Originally, Marine forces, the entire 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized), and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 

patrolled the precincts of Baghdad. The 101st was soon shifted to northern Iraq to the vicinity of Mosul. The Marines took over a sector in 

south-central Iraq that included the cities of Najaf and Nasiriyah, while 

the 1st Armored Division deployed to the theater and assumed responsibility for the Baghdad area from the 3d Infantry Division. The 3d Infantry division then was shifted west to Anbar Province, an area originally 

allocated only a single brigade-size armored cavalry regiment. Anbar, 

while mostly uninhabited desert, contained the restive Sunni Arab cities 

of Ramadi and Fallujah, requiring a larger force than originally estimated. The British 1st Armoured Division was deployed in the south around 

the city of Basra.

The shape of a more permanent occupation force began to develop in 

July 2003 when multinational forces began deploying to Iraq to augment 

or replace American and British forces. The largest contingents were 

from Poland, the Ukraine, Spain, and Italy. The higher commands for 

the occupation evolved as well. In May civilian government functions 

had been delegated to a new agency, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA), under retired ambassador L. Paul Bremer. Bremer reported directly to the US Secretary of Defense. Militarily, the Baghdad campaign had 
114

been fought under the control of the Combined Forces Land Component 

Command (CFLCC). Under CFLCC were two major subordinate corpssize commands, V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). To 

manage the military aspects of the occupation, CFLCC was replaced by 

Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), a headquarters formed from the V 

Corps staff. I MEF redeployed out of Iraq in the fall of 2003. 

Four regionally-based division sectors were organized under CJTF7: two under American control, one in the north-central area and one in 

Baghdad, one under Polish command south of Baghdad, and one under 

British command in the extreme south. An additional US division-size 

force would subsequently be deployed to Anbar Province.3 Immediately 

following the fall of Baghdad, an American division operated in the northwestern region around the city of Mosul. The division was replaced by 

a brigade in 2004, and in 2005 a division-size force was returned to the 

northwestern sector. Each division or force was responsible for a distinct 

sector, although during the Shiite uprising in 2004, the boundaries would 

temporarily be redrawn to allow large number of US forces to be introduced into what had been the Polish sector in the cities of Karbala, Najaf, 

Figure 27. Troop dispositions in the initial occupation of Iraq, May-July 2003.
115

and Kut, for the duration of that operation.4 Otherwise, sectors were generally divided by Iraqi provinces. 

Within the first year of the occupation, all Coalition forces began 

troop rotations generally six months in duration for non-American forces and a year or slightly longer for US Army forces.5

 The first group of 

forces in Iraq were designated as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-I (OIF 

-I). The OIF-I forces rotated out of the theater in a staggered manner. 

The Marines and the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) that had done 

most of the fighting in the Baghdad campaign redeployed first in the 

fall of 2003. A majority of the remaining OIF-I forces redeployed in the 

early spring of 2004, although the Shiite uprising in Najaf in April 2004 

resulted in the 1st Armored Division remaining in the country several 

months beyond its original redeployment date. 

OIF-II began when the I MEF replaced the 82d Airborne Division as 

Multinational Forces-West (MNF-W) in March 2004 in Anbar Province. 

The last OIF-I unit, the 1st Armored Division, redeployed in July 2004 

ending OIF-I.6 In May 2004 as part of the OIF-II transition, the land 

component headquarters, CJTF-7, was replaced by two new commands, 

a theater command called Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and an 

operational command called Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). MNF-I 

was a composite command, designed to interface with the new Iraqi provisional government, which would assume governance responsibilities 

in Iraq from the CPA in July 2004. MNC-I was a placeholder command 

staffed by rotating US corps headquarters. The III Corps headquarters 

deployed from Fort Hood, Texas, to command MNC-I during OIF-II. 

During the OIF-II rotation, there was also a large-scale introduction 

of reserve component ground combat units into the occupation order 

of battle, as brigades from the Arkansas, Oregon, and North Carolina 

Army National Guard were deployed into Iraq and integrated into active Army divisions. While most elements were replaced by like-size 

units, in northwestern Iraq around the city of Mosul, a brigade equipped 

with the Stryker, the recently fielded, eight-wheeled, armored combat 

vehicle, replaced the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).7

The transfer of authority from OIF-I to OIF-II was originally intended to mark the first programmed reduction in the number of US 

troops from approximately 141,900 to about 100,000. In February 2004 

US troop numbers did slightly decrease to 108,000 because of troop 

deployments and redeployments in theater, however, this was only a 

temporary reduction. By April 2004 troop numbers increased to more 
116

Figure 28. Unit rotations in Iraq, 2003-2005.
117

than 140,000 in response to the increasing intensity of the insurgency.8

Additionally, the March 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain, and the 

election of a new government there resulted in the withdrawal of a brigade-size contingent of Spanish peacekeepers. This withdrawal, however, 

did not permanently affect the number of soldiers available because South 

Korea deployed a force equivalent to a large brigade to northeastern Iraq 

several months later.9 See figure 28 for occupation troop rotations in Iraq 

from July 2003 through January 2005.

Combat operations during the occupation were focused primarily on 

the Sunni-Arab insurgency near Baghdad and Fallujah and in the north 

near Mosul, and on the Shiite uprising led by Muqtada al-Sadr and his 

Mahdi Army militia in Baghdad and Najaf. Military forces were also responsible for securing the January 2005 general elections and the October 

2005 constitutional referendum. The intensity of combat, represented by 

US combat-related deaths, peaked during the periods of combat operations 

against major insurgent forces.10 See figure 29.

In April 2004 US forces faced the twin threat of Sunni resistance in 

the Anbar Province city of Fallujah, 50 miles west of Baghdad, and Shiite 

intransigence in the Sadr City section of Baghdad and in the Shiite holy 

city of Najaf. Actions against both groups ended without resolution. Marine forces ended their siege of Fallujah at the end of the month, and Sadr 

signed a truce agreement on 4 June. 

The truce was short-lived and in August 2004 forces from I MEF 

and the Iraqi security forces massed against Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia 

in Najaf. They quickly compressed Sadr’s forces into the precincts near 

the Shiite Imam Ali shrine. This resulted in a standoff that did not favor 

Sadr. After the intervention of other Shiite factions, Sadr again agreed to a 

cease-fire in Najaf and later in Sadr City, after which he agreed to participate in the January 2005 electoral process.

Fallujah, meanwhile, had become a bastion for the Sunni insurgent 

forces primarily led by the Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A combined 

Marine-Army force cordoned off Fallujah in November 2004 and systematically assaulted and cleared the city over the course of eight days. 

In addition to these major operations, the insurgents, using terror tactics almost on a daily basis, opposed the occupation and the development 

of new Iraqi civil and military structures. These terror tactics consisted 

of the employment of scores of fanatical suicide bombers, convoy ambushes, snipers equipped with light rocket propelled grenade launchers 

(RPG), and a variety of improvised explosive devices (IED) placed along 
118

0

80604020

140120100

First Battle 

of Fallujah

US Troops Killed In Action

2003 2004 2005

Capture of 

Baghdad

Second Battle 

of Fallujah

Second Battle

of Najaf

Third Battle 

of Najaf

Mosul Shootout 

Kills

Uday and Qusay

OIF-III

Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Jan Feb Mar

OIF-I OIF-II

Battle of 

Qaim

Capture of 

Saddam

Battle of 

Tal Afar

Pre-election 

Terror Surge

Figure 29. Intensity of operations in Iraq in terms of US soldiers killed in action. 
119

roads or in vehicles and remote detonated. The homicidal suicide bombers 

consisted primarily of non-Iraqi, Islamic fanatics, serving loosely under the 

banner of Zarqawi, the operative who had also masterminded the resistance 

in Fallujah.11

In late June 2004, the new Iraqi provisional government led by interim 

Prime Minister Iyad Allawi assumed sovereignty for Iraq from the CPA. Allawi was a prominent Shiite who had lived in exile in Britain and had been a 

member of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Bremer had established the 

IGC in July 2003 initially to draft a new Iraqi constitution. Failing at this, 

the IGC, in coordination with the American authorities, prepared a plan to 

transition Iraq to a new sovereign, civilian government. Initially, the new 

scheme called for the establishment of an interim government in June 2004 

to govern Iraq until the national elections on 31 January 2005 would elect 

a transitional government to draft a national constitution. After these elections, a national referendum to approve the proposed constitution would be 

held in October 2005. If voters approved the constitution, which they did by 

a narrow margin, provisions of the new constitution would be implemented 

to establish a permanent government. 

Allawi led the interim government from June 2004 to January 2005. 

After the January 2005 elections, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, another 

former Shiite exile, and President Jalal Talabani, the most prominent Kurdish politician, led the new Iraqi transitional government.

As the end of OIF-II approached in early 2005, so too did the first Iraqi 

general elections. Because of the added security concerns and the increased 

intensity of insurgent attacks in the weeks and months leading up to the elections, troop density did not drop drastically during the transition from OIF-II 

to OIF-III as it had between OIF-I and OIF-II. In fact, US force strength increased before the elections, reaching about 160,000 in January 2005.12 This 

represented an augmentation of about 20,000 from the 2004 average numbers and occurred due to a combination of the early arrival of several OIF-III 

brigades and the temporary deployment of troops from the 2d Brigade, 82d 

Airborne Division, to augment forces in Baghdad. The overlapping of OIFII and OIF-III forces not only allowed the rotation to be staggered, but also 

temporarily increased the number of forces available during the elections.13

This was only transitory. After the handoff to the OIF-III rotation, completed by May 2005, troop force levels fell back to 140,000. During OIF-III 

the XVIII Airborne Corps replaced the III Corps as the MNC-I. OIF-III also 

included the first use of a reserve component, division headquarters, the 

42d Infantry Division (Mechanized), New York Army National Guard, as 

the MND-NC. In addition to the 42d, during OIF-III, five Army National 
120

Guard brigades were deployed throughout the occupation force. OIF-III was 

also the first time units organized under the Army’s new modularity concept 

deployed. The 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) returned to Baghdad configured under the new structure. OIF-III also marked the return of a larger 

force to the Mosul area, as an armored cavalry regiment headquarters, an 

armored cavalry regiment, and a Stryker brigade replaced the brigade-size 

Task Force Olympia.

Due to growing security concerns as the October 2005 Iraqi constitutional referendum vote approached, US forces were increased by about 

12,000 troops. This plus up was completed by overlapping OIF-III and early 

OIF-IV unit deployments and through the dispatch of several smaller units 

to reinforce the theater forces.14

As early as December 2004, the US Department of Defense had begun 

programming for the 2005-06 OIF-IV rotation. To accommodate the projected December 2005 Iraqi general elections, redeployment dates for about 

10,000 troops were extended into 2006.15 Even before the October 2005 

referendum, however, there were clear indications the year 2006 could mark 

a reduction in US troops as trained Iraqi security forces assumed security 

responsibilities.16

Geographical Area, Terrain, and Population Density

The area of Iraq is 167,617 square miles. In 2003 US Army planners 

estimated the population at 25.5 million. Nationwide, Iraq has a population 

density of 152.13 people per square mile. However, this figure is deceptive 

as whole tracts of Iraq are uninhabited desert, while other areas, primarily in 

the fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, are much more densely 

settled. Up to 68 percent of the population lives in urban areas. The population of the Baghdad metropolitan area is 6.2 million people packed into 283 

square miles, giving Baghdad a population density of 21,908.1 people per 

square mile, comparable to New York City’s population density of 25,025 

people per square mile.17

The population of Iraq is not homogeneous, but consists primarily of 

two distinct ethnic groups, Arabs and Kurds. The Kurds, about 18 percent 

of the population or 4 million strong, speak an Iranian language related 

distantly to Persian and live primarily in the north and northeast areas of 

Iraq. Kurds also live in neighboring parts of Iran and Turkey. In the 1990s, 

the Iraqi Kurds had maintained an autonomous status in Iraq after many 

conflicts with the central government in Baghdad. The Kurds are Islamic, 

primarily of the Sunni sect. In addition to the Kurds, small numbers of Turkmen (speaking a language related to Turkish) live in northern Iraq.18
121

Arabs are the other major ethnic group in Iraq. While all Arabs speak 

the Iraqi dialect of Arabic, religion divides the Arabs into two subgroups: 

the majority Shiites (60 percent) and the minority Sunnis (35 percent), and 

a small group of Christians (5 percent) who are somewhat anachronistically 

referred to as Assyrians or Chaldeans. Some or all of the Christian groups, 

while all speak Arabic, also speak another Semitic language called Aramaic 

or Syriac. The Shiites live primarily in Baghdad and in the southern portion of the country near the two main shrines of the Shiite sect at Najaf 

and Karbala. The Sunni Arabs are concentrated in the central portion of 

the country around Baghdad and along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to 

the north and east. There had also been deliberate Sunni settlement in the 

southern portions of the Kurdish area under the Baathist regime, particularly 

around the city of Mosul. Figure 30 depicts population density and ethnic 

group dispersion in Iraq.

Figure 30. Population density, Iraq 2003.
122

Iraq is divided into 18 provinces sometimes referred to as governorates. Table 14 lists the provinces, provincial capitals, and demographics 

for each of the provinces. In 2003 nine provinces had a majority Shiite 

population, two a Sunni majority, two a Kurd majority and two had a 

Table 14. Demographics in Iraq Provinces, 200319

Province Population

Area 

(square 

miles)

Capital Pop Density

Main Ethnic 

Group

Baghdad 6,200,000 283 Baghdad 21,908.1 Sunni & Shiite Arab

Basrah

2,400,000

7363 Basra

325.9

Shiite Arab

Maysan 6205 Amarah Shiite Arab

Arbil

2,100,000

5587 Arbil

375.9 Kurd/ Sunni 

Arab/Turkmen Ta’mim 3970 Kirkuk

Salah ad-Din 

(Saladin) 1,100,000 9556 Samarra 115.1 Sunni Arab

Nineva 2,400,000 14,410 Mosul 166.5 Sunni Arab/ 

Kurd

Sulaymaniyah 1,400,000 6573 Sulaymaniyah 213.0 Kurd

Anbar 1,200,000 53,476 Ramadi 224.4 Sunni Arab

Babil (Babylonia) 1,700,000 2497 Hillah 680.8 Shiite Arab

Najaf 900,000 11,129 Najaf 80.9 Shiite Arab

Karbala 700,000 1944 Karbala 360.1 Shiite Arab

Dhi Qar 1,400,000 4981 Nasiriyah 281.1 Shiite Arab

Wasit 860,000 6623 Kut 129.9 Shiite Arab

Diyala 961,073 7365 Ba’quba 190.1 Sunni & Shiite Arab

Dahuk 450,000 2530 Dahuk 177.9 Kurd

Qadisiyah 850,000 3148 Diwaniyah 270.0 Shiite Arab

Muthanna 480,000 19,977 Samawah 24.0 Shiite Arab

18 provinces 25,500,000 167,617
123

mixed Sunni-Shiite population, while the remaining three had a mixed 

Sunni-Kurd population.20

An analysis of the 2003 population densities of the 18 provinces (with 

several grouped together as American planners did prior to the start of US 

operations there) shows two provinces (Baghdad, Babil) had a population density more than three times the national average, while three others were more than double the national average (Basrah-Maysan, ArbilTa’mim, and Karbala). At the other extreme, the provinces of Muthanna, 

consisting mostly of desert bordering on Saudi Arabia, and Najaf, which, 

except for the city of Najaf, is empty desert, were two times less dense 

than the national average.

Troop Deployment and Organization

Planning for the occupation of Iraq was concurrent with the planning 

for the Baghdad campaign. The chief of the CFLCC C5 (Plans) section, 

Colonel Kevin Benson, has outlined how his staff section estimated the 

minimum projected force density needed for the occupation phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.21 Initially, the planners looked at the area and 

population of Iraq, emphasizing demographic factors, but ensuring force 

coverage for the whole country. Then Benson’s team determined the number of combat troops needed to perform occupation activities. Planners 

used a brigade of four battalions as the basic building block, and the Iraqi 

province as the basic deployment area, emphasizing coverage in all of the 

major cities. Planners prioritized the cities and provinces beginning with 

Baghdad. For a rough estimate of the number of brigades needed, Benson 

looked at the example of local police forces in the state of California as a 

guideline.22

Benson’s planning presumed an unknown level of indigenous support 

from the former Iraqi police and military forces.23 The projected minimum 

force levels included all Coalition land forces, Marines, and multinational 

elements. Table 15 and figure 31 illustrate the results of the CFLCC C5 

planning.

This planning estimate resulted in a minimum force of 20 brigade 

equivalents, interpolated as a force of 125,000 combat troops and 175,000 

non-combat support and command and control troops for a total force of 

300,000.24 The C5 estimate would soon prove to be too optimistic, both 

in number of brigades and in the placement of forces. While the estimate 

provided for a force of 20 brigades for the whole Coalition, throughout the 

occupation, American forces alone averaged between 17 and 20 brigade 

equivalents, the multinational forces supplied an additional 5.25 brigades, 
124

equating to a peak total force of 25.25 brigade equivalents in January 

2005.25 At this time, there were 184,500 troops in Iraq, 160,000 of which 

were American.26 Overall, each brigade equivalent and support slice averaged 7306.93 troops, 8000 per American brigade and 4666.66 per Coalition brigade. In January 2005 at the peak of US force size there were five 

more brigades deployed than the planners had estimated. However, the 

actual size of the brigade equivalents and related support slice was roughly 

half of what they had projected, 7306.93 versus 15,000 personnel per brigade and the total force strength was just over half the number of troops 

planners estimated would be needed, 184,500 versus 300,000. See figure 

32 for a graph of US force strength in Iraq from 2003-05.

Apart from force size, brigade areas of responsibility were, for the 

most part, consistent with projections. The one anomaly was Anbar Province. Although mostly uninhabited desert, two key Sunni cities were located in eastern Anbar Province, Ramadi and Fallujah, and in northern 

Anbar, several large Sunni settlements existed along the Euphrates River 

Table 15. Planning Factors for Iraq Occupation Force

Priority Planned 

No of 

Bdes

Province Population Area 

(square 

mile)

Pop Density

1 6 Baghdad 6,200,000 283 21,908.1

2 2

Basrah 2,400,000 7363 325.9

Maysan 6205

3 3

Arbil 2,100,000 5587 375.9

Ta’mim 3970

4 2 Salah ad-Din 1,100,000 9556 115.1

5 1 Nineva 2,400,000 14,410 166.5

6 1 Sulaymaniyah 1,400,000 6573 213.0

7 1 Anbar 1,200,000 53,476 224.4

8 0.5 Babil 1,700,000 2497 680.8

9 0.75 Najaf 900,000 11,129 80.9

10 0.5 Karbala 700,000 1944 360.1

11 1 Dhi Qar 1,400,000 4981 281.1

12 0.5 Wasit 860,000 6623 129.9

13 0.25 Diyala 961,073 7365 190.1

14 0.25 Dahuk 450,000 2530 177.9

15 0.25 Qadisiyah 850,000 3148 270.0

16 0 Muthanna 480,000 19,977 24.0

Totals 20 18 provinces 25,500,000 167,617
125

extending from the Baghdad area to Syria. Benson’s planners believed 

one brigade could cover this area. In the early days of the occupation, 

the 3d ACR was the sole Coalition force for the province. However, it 

quickly became apparent the armored cavalry troopers would have to be 

augmented by the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), which was shifted 

from Baghdad to Anbar. From this point forward, an equivalent of four 

brigades would garrison Anbar. 

Troop organization has been discussed in the situational narrative. As 

in Bosnia and Kosovo, Coalition forces established placeholder multinational commands in Iraq, which remained in place while headquarters and 

units rotated in and out to assume their mission. In an unusual move, large 

artillery units from the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, and 

197th Field Artillery Brigade deployed, not as firing units, but as motorized patrol and security units. While the other nations in the Coalition 

created special units for the occupation, American forces were composed 

of preexisting units, although at the brigade and division level, units were 

Figure 31. Minimum planned Coalition occupation force.
126

80

200180160140120100

Thousands

2003 2004 2005

CJTF-7 

Operational

Constitutional 

Referendum

Capture of 

Baghdad

First Battle 

of Fallujah

Second Battle

of Najaf

Third Battle 

of Najaf Mosul

Shootout Kills 

Uday and Qusay

OIF-III

Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Jan Feb Mar

OIF-I OIF-II

First Iraq 

General 

Election

Spanish Troops 

Pull Out 

Abu Ghraib

Scandal

Iraq Regains 

Sovereignty

Battle of 

Qaim Capture of 

Saddam

Battle of 

Tal Afar

Pre-election 

Terror Surge

MNF-I and 

MNC-I

Operational Coalition

US Forces

Second Battle 

of Fallujah 

Deployment of 

Multinational Forces 

Figure 32. US troop strength in Iraq, 2003-2005.
127

often mixed and matched, with reserve component battalions and brigades 

attached to augment or replace organic active units. In early 2005 the first 

four-brigade modular division force, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), was dispatched to Baghdad. For the mission in Iraq, the division’s 

four brigades were separated. Two of the brigades were attached to the 42d 

Infantry Division and the remaining two served under the parent division, 

which was then augmented by a brigade from the 1st Armored Division 

and an Army National Guard brigade. See figure 33 for actual brigade 

deployment locations. 

The city of Baghdad is a good example of how the occupation/contingency operation was managed in terms of organization and troop density 

in an urban environment. For the 2003 Baghdad campaign and the contingency operation, operational planners divided Baghdad into 55 tactical 

zones or sectors, each numbered in order of relative importance. 

As in the rest of the country (where the province boundaries marked 

areas of responsibility), the zones in Baghdad delineated the areas of 

Figure 33. Actual brigade deployment for the occupation of Iraq.
128

responsibility for specific units. For example, during its brief time in 

Baghdad in April 2003, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was responsible for clearing the ten sectors of southwestern Baghdad, west of the 

Tigris River (sectors 3, 25-6, 39-44 and 47).27 See figure 34 for the sector 

organization of Baghdad. 

Indigenous Support 

Initially, the occupation force in Iraq, after concluding a victorious 

campaign against the Baathist regime, could not and did not count on any 

indigenous support. On 23 May 2003 Bremer issued CPA Order Number 2 

officially dissolving the Iraqi armed forces and associated security forces, 

which together had numbered about 400,000 prior to the Baghdad campaign. While these forces no longer existed as organized units after most 

had dissolved of their own accord rather than being destroyed in battle, 

Figure 34. Organization of Baghdad by sector.
129

there had been speculation some of the less politicized elements of the 

former Baathist regime’s armed forces could be used as a basis for a new 

Iraqi army.28

Under orders issued on 7 August 2003, Bremer created new Iraqi 

armed forces. The new forces were originally a complicated grouping of 

various defense agencies: a civil defense corps designed for local self-defense, an intervention force specially trained in urban counterinsurgency 

tactics, and various other small agencies, as well as a three-division, regular army designed to fight foreign threats. All of these forces eventually fell 

under the Ministry of Defense of the several transitory Iraqi governments. 

By far, the civil defense corps was the largest of these forces in terms of 

recruited personnel. In January 2004 this corps was given a more nationallevel mission and redesignated as the Iraqi National Guard. A year later, 

its forces were amalgamated into the army, as were various other small 

military forces such as the Iraqi Intervention Force. At the same time, the 

Iraqi Ministry of the Interior was fielding various police forces, including a general police force, the Iraqi Police Service, a mechanized reaction force (eventually the size of a division), a border patrol, and several 

smaller agencies. 29

The total size of the joint Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the 

Interior’s Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from October 2003 to October 2005 

is shown in figure 35. The Iraqis never suffered from a lack of volunteers 

for all their services, despite cyclic insurgent attacks directed at the ISF. 

After the January 2005 elections, even Sunni Arabs began volunteering 

for the forces in proportional numbers.30 However, the ISF suffered from 

a slow start in 2003-04 because of frequent changes in its force structure 

and mission, partially due to the fact three different governments ruled 

Iraq between late 2004 and early 2005, and partially due to a variety of 

other miscalculations. Therefore, it was not until mid-2004 when the ISF 

began training in significant numbers and receiving adequate equipment to 

participate effectively in combat operations.31

Actual, effective strength of the ISF often differed from the reported 

strength. For example, when the Iraqi government reviewed the police 

force numbers in detail in mid-2004, they found up to 100,000 of the officers reported proved to be unfit, nonexistent, or deserters. After such scrutiny, the police force size dropped by two-thirds in the last half of 2004, 

but this revised strength was a more accurate picture of the qualified police 

force.32

The long-term objective was for ISF elements to relieve Coalition 

troops from their occupation duties. However, when Coalition troop 
130

Figure 35. Iraqi security forces strength during US occupation, 2003-2005.

Thousands

0

50

200150100

2003 2004 2005

Oct 05

Constitutional 

Referendum

Oct Nov Dec Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Jan Feb Mar

Jan 05

First Iraq General 

Election 

Coalition Forces 

at Maximum 

Strength

Jan 05

National Guard 

Merged into Army

Pol ci e

National Guard

Army

Aug 2003

New Iraqi Armed 

Forces Established

C

vi il Defense

Corps

Nov 05

Iraqi Security 

Force Numbers 

Over 200,000

May 03

Iraqi Armed Forces 

Disbanded

Iraq Regains 

Sovereignty

Jul 04

Civil Defense Corps 

Redesignated as 

National Guard

Sep

Police Strength 

Declines due to 

Government 

Personnel Purges 

and Officer 

Desertions
131

deployments reached their zenith in January 2005, ISF had yet to take over 

any operational missions. It was not until late February when the first Iraqi 

army brigade assumed an area of operations in Baghdad from an American 

unit.33

Throughout 2005, Iraqi army units assumed an increasing number of 

roles and missions and took over more camps and forward operating bases 

from Coalition troops. The ISF took on a more sectarian appearance as, by 

mid-2005, three Kurds, three Shiite Arabs, three Sunni Arabs, and a Turkmen commanded the 10 Iraqi army divisions.34 See figure 36 for locations 

of active Iraqi Security Forces in June and September 2005. 

Although some questioned the overall readiness and capability of the 

Iraqi forces, they provided the bulk of the security for the October 2005 

referendum and were projected to do so for the December 2005 general 

elections. Iraq president Jalal Talabani expected the ISF to be able take 

over for 50,000 Coalition troops by the end of 2005, although the US 

Figure 36. Location of Iraqi army units, 2005.
132

OIF-IV troop rotation had already commenced in November 2005 without 

any reduction in troops.35

By all objective standards, however, the ISF had shown remarkable 

progress since July 2004 when it had no operational battalions at the national level. In the later part of 2005, the Iraqi army began expanding its 

own logistic support capabilities.36 By December 2005 projections were 

for an operational force at the national level of 106 battalions, organized 

into 35 brigades and 10 divisions, and an additional 10 specialized police 

battalions. By June 2006 the number of battalions was expected to increase to 114. In October 2005 ISF strength crossed the 200,000 threshold, 

with a projected strength of 230,000 by December 2005 and 270,000 by 

June 2006.37

Iraq Operation Analysis

The Force Size Debate 

The size of the force for the occupation of Iraq has been a hotly debated issue. One of the main focal points of this debate has been comments 

made by General Eric Shinseki, then Army Chief of Staff, while testifying 

to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2003. When asked, 

General Shinseki commented he felt the occupation would require several 

hundred thousand soldiers, an estimate interpreted in this work as 300,000. 

Shinseki had a background in the Balkan occupations as the commander 

of the SFOR in 1997 and 1998. Following that, he had been the Vice Chief 

of Staff, then Chief of Staff of the Army during the 1999 Kosovo crisis and 

subsequent deployment. 

Newspaper reports claimed at the time Pentagon officials disagreed 

with Shinseki’s proposed 300,000 total and believed the figure to be closer to 100,000. However, as discussed previously, Benson, as the chief 

Army planner for the occupation force, projected at a minimum a force 

of 125,000 combat troops alone. He also estimated an additional 125,000 

to 175,000 support troops, bringing the total force projection closer to 

Shinseki’s 300,000 total. As stated, the combat force actually deployed 

was larger than Benson’s estimate, but the tooth-to-tail ratio was a good 

bit smaller.38

The commanders in the field have never said there was a troop shortage in Iraq and believed when they requested an increase in forces, for example, during the Fallujah and Najaf crises in 2004, they were provided all 

the troops they asked for. General John Abizaid, the US Central Command 

(CENTCOM) commander, not only reiterated this, but also stated what 

he believed was needed in Iraq was a greater role for Iraqi security forces 
133

and Coalition troops from Islamic countries, rather than additional US 

forces.39

In many ways, the force size debate has come full circle as some commanders and military observers are ultimately arguing for a smaller force 

or claiming only the new Iraqi armed forces can defeat the insurgency, 

though those same observers often cite the purported low quality of those 

forces.40

Troop Density in Iraq 

Table 16 provides a summary of troop density in the Iraq contingency operation. Coalition forces deployed a maximum of 1.10 soldiers 

per square mile nationwide. However, this included large swathes of 

Table 16. Troop Density in Iraq, 2003-2005

Area Military 

Forces 

(at maximum)

PopulationArea 

(square 

miles)

Population Density (per 

square 

mile)

Soldier Density

Per 

Area 

(soldiers 

per 

square 

mile)

Per 

Population (1 

soldier 

per x 

residents)

Soldiers 

Per 

1000 

People

Iraq

Planned 300,000

25.5 

million 167,617 152.13

1.79 85.0 11.76

Planned 

(smaller 

tooth-totail ratio)

146,139 0.87 174.5 5.73

Actual 184,500 1.10 138.2 7.23

Baghdad

Planned 89,985

6.2 

million 283.4 21,878.61

317.57 68.9 14.52

Planned 

(smaller 

tooth-totail ratio)

48,000 169.37 129.2 7.74

Actual 56,000 197.6 110.7 9.03
134

uninhabited territory. The ratio was much higher in the urban area of Baghdad: 176 troops per square mile. In terms of demographics, the Coalition 

at its maximum deployed 1 soldier for every 139 inhabitants, or 7.26 soldiers per 1000 local inhabitants. In Baghdad, again the ratios were much 

higher, with 1 soldier for every 177 Baghdad residents or 9.03 soldiers 

per 1000 city residents. Table 16 also displays Benson’s planning figures 

and a modified version of them using the smaller tooth-to-tail ratio actually employed by the deployed force. Benson’s original figures were all 

considerably higher than those of the force actually deployed (although 

his planning force of 17 to 20 brigades was actually about five brigades 

less than the number actually deployed). His planning estimates modified 

to include the actual tooth-to-tail ratio were, however, all smaller than the 

forces actually deployed. 

Indigenous forces, although increasing in size and effectiveness over 

the course of time, were not really a factor in troop density determinations 

in the Iraq occupation, as no Iraqi forces relieved Coalition forces of any 

occupation responsibilities until after the maximum force was deployed in 

January 2005. Iraqi security forces augmented but did not replace Coalition forces until February 2005.

Analysis of the Factors Affecting Troop Density 

The previous chapter analyzed the various factors affecting troop density in contingency operations using the operations studied earlier in this 

work. The same factors will now be similarly analyzed in terms of the Iraq 

operation. 

Iraq has both a large population and a large area. However, large portions of the population are concentrated in urban and suburban areas, particularly in Baghdad where the population density approaches that of New 

York. Therefore, Baghdad is a relatively compact area of responsibility 

with a high population density 

The number of troops available initially for the Iraq contingency operation was actually less than those available shortly thereafter and in 

subsequent months when additional reinforcements arrived in the theater. 

Because the previous campaign emphasized defeating the Iraqi forces, not 

occupation locations, troops deployed more densely in certain areas than 

in others. For example, because the city of Baghdad was the objective 

of the campaign, most of the large units ultimately converged there. In 

fact, in the early days of the contingency operation, the equivalent of three 

divisions (roughly between 10 and 13 brigade equivalents) was operating in the Baghdad area. For most of the extended operation, however,
135

Baghdad was the responsibility of a single reinforced division (seven brigade equivalents).

Additionally, the troops deployed for contingency operations in Iraq 

were not recruited specifically for the operation. US troops deployed in 

preexisting units, on a 12-month troop rotation cycle for the Army and 

seven months for the Marines. Coalition troops generally rotated every 

six months. 

In relation to the duration and intensity factor studied in other operations, Iraq has proven to be a counterinsurgency operation of extended 

duration and a continuous high level of intensity. Accordingly, deployed 

forces reached the height of their strength not at the beginning of the operation, but in January 2005. 

Another key factor in this study is the use of substitute forces in contingency operations. In Iraq substitute forces have been primarily civilian 

contractors. Confirmed numbers of contractors supporting the Iraq operation are inconsistent. Estimates range between 20,000 and 100,000 cited 

from various sources and contexts. It is, however, clear there are about 

20,000 employees of private military corporations (PMC) devoted solely 

to security functions. In previous operations soldiers or local police officers would have been responsible for these security functions. In addition 

to security contractors, other civilian contractors provide necessary support services, such as transportation, construction, and food service, functions that have also historically been the responsibility of military forces. 

Contractor Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) at one point employed 

approximately 24,000 workers to conduct support functions, increasing 

the number of nonsecurity contractors to somewhere in the range of 30,000 

to 80,000. For the purpose of this study, a mean of 58,000 contractors is 

added to the security contractor estimate of 20,000 for a total estimated 

contractor strength in Iraq of 78,000. This interpolated figure is considered 

the estimated number of contractors in Iraq at the height of Coalition deployment in January 2005. Because of the important role contractors play 

in Iraq, they are a key factor in any discussion of troop density.42

As noted, the key factors in studying troop density in Iraq are indigenous forces and substitute forces. At the maximum deployment of 

ground troops in Iraq in January 2005, indigenous forces had not yet taken 

over any operational missions, so there can be no adjustment to the troop 

figures to include indigenous forces. However, substitute forces in the 

form of contractor personnel, with an estimated total of 78,000, played 

a key role. Augmenting the 184,500 Coalition troops in Iraq with 78,000 
136

contractors adjusts the strength to 262,500. This represents a troop density 

of 97.14 inhabitants per soldier, 5.32 inhabitants per soldier less dense 

than the planning figure of 91.82. In terms of troops per 1000 inhabitants, 

this corresponds to a ratio of 10.29 troops per 1000 residents, 2.97 soldiers 

per 1000 less than the recommended planning ratio of 13.26 per 1000 

residents. 

Table 17 represents how the Iraq deployment fits proportionally with 

the historical trends in troop density examined in this work. While not the 

densest deployment, the Iraq operation is in the middle range among the 

analyzed case studies. Overall, how does the Iraq operation relate to historical trends in troop density? Table 18 shows the results of a comparison 

between the troop density figures for the Iraq operation with the planning 

factors derived from the case studies examined in this work. 

Table 17. Iraq and Troop Density Variation in Terms of Key Factors Troop Density (+/- adjusted mean of 13.26 soldiers per 1000 population) Dense Area Troops Available Troop Rotation Troops Recruited Intensity/ Duration Substitute Forces

Indigenous forces

Malaya

Fewer Troops More 

11.44 ● ● ● ● ● ●

Kosovo 7.84 ● ●

Germany 

1 year 2.44 ●

Bosnia IFOR 1.74 ● ● ●

Austria 0.11 ● ●

Northern 

Luzon -0.76 ● ● ●

Iraq -2.97 ● ● ●

Philippines -3.46 ● ● ●

Bosnia SFOR -5.36 ● ● ● ●

Germany 

2 years -6.88 ●

Japan -7.06 ● ●
137

Table 18. Applying the Planning Factors to the Iraq Deployment

(a) Planning Factors

(a1) Population of Iraq 25.5 million

(a2) Adjusted raw force planning factor

13.26 soldiers per 1000 of 

population

91.82 inhabitants per soldier

(a3) Brigade equivalent planning factor size 5909 troops

(a4) Brigade equivalent to population ratio One brigade per 483,141 

inhabitants

(b) Expected Deployment Size

(b1) Expected adjusted force size estimate 

(a1/a2) 277,748

(b2) Number of brigades expected (b1/a3) 47

(c) Actual Deployment

(c1) Maximum force size 184,500 (January 2005)

(c2) Maximum adjusted force size

262,500 (January 2005) 

(184,500 Troops +78,000 

Contractors).

(c3)

Adjusted troop density ratio 

c2/(a1/1000)

(a1/c2)

10.29 soldiers per 1000 of 

population

97.14 inhabitants per soldier

(c4) Number of brigades actually deployed 25.25 (January 2005)

(c5) Actual brigade size (c1/c4) 7307

(c6) Adjusted number of brigade equivalents 

([c2-c1]/c5)+c4 35.9

(c7) Brigade equivalent to population ratio 

(a1/c6)

One brigade per 709,816 

inhabitants.

(d) Differences

(d1) Adjusted force size difference (b1-c2) -15,217 troops deployed

(d2) Difference from force planning factor 

(a2-c3)

 -2.97 soldiers per 1000 of 

population

+5.32 inhabitants per soldier

(d3) Number of brigade equivalents 

difference (b2-c6) -11.1 brigade-equivalents

(d4) Adjusted brigade size (a3-c5) +1,398 troops per brigade 

equivalent

(d5) Brigade equivalent to population ratio 

difference (c6-a4)

+226,625 inhabitants per one 

brigade equivalent
138

The OIF actual deployment numbers were 15,217 below the planning 

figure estimate, 95 percent of the projected total or roughly the size of 

two brigade equivalents. Additionally, the actual deployment figures were 

slightly less dense than the planning factor ratio by approximately 3 troops 

per 1000 of population. In terms of expected operational units, the total 

force brigade-equivalent, however, was roughly 11 brigade equivalents (or 

24 percent) below the estimated planning factor. However, brigade equivalents for the Iraq deployment were 124 percent larger than the projected 

size of a brigade equivalent during the planning process, meaning the 35.9 

adjusted brigade equivalents (see table 18) were in fact equivalent in size 

to 44.5 planning factor brigade equivalents. This corresponds to the forcesize difference of 15,217, which, as stated above, is roughly equivalent to 

two Iraq deployment brigade equivalents.

In terms of the Iraq operation, the maximum troop deployment period 

was in January 2005. At that time, the 124,733 Iraqi forces had not yet 

taken an operational role. Therefore, these troops and police forces were 

not taken into account. Additionally, the estimated 78,000 contractors in 

Iraq were not all executing operational missions, but they are included 

in total force estimates because their presence in Iraq, even in supporting roles, effectively released military personnel for roles more directly 

related to combat operations. 

Therefore, in January 2005, the number of troops deployed in Iraq, 

including operational contractor elements, was slightly less than projected 

by the planning factors in raw troop strength and in proportion to the population. Total force operational brigades in Iraq, while about 11 brigades below the expected planning factor level, were proportionally larger than the 

planning factor brigade size, which accounts for the variance ultimately 

resulting in a force slightly more than two brigades smaller than the planning factor estimate.
139

Notes

1. Michael Hersh and John Barry, “Drawing down in Iraq: Drastic Troop 

Cuts are in the Pentagon’s Secret Plans,” Newsweek, 8 August 2005 [article online] available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8770418/site/newsweek/; Internet; accessed 24 October 2005; Jim VandeHei, “Talabani Says Iraqis Could Replace Many U.S. Troops: President’s Claim About Major American Withdrawal by 

Year’s End Conflicts With White House Position,” Washington Post, 13 September 2005, A20 [article on-line] available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp

-dyn/content/article/2005/09/12/AR2005091201986.html; Internet; accessed 24 

October 2005. 

2. Before the arrival of multinational Coalition forces, US forces reached a 

height of 148,750 in July 2003. Force size fluctuations in early 2004 were primarily based on unit rotation overlaps. The primary US forces withdrawn without 

rotational American replacement were the roughly 25,000 Marines of the I Marine 

Expeditionary Force, which handed its sector of responsibility over to a Polish 

division and to an Italian brigade serving under the British, whose own sector was 

accordingly extended. British forces originally numbered about 26,000, but were 

reduced from three to one brigade, with replacements including a Dutch battalion 

and the aforementioned Italian brigade. For a table of US ground forces numbers, 

see “US Ground Troops in Iraq,” 27 April 2005 [website on-line] available at 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_es.htm; Internet; accessed 

24 October 2005. 

3. The sector in Anbar Province would be later given over to the Marines 

who commanded it with a MEF headquarters (although usually only employing 

a division-equivalent of land forces), giving the Marine commander in Anbar the 

same rank (lieutenant general) as the Army commander of CJTF-7 in Baghdad, 

the higher command echelon for the MEF.

4. The Polish forces were mandated by their government to only engage in 

security operations. See Associated Press, “Polish Commander Urges Early Iraq 

Vote,” 30 August 2004, [document on-line] available at http://www.wjla.com/

news/stories/0804/169623.html; Internet; accessed 25 October 2005. 

5. A rationale for the shorter rotation periods of non-American forces can 

be found in Andrew A. Michta, “Military Capabilities of the Central Europeans: 

What Can They Contribute to the Stabilization of Iraq?” (summary of lecture from 

the Eastern European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, Washington, DC, 2003, meeting #284) [meeting report on-line] available 

at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.print_pub&doc_

id=54116&group_id=7427&topic_id=1422&stoplayout=true; Internet; accessed 

24 October 2005. Active duty US army units were on a 12/12 plan, deploying for 

12 months and then exempt from deployment for the next 12 months. US Marine 

Corps units, except higher headquarters, were on a 7/7 plan, seven-month deployments followed by a seven-month break from deployment eligibility. See “Troop 

Move Will Not Reduce Korean Security, Officials Say,” (press briefing by senior 

defense and military officials, 17 May 2004) 18 May 2004 [transcripts on-line] 
140

available at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&

y=2004&m=May&x=20040518135243AJesroM8.613223e-02&t=xarchives/xar

chitem.html; Internet; accessed 28 October 2005. 

6. The 82d Airborne Division had replaced the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Anbar Province in September 2003 as the first rotation. This relief is 

sometimes considered to be part of OIF II, but the 82d was slated to remain in 

Anbar for only six months and then redeploy without replacement. The 82d was 

relieved in March 2004, but the division was in fact replaced in a modification to 

the OIF II rotation scheme by the Marines of I MEF. See press briefing by General 

John Keane, acting Army chief of staff, “Gen. Keane Press Briefing on Plans to 

Rotate Forces in Iraq,” (Pentagon press briefing by acting Army chief of staff and 

other military officials, Washington, DC, 23 July 2003) July 2003 [transcripts online] available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/07/

mil-030723-dod03.htm; Internet; accessed 27 October 2005. 

7. The replacement force was officially known as Task Force (TF) Olympia, but its main component was the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, the Army’s 

first experimental Stryker unit out of Fort Lewis, Washington. This brigade was 

originally slated to be the replacement for the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

in Anbar Province, but was shifted to Mosul to replace the proposed multinational division. Almost all the US divisional forces also had task force designations, with most designations, such as TF Ironhorse for the 4th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), later replaced by TF Danger (1st infantry Division [Mechanized]) 

and then TF Liberty (42d Infantry Division), changing with the units, making the 

designation somewhat redundant. Some of these designations, however, such as 

TF Baghdad, were used by all the units, which rotated through Baghdad in turn. 

In this work, the actual unit designations are used whenever possible. Originally a 

multinational division, possibly from India or Pakistan, was supposed to assume 

responsibility for the Mosul area. However, this support never materialized. See 

Keane press briefing and Colin Robinson, “The U.S. presence in Iraq: Inching toward internationalized ‘peace keeping’?” 28 July 2003 [document on-line] available at http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1534; 

Internet; accessed 26 October 2005.

8. Keane press briefing; Ann Scott Tyson, “Should US Draw Down Troops 

in Iraq?” Christian Science Monitor, 23 October 2003. [article on-line] available 

at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1023/p02s02-usmi.html; Internet; accessed 

26 October 2005. As originally planned, the 82d Airborne Division force in Anbar Province was not to be replaced. The 3d ACR, originally attached to the 82d, 

was, however, to be replaced by the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division. However 

that brigade was diverted to Mosul and the 3d ACR was replaced by the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). The Marine Corps’ I MEF replaced the 

82d. The 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, detached from its parent division 

and serving under the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad, was also originally not 

scheduled for a replacement. However, the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division 

(Light Infantry) replaced it and served under the 1st Armored Division’s successor unit, the 1st Cavalry Division. 
141

9. The Korean force was styled the “Zaytun” Division, using the Arabic 

term for “olive,” a metaphor for peace. Despite its designation as a division, 

the Republic of Korea (ROK) contingent was only about 3,000 soldiers in size, 

roughly equivalent to a brigade. The Korean force was given the predominately 

Kurdish Province of Arbil as its sector. “Korea’s Zaytun Troops Mark 1st Anniversary in Iraq,” Korea Update 16, no. 10 (31 August 2005) [article on-line] 

available at http://www.koreaemb.org/archive/2005/8_2/foreign/foreign1.asp; Internet; accessed 26 October 2005. 

10. As of October 2005, at only three points in time were there more than 

100 US KIAs: April 2004, with 135 (55 during the first battle of Fallujah and 

another eight during the Sadr City fight with the Mahdi militia), November 2004, 

with 137 (of which 71 deaths occurred during the second battle of Fallujah); and 

January 2005 with 107, including 31 killed in a Marine helicopter crash. See 

“US Troop Deaths Hit 100 Mark for Only Third Month Since the War Began,” 

1 February 2005 [article on-line] available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/

news/world/iraq/memorial/20050201-1403-iraq-uslosses.html; Internet; accessed 

26 October 2005. 

11. Eric Schmitt, “US Commanders See Possible Cuts in Troops in Iraq,” 

New York Times, 11 April 2005 [article on-line] available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2005/0411cut.htm; Internet; accessed 27 

October 2005. 

12. Non-American Coalition forces in Iraq totaled about 33,000. 

13. Bradley Graham, “U.S. to Pull 15,000 Troops Out of Iraq,” Washington 

Post, 4 February 2005, p. A01 [article on-line] available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61910-2005Feb3.html; Internet; accessed 28 October 2005; “US Forces Order of battle – 4 March 2005,” 8 November 2005 [document on-line] available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat.

htm; Internet; accessed 28 October 2005. For information on units extended in 

Iraq see “Department of Defense Announces Troop Extensions for Iraq,” Department of Defense Press Release, 1 December 2004 [press release on-line] available 

at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041201-1741.html; Internet; accessed 20 October 2005. 

14. “Numbers of US Troops in Iraq Has Risen,” Associated Press, 7 October 2005 [article on-line] available at http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,78282,00.html?ESRC=army.nl; Internet; accessed 26 October 2005; 

Will Dunham, “US Increases to 152,000 Troops for Iraq Referendum,” Reuters, 

6 October 2005, [article on-line] available at http://www.boston.com/news/

world/middleeast/articles/2005/10/06/us_increases_to_152000_troops_for_iraq_

referendum?mode=PF; accessed 10 February 2005.

15. Dunham; “DoD Announces OEF/OIF Rotational Units,” Department of 

Defense Press Release, 14 December 2004 [press release on-line] available at 

http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041214-1823.html; Internet; accessed 30 October 2005. For example, the 3-504th Infantry, a paratrooper battalion from the 82d Airborne Division, was dispatched to reinforce II MEF for a 

short tour of several months in September 2005. OIF IV units deployed prior to 
142

the referendum included the 172d Infantry Brigade (Stryker), 2d Brigade, 28th 

Infantry Division (Pennsylvania Army National Guard [ARNG]), 56th Cavalry 

Brigade, 36th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (Texas ARNG) and the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Georgia ARNG).

16. VandeHei; Mark Mazzetti, “US Generals Now See the Virtues of a Smaller Troop Presence in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 1 October 2005, [article on-line] 

available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/latimests/20051001/ts_latimes/usgenerals

nowseevirtuesofasmallertrooppresenceiniraq; accessed 30 October 2005.

17. Atlas of the Middle East (Washington, DC: National Geographic Society, 

2003), 65

18. The Turkmen or Turkomen, are variously described as Turkish settlers 

from the 18th century, or descendents of Turkic speaking Oghuz tribesman from 

medieval times. The language they speak is variously described as a dialect of 

Turkish or related to the speech of Azerbaijani Republic in the Caucasus. The 

cited numbers of Turkmen in Iraq varies between 10,000 and 3 million, with the 

figure likely over one million. See “Iraqi Turkmen,” [document on-line] available at http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=27; Internet; accessed 31 October 

2005. 

19. Kevin Benson, “’Phase IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in 

Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign ed. Brian 

DeToy (paper presented at conference sponsored by US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14-16 September 2004); (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 187; “Iraq: Administrative Divisions 

(Population and Area),” World Gazetteer, [table on-line] available at http://www.

world-gazetteer.com/r/r_iq.htm; accessed October 31, 2005. The latter reference 

was only used for geographical purposes. 

20. Several provinces have honorific titles. The Province of Babil or Babylonia is named to commemorate the ancient empire of Babylonia, the ruins of whose 

capital, Babylon, are located in Babil. Salah-ad-Din or Saladin is named after the 

12th century military leader who fought against the crusaders. Saladin was born 

in Tikrit, one of the major cities of Salah-ad-Din Province. Ironically, considering 

the Baathist treatment of that group, Saladin was a Kurd.

21. Benson, 179-206.

22. Ibid., 185-9. Benson chose California because it was roughly similar to 

Iraq in size. However, as was discussed in chapter 3, it was a poor choice as two 

of its major police forces, those of the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego, are 

anomalies in their proportional size compared to most other American municipal 

police departments.

23. Ibid., 189.

24. Ibid., 198. Using Benson’s figures as guidelines, a four-battalion brigade would equate to 6250 soldiers and its support slice would be 1.4 times this 

strength, or 8750 resulting in 15,000 soldiers in a brigade equivalent.

25. The order of battle in January 2005 with brigade equivalents is found in 

table B-13, appendix B.
143

26. The average coalition strength between April 2003 and September 2005 

was 159,065. The US land forces average was 132,850. See figure 32 for monthly strengths during that period. The methodology of this study is to look at the 

maximum troop density in a historical contingency operation, presuming that it 

is better to have the maximum needed number of troops rather than an average or 

minimum force size as a guideline for planning troop density.

27. “ENCL 2: Operational Graphics for the Clearance of Southwest Baghdad” (PowerPoint presentation, Disc 38 of 68), 2-17th Cavalry, 25 April 2003. 

Document was collected by OIF study group as primary source material during 

a trip to Iraq to collect archival material. Originally housed at the 35th Infantry 

Division Headquarters in Leavenworth, KS. 

28. The decision to disband the Iraqi forces became one of the most controversial of the occupation. Bremer’s immediate predecessor, Jay Garner, wanted 

to use the former Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Army to employ the masses of 

soldiers. See Jay Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign ed. Brian DeToy (paper presented at conference sponsored by US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 14-16 September 2004); (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2004), 265. On the other hand, the Iraqis felt that the issue was not that significant. See Anthony Cordesman, “Iraqi Force Development: An Iraqi View,” 10 

March 2005, 3-4 [document on-line] available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/

pubs/050310_iraqiforces.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 November 2005.

29. “Iraqi Military Reconstruction;“ Iraq to Dissolve National Guard,” BBC 

News/Middle East, 29 December 2004, [article on-line] available at http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/low/middle_east/4133039.stm; Internet; accessed 7 November 2005.

30. Anthony Cordesman, “Iraqi Forces Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the 

Job?” 8 August 2005, 15 [document on-line] available at http://www.csis.org/me

dia/csis/pubs/050808_iraqiforces.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 November 2005.

31. “Iraqi Military Reconstruction”; Anthony Cordesman, “Inexcusable Failure: Progress in training the Iraqi Army and Security Forces as of Mid-July 2004,” 

20 July 2004, 1-12 [document on-line] available at http://www.csis.org/media/

csis/pubs/iraq_inexcusablefailure.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 November 2005.

32. “Iraqi Police Force Reviewed”, Knight Ridder Newspapers, 23 October 

2004, [article on-line] available at http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:VIsxf

nbVwt4J:charleston.net/stories/102304/ter_23police.shtml+%22Iraqi+Police+Fo

rce+Reviewed%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1; Internet; accessed 7 November; Walter Pincus, “U.S. Says More Iraqi Police Are Needed as Attacks Continue,” Washington Post, 28 September 2004, p. A23 (F). At least one observer 

claimed that the sharp fall in police strength to indicate large-scale desertion 

rather than a government review. See William Kulin, “50% of Iraqi Police Have 

Deserted (The 50-Year Occupation),” 26 November 2004 [article on-line] available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/041126-iraq.htm; Internet; 

accessed 3 November 2005. 

33. “Iraqi Brigade Takes Control of Area, Future,” 23 February 2005 [press 

release on-line] available at http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/feb2005/
144

a022305la4.html; Internet; accessed 7 November 2005. The former 40th Brigade, 

Iraqi National Guard, was reflagged as the 1st Brigade, 6th Division. The 6th 

Division was the Iraqi army’s designated Baghdad defense division.

34. Cordesman, “Iraqi Forces Development,” 15.

35. VandHei; Sara Wood, “Iraqi Forces to Provide Bulk of Election Security,” 2 September 2005, [article on-line] available at http://www.blackanthem.com/

World/2005090208.html; Internet; accessed 3 November 2005; Elaine Grossman, 

“Officers Worry Iraqi Army Will Disintegrate After U.S. Draws Down,” Inside 

Washington Publishers, 15 September 2005 [article on-line] available at http://

www.d-n-i.net/grossman/iraqi_army_will_disintegrate.htm; Internet; accessed 26 

October 2005; Josh White and Bradley Graham, “Decline in Troops’ Readiness 

Cited,” Washington Post, 30 September 2005, p. A12(F) [article archived online] available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/904706971.

html?dids=904706971:904706971&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&fmac=&da

te=Sep+30%2C+2005&author=Josh+White+and+Bradley+Graham&desc=De

cline+in+Iraqi+Troops%27+Readiness+Cited; Internet; accessed 7 November 

2005; “101st’s 1st BCT Takes Over Authority for Kirkuk Area Base,” This Week 

in Iraq, 1, no. 12 (2 November 2005) : 1,3 [article on-line] available at http://

www.mnf iraq.com/Publications/TWII/02Nov.pdf; Internet; accessed 4 November 2005.

36. Sara Wood, “Partnership Between U.S., Iraqi Logistics Forces Yielding 

Results, Commander Says,” 12 August 2005 [press release on-line] available at 

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2005/20050812_2405.html; Internet; accessed 7 November 2005.

37. Cordesman, “Iraqi Forces Development,” 12, 17.

38. Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s 

Size”; “Wallace Failed to Challenge Rumsfeld’s False Claims about Troop Levels in Iraq, which Hume Later Echoed,” 28 June 2005 [article on-line] available 

at http://mediamatters.org/items/200506280010; Internet; accessed 26 October 

2005; see also Benson, 198. The ‘too few’ troops controversy gained new fuel 

in October 2004 when comments from former CPA Director Paul Bremer were 

interpreted by some media sources to mean that he felt there were too few troops 

in Iraq when he was there. Bremer later clarified that he meant more troops were 

needed immediately after the end of the Baghdad campaign. In the period from 

April to May 2003, Coalition forces did increase from 118,000 to 168,500. For 

the Bremer controversy, see “Bremer Remarks Fuel Campaign Fire,” CBS News, 

5 October 2004 [article archived on-line] available at http://www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2004/10/05/iraq/main647476.shtml?CMP=ILC-SearchStories; Internet; 

accessed 26 October 2005. In a recent work on the Baghdad campaign, the authors emphasize the similarity of CENTCOM planning estimates with those of 

Shinseki. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story 

of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 103.

39. “General Abizaid Central Command Operations Update Briefing,” (Central Command [CENTCOM] press briefing by CENTCOM Commander, General 

John Abizaid, Qatar, 30 April 2004) April 2004 [transcripts on-line] available at 
145

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040430-1402.html; Internet; accessed 3 November 2005.

40. Mazzetti; Grossman.
146
147

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This work analyzed successful past contingency operations in order 

to determine historical trends in the troop densities of such deployments. 

The methodology was to use the maximum number of troops deployed in 

an operation as the snapshot benchmark because planning factors should 

be based on the maximum amount of forces ultimately needed in a contingency operation, rather than an average or minimal number. Accordingly, 

these factors are inherently based on the worst-case scenario for each operation studied.

The results of the analysis show clearly that past deployment strengths 

have been primarily based on the population of the operational area rather 

than its size. Additionally, while many current sources cite as a standard a 

minimum of 20 troops to 1000 inhabitants as the necessary ratio, the case 

studies of this work indicate a figure of about 13.26 troops per 1000 inhabitants provides a more historically based guideline. Moreover, the figure 

of 13.26 includes any other operational forces including indigenous police 

and military forces, as well as contractors. 

This work also analyzed a sampling of the largest and most successful 

municipal police forces in the United States in terms of size and density. 

As with military forces in contingency operations, police force size has 

been almost exclusively based on the size of the population the force supported. The average ratio of police officers to population was 4.1 per 1000. 

Since troops deployed operationally for contingency operations assume 

police roles as an inherent part of their mission, this indicates that such 

a force requires a minimum of 4.1 troops per 1000 of local population to 

be engaged in police activities. With an overall planning factor of 13.26 

troops per 1000 residents, this means about 30 percent or slightly less 

than one-third of the projected force in a contingency operation should be 

employed as police. 

Forces in contingency operations are usually deployed in operational 

units. In this work, the brigade or its equivalent is used as the basic operational unit. The brigade equivalent, including its support slice, averaged 

5909 troops. The planning factor for the number of brigades deployed is 

one brigade for every 483,141 inhabitants. 

Table 19 summarizes the planning factors. As a useful addition, the 

table also includes revised planning factors, which include the Iraqi deployment as one of the historical examples from which data was drawn. If 

the Iraqi operation is included, the planning factor figures become slightly 
148

less dense, while the brigade equivalent size becomes slightly larger both 

in size and in proportion to the local inhabitants. 

The planning factors provide general guidelines for future contingency operation deployments based on successful historical operations. However, each situation remains unique with its own set of variables that may 

or may not result in force densities higher or lower than the planning factors, and operational employment of brigade-equivalent forces of greater 

or lesser numbers than the factors indicate. Nevertheless, because of this 

work, future operational planners have a starting point for determining 

how many troops will be necessary to execute a contingency operation. 

Table 18. Planning Factor Summary

Planning Factors

Adjusted force planning factor

13.26 soldiers per 1000 of 

population

91.82 inhabitants per soldier

Brigade-equivalent planning factor 

size 5909 troops

Brigade equivalent to population 

ratio

One brigade per 483,141 

inhabitants

Proportion of force density 

devoted to police operations

4.1 per 1000 (30 percent of force 

size)

Planning Factors (including Iraq)

Adjusted force planning factor

12.43 soldiers per 1000 of 

population

98.01 inhabitants per soldier

Brigade-equivalent planning factor 

size 6064 troops

Brigade equivalent to population 

ratio

One brigade per 429,458 

inhabitants
149

About the Author

Boston native John McGrath has worked for the United States Army 

in one capacity or another since 1978. A retired Army Reserve officer, 

Mr. McGrath served in infantry, field artillery, and logistics units, both on 

active duty and as a reservist. Before coming to work at the Combat Studies Institute, he worked for four years at the US Army Center of Military 

History in Washington, DC, as a historian and archivist. Prior to that, Mr. 

McGrath worked full time for the United States Army Reserve in Massachusetts for more than 15 years, both as an active duty reservist and as 

a civilian military technician. He also served as a mobilized reservist in 

1991 in Saudi Arabia with the 22d Support Command during Operation 

DESERT STORM as the command historian and in 1992 at the US Army 

Center of Military History as a researcher and writer. 

Mr. McGrath is a graduate of Boston College, holds an MA in history 

from the University of Massachusetts at Boston, and is currently a PhD 

candidate at Kansas State University. He is the author of numerous articles 

and military history publications. He has published several books including Theater Logistics in the Gulf War published by the Army Materiel 

Command in 1994, The Brigade: A History published by the US Army 

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) in 2005; and Crossing the Line of Departure, also published by CSI in 2006. He served as the general editor of the 

published proceedings from CSI’s 2005 Military History Symposium, An 

Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict. Aside from a general interest in things military and historical, his areas of particular interest include 

modern military operations, the German army in World War II, August 

1914, and the Union Army in the Civil War. He also has a keen interest in 

ancient history, historical linguistics, the city of Boston, and baseball.
150
151

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Area/Item Military 

Forces 

(at 

max.)

Pop. (in 

1000s)

Area 

(sq 

mi) (in 

1000s)

Pop. 

Density 

(per sq 

mil)

Per 

Area 

(troop 

per sq 

mi)

Per 

Pop.(1 

soldier 

per x # 

pop.)

Troops 

Per 

1000 

pop.

Philippines, 1899-1901

Maximum 

October 

1900

68,816 7,000.0 115.0 60.9 0.60 101.70 9.80

Northern 

Luzon 

October 

1900

25,000 2,000.0 30.0 66.7 0.83 80.00 12.50

Germany, 1945-50

Planned 

Army-type 285,000

19,000.0 45.6 416.7

6.25 66.70 15.00

Planned 

Policetype203,000 4.45 93.60 10.68

Planned 

Constabulary

38,000 0.83 500.00 2.00

Actual 

one year 

June 

1946

299,264 6.56 63.50 15.70

Actual 

two years 

June 

1947

117,224 2.57 162.10 6.20

Adj. two 

years 

(includes 

indig.)

121,224 2.66 156.70 6.38

Actual 

Constabulary 

June 

1947

33,333 0.73 570.01 1.75

(continued on next page)

Appendix A.

Table 1. Troop Density Data
164

Area/Item Military 

Forces

Pop (in 

1000s)

Area 

(in 

1000s)

Pop. 

Density

Per 

Area 

Per 

Pop.

Troops 

Per 

1000 

pop

Austria, 1945-49

Planned 73,000

1,297.0 62.00 209.30

11.77 17.78 56.25

Actual 

two years 

June 

1947

11,345 1.83 114.39 8.70

Adj. two 

years 

(includes 

indig.)

17,345 2.80 74.80 13.37

Japan, 1945-48

Planned 600,000

72,147.0 142.86 505

4.20 120.25 8.32

Maximum 

Dec 1945 354,675 2.48 203.42 4.90

Adj. max. 

(including 

indig.)

448,675 3.14 160.80 6.20

One year 

Aug 1946 192,236 1.35 375.30 2.66

Commonwealth 

forces 

Aug 1946

40,236 20,000.0 22.00 909.1 1.83 497.07 2.01

Japanese 

police 

Dec 1945

94,000 72,147.0 142.86 505 0.66 767.52 1.30

Malaya, 1948-60

Max. April 

1952 30,000

4,856.0 50.90 95.5

0.59 161.90 6.18

Adj. 

(including 

indig.)

120,000 2.36 40.50 24.70

(continued on next page)

Table 1. Troop Density Data
165

Area/Item Military 

Forces

Pop (in 

1000s)

Area 

(in 

1000s)

Pop. 

Density

Per 

Area 

Per 

Pop.

Troops 

Per 

1000 

pop

Bosnia, 1995-96

IFOR 

1995-96 60,000

4,000.0 19.74 202.6

3.04 66.70 15.00

SFOR 

1996-99 30,000 1.52 133.30 7.50

SFOR 

adj. for 

international 

police

31,721 1.61 126.10 7.90

Kosovo, 

1999 41,618 1,9700.0 4.20 468.6 9.90 47.33 21.10

Iraq, 2003-05

Planned 300,000

25,500.0 167.62 152.1

1.79 85.00 11.76

Planned 

(adj. 

tooth-totail)

146,139 0.87 174.49 5.73

Actual 

max.Jan 

2005

184,500 1.10 138.21 7.24

Adj. max. 

(includes 

contracor)

262,500 1.57 97.14 10.29

Baghdad, 2003-05

Planned 

(adjusted) 48,000 6,200.0 .028 21,878.6 169.37 129.17 7.74

Actual 

(Jan 

2005)

56,000 197.60 110.70 9.00

Avg. of 

actual 

deployments

113.44 10.76

(continued on next page)

Table 1. Troop Density Data
166

Area/Item Military 

Forces

Pop (in 

1000s)

Area 

(in 

1000s)

Pop. 

Density

Per 

Area 

Per 

Pop.

Troops 

Per 

1000 

pop

Adj. avg. 

(including 

indig. 

and other 

forces)

Troop Density Planning Factors 91.82 13.26

Adj.avg. 

including 

Iraq

Troop Density Planning Factors (Including Iraq) 98.01 12.43

Average municipal police forces 60.9 248.12 4.10

Table 1. Troop Density Data
167

Table 2. Operational Forces

Brigade Equivalent Size

Maximum No. of Brigadeequivalents (actual brigades deployed)

Maximum No. of Brigadeequivalents (actual brigades plus other operational forces)

Population Density per Brigade

Population Density per Brigade for the Total Force

Area Density per Brigade (sq mi) (actual brigades deployed)

Area Density per Brigade (sq mi) (total force deployed)

Philippines 3583 19.20 19.20 368,421 368,421 5990 5990Germany one year 11,971 25.00 25.00 760,000 760,000 1824 1824Austria 5673 2.00 3.00 648,850 432,567 3100 2066Japan 7389 48.00 60.72 1,503,063 1,188,192 2977 2353Malaya 3000 10.00 40.00 485,600 121,400 5085 1271Bosnia IFOR 6000 10.00 10.00 400,000 400,000 1974 1974Kosovo 8324 5.00 5.00 394,000 394,000 841 841Police forces 1333 200,550 200,550Average 5909 595,061 483,141 3113 2706
168
169

Appendix B. Compendium of Tables

Table 1. US Troops in Germany on V-E Day, May 1945 

Table 2. US Initial Troop Deployment, Japan 1945 

Table 3. US Forces Downsizing, Japan 1945-46 

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Table 5. Bosnia—Base Camp Density in the US (MND-N) Sector 

Table 6. US Forces Deployed to KFOR and MND-E, 1999-2005

Table 7. KFOR Command by Nationality

Table 8. New York Police Department Organization 

Table 9. Largest Municipal Police Departments in the United States 

Table 10. Chicago Police Department Organization 

Table 11. Philadelphia Police Department Organization 

Table 12. Los Angeles Police Department Organization

Table 13. OIF Troop Deployment by Brigade Equivalent in Iraq, January 

2005 

Note: This appendix consolidates several tables referred to in the notes.
170

Table 1. US Troops in Germany on V-E Day, May 1945

Infantry divisions (41)

1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 26th, 28th, 

29th, 30th, 35th, 36th, 42d, 44th, 45th, 

63d, 65th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 75th, 76th, 

78th, 79th, 80th, 83d, 84th, 86th, 87th, 

89th, 90th, 94th, 95th, 97th, 99th, 100th, 

102d, 103d, 104th, 106th

Armored divisions (15) 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 

11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 20th

Airborne divisions (3) 17th, 82d, 101st

Corps headquarters (15) III, V, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVIII 

(Airborne), XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII

Army headquarters (5) 1st, 3d, 7th, 9th, 15th

Army group headquarters (2) 6th, 12th

Table 2. US Initial Troop Deployment, Japan 1945

Infantry divisions (ID) (12) Americal, 1st Cav, 24th, 25th, 27th, 32d, 

33d, 41st, 43d, 77th, 81st, 97th, 98th

Marine divisions (2) 2d, 5th

Airborne divisions (1) 11th

Regimental combat teams (RCTs)(3) 112th Cav, 158th, 4th Marine

Corps headquarters (7) I, IX, X, IX, XI, XIV, V (Amphibious)

Army headquarters (2) 6th, 8th

Cav= cavalry organized as infantry
171

Table 3. US Forces Downsizing, Japan 1945-46

Date Inactivated Redeployed

October 1945 43d, 77th IDsDecember 1945 41st ID XIV Corps, Americal Division. 27th IDJanuary 1946 6th Army, X Corps, 81st ID, 112th Cav, 158th RCT V Amphibious Corps, 4th Marine RegimentFebruary 1946 32d, 33d, 98th IDs, 5th Marine DivisionMarch 1946 XI Corps, 77th, 97th IDsJune 1946 2d Marine Division
172

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency 

Unit (only battalions and 

above shown) Note: 

units listed in figure 9 

are spelled out below

Deployment Dates

Remarks (Note: unit 

abbreviations found in this 

column are indicated in the 

far left column)

Headquarters Units

HQ, 17th Gurkha 

Division Feb 1950-Jul 1960

Organized to take control 

of the Gurkha brigades in 

Malaya; combined with South 

Malaya district (Sept 1952); 

redesignated upon Malayan 

independence as 17th 

Gurkha Division/Overseas 

Commonwealth Land Forces 

(Malaya); controlled at 

various times 26th, 48th, 

63rd, 99th Gurkha brigades; 

operated primarily in northern 

Malaya

HQ, 1st Federation 

Division 1952-60 Operated primarily in southern Malaya

HQ, 2d Guards Brigade Oct 1948-Jul 1950

Redesignated as the 18th 

Infantry Brigade (Jul 1950); 

subordinate units: 3/GG, 2d 

Cold, 2d Scots Gd

HQ, 48th Gurkha 

Brigade Dec 1949-Jul 1960

Formed to control Gurkha 

battalions in Johore subdistrict

HQ, 3d Commando 

Brigade Apr 1950-Dec 1951 Subordinate units: 40, 42, 45th Commando (RM)

HQ, 26th Gurkha 

Brigade Apr 1950-Jul 1960

Arrived from Hong Kong; 

subordinate units: 1 Cam, 2/6 

GR, 2/10 GR

HQ, 63d Gurkha 

Brigade Jul 1950-Jul 1960 Formed to command Gurkha battalions

HQ, 18th Infantry 

Brigade Jul 1950-Dec 1956 Brigade disbanded (Dec 1956)

(continued on next page)
173

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

HQ, 99th Gurkha 

Brigade Sep 1952-Jul 1960

HQ, 28th 

Commonwealth Brigade

Sep 1955-Jul 1960

Reformed in Malaya after 

service in Korea; subordinate 

units: British: 1/RSF, 1/

RLincs, 1/Loyal, 1/3 EA, 1 

Squadron, 15/19 Hussars, 

11 Field Squadron. Royal 

Engineers; Australian: 1/ 

RAR, 2/RAR, 3/ RAR, 105 

Battery, Royal Australian 

Artillery, 100 Battery, Royal 

Australian Artillery 104 

Battery, Royal Australian 

Artillery. New Zealand: 1/NZ

HQ, 1st Federation 

Brigade 1952-60

HQ, 2d Federation 

Brigade 1952-60

British Units

1st Battalion, Kings Own 

Yorkshire Light Infantry 

(1 KOYLI)

April 1948-Aug 1951

Penang; redesignated 

from 2d Battalion, KOYLI, 

Nov 1948; replaced by 1 

Manchester

1st Battalion, 

Devonshire Regiment (1 

Devonshire)

Jun 1948-Feb 1951 1948: Johore sub-district 

(Singapore?); not replaced

1st Battalion, Seaforth 

Highlanders (1 Seaforth) Jun 1948-Apr 1951

Amalgamated with 2d 

Battalion, Seaforth 

Higlanders, Oct 1948; in 

Singapore initially; 1948: 

Johore sub-district ; under 

63d Gurkha Brigade (Dec 

1950-Apr 1951); replaced by 

1 Gordon Highlanders

(continued on next page)
174

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

26th Field Regiment, 

Royal Artillery (26 RA) Jun 1948-Apr 1951

Operating as infantry; 1948: 

Central sub-district; replaced 

by 25 RA

1st Battalion, Royal 

Inniskilling Fusiliers (1 

RIF)

Aug 1948-Aug 1949 Replaced by 1st Green 

Howards

3d Battalion, Grenadier 

Guards (3 GG) Oct 1948-Jul 1949 Under 2d Guards Brigade; replaced by 1 Suffolk

2d Battalion, 

Coldstream Guards(2 

Cold)

Oct 1948-Jul 1950 Under 2d Guards Brigade; 

replaced by 1 Worcester

2d Battalion, Scots 

Guards (2 Scots Gd) Oct 1948-Mar 1951

Under 2d Gds Brigade (Oct 

1948-Jul 1950), 18th Infantry 

Brigade (Jul 1950-Mar 1951); 

replaced by 1 Royal West 

Kent

1st Battalion, Suffolk 

Regiment (1 Suffolk) Jul 1949-Jan 1953

Replaced 3 Gren Gds; 

replaced by 1 Somerset; 

under 18th Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, Green 

Howards (1Green 

Howards)

Aug 1949-Dec 1952 Replaced 1st RIF; not 

replaced

40th Commando, Royal 

Marines (40 CDO [RM]) Aug 1949-May 1952 Under 3d Commando Brigade

1st Battalion, 

Cameronians (1 Cam) Mar 1950-May 1953

Under 26th Gurkha Brigade; 

replaced by 1 East Yorkshire; 

operating in Labis (N. Johore) 

early 1953

(continued on next page)
175

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

13/18th Hussars

Jun 1950-Jul 1953; 

(1 squad Sep 1957) 

Aug 1958-Jul 1960

Replaced by 11th Hussars 

(1953); replaced 1 Kings 

Dragoon Gds (1958)

42d Commando, Royal 

Marines (42 CDO (RM)) Jun 1950-Jun 1953 Under 3d Commando Brigade

45th Commando, Royal 

Marines (45 CDO (RM)) Jun 1950-Mar 1952 Under 3d Commando Brigade

1st Battalion, 

Worcestershire 

Regiment (1 Worc)

Jul 1950-Jul 1953

Replaced 2 Cold; replaced by 

1 West Yorkshire; under 18th 

Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, Queen’s 

Own Royal West Kent 

Regiment (1 West Kent)

Mar 1951-Mar 1954

Replaced 2 Scots Gds; 

replaced by 1 Hampshire; 

under 18th Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, 

Manchester Regiment 

(1 Manchester)

Aug 1951-Apr 1954 Penang; replaced by 1st 

RSF; 18th Infantry Brigade

25th Field Regiment, 

Royal Artillery (25 RA) Apr 1951-May 1956 May have been only a battery; replaced by 48th RA

1st Battalion, Gordon 

Highlanders (1 Gordon 

Highlanders)

Apr 1951-Mar 1954

Singapore; under 63d 

Gurkha Brigade; replaced 

1st Seaforth; replaced by 1st 

Queens Royal Regiment

(continued on next page)
176

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

12th Royal Lancers (12 

Lancers) Sep 1951-Jan 1955 Replaced 4th Hussars; replaced by 15/19th Hussars

1st Battalion, Somerset 

Light Infantry (1 

Somerset)

Jan 1953-Sep 1955 Replaced 1st Suffolk; 

replaced by 1st Lincoln

1st Battalion, East 

Yorkshire Regiment (1 

East Yorkshire)

Apr 1953-Dec 1955

Replaced 1 Cam; replaced by 

1 SWB; under 26th Gurkha 

Brigade

1st Battalion, Prince 

of Wale’s Own (West 

Yorkshire) Regiment (1 

West Yorkshire)

Jul 1953-Mar 1955 Replaced 1st Worcestershire

11th Hussars Jul 1953-Aug 1956

Replaced 13/18th Hussars; 

replaced by 1st Kings 

Dragoon Gds

1st Battalion, Hampshire 

Regiment (1st 

Hampshire)

Jan 1954-Aug 1956

Replaced 1st West Kent; 

replaced by 1st Rifle Bde; 

under 18th Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, Queen’s 

Royal Regiment (West 

Surrey) (1 Queen’s 

Royal)

Mar 1954-Feb 1957 Replaced 1st Gordon 

Highlanders

1st Royal Scots 

Fusiliers (1 RSF) Apr 1954-May 1957 Under 28th Commonwealth Brigade; Penang

2d Battalion, Royal 

Welch Fusiliers (2 RWF) Aug 1954-Aug 1957

15/19th King’s Royal 

Hussars (15/19 

Hussars)

Aug 1954-Jun 1957

Replaced 4th Hussars; under 

Malaya Command; one 

squadron (company) under 

28th Commonwealth Bde

(continued on next page)
177

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

1st Battalion, King’s 

Own Scottish Borderers 

(1 KOSB)

Aug 1955-Aug 1958

Under 1st Federation 

Brigade, 1st Federation Div 

(1957)

1st Battalion, Royal 

Lincolnshire Regiment 

(1 Lincolnshire)

Oct 1955-Jun 1958

Replaced 1 Somerset (Oct 

1955); replaced 1/6th GR 

(Nov 1956); under 28th 

Commonwealth Bde

1st Battalion, South 

Wales Borderers (1 

SWB)

Oct 1955-May 1958 Replaced 1st East Yorkshire; 

under 26th Gurkha Bde

1st Battalion, Rifle 

Brigade (1 Rifle 

Brigade)

Apr 1956-Oct 1957 Replaced 1 Hampshire

48th Field Regiment, 

Royal Artillery (48 RA) May 1956-Jun 1960

1st King’s Dragoon 

Guards (1 Kings Drag 

Gds)

Jun 1956-Dec 1958 Replaced 11 Hussars; 

replaced by 13/18th Hussars

1st Battalion, Loyal 

Regiment (North 

Lancashire) (1 Loyal)

May 1957-Jan 1960 Under 28th Commonwealth 

Brigade

1st Battalion, Cheshire 

Regiment (1 Cheshire) Apr 1958-Jul 1960

1st Battalion, Sherwood 

Foresters (1 SF) Jun 1958-Jul 1960

1st Battalion, 3d East 

Anglian Regiment (16th/

44th Foot) (1/3 EA)

Dec 1959-Jul 1960 Under 28th Commonwealth 

Brigade

22d Special Air Service 

Regiment Oct 1950-58

Formed as Malayan Scouts; 

redesignated 22d Special 

Air Service Regiment (SAS) 

1952; later redesignated 

SAS Regiment (without any 

numerical designation)

(continued on next page)
178

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

Gurkha Units

1st Battalion, 2d Gurkha 

Rifles (1/2 GR) May 1948-Apr 1960

1948: Johore sub-district; 

southern sub-district (Dec 

1949); 26th Gurkha Brigade 

(Dec 1950); 99th Gurkha 

Brigade (Apr 1953-Apr 1960) 

1st Battalion, 6th 

Gurkha Rifles (1/6 GR)

May1948-Nov 1956; 

May 1958-60

In 1948 in northern subdistrict; under 48th Gurkha 

Brigade (Sep 1949-Nov 

1956); replaced by 1 

Lincolnshire (1956)

2d Battalion, 2d Gurkha 

Rifles (2/2 GR)

May 1948-Sep 

1953; Apr 1957-Jul 

1960

In 1948 in northern subdistrict; under 26th Gurkha 

Brigade (Dec 1950-Apr 1953; 

Apr 1957-Apr 1960); 48th 

Gurkha Brigade (Apr-Sep 

1953); 99th Gurkha Brigade 

(Apr-Jul 1960)

2d Battalion, 6th Gurkha 

Rifles (2/6 GR)

May 1948-Oct 1948; 

Apr 1950-Jul 1960

1948: central sub-district; 

under 26th Gurkha Brigade 

(Apr 1950-Apr 1960)

1st Battalion, 7th 

Gurkha Rifles (1/7 GR) May 1948-Apr 1959

1948: central sub-district 

converted to an artillery 

battalion 1948; converted 

back to infantry Jun 1949; 

under 48th Gurkha Brigade 

(Dec 1950-Apr 1953); 53d 

Gurkha Brigade (Apr 1953-

Apr 1959)

2d Battalion, 7th Gurkha 

Rifles (2/7 GR)

May 1948-Apr 1954; 

Feb 1957-Jul 1960 

1948: central sub-district; 

converted to an artillery 

battalion 1948; converted 

back to infantry Jun 1949; 

under 48th Gurkha Brigade 

(Dec 1950); 99th Gurkha 

Brigade (Feb 1957-Jul 1960)

(continued on next page)
179

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

1st Battalion, 10th 

Gurkha Rifles (1/10 GR)

Jan 1948-Apr 1953; 

Apr-Jul 1960

1948: Johore sub-district; 

under 48th Gurkha Brigade 

(Dec 1949-Apr 1953; ); 

Malaya Command (Apr 

1953-Apr 1954); 63d Gurkha 

Brigade (Apr-Jul 1960)

2d Battalion, 10th 

Gurkha Rifles (2/10 GR) Apr 1950-Jul 1960

Under 26th Gurkha Brigade 

(Apr 1950-Ap 1957); Federal 

Brigade (Malaya) (Apr 1957-

Apr 1960); 63d Gurkha 

Brigade (Apr-Jul 1960).

Commonwealth Units

1st Battalion, Malay 

Regiment (1/Malay 

Regiment)

Jun 1948-Jul 1960 1948: northern sub-district

2d Battalion, Malay 

Regiment (2/Malay 

Regiment)

Jun 1948-Jul 1960 1948: northern sub-district

3d Battalion, Malay 

Regiment (3/Malay 

Regiment)

1948-60 Battalion raised in 1948

1st (Nyasaland) 

Battalion, Kings African 

Rifles (1/ KAR)

Dec 1951-Mar 1953 Under northern command

4th Battalion, Malay 

Regiment (4/Malay 

Regiment)

1952-60

5th Battalion, Malay 

Regiment (5/Malay 

Regiment)

1952-60

6th Battalion, Malay 

Regiment (6/Malay 

Regiment)

1952-60

(continued on next page)
180

Table 4. British and Commonwealth Order of Battle, Malayan Emergency

Unit Deployment Dates Remarks

7th Battalion, Malay 

Regiment (7/Malay 

Regiment)

1952-60

1st Battalion, Federation 

Regiment (1/ Fed 

Regiment)

Sep 1952-60 Formed Sep 52 in northern 

Malaya

1st Battalion, Fiji 

Regiment (1/Fiji) 1953-Aug 1956

3d (Kenya) Battalion, 

Kings African Rifles (3/ 

KAR)

Mar 1953-54

2d (Nyasaland) 

Battalion, Kings African 

Rifles (2/ KAR)

May 1953-54

1st Battalion, Northern 

Rhodesian Regiment 

(1/NRR)

1954-56

2d Battalion, Royal 

Australian Regiment 

(2/RAR)

Oct 1955-Sep 1957 Under 28th Commonwealth 

Brigade

1st Battalion, Royal 

Australian Regiment 

(1/RAR)

Oct 1959-Jul 1960 Under 28th Commonwealth 

Brigade

3d Battalion, Royal 

Australian Regiment 

(3/RAR)

Sep 1957-Nov 1958 Under 28th Commonwealth 

Brigade

1st Battalion, New 

Zealand Regiment 

(1/NZ)

Nov 1957-Oct 1959 Under 28th Commonwealth 

Brigade

2d Battalion, New 

Zealand Regiment 

(2/NZ)

Oct 1959-Jul 1960 Under 28th Commonwealth 

Brigade
181

Table 5. Bosnia—Base Camp Density in the US (MND-N) Sector

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average

Number of MND-N base camps 43 41 19 18 16 15 13 12MND-N base camp density (troops per base camp)

465.10 346.30 747.40 700.00 743.10 450.50 443.10 395.20 536.34

Number of US base camps 33 31 9 8 6 6 6 5US base camp density (troops per base camp)

560.60 274.10 944.40 862.50 1033.30 651.10 561.00 570.20 682.15
182

Table 6. US Forces Deployed to KFOR and MNB-E, 1999-2005

Rotation Unit Dates

1A 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division 

(Mech) June-December 1999

1B 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division 

(Mech) December 1999-June 2000

2A 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division June-December 2000

2B 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division December 2000-May 2001

3A 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault) May-November 2001

3B 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain 

Division (Light Infantry) November 2001-May 2002

4A 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division 

(Mech) May-November 2002

4B 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division 

(Mech)

November 2002-March 

2003

5A

TF 28th Infantry Division (Mech) 

(PA ARNG) 56th Brigade, 28th 

Infantry Division (Mech) (PA 

ARNG) March 2003-July 2003

July 2003-February 2004

5B 2d Brigade, 34th Infantry Division 

(IA ARNG) February-August 2004

6A 37th Brigade, 38th Infantry 

Division (OH ARNG)

September 2004-March 

2005

6B 1st Brigade, 40th Infantry Division 

(Mech) (CA ARNG) March 2005-October 2005
183

Table 7. KFOR Command by Nationality

Date Nationality

June-October 1999 British

October 1999-April 2000 German

April-October 2000 Spanish

October 2000-April 2001 Italian

April 2001-October 2001 Norwegian

October 2001-October 2002 French

October 2002-October 2003 Italian

October 2003-August 2004 German

September 2004-September 2005 French

September 2005-September 2006 Italian

Number of different commanders per brigade, 1999-2005

MND-E American 13

MND-C British/Swedish (2000) Finnish (2003-04) Czech 

(2005) 13

MND-N French/MND-NE (after 2002) French 18

MND-S German (1999-2002) 6

MND-W Italian (1999-2002) 8

MND-SW (2002-05) German/Italian 6
184

Table 8. New York Police Department Organization

Higher 

Command Precinct Area (sq mi) Population Command Grade

Patrol Borough 

Manhattan 

South 

(Assistant 

Chief)

1 1.00 40,451 Captain

5 1.20 57,199 Captain

6 0.79 64,355 Deputy Inspector

7 0.62 58,438 Deputy Inspector

9 0.79 71,503 Captain

10 0.93 42,312 Captain

13 1.08 84,121 Deputy Inspector

17 0.94 75,063 Deputy Inspector

Midtown 

North 1.13 49,984 Inspector

Midtown 

South 0.77 16,179 Deputy Inspector

Patrol Borough 

Manhattan 

North 

(Assistant 

Chief)

19 1.75 217,063 Inspector

20 1.10 96,865 Deputy Inspector

23 0.91 72,582 Deputy Inspector

24 0.91 109,057 Inspector

25 0.62 45,161 Deputy Inspector

26 1.00 48,173 Deputy Inspector

28 0.49 35,500 Deputy Inspector

30 0.80 64,879 Deputy Inspector

32 0.98 61,027 Deputy Inspector

33 1.00 260,000 Deputy Inspector

34 2.00 123,048 Deputy Inspector

Central 

Park 1.31 0 Captain

Patrol Borough 

Bronx 

(Assistant 

Chief)

40 2.80 82,159 Deputy Inspector

41 2.10 46,824 Captain

42 1.09 68,574 Captain

43 4.34 167,663 Captain

44 1.97 125,000 Deputy Inspector

(continued on next page)
185

Table 8. New York Police Department Organization

Higher 

Command Precinct Area (sq mi) Population Command Grade

Patrol Borough 

Bronx 

(Assistant 

Chief) 

(continued)

45 8.12 115,960 Captain

46 1.32 128,313 Inspector

47 5.50 149,078 Deputy Inspector

48 No data 75,501 Captain

49 3.40 111,116 Captain

50 8.20 101,332 Deputy Inspector

52 2.00 141,607 Deputy Inspector

Patrol Borough 

(Strategic 

and Tactical 

Command) 

(Assistant 

Chief)

73 1.80 85,343 Deputy Inspector

75 5.50 173,198 Inspector

77 1.73 96,073 Deputy Inspector

79 1.20 82,947 Inspector

81 1.70 60,920 Inspector

83 2.00 104,358 Deputy Inspector

84 1.07 43,862 Captain

88 1.42 98,620 Captain

90 2.80 104,775 Captain

94 2.34 55,563 Captain

Patrol Borough 

Brooklyn South 

(Assistant 

Chief)

60 3.40 106,087 Deputy Inspector

61 5.50 160,319 Captain

62 3.90 172,222 Captain

63 8.96 108,325 Deputy Inspector

66 3.50 185,046 Deputy Inspector

67 3.40 165,736 Inspector

68 4.10 122,542 Captain

69 5.00 85,900 Captain

70 3.00 168,806 Inspector

71 1.00 104,014 Deputy Inspector

(continued on next page)
186

Table 8. New York Police Department Organization

Higher 

Command Precinct Area (sq mi) Population Command Grade

Brooklyn South 

(continued)

72 2.50 120,063 Captain

76 2.10 43,671 Deputy Inspector

78 2.20 60,397 Deputy Inspector

Patrol Borough 

Queens North 

(Assistant 

Chief) 

104 7.50 167,201 Captain

108 4.40 109,920 Captain

109 12.70 242,948 Deputy Inspector

110 5.50 167,147 Deputy Inspector

111 9.40 116,404 Captain

112 3.00 115,910 Captain

114 6.00 220,740 Deputy Inspector

115 2.80 169,083 Deputy Inspector

Patrol Borough 

Queens South 

(Assistant 

Chief)

100 3.57 43,584 Captain

101 2.50 63,154 Captain

102 5.10 141,814 Deputy Inspector

103 4.80 101,527 Inspector

105 12.67 196,284 Captain

106 6.20 127,274 Captain

107 7.50 146,594 Deputy Inspector

113 16.00 122,103 Deputy Inspector

Patrol Borough 

Staten Island 

(Assistant 

Chief)

120 14.10 141,500 Deputy Inspector

122 27.00 191,090 Captain

123 17.50 89,772 Captain

Note: 12 transit districts are organized by borough and commanded by a 

captain.
187

Table 9. Largest Municipal Police Departments in the United States

City Population Area (sq 

mi)

Size of Police 

Department 

Police Density

per 

square 

mile

per 

1000 

population

Houston 2,009,690 579.50 5028 8.67 2.50

Phoenix 1,388,416 474.90 6664 14.03 2.12

San Diego 1,266,753 324.40 1984 6.11 1.58

San Antonio 1,214,725 407.60 2054 5.03 1.69

Dallas 1,208,318 342.60 2833 8.27 2.35

Detroit 911,402 138.80 3645 26.26 4.00

San Jose, 

CA 898,349 174.90 1320 7.54 1.47

Indianapolis 783,438 361.50 1169 3.23 1.49

Jacksonville, 

FL 773,781 757.70 1592 2.10 2.06

San 

Francisco 751,682 46.70 2164 46.33 2.88

Columbus, 

OH 728,432 210.30 1819 8.64 2.50

Austin 672,011 251.50 1327 5.27 1.98

Memphis 645,978 80.80 2013 24.91 3.12

Baltimore 628,670 279.30 3094 11.07 4.92

Milwaukee 586,941 96.10 1907 19.84 3.25

Washington, 

DC 563,384 61.40 3782 61.59 6.71
188

Table 10. Chicago Police Department Organization

Area District/Station Sectors/

Beats

Size (square 

mile) Population

Central Control 

Group 

1st/Central 3/10 3.14 25,613

18th/Near North 3/12 4.69 110,995

1st

2d/Wentworth 3/12 3.77 50,967

7th/Englewood 3/15 6.56 91,600

8th/Chicago 

Lawn 3/15 23.12 244,470

9th/Deering 3/15 13.09 165,457

21st/Prairie 3/9 4.92 78,111

2d

3d/Grand 

Crossing 3/12 6.04 93,384

4th/South 

Chicago 3/12 27.27 141,422

5th/Calumet 3/9 12.80 92,729

6th/Gresham 3/12 8.10 105,360

22d/Morgan Park 3/9 13.46 111,545

3d

19th/Belmont 3/9 5.57 107,516

20th/Foster 3/9 4.37 102,512

23d/Town Hall 3/9 3.01 98,391

24th/Rogers Park 3/9 5.43 151,435

4th 

10th/Ogden 3/12 7.87 137,120

11th/Harrison 3/15 6.11 82,392

12th/Monroe 3/9 5.47 69,677

13th/Wood 3/9 4.21 60,517

5th 

14th/

Shakespeare 3/12 6.00 132,459

15th/Austin 3/9 3.82 72,736

16th/Jefferson 

Park 3/12 30.95 199,898

17th/Albany Park 3/9 9.62 156,859

25th/Grand 

Central 3/15 10.91 212,535
189

Table 11. Philadelphia Police Department Organization

Area District Area (square mile) Population

South 

1st ** 42,000

3d

South Street Detail 21,178

4th 6.10 45.566

17th 1.66 41,328

Northeast

2d 

7th 13.55 86,500

8th 14.54 98,146

15th 8.50 148,000

Northwest

5th 8.51 45,000

14th

35th

39th

Central

6th 2.10 30,000

9th

22d

23d

Center City

Southwest

12th

16th 1.05* 29,032*

18th

19th

East

24th

25th

26th 3.30 54,000

Airport 77th

Schuylkill 92d

*Data from 1990, most recent data available

**Areas where information was not available have been left blank.
190

Table 12. Los Angeles Police Department Organization

Bureau Division Area 

(sq mi)

Population

Number 

of Patrol 

Dist.

Police Patrol Density

per 

area

per 

pop

per 

1000

Valley

Foothills 43.30 182,214 7 8.12 520 1.90

Devonshire 28.18 201,862 5 12.42 577 1.70

Mission 53.90 240,000 7 6.49 686 1.50

West 

Valley 52.00 300,000 10 6.73 857 1.20

Van Nuys 30.00 325,000 11 11.70 929 1.10

North 

Hollywood 25.00 220,000 10 14.00 628 1.60

Bureau 

Total 221.80 1,270,000 50 9.47 605 1.60

West

Hollywood 17.20 300,000 10 20.34 857 1.20

Pacific 24.10 200,000 8 

(+LAX) 14.52 571 1.75

West LA 65.14 280,000 7 5.37 800 1.75

Wiltshire 13.97 251,000 13 25.05 717 1.40

Bureau 

Total 124.00 840,000 38 11.29 600 1.70

Central

Central 4.50 40,000 6 77.77 114 8.70

Rampart 8.00 350,000 13 43.75 1000 1.00

Newton 9.00 150,000 9 38.88 429 2.30

Hollenbeck 15.20 200,000 7 23.03 571 1.75

Northeast 29.00 250,000 8 12.06 714 1.40

Bureau 

Total 65.00 900,000 43 26.92 514 1.90

South

77th Street 11.90 175,000 11 29.41 500 2.00

Southeast 10.20 150,000 10 34.31 429 2.30

Southwest 13.11 165,000 10 26.69 471 2.10

Harbor 27.00 171,000 8 12.96 489 2.00

Bureau 

Total 57.60 640,000 39 24.30 457 2.20

Department total 

(includes all noncivilian personnel)466.80 3,694,820 170 19.70 431.2 2.49
191

Table 13. OIF Troop Deployment by Brigade Equivalent, January 2005

US Forces Deployed

Total of Brigade Equivalents per 

Command

1st Cavalry Division (MND-B)

1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division 

2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division 

3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division 

5th Brigade (Provisional), 1st Cavalry Division 

2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) 39th 

Infantry Division (Arkansas ARNG) 

256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Louisiana ARNG) 

Elements, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

8

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) (MND-NC) 

2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division 

30th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (North Carolina ARNG) 

278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Tennessee ARNG)

5

1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker) (MNB-NW) 1

81st Armored Brigade (Washington ARNG) (Theater Security 

Brigade North) 1

197th Field Artillery Brigade (New Hampshire ARNG) (Theater 

Security Brigade South) 1

I Marine Expeditionary Force (MNF-W) 

1st Marine Division 

1st Marine Regiment 

5th Marine Regiment 

7th Marine Regiment 

2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division 

4

Coalition Forces Deployed 

South Korean Zaytun Division 1

Polish Division (MND-CS) 

1st Polish Brigade 

2d Ukrainian Brigade

2

3d United Kingdom (UK) Armored Division (MND-SE) 

4th United Kingdom (UK) Armoured Brigade 

Italian ‘Garibaldi’ Bersaglieri Mechanized Brigade 

11th Netherlands (NL) Infantry Battalion Battlegroup 

2.25

Total of brigade-equivalents in Iraq, January 2005 25.25
192
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Appendix C 

A Special Note on Iraq

The methodology of this work is based on a study of various historical 

contingency operations at the point of their maximum troop deployment. 

That information was then used to develop a representative troop density 

average that could be applied to future planning. The computation of this 

average, while based on the number of non-indigenous forces deployed 

for the operation, also included any indigenous forces operational at the 

time of the maximum deployment strength of the non-indigenous forces as 

well as any substitute forces, such as contractors, who provided support or 

conducted missions that released operational forces for other duties. 

Using this methodology, the force ratio for the ongoing operation in 

Iraq was computed for January 2005, the period of the highest troop levels 

of non-indigenous (i.e. Coalition) forces. The force size, increased to provide security for the Iraqi elections, at that time provided a troop density 

equation and ratio as follows:

US forces 160,000

Coalition troops (non-US) 24,500

Contractors (estimated) 78,000

Iraqi Security Forces (operational) 0

Total 262,500

Population of Iraq 25.5 million

Ratio 10.29 troops per 1000 local inhabitants

This yields a troop density ratio lower than the historical average 

(13.26) found in the six other historical cases of this study (10.29 soldiers 

per 1000 population versus 13.26 soldiers per 1000).

The Iraqi security forces (ISF) made great progress toward becoming 

an operational force in the second half of 2004 and had begun to supplement Coalition units during operations. However, in January 2005, no 

Iraqi forces were independently operational in their own assigned sectors. 

Accordingly, based on the methodology used in the other case studies in 

this work, those forces were not included in the computations. Beginning 

in February 2005, the ISF began to take over operational responsibility for 

specific areas in Iraq, a process still underway as of the publication of this 

work. 

The operational viability of the ISF in January 2005 is open to debate. As of January 2005, the ISF numbered 124,733 (14,156 army, 36,827 
194

National Guard, 73,750 police). If one includes the ISF in the troop density equation, the result is as follows:

US Forces 160,000

Coalition troops (non-US) 24,500

Contractors (estimated) 78,000

Iraqi security forces (operational) 124,733 

Total 387,233

Population of Iraq 25.5 million

Ratio 15.52 troops per 1000 local inhabitants

This yields a troop density ratio higher than the historical average 

found in the six other historical cases of this study (15.52 soldiers per 1000 

inhabitants versus 13.26 per 1000).

To continue this approach, in September 2005 the formula for troop 

density, counting the Coalition and ISF forces as they were deployed, is 

as follows: 

US Forces 152,000

Coalition Troops (non-US) 22,409

Contractors (estimated) 78,000

Iraqi Security Forces (operational) 174,409 

Total 426,818

Population of Iraq 25.5 million

Ratio 16.73 troops per 1000 local inhabitants

This yields a troop density ratio higher again than the historical average found in the six other historical cases of this study (16.73 soldiers per 

1000 population versus 13.26 per 1000), a higher ratio even as Coalition 

troop strength was past its peak.

The trend continues to this day. Since September 2005, Coalition 

forces have remained at roughly the same force levels or declined slightly. 

However, ISF troop levels have continued to climb and reached a level of 

261,500 by May 2006. Additionally, by April 2006, ISF forces were conducting a quarter of all operations independently and another 40 percent of 

operations in conjunction with Coalition forces.1

Since the drafting of this work, two commentaries about troop density 

have been published reflecting a lower troop density level than cited in this 

work. In the first of these, the former US Army Chief of Military History, 

retired Brigadier General John S. Brown, reflected on troop density in past 
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US occupations and cited as a reasonable ratio one soldier for every 100 

inhabitants, or 10 per 1000.2

A team of Rand Corporation analysts completed a detailed analysis of 

post-conflict law and order operations. While including three case studies 

examined in this work (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq), the Rand team also 

examined operations in Panama, El Salvador, Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti, 

and East Timor. The Rand team has concluded the minimal force required 

is 1000 soldiers per 100,000 inhabitants or 10 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants. The study also adds a domestic police force of 2 police officers per 

1000 of population, giving a combined minimum ratio of 12 soldiers/police per 1000 population.3
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Notes

1. Anthony Cordesman and William D. Sullivan, “Iraqi Force Development in 2006,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

June 2006), 32, 83, 109.

2. John S. Brown, “Numerical Considerations in Military Occupations,” 

Army (April 2006), http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/

KHYL-6MYKGY, accessed 16 June 2006. 

3. Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, 

“Establishing Law and Order after Conflict” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), xiii.