[J-118-2016] [MO: Donohue, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

QU'EED BATTS,

Appellant

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No. 45 MAP 2016

Appeal from the Order of the Superior 

Court dated September 4, 2015, 

reconsideration denied November 10, 

2015, at No. 1764 EDA 2014 Affirming 

the Judgment of Sentence of the 

Northampton County Court of Common 

Pleas, Criminal Division, dated May 2, 

2014 at No. CP-48-CR-0001215-2006.

ARGUED: December 7, 2016

CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: June 26, 2017

I join the learned Majority’s opinion in full. 

Recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence imposes a challenging task upon trial 

courts called upon to sentence juveniles convicted of murder. As well, it cannot be 

gainsaid that the Commonwealth’s burden in overcoming the presumption announced 

by the Majority is high. But, the Supreme Court of the United States has made its will 

clear in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 

S.Ct. 718 (2016), directing that life without parole sentences (“LWOP”) for juveniles 

should be rare and uncommon, and imposed only in “exceptional circumstances.” See

Maj. Op. at 70 (quoting Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736).1 

 

1 See also Tatum v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 11, 13 (2016) (per curiam) 

(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that the “very meaningful task for the lower 

courts to carry out” involves deciding “whether the juvenile offender before it is a child 

whose crimes reflect transient immaturity or is one of those rare children whose crimes 

reflect irreparable corruption for whom a life without parole sentence may be 

appropriate”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
[J-118-2016] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2

Our reversal of Batts’ sentence in the instant case illustrates the complexities and 

difficulties associated with sentencing juveniles in this context. Here, the trial court 

expended a significant amount of time and effort contemplating the testimony and 

expert evaluations of Batts, and reached a considered judgment on what the court

believed was the correct sentence for Batts. The court then authored a comprehensive 

opinion detailing its factual determinations and its bases for sentencing Batts to life in 

prison without parole. All of these diligent efforts notwithstanding, the trial court still fell 

short of the new constitutional standard. In a routine sentencing appeal, the trial court’s 

decision would be nearly unassailable. In this singular context, however, the sentence 

must be ruled unconstitutional, despite the trial court’s commendable efforts. 

I agree with the Majority that, while the Constitution does not require the 

Commonwealth to present expert testimony in order to overcome the evidentiary 

presumption against LWOP, see Maj. Op. at 76-77, it is “difficult to conceive” of 

situations where the Commonwealth can rebut that presumption without such testimony. 

Id. at 77. Following today’s decision, the Commonwealth likely will (and I believe 

should) retain and present an expert in the vast majority of LWOP resentencing 

hearings, if not in all of them. That being the case, equity demands that trial courts 

exercise their discretion to provide such juveniles with their own expert, in the event that

the juvenile cannot afford one on his or her own. This not only would ensure 

evenhandedness in the proceeding, but also would provide the trial court with a

complete perspective of the juvenile, which is necessary in order to correctly navigate 

the framework that is established today by this Court. 

Justice Todd joins this concurring opinion.