[Cite as Jallaq v. Jallaq, 2020-Ohio-5402.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Musa Jallaq, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 19AP-602 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CV-3025) 

Mohammad Jallaq et al., : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendants-Appellees, : 

(Marcelle Rose Anthony, J.D., L.L.M., : 

 Defendant-Appellant). : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 24, 2020 

 

On brief: Marcelle Rose Anthony, LLC and Marcelle Rose 

Anthony, for appellant. Argued: Marcelle Rose Anthony. 

On brief: Hrabcak & Co., L.P.A., and Gregory A. Wetzel, for 

appellee. Argued: Gregory A. Wetzel. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BEATTY BLUNT, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a trial court order adopting a magistrate's decision that 

imposes a monetary sanction on defendants' counsel and respondent-appellant, 

Marcelle R. Anthony (hereinafter "Anthony"), in the amount of $13,718.40. The sanction is 

in the favor of plaintiff's counsel and movants-appellees, Moyer Law Offices, LLC., Attorney 

Stephen A. Moyer, Esq., and Attorney Gregory A. Wetzel, Esq. (hereinafter "movants"), who 

had been named as third-party defendants in a complaint filed by Anthony on behalf of the 

defendants. The named parties in the case, plaintiff Musa Jallaq and defendants 

Mohammad Jallaq et al. are not parties to this appeal, as they have settled their dispute. 
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No. 19AP-602 

The only issues for this court to decide relate to the trial court's award of sanctions against 

Anthony. 

{¶ 2} On March 28, 2017, movants filed the lawsuit that gives this appeal its caption 

on behalf of their client Musa Jallaq, who was a minority member of a limited liability 

company. The claims filed were against the managing member Mohammad Jallaq, the 

company itself, and an affiliated company, and asserted that the company had improperly 

withheld distributions. Anthony represented the defendants in that lawsuit, and on April 7, 

2017, she filed a third-party complaint in the lawsuit directly against movants Moyer Law 

Offices, L.L.C., Stephen A. Moyer, Esq, and Gregory A. Wetzel, Esq., asserting claims for 

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981, state and federal racketeering violations, and civil 

liability for aiding and abetting criminal acts. Movants obtained separate counsel, but 

Anthony voluntarily dismissed the third-party complaint less than 2 weeks later, on 

April 19, 2017. The underlying lawsuit itself was settled shortly thereafter, and dismissed 

on May 12, 2017. 

{¶ 3} One week later, movants filed the motion for sanctions that gives rise to this 

appeal, against both Mohammad Jallaq and Anthony. Hearings on the motion were held 

on November 30, 2017 and February 13, 2018. Following the close of evidence, movants 

dismissed their motion as to Mohammad Jallaq, and chose to proceed solely against 

Anthony. 

{¶ 4} The third-party complaint Anthony filed asserts that movants "hate or seek 

to destroy Arab-Americans or people or business owned by or the rate or nation origin of 

Arab [sic]," that the request for discovery that had been filed by the movants on behalf of 

their client Musa Jallaq "discriminate[s] against members and owners of [the defendant 

LLC], that movants "aided and abetted" their client in criminal acts and movants 

themselves violated R.C. 2923.32 and federal racketeering law, that movants taught their 

clients to prepare legal documents with "the intention of destroying business, property[,] 

and wealth of whistleblowers in the Arab-American community" in violation of 

racketeering laws, and that movants advised their client to criminally trespass and 

burglarize the offices of the defendant L.L.C. The third-party complaint sought $85 million 

dollars in damages plus punitive damages. (Mag.'s Decision at 6-7). At a hearing on the 

motion for sanctions, Anthony's client Muhammad Jallaq testified that he had not 
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No. 19AP-602 

authorized the filing of the third-party complaint. (Tr. at 361-62.) Anthony then contended 

her own client had perjured himself. Id.

{¶ 5} On June 13, 2019, the magistrate issued a 40-page decision granting 

movants' motion for sanctions. The magistrate concluded that Anthony failed to present 

any evidence to support the claims in the complaint, that she had no good-faith basis to 

believe in the veracity of the claims, and that the claims were not warranted under existing 

law, and moreover could not be supported by a good-faith argument for an extension, 

modification, or reversal of the law or for the establishment of new law. The magistrate 

observed: 

[T]he purely fantastic nature of her claims was exposed once it 

was clear that [Ms. Anthony's client] Muhammad Jallaq 

ardently disapproved of [the third-party complaint's] contents. 

In this respect, Third-Party Defendants have insisted that [Ms. 

Anthony] advanced claims that she knew could never be 

substantiated. The undersigned is compelled to agree * * * the 

information adduced at the hearing failed to even provide a 

scintilla of evidence in support of such claims when directed at 

Third-Party Defendants * * * [d]espite holding a two-day 

hearing, including rigorous cross-examination of witnesses, 

the Magistrate was not left with any factual findings that form 

a basis or justification for these causes of action against [the 

third-party defendants] * * *. After a review of the hearing 

evidence, with emphasis on the testimony of Ms. Anthony and 

[her client] Muhammad Jallaq, the Magistrate is compelled to 

conclude that the Third-Party Complaint cannot survive even 

the subjective good faith standard. Based on the foregoing 

findings, it is determined that while Ms. Anthony read and 

drafted this pleading, it cannot be said that she harbored good 

grounds to support it to the best of her knowledge, information 

and belief. 

(Mag.'s Decision at 30-33.) Accordingly, the magistrate found that sanctions against 

Anthony were warranted under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. Id. at 36. Based on the evidence 

of the attorneys and fee experts presented at the hearing and following "the well-recognized 

lodestar method" for calculating fee awards, the magistrate awarded movants sanctions 

against Anthony in the amount of $13,718.40. Id. at 39. 

{¶ 6} Anthony filed 32 separate objections to the magistrate's decision. In her 

objections, she reasserted most of the same factual and legal claims she presented at the 

hearing. She further suggested that movants may have "preapproved or wrote in whole or 
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No. 19AP-602 

in part the Magistrate's Decision of June 13, 2019, and it was not the separate independent 

work of the [the] Magistrate * * *." (Am./Supp. Objs. to Mag. Decision Filed June 13, 2019 

at 24.) 

{¶ 7} On September 4, 2019, the trial court issued an 11-page order overruling all 

objections and adopting the magistrate's decision. The trial court stated that the suggestion 

that movants may have drafted the magistrate's decision: 

is an outlandish claim that has no basis in fact. The Court is 

stunned that Defense Counsel would allege such wrongdoing 

against this Court's Magistrate, who has shown nothing but fair 

and reasonable attention to the Motion for Sanctions, along 

with writing his decision without any outside influence. 

Ultimately, Defense Counsel is treading a very fine ethical line 

in her motion practice and would be wise to closely examine 

her filings for accuracy before submitting them in the future. 

(Order Adopting Mag.'s Decision & Overruling Am./Supp. Objs. to Mag.'s Decision at 3.) 

(hereinafter Order) at 10. This timely appeal followed. Anthony now asserts eight separate 

assignments of error with the trial court's decision. 

{¶ 8} We review the trial court's decision to overrule objections and adopt the 

magistrate's decision for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-541, 2010-Ohio-2774, ¶ 15 (standard for review of court's 

adoption of magistrate's decision). But we review the magistrate's legal conclusions de 

novo, and its factual conclusions to determine if there is competent, credible evidence to 

support them. See, e.g., Adams, Babner & Gitliz, L.L.C. v. Tartain West, L.L.C., 10th Dist. 

No. 14AP-277, 2014-Ohio-5305, ¶ 22. Accordingly, our standard of review is somewhat 

mixed, but we are mindful of the magistrate's significant role as the receiver of factual 

evidence and the trial court's wide discretion as the ultimate finder of fact. We have fully 

reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, and we overrule all eight assignments 

of error, as follows. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he failed and refused 

to conduct an independent review of the record, including the 

hearing transcript, and summarily overruled the appellant's 

objections contained in appellant's amended/supplemental 

objections to the magistrate['s] decision of June 13, 2019 which 

objections contained numerous references to the hearing 

transcripts. 
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No. 19AP-602 

{¶ 9} Anthony first asserts that the trial court did not conduct an independent 

analysis of the record, but the court's entry specifically states that it was conducting a de 

novo review of the facts and conclusions of the magistrate's report, and that the trial court 

was "the ultimate finder of fact [and] must make its own factual determinations through an 

independent analysis of the issues and should not adopt the findings of the magistrate 

unless the trial court fully agrees with them." (Order at 3.) See also DeSantis v. Soller, 70 

Ohio App.3d 226, 232 (10th Dist.1990) (holding that the trial court's review of the facts and 

conclusions in a magistrate's report is de novo). Our own review reveals a thorough review 

of the factual and legal record by the trial court, and Anthony has not identified any aspect 

of the decision that supports her claim in this assignment of error. There is nothing in the 

record on appeal that suggests the trial court's review was an abuse of its wide discretion, 

and accordingly we overrule this assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he adopted the 

magistrate decision which failed to place the burden of proof 

on appellees to demonstrate that their motion for sanctions 

against appellant for filing a frivolous third-party complaint 

which burden was not met for each of the five claims in the 

third-party complaint. 

{¶ 10} Anthony next argues that the trial court failed to allocate the burden of proof 

to the third-party defendants. But the trial court stated that "there is no indication that the 

Magistrate placed the burden of proof on [Anthony]," and after review of the record 

adopted both the findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Order at 8. Our review of the 

transcript, the magistrate's decision, the trial court's order, and the remainder of the record, 

with specific reference to the magistrate's discussion of the evidence presented at hearing 

and factual findings regarding that evidence, compel this court to find the trial court's 

holding was not an abuse of discretion. We accordingly overrule this assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he failed to consider 

the affidavit of appellant which reflected that at no time was 

appellant instructed one way or another to file or dismiss the 

third-party complaint by her clients who were impeached at the 

hearing. 
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No. 19AP-602 

{¶ 11} In her third assignment of error, Anthony asserts the trial court erred by 

failing to consider her affidavit and her witness, but her brief fails to identify any part of the 

record demonstrating this. In fact, the argument under this assignment of error 

demonstrates that the magistrate did thoroughly address the affidavit and witness, but that 

Anthony simply disagreed with the magistrate's resolution of the underlying factual 

question—whether her client Mohammad Jallaq had authorized her to file a third-party 

complaint with allegations of criminal activity and racist behavior against the movants. 

{¶ 12} At the hearing, Anthony testified that she "tried to explain [the third-party 

complaint] to [Mohammad Jallaq] and I said I need your approval and he didn't give it 

then. And he held off on it * * * I probably forgot about it, that I needed his approval or I 

didn't have it, and I went ahead and filed it. [I] didn't want it hanging on my desk so I filed 

it without his approval." (Tr. at 150-51.) Mohammad Jallaq, by contrast, testified that he 

specifically instructed Anthony not to file a third-party complaint against the movants, see 

id. at 361-62, that he was angry with her when he learned that she had filed a third-party 

complaint, that she filed it "without my permission," id., and that he had no factual 

knowledge regarding the movants and that he had in fact never met movants prior to the 

sanctions hearing: "I don't know the lawyers. I really didn't know if they hate Arab or they 

don't. I have no idea. I have not met them. This is the first time I [have] seen them. This is 

the first time I met them, therefore, I don't know who they hate or not." Id. at 354. He also 

specifically stated he had no personal knowledge or basis to believe that movants actively 

aided or abetted Musa Jallaq in any criminal activity, as was alleged in the third-party 

complaint. Id. at 378. 

{¶ 13} At the conclusion of Mohammed Jallaq's testimony the movants dismissed 

the defendants from the sanctions motion and chose to proceed solely against Anthony. 

Anthony then proceeded to proffer that her former co-counsel and Mohammed Jallaq's 

current counsel "sent me affidavits, letters, text messages, whatever, back and forth to 

[movants] who promised him that if Mr. Jallaq gave testimony against me and against this 

case they would dismiss him from the lawsuit." Id. at 390. Accordingly, Anthony's position 

was basically that all of the attorneys, including her former co-counsel, had entered into a 

conspiracy to suborn perjury from Mohammed Jallaq and leave her as the patsy for filing 

the third-party complaint. She provided no supporting evidence for this suggestion. 
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No. 19AP-602 

{¶ 14} In reviewing the evidence and "[i]n reconciling the very divergent testimony 

between client and former counsel, the Magistrate determines that [Mohammed] Jallaq 

was credible and did not 'perjure himself,' as suggested by Ms. Anthony * * * [he] verified 

that no factual basis exists for the claims included in the Third-Party Complaint, and that 

he expressly instructed his lawyer that it not be pursued before it was filed." (Emphasis in 

original.) (Mag.'s Decision at 16-17.) 

{¶ 15} Given our review of Mohammad Jallaq's testimony as well as Anthony's own, 

given the position of the magistrate as the receiver of that testimony, and the position of 

the trial court as the ultimate finder of fact, we decline to entertain Anthony's conspiracy 

theory. She has wholly failed to establish that the trial court lacked competent and credible 

evidence to support its view of the facts, or an abuse of the court's discretion. Accordingly, 

her third assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he adopted 

sanctions of attorney fees when attorney fees were not paid to 

an independent law firm to defend against the third-party 

complaint as a legal malpractice case against appellees; further 

attorneys fees to appellees representing themselves pro se in 

the motion for sanctions proceedings were illegal. Further, the 

trial judge abused his discretion in ordering as sanctions the 

striking of an exhibit and third party complaint and settlement 

agreement in the record. 

{¶ 16} Anthony's fourth assigned error asserts that the trial court erred by awarding 

attorney fees to the third-party defendants because they represented themselves rather 

than hiring counsel, and also by sealing the frivolous complaint. As to the first issue, the 

third-party defendants presented evidence, including expert testimony to support their fee 

claims, specifically that the filing of the complaint caused them both to have to retain 

counsel and spend time prosecuting the sanctions motion. In a bit of an unusual situation, 

on the motion proceedings Attorney Moyer represented Attorney Wetzel, Attorney Wetzel 

represented Attorney Moyer, and both attorneys represented the firm. Anthony argues that 

all representations were subterfuge and that the attorneys were actually proceeding pro se, 

because attorney fee awards as sanctions to are not available to pro se litigants. See, e.g. 

State ex rel. Freeman v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.3d 516, 517 (1992) ("R.C. 2323.51 provides 

for attorney fees, not compensation for pro se litigants."). 
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No. 19AP-602 

{¶ 17} However, we have reviewed the cases that Anthony cites to support the claim 

that movants who are both parties and attorneys can never be awarded sanctions for 

frivolous conduct, and those cases do not hold or even suggest that is the case. Anthony also 

appears to argue that only direct monetary losses actually paid to an attorney as a result of 

the sanctionable actions are compensable by a sanction under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11, 

but neither the statute or the rule contain language to that effect. 

{¶ 18} We do agree that in general R.C. 2323.51 does not provide for fee awards to 

pro se movants. But at least one other district has specifically distinguished Freeman and 

affirmed a fee sanction under R.C. 2323.51 to an attorney "pro se litgant" under analogous 

circumstances. See Mikhael v. Gallup, 9th Dist. No. 22992, 2006-Ohio-3917, ¶ 8-23. 

Moreover, just as in Mikhael, both of the attorney movants also represented their firm as a 

business entity separate and apart from themselves in their individual capacities. Given this 

unusual circumstance, we agree with the Mikhael court. Here, the movants were attorneys 

and their law firm and were sued for reasons solely based on their representation of the 

plaintiff. The overwhelming evidence at hearing demonstrated that neither Anthony nor 

her client had any basis to believe the factual allegations in the complaint, and that 

Anthony's filing of an unfounded third-party complaint was willfully and consciously in bad 

faith. See generally State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 127 Ohio St.3d 

202, 2010-Ohio-5073, ¶ 8. We conclude that the trial court's award of attorney fees as a 

sanction is not an abuse of its wide discretion under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. See, e.g., 

id. at ¶ 9, 17. Similarly, the trial court did not err by sealing the portion of its own record 

that included Anthony's unsupported allegations. See, e.g., A.P. Lee & Co. v. R.R. Bowker, 

L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-599, 2015-Ohio-2535, ¶ 46, citing Schussheim v. Schussheim, 

137 Ohio St.3d 133, 2013-Ohio-4529, ¶ 3 (recognizing inherent power of court to seal 

records of proceedings under "unusual and exceptional circumstances."). Anthony's fourth 

assignment of error is therefore overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he adopted the 

magistrate decision without according appellant discovery of 

appellees, there being no discovery of appellees while the third 

party complaint was pending for only thirteen days, and the 
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No. 19AP-602 

magistrate quashed two appellant subpoenas in an attempt to 

obtain discovery. 

{¶ 19} Anthony next suggests that the magistrate erred by granting the sanctions 

motion without allowing her to conduct discovery. As the third-party defendants correctly 

observe, discovery is not necessarily required before conduct can be deemed frivolous. But 

even if she was entitled to additional discovery, Anthony squandered her opportunity. The 

motion for sanctions was filed on June 12, 2017, and on August 2, 2017 the hearing was 

rescheduled by agreement of the parties to commence on the firm date of November 30, 

2017. Anthony made no attempt to serve interrogatories or requests for production of 

documents, and did not schedule any depositions, and did not file any subpoenas until 

November 9, 2017. She made no attempt to compel any discovery. On the eve of the 

hearing, following the filing of a motion to quash two of her subpoenas to the law firm and 

attorneys that movants had hired to represent them regarding the third-party complaint, 

Anthony filed two motions to continue discovery. The magistrate granted the motion to 

quash insofar as they related to privileged information, and overruled her motions to 

continue: 

It's difficult to get a judge or a magistrate in the loop of 

communication, and often we struggle to do that. [But y]ou had 

me on the line to continue the hearing. You could have said, oh 

my God, there are so many things we need to talk about. We 

need to talk about a final pretrial. We need to talk about a 

deadline to file motions. We need to talk about the Court 

getting actively involved in discovery. We have depositions to 

schedule. We have subpoenas to serve. I heard nothing. There 

was absolutely every opportunity in what has been almost six 

months to address all of those issues, so I am profoundly 

disappointed to hear them come up for the first time 24 hours 

before the hearing. 

(Tr. at 32-33.) Our review of the record reveals that the magistrate's rulings regarding 

discovery and the scheduling of the hearing were fully justified, and that the trial court's 

decision to overrule her objections to those rulings were well within the wide discretion that 

trial courts enjoy on such matters of trial procedure. See, e.g., Roty v. Battelle Mem. Inst., 

10th Dist. No. 18AP-956, 2020-Ohio-4389, ¶ 10-11 (finding no abuse of discretion where 

post-cutoff discovery was denied). Accordingly, Anthony's fifth assignment of error is 

overruled. 
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No. 19AP-602 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VI 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he failed to dismiss 

the motion for sanctions on jurisdictional grounds. 

{¶ 20} Anthony's sixth assignment of error argues that the sanctions motion was 

untimely under the statute because it was not filed until May 19, 2017, which she claims 

violates the deadline set forth in R.C. 2323.51. But the primary complaint was not dismissed 

until May 12, 2017, and under Gitlin v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 161 Ohio App.3d 660, 2005-

Ohio-3024 (8th Dist.2005), the time for filing a sanctions motion does not begin to run 

until a final appealable order is filed in the case. Id. at ¶ 17-19, citing R.C. 2323.51 and Soler 

v. Evans, St. Clair & Kelsey, 94 Ohio St.3d 432, 2002-Ohio-1246. R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) itself 

provides that a motion for sanctions under the sanction can be filed "at any time not more 

than thirty days after the entry of final judgment in a civil action or appeal * * *." The motion 

for sanctions was timely under the statute, as it was filed only seven days after the final 

order of dismissal was entered. Moreover, the third-party complaint itself was dismissed 

on April 19, 2017, so even if that dismissal is deemed the triggering date, as Anthony claims, 

the motion was still timely filed. Her arguments therefore lack merit and we overrule this 

assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VII 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he adopted the 

magistrate decision rendered after a hearing where the 

magistrate denied appellant due process as guaranteed by the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; further, 

whether O.R.C., Section 2323.51 and/or Rule 11, O.R.C.P. is 

unconstitutional on its face or as applied. 

{¶ 21} In her seventh assignment of error Anthony claims that the sanctions statute 

and civil rule, as applied by the magistrate and trial court, are unconstitutional in violation 

of her right to due process. She takes no issue with the text of either rule, but rather with 

the magistrate's evidentiary rulings (quashing two subpoenas duces tecum, prohibiting the 

testimony of an undisclosed "character witness," and denying additional late discovery) as 

well as the magistrate's alleged misallocation of the burden of proof, and claims that the 

magistrate thereby denied her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
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No. 19AP-602 

the United States Constitution. She further argues that the trial court's failure to sustain her 

objections was a violation of her right to due process. 

{¶ 22} We have already concluded in our analysis of Anthony's first and fifth 

assignments of error that the magistrate's evidentiary rulings and the trial court's decision 

to overrule Anthony's objections relating to those rulings were not an abuse of discretion. 

And we have concluded that the magistrate did not misallocate the burden of proof and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in so holding in our response to her second 

assignment of error. Anthony has provided no caselaw to establish that these appropriate 

rulings can be deemed to be constitutional violations simply by reciting the words "due 

process." Anthony's seventh assignment of error is wholly without merit and is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VIII 

The trial judge abused his discretion when he failed and refused 

to find that appellees filed a frivolous and fraudulent and false 

complaint with illegal discovery requests meant only to injure 

third party plaintiffs and their commercial real estate income 

producing property. 

{¶ 23} Anthony's eighth assignment of error asserts that the magistrate and trial 

court erred by not finding the primary complaint filed by movants' client against her own 

clients to be frivolous and evidence that the movants were in bad faith. But Anthony herself 

has forfeited any claim on this point, as she never filed a motion for sanctions on behalf of 

her client in the trial court. Her clients have likewise forfeited any further argument on this 

issue by entering into a stipulation and settlement. (See May 12, 2017 Stipulation of the 

Parties & Dismissal with Prejudice). Finally, Anthony was discharged by her clients before 

the magistrate ruled on the third-party defendants' sanctions motion, and well before she 

filed either her objections or this appeal. For all these reasons, she lacks standing to present 

this assignment of error, and it is overruled. 

{¶ 24} Having overruled all of Anthony's assignments of error, we accordingly affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

BROWN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.