P.1 

OAR Box 1818 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

72) IV-A-1 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 11/6/2008 3:12:46 PM Sheet 72 of 79 
P.2 

i V . EPA-AA-SDSB-88-0 5 

Technical Report 

Analysis of Motor Vehicle Fuel Tank-Related Fires 

By 

Kathleen Steilen 

February 1988 

NOTICE 

Technical Reports do not necessarily represent final EPA 

decisions or positions. They are intended to present 

technical analysis of issues using data which are 

currently available. The purpose in the release of such 

reports is to facilitate the exchange of technical 

information and to inform the public of technical 

developments which may form the basis for a final EPA 

decision, position or regulatory action. 

Standards Development and Support Branch 

Emission Control Technology Division 

Office of Mobile Sources 

Office of Air and Radiation 

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 
P.3 

< 

-2-

Table of Contents 

Section Page 

I. Introduction 3 

II. Summary of Available Data 4 

A. Motor Vehicle Fire Data Bases 5 

B. Previous Motor Vehicle Fire Analyses 7 . 

III. Analysis of Data 12 

IV. Development of 1990 Vehicle Fire Data 14 

V. Summary and Conclusions 17 

Appendix A-l 
P.4 

-3-

I. Introduction 

Recently several parties have expressed concern regarding 

the safety of onboard refueling emission controls. These 

parties have commented that adding canister-based onboard 

controls to current motor vehicles would add some complexity to 

the fuel system which could increase the risk of crash and 

non-crash fires. In a separate analysis, EPA conducted an 

evaluation of the safety implications of canister-based onboard 

systems to address the concerns raised. This evaluation 

concluded that straightforward, reliable, relatively 

inexpensive engineering solutions exist for each of the 

potential problems identified and that no increase in risk need 

occur or be accepted because of the presence of an onboard 

system.[1] 

Since onboard refueling controls will modify the fuel/ 

evaporative systems of motor vehicles and thus could have some 

impact on the risk of fire, it is important to have a baseline 

assessment of the risk for current vehicles. The purpose of 

this technical report is to provide an assessment of the 

current risk of fuel tank-related fires for motor vehicles 

which meet current safety standards, and therefore provide a 

baseline from which to assess any potential change in risk 

(increase or decrease) which may occur due to onboard vapor 

recovery systems. 

A preliminary assessment of fuel tank-related fires was 

drafted and released for comment and review to agencies with 

expertise in this area.[2] (This preliminary assessment was 

also placed in EPA Docket A-87-11 for public review.) Agencies 

which were asked to review this analysis include the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Office of 

Motor Carrier Safety (OMCS) of the Federal Highway 

Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS). Based 

on comments and further data received from these parties, the 

preliminary analysis has been refined and is summarized in this 

technical report.[3,4,5] 

Before presenting this analysis, it is important to note 

that the potential hazard of fuel tank-related fires has been a 

concern in the past. To address such concerns, Federal Motor 

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 301 was promulgated by the 

Department of Transportation in 1967 (effective January 1, 

1968) to decrease the potential of crash fires.[6] This 

standard improved the fuel system crashworthiness of passenger 

cars by limiting the amount of allowable fuel leakage in the 

event of an accident. Since that time, there have been two 

additional FMVSS 301 rulemakings to upgrade the standard and 

further improve the fuel system integrity of motor 

vehicles.[7,8] In 1975, this Standard was substantially 

enhanced by extending the coverage of impact types and 

applicable vehicles. According to this upgraded standard, 

FMVSS 301-75, which was effective for 1976 model year passenger 
P.5 

-4-

cars and 1977 and 1978 model year light-duty trucks, all 

vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of 10,000 

pounds or less must restrict fuel leakage to less than five 

ounces per five minutes when subjected to a rollover test 

following front and rear collisions at 30 miles per hour (mph), 

and side collision(s) at 20 mph.[7] Furthermore, beginning in 

April 1977, school buses with a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds 

must meet the same requirements when subjected to an impact 

with a contoured moving barrier at any speed up to and 

including 30 mph, at any point and angle.[8] Therefore, past 

concerns regarding crash fires have lead to three FMVSS 301 

rulemakings with increasing stringency. 

As a result of these variations of FMVSS 301, the motor 

vehicle fire data base is more complex. The fire data which 

exists today includes a mixture of vehicles of varying model 

years which comply with different versions of FMVSS 301 and in 

some cases meet no standard. These data must be analyzed 

closely to assess the fire risk associated with current motor 

vehicles, to which FMVSS 301-75 is applicable. 

As mentioned above, the purpose of this report is to 

analyze the motor vehicle fire data and to estimate the current 

risk of fuel tank-related fires. The report begins with a 

summary of currently available data on the annual number of 

total motor vehicle fires, post-collision fires, and fuel 

tank-related fires and the subsequent associated fatalities, 

injuries and property damage with these fires. This is 

followed by a discussion of how these data were analyzed and 

adjusted to project the number of fuel tank fires, fatalities, 

injuries, and property damage in 1990 and beyond when refueling 

controls could be required.[9] The report closes with a brief 

summary of the analysis and draws some conclusions. 

II. Summary of Available Data 

The available data on fuel tank-related fires and their 

subsequent effects are limited; no single body of data exist 

which accurately assesses the overall hazards. Virtually all 

of the available data arise initially from police and fire 

marshall reports from different states. While police reports 

from such states as Michigan, Illinois, North Carolina, 

Maryland, and Pennsylvania are quite useful, these records 

alone are not adequate to characterize the problem. Data from 

these records can be extrapolated to obtain an estimate of 

national values. 

Further, the nature and extent of the fire crash data 

varies in different state reports. For example, some state 

accident reports are very explicit in evaluating fires from 

fuel leakage, the type of accident (front end, rear end, 

rollover) and the accident severity. Others are less complete 

perhaps only reporting information on fires and fatalities 

without much supporting detail on the cause or location of the 

vehicle fire. 
P.6 

-5-

The available fire information from police and fire 

reports has been used by several different motor vehicle safety 

experts to develop data bases and other analyses which can 

estimate the number of fuel tank-related fires and their 

subsequent effects. This analysis of fuel tank fires uses 

information from two data bases, the Fatal Accident Reporting 

System (FARS) and the National Fire Incident Reporting System 

(NFIRS), and four past analyses on motor vehicle fires. Each 

of these data bases and analyses will be described below, 

together with the important information drawn from the source. 

A. Motor Vehicle Fire Data Bases 

Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS)[10] 

The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) is a motor 

vehicle accident data base operated and maintained by NHTSA 

which gathers data on all nationwide police-reported accidents 

(for all types of vehicles, including passenger cars, 

light-duty trucks, buses, and heavy-duty vehicles) in which a 

fatality occurs. FARS specifies the occurrence of fire in such 

motor vehicle accidents, but does not define the severity of 

the fire, the cause of the fire, which vehicle the fire was 

initiated in (when two or more vehicles are involved), or 

whether a fatality was caused directly by fire. Since the FARS 

data represent only accidents with fatalities, the reported 

motor vehicle accidents contained in this data base are 

generally more severe. Therefore, use of these data alone 

could misrepresent or overestimate the overall fire hazard for 

current vehicles. 

Nevertheless, FARS does offer some useful information with 

respect to the number of fatalities from all motor vehicle 

accidents and those in which a post-collision fire occurred. 

The data cover vehicles of all model years (i.e., both pre- and 

post-standard vehicles). The key data extracted from this 

source were averaged over the time period of 1980 through 1984 

and are summarized below: 

1,605 annual post-collision motor vehicle fires in 

which a fatality was reported. 

46,237 annual fatalities resulted from all motor 

vehicle accidents. 

1,655 (3.6 percent) of these total fatalities 

resulted in accidents where a post-collision fire 

occurred. 

National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS)[11] 

The National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) is a 

fire data base operated and maintained by FEMA which gathers 

data on all types of reported fires, including motor vehicle 

fires. (This motor vehicle data are based on all types of 
P.7 

-6-

vehicles, including passenger cars, light-duty trucks, buses, 

and heavy-duty trucks.) The system receives a sampling of 

state fire reports and extrapolates national statistics from 

these. (For example, NFIRS received about 40 percent of the 

total nationwide fires for 1985.) NFIRS supplies data on the 

number of fires and the fatalities, injuries and property 

damage in these fires. Furthermore, this data base can 

characterize the fire information by type of vehicle, the 

vehicle area where the fire originated (i.e., fuel tank area), 

and whether the fire was a result of a collision or had some 

other non-collision cause. 

For the purpose of this analysis, NFIRS data were 

extrapolated to represent nationwide estimates and were then 

averaged over the period of 1980 through 1985. (Detailed 

information obtained from NFIRS is presented in the appendix to 

this report.) Since NFIRS statistics are compiled on an annual 

basis, the data cover both pre- and post-standard vehicles. 

The important motor vehicle fire estimates (expressed as annual 

average values for both collision and non-collision fires) from 

the NFIRS data include: 

488,000 total motor vehicle fires (of all vehicle 

types). 

10,800 motor vehicle fires (2.2 percent) which 

originated in the fuel tank area. 

237 fatalities in motor vehicle fires which 

originated in the fuel tank area. 

631 injuries in motor vehicle fires which originated 

in the fuel tank area. 

$32 million in property damage from motor vehicle 

fires which originated in the fuel tank area. 

The NFIRS annual average nationwide fire estimates using data 

from 1981 to 1985 for post-collision fires exclusively include: 

1,871 motor vehicle fires which originated in the 

fuel tank area. 

185 fatalities in motor vehicle fires which 

originated in the fuel tank area. 

336 injuries in motor vehicle fires which originated 

in the fuel tank area. 

$14 million in property damage from motor vehicle 

fires which originated in the fuel tank area. 

Another accident data base, the MCS 250 Accident Reports, 

which is operated and maintained by the Federal Highway 

Administration/OMCS, also reports the occurrence of motor 

vehicle fires in accidents. As is prescribed in the Code of 

Federal Regulations (49 CFR 394.3), all heavy-duty vehicle 

accidents in which death, bodily injury, or property damage of 

$4400 or greater have occurred must be reported to this data 

base. Since the data from this source only covers one class of 
P.8 

f 

v 

-7-

vehicles and its nationwide representativeness of all accidents 

can not be determined, the MCS 250 Accident Reports were not 

used for this analysis. Other sources of helpful information 

for this assessment include previous analyses by vehicle safety 

experts. These analyses will be presented and discussed below. 

B. Previous Motor Vehicle Fire Analyses 

"Evaluation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 

301-75, Fuel System Integrity: Passenger Cars," Glenn Parsons, 

NHTSA (1983)[12] 

This analysis was published by NHTSA in 1983 to evaluate 

the effectiveness of the improved FMVSS 301-75. The report 

characterizes the in-use accident and fire experience of both 

pre- and post-standard .vehicles. The data contained in this 

report are obtained primarily from Michigan police accident 

reports for the calendar years 1978, 1979, and 1980 for 

accidents involving passenger vehicles only. From data 

presented in this report, Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution 

of impact type and vehicle damage severity in accidents 

involving both pre- and post-standard passenger cars. Table 1, 

which presents the frequency of accidents from the various 

impact types, shows that rollover accidents are rare 

occurrences (about 1.4 percent frequency) and most accidents 

are frontal impacts (about 60.9 percent frequency). Table 2 

presents the damage severity sustained by each vehicle involved 

in an accident based on a Vehicle Damage Severity (VDS) scale. 

A VDS of 1 represents very minor vehicle damage, whereas a VDS 

of 8 represents extreme damage. As expected, this table shows 

that accidents with Lo-Moderate severity damage (VDS =2 , 3, 4, 

5) are more frequent in comparison to major severity accidents 

(VDS = 6, 7, 8). 

Furthermore, this report supplies data which characterizes 

the occurrence of fires in accidents involving pre- and 

post-standard vehicles. Table 3 presents the fire rates 

(number of fires per number of vehicle crashes) for both types 

of vehicles by impact type and damage severity. The data show 

that rollover and rear end collisions, especially those with 

major damage severity, have the highest fire rates. This table 

also shows that FMVSS 301-75 gave a greater reduction in the 

fire rates for major severity accidents (50.6 percent) than for 

Lo-Moderate severity accidents (22.4 percent) of these impact 

types. 

Other data provided by this NHTSA technical report include 

the number and degree of injuries which result from vehicle 

accidents and post-collision fires. It categorizes the 

injuries into four types: fatal injuries, incapacitating 

injuries, non-incapacitating injuries, and possible injuries. 

In addition to the key data with regard to fire rates shown in 

Table 3, some further information presented in this report 

include: 
P.9 

-8-

Table 1 

Distribution of Accidents by Impact Type* 

Impact 

Type 

Frontal 

Rollover 

Rear end 

Other (Sid( 

Pre-Standard 

Frequency (%) 

= , etc 

62.9 

1.5 

22.9 

.) 12.£ . 

Post-Standard 

Frequency (%) 

59.7 

1.4 

24.5 

14.4 

Overall 

Frequency (%) 

60.9 

1.4 

23.9 

13.8 

Based on Michigan data for calendar year 1980. 
P.10 

-9-

Table 2 

Distribution of Accidents by Vehicle Damage Severity* 

Vehicle 

Damage 

Severity 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Pre-Standa 

Frequency 

3.858 

25.595 

26.134 

20.220 

12.447 

6.552 

3. 112 

2.076 

rd 

(%) 

Post-Standard 

Frequency 

2.892 

26.108 

27.162 

20.532 

12.398 

6.350 

2.821 

1.707 

(%) 

Overall 

Frequency (%) 

3.26 

25.92 

26.78 

20.42 

12.42 

6.43 

2.93 

1.85 

Based on Michigan data for calendar year 1980. 
P.11 

-10-

Table 3 

Fire Rates for Pre- and Post-Standard 

Vehicles by Impact Type and Damage Severity* 

# of fires/M of vehicle crashes = fire rate(xl0-3) 

Lo-Moderate Severity Majority Severity 

(VDS = 2,3,4,5) (VDS = 6,7,8) 

Pre-Standard 

Front end 360/229,433 = 1.569 91/9465 = 9.614 

Rear end 139/99,663 = 1.395 90/6304 = 14.28 

Rollover 14/2946 = 4.752 49/3389 = 14.46 

TOTAL 513/332,042 = 1.545 230/19,158 = 12.01 

Post-standard 

Front end 311/261,002 = 1.192 79/14,425 = 5.477 

Rear end 139/119,141 = 1.167 40/6944 = 5.76 

Rollover 10/3541 = 2.824 29/3599 = 8.05 

TOTAL 460/383,684 = 1.199 148/24,968 =5.93 

Reduction from Standard 22.4% 50.6% 

Based on Michigan data for calendar years 1978, 1979, and 

1980. Information for other types of impacts were not 

reported. 
P.12 

-11-

20,600 annual motor vehicle fires resulting from 

passenger car accidents. 

1,099 annual fatalities in passenger car accidents 

with fire (average from FARS for 1978-1981). 

Total injuries in all passenger car accidents: 

385,892 incapacitating injuries 

865,642 non-incapacitating injuries 

1,095,180 possible injuries 

Injuries in passenger car accidents with 

post-collision fire: 

3,867 incapacitating injuries 

3,836 non-incapacitating injuries 

2,486 possible injuries 

"Fires in Motor Vehicle Accident," Peter Cooley (1974)[13] 

This analysis done by Peter Cooley of the Highway Safety 

Research Institute (HSRI, now the University of Michigan 

Transportation Research Institute or UMTRI) provides data on 

the total number of vehicle fires and the resulting 

fatalities. In this analysis, Cooley studies accidents of 

passenger cars to estimate the number of post-collision fires. 

Furthermore, he analyzes the fatalities involved in 

post-collision fires and determines whether the fatality was 

"accompanied by" or "directly caused by" the post-collision 

fire. Unfortunately, his data do not specify the source of the 

fire (i.e., fuel tank). Since this report was written in 1974, 

the data are based entirely on pre-standard vehicles. The key 

data presented in this analysis include the following: 

17,000 annual fires result from motor vehicle 

accidents. 

720-1,250 fatalities are accompanied by these fires. 

450-650 fatalities are directly caused by the 

vehicle fi res. 

"General Motors and Fuel System Collision Fires" (1974)[14] 

This study provides General Motors'- point of view on the 

fire hazards of motor vehicles. It offers statistics on the 

number of passenger car fatalities caused directly by 

post-collision fires and more specifically, fuel system 

collision fires. Since this study was performed in 1974, it 

only relates to pre-standard vehicles. Key data include: 

560-1,870 annual fatalities due to collision fires. 

250 annual fatalities due to vehicle fuel system 

collision f Lres. 
P.13 

-12-

"A Perspective on Automobile Crash Fires," SAE 850092. 

Warner, James and Woolley, (1985)[15] 

This SAE publication analyzes previous studies regarding 

automobile crash fires. The major conclusion from this 

analysis is that post-collision fuel-fed fires cause 

approximately 1-1.5 percent of all vehicle occupant fatalities 

in spite of the FMVSS 301 improvements. 

This concludes the data available on fuel tank-related 

fires which were used in this analysis. Based on information 

gathered from these motor vehicle fire data bases and previous 

studies, the fire hazard of current vehicles can be estimated. 

Ill. Analysis of Data 

As shown in the previous section, Summary of Available 

Data, the data bases and previous analyses regarding motor 

vehicle fires provide different types of information covering 

different time periods. With careful analysis, the information 

obtained from these sources can be used to generate estimates 

of fuel tank-related fires, fatalities, injuries, and property 

damage for vehicles operating in the post-1990 time frame. In 

the post-1990 time frame, essentially all light-duty vehicles 

and light-duty trucks would be in compliance with FMVSS 301-75 

and onboard refueling controls would be required on these 

gasoline-powered motor vehicles.[9] Therefore, for purposes of 

this analysis, the year 1990 is used to adjust the data by 

vehicle miles travelled (VMT) to account for such a time frame. 

Before these data can be used to generate the desired 

estimates, two adjustments are necessary to get all data on a 

common basis. First, all data must be put in terms of poststandard fire rates, since refueling controls would be required 

on post-standard vehicles only. To put the data in terms of 

post-standard rates, the fraction of fires contributed by 

pre-standard vehicles was determined using the estimated 

percentage of VMT by these vehicles when the data were 

taken.[16,17] These pre-standard fractions were then- adjusted 

to post-standard rates based on the effectiveness of FMVSS 

301-75 given in the aforementioned NHTSA report.[12] Since it 

is reasonable to assume that most rear-end and rollover 

accident fires occur in the fuel tank area, a fuel tank-related 

fire reduction factor for FMVSS 301-75 was calculated using the 

pre- and post-standard fire rates for rear-end and rollover 

collisions shown in Table 1. For purposes of this analysis, 

these overall post-collision and fuel tank-related fire 

reduction factors for FMVSS 301-75 were estimated to be 32.7 

and 36.9 percent, respectively. 

The estimated fire reduction factors for FMVSS 301-75 

discussed above are based on fire data involving only passenger 

cars. It should be noted that these adjustment factors were 
P.14 

-13-

applied to all data sources, including FARS and NFIRS, which 

include fires from other vehicles besides passenger cars (e.g., 

light-duty trucks, buses, and heavy-duty vehicles). Absent any 

other data, it is reasonable to assume that FMVSS 301-75 would 

reduce fires involving light-duty trucks and school buses as 

effectively as the NHTSA report shows for passenger cars. 

Using the fire reduction factors on heavy-duty vehicle (over 

10,000 pound gross weight) data, however, could possibly 

underestimate the number of fires and their consequences, since 

these vehicles do not have to comply with FMVSS 301-75. To put 

such a possible underestimation in proper perspective, it is 

important to note that heavy-duty vehicles account for less 

than five percent of the in-use vehicles and VMT each year, and 

information in the appendix to this report suggests that these 

vehicles contribute only a few percent of the annual motor 

vehicle fires.[18,19] Nevertheless, it is important to note 

that by 1973 all fuel tanks manufactured for heavy-duty 

vehicles which are involved in interstate commerce must comply 

with OMCS performance requirements.[20] Therefore, applying 

the fire reduction factors estimated from NHTSA's report to 

data sources which include fires from heavy-duty vehicles (FARS 

and NFIRS) should not introduce an appreciable error to the 

fire estimate projections presented in this analysis. 

Second, after the data are adjusted to post-standard fire 

rates it is also necessary to consider that increasing VMT 

between the time when the data were generated and 1990 would 

increase the absolute number of fuel tank fires and related 

after effects. It is logical to project that absent other 

measures, fires and subsequent fatalities, etc., would increase 

as VMT increases. It should be noted that fatality rates based 

on VMT have generally declined over the last several 

years.[21] However, absent any other method to account for the 

effects of the increase in vehicles and VMT between the time 

when the data were collected and 1990, using VMT for this 

adjustment seems reasonable. Thus, all data were adjusted to 

1990 using the ratio of the 1990 total VMT to the total VMT of 

the year(s) in which the data were generated.[18] 

One other adjustment which was considered but not 

incorporated into this analysis is the effect of vehicle aging 

on fire rates. If vehicle aging does affect fire rates, the 

data adjustments for pre- to post-standard vehicles would have 

to be adjusted further. This concern arises because the preand post-standard fire rate data used to develop the adjustment 

factor did not use all vehicles of the same age. The poststandard fire rate was based on vehicles 0-4 years old, and the 

pre-standard rate was based on vehicles 3-8 years old.[12] 

Thus, there is the possibility that the adjustment factor could 

be too large since it incorporates the effect of different fire 

rates on different age vehicles, in addition to the 

improvements brought by the safety standard. 
P.15 

•14-

Fire rates (fires per crash) may vary by vehicle age 

because changes in driving patterns (less high speed freeway, 

more lower speed urban area), ownership, fuel system component 

deterioration, and lack of maintenance with vehicle age may 

have an effect on the possibility of a fire in the event of an 

accident. The net effect of these factors was evaluated using 

data from the NHTSA technical report.[12] Using this report, 

preliminary analysis of the data concluded that the effect of 

aging is probably small. However, an accurate and more 

conclusive determination (either quantitatively or 

directionally) cannot be made until more information becomes 

available with greater range in vehicle age. NHTSA plans to 

update their evaluation of FMVSS 301-75 in the near future 

based on more recent data. Regarding the effect of vehicle 

aging, it is interesting to note that the 1985 FARS data 

suggest that the percent of vehicle accidents (not fires) by 

model year are directly proportional to registrations of that 

model year's vehicles, not VMT.[21] This supports the 

hypothesis that vehicle aging has no effect on vehicle 

accidents. 

IV. Development of 1990 Vehicle Fire Data 

The data on motor vehicle fires extracted from the six 

sources were collectively analyzed, according to the 

methodology described above, to estimate the annual number of 

post-collision and fuel tank related fires and the resulting 

fatalities, injuries and property damage. As previously 

mentioned, to be useful the characteristics of all available 

data must be put in terms of a common basis. Therefore, the 

fire data were scaled to represent post-standard vehicles 

operating in the year 1990 when essentially all vehicles in-use 

will meet FMVSS 301. 

Very few sources directly provide statistics for fuel 

tank-related fires. In fact, only three of the sources studied 

provide such statistics: NFIRS, the General Motors study, and 

SAE paper 850092.[11,14,15] Another method to estimate the 

statistics for fuel tank fires in particular is bo approximate 

the percentage of total post-collision fires which are fuel 

tank-related. Since it is logical to assume that most of the 

fuel tank-related fires result from rollover and rear end 

collisions, this percentage can be estimated from the total 

fraction of these collision types. Using this assumption and 

the NHTSA report, it can be calculated that fuel tank fires 

account for approximately 31 percent of the total collision 

fires.[12] With this percentage factor, post-collision fire 

data from the remaining sources can be used to estimate the 

number of fuel tank-related fires and their subsequent effects. 

Table 4 presents the 1990 post-standard motor vehicle fire 

data generated from the six sources used in this analysis. The 

data presented include the number of vehicle fires and/or their 

aftereffects for post-collision fires and particularly for fuel 
P.16 

-15-

Table 4 

1990 Post-Standard Vehicle Fire Data 

Source/Statistic 

FARS 

Fires with Fatalities 

Fatalities 

NFIRS 

Vehicle Fires 

Fatalities 

Injuries 

Property Damage 

NHTSA Report 

Vehicle Fires 

Fatalities 

Injuries: 

Incapacitating 

Non-Incapacitating 

Possible 

Cooley's Report 

Vehicle Fires 

Fatalities 

GM Study 

Fatalities 

SAE 850092 

Fatalities 

Post Collision 

Fires 

1,629 

1,679 

19,550 

1,043 

3,669 

3,640 

2,350 

15,313 

405-1, 

505-1, 

126 

685 

Fuel Tank-Related Fires 

Collision & 

Collision Non-Collision 

505 

520 

1,871 10,730 

185 236 

336 625 

$14 million $32 million 

6,060 

323 

1,137 

1,128 

728 

4,747 

126-349 

211 

560-839 
P.17 

-16-

tank fires (for both post-collision fires only and postcollision and non-collision fires). As previously mentioned, 

only the NFIRS, GM Study, and SAE 850092 directly report data 

for fuel tank-related fires. Fuel tank fire statistics for 

collisions from the remaining sources (FARS, NHTSA report, 

Cooley's report) were estimated by scaling the post-collision 

fire data with the percentage of fuel tank fires approximated 

from Parsons' report (31 percent). Therefore, the data in 

Table 4 encompasses all of the available data and presents a 

reasonable range of the fire hazards for motor vehicles in the 

year 1990. 

The data from the six sources presented in Table 4 can be 

summarized for both the post-collision and fuel tank-related 

fires as presented below: 

• Post-Collision Motor Vehicle Fires (annual 

projections) 

15,300-19,600 annual fires 

400-1,700 fatalities 

3,700 serious injuries 

3,600 moderate injuries 

• Fuel Tank-Related Fires (annual projections) 

4,750-10,700 fuel tank-related fires (for both 

collision and non-collision fires)* 

1,870-6,060 fuel tank-related fires (for 

collision fires only)* 

126-839 fatalities 

625-1,140 serious injuries (for both collision 

and non-collision fires) 

336-1,140 serious injuries (for collision fire 

only) 

1,130 moderate injuries 

$32 million property damage (for both 

collision and non-collision fires) 

$14 million property damage (for collision 

fires only) 

These statistics, based on extrapolations to 1990, 

represent a reasonable range for the fire hazards of motor 

vehicles for the post-L990 time frame, when refueling controls 

may be required. As can be seen from these statistics, a large 

percentage of fuel tank-related fires are non-collision fires. 

Statistics for non-collision fires only cannot be obtained 

directly by subtracting these ranges. These ranges are 

based on several sources which report collision fires or 

collision and non-collision fires. 
P.18 

-17-

V. Summary and Conclusions 

In response to the recent concerns regarding the potential 

safety implications of onboard refueling controls, this 

analysis estimated the potential hazard of fuel tank-related 

fires for both current motor vehicles and in the post-1990 

timeframe when essentially all in-use passenger cars and 

light-duty trucks would meet FMVSS 301-75. This assessment 

provides a baseline from which to assess any change in risk 

which could occur as a result of the addition of onboard vapor 

recovery systems. 

As shown in this report, very few sources of motor vehicle 

fire data exist which accurately assess and characterize the 

fire hazard for current vehicles. This analysis uses fire 

information from two data bases and four past analyses of motor 

vehicle fires to perform a vehicle fire hazard assessment. 

With careful analysis, the fire information obtained from these 

sources were used to estimate a range for the number of fuel 

tank-related fires and their consequences for vehicles in the 

post-1990 time frame, when onboard refueling controls could be 

required on gasoline-fueled motor vehicles. In order to put 

all data on a common basis, this analysis accounts for both the 

effectiveness of FMVSS 301-75 and the increase in VMT from when 

the data were generated and 1990. From this analysis, the 

following statistics summarize the hazards of fuel tank-related 

fires for motor vehicles on an annual basis, projected for the 

post-1990 timeframe: 

1,870-10,700 annual fuel tank-related fires 

126-839 fatalities 

336-1,140 serious injuries 

1,130 moderate injuries 

$14-$32 million property damage 
P.19 

-18-

References 

1. "Safety Implications of Onboard Refueling Vapor 

Recovery Systems," U.S. EPA-AA-SDSB-87-05, June 1987. 

2. "Analysis of Fuel Tank-Related Fires," EPA 

Memorandum, Kathleen A. Steilen to Charles L. Gray, U.S. EPA, 

OAR, OMS, OMS, ECTD, SDSB, June 10, 1987. 

3. National Fire Incident Reporting System, Motor 

Vehicle Fire Tallys, FEMA, U.S. Fire Administration, 1980-1985. 

4. Letter, Ralph J. Hitchcock, NHTSA to Chester J. 

France, U.S. EPA, September 21, 1987. 

5. Letter, John Glenn Hart III, U.S. Fire 

Administration to Kathleen A. Steilen, U.S. EPA, September 16, 

1987. 

6. Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel Tanks, 

Fuel Tank Filler Pipes, and Fuel Tank Connections - Passenger 

Cars: 32 FR 2416, February 3, 1967, Part 571: S 301-1. 

7. Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301-75, Fuel 

System Integrity: 39 FR 10588, March 21, 1974, Part 571: 

S 301-75-5.1, 5.2, 5.3. 

8. Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301-75, Fuel 

System Integrity: 40 FR 48352, October 15, 1975, Part 571: 

S 301-75-5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4. 

9. "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles 

and New Motor Vehicle Engines; Refueling Emission Regulations 

for Gasoline-Fueled Light-Duty Vehicles and Trucks and 

Heavy-Duty Vehicles," Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FRN: pp. 

31162-31271, August 19, 1987. 

10. Fatal Accident Reporting System, NHTSA, DOT, 

1980-1984. 

11. National Fire Incident Reporting System, FEMA, U.S. 

Fire Administration, 1980-1985. 

12. "Evaluation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 

301-75, Fuel System Integrity: Passenger Cars," DOT 

HS-806-335, January 1983. 

13. "Fires In Motor Vehicle Accidents," UM-HSRI-SA-74-3, 

Peter Cooley, April 1974. 
P.20 

-19-

14. "General Motors and Fuel System Collision Fires," 

Environmental Activities Publication No. A-3177, December 16, 

1974. 

15. "A Perspective on Automobile Crash Fires," SAE 

850092, Warner, James and Woolley, 1985. 

16. "Revised Diesel Sales Fraction Projections," U.S. 

EPA Memorandum, John W. Mueller to Charles C. Gray, January 9, 

1987. 

17. "Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors, 

Volume II: Mobile Sources," AP-42, Fourth Edition, September 

1985. 

18. "MOBILE3 Fuel Consumption Model," U.S. EPA-AA-TEBEF-85-2, Mark A. Wolcott and Dennis F. Kahlbaum, February 1985. 

19. "MVMA Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 1987," Motor 

Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., 

1987. 

20. "Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and Noise 

Emission Requirements," Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Federal 

Highway Administration, U.S. DOT, October 31, 1983. 

21. "Fatal Accident Reporting System 1985, A Review of 

Information on Fatal Traffic Accidents in the U.S. in 1985," 

NHTSA, DOT, 1985. 
P.21 

Appendix 

NFIRS Detailed Data 
P.22 

Table A-l 

NFIRS Tally by Mobile Property Type 

- Annual Nationwide Projection Averages 1980 through 1985 

- Collision and Non-Collision Fires 

Mobile Property Type Fires Injuries Deaths Loss (xlO-^S) 

Automobile 

Bus, Trackless Trolley 

Terrain Vehicles 

Pass. Road Trans, Other 

Pass. Road Trans, Unc. 

Pass. Road Trans 

Truck - Over 1 ton 

Truck - Under 1 ton 

Semi-Trailer Truck 

Tank Truck - Non-Flam. 

Tank Truck - Flam Lqd. 

Tank Truck - Comp. Gas 

Trash Truck 

Freight Road Trans, Other 

Freight Road Trans, Unc. 

Freight Road Trans 

443,958 

3,622 

8,212 

1,458 

3,463 

460,713 

19, 

35, 

7, 

382 

994 

821 

289 

1, 131 

372 

3989 

530 

4961 

74 , 469 

3,344 

41 

246 

29 

23 

3,683 

260 

455 

114 

10 

110 

14 

15 

8 

31 

1016 

726 

4 

24 

1 

2 

758 

53 

113 

46 

2 

20 

1 

0 

0 

10 

245 

689.92 

10.31 

11.30 

2.87 

1.96 

716.36 

60.86 

49.78 

59.65 

1.43 

10.50 

1.91 

8.05 

2.15 

16.99 

211.33 

Total 535,183 4,699 1,003 927.68 
P.23 

t> , -* Table A-2 

NFIRS Tally by Area of Fire Origin* 

Annual Nationwide Projection Averages 1980 through 1985 

Collision and Non-Collision Fires 

Vehicle Area 

Passenger Area 

Trunk Area 

Engine Area 

Fuel Tank Area 

Control Area 

Exterior Surface 

Not Classified 

Total 

Fires Injuries Deaths Loss (x!06$) 

100,616 

18,659 

332,681 

10,828 

7,121 

6,931 

11,179 

488,015 

868 

274 

1,964 

631 

58 

80 

136 

4,010 

202 

30 

286 

237 

8 

14 

43 

821 

250.52 

36.79 

388.92 

32.18 

17.70 

10.97 

21.66 

758.74 

This tally includes only vehicle fires in which the fire 

originated in the vehicle. The total is smaller than the 

total of Table A-l because it excludes apparent NFIRS 

reporting errors and vehicles that were involved in fires 

which did not originate within the vehicle. 
A -

*» 

- * * ' Table A-3 

1990 Post - FMVSS 301-75 

Annual Projections for Motor Vehicle Fires 

- Collision and Non-Collision Fires 

- Based on 1980-1985 data 

Area of Fire Origin 

Passenger Area 

Trunk Area 

Engine Area 

Fuel Tank Area 

Control Area 

Exterior Surface 

Not Classified 

Total 

Fires 

101,300 

18,782 

335,358 

10,731 

7,175 

7,005 

11,255 

491,605 

Injuries 

874 

275 

1,978 

625 

58 

80 

137 

4,028 

Deaths 

204 

30 

287 

236 

9 

14 

43 

822 

Loss (xlO 

253.04 

37.12 

393.43 

31.97 

17.88 

11.09 

21.86 

766.39 
P.25 

Table A-4 

NFIRS Annual Fuel Tank Fire Tally 

- Collision Fires Only 

Year Nationwide Projections 1990 Post-FMVSS 301-75 Projections 

1981 

1982 

1983 

1984 

1985 

Fires 

2418 

1945 

1771 

1725 

1494 

Injuries 

366 

353 

329 

387 

245 

Deaths 

228 

159 

160 

222 

154 

Loss(M$) 

17.66 

10.76 

12.08 

16.51 

12.75 

Fires 

2363 

1942 

1786 

1747 

1515 

Injuries 

357 

352 

332 

392 

248 

Deaths 

223 

159 

162 

225 

156 

Lo ss (xl05$) 

17.26 

10.74 

12.18 

16.71 

12.92 

Avg. 1871 336 185 13.95 1871 336 185 13.96