The New Triad

by

Marc A. Peterson, Lt Col, USAF

The Counterproliferation Papers

Future Warfare Series No. 55

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

The New Triad

by

Marc A. Peterson, Lt Col, USAF

December 2010

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF Counterproliferation Center 

to provide information and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers 

and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. 

Copies of No. 55 and previous papers in this series are available from the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-7530, phone 

(334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 55

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Table of Contents

 

Disclaimer...................................................................................................VII

 

Acknowledgements........................................................................................VIII

 

Author...............................................................................................................IX

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................1

II. SURVUVABILITY: The essential Component of Credible Deterrence......................2

III. U.S. NUCLEAR TRIAD: Strengths and Weakness.............................................4

 Impact of New Start on the U.S. Triad............................................................6

IV. DIVERSITY: An Essential Component to an Effective Triad.................................7

V. POLICY RECOMMENDATION: Hardened Mobile Launchers.............................10

VI. CONCLUSION......................................................................................15

BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................18

[vii]

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force 

Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
[viii]

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his gratitude to the Air Force and Air University for allowing a 

year of focused Strategic Study and for Dr. Barry R. Schneider for his guidance through the study of US 

National Security as it relates to the nuclear triad.

The author would like to express his gratitude to the Earhart Foundation for a generous grant which 

made possible the research and writing of this study, and to Paul Bernstein, Michael Eisenstadt, Jerrold 

Post, and Barry R. Schneider for their valuable comments on early drafts.

Marc A. Peterson, Lt Col, USAF
[ix]

The Author

Lieutenant Colonel Peterson is the Deputy Commander of the 821st Air Base Group, Thule Air Base 

Greenland responsible for the administration and security of the Air Force’s largest overseas and 

America’s northernmost base. He received his commission from Officer Training School and has served 

as a personnel officer, Instructor and Flight Commander in both ICBM and Spacelift duty. He was also 

assigned to various staff positions in the Space Warfare Center and Air Force Space Command where he 

supported strategy, policy and doctrine for the command. Col Peterson was also the Deputy Mission 

Support Group Commander for the nation’s only underground C4ISR facility certified against High 

Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse. He gained additional Space C2 experience as the Director of the 

Peterson Installation Control Center and as the Chief of Plans and Programs for the 50th Space Wing.

He received a Bachelor of Science from Oklahoma State University, OK, a Masters of Management 

Science from Lesley University, MA, a Masters in Military Operational Arts and Science, Air University, 

AL, and a Masters in Strategic Studies from Air University, AL. He has additional study in Joint Special 

Operations, as well as the Middle East.

[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

 On April 5, 2009 President Obama introduced his vision of reducing nuclear dangers and 

overcoming grave and growing threats by seeking the “peace and security of a world without 

nuclear weapons.”1 Whether or not this is an obtainable goal or even in the National Security 

Interests of the U.S., reducing the number of nuclear weapons is a plausible endeavor. As stated 

in the third objective of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) the U.S. must continue 

“maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels.”2

 Additionally, the U.S. must continue to provide assurance to allies who are covered under the 

U.S. nuclear deterrence umbrella. More significant reductions are possible through a mindset 

change regarding the traditional nuclear triad consisting of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear bombers. Specifically, 

this paper proposes a new version of the nuclear triad—one centered on hardened mobile 

ICBMs—as a means to a survivable nuclear deterrent on the road to zero.

 In fact, it is 

possible to substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons well below new START 

numbers and still maintain national security.

The existing nuclear triad may presently provide an effective deterrent against Russia, 

and other nuclear weapon states. However, U.S. security could be compromised if we agree to 

much deeper cuts in strategic forces in future arms control agreements and, after having done so, 

Russia once again becomes an adversary—perhaps after a new crisis in Georgia, Ukraine, or one 

of the Baltic states. As I demonstrate in the following pages, an economical way to enhance 

survivability and account for such a strategic development is to revisit the Midgetman—a 

concept that has already been designed and tested.
[2]

This paper proceeds in five parts: first, a conceptual overview of how survivability affects 

the credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrent; second, the strengths and weaknesses of the current 

nuclear triad; third, the potential impact of New START on the existing triad; fourth, the 

necessity of diversity within the triad post-New START; and, fifth, the role of hardened mobile 

launchers in the future U.S. nuclear triad. 

II. Survivability: The Essential Component of Credible Deterrence

In order to provide a credible nuclear deterrence the force must be survivable, which is 

accomplished in two ways. One method is by keeping the location of the nuclear delivery 

system unknown. Nuclear submarines are somewhat fragile vessels, but since the submarines 

are undetectable it is impossible to directly target them. Nuclear bombers on alert were set to 

take off to unknown locations within 15 minutes of notification making them nearly 

impossible to target. Another concept of survivability is to harden the facility against nuclear 

blast much like the ICBM force. Although the ICBM silos and launch control centers can no 

longer survive a direct hit, they may survive an indirect detonation. Therefore, and individual 

ICBM may not be survivable, but their location plays into the concept of dispersal.

 The ICBM field is spread out, or dispersed across the U.S. in such a way as to ensure their 

survivability. The deterrent to a nuclear first strike by an adversary is to ensure a nuclear 

response. Spreading the ICBMs far enough apart requires a nearly impossible targeting and 

timing problem for any adversary. Gen Power wrote, “The primary objective of dispersal, as 

applied to both manned and unmanned weapon systems, is to increase the target system of a 

potential aggressor and thus to lower his confidence that he can hit and destroy all our strike 

forces simultaneously.”3

 Therefore, vulnerable air and sea weapon systems become more 
[3]

survivable upon deployment, and subsequently more dispersed. Although ICBMs have fixed 

sites their dispersal ensures enough missiles would survive a nuclear first strike by an 

adversary and provide a guaranteed nuclear response. As stated by Gen Power, the current 

U.S. nuclear triad presents the “unquestionable capability to counter any act of aggression 

with decisive results.”4

 A March 2006 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike 

Skills number one finding stated, “The DoD has not provided specific direction regarding 

next-generation strategic strike systems.”

 Even though the POTUS desires a decrease in nuclear weapons a 

viable nuclear deterrent is required as long as the nuclear threat remains. Congress and the 

Department of Defense (DoD) commissioned several studies regarding the U.S. nuclear 

weapons capability.

5

 Finding number three stated, “The strategic strike 

area most at risk is ballistic missiles.”6 The report recommended, “The Secretary of Defense 

should direct the Navy and the Air Force -- absent near-term systems development -- to fund 

advanced development (subsystem design, system prototype development, and testing) to 

support next-generation system development (which will also restore and maintain the skills 

base).7 Additionally, the final hearing before the House Armed Service Committee depicted 

the current U.S. Strategic Posture as similar to President Clintons who’s “policy called for the 

United States to lead the world in nuclear arms reductions...while at the same time 

maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that hedged against adverse geopolitical 

developments.”8

 As the U.S. and Russia show cooperation in reducing the number of nuclear 

weapons the theory supposes nuclear counter proliferation efforts improve since pressure by 

other states to gain nuclear weapons reduces. The hearing report also reiterated the need to 

maintain “sufficient quantities to perform their deterrent tasks.”9 In summary, the ninth and 
[4]

tenth findings of the Armed Services Committee Hearing stated the conditions for eliminating 

nuclear weapons are not present today, and the U.S. must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent 

for the near future.10

III.U.S. Nuclear Triad: Strengths and Weaknesses

 What should the U.S. nuclear deterrent force look like in terms of 

numbers?

 Before constructing a proposed new triad, a baseline understanding is required for each leg 

of the current triad. According to the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing Report the 

triad should remain the same. It further reported each leg of the triad has its own value:

- “The bomber force is valuable particularly for extending deterrence in time of crises, as 

their deployment is visible and signals U.S. commitment. Bombers also impose a 

significant cost burden on potential adversaries in terms of the need to invest in 

advanced air defenses.

- The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force imposes on a prospective aggressor the need 

to contemplate attacking only with very large number of nuclear weapons, substantially 

depleting its forces while ensuring a devastating response by the United States. The 

force is also immediately responsive in a highly controlled manner. And for the 

foreseeable future, there is no prospect that a significant portion of the ICBM force can 

be destroyed by a preemptive strike on the United States by small nuclear powers, 

including China.

- The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile force is currently the most survivable, 

meaning that no attacker could contemplate a nuclear attack on the United States 

without expecting U.S. retaliation.”11 
[5]

 The general theme regarding U.S. nuclear policy is the need to further reduce nuclear 

weapons without reducing nuclear deterrence capability. Furthermore, any solution should 

continue to provide assurance to allies, and should “maintain equivalency” with Russia. 

Rather than follow the status quo regarding the value of each triad leg, a serious review of the 

perceived benefits is required.

 The nuclear bomber force is no longer on “alert.” As a result the benefit of survivability 

and subsequent dispersal upon take off is no longer valid. Although nuclear bombers provide 

flexibility their responsiveness depends on their formal alert status. Without the alert status, 

nuclear bombers rely on advanced intelligence leading to changes in readiness. Otherwise, 

planes and crews can no longer generate with little to no warning placing their survivability in 

question. Nuclear bombers are currently stationed at known locations without a responsive 

state of readiness. The most significant argument for the nuclear bombers is their visible

deployment as a demonstration of U.S. commitment. This assumes a show of force cannot be 

accomplished by any other leg of the triad. ICBMs and SLBMs are strategic weapon systems. 

An increase in readiness in either weapon system is noted by Russia. Russian intelligence 

system tracks changes in U.S. readiness and will be well aware of increased activity. When a 

nuclear submarine leaves port, strategic level adversaries are aware. When the ICBM field 

increases readiness, strategic level adversaries are aware. In reality, showing U.S. 

commitment through a visible deployment is no longer exclusive to nuclear bombers. 

 ICBMs present easily targeted, fixed locations. The benefit lies in their constant state of 

readiness and preparedness to launch within minutes of POTUS direction. Additionally, the 

dispersal of the ICBM fields mitigates the fixed locations. The ability to conduct an all 
[6]

inclusive, simultaneous strike to every missile site is impossible with current technology.

More discussion on this topic will follow in subsequent paragraphs.

 Nuclear capable submarines are impossible to detect with current technology. Their 

extreme stealth adds to the impossibility of preempting the entirety of U.S. nuclear response 

capability. With these vast and varying nuclear capabilities, how can the U.S. determine 

where reductions in the nuclear force should occur without increasing risk to U.S. national 

security?

Impact of New START on the U.S. Triad

New START is a blend between START I and the Moscow Treaty. Each delivery vehicle 

counts as one. But, each “deployed heavy bomber counts as one warhead toward this limit 

regardless of whether it is equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).”12 This 

becomes interesting when taken into account that a B-52H can be armed with up to 20 

ALCM-Bs.13 The B-2 can carry up to 16 B61-7, B61-11, or B83 bombs.

14

 Russia has significant air defenses. They are highly motivated to keep U.S. offensive 

capability focused on air frames because Russia has a chance of defending against an air 

strike, but is practically defenseless against ICBMs and SLBMs. They have been highly 

successful, so far, by negotiating strict rules on ICBM and SLBM rocket bodies while 

allowing broad interpretation for air breathing platforms such as bombers. Since this is a 

matter of U.S. National Security Strategy it is incomprehensible to play into a potential 

adversary’s strengths without exploiting their weaknesses. With that said, it is still possible to 

 Therefore, two 

bombers armed with 36 nuclear bombs count as two warheads. Why the disparity between 

bombers and missile systems?
[7]

substantially reduce operationally deployed nuclear weapons without jeopardizing national 

security. What are the nuclear numbers and how much reduction is reasonable?

 The New START has another wrinkle that will force hard decisions on what weapon 

systems to maintain. The New START intends to place restriction on the number of delivery 

systems. The initial goal is to reduce to 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, 

SLBM launchers, and nuclear capable heavy bombers and eventually reduced to 700.

15 

According to an article in Defense News, “the United States has 450 intercontinental ballistic 

missiles based on land and 336 based on submarines. It also has 44 nuclear capable B-52 

bombers and 16 nuclear-capable B-2 bombers. That gives the United States a total of 846 

launchers. The treaty permits 800 launchers, but says only 700 can be “deployed.”16

IV.Diversity: An Essential Component to an Effective Triad

 Simple 

math identifies 46 launchers too many and potentially 146 launchers too many. The term 

“deployed” lends itself to further definition during treaty negotiations. However, it is safe to 

say the U.S. Nuclear Triad as it exists today is unsustainable under proposed treaty 

restrictions. What is a logical way ahead considering the immediacy of the treaty timelines?

 Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project for the Federation of 

American Scientists said, “Bombers have already been relegated to a limited role in the 

United States’ day-to-day nuclear posture. Warheads on missiles are the day-to-day 

deterrence. Bombers are really just a backup.”17 The “Bomber Mafia” and the U.S. Air Force 

in general must overcome the emotions evoked by Kristensen’s statement, and understand the 

real discussion point is not the value of long range bombers, but the best means to maintain 

survivability, and thus credibility,.
[8]

Herein lays the crux of the entire paper. The United States bomber force provides an 

extremely capable and unmatched conventional capability. The current struggles for the U.S. 

military require extensive conventional support. Releasing additional bombers, crews, tankers 

and support to conventional tasks or financial reductions is a prudent decision. Taking the 

nuclear mission away from the 60 bombers reduces the U.S. nuclear launcher total to 786. 

Easily meeting the immediate restriction of 800 and making a dent in the goal to reach 700 

launchers. This also allows for a substantial reduction in nuclear warheads assigned to air 

breathing platforms based on the treaty counting rules previously discussed. The remaining 

ICBM and SLBM force now forms a dyad, but the paper is entitled “The New Triad.” The 

concept of diversification is also important when considering a system of nuclear weapons 

and their launch vehicles.

 Colin Grey described the virtues of a diverse U.S. strategic force through the following 

example:

 “To the very limited extent to which a strategic triad of forces provides redundant capabilities, an analogy 

with elevator safety design features is appropriate. An elevator accident could be so catastrophic for those 

involved that backup systems to backup systems are provided for safety. No elevator designer is permitted to ask 

of safety engineering, ‘how little is enough?’ Statistically improbable sequences of events do occur. The 

designer of strategic forces knows that the potential failure of one element of the triad needs to be insured 

against by the existence of complementary retaliatory forces in the other triad legs.”18

He added, 

 

“A diverse force structure enhances the survivability of U.S. strategic forces. The dispersal of the U.S. strategic 

nuclear arsenal among ICBMs, SLBMs and aircraft poses extremely severe, and perhaps impossible, difficulties 

of attack timing for a first-strike planner...the ICBM force--as always--will be instantly ready to fire.”19

In order to conduct a first-strike against a diverse, nuclear weapon system an adversary 

would need to ensure every delivery system was destroyed simultaneously and without 

warning to prevent any ability to retaliate. Currently, time, distance and U.S. missile warning 

make a first-strike unproductive to all who would attempt such an endeavor. Grey also wrote, 

 
[9]

“Not only do these individual characteristics necessitate unique attacks to counter a single 

triad element, they also provide complementary survivability for the triad as a whole.”20

 Additionally, weapon system diversification provides internal benefits. For example, if a 

failure or fault occurred, significant enough to cause an entire family of systems (say ICBMs) 

to be taken off alert, the remaining systems (Bombers and SLBMs) would provide deterrence. 

Therefore, if one system is down for one reason or another the other two systems would 

provide deterrent support. How does this position support removal of the nuclear bomber 

mission?

 Removal of the nuclear bomber mission does not support diversity at face value. However, 

removing the nuclear bomber mission could provide needed resources for the previously 

proven need to diversify the ICBM force. If the decision is made to eliminate nuclear 

bombers then it stands to reason the remaining delivery systems must be even more 

survivable. Reduction of nuclear weapon numbers requires and ensured retaliation as long as 

adversarial nuclear weapons exist. As far back as the 1960s, adding a mobile facet to ICBMs 

was highly recommended. 

 The first Peacekeeper missiles were initially designed for deployment as a rail garrison on 

the public railroad systems across the United States. Testing was conducted and simulated 

deployment of a mobile rail launcher was also successfully accomplished, but the rail garrison

was never operationally deployed. It turns out that despite the vast railroad system, launches 

could only occur at key points in the U.S. due to guidance system calibration, flight distances 

from launch to target, etc. Even though the rail garrison was mobile and unpredictable, the 

actual launch sites were predictable and therefore targetable. Much study was conducted 
[10]

regarding deployment of the rail garrison that could be applied to a road mobile force of small 

ICBMs. In fact, the Rapid Execution And Combat Targeting (REACT) system currently 

employed in U.S. ICBM Minuteman III (MMIII) Launch Control Centers was originally 

designed for the rail garrison concept. If the rail garrison is not the answer for ICBM mobility 

then what is the answer?

 Understanding the proposal of an additional nuclear weapon system during fiscally 

challenging times could seem improbable, but the following information will reveal the 

possible. First, the Defense Science Board and then the House Armed Services Committee 

both identified a top finding, and the need to develop the next generation ICBM. The future

of both ICBMs and the Triad may very well be found in the recent past. As far back as 1960 

Gen Power stated, “In addition to hardening and dispersal of ICBM sites, SAC is now 

resorting to another protective tactic--mobility--tests of which began in June 1960. Mobility 

is a most attractive defense tactic against missile attacks because the probability of destroying 

a mobile target with a long-range missile is very small.”21

V. Policy Recommendation: Hardened Mobile Launchers

 Since the life extension program of 

the ICBM and SLBM force is so successful it would be prudent to pursue transitional 

technology rather than moving straight toward next generation missile systems.

 In the mid 1980s the Air Force was concerned over the growing accuracy of Russian 

SLBMs that could be launched off the coasts and jeopardize fixed U.S. ICBM locations. At 

that time the Air Force saw the need for a road mobile ICBM force that deployed a Small 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SIBM). The Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and 

Missiles provided the following information: Martin Marietta was chosen to develop the 
[11]

XMGM-13A Midgetman. It was a single warhead, solid fuel missile capable of flying 6,800 

miles.22

 According to the Hill Air Force Base Museum website, the prototype for the Boeing 

manufactured small ICBM Hardened Mobile Launch (HML) Vehicle is on display at the Hill 

AFB Museum’s Missile Park. The fact sheet described the HML as a mobile, radiationhardened, vehicle designed to transport and launch the MGM-134A Small Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile unofficially called the “Midgetman” missile.

 The first prototype successfully launched in 1991. Comparable to the MMIII in 

performance it provided a cheaper, light weight, smaller and therefore mobile option to the 

fixed ICBM sites. The Cold War ended and the program was cancelled in 1992 due to 

budgetary constraints. The main point to this section is to identify that a prototype has already 

been successfully developed and tested. It would not be necessary to start the research and 

development from scratch since the program already existed and could be reenergized as 

needed. Combined with life extension of the MMIII ICBMs and SLBMs, the Midgetman 

could provide a viable transitional option allowing more time to develop the next generation 

nuclear missile identified by Congress. A light weight and smaller ICBM also requires a 

mobile launch vehicle.

23 If the HML was only road 

mobile it would fall under the same predictability via the roadways as the rail garrison fell 

under the railways. However the HML was described further as over 110 feet long and 

weighed over 239,000 pounds when fully loaded, yet it could travel on paved roads at up to 55 

miles per hour. The HML could also travel off-road. It could withstand moderate nuclear 

effects and the trailer-mounted plow allowed the tractor to bury the launcher-trailer into the 

ground for additional protection from nuclear blasts.24 Although the HML vehicle on display 

is no longer a working model, like the Midgetman, the HML prototype already went through 
[12]

the research and development stage and could be revitalized by contacting Boeing Aerospace 

and Electronics who also cooperated with Loral Defense Systems Division.

 The HML is survivable through both its’ unknown location and hardening. The ability to 

“dig in” creating a low profile protected on its sides by the earth would cause an adversary’s 

nuclear blast to travel over the HML allowing for a retaliatory strike capability. Rather than 

depending solely on the plow concept of digging in to increase survival, multiple, fixed sites 

could be built for quick deployment. This falls in line with the dispersal concept since an 

adversary would never know which sites were to be used and would have to target every site 

to ensure total destruction. The proposed treaty limitations on launchers would make 

targeting all the known locations impossible. The original concept for the HML was to utilize 

various bomb ranges since the land was already owned by the federal government, and would 

also alleviate potentially problematic land use negotiations with local land owners. This is a 

fine plan however, ranges are also known locations, and provide a focused area that could aid 

the targeting options of a determined foe. Therefore, additional basing concepts would prove 

helpful.

 If eliminating the nuclear bomber mission does not generate enough funding to develop 

and field the Midgetman and HML concept then further tradeoffs with the ICBM and SLBM 

could be entertained. The author does not have the background to offer credible 

recommendations for SLBM reductions, but assumes some could be made. Qualified 

personnel at USSTRATCOM are better suited to determine appropriate SLBM tradeoffs. 

Since the MMIII has been de-MIRved (reduced to single warheads) it is reasonable to assume 

a one-for-one tradeoff between MMIII and the Midgetman. That is to say if additional 
[13]

funding is necessary beyond the amount recovered from the nuclear bomber cuts then a 

MMIII could be taken out of service for each Midgetman placed in service.

 Further utilizing existing resources the author recommends consideration of deploying 

HMLs from existing ICBM bases. Deployment from ICBM bases would keep HMLs in close 

proximity to Weapon Storage Areas (WSA), security, maintenance and operational crews 

familiar with the care and feeding of ICBMs. The expensive Missile Procedures Trainers 

could also be dual use to include HML ops crews if the REACT consoles originally designed 

for the rail mobile mission and currently utilized in the fixed launch control centers were used 

in the HML redesign. Missile Combat Crews could be proficient or easily transferred 

between MMIII, and Midgetman deployment duty. Incorporating the REACT consoles into

the HMLs would also take advantage of the existing Undergraduate Missile Training 

conducted at Vandenberg AFB further taking advantage of a proven training and operating 

system. Operationally similar systems would also aid Global Strike Command and 20th Air 

Force with standardization of Nuclear Surety Inspections, Combat Capability Inspections and 

Operational Readiness Inspections. If thought through completely, MMIII and HML 

similarities could provide operational, maintenance and security synergies while creating the 

dispersal desired in separate missile systems.

 In addition to unknown HML sites any of the MMIII missile sites that are vacant as a result 

of the offset equation mentioned previously, could be converted into “prepared” HML sites 

further capitalizing off the existing generator system and connection to C4 systems. Although 

the fixed sites are known locations, they are also dispersed. An adversary would be forced to 

hold the empty site as a continuous target whether or not a HML were present. Continued 
[14]

deterrence of an adversary’s first-strike capability must be ever present when designing 

nuclear weapon system deployment options.

 There is no need to continually argue the value of the ICBM system. In fact the 1983

“bipartisan Scowcroft Commission on Strategic Forces provided an invaluable service by 

identifying the key issues related to how and why we should modernize U.S. ICBMs and by 

examining these issues within a comprehensive framework.”25 The Scowcroft Commission 

also identified the deployment of fixed silo ICBMs should be “complemented by subsequent 

development of a small mobile ICBM.”26 Additionally, the major recommendations of the 

Commission’s report “were derived from a comprehensive view of policy, strategy and force 

requirements.”27

 Without an understanding of the exact budgetary gains from relieving the bombers from the 

nuclear mission in terms of personnel, machines and even warhead numbers, further reductions 

will be required. As indicated earlier an undefined number of SLBMs should be under 

consideration for reduction, but another option is possible. With the concept of using ICBM 

bases for HML home stations the one-for-one swap between ICBMs could take the form of 

totally eliminating a squadron of 50 ICBMs toward the deployed launcher cuts bringing the total 

launcher number down to 736. Take the remaining 36 cuts from SLBMs will allow the U.S. to 

meet the deployed nuclear launcher goal of 700. Again, the term “deployed” requires defining, 

therefore, these numbers are notional. Then the one-for-one swap between HMLs and MMIIIs 

could start with 50. Activate a squadron of deployable HMLs and deactivate a squadron of 

MMIIIs. This paper recommends taking one squadron from two missile wings leaving a deficit 

of 100 MMIIIs in total (50 from each wing) replacing them with 25 HMLs each. This concept 

 ICBMs, fixed or mobile, are the force always ready to launch within 

minutes of POTUS direction and form the backbone of U.S. deterrence efforts.
[15]

would leave 100 MMIII sites that could be used as “prepared” HML sites in addition to their 

unknown mobile locations, and would keep the road mobile HML in an environment of nuclear 

missile experience as previously discussed.

VI.Conclusion

In sum, the New START numbers will drive hard decisions. Reducing nuclear weapons has 

been directed by the POTUS. Both Congressional and DoD studies have confirmed the need 

to develop next generation ICBMs and SLBMs along with revitalizing the nuclear industrial 

base in the process. The tried and true concepts of survivability, dispersal, and diversity are 

like laws of physics to the nuclear strategist, and any solution should keep these concepts at 

the forefront. Taking nuclear bombers off alert compromised the survivable and responsive 

nature that made the nuclear bomber a strong and essential leg of the triad. Therefore, the 

unstated U.S. nuclear strategy is to operate as a dyad with the assumption of ramping up to a 

triad as needed. Assuming perfect intelligence regarding a potential nuclear threat is required 

for a nuclear bomber force to remain off alert and capable at a moment’s notice. Rather than 

withering away the capability of the entire triad the time has come to form a “New Triad” 

consisting of fixed and mobile ICBMs along with SLBMs. The compelling argument for the 

nuclear bomber force was three-fold: 1. they could be used as a show of force; 2. they forced 

adversaries to spend significant resources on fielded air defenses rather than developing 

defenses against missiles; 3. Bombers are recallable, which provides a hedge against 

misperception and miscommunication during peacetime and crisis.

 Advances in communication and intelligence allow for flushing HMLs and nuclear 

submarines to send the same “show of force” strategic message. The proven capability of the 
[16]

U.S. conventional bomber force will cause potential adversaries to continue committing vast 

resources to fielding air defense weapon systems. Eliminating the nuclear bomber mission 

and converting those bombers to conventional only status is a logical decision. Doing so

provides necessary funding and other resources and increases the need for the remaining 

systems to be even more survivable and reliable. The Hardened Mobile Launch vehicles 

along with the Midgetman provide an affordable and capable transitional system to meet U.S. 

National Security interests and to meet the New START restrictions on nuclear weapons and 

delivery systems. Reducing nuclear weapons to zero may or may not be possible, but 

significant reductions are very possible while maintaining U.S. national security and 

assurance to her Allies.

 1 Office of the Press Secretary. "The White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic." 

April 5, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gove/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-AsDelivered/.

2 "2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report." April 2010, p. iii.

3 Ibid, p. 3.

4 Ibid, p. 2.

5 Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Skills.

Independent Task Force Advice to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, March 2006, p. 4.

6 Ibid, p. 5.

7 Ibid, p. 5.

8 Committee on Armed Services. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate.

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, United States Senate, One Hundred 

Eleventh Congress, First Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 7, 2009, p. 12. 9 Ibid, p. 13.

10 Ibid, p. 38. 11 Ibid, p. 47. 12 Ibid, p. 2-3. 13 U.S. Air Force, Long Range Strike Aircraft White Paper, op. cit., p. 20. 14 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters: A Practical 

Guide (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, 2008), p. 

37.

15 "2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report." April 2010, p. 21. 16 Matthews, William. "New Treaty Could Trim U.S. Bombers Nuclear Role." Defense News. April 1, 2010. 

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4564748. 17 Ibid. 18 Dr. Barry R. Schneider, Colin S. Gray, Keith B. Payne. Missiles for the Nineties, ICBMs and Strategic Policy.

Westview Replica Edition, p. 8.
[17]

 19 Ibid, p. 8. 20 Ibid, p. 9. 21 Thomas S. Power, USAF. "Strategic Air Command," p. 5. 22 Parsch, Andreas. "Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles." MGM-134. 2002. http://www.designationsystems.net/dusrm/m-134.html (accessed Dec 7, 2010). 23 Hill Air Force Base. "Fact Sheet." Small ICBM Mobile Launcher.

http://www.hill.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5717 (accessed December 7, 2010).

24 Ibid. 25 Dr. Barry R. Schneider, Colin S. Gray, Keith B. Payne. Missiles for the Nineties, ICBMs and Strategic Policy.

Westview Replica Edition, p. 3.

26 Ibid, p. 3. 27 Ibid, p. 3.
[18]

 

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