The U.S. Navy has made amazing progress in a hundred years. From coal power to nuclear power and hybrid electric 

drive; from weapons like basic guns and artillery to precision laser-guided munitions, lasers, and developmental 

electromagnetic railguns; from paper maps and charts to real-time satellite navigation—the Navy has come a long 

way.

While credit for the operational success of the Navy lies squarely on the shoulders of our Sailors, it’s important to 

know that the tools they use, many of them technological marvels, didn’t just happen. Putting those tools in the hands of 

Sailors, making it possible for them to sail into harm’s way and emerge victorious, takes a complex structure of setting 

requirements, development, evaluation, acquisition, and distribution on the front end and detailed plans for manning, training, 

equipping, and maintaining it all on the backend. The dedicated military and civilian personnel of the OPNAV staff have 

performed the vital functions of resource allocation, risk assessment, and balancing.

	 For more than 100 years, the person leading that effort has been the Chief of Naval Operations. The office has

changed quite a bit since May 11, 1915, when Adm. William S. Benson took office as the first CNO, but I believe Adm.

Jonathan Greenert, the 30th CNO, would agree that the one thing that remains the same is the importance of the office’s

mission: to ensure our globally deployed Sailors have all the tools and training necessary to successfully achieve their 

missions and return home safely.

	 This book scratches the surface of the challenges and accomplishments of all 30 CNOs. I hope it gives the reader

some insight into the office and importance of the work that goes on, often behind the scenes, to make possible the 

successes of the United States Navy.

Foreword

S. J. Cox

Director

Naval History and Heritage Command

Creation of the office of Chief of Naval Operations marked

the culmination of a well-defined and long-recognized need

in the Navy Department. As early as 1798, the year the 

Department of the Navy was founded, Commodore John 

Barry of Revolutionary War fame proposed that a board of naval 

officers be named to assist the Secretary of the Navy. Growth of the 

Navy during the War of 1812, with deployment on oceans and lakes, 

placed increased demands on the Secretary and gave substance to Barry’s 

earlier recommendations. Accordingly, a law was passed on February 

7, 1815, forming a Board of Navy Commissioners comprised of three 

naval captains appointed by the President. The act specified that “the

board, so constituted, shall lie attached to the office of the Secretary

of the Navy, and, under his superintendence, shall discharge all the 

ministerial duties of said office,relative to the procurement of navalstores

and materials, and the construction, armament equipment and 

employment, of vessels of war, as well as all other matters connected 

with the naval establishment of the United States.”

The commissioner system suffered from assignment of 

responsibility to a board rather than to individuals. The board’s ability 

to carry out its duties varied with the extent to which the respective 

Secretaries of the Navy delegated authority, and the board’s willingness 

to exercise authority, as well as the board president’s strength of 

leadership.

	 Actions against the Seminole Indians and West Indian pirates,

suppression of the African slave trade, and protection of expanding 

worldwide commerce highlighted U.S. Navy operations during the 27 

years of the board’s tenure. As a result of the secretaries’ frequent 

exercise of direct control over the relatively low-intensity naval 

operations during this period, the board tended to be purely advisory 

in areas of supply, building, equipping, and repairing ships.

Toward the end of the Board of Navy Commissioners’ span, 

it was charged that the board was slow to act and was criticized for a 

lack of individual responsibility. In 1842 the board was abandoned in

favor of a bureau structure of administration. Five functional bureaus 

were created: Navy Yards and Docks; Construction, Equipment, and 

Repairs; Provisions and Clothing; Ordnance and Hydrography; and 

Medicine and Surgery.

Bureau chiefs were individually responsible to the Secretary 

of the Navy and no formal means of coordination was provided. From 

time to time, secretaries would convene special purpose boards (strategy, 

personnel, etc.) as a need arose. Some secretaries relied heavily on 

individual bureau chiefs or one or more prominent officersfor assistance

and advice in conducting the affairs of the Navy. It was the stress of

wartime requirements—the Civil and Spanish-American Wars—and 

the needs of operational direction, coupled with revolutionary 

technological advances, which brought into focus the serious 

shortcomings of departmental organization.

For the Navy, the period from the end of the war with Spain 

in 1898 to the beginning of American participation in World War I in

1917 was a time of change and uncertainty. The U.S. Government was 

committed to building a world-class navy, but getting that navy would 

require a transformation in how it was managed, directed, financed,

trained, and supported. 

	 In 1900, the Navy recognized the need for a general staff.

Navy officers wanted a modern navy—one capable of deterring or 

fighting other modern navies, navies equipped with the latest naval

technology and directed by formally trained officers. 

At the same time, civilian secretaries of the Navy were often 

frustrated by the fragmented naval administration. InApril 1904 Navy

Secretary William H. Moody told the members of the Naval Affairs 

Committee of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the 

Navy needed a senior uniformed adviser. Though his insight would 

not be realized at that time, it set the stage for the advent of the Office

of the Chief of Naval Operations.

At the turn of the twentieth century, then-Secretary of the 

Navy John D. Long created the General Board. Unlike the temporary 

boards of earlier eras, the General Board was to be a permanent body 

for the purpose of ensuring “efficient preparation of the fleet in case

of war and for the naval defense of the coast.” Although the General 

Board, which remained in existence until 1951, had no statutory status 

and was merely advisory, it did exercise considerable influence,

particularly under the presidency of Admiral of the Navy George Dewey 

from 1900 to 1917.

Secretary of the Navy George von Lengerke Meyer initiated 

the naval aide system in 1909. To assist him in the efficient administration

of the department and improve coordination of the work of the bureaus, 

Meyer named four officers as aidesfor operations, personnel, material,

and inspection.

The aide for operations was the most important assignment 

and was the direct forerunner of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

However, like the numerous boards before them and the navy 

commissioners of the early nineteenth century, the aides lacked 

executive authority. Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, the last officer to be

assigned as aide for operations was a prime mover in the establishment 

of a Chief of Naval Operations.

	 When Josephus Danielstook office as navy secretary in 1913,

he inherited Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske as his aide for operations. 

Fiske, along with the upper officers of the Navy, realized that, while

the Navy was in good condition for times of peace, it was not organized 

for war. 

Fiske developed the basis of legislation that would establish 

the “Chief of Naval Operations.” He planned with Captains Harry S.

Knapp, John Hood, James H. Oliver, and Lieutenant Commanders 

William P. Cronan, Zachariah H. Madison, and Dudley W. Knox to 

prepare the legislation for this position. 

Two months later, a congressional enactment signed into law 

by President Woodrow Wilson on March 3, 1915 provided for a Chief 

of Naval Operations “who shall be an officer on the active list of the

Navy appointed by the President . . . from among the officers of the

line of the Navy not below the grade of captain for a period of four 

years, who shall, under the direction of the secretary of the Navy, be 

charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and

readiness of plans for its use in war.”

	 In August of the following year, Congress authorized the

rank of admiral for the Chief of Naval Operations and strengthened 

the office by adding that “All orders issued by the Chief of Naval

Operations . . . shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, 

and shall have full force and effect as such.”

With the enactment of the 1915 law, with the nation soon to 

be embroiled in World War I, the U.S. Navy for the first time had a

professional naval officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, who, under

the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, had statutory authority and 

responsibility for war plans, preparation for combat, and operations 

of the fleet.

The Establishment of the Office

Admiral William S. Benson

First Chief of Naval Operations

May 11, 1915–September 25, 1919

War raging in Europe threatened to involve the United 

States as the first Chief of Naval Operations took up

his duties and began to organize and staff the new office.

In order that “there would no longer be the former

separation of the material preparation of the fleet from its operations,”

the duties of the aide for material were assigned to the Chief of Naval 

Operations in June 1915. The Navy’s preparedness and expansion, war 

planning and, after April 6, 1917, when the nation entered World War 

I, direction of overall combat operations were the responsibilities

confronting Admiral William Benson.

	 Readiness of the forces afloat and of the Navy’s shore

establishment to meet wartime demands was a matter of urgency. 

Admiral Benson initiated a systematic inspection of merchant vessels 

to determine suitability for conversion to naval auxiliaries. Concerted 

attention was directed to naval aviation, and seaplane development 

went forward on a priority basis. Naval district organization was 

modernized, and plans were made for navy yard improvement to absorb 

the stresses of war expansion. 

	 Admiral Benson was an ex-officio member of the Naval

Consulting Board named by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels 

in the fall of 1915 under the chairmanship of Thomas A. Edison. This 

important board focused the efforts of some of the country’s most 

distinguished scientific and inventive talent on naval matters and

sponsored a farsighted and vitally significant industrial census to

measure the national capacity to meet war requirements of the sea 

forces.

The Chief of Naval Operations’ testimony before Congress 

influenced passage of the 1916 NavalAppropriationsAct, authorizing

construction of 10 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 50 

destroyers, and 67 submarines—the largest building program authorized 

to that date and designed to rank the U.S. Navy as “second to none.”

Admiral Benson also successfully persisted in his efforts to increase 

naval personnel strength. 

Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare campaign with 

its disregard for neutral rights on the high seas was a major factor in 

bringing the United States into World War I. Under the Secretary of

the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations exercised direction and control 

of the mammoth naval effort. A stream of destroyer- and cruiser-escorted 

convoys carried millions of troops and their supplies through U-boatinfested watersto the battlefields of France. Destroyers based onAtlantic

coast ports and in Europe were joined by naval aircraft for a vigorous 

offensive against the German submarines. The U.S. Navy rapidly 

developed and produced antisubmarine mines and took the leading 

role in laying the huge North Sea Mine Barrage from Scotland to 

Norway. A division of American battleships operated with the British 

Grand Fleet and, in France, heavy naval guns mounted on railway cars 

and manned by U.S. gunners pounded enemy targets at long range. 

Following the defeat of the Central Powers and the Armistice 

of November 11, 1918, Admiral Benson went to Paris as naval adviser 

to the U.S. delegation at the peace conference and as a member of the 

Admirals of Allied and Associated Powers Committee, which 

recommended the naval provisions of the treaty. He strongly defended 

American interests in reference to freedom of the seas and fleet

expansion. Admiral Benson retired from the naval service on September 

25, 1919, urging resumption of the construction of major combatant 

ships that had been suspended during the war in order to concentrate 

production on antisubmarine forces.

William Shepherd Benson was born in Macon, Georgia, 

on September 25, 1855, and entered the U.S. Naval 

Academy from his native state, graduating with the 

class of 1877. He saw early service in the historic frigate 

USS Constitution (“Old Ironsides”) and the USS Hartford—of Civil

War fame. In 1883 Benson was attached to USS Yantic in search of

the lost Greely arctic exploring expedition. The future Chief of Naval 

Operations served three tours at the Naval Academy during the 1890s 

and early 1900s as an instructor in seamanship and senior assistant to 

the Commandant of Midshipmen (termed “Cadets” at that time). While

at the academy, Benson, then a lieutenant commander, revised Admiral 

Stephen B. Luce’s Textbook of Seamanship.

Duty on board USS New York and USS Kearsarge was 

followed by command of USS Albany in 1908, and a year later 

assignment as Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Promoted to captain

in 1909, Benson commanded the battleships USS Missouri and USS 

Utah. InAugust 1913 he was ordered to Commandant of the Philadelphia

Navy Yard with a supervision over the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval 

Districts. He was on duty in Philadelphia when appointed Chief of 

Naval Operations. Always a champion of a strong American merchant 

marine, Admiral Benson served as chairman of the United States 

Shipping Board and trustee of the Emergency Fleet Cooperation after 

his retirement from the Navy. He died at his Washington home on May 

20, 1932, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. Of this wartime 

and first Chief of Naval Operations, Edward M. House said, “Probably

no other American Admiral ever had so many momentous questions 

come before him or met them more wisely.”

Admiral Robert E. Coontz

Second Chief of Naval Operations

November 1, 1919–July 21, 1923

The immediate post-World War I years were dominated by

headlong demobilization of the armed forces, a mood of 

stringent economy in government, and the search for a lasting 

peace through disarmament and international agreements to 

limit naval armaments. Against this background, Admiral Coontz was 

confronted with the problem of retaining the Navy at a ship and manning 

level sufficient to assure safeguarding national defense and interests. 

	 Initially directing attention to the shore establishment, the

Chief of Naval Operations made personal inspection tours to obtain 

information “as to what station complements could be reduced, which

station could be closed down and possibly sold, and what other property 

could be transferred or disposed of.” Admiral Coontz and other staff 

officersjoined withAssistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt

Jr. to outline the United States’ position at the Washington Naval 

Conference of 1921–1922. The Chief of Naval Operations was an 

advisor to the American delegation. A capital ship ratio of 5:5:3 among 

Great Britain, the United States, and Japan was agreed upon by the 

conference. Admiral Coontz argued that such a ratio was meaningless 

unless the U.S. Navy was maintained at treaty strength. 

	 It was on the premise of treaty strength that he stood in firm

opposition to drastic cuts in naval appropriation by Congress following 

the Washington Conference. “Men fight, not ships,” was the expressed

conviction of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Just because a nation

has hundreds of thousand[s] of tons of naval vessels tied up in navy 

yards does not mean that the ratio is being maintained when compared 

to another navy of equal tonnage which is fully manned and highly 

trained.” He was instrumental in winning Congressional approval for 

an enlisted strength of 86,000 men and money for improvements at 

West Coast and Pearl Harbor navy yards. 

The Naval Research Laboratory, destined to achieve worldwide 

renown, became operational July 2, 1923. Naval aviation that had 

come of age in World War I combat moved ahead during Admiral

Coontz’s term as Chief of Naval Operations. The Bureau of Aeronautics 

was created in 1921, and the following year USS Langley, the Navy’s 

first aircraft carrier, was commissioned. Admiral Coontz sponsored

conversion of two uncompleted battle cruisers to aircraft carriers. They 

became USS Lexington and USS Saratoga and would be called upon 

to play historic roles in World War II, 20 years later.

Robert Edward Coontz was born in Hannibal, Missouri, on 

June 11, 1864. He entered the Naval Academy from that

state and graduated in the class of 1885. Ensign Coontz 

 served in the gunboat USS Pinta for nearly six years in 

Alaskan waters. The Spanish-American War found him on board USS 

Charleston, which participated in the capture of Guam and the final

bombardment of Manila.

	 Coontz was executive officer of USS Nebraska and made the

cruise around the world with the “Great White Fleet.” In 1909

he reported to the Naval Academy as Commandant of Midshipmen. 

Shore duty in Washington, DC, on the Board of Inspection and Survey

was followed by assignment as Naval Governor of Guam in 1912. 

Coontz commanded the battleship USS Georgia from December 1913 

until mid-1915 when he became Commandant, Navy Yard, Puget Sound. 

He was commanding Battleship Division Six, U.S. Pacific Fleet, when

named as Chief of Naval Operations.

	 After his four years in that office, Admiral Coontz became

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and later Commandant, Fifth Naval 

District. He retired on June 11, 1928, and died at Puget Sound Naval 

Hospital on January 26, 1935. Burial was in Hannibal, Missouri.

Admiral Edward W. Eberle

Third Chief of Naval Operations

July 21, 1923–November 14, 1927

The fate of naval aviation and a critical cruiser shortage in the 

U.S. Navy, political upheaval in the Caribbean, and continued 

turmoil in China requiring the presence of ships and U.S. 

Marines for the protection of American citizens and interests 

were prominent issues dominating Admiral Eberle’s term as Chief of 

Naval Operations.

	 In 1925 President Calvin Coolidge named a board under the

chairmanship of Dwight W. Morrow to formulate the first national

aviation policy for the United States. The Morrow Board considered 

not “only commercial aviation but also the place of military aviation

in the national defense.” Admiral Eberle’s testimony before the board 

convincingly countered extremist efforts to deprive the Navy of aviation 

or to form a separate aviation corps. He stressed that aviation must be 

integrated with the fleet and naval aviators must also be seamen. “The

air forces,” he said, “operating with the Navy, whether based on carriers

or on other vessels of the fleet, can only accomplish the maximum

results when their operations are coordinated with those of the surface 

and sub-surface vessels.” Eberle further testified that a separate naval

aviation corps would create a large body of officers and enlisted men,

“restricted presumably to aviation duties,” who, when serving afloat

and while not flying, “would be virtually passengers.” The Morrow

Board’s findings on naval aviation reflected the Chief of Naval

Operations’ thinking.

	 The Navy’s first rigid airship, Shenandoah, made a maiden

flight in September 1923. Post-World War I economies and the headlong

rush toward naval limitations seriously weakened the U.S. Navy, 

particularly in the category of modern cruisers. Admiral Eberle pressed 

the need for a “consistent and progressive shipbuilding program” to

achieve parity with Great Britain. His presentation of the Navy’s position 

to Congress, based on sound factual documentation, was instrumental 

in obtaining authorization for eight vitally needed cruisers of the 

Pensacola and Northampton classes. A change to Navy regulations in 

1924 broadened the powers of the Chief of Naval Operations, authorizing

him to “coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply

of personnel therefor as to insure maximum readiness of the fleet for

war.”

Admiral Eberle was recognized as one of the Navy’s foremost 

training experts. As Chief of Naval Operations, his interest in training, 

combined with his sponsorship of a strong reserve, was reflected in a

major revision of the Naval Reserve structure and in affording reservists 

realistic up-to-date training. Likewise, the Naval Reserve Officer

Training Corps was established in universities “to provide systematic

instruction and training at civil educational institutions which will 

qualify selected students for appointment as officers in the Naval

Reserve. . . .”

Born in Denton, Texas, on August 17, 1864, Edward Walter

Eberle entered the U.S. Naval Academy from Arkansas and 

graduated with the class of 1885. He was in charge of the 

forward turret onboard USS Oregon at the Battle of Santiago 

in 1898 when the Spanish fleet was destroyed. Eberle took part in

Philippine pacification operations before returning for duty at the Naval

Academy as Aide to the Superintendent and Commander of Ships. At 

the academy he wrote Gun and Torpedo Drills for the United States 

Navy—the first such manual prepared for modern ordnance.

	 Serving as aide and flag lieutenant to Commander in Chief,

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Eberle, then a lieutenant commander, helped set 

up the first wireless telegraph installation on naval vessels. He also

prepared operating instructions and developed codes for this new and 

vital communication medium. He served as executive officer on USS

Louisiana during the historic around the world cruise of the “Great

White Fleet.”

	 Several commands afloat were followed by assignment in

1911 to command the Atlantic Torpedo Fleet, specifically to develop

tactical doctrine for the new destroyers coming into the Navy. Eberle 

pioneered in the use of smoke screens by destroyers and, off Guantanamo, 

he employed the emerging aviation corps to determine the depth at 

which submerged submarines could be detected from the air.

	 In November 1914 Eberle became Commandant of the

Washington Navy Yard and Naval Gun Factory, and was detached the 

following year to be Superintendent of the Naval Academy. 

The acute need for officers generated by World War I expansion placed

heavy demands on the academy, which Eberle met with efficiency and

resourcefulness. Enlarged and accelerated classes of men were graduated 

in three years; at the same time large numbers of young men were 

rapidly trained at the academy as Naval Reserve officers.

	 Following World War I, Admiral Eberle commanded two

battleship divisions in the Atlantic Fleet. He was designated Commander 

in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet in July 1921 and two years later was named

Chief of Naval Operations. 

After completing his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, 

Admiral Eberle served on the General Board until his retirement, August 

17, 1928. He died at the Naval Hospital, Washington, on July 6, 1929, 

and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral Charles F. Hughes

Fourth Chief of Naval Operations

November 14, 1927–September 17, 1930

Admiral Hughes expressed three primary objectives as Chief 

of Naval Operations: to organize and train the fleet to the

highest state of efficiency and provide a nucleus for

expansion in case of national emergency, to protect 

American interests in the disturbed areas of the world, and to cultivate 

friendly relations with foreign peoples.

	 Aircraft carriers became part of the Battle Fleet for the first

time while Admiral Hughes was Chief of Naval Operations. USS 

Saratoga and USS Lexington joined in 1928 and participated in 

the fleet exercises of 1929 and 1930. These annual exercises convinced

Admiral Hughes that an urgent need existed for additional light cruisers 

of improved design. The Chief of Naval Operations stated, “the light

cruisers present with the fleet demonstrated their value, and the need

for still larger numbers of these important craft was, as always in these 

problems, an obvious conclusion.” He successfully pressed for the 

authorization of 15 light cruisers. Likewise, the notable success of 

USS Saratoga and USS Lexington in the fleet exercises highlighted

the requirement for expansion of naval aviation.

	 In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee

in January 1929, Admiral Hughes asserted, “the general war

readiness of the fleet is not being maintained, and increased funds

are needed for this purpose.” During his term as Chief of Naval 

Operations, five new light cruisers were added to the fleet; USS

Ranger, the first ship in the U.S. Navy designed from the keel up

as an aircraft carrier, was authorized; and the number of naval 

aircraft increased from 297 in 1928 to a total of 875 in 1930. With 

the onset of the Great Depression, however, naval construction and 

operating funds, as well as personnel levels, were severely curtailed.

Political tumult in China and the Caribbean necessitated the 

presence of ships and Marines to safeguard American nationals and 

interests. Assistance afforded by U.S. Sailors and Marines in the 

Nicaraguan election of November 1928 was notable. Admiral Hughes 

observed that “the conduct of the election was a success in every

respect; no disorder occurred, there was no intimidation of voters, and 

the presidential candidate of both political parties publicly acknowledged 

the fairness and impartiality that characterized the entire conduct of 

the election.”

Charles Frederick Hughes was born on October 14, 1866, in

Bath, Maine. Graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 

1888 was followed by more than a decade of virtually 

continuous sea duty. During this period he became an expert 

in deep sea sounding. In the monitor USS Monterey during the SpanishAmerican War, he participated in the bombardment of Manila’s defenses, 

and later, while on board USS Concord, took part in operations against 

Philippine insurgents. Varioustypes of duties afloat and ashore including

hydrographic work, torpedo instruction, and a tour in the Bureau of 

Equipment followed until December 1911 when he received his first

command, USS Birmingham. After the Titanic disaster, Birmingham 

was assigned to the first ice patrol ever formed by any nation.

Captain Hughes commanded USS New York when that 

battleship was one of the squadron that joined Britain’s Grand Fleet 

during World War I. Promoted to rear admiral after the war, Hughes

was assigned fleet commands of ever-increasing responsibility, briefly

attended the Naval War College, and had duty as Director of the Fleet 

Training Division in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. With a

four-star rank, he assumed command of the U.S. Fleet, September 4,

1926, and the next year was appointed Chief of Naval Operations. 

Admiral Hughes retired November 1, 1930, and died at his 

home in Chevy Chase, Maryland, on May 28, 1934. He is buried in

Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral William V. Pratt

Fifth Chief of Naval Operations

September 17, 1930–June 30, 1933

The challenges facing Admiral Pratt as Chief of Naval 

Operations were compounded by the severe national problems 

of the economic depression. Terms of the just-concluded 

London Naval Treaty had to be implemented, the fleet

demanded modernization, and somehow the level of adequately trained 

personnel had to be maintained.

Admiral Pratt had supported the London Naval Treaty on the 

premise that the Navy would be built to treaty strength. Accordingly, 

he urged upon the President and Congress a long-range building program 

to attain this objective; stringent economy in all areas was also a 

necessity.

	 In November 1930, the Chief of Naval Operations approved

reorganization of the U.S. Fleet into four forces: Battle Force, Scouting 

Force, Submarine Force, and Base Force. Thus for operations and fleet

exercises ships were grouped into forces best suited to perform any 

given mission. For other than operational purposes, continuity of 

command was achieved by assigning ships to type commands.

	 At about the same time this fleet organization was adopted,

Admiral Pratt, acting within the context of the London Treaty as well 

as for economy and improved efficiency, ordered a reduction of 4,800

men and the disposal or decommissioning of 48 ships.

The depression deepened, and more severe cuts in personnel, 

ship construction, and alterations were in the offing. In 1932, without

success, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed suspension of 

construction on several destroyers in order to keep on active duty 5,000 

men scheduled to be released.

As a means of obtaining a maximum state of readiness in 

this fiscal and manpower crisis, Admiral Pratt sponsored a “Rotating

Reserve” plan wherein one third of the ships would be laid up on a 

rotating basis with skeleton crews, while the remainder operated with 

full peacetime complements.

Admiral Pratt found one bright spot in the personnel attrition 

being forced on the Navy. He saw it as an opportunity to upgrade naval 

leadership and the overall caliber, physically and educationally, of men 

accepted into the service. Nationwide unemployment had enhanced 

the attractiveness of a naval enlistment to highly qualified young men.

	 In spite of a drastically limited budget,some fleet modernization

went forward. Conversion of the battleships’ fuel from coal to oil was 

completed, and limited new construction was funded. Aviation as a 

fleet arm took on increased importance. The keel of the USS Ranger,

the first ship of the U.S. Navy to be built as an aircraft carrier, was

laid. Men assigned to aviation duties by the end of June 1932 had 

increased to 12,408, or 15.6 percent of the Navy’s total personnel

strength as compared to 4.9 percent in 1923. The number of aircraft

exceeded 1,000 by 1933.

	 Admiral Pratt firmly held that the nation’s best defense posture

demanded close coordination between the Army and Navy. Working 

with his Army counterpart, General Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of 

Naval Operations reached agreements on such subjects as radio 

communication networks and the roles of the respective services in 

coastal defense. They jointly opposed creation of a Department of 

Defense and a separate air force because no economies would be realized 

by the move. Additionally, Admiral Pratt argued the growing offensive 

capability of naval aviation would be destroyed if taken from Navy 

control.

	 The Manchurian Incident in the fall of 1931 unveiled Japan’s

aggressive intent in China and foreshadowed the cataclysmic events 

of a decade later. Admiral Pratt ordered the Atlantic-based Scouting 

Force to join the Battle Force in the Pacific to form a united U.S. Fleet.

William Veazie Pratt was born in Belfast, Maine, on 

February 28, 1869, and graduated in the U.S. Naval 

Academy class of 1889. During his early career, he 

served in ships of the new steel Navy including USS 

Atlanta and USS Chicago. The Spanish-American War found Pratt on 

board USS Mayflower participating in the blockade of the Cuban coast.

Various sea assignments as navigator and executive officer were

followed by attendance at the Naval War College from 1911 to 1913, 

command of USS Birmingham, and instruction at the Army War College. 

Pratt, now a captain, was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations in 1917, and the following year was named Assistant Chief 

of Naval Operations. As Admiral Benson’s principal assistant, he played 

a key role in directing naval operations during World War I.

He acted as a naval adviser to President Woodrow Wilson at 

the Paris Peace Conference. Returning from Europe, he assumed 

command of USS New York and was then Commander, Destroyer 

Force, Pacific, from October 1920 to July 1921. He was a technical

advisor at both the Washington and London Naval conferences. Prior 

to being named Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Pratt had been 

president of the Naval War College, served on the General Board, and 

had held top fleet commands, including Commander in Chief, U.S.

Fleet.

	 Admiral Pratt retired after 47 years of naval service on June

30, 1933. President Franklin Roosevelt briefly recalled him to active

duty in 1941 to help expedite the development of escort carriers to

counter the German submarine threat.

He died at the Naval Hospital, Chelsea, Massachusetts, on 

November 25, 1957, and is buried in the town of his birth. The New 

York Times carried an obituary tribute: “Admiral Pratt was a naval

commander of the old school with a firm faith in the enduring role of

sea power in a nation’s defense and a strong belief in the value of 

constant mobility, both in peace and war.”

Admiral William H. Standley

Sixth Chief of Naval Operations

July 1, 1933–January 1, 1937

These were years in which the clouds of impending conflict

were thickening over Europe and Asia and which witnessed 

political upheaval in Cuba, requiring the presence of U.S. 

Navy ships in the Caribbean.

	 The readiness and efficiency of the Navy were critically

hampered by deep personnel reductions imposed since the outset of 

the economic depression. Meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

several days before reporting as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 

Standley stated frankly, “Mr. President, to operate our fleet on this

basis is unfair to the American people. They think they have a fleet in

being. In reality, it is a phantom fleet.” He advised that the Navy was

short some 30,000 enlisted men and requested an immediate increase 

in naval personnel. “If we do not get it, I am going to recommend that

we lay up enough ships so that the ones we do operate will be effective 

fighting units of a smaller Fleet ready for action on a moment’s notice.”

Admiral Standley’s solid argument prevailed and the downward trend 

was reversed during his term as Chief of Naval Operations. The Fleet 

Marine Force was established December 7, 1933.

To meet the needs of the constant technological changes 

inherent in a modern fleet, Admiral Standley staunchly advocated

adopting a regular schedule of ship replacement. The system evolved 

would thus prevent vessels from becoming obsolete en masse. Shortly 

after his 1933 inauguration, President Roosevelt allocated public works 

funds amounting to $238 million to proceed with the building of some 

32 naval vessels of varying types. Following this impetus, the Chief 

of Naval Operations and his staff took the leading role in drafting a 

bill to enable the Navy to build to full strength allowable under the 

Washington and London naval treaties. Championed by Congressman 

Carl Vinson and Senator Park Trammell, the Vinson-Trammell Act 

became law on March 27, 1934, and was a major step toward providing

the nucleus of the Navy that would have to fight in World War II. A

working plan was devised that provided for annual building programs 

designed to bring the U.S. Navy to treaty strength by 1942 and to

ensure replacement of overage tonnage.

	 Illness forced Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson to be

frequently absent from the Department, and Admiral Standley often 

bore the added responsibility of performing the duties of the Secretary’s 

office. The Chief of Naval Operations was also a delegate to the second

London Naval Conference in 1935–1936.

William Harrison Standley was born in Ukiah, California, 

on December 18, 1872. After graduation from the U.S. 

Naval Academy in 1895, he was ordered to USS 

Olympia. He had Spanish-American War service in the 

monitor USS Monterey and was in the gunboat USS Yorktown during 

the Philippine Insurrection. Standley’s varied tours afloat, including

command, for the next 16 years were broken by assignment ashore at 

Tutuila, Samoa, to serve as Captain of the Yard, Chief Customs Officer,

and Commander of the Native Guard. He was ordered to the Naval 

Academy in 1916 where he supervised construction of the new 

seamanship and navigation buildings and the enlargement of Bancroft 

Hall. A year in command of USS Virginia preceded attendance at the 

Naval War College and staff duty with the Battle Fleet.

	 In 1923 he reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations as Head of the War Plans Division. He took command of 

the battleship USS California on February 15, 1926.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1927, Standley returned to 

Washington, DC, as Director of the Fleet Training Division, Office of

the Chief of Naval Operations, and later was named Assistant Chief 

of Naval Operations. Various type commands followed and in 1933, 

just prior to being named Chief of Naval Operations, he was Commander, 

Battle Force, U.S. Fleet.

Admiral Standley retired on January 1, 1937, but was recalled 

to active duty on February 13, 1941, and served on a number of boards

and commissions. In the historic tradition of the naval officer diplomat,

Admiral Standley was U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 

February 1942 to October 1943. He was again relieved of all active

duty on August 31, 1945.

Admiral Standley died in San Diego, California, on October 

25, 1963. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy

Seventh Chief of Naval Operations

January 2, 1937–August 1, 1939

Admiral Leahy entered upon his duties as Chief of Naval 

Operations at a point when the international scene and the 

outlook for peace were deteriorating rapidly 

in Europe andAsia. During his first year in office, an acute

crisis was created when Japanese aircraft sank the gunboat USS Panay 

in China’s Yangtze River.

The Chief of Naval Operations faced the urgent requirement 

of preparing the Navy for large-scale combat action should the nation 

become enmeshed in a global war. He pressed relentlessly for increased 

naval strength to meet the mounting threat. His vigorous support resulted 

in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1938. This legislation upped 

authorized tonnage by 20 percent and fixed the number of naval aircraft

at no fewer than 3,000. Funds for the aircraft carrier USS Hornet and 

South Dakota-class battleships were also provided.

The serious lag in base development was of particular concern 

to Admiral Leahy. Under his guidance, the Hepburn Board conducted 

a detailed study of base requirements. Although unable to implement 

the board’s recommendations fully, the Chief of Naval Operations 

obtained a Congressional appropriation of $65 million for 15 air bases 

extending from Kodiak to Palmyra Island in the Pacific, and from San

Juan, Puerto Rico, to Quonset Point, Rhode Island, in the Atlantic.

Upon completion of his term as Chief of Naval Operations, 

Admiral Leahy was placed on the retired list. However, the illustrious 

career of this distinguished officer was far from finished. He was

Governor of Puerto Rico from September 1939 until November 1940

when he became U.S. Ambassador to France. Admiral Leahy held this 

difficult diplomatic post in Vichy for more than two years. President

Franklin D. Roosevelt, acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief, 

returned Leahy to active duty and named him his Chief of Staff in July 

1942. TheAdmiral presided over meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

as well as the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff when the United States 

was host country. As a senior adviser, he accompanied the President 

to all the historic wartime international meetings. Leahy was promoted 

to five star fleet admiral rank on December 15, 1944.

President Harry S. Truman accepted Fleet Admiral Leahy’s 

resignation as Chief of Staff on March 2, 1949, but like all five star

fleet admirals, he remained on active duty in an advisory capacity to

the Secretary of the Navy.

William Daniel Leahy was born on May 6, 1875, in 

Hampton, Iowa. His 1897 Naval Academy class

graduated in time to see active Spanish-American War 

service. Leahy was in the USS Oregon when she made 

her celebrated speed dash from the West Coast around Cape Horn to 

take part in the decisive battle off Santiago, Cuba. Returning to the 

Pacific, he took part in the operations to suppress the Philippine

Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion in China. Leahy was an instructor

in the Department of Physics and Chemistry at the Naval Academy 

for his firstshore duty from 1907 to 1909. Sea assignments as navigator

and ordnance officer followed the Naval Academy tour. Late in 1912

he was ordered to Washington, DC, as Assistant Director of Gunnery 

Practice and Engineering Competitions.

	 World War I duty for Leahy was as executive officer of USS

Nevada and Commanding Officer of a troop transport. The postwar

years found him filling a broad spectrum ofship and shore assignments

with emphasis on ordnance duties. He took command of USS New 

Mexico in June 1926 and 16 months later was appointed Chief of the 

Bureau of Ordnance. On another Washington, DC, tour from 1933 to 

1935, he was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Admiral Leahy was 

Commander in Chief, Battle Force, flying his four star flag on USS

California, when appointed Chief of Naval Operations.

Fleet Admiral Leahy died at the Naval Hospital Bethesda, 

Maryland, on July 20, 1959. He is buried in Arlington National 

Cemetery.

Admiral Harold R. Stark

Eighth Chief of Naval Operations

August 1, 1939–March 26, 1942

Amonth after Admiral Stark assumed his duties as Chief 

of Naval Operations, Hitler’s army invaded Poland, and 

World War II was underway. Western hemisphere defense

and the Navy’s combat readiness were matters of such 

urgency as to permit no delay should the nation be drawn into the war.

To prevent belligerent actions in a zone encompassing water 

approaches to the Western hemisphere, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 

on September 5, 1939, ordered formation of a Neutrality Patrol—an 

action subsequently endorsed by the Pan-American states. Within a 

week eight units had been organized to cover offshore waters from 

Newfoundland to the Guianas. The Chief of Naval Operations called 

the presence of the Neutrality Patrol “a deterrent against embarrassing

situations which might come within our waters.”

	 Admiral Stark spearheaded the drive for “Two Ocean Navy”

legislation, that passed Congress in July 1940. The Naval Expansion

Act provided more than 1.3 million tons of new construction, including 

Essex-class carriers, Iowa-class battleships, Cleveland- and Baltimoreclasses light and heavy cruisers, submarines, Fletcher-class destroyers, 

plus auxiliaries, and escort vessels. Considerable time would, of course, 

be required before the tonnage authorized by this act actually became 

available. However, the active fleet was markedly strengthened when

battleships USS North Carolina and USS Washington and aircraft carrier 

USS Hornet were commissioned in 1941.

	 World War I duty with Admiral William S. Sims in London

had impressed upon Admiral Stark the vital nature of early planning 

for coordination between the U.S. and Royal navies. Accordingly in 

mid-1940, the Chief of Naval Operations sent Rear Admiral Robert

L. Ghormley to England for informal conversations with British naval 

authorities. This was a move toward a 1941 series of secret AngloAmerican staff planning sessions from which emerged agreements on 

major strategy and combined operations.

The Chief of Naval Operations prepared a perceptive national 

strategy evaluation that he presented to Secretary of the Navy Dudley 

W. Knox in November 1940. Admiral Stark recognized that Japan’s

aggressive expansion threatened vital national interests in the Pacific,

but he reasoned that Nazi Germany represented the gravest danger to 

American security. Therefore, he held that the right course would be 

an initial offensive strategy in the Atlantic and defensive in the Pacific

if the United States entered the war.

The U.S. Navy, in addition to Neutrality Patrol Operations, 

undertook limited convoys of merchantmen carrying lend-lease 

materials and implemented the “Destroyers for Bases” agreement,

which aided Britain’s battle against German U-boats and provided 

the United States with a chain of bases in the Atlantic for hemisphere 

defense. This was the “short of war” period that ended abruptly when

the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

	 Following President Roosevelt’s decision to have one officer

serve as wartime Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Fleet, Admiral Stark was relieved by Admiral King as CNO. 

Admiral Stark remained on active duty as Commander, U.S. Naval 

Forces, Europe, with headquarters in England, from April 1942, until

the end of World War II. His command embraced all U.S. naval forces

assigned to British waters and in the Atlantic coastal waters of Europe.

Harold Rainsford Stark was born in Wilkes Barre, 

Pennsylvania, on November 12, 1880. He entered the U.S. 

Naval Academy in 1899 and graduated with the class of 

1903. He was the first twentieth-century graduate of the

academy to become Chief of Naval Operations. 

While on duty in the battleship USS Minnesota, Stark made 

the “Great White Fleet” cruise around the world, 1907–1909. During

the next six years, he commanded four different destroyers and was 

engineering officer of the cruiser USS Brooklyn. 

	 He went to the Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, in

1915 and, in June 1917, shortly after the United States’ entry into World 

War I, he took command of Torpedo Flotilla,Asiatic Fleet. He steamed

his small destroyers in record time from the Philippines to the 

Mediterranean, where he took an active part in the antisubmarine 

campaign. Stark was detached in November 1917 to join Admiral Sims’ 

staff in London.

	 Duty in battleships, on major fleetstaffs, at ordnance activities,

and command at sea and as a Naval War College student 

were Stark’s assignments in the decade after World War I. He then

served as Aide to Secretaries of the Navy Charles F. Adams and Claude 

A. Swanson. A year commanding USS West Virginia was followed by 

assignment as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance in 1934 with the rank

of rear admiral. Returning to sea duty in 1937, Admiral Stark was 

Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, with his flag in USS Honolulu,

when chosen to succeed Admiral Leahy as Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Stark was placed on the retired list as of April 1, 

1946. He died at his Washington, DC, home on August 20, 1972, and

is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King

Ninth Chief of Naval Operations

March 26, 1942–December 15, 1945

F

leet Admiral King provided American naval leadership for 

World War II. Even in the darkest days immediately after the

Pearl Harbor attack, King never deviated from his basic 

precept: “We must do all that we can with what we have.” He

combined an iron will, decisiveness of character, and insatiable capacity 

for work with high intelligence and an encyclopedic knowledge of 

naval subjects. Against all obstacles, these strengths and adherence to 

the principle of the initiative of the subordinate, carried him through 

the four years of war.

	 Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets

came under the operational command of Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Fleet only for combined operations. Faced with the problem of a “two

ocean war” against the Axis powers of Europe and against Japan, 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered that “the Commander in Chief,

United States Fleet, shall have supreme command of the operating 

forces comprising the several fleets of the United States Navy and the

operating forces of the naval coastal frontier commands, and shall be 

directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of 

the Navy, to the President of the United States therefor.”

Admiral King assumed these duties on December 30 and 

shifted from the flagship to Washington, DC. RelievingAdmiral Stark

on March 26, l942, he also became Chief of Naval Operations. The

President directed that these duties, under the Secretary, “shall be

contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander 

in Chief, United States Fleet.”

Although combined under Admiral King, the Headquarters, 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations remained separate entities throughout the war. In general

terms COMINCH planned and executed operations, while CNO planned

for and provided the men, ships, aircraft, and supplies necessary to 

carry out operations at sea.

Admiral King was the U.S. Navy member of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff. He participated in 

and left his imprint on every important war conference from Casa 

Blanca to Yalta. While fully supporting the basic allied strategy of 

defeating Germany first, King nevertheless steadfastly insisted that

adequate strength go into the Pacific to keep pressure on the Japanese

enemy and prevent it from consolidating earlier gains.

German U-boat sinkings, including off America’s East Coast 

and in the Caribbean, continued to rise to the point that Britain’s 

survival was in doubt. Admiral King took extraordinary actions. He 

transferred the Convoy and Routing Section of CNO to the U.S. Fleet 

staff in the spring of 1942. As antisubmarine activities expanded and

committed forces grew, he recognized the need for overall direction 

of operations, new techniques and tactics, and close liaison with the 

Army Air Corps, the British, and the Canadians. On May 20, 1943,

Admiral King established the Tenth Fleet, an antisubmarine command, 

to exercise direct control over all facets of the Navy’s war against 

U-boats, and for that purpose to allocate antisubmarine forces to all 

commands in the Atlantic. Admiral King assumed command of the 

Tenth Fleet, which included a research-statistical analysis group 

composed of civilian scientists within its structure.

Under Admiral King’s direction the U.S. Navy became the 

most versatile sea force ever conceived. The U-boat was beaten in the 

Atlantic, and amphibious operations, unprecedented in their magnitude, 

led to land operations that brought Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” crashing

down. In the Pacific, U.S. submarines severed Japan’s lifelines as

powerful task forces fought their way through the island chains to 

Tokyo Bay, and the Japanese surrendered on board USS Missouri on 

September 2, 1945.

	 On October 10, 1945, the headquarters of Commander in

Chief, U.S. Fleet, was dissolved, and operational command of the 

operating forces reverted to the Chief of Naval Operations. Fleet Admiral 

King turned over his responsibilities to Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz 

two months later.

Ernest Joseph King was born in Lorain, Ohio, on November 

23, 1878. Prior to graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy 

in 1901, his class saw brief Spanish-American War service. 

Five years of sea duty were followed by three years instructing 

in ordnance and gunnery at the Naval Academy. King returned to sea 

in 1909, serving in various staff and engineering assignments and, in 

1912, he came ashore for duty at the Engineering Experiment Station, 

Annapolis, MD. His first command was the destroyer USS Terry in

1914.

	 During World War I, King was awarded the Navy Cross for

“distinguished service in the line of his profession as Assistant Chief

of Staff for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.” Captain 

King’s postwar duty brought him back to the Naval Academy to head 

the Postgraduate Department. He commanded several submarine 

divisions and the Submarine Base, New London, from 1923 to 1926. 

During this tour he was officer in charge of the salvaging of USS S-51,

which sank off Block Island in September 1925.

	 In January 1927 King reported to NavalAir Station, Pensacola,

for flight training and was designated a naval aviator on May 26 of

that year. Aviation-related assignments afloat and ashore followed,

interrupted in 1927 by temporary duty in command of the salvage 

force that raised USS S-4. In 1930 he took command of USS Lexington.

He next completed the senior course at the Naval War College and 

then was Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics as a rear admiral until 

June of 1936.

Admiral King served as a member of the General Board and 

continued to move up the command ladder. On February 1, 1941, he

was named Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, from which 

assignment he became Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet/Chief of Naval 

Operations. He was the first naval aviator named Chief of Naval

Operations. The President nominated him for Fleet Admiral, and he 

took the oath of office for that five star rank on December 20, 1944.

After being relieved as Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet 

Admiral King continued to serve in an advisory capacity in the Office

of the Secretary of the Navy. He died at the Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, 

New Hampshire, on June 25, 1956, and is buried in the Naval Academy 

Cemetery, Annapolis, MD. Of Fleet Admiral King, the distinguished 

naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote, “He was a sailor’s sailor,

who neither had nor wanted any life outside the Navy.”

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

Tenth Chief of Naval Operations

December 15, 1945–December 15, 1947

After brilliantly leading American forces to victory in World 

War II, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, the Commander in Chief,

U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, hauled down

his flag at Pearl Harbor and relieved Fleet Admiral King

as Chief of Naval Operations. Accorded a hero’s welcome at home, 

the quiet, self-effacing officer described himself as merely “a

representative of the brave men who fought” under his command.

When Admiral Nimitz took over as Chief of Naval Operations, 

rapid demobilization was the order of the day. He was faced with the 

perplexing problem of maintaining an effective fleet to carry out

extensive operational commitmentsthroughout the world. In the Pacific,

naval vessels engaged in “Operation Magic Carpet” brought home

more than two million American servicemembers over a period of six 

months. Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and other troops were lifted to 

their homelands, as the Navy conducted operations in the disarmament 

and the transfer of control and occupation of territories previously held 

by the enemies.

The task of reducing the most powerful Navy in history to a 

fraction of its wartime peak entailed drastic cutbacks in ships, personnel, 

and the shore establishment; surplus property disposal; and cancellations 

of construction contracts. Fleet Admiral Nimitz provided the 

administration necessary to achieve this huge rollback in an orderly 

fashion without destroying the Navy’s effectiveness. Programs were 

initiated for the establishment and maintenance of active and reserve 

fleets with the potential strength and readiness required to support

national policy.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz faced a new set of challenges to 

American naval power. With the destruction of the German and Japanese 

navies and the advent of the atomic bomb, the continuance of a major 

U.S. Navy was questioned. Nimitz was persuasive in his efforts to 

retain balanced naval forces.

	 In response to the campaign to merge the military services

within a single executive department and under a single Chief of Staff, 

his leadership played a key role in achieving a reasonable compromise, 

one in which naval aviation and the Marine Corps remained under the 

Department of the Navy.

The Navy effectively met the new challenges of the Cold 

War. The deployment of naval forces to crisis points in the Mediterranean 

and elsewhere was a major influence in stemming Communist advances.

	 In the midst of overriding demobilization pressures and

extensive operational commitments overseas, Fleet Admiral Nimitz 

remained acutely aware that the efficiency of the postwar Navy hinged

on the continued development and use of technological innovations 

generated by the war. To prepare to meet future threats, the Navy 

stressed research and development. Emphasis was placed on 

antisubmarine warfare and, in January 1946, a Coordinator of Undersea

Warfare was established in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

with responsibilities for both submarines and antisubmarine warfare. 

The Chief of Naval Operations also directed attention to the potential 

of guided missiles as seagoing weapon systems and to nuclear energy 

for ship propulsion. Prophetically, he reported, “the Navy of the future

will be capable of launching missiles from surface vessels and 

submarines, and of delivering atomic bombs from carrier-based planes.” 

As his two-year term drew to a close late in 1947, the first post-World

War II Chief of Naval Operations could take satisfaction that the Navy

had weathered the hazards of demobilization and reorganization. 

Transition to a peacetime posture had been the main problem when 

Fleet Admiral Nimitz assumed office; Cold War operations and

preparedness for possible conflict were in the forefront when he left.

Chester William Nimitz was born in Fredericksburg, Texas, 

on February 24, 1885. After graduation from the

Naval Academy in 1905, he was on the China Station 

for two years where, as an ensign, he had his first command,

the gunboat USS Panay. Nimitz was with the young submarine service 

until 1913 when he was sent to Germany and Belgium to study diesel 

engines. Duty in the USS Maumee, the first diesel powered surface

ship in the U.S. Navy, followed and, during 

World War I, he was Chief of Staff to Commander, Submarine Force,

U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Post-World War I assignments included a tour as

Senior Member, Board of Submarine Design in the Navy Department; 

as executive officer of USS South Carolina; command of USS Chicago;

on the staff of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and as a student at the 

Naval War College. Speaking at the college after World War II, Fleet

Admiral Nimitz reflected on the value of his training there: “The war

with Japan had been reenacted in the game room here by so many 

people in so many different ways that nothing that happened during 

the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics 

toward the end of the war; we had not visualized those.”

	 In August of 1926 he was ordered to the University of

California where he established one of the first Naval Reserve Officer

Training Corps units. Various submarine and surface assignments 

followed, and in 1933 he commanded USS Augusta, flagship of the

Asiatic Fleet. Again returning to Washington, DC, he was Assistant 

Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for three years, back to sea to 

command a battleship division, and then Chief of the Bureau of 

Navigation in 1939. Admiral Nimitz was serving as Bureau Chief when 

he was chosen to be Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Shortly

thereafter he was given the additional responsibilities of joint command 

as Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. He was elevated to

five-star fleet admiral rank in December 1944. Fleet Admiral Nimitz

was one of the signatories of the Japanese surrender documents on 

board USS Missouri on September 2, 1945. He signed for the United

States as General Douglas MacArthur signed for the United Nations.

Detached as Chief of Naval Operations, he became Special 

Assistant (Western Sea Frontier) to the Secretary of the Navy. Fleet 

Admiral Nimitz was extremely active in educational, cultural, and 

community affairs. He died at his quarters, Yerba Buena Island, San

Francisco, CA, on February 20, 1966, and is buried in Golden Gate 

National Cemetery.

Admiral Louis E. Denfeld

Eleventh Chief of Naval Operations

December 15, 1947–November 2, 1949

Admiral Denfeld’s term as Chief of Naval Operations was a 

time of stringent peacetime economy and severe cutbacks 

in the national defense budget. Competition for the limited 

funds and intense debate over the roles, force levels, and 

missions of the three military services followed enactment of the National 

Security Act of 1947. At the same time, the need continued for U.S.

naval forces to counter increasing threats to peace in the Mediterranean 

and Far Eastern waters.

The Chief of Naval Operations emphasized the goal of 

coordination of effort. He voiced Navy support of the unification concept

on the basis of each service being admitted to full membership on the 

defense team.

Admiral Denfeld expressed grave concern over the prospect 

that during this period of ferment, transition, and a sharply reduced fleet,

the Navy could be relegated to solely a convoy and antisubmarine role. 

Aware also of the dangers inherent in over reliance on a single weapon 

system, such as strategic bombing, he called for a balanced national 

defense.

The Chief of Naval Operations resolutely set forth the nation’s 

need of balanced naval forces to support the United States’ interests in 

times of peace, to deter war, and to be prepared for defensive and 

offensive missions in times of war. To meet these commitments to 

national security, Admiral Denfeld reasoned logically, the Navy must 

have the Marine Corps, aircraft carriers, and the modern weapon systems 

made possible by ever expanding technology research. He also recognized 

the Navy needed to move forward development to provide the Navy 

with carrier-based atomic attack capability. Other areas of emphasis 

included antisubmarine warfare and airborne and surface-launched 

guided missiles. The seaplane tender USS Norton Sound was converted 

to a mobile missile testing platform.

	 In April 1948 the Soviet Union precipitated a major crisis by

cutting off land access to West Berlin. U.S. Air Force planes were joined 

by naval aircraft in the celebrated Berlin Airlift. Hundreds of thousands 

of tons of food and supplies were shuttled to the isolated city, while 

Navy tankers delivered millions of gallons of aviation gasoline at 

Bremerhaven, Germany, to keep the humanitarian lift going and break 

the Russian blockade.

The Navy assumed sealift responsibilities for all the armed 

services on October 1, 1949, when the Military SeaTransportation Service

(MSTS) was established under the command of the Chief of Naval 

Operations.

Although Admiral Denfeld’s testimony before Congress and 

his public statements on strategy for national security and the maintenance 

of strong, ready naval forces reflected thoughtful moderation, he was

relieved as Chief of Naval Operations prior to the completion of his tour.

Louis Emil Denfeld was born in Westboro, Massachusetts, on 

April 13, 1891. Entering the U.S. Naval Academy from 

Minnesota, he graduated in 1912 and, following the pattern of 

the period, went to battleship duty. His World War I service

was in USS Ammen, a destroyer based on Queenstown, Ireland. He

continued in destroyers after the war, including command of USS McCall. 

In 1922, Denfeld, then a lieutenant commander, reported to New London

for instruction in submarines. He served in USS S-30 and commanded 

USS S-24 until June 1924, when he was detailed to the Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations for duty in the Ships Movements Division. 

This shore tour was followed by command of destroyer USS Brooks.

	 Between 1929 and World War II, Denfeld alternated between

the Bureau of Navigation, destroyer division command, and duty on 

major staffs afloat. As a rear admiral, he was Assistant Chief of the

Bureau of Naval Personnel from January 1942 to March 1945. He then

commanded Battleship Division Nine, and with his flag on USS

Wisconsin, he participated in the Okinawa operation and bombardment 

of the Japanese home islands.

	 Immediately afterJapan’ssurrender he returned toWashington,

DC, as Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel with 

the rank of vice admiral. He directed the Navy’s successfully concluded 

demobilization program and effected personnel plans 

for the postwar Navy. On February 28, 1947, Admiral Denfeld was

named Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific Fleet, and was so serving when appointed Chief of Naval

Operations.

Admiral Denfeld retired on March 1, 1950, and returned to 

live in his birthplace, Westboro, where he died on March 28, 1972. He 

is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman

Twelfth Chief of Naval Operations

November 2, 1949–July 22, 1951

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman was named Chief of Naval 

Operations at a critical period. The turbulence of defense 

unification and intense competition for the budget still

persisted. Both as Chief of Naval Operations and a member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sherman’s leadership and political 

statesmanship generated a confidence that did much to calm interservice

waters without sacrificing the Navy’s interests in aviation and other

vital areas. His marked success in working with the other services 

ideally fittedAdmiral Sherman to be Chief of Naval Operations at this

difficult time.

North Korean troops poured into South Korea on June 

25, 1950. Within the context of the United Nations resolution to assist 

South Korea in repelling the Communist invaders, American fighting

men were again in combat just five years after World War II ended.

U.S. Navy control of the sea was essential to the movement 

of men and supplies, the mounting of amphibious assaults,ship gunfire,

air support, and coastal blockade. Superimposed on Korean War tasks 

was President Truman’s order to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an invasion 

of Formosa by the Chinese Communists and also bar Nationalist attacks 

against the Chinese mainland.

The Chief of Naval Operations rapidly deployed naval forces 

to the Western Pacific. Mothballed ships in the reserve fleets were

reactivated and, to help man them, Naval Reservists were called to 

active duty.

Admiral Sherman played a prominent role in shaping the 

Korean War strategy. He recommended a blockade of the North Korean 

coast and went to Japan to participate in planning the historic “end-run”

amphibious assault at Inchon that sent the North Korean invaders

reeling back.

Modern Russian mines encountered at Wonsan and elsewhere 

presented a serious threat to the projection of strength ashore in the 

combat zone. “When you can’t go where you want to, when you want

to,” said Admiral Sherman referring to the mine hazard, “you haven’t

got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock bottom 

foundation of all of our war plans.” He assigned the highest priority 

to mine countermeasures, an area that had languished in the post-World 

War II economy.An intensive reactivation in the program swiftly readied

mine vessels for service in the Far East.

	 In 1950 the Navy gained its initial capacity for nuclear attack

by carrier aircraft, the forerunner of an operational capability as a major 

sea-based deterrent force.

The Chief of Naval Operations went to Europe in the summer 

of 1951. At the conclusion of a highly successful military-diplomatic 

mission, including conversations with Generalísimo Francisco Franco 

regarding establishing U.S. bases in Spain, Admiral Sherman succumbed 

to a heart attack in Naples on July 22, 1951.

F

orrest Percival Sherman was born in Merrimack, New 

Hampshire, on October 30, 1896, and graduated in the Naval 

Academy class of 1918. World War I found him serving afloat

in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. He received his first

command, the destroyer USS Barry, in 1921. The next year Sherman 

reported to the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, for flight training. On

December 22, 1922, he was designated a naval aviator and ordered to 

Fighting Squadron Two, Battle Fleet.

	 Instructor duty at Pensacola and study at the Naval War College

were followed by duty on board carriers USS Lexington and USS 

Saratoga. During the academic year 1930–1931, Sherman taught in 

the Department of Seamanship and Flight Tactics at the Naval Academy 

and then returned to Saratoga for a second tour.

	 Following assignmentsin the Bureau of Ordnance, the Office

of the Chief of Naval Operations, and on major fleet staffs, Captain

Sherman was ordered to command carrier USS Wasp in May 1942.

He commanded her on September 15, 1942, when Wasp, heavily

damaged by an enemy submarine attack during the Guadalcanal 

campaign, had to be sunk by friendly forces to avoid falling into enemy 

hands. Sherman was designated Chief of Staff to Commander, Air 

Force, Pacific Fleet, in which assignment he was promoted to rear

admiral before being transferred to duty as Deputy Chief of Staff to 

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. Admiral

Sherman represented the Navy in the initial surrender conferences with 

the Japanese at Manila in August 1945 and was present onboard USS

Missouri when the formal surrender was signed.

	 He briefly commanded a carrier division before coming to

Washington, DC, in December 1945 as Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations (Operations). In January 1948, Admiral Sherman was

named Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean (changed to 

Commander, Sixth Task Fleet) and served in that capacity until 

appointed Chief of Naval Operations.

Of his untimely death, General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force 

Chief of Staff, said, “In Admiral Sherman the United States has lost

one of its most brilliant military minds. He had an understanding 

possessed by few men of the nature of American leadership in the free 

world.” The admiral is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral William M. Fechteler

Thirteenth Chief of Naval Operations

August 16, 1951–August 17, 1953

The naval buildup necessary to meet combat and logistic support 

demands of the war in Korea continued to be the matter of 

first priority whenAdmiral Fechteler began his duties as Chief

of Naval Operations. Between the opening of hostilities in 

June 1950 and December 1952, the U.S. Navy added 526 ships to the 

active list—all but four were reactivated from the reserve mothballed 

fleets.

Modernization of the Navy moved forward on a broad front. 

Submarine USS Nautilus, the first vessel in history propelled by nuclear

energy, was under construction, as was the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal 

the first of a new post-World War II class, designed to operate high

performance jet aircraft. Several ships from the reserve fleets were

converted to guided missile ships and Admiral Fechteler proposed that 

this number be increased. In collaboration with the Atomic Energy

Commission, the Navy initiated development of tactical nuclear 

weapons, including an atomic depth bomb for use against fast deepdiving submarines.

While fully alert to the potential of atomic weaponry and 

other technical advances, Admiral Fechteler also stressed the need for 

conventional warfare capabilities, including amphibious assault. New 

classes of amphibious ships, LSTs and LSDs, vastly improved and 

faster than World War II types, were joining the fleet and under

construction. The Chief of Naval Operations likewise voiced the 

conviction that without a first-rate air arm the Navy would be “totally

inadequate.” The war in Korea, he said, demonstrated anew “the

mobility of carrier-borne air power and its ability to go in and deliver 

air support to ground troops.” In addition to the Korean experience,

events in subsequent years bear witness to the soundness of the Chief 

of Naval Operations’ views.

Before Congress, where he was characterized as being incisive 

and extremely well informed, Admiral Fechteler successfully urged 

funding for a second Forrestal-class carrier. The Chief of Naval 

Operations also directed his attention to the structure of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization naval forces and specifically the creation

of a single NATO naval command in the Mediterranean. As Admiral 

Fechteler’s tenure as Chief of Naval Operations came to a close, an 

uneasy truce ended the fighting in Korea, where once again control

and optimum use of the sea by the U.S. Navy and other United Nations 

naval forces had been indispensable to success.

William Morrow Fechteler, “a gutsy product of the Navy’s

blue water tradition,” was born in San Rafael, California 

on March 6, 1896. Graduation from the Naval Academy 

in 1916 was followed by World War I duty in USS

Pennsylvania. He had postwar duty in battleships and destroyers—

including command of USS Perry and with various staffs afloat. At

the Naval Academy he was an instructor in electrical engineering and 

physics. He later taught at the Postgraduate School.

At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, Captain Fechteler was 

Chief of Staff to Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet. 

Transferred to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, he served as Director 

of Officer Personnel until assuming command of USS Indiana inAugust

1943. Promoted to rear admiral, he commanded or participated in ten

amphibious operations in New Guinea and the Philippines as 

Commander, Amphibious Group Eight. Returning to Washington in 

March 1945, Admiral Fechteler was Assistant Chief of the Bureau of

Naval Personnel, and after commanding the Atlantic Fleet battleships 

and cruisers, he served for three years as Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations for Personnel. Admiral Fechteler became Commander in 

Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in 1950 and held this command until named 

Chief of Naval Operations. After leaving office as Chief of Naval

Operations, he was Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern 

Europe and transferred to the retired list on July 1, 1956. 

Admiral Fechteler died at Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Maryland, 

on July 4, 1967. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral Robert B. Carney

Fourteenth Chief of Naval Operations

August 17, 1953–August 17, 1955

The end of hostilities in Korea three weeks before Admiral 

Carney became Chief of Naval Operations was attended by 

reduction in force levels and redeployment. While guns were 

momentarily silenced following the Korean truce, trouble 

spots persisted in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, where aggressive 

threats to peace required a strong naval presence and much of the Chief 

of Naval Operations’ attention.

The close of the French-Viet Minh War and the division of 

Vietnam at the 17th parallel stranded vast numbers of refugees who 

desired not to remain in Communist-dominated North Vietnam. 

Beginning in August 1954 and continuing until July of the next year,

the U.S. Navy organized and conducted a huge humanitarian operation: 

Passage to Freedom. Some 300,000 refugees and thousands of tons of 

cargo were sealifted from North to South Vietnam. Admiral Carney 

directed the operation as a result of the Navy’s responsibilities as 

executive agent for the Pacific Command.

At the request of the Republic of China, elements of the U.S. 

Seventh Fleet helped evacuate the military garrison and civilian population 

from the beleaguered Tachen Islandsjust off the China coast.Although

the removal took place within range of Communist artillery, the presence 

in strength of Seventh Fleet carriers, cruisers, and destroyers was 

sufficient deterrent to any overt action by the mainland Chinese.

	 The demands of the Passage to Freedom and Tachen Islands

operations reinforced Admiral Carney’s conviction that the post-Korean 

War Navy must be a versatile, balanced force capable of meeting any 

spectrum of hostile situations from an atomic confrontation to localized 

brush fire conflicts.

An area of major thrust by Admiral Carney as Chief of Naval 

Operations was modernization of the Navy. In public speeches and in

appearances before Congress seeking shipbuilding appropriations, he 

stressed the acute threat of “block obsolescence,” that is, the danger

that large segments of the fleet, built during World War II, would grow

old and unserviceable all at once.

A dramatic and revolutionary development became reality 

with the commissioning and initial cruise of the submarine USS 

Nautilus—the world’s first nuclear-powered ship.And on December 11,

1954, USS Forrestal, the first of a new generation of aircraft carriers,

was launched.

While working to update ships and weapons and incorporate 

the new technology, Admiral Carney never lost sight of the fact that 

the nation’s sea strength rested on the men and women of the Navy. 

To retain highly qualified personnel, the Chief of Naval Operations

devoted himself to making naval careers attractive and increasingly 

rewarding.

Robert Bostwick Carney was born in Vallejo, California, on 

March 26, 1895. His 43-year naval career began in 1912,

as he became a Naval Academy midshipman. After graduation 

in 1916, he joined the battleship USS New Hampshire. He 

was Torpedo and Gunnery Officer of the USS Fanning when she sank

the German submarine U-58.

Between the wars, Carney commanded several destroyers 

and a cargo ship, and served as gunnery and executive officer in

battleships and cruisers and with fleet staffs. Navy Department duty

ashore included Fleet Training Division, Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations, and small craft program coordination in the Secretary of 

the Navy’s office.

	 When the United States entered World War II, he was serving

on the staff of Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet, involved in 

convoy escort operations. From October 15, 1942, until July 1943,

Captain Carney commanded the cruiser USS Denver, participating in 

Solomon Islands actions. He was promoted to rear admiral on July 26,

1943, and became Chief of Staff to Admiral William F. Halsey Jr.,

Commander, South Pacific Force, and Commander, Third Fleet.Admiral

Carney remained with Admiral Halsey throughout the remainder of 

the Pacific war campaigns. He concluded arrangements with the

Japanese for entry of the Third Fleet into Tokyo Bay and accepted the 

surrender of Yokosuka Naval Base.

	 From 1946 to early 1950,Admiral Carney was Deputy Chief

of Naval Operations (Logistics). He took command of the Second Fleet 

on March 6 and on October 2, 1950, was promoted to four-star rank 

and named Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic 

and Mediterranean. He became Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, 

Southern Europe, in June 1951, and retained that NATO command 

until appointed Chief of Naval Operations by President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower. Admiral Carney retired from active duty upon completion 

of his tour as Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Carney died in 1990 of heart failure in Washington, 

DC, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke

Fifteenth Chief of Naval Operations

August 17, 1955–August 1, 1961

Admiral Burke served an unprecedented six years in office

as Chief of Naval Operations. These were years of intensified

international friction and of revolutionary changes in ships 

and weaponry of the U.S. Navy. The undersea nuclear 

weapon capability conceived and developed in the brief span of five

years added a vast new dimension to naval warfare.

The Chief of Naval Operations established a Special Project 

Office late in 1955, charged with the responsibility of developing a

Fleet Ballistic Missile for sea launch. Admiral Burke backed the project 

with priority call on professional talent and other resources. Submarine 

USS George Washington submerged in the Atlantic on July 20, 1960, 

and fired the first Polaris missile. The missile arched to a target more

than a thousand miles downrange. This phenomenal weapon married 

the nuclear submarine to the long-range solid fuel ballistic missile. 

Shortly, the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine Missile System would 

be the keystone for American nuclear deterrence.

	 Like his predecessors, Admiral Burke saw the fleet’s combat

readiness and fighting edge as the primary missions of the Chief of

Naval Operations. Before Congress, he ably presented the country’s 

need for new types of ships to counter a growing Soviet naval strength. 

To provide new construction with maximum and flexible capability,

he pressed forward with modern shipboard equipment development.

	 An impressive array of “firsts” occurred during Admiral

Burke’s tour. The world’s first guided-missile ship—modernized USS

Boston, with her Terrier antiaircraft system—joined the fleet in 1956;

the first guided-missile frigates commissioned; the first nuclear-powered

surface ships—USS Enterprise, USS Long Beach, and USS Bainbridge—

were launched; and the first helicopter carrier designed for vertical

envelopment amphibious assault was commissioned. Major progress 

was made in a variety of shipboard and air-launched guided missiles, 

sonar, and antisubmarine warfare weapons.

While breakthroughs in missiles and nuclear power were 

unfolding, Admiral Burke remained attuned to the requirements for 

powerful conventional forces afloat. He staunchly defended the aircraft

carrier and the versatility of embarked aircraft. Concerned with “block

obsolescence,” he sponsored new construction and the successful FRAM 

(Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization) program to extend the useful 

life of older destroyers.

A strong advocate of the role of small navies in combat, the 

Chief of Naval Operations contended that ships loaned to allies should 

be in top condition, ready for immediate service.

Admiral Burke held that the likelihood of a nuclear 

confrontation was much lessthan chances of brush fire conflicts breaking

out any time or any place, and that these could be cooled or confined

by a U.S. naval presence. Such proved to be the case during the Suez 

crisis, the troubles in Jordan, across the world off the islands of Quemoy 

and Matsu, and in 1958 when the Lebanese government, threatened 

by aggression, asked for assistance. Marines from U.S. Sixth Fleet 

ships were landed at Beirut.

The Chief of Naval Operations responded to Cold War crises 

with notable initiative and keen insight. He rapidly ordered naval forces 

deployed, diverted if necessary, and so positioned in international waters 

as to render maximum service in implementing national policy decisions. 

	 The Navy “is people” was a point that Admiral Burke

constantly emphasized during his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations. 

He opened additional avenues of communication so that, from flag

officer to seamen, all “would know, not only what they were doing,

but why.”

Arleigh Albert Burke was born in Boulder, Colorado, on 

October 19, 1901. The first Chief of Naval Operations to

be born in the 20th century, he graduated from the Naval 

Academy in 1923. Between tours of duty in various 

battleships and destroyers, he earned a master of science degree in 

chemical engineering at the University of Michigan as a Navy 

postgraduate student in explosive ordnance.

Burke was on shore duty at the Naval Gun Factory in 

Washington, DC, in December 1941. Ordered to the South Pacific, he

commanded several destroyersquadrons. It was while he had Destroyer

Squadron 23, the “Little Beavers,” that he earned the nickname “31-

Knot Burke.” With one ship having boiler problems, DESRON 23 had 

been held to 30 knots. While en route to a muster point, Burke radioed 

he was pushing his squadron to 31 knots. With Burke commanding, 

Destroyer Squadron 23 participated in more than 20 engagements; 

destroyed a Japanese cruiser, nine destroyers, and a submarine; and 

accounted for some 30 enemy aircraft.

	 In March of 1944, Captain Burke reported as Chief of Staff

to Admiral Marc Mitscher, Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force 58/38 

and saw extensive action with that force until just prior to the Japanese 

surrender.

During the Korean War, Rear Admiral Burke served as Deputy 

Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East; commanded 

a cruiser division; and was a member of the Military Armistice 

Commission. He then returned to duty in the Office of the Chief of

Naval Operations as Director of the Strategic Plans Division until 

1954. In April of that year, he took command of Cruiser Division Six,

and in January 1955 he became Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic, 

from which assignment he was appointed Chief of Naval Operations 

by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Admiral Burke was transferred to the retired list on August 

1, 1961. In ceremonies that day at the Naval Academy, his four star

flag was struck, and the Secretary of the Navy expressed the “thanks

of a grateful Nation and the enduring affection of sailors everywhere.” 

He died January 1, 1996, at National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, 

Maryland, and is buried at the U.S. Naval Academy cemetery in 

Annapolis.

Admiral George W. Anderson Jr. Sixteenth Chief of Naval Operations

August 1, 1961–August 1, 1963

As Admiral Anderson took over the watch from Admiral 

Arleigh Burke, he pledged to keep the Navy “on course

and steaming strong regardless of what the future may 

portend.” Speaking at the change of command ceremony, 

the new Chief of Naval Operations could not foresee that the immediate 

future held an ominous and direct confrontation between the United 

States and the Soviet Union—the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Reconnaissance aircraft in the fall of 1962 detected Russian 

offensive ballistic missile launch sites under construction in Cuba. 

These weapons posed a dire threat to national and hemispheric security. 

To back demands that the sites be dismantled, missiles removed, and 

Russian ships carrying missiles or components to Cuba turned back, 

President John F. Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of the island. 

The Chief of Naval Operations was designated to act for the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on quarantine matters.

	 In a graphic demonstration of readiness, U.S. Navy ships of

many types were almost immediately on the quarantine line carrying 

out the Presidential directive. The Soviets backed off. The entire 

operation was a dramatic illustration of how the precise application of 

the right amount of seapower can support the foreign policy of the 

United States. Admiral Anderson said in summation, “There is no

substitute for well-trained, versatile and indoctrinated ready forces, 

under competent professional leadership with secure, rapid and reliable 

channels of communication.”

Other high-tension areas demanding a naval role during 

Admiral Anderson’s tenure included Haiti, the Dominican Republic, 

Southeast Asia, and Berlin. The tinderbox situation in Berlin, after 

erection of the infamous wall, dictated a decision to activate reserve 

ships and call selected Naval Reservists to active duty.

	 Meanwhile, modernization of the fleet and introduction of

advanced technology continued to move ahead.Additional fleet ballistic

missile submarines and nuclear-powered surface ships went into 

commission. The Navy, looking to the future as well as the present, 

went forward in antisubmarine warfare, Antarctic research, space, and 

oceanography.

Accidental loss of nuclear submarine USS Thresher in April 

1963 pointed up the price sometimes demanded by duty and progress. 

Detection, photography, and ultimate recovery of parts of Thresher at 

depths exceeding 8,000 feet led to improvements in deep submergence 

research vehicles and submarine safety.

The Chief of Naval Operations continued to emphasize the 

importance of research and development,stating, “there is no escaping

the facts that if we are going to compete, we have to pay the entry fee, 

and that today’s probable combat environment of electronic, ballistic, 

supersonic and nuclear equipment demands sophisticated equipment.”

While Admiral Anderson was keyed to the absolute necessity 

for the most modern weapon systems, he also knew that the Navy is, 

and has always been, “primarily an assembly of people,” and that

morale “is all important.” He likewise stressed the nation’srequirement

for a flexible means of meeting global contingencies of any magnitude

and highlighted the preeminent role of aircraft carriers as such a means 

of projecting U.S. military power wherever deemed necessary.

George Whalen Anderson Jr., a native of New York City, was 

born in Brooklyn on December 15, 1906. He graduated 

from the Naval Academy in 1927 and went to duty in cruiser 

USS Cincinnati before reporting to Naval Air Station, 

Pensacola, for flight training.

Designated a naval aviator in October 1930, various aviationtype assignments followed, including tours in carriers USS Lexington 

and USS Yorktown. He was on duty in the Plans Division, Bureau of 

Aeronautics, when the country was plunged into World War II.

	 In March of 1943 he was ordered to assist in fitting out a new

USS Yorktown and after commissioning, served on board as Navigator 

and Tactical Officer in Pacific actions. Other World War II duties

included staff assignments, usually in a planning capacity, with 

Commander, Aircraft, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas; and Commander in Chief, U.S.

Fleet.

Following the war, he was a member of Canada-United States 

and Brazil-United States defense boards before returning to sea in 

1948 commanding USS Mindoro. Captain Anderson, completing the

National War College course in July 1950, went to Sixth Fleet Staff 

as Fleet Operations Officer, then to the staff of the Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe, followed by command of the carrier USS Franklin 

D. Roosevelt. In June 1953 he reported to Washington, DC, for duty

in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and as SpecialAssistant

to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

	 In mid-1955, when promoted to flag rank, he spent the next

three years as Commander, U.S. Taiwan Patrol Force, and later 

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. He took 

command of Carrier Division Six in July 1958 and became Commander, 

Sixth Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, 

Southern Europe, on September 14, 1959. Admiral Anderson left his

Mediterranean assignment when named Chief of Naval Operations.

After retirement from the naval service, effective on August 

1, 1963, Admiral Anderson served as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal 

and as Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Admiral

Anderson died on March 20, 1992, of congestive heart failure at the 

age of 85. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral David L. McDonald

Seventeenth Chief of Naval Operations

August 1, 1963–August 1, 1967

The commissioning of ten additional fleet ballistic missile

submarines during Admiral McDonald’s first year as Chief of

Naval Operations strengthened the nation’s nuclear deterrent 

posture. Two important new ships were launched, the attack 

carrier USS America and the high-speed combat support ship USS 

Sacramento—the first of a new type capable of simultaneous alongside

and helicopter replenishment at sea of fuel, ammunition, provisions, and 

stores. Fleet modernization continued as older destroyers and other types 

passed through the fleet rehabilitation and modernization program.

Admiral McDonald shaped and guided the extensive buildup 

of naval strength consonant with an expanding U.S. commitment in 

Southeast Asia following the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and

the retaliatory carrier air strikes. 

U.S. Navy operations spanned the widest range from carrier 

strikes to coastal interdiction, gunfire support, amphibious landings,

riverine warfare, and logistic support. The unchanging importance of 

the sea lanes was once again demonstrated by Vietnam, where all of the 

bulk fuel, more than 99 percent of the ammunition, and 95 percent of 

all other cargoes went by ship.

	 The Chief of Naval Operations took justifiable pride in the

responsiveness of the Navy in projecting national power quickly and 

effectively. Before Congress and to the American public, Admiral 

McDonald set forth his views on the mobility and flexibility of naval

forces, which gave them the inherent capability forselective fine tuning.

“We can,” he said, “strike with swift precision, if ordered, doing harm

only to those who would harm us; we could, if necessary, cause 

overwhelming catastrophe to our enemies; and we can carry out any 

mission between those extremes. To accomplish these finely graduated

purposes, we operate from mobile floating bases limited by little else

than an adequate depth of water for safe navigation . . . sea-based forces 

require neither international nor local license to move anywhere on the 

high seas.”

	 In addition to SoutheastAsian operations and continuing crises

in other areas of the Far East, the Navy was able to fulfill its worldwide

responsibilities. The government of the strife-torn Dominican Republic 

requested the presence of U.S. Navy ships and Marines. The Sixth Fleet 

remained a stabilizing influence in the Mediterranean.At the same time

diverse other requirements, including the training and readiness of space 

recovery forces, were met. In 1964, an all-nuclear task force of carrier

USS Enterprise, cruiser USS Long Beach and frigate Bainbridge 

circumnavigated the world without refueling and without logistic 

augmentation. This Operation Sea Orbit dramatically demonstrated the 

capabilities and potential of nuclear-propelled ships. Later, off Vietnam, 

the nuclear ship went into combat for the first time in history.

By 1965, the Chief of Naval Operations could announce that 

the last of the programmed total of 41 fleet ballistic missile submarines

was under construction and that development of the advanced Poseidon 

missile, with greater range, payload, and accuracy than Polaris, was authorized.

A General Order on the assignment of authority and 

responsibility in the Department of the Navy, issued by Secretary of the 

Navy Paul Nitze in April 1966, gave the Chief of Naval Operations direct 

command over the Naval Material Command and its bureaus.

Admiral McDonald placed strong emphasis on antisubmarine 

warfare and saw to it that an adequate segment of the Navy’s budget 

was channeled for progressive development in this critical field. Likewise,

the Navy made increasingly important contributions to oceanographic 

research. Programs typified by SEALAB and Alvin were intensified.

The retention of highly trained Navy pilots and technical ratings 

was a matter of concern. To make a naval career more attractive, Admiral 

McDonald repeatedly and successfully pushed for better housing, pay, 

enhanced medical benefits,shipboard habitability, and—consistent with

the needs of the sea service—a more normal home life for all naval 

personnel.

David Lamar McDonald was born September 12, 1906, in 

Maysville, Georgia. He entered the NavalAcademy in 1924,

graduated four years later, went to battleship duty and on to 

flight training at Pensacola. Designated a naval aviator in

1931, various aviation duties followed, including a tour with Fighter 

Squadron Six in USS Saratoga and at Pensacola as a flight instructor.

	 At the outbreak of World War II, Lieutenant McDonald was

serving on carrier USS Ranger as Flag Secretary to Commander, Aircraft, 

Atlantic Fleet. Later in the conflict he was air officer and executive

officer of USS Essex and on the staff of Commander,Air Force, Pacific

Fleet.

Postwar duties included assignment as Director of Military 

Requirements in the Bureau of Aeronautics, Aide to the Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy for Air and the Under Secretary of the Navy, attendance at 

the National War College, and command of the carriers USS Mindoro 

and USS Coral Sea. He attained flag rank in 1955 and was ordered as

Director of the Air Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations. In November 1957,Admiral McDonald was named Deputy

Assistant Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe. 

Command of a carrier division followed until July 1961, when he reported 

as Commander, Sixth Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support 

Forces, Southern Europe. From April 9, 1963 until named Chief of Naval 

Operations, Admiral McDonald was Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval 

Forces, Europe, with additional duty as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval 

Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean and Commander of the Naval 

Component of the U.S. Forces in Europe.

The citation accompanying the Legion of Merit medal awarded 

to Admiral McDonald before he transferred to the retired list on August 

1, 1967, noted his “rare ability to identify central issues, to balance

economic requirements against military necessities, and to ensure that 

the capabilities of the military services are expeditiously and cooperatively 

employed in the best interest of the United States.”

Admiral McDonald died at the age of 91 in 1997 and is buried 

at the United States Naval Academy Cemetery in Annapolis, Maryland.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer

Eighteenth Chief of Naval Operations

August 1, 1967–July 1, 1970

Conduct and support of operations in Southeast Asia remained 

the first priority item during the Moorer years in the Navy’s

top assignment. The Chief of Naval Operations described 

the diverse nature of the Navy’s combat role in this unusual 

conflict: “Today, our Navy and Marine forces utilize every available

technique and skill. Tactics akin to those used by gunboats in the Civil 

War are exploited in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam. At the same 

time offshore, our carriers and amphibious task forces are operating 

with the most complex and sophisticated electronic and weapons 

systems known to man. On board our Navy river boats, the seamen’s 

eye and the bamboo pole are used to navigate, while far at sea satellite 

navigation systems guide ourships.” In-country an accelerated training

program moved ahead, looking toward turning over total operational 

responsibilities to the South Vietnamese Navy.

The demands of the combat area strained the Navy’s capability 

to meet mission requirements in other sectors of the globe. Confronted, 

likewise, with force level reductions and the necessity to present a 

credible worldwide readiness posture, a vastly increased tempo of 

at-sea time was required of all fleet units. The resulting effect on career

motivation and retention rate was severe. Admiral Moorer directed 

attention to meeting the needs of Navy men and their families by 

stating, “no matter how complex or how awesome you build the weapons

of war, man is still the vital element of our defense team. Men make 

decisions, men fight battles, men win wars.”

Two tragic events occurred—accidental loss at sea of the 

nuclear submarine USS Scorpion and the boarding and capture of USS 

Pueblo by the North Koreans—disasters entirely different in nature, 

but each with considerable impact.

Time and again before Congress and the public, the Chief of 

Naval Operations focused on the expanding and aggressive employment 

of the Russian Navy. “A Soviet bear who has demonstrated a new

fondness for deep salt water,” said Admiral Moorer, “represents a real

and substantial challenge to free world maritime supremacy.”

	 Rather than quantity—“the numbers game”—for the U.S.

Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations stressed quality for ships, aircraft, 

and personnel. “We must be prepared for almost any environment in

any area of the world.” Admiral Moorer pressed for continued 

modernization and the phasing out of older ships to overcome the 

encroaching obsolescence of much of the active fleet. He drew notice

to the fact that one new advanced design multipurpose ship could 

perform the mission of two or more old ships, and better.

Admiral Moorer considered a strong, broadly based research 

and development program—and incorporation of the most advanced 

technology—as matters of the utmost importance. He urged construction 

of a third Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier, while pointing out the 

increasing significance of carrier forces as the availability of overseas

land bases continued to diminish. The program of converting Polaris 

submarines to receive the new Poseidon missiles moved ahead.

Thomas Hinman Moorer was born February 9, 1912, in Mount 

Willing, Alabama. After graduation from the Naval Academy 

in 1933 and Gunnery and Engineering duty in cruisers, he 

reported to Pensacola for flight training and was designated

a naval aviator in 1936. His first flight duty was on board carriers and,

at the time of the Japanese attack, he was attached to a patrol squadron 

based on Pearl Harbor. Moving with his squadron to the Southwest 

Pacific in the early desperate days of the war, Moorer’s PBY was shot

down off Darwin, Australia. Returning from the Pacific in July 1942,

he was sent to the United Kingdom as a mining observer for Commander 

in Chief, U.S. Fleet. He then commanded a bombing squadron in the 

Atlantic and was later on the staff of Commander, Air Force, Atlantic 

Fleet, as Gunnery and Tactical Officer.

His immediate postwar assignment was with the Strategic 

Bombing Survey established by the President to study the effects of 

all types of air attacks on the enemy. This was followed by various sea 

and shore assignments including executive officer, Naval Aviation

Ordnance Test Station, Chincoteague, Virginia; Experimental Officer,

Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California; a year in study at

the Naval War College; and Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Air).

Promoted to rear admiral on August 1, 1958, he served in the 

Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, then

later as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (War Gaming Matters), 

and then to sea as a carrier division commander. In November 1960,

he returned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director,

Long Range Objectives Group, and in October 1962 assumed command 

of the Seventh Fleet. In June 1964,Admiral Moorer became Commander

in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The followingApril he broke his four-star

flag in the dual national capacity as Commander in Chief,Atlantic and

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and in the NATO capacity 

as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. President Lyndon B. Johnson 

elevated Admiral Moorer to Chief of Naval Operations and President 

Richard M. Nixon reappointed him on June 12, 1969. The Senate 

confirmed his nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on June 17, 1970, and he took office July 2—the first former Chief of

Naval Operations to hold the post.

	 Admiral Moorer died in 2004 and is buried at Arlington

National Cemetery.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. Nineteenth Chief of Naval Operations

July 1, 1970–July 1, 1974

When he was tapped as Chief of Naval Operations at 49

years old,Admiral Zumwalt became the youngest officer

ever named to the post. His tour was one of sweeping 

changes within the Navy. Entering office as defense

spending declined and with a steadily aging fleet, he saw it as his job

to ensure the Navy remained capable of meeting the Soviet threat. That 

included a program of retiring, sometimes ahead of schedule, obsolete 

fleet forces, in order to improve capability and maintenance elsewhere.

He had to do so while enabling an overextended Navy to continue to 

meet mission requirements, acquire affordable equipment, and ensure 

lifecycle costs made it possible to adequately man, train, equip, and 

maintain the force. The result was a number of new programs that had 

lasting impacts on the warfighting readiness of the Navy.

The Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigate (FFG) 

was designed to provide commanders with increased capability at a 

reduced cost. With Admiral Zumwalt’s support, the program produced 

51 FFGs for the U.S. Navy. They served the U.S. Navy for 38 years, 

from 1977 through 2015, and more than 20 of the American ships went 

on to serve in the navies of Bahrain, Egypt, Poland, Pakistan, and 

Turkey. The class was described by former Secretary of the Navy John 

F. Lehman Jr. as “one of the most successful shipbuilding programs

in the Navy’s postwar history.”

By the time Admiral Zumwalt became CNO, the Navy was 

no longer building fleet ballistic missile submarines(SSBN). The newest

of the original “41 for Freedom” SSBNs was commissioned three years

earlier and ongoing strategic arms limitations talks, if ratified, would

prevent modernization of the aging SSBN fleet. Admiral Zumwalt saw

this as a threat to the future readiness of this important element of the 

nation’s strategic deterrent and put his support behind the design and 

construction of a new, more capable class of SSBN. The Ohio-class 

submarines were an evolutionary leap ahead of their predecessors, 

designed specifically for extended patrols,stealth, and increased accuracy

and range of weapons. Thirty five years after Ohio was commissioned

in 1981, all 18 of the boats in the class remained in service.

	 Admiral Zumwalt also championed the F-14 Tomcat as the

Navy’s replacement for the F-4 Phantom. Admiral Zumwalt sold a

reluctant Congress on the F-14 with calculations comparing a 13-carrier

force carrying 301 F-14s to a 16-carrier force carrying 903 of the old

F-4s. The smaller force, he said, was “militarily more effective; $2.5

billion cheaper in procurement costs; $500 million a year cheaper in 

operating costs and requiring 17,000 fewer Sailors.” The F-14 served

in the U.S. Navy for more than 30 years from 1974 to 2006.

	 Admiral Zumwalt believed it was his job to “modernize and

humanize the Navy,” yet he is especially remembered for his progressive 

personnel programs. To articulate his position on the changes he planned, 

Admiral Zumwalt implemented a series of naval messages given the 

moniker “Z-grams.” The first Z-gram was released the day he took

office. A torrent of the missives followed (the first 92 of a total of 120

came out in his first year in office). They addressed personnel matters

that Admiral Zumwalt described as “Mickey Mouse” issues that he

believed were partially responsible for plummeting retention of a force 

attained through the draft. Reversing that trend was one of his top 

priorities. On November 10, 1970, he released Z-57. In it, he advised

the fleet he intended to rid the Navy of demeaning or abrasive

regulations, singling out one issue in particular: fashion. “I will not

countenance the rights or privileges of any officers or enlisted men

being abrogated in any way because they choose to grow sideburns or 

neatly trimmed beards or moustaches or because preferences in neat 

clothing styles are at variance with the taste of their seniors.” 

	 But not all the Z-grams dealt with “Mickey Mouse” issues—

some were the foundation of policies that remain in effect today. During 

Admiral Zumwalt’s term as CNO, the Navy, like the nation, experienced 

racial unrest. In Z-66 dated December 17, 1970, Admiral Zumwalt

noted “there is significant discrimination in the Navy.” However, he

didn’t shrink from it. “We do have problems, and it is my intention . . .

to take prompt steps toward their solution.” He directed each command 

to appoint a special assistant for minority affairs with direct access to 

the commanding officer, and for commanders to ensure a minority

group wife was included in the ombudsman program. He also directed 

the Naval Supply Systems Command to renew emphasis on meeting 

the special needs of minority groups in ships’ stores and other service 

organizations. He understood this was just the beginning and committed 

to further study and action. To emphasize his determination, he gave 

commanders until January 15, 1971—less than a month—to take action 

on the directives. He wrapped up the Z-gram saying, “There is no black

Navy, no white Navy—just one Navy—the United States Navy.” 

Minority firsts in the Navy in the succeeding years can trace their roots

to Z-gram 66.

Another Z-gram that has become a milestone for equality in 

the Navy is Z-116: Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women in the 

Navy. Like Z-66, Z-116 began the process of more fully integrating 

women into the Navy. Admiral Zumwalt not only believed the Navy 

could do better in the fair treatment of women, but he also saw women 

as “a vital personnel resource” in the early days of the all-volunteer

force. Among other things, Z-116 opened ratings to enlisted women, 

established a pathway for women to be assigned to ships, and opened 

all staff corps and restricted line communities to women. 

Elmo Russell Zumwalt Jr. was born in San Francisco, California. 

He was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1939, 

graduating in 1942, a year early, due to World War II. His

early sea tours included service aboard four destroyers and 

USS Wisconsin. He commanded USS Tills, USSArnold J. Isbell, USS

Dewey, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Seven, and Naval Forces, Vietnam. 

He served ashore in a number of important billets on the staffs of the 

Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. President 

Richard M. Nixon nominated him as CNO, and he took office on July

1, 1970, retiring on the same date in 1974. Admiral Zumwalt died

January 2, 2000, at the age of 79. “At a time when morale and enthusiasm

were at an all-time low, he had the vision to see a great future for the 

Navy,” said President William J. Clinton during a memorial service 

for Admiral Zumwalt. “The changes he brought about three decades

ago will continue to shape the character and culture of our Navy for a 

long time in the 21st century.” 

Admiral James L. Holloway III

Twentieth Chief of Naval Operations

July 1, 1974–July 1, 1978

I

t was a time of great transition for the United States when Admiral 

James L. Holloway III took the helm as the Navy’s top military

leader, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and acting Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1974. The nation and the Navy were

healing from the trauma of Vietnam and transitioning from the draft 

to an all-volunteer force. 

While bolstering predecessor Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s 

revolutionary strategic and personnel initiatives, Admiral Holloway 

set goals of his own on readiness, flexibility, offensive capability,

balance, and personnel professionalism and stability. 

	 The seasoned admiral had the difficult task of leading the

Navy through the challenges of inflation, defense spending cuts, and

the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

As the tension between the United States and the Soviet 

Union increased after the fall of Saigon in 1975, and communism 

spread into Angola by Soviet and Cuban forces in 1976, Admiral 

Holloway was among other military leaders who held the line as the 

Soviets continued to flex their growing fleet further and further into

international waters. Playing a crucial role in negotiations during 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, Admiral 

Holloway’s direct influence on President Gerald Ford ended the SALT

II Treaty proposal to ban the cruise missile, which is still the Navy’s

principal offensive weapon for destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. 

Having newly-gained leverage, Admiral Holloway, an 

advocate ofstandardized processes,set out to reorganize fleet operating

forces into battle groups, integrating carriers, cruisers, and submarines 

into individual tactical units. These battle groups would exploit the 

expanded warfare capabilities of surface combatants and enable a full 

range of naval abilities—in support of the national strategy of forward 

posture—to handle hostile threats.

	 This led to one of Admiral Holloway’s most significant

contributions as CNO: establishing the Battle Force Fleet organization. 

By using understandable terms and language, the instruction provided 

a succinct and common reference for all naval personnel while providing 

Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff a 

deeper understanding of the Navy’s roles in effective joint strategies, 

plans, and operations. 

While under Admiral Holloway’s watch, the Navy assisted 

in the evacuation of thousands of Cyprus residents during political 

unrest between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1974. The Navy also

provided support in 1976 during evacuation of Americans from Lebanon 

and the Korean DMZ incident when twoAmericanArmy officers were

killed by North Korean soldiers during a tree-trimming in the Joint 

Security Area. 

Admiral Holloway’s leadership and ability to advocate for 

the Navy were also evident during the early days of the F/A-18 Hornet. 

In 1975, the CNO successfully argued to Secretary of Defense James

Schlesinger to sign off on the Navy’s fighter-attack F-18 type rather

than the Air Force preference of the F-16 Light Weight Fighter (LWF). 

The F-18 type was designed for the all-weather capableAIM-7 Sparrow

III missile, while the F-16 LWF was designed for the Sidewinder

missile system that operated best under clear-air conditions. The F/A18 replaced both the A-7 attack plane and the F-14 Tomcat, with the

Hornets coming into the fleet in 1983. 

	 In preparation for hissuccessor,Admiral Holloway developed

Naval Warfare Publication (NWP-1), Strategic Concepts of the U.S. 

Navy, Part I: “Generation of Naval Force Requirements,” and Part II:

“Planning, Employment and Readiness Doctrine for Naval Operating

Forces.”

J

ames Lemuel Holloway III was born in Charleston, South

Carolina, in 1922. He and his father, Admiral James L. Holloway 

Jr., both served as four-star admirals in the U.S. Navy while on 

active duty, the only son and father to do so to date. This member 

of Naval Academy class of 1943 reached the fleet a year early due to

acceleration of graduation for several wartime-era classes. He served 

on destroyers during World War II, torpedoeing a Japanese battleship

during the Battle of Surigao Strait as gunnery officer of USS Bennion.

	 Following World War II, he became a naval aviator. He flew

missions during the Korean War and in 1959, as the Deputy CNO for 

Air Warfare, developed the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 

Standardization (NATOPS) program. This program is still in effect 

more than 55 years later and has been credited with substantially 

reducing naval aviation accidents.

	 He commanded the first nuclear-powered carrier, USS

Enterprise, during two Vietnam War combat cruises in the Gulf of 

Tonkin and, returning to the Pentagon in 1968, he helped establish the 

Navy’s Nuclear Powered Carrier Program, building the USS Nimitz 

and paving the way for nine more supercarriers. Other accomplishments 

include commanding Sixth Fleet Carrier Striking Force during the 

Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970 and commanding Seventh Fleet in 

1972 during the Vietnam War. 

Having served 36 years on active duty, Admiral Holloway 

retired in 1978, but he remains closely involved with the Navy. In 2007

Holloway published Aircraft Carriers at War, a book that he describes 

as a “contemporary perspective of the events, decisions, and outcomes

in the history of the Cold War—Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet 

confrontation—that shaped today’s U.S. Navy and its principal shipsof-the-line, the large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.”

Admiral Holloway served as president of the Naval Historical 

Foundation from 1980 to 1998 and ten years more as chairman. Since 

2008 he has served as elected chairman emeritus. His support for the 

Navy’s official history programs made possible the Naval History and

Heritage Command’s online Dictionary of American Naval Fighting 

Ships project, one of the most important U.S. naval history resources 

available to a worldwide audience.

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward

Twenty-first Chief of Naval Operations

July 1, 1978–June 30, 1982

During the years following the end of the Vietnam War in 

1975, the Navy was faced with the challenges of an allvolunteer force after the draft ended in 1973. Many draftees 

left when their term was up. A number of noncommissioned 

officers, seeing improved prospects for pay and quality of life in the

civilian sector, also left, taking with them decades of collective expertise. 

Retention rates fell from 64 percent to 45 percent. It was during this

time that Admiral Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations.

Testifying before Congress, Admiral Hayward called this 

mass exodus a “hemorrhage of talent” thatseverely affected the combat

readiness of the Navy. In 1980, the year Army Chief of Staff General

Edward C. Meyer coined the term “hollow force,” the lack of boiler

technicians and machinist mates forced USS Canisteo to be removed 

from operations. Unlessthe President, Congress, and the public fulfilled

their commitment to raise pay to a level comparable to that of the 

civilian sector and improve living standards, the Navy would be forced 

to place more of the fleet in an inactive status indefinitely.

	 In a 2002 interview with Paul Stillwell for the book

Reminiscences of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired), 

Admiral Hayward summed up the challenges: “Not enough people,

not the right kind of people, nobody’s been trained.” One of his first

initiatives as CNO was to travel to all of the training commands. He 

observed tiles falling out of the ceilings, insufficient tools to train the

Sailors, and bases in disrepair. In response,Admiral Hayward directed

his admirals, “You find the money to fix that problem. We cannot

tolerate that. . . .Let’s get some pride back into who we are.” Within 

six months, Admiral Hayward indicated he was pleased to see attitudes 

turn around.

Admiral Hayward also looked to his senior enlisted leadership, 

not to put out new directives or instructions, but to “execute the ones

we have in a professional manner,” as he explained in a 1981 All Hands 

Magazine article. He emphasized that “our standards must be more

than a mirror of society. Civilian members of our society have not 

taken solemn oaths; we in the Navy have. . . .Our standards must be 

visibly higher than those of the society around us.”

Admiral Hayward tied the issue of retention to the Navy’s 

need to outpace the Soviet threat and maintain supremacy on the ocean. 

Without crucial staffing, the most advanced warfighting systems and

ships in the world would not be ready to fight when called upon. The

fleet was “undermanned and overworked,” Admiral Hayward recalled

during a Stillwell interview. He recognized that “the Vietnam demand

was an intense one, and that intensity kept the focus properly on 

Vietnam.” But in the meantime, a Soviet naval threat loomed.

	 The U.S. Navy began operating in the Indian Ocean to counter

the Soviets, who were increasingly deploying “out of area,” according

to Hayward’s 1979 strategic document “The Future of U.S. Sea Power.”

The Soviets were also building up their submarine fleet and Backfire-B

bombers. Yet thanks to the investment made in a little atoll about 1,000 

miles south of India called Diego Garcia, the Navy had nuclear

deterrence capability against the Soviets. Admiral Hayward further 

strengthened the Navy to meet the challenge of a growing Soviet power 

by building sophisticated submarines, surface ships, and aircraft and 

promoting a global, offensive-minded maritime strategy. The 12-carrier 

battle group was his design.

	 When the Iran hostage situation began in 1979, the Navy had

already been operating continuously in the area. “But it was stretching

the heck out of our forces,” Admiral Hayward recalled during a Stillwell 

interview. The Navy was also operating in the Mediterranean and 

Western Pacific. With the resources and manning available, the Navy

was “trying to meet a three-ocean requirement with a one-and-a-halfocean Navy.”

Admiral Hayward warned that just because the nation was 

“technically” at peace, the Navy should not relax. “We should not be

lulled into thinking that the job will be any easier because we are 

operating in a ‘peacetime’ environment,” he advised in the March 1982 

All Hands Magazine. During a 1982 change of command for the aircraft 

carrier USS Nimitz, Hayward continued to press for the need of both 

manning and ships: “Our narrow margin of maritime superiority over

the Soviet navy has vanished.” 

Admiral Hayward managed to successfully argue for an 

increase in fleet capabilities. The citation for his 1982 Defense

Distinguished Service Medal reads: “He was singularly effective in

facilitating just pay and compensation for military personnel, and in 

initiating critical building programs to enhance essential naval warfare 

capabilities.”

Thomas Bibb Hayward was born in 1924 in Glendale, California.

After serving as an enlisted Sailor during World War II, he

attended the U.S. Naval Academy, graduating in 1947. An

aviator, he repeatedly served on board aircraft carriers at sea 

and in training and test pilot commands ashore. Combat command of 

Carrier Air Wing Ten and aircraft carrier USS America during the 

Vietnam War rounded out his sea duty, and he served as Commander, 

U.S. Seventh Fleet and then as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

prior to being named CNO. 

Admiral James D. Watkins

Twenty-second Chief of Naval Operations

June 30, 1982–June 30, 1986

Admiral Watkins served as Chief of Naval Operations as the 

relationship between the United States and the Soviets began 

to deteriorate toward the end of the Cold War. The Soviets 

were expanding their boundaries of operations in the oceans, 

including sailing into the Gulf of Mexico.

During his tenure as CNO, Admiral Watkins developed a 

maritime strategy for dealing with the Soviet navy, keeping their naval 

forces on the defensive and ultimately demonstrating to the world that 

the United States Navy was a formidable foe.

It would not be an easy task. According to a Congressional

Budget Office report in March 1982, between 1970 and 1980 the number

of ships in the Navy fell from 847 to 538 and uniformed personnel

declined from 675,000 to 525,000. Watkins’ predecessor, CNO Thomas 

B. Hayward,stated the Navy “had been at virtually a wartime operating

tempo since the beginning of the Vietnam conflict and has never stood

down.”

Admiral Watkins would be one of the early supporters of 

President Ronald W. Reagan’s military buildup to defend against a 

missile attack, believing nuclear deterrence would work well as a 

defense mechanism rather than just perceived just as an offensive 

threat. 

The Reagan administration proposed a 600-ship initiative to 

bring the armed forces back into fighting shape to prepare for a potential

face-off with the Soviets. The ambitious five-year plan called for 133

new construction ships at the cost of more than $80 billion, but the 

600-ship initiative was never achieved under mounting pressures to 

reduce the national deficit.

Admiral Watkins would work tirelessly to oversee the 

rebuilding program that would continue the Ohio-class ballistic missile 

submarine program first commissioned in 1981; a redesign of the Los

Angeles-class attack submarines that allowed 12 new vertical launch 

tubes capable of firing Tomahawk missiles; and ramping up the

production of the remaining seven Nimitz-class aircraft carriers to join 

USS Nimitz, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and USS Carl Vinson. The 

600-ship initiative also included recommissioning the pre-World War 

II-era Iowa-class battleships—Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and

Wisconsin—that had already served in four wars. They were to be 

refitted with Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles to augment their

16-inch guns. The plan also called for weaponry that included Harpoons, 

Tomahawks, and AGM-88 HARM missiles, and the 25 cruisers and 

destroyers included in the program would be equipped with AEGIS

or AEGIS-derivative AAW systems.

Massive naval exercises were held annually in sea areas close 

to the Soviet Union. Admiral Watkins ensured naval forces operated 

in support of national objectives in Grenada, Lebanon, and the Persian 

Gulf as well.

Improving the quality of life for Sailors and their families was

an immediate priority for Admiral Watkins, who pushed for better pay 

and more support for spouses and children when the Sailor was deployed. 

The CNO also encouraged a new generation of officersto become more

deeply involved in what the Navy was doing at home and globally. This 

effort addressed an era he described as one of “violent peace” with a

new forward-thinking and forward-deployed maritime strategy.

That strategy would come into play in March 1986 when the 

Navy challenged—yet again—Libya’s claim to the entire Gulf of Sidra 

by crossing Muammar al-Qadafi’s “Line of Death.” On March 23 Libya

launched four surface-to-air missiles toward USS America’s F-14A

Tomcats conducting freedom of navigation operations that would begin 

a day of missile-launching attacks and counterattacks. By the end of 

the airstrike, there were no American losses, but 35 Libyan seamen 

were killed and there were numerous material losses.

J

ames David Watkins was born on March 7, 1927, in Alhambra, 

California, the sixth of seven children. After receiving his 

bachelor’s degree from the U.S. NavalAcademy in 1949, Watkins

served on submarines during the Korean and Vietnam wars. In

1958 he earned a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from the 

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

As a nuclear officer, Admiral Watkins served under Admiral

Hymen G. Rickover during the development of the nuclear propulsion 

program.

He served as executive officer of the submarine USS Barbero

and as both executive officer and commanding officer of the submarine

USS Snook. He participated in two cruises to the Western Pacific and

the Snook, under his command, wasthe first nuclear-powered submarine

to visit the Republic of Korea and Yokosuka, Japan. He was executive 

officer of USS Long Beach during the Vietnam War, which included

a deployment in 1968 to the Gulf of Tonkin while supporting Task 

Force 72.

Admiral Watkins’ broad knowledge of naval operations 

propelled him up the Navy’s chain of command. As a flag officer, he

served as Chief of Naval Personnel, Commander of the Sixth Fleet, 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and Commander in Chief of the Pacific

Fleet. In 1982 President Ronald W. Reagan appointedAdmiral Watkins

to the post of Chief of Naval Operations.

He held many prestigious posts after his retirement from 37 

years of naval service in 1986. After completing his term as Chief of 

Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins was appointed by President Reagan 

to lead the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency

Virus Epidemic; from 1989 to 1993 he served as the Secretary of 

Energy for President George H. W. Bush; and in 2001 he was named 

chairman of the Commission on Ocean Policy, a position created by 

President George W. Bush. 

Two weeks after retiring as CNO on June 30, 1986, Admiral 

Watkins gave the eulogy at the funeral for his mentor and long-time 

friend, Admiral Hymen G. Rickover, who he credited with shaping 

him as a young officer. “The Navy changed me,”Admiral Watkins told

The Los Angeles Times in 1988. “(Admiral Hymen) Rickover had an

intense interest in getting involved with the best and the brightest, and 

he drove it very hard. . . . He got me to understand the importance of 

education and doing everything you can to measure up to your Godgiven potential.”

Admiral Watkins died at his home in Alexandria, Virginia, 

on July 26, 2012. Interment was at Arlington National Cemetery.

Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost

Twenty-third Chief of Naval Operations

June 30, 1986–June 29, 1990

Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost facilitated the transition of the 

U.S. Navy from a Cold War focus on sea control to a new 

emphasis on regional littoral conflicts. 

He confronted growing tensions in the Middle East, 

complicated by the Iran-Iraq War. Less than one year into his tour, on

May 17, 1987, the USS Stark was hit by two missiles fired by an Iraqi

aircraft that killed 37. Starting in 1987 and for more than a year, the 

Navy supported Operation Earnest Will, escorting Kuwaiti-owned 

tankersto ensure theirsafe passage in the Gulf. In response to a missile

attack on the MV Sea Isle City, the Navy launched Operation Nimble

Archer to destroy two Iranian oil platforms. Only a few months later,

onApril 14, 1988, the guided-missile frigate Samuel B. Roberts, while

on escort patrol in the Persian Gulf, was severely damaged by an 

Iranian mine. In response the Navy retaliated by attacking more oil

platforms and Iranian vessels during Operation Praying Mantis. While

hostilities were active in the Persian Gulf, there were operations close 

to home as well requiring naval capabilities. In 1989 the U.S. Navy

provided critical support to SEAL and other military forces operating 

to restore democracy in Panama. 

At home, he faced the more pressing task of meeting Defense 

Secretary Dick Cheney’s request for the military to cut its projected 

spending by $180 billion. 

Just one year into Admiral Trost’s term as CNO, President 

Ronald W. Reagan was urging “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”

By the end of Admiral Trost’s term, the Berlin Wall was down. As the 

Soviet Union crumbled, however, Admiral Trost never wavered from 

his belief that the Navy needed to remain vigilant with its forward 

presence. He warned of “governments of fanatics” whose national

policy wasto destroy democracy. “They move in wherever they perceive

a weakness. They use terrorism as an instrument; they use it coldly 

and deliberately. In many ways, these governments are an even more

visible threat to us . . . .” 

Among his goals as CNO was to maintain the Navy’s global 

maritime superiority, “a sufficient force to carry out our nationalstrategy

of deterrence, crisis control and support our allies,” not only from 

larger threats, such as the Soviet Union and China, but also from smaller 

nations, drug traffickers, and terrorists. To achieve that mission would

require the U.S. Navy to maintain its advantage in antisubmarine 

warfare, using forward flexible forcesthat only the Navy could provide.

Admiral Trost made joint international exercises with allies 

a part of the Navy’s operational and training missions. He invited 

CNOs from other countries and also visited them to assess their viability 

as allies and partners. 

	 In October 1989 Admiral Trost made a historic visit to the

Soviet Union where he met with his Soviet counterpart and fellow 

submariner, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin. His trip’s purpose was 

to enhance mutual understanding and reduce tensions between the two 

countries. Admiral Trost toured a nuclear-powered submarine and 

cruiser and spoke to more than 1,200 students, faculty, and senior 

officers at the Soviet naval academy.

Admiral Trost dealt with more than budget cuts and the 

Soviets. A series of mishaps in 1989 forced Trost to suspend all air, 

land, and sea operations for 48 hours in order to review safety

procedures. Among those was the explosion on April 19 that killed 47

gun turret crewmen on the battleship USS Iowa. Within hours of the

incident, Trost issued a moratorium on 16-inch guns being fired. 

Through his guidance and perseverance in keeping the Navy 

and Sailors at operational readiness, the United States was prepared 

to lead a multinational force in the first Persian Gulf War in 1991,

months after his departure from office.

Anative of Illinois, Carlisle Albert Herman Trost was born in

Valmeyer in 1930. After graduating first in his class from

the U.S. Naval Academy in 1953, he joined the crew of a 

destroyer and then attended submarine school and was 

trained in nuclear power, graduating number one in that class as well. 

In 1956 he was stationed on USS Sirago.

	 As a junior officer he was awarded an Olmstead Scholarship

to study at the University of Freiburg, Germany. During the 1970s 

Admiral Trost completed assignments as the naval aide to the Secretary 

of the Navy; Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel; and Director, Navy 

Program Planning. During his more than 37 years of commissioned 

service, Admiral Trost served at sea in destroyers and diesel-powered 

and nuclear-powered submarines. He was executive officer of two

nuclear-powered submarines and commanding officer of a fleet ballistic

missile submarine. 

	 Subsequent to selection to flag rank in 1973, he commanded

Submarine Flotilla One and Submarine Group Five. Later operational 

assignments included Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; 

Commander, Seventh Fleet; Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; 

and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. Ashore, 

Admiral Trost was military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; 

executive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy; on the Navy staff as 

Director, Systems Analysis Division; Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel; 

and Director, Navy Program Planning. 

He retired at the end of his term as Chief of Naval Operations 

on June 29, 1990.

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II

Twenty-fourth Chief of Naval Operations

June 29, 1990–April 23, 1994

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II led the Navy in a period of

significant drawdown of U.S. naval forces in the wake of

the presumed end of the Cold War. The Navy staff was 

reorganized, reduced in size, and diversified while 

embracing closer joint operations with the other services. The shore 

establishment was significantly reduced and bases closed to match the

needs of a smaller Navy.

He oversaw the introduction of new platforms and systems 

that improved capabilities, including precision strike operations. The 

nation persistently called on the naval capabilities throughout his tour, 

starting with Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and Operation Desert 

Storm in 1991. He also served concurrently as the CNO and as acting 

Secretary of the Navy for seven and a half months in 1993, after 

SECNAV Sean O’Keefe left that office when President George H. W.

Bush’s term ended January 20, 1993.

Admiral Kelso oversaw revolutionary changes within the 

OPNAV staff and profoundly changed the means by which the Navy 

processed and made decisions. In keeping with Joint Staff practices,

he changed “OP” codes to “N” codes, and the staff was reorganized

to align with a “Napoleonic” arrangement used by both the Army and

the Joint Staff. In a period of dramatic change, he helped transform

not merely the organization but also the processes by which information 

could be shared and considered. He is credited with dramatically 

changing the means by which more informed decisions could be made 

by the Navy. 

As CNO at the time of the 1991 Tailhook Convention, during 

which numerous incidents of sexual assault and harassment were found 

to have occurred, Admiral Kelso found himself at the epicenter of the 

debate on the treatment of women in the military. Tailhook was a 

turbulent event for the entire Navy, resulted in the resignation of 

Secretary of the Navy Henry L. Garrett III on June 26, 1992, and

arguably precipitated momentum to support widening opportunities 

for women in the services. Admiral Kelso, a proponent of allowing 

women to serve in expanded roles, embraced the integration. While 

he was CNO, the Navy was the first of the services to act when, on

April 28, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin removed combat aircraft 

assignments from the positions women could not fill in the military

under the Department of Defense’s Combat Exclusion Policy. Despite 

the challenges Admiral Kelso faced because of Tailhook, the Navy 

used the scandal to reinforce within its ranks its core values of Honor, 

Courage, and Commitment. 

Admiral Kelso also worked through considerable public 

interest surrounding a gun turret explosion on the battleship USS Iowa

that killed 47 crew membersinApril 1989. The initial Navy investigation

completed before he took office suggested the explosion was a deliberate

act most likely caused by one of the crewmembers. The Navy’s findings

precipitated Congressional and media interest, and ultimately the CNO 

apologized to members of the Sailor’s family, stating publicly there 

was no evidence to support he had committed suicide and “despite all

efforts no certain answer regarding the cause of this terrible tragedy 

can be found.” The four battleships that had been recommissioned in 

the 1980s—Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri and Wisconsin—were all

decommissioned by 1992. All now serve as museum ships.

F

rank Benton Kelso II was born on July 11, 1933, in Fayetteville,

Tennessee. He attended the University of the South in Sewanee, 

Tennessee, and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 

1956. Kelso served at sea on a cargo ship and diesel-powered 

and nuclear-powered submarines. He was the engineering officer on

a ballistic missile submarine, the executive officer of two nuclearpowered submarines, and the commanding officer of two attack

submarines.

His shore assignments included command of the U.S. Naval 

Nuclear Power School; staff of Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. 

Atlantic Fleet; and Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Atlantic Command; and U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied 

Commander, Atlantic. He served as Commander, Submarine Squadron 

7; Division Director, Submarine Distribution Division in the Naval 

Military Personnel Command; and Section Head of the Submarine 

Programs Section in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

(Manpower, Personnel, and Training). He was selected for promotion 

to rear admiral in 1980.

Admiral Kelso served as Director, Strategic Submarine 

Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and then as Director,

Office of Program Appraisal, Office of the Secretary of the Navy. In

1985 he became Commander, Sixth Fleet and NATO Commander, 

Naval Striking Force and Support Forces, Southern Europe. During 

this tour members of the Palestine Liberation Front hijacked the cruise 

ship Achille Lauro and killed a disabled passenger. They negotiated 

safe refuge and were flown toward Tunisia; the plane was intercepted

by U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats and forced to land in Sigonella, Sicily,

where the hijackers were arrested and later tried for murder.

	 In March of 1986 the United States initiated a series of

“Freedom of Navigation” exercises that challenged Libyan leader

Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi’s “line of death.” Then-Vice Admiral

Kelso deployed elements of Task Force 60, including three aircraft 

carriers, 250 aircraft (1,546 sorties), and 26 ships and submarines

across the line and triggered Libyan action. The next month, following 

additional terrorist attacks sponsored by al-Qadhafi, the United States

launched Operation El Dorado Canyon—attacks against Libyan military 

targets. Under Admiral Kelso, U.S. aircraft attacked three target areas 

near Tripoli.

After he assumed the duties as Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Atlantic Fleet, he subsequently became Supreme Allied Commander, 

Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command in 1988. 

Admiral Kelso became the Navy’s 24th Chief of Naval Operations on

July 1, 1990. 

	 He retired in 1994 after 38 years of service. Kelso returned

to his hometown in Fayetteville, Tennessee, in 2003 where he remained 

until his death at 79 on June 23, 2013. He is buried in Fayetteville in 

the historic Rose Hill Cemetery.

Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda

Twenty-fifth Chief of Naval Operations

April 23, 1994–May 16, 1996

Admiral Jeremy “Mike” Boorda, known as a “Sailor’s

Sailor,” was the first surface warrior to hold the office

since Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and the first enlisted Sailor

to rise continuously from the ranks to become Chief of 

Naval Operations. Within a year, he had promulgated “Forward . . .

. From the Sea,” which emphasized a post-Cold War Navy focused 

on combat-credible forward presence that would be borne out 

consistently in operations. Experienced in manpower and personnel 

areas, he managed the largest mandated reduction in naval personnel 

since World War II with sensitivity and careful priorities while driving

Navy modernization with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft, a 

new attack submarine, Surface Combatant 21, and theater ballistic 

missile defense.

Forward presence as a central U.S. Navy tenet was the 

premise in “Forward . . . . From the Sea” and the primary driver in

the Navy’s budget while Admiral Boorda was Chief of Naval 

Operations. It also included justification for the twelfth carrier

requirement. Preventing conflict and emphasizing joint and combined

exercises and operations were also significant aspects of the new

strategic construct. The ability to put two carrier battle groups off 

Taiwan in 1996 during People’s Republic of China missile tests and 

have a third move from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf at the 

same time was a powerful proof of concept.

Admiral Boorda became Chief of Naval Operations after a 

relatively bumpy period of negative publicity for the Navy—from 

Tailhook to a cheating scandal at the U.S. Naval Academy to an 

accidental firing on a Turkish destroyer—and he worked hard at

returning a sense of pride to those serving. His predecessor, Admiral 

Frank Kelso, had instituted the “Sailor’s Creed” for all enlisted to

memorize at boot camp. Admiral Boorda replaced the word 

“bluejacket” with “Navy” to include all hands in this unifying effort,

emphasizing that Navy personnel are Sailors first and their ranks

second.

Much like Admiral Zumwalt, Admiral Boorda focused his 

energies on improving the quality of life for all Sailors. He was well 

known for ignoring concerns about setting precedents that could not 

be maintained, emphasizing instead the need to do the right thing for 

individual Sailors. His tenure saw the first women deploy in combat

air squadrons on carriers and reporting to surface combatants following 

the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Law in 1994. 

	 It was while he was CNO that the Blue Angels named their

first African-American commanding officer, and the first AfricanAmerican admiral, J. Paul Reason, achieved four-star rank. Admiral 

Boorda also reinstituted a program known as “Seaman to Admiral”

to provide Sailors the same promotional opportunity he had.

J

eremy Michael Boorda was born in South Bend, Indiana, on

November 26, 1939, and enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1956. On 

his way to the rank of petty officer first class, he served primarily

in aviation. He was selected for commissioning under the 

Integration Program and, after attending Officer Candidate School in

Newport, Rhode Island, was commissioned in August 1962.

	 During his 34 years of commissioned service, he served at

sea in destroyers USS Porterfield and USS John R. Craig. He was

executive officer of USS Brooke and commanded USS Parrot, USS

Farragut, and Destroyer Squadron 22. Afloat tours as a flag officer

included Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight in Norfolk, 

Virginia; Carrier Battle Group Commander embarked in USS Saratoga; 

and Commander, Battle Force Sixth Fleet.

Ashore, he was a weapons instructor at Naval Destroyer School 

in Newport, attended the U.S. Naval War College, and earned a bachelor 

of arts degree from the University of Rhode Island. His first tour in

manpower and personnel came as Head, Surface Lieutenant Commander 

Assignments/Assistant for Captain Detailing in the Bureau of Naval 

Personnel. Relieving a civilian presidential appointee, he was assigned 

as Executive Assistant to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, DC.

He served as Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval 

Personnel/Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, 

and Training. In December 1984 he assumed his first flag officer

assignment as Executive Assistant to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 

James Watkins. In August 1988 Admiral Boorda became Chief of

Naval Personnel/Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, 

Personnel, and Training.

Receiving his fourth star in November 1991, he reported as 

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH)

and Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe in December. As 

CINCSOUTH, Admiral Boorda was in command of all NATO forces

engaged in operations enforcing United Nations sanctions against the 

warring factions in the former Republic of Yugoslavia and ordered the 

first offensive action in NATO’s history, the strikes against Bosnian Serb

aircraft violating the no-fly zone. On February 1, 1993,Admiral Boorda

assumed additional duty as Commander, Joint Task Force Provide 

Promise, responsible for the supply of humanitarian relief to Bosnia.

	 Admiral Boorda died May 16, 1996, of a self-inflicted gunshot

wound. President William J. Clinton, his Commander in Chief, said 

of Admiral Boorda at his funeral in the National Cathedral in Washington, 

DC, “Many have said before me that his lasting legacy will be his

concern for the Sailors. He knew the people were the Navy’s greatest 

asset. And every day he made the Navy stronger because he took good 

care of its Sailors.” 

Admiral Jay L. Johnson

Twenty-sixth Chief of Naval Operations

August 2, 1996–July 21, 2000

Admiral Jay L. Johnson served as interim Chief of Naval 

Operations following Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda’s death 

in May 1996, and he was confirmed for the position in

August. During his confirmation hearing,Admiral Johnson

stated, “As a vision for the future, let me just say that we will steer by

the stars and not the wake.” He explained that four stars of equal 

magnitude in the constellation would guide the Navy: operational 

primacy, leadership, teamwork, and pride.

Described as a champion of reform, Admiral Johnson improved 

the interdeployment training cycle—the period between deployments—

by reducing at-sea time, easing wear and tear on equipment, and ensuring 

Sailors could spend more time in port with their families. His 

improvements included empowering the Navy’s commanding officers

by removing redundant inspections and burdensome paperwork and 

raising morale among Sailors, while giving commanders the opportunity 

to truly lead their ships, squadrons, submarines, and SEAL teams.

Even as the Navy was reduced in size over the previous 

decade, the number of operational tasks for the Navy continued to 

increase, from promoting stability, providing timely crisis response, 

deterring aggression, or if required, fighting and winning, a responsibility

Admiral Johnson said was the Navy’s “most fundamental, enduring

strength.” 

Admiral Johnson employed a three-part strategy—shaping, 

responding, preparing—with a force shaped around 12 carrier battle 

groups and 12 amphibious ready groups. The Navy often had half of 

its fleet underway, and 32 percent of that forward deployed, capable

of responding to a full spectrum of crises whenever tasked.

Admiral Johnson also led the Joint Chiefs of Staff in calling 

for improved personnel compensation. He was the first service chief

to step forward and support food stamp relief for needy Sailors, Soldiers, 

Airmen, and Marines. He was instrumental in restoring full retirement 

pay for military retirees and in pushing for larger increases in annual 

military pay raises. 

	 With promulgation of the “. . . From the Sea” and “Forward.

. . . From the Sea” naval strategies, Admiral Johnson guided the Navy 

to focus on operating in the littoral zones of the world that encompassed 

areas of strategic importance to the United States, as well as to enhance 

the reach inland from the sea for joint and coalition forces.

	 “Seventy-five percent of Earth’s population and a similar

proportion of national capitals and major commercial centers lie in the 

littorals,” Admiral Johnson said of his 1997 strategy plan. “These are

the places where American influence and power have the greatest

impact and are needed most often. For forward-deployed naval forces, 

the littorals are a starting point as well as a destination. The mission 

may require us to exercise our considerable reach and operate far 

inland.”

To replace worn-out equipment, Admiral Johnson emphasized 

development of the next generation of ships, aircraft, and information 

systems.

An advocate for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program, 

Admiral Johnson emphasized the importance of maintaining the Navy’s 

air superiority into the future. He believed the F/A-18E/F was the 

cornerstone of the future of carrier aviation and the Navy’s number 

one aviation priority. “You can’t think about the F/A-18E/F without

thinking about Jay Johnson,” said Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig. 

“He virtually willed this program into success. We are buying aircraft

that will transform the nature of naval aviation and protect it for decades 

ahead because of Jay Johnson.”

Additionally, during his tenure Admiral Johnson helped 

formulate military policy to respond to persistent tensions and aggressive 

actions in Southwest Asia, such as Operation Desert Strike on September 

6, 1996, in retaliation for Saddam Hussein moving 40,000 troops into

northern Iraq, threatening the Kurds, and violating the no-fly zone. A

coordinated cruise missile attack targeted Iraqi air defense infrastructure.

When Operation Provide Comfort ended on December 31, 1996, the 

Navy continued to offer protection for the Kurdish population in Iraq

with the no-fly zones of Operations Northern and Southern Watch,

which expanded the reach of the zone to include Saudi Arabia and 

Kuwait. Hussein continued to resist UN directives to allow Special 

Commission inspectorsinto Iraq to look for weapons of mass destruction,

so from December 16 to 19, 1998, U.S.-led coalition forces bombed 

Iraqi targets during Operation Desert Fox.

Admiral Johnson also helped form NATO’s answer to Serbian 

aggression in Operation Allied Force in 1999. While he served on the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sailors participated in 45 operations around the

world, ranging from humanitarian efforts to intense combat. 

J

ay Lynn Johnson was born in 1946 in Great Falls, Montana, and

raised in West Salem, Wisconsin. Johnson graduated from the 

U.S. Naval Academy in 1968 and, upon completion of flight

training, was designated a naval aviator in 1969. Johnson served 

two combat tours in Vietnam. He later flew F-14 Tomcat fighters and

commanded Fighter Squadron 84. He next commanded Carrier Air

Wing One and led its squadrons in a 1986 strike on Libya. In July 1994

Johnson took command of the U.S. Second Fleet. He became Chief 

of Naval Operations during a time of increased U.S. commitments to 

international peacekeeping operations. 

Admiral Johnson retired as the 26th CNO on July 21, 2000, 

in a retirement and change of command ceremony at the U.S. Naval 

Academy, where his naval career began.

Admiral Vernon E. Clark

Twenty-seventh Chief of Naval Operations

July 21, 2000–July 22, 2005

Admiral Clark had been Chief of Naval Operations only two 

months when a terrorist suicide attack blasted a hole into 

the side of guided-missile destroyer USS Cole while the 

ship was harbored at a Yemen port on October 12, 2000. 

As the Navy adapted to an enemy with neither geographic borders nor 

moral boundaries, the September 11, 2001, attacks further signified

that the battlespace had changed. American Airlines Flight 77 slammed 

into the Pentagon just yards from the CNO’s office. Admiral Clark

would spend the remainder of his time as CNO shaping the Navy to 

fight a war against terrorism.

Under his guidance, the Navy was at the forefront during 

Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In

OEF, the Navy outfitted the USS Kitty Hawk with a contingent of

special forces from which a meaningful land campaign could be 

launched and sustained. In OIF, five carrier strike groups deployed in

simultaneous support of major combat operations in the war. The Navy 

also operated closer to the home front while supporting Homeland 

Security’s Noble Eagle response following the 9/11 attacks. 

To counter the risk of regional and widespread terrorism, 

Admiral Clark stressed that the Navy “must expand its striking power,

achieve information dominance, and develop transformational ways 

of fulfilling our enduring missions of sea control, power projection,

strategic deterrence, strategic sealift and forward presence.” He would 

achieve that with his innovative strategic plan, “Seapower 21,” which

utilized three fundamental concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea 

Basing. These elements would revamp the Navy into a more costefficient, strategically defensive, and effective service. Admiral Clark

stated, “Bringing the fight to our enemies is our mission. Transforming

ourselves and our great institution for the dangerous decades ahead is 

our imperative. Our task: Prevail today while bridging to a successful 

future.”

Warfare had become anything but predictable, so he sought 

to improve flexibility of the ship maintenance schedules that rendered

non-deployable significant portions of the fleet. His Fleet Response

Plan brought major change to the means by which ships were maintained. 

His other innovations included standing up the Expeditionary Strike 

Group Command for fast action overseas. Admiral Clark recognized 

that “speed is not just about how fast your ships or airplanes go, it also

is about how responsive and agile your organizations are.” 

Through his tenure as CNO, Admiral Clark remained focused 

on histop five priorities: manpower, current readiness, future readiness,

quality of service, and alignment. That included a shift from a planned 

maintenance system to one based more on the readiness condition of 

the ship in order to maintain operational readiness. “It’s critical to

mission accomplishment,” explained Admiral Clark, “If our fleets,

staffs and various systems are in alignment, we can more effectively 

accomplish our primary mission and that’s victory in combat.” 

	 As the first CNO to face budget constraints following 9/11,

Admiral Clark applied business tactics to reorganize the Navy into a 

more efficient and productive military branch. He proposed cutting

the number of military personnel in order to reallocate the funding to 

purchase more ships. To balance the impact of this policy, he promoted 

the education of current staff. In order to increase retention of naval

service members he implemented a personnel plan that enabled Sailors 

to develop their own career paths. The Navy expanded educational 

opportunities for Sailors with internet-based courses afloat as well as

traditional opportunities like the ProgramAfloat for College Education

(PACE). Admiral Clark credited the Navy’s personnel with making 

“ours the greatest Navy ever to sail the world’s oceans; our ability to

attract, train, and retain them is a testament to the health of our service 

and an indicator of our proper heading as we chart our course into the 

twenty-first century.”

Admiral Clark retired many ships during his time as Chief 

of Naval Operations. Innovations in systems maintenance and a

reduction in the number of personnel required to serve on active ships 

further cut operational costs across the fleet. While Admiral Clark

served as CNO, the Navy purchased ships on an installment plan rather 

than paid in full, which made available additional money for personnel 

retention and educational training. “At the heart of everything good

that is happening in our Navy today is the vital fact that we are winning 

the battle for people. We are attracting, developing, and retaining a 

talented cadre of professionals who have chosen a life of service. Our 

ability to challenge them with meaningful, satisfying work that lets 

them make a difference is fundamental to our covenant with them as 

leaders,” Admiral Clark testified before the House Appropriations

Committee in March 2005. 

He retired a few months later on July 22, 2005, the longest 

serving CNO since Admiral Arleigh Burke. 

Vernon E. Clark was born in Sioux City, Iowa. A graduate

of Evangel College, Clark continued his education to earn 

a master of business administration from the University of 

Arkansas.Afterward, he attended Officer Candidate School

and received his commission in August 1968.

He served aboard destroyers such as USS John W. Weeks 

and USS Gearing. During his time as a lieutenant, he commanded the 

Asheville-class gunboat Grand Rapids. He later commanded USS 

McCloy, USS Spruance, Atlantic Fleet’s Anti-Submarine Warfare 

Training Center, Destroyer Squadron Seventeen, and Destroyer 

Squadron Five. 

During his time ashore he served as an Assistant Director of 

the System Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations. Other assignments included Administrative Assistant to 

the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) as well as 

Administrative Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. 

Admiral Michael G. Mullen

Twenty-eighth Chief of Naval Operations

July 22, 2005–September 29, 2007

As a fleet officer, Admiral Michael G. “Mike” Mullen

envisioned seapower as a show of force to deter terrorism 

or other acts of aggression. As Chief of Naval Operations, 

however, seapower began to take on a different meaning. 

It still included a strong forward presence in the blue waters and brown

littorals, but it also included those serving on shore providing 

humanitarian aid or rebuilding infrastructure torn down by years of 

conflict.

As Admiral Mullen told students at the Naval War College 

in August 2005, the bigger picture relies on a “very different image of

seapower” that includes “doctors and nurses healing the sick.”American

warships may deter acts of violence, but it will be the service members 

providing aid who will change how Americans are perceived globally, 

Mullen explained in a 2006 interview with Seapower Magazine.

Just one month into his assignment as CNO, Hurricane Katrina 

made landfall in New Orleans with loss of life and property damage. 

On Admiral Mullen’s watch, the Navy dispatched Sailors, Seabees and 

more than 20 ships, including hospital ship USNS Comfort; provided 

medical services for the hurricane-stricken city; and oversaw search 

and rescue, search and recovery, and dive and salvage operations.

A bit further from home, Admiral Mullen was tasked with 

providing the forces and capabilities to support the combat missions 

in Iraq andAfghanistan.Admiral Mullen referred to the conflict in Iraq

and Afghanistan as the “long war,” one that will be “generational,”

with perhaps his grandchildren and even their children still fighting it.

	 Despite the strain on his current fleet in directly supporting

two wars, his vision never waned. “I have three priorities ... and they

are to get it right for our people, operate our fleet and build the fleet

for the future,” he said during an All Hands call at Naval Station Norfolk 

in May 2007. 

	 As the United States continued fighting in ground wars, the

Navy’s role became more expansive, and its definition of seapower

evolved with mushrooming threats. According to Admiral Mullen, 

seapower was a “forward-deployed Navy, rotational and surge capable,

in support of the joint force, large enough, agile enough, and lethal 

enough to deter any threat and defeat any foe.”

	 In January 2006 Admiral Mullen established the U.S. Navy

Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to realign the existing 

expeditionary units under a single type command. NECC aimed to be 

more capable, responsive, and effective in responding to the requirements 

ordered by U.S. joint combatant commanders fighting terrorism and

beyond.

Admiral Mullen also developed the Navy’s 30-year 

shipbuilding plan, which was designed to stabilize the fleet at 313 ships

from 281 ships. The 2007 plan supported the Navy’s trend toward 

modernization and a larger force to carry on the fight against terrorism

while remaining capable of providing humanitarian relief and deterring 

potential combatants in the maritime domain.

During his tenure as CNO, Admiral Mullen tasked the Naval 

War College with creating a new maritime strategy that addressed the 

challenges of the time and guided the Navy in an entirely new, globally 

connected environment. Representatives from the CNO’s staff and the 

Naval War College traveled throughout the country to facilitate the 

Maritime Strategy Symposium Series. This effort to define a new

maritime strategy for the nation included involving American citizens 

through a series of public forums.

The maritime forces of the United States—the Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Coast Guard—came together to create the unified maritime

strategy. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower was released 

under Admiral Mullen’s successor, Admiral Gary Roughead.

Michael Glenn “Mike” Mullen was born in 1946 in Los

Angeles. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy as a 

recruited basketball player and graduated in 1968. In

1985 Mullen earned a master of science degree in 

operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and in 1991 

he graduated from the advanced management program at the Harvard 

Business School.

	 As a junior officer, he served in various leadership positions

aboard USS Collett, USS Blandy, USS Fox, and USS Sterett. Mullen 

commanded three ships: USS Noxubee, USS Goldsborough, and USS 

Yorktown. As a flag officer, he commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group

Two and the George Washington Battle Group. His last command at 

sea was as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet/Commander, NATO Striking 

Fleet Atlantic.

	 Shore assignmentsincluded Company Officer and Executive

Assistant to the Commandant of Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval 

Academy. He also served in the Bureau of Naval Personnel as Director, 

Surface Officer Distribution and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense

on the staff of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. On the 

Chief of Naval Operations’ staff, he served as Deputy Director and 

Director of Surface Warfare; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 

Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N8); and as the 32nd Vice 

Chief of Naval Operations.

Before being named Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 

Mullen’s final operational assignment was as Commander,Joint Force

Command Naples/Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. After two 

years as CNO, Admiral Mullen was sworn in as the 17th Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1, 2007. He was nominated and 

confirmed unanimously for a second term, which began Oct. 1, 2009.

Admiral Mullen retired on Sept. 30, 2011.

Admiral Gary Roughead

Twenty-ninth Chief of Naval Operations

September 29, 2007–September 23, 2011

Admiral Gary Roughead assumed the Navy’s helm nearly 

six years into a multifront war on terror. The Navy was 

supporting military operations against terrorists at sea and 

contributing significant forcesto operations against enemies

on land—in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in numerous countries around

the world.

As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Roughead guided 

the Navy through a challenging period of transformation in fiscal,

security, and personnel matters. He had to sustain an ambitious wartime 

fighting force, yet transition the 20th-century Navy to an increasingly

perilous 21st-century battlespace, which included cyber warfare, the 

proliferation of affordable nuclear and missile technology, nonstate 

combatant networks and forces, the increased focus on naval power 

by many nations, and spiraling force acquisition costs and delivery 

timelines. He was also determined not to reduce the nation’s historical 

commitment to supremacy at sea. As he put it, he never wanted to see 

America’s Sailors in a fair fight.

As Chief of Naval Operations, his leadership reshaped the 

Navy strategically and operationally. Shortly after taking officeAdmiral

Roughead, among others, introduced A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 

Century Seapower, the landmark U.S. maritime strategy document 

coauthored by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It was, in

effect, a blueprint for the future of the nation’s maritime forces and 

relationships with its many global partners. 

	 Innovations under his administration restructured Navy fleets

in a number of ways. He reestablished Fourth Fleet in the Caribbean 

and then appointed for the first time a Navy SEAL as commander of

a numbered fleet. He also stood up Fleet Cyber Command as the Tenth

Fleet, while consolidating the Navy’s information-related communities 

together in the Information Dominance Corps. 

	 Recapitalizing a global blue-water fleet remained a priority

throughout Admiral Roughead’s tour. His leadership was critical in 

securing investment and support for a dual-block purchase of the littoral 

combat ship. He advocated buying ten ships of both variants in order 

to rapidly expand force structure with agile, fast, and flexible platforms

more capable and responsive to the threats faced at sea. The Navy also 

restarted the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer production line 

while truncating the DDG-1000 program to three ships.

One concerted effort launched in the wake of the 9/11 attack 

was the recruitment and growth of special forces—in the Navy’s case, 

SEALs—to more nimbly respond to world events. Efforts in this regard 

bore fruit in two high-profile operations during his tour as CNO. The

first was the at-sea rescue of the captain of the hijacked Americanflagged motor vessel Maersk Alabama, who had been taken hostage

by pirates off Somalia in April 2009. The second was the successful 

raid and killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. 

Two events that captured the world’s attention demonstrated 

Admiral Roughead’s investment in delivering capability and capacity 

when nations needed it most: Operation Unified Response (the U.S.

military’s response to the January 12, 2010, Haiti earthquake) and 

Operation Tomodachi (the Department of Defense’s disaster relief to 

Japan following the March 12, 2011, earthquake and tsunami). Within 

one week of the Haiti earthquake, the U.S. Navy had dedicated 17 

ships, 48 helicopters, and 12 fixed-wing aircraft in support of

approximately 10,000 Sailors and Marines for Operation Unified

Response. As many as 16 U.S. Navy ships participated in Operation 

Tomodachi. Commander, Seventh Fleet oversaw 160 search and relief 

air sorties for 1,100 flight hours, delivered 260 tons of relief supplies,

and helped clear the ports of Hachinohe, Aomori; Miyako, Iwate; and

Kesennuma, Miyagi. These disasters and the corresponding relief efforts 

illustrated the value of the American maritime forces in an increasingly 

connected world.

	 Admiral Roughead recognized that the influence of social

media had become undeniable on the global stage and publicly espoused 

that government leaders who were reluctant to allow access to social 

media were making a strategic error. He went on to say that the Navy 

was irreversibly committed to engaging in social media throughout 

the organization and had come to realize the demand for radical 

transparency in external communications.

Admiral Roughead also led the Navy in another considerable 

change for the military force, the repeal of the “Don’tAsk, Don’t Tell”

policy that prevented openly gay people from serving in the military. 

As CNO, Admiral Roughead led the Navy through a comprehensive 

training and certification program aimed at ameliorating religious and

societal concerns of its members. He certified the service was ready

to implement the change and, three days before Admiral Roughead 

left office, the policy was officially repealed on September 20, 2011.

Gary Roughead was born in 1951 in Buffalo, New York, and 

is a 1973 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Among his six operational commands, Roughead 

wasthe first officer to command both classes ofAegisships,

having commanded USS Barry and USS Port Royal. As a flag officer,

he commanded Cruiser Destroyer Group 2, the George Washington 

Battle Group, and U.S. 2nd Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic and 

Naval Forces North Fleet East. At the time he was on active duty, 

Roughead was one of only two officers to have commanded the fleets

in both the Pacific and Atlantic, having commanded the U.S. Pacific

Fleet and Joint Task Force 519, as well as U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 

where he was responsible for ensuring Navy forces were trained, ready, 

equipped, and prepared to operate around the world, where and when 

needed.

Ashore he served as the Commandant at the U.S. Naval 

Academy, during which time he led the strategic planning effort that 

underpinned that institution’s first capital campaign. He was also the

Navy’s Chief of Legislative Affairs, responsible for the Department 

of the Navy’s interaction with Congress, and the Deputy Commander 

of the U.S. Pacific Command during the massive relief effort following

the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Admiral Roughead retired on November 1, 2011, after more 

than three decades of service in the U.S. Navy.

Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert

Thirtieth Chief of Naval Operations

September 23, 2011–Present

Admiral Greenert’s appointment as Chief of Naval Operations 

represented the first break from an 11-year, three-consecutive

line of surface warfare CNOs. Central to his leadership 

priorities have been his “Sailing Directions,” “Navigation

Plan,” and his three tenets: “Warfighting First,” “Operate Forward,”

and “Be Ready.”

Admiral Greenert faced direct operational impact from 

budgetary constraints during sequestration. Despite these challenges, 

the Navy maintained its global reach through scaled forward operational 

presence. He continued to invest in platforms and personnel to meet 

ever-shifting deterrence demands and adapt to their multifunction 

mission requirements.

	 As ground forces finalized major combat operations in the

Middle East, the Navy rebalanced its priorities to the Pacific, an area

of operation with which Admiral Greenert has significant experience.

	 As CNO, he has led a forward and flexible force in a dynamic

security environment, including challenges in the Atlantic and 

Mediterranean, off the coasts of Libya, Somalia, Yemen, and 

Afghanistan, and across the Pacific. The Navy’s forward presence is

an effort to combat nontraditional and ever-evolving threats to stability 

and security, such as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), while

not forgetting the importance of humanitarian assistance and disaster 

response missions. By entering into the Pacific Partnership and the

2015 Continuing Promise, assisting after natural disasters, combating 

the deadly virus Ebola, and spearheading search and rescue missions, 

the Navy has not only provided assistance but also strengthened 

relationships that are critical to deterring future conflicts. 

Through the combination of creative thinking, technology, 

process improvements, and Sailors’ ingenuity, the Navy is uniquely 

positioned to rapidly test and use innovative concepts across the force. 

This is evident through Admiral Greenert’s establishment of the CNO 

Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC), advancementsin information dominance,

and cyber warfare applications to better support fleet operations and

the joint domain.

	 Starting in 2015 under the CNO’s leadership, female officers

began serving aboard Virginia-class attack submarines—the first of

which are USS Virginia and USS Minnesota. 

The Chief of Naval Operations has been charged with 

sustaining and improving seapower and operational focus. Admiral 

Greenert has kept “Warfighting First” as his core mandate. From

increased combat operations to maritime security, counterpiracy, and 

support for high-end units (Marines and Special Forces) operating 

ashore, he has worked to ensure the Navy supports its maritime partners 

both domestically and internationally.

A wide range of milestones have occurred during Admiral 

Greenert’s tenure. The twelfth Virginia-class attack submarine entered 

the fleet, with eight additional planned through 2019. The integration

of P-8A Poseidons and launching of additional San Antonio-class 

amphibious transport dock ships, PCU Zumwalt (the DDG-1000 

program), and various vehicle systems—including innovation in 

propulsion—have maximized resources and increased the reach and 

response of the Navy into a more agile sea-based strategic deterrent.

Operating on multiple fronts, despite the reduction in personnel 

and platforms, Admiral Greenert has led the Navy’s charge for more 

diverse multiuse platforms and systems. By incorporating the joint 

high speed vessel, littoral combatship, mobile landing platform,Afloat

Forward Staging Base, Ohio-class replacement, F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter, unmanned combat air system, antisubmarine warfare mission 

modules, and energy lasers, Admiral Greenert has been able train, 

diversify, and equip his Sailors.

Leading the service through sequestration, Admiral Greenert 

evaluated all areas to help control costs and balance the overall budget 

to ensure the Navy continues to meet the nation’s needs. Decisions to 

cancel five deployments, reduce procurement of numerous weapons,

furlough civilians, and defer important facility renovations and 

modernization plans were some of the ways Admiral Greenert found 

the right balance for the Navy. 

Admiral Greenert has actively sought to engage in candid 

and direct conversations with Navy personnel. A strong advocate for 

ensuring “Quality of Life” and “Quality of Work,” he has understood

that innovation has driven the Navy to a new way of operating and 

thinking. Communicating with Sailors has always been a vital tool for 

CNOs, and Admiral Greenert has engaged the deck-plate Sailor through 

personal and virtual communications with his many visits throughout 

the fleet, town hall sessions, and social media.

J

onathan W. Greenert is a native of Butler, Pennsylvania. He 

graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and completed 

studies in nuclear power for service as a submarine officer

His career as a submariner includes assignments aboard USS 

Flying Fish, USS Tautog, submarine NR-1, and USS Michigan, 

culminating in command of USS Honolulu from March 1991 to July 

1993 during which time he was nominated by his peers and presented 

the Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Award for inspirational 

leadership.

	 Subsequent fleet command assignmentsinclude Commander,

Submarine Squadron 11; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas; 

Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet; and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces 

Command. 

	 Greenert has served in various fleet support and financial

management positions, including Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 

for Integration of Capabilities and Resources(N8); Deputy Commander,

U.S. Pacific Fleet; Chief of Staff, U.S. Seventh Fleet; Head, Navy

Programming Branch; and Director, Operations Division, Navy 

Comptroller. 
Prepublication edition produced by the

Naval History and Heritage Command

in commemoration of the centennial of the

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

May 11, 2015

All photos are U.S. Navy origin in the public domain.