MCDP 1-0

Marine Corps Operations

U.S. Marine Corps 

PCN 142 000014 00 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20308-1775

27 September 2001

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0 is the first Marine Corps 

Operations doctrinal publication written for the Marine component and the 

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). It represents how our warfighting 

philosophy is codified in operational terms. MCDP 1-0 is intentionally written 

broadly to capture the employment of Marine components and the MAGTF 

across the range of military operations. The supporting tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP) are contained in our warfighting and reference publications. 

This doctrinal publication is the transition—the bridge—between the Marine 

Corps' warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare to the TTP used by Marines. 

MCDP 1-0 is written for the Marine component and the MAGTF and is the 

precursor to future MAGTF-oriented warfighting doctrine. It addresses how the 

Marine Corps conducts operations to support the national military strategy across 

the broad range of naval, joint, and multinational operations. MCDP 1-0 explores 

the contribution to the national defense provided by the unique structure of 

Marine Corps organizations—the Marine component and the MAGTF. It reflects 

the notion that "words matter", providing definitions of key operational terms to 

ensure that Marines speak a common operational language. It describes the role 

of the Marine component in providing, sustaining, and deploying Marine Corps 

forces at the operational level of war and how the MAGTF conducts 

expeditionary operations at the operational and tactical levels.

MCDP 1-0 focuses on how Marine Corps forces conduct operations today and 

the direction the Marine Corps capstone concept expeditionary maneuver warfare

and the supporting concepts of operational maneuver from the sea and ship-toobjective maneuver will take Marine Corps operations in the near future. 

MCDP 1-0 concentrates on the operating forces of the Marine Corps—Marine 

Corps forces as a Service component under joint force command, and the 

MAGTF. It acknowledges that Marine Corps operations are now and will 

continue to be joint and likely multinational. It describes how Marine Corps 

forces support the joint or multinational force commander and what capabilities 

the Marines bring to a joint or multinational force. It illustrates how the Marine 

Corps' task-organized combined arms forces, flexibility, and rapid deployment 

capabilities apply to the widening spectrum of employment of today's military 
forces. This publication provides the fundamentals of how MAGTFs conduct 

tactical operations and concisely addresses the types of operations MAGTFs will 

conduct to accomplish these missions. Marine Corps commanders and leaders at 

all levels should read and study this publication. Additionally, joint force 

commanders and their staffs can use this publication to better understand the 

capabilities of Marine Corps forces assigned to the joint force.

/s/

J. L. JONES

General, United States Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: 142 000014 00

©2001 United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy. 

All rights reserved.

Throughout this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake 

of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to 

either gender.
MCDP 1-0, MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 The Marine Corps in National Defense

Historical Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

The Character of Modern Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Operational Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Threat Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Political Dimension. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Levels of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Range of Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

The National Security Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

National Command Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

The Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Unified Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Joint Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Multinational Operations, Alliances, and Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12

Roles and Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, 

Functions of the Department of Defense and

its Major Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15

Marine Corps Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

Commandant of the Marine Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

Organization and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17

Operating Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18

Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22

Marine Corps Forces Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22

Marine Corps Ethos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
iv MCDP 1-0

Chapter 2 Marine Corps Expeditionary Operations

Marine Corps Core Competencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Warfighting Culture and Dynamic Decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Expeditionary Forward Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Sustainable and Interoperable Littoral Power Projection. . . . . . . . . 2-3

Combined Arms Integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Forcible Entry from the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Expeditionary Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Force Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Amphibious Operation Command Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Forcible Entry through an Amphibious Assault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Sequence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Maritime Pre-positioning Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

Sustained Operations Ashore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Enabling Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Decisive Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Exploitation Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Sustaining Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Emerging Concepts and Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

Operational Maneuver from the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

Maritime Pre-positioning Force Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

Expeditionary Bases and Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

Chapter 3 Marine Corps Forces

Marine Corps Component. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Role and Responsibilities to the Commandant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Role and Responsibilities to a Combatant Commander. . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Role and Responsibilities to the Joint Force Commander . . . . . . . . 3-4

Joint Operations Conducted Through

Service Component Commanders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Joint Operations Conducted Through

Functional Component Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

The Marine Corps Component Commander as a

Functional Component Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7
Marine Corps Operations v

Role and Responsibilities to the MAGTF Commander. . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Component Command Relationships and Staff Organization. . . . . 3-10

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12

Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16

Marine Logistics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20

Chapter 4 Employment of Marine Corps Forces at the

 Operational Level

Battlespace Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Area of Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Area of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Area of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Boundaries, Maneuver Control Measures, and 

Fire Support Coordinating Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10

Force Deployment Planning and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10

Predeployment Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

Movement to and Activities at the Port of Embarkation. . . . . . . . . 4-15

Movement to the Port of Debarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration . . . . . . . . 4-16

Deployment Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

Planning Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19

Arranging Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20

Combat Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21

Warfighting Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21

Information Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-22

Redeployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24

Expeditionary Operations in Support of Future Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . 4-24

Chapter 5 Logistics in Marine Corps Operations

Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Strategic Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Operational Logistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Tactical Logistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
vi MCDP 1-0

Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

General Engineering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Health Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Joint and Multinational Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

Strategic Logistics Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

Strategic Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

United States Transportation Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11

Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Defense Logistics Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Operational Logistics Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Marine Corps Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Marine Logistics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Reconstitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

Logistics Support to MAGTF Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

Marine Expeditionary Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17

Marine Expeditionary Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). . . . . . . . 5-18

Special Purpose MAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Air Contingency Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

Maritime Pre-positioning Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

Aviation Logistics Support Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

Norway Geopre-positioning Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

War Reserve Materiel Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Tactical Level Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Marine Corps Combat Development Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Marine Corps Materiel Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Marine Corps Bases, Stations, and Reserve Support Centers . . . . . 5-22

Department of the Navy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22

Future Sustainment Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-23
Marine Corps Operations vii

Chapter 6 Planning and Conducting Expeditionary Operations

Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Operational Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Visualize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Describe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Direct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9

Commander’s Battlespace Area Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

Analyze and Determine the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11

Commander’s Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13

Commander’s Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14

Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15

Decisive Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17

Shaping Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18

Battlefield Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19

Integrated Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19

Single Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20

Deep Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21

Close Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22

Rear Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22

Noncontiguous and Contiguous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23

Main and Supporting Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24

The Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27

Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28

Phasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29

Operation Plans and Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30

Transitioning Between Planning and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31

Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31

Command and Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32

Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33

Tactical Tenets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34

Achieving a Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35

Gaining Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36

Tempo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38

Adapting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39

Exploiting Success and Finishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-40
viii MCDP 1-0

Chapter 7 The MAGTF in the Offense

Purpose of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Characteristics of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Organization of the Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4

Types of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7

Movement to Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7

Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10

Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14

Pursuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15

Forms of Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16

Frontal Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17

Flanking Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18

Envelopment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-19

Turning Movement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21

Infiltration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22

Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-23

Future Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24

Chapter 8 The MAGTF in the Defense

Purpose of Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Characteristics of MAGTF Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7

Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7

Disruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7

Mass and Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Operations in Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10

Security Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11

Main Battle Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Rear Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Security Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Main Battle Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13

Rear Area Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15
Marine Corps Operations ix

Types of Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16

Mobile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17

Position Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20

Future Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22

Chapter 9 Other MAGTF Tactical Operations

Retrograde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2

Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3

Retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4

Passage of Lines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Linkup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6

Relief in Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7

Obstacle Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7

Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8

River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9

Breakout from Encirclement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9

Chapter 10 Military Operations Other Than War

Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4

Unity of Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4

Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5

Restraint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5

Perseverance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6

Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6

Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7

Combatting Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7

Department of Defense Support to Counterdrug Operations. . . . . . . . . . 10-7

Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Enforcing Exclusion Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Military Support to Civil Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-9

Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11

Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12

Protection of Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13

Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13

Show of Force Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
x MCDP 1-0

Strikes and Raids. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Support to Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Warfighting Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15

Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16

Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16

Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17

Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18

Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19

Chapter 11 MAGTF Reconnaissance and Security Operations

MAGTF Reconnaissance Assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2

Command Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3

Ground Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4

Aviation Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5

Combat Service Support Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6

National and Theater Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6

Reconnaissance Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6

Types of Reconnaissance Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8

Route Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8

Area Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8

Zone Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9

Force-Oriented Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9

Reconnaissance Pull and Reconnaissance Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9

Counterreconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-11

Security Forces and Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12

Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-13

Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-14

Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-16

Security Operations in Other Tactical Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-17

Military Operations Other Than War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-17

Appendices

A Warfighting Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B Principles of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

C Tactical Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

D Planning and Employment Considerations for Tactical Operations . . D-1

E Planning and Employment Considerations for MOOTW . . . . . . . . . . E-1

F Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography-1
Marine Corps Operations xi

Figures

1-1. Marine Corps Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18

1-2. Marine Corps Forces and Fleet Marine Force Relationship . . . . . . . 1-21

2-1. Current Location of Maritime Pre-positioning Ships Squadrons . . . 2-11

2-2. Operational Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

3-1. Chains of Command and Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3-2. Commander’s Level of War Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

3-3. Combatant Command Organized by Functional Components . . . . . 3-6

3-4. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12

3-5. MAGTF Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

4-1. Noncontiguous Areas of Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

4-2. Unit Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

5-1. Strategic Mobility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11

6-1. Operational Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

6-2. Commander’s Vision of Decisive and 

Shaping Actions and Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7

6-3. Battlefield Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8

6-4. Single Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21

6-5. Battlespace Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24

7-1. Types of Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7

7-2. Movement to Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8

7-3. Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16

7-4. Frontal Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17

7-5. Flanking Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18

7-6. Single Envelopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-19

7-7. Double Envelopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20

7-8. Turning Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21

7-9. Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22

7-10. Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24

8-1. Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11

8-2. Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13

8-3. Mobile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18

8-4. Position Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21

9-1. Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
CHAPTER 1

The Marine Corps in National Defense

Contents

Historical Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

The Character of Modern Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Threat Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Political Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Levels of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Range of Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

The National Security Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

National Command Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

The Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Unified Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Multinational Operations, Alliances, and Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12

Roles and Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 . . . . . . . . . 1-14

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the 

Department of Defense and its Major Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15

Marine Corps Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

Commandant of the Marine Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

Organization and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17

Operating Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18

Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22

Marine Corps Forces Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22

Marine Corps Ethos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
1-2 MCDP 1-0

“Despite its outstanding record as a combat force in the past war [World War II], the Marine Corps’

far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal [new concepts]: that is, the fact that the basic 

amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead of World War II had been 

largely shaped—often in [the] face of uninterested or doubting military orthodoxy—by U.S. Marines, 

and mainly between 1922 and 1935.”

—General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC

“...American history, recent as well as remote, has fully demonstrated the vital need for the existence 

of a strong force-in-readiness. Such a force, versatile, fast moving, and hard-hitting,... can prevent the 

growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and vigorous action during their incipient stages. 

The nation’s shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready... to provide a 

balanced force-in-readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force 

ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large scale war....”

-82nd Congress (1952)

Since 1775, the United States Marine Corps has served as an expeditionary force 

organized and trained to act in the national security interest and carry out the 

national military strategy. The Marine Corps’ contribution to the national defense 

has successfully evolved throughout its history by virtue of the ability of Marines 

to identify and adapt to the nation’s national security needs, often before those 

needs were commonly recognized. Such innovations as the seizure and defense of 

advanced Naval bases, amphibious operations, close air support, helicopterborne 

vertical envelopment tactics, maritime pre-positioning forces (MPFs), and taskorganized, combined arms forces consisting of aviation, ground, and logistic 

elements known as Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) are prime examples 

of how the Marine Corps has adapted and evolved as an expeditionary force. The 

Marine Corps continually reviews its roles and missions in the context of an 

uncertain world, adapting to the changing security needs of the Nation while 

preserving those core values and professional capabilities that make Marines 

succeed in war and peace.

The Nation requires an expeditionary force-in-readiness that can respond to a 

crisis anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps provides self-sustainable, task 

organized combined arms forces capable of conducting a full spectrum of 

operations in support of the joint force commander. Missions might include 

forcible entry operations, peace enforcement, evacuation of American citizens 

and embassies, humanitarian assistance or operations to reinforce or complement 

the capabilities of other Services to provide balanced military forces to the joint 

force commander. The unique capability of the Marine Corps as a sea service and 

partner with the United States Navy allows the use of the sea as both a maneuver 

space and a secure base of operations to conduct operations in the littoral areas of 

the world. The ability to remain at sea for long periods without the requirement 

of third nation basing rights makes the Marine Corps the force of choice in 

emerging crises. Marine Corps forces exploit the Total Force concept, employing 
Marine Corps Operations 1-3

combinations of active duty and reserve Marines to ensure that missions are 

effectively and efficiently executed.

Naval expeditions comprised of Navy and Marine Corps forces have long been 

the instruments of choice in our Nation’s response to global contingencies. From 

humanitarian assistance, to peacekeeping, to combat, these forces are normally 

the first on scene and ready to respond. Naval expeditionary forces combine the 

complementary but distinct capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps. They 

provide strategic agility and overseas presence without infringing on the 

sovereignty of other nations and simultaneously enable enhanced force 

protection. They provide a power projection capability that can be tailored to 

meet a wide range of crises from a major theater war to military operations other 

than war (MOOTW). Naval expeditionary forces can be task-organized to 

provide an array of options to the National Command Authorities and combatant 

commanders in dealing with a particular situation. Naval expeditionary forces 

provide the United States the unique capability to conduct and sustain operations 

from the sea—including continuous forward presence and self-sustainment—in 

support of our national interests without reliance on pre-positioning ashore, 

foreign basing or the granting of overflight rights.

HISTORICAL ROLE

Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has lead in developing innovative and 

successful military concepts. These concepts have helped the Marines and their 

sister Services to win the Nation’s battles and wars. The Marine Corps success in 

developing into the Nation’s premier expeditionary force has its roots in decades 

of innovative thought, bold experiments, and constant training.

The Marine Corps was established in 1775 to provide landing forces (LFs) for 

Navy ships. Throughout its first 150 years of existence the Marine Corps 

provided Marines for ships detachments and temporary battalions and brigades 

formed from ships detachments and Marine Barracks to provide LFs to the fleet 

during naval expeditions. These forces conducted expeditionary operations 

throughout the world such as—

l Seizing New Providence in the Bahamas from the British (1776).

l Raising the United States flag over a foreign city for the first time when 

Lieutenant O’Bannon and eight Marines, leading a rag-tag force of Arabs and 

mercenaries, captured the Tripolitan city of Derna (1805).

l Accompanying Commodore Perry as he opened Japan to trade with the

world (1854).
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l Conducting an amphibious assault on Fort Fisher in the Civil War (1865).

l Landing at Guantanamo Bay during the Spanish American War (1898).

Marines participated with Army forces in sustained combat operations as in the 

capture of Mexico City (1847) and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive during 

World War I (1918). Marines also conducted other special missions as directed 

by the President, such as the capture of John Brown at Harper’s Ferry (1859) and 

the defense of the American Legation in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion 

(1900). Deployed in MOOTW, Marines performed constabulary and nation 

building duties in the Philippines, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti (1899-1934).

In the years between World War I and World War II, the Marines, building on 

their long experience as an expeditionary force from the sea, created the concept 

of modern amphibious warfare. The Marines studied past operations, 

experimented with new equipment such as landing craft and amphibious assault 

vehicles, and conducted innovative amphibious exercises with the fleet. These 

efforts resulted in the doctrine and new tactics, techniques, and procedures in 

amphibious warfare that were instrumental in winning in the European and 

Pacific theaters of war during World War II. Not only was this new concept of 

amphibious warfare displayed at Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima, the landings at 

North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and Normandy were also a direct result of the 

conceptual effort of the Marines. Lessons learned from World War II operations 

were applied in the masterful Inchon landing during the Korean War (1950), and 

the continued evolution of amphibious operations enabled Marine Corps 

expeditionary operations through the end of the 20th century. 

The Marine Corps concept of creating expeditionary combined arms forces that 

exploited the synergy of task-organized Marine aviation, ground combat forces and 

combat service support, was codified by the National Security Act of 1947. The 

MAGTF concept was soon tested in combat with the rapid deployment and highly 

successful operations of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) in the early days of 

the Korean War. This MAGTF was rapidly formed and deployed and was 

instrumental in stopping the North Korean’s offensive to drive United States forces 

from Korea. The 1st Marine Brigade’s defense of the Pusan Perimeter enabled the 

decisive Inchon landing that led to the defeat and expulsion of the North Koreans. 

Public Law 416 passed by the 82nd Congress in 1952 further solidified the nature 

of the MAGTF. This law ensured that the Marine Corps would be organized with 

three aircraft wings and three combat divisions.

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Marines led the way in developing concepts 

of employment for the helicopter, using this new technology to rapidly move 

troops, supplies, and evacuate casualties during the Korean War. The concept of 
Marine Corps Operations 1-5

vertical envelopment added a new dimension not only to the amphibious assault 

but to a range of military operations soon to be conducted in Algeria (1954-62), 

the Sinai (1956), and by Marines and the Army in Southeast Asia (1962-75).

Building on the counterinsurgency experiences of Marines in Haiti and 

Nicaragua, innovative Marines created the combined action platoon (CAP) 

program in South Vietnam in 1965. This program placed small teams of Marines, 

led by noncommissioned officers, in the hamlets and villages throughout the 

Marines’ area of operations (AO). These Marines earned the trust of the villagers 

by living in the village while protecting the people. Marines led and trained the 

local people’s defense forces, learned the language and customs of the villagers, 

and were very successful in denying those areas under their control to the enemy. 

The CAP program became a model for success in countering insurgencies. Many 

of the lessons learned from the CAP program were emulated in various peace 

enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations Marines have performed 

over the last decade, such as Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq (1991) 

and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992-93).

Following the Vietnam War and military operations such as the ill-fated Iranian 

rescue mission, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, and peace enforcement in 

Beirut in the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress mandated several important changes 

in the way that joint forces conducted military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 defined the responsibilities of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service chiefs, and combatant 

commanders and provided the authority to perform them. The law fundamentally 

changed the way the Department of Defense operated by distinguishing between 

the operational contributions of the Services and those of the combatant commands. 

At the operational and tactical levels, the Services were to provide forces to the 

joint force commander who would then exercise command in operations. This 

combination of air, ground, and sea forces closely mirrored the organization of the 

MAGTF. Accordingly, Marines experienced no difficulty in understanding and 

adapting to joint operations. After all, the MAGTF was the precursor to the 

functionally oriented joint force. The joint operations concept was validated in 

Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989) and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

in the Persian Gulf (1990-91).

The inability of the Nation to rapidly deploy large numbers of heavy forces to the 

Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s provided the impetus to the Marine Corps to 

develop and refine the MPF concept. The Marines helped the Navy design the 

ships of the maritime pre-positioning ships squadrons (MPSRON), identifying 

the key requirements and features necessary to provide rapid loading and 

unloading, adequate storage, and supply capacity. The Marines developed and 
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tested the organization of the squadrons and those Marine units that would 

execute the loading, maintenance, and off loading of the maritime pre-positioning 

ships (MPS). The MPFs concept has been validated with the extremely successful 

employment of MPF in combat operations during Operation Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm, and in humanitarian assistance operations such as Operation Sea Angel in 

Bangladesh (1991) and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992-93). This 

concept has provided the combatant commanders with a very flexible capability 

to rapidly deploy and sustain robust combat and humanitarian forces throughout 

the littorals.

Maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy and forms the 

basis for the concept of expeditionary maneuver warfare. During the late 1970s 

and the 1980s Marines embraced the theory of maneuver warfare and developed 

their own institutional approach to maneuver warfare. This process of debate, 

discussion, and experimentation culminated in the publication of Fleet Marine 

Force Manual 1, Warfighting. This seminal document subsequently provided the 

foundation for the training and education of Marine leaders who conducted 

maneuver warfare with great success in Operation Desert Storm. Warfighting was 

followed by a series of doctrinal publications that provided further guidance on 

the theory and nature of strategy, campaigning, and tactics in maneuver warfare.

The continued development of new concepts and doctrine, along with the refining 

of accepted doctrine, will help ensure that the Marine Corps provides the Nation 

with a balanced force in readiness to conduct expeditionary operations in a 

dangerous and uncertain world.

THE CHARACTER OF MODERN CONFLICT

Despite (or perhaps as a result of) the victory of the United States in the Cold 

War, the world is characterized by crisis and disorder. Instead of the relative 

certainty provided by the bi-polar world of the United States and the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics, the world now has a single super power—the United 

States—and several regional powers. This has led to regional competition in 

many areas of the world and new threats of terrorism and international organized 

crime have taken on more menacing dimensions. Burgeoning populations in 

emerging nations are threatened by famine, shortages of natural resources, and 

disease, and are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. All of these factors 

combine to create an environment where United States military forces are 

constantly challenged to accomplish multidimensional missions. Marines may be 

conducting combat, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations 

simultaneously within an emerging nation in an austere theater or a major 

metropolitan city in the littorals.
Marine Corps Operations 1-7

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The environment where Marines will operate in the next decade reflects the 

changing character of modern conflict. While the Marine Corps has participated 

in some combat in urban areas such as Inchon and Seoul in the Korean War, 

Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic (1965), Hue in the Vietnam War 

(1968), and Mogadishu in Somalia (1992-93), most Marine Corps combat 

operations have taken place in isolated unpopulated settings. The growth of cities 

along the world’s littorals means Marines must be prepared to conduct a range of 

operations in heavily populated urban areas and that civilians and other 

noncombatants will be an ever-increasing concern to the commander. While 

fighting and winning the Nation’s battles will ever be the focus of the Marine 

Corps, commanders must be able to successfully conduct a wide variety of 

missions against diverse and ever-changing threats while under a myriad of 

political constraints and restraints and while operating under joint or 

multinational command.

Threat Dimension

As the nature of modern conflict evolves so does the nature of the threat that the 

Nation and Marine Corps forces face. No longer are Marines only concerned with 

defeating Soviet or their proxy forces. Marines must be able to face threats that 

include natural or man-made disasters such as famine or disease, transnational 

criminals such as drug cartels and weapon smugglers, terrorists, and insurgents, 

as well as soldiers in the armies of the Nation’s foes.

The national armed forces of regional powers continue to be a major threat to 

world peace. Regional powers and smaller nations continue to field large and 

relatively competent forces. These forces will continue to modernize their 

equipment to take advantage of technological advancements and to challenge 

United States strengths in information technology, intelligence gathering and 

targeting, and precision strike capabilities. United States forces must remain 

focused on the challenge of defeating these near peer competitors and regional 

powers to protect the Nation’s interests. 

Nonstate actors are those individuals or forces that perform criminal acts of 

terrorism, drug production and smuggling or conduct guerrilla warfare for 

personal gain or to achieve the nonlegitimate goals of their organization or cause. 

In some cases nations support or hire these nonstate actors to achieve their 

national goals.

Transnational entities conduct a wide variety of activities to threaten United 

States interests and security abroad and at home. These include terrorism, drug 
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smuggling and production, illegal arms trading, organized international crime, 

and environmental terrorism. Disasters such as famine and disease, coupled with 

war and ethnic strife, result in migrations of refugees that overwhelm the 

resources of the gaining countries. International assistance is often the only 

recourse to alleviate the suffering of the refugees and prevent the gaining 

countries from closing their borders.

To succeed against United States forces, the enemy must be smart and flexible. 

Adversaries will develop forces, tactics, and equipment that will seek to attack 

perceived United States weaknesses and avoid strengths. These asymmetrical 

operations will require forces that can change tactics and organizations in 

anticipation of or in response to a new situation. For example, such an enemy force 

would conduct conventional force operations during early stages of a crisis while 

United States forces are deploying and the enemy has temporary superiority of 

forces. Once the United States has achieved conventional superiority in the AO, the 

enemy would then quickly adapt and conduct nonconventional operations, such as 

guerrilla warfare, terrorist attacks, and psychological operations.

Adversaries will conduct operations to set the conditions that lead to accomplishing 

their national or organizational objectives. They will try to change the nature of the 

conflict or employ capabilities that they believe the United States will have 

difficulties countering. Adversaries will attempt to shape the situation by—

l Conducting force-oriented operations against United States forces and coalition

partners to create casualties.

l Denying or disrupting United States forcible entry operations.

l Avoiding decisive battles to preserve their forces and prolong the conflict.

l Conducting asymmetrical operations.

l Forming political and military coalitions to limit United States operations.

Adversaries will attempt to prolong the conflict while using terrorism and other 

attacks to erode international support, alliance cohesion, and the will to fight once 

United States forces arrive in the crisis area. Use of the media and other 

information operations to portray United States forces as aggressors, the use of 

noncombatants to garner world sympathy, and the fear generated by terrorism or 

the threat of employment of weapons of mass destruction are only some of the 

ways that an intelligent enemy can shape the situation. By turning world and 

United States’ public opinion against the policies and practices of an alliance or 

international organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the 

United Nations, the enemy can neutralize or eliminate United States military 

involvement in a crisis.
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Political Dimension

The President identifies the United States security objectives in the National 

Security Strategy, establishing the Nation’s broad political, economic, and 

military interests in peace and war. The National Military Strategy supports the 

national security strategy by translating strategic political and economic 

objectives into national military objectives and tasks. These objectives and tasks 

protect and promote United States national interests. Current national military 

objectives are to promote peace and stability and, when necessary, to defeat 

adversaries who threaten the United States, national interests or allies. These 

objectives drive strategic tasks: shape the international environment and create 

conditions favorable to United States interests and global security; respond to the 

full spectrum of crises; and prepare now for an uncertain future. 

United States military forces accomplish the national military objectives and 

tasks through the four strategic concepts of strategic agility, overseas presence, 

power projection, and decisive force. The Nation’s forward-deployed naval 

forces, together with forward and United States-based forces from all the 

Services, combine to meet the requirements of conflicts and can operate across 

the full range of military operations. 

Levels of War

The highest level is the strategic. Strategy involves establishing goals, assigning 

forces, providing assets, and imposing conditions on the use of force. Strategy 

derives from political and policy objectives and is the sole authoritative basis for 

military operations. The strategic level of war involves the art of winning wars 

and maintaining the peace.

The next level—operational—links the strategic and tactical levels. It includes 

deciding when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle. 

The operational level of war is the art and science of winning campaigns.

The final level of war is the tactical. Tactics are the concepts and methods used to 

accomplish a particular mission in either combat or MOOTW. In war, tactics 

focus on applying combat power to defeat an enemy force. The tactical level of 

war involves the art and science of winning engagements and battles to achieve 

the objectives of the campaign.

The distinctions between the levels of war are rarely clear and often overlap in 

practice. Commanders may operate at multiple levels simultaneously. In 

MOOTW, small unit leaders may conduct tactical actions that have operational 

and even strategic consequences.
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Range of Military Operations

Conflict can take a variety of forms ranging from general war, such as a global 

conflict between major powers, all the way down to MOOTW where violence is 

limited and combat forces may not be needed. This range may be characterized 

by two major categories:

A major theater war is the employment of large joint and multinational forces in 

combat operations to defeat an enemy nation, coalition or alliance. Operation 

Desert Storm is an example of a major theater war.

A smaller-scale contingency normally encompasses a wide range of naval, joint 

or multinational operations in small wars and MOOTW. Peace enforcement 

operations in the Balkans and humanitarian assistance operations are examples of 

smaller-scale contingencies.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

The Marine Corps’ involvement in national security has its foundation in law. 

The National Security Act of 1947 unified the defense establishment, assigned 

roles, missions, and functions among major Department of Defense agencies, 

including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Services, and combatant commands.

National Command Authorities

The National Command Authorities include the President and the Secretary of 

Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. They exercise authority 

over the Armed Forces through combatant commanders and the Secretaries of the 

Military Departments and the chiefs of the Services for those forces not assigned 

to the combatant commanders. The National Command Authorities translate 

policy into national strategic military objectives.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Sections 151 and 153, the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in 

providing strategic direction of the Armed Forces. His responsibilities include—

l Presiding over the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

l Acting as the spokesman for the combatant commanders.

l Preparing military strategy, assessments, and strategic plans.

l Providing for the preparation and review of joint operation plans.

l Providing military guidance to the Services in preparation of their detailed plans.
Marine Corps Operations 1-11

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Vice Chairman, and the four Service chiefs. Joint Chiefs of Staff members advise 

the National Command Authorities upon their request or when a member 

recognizes a matter of national security that merits being addressed. When the 

Chairman advises the President, National Security Council or the Secretary of 

Defense, any member may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that 

of the Chairman in addition to the advice provided by the Chairman. Duties of 

the members take precedence over all their other duties as Service chiefs.

UNIFIED ACTION

Unified action is a generic term that refers to a broad scope of activities 

(including the synchronization of activities with governmental and 

nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, sub-unified 

commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of 

those commands. The national military strategy calls for the Marine Corps to act 

as part of fully interoperable and integrated joint forces. The joint force 

commander synchronizes the employment of Marine Corps forces with that of 

the other Services to fully exploit the capabilities of the joint force and to 

effectively and efficiently accomplish the mission.

Joint Operations

Joint operations are operations that include forces of two or more Military 

Departments under a single commander. Joint force commanders use joint forces 

within their AOs to participate in engagement activities and to conduct military 

operations in support of the geographic combatant commanders’ contingency and 

war plans. Combatant commanders and their staffs are responsible for preparing 

plans for engagement with other nations and their forces throughout the theater. 

They also must prepare and maintain contingency and war plans for their theater 

of operations.

Engagement is the use of military forces to contribute to regional stability, 

reduction of potential conflicts, and the deterrence of aggression. Engagement 

activities are pro-active, conducted at home and abroad, that take advantage of 

opportunities to shape the international security environment. They include 

overseas presence, forward deployment, foreign internal development, and 

alliance and coalition training and exercises.
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Contingency plans are plans for major contingencies that can reasonably be 

expected to occur within the theater of operations. Contingency planning can be 

deliberate or can be conducted under time constraints in crisis action planning. 

Contingency plans differ from operation plans as they are in an abbreviated 

format and require significant time or considerable expansion or alteration to 

convert them to operation plans or orders. War plans are completed operation 

plans for major contingencies such as major theater wars.

One of the techniques the combatant commanders and their staffs employ in 

contingency and war planning is flexible deterrent options. These are tailored 

military forces and operations designed to effectively and efficiently accomplish 

an anticipated mission or meet an unexpected contingency. Joint planners use 

flexible deterrent options within a planning framework intended to facilitate early 

decision and rapid response by laying out a range of forces and capabilities to be 

employed by the combatant commanders to accomplish particular missions. 

Flexible deterrent options are carefully tailored to send the right signal to the 

threat and the United States and world public. These options should include the 

minimum military force necessary to accomplish the objectives and the 

coordinated use of economic, diplomatic, and political actions appropriate to the 

particular situation. For more on Marine Corps participation in joint operations 

see chapter 3.

Multinational Operations, Alliances, and Coalitions

Although the United States may act unilaterally when the situation requires, it 

pursues its national interests through alliances and coalitions when possible. 

Alliances and coalitions can provide larger and more capable forces, share the costs 

of the operation, and enhance the legitimacy of the operation in world and United 

States public opinion. Multinational operations are usually conducted within the 

structure of an alliance or coalition. Alliances normally have established 

agreements for long term objectives, developed contingency plans, and 

standardized some equipment and procedures to ease interoperability. Coalitions 

are normally established for shorter periods or for specific multinational operations. 

They normally do not have established procedures or standardized equipment. 

However organized, multinational operations normally involve complex cultural 

issues, interoperability challenges, conflicting national command and control 

procedures, intelligence sharing, and other support problems. Even long 

established alliances experience some degree of these obstacles. Unity of 

command is difficult to achieve in multinational operations. To compensate for 

this, commanders concentrate on obtaining unity of effort between the 

participating national forces. Consensus building is the key element in building 
Marine Corps Operations 1-13

unity of effort in multinational operations. Multinational operations command 

and control is usually based on parallel or lead nation command and control 

structures. Parallel command requires coordinated political and senior military 

leadership to make decisions and transmit their decisions through existing chains 

of command to their deployed forces. This is the simplest to establish but limits 

tempo. Lead nation command and control requires that one nation (usually the 

one providing the preponderance of forces or capabilities) provides the 

multinational force commander and uses that nation’s command and control 

system. Other nations’ forces are then assigned as subordinate forces. Normally, 

this structure requires some integration of national staffs.

Multinational commanders must be prepared to accommodate differences in 

operational and tactical capabilities by nations within the combined force. The 

commander’s intentions, clear guidance, and plans must be articulated to avoid 

confusion that might occur due to differences in doctrine and terminology. Detailed 

planning, wargaming, exchange of standing operating procedures and liaison 

officers, and rehearsals help to overcome procedural difficulties between nations. 

Finally, the commander should ensure that the missions assigned to nations within 

the multinational force reflect the specific capabilities and limitations of each 

national contingent. Mission success should not be jeopardized because of 

unrealistic expectations of the capabilities or political will of member forces. 

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and USSOCOM 

were established by Congress by law. Missions are the tasks assigned by the 

President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. Functions are 

specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to 

enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles. Various laws, directives, 

and manuals establish the roles and functions of the Marine Corps and describe the 

general composition and responsibilities of the Marine Corps. The key sources are 

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces; Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, 

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components; and the 

Marine Corps Manual.

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces

Chapter 507, Section 5063 details the Marine Corps’ composition and functions. 

The Marine Corps—

l Shall be organized to include not less than three combat divisions and three 

aircraft wings, and other organic land combat forces, aviation, and services.
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l Shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of 

combined arms, together with supporting aviation forces, for service with 

the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for the 

conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a 

naval campaign.

l Shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of 

the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval 

property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the 

President may direct. These additional duties may not detract from or interfere 

with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

l Shall develop, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, those phases of 

amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment 

used by landing forces.

l Is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the 

expansion of the peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs 

of war.

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986

Salient features of the act are the— 

l Service chiefs (Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force, and Commandant of the Marine Corps) are responsible 

for organizing, training, and equipping Service forces, while combatant 

commanders are responsible for the planning and execution of joint operations.

l Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the 

President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. While he 

outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces, he does not exercise military 

command over the combatant commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of the 

Armed Forces.

l Joint Staff is under the exclusive direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. It is organized along conventional staff lines to support the Chairman 

and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in performing their duties. 

The Joint Staff does not function as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and 

has no executive authority.

l Operational chain of command is clearly established from the President 

through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders.
Marine Corps Operations 1-15

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of

the Department of Defense and its Major Components

This directive defines the primary functions of the Marine Corps. Among these 

primary functions are to—

l Organize, train, equip, and provide Marine Corps forces to conduct prompt and 

sustained combat operations at sea, including sea-based and land-based aviation. 

These forces will seek out and destroy enemy naval forces, suppress enemy sea 

commerce, gain and maintain general naval supremacy, control vital sea areas, 

protect vital sea lines of communications, establish and maintain local superiority 

in an area of naval operations, seize and defend advanced naval bases, and 

conduct land, air, and space operations essential to a naval campaign.

l Provide Marine Corps forces of combined arms for service with the Navy to 

seize and defend advanced naval bases and to conduct land operations 

necessary for a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide 

detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy and 

provide security detachments for naval stations and bases.

l Organize, equip, and provide Marine Corps forces to conduct joint amphibious 

operations. The Marine Corps is responsible for the amphibious training of all 

forces assigned to joint amphibious operations.

l Organize, train, equip, and provide forces for reconnaissance, antisubmarine 

warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling, and minelaying operations.

l Organize, train, equip, and provide forces for air and missile defense and space 

control operations.

l Provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine to conduct and support 

electronic warfare.

l Organize, train, equip, and provide forces to conduct and support 

special operations.

l Organize, train, equip, and provide forces to conduct and support 

psychological operations.

Functions to be accomplished together with other Services include develop— 

l The doctrine, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious 

operations and the doctrine and procedures for joint amphibious operations.

l The doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in 

amphibious operations. The Marine Corps has primary responsibility for the 

development of landing force doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment that 

are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.
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l Doctrine, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for 

airborne operations not provided for by the Army.

l Doctrine, procedures, and equipment employed by Marine Corps forces in the 

conduct of space operations.

In addition to the above functions, the Marine Corps will perform such other 

duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct. However, these 

additional duties must not detract from or interfere with the operations which the 

Marine Corps is primarily organized. These functions do not contemplate the 

creation of a second land army. Finally, the directive describes collateral 

functions of the Marine Corps to train its forces to—

l Interdict enemy land and air forces and communications through operations at sea.

l Conduct close air and naval support for land operations.

l Furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.

l Participate in the overall air effort, when directed.

l Establish military government, as directed, pending transfer of this 

responsibility to other authority.

Marine Corps Manual

The Marine Corps Manual adds three more functions. The Marine Corps shall—

l Maintain a Marine Corps Forces Reserve for the purpose of providing trained 

units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Marine 

Corps in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the 

national security may require.

l Provide Marine Corps officer and enlisted personnel in support of the 

Department of State security program overseas.

l Organize Marine Corps aviation, as a collateral function, to participate as an 

integral component of naval aviation in the execution of such other Navy 

functions as the fleet commanders may direct.

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

The Commandant has two vital functions—as a member of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and as Marine Corps Service Chief. His duties as a member of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff take precedence over all other duties.

As a Joint Chiefs of Staff member, the Commandant may submit his advice or 

opinion to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when it is in disagreement 
Marine Corps Operations 1-17

with or provides additional insight to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 

point of view. When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submits his advice 

or opinion to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of 

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is obligated to submit any 

additional input from the Commandant or other members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. When the Commandant is acting in his capacity as a military adviser, he 

may provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the 

Secretary of Defense when his opinion is requested.

The Commandant may make recommendations to Congress relating to the 

Department of Defense, providing he has informed the Secretary of Defense prior 

to the meeting with Congress. The Commandant will attend the regularly scheduled 

meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As long as his independence as a member of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not impaired, the Commandant will keep the Secretary 

of the Navy informed of military advice given by the other members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on matters that impact the Department of the Navy.

As the Service chief, the Commandant is subject to the authority, direction, and 

control of the Secretary of the Navy. He is directly responsible for the 

administration, discipline, internal organization, training, requirements, 

efficiency, and readiness of the Marine Corps. He is also responsible for the 

Marine Corps’ materiel support system and accountable for the total performance 

of the Marine Corps.

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

The Marine Corps’ organization consists of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; 

the operating forces; the supporting establishment; and the Marine Corps Forces 

Reserve. See figure 1-1 on page 1-18.

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

The Commandant presides over the daily activities of Headquarters, U.S. Marine 

Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps provides staff assistance to the 

Commandant by—

l Preparing the Marine Corps for employment. This is accomplished through 

recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and 

development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, 

and maintaining the Marine Corps.

l Investigating and reporting on the efficiency of the Marine Corps and its 

preparation to support military operations by combatant commanders.
1-18 MCDP 1-0

l Preparing detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans and 

supervising the execution of those plans and instructions.

l Coordinating the actions of organizations of the Marine Corps.

l Performing such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be 

prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy or the Commandant.

Operating Forces

Assigned Marine Corps Forces

All Marine Corps combat, combat support, and combat service support units are 

part of the assigned Marine Corps forces. Normally, these forces are taskorganized for employment as MAGTFs. 

Figure 1-1. Marine Corps Organization.
Marine Corps Operations 1-19

The Secretary of Defense “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum assigns 

designated Marine Corps operating forces to Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint 

Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific 

Command (USCINCPAC). USCINCJFCOM exercises combatant command 

(command authority) or COCOM of II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 

through the Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT). 

COMMARFORLANT has Service component responsibilities to 

USCINCJFCOM, U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), and 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO) as 

COMMARFORLANT, Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Europe 

(COMMARFOREUR), and Commander, Marine Corps Forces, South 

(COMMARFORSOUTH) respectively. USCINCPAC exercises COCOM of I 

and III MEF through the Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Pacific 

(COMMARFORPAC). COMMARFORPAC is also the Service component 

commander for Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT) 

as Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Central (COMMARCENT). In addition to 

his Service component responsibilities for USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT, 

COMMARFORPAC has multiple responsibilities in Korea. He exercises Service 

component responsibilities over Marine Corps forces as Commander, U.S. 

Marine Corps Forces - Korea (COMUSMARFOR-K). He also exercises 

functional component responsibilities as Commander, Combined Marine Forces 

Command (COMCMFC).These assignments reflect the peacetime disposition of 

Marine Corps forces. MEFs are apportioned to the geographic combatant 

commanders for contingency planning and are provided to these combatant 

commands when directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Assigned Marine Corps forces are commanded by a combatant command-level 

Marine Corps component commander. He is responsible for—

l Training and preparing Marine Corps forces for operational commitment 

commensurate with the strategic situation and the combatant 

commander’s requirements.

l Advising the combatant commander on the proper employment of Marine 

Corps forces, participating in associated planning, and accomplishing such 

operational missions as may be assigned.

l Providing Service administration, discipline, intelligence, and operational 

support for assigned forces.

l Identifying requirements for support from the Marine Corps 

supporting establishment.

l Performing such other duties as may be directed.
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Fleet Marine Forces

Fleet Marine Forces units serve with Navy fleets in the seizure or defense of 

advanced naval bases and in the conduct of such land operations as may be 

essential to the prosecution of naval operations in support of the joint campaign. 

When assigned, Fleet Marine Force units are commanded by the Commanding 

Generals, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Europe, South, or Pacific. 

When the combatant commander tasks the Marine Corps component commander to 

provide assigned Marine Corps forces to the Navy component commander, the 

combatant command-level Marine Corps component commander CHOPs (change 

of operational control) MAGTFs and designated forces from Marine Corps forces 

to the Navy component commander. These Fleet Marine Forces then serve with a 

numbered fleet or for naval operations and other commitments; e.g., deployed 

Marine expeditionary units (MEUs). 

The relationship between Marine Corps forces and the Fleet Marine Force 

reflects the roles and functions of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has 

separate responsibilities to provide forces for use by the combatant 

commanders—Marine Corps forces—and by Navy operational commanders—

Fleet Marine Forces. See figure 1-2.

Security Forces

The 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) (Antiterrorism (AT)) provides the 

unified combatant commanders with a rapidly deployable and sustainable 

specialized antiterrorism force to deter, detect, and defend against terrorist 

actions and conduct initial incident response to combat the threat of terrorism 

worldwide. The 4th MEB (AT) provides the following capabilities: 

l Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive incident 

response.

l Physical and electronic security.

l Integrated vulnerability assessment and threat analysis.

l Explosive ordnance detection and disposal.

l Lethal and nonlethal weapons employment and training.

l Urban search and rescue.

l Physical security and antiterrorism/force protection training.

The 4th MEB (AT) deploys a forward command element (CE)/assessment team 

within 6 hours of notification and maintains a task-organized antiterrorism/incident 

response MAGTF on 12-hour alert. The entire MEB (AT) can deploy within 
Marine Corps Operations 1-21

72 hours of notification. It may include an air contingency battalion/antiterrorism 

battalion, a Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, Marine Corps Security 

Force Battalion elements, and Marine Security Guard Battalion elements. 

The Marine Corps Security Force Battalion provides armed antiterrorism and 

physical security trained forces to designated naval installations, vessels or units. 

The Battalion’s Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) companies provide 

Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and Fleet Commanders forward-deployed 

FAST platoons for responsive short-term security augmentation of installations, 

ships or vital naval and national assets when force protection conditions have 

been elevated beyond the capabilities of the permanent security forces. Marine 

Corps Security Force Battalion companies operate under operational control 

(OPCON) of the designated Navy commanding officer and under the 

administrative control (ADCON) of the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

through the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. 

Special Activity Forces

Special activity forces provide security or services or perform other certain 

special type duties for agencies other than the Department of the Navy. 

Assignment of personnel to and the mission of these forces are specified by the 

Figure 1-2. Marine Corps Forces and Fleet Marine Force Relationship.
1-22 MCDP 1-0

supported agency and approved by the Commandant. The Marine Corps provides 

Marines from the Marine Security Guard Battalion to meet the security guard 

detachment requirements at foreign service posts throughout the world. The 

Marine security guard detachment mission is to provide internal security services 

to selected Department of State embassies, consulates, and legations to prevent 

the compromise of classified material and equipment and protect United States 

citizens and government property. Marine security guard detachments operate 

under the OPCON of the Secretary of State and under the ADCON of the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps via the Commander, Marine Corps Forces, 

Atlantic/Commanding General 4th MEB (AT). 

Supporting Establishment

The supporting establishment assists in the training, sustainment, equipping, and 

embarkation of deploying forces. The supporting establishment includes—

l Marine Corps Materiel Command.

l Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

l Marine Corps Recruiting Command.

l Marine Corps bases.

l Marine Corps air stations.

l Individual training installations.

l Reserve support activities.

Marine Corps Forces Reserve

Marine Corps Forces Reserve is an integral part of Marine Corps Total Force. It 

is organized, trained, and equipped under the direction of the Commandant and 

commanded by the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Reserve. The Commander, 

Marine Corps Forces Reserve provides trained and qualified units and individuals 

to be available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, and at such 

other times as the national security may require. In recent years, the Marine 

Corps Forces Reserve has been increasingly called upon to provide peacetime 

operational support. This operational support enhances the entire Marine Corps’ 

operational readiness and reduces the strain of the operational tempo on the 

active forces. Marine Corps Forces Reserve also maintains close contact with the 

American people through community outreach and operates reserve training 

centers that ensure forces are ready in the event of mobilization.
Marine Corps Operations 1-23

Like the active forces, it is a combined arms force with balanced ground, aviation, and 

combat service support units. The Marine Corps Forces Reserve includes a division, 

wing, and force service support group and unique capabilities such as civil affairs 

groups, aviation aggressor squadrons, and air-naval gunfire liaison companies. Reserve 

units routinely exercise with the active forces and are assigned operational 

responsibilities. Marine Corps Forces Reserve units and individuals are available for 

employment on short notice after mobilization and any required refresher training. 

They can provide augmentation, reinforcement or reconstitution of regular Marine 

Corps forces to satisfy mission requirements. The Marine Corps Forces Reserve shares 

the same commitment to expeditionary readiness as the active duty Marine Corps.

MARINE CORPS ETHOS

The Marine Corps’ most important responsibility is to win the Nation’s battles. 

Winning these battles rests, as it has throughout the Nation’s history, on the 

individual Marine. The Marine Corps must recruit America’s finest young men and 

women and make Marines capable of winning the Nation’s battles and becoming 

outstanding citizens. Accordingly, the institutional focus of the Marine Corps is on 

how Marines are inculcated with the ethos of the Marine Corps, trained for combat, 

and equipped with the best possible weapons to win these battles. Marine Corps 

ethos are based on the core values of honor, courage, and commitment. These 

values provide a framework for how Marines act and think. Strict adherence to the 

core values, coupled with rigorous training and education, ensure a Marine Corps 

that is made up of men and women with intellectual agility, initiative, moral 

courage, strength of character, and a bias for action.

At the heart of the ethos of the Marine Corps is the belief that every Marine is first a 

rifleman; specialty skills such as being an aviator, a tanker, a radio operator or a 

mechanic are secondary. Marines understand that everything they do is ultimately to 

defeat the enemy. Marines fighting at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) are 

supported by Marines who distribute supplies, repair battle-damaged equipment, and 

evacuate wounded Marines. There are no “rear area” Marines, as all Marines are 

expected to drop their wrenches, leave their computers, and pick up their rifles to 

defend their position or form provisional units to reinforce an attack.

The belief that every Marine is a rifleman is instilled in Marines during their 

initial training and is continually reinforced through training exercises and formal 

schooling. All Marine officers attend The Basic School before receiving any 

military occupational specialty training. Staff noncommissioned officers and 

noncommissioned officers attend academies designed to promote Marine 

leadership skills regardless of military occupational specialty. This collective 

training is critical in ensuring all Marines embrace the Marine Corps ethos.
1-24 MCDP 1-0

Marines possess a number of characteristics that contribute to success in all 

operations. These characteristics, based on the Marine Corps core values include—

l Offensive spirit.

l Loyalty.

l Discipline.

l Mental and physical fitness.

l Tactical and technical proficiency.

l Readiness.

l Expeditionary mindset.

l Selflessness.

l Esprit de corps.

Such characteristics are essential if Marines are to employ the Marine Corps’ 

maneuver warfare philosophy on a chaotic battlefield. Emerging operational 

concepts like expeditionary maneuver warfare, with its supporting concepts, and 

the demands of MOOTW can best be accomplished by forces that are completely 

imbued with the ethos and traditions of the Marine Corps.

By making Marines who embrace this Marine Corps culture and exhibit an 

expeditionary mindset, building on a history of innovation and experimentation 

to develop new warfighting concepts, and capitalizing on emerging technologies, 

the Marine Corps continues to be the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness.
CHAPTER 2

Marine Corps Expeditionary Operations

Contents

Marine Corps Core Competencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Warfighting Culture and Dynamic Decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Expeditionary Forward Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Sustainable and Interoperable Littoral Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Combined Arms Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Forcible Entry from the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Expeditionary Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Force Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Amphibious Operation Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Forcible Entry through an Amphibious Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Maritime Pre-positioning Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

Sustained Operations Ashore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Enabling Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Decisive Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Exploitation Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Sustaining Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Emerging Concepts and Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

Operational Maneuver from the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

Maritime Pre-positioning Force Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

Expeditionary Bases and Sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
2-2 MCDP 1-0

“If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will 

be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or 

hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.”

—Samuel P. Huntington

“. . . given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its 

overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full 

spectrum dominance.”

—Joint Vision 2020

MARINE CORPS CORE COMPETENCIES

The Marine Corps’ contribution to national security and its role within a naval 

expeditionary force rest upon five unique core competencies. These competencies 

define the essence of the Marine Corps’ institutional culture and its contribution 

to the national military establishment. Core competencies are the set of specific 

capabilities or activities fundamental to a Service or agency role. The Marine 

Corps’ core competencies allow Marines to conduct expeditionary operations 

across the spectrum of crisis and conflict around the world. These core 

competencies, articulated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, follow.

Warfighting Culture and Dynamic Decision-making

War is fundamentally a clash of human wills and, as such, its outcomes are often 

determined more by human qualities than by technology. For this reason, 

Marines focus on the force of human resolve and utilize technology to leverage 

the chaos and complexity of the battlefield. From early on, Marines are instilled 

with a determination to accomplish the mission, ingeniously adapting available 

resources in chaotic and austere operating environments to realize success in 

battle. While Marines leverage technology to enhance tempo and decisionmaking capabilities—their training, education, and experience foster decisiveness 

even in the absence of perfect information. This ‘decision superiority’ recognizes 

that technology will never fully obviate fog and friction, and that the human 

ability to make effective decisions in battle is best achieved by intuition built 

through rigorous training, practiced discipline, and relevant experience. 

Leveraging chaos and complexity through information and decision-making 

technologies provides a truly asymmetric advantage to Marines engaged across 

the spectrum of operations. 

Expeditionary Forward Operations

Marines are continuously deployed around the world near potential trouble spots 

where they can deter aggression, respond quickly, and resolve crises whenever 
Marine Corps Operations 2-3

called. The Corps’ naval character and its strategically mobile presence enhance 

cultural and situational awareness of potential operating areas. This enhanced 

awareness enables Marines to work with friends and allies throughout each 

region, and is a cornerstone of the CINCs’ engagement plans.

Sustainable and Interoperable Littoral Power Projection

Today’s scalable MAGTFs can access the world’s littoral regions on short notice, 

responding quickly with a force tailored to the mission at hand. Our partnership 

with the Navy provides significant organic sustainment capabilities from the sea, 

and reduces the CINC’s requirement to dedicate precious lift assets to sustaining 

early entry forces. This means that sustainable and credible naval forces can 

begin responding to a crisis early, supporting other elements of national power 

while giving the joint or combined commander time to develop the theater of 

operations more fully as required.

Combined Arms Integration

Marines pioneered development of concepts such as close air support and vertical 

envelopment. MAGTFs constantly blend the art and science of commanding, 

controlling, training, and executing combined arms operations from air, land, sea, 

and space. Marines understand the logic and synergy of joint and multinational 

forces under the ‘Single Battle’ concept because of their culture and training in 

combined arms and expeditionary operations. They have experience with other 

government and nongovernment agencies. MAGTFs deliver desired ‘effects’ 

through both lethal and nonlethal means, with simultaneity and depth across the 

spectrum of operations. Marine employment of combined arms at the tactical 

level of war is a truly unique capability that reflects our innovative approach to 

warfighting and complements the tenets of maneuver warfare.

Forcible Entry from the Sea

Together, the Navy and Marine Corps provide the Nation with its primary 

capability to rapidly project and sustain combat power ashore in the face of 

armed opposition. When access to safeguarding America’s interests is denied or 

in jeopardy, forward-present, rapidly deployable Marine forces are trained and 

ready to create and exploit seams in an enemy’s defenses by leveraging available 

joint and naval capabilities, projecting sustainable power ashore, and securing 

entry for follow-on forces. MEFs, reinforced by maritime pre-positioned assets 

when required, allow the United States to protect its worldwide interests, reassure 

allies, and fortify other elements of national power.
2-4 MCDP 1-0

EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

An expedition is a military operation conducted by an armed force to 

accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. Expeditionary operations 

encompass the entire range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance 

to forcible entry in a major theater war. The defining characteristic of 

expeditionary operations is the projection of force into a foreign setting. 

Successful expeditionary operations require—

l Expeditionary Mindset. Expeditionary Marine forces must establish and 

maintain an expeditionary mindset—an expeditionary culture—devoted to 

readiness and the mental agility and adaptability to accommodate changing 

conditions and accomplish rapidly changing missions with the forces and 

capabilities at hand.

l Tailored Forces. Marine forces are task-organized into MAGTFs to 

conduct expeditionary operations. MAGTFs are designed to accomplish the 

mission assigned and do not include forces or capabilities not required by 

the mission. Therefore, those forces needed to do the job—and only those 

forces—are employed.

l Forward Deployment. The presence of forward-deployed MAGTFs close 

to the crisis or objective area can expedite accomplishing the mission. They 

allow for a real deterrence, as the threat of employment is imminent and 

credible. Forward-deployed MAGTFs also can serve as a precursor to larger 

follow-on forces.

l Rapid Deployment. Expeditionary forces must be able to get to the crisis 

or AO quickly with all their capabilities ready to be employed. MAGTFs 

can rapidly deploy using airlift, sealift or movement or maneuver from a 

forward expeditionary site. Marines are always prepared to deploy 

anywhere in the world.

l Expeditionary Basing. Marines are prepared to take advantage of any 

opportunity to use expeditionary basing or sites to support rapid deployment 

and employment within the AO. Amphibious shipping, forward expeditionary 

sites, and intermediate staging bases are all methods the MAGTFs can employ 

to ensure the rapid buildup and effective employment of combat power.

l Forcible Entry. Expeditionary forces must be able to gain access to the AO 

despite the efforts of the enemy to prevent it. While Marines strive to avoid 

enemy strengths and take advantage of the enemy’s weakness, MAGTFs must 

be prepared to defeat the enemy to allow follow-on operations. Marines are 

highly trained in forcible entry techniques such as amphibious assaults and 

helicopterborne (air assault) operations. Marines also train with allied, 

multinational, and joint forces such as United Kingdom Royal Marines, 

Republic of Korea Marines, and United States Army airborne forces.
Marine Corps Operations 2-5

l Sustainment. Expeditionary operations are often conducted in austere theaters or 

undeveloped areas of the world. Forces must be able to sustain their operations, 

providing the essential supplies and services necessary to keep the force manned 

and equipped to accomplish the mission. MAGTFs are well-suited to operate in 

these conditions as MAGTFs bring robust logistic and combat service support to 

the operation. Sea-basing, expeditionary sites, and the use of pre-positioned 

supplies and equipment assist in sustaining the force.

FORCE PROJECTION

Forward-deployed MAGTFs, with their range of capabilities, are designed to 

enable the joint force commander to resolve crises and win conflicts. MAGTFs 

are uniquely suited to support the national security strategy by rapidly projecting 

the required capability into a foreign setting to abate the crisis. This capability is 

central to the United States ability to safeguard its national interests. Forwarddeployed MAGTFs are prepared to meet a wide array of challenges in their AO. 

Their presence and engagement activities help to shape the crisis area. Finally, 

MAGTFs respond with appropriate force or capabilities to defeat the enemy, 

restore order or provide humanitarian relief.

The role of forward-deployed naval forces will grow even more critical as crises 

become more frequent, more unpredictable, and more difficult to resolve. 

Marines will be called upon to support, conduct, and in some cases, lead 

interagency crisis response operations. In such contingencies, the MAGTF’s 

ability to establish immediate presence and access into the crisis area will be key. 

As the “first to respond” force, the MAGTF must be in or close to the intended 

AO, ready to gain access through forcible entry, and organized, trained, and 

equipped to respond to a wide variety of challenges. Deploying forces may be 

supported by a wide range of informational and security activities designed to 

demonstrate the Nation’s commitment to regional security, strengthen ties with 

allies, and deter aggression. While these information operations may involve 

many agencies outside the MAGTF, it is the presence, readiness, and inherent 

flexibility of the MAGTF that ultimately projects national military power. In 

essence, this will enable the Marine Corps to expand its traditional “first to fight” 

role, becoming a “first to respond” element of national power.

The Marine Corps conducts force projection primarily through the use of MAGTFs 

conducting expeditionary operations employing three primary methods:

l Amphibious operations.

l MPF operations.

l Combination of the above methods.
2-6 MCDP 1-0

Although the Marine Corps can deploy forces solely through organic, strategic, 

or theater air assets, our naval character favors the three primary methods. 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Joint Pub (JP) 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, defines an 

amphibious operation as a military operation launched from the sea by an 

amphibious force embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of 

introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission. 

Amphibious operations require a high degree of training and specialized 

equipment to succeed. Marine Corps forces are specifically organized, trained, 

and equipped to deploy aboard, operate from, and sustain themselves from 

amphibious ships. They are specifically designed to project land combat power 

ashore from the sea.

Amphibious operations are normally part of a larger joint operation. JP 3-02 sets 

forth the doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern 

amphibious operations. Under Title 10, United States Code, the Marine Corps has 

primary responsibility for developing LF doctrine, tactics, techniques, 

procedures, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the 

Marine Corps. The doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting 

amphibious operations are not immutable; they are dynamic and evolutionary, 

adapting to new technology, threats, and requirements. Command relationships, 

the use of specific operational areas, and the control of airspace and fires must be 

flexible and adaptable to make amphibious forces more responsive to the current 

environment and an uncertain future.

Amphibious Operation Command Relationships

Command relationships in amphibious operations should facilitate cooperative 

planning between the joint force, the Navy, and the Marine forces. They should 

ensure that appropriate responsibility and authority for the conduct of the 

amphibious operation is assigned to the commander of the Marine forces. The 

command relationship options available to a joint force commander or other 

establishing authority of an amphibious operation include OPCON, tactical 

control (TACON) and support as described in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed 

Forces (UNAAF), and JP 3-02. While doctrine should not specify a normal 

command relationship, typically a support relationship is established between the 

amphibious task force commander (Navy) and the LF commander (Marine or 

Army) based on the complementary capabilities of the amphibious task force and 

the LF. The establishing authority should consider the following factors when 
Marine Corps Operations 2-7

developing the establishing directive and designating the supported commander at 

various phases and events during the amphibious operation (not all inclusive):

l Responsibility for the preponderance of the mission.

l Force capabilities.

l Threat.

l Type, phase, and duration of the operation.

l Command and control capabilities.

l Battlespace assigned.

l Recommendations from subordinate commanders.

An amphibious force is an amphibious task force and a landing force together 

with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious 

operations. An amphibious task force (ATF) is a Navy task organization formed 

to conduct amphibious operations. The ATF, together with the landing force and 

other forces, constitutes the amphibious force. A landing force (LF) is a Marine 

Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The 

LF, together with the ATF and other forces, constitute the amphibious force. 

There are five types of amphibious operations, each designed to have a specific 

impact on the adversary.

Amphibious Assault

The principal type of amphibious operation. It involves establishing a force on a 

hostile or potentially hostile shore. The assaults on strongly defended islands of 

Tarawa and Iwo Jima during World War II are examples.

Amphibious Raid

An amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or the temporary 

occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. The raid on Makin 

Island by Marine Raiders against the Japanese in 1942 is an example.

Amphibious Demonstration

An amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy 

through a show of force intended to delude the enemy into adopting a course of 

action unfavorable to him. The 2d Marine Division conducted a highly successful 

demonstration off the island of Tinian in 1944, fixing the Japanese defenders in 

place while the actual landing occurred at an unexpected landing site elsewhere 

on the island.
2-8 MCDP 1-0

Amphibious Withdrawal

An amphibious operation involving the extraction of forces by sea in naval ships 

or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. The withdrawal of the 1st 

Marine Division’s Marines, soldiers, and equipment along with 91,000 Korean 

refugees from the port of Hungnam following the retreat from the Chosin 

Reservoir in 1950 is a classic example of an amphibious withdrawal.

Other Amphibious Operations

The capabilities of amphibious forces may be especially suited to conduct other 

types of operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations and foreign 

humanitarian assistance.

Forcible Entry through an Amphibious Assault

To support national interests and achieve national objectives, the United States 

must maintain the capability to gain access to a crisis area by forcible entry. 

United States forces cannot depend solely on the cooperation from contiguous 

countries to allow the introduction of forces within the crisis area. Forcible entry 

through an amphibious assault remains the Marine Corps’ specialty. The 

amphibious assault is often considered the most difficult type of military 

operation due to the necessity to rapidly buildup combat power ashore. The 

unique power projection capabilities of the Marine Corps take advantage of the 

mobility provided by naval strategic lift and the organic logistics and sustainment 

within amphibious forces to provide significant capabilities to the joint force 

commander. Marine Corps amphibious assault forces complement other forcible 

entry forces such as airborne and air assault forces by seizing ports and airfields 

necessary to facilitate the arrival and sustainment of these forces.

Within the five types of amphibious operations, there are a number of tasks that 

the Marine Corps, as part of an amphibious force, can accomplish to facilitate 

naval and joint operations. The following are representative, but not inclusive, of 

tasks that may be performed:

l Attack an enemy operational or tactical center of gravity or critical 

vulnerability.

l Seize a lodgment, to include ports and airfields, for the introduction of followon forces.

l Seize areas for the development of advanced bases.

l Destroy, neutralize or seize enemy advanced bases and support facilities.

l Seize or conduct a preemptive occupation of areas that block free passage by 

opposing forces.
Marine Corps Operations 2-9

l Provide afloat strategic reserve to exploit opportunities and counter threats.

l Provide strategic deception to force the enemy to defend along littoral areas.

l Evacuate United States citizens and selected citizens from the host nation or 

third country nationals whose lives are in danger from a foreign country to a 

designated safe haven.

l Operate with and provide training to allied or coalition amphibious forces.

l Provide a secure environment until other forces arrive on-scene to allow 

humanitarian relief efforts to progress and facilitate the movement of food and 

medical care to relieve suffering and prevent the loss of life.

The adaptability and versatility of Marine Corps forces provide unique 

warfighting capabilities to the joint force commander. Amphibious forces are 

well-suited to accomplish a wide variety of operational missions. Opportunities 

should be sought to—

l Use the MAGTF decisively to seize or obtain the joint force commander’s 

operational objectives.

l Use the full operational reach of the amphibious force, through its organic 

aviation, fires, and surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

l Use the command and control capability on amphibious ships to minimize 

staffs ashore and facilitate force protection.

l Sea-base logistics and selectively offload to minimize footprint ashore and 

facilitate force protection.

Once an amphibious force has executed its mission ashore, the LF can remain 

ashore to support ongoing land operations or may re-embark in amphibious 

shipping to be available for a new mission. Marine Corps forces can provide 

great flexibility to a joint force commander when they are re-embarked aboard 

amphibious shipping and poised to strike the enemy again.

Sequence

Amphibious operations generally follow distinct phases, though the sequence 

may vary.

When amphibious forces are forward-deployed or subsequent tasks are assigned, 

the sequence of phases may differ. Generally, forward-deployed amphibious 

forces use the sequence embarkation, planning, rehearsal (to include potential 

reconfiguration of embarked forces), movement to the operational area, and 

action. However, significant planning is conducted prior to embarkation to 

anticipate the most likely missions and to load assigned shipping accordingly. 
2-10 MCDP 1-0

The five phases of an amphibious operation are always required, but their 

sequence may change as circumstances dictate.

Planning

The planning phase normally denotes the period extending from the issuance of 

an order that directs the operation to take place and ends with the embarkation of 

landing forces. Planning, however, is continuous throughout the operation. 

Although planning does not cease with the termination of this phase, it is useful 

to distinguish between the planning phase and subsequent phases because of the 

change that may occur in the relationship between amphibious force commanders 

when the planning phase ends and the operational phase begins.

Embarkation

The embarkation phase is when the landing forces, with their equipment and 

supplies, embark in assigned shipping. Organization for embarkation needs to 

provide for flexibility to support changes to the original plan. The landing plan 

and scheme of maneuver ashore are based on conditions and enemy capabilities 

existing in the operational area before embarkation of the landing force. A 

change in conditions of friendly or enemy forces during the movement phase may 

cause changes in either plan with no opportunity for reconfiguration of the 

landing force. The extent to which changes in the landing plan can be 

accomplished may depend on the ability to reconfigure embarked forces.

Rehearsal

Rehearsal may consist of an actual landing or may be conducted as a command post 

exercise. The rehearsal phase is when the prospective operation is rehearsed to—

l Test the adequacy of plans, timing of detailed operations, and combat readiness 

of participating forces.

l Ensure that all echelons are familiar with plans.

l Provide an opportunity to reconfigure embarked forces and equipment.

l Verify communications for commonality, redundancy, security, and reliability.

Movement

The movement phase is when various elements of the amphibious force move 

from points of embarkation or from a forward-deployed position to the 

operational area. This move may be via rehearsal, staging or rendezvous areas. 

The movement phase is completed when the various elements of the amphibious 

force arrive at their assigned positions in the operational area. 
Marine Corps Operations 2-11

Action

The decisive action phase is the period from the arrival of the amphibious force 

in the operational area through the accomplishment of the mission to the 

termination of the amphibious operation. While planning occurs throughout the 

entire operation, it is normally dominant prior to embarkation. Successive phases 

bear the title of the dominant activity taking place within the phase.

MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING FORCE

The MPF is an integral part of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary capability. Rapid 

response to regional contingencies is its primary role. An MPF consists of the 

MPS squadron (MPSRON), Navy support element, and MAGTF fly-in echelon. 

Together they provide the joint force commander with a proven, flexible force 

that can quickly respond to a full range of missions from combat to humanitarian 

relief. Fundamental to the MPF is its interoperability with joint forces and its 

rapid introduction of combat forces into austere environments.

Comprised of specially designed ships, organized into three squadrons, 

MPSRONs carry equipment and supplies for 30 days of combat operations by a 

Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) of approximately 16,000 Marines and 

Sailors. When deployed together, these squadrons provide equipment and 

supplies to support a MEF. These squadrons are forward-deployed to ensure 

rapid closure to the crisis area within a 5–14 day sailing period. See figure 2-1.

MAGTF and Navy support element personnel are airlifted to a previously seized 

lodgment, a benign or host nation port and airfield or to an intermediate support 

Figure 2-1. Current Location of Maritime

Pre-positioning Ships Squadrons.
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base where they link up with equipment and supplies offloaded from the 

MPSRON. If a port is not available, the squadron may be offloaded in-stream. A 

unique characteristic of the MPF is that the embarked equipment is maintained 

aboard ship and is combat-ready immediately upon offload. The entire squadron 

or selected capability sets from designated ships can be offloaded to support a 

wide range of MAGTF missions.

Movement of Marine forces and their combat essential equipment must be fully 

integrated with ongoing tactical operations ashore. The MPF, consisting of the 

MPS and the fly-in echelon of Navy and Marine forces, can then integrate with 

the MAGTF commander’s scheme of maneuver while delivering combat service 

support and force sustainment, enabling a rapid force buildup or providing 

support and sustainment for a prolonged period from offshore. MPFs can tailor 

support packages to accommodate a variety of missions to include MOOTW of 

varying scope and complexity.

SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

The Marine Corps also has the capability to operate independent of the sea to 

support sustained land operations ashore with the Army or coalition partners. The 

Marine Corps conducts sustained operations ashore to provide the joint force 

commander four options when fighting a land operation.

Enabling Force

The enabling force sets the stage for follow-on operations by other joint force 

components. The amphibious landing and subsequent operations ashore against 

the Japanese on Guadalcanal in 1942 set the stage for the arrival of Army forces 

to complete the seizure of the island in 1943. These enabling actions are not 

limited to the opening phases of the campaign such as establishing a lodgment, 

but may be conducted to divert attention away from the main effort. An example 

of this would be the role of I MEF in Operation Desert Storm (1991) in fixing the 

Iraqi forces in Kuwait while allowing Central Command’s main effort, U.S. 

Army VII Corps, to maneuver to envelop the enemy.

Decisive Force

The decisive force exploits its advanced command and control system to identify 

gaps necessary to conduct decisive operations and reduce enemy centers of 

gravity. Decisive actions run the gamut from destruction of enemy military units 

to interdiction of critical lines of communications to the evacuation of American 

and third country nationals from untenable urban areas. An example of such a 
Marine Corps Operations 2-13

decisive action is the landing at Inchon in 1950 that severed the North Korean 

lines of communications and forced their withdrawal from South Korea.

Exploitation Force

The exploitation force takes advantage of opportunities created by the activity of 

other joint force components. The joint force commander may exploit these 

opportunities through rapid and focused sea-based operations by the MAGTF that 

capitalize on the results of ongoing engagements to achieve decisive results. The 

24th MEU served in this role during operations to seize Grenada and safeguard 

American citizens in 1983. While Army forces fixed the Cuban and Grenadian 

forces at one end of the island, the Marines landed at will and maneuvered freely 

around the island, accomplishing the joint force commander’s objectives.

Sustaining Force

The sustaining force maintains a presence ashore over an extended period of time 

to support continued operations by the joint force commander within the joint 

AO. Also includes providing logistical sustainment to joint and coalition forces 

until theater level sustainment is established. I MEF fulfilled this role in the early 

days of Operation Desert Shield (1990) in Saudi Arabia and Operation Restore 

Hope (1992–1993) in Somalia by providing sustainment to joint and Army forces 

until arrangements for theater support were complete.

EMERGING CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGIES

Concepts enable decisionmakers the ability to identify capabilities and changes 

to doctrine, organization, training, and education to create a force for the future. 

Future operational concepts are general descriptions of how military forces 

intend to fight in the future. Services and the joint community have relied 

increasingly on operational concepts as the “engines” for their combat 

development processes. These concepts also furnish the intellectual basis for 

experimentation and force development. 

Increasing technological advancements will expedite the creation of capabilities 

articulated in emerging concepts. Technologically advanced systems will enhance 

the United States military forces’ ability to exploit critical vulnerabilities and 

rapidly defeat centers of gravity. These centers of gravity will be located and 

identified using modern sensors and sophisticated intelligence collection and 

analysis. Some of the advanced systems that will provide the enhanced capability 

to conduct operations are advanced sensors and information systems; tilt rotor 

aircraft; vertical and short take-off aircraft; air-cushion vehicles and other hovercraft; high-speed shallow-draft ships; and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle. 
2-14 MCDP 1-0

EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE

Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps capstone concept. It 

prepares the Marine Corps as a “total force in readiness” to meet the challenges 

and opportunities of a rapidly changing world. Expeditionary maneuver warfare 

focuses our core competencies, evolving capabilities, and innovative concepts to 

ensure that the Marine Corps provides the joint force commander with forces 

optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, and warfighting. 

Expeditionary maneuver warfare serves as the basis for influencing the Joint 

Concept Development and Experimentation Process and the Marine Corps 

Expeditionary Force Development System. It further refines the broad “axis of 

advance” identified in Marine Corps Strategy 21 for future capability 

enhancements. In doing so, expeditionary maneuver warfare focuses on—

l Joint/multinational enabling. Marine forces are ready to serve as the lead 

elements of a joint force, act as joint enablers and/or serve as joint task force or 

functional component commanders (JFLCC, JFACC or JFMCC).

l Strategic agility (rapidly and fluidly transitioning from pre-crisis state to full 

operational capability in a distant theater [requires uniformly ready forces, 

sustainable and easily reorganized for multiple missions or functions]). They 

must be agile, lethal, swift in deployment, and always prepared to move 

directly to the scene of an emergency or conflict. 

l Operational reach (projecting and sustaining relevant and effective power 

across the depth of the battlespace).

l Tactical flexibility (operating with tempo and speed and bringing multi-role 

flexibility [air, land, and sea] to the joint team).

l Support and sustainment (providing focused logistics to enable power 

projection independent of host-nation support and against distance objectives 

across the breadth and depth of a theater of operations). 

These capabilities enhance the joint force’s ability to reassure and encourage our 

friends and allies while we deter, mitigate or resolve crises through speed, stealth, 

and precision. 

Expeditionary maneuver warfare focuses our warfighting concepts toward 

realizing the Marine Corps Strategy 21 vision of future Marine forces with 

enhanced expeditionary power projection capabilities. It links Marine Corps 

concepts and vision for integration with emerging joint concepts. As our capstone 

concept, expeditionary maneuver warfare will guide the process of change to 

ensure that Marine forces remain ready, relevant, and fully capable of supporting 

future joint operations. 
Marine Corps Operations 2-15

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

OMFTS applies across the range of military operations, from major theater war 

to smaller-scale contingencies. OMFTS applies maneuver warfare to 

expeditionary power projection in naval operations as part of a joint or 

multinational campaign. OMFTS allows the force to exploit the sea as maneuver 

space while applying combat power ashore to achieve the operational objectives. 

It reflects the Marine Corps’ expeditionary maneuver warfare concept in the 

context of amphibious operations from a sea base, as it enables the force to—

l Shatter the enemy’s cohesion.

l Pose menacing dilemmas.

l Apply disruptive firepower.

l Establish superior tempo.

l Focus efforts to maximize effect.

l Exploit opportunity.

l Strike unexpectedly.

The force focuses on an operational objective, using the sea as maneuver space 

to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against enemy critical 

vulnerabilities. OMFTS provides increased operational flexibility through 

enhanced capabilities for sea-based logistics, fires, and command and control. 

Sea-basing facilitates maneuver warfare by eliminating the requirement for an 

operational pause as the LF builds combat power ashore and by freeing the 

MAGTF from the constraints of a traditional beachhead. OMFTS is based on 

six principles:

l Focus on the Operational Objective. The operation must be viewed as a 

continuous event from the port of embarkation to the operational objective 

ashore. Everything the force does must be focused on achieving the objective 

of the operation and accomplishing of the mission. Intermediate objectives or 

establishing lodgments ashore assume less importance in OMFTS as the force 

is centered on decisive maneuver to seize the force objective.

l Use the Sea as Maneuver Space. Naval forces use the sea to their advantage, 

using the sea as an avenue of approach and as a barrier to the threat’s 

movement. This allows the force to strike unexpectedly anywhere in the 

littorals and to use deception to mislead the enemy as to actual point of attack.

l Generate Overwhelming Tempo and Momentum. The objective of 

maneuver warfare is to create a tempo greater than that of the enemy. The 

tempo generated through maneuver from the sea provides the commander 

freedom of action while limiting the enemy’s freedom of action.
2-16 MCDP 1-0

l Pit Friendly Strength Against Enemy Weakness. The commander identifies 

and attacks critical vulnerabilities where the enemy is weak, rather than 

attacking his center of gravity when it is strong.

l Emphasize Intelligence, Deception, and Flexibility. Deception enhances 

force protection while reconnaissance and intelligence are essential in 

identifying fleeting opportunities.

l Integrate all Organic, Joint, and Multinational Assets. To realize the 

maximum effectiveness the commander must ensure the coordinated use of all 

available forces and capabilities..

When operating as part of a naval expeditionary force, MEFs will normally focus 

on conducting operations using OMFTS. The Marine commander, in concert with 

his Navy counterpart and higher-level direction, will orchestrate the employment 

of amphibious forces, MPFs, and Marine forces operating from land bases to 

shape events and create favorable conditions for future combat actions. The 

amphibious forces will normally execute tactical-level maneuver from the sea to 

achieve decisive action in battle. For the action to be decisive, the battle must 

lead to the achievement of the operational objectives.

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver

STOM is the tactical implementation of OMFTS by the MAGTF to achieve the 

joint force commander’s operational objectives. It is the application of maneuver 

warfare to amphibious operations at the tactical level of war. STOM treats the sea 

as maneuver space, using the sea as both a protective barrier and an unrestricted 

avenue of approach. While the aim of ship-to-shore movement was to secure a 

beachhead, STOM thrusts Marine Corps forces ashore at multiple points to 

concentrate at the decisive place and time in sufficient strength to enable success. 

This creates multiple dilemmas too numerous for the enemy commander to 

respond to, disrupting his cohesiveness and diminishing his will or capacity to 

resist. This concept focuses the force on the operational objective, providing 

increased flexibility to strike the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. Sea-basing of 

some of the fire support and much of the logistics support reduces the footprint of 

forces ashore while maintaining the tempo of operations. Emerging command 

and control capabilities will allow commanders to control the maneuver of their 

OMFTS should not be viewed as a revolutionary new way of conducting amphibious and MPF 

operations. The brilliant amphibious operation at Inchon in 1950 is a classic example of 

OMFTS. It is an evolutionary way of using expeditionary forces assisted by greatly increased 

enhancements to current capabilities such as sea-basing. These enhancements will be in the 

form of new doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and technology.
Marine Corps Operations 2-17

units the moment they cross the line of departure at sea, to include changing the 

axis of advance or points where they cross the beach during the assault.

In STOM, rather than an amphibious assault to establish a force on a hostile or 

potentially hostile shore, an amphibious attack may occur. An amphibious attack 

may be defined as an attack launched from the sea by amphibious forces directly 

against an enemy operational or tactical center of gravity or critical vulnerability. 

See figure 2-2.

Maritime Pre-positioning Force Future

MPF Future is the concept that next-generation MPFs will contribute to forward 

presence and power projection capabilities, which will remain central to United 

States deterrence and conflict resolution strategies well into the future. 

Enhancements envisioned in MPF Future will expand the use of the future MPF 

across an increased range of contingencies. The concept is best illustrated 

through the pillars of future MPF operations:

l Force Closure—provides for at-sea arrival and assembly of forces.

l Amphibious Force Integration—using selective offload capabilities to 

reinforce the assault echelon of an amphibious force.

Figure 2-2. Operational Objectives.
2-18 MCDP 1-0

l Indefinite Sustainment—by serving as a sea-based conduit for 

logistic support.

l Reconstitution and Redeployment—without a requirement for extensive 

material maintenance or replenishment at a strategic sustainment base.

Expeditionary Bases and Sites

Future contingencies will compel an ever-increasing reliance on expeditionary 

bases and sites, especially sea-basing, to support and sustain expeditionary 

maneuver warfare. Expeditionary bases and sites are locations in and out of the 

AO that can support the deployment, employment, and sustainment of 

expeditionary forces. They might include—

l Intermediate staging bases outside of the AO.

l Sites located within friendly contiguous nations or the host nation.

l Expeditionary airfields and forward operating bases established within the AO 

by the expeditionary forces.

l Existing facilities within the AO seized from the enemy.

l United States military bases overseas or in CONUS located near the AO.

l Amphibious shipping.

l MPS squadrons.

Marine Corps forces can quickly establish these temporary and often austere 

expeditionary bases and sites providing the ability to project, support, and sustain 

forces. Amphibious shipping or the MPS allows Marine Corps forces to operate 

from a mobile sea base far from the enemy's shore. Sea-basing allows the Marine 

Corps to bring ashore only those forces and assets essential to the mission. This 

provides the joint force commander with increased operational freedom, 

precluding the need to establish, man, and protect extensive shore-based 

facilities. The ability to conduct logistics and sustainment activities from the sea 

base, existing infrastructure ashore, or any combination will reduce the footprint 

ashore, thereby minimizing the threat to deployed forces.
CHAPTER 3

Marine Corps Forces

“I have just returned from visiting the Marines at the front, and there is not a finer fighting organization in 

the world.”

—General Douglas MacArthur, USA

The Marine Corps organizes its operational forces as Marine Corps components 

and as MAGTFs to provide task-organized, self-sustaining, multipurpose forces 

to the joint force or naval expeditionary force. These uniquely organized Marine 

Corps forces can respond to a wide range of operational and tactical missions and 

tasks, providing the National Command Authorities with an unmatched 

combination of deployment and employment options.

MARINE CORPS COMPONENT

The Marine Corps will normally conduct operations as part of a joint force. 

While the overwhelming majority of operations that Marine Corps forces will 

be involved with will be joint, there may be instances where Marine Corps 

forces may conduct single-Service operations. A combatant commander can 

establish command structure and conduct operations using a single-Service 

Contents

Marine Corps Component. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Role and Responsibilities to the Commandant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Role and Responsibilities to a Combatant Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Role and Responsibilities to the Joint Force Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Joint Operations Conducted Through Service Component Commanders . . . . . . . . 3-5

Joint Operations Conducted Through Functional Component Commanders. . . . . . 3-5

The Marine Corps Component Commander as a

Functional Component Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Role and Responsibilities to the MAGTF Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Component Command Relationships and Staff Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12

Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16

Marine Logistics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20
3-2 MCDP 1-0

force. See JP 0-2 and JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, for more 

information. Joint forces are constituted with subordinate organizations known 

as components. Per JP 0-2, the Service forces that comprise the joint force 

operate as components. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination 

of Service and functional components. Regardless of how a joint force 

commander organizes his forces, if Marine Corps forces are assigned, there is a 

Marine Corps component. There are two levels of Marine Corps components: a 

Marine Corps component under a unified command and a Marine Corps 

component under a subordinate unified command or a joint task force. The 

Marine Corps component commander deals directly with the joint force 

commander in matters affecting Marine Corps forces. See figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Chains of Command and Command Relationships.
Marine Corps Operations 3-3

The Marine Corps component commander commands, trains, equips, and sustains 

Marine Corps forces. He sets the conditions for their success in the battlespace. He 

translates the joint force commander’s intent into Marine Corps forces’ actions.

Role and Responsibilities to the Commandant

The Marine Corps component commander is responsible for and accountable to 

the Commandant for the internal discipline, training, and administration of his 

forces. His responsibilities specifically include—

l Internal discipline and administration.

l Training in Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

l Logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by 

higher authority.

l Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities according to 

current laws, policies, and directives.

While the Marine Corps component commander responds to the joint force 

commander in the operational chain of command, his component is equipped, 

manned, and supported by the Commandant through the Service chain of 

command. The Commandant’s relationship with the Marine Corps component 

commander is through the Service chain—not the operational chain. Unless 

otherwise directed by the combatant commander, the Marine Corps component 

commander will communicate through the combatant command on those matters 

that the combatant commander exercises COCOM or directive authority. On 

Service-specific matters—personnel, administration, and unit training—the 

Marine Corps component commander will normally communicate directly with 

the Commandant, informing the combatant commander as the combatant 

commander directs.

A combatant command-level Marine Corps component is generally required for 

a major theater war. A subordinate joint command-level Marine Corps 

component is normally appropriate for a smaller-scale contingency and 

MOOTW. MOOTW may occur simultaneously with a major theater war or a 

smaller-scale contingency.

Role and Responsibilities to a Combatant Commander

There are five combatant command-level Marine Corps components-Marine 

Corps Forces, Atlantic (MARFORLANT), Marine Corps Forces, Pacific 

(MARFORPAC), Marine Corps Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR), 
3-4 MCDP 1-0

MARFORSOUTH, and Marine Corps Forces, United States Central Command 

(MARFORCENT). Only MARFORLANT and MARFORPAC have assigned 

forces. COMMARFORLANT is the combatant command-level Marine Corps 

component commander for the USCINCJFCOM and is assigned as the 

combatant command-level Marine Corps component commander to both 

USCINCEUR, and USCINCSO. COMMARFORPAC is the combatant 

command-level Marine Corps component commander for USCINCPAC, and is 

designated as the combatant command-level Marine Corps component 

commander to the USCINCCENT. COMMARFORPAC is also designated as 

COMUSMARFOR-K to the Commander United States Forces Korea, a 

subordinate unified commander. See Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 

(MCDP) 1-0.1, Componency, for more information.

Role and Responsibilities to the Joint Force Commander

The joint force commander conducts campaigns through a series of related 

operations. He conducts his campaigns by assigning component commanders 

missions that accomplish strategic and operational objectives. The orientation 

of the Marine Corps component commander is normally at the operational level 

of war, while the MAGTF commander is normally at the tactical level. See 

figure 3-2. Naturally, there is some overlap. The Marine Corps component 

commander is normally responsible to set the conditions for Marine Corps 

tactical operations. These operations include military actions executed by the 

MAGTF, other assigned or attached Marine Corps forces, and assigned or 

attached forces from other Services and nations.

A joint force commander organizes his forces to accomplish the assigned 

mission based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and 

support available, and time available (METT-T), and the concept of operations. 

Figure 3-2. Commander’s Level of War Orientation.
Marine Corps Operations 3-5

The organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and 

decentralized execution. The joint force commander establishes subordinate 

commands, assigns responsibilities, and establishes appropriate command and 

support relationships. He should allow Service tactical and operational assets to 

function generally as they were designed, trained, and equipped. The intent is to 

meet the needs of the joint force while maintaining the tactical and operational 

integrity of the Service organizations. He can organize and conduct operations 

through Service component commanders, functional component commanders or 

a combination of the two.

Joint Operations Conducted

Through Service Component Commanders

A joint force commander may conduct operations through the Service component 

commanders. Conducting operations through Service components has certain 

advantages, including clear and uncomplicated command lines. This relationship 

is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, 

and scope of operations dictate preserving the organizational integrity of Service 

forces. These conditions apply when most of the required functions in a particular 

dimension are unique to a single-Service force or when Service force capabilities 

or responsibilities do not significantly overlap. In addition, Service component 

commands provide administrative and logistic support for their forces in a 

joint operation.

When the joint force commander conducts joint operations through Service 

component commanders, the Marine Corps component commander and the other 

Service component commanders have command—OPCON and ADCON—of 

their assigned Service forces. The joint force commander may also establish a 

support relationship between Service components to facilitate operations. Support 

is a command authority. A superior commander establishes a support relationship 

between subordinate commanders when one should aid, protect, complement or 

sustain the other. The four categories of support are general, mutual, direct, and 

close. See MCDP 1-0.1, Componency.

Joint Operations Conducted

Through Functional Component Commanders

A joint force commander may conduct operations through functional components 

or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. Regardless of how the 

joint force commander organizes his assigned or attached forces, a Marine Corps 

component is included to provide administrative and logistic support for the 

assigned or attached Marine Corps forces. See figure 3-3 on page 3-6. Functional 

components may be established across the range of military operations to 
3-6 MCDP 1-0

perform operational missions that may be of short or extended duration. 

Functional components can be appropriate when forces from two or more 

Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is 

a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Functional 

components are components of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” 

with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force.

When the joint force commander centralizes direction and control of certain 

functions or types of joint operations under functional component commanders 

he must establish the command relationships. The joint force commander must 

designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the 

functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) 

the functional component commander will exercise. For example, a joint force 

special operations component commander normally has OPCON of assigned 

forces and a joint force air component commander is normally delegated TACON 

of air defense, long-range interdiction, or long-range reconnaissance sorties or 

other military capability made available. The policy for the command and control 

of Marine Corps aviation, specifically covered by the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff “Policy for Command and Control of USMC Tactical Air in 

Sustained Operations Ashore,” is found in JP 0-2.

The Marine Corps component commander retains command—OPCON and 

ADCON—of those Marine Corps forces and capabilities not designated by the 

joint force commander for tasking by functional component commanders. The 

Figure 3-3. Combatant Command Organized by Functional Components.
Marine Corps Operations 3-7

Marine Corps component commander advises functional component 

commanders on the most effective use of Marine Corps forces or capabilities 

made available. Marine Corps forces or capabilities made available by the joint 

force commander respond to the functional component commander for 

operational matters based on the existing command relationship. All Marine 

Corps forces receive administrative and logistic support from the Marine Corps 

component commander. The joint force commander may also establish a support 

relationship between components to facilitate operations. See MCDP 1-0.1 

for more information on the designation and responsibilities of functional 

component commanders.

Designation of a functional component commander must not affect the command 

relationships between Service component commanders and the joint force 

commander. The joint force commander must specifically assign the responsibilities and authority of the functional component commander. He defines the 

responsibilities and authority based on the concept of operations and may alter 

these responsibilities and authority during the course of an operation. Functional 

component commander responsibilities are found in JP 0-2 and JP 3-0, Doctrine 

for Joint Operations.

The Marine Corps Component Commander

as a Functional Component Commander

Forward-deployed naval forces, including Marine Corps forces, are usually the 

first conventional forces to arrive in an austere theater or AO during 

expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps component commander’s inherent 

capability to command and control Marine Corps forces—and attached or 

assigned forces of other Services or nations—allows him to command and 

control a functional component. The Marine Corps component commander can 

serve as a functional component commander in most smaller-scale contingencies 

and MOOTW. If the Marine Corps component commander is assigned functional 

component commander responsibilities, execution is normally accomplished by 

the assigned MAGTF.

As the commander of the force most capable of rapid worldwide deployment, the 

Marine Corps component commander may serve as a functional component 

commander in the initial phase of a major theater war. As the theater matures and 

additional United States forces flow into the theater, the Marine Corps 

component commander’s capability to command and control these joint forces 

diminishes. When the functional component commanders establish their 

headquarters and supporting infrastructure, they begin to assume command and 

control of their assigned forces and capabilities. The transition of functional 

component duties from the Marine Corps component commander continues until 
3-8 MCDP 1-0

the gaining functional component commander demonstrates full operational 

capability. The joint force commander can designate the Marine Corps 

component commander as follows.

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

This commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing joint 

maritime operations. Joint maritime operations are performed with maritime 

capabilities or forces made available by components to support the joint force 

commander’s operation or campaign objectives or to support other components of 

the joint force. The maritime environment includes oceans, littorals, riverine areas, 

and amphibious objective areas, and the coordinated airspace above them as 

defined by the joint force commander. The joint force commander will designate 

the component commander best suited to accomplish the mission as the joint force 

maritime component commander. When maritime operations are focused on littoral 

operations—and Marine Corps forces have the preponderance of the mission or 

capabilities to accomplish the mission—the Marine Corps component commander 

may be designated the joint force maritime component commander.

Joint Force Land Component Commander

This commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing joint land 

operations. Joint land operations are performed with land capabilities or forces 

made available by components to support the joint force commander’s operation or 

campaign objectives or to support other components of the joint force. Marine 

Corps component commanders normally have the preponderance of land forces and 

the necessary command and control capability to direct their activities during 

expeditionary operations in a smaller-scale contingency. In the early stages of a 

major theater war, the Marine Corps component commander may serve as the joint 

force land component commander, but as forces continue to build up in theater, the 

joint force commander will normally designate the Army Service component 

commander as the joint force land component commander.

Joint Force Air Component Commander

This commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing joint air 

operations. Joint air operation are performed with air capabilities or forces made 

available by components to support the joint force commander’s operation or 

campaign objectives or to support other components of the joint force. The 

expeditionary nature of Marine aviation and its associated command and control 

capability allow the Marine Corps component commander to function as the joint 

force air component commander in a smaller-scale contingency. In the early 

stages of a major theater war, the Marine Corps component commander may 

serve as the joint force air component commander, but as forces continue to 
Marine Corps Operations 3-9

buildup in theater, the joint force commander will normally designate another 

component commander as the joint force air component commander.

Most often, the joint force commander conducts operations through a 

combination of Service and functional component commands with operational 

responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps components will have special operations forces (if assigned) organized as a 

functional component. The joint force commander defines the authority and 

responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders. However, 

the Service responsibilities, i.e., administrative and logistic, of the components 

must be given due consideration by the joint force commander.

In addition to functional component responsibilities, a joint force commander can 

assign the Marine Corps component commander other joint responsibilities. The 

joint force commander can designate the Marine Corps component commander as 

the area air defense commander, airspace control authority, joint rear area 

coordinator or to establish the joint search and rescue center.

Role and Responsibilities to the MAGTF Commander

The Marine Corps component commander is responsible for the employment of 

his forces and to support other component commanders as directed by the joint 

force commander. The Marine Corps component commander sets conditions for 

the successful employment of the MAGTF by ensuring that appropriate missions, 

forces, resources, battlespace, and command relationships are assigned or made 

available to the MAGTF. While principally a force provider and sustainer, the 

Marine Corps component commander may be assigned some operational 

responsibilities. He focuses on the formulation and execution of the joint force 

commander’s plans, policies, and requirements. He coordinates strategic and 

operational actions with other component commanders to achieve unity of effort 

for the joint force. He accomplishes any assigned mission by executing Marine 

Corps component operations through the MAGTF and other assigned forces.

During employment, the command relationship between the Marine Corps 

component commander and the MAGTF commander can vary with each phase of 

an operation. The MAGTF commander may have command relationships with 

two types of components: functional and Service. When the MAGTF is OPCON 

or TACON to a functional component commander, the functional component 

commander provides the tasks and purpose for the MAGTF, which in turn drive 

the development of the MAGTF’s course of action and subsequent planning 

efforts. If the joint force is organized on a Service component basis, the Marine 

Corps component commander provides the tasks and purpose for the MAGTF.
3-10 MCDP 1-0

As the Service component commander, the Marine Corps component commander 

represents MAGTF interests at various joint force boards. He will participate on 

joint force boards along with any functional component commander the MAGTF 

may be supporting. Consequently, the MAGTF must keep the Marine Corps 

component commander informed of operational matters to ensure relevant and 

contextual representation at the various joint boards.

Component Command Relationships and Staff Organization

This difference in orientation is the result of the joint force commander’s 

organization of forces and each subordinate commander’s place in the operational 

chain of command and the assigned mission. This placement, in turn, determines 

the people and agencies with whom the Marine Corps component and MAGTF 

commanders must interact.

The Marine Corps component commander—who translates strategic objectives 

into operational objectives—must interact up the chain of command with the 

joint force commander, laterally with other component commanders, and down to 

his MAGTF commander. The MAGTF commander—who translates operational 

objectives into tactical actions—must interact up the chain of command with the 

Marine Corps component commander, laterally with adjacent tactical 

commanders, and down to his subordinate commanders. The Marine Corps 

component commander assigns the MAGTF commander missions that may 

accomplish objectives at both the operational and tactical levels of war when the 

joint force is organized on a Service component basis.

The difference in orientation of the Marine Corps component commander and 

the MAGTF commander also has an important influence on the Marine Corps 

component-MAGTF command relationship and the staff organization adopted 

by the Marine Corps component commander. The Marine Corps componentMAGTF command relationship and staff organization that the Marine Corps 

component commander selects depends on the mission, size, scope, and 

duration of the operation and the size of the assigned force. Three possible 

command relationships and staff organizations are: one commander with one 

staff, one commander with two staffs, and two commanders and two staffs. 

See MCDP 1-0.1.

THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

The Marine Corps task-organizes for operations consistent with its statutory 

tasking to “. . . provide forces of combined arms, including aviation . . .” by 

forming MAGTFs. The MAGTF is a balanced, air-ground combined arms task 
Marine Corps Operations 3-11

organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander, structured to 

accomplish a specific mission. It is the Marine Corps’ principal organization for 

all missions across the range of military operations. It is designed to fight, while 

having the ability to prevent conflicts and control crises. All MAGTFs are taskorganized and vary in size and capability according to the assigned mission, 

threat, and battlespace environment. See figure 3-4, page 3-12. They are 

specifically tailored for rapid deployment by air or sea and ideally suited for a 

forward presence role. A MAGTF provides the naval, joint or multinational 

commander with a readily available force capable of operating as—

l The landing force of an amphibious task organization.

l A land force in sustained operations ashore.

l A land force or the landward portion of a naval force conducting MOOTW 

such as noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief or 

the tactical recovery of an aircraft or aircrew.

l A forward-deployed force providing a strong deterrence in a crisis area.

l A force conducting training with allied forces as part of a theater 

engagement plan.

Capabilities

MAGTFs provide joint force commanders with the capability to—

l Move forces into crisis areas without revealing their exact destinations or 

intentions.

l Provide continuous presence in international waters.

l Provide immediate national response in support of humanitarian and natural 

disaster relief operations.

l Provide credible combat power in a nonprovocative posture, just over the 

horizon of a potential adversary, for rapid employment as the initial response to 

a crisis.

l Support diplomatic processes for peaceful crisis resolution before employing 

immediately responsive combat forces.

l Project measured degrees of combat power ashore, day or night, and under 

adverse weather conditions, if required.

l Introduce additional forces sequentially into a theater of operations.

l Operate independent of established airfields, basing agreements, and 

overflight rights.

l Conduct operations ashore using organic combat service support brought into 

the AO.
3-12 MCDP 1-0

l Enable the introduction of follow-on forces by securing staging areas ashore.

l Operate in rural and urban environments.

l Operate under nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare conditions.

l Withdraw rapidly at the conclusion of operations.

l Participate fully in the joint planning process and successfully integrate 

MAGTF operations with those of the joint force.

Elements

All MAGTFs are expeditionary by design and comprised of four core elements: a 

command element (CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat 

Figure 3-4. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.
Marine Corps Operations 3-13

element (ACE), and a combat service support element (CSSE). See figure 3-5. 

The MAGTF’s combat forces reside within these four elements. Although 

MAGTFs will differ because of mission and forces assigned, a standard 

procedure exists for organization, planning, and operations.

As a modular organization, the MAGTF is tailorable to each mission through task 

organization. This building block approach also makes reorganization a matter of 

routine. In addition to the Marine Corps units, MAGTFs may have attached 

forces from other Services and nations; e.g., naval construction force, multiple 

launch rocket system batteries, and armor brigades.

A key feature of Marine expeditionary organization is expandability. Crisis 

response requires the ability to expand the expeditionary force after its 

introduction in theater without sacrificing the continuity of operational capability. 

The MAGTF’s modular structure lends itself to rapid expansion into a larger 

force as a situation demands by simply adding forces as needed to the core units 

of each existing element. This expandability includes expanding into a joint or 

multinational force because the MAGTF structure parallels the structure of a 

multidimensional joint force. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is an example 

of the expandability of the MAGTF. This contingency began with the 

employment of a MEU (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) to seize the 

port and airport in Mogadishu, enabling the deployment of elements of I MEF via 

air and MPS, with the MEF eventually employing a brigade-sized force to 

provide security and humanitarian relief to the Somalis.

On missions where Marine forces are not deployed as part of a MAGTF (such as 

the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force), Marine security forces, or 

Figure 3-5. MAGTF Organization.
3-14 MCDP 1-0

forces assigned to battle forest fires, the Marine Corps component commander 

plays an increasingly important role in ensuring the Marine forces are properly 

equipped, trained, and employed. Marine forces deployed as a MAGTF are 

normally employed by the joint force commander as a MAGTF. As a taskorganized force, the MAGTF’s size and composition depend on the committed 

mission. If a MAGTF is deprived of a part of its combat forces, accomplishment 

of the mission for which it is tailored is jeopardized. However, on a day-to-day 

basis, the MAGTF may be tasked to conduct operations in support of another 

force and will identify capabilities; e.g., air sorties, beach and port operations, 

and civil affairs, excess to its mission requirements to the joint force commander 

that may be of use to other components of the joint force.

Command Element

The CE is the MAGTF headquarters. As with all other MAGTF elements, it is taskorganized to provide the command and control capabilities necessary for effective 

planning, execution, and assessment of operations across the warfighting functions. 

Additionally, the CE can exercise command and control within a joint force from 

the sea or ashore and act as a core element around which a joint task force 

headquarters may be formed, provide interagency coordination for MOOTW, and 

conduct “reach back.” The six warfighting functions are: command and control, 

intelligence, maneuver, fires, logistics, and force protection.

A CE may include additional command and control and intelligence capabilities 

from national assets and theater, force reconnaissance company assets, signals 

intelligence capabilities from the radio battalion, and a force fires coordination 

center. A CE can employ additional major subordinate commands such as the 

force field artillery headquarters, naval construction regiments, or Army 

maneuver or engineering units.

Ground Combat Element

The GCE is task-organized to conduct ground operations, project combat power, 

and contribute to battlespace dominance in support of the MAGTF’s mission. It 

is formed around an infantry organization reinforced with artillery, 

reconnaissance, assault amphibian, tank, and engineer forces. The GCE can vary 

in size and composition from a rifle platoon to one or more Marine divisions. It is 

the only element that can seize and occupy terrain.

Aviation Combat Element

The ACE is task-organized to conduct air operations, project combat power, and 

contribute to battlespace dominance in support of the MAGTF’s mission by 

performing some or all of the six functions of Marine aviation: antiair warfare, 
Marine Corps Operations 3-15

assault support, electronic warfare, offensive air support, air reconnaissance, and 

control of aircraft and missiles. It is formed around an aviation headquarters with 

air control agencies, aircraft squadrons or groups, and combat service support 

units. It can vary in size and composition from an aviation detachment of 

specifically required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. The ACE may 

be employed from ships or forward expeditionary land bases and can readily 

transition between sea bases and land bases without loss of capability. It has the 

capability of conducting command and control across the battlespace.

Combat Service Support Element

The CSSE is task-organized to provide all functions of tactical logistics necessary 

to support the continued readiness and sustainability of the MAGTF. The six 

functions of tactical logistics are: supply, maintenance, transportation, health 

services, engineering, and other services which include legal, exchange, food, 

disbursing, postal, billeting, religious, mortuary, and morale and recreation 

services. See MCWP 4, Logistics, for a detailed discussion. The CSSE is formed 

around a combat service support headquarters and may vary in size and 

composition from a support detachment to one or more force service support 

groups. The CSSE, operating from sea bases or from expeditionary bases 

established ashore, enables sustainment of forces, thus extending MAGTF’s 

capabilities in time and space. It may be the main effort of the MAGTF during 

humanitarian assistance missions or selected phases of MPF operations.

Supporting Establishment

The supporting establishment is often referred to as the “fifth element of the 

MAGTF.” It is vital to the success of Marine Corps forces conducting 

expeditionary operations. It recruits, trains, equips, and sustains Marines enabling 

them to conduct expeditionary operations in increasingly complex and dangerous 

environments. Bases and stations of the supporting establishment provide the 

training areas, ranges, and the modeling and simulation facilities necessary to 

prepare Marines and their units for combat. These posts of the Corps serve as 

staging and marshalling areas for deploying units and often are the CONUS end of 

a responsive replacement, supply, and new equipment pipeline into the AO. The 

Marines, sailors, and civilians of the supporting establishment are true partners with 

the Marines of the operating forces in accomplishing the mission.

Bases and stations of the supporting establishment also provide facilities and support 

to the families of deployed Marines, allowing Marines to concentrate fully on their 

demanding missions without undue concern for the welfare of their families.
3-16 MCDP 1-0

Types

MAGTFs are integrated combined arms forces structured to accomplish specific 

missions. MAGTFs are generally categorized in the following four types.

Marine Expeditionary Force

The MEF is the Marine Corps’ principal warfighting organization. It can conduct 

and sustain expeditionary operations in any geographic environment. MEFs are 

the sole standing MAGTFs; e.g., they exist in peacetime as well as wartime. Size 

and composition can vary greatly depending on the requirements of the mission. 

A MEF is normally commanded by a lieutenant general. It can be comprised of—

l A standing command element.

l A GCE of one or more divisions.

l An ACE of one or more aircraft wings.

l A CSSE of one or more force service support groups.

A MEF not only deploys and commands its own units, but also units from 

other MEFs, the Marine Corps Forces Reserve, other Services and nations, and 

the Special Operations Command. It typically deploys by echelon with 60 days 

of sustainment, but can extend operations with external support from other 

United States Services or through host-nation support agreements. The MEF 

commander and his staff can form the nucleus for a joint task force or 

functional component headquarters.

A MEF nominally consists of a permanent CE as well as a tailored Marine 

division, Marine aircraft wing, and Marine force service support group. Each 

MEF deploys a MEU(SOC) on a continuous basis to provide forward presence 

and crisis response capabilities to the combatant commanders. There are three 

standing MEFs:

l I MEF, based in southern California and Arizona, assigned to 

CINCUSPACOM.

l II MEF, based in North Carolina and South Carolina, assigned to 

CINCUSJFCOM.

l III MEF, based in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and Hawaii, assigned to 

CINCUSPACOM.
Marine Corps Operations 3-17

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) is the “middle-weight” MAGTF. It is a 

crisis response force capable of forcible entry and enabling the introduction of 

follow-on forces. It can serve as part of a joint or multinational force and can 

provide the nucleus of a joint task force headquarters. It is unique in that it is the 

smallest MAGTF with a fully capable aviation element that performs all six 

functions of Marine aviation and is self-sustaining for 30 days. A MEB is capable 

of rapid deployment and employment deploying either by air, in combination 

with the MPS, or by amphibious shipping.

As a result, the MEB can conduct the full range of combat operations and may 

serve as the lead echelon of the MEF. The MEB is not a standing organization, 

but rather imbedded within the MEF. As a result, MEBs are task-organized for 

specific missions from within the assets of the MEF. The MEB conducts the 

mission or prepares for the subsequent arrival of the rest of the MEF or other 

joint or multinational forces. However, the deployment of a MEB does not 

necessarily mean that all the forces of the MEF will follow. Currently, the 1st, 2d, 

and 3d MEBs have been designated within I, II, and III MEF and are commanded 

by the deputy MEF commanders or other general officers. A MEB notionally 

consists of the following elements:

l A CE that may include additional assets such as command and control, force 

reconnaissance company, signals intelligence capabilities from the radio 

battalion, and engineering capabilities from the naval construction regiments. It 

can also control the forces of other Services and nations in missions ranging 

from combat in an urban area to disaster relief.

l A GCE composed of an infantry regiment reinforced with artillery, 

reconnaissance, engineer, light armored reconnaissance units, assault 

amphibian units, and other attachments as required.

l An ACE composed of a Marine aircraft group comprised of combat assault 

transport helicopter, utility and attack helicopters, vertical/short takeoff and 

landing fixed-wing attack aircraft, air refuelers/transport aircraft, and other 

detachments as required.

l A CSSE task-organized around a brigade service support group. This element 

has engineering, supply, transportation, landing support for beach, port and 

airfield delivery, medical, and maintenance capabilities.

The 4th MEB (AT) provides the unified combatant commanders with a rapidly 

deployable and sustainable specialized antiterrorism force to deter, detect, and 

defend against terrorist actions and conduct initial incident response to combat 

the threat of terrorism worldwide. See page 1-20. 
3-18 MCDP 1-0

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

The MEU(SOC) is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary 

organization. A forward-deployed MEU(SOC) provides an immediate sea-based 

response to meet forward presence and power projection requirements. A 

MEU(SOC) is commanded by a colonel and deploys with 15 days of supplies. It 

is normally comprised of—

l A CE that may include additional assets such as command and control, 

force reconnaissance company, and signals intelligence capabilities from 

the radio battalion.

l A GCE comprised of an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery, 

reconnaissance, engineer, tanks, light armored reconnaissance units, assault 

amphibian units, and other attachments as required.

l An ACE comprised of a combat assault transport helicopter squadron 

reinforced with utility and attack helicopters, vertical/short takeoff and landing 

fixed-wing attack aircraft, air refuelers/transport aircraft, and other 

detachments as required.

l A CSSE task-organized around a MEU service support group. This element 

has engineering, supply, transportation, landing support, medical, and 

maintenance capabilities.

A forward-deployed MEU(SOC) operates continuously in the Mediterranean Sea, 

the western Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean or Arabian Gulf region. 

Embarked aboard a Navy amphibious squadron, the MEU(SOC) provides a 

combatant commander or other operational commander a quick, sea-based 

reaction force for a wide variety of missions such as limited forcible entry 

operations, noncombatant evacuations, raids, or disaster relief. In many cases, the 

MEU embarked on amphibious shipping may be the first United States force at 

the scene of a crisis and can enable the actions of larger follow-on forces. It can 

provide a visible and credible presence in potential trouble spots and can 

demonstrate the United States’ willingness to protect its interests overseas. While 

the MEU(SOC) is not a special operations force per se, it can support special 

operations forces and execute certain maritime special operations missions. These 

include reconnaissance and surveillance; specialized demolitions; tactical 

recovery of aircraft and personnel; seizure/recovery of offshore energy facilities; 

seizure/recovery of selected personnel or material; visit, board, search, and 

seizure of vessels; and in extremis hostage recovery.

Prior to deployment, the MEU(SOC) undergoes an intensive 6-month training 

program focusing on its conventional and selected maritime special operations 

missions. Training culminates with a thorough evaluation and certification as 
Marine Corps Operations 3-19

“special operations capable.” To receive this certification, a MEU must 

demonstrate competence across the entire spectrum of required capabilities, be 

able to plan and execute any assigned mission within 6 hours of notification, and 

conduct multiple missions simultaneously. Inherent capabilities of a MEU(SOC) 

are divided into four broad categories:

l Amphibious operations.

l Direct action operations.

l MOOTW.

l Supporting operations.

The complete list of capabilities subcategories for the MEU(SOC) is found in 

Marine Corps Order 3120.9A, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 

Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]).

Special Purpose MAGTF

A special purpose MAGTF is a nonstanding MAGTF temporarily formed to 

conduct a specific mission for which a MEF or other unit is either inappropriate 

or unavailable. They are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct such a 

mission. Special purpose MAGTFs have been deployed for a wide variety of 

missions such as humanitarian relief and coalition training. Designation of a 

special purpose MAGTF is based on the mission it is assigned (“Special Purpose 

MAGTF Hurricane Relief”), the location in which it will operate (“Special 

Purpose MAGTF Somalia”) or the name of the exercise in which it will 

participate (“Special Purpose MAGTF Unitas”).

A special purpose MAGTF may be of any size—but normally no larger than a 

MEU—with narrowly focused capabilities required to accomplish a particular 

mission. It may be task-organized from nondeployed Marine Corps forces or 

formed on a contingency basis from a deployed MAGTF. Regimental-level 

headquarters often assume the role as a special MAGTF CE and may conduct 

training in anticipated mission skills prior to establishment. A special purpose 

MAGTF may be deployed using commercial shipping or aircraft, strategic airlift, 

amphibious shipping or organic Marine aviation.

An important type of special purpose MAGTF is the air contingency force 

(ACF). An ACF is an on-call, task-organized alert force that is maintained by all 

three MEFs. An ACF can deploy within 18 hours of notification. It can be 

dispatched virtually worldwide to respond to a rapidly developing crisis. The 

ACF is the MEF’s force in readiness. It can deploy independently or in 

conjunction with amphibious forces, MPFs, or other expeditionary forces. 
3-20 MCDP 1-0

Because it can deploy so rapidly, readiness is paramount. Equipment and supplies 

intended for use as part of an ACF are identified and, where appropriate, stored 

and staged for immediate deployment. Personnel continuously focus on their 

tactical readiness. The ACF is airlifted to a secure airfield and carries its own 

initial sustainment.

The ACF is comprised of the same elements as any MAGTF although normally 

an ACF is a MEU-sized force. Due to the need to reduce to an absolute minimum 

the size and weight of an air deployed force, only those personnel and equipment 

needed to perform the function of each MAGTF element are included 

in the ACF.

MARINE LOGISTICS COMMAND

The Marine Corps component commander may establish a Marine Logistics 

Command (MLC) if he determines that the mission requires logistic support 

beyond what the CSSE can provide. The combatant command-level Marine 

Corps component commander may establish an MLC to fulfill his Service 

logistic responsibilities. The MLC is not a standing organization, but is taskorganized to meet the operational support and sustainment requirements of the 

mission and is normally formed around a force service support group from 

another MEF. When formed, it provides logistic support to all Marine Corps 

forces in theater, and may provide limited support to other joint and multinational 

forces as directed by the combatant commander. The MLC provides operational 

logistics to Marine Corps forces as the Marine Corps component’s logistics 

agency in theater. Operational-level logistics includes deployment, sustainment, 

resource prioritization and allocation, and requirements identification activities 

required to sustain the force in a campaign or major operation. These 

fundamental decisions concerning force deployment and sustainment are key for 

the MLC to provide successful logistical support.

The MLC provides the Marine Corps theater support structure necessary to 

facilitate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of 

deploying Marine Corps forces. For more on RSOI, see chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4

Employment of Marine Corps

Forces at the Operational Level

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be 

prepared with the necessary means to counteract it.”

—Napoleon Bonaparte

Marine Corps expeditionary forces, comprised of a Marine Corps component 

command and one or more MAGTFs, are well-suited to perform full spectrum 

operations as part of a joint or multinational force at the operational level of war. 

Contents

Battlespace Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Area of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Area of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Area of Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Boundaries, Maneuver Control Measures, and 

Fire Support Coordinating Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10

Force Deployment Planning and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10

Predeployment Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

Movement to and Activities at the Port of Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15

Movement to the Port of Debarkation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16

Deployment Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16

Employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

Planning Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19

Arranging Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20

Combat Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21

Warfighting Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21

Information Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-22

Redeployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24

Expeditionary Operations in Support of Future Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24
4-2 MCDP 1-0

Uniquely equipped and trained to perform a variety of tactical actions from the 

sea, in the air, and on land, Marine Corps expeditionary forces are often the first 

forces to arrive in a crisis area. They then begin a series of actions to create 

conditions that meet the Nation’s goals and strategic objectives. Marine 

commanders may have operational-level responsibilities that include making onthe-spot decisions that will set the course of the Nation’s role in the crisis. They 

may also be responsible for providing the nucleus of a joint force headquarters. 

Regardless of the size of the forces involved or the scope of the military action, 

if Marine Corps expeditionary forces are operating to achieve a strategic 

objective, then they are being employed by the joint force commander at the 

operational level.

As stated in MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, the principal tool by which the joint force 

commander pursues the conditions that will achieve the strategic goal is the 

campaign. A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at 

accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. 

Normally, there is only one campaign underway within a combatant 

commander’s theater of war or theater of operations. This campaign is almost 

always a joint campaign and is under the command of the combatant commander 

or the commander of a subordinate joint task force. The joint force commander’s 

campaign is normally a series of related operations, some of which may be 

conducted by a single Service, such as the Navy escorting foreign flag tankers 

through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Other campaigns 

may consist of large operations conducted by joint and multinational forces such 

as the Marianas campaign in the Central Pacific in 1944. During this campaign, 

Marine, Navy, and Army forces conducted three major amphibious operations, 

seizing the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam from the Japanese, while the 

Navy turned away the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

The art of campaigning consists of deciding who, when, and where to fight and 

for what purpose. As a campaign is a series of operations or battles whose 

outcome lead to accomplishing the strategic goals, the commander must focus on 

these goals. Tactical and operational decisions must be made with these goals in 

mind. Ideally, operational commanders fight only when and where they want, 

maintaining the initiative and a high tempo of operations. They fight when they 

are stronger than the enemy and avoid battle when they are at a disadvantage. 

This allows them to shape the tactical actions to meet their strategic goals.
Marine Corps Operations 4-3

Campaigns are normally conducted by joint force commanders within a joint or 

combined operational framework. This framework provides for logical divisions 

of the battlespace to facilitate operations and clearly delineate Service 

responsibilities. Campaigning involves—

l Fighting a series of battles to accomplish the joint force

commander’s objectives.

l Defeating the enemy in depth by fighting the single battle.

l Synchronizing operations (not scripting activities but arranging 

activities in space and time.)

l Breaking the enemy apart over time. While destroying the enemy’s 

will to resist in one attack is the ideal, the MAGTF may not have the 

ability to do this. A series of battles may be necessary.

l Knowing when and where to give battle and when to refuse battle.

BATTLESPACE ORGANIZATION

Understanding the joint battlespace at the operational level of war in which 

Marine Corps forces will operate is an important step in setting the conditions for 

their success. Marines must understand the relationship between the AO, area of 

interest, and area of influence. By analyzing his AO in terms of his area of 

influence and area of interest, a Marine commander determines whether his 

assigned AO is appropriate. This analysis may include the forces’ capabilities to 

conduct actions across the warfighting functions.

Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to 

successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and accomplish the mission. 

This includes the air, land, sea, space, and enemy and friendly forces, 

infrastructure, weather, and terrain within the assigned AO and the commander’s 

area of interest. Battlespace is conceptual—a higher commander does not assign 

it. Commanders determine their own battlespace based on their mission, the 

enemy, and their concept of operations and force protection. They use their 

experience and understanding of the situation and mission to visualize and adapt 

their battlespace as the situation or mission changes. The battlespace is not fixed 

in size or position. It varies over time, and depends on the environment, the 

commander’s mission, and friendly and enemy actions. Battlespace is normally 

comprised of an AO, area of influence, and area of interest.

Joint force commanders may define additional operational areas or joint areas to 

assist in the coordination and execution of joint operations. The size of these 

areas and the types of forces used depend on the scope, nature, and projected 
4-4 MCDP 1-0

duration of the operation. Combatant commanders and other joint force 

commanders use the following organization of the battlespace at the operational 

level of war.

Combatant commanders are assigned an area of responsibility in the Unified 

Command Plan. Areas of responsibility are also called theaters where the 

combatant commanders have the authority to plan and conduct operations. 

Within the theater, the combatant commanders may designate theaters of war, 

theaters of operation, combat zones, and a communications zone.

A theater of war is the area of air, land, and sea that is, or may become, directly 

involved in the conduct of the war. It may be defined by either the National 

Command Authorities or the combatant commander and normally does not 

encompass the combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility.

A theater of operations is a subarea within a theater of war defined by the 

combatant commander required to conduct or support specific operations. 

Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be 

geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of 

operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended 

periods of time.

A combat zone is that area required by combat forces for the conduct of 

operations. The communications zone is the rear part of the theater of war or 

theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) that contains 

lines of communications, establishments for supply or evacuation, and other 

agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. 

The Marine Corps component commander will normally focus his efforts to 

deploy, support, and sustain his forces, particularly the MAGTF, in the 

communications zone. He will normally locate his headquarters close to the joint 

force commander, who usually establishes his headquarters in the 

communications zone.

Area of Operations

An AO is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and 

naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the 

joint force commander, but should be large enough for the Marine Corps 

component commander and his subordinate units to accomplish their missions 

and protect their forces. The AO is the tangible area of battlespace and is the only 

area of battlespace that a commander is directly responsible for. AOs should also 

be large enough to allow commanders to employ their organic, assigned, and 

supporting systems to the limits of their capabilities. The commander must be 
Marine Corps Operations 4-5

able to command and control all the forces within his AO. He must be able to see 

the entire AO—this includes coverage of the AO with the full range of 

collections assets and sensors available to the Marine Corps component 

command and MAGTF, to include reconnaissance, electronic warfare aircraft, 

unmanned aerial vehicles, remote sensors, and radars. He must be able to control 

the events and coordinate his subordinates’ actions. Finally, the commander must 

be able to strike and maneuver throughout the AO.

Marine Corps component commanders may assign AOs to their subordinates. 

These commanders typically subdivide some or all of their assigned AO to their 

subordinates. As operations unfold the Marine Corps component commander 

may adjust or reposition the MAGTF’s AO and assume responsibility for what 

was the MAGTF’s rear area. This allows the MAGTF to maintain momentum 

and have appropriate battlespace to continue the mission and protect the force.

The commander will use control measures to describe the AO, using the 

minimum necessary control measure to assign responsibility, promote unity of 

effort, and accomplish the unit’s mission. Commanders should not assign areas of 

operations that are significantly greater than the unit’s area of influence. A 

subordinate commander who is unable to directly influence his entire AO may 

have to request additional forces or assets that will allow him to extend his 

operational reach. Failing that he may have to—

l Request a change in mission or tasks.

l Request a reduction in the size of his AO.

l Revise his concept of operations by phasing operations in such a way that he 

only needs to directly influence portions of his AO.

The commander can choose to organize his AO so that his subordinates have 

contiguous or noncontiguous AOs. A contiguous AO is one where all subordinate 

commands’ AOs share one or more common boundary while a noncontiguous 

AO is one where one or more subordinate AOs do not share a common boundary. 

Commands with contiguous AOs are normally within supporting distance of one 

another. The commander establishes contiguous AOs when—

l The AO is of limited size to accommodate the force.

l Political boundaries or enemy dispositions require concentration of force.

l There is a risk of being defeated in detail by enemy forces or the enemy 

situation is not clear.

l Key terrain is in close proximity to each other.
4-6 MCDP 1-0

l Concentration of combat power along a single avenue of advance or movement 

corridor is required.

A noncontiguous AO is normally characterized by a 360-degree boundary. 

Because units with noncontiguous AOs must provide all-around security, they 

generally allow for less concentration of combat power along a single axis. There 

is additional risk associated with noncontiguous AOs in that units with 

noncontiguous AOs are normally out of supporting range of each other. The 

commander establishes noncontiguous AOs when—

l Limited friendly forces must occupy or control widely separated key terrain.

l Relative weakness of the enemy does not require that subordinate units remain 

within supporting range of each other.

l Dispersal of the enemy throughout the AO requires a corresponding dispersal 

of friendly units.

Operations against the enemy outside of noncontiguous subordinate commands’ 

AOs are the responsibility of the common higher commander.

A joint operations area is determined and assigned by a combatant commander or 

a subordinate unified commander. It is the area of land, sea, and airspace in 

which a joint force commander (normally the commander of a joint task force) 

conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. In amphibious 

operations, the joint force commander may designate an amphibious objective 

area or an AO that contains the amphibious task force objectives.

Area of Influence

The area of influence is that geographical area wherein a commander is directly 

capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally 

under the commander’s command or control. It is that portion of the battlespace 

that the commander can affect through the maneuver, fires, and other actions of 

his force. Its size is normally based on the limits of organic systems (fire support, 

aviation, mobility, and reconnaissance capabilities) and operational requirements 

identified within each of the warfighting functions. The area of influence 

normally reflects the extent of the force’s operational reach. MAGTFs have 

significant areas of influence, employing Marine fixed-wing aviation, to extend 

the operational reach of Marine forces.

The commander considers his mission, forces, inherent warfighting functions 

requirements, and the AO to determine his area of influence. The area of 

influence is useful to the commander as a tool in assigning subordinate areas of 
Marine Corps Operations 4-7

operations and in focusing intelligence collection and information operations to 

shape the battlespace to facilitate future operations. Today’s area of influence 

may be tomorrow’s AO.

Area of Interest

The area of interest contains friendly and enemy forces, capabilities, 

infrastructure, and terrain that concern the commander. This area includes the 

area of influence and those areas that contain current or planned objectives or 

enemy forces that are capable of endangering mission accomplishment. The size 

of the area of interest normally exceeds the commander’s operational reach.

While the area of interest includes the AO and area of influence, the area of 

interest may stretch far beyond the other parts of his battlespace. In analyzing the 

battlespace to determine his area of interest, the commander may pose the 

questions, “Where is the enemy and where are his friends?” and then “Where am 

I, and where are my friends?” The answers to these questions help identify the 

size, location, and activities that constitute the commander’s area of interest. He 

may also consider critical information requirements such as critical terrain and 

infrastructure features and the ability of his intelligence and information assets to 

collect on these features when determining this area. The commander may 

request joint theater or national assets to help him understand the battlespace and 

collect intelligence throughout his area of interest.

Another key point to remember is that the area of interest may be noncontiguous. 

See figure 4-1 on page 4-8. For example, a forward-deployed MEF may have an 

area of interest back in the CONUS while the time-phased force and deployment 

list is being executed. It may also have areas of interest around airbases in other 

countries neighboring the MEF’s AO. Using noncontiguous areas of interest 

conserves time and scarce collection assets. Assets will be allocated and time will 

be invested to provide the information required. Identifying noncontiguous points 

vice large generic areas is a technique that can conserve these valuable resources.

Boundaries, Maneuver Control Measures,

and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

Joint force commanders and other commanders at the operational level of war 

often use boundaries, maneuver control measures, and fire support coordinating 

measures to control and coordinate the operations of their forces in the 

battlespace. These measures are usually employed to delineate areas of 

operation or other areas where components or subordinate commands will 

conduct their operations or to coordinate maneuver or fires between adjacent 

units. Each of these measures has specific and discrete purposes. Their use 
4-8 MCDP 1-0

normally results in the units affected by them having to do something or refrain 

from doing something. Therefore, it is critical that Marine commanders use 

these measures as they were designed and that any modifications to the 

doctrinally based measure be clearly articulated to all affected higher, adjacent, 

and subordinate units.

The most commonly used of these measures is the boundary. A boundary is a line 

that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and 

deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations or areas. They are 

used to define the forward, flank, and rear limits of an AO and when possible 

should be drawn along identifiable terrain to aid in recognition. See figure 4-2.

An axis and limit of advance are used at the operational and tactical levels of war. 

An axis of advance is a line of advance assigned for the purpose of control; often 

a road, network of roads, mobility corridor, or a designated series of locations, 

extending in the direction of the enemy. It provides subordinate commanders 

with a graphic representation of the commander’s intent for their scheme of 

maneuver. Subordinate commanders are guided by it but may deviate from it 

when the situation dictates. A limit of advance is an easily recognizable terrain 

feature beyond which attacking elements will not advance. It is assigned by the 

commander to subordinate maneuver commanders to control their actions and 

form a limit of their advance.

Figure 4-1. Noncontiguous Areas of Interest.
Marine Corps Operations 4-9

One of the most important and frequently misused fire support coordinating 

measures at the operational level is the fire support coordination line (FSCL). A 

FSCL is a permissive fire support coordinating measure used to facilitate timely 

attack of the enemy by air and surface-based fires. Supporting elements may 

engage targets beyond the FSCL without prior coordination with the establishing 

commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on or to the rear 

of the FSCL or on forces operating beyond the FSCL. It is established and 

adjusted by the appropriate ground or amphibious force commander in 

consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and other affected 

commanders. The FSCL is not a boundary between aviation and ground forces 

and should not be used to delineate a de facto AO for aviation forces. It is located 

within the establishing commander’s AO. Synchronization of operations on either 

Figure 4-2. Unit Boundaries.
4-10 MCDP 1-0

side of the FSCL out to the forward boundary of the establishing unit is the 

responsibility of the establishing commander. When possible the FSCL should be 

drawn along readily identifiable terrain to aid in recognition.

DEPLOYMENT

Deployment is the relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. 

The task-organized MAGTF is a flexible force designed to quickly and 

efficiently transition from peacetime to wartime and is designed for rapid 

deployment. MAGTFs are deployed as one of three basic types of forces; 

amphibious, MPF, and ACF. The MAGTF deploys by a variety of means—

amphibious ships, strategic sealift, strategic airlift, and self-deploying aircraft. 

Deployment includes a range of activities from preparing to deploy, to transit, to 

arrival, right up to the beginning of employment. Deployment readiness is 

critical. Deployment planning is accomplished simultaneous to, and in 

conjunction with, employment planning. This planning entails all activities 

necessary to organize, train, educate, and equip forces for deployment.

Force Deployment Planning and Execution

The key to successful deployment is planning. While planning takes many forms, 

the Marine Corps engages in two basic categories of planning—force planning 

and operation planning. Both of these categories of planning impact on 

deployment. Force planning involves the activities necessary to recruit, train, 

educate, organize, equip, and provide forces. Operation planning involves the 

activities necessary to develop concepts, objectives, and tasks at all three levels 

of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. The Marine Corps integrates aspects 

of both categories of planning to ensure forces are prepared to deploy for 

immediate employment in a crisis. This integration is referred to as force 

deployment planning and execution. Proper force deployment planning and 

execution enables rapid deployment and responsive employment of forces.

Force deployment planning and execution includes the development of 

operational deployment procedures and the execution of those procedures. It is 

conducted with deliberate or crisis action planning in support of combatant 

commander requirements. Command elements at all echelons of the Marine 

Corps have an important part to play in force deployment planning and 

execution. The Marine Corps component commander and the MAGTF 

commander play critical roles.
Marine Corps Operations 4-11

The Marine Corps component commander is responsible for the development of 

supporting plans and time-phased force and deployment data, and exercises overall 

responsibility for the force deployment planning and execution for all Marine 

Corps forces assigned to a combatant commander. Normally, a subordinate joint 

command-level Marine Corps component commander focuses on those roles and 

responsibilities surrounding the employment and, to a lesser degree, redeployment 

of Marine Corps forces within the joint force. He has the same responsibilities as a 

combatant command-level Marine Corps component commander, but is primarily 

focused on crisis action planning. The combatant command-level Marine Corps 

component commander supports the subordinate joint command-level Marine 

component commander in executing his responsibilities.

The combatant command-level Marine Corps component staff works with the 

combatant commander’s staff to prepare the operation plans and campaign plans 

for a theater. The component is the principal interface with the combatant 

commander for the development of required supporting plans to the operation 

plans. The component will task the MAGTF to accomplish detailed requirements 

determination; e.g., personnel, vehicles, sustainment, supplies required and 

associated shortfalls so the plan can be completed. The component commander is 

responsible for supporting those requirements. During deliberate planning, the 

MAGTF commander can direct the preparation of a supporting plan or operation 

orders. During the deliberate planning cycle, the Marine Corps component 

commander may prepare plans and operation orders to support the combatant 

commander’s major theater war operation plans.

During deliberate planning, the Marine Corps component commander uses the 

MAGTF concept of operations as the focal point for his sustainment, support, and 

deployment planning. The component commander is ultimately responsible to the 

combatant commander for the deployment and subsequent employment of 

Marine Corps forces. He is assisted by the supporting establishment and other 

Marine Corps and external organizations; e.g., Marine Corps bases or Air Force 

airfield control units. Based on requirements identified to support the deployment 

and employment of the MAGTF, the component commander has the authority to 

enter into cross service and interservice support agreements, to submit for hostnation support, and to commit to contracts with civilian support agencies to 

support Marine Corps forces deployment.

The Marine Corps component commander determines the Marine Corps forces to 

be used in support of the combatant commander’s requirements and advises him 

on the proper employment of the force. The component commander will publish 

joint operation planning and execution system planning guidance and a timephased force and deployment data letter of instruction to aid the MAGTF in plans 
4-12 MCDP 1-0

development. The component commander reviews the concepts of deployment 

and employment developed by the MAGTF commander and consolidates the 

time-phased force and deployment data inputs with those the component staff 

developed in support of the MAGTF. He then ensures the information is 

integrated into the combatant commander’s operation plan and entered into the 

strategic deployment system. Planning considerations include the commander’s 

intent for deployment and employment, the time-phasing of the forces and their 

sustainment, and the forces’ closure requirements and responsibilities.

Sustainment planning is important as forces rapidly lose capabilities without 

adequate and dependable sustainment, particularly in an expeditionary 

environment. The component commander directs the deployment of the MAGTF 

and sources both the sustainment to support the deployment and to support the 

needs of the MAGTF during employment. The MAGTF and its major 

subordinate commanders identify any sustainment shortfalls not previously 

recognized by the component commander or the theater. The component 

commander coordinates sourcing sustainment to fill such critical shortfalls and 

ensures the earliest deployment of those assets. See chapter 5.

The Marine Corps component conducts both deliberate and crisis action 

planning. Deliberate planning is the joint process used primarily during 

peacetime and in prescribed cycles to develop joint operation plans; e.g., 

operation plans and contingency plans. Crisis action planning is the process used 

in response to an imminent crisis to develop joint operation plans or orders. 

During deliberate or crisis action planning, the component accomplishes the 

following tasks in support of deployment:

l Determines the force required to meet the combatant commander’s 

requirement.

l Ensures that command relationships that maximize MAGTF capabilities 

are established.

l Provides planning guidance/letters of instruction to the MAGTF, supporting 

establishment, and Marine Corps Forces Reserve, as needed to guide 

deployment and sustainment planning.

l Registers all force and sustainment requirements in the time-phased force and 

deployment data.

l Fills or sources sustainment requirements.

l Fills or sources force and sustainment shortfalls.

l Monitors the task organization and deployment preparations of the force 

and sustainment.
Marine Corps Operations 4-13

l Coordinates CONUS and overseas bases and stations deployment support to 

the MAGTF.

l Arranges for interservice and host-nation support agreements.

l Integrates deployment planning information with the combatant commander’s 

plan for deployment and employment of the joint force.

l Develops necessary supporting plans and orders.

The MAGTF commander accomplishes the detailed planning needed to prepare 

the forces to deploy and to employ. The MAGTF commander reviews the 

component commander’s planning guidance and publishes guidance to his major 

subordinate commanders on planning for deployment and employment of the 

MAGTF. The major subordinate commanders follow this guidance to prepare 

their planning data, requirements, and operation orders for deployment and 

employment. This guidance is critical as it focuses their planning and ensures 

integrated planning. The major subordinate commanders integrate their planning 

efforts with the MAGTF commander’s planning efforts. The MAGTF 

commander integrates the MAGTF planning effort with the component 

commander’s efforts. Each commander and staff have specific tasks in planning 

and execution for which they are responsible, but there is also some overlap. This 

overlap is key to ensuring all aspects of the planning effort are addressed; e.g., 

requirements and shortfalls in personnel and supplies or phasing. During crisis 

action planning, the component, MAGTF, and major subordinate commands’ 

staffs may conduct concurrent planning with the six steps of the Marine Corps 

Planning Process (MCPP) occurring near simultaneously. For more information 

on the MCPP, see MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process.

Commanders may use reverse planning when the tactical employment of the 

forces dictate the operational and strategic deployment of the forces and their 

sustainment into a theater of operations. By envisioning the intended employment 

of the force, the MAGTF commander can better determine how the plan should 

reflect the arrival time of a specific unit and their support’s deployment. In other 

cases, reverse planning will only be used as a means of planning to the final 

assembly area after arrival in the theater of operations.

During deliberate or crisis action planning, the Marine Corps component 

commander, MAGTF commander, and their staffs accomplish the following 

tasks in support of deployment:

l Determine the task organization of the force required to accomplish 

the mission.

l Develop a concept of deployment for the Marine Corps forces that supports 

force closure and employment.
4-14 MCDP 1-0

l Provide planning guidance/letters of instruction to the major subordinate 

commanders as needed to guide their deployment and sustainment planning.

l Determine force shortfalls.

l Determine sustainment requirements, shortfalls, and phasing.

l Determine host nation or other service support requirements.

l Direct the preparation of embarkation and load plans.

l Determine the phasing of the assigned forces.

l Register all requirements in the time-phased force and deployment data.

l Develop a supporting plan or order as required.

l Submit all requirements to the component commander.

l Monitor execution of the deployment plan.

The deployment plan is developed with the employment plan. To facilitate 

effective and efficient execution of the deployment, the MAGTF identifies the 

requirements for support in—

l Personnel.

l Movement.

l Medical.

l Supply.

l Services.

l Maintenance of nondeploying equipment left in garrison.

Deployment is conducted in four general phases. The phases are predeployment 

activities, movement to and activities at the port of embarkation, movement to the 

port of debarkation, and RSOI.

Predeployment Activities

Predeployment includes two types of activities. The first is the daily activities 

that are part of the units’ ongoing training, education, exercising, and health and 

comfort efforts. The unit’s readiness for deployment and employment as a taskorganized combat force is central to its expeditionary capability. Units address 

readiness in the areas of:

l Unit training.

l Personal readiness.

l Medical and dental.
Marine Corps Operations 4-15

l Supply and equipment.

l Administrative and legal.

Preparedness is a key to deployment. Leaders at all levels, from the component 

commander to the last fire team leader in a squad, must understand their 

responsibilities for organizational readiness. Readiness in each of the above areas 

is essential if a Marine Corps force is to be prepared to deploy at any time, 

anywhere in the world.

The second type of predeployment activity includes those preparations made 

immediately prior to a deployment. These activities include packing, marking, 

weighing, staging, and manifesting personnel and equipment. The mode of 

transportation, airlift or sealift, determines the time frame for conducting these 

activities. A pivotal consideration is whether or not the mode of transportation is 

to be administratively or combat loaded. Method of entry into the theater also 

dictates the loading consideration and is critical to preparation activities. To 

ensure the highest state of readiness, the MAGTF maintains designated quantities 

of equipment and supplies in a constant state of predeployment preparedness. 

These assets are stored and staged already packed, marked, weighed, and 

manifested for immediate deployment by air or sea. The ACE must be ready to 

self deploy its aircraft to the AO on short notice, so assets to support this 

movement must be readily available for deployment on support aircraft. The 

equipment and supplies necessary to operate expeditionary airfields or to operate 

from existing airfields in austere locations will usually be greater than those 

needed to operate from more developed sites.

Movement to and Activities at the Port of Embarkation

Movement to and activities at the port of embarkation and aerial port of 

embarkation is the second phase in deployment. The MAGTF supervises these 

activities. The MAGTF publishes guidance and procedures necessary to move 

to the port of embarkation and to prepare for movement into the theater of 

operations. Based on the requirements of the deployment and with the 

assistance of the supporting establishment, the MAGTF stands up the 

necessary organizations to facilitate this phase. They include the force 

movement control center, logistic and movement control center, and unit 

movement control centers to conduct the preparation and movement of the 

forces to the port of embarkation.

The force movement control center, as the MAGTF’s senior movement agency, 

issues movement policy and guidance, and supervises the movement activities on 

behalf of the MAGTF commander. Personnel from all major subordinate 
4-16 MCDP 1-0

commands man the logistic movement control center, located at the force service 

support group. It orchestrates the staging and movement of all forces and 

equipment to the appropriate ports of embarkation. The unit movement control 

center coordinates the preparation, staging, and movement of the subordinate 

units’ personnel and equipment as directed and supported by the logistic 

movement control center. The force flows to the port of embarkation in 

accordance with the RSOI plan. It normally remains at the port of embarkation 

for a brief time, and then commences the next phase of deployment.

Movement to the Port of Debarkation

Movement to the port of debarkation is the third phase of deployment and is 

normally strategic movement. The forces will flow to the theater of operations 

via sealift or airlift according to the deployment plan in order to expedite force 

closure. In many cases, Marine squadrons will self-deploy to the theater and 

establish forward operating bases. When flowing via airlift, little integration can 

be accomplished prior to arrival at the port of debarkation. However, if the force 

is moving via sealift, some force integration can be accomplished. As sealift 

movement time is measured in days and weeks, the forces embarked on board 

can train and can further prepare their equipment for immediate use once in 

theater. This is especially critical in an amphibious operation where forcible entry 

is required.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

RSOI is the fourth phase of deployment and includes those basic activities 

involving the personnel, equipment, and supplies of the MAGTF and their 

integration into warfighting capabilities. The Marine Corps integrates its combat 

power as soon as forces begin to arrive in the theater of operations. In 

amphibious operations, the integration of the MAGTF’s combat power can be 

accomplished aboard ship prior to the assault. In MPF operations, the 

development of warfighting capabilities is accomplished ashore as soon as the 

off-loaded equipment and supplies are combined with the fly-in echelon. It is the 

RSOI phase that completes force closure and enables the MAGTF to transition 

into employment. The Marine Logistics Command, if established, may be used to 

conduct RSOI, as well as provide component-level logistic support to Marine 

forces in theater.

Deployment Forces

Each of the three deployment methods—amphibious, MPF, and ACF—influence 

employment and deployment planning and can influence the MAGTF’s focus 

on readiness.
Marine Corps Operations 4-17

Amphibious forces remain the key option for the MAGTF to deploy forces into a 

theater where forcible entry is a likely requirement. They are also the primary 

means by which the Marine Corps provides a credible forward presence 

throughout the world. Amphibious forces allow the MAGTF to be indefinitely 

sustained from a protected area at sea, increase force endurance by allowing force 

reconstitution in a protected area, increase flexibility for force entry into the 

theater of operations, and offer a credible deterrent to hostilities. The MAGTF 

must have personnel, equipment, and supplies prepared at all times for 

deployment as an amphibious force and consider the implications on employment 

and deployment planning. In particular, the MAGTF commander considers the—

l Advantages/disadvantages of combat versus administrative loading of the ships 

to support the mission.

l Potential degradation of specific combat skills that cannot be exercised while at 

sea for extended periods of time.

l Advantages/disadvantages of deploying required sustainment with the force.

l Potential degradation of equipment readiness due to the lack of use for 

extended periods of time.

l Inherent flexibility in off-load methods available; e.g. boat, helicopter, aircushioned landing craft, amphibious assault vehicle, and pier side.

l Advantages/disadvantages of conducting a rehearsal of the tactical tasks 

assigned when time allows during the at sea transit period.

l Advantage gained by not requiring a benign port or airfield for preparing for 

combat or assembling forces and their equipment.

The MPF allows the MAGTF to rapidly deploy to nearly all areas of the world. 

The MPF can deploy independently to a secure arrival/assembly area or it can 

deploy with an amphibious force that secures the arrival/assembly area. This 

flexibility provides the MAGTF commander with several employment options, 

which may influence his deployment planning and execution. The flexibility of 

the MPF not only allowed for the rapid deployment of 7th MEB during the early 

days of Operation Desert Shield (1990–1991), it also sustained the Army’s XVIII 

Airborne Corps as it deployed into theater. The MAGTF considers the 

implications MPF operations have on employment and deployment planning. In 

particular, the MAGTF commander considers the—

l Advantages for rapid deployment gained because the majority of the 

MAGTF’s equipment, vehicles, and supplies are pre-positioned.

l Speed with which personnel can be deployed via airlift.
4-18 MCDP 1-0

l Requirement for large staging areas for the integration of personnel 

and equipment.

l Advantages in being able to incrementally off-load pier side or across 

a beach.

l Flexibility in being able to incrementally build the size of a force and its 

combat capability based on the mission requirements.

l Advantage in sustainability that the MPF provides to the MAGTF.

The ACF is a MAGTF that specializes in crisis response and can be used to 

reinforce MEUs, provide the lead echelon of a MEB, link up with the MPF, and 

support humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations. The MEF 

commander considers the implications ACF operations have on employment and 

deployment planning. In particular, he considers—

l Advantages of the rapid deployment capability of the ACF.

l Impact the requirement for rapid deployment has on readiness.

l The requirement to prepare all of the ACF’s organic equipment for deployment 

with personnel.

l The limited self-sustainment capability until link up with other forces, such as 

the MPF.

l The requirement for augmenting or sustaining the ACF for an extended period 

of time.

l The potential movement and resupply difficulties the ACF will encounter if the 

arrival airfield is a great distance from the AO.

l The requirement to self-deploy the ACE of the ACF.

To rapidly and efficiently deploy by any of these three methods requires all 

personnel, supplies, and equipment to be prepared. A detailed plan, which 

includes the procedures for executing the deployment, should be developed and 

exercised periodically.

EMPLOYMENT

Deployment of expeditionary forces to a foreign setting and their visible, credible 

presence offshore may be sufficient to accomplish national objectives or deter 

further crisis. However, when presence has not achieved friendly intentions, the 

actual employment of forces may be required to achieve military objectives and 

political goals. Employment is the use of Marine Corps forces to conduct 

operations to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander. This 
Marine Corps Operations 4-19

employment is comprised of the operational use of Marine Corps forces by the 

Marine Corps component commander or functional component commander and 

the tactical use of the MAGTF within the AO to attain military objectives. 

Employment includes both combat operations as well as MOOTW.

During employment, it is not unusual for a MAGTF to conduct offensive and 

defensive operations simultaneously. Early in Operation Desert Storm, I MEF 

aviation forces attacked Iraqi forces and installations in Kuwait while still 

maintaining a defensive combat air patrol over friendly forces in Saudi Arabia. 

Similarly, while I MEF ground units were attacking enemy critical vulnerabilities 

by use of artillery raids, adjacent light armored vehicle units were protecting 

friendly vulnerabilities by conducting counterreconnaissance missions.

Simultaneous combined arms operations, like those discussed above, and the 

need to operate across the entire range of military operations require MAGTFs to 

operate in an environment of mission depth. Marines have recently experienced 

mission depth in Somalia and Haiti with Marines on one city block providing 

humanitarian assistance, while on the next block dealing with civil disturbance, 

and on yet another block fully engaged in armed combat.

Planning Approach

Planning for employment is based on the factors of METT-T that provide a 

framework for assessing the elements of the battlespace (infrastructure, threat, 

friendly and noncombatants) to determine employment requirements. The 

mission establishes the context, relevancy, depth, and objectives of friendly 

operations. The enemy (or the threat—famine, political unrest, natural disaster) 

must be considered in the context of the environment and the elements that 

comprise it, such as the populace, governmental institutions, industry, and media. 

Terrain and weather determine the physical parameters of the battlespace—where 

the force interacts with the enemy. Troops and support available are the friendly 

resources and capabilities to be applied against the enemy or threat to accomplish 

the mission and achieve the desired effects. Time helps determine the scope of 

the battlespace—its depth and the extent and duration of operations. METT-T is 

used by the commander to prepare his forces to accomplish the mission, defeat 

the enemy, and operate effectively in the surrounding environment.

This approach to employment planning promotes a unifying effort within the 

force. Just as the enemy cannot be viewed in isolation, each MAGTF element 

has its own unique characteristics, capabilities, and in some cases, AO. Yet the 

efforts of the elements, when focused toward a common purpose, synergistically create combat power far greater than that possible through their 

independent employment.
4-20 MCDP 1-0

Arranging Operations

The principal tool by which the operational level commander pursues the 

conditions that will achieve the strategic goal is the campaign. The MAGTF 

commander arranges his operations to support the joint force commander’s 

campaign and fulfill the joint force commander’s operational goals. The MAGTF 

commander’s focus must be on achieving these operational goals. The MAGTF 

commander and his staff must understand the following key issues when 

arranging operation—

l The higher headquarters commander’s intent and end state.

l The MAGTF’s wider interaction with the joint force and Marine Corps 

component than that of its major subordinate commands.

l How the MAGTF gets to the AO particularly through force deployment 

planning and execution and RSOI.

l Theater logistics, specifically how to sustain the force over time and in depth.

Ideally, Marine commanders want to attack the enemy simultaneously across the 

width and breath of the battlespace to overwhelm the enemy’s capabilities and 

reduce his options to counter. The simultaneous attacks throughout Panama by 

Army and Marine Corps forces during Operation Just Cause (1989) are examples 

of the devastating effect on the enemy’s ability to command and control his 

forces. The scope, complexity, and duration of military operations during the 

campaign may require Marine Corps forces to phase their operations. A phase 

represents a period where a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or 

mutually supporting activities or there is a distinct type of operation. A transition 

from one phase to another may indicate a shift in emphasis, the main effort or the 

objective. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to 

define in absolute terms. During planning, commanders establish conditions for 

transitioning from one phase to another. The commander bases these conditions 

on measurable effects on the enemy, friendly forces, and the battlespace resulting 

from his and the enemy’s actions. He must determine these effects and his 

procedures for collecting information to make his assessment of the conditions 

early in the planning process. During execution, commanders adjust the phases to 

exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations. 

Phasing assists commanders in thinking through the entire operation and defining 

requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, and desired effects. A significant 

benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives by 

planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages 

against the enemy. A significant disadvantage of phasing is the possible loss of 

tempo or momentum when transitioning between phases. This can create a period 
Marine Corps Operations 4-21

of vulnerability for the force. The enemy can take advantage of additional time 

and lack of pressure during any loss of tempo to consider his options and take 

more calculated actions to counter friendly operations. Another disadvantage of 

phasing is that it may create a discernable and predictable pattern that the enemy 

can use to disrupt or defeat friendly operations. The commander must be aware of 

the advantages and disadvantages of phasing. The commander can reduce the 

risks associated with transitioning between phases by overlapping phases and by 

anticipating potential problems. 

Branches are options built into the basic plan. They may require shifting 

priorities, changing task organizations, and command relationships or change the 

very nature of the operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by 

anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. The requirement for a 

branch plan may surface during the course of action war game step or as a result 

of the execution drills and rehearsals conducted during the transition of the plan. 

Such situations could arise from enemy action, availability of friendly 

capabilities or resources or even a change in the weather or season within the 

operational area. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible 

outcomes of the current operation—victory, defeat, or stalemate. Welldeveloped sequels help maintain momentum and facilitate the exploitation of 

fleeting opportunities.

Combat Power

MCDP 1, Warfighting, describes combat power as the total destructive force we 

can bring to bear on our enemy at a given time. MCDP 1-3, Tactics, describes it 

as a unique product of a variety of physical, moral, and mental factors. 

Commanders conceptually combine the elements of combat power—maneuver, 

fires, leadership, force protection, and information—to create overwhelming 

effects that lead to the defeat of the enemy. By combining and synchronizing 

these effects at the decisive place and time, the commander can convert the 

potential of his forces, resources, and opportunities into combat power. He then 

uses his combat power to reduce that of the enemy by destroying or disrupting 

the enemy’s capability and will to resist. Combat power is generated through 

integrated planning and synchronization of the warfighting functions.

Warfighting Functions

The warfighting functions encompass all military activities performed in the 

battlespace. Warfighting functions are a grouping of like activities into major 

functional areas to aid in planning and execution of operations. These functional 

areas currently include command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, 

logistics, and force protection. The key advantage of using warfighting functions 
4-22 MCDP 1-0

is that they allow the commander and his planners to look at all aspects of the 

battlespace and not leave anything to chance if it is within their capability to 

coordinate, control, influence, and synchronize them. By synchronizing the 

warfighting functions, the commander can increase the force’s combat power, 

mass effects on the enemy, and aid in the assessment of the success of the 

operation. As stated in MCDP 1-2, maximum impact is obtained when all 

warfighting functions are synchronized to accomplish the desired objective 

within the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties.

Planners consider and integrate the warfighting functions when analyzing how to 

accomplish the mission. Integrating the warfighting functions helps to achieve 

focus and unity of effort. They provide a method for planners to think in terms of 

how each function supports the accomplishment of the mission. Critical to this 

approach to planning is the coordination of activities not only within each 

warfighting function but also among all the warfighting functions. By using 

warfighting functions as the integration elements, planners ensure all functions 

are focused toward a single purpose. The warfighting functions apply equally to 

conventional operations and other types of operations such as MOOTW and 

information operations. See appendix A.

Information Operations

Information operations (IO) include all actions taken to affect enemy information 

and information systems while defending friendly information and information 

systems. IO consist of the following distinct elements that must be employed 

together in an integrated strategy to succeed:

l Operations security.

l Psychological operations.

l Military deception.

l Electronic warfare.

l Physical destruction.

l Computer network operations.

IO related activities include public affairs and civil military operations that help 

shape civilian perceptions of MAGTF operations at home and in the AO.

IO are conducted across the range of military operations and at every level of 

war. They are well-suited to support expeditionary operations since they can 

project United States influence and can be tailored to provide measured effects in 

a specific mission or situation. They are scalable, allowing the commander to 

increase or decrease the level of intensity to reflect a changing situation. IO must 
Marine Corps Operations 4-23

be closely coordinated with those of the joint force commander to ensure unity of 

effort and to avoid undermining the effects desired by higher headquarters.

The primary focus of MAGTF IO is at the operational and tactical levels of war. 

Offensive IO are oriented against command and control targets, disrupting or 

denying an enemy’s use of information and information systems to achieve the 

commander’s objectives. The MAGTF relies primarily on electronic warfare and 

physical destruction to attack command and control, intelligence, and other 

critical information-based targets the enemy needs to conduct operations. The 

MAGTF can also employ deception operations to deceive the enemy 

commander’s intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. 

MAGTF defensive IO protect information and information systems the MAGTF 

commander requires to plan and execute operations.

In some environments, IO capitalizes on the growing sophistication, connectivity, 

and reliance on information technology and focuses on the vulnerabilities and 

opportunities presented by the increasing dependence of the United States and its 

adversaries on information and information systems.

In other situations, IO may mean employing decidedly low-tech means to 

facilitate civil-military operations, influence selected target audiences or support 

military deception. Whatever the nature of the conflict, IO targets information 

or information systems to affect the information-based decisionmaking process. 

IO may, in fact, have its greatest impact as a deterrent in peace and during the 

initial stages of crisis. IO may help deter adversaries from initiating actions 

detrimental to the United States. At every echelon of command and all levels of 

warfare, some form of IO is likely to be a critical tool in achieving the 

objectives of the commander.

IO are a combination of offensive, defensive, and informational capabilities that 

are integrated and concurrently planned. Effective IO planning requires a 

framework that focuses the staff, ensuring a plan that supports the commander’s 

concept of operations by integrating the elements of IO into a coherent, 

synchronized plan. In a sense, defensive IO is the shield to protect our own 

systems and decision processes and offensive IO is the sword used against the 

adversary. IO includes perception management, or those actions taken to 

influence selected groups and decisionmakers. Perception management combines 

informational activities, truth projection, operations security, cover and military 

deception, and psychological operations. It encompasses all actions taken to 

convey (or deny) selected information to an audience. It may be a key contributor 

to battlespace shaping efforts.
4-24 MCDP 1-0

REDEPLOYMENT

Redeployment is the transfer of a unit, an individual or supplies deployed in one 

area to another area; to another location within the area for the purpose of further 

employment. It may also include movement back to home station. Redeployment 

is planned and executed based on mission requirements and with the same level 

of detail as was the original deployment. The same procedures and systems used 

to deploy the force are also used to support redeployment. Many of the same 

issues experienced during deployment will require similar detailed consideration 

during redeployment. Redeployment planning is conducted concurrently with 

deployment planning and continues until redeployment is completed.

A key difference between the Marine Corps and other Services is that during 

redeployment Marines focus on reestablishing the force’s readiness for 

subsequent deployment and employment rather than merely returning to their 

home base. This ability to “re-cock” provides the joint force commander and the 

National Command Authorities with adaptable forces that can rapidly reload on 

amphibious or maritime pre-positioning shipping and conduct new missions in or 

out of theater. Operation Sea Angel in 1991 is an example of how Marine Corps 

forces undertook varied missions even while redeploying. Leaving the Persian 

Gulf after the successful completion of Operation Desert Storm, Marine Corps 

amphibious forces in transit to the United States were rapidly employed to 

conduct humanitarian assistance operations in flood ravaged Bangladesh.

As Marine Corps forces begin redeployment it may be necessary to reconstitute 

all or part of the force. Reconstitution entails those actions that commanders plan 

and take to restore units after operations to a desired level of combat readiness. 

This process may require reorganization of units that have sustained losses in 

personnel and equipment and, in cases of severe losses and damage, regeneration 

of units with replacements and new equipment. Reconstitution aims to restore the 

readiness of the force as quickly as possible. Units begin redeployment activities 

as soon as the operational employment has ceased for that unit. As redeployment 

begins, units also commence activities such as training and maintenance to 

restore and maintain combat readiness for its next mission.

EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN

SUPPORT OF FUTURE CAMPAIGNS

Expeditionary maneuver warfare provides an axis of advance for future 

developments in how Marine Corps forces will conduct expeditionary 

operations. Technology—advanced aircraft, advanced amphibious assault 

vehicles, and enhanced command and control systems—with expeditionary 
Marine Corps Operations 4-25

maneuver warfare will improve the strategic agility, operational reach, support 

and sustainment, and joint and multinational interoperability of Marine Corps 

forces. Expeditionary operations will be conducted from sea bases—ships and 

expeditionary bases beyond the reach of the enemy’s defenses—with forces 

rapidly maneuvering from the sea directly to objectives far inland. The operating 

forces will collaborate closely with the supporting establishment to deploy even 

more rapidly, organizing “on the fly”—tailoring and refining the mix of 

capabilities the scalable force brings to the crisis. Forcible entry will continue to 

be the focus of the Marine Corps as it employs new supporting concepts to 

overcome the challenges posed by the littoral area access denial steps taken by 

future adversaries.

The Marine Corps will capitalize on innovation, experimentation, and 

technology, as well as changes to doctrine, organization, training, and education, 

to provide competent and effective forces and capabilities to the joint force 

commander in future campaigns.
CHAPTER 5

Logistics in Marine Corps Operations

Contents

Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Strategic Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Operational Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Tactical Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

General Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Health Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Joint and Multinational Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

Strategic Logistics Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

Strategic Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

United States Transportation Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11

Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Defense Logistics Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Operational Logistics Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Marine Corps Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Marine Logistics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Reconstitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

Logistics Support to MAGTF Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

Marine Expeditionary Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17

Marine Expeditionary Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Special Purpose MAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Air Contingency Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

Maritime Pre-positioning Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

Aviation Logistics Support Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

Norway Geopre-positioning Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19

War Reserve Materiel Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Tactical Level Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Marine Corps Combat Development Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Marine Corps Materiel Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Marine Corps Bases, Stations, and Reserve Support Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22

Department of the Navy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22

Future Sustainment Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-23
5-2 MCDP 1-0

“Logistics is a key component of any and every operation of war. While it does not determine the shape 

that operations take, it sets limits that restrict the options available to commanders. Thus, the more flexible 

and far-reaching the logistics, the greater the possibility for bold, decisive, and imaginative action.”

—MCDP 4, Logistics

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and 

maintenance of forces. Logistics encompasses all actions required to move and 

maintain forces. This includes the acquisition and positioning of resources as well 

as the delivery of those resources to the forces. The terms logistics and combat

service support are often used interchangeably, but there is a distinction. 

Logistics is the larger of the two concepts. Combat service support is the activity 

that actually provides essential services and supplies to operating forces in 

theater. Since most of the delivery of resources occurs at the tactical level of war, 

combat service support has been considered to be essentially the same as tactical 

logistics. Specific logistic needs are tailored to meet the conditions and the level 

of crisis or conflict under which a military force operates.

United States Code, Title 10, assigns each Service responsibility for organizing, 

training, and equipping forces for employment in the national interest. The 

Commandant is responsible for Marine Corps logistics. The Commandant 

ensures that Marine Corps forces under the command of a combatant commander 

or the OPCON of a unified, sub-unified or joint task force commander are 

trained, equipped, and prepared logistically to undertake assigned missions.

Logistics is a fundamental element of MAGTF expeditionary operations. Marine 

expeditionary forces provide self-contained and self-sustained forces that have the 

logistics to accomplish the mission from individual equipment to expeditionary 

airfields and medical treatment facilities. These forces are structured to meet a wide 

range of contingency operations and possess the logistic capabilities needed to 

initiate an operation, sustain forces, and reconstitute for follow-on missions. The 

Marine Corps’ logistic responsibilities include—

l Preparing forces and establishing reserves of equipment and supplies for the 

effective prosecution of war.

l Planning for the expansion of peacetime forces to meet the needs of war.

l Preparing budgets for submission through the Department of the Navy based 

on input from Marine operating forces and Fleet Marine Force commanders 

assigned to unified commands.

l Conducting research and development and recommending procurement of 

weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the combatant 

mission assigned to the Marine Corps.
Marine Corps Operations 5-3

l Developing, garrisoning, supplying, equipping, and maintaining bases and 

other installations.

l Providing administrative and logistics support for all Marine Corps forces 

and bases.

l Ensuring that supported unified commanders are advised of significant changes 

in Marine Corps logistic support, including base adjustments that would impact 

plans and programs.

The Commandant, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensures that the 

Marine Corps—

l Prepares integrated logistic plans, which include assignment of 

logistic responsibilities.

l Prepares integrated plans for military mobilization.

l Reviews major personnel, materiel, and logistic requirements in relation to 

strategic and logistic plans.

l Reviews the plans and programs of commanders of unified and specified 

commands to determine their adequacy, feasibility, and suitability for the 

performance of assigned missions.

The Commandant vests in Marine Corps commanders the responsibility and 

authority to ensure that their commands are logistically ready for employment 

and that logistic operations are efficient and effective. This authority is exercised 

through administrative command channels for routine matters of logistic 

readiness and service planning. Designated commanders (usually at the Marine 

Corps component and/or MAGTF level) are also under the OPCON of unified, 

subordinate unified, and/or joint task force commanders for planning and 

conducting specified operations. Marine Corps component commanders, 

MAGTF commanders, and their subordinate commanders exercise the 

appropriate logistic responsibilities and authority derived from the joint force 

commander of a specified operation. Operational assignments do not preclude 

Service administrative command responsibilities and obligations. Commanders in 

the operating forces, supporting establishment, and the Marine Corps Reserve 

delegate authority for logistic matters to designated subordinates.

LEVELS

The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of logistics function as a coordinated 

whole, rather than as separate entities. Although the Marine Corps generally 

focuses on the tactical level of logistics, it is imperative that all Marines understand 
5-4 MCDP 1-0

the interaction of all three logistic levels. These levels interconnect like sections of 

a pipeline, tying together logistics at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic Logistics

Strategic logistics supports organizing, training, and equipping the forces needed 

to further the national interest. It links the national economic base (people, 

resources, and industry) to military operations. The combination of strategic 

resources (the national sustainment base) and distribution processes (Service 

components) represents the Nation’s total capabilities. These capabilities include 

the Department of Defense, the Military Services, other government agencies as 

necessary or appropriate, and the support of the private sector. Headquarters, 

Marine Corps and the Marine Corps supporting establishment plan and conduct 

Marine Corps strategic logistics—with the exception of aviation-peculiar support. 

Aviation-peculiar support is planned and conducted by the Chief of Naval 

Operations, the Navy supporting establishment, and the Naval Reserve. At the 

strategic level, the Marine Corps—

l Procures weapons and equipment, except aircraft and aviation ordnance.

l Recruits, trains, and assembles forces.

l Establishes bases, stations, and facilities to include ranges and airspace, to 

house, train, and maintain forces and stockpile resources.

l Mobilizes forces.

l Oversees and coordinates employment of strategic-level transportation assets.

l Regenerates forces.

l Provides command and control to manage the flow of resources from the 

strategic to the tactical level.

Operational Logistics

Operational logistics links tactical requirements to strategic capabilities to 

accomplish operational goals and objectives. It includes the support required 

to sustain campaigns and major operations. Operational logisticians assist in 

resolving tactical requirements and coordinating the allocation, apportionment, 

and distribution of resources within theater. They coordinate with logisticians 

at the tactical level to identify theater shortfalls and communicate these 

shortfalls back to the strategic source. The Marine Corps’ operating forces, 

assisted by Headquarters, Marine Corps and the supporting establishment, are 

responsible for operational logistics. The Marine Corps component 

commander or the MAGTF commander in the absence of an in-theater Marine 

component commander, conducts operational logistics. The Marine Corps 
Marine Corps Operations 5-5

component commander may establish a MLC to perform operational logistic 

functions to support tactical logistics in the AO. The focus of operational 

logistics is to balance the MAGTF deployment, employment, and support 

requirements to maximize the overall effectiveness of the force. Marine Corps 

operational logistics orients on force closure, sustainment, reconstitution, and 

redeployment of Marine forces in theater.

Tactical Logistics

Tactical logistics includes organic unit capabilities and the combat service support 

activities that support military operations. It supports the commander’s intent and 

concept of operations while maximizing the commander’s flexibility and freedom of 

action. The goal of tactical level logistics is to prevent the MAGTF from reaching a 

premature culminating point. Tactical logistics involves the planning, execution, and 

coordination of the functions of logistics required to sustain and move units, 

personnel, equipment, and supplies. These functions must provide flexible and 

responsive combat service support to the MAGTF. Tactical logistics must be timely 

and anticipate the needs of the MAGTF to provide responsive support. Generally, 

the MAGTF and other Services and/or multinational forces assigned or attached to 

the Marine Corps component conduct tactical level logistic operations.

The MAGTF is task-organized with the combat service support organizations that 

it needs to accomplish assigned missions. Although no single MAGTF element 

has all of the operational and logistic capabilities to operate independently, each 

element has the capability for at least some basic self-support tasks. Marine 

tactical units have logistics officers and logistics sections, but the units that 

perform combat service support functions for these units are referred to as 

CSSEs. The CSSE provides general ground logistics to all MAGTF elements. 

The ACE possesses logistic capabilities essential for aircraft operations. 

Typically, the MAGTF deploys with accompanying supplies that enable it to 

conduct operations that range from 15 to 60 days, depending on the size of the 

MAGTF. Normally, resupply channels are established and flow of supplies 

initiated to support the MAGTF prior to the consumption of the MAGTF’s 

organic supplies.

For more information on the levels of logistics see MCDP 4, Logistics and 

MCWP 4-1, Logistics Operations.

FUNCTIONS

Logistics is normally categorized in six functional areas: supply, maintenance, 

transportation, general engineering, health services, and services. Logistic 
5-6 MCDP 1-0

systems and plans are usually developed to address each functional area. 

Logisticians commonly discuss support requirements and concepts in terms 

of these commodity areas. While each functional area is essential, all 

functions must be integrated into the overall logistic plan for total support of 

MAGTF operations.

Supply

Supply is the receipt, storing, issuing, and re-supplying of material necessary to 

conduct operations. The needs of the supported force drive all supply efforts. 

Supply systems should be organized to respond rapidly to changing tactical 

situations and flexible enough to accommodate modifications to the concept 

of operations.

Maintenance

Maintenance involves those actions taken to retain or restore materiel to 

serviceable condition. The purpose and function of equipment maintenance are 

universally applicable, but the Marine Corps has developed distinct applications 

for the support of ground-common and aviation-unique equipment.

Organizational-level maintenance is performed by the using unit on its organic 

equipment in ground and aviation units. The MAGTF combat service support 

units and organic maintenance organizations that possess intermediate 

maintenance capabilities conduct intermediate-level ground maintenance. Marine 

aviation logistics squadrons (MALS) conduct intermediate aviation maintenance. 

Depot-level maintenance for ground equipment, particularly Marine Corpsspecific items, is performed at commercial and Department of Defense depot 

maintenance facilities. The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 

coordinates aviation, depot-level maintenance needs. Aviation maintenance 

support for a MEB may come from an intermediate maintenance activity or may 

be provided through a combination of MPS assets, fly-in support packages, and/

or off-the-shelf spares or organic repair support from an aviation logistics support 

ship. While a MAGTF is aboard amphibious shipping, its aircraft maintenance 

support is provided by the ship’s aircraft maintenance department, augmented by 

personnel from one or more of the MALS. Smaller MAGTFs draw support from 

MALS allowance lists (aviation consolidated allowance lists, consolidated 

allowance lists), fly-in support packages, and/or contingency support packages in 

a variety of combinations.
Marine Corps Operations 5-7

Transportation

Transportation is moving personnel and materiel from one location to another via 

highways, railroads, waterways, pipelines, oceans or air. For a MAGTF, 

transportation support is defined as that support needed to put personnel and 

materiel in the correct location at the proper time to start and maintain operations. 

The transportation system that supports an expeditionary MAGTF not only 

includes the means of transportation but also the methods to control and manage 

those transportation means. 

General Engineering

General engineering supports the entire MAGTF. It involves a wide range of tasks 

that serve to sustain forward combat operations; e.g., vertical or horizontal 

construction and facilities maintenance. Most general engineering support for 

MAGTF ground units comes from the engineer support battalion of the force 

service support group. The combat engineer battalion provides combat and combat 

support engineering to the division. Engineering capabilities are also inherent in the 

Marine aircraft wing and are found in the Marine wing support squadrons of the 

Marine wing support groups. If MAGTF construction needs exceed its inherent 

engineering capabilities, the naval construction force may provide augmentation.

Health Services

The objective of health services is to minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, 

and disease on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. This objective is 

accomplished by a proactive, preventive medicine program and a phased health 

care system (levels of care) that extends from actions taken at the point of 

wounding, injury, or illness to evacuation to a medical treatment facility that 

provides more definitive treatment. Health service support deploys smaller, 

mobile, and capable elements to provide essential care in the theater. Health 

service support resources are flexible and adaptable and can be tailored to 

missions ranging from major theater wars to MOOTW.

Services

JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations; Naval Doctrine 

Publication 4, Naval Logistics; and MCDP 4 discuss a variety of nonmateriel and 

support activities that are identified as services. These services are executed in 

varying degrees by each of the Military Services, the Marine Corps supporting 

establishment, and the MAGTF. An understanding of the division of labor and 

interrelationship of the responsibilities and staff cognizance for specific services 
5-8 MCDP 1-0

is essential to ensure those services are provided. Typically, within the MEF, the 

force service support group provides the following services:

l Disbursing.

l Postal.

l Legal.

l Security support.

l Exchange.

l Civil affairs (augmentation required from the Marine Corps Reserves).

l Graves registration (United States Army provides technical expertise).

Centralization of these capabilities within the force service support group does 

not imply sole logistic staff cognizance for execution of the task. The Marine 

Corps component may absorb the legal services, civil affairs, and disbursing 

capabilities of the MAGTF. This allows the force service support group to 

facilitate host nation and coalition relations, contingency contracting, the 

development of inter-Service and multinational support agreements, as well as 

provide general support to the MAGTF.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Marine forces often deploy for operations as part of a joint or multinational task 

force. Logistic support of joint or multinational operations may call for 

compliance with specific operational and administrative requirements that are 

unique to those operations. Current joint and multinational doctrine provides a 

standard frame of reference for the planning, direction, and conduct of joint or 

multinational operations.

Joint and multinational operations are complex and bring together diverse 

military organizations that must operate together and logistically support one 

force. Multinational forces may have differences in command and control 

systems, language, terminology, doctrine, and operating standards. The following 

considerations minimize the impact of this diversity and promote efficiency:

l Liaison is the basis for effective command and control of logistics in joint and 

multinational operations. Liaison representatives (e.g., liaison officers, liaison 

teams, couriers) are chosen specifically for their knowledge and familiarity 

with the capabilities, limitations, and logistic concept of operations of their 

Service/national organization.
Marine Corps Operations 5-9

l The demand for information often exceeds the capabilities of command and 

control equipment within joint and multinational commands. It is crucial that 

the commander identify, as early as possible, the command and control 

requirements that are external to the command or that require the use of 

national and/or host nation equipment.

l Standardization of logistic procedures by joint or multinational forces is essential.

l Agreements are made with probable joint or multinational partners regarding 

command and control of logistics. These agreements should cover principles, 

procedures, and overall logistic report requirements (including standard text 

format, standard databases, and data formats). Agreements should be arrived at 

by mutual agreement in advance of the operation.

l Joint or multinational forces adopt the procedures of one Service or nation if 

command and control agreements have not been determined in advance.

l The commander of all United States forces provides interpreters to 

facilitate command and control and ensure that United States interests are 

adequately protected.

l The operational acceptability and disclosure or release of communications 

security to allied governments for multinational operations will be determined 

and approved by national authorities before entering into discussions with 

allied nations.

In joint operations, the Services are normally responsible for providing their own 

logistics. However, the combatant commander, acting through the commanders 

of the component forces, is responsible for overall logistic coordination. The 

combatant commander must oversee the logistics for all parts of the unified force 

and may direct Marine Corps resources to support other Services. The combatant 

commander is specifically responsible for developing and sustaining military 

effectiveness by establishing an effective logistic structure. The combatant 

commander makes recommendations for joint efforts to improve economy 

consistent with military efficiency, reviews requirements, and recommends 

priorities and programs. He has the authority to coordinate the logistics of the 

Service components and to control distribution of that support when shortages 

occur. The most common type of support is single Service logistic support. 

However, plans may require or direct the use of other types of support such as 

common servicing, cross-servicing or joint servicing at the force, theater, military 

department, or Department of Defense-level.

The Marine Corps component commander may establish a MLC to provide or 

coordinate operational logistics as an interface between the MAGTF and joint 

logistic organizations and agencies. The MLC establishes the Marine Corps 
5-10 MCDP 1-0

theater support structure to facilitate reception, staging, onward movement, and 

integration operations, as well as provide long-term logistic support for sustained 

operations ashore.

In multinational operations, logistics is a national responsibility. However, 

agreements may be made to establish the framework for mutual support. The 

exchange of logistic support between Unites States forces and alliance or 

coalition participants can create significant economies of effort and cost savings. 

This type of logistic support or cross-servicing may be in the form of supplies 

and/or services. Host-nation support agreements normally establish or specify the 

type and amount of such support. An acquisition cross-Service agreement is a 

nation-to-nation bilateral agreement that specifies procedures and points of 

contact for equal value exchange, replacement in kind or acquisition of goods and 

services between United States forces and the forces of the given nation.

If no appropriate international agreements exist, no authority exists whereby 

combatant commanders can provide for or accept logistic support from allies or 

coalition forces. Combatant commanders are not authorized to enter into logistic 

support relationships with other nations without direction from the National 

Command Authorities. Under these circumstances, and with National Command 

Authorities’ approval, Unites States commanders should acquire as much 

logistical support as possible through tact and diplomacy, their knowledge of the 

other nation’s doctrine, and personal and professional relations with the other 

nation’s commanders and appropriate political leaders. In the absence of 

approved formal support agreements, authorization for Marine Corps forces to 

receive logistic support from the other nation’s forces or to provide support to 

these forces must come from higher authority in the operational chain of 

command. This does not preclude normal contracting of goods and services from 

the local economy.

STRATEGIC LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Strategic Mobility

A central concept in the national military strategy is strategic mobility. Strategic 

mobility includes the ability of the United States armed forces to deploy 

expeditionary forces to any region in the world and sustain them for the full range 

of military operations. The strategic mobility triad is the combination of sealift, 

airlift, and pre-positioning. Figure 5-1 highlights the strengths of each component 

of the strategic lift triad.
Marine Corps Operations 5-11

Figure 5-1. Strategic Mobility Considerations.

The sea dominates the surface of our globe. For any global power, sea power is 

essential. Lack of modern or developed infrastructure can pose significant 

problems for military action in the developing world. Many ports cannot handle 

the deepest-draft ships. Many airfields in the developing world cannot handle the 

largest military transport aircraft.

The expeditionary MEF is capable of rapid response as part of a naval 

amphibious force, MPF or ACF. In other words, the MAGTF moves to crisis 

areas via the strategic mobility triad: sealift, pre-positioning, and airlift.

United States Transportation Command

The Department of Defense single manager of the Defense Transportation 

System is the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The 

Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM provides air, land, and sea transportation 

and common-user port management at air/seaports of debarkation as well as air/

seaports of embarkation for the Department of Defense across the range of 

military operations. USTRANSCOM is a unified command with the following 

component commands: Air Mobility Command, Military Traffic Management 

Command, and Military Sealift Command. The Commander in Chief, 

USTRANSCOM has command of the components and their assigned 

transportation assets in peace and war. The component commands organize, train, 

and equip their forces.

USTRANSCOM is the Department of Defense’s single worldwide manager for 

common user ports of embarkation and debarkation. The single port manager 

concept ensures the seamless transfer of cargo and equipment in any given 

theater. Combatant commanders are the supported commanders in determining 

movement requirements and required delivery dates. USTRANSCOM is the 

supporting command that, with the transportation component commands, 

provides a complete movement system from origin to initial theater destination. 

This system includes use of military and commercial assets. It has the authority to 

Closure 

Speed Flexibility Capability

Sealift X X

Pre-positioning X X

Airlift X X
5-12 MCDP 1-0

procure commercial transportation services through component commands and to 

activate, with approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 

Ready Reserve Fleet, Sealift Readiness Program, and the Voluntary Intermodal 

Sealift Agreement. The USTRANSCOM component commands operate the 

Defense Transportation System. The specific operations of the Defense 

Transportation System are covered in JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense 

Transportation System.

Department of Transportation

Under the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness (Executive Order 12656), 

the Secretary of Transportation leads the Federal transportation community. 

During national defense emergencies, the Secretary of Transportation has a wide 

range of delegated responsibilities, including executive management of the 

Nation’s transportation resources in periods of crisis. A more detailed account of 

Department of Transportation responsibilities is contained in JP 4-01, chapter V.

Defense Logistics Agency

The Defense Logistics Agency, a strategic and operational level logistic agency 

of the Department of Defense, provides worldwide logistic support to the 

Military Departments and the combatant commands across the range of military 

operations, as well as to other Department of Defense components, federal 

agencies, foreign governments, or international organizations. It provides 

materiel and supplies to the Military Services and supports their acquisition of 

weapons and other equipment. Support begins with joint planning with the 

Services for parts for new weapon systems, extends through production and 

concludes with the disposal of materiel that is obsolete, worn out or no longer 

needed. The Defense Logistics Agency provides supply, support and technical 

and logistic services to all branches of the military.

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Marine Corps Component

The Marine Corps component commander’s logistic functions include the 

identification and coordination of required Marine Corps logistic support at the 

operational level. Assigned or attached Marine Corps forces forward their 

support requirements and priorities to the Marine Corps component commander. 

The Marine Corps component commander then determines what resources will 

be used to fulfill the requirements. The Marine Corps component commander 

develops agreements with other component commanders and participates in 
Marine Corps Operations 5-13

component, command-level working groups. In military operations other than 

war, logistic support may also apply to support of United States forces, other 

United States Government agencies, and forces of friendly countries or groups 

supported by United States forces.

During predeployment the Marine Corps component commander conducts force 

sustainment planning and force reception planning. Throughout deployment the 

Marine Corps component commander refines Marine Corps forces personnel, 

sustainment, transportation, and reception requirements. The Marine Corps 

component commander may meet these requirements using Service sources or 

other joint resources.

A key function of the Marine Corps component commander during employment 

is to inform the joint force commander of changes to personnel and logistic 

requirements that might affect the Marine Corps’ ability to support the operation. 

During employment, the Marine Corps component commander concentrates on—

l Sustainment sourcing.

l Intratheater transportation asset allocation.

l Facility and base development.

l Host-nation support.

l Health services management.

During redeployment the Marine Corps component commander focuses on 

reconstituting Marine Corps forces. The identification of accurate mission costs 

and material losses is also important to the Marine Corps component commander.

Marine Logistics Command

The Marine Corps component commander may establish an MLC to fulfill his 

Service logistic responsibilities. The MLC is task-organized around a force 

service support group. When formed, it provides logistic support to all Marine 

Corps forces—and may provide limited support to other joint and multinational 

forces as directed by the combatant commander. The MLC provides operational 

logistics to Marine Corps forces as the Marine Corps component’s logistics 

agency in theater. Operational-level logistics includes deployment, sustainment, 

resource prioritization and allocation, and requirements identification activities 

required to sustain the force in a campaign or major operation. These 

fundamental decisions concerning force deployment and sustainment are key for 

the MLC to provide successful logistical support.
5-14 MCDP 1-0

The Marine Corps component commander provides the logistic policy for Marine 

Corps forces. The MLC executes that policy to support all Marine Corps forces. 

When priorities of support are required, the Marine Corps component 

commander provides these to the MLC commander. Likewise, the Marine Corps 

component commander ensures the MLC receives assistance and resources 

outside its organic capability; i.e., intelligence necessary for the MLC mission.

The Marine Corps component commander may employ the MLC when the 

following operational conditions occur:

l Expeditious force closure of a MEF-sized MAGTF is required.

l A MEF will be ashore for more than 60 days.

l Sequential maritime pre-positioning force offloads or backloads are planned 

or required.

l Common item or user support is planned.

l Theater logistic support is shallow or has shortfalls.

These conditions assist the Marine Corps component commander in deciding if a 

MLC is necessary and, if so, its composition and capabilities.

The MLC is task-organized to fit the mission and tailored to meet specific theater 

and situational requirements. The Marine Corps component commander 

establishes support relationships between the MLC and the MAGTF. The 

division of labor between the MLC and the MAGTF is theater-specific.

Reconstitution

Reconstitution is the responsibility of the Marine Corps component commander 

and is normally executed by the MLC. It is how commanders plan and implement 

the restoration of units to a desired level of combat effectiveness to meet mission 

requirements. While it transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions, it 

uses existing systems and units.

Commanders conduct reconstitution when units become combat ineffective or 

when shifting available resources can raise combat effectiveness closer to the 

level they desire. Besides normal support actions, reconstitution may include—

l Removing the unit from combat.

l Assessing it with external assets.

l Reestablishing the chain of command.

l Training the unit for future operations.

l Reestablishing unit cohesion.
Marine Corps Operations 5-15

Although reconstitution is largely a command and operations function, the actual 

refitting, supply, personnel fill, and medical actions are conducted by combat 

service support and administrative elements.

There are two methods for conducting reconstitution—reorganization and 

regeneration. Reorganization is action taken to shift internal resources within a 

degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness. Regeneration is action 

taken to reconstitute a unit through significant replacement of personnel, 

equipment, and supplies in an attempt to restore a unit to full operational 

capability as rapidly as possible. Reorganization is normally done at the unit level 

and does not require extensive external support. Regeneration is normally 

accomplished by the Marine Corps component or MAGTF and involves 

augmentation from the supporting establishment.

When established, the MLC—augmented by the supporting establishment—is 

responsible for executing regeneration operations. The MLC will manage the 

inbound replacement equipment and combat replacement companies. It will 

provide storage for equipment, billeting for personnel, and coordinate movement 

of personnel and equipment to the major subordinate commands based on the 

Marine Corps component commander’s priorities. The MLC coordinates the 

replacement of personnel using existing capabilities to move personnel. When an 

MLC is not established, the Marine Corps component commander will plan 

movement of replacement personnel and equipment from outside the theater 

directly to the appropriate units.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

All logistics efforts support mission accomplishment and are ultimately the 

responsibility of the commander. Command and control of logistics enables the 

commander to recognize requirements and provide the required resources. It must 

provide visibility of both capabilities and requirements. This visibility allows the 

commander to make decisions regarding the effective allocation of scarce, highdemand resources. Additionally, command and control facilitates the integration 

of logistic operations with other warfighting functions so that the commander's 

time for planning, decision, execution, and assessment is optimized. Only when 

command and control effectively direct the logistic effort can logistics effectively 

and efficiently support the mission.

At the strategic level of war, the Marine Corps must disseminate information and 

directives to and from Headquarters, Marine Corps. The principal agents for 

dissemination of logistic policy and information are Deputy Commandant for 

Installations and Logistics and Deputy Commandant for Aviation. The 
5-16 MCDP 1-0

Commander, Marine Corps Materiel Command is responsible for executing 

Marine Corps strategic-level ground logistics, while Commander, Naval Air 

Systems Command executes strategic-level aviation support. An effective flow of 

information and directives enables the Marine Corps to manage materiel 

readiness, mobilization and deployment support, and materiel replenishment. 

At the operational level of war, the logistic effort enables force closure; 

establishes and maintains arrival and assembly areas; and coordinates intratheater airlift, sustainment needs, and force reconstitution and redeployment 

requirements. Marine Corps component commanders direct logistics at the 

operational level.

Marine Corps component G-4s coordinate ground logistics issues with 

subordinate MAGTF G-4/S-4s. Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific, and 

Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic, deal directly with the MAGTF ACE 

aviation logistics department to assist in resolving aviation logistic requirements. 

In joint operations, the principal logistics agent is the J-4 at the unified, subunified, and/or the joint task force staff level.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO MAGTF OPERATIONS

Successful deployment, sustainment, employment, and redeployment of a 

MAGTF are the result of well-coordinated logistic support activities 

conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The organization of 

forces, materiel support, and assigned logistic responsibilities are structured 

with one goal—to logistically support MAGTF operations. Initially, logistics 

is drawn from internal Marine Corps/Navy resources located within the 

operating forces, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the supporting establishment. 

Specific operational requirements dictate the extent to which additional 

logistic support is drawn from other Services, non-Department of Defense 

resources, and multinational resources.

JP 1-02 defines combat service support as the essential capabilities, functions, 

activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in 

theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it 

includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring 

the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other 

services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to 

accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those 

activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on 

the battlefield. Combat service support in the Marine Corps is a function or 

tasking associated with a unit that, by table of organization and table of 
Marine Corps Operations 5-17

equipment, is organized, equipped, and trained as a combat service support 

organization to perform those operations.

The Marine Corps’ logistic mission is to generate MAGTFs that are rapidly 

deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining, and flexible and that can rapidly 

reconstitute. The Marine Corps, in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, 

has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of MAGTF 

expeditionary warfighting capabilities.

Marine Expeditionary Force

The MEF is normally supported by at least one force service support group as the 

CSSE. It is designed to deploy with accompanying supplies for up to 60 days. 

The force service support group is task-organized to provide a full range of 

support functions from sea bases aboard naval shipping or from expeditionary 

bases ashore. It can task-organize the appropriate capability into smaller combat 

service support groups/detachments in direct support of specific task-organized 

units of the MEF. The force service support group is the embodiment of a 

fundamental principle—economy of operations through centralization of logistic 

resources and decentralization in executing support operations.

The force service support group, as the CSSE of a MEF, is organized to provide a 

full range of combat service support capabilities for 60 days. Normally it is 

comprised of the following battalions:

l Headquarters and service battalion.

l Maintenance battalion.

l Engineer support battalion.

l Supply battalion.

l Transportation support battalion.

l Medical battalion.

l Dental battalion.

The Marine division depends on the force service support group as its primary 

source of logistic support. However, the division has organic combat engineer 

capability that it can employ in general and direct support of division 

organizations before requesting additional support from the engineer assets of the 

force service support group. The division also possesses a limited general and 

direct support motor transport capability, which is normally employed in support 

of the division headquarters.
5-18 MCDP 1-0

The Marine aircraft wing possesses logistic units in the Marine wing support 

groups that provide aviation ground support. The Marine Aviation Logistics 

Squadron (MALS) provides intermediate-level, aircraft-specific aviation supply, 

maintenance, avionics, and ordnance capabilities in direct support of aircraft 

squadrons and groups. The Marine aircraft wing depends on the force service 

support group as its primary external source of ground logistics and for delivery 

of aviation bulk commodities.

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

The MEB, with up to 30 days of supplies for sustained operations, can operate 

independently or serve as the advance echelon of a MEF. The brigade service 

support group is task-organized to provide combat service support to the MEB. It 

is structured from personnel and equipment of the force service support group. 

Normally the brigade service support group is comprised of the following units 

and may establish CSS detachments as required.

l Headquarters company.

l Transport support company.

l Supply company.

l Maintenance company.

l Engineer support company.

l Bulk fuel company.

l Collecting and clearing company.

l Surgical support company.

l Dental detachment.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

The MEU(SOC) is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary 

organization. The MEU service support group is task-organized to provide 

combat service support to the MEU. The MEU service support group provides 15 

days of sustainment, except for aviation. 90 days of supplies and repair parts are 

normally provided aboard amphibious shipping, except for aviation ordnance, 

which is constrained to 15 days due to limits of amphibious shipping explosive 

material storage capabilities.

Special Purpose MAGTF

A special purpose MAGTF is organized to accomplish a specific mission, 

operation, or exercise. The size and capabilities of its elements will vary with the 
Marine Corps Operations 5-19

mission. Normally, a combat service support detachment is task-organized to be 

the CSSE. The assigned mission will reflect the logistic functional capabilities 

and the level of organic sustainment assigned.

Air Contingency Force

An ACF consists of air-deployable forces that are maintained in Marine Corps 

Forces, Pacific, and Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic. The size of the force can 

range from a reinforced rifle company to a regimental-sized force with an 

appropriately sized CSSE.

Maritime Pre-positioning Forces

MPFs provide an added dimension to strategic mobility, readiness, and global 

responsiveness. By pre-positioning the bulk of equipment and 30 days of supplies 

for a notional 17,600-man force aboard specially designed ships, the MPF 

program reduces MAGTF response time from weeks to days. Included in each 

MPS squadron is organizational-level, common aviation support equipment and 

limited, intermediate-level support equipment. The ACE deploys with a fly-in 

support package that, when combined with pre-positioned assets on the MPS 

squadron, provides critical aviation support for 30 days of combat flying. 

Equipment and supplies, to a limited extent, can be offloaded selectively to 

support smaller MAGTFs. While normally associated with MEB employment, 

supplies and equipment aboard MPS squadrons are loaded to support lesser 

contingencies if necessary.

Aviation Logistics Support Ship

The aviation logistics support ship is a program developed to transport critical, 

tailored, intermediate-level maintenance and supply support to a forward 

operating area in support of deployed aircraft. The two aviation logistics support 

ships (one located on the west coast and one on the east coast) are under the 

ADCON of the Military Sealift Command. They provide a dedicated sealift for 

movement of the Marine aviation logistics squadron supplies and equipment and 

an afloat intermediate maintenance activity capability. This intermediate 

maintenance activity is task-organized to repair aircraft parts and equipment of 

the aircraft platforms within the MAGTF.

Norway Geopre-positioning Program

The Norway Geopre-positioning Program is a capability similar in scope to that 

of an MPS squadron. The program, established with the Government of Norway, 
5-20 MCDP 1-0

permits the pre-positioning and maintenance of a MEB’s worth of equipment in 

underground storage facilities in Norway.

War Reserve Materiel Support

Availability and responsiveness of access to stocks of war reserve materiel is 

maintained in accordance with Department of Defense policy. War reserve 

materiel is defined as mission-essential principal end items, secondary items, and 

munitions required to attain operational objectives in the scenarios authorized for 

sustainability planning and other stockage objectives approved for programming 

in the Defense Planning Guidance. War reserve materiel inventories are acquired 

during peacetime. These inventories are flexible. They provide an expansion 

capability that can respond to a spectrum of regional contingencies while 

minimizing investment in resources. Authority to approve the release of war 

reserve materiel stocks is limited to specified commanders.

Tactical Level Command and Control

Command and control of logistics at the tactical level focuses on monitoring, 

directing, and executing logistic operations and maintaining communications 

with supporting operational level forces. MAGTF element G-4s/S-4s employ all 

of their organic logistic support capabilities and coordinate with the CSSE for 

additional support as necessary. The CSSE’s mission is to provide logistics 

exceeding the organic capabilities of other MAGTF elements. The ACE aviation 

logistics department works with the MALS to resolve aviation logistics shortfalls.

SUPPORTING ESTABLISHMENT

The organization of the Marine Corps consists of Headquarters, Marine Corps; the 

operating forces; the Marine Corps Reserve; and the supporting establishment. 

Each category has inherent logistic capabilities and specific logistic responsibilities 

at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The supporting 

establishment, referred to as the “fifth element” of the MAGTF, is inextricably 

linked to the operational forces as it furnishes logistics vital to the overall combat 

readiness and sustainment of the Marine Corps. Its inherent logistics capabilities 

and specific logistics responsibilities are found throughout the strategic and 

operational levels of war. It is the source of Marine Corps strategic logistics in that 

it recruits, trains, equips, and provisions the force, as well as providing the bases 

and stations with the associated infrastructure to house, train, and maintain the 

force. The supporting establishment provides the operational logistics link between 

the strategic and tactical levels. Although not part of the Marine Corps, the Navy 
Marine Corps Operations 5-21

supporting establishment also provides essential logistics to the Marine Corps; in 

particular its support of Marine aviation.

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Logistics is a significant focus of the Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command (MCCDC). Each division within MCCDC establishes logistics 

branches and sections to ensure that logistics is properly integrated into the 

Concepts Based Requirements Process, the Combat Development System, and 

the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan. MCCDC develops or identifies the concepts, 

doctrine, organizations, equipment requirements, training programs, facilities, 

and support that generate Marine Corps’ warfighting capabilities. It is also 

responsible for professional military education programs that teach Marines their 

warfighting profession and provide an intellectual environment for improving 

established methods and equipment for mission accomplishment.

Marine Corps Materiel Command

The Commander, Marine Corps Materiel Command is the single process owner 

for the Marine Corps life cycle management process. He executes this process 

through two subordinate commanders: Commander, MARCORSYSCOM and 

Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases.

MARCORSYSCOM is responsible for research, development, acquisition, and 

life-cycle management of Marine Corps funded materiel and information 

systems. MARCORSYSCOM directs Marine Corps-sponsored programs and 

represents the Marine Corps in the development of other Service-sponsored 

programs in which the Marine Corps participates. MARCORSYSCOM 

coordinates program interface internally within the Marine Corps and externally 

with Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, other Services, Congress, 

and industry. MARCORSYSCOM also manages Marine Corps ground 

ammunition acquisition programs and Marine Corps owned and controlled 

ground ammunition stocks. The ground ammunition function is particularly 

significant in supporting MAGTF sustainability during operations and crisis 

action response planning and execution.

The Marine Corps logistics bases at Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California, 

and the Blount Island Command at Jacksonville, Florida, are under the command 

of the Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, headquartered at Marine 

Corps Logistics Base, Albany. They provide general, Service-level supply and 

maintenance support to the Marine Corps and certain support services to the 

Department of Defense. Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, is the inventory 

control point for the Marine Corps supply system. Albany and Barstow have 
5-22 MCDP 1-0

materiel storage facilities that house consumable and repairable materiel, 

including some pre-positioned war reserve materiel. They control the storage of 

principal end items. They also have repair centers that perform depot-level 

maintenance and, when directed, overflow intermediate level maintenance on 

ground equipment. They can also serve as manufacturing centers when directed. 

Blount Island Command is responsible for inventory management and equipment 

maintenance, modification, and replacement in support of the MPF and the 

Norway Geopre-positioning Program.

Marine Corps Bases, Stations, and Reserve Support Centers

Marine Corps bases, stations, and reserve support centers provide the 

infrastructure and facilities that support the operating forces and allow training as 

a MAGTF. They provide the programs that ensure safety and services for all 

Marines, their families, civilian employees, and retirees. The bases, stations, and 

centers provide the training areas, airspace, and infrastructure that enable the 

operating forces, including the Marine Corps Reserve, to maintain their combat 

readiness. They support force deployments on routine and contingency response 

operations and provide critical logistics to deploying units from predeployment 

preparation through deployment and reconstitution. Finally, in support of the total 

force, some bases and stations are designated stations of initial assignment for 

Marine Corps Reserve mobilization and are responsible for assisting the 

operating forces with the throughput of Marine Corps Reserve personnel and 

materiel in support of MAGTF deployment.

Department of the Navy Agencies

Certain Department of the Navy agencies support both the Navy and the Marine 

Corps. In logistics, the most visible functions are naval aviation materiel support 

and health service support. Materiel support is provided by Naval Systems 

Command. The Navy’s logistics effort is divided between several commands. 

Naval Supply Systems Command provides logistics support less aviation 

logistics support. Naval Sea Systems Command oversees the five depot 

maintenance shipyards. Naval Air Systems Command provides aviation logistics 

support to include oversight of the three aviation maintenance depots. Other 

naval organizations providing significant supply support include Naval Medical 

Logistics Command, which is the Navy and Marine Corps subject matter expert 

for medical materiel, and procures all medical and dental equipment, services, 

and supplies for naval forces. Naval Facilities Engineering Command provides 

initial outfitting of chemical, biological, and radiological defense material and 

equipment to overseas shore installations, Naval Construction Force, and naval 

beach group units. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Chesapeake 
Marine Corps Operations 5-23

provides software support for the fleet logistics programs that automate supply, 

inventory control, maintenance, and financial management. 

FUTURE SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

MAGTFs conducting expeditionary operations require sustainment that is 

responsive, flexible, and scalable to generate and sustain combat power. Key to 

sustainment operations in the future will be the use of sea-based logistics that 

provide a secure base for the rapid and anticipatory distribution of supplies and 

services. Enhancements in information technology will be used to ensure 

visibility of the location and availability of supply items, exercise economy, and 

streamline the prioritization and delivery of services to support rapidly moving 

maneuver and fire support units.

Sea-basing of sustainment will allow the commander to further reduce the 

footprint of sustainment personnel and material ashore, reducing the need for 

security forces, and minimizing the impact of MAGTF operations on the local 

population in the AO. Precision logistics will ensure that only the material and 

services actually needed by the forces will be brought ashore. Marine Corps 

forces will be able to rapidly deploy to the AO, conduct operations, and redeploy, 

ready for subsequent operations.
CHAPTER 6

Planning and Conducting Expeditionary Operations

Contents

Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Operational Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Visualize. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Describe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Direct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9

Commander’s Battlespace Area Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

Analyze and Determine the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11

Commander’s Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13

Commander’s Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14

Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15

Decisive Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17

Shaping Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18

Battlefield Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19

Integrated Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19

Single Battle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20

Deep Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21

Close Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22

Rear Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22

Noncontiguous and Contiguous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23

Main and Supporting Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24

The Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27

Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28

Phasing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29

Operation Plans and Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30

Transitioning Between Planning and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
6-2 MCDP 1-0

“The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. 

Strike at him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.”

—Lieutenant General U.S. Grant, USA

“To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war.”

—Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, CSA

This chapter provides the foundation for MAGTF tactical operations because it 

discusses the importance of single battle, decisive and shaping actions, centers of 

gravity and critical vulnerabilities, main and supporting efforts, security, and the 

reserve. It describes operational design and addresses how the MAGTF 

commander plans and conducts expeditionary operations. It also identifies the 

tactical tenets essential to succeeding on the battlefield.

MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps practices maneuver warfare when conducting operations.

MCDP 1 defines maneuver warfare as a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter 

the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions 

which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy 

cannot cope. Maneuver warfare is based on the avoidance of the enemy’s 

strengths—surfaces—and the exploitation of the enemy’s weaknesses—gaps. 

Rather than attacking the enemy’s surfaces, Marines bypass the enemy’s defense 

and penetrate those defenses through gaps to destroy the enemy system from within. 

The goal of maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of effective 

resistance by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion.

Maneuver provides a means to gain an advantage over the enemy. Traditionally, 

maneuver has meant moving in a way that gains positional—or spatial—

advantage. For example, a force may maneuver to envelop an exposed enemy 

flank or deny him terrain critical to his goals. The commander may maneuver to 

threaten the enemy’s lines of communications and force him to withdraw. He 

Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32

Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33

Tactical Tenets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34

Achieving a Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35

Gaining Advantage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36

Tempo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38

Adapting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39

Exploiting Success and Finishing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-40
Marine Corps Operations 6-3

may maneuver to seize a position that brings effective fire to bear against the 

enemy but protects his forces against enemy fires. 

To maximize the usefulness of maneuver, the commander must maneuver his 

forces in other dimensions as well. The essence of maneuver is taking action to 

generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of 

accomplishing his objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be 

psychological, technological or temporal as well as spatial.

A force maneuvers in time by increasing relative speed and operating at a faster 

tempo than the enemy. Normally, forces maneuver both in time and space to gain 

advantage and, ultimately, victory at the least possible cost. Operation Desert 

Storm (1991) is a classic example where forces used time and space to their 

advantage to outmaneuver the enemy. While the Marines and Arab coalition 

forces fixed the Iraqis in Kuwait, other coalition forces rapidly maneuvered 

through the Iraqi desert to out flank the enemy. The success of this maneuver led 

to the complete disruption of the Iraqi defense and their rapid capitulation. This 

operation illustrates the importance of synchronizing the maneuver of all 

MAGTF elements to achieve a decision.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Commanders initiate the conduct of operations with a design that will guide their 

subordinate commanders and the staff in planning, execution, and assessment. 

This operational design is the commander’s tool for translating the operational 

requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate 

commanders and his staff. The commander uses his operational design to 

visualize, describe, and direct those actions necessary to achieve his desired end 

state and accomplish his assigned mission. It includes the purpose of the 

operation, what the commander wants to accomplish, the desired effects on the 

enemy, and how he envisions achieving a decision. Visualization of the 

battlespace and the intended actions of both the enemy and the friendly force is a 

continuous process that requires the commander to understand the current 

situation, broadly define his desired future situation, and determine the necessary 

actions to bring about the desired end state. The commander then articulates this 

visualization to his subordinate commanders and staff through his commander’s 

battlespace area evaluation (CBAE) and guidance. By describing his visualization 

in this concise and compelling method, the commander focuses the planning and 

execution of his subordinate commanders and staffs. Finally, the commander 

directs the conduct of operations by issuing orders, assigning missions and 

priorities, making decisions, and adjusting his planned actions as necessary based 

on assessment. See figure 6-1 on page 6-4.
6-4 MCDP 1-0

Operational design differs at various levels of command, principally in the scope 

and scale of operations. Higher level commanders, such as the component and 

MAGTF commander, identify the time, space, resources available, and purpose of 

operations that support the joint force commander’s campaign plan or component 

commander’s operational design. At a lower level of command, the commander 

may be able to include in his operational design a detailed description of the 

battlespace, objectives, available forces and desired task organization, and guidance 

on the phasing of the operation. The elements of operational design include—

l Factors of METT-T.

l CBAE consisting of the commander’s analysis of the battlespace, 

commander’s intent, center of gravity analysis, and commander’s critical 

information requirements.

l Commander’s guidance, to include desired effects.

l Decisive actions.

l Shaping actions.

Figure 6-1. Operational Design.
Marine Corps Operations 6-5

l Sustainment.

l Principles of war and tactical fundamentals. See appendix B.

l Battlefield framework.

l Operation plan or order.

Visualize

The visualize portion is what MCDP 5, Planning, refers to as conceptual planning, 

the highest level of planning. The commander determines the aims and objectives 

of the operation. During visualization, the first task for the commander is to 

understand the situation. He studies the situation to develop a clear picture of what 

is happening, how it got that way, and how it might further develop. The 

commander considers the information available on the factors of METT-T and any 

other information on the situation or potential taskings from higher headquarters. 

He develops an initial view of friendly actions, desired effects and their results, and 

determines the means to achieve those results. Part of the commander’s thinking 

should also include assuming the role of the enemy, considering what the enemy’s 

best course of action may be, and deciding how to defeat it. Thinking through these 

factors helps the commander develop increased situational awareness. The 

commander must also address possible outcomes and the new situations that will 

result from those possibilities. As the situation changes, so will the solution and the 

actions that derive from it. Combining this initial understanding of the situation 

within the battlespace with his experience and military judgment, he may begin his 

visualization by posing the following questions:

l Where am I? Where is the enemy?

l Where are my friends? Where are the enemy’s friends?

l What are my strengths? What are the enemy’s strengths?

l What must I protect? What are the enemy’s weaknesses?

l What must I do and why? What will the enemy do and why?

l What is the enemy’s most dangerous course of action?

As the commander considers these questions, he visualizes what he thinks he 

has to accomplish to achieve a decision and best support his higher 

commander’s operation. This becomes the basis for his CBAE and guidance he 

provides to his subordinate commanders and the planners in the describe 

portion of operational design.

Describe

The describe portion is a combination of conceptual planning and what MCDP 5 

refers to as functional planning, the middle level of planning where the 
6-6 MCDP 1-0

commander and the staff consider discrete functional activities that form the basis 

for all subsequent planning. It begins when the commander articulates his vision 

through his CBAE and initial guidance. The commander then uses this 

visualization to focus and guide the staff as they conduct mission analysis to 

determine the mission of the force. Mission analysis provides the commander and 

his staff with additional insight on the situation. Combined with any intelligence 

or operational updates, mission analysis may prompt the commander to refine his 

vision, confirming or modifying his commander’s intent or other initial guidance 

on decisive and shaping actions and sustainment. See figure 6-2.

Once the mission statement has been produced, the commander and staff are ready to 

further develop the operational design by describing how the command will achieve a 

decision through decisive and shaping actions that accomplish the mission and 

achieve the desired effects. They also describe how these actions will be sustained. 

Receiving necessary commander’s planning guidance, the staff begins to develop the 

battlefield framework. See figure 6-3 on page 6-8. It describes how the commander 

will organize his battlespace and his forces to achieve a decision. The battlefield 

framework consists of the battlespace organization of envisioned deep, close, and rear 

tactical operations as well as the organization of the force into the main effort, 

reserve, and security. Supporting efforts are addressed in the context of deep, close, 

and rear operations as part of the single battle.

Direct

The direct portion is a combination of functional planning and what MCDP 5 

refers to as detailed planning, the lowest level of planning. During direct, the 

commander and the staff determine the specifics of implementing the operational 

design through the operation plan or order. Armed with the description of how 

the commander intends to achieve a decision and obtain his desired end state, 

planners conduct integrated planning using the battlefield framework and the six 

warfighting functions to develop and war game courses of action that address the 

following considerations and issues:

l Type of operation.

l Forms of maneuver.

l Phasing/sequencing of the operation.

l Security operations.

l Sustaining the operation.

l IO.

l Targeting priorities.

l Intelligence collection priorities.

l Assessment.
Marine Corps Operations 6-7

Figure 6-2. Commander’s Vision of Decisive

and Shaping Actions and Sustainment.

The purpose of this operation is to defeat the enemy's first tactical echelon. I see the enemy’s tactical strength as his 

mobile reserves. I cannot let the enemy commit these reserves in a decisive manner. To support the higher 

commander’s plan, I will have to keep the reserve mechanized brigade from committing against our higher 

commander’s main effort or being used decisively against my forces. I want to shape the enemy by having him first 

commit his reserve armor battalion against my secondary effort. Simultaneously, by using lethal and nonlethal fires, I 

want to control the timeline for the commitment of the enemy's reserve mechanized brigade and once committed 

against my forces, I want to limit its capability. These shaping actions will allow me to fix the enemy reserves while I 

mass my combat power at the time and place of my choosing. I want to exploit my tactical center of gravity—my 

superior tactical mobility—and combined arms. I want to avoid the enemy's fixed defenses and focus my decisive 

action against the enemy’s flank to defeat the two isolated mechanized battalions. Once defeated, I want to rapidly 

focus on the defeat of his remaining mechanized and reserve units that were fixed by my supporting effort. I want a 

viable security force protecting the flank of my main effort. My sustainment must be task-organized and positioned 

forward to allow the force to maintain operational momentum.
6-8 MCDP 1-0

Figure 6-3. Battlefield Framework.

On order the division attacks in zone to defeat the first echelon. Close Operations—In the west a mechanized regiment 

conducts a supporting attack to fix the forward mechanized battalion and cause the commitment of the enemy reserve 

armor battalion. To support this attack our deception effort will focus on portraying this supporting attack as our main 

effort. Upon the commitment of the enemy reserve, our main effort, consisting of a mechanized regimental task force, 

conducts a flanking attack through the gap between the two defending mechanized infantry battalions and defeats the 

enemy armor battalion. Fires will disrupt any movement of the two mechanized enemy battalions and the enemy 

division’s command and control. The reserve is a mechanized regiment that follows the main effort and is prepared to 

defeat a flank counterattack from either enemy mechanized infantry battalion. If not committed against the two 

mechanized battalions, it will be prepared to block the enemy reserve mechanized brigade. Deep Operations—The 

MAG limits the reserve mechanized infantry brigade from reinforcing the first echelon. Rear Operations—A mobile 

combat service support detachment is prepared to follow the main effort and conduct refuel on the move to maintain 

operational momentum. Security—A light armored reconnaissance battalion screens the main effort’s eastern flank.
Marine Corps Operations 6-9

As this integrated planning continues, the commander chooses a course of action 

and, if time and situation allow, the staff conducts detailed planning to provide 

further direction to the force and prepare necessary operation plans and orders. 

Once the plan or order is completed, the direct portion of operational design 

concludes with the transition of the plan or order to the subordinate commanders 

and the staff that will execute it. The operational design, once developed into an 

operation plan or order, is the basis for execution and aids the commander and 

the staff as they execute operations.

The commander assesses the success of the operation by comparing the 

envisioned operational design—as expressed in the operation order—with what is 

actually occurring in the battlespace. If the assessment indicates the need to 

modify or adjust the operational design, the commander will again visualize what 

must be done and then he and the staff will describe how it will be accomplished 

by modifying or adjusting the battlefield framework. Fragmentary orders, branch 

plans or sequels to direct the operation will be prepared and issued, if necessary.

PLANNING

As described in MCDP 5, planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired 

future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about. It encompasses 

envisioning this desired end state and arranging a configuration of potential actions 

in time and space that will realize the end state. Planning is an essential element of 

command and control and the responsibility to plan is inherent in command. It is a 

truism that planning is half of command and control. The fundamental object of 

command and control is also the fundamental object of planning—to recognize 

what needs to be done in any situation and to ensure appropriate actions are taken. 

This requires commanders who can visualize what they want to happen, the effects 

they want to achieve, and how they will employ their forces to achieve their goals. 

They must be able to contemplate and evaluate potential decisions and courses of 

action in advance of taking action. The commander must be constantly aware of 

how much time a situation allows for planning and make the most of that available 

time. Whether planning is done deliberately or rapidly, the commander must 

display an acute awareness of the time available. All planning is time sensitive.

Planning can be viewed as a hierarchical continuum with three levels of 

planning—conceptual, functional, and detailed. All three levels are used at 

various times in the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), such as the use of 

conceptual planning during mission analysis, functional planning during course 

of action development, and detailed planning during orders development.
6-10 MCDP 1-0

While the commander is primarily involved at the conceptual level, he is an 

important participant throughout the planning process and must supervise his 

subordinate commanders and the staff in their efforts at the functional and detailed 

levels of planning. The commander’s conceptual planning provides the basis for all 

planning performed by the staff. He must organize and train his staff to gather, 

manage, and process information essential to the commander’s decisionmaking 

process. The size and capabilities of the staff depend on the level of command and 

the information and decisionmaking needs of the commander.

The MCPP is the vehicle the Marine Corps component or MAGTF commander 

and their staffs use to provide input to the joint planning process. It interfaces 

with the joint planning system during the supporting plan development phase in 

deliberate planning and during the situation development phase during joint crisis 

action planning. The Army’s planning process closely resembles the MCPP, 

enabling close coordination in planning and execution among Marine Corps and 

Army forces assigned supporting missions or attached to the other Service. 

MAGTF planners must ensure that IO planning begins at the earliest stage of 

operation planning, is nested within the IO plans of the higher headquarters, and 

fully integrated into the MAGTF operations plan.

COMMANDER’S BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION

CBAE is the commander’s personal vision based on his understanding of the 

mission, the battlespace, and the enemy. It is his visualization of what needs to be 

done and his first impressions of how he will go about doing it. He uses CBAE to 

articulate his initial view of the operational design. This visualization is used to 

transmit critical information to subordinate commanders and the staff and is the 

basis for the commander’s planning and decisionmaking. It identifies the 

commander’s battlespace, center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, the 

commander’s intent, and his critical information requirements. The staff normally 

assists the commander in preparing much of his CBAE, including battlespace 

appreciation, center of gravity analysis, and determining commander’s critical 

information requirements. The G/S-2 is particularly helpful to the commander in 

determining possible enemy centers of gravity.

Analyze and Determine the Battlespace

As described in chapter 4, the commander’s battlespace consists of his AO, area 

of influence, and area of interest. The commander analyzes his assigned AO, 

comparing the capabilities of his forces with the mission assigned to determine 

his area of influence. He then visualizes how he will use his forces within the 

battlespace to accomplish his mission. This visualization allows the commander 
Marine Corps Operations 6-11

to recognize critical information requirements that will determine the extent of 

his area of interest.

The commander compares his AO to his area of influence to determine whether 

the AO’s size and location will allow him to accomplish his mission. If the AO is 

too small to allow the commander to use all the assets of the MAGTF effectively 

to accomplish the mission, then he should request a larger AO be assigned. If he 

determines that the AO assigned is too large for his force or that it is not located 

to best accommodate the MAGTF, then he should request a new or modified AO, 

or additional forces, from his commander. Regardless of its size, the MAGTF 

commander must be able to command and control his forces throughout the 

assigned AO.

Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities

The commander continues to visualize what he must do and how he thinks he 

will use his force to accomplish that mission. An important aspect of the 

commander’s visualization includes his analysis of centers of gravity and critical 

vulnerabilities. This analysis, based on the expected enemy COA, assists the 

commander in visualizing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and 

friendly forces.

As discussed in MCDP 1, a center of gravity is an important source of strength. 

Both enemy and friendly forces have centers of gravity. Depending on the 

situation, centers of gravity may be intangible characteristics such as resolve or 

morale. They may be capabilities such as armored forces or aviation strength. 

They may be the cooperation between two arms, the relations in an alliance or a 

force occupying key terrain anchoring an entire defensive system. Employing 

friendly strengths or centers of gravity to directly attack the enemy’s strength 

should be avoided whenever possible. Rather, the commander seeks to employ 

his strength against threat weaknesses. To accomplish this task, the commander 

must identify the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities; i.e., vulnerabilities that permit 

destruction of a capability without which the enemy cannot function effectively. 

Attacking critical vulnerabilities may achieve effects that bend the enemy to the 

commander’s will.

Critical vulnerabilities provide an aiming point for the application of friendly 

strengths against threat weaknesses. The commander directs his force’s strength 

at those capabilities that are critical to the enemy’s ability to function—to defend, 

attack or sustain himself or to command his forces. The commander focuses on 

those critical vulnerabilities that will bend the enemy to his will most quickly. He 

must establish a process to identify those capabilities that are vulnerable and 

whose destruction or disruption will achieve the desired results. Once identified, 
6-12 MCDP 1-0

critical vulnerabilities assist the commander in choosing where, when, and what 

will constitute decisive action. By attacking critical vulnerabilities, the 

commander increases the potential that the attack may in fact be the decisive 

action. Friendly critical vulnerabilities must also be identified to protect the 

friendly center of gravity from similar attack by the enemy.

The commander’s analysis of centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities during 

CBAE may require refinement as more information about the enemy and the 

tactical situation becomes available. The commander will continue to refine his 

visualization of the battlespace and his mission, which may require him to 

modify or delete his current choice for centers of gravity and critical 

vulnerabilities. Center of gravity and critical vulnerability analysis is an ongoing 

process and the commander’s thinking on these items during CBAE may be 

radically altered during the remainder of the planning process and once the plan 

is executed.

Commander’s Intent

The commander continues his CBAE by describing the interaction of the 

enemy, his own force and the battlespace over time and how he will 

achieve a decision that leads to the desired end state. He communicates 

this vision to his subordinates through the most important element of 

CBAE—commander’s intent.

As described in MCDP 1, commander’s intent is the commander’s personal 

expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear, concise, and easily 

understood. It may also include how the commander envisions achieving a 

decision as well as the end state, conditions, or effects that, when satisfied or 

achieved, accomplish the purpose.

Commanders intent helps subordinates understand the larger context of their 

actions and guides them in the absence of orders. It allows subordinates to exercise 

judgment and initiative—in a way that is consistent with the higher commander’s 

aims—when the unforeseen occurs. This freedom of action, within the broad 

guidance of the commander’s intent, creates tempo during planning and execution.

Higher and subordinate commander’s intent must be aligned. Commander’s 

intent must be promulgated and clearly understood two levels down so that 

commander’s intent and the resulting concepts of operation are “nested” to 

ensure unity of effort. Nested commander’s intent ensures that while subordinates 

have the freedom to conduct their part of the operation as their situation dictates, 

the results of these disparate actions will contribute to achieving the higher 

commanders desired end state.
Marine Corps Operations 6-13

Commander’s intent focuses on the enduring portion of any mission—the purpose of 

the operation—which continues to guide subordinates’ actions, while the 

subordinates’ tasks may change as the situation develops. As the commander 

proceeds through planning and his situational awareness grows, he may refine his 

intent. He may also include how he envisions achieving a decision—his method—as 

well as the end state that, when satisfied, accomplishes the purpose of the operation.

The commander’s intent provides the overall purpose for accomplishing the task 

assigned through mission tactics. Although the situation may change, 

subordinates who clearly understand the purpose and act to accomplish that 

purpose can adapt to changing circumstances on their own without risking 

diffusion of effort or loss of tempo. Subordinate commanders will be able to 

carry on this mission on their own initiative and through lateral coordination with 

other units.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) identify information 

on friendly activities, enemy activities, and the environment that the commander 

deems critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, 

and assisting in timely and informed decisionmaking. Commanders use CCIRs to 

help them confirm their vision of the battlespace, assess desired effects, and how 

they will achieve a decision to accomplish their mission or to identify significant 

deviations from that vision.

Not all information requirements support the commander in decisionmaking. 

CCIRs must be linked to the critical decisions the commander anticipates making. 

They focus the commander’s subordinate commanders and staff’s planning and 

collection efforts. The number of CCIRs must be limited to only those that support 

the commander's critical decisions. Too many CCIRs diffuse focus.

CCIRs help the commander tailor his command and control organization. They 

are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, 

flow, and use of information throughout the force. While the staff can 

recommend CCIRs, only the commander can approve them. CCIRs are 

continually reviewed and updated to reflect the commander’s concerns and the 

changing tactical situation.

CCIRs are normally divided into three subcategories: priority intelligence 

requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of 

friendly information. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence 

requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall 

success of the command’s mission. A friendly force information requirement is 
6-14 MCDP 1-0

information the commander needs about friendly forces to develop plans and 

make effective decisions. Depending on the circumstances, information on unit 

location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistic status could 

become a friendly force information requirement. An essential element of 

friendly information is a specific fact about friendly intentions, capabilities, and 

activities needed by adversaries to plan and execute effective operations against 

friendly forces.

COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE

Guidance and intent are distinctly different and cannot be used interchangeably. 

Commander’s intent is the purpose of the operation and allows subordinates to 

exercise judgment and initiative when the unforeseen occurs. Commander’s 

guidance provides preliminary decisions required to focus the planners on the 

commander’s conceptual vision of the operation. The commander develops his 

commander’s initial guidance using how he envisions planning and conducting 

the operation, his CBAE, his experience, and any information available from 

higher headquarters. This guidance provides his subordinate commanders and the 

staff with additional insight of what the force is to do and the resources that will 

be required to achieve the desired end state. It may be based on the warfighting 

functions or how the commander envisions the sequence of actions that will 

allow his force to achieve a decision. The commander may provide general 

guidance and specific points he wants the staff to consider, like a particular 

enemy capability, a certain task organization or constraints or restraints from 

higher headquarters. The commander should articulate those desired effects that 

will lead to mission accomplishment. This initial guidance is best transmitted to 

the subordinate commanders and the staff by the commander personally as it will 

set the direction for the initial planning and preparations and will contribute to 

establishing tempo in the operation.

Effects are the results of actions—both lethal and nonlethal—taken against the 

enemy that the commander must achieve to obtain a decision and accomplish his 

mission. The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare calls for 

the synchronization of efforts—their arrangement in time, space, and purpose to 

maximize combat power—to achieve the desired effects on the enemy. 

Commanders focus combat power to maximize the convergence of effects in time 

and space at the decisive location and moment. Instead of relying on massed forces 

and sequential operations, the commander achieves desired effects through the 

tailored application of the MAGTF’s combat power combined with joint combat 

power. The commander uses lethal and nonlethal means to obtain physical as well 

as psychological effects against the enemy commander.
Marine Corps Operations 6-15

There are two forms of effects: direct and indirect. Direct effects are the firstorder consequence of a military action, such as the physical attack of an enemy 

unit or psychological operations to influence the enemy’s will to resist. Indirect 

effects are second- and third-order consequences of military action, often 

delayed, such as the demoralization of other than the targeted units. Indirect 

effects can ripple through an enemy force, often influencing other elements of the 

enemy force physically or psychologically. If combat power is focused on key 

enemy capabilities and units at the proper place and time, the direct effects of this 

action may cause the cascade of indirect effects throughout the enemy force and 

lead to the breakdown of the enemy’s will to resist.

Direct and indirect effects often spill over and create unintended consequences, 

usually in the form of injury or damage to persons or objects unrelated to the 

objective. Often these unintended consequences can benefit the commander as the 

effects of friendly actions compound and then cascade throughout the entire enemy 

force. Integrated planning by the commander includes considering risks of 

unintended second- and third-order consequences that may result in a negative 

outcome for friendly forces and noncombatants.

While estimating the outcome of direct and indirect effects can never be an exact 

process, it becomes increasingly difficult as effects continue to compound and 

cascade. The commander must consider the factors of METT-T when choosing 

the desired effect. He must focus on the combination of lethal and nonlethal 

actions that best accomplishes the desired effects. These effects should be 

articulated in terms of conditions and measures of effectiveness to facilitate 

assessment and should be included in the CCIRs. If the desired effect was not 

achieved, the action may need to be repeated or another method should be sought 

to achieve the effect.

MISSION

Commanders determine their missions through an analysis of the tasks assigned. 

This analysis will reveal the essential tasks, together with the purpose of the 

operation, that clearly indicate the actions required and the desired end state of 

the operation. The mission includes who, what, when, where, and why the task is 

to be accomplished. 

There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason or 

intent behind it. The task describes the action to be taken while the intent 

describes the purpose of the action. The task denotes what is to be done, and 

sometimes when and where; the intent explains why. Tasks can be either 

specified or implied.
6-16 MCDP 1-0

Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. They 

are derived primarily from the mission and execution paragraphs of the higher 

headquarters operation order but may be found elsewhere, such as in the 

coordinating instructions or annexes.

Implied tasks are not explicitly stated in the higher headquarters order but should 

be performed to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks emerge from analysis 

of the higher headquarters order, the threat, and the terrain. Routine or continuing 

tasks are not included in implied tasks.

Essential tasks are those specified or implied tasks that define mission success 

and apply to the force as a whole. If a task must be successfully completed for the 

commander to accomplish his purpose, it is an essential task. Once they have 

been identified as essential tasks, they form the basis of the mission statement.

Tasks normally include a desired end state, which helps the subordinate to more fully 

understand the purpose of the task and to allow him to make an informed deviation 

from the stated task if the situation warrants. A task may also have pre-determined 

conditions that when satisfied tells a subordinate when the desired end state has been 

reached. End state and conditions help the commander to measure the effectiveness 

of his subordinate’s actions in achieving a decision and accomplishing the mission. 

See appendix C.

Mission tactics is the assignment of a mission to a subordinate without specifying 

how the mission must be accomplished. It is a key tenet of maneuver warfare. 

The higher commander describes the mission and explains its purpose. The 

subordinate commander determines the tactics needed to accomplish the task 

based on the mission and the higher commander’s intent. Each leader can act 

quickly as the situation changes without passing information up the chain of 

command and waiting for orders to come back down.

At the conclusion of mission analysis the commander issues his commander’s 

planning guidance. Planning guidance may be either broad or very detailed 

depending on the commander and the time and information available. Whatever the 

nature of this guidance, it must convey the essence of the commander’s vision. This 

guidance should include the commander’s vision of decisive and shaping actions 

and desired effects on the enemy. This assists the staff in applying the elements of 

the battlefield framework in developing courses of action. The commander’s 

planning guidance may also include phases of the operation, targeting guidance, 

location and timing of critical events and other aspects of the operations the 

commander considers important. The commander’s planning guidance assists the 

staff in developing and wargaming courses of action and other planning activities.
Marine Corps Operations 6-17

Decisive Action

The purpose of all military operations is mission success. Decisive action 

achieves mission success with the least loss of time, equipment and, most 

importantly, lives. It causes a favorable change in the situation or causes the 

threat to change or cease planned and current activities. When a commander 

seeks battle, he seeks victory: accomplishment of the assigned mission that 

leads to further significant gains for the force as a whole. Tactical battles are 

planned for their overall operational and strategic effect. Consequences of a 

tactical engagement should lead to achieving operational and strategic goals. 

The goal is not just for the MAGTF commander to achieve a decision, but to 

ensure that decision has greater meaning by contributing to the success of his 

senior commander’s operation or campaign. For an action to be truly decisive, 

it must lead to a result larger than the action itself. Decisive action creates an 

environment where the enemy has either lost the physical capability or his will 

to resist. Forcing the enemy to reach a culminating point could be a decisive 

action by a defending force. A culminating point is that point in time and space 

where an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender and/

or an attacker’s momentum can no longer be sustained. A culminating point 

for a defender is that point in time when a defender must withdraw to preserve 

his force.

Decisive action may occur anywhere and at any time in the single battle. Any of 

the MAGTF’s three major subordinate commands can achieve a decision. The 

ACE and the GCE normally achieve a decision through combat. The CSSE may 

be called upon to achieve a decision in MOOTW; e.g., humanitarian assistance. 

The commander considers the following in planning decisive action:

l What are the enemy’s intentions?

l What are the centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities?

l What is the battlespace and is it appropriate to the MAGTF’s capabilities?

l What are the effects necessary to achieve a decision?

l Are the command relationships appropriate to the mission and battlespace?

l Have proper missions been assigned to the main effort, supporting efforts, and 

the reserve?

l How to synchronize the actions of the major subordinate commands?

l Does the MAGTF have the resources to accomplish the mission within the 

battlespace assigned?

l Have the MAGTF’s resources been allocated and apportioned properly?

l Can the MAGTF be sustained in its effort to achieve a decision?
6-18 MCDP 1-0

l Can the MAGTF accomplish the mission without reaching a 

culminating point?

l How does the MAGTF commander recognize whether the MAGTF succeeded 

in executing the plan? 

l How does the commander assess success and whether changes must be made?

Decisive action at the MAGTF level involves more than just fire and maneuver. 

The MAGTF commander arranges a series of battles or engagements to achieve a 

decision. The commander arranges the actions of the MAGTF in terms of time, 

space, and resources to generate combat power at the decisive time and place.

Shaping Actions

The MAGTF commander sets the conditions for decisive action by conducting 

shaping actions to achieve desired effects. Shaping is all lethal and nonlethal 

activities conducted throughout the battlespace to influence a threat capability, 

force or the enemy commander’s decision. The commander shapes the 

battlespace principally by creating conditions to protect friendly critical 

vulnerabilities and attack enemy critical vulnerabilities. In many cases, the 

MAGTF can achieve much of its own shaping. The objective of shaping actions 

might include—

l Limit enemy freedom of action.

l Deny the enemy the capability to concentrate forces.

l Deceive the enemy as to friendly intentions.

l Destroy enemy capabilities.

l Alter the tempo of operations.

l Gain and maintain momentum.

l Influence perceptions of the enemy, allies, and noncombatants.

Shaping can have a favorable impact on friendly forces. The sense of being on 

the offensive and taking the fight to the enemy helps to maintain morale and 

foster offensive spirit for later decisive actions. Shaping incorporates a wide array 

of functions and capabilities to achieve desired effects and is more than just fires 

and targeting. It may include, but is not limited to, direct attack, psychological 

operations, electronic warfare, deception, civil affairs, information management, 

public affairs, engineer operations, and preventive medical services. Logistics 

operations, such as the marshalling of critical ammunition, fuel, and supplies to 

facilitate future operations, shape both friendly and threat forces.
Marine Corps Operations 6-19

Shaping makes the enemy vulnerable to attack, impedes or diverts his attempts to 

maneuver, aids the MAGTF’s maneuver, and otherwise dictates the time and 

place for decisive action. It forces the enemy to abandon their course of action 

and adopt a course of action favorable to the MAGTF. Shaping actions must be 

relevant to the envisioned decisive action. The commander attempts to shape 

events in a way that allows him several options, so that by the time the moment 

for decisive action arrives, he is not restricted to only one course of action. The 

goal of shaping is to eliminate the enemy’s capability to fight effectively before 

the MAGTF initiates decisive action. As stated in MCDP 5, ideally, when the 

decisive moment arrives, the issue has been resolved. Our actions leading to this 

point have so shaped the conditions that the result is a matter of course.

BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

This framework describes how the commander will organize his battlespace and 

his forces to achieve a decision. The battlefield framework consists of the 

battlespace organization of envisioned deep, close, and rear tactical operations as 

well as the organization of the force into the main effort, reserve, and security. 

Supporting efforts are addressed in the context of deep, close, and rear operations 

as part of the single battle. The battlefield framework provides the commander 

and his staff with an organized way to ensure that they consider in planning and 

execution all essential elements of successful military operations.

INTEGRATED PLANNING

Integrated planning is a disciplined approach that is systematic, coordinated, and 

thorough. It uses the warfighting functions to integrate the planning and supervise 

execution. Planners use integrated planning to consider all relevant factors, 

reduce omissions, and share information across the warfighting functions.

Integrated planning is essential to eliminate “stove pipe” planning when individual 

planners, staff sections, and functional areas plan in a vacuum, without 

coordination with others. This approach often results in disjointed plans and 

execution that is not synchronized. Staffs will produce more useful operation plans 

and orders and commanders will realize more synchronized operations across the 

elements of the MAGTF with increased tempo.

The warfighting functions are used extensively in integrated planning. 

Commanders and staffs use warfighting functions as a planning framework. Their 

use ensures that the commander and his planners consider all critical functional 

areas when planning and making decisions. Warfighting functions are planning 

and execution tools used by planners and subject matter experts in each of the 
6-20 MCDP 1-0

functional areas to produce comprehensive plans that are integrated with the 

other warfighting functions. This integration of the planning effort helps the 

commander to achieve unity of effort.

SINGLE BATTLE

The MAGTF commander conducts operations within the context of the single 

battle. Single battle allows the commander to effectively focus the efforts of all 

MAGTF elements of the force to accomplish his mission. Within the single 

battle, the commander conducts centralized planning while fostering 

decentralized execution allowing subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative 

and exploit opportunities. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and 

coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is 

essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the 

uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat.

A commander must always view his AO as an indivisible entity. Operations or 

events in one part of the AO may have profound and often unintended effects on 

other areas and events. While the AO may be conceptually divided to assist 

centralized planning and decentralized execution, the commander’s intent ensures 

unity of effort by fighting a single battle. The asymmetrical nature of the 

MAGTF elements makes this particularly critical to the success of the MAGTF’s 

operations. See figure 6-4.

Under single battle, the AO consists of three major areas—deep, close, and 

rear—where distinctly different operations are performed. These operations are 

not necessarily restricted to or characterized by distance or location in the AO. 

They are functional actions that must be accomplished for other functions to be 

effective. The MAGTF does not merely divide the battlespace up with the ACE 

taking the deep, the GCE taking the close, and the CSSE taking the rear area. The 

MAGTF commander is in charge and is responsible for the entire battle. To 

synchronize actions within the single battle, the commander must determine 

what, where, when, and how to apply the warfighting functions.

While the MAGTF commander desires to defeat the enemy in a single battle or 

engagement, it may be beyond the capabilities of the MAGTF to achieve this. 

Thus, MAGTF operations may need to be phased. All actions and phases must be 

connected and focused on achieving a decision. This arrangement of forces in 

time and space to generate sufficient combat power to achieve a decision is the 

result of detailed and integrated planning.
Marine Corps Operations 6-21

Deep Operations

Deep operations shape the battlespace to influence future operations. They seek 

to create windows of opportunity for decisive action, restrict the enemy’s 

freedom of action, and disrupt the cohesion and tempo of his operations. Deep 

operations help the commander seize the initiative and set the conditions for close 

operations. Because of its operational reach, deep operations are primarily 

conducted by the ACE, although the GCE and CSSE may play significant roles. 

MAGTF intelligence assets; e.g., force reconnaissance and signals intelligence 

and ACE and GCE surveillance and reconnaissance assets (UAVs and ground 

surveillance radars) contribute to the conduct of deep operations.

Figure 6-4. Single Battle.
6-22 MCDP 1-0

The commander focuses on attacking enemy capabilities—moral and 

physical—that most directly contribute to the accomplishment of his mission. 

Deep operations should exploit or create these critical enemy vulnerabilities. 

Deep operations normally focus on the enemy’s follow-on and supporting 

forces, command and control nodes, and key lines of communications or 

facilities. Deep operations may require coordination and integration with 

national-level assets and joint forces. They may include—

l Interdiction through fires and maneuver.

l Surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition.

l IO such as deception or psychological operations.

l Offensive antiair warfare.

Close Operations

Close operations project power against enemy forces in immediate contact and 

are often the decisive actions. These operations require speed and mobility to 

rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place 

and exploit success. Close operations are dominated by fire and maneuver 

conducted by combined arms forces from the GCE and the ACE. Combined arms 

forces maneuver to enhance the effects of their fires and fire to enhance their 

ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the 

enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy’s ability to 

interfere with that maneuver. Commanders prioritize fires to weight the main 

effort and to focus combat power to achieve effects that lead to a decision. The 

effects of fires can be massed to strike the enemy at the decisive point and time, 

while reducing the risks to the force entailed in massing maneuver forces at a 

single point or in a single portion of the battlespace.

Rear Operations

Rear operations support deep and close operations and facilitate future 

operations. Security is inherent in rear operations. Sustainment must not be 

interrupted and assets must be protected. Rear operations ensure the freedom of 

action of the force and provide continuity of operations, logistics, and command 

and control. Rear area operations deny the use of the rear area to the enemy. To 

minimize the logistical footprint, rear operations may require the maximum use 

of sea-basing, push logistics, host-nation support, and existing infrastructure. 

Rear operations are conducted by all MAGTF elements.

Rear area operations are evolutionary in nature. As the operation progresses, the 

geographic location, command and control structure, and the organization of the 
Marine Corps Operations 6-23

rear area can be expected to change. The broad functions of rear area operations, 

as delineated in joint and Marine Corps doctrine, include—

l Communications.

l Intelligence.

l Sustainment.

l Security.

l Movement.

l Area management.

l Infrastructure development.

l Host-nation support.

To provide command and control of rear area operations, the commander may 

assign a rear area coordinator or commander with specific, designated functions. 

He usually establishes a rear area operations center to assist in the conduct and 

coordination of those functions of rear area operations assigned. For more 

information, see MCWP 3-41.1, Rear Area Operations.

Noncontiguous and Contiguous

The battlefield framework may reflect linear operations where there is a 

continuous and contiguous array of units across the AO and through the depth of 

the deep, close, and rear areas. A more likely situation is one where the MAGTF 

conducts nonlinear operations within a noncontiguous battlespace and within an 

operational framework with noncontiguous deep, close, and rear areas. Operation 

Restore Hope in Somalia (1992–1993) is an example of a battlefield framework 

with noncontiguous areas. The MAGTF’s rear area was centered around the 

separate sites of the embassy compound, port, and airfield in the city of 

Mogadishu, while its close area was widely scattered around the towns and 

villages of the interior that were occupied by the MAGTF. The MAGTF’s deep 

area included the rest of the country and particularly those population and relief 

centers not under the joint force commander's supervision.

The MAGTF commander must be well versed in the capabilities and limitations 

of his forces and their role in deep, close, and rear operations to conduct the 

single battle. He must consider that there may be deep, close, and rear operations 

at every level of command. For example, a subordinate commander’s deep 

operations may constitute part of the higher commander’s close operations. See 

figure 6-5 on page 6-24.
6-24 MCDP 1-0

By conceptually dividing the AO and using the warfighting functions to conduct 

integrated planning for each area, the commander ensures the coordination of 

his forces in executing the single battle. It is important to remember that the 

enemy’s disposition and actions will seldom coincide with how the Marine 

commander has organized his AO. Therefore, the commander’s planning and 

execution must be flexible enough to accommodate this difference and exploit 

resulting opportunities.

MAIN AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS

The main effort is a central concept of maneuver warfare. It calls for concentrating 

efforts on achieving objectives that lead to victory. The main effort is that unit 

assigned to accomplish the mission or task critical to mission success. The main 

effort normally is that unit with which the commander plans to conduct the decisive 

action and it should be selected, reinforced, and supported accordingly. The 

commander assigns the main effort to a specifically designated subordinate unit. 

Figure 6-5. Battlespace Organization.
Marine Corps Operations 6-25

The commander focuses the combat power of the force against enemy critical 

vulnerabilities in a bold bid to achieve decisive results. The main effort may be 

viewed as a harmonizing force for subordinate’s initiative.

The main effort may be from any MAGTF element or force assigned. MCDP 1-3 

says the commander provides the bulk of his combat power or other assets to the 

main effort to maintain momentum and ensure accomplishment of the mission. 

These assets may include not only maneuver forces but also capabilities that 

enhance the main effort’s ability to accomplish its mission. The commander 

normally gives the main effort priority of various types of support. It is also 

provided with the greatest mobility and the preponderance of combat support and 

combat service support. However, overburdening the main effort with 

unnecessary assets can degrade its ability to move rapidly and decisively. The 

reserve is positioned to best exploit the main effort’s success.

The commander may concentrate the combat power of the main effort by 

assigning it a narrower zone of action or reducing its AO. In summary, the 

commander weights the main effort by task-organizing his force or by providing 

priority of—

l Air support.

l Fire support assets.

l Transportation and mobility assets such as heavy equipment transporters, 

assault support helicopters, bridging, and obstacle clearing engineer support.

l Combat service support to preclude the main effort from reaching the 

culminating point prematurely. This support might include mobile CSSEs, 

critical supplies like fuel and ammunition, and exchange or rapid repair of 

essential equipment.

l Specialized units or capabilities, such as civil affairs or psychological 

operations units during MOOTW.

l Personnel replacements.

l Command and control support.

l Intelligence support.

The commander disguises the main effort until it is too late for the enemy to react 

to it in strength. He accomplishes this through demonstrations and feints, 

security, cover and concealment, and by dispersing his forces until the last instant 

and achieving mass at the critical time and place.

Supporting efforts help shape the battlespace in support of the main effort’s 

envisioned decisive action. Faced with a decision, commanders of supporting 
6-26 MCDP 1-0

efforts must ask themselves how can I best support the main effort? Conversely, 

they must avoid actions that do not contribute to the success of the main effort. 

There may be more than one supporting effort in support of the main effort.

Massing of combat power to support the main effort may require time and 

additional transportation assets to marshal the necessary support. Task 

organization of supporting units may also be required to provide responsive and 

flexible support.

Commanders apply the principle of economy of force to supporting efforts. They 

make effective use of available assets needed to support the main effort, while 

conserving others for future actions. MCDP 1-3 states that forces not in a position 

to directly support the main effort should be used to indirectly support it. For 

example, a commander may use other forces to deceive the enemy as to the 

location of the main effort. Such forces might be used to distract the enemy or to 

tie down enemy forces that might otherwise reinforce the threatened point. The 

commander weighs the value of the deception against the cost in terms of forces 

and assets needed to portray a credible force. Uncommitted forces can be used in 

this effort by maneuvering them in feints and demonstrations that keep the enemy 

off balance.

The reserve may be tasked to support the main effort and often will become the 

main effort when employed. It is important for the commander to ensure that the 

reserve is not assigned nonessential tasks that degrade its ability to respond 

rapidly to fleeting opportunities created by the main effort or to reinforce the 

main effort at the decisive time and place.

While a commander always designates a main effort, it may shift—either planned 

or unplanned—during the course of a battle as events unfold. Because events and 

the enemy are unpredictable, few battles flow exactly as the commander has 

planned. A supporting effort may achieve unexpected success during execution. 

As a result, the commander must make adjustments. After assessing the changing 

situation, he may designate the supporting effort as the main effort. Commanders 

of supporting efforts must be prepared to assume the role of the main effort as the 

situation changes as a result of emerging opportunities or unforeseen setbacks.

There may be costs in shifting the main effort. The larger the organization, the 

more costly this shift may be. The costs include the time and effort to shift 

resources and priority of support (fires, supply, transportation, medical, 

engineering). The commander must weigh the benefits and costs for shifting the 

main effort. He should only shift the main effort when he is convinced this will 

lead to decisive action.
Marine Corps Operations 6-27

The flexibility inherent in Marine aviation allows the commander to shift the 

main effort to the ACE rapidly and usually with significantly less repositioning of 

resources than other forces of the MAGTF. Normally the greatest impact on the 

ACE is that the new tasks resulting from the shift of the main effort may not be 

performed as timely or with the optimum combination of forces and ordnance as 

the previously planned tasks. Forces may be required to reorganize and plan new 

missions or to redirect previously planned missions designed to attack specific 

targets against new targets.

To conduct decisive actions and to weight the main effort sufficiently so that he 

can achieve a decision, the commander must organize his assigned and attached 

forces for specific missions and tasks. This process of allocating available assets 

to subordinate commanders and establishing appropriate command and 

supporting relations is called task-organizing. The grouping of forces or units to 

accomplish a specific mission or task is task organization. Marine Corps forces 

are task-organized routinely and are used to operate in task forces to accomplish 

specific missions and then rapidly resume their duties with their parent command. 

While taking advantage of the close coordination and cooperation realized by 

units with habitual relations with other units; e.g., Marine artillery units 

habitually support certain infantry regiments, these forces are agile enough to 

assume a new supporting relationship or attachment to a different unit.

The ability to rapidly tailor Marine Corps forces through task organization to 

accomplish a wide array of missions or tasks allows the commander to effectively 

and efficiently use the forces and assets available to him. It is incumbent on the 

commander to understand the capabilities and limitations of the forces available 

to develop the best possible task organizations. He must also realize that the 

creation of a task-organized force will take some time and may have an affect on 

his forces’ tempo. Frequent or gratuitous task-organizing may actually reduce the 

effectiveness of the force.

THE RESERVE

The reserve is an essential tool used by the commander to exploit success. The 

reserve is part of the commander’s combat power initially withheld from action 

in order to influence future action and deal with emerging opportunities or a 

crisis. The reserve provides the commander the flexibility to react to unforeseen 

developments. Often a commander’s most difficult and important decision 

concerns the time, place, and circumstances for committing the reserve. While 

the commander sometimes must employ his reserve to deal with a crisis, he 

should always attempt to use the reserve to reinforce success and exploit 

opportunities to achieve a decision. The commander uses his reserve to restore 
6-28 MCDP 1-0

momentum to a stalled attack, defeat enemy counterattacks, and exploit success. 

Once committed, the reserve’s actions normally become the decisive operation. 

Every effort is made to reconstitute another reserve from units made available by 

the revised situation. Since the reserve is often the commander’s bid to achieve a 

decision, it is usually designated the main effort when committed. The reserve is 

not to be used as a follow and support force or a follow and assume force.

The reserve should be as strong a force as possible with appropriate mobility and 

firepower. Its strength and location will vary with its contemplated mission, the 

form of maneuver, the terrain, the possible enemy reaction, and the clarity of the 

situation. The commander should organize, equip, and rehearse the reserve for 

the intended mission. He should not constitute his reserve by weakening his 

decisive operation. A reserve must have mobility equal to or greater than the 

most dangerous enemy threat, and it must be able to fight the most dangerous 

enemy threat. The more uncertain the situation, the larger should be the reserve. 

When the situation is obscure, the reserve may consist initially of the bulk of the 

force, centrally located and prepared to be employed at any point. The 

commander only needs to provide a small reserve to respond to unanticipated 

enemy reactions when he has detailed information about the enemy. However, 

the reserve must always be sufficient to exploit success.

The commander must also consider intangible factors when selecting and tasking 

a reserve, including the proficiency, leadership, morale, fatigue and combat 

losses, and maintenance and supply status of the unit. Care is taken in the 

positioning of the reserve to balance force protection requirements with the 

imperative to best position the reserve to enhance its ability to exploit 

opportunities. When committed, the reserve—as the main effort—receives 

priority for resources and services.

SECURITY

Security is inherent in all MATGF operations and includes those measures taken 

by a military unit, an activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts 

designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. See chapter 11. Security 

operations are an element of overall force protection measures that must be 

conducted in all operations, whether offense or defense. Sound security 

operations are based on—

l Orientation. Security forces position themselves between the main force and 

the enemy. Security elements depend on the movement of the main force. The 

operations of the security force must be closely coordinated with the concept 

of operations.
Marine Corps Operations 6-29

l Reconnaissance. Security forces conduct reconnaissance, which seeks to 

reduce unknowns for the commander. The security force reduces the chance of 

surprise to friendly forces.

l Early and Accurate Warning. Unless warning of an enemy threat reaches the 

commander in time for him to react, the warning is useless. An erroneous 

warning may be as detrimental as no warning as all.

l Reaction Time and Maneuver Space. The security force gives the 

commander the time and space to counteract an enemy threat. A security force 

executes its mission to the greatest depth possible based on its capabilities and 

the tactical situation.

l Gain and Maintain Contact. Security forces seek to gain contact with the 

enemy as early as possible. Based on the assigned mission and the capabilities 

of the security force, contact may vary from observation to combat. Contact is 

normally not broken off without permission from higher headquarters because 

accurate information about the enemy’s location, disposition, and movement 

prevents surprise by the enemy. However, the requirement to maintain contact 

must be balanced with the friendly concept of operations.

l Conduct Counterreconnaissance. Counterreconnaissance is an important 

aspect of all security operations. It is all measures taken to prevent hostile 

observation of a force, area or place.

l Mobility. Security forces normally require mobility equal or greater than that 

of the enemy. In mountains, dense forests or built up urban areas, dismounted 

lighter forces may have greater relative mobility than mechanized forces. The 

inherent mobility of the ACE provides the MAGTF with an ideal force for the 

conduct of selected security operations.

PHASING

Phasing assists the commander and staff in planning and executing operations. 

The commander uses phasing to divide his vision for how he intends to 

accomplish his mission into portions that reflect the requirement to perform a 

major task to achieve a decision. A change in phase usually involves a change of 

a major task. I MEF offensive operations during Operation Desert Storm (1991) 

was conducted using the following phases:

l Phase I. Strategic air operations to attain air supremacy, attack Iraqi 

warmaking infrastructure, and destroy the Republican Guard.

l Phase II. Attainment of air supremacy in the Kuwait theater of operations and 

the suppression of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
6-30 MCDP 1-0

l Phase III. Preparation of the battlespace to reduce the combat effectiveness of 

the enemy in the Kuwait theater of operations, specifically the reduction of 

Iraqi armor and artillery by 50 percent and FROG (free rocket over ground) 

missiles and multiple rocket launchers by 100 percent.

l Phase IV. Ground offensive operations.

Commanders should establish clear conditions for the initiation and termination 

of each phase. While phases are distinguishable by friendly forces, they should 

not be readily apparent to the enemy. The commander should take whatever 

actions necessary to conceal from the enemy the distinctions and, most 

especially, the transitions between phases.

Phases may be further subdivided into stages to provide greater detail in planning 

and enhance control and coordination in execution. I MEF’s Phase IV ground 

offensive operations consisted of—

l Stage A. Penetration of forward Iraqi defenses.

l Stage B. Exploit the success of the penetration to destroy Iraqi forces in zone.

l Stage C. Consolidate to prevent reinforcement or escape of Iraqi forces 

in zone.

Phases and stages should be aligned as closely as possible with those adopted by 

higher headquarters to reduce confusion during transition from one phase or stage 

to another and to enhance coordinated efforts.

OPERATION PLANS AND ORDERS

Operation plans and orders communicate the commander’s intent, guidance, and 

decisions in a clear, useful, and timely form. They should be easily understood by 

those who must execute the order. Operation plans and orders should only 

contain critical or new information—not routine information and procedures 

normally found in standing operating procedures.

Plans and orders should be the product of integrated planning to eliminate 

stovepiping of information. Critical information, such as the mission, 

commander’s intent, and tactical tasking should be prominently positioned in the 

basic order. Concepts of maneuver, fires, and support should also be in the basic 

order. Planners need to reconcile plans and orders to ensure all critical 

information is presented. Comparison or “crosswalking” of the plan or order with 

those of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands help to identify conflicts or 

omissions and achieve unity of effort. The operation plan or order is the source of 
Marine Corps Operations 6-31

authority on the operation, not briefing slides and e-mail messages. Chiefs of 

staff must maintain close control over versions and changes to the plan or order 

to ensure unauthorized changes do not get promulgated and that the approved 

version is properly disseminated.

TRANSITIONING BETWEEN PLANNING AND EXECUTION

The actions of the commander and the staff during the transition from planning to 

execution may be of critical importance in accomplishing the mission. Transition 

ensures a successful shift from planning to execution. It enhances the situational 

awareness of those who must execute the plan, maintains the intent of the concept 

of operations, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo. Transition 

facilitates the synchronization of plans between higher and subordinate 

commands and aids in integrated planning by ensuring the synchronization of the 

warfighting functions. At the MAGTF level (where the planners may not be the 

executors), transition provides a full understanding of the plan to those who were 

not involved in its development. 

Transition occurs at all levels of command. A formal transition normally occurs 

on staffs with separate planning and execution teams. Planning time and 

personnel may be limited at lower levels of command, such as the regiment, 

aircraft group, or below. Therefore, transition may take place intuitively as the 

planners are also the executors. Transition may be accomplished through the 

assignment of a plan proponent—a planner who aids the executors in interpreting 

and applying the plan in action—and through participation in transition briefs, 

drills, and a confirmation brief. Confirmation briefs are a particularly valuable 

technique to ensure synchronization or nesting of higher, adjacent, and 

subordinate command’s plans.

EXECUTION

Execution of MAGTF operations is the concerted action of the commander and 

his forces to conduct operations based on the operation plan or order, modified as 

the current tactical situation dictates, to achieve the commander’s end state and 

accomplish the mission. The commander and his forces must seize and retain the 

initiative, create overwhelming tempo, establish and maintain momentum, 

achieve desired effects, exploit success, and successfully finish the operation. He 

commands the activities of his various subordinate units and assesses the success 

of those activities in obtaining the goals of the operation.

The commander, assisted by his deputy commander and the staff, must control or 

coordinate the activities of all of the MAGTF elements. These activities include 
6-32 MCDP 1-0

the movement and maneuver of the force, coordination and control of fires, 

collection of intelligence, sustainment and protection of the force, and assessment 

of these activities to determine the progress of the command in achieving the 

desired end state. He must command the force and supervise the activities of his 

subordinate commanders in carrying out his mission and intent.

Command and Control

MCDP 6 states that no single activity in war is more important than command 

and control. It is the means by which the commander recognizes what needs to be 

done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control 

provides purpose and direction to the varied activities of a military unit. If done 

well, command and control adds to the strength of the force—if done poorly, it 

may be a liability to the force.

JP 1-02 defines command as the authority that a commander in the Armed Forces 

lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command 

includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources 

and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. The 

commander must effectively command the activities of his subordinate 

commanders during operations. His span of control should not exceed his 

capability to effectively command.

Command in battle incorporates two vital skills—the ability to decide and the 

ability to lead. They integrate a commander’s vision of the situation and 

battlespace and how he plans to achieve his desired end state with leading, 

guiding, and motivating subordinates. These two skills are tightly interwoven and 

are the central factors from which the warfighting functions are integrated to 

create combat power and conduct expeditionary maneuver warfare.

Leadership is the influencing of people to work toward the accomplishment of a 

common objective and is essential to effective command. While the component, 

MAGTF, and major subordinate command commanders exercise leadership by 

visualizing and describing how the operation will be conducted, commanders at 

lower levels accomplish the goals of the operation by motivating and directing 

the actions of their units.

The ability to command and control an organization is enhanced when the 

commander decentralizes decisionmaking authority as much as each situation 

allows. This means that commanders on the scene and closest to the events have 

the latitude to deal with the situation as required on their own authority—but 

always in accordance with the higher commander’s intent. Decentralization 
Marine Corps Operations 6-33

speeds up reaction time: the commander does not have to wait for information to 

flow up to a higher commander and orders to flow back down. Confidence in the 

abilities of subordinates is an important part in decentralization. Leaders who 

have confidence in their subordinates will feel more comfortable in granting them 

greater latitude in accomplishing tasks. It fosters a climate where senior leaders 

know that their intent will be carried out.

Control can generally be divided into two types: centralized and decentralized. 

Centralized control tends to work from the top down: the commander determines 

what his subordinates will and will not do. Decentralized control works from the 

bottom up. While cooperation is required for both types of control, it is essential 

in decentralized control. Subordinates work together laterally and from the 

bottom up to accomplish tasks that fulfill the commander’s intent.

Battle rhythm is an important aspect of command and control. The commander 

must ensure that the planning, decision, and operating cycles of his command are 

nested or linked to that of his higher headquarters and that his subordinate 

commanders synchronize their battle rhythms with his headquarters. Ensuring 

information and requests for support are forwarded to higher headquarters in time 

for that headquarters to act increases the likelihood that the command will obtain 

the desired support or effects. Some of the planning, decision, and operating 

cycles that influence the battle rhythm of the command include the intelligence 

collection cycle, targeting cycle, air tasking order cycle, reconnaissance tasking 

cycle, and the battle damage assessment collection cycle. 

Effective decisionmaking is essential to command and control. Commanders 

develop information management processes to ensure access to timely and useful 

information to make decisions. Information management is the processes and 

techniques the command uses to obtain, manipulate, direct, control, and 

safeguard information. Sound information management practices facilitates the 

rapid, distributed, and unconstrained flow of information in all directions—to 

higher headquarters, adjacent units, and subordinate commanders. Information 

management policies and procedures enable the staff to determine the 

importance, quality, and timeliness of information to provide the commander 

with focused information to prevent information overload.

Assessment

Assessment is the continuous appraisal of military operations to determine 

progress toward established goals. It answers the commander’s question “How 

are we doing?” It helps the commander recognize whether his planned activities 

are achieving their desired effects and whether he has to modify or cease those 

activities to achieve his desired end state. Assessment is continuous and is 
6-34 MCDP 1-0

focused on the overall effectiveness of the command in achieving the 

commander’s goals. Assessment is the basis for the commander’s decisions 

concerning future actions. It allows him to rapidly act to exploit unexpected 

success or opportunity and to counter unanticipated enemy success.

Successful assessment requires a commander who can clearly and accurately 

visualize the battlespace and the operation. It requires situational awareness on 

the part of the commander that allows him to recognize the difference between 

the desired effects and the actual effects of the operation. This perceived 

difference between what was planned and what actually happened then becomes 

the catalyst for decisionmaking.

Commanders assess their operation’s effectiveness by measuring how successful 

they have been in completing the tasks stated or inherent in their mission. They 

determine if operations have met the conditions previously established that 

support an upcoming decision by the commander or if the task has been 

completed. Conditions should be linked to the purpose of the task and be 

understandable, relevant, and measurable. Since some conditions are necessarily 

complex, commanders and their staffs may also use measures of effectiveness to 

further describe those conditions that must be met before a task is completed or a 

new phase of the operation can commence. Measures of effectiveness are 

indicators that demonstrate the degree to which a condition has been satisfied. 

They provide the commander with a tangible indicator of how close he is to 

achieving his desired conditions.

The intelligence collection effort, as well as the overall combat reporting process 

in the force, must focus on providing timely and useful information to the 

commander to aid him in his assessment of operations. The fulfillment of CCIRs 

and priority intelligence requirements will often be critical in determining 

whether the task has been completed and the conditions exist to support transition 

from one phase of the operation to another. While assessment routinely takes 

place throughout the planning, deployment, and redeployment phases of an 

operation it is truly essential during execution.

TACTICAL TENETS

Actions at the tactical level of war are the building blocks the MAGTF 

commander uses to achieve operational success and fulfill the joint force 

commander’s operational goals. Every action the MAGTF commander and the 

major subordinate element commanders take is aimed at achieving the senior 

commander's goals and accomplishing their mission. The tactical level of war is 

the province of combat. It includes the maneuver of forces to gain a fighting 
Marine Corps Operations 6-35

advantage; the use and coordination of fires; the sustainment of forces throughout 

combat; the immediate exploitation of success; and the combination of different 

arms and weapons—all to cause the enemy’s defeat. It is the MAGTF that 

conducts these tactical operations through the major subordinate commands that 

execute these tactical operations. See appendix D.

Successful execution of Marine Corps tactics requires the thoughtful application of 

a number of tactical tenets to succeed on the battlefield. Key among them are 

achieving a decision, gaining advantage, tempo, adapting, and exploiting success 

and finishing. They do not stand alone but are combined to achieve an effect 

greater than their separate sum. Part of the art of tactics is knowing where and when 

to apply these tenets and how to combine them to achieve the desired effect.

Achieving a Decision

The objective of tactics is to achieve military success through a decision in battle. 

In combat, the success the commander seeks is victory—not a partial or marginal 

outcome, but a victory that settles the issue in his favor and contributes to the 

success of the overall campaign.

Achieving a decision is not easy. The enemy’s skill and determination may 

prevent even a victorious commander from achieving the decision he seeks. 

Commanders must not engage in battle without envisioning a larger result for 

their actions.

Perfect understanding of the situation or a highly detailed plan is useless if the 

commander is not prepared to act decisively. When the opportunity arrives, the 

commander must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of 

combat power he can muster and pushing the force to the limits of exhaustion. 

Key to this effort is identifying enemy critical vulnerabilities, shaping the 

operating area to gain an advantage, designating a main effort to focus the 

MAGTF’s combat power, and acting in a bold and relentless manner.

Forcing a successful decision requires the commander to be bold and relentless. 

Boldness refers to daring and aggressiveness in behavior. It is one of the basic 

requirements for achieving clear-cut outcomes. The commander must have a 

desire to “win big,” even if he realizes that in many situations the conditions for 

victory may not yet be present. Relentlessness refers to pursuing the established 

goal single-mindedly and without let up. Once he has an advantage, he should 

exploit it to the fullest. He should not ease up, but instead increase the pressure. 

Victory in combat is rarely the product of the initial plan, but rather of 

relentlessly exploiting any advantage, no matter how small, until it succeeds.
6-36 MCDP 1-0

Gaining Advantage

Combat is a test of wills where the object is to win. One way to win is to gain and 

exploit every possible advantage. The commander uses maneuver and surprise 

whenever possible. He employs complementary forces as combined arms. He 

exploits the terrain, weather, and times of darkness to his advantage. He traps the 

enemy by fires and maneuver. He fights asymmetrically to gain added advantage. 

He strives to gain an advantage over the enemy by exploiting every aspect of a 

situation to achieve victory, not by overpowering the enemy's strength with his 

own strength.

Combined Arms

Combined arms is a Marine Corps core competency. The use of combined arms 

is a key means of gaining advantage. Combined arms presents the enemy not 

merely with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation. The commander 

combines supporting arms, organic fires, and maneuver in such a way that any 

action the enemy takes to avoid one threat makes him more vulnerable to another.

Modern tactics is combined arms tactics. It combines the effects of various 

arms—infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation—to achieve the greatest possible 

effect against the enemy. The strengths of the arms complement and reinforce 

each other. At the same time, weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each arm are 

protected or offset by the capabilities of the other.

The MAGTF is a perfect example of a balanced combined arms team. For 

example, an entrenched enemy discovers that if he stays in fighting holes, Marine 

infantry will close with and destroy him. If he comes out to attack, Marine 

artillery and aviation will blast him. If he tries to retreat, Marine mechanized and 

aviation forces will pursue him to his destruction. Combined arms tactics is 

standard practice and second nature for all Marines.

Exploiting the Environment

The use of the environment offers tremendous opportunities to gain advantage 

over the enemy. Marines must train for and understand the characteristics of any 

environment where they may have to operate: jungle, desert, mountain, arctic, 

riverine or urban. More importantly, Marines must understand how the terrain, 

weather, and periods of darkness or reduced visibility impact on their own and 

the enemy’s ability to fight.

In addition to the physical aspects of the environment, Marines must consider the 

impact on the operation by the people and the culture, political and social 

organization, and any external agencies or organizations that exist within the AO. 
Marine Corps Operations 6-37

As most expeditionary operations take place in the world’s littoral regions that 

are more densely populated and contain more urban areas than the hinterlands, 

Marines must plan for and be prepared to conduct more civil-military operations.

Complementary Forces

Complementary forces—the idea of fix-and-flank—are an important way of 

gaining advantage. The commander seeks to crush the enemy—as between a 

hammer and an anvil—with two or more actions. With its two combat arms, the 

MAGTF has organic complementary and asymmetric forces. Ground combat 

forces may attack an enemy in one direction and dimension, while aviation combat 

forces are attacking from another direction and dimension. This capability places 

the enemy in a dilemma. The opponent is now vulnerable to one or the other of the 

two combat forces. He has no protection against both-no matter how he moves he 

is exposed.

One of the complementary forces may take a direct, obvious action to fix the 

enemy. The other force takes the unexpected or extraordinary action. These two 

actions work together against the enemy. The two actions are inseparable and can 

be interchangeable in battle. The concept is basic, but it can be implemented in a 

variety of combinations limited only by imagination.

Surprise

Achieving surprise can greatly increase advantage. In fact, surprise can often 

prove decisive. The commander tries to achieve surprise through information 

operations that result in deception, stealth, and ambiguity.

The commander uses deception to mislead the enemy with regard to his real 

intentions and capabilities. By employing deception, he tries to cause the enemy 

to act in ways that will eventually prove prejudicial for them. He may use 

deception to mislead the enemy as to the time and location of a pending attack. 

He may use deception to create the impression that his forces are larger than they 

really are. Forces used to support deception operations must be appropriate to and 

of sufficient size to make the deception credible. The commander hopes the 

enemy will realize this deception only when it is too late for them to react.

Surprise can be generated through stealth. Stealth is used to advantage 

when maneuvering against an enemy. It provides less chance of detection 

by the enemy, leaving him vulnerable to surprise action for which he 

may be unprepared.

The commander can also achieve surprise through ambiguity. It is usually 

difficult to conceal all friendly movements from the enemy, but the commander 
6-38 MCDP 1-0

can sometimes confuse him as to the meaning of what he sees, especially his 

awareness of where the main effort is or where the commander has placed his bid 

for a decision. Clearly, the ambiguity created in the minds of the Iraqi high 

command by the amphibious force contributed to fixing the Iraqi forces, allowing 

coalition forces to succeed in Operation Desert Storm.

Asymmetry

Fighting asymmetrically means gaining advantage through imbalance, applying 

strength against an enemy weakness in an unexpected way. At the tactical level, 

fighting asymmetrically uses dissimilar techniques and capabilities to maximize 

the MAGTF’s strengths while exploiting enemy weaknesses. By fighting 

asymmetrically, the MAGTF does not have to be numerically superior to defeat 

the enemy. It only has to be able to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities in all 

dimensions. In MAGTF operations, using tanks to fight enemy artillery or attack 

helicopters against enemy tanks are examples of fighting asymmetrically. In 

these examples, the tanks’ and aircraft’s greater speed and mobility provides an 

advantage over the enemy. Fast moving tanks operating in the enemy’s rear 

against stationary or slow moving artillery can disrupt the enemy’s cohesion. 

Ambushing tanks with attack helicopters in terrain that hampers tank maneuver 

provides even greater effect and generates even more advantage. United States 

attack helicopters assisted in blunting a rapid and powerful North Vietnamese 

advance and destroyed the enemy’s armor using just such tactics during the 

Easter offensive of 1972 in the Republic of Vietnam.

Commanders must anticipate asymmetric actions and take measures to reduce the adversary’s advantage. An adversary may counter MAGTF 

strengths asymmetrically by conducting insurgency or terrorist

operations, such as the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, 

Lebanon (1983). He may try to use information operations to undermine 

alliances and influence public opinion.

Tempo

One of the most powerful weapons available to the commander is speed. The unit 

that can consistently move and act faster than its enemy has a powerful 

advantage. The ability to plan, decide, execute, and assess faster than the enemy 

creates advantage that commanders can exploit.

In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast, and there is a 

vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. Speed and time 

are closely related. In tactics, time is always of the utmost importance. Time 

that cannot be spent in action must be spent preparing for action and shaping 
Marine Corps Operations 6-39

conditions for decisive actions. If speed is a weapon, so is time. Speed and 

time create tempo. Tempo is the rate of military action and has significance 

only in relation to that of the enemy. When friendly tempo exceeds that of the 

enemy to react, friendly forces seize and maintain the initiative and have a 

marked advantage. 

Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is 

also a matter of timing—acting at the right time. The commander must be able to 

generate and maintain a fast pace when the situation calls for it and to recover 

when it will not hurt. Timing means knowing when to act and, equally important, 

when not to act. To be consistent, superiority in tempo must continue over time. 

It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then. When the 

friendly force is not moving faster, the advantage and initiative passes to the 

enemy. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but must then halt 

for a considerable period to recover. During that halt, they are likely to lose their 

advantage. While a force cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, the challenge 

is to be consistently faster than the enemy.

To act consistently faster than the enemy, it is necessary to do more than move 

quickly. It is also necessary to make rapid transitions from one action to another. 

While there are many types of transitions in combat, the important thing to 

remember is that transitions produce friction. Reduction of friction minimizes the 

loss of tempo that is generated at the point of transition. A unit that can make 

transitions faster and more smoothly than another can be said to have greater 

relative speed.

Adapting

War is characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, and rapid change. Each 

situation is a unique combination of shifting factors that cannot be controlled 

with precision or certainty. A tactically proficient leader must be able to adapt 

actions to each situation. For adaptation to be effective, commanders must 

readily exploit the opportunities uncovered by subordinates. While making the 

best possible preparations, they must welcome and take advantage of 

unforeseen opportunities.

There are two basic ways to adapt. Sometimes the commander has enough 

situational awareness to understand a situation in advance and take preparatory 

action. This is anticipation. At other times he has to adapt to the situation on the 

spur of the moment without time for preparation. This is improvisation. A 

successful commander must be able to do both.
6-40 MCDP 1-0

To anticipate, the commander must forecast future actions, at least to some 

extent. Forecasts are usually based on past experiences, learned through trial and 

error in training, exercises or actual combat. Planning is a form of anticipatory 

adaptation—adapting actions in advance. Another form of adaptation is 

immediate-action drills or standing operating procedures. These tools allow 

Marines to react immediately in a coordinated way to a broad variety of tactical 

situations. They provide the basis for adaptation.

Improvising is adjusting to a situation on the spur of the moment without any 

preparation. Improvisation requires creative, intelligent, and experienced leaders 

who have an intuitive appreciation for what will work and what will not. 

Improvisation is of critical importance to increasing speed. It requires 

commanders with a strong situational awareness and a firm understanding of 

their senior commander’s intent so that they can adjust their own actions in 

accordance with the higher commander’s desires.

Exploiting Success and Finishing

The successful commander exploits any advantage aggressively and relentlessly, 

not once, but repeatedly, until the opportunity arises for the finishing stroke. He 

uses this advantage to create opportunities. The commander builds on 

successfully exploited advantages to create new advantage, reflecting the 

changing situation resulting from both friendly and enemy adaptation. 

Advantages don’t have to be large—small favorable circumstances exploited 

repeatedly and aggressively can quickly multiply into decisive advantages. In the 

same way, the commander exploits opportunities to create others. Victories are 

usually the result of aggressively exploiting some advantage or opportunity until 

the action becomes decisive.

Such victories are realized through development and maintenance of momentum 

and the successful attack of enemy critical vulnerabilities. Momentum is the 

increase of combat power, gained from seizing the initiative and attacking 

aggressively and rapidly. Once the commander decides to exploit an advantage, 

he makes every effort to build momentum until the offensive becomes 

overwhelming and the objective is achieved. He should not sacrifice momentum 

to preserve the alignment of advancing units and he should drive hard at gaps in 

the enemy defense. The commander should not waste time or combat power on 

enemy units that cannot jeopardize the overall mission, choosing instead to fix 

them with minimal forces and bypass them with his main force. The commander 

exploits enemy weaknesses such as tactical errors, faulty dispositions, assailable 

flanks, poor or no preparation, lack of support, numerical and equipment 

inferiority, low morale, and predictable operational patterns.
Marine Corps Operations 6-41

Subordinates must be accustomed through practice and training to seize 

opportunities on their own volition. For example, a major subordinate 

commander should have a complete understanding of the MAGTF commander’s 

intent so that he will recognize a decisive opportunity and have the confidence to 

rapidly exploit the opportunity without further orders from the MAGTF 

commander. The commander exploits opportunities by conducting consolidation, 

exploitation or pursuit.

Exploiting advantages without applying the finishing stroke to defeat the enemy 

or achieve the objective cannot be decisive. Once the commander has created the 

opportunity to deliver the decisive blow he must strike the enemy vigorously and 

relentlessly, until the enemy is defeated. At the same time, the commander must 

exercise judgment to ensure that the force committed to the decisive action is not 

unduly or unintentionally made vulnerable to enemy counteraction. Rapid and 

accurate assessment by the MAGTF commander and his major subordinate 

commanders is critical in determining the appropriate time and place of the 

decisive action.

According to MCDP 1-3, tactical excellence is the hallmark of a Marine Corps 

leader. We fight and win in combat through our mastery of both the art and 

science of tactics. The art of tactics involves the creative and innovative use of 

maneuver warfare concepts, while the science of tactics requires skill in basic 

warfighting techniques and procedures. It is our responsibility as Marine 

leaders to work continuously to develop our own tactical proficiency and that 

of our Marines.
CHAPTER 7

The MAGTF in the Offense

“Since I first joined the Marines, I have advocated aggressiveness in the field and constant offensive 

action. Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to 

consolidate his forces and hit back at you. This is the shortest road to victory.”

—General H.M. “Howling Mad” Smith, USMC

The commander conducts offensive operations within the context of the single 

battle. The offense is the decisive form of warfare. While defensive operations can 

do great damage to an enemy, offensive operations are the means to a decisive 

victory. Offensive operations are conducted to take the initiative from the enemy, 

gain freedom of action, and mass effects to achieve objectives. These operations 

impose the commander’s will on the enemy. Offensive operations allow the 

commander to impose his will on the enemy by shattering the enemy’s moral, 

mental, and physical cohesion. The enemy loses his ability to fight as an effective, 

coordinated force as Marine Corps forces generate an overwhelming tempo by 

conducting a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected offensive actions.

Contents

Purpose of Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Characteristics of Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Organization of the Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4

Types of Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7

Movement to Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7

Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10

Exploitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14

Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15

Forms of Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16

Frontal Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17

Flanking Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18

Envelopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-19

Turning Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21

Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22

Penetration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-23

Future Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
7-2 MCDP 1-0

PURPOSE OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The offense is undertaken to gain, maintain, and exploit the initiative—thus 

causing the enemy to react to our actions. The focus of offensive operations is the 

enemy, not seizure of terrain. Even in the defense, a commander must take every 

opportunity to seize the initiative by offensive action. Offensive operations are 

conducted to—

l Destroy enemy forces and equipment.

l Deceive and divert the enemy.

l Deprive the enemy of resources.

l Gain information.

l Fix the enemy in place.

l Seize key terrain.

l Produce a reaction from the enemy.

l Disrupt enemy actions or preparations.

Successful offensive operations—

l Avoid the enemy’s strength and attack his weakness by massing combat power 

or its effects against the enemy's critical vulnerabilities.

l Isolate the enemy from his sources of support—both moral and physical—to 

include logistics, fires, command and control, and reinforcements.

l Strike the enemy from an unexpected direction, disrupting his plan.

l Aggressively exploit every advantage.

l Overwhelm the enemy commander’s ability to observe, orient, decide, and act.

l Employ accurate and timely assessment of effects against the enemy to 

exploit success.

The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy is offensive in nature, focuses on the 

threat, uses speed to seize the initiative, and surprise to degrade the enemy’s 

ability to resist. Offensive operations require the attacker to weight the main 

effort with superior combat power. The requirement to concentrate and the need 

to have sufficient forces available to exploit success imply accepting risk 

elsewhere. Local superiority must be created by maneuver, speed, surprise, and 

economy of force.

Before conducting offensive operations, the commander seeks to discover where 

the enemy is most vulnerable through reconnaissance and surveillance. Shaping 

actions set the conditions for decisive action by disrupting the enemy’s command 
Marine Corps Operations 7-3

and control, limiting his ability to apply combat power, and further exposing 

weaknesses in the defense. Shaping actions should place the enemy at the 

greatest disadvantage possible. The commander directs the battle from a position 

that allows him to develop a firsthand impression of the course of the battle. He 

provides personal leadership and inspires confidence at key points in the battle.

The fundamentals of offensive action are general rules evolved from logical and 

time-proven application of the principles of war to the offense. Many of the 

fundamentals are related and reinforce one another as follows:

l Orient on the enemy.

l Gain and maintain contact.

l Develop the situation.

l Concentrate superior firepower at the decisive time and place.

l Achieve surprise.

l Exploit known enemy weaknesses.

l Seize or control key terrain.

l Gain and retain the initiative.

l Neutralize the enemy’s ability to react.

l Advance by fire and maneuver.

l Maintain momentum.

l Act quickly.

l Exploit success.

l Be flexible.

l Be aggressive.

l Provide for the security of the force.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Organization of the Battlespace

Deep operations are conducted using maneuver forces, fires, and information 

operations. They seek to create windows of opportunity for decisive maneuver 

and are designed to restrict the enemy’s freedom of action, disrupt the 

coherence and tempo of his operations, nullify his firepower, disrupt his 

command and control, interdict his supplies, isolate or destroy his main forces, 

and break his morale.
7-4 MCDP 1-0

The enemy is most easily defeated by fighting him close and deep simultaneously 

while protecting the MAGTF rear area. Well-orchestrated deep operations, 

integrated with simultaneous close operations, may be executed with the goal of 

defeating the enemy outright or setting the conditions for successful future close 

operations. Deep operations enable friendly forces to choose the time, place, and 

method for close operations. Deep operations may include—

l Deception.

l Deep interdiction through deep fires, deep maneuver, and deep air support.

l Deep surveillance and target acquisition.

l Information operations.

l Offensive antiair warfare.

Close operations are required for decisive and lasting effects on the battlefield. 

The MAGTF commander shapes the course of the battle and takes decisive 

action, deciding when and where to commit the main effort to achieve mission 

success. The MAGTF commander picks a combination of the types of offensive 

operations and forms of maneuver to use at the critical time and place to defeat the 

enemy. Commanders weight their combination of options to mass effects. For 

example, commanders may fix a part of the enemy force with a frontal attack by a 

smaller combined arms force while maneuvering the rest of the force in an 

envelopment to defeat the enemy force. The reserve enters the action offensively 

at the proper place and moment to exploit success. The reserve provides the 

source of additional combat power to commit at the decisive moment.

Rear area operations protect assets in the rear area to support the force. Rear area 

operations encompass more than just rear area security. While rear area 

operations provide security for personnel, materiel, and facilities in the rear area, 

their sole purpose is to provide uninterrupted support to the force as a whole. 

Rear area operations enhance a force’s freedom of action while it is involved in 

the close and deep fight and extend the force’s operational reach. The primary 

focus of rear area operations during the offensive is to maintain momentum and 

prevent the force from reaching a culminating point.

Organization of the Force

The commander will normally organize his force differently depending on the 

type of offensive operation he is conducting. There are four basic types of forces: 

security forces, main body, reserve, and sustainment forces.
Marine Corps Operations 7-5

The commander may use security forces to—

l Gain and maintain enemy contact.

l Protect the main battle force’s movement.

l Develop the situation before committing the main battle force.

Security forces are assigned cover, guard or screen missions. Operations of security 

forces must be an integral part of the overall offensive plan. The element of the 

MAGTF assigned as the security forces depends on the factors of METT-T. 

Security forces are discussed in detail in chapter 11.

The main body constitutes the bulk of the commander’s combat power. It is 

prepared to respond to enemy contact with the security forces. Combat power 

that can be concentrated most quickly, such as fires, is brought to bear while 

maneuver units move into position. The main body maintains an offensive spirit 

throughout the battle, looking to exploit any advantageous situations. The main 

body engages the enemy as early as possible unless fires are withheld to prevent 

the loss of surprise. Commanders make maximum use of fires to destroy and 

disrupt enemy formations. As the forces close, the enemy is subjected to an everincreasing volume of fires from the main body and all supporting arms.

The commander uses his reserve to restore momentum to a stalled attack, defeat 

enemy counterattacks, and exploit success. The reserve provides the 

commander the flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances. Once 

committed, the reserve’s actions normally become the decisive operation, and 

every effort is made to reconstitute another reserve from units made available 

by the revised situation.

In the attack, the combat power allocated to the reserve depends primarily on the 

level of uncertainty about the enemy, especially the strength of any expected 

enemy counterattacks. The commander only needs to resource a small reserve to 

respond to unanticipated enemy reactions when he has detailed information about 

the enemy. When the situation is relatively clear and enemy capabilities are 

limited, the reserve may consist of a small fraction of the command. When the 

situation is vague, the reserve may initially contain the majority of the 

commander’s combat power.

In an attack, the commander generally locates his reserve to the rear of the main 

effort. However, it must be able to move quickly to areas where it is needed in 

different contingencies. This is most likely to occur if the enemy has strong 

counterattack forces. For heavy reserve forces, the key factor is cross-country 

mobility or road networks. For light forces, the key factor is the road network, if 
7-6 MCDP 1-0

trucks are available, or the availability of landing zones for helicopterborne 

forces. The commander prioritizes the positioning of his reserve to counter the 

worst case enemy counterattack first, then to reinforce the success of the 

decisive operation.

The commander task-organizes his sustainment forces to the mission. He 

decentralizes the execution of sustainment support, but that support must be 

continuously available to the main body. This includes using preplanned 

logistics packages. Aerial resupply may also be necessary to support large-scale 

movements to contact or to maintain the main body’s momentum. Combat 

trains containing fuel, ammunition, medical, and maintenance assets move with 

their parent unit. Fuel and ammunition stocks remain loaded on tactical vehicles 

in the combat trains so they can instantly move. Aviation assets may use 

forward operating bases (including forward arming and refueling points and 

rapid ground refueling sites) to reduce aircraft turnaround time. The commander 

will frequently find that his main supply routes become extended as the 

operation proceeds.

In an attack, the commander tries to position his sustainment forces well 

forward. From these forward locations they can sustain the attacking force, 

providing priority of support to the decisive operation. As the attacking force 

advances, sustainment forces displace forward as required to shorten the 

supply lines to ensure uninterrupted support to maneuver units. The size of the 

force a commander devotes to sustainment force security depends on the 

threat. A significant enemy threat requires the commander to provide a tactical 

combat force.

During periods of rapid movement sustainment forces may be attached to the 

moving or attacking force. Alternatively, sustainment forces may follow the 

moving or attacking force in an echeloned manner along main supply routes. 

Transportation and supplies to sustain the moving or attacking force become 

increasingly important as the operation progresses. As supply lines lengthen, the 

condition of lines of communications and the conduct of route and convoy 

security can become problems. The largest possible stocks of fuel, spare parts, 

and ammunition should accompany the moving or attacking force so that it does 

not lose momentum because of a lack of support. The offensive operation may be 

limited more by vehicle mechanical failures and the need for fuel than by combat 

losses or a lack of ammunition. Therefore, direct support maintenance support 

teams accompany the moving or attacking force to repair disabled vehicles or 

evacuate them to maintenance collection points for repair by general support 

maintenance units. The commander may also use helicopters to move critical 

supplies forward.
Marine Corps Operations 7-7

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are four types of offensive operations—movement to contact, attack, 

exploitation, and pursuit. These operations may occur in sequence, 

simultaneously or independently across the depth of the battlespace. For example, 

a movement to contact may be so successful that it immediately leads to an 

exploitation or an attack may lead directly to pursuit. See figure 7-1.

These types of offensive operations are rarely all performed in one campaign 

or in the sequence presented in this chapter. Nor are the dividing lines 

between the types of offensive operations as distinct in reality as they are in a 

doctrinal publication. The successful commander uses the appropriate type of 

offensive operation for his mission and situation, not hesitating to change to 

another type if the battle dictates. The goal is to move to exploitation and 

pursuit as rapidly as possible. The commander seeks to take advantage of 

enemy weaknesses and maneuver to a position of advantage, creating the 

conditions that lead to exploitation.

Movement to Contact

Movement to contact seeks to gain or regain contact with the enemy and develop 

the situation. Movement to contact helps the commander to understand the 

battlespace. It allows him to make initial contact with the enemy with minimum 

forces, thereby avoiding an extensive engagement or battle before he is prepared 

for decisive action. When successfully executed, it allows the commander to 

strike the enemy at the time and place of his choosing. A movement to contact 

ends when the commander has to deploy the main body—to conduct an attack or 

establish a defense.

Figure 7-1. Types of Offensive Operations.
7-8 MCDP 1-0

A force conducting movement to contact normally organizes in an approach 

march formation, with advance, flank, and rear security elements protecting the 

main body. See figure 7-2. The main body contains the bulk of the MAGTF’s 

forces. The advance force, flank, and rear security formations may consist of 

aviation or ground combat units (one or both as individual elements or as taskorganized combined arms teams) and appropriate combat service support 

organizations, based on the factors of METT-T.

As the purpose of movement to contact is to gain contact with the enemy, the 

MAGTF commander will normally designate the advance force as the main 

effort. As contact with the enemy is made and the situation develops, the 

MAGTF commander has two options. If he decides that this is not the time or 

place to offer battle, he bypasses the enemy and the advance force remains the 

main effort. When bypassing an enemy unit it may be necessary to task a 

subordinate unit to fix or block the bypassed enemy. As the second option, if the 

MAGTF commander determines that his shaping actions have set the conditions 

for decisive action, he will shift the main effort—probably to the main body or a 

unit in the main body. During movement to contact, the MAGTF commander 

may designate all or part of the main body as the MAGTF reserve.

The MAGTF commander may use the ACE to exploit the situation as it is 

developed by the advance force. Aviation forces can attack enemy forces 

involved in a meeting engagement or fix enemy forces while the advance force 

makes contact, allowing the main body to maneuver without becoming decisively 

Figure 7-2. Movement to Contact.
Marine Corps Operations 7-9

engaged. Aviation forces can also attack second echelon forces, limiting the 

enemy’s ability to reinforce his first echelon or fight in depth.

Even if the MAGTF commander properly develops the situation during a 

movement to contact, he may be faced with a meeting engagement. Meeting 

engagements are clashes that take place at unexpected places and times when 

forces are not fully prepared for battle. A meeting engagement may result in 

confusion, delay or even in the premature employment of the main body before 

the MAGTF commander has set the conditions for decisive action. The premature 

employment of the main body slows the MAGTF's tempo of operations and may 

cause it to lose the initiative.

When organizing his forces for movement to contact, the MAGTF commander 

considers span of control, communications, and the capabilities of the major 

subordinate commands. Both the GCE and the ACE can provide forces for all the 

formations. The GCE can gain and maintain physical contact with the enemy. 

The ACE can establish initial visual and electromagnetic contact with the enemy 

at extended ranges.

The MAGTF commander should give the major subordinate commanders the 

widest latitude to conduct movement to contact. This allows them the freedom to 

maneuver and exercise initiative in developing the situation once contact with the 

enemy is made. Unnecessary subdivision of the MAGTF’s battlespace or 

constraints placed on the major subordinate commands for fire and maneuver 

within their respective AO may only slow the MAGTF’s tempo. The MAGTF 

commander must consider airspace requirements and the capability of the Marine 

air command and control system during movement to contact.

The frontage assigned to the unit conducting a movement to contact must allow it 

sufficient room to deploy its main body, but not be so wide that large enemy 

forces might be inadvertently bypassed. The unit’s frontage will be affected by 

the MAGTF commander’s guidance on bypassing enemy forces or the 

requirement to clear his zone of all enemy forces. The MAGTF commander must 

ensure that the desired rate of advance is supportable by the CSSE to ensure that 

he does not reach a culminating point or an unplanned operational pause.

The MAGTF may encounter enemy forces too small to threaten the main body 

and that do not require its deployment with the resulting loss of momentum. 

While such enemy forces may pose little threat against the ground or ACE’s 

combat power, they may pose a serious threat to the CSSE. The MAGTF 

commander must establish criteria on the size, nature or type of enemy activity 

that the main body may bypass and how assigned follow and support forces will 

deal with bypassed enemy forces.
7-10 MCDP 1-0

The MAGTF commander identifies potential danger areas where his forces may 

make contact with the enemy, such as likely enemy defensive locations, 

engagement areas, observation posts, and natural and artificial obstacles. The 

MAGTF’s reconnaissance and surveillance plan must provide for coverage of 

these danger areas. The MAGTF commander must recognize the enemy’s most 

dangerous course of action and be prepared to focus his combat power at those 

times and places where the MAGTF is most vulnerable.

Because the MAGTF may be engaged by the enemy’s air forces well before 

coming into contact with the enemy’s ground forces, offensive air support (close 

air support and air interdiction specifically) and antiair warfare functions are 

essential to success of the movement to contact. The ACE must gain and 

maintain contact with the enemy. The MAGTF commander may also task the 

ACE to conduct deep reconnaissance to determine or confirm the location of 

enemy reserve, follow-on, and support forces. If he has enough intelligence to 

target these enemy forces, he may task the ACE to conduct an attack.

The CSSE must provide the full range of combat service support during 

movement to contact without slowing or jeopardizing the MAGTF’s tempo. 

The support must be responsive and provide only what is needed—it should 

not encumber movement or maneuver. This requires a fine balance between 

push- and pull-logistics. The CSSE must take advantage of natural pauses 

during the course of the MAGTF’s movement to replenish expended resources. 

Support for security forces is more difficult due to their separation from the 

main body and the need for self-contained maintenance and supply capabilities. 

This may also require a greater reliance on ACE assets to ensure prompt and 

effective support.

The MAGTF commander must ensure that once contact with the enemy has been 

gained, that it is maintained with whatever assets available. Aviation and ground 

combat assets may have to shift to maintain contact. The CSSE can also assist by 

ensuring that combat units do not reach a culminating point.

As the situation becomes clearer, the MAGTF commander is better able to 

determine how best to exploit the opportunity. Ideally, this means shifting to an 

attack, exploitation or pursuit. The major subordinate commanders must be ready 

to support a transition from one type of offensive operation to another.

Attack

An attack is an offensive operation characterized by coordinated movement, 

supported by fire, conducted to defeat, destroy, neutralize or capture the 

enemy. An attack may be conducted to seize or secure terrain. Focusing 
Marine Corps Operations 7-11

combat power against the enemy with a tempo and intensity that the enemy 

cannot match, the commander attacks to shatter his opponent’s will, disrupt his 

cohesion, and to gain the initiative. If an attack is successful, the enemy is no 

longer capable of—or willing to offer—meaningful resistance.

Attacks rarely develop exactly as planned. As long as the enemy has any freedom 

of action, unexpected difficulties will occur. As the attack progresses, control 

must become increasingly decentralized to subordinate commanders to permit 

them to meet the rapidly shifting situation. This is achieved through the use of the 

commander’s intent and mission tactics. The commander sets conditions for a 

successful attack by attacking enemy fire support assets, command and control 

assets and support facilities, and front-line units. These fires protect the main 

effort and restrict the enemy's ability to counterattack. During the final stages of 

the attack, the main effort may rely primarily on organic fires to overcome 

remaining enemy resistance. The attack culminates in a powerful and violent 

assault. The commander immediately exploits his success by continuing the 

attack into the depth of the enemy defense to disrupt his cohesion.

Attacks can be hasty or deliberate based on the degree of preparation, planning, 

and coordination involved prior to execution. The distinction between hasty and 

deliberate attacks is a relative one.

A hasty attack is an attack when the commander decides to trade preparation time 

for speed to exploit an opportunity. A hasty attack takes advantage of audacity, 

surprise, and speed to achieve the commander’s objectives before the enemy can 

effectively respond. The commander launches a hasty attack with the forces at 

hand or in immediate contact with the enemy and with little preparation before 

the enemy can concentrate forces or prepare an effective defense.

By necessity, hasty attacks do not employ complicated schemes of maneuver and 

require a minimum of coordination. Habitual support relationships, standing 

operating procedures, and battle drills contribute to increased tempo and the 

likelihood of success of the hasty attack. Unnecessary changing of the task 

organization of the force should be avoided to maintain momentum.

A deliberate attack is a type of offensive action characterized by pre-planned 

and coordinated employment of firepower and maneuver to close with and 

destroy the enemy. Deliberate attacks usually include the coordinated use of all 

available resources. Deliberate attacks are used when the enemy cannot be 

defeated with a hasty attack or there is no readily apparent advantage that must 

be rapidly exploited.
7-12 MCDP 1-0

Main and supporting efforts and the forward positioning of resources are 

planned and coordinated throughout the battlespace to ensure the optimal 

application of the force’s combat power. The commander must position followon forces and the reserve to best sustain the momentum of the attack. Deliberate 

attacks may include time for rehearsals and refinement of attack plans. The 

commander must weigh the advantages of a deliberate attack with respect to the 

enemy’s ability to create or improve his defenses, develop his intelligence 

picture or take counteraction.

Commanders conduct various types of attack to achieve different effects. A 

single attack that results in the complete destruction or defeat of the enemy is 

rare. The commander must capitalize on the resulting disruption of the enemy’s 

defenses through exploitation to reap the benefits of a successful attack.

Spoiling Attack

A spoiling attack is a tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack 

while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack. A spoiling 

attack is usually an offensive action conducted in the defense. See chapter 8.

Counterattack

A counterattack is a limited-objective attack conducted by part or all of a 

defending force to prevent the enemy from attaining the objectives of his attack. 

It may be conducted to regain lost ground, destroy enemy advance units, and 

wrest the initiative from the enemy. It may be the precursor to resuming offensive 

operations. See chapter 8.

Feint

A feint is a limited-objective attack made at a place other than that of the main 

effort with the aim of distracting the enemy’s attention away from the main 

effort. A feint is a supporting attack that involves contact with the enemy. A feint 

must be sufficiently strong to confuse the enemy as to the location of the main 

attack. Ideally, a feint causes the enemy to commit forces to the diversion and 

away from the main effort. A unit conducting a feint usually attacks on a wider 

front than normal with a consequent reduction in mass and depth. A unit 

conducting a feint normally keeps only a minimal reserve to deal with 

unexpected developments.

Demonstration

A demonstration is an attack or a show of force on a front where a decision is not 

sought. Its aim is to deceive the enemy. A demonstration, like a feint, is a 

supporting attack. A demonstration, unlike a feint, does not make contact with 
Marine Corps Operations 7-13

the enemy. The commander executes a demonstration by an actual or simulated 

massing of combat power, troop movements or some other activity designed to 

indicate the preparations for or beginning of an attack at a point other than the 

main effort. Demonstrations are used frequently in amphibious operations to 

draw enemy forces away from the actual landing beaches or to fix them in place. 

Demonstrations and feints increase the enemy’s confusion while conserving 

combat power for the main and supporting efforts.

Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate attack made to obtain information and to 

locate and test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. It is used when 

knowledge of the enemy is vague and there is insufficient time or resources to 

develop the situation. While the primary purpose of a reconnaissance in force is 

to gain information, the commander must be prepared to exploit opportunity. 

Reconnaissance in force usually develops information more rapidly and in more 

detail than other reconnaissance methods. If the commander must develop the 

enemy situation along a broad front, reconnaissance in force may consist of 

strong probing actions to determine the enemy situation at selected points.

The commander may conduct reconnaissance in force as a means of keeping 

pressure on the defender by seizing key terrain and uncovering enemy 

weaknesses. The reconnoitering force must be of a size and strength to cause the 

enemy to react strongly enough to disclose his locations, dispositions, strength, 

planned fires, and planned use of the reserve. Since a reconnaissance in force is 

conducted when knowledge of the enemy is vague, a task-organized combined 

arms force normally is used. Deciding whether to reconnoiter in force, the 

commander considers—

l His present information on the enemy and the importance of additional 

information.

l Efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection assets.

l The extent his future plans may be divulged by the reconnaissance in force.

l The possibility that the reconnaissance in force may lead to a decisive 

engagement that the commander does not desire.

Raid

A raid is an attack, usually small scale, involving a penetration of hostile territory 

for a specific purpose other than seizing and holding terrain. It ends with the 

planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. The organization 

and composition of the raid force are tailored to the mission. Raids are 
7-14 MCDP 1-0

characterized by surprise and swift, precise, and bold action. Raids are typically 

conducted to—

l Destroy enemy installations and facilities.

l Disrupt enemy command and control or support activities.

l Divert enemy attention.

l Secure information.

Raids may be conducted in the defense as spoiling attacks to disrupt the enemy’s 

preparations for attack; during delaying operations to further delay or disrupt the 

enemy or with other offensive operations to confuse the enemy, divert his 

attention or disrupt his operations. Raids require detailed planning, preparation, 

and special training.

Exploitation

Exploitation is an offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and 

is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. The exploitation extends the initial 

success of the attack by preventing the enemy from disengaging, withdrawing, 

and reestablishing an effective defense. The exploitation force expands enemy 

destruction through unrelenting pressure thus weakening his will to resist. The 

exploitation is characterized by initiative, boldness, and the unhesitating 

employment of uncommitted forces.

The commander must prepare to exploit the success of every attack without delay. 

In the hasty attack, the force in contact normally continues the attack, transitioning 

to exploitation. In the deliberate attack, the commander’s principal tool for the 

exploitation is normally the reserve. At the MAGTF level, aviation forces may 

support the reserve or be additionally tasked as the exploitation force. The 

commander retains only those reserves necessary to ensure his flexibility of 

operation, continued momentum in the advance, and likely enemy responses to the 

exploitation. The reserve is generally positioned where it can exploit the success of 

the main effort or supporting efforts. Exploitation forces execute bold, aggressive, 

and rapid operations using the commander’s intent and mission tactics.

The decision to commence the exploitation requires considerable judgment, 

intuition, and situational awareness by the commander. Committing the 

exploitation force prematurely or too late may fail to exploit the opportunity 

presented by a successful attack. Conditions favorable for an exploitation 

may include—

l Increased number of enemy prisoners of war.

l Absence of organized defenses.
Marine Corps Operations 7-15

l Absence of accurate enemy massed direct and indirect fires.

l Loss of enemy cohesion upon contact.

l Capture, desertion or absence of enemy commanders and senior staff officers.

Typical objectives for the exploitation force include command posts, reserves, seizure 

of key terrain, and the destruction of combat support and service support units deep in 

the enemy’s rear. The destruction or defeat of these objectives further disrupt and 

disorganize the enemy, preventing reconstitution of the defense or the enemy’s force. 

The commander must be prepared to assess the effects of his exploitation and 

determine when the time is at hand to commence the pursuit of the enemy.

Pursuit

A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force 

attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. Pursuits often develop from 

successful exploitation operations when the enemy defenses begin to disintegrate. 

A pursuit may also be initiated when the enemy has lost his ability to fight 

effectively and attempts to withdraw.

Since the conditions that allow for pursuit can seldom be predicted, a pursuit 

force is not normally established ahead of time. The commander must quickly 

designate appropriate forces to conduct and support pursuit operations or the 

exploitation force may continue as the pursuit force. A pursuit is normally made 

up of a direct pressure force and an encircling force. See figure 7-3 on page 7-16.

These forces are similar to a hammer and anvil. The direct pressure force is like 

the hammer. It is usually a powerful maneuver force that maintains continuous 

contact with the retreating enemy, driving the enemy before them. The encircling 

force serves as the anvil. The encircling force requires sufficient mobility and 

speed to get itself into position ahead of or on the flank of the fleeing enemy to 

halt and fix the enemy in place. Aviation forces are particularly well-suited to act 

as the encircling force. By using its superior tactical mobility and agility in 

concert with its potent firepower, aviation forces can destroy enemy forces, 

interdict lines of retreat, and add to the demoralization of the enemy force.

Pursuits are pushed to the utmost limits of endurance of troops, equipment, and 

supplies. If the pursuit force is required to pause for any reason, the enemy has an 

opportunity to break contact, reorganize, and establish organized defenses. 

Pursuit, like exploitation, must be conducted relentlessly. Highly mobile and 

versatile combat service support forces are particularly critical to sustaining a 

relentless pursuit and preventing the MAGTF from reaching its culminating point 

before the enemy is completely defeated.
7-16 MCDP 1-0

FORMS OF MANEUVER

The forms of offensive maneuver are the basic techniques a force conducting 

offensive operations uses to gain advantage over the enemy. Each form of 

maneuver has a resultant effect on the enemy. The MAGTF commander chooses 

the form of maneuver that fully exploits all the dimensions of the battlespace and 

best accomplishes his mission. He generally chooses one of these as a foundation 

upon which to build a course of action.

The MAGTF commander organizes and employs the ACE, GCE or CSSE to 

best support the chosen form of maneuver. The GCE and ACE are the two 

combat arms of the MAGTF. They execute tactical actions to support or 

accomplish the MAGTF commander’s mission. Either can be used as a 

Figure 7-3. Pursuit.
Marine Corps Operations 7-17

maneuver force or a source of fires as the MAGTF commander applies 

combined arms. The MAGTF commander may task-organize aviation and 

ground combat units, along with combat service support units, under a single 

commander to execute the form of offensive maneuver selected. Aviation forces 

may be comprised of fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft or a combination 

with GCE and CSSE units attached or in support.

Frontal Attack

A frontal attack is an offensive maneuver where the main action is directed 

against the front of the enemy forces. It is used to rapidly overrun or destroy a 

weak enemy force or fix a significant portion of a larger enemy force in place 

over a broad front to support a flanking attack or envelopment. It is generally the 

least preferred form of maneuver because it strikes the enemy where he is the 

strongest. See figure 7-4. It is normally used when commanders possess 

overwhelming combat power and the enemy is at a clear disadvantage.

For deliberate attacks, the frontal attack may be the most costly form of 

maneuver since it exposes the attacker to the concentrated fires of the defender 

while limiting the effectiveness of the attacker’s own fires. As the most direct 

form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is useful for overwhelming light 

defenses, covering forces or disorganized enemy forces. 

Figure 7-4. Frontal Attack.
7-18 MCDP 1-0

Frontal attacks may be used by supporting efforts to fix the enemy in place and 

enable the main effort to maneuver to a position of advantage during an 

envelopment or a flanking attack. A frontal attack can create a gap through which 

the attacking force can conduct a penetration. Frontal attacks are often used with 

feints and demonstrations. Aviation forces and supporting arms are often used to 

create gaps with fires in the enemy’s front or to prevent or delay enemy 

reinforcements reaching the front lines.

Flanking Attack

A flanking attack is a form of offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an 

enemy force. See figure 7-5. A flank is the right or left side of a military 

formation and is not oriented toward the enemy. It is usually not as strong in 

terms of forces or fires as is the front of a military formation. A flank may be 

created by the attacker through the use of fires or by a successful penetration. It is 

similar to an envelopment but generally conducted on a shallower axis. Such an 

attack is designed to defeat the enemy force while minimizing the effect of the 

enemy’s frontally oriented combat power. Flanking attacks are normally 

conducted with the main effort directed at the flank of the enemy. Usually, there 

is a supporting effort that engages by fire and maneuver the enemy force’s front 

while the main effort maneuvers to attack the enemy’s flank. This supporting 

effort diverts the enemy’s attention from the threatened flank. It is often used for 

a hasty attack or meeting engagement where speed and simplicity are paramount 

to maintaining battle tempo and, ultimately, the initiative.

Figure 7-5. Flanking Attack.
Marine Corps Operations 7-19

Envelopment

An envelopment is a form of offensive maneuver by which the attacker bypasses the 

enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear. See 

figure 7-6 and figure 7-7 on page 7-20. The enemy’s defensive positions may be 

bypassed using ground, waterborne or vertical envelopment. An envelopment compels the defender to fight on the ground of the attacker’s choosing. It requires surprise 

and superior mobility relative to the enemy. The operational reach and speed of aviation forces, coupled with their ability to rapidly mass effects on the enemy, make 

them an ideal force to conduct an envelopment. An envelopment is designed to—

l Strike the enemy where he is weakest (critical vulnerabilities).

l Strike the enemy at an unexpected place.

l Attack the enemy rear.

l Avoid the enemy’s strengths.

l Disrupt the enemy’s command and control.

l Disrupt the enemy’s logistics effort.

l Destroy or disrupt the enemy’s fire support assets.

l Sever the enemy’s lines of communications.

l Minimize friendly casualties.

Figure 7-6. Single Envelopment.
7-20 MCDP 1-0

When enveloping, the commander applies strength against weakness by 

maneuvering the main effort around or over an enemy’s main defenses. Envelopments normally require a supporting effort to fix the enemy, prevent his escape, 

and reduce his ability to react against the main effort. They fix the enemy by 

forcing him to fight in multiple directions simultaneously or by deceiving him 

regarding the location, timing or existence of the main effort. Supporting efforts 

must be of sufficient strength to ensure these tasks are successful, as the success 

of the attack often depends on the effects achieved by the supporting effort.

An envelopment is conducted at sufficient depth so that the enemy does not have 

time to reorient his defenses before the commander concentrates his force for the 

attack on the objective. Because of their ability to rapidly mass, aviation forces are 

particularly well-suited to function as the enveloping force or to enable the success 

of the enveloping force.

The commander may choose to conduct a double envelopment. Double envelopments 

are designed to force the enemy to fight in two or more directions simultaneously to 

meet the converging axis of the attack. It may lead to the encirclement of the enemy 

force so the commander must be prepared to contain and defeat any breakout attempts. 

The commander selects multiple objectives to the rear of the enemy’s defense and the 

enveloping forces use different routes to attack, seize or secure those objectives.

Figure 7-7. Double Envelopment.
Marine Corps Operations 7-21

Turning Movement

A turning movement is a form of offensive maneuver where the attacker passes 

around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives 

deep in the enemy’s rear. See figure 7-8. Normally, the main effort executes the 

turning movement as the supporting effort fixes the enemy in position. A turning 

movement differs from an envelopment in that the turning force usually operates 

at such distances from the fixing force that mutual support is unlikely. The 

turning force must be able to operate independently.

The goal of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon his position or 

reposition major forces to meet the threat. Once “turned” the enemy loses his 

advantage of fighting from prepared positions on ground of his choosing. Typical 

objectives of the main effort in a turning movement may include—

l Critical logistic sites.

l Command and control nodes.

l Lines of communications.

Figure 7-8. Turning Movement.
7-22 MCDP 1-0

Using operational maneuver from the sea, the MAGTF is particularly well-suited 

to conduct a turning movement for the joint force commander. The ACE’s speed 

and agility allow it to mass at the necessary operational depth to support the 

MAGTF commander’s plan.

Infiltration

Infiltration is a form of maneuver where forces move covertly through or into an 

enemy area to attack positions in the enemy’s rear. This movement is made, either 

by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. Forces move 

over, through or around enemy positions without detection to assume a position of 

advantage over the enemy. See figure 7-9. Infiltration is normally conducted with 

other forms of maneuver. The commander orders an infiltration to move all or part 

of his force through gaps in the enemy’s defense to—

l Achieve surprise.

l Attack enemy positions from the flank or rear.

l Occupy a position from which to support the main attack by fire.

l Secure key terrain.

l Conduct ambushes and raids in the enemy’s rear area to harass and disrupt his 

command and control and support activities.

l Cut off enemy forward units.

Figure 7-9. Infiltration.
Marine Corps Operations 7-23

Infiltrations normally take advantage of limited visibility, rough terrain or 

unoccupied or unobserved areas. These conditions often allow undetected 

movement of small elements when the movement of the entire force would 

present greater risks. The commander may elect to conduct a demonstration, feint 

or some other form of deception to divert the enemy’s attention from the area to 

be infiltrated.

To increase control, speed, and the ability to mass combat power, a force 

infiltrates by the largest possible units compatible with the need for stealth, 

enemy capabilities and speed. Infiltrating forces may depend heavily on aviation 

forces for aerial resupply and close air support.

The infiltrating force may be required to conduct a linkup or series of linkups 

after infiltrating to assemble for its subsequent mission. Infiltration requires 

extremely detailed and accurate information about terrain and enemy 

dispositions and activities. The plan for infiltration must be simple, clear, and 

carefully coordinated.

Penetration

A penetration is a form of offensive maneuver where an attacking force seeks to 

rupture the enemy’s defense on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. 

Penetrations are used when enemy flanks are not assailable or time, terrain or the 

enemy’s disposition does not permit the employment of another form of 

maneuver. Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide access to 

the enemy’s rear. A penetration generally occurs in three stages:

l Rupturing the position.

l Widening the gap.

l Seizing the objective.

A penetration is accomplished by concentrating overwhelmingly superior combat 

power on a narrow front and in depth. As the attacking force ruptures the 

enemy’s defenses, units must be tasked to secure the shoulders of the breach and 

ultimately widening the gap for follow-on units. Rupturing the enemy position 

and widening the gap are not in themselves decisive. The attacker must exploit 

the rupture by attacking into the enemy’s rear or attacking laterally to roll up the 

enemy’s positions. See figure 7-10 on page 7-24. The shock action and mobility 

of a mechanized force and aviation forces are useful in rupturing the enemy’s 

position and exploiting that rupture.

The commander may conduct multiple penetrations. Exploitation forces may 

converge on a single, deep objective or seize independent objectives. When it is 
7-24 MCDP 1-0

impracticable to sustain more than one penetration, the commander generally 

exploits the one enjoying the greatest success. Due to their inherent flexibility 

and ability to rapidly mass effects, aviation forces are well-suited to the role of an 

exploitation force or to enable the success of the exploitation force. Because the 

force conducting the penetration is vulnerable to flanking attack, it must move 

rapidly. Follow-on forces must be close behind to secure and widen the shoulders 

of the breach.

FUTURE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Expeditionary maneuver warfare and emerging technologies will have a major 

impact on how the Marine Corps will conduct offensive operations in the future. 

New information technologies will allow the commander to share his operational 

design and situational awareness with his subordinates much faster and clearer 

than in the past. All commanders will share a common operational picture, 

specifically tailored for their echelon of command. This situational awareness, 

coupled with a common operating picture will allow commanders to synchronize 

the actions of their forces, assess the effects of their operations, and make rapid 

adjustments to the plan. Subordinate commanders will have the same situational 

Figure 7-10. Penetration.
Marine Corps Operations 7-25

awareness as their commander allowing them to exercise their initiative to meet 

the commander’s intent without waiting for direction from their higher 

headquarters. This increased ability to fuse information, determine its 

significance, and exploit the resulting opportunities will help maintain the 

initiative and generate tempo.

New doctrine, organizations, and training based on evolving tactics and 

equipment will allow commanders to mass the effects of long range fires and 

agile maneuver, rather than massing forces to deliver the decisive stroke. New 

intelligence collection and surveillance technologies will allow the commander to 

accurately and rapidly locate the enemy and will reduce the need to conduct 

costly and time-consuming movements to contact or meeting engagements. New 

target acquisition equipment and fire support command and control systems will 

increase responsiveness and enable emerging “sensor to shooter” technologies.

Expeditionary maneuver warfare and emerging technologies will enable the 

MAGTF commander to conduct simultaneous operations across the battlespace 

to defeat specific enemy capabilities. The effects of these operations will 

present the enemy with multiple, simultaneous dilemmas for the MAGTF 

commander to exploit.
CHAPTER 8

The MAGTF in the Defense

Contents

Purpose of Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Characteristics of MAGTF Defensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Preparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7

Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7

Disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7

Mass and Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Flexibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Operations in Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8

Organization of the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10

Security Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11

Main Battle Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Rear Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12

Main Battle Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13

Rear Area Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15

Types of Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16

Mobile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17

Position Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20

Future Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22
8-2 MCDP 1-0

“A swift and vigorous transition to attack—the flashing sword of vengeance—is the most brilliant point of 

the defensive.”

—Carl von Clausewitz

“Counterattack is the soul of defense . . . . We wait for the moment when the enemy shall expose 

himself to a counterstroke, the success of which will so far cripple him as to render us relatively strong 

enough to pass to the offensive ourselves.”

—Julian Corbett

The commander conducts defensive operations within the context of the single 

battle. The MAGTF conducts defensive operations, in combination with 

offensive operations, to defeat an enemy attack. During the early days of the 

Korean War (1950-53) the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) conducted defensive 

operations along the Pusan Perimeter, buying time for the 1st Marine Division to 

embark and deploy to Korea where it conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon 

to kick off the United Nation’s long awaited offensive.

Defensive operations are conducted to—

l Counter surprise action by the enemy.

l Cause an enemy attack to fail.

l Gain time.

l Concentrate combat power elsewhere.

l Increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing him to concentrate his forces.

l Attrite or fix the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations.

l Retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy.

l Prepare to resume the offensive.

Forward deployed or early arriving combat forces may conduct defensive 

operations in theater to protect the force during the build-up of combat power. 

During initial entry, the MAGTF may not be capable of conducting offensive 

operations to defeat an enemy rapidly. A classic example was the defensive 

operations conducted by the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal in 1942. These 

defensive operations allowed aircraft to operate from Henderson Field. It was not 

until 4 months after the initial landing that the 2d Marine Division and Army 

units could conduct offensive operations to secure the island. 

Initial MAGTF forces may be assigned a mission to defend follow-on forces, air 

bases, and seaports in the lodgment area to provide time for the joint force 

commander to build sufficient combat power to support future operations. Under 
Marine Corps Operations 8-3

this condition the MAGTF must ensure sufficient combat power is available to 

deter or defend successfully while the buildup continues.

As a supporting effort during offensive operations, the MAGTF may be 

assigned to conduct defensive operations such as economy-of-force missions. 

This could be accomplished using air assault or amphibious forces until a larger 

force could linkup.

In keeping with the single battle concept, the preferred method is to conduct 

operations simultaneously across the depth and space of the assigned battlespace; 

however, it is recognized this may dictate defensive operations in some areas. 

The MAGTF commander and his staff will continuously make recommendations 

to the Marine Corps component commander and joint force commander on the 

proper employment of Marine forces in any type of defensive operations.

PURPOSE OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat an enemy attack. The MAGTF 

defends in order to gain sufficient strength to attack. Although offensive action is 

generally the decisive form of combat, it may be necessary for the MAGTF to 

conduct defensive operations when there is a need to buy time, hold a piece of 

key terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy in one area so 

friendly forces can attack him in another, or erode enemy resources at a rapid rate 

while reinforcing friendly operations. Defensive operations require precise 

synchronization since the defender is constantly seeking to regain the initiative. 

An effective defense consists of the following:

l Combined use of fire and maneuver to blunt the enemy’s momentum.

l Speed that facilitates transition of friendly forces to the offense.

l Reducing enemy options while simultaneously increasing friendly options, 

thereby seizing the initiative.

l Forcing unplanned enemy culmination, gaining the initiative for friendly 

forces, and creating opportunities to shift to the offensive.

While the defense can deny victory to the enemy, it rarely results in victory for 

the defender. In many cases, however, the defense can be stronger than the 

offense. For example, favorable and familiar terrain, friendly civilian 

populations, and interior lines may prompt a commander to assume the defense to 

counter the advantages held by a superior enemy force. The attacking enemy 

usually chooses the time and place he will strike the defender. The defender uses 

his advantages of prepared defensive positions, concentrated firepower, 
8-4 MCDP 1-0

obstacles, and barriers to slow the attacker’s advance and disrupt the flow of his 

assault. Marines exploited these advantages in the defense of the Khe Sanh 

Combat Base, Republic of South Vietnam, during the Tet Offensive of 1968. 

Using aggressive defensive tactics and well-placed obstacles that were supported 

by responsive and continuous fires, the 26th Marines (Reinforced) destroyed two 

North Vietnamese Army divisions.

While on the defense, the commander conducts shaping actions, such as attacking 

enemy forces echeloned in depth, essential enemy sustainment capabilities, or 

moves his own forces and builds up fuel and ammunition to support future 

offensive operations. These shaping actions help to set the conditions for decisive 

action in the defense such as the defeat of the enemy’s main effort, destruction of 

a critical enemy command and control node, or a counterattack as the force 

transitions to offensive operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MAGTF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The objective of the defense is to force the enemy to reach his culminating point 

without achieving his objectives, to rapidly gain and maintain the initiative for 

friendly forces, and to create opportunities to shift to the offense. The integrity of 

the defense depends on maneuver and counterattack, as well as on the successful 

defense of key positions. Early identification of the enemy’s committed units and 

direction of attack allows the defense time to react. Security forces, intelligence 

units, special operations forces, and aviation elements conducting deep 

operations will be the MAGTF’s first sources of this information.

Command and control in the defense differs from the offense. Defensive 

operations require closer coordination, thus commanders tend to monitor the 

battle in more detail. Situational awareness and assessment are difficult, making 

identification of conditions for the resumption of the offense equally difficult.

During the defense, commanders shift their main effort to contain the enemy’s 

attack until they can take the initiative themselves. This requires the adjustment 

of sectors, shifting priority of fires, repeated commitment and reconstitution of 

reserves, and modification of the original plan. To deny the enemy passage 

through a vital area, commanders may order a force to occupy a defensive 

position on key terrain. They also might leave a unit in position behind the enemy 

or give it a mission that entails a high risk of entrapment. During operations in a 

noncontiguous AO, units will routinely be separated from adjacent units and may 

be encircled by the enemy. Defending units may be unintentionally cut off from 

friendly forces. Whenever an unintentional encirclement occurs, the encircled 
Marine Corps Operations 8-5

commander who understands his mission and his higher commander’s intent can 

continue contributing to his higher commander’s mission.

An encircled force acts rapidly to preserve itself. The senior commander assumes 

control of all encircled elements and assesses the all-around defensive posture of 

the force. He decides whether the next higher commander wants the force to 

break out or to defend its position. He reorganizes and consolidates 

expeditiously. If the force is free to break out, it should do so before the enemy 

has time to block escape routes. Breaking out might mean movement of the entire 

encircled force, where one part is attacking and the other defending. The entire 

formation moves through planned escape routes created by the attacking force. If 

the force cannot break out, the senior commander continues to defend while 

planning for and assisting in a linkup with a relieving force.

Reserves preserve the commander’s flexibility and provide the offensive 

capability of the defense. They provide the source of combat power that 

commanders can commit at the decisive moment. The reserve must have the 

mobility and striking power required to quickly isolate and defeat breakthroughs 

and flanking attempts. It must be able to seize and exploit fleeting opportunities 

in a powerful manner to throw the enemy’s overall offensive off balance. The 

commander must organize his reserve so it can repeatedly attack, regroup, move, 

and attack again. Commanders may use reserves to counterattack the enemy’s 

main effort to expedite his defeat, or they may elect to exploit enemy 

vulnerabilities, such as exposed flanks or support units and unprotected forces in 

depth. Reserves also provide a hedge against uncertainty. Reserves may reinforce 

forward defensive operations, block penetrating enemy forces, conduct 

counterattacks, or react to a rear area threat. Reserves must have multiple 

counterattack routes and plans that anticipate enemy’s scheme of maneuver.

Helicopterborne forces can respond rapidly as reserves. On suitable terrain, they 

can reinforce positions to the front or on a flank. In a threatened sector, they are 

positioned in depth and can respond to tactical emergencies. These forces are also 

suitable for swift attack against enemy airborne units landing in the rear area; 

once committed, however, they have limited mobility.

Timing is critical to counterattacks. Commanders anticipate the circumstances that 

require committing the reserves. At that moment, they seek to wrest the initiative 

from the attacker. Commanders commit their reserves with an accurate 

understanding of movement and deployment times. Committed too soon, reserves 

may not have the desired effect or may not be available later for a more dangerous 

contingency. Committed too late, they may be ineffective. Once commanders 
8-6 MCDP 1-0

commit their reserves, they should immediately begin regenerating another reserve 

from uncommitted forces or from forces in less threatened sectors.

During battle, protection of rear areas is necessary to ensure the defender’s 

freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. Because fighting in the rear 

area can divert combat power from the main effort, commanders carefully weigh 

the need for such diversions against the possible consequences and prepare to 

take calculated risks in rear areas. To make such decisions wisely, commanders 

require accurate information to avoid late or inadequate responses and to guard 

against overreacting to exaggerated reports.

Threats to the rear area arise throughout the battle and require the repositioning 

of forces and facilities. When possible, defending commanders contain enemy 

forces in their rear areas, using a combination of passive and active defensive 

measures. While commanders can never lose focus on their primary objectives, 

they assess risks throughout their battlespace and commit combat power where 

necessary to preserve their ability to accomplish the mission.

Commanders use force protection measures to preserve the health, readiness, and 

combat capabilities of their force. They achieve the effects of protection through 

skillful combinations of offense and defense, maneuver and firepower, and active 

and passive measures. As they conduct operations, they receive protective 

benefits from deep and close operations as they disrupt the attacker’s tempo and 

blind the enemy reconnaissance efforts. Defenders also employ passive measures 

such as camouflage, terrain masking, and operations security to frustrate the 

enemy’s ability to find them. Commanders should remain aware that their forces 

are at risk. They should adjust their activities to maintain the ability to protect 

their forces from attack at vulnerable points.

Weapons of mass destruction present defenders with great risks. These weapons can 

create gaps, destroy or disable units, and obstruct the defender’s maneuver. 

Commanders anticipate the effects of such weapons in their defensive plans. They 

provide for dispersed positions for forces in depth, coordinating the last-minute 

concentration of units on positions with multiple routes of approach and withdrawal. 

They also direct appropriate training and implement protective measures.

The general characteristics of MAGTF defensive operations are preparation, 

security, disruption, mass and concentration, flexibility, maneuver, and 

operations in depth.
Marine Corps Operations 8-7

Preparation

The MAGTF commander organizes his defenses on terrain of his choosing. He 

capitalizes on the advantage of fighting from prepared positions by organizing his 

forces for movement and mutual support. He also conducts rehearsals to include 

use of the reserve and counterattack forces.

The MAGTF commander organizes his defenses in depth. Depth allows the 

MAGTF to push reconnaissance and surveillance forward of defended positions 

to detect enemy movements and to deny enemy reconnaissance. Depth allows the 

defense to—

l Absorb enemy attacks without suffering a breakthrough.

l Provide mutually supporting defensive positions.

l Canalize enemy forces into preset engagement areas.

Security

Security preserves the combat power of the force, allowing future employment at 

a time and choosing of the MAGTF. MAGTF security is achieved through the 

judicious use of deception that denies the enemy knowledge of friendly strengths 

and weaknesses.

The MAGTF plans passive measures such as dispersion, camouflage, hardening 

of defensive sites and facilities, barrier and obstacle plans, creation of dummy 

installations, and the establishment of mutually supporting positions. The 

MAGTF plans active measures such as conducting antiarmor and air defense 

operations and coordinating plans for the emplacement and security of patrols, 

observation posts, and reaction forces. The MAGTF may also use physical means 

such as a covering force in the security area to delay and disrupt enemy attacks 

early before they can be fully coordinated. 

Disruption

The MAGTF seeks to disrupt the attacker’s tempo and synchronization by 

countering his initiative and preventing him from massing overwhelming combat 

power. Disruption also affects the enemy’s will to continue the attack by—

l Defeating or deceiving enemy reconnaissance and surveillance.

l Separating the enemy’s forces, isolating his units, and breaking up his 

formations so that they cannot fight as part of an integrated whole.

l Interrupting the enemy’s fire support, logistics support, and command and control.
8-8 MCDP 1-0

Mass and Concentration

The MAGTF masses the effects of overwhelming combat power at the point and 

time of choice. Mass and concentration, while facilitating local superiority at a 

decisive point, may mean accepting risk in other areas.

The MAGTF must consider the collective employment of fires, maneuver, 

security forces, and reserve forces to mitigate this risk and, if necessary, trade 

terrain for time in order to concentrate forces. The MAGTF must ensure fire 

support assets and fire support coordination are synchronized within the overall 

concept of defense. This includes assignment of priority of fires, coordination of 

the targeting process, use of target acquisition assets, and allocation of munitions.

Flexibility

Defensive operations epitomize flexible planning and agile execution. While the 

attacker initially decides where and when combat will take place, agility and 

maneuver allow the defender to strike back effectively. Flexibility enables the 

MAGTF to rapidly shift the main effort, thereby constantly presenting the attacker 

with a coordinated, well-synchronized defense. Flexibility is enhanced by 

coordinating and ensuring continued sustainment to the MAGTF. Sustainment not 

only promotes flexibility but aids in the ability of the MAGTF to maneuver, mass 

fires, and concentrate forces when required. The MAGTF coordinates sustainment 

issues such as availability of forces, AO, infrastructure, host-nation support, 

sustainment bases, and basing agreements with the Marine Corps component.

Maneuver

Maneuver allows the MAGTF to take full advantage of the battlespace and to 

mass and concentrate when desirable. Maneuver, through movement in 

combination with fire, allows the MAGTF to achieve a position of advantage 

over the enemy to accomplish the mission. It also encompasses defensive actions 

such as security and rear area operations.

Operations in Depth

Simultaneous application of combat power throughout the battlespace improves 

the chances for success while minimizing friendly casualties. Quick, violent, and 

simultaneous action throughout the depth of the defender’s battlespace can hurt, 

confuse, and even paralyze an enemy just as he is most exposed and vulnerable. 

Such actions weaken the enemy’s will and do not allow his early successes to 

build confidence. Operations in depth prevent the enemy from gaining 

momentum in the attack. Synchronization of close, rear, and deep operations 

facilitates MAGTF mission success. 
Marine Corps Operations 8-9

The ability of the MAGTF to control and influence operations throughout the 

depth of the battlespace prevents enemy freedom of movement. Regardless of the 

proximity or separation of various elements, MAGTF defense is seen as a 

continuous whole. The MAGTF fights deep, close, and rear operations as one 

battle, synchronizing simultaneous operations to a single purpose—the defeat of 

the enemy’s attack and early transition to the offense.

Deep Operations

The MAGTF designs deep operations to achieve depth and simultaneity in the 

defense and to secure advantages for future operations. Deep operations disrupt 

the enemy’s movement in depth, destroy high-payoff targets vital to the attacker, 

and interrupt or deny vital enemy operating systems such as command, logistics 

or air defense at critical times. As deep operations succeed, they upset the 

attacker’s tempo and synchronization of effects as the defender selectively 

suppresses or neutralizes some of the enemy’s operating systems to exploit the 

exposed vulnerability. Individual targets in depth are only useful as they relate to 

achieving the commander’s desired effects, which could include destruction of a 

critical enemy operating system such as air defense or combat service support. As 

the defender denies freedom of maneuver to the attacker with deep operations, he 

also seeks to set the terms for the friendly force’s transition to offense.

Deep operations provide protection for the force as they disrupt, delay or destroy 

the enemy’s ability to bring combat power to bear on friendly close combat forces. 

As with deep operations in the offense, activities in depth such as counterbattery 

fire focus on effects to protect the close combat operations directly. To synchronize 

the activities that encompass both deep and close objectives, commanders integrate 

and prioritize reconnaissance, intelligence, and target acquisition efforts to focus 

fires and maneuver at the right place and time on the battlefield.

Close Operations 

Close operations are the activities of the main and supporting efforts in the 

defensive area to slow, canalize, and defeat the enemy’s major units. The 

MAGTF may do this in several ways. Often, the MAGTF will fight a series of 

engagements to halt or defeat enemy forces. This requires designation of a main 

effort, synchronization to support it, and finally a shift to concentrate forces and 

mass effects against another threat. This may be done repeatedly. Maneuver units 

defend, delay, attack, and screen as part of the defensive battle. Security 

operations warn of the enemy’s approach and attempt to harass and slow him. A 

covering force meets the enemy’s leading forces, strips away enemy 

reconnaissance and security elements, reports the attacker’s strength and 

locations, and gives the MAGTF time and space in which to react to the enemy.
8-10 MCDP 1-0

Reserves conduct operations throughout the defense and may require continual 

regeneration. They give the MAGTF the means to seize the initiative and to 

preserve their flexibility; they seek to strike a decisive blow against the attacker 

but prepare to conduct other missions as well. They provide a hedge against 

uncertainty. Reserves operate best when employed to reinforce and expedite 

victory rather than prevent defeat.

Rear Operations

Rear operations protect the force and sustain combat operations. Successful rear 

operations allow the MAGTF freedom of action by preventing disruption of 

command and control, fire support, logistical support, and movement of reserves. 

Destroying or neutralizing enemy deep battle forces achieves this goal.

Enemy forces may threaten the rear during establishment of the initial 

lodgment and throughout operations in theater. Initially, close and rear 

operations overlap due to the necessity to protect the buildup of combat power. 

Later, deep, close, and rear operations may not be contiguous. When this 

situation occurs, rear operations must retain the initiative and deny freedom of 

action to the enemy, even if combat forces are not available. A combination of 

passive and active defensive measures can best accomplish this. The MAGTF 

assesses threat capabilities, decides where risk will be accepted, and then 

assigns the units necessary to protect and sustain the force. Unity of command 

facilitates this process.

Regardless of the proximity or separation of elements, defense of the rear is 

integrated with the deep and close fight. Simultaneous operations defeat the 

attacking enemy throughout the battlefield and allow an early transition to 

the offense.

To minimize the vulnerability of rear operations, command and control and 

support facilities in the rear area must be redundant and dispersed. Air defense 

elements provide defense in depth by taking positions to cover air avenues of 

approach and vital assets. When rear battle response forces are insufficient, 

tactical combat forces prepare to respond rapidly against rear area threats and 

prepare to move to their objectives by multiple routes.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

During defensive operations, the commander organizes his battlespace into three 

areas—security, main battle, and rear—in which the defending force performs 

specific functions. See figure 8-1. These areas can be further divided into sectors. 

A defensive sector is a section assigned to a subordinate commander in which he 
Marine Corps Operations 8-11

is provided the maximum latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in order to 

conduct defensive operations. The size and nature of a sector depends on the 

situation and the factors of METT-T. Commanders of defensive sectors can 

assign subordinates their own sector. 

Security Area

The security area begins at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and 

extends as far to the front and flanks as security forces are deployed, normally to 

the forward boundary of the AO. Forces in the security area conduct 

reconnaissance to furnish information on the enemy and delay, deceive, and 

disrupt the enemy. The commander adds depth to the defense by extending the 

security area as far forward as is tactically feasible. For more information on 

security operations see chapter 11.

Figure 8-1. Organization of the Battlespace.
8-12 MCDP 1-0

Actions in the security area are designed to disrupt the enemy’s plan of attack and 

cause him to prematurely deploy into attack formations. Slowing the enemy’s 

attack enables our forces, particularly Marine aviation, to strike the enemy’s critical 

vulnerabilities (i.e., movement, resupply, fire support, and command and control).

Main Battle Area

The main battle area is that portion of the battlespace in which the commander 

conducts close operations to defeat the enemy. Normally, the main battle area 

extends rearward from the FEBA to the rear boundary of the command’s 

subordinate units. The commander positions forces throughout the main battle 

area to defeat, destroy or contain enemy assaults. Reserves may be employed in 

the main battle area to destroy enemy forces, reduce penetrations or regain 

terrain. The greater the depth of the main battle area, the greater the maneuver 

space for fighting the main defensive battle.

Rear Area

The rear area is that area extending forward from a command’s rear boundary to 

the rear of the area assigned to the command’s subordinate units. This area is 

provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions. Rear 

area operations include those functions of security and sustainment required to 

maintain continuity of operations by the whole force. Rear area operations protect 

the sustainment effort as well as deny use of the rear area to the enemy. The rear 

area may not always be contiguous with the main battle area.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

During defensive operations, the commander organizes his force into security, 

main battle, and rear area forces. See figure 8-2.

Security Forces

The commander uses security forces forward of the main battle area to delay, 

disrupt, and provide early warning of the enemy’s advance and deceive him as to 

the true location of the main battle area. These forces are assigned cover, guard or 

screen missions. Operations of security forces must be an integral part of the 

overall defensive plan. To ensure optimal unity of effort during security 

operations, a single commander is normally assigned responsibility for the 

conduct of operations in the security area. The composition of the security force 

is dependent on the factors of METT-T. A task force may be formed from the 

various elements of the MAGTF to conduct security operations.
Marine Corps Operations 8-13

The commander seeks to engage the enemy as far out as possible. Suppression 

and obscuration fires are employed to facilitate maneuver of the security force. 

Maximum use may be made of all fire support assets to disrupt and destroy 

enemy formations as they move through the security area approaching the main 

battle area. Obstacles and barriers are positioned to delay or canalize the enemy. 

They are kept under observation and covered by fires to attack him while he is 

halted or in the process of breaching.

Main Battle Forces

Main battle forces engage the enemy to slow, canalize, disorganize or defeat his 

attack. The commander positions these forces to counter the enemy’s attack along 

the most likely or most dangerous avenue of approach. As in offensive 

operations, the commander weights his main effort with enough combat power 

and the necessary support to ensure success. When the enemy attack has been 

broken, the commander executes his plan to exploit any opportunity to resume 

the offensive.

Figure 8-2. Organization of the Force.
8-14 MCDP 1-0

Main battle forces engage the enemy as early as possible unless fires are withheld 

to prevent the loss of surprise. Commanders make maximum use of fires to 

destroy and disrupt enemy formations as they approach the main battle area. As 

the enemy closes, he is subjected to an ever-increasing volume of fires from the 

main battle area forces and all supporting arms. Again, obstacles and barriers are 

used to delay or canalize the enemy so that he is continually subjected to fires.

Combat power that can be concentrated most quickly, such as fires, is brought to 

bear while maneuver units move into position. The defender reacts to the enemy's 

main effort by reinforcing the threatened sector or allowing the enemy’s main 

effort to penetrate into engagement areas within the main battle area to cut him 

off and destroy him by counterattack. Main battle forces maintain an offensive 

spirit throughout the battle, looking to exploit any advantageous situations.

The MAGTF commander must determine the mission, composition, and size of 

the reserve and counterattack forces. Reserves by definition are uncommitted 

forces; however, reserve forces are not uncommitted if the concept of defense 

depends upon their employment as a counterattack force. Counterattacking, 

blocking, reinforcing defending units, or reacting to rear area threats are all 

actions a reserve may be required to perform. The primary mission of the reserve 

derives directly from the concept of the defense and, therefore, the commander 

who established the requirement to have a reserve must approve its commitment.

A counterattack is an attack by part or all of a defending force against an 

attacking enemy force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or 

cutting off and destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of 

denying to the enemy the attainment of his purpose in attacking. In many cases, 

the counterattack is decisive action in defensive operations. It is the commander’s 

primary means of breaking the enemy’s attack or of regaining the initiative. Once 

commenced, the counterattack is the main effort. Its success depends largely on 

surprise, speed, and boldness in execution. A separate counterattack force may be 

established by the commander to conduct planned counterattacks and can be 

made up of uncommitted or lightly engaged forces and the reserve.

The reserve is the commander’s tool to influence the course of the battle at the 

critical time and place to exploit opportunities. The commander uses his reserve 

at the decisive moment in the defense and refuses to dissipate it on local 

emergencies. The reserve is usually located in assembly areas or forward 

operating bases in the main battle area. Once the reserve is committed, the 

commander establishes or reconstitutes a new reserve.

Reserves are organized based on the factors of METT-T. The tactical mobility of 

mechanized and helicopterborne forces make them well suited for use as the 
Marine Corps Operations 8-15

reserve in the defense. Mechanized reserve forces are best employed offensively. 

In suitable terrain, a helicopterborne reserve can react quickly to reinforce the 

main battle area positions or block penetrations. However, helicopterborne forces 

often lack the shock effect desired for counterattacks. The inherent surge 

capability of aviation combat forces provides the commander flexibility for 

reserve tasking without designating the ACE as the reserve.

Timing is critical to the employment of the reserve. As the area of probable 

employment of the reserve becomes apparent, the commander alerts his reserve 

to have it more readily available for action. When he commits his reserve, the 

commander must make his decision promptly and with an accurate understanding 

of movement factors and deployment times. If committed too soon or too late, the 

reserve may not have a decisive effect. The commander may choose to use 

security forces as part or all of his reserve after completion of their security 

mission. He must weigh this decision against the possibility that the security 

forces may suffer a loss of combat power during its security mission.

Rear Area Forces

Rear area forces protect and sustain the force’s combat power. They provide for 

freedom of action and the continuity of logistic and command and control 

support. Rear area forces facilitate future operations as forces are positioned and 

support is marshaled to enable the transition to offensive operations. These forces 

should have the requisite command and control capabilities and intelligence 

assets to effectively employ the maneuver, fires, and combat service support 

forces necessary to defeat the rear area threat. Aviation forces are well suited to 

perform screening missions across long distances in the rear area.

The security of the rear area is provided by three levels of forces corresponding to the 

rear area threat level. Local security forces are employed in the rear area to repel or 

destroy Level I threats such as terrorists or saboteurs. These forces are normally 

organic to the unit, base or base cluster where they are employed. Response forces are 

mobile forces, with appropriate fire support designated by the area commander, 

employed to counter Level II threats such as enemy guerrillas or small tactical units 

operating in the rear area. The tactical combat force is a combat unit, with appropriate 

combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of 

defeating Level III threats such as a large, combined arms-capable enemy force. The 

tactical combat force is usually located within or near the rear area where it can 

rapidly respond to the enemy threat.
8-16 MCDP 1-0

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are two fundamental types of defense: the mobile defense and the position 

defense. In practice, Marine commanders tend to use both types simultaneously 

and rarely will one type or the other be used exclusively. Mobile defense orients 

on the destruction of the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into 

a position that exposes him to counterattack by a mobile reserve. Position defense 

orients on retention of terrain by absorbing the enemy in an interlocking series of 

positions and destroying him largely by fires. The combination of these two types 

of defense can be very effective as the commander capitalizes on the advantages 

of each type and the strengths and capabilities of his subordinate units.

Although these descriptions convey the general pattern of each type of defense, 

both forms of defense employ static and dynamic elements. In mobile defenses, 

static defensive positions help control the depth and breadth of enemy penetration 

and ensure retention of ground from which to launch counterattacks. In position 

defenses, commanders closely integrate patrols, intelligence units, and reserve 

forces to cover the gaps among defensive positions, reinforcing those positions as 

necessary and counterattacking defensive positions as directed. Defending 

commanders combine both patterns, using static elements to delay, canalize, and 

ultimately halt the attacker, and dynamic elements (spoiling attacks and 

counterattacks) to strike and destroy enemy forces. The balance among these 

elements depends on the enemy, mission, force composition, mobility, relative 

combat power, and the nature of the battlefield.

The specific design and sequencing of defensive operations is an operational art 

largely conditioned by a thorough METT-T analysis. Doctrine allows great 

freedom in formulating and conducting the defense. The MAGTF commander 

may elect to defend well forward with strong covering forces by striking the 

enemy as he approaches, or he may opt to fight the decisive battle well forward 

within the main battle area. If the MAGTF does not have to hold a specified area 

or position, it may draw the enemy deep into its defenses and then strike his 

flanks and rear. The MAGTF commander may even choose to preempt the 

enemy with spoiling attacks if conditions favor such tactics.

A key characteristic of a sound defense is the ability of the commander to 

aggressively seek opportunities to take offensive action and wrest the initiative 

from the enemy. With this in mind, the decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate 

defense is based on the time available or the requirement to quickly resume the 

offense. The enemy and the mission will determine the time available.

A hasty defense is normally organized while in contact with the enemy or when 

contact is imminent and time available for the organization is limited. It is 
Marine Corps Operations 8-17

characterized by the improvement of natural defensive strength of the terrain by 

utilization of foxholes, emplacements, and obstacles. The capability to establish a 

robust reconnaissance effort may be limited because the defense is assumed 

directly from current positions. The hasty defense normally allows for only a 

brief leaders’ reconnaissance and may entail the immediate engagement by 

security forces to buy time for the establishment of the defense.

Depending on the situation, it may be necessary for a commander to initially 

attack to seize suitable terrain on which to organize his defense. In other 

situations, the commander may employ a security force while withdrawing the 

bulk of his force some distance rearward to prepare a defense on more suitable 

terrain. A hasty defense is improved continuously as the situation permits, and 

may eventually become a deliberate defense.

A deliberate defense is normally organized when not in contact with the enemy 

or when contact is not imminent and time for organization is available. A 

deliberate defense normally includes fortifications, strong points, extensive use of 

barriers, and fully integrated fires. The commander normally is free to make a 

detailed reconnaissance of his sector, select the terrain on which to defend, and 

decide the best distribution of forces.

The advantage of a deliberate defense is that it allows time to plan and prepare 

the defense while not in contact with the enemy. A deliberate defense is 

characterized by a complete reconnaissance of the area to be defended by the 

commander and his subordinate leaders, use of key terrain, and the establishment 

of mutually supporting positions. The force normally has the time to create field 

fortifications, barriers, and emplace obstacles.

Mobile defenses sometimes rely on reserves to strike the decisive blow. They 

require a large, mobile, combined arms reserve. Position defenses are more likely 

to use reserves to block and reinforce at lower tactical levels, leaving major 

counterattacks to divisions and higher echelons. Regiment and battalion-level 

area defenses may benefit from the use of mobile reserves when such a force is 

available and the enemy uncovers his flanks. The actual size and composition of 

the reserve depend on the concept of operations.

Mobile Defense

A mobile defense is the defense of an area or position in which maneuver is used 

together with fire and terrain to seize the initiative from the enemy. The mobile 

defense destroys the attacking enemy through offensive action. The commander 

allocates the bulk of his combat power to mobile forces that strike the enemy 

where he is most vulnerable and when he least expects attack. Minimum force is 
8-18 MCDP 1-0

placed forward to canalize, delay, disrupt, and deceive the enemy as to the actual 

location of our defenses. Retaining his mobile forces until the critical time and 

place are identified, the commander then focuses combat power in a single or 

series of violent and rapid counterattacks throughout the depth of the battlespace. 

See figure 8-3.

A mobile defense requires mobility greater than that of the attacker. Marines generate 

the mobility advantage necessary in the mobile defense with organic mechanized and 

armor forces, helicopterborne forces, and Marine aviation. The commander must 

have sufficient depth within the AO to allow the enemy to move into the 

commander’s mobile defensive area. Terrain and space are traded to draw the enemy 

ever deeper into the defensive area, causing him to overextend his force and expose 

his flanks and lines of communications to attack. The success of the mobile defense 

often presents the opportunity to resume the offense and must be planned.

Figure 8-3. Mobile Defense.
Marine Corps Operations 8-19

Mobile defense orients on the destruction of the enemy force by employing a 

combination of fires, maneuver, offense, defense, and delay to defeat the enemy 

attack. Open terrain or a wide sector favors a mobile defense that orients on the 

enemy. The primary function of committed units in a mobile defense is to control 

the enemy penetration pending a counterattack by a large reserve. In mobile 

defense, the MAGTF commander—

l Commits minimum forces to pure defense.

l Positions maximum combat power to catch the enemy as he attempts to 

overcome that part of the force dedicated to the defense.

l Takes advantage of terrain in depth, obstacles, and mines, while employing 

firepower and maneuver to wrest the initiative from the attacker.

l Employs a strong counterattack force to strike the enemy at his most vulnerable 

time and place. 

l Uses reconnaissance and surveillance assets to track the enemy, identifying 

critical enemy nodes, such as command and control, radars, logistics trains, and 

indirect fire support elements. These asset blind or deceive enemy critical 

reconnaissance and sensors, allowing less critical reconnaissance elements to 

draw attention to the friendly forces’ secondary efforts. At the decisive 

moment, defenders strike simultaneously throughout the depth of the attacker’s 

forces, assaulting him from an open flank and defeating him in detail.

l May trade terrain to divert the attention of the enemy from the main force, 

overextend the attacker’s resources, expose his flanks, and lead him into a 

posture and terrain that diminishes his ability to defend against counterattack.

l Sets up large-scale counterattacks that offer opportunity to gain and retain the 

initiative and transition to offensive operations such as exploitation and pursuit.

Depth is required in a mobile defense to draw the enemy in and expose an 

exploitable weakness to counterattack. The following circumstances favor the 

conduct of a mobile defense:

l The defender possesses equal or greater mobility than the enemy.

l The frontage assigned exceeds the defender’s capability to establish an 

effective position defense.

l The available battlespace allows the enemy to be drawn into an unfavorable 

position and exposed to attack.

l Time for preparing defensive positions is limited.

l Sufficient mechanized and aviation forces are available to allow rapid 

concentration of combat power.
8-20 MCDP 1-0

l The enemy may employ weapons of mass destruction.

l The mission does not require denying the enemy specific terrain.

Using mobile defenses, commanders anticipate enemy penetration into the 

defended area and use obstacles and defended positions to shape and control such 

penetrations. They also use local counterattacks either to influence the enemy 

into entering the planned penetration area or to deceive him as to the nature of the 

defense. As in area defenses, static elements of a mobile defense contain the 

enemy in a designated area. In a mobile defense, the counterattack is strong, welltimed, and well-supported. Preferably, counterattacking forces strike against the 

enemy’s flanks and rear rather than the front of his forces.

Position Defense

The position defense is a type of defense in which the bulk of the defending force 

is disposed in selected tactical positions where the decisive battle is to be fought. 

It denies the enemy critical terrain or facilities for a specified time. A position 

defense focuses on the retention of terrain by absorbing the enemy into a series of 

interlocked positions from which he can be destroyed, largely by fires, together 

with friendly maneuver. Principal reliance is placed on the ability of the forces in 

the defended positions to maintain their positions and to control the terrain 

between them. The position defense is sometimes referred to as an area defense. 

See figure 8-4. This defense uses battle positions, strong points, obstacles, and 

barriers to slow, canalize, and defeat the enemy attack. The assignment of forces 

within these areas and positions allows for depth and mutual support of the force.

Battle Position

A battle position is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue 

of approach from which a unit may defend or attack. It can be used to deny or delay 

the enemy the use of certain terrain or an avenue of approach. The size of a battle 

position can vary with the size of the unit assigned. For ground combat units, battle 

positions are usually hastily occupied but should be continuously improved.

Strong Point

A strong point is a fortified defensive position designed to deny the enemy 

certain terrain as well as the use of an avenue of approach. It differs from a battle 

position in that it is designed to be occupied for an extended period of time. It is 

established on critical terrain and must be held for the defense to succeed. A 

strong point is organized for all-around defense and should have sufficient 

supplies and ammunition to continue to fight even if surrounded or cut off from 

resupply. Strong points require considerable time and engineer resources.
Marine Corps Operations 8-21

Preparation of a position defense is a continuing process that ends only when the 

defender is ordered to give up the terrain. METT-T drives the tasks to be done 

and their priority, making maximum use of obstacle and barrier plans, 

engagement areas, and fires. Mobile defenses require considerable depth, but 

position defenses vary in depth according to the situation. For example, a 

significant obstacle to the front—such as a river, built-up area, swamp, or 

escarpment—favors a position defense. Such an obstacle adds to the relative 

combat power of the defender. Obstacles support static elements of the defense 

and slow or canalize the enemy in vital areas.

The commander positions the bulk of his combat power in static defensive positions 

and small mobile reserves. He depends on his static forces to defend their positions. 

His reserves are used to blunt and contain penetrations, to counterattack, and to 

exploit opportunities presented by the enemy. The commander also employs security 

Figure 8-4. Position Defense.
8-22 MCDP 1-0

forces in the position defense. The commander conducts a position defense under the 

following circumstances:

l The force must defend specific terrain that is militarily and politically essential.

l The defender possesses less mobility than the enemy.

l Maneuver space is limited or the terrain restricts the movement of the 

defending force.

l The terrain enables mutual support to the defending force.

l The depth of the battlespace is limited.

l The terrain restricts the movement of the defender.

l There is sufficient time to prepare positions.

l The employment of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy is unlikely.

In a position defense, committed forces counterattack whenever conditions are 

favorable. Commanders use their reserves in cooperation with static elements of their 

defense’s battle positions and strongpoints to break the enemy’s momentum and 

reduce his numerical advantage. As the attack develops and the enemy reveals his 

dispositions, reserves and fires strike at objectives in depth to break up the 

coordination of the attack.

FUTURE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Expeditionary maneuver warfare and changes in organization, doctrine, and 

training will alter how the MAGTF conducts defensive operations in the future. 

Enhancements to information technology will provide commanders with 

increased flexibility in the defense. 

Increasingly, the MAGTF commander will receive real-time, fused information to 

make better informed and more timely decisions. Highly capable precision munitions, 

improved unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and new “sensor to shooter” 

technologies will increase the MAGTF commander’s ability to engage an attacking 

force, shape the battlespace, and set conditions for decisive actions. Increased ranges 

of fire support systems and improved mobility of ground forces, using advanced 

amphibious assault vehicles and innovative aircraft, will allow the commander to 

mass effects on the enemy instead of massing forces that become more susceptible to 

enemy counteractions. The importance of the MAGTF’s access to, and use of 

information and information systems will not go unnoticed by future adversaries. To 

reduce its susceptibility, the MAGTF will require defensive activities to protect and 

defend the information and information systems that are critical to operational 

success. Ultimately, these innovations will allow the MAGTF to rapidly transition 

from the defense to the offensive—moving directly to exploitation and pursuit.
CHAPTER 9

Other MAGTF Tactical Operations

"Gentlemen, we are not retreating. We are merely attacking in another direction." 

—Major General O.P. Smith, USMC

"The withdrawal should be thought of as an offensive instrument, and exercises be framed to teach how 

the enemy can be lured into a trap, closed by a counterstroke or devastating circle of fire." 

—B.H. Liddell Hart

This chapter describes some of the other tactical operations that enable the MAGTF 

to execute offensive and defensive operations. These tactical operations include 

retrograde, passage of lines, linkup, relief in place, obstacle crossing, and breakout 

from encirclement. These operations are planned, coordinated, synchronized, 

integrated, and conducted by various MAGTF elements. For example, in the conduct 

of a relief in place, linkup or passage of lines, the commander ordering the operation 

will specify responsibilities, procedures, and resolve differences in methods of 

execution. The higher commander must establish measures to ensure continuous and 

effective fire and other support during the operation.

RETROGRADE

A retrograde is any movement or maneuver to the rear or away from the enemy. 

It may be forced by the enemy or may be made voluntarily. Commanders 

Contents

Retrograde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2

Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3

Retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4

Passage of Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Linkup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6

Relief in Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7

Obstacle Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7

Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8

River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9

Breakout from Encirclement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
9-2 MCDP 1-0

combine delay, withdrawal, and retirement for offensive and defensive schemes 

of maneuver. All retrograde operations are conducted to improve an operational 

or tactical situation or prevent a worse one from developing. They—

l Reduce the enemy’s offensive capabilities.

l Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.

l Enable combat under conditions favorable to friendly forces.

l Gain time.

l Disengage from contact with the enemy.

l Reposition forces for commitment elsewhere.

l Shorten lines of communications.

Retrograde operations will usually involve all MAGTF elements. While the GCE is 

normally the main effort, the ACE and the CSSE play major roles in setting the 

conditions for a successful retrograde. The ACE, operating from the sea or from bases 

beyond the reach of the enemy's artillery, interdicts enemy forces to disrupt and delay 

his advance, and provides close air support to ground forces in contact and assault 

support to move troops, equipment, and supplies away from the enemy. The CSSE 

continues to provide combat service support to the MAGTF and transportation to 

move troops, equipment, and supplies away from the enemy and to establish new 

combat service support facilities in the rear to support future operations.

Delay

A delay is an operation where a force under pressure trades space for time by 

slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the 

enemy without becoming decisively engaged. Forces execute delays when they 

have insufficient combat power to attack or defend or when the plan calls for 

drawing the enemy into an area for counterattack. See figure 9-1.

The MAGTF commander may specify the amount of time to be gained or events 

to be accomplished by the delaying force to successfully accomplish the mission. 

Delays may be used in the security area, main battle area or rear area. Sufficient 

depth of area is required for a delay.

Commanders should plan maximum use of terrain, barriers, and obstacles. 

Delaying forces must remain in constant contact with the enemy to ensure that 

the enemy experiences continuous pressure and to prevent delaying units from 

being by-passed by the enemy. The delaying force should make every effort to 

ensure that it does not become decisively engaged.
Marine Corps Operations 9-3

Delays are conducted—

l When the force’s strength is insufficient to defend or attack.

l To reduce the enemy’s offensive capability by inflicting casualties.

l To gain time by forcing the enemy to deploy.

l To determine the strength and location of the enemy’s main effort.

l When the enemy intent is not clear and the commander desires intelligence.

l To protect and provide early warning for the main battle area forces.

l To allow time to reestablish the defense.

Withdrawal

A withdrawal is a planned operation where a force in contact disengages from an 

enemy force. The commander’s intent is to put distance between his force and the 

Figure 9-1. Delay.
9-4 MCDP 1-0

enemy. Ideally, a withdrawal is done without the enemy’s knowledge or before 

he can prevent or disrupt it. A withdrawal is conducted—

l If the force is in danger of being defeated.

l To avoid battle under unfavorable conditions.

l To draw the enemy into terrain or a position that facilitates our offensive action.

l To allow for the reposition or redeployment of the force for employment 

elsewhere.

There are two types of withdrawal operations that are distinguished by the 

enemy’s reaction to the withdrawal:

l Withdrawal under enemy pressure, in which the enemy tries to prevent the 

disengagement by attacking.

l Withdrawal not under enemy pressure, in which the enemy does not or cannot 

try to prevent the withdrawal.

Regardless of the type of withdrawal, planning considerations are the same. A 

prudent commander always plans to execute the withdrawal under enemy 

pressure. He should anticipate enemy interference by fires, direct pressure, and 

envelopment. If the enemy interferes, security forces will have to fight a delaying 

action as they move to the rear. If the enemy does not interfere, security forces 

disengage and withdraw on order. The more closely a unit is engaged with the 

enemy, the more difficult it will be to withdraw. Withdrawal will be easiest after 

success in combat. If a unit cannot disengage from the enemy on its own, the 

commander may employ other units elsewhere to reduce enemy pressure on the 

withdrawing unit or he may employ additional combat power at the point of 

withdrawal for disengagement.

In any withdrawal, the commander should attempt to deceive the enemy about his 

intention to withdraw. Emphasis is placed on speed and surprise. Withdrawing 

during periods of reduced visibility facilitates disengagement from the enemy and 

conceals movement to a degree but also may make control more difficult. Due to 

the inherent difficulties of conducting a withdrawal and the likely adverse 

situation, the commander must have the flexibility to switch to any other type of 

operation such as delay, defend or attack as the situation demands.

Retirement

A retirement is an operation where a force out of contact moves away from the 

enemy. A retirement may immediately follow a withdrawal. A retiring unit is 

normally protected by another unit between it and the enemy. However, this does 
Marine Corps Operations 9-5

not preclude the commander from having to establish adequate security during 

the movement. A retirement is largely an administrative movement. Speed, 

control, and security are the most important considerations. Commanders retire 

units to—

l Position forces for other missions.

l Adjust the defensive scheme.

l Prepare to assist the delays and withdrawals of other units.

l Deceive the enemy.

PASSAGE OF LINES

A passage of lines is an operation where a force moves forward or rearward 

through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out 

of contact with the enemy. It is always conducted with another mission, such as 

to begin an attack, conduct an exploitation or a security force mission. A passage 

of lines, forward or rearward, is a complex and often dangerous operation, 

requiring thorough coordination. Inherent in the conduct of security operations, 

especially in the defense, is the requirement to execute a passage of lines. In an 

advance, security forces may be required to fix enemy forces in place and allow 

the main force to pass through in the attack. Faced with a superior enemy force or 

in the conduct of security operations in the defense, security forces must fall back 

and execute a rearward passage of lines, conducting battle handover with forces 

in the main battle area.

The conduct of a passage of lines involves the stationary force and the moving 

force. In the offense, the moving force is normally the attacking force and is 

organized to assume its assigned mission after the passage. The stationary force 

facilitates the passage and provides maximum support to the moving force. 

Normally, the plans and requirements of the moving force have priority. The time 

or circumstances when responsibility for the zone of action transfers from the 

stationary force to the moving force must be agreed upon by the two commanders 

or specified by higher authority. Normally, the attacking commander assumes 

responsibility at or before the time of attack. Responsibility may be transferred 

before the time of attack to allow the attacking commander to control any 

preparation fires. In this latter case, stationary force elements that are in contact 

at the time of the transfer must be placed under the operational control of the 

attacking commander. Liaison between the forces involved should be established 

as early as possible.
9-6 MCDP 1-0

In the defense, a rearward passage of lines is normally executed when withdrawing 

a security force. The withdrawing force is the moving force and may pass through 

the stationary force en route to performing another mission or it may be integrated 

into the stationary unit. The common commander must specify any special 

command relationships and retains control of the passage. The actual transfer of 

responsibility for the sector normally is agreed upon by the executing commanders. 

This is carried out more effectively if the commanders are collocated. The 

withdrawing commander is responsible for identifying the last element of his 

command as it passes through the stationary unit. A detailed plan for mutual 

recognition must be prepared and carefully disseminated throughout both forces. 

The stationary commander reports to his senior commander when he has assumed 

responsibility for the sector. The withdrawing commander reports to the senior 

commander when his unit has completed the passage.

Due to the risks associated with a passage of lines, they are, if possible, 

conducted at night or during periods of reduced visibility. Risks include 

fratricide, exposure to enemy counteractions, and loss of control as responsibility 

for the sector is handed over from one force to another, and the potential of 

unintegrated movement of forces. Stationary and moving force commanders 

normally collocate their command posts to facilitate command and control of this 

demanding tactical operation.

LINKUP

A linkup is an operation where two friendly forces join together in a hostile area. 

The purpose of the linkup is to establish contact between two forces. A linkup 

may occur between a helicopterborne force and a force on the ground, between 

two converging forces or in the relief of an encircled force. The commander 

directing the linkup establishes the command relationships and responsibilities of 

the two units, during and after the linkup, to include responsibility for fire 

support coordination.

A linkup involves a stationary force and a moving force. If both units are moving, one 

is designated the stationary force and should occupy the linkup point at least 

temporarily to effect linkup. The commanders involved must coordinate their 

schemes of maneuver. They agree on primary and alternate linkup points where 

physical contact between the advance elements of the two units will occur. Linkup 

points must be easily recognizable to both units and are located where the routes of 

the moving force intersect the security elements of the stationary force. Commanders 

must carefully coordinate fire support for the safety of both units.
Marine Corps Operations 9-7

RELIEF IN PLACE

A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or 

part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. Responsibilities of the 

replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are 

transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as 

ordered. The relief must be executed in an expeditious and orderly manner. Every 

effort must be made to effect the relief without weakening the tactical integrity 

and security of the assigned area.

The outgoing commander is responsible for the defense of his sector until 

command is passed. The moment when command is to pass is determined by 

mutual agreement between the commanders involved, within the direction of 

higher headquarters. Both commanders should be collocated throughout the 

operation to facilitate the transfer of command and control. Following this 

transfer, the incoming commander will assume OPCON of all elements of the 

outgoing force that have not yet been relieved. The incoming commander will 

report to higher headquarters when he has assumed command.

The relief can take place simultaneously over the entire width of the sector or it 

can be staggered over time. If forces are relieved simultaneously across the 

sector, less time is required but greater congestion may be created. The readiness 

of the defense is reduced, and the enemy is more likely to detect the greater level 

of movement. By contrast, a relief staggered over time takes longer, but a larger 

portion of the force is prepared to conduct operations.

OBSTACLE CROSSING

An obstacle is a natural or manmade impediment to movement that usually 

requires specific techniques and equipment to overcome. A series of such 

obstacles is called a barrier. Crossing obstacles is most often required as part of 

the offense, although it may take place during the defense. Any obstacle can be 

crossed given sufficient time and resources. Crossings covered by the enemy, 

however, require extensive control and preparation to minimize losses from 

enemy action. A critical requirement in any obstacle crossing is the reduction or 

elimination of the effects of enemy fire covering the obstacle through the 

employment of maneuver and neutralizing, suppressing or obscuration fires. The 

goal is to cross the obstacle with minimum delay, loss of momentum, and 

disruption to concept of operations and casualties.

Upon encountering an obstacle, the commander can bypass the obstacle or 

execute a breach. Detailed intelligence is required to reveal the enemy’s 

capability to oppose the crossing, the characteristics of the obstacle and crossing 
9-8 MCDP 1-0

points, and the terrain on the far side. When possible, the attacker bypasses the 

enemy obstacles, saving time, labor, and risk to personnel and equipment. 

However, the commander must exercise caution since obstacles are often 

employed to canalize forces. A bypass route that at first appears desirable may 

lead into a killing zone.

Planning an obstacle crossing should include provisions for a hasty, and, failing 

or precluding that, a deliberate attempt. The commander’s options may be limited 

because of restrictions on maneuver, the ability to deliver supporting fires, and 

the time required to move forces across or around the obstacle. The commander 

may conduct demonstrations and feints at locations away from the main crossing 

or breaching point to draw the enemy’s defenses from that point.

The attacker advances to the obstacle quickly and on a broad front to increase the 

possibility of effecting a hasty crossing. The inherent capabilities of the ACE 

provide the MAGTF commander multiple options for moving on a broad front 

and rapidly crossing obstacles to establish security on the enemy side. The ACE 

can either provide combat assault transport for MAGTF units attacking directly 

across the obstacle or carry MAGTF units far beyond the obstacle to bypass the 

enemy or conduct a turning movement.

Once forces and equipment are committed to crossing, withdrawal or deviation 

from the initial plan is extremely difficult. During a crossing, a force is most 

vulnerable while astride the obstacle. After establishing units on the far side of 

the obstacle, the commander pushes his combat power across or through as 

quickly as possible.

Breach

When he cannot bypass an obstacle, the attacker attempts to breach. Breaching, 

the most common means of crossing an obstacle, is the employment of any 

available means to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defense, 

obstacle, minefield or fortification. The plan for breaching is based on the 

concept of operation on the far side. There are two types of breaching that 

generally correspond to hasty and deliberate attacks, with many of the same 

considerations, advantages, and disadvantages.

A hasty breach is the rapid creation of a route through a minefield, barrier or 

fortification by any expedient method. It is conducted as a continuation of the 

operation underway with a minimum loss of momentum. A hasty breach is 

characterized by speed and surprise, minimal concentration of forces, and 

decentralization of control and execution. Leading elements try to cross or breach 
Marine Corps Operations 9-9

using their own resources. Minimal engineer support, if any, is involved. 

Breaching equipment should be readily available to avoid the loss of momentum.

A deliberate breach is the creation of a lane through a minefield or a clear route 

through a barrier or fortification, which is systematically planned and carried out. 

It requires a concentration of the force to overcome the obstacle and enemy 

defenses on the far side. This requires extensive planning, detailed preparation, 

sustained supporting arms and engineer support. Control is centralized 

throughout. When forced to conduct a deliberate breach, the attacker may lose 

momentum and the initiative. A deliberate breach should only be implemented if 

the tactical situation does not permit a hasty breach.

River Crossing

Wide, unfordable rivers exercise considerable influence on military operations 

because they impose restrictions on movement and maneuver. They constitute 

obstacles to attack and form natural lines of resistance for defense. The strength 

of a river as an obstacle increases with width, depth, and velocity of the current. 

A river crossing is an operation required before ground combat power can be 

projected and sustained across a water obstacle. Like an amphibious operation, it 

is a centrally planned offensive operation that requires the thoughtful allocation 

of resources and control measures. The primary concern is the rapid buildup of 

combat power on the far side to continue offensive operations.

A hasty crossing is crossing an inland water obstacle using crossing means at 

hand or those readily available and made without pausing for elaborate 

preparations. Preferably, a hasty crossing is conducted by seizing an intact 

crossing site.

A deliberate crossing is crossing an inland water obstacle that requires extensive 

planning and detailed preparations.

BREAKOUT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT

A breakout is both an offensive and a defensive operation. An encircled force 

normally attempts a breakout when the—

l Breakout is ordered or is within a senior commander's intent.

l Encircled force does not have sufficient relative combat power to defend itself 

against the enemy.

l Encircled force does not have adequate terrain to conduct its defense.

l Encircled force cannot sustain itself for any length of time or until relieved by 

friendly forces.
9-10 MCDP 1-0

The commander must execute the breakout as soon as possible. The sooner the 

breakout is executed, the less time the enemy has to strengthen his position and 

the more organic resources and support the encircled force has available. The 

encircled force may receive fire support and diversions from forces outside the 

encirclement. Most importantly, the encircled force must maintain the 

momentum of the attack. If the breakout fails, the force will be more vulnerable 

to defeat or destruction than it was before the breakout attempt. 

The encircled force normally conducts a breakout by task-organizing with a force 

that conducts the rupture, a main body, and a rear guard. If the commander has 

enough forces, he may organize separate reserve, diversionary, and supporting 

elements. Any of these forces may consist of aviation or ground combat units 

(one or both as individual elements or as task-organized combined arms teams) 

and appropriate combat service support organizations, based on the factors of 

METT-T.

The force conducting the rupture, which may consist of two-thirds of the total 

encircled force, is assigned the mission to penetrate the enemy’s encircling 

position, widen the gap, and hold the shoulders of the gap until all other encircled 

forces have moved through. The main body follows the force conducting the 

rupture to maintain the momentum of the attack and secure objectives past the 

rupture. The main body includes the main command post and the bulk of the 

combat service support. The rear guard provides protection for the force 

conducting the rupture and the main body as they pass beyond the rupture.
CHAPTER 10

Military Operations Other Than War

Contents

Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4

Unity of Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4

Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5

Restraint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5

Perseverance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6

Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6

Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7

Combatting Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7

Department of Defense Support to Counterdrug Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7

Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Enforcing Exclusion Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-9

Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11

Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12

Protection of Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13

Recovery Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13

Show of Force Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Strikes and Raids. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Support to Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Warfighting Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15

Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16

Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16

Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17

Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18

Force Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
10-2 MCDP 1-0

"One of the dominating factors in the establishment of the mission in small war situations has been in the 

past, and will continue to be in the future, the civil contacts of the entire command. The satisfactory 

solution of problems involving civil authorities and civil population requires that all ranks be familiar with 

the language, the geography, and the political, social, and economic factors involved in the country in 

which they are operating. Poor judgment on the part of subordinates in the handling of situations involving 

the local civil authorities and the local inhabitants is certain to involve the commander of the force in 

unnecessary military difficulties and cause publicity adverse to the public interests of the United States."

—Small Wars Manual (1940 Edition)

In contrast to large-scale sustained combat operations, MOOTW focuses on 

deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil 

authorities in response to domestic crises. The Marine Corps has a long history of 

successful participation in MOOTW, from restoring order and nation building in 

Haiti and Nicaragua from 1900 to the 1930s, to guarding the United States mail 

in the 1920s. Capturing lessons learned from years of experience in such 

operations, the Marine Corps published a Small Wars Manual in 1940. This 

seminal reference publication continues to be relevant to Marines today as they 

face complex and sensitive situations in a variety of operations.

The national security strategy calls for engagement with other nations and a rapid 

response to political crises and natural disasters to help shape the security 

environment throughout the world. While this engagement or response may take 

the form of financial or political assistance, the use of United States military 

forces is always an option for the National Command Authorities. Combatant 

commanders often rely on responsive, forward-deployed MAGTFs, such as the 

MEU(SOC), to promote and protect national interests within their area of 

responsibility. These capable forces, task-organized to meet a variety of 

contingencies, are usually the first forces to reach the scene and are often the 

precursor to larger Marine and joint forces.

The Marine Corps approach to MOOTW builds on joint doctrine to better address 

the expeditionary nature of these types of military operations. It links Marine 

Corps capabilities with the collective, coordinated use of both traditional and 

nontraditional elements of national power into a cohesive foreign policy tool, and 

focuses on the ability to be expeditionary through forward-deployed naval forces. 

The Marine Corps’ role is to provide the means for an immediate response while 

serving as the foundation for follow-on forces or resources. Forward-deployed 

MAGTFs, with their inherent range of capabilities, are well-positioned to conduct 

the wide range of missions and coordination with coalition, nongovernmental 

organizations, and other agencies essential to success in a MOOTW environment. 

Through IO, including information sharing and maintaining a wide range of 

contacts with our allies, Marines promote trust and confidence and increase the 

security of our allies and coalition partners. Regional engagement enhances force 
Marine Corps Operations 10-3

protection and provides an understanding of the role and preparedness of the 

MAGTF to respond to crises.

MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in 

peacetime, conflict, and war. Those smaller-scale contingencies involving 

combat, such as peace enforcement in Haiti in 1995, Operation Urgent Fury in 

Grenada (1983), Operation El Dorado Canyon in Libya (1986) and Operation 

Just Cause in Panama (1989), may have many of the same characteristics as war, 

including offensive and defensive combat operations and employment of the full 

combat power of the MAGTF. Noncombat operations do not involve the use or 

threat of force and can help keep the tensions between nations below the 

threshold of armed conflict or war. In MOOTW, political and cultural 

considerations permeate planning and execution of operations at all levels of 

command. As in war, the goal of MOOTW is to achieve national objectives as 

quickly as possible. 

MAGTFs conducting MOOTW are often in a support role to other governmental 

agencies and the United Nations. However, in certain types of MOOTW, the 

military may have the lead, as in small wars like Operation Urgent Fury and 

Operation Just Cause. MOOTW usually involve coordination with non-Department 

of Defense agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Although normally 

conducted outside of the United States, MOOTW may be conducted within the 

United States in support of civil authorities, as demonstrated when Marines assisted 

civil authorities in restoring order in Los Angeles following the 1992 riots.

Pages 10-7 through 10-14 identify the 16 types of military operations (arms 

control through support to insurgency) that apply to MOOTW and that a MAGTF 

could perform or support.

PRINCIPLES

Although primarily associated with traditional combat operations, the principles 

of war generally apply to MOOTW. For example, raids rely on the principles of 

surprise, offensive, mass, and economy of force to achieve a favorable outcome. 

MOOTW are conducted in a fluid environment with changing rules of 

engagement, always subject to rapidly transitioning from noncombat to combat 

operations and back again. This dynamic situation requires commanders consider 

not only the principles of war (based on the political situation and the nature of 

the crisis), but also the principles of MOOTW. JP 3-0 and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine 

for Military Operations Other Than War, provide the following principles that 

apply specifically to MOOTW.
10-4 MCDP 1-0

Objective

Direct every operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable 

objective. While defining mission success may be difficult in MOOTW, it is 

essential that the MAGTF remain focused on a clear and attainable objective. 

Specifying end state and conditions in advance helps define mission 

accomplishment and identify transitions between phases of the operation.

The political objectives that military objectives are based on may not specifically 

address the desired military end state. Commanders, from the joint force 

commander to the company commanders, should translate their political guidance 

into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission 

and threat analysis. They should carefully explain to political authorities the 

implications of political decisions on the capabilities of and risk to military 

forces. Care should be taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of 

common terminology.

Changes to the initial military objectives may occur as political and military 

leaders gain a better understanding of the situation or because it changes. The 

MAGTF commander should be aware of shifts in the political objectives or in the 

situation itself. These changes may be very subtle, yet they may still require 

adjustment of the military objectives. If this adjustment is not made, the military 

objectives may no longer support the political objectives, legitimacy may be 

undermined, and force security may be compromised. Continuous assessment of 

the mission and end state is essential.

Unity of Effort

Seek unity of effort in every operation. This principle is derived from unity of 

command. It emphasizes the need to ensure all activities of the command are 

directed against a common objective. The often complicated command lines 

encountered during MOOTW place a premium on the MAGTF commander’s 

ability to achieve consensus with his higher and adjacent commanders.

In MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of 

international, foreign, and domestic military and nonmilitary participants; the 

lack of definitive command arrangements among them; and varying views of the 

objective. While the chain of command for United States military forces remains 

inviolate (flowing from the National Command Authorities through the 

combatant commander and the Marine Corps component commander to the 

MAGTF commander), command arrangements among coalition partners may be 

less well-defined and not include full command authority. The MAGTF 

commander must establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve 
Marine Corps Operations 10-5

unity of effort. Because MOOTW are often conducted at the small unit level, all 

levels of command must understand the informal and formal relationships.

Security

Acquire a military, political or informational advantage to prevent hostile 

factions from doing so. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing 

vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise. The uncertain nature of the 

situation inherent in many MOOTW, coupled with the potential for rapid change, 

require that operations security be an integral part of the operation. Operations 

security planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility 

coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in 

MOOTW; rules of engagement should not interfere with this right. Self-defense 

may be exercised against those persons, elements or groups hostile to the 

operation, such as terrorists or looters after a civil crisis or natural disaster. The 

MAGTF commander must be ready to counter any activity that could endanger 

friendly units or jeopardize the operation. All MAGTF personnel should stay 

alert even in a nonhostile operation with little or no perceived risk, ready to 

quickly transition to combat operations should circumstances dictate.

Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and 

organizations. The perceived neutrality of these protected elements may be a 

factor in their security. Protection of a nongovernmental organization by United 

States military forces may create the perception that the nongovernmental 

organization is not neutral. Therefore, a nongovernmental organization may be 

reluctant to accept the United States military’s protection. The MAGTF may have 

to balance these two potentially conflicting objectives (security and neutrality) in 

a diplomatic fashion through low visibility security measures that protect the 

civilian organization while permitting it to function in a neutral fashion.

Restraint

Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single ill-advised act could 

result in significant political or military consequences. Judicious use of force is 

necessary. Restraint requires balancing the need for security, the conduct of the 

operation, and the political objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties 

involved, damaging the perception of legitimacy of United States forces while 

possibly enhancing that of the opposing party. The MAGTF may have to avoid 

the use of force and accept additional risk unless security considerations 

absolutely require it.
10-6 MCDP 1-0

Commanders at all levels of the MAGTF should ensure their personnel know and 

understand the rules of engagement and are quickly informed of changes. Failure to 

understand and comply with established rules of engagement can result in 

fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. Rules of engagement in 

MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns 

than in war. Restraint is best achieved when rules of engagement issued at the 

beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. Rules 

of engagement should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Rules of 

engagement should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of 

military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.

Perseverance

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support 

of strategic aims. MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. The 

underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve 

decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals 

and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is often a requirement for 

success. Commanders must be prepared to transition from periods of combat 

operations to noncombat operations and back again as conditions evolve.

Legitimacy

Sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where 

applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is based on the perception of a specific 

audience of the legality, morality or rightness of a set of actions. This audience 

may be the United States public, foreign nations, the population in the AO, 

participating forces or potentially hostile factions. If an operation is not perceived 

as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In 

MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The prudent use of 

psychological operations and humanitarian and civil assistance programs assists 

in developing a sense of legitimacy for the supported government.

Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international 

community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in 

dealing with various factions. It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, 

the type of forces employed, and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved. 

The perception of legitimacy by the United States public is strengthened if there 

are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake and if there is assurance 

that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.
Marine Corps Operations 10-7

ARMS CONTROL

Arms control includes those activities by military forces to verify conventional, 

nuclear, biological or chemical arms control agreements; seizing or destroying 

weapons; dismantling or disposing of weapons and hazardous materials; and 

escorting deliveries of weapons. It encompasses any plan, arrangement or process 

controlling the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of any weapon 

system. These activities help reduce threats to regional security and assist in 

implementing arms agreements. A MAGTF may provide command and control, 

logistics or intelligence support to verification and inspection teams or conduct 

arms control inspections itself.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

Combatting terrorism involves actions to oppose terrorism including 

antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability of individuals 

and property to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to 

prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). Marine Corps forces, such as 

MEU(SOC), the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams, and the Chemical/

Biological Incident Response Force, can participate in these kinds of operations. 

MAGTFs may provide secure base areas, communications, logistics, and 

transportation support, as well as specially tailored conventional forces to other 

forces conducting counterterrorism operations.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT

TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

The Department of Defense supports federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United 

States. Military forces assist in detecting and monitoring drug trafficking; support 

interdiction efforts; provide intelligence and logistic support; and integrate 

command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence assets dedicated 

to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States. Marine 

Corps forces frequently support Defense Department counterdrug activities, such 

as the Joint Task Force-Six operations along the United States-Mexico border, by 

providing observation, radar support, and cargo inspection.
10-8 MCDP 1-0

ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS/

MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS

These operations employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of 

designated items in or out of a nation or specified area, to compel a country or 

group to conform to the objectives of the nation or international body that 

establishes the sanctions. MAGTFs, as part of a larger naval force, can establish a 

barrier, detect blockade runners, and intercept and search such vessels to enforce 

the sanction. These operations allow authorized cargo and persons to pass 

through while preventing sanctioned material and persons from entering, as 

demonstrated during the naval blockade against Iraq throughout the 1990s.

ENFORCING EXCLUSION ZONES

These operations employ coercive measures to prohibit specified activities in a 

specific geographic area. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning 

body to persuade a nation or a group to modify their behavior to meet the 

desires of the sanctioning body or face continuing sanctions or the use or threat 

of force. Marine Corps forces, including Marine aviation, can enforce exclusion 

zones, as demonstrated in Operation Southern Watch (Iraq) and Operation 

Deny Flight (Bosnia).

ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT

These operations are conducted to demonstrate United States or international 

rights to navigate sea or air routes in accordance with international law. In 1986 

United States forces conducted Operation Attain Document, a series of freedom 

of air and sea navigation operations, against Libya in the Gulf of Sidra. MAGTFs 

can conduct operations to seize and control critical chokepoints on sea lines of 

communication to help ensure unimpeded use of the seas. Marine aviation can 

assist the combatant commander provide combat air patrol (CAP) or strikes 

against hostile antiair missiles and guns to ensure use of air routes in accordance 

with international law.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian assistance operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or 

manmade disasters that might present a serious threat to life or result in extensive 

damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by United States 

forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is 

designed to supplement or complement the host-nation civil authorities efforts. 
Marine Corps Operations 10-9

The United States military provides assistance when the relief need is gravely 

urgent and when the humanitarian emergency overwhelms the ability of normal 

relief agencies to effectively respond.

Humanitarian assistance operations may be directed by the National Command 

Authorities when a serious international situation threatens the political or 

military stability of a region considered of interest to the United States or when 

the humanitarian situation itself may be sufficient and appropriate for 

employment of United States forces. The Department of State or the United 

States ambassador in the affected country is responsible for declaring a foreign 

disaster or situation that requires humanitarian assistance. The Department of 

State then requests Department of Defense assistance from the National 

Command Authorities.

Humanitarian assistance operations may cover a broad range of missions. A 

humanitarian assistance mission could also include securing an environment to 

allow humanitarian relief efforts. In 1991, 24th MEU(SOC) provided security, 

shelter, food, and water to the dissident Kurdish minority in northern Iraq. United 

States military forces participate in three basic types of humanitarian assistance 

operations: those coordinated by the United Nations, those where the United 

States acts in concert with other multinational forces or those where the United 

States responds unilaterally. The Marine Corps can respond rapidly to 

emergencies or disasters and achieve order in austere locations. This response 

could include providing security, logistics, engineering, medical support, and 

command and control and communications capabilities. Marine Corps forces can 

provide sea-based humanitarian assistance. The 5th MEB, during Operation Sea 

Angel in 1991, assisted Bangladesh in the aftermath of a devastating tropical 

cyclone by distributing food and medical supplies and repairing the country’s 

transportation infrastructure.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

These operations provide temporary military support to domestic civil authorities 

when permitted by law and are normally undertaken when an emergency 

overwhelms the capabilities of the civil authorities. Support to civil authorities 

may be as diverse as temporary augmentation of government workers during 

strikes, restoration of law and order in the aftermath of riots or protecting life and 

property, and providing humanitarian relief after a natural disaster. Limitations 

on military forces providing support to civil authorities include the Posse 

Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or 

otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by an 

act of Congress. Marine Corps forces provided military support to civil 
10-10 MCDP 1-0

authorities during disaster relief operations following Hurricane Andrew in 

Florida in 1992. The special purpose MAGTF established and maintained a 

temporary city for 2,500 displaced civilians, distributed supplies, and helped 

restore power to Dade County. Marines also supported civilian authorities by 

combatting forest fires in Idaho in 2000.

NATION ASSISTANCE/SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

Nation assistance is civil or military assistance, other than humanitarian 

assistance, rendered to a nation by military forces to promote sustained 

development and growth of civil institutions to promote long term regional 

stability. Nation assistance normally consists of security assistance, foreign 

internal defense, and humanitarian and civic assistance, and is integrated into the 

United States ambassador's country plan.

Security assistance is a series of programs the United States provides to defense 

equipment, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations 

in furtherance of United States national policies and objectives. The Marine 

Corps supports these programs by deploying mobile training teams to conduct 

military-to-military training. The mission of these teams is to train host-nation 

personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems or to 

develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. Teams may be tasked to 

train either military or civilian personnel, depending on host-nation requests.

Foreign internal defense programs encompass all political, economic, 

informational, and military support provided by the United States to another 

nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. These programs may 

address other threats to a host nation’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, 

illegal drug trafficking, and terrorism. Marine Corps military support may include 

training, material, advice or other assistance, including direct support and combat 

operations as authorized by the National Command Authorities.

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are provided with military 

operations and exercises. They must fulfill military unit training requirements 

that incidentally provide humanitarian benefit to the host nation. Unlike 

humanitarian assistance operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs 

are centered on planned activities to provide medical, dental, and veterinary 

services; construct rudimentary surface transportation systems, well drilling, and 

basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public 

facilities. Marine Corps units traditionally perform these humanitarian and civic 

assistance activities. In 1993 and 1994, II MEF established tent camps in 

Guantanamo Bay to assist Haitian and Cuban refugees. In 2000, III MEF 
Marine Corps Operations 10-11

deployed combat service support units to East Timor in the wake of civil unrest 

after the independence plebiscite.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Noncombatant evacuation operations are the evacuation of noncombatants 

located in a foreign country who are faced with the threat of hostile or potentially 

hostile actions. They are normally conducted to evacuate United States citizens 

whose lives are in danger, but may also include the evacuation of United States 

military personnel, citizens of the host country, and third country nationals 

friendly to the United States, as determined by the Department of State.

The Department of State is responsible for protecting and evacuating American 

citizens abroad and for guarding their property. The Department of Defense 

advises and assists the Department of State in preparing and implementing plans 

for evacuating United States citizens. The United States ambassador or chief of 

the diplomatic mission is responsible for preparing emergency action plans that 

address the military evacuation of United States citizens and designated foreign 

nationals from a country. The conduct of military operations to assist 

implementation of emergency action plans is the responsibility of the geographic 

combatant commander.

Noncombatant evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty. These 

operations may be directed without significant warning because of sudden 

changes in a country’s government, reoriented political or military relationship 

with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to United States citizens from 

elements within or external to a foreign country or in response to a natural 

disaster. Noncombatant evacuation operations methods and timing are 

significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances 

there may be little or no opposition. However, commanders should anticipate 

opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

Noncombatant evacuation operations are similar to raids in that they involve 

swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and end with a 

planned withdrawal. They differ from raids in that force used is normally limited 

to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation forces. Forces 

penetrating foreign territory to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation 

should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the 

security of the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees. Forwarddeployed MAGTFs are an ideal force to conduct these missions. Sea-basing and 

the task-organized nature of the MAGTF provide the combatant commander with 

multiple options as Marine forces did in Operations Assured Response/Quick 
10-12 MCDP 1-0

Response (Liberia, 1996), Nobel Obelisk (Sierra Leone, 1997), and Silver Wake 

(Albania, 1997). A MAGTF might conduct the entire operation itself or provide 

forces in a support role.

PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations are conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and 

maintain peace. These operations include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and 

operations in support of diplomatic efforts. Peace operations are conducted under 

the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The specific United Nations 

resolution under which a peace operation is conducted may dictate rules of 

engagement, use of combat power, and type of units deployed.

Peace enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, 

usually based on international authorization or consent, to compel compliance 

with a generally accepted resolution or sanction. Unlike peacekeeping, peace 

enforcement does not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties 

to the conflict and the intervening force is not necessarily considered impartial. 

Such operations are conducted under the mandate of Chapter VII of the United 

Nations Charter. The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore 

peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement. Peace 

enforcement operations missions include intervention operations, as well as 

operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and 

establish and supervise exclusion zones to establish an environment for truce or 

cease-fire. A MAGTF must deploy sufficient combat power to present a credible 

threat, protect the force, and conduct the full range of combat operations 

necessary to restore order and separate the warring factions, if necessary. 

Examples of peace enforcement are Operation Power Pack conducted in the 

Dominican Republic in 1965 and the initial phase of United States involvement 

in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy in 1995.

Peacekeeping operations are conducted with the consent of all major belligerents. 

They involve high levels of mutual consent and strict impartiality by the 

intervening force, and are authorized under Chapter VI of the United Nations 

Charter. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an 

existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political 

settlement. Forces conducting peacekeeping operations must be prepared to 

rapidly transition to peace enforcement operations as conditions change or 

consent of one or more of the belligerents is withdrawn. Preparation should 

include planning, task organization, equipment, and appropriate force protection 

measures. An example of peacekeeping is the deployment of Marine forces to 
Marine Corps Operations 10-13

Lebanon in 1982-83. This mission began as a peacekeeping operation but 

evolved into a peace enforcement operation.

Operations in support of diplomatic efforts are those military actions that 

contribute to the furtherance of United States interests abroad. They include—

l Preventive Diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy involves diplomatic actions 

taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Military 

activities that support preventive diplomacy include deployment of military 

forces, presence forces, and increased readiness levels to show United States 

resolve and ability to use force to preserve the peace.

l Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, 

negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a 

dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support 

peacemaking include security assistance and military-to-military relations.

l Peace Building. Peace building consists of post-conflict activities, primarily 

diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in 

order to prevent a return to conflict. These activities include restoring civil 

authority, rebuilding physical infrastructure, and reestablishing civil 

institutions like schools and medical facilities.

PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

When necessary, Marine Corps forces can protect United States flag vessels, 

citizens, and their property embarked on United States or foreign vessels from 

unlawful violence in and over international waters. Protection can take the form 

of embarked Marines to provide security on board the vessel, ship and convoy 

escort and CAP by Marine aviation, and the recovery of hijacked vessels by 

Marine Corps security forces. MAGTFs can also protect United States shipping 

by eliminating threats such as a land-based antiship missiles, coastal guns, and 

hostile naval forces operating in the littorals.

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and 

return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment or items critical to 

national security. Hostile forces may oppose recovery operations. An example of 

a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel is the rescue by a MEU of a downed 

United States Air Force pilot in Bosnia in 1995.
10-14 MCDP 1-0

SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS

Show of force operations are designed to demonstrate United States resolve and 

involve increased visibility of deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific 

situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States 

interests or national objectives. These operations often involve forward deployed 

forces such as MEU(SOC) and other MAGTFs offloading MPF assets and 

include multinational training exercises, rehearsals, forward deployment of units, 

or the buildup of forces within a theater. The Cobra Gold exercises in Thailand 

and Ahuas Tara exercises in Central America are examples of exercises as show 

of force operations.

STRIKES AND RAIDS

Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize or destroy 

an objective for political purposes. An example of a strike is Operation Praying 

Mantis where a MEU participated in the 1988 destruction of two oil platforms 

being used by Iran to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping.

A raid is usually a small scale operation, involving swift penetration of hostile 

territory to secure information, confuse the enemy or to destroy installations, 

followed by a planned withdrawal. Special maritime operations are principally 

specialized amphibious raids, including the tactical recovery of aircraft and 

personnel. An example of a raid is Operation El Dorado Canyon conducted 

against Libya in 1986, as a response to the terrorist bombing of United States 

servicemembers in Berlin.

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 

government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The United States 

may support an insurgency against a regime threatening United States interests. A 

MAGTF may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency but does not 

normally conduct combat operations against the targeted regime. An example of 

support to insurgency is the United States support to the Mujahadin resistance in 

Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

Commanders and planners use the warfighting functions to achieve integrated 

planning and synchronized execution when planning and conducting MOOTW. 

See appendix E.
Marine Corps Operations 10-15

Command and Control

Command and control is overseen by the MAGTF commander and his 

subordinates and should remain flexible and promote unity of effort. No single 

command and control option works best for all MOOTW. MAGTFs should be 

flexible in modifying their standing operating procedures to meet the specific 

requirements of each situation.

If the MAGTF is part of a multinational force, planners must be prepared to 

provide increased liaison officers or advisors. Language barriers, varied cultural 

backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from 

effective coordination with multinational partners. Liaison and advisory teams 

must be adequately organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to overcome these 

detractors. Liaison teams must be provided with adequate and redundant 

communications means to ensure they maintain connectivity to the MAGTF. 

Deployment of a team may be critical to effective coordination and mission 

accomplishment. Marine foreign area officers possess unique capabilities in 

language and cross-cultural training. Their regional orientation makes them one 

of the principal choices to complement and support MOOTW involving 

multinational operations.

MAGTF planners should also consider assigning missions based on each 

multinational partner’s capabilities. Political considerations will influence the 

degree of involvement for each nation. Some multinational partners may not be 

traditional allies of the United States. Others may harbor long-standing 

animosities towards other participating nations. These factors create unique 

interoperability, foreign disclosure, and counterintelligence issues. Early 

determination and resolution of these issues with partner nations during the 

planning process are critical for retaining the cooperation of multinational 

partners and ensuring they have the resources necessary to accomplish their 

assigned missions.

Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the 

operation. In United States unilateral operations, command and control 

arrangements may vary based on coordination with military, civil authorities or 

federal, state, and local agencies. For example, command and control 

arrangements during support to United States civil authorities must be planned 

with unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate 

United States agencies. In a disaster, routine communications may be disrupted. 

Civil authorities might have to rely on backup communications systems or, if 

civilian backup systems are disrupted, the military may have the only 

communications equipment available. The MAGTF should be prepared to 

establish communication linkages with these authorities.
10-16 MCDP 1-0

Outside the United States, even on those rare occasions when the MAGTF 

operates unilaterally, some communications links will usually be required with 

local civil authorities or international agencies. Communications planning must 

consider the termination of United States involvement in the small war or 

contingency and the transfer of responsibility to another agency such as the 

United Nations or a nongovernmental organization. Some communications 

systems may have to be left behind to support the ongoing effort. This issue 

should be addressed early in the planning effort.

Maneuver

MOOTW encompasses both smaller-scale contingencies and other military 

actions that often require combat operations.

A key capability in MOOTW is to be able to act rapidly and to overwhelm the 

threat with a combination of potent combat forces and operational tempo. This 

requires the MAGTF commander to rapidly deploy the MAGTF while 

simultaneously employing the force in the AO. Combat power must be rapidly built 

up to allow the force to undertake decisive action as early in the operation as 

feasible. While combat operations normally require the overwhelming application 

of this combat power against the enemy, some MOOTW require considerable 

restraint in the application of deadly force. The commander and his staff must be 

attuned to the necessity to limit threat and noncombatant casualties and the 

collateral effects normally resulting from maneuver, particularly in urban areas.

Fires

A MAGTF must still plan for the use of fires in MOOTW. These fires can be 

lethal and nonlethal, provided by organic assets or by joint or multinational 

assets. The political nature and the need to maintain legitimacy makes careful 

mission analysis and precise use of lethal or nonlethal fires essential. MOOTW 

will also increasingly require the flexibility to use nonlethal fires when lethal 

fires are neither required nor desired. Nonlethal fires can confuse, deceive, delay 

or disorganize potential threat forces. Lethal fires are likely to be used sparingly, 

often only when necessary to protect the force. Precise planning and delivery of 

lethal fires are required to prevent unwanted collateral damage and avoid possible 

public affairs repercussions. Collateral damage can have an adverse impact on a 

fragile civilian infrastructure and in maintaining the support of the local 

population. The MAGTF must ensure it coordinates its fire support coordinating 

measures with its analysis of the rules of engagement.
Marine Corps Operations 10-17

Intelligence

Intelligence collection activities in MOOTW require a focus on the political, 

cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. Information collection and 

analysis must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered 

in war. The MAGTF will require information on many aspects of the operational 

environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and any 

variances within affected groups of people. Intelligence collection should also 

focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the AO, including capabilities 

and limitations of major seaports, airfields, and surface lines of communications.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) may provide the most useful source of 

information. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence sources with 

information not available through technical means. For example, while overhead 

imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in the town 

square, it cannot gauge motivations or enthusiasm of the crowds. 

Underdeveloped areas may not rely heavily on radio communication, denying 

United States forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. A HUMINT 

infrastructure may not be in place when United States forces arrive and should be 

established as quickly as possible. In coordination with theater commander and 

the United States country team, the MAGTF will conduct aggressive active and 

passive counterintelligence (CI) measures designed to neutralize threat 

intelligence collection activities and protect friendly information.

CI operations are vital in MOOTW. Protection of the force requires safeguarding 

essential elements of friendly information and countering potential threat 

intelligence collection efforts. Members of civilian organizations or the local 

populace may pass information (knowingly or unknowingly) to belligerent 

elements. MAGTFs must prepare for the possibility for compromise of 

operational information and take actions to counter the threat. Because of the 

possibly tenuous relationships between the United States and coalition partners 

during a particular small war or contingency, MAGTFs must also be alert to the 

possibility that covert intelligence operations may be conducted against them by 

a coalition partner. CI planning and operations must address this contingency in a 

sensitive way. Equally important is CI’s role in establishing procedures and 

safeguards regarding the protection, handling, and release of classified or 

sensitive information to coalition partners and allies.

The MAGTF should exchange information with civilian organizations to benefit 

from their knowledge and familiarity with the culture, language, and sensitivities 

of the local populace. This information can be very valuable to the MAGTF as it 

conducts planning. However, civilian organizations may resent being considered 

a source of intelligence or believe that the MAGTF is seeking to recruit members 
10-18 MCDP 1-0

of their organizations for collection efforts. MAGTF intelligence personnel 

should use the term “information gathering” rather than the term “intelligence.” 

Peacekeeping operations should also use this term so that the MAGTF will be 

seen as conducting operations in an overt, neutral, and impartial manner. This 

may help the MAGTF foster better communications with other agencies, and 

thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge.

Logistics

Most crises requiring United States involvement will occur in developing nations 

that lack a robust infrastructure. Marine Corps forces can anticipate minimal 

host-nation support in urban and rural environments. Sea-based combat service 

support facilitates MOOTW, particularly in locations with a fragile infrastructure 

or where the security of a large support presence ashore would be at issue.

Logistics elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal 

military roles and in nonstandard tasks. Planners must be aware that overextending 

such forces may jeopardize their ability to support combat operations. Logistics 

elements may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. 

Logistics personnel may be deployed to a foreign nation to support either United 

States or multinational forces. Logistics forces may also have a continuing 

responsibility, after the departure of combat forces, to support multinational forces 

or civilian organizations. They must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable 

status-of-forces agreement to which the United States is a party.

MAGTF logistics planners should analyze the capability of the host-nation 

economy to accommodate the logistic support required by the MAGTF or 

multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on the economy. 

Early mission analysis must also consider transportation requirements. Airfields 

and ports must be evaluated, particularly those in underdeveloped countries. 

Delay in completing the evaluation will directly affect the flow of assets into the 

region. Additional support forces may be required to build supporting 

infrastructure. These factors will impact movement of follow-on forces as well as 

delivery of humanitarian cargo. Procedures must be established to coordinate 

movement requirements and airfield slot times with other participants in the 

operation. Availability of fuel and other key support items may impinge on 

transportation support.

Medical support operations protect MAGTF personnel and support the mission 

by reducing the threat of uncontrolled disease problems. Medical planning should 

include hospitalization, preventive medicine, medical logistics, blood, medical 

regulating, and medical evacuation for MAGTF personnel and other individuals 

as designated by the commander. Preventive medicine, based on a thorough 
Marine Corps Operations 10-19

knowledge of the local environment, is a critical force protection measure that 

will reduce needless casualties for the MAGTF from disease in austere 

conditions. Medical examination of indigenous and coalition personnel and their 

environments will frequently provide unique operational insights for the 

MAGTF. The presence and use of drugs, threat development of weapons of mass 

destruction, and other critical evidence are often first identified or verified 

through this valuable information source. Preventive medicine units should be 

deployed and preventive medicine operations integrated into the overall operation 

as soon as possible. When planning for MOOTW, the potential requirement to 

treat the indigent population or allied military personnel must be considered. The 

respective capabilities of allied, civilian relief or other supporting medical forces 

should be evaluated before finalizing the medical support concept.

Force Protection

MOOTW involve elements of combat. Should the deterrent effect fail, these 

operations may escalate into war and place Marines in harm's way. The ingenuity 

that can be displayed by those planning and conducting attacks against MAGTF 

forces should not be underestimated. The impact of resulting friendly casualties 

on public perception and the political goals underlying the operation cannot be 

discounted. Appropriate force protection measures must be taken.

In addition to providing security for the MAGTF, Marine forces may need to 

conduct law-and-order missions during MOOTW. The MAGTF may have to plan 

on protecting such key host nation economic assets as telecommunications 

facilities, electric power plants, public health services and facilities, gas and oil 

storage and distribution networks, banks and finance centers, transportation 

networks, and water purification and distribution assets.

The local government may be unable to provide the necessary security and law 

and order for itself or its population. The MAGTF could be required to maintain 

general law and order, establish a civil defense effort, and protect the government 

infrastructure. While military police are the first considered for law-and-order 

missions, other MAGTF units may perform security missions such as patrolling, 

manning static guard positions, reinforcing police patrols, and crowd control.

Marine Corps forces may need to consider employment of active security 

measures such as hardening facilities and fortification. Buffer spaces around 

bases, mine detection and clearing, physical security measures such as obstacles 

and fences, personnel security, convoy escorts, and patrols may also be required. 

Protective measures against weapons of mass destruction may be increasingly 

necessary as these weapons proliferate and become more likely to be employed 

by terrorist groups.
CHAPTER 11

MAGTF Reconnaissance and Security Operations

“The most certain method to uncover an enemy is to send scouts to visit suspected positions.”

—Small Wars Manual (1940 Edition)

“Skepticism is the mother of security. Even though fools trust their enemies, prudent persons do not. 

The general is the principal sentinel of his army. He should always be careful of its preservation and 

see that it is never exposed to misfortune.”

—Frederick the Great

The fog and friction of war will never allow the commander to have a perfect 

picture of the battlespace. However, reconnaissance operations can reduce 

uncertainties about an unfamiliar area and a hostile enemy who is actively trying 

to conceal information about his forces and intentions. Reconnaissance is an 

Contents

MAGTF Reconnaissance Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2

Command Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3

Ground Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4

Aviation Combat Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5

Combat Service Support Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6

National and Theater Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6

Reconnaissance Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6

Types of Reconnaissance Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8

Route Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8

Area Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8

Zone Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9

Force-Oriented Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9

Reconnaissance Pull and Reconnaissance Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9

Counterreconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-11

Security Forces and Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12

Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-13

Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-14

Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-16

Security Operations in Other Tactical Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-17

Military Operations Other Than War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-17
11-2 MCDP 1-0

essential and continuous operation conducted to collect information and to gain 

and maintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance of some type should 

always precede a commitment of forces. Failure to conduct a thorough 

reconnaissance may cause the loss of initiative or failure to exploit fleeting 

opportunities. Lack of reconnaissance can result in the enemy’s achieving 

surprise, inflicting unacceptable losses on friendly forces, and causing the failure 

of the mission. As part of the overall MAGTF intelligence effort, reconnaissance 

operations support the commander’s decisionmaking process by collecting 

information to develop situational awareness and satisfy CCIRs.

Security operations are an essential component of all MAGTF operations. They 

can reduce risk by providing the MAGTF with maneuver space and reaction 

time. They protect the force from surprise and attempt to eliminate the unknowns 

in any tactical situation. Security operations prevent the enemy from collecting 

information on friendly forces, deceive him as to friendly capabilities and 

intentions, and prevent enemy forces from interfering with friendly operations. 

Reconnaissance operations support security operations by providing information 

on enemy forces, capabilities and intentions, and by denying the enemy 

information of friendly activities through counterreconnaissance. To succeed, a 

MAGTF’s security operations should be integrated with its reconnaissance 

operations. Security operations are required during offensive, defensive and other 

tactical operations.

MAGTF RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

Reconnaissance is a necessary precursor to any military operation. It attempts to 

answer questions the commander has about the enemy that the MAGTF will fight 

and the battlespace in which the MAGTF will operate. The term reconnaissance 

describes any mission—aerial, ground or amphibious—undertaken to obtain, by 

visual or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources 

of the enemy or to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic 

characteristics of a particular area. More simply, reconnaissance obtains 

information about the characteristics of a particular area and any known or 

potential enemy within it.

The commander uses reconnaissance to collect information and to gain and maintain 

contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance activities may range from passive 

surveillance to aggressive measures designed to stimulate a revealing enemy 

response, such as reconnaissance by fire. Passive surveillance includes systematically 

watching an enemy force or named area of interest; listening to an area and the 

activities in it to help develop intelligence needed to confirm or deny estimated threat 

course of action; or identifying threat critical vulnerabilities and limitations.
Marine Corps Operations 11-3

All MAGTF elements have reconnaissance capabilities. Each element brings to 

the MAGTF its own unique capabilities. Together they collect the information to 

plan and conduct MAGTF operations. 

Command Element

The CE centralizes the planning and direction of the entire reconnaissance effort 

for the MAGTF. The CE can task any MAGTF element to conduct 

reconnaissance to satisfy the commander's information requirements. It also 

directly controls MAGTF-level reconnaissance assets as follows.

Radio Battalion

The radio battalion provides ground-based signals intelligence, electronic 

warfare, communications security monitoring, and special intelligence 

communications capability to support MAGTF operations. It plans and 

coordinates the employment of its subordinate elements, to include radio 

reconnaissance elements beyond the FEBA and mobile electronic warfare 

support system in light armored vehicles. It is the focal point for MAGTF 

ground-based signals intelligence operations.

Remote Sensors and Imagery Interpretation

The intelligence battalion provides remote sensor, imagery interpretation, and 

topographic intelligence support to MAGTF operations. In addition to the sensor 

control and management platoon, the force imagery interpretation unit, and the 

topographic platoon, the intelligence company establishes and mans the 

MAGTF’s surveillance and reconnaissance center. It plans, executes, and 

monitors MAGTF reconnaissance operations.

Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence

The intelligence battalion provides HUMINT, CI, and interrogator-translator support 

to MAGTF operations. This support can include screening and interrogation/

debriefing of prisoners of war and persons of intelligence interest; conduct of CI force 

protection source operations; conduct of CI surveys and investigations; preparation of 

CI estimates and plans; translation of documents; and limited exploitation of captured 

material. In addition to the specialized CI and interrogator-translator platoons, the 

company employs task-organized HUMINT exploitation teams in direct support of 

MAGTF subordinate elements. HUMINT exploitation teams combine CI specialists 

and interrogator-translators in one element, thereby providing a unique and 

comprehensive range of CI/HUMINT services.
11-4 MCDP 1-0

Force Reconnaissance

Force reconnaissance conducts distant and deep reconnaissance and 

surveillance in support of MAGTF operations. It uses specialized insertion, 

patrolling, reporting, and extraction techniques to carry out amphibious, 

distant, and deep reconnaissance and surveillance tasks in support of the 

MAGTF. Force reconnaissance maintains the capability to perform special 

operations-capable tasks.

Ground Combat Element

The GCE has substantial organic reconnaissance assets. Those units in contact 

with the enemy, especially patrols, are among the most reliable sources of 

information. Combat engineers are also good sources of information. These 

engineer units often conduct engineer reconnaissance of an area and can provide 

detailed reporting on lines of communications; i.e., roads, rivers, railroad lines, 

bridges, and obstacles to maneuver.

The mission of ground reconnaissance is to provide immediate tactical ground 

reconnaissance and surveillance to the GCE. Like force reconnaissance, ground 

reconnaissance is employed to observe and report on enemy activity and other 

information of military significance. Their capabilities are similar to those of force 

reconnaissance but ground reconnaissance does not insert units by parachute. The 

division reconnaissance battalion provides the ground reconnaissance assets for the 

GCE. The division also has other reconnaissance assets.

Light Armored Reconnaissance

Light armored reconnaissance units usually operate in forward areas or along flanks 

and can be relied upon to report early warning of contact with an enemy force. The 

Marines in each light armored vehicle are trained in information collection and 

reporting. These units are capable of a wide variety of missions due to their 

inherent mobility and organic firepower. The division light armored reconnaissance 

battalion provides the GCE with its light armored reconnaissance capability.

Counterbattery Radar

The counterbattery radar platoon is located within the artillery regiment’s 

headquarters battery. It is equipped with mobile radars that detect and accurately 

locate enemy mortars, artillery, and rockets permitting rapid engagement with 

counterfire. Information on enemy order of battle and locations derived from 

counterbattery radar detections are reported via the GCE to the MAGTF CE.
Marine Corps Operations 11-5

Scout-Snipers

The scout-sniper platoon is an organic collection asset of each infantry battalion. 

Although the platoon can be employed in support of a myriad of tactical missions 

in defensive and offensive operations, they are primarily employed to provide 

timely surveillance and tactical data and coordinate supporting arms and close air 

support. The scout-sniper platoon provides the infantry battalion with extended 

area observation.

Aviation Combat Element

The capability of the ACE to observe the battlefield and report in near-real time 

gives the MAGTF commander a multidimensional capability that should be used 

at every opportunity. Aviation combat units can view the entire AO in depth, 

providing early indications and warning and reconnaissance information that can 

be essential to the success of the MAGTF. Each ACE aircraft (rotary- or fixedwing), can conduct visual observation of terrain and enemy forces that it may fly 

over. Given the combined arms capability of the MAGTF, these aircraft can 

engage enemy targets immediately or direct other supporting arms against the 

enemy forces. The ACE manages the following reconnaissance systems. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UAVs provide day-night, real-time imagery reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition. Its unique capabilities can also be used to support real-time target 

engagement, assisting in the control of fires/supporting arms and maneuver. The 

UAV provides high quality video imagery for artillery or naval gunfire adjustment, 

battle damage assessment, and reconnaissance over land or sea. It is capable of both 

day and night operations using TV or forward-looking infrared cameras. UAV 

squadrons are under the ADCON of the ACE. The MAGTF commander retains 

OPCON because of the limited number of UAV assets and the critical 

reconnaissance capabilities they provide to the entire force. Mission tasking is 

exercised through the surveillance and reconnaissance center.

Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System

The F/A-18D can be equipped with the advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance 

system and the Radar Upgrade Phase II with synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The 

advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance system is a real-time digital package 

providing day/night, all-weather imagery capability. The imagery collected 

provides sufficient detail and accuracy to permit delivery of appropriate air and 

ground weapons, assist with battle damage assessment, and provide tactical 

commanders with detailed information about the enemy’s weapons, units, and 

disposition. Imagery resulting from collection can be digitally disseminated to the 
11-6 MCDP 1-0

force imagery interpretation unit tactical exploitation group for exploitation, 

printing, and dissemination.

Electronic Reconnaissance and Warfare

Aerial electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare is conducted using 

EA-6B aircraft. EA-6B aircraft also process and disseminate information from 

digital tape recordings obtained during electronic warfare missions to update and 

maintain enemy electronic order of battle information. The sensors are passive 

systems that require threat emitters to be active to collect.

Combat Service Support Element

The CSSE is limited in its reconnaissance capabilities, having no dedicated 

reconnaissance capabilities. However, it can conduct road and route 

reconnaissance with its engineer units, convoys, and military police. As the CSSE 

is often in more direct contact with the indigenous population, it can collect 

HUMINT unavailable to the other MAGTF elements. For example, medical 

battalion personnel can often provide information on health conditions and their 

potential impact on operations.

NATIONAL AND THEATER ASSETS

The MAGTF can draw on the full range of national, theater, joint, other Service, 

and allied reconnaissance assets. When made available, these capabilities will be 

fully integrated into MAGTF reconnaissance operations; e.g., Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Navy SEALS or Army signals 

intelligence aircraft. During forcible entry operations, the MAGTF integrates its 

amphibious reconnaissance capabilities with national, theater, and special 

operating forces.

The Marine Corps component will support the MAGTF by monitoring the status 

of MAGTF reconnaissance requests to national and theater entities. The 

component coordinates the provision of Marine intelligence liaison to the joint 

task force and other component intelligence elements to satisfy the MAGTF’s 

requirements. Some MAGTF reconnaissance assets, such as the radio battalion 

and the CI/HUMINT company, will usually have direct connectivity with 

appropriate external agencies to coordinate tasking or support.

RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING

Reconnaissance supports the MAGTF commander’s intent and his CCIRs. While 

contributing to the commander’s broad situational awareness and development, 
Marine Corps Operations 11-7

reconnaissance assets tailor their efforts to support the specific CCIRs indicated 

by the commander’s intent and subsequent unit intelligence and operations 

planning. Simultaneously, reconnaissance forces must remain alert to any 

developments that may cause the commander to reassess that intent.

MAGTF reconnaissance assets are best employed early to support the CCIRs and 

friendly course of action development and selection. When reconnaissance is 

initiated early in the planning cycle, planning and execution are driven by the 

flow of solid, timely information and intelligence. If reconnaissance is delayed, 

situation development will generally be more uncertain. In this case, planning 

and execution can either take place in an information vacuum or be driven by the 

search for such information.

Reconnaissance assets are best employed in general support. Because of the 

nature of warfare, MAGTF reconnaissance units will most likely be employed in 

rapidly developing and fluid situations. The main effort may shift quickly from 

one subordinate element to another. Such situations often require modifications 

or complete changes in reconnaissance elements’ missions. The MAGTF 

commander and his staff are usually the most capable of determining the best use 

of MAGTF reconnaissance assets at any given time, to provide the necessary 

support, and to integrate the results of reconnaissance information with other 

intelligence sources. Although placing reconnaissance assets in direct support of 

some subordinate element or even attaching them to specific units is occasionally 

appropriate, in general, such support relationships make for inefficient use of 

specialized reconnaissance forces. Proper planning; the institution of flexible, 

responsive command and control and intelligence reporting procedures and 

networks; and clear intelligence reporting and dissemination priorities will ensure 

that the products of reconnaissance are shared to the maximum benefit of all 

potential users.

Reconnaissance requires adequate time for detailed planning and preparation. 

Most reconnaissance focuses on the enemy’s activities and intentions to satisfy 

the commander’s need to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities or to attack his 

center of gravity. This frequently necessitates operating in and around the 

enemy's most critical and best defended areas. This normally requires that 

reconnaissance be conducted over long distances and well in advance of 

commencement of the operations it will support. These conditions usually dictate 

specialized methods of transportation, communications and information systems 

support, combat service support, equipment, and coordination.
11-8 MCDP 1-0

TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

There are four basic types of reconnaissance: route, area, zone, and forceoriented. Each type provides specific details for mission planning and 

maintaining situational awareness.

An important factor in characterizing reconnaissance missions is the depth of 

penetration they require, which has important implications in terms of time, risk, 

coordination, and support requirements. The depth of penetration can be close, 

distant or deep.

Close reconnaissance is conducted in the area extending forward of the forward 

edge of the battle area to the fire support coordination line. It is directed toward 

determining the location, composition, disposition, capabilities, and activities of 

enemy committed forces. Close reconnaissance is primarily conducted by combat 

units manning the FEBA.

Distant reconnaissance is conducted in the far portion of the commander’s area of 

influence. It is usually directed toward determining the location, composition, 

disposition and movement of supporting arms, and the reserve elements of the 

enemy committed forces. Distant reconnaissance is conducted beyond the FSCL 

to the limits of the commander’s area of influence.

Deep reconnaissance is conducted beyond the commander’s area of influence to the 

limits of the commander’s area of interest (i.e., the geographic area from which 

information and intelligence are required to execute successful tactical operations 

and to plan for future operations). It is usually directed toward determining the 

location, composition, disposition, and movement of enemy reinforcements.

Route Reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information of a 

specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement 

along that route. Route reconnaissance is focused along a specific line of 

communication, such as a road, railway or waterway to provide new or updated 

information on route conditions and activities. Route reconnaissance normally 

precedes the movement of friendly forces. It provides detailed information about 

a specific route and the surrounding terrain that could be used to influence 

movement along that route.

Area Reconnaissance

Area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information on the 

terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area, such as a town, ridge line, 
Marine Corps Operations 11-9

woods or other features critical to operations. Area reconnaissance can be made 

of a single point, such as a bridge or installation, and could include hostile 

headquarters, key terrain, objective areas or critical installations. Emphasis is 

placed on reaching the area without being detected. Hostile situations 

encountered en route are developed only enough to allow the reconnoitering units 

to report and bypass.

Zone Reconnaissance

Zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all 

routes, obstacles (to include chemical or radiological contamination), terrain, and 

enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissance 

normally is assigned when the enemy situation is vague or when information on 

cross-country trafficability is desired. Zone reconnaissance concerns itself with 

the total integrated intelligence picture of a space defined by length and breadth. 

The size of the area depends on the potential for information on hostile forces, 

terrain, and weather in the zone; the requirements levied by the commander; and 

the reconnaissance forces available to exploit the intelligence value of the zone.

Force-Oriented Reconnaissance

Force-oriented reconnaissance is focused not on a geographic area but on a 

specific enemy organization, wherever it may be or go. Force-oriented 

reconnaissance concerns itself with intelligence information required about 

a specific enemy or target unit. Reconnaissance assets orient on that specific 

force, moving when necessary to observe that unit and reporting all 

required information (both requested and other pertinent observed and 

collected information).

RECONNAISSANCE PULL AND RECONNAISSANCE PUSH

A MAGTF can conduct reconnaissance using one of two basic 

methods—reconnaissance pull and reconnaissance push. In operations 

based on reconnaissance pull, information derived from reconnaissance 

forces guides friendly force activities. Reconnaissance elements identify 

the surfaces and gaps in overall enemy dispositions and permit the 

commander to shape the battlespace. Making rapid decisions based on 

the flow of information, friendly combat forces are drawn to and through 

the weak spots in the enemy defense and seek to quickly exploit the 

advantages gained. Reconnaissance pull requires early commitment of 

reconnaissance elements, allowance for the time to fully develop the 

reconnaissance picture, and a smooth flow of information from 
11-10 MCDP 1-0

reconnaissance elements directly to higher and supported commanders 

and staffs in immediate need of reconnaissance data. 

The landing at Tinian during World War II is an example of reconnaissance pull. 

Aerial and amphibious reconnaissance determined that the Japanese defenders 

had largely ignored the northern beaches, while focusing most of their defensive 

effort on most likely beaches in the southwest. The landing was changed to the 

northern beaches, and when coupled with a deception operation off the southern 

beach, resulted in a complete surprise. As Marines have done in the past, current 

concepts for MAGTF operations such as OMFTS and STOM depend on the 

ability of the MAGTF to use reconnaissance pull to determine enemy 

dispositions, and find or create exploitable gaps through which the MAGTF can 

pass while avoiding obstacles and strong points.

Reconnaissance pull requires a high tempo of intelligence operations to collect 

and report timely information. To sustain such operations, a reserve must be 

carefully maintained so that fresh reconnaissance elements are always available 

to support developing situations. Maintenance of a reconnaissance reserve 

requires adequate consideration of the time required for reconnaissance unit 

preparation, insertion, mission execution, extraction, and recovery. 

Reconnaissance pull is easiest to execute early in an operation. It is difficult to 

support over a lengthy period of high-tempo operations.

Operations based on reconnaissance push use reconnaissance elements more 

conservatively. They are often used as a tactical resource and generally with a 

shorter timeline. Reconnaissance push uses reconnaissance forces as the lead 

element of pre-planned tactical operations, detecting enemy dispositions during 

the movement of the entire friendly force. I MEF operations in Operation Desert 

Storm in 1991 were characterized by reconnaissance push. Reconnaissance 

forces, assisted by aggressive patrolling by combat forces, located Iraqi forces (to 

include the counterattack by the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Infantry Division from the 

Burqan oil field) forward of advancing friendly forces in enough time to prevent 

them from interfering with I MEF operations. 

Reconnaissance pull is preferred when the MAGTF can maneuver freely and 

exploit the enemy weaknesses located by reconnaissance forces. It is the 

preferred method during offensive operations (it takes advantage of the 

MAGTF’s inherent flexibility and reconnaissance capabilities). Reconnaissance 

push is more often used when the MAGTF is following a predetermined course 

of action, targeting and destruction of enemy forces is a priority, freedom of 

maneuver is limited, and usually when on the defense.
Marine Corps Operations 11-11

Reconnaissance, although naturally oriented towards the battlespace beyond the 

FEBA, should not ignore the threat to the rear area, attacking friendly command 

and control nodes, lines of communications, and logistics facilities. To prevent 

the enemy in the rear area from interfering with friendly combat operations, 

sufficient MAGTF reconnaissance capabilities should be devoted to the rear area.

Reconnaissance efforts must be coordinated between different echelons of 

command within the MAGTF as well as within the joint force to avoid 

duplication of effort by scarce reconnaissance assets and to facilitate turnover of 

reconnaissance responsibilities as units maneuver throughout the battlespace.

Reconnaissance assets may be given the additional mission of engaging enemy 

forces with combined arms to disrupt and delay their advance. With advances in 

technology, there is now an emerging capability to directly communicate 

between a specific MAGTF reconnaissance asset via automated data link and a 

fire support unit (sensor to shooter). Automatically transmitting target data from 

the sensor directly to the aircraft or firing unit brings combat power to bear 

against the enemy before the situation can change.

In MOOTW reconnaissance forces provide a broad range of capabilities from 

direct-action combat missions to support for disaster relief and humanitarian 

operations. MOOTW calls for pinpoint intelligence collection accuracy and 

timely reporting to support MAGTF delivery of services, fires or other support, 

and also usually for great restraint in the use of force. Reconnaissance operations 

may emphasize objectives such as the location and identification of lines of 

communications, services, and infrastructure to support threatened civilian 

populations. The CI/HUMINT capabilities of the MAGTF are exceptionally 

useful in the surveillance of indigenous peoples and identification and targeting 

of the hostile segments of the population. 

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

At the same time that the MAGTF is conducting its reconnaissance operations the 

enemy will be conducting similar operations to determine the disposition of 

friendly forces. For example, when the enemy comes under indirect fire, they will 

increase their counterreconnaissance operations to locate and destroy the friendly 

reconnaissance elements controlling the fire. Counterreconnaissance prevents the 

enemy from collecting sufficient information about friendly activities to interfere 

with them. Counterreconnaissance consists of all measures taken to prevent hostile 

observation of a force, area or place. It focuses on denying the enemy access to 

essential elements of friendly information, information about the MAGTF in the 

security area, the flanks, and the rear that would further enemy objectives.
11-12 MCDP 1-0

Counterreconnaissance consists of active and passive measures. Active measures 

detect, fix, and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. Passive measures 

conceal friendly units and capabilities and deceive and confuse the enemy. There 

are two components of counterreconnaissance—the detection of enemy 

reconnaissance forces and the targeting, destruction or suppression of those 

reconnaissance forces so they cannot report friendly unit positions or activities. 

Counterreconnaissance consists of—

l Developing named areas of interest and targeted areas of interest for likely 

enemy reconnaissance forces.

l Conducting continuous surveillance of designated named areas of interest and 

targeted areas of interest.

l Executing targeting plan against enemy reconnaissance forces.

l Recovering forward security elements.

Reconnaissance operations support counterreconnaissance through collecting 

information on enemy reconnaissance forces, assets, and activities. 

Counterreconnaissance in turn supports security operations by protecting the 

MAGTF from enemy collection. 

SECURITY FORCES AND MISSIONS

Security is inherent in all MAGTF operations. MAGTF security forces 

aggressively and continuously seek the enemy and reconnoiter key terrain. They 

conduct active reconnaissance to detect enemy movement or preparations for 

action and to learn as much as possible about the terrain. The ultimate goal is to 

determine the enemy’s course of action and assist the main body in countering it. 

The security force uses a combination of ground patrols, observation posts, 

electronic warfare, and aviation assets.

Security in offensive operations is achieved by employing security elements to 

protect the MAGTF from unexpected attack, long range fires, and observation by 

the enemy. The MAGTF commander can employ a wide range of forces and 

capabilities to conduct security operations. This can include—

l Aviation forces to screen the main force from enemy interference during fast 

moving offensive operations.

l Ground forces to control, seize or retain terrain to prevent enemy observation.

l Sensors (UAVs, radar and seismic sensors) to detect the enemy or his long 

range fires.
Marine Corps Operations 11-13

Planning of security operations must consider the possibility of security forces 

making contact with the enemy and, if the situation dictates, include provisions 

for handing over the battle to the main force.

In the defense, the security force engages the enemy in the security area, screening, 

guarding, and covering as ordered. Normally, the commander designates the 

security force as his initial main effort. This force maintains contact with the enemy 

while falling back under pressure. At a predetermined location, normally a phase 

line designated as a handover line, control of the battle is transferred to the main 

battle force. A handover line is a control measure, preferably following easily 

defined terrain features, at which the responsibility for the conduct of combat 

operations is passed from one force to another. The transfer of control must be 

carefully coordinated. The main battle force supports the disengagement of the 

security force as it withdraws in preparation for its subsequent mission. The 

commander may shift the main effort to the appropriate element of the main battle 

force. As the enemy’s advance force approaches the main battle area, execution of 

the defensive battle becomes increasingly decentralized.

At some point, the defending commander must plan for the enemy force breaking 

through the friendly security forces and approaching the main battle force. This 

requires transitioning friendly forces and control of the battle from security forces 

to the main battle force. Whenever the battle is transitioned, it requires 

coordination from the highest common commander.

There are three types of security missions. They vary in the degree of security 

provided, the forces and capabilities required, and the degree of engagement with 

the enemy that the commander desires. From the least degree of protection to the 

greatest, they are screen, guard, and cover. The forces that conduct these security 

missions are called a screen, a guard or a covering force. These forces may be 

further identified by the establishing headquarters and the location of the security 

force; e.g., MEF covering force, division advance guard or regimental flank 

screen. Security forces may consist of existing units, reinforced units or taskorganized forces.

Screen

A screen observes, identifies, and reports information. It only fights in selfprotection. A screen—

l Provides early warning of enemy approach.

l Gains and maintains enemy contact and reports enemy activity.

l Within capabilities, conducts counterreconnaissance.

l Within capabilities, impedes and harasses the enemy.
11-14 MCDP 1-0

A screen only provides surveillance and early warning of enemy action, not 

physical protection. It can be employed as an economy of force measure in a low 

risk area because it provides security on a broad frontage with limited assets. A 

screen provides the least amount of protection of any security mission. It does not 

have the combat power to develop the situation. Aviation combat forces may be 

used to screen large, open areas during rapid and deep offensive operations. 

Terrain, weather, and the duration of the screen are critical considerations when 

assigning screening missions to aviation forces. The screen may operate within 

range of friendly artillery positioned with the ground forces because of its 

immediate availability. The ACE can also provide this fire support capability, but 

the cost in resources versus time is a factor; e.g., one section of F/A-18s may 

require an entire squadron for 24-hour coverage.

In offensive operations, a screening force primarily engages and destroys enemy 

reconnaissance elements within its capability but otherwise fights only in selfdefense. It primarily uses indirect fires or close air support to destroy enemy 

reconnaissance elements and slow the movement of other enemy forces. The 

screen has the minimum combat power to provide the desired early warning 

while allowing the commander to retain the bulk of his combat power to execute 

the decisive action.

In defensive operations, security elements screen a stationary force by 

establishing a series of positions along a designated screen line. Positions are 

located to provide overlapping observation. Areas that cannot be observed from 

these positions are normally patrolled. Screening forces report any sightings of 

enemy activity and engage enemy forces with fires. Maintaining contact, the 

screen falls back along previously reconnoitered routes to subsequent positions. 

Screening forces should avoid becoming decisively engaged. 

Guard

A guard protects the main force from attack, direct fire, and ground observation 

by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information. 

A guard—

l Provides early warning of enemy approach.

l Provides maneuver space to the front, flanks or rear of the force.

l Screens, attacks, defends or delays, within its capabilities, to protect the force.

A guard force protects the main body by fighting to gain time while also 

observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of 

and direct fire against the main body. A guard differs from a screen in that a 
Marine Corps Operations 11-15

guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat, repel or fix the lead 

elements of an enemy ground force before they can engage the main body with 

direct fire.

The commander may assign guard missions to reinforced light armor units or 

task-organized maneuver elements, including ACE assets. A guard normally 

operates within range of friendly artillery positioned with the ground forces. It 

normally operates on a narrower front than a screen because it is expected to 

fight. In extreme cases, a guard may have to conduct sustained and prolonged 

fighting against the enemy to fulfill its primary mission to protect the force. The 

commander may order the guard to hold for a specified period of time.

An offensive guard may be established to the front, flanks or rear to protect the 

main body during the advance. Guard forces orient on the movement of the main 

body of the MAGTF. They provide security along specific routes of movement of 

the main body. They operate within the range of the main body’s fire support 

weapons, deploying over a narrower front than a comparable-size screening force 

to permit concentration of combat power.

A security element guards the MAGTF in the defense by establishing a series of 

mutually supporting positions. The guard may establish a screen line forward of 

these positions. These positions immediately report any enemy contact and 

engage with fires at maximum range. The guard defends in place, attacks or 

delays to rearward positions. Routes and subsequent positions should have been 

previously reconnoitered.

The three types of guard forces are advance, flank, and rear.

The advance guard operates within supporting range of the main body and 

protects it from ground observation and direct fire.

A flank guard operates to the flank of a moving or stationary force to protect it 

from enemy ground observation, direct fire, and surprise attack. It must protect 

the entire depth of the main force’s flank. 

A rear guard protects the rear of the column from hostile forces. It attacks, 

defends, and delays as necessary, but it does not develop the situation to the point 

that it loses contact with the main force.
11-16 MCDP 1-0

Cover

A cover operates apart from the main force to intercept, engage, delay, 

disorganize, and deceive the enemy before he can attack the main body. It 

prevents surprise during the advance. A cover—

l Gains and maintains contact with the enemy.

l Denies the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and 

intention of the main force.

l Conducts counterreconnaissance and destroys enemy security forces.

l Develops the situation to determine enemy dispositions, strengths, and 

weaknesses.

A cover screens, guards, attacks, defends, and delays to accomplish its mission. It 

is a self-contained maneuver force that operates beyond the range of friendly 

artillery positioned with the main force. A cover may be task-organized, 

including aviation, artillery, tank, reconnaissance, and combat service support, to 

operate independently. The cover mission may be expressed in terms of time or 

friendly and enemy disposition; e.g., “Engage enemy forces until our main body 

deploys for attack.”

A covering force protects the main body by fighting to gain time while also 

observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of 

and direct fire against the main body. A covering force operates outside 

supporting range of the main body to develop the situation. It deceives the enemy 

about the location of the main body while disrupting and destroying his forces. 

This provides the main body with the maximum early warning and reaction time. 

The distance forward of the main body depends on the intentions and instructions 

of the main body commander, the terrain, the location and strength of the enemy, 

and the rates of march of both the main body and the covering force. The width 

of the covering force area is the same as that of the main body.

Unlike a screening or guard force, a covering force is self-contained and can 

operate independently of the main body. A covering force or portions of it often 

becomes decisively engaged with enemy forces. The covering force must have 

substantial combat power to engage the enemy and accomplish its mission. A 

covering force develops the situation earlier than a screen or a guard. It fights 

longer and more often and defeats larger enemy forces.

While a covering force provides more security than a screen or guard, it also 

requires more resources. Before assigning a cover mission, the commander must 

ensure that he has sufficient combat power to resource a covering force and the 
Marine Corps Operations 11-17

decisive operation. When the commander lacks the resources to support both, he 

must assign his security force a less resource-intensive security mission, either a 

screen or a guard.

In the offense, a covering force is normally expected to penetrate the enemy’s 

security forces and main defensive positions sufficiently for MAGTF main body 

units attacking the enemy’s main defenses in depth; to identify the location and 

deployment of enemy forces in the main defensive positions; and to limit the 

ability of the enemy security forces to collect intelligence and disrupt the 

deployment and commitment of forces from the main body.

In the defense, a covering force conducts operations to either defend against or 

delay an attacking enemy force. A defensive covering force may be tasked to 

force the enemy to prematurely deploy and commence his attack; to identify the 

enemy effort; and to reduce the enemy’s strength by destroying specific 

maneuver units and stripping away essential assets such as artillery. The 

defensive covering force must have mobility equal to or greater than that of 

the enemy.

SECURITY OPERATIONS IN OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Inherent in the conduct of security operations, especially in the defense, is the 

requirement to execute a passage of lines. In an advance, security forces may be 

required to fix enemy forces in place and allow the main body to pass through in 

the attack. Faced with a superior enemy force or in the conduct of security 

operations in the defense, security forces must fall back and execute a rearward 

passage of lines, handing the battle over to elements of the main body. During 

retrograde operations, the covering force may be used to facilitate and protect the 

withdrawal of the main body. At the appropriate time, the security must break 

contact with the enemy. To avoid decisive engagement, security forces must 

have the mobility and firepower to disengage. During obstacle crossings, the 

security force is required to protect the breaching force and prevent the enemy 

from interfering.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Security operations in MOOTW are complicated by the requirement to extend the 

protection of the force to include civilians and other nongovernmental 

organizations, the desire for minimal casualties, and the effect of media coverage. 

The MAGTF commander must be ready to counter any activity that could 

endanger friendly units or jeopardize the operation. Even in a nonhostile 

operation with little or no perceived risk, all MAGTF personnel should be 
11-18 MCDP 1-0

prepared to quickly transition to combat operations should circumstances dictate. 

In these situations, the mission of military forces commonly has aspects that are 

preventive in nature. That is, the MAGTF can accomplish its mission by 

preventing individuals or groups from carrying on undesirable activities such as 

rioting and looting or attacking, harassing, and otherwise threatening opponents. 

Sometimes hostile elements blend in with the local population of uninvolved 

citizens. Other times, sectors of the local population may rise against MAGTF 

forces and become active participants in acts of violence. Factional alignments, 

the level of violence, and the threat to mission accomplishment may change 

frequently and with little or no warning. Under such circumstances, the identity 

of opponents is uncertain, and the use of deadly force for purposes other than 

self-defense may be constrained by rules of engagement or by the judgment of 

the commander on the scene. See appendix E.

Nonlethal weapons expand the number of options available to commanders 

confronting situations where the use of deadly force poses problems. They 

provide flexibility by allowing the MAGTF to apply measured military force 

with reduced risk of serious noncombatant casualties, but still in such a manner 

as to provide force protection and effect compliance. Because nonlethal weapons 

can be employed at a lower threshold of danger, the MAGTF can respond to an 

evolving threat situation more rapidly. This will allow the MAGTF to retain the 

initiative and reduce its vulnerability. Thus, a robust nonlethal capability will 

assist in bringing into balance the conflicting requirements of mission 

accomplishment, force protection, and safety of noncombatants. It will therefore 

enhance the use and relevance of military force as an option while simultaneously 

enhancing the security of the MAGTF. The capabilities of reconnaissance forces 

can take on an unusual importance in MOOTW. Missions can range from directaction combat missions to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance/disaster 

relief operations. Such operations call for pinpoint intelligence collection 

accuracy and timely reporting to support the MAGTF’s delivery of services, fires 

or other support. They also usually require great restraint in the use of force. 

Reconnaissance operations may emphasize objectives such as the location and 

identification of lines of communications, services, and infrastructure to support 

threatened civilian populations.
APPENDIX A

Warfighting Functions

Warfighting functions are conceptual planning and execution tools used by 

planners and subject matter experts in each of the functional areas to produce 

comprehensive plans. They should not be viewed independently but as 

inseparable parts of a whole. Warfighting functions help the commander achieve 

unity of effort and build and sustain combat power. Their effective application, in 

concert with one another, will facilitate the planning and conduct of 

expeditionary operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and 

attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control 

involves arranging personnel, equipment, and facilities to allow the commander 

to extend his influence over the force during the planning and conducting of 

military operations. Command and control is the overarching warfighting 

function that enables all of the other warfighting functions.

Command has two vital components—decisionmaking and leadership. 

Decisionmaking is choosing if to decide, then when and what to decide. It also 

includes recognizing the consequences of the act of deciding, and anticipating the 

outcomes that can be expected from the implementation of the decision. 

Leadership is taking responsibility for decisions; being loyal to subordinates; 

inspiring and directing Marines toward a purposeful end; and demonstrating 

physical and moral courage in the face of adversity. Command remains a very 

Contents

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2

Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3

Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3

Logistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4

Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4
A-2 MCDP 1-0

personal function. Professional competence, personality, and the will of strong 

commanders represent a significant part of any unit’s combat power. The 

commander goes where he can best influence the action, where his moral and 

physical presence can be felt, and where his will to achieve a decision can best be 

expressed, understood, and acted upon. The focus of command and control is on 

the commander—his intent, guidance, and decisions and how he receives 

feedback on the results of his actions. Commanders command while staffs 

coordinate and make necessary control adjustments consistent with the 

commander’s intent.

Control is inherent in command. Control allows the staff to monitor the status of 

the command, assess the gap between what was planned and what has been 

accomplished, and direct action to exploit new opportunities or correct 

deficiencies. Control serves its purpose if it allows the commander freedom to 

operate, delegate authority, lead from any critical point on the battlefield, and 

synchronize actions across his AO.

MANEUVER

Maneuver is the movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage 

over the enemy in order to accomplish an objective. That advantage may be 

psychological, technological or temporal as well as spatial. Maneuver is 

movement relative to the enemy to put him at a disadvantage. It normally 

includes the movement of forces on the battlefield in combination with fires. 

Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat and the means of concentrating 

forces for decisive action to achieve the surprise, psychological shock, physical 

momentum, and moral dominance that enables smaller forces to defeat larger 

ones. Commanders maneuver their forces to create the conditions for tactical and 

operational success. Forces may maneuver in other dimensions as well. For 

instance, a force may also maneuver in time by increasing relative speed and 

operating at a faster tempo than the enemy.

Maneuver is rarely effective without firepower and force protection. Maneuver 

and firepower are complementary dynamics of combat. Although one might 

dominate a phase of the battle, the synchronized effects of both characterize 

combat operations. Mobility operations—such as breaching, route 

improvement, and bridging—preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly 

forces. Countermobility operations—such as building obstacles in conjunction 

with fires—hinder enemy maneuver and deny mobility to enemy forces. 

Deception can also enhance the effectiveness of maneuver through 

psychological shock and surprise.
Marine Corps Operations A-3

FIRES

Fires are the employment of firepower against air, ground, and sea targets. Fires 

delay, disrupt, degrade or destroy enemy capabilities, forces or facilities, as well 

as affect the enemy’s will to fight. Fires include the collective and coordinated 

use of target acquisition systems, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft 

of all types, and other lethal and nonlethal means, such as electronic warfare and 

physical destruction. Fires are normally used in concert with maneuver and help 

to shape the battlespace, thus setting conditions for decisive action.

Synchronizing fires with maneuver is critical to the successful prosecution of 

combat operations. Commanders synchronize organic and supporting joint fire 

assets with their scheme of maneuver to get maximum effects of fires. Generating 

effective firepower against an enemy requires that organic and supporting fires be 

coordinated with other warfighting functions such as intelligence, maneuver, and 

logistics. Subordinate fire support systems and processes for determining 

priorities, identifying and locating targets, allocating fires assets, attacking 

targets, and assessing battle damage must be fully integrated. The employment of 

all available fires throughout the depth of the battlespace as an integrated and 

synchronized whole is done through the process of fire support planning, 

coordination, and execution.

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the enemy and the 

battlespace, as well as identifying the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical 

vulnerabilities. It assists the commander in understanding the situation, alerts him 

to new opportunities, and helps him assess the effects of actions upon the enemy. 

Intelligence drives operations and is focused on the enemy. Intelligence supports 

the formulation and subsequent modification of the commander’s estimate of the 

situation by providing as accurate an image of the battlespace and the threat as 

possible. It is a dynamic process used to assess the current situation and confirm or 

deny the adoption of specific courses of action by the enemy. It helps refine the 

commander’s understanding of the battlespace and reduces uncertainty and risk.

Intelligence provides indications and warning of potential hostile action, which 

prevents surprise and reduces risk from enemy actions. Intelligence supports force 

protection by identifying, locating, and countering an enemy’s intelligence 

collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism capabilities. It also supports 

targeting by identifying target systems, critical nodes, and high-value targets and 

locating high-payoff targets. Intelligence support is critical to the planning, 

execution, and assessment of information operations. Finally, intelligence supports 
A-4 MCDP 1-0

combat assessment by providing battle damage assessment, which is the timely and 

accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force.

LOGISTICS

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and sustain military forces. At 

the tactical level, logistics is referred to as combat service support and involves 

arming, fueling, fixing equipment, moving, supplying, and manning, and provides 

personnel health services. A dependable, uninterrupted logistics system helps the 

commander seize and maintain the initiative. Conversely, attacking the enemy’s 

support system can often threaten or weaken his center of gravity.

Commanders should anticipate requirements in order to push the right support 

forward. Tactical and operational success depends on fully integrating concepts 

of logistics and operations. Commanders should develop a logistics system that 

can react rapidly in crises or can sustain efforts to exploit tactical success. 

Logistics must also be prepared to support other operations, such as civil affairs. 

Logistics arrangements cannot be so meager that they do not meet the needs of 

commanders as they execute their operations, nor can they be so excessive that 

they overwhelm the ability of commanders to conduct operations effectively.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection consists of those measures taken to protect the force’s fighting 

potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. It includes 

those measures the force takes to remain viable by protecting itself from the 

effects of enemy activities and natural occurrences. Force protection is essential 

to the preservation of combat power across the spectrum of operations, even in 

benign environments. However, since risk is an inherent condition of war, force 

protection does not imply over-cautiousness or the avoidance of calculated risk.

Force protection safeguards friendly centers of gravity and protects, conceals, 

reduces or eliminates friendly critical vulnerabilities. Hardening of facilities and 

fortifications of battle positions are active survivability measures. Deception, 

operational security, computer network defense, and dispersion—in conjunction 

with security operations—can increase survivability. Public affairs and civil 

affairs can also provide force protection by establishing a positive perception of 

United States forces and actions among the local population. Air defense 

operations provide the force with protection from enemy air and missile attack.
APPENDIX B

Principles of War

The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare is rooted in the 

principles of war. These nine principles apply across the range of military 

operations and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are listed 

under the age-old acronym, “MOOSEMUSS.”

The principles of war are useful aids to a commander as he considers how to 

accomplish his mission. They assist the commander in organizing his thinking 

about his mission, the enemy, the battlespace, and his forces. They should not be 

considered as prescriptive steps or actions that must be accomplished, but as tools 

to plan, execute, and assess operations. Successful application of the principles 

requires a commander’s judgment, skill, and experience to adapt to constantly 

changing conditions and situations.

MASS

Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time to 

achieve decisive results.

Commanders mass the effects of combat power to overwhelm the enemy and 

gain control of the situation. Mass applies to fires, combat support, and combat 

service support as well as numbers of forces. Proper use of the principle of mass, 

Contents

Mass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2

Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2

Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2

Economy of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

Unity of Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4

Surprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4

Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4
B-2 MCDP 1-0

together with the other principles of war, may achieve decisive local superiority 

by a numerically inferior force. The decision to concentrate requires strict 

economy and the acceptance of risk elsewhere, particularly in view of the 

lethality of modern weapons that mandate rapid assembly and speedy dispersal 

of forces.

OBJECTIVE

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and 

attainable objective.

The ultimate military objective of war is to defeat the enemy’s forces or destroy 

his will to fight. The objective of each operation must contribute to this ultimate 

objective. Intermediate objectives must contribute quickly and economically to 

the purpose of the operation. The selection of an objective is based on 

consideration of the ultimate goal, forces available, the threat, and the AO. Every 

commander must clearly understand the overall mission of the higher command, 

his own mission, the tasks he must perform, and the reasons therefore. He 

considers every contemplated action in light of its direct contribution to the 

objective. He must clearly communicate the overall objective of the operation to 

his subordinates.

OFFENSIVE

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Offensive action is the decisive form of combat. Offensive action is necessary to 

seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and to maintain freedom of action. It 

allows the commander to exploit enemy weaknesses, impose his will upon the 

enemy, and determine the course of the battle. A defensive posture should only 

be a temporary expedient until the means are available to resume the offensive. 

Even in the conduct of a defense, the commander seeks every opportunity to 

seize the initiative by offensive action.

SECURITY

Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

Security is those measures taken to prevent surprise, ensure freedom of action, 

and deny the enemy information about friendly forces, capabilities, and plans. 

Security is essential to the preservation of combat power across the range of 

military operations, even in benign environments. However, since risk is an 
Marine Corps Operations B-3

inherent condition of war, security does not imply overcautiousness or the 

avoidance of calculated risk. In fact, security can often be enhanced by bold 

maneuver and offensive action, which deny the enemy the chance to interfere. 

Adequate security requires an accurate appreciation of enemy capabilities, 

sufficient security measures, effective reconnaissance, and continuous readiness 

for action.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

Economy of force is the reciprocal of the principle of mass. The commander 

allocates the minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. This requires 

the acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas to achieve superiority at the 

decisive time and location with the main effort. To devote means to unnecessary 

efforts or excessive means to necessary secondary efforts violates the principles 

of mass and objective. Economy of force measures are achieved through limited 

attacks, defense, deceptions or delaying actions.

MANEUVER

Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible 

application of combat power.

Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in 

combination with fires, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in 

respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. That advantage may be 

psychological, technological or temporal as well as spatial. Maneuver alone 

cannot usually produce decisive results; however, maneuver provides favorable 

conditions for closing with the enemy in decisive battle. Maneuver contributes 

significantly to sustaining the initiative, exploiting success, preserving freedom 

of action, and reducing vulnerability. Effective maneuver—in combination with 

mass, surprise, and economy of force—allows an inferior force to achieve 

decisive superiority at the necessary time and place. At all echelons, successful 

application of this principle requires not only fires and movement, but also 

flexibility of thought, plans, organization, and command and control.
B-4 MCDP 1-0

UNITY OF COMMAND

For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible 

commander.

Unity of command is based on the designation of a single commander with the 

authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned forces in pursuit of a 

common objective. The goal of unity of command is unity of effort. In joint, 

multinational, and interagency operations where the commander may not control 

all elements in his AO, he seeks cooperation and builds consensus to achieve 

unity of effort.

SURPRISE

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is 

unprepared.

The commander seeks every possible means to achieve surprise by striking the 

enemy at a time or place, or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. It is 

not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he become aware too 

late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, the use of 

unexpected forces, operating at night, effective and timely intelligence, 

deception, security, variation in tactics and techniques, and the use of unfavorable 

terrain. Surprise can decisively affect the outcome of a battle and may 

compensate for numerical inferiority.

SIMPLICITY

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure 

thorough understanding.

Plans should be as simple and direct as the situation and mission dictate. Direct, 

simple plans, and clear, concise orders reduce the chance for misunderstanding and 

confusion, and promote effective execution. In combat, even the simplest plan is 

usually difficult to execute. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan is preferred.

Multinational operations place a premium on simplicity. Language, doctrine, and 

cultural differences complicate military operations. Simple plans and orders 

minimize the confusion inherent in joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
APPENDIX C

Tactical Tasks

Contents

Enemy-Oriented Tactical Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2

Ambush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2

Attack by Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2

Block. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2

Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2

Bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Canalize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Contain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Defeat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Destroy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Disrupt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Exploit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Feint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Fix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Interdict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Neutralize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Penetrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Reconnoiter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Rupture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Support by Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Terrain-Oriented Tactical Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Clear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4

Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Occupy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Reconnoiter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Retain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Secure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Seize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Friendly Force-Oriented Tactical Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Disengage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-5

Displace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-6

Exfiltrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-6

Follow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-6

Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-6

Protect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-6

Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-6
C-2 MCDP 1-0

The following commonly assigned MAGTF tactical tasks may be specified, 

implied or essential. They define actions the commander may take to accomplish 

his mission. In special circumstances, tasks may be modified to meet METT-T 

requirements. The commander must clearly state that he is departing from the 

standard meaning of these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the 

modified task with the statement “What I mean by [modified task] is . . . .”

Tactical tasks are assigned based on capabilities. The GCE can execute all of the 

MAGTF’s tactical tasks. The CSSE can execute those tactical tasks essential for 

it to provide sustainment to the MAGTF. The ACE can execute many of the 

MAGTF’s tactical tasks but it cannot secure, seize, retain or occupy terrain 

without augmentation by the GCE. Weather and task duration may significantly 

affect the ACE’s ability to execute assigned tactical tasks.

For additional information on tactical tasks, see JP 1-02; MCRP 5-12A; and 

MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

ENEMY-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

Ambush

A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily 

halted enemy.

Attack by Fire

Fires (direct and indirect) to destroy the enemy from a distance, normally used 

when the mission does not require or support occupation of the objective. This 

task is usually given to the supporting effort during offensive operations and as a 

counterattack option for the reserve during defensive operations. The assigning 

commander must specify the intent of fire—either to destroy, fix, neutralize 

or suppress.

Block

To deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given 

direction or on an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. Units 

assigned this task may have to retain terrain.

Breach

To break through or secure a passage through a natural or enemy obstacle.
Marine Corps Operations C-3

Bypass

To maneuver around an obstacle, position or enemy force to maintain the 

momentum of advance. Previously unreported obstacles and bypassed enemy 

forces are reported to higher headquarters.

Canalize

The use of existing or reinforcing obstacles or fires to restrict enemy operations 

to a narrow zone.

Contain

To stop, hold or surround enemy forces or to keep the enemy in a given area and 

prevent his withdrawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere.

Defeat

To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander’s plan and overcome his will to fight, 

thus making him unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action and 

yield to the friendly commander’s will.

Destroy

Physically rendering an enemy force combat-ineffective unless it is reconstituted.

Disrupt

To integrate fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy’s formation and tempo, 

interrupt his timetable or cause premature commitment or the piecemealing of 

his forces.

Exploit

Take full advantage of success in battle and follow up initial gains; offensive 

actions that usually follow a successful attack and are designed to disorganize the 

enemy in-depth.

Feint

An offensive action involving contact with the enemy to deceive him about the 

location or time of the actual main offensive action.
C-4 MCDP 1-0

Fix

To prevent the enemy from moving any part of his forces, either from a specific 

location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to 

prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere.

Interdict

An action to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy’s surface military 

potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

Neutralize

To render the enemy or his resources ineffective or unusable.

Penetrate

To break through the enemy’s defense and disrupt his defensive system.

Reconnoiter

To obtainable visual observation or other methods, information about the 

activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy.

Rupture

To create a gap in enemy defensive positions quickly.

Support by Fire

Where a force engages the enemy by direct fire to support a maneuvering force 

using overwatch or by establishing a base of fire. The supporting force does not 

capture enemy forces or terrain.

TERRAIN-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

Clear

The removal of enemy forces and elimination of organized resistance in an 

assigned zone, area or location by destroying, capturing or forcing the 

withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit’s ability to 

accomplish its mission.
Marine Corps Operations C-5

Control

To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon systems over 

the activities or access in a defined area.

Occupy

To move onto an objective, key terrain or other man-made or natural terrain area 

without opposition, and control the entire area.

Reconnoiter

To secure data about the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic 

characteristics of a particular area.

Retain

To occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occupation 

or use.

Secure

To gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to 

prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force may or may 

not have to physically occupy the area.

Seize

To clear a designated area and gain control of it.

FRIENDLY FORCE-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

Breach

To break through or secure a passage through a natural or friendly obstacle.

Cover

Offensive or defensive actions to protect the force.

Disengage

To break contact with the enemy and move to a point where the enemy cannot 

observe nor engage the unit by direct fire.
C-6 MCDP 1-0

Displace

To leave one position and take another. Forces may be displaced laterally to 

concentrate combat power in threatened areas.

Exfiltrate

The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control.

Follow

The order of movement of combat, combat support, and combat service support 

forces in a given combat operation.

Guard

To protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and 

reporting information.

Protect

To prevent observation, engagement or interference with a force or location.

Screen

To observe, identify and report information and only fight in self-protection.
APPENDIX D

Planning and Employment Considerations

for Tactical Operations

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Decisive victory rarely is the result of success gained in an initial attack; rather, it is 

the result of quickly and relentlessly exploiting that initial success. As specific 

opportunities for exploitation cannot be anticipated with certainty, the commander 

plans thoroughly and develops sequels based on potential outcomes of the battle. 

He prepares mentally for any contingency, identifying tentative concepts of 

operation and missions and objectives for each element of the MAGTF.

Aviation Combat Element

The aviation combat element (ACE) may conduct offensive operations to defeat, 

destroy or neutralize the enemy. The MAGTF must ensure that adequate 

battlespace is assigned to employ all the capabilities of available ACE assets. The 

MAGTF commander takes advantage of the ACE’s capabilities—range, speed, 

mobility, and agility—to shape the battlespace and set conditions for decisive 

Contents

Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

Aviation Combat Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

Ground Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-5

Combat Service Support Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-9

Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-12

Aviation Combat Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-12

Ground Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-14

Combat Service Support Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-16

Other Tactical Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-18

Aviation Combat Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-18

Ground Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-20

Combat Service Support Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-22
D-2 MCDP 1-0

action. MAGTF aviation assets will be integrated into MAGTF offensive 

operations either as the main effort or in a supporting role.

The “Policy for Command and Control of USMC Tactical Air in Sustained 

Operations Ashore,” found in JP 0-2, directs the MAGTF commander to provide 

sorties to the joint force commander for air defense, long-range interdiction, and 

long range reconnaissance. He must also provide sorties in excess of MAGTF 

direct support requirements. The MAGTF commander may task-organize 

aviation, ground, and combat service support units under a single commander to 

execute the form of offensive maneuver selected. When considering the 

employment of MAGTF aviation assets in the offense, planners must consider 

weather conditions and employment duration.

Three closely related activities occur within the MAGTF’s single battle: deep, 

close, and rear operations. As a result, the ACE will be integral in each operation 

in depth to support the MAGTF’s single battle.

The ACE conducts deep operations by providing fires through offensive air support 

(deep and close air support); force protection through antiair warfare, air 

reconnaissance, and electronic warfare; and support of maneuver, insertion, 

movement, and resupply of forces in the deep area through assault support. Security 

missions, such as screening, may be conducted in the deep area by the ACE.

In close operations, the ACE can be the decisive action for lasting effects on the 

battlefield. MAGTF commanders shape the course of the battle and can pick from a 

combination of the types of offensive operations and forms of maneuver to use at 

the critical time and place to close with and destroy the enemy. For example, 

commanders may fix a part of the enemy forces with aviation forces through 

offensive air support and then envelop using the ground combat element (GCE) to 

defeat the enemy. The ACE can augment the combat power of the reserve when 

committed by the MAGTF commander at the decisive time and place.

In rear operations, MAGTF commanders should allocate adequate resources to 

maintain freedom of action and continuity of operations. Aviation assets can 

support the force in the rear because of the range, speed, mobility, and agility. 

Assault support assets increase the mobility of the tactical combat force that 

operates in the rear area. To decrease reaction time, ACE assets may be employed 

as direct support assets to the rear area commander by the MAGTF commander.

Types of Offensive Operations

The ACE can conduct or support all types of offensive operations.
Marine Corps Operations D-3

Movement to Contact. The initial task of the ACE is to locate the enemy by 

reconnoitering forward or by screening the flanks of the force. Rotary-wing 

aircraft are well-suited to gain, regain or maintain continuous contact with the 

enemy during movement to contact. Once the ACE locates the enemy it may use 

offensive air support to fix him. The MAGTF commander can then use the ACE 

to attack, to support an attack by the GCE or bypass the enemy force. During a 

movement to contact, aviation assets may perform a number of tasks to include:

l Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability of all high-speed routes, bridges, 

culverts, overpasses, underpasses, bypasses, and fords within the zone.

l Find and report all enemy forces within the zone and help determine their size, 

composition, and activity. The ACE is capable of establishing visual and 

electromagnetic contact with the enemy at extended ranges.

l Provide aviation assets for advance force, flank or rear security missions 

associated with the MAGTF's movement to conduct.

l Conduct screening missions.

l Provide fires and assault support for the force.

Attack. MAGTF aviation assets will be integrated into MAGTF attack 

operations either as the main effort or in a supporting role. During attack 

operations, MAGTF aviation assets may be employed in the close fight or deep 

against second echelon forces, enemy artillery, enemy helicopter forces, and 

enemy reaction forces, which could disrupt the momentum of the MAGTF attack. 

Operations beyond the depth of the close fight, especially when conducted in 

synchronization with other combined arms and joint service contributions, can 

break the cohesion of enemy defenses and lead to exploitation and pursuit. 

During attack operations, the ACE may perform a number of tasks to include:

l Disrupt, degrade or destroy specific enemy units.

l Envelop (along a specific axis) enemy forces.

l Block enemy forces.

l Conduct raids against enemy units.

l Fix enemy units.

l Screen or guard.

l Conduct counterattacks.

l Conduct feints or demonstrations.

While MAGTF aviation forces are capable of performing the tasks and/or 

missions listed above, they will seldom execute them alone. The MAGTF will 
D-4 MCDP 1-0

employ forces with a variety of integrated, mutually supporting forces. An 

example might be the ACE attacking a second echelon enemy unit under the 

direction of a force reconnaissance team. To allow the aircraft to reach the target 

area, the GCE suppresses an enemy air defense site along the ingress route.

Exploitation. During exploitation operations, MAGTF aviation assets may be 

used to maintain pressure on the collapsing enemy forces. MAGTF aviation 

operations may be tasked to prevent the enemy from reconstituting a defense, 

prevent the withdrawal of enemy forces to other defensible terrain, and destroy 

the enemy command and control during exploitation operations. They may also 

be used to strike enemy, attempt to reform or provide reconnaissance in front of 

friendly advancing ground exploitation forces. MAGTF aerial reconnaissance 

gives the MAGTF commander the capability to exploit by using the greatest 

advantage that MAGTF aviation has to offer: range and speed.

During exploitation, the MAGTF commander assumes risk on the flanks and in 

the rear. He can employ aviation assets to minimize the risk by assigning the 

ACE to protect the flanks and can also assign direct support aviation assets to the 

rear area.

Pursuit. During a pursuit, the inherent speed and mobility of aviation forces are 

ideally suited to maintain enemy contact, develop the situation, and deliver aerial 

fires upon positions of enemy resistance. Since pursuit is a difficult phase of an 

operation to predict, ground forces may not be positioned to properly exploit the 

situation. Aviation forces may be moved quickly and may be tasked to find, fix, 

and attack fleeing enemy units; locate the enemy strike forces; and guide the 

GCE into attack positions or around enemy exposed flanks. The maneuverability 

and firepower of MAGTF aviation assets make it the optimum force to conduct 

pursuit operations.

Forms of Offensive Maneuver

The MAGTF commander chooses the form of maneuver that fully exploits all the 

dimensions of the battlespace, and that fully utilizes the capabilities of the 

MAGTF that best accomplishes the mission. The MAGTF commander organizes 

and employs the ACE to best support the chosen form of maneuver.

Envelopment. In an envelopment, the enemy’s defensive positions may be 

bypassed using vertical envelopment from assault support assets. The commander 

may choose to conduct a double envelopment, and helicopterborne forces can be 

effectively used on a different route to attack than those of the GCE. This allows 

forces to converge with minimal risk of fratricide caused by two opposing 

friendly ground forces coming from different attack routes in a double 
Marine Corps Operations D-5

envelopment. The ACE can screen the flanks of an enveloping force reducing its 

vulnerability to enemy counteraction.

Turning Movement. A turning movement may use aviation forces to pass around 

the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure by helicopterborne forces or 

fires objectives deep in the enemy’s rear using the ACE’s advantages in speed, 

range, and mobility. The turning force usually operates at such distances from the 

fixing forces that mutual support is unlikely, except in the case of aviation units 

that can mutually support ground forces because of speed, range, mobility, 

agility, and line of sight communications. The ACE can screen the flanks of a 

turning force reducing its vulnerability to enemy counteraction.

Infiltration. During infiltration, the ACE can—

l Achieve surprise.

l Occupy a position from which to support the main attack by fire, especially 

rotary-wing close air support assets that can hover or land.

l Conduct ambushes and raids in the enemy’s rear area to harass and disrupt his 

command and control and support activities.

l Cut off enemy forward units.

However, without augmentation by the GCE, the ACE would have difficulty 

securing key terrain.

Penetration. A penetration is a form of offensive maneuver that seeks to breach 

the enemy's main defenses creating an assailable flank where none existed 

before. Aviation forces can create and support the penetration or they can attack 

the flanks once the break has been made through the enemy’s main defenses.

Flanking Attack. Aviation forces work well when conducting a flanking attack 

because the enemy’s strength is normally oriented to the front and aviation 

forces can use all of the battlespace to attack from the flanks to minimize the 

enemy’s strengths.

Frontal Attack. Aviation forces are often used to create gaps with fires in the 

enemy’s front or to prevent or delay enemy reinforcements reaching the 

frontlines. Normally, the ACE will support the GCE in a MAGTF frontal attack.

Ground Combat Element

The GCE is a task-organized, combined arms force that closes with and defeats 

the enemy through the use of fires and maneuver. The MAGTF greatly enhances 

the combined arms capabilities resident in the GCE by extending the battlespace 
D-6 MCDP 1-0

through application of firepower, information operations, target acquisition, and 

mobility. The GCE is particularly effective in battlespace with restricted 

mobility, such as urban, wooded, mountainous or jungle. It is also highly 

effective in limited visibility and in missions to attack, defeat, and clear the 

enemy in prepared defenses.

To increase tactical tempo, flexibility, mobility, survivability, and to seize the 

initiative, as well as inflict shock effect on the enemy, the assault forces of the 

GCE can be transported by helicopter or organic assault amphibian vehicles. 

GCE mobility is often provided by a combination of these means.

Distribution of Forces

One of the primary ways the commander can influence the course of the attack is 

through the distribution of force into a main attack, one or more supporting attacks, 

and a reserve. By properly distributing his assets, the commander achieves 

superiority at the decisive time and place while maintaining the minimum 

necessary forces elsewhere to accomplish supporting tasks. The GCE’s flexibility 

and capabilities are ideally suited for assignment to any of these missions.

Main Effort. The GCE commander provides the bulk of his combat power to the 

main effort to maintain momentum and ensure accomplishment of the mission. 

The commander personally allocates resources or shifts his main effort as needed. 

The GCE, together with other elements of the MAGTF, reconnoiters extensively 

to locate enemy strengths and weaknesses. Once a weakness is identified, the 

GCE commander rapidly maneuvers his main effort to exploit it.

The main effort is provided with the greatest mobility and the preponderance of 

combat support and combat service support. Consideration is made to the 

mobility, survivability, shock effect, sustainability, and lasting effect of the GCE 

when determining the force designated as the main effort. The commander 

normally gives the main effort priority of fire support.

Reserves are echeloned in depth to support exploitation of the main effort’s 

success. The commander can further concentrate the main effort by assigning it a 

narrower zone of action. All other actions are designed to support the main effort.

Supporting Effort. The commander assigns the minimum combat power 

necessary to accomplish the purpose of each supporting effort. A supporting 

effort in the offense is carried out in conjunction with the main effort to achieve 

one or more of the following:

l Deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort.

l Destroy or fix enemy forces that could shift to oppose the main effort.
Marine Corps Operations D-7

l Control terrain that, if occupied by the enemy, will hinder the main effort.

l Force the enemy to commit reserves prematurely.

In support of the MAGTF single battle, the GCE can be an ideal supporting effort 

for the ACE when the ACE is assigned as the main effort. In logistic-oriented 

missions, such as humanitarian assistance operations, the GCE can be an ideal 

supporting effort for the combat service support detachment if that element is 

assigned as the main effort.

Reserves. The primary purpose of the reserve is to attack at the critical time and 

place to ensure the victory or exploit success. Its strength and location will vary 

with its contemplated mission, form of maneuver, terrain, possible enemy 

reaction, and clarity of the situation. The reserve should be:

l Positioned to readily reinforce the main effort.

l Employed to exploit success, not reinforce failure.

l Committed in strength, not piecemeal.

l Reconstituted immediately.

Types of Offensive Operations

An attack by the GCE rarely develops exactly as planned. The commander must 

be prepared to take advantage of fleeting opportunities that present themselves 

during offensive operations. To exploit these opportunities and generate tempo, 

command and control must be decentralized. Subordinate commanders must 

make decisions using their initiative and understanding of their senior’s intent. In 

the attack, the GCE must minimize its exposure to enemy fire by using rapid 

maneuver and counterfire, exploiting cover offered by the terrain, avoiding 

obstacles, and maintaining security.

The GCE commander employs his organic fires and supporting arms in 

coordination with maneuver to enable him to close with the enemy. The 

commander prepares for the attack by successively delivering fires on enemy fire 

support assets, command and control assets, support facilities, and frontline units. 

These fires protect the force and restrict the enemy’s ability to counter the attack. 

Artillery and other supporting arms ensure continuity of support and the ability to 

mass fires by timely displacement. During the final stages of the attack, the attacker 

must rely primarily on organic fires to overcome remaining enemy resistance.

The attack culminates in a powerful and violent assault. The assaulting units 

overrun the enemy using fire and movement. The attacker exploits success 

immediately by continuing to attack into the depth of the enemy to further disrupt 
D-8 MCDP 1-0

his defense. Deep operations, augmented with ACE or other MAGTF fires and 

information operations, attack enemy command and control and critical logistic 

nodes or second echelon maneuver forces, helping to break down the enemy’s 

cohesion. As the defense begins to disintegrate, the attacker pursues the enemy to 

defeat him completely.

Movement to Contact. Using its internal reconnaissance and security assets, in 

coordination with MAGTF and ACE capabilities, the GCE finds and maintains 

contact while developing the situation with ground combat enemy forces in order to 

achieve the commander’s decisive action. The GCE commander will initiate 

contact with as minimal a force as necessary so as to maintain freedom of 

maneuver with the bulk of his force. Once contact is gained, it is not normally 

broken without authority from the MAGTF commander. The GCE commander 

must exercise careful judgment to ensure that by maintaining contact, his force is 

not bending to the will of the enemy or being drawn into an ambush or other 

consequential action.

Attack. In the MAGTF single battle, the ACE and GCE, when supported in depth 

by the combat service support element (CSSE), have complementary capabilities. 

When integrated for the purpose of the attack, these capabilities can significantly 

increase their combined effects on the enemy for greater tactical decisiveness. In 

an attack, the GCE commander prevents effective enemy maneuver or 

counteraction by seizing the initiative through the use of his organic intelligence 

and security elements while masking his true intentions. The GCE commander 

makes every effort to achieve surprise by such methods as attacking under cover 

of darkness or using terrain and/or weather to conceal his force as it closes with 

the enemy. Once the GCE has gained the advantage, the commander will focus 

his combat power against the enemy’s center of gravity through its critical 

vulnerabilities in order to destroy it and exploit all advantages gained.

Exploitation. The GCE normally conducts an exploitation by continuing the 

attack with committed units or by launching an uncommitted unit into the attack 

through a passage of lines. The commander may commit his reserve as the 

exploitation force depending on the factors of METT-T. He will constitute a new 

reserve as soon as possible to defeat enemy counterattacks and to restore 

momentum to a stalled attack.

Pursuit. Success in the pursuit is particularly enhanced through extensive use of 

the ACE to support the GCE’s rapid movement and to provide flank security. 

Combat service support planning by the GCE in advance of the initial attack must 

take into account success and ensure that the combat trains have the mobility to 

support an aggressive pursuit.
Marine Corps Operations D-9

Forms of Maneuver

The GCE commander selects the best form of maneuver to support the MAGTF 

commander’s concept of operation.

Envelopment. The most successful envelopments by the GCE require MAGTF 

resources and support from the ACE and CSSE. By nature, envelopments require 

surprise, superior mobility (ground and/or air) on the part of the enveloping force, 

the main effort, and success by the supporting efforts to fix the enemy in place.

Turning Movement. During a turning movement, the main effort usually 

operates at such a distance from supporting efforts that its units are beyond 

mutual supporting distance. Therefore, the GCE’s main effort must be selfsufficient or integrated with highly mobile CSSEs in order to reach the objective 

before becoming decisively engaged. A turning movement is rarely executed by a 

GCE of less than division strength. Consideration should be made to use the ACE 

as a supporting effort to capitalize on its inherent mobility, speed, and range.

Flanking Attack. The GCE commander will use fires and terrain, and exploit 

weaknesses in enemy dispositions to create a flank. To the GCE, a flanking 

attack is similar to envelopment but is conducted on a shallower axis and is 

usually less decisive and less risky than a deeper attack. A flanking attack is 

usually conducted by battalions or below. This attack usually requires a 

supporting attack to occupy the enemy to the GCE’s front.

Frontal Attack. The GCE goal in the frontal attack is to fix or defeat the enemy. 

The GCE commander may conduct feints or demonstrations in other areas to 

weaken the enemy effort at the breach by causing him to shift his reserves to the 

GCE’s advantage.

Infiltration. The GCE commander must ensure that operational security is a top 

priority during planning and preparation for an infiltration as the forces 

conducting the infiltration are particularly vulnerable to surprise and ambush. 

Prearranged helicopter-delivered combat service support resupply is critical to 

support forces beyond the FEBA.

Penetration. The GCE must closely coordinate its operations with the ACE to 

take advantage of the ACE’s ability to create gaps in the enemy’s defense. 

Combat Service Support Element

Combat service support planners should keep continuously informed of operation 

plans. They anticipate offensive operations even while supporting other types of 

operations. The objective of combat service support conducted in support of 
D-10 MCDP 1-0

offensive operations is to extend operational reach and increase the endurance of 

the force by supporting as far forward as possible with a logistics system that is 

optimized for throughput.

To prepare for an attack, CSSEs ensure that all support equipment is ready and 

that supplies are best located for support. They ensure that enough transportation 

is available to support the tactical and support plans. Commanders ensure that all 

support elements understand their responsibilities.

The forward deployment of CSSEs must take into account the vulnerability of the 

unit to enemy counterattack and maneuver element requirements for space and 

roads. CSSEs, especially mobile combat service support detachments, require 

security assistance. They need to be written into the fire support plan, have their 

own list of on-call targets, and have assets to call for fire from artillery and 

aviation platforms, as well as have established procedures for actions upon 

enemy contact.

The fundamental principle of supply support in the offense is responsiveness-to 

the supported unit. Supply support is typically more difficult in the offense than 

in the defense because of the ever-changing locations of units and their support 

areas. The concept of support becomes even more important and increasingly 

difficult to execute. Combat service support planners must coordinate 

preparations and unit positioning with deception plans to avoid giving away the 

element of surprise. Consequently, most combat service support operations will 

be conducted under the cover of darkness.

Ammunition

Responsive ammunition support for offensive operations is critical. This support 

is more difficult in offensive operations due to the lengthening of supply lines 

and the need for user resupply vehicles to stay close to firing elements. In 

preparing for the attack, logistics planners consider the following:

l Placing ammunition close to the user.

l Preparing ammunition supply points and ammunition transfer points to rapidly 

move forward as the attack advances.

l Stockpiling artillery ammunition at designated firing positions (possibly 

forward of current positions).

l Moving ammunition forward with advancing elements to ensure that basic 

loads can be replenished quickly.
Marine Corps Operations D-11

Fuel

Offensive operations use large quantities of fuel. As a result, logisticians prepare 

for the attack by building up stocks in forward sites while avoiding signaling 

intentions to the enemy. They also ensure that fuel supply elements can move 

forward as the attack develops. Control of bulk transporter assets must be closely 

maintained throughout the AO. This is particularly true if the attack is highly 

successful and results in exploitation or pursuit.

Maintenance

Planners ensure maintenance operations support momentum and massing at 

critical points. Maintenance personnel maximize momentum by repairing at the 

point of malfunction or damage. They enhance momentum by keeping the 

maximum number of weapon systems operable and mobile. Emphasis is on battle 

damage assessment and rapid return of equipment to the supported unit. Repair 

and recovery personnel perform their mission in forward areas.

Supply

While Classes III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and V (ammunition) are the 

most important supplies in the offense, planners consider all classes of supply. 

While the need for barrier and fortification material decreases, for example, the 

requirement for obstacle, breaching, and bridging material may increase. 

Weapons system requirements may also be higher since weapon systems 

exposure to enemy fire during offensive operations is usually greater.

Transportation and Distribution

Movement requirements heavily tax transportation resources. There may be a 

wide dispersion of units and lengthening lines of communications. There may 

also be an increased requirement for personnel replacements and some classes of 

supply, such as fuel and weapon systems. These factors demand close 

coordination and planning for the use of transportation assets. Techniques such as 

supply push (unit distribution) or mobile forward tactical resupply and refueling 

points may be incorporated into the concept of support. Resources such as 

transportation and supply infrastructure that may be secure in the more stable 

environment of defense may not be as reliable in the offense. The opening and 

securing of main supply routes and available logistics facilities to sustain the 

MAGTF’s offensive operations must be included in the operational and combat 

service support planning.

The mobility of offensive operations requires reliance on motor and air transport. 

When considering the air transport mode, the planner also considers aerial 

delivery. Movement control personnel set priorities in accordance with the 
D-12 MCDP 1-0

combatant commander’s or joint force commander’s priorities to ensure that 

transportation assets meet the most critical needs. Aerial delivery or external 

helicopter delivery may be in greater demand.

Medical

Offensive operations increase the burden on medical resources. Planners can 

expect high casualty rates. High casualties and long evacuation lines will stress 

medical treatment and evacuation resources to their limits and may dictate 

augmentation for medical detachments. Fleet hospitals move forward in 

preparation for offensive operations to provide maximum treatment and holding 

facilities. When organic medical resources are insufficient, evacuation may 

require use of nonmedical transportation assets, adding additional stress to an 

already overtaxed transportation system.

Services

The main combat service support effort in the offense is to provide only the most 

critically needed support to the attacking force. Most service functions play a 

minor role. Commanders suspend some services until the situation stabilizes. 

Laundry, clothing exchange, and field showers may be temporarily suspended. 

Mortuary affairs/graves registration is a major exception. It continues and may 

intensify. Adequate mortuary affairs/graves registration supplies must be on 

hand. Mortuary affairs detachments maintain close communications with 

personnel elements to verify and report casualty information and aid in the 

identification of remains.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

An effective defense is never passive. The defender cannot prepare his positions 

and simply wait for the enemy to attack. Commanders at every level must seek 

every opportunity to wrest the initiative from the attacker and shift to the offense. 

Subordinate commanders take the necessary steps to maintain their positions and 

cover gaps in their dispositions by the use of observation, obstacles, fires or 

reserves. The defense demands resolute will on the part of all commanders.

Aviation Combat Element

The MAGTF commander uses speed, range, mobility, and agility of aviation 

assets to maximize concentration and flexibility in the defense. MAGTF aviation 

assets are integrated into MAGTF defensive operations either as the main effort 

or in a supporting role. During preparation for defensive operations, the ACE 

may support the covering force with aerial reconnaissance and fires. The 
Marine Corps Operations D-13

MAGTF commander may task-organize aviation, ground, and combat service 

support units under a single aviation combat commander to execute the form of 

defensive maneuver selected. 

During defensive operations, the MAGTF commander organizes his battlespace 

into three areas: security area, main battle area, and rear area. The ACE will 

operate throughout all of these areas and is integral to the MAGTF’s single battle 

in the defense.

Security Area

Typically, operations in the security area include interdiction by air maneuver 

and fires. During the defense, aviation can be used to attack deep against highpayoff targets, enemy concentrations, and moving columns, and also to disrupt 

enemy centers of gravity.

The MAGTF commander seeks to engage the enemy as far out as possible. 

Because of the mobility and range of aviation assets, the ACE has excellent 

capabilities to conduct these operations. ACE assets can be employed in depth to 

attack follow-on echelons before they can move forward to the main battle area. 

Aviation forces can be employed to conduct screening operations; in conjunction 

with ground forces, they conduct guard operations on an open flank. Normally, 

ACE forces are not given guard missions.

Main Battle Area

The greater the depth of the main battle area, the greater the maneuver space for 

maximizing the capabilities of the ACE. A counterattack is an attack by part or 

all of a defending force against an attacking enemy force, for such specific 

purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off and destroying enemy advance 

units. ACE assets used as the counterattack force can be employed to conduct 

decisive action to regain the initiative.

Rear Area

MAGTF commanders should allocate adequate resources to protect the rear area to 

maintain freedom of action and continuity of operations. Aviation assets can 

support the force in the rear because of their range, speed, and mobility. Because 

ACE airfields often operate in rear areas, aviation assets must depend on those 

functions of security and sustainment required to maintain continuity of operations. 

Assault support assets increase the mobility of the tactical combat force that 

operates in the rear area. To increase reaction time, ACE assets may be employed 

as direct support assets to the rear area commander by the MAGTF commander.
D-14 MCDP 1-0

Mobile Defense

Since minimum force is placed forward to canalize, delay, disrupt, and deceive 

the enemy as to the actual location of the defense, MAGTF aviation assets can 

supplement mobile forces to fill in gaps where the MAGTF is most vulnerable. A 

mobile defense requires mobility greater than that of the attacker. The MAGTF 

generates the mobility advantage with helicopterborne forces and MAGTF 

aviation assets. The ACE can support through fires the displacement of GCE 

units to alternate and supplementary positions used in the mobile defense. Terrain 

and space are traded to draw the enemy deeper into the defensive area, causing 

him to overextend his force and expose his flanks to ACE assets. Together, 

MAGTF aviation assets and ground combat forces provide a much more effective 

strike force that can bring simultaneous fires to bear upon the enemy from 

unexpected directions.

Position Defense

In a position defense, the MAGTF commander can employ his aviation assets 

(primarily assault support aircraft) to help contain tactical emergencies, by 

disengaging them from an area and quickly concentrating them in another. 

Because of the ACE’s mobility and agility, the MAGTF commander can risk 

reducing the size of the ground maneuver force placed in reserve. In a position 

defense, aviation assets can be used to blunt and contain enemy penetrations, to 

counterattack, and to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy.

Ground Combat Element

The GCE conducts the defense through the assignment of sectors, battle or 

blocking positions, and strong points. These assignments are made in a manner 

that enhances depth and mutual support; provides opportunities to trap or ambush 

the attacker; and affords observation, surprise, and deception. The GCE 

commander maintains an awareness of concurrent delaying actions to take 

advantage of opportunities created by adjacent units. The GCE receives 

substantial heavy engineering and logistical support from the combat service 

support detachment to enhance the survivability, sustainability, and 

countermobility of its defensive positions. The ACE provides support to the GCE 

through assault support, close air support, and reconnaissance.

Security Forces

GCE security forces are employed in the security area to delay, disrupt, and provide 

early warning of the enemy’s advance and to deceive him as to the true location of 

the main battle area. These forces are assigned cover, guard or screen missions.
Marine Corps Operations D-15

Screening Force

The GCE may establish a screening force to gain and maintain contact with the 

enemy, observe enemy activity, identify the enemy main effort, and report 

information. In most situations, the minimum security force organized by the 

GCE is a screening force. Normally, the screening force only fights in selfdefense, but may be tasked to—

l Repel enemy reconnaissance units as part of the GCE’s counterreconnaissance effort.

l Prevent enemy artillery from acquiring terrain that enables frontline units to 

be engaged.

l Provide early warning.

l Attack the enemy with supporting arms.

Guard Force

The GCE may designate a guard force for protection from enemy ground 

observation, direct fire, and surprise attack for a given period of time. A guard 

force allows the commander to extend the defense in time and space to prevent 

interruption of the organization of the main battle area. Observation of the enemy 

and reporting of information by the guard force is an inherent task of the guard 

force, but secondary to its primary function of protection.

The GCE commander determines the orientation of the guard force and the 

duration the guard must be provided. Normally, guard forces are oriented to the 

flanks for the minimum amount of time necessary to develop an integrated defense.

Covering Force

The GCE may provide the bulk of the MAGTF’s covering force. The covering 

force operates apart from the main force to engage, delay, disrupt, and deceive 

the enemy before he can attack the main force. A GCE covering force can be 

augmented or supported by rotary-wing attack assets in order to strengthen its 

capabilities and further disrupt enemy attack formations.

Security Measures

Security measures are employed by the GCE and coordinated at all levels. These 

security measures include combat patrolling, sensors, target acquisition radars, 

surveillance, and employment of false visual and electronic signatures. In 

addition, skills of certain units within the GCE enhance the security posture of 

the organization. For example, engineers within the GCE contribute to 

survivability, mobility, and countermobility, all of which contribute to security. 
D-16 MCDP 1-0

Any active measure that may impact on other elements of the MAGTF is 

coordinated throughout the MAGTF. All units of the GCE provide local security. 

The degree of local security is dictated by terrain, communications, target 

acquisition capabilities, and the enemy threat.

Combat Service Support Element

The role of the CSSE in the defense is to support defensive battles while 

maintaining the capability to shift to the offense with little notice. Facilities and 

combat service support areas should be far enough in the rear to be out of the flow 

of battle and relatively secure. They should not be so far back that they make the 

support effort less effective. Where possible, combat service support units locate 

out of the reach of potential penetrations in protected and concealed locations 

without sacrificing support and out of the movement routes for retrograding units. 

Dispersion should be consistent with support requirements, control, and local 

security. Air defense coverage should be planned and emplaced.

Ammunition

Logisticians position ammunition supply and transfer points to facilitate rapid 

and responsive support. Using units may stockpile ammunition in excess of their 

basic loads. Ammunition may also be placed at successive defensive positions. 

This provides easy access and lessens transportation problems during the 

withdrawal to those positions. The defense usually requires a greater volume of 

ammunition than the offense. Construction and barrier material and ammunition 

requirements, especially for mines and barrier materials, are heaviest during the 

preparation for defense.

Fuel

The form of defensive operation influences fuel requirements. A position defense 

typically requires less fuel than an offensive operation. Mobile defenses, on the 

other hand, generally involve greater fuel consumption that the more 

static-oriented area defense. In either case, forward stockpiles of fuel 

may be appropriate.

Maintenance

The primary thrust of the maintenance effort in the defense is to maximize the 

number of weapon systems available at the start of the operation. Once the 

defensive battle begins, the thrust is to fix the maximum number of inoperable 

systems and return them to battle in the least amount of time. This requires 

forward support at, or as near as possible to, the intended AO of the systems.
Marine Corps Operations D-17

Supply

Supply activity will be the most intensive during the preparation stage. Stockpiles 

should be far forward and at successive defensive positions, especially critical 

supplies (fuel, ammunition, barrier materiel). While many supplies—especially 

munitions and barrier material—must be far forward, they must also be as mobile 

as possible. This allows continuous support as combat power shifts in response to 

enemy attacks. The CSSE must position the ammunition supply points or transfer 

points to maximize responsiveness.

Transportation and Distribution

Transportation resources are most critical in the preparation stage of the defense. 

Stockpiling supplies and shifting personnel, weapon systems, and supplies 

require extensive transportation, laterally or in depth, to meet the probable points 

of enemy attack. Transportation assets move barrier supplies and ammunition 

(e.g., mines, demolitions) as close to the barrier sites as possible. Logisticians 

take action to increase the flow of these materials as soon as the intention to 

conduct a deliberate defense is known.

Medical

Medical support of defensive operations is more difficult than in the offense. 

Casualty rates are lower, but forward acquisition is complicated by enemy action 

and the initial direction of maneuver to the rear. The task of frontline medical 

units is to stabilize, prioritize, and evacuate the wounded. Priorities for 

evacuation will be complicated by the probable enemy main effort. Enemy 

activities may inhibit evacuation, increase casualties among medical personnel, 

and damage medical and evacuation equipment. Heaviest casualties, including 

those caused by enemy artillery and weapons of mass destruction, may be 

expected during the initial enemy attack and in the counterattack.

The enemy attack may disrupt ground and air communications routes and delay 

evacuation of patients to and from aid stations. Clearing facilities should be 

located away from points of possible penetration and must not interfere with 

reserve force positioning. The depth and dispersion of the mobile defense create 

significant time and distance problems in evacuation support to security and 

fixing forces. Security forces may be forced to withdraw while simultaneously 

carrying their patients to the rear. Peak loads may require additional helicopter 

evacuation capability. Nonmedical transportation assets may not be available to 

assist in casualty evacuation.
D-18 MCDP 1-0

Services

In the defense, services operate routinely where the tactical situation permits. 

Service facilities should locate out of the way and not interfere with tactical 

operations. Mortuary affairs detachments evacuate the dead as rapidly as possible 

especially in deliberate defensive position to maintain morale. The use of hot 

rations tends to increase in the defense. Aerial delivery of rations and other 

services may be employed for cut-off, screening or guarding units.

OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS

A MAGTF may be required to conduct other tactical operations in combination, 

sequentially or as part of the offense or defense. Such operations are difficult, 

complex, often involve risk, and require detailed planning. Methods for 

conducting other tactical operations vary according to METT-T factors as they 

apply to each situation.

Aviation Combat Element

The MAGTF commander uses the ACE's inherent capabilities of range, speed, 

mobility, and agility when conducting these tactical operations He should ensure 

that adequate battlespace is assigned to employ all the capabilities of available 

aviation assets. Marine aviation is capable of operating in any environment; 

however, weather can adversely affect its effectiveness in performing some 

functions such as assault support and reconnaissance. Longer periods of 

employment will require increased maintenance efforts and the MAGTF may be 

required to support the joint force commander by providing excess sorties.

Retrograde

Aviation plays a major role in setting the conditions for a successful retrograde. 

The ACE can provide security for friendly ground forces and interdict enemy 

forces to disrupt and delay his advance. Air delivered mines can be used to 

supplement obstacles emplaced by engineers to impede or canalize enemy 

movements throughout the battlespace. Assault support may be used to move 

ground forces rapidly between delaying positions and move troops, equipment, 

and supplies away from the enemy. When a retirement occurs over extended 

distances, the security mission may be given to the aviation commander and 

appropriate ground units may be placed under his command authority. 

Retrograde operations are conducted primarily during limited visibility; 

therefore, aviation’s all-weather abilities should be exploited. Should the 

retrograde operation require the displacement of aviation assets, the MAGTF 
Marine Corps Operations D-19

should plan for the movement by echelon of airfield equipment and personnel 

while maintaining continuous aviation support for the duration of the operation.

Passage of Lines

MAGTF aviation assets can support a forward passage of lines by providing or 

supporting the security force to fix enemy forces in place and permit the MAGTF 

to complete the passage of lines. Aviation could then be used to exploit success 

of the moving force. In a rearward passage, in addition to a security force role, 

aviation can serve as the MAGTF counterattack force.

Linkup

Tactical aviation assets can be used to establish initial electronic connectivity 

between two units conducting a linkup while physical contact between ground 

forces occurs later. A helicopterborne force acting as the moving force can 

usually accomplish physical linkup rapidly.

Relief in Place

Assault support assets are ideal to transport infantry units to conduct a rapid relief 

in place especially where there is no enemy pressure or where a replacement of 

like type units is required. In certain instances, a relief in place of a ground unit 

with an aviation force such as attack helicopters can keep the enemy off balance 

and rest a ground unit.

Obstacle Crossing

Aviation assets give the MAGTF the ability to cross obstacles with minimal 

delay, loss of momentum, and casualties. Helicopterborne forces can bypass most 

obstacles completely; if necessary, these forces can reduce or eliminate the 

obstacle from the far side of the impediment. Aviation assets can suppress and 

disrupt the enemy when the force is most vulnerable while astride the obstacle.

Breakout from Encirclement

Normally, when encircled by the enemy, a MAGTF commander will attempt to 

breakout as soon as possible. Aviation forces provide an immediately responsive 

and effective asset to aid in the breakout. The encircled force may receive fire 

support from aviation assets outside the encirclement. Attack helicopters can 

conduct a breakout by rupturing and penetrating the enemy's encircling position, 

widening the gap until all the other encircled forces have moved through. In 

addition, aviation forces can be used as a diversion or may augment the reserve 

when committed. Any of the encircled forces (rupture force, main body, or rear 

guard) may consist of aviation and ground task-organized combined arms teams.
D-20 MCDP 1-0

Ground Combat Element

The GCE conducts other tactical operations to support the MAGTF's offensive 

and defensive operations. These operations may require augmentation of 

specialized equipment and personnel with special skills. The type of 

augmentation will depend on the characteristics of the AO, conditions under 

which they are conducted, the nature of the operations, or any combination of 

these factors. The GCE is dependent upon the rest of the MAGTF for the 

additional fires, logistics, and other support necessary to execute these operations 

with speed and security.

Retrograde

In a retrograde, the GCE will normally conduct disengagement by echelon. 

Security forces (such as the guard and covering force) and the reserve usually are 

highly mobile units comprised of tanks, light armored reconnaissance, and 

infantry mounted on assault amphibious vehicles and augmented by attack 

helicopter assets. The GCE's organic combat engineering assets or those from the 

CSSE are employed to prepare initial and subsequent delaying positions and 

support other countermobility requirements. Indirect fires are used to attack 

enemy formations, force their early deployment, slow their advance, and limit 

their contact with friendly forces. Tactical deception is used to confuse the enemy 

as to the true location and intent of ground forces; the retrograde itself may be a 

deception measure to make the enemy susceptible to a counterattack. The 

MAGTF commander should consider the use of a mobile reserve to support the 

counterattack during a retrograde. The GCE will employ appropriate force 

protection measures and normal movement-to-contact methods, including 

security measures, in a retrograde.

Passage of Lines

The GCE can control linkup operations between its subordinate commands or 

conduct them with the ACE, CSSE, and with other joint or multinational forces. 

When the GCE conducts a linkup, the force designated as the stationary unit should 

at least temporarily occupy the designated linkup point. The moving ground force 

commander will normally locate his forward command post in the vicinity of the 

stationary ground force combat operations center to facilitate integration and 

coordination of tactical plans, fire support, security, command and control, combat 

service support, communications, and maneuver control and fire support 

coordinating measures. The GCE commander should ensure that appropriate 

command relationships are established and understood by both elements. Fire 

support coordinating measures, such as restricted fire lines, are established or 

modified as required to balance freedom of action and positive control.
Marine Corps Operations D-21

Linkup

When the linkup is between two subordinate ground units, the GCE establishes 

maneuver control measures such as linkup points and boundaries between 

converging forces, and fire support coordinating measures such as restricted fire 

lines and coordinated fire lines. Control measures are adjusted during the operation 

to provide for freedom of action and maximum control. The GCE commander may 

designate linkup points, usually located where the moving force's routes arrive at 

the location of the stationary force's security elements. Alternate linkup points are 

also designated since enemy action may interfere with linkup at primary points. To 

assist in the linkup, stationary forces help open lanes in minefields, breach or 

remove selected obstacles, furnish guides, and designate assembly areas. Leading 

elements of each force should be on a common radio net.

Relief in Place

Control of all ground units normally remains with the outgoing commander. This 

requires close coordination with the supported units. Units may need to exchange 

certain weapons, supplies, equipment, and, occasionally, vehicles to facilitate a 

rapid relief. To ensure coordination and maintain security, the outgoing unit's 

radio nets, command frequencies, and operators should be used. The outgoing 

unit remains in charge of communications throughout the entire relief. Artillery is 

normally relieved last to ensure continuous fire support; if possible, the outgoing 

unit artillery remains in position until all units are relieved.

Obstacle Crossing

The GCE normally bypasses obstacles whenever possible, often using 

helicopterborne forces conducting an envelopment. It has the capability to 

conduct hasty and deliberate breaches. When conditions permit, assault 

amphibious vehicles are ideal to move assault elements across a river. For largescale river crossing operations, the GCE may require additional bridging assets 

provided by the MAGTF or the joint force. The GCE maximizes the use of 

combined arms during crossing operations. Use of supporting arms, combat 

engineers, reconnaissance, rotary wing ACE assets, and armor reduces 

vulnerability, increases tempo, and supports initiative in breaching operations. 

Deception is maximized to deceive the enemy and draw enemy attention away 

from the crossing site.

Breakout from Encirclement

The GCE will attempt to deceive the enemy on the time and place of the 

breakout. It will make best use of limited visibility but not necessarily at the 

expense of time. The GCE will use its organic reconnaissance as well as other 
D-22 MCDP 1-0

reconnaissance assets to locate gaps and weaknesses in the enemy force. Initially, 

the rupture force will be the GCE's main effort and may be provided additional 

combat power, such as engineer support, necessary to achieve the rupture. During 

the breakout, massed continuous fires are used to open the rupture point, suppress 

enemy direct fire systems, and isolate the breakout from the enemy. Once the 

rupture is achieved, priority of fires may shift to the rear guard action if sufficient 

fires are available to support the momentum of the breakout. Artillery will 

provide continuous fire support during the breakout and subsequent movement to 

linkup with friendly forces.

Combat Service Support Element

The principles of logistics—responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, 

attainability, sustainability, and survivability—are universal constants that apply 

equally to the functional areas of logistics during other tactical operations. These 

considerations will not dictate a specific course of action, but will help maximize 

the effectiveness and efficiency of logistics operations.

Retrograde

Priority of support during retrograde operations is determined by the commander 

but is usually given to units that have completed the move and are preparing new 

positions. CSSEs must continue to support the delaying force with critical 

supplies at the old defensive positions while establishing support to withdrawing 

elements moving rearward. Combat service support personnel and equipment not 

essential to supporting forward combat forces should be moved as soon as 

feasible. Retrograde operations will strain the transportation system as all 

essential supplies, materiel, and personnel are moved rearward. Movement 

control personnel and agencies should maximize the use of all available 

transportation assets—watercraft, railroads, air, and line haul. All movements 

throughout the entire retrograde will be regulated, controlled, and prioritized to 

eliminate unnecessary surge periods and to avoid congestion. Helicopter and 

aerial delivery should be used whenever possible, as well as mobile loading of 

fuel and ammunition. If sufficient rolling stock is not available for mobile supply 

points, supplies can be placed along the retrograde route so forces can fall back 

on a continuous supply. Heavy equipment transportation should be coordinated 

by the senior movement control organization. Supplies that cannot be moved 

should be destroyed. Maintenance efforts should concentrate on use of controlled 

exchange and cannibalization to facilitate rapid turnaround of weapon systems. 

Repair to transportation assets is critical to retrograde operations.
Marine Corps Operations D-23

Passage of Lines

The CSSE should establish liaison and coordinate movement control during the 

passage with the other force involved. Every action should be taken to avoid any 

interruption in logistics operations that would diminish the combat power of either 

force. All units should completely understand which unit will provide supply, 

maintenance; nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination; medical; and 

movement priorities and control for the stationary and passing forces.

Linkup

Before the linkup has been initiated, combat service support is the responsibility 

of each unit involved in the linkup operation (whether it be converging forces, a 

force closing on a previous secured objective, forces encircling an enemy force, 

or during a counterattack). Converging forces should coordinate combat service 

support that can be mutually provided to facilitate the linkup operation and any 

subsequent mission.

Relief in Place

A CSSE involved in a relief in place should develop and coordinate a common 

concept of support, and exchange standing operating procedures, and combat 

support and combat service support status. The concept of support should clearly 

identify the specific elements of combat service support to be provided by each 

force involved in the relief. When possible, existing supplies, end items, and 

maintenance facilities should be left in place for the relieving force or 

prepositioned to support the movement of the forces involved in the relief.

Obstacle Crossing

Combat service support for obstacle crossing operations differs slightly from 

sustainment operations during the offense or defense. Transportation support for 

engineer units and bridging materiel is the primary concern, with maintenance of 

bridging equipment and fuel requirements a secondary consideration. All 

essential combat support and combat service support units should be moved 

across the obstacle early and dispersed in locations that can support the operation. 

Whenever possible, bridging equipment should be recovered early and replaced 

with assault float bridging and unit assets that can be recovered quickly. CSSEs 

may also have unique intelligence collection requirements, such as obstacle 

surveys or soil and trafficability studies, that must be satisfied in order to provide 

the desired support.
D-24 MCDP 1-0

Breakout from Encirclement

The commander of an encircled force may have to reorganize his logistic support, 

centralize all supplies, and establish strict rationing and supply procedures to 

conserve his sustainment ability. If possible, resupply and casualty evacuation 

should be done by air. Centralized medical and graves registration operations 

should be established. The CSSEs should be integrated into the main body. In the 

event that some forces must be left behind, sufficient medical personnel and 

supplies will be left to attend the wounded, and personnel will also be detailed to 

destroy abandoned equipment.
APPENDIX E

Planning and Employment

Considerations for MOOTW

Marine Corps forces may be required to conduct many of the various types of 

military operation other than war (MOOTW) while conducting combat operations 

in a major theater war. Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as 

plans for war. As with combat operations, mission analysis and the commander’s 

operational design are the foundation of the plan. The development of a clear 

definition, understanding, and appreciation for all potential threats is essential in 

assisting the commander in the proper organization of forces. All operations should 

be specific in nature with an established mission and end state. Rules of 

engagement should be clearly defined, fully disseminated, and reviewed for 

continued relevance as the situation or mission changes. Operations that are openended and not clearly defined can develop “mission creep,” an insidious expansion 

of the original mission until there are either several new missions or the nature of 

the mission has changed. The commander and his staff should focus on the 

following key issues during planning.

UNIT INTEGRITY

To quickly deploy and begin operations immediately, planners should try to 

maintain unit integrity when developing a proposed force list for MOOTW. 

Marine forces train as units and are best able to accomplish a mission when 

deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, Marine forces are able to 

continue to operate under established procedures, adapt these procedures to the 

mission and situation, and maintain effectiveness. An ad hoc force is less 

Contents

Unit Integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

Information Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-2

Civil-Military Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-3

Religious Ministry Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-4

Legal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-4
E-2 MCDP 1-0

effective and takes more time to adjust to the requirements of the mission. 

This not only complicates mission accomplishment, but may also have an impact 

on force protection. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large 

force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller but cohesive 

elements that have trained and operated together. Additionally, when deploying 

into a situation involving combat operations, units should deploy with 

appropriate combat capability.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

MOOTW require sound management of information to ensure unity of purpose 

and consistent themes in psychological, public affairs, and civil affairs 

operations. Psychological operations provide a planned, systematic process of 

conveying messages and influencing selected target groups. The messages are 

intended to promote particular themes that can result in desired attitudes and 

behaviors. This information may include safety, health, public service, and 

messages designed to favorably influence foreign perceptions of United States 

forces and operations. Success may hinge on direct control of or direct influence 

over the mass communication media (radio and television) in the region.

MOOTW often become of significant interest to the news media. As a result of 

this interest, the MAGTF commander must be prepared to deal with the media on 

a daily basis. Public affairs, including media reporting, influences public opinion 

and is a principal factor in the success or failure of MOOTW. Worldwide media 

coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for public affairs 

more important than in the past. This is especially critical in MOOTW, where 

there can be significant political impact. Media reporting influences public 

opinion, which may affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation and 

ultimately influence the success or failure of the operation. The speed with which 

the media can collect and convey information to the public makes it possible for 

the world populace to become aware of an incident as quickly as, or even before, 

MAGTF decisionmakers.

MAGTFs should develop a well-defined, concise public affairs plan to 

minimize adverse effects upon the operation and integrate their public affairs 

officer early in the planning process. The MAGTF should facilitate open and 

independent reporting, respond to media queries that provide the maximum 

disclosure with minimum delay, and create an environment between 

commander and reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. An 

effective public affairs plan provides ways to communicate information about 

an operation and fulfills the military’s obligation to keep the American public 

informed. It enhances force protection by ensuring that the media does not 
Marine Corps Operations E-3

compromise operational security. The public affairs plan promotes operational 

security awareness by addressing the possibility of media attempts to acquire 

and publicly disseminate classified information. Public affairs plans should also 

anticipate responses to inaccurate media analysis and promulgation of 

disinformation and misinformation.

The command must establish a positive relationship with host-nation leadership 

and the local populace. Civil affairs units ensure local needs are identified and 

build cooperation and coordination among the participants. They assess the civil 

infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison 

between military and outside groups. These units contain a variety of specialty 

skills that support small wars and contingencies and are normally tailored to 

support specific operational requirements. They can also provide expertise on 

factors that directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, 

economic systems, language, and host-nation support capabilities. Civil affairs 

units may also include forces conducting activities normally the responsibility of 

local or indigenous governments. Selection of civil affairs units should be based 

on a clear concept of the mission requirements for the type operation 

being planned.

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

MOOTW are normally joint and multinational operations set in an interagency 

environment. In many cases, nongovernmental agencies, media concerns, and 

other nontraditional influences will affect decisionmaking. Coordination with 

nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and interagency 

operations allows the MAGTF to gain greater situational and cultural awareness. 

A technique to build unity of effort and conduct liaison with nonmilitary 

organizations is the establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC). 

Members of a CMOC may include representatives of adjacent and allied military 

commands, U.S. government agencies, other countries’ forces involved in the 

operation, and civilian organizations. Civil affairs units should be the core of the 

CMOC. Through a CMOC, the MAGTF can gain a greater understanding of the 

roles of civilian organizations and how they influence mission accomplishment. 

Although formal agreements are not always necessary, such agreements between 

military and civilian organizations may improve coordination and effectiveness.

MOOTW can involve other United States non-Department of Defense 

departments and agencies. Within the United States, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency normally leads the response to a natural disaster, while the 

Departments of Justice or Transportation could be expected to lead in a 

counterterrorist operation. Effective liaison with the lead agency enables the 
E-4 MCDP 1-0

MAGTF to support the political objectives of the operation. Outside the United 

States, the lead agency will normally be the Department of State and the United 

States ambassador will coordinate activities through an established country team 

with representation from all United States departments and agencies in that 

country. A non-Department of Defense lead agency does not alter the military 

chain of command.

RELIGIOUS MINISTRY SUPPORT

The cultural complexity of certain MOOTW elicits the need for special 

consideration regarding religious ministry. The role of religious ministry teams 

may be expanded beyond the traditional provision of divine services and facilitation 

of religious requirements within the unit. As advisors to the commander, chaplains 

assess and advise commanders and their staffs on cultural and religious issues—as 

well as moral, ethical, morale, and core values—both internal and external to the 

command. This includes advising the commanders and their staffs on religious and 

cultural matters within the AO, on ethical issues impacting the mission, and on 

morale within the indigenous community. Additionally chaplains play a major role 

in support of noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign humanitarian assistance/

disaster relief operations, or peacekeeping operations and should be active 

members of the CMOC. Religious ministry teams should be trained adequately and 

provided the resources and command support necessary to perform these functions. 

Likewise, commanders and their staffs should be trained to understand the role 

chaplains should play in the planning process as well as the input they have to the 

commander's situational awareness.

LEGAL

MOOTW may present unique legal challenges. In addition to traditional skills 

necessary in military justice, legal personnel may require expertise in areas such 

as refugees, displaced and detained civilians, fiscal law, rules of engagement, 

psychological operations, civil affairs, local culture, customs, and government, 

international, and environmental law. Commanders should ensure that the staff 

judge advocate has the resources available to respond to the variety of complex 

international and operational legal and regulatory issues that may arise. Hostnation legal personnel can be integrated into the MAGTF legal staff as soon as 

practical to provide guidance on unique indigenous legal practices and customs. 

The MAGTF commander should be alert for potential legal problems arising 

from the unique, difficult circumstances and the highly political nature of such 

operations as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.
Marine Corps Operations E-5

One of the United States military’s most experienced leaders in the field of MOOTW, General Anthony 

Zinni, USMC (Retired), has developed the following considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations:

l Each operation is unique. We must be careful what lessons we learn from a single experience.

l Each operation has two key aspects: (1) the degree of complexity of the operation, and (2) the degree 

of consent of the involved parties and the international community for the operation.

l The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.

l Start planning as early as possible, including everyone in the planning process.

l Make as thorough an assessment as possible before deployment.

l Conduct a thorough mission analysis, determining the centers of gravity, end state, commander’s 

intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated duration of the operation.

l Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks with political objectives. Avoid mission creep and 

allow for mission shifts. A mission shift is a conscious decision, made by the political leadership in 

consultation with the military commander, responding to a changing situation.

l Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the operation. This allows subordinate commanders 

to make appropriate adjustments to meet their individual situation or rapidly changing conditions.

l Coordinate everything with everybody. Establish coordination mechanisms that include political, 

military, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the interested parties.

l Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the decisionmakers are. We must know how the 

involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural values on people with their own culture.

l Start or restore key institutions as early as possible.

l Don’t lose the initiative and momentum.

l Don’t make unnecessary enemies. If you do, don't treat them gently. Avoid mindsets or use words that 

might come back to haunt you.

l Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the fewest possible seams between organizations 

and involved parties.

l Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each of the involved parties.

l Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.

l Personalities often are more important than processes. You need the right people in the right places.

l Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about who you invite to participate, use as a gobetween, or enter into contracts with since you are giving them influence in the process.

l Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused on it. Whatever the image, humanitarian or 

as firm but well-intentioned agent of change, ensure your troops are aware of it so they can conduct 

themselves accordingly.

l Centralize information management. Ensure that your public affairs and psychological operations are 

coordinated, accurate, and consistent.

l Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and political compatibility and military interoperability are 

crucial to success. The interests, cultures, capabilities, and motivations of all the parties may not be 

uniform, but they cannot be allowed to work against each other.

l Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training in nontraditional roles. The 

troops need awareness and understanding of their roles. The commander and the staff need to 

develop and apply new skills, such as negotiating, supporting humanitarian organizations effectively 

and appropriately, and building coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.
APPENDIX F

Glossary

Section I Acronyms

ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat element

ACF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air contingency force

ADCON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . administrative control

AO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of operations

AOI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of interest

AT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .antiterrorism

ATF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious task force

BLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion landing team

CAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combined action platoon

CBAE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s battlespace area evaluation

CCIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s critical information requirements

CE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command element

CHOP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . change of operational control

CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .counterintelligence

CINCs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commanders in chief

CINCUSJFCOM . . . . . . . . . . Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command

CINCUSPACOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

CMOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil-military operations center

COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of action

COCOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combatant command (command authority)

COMCMFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Commander, Combined Marine Forces Command

COMMARCENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Central

COMMARFOREUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Europe

COMMARFORLANT. . . . . . . . . . . .Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic

COMMARFORPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

COMMARFORSOUTH . . . . . . . . . . . .Commander, Marine Corps Forces, South

COMUSMARFOR-K . . . . . . . . . .Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces-Korea

CONUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . continental United States

CSS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support

CSSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat service support element

DOD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

DODD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense directive

EMW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . expeditionary maneuver warfare
F-2 MCDP 1-0

FAST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team

FEBA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward edge of the battle area

FROG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .free rocket over ground

FSCL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination line

GCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ground combat element

HUMINT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . human intelligence

IO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operations

JP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publication

JSTARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

LF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing force

LOGAIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics automated information system

MAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine aircraft group

MAGTF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force

MALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine aviation logistics squadron

MARCORSYSCOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Systems Command

MARFORCENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Forces, Central

MARFOREUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Forces, Europe

MARFORLANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic

MARFORPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

MARFORSOUTH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Forces, South

MCCDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publication

MCMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Materiel Command

MCPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Planning Process

MCRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps reference publication

MCWP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine expeditionary brigade

MEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine expeditionary force

METT-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .support available - time available

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine expeditionary unit

MEU(SOC) . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)

MLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Logistics Command

MOOSEMUSS . . . . . . . . mass; objective; offensive; security; economy of force;

 maneuver; unity of command; surprise; simplicity

MOOTW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military operations other than war

MPF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . maritime pre-positioning force

MPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .maritime pre-positioning ship

MPSRON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . maritime pre-positioning ships squadron

NEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . naval expeditionary forces

OMFTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .operational maneuver from the sea
Marine Corps Operations F-3

OPCON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .operational control

OPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations

RLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . regimental landing team

RSOI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

SAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . synthetic aperture radar

SEALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sea-air-land teams

SPMAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . special purpose MAGTF

STOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ship-to-objective maneuver

TACON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical control

UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unmanned aerial vehicle

UNAAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unified Action Armed Forces

U.S.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States

USCINCCENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

USCINCEUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command

USCINCJFCOM . . . . . . . . . . Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command

USCINCPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

USCINCSO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command

USMC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .United States Marine Corps

USSOCOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Southern Command

USTRANSCOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Transportation Command
F-4 MCDP 1-0

Section II Definitions

administrative control—Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or 

other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization 

of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit 

logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, 

discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the 

subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

amphibious assault—The principal type of amphibious operation that involves 

establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (JP 1-02)

amphibious demonstration—A type of amphibious operation conducted for the 

purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of 

deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him. (JP 1-02)

amphibious force—An amphibious task force and a landing force together with 

other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations.

(JP 3-02)

amphibious raid—A type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion 

into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. 

(JP 1-02)

amphibious task force—A Navy task organization formed to conduct 

amphibious operations. (JP 3-02)

amphibious withdrawal—A type of amphibious operation involving the 

extraction of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially 

hostile shore. (JP 1-02)

area of influence—A geographical area wherein a commander is directly 

capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally 

under the commander’s command or control. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of interest—That area of concern to the commander, including the area of 

influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the 

objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas 

occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the 

mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander 

for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the 
Marine Corps Operations F-5

entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough 

for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. 

Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

asymmetry—Unconventional, unexpected, innovative or disproportional means 

used to gain advantage over an adversary. (MCRP 5-12C)

attack—An offensive action characterized by movement supported by fire with 

the objective of defeating or destroying the enemy. (MCRP 5-12C)

aviation combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct aviation operations. The aviation 

combat element (ACE) provides all or a portion of the six functions of Marine 

aviation necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. These functions are 

antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support, electronic warfare, air 

reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is usually composed 

of an aviation unit headquarters and various other aviation units or their 

detachments. It can vary in size from a small aviation detachment of specifically 

required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. The ACE itself is not a 

formal command. Also called ACE. (JP 1-02)

avenue of approach—An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given 

size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. Also called AA.(JP 1-02)

axis of advance—A line of advance assigned for purposes of control; often a 

road or a group of roads, or a designated series of locations, extending in the 

direction of the enemy. (JP 1-02)

barrier—A coordinated series of obstacles designed or employed to channel, 

direct, restrict, delay, or stop the movement of an opposing force and to impose 

additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. 

Barriers can exist naturally, be manmade, or a combination of both. (JP 1-02)

battalion landing team—In an amphibious operation, an infantry battalion 

normally reinforced by necessary combat and service elements; the basic unit for 

planning an assault landing. Also called BLT.

battle position—1. In ground operations, a defensive location oriented on an 

enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend. 2. In air operations, an 

airspace coordination area containing firing points for attack helicopters. Also 

called BP. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace—1. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood 

to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. 
F-6 MCDP 1-0

This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; 

facilities; weather; terrain; the electromatic spectrum; and the information 

environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02) 2. All 

aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which 

encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace dominance—The degree of control over the dimensions of the 

battlespace which enhances friendly freedom of action and denies enemy 

freedom of action. It permits force sustainment and application of power 

projection to accomplish the full range of potential operational and tactical 

missions. It includes all actions conducted against enemy capabilities to influence 

future operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

boundary—A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating 

coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, 

or areas. (JP 1-02)

breach—The employment of any means available to break through or secure a 

passage through an obstacle. (MCRP 5-12C)

centers of gravity—Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a 

military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. 

Also called COGs. (JP 1-02)

close operations—Military actions conducted to project power decisively against 

enemy forces which pose an immediate or near term threat to the success of 

current battles or engagements. These military actions are conducted by 

committed forces and their readily available tactical reserves, using maneuver 

and combined arms. (MCRP 5-12C)

combatant command (command authority)—Nontransferable command 

authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 

164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands 

unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant 

command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a 

combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned 

forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, 

designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the 

missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) 

should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. 

Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders 

and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command 
Marine Corps Operations F-7

(command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands 

and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish 

assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command 

(command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander—A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified 

combatant commands established by the President. Also called CINC. (JP 1-02)

combat power—The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a 

military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. (JP 1-02)

combat service support—The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and 

tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels 

of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not 

limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of 

supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required 

by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their 

missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all 

levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. 

Also called CSS. (JP 1-02)

combat service support area—An area ashore that is organized to contain the 

necessary supplies, equipment, installations, and elements to provide the landing force 

with combat service support throughout the operation. Also called CSSA. (JP 1-02)

combat service support element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task 

force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to provide the combat service support 

necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission. The combat service support 

element varies in size from a small detachment to one or more force service 

support groups. It provides supply, maintenance, transportation, general 

engineering, health services, and a variety of other services to the MAGTF. The 

combat service support element itself is not a formal command. Also called 

CSSE. (JP 1-02)

combined arms—The full integration of combat arms in such a way that to 

counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. (MCRP 5-12C)

command and control—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 

the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement 

of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and 

operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)
F-8 MCDP 1-0

command element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF) that is the headquarters. The command element is composed of the 

commander, general or executive and special staff sections, headquarters section, 

and requisite communications support, intelligence, and reconnaissance forces 

necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission. The command element provides 

command and control, intelligence, and other support essential for effective 

planning and execution of operations by the other elements of the MAGTF. The 

command element varies in size and composition. Also called CE. (JP 1-02)

commander's intent—A commander’s clear, concise articulation of the 

purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two 

parts of every mission statement which guides the exercise of initiative in the 

absence of instructions. (MCRP 5-12C)

component—1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. 

Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional 

components. (JP 1-02)

covering force—1. A force operating apart from the main force for the purpose 

of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy 

before the enemy can attack the force covered. 2. Any body or detachment of 

troops which provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, 

attack, or defense, or by any combination of these methods. (JP 1-02)

critical capability—An inherent ability that enables a center of gravity to 

function as such. Also called CC. (MCRP 5-12C)

critical requirement—An essential condition, resource, or means that is needed 

for a critical capability to be fully functional. Also called CR.(MCRP 5-12C)

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the 

most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be 

critical unless it undermines a key strength. Also called CV. (MCRP 5-12C)

culminating point—The point in time and space when the attacker can no longer 

accomplish his purpose, or when the defender no longer has the ability to 

accomplish his purpose. This can be due to factors such as combat power 

remaining, logistic support, weather, morale, and fatigue. (MCRP 5-12A)

deception—Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, 

distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner 

prejudicial to the enemy's interests. (JP 1-02)
Marine Corps Operations F-9

deep operations—Military actions conducted against enemy capabilities which 

pose a potential threat to friendly forces. These military actions are designed to 

isolate, shape, and dominate the battlespace and influence future operations. 

(MCRP 5-12C)

defense—A coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attack by an opposing 

force and prevent it from achieving its objectives. (MCRP 5-12C)

defense in depth—The siting of mutually supporting defense positions designed 

to absorb and progressively weaken attack, prevent initial observations of the 

whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to maneuver the 

reserve. (JP 1-02)

defensive operations—Operations conducted with the immediate purpose of 

causing an enemy attack to fail. Defensive operations also may achieve one or 

more of the following: gain time; concentrate forces elsewhere; wear down 

enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations; and retain tactical, strategic, or 

political objectives. (MCRP 5-12C)

delaying operation—An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for 

time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on 

the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. (JP 1-02)

deliberate breaching—The creation of a lane through a minefield or a clear 

route through a barrier or fortification, which is systematically planned and 

carried out. (JP 1-02)

demonstration—1. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not 

sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. 2. In military deception, a 

show of force in an area where a decision is not sought, made to deceive an 

adversary. It is similar to a feint, but no actual contact with the adversary is 

intended. (JP 1-02)

deterrence—The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence 

is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of 

unacceptable counteraction. (JP 1-02)

encircling force—In pursuit operations, the force which maneuvers to the rear or 

flank of the enemy to block its escape so that it can be destroyed between the 

direct pressure and encircling force. This force advances or flies along routes 

paralleling the enemy’s line of retreat. If the encircling force cannot outdistance 

the enemy to cut it off, the encircling force may attack the enemy’s flanks. 

(MCRP 5-12C)
F-10 MCDP 1-0

end state—What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be 

when operations conclude-both military operations, as well as those where the 

military is in support of other instruments of national power. (JP 1-02)

feint—A limited-objective attack involving contact with the enemy, varying in 

size from a raid to a supporting attack. Feints are used to cause the enemy to react 

in three predictable ways: to employ reserves improperly, to shift supporting 

fires, or to reveal defensive fires. (MCRP 5-12C)

force protection—Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, 

facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting 

potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the 

coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the 

effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 

enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)

forcible entry—Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed 

opposition. (JP 3-18)

forward deployment—A basic undertaking which entails stationing of alert 

forces with their basic stocks for extended periods of time at either land-based 

overseas facilities or, in maritime operations, aboard ships at sea as a means of 

enhancing national contingency response capabilities. (MCRP 5-12C)

forward edge of the battle area—The foremost limits of a series of areas in 

which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the 

covering or screening forces are operating, designed to coordinate fire support, 

the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units. Also called FEBA. (JP 1-02)

frontal attack—An offensive maneuver in which the main action is directed 

against the front of the enemy forces. (JP 1-02)

functional component command—A command normally, but not necessarily, 

composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be 

established across the range of military operations to perform particular 

operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of 

time. (JP 1-02)

ground combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is usually 

constructed around an infantry organization but can vary in size from a small 

ground unit of any type, to one or more Marine divisions that can be independently 
Marine Corps Operations F-11

maneuvered under the direction of the MAGTF commander. The ground combat 

element itself is not a formal command. Also called GCE. (JP 1-02)

guard—A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main 

force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information. 

(excerpt from JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results 

of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, 

disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can 

result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided 

by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is 

designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil 

authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing 

humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander—The joint force air component 

commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the 

authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination 

among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of 

effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander 

will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force 

air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force 

commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, 

coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander’s 

apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and 

authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and 

other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component 

commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air 

sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander—A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint 

force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander—The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such 

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component 

commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks 

assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component 
F-12 MCDP 1-0

commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land 

forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFLCC. 

(JP 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander—The commander within a 

unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible 

to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper 

employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime 

operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The 

joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to 

accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The 

joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander 

with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and 

control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02)

joint logistics—The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force 

commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, 

maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more 

Military Departments of the same nation. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area—An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a 

geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a 

joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military 

operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are 

particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or 

when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also 

called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the 

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an 

existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

landing force—A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct 

amphibious operations. (JP 3-02)

limit of advance—An easily recognized terrain feature beyond which attacking 

elements will not advance. (MCRP 5-12C)

line of communications—A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an 

operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and 

military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02)

linkup—An operation wherein two friendly ground forces join together in a 

hostile area. (MCRP 5-12C)
Marine Corps Operations F-13

main body—The principal part of a tactical command or formation. It does not 

include detached elements of the command such as advance guards, flank guards, 

covering forces, etc. (MCRP 5-12C)

main effort—The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in 

time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the 

preponderance of combat power and is directed against a center of gravity 

through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's 

cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which 

create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy 

cannot cope. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air-ground task force—The Marine Corps principal organization for all 

missions cross the range of military operations, composed of forces taskorganized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a 

contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground 

task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a 

command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a 

combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, 

not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though 

the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four 

elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational 

structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. Also 

called MAGTF. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary brigade—A Marine air-ground task force that is 

constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft 

group, and a brigade service support group. The Marine expeditionary brigade 

(MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the 

requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, or 

as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), or alone. It varies 

in size and composition, and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but 

smaller than a MEF. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the full 

range of military operations. It may contain other Service or foreign military 

forces assigned or attached. Also called MEB. (proposed for JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary force—The largest Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF) and the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly 

for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent 

command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine 

aircraft wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine 
F-14 MCDP 1-0

expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, 

including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any 

environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. Also called 

MEF. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary unit—A Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is 

constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a helicopter squadron 

reinforced, and a task-organized combat service support element. It normally 

fulfills Marine Corps forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine 

expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and 

is capable of limited combat operations. Also called MEU. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)—The Marine Corps 

standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization. The Marine 

expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) is a Marine 

expeditionary unit, augmented with selected personnel and equipment, that is 

trained and equipped with an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious 

operations and a variety of specialized missions of limited scope and duration. 

These capabilities include specialized demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and 

surveillance, raids, in-extremis hostage recovery, and enabling operations for 

follow-on forces. The MEU(SOC) is not a special operations force but, when 

directed by the National Command Authorities, the combatant commander, and/

or other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations in 

extremis, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable. Also called 

MEU(SOC). (JP 1-02)

Marine Logistics Command—The US Marines may employ the concept of the 

Marine Logistics Command (MLC) in major regional contingencies to provide 

operational logistic support, which will include arrival and assembly operations. 

The combat service support operations center will be the MLC’s primary combat 

service support coordination center for units undergoing arrival and assembly. 

Also called MLC. (JP 1-02)

maritime pre-positioning force—A task organization of units under one 

commander formed for the purpose of introducing a MAGTF and its associated 

equipment and supplies into a secure area. The maritime pre-positioning force is 

composed of a command element, a maritime pre-positioning ships squadron, a 

MAGTF, and a Navy support element. Also called MPF. (MCRP 5-12C)

maritime pre-positioning force operation—A rapid deployment and assembly 

of a Marine expeditionary force in a secure area using a combination of strategic 

airlift and forward-deployed maritime pre-positioning ships. (JP 1-02)
Marine Corps Operations F-15

maritime pre-positioning ships—Civilian-crewed, Military Sealift Commandchartered ships that are organized into three squadrons and are usually forwarddeployed. These ships are loaded with pre-positioned equipment and 30 days of 

supplies to support three Marine expeditionary brigades. Also called MPS. (JP 1-02)

maritime special purpose force—A task-organized force formed from elements 

of a Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) and naval special 

warfare forces that can be quickly tailored to a specific mission. The maritime 

special purpose force can execute on short notice a wide variety of missions in a 

supporting, supported, or unilateral role. It focuses on operations in a maritime 

environment and is capable of operations in conjunction with or in support of 

special operations forces. The maritime special purpose force is integral to and 

directly relies upon the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) for 

all combat and combat service support. Also called MSPF. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war—Operations that encompass the use of 

military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These 

military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other 

instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also 

called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

mission—1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to 

be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to 

lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 1-02)

mission statement—A short paragraph or sentence describing the task and 

purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It 

usually contains the elements of who, what, when, and where, and the reason 

therefore, but seldom specifies how. (MCRP 5-12A)

mission type order—1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the 

accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order 

to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. 

(JP 1-02)

mobile defense—Defense of an area or position in which maneuver is used with 

organization of fire and utilization of terrain to seize the initiative from the 

enemy. (JP 1-02)

National Command Authorities—The President and the Secretary of Defense 

or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations—Operations directed by the Department 

of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby 
F-16 MCDP 1-0

noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are 

endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United 

States. Also called NEO. (JP 1-02)

obstacle—Any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block 

the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, 

time, and equipment on the opposing force. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, 

or a combination of both. (JP 1-02)

operational control—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. 

Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). 

Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and 

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational 

control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and 

joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. 

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint 

force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and 

forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control 

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does 

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called 

OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational reach—The distance and duration across which a unit can 

successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 1-02)

operations security—A process of identifying critical information and 

subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other 

activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary 

intelligence systems. b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might 

obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in 

time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate 

or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to 

adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

peace building—Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, 

that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order 

to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 1-02)
Marine Corps Operations F-17

peace enforcement—Application of military force, or the threat of its use, 

normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with 

resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)

peacekeeping—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major 

parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an 

agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic 

efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02)

peacemaking—The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms 

of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that 

led to it. (JP 1-02)

position defense—The type of defense in which the bulk of the defending force is 

disposed in selected tactical localities where the decisive battle is to be fought. 

Principal reliance is placed on the ability of the forces in the defended localities to 

maintain their positions and to control the terrain between them. The reserve is used 

to add depth, to block, or restore the battle position by counterattack. (JP 1-02)

power projection—The application of measured, precise offensive military force 

at a chosen time and place, using maneuver and combined arms against enemy 

forces. (MCRP 5-12C)

rear operations—Military actions conducted to support and permit force 

sustainment and to provide security for such actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

reconstitution—Those actions that commanders plan and implement to restore 

units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission 

requirements and available resources. Reconstitution operations include 

regeneration and reorganization. (MCRP 5-12A)

regimental landing team—A task organization for landing comprised of an 

infantry regiment reinforced by those elements that are required for initiation of 

its combat function ashore. Also called RLT. (JP 1-02)

reserve—1. Portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear, or withheld from 

action at the beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive 

movement. 2. Members of the Military Services who are not in active service but 

who are subject to call to active duty. (JP 1-02)

retirement—An operation in which a force out of contact moves away from the 

enemy. (JP 1-02)
F-18 MCDP 1-0

retrograde movement—Any movement of a command to the rear, or away from the 

enemy. It may be forced by the enemy or may be made voluntarily. Such movements 

may be classified as withdrawal, retirement, or delaying action. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that 

delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will 

initiate and /or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also 

called ROE. (JP 1-02)

screen—4. A security element whose primary task is to observe, identify and 

report information, and which only fights in self-protection. (JP 1-02)

sea control operations—The employment of naval forces, supported by land and 

air forces as appropriate, in order to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. 

Such operations include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy 

sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military 

superiority in areas of naval operations. (JP 1-02)

sector—1. An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and 

for which it is responsible. (JP 1-02)

security force—The detachment deployed between the main body and the enemy 

(to the front, flanks, or rear of the main body) tasked with the protection of the 

main body. The security force may be assigned a screening, guard, or covering 

mission. (MCRP 5-12C)

Service component command—A command consisting of the Service 

component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, 

detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the 

support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further 

assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

shaping—The use of lethal and nonlethal activities to influence events in a manner 

which changes the general condition of war to an advantage. (MCRP 5-12C)

special purpose MAGTF—A Marine air-ground task force organized, trained, 

and equipped with narrowly focused capabilities. It is designed to accomplish a 

specific mission, often of limited scope and duration. It may be any size, but 

normally it is a relatively small force - the size of a Marine expeditionary unit or 

smaller. Also called SPMAGTF. (JP 1-02)

spoiling attack—A tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile 

attack while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack. 
Marine Corps Operations F-19

Usually employed by armored units in defense by an attack on enemy assembly 

positions in front of a main line of resistance or battle position. (JP 1-02)

strong point—A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly fortified and 

heavily armed with automatic weapons, around which other positions are 

grouped for its protection. (JP 1-02)

supporting effort—Designated subordinate unit(s) whose mission is designed to 

directly contribute to the success of the main effort. (MCRP 5-12C)

sustained operations ashore—The employment of Marine Corps forces on land 

for an extended duration. It can occur with or without sustainment from the sea. 

Also called SOA. (MCRP 5-12C)

strategic mobility—The capability to deploy and sustain military forces 

worldwide in support of national strategy. (JP 1-02)

support—1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (JP 1-02)

synchronization—1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and 

purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 

(JP 1-02)

tactical control—Command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 

limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or 

maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control 

is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and 

exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called 

TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel—A mission performed by an 

assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of 

personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search 

and rescue assets from responding and when survivors and their location have 

been confirmed. Also called TRAP. (MCRP 5-12C)

tempo—The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time. 

(MCRP 5-12C)

warfighting functions—The six mutually supporting military activities 

integrated in the conduct of all military operations are:1. command and controlThe means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to 
F-20 MCDP 1-0

it that appropriate actions are taken. 2. maneuver-The movement of forces for the 

purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy. 3. fires-Those means used to 

delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well 

as affect the enemy’s will to fight. 4. intelligence-Knowledge about the enemy or 

the surrounding environment needed to support decisionmaking. 5. logistics-All 

activities required to move and sustain military forces. 6. force protectionActions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, 

concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. Also called 

WF. (MCRP 5-12C)

withdrawal operation—A planned retrograde operation in which a force in 

contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the 

enemy. (JP 1-02)
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