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The Wright Flyer Papers

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Inside cover.indd 1 12/7/05 10:51:
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Back to the Basics

An Aviation Solution

to Counterinsurgent Warfare

ARTHUR D. DAVIS

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 23

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 2005

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ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

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iii

Foreword

Welcome to another in our series called “The Wright 

Flyer Papers.” The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) 

is pleased to publish our best student research projects 

each academic year. Our research program is designed to encourage our students to explore topics and issues aimed at 

advancing the application of air and space power and understanding the profession of arms. To that end, this series 

reflects our desire to perpetuate the intellectual spirit of 

early military aviation pioneers who availed themselves of 

time, here at Maxwell, to reflect solid research, innovative 

thought, and lucid preparation. Put another way, we think 

they are worth your time to read.

The Wright Flyer Papers reflect an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and institutional issues. 

Some research provides new solutions to familiar problems. 

Other studies highlight new opportunities and the benefits 

of their pursuit. By making these research studies available 

through the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC intends to foster 

continued conversation amongst Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms . . . a conversation that has 

helped create the most capable fighting force the world has 

ever known.

RANDAL D. FULLHART

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

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v

Preface

When I embarked on this “voyage of discovery” at the start 

of my academic endeavors for Air University, I had no idea 

of the amount of information available with regard to using 

airpower in fighting “small wars.” In terms of the use—or 

misuse—of aircraft in counterinsurgency, I found fascinating the emphasis placed on overwhelming the insurgent with 

technology and mass. Today’s Air Force can deliver maximum violence upon the enemy with minimal effort, provided 

it can find him. A complex battlespace populated by a noncomplex enemy, counterinsurgency makes many Air Force 

people uncomfortable since the ability to leverage technology 

in the air war is part of the very fabric of our service.

In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that the methods of 

using airpower to take the fight to the enemy and protect 

our ground forces during small wars need not involve the 

most advanced aircraft available. This “low-tech” approach 

does not suggest using lesser technology per se but proposes 

a different look for the types of aircraft that can perform a 

specific mission and for their manner of employment—that 

of protecting ground forces while combating the elusive insurgent. These same aircraft can prove invaluable in training 

an indigenous force to take the fight forward. By looking to 

relatively inexpensive, off-the-shelf aircraft, the Air Force can 

protect its ground-based charges and cement a relationship 

with embattled nations by helping them help themselves.

I could not have completed this study without the guidance 

and support of Dr. William Dean and his class of “small warriors.” His mentorship and their advice enabled me to make 

the leap from an academic interest in counterinsurgency to a 

real application of what the Air Force can bring to the fight. 

Finally, I extend my eternal gratitude to my wife, who now 

knows more about airpower than she ever wanted to.

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Abstract

This study focuses on the current global war on terrorism 

as a conflict against insurgents who attack US power through 

asymmetric means. Of late, these individuals have selected as 

a primary target the military and civilian convoy operations 

in Iraq and, to some extent, Afghanistan. By examining past 

examples of the use of airpower in counterinsurgent warfare, 

this study sheds light on the United States’ current failings in 

both equipment and doctrine as it wages this type of war. The 

French used low-technology aircraft—World War II–vintage

A-1 and T-6 fighters—in Algeria to attack insurgent forces and 

defend ground troops. Well adapted to the environment as well 

as effectively deployed and employed, these aircraft helped 

contain and defeat the insurgents. In Vietnam, the United 

States employed A-1s and T-28s—aircraft with a proven track 

record in this type of war and ideally suited to training the 

South Vietnamese air force. The United States should rethink 

its inventory of aircraft devoted to counterinsurgent war by 

considering possible replacements for the A-1. It should also 

reevaluate the manner of employing these assets by locating 

them with the ground forces they support.

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1

Back to the Basics

An Aviation Solution

to Counterinsurgent Warfare

If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a 

future war will be just like the last one, it is to assume that it 

will be so utterly different that we can ignore all of the lessons 

of the last one.

—Royal Air Force Marshal Sir John Slessor

As the leading crusader in a global war on terrorism, the 

United States finds itself arrayed against an enemy who wishes 

to fight on his own terms by using asymmetric means—those 

of the insurgent. He has at his disposal weapons and tactics 

that have changed little in the past 50 years. Although the US 

Department of Defense currently seeks to transform the US 

military into a lighter, leaner force capable of fighting the enemy 

on any terrain with twenty-first-century technology, we must 

still look to history as a guide for this transformation. As Pres. 

John F. Kennedy stated in 1962, “This is another type of war, 

new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, 

subversives, insurgents, assassins . . . war by ambush instead of combat . . . seeking victory by eroding and exhausting 

the enemy instead of engaging him.”1

In Iraq today, the conflict has shifted from a mobile forceon-force campaign to an active insurgency. When we fight an 

enemy who relies on insurgent tactics, mobility becomes a 

crucial element of success. As we have seen demonstrated 

time and again, the protection of advances and lines of communications is critical when dealing with an enemy who 

chooses not to engage in direct action but utilizes harassment 

and ambush. Assets in the US Air Force inventory, however, 

lack the ability to support ground forces adequately in the 

prosecution of a counterinsurgent campaign. This paper discusses the nature of this type of fight, both past and present, 

and then analyzes two historical case studies to demonstrate 

that although this problem is not new, counterinsurgent 

forces have successfully handled it by using a distinctive type 

of airpower. Specifically, instead of fast, expensive turbojets, 

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2

we need reliable, propeller-driven aircraft designed to work in 

the environment favored by the insurgent.

The Nature of the Fight:

An Analysis of Guerrilla War

Guerrilla warfare is a form of operations above all things to be 

avoided.

—Col C. E. Callwell

In the quest for a decisive battle that defeats the enemy 

on the field using the strategy of annihilation, commanders 

have always remained wary of that most deplorable form of 

combat—the “small war” against an insurgent army. Theorists from Sun Tzu to Carl von Clausewitz have recognized 

this situation as a real concern that generals should not 

discount. This paper treats small wars, insurgencies, low intensity conflicts, and guerrilla warfare as essentially similar 

in terms of tactics, though at times ideologically different in 

goals and final outcomes. Oftentimes, we cannot separate 

politics from small wars since the former represents the 

reason for the fight or the force that drives the insurgent to 

resist. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to divorce political 

or ideological motives from the technical aspect of this kind 

of war; although such motives may differ throughout history, the manner of fighting these wars remains the same.

Insurgent armies have perennially used guerrilla tactics 

to wage small wars on their own terms and turf. N. I. Klonis 

observes that by using such methods, adversaries avoid “direct confrontation with the enemy main forces . . . where 

operations are conducted in enemy controlled territory by 

relatively small forces which strike the enemy where he may 

be relatively weak or where the guerrillas can obtain a temporary superiority over a localized enemy force.”2 Put simply, 

the guerrilla or insurgent army avoids direct confrontation 

by attacking the opposing force on its flanks or through its 

long line of communications. The mujahideen who fought 

the Soviet army in Afghanistan illustrate this principle. Because the Afghan fighters could not compete with the overwhelming Soviet arsenal during this campaign, they resorted 

to attacks against supply lines, using the few passable roads 

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in the country. Consequently, the Soviets put much effort 

into using aircraft to protect their convoys—primary targets 

of the mujahideen.3

The Insurgent: Past and Present

Throughout history, insurgencies and small wars have existed as background noise to competition or conflict between 

great powers.4 The Soviets in the Afghanistan war used technology—airpower in the form of helicopter gunships—to battle 

insurgent forces bent on attacking their bases and supply lines. 

This strategy proved largely successful until the United States 

“donated” advanced surface-to-air missiles to the mujahideen, 

effectively negating the Soviet advantage.5 Similarly, Vietcong 

guerrilla fighters received much Soviet assistance, both weapons and training, in their fight against the United States in 

South Vietnam. Both conflicts saw insurgents use a strategy to 

which the greater powers had to adapt—that of avoiding direct 

confrontation. As Clausewitz put it, “[Insurgents] are meant to 

operate just outside the theater of war—where the invader will 

not appear in strength—in order to deny him these areas altogether.”6 The link between past examples of small wars and 

those of today lies in the details.

Regardless of ideological or political aims, insurgents 

function similarly and require the same resources to continue their struggles. They try to postpone decisive action 

until they have a decided advantage or until the opponent 

becomes exhausted by the effort. They require not only a 

safe location from which to train and project power but also 

logistic or financial support. Furthermore, insurgents must 

have the ability to melt into the terrain or population to effect their disengagement from the enemy so they can fight 

another day. They also benefit from their flexibility, both 

in the form of tactics and the absence of ethical or legal 

restraints.7 Some commentators liken today’s war on terror 

to a counterinsurgency since “contemporary terrorism is a 

lineal descendant of the type of low-intensity conflict seen 

in the Third World over the past 50 years.”8

Enduring Principles for Fighting Small Wars

With operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq shifting 

from major combat operations to stabilization and transiArticle.indd 3 12/8/05 6:07:0
4

tion to democratic rule, the United States again finds itself 

facing an insurgent force that relies on terror tactics and a 

strategy of exhaustion to further its goal of thwarting Western influence in the region. This situation resembles the 

US experience in Vietnam: in 1962, following major combat 

operations, the United States found itself “organizationally, 

doctrinally, conceptually, and psychologically unprepared 

for [this type of] war.”9 At the operational and tactical levels, 

counterinsurgency has changed little in the past 50 years. 

We still find that “tactics favor the regular troops, while 

strategy favors the enemy.”10

As the British and French colonial armies, US expeditionary forces, and a host of others learned the hard way, 

an army facing guerrilla forces must maintain a presence 

in foreign terrain and confront an enemy who attacks weak 

points when he chooses. The regular army’s bases of operation and lines of communications are vulnerable to attack from bands of insurgents who specialize in this type of 

work and who can disappear at will. We find an answer to 

this dilemma within Clausewitz’s work: “The [army’s] only 

answer to military actions is the sending out of frequent 

escorts as protection for his convoys, and as guards on all 

of his stopping places, bridges, defiles, and the rest.”11 The 

counterinsurgent force—extremely hampered by its supply 

lines—fights an enemy who has little need for such lines 

and often supplies himself from what he can take from both 

regular forces and the population.

In all cases of this type of war, the regular army achieves 

victory when it can pursue relentlessly and deny the insurgent 

rest, recuperation, and supply. The “tradition within the US 

military has been to develop an impressive understanding and 

the skills at counterinsurgency when engaged in such an operation, and then let the expertise atrophy afterwards.”12 The war 

on terror has all of the classic characteristics of an insurgency. 

The US military must face asymmetric violence, ambiguity, and 

an enemy with no ethical or moral constraints. Insurgents use 

improvised explosives to attack convoys and demoralize the 

regular army with hit-and-run rocket or mortar attacks. Like 

T. E. Lawrence’s indirect approach to insurgent warfare, the 

goal becomes cutting lines of supply and demoralizing rather 

than attacking directly.13 To counter this method of operating, the United States must look to past examples of tactics 

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and technology to relearn what it has forgotten. Airpower is a 

powerful tool, but technology is no panacea in the small-war 

arena. Linking the past with the present in this regard will only 

help the United States capitalize on airpower in fighting small 

wars.

The Iraqi Insurgency:

Implications for Airpower

To attempt to restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to 

attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine when the powder 

has already been ignited: it is far better to await the explosion 

and afterward fill up the crater than to try to prevent it and 

perish in the attempt.

—Henri Jomini

Since the end of major combat operations in May 2003, 

the United States has been fighting an insurgent force within 

Iraq. Of the 120,000 troops who remain in the country to help 

rebuild and pave the way for democracy, many are dedicated 

to security concerns that arise from an active insurgency. 

Both in rural and urban settings, the insurgent force fights 

much like past guerrillas have fought—through asymmetric 

tactics that emphasize a strategy of exhaustion. Today, this 

campaign continues against enemies who use nontraditional 

tactics and asymmetric/asynchronous strategies designed to 

inflict damage on the counterinsurgent’s fielded forces and 

national will by exploiting ethical constraints, an obsession 

with a declared end state, and a “better state of peace.”14

The current insurgent force most favors the asymmetric 

means of convoy attack. Like the mujahideen in Afghanistan, Iraqi insurgents pose the greatest danger to US troops 

not from direct confrontation but from ambush on the roads 

of Iraq. In fact, John Pike, executive director for the Web 

site GlobalSecurity.org, notes in an interview with the Atlantic Monthly that “this is a war of convoy ambushes and car 

bombs.”15 More than 20,000 soldiers and private contractors 

operate convoys that bring fuel, food, and water into Iraq 

from Kuwait—all of them primary targets for the insurgent. 

Exact numbers of US troop casualties remain classified, but 

more than 65 private contractors have been killed in convoy ambushes since July 2003, leading the Army and Air 

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Force to train more than 1,000 soldiers in convoy security.16

This situation has led US military leadership to shift emphasis from overland supply efforts to an aviation solution. 

Although 85 percent of troop supplies still travel around Iraq 

by road, US Transportation Command has tried to pick up 

the remainder by using intratheater-airlift assets, thereby 

taking Army trucks “off the roads in the deadly Sunni Triangle section of Iraq.”17 Similar to the Soviets’ experience in 

Afghanistan, convoy security has become a primary concern 

for US armed forces.

Air Support for the Counterinsurgent Army

Even as far back as the late nineteenth century, the security of troops on the march had become a priority during 

conflict with guerrillas. Colonel Callwell’s Small Wars: Their 

Principles and Practice discusses an insurgent attack on a 

column of troops: “The tendency of the enemy in these campaigns even in the heat of action [is] to avoid decisive collision with the front of the regular troops but to work against 

the flanks and rear.”18 In Iraq, for instance, this observation 

still holds true: insurgents use asymmetric means, explosive devices, or concealed rocket attack to engage and harass 

columns of troops on the move. As noted in US Army Field 

Manual 3-90, Tactics, the purpose of a convoy is to reach its 

destination—not to engage the enemy in a movement to contact.19 Similarly, the US Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual 

observes that since the flanks and rear of a convoy are especially vulnerable to irregular forces, it must “ensure itself 

from an attack from every direction.”20 Examples of types of 

support include reconnaissance patrols and air cover to free 

the convoy from contact or prevent it.

 Aircraft in Use Today

US and coalition forces in Iraq employ a variety of aircraft. 

High-tech, multirole jet aircraft such as the F-16, F-15C/E, 

and F/A-18 as well as the venerable A-10 and Vietnam-era 

AC-130 provide close air support (CAS) and a host of other 

air-support functions to ground troops. Alongside these platforms, helicopter gunships play an important role in securing the movement of troops and materiel within the country. 

However, each weapon system has its drawbacks.

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Because few of the high-speed fighters are forward deployed, they must orbit in preplanned locations, awaiting 

missions from ground commanders. The A-10 is forward deployed to Iraq at several locations but has relatively short 

loiter capability over a convoy or fixed location; furthermore, 

we must use many of these aircraft to provide necessary 

coverage during refueling. The A-10 is designed to provide 

CAS and convoy escort, but its slow speed, vulnerability to 

ground fire, and few numbers limit the aircraft to nighttimeonly missions of high priority. Helicopter gunships handle 

much of the work in covering troop or supply movement, 

but, again, their slowness and vulnerability to ground fire 

do not make them ideal platforms in this environment. All of 

these aircraft share a common characteristic: they are multirole platforms used for a variety of missions. One study produced during the Vietnam era notes that “the Close Air Support/Interdiction mission has become so specialized that the 

all purpose approach leaves much to be desired, producing 

instead the jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none machine.”21

New Direction Needed

Both the Army and Marine Corps recognize that air support plays a valuable role in convoy protection and force 

movement in the counterinsurgent’s home terrain. In Iraq 

most of the requests for air support from ground-force commanders are for preplanned raids, reconnaissance of pipelines and suspected enemy safe houses, and truck convoys.22

For example, in one 30-day period, insurgents conducted 

more than 2,300 attacks on military and civilian convoys.23

Furthermore, convoy attacks accounted for more than 20 

percent of the 32 deaths in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment during its last deployment—the second-leading cause 

of death in the unit.24 Such violence on the part of the insurgents has prompted the Army to reduce the number of convoys since the attacks have increased. Consequently, the Air 

Force carries a larger portion of the logistics-resupply load on 

tactical and strategic airlift because the roads remain quite 

dangerous for military and civilian convoy activity.25 None of 

this insurgent activity is either new or unique in this type of 

war. Past examples of the use of airpower have yielded good 

results in supporting ground forces.

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Only air assets designed to provide troop and convoy security offer a solution to this problem. The A-10, AC-130, and 

helicopter gunship promise much-needed assistance, but their 

own operational flaws restrict their availability when our forces 

need them. Earlier conflicts indicate the success of matching 

the weapon with the task. The United States faces an enemy 

who avoids US strengths by utilizing lesser technology and 

asymmetric tactics. Only by turning to a propeller-driven CAS 

platform that can support the Army in its current mission will 

our country gain the upper hand.

Case Studies in Counterinsurgency

To learn something new, read an old book!

—Anonymous

Forgetting history dooms us to repeating it. That said, we 

would do well to look to two historical examples of the use 

of low-tech aircraft in small wars. In both cases, politics and 

world opinion defined the eventual outcome of each war. As 

stated previously, one cannot separate politics from insurgency because it serves as a primary motivating factor for both 

sides and often defines the war, but the manner in which the 

combatants fought these wars holds valuable lessons for the 

student of airpower application in conflicts such as these.

Fighting in Algeria from 1958 to 1962, the French enjoyed 

much success, thanks to the application of airpower. Although the Algerians still won their independence, one can 

argue that this was a foregone conclusion at the outset of the 

war and that political factors—not military defeat—forced 

the French government to acquiesce to the Algerian nationalists. Fighting in Vietnam from 1962 to 1966, the United 

States responded to the initial insurgency with a successful application of airpower. Only when the North Vietnamese 

gained sponsorship from other powers in terms of weapons 

and training and sought conventional war did the United 

States have to reevaluate its involvement and pull out.

The French in Algeria

Part of France since the mid-1800s, Algeria was home to 

over a million European settlers—Colons—by the end of World 

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War II, amongst a population of over nine million Arabs.26 In 

the aftermath of the war, nationalistic fervor led to the creation of the Front de la Libération Nationale (FLN) in 1954 and

its armed wing—the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). In 

1958 tensions among the French government, the Colons, and 

the FLN came to a head, placing the military squarely in the 

middle. With a rising insurgency and a need by military professionals to redeem themselves from their recent defeat in Indochina, Charles de Gaulle rose to power with the understanding 

that Algeria would remain French.27 To defeat this insurgency, 

Gen Maurice Challe of the French air force assumed command 

of French forces in Algeria with a goal of conducting a mobile 

campaign to purge the wilayas (ALN territorial segments) by 

destroying ALN forces without occupying territory.28 General 

Challe envisioned a ground campaign that used airpower extensively to provide mobility and fire support.

Aircraft Types and Tactics. The end of World War II saw a 

French air force strapped for manning, funds, and airframes. 

In 1946, without the means to create a conventional strategic air force, France had to rely on equipment “donated” by 

the United States or left over from the German occupiers.29

This situation produced a force heavily linked to its ground 

component with significant joint-arms doctrine and few assets outside of propeller-driven aircraft and first-generation 

helicopters. One study observed that “without the benefit of 

exotic hardware, or perhaps because of a lack of it, an effective counter-guerrilla Air Force was in being by 1959.”30

French air force strategy in support of counterinsurgency 

operations emphasized four major systems: command and 

control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics support and troop delivery; and firepower in direct 

support of ground operations, with each of these interdependent systems based on the utilization of available assets.31

By 1959 the T-6G Harvard had become the workhorse for 

the French air force in Algeria, over 240 of them conducting operations in the country. Donated by the United States 

as surplus, these aircraft came equipped with three .30-

caliber guns and pylons for carrying a variety of weapons. 

These converted trainers primarily conducted air cover for 

convoy operations and armed reconnaissance of roads and 

railways.32 Because they had reached the end of their life 

span by 1960 and because of increasing ALN capabilities in 

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antiaircraft artillery, the French had to switch to the A4D 

Skyraider. In addition to relying heavily on propeller-driven 

aircraft to support ground operations, the French used helicopters extensively in Algeria, including duty as fire-support 

platforms.33

Employment and Doctrine. As stated previously, because 

the war in Algeria differed from earlier French experiences in 

World War II, it required a different approach to the use of airpower. After suffering a bitter defeat in Indochina, the French 

sought to put those lessons to good use. As Lieutenant General 

Enzanno of the French air force’s 2d Tactical Air Command 

stated, “Obviously, the role of the Air Force in Algeria was 

very different from its traditional role in conventional warfare; 

instead of powerful concentrations of force and maneuvers 

conducted at very high levels of command, the Algerian War 

called for dispersion of forces at low levels of command.”34

To accomplish this feat, the French exercised operational 

control of the armed forces through three unified commands consisting of three army corps and three tactical 

air commands, each controlled by a joint operations center 

(JOC) responsible for a specific zone in Algeria.35 The overall 

commander received information about operations within 

each of these zones, but the JOCs managed the day-to-day 

operational mission of each force, thus allowing for decentralized execution of operations in a fluid battlespace.

Of primary concern to the ground force was air cover for 

convoy operations as well as force movement and fire support. Convoy-escort aircraft would often stage from rough 

forward-operating fields, or even roadways, to support the 

column or conduct reconnaissance ahead of the force, using firepower as necessary.36 Helicopter assets provided logistics and fire support, covered by slow-moving T-6 or A-4 

aircraft. Mobile command posts facilitated close coordination between the army and air force during planned or contingency operations; these posts reported to the area JOC 

to keep the overall command structure informed and to 

“lease” additional assets as required.37 Thanks to the particular organizational structure of the armed forces, the air 

force could react quickly, often within 30 minutes or less, to 

support the army against a highly mobile enemy who knew 

the terrain.

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Summary of Operations. Although the French granted 

Algerians their independence in 1962, the military side of 

the war proved successful and validated the French counterinsurgency effort with respect to air integration. The use of 

“low technology” aircraft, coupled with the first use of helicopter gunships, gave the French army a decided advantage 

against the ALN. Through the adaptation of new technology in 

helicopter gunships, the use of rugged fixed-wing aircraft, and 

close coordination with the ground component, the French 

demonstrated the key importance of airpower to counterinsurgent operations. According to one study conducted soon 

after the war, “counterinsurgency is by nature a ground effort 

. . . but in this instance it was a ground effort in which airpower was the equalizer.”38

The US Experience in Vietnam

Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, 

Vietnam split into a Communist north and non-Communist 

south. By 1959 Communist leader Ho Chi Minh was ready to 

“liberate the south and re-unify the country.”39 The ensuing 

campaign took the form of an armed struggle between insurgent Communist forces—the Vietcong—and the fledgling 

military of the south. The United States had established a 

presence in the country as early as 1950 to aid the French 

during their struggle. When President Kennedy came to office 

in 1960, he pledged to assist any nation in a struggle against 

Communist aggression by supplying aid and, in South Vietnam as in other places, military advisers.

The insurgency in the south had worsened by late 1960, 

with assassinations and terror campaigns conducted by the 

Vietcong destabilizing the already weak and corrupt USsponsored government. Although US military advisers had 

provided training and some aircraft (initial deliveries of Navy 

AD6 aircraft began in 1958), the main challenge to Saigon 

came not from regular armies but guerrillas.40 In response, 

President Kennedy’s counterinsurgency plan for Vietnam, 

developed in late 1960, sought to increase US involvement 

with more troops and Airmen to perform such missions as 

aerial reconnaissance and airlift, neither of which the South 

Vietnamese air force (VNAF) could conduct.41 This move, part 

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of the president’s overall counterinsurgency strategy, led to 

the introduction of the Farmgate group.

The Guerrilla War and Airpower. As part of the counterinsurgency strategy sponsored by the Kennedy administration, 

the Farmgate project originated at Eglin AFB, Florida, to “train 

the Vietnamese in counterinsurgency and develop/confirm 

tactics and techniques for counterinsurgency operations” using aircraft primarily.42 The training advisers from Farmgate 

deployed to Southeast Asia with a contingent of T-28s and

B-26s to conduct CAS and armed reconnaissance operations. 

In 1961 the VNAF’s inventory consisted of Navy AD6s (redesignated A-1s) and F-8Fs, with a small contingent of L-19 spotter 

aircraft and helicopters—all of them in fair to poor condition.43

Farmgate sought to develop this force into one capable of defeating the insurgents within the confines of South Vietnam by 

training pilots and flying operational missions with them.

Many of the missions conducted by the US advisers alongside their VNAF brethren ranged from CAS of US “irregular 

forces and advisors and their indigenous South Vietnamese 

forces” to aerial resupply and convoy or helicopter escort. 

“Their tactics call for operations from simple airstrips in 

remote areas with low and slow flying aircraft. They train to 

perform low-level bombing and reconnaissance missions to 

flush out fleeing and concealed targets in the jungle, to air 

drop or land troops, and conduct psychological warfare.”44

Given the rough terrain and limited forces involved at the 

outset of the war, the aircraft in use proved themselves 

quite capable of performing the counterinsurgent mission. 

While the remainder of the conventional US Air Force developed new jet aircraft and focused on a nuclear-delivery 

mission, the Farmgate advisers and the VNAF continued 

a campaign of aerial counterinsurgency against an enemy 

who was becoming increasingly adept at his craft and more 

competent at defeating aerial threats.

Aircraft and Outcomes of the Vietnam War. The T-28 and 

A-1 aircraft proved themselves reliable machines in this environment, with excellent rough-field capabilities and ease of 

flight. Long loiter times, the ability to carry a variety of stores, 

and .30-caliber guns made these tough aircraft indispensable 

during the close-in fighting that characterized the war. The 

North Vietnamese had respectable antiaircraft capability as 

early as 1953, but the United States and VNAF did not become 

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concerned with losses inflicted by the north on their aircraft until 1963, at which time they withdrew the T-28 from service.45

This move left the VNAF with the A-1 as its primary fighter for 

performing a multitude of roles in a rapidly escalating conflict. 

Attacks by insurgents against US forces in 1963 led Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson to authorize direct attacks against the north, 

ushering in a new phase of the war.46

In January 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the initiation of “bolder actions” in response to the deteriorating 

political and military state of affairs in South Vietnam, effectively taking the war away from the South Vietnamese. In 

August 1964, following attacks against the USS Turner Joy

and USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson 

signed a resolution to move additional Army and Air Force 

personnel and equipment into Southeast Asia, including 

frontline fighters like the F-102, F-100, and F-105.47 This 

action offered relief to the Farmgate crews, whose equipment 

was wearing out and whose time in the air had more than 

doubled from the previous year. From that point on, the Air 

Force used the A-1 in a support role as an excellent escort 

asset for search-and-recovery missions and to provide CAS 

in areas of South Vietnam where the threat was not so high. 

The political situation became dire in 1965, prompting JohnA-1E Skyraiders over South Vietnam, 1965

 USAF photo

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son to increase US commitment in South Vietnam yet again 

by ordering a massive bombing campaign (Rolling Thunder) 

to “stave off communist victory,” thus ending the counterinsurgency effort and airpower’s role in it.48

As we have seen, the French in Algeria developed their tactics from experiences in Indochina, using readily available 

aircraft rather than limited numbers of strategic (high-tech) 

aircraft. Similarly, the United States used its experience in aiding the French in Indochina to prepare for counterinsurgent 

operations against the Communists; like France, it favored 

lower-tech aircraft, leaving the jets at home until 1964–65, 

when escalation made the war more conventional. Both countries entered these wars fighting a guerrilla army and modified their approach to warfare accordingly. Both realized early 

on that airpower in support of ground operations would prove 

decisive. Examining the types and roles of the aircraft that 

they used presents us with a wealth of knowledge that we may 

find invaluable for today’s counterinsurgency operations.

Airpower and Fighting

a Modern Counterinsurgency

He who understands how to use both large and small forces 

will be victorious.

—Sun Tzu

Modern warfare, both conventional and irregular, has featured the aircraft as a primary tool for the ground force. From 

aerial reconnaissance to logistics support to fire support, the 

aircraft has often made the difference between military defeat 

and victory. Yet, few wars have been waged without “boots on 

the ground.” Small wars are no different. Advances in aircraft 

engines, avionics, and firepower have revolutionized the conduct of war. Nevertheless, the ground commander still must 

move forces from one point on the battlefield to another. Both 

rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft often aid the ground-force commander in protecting convoys as well as providing fire support 

and reconnaissance when needed. The case studies illustrate 

the necessity of air support in defeating insurgent factions. 

France and the United States used similar types of support 

and aircraft—with good reason. These tough aircraft, driven 

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by reciprocating engines, supported forces on the move with 

economy, durability, and skill.

Now we turn to the specific missions required of these aircraft and the type of technology and doctrine that makes a 

viable counterinsurgent air platform. Even while the US Air 

Force awaits its new, expensive multirole fighters—the F-22A 

Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—operations today and 

for the foreseeable future call for a different platform: an aircraft designed to fight the small war. As Frank Jones, professor and former staff officer for the secretary of defense, observes, “Even superpowers can lose asymmetric wars. . . . The 

ideal response to such conflicts requires preparing for engagements despite technological advantages.”49

The Low-Tech Aviation Solution

Militaries have sought an aviation solution to counterinsurgent warfare for decades. The Marines used air cover 

and escort extensively in Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s, 

and the basic concept has not changed: “flying overhead, 

covering aircraft reconnoiter ahead of the ground forces and 

prevent ambushes as well as provide air-delivered ordnance 

on short notice.”50 Commenting on how best to conduct such 

missions in small wars, James Corum and Wray Johnson 

point out that “in many cases a low-tech approach has proven 

to be a highly useful and cost-effective means of employing 

airpower in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.”51 The aircraft that figured most prominently in these 

two conflicts, as well as others, was the A-1 Skyraider.

Many studies discussed the type of aircraft that should 

replace the A-1 during and after the Vietnam War. After all, 

this World War II–vintage aircraft seemed out of place in 

the new jet-age Air Force.52 But the A-1 did have its strong 

points. In both Vietnam and Algeria, the A-1 flew interdiction and CAS: “The A-1 had by far its greatest value in the 

unconventional warfare being conducted in Vietnam. It was 

the large load carrying capability together with its unique 

loiter capability that could be best utilized in the relatively 

safe anti-aircraft environment.”53

Furthermore, its relatively low cost offered an appealing 

alternative to the questionable economy of using jet aircraft 

to attack low-value ground targets.54 A tough aircraft able to 

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absorb ground fire and continue its mission, the A-1 could 

land in outlying, rough airstrips—as the French did time 

and again during their campaign. Finally, the aircraft’s low 

speed not only gave it excellent observation characteristics 

but also prevented the A-1 from “outrunning” its charges, 

whether helicopters or ground convoys. Along these same 

lines, aircraft flying this type of mission needed to fly low 

and slowly since “aerial reconnaissance and surveillance 

of the guerrilla operating area is most effective when conducted at low altitude (below 1500') and at low speed (under 

125 knots).”55 Given these features and unique employment 

concepts, the A-1 and its low-technology brethren made a 

name for themselves in small wars.

The New Skyraider

France and the United States used low-tech aircraft out of 

necessity in their small wars, realizing that the answer to this 

type of conflict lay not in expensive jet aircraft but in easily 

operated, maintained, and replaced airframes that served multiple roles on and off the battlefield. For the French, the plentiful T-6s and A4Ds (A-1s) presented an economically sound 

choice to outfit their post–World War II air force, whose jet aircraft would defend against possible Soviet advances in Europe. 

Very in tune to the type of conflict in which they engaged, the 

French used these assets quite effectively. Recognizing the

T-28 and A-1 as effective, cheap fire-support platforms useful 

in training an indigenous VNAF to defend itself, the Americans 

favored them over newer, frontline jet fighters. As one study 

put it, “The A-1 is sophisticated in another way; it is designed 

to match its operating environment as a classroom for pilots of 

friendly, underdeveloped nations, could carry lots of different 

bombs, and had a short take-off and landing capability.”56

From the Philippines to Malaya to Algeria to Vietnam, lowtechnology-based aircraft proved their worth in conflicts in 

which the counterinsurgent engaged a guerrilla enemy with 

less than a total military or political effort. Today, the United 

States has high stakes, politically and militarily, in the war 

on terror and gives priority to protection of its troops. Yet, US 

assets that would typically protect them from the air are not 

designed to do so in this type of environment. Indeed, “more 

and more emphasis [was] placed on massive, complex weapon 

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systems, leaving much to be desired in the aircraft especially 

designed to meet the needs of future limited conflicts.”57

Such aircraft should have the following characteristics: (1) 

off-the-shelf technology, (2) long range and loiter capability, 

(3) short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability, (4) ability to 

operate from austere airfields, (5) diverse weapons-carrying 

capability, (6) good navigation and fire-control systems, (7) 

good pilot visibility, (8) speed and maneuverability at lowto-medium altitudes, and (9) ability to absorb ground fire 

with a high degree of survivability. Of especial importance, 

the aircraft should be inexpensive and suited to the type of 

support expected of it. As a corollary, it should lend itself 

well to training pilots from “lesser-developed” nations that 

will eventually assume responsibility for internal security 

against insurgent factions once the United States ends its 

involvement and these countries become self-governing.

With regard to off-the-shelf technology, the French went 

to war in Algeria using readily available aircraft since their 

limited jet inventory was engaged in Europe. For a nation 

trying to come out from under the financial effects of a major 

war, these cheap platforms proved more than adequate. The 

United States was similarly justified in supplying Farmgate 

with surplus machinery that suited the nature of the war, 

both militarily and politically. Today, the costs of developing 

and producing high-tech aircraft with stealth and speed have 

become onerous to the US treasury. When the United States 

fights small wars, it needs to keep costs low—in terms of 

both life and treasure—in order to maintain public support. 

By adapting an aircraft already in production or by making 

it specifically suited to the intended low-tech task, an aviation solution will find its way to the battlefield quickly and in 

suitable numbers.

Long range/loiter capability, STOL, and rough-field operating characteristics also became important factors in Algeria 

and Vietnam with regard to terrain and the nature of the 

conflicts. The desert and jungle environments, coupled with 

a need for immediate support to troops on the move, required 

that these aircraft be readily available to the ground commander and be sufficiently rugged since they would often 

stage at forward locations, bereft of the high-tech support 

equipment needed by newer jet aircraft and served only by 

short, rough “runways.” Like the French aircraft in Algeria, 

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the new Skyraiders need to stage close to the convoy or force 

they will protect so they can provide rapid response and continuous cover.

The aircraft mentioned in both case studies reflected 

World War II design. However, as the conflict in Southeast 

Asia became more intense, the manufacturers enhanced 

their weapons-carrying capability and delivery systems. 

Rocket pods, bomb racks, and infrared tracking devices improved the CAS proficiency of the A-1 as the war progressed. 

Today, engineers can modify an aircraft of commercial or 

military design with sophisticated navigation and fire control so it can deliver anything from munitions guided by the 

global positioning system to heavy cannon fire or cluster 

munitions with relative ease. In this sense, low tech does 

not necessarily apply to avionics and weapons.

Timely response to an insurgent attack depends upon the 

aircraft’s ability to maneuver away from threats and permit 

good pilot visibility of the often small, fleeting insurgent target. Jet aircraft can respond to any situation quickly but 

often cannot “see” the target in jungle or restrictive terrain. 

According to one study, although the threat environment 

of Vietnam proved too great for aircraft such as the A-1 to 

operate close to regular units, it could escort rescue forces 

effectively because it was fast (more so than helicopters) 

but not so fast that it would outrun the forces it escorted or 

prevent the pilot from seeing enemy forces in the jungle.58

Thus, speed and maneuverability can only aid a propellerdriven aircraft in defense missions.

Just as the counterinsurgent theater of operations has 

matured since the end of the Vietnam War, so must aircraft that use current defensive technology. As Gen Eugene 

M. Zuckert, former secretary of the Air Force, stated with 

regard to the A-1, “[Its] effectiveness was apparent in the 

counterinsurgent environment while the problem was not 

air superiority but an elusive enemy.”59 Unlike the US experience in the latter half of the Vietnam War, the United 

States now usually enjoys air superiority in areas where 

insurgents operate. The problem in Vietnam lay in the proliferation of man-portable missiles and light arms. Today’s 

defensive measures can more than meet the challenge presented by this threat; in fact, propeller-driven aircraft have 

smaller heat signatures for the type of infrared homing misArticle.indd 18 12/8/05 6:07:0
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siles that insurgents might employ. In addition, avionics 

solutions can update the natural defenses of such aircraft 

to allow them to become more survivable in this type of environment. Hence, an aircraft such as the newly fielded T-6 

Texan II, or something similar, might be a good start.

 T-6A Texan II

Raytheon Aircraft Corporation has rejuvenated the T-6’s 

heritage in its latest aircraft design for the US Undergraduate 

Pilot Training program. Although a detailed analysis of aircraft 

performance and design lies beyond the scope of this paper, 

this aircraft offers a good example of the type of off-the-shelf 

platform that could undergo modification to perform today’s 

counterinsurgent mission. Its performance resembles that of 

the A-1 in terms of maneuverability, speed (maximum of 320 

miles per hour [mph]), and range (900 miles without external 

tanks).60 Both the A-1 and T-6A boast excellent pilot visibility 

and ease of handling. Employment as a combat platform would 

require modifications, but the aircraft’s basic performance 

makes it a viable alternative to the fast-moving, expensive jet 

aircraft that now dominate our inventory. As James Donovan 

notes, the “A-1’s adaptability to operations in underdeveloped 

areas was the primary reason it was used rather than faster, 

more modern jet aircraft.”61

Doctrine for Employment

One can liken aviation support in small wars to artillery 

in Callwell’s era because its “primary duty . . . in warfare is 

USAF photo

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to ensure that it is on hand and well to the front.”62 That is, 

propeller-driven aircraft or any aircraft capable of serving as 

a slow, stable fire-support or reconnaissance platform must 

be immediately available for usually violent but short-lived 

guerrilla engagements. The French in Algeria made use of 

forward-operating locations, often along the route of march, 

to rearm and refuel their aircraft so that a convoy would always have access to some form of on-hand air support.63

The tactical air control system employed by the French assured that their air assets stayed in proximity to and worked 

closely with the units they supported. The tactical air command maintained centralized control to some extent, but execution remained extremely decentralized, allowing the ground 

commander to adjust to mission needs and keep aviation support on hand. Similarly, in Vietnam the VNAF and US JOC 

maintained overall situational awareness of the battlespace. 

However, this primitive system, combined with the slow cruising speed of the T-28 and A-1, forced us to adopt more proactive air-cover schemes to facilitate immediate response to the 

needs of the ground-force commander.64 Because the United 

States had built a system too unwieldy to handle a rapidly 

changing environment, as the air war got larger and more air 

assets poured into the theater, the system broke down.

Putting It All Together

As we have seen previously, the aircraft type alone does not 

dictate the successful use of airpower in counterinsurgencies. 

Ground commanders must have access to the asset where 

and when they need it. Jerome Klingaman comments that

the history of aircraft operations in counter guerrilla warfare . . . 

suggests the following considerations and recommendations. . . . 

Given a reasonable STOL capability, light armed surveillance aircraft should be attached to and deploy with small ground combat 

units. Fixed-base operations from large built-up facilities outside 

the combat area should be avoided. Aircraft should be immediately 

available to the ground force commander as assigned or attached 

resources of the counter guerrilla attack or reconnaissance unit. 

When the unit moves, the aircraft moves with it.65

Although this passage refers to reconnaissance aircraft, 

the principle holds true for close-support aircraft as well. 

The French tied air operations directly to the ground commander by working fire-support issues directly through a 

JOC, but they went one step farther by placing those assets 

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directly with the units they supported, allowing for close 

coordination of movement and fires.

The struggle to stabilize nations riddled with insurgent or terrorist factions will occupy US armed forces for the foreseeable 

future. To protect our ground forces on the move, either traveling in convoys or conducting direct attack, we must return 

to simpler times with regard to aviation support assets. Fastmoving jet aircraft operating at high altitudes and awaiting 

support requests are not as immediately responsive to the 

ground commander as relatively slow propeller aircraft operating at lower altitudes and working immediately over the column, ready to provide intelligence or fires on command. Missions that take up so much of the air components’ time today 

in Iraq involve reconnaissance/surveillance of thoroughfares 

and pipelines and spending time in the “CAS stack” waiting for 

on-call fire missions.66 To use these assets, the ground commander must call back to a centralized control center.

With regard to operations against insurgents, we must 

loosen the focus on centralized control of air assets. Having 

stacks of jet aircraft orbiting in a central location offers some 

form of flexibility. However, this solution is an expensive way 

to utilize frontline aircraft that may or may not have the loiter 

time and responsiveness to press the attack when the enemy 

ambushes a convoy. Regular, face-to-face contact between 

pilots and the troops they support is invaluable and can 

work only when the two are colocated and part of the same 

“fight.” When fighting enemies who “[prowl] about waiting for 

their opportunity to pounce upon small parties,”67 we must 

have aircraft waiting for them.

Summary

The employment of aviation in small wars is characterized by 

the operation of many small units, two or three plane patrols, 

over a wide area.

—US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940

There is nothing new about supporting the ground force 

in a dangerous guerrilla environment. Many people have 

written on the subject and continue to do so because of the 

current global war on terrorism. Insurgents, few in number, 

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fight with asymmetric weapons. Often, this type of fight is 

merely a nuisance to a larger, more heavily armed force, 

but to a convoy trying to reach its destination and avoid 

enemy contact, it becomes something entirely different. As 

the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment learned in Iraq, “Much 

of the combat [now] hits rear-echelon soldiers rather than 

front-line troops. . . . Supply experts and truck drivers, who 

expected to be comparably safe, [are] more likely to face 

attack than more heavily armored soldiers in tanks and 

trenches.”68 Air support from a force tailored for this type of 

combat in terms of both equipment and doctrine will prove 

decisive in the war we wage today.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Yarborough, “Counterinsurgency,” 103–4.

2. Klonis, Guerrilla Warfare, 5.

3. Russian General Staff, Soviet-Afghan War, 306–7. This war was 

fought between Soviet regulars aided by the Afghan National Army as well 

as religiously and nationalistically motivated rebels for nearly a decade. The 

terrain and nature of the war led the Soviets to adopt a garrison strategy—a 

departure from their traditional form of mobile combat. The principal forms 

of fighting adopted by the Soviets included the raid, block and sweep, ambush, and actions connected with convoy escort or security since the mujahideen did not engage in groups of more than five to 20 fighters and avoided 

direct confrontation.

4. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 1.

5. Yousaf, Bear Trap, 178–81.

6. Clausewitz, On War, 481.

7. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 6.

8. Danilowicz, “Fish out of Water,” 5.

9. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 10.

10. Callwell, Small Wars, 91.

11. Clausewitz, On War, 481.

12. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 22.

13. Lawrence, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 883.

14. Jones, “Army SOF in Afghanistan,” 18.

15. Bryce, “Gas Pains,” 34–35.

16. Ibid., 35.

17. Gen John W. Handy as quoted in Hebert, “Headwinds for the Air 

Force,” 53.

18. Callwell, Small Wars, 475.

19. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics, E-38.

20. US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 228.

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21. Bliesener et al., “New and Unique Demands,” 29.

22. Graham, “Over Iraq.”

23. Glanz and Shanker, “Iraq Study.”

24. Roeder, “US Soldiers, Iraqis Changed,” 1, sec. A.

25. “Insurgent Attacks.”

26. Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft, 79.

27. Melnik, French Campaign, 8.

28. Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft, 81.

29. Christienne and Lissarague, French Military Aviation, 428.

30. Aerospace Studies Institute, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 39.

31. Ibid., 40.

32. Ibid., 62.

33. Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft, 81.

34. Aerospace Studies Institute, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 40.

35. Ibid., 41.

36. Christienne and Lissarague, French Military Aviation, 430.

37. Aerospace Studies Institute, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 43.

38. Ibid., 92.

39. Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, 287.

40. Ibid., 288.

41. Napier, “Air Commandos in Vietnam,” 67.

42. Farmgate was a training cover for a covert mission supporting the 

VNAF against the Vietcong. Message, TSC-PFOCC-S 61-170.

43. Doucette, “US Air Force Lessons,” 19.

44. As quoted in Napier, “Air Commandos in Vietnam,” 104.

45. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 263.

46. Ibid., 265. The A-1 had the following specifications: Wright R3350-26B 2,800-horsepower radial piston engine; empty weight of 10,550 

pounds; maximum takeoff weight of 25,000 pounds; wingspan of 50 feet, 

nine inches; length of 38 feet, 10 inches; height of 15 feet, 8.25 inches; 

maximum speed of 320 mph at 18,000 feet; cruising speed of 190 mph at 

6,000 feet; ceiling of 25,500 feet; range of 900 miles; and armament of four 

20 mm cannons as well as 8,000 pounds of hard-point-mounted free-fall 

and/or forward-firing weapons. “Douglas A-1 Skyraider.”

47. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 266.

48. Ibid., 267.

49. Jones, “Army SOF in Afghanistan,” 21.

50. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 261.

51. Ibid., 431.

52. Mutza, A-1 Skyraider in Vietnam, 16.

53. Donovan, “A1 Aircraft in Southeast Asia,” 6.

54. Ibid., 10.

55. Drew, “Air Theory, Air Force,” 341. Professor Drew refers to the 

need to include additional crew members to enhance observation in difficult terrain—a point made by Jerome Klingaman and other writers who 

have discussed types of airpower constructs for low intensity conflict.

56. Johanson, “Counterinsurgency in the USAF Today,” 18–19.

57. Bliesener et al., “New and Unique Demands,” 10.

58. Newton, “Armed Escort,” 50.

59. Donovan, “A1 Aircraft in Southeast Asia,” 6–7.

Article.indd 23 12/8/05 6:07:
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60. The T-6A Texas II entry-level trainer has the following specifications: Pratt and Whitney 1,100-horsepower Canada PT6A-68 turboprop 

engine; standard basic empty weight of 6,500 pounds; wingspan of 33.5 

feet; length of 33.4 feet; height of 10.7 feet; maximum speed of 320 mph; 

ceiling of 31,000 feet; range of 900 nautical miles; crew of two; and no 

armament. “T-6A Texan II.”

61. Donovan, “A1 Aircraft in Southeast Asia,” 7.

62. Callwell, Small Wars, 433.

63. Christienne and Lissarague, French Military Aviation, 464.

64. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 261.

65. Klingaman, “Light Aircraft Technology,” 129.

66. Graham, “Over Iraq.”

67. Callwell, Small Wars, 125.

68. Roeder, “US Soldiers, Iraqis Changed,” 1, sec. A.

Article.indd 24 12/8/05 6:07:
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