AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Enabling Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Effects for Effects-Based

Operations Conditions

DANIEL R. JOHNSON

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 34

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 2005
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

In support of national and military security strategies, the

DOD has established the joint force commander (JFC) as the

means to provide unity of command, exercised through component commanders, during contingency operations. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is key to the

JFC’s successful prosecution of contingency operations. The

term ISR is often misperceived as a generic synonym for

such platforms as uninhabited aerial vehicles or satellites

without regard to the complexities of the larger US national

intelligence community (IC), or even a full understanding of

the convoluted command relations and underpinnings of the

DOD’s intelligence resources beyond the JFC’s span of control. Colonel Johnson states that ISR processes are at least

as challenging, if not more so, than the targeting process

used to place a bomb on a target. The multifaceted complexity cannot be overstated as both national and theater

ISR architectures include many linked nodes that can act

and be tasked independently from one another (i.e., the platforms, sensors, DOD and commercial communication nodes,

and a variety of exploitation organizations). The JFC cannot

continue to ignore this reality if he or she wants to properly

employ ISR-intensive effects-based operations (EBO) to

achieve overall campaign objectives—that is, to provide unity

of ISR effects in support of the campaign plan. The author

recognizes that there are elements of the IC that are beyond

the JFC’s direct control, but he also recognizes the value of

these national ISR assets in support of the overall campaign

plan and the need for the JFC to influence the IC and its

processes. Hence the author asserts that there is a requirement for the JFC to establish an ISR “strategy-to-task”

methodology to set EBO conditions as they evolve, such that

they will enable both the smooth execution of requisite

command authorities (operational control, tactical control,

and direct support) within theater ISR, and create a

JFC/component commander mechanism to establish or

influence priority ISR needs beyond his or her control. This

will better enable theater and national ISR to provide

measurable effects under the strategy, planning, execution,

iii
and assessment war-fighting construct in support of the

campaign plan.

In the case of ISR, a viable option for the JFC is to follow

the joint force air and space component commander (JFACC)

precedent and delegate theater air and space ISR command

and control (C2) authority to the component with the preponderance of air assets and ability to command and control them. The JFACC’s air operations center (AOC) weapon

system already exercises such delegated authorities as air

coordination authority, area air defense authority, air interdiction, air superiority, time-sensitive targeting, space coordinating authority, and preplanned targeting oversight. In

the air operations directive (AOD), which outlines the

JFACC’s guidance for employment of air and space forces in

support of the JFC, the JFACC/AOC already has in place

processes, resources, and expertise that could be easily

adapted to help unify ISR efforts. This action would establish

clear lines of ISR C2 for theater, reach-back organizations,

and national agencies. This C2 linkage, together with the

AOD, would also provide the JFC a tool to assess how well

ISR organizations and agencies are meeting the JFC’s effectsbased objectives. It is the author’s belief that there has been

significant progress in the existing joint processes—the Joint

Collection Management Board and the Joint Targeting Coordination Board—and that this evolutionary process has

improved to a point that the time is right for the introduction of a means to “unify ISR efforts” via clear command

relationships and establishment of a “coordinated influencing strategy.”

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the

spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious discussion of issues. We encourage your responses. 

iv

ROBERT J. ELDER JR.

Major General, USAF 

Commandant, Air War College
About the Author

Lt Col Daniel R. Johnson, USAF, is director, Commanders

Action Group, Pacific Air Forces. He is a career intelligence

officer who has worked national and theater ISR operations to include deliberate and crisis-action planning, indications and warning, response-option targeting, and timesensitive targeting missions. Colonel Johnson has served

as a branch chief for Imagery Operations at the Strategic Air

Command, as a reach-back director of Operations at the

Distributed Ground Station under the Ninth Air Force in

support of Operation Southern Watch, and as commander

of the 607th Air Intelligence Squadron in South Korea. He

was responsible for indications and warning missions, predictive analysis, and target system analysis against North

Korea while working in the Korean Air Operations Center.

Colonel Johnson is a 2004 graduate of the Air War College,

Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

v
Enabling Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Effects for Effects-Based

Operations Conditions

Let me illustrate the complexity of the situation via a

short vignette. In March 2002, while stationed at Osan Air

Base, Korea, as the commander of the 607th Air Intelligence Squadron, I was preparing for a visit by the chief of

staff of the Air Force (CSAF). Our squadron was excited

about the visit and ready to showcase how we were operationalizing the “air operations center (AOC) as a weapon

system.” We had recently completed a two-week field exercise called Foal Eagle with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and

were confident that we had made great strides in improving the AOC’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Division processes, in particular the kill-chain

timelines for time-sensitive targets (TST). Armed with an

ISR operations cell assigned to the AOC’s Combat Operations Division, we were able to find, fix, track, target, engage,

and assess (F2T2EA) surrogate North Korean Scud batteries

operating in ROK training ranges well under the nominal

10-minute TST kill-chain timeline.

Prior to the CSAF’s arrival, the Seventh Air Force commander received a dry run of our briefing on ISR visualization in combat. The briefing began by showing multiple

orbits of various collection platforms. But the mere display

of orbiting intelligence assets and their associated sensor

volumes compelled him to ask, So what? I knew I missed

his intent. I persisted by continuing to show the many ways

ISR could be displayed to support today’s and tomorrow’s

wars. But it was only when I showed him the integrated

tasking order (ITO)—aka the air tasking order (ATO)—and

its targets and various collections of orbits and sensor

taskings that the “light came on” for both of us. That is, we

both realized the importance of assessing ISR effects

within the ITO to the joint force air and space component

commander’s (JFACC) ability to move to the next phase of

his air strategy in support of the joint force commander’s

1
(JFC) campaign plan. Better assessment led to greater

progress.

This action led to other challenging questions. How, he

asked, do you handle TSTs and emerging targets along

with assessing the preplanned ITO targets? Well sir, I answered, we have to coordinate with the combat ops floor to

ensure we task a sensor in the right orbit, or we call combined force commander’s (CFC) J2 (intelligence staff) section to check on the availability of national coverage. Next,

we need to coordinate with the tasking authority, which

might be within JFACC control, organic to component

commanders, or a national agency. Then we have to coordinate with the exploitation air or ground stations to ensure they know what to read out (i.e., exploit). He then

asked how flexible and adaptive is the ISR community to

changing enemy courses of action and the evolving battlespace? Sir, it’s a challenge because many do not understand the complexity of ISR which includes the tasking authority, platform, sensor, communication networks, and

multiple exploitation nodes. This is not a clean weapon system. He shook his head and departed, leaving me in search

of a better way to manage and influence ISR operations especially in support of effects-based operations (EBO) that

require on-demand ISR from a variety of sensors and platforms depending on the effects you want to target. The

process is difficult to explain especially when there is no

positive control like a fighter/bomber weapon system;

however, if planned right, ISR can be a key enabler that

helps target the right effects and potentially helps limit the

amount of collateral damage.

Subsequent to Operation Desert Storm, the pace and

manner of war for the US military changed. This change

required improvement in our war-fighting construct that

guides strategy development, planning processes, the execution cycle, and effects assessment. Our new tools of war

have increased our adversary’s observe, orient, decide, and

act (OODA) speed. In response our adversaries are not sitting

still, waiting to be destroyed in place. They are using technologies and strategies that enhance their mobility and deception and increase their decision time. Today’s warfare

tools are not limited to the theater of operation because

many agencies and organizations in reach-back locations

2 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
provide invaluable support to the JFC in such areas as communications and intelligence. Historic approaches that focused on weapon systems and bomb damage assessment

have evolved to focus on EBO in support of the JFC campaign objectives. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) had 80-plus

US and coalition ISR platforms flying at any particular

time over Iraq.1 Such experiences, coupled with the shortened target-identification and kill-chain timelines, have

changed how campaigns and wars will be fought in the future.

Enabling ISR effects is a daunting task when one realizes how many agencies, organizations, and component

commands have a stake in the sand. There are an everincreasing number and capability of specialized organic

military assets, personnel, and techniques potentially

available within the JFC’s subordinate forces; the larger

US intelligence community that encompasses more than

20 agencies; and the capabilities that help with predictive

analysis, target materials, and national-level exploitation.

Additionally ISR capabilities (i.e., platforms, sensors, communication networks, and exploitation nodes) have been

traditionally labeled high demand/low density or scarce

assets that create a conundrum when trying to horizontally

integrate component-specific capabilities into an overall

campaign plan. Despite all the positive movement to horizontally integrate systems, there remains a huge shortfall

in guiding and setting priorities for airborne ISR in support

of the JFC’s campaign plan.

Component commands have a tendency to reserve their

assets for their own tasks, precisely because the processes

for integrating and achieving desired ISR effects theaterwide are not in place. This, coupled with the highly structured processes for tasking national collection platforms,

leads to suboptimization of ISR across a campaign plan.

Despite all the positive movement to horizontally integrate

systems, there remains a huge shortfall in guiding and setting priorities for ISR for the JFC’s campaign plan.

Currently, under strategy, planning, execution, and assessment (SPEA) processes, the JFC has a fragmented ISR

planning process that does not realize fully ISR effects during contingency operations. As recently as Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) in January to February 2005, the

JOHNSON 3
pitfalls of not having adequate unified ISR command and

control of theater and national collection assets remain a

lingering lesson observed. OUA resulted from a tsunami

that hit India, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia on 26

December 2004, causing over 200,000 deaths and over 5

million displaced people. At the onset of this humanitarian

and disaster relief operation—before the P3s (reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft) were assigned under tactical control (TACON) to the JFACC—they remained servicefocused. If they were routinely orchestrated as part of a

unified Pacific ISR operation under the JFACC, the P3s

early on may have been able to help better by deploying

units like Transportation Command’s (TRANSCOM) tactical

airlift control elements to assess runway status for relief aid

as they would have known of this requirement. Analysis of

OUA indicates that until all airborne ISR assets were assigned to the JFACC, they did not have the requisite

processes in place at the start of the contingency to focus

on joint requirements. Eventually P3s were chopped to the

JFACC.2

The JFC could integrate ISR better by establishing an

ISR “strategy-to-task” methodology to set EBO conditions

as they evolve. This could provide command authority

(OPCON, TACON, or direct support) coupled with a JFC and

component commander’s priority ISR needs and influence

agencies and organizations beyond the JFC’s control. This,

in turn, will enable effects of ISR under the SPEA warfighting construct from theater and national ISR in support

the campaign plan.3 Within the current joint air operations

planning (JAOP) construct, the ISR planning approach

lacks specific linkages to the SPEA processes and does not

reflect the highly interconnected relationship between ISR

and EBO. The interconnection between EBO and ISR priorities enables the JFC a means for measuring both behavioral

and physical effects at the right time and at the right place,

especially in a contingency operation that is fluid and changing. The JFACC and other functional component processes

can be modified easily to meet these deficits, and in doing

so, could provide the basis for eventual ISR unity-of-effort,

by using the air operations directive (AOD) format to reach

not only component commanders but also ISR organizations

and agencies also supporting campaign objectives.

4 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
This paper will begin by looking at the challenge of setting

EBO conditions. It will then show how the JAOP’s strategyto-task methodology could be a viable solution for establishing the requisite command relations. Lastly it will show

the positive or cascading effects this approach may have

on other, often contentious processes dealing with ISR

support to campaign plans.

The Challenge—Enabling ISR

Effects to Achieve EBO Conditions

Have you noticed the tendency by the media to talk about intelligence failure? There is no intelligence failure in our country.

There has been simply inadequate (use) of our intelligence bases.

—Gen Tommy Franks, USAF, Retired

The following is a short vignette on the importance of

understanding ISR effects and the need for requisite command authority and a unifying ISR influence on agencies

and organizations beyond JFC span of control. The Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF) drive to Baghdad in OIF proved

there is a need for faster target identification and combat

assessment to measure effects better and allow operational

commanders decision-quality information while in combat.

The 1st MEF was tasked to face eight Iraqi armor divisions

in their zone of operations. On D-day they jumped into the

middle of three Iraqi divisions without theater priority for

ISR. A detailed examination of this major air-ground operation revealed that the lead units in the Marine Air Ground

Task Force (MAGTF) did not have a “good read” of what

was in front of them because of a lack of theater-level ISR

allocation in their zone. As a result, the aviation combat element (3d Marine Air Wing) used its organic flying assets to

complete the much needed intelligence picture. Without allocated theater ISR, the MAGTF’s air control element commander related that the air war and ground war effectsbased targeting assessments could not keep up with their

schemes of maneuver against the Iraqis.4 Army lessons

observed point to similar problems as operational commanders were unable to assess operational effects caused

by a lack of ISR focus and were forced to rely on armed reJOHNSON 5
connaissance to fulfill those mission needs.5 Both the

Marines and Army lacked the airborne ISR to enable EBO

conditions which could provide them all-weather, day/night,

real-time video and near-real-time imagery.

The JFC must better enable ISR effects in support of

component commanders and better employ ISR to enable

EBO. The SPEA processes of the JFC and his or her combatant commanders do not adequately link in a strategyto-task method, as required for EBO from the tactical-tostrategy levels. Desert Storm demonstrated the effectiveness

of intense sustained airpower over a period of time, targeting fixed locations using precision munitions. However,

OIF demonstrated that the direct weapon-to-target engagement time line has markedly decreased during combat

operations because of the introduction of precision munitions, dominant maneuver, and improved command and

control (C2). Accordingly, the JFC must authoritatively articulate ISR intent and priorities to drive theater, service

reach-back, and national agencies.

ISR-SPEA processes are more complicated than the targeting process for putting bombs on targets. First, the JFC

may not have positive control of the entire theater ISR entity that includes platforms, sensors, communication networks, and exploitation organizations supporting the contingency. ISR continues to be labeled a high-demand and

low-density capability that lends itself to component ownership/tasking. Second, if the JFC wants to set the conditions for EBO, there needs to be a better way to establish the

requisite command authority among theater-controlled ISR

and an influence mechanism to guide the various ISR organizations/agencies supporting EBO to understand better

and contribute to the overall campaign objectives.

The relatively new acronym EBO is often misunderstood.

It is described as a way for policy and military planners to

think primarily through results rather than on how those

results are achieved. EBO is a process that may produce a

condition, or set of conditions, that drives how campaign

planners think about what, when, and how the enemy will

and can act. The concept centers on showing causal linkages between strategic objectives and tactical tasks to ensure that planners from the highest and lowest levels focus

6 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
efforts on achieving results in line with objectives. Examples of tactical tasks include denying enemy capabilities and

options, expanding and disrupting leadership’s decisionmaking cycle, forcing the fight on friendly terms, and making an adversary more predictable to campaign planners.6

Tactical tasks include kinetic and nonkinetic targeting

schemes that have the potential to create first-order, secondorder, and third-order effects that link back to the original

objectives. Kinetic effects are often categorized with action

verbs such as defeat, destroy, interdict, isolate, neutralize,

suppress, and fix. Nonkinetic-effect verbs—as found

within information operations—include inform, influence,

isolate, and deceive.

Order-of-effects thinking takes planners beyond traditional targeting methodology and battle damage assessment,

which is the basis for EBO’s first-order effects.7 It also requires planners to think about second- and third-order effects that may ripple through the adversary’s actions or behavior in executing his or her war plan and helps to minimize

unintended consequences and elements of friction in war,

which makes even the simplest enemy actions difficult.8 The

concept is comprehended when examining the JFC’s JFACC

priority of attaining air superiority. By viewing this from a

traditional perspective, targeting and weapon employment

would focus on attriting or destroying the enemy.

EBO planners take a different approach by considering

the dual nature of effects, focusing not only on priority objectives or desired effect but also on cascading effects upon

enemy actions.9 As an example, instead of conceiving air

superiority in relation to attacking airfields, aircraft, or

surface-to-air missiles (SAM), planners would think about

reducing adversary sortie generation for time and space in

relationship to ground and maritime commanders’ need to

posture and prosecute the schemes of maneuver. They

would evaluate short- and long-term effects and how ISR

should be integrated. EBO allows planners to consider

mass for precision effects rather than massing of forces or

resources. EBO efficiencies may save lives on both sides,

cause less collateral damage, expend fewer munitions, and

reduce risk of fratricide.10

JOHNSON 7
The Solution: Embed ISR Effects

into JAOP Strategy-to-Task Methodology

When you talk about the number of targets that we’re servicing and the synchronization or linkage between that and

ground movement, and you’re shooting, you know, say, a

thousand targets overnight, how do you get that information, I

mean feedback from that to the guy who needs it, who’s the

guy in the tank that’s going—or the Bradley that’s going to

cross that piece of ground the next day.

—Brig Gen Robert W. Cone

Joint Forces Command

Within the war-fighting “strategy” development construct

of SPEA, the JFACC is currently without an overarching

framework to both articulate his ISR requirements to the

JFC and tie the employment of ISR assets (platforms, sensors, production, and people) to the strategy-to-task

methodology. This methodology should not only guide sensors, platforms, and exploitation nodes but also guide or

influence organizations beyond the JFACC’s or JFC’s control in a unified manner for setting the conditions conducive for EBO. Inadequate ISR C2 relationships create

confusion and uncertainty, which result in untidy linkages between ISR support and overall campaign objectives.

The inclusion of airborne ISR guidance into the JFACC’s

strategy-to-task methodology could help overcome a major

obstacle within the ISR high-demand and low-density asset

availability area by establishing a clear linkage between

ISR efforts and SPEA processes.

Why is ISR planning different from other assigned missions (e.g., strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support)? Because of the multifaceted nature of some platforms and sensors, the current airborne ISR-planning

process tends to prefer apportioning (e.g., joint force land

component commander [JFLCC] gets one Predator on D-day)

rather than allocating ISR assets to meet the broader,

emerging battlespace needs.

If the situation warrants, ISR could dynamically shift to

the battlespace and component commander’s needs. The

lack of ISR priority and mission focus becomes apparent

when there is no arbitrator to balance competing interests

and where there is no clear relationship of ISR intent to

8 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
the targeting, strategic warning, and situational awareness

processes.11

The Authoritative Means:

JFC/JFACC’s Joint Air Operations

Planning Process within the AOC

The following sample JFACC daily operations directives

provide examples of how requisite C2 and a unified statement of ISR needs to guide agencies and organizations beyond JFACC (or JFC) control could be integrated into the

existing AOD format.12 This guidance, methodologically

based on the JFACC’s (and therefore the JFC’s) strategy,

would provide the framework for the rigorous application

of scarce resources to attain campaign objectives as well as

an ongoing assessment of its effectiveness.

Situation

The situation section lays out the JFC’s prioritized

mission-type orders to component commanders and restates the JFACC’s task to allocate efficient air and space

power to produce prioritized effects. This section also assesses enemy and friendly intent. Within the friendly portion, the JFACC describes the components’ (i.e., JFLCC,

joint force maritime component commander, joint force

special operations component commander, and JFACC)

schemes of maneuver and expected high-level results (i.e.,

the focus of EBO) based on campaign emphasis.

With the JFC’s concurrence, or through explicit JFCprovided guidance, the situation section also could establish clearly ISR priorities based on the JFC-assigned missions by component. These priorities may change as

operations move forward; however, establishing JFC-ISR

priorities 96 hours and beyond will enable the JFACC to

prioritize and secure ISR platforms, sensors, and exploitation nodes to meet JFC campaign objectives. This section

could allow component commanders a means to inject

their theater priority ISR attention based on assigned JFC

missions thus establishing a mechanism to potentially correct the ISR shortfalls such as those experienced by the

3MEF command center (CC) and 5th Corps during OIF.

JOHNSON 9
However, this change is contingent on recognition at the

JFC, rather than the component level, that the JFC, the

J2, the Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB) (or

some combination thereof) needs to improve the rigor and

format of ISR guidance beyond its current level, a requirement discussed further in this paper. 

Mission of the Joint Force Air and Space

Component Commander

This section relates how the JFACC will conduct air and

space operations to achieve the JFC’s desired end state.

Within the mission of this section, the JFACC could articulate the need for ISR to enable the desired effects of the

JFACC/JFC campaign objectives.

Air Operations

In the first section—JFACC intent—the JFACC with component commander coordination gives the primary aim of

the ATO, which normally centers on degrading an adversary’s combat effectiveness and ensuring friendly freedom

of action. To set the stage for ISR employment, the JFACC

intent lends itself, for instance, to establishing a specific

intent to measure first-, second-, and third-order effects.

Similarly, the allocation intent could identify under what

circumstances ISR can shift from its preplanned use. For

instance, the JFACC might make these statements: “The

primary aim of theater airborne ISR is to support priority

JFC and component assigned-mission tasks or in such instances as asymmetrical attacks or emergent high-value

targets, ISR priorities may shift with the battlespace in

support of predictive analysis, the assessment of emerging

or fleeting targets, or other TST scenarios.” It could also

describe the JFC’s ISR SPEA intent for component needs.

The second section—operational concept—describes how

the JFACC will conduct air and space operations in support of the JFC mission-type orders from the JFACC-intent

situation. Those JFC mission-type orders are the foundation for the operational objectives, which are translated into

tactical objectives and tasks. Direct or annex integration

are two possible approaches to integrating ISR tactical objectives and tasks into the AOD.13

10 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
Direct Integration

The direct-integration approach includes the theater airborne ISR objectives and tasks embedded within the AOD’s

existing operational and tactical objectives and tasks. ISR

would then draw direct linkage to measure the effects of

the JFACC with component coordination targeting priorities. Below is an example of an EBO-based AOD that directly includes implicit ISR linkages, such as “assess,”

“discover,” and “confirm”:

1. Assess, gain, and maintain air superiority in support

of land and maritime schemes of maneuver.

1.A Neutralize SAMs.

1.A.1 Detect, discover, and degrade key components of SA-10 systems; confirm damage to

target acquisition radars and height-finding

radars.

1.A.2 Detect, discover, and degrade key components of SA-5 systems; confirm damage to

target acquisition radars, and height-finding

radars.

In addition to linking to JFC targeting priorities, the

AOD could also develop prioritized ISR-specific objectives

to support all component commanders that deal with predictive analysis of enemy intentions regarding, for instance,

weapons of mass destruction. These ISR-specific objectives

would then gain prominence, visibility, and ranking in the

AOD process, and would benefit from the actions of the

AOD staff to support them. For example:

2. Assess enemy intent to employ land, air, and maritime

weapons of mass destruction at D+3.

2.A Monitor strategic leadership.

2.A.1 Locate key leadership.

2.A.2 Exploit communication links between top

leaders and subordinates as the results of

friendly actions are reported.

2.A.3 Predict strategic behavior based on friendly

action.

This same ISR objective construct could also be used to

develop ISR objectives and tasks specifically to improve

EBO conditions. For instance, an ISR objective may be

JOHNSON 11
conceived to exploit enemy communications nodes that are

vulnerable to existing ISR capabilities. To achieve this objective, specific communication nodes would be targeted with

a weapon system in the ATO process; this different approach

has kinetic actions supporting an ISR requirement to understand enemy intentions. For example:

3. Exploit strategic leadership C2 nodes for land, air, and

maritime course of action.

3.A. Drive key leadership nodes to exploitable communications.

3.A.1 Destroy encrypted communications between C2 leadership and fielded forces.

3.A.2 Exploit communication links between top

leaders and subordinates.

3.A.3 Predict enemy strategic and operational intent.

The direct-integration approach enables a direct ISR

linkage to the existing AOD product. It clearly integrates

ISR alongside the JFC/component commanders’ targeting

priorities and provides specific guidance on the kind of effect

to be measured. This approach, if adopted/vetted/sanctioned by the JFC, enables the AOD to become the theater

vehicle for all ISR prioritization, much as it is the theater vehicle for bomb prioritization.

The downside to this approach is that the document may

become too unwieldy for other users across the AOC. The

current AOD product averages between 10 to 15 pages and,

with the addition of airborne ISR objectives and tasks,

could potentially triple the product size. The size and complexity of ISR input may encourage AOD planners, working

under time constraints, to cut back on ISR input, potentially defeating the purpose of methodologically including

ISR objectives and tasks. Another danger is the possibility

that specific ISR objectives, in the ruthless prioritization of

alphanumerical hierarchy, would gravitate towards the bottom of the list. Instead of being seen as an enabler needed

to support all objectives and tasks across the board, ISR

could be “ghettoized.” Simply, an ISR tactical objective will

more than likely be a lower priority than a targeting priority. When placed against the competing requirements of

other components, this lower priority may not bode well in

12 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
securing ISR because numbers and priorities mean everything in the ISR high-demand, low-density community.14

Annex Integration

An alternative to the direct approach would be to create

a separate air ISR annex based on the AOD’s prioritized

operational objectives using the same strategy-to-task

methodology.15 For this approach, the AOC would repeat

the wording of the AOD strategy-to-task section and develop ISR tasks that link directly to the AOD’s objectives

and tasks. An ISR annex extracted from the AOD might resemble the following:

1. Gain and maintain air superiority for land and maritime

schemes of maneuver.

ISR 1. Provide direct threat warning to US and coalition aircraft.

1.A Neutralize SAMs.

1.A.1 Degrade key components of SA-10

systems.

ISR 1.A.1a Confirm damage to target

acquisition radars and

height finding radars

and threat to coalition

aircraft.

ISR 1.A.1b Confirm prestrike operational status and prepare for postdamage assessment of acquisition

radars located at X locations between X hour

and Y hour.

ISR 1.A.1c Monitor site for reconstitution.

The above approach offers the JFACC an alternative to

making his or her AOD too unmanageable. This approach

also would allow the ISR professionals, working on behalf

of the JFACC, to craft an intel-user-friendly document that

translates the JFC and JFACC operational language into

words that the larger intelligence community would understand.16

JOHNSON 13
The ISR annex route would establish an easy vehicle for

the JFACC to demonstrate to various ISR agencies how his

priorities support the JFC without major changes to the

AOD process. This method would enable the JFACC, under

the authority of the JFC, to give a stamp of approval on an

ISR annex that would provide clearer direction and priorities for ISR to the guiding SPEA processes. When comparing these two options, if the contingency turns out to be on

the magnitude of an OIF or a future Korean peninsula conflict, the indirect integration of an ISR annex would probably

be the best course of action for the JFC and component

commanders due to the magnitude of ISR support needed

to enable and assess EBO conditions.

Coordinating Instructions 

The third section—coordinating instructions—defines the

commander’s critical information needs along with guidance

on the use of the reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and

assessment (RSTA) annex. It also describes priorities for

combat and operational assessment as well as TST priorities and guidance. There is a need to provide ISR guidance

beyond that provided by the RSTA annex, which is doctrinally 10 years old and woefully inadequate for enabling

EBO conditions. For instance, in its current format the

RSTA only considers one ATO and does not allow for past

and future assessments.

The coordinating instructions could be used by the AOD

to provide assessment instructions to theater, reach-back,

and national organizations and agencies tasked to support

the AOC. Such guidance could be given, for example, as requiring that first-order effects must be measured in X

hours, second-order effects within Y hours, and thirdorder effects within Z hours. Guidance could also include

instructions stating if these timelines are not met (e.g., because of a lack of collection opportunity), then the agency

should move on to the next target set.

By specifying the useful life cycle of certain types of information, the AOD would positively encourage an interaction between agency and consumer on supporting the requirements of the current battlespace and dropping

superceded requirements. Well-meaning ISR agencies

14 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
often work doggedly to support JFACC needs (tasked to

them through the JFC) but without full knowledge of the

battlespace—sometimes at the expense of current and future

predictions. For example, with well-thought-out guidance,

agencies could avoid expending collection resources for

battle damage assessment (BDA) on enemy assets already

leapfrogged by swiftly advancing blue forces. By providing

this type of “exception” guidance to the supporting organizations, the JFACC has the potential to free up ISR resources

for current- and future-effects thinking. This also could be

a good section to establish coordinating instructions between

various ISR organizations and supporting agencies to minimize duplication of work and ensure a higher level of confidence in enabling and measuring effects to provide a better assessment of the battlespace.

Logistics

The logistics support section deals with the phasing of

joint air operations. Regarding ISR logistics, it could identify primary basing and divert basing for airborne ISR assets that include prior consideration for ISR logistical support. ISR systems are complex and require specialized

maintenance and logistical tails.

Command and Control

Assuming JFC delegates this authority, the JFACC focus

for this section would center on command and control of

air and space power. This would be the ideal place to establish the requisite ISR command relationships between

the JFACC and subordinate ISR organizations, as well as

solidify this process as the mechanism for the JFACC to

establish ISR requirements to influence agencies and organizations beyond the JFACC span of control. This could

be a good section to identify the JFACC’s AOC as the theater

ISR C2 node and the entry point for coordinating authority

for ISR organizations and agencies supporting the contingency.

In improving the JFC’s assessment process, the JFACC

within this section—through the AOC—could receive dedicated ISR exploitation and assessment through the joint Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (DCGS) proJOHNSON 15
gram. In tasking the DCGS, the AOC ISR planners should

use a process that embodies “centralized planning and decentralized execution.”17 The result would be planning for

sensor sorties with clear, authoritative guidance on prioritized targets and reporting requirements, but it would employ the expertise at the DCGS to determine how to best

satisfy the requirement, similar to the current performance

of aircrews at wing and squadron operations. Making the

JFC/JFACC ISR strategy available to DCGS organizations

would deepen their understanding of theater campaign

needs and allow them to make more useful decisions. The

strategy can also offer practical help to ISR organizations

or agencies beyond JFC/JFACC control by defining reporting expectation levels. ISR coordinating strategy within the

SPEA construct has the potential to help theater and national agencies prioritize support and produce more tailored

products to meet the assessment needs of EBO.18

Cascading and Positive Effects

on Established Processes—Joint

Targeting Coordination Board and

Joint Collection Management Board

On Operation Iraqi Freedom’s intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance employment, A. You work the targeting cycle,

and I think we did real well at that. B. You understand enemy

composition and disposition. We did pretty well at that. And

the last part is you assess the effects of what you did. And

quite frankly, we struggle with that.

—Brig Gen Robert W. Cone

Joint Forces Command

The parallel processes between the Joint Targeting Coordinating Board (JTCB) and Joint Collection Management

Board (JCMB) create a rough seam in ISR support to the

SPEA processes. If the JFC adopts the AOD with integrated

ISR effects as described above, this AOD would be a viable

means for all component commanders to drive ISR requirements according to assigned tasks and guide ISR organizations beyond the JFC control.19 The AOD could ensure ISR planners at the JTCB and JCMB secure the

appropriate means and sensors for enabling and measuring

16 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
the desired effects; help articulate the level of ISR support

from theater, reach-back, and national agencies; and define the JFC-ISR C2 and influence architecture throughout

all phases of the contingency operations.

The AOD structure also lends itself to this prioritization

while providing a logical and accountable framework for

stating ISR priorities and requirements to the JCMB process.

Under this framework, the JFC’s AOD and ISR strategy could

task theater-assigned ISR organizations and guide reachback organizations and national agencies on ISR intent.

That tasking and guidance could include tailored production requirements; high-value targeting scenarios; sensor

cross cueing; TST prosecution; ISR feedback and assessment; and triggering events for diverting ISR sensors. These

tasking and guiding instructions could enable an ISR decision matrix for making real-time decisions on ISR employment and help prioritize and focus analytical efforts on

desired effects.

Improvements to the Joint Targeting Coordination

Board Process

The current AOD process centers on “the JFACC’s guidance for each ATO to the succession planning steps . . .

[which provides] guidance with respect to acceptable risk,

usually based on mission type orders.”20 The AOD drives the

JTCB’s ATO cycle and production focus three days from its

publication. There are parallels to be drawn from existing

AOD and ATO processes for dropping bombs on targets and

putting airborne ISR sensors on targets.21

Like bombs and aircraft sorties, ISR assets are a scarce

resource, and planning for ISR employment and managing

its use are invariably more complicated from a C2 perspective

than bombing targets (i.e., greater positive control). There

is not, however, a comparable, recognized, and formalized

process for the AOC to plan and manage it. Such a process

would require ISR professionals to prioritize targets, production, and analytical efforts to meet the JFACC’s most important intelligence needs. In some ways, planning for ISR

employment can be considered more complicated than

planning for bombing because the AOD in its current form

focuses on one ATO, whereas one cycle of ISR must multiJOHNSON 17
task to assess the effects of past ATOs, to support and report on the effects of the current ATO, and to look forward

to future enemy courses of action.22

The most effective ISR support to the JFACC thus requires

the same or greater levels of planning as the traditional JTCB

process. This support requires the JFACC—through the

AOD—to provide the same guidance to determine and assign

the priorities of platforms, sensors, air and ground stations,

and ISR personnel. This guidance should be as authoritative

with requisite C2, focus, and prioritization as the weaponeering in the ATO process. Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner

highlighted a need for ISR to be planned in the same

“manner as riflemen, bomb-laden aircraft, or attack submarines. As hints and clues are received in the execution

element then they must redirect planned ISR collection

assets knowing that in doing so they will disrupt the priority of the original planning effort.”23

The parallels between weapon employment and ISR employment are visible even when the processes managing

them diverge. JTCB processes focus on weapon platforms to

include the traditional bombers and fighters effects to the

role of nonkinetic effects that help enable EBO conditions.

Obviously, the AOC is both a contributor to, as well as

manager of, the JTCB process. The JFACC is but one component with requirements for airpower effects, even though

the AOC is the provider of these effects. Likewise, the AOC

provides the bulk of airborne ISR assets, but is merely one

consumer of ISR products. Because the AOC manages the

process, we Airmen have a tendency to forget the distinction. The current authority for managing the ISR process is

the JCMB, under the auspices of the JFC/J2.

A JFC-adopted AOD with integrated ISR effects may also

be the procedure to establish an ISR linkage to nontraditional ISR sensors during the JTCB processes. Such sensors, when integrated with space- and theater-based ISR

collectors, can provide a valuable means for assessing and

supporting the JFC’s campaign objectives. Nontraditional

capabilities include advanced targeting and navigation pods

(e.g., LITENING AT), seismic ground, and sea acoustic sensors. Integrating them with the rest of the traditional ISR

platforms (e.g., satellites and theater reconnaissance platforms) can only enhance intelligence support to intelli18 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
gence—hungry EBO orders-of-effects thinking, and a common operational picture of the battlespace.24

Improving on the Joint Collection Management

Board Process

The existing procedure to submit ISR requirements from

the JFACC and other component commanders to the JFC,

and from the JFC to the national community, is via priority

intelligence requirements (PIR) and component collection

requirements to the JCMB. This method as it is currently

used is inadequate both because PIRs and component collection requirements are traditionally phrased in a question

format (e.g., What is the enemy’s scheme of maneuver in

the next 24 hours?) that does not necessarily link directly to

a commander’s prioritized objectives and because collection

needs tend to be suboptimized because they are componentcentric. Collectively they do not provide a rigorous framework

to connect ISR to the JFC’s campaign or to connect it to the

JFC/JFACC’s operational objectives and tactical tasks for

enabling EBO orders-of-effects thinking.25

The JCMB complexity of balancing competing requirements in the ISR world increases when strategic requirements supporting the national command level are included.

Operational and tactical intelligence requests for nationallevel support must compete with the requirements of agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National

Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

Department of State Intelligence Division, and others.26

These agencies often have higher priorities for ISR than the

JFC. During combat operations, these priorities frequently

overlap, and JFC ISR requirements are met either because

national agency support to the JFC is itself a priority or

because these requirements are also national collection

requirements. However, if these distinctions are not well

understood, this can create a false sense of ISR support to

the JFC or component commander; a JFACC may be disabused of this notion only when national agency support

decreases because of other ISR priorities at the strategic

level.

As opposed to an ambiguous comingling of requirements,

the JFC and component commanders should have the

JOHNSON 19
ability to know what type of national collection they can

rely on so they can plan accordingly. If other strategic requirements will supplant operational or tactical requirements, this will translate into less national-level and/or

lower-quality intelligence support for target development, assessment, and predictive analysis. At best, this deficit

would force a heavier reliance on theater ISR assets normally tasked for situational awareness or indications and

warning missions, not specialized production needs. At

worst, the deficit would remain unaddressed, and products

supporting the EBO beyond the immediate operation

would be relegated to a perpetual “back-burner,” contributing to operational and intelligence “near-sightedness” as ISR

assets focus on immediate and near-term needs as opposed

to longer-term, strategic analyses.27 A component-vetted

AOD with guidance on ISR effects would help mitigate this

problem.

Strategy-to-Task Methodology

Provides Other Benefits to the JFC

A one-man band is a waste of talented musicians and their expensive instruments. It also sounds like s--t.

—Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, USAF, Retired

Could Provide Assessment Guidance That Draws

Effects to a Campaign Plan

Today’s campaign plans rely on theater and reach-back

ISR organizations such as the joint DCGS, coalition ground

stations (e.g., ROK Kumgang for imagery and Paekdo for

signals in the Korean theater), theater tactical reconnaissance ground stations (e.g., Great Britain’s Tornados), and

various national agencies such as DIA, CIA, NSA, and National Reconnaissance Office. With the proliferation of ISR

sources supporting the JFC and component commanders,

it is imperative to have some form of assessment and feedback loop that helps measure the overall effectiveness of

ISR to the JFACC’s campaign objectives. When guided by

an overarching statement of ISR strategy/priorities (i.e.,

AOD), the JTCB and JCMB processes can accomplish this

feedback.

20 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
The JFACC, like component commanders, uses operations

assessment to measure achieved effects and determine how

they contribute to the overall JFC campaign. The JFACC

uses the AOD as his scorecard in looking at the JFC overall campaign assessment. The campaign assessment attempts to quantify the EBO results for future campaign

strategies.28 ISR effects are missing from the overall assessment process.

Quantifiable ISR data, such as numbers of taskings, processing timelines, exploitation satisfaction, and timelines of

dissemination to the operational user are routinely captured by supporting ground stations and airborne reconnaissance platforms. Moreover, these ISR operators, as

well as ISR personnel embedded in the AOC, can qualify

the data and aid an AOC-level operational assessment of

the overall utility of intelligence received. Knowing this information, the JFACC can recommend to the JFC whether

to adjust the allocation of ISR platform assets, insert priority

collection for missing assessments, revector ISR tasking to

higher-priority needs, or target ISR shortfalls for enabling

and measuring EBOs.

Campaign and operational assessment commonly measure effects to objectives by using a “stoplight” chart based on

objectives, tasks, and measures of effectiveness and merit.

By adding ISR guidance to the AOD as detailed above, the

JFACC could ensure an assessment of ISR’s effectiveness is

incorporated into the operational-assessment process, thus

providing continuous ISR feedback to the JFC’s campaign

assessment. Some examples of potential feedback include

observations from ISR units that tasked sensors were not

suited for the tasked collection, reports on collection limitations due to sensor capabilities, mission problems, and

information on potential areas for predictive analysis.

The current process lacks a theater and national feedback

mechanism that informs the JFC how well ISR planning and

employment meets objectives and tasks. Reach-back organizations such as national agencies and the DCGS often provide reporting via standard reporting procedures, and the

JFC and component commanders rarely get insight as to

how well these organizations are meeting the campaign

objectives and tasks. Along with a well-established C2 relationship, a well-developed ISR assessment process would

JOHNSON 21
provide the means for national agencies to report meaningful

metrics to the JFC on how well ISR is meeting the campaign

objectives.

Doctrinally the JFC does not have a level of authority to

hold national and reach-back organizations or agencies accountable for tailored ISR assessment and reporting, although by the nature of this position, the JFC can influence these organizations or agencies based on his or her

operational needs. During OIF, the ISR command relationships for reach-back and national organizations or agencies

were not clearly established, nor was there clear guidance

from the CFC or JFC on ISR objectives to meet their operational needs.29 This was problematic for components needing theater ISR support during combat operations, and it

fragmented persistent ISR operations during the stabilization phase in Iraq.

This AOD approach provides the JFC and component

commanders, through the JFACC, a viable means for guiding airborne ISR effects and assessment at the JCMB, just as

they do at the JTCB. OIF demonstrated that the JFACC

could successfully direct theater airborne ISR platforms and

sensors during TST scenarios earmarking the JFACC/AOC

as the “supported” theater ISR C2 node and coordinating authority for supporting ISR.30

Improves Execution—Could Help Solve the ISR

Ownership and Fragmented Reporting Issue

The problem of ownership and reporting cannot be overstated. In the winter of 2003, a US reconnaissance aircraft

flying in the Sea of Japan was intercepted by a North Korean

M-29. A key lesson observed centered on an ISR C2 seam

between Korean area of responsibility (AOR) and Pacific

Command (PACOM) AOR which led to a dangerous lapse in

direct threat warning to a PACOM ISR asset. Peeling the

onion back further, the C2 seam between the PACOM-USonly reporting and Korean-peninsula-combined reporting

environment was the question of which one was in the best

position to warn against North Korean threats.31 This example further strengthens the need for ISR requisite command authority and a method to influence the tasking and

exploitation nodes based on JFC priorities to agencies and

22 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
organizations beyond JFC control. Within the JFC’s authority, theater airborne ISR assets fall under the JAOP

process, and so Air Force planners are used to counting the

U-2, RC-135, Predator, Global Hawk, and others among

the assets they manage from the AOC perspective. Sensor

priorities, however, are often managed at the national and/or

JFC level because of the high-demand, low-density strain

on these assets. Moreover, true ISR “unity of effort” must

recognize the need for a full management of the ISR continuum, of which the JFACC only provides a portion, albeit

a large one. Without guiding ISR effects and established

planning process, ISR ownership and execution become fragmented and inefficient because of misunderstandings about

who owns ISR platforms and sensor tasking. The key execution reality is that the airframe and sensor tasking can

occur independently from one another and that they likely

are responsible to different authorities.

Additionally, the physical control and tasking of an ISR

sensor is analogous to the physical control a fighter pilot

exerts over her aircraft. It is in most cases influenced by,

but distinct from, the control of the airframe. ISR operators, whether ground or airborne, receive their taskings,

analyze the collection deck, plan the use of the sensor for

maximum efficiency in meeting reporting requirements,

and have the physical means to dynamically retask the

sensor during execution. Just like any other operator, their

work derives from the authority under which they are

tasked. We often view theater ISR C2 backwards because

we look at the platform carrying the sensor, rather than

looking at the requirements and authority driving the production of the intelligence from the sensor. ISR sensor

tasking must be allocated clearly, regardless of platform

ownership, to enable EBO conditions.32

The effects of the discrepancy between platform and

sensor authority can be seen in an AOC. In the ATO, the

JFACC as the airspace control authority plans airspace for

theater ISR assets, to include the U-2, Rivet Joint, Global

Hawk, Predator, EP-3, and others. Once produced, the

ATO reflects ISR assets, orbits, and altitudes. However, the

JFC’s AOC often lacks sensor-tasking authority over these

assets when fighting today’s war. The results are confusing

to the AOC’s combat operations crew because lines of conJOHNSON 23
trol to ISR sensors are not necessarily similar to those of

traditional weapon systems, such as those that support

close air support, air interdiction, and strategic attack.

Lack of understanding of sensor control and muddled ISR

C2 has the potential to put joint and coalition forces in

harm’s way; for instance, is the AOC crew trained to think

about this when redirecting AOC manned assets that rely

on ISR for direct threat warning? An additional frustrating

conflict can occur during TST scenarios when the AOC’s

chief of combat operations attempts to task the optimum

sensor in the TST hunt, only to find retasking the sensor is

outside of his authority. OIF observations point to process

breakdowns resulting from a lack of unity of ISR effort in

prosecuting TST scenarios and supporting tactical ISR requirements.33

Could Establish a Central Node for JFC ISR as the

Strategy-to-Task Builder and Theater ISR C2 Node

A logical link was set for the JFC to establish the JFACC

as the supported commander for formulating unity of ISR

effort by building an airborne ISR strategy under the JFC’s

SPEA construct. The JFACC normally leads the JAOP

process, which plans and executes targeting priorities determined by the JTCB. The JFACC could allocate ISR assets as he does traditional weapon systems from other

services in support of the JFC’s campaign objectives.34 The

JFC normally designates the JFACC for the planning and

execution processes for component commanders’ needs as

the airspace control authority, area air defense control authority, and most recently as the space coordination authority. There are also instances when the JFC delegates

weapon system control to the JFACC for the Army Tactical

Missile System supporting TST scenarios and the Navy’s

Aegis cruiser for air defense.35 Having air and space control or coordinating plus targeting responsibilities makes

the JFACC, coupled with the AOC weapon system, the most

likely choice as the supported theater ISR C2 node. The

JFACC is the most logical choice for providing the JFC this

ISR support.36

This process is going to require an aggressive promotion

for components to relinquish their ability to influence

24 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
national-ISR collection via the JCMB. But if the component

commanders examine this process from the same point of

view as the JTCB, they may recognize the synergy they can

achieve by having influence over theater and national-ISR

collection. As RADM Jack Dorsett, Pacific Command/J2 and

former Central Command Joint Intelligence Center commander, pointed out, “This relinquishment will rest on a

matter of trust and proven performance.”37

May Help Solve Coalition ISR Sharing—through

Guidance 

A thornier issue that often gets overlooked is the JFACC’s

intent about ISR sharing in a coalition environment. By

providing clear intent, the JFACC establishes an operational justification that will enable the foreign disclosure

officers’ sufficient time to work with national policy decision makers on releasability and disclosure guidance. The

JFC through the JFACC can explain their ISR intent for integrating coalition partners ISR to enable effects for campaign objectives.

Conclusions

All the high-tech weapons in the world won’t transform the US

Armed Forces unless we also transform the way we think,

train, exercise, and fight.

—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

The JFC should have a planning process that establishes

theater-ISR effects with theater-ISR and ISR organizations

or agencies beyond JFC control. The latter deals primarily

with establishing processes for components to state their

national-ISR needs in conjunction with theater-ISR needs.

This process creates a synergetic effort when prioritizing

national ISR with one theater voice instead of attempting

to satisfy separate component interests on equal footing.

The major phases of combat for Desert Storm, Operation

Enduring Freedom (OEF), and OIF were all less than 100

days. In comparison Operations Northern and Southern

Watches maintained ISR vigilance for 11-plus years after

Desert Storm—predominantly supported by the combined

JOHNSON 25
force air component commander (CFACC)/Ninth Air Force’s

ISR organizations in the south, and the CFACC and European Command’s ISR organizations in the north. The Korean peninsula remains a hot spot and strong consumer of

ISR needs—mostly supported by the JFACC and Seventh Air

Force’s ISR organizations. Both OEF and OIF are shaping

into long-term ISR support missions. The author asserts

that the JFC needs clear requisite C2 authority over theater

ISR and the ability to influence those ISR organizations beyond his/her control during all phases of a conflict for understanding an adversary’s intent.38 This requirement is especially true in Iraq where stabilization operations continue

to demand ISR support against insurgents. The current OIF

ISR focus misses the conceptual premises behind setting

EBO conditions as management of ISR platforms centers on

numbers of missions and hours of coverage rather than effects required to achieve campaign objectives.39

These untidy linkages affect ISR support to the entire

SPEA construct—from not having an overarching or guiding

ISR effects strategy-to-task methodology for high-demand

and low-density ISR platforms to fragmented planning

processes, dangerous C2 at the execution level as demonstrated during OIF, and unfocused ISR for the intelligenceintensive EBO assessment. The problem remained unsolved

as recently as OIF, as witnessed by the Marine and Army

lessons observed for not having theater ISR support during

their drive to Baghdad.40 For EBO to be effective, the JFC

needs an operational-level ISR strategy to task methodology

that enables EBO conditions through requisite commander

relationships and provides influencing direction at the

national-interagency level. Precedence has been established, and the JFACC possesses the best capabilities to

develop and execute an operational-level ISR strategy that

can centralize theater ISR planning and provide a forum

for consolidating and prioritizing national-level ISR priorities up through the JFC.

If the JFC embraces EBO conditions, there is a need to

establish a theater C2 ISR node and an ISR effects strategyto-task methodology that link to the JFC’s SPEA processes

for achieving campaign objectives. The problem has and

continues to be with the JFC’s ISR planning and execution

processes that do not have an overarching ISR strategy-to26 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
task methodology to guide national and theater ISR in a

unified manner. This lack of an ISR-effects strategy has a

ripple effect, impeding the full operationalization of EBO even

though improved processes and better tools have matured

to support the intelligence-intensive JFC’s SPEA requirements. An integrated ISR strategy-to-task methodology

could help solidify theater airborne ISR C2 lines of communication that often get blurred or ignored because there is

not a clear chain of command for theater and national ISR

(which has to manage competing interests among strategic, operational, and tactical commanders). If adopted, an

AOD with integrated ISR effects could be the means for conveying the JFC’s ISR strategy through the JFACC’s JAOP

process. Placing the JFACC in the position of the supported theater-ISR node would help guide the two parallel

SPEA processes—the JTCB and JCMB. The JTCB’s primary focus is to produce an ATO that puts bombs on targets, and the JCMB’s primary focus could likewise become

putting sensors on target and providing ISR effects for all

the components.

By using parallels to this process, a first transformation

step would be to ensure the appropriate sensors are on the

correct targets at the right time. The JCMB processes

focus on JFC and component-priority-intelligence requirements and the components’ ability to influence collection

requirements with agencies and organizations beyond JFC

control. As a separate but equally important process, the

JFC/JFACC and component commanders need one coherent ISR position expressed at each forum. By including ISR

effects and focus during these guiding processes, the

JFC/JFACC can enable and measure effects at the right

time to future campaign direction. Clear ISR intent in the

AOD also will help theater, reach-back, and national agencies understand their role in the contingency operation

and assist them to tailor reporting to AOD’s desired effects

in the form of an ISR assessment. The ISR assessment

from these organizations and agencies would enable the

JFC to recognize how well ISR is meeting his or her campaign objectives.

The role of ISR effects must be addressed to maximize

EBO for ongoing and future contingencies. OIF demonstrated an unprecedented number of real-time ISR platform

JOHNSON 27
feeds to the AOC that enabled the AOC to act much faster

than in previous conflicts. These capabilities coupled with

TSTs and emerging targets have overtaken preplanned targets, which beg a better way to guide and prioritize ISR. It

is often the plea of the operational commanders that ISR is

not responsive; in this case, the operational intent in the

form of an ISR effects strategy-to-task methodology is not

delineated effectively and clearly. We now need the JFC to

respond and adjust the ISR processes to establish requisite C2 for theater ISR and establish a guiding mechanism

to influence agencies and organizations beyond his or her

control.

Notes

1. Lt Gen Michael T. Moseley, Ninth Air Force commander. Operation

Iraqi Freedom—by the Numbers (Assessment and Analysis Division), 30 April

2003, 3.

2. Maj Gen David Deptula, Pacific Air Forces director of Operations,

interview by the author, 1 March 2005. 

3. Ibid., 30 November 2004.

4. Maj Gen James F. Amos, MAGTF’s Tactical Air Component commander, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” lecture, Air War College, Maxwell Air

Force Base, Ala., 30 September 2003.

5. David Tohn and Dan Corey, “The Intel Soldier in OIF . . . Right

Skills, Right Ethos: Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Observations,” Secure Internet Live Conferencing 2003, October 2003.

6. Col Mark Kipphut, PACAF/IN, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, interview by

the author, 15–16 December 2003.

7. Edward C. Mann, Gary Endersby, and Thomas Searle, Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:

Air University Press, October 2002), 29–35, 42–55, 90–92.

8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

1976), 119.

9. Mann, Endersby, and Searle, Thinking Effects, 29–35, 42–55,

90–92.

10. Kipphut interview.

11. Ibid.

12. Standardized Air Operations Directive, Air Force Operational Control

Training Program (AF OCTP) (Hurlburt Field, Fla., 1 February 2002), 9–12.

13. Capt David Vernal, Korean Air Operations Center, ISR Division

strategist, Washington, D.C., interview by the author, 9 October 2003.

14. Ibid.

15. Seventh Air Force Standard Operations Procedures (SOP) for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division, 3 March 2003, 11–14.

28 ENABLING ISR EFFECTS
16. Capt David Vernal, Korean Air Operations Center, ISR Division

strategist, Washington, D.C., interview by the author, 9 October 2003.

17. Ibid.

18. Maj Scott Scheppers, Army Command and Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth, Kans., interview by author, 25 September 2004.

19. Lt Col Courtney Ducharme, Operation Iraqi Freedom, ISR Division, Central Command, interview by the author, November 2003.

20. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June

2003, C-1.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., III-22–23.

23. Gen Charles “Chuck” Horner, “Thoughts on Command and Organizational Structures for Military Forces,” 10 October 2003.

24. Col Mark Kipphut, PACAF/IN, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, interview by

the author, 28 September 2004.

25. Ibid.

26. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 9

March 2000, IV-5. 

27. Ibid., IV-5 to IV-7.

28. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, C-1.

29. Lt Col Courtney Ducharme, OIF, ISR Division, Central Command,

interview by the author, November 2003.

30. Moseley, Operation Iraqi Freedom—by the Numbers, 9.

31. Col James Whidden, former 607th Air Intel Group, Osan AB,

South Korea, interview by the author, 2 February 2005.

32. Maj Matthew Johnson, former Strategy Flight commander, 502 Air

Ops Group, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, interview by the author, 15 March 2005.

33. “Operation Iraqi Freedom C4ISR Lessons Learned.” CENTAF2/DO,

Nellis AFB, Nev., 7 July 2003. 

34. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, III-10.

35. Exercise Ulchi-Focus Lens 2002, Osan AB, South Korea, August

2002.

36. Col Mark Kipphut, PACAF/IN, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, interview by

the author, 29 July 2004. Kipphut stated, “The JFACC is best poised to

work all airborne assets, and I would argue this also includes national

systems (involving building the collection strategy, run the de-confliction,

determine natural tasks, etc.) [In short] we need a more unified effort

achieved by an agreed process under a single commander who would be

held accountable for functions and processes.”

37. Rear Adm (Adm-select) Jack Dorsett, Pacific Command/J2 and

staff, Camp Smith, Hawaii, interview by the author, 16 December 2003.

38. Maj Gen David Deptula, Pacific Air Forces director of Operations,

interview by the author, 30 November 2004.

39. Maj Carol Northrup, ISR Division, Air Operations Center, Al

Udeid, Qatar, interview by the author, October 2003.

40. Amos, “Operation Iraqi Freedom”; and Tohn and Corey, “The Intel

Soldier in OIF . . . Right Skills, Right Ethos.”

JOHNSON 29
Glossary

AOC air operations center

AOD air operations directive

ATO air tasking order

C2 command and control

CFC combined force commander

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CSAF chief of staff of the Air Force

DCGS Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

EBO effects-based operations

F2T2EA find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ITO integrated tasking order

JAOP joint air operations planning

JCMB Joint Collection Management Board

JFACC joint force air and space component commander

JFC joint force commander

JP joint publication

JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

NRO National Reconnaissance Officer

NSA National Security Agency

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OODA observe, orient, decide, and act

PIR priority intelligence requirements

ROK Republic of Korea

RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and

assessment

SAM surface-to-air missile

SPEA strategy development, planning processes,

execution cycle, and assessment of effects

TCT time-critical targeting

TST time-sensitive targets

31
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35