UNITED STATES ARMr IN WORLD WAR II 

The War in the Pacific 

THE APPROACH TO 

THE PHILIPPINES 

hJ 

Rohert Ross Smith 

ctNfER OF MIUTARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.G., 1996 

Foreword 

The Approach to the Philippines deals principally with lesser known bUl 

highly interesting amphibious and gTound operations along the New Guinea coast 

durin ~ 1944 and also relates the Anny's pan in the conquest of the southern Palau 

Islands. Opening the way for the Allied invasion of the Philippine Islands in the 

fall of 1944, the operations described in this volume involved all the mechanics 

of modem warfare--the complexities of arnphihiolLS landings, carrier-based and 

land-based air support, infantry maneuver and small unit action, artillery support, 

logistics, lank and flame thrower action, troop leadership, medical problems, civil 

affairs, intdligcncc=, and all the rest. Whih": primarily a story of ground combat 

action, the volume describes the activities of the Anny's supporting services in 

sufficie::nt de::tail to complete:: the history of the ground ope::rations. Navy, Anny Air 

Forcts, and Marine Corps activities are:: cove::red as ne::ccssary to provide a wdlbalance::d pictu re, and enough strategic background material is included to fit the 

tactical narrative into its proper perspective in the global war. 

Mr. Robert Ross Smith, the author, has a B. A. and M. A. in history from 

Dukr University, and he holds a Reserve commission as a Major of Infantry . 

A graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Ga., Mr. 

Smith scrv(:d for two years during World War II as a member of the G-3 Historical Division at General Douglas MacArthur's Allied Headquarters in the 

Southwtst Pacific Area. Mr. Smith has been with the Office of the Chid of 

Military History, either as an officer on active duty or as a civilian, since January 

1947. 

Washinglon, D. C. 

1 M,y 1952 

ORLANDO WARD 

Maj. Gen ., U. S. A. 

Chief of Military History. 
Author

Robert Ross Smith received his B.A. and M.A. degrees from Duke University.

A graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia,

Mr. Smith served two years in the G-3 Historical Division staff at General MacArthur's headquarters in the Southwest Pacific. He joined the Center of Military

History in 1947 and rose to the position of branch chief before retiring in 1983.

He also served as chief historian of U.S. Army, Pacific, during an important phase

of the Vietnam War. Mr. Smith has written many works on military history, including Triumph in the Philippines, another volume in the U.S. Army in World War

II series. He is a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve.

iv
Preface

This volume describes the operations of Allied forces in the Pacific theaters

during the approach to the Philippines, April through October 1944. While this

is essentially the story of U. S. Army ground combat operations during the

approach, the activities of all ground, air, and naval forces are covered where

necessary for the understanding of the Army ground narrative. Eight major and

separate operations, all susceptible of subdivision into distinct phases, are described.

Seven of these operations took place in the Southwest Pacific Area, while one—the

Palau Islands operation—occurred in the Central Pacific Area. This series of

actions is exceptional in that the operations were executed in such rapid succession

that while one was being planned the height of combat was being reached in

another and still others had entered the mopping-up stage.

Because of the nature of the combat, the level of treatment in this volume is

generally that of the regimental combat team—the infantry regiment with its

supporting artillery, engineer, tank, medical, and other units. The majority of the

actions described involved a series of separate operations by infantry regiments or

regimental combat teams, since divisions seldom fought as integral units during the

approach to the Philippines. Division headquarters, often assuming the role of a

ground task force headquarters, co-ordinated and administered the ofttimes widely

separated actions of the division's component parts.

In accomplishing the research and writing for this volume, which was begun

in the spring of 1947, the author had access to the records of the U. S. Army

units involved in the approach to the Philippines. Records of the Combined and

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Army General Staff, the U. S. Navy and Marine

Corps, the U. S. Air Force, and the Australian services were also made available

to the author upon request. Principal Japanese sources employed were monographs of Japanese operations prepared by former Japanese Army and Navy

officers, beginning in late 1946, under the direction of the United States high

command in Tokyo.

Unlike most operations in the Central Pacific and in Europe, those of U. S.

Army ground combat forces in the Southwest Pacific Area had no contemporary

historical coverage during World War II. In the last-named theater, no teams

of historians accompanied combat units to observe, collect materials, conduct

interviews, and prepare preliminary historical manuscripts. Thus, the sections of

this volume concerning operations in the Southwest Pacific Area are based principally upon the official unit records maintained during combat and, to a lesser

extent, the unit After Action Reports required by Army regulations. For operav
tions in the Palaus, there was available an incomplete manuscript covering part

of the 81st Infantry Division's actions. This was prepared partly in the field and

partly during a short tour of duty with the Historical Division, War Department

General Staff, by Maj. Nelson L. Drummond, Jr. For operations of the 1st Marine

Division in the Palaus, the author depended for the most part on Maj. Frank O.

Hough's The Assault on Peleliu, an official publication of the Historical Division,

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

It is manifestly impossible for the author to list all those who have aided or

guided him during the preparation of this volume, but he must express his gratitude

to those who have made especially notable contributions.

Thanks are due the personnel of the Historical Records Section, Departmental

Records Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, especially Mr.

Wilbur Nigh and Miss Thelma K. Yarborough, for their co-operation and patience

in helping the author locate source material. For similar reasons thanks are due

the members of the Organization Records Branch, Records Administration Center,

Office of The Adjutant General. The author is also greatly indebted to Maj.

Frank O. Hough (USMCR) of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S.

Marine Corps; to Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR) of the Naval History Branch, Naval

Records and History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U. S.

Navy; to the personnel of the Naval Records and Library Branch of the same

Division; to Capt. Bernhardt L. Mortensen (USAF) of the USAF History, Research, and Library Division, Air University Library, Air University, U. S. Air

Force; to Flight Lt. Arthur L. Davies (RAAF) of the History Section, Headquarters Royal Australian Air Force; and to the author's personal friend Capt.

John Balfour (AIF) of the Office of the Official War Historian, Australia. The

list would not be complete without mention of the time and patience of fifty-odd

participating commanders who provided comments on all or parts of the manuscript and, finally, official reviews undertaken by members of the Historical

Sections of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Marine Corps, the U. S. Navy,

the U. S. Air Force, and the Australian Army.

Especial thanks are due Dr. John Miller, jr., during whose tenure as Chief

of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, much of this volume

was written, for his sound counsel and his careful reviewing of the final manuscript. For his excellent guidance and valuable advice, a great debt of gratitude

is likewise owed Dr. Louis Morton, under whose direction as Chief of the Pacific

Section preparation of this volume was begun and (upon his return to the section

after a period of service as Deputy Chief Historian, Department of the Army)

completed. The help and encouragement of Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief

Historian, Department of the Army, is also keenly appreciated. The author is

greatly indebted to the late Mr. W. Brooks Phillips of the Editorial Branch, Office

of the Chief of Military History, who did the final editing, ably assisted by

Mrs. Loretto Stevens and other members of the same branch. Mr. Leonard B.

Lincoln prepared the index, and the painstaking task of final typing for the

vi
printer was in charge of Mrs. Lois Riley. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the many other members of the Office of the Chief of Military History

(especially Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, the Chief Cartographer, and his colleagues

of the Cartographic Branch, as well as the members of the Photographic Branch),

for the time and effort they expended during the preparation of the volume.

Finally, the completion of the work would not have been possible without

the support of Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief of Military History, Department

of the Army, and the military members of his staff who, understanding the

problems of the historian, made the path smoother.

ROBERT ROSS SMITH

Washington, D. C.

1 May 1952

vii

... to Those Who Served

Contents

Chapter Page

I. THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND ........... . 1

Determining the Strategy of the Approach ........... . 1

Acceleration of Pacific Operations in Early 1944 ........ . 6

The New Directive for 1944 ................. 11

II. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE HOLLANDIAAITAPE OPERATION ............... . 1 3

Theater Organization. .................. . 1 4

T h e Hollandia Area ................... . 1 6

The Decision to Take Aitape ............... . 19

The Forces and Their Missions .............. . 23

Logistics. ....................... . 3 2

The Hollandia Tactical Plan................. 42

Preliminary Operations and the Approach ........... . 48

III. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION ............ . 5 3

The Landings at Tanahmerah Bay ............. . 53

The 24th Division's Drive to the Airfields .... ....... 59

The Seizure of Hollandia Town .............. . 68

The Drive Inland from Humboldt Bay ............ . 71

Logistic Problems of the RECKLESS Task Force ........ . 77

The End of the Operation ................ . 82

IV. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA ...................... . 8 4

Strategy and Dispositions to April 1944 ............ . 84

The Japanese at Hollandia ................ . 95

V. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR ... 103

Securing the Airfield Area ................. . 103

Contact with the 18th Army on the East Flank ........ . 114

V I. DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE ............. . 13 1

Reinforcement and Reorganization of the PERSECUTION Task

Force ........................ . 13 1

Gathering Combat Intelligence ............... . 13 7

The 18th Army Moves West ............... . 145

VII. THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR, PHASE I: THE 18TH

ARMY ATTACKS ................. . 15 2

Withdrawal of the PERSECUTION Covering Force ....... . 152

Restoration of the Driniumor Line .............. . 158

Operations West of the Driniumor .............. . 167

The Japanese Attack on the South Flank ........... . 170

xi
Chapter Page

VIII. THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR, PHASE II: THE 18TH

ARMY RETREATS ................ . 17 7

Securing the Afua Area .................. . 177

Envelopment to the East .................. 188

The End of the Aitape Operation .............. . 200

IX. THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND .......... . 206

T h e Sarmi-Biak Plan .................. . 20 6

T h e Wakde Plan .................... . 21 2

Preparations for the Capture of Wakde Island ......... . 218

Small-Island Warfare, Southwest Pacific Style ......... . 222

X. LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS ..... . 232

The Japanese at Wakde-Sarmi ............... . 232

The 158th Infantry Against Lone Tree Hill .......... . 236

Final Operations of the 158th Infantry ............ . 253

X I. LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND ........... . 26 3

The 6th Division Against Lone Tree Hill .......... . 263

Final Operations in the Wakde-Sarmi Area .......... . 275

The Results of the Wakde-Sarmi Operation .......... . 278

XII. BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY . . . 280

T h e Biak Plan ..................... . 28 0

T h e Landing ..................... . 28 9

T h e Japanese o n Biak .................. . 29 9

XIII WEST TO MOKMER DROME ............ . 304

A n Initial Reverse ................... . 30 4

Preparations for a New Attack ............... . 312

The Seizure of Mokmer Drome .............. . 316

XIV. FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME ........ . 32 6

Reinforcements for the 186th Infantry ............ . 326

Operations North of Mokmer Drome ............ . 331

Allied Command a t Biak ................. . 34 0

XV. THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK .......... . 346

Biak and Japanese Naval Plans .............. . 346

T h e KO N Operation ................. . 35 0

Results of the KON Operation .............. . 361

XVI. BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS . . 365

The Reduction of the West Caves .............. . 365

Securing the Western Area ................ . 377

The Reduction of the East Caves .............. . 380

The Reduction of the Ibdi Pocket .............. . 384

The End of the Operation ................ . 390

xii
Chapter Page

XVII. OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND. ....... . 397

The Noemfoor Plan .................... . 397

T h e Landing ...................... . 40 6

The Occupation of Noemfoor Island .............. . 416

Base Development on Noemfoor ................ . 421

XVIII. AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA ..... . 425

Early Plans for the Vogelkop ................ . 425

T he Sansapor-Mar Plan .................. . 431

Operations in the Sansapor-Mar Area ............. . 440

XIX. THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: STRATEGIC AND TACTIC A L PLANNING ................... . 45 0

T h e Strategic Setting .................. . 45 0

T h e Objectives ..................... . 45 6

Organization, Tactics, and Logistics .............. . 463

XX. THE MOROTAI OPERATION ............. . 480

T h e Landing ...................... . 48 0

Securing and Developing Morotai ............... . 488

XXI. THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR ...... . 494

Preliminary Air and Naval Bombardment ............ . 494

T h e Peleliu Beachhead ................... . 49 6

The Decision to Land on Angaur . . ............ . 498

The Assault on Angaur ................... . 499

Securing Southern Angaur ................. . 508

XXII. THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR ... . 515

Into the Main Defenses .................. . 515

Overcoming the Last Resistance ................ . 523

Results of Operations on Angaur ............... . 530

XXIII. SECURING PELELIU ISLAND ............. . 532

Marine Operations in Southern Peleliu to 22 September ....... . 532

Dividing the Island ..................... 536

Northern Peleliu and the Offshore Islands ............ . 543

XXIV. PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE .......... . 551

Compressing the Umurbrogol Pocket .............. . 551

Entr'acte: The Relief of the 1st Marine Division ......... . 559

Overcoming the Final Resistance ............... . 561

Results of Operations in the Palaus .............. . 573

CONCLUSION: THE RESULTS AND THE COSTS ........ . 576

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ................... . 57 9

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................... . 595

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ............... . 601

INDEX ............................ . 60 5

xiii
Tables

No. Page

1. American Casualties During the Approach to the Philippines: AprilDecember 1944 ....................... . 57 7

2. Japanese Casualties, Defending the Approaches to the Philippines: AprilDecember 1944 ....................... . 57 8

Charts

1. Operational Organization of the Southwest Pacific Area: April 1944 . . 15

2. Air Organization for the Hollandia-Aitape Operations (Amphibious

Phase). .......................... . 2 5

3. Naval Organization for the Hollandia-Aitape Operations (Amphibious

Phase). .......................... . 2 8

4. Ground Organization for the Hollandia-Aitape Operations (Amphibious Phase). ...................... . 3 3

5. Japanese Army Operational Organization in the Southwest Pacific

Area: April 1944 ...................... . 9 4

6. Japanese Naval Operational Organization in the Central and Southwest

Pacific Areas: April 1944 .................. . 9 6

7. The PERSECUTION Task Force: 22 April-4 May 1944 ........ . 104

8. The PERSECUTION Task Force: 4 May-28 June 1944 ........ . 115

9. The PERSECUTION Task Force: 28 June-11 July 1944 ........ . 136

10. The PERSECUTION Task Force: 11 July-21 July 1944 ........ . 160

11. The PERSECUTION Task Force: 22 July-30 July 1944 ........ . 175

12. The PERSECUTION Task Force: 31 July-11 August 1944 . ...... . 189

13. The PERSECUTION Task Force: 11 August-25 August 1944. ..... . 203

14. Organization for the Palau Operation .............. . 465

Maps

1. Situation in the Pacific, 12 March 1944 ....... . .... . 2

2. Hollandia Operation Area ................... . 17

3. Aitape Landings, 22 April 1944 ................. . 106

4 . Yakamul Area ........................ . 12 4

5. Situation Along the Driniumor, Evening, 10 July 1944 ....... . 141

6. Japanese Plan of Attack, 10 July 1944 .............. . 149

7. Japanese Attack on Driniumor Line, Night, 10-11 July 1944 .... . 153

8. The TED Force Action, 31 July-10 August 1944 . ......... . 193

9 . Wakde-Sarmi Area ...................... . 20 7

10. Capture of Wakde Islands, 17-19 May 1944 ........... . 223

11. Advance to Lone Tree Hill, 23-26 May 1944 ........... . 240

12. TORNADO Task Force, Night, 30-31 May 1944 .......... . 254

1 3 . Schouten Islands ....................... . 28 1

xiv
No. Page

1 4 . Bosnek-Sorido Coast ..................... . 28 2

15. Attack North of Mokmer Drome, 11-15 June 1944 ........ . 333

16. Securing the Airfields, 18-24 June 1944 ............. . 370

17. Capture of Noemfoor, 2 July-31 August 1944 ........... . 399

18. Vogelkop Operation, 30 July-31 August 1944 . .......... . 431

1 9 . Palau Islands ........................ . 45 8

20. Morotai Landings, 15 September 1944 .............. . 476

2 1. Terrain o f Umurbrogol Pocket ................. . 552

22. Marines at Umurbrogol Pocket, 30 September-15 October 1944 ... . 557

23. 321st Infantry at Umurbrogol Pocket, 16-25 October 1944 ...... . 562

24. 323d Infantry at Umurbrogol Pocket, 26 October-27 November 1944 . . 570

Maps I-IX are in accompanying map envelope

I. New Guinea.

II. The Hollandia Operation, 22-26 April 1944.

III. Securing the Beachhead, 23 April-4 May 1944.

IV. Lone Tree Hill.

V. Biak Landings and Seizure of Mokmer Drome, 27 May-7 June 1944.

VI. Assault on Peleliu, 15-23 September 1944.

VII. Assault on Angaur, 17-20 September 1944.

VIII. Reduction of Northwestern Angaur, 21 September-1 October 1944.

IX. Dividing the Island, 24-26 September 1944.

Illustrations

Lake Sentani Plain, Showing Airfields ............... . 1 9

Hollandia-Aitape Planners .................... . 3 0

Humbolt Bay ........................... 44

Tanahmerah Bay ......................... 46

Damaged Japanese Airplanes ................... . 5 1

Landings at Tanahmerah Bay .................... 54

Unloading LST's ........................ . 5 7

Hand-Carrying Supplies ..................... . 6 3

General Douglas MacArthur .................... . 6 9

LVT's Crossing Lake Sentani ................... . 7 5

Troops Unloading Supplies at Aitape ................. 109

Yakamul Area .......................... . 12 4

Tadji Fighter Strip ........................ . 12 9

Driniumor River ........................ . 14 2

Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi ...................... 146

T h e Afua Area ......................... . 17 8

Artillery Supporting TE D Force ................... . 19 8

Native Litter Bearers ....................... . 20 1
Page

Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe ...................... . 220

T h e Assault o n Wakde Island ................... . 22 5

Enemy Defensive Positions on Wakde ................ . 229

LCM Ferry ............................ 253

Mokmer Drome, Biak ....................... . 28 8

Biak Coast Line ......................... . 29 2

Unloading at Biak ......................... 298

East Caves Area ......................... . 30 5

Scene o f Tank Battle ....................... . 30 8

The Parai Defile .......................... 314

Men of the 162d Infantry Seeking Cover .............. . 331

Disabled Japanese Tank ...................... . 33 9

Infantrymen Moving U p t o Attack ................. . 36 7

Entrances to the West Caves ..................... 376

Entrance to the East Caves ..................... 383

Dock Area, Biak ......................... . 39 4

Base H and Hospital Areas on Biak ................. . 395

DUKW Burning on the Beach a t Noemfoor ............. . 410

Paratroopers Landing o n Noemfoor ................. . 41 4

Sansapor Planners ........................ . 43 5

Bulldozer Clearing Jungle Undergrowth ............... . 44 8

Maj. Gen. Paul J. Mueller . .................... . 467

LCI's at Morotai .......................... 484

Unloading a t Morotai ...................... . 48 6

R e d Beach Unloading Operations ................. . 50 2

Saipan Town Area . ....................... . 50 6

Entrance to Lake Salome Bowl .......... ......... 520

Interior of Lake Salome Bowl .................... 525

Mopping Up in Northwest Angaur .................. 528

Southeast Corner of Umurbrogol Pocket ............... . 554

LVT Flame Thrower in Action ................... 564

Moving into Mortimer Valley ....... . .......... . 56 8

Peleliu .............................. 574

The illustration on p. 146 is an Australian War Memorial photograph. All

other illustrations in this volume are from the files of the Department of Defense.

xvi
CHAPTER I

The Strategic Background

In March 1944 the U. S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff directed Allied forces in the Pacific to

begin an offensive toward the Philippine

Islands. Recapture of the Philippines would

be a profoundly important step toward the

defeat of Japan, for from those islands the

Allies could cut Japanese lines of communication to the rich, conquered territory of the

Netherlands East Indies, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. In the Philippines the Allies could also establish bases

from which to support subsequent advances

against Formosa, the China coast, or Japan

itself.

Before March 1944 the objectives of operations in the Pacific had been limited to

securing the lines of communication from

the United States to Australia, beginning an

attack across the Central Pacific, and occupying bases from which to launch future

operations. During these operations Allied

forces of General Douglas MacArthur's

Southwest Pacific Area had secured eastern

New Guinea, western New Britain, and the

Admiralty Islands, joining with the drive of

Admiral William F. Halsey's South Pacific

Area forces up the Solomon Islands in a

campaign to neutralize the great Japanese

base at Rabaul. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

had begun an offensive in his Central Pacific

Area late in 1943; by March 1944 his forces

had driven through the Gilbert Islands into

the Marshalls. Now the war in the Pacific

was ready to enter a more decisive stage, as

the various land, sea, and air forces under

General Mac Arthur and Admiral Nimitz

attacked toward the Philippines from the

bases already in Allied hands.

The offensive toward the Philippines

would have to be undertaken with relatively

limited means. The U.S.-British Combined

Chiefs of Staff, subject to whose approval the

U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the war

in the Pacific, had from the first assigned

priority in the global war to the defeat of

Germany.

Determining the Strategy of the Approach

In May 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff secured approval from the Combined Chiefs

for a course of action providing that the

main offensive against Japan would be conducted across the Pacific, as opposed to advances from the Aleutians, Southeast Asia,

or China. The Joint Chiefs decided that the

seizure of a foothold in the Philippines would

be necessary before any subsequent operations against Japan or her holdings could be

launched. To the Joint Chiefs, there were

two practicable routes of approach to the

Philippines. One was across the Central Pacific via the Marshalls, Carolines, and Palaus; the other in the Southwest Pacific along

the north coast of New Guinea and into the

islands between northwestern New Guinea

and Mindanao, southernmost large island

of the Philippine Archipelago. The choice of
Map 1
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 3

routes and the direction and objectives of

amphibious offensives in both the Central

and Southwest Pacific Areas were not determined without a great deal of discussion

at the highest levels of United States command.1

General Mac Arthur's Concepts

General MacArthur, who upon orders

from the President had left the Philippines

in early 1942, had a burning determination

to return to those islands as soon as possible.

He favored the New Guinea-Mindanao

axis of advance to the Philippines. Almost

as soon as he assumed his new command in

the Southwest Pacific Area he began thinking about moving back to the Philippines

by means of a series of amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea.2

He envisaged this campaign as entailing a

steady advance of the Southwest Pacific's

land-based bomber line northwestward to

the Philippines by the successive seizure of

air-base sites along the 1,400-mile north

coast of New Guinea. General MacArthur

realized that once his forces began pushing

on to the Philippines from the Vogelkop

Peninsula of northwestern New Guinea they

would present vulnerable flanks to Japanese

air and sea power based in the Palau Islands

to the right (north) and in the Netherlands

East Indies to the left. He said, however,

that the advance along the New Guinea

coast as far as the Vogelkop could not be

endangered by hostile air attacks from the

Marshall or Caroline Islands to the north,

that it would take "full advantage of landbased air power" and could be "fully protected by naval power."

Beyond the Vogelkop the Allied left

would be protected by land-based aircraft

flying from fields which would be established

on islands between New Guinea and the

southern Philippines. The right flank could

be safeguarded by the occupation of the

Palau Islands or by operations of the U. S.

Pacific Fleet, the strategic missions of which,

General MacArthur averred, were to protect his right flank and destroy or contain

the Japanese fleet. Finally, he said, the advance along the north coast of New Guinea

could most quickly achieve one important

strategic objective—cutting the Japanese

lines of communication to the Indies.3

On the other hand, declared General

MacArthur, an advance toward the Philippines through the Central Pacific, via the

1

 JPS 67/4, 29 Apr 43; JPS 67/5, 26 May 43;

JCS 287, 7 May 43; JCS 287/1, 8 May 43. All entitled Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and all

in OPD file, ABC 381 Japan (8-27-42) Secs. 1 and

2. Min, JCS 76th and 80th Mtgs, 8 and 12 May 43;

CCS 220, 14 May 43, Strategic Plan for the Defeat

of Japan, and CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, Final Report

to the President and Prime Minister, TRIDENT Conference, last two in OPD file, bound volume of

TRIDENT [Washington, D. C.] Papers. Bound folders

containing minutes of meetings of the CCS, JCS,

and their subordinate committees are filed in the

office of ACofS, G-3, GSUSA. 2

 Ltr, CofS GHQ SWPA to Comdrs Allied Land,

Air, and Naval Forces SWPA (n. d., circa 13 May

42), sub: Preparations for the Counteroffensive,

copy atchd as Incl 3 to Ltr, Maj Gen Charles A.

Willoughby [ACofS G-2 GHQ FEC] to Maj Gen

Orlando Ward [Chief of Military History, Dept of

the Army] (n. d., circa 10 Mar 51), in OCMH

files. For 1941-42 operations in the Philippines and

General MacArthur's departure from those islands,

see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, a

forthcoming volume in the series, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

3

 GHQ SWPA, Estimate of the Situation and

Rough Draft, RENO Plan, 25 Feb 43, photostat copy

in OCMH files; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C3302, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 13149; Rad, CINCSWPA

to CofS, C-1217, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1443. The quotations are from the RENO plan, hereafter cited as

RENO I. CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers used in

the footnotes of this volume refer to numbers appearing on copies of those messages in Gen. George

C. Marshall's In and Out Logs, filed in the Staff

Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff,

U. S. Army.
4 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Marshall and Caroline Islands, would have

to be undertaken without any land-based air

support. Such a course of action would "be

time consuming and expensive in ...

naval power and shipping." It would "require a reorientation of front" from that already established in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas during operations aimed

at the reduction of Rabaul. It could gain no

important strategic objectives, in General

Mac Arthur's opinion, until a series of amphibious frontal assaults on small, fortified

islands brought Allied forces finally to Mindanao in the southern Philippines. Finally,

he argued, the concept of an advance

through the Central Pacific was a return to

the prewar plans, which, he declared, had

not been premised on the availability of Australia as a base for offensive operations.4

For a time General Mac Arthur's plans

for the approach to the Philippines via the

southern route called for the seizure of the

Hansa Bay area of northeastern New Guinea

as the first step of the drive to the Philippines

and the last of the campaign for the reduction of Rabaul. Next, the forces of the Southwest Pacific would jump approximately 275

miles northwest to establish air and logistic

bases at Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, bypassing a Japanese stronghold at Wewak.

Then General Mac Arthur intended to move

on to the Geelvink Bay and Vogelkop Peninsula regions of western Dutch New Guinea.

Following these operations, airfield sites on

Halmahera or the Celebes, lying between the

Vogelkop and Mindanao, would be seized.

If necessary for additional left flank protection, air bases would also be established on

the islands of the Arafura Sea (south of

western New Guinea), simultaneously with

the advance to Hollandia, and on Ambon

Island (south of the Halmaheras) .

5

The Joint Chiefs' Strategic Plans

General Mac Arthur's concept of the best

course of action in the Pacific did not coincide with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

who had decided that an advance via the

Central Pacific would be strategically more

decisive. The Joint Chiefs concluded that

pressure applied on the Central Pacific front

would bear directly on Japan's most vulnerable flank—the east—and would, indeed,

outflank the enemy's positions in New

Guinea. But operations along the New

Guinea coast could not threaten Japan's

bases in the Central Pacific and would not

impair free movement by the Japanese

Navy.

The Joint Chiefs believed that the U. S.

Pacific Fleet (commanded by Admiral

Nimitz in addition to his area command)

could be used to best advantage in the vast

open reaches of the Central Pacific. Should

naval operations in the Pacific precipitate

an overwhelming defeat of the Japanese

Navy, the Allies might be provided with an

opportunity to bypass intermediate objectives and to strike directly against the Japanese home islands. Moreover, a drive

through the Central Pacific would take advantage of rapidly growing American naval

power, with which it might be found easier

to move into the Philippines from the Central rather than the Southwest Pacific.

4

 RENO I, 25 Feb 43; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS,

C-3302, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 13149. The quotations

are from RENO I.

5

 RENO I, 25 Feb 43; GHQ SWPA, RENO III,

Outline Plan of Operations in the Southwest Pacific

Area to Reoccupy the Southern Philippine Islands,

20 Oct 43, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific, Sec. 8-A;

Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, 3406, 24 Jan 44, CMOUT 9451; GHQ SWPA, RENO IV, Outline Plan

for Operations of the SWPA 1944, 6 Mar 44, in

OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A.
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 5

Logistically, the Joint Chiefs believed that

the Central Pacific route of approach to the

Philippines was preferable because it was

shorter and more direct. In opposition to

General Mac Arthur's views, the Joint Chiefs

felt that the longer Southwest Pacific route

would be more costly in terms of money,

men, aircraft, time, and ships. The Central

Pacific route was also better hygienically—

it would entail far less jungle and swamp

warfare with attendant tropical diseases

than would operations in New Guinea.

Finally, there was a practical limit to the

Japanese air and ground strength which

could be deployed on the small islands of the

Central Pacific. On the other hand, the

Japanese could place men and aircraft on

New Guinea and the islands between the

Vogelkop Peninsula and Mindanao in numbers limited only by the availability of

troops, engineering equipment, ships, and

planes.6

Another factor destined to influence the

Joint Chiefs in placing emphasis on the Central Pacific offensive was the potential of the

Army Air Forces' new offensive weapon, the

huge B-29 bomber. Though the Joint

Chiefs' plans for the defeat of Japan called

for large-scale bombing of the Japanese

home islands from China, as early as November 1943 there was some doubt that the

Chinese armies under Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek could hold eastern China fields

from which the B-29's would operate. Certainly the initiation of B-29 operations from

those fields would prompt the Japanese to

launch ground offensives to capture the air

bases.

But, should the Allies secure air-base sites

in the Mariana Islands, lying in the Central

Pacific less than 1,500 miles from Tokyo, the

B-29's would be provided with bases which

the Japanese could not retake. The Army

Air Forces was therefore eager for the capture of the Marianas. The air planners found

a strong advocate for the early seizure of the

Marianas in Admiral Ernest J. King (Chief

of Naval Operations and Commander in

Chief of the U. S. Fleet), Navy representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral

King repeatedly termed the occupation of

the Marianas a key operation in the successful prosecution of the war against Japan,

since an invasion of those islands, in his opinion, might well precipitate a showdown

battle with the Japanese Fleet and would

open a line of advance aimed directly at

Japan.7

Though the Joint Chiefs believed that the

Central Pacific route of advance was strategically, logistically, and tactically better than

the Southwest Pacific route, they also decided that it would be most wasteful of time

and resources to move all the Allied forces

from the Southwest and South Pacific Areas

out of the firm contact with the Japanese

established during the campaign for the reduction of Rabaul. The Joint Chiefs held

that the employment of both routes would

prevent the Japanese from knowing where

and when the next blow was to fall. It was

also believed that the Australian Government would react unfavorably to redirection

of all Allied effort to the Central Pacific. If

the Southwest Pacific offensive were curtailed, Australia might well let down in its

war effort, an action which would result in

6

 JPS 67/4, 28 Apr 43; JPS 67/5, 26 May 43;

JCS 287, 7 May 43; JCS 287/1; Rad, CofS (for

JCS) to CINCSWPA, 8679, 2 Oct 43, CM-OUT

630.

7

 Min, JPS 109th Mtg, 27 Oct 43; Min, JCS 123d

and 124th Mtgs, 15 and 17 Nov 43, respectively;

General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold, Global

Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 476-80. For additional material upon the selection of the Marianas

as an objective and for coverage of the fighting in

those islands, see Philip A. Growl, Campaign in the

Marianas, another forthcoming volume in this series.
6 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

a drag on all operations throughout the

Pacific.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the approach to the Philippines

would be made through both the Central

and Southwest Pacific Areas, with priority

assigned to the Central Pacific since that approach appeared strategically more decisive.

Central Pacific forces would move toward

the Philippines via the Marshalls, Carolines,

and Palaus, while Southwest Pacific forces

would drive up the northern New Guinea

coast and on into the islands between the

Vogelkop Peninsula and Mindanao.8 In accordance with this concept Admiral Nimitz'

forces, in November 1943, had taken the

first step toward opening the drive across the

Central Pacific by seizing air and naval base

sites in the Gilbert Islands. This operation

was a preliminary to the occupation of the

Marshalls, to begin early in 1944.

Acceleration of Pacific Operations in

Early 1944

The Marshalls, Truk, and

the Admiralties

In January 1944 Admiral Nimitz was

planning to move his Central Pacific forces

into the eastern and central Marshalls by the

end of the month. Late in March he would

execute a much-desired carrier strike against

Truk, a presumably strong Japanese base

near the center of the Caroline chain.

Whether Truk would be seized was still a

moot question. Although the capture of that

atoll might well precipitate a showdown battle with the Japanese Fleet, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had begun to wonder if the seizure of

Truk might not prove too costly for the results achieved. They agreed in late 1943 to

postpone a decision concerning its capture

until the U. S. Pacific Fleet could test the

strength of the base in a carrier raid.9

In May, according to Admiral Nimitz'

plans, the Central Pacific's amphibious assault forces would advance to the western

Marshalls. On 1 August they would land at

Mortlock and Truk in the Central Carolines. If, however, the invasion of Truk

should prove either unnecessary or undesirable, then Admiral Nimitz would be prepared to bypass that atoll in favor of a direct

move to the Palau Islands about 1 August.

First landings in the Marianas were to take

place by 1 November.10

At the time Admiral Nimitz prepared this

plan, General Mac Arthur's planners were

trying to find ways and means to accelerate

the final phases of the campaign against

Rabaul: the capture of Hansa Bay on the

northeast coast of New Guinea, the occupation of the Admiralty Islands, and the seizure of Kavieng, on New Ireland north of

Rabaul. To fit in with Admiral Nimitz' plans

for the use of the Pacific Fleet's carriers during the invasion of the Marshalls and the

strike against Truk, General Mac Arthur had

had to schedule the attacks against Kavieng

and the Admiralties for 1 April and the

Hansa Bay operation for 26 April. For postHansa Bay operations, General Mac Arthur's

current plans called for the advance to Hollandia and the Arafura Sea islands about 1

June; the Geelvink Bay area in mid-August;

the Vogelkop Peninsula by 1 October; Halmahera and the Celebes on 1 December;

and, finally, an entry into the southern Phil8

 JPS 67/5, 26 May 43; JCS 287/1, 8 May 43;

Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-6131, 28 Sep 43,

CM-IN 19656; Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, 8679,

2 Oct 43, CM-OUT 630.

9

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Campaign Plan GRANITE, 13 Jan 44, in files of the Navy Dept; Min, JCS

123d and 124th Mtgs, 15 and 17 Nov 43. 10

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Campaign Plan GRANITE, 13 Jan 44.
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 7

ippines at Mindanao on 1 February 1945.

This schedule was slower than one approved

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in late

1943; but if the Southwest Pacific could accelerate the last phases of the reduction of

Rabaul, all subsequent operations could be

considerably speeded.11

Principally to settle details of fleet support

for the Admiralties, Kavieng, and Hansa

Bay operations, planners of the South,

Southwest, and Central Pacific Areas met at

Pearl Harbor on 27 and 28 January 1944.12

The planners also discussed in a general way

the question of bypassing Truk, the target

dates for other operations in the Pacific, and

the proposed B-29 bases in the Marianas.

Admiral Nimitz presented revised plans calling for the invasion of the eastern and central Marshalls on 1 February and the western Marshalls on 15 April. He also suggested

possible revisions in his schedule of operations against the Palaus, the Marianas, and

Truk. Previously he had planned to take the

Palaus before the Marianas, and he had

believed it essential to seize Truk as an advanced fleet base. Now the Central Pacific

commander thought that if the proposed

carrier strike against Truk drove the Japanese fleet westward, it might be possible to

bypass Truk, seize the Marianas about 15

June, and move to the Palaus early in

October.

Most of the Army and Navy planners at

the January conferences favored the idea of

bypassing Truk. Apparently the majority of

them also favored bypassing the Marianas,

and the consensus at Pearl Harbor seemed to

lean toward a sequence of operations which

would place the emphasis of the drive to the

Philippines in the Southwest Pacific Area.

All the planners agreed that the Palaus

would have to be taken to safeguard the

right flank of the Southwest Pacific's advance beyond the Vogelkop Peninsula to

Mindanao in the Philippines. Most of them

approved a course of action which would

take Central Pacific forces directly from the

Marshalls to the Palaus and provide the

Southwest Pacific Area with sufficient support to move up the north coast of New

Guinea and into the Philippines well before

the end of 1944.

As far as B-29 operations against the

Japanese home islands from the Marianas

were concerned, there seems to have been a

lack of enthusiasm at the Pearl Harbor conferences. General Mac Arthur's planners,

taking their cue from their commander, de11

 Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-164, 6 Jan 44,

CM-IN 3366; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-172, 6

Jan 44, CM-IN 4188; Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330; Rad, COMSOPACADMIN to COMSOPAC [Admiral Halsey, then in

Washington], 8 Jan 44, CM-IN 8331; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-1217, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1443;

RENO III, 20 Oct 43. For earlier operations in the

South and Southwest Pacific Areas see John Miller,

jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington,

1949) and Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, both

in this series, the latter in preparation. These two

volumes provide information concerning the establishment of the Allied commands in the Pacific and

the assignment of the first mission to the Allied

forces. The campaign against Rabaul is to be covered in John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, while operations in the Gilberts and

Marshalls are to be described in Philip A. Growl and

Edmund G. Love, The Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, both in this series. 12

 The following information on the Pearl Harbor

Conference and General MacArthur's views on the

use of the B-29 is based principally upon: Rad,

CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330;

Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-1217, 2 Feb 44, CMIN 1443; Memo, Col William L. Ritchie [Chief,

SWP Theater Group, OPD GSUSA] to Maj Gen

Thomas T. Handy [Chief, OPD], 4 Feb 44, sub:

Brief of Pacific Conf, Pearl Harbor, 27-28 Jan 44, in

OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A;

Min, JPS 125th Mtg, 2 Feb 44; Min, JCS 145th

Mtg, 8 Feb 44; History of AFMIDPAC and Predecessor Commands, I, 90ff, in OCMH; General

George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New

York, 1949), pp. 347-49.
8 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

sired that the B-29's be sent to the Southwest Pacific, whence they could strike

lucrative targets in the Netherlands East

Indies. General MacArthur's opinion was

that B-29 operations against Japan from

the Marianas would obtain negligible strategic and tactical effects, that operating

hazards from the Mariana bases would be

great, and that logistic support of the B-29's

in the Marianas would be much more difficult than it would be in the Southwest

Pacific.

While it is noteworthy that both Army

and Navy planners of the Pacific commands

were, in January 1944, inclined to take issue

with the Combined and Joint Chiefs of

Staff over the emphasis on lines of advance

toward the Philippines and the seizure of the

Marianas, the higher level planners had

already decided that the Marianas would be

seized, that B-29 operations from those

islands would start in 1944, and that the

priority of the advance to the Philippines

would be given to the Central Pacific. Indeed, so important did the Joint Chiefs consider operations in the Central Pacific that

they were willing to delay beyond 1 April

1944 General MacArthur's attacks against

Kavieng and the Admiralties if such a delay

would make it possible to accelerate Admiral

Nimitz' advances in the Marshall Islands.13

Such a delay would, of course, probably

mean the postponement of subsequent

Southwest Pacific operations along the New

Guinea coast.

As events turned out, the strength of Central Pacific forces used to invade the eastern

and central Marshalls on 31 January proved

so preponderant and Japanese resistance

and reactions so weak that Admiral Nimitz'

reserves and garrison forces, already staging

for the eastern Marshalls, did not have to be

committed to that operation. The Central

Pacific commander, urged on by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, was therefore able to step up

his attack into the western Marshalls to midFebruary. The Joint Chiefs also instructed

Admiral Nimitz to execute the scheduled

March carrier strike against Truk as much

earlier as possible.14

A successful invasion of the western Marshalls was carried out on 17 February 1944.

To support and provide strategic cover for

this operation, the long-awaited carrier strike

on Truk was made on the 16th and 17th.

During the ensuing week other targets in the

Carolines were hit and a one-day carrier attack against the Marianas was also undertaken. Evaluation of the Truk strikes disclosed that the base was much weaker than

had previously been supposed. The main

body of the Japanese Fleet had already left

the atoll and the threat of additional attacks

by the U. S. Pacific Fleet kept it in the western Pacific. Truk and the eastern Carolines

were eliminated as an effective section of the

Japanese defense system.15

While the strikes against the Carolines

and Marianas had been taking place in the

Central Pacific, preparations for the scheduled Admiralties, Kavieng, and Hansa Bay

operations had been going on apace in the

Southwest Pacific. Troop units were designated and preliminary steps were taken to

gather supplies, shipping, and personnel at

13

 Rad, COMINCH to CINCPOA, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1854.

14

 Ibid.; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 2 Feb

44, CM-IN 1855; Min, JCS 145th Mtg, 8 Feb 44;

Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 15 Feb 44, CM-IN

10592. 15

 United States Strategic Bombing Survey

[USSBS], The Campaigns in the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), pp. 194-95; Growl and Love, The

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, passim.
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 9

staging areas.16 These preparations were

never completed.

From 300-mile distant airfields in New

Guinea, Southwest Pacific land-based

planes had for some time been flying bombing and reconnaissance missions against the

Admiralty Islands. On 23 February planes

on armed reconnaissance over the Admiralties failed to elicit any response from Japanese ground defenses. The next day General

Mac Arthur ordered an immediate ground

reconnaissance in force to be sent to the

Admiralties aboard high speed destroyertransports (APD's). The troops of the U. S.

1st Cavalry Division engaged in this risky

undertaking were instructed to remain

ashore and secure a beachhead upon which

reinforcements could be landed. The initial

landings were made on 29 February. The

desired beachhead was taken and the assault

units were reinforced beginning on 2 March

by the rest of the 1st Cavalry Division.17

The landing in the Admiralties, taking

place a month ahead of schedule, gave General MacArthur a welcome opportunity to

speed the pace of operations within the

Southwest Pacific Area and to keep abreast

of developments in the Central Pacific Area.

On 5 March he proposed a new plan of

operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He

suggested that the Kavieng operation be

executed as planned on 1 April but, since

aircraft from the Admiralties could support

operations along the New Guinea coast, that

the Hansa Bay operations be canceled in

favor of a direct jump to Hollandia before

the end of April.

The bypassing move to Hollandia would

isolate Japanese ground troops in the Hansa

Bay, Madang, and Wewak areas of eastern

New Guinea. Moreover, the Hollandia area

was considered capable of development into

a major air base from which land-based

planes could dominate western New Guinea

where the Japanese were building up their

own air strength. If Hollandia could be

seized at an early date, General MacArthur

reasoned, this Japanese air redeployment

could be forestalled and the westward advance toward the Philippines could be hastened by several months.18

Washington Planning Conferences,

February-March

The acceleration of the Marshall and Admiralty operations made it urgent that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a detailed directive for the conduct of the war in the Pacific

during the rest of 1944. They now had General Mac Arthur's proposals to consider, as

well as new plans being prepared by Admiral

Nimitz, and they had yet to decide the question of bypassing Truk. Early in February

General MacArthur had sent his chief of

staff, Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, to

Washington in an attempt to persuade the

Joint Chiefs to direct the concentration of

all forces in the Pacific along the New

Guinea axis of advance, bypassing both

Truk and the Marianas. Later in the same

month Admiral Nimitz and members of his

staff also arrived at Washington to discuss

with the Joint Chiefs plans for future operations in the Central Pacific Area.

General Sutherland had not been in

Washington long before he found it necessary to advise General MacArthur that the

16

 GHQ SWPA, Operations Instructions (OI) 44,

13 Feb 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 13 Feb 44. 17

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO Force, XC-1428,

24 Feb 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 24 Feb 44; GHQ

SWPA, OI 44/2, 19 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 13

Feb 44. For details of operations in the Admiralties

see Miller, CARTWHEEL : The Reduction of Rabaul.

18

 Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-2473, 5 Mar 44,

CM-IN 3318.
10 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Mariana operation was inevitable since both

the Army Air Forces and the Navy were

pressing for the undertaking.19 Accepting

this, General MacArthur came to the conclusion that, assuming Truk would be bypassed, the invasion of the Marianas need

not materially interfere with the schedule of

Southwest Pacific operations along the New

Guinea coast.20 Admiral Nimitz, discussing

the possibility of bypassing Truk, told the

Joint Chiefs that his forces would be ready

to undertake another major amphibious operation about mid-June. Either Truk or the

Marianas, he said, would be acceptable targets, but if Truk were bypassed he thought

it would still be necessary to take the southern Marianas and the Palaus to assure the

neutralization of the central Caroline atoll.

Since a good fleet base in the western Pacific

would be needed before moving into the

Philippines, Admiral Nimitz proposed seizing Ulithi Atoll, about midway between the

Marianas and the Palaus. The capture of

Ulithi would, he thought, probably require

the occupation of Yap, 100 miles to the

southwest, and the neutralization if not the

capture of the Palaus. Woleai, in the Carolines 400-odd miles almost due south of the

Marianas, should also be taken to assure the

neutralization of Truk and the protection of

the lines of communication from the Marianas to Yap and Ulithi.

Initially, Admiral Nimitz recommended

that the Marianas should be taken in midJune, Woleai a month later, Yap and Ulithi

at the beginning of September, and the

Palaus early in November.21 Reconsideration of this plan led Admiral Nimitz to the

conclusion that the occupation of Ulithi

should follow landings in the Palaus, a sequence which might permit the neutralization rather than the capture of Yap. This

schedule would call for landings in the Marianas on 15 June, on Woleai 15 July, the seizure of the Palaus beginning 1 October, and

the occupation of Ulithi at an opportune

moment after the Palau operation began.22

While Admiral Nimitz had been presenting his plans to the Joint Chiefs, General

Sutherland had also been preparing new

plans on the basis of General MacArthur's

proposals of 5 March. The outline which

General Sutherland gave to the Joint Chiefs

called for the Southwest Pacific forces to

move into the Hollandia area with two divisions on 15 April, supported by the Pacific

Fleet. Air, naval, and logistic bases would be

established at Hollandia to support subsequent Southwest Pacific advances northwest

to the Geelvink Bay region of Dutch New

Guinea. The Southwest Pacific forces would

move to Geelvink Bay about 1 June.

In the middle of the next month, according to General Sutherland's presentation,

three Southwest Pacific divisions would be

sent against the Arafura Sea islands, southwest of Dutch New Guinea. There, air bases

would be established from which to cover

later advances to the Vogelkop Peninsula

and Halmahera, both scheduled for mid19

 Tel conv, Gen Sutherland [in Washington] and

Maj Gen Richard J. Marshall [Deputy CofS GHQ

SWPA, in Brisbane, Australia], 15 Feb 44, CM-IN,

WD-Telecon 192. 20

 Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-1741, 16 Feb 44,

CM-IN 10909.

21JCS, Memo for Info 200, 7 Mar 44, sub:

Sequence and Timing of Opns, Central Pacific

Campaign, A Rpt by CINCPOA, in OPD file, ABC

384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A; Min, JCS 150th

Mtg, 7 Mar 44. 22

 Addendum to JCS Memo for Info 200, 8 Mar

44, sub: Sequence and Timing of Opns, Central

Pacific Campaign, Further Rpt by CINCPOA, in

OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43), Sec. 3-A.
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 11

September, when Central Pacific forces

might be ready to move to the Palaus. If the

Marianas were bypassed, however, the

Southwest Pacific chief of staff pointed out,

the Palaus might then be invaded as early

as mid-July. Land-based aircraft of the

Southwest Pacific Area could support a July

invasion of the Palaus from air bases in the

Hollandia and Geelvink Bay regions. If air

bases on the Vogelkop, Halmahera, and the

Arafura Sea islands proved inadequate to

provide left flank protection for the move

into the Philippines, then airdrome sites on

Ambon Island might also be seized in September or October. The entry into the Philippines would be effected at southeastern

Mindanao on 15 November 1944.23

Studies of the outlines presented by General Sutherland and Admiral Nimitz were

undertaken for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by

subordinate, advisory committees, which

found some fault with parts of both plans.

The committees concluded that Admiral

Nimitz' plan to seize Woleai had little merit,

because the operation threatened to be too

costly in comparison with the possible results. Woleai, they determined, should be

bypassed and neutralized by air action. The

committees also advised bypassing Truk.

The capture of the Palaus they considered

necessary to assure the neutralization of

Truk, to protect the right flank of Southwest

Pacific forces moving into the Philippines,

or to support a move by Central Pacific

forces directly to Formosa. Again the planners turned down the suggestion that all

forces in the Pacific be concentrated on the

drive up to the New Guinea coast.24 The sequence of operations ultimately recommended by the Joint Chiefs' subordinate

committees provided for the invasion of Hollandia on 15 April, the Marianas on 15

June, the Palaus on 15 September, and Mindanao on 15 November.25

The New Directive for 1944

On 12 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff

completed consideration of the proposals

submitted by their subordinate committees

and the planners of the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas. On the same day the

Joint Chiefs issued their new directive for

action in the Pacific during the rest of 1944.

Reaffirming their belief that Allied strength

in the Pacific was sufficient to carry on two

drives across the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs'

directive was, in effect, a reconciliation

among conflicting strategic and tactical concepts. The Joint Chiefs took into consideration the Army Air Forces' desire to begin

B-29 operations against Japan from the

Marianas as soon as possible; Admiral

King's belief that the Marianas operation

was a key undertaking which might well precipitate a fleet showdown; the knowledge

concerning the weakness of Truk gained

during the February carrier attacks; the proposals offered by various planner concerning the feasibility of bypassing Truk; Admiral Nimitz' belief that the occupation of

the Palaus and Ulithi was necessary to assure the neutralization of Truk and to provide the Pacific Fleet with a base in the western Pacific; and, finally, General MacArthur's plans to return to the Philippines as

early as possible via the New GuineaMindanao axis of advance.

The Joint Chiefs instructed General MacArthur to cancel the Kavieng operation, to

complete the neutralization of Rabaul and

23

 RENO IV, 6 Mar 44. 24

 JCS 713, 16 Feb 44, Strategy in the Pacific [a

Rpt by JSSC] and JCS 713/1, 10 Mar 44, Future

Opns in Pacific [a Rpt by JPS], both in OPD file,

ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A. 25

 JSC 713/1, 10 Mar 44.
12 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Kavieng with minimum forces, and to speed

the development of an air and naval base in

the Admiralties. The Southwest Pacific's

forces were to jump from eastern New

Guinea to Hollandia on 15 April, bypassing

Wewak and Hansa Bay. The Joint Chiefs

stated that the principal purpose of seizing

Hollandia was to develop there an air center from which heavy bombers could start

striking the Palaus and Japanese air bases

in western New Guinea and Halmahera.

After the occupation and development of

the Hollandia area, General MacArthur was

to conduct operations northwest along the

northern New Guinea coast and "such other

operations as may be feasible" with available forces in preparation for the invasion

of the Palaus and Mindanao. The target

date for the Southwest Pacific's landing in

the Philippines was set for 15 November.

Admiral Nimitz, in turn, was ordered to

cancel the Truk operation and to speed the

aerial neutralization of Truk, Woleai, and

other Japanese bases in the central and eastern Carolines. He was also directed to conduct heavy carrier strikes against the Marianas, the Carolines (including the Palaus),

and "other profitable targets," and to provide carrier support and amphibious means

for the Southwest Pacific's landings in the

Hollandia area. The Mariana Islands were

to be occupied by Central Pacific forces beginning 15 June and the Palaus starting 15

September. The Palaus, said the Joint

Chiefs, were to be occupied for the purposes

of extending Allied control over the eastern

approaches to the Philippines and Formosa

and to secure air and naval bases from which

to support operations against Mindanao,

Formosa, and the China coast.26

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decreed that

Pacific strategy would entail a reinvasion of

the Philippines, but for operations after Mindanao no decision was made in March 1944.

The strategy for the approach to the Philippines was clearly delineated—the forces of

the Southwest Pacific were to move northwest along the coast of New Guinea and via

the islands northwest of the Vogelkop Peninsula into the Philippines; Central Pacific

forces were to continue operations in two directions, the first toward Japan through the

Marianas and the other west toward the

Philippines via the Palaus. The stage was set

for the acceleration of the drive to the Philippines.

26

 Rad, CofS (for JCS) to CINCSWPA, 5171,

and to COMGENCENPAC (to CINCPOA), 989,

12 Mar 44, CM-OUT 5137. This message is also

JCS 713/4, 12 Mar 44, Future Opns in Pacific, in

OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A.
CHAPTER II

Planning and Preparation for the

Hollandia-Aitape Operation

The first step in the Southwest Pacific

Area's drive to the Philippines—the seizure

of the Hollandia region of Dutch New

Guinea—could have far-reaching consequences. (Map I) Anchorages at Hollandia were known to be capable of basing

many of the largest combat vessels, cargo

ships, and troop transports. Inland plains in

the area were thought to provide almost unlimited potentialities for airdrome development. Aircraft operating from fields at Hollandia could dominate most Japanese airdromes in western New Guinea and nearer

islands of the Indies, could fly reconnaissance and bombing missions against the

western Carolines, including the Palaus, and

could provide support for subsequent landing operations along the north coast of New

Guinea. Small naval vessels, such as motor

torpedo boats (PT's), operating from Hollandia area bases, could interdict Japanese

barge traffic for miles both east and west of

that region. Finally, the Hollandia region

was capable of development into a major

supply base and staging1 area for the support of subsequent Allied operations farther

to the west.

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific

Area, and its subordinate commands were

to have no easy task in planning the advance

to Hollandia; but by March 1944 these

headquarters had accumulated two years'

experience with the complex air, sea, and

ground operations that characterized the

war in the Pacific. Indeed, the planning for

Hollandia provides an excellent case study

for most amphibious undertakings in the

Southwest Pacific. For this reason a detailed

discussion of the work undertaken by the

various theater commands, the problems

they faced, and the means by which these

problems were solved is included here. The

planning for subsequent operations within

the Southwest Pacific is treated in less detail

with emphasis placed principally on the differences from the Hollandia planning.

Solving the many problems faced by the

Southwest Pacific commands in planning

the advance to Hollandia was made more

difficult by the interrelationship of many of

those problems. A direct move to Hollandia

from eastern New Guinea, bypassing Wewak

and Hansa Bay, could not be undertaken

unless carrier-based air support were made

1

 The term "staging" used in the Pacific theaters

during World War II had a broader meaning than

that usually applied in Europe or the zone of interior. In the Pacific a staging base was the point

of departure for an amphibious operation. At such

a base not only would troop units be assembled, but

supplies and equipment of all types would also be

gathered to be loaded for either immediate or future

use at objective areas.
14 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

available from the Pacific Fleet. It was also

possible that a more powerful enemy force

might be encountered at Hollandia than had

been met during any previous landing operation in the Pacific theaters. This meant that

a larger Allied force than had ever before

been assembled for any single amphibious

operation in the Pacific would have to be

sent against Hollandia. The size of this force

would complicate logistic planning and

preparations and would necessitate the use

of more assault shipping than was available

within the Southwest Pacific Area. Finally,

the advance was to be made into terrain

about which many important details were

unavailable and unobtainable. Thus, all interested commands of the Southwest Pacific

Area were to have a thoroughgoing test of

their training or past experience.

Theater Organization

General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific

Area headquarters was an inter-Allied, interservice command exercising operational

and policy-making functions. The staff was

organized generally along U. S. Army lines

except that many technical and administrative special staff sections were not included.

Administrative services for U. S. Army

forces within the theater were concentrated

at Headquarters, United States Army Forces

in the Far East, also commanded by General

MacArthur. Logistic and technical service

functions for U. S. Army forces were under

Headquarters, United States Services of

Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, which also

had certain inter-Allied and interservice logistic responsibilities. Allied combat operations were conducted through four operational headquarters subordinate to General

MacArthur—the Allied Air Forces, the Allied Land Forces, the Allied Naval Forces,

and ALAMO Force.

Allied Air Forces was commanded by Lt.

Gen. George C. Kenney (USA). Its major

component parts during the early period

covered in this volume were the U. S. Fifth

Air Force and the Royal Australian Air

Force Command, Allied Air Forces. Later,

the U. S. Thirteenth Air Force was redeployed from the South Pacific Area to pass

to the control of the Allied Air Forces,

Southwest Pacific Area. At the time of the

Hollandia operation, General Kenney was

also in direct command of the Fifth Air

Force, while the Royal Australian Air Force

Command was under Air Vice Marshal

William D. Bostock (RAAF), who also had

operational control over the few Dutch air

organizations in the theater.

The Allied Naval Forces was commanded

by Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid (USN),

whose organization comprised the U.S. Seventh Fleet (commanded directly by Admiral

Kinkaid) and ships assigned from the Royal

Australian Navy and the Royal Netherlands

Navy. Admiral Kinkaid's chief subordinate

for amphibious operations was Rear Adm.

Daniel E. Barbey (USN), who was the

commander of the VII Amphibious Force,

Seventh Fleet.

Allied Land Forces was commanded by

General Sir Thomas Blarney (AIF), who

was also the commander in chief of the Australian Army and who had operational control over the very few Dutch ground force

troops in the Southwest Pacific Area.

ALAMO Force was commanded by Lt. Gen.

Walter Krueger (USA), also the commander of the U. S. Sixth Army. The staffs

of ALAMO Force and Sixth Army were identical. As Sixth Army, General Krueger's

command was subordinate to General

16 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Blarney's Allied Land Forces, but as ALAMO

Force it was subordinate only to General

Headquarters. Allied Land Forces, while retaining operational control of U. S. Army

troops in continental Australia for defensive

purposes, controlled during the period of

operations described in this volume the

offensive operations of only those ground

task forces primarily Australian in character.

Conversely, ALAMO Force directed offensive

operations of ground organizations comprising principally U. S. Army troops.2

In mid-April there were almost 750,000

troops in the various ground, air, and naval

services under General MacArthur's command. Included in this total were approximately 450,000 U. S. Army ground and air

personnel. Major ground combat components of the U. S. Army were 7 divisions

(6 infantry and 1 dismounted cavalry), 3

separate regimental combat teams, and 3

engineer special brigades. Australian ground

forces comprised 5 infantry divisions and

enough division headquarters, brigades, or

brigade groups (the latter equivalent to a

U. S. Army regimental combat team) to

form two more divisions.3

Within the boundaries of the Southwest

Pacific Area were approximately 350,000

Japanese, of whom 50,000 were hopelessly

cut off in the Bismarck Archipelago. In the

New Guinea area were 5 Japanese divisions

(3 of them greatly understrength); in the

Netherlands East Indies 3 divisions and 2

independent mixed brigades (the latter

somewhat larger than a U. S. Army regimental combat team); and in the Philippines 1 division and 4 independent mixed

brigades.4

The Hollandia Area

The Terrain

The Allied organizations which were to

move against the Hollandia area were to

find there an excellent site for a major air

and supply base, including the only good

anchorage between Wewak in Australian

New Guinea and Geelvink Bay, 450 miles

northwest in Dutch New Guinea.5 The coast

line in the Hollandia area is broken by Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bays, which lie

about twenty-five miles apart. (Map 2)

Between the two are the Cyclops Mountains, dominating the area. This short range

rises to a height of over 7,000 feet and drops

steeply to the Pacific Ocean on its northern

side. South of the mountains is Lake Sentani, an irregularly crescent-shaped body of

fresh water about fifteen and a half miles

long. Between the north shore of the lake

and the Cyclops Mountains is a flat plain

well suited to airdrome construction, while

other airfield sites are to be found on coastal

flatlands just east of Humboldt Bay. South

of Lake Sentani are more plains, which give

way to rolling hills and a largely unexplored

mountain range running roughly parallel to

the coast about thirty or forty miles inland.

Hollandia is a wet area. In the Humboldt

Bay region the average annual rainfall is

90-100 inches; around Tanahmerah Bay

2

 Milner, Victory in Papua, describes the establishment of the command in the Southwest Pacific

Area. 3

 G-3 GHQ SWPA, G-3 Monthly Sum of Opns,

May 44, 31 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 31 May 44.

4

 G-2 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Monthly Sum of Enemy

Dispositions, Apr 44, 30 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

30 Apr 44. See also below, Ch. IV. 5

 Terrain information in this subsection is based

principally on AGS SWPA Terrain Study 78, Locality Study of Hollandia, 6 Mar 44. in OCMH files.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 17

MAP 2

130-140 inches; and in the Lake Sentani

depression 60-70 inches. April is neither the

wettest nor the driest month—those distinctions are reserved to February and September, respectively. But rain and mud can be

anticipated at Hollandia during April, when

the average rainfall is eight and one-half

inches and about thirteen rainy days are to

be expected. The rivers in the area flood

after heavy rains, but flood conditions

usually last only a few hours.

The Hollandia region was well suited for

defense. The Cyclops Mountains presented

an almost impassable barrier on the north

while the width of New Guinea, with its

rugged inland mountain chains, prevented

an approach from the south. Movement of

large bodies of troops along the coast either

east or west of Hollandia was nearly impossible. Thus, the only practical means of

access to the most important military objective in the area, the Lake Sentani Plain, was

by amphibious assault at Humboldt Bay, on

the east, or Tanahmerah Bay, on the west.

From these two bays Lake Sentani could be

approached only over many hills and

through numerous defiles. Roads inland

through these approaches were little better

than foot trails prior to the war, but it was

believed that they had been somewhat improved by the Japanese.

Landing beaches were numerous in the

Humboldt Bay area, but there were few

along the shores of Tanahmerah Bay.

Almost all beaches in the region were narrow, backed by dense mangrove swamps,

and easily defensible from hills to their rear

and flanks. Measured by standards of jungle

warfare, the distances from the beaches to

the center of the Lake Sentani Plain were

long, being eighteen miles by trail from

Humboldt Bay and about fourteen miles

from Tanahmerah Bay.
18 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Japanese Developments at Hollandia

Hollandia had little claim to prominence

before the war. Once it had been a center of

trade in bird-of-paradise feathers, but this

commerce had declined after 1931. In the

late 1920's and early 1930's the Netherlands

East Indies Government had promoted colonization and agriculture in the area, but

labor trouble and sickness had caused these

ventures to be practically abandoned by

1938. The town of Hollandia, situated on

an arm of Humboldt Bay, then ceased to be

commercially important and served only as

the seat of local government and as a base

for several exploring expeditions into the interior of Dutch New Guinea.

The Japanese occupied the Hollandia

area early in April 1942 but paid little attention to the region until almost a year

later, when Allied air reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy was constructing airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain. This development progressed slowly until late 1943,

by which time successive reverses in the air

and on the ground in eastern New Guinea

and the Bismarck Archipelago, together

with increasing shipping losses in the same

region, began to demonstrate to the Japanese the vulnerability of their air and supply

bases east of Hollandia.6 In late 1943 and

early 1944 the enemy built three airfields on

the Lake Sentani Plain and started a fourth

at Tami, on the seacoast east of Humboldt

Bay. Their reverses in eastern New Guinea

prompted the Japanese to withdraw their

strategic main line of resistance to the west,

and the Hollandia airdromes were developed as the forward anchor of a string of air

bases stretching from the southern Netherlands East Indies into the Philippine Islands.

The Japanese 4th Air Army, principal

enemy air headquarters in New Guinea,

established at Hollandia an air base which

ultimately became so large that it was surpassed in size and strength only by the air

center earlier developed by the Japanese at

Rabaul. At Hollandia the 4th Air Army and

its operating echelon, the 6th Air Division,

felt comparatively safe, for prior to 1944

that area lay beyond the effective range of

Allied land-based fighter planes.

In addition, because of shipping losses

east of Hollandia, the Japanese began to develop Humboldt Bay into a major supply

base and transshipment point. Large ships

would unload at Hollandia, whence cargo

would be carried by barge to points southeast along the coast of New Guinea as far

as Wewak, 215 miles away. Much of the

cargo of the large ships remained at Hollandia to build up the base there. Continuous Japanese shipping activity throughout

western New Guinea indicated to General

MacArthur's Intelligence (G-2) Section

that reinforcements were pouring into that

area—reinforcements which might reach

Hollandia. At the same time, it seemed

possible that the Japanese 18th Army might

send reinforcements to Hollandia from eastern New Guinea. Time favored whatever

development the Japanese were undertaking

6

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Hollandia-Aitape Operation, 10 Mar 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Japanese

Studies in World War II, No. 43, 18th Army

Operations, III, 17-20, copy in OCMH files. The

latter document is one of a series prepared in Japan

by Japanese Army and Navy officers after the war

and translated by ATIS SCAP. Copies of the

translations as well as copies of most of the Japanese

originals are on file in the OCMH. Dubious or

questionable parts of the translations were checked

against the Japanese originals before use was made

of the documents.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 19

LAKE SENTANI PLAIN, SHOWING AIRFIELDS. Between the north shore of

the lake and the Cyclops Mountains is a flat plain well suited to airdrome development.

at Hollandia. It was highly important that

the Allies seize the area before the enemy

could build it into a formidable fortress.7

The Decision to Take Aitape

Preliminary planning for an advance to

Hollandia had been undertaken in General

Headquarters during late February 1944.

On 3 March representatives from major

commands in both the South and Southwest

Pacific Areas gathered at General Mac Arthur's command post in Brisbane, Australia,

to discuss the problems involved in carrying

out the direct advance to Hollandia without

seizing an intermediate base in the Hansa

Bay-Wewak area. It was immediately apparent to the Brisbane conferees that the

7

 18th Army Opns, III, 17-20; Amendment 2, 17

Mar 44, to GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit

with Respect to an Opn Against Hollandia, 1 7 Feb

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 29 Feb 44; GHQ SWPA,

G-2 Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence [DSEI]

719, 720, and 759, 11 Mar, 12 Mar, and 20 Apr

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 11 Mar, 12 Mar, and 20

Apr 44, respectively.

A Japanese area army is equivalent to the U. S.

Army's field army; a Japanese army roughly equals

a U. S. Army corps. Some special Japanese organizations, such as the Southern Army and the

Kwantung Army, are equivalent to the U. S. Army's

army group. A Japanese air army was theoretically

equivalent to a U. S. Army air force, such as the

Fifth Air Force; and the Japanese air division, while

having no exact equivalent in the U. S. forces, would

occupy the same relative command position as a

U. S. bomber command or fighter command. Actually the Japanese 4th Air Army contained fewer

planes than the average U. S. air group.
20 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

basic problem was that of obtaining air

support.

Obtaining Carrier-Based Air

Support

Previous operations in the Southwest Pacific Area had been undertaken within effective range of Allied land-based fighter cover,

but Hollandia was beyond this range, since

the nearest Allied base was Nadzab in Australian New Guinea, almost 500 miles southeast of the objective. On the other hand, the

Japanese had completed one airfield and

were constructing two others in the Wakde

Island-Sarmi area of Dutch New Guinea,

only 125 miles northwest of Hollandia.

Neither the Wakde-Sarmi nor the Hollandia fields could be kept neutralized by longrange bomber action alone. Fighter sweeps

against both objectives would be necessary

before D Day at Hollandia.

Since land-based fighters could not accomplish these tasks, the long jump to Hollandia could be undertaken only if carrierborne air support could be obtained. The

Southwest Pacific's naval arm had no carriers permanently assigned to it. Therefore,

carriers had to be obtained from sources outside the theater.8

In their 12 March directive the Joint

Chiefs had instructed Admiral Nimitz to

provide support for the Hollandia operation.9

 Now, in accordance with these instructions, Admiral Nimitz proposed that he provide air support for Hollandia by undertaking carrier-based air strikes against WakdeSarmi and Hollandia prior to D Day. In

addition, he would provide air support for

the landings and, for a limited period thereafter, operations ashore. This support was

to be made available by two groups of fast

carriers assigned to Task Force 58 of the

U. S. Fifth Fleet, an operational part of

Admiral Nimitz' Pacific Fleet.10

Initially, General MacArthur planned to

have these carriers conduct fighter sweeps

against Hollandia and the Wakde-Sarmi

area on D minus 1 and D Day of the Hollandia operation. On D Day carriers would

support the landings at Hollandia and then

would remain in the objective area to furnish cover for ground operations and unloading of supplies and troops through D

plus 8 or until fields for land-based fighters

could be constructed at Hollandia.11 This

plan was opposed by Admiral Nimitz on the

grounds that it would invite disaster. In

western New Guinea the Japanese were

building many new airfields to which they

could send large numbers of planes from

other parts of the Netherlands East Indies or

from the Philippines. There was no assurance that Allied carrier-based aircraft and

land-based bombers could keep these enemy

fields sufficiently neutralized to prevent the

Japanese from staging large-scale air attacks

against the Hollandia area. Admiral Nimitz

therefore refused to leave the large carriers

in the objective area for the period desired

by the Southwest Pacific Area. Instead, he

would permit Task Force 58 to remain in the

Hollandia region only through D plus 3.12

General MacArthur reluctantly accepted

8

 Min of Conf, 3 Mar 44, held at GHQ

SWPA between representatives of GHQ SWPA,

COMSOPAC, ANF SWPA, et al, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

3 Mar 44; Rad, CINCSWPA to CINCPOA,

C-2853, 14 Mar 44, CM-IN 9841. 9

 Rad, CofS (for JCS) to CINCSWPA, 5171,

and to COMGENCENPAC (for CINCPOA), 989,

Mar 44, CM-OUT 5137.

10

 Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 14 Mar 44,

CM-IN 9944; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 17

Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44. 11 GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan, 29 Feb

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 12

 Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 ALAMO for ACofS G-3

ALAMO, 31 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 21

this condition, although it left unsolved the

problem of obtaining air support at Hollandia from D plus 3 until land-based

fighters could be sent there. Many solutions

were proposed for this problem.

Land-Based Air Support

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific

Area, had once given serious consideration

to a plan to drop parachute troops on the

Japanese-held airfields north of Lake Sentani. Since a large Japanese force was estimated to be defending Hollandia, there was

no assurance that this action would be tactically successful. Even if the paratroopers

captured the airfields quickly, there could be

no assurance that enough men and engineering equipment could be flown to the Lake

Sentani Plain in time to construct a fighter

strip there before Task Force 58 was scheduled to retire. This plan was therefore

abandoned.13

The Allied Air Forces proposed the establishment of land-based fighters on Wuvulu

Island, which lies about 125 miles northeast

of Hollandia. This plan was also given up.

Little was known about terrain conditions on

Wuvulu, the island was much closer to Japanese bases than to Allied, and its seizure

would disclose the direction of the main attack. Furthermore, the Wuvulu operation

would absorb ground forces, amphibious

shipping, and engineering equipment sorely

needed for the Hollandia campaign.14

A plan to develop a fighter strip at Tanahmerah (inland in south-central Dutch New

Guinea and not to be confused with Tanahmerah Bay) was likewise proposed and discarded. The terrain at the inland Tanahmerah was poor and the transportation of

supplies and engineering equipment to the

site would present major problems. Since

Tanahmerah lies south and Hollandia north

of the great unexplored inland mountain

range which laterally bisects New Guinea,

bad weather over this range, by no means

unusual, might prevent fighters based at

Tanahmerah from supporting landings at

Hollandia.15 Also given serious consideration

was the possibility of seizing a field in the

Wakde-Sarmi area simultaneously with

Hollandia. The principal obstacle to the execution of this plan was lack of sufficient assault shipping and landing craft to insure

tactical success. Information about the

Wakde-Sarmi area was exceedingly meager,

but it was estimated by General Mac Arthur's G-2 Section that enemy strength there

was growing rapidly.16

It was finally decided to obtain land-based

air support for Hollandia by seizing an airfield site on the northern New Guinea coast

east of the main objective. The location

chosen was a lightly held area already partially developed by the Japanese near Aitape, which lies in Australian New Guinea

13

 Ibid.; GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan

Draft, 28 Feb 44, and Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA,

WF-1012, 7 Mar 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 14

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, XC-1855, 8 Mar

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 8 Mar 44; Rad, ALAMO to

GHQ SWPA, WF-1453, 10 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 10 Mar 44; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA,

WF-1555, 10 Mar 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

2-14 Mar 44. 15

 GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA,

Hollandia Outline Plan, 29 Feb 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 16

 GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA

Memo, no addressee, 1 Mar 44, sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize Humboldt Bay

Area with Strong Support of Carriers, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA,

G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Wakde-Sarmi Area, 8 Apr

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 8 Apr 44.
22 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

about 125 miles east-southeast of Hollandia.17

The Aitape Area

Aitape had been occupied by the enemy

in December 1942.18 Before the war the

town was the seat of local government and

an interisland trading point of but small

commerce. The entire region is a coastal

plain, varying from five to twelve miles in

width, swampy in many places and cut by

numerous streams. The only prominent terrain feature on the coast is a small hill at

Aitape. There are no natural eastern or western boundaries in the area. To the north

lies the Pacific Ocean, and south of the

coastal plain rise the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains. Offshore, about eight miles

east of Aitape, are four small islands. Good

landing beaches exist throughout the region,

the best a few miles east of Aitape. The

absence of suitable terrain features makes

difficult the defense of the area against amphibious assault. The many rivers could provide some defense against lateral movement,

but these rivers vary greatly in width and

depth according to the amount of rainfall.

April marks the end of the wettest season

in the Aitape region, where rainfall averages about 100 inches per year. Though

June is one of the dryest months, July is one

of the wettest, with almost eight inches of

rain. Torrential tropical downpours rather

than prolonged rains are to be expected at

Aitape.

Japanese development in the area centered around airfield construction near

Tadji Plantation, about eight miles eastsoutheast of Aitape. At least three fields were

begun by the enemy near Tadji at one time

or another, but terrain conditions and lack

of equipment prevented the Japanese from

completing more than one of these strips.

They used this field as a staging area for aircraft flying between Wewak and Hollandia

and as a dispersal field for planes evacuated

from heavily bombed airdromes east of

Aitape. Intelligence reports indicated that

Japanese ground defenses in the Aitape area

were weak. It therefore seemed probable

that there would be little opposition to a

landing and that the assault force, once

ashore, could quickly seize the airstrip area.

It was estimated that Allied engineers could

rehabilitate one of the Tadji strips for the

use of fighter planes within forty-eight hours

after the initial landings. Aircraft based on

the Tadji strips would be within easy supporting distance of Hollandia, able to provide air cover after the carriers departed

from Hollandia.19

The seizure of the Aitape area had an additional important aspect besides providing

land-based support for Hollandia. Once established ashore at Aitape, Allied forces

could provide ground flank protection for

Hollandia against any westward movement

on the part of the Japanese 18th Army.

Additional Air Support Problems

Although the decision to seize the Tadji

airstrips assured that the departure of Task

Force 58 would not leave ground operations

at Hollandia without air support, other air

17

 GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; Rad, GHQ

SWPA to ALAMO, XC-1753, 5 Mar 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 18

 The description of the Aitape area is based

principally on AGS SWPA Terrain Handbook 21,

Aitape-Vanimo, 21 Mar 44, copy in OCMH files.

19

 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, PERSECUTION [Aitape], 24 Jan 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

26 Jan 44; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for

CINCSWPA, 25 Mar 44, sub: Air Tasks for the

Hollandia Opn, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31

Mar-1 Apr 44.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 23

support problems arose. The seizure of the

Aitape area itself required air support, but

Aitape, like Hollandia, was beyond the most

effective range of Allied land-based fighters.

Not enough large carriers had been made

available to support the Hollandia landings

(providing support for operations there for a

few days and carrying out air strikes against

Japanese bases in western New Guinea) and

also to support the landing at Aitape.

Eight escort carriers (CVE's), together

with the large carriers, had been made available by Admiral Nimitz to support the Hollandia operation. At first General MacArthur planned to use the escort carriers for

close support missions at both Hollandia and

Aitape,20 but it was decided that Task Force

58's carriers could provide all the air support necessary in the Hollandia area. Therefore the eight CVE's were to be used to

support only the assault at Aitape and to

cover ground operations in that area until

one of the Tadji strips could be rehabilitated.

They were to be released for return to the

Central Pacific Area no later than D plus

19 of the Hollandia and Aitape landings,

and earlier if possible.21

In order to carry out all the air support

missions which might become necessary, it

was extremely important that the maximum

possible number of fighters be based on the

Tadji strips at an early date. Originally it

was planned to send one fighter group of the

U. S. Fifth Air Force to Tadji, a group containing both P-38 and P-40 aircraft; but

it was expected that the airstrips, if in operation by D plus 1, would be rough and lacking many normal airfield facilities. It was

therefore decided to send No. 78 Wing of the

Royal Australian Air Force to Tadji. This

Australian unit, which was comparable in

size to an American group, was equipped

solely with P-40 aircraft, planes peculiarly

suited to operations under the rough conditions and incomplete facilities that could be

expected at Tadji.22

The Forces and Their Missions

Once it had become certain that close air

support for the assaults at Hollandia and

Aitape could be obtained, it was possible to

undertake detailed logistical and tactical

planning. D Day, originally set for 15 April,

was postponed to 22 April, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Tide conditions along the north-central coast of New

Guinea, the schedule of carrier operations

already planned by Admiral Nimitz, and

logistic problems within the Southwest Pacific Area combined to force this change

in date.

On 22 April the air, sea, and land forces

of the Southwest Pacific, supported by Task

Force 58, were to seize the Hollandia and

Aitape areas, isolating the Japanese 18th

Army to the east. The operations of forces

assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area were

to be co-ordinated by General MacArthur's

headquarters in accordance with the principles of unity of command. The action of

Task Force 58 was to be governed by mutual

agreement and co-operation between General Mac Arthur and Admiral Nimitz. At 20

 GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA

OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44. 21

 Memo, G-3 GHQ Opns Div for ACofS G-3

GHQ, 25 Mar 44, no sub, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25

Mar 44; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ for CINCSWPA,

25 Mar 44, sub: Air Tasks for the Hollandia Opn,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44;

GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44.

22

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, CX-10218, 30

Mar 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 28-30 Mar

44; Rad, Advon5AF to GHQ SWPA, R-6915-F,

31 Mar 44, and Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA,

WF-118, 1 Apr 44, last two in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44.
24 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Aitape minor air and naval facilities were to

be established. At Hollandia a major air

base, a logistics base capable of supporting

and staging 150,000 troops, and a small

naval base were to be constructed.23

The Air Plan and Organization

Long-range or strategic air support, both

before and during the Hollandia-Aitape

operation, was to be provided by Task Force

58 and the Allied Air Forces, Southwest

Pacific Area. Task Force 58, commanded

by Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher (USN),

consisted of the large carriers and escorting

battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The

escort carriers scheduled to support the

Aitape landing were to operate as Task

Force 78 under the command of Rear Adm.

Ralph E. Davison (USN).24

Prior to 22 April the land-based bombers

of the Allied Air Forces were to undertake

neutralization of enemy air installations

along the northern coast of New Guinea as

far west as the Wakde-Sarmi area. Japanese

air bases on islands in the Arafura Sea, on

the Vogelkop Peninsula, and in the Caroline

Islands were all to be hit by Allied Air Forces

bombers. The missions against the Carolines

were to be carried out for the most part by

planes of the XIII Air Task Force, an advanced group of the Thirteenth Air Force,

the latter then in process of moving from the

South, Pacific to the Southwest Pacific Area.

Aircraft under control of the Allied Air

Forces were also to provide aerial reconnaissance and photography as required by the

ground and naval forces participating in the

operation.25

Land-based fighters of the Allied Air

Forces were to cover convoys within range of

Allied Air Forces bases, while Allied shipping beyond this range was to be protected

by aircraft from escort carriers. In order to

prevent the Japanese from deducing the direction and objective of the operation, General Headquarters had decided to route the

assault convoys from assembly points in

eastern New Guinea north to the Admiralty

Islands and thence west-southwest toward

Hollandia and Aitape. Since this extended

route would take the convoys into ocean

areas which could not be covered by landbased fighters, the escort carriers had been

assigned their additional support role.26

Medium bombers (B-25's and A-20's)

of the Allied Air Forces, based in eastern

New Guinea, were to undertake such close

support missions at Hollandia and Aitape on

D Day and thereafter as might be requested

by the ground force commanders and permitted by distance and weather. Escort

carrier aircraft would, if necessary, fly close

support missions at Hollandia as well as at

Aitape after Task Force 58 left the former

area. Task Force 58 planes were to operate

against targets designated by General Headquarters and requested by the ground commanders at Hollandia. The primary mission

of Task Force 58, however, was to destroy

or contain Japanese naval forces which

23

 GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 18 Mar 44. 24

 ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44; CTF 58

Opn Plan 5-44, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 21

Apr 44.

25

 GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 18 Mar 44; AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 30

Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44. 26

 Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for CINCSWPA, 25 Mar 44, sub: Air Tasks for the Hollandia

Opn, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr

44; ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44; GHQ

SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 28 Mar 44.

26 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

might attempt to interfere with the Hollandia operation. The air support missions

of the force were secondary to the destruction of the Japanese fleet.27

Most of the air support tasks assigned to

land-based aircraft of the Allied Air Forces

were to be carried out by the U. S. Fifth Air

Force. Forward area operations were assigned to the Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air

Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ennis C.

Whitehead. Many missions against the

islands of the Arafura Sea and the Geelvink

Bay area were to be undertaken by Air Vice

Marshal Bostock's Royal Australian Air

Force Command. American air missions

were to be flown principally from Fifth Air

Force bases in eastern New Guinea. Australian planes, aided by bombers of the Fifth

Air Force and a B-25 squadron of the Royal

Netherlands East Indies Air Force, were to

strike most of their targets from fields at

Darwin in northern Australia.28

In addition to conducting a fighter sweep

of the Hollandia and Wakde-Sarmi fields

prior to D Day and covering the landings at

Hollandia, Task Force 58 was assigned another important air support mission. Carrier

strikes by the U. S. Fifth Fleet during February had driven the main body of the Japanese fleet west from its forward base at

Truk in the Carolines. In March the Japanese began to reassemble naval power in

the Palau Islands, some 800 miles northwest

of Hollandia. This new naval strength constituted a potentially serious threat to the

success of the Hollandia operation. It was

therefore considered imperative to conduct

a carrier strike against the Palaus in order

to drive the enemy fleet still farther west, an

operation scheduled by Admiral Nimitz for

about 1 April. After the strike against the

Palaus, Task Force 58 was to retire from the

Carolines and western New Guinea until 21

April, D minus 1 of the Hollandia operation,

when it was to return to sweep the WakdeSarmi and Hollandia fields.29

Admiral Nimitz requested that Southwest

Pacific aircraft cover the strike against the

Palaus by undertaking reconnaissance and

bombardment missions over those islands

and others in the Carolines during the passage of Task Force 58 to and from its objective. He also asked for missions against Japanese air and naval installations in the Bismarck Archipelago and along the northern

coast of New Guinea. There were not sufficient long-range aircraft available to the

Allied Air Forces to carry out all the missions

requested by Admiral Nimitz and at the

same time continue necessary bombing and

reconnaissance preparations for the advance

to Hollandia. Therefore a squadron of

PB4Y's (the naval version of the Army B24) was transferred from the South Pacific

to the Southwest Pacific. These planes were

stationed initially in eastern New Guinea

and then sent to the Admiralties when the

fields there became operational. Other longrange missions in support of the Palau strike

were carried out by Fifth Air Force B-24's

27

 AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 30 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44; Change No. 1, 10 Apr 44, to

CTF 58 Opn Plan 5-44, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 21 Apr 44; ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44;

Rad, GINCPOA to Com5thFlt et al, 27 Mar 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27 Mar 44. 28

 AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 30 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44.

29

 GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; Memo, GHQ

SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44, sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize Humboldt Bay

Area with Strong Support of Carriers, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Rad, Com5dFlt

to CINCPOA, 8 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 9 Mar

44; CINPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 1-44, 18 Mar

44, in G-3 Jnl, 19 Mar 44; Rad, CINCPOA to

Com5thFlt, et al., 27 Mar 44, CM-IN 19262.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 27

and PBY's (two-engined patrol bombers) of

the Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific

Area.30

Aircraft of the South Pacific Area (the

operations of this area were under General

Mac Arthur's strategic direction) were to

continue aerial blockade of the Bismarcks

and Solomons. The same air units were to

assist in reconnaissance missions required to

cover the operations of both Task Force 58

and the movement of Southwest Pacific

forces to Hollandia and Aitape. Finally,

with naval forces of the South Pacific assisting, the South Pacific air was to halt Japanese sea-borne reinforcement and supply activities within the area.31

Naval Plans

The Allied Naval Forces was to transport

and land the assault troops and supporting

forces, together with their supplies, and to

furnish necessary naval protection for the

overwater movement to the objectives. Admiral Kinkaid's command was also to conduct hydrographic surveys of harbors and

approaches at Hollandia and Aitape, undertake mine-sweeping at both objectives, and

carry out submarine reconnaissance as required by General Mac Arthur. Admiral

Kinkaid delegated control of both ground

and naval forces during the amphibious

phase of the operation to Admiral Barbey.

In case of an engagement with Japanese

fleet units, Admiral Kinkaid would assume

direct command of Allied Naval Forces

combat ships supporting the HollandiaAitape operation, but otherwise Admiral

Barbey would remain in control.32

For the Hollandia-Aitape operation Admiral Barbey's command was designated

Task Force 77. It contained all the attack

shipping available to the Allied Naval

Forces and also covering and support forces

of escort carriers and American and Australian cruisers and destroyers. Task Force

77's attack shipping and fire support vessels

were divided into three main sections—the

Western, Central, and Eastern Attack

Groups. The first two were responsible for

the Hollandia area landings, while the Eastern Attack Group was to carry assault

troops to Aitape.33

Naval fire support for the landings was

primarily a responsibility of Task Force 77,

but the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers

of Task Force 58 were also to be ready to

provide fire support for the landings and

operations ashore at Hollandia, should such

additional bombardment prove necessary.34

In case of fleet action, Admiral Mitscher's

Task Force 58 would retain its independence

and would not come under the control of

General Mac Arthur or of the latter's naval

commander, Admiral Kinkaid. Task Force

58 could depart the Hollandia area at a moment's notice to carry out its primary mission, destruction or containment of threatening Japanese fleet units. Conversely, the

combat ships and escort carriers of the Allied

Naval Forces would not pass to the control

of Admiral Mitscher. There was no provi- 30

 Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 14 Mar 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44; Rad, CINCSWPA

to COMSOPAC, XC-2255, 20 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 20 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 48, 24 Mar

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 24 Mar 44; Rad, GHQ

SWPA to ANF SWPA and AAF SWPA, CX-10113,

27 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27 Mar 44. 31

 GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44; GHQ

SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 48,

24 Mar 44.

32

 GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44; ANF

SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44. 33

 Ibid.; CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4-5 Apr 44. 34

 ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44; CTF

58 Opn Plan 5-44, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

21 Apr 44.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 29

sion made for unified air or naval command

in the objective area—a situation similar to

that which obtained six months later at

Leyte Gulf.

The Ground Forces

Ground operations at Hollandia and

Aitape were to be under the control of

ALAMO Force, commanded by General

Krueger.35 General Headquarters' early

plans, which were based on the assumption

that Hollandia would be a single objective,

had assigned to ALAMO FORCE one and onethird reinforced divisions, totaling about

32,000 combat and service troops. When

intelligence estimates indicated that nearly

14,000 Japanese troops, including two infantry regiments, might be stationed at Hollandia by D Day, it became obvious that

General Krueger would need more strength.

When Aitape was added to the Hollandia

plan, another need for increased strength

became apparent. Japanese forces at Aitape

were estimated at 3,500, including 1,500

combat troops. Since the Japanese used

Aitape as a staging area for troop movements between Wewak and Hollandia, it

was considered possible that before 22 April

enemy strength at Aitape might fluctuate

from one to three thousand above the estimated figure.36

 As a result of these estimates,

two and one-third reinforced divisions, totaling almost 50,000 troops, were made available to General Krueger for the assault

phase of the Hollandia-Aitape operation.37

Responsibility for ground operations at

Hollandia was delegated by General Krueger to Headquarters, U. S. I Corps, which

for this undertaking was designated the

RECKLESS Task Force. Commanded by Lt.

Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, I Corps headquarters had seen action during the Papua

Campaign. Since then it had been based

in Australia, operating as a training and

defense command. Early in 1944 the corps

headquarters had moved to Goodenough

Island, off the eastern tip of New Guinea, to

prepare for the now canceled Hansa Bay

operation. At Hollandia General Eichelberger was to control the action of the 24th and

41st Infantry Divisions (the latter less one

regimental combat team). The 24th Division, when alerted for the Hollandia operation, was finishing amphibious and jungle

training at Goodenough Island in preparation for the Hansa Bay campaign. Elements

of the 41st Division, which was commanded

by Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller, had participated in the Papua Campaign, while other

parts of the unit had gained experience in

the Lae-Salamaua operations. At the time

it was alerted for Hollandia, the 41st Division was rehabilitating and retraining in

Australia.38

Two regimental combat teams of the yet

untried 24th Division, commanded by Maj.

Gen. Frederick A. Irving, were to land at

Tanahmerah Bay, while two regimental 35

 GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44. 36

 Memo, GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44,

sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize

Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Carriers, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44;

GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, PERSECUTION

[Aitape], 24 Jan 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26 Jan 44;

GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI's 710-761, in G-3 GHQ

Jnls, 1 Mar-22 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of

Enemy Sit, 22 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 22 Mar 44.

37

 GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44. 38

 ALAMO Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA,

G-3 Hist Div, Chronology of the War in the SWPA,

copy in OCMH files; Memo, CINCSWPA for

COMSOPAC, Comdr AAF SWPA, Comdr ANF

SWPA, et al, 9 Feb 44, sub: Outline Plan Hansa

Bay Opn, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 9 Feb 44; RECKLESS

Task Force (hereafter cited as RTF) Opns Rpt

Hollandia, p. 6.
30 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

HOLLANDIA-AITAPE PLANNERS. Left to right: Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, Lt. Gen.

Walter Krueger. Officer at right is unidentified.

combat teams of the 41st Division were to

go ashore at Humboldt Bay.39 At Aitape, the

163d Infantry of the 41st Division was to

make the initial landings.

Operations at Aitape were to be controlled by Headquarters, PERSECUTION

Task Force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Jens

A. Doe, Assistant Division Commander, 41st

Division. The PERSECUTION Task Force,

organized on 23 March, was an Allied headquarters especially set up for the Aitape

operation. It was to exercise its command

functions directly under ALAMO Force and

was on the same level of command as the

RECKLESS Task Force.40

Until a beachhead was secured in the

Aitape area, control of the landing and operations ashore was to be vested in Admiral

Barbey as the Attack Force commander,

who was to be represented at Aitape by the

Commander, Eastern Attack Group, Capt.

39

 RTF FO 1, 27 Mar 44, atchd to RTF Opns

Rpt Hollandia; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 6.

40

 ALAMO Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44; PERSECUTION

Task Force (hereafter cited as PTF) FO 1, 6 Apr

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 5-6 Apr 44.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 31

Albert G. Noble (USN). General Doe was

to assume command of operations at Aitape

upon the seizure of the beachhead, at which

time the PERSECUTION Task Force was automatically to pass from the control of the

Navy to ALAMO Force.

At Hollandia the control of operations

was to pass from the commanders of the

Western and Central Attack Groups to the

commanders of the 24th and 41st Divisions,

respectively, when those units had secured

their beachheads. Admiral Barbey was to

retain control over ground action in the Hollandia area until General Eichelberger saw

fit to move his headquarters ashore. The

task force would then revert from naval

control to the supervision of ALAMO Force.41

To reinforce the 24th and 41st Divisions

for the Hollandia-Aitape operation, three

separate field artillery battalions, four engineer combat battalions, seven (plus) antiaircraft battalions, a tank destroyer battalion, and the bulk of three engineer boat and

shore regiments were made available. Other

reinforcing units included a medium tank

company of the 1st Marine Division, then on

New Britain, and another from the 1st Cavalry Division, which was operating on the

Admiralty Islands. Among the service

organizations assigned to the operation was

No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air

Force, to which was assigned the task of

rehabilitating an airfield at Aitape by D

plus 1.42

General Headquarters Reserve for the

operation was the 6th Infantry Division,

then finishing training for amphibious and

jungle warfare at Milne Bay, New Guinea.

About a week before the landings the 503d

Parachute Infantry, veteran of one combat

jump in eastern New Guinea, was designated as an additional General Headquarters Reserve.

ALAMO Force Reserve for the HollandiaAitape operation was originally the 127th

Infantry (and regimental combat team attachments) of the 32d Division. It was

brought out of reserve and assigned to the

PERSECUTION Task Force to arrive at Aitape

on D plus 1 because, as D Day approached,

General Krueger became increasingly concerned over the capabilities of the Japanese

18th Army, concentrating a strength of

fifty to sixty thousand at Wewak, only ninety-four miles east-southeast of Aitape. The

G-2 Section of General MacArthur's headquarters estimated that a large part of the

18th Army could march overland from Wewak to Aitape in two weeks, an opinion not

shared by the Operations Section (G-3) of

the same headquarters. The 18th Army, according to General MacArthur's G-2, could

be expected to make determined efforts to

recapture the Aitape area.43

41

 ALAMO Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44; ANF SWPA

Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46

(Rev), 28 Mar 44. 42

 Annex 1, Tentative Troop List, 13 Mar 44, to

GHQ SWPA Warning Order 4, 7 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 7 Mar 44; ALAMO Force FO 12, 23

Mar 44.

43

 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Hollandia,

22 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 22 Mar 44; Amendment 2, 17 Mar 44, to GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of

Enemy Sit with Respect to an Opn Against Hollandia, 17 Feb 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 29 Feb 44;

GHQ SWPA, DSEFs 710-761,1 Mar-22 Apr 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnls, 1 Mar-22 Apr 44; remarks of Maj

Gen Stephen J. Chamberlin, ex-ACofS G-3 GHQ

SWPA, at Hist Div SSUSA Seminar, 23 Jan 48,

copy in OCMH files. General Willoughby, General

MacArthur's G-2, as late as 4 March opposed the

jump to Hollandia because he doubted the ability

of distant land-based and local carrier-based aircraft to protect Allied forces until land-based planes

could be established at Hollandia, and he advised

adhering to the earlier plans for an operation

against the Hansa Bay-Wewak area. General

Chamberlin had much more faith in the carriers.

General Willoughby's views are to be found in

Memo, ACofS G-2 GHQ SWPA to ACofS G-3

GHQ SWPA, 4 Mar 44, no sub, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

3 Mar 44. The G-3's reply is attached.
32 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

General MacArthur considered General

Krueger's commitment of the 127th Regimental Combat Team to operations at

Aitape at least premature, if not unnecessary. The theater commander had planned

to relieve the 32d Division, then at Saidor

on the Huon Peninsula, with Australian

troops. The division was to be staged at

Saidor for an operation against the WakdeSarmi area in quick exploitation of expected

success at Hollandia and Aitape. General

MacArthur believed, however, that Aitape

might ultimately have to be reinforced. Reluctant consent was therefore given to General Krueger's plan and General MacArthur

made provision to use other units at WakdeSarmi. ALAMO Force Reserve then became

the 32d Division less two regimental combat teams—the 127th at Aitape and another

which was to remain in the Saidor area for

an indeterminate period.44 RECKLESS Task

Force Reserve at Hollandia was the 34th

Infantry (and combat team attachments)

of the 24th Division. PERSECUTION Task

Force Reserve during the landings at Aitape

was the 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry.45

Ground forces of the South Pacific Area

were to continue their campaigns in the Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago

during the Hollandia-Aitape operation.

New Guinea Force, commanded by General

Blarney and consisting principally of Australian troops, was to continue pressure

against 18th Army elements southeast of

Wewak. This action was expected to help

prevent the 18th Army from moving westward at will either to attack or to bypass the

Aitape area. New Guinea Force was also to

defend all of eastern New Guinea it then

occupied.46

Logistics

Logistic support of the Hollandia-Aitape

operation was the responsibility of the

United States Army Services of Supply,

Southwest Pacific Area. The magnitude of

the logistic problem is illustrated by the fact

that the grand total of all Southwest Pacific

Area forces assigned directly to the Hollandia-Aitape operation was over 84,000 men.

There were approximately 50,000 ground

combat troops and almost 23,000 personnel

of all types of service units. Allied Air Forces

units scheduled to move forward to Hollandia and Aitape during the opening stages

of the operation, including both ground and

air echelons, totaled over 12,000 men. Of

the 84,000 troops assigned to the operation,

about 52,000 men were to land in the objective areas by the evening of D plus 3, considered the. end of the assault phase.47

Never before had an operation of this size

been undertaken in the Southwest Pacific

Area.

Other problems existed, some of them directly and others indirectly related to the

size of the force. Heading the list was the

theater's chronic and sometimes acute shortage of ships. There were to be three widely

separated beaches, each far more distant

from supply bases than had been the case in 44

 GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 18 Mar 44; ALAMO Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44;

Rad, ALAMO to 32d Div, no number, 13 Apr 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 13 Apr 44; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ

SWPA for CofS GHQ SWPA, 14 Apr 44, no sub;

Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-2393, 14 Apr 44;

Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, C-10671, 14 Apr 44.

Last three documents in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 14 Apr 44. 45

 RTF FO 1, 27 Mar 44; PTF FO 1, 6 Apr 44,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 5-6 Apr 44.

46

 GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, and OI 46

(Rev), 28 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 48, 24 Mar 44. 47

 Annex 1, Tentative Troop List, 13 Mar 44, to

GHQ SWPA Warning Order 4, 7 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl 7 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar

44, and OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44; ALAMO Force

FO 12, 23 Mar 44.

34 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

earlier operations in the theater. The necessity for hurried airdrome construction at the

objectives made it imperative that large

quantities of engineering equipment and

matériel be sent to Hollandia and Aitape

during the first two or three days of the operation. Plans to develop Hollandia into a

major air center and logistic base involved

a long-range program of construction. Staging the troops was complicated by the fact

that the units were scattered from points in

southern Australia to the Admiralty Islands

and from the Huon Peninsula to western

New Britain.

The Logistic Plan

While logistic support of the HollandiaAitape operation was a responsibility of the

Services of Supply, ALAMO Force was responsible for the co-ordination of all detailed

logistic planning.48 For the purposes of coordination, General Krueger was authorized

to call to his headquarters representatives of

the Services of Supply, the Allied Air Forces,

and the Allied Naval Forces.

The Allied Naval Forces was responsible

for the logistic support of its own elements,

but in case of emergency it could draw supplies from Services of Supply stocks. All air

force technical supplies required to support

air force units moving to Hollandia or

Aitape were to be provided by the Allied Air

Forces. That headquarters was to be prepared to fly emergency supplies to Hollandia

and Aitape upon call from ALAMO Force.

The latter organization was to provide maintenance and rations for troops staging for

Hollandia and Aitape, establish initial supply bases at the objectives, and initiate

numerous construction projects, including

airfields at Hollandia and Aitape.

To insure supply of units moving to Hollandia and Aitape, the Services of Supply

was to provide at forward bases a thirty-day

supply of rations, unit equipment, clothing,

fuels, and lubricants. Six units of fire49 of

all types of ammunition were to be stockpiled for ground assault troops. Construction

matériel, in amounts and types determined

by ALAMO Force, was also to be provided at

forward bases. The responsibility for obtaining these supplies from the Services of Supply and assembling them at RECKLESS and

PERSECUTION Task Force staging areas was

vested in ALAMO Force.

Assault units of the RECKLESS and PERSECUTION Task Forces were to carry ashore a

five-day supply of rations. Additional rations

to assure food until D plus 20 for all units of

the RECKLESS Task Force landed through

D plus 3 were to be moved to Hollandia

with those units. Sufficient rations were

to be loaded for PERSECUTION Task Force

assault echelons to supply them through

D plus 29. Both task forces were to take with

them a fifteen-day supply of unit equipment,

clothing, fuels, and lubricants. Engineer

construction matériel was to be loaded on

ships scheduled to land through D plus 3 in

such quantity as to satisfy the minimum pre48

 The material in this subsection is based principally on: Annex 4, Logistics, to GHQ SWPA OI

46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44;

USASOS Logistics Instructions 46/SOS, 2 Apr 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 3 Apr 44; ALAMO Force Adm

O 7, 6 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23

Mar 44.

49

 From available evidence, it appears that at the

time of the Hollandia-Aitape operation the unit of

fire used in the Southwest Pacific was the same as

that established by the War Department. Later,

however, some changes were effected within the

theater, notably an increase in the rounds per unit

of fire for the BAR and the 105-mm. howitzer and

a reduction in rounds for the M1 rifle. The War

Department unit of fire during 1944 is to be found

in the 1944 edition of FM 101-10, Staff Officers'

Field Manual: Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 35

scribed by ALAMO Force, and in additional

quantities as required by the commanders of

the RECKLESS and PERSECUTION Task

Forces. Fifteen days' supply of other types of

construction and maintenance matériel was

to be moved to Hollandia and Aitape during

the assault phase of the operations.

Provision for ammunition supply was

more complex and depended to a large extent upon the nature of individual combat

organizations. Assault troops moving to Hollandia were to be provided with at least two

units of fire for all weapons. On the other

hand, the PERSECUTION Task Force was to

be supplied with four units of fire for the

landing. Sufficient ammunition for field and

antiaircraft artillery weapons, 4.2-inch mortars, and hand grenades was to be shipped

forward on assault convoys to provide each

task force with six units of fire by D plus 3.

Other types of ammunition, to establish a

total of five units of fire by D plus 3, would

also be shipped to Hollandia and Aitape.

Resupply of ammunition for the RECKLESS

and PERSECUTION Task Forces was a responsibility of ALAMO Force. Two units of

fire for all weapons were to be brought forward on convoys scheduled to arrive at the

objectives on D plus 8. After this first automatic resupply, the two task forces would

requisition from ALAMO Force ammunition

as needed.

Extra rations, fuels, lubricants, and ammunition were to be stockpiled at forward

bases so as to insure uninterrupted flow of

these items to the objectives. The Services of

Supply was to hold two large cargo vessels

empty at a forward base for possible emergency use until D plus 30, and was also to

furnish, prior to D Day, 1,000 tons of space

on small ships for emergency use. The Allied

Naval Forces and the Services of Supply

were to co-operate in providing tankers for

movement of bulk-loaded aviation gasoline,

barges for handling such fuel at the objectives, and harbor and lightering craft.

Through D plus 45 the control of all shipping moving to Hollandia and Aitape was to

rest with Allied Naval Forces. After that

date the Services of Supply was to assume

this responsibility. Principal supply and staging bases were to be at Goodenough Island

and Finschhafen. The latter base would be

the point of departure for resupply ships controlled by Allied Naval Forces. Services of

Supply shipping was to use such bases as

might be determined by that headquarters.

Obtaining the Shipping

Early plans for the operation had indicated that 32,000 troops with 28,500 measurement tons of supplies would be ample to

secure the Hollandia area. Enough shipping

could have been scraped up within the

Southwest Pacific to carry out an operation

of that size, but the scope of the undertaking

was entirely changed by the enlargement of

the forces and the decision to seize Aitape.

The 52,000-odd troops finally assigned to the

assault phase of the operation would require

58,100 tons of supplies and equipment.

There was not enough assault shipping within the theater to meet such requirements of

troop and cargo space.50

Most of the necessary additional shipping

was obtained by borrowing for a limited period assault vessels from the South and Central Pacific Areas and by utilizing some

theater ships normally engaged in training

activities or operations in rear areas, substituting civilian-manned vessels for the lat50

 Annex 4, Logistics, to GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18

Mar 44; GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan

Draft, 28 Feb 44, and atchd, unsigned, undated

memo, sub: Comments on Hollandia Outline Plan,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44.
36 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ter. By mid-March it appeared that these

steps had secured the minimum shipping

space needed for the operation. However,

requirements for hurried airdrome and base

construction made it necessary to add more

service troops and larger quantities of engineer equipment to assault cargoes than had

been contemplated when arrangements for

borrowing ships were first completed.51

General Krueger proposed that additional

shipping space be obtained by using large

cargo vessels (AK's) which were not usually

employed during assaults. These vessels,

often of the Liberty-ship type, differed from

attack cargo ships (AKA's) principally in

that they did not carry enough small boats

to unload themselves. Four AK's, manned

by U. S. Navy or Coast Guard personnel,

were operating in rear areas in the theater

where dock facilities and large cranes were

available. General Krueger requested that

these four be made available for the Hollandia-Aitape operation, a request which

seemed justified in the light of expected

Allied air superiority at the objectives and

which had a precedent in Japanese practice

during the early months of the war in the

Pacific.52

Admiral Barbey, in charge of the amphibious phase of the operation, opposed this

plan. He felt that AK's would be especially

vulnerable to attack in the forward areas if

they were to remain at the objectives until

completely unloaded of a capacity cargo.

The Supply Section (G-4) of General MacArthur's headquarters did not entirely agree

with the admiral and was, indeed, inclined

toward the point of view that AK's ". . .

should be operated with a view to support

rather than preservation of naval facilities . . ." 53

The G-4 Section's point of view represented one side of a basic disagreement between Army and Navy circles not only in the

Southwest Pacific Area but also, to varying

degrees, in other theaters of operations. To

the Navy, the shipping shortage in the

Southwest Pacific, together with the importance of keeping in operation ships capable

of providing further logistic support, outweighed the necessity for employing merchant-type shipping, such as AK's, in the

early phases of amphibious operations. The

loss of a single vessel of that type would be

keenly felt in both rear and forward areas in

the Southwest Pacific for months to come.

Moreover, to the Navy a piece of capital

equipment such as an AK was not as expendable as such items of ground force

equipment as an artillery piece, a tank, or a

truck. An AK represented months or perhaps years of construction effort and crew

training.54

Admiral Barbey finally determined to 51

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, XC-1753, 5

Mar 44, and Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF1012, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14

Mar 44; Memo, G-3 GHQ Opns Div to ACofS

G-3 GHQ, 25 Mar 44, sub: Shipping Borrowed

from SOPAC, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Mar 44; Memo,

ACofS G-3 ALAMO for CofS ALAMO, 27 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 24-27 Mar 44. 52

 Memo, GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44,

sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize

Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Carriers, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44;

Memo, G-3 ALAMO Plng Div for ACofS G-3

ALAMO, 11 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Rad, Com7thFlt to

ALAMO, 15 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 16 Mar 44.

53

 Memo, ACofS G-2 ALAMO to CofS ALAMO,

15 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

15-18 Mar 44; Memo, ACofS G-3 ALAMO, for CofS

ALAMO, 27 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 24-27 Mar 44; Ltr, Col Harold E. Eastwood

[of G-4 GHQ SWPA] to ACofS G-4 ALAMO, 26

Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 11

Feb-2 Apr 44. The quotation is from the latter

document. 54

 Ltr, Rear Adm Albert G. Noble [Chief, BuOrd

USN and, in 1944, one of Admiral Barbey's chief

deputies] to Gen Ward, 18 Dec 50, no sub, in

OCMH files.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 37

take some calculated risks that seemed to

be warranted by the importance of the

cargo which AK's could carry to the objectives. He decided that two lightly loaded

AK's would move to Hollandia with the

D-Day convoys. These two ships were to

leave that area on D plus 2 whether or not

their unloading was completed. Another

AK was to reach Aitape on D Day and the

fourth would arrive at Aitape on D plus 1.

Both the latter were to have a capacity load

and were to remain at Aitape until completely discharged. During the period that

the four AK's were operating in the forward

area, the Services of Supply, by arrangement with Allied Naval Forces, was to

provide civilian-manned vessels totaling

equivalent tonnage for operations in the

rear area.55

The fact that the AK's scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on D Day were not to be

completely loaded resulted in a reduction

of tonnage space—space which ALAMO

Force believed necessary for the success of

the operation. During the discussion concerning the dispatch of AK's to Hollandia,

the Allied Naval Forces had made available

six landing ships, tank (LST's) which had

not previously been assigned to the operation, apparently in the hope that ALAMO

Force would accept these vessels in lieu of

the AK's. Even with this addition, space

was still lacking for 3,800 tons of engineering equipment and other cargo that ALAMO

Force desired to send forward with initial

convoys. This cargo had to wait for later

convoys.56

As another result of the limitations on

cargo space, the quantity of supplies to be

carried forward after the assault phase, on

Services of Supply ships manned by civilian

crews, was increased beyond that originally

contemplated. In addition, some of the ships

sailing with the D Day through D plus 3

convoys would have to unload at Hollandia

and Aitape, return to eastern New Guinea

bases for reloading, and go back to the forward objectives with a new series of convoys

beginning on D plus 8.57

The first detailed plans for the Hollandia

operation had been drawn up during the

last week of February 1944 and final major

changes were completed in the second week

of April. As a result of the various changes,

ships scheduled to arrive at the objectives

during the assault phase of the operation

had increased as follows:

55

 Ibid.; Rad, Com7thFlt to ALAMO, 15 Mar 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 16 Mar 44; Rad ComServFor7thFlt to CTF 76, 15 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

16 Mar 44; Rad, CTF 76 to ALAMO and ANF

SWPA, 1 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

31 Mar-1 Apr 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO,

C-10273, 1 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 1 Apr 44;

Rad, CTF 76 to ALAMO and Com7thFlt, 1 Apr 44,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-4 Apr 44; Annex

6, Assignment of Shipping, 1 Apr 44, to ALAMO

Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 20-23 Mar. 44.

56

 Memo, ACofS G-3 ALAMO for CofS ALAMO,

27 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

24-27 Mar 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO,

CX-10175, 28 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28

Mar 44. 57

 Memo, ACofS G-4 ALAMO for ACofS G-4

USASOS, 9 Apr 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl

Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44; CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44,

3 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4-5 Apr 44.
38 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

After 9 April the number of assault vessels

was not changed and the quantity of personnel and supplies scheduled to be landed

through D plus 3 remained substantially the

same.58

Loading and Unloading Problems

Because of the shipping shortage, it was

extremely important to make use of all available cargo space on each vessel. In accordance with common practice in amphibious

operations, the ships of the HollandiaAitape assault convoy were to be combatloaded, which is to say that supplies most

needed ashore would be the last loaded at

staging areas, and the most important matériel would be aboard ships to be first discharged. This would insure that priority

cargo would be the first ashore. Combat

loading could take a variety of forms or combinations thereof. All cargo could be loaded

in bulk in the holds of ships, or could be

stowed aboard wheeled or tracked vehicles,

themselves to be combat-loaded. Another

possibility considered during preparations

for the Hollandia-Aitape operations was to

lash supplies onto prefabricated platforms—

known as pallets—which could easily be

loaded aboard cargo ships. For unloading,

these platforms could be lowered by deck

cranes into small boats or, occasionally, into

water to be dragged behind small craft to

the beach.59

Pallet-loading had been used extensively

during operations in the Central Pacific

Area but had been little employed in the

Southwest Pacific. The system had the advantage of saving much time and labor by

reducing to a minimum the handling of

individual boxes, crates, and cartons. But

it had the disadvantage of using somewhat

more space in holds than simple bulk

stowage. Moreover, not many pallets were

readily available in the forward areas of

the Southwest Pacific and, again, the theater

had had little experience in their use. To

save all possible space and to take advantage

of theater experience, ALAMO Force decided

that bulk combat-loading would be employed for all cargo not stowed aboard

vehicles.60

Another problem was that of lighterage

at the objectives. Since the AK's did not

carry small craft with which to unload

themselves provision had to be made to

secure such boats. For Aitape, ALAMO Force

believed that one landing craft, tank

(LCT), and twenty landing craft, mechanized (LCM's) would be required on D

Day and twice that number on D plus 1,

when the second of the two AK's was

scheduled to arrive. General Krueger therefore requested that Allied Naval Forces set

up an LCT-LCM convoy or its equivalent 58

 GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan Draft,

28 Feb 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar

44; ALAMO Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44. The second

column includes the AK's, the shipping listed in

CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44 of 3 Apr 44, the ships

carrying the 127th RCT to Aitape (shipping which

was committed to the assault phase on 9 April),

and miscellaneous other additions in the period prior

to 9 April. The totals agree with those set forth-in

ALAMO FO 12 and with the naval reports of the

operation, although not with the naval plans.

59

 The water drag method could, of course, be

used only for items such as canned rations which

were to be used immediately ashore and which

would not suffer from temporary immersion in salt

water. 60

 Memo, ALAMO G-3 Plng Div for ACofS G-3

ALAMO, 11 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Memo, ALAMO QM for

ACofS G-4 ALAMO, 21 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO

G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 39

in other landing craft to arrive at Aitape on

D Day.

Admiral Barbey would not approve this

plan. He felt that it would not be practical

for LCM's and LCT's to move to Aitape under their own power nor to be towed there

by large ships. The distance from staging

areas to Aitape would increase the possibility

of mechanical failures on the part of the

LCT's and LCM's moving under their own

power. Towing would decrease the speed of

the assault convoy, thereby increasing the

possibility of Japanese air attacks on the convoys and lessening chances for tactical surprise at the objectives. Admiral Barbey

therefore felt that the Aitape unloading plan

would have to be based on the use of small

craft carried forward by the assault shipping

scheduled to arrive on D Day.61

To obtain some additional lighterage, it

was decided to carry extra landing craft on

all large assault ships arriving at Aitape on

D Day.62 In addition, three landing ships,

dock (LSD's) scheduled to arrive at Hollandia and Aitape on D Day were ordered

to make a rapid return trip to eastern New

Guinea bases to pick up another load of

small craft. On the return trip the LSD's

were to carry a total of three LCT's and

twenty-four LCM's to Aitape, which, together with one LCT and six LCM's that

could be loaded on D-Day shipping, was

considered ample. It was hoped that this return trip of the LSD's could be accomplished

by the afternoon of D plus 3. Because of the

distances involved, however, Admiral Barbey could not promise that the LSD's would

arrive at Aitape on their second trip prior

to the morning of D plus 4.63

Since it was not necessary to unload as

much engineering construction equipment

at Hollandia during the assault phase as at

Aitape, the lighterage problem at Hollandia

did not appear acute prior to the landings.

It was thought probable that such shortages

as might occur there would be eased by sending forward extra small craft aboard the

ships of the first resupply convoy on D

plus 8.64

A third problem of supply movement was

to find a method of transporting supplies

from the water's edge to dump areas by

means other than the conventional, timeconsuming individual handling of each item

or container. ALAMO Force decided that

beach sleds—which could be dragged any

place on a beach negotiable by wheeled

vehicles, tractors, or bulldozers—would be

the answer. About 150 sleds had been manufactured in Australia for use by the 1st Cavalry Division in the Admiralties, but they

had not been ready in time for that operation. ALAMO Force obtained a high shipping

priority for the movement of 34 sleds from

Brisbane, Australia, to the staging area of

the 24th Division at Goodenough Island.

61

 Rad, ALAMO to CTF 76, WF-4237, 25 Mar 44,

Rad, CTF 76 to PTF, 25 Mar 44, and Memo,

ACofS G-3 ALAMO for CofS ALAMO, 27 Mar 44,

no sub, all three in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

24-27 Mar 44; Memo for record, G-3 ALAMO,

28 Mar 44, sub: Status of Planning, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 28-30 Mar 44. 62

 Available documents do not indicate how many

landing craft were to be so carried forward nor on

which large ships they were to be carried.

63

 Memo, ACofS G-3 ALAMO for CofS ALAMO,

31 Mar 44, no sub, and Rad, ALAMO to CTF 76,

WF-5127, 31 Mar 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44; Rad, ALAMO to CTF

76, WF-834, 6 Apr 44, and Rads, CTF 76 to

ALAMO, 6 and 7 Apr 44, last three in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44. 64

 Rad, CTF 76 to Com7thFlt, 7 Apr 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44; CTF 77,

Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 4-5 Apr 44.
40 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

These sleds arrived at Goodenough too late

to be loaded on the Hollandia convoy.65

Meanwhile, ALAMO Force had discovered

that another 26 sleds were on the way from

Australia to Oro Bay, New Guinea, and

that the remainder of the original 150 had

supposedly been shipped during March to

Cape Cretin, New Guinea.66 From the

middle of March to the middle of April the

ALAMO G-4 Section directed a widespread

search for these two shipments, all trace of

which had apparently been lost. An officer

from the ALAMO Ordnance Section looked

for the sleds to no avail at various Services

of Supply bases in New Guinea and Australia. Finally, official channels having

failed, the ALAMO G-4 Liaison Officer at

Oro Bay, who was also engaged in the

search, followed a hunch. He had a sergeant from his liaison group informally

establish contact with a supply sergeant at

the Oro Bay Base Engineer Section. This

supply sergeant immediately located 60

beach sleds at the base engineer supply

dump.

These sleds were perhaps not the particular ones for which the search was being

conducted, since their dimensions differed

slightly from those specified. However, the

liaison officer was acting on instructions

from the ALAMO G-4 to get some beach

sleds to Cape Cretin, where some of the

Hollandia-bound convoy was loading, no

later than 17 April. He therefore drew the

60 sleds from the base engineer and had

them shipped forward from Oro Bay by

small boat. Taking this action on his own

responsibility, the liaison officer assured at

least a partial supply of beach sleds for the

RECKLESS Task Force.67

Problems of Subordinate Commands

While sufficient supplies were on hand

within the Southwest Pacific Area to provide

assault units with almost all the materials

they needed for initial operations, some

shortages did exist which could not be filled

prior to the assault. Other logistic difficulties

were caused by the rather hurried organization of the task forces and by the fact that

units assigned to the operation were scattered

all over the eastern part of the theater. The

RECKLESS Task Force G-4 complained that

many units scheduled to engage in the operation were assigned to the task force so late

that it was nearly impossible to ascertain

their supply shortages. General Krueger had

originally approved a plan to make the task

force responsible only for the supply of units

specifically assigned to it. But the task force

was later ordered to assure completeness and

serviceability of supplies and equipment of

65

 Rad, G-4 ALAMO to ALAMO G-4 Liaison Officer (LO) at Hq USASOS, WF-2088, 14 Mar 44,

in 24th Div G-4 Plng Jnl, Hollandia; Rad, GHQ

Chief Regulating Officer at Goodenough Island to

G-4 ALAMO, WA-409, 15 Mar 44, in ALAMO G-4

Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44; Memo, Asst

ACofS G-4 ALAMO for ALAMO G-4 LO at USASOS

Base B, 23 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl

Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44; Memo, ACofS G-4

ALAMO for ALAMO Engr, 18 Apr 44, no sub, in

ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 17-29 Apr 44; Ltr,

ALAMO G-4 LO at Hq USASOS to ACofS G-4

ALAMO, 9 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia,

3-16 Apr 44. 66

 Memo, Asst AGofS G-4, ALAMO for ALAMO G-4

LO at USASOS Base B, 23 Mar 44, no sub, and

Memo, G-4 ALAMO for ALAMO Engr and ALAMO

Ord O, 31 Mar 44, no sub, both in ALAMO G-4

Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44.

67

 Rads, ALAMO G-4 LO at Base B to ALAMO,

WO-1702 and WO-1710, 14 and 15 Apr 44, respectively, and Ltr, ALAMO G-4 LO at Base B to

ACofS G-4 ALAMO, 15 Apr 44, all three in ALAMO

G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 41

all units scheduled to be controlled by the

task force at Hollandia, whenever assigned.68

In order to carry out its broad supply

duties, the RECKLESS Task Force G-4 Section decentralized responsibility for the supply and equipment of various attached units

to the headquarters' Special Staff Sections

of corresponding services. This step, which

speeded communication between the task

force headquarters and the scattered attached units, made possible quick and

accurate determination of shortages and

insured that steps would be taken to fill

requisitions from attached organizations.

Nevertheless, because so many units were

assigned to the task force quite late, the

Ordnance Section declared that determination of numerous ammunition shortages

could be made only on "suspicion."

 69

Another means by which the RECKLESS

Task Force solved some of its logistic problems was to make minor modifications in

the Tables of Equipment and Basic Allowances of various units assigned or attached

to the task force. ALAMO Force approved this

step only on the condition that such changes

would not materially affect unit tonnage

and space requirements, thereby creating a

need for more shipping space or causing

major last-minute changes in loading

plans.70

Subordinate units of the RECKLESS Task

Force had their own supply problems. On 8

March, with little more than a week's notice,

the 41st Division had to begin moving from

Australia to Cape Cretin, New Guinea,

where it was to stage for Hollandia. On such

short notice a good portion of the division's

supply shortages could not be filled on the

Australian mainland. The division sent liaison officers to Services of Supply headquarters, to ALAMO Force headquarters, and to

Services of Supply forward bases in New

Guinea to find out where shortages could

be filled and to start the movement of necessary items to Cape Cretin. Most shortages

were filled without undue difficulty from

New Guinea bases, but there was a permanent shortage of wheeled vehicles. The 41st

Division had no 21⁄2-ton 6x6 trucks and

only 50 percent of other authorized vehicles.

Some vehicles were supplied in New Guinea,

but the fulfillment of authorized allowances

had to await post-assault shipment.71

The 24th Division, staging at Goodenough Island, had especial difficulty in

procuring certain types of ammunition.

The division was unable to procure enough

2.36-inch bazooka rockets to build its stocks

to the prescribed level of five units of fire.

Theater stocks of bazooka rockets were so

low that the success of future operations

might have been jeopardized if all those

available were issued for the HollandiaAitape attacks. Therefore, only three units

of fire of the 2.36-inch rockets could be

issued to the 24th Division itself and only

two units of fire to attached units.72 Some 68

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 65; Ltr, CofS

I Corps [RECKLESS TF] to ACofS G-4 ALAMO,

15 Mar 44; Ltr, ACofS G-4 ALAMO to CofS I

Corps, 22 Mar 44; Rad, ALAMO to I Corps, WF-96,

1 Apr 44. Last three in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia,

11 Feb-2 Apr 44. 69

 Rad, I Corps to ALAMO, RM-2362, 7 Apr 44,

in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44; RTF

Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 36, 65. 70

 Rad, I Corps to ALAMO, RM-1103, 25 Mar 44,

and Rad, ALAMO to I Corps, WF-4218, 25 Mar 44,

both in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44.

71

 Rad, ALAMO to 41st Div, WF-1247, 8 Mar 44,

and Memo, ACofS G-4 41st Div for ADC 41st

Div, 11 Mar 44, no sub, both in ALAMO G-4 Jnl

Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44. 72

 ALAMO Force Adm O 7, 6 Apr 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44; Rad, ALAMO to

USASOS, WF-4530, 27 Mar 44, and Rad,

USASOS to ALAMO, ABO-265, 27 Mar 44, both

in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Acr 44.
42 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

lots of 60-mm. mortar ammunition supplied

to the 24th Division were found to be defective—a condition which obtained for a

large portion of theater stocks of this item.

The division was advised that it would have

to use the 60-mm. ammunition issued and

that the defective lots were not to be fired

over the heads of friendly troops.73 One

regiment of the division was initially short

of both 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortar shells.

Most of these shortages were made up from

stocks in Services of Supply bases in New

Guinea, and the shells were shipped to

Goodenough Island by small craft. The remainder was shipped by air from these bases

or Australia to Goodenough just in time to

be loaded on the 24th Division assault

convoy.74

Like the RECKLESS Task Force, the 24th

Division was not made responsible for the

supply of many attached units until late in

March. Some of these units had difficulty

obtaining needed supplies and equipment,

although they made efforts to fulfill their requirements. General Irving, the division

commander, felt so strongly about the difficulties of attached units that he requested

investigation of the failure on the part of

some Services of Supply bases to provide

spare parts and maintenance supplies for

attached artillery and tank units. Spare parts

for artillery mounts, tractors, and tanks were

ultimately located at various Services of

Supply installations and shipped to Goodenough. However, all the desired spare parts

for engineer and ordnance equipment could

not be found before the division left its staging area, and provision had to be made to

ship such items to the objective on resupply

convoys.75

The PERSECUTION Task Force had few

separate logistic problems. The principal assault element of the task force was the 163d

Infantry of the 41st Division, and that regiment's supply problems were solved along

with those of the division. The 167th Field

Artillery Battalion, which was to support the

163d Infantry at Aitape, had some difficulties. Because of the shortage of shipping

space, the battalion's organic transportation

could not all be sent forward on assault convoys. The unit's radio and wire would therefore have to be manhandled at the objective,

and liaison and fire control parties attached

to the battalion were to be without their

usual transportation.76

The Hollandia Tactical Plan

While the problems of logistics were being

solved, the tactical plans for the Hollandia

and Aitape assaults were being drawn up.

Limited knowledge of the terrain at the objectives was a major obstacle to detailed

planning, but by early April the ground, air,

and amphibious force commanders, in cooperation, had solved most of their problems

and had published their final tactical plans.

Humboldt Bay

Two regimental combat teams of the 41st

Division were to start landing at Humboldt

73

 Ltr, Ord O 24th Div to Ord O I Corps, 29

Mar 44, and atchd, undated Memo for record from

Ord Sec. ALAMO, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia,

11 Feb-2 Apr 44. 74

 Ltrs, ALAMO G-4 LO with 24th Div to ACofS

G-4 ALAMO, 6, 11, and 15 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-4

Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44.

75

 Notes of Conf between Ord O's 24th Div and

I Corps, 30 Mar 44, and atchd, undated notes by

ALAMO Ord O, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Hollandia,

II Feb-2 Apr 44; Ltrs, ALAMO G 4 LO with 24th

Div to ACofS G-4, 6 and 15 Apr 44, in ALAMO

G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44. Apparently nothing ever came of General Irving's request for

investigation. 76

 167th FA Bn Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-2.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 43

Bay on 22 April at 0700, high tide time in

the Hollandia area. Simultaneously, two regimental combat teams of the 24th Division

were to go ashore at Tanahmerah Bay. After

securing their beachheads, the two divisions

were to drive inland through successive

phase lines to complete a pincers movement

aimed at the rapid seizure of the Japaneseheld airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain.

It was intended that the main effort

should be made from Tanahmerah Bay by

the 24th Division, since known and suspected Japanese defenses seemed concentrated at Humboldt Bay. While the RECKLESS Task Force Reserve (the 34th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Division)

might actually be more needed by the 41st

Division at Humboldt Bay, General Eichelberger, the task force commander, planned

to land the reserve at Tanahmerah Bay in

an endeavor to exploit expected enemy

weaknesses there. Task force headquarters

and most of the reinforcing units and service

organizations were also to land at Tanahmerah Bay. The 41st Division was to be prepared to drive inland from Humboldt Bay,

but its role might be limited to containing

Japanese strength which could otherwise

move against the 24th Division. Nevertheless, the 41st Division's plans were made to

take advantage of whatever weaknesses

might be found in enemy defenses at Humboldt Bay.77

The Humboldt Bay landing areas selected for the 41st Division, White Beaches

1-4, presented complex problems of coordination and control. From the northwestern and southeastern shores of the inner

reaches of Humboldt Bay ran two low sand

spits, divided one from the other by a narrow channel leading from Humboldt Bay

southwestward into smaller Jautefa Bay.

Narrow, sandy beaches lined the Humboldt

Bay side of the two spits, but the Jautefa

Bay shore was covered with tangled mangrove swamps.

White Beaches 1-3 were located on the

two sand spits. None was ideally located in

relation to division objectives, but the

beaches were the best in the area. Access

to the mainland from the spits could be

obtained by movement along the Humboldt

Bay side to inland ends of both peninsulas.

The northern spit was flanked inland by an

open-topped height called Pancake Hill,

which was suspected of containing Japanese

defensive installations. North of Pancake

Hill, toward the town of Hollandia, lay

wooded hills rising to a height of over 1,000

feet. The southern spit opened on marshy

ground along the southeastern shore of

Humboldt Bay.

White Beach 1, about 800 yards long and

70 wide, ran along the northern spit south

from the point at which that peninsula

joined the mainland. White Beach 2 was at

the outer end of the same spit, while White

Beach 3 was located at the northern end of

the southern peninsula. White Beach 4 was

on the western shore of Jautefa Bay and

was situated just north of Pim, a native

village at the eastern terminus of a motor

road running inland to Lake Sentani and

the task force objectives.78

Close air support for the landings of the

41st Division was the responsibility of planes

aboard the carriers of Task Force 58. These

aircraft were to maintain combat air patrols

over enemy airstrips in the Hollandia area

from earliest light on D Day until H plus 60

minutes (0800), or until such patrols

77

 RTF FO 1, 27 Mar 44; RTF Opns Rpt Hol- landia, p. 6.

78

 LETTERPRESS Landing Force [41st Inf Div]

FO 1, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 Annex to 41st Div Opns

Rpt Hollandia.
HUMBOLDT BAY
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 45

proved unnecessary. Fighter planes engaged

in these patrol missions were to have freedom of action over the entire Hollandia region until H minus 30 minutes, after which

they were to confine their operations to targets two or more miles inland from the

landing beaches at both Humboldt and

Tanahmerah Bays.

At Humboldt Bay, from H minus 15 minutes until H minus 4, or until the 41st Division's leading landing wave was within 800

yards of the shore, carrier-based aircraft

were to hit enemy antiaircraft batteries and

other known or suspected defensive positions

around Humboldt Bay, especially on hills

near White Beaches 1 and 4. At H minus 4

minutes, carrier-based bombers were to drop

their bombs on the beaches in an attempt

to detonate possible beach mines. At H

minus 3, when the first wave was scheduled

to be 500 yards from shore, antipersonnel

fragmentation bombs were to be dropped

on White Beach 1.

Naval fire support at Humboldt Bay was

to be provided by three light cruisers and

six destroyers of the U. S. Navy, firing to

begin at H minus 60 minutes. Principal targets were Hollandia, Pim, heights north of

White Beach 1, Cape Soedja at the northwestern end of Humboldt Bay, and the four

landing beaches. Two rocket-equipped landing craft, infantry (LCI's), were to accompany the leading boat waves, one to fire on

Pancake Hill and the other to bombard high

ground north of Pancake. A single destroyer

was to accompany the first waves to bombard Capes Pie and Tjeweri (the tips of the

two sand spits) and to support movement of

amphibian tractors (LVT's) from White

Beach 2 to White Beach 4.79

The first landings to take place on White

Beach 1, at H Hour, were to be executed by the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry.

After landing, the battalion was to push

rapidly north along the beach to the mainland and make ready to descend into Hollandia from hills south of that town. One

company was to move west from the main

body to establish a block across a road connecting Hollandia and Pim. The seizure of

the northern section of the Hollandia-Pim

road was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 162d

Infantry, which was to follow the 3d ashore

on White Beach 1. The 2d was to push up

the road toward Hollandia and assist the 3d

Battalion in securing that town. The 1st

Battalion, 162d Infantry, was to land at

White Beach 1 still later and assemble inland as division reserve.

White Beach 2 and Cape Pie were to be

seized at H Hour by a reinforced rifle

platoon from the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry. The beach was to be used by the 3d

Battalion, 186th Infantry, which, aboard

LVT's, was to move across the spit, push

through the backing mangrove swamp, and

land on White Beach 4 across Jautefa Bay.

Then the battalion was to clear neighboring

hills and advance south toward Pim along

the Hollandia-Pim road. The rest of the

186th Infantry was to land on White Beach

1 after H Hour and move inland around

the upper end of the spit. The 1st Battalion,

186th Infantry, was to move to Pim while

the 2d Battalion assembled in division

reserve.

Seizure of White Beach 3 on the southern

sand spit was designed as a security measure,

and the beach was to be occupied by a rifle

company of the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, at H Hour. This unit was then to

secure Cape Tjeweri, at the northern tip of

the spit, and patrol southeastward from the

peninsula along the shore of Humboldt Bay 79

 CTF 77 Opn plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44
TANAHMERAH BAY
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 47

to ward off or delay any Japanese counterattacks from that direction.

Artillery landing on D Day was to take

up positions either on the northern spit or

near the Hollandia-Pim road and from

those positions provide support for infantry

advancing inland and toward Hollandia.

Antiaircraft artillery was to be grouped initially on or near White Beach 1. The first

duties of engineers were to unload ships,

construct or improve exit roads from White

Beach 1 to the Hollandia-Pim road, and

improve the latter track. The 41st Reconnaissance Troop was to scout along the

shores of Humboldt Bay as far as Tami Airstrip, eight miles southeast of Hollandia, and

to Imbi Bay and Cape Soedja at the northwestern limits of Humboldt Bay.80

Tanahmerah Bay

Landing points chosen for the 24th Division at Tanahmerah Bay were designated

Red Beaches 1 and 2 and the principal

thrust was to be made over the latter. Situated on the east-central shore of Tanahmerah Bay, Red Beach 2 ran north and

south about 800 yards, boasted clear approaches from the sea, and was steeply

inclined. It was known to be narrow and

backed by a swamp, the nature of which

could not be ascertained before the landing.

Red Beach 1 was located at the southern

end of Dépapré Bay, a narrow southeastern arm of Tanahmerah Bay. The narrow approach to Red Beach 1 was flanked

on each side by hills only 600 yards from the

central channel, and the landing area was

fronted by a coral reef, the characteristics

of which were unknown before D Day.

Red Beach 1 opened on a small flat area

at the native village of Dépapré, near the

beginning of the only road between Tanahmerah Bay and the inland airfields. Little

was known about this road, but it was believed to be extensively used by the Japanese, passable for light wheeled vehicles, and

subject to rapid improvement. West and

south of Red Beach 1 lay a swamp backed

by heavily forested hills. To the north was

more difficult terrain, dominated by three

prominent hills overlooking both Red

Beaches. The division expected to find a

road running along the sides of these heavily

forested hills over the two miles which

separated the beaches.81

H Hour at Tanahmerah Bay was the same

as for Humboldt Bay, 0700, and carrierbased aircraft from Task Force 58 were to

support the landings of the 24th Division in

much the same manner they were to support

the 41st Division's assault. Naval fire support at Tanahmerah Bay would be provided

by two Australian cruisers and by Australian

and American destroyers. Targets and timing of naval support fires were similar to

those to be used at Humboldt Bay. Most of

the fire at Tanahmerah Bay was to be directed at Red Beach 2 and its environs and,

prior to H Hour, only one destroyer was assigned to fire on Red Beach 1. After H Hour

all fire support ships would be available to

fire on targets of opportunity or objectives

designated by the forces ashore. One LCI

was to support the leading waves to Red

Beach 2 with rocket and automatic weapons

fire, which was to begin when the carrierbased planes finished their close support missions (about H minus 4 minutes) and continue until the first troops were safely

ashore.82

80

 LETTERPRESS LF FO 1, 9 Apr 44.

81

 NOISELESS Landing Force [24th Inf Div] FO 1,

5 Apr 44, in 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 24ff. 82

 CTF 77 Opn plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44
48 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

On the northern half of Red Beach 2 the

19th Infantry (less one battalion in division

reserve) was to land. The two assault battalions were to secure half the beachhead,

establish left flank security for the rest of the

division, prepare to assume responsibility for

the protection of the entire beachhead, and

undertake mopping up north of the beach.

Simultaneously two battalions of the 21st

Infantry were to land on the southern half

of Red Beach 2. After securing their sectors

of Red Beach 2, these battalions were to

push overland and south toward Red Beach

1. The division planned to improve the road

which supposedly connected the two beaches

or, if necessary, construct a new road between the two.

Initial landings on Red Beach 1 were to

be undertaken by three reinforced rifle companies of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry,

and were to begin at H plus 25 minutes,

0725. The primary missions of this force

were to start rapidly inland over the road

leading to Lake Sentani and the airfields

and to report the size and condition of possible additional landing points in the

Dépapré area. Movement inland was to begin before the Japanese could organize defenses along that portion of the road which

wound snake-like over rugged hills south and

east of Dépapré.

The Allied Naval Forces originally objected to a landing on Red Beach 1 and by

arrangement with General Eichelberger had

had this plan canceled. But General Irving,

who wished to provide for every contingency

in a landing area where terrain conditions

were practically unknown, wanted the Red

Beach 1 landing to remain in the plan, even

if naval fire support for the assault could not

be obtained. He considered it possible that

failure to secure quickly the entrance to the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani road might have disastrous consequences were it found impracticable to build a good road from Red Beach

2 to Red Beach 1. Seizing an opportunity

to reopen the discussion of a landing on Red

Beach 1, General Irving made personal pleas

to General Eichelberger and Admiral Barbey, and succeeded in having the landing

reinstated in the plan. This proved one of

the most important tactical decisions of the

Hollandia operation.83

Preliminary Operations and the Approach

Intelligence Operations

Early in 1944 General MacArthur's G-2

Section had noted that the Japanese were

increasing their activities in the Wewak area

and near-by Hansa Bay. As D Day for the

Hollandia-Aitape operation approached, it

was discovered that the bulk of the Japanese 18th Army was withdrawing from forward bases at Madang and Alexishafen and

was moving rapidly westward across the

Ramu and Sepik Rivers to Wewak and

Hansa Bay. These activities seemed to indicate that the Japanese probably expected

the next Allied attack to be aimed at the

Wewak-Hansa Bay area.

Every effort was made to foster in the

mind of Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi, commanding the 18th Army, the growth of the idea

that a major assault in the Wewak sector was

imminent. During March and early April,

Wewak was heavily bombed by the Allied

Air Forces, not only to prevent the Japanese

from using their airfields there but also to

lead the enemy to believe that the usual

aerial softening-up process preceding an

amphibious operation was taking place.

83

 NOISELESS LF FO 1, 5 Apr 44; 24th Div Opns

Rpt Hollandia, p. 23; Ltr, Gen Irving to Gen Ward,

3 Nov 50, in OCMH files.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 49

Minor naval bombardments of the Wewak

and Hansa areas were carried out in March

and early April, and PT's of the Allied

Naval Forces patrolled actively along the

coast north from Madang to Wewak. By

various means propaganda was spread to

convince the 18th Army that a landing was

soon to be made at Wewak, and dummy

parachutists were dropped in the same vicinity. Allied Naval Forces submarines

launched empty rubber life rafts along the

coast near Wewak in an endeavor to make

the Japanese believe that reconnaissance patrols were active in that area.84

One effort was made to obtain terrain information and knowledge of enemy troop

strength and dispositions in the Hollandia

area. About two weeks before the landing a

Seventh Fleet submarine landed an Allied

reconnaissance patrol at Tanahmerah Bay.

The venture proved completely abortive.

Local natives betrayed the patrol to the

Japanese, and the members were killed, captured, or dispersed. A few men of the original party eluded the enemy and were found

alive after the Allied landings.85

Air Operations

The scheduled strike by Task Force 58

against the Palaus, designed both for strategic support of the Hollandia operation and

the destruction of enemy air and surface

units, was carried out on 30-31 March.

Other islands in the western Carolines, including Yap, Ulithi, Ngulu, and Woleai,

were hit during the same two days or on 1

April. The raids resulted in the loss for the

Japanese of almost 150 aircraft either in the

air or on the ground. Two enemy destroyers,

four escort vessels, and 104,000 tons of

merchant or naval auxiliary shipping were

sunk and many other ships, of both combat

and merchant classes, were damaged. In

addition, airfields and shore installations at

all objectives were damaged and the main

channels into the Palau fleet anchorage at

least temporarily blocked by mines.

Unfortunately, Task Force 58 had been

sighted by Japanese search planes prior to

its arrival off the Palaus, and many enemy

combat ships and a number of merchant

vessels had fled from the area. The desired

results were achieved, however—the enemy

naval units at Palau were removed as a

threat to the Hollandia-Aitape operation

and driven back to more westerly bases.

Task Force 58 lost twenty planes, but its

ships suffered no damage.86

The efforts of Task Force 58 had been

supplemented by South and Southwest

Pacific aircraft which, from bases in eastern

New Guinea and the Admiralties, bombed

islands in the eastern Carolines and undertook many long reconnaissance missions.

Meanwhile, Southwest Pacific aircraft had

been neutralizing enemy air bases in western

New Guinea and eastern islands of the

Netherlands East Indies. Most of the strategic support missions flown to western New

Guinea were undertaken by U. S. Fifth Air

84

 Memo, GHQ SWPA for ANF SWPA, AAF

SWPA, and ALAMO, 30 Mar 44, no sub, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-4 Apr 44; Rad, Com7thFlt

to CTF 75, 5 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 5 Apr 44;

Rad, CINCSWPA to COMINCH, 11 Apr 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 12 Apr 44; 18th Army Opns, III,

pp. 17-20, 39-40. 85

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp.

20-21. For a complete account of the scouting attempt at Hollandia see Comdr. Eric A. Feldt

(RAN), The Coast Watchers (Melbourne, 1946),

pp. 364-74.

86

 U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 207; Japanese Studies

in WW II, No. 34, Naval Operations in the Western

New Guinea Area, 1943-45, p. 11, and No. 60, The

A-GO Operation, 1914, p. 2, copies in OCMH files.
50 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Force planes while the Royal Australian Air

Forces Command assumed responsibility for

the majority of the strikes against the islands

in the eastern Indies. These operations

were intensified about six weeks before the

landings at Hollandia and Aitape. From

Wewak to the Vogelkop Peninsula of western New Guinea, and from Biak to Timor,

the Allied Air Forces destroyed Japanese

planes and airfield installations, rendered

many air bases at least temporarily unusable, and hindered enemy attempts to fly

air reinforcements to New Guinea from the

Philippines.87

Spectacular results were achieved by the

Fifth Air Force at Hollandia, where the

Japanese 6th Air Division had recently retreated from Wewak and received strong

reinforcements. The air unit conserved its

planes, apparently waiting to see where the

Allies would strike next.88 The Japanese

waited too long.

The Fifth Air Force shifted the weight

of its attack from the Wewak area to Hollandia, and, during the period 30 March

through 3 April, destroyed or damaged over

300 Japanese aircraft, most of them on the

ground. On 30 March, when over 100

planes were destroyed at Hollandia, the

Japanese were caught completely unprepared. Faulty intelligence, resulting partially

from insufficient radar warning facilities,

found many Japanese planes on the ground

refueling after early morning patrols. Others

had been left unattended upon receipt of

reports that a large Allied air formation had

turned back eastward after bombing Aitape.

Finally, earlier Fifth Air Force attacks had

so cratered runways and taxiways of two

of the three enemy fields at Hollandia that

there was little room to disperse the planes.

The Fifth Air Force, in a series of low-level

bombing attacks, covered and aided by

newly developed long-range fighters, found

enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip

along the runways. By 6 April the Japanese

had only twenty-five serviceable aircraft at

Hollandia.89 They made no attempt to rebuild their air strength there and, after 3

April, Fifth Air Force raids were met by

only a small number of enemy fighter planes

which made but desultory attempts at

interception.90

The Japanese did build up a small concentration of air strength farther west, at

Wakde-Sarmi, and continued airfield development at still more westerly bases. The

Fifth Air Force and Australian aircraft increased their efforts against these latter

installations,91 while planes of Task Force 58

effectively neutralized Japanese air power

at Wakde-Sarmi just prior to 22 April.

87

 USSBS, op. cit., p. 179; GHQ SWPA OI 48, 24

Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 24 Mar 44; Rad, CINCSWPA to CINCPOA et al., CX-10718, 15 Apr 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 15 Apr 44; AAF SWPA OI 49

(Rev), 30 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44. 88

 AAF SWPA Int Sum 193, 25 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 24 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI's

737 and 742, 26 Mar and 3 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnls, 26 Mar and 3 Apr 44; 18th Army Opns, III,

4-9, 17-20.

89

 18th Army Opns III, 35-37; AAF SWPA Int

Sum 197, 8 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 7 Apr 44;

GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 742, 3 Apr 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 3 Apr 44. Many additional details of AAF

SWPA action against Hollandia are provided in the

Air Force's official history: Wesley Frank Craven

and James Lea Cates (Eds.), The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago, 1950), pp. 587-98. 90

 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46; Japanese Studies

in WW II, 31, History of the 2d Area Army, 1943-

1945, pp. 30-40, copy in OCMH files; ALAMO

Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 45-48; AAF

SWPA Int Sum 197, 8 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2

DSEI 760, 21 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 21 Apr 44.

For additional information on the effects of Japanese air losses at Hollandia, see Ch. IV, below. 91

 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, WakdeSarmi, 8 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 8 Apr 44; GHQ

SWPA, G-2 DSEI 760, 21 Apr 44.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 51

DAMAGED JAPANESE AIRPLANES. The Fifth Air Force, in a series of low-level

bombing attacks, found enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip along the runways.

Task Force 58's efforts at Wakde and Hollandia on D minus 1 and D Day bagged

an estimated thirty-three aircraft shot down.

Damage to planes on the ground at either

objective was difficult to assess because of the

degree of destruction previously achieved at

both places by the Allied Air Forces.92

Attack Force Preparations

Meanwhile, Allied ground and amphibious forces had been engaged in final preparations and training for the coming assault

and, on 8, 9, and 10 April, had undertaken

last rehearsals. The 24th Division's rehearsal

at Taupota Bay, on the coast of New Guinea

south of Goodenough Island, was incomplete. Little unloading was attempted, and

the area selected did not permit the employment of naval gunfire support. The 41st

Division had a more satisfactory rehearsal,

with realistic unloading and naval fire, near

Lae, New Guinea.93

Final loading began on 10 April. LCI's

of the RECKLESS Task Force left their loading points on 16 April in order to allow the

troops aboard to disembark at the Admiralty Islands for a day of exercising, resting,

92

 USSBS, op. cit., p. 208; ALAMO Force Opns

Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 45-46.

93

 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 37; CTF 77

Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape,

p. 29; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 3; PTF Opns

Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 Mar 44, p. 1; 41st Div Opns

Rpt Hollandia, p. 1.
52 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

and eating. Other vessels of Hollandiabound convoys left the Goodenough Island

and Cape Cretin staging areas on 17 and 18

April. Ships carrying the PERSECUTION Task

Force moved out of the Finschhafen area

on 18 April and on the same day rendezvoused with the vessels bearing the 41st

Division toward the Admiralties.

All convoys moved north around the eastern side of the Admiralties and, at 0700 on

20 April, the various troops assembled at a

rendezvous point northwest of Manus

Island. Moving at a speed of about nine

knots, the massed convoys steamed westward from the Admiralties all day and at

dusk turned southwest toward Hollandia.

At a point about eighty miles off the New

Guinea coast between Hollandia and

Aitape, the PERSECUTION Task Force convoy—the Eastern Attack Group—broke off

from the main body and swung southeast

toward Aitape. The ships bearing the RECKLESS Task Force proceeded to a point

twenty miles offshore between Humboldt

and Tanahmerah Bays. There, at 0130 on

D Day, this convoy split. The Central Attack Group, with the 41st Division aboard,

turned southeast toward Humboldt Bay

and arrived in the transport area at 0500.

The ships of the Western Attack Group,

carrying the 24th Division and the remainder of the RECKLESS Task Force,

moved into Tanahmerah Bay at the same

time.94

94

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, Map 1, p. 5; CTF

77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt BayAitape, pp. 9-10; CTG 77.2 (Central Attack

Group) Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, p. 3; CTG 77.3

Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-2.
CHAPTER III

The Hollandia Operation

First light in the Hollandia area on 22

April 1944 disclosed a heavily overcast sky

from which a light drizzle intermittently fell

upon the ships bearing the RECKLESS Task

Force toward its objectives. (Map II) The

weather gave no promise that aircraft

aboard the carriers of Task Force 58, standing offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bays, would be able to execute all

their assigned support missions. On the other

hand, the weather conditions aided Allied

forces, for the approach of the convoys to

Hollandia was at least partially concealed

from Japanese eyes. Chances for local surprise seemed excellent.

The Landings at Tanahmerah Bay

The assault ships of the Western Attack

Group, carrying the 24th Infantry Division

to Tanahmerah Bay, anchored some 10,000

yards off Red Beach 2, about a mile farther

than planned. This change was due to bad

weather, which obscured landmarks expected by ships' pilots to guide them to the

proper anchorages. The troops of the 24th

Division quickly breakfasted and assault

personnel then began clambering down nets

into waiting landing craft of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. The transfer

to small craft, although hampered by rough

seas in the transport area, was completed

about 0535, and the leading waves formed

rapidly.

The Assault

Naval fire support vessels, operating under the command of Rear Adm. V. A. C.

Crutchley (RN), picked up their landmarks

through the mist as best they could, and at

0600 the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy

cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS

Shropshire shattered the silence of the

steaming tropical morning.1 To this din was

added the sharper crack of 5-inch and

4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. In order to obtain observation of important targets, the fire

support ships stood as close inshore as the

weather conditions and incomplete knowledge of the waters at Tanahmerah Bay

allowed. The fire continued until 0645, by

which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500

rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition

had been expended. The naval bombardment was carried out according to plan

and without response from Japanese shore

1

 Information in this and the following subsection is from: 24th Inf Div [NOISELESS Landing

Force] Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 56-79, 223-24;

24th Div G-3 Jnl, Hollandia; 21st Inf Jnl, Hollandia; 19th Inf Jnl, Hollandia; RTF G-3 Jnl Hollandia; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 24; Ltr, CG 2d ESB to Comdr

ALAMO Force, 24 Apr 44, sub: Observations, D Day,

Red Beach, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26

Apr 44; draft MS History of the 2d Engineer Special

Brigade, Ch. VII, "The RECKLESS Task Force," pp.

13-20, copy in OCMH files; Co A, 1st Tank Bn,

1st Mar Div, Opns Rpt, 15 Apr-13 May 44, pp.

1-2; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 46.
54 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

LANDINGS AT TANAHMERAH BAY. Landing craft heading toward Red Beach 2.

Despite unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air

alert over the Hollandia area.

defenses. At its conclusion Allied destroyers

moved still closer inshore to fire on targets

of opportunity.

Despite the unfavorable weather, Task

Force 58 had managed to maintain planes

on air alert over the Hollandia area since

dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the

Hollandia fields, and the few apparently

operational planes sighted on those strips

were strafed. In general there were no

indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area.

Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and

strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled.

As the leading wave of landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP's), approached

Red Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke

from the naval bombardment, a rocket

barrage was laid on the landing area by one

Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,

support (LCS's), of the 542d Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns

mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept

up a steady fire against the beach. There

was no answer from the Japanese, and the
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 55

only opposition to the landing was scattered

small arms and light automatic weapons

fire from points far on the flanks of the

beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced

by supporting destroyers that the assault

waves suffered no casualties before reaching

shore.

The first group of LCVP's, carrying men

of the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the

2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, was eight or

nine minutes late in reaching Red Beach 2.

But this tardiness did not prevent a successful landing, and after orders were issued to

add eight minutes to the starting time of

each, succeeding waves were almost perfectly timed. Tactical surprise was evidently

complete. No Japanese defended the

beaches and the two assault battalions had

no difficulty occupying the initial beachhead.

The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly

secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols

east and north to probe suspected enemy

positions. The 1st Battalion, following the

3d ashore, went into an assembly area to

act as local reserve and to make ready to

aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge

if that proved necessary. The 2d Battalion,

21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red

Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3d Battalion

of that regiment quickly followed the 2d

ashore and sent Company I south to look

for the trail expected to connect with Red

Beach 1 at Dépapré.

Company A of the 21st Infantry led the

way to Red Beach 1 aboard LVT's of the

542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

protected by the 2d Engineer Special Brigade's Support Battery craft. Scheduled for

0725, Company A's landing actually took

place about twenty minutes late. LVT's on

the flanks of the initial waves had to cross

coral barrier reefs on their way to the shore,

while in the center only two LVT's at one

time were able to proceed abreast through

a narrow channel in the reefs. The landing

was unopposed, and the remainder of the

1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, moved ashore

quickly.

Red Beach 1 contained a veritable maze

of trails which crossed each other, recrossed,

and wandered off toward all points of the

compass. The 1st Battalion thus found it

difficult to accomplish one of its principal

missions—locating the beginning of the road

leading inland to Lake Sentani and the airfields. After an hour's search, the entrance

to this important trail was discovered about

500 yards south-southeast of Dépapré.

While that reconnaissance was under way,

Company A secured and expanded the

beachhead. Huts which had survived

the naval bombardment were carefully

searched, footpaths throughout the area

were explored, a few Japanese stragglers

were killed, and some potential supplydispersal areas were located.

Back at Red Beach 2, which had been intended as the principal landing area for both

troops and supplies, operations were not proceeding according to plan. General Irving,

when he assumed command ashore at 0930,

found the terrain at Red Beach 2 much more

difficult than he or members of his staff had

anticipated. A major change in landing

plans, not only for the 24th Division but also

for the rest of the RECKLESS Task Force,

seemed imminent.

The Landing Plans Are Changed

Contrary to estimates, which had been

based primarily on interpretation of aerial

photographs, Red Beach 2 proved to be but
56 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

thirty yards deep. Behind this narrow beach

was discovered a wide swamp covering most

of the area which the task force had planned

to use for bivouacs and supply dumps. The

swamp was soon found to be impassable for

everything except individual infantrymen

bearing only small arms. Power tools were

useless in the morass. Neither time nor men

and equipment were available to adapt Red

Beach 2 to the role originally planned for it.

A limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of

the swamp, was discovered at the northern

edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery,

ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on

inland targets. But the fill used to build this

road stopped the flow of the little stream

which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's

water level, a drainage canal was cut directly

through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp

water, lowered the water level a little, and

created a small additional dry area behind

the beach, but it did not provide sufficient

dry land for dispersal of all the troops and

supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2.

Meanwhile, more obstacles to the execution of the original logistic plans had been

discovered. First, it proved impracticable to

build planned roads inland 500 yards on

both sides of Red Beach 2 to dry areas behind the swamp. Then it was found that

there was no road connecting Red Beach 2

with Red Beach 1 or with the Dépapré-Lake

Sentani road. This was an especially serious

circumstance, for the landing plans had

called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road

inland. Construction of a road between the

two beaches was soon found impracticable

and when, after a day and a half of hard

work, engineers had succeeded in driving

a few yards of road into the hills south

toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch

did serve some useful purpose. On D Day

two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were

dragged along the road as far as possible to

a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site

the howitzers could deliver some fire support

for troops advancing inland from Red Beach

1, but the direction of this fire was limited by

a number of hills near by. The same stretch

of road also provided dispersal space for a

few of the many vehicles which had been

unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D Day.

Other difficulties were encountered at

Red Beach 2. As soon as LST's touched

shore, they began disgorging tanks, 90-mm.

antiaircraft weapons, and 155-mm. artillery.

Practically all the artillery mounts mired to

their hubs in deep mud at the inner side of

the beach. Bulldozers then had to be taken

off essential road construction projects to

pull the vehicles out of the way. The 2d and

3d Platoons of Company A, 1st Marine

Tank Battalion, ashore at 0830, could not

be used tactically and had to find space to

bivouac on the beach or on the road to the

south. When it was found that the available

beach area was inadequate to hold the many

tracked and wheeled vehicles still aboard

the LST's, work was redirected to unloading

bulk cargo. Roller conveyors were set up on

the beach but could not be extended into

LST cargo decks because those decks were

still so tightly packed with vehicles. A long

stream of men had to proceed to the stern

of each LST to bring out bulk supplies

by hand through narrow spaces between

vehicles.
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 57

UNLOADING LST'S, Red Beach 2.

Since it was impossible to move the supplies inland they were piled on the beach,

where many stacks of boxes or crates soon

reached heights up to eight feet. The beach

quickly became so crowded that it was soon

obvious that the efforts of ALAMO Force to

secure beach sleds for the 24th Division had

been in vain—there was simply no room to

use them. But, despite the seemingly patent

impossibility of finding room for all men and

supplies on Red Beach 2, the APA's and

LST's bearing cargo for the division's two

assault regiments were unloaded by 1900 on

D Day. By that time the beach was almost

solidly covered with supplies, troops, tanks,

vehicles, and gun emplacements. It was

clear that supplies and personnel of Headquarters, RECKLESS Task Force, the task

force reserve, miscellaneous service units,

and various organizations attached to the

24th Division could not possibly be squeezed

onto the beach. Unless Red Beach 1 provided materially greater dispersal space,

convoys scheduled to reach Tanahmerah

Bay on D plus 1 and D plus 2 would have

to be held at eastern New Guinea ports or

diverted to other landing areas.

Now the beneficial results of General

Irving's determination to keep Red Beach 1

in the landing plans became apparent. Behind that beach were found some additional

dry, flat dispersal areas. Access to the beach
58 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

was hampered by the fronting reef, but the

24th Division solved this problem by setting

up a shuttle system from Red Beach 2.

Shallow-draft boats carried the supplies to

the entrance of Dépapré Bay. There, on the

water, matériel was transferred to LVT's

which served as ferries to the shore. At high

tide small boats could reach Dépapré—only

two could beach there at a time—and at

1730 LCM's took the 2d Platoon and the

command section of Company A, 1st Tank

Battalion, to Dépapré through the reefs.

Ultimately the water approach to Dépapré

was improved when naval demolition personnel

 2 blasted a wider and deeper channel

through the reef, thus giving small landing

craft continuous access to Red Beach 1.

The shuttle to Dépapré continued

throughout the night of 22-23 April. Some

of the congestion on Red Beach 2 was

thereby relieved and, by dint of almost

superhuman effort, the cargo from seven

LST's of the D plus 1 convoy was put on

that beach on the 23d, and the AKA of the

D plus 1 echelon was unloaded by noon on

the 24th. Transshipments to Red Beach 1

were continued, but by noon on 23 April

it had become obvious that there was no

space to be found anywhere along the shores

of Tanahmerah Bay to unload the supplies

and troops aboard the D plus 2 convoy.

Meanwhile, advance elements of the 24th

Division had pushed far inland on their way

toward the airfields over the Dépapré-Lake

Sentani road. Contrary to expectations, this

road was found to be ungraded and extremely narrow. It was a mere track which,

winding in a series of hairpin turns over the

Takari Hills east of Dépapré, hung precariously along the sides of slopes that in some

cases were as steep as 60 degrees. It was far

from being the well-traveled motor road expected. Neither the Army's wheeled vehicles

nor the Marine's tanks could reach the crest

of the Takari Hills over this road. The tanks

were relegated to the role of perimeter defense around Dépapré.3

 Heavy construction,

which was destined to be impeded by many

landslides, had to be undertaken before the

trail inland could be used for a main supply

line as originally planned. Until it was improved, only a small number of men could

be sustained over the track, and all their

supplies would have to be hand-carried forward from Dépapré.

To Headquarters, RECKLESS Task Force,

the logistic difficulties inherent in supporting a large-scale drive inland over the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail far outweighed

the tactical advantages of such a movement.

The 41st Infantry Division, on the other

hand, was meeting with unexpectedly rapid

success in its drive to the airfields from

Humboldt Bay, the shores of which had been

found better suited to troop and supply dispersal than those at Tanahmerah Bay. The

RECKLESS Task Force staff therefore recommended that a sweeping change in plans

be made. General Eichelberger, accepting

these recommendations, decided to make the

Humboldt Bay area the principal task force

landing point and to change the emphasis of

attack to the 41st Division's drive inland.

Accordingly, about noon on D plus 1, the

D plus 2 convoy to Tanahmerah Bay was

diverted to Humboldt Bay. Task force head2

 From a mine sweeper (YMS) accompanying the

Western Attack Group The men worked under the

direction of the Naval Beach Party commander.

3

 There being no possible way to employ the tanks

in their proper roles in the Tanahmerah Bay area,

they merely bivouacked in that region until 2 May,

when they were sent to Humboldt Bay. There, the

services of the tank company were not needed, and

on 4 May the company left the Hollandia area via

LST to rejoin the rest of the 1st Tank Battalion on

Pavuvu Island in the Solomons on 13 May.
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 59

quarters, the task force reserve, and miscellaneous service units, all of which were still

awaiting a chance to unload at Tanahmerah

Bay, were also directed to move to the Humboldt Bay beaches. A part of the task force

headquarters which had already landed on

Red Beach 2 was reloaded on an LST and

sent to Humboldt Bay.4

Red Beaches 1 and 2 had proved able to

provide dispersal areas for a bare minimum

of supplies for the 24th Division's two assault regiments, but they were inadequate

for the larger load assigned to them prior to

the landings. The division would therefore

have to support its drive inland with only

the supplies and equipment unloaded at

Tanahmerah Bay through D plus 1.

The 24th Division's Drive to the Airfields

Leaving Company A at Red Beach 1, the

1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, commanded

by Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford, Jr., had

started up the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail

at 0837 on D Day.5 At any one of the

numerous hairpin turns and defiles over the

first two or three miles of the track, a squad

of Japanese riflemen could have delayed an

entire infantry division. Surprisingly, no

determined opposition was encountered.

Enemy defensive installations (many of

them incomplete) at important points were

found to be unoccupied. The Japanese had

not been ready for the attack and those who

had been in the Tanahmerah Bay area had

apparently fled in panic when the 24th

Division began to land. The 1st Battalion,

21st Infantry, was therefore able to advance as rapidly as terrain conditions and

necessary security measures permitted.

The First Day of the Advance

Moving through fire lanes down which

no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early

stages of construction, the battalion column

reached the village of Mariboe at 1047

hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle

shots had been encountered during this

march and the village was secured without

opposition. Over three miles by trail inland

from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident

from scattered Japanese equipment in and

around Mariboe that the Japanese had

evacuated that village not long before the

1st Battalion's arrival.

Colonel Clifford now halted his men.

Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had

been lost, he sent messengers back over the

tortuous trail to report progress to General

Irving. At the same time patrols were sent

toward Kantome, nearly two miles southeast

of Mariboe. They reported few signs of

enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not

wait to re-establish contact with higher

headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main

trail, the unit reached Kantome about noon.

From that village patrols were sent almost

ten miles eastward along the trail through

Paipou, Jangkena, Waibron-Baroe, and

4

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 46. 5

 Unless otherwise indicated, information on the

24th Division's drive to the airfields is based on:

24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 60-100, ISO82, and 191-93; 24th Div G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 21st

Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 2-3; 21st Inf Jnl Hollandia; Notes, 27 Oct 50 and 15 Dec 50, provided

by Lt Col Chester A. Dahlen [ex-CO 3d Bn 21st Inf]

and Mr. Clarence E. Short [ex-S-3, 21st Inf], in

OCMH files; Ltr, Brig Gen Charles B. Lyman to

Gen Ward, 23 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH files. The

bulk of Company A, 21st Infantry, after securing

Red Beach 1 and finding the trail entrance, remained on the beach until 24 April.
60 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Waibron-Bano to Dazai, the division's intermediate objective. The patrols encountered

no active resistance, although signs of recent

enemy occupation abounded at numerous points along the trail to Dazai. Colonel

Clifford then sent the main body of the battalion on to Jangkena, about eight miles by

trail inland from Dépapré. At Jangkena the

advance was again halted because night was

approaching and because only sporadic

radio contact could be maintained with regiment or division headquarters.

Colonel Clifford possessed little or no

knowledge of the situation to the rear other

than the difficulties presented by terrain.

Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be

concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena

was on flat, swampy ground and was not an

easily defensible position. Should the 1st

Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat

ground, Japanese troops might outflank the

unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut

off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the

first two or three miles of the trail inland

from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore

decided to pull his men back to Kantome

for the night, leaving only outposts along the

trail east of that village. Kantome was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which

he thought would present a serious obstacle

to any Japanese flanking maneuvers.

The soundness of Colonel Clifford's decision was demonstrated about midnight

when a small Japanese force, which had

apparently moved overland around the 1st

Battalion's outposts, struck the battalion's

left. The jungled hills in the Kantome

neighborhood prevented further enemy

movement and the Japanese force, although

it managed to keep the 1st Battalion awake

most of the night, did not penetrate the

perimeter. At dawn on the 23d the Japanese gave up their attempts to cut the trail

to the rear and withdrew.

About the time that the 1st Battalion had

started withdrawing to Kantome for the

night, radio communications with regimental headquarters had been re-established. It was then learned that the 3d

Battalion, 21st Infantry (less Company I),

had moved from Red Beach 2 to Dépapré.

During the morning of D Day the 3d Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col.

Chester A. Dahlen, had been engaged in

probing the southern flank of Red Beach 2.

It had soon become apparent, however, that

no Japanese were in that area, and General

Irving had accordingly ordered the unit to

move to Red Beach 1 to support the advance

of the 1st Battalion. This move started about

1400 and as each element of the battalion

reached Red Beach 1, it started up the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Company I

continued overland through the hills between Red Beaches 1 and 2. By nightfall the

battalion's forward elements had reached

the crest of the Takari Hills. The rest of the

unit (still less Company I) continued moving after dark to close in on the leading

elements, finally bivouacking along the trail.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the 21st

Infantry had also begun moving to Red

Beach 1, responsibility for the defense of

Red Beach 2 passing to the 19th Infantry.

Col. Charles B. Lyman, commanding the

21st Infantry, moved his command post to

Dépapré about noon. By the morning of the

next day, 23 April, the bulk of the 2d Battalion was concentrated at Dépapré. Company I rejoined the regiment about 1400

the same day, after a march over very rough

and jungled terrain from Red Beach 2.

Colonel Lyman now had his entire regiment
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 61

under his control, ready to exploit the initial

success of the 1st Battalion. Late at night

on the 22d, he instructed the regiment to

resume the advance eastward at 0700 on

D plus 1.

Logistic Problems Delay the Advance

The 1st Battalion began moving out of

Kantome on schedule on the 23d and by

1045 had re-entered Jangkena. Shortly after

1200 the unit reached Dazai, farthest limit

of patrol advance the previous day, and then

pushed on to Sabron. No signs of enemy opposition other than a few rifle shots from

woods on both sides of the trail had been

encountered. At 1445, after lunch and a rest,

the battalion moved cautiously out of Sabron. About 1,500 yards beyond that village

a small stream crossed the main track. This

crossing had been reconnoitered by patrols

early in the afternoon, and there had been

found the first signs of organized resistance.

Two platoons of Company B, leading the

advance from Sabron, safely crossed the

small stream but soon found themselves in

the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy

machine gun fire made the stream's steep

banks untenable, and the forward platoons

hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four

dead men behind. Over his now well-functioning radios, Colonel Clifford requested

air support. The message was relayed to

Task Force 58 carriers lying offshore and

three planes quickly appeared to strafe the

enemy position. In addition, the 1st Battalion's 81-mm. mortars and heavy machine

guns were also brought forward to lay a

barrage on the enemy defenses. But all this

fire failed to dislodge the Japanese. In an

attempt to outflank the enemy position,

Colonel Clifford sent small patrols across the

stream both above and below the crossing.

These efforts proved futile, for the patrols

could not locate the enemy flanks and were

kept away from the main Japanese position

by small arms fire. After a lively fire fight

at the crossing, which lasted almost to dusk,

Colonel Clifford decided to pull back toward

Sabron so that mortars and artillery could

fire freely on the stream-crossing area.

During the night 105-mm. howitzers of

the 52d Field Artillery Battalion fired on the

enemy positions at the crossing for over an

hour. The Japanese replied with mortar,

grenade, and small arms fire which was directed against the 1st Battalion's perimeter

near Sabron. About 2100 a Japanese field

piece, believed to have been a dual purpose

90-mm. antiaircraft gun, opened fire on the

battalion from the vicinity of the airfields.

The enemy's harassing fire continued almost

to dawn on the 24th, and again the American unit was kept awake much of the night.

The rest of the 21st Infantry was now

echeloned along the trail behind the 1st

Battalion. The 3d Battalion, which had advanced to within 1,000 yards of Dazai, was

also harassed by Japanese fire during the

night of 23-24 April, but the area of the 2d

Battalion (which had moved up to Mariboe

from Dépapré) was quiet. The 2d and 3d

Battalions' advances had been made without opposition.

Even with the support of the remainder

of the regiment echeloned on the trail to

its rear, the position of the 1st Battalion was

not enviable. The unit was over twelve miles

by trail inland; it had only enough rations

left for breakfast; and it was running low

on ammunition. No supplies had been received since landing, and hard fighting on

the 24th seemed unavoidable.

Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for

the Hollandia operation had taken into
62 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

consideration many of the potential logistic

problems that might be encountered in the

Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4

Section had made a detailed study which

had shown that a full infantry regiment

could be supplied by hand-carry from Red

Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani

trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no

road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red

Beach 1 had been found, the division moved

the main supply point to Dépapré, from

which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4

Section undertook new computations and

calculated that the hand-carry distance

could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion

was based on the assumption that adverse

weather conditions would not make the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable.

On 23 April heavy rains started to turn

the road into a quagmire through which

struggling men could scarcely carry their

own equipment and food, to say nothing of

extra supplies for the leading battalion.

By evening on that day logistic support of

the 21st Infantry had therefore become a

major problem. There was no question but

that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated

that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road

from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be

made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st

Battalion had already advanced east of

Dazai, beyond which point, according to

the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry

would be next to impossible.

When the 2d and 3d Battalions had

moved inland on the 23d, both had carried

extra supplies, principally food and ammunition, but these supplies were inadequate

to support the 1st Battalion as well. The

24th Division thereupon decided to increase

the number of men assigned to hand-carrying duties. The overwater shuttle system

from Red Beach 2 to Dépapré was now

working smoothly and few combat troops

were needed at Red Beach 2 to assist in

moving supplies or to defend that area,

which had proved to be bare of Japanese

forces. Therefore the 2d Battalion, 19th

Infantry (initially division reserve), was

moved to Dépapré on D plus 1. The Antitank and Cannon Companies of both the

19th and 21st Infantry Regiments were also

dispatched to Red Beach 1 on the same day.

To speed the flow of supplies inland, all

these troops were stationed at various points

along the trail from Dépapré to Mariboe.

The supplies were moved by a combination

of a shuttle system and forward displacement of companies.

But the best efforts of three infantry battalions and four antitank or cannon companies proved inadequate to assure continued support of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry. In addition, trail conditions were

becoming worse and hand-carrying progressively more difficult. General Irving therefore requested that aircraft (the nearest base

for which was at Nadzab, almost 500 miles

southeast of Hollandia) drop supplies at

Jangkena on 24 April so that the 1st Battalion could continue its advance without depending on hand-carrying parties.

General Irving himself reconnoitered the

trail a little way forward from Dépapré during the afternoon of 23 April. After his trip

he realized that continued rapid advance inland was no longer possible under the handcarry scheme. He also learned that the

weather was so threatening that little dependence could be placed on air supply.

Accordingly, late in the afternoon of the

23d, he ordered the 21st Infantry to con-
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 63

HAND-CARRYING SUPPLIES. Men of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, carrying

supplies forward.

solidate its forward positions at Sabron and

Dazai. Elements of the regiment not already

at those two villages were to remain echeloned to the rear for hand-carrying duties.

Further offensive efforts were to be limited

to patrol action until the inland supply situation could be improved.

Supply Difficulties, 24-25 April

By exhaustive work during the afternoon

of 23 April and the following night, rear

elements of the 21st Infantry had managed

to build up a small reserve of rations and

ammunition at Dazai. The next morning the

1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, moved to

Dépapré from Red Beach 2 to augment the

number of hand-carrying parties along the

road inland. The Cannon and Antitank

Companies of the same regiment, carrying

extra supplies, pushed over the Takari Hills

to Mariboe and Jangkena, respectively.

Inland, most efforts during the day were

limited to patrolling. In the morning General Irving slogged his way overland to

Colonel Lyman's forward command post

with the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry. After

learning about the situation in the forward
64 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

area, he instructed Colonel Lyman to advance no farther than the point at which the

two forward battalions, the 1st and 3d,

could supply themselves from Dazai. Accordingly the 3d Battalion spent the day

sending out flanking patrols and closing up

on the 1st. The latter unit sent out patrols

to the scene of the previous day's ambush

and found that artillery and mortar fire had

killed or driven away from that area almost

all the Japanese defenders. At nightfall the

1st Battalion's position had been little

changed from that which it had held at daylight, forward displacement of the main

body having been limited to less than 200

yards. The 3d Battalion established a new

perimeter about 500 yards to the rear of the

1st, while the 2d Battalion was spread from

Dazai back to Mariboe, its companies acting as links in an ever-growing chain of

hand-carrying parties.

To the rear of the 2d Battalion, additional

links had been established by dark on the

24th. Most of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the Antitank and Cannon Companies of the 21st Infantry had been handcarrying supplies from Dépapré to Mariboe

during the day and by nightfall had set up

a small supply dump at the latter village.

The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, had been

handling supplies all day at Red Beach 1

and had also taken over responsibility for

the security of that beach, allowing Company A, 21st Infantry, to rejoin its battalion

inland. The Cannon Company of the 19th

Infantry had moved forward with supplies

to Mariboe, and the Antitank Company of

the same regiment had reached Jangkena

with some rations and ammunition. The

Cannon and Antitank Companies of both

the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments had,

perforce, left their organic weapons and

transportation behind them and were acting

purely as service troops.

In spite of the efforts of all these units, the

supply of rations, ammunition, and medical

equipment for the two advance battalions

was but little augmented on the 24th. Worse

still, the scheduled airdrop at Jangkena had

been canceled because of poor weather, and

the continuing rain was turning most of the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani road into a sea of

mud. There was little hope for quick improvement in the situation.

But General Irving was optimistic and he

felt sure that conditions would improve on

the 25th. He requested another airdrop

which, in order to get the supplies farther

forward, he wanted made at Dazai. On

the basis of this request and because the

number of carrying parties along the main

trail had been increased and some supplies

had been moved to Dazai on the 24th, the

division commander ordered the 21st Infantry to continue its advance the next day.

First objectives were wooded hills on either

side of the main road about 3,000 yards

beyond Sabron.

The 25th of April dawned heavily overcast and rain threatened, auguring ill for

the proposed airdrop. Nevertheless, advance patrols of the 1st Battalion, 21st

Infantry, moved out at 0500. Colonel Lyman planned to have the two forward battalions advance on a wide front to make

sure that no Japanese would be bypassed

and left behind to cut the tenuous supply

line back to Dépapré. But the jungle was so

thick on both sides of the trail that it was

impossible for the main bodies to move

rapidly in the dense undergrowth. The bulk

of the two battalions therefore pushed for-
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 65

ward in column along the road, while numerous small patrols kept up as best they

could in the jungle off the trail.

After an artillery bombardment of known

and suspected enemy positions, the rest of

the two battalions followed the advance patrols. Only scattered small arms fire slowed

the advance, although it was necessary to

halt from time to time as patrols searched

the terrain far to both sides of the main trail.

About 1115 the advance stopped temporarily while demolition teams destroyed

two recently abandoned Japanese armored

vehicles.6

The first objectives were cleared by noon,

at which time the 1st Battalion halted to

rest at a point about 1,000 yards short of the

next natural barrier, a branch of the Dejaoe

River. Soon 1st Battalion patrols reached

the river. A small enemy delaying position

at the crossing—a ford—was quickly outflanked by the 21st Infantry patrols and by

midafternoon patrols had moved across the

stream toward Julianadorp, a farm settlement to the east. Meanwhile, automatic

weapons fire had been received from Japanese guns emplaced on high ground north

of the ford. Scouts sent out to locate the

source of this fire found enemy antiaircraft

guns protected by riflemen and machine

gunners. The Japanese positions were soon

neutralized by mortar fire, and the main

bodies resumed the advance about 1530.

Progress was slow during the rest of the

afternoon. Japanese patrols which threatened the line of communications became

active north of the main road, and it was

necessary for the 21st Infantry to send out

its own combat patrols to hunt down and

disperse the Japanese parties. These operations, which delayed the advance of the

main body, were not finished until 1700.

Then Colonel Lyman halted the advance

for the night. The 1st Battalion dug in on

the nose of a low hill about 500 yards west

of the Dejaoe River branch crossing and

approximately 125 yards north of the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. The 3d Battalion and regimental headquarters bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of the

day's first objectives, to the rear of the 1st

Battalion.

The supply situation in the forward area

had been little improved during the 25th.

Rain had fallen steadily all day, there had

been no airdrop, and the Dépapré-Lake

Sentani road had become practically impassable. The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry,

had moved forward through Sabron to

Dazai, laboriously hand-carrying supplies

as it struggled eastward in the rain and mud.

By this means small supply dumps had been

built up at both villages by dusk, but the

battalion's displacement had left a large gap

in the carrying line. West of Dazai the next

sizable carrying party was the Antitank

Company of the 19th Infantry, at Paipou.

Behind that unit was the Cannon Company,

19th Infantry, at Mariboe. General Irving

ordered both units to move at dawn on the

26th to Dazai, carrying with them all

possible supplies.

These displacements would leave the

trail from Dazai west to Mariboe bare of

hand-carrying parties, thus disrupting the

supply relay system. General Irving therefore ordered the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, to move to Jangkena and instructed a

company of the 2d Battalion of the same

regiment to push on to Mariboe. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, which was to

be assisted by miscellaneous artillery, medical, and quartermaster units, was made re6

 One report states that these vehicles were light

tanks, but all other sources describe them as armored cars or trucks.
66 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

sponsible for moving supplies up the trail

from Dépapré as far as the crest of the

Takari Hills. Finally, the Antitank and

Cannon Companies of the 21st Infantry

were ordered to push from Mariboe to

Dazai, hand-carrying extra supplies as they

advanced.

Thus, by morning of the 26th, three infantry battalions, two antitank companies,

and two cannon companies were assigned to

carrying supplies. These troops were supported by parts of the Service Companies

of both the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments, by elements of various engineer and

quartermaster organizations, and by volunteer groups from other units whose services

were not needed for their normal duties. At

least 3,500 combat troops were directly employed in moving supplies to the two forward battalions.

Since his two forward battalions were

now beyond the most effective and accurate

support range of artillery emplaced at the

beaches, Colonel Lyman asked that 4.2-inch

mortars of Company A, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, be sent inland. Such was

the condition of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani

trail that plans were made to move only one

mortar. A detachment comprising two gun

crews and the ammunition carriers of an

entire platoon were detailed for the task,

and the movement of the mortar was given

the highest priority. About the same time a

single 105-mm. howitzer of Battery A, 52d

Field Artillery Battalion, was started over

the Takari Hills. Battery C, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, offered support a different

way. Because its guns could no longer help

the infantry inland, the battery volunteered

to a man to carry rations and other supplies

over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road. Such

help was indeed welcome. The spirit was

excellent in the 24th Division, but spirit

alone could not conquer all the difficulties

of terrain. Neither the 4.2-inch mortar nor

the 105-mm. howitzer were to reach positions from which they could support the 21st

Infantry's advance on 26 April.

While these steps were being taken to deliver both supplies and support weapons to

the front, General Irving decided to order

the advance continued. He reached this decision despite the fact that the supply situation was still serious. It had been impossible

to drop supplies from the air on the 25th and

even hand-carrying had been stopped late in

the afternoon by heavy rains which had

flooded many small streams. Parts of the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now kneedeep in water. The two forward battalions

were low on ammunition, and they would

have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the

weather, believing that air supply would be

successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had

received information which indicated that

the Japanese were evacuating the airfield

area. For these reasons he considered that a

continuation of the advance would not be

unduly hazardous.

In ordering the advance, the division

commander was knowingly pushing his men

far beyond the limit at which they could be

supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop

should again fail or if track conditions

should not improve, one of the two forward

battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the

carrying parties, and the advance would

probably have to be halted. Should enemy

opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as

far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General

Irving was taking a calculated risk which
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 67

assumed the success of the airdrop and an

absence of determined Japanese opposition.

The Airfields Are Secured

After passing an uneventful night, the 1st

and 3d Battalions, 21st Infantry, resumed

the advance at 0830 on 26 April. There was

no opposition as the main bodies moved

across the Dejaoe River and on through

Julianadorp. About 1130 both units stopped

at Ebeli Plantation, about 1,800 yards east

of Julianadorp, to clear out a bunker which

was occupied by four Japanese riflemen.

While the 3d Battalion dispatched Company L north some 600 yards off the main

trail to flush some Japanese from Ebeli Sawmill, the rest of the troops moved on eastward. By noon advance elements were atop

a hill whence they could see the inland airfields, and minutes later forward patrols

reached the outermost dispersal areas of

Hollandia Drome, the most westerly of the

three Japanese airfields on the plain north

of Lake Sentani. Now the advance was

halted as the battalions regrouped and Colonel Lyman issued a new attack order.

The 1st Battalion was instructed to clear

a Japanese encampment area left of the trail

and north of the center of Hollandia Drome.

The 3d Battalion was to push directly on to

the airfield, secure it, and then advance as

far as the edge of a swamp lying southeast

of the strip.

By 1350 the 1st Battalion had secured its

objective, having encountered little resistance. The 3d Battalion's forward patrols

reached the western edge of the main runway about the same time and, locating no

opposition worthy of mention, arrived at the

eastern end of the field half an hour later.

At 1530 Colonel Lyman radioed to division

headquarters that the entire Hollandia

Drome area had been secured. By dark the

2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had closed at

Hollandia Drome.

The bad weather which had forced cancellation of attempted airdrops on 24 and

25 April had finally broken sufficiently for a

few planes from eastern New Guinea to get

through to Hollandia. Twelve B-25's of the

17th Reconnaissance Squadron, Fifth Air

Force, flew the nearly 500 miles from Saidor

to drop rifle, carbine, machine gun, and

mortar ammunition, hand grenades, and

rations at Dazai.7 Moreover, the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had managed to bring

forward some extra rations, ammunition,

and medical equipment. As the rain stopped,

fresh carrying parties following the 2d Battalion found trail conditions greatly improved. Finally, some wheeled transport

was now available at both ends of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road. Hard work by engineers had made the road passable for jeeps

from Dépapré halfway up the first steep

slopes of the Takari Hills. At Hollandia

Drome the 21st Infantry had captured a few

Japanese trucks. These were sent west from

the airstrip as far as possible along the main

trail, which was passable to a point near

Julianadorp. There the supplies dropped

from the air during the day, as well as those

still being hand-carried overland from Dépapré, were picked up and taken back to

the airfield area.

As soon as Hollandia Drome was secured,

7

 The information on the airdrop on 26 April was

supplied to the author on 24 May 1949 by Capt.

Bernhardt L. Mortensen, Air Historical Group,

Headquarters, USAF. C-47's could not be used for

the transport because the nearest Allied air bases

were beyond practicable round trip range of such

aircraft. While the B-25 mission did not fill all the

needs of the forward battalions, other rations

brought over the trail on the 26th, coupled with

larger airdrops on the 27th and succeeding days,

saved the situation from becoming critical.
68 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

patrols of the 21st Infantry pushed on toward Weversdorp, a farm about 2,500 yards

beyond the eastern end of the field. At 1645,

between Weversdorp and the airdrome,

contact was established with elements of the

186th Infantry, 41st Division, which had

been attacking westward from Humboldt

Bay into the airfield area.8

The Seizure of Hollandia Town

While the 24th Division had been driving

inland to Hollandia Drome, the 162d and

186th Infantry Regiments of the 41st Division had pushed toward the fields from

Humboldt Bay, twenty-five miles east of

Tanahmerah Bay. The 41st Division had

begun landing on White Beaches 1-4 on the

shores of Humboldt Bay at 0700 on 22

April. Initial assaults were made by the

162d Infantry over the sandspits across the

inner reaches of Humboldt Bay. The 186th

Infantry followed the 162d ashore to initiate

a drive southwest and inland from Humboldt Bay toward the airfields on the Lake

Sentani Plain.9

The Beachhead at Humboldt Bay

The convoy bearing the 41st Division to

Humboldt Bay did not have the same difficulty locating landmarks as did the ships at

Tanahmerah Bay, and the ships found their

assigned transport and fire support areas

without much trouble. The naval fire support conducted by American light cruisers

and destroyers and the air support missions

flown by Task Force 58 planes were executed as planned. There was no opposition

to either the naval gunfire or the aircraft

activity, and surprise was as complete as

that achieved at Tanahmerah Bay. Assault

troops of the 41st Division quickly unloaded from the APD's which had carried

them to Humboldt Bay and boarded landing craft, personnel, ramp (LCPR's), coxswained by naval personnel, for the short

run to the beaches. The first of these boats

touched shore exactly on schedule at 0700.

The leading waves of landing craft were

supported by rocket fire from two Seventh

Fleet LCI's which fired principally on Pancake Hill, just north of White Beach 1, and

by rocket or automatic weapons fire from

two LCVP's of the 532d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment. There was no answering

fire from Japanese weapons and no opposition at the beaches.10

The first assault was made by Companies

K and L, 162d Infantry, which landed

along an 800-yard front on White Beach 1,

located on the more northern of the two

sandspits dividing Humboldt Bay from Jautefa Bay.11

 Succeeding waves of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, came ashore in

LCVP's and LCM's manned by the Boat

Battalion, 532d Engineer Boat and Shore

8

 This final paragraph is based on 24th Div Opns

Rpt Hollandia, p. 80; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 8; 21st Inf Jnl Hollandia. These sources disagree as to the locations of the meeting between the

24th and 41st Division units on the afternoon of 26

April, the 186th Infantry report putting it west of

Weversdorp and the 21st Infantry journal placing it

east of that farm. From a close check of the timing

of all reports concerning this contact, it seems that a

point some place between Weversdorp and the eastern edge of Hollandia Drome is correct. 9

 LETTERPRESS LF FO 1, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 Annex

to 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia.

10

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt

Bay-Aitape, pp. 5, 26-27; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt

Humboldt Bay, pp. 3-4. 11

 Information in this and the following subsection

is based on: 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 2-7;

162d Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 1-3; 41st Div

G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 162d Inf Jnl Hollandia; 186th

Inf Jnl Hollandia; draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch. VII,

pp. 7-8, 30-31.
GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR and General Horace H. Fuller, on the

beach at Humboldt Bay, New Guinea, 22 April 1944.
70 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Regiment. Simultaneously, a reinforced rifle

platoon of Company A, 162d Infantry, was

put ashore from Army LCVP's on White

Beach 2, immediately south of White Beach

1. Company I, 186th Infantry, landed in

the same manner on White Beach 3 on the

southern sandspit. There was no enemy opposition to these two secondary landings.

Within half an hour the remainder of the

3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, the 1st and

2d Battalions of the same regiment, six tanks

of the 603d Tank Company, and elements

of the 116th Engineer Battalion were all

safely ashore on the northern spit.

The rifle platoon of Company A, 162d

Infantry, advanced rapidly south along the

spit and by 0745 secured Cape Pie, at the

peninsula's southern extremity. This action

eliminated the possibility of a Japanese surprise attack and secured the southern end

of the spit. Company I of the 186th Infantry, also unopposed, quickly secured Cape

Tjeweri at the northern tip of the southern

spit, and then began moving southeast along

the shore of Humboldt Bay toward Hollekang to forestall any Japanese counterattacks from that direction.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, had landed on White

Beach 1 and had started north to secure

Pancake Hill which, located at the inland

end of the northern peninsula, overlooked

all the 41st Division's landing beaches.

So surprised had the Japanese been by the

landings and by the speed of the 3d Battalion's advance, that the American troops,

encountering only scattered rifle fire, were

able to take Pancake Hill before 0800.

Atop that important terrain feature they

found a Japanese antiaircraft gun from

which the canvas weather covering had not

been removed. This weapon had not been

touched by the preassault naval bombardment and was still in perfect condition. Had

the Japanese antiaircraftmen been alert,

they could have created havoc among the

41st Division troops landing on the beaches

below Pancake Hill.

After the hill was occupied, most of the

3d Battalion pushed up the shores of Humboldt Bay, while one company moved overland north from Pancake Hill. No resistance

worthy of mention opposed this twopronged attack, the objective of which was

to surround and seize another dominating

terrain feature, Jarremoh Hill. This hill,

rising some 1,000 feet, overlooked the sandspits and the shores of Challenger Cove, a

northwesterly arm of Humboldt Bay. On

the west shore of the cove was located the

town of Hollandia.

Hollandia Falls

By 1430 the 3d Battalion had cleared

Jarremoh Hill and was digging in for the

night along a ridge overlooking Hollandia.

The battalion commander wanted to push

on into the town before dark, but General

Fuller, commanding the 41st Division,

vetoed this proposal. On the basis of intelligence reports which indicated that the Japanese were occupying Hollandia in some

strength, General Fuller had decided that

the seizure of the town would have to wait

until the morning of the 23d. During the

night naval guns and 105-mm. howitzers

of the 146th Field Artillery Battalion—emplaced on firm ground north of White Beach

1—bombarded Hollandia, softening the 3d

Battalion's task for the morrow.

In the meantime the 2d Battalion had begun advancing from White Beach 1 to the

track connecting Hollandia with Pim, on

the western shore of Jautefa Bay. Company

E led off on the left at 0756, moving past
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 71

the southwest side of Pancake Hill, while

Company G took a route east of the hill.

The rest of the battalion soon started out

after Company E but found the terrain west

of Pancake Hill unexpectedly swampy and

rough going for a large body of troops. The

battalion commander therefore ordered the

units on that side to turn and follow Company G. Company E kept on overland and

quickly reached the Pim-Hollandia track

at a point about 1,000 yards west of Pancake Hill. By midmorning Company G had

arrived on the trail north of Company E.

The rest of the battalion concentrated on

the trail between Companies E and G early

in the afternoon.

Contact was soon established with the

company of the 3d Battalion which had advanced to the Pim-Hollandia road from

Pancake Hill earlier in the day. The 2d Battalion then moved up the road toward Hollandia, and by nightfall had joined the 3d

on the ridge overlooking the town. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had assembled as

division reserve at the base of Pancake Hill.

By dark on the 22d the 162d Infantry

had carried its advance to the 41st Division's

first phase line. To that time, opposition had

been so light that American casualties, including those of the 186th Infantry, totaled

only six men killed and sixteen wounded.

As at Tanahmerah Bay, the Japanese had

made no effort to man their prepared defenses which, though not as extensive as had

been expected, could have produced considerable trouble for the 41st Division. The division staff was both pleased and worried by

the lack of enemy resistance and could make

no estimate as to the character of Japanese

opposition which might be met on the 23d.

Nevertheless, since it was expected that the

162d Infantry would have little trouble in

seizing Hollandia, that action was ordered.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry,

jumped off at 0730 on the 23d. The units

moved rapidly down the ridge to Hollandia

and at 1115 reported that they had secured

the town. There was no opposition.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, had

meanwhile relieved a battalion of the 186th

Infantry which had been waiting in division

reserve west of Pancake Hill. The 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, after helping the 3d

to secure Hollandia, moved into high ground

west and northwest of that town. During the

remainder of the attack phase of the Hollandia operation, the entire 162d Infantry

patrolled the hilly environs of Hollandia,

securing the northern shores of Humboldt

Bay, the beaches of Challenger Cove, and

rough hills along the western side of Jautef a

Bay. To the 186th Infantry fell the task of

driving inland to the main objective, the airfields on the north shore of Lake Sentani.

The Drive Inland from Humboldt Bay

The Landing of the 186th Infantry

LVT's carrying Companies K and L of

the 186th Infantry hit White Beach 2 about

0715, ten minutes ahead of schedule, on 22

April.12 Original plans had provided that

these LVT assault waves would cross White

Beach 2 and the mangrove swamp to its rear

and proceed overwater across Jautefa Bay

to White Beach 4, located north of Pim,

near the eastern terminus of the main road

leading inland to the airfields. But the mangrove swamp proved impassable for the

12

 Information in this and the following two subsections is based principally on: 41st Div Opns Rpt

Hollandia, pp. 2-11; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp.

9-12; 41st Div G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 186th Inf Jnl

Hollandia, 186th Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 1-8;

draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch. VII, pp. 32-34.
72 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

LVT's. The amphibians withdrew from the

beach and, under cover of Support Battery

craft of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade,

proceeded into Jautefa Bay through the

narrow channel between Capes Pie and

Tjeweri.

At 0810 Company L started moving

ashore about 900 yards north of Pim. Company K landed 500 yards farther north

about 0825. The remainder of the 3d Battalion (less Company I, which was operating on White Beach 3) arrived in the White

Beach 4 area about 0915. The first objective was Leimok Hill, lying 1,800 yards

northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements

advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against

light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim,

was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near

Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable

was over.

The 3d Battalion established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along

a trail leading west from that village to the

point at which the Pim-Hollandia track

joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which

movements to inland objectives had to begin. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry,

which had followed the 162d Infantry

ashore on White Beach 1, had proceeded

north and west around the mangrove swamp

and down the Pim-Hollandia track to Leimok Hill. There it relieved the 3d Battalion

and established a night defensive perimeter.

The 2d Battalion (less two rifle companies)

move Hllandi d inta trac o divisiona k westl o reserv f Pancak e on the Hill e Pim; it-s

remaining two companies stayed afloat until D plus 1. Orders were issued late at night

on the 22d to the 186th Infantry, Col. Oliver

P. Newman commanding, to move out the

next morning at daybreak. The objective

was the inland airfield area and the axis of

advance was the Pim-Lake Sentani road.

Back on White Beach 1, the Naval Beach

Party and the 532d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment (the Shore Party), augmented by the Cannon Companies of the

162d and 186th Infantry Regiments,

worked hard to unload all D-Day shipping

before dark. Seven LST's were discharged

on White Beach 1. Roller conveyors were

used for the 375 tons of bulk cargo each

LST carried in addition to its mobile load.

Cargo and equipment aboard the APA

HMAS Westralia was lightered to White

Beach 1 or 2 by small craft. Since White

Beach 3 was very steep and had no suitable

landing spots, most cargo had to be unloaded on the northern sandspit. That spit

was already cluttered with Japanese stores;

it was narrow; and exits to inland dispersal

areas were limited. These factors combined

to lead to a great deal of congestion.

To the Shore of Lake Sentani

At 0800 on 23 April the 1st Battalion left

its night positions on Leimok Hill and started

out over the main track, passing through the

3d Battalion. The movement was supported

by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft

from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 0900

the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's

Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from

the main body to patrol northwest up the

Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about

2,000 yards upstream, the two companies

repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 73

which were launched against the right flank

of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon

by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The

two companies remained at the streambranching during the night of 23-24 April,

and on the latter day they moved overland

southwest to rejoin the main force on the

Pim-Lake Sentani trail.

Leaving Companies A and C to guard

its right flank, the remainder of the 1st Battalion had continued the advance along the

main trail against negligible opposition. By

noon the battalion had reached the outskirts

of a large Japanese dump and storage area

about 2,500 yards beyond Brinkman's Plantation. The unit halted to await the results

of an air strike on suspected enemy positions

west of the storage area and for the 3d Battalion to close up from the rear.

It was hoped that the 186th Infantry

could reach the second phase line, Koejaboe

and the northeast shores of Lake Sentani,

during the afternoon of the 23d, but air

observers and forward patrols had reported

considerable Japanese activity along the

trail west of the storage area. Colonel Newman felt that the now understrength 1st Battalion did not have enough men to continue

an advance against what might prove to be

strong enemy defenses. Moreover, the 3d

Battalion's movement from Pim had been

slow and the unit did not reach the Japanese

storage area until 1500, when it was necessary to halt for the day. General Fuller had

ordered that offensive action—other than

patrolling—cease each day at 1500 so that

defensive positions could be prepared before

dark. The forward elements of the 186th Infantry set up their night perimeters at the

eastern edge of the Japanese storage area.

By 1500 heavy rain had begun to turn

spots of the Pim-Lake Sentani road—the

best yet found in the Hollandia area—into

great mudholes. LVT's had started out over

the trail from Pim to bring supplies forward

to the advancing infantry and, if necessary,

to provide fire support. But many of the

LVT's bogged down in the mud along the

road. Supply problems seemed imminent.

Colonel Newman suggested to division

headquarters that on the 24th the advance

be resumed with the 3d Battalion passing

through the 1st. The latter was to remain

in the storage area until rejoined by Companies A and C, after which it would follow

the 3d Battalion and protect the right flank

of the advance by patrolling along high

ground north of the main trail. The 3d

Battalion's initial objective was a jetty at the

point where the main road first touched the

shore of Lake Sentani. This jetty was to be

held as a base for future operations. Company I, scheduled to rejoin the 3d Battalion

on the 24th, was ordered to take a branch

trail to Koejaboe and its jetty, southeast of

the first jetty. The 2d Battalion was to remain in reserve in the Pim area and along

the track west of that village.

Permission to carry out Colonel Newman's plan came from 41st Division headquarters at 0630 on the 24th, and at 0845

the 3d Battalion moved out. Since Japanese

air action during the night of 23-24 April

had succeeded in firing the American ammunition and ration dumps on White Beach

1, the advance of the 186th Infantry had

to be made on half-rations, and the troops

were ordered to conserve ammunition.

Luckily, little enemy opposition was encountered during the morning, and by 1100

3d Battalion patrols were within 500 yards

of the initial objective. Light fire from a

force of Japanese, estimated at 150, then

temporarily delayed the advance, but the

first jetty and its environs were secured

shortly after noon.
74 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

It had meanwhile become apparent that

the 1st Battalion was too widely dispersed to

carry out its assigned support and follow-up

roles. Two companies followed along the

main track as best they could, but extensive

patrolling on the high ground north of the

trail proved necessary because small parties

of Japanese were continually being discovered wandering about on the right flank.

While these Japanese parties did not seem

aggressive in most cases, Colonel Newman

wisely chose to take no chances by leaving

his flank unprotected. Companies A and C

were again assigned to the arduous patrolling task. The 3d Battalion was now far inland and practically unsupported. General

Fuller therefore released the 2d Battalion,

until now in division reserve, to Colonel

Newman's control.

The 2d Battalion pushed rapidly westward from Pim, passed through such elements of the 1st Battalion as were still on

the trail, and took up positions on the right

of the 3d Battalion late in the afternoon. The

two units then set up night perimeters in the

vicinity of the jetty. The 3d Battalion was

established along a line running 700 yards

inland from Lake Sentani and the 2d Battalion refused the right flank by extending

its lines northeast 500 yards to the right rear.

About 1630, Companies A and C rejoined

the main body of the 1st Battalion in a night

perimeter at the junction of the main PimLake Sentani road and the track leading to

Koejaboe, not yet captured. The 1st Battalion's position was about 3,500 swampy

yards east of the 2d and 3d Battalions.

During the day the 34th Infantry of the

24th Division, RECKLESS Task Force Reserve, had been transferred from Tanahmerah Bay to Humboldt Bay. Its arrival

had allowed the task force commander to release Company I, 186th Infantry, from

White Beach 3 and the 2d Battalion, 186th

Infantry, from its reserve role.

Amphibious Movement on

Lake Sentani

Colonel Newman's plans for the 25th envisaged using his entire regiment in a combined amphibious and overland advance to

the airfields, a maneuver now possible because the 34th Infantry could free 186th Infantry units from guard duties along the line

of communications back to Pim. Colonel

Newman ordered the 3d Battalion, 186th

Infantry, to move west along the main road

to Nefaar, six and one half miles beyond the

night bivouac area. The 1st Battalion was to

load on LVT's at the jetty which had been

captured the previous afternoon. From that

jetty, the troops were to move by LVT over

Lake Sentani to a point on the shore west of

Nefaar and, upon landing, help the 1st Battalion to secure that village. Two companies

of the 2d Battalion were to clear scattered

enemy troops from high ground on the right

flank, whence the Japanese had harassed

the battalion's night bivouac. As soon as

this task was accomplished, the 2d Battalion

would reassemble as regimental reserve and

follow the 3d along the main track toward

Nefaar. Company I had not reached the 3d

Battalion the previous day and was therefore ordered to operate with the 1st Battalion, at the perimeter of which it had arrived just before dark. Company B was lent

to the 3d Battalion to bring that unit up to

full strength for the advance west.

The 3d Battalion started moving at 0800

on the 25th and by 1000 had marched almost 3,000 yards westward against no opposition. The Japanese who had delayed the

advance on the 24th had vanished. Company K, moving to the north of the main
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 75

LVT'S CROSSING LAKE SENTANI. Note Fifth Air Force B-25's overhead.

road, flushed the few enemy seen during the

morning.

LVT's of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade had now moved up to the jetty which

the 3d Battalion had captured the previous

day. There, at 1000, two companies of the

1st Battalion loaded on the amphibians and

departed for Nefaar. No Japanese fire from

the shores of Lake Sentani greeted this landlocked amphibious maneuver, and at 1150

two companies landed at Nefaar. The remainder of the 1st Battalion moved by LVT

to Nefaar later in the day and at 1530 the

3d Battalion reached that village after an

uneventful march overland. The 2d Battalion closed on the village shortly thereafter.

Vigorous patrolling north and west of

Nefaar characterized action the rest of the

afternoon, during which only slight resistance was encountered. Expected strong

enemy opposition had not as yet materialized, but before dark a platoon of Company

A made a brief reconnaissance of Cyclops

Drome, most easterly of the three Japanese

fields on the north shore of Lake Sentani,

and reported evidences of considerable

enemy movement and strong defensive positions. Despite these reports, Colonel Newman was confident that his troops would

have little or no difficulty in securing Cy-
76 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

clops Drome on the 26th, for he now believed that the enemy had vacated the

airfield area.

One of the reasons that the 186th Infantry had not reached the airdromes on the

afternoon of 25 April was that artillery fire

was falling on those fields. Some of this fire

may have been from the 155-mm. weapons

of the 11th or 168th Field Artillery Battalions, emplaced on the 24th Division's

beaches at Tanahmerah Bay, but other artillery fire was undoubtedly from Japanese

dual-purpose weapons dug in north of the

airfields. Whatever the case, communications difficulties prevented the fire from the

24th Division's area being stopped before

the time came for the 186th Infantry to set

up night defenses. The 1st Battalion bivouacked about 1,700 yards west of Nefaar

and placed outposts in high ground 700

yards north of the main trail. The 3d Battalion went into position about 1,000 yards

behind the 1st, while the 2d remained at

Nefaar for the night.

For the morrow, Colonel Newman ordered the 1st Battalion to seize the northwestern half of Cyclops Drome. One company of the 3d was to secure the southeastern

part of the field and the remainder of the

battalion was to act as general reserve. The

2d Battalion was to move by LVT from

Nefaar to another jetty located about 2,000

yards southeast of Sentani Drome and the

village of Ifaar. Pushing rapidly up a trail

from the jetty to Ifaar, the battalion was to

seize that village and Sentani Drome.

The 1st and 2d Battalions moved out as

planned shortly after 0800 on the 26th. By

1040 the 1st Battalion had secured Cyclops

Drome against no opposition. About 1000,

Companies F and G of the 2d Battalion

landed against scattered rifle fire at the jetty

below Ifaar, a mile overwater from Nefaar.

The rest of the battalion came ashore in the

same area in the early afternoon. Advance

elements of the 2d Battalion were on Sentani

Drome at 1130, and by 1215 the battalion

commander was able to report that the airfield and its environs had been secured.

During the remainder of the afternoon

patrol action around both airfields accounted for a few Japanese stragglers. Opposition throughout the day had been conspicuous by its absence—the Japanese had

disappeared. The 3d Battalion moved up to

the airstrips before dark, and at nightfall the

entire 186th Infantry set up a defensive perimeter around Cyclops and Sentani Dromes.

Patrols of the 1st Battalion were sent west

beyond the fields and at 1645 made contact

with patrols of the 21st Infantry between

Weversdorp and Hollandia Drome. This

contact completed the pincers movement instituted by the 24th and 41st Divisions on

22 April. All important objectives of the

RECKLESS Task Force had been secured.

Mopping-Up Operations

Although the contact between the 24th

and 41st Divisions ended the major tactical

phase of the Hollandia operation, it was

necessary to clear the area of scattered enemy troops, attempt to find large organizations of Japanese forces, and cut enemy

escape routes.13 With these objectives in

view, elements of the 186th Infantry reconnoitered the north shores of Lake Sentani,

and Poegi and Ase Islands in the lake during 27 April. These and many later patrols,

most of which were transported by 2d En13

 This subsection is based principally upon: RTF

Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 14; 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 11-16; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia,

pp. 8-12; 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 85-

92, 98-110; draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch. VII, pp.

23-24.
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 77

gineer Special Brigade LVT's or amphibian

6x6 trucks (DUKW's), encountered few

Japanese in the area covered. Other troops

of the 186th Infantry flushed about 400

Japanese on Hill 1000, approximately 4,000

yards northeast of Cyclops Drome. On the

29th, with the help of fire from the 205th

Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st Battalion

seized the hill, killing or dispersing the enemy. Thereafter the 186th Infantry patrolled into the Cyclops Mountains north

and northeast of the airdromes.

The 162d Infantry's principal action after

clearing the environs of Hollandia was to

seize Cape Soeadja, at the northwest limits

of Humboldt Bay, on 27 April. The regiment continued patrolling in the Hollandia

area until 6 May when it was relieved by

the 34th Infantry.

The latter unit was greatly dispersed.

Some elements patrolled around Pim and

along the road inland to support the drive

of the 186th Infantry, while the 2d Battalion

moved to the Hollekang-Cape Djar area,

east of Humboldt Bay. Ultimately, the entire 2d Battalion moved to Tami Drome,

on the coast six miles east of Hollekang, to

protect engineers who were repairing the

Tami strip. The battalion later established

an outpost at Goya, about five miles inland

south of Hollekang, in order to halt Japanese movements in that area. The 1st and

3d Battalions furnished guards for supply

dumps, working parties at the beaches,

truck drivers, and construction personnel for

a number of minor projects.

The 21st Infantry sent a reinforced company to Marneda, about five miles southwest

of Lake Sentani, to establish a patrol base,

and another company held a base at Iris

Bay, northwest of Tanahmerah Bay, for a

short time. (See Map 2.) The 19th Infantry

sent patrols overland to the coast north of

the Cyclops Mountains to secure trails running through the mountains to the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road or the airfields.

Other elements of the regiment were transported by 542d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment boats to Demta Bay, west of

Tanahmerah Bay, and maintained an outpost there for some days. Still other units

of the 24th Division probed overland from

the western end of Lake Sentani to Genjem,

a main inland trail junction through which

passed many Japanese who were attempting

to escape westward from the Hollandia area.

The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,

later reinforced by Company B, 21st Infantry, patrolled along the western, southwestern, and southern shores of Lake

Sentani.

By 6 June the mopping-up efforts of the

RECKLESS Task Force had succeeded in

clearing all but a few Japanese stragglers

from the immediate area of the airfields,

Hollandia, Tanahmerah Bay, and Tami.14

Logistic Problems of the RECKLESS Task

Force

Evening of 26 April found the RECKLESS

Task Force in an excellent position tactically. The principal objective—the inland

airfields—had been seized within four days

despite radical changes in the original

scheme of maneuver. Japanese opposition

had been negligible and in much less

strength than expected; there was no evidence that any large-scale enemy counterattack could or would be made against the

Hollandia area; and land-based air support

for the RECKLESS Task Force was being

made available from fields captured at

14

 Details concerning mopping up in the area west

of Lake Sentani after 6 June are to be found in

Chapter IV below.
78 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Aitape, 125 miles to the southeast. On the

other hand, the restricted beaches at Tanahmerah Bay and the poor condition of the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani road gave no promise that supplies for the 24th Division would

be adequate for some time to come. Congestion on the beaches at Humbolt Bay, the

rapid deterioration of the Pim-Lake Sentani

road, and a disastrous fire on White Beach 1

during the night of 23-24 April made supply

of the 41st Division difficult. In brief, the

logistic problems of the entire RECKLESS

Task Force had assumed amazing proportions.

The Fire

The units moving ashore at Humboldt

Bay on 22 April found Japanese supplies

covering White Beaches 1 and 2. Air bombing and naval support fire prior to the

landings had scattered these enemy supplies

all over the northern sandspit, while smoke

and flames issued from much of the matériel

as a result of the bombardment. A complicated dispersal problem for the supplies of

the 41st Division and its attached units was

thereby created.15

The 116th Engineer Battalion, ashore

shortly after H Hour, immediately set to

work clearing White Beach 1. In accordance

with RECKLESS Task Force plans, the battalion endeavored to construct an exit road

from the beach to the Pim-Hollandia track,

but the terrain north of the beach proved

more rugged than anticipated and the

swamp northwest of the beach more formidable than expected. Rapid road building

was impossible and the project was temporarily abandoned while all efforts were

turned to unloading D-Day shipping. On

D plus 1, more troops, vehicles, and supplies

began pouring onto White Beaches 1 and 2.

Only slow progress could be made on exit

roads, and beach congestion increased. The

situation was not helped by the necessity for

basing both antiaircraft and field artillery

units along the northern sandspit. Some

relief was effected during the day as boats

of the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment began ferrying a few supplies directly

from the transports to Pim and transferring

more there from the two principal unloading

beaches.16

Shortly after dark on the night of 23-24

April, a lone Japanese aircraft, apparently

guided by still smoldering fires in old Japanese dumps, dropped a stick of bombs on

White Beach 1. One of these bombs, landing

at the edge of a Japanese ammunition dump

below Pancake Hill, started a series of conflagrations which soon spread to an American gasoline dump near by and thence to

other RECKLESS Task Force equipment.

Efforts to stop the fires during the night

proved fruitless, for intense heat and continuous explosions drove back troops who

tried to put out the flames or salvage matériel. The fires raged all night and through

most of the next day.17

Much confusion resulted from the fires.

Shortly before midnight it was rumored at

41st Division headquarters that a Japanese

force of unknown strength had landed on

White Beach 1 or 2 and possibly on White

Beach 4. This erroneous report was relayed

to forward units.18 But even after this rumor

had been proved false, both the 162d and

15

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 18-19; GTF 77

Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape,

p. 28.

16

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 18-19, 55. 17

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 10, 19; 41st Div

Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 6-7; GTG 77.2 Opns Rpt

Humboldt Bay, p. 4. 18

 Msg, 41st Div to 186th Inf, 2100, 23 Apr 44,

in 186th Inf S-1 Jnl Hollandia.
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 79

186th Infantry Regiments were ordered to

cease all forward movement, go on halfrations, and make every attempt to conserve

ammunition.19 As daylight came and the situation at the beaches became clearer, the

186th Infantry was instructed to continue

its advance inland, but was again ordered

to issue only half-rations and to continue all

efforts to conserve ammunition and other

supplies. The 162d Infantry was allowed to

execute its plans to seize the town of Hollandia but after that was to limit its operations

to patrolling and defensive measures until

further notice.20

The fire had a far worse effect on the

logistical situation than on the tactical. Well

over 60 percent of the rations and ammunition landed through D plus 1 was burned

or blown up during the following two days.

The equivalent of eleven LST loads of supplies was lost, while twenty-four men were

killed and about one hundred wounded or

injured as a result of the fires and explosions.21

General Eichelberger immediately radioed to ALAMO Force a request for duplication of all bulk stores which had been

unloaded from LST's at Humboldt Bay on

D Day and D plus 1. It was further requested that these loadings be sent forward

with the first reinforcement convoy, scheduled to arrive on D plus 8.22

 When these

instructions reached the RECKLESS Task

Force's G-4 liaison groups at the staging

areas in eastern New Guinea, ships of the

D plus 8 convoy were already being loaded

not only with supplies but also with service

troops. In order that enough matériel might

be sent forward to replace the eleven LST

loads which had been lost, the troop space

was reassigned to supplies. A good deal of

confusion was caused in the rear bases by

the speed at which decisions had to be made,

lack of traffic control at the loading area,

absence of ammunition data except for

dead-weight tonnage, and incomplete understanding of time and space requirements

by those responsible for the new loading

plans.23

Some of the paper work for shipping

plans, especially for resupply echelons, had

apparently not been completed, and the

RECKLESS Task Force G-4 later reported:

". . . the Task Force was extremely handicapped by the lack of stowage plans and

manifests on shipping in the harbor and

awaiting call forward. This resulted in the

loss of valuable time in unloading urgently

needed cargo and the calling forward of

most ships was like reaching in a grab

bag".24

As a result of inadequate information and

the confusion in the staging areas, it was

impossible for the G-4 Section to ascertain

exactly what types and quantities of ammunition arrived with the hurriedly reloaded D plus 8 replacement ships. It can

be assumed, however, that all ammunition

losses were adequately replaced at least after

D plus 12, by which time the end of Japanese resistance in the Hollandia area had

eliminated the ammunition problem.25 Even

though the ammunition resupply problem

had been solved without undue difficulty, it

was the opinion of the G-4 that the RECK19

 Msgs, 41st Div to 186th Inf, 0400 and 0545, 24

Apr 44, in 186th Inf S-1 Jnl Hollandia. 20

 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 7. 21

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 11, 19; Rad,

CTG 77.2 to CTF 77, 23 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 23-24 Apr 44. 22

 Rad, RTF to ALAMO, 5619, 24 Apr 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44; RTF

Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 19.

23

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 37, 65-66. 24

 Ibid., p. 40. 25

 Ibid., pp. 37, 65-66.
80 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

LESS Task Force had been extremely fortunate: "Had the enemy attack from the air

been in force, the loss of life and property

would have probably delayed the operation

for a considerable period of time."

 26

But the general congestion at Humboldt

Bay was not improved for some time. On D

plus 2, with fires still raging on the northern

spit, RECKLESS Task Force headquarters,

the task force reserve, and miscellaneous

service units, together with their supplies

and equipment, arrived from Tanahmerah

Bay. In addition, five LST's of the D plus 2

convoy from eastern New Guinea bases

hove into view. There were now eleven

LST's awaiting unloading in Humboldt

Bay, and the best beaches, White 1 and 2,

could not be used. Beaches at Hollandia and

other points around the shores of Challenger

Cove were obstructed by reefs. Extensive

demolitions would be necessary before LST's

could use that area. White Beach 4, at Pim,

was inaccessible to LST's. The only remaining area was White Beach 3 and the shore

line to its south along the Cape Tjeweri

sandspit.

White Beach 3 was ill suited for beaching

LST's and there were some objections from

Admiral William M. Fechteler's Central

Attack Group to RECKLESS Task Force

plans for using that beach. But the admiral

realized that many of the available LST's

had to be unloaded promptly so that they

could be returned on schedule to the Central Pacific Area, whence they had been

borrowed. He also knew that the cargo

aboard some LST's was badly needed ashore

to replace the supplies destroyed on White

Beaches 1 and 2. He therefore decided to

use White Beach 3 until White Beaches 1

and 2 were again safe. Admiral Fechteler

ordered his LST commander, Capt. Roger

Cutler (USN), to run the LST's into White

Beach 3 from the northern side of Humboldt Bay at full speed in order to ram the

ships as high as possible on the sandspit.

Captain Cutler's LST skippers did such a

good job that the Central Attack Group

later had considerable difficulty retracting

many LST's from the beach.27

Supplies and equipment unloaded at

White Beach 3 were transferred by small

craft to Pim, where, since very limited dispersal areas were available, a bottleneck

soon formed. The road inland from Pim,

barely passable for wheeled vehicles on D

Day, was rapidly deteriorating under continuous heavy trucking and rain. Finally,

demands for the use of lighterage between

White Beach 3 and Pim far exceeded the

available supply of small craft. Some additional complications arose from disagreements between naval and engineer special

brigade units regarding the employment of

small boats. Luckily, ample manual labor

was available, especially after the arrival of

the 34th Infantry and various service units

from Tanahmerah Bay. LST's were unloaded rapidly at White Beach 3, and work

around the clock kept the unloading areas

at Pim clear enough for steady use of the

limited beach and small jetty there. White

Beaches 1 and 2 were usable again on D

plus 8.28

By the morning of 25 April an inventory

of supplies could be taken. With the supplies

and ammunition landed from the D plus 2

convoy and those transferred from Tanahmerah Bay, the situation appeared

brighter. During the afternoon General

26

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 36.

27

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20; Ltr, Adm

Fechteler to Gen Ward, 8 Nov 50, no sub, in OGMH

files. 28

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20; CTF 77

Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape,

pp. 28-29; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, p. 4.
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 81

Eichelberger was able to report to ALAMO

Force that three and one half units of fire

for all weapons were on hand and that

enough rations were available to feed all

troops for six days.29

Supplying Forces Inland

The problem of supplying the troops on

the Lake Sentani plain did not end with the

seizure of the airfields on 26 April. For some

time thereafter the 24th Division continued

to receive some of its supplies by laborious

hand-carry from Tanahmerah Bay, but this

relatively inefficient method did not get adequate quantities of food forward. The division's inland troops were on half-rations

much of the time. Despite continuous work

by engineers, the 41st Division's main supply line—the Pim-Lake Sentani road—

could not stand the demands made upon it,

and from time to time sections of the road

had to be closed so that heavy equipment

could make repairs on it.

Early half-successful airdrops had added

little to the supplies of the troops inland, but

air supply was the only feasible method of

supporting the inland forces. Cyclops Drome

was ready for limited employment on 27

April, and Hollandia Drome could be used

by 1 May. But the mere availability of these

fields did not solve the supply problem. First,

weather prevented regular air supply runs

for a while and, second, it was initially somewhat difficult to assemble the needed supplies at rear bases, from which supplies were

already on their way forward to Hollandia

by water or were being loaded aboard ship

for water transportation. Neither time nor

planes were available to carry out a program

of unloading the ships, reloading their cargoes on aircraft, and flying the supplies to

the Hollandia fields. This difficulty was

overcome in part by the seizure of Tami

Drome, on the coast six miles east of Humboldt Bay.

Tami Drome was ready for use by transport aircraft on 3 May. From unloading

points at Humboldt Bay, small craft lightered supplies to the mouth of the Tami

River, whence trucks hauled the matériel to

Tami Drome. From that field C-47 aircraft

shuttled supplies to Cyclops and Hollandia

Dromes, probably executing one of the shortest field-to-field air supply missions on

record.30

But these efforts at local air supply proved

inadequate, and with no marked improvement of road conditions the supply situation for troops inland deteriorated rapidly.

The 186th Infantry, for instance, subsisted

for three or four days principally on rice and

canned fish from captured Japanese ration

dumps.31 The 24th Division was in like

straits. Finally, all local measures became

insufficient to meet the needs of the inland

infantry units, to say nothing of the thousands of engineer troops who began pouring

into the airfield area on 27 April. Consequently, on 4 May, the RECKLESS Task

Force requested that 20,000 rations be

flown daily to the Hollandia airfields from

eastern New Guinea Services of Supply

bases. This particular phase of the air transport was begun immediately and ceased

29

 Rad, RTF to ALAMO, 0304, 25 Apr 44, and

Rad, RTF to ALAMO, 2050, 25 Apr 44, both in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44.

30

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 14, 19-20;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 48-

51; 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 88-89, 153-

54.

31

 This information on the 186th Infantry was supplied to the author by Colonel Newman, ex-commanding officer of the 186th Infantry, who read and

made notes on this and other draft chapters of the

volume during March 1950. These notes are hereafter cited as Newman Notes. Copy in OCMH files.
82 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

about 15 May, by which time local overland transportation had greatly improved.

Many expedients were employed to get

the roads into shape both for supply movements and to send inland the heavy engineering equipment that was needed to

repair the three airfields. To avoid some of

the worst stretches of the Pim-Lake Sentani

road, especially those along the north shore

of the lake, overwater movements were executed. Small boats and amphibian vehicles

were laboriously hauled to Koejaboe (captured on 25 April) from Humboldt Bay,

and from the Koejaboe jetty supplies and

equipment were transported across the lake

to Nefaar. Meanwhile, engineers kept up

steady work on the road inland from Pim.

Landslides, mud, and lack of heavy equipment hindered rapid reconstruction of the

Dépapré-Lake Sentani road, over which

few attempts were made to move supplies

after 26 April.32

In order to organize and control supply

activities, the RECKLESS Task Force set up

supply "Sub-Sectors" at Tami Drome, Cape

Pie, Cape Tjeweri, and Pim. The officers in

charge of each Sub-Sector were made responsible for clearing the beaches, making

the most efficient use of available lighterage,

speeding the flow of supplies inland, and

controlling local troop movements. This decentralization of responsibility from the task

force G-4 relieved that section of burdensome detail work and operating functions,

permitting it to revert to the normal role of

planning, overseeing, and co-ordinating. As

time passed, roads were repaired or new

ones constructed, air supply became automatic, shipping difficulties were straightened

out, and the supply situation gradually

improved.33

Although the terrain and the unlucky

bomb hit on White Beach 1 did much to

complicate the supply problems of the

RECKLESS Task Force, other explanations

for the difficulties are to be found in the task

force G-4 Section's reports: "Operation

'G' [Hollandia] was a logistical nightmare

due primarily to the fact that too much was

thrown too soon into too small an area.

Under the circumstances, it is felt that the

Operation progressed far more smoothly

than should be reasonably expected."34

And again: "Operation G almost completely 'bogged down' due to the fact that

in both objective areas [Tanahmerah and

Humboldt Bays] many more vehicles, pieces

of heavy equipment, and supplies were

landed on the first three days than could be

cleared from the beaches."

 35

 What might

have happened at Hollandia had the Japanese been prepared can only be surmised.

The End of the Operation

The RECKLESS Task Force retained control over supply and construction in the

Hollandia area until 6 June. During this

period the task force, under the direction of

ALAMO Force, initiated that construction

which ultimately resulted in the development of Hollandia into a major base from

which many future operations were supported. The RECKLESS Task Force paid

particular attention to airdromes, roads,

docks, headquarters buildings, and dispersal areas. On 6 June the Services of

32

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20. It is the

author's remembrance that the good road which was

finally built from the airfields to Tanahmerah Bay

was completed in July 1944. This road, an impressive engineering feat, led to Seventh Fleet fuel installations at Tanahmerah Bay, where PT boats

were based.

33

 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 20, 39. 34

 Ibid., p. 41. 35

 Ibid., p. 36.
THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 83

Supply assumed responsibility for the continuation of this development.36

 At Hollandia the Services of Supply established

Base G, under which construction was

speeded. Major headquarters that ultimately moved to Hollandia included General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific

Area, United States Army Forces in the Far

East, Allied Air Forces, Allied Land Forces,

the U. S. Seventh Fleet, the Fifth Air Force,

ALAMO Force (Sixth Army), and the U. S.

Eighth Army.

After 6 June patrolling in the area continued, much of it by the 24th Division,

which was later succeeded by other units.

By the 6th, American casualties amounted

to 124 men killed, 1,057 wounded, and 28

missing. During the same period, 611 Japanese were captured and over 3,300 killed.

Most of the Japanese losses occurred after

26 April (the day the airfields were captured) during mopping up, and the bulk

of the enemy were killed in small groups.

The pace of the mopping-up operations is

illustrated by the fact that 800 Japanese

were killed during the week ending 6 June.

In exchange for each American killed or

wounded, to 6 June, the enemy lost four

men. For this price, the Allies secured a forward area which lay in the heart of territory

previously held by the Japanese. The Hollandia area was to prove an excellent air,

naval, and logistic base from which future

operations in western New Guinea were to

be staged and protected, and from which a

large part of the force which invaded the

Philippines in October 1944 set sail.37

36

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, p.

54.

37

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp.

31, 58; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May 44,

copy in G-2 DofA files.
CHAPTER IV

The Japanese: Pearl Harbor

Through Hollandia

To the Allies the Hollandia operation had

proved an unexpectedly easy tactical success, since the Japanese had been strangely

ill prepared to defend adequately this potentially powerful base. General Mac Arthur

had sent one and two-thirds reinforced divisions against Hollandia on the assumption

that 14,000 Japanese, including nearly two

regiments of infantry, would be found

there.1 But no strong Japanese resistance and

little co-ordinated defense had been encountered there.2

 It appears that about

11,000 Japanese of all services were at Hollandia on 22 April and that ground combat

elements were represented by no more than

500 antiaircraft artillerymen.3

There are many reasons for Japanese unpreparedness at Hollandia. First, the Japanese had been caught by surprise, tactically

speaking. Second, there had been sweeping

changes in their command structure at Hollandia just before 22 April. Third, not

enough combat equipment was available

at Hollandia even to arm properly the thousands of service troops who were there.

Finally, and most important, time had

worked against the Japanese in the case of

Hollandia just as time had worked against

them throughout the Pacific since their first

successes in late 1941 and early 1942.

Strategy and Dispositions to April 1944

The Japanese Situation to Mid-1943

The Japanese entered World War II with

limited objectives in mind, having no plan

1

 Memo, GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44,

sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize

Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Carriers, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44;

see also above, Ch. II. Just prior to D Day, new G-2

estimates raised the total to 15,000 Japanese, but

lowered combat strength to 1,000. GHQ SWPA,

G-2 DSEI 755, 16 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 16

Apr 44. This revised estimate was made too late to

affect Allied plans. 2

 At first, when no fighting took place at the

beachheads, General .MacArthur's G-2 considered

it probable that the Japanese had withdrawn inland

to make a final, determined stand around the airfields. GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 764, 25 Apr 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Apr 44. 3

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 44, 7 Jun 44, copy

in G-2 DofA files; 18th Army Opns, III, 41-48;

Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 48-51.

The ALAMO source states that 8,981 Japanese

were at Hollandia on 22 April. The 18th Army citation provides two figures: the first, as of ten days

prior to the Allied landings, gives a total of 14,700;

while the second, for which no specific date is given,

sets figures of 10,000 Japanese Army troops and

1,000 Japanese Navy troops. In the light of other

estimates, the first 18th Army figure is believed to

overlook the number of Japanese Army Air Force

pilots and ground crewmen evacuated from Hollandia during April before the Allied landings and, apparently, makes no allowance for casualties resulting

from Allied air action before 22 April. The 2d

Area Army monograph states that approximately

10,000 Japanese were at Hollandia on D Day.
THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 85

to press home their attacks or to meet and

defeat the main body of the forces opposing

them. Initially, they intended only to knock

out the U. S. Pacific Fleet, to seize Malaya

and the Netherlands East Indies, to occupy

the Philippine Islands, and to gain control

over a defensive perimeter reaching southwestward from the Kuriles (north of Japan)

through Wake Island, the Marianas, the

Carolines, and the Marshalls, to Rabaul.

After attaining these objectives, the Japanese expected ultimately to obtain from the

United States and Britain a negotiated

peace which would leave Japan in possession

of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere."

Quickly, in late 1941 and early 1942, the

Japanese seized their initial perimeter and

brought under military control most of the

contemplated Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere except for southern China.

But no negotiated peace was forthcoming.

On the contrary, the United States and

Britain gave every indication that they

would mount counteroffensives long before

the Japanese anticipated such action. The

United States began to develop a line of

communications to Australia and to reinforce that continent as a base for future

operations.4

Returning to plans considered but not

approved prior to the war,5 Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, early in 1942,

developed in a piecemeal fashion plans to

expand the perimeter already seized. Discarding as impossible of execution a Navy

plan to take Australia, Imperial General

Headquarters determined to cut the line of

communications from the United States to

Australia by occupying New Caledonia, the

Fiji Islands, and Samoa. Flank protection

for the new perimeter was to be obtained

on the south by seizing Port Moresby, in

southeastern New Guinea, and on the north

by securing bases in the American Aleutian

Islands. The Japanese hoped that the

United States would wear itself out in attacks against the new perimeter, find itself

unable to mount stronger counteroffensives,

and thus afford Japan better opportunity to

secure a negotiated peace.6

During the spring and summer of 1942

the initial Japanese attempts to expand the

perimeter met with disaster during the

Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Undaunted, the Japanese expanded southward

from Rabaul down the chain of Solomon

Islands to seize air bases in preparation for

the advance to Fiji, New Caledonia, and

Samoa. At the same time they attempted to

capture Port Moresby by overland action.

American landings at Guadalcanal in the 4

 Interrog of Flt Adm Osamu Nagano [Chief of

the Navy Section, Imperial GHQ, and Supreme

Naval Adviser to the Emperor], 30 Nov 45, in

United States Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS],

Interrog 498, copy in OCMH files; USSBS, Summary Report [Pacific War] (Washington, 1946) p.

2. In addition to the specific documents cited in this

chapter, the author was furnished additional information by Mr. Clarke Kawakami, research assistant

to Commodore Richard W. Bates (USN), of the

Naval War College. Mr. Kawakami's remarks on

the original draft of this chapter were based on research into Japanese sources and on interviews with

high-ranking Japanese Army and Navy officers undertaken while he was a member of the G-2 Historical Section of GHQ FEC in Tokyo.

5

 As outlined in Combined Fleet Top Secret Opn

Order 1, 5 Nov 41, translation in Joint Congressional

Investigation Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack

(Washington, 1946), Pt. XIII, Exhibit 8, pp. 431-

84.

6

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 72, Hist of Army

Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 45-46, 50-54, copy of

translation in OCMH files; Kawakami Comments.

The plan to move into the Solomons and eastern

New Guinea, including Port Moresby, was developed

in late January 1942; the plan to move into Fiji,

New Caledonia, and Samoa, in late April; and the

plan to seize bases in the Aleutians not until late

May or early June.
86 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Solomons during August stopped the Japanese expansion to the southeast, and Australian troops threw the enemy back from

Port Moresby later in the year. The Japanese

realized by September 1942 that they had

overreached themselves and directed their

energies to strengthening their forces in

eastern New Guinea, the Solomons, and the

Bismarck Archipelago.7

To control operations in these areas, the

Japanese, in November 1942, established at

Rabaul the headquarters of the 8th Area

Army. Under this headquarters was placed

the 17th Army, already operating in the

Solomons and eastern New Guinea, and

the 18th Army, which was set up at Rabaul

in November to take over control of operations in eastern New Guinea. About the

same time the 6th Air Division was organized, placed under the 8th Area Army's control, and sent to New Guinea. The 17th

Army failed in attempts to retake Guadalcanal, while in eastern New Guinea the 18th

Army fared no better in trying to maintain

its hold on the north coast of Papua at Buna

and Gona. The two campaigns made heavy

inroads into Japanese ground, air, and naval

strength. Imperial General Headquarters

paused to take stock.8

At the close of 1942 Imperial General

Headquarters estimated that the Allies intended to conduct a two-pronged drive

toward Rabaul (then the principal Japanese forward base in the Southwest Pacific

Area) from eastern New Guinea and the

Solomons. The Japanese expected that the

Allies would then move up the northern

coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines

and, possibly, conduct another advance toward the Philippines from northwestern

Australia through the Netherlands East

Indies. Recognizing that the initiative had

been lost, and faced with a lack of shipping

and diminishing air and naval power, Imperial General Headquarters decided upon

a strategic withdrawal in order to build up

defenses against the expected Allied drives

and to prepare bases from which future

offensives might be launched.

Accordingly, on 4 January 1943, Japan

set up a strategic defensive line running

through the southern Indies to Wewak, on

the northeastern coast of New Guinea between Hollandia and the Buna-Gona area.

From Wewak the line ran southeastward to

Lae and Salamaua, whence it jumped

to the south coast of New Britain, up to

Rabaul, and south along the Solomons

to New Georgia. To the north the line ran

through the Gilbert Islands, the Marianas,

Wake, and the Aleutians.

The 17th Army now began building new

defenses in the northern Solomons, withdrawing from Guadalcanal. Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi, commanding the 18th Army,

moved his headquarters from Rabaul to Lae

in March and prepared to defend what was

left of eastern New Guinea. To strengthen

this area the 41st Division was moved from

China to eastern New Guinea during the

same month. About the same time the bulk

of the 51st Division, some of which was

already in New Guinea, began shuttling to

the Lae area from New Britain. Large-scale

attempts to reinforce the 18th Army ended

in early March after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, during which the 115th Infantry

of the 51st Division was practically wiped

out when the convoy carrying it from New

Britain to Lae fell prey to Allied air action.

The 20th Division, already in eastern New

7

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 50-66. 8

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 68-

74; MID WD, Disposition and Movement of Japanese Ground Forces, 1941-45, copy in OCMH files;

Japanese Studies in WW II, 38, Southeast Area Air

Opns, pp. 2-4, copy in OCMH files.
THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 87

Guinea, was placed under General Adachi's

command in April.9

Operations in the Philippines and the

Netherlands East Indies since the beginning

of the war had been under the control of the

Southern Army,10 subordinate to which were

the 14th Army in the Philippines and the

16th Army in the Indies. On 7 January the

19th Army was set up under the Southern

Army to relieve the 16th Army of responsibility for Timor, the islands of the Arafura

Sea, Dutch New Guinea, Ceram, Ambon,

Halmahera, and Morotai. The 48th Division, in the Indies since early 1942, and the

newly arrived 5th Division were placed

under the 19th Army, which established its

command post at Ambon. Troops and supplies destined for the 19th Army passed

through the Philippines, while the Palau

Islands, already in use to some extent for

such purposes, assumed new importance as

a staging area through which men and

equipment going to the 8th Area Army

passed. Initially the boundary between the

19th and 18th Armies (and therefore between the Southern and 8th Area Armies)

was the Dutch-Australian international

border across central New Guinea. But in

April 1943 this boundary was changed to

140 degrees east longitude in order to place

Hollandia within the 8th Area Army's zone

of responsibility.11

Japanese Strategic Withdrawals

to April 1944

Slow but steady Allied progress in eastern

New Guinea and the Solomons during the

spring and summer of 1943 prompted Imperial General Headquarters to send air reinforcements to the 8th Area Army. The 7th

Air Division, organized in January 1943 for

operations in the Netherlands East Indies,

was transferred to the command of the 8th

Area Army in late May or early June and

began sending planes to eastern New

Guinea in June. To co-ordinate the operations of the 6th and 7th Air Divisions, the

headquarters of the 4th Air Army was set up

at Rabaul under the 8th Area Army. The

6th Air Division was to concentrate its

strength at Rabaul, the Admiralty Islands,

Wewak, and Hansa Bay, east of Wewak.

The 7th Air Division was to develop rear

area bases immediately west of Wewak and

also at Aitape and Hollandia.12

In September 1943 the pace of Allied

operations in eastern New Guinea was accelerated and it appeared to the Japanese

that an invasion of New Britain was probable. Unable to think of any feasible way to

reinforce the area in the face of increasing

Allied air and naval action, Imperial General Headquarters decided upon another

strategic withdrawal. Having already lost

the Aleutians, Japan established a new

strategic main line of resistance along the

line southern Indies, Dutch New Guinea,

the Carolines, and the Marianas, back to

the Kuriles. The former all-important eastern New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelagonorthern Solomons area was relegated to

the status of a holding front, while behind

9

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 70-

78; MID WD, op. cit.; Japanese Studies in WW II,

37, Hist of 8th Area Army, 1942-45, copy in OCMH

files; Japanese Studies in WW II, 41, 18th Army

Opns, I, 87-97, copy in OCMH files. General

Adachi went to New Guinea twice in March, but

his headquarters was not permanently established

at Lae until April. 10

 Some translations render Southern Army as

Southern Area Army. 11

 Hist of 8th Area Army, p. 11; Hist of 2d Area

Army, pp. 4-6; Japanese Studies in WW II, 21,

Hist of Southern Area Army, 1941-45, pp. 29-35,

copy in OCMH files. The 15th Army, in Burma,

and the 25th Army, at Singapore, were also under

the Southern Army. 12

 Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 13-18; Hist of 8th

Area Army, pp. 15-31.
88 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the new defensive line ground strength was

to be rebuilt and new air and naval power

was to be mustered. By the spring of 1944

the rebuilding was to be so complete that

offensive operations, including a naval

showdown, could be resumed in midsummer.13

Rabaul remained the center of the holding front area while Hansa Bay, previously

the main port of entry for large ships taking

supplies and troops to the 8th Area Army,

became a small-boat base. Hollandia took

the place of Hansa Bay as the principal unloading point and was to be developed into

a major base from which the mid-1944

offensives might be supported. The distribution point for the eastern Indies and

Dutch New Guinea became Halmahera,

while Manokwari, on the Vogelkop Peninsula of western New Guinea, became the

main supply base for western New Guinea.

Other air and supply bases were to be developed at Sorong, at the western tip of the

Vogelkop, and on the islands in Geelvink

Bay. The Palaus retained their status as a

staging area for men and supplies moving

southeastward toward New Guinea.14

In October and November 1943 Allied

forces of the South Pacific Area drove up

the chain of Solomon Islands to Bougainville, new stronghold of the 17th Army;

Central Pacific Area forces invaded the

Gilberts; and Southwest Pacific Area troops

trapped part of the 18th Army on the Huon

Peninsula of eastern New Guinea. The Japanese Navy sent the bulk of its carrier-based

air strength to Rabaul in a vain attempt to

stem the tide of Allied advance, but this

move ended in disaster for practically all

of the Japanese Navy's carrier-based aircraft. Coupled with concurrent losses of

cruisers, the decimation of the carrier-based

air power resulted in the temporary immobilization of the Japanese Fleet.15

Imperial General Headquarters now gave

up hope of long holding the eastern New

Guinea-Solomons-Bismarck Archipelago

area and became perturbed about the opening of a new Allied front in the Central Pacific, presaged by the invasion of the Gilberts. Imperial General Headquarters was

again worried lest the Allies mount an offensive toward the Philippines from northwestern Australia, and it still firmly believed that

a drive northwest up the north coast of New

Guinea was to be undertaken by the forces

under General MacArthur's command. To

strengthen the eastern Indies and western

New Guinea, plans were made to send the

3d, 36th, and 46th Divisions to that area

from China or Japan. To control future

operations in the region, the Headquarters,

2d Area Army, was dispatched from Manchuria to Davao, Mindanao, in the Philippines, where it arrived during late November 1943. Sent south with Lt. Gen. Korechika Anami's 2d Area Army headquarters

was the headquarters of the 2d Army, under

Lt. Gen. Fusataro Teshima, who established

his command post at Manokwari on the

13

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 84-

96; Japanese Studies in WW II, 50, Southeast Area

Naval Opns, III, 2-5, copy in OCMH files. 14

 Southeast Area Naval Opns, III, 4; Hist of

Army Section, Imperial GHQ, p. 92; Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 44-47; Japanese Studies in WW

II, 42, 18th Army Opns, II, 134, copy in OCMH

files.

15

 Southeast Area Naval Opns III, 5; GHQ

SWPA, G-3 Hist Div, Chronology of the War in the

SWPA, 1941-45, copy in OCMH files; Tabular Records of Daily Movements of Japanese Battleships,

Carriers, and Cruisers, in WW II Seized Enemy

Records, Record Group 242, Doc 11792, National

Archives; Vols. III and IV of Aircraft Carriers, part

of a series of "Greater East Asia War Campaigns:

Materials for Investigation of Meritorious Service,"

in WW II Seized Enemy Records, Rec Grp 242,

Docs 12552 and 12060, respectively. Last two as

translated and analyzed by Mr. Thomas G. Wilds,

Pacific Section, OCMH.
THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 89

Vogelkop Peninsula. The 2d Army and the

19th Army were both placed under the control of the 2d Area Army which, in turn, was

directly under Imperial General Headquarters. The 2d Area Army was to hold the area

from 140 degrees east longitude, west to

Macassar Strait and south from 5 degrees

north latitude. Hollandia remained within

the 8th Area Army's zone of responsibility.16

The 36th Division began arriving at

Sarmi, 125 miles west-northwest of Hollandia, in December 1943, while one regiment, the 222d Infantry, reached Biak Island in Geelvink Bay the same month.

Remnants of the 46th Division, most of

which was sunk in transit by Allied submarines, arrived in the Lesser Soendas about

the same time. Because of developments in

central China, the 3d Division was left in

that country. Initially, the 14th Division was

substituted for the 3d, but neither did it

ever reach New Guinea. The 36th Division

passed to the control of the 2d Army, and

the 46th was placed under command of the

19th Army. The 7th Air Division, which

had hardly started moving toward eastern

New Guinea, was taken from the control of

the 8th Area Army and reassigned to the 2d

Area Army. The air division headquarters

was set up at Ambon in November, and

shortly thereafter the few planes remaining

among those previously sent to eastern

New Guinea went to Ambon.17 Finally, to

strengthen the front against the threat of

Allied advance across the central Pacific,

Imperial General Headquarters dispatched

the 52d Division to the Carolines. There it

and other Japanese Army units either already in the Central Pacific or on their way

to that area passed to the operational control

of the Combined Fleet.18

During the last months of 1943 and the

opening months of 1944 Allied offensive

moves continued at an ever-increasing rate.

In the Southwest Pacific the entire Huon

Peninsula area was cleared of Japanese

troops, and a foothold was seized in western

New Britain. In the South Pacific the Japanese could not stem the Allied advance

in the northern Solomons, and the Allies

moved on to seize an airfield site on Green

Island, east of Rabaul and within easy

fighter range of that base. The final steps

in the isolation of Rabaul were the seizure

of the Admiralty Islands by Allied forces

of the Southwest Pacific Area in February

and March 1944, and the capture of Emirau

Island by South Pacific Area troops in

March. In the Central Pacific events moved

just as rapidly. In January and February

Allied forces advanced into the Marshall

Islands, while carrier-based aircraft of the

U. S. Pacific Fleet struck heavily at Truk,

previously the Combined Fleet's strongest

advance base.19

16

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 9-13; 2d Area Army

Opn Plan A-1, 23 Nov 43, as cited in Hist of 2d

Area Army, pp. 14-21; Hist of Southern Area Army,

pp. 45-47; Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ,

pp. 94-96; Kawakami Comments. Lt. Gen. Kenzo

Kitano, the 19th Army's commander, commanded

the 4th Division in the Philippines in 1942. This division spearheaded the final Japanese drive which

resulted in the American surrender at Bataan and

Corregidor. See Morton, The Fall of the Philippines. 17

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 32, 2d Army Opns

in the Western New Guinea Area, pp. 1-2, copy in

OCMH files; Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 44-

57; Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 25-29; Interrog of

Col Rinsuke Kaneko (JAAF), 21 Nov 45, in USSBS

[Pacific], Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of

Japanese Officials, 2 vols. (Washington, 1946,

OPNAV-P-03-100), II, 404-08; 2d Area Army

Opn Order, no number, 28 Nov 43, as translated in

GHQ SWPA, ATIS Current Translation 131, 31

Jul 44; Kawakami Comments. 18

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ,, p. 93;

Japanese Studies in WW II, 55, Central Pacific

Opns, pp. 17-18, copy in OCMH files. 19

 GHQ SWPA, G-3 Hist Div, Chronology of the

War in the SWPA.
90 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

The Japanese high command was again

forced to issue withdrawal orders and to

make attempts to strengthen forward area

positions. The Allied advances in eastern

New Guinea prompted the 8th Area Army

to order the 18th Army to retreat to Madang. On 8 January 1944 General Adachi

moved his 18th Army headquarters by submarine from Sio, on the Huon Peninsula,

to Madang, only eight days before Australian troops seized Sio. Shortly after that

narrow escape, the command post was

moved still farther westward to Wewak.20

About 10 February the Combined Fleet,

recognizing that the establishment of Allied

air bases on the Admiralties and Marshalls

would bring all the Carolines within range

of Allied bombers, decided that the Truk

fleet base was no longer tenable. The opinion

was forcibly strengthened by the Pacific

Fleet carrier strike on Truk later in the

month, and Combined Fleet headquarters

was moved to the Palaus. About the same

time, the Japanese Navy abandoned all

hope of conducting successful operations in

the Bismarck Archipelago-northern Solomons area and withdrew the last remnants

of its air power from Rabaul.21

More drastic redispositions and new

changes in command structure were effected

by both the Japanese Army and Navy in

March and early April 1944. The Combined

Fleet had no intention of making the Palaus

a permanent base but planned to use the

base only as a temporary advanced anchorage until new base facilities in the Philippines could be developed. The ultimate

withdrawal of Combined Fleet headquarters and surface units from the Palaus was

speeded by the carrier raids of the U. S.

Fifth Fleet on those islands at the end of

March, when the American carriers were

providing strategic support for the Hollandia operation. The Japanese Navy, as a

result of these carrier raids and, later, the

threat of Allied land-based bomber attacks

on the Palaus from Hollandia, ceased to

be much interested in the Palaus.

But Imperial General Headquarters, in

March, was still determined to strengthen

the central Pacific. Accordingly, early that

month, the headquarters of the 31st Army,

Maj. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata commanding,

was set up on Guam in the Marianas to exercise command under direction of the

Combined Fleet of all Japanese Army units

in the Central Pacific islands. The 29th

Division was sent out to the Marianas in

March also, and plans were made to send

the 43d Division to the same islands.22

The portion of the strategic main line of

resistance for which the 31st Army was

responsible extended along the line BoninsVolcanos- Marianas- Ponape-Truk-Woleai-Yap-Palaus. At the Palaus the line tied

into the 2d Area Army's zone of responsibility. So far, the Palaus had been little more

than a staging area, and few combat troops

were on the islands. In March, line of communications troops, replacements, and rear

echelons of various 8th Area Army units in

the Palaus passed with their commander,

Maj. Gen. Takeo Yamaguchi, to the control 20

 Hist of 8th Area Army, p. 46; MID WD, op.

cit.; Interrog of Capt Shigeru Iwaki, 21 Feb 46, in

GHQ SCAP, ATIS Doc 14924-A, copy in OCMH

files. 21

 Southeast Area Naval Opns, III, 2-9; Interrog

of Comdr Chikataka Nakajima [staff of CinC, Combined Fleet], 22 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations

of Japanese Officials, II, 432-35.

22

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, p. 93;

Central Pacific Opns, pp. 17-18; MID WD, Order

of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces, 1 Mar 45,

pp. 72, 100. The 43d Division's convoy suffered

heavy losses on the trip to the Marianas, but the

remnants of the division arrived in the islands in

May.
THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 91

of the 2d Area Army. More wide-sweeping

changes were due in the Palaus, for by

March Imperial General Headquarters was

worried lest the Palaus were to become an

immediate target of Allied invasion. It was

therefore decided to send strong reinforcements to the Palaus, and the 14th Division

was scheduled for shipment to the islands

from northern China. The 35th Division

was promised to the 2d Area Army in place

of the 14th, but, since it would be some time

before the 14th Division could reach the

Palaus, the 219th Infantry (less one battalion, but with a battalion of artillery attached) of the 35th Division was sent on to

the Palaus, where it landed during March.

The remainder of the 35th Division proceeded to Halmahera and western New

Guinea via the Philippines, delayed as a

result of Allied submarine attacks on the

convoy carrying it southward.

The U. S. Fifth Fleet's carrier raid on the

Palaus at the end of March apparently

prompted Imperial General Headquarters

to expect an invasion of the Palaus in the

near future. Obviously, the understrength

regimental combat team of the 35th Division could not hold those islands, and therefore efforts were made to speed the shipment

of the 14th Division. Destined originally for

western New Guinea and even later for the

Marianas, the 14th Division finally set sail

for the Palaus early in April, reaching those

islands safely on the 24th of the month, just

two days after the Allied landings at Hollandia. During the ensuing weeks the elements of the 35th Division already in the

Palaus left to rejoin their parent unit in

western New Guinea. Lt. Gen. Sadae Inoue,

commanding the 14th Division, was appointed Commander, Palau Sector Group,

in which capacity his area of responsibility

included Yap in the Carolines, as well as the

Palaus. General Yamaguchi's staging area

forces already in the Palaus passed to General Inoue's command, probably about the

same time that the 14th Division arrived in

the islands.23

Equally radical changes had been made

to the south. Recognizing that the 8th Area

Army and the 17th Army were irretrievably

cut off, Imperial General Headquarters, on

14 March 1944, wrote them off as a loss, ordering them to hold out as best they could.

About the same time the 18th Army and the

4th Air Army were transferred to the jurisdiction of the 2d Area Army, for it was evident that the 8th Area Army's headquarters

at Rabaul could no longer exercise effective

control over the two units. The boundary

between the 2d and 8th Area Armies was

moved eastward to 147 degrees east longitude (the Admiralties, however, remained

under the 8th Area Army). The 18th Army,

then reorganizing at Madang, was brought

well within the 2d Area Army's zone, as

were the Japanese bases at Hansa Bay,

Wewak, Aitape, and Hollandia.

Imperial General Headquarters ordered

the 2d Area Army to hold all the territory

west of Wewak within its zone and to pull

the 18th Army west from Madang to Wewak, Aitape, and Hollandia. The 2d Area

Army was also instructed to develop Hollandia into a major supply base, but neither

this development nor the 18th Army's withdrawal was to interfere with more important

defense preparations in western New Guinea

and the islands between the Vogelkop

Peninsula and the Philippines. Given this

leeway, the 2d Area Army decided to concentrate its efforts in strengthening a stra23

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 87-

93, 109, 121-23; Central Pacific Opns, pp. 17-18;

Japanese Studies in WW II, 56, The Palau Opns,

pp. 4-5, 45-47, 57-61, copy in OGMH files; Kawakami Comments.
92 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tegic defensive front along the line from the

Lesser Soendas through the Aroe Islands

in the Arafura Sea, north to Mimika on the

southwest coast of Dutch New Guinea, and

thence to the Wakde-Sarmi area, 125 miles

northwest of Hollandia. Although this decision would obviously leave the 18th Army

out in the cold insofar as supplies or reinforcements were concerned, Imperial General Headquarters approved the 2d Area

Army's plan without recorded comment.24

To strengthen the 2d Area Army, the 32d

and 35th Divisions had already been dispatched toward western New Guinea and

Halmahera, where they began arriving in

late April. Air redispositions also took place.

The 4th Air Army headquarters and the

6th Air Division moved from Wewak to

Hollandia in March (both had moved from

Rabaul to Wewak in late 1943). Though

reinforced, the 6th Air Division was practically wiped out by Allied air attacks during

March and April,25 but its headquarters

remained at Hollandia.

Defensive planning of the 4th Air Army

and the 2d Area Army was thrown askew

by the aircraft losses at Hollandia, and the

Japanese had to decide whether they could

again afford to risk a large number of planes

as far forward as Hollandia, or whether

remaining air power should be reconcentrated farther westward. Since the 2d Area

Army had already decided to establish its

main defensive line west of Hollandia, the

decision was obvious—no more large numbers of aircraft were to be sent to Hollandia.

The 4th Air Army's headquarters moved

west from Hollandia on 15 April and reestablished the command post at Manado

in the Celebes, to which town the 2d Area

Army moved its headquarters from Davao

a few days later. At the same time, to coordinate command in the southern regions,

the 2d Area Army passed from the direct

control of Imperial General Headquarters

to the control of the intermediate link, the

Southern Army. Simultaneously, the 4th

Air Army passed to the direct command of

the Southern Army.26

Halmahera, already the principal distribution point for the eastern part of the

Netherlands East Indies and for Dutch New

Guinea, also gradually developed into a

focal point for the Japanese defense of the

southern approaches to the Philippines. The

Palaus' former status as a major staging

base was gradually curtailed, and the islands

lost their importance to the 2d Area Army.27

General Anami was again instructed by

Imperial General Headquarters rapidly to

develop, behind the new strategic main line

of resistance, supply and staging bases from

which a general offensive might be resumed

inmid-1944.28

24

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 107-

11; 2d Area Army Opn Order A-40, 20 Mar 44, as

translated in ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 48, 5 Jul

44, copy in G-2 Dof A files. 25

 The destruction of the 6th Air Division is discussed in Ch. II, above.

26

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 110-

13, 120-23; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 30-44,47-48,

53-55; Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 16-18, 36;

18th Army Opns, III, 41-46; 4th Air Army OpnOrder A-250, 22 Mar 44, in GHQ SWPA, ATIS

Enemy Publication 268, 4 Jan 45, copy in OCMH

files; Interrog of Col. Kaneko, 21 Nov 45, in

USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II,

404-08; AAF SWPA Int Sum 197, 8 Apr 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 7 Apr 44. 27

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to Morotai, 1 Aug 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Morotai, 2-8 Aug 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly

Rpts 44 and 51, 7 Jun and 26 Jul 44, respectively,

copies in G-2 Dof A files; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp.

53-55. 28

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp.

84-96.
THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 93

Japan's Pacific Order of Battle,

April 1944

Thus, in the area of principal immediate

interest to Allied forces of the Southwest

Pacific as they moved toward Hollandia in

April 1944, the Japanese high command

centered in General Count Hisaichi Terauchi's Southern Army, with headquarters

at Singapore.29 Under the Southern Army

was the 2d Area Army, headquarters at

Manado, which in turn controlled the 2d,

18th, and 19th Armies. The 2d Area Army

had about 170,000 troops under its command. In western New Guinea and the

Hamahera region was the 2d Army,

headquarters at Manokwari, comprising the

32d, 35th, and 36th Divisions, and miscellaneous other units, totaling about 50,000

men. The strength of the 19th Army, spread

over most of the rest of the Netherlands East

Indies, was also about 50,000 troops, centered around the 5th, 46th, and 48th Divisions.

The 8th Area Army, controlled directly

by Imperial General Headquarters, retained

under its command in the Solomons and

Bismarck Archipelago the 17th Army, the

38th Division, the 65th Brigade, and the

remnants of the 6th and 17th Divisions.

Total strength of the 8th Area Army in April

1944 was perhaps 80,000 men. In the

Philippines the Southern Army had under

its command the 14th Army, comprising the

16th Division and four independent mixed

brigades. The 14th Army had about 45,000

combat troops under its control, and total

Japanese strength in the Philippines was

about 100,000 men, including air, naval,

and army service troops. On the Central

Pacific islands was the 31st Army, under the

operational control of the Central Pacific

Fleet and consisting of the 14th, 29th, and

52d Divisions, with the 43d Division on the

way. The 31st Army was about 60,000 men

strong. The 14th Division and other units in

the Palaus, including naval and air, totaled

about 30,000 men.30

When the 18th Army, passed to the control of the 2d Area Army in March 1944,

General Adachi had under his control from

50,000 to 60,000 men. His three infantry

divisions, the 20th, 41st, and 51st, had all

been badly battered in fighting in eastern

New Guinea and, since January, had been

suffering heavy casualties during withdrawal

from the Huon Peninsula area. At the time

of the change in command, the 20th Division was painfully reorganizing at Madang

(east of which it was fighting a rear guard

action against Australian troops) and

Hansa Bay. The 41st Division was deployed

in the Madang area and was preparing to

move westward, while the 51st Division was

assembling at Wewak for rehabilitation and

reorganization. The total strength of the

three divisions at the time of the Allied

landings at Hollandia probably did not exceed 20,000 trained combat effectives.31

29

 Southern Army headquarters moved to Manila

in mid-May 1944.

30

 The figures given above were derived by Mr.

Burke C. Peterson, of the Pacific Section, OCMH,

from a mass of Japanese and Allied sources. The location of units was derived from the Japanese Army

sources cited in the preceding section. 31

 MID WD, Disposition and Movement of Japanese Ground Forces, 1941-45, copy in OCMH

files; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Monthly Sum of Enemy

Dispositions, 30 Apr 44, copy in OCMH files; GHQ

SWPA, G-2 DSEI's 761 and 828, 22 Apr and 28

Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 22 Apr and 28 Jun 44;

18th Army Opns, Annex A-Statistics, Supplementary Chart No. 1. Definitive figures for the strength

of the 18th Army in April 1944 are simply not available and all sources are contradictory. General MacArthur's G-2 Section put the 18th Army strength

for April at about 45,000 men. ALAMO Force and

Allied Land Forces consistently gave much higher

estimates, running from 55,000 to 65,000, while

the Japanese source cites a figure of about 75,000

for 1 April.

THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 95

Co-operating with the 18th Army was the

Japanese 9th Fleet, principal Japanese

naval headquarters in New Guinea. The

9th Fleet's commander was Vice Adm.

Yoshikazu Endo, whose command post was

located at Wewak until late March, when

it moved to Hollandia. Admiral Endo's

command consisted primarily of service

troops, naval antiaircraft gunners, and a few

shore defense units. His surface strength

comprised only a miscellaneous collection

of landing craft and armed barges. The majority of the naval service troops in eastern

New Guinea were members of the 27th

Special Base Force, while the few Japanese

naval personnel at Hollandia were under

Capt. Tetsuo Onizuka, naval ground commander in the area.32

In western New Guinea, acting in concert with the 2d Area Army, was the 4th

Expeditionary Fleet. The next step up the

Japanese naval chain of command was the

Southwest Area Fleet, controlling all Japanese naval units in the Netherlands East

Indies area and operating directly under the

Combined Fleet. The 9th Fleet, formerly

under the Southeast Area Fleet's headquarters at Rabaul, passed to the control of

Southwest Area Fleet in March 1944.33

There were a few naval aircraft based at

Hollandia from time to time, but Japanese

naval air power was, generally speaking, a

negligible factor in the New Guinea and

Netherlands East Indies areas in April 1944,

The Japanese Army Air Force, after the

destruction of the 6th Air Division at Hollandia and the withdrawal of the 4th Air

Army's headquarters to Manado, likewise

had little left with which to stem an Allied

advance in New Guinea. The 4th Air Army

had never been at full strength during its

operations in the Bismarck Archipelago and

New Guinea areas. Its heavy combat losses

were aggravated by poor equipment, inadequate aircraft maintenance, supply difficulties, and rough fields which could not be

kept in repair. Its history in New Guinea

was principally one of frustration.34

The Japanese at Hollandia

Japanese Planning and Command

at Hollandia

The Japanese high command had been

for some time aware of the potential importance of Hollandia and of the necessity

for building up the defenses of the area. The

enemy had decided to develop a major base

at Hollandia as early as the withdrawal of

the strategic main line of resistance in September 1943.35

 The 2d Area Army, when it

took over control in western New Guinea

in November, perceived that holding Hollandia would have great advantages and

believed that Hollandia ought to be strongly

defended as an outpost for the protection of

the strategic defense lines base at WakdeSarmi, to the west. General Anami, commanding the 2d Area Army, in November

32

 Rpt of Capt Shigeru Iwaki (staff, 9th Fleet), 21

Feb 46, in GHQ SCAP, ATIS Doc 14924-A, copy

in G-2 DofA files, Doc 257846; Interrog of Capt

Toshikazu Ohmae (IJN), 25 Nov 45, in USSBS,

Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 409-10;

GHQ SCAP, ATIS Doc 16947, Full Translation of

Answers to Questions Concerning the Admiralties

and Hollandia, 14 Apr 46, copy, in G-2 DofA files,

Doc 261219; 18th Army Opns, III, 41-42. 33

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 34, Naval Opns in

the Western New Guinea Area, 1943-45, pp. 1-10,

copy in OCMH files.

34

 Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 16-18, 36; 4th

Air Army Opns Order A-250, 22 Mar 44, as translated in GHQ SWPA, ATIS Enemy Publication

268, 4 Jan 45, copy in OCMH files; Interrog of

Col Kaneko, 21 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations

of Japanese Officials, II, 404-08. 35

 Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 90-96.

THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 97

gave some thought to sending elements of

the 36th Division east from Sarmi to Hollandia. This plan was abandoned, however,

for at the time Hollandia was still within

the 8th Area Army's zone of responsibility.36

The 18th Army (if not the 8th Area

Army) attached some importance to Hollandia. In January 1944 General Adachi

stated that Hollandia was to be ". . . the

final base and last strategic point of [the

18th Army's] New Guinea operation."

 37

He outlined a plan for withdrawal to Hollandia should 18th Army operations in eastern New Guinea result in defeat, and he

ordered the forces at Hollandia to exert

themselves to develop the defenses of that

base. General Adachi complained that the

troops at Hollandia, being out of the active

combat zone, were leading a life of ease, and

he hinted that all was not well with the

command structure at the base. In an address to the Hollandia garrison, delivered

by proxy during January, the general exhorted forces there to expend ". . . all your

effort and be determined to sacrifice everything for the glorious cause."

 38

 But exhortations were hardly sufficient—some definite

plan of action for the development and

defense of Hollandia was needed.

The 2d Area Army supplied the outline

of such a plan when it assumed control of

the 18th Army in March. General Adachi

was instructed to hold firmly at Wewak,

Aitape, and Hollandia; to institute a delaying action westward from Madang and

Wewak; to use and co-operate with the 4th

Air Army during this withdrawal; and

gradually to consolidate the bulk of the 18th

Army at Hollandia. General Adachi was to

start withdrawing all his forces west from

Madang and Hansa Bay beyond the Sepik

River immediately, and these forces were

to be concentrated at Wewak as quickly as

possible. Finally, a cadre of one division was

immediately to be sent to Hollandia.39

General Adachi received his new orders

on 25 March, but his reaction was not

exactly that probably expected by the 2d

Area Army. The 8th Area Army had

planned to continue operations east of Wewak, to make Madang the front line, and to

build up strength to counterattack Allied

forces.40 Possibly General Adachi, upon his

transfer to the 2d Area Army, may have had

some mistaken loyalty to his former commander and a feeling that the 8th Area

Army plan was the better, although he finally recognized that the latter plan would

be practically impossible of execution. At

any rate, General Adachi's interpretation of

the 2d Area Army's definitively worded

order was rather strange. He ordered the

41st Division to hold the Madang area by

rear guard action until the end of April, but

at the same time the bulk of the division was

to be sent westward 100 miles along the coast

to Hansa Bay. The 20th Division was to

move initially to Hansa Bay. Upon its relief

there by the 41st Division, the 20th was to

proceed to But, some thirty-five miles west of

Wewak, and, ultimately, to Aitape. The 51st

Division was ordered to move from Hansa

Bay to Wewak and, beginning in late July or

early August, was to push on toward Hollandia. Instead of sending one division to

Hollandia immediately and getting the rest

of the 18th Army started on its way to that

area as ordered by the 2d Area Army, Gen36

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 22-23, 26-27. 3718th Army Opn Order, no number, 22 Jan 44,

as translated in ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 39, 3

May 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. 38

 Ibid.; 18th Army Opns, II, 141-46.

39

 2d Area Army Opn Order No. A-46, 20 Mar

44, as translated in ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 48,

5 Jul 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; 18th Army Opns,

III, 17-20; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 30-46. 40

 18th Army Opns, III, 4-8.
98 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

eral Adachi decided to concentrate all his

forces at Wewak. One concession to the letter and spirit of the 2d Area Army's order

was made: ". . . and, if conditions permit,

strengthen the Hollandia sector also."

 41

The Japanese apparently expected the

Allies to launch a large-scale amphibious

attack along the north coast of Australian

New Guinea about the end of April. However, the enemy placed Hansa Bay and

Wewak, in that order, ahead of Hollandia

as probable targets for the expected assault.

General Adachi apparently believed that the

Allies were going to move on Hansa Bay

and therefore evidently considered that he

had ample time in which to reinforce Hollandia (although he did betray some slight

concern about the Aitape area) but little

time to strengthen Hansa Bay. His propensity for devoting most of his attention

to Hansa Bay may also have resulted from

some wishful thinking. While he had no

great fear of Allied forces then patrolling

in the area south and east of Madang, he

did have some trouble disengaging his units

from that region. Moreover, the 18th Army

had considerable difficulty crossing the

broad swamps and wide washes at the mouth

of the Sepik River, between Hansa Bay and

Wewak. It would have been much simpler

to hold at Hansa Bay.42

The 2d Area Army was not satisfied with

the progress of the 18th Army's westward

movement. Therefore, on 12 April, General

Anami sent his chief of staff, Lt. Gen.

Takazo Numata, to Wewak. Perhaps coincidentally with General Numata's arrival

at Wewak, the 80th Infantry of the 20th

Division was ordered to prepare for movement to Aitape. The displacement of the

80th Infantry apparently started soon thereafter, but few men of that regiment had

reached Aitape by 22 April. General Numata flew back to his headquarters on 13

April, after he had instructed General

Adachi to start troops moving to Hollandia

as well as Aitape. On 18 April the 66th Infantry of the 51st Division was ordered to

strike out from Wewak for Hollandia, where

the regiment was expected to arrive about

mid-June. The 66th Infantry had not

started its movement when for obvious reasons General Adachi, on 22 April, revoked

the regiment's marching orders.43

There is no evidence that the Japanese

had any prepared defense plans for Hollandia. It could hardly have been otherwise.

If General Adachi had entertained misgivings about the command situation at Hollandia in January, by 22 April he may well

have been experiencing sleepless nights over

it. The Headquarters, 4th Air Army, previously senior headquarters at Hollandia, had

left that base for Manado on 15 April. The

Commanding General, 6th Air Division,

had arrived at Hollandia from Wewak during late March, but he and other members

of that unhappy air unit's staff had been relieved in disgrace after the loss of his planes.

His place was taken by Maj. Gen. Masazumi Inada, who had been sent to Hollandia

from his western New Guinea logistic support command, the 2d Field Base Unit, by

the 2d Area Army in mid-April. Admiral

Endo, 9th Fleet, commander and senior

naval officer at Hollandia, had arrived from

41

 18th Army Opns, III, pp. 4-8, 9-11; 18th

Army Opn Order, no number, 25 Mar 44, as translated in ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May

44, copy in G-2 DofA files. The quotation is from

the 18th Army's translated order. 42

 18th Army Opns, III, 17-28, 39-40.

43

 18th Army Opns, III, 17-20, 28-32, 40-41;

Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 45-46; 20th Div Opn

Order, no number, 12 Apr 44, as translated in

ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 49, 12 Jul 44, copy in

G-2 DofA files; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 38, 26

Apr 44, copy in G-2 DofA files.
THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 99

Wewak only late in March. Finally, the senior officer of all services at Hollandia was

Maj. Gen. Toyozo Kitazono, who had

reached Hollandia from Wewak (where he

had commanded the 3d Field Transportation Unit) only ten days before the Allied

landings. General Kitazono had no time to

develop a comprehensive defense plan for

Hollandia, let alone co-ordinate such a plan

with General Inada and Admiral Endo.44

In fact, there can be some doubt that General Kitazono was in a hurry about developing the needed defenses. He had served long

and well with the 18th Army and probably

brought with him to Hollandia at least some

of General Adachi's belief that either Hansa

Bay or Wewak would be the site of the next

major Allied invasion.

Japanese Reactions to Hollandia

What happened to General Kitazono is

uncertain, but somehow he escaped the

Hollandia area to survive the war. Whatever was General Kitazono's situation, the

2d Area Army, on 22 April, ordered General

Inada of the 6th Air Division to assume

command at Hollandia. At 0930 that morning General Inada issued a grandiose plan

of resistance. Japanese troops in the area

were ordered to take up positions near the

town of Hollandia and also to ". . . destroy

the enemy expected from Tanahmerah

Bay." Most of the troops that he was able

to organize General Inada finally concentrated near Sabron on the Dépapré-Lake

Sentani road. There the 24th Infantry Division, advancing inland from Tanahmerah

Bay, found the only significant organized

resistance encountered during the Hollandia

operation.

But, despite General Inada's best efforts

to bring order out of the chaos created by the

surprise invasion, most of the Japanese

troops in the Hollandia area fled ignominiously into the hills as the first shots were fired

from Allied naval guns. Late in the afternoon of 22 April, General Inada, apparently

a realist, practically gave up the fight. Faced

with the rapid disintegration of his organizations, at least 90 percent of which were

service units, he issued a new order which

expressed a defeatist sentiment usually foreign to Japaneses thought: "The division

[6th Air Division] will be on guard against

enemy landings and will attempt to withdraw at night."

 45

West of Hollandia the 2d Area Army attempted to take action to counter the Allied

invasion. General Anami, feeling that Hollandia was too important a base to be meekly

abandoned, wanted to dispatch eastward

and overland the bulk of the 36th Division

from the Wakde-Sarmi area. Acting on

instructions from the 2d Area Army, the

2d Army ordered two battalions of the

224th Infantry and a battalion of the

36th Division's field artillery to start toward

Hollandia on 24 April. It was expected that

the rest of the division could start moving

eastward from Sarmi about 10 May.

The Southern Army, however, would not

permit the Sarmi area to be denuded of

troops and on 25 April vetoed the plan to

send 36th Division units eastward. General

Anami stubbornly argued the necessity for

the recapture of Hollandia and further

recommended that a large-scale amphibious

operation for its reoccupation be mounted

in western New Guinea in mid-June. The

44

 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46, 48-54; Hist of

2d Area Army, pp. 30-44, 48-51.

45

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 48-51; 18th Army

Opns, III, 48-54; 6th Air Div Opn Orders 45 and

46, 22 Apr 44, as translated in 24th Div Opns Rpt

Hollandia, pp. 146-47. The quotations are from the
100 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Southern Army was adamant and took pains

to point out to General Anami that it would

be impossible, because of lack of shipping

and air support, to stage a large amphibious

task force within the foreseeable future.

Finally, on 30 April, the Southern Army

canceled further preparations for a push to

Hollandia by the 36th Division.

The best General Anami was able to

obtain from his discussions with the Southern Army (and representatives had been

flown to the senior headquarters to plead the

2d Area Army's case) was tacit approval to

continue the movement toward Hollandia

of such 36th Division elements as had already been dispatched eastward from

Sarmi. These units, both infantry and artillery, had been placed under the control of

Col. Soemon Matsuyama, commander of

the 224th Infantry, and had been designated the Matsuyama Force. The last elements of the Matsuyama Force cleared the

Sarmi area on 4 May. The point of the column had advanced to Armopa, about half

way between Sarmi and Hollandia, when,

on 17 May, the Allies made a new landing

near Sarmi. The 36th Division immediately

ordered the Matsuyama Force to retrace its

steps. Thus ended Japanese efforts to recapture Hollandia from the west.46

Except for the one lucky bomb hit on supplies at Humboldt Bay, Japanese air reaction to the seizure of Hollandia was practically nonexistent, although on 22 April the

4th Air Army was ordered to concentrate

all its aircraft on western New Guinea fields

to prepare for strong attacks against the

Allied shipping and ground forces at Hollandia. The project was unsuccessful. The

4th Air Army did not have the necessary

planes to stage major attacks; Allied naval

aircraft intercepted most of the planes the

Japanese were able to send toward Hollandia; Allied air action prevented the Japanese from keeping their western New Guinea

fields operational; and by the time the

American carriers had to leave the area,

land-based air support was available to the

Allies either at or within range of Hollandia.

Japanese naval reaction by air, sea, or

subsurface means was equally insignificant.

On 21 April, having learned of the departure of a large Allied convoy from the Admiralties, the Combined Fleet issued orders

to the Central Pacific Fleet to attack the

convoy with all available submarines. But

difficulties arose in getting the submarines

assembled for a concerted attack and, except for a few sightings off Hollandia, the

subsurface vessels stayed away from the

area. The Combined Fleet was itself preparing for a naval showdown in the Pacific,

but this battle was not scheduled until midsummer. The Hollandia operation caught

the Combined Fleet by surprise and completely unprepared for battle. The Japanese

Navy quickly decided that it was powerless

to undertake any action against Allied forces

at Hollandia.47

Japanese Withdrawal from Hollandia

At Hollandia, General Inada decided to

assemble his forces at Genjem, a village

about fifteen miles west of Lake Sentani.

Near Genjem, situated on the main eastwest inland trail of the Hollandia area, the

46

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 51-53; Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 61-64; 224th Inf Opn Orders,

no numbers, 24 Apr and 17 May 44, as translated in

ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 48, 5 Jul 44, copy in

G-2 DofA files; Kawakami Comments. More material on Matsuyama Force operations is set forth below in the chapters concerning action in the WakdeSarmi area.

47

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 48-51; Naval Opns

in Western New Guinea Area, pp. 4-7; Kawakami

Comments.
THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 101

Japanese had started some agricultural projects. By reason of its location and agriculture

the Genjem area was the logical place for

gathering forces that were retreating before

the Allied advance. Most of the Japanese

supplies at Hollandia had been stored

around the shores of Humboldt Bay. With

these lost, the Japanese could muster less

than a week's supply of rations from inland

stockpiles, but they might augment these

rations from the projects at Genjem. The

next phase of General Inada's withdrawal

plan was an overland trek of 125 miles to the

Wakde-Sarmi area. From Genjem one trail

led west toward Sarmi, and another trail

ran north 16 miles to Demta, a bay village

located on the east-west coastal trail.

By 30 April some 7,000 Japanese troops

had assembled in the vicinity of Genjem.

Here they were reorganized, without maps

and already short of rations and medical

supplies, into nine or ten echelons for the

long march westward through inhospitable

country. The first echelon, consisting of

stranded pilots and ground crews as well as

the headquarters of the defunct 6th Air Division, left the Genjem area by 9 May.48

The Japanese troops who struck out from

Genjem after 1 May either had to push

overland through mainly untracked wilderness (the inland trail lost its identity not far

west of Genjem and deteriorated into many

unmapped and dead-end jungle tracks) or

risk encounter with a series of Allied outposts. Companies I and K of the 19th Infantry, 24th Division, had set up road blocks

at Genjem and Demta during the first week

of May. Company K sent numerous patrols

over all trails in the vicinity of Genjem and

combed neighboring native hamlets for

Japanese stragglers. Company I patrolled

south from Demta and along coastal trails

leading both east and west of that village.

By 6 June the two companies had killed 405

Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the

Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease

along the trails in the same area.49

The hardships suffered by those Japanese

killed in the Genjem—Demta sector were

probably fewer than those of the troops who

sought to make the trek to Sarmi. Remnants

of the first group, which had left Genjem

on 26 April, approached Sarmi just in time

for the Allied invasion of that area on 17

May; the rest had to attempt to bypass

Sarmi too. For the most part, the Japanese

retreating through Genjem toward Sarmi

died slowly from starvation, wounds, and

disease. Of those who left the Hollandia area

via Genjem, the Japanese themselves estimated that only 7 percent survived to reach

the Sarmi area.50

Excluding prisoners, there could have

been very few survivors of the Japanese

Hollandia garrison. The following appear

to be reasonable figures concerning operations at Hollandia from 22 April to 6 June

1944:

48

 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46; Hist of 2d Area

Army, pp. 51-53.

49

 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 98-110. 50

 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46, 48-54. General

Inada survived the trek to Sarmi and before the

end of the war held important posts in the Philippines and the home islands. Admiral Endo was

killed in the Hollandia area on or about 3 May.
102 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Allowing for errors in the first two figures

but also taking into account the number of

Japanese killed or captured in the Hollandia

area after 6 June and those of the Hollandia

garrison later killed or captured during operations farther west, the losses of the original

Japanese garrison at Hollandia remain at a

staggering figure. Assuming that the Japanese estimate of 93 percent casualties for the

troops who attempted the march to Sarmi

is reasonably accurate, then it appears that,

including prisoners, less than 1,000 of the

approximately 11,000 Japanese who were

stationed at Hollandia on 22 April 1944

could have survived the war.51

51

 As of 27 September 1944, the last date for

which comprehensive figures are available, ALAMO

Force estimated that 4,478 Japanese had been killed

or found dead in the Hollandia area. This is an increase of only 1,146 over the 6 June figure, a fact

which lends credence to the Japanese estimate that

some 7,000 troops tried the march to Sarmi. Of this

number, not more than 500 could have reached the

Sarmi area, indicating that 6,000, more or less, must

have died from starvation or disease during the trek

westward. As of 27 September, ALAMO Force accounted for 656 Japanese prisoners and 13 Formosan

prisoners from the Hollandia garrison. These 27

September figures are from ALAMO Force G-2 Wkly

Rpt 60, 27 Sep 44, copy in G-2 DofA files.
CHAPTER V

Prelude to the Battle

of the Driniumor

While operations at Hollandia were rapidly drawing to a successful conclusion,

another action was just beginning at Aitape,

125 miles to the southeast. The PERSECUTION Task Force, with the 163d Regimental

Combat Team of the 41st Infantry Division

as its combat nucleus, landed near Aitape

on 22 April, D Day for Hollandia as well.

The principal objective of General Doe's

PERSECUTION Task Force was the seizure

and rehabilitation of the Japanese-constructed Tadji airstrips, eight miles eastsoutheast of Aitape. These fields were to

provide bases from which Allied aircraft

could support ground operations at Hollandia after the Fifth Fleet's carriers left the

latter area. General Doe's command was

also to provide ground flank protection for

Hollandia by preventing westward advance

of the Japanese 18th Army, assembling some

ninety miles southeast of Aitape at Wewak.1

(Map 3)

Securing the Airfield Area

The Tactical Plan

Knowledge of beach conditions in the

Aitape area was obtained principally from

aerial photographs, and the PERSECUTION

Task Force landing beach was chosen with

reference to beach exits and shore objectives

as they appeared on these pictures. The

shore line opposite the Tadji airfields, which

lay only 1,000 yards inland, was uniform

and sandy for long distances. There were

clear approaches to the beach, which had

a medium rise. The selected landing point

was located at Korako, a native village on

the coast at the northeast corner of the airfield area. From this point, which was designated Blue Beach, a track passable for

wheeled vehicles ran directly inland to the

Tadji strips.2

The PERSECUTION Task Force was to begin landing at 0645, high tide time in the

Aitape area. In charge of the amphibious

phases of the operation was Capt. Albert G.

Noble (USN), whose command, the Eastern Attack Group (Task Group 77.3), was

part of Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77.

Close air support operations at Aitape were

primarily the responsibility of planes aboard

eight CVE's and were similar to the air support activities carried out by Task Force 58

at Hollandia. Initially, last-minute beach

strafing at Blue Beach was planned to con1

 The decision to seize Aitape and the organization of the PERSECUTION Task Force are described

in Chapter II, above.

2

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt

Bay-Aitape, p. 29; CTG 77.3 [Eastern Attack

Group] Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-2.
104 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tinue until the leading wave of landing craft

was within 300 yards of the shore. But General Doe believed that such close-in strafing

would endanger the troops aboard the landing craft. It was therefore decided that

strafing would begin when the leading boat

wave was 4,500 yards from shore (expected

to be at H minus 15 minutes) and would

end when that wave approached to within

1,200 yards of the shore, timed for about

H minus 4 minutes.3

The Allied Air Forces also had important

air support missions at Aitape. A squadron

of attack bombers (A-20's or B-25's) was

to be in the air over the landing area from

0830 to 1030 on D Day. After 1030, if no

earlier calls for bombardment had been

made, these planes were to drop their bombs

on targets on both flanks of Blue Beach.

Two squadrons of attack bombers were to

be maintained on daily alert at a field in

eastern New Guinea for as long as the situation at Aitape required, and additional air

support at Aitape would be provided upon

request from ALAMO Force.4

Naval fire support for the landings on

Blue Beach was to be executed by 5 destroyers, 9 APD's, and 1 AK. This was the

first time that APD's or AK's had been assigned fire support missions in the Southwest Pacific. Targets for the destroyers were

similar to those assigned naval fire support

vessels at Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays.

Six APD's were to fire on St. Anna and

Tadji Plantation (west of the airstrips), on

enemy defensive installations at or near

Aitape town, and on the offshore islands—

Tumleo, Ali, and Seleo. The AK was to

aim its 5-inch fire at Tumleo and Ali Is3

 CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44, and Change

1, 10 Apr 44, thereto, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

4-5 Apr 44; CTF 78 Opn Plan D2-44, 12 Apr 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Apr 44. The CVE's operated

as TF 78, which was under the command of Admiral

Davison. Although Admiral Davison was the senior

officer present, Captain Noble retained command in

the area during the amphibious phases. This was

accomplished by personal agreement between the

two officers. Tel conv, author with Vice Adm Albert G. Noble, 3 Jan 51.

4

 AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44.
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 105

lands. Close-in support was to be provided

for the leading landing waves from 0642 to

0645 by rocket and automatic weapons fire

from two submarine chasers. All destroyers,

submarine chasers, and the AK were to deliver fire upon call from forces ashore after

H Hour.5

At 0645 the 2d and 3d Battalions, 163d

Infantry, were to land abreast on Blue

Beach. As soon as a beachhead had been

secured the 1st Battalion was to land and,

aided by the 2d, was to initiate a drive

toward the Tadji strips. After the airfields

had been captured, the 2d Battalion was to

defend the task force's western flank, the

1st was to establish defenses along the southern edge of the airfield area, and the 3d was

to defend the eastern flank. On D plus 1 the

127th Regimental Combat Team, 32d Division, was to reach Blue Beach. Then patrols

west and east of the beachhead were to begin

seeking out Japanese forces, and, as soon as

possible, Aitape town was to be captured.

Field and antiaircraft artillery going

ashore on D Day were to protect and support the infantry's operations and the engineers who were to start work on the airfields

immediately after they were secured. Engineers and other service troops not assigned

to airfield construction tasks were to unload

ships, improve roads and tracks, build or

repair bridges over streams in the beachhead

area, and find and clear dump and bivouac

sites.6

The Capture of the Airfields

At 0500 on 22 April, after an uneventful

trip from the Admiralties, the Eastern Attack Group convoy arrived in the transport

area off Blue Beach.7 The assault troops of

the 163d Infantry, Col. Francis W. Mason

commanding, immediately began debarking

into LCPR's from the APD's which had

brought them to Aitape. Naval gunfire and

aerial support was carried out almost exactly

as planned, and the first wave of LCPR's

hit the shore on schedule at 0645. It would

have been a model landing except for one

thing—it didn't take place on Blue Beach.

D Day had dawned dull and overcast,

making for poor visibility in the landing

area. Heavy smoke from fires set in Japanese

supply dumps by preassault bombardments

further obscured the coast line. With no

landmarks to guide them, the coxswains of

the leading boat wave missed Blue Beach

and the landing took place at Wapil, a small

coastal village about 1,200 yards east of

Korako. The accident proved a happy one,

for it was soon discovered that the Wapil

area was much better suited to beaching

LST's and large landing craft than any

other in the Aitape region.

For the assault troops the change in

beaches created little difficulty, since the

Wapil area had been adequately covered by

support fires and there was no opposition

from the Japanese. Tactical surprise was as

complete as that achieved the same day by

the RECKLESS Task Force at Hollandia.

Leaving breakfasts cooking and bunks unmade, the Japanese at Aitape had fled in

panic when the naval support fire began.

The 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, had

landed on the right, or west. The unit immediately swung west along the beach to

5

 CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44; CTG 77.3

Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 2-3. 6

 PTF FO 1, 6 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 5-6 Apr 44.

7

 Information in this subsection is based on: CTG

77.3 Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 4-5; CTF 77 Opns Rpt

Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 31;

163d Inf Jnl, Aitape; 163d Inf Opns Rpt Aitape,

p. 2; PTF G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; PTF Opns

Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, pp. 2-3; Ltr, Gen

Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, no sub, in OCMH files.
MAP 3

AITAPE LANDINGS, 22 April 1944

108 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

find Korako and the trail leading inland to

the Tadji strips. This task was accomplished

by 0800 and the two battalions quickly expanded the beachhead to a depth of 500

yards and westward about 2,500 yards from

Wapil to Waitanan Creek. This area, occupied by 1000, marked the limits of the task

force's first phase line. So far, opposition

had consisted of only a few rifle shots. Three

Japanese prisoners had been captured and

over fifty Javanese laborers had willingly

given themselves up. The two assault units

now waited for the landing of the 1st Battalion and for an order from General Doe

to move on the Tadji strips.

The 1st Battalion was assembled ashore

by 1030 and, passing through the 3d, started

moving inland toward Tadji Bomber Strip

at 1100. Simultaneously, the 2d Battalion

began advancing on Tadji Fighter Strip,

north of the bomber field. The 3d Battalion

remained at the beach area.

The advance inland was slow and cautious but by 1245 the 2d Battalion had

cleared its objective and the 1st soon secured

Tadji Bomber Strip against no opposition.

The 2d Battalion then moved across Waitanan Creek to Pro and Pro Mission, which

were found clear of Japanese. The battalion

command post was set up at Pro before dark,

while the rest of the unit bivouacked along

trails leading inland to the fighter strip. The

1st Battalion settled down for the night at

the west end of the bomber field. During the

afternoon the 3d Battalion sent patrols east

from Wapil to the coastal villages of Nor,

Rilia, and Lemieng, noting no enemy activity. Three miles east of Wapil, at the mouth

of the Nigia River, an outpost was set up.

The bulk of the battalion bivouacked along

the eastern edges of the two captured strips.

By dark on D Day the principal objectives of the PERSECUTION Task Force had

been secured. Work could be started on the

airfields, needed to insure land-based air

support for both the Aitape and Hollandia

beachheads. The strips had been secured at

an amazingly low cost—two men of the

163d Infantry had been killed and thirteen

wounded.

Airfield Construction and

Supporting Arms

No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian

Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach

during the morning and had been able to

start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1300.

Repairs continued throughout the night

under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although

it had been hoped that the strip would be

ready for use on D plus 1, terrain conditions

were such that necessary repairs were not

completed on schedule. Thus it was 0900 on

24 April before the Australian engineers,

who had worked without break for almost

forty-eight hours, could announce that the

airstrip was ready. At 1630 twenty-five

P-40's of No. 78 Wing, Royal Australian

Air Force, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day.8

The ground on which the fighter strip

was located was so poorly drained that it

was not until 28 April, after steel matting

had been placed on the field, that it could

be used continuously.9 The works wing then

8

 Ltr, F/Lt Arthur L. Davies [RAAF], Officer-inCharge, War Hist Sec., Hq RAAF, to author, 8 Mar

48, in OCMH files. 9

 PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, p. 5;

PTF Engr Rpt, Pt. IV, p. 2, copy in files of OCE

GHQ AFPAC. The strip was 4,000 by 100 feet. It

was used until 12 July, when it was declared unserviceable and converted to an emergency field.

Proper drainage could not be obtained at the site,

but the strip had well served its intended purpose—

quick provision of land-based air support for Hollandia and Aitape.
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 109

TROOPS UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT AITAPE. In the background are the

two AK's.

moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the

872d and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the

operational control of Wing Commander

William A. C. Dale (RAAF), who, besides

commanding the works wing, was PERSECUTION Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and

that field was not ready for use by fighter

and transport planes until 27 May and for

bombers until early July.10

Other engineer units ashore on D Day

directed their energies to ship unloading,

road and bridge construction, and dump

and bivouac clearance. By 1930 the 593d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (the

Shore Party) and the Naval Beach Party

had unloaded all D-Day LST's. The next

day one AKA and seven more LST's were

discharged. Unloading of the two AK's did

not proceed as rapidly as expected, for

neither ship had been properly combat

loaded. The AK which arrived on D Day

was only 65 percent discharged when, during the night of 27-28 April, it was hit by

a bomb dropped from a lone Japanese plane

flying in from an unknown base in western

New Guinea. The other AK, undamaged,

towed the first back to Finschhafen, returning then to Blue Beach to complete its own

unloading. No other untoward incident

10

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, p.

50; PTF Engr Rpt, Pt. VI, pp. 2-3; Ltr, F/Lt

Davies to author, 8 Mar 48.
110 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

marred the debarkation of troops and

supplies.11

American engineers constructed roads

inland from Blue Beach to the airstrips and

improved the coastal roads. Light Japanese

culverts and bridges in the area had collapsed under the weight of American and

Australian heavy equipment or had been

damaged by preassault bombardment, making repairs a pressing problem. Australian

engineers bridged Waitanan Creek while

American engineers threw a bridge across

the Nigia River, on the east flank. Pending

completion of other bridges, American engineers maintained ferry services across the

main streams. On 2 May heavy rains flooded

all streams in the area, wiping out much

bridge construction already accomplished,

damaging ferry stages, and making necessary extensive repairs or new construction.

Continued rain during May made road

maintenance so difficult that engineers

working on airstrips or bridges had to devote

much time to the roads.12

Artillery moved ashore on D Day without difficulty. The 167th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 163d Infantry, was in

position and registered on check points by

H plus 4 hours but fired no support mission

while in the Aitape area. On D plus 1 the

190th Field Artillery Group assumed command of all field artillery, and on the same

day the 126th Field Artillery Battalion of

the 32d Division arrived. Antiairciaft artillery came ashore rapidly on D Day and set

up positions along Blue Beach and around

Tadji Fighter Strip.13

Securing the Flanks

While engineers continued work through

the night of 22-23 April, other elements of

the task force made preparations to expand

the perimeter.14 (Map III) About 0800 on

the 23d, the 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry,

started westward over inland trails to the

Raihu River, six miles beyond Blue Beach.

A tank of the 603d Tank Company, which

was supporting the advance, broke through

a Japanese bridge over Waitanan Creek, but

the infantry continued westward and within

an hour had secured incomplete Tadji West

Strip. The 2d Battalion pushed west along

the coastal track and by noon reached the

mouth of the Raihu. Both battalions bivouacked for the night on the east bank, the 1st

at a point about 4,000 yards upstream. During the day the 3d Battalion (which had

been relieved on the east flank and at Blue

Beach by elements of the 127th Infantry)

moved forward with regimental headquarters to Tadji Plantation, 1,200 yards east

of the Raihu and about 2,000 yards inland.

So light had Japanese opposition been that

the 163d Infantry had suffered but two casualties—one man wounded and another

missing.

The next day the 1st and 2d Battalions

resumed the advance at 0730. The 1st

crossed the Raihu and pushed northwest

over ill-defined tracks to establish contact,

11

 CTG 77.3 Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 7; PTF Opns

Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, p. 3. The loss of the

AK Etamin was grim justification of Admiral Barbey's reluctance to send AK's forward in early convoys to a combat area. See Ch. II, above. According

to Admiral Noble, the loss of the Etamin was ". . .

very keenly felt for several months to come." Ltr,

Rear Adm Noble to Gen Ward, 18 Dec 50, in

OCMH files. 12

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, p.

50; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, pp.

2-6; PTF Engr Rpt, Pt. IV, pp. 2-3.

13

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; 167th FA

Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 3-6. 14

 Information on west flank operations is from:

163d Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 2-3; PTF Opns Rpt

Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, pp. 3-6; 163d Inf Jnl

Aitape; PTF G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44.
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 111

about 0930, with the 2d Battalion at the

mouth of a small creek 1,800 yards west of

the Raihu. Colonel Mason now halted the

1st Battalion and ordered it to patrol the

trails radiating south and west from its new

position. The 2d Battalion moved on along

the coast to Aitape, securing that town and

the near-by dominating height at Rohm

Point by 1100. The unit had met no Japanese and was preparing to push on when,

early in the afternoon, Colonel Mason ordered it to stop. The 3d Battalion was ready

to pass through the 1st and move forward

over inland trails, but the regimental commander suddenly ordered both it and the

1st to retire to the east bank of the Raihu

for the night. It is not clear why this withdrawal was ordered. Japanese opposition

had been almost nonexistent and the 163d

Infantry had lost only one man killed during the day.

General Doe was by now dissatisfied with

the pace of the westward advance, and he

therefore suggested to ALAMO Force that

the 163d's commander be relieved. This

step was approved by General Krueger,

although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May,

only two days before the 163d Infantry began loading for another operation.15

For the next few days there were no major

changes in the dispositions of the 163d Infantry as patrolling inland and along the

coast west of Aitape continued. Patrol bases

were set up at inland and coastal villages

to hunt down Japanese attempting to escape

westward from the Aitape area. At the

Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the

Raihu, elements of the 3d Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to

4 May. At one of these villages—Kamti—

outpost troops of the 3d Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who

made a number of harassing attacks on 28

and 29 April. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while

it was estimated that the Japanese lost about

90 killed. On 30 April the men at Kamti

withdrew while Battery A, 126th Field

Artillery Battalion, fired 240 rounds of 105-

mm. ammunition into the village and its

environs. The next morning Company L,

163d Infantry, moved back to Kamti against

no opposition. There were few further contacts with the Japanese on the west flank

and all outposts of the 163d Infantry were

relieved by 32d Division troops early in

May.

The 127th Regimental Combat Team

(less the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, and

Companies F and G of the same regiment)

had unloaded at Blue Beach on 23 April.16

About 0700 the same morning, after an air

and naval bombardment, Companies F and

G landed on Tumleo and Seleo Islands off

Blue Beach, securing them against minor

opposition by 1400. On 25 April Company

G occupied the third large offshore island,

Ali, without difficulty. The 1st Battalion,

127th Infantry, arrived at Blue Beach on

26 April and established its headquarters

near Korako. The 2d Battalion relieved the

3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, on the east

flank, and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry,

established a defense line along the southern

and eastern edges of Tadji Bomber and

Fighter Strips. 15

 The circumstances surrounding this relief are

found in: Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-72, 24 Apr 44,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44; Rad,

ALAMO to RTF [I Corps], WF-4652, 29 Apr 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 29-30 Apr 44; Ltr, Gen

Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, in OCMH files.

16

 Information on 127th Infantry activities is

based on: 127th Inf Jnl, 23 Apr-4 May 44; PTF

G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape,

22 Apr-4 May 44, pp. 3-6.
112 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Patrols of the 2d Battalion moved east

along the coastal track to the mouth of the

Driniumor, about twelve miles beyond

Blue Beach; up the banks of the Nigia River

five miles to Chinapelli; and up the west

bank of the Driniumor about six miles to

Afua. From Afua a trail was found running

westward through dense jungle to Chinapelli by way of a village called Palauru.

From Chinapelli one track ran north to the

mouth of the Nigia and others wandered

off in a westerly direction toward the

Kapoam villages. From the Driniumor two

main trails were found leading eastward—

one the principal coastal track to Wewak

and the other a rough inland trace originating at Afua.

The latter trail paralleled the coast line

and ran along the foothills of the Torricelli

Mountains. North of the trail was a flat

coastal plain, generally forested with dense

jungle growth and containing numerous

swampy areas and a multitude of small and

large streams. The plain narrowed gradually

from a depth of about ten miles at the Nigia

River to less than a mile at the Danmap

River, flowing into the Pacific about fortyfive miles east-southeast of Aitape. Beyond

the Danmap, toward Wewak, was more

rolling terrain where hills descended from

the Torricelli Mountains down to the sea.

The trail east from Afua crossed the many

streams between the Driniumor and the

Danmap at points three to five miles south

of the coast.

It was essential to the security of the

newly won Tadji strips that any Japanese

movements westward from Wewak along

both inland and coastal trails be discovered

and watched. Therefore, it was decided to

send Company C, 127th Infantry, reinforced by part of Company D, by boat to

Nyaparake, a coastal village about seventeen

miles east of the Nigia River. There the reinforced company, known as the Nyaparake

Force, was to set up a patrol base and report and delay Japanese movements in the

vicinity.

On 28 April the unit boarded small boats

at Blue Beach and sailed eastward along the

coast, missing its objective and landing near

the mouth of the Dandriwad River, about

eight miles east of Nyaparake. This error

was quickly discovered but the force remained at its position for three days, sending

out patrols in all directions. Few signs of

enemy activity were observed, and the five

Japanese killed in the area appeared to be

stragglers rather than representatives of any

organized unit of the 18th Army. On 1 May

the unit moved by water back to Nyaparake.

Outposts were established about four miles

inland at Charov and Jalup, where the

principal inland trail crossed the Drindaria

River, and patrols were sent to the east and

west over the inland trail and in both directions along the coastal track. The Nyaparake

Force noticed no signs of organized enemy

activity in the areas patrolled during the

next few days.

Meanwhile, patrols of the 2d Battalion

had moved along the coast from the Driniumor River to Yakamul, four miles west of

Nyaparake. Elements of the 1st Battalion

maintained a patrol base at Afua for four

days, and 3d Battalion patrols scouted trails

from Chinapelli to the Tadji strips and the

Kapoam villages. No signs of organized enemy movements were discovered, and only

weary Japanese stragglers attempting to

make their way inland and westward were

encountered. This complete lack of organized Japanese operations in the area patrolled by the 127th Infantry to 4 May,

together with the surprisingly easy seizure of

the Tadji strips by the 163d Infantry, con-
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 113

tradicted preassault estimates of the enemy

situation in the Aitape area.

The Enemy Situation to 4 May

Prior to 22 April the Allies had estimated

that 3,500 Japanese, including 1,500 combat troops of the 20th Division, were based

at Aitape. The indications are that not more

than 1,000 Japanese of all arms and services

were actually in the Aitape area on D Day.17

These troops comprised mostly antiaircraft

artillerymen and service personnel who fled

inland when Allied landing operations began. No organized resistance was encountered except for the skirmishes at Kamti,

and the only evidence of centralized command in the area was a captured report,

dated 25 April, from the Commander,

Aitape Garrison Unit, to the 18th Army.

The document told of the Allied landings,

described operations to 25 April, set the

strength of the Aitape Garrison Unit at 240

troops, and outlined a grandiose plan of

attack, which probably culminated in the

action around Kamti. Unknown to the Allies, there had been a small scouting party of

the 20th Division at Aitape on D Day, but

after the landings this group withdrew eastward to rejoin the main body of the 18th

Army. Other Japanese survivors in the

Aitape area tried to make their way westward to Vanimo, a minor enemy barge

hideout on the coast between Aitape and

Hollandia.18

Between 22 April and 4 May, Japanese

casualties in the Aitape area were estimated

at 525 killed, and during the same period

25 of the enemy were captured. Allied losses

were 19 killed and 40 wounded. All the

Allied casualties were American, and with

but two or three exceptions all were suffered by the 163d Infantry.19

There were a few signs that the 18th

Army might be initiating a movement westward from Wewak toward Aitape, since

interrogations of natives and aerial reconnaissance produced indications of organized

enemy activity far beyond the east flank of

the PERSECUTION Task Force. The Japanese were reported to be bridging the

Anumb River, about fifteen miles east of the

Danmap. Motor vehicles or their tracks were

observed along the beach and on the coastal

trail from Wewak west to the Anumb, and

aerial observers and Allied ground patrols

found that enemy parties were reconnoitering the coastal track from the Danmap River

west to the mouth of the Dandriwad.

Natives reported that organized Japanese

groups were bivouacking at various coastal

villages between the Dandriwad and

Danmap.

Intelligence officers of the PERSECUTION

Task Force and ALAMO Force interpreted

these activities as indicating that an organized westward movement by 18th Army

units was under way. Whether or not this

movement presaged an attack on the PERSECUTION Task Force was not yet clear, but

it seemed certain that Allied troops on the

east flank might soon meet strong Japanese

units.20

17

 Rad ALAMO to GHQ, WF-3714, 22 Apr 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 21-22 Apr 44; GHQ

SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, PERSECUTION, 24

Jan 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26 Jan 44; PTF G-2 Jnl,

22 Apr-4 May 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI's 710-

61, 1 Mar-22 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 1 Mar-22

Apr 44. 18

 PTF G-2 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; Rad, PTF to

ALAMO, AE-220, 29 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 29-30 Apr 44; 18th Army Opns, III, 47,

55-56.

19

 PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, p. 6;

PTF G-1 and G-2 Jnls, 22 Apr-4 May 44. 20

 Rads, PTF to ALAMO, KL-748 and AE-373, 3

May 44, Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-406, 4 May 44,

and Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-617, 4 May

44 all in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4-5 May 44.
114 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Contact with the 18th Army on the East

Flank

While the PERSECUTION Task Force was

accomplishing its primary mission—seizure

and repair of the Tadji strips—final plans

were being made at higher headquarters for

another operation in the Wakde-Sarmi area

of Dutch New Guinea, 250 miles northwest

of Aitape. The 163d Regimental Combat

Team and General Doe with most of his

staff were to participate in the new advance,

which was scheduled for mid-May. General

Krueger therefore directed that the 163d

Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Division be relieved of combat in the Aitape

area and concentrated at Blue Beach by

6 May to begin staging for Wakde-Sarmi.21

Reorganization of the PERSECUTION

Task Force

The 32d Infantry Division, less two regiments, was to move from Saidor in eastern

New Guinea to Aitape to relieve the 163d

Regimental Combat Team. The 127th

Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Division had already arrived at Aitape. Initially, the 128th Infantry was to remain at

Saidor as part of the ALAMO Force Reserve

for Wakde-Sarmi. The remainder of the

32d Division, consisting of the 126th Regimental Combat Team and division troops,

arrived at Blue Beach on 4 May. Maj. Gen.

William H. Gill, the division commander,

immediately assumed command of the PERSECUTION Task Force and two days later his

division staff, after becoming acquainted

with the situation in the Aitape area, began

activity as Headquarters, PERSECUTION

Task Force.22

Just before the Wakde-Sarmi operation

began, it was decided to move the 128th

Infantry from Saidor to Aitape so that the

unit would be closer to its potential objective area in case of need. Noncombat ships

being available, the 128th Infantry (less the

3d Battalion) was shipped to Blue Beach,

where it arrived on 15 May. The rest of the

regiment, together with rear echelons of

other 32d Division units, arrived at Aitape

later in the month. Early in June the 128th

Infantry was released from its ALAMO Force

Reserve role for Wakde-Sarmi and reverted

to the control of the 32d Division and the

PERSECUTION Task Force.23

As soon as General Gill assumed command of the PERSECUTION Task Force, defenses in the Aitape area were reorganized.

The area west of Waitanan Creek, designated the West Sector, was assigned to the

126th Regimental Combat Team. To the

east, the 127th Regimental Combat Team

was to operate in an area named the East

Sector. A series of defensive lines in front

of a main line of resistance around the airstrips covered the approaches to the vital

fields. Positions on the main line of resistance were to be constructed rapidly but

were to be occupied only on orders from

task force headquarters. Beyond the main

line of resistance there were set up a local

security line, an outpost line of resistance,

and an outpost security patrol line. The lat21

 ALAMO Force FO 15, 29 Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 29-30 Apr 44; Rad, PTF to ALAMO,

R-103, 4 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

6-7 May 44.

22

 ALAMO Force FO 15, 29 Apr 44; 32d Div FO 1,

30 Apr 44, and PTF FO 2, 6 May 44, both in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-3 May 44. 23

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-840, 17 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 16-18 May 44; Rad,

ALAMO Adv Hq to PTF, WH-271, 8 Jun 44, in

ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 7-8 Jun 44.

116 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ter, lying about ten miles inland, was to

mark the general limits of patrolling.24

The 126th Infantry completed relief of

the 163d Infantry's outposts and patrol

bases on the west flank by 8 May. Thereafter, outpost troops were rotated from time

to time, and gradually many outposts were

closed out, as Japanese activity on the west

ceased. On 29 May, because Japanese pressure was increasing on the east flank, the 1st

and 2d Battalions, 126th Infantry, were

transferred to the East Sector, and responsibility for patrolling and defending the West

Sector (which had been extended in midMay to the eastern edge of Tadji Fighter

Strip) passed to the 3d Battalion, 126th

Infantry. Patrolling by all elements of the

126th Infantry in the West Sector accounted for a few Japanese killed, found

dead along inland trails, or captured.25

On 10 June boundaries between various

elements of the PERSECUTION Task Force

were again changed and redispositions

were effected. A new defensive area, designated the Center Sector, was established

between the West and East Sectors to cover

the ground between the eastern edge of the

Tadji airstrips to a line running southwestward inland from Pro. The new sector

became the responsibility of the 128th Infantry, while the 126th Infantry retained

control in the West Sector and the 127th

continued operations in the East Sector.

At the same time, the main line of resistance

was drawn in toward the airfields from a

previous eastern extension along the Nigia

River, and the earlier inland defensive lines

were either abolished or withdrawn. Troops

of the West and Center Sectors continued

patrolling in the areas for which they were

responsible. Only a few enemy stragglers

were encountered, and no signs of organized

Japanese activity were discovered in those

sectors.26

East Sector Troops Meet the Enemy

Col. Merle H. Howe, commanding the

127th Infantry, was assigned to the command of the East Sector on 6 May. His missions were to maintain contact with the

enemy on the eastern flank, to discover enemy intentions, and to delay any westward

movement on the part of elements of the

18th Army. He was ordered to maintain

outposts and patrol bases at Anamo and

Nyaparake on the coast and at Chinapelli

and Afua inland. When he took over his

new command, Colonel Howe had little information concerning the Japanese on the

east flank beyond the fact that elements of

two of the 18th Army's three divisions had

been identified far east of the Nigia River.

Troops of the 20th Division had been discovered building defensive positions on the

east bank of the Danmap River and elements of the 41st Division were thought to

be in the same general area. Finally, air observers had discovered concentrations of

Japanese troops at coastal villages between

the Danmap and Wewak. There seemed to

be definite indications that large elements

of the 18th Army were beginning to move

westward from Wewak.27

Colonel Howe subdivided his East Sector

into battalion areas. The 1st Battalion,

127th Infantry, was to maintain a rein24

 PTF FO 2, 6 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-3 May 44. 25

 126th Inf Jnl, 4 May-27 Jun 44; 1st Bn 126th

Inf Jnl, 4 May-27 Jun 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4

May-28 Jun 44, pp. 3-10.

26

 PTF FO 4, 10 Jun 44, atchd to PTF Opns Rpt

Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 126th Inf Jnl, 4 May-27

Jun 44; 128th Inf Jnl, 4 May-Jun 44. 27

 PTF FO 2, 6 May 44, and G-2 Annex thereto,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-3 May 44; 127th

Inf Jnl file, 4-15 May 44.
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 117

forced rifle company at Nyaparake and an

outpost at Babiang, to the east near the

mouth of the Dandriwad River. The battalion was to patrol up the Dandriwad and

along the coast east to the Danmap River.

The 2d Battalion was made responsible for

inland patrols to Chinapelli, Palauru, and

Afua. The 3d Battalion was to maintain

permanent outposts at Anamo, near the

mouth of the Driniumor River, and at Afua,

six miles up that stream. Some of these dispositions were already in effect, with the

Nyaparake Force on station and 2d Battalion units operating in the Palauru area.

The other dispositions were completed by

mid-May.28

The Nyaparake Force, comprising Company C and elements of Company D, and

commanded by Capt. Tally D. Fulmer of

Company C, 127th Infantry, started patrolling to the east and inland on 7 May.29

On that day, patrols pushed across the

mouth of the Dandriwad River to Babiang

and Marubian. After clashing with a wellorganized Japanese patrol, the Nyaparake

Force elements withdrew to the west bank

of the Dandriwad and spent the next day

patrolling up that river and questioning

natives concerning enemy movements. On

the 8th a rifle platoon and a light machine

gun section from Company A arrived to

strengthen the Nyaparake Force.

The advance eastward was resumed the

next day along two routes beyond Babiang.

One was the coastal trail and the other the

"Old German Road," a name presumably

referring to the days of German occupation

of this part of New Guinea before World

War I. The Old German Road paralleled

the coastal track at a distance of about 300

yards inland. Supported by Seventh Fleet

PT's based at Aitape, Nyaparake Force patrols pushed almost 5,000 yards east of the

Dandriwad during the day, encountering

some resistance along both routes. At dusk

all patrols retired to Babiang, and Captain

Fulmer re-examined his situation in the

light of information obtained during the

day. Large enemy groups had been reported

to the west of Nyaparake at Yakamul and

even as far distant as the Driniumor River,

over halfway back to the Tadji perimeter.

To the east, Japanese opposition gave every

indication of increasing. Finally, it appeared

that the Nyaparake Force was being outflanked to the south. Reports had come in

that enemy parties were moving along the

foothills of the Torricelli Mountains immediately south of the main inland east-west

trail, which crossed the Dandriwad and

Drindaria Rivers about four miles upstream.

Captain Fulmer strengthened the outpost at Charov, up the Drindaria, in order

to keep closer watch on the enemy reported

south of that village. At the same time he

requested that aircraft strafe the coastal

trail and the Old German Road east of

Babiang before any further attempt to advance eastward was made. Colonel Howe

agreed to request the air support mission,

and he ordered the Nyaparake Force to continue pushing eastward after the air strike

was completed.

Eight P-40's of No. 78 Wing, Royal

Australian Air Force, bombed and strafed

the two roads east of Babiang at 1130 on

10 May. Marubian, thought to be a Japanese assembly point, was also attacked. After

the air strikes Captain Fulmer sent the 1st

Platoon, Company C, forward from Ba28

 127th Inf Jnl file, 4-15 May 44. 29

 Information in the remainder of this subsection

is based principally upon: 127th Inf Jnl files, 5-15

and 15-31 May 44; 1st Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4 May-28

Jun 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44,

pp. 3-10; PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 127th

Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 1-2.
118 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

biang while the 3d Platoon moved on to

take Marubian without opposition. A defensive perimeter was set up around Marubian and an ambush was established on the

Old German Road south of that village. No

contacts were made with the enemy during

the day. The advance continued on the 11th

and the two forward platoons had reached

a point about two miles beyond Marubian

by early afternoon when they were halted

by Japanese machine gun and small arms

fire. The 3d Platoon, on the coastal trail,

pulled back about six hundred yards from

the point of contact and watched a party

of about fifty-five well-equipped Japanese

proceed southwestward off the trail and disappear inland. The 3d Platoon dug in for

the night on the beach, while the 1st Platoon, on the Old German Road, returned

to Marubian.

Captain Fulmer decided to move the rest

of Company C, 127th Infantry, to Marubian on 12 May. Since this would practically denude the base at Nyaparake of

combat troops, the Charov outpost was

ordered to return to the base village. These

redispositions were accomplished during the

morning of the 12th, and the advance eastward beyond Marubian was resumed about

1300 the same day.

The 3d Platoon of Company C, in the

lead, soon encountered rifle and machine

gun fire from Japanese positions at a streamcrossing near which the advance had

stopped the previous afternoon. In an attempt to outflank the Japanese, the 1st

Platoon moved inland about 300 yards and

into line south of the 3d. This maneuver led

the 1st Platoon into dense jungle where it

was stopped by determined enemy small

arms fire. Further probing of the enemy

defenses proved fruitless and, as night was

approaching, Captain Fulmer pulled the

platoon out of action. The unit moved back

to the beach and dug in about 600 yards

west of the stream crossing, where the 3d

Platoon had already set up defenses.

About 1100 on the 13th the 2d Platoon,

with a section of 81-mm. mortars and another of .50-caliber machine guns attached,

arrived in the forward area. The riflemen

of the 2d and 3d Platoons then joined forces

and pushed on down the coast through the

scene of the previous afternoon's encounter

until held up at another stream by new

enemy defenses. The 1st Platoon remained

behind to protect the mortars and machine

guns. Scouts having reported that the Japanese were firmly entrenched at the new

crossing, Captain Fulmer used his heavy

weapons to soften the opposition. The 81-

mm. mortars and the .50-caliber machine

guns fired for about twenty minutes on the

enemy defenses, and a section of 60-mm.

mortars joined in the last ten minutes of the

barrage. Under cover of this fire the 2d and

3d Platoons formed along the west bank

of the small stream on a front extending 300

yards inland. The 3d Platoon was on the

beach and the 2d on the right. At 1400, as

preparation fire ceased, the two platoons

started eastward. The 3d crossed the small

creek near the mouth without difficulty and

pushed eastward nearly 500 yards before

encountering any resistance.

The situation in the 2d Platoon's sector

was quite different. There the ground was

covered with sago palms, underbrush, and

heavy jungle growth which limited visibility

to five or ten yards. The platoon ran into

concentrated rifle and machine gun fire immediately after starting its attack and was

unable to force a crossing of the small

stream. The platoon leader disengaged his

force and tried to cross the creek farther inland. But the enemy refused his left flank
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 119

and the maneuver failed. Because the dense

rain forest masked their fires, mortars and

heavy machine guns could not support

further advances in the inland sector. Captain Fulmer therefore pulled the platoon out

of action on the right flank, drew it back to

the beach, and sent it across the stream

along the route taken by the 3d Platoon.

After crossing the creek and drawing abreast

of the 3d Platoon, the 2d Platoon again

attacked in a southeasterly direction.

The unit overran a small Japanese supply

dump and aid station and advanced 50-100

yards inland but was again pinned down by

enemy machine gun fire. One squad attempted to find the left of the enemy's defenses by moving 100 yards deeper into the

jungle. This effort proved futile. Since the

platoon's forward elements were now being

fired on from both the south and the east

and because it was again impossible to support the unit with mortar or machine gun

fire, no further progress could be expected.

The 3d Platoon had been forced to halt because of the danger of being cut off by the

Japanese opposing the 2d Platoon. Captain

Fulmer called off the attack to set up night

defenses.

The 3d Platoon anchored its left flank on

the beach at a point about 150 yards east of

the small stream, extending its lines about

50 yards inland and westward another 75

yards. The 2d Platoon tied its left into the

right of the 3d and stretched the perimeter

west to the mouth of the creek. About 200

yards beyond the eastern edge of this perimeter was an outpost of eight men, including

mortar observers who were in contact with

the main force by sound-powered telephone.

Inside the larger perimeter were 60-mm.

mortars, light machine guns, .50-caliber

machine guns, and an aid station. Since the

81-mm. mortars could not obtain clearance

in the area chosen for the main force, they

remained under the protection of the 1st

Platoon in a separate perimeter about 500

yards to the west. It seemed certain that the

Japanese who had been holding up the advance during the day would attack during

the night, and it was considered probable

that such an attack would come through the

heavy jungle at the southern, or inland, side

of the main perimeter, where visibility was

limited to five yards even in daylight.

The expected attack was not long in coming, although not from the direction anticipated. Shortly after 0200 on 14 May, after

a short preparation by grenades, light mortars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200

Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division,30 attacked from the east against the

coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault

was broken up by rifle and automatic weapons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the

rear of the advancing enemy group. The

Japanese disappeared into the jungle south

of the narrow beach. For the next hour Captain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire

into suspected enemy assembly points east

of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eightman outpost reported that many small parties of Japanese were moving up the beach

within 300 yards of the main perimeter and

then slipping southward into the jungle.

Such maneuvers seemed to presage another

attack.

The second assault came about 0330,

this time against the eastern and southeastern third of the defenses. The Japanese were

again beaten back by small arms and mortar fire, but at 0500 they made a final effort

which covered the entire eastern half of

the perimeter. This last attack was quickly

broken up and the Japanese quieted down.

30

 This identification is from 18th Army Opns,

III, 83-84.
120 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

About 0730 on the 14th, elements of Company A, 127th Infantry, began moving into

the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain

Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Platoon of Company C and the 81-mm. mortar

section also moved forward in preparation

for continuing the advance.

But now questions arose at the headquarters of the East Sector and the PERSECUTION

Task Force concerning the feasibility of further advance. Captain Fulmer was willing

to continue forward if he could be reinforced by a rifle platoon of Company A,

another section of heavy machine guns, and

another section of 81-mm. mortars. Colonel

Howe and General Gill looked on the matter

from a different point of view. It would be

extremely difficult, they realized, to establish an overland supply system for the advancing force and they knew that there were

not enough small boats available in the

Aitape area to insure overwater supply.

Further advance would accomplish little

unless a large base for future operations

could be established well beyond the Marubian area, a project for which insufficient

troops and amphibious craft were available.

Moreover, the principal mission of the PERSECUTION Task Force was to protect the

Tadji airfields, not to undertake large-scale

offensive operations. General Gill finally

decided to withdraw the Nyaparake Force's

advance elements from the Marubian area

and replace it with Company A, under the

command of Capt. Herman Bottcher,31 who

was to carry out a holding mission on the

west bank of the Dandriwad,

Withdrawal from Yakamul

On 13 May the bulk of Company A arrived at Ulau Mission, just west of the

Dandriwad's mouth.32 Company C remained at Marubian temporarily. There

was little action on the 13th, but events the

next day prompted General Gill to change

his plans again. On the 14th Japanese

patrols moved between Company C and the

Dandriwad River, cutting the company's

overland line of withdrawal. At the same

time strong enemy patrols harassed Company A's positions at Ulau Mission. It

seemed apparent that the American outposts

could not long withstand this pressure and,

therefore, both the Ulau and Marubian

units were picked up by small craft on the

15th and taken westward to Nyaparake,

whence the advance eastward had begun a

week earlier.

During the next few days the Nyaparake

Force continued patrolling, making contacts with well-organized enemy units which

appeared to be more aggressive and larger

than those previously encountered in the

East Sector. Companies C and D returned

to Tadji Plantation on 19 May and were

31

 Captain Bottcher had been awarded a DSC and

a battlefield promotion from the ranks during the

Papuan Campaign. His exploits there are recounted

in Milner, Victory in Papua.

32

 Information in this subsection is based on:

127th Inf Jnl files, 15-31 May and 1-11 Jun 44:

1st Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 32d Rcn

Tr Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 6-14; PTF G-3 Jnl, 4

May-28 Jun 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28

Jun 44, pp. 4-9; 1st Bn 126th Inf Jnl, 4 May-27

Jun 44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28

Jun 44, pp. 2-7; PTF FO 3, 19 May 44, in PTF

G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 2d Bn 80th Inf, Field

Diary, 31 May-14 Jul 44, as translated in 32d

Inf Div G-2 files, in ORB RAG AGO collection;

18th Army Opns III, 84-88; Incl 2, Comments and

Observations, pp. 1-2, to Ltr, Maj Gen Clarence A.

Martin to Gen Ward, 12 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH

files. The latter document is hereafter cited as Martin Comments.
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 121

replaced at Nyaparake by the 32d Reconnaissance Troop. On the same day Brig.

Gen. Clarence A. Martin, Assistant Division

Commander, 32d Division, was placed in

command of the East Sector and charged

with the missions previously assigned to

Colonel Howe—to maintain contact with

and delay enemy units moving westward.

General Martin was directed to move all

East Sector troops except the Nyaparake

Force to the west bank of the Driniumor

River. The Nyaparake Force, now comprising the 32d Reconnaissance Troop and

Company A, 127th Infantry, was placed

under the command of Captain Bottcher,

who was transferred from Company A to

the command of the reconnaissance unit.

To render the force more mobile, all its

heavy equipment was sent back to Blue

Beach, and the unit was instructed to retire

to the Driniumor River in case Japanese

pressure increased.

Captain Bottcher's patrols soon found

that enemy pressure was indeed increasing.

Some Japanese patrols were active to the

east while others outflanked the force to the

south and, about 1850 on 22 May, attacked

from the west. During the following night

the Nyaparake Force fought its way out of

this encirclement and retired two miles

along the beach to Parakovio. The next day

General Martin sent most of Company A

back to Tadji and that night and during the

morning of the 24th the remaining elements

of the Nyaparake Force withdrew along the

beach to good defensive positions at the

mouth of a small creek about 3,000 yards

west of Yakamul. The Japanese followed

closely, occupying Yakamul and sending

scouting parties westward along inland trails

toward Afua and the Driniumor River.

By now it was evident that the Japanese

had crossed the Drindaria in some force

and it appeared that the aggressive enemy

patrols had missions other than merely

screening movements far to the east in the

Wewak area. Deeming the Japanese movements a threat to the security of the Tadji

airfields, General Gill decided to make an

effort to drive the enemy's forward units

back across the Drindaria. For this purpose

he assigned the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, to the East Sector. The battalion was to

move forward to the Nyaparake Force's

perimeter, where Company G, 127th Infantry, was to relieve Captain Bottcher's

men. The 126th Infantry's unit was to be

supported by Battery C, 126th Field Artillery Battalion, from positions at the mouth

of the Driniumor and by Battery B from the

perimeter of Company G, 127th Infantry.

Company G completed the relief of the

now misnamed Nyaparake Force on 31

May, and about 1100 on the same day the

1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, reached the

forward position. Lt. Col. Cladie A. Bailey's

battalion pushed rapidly onward through

Yakamul, from which the enemy withdrew

hurriedly, and moved on to Parakovio

against little opposition. Despite the lack of

determined resistence on 31 May, it was

soon to become evident that one battalion

was not going to be strong enough to drive

the Japanese forces already west of the

Drindaria back across that stream. By this

time elements of the 78th and 80th Infantry

Regiments, 20th Division, had been definitely identified west of the Drindaria. Although the PERSECUTION Task Force did

not yet know it, large segments of both regiments were operating in the Yakamul area,

where they were supported by a few weapons of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment,

20th Division. These Japanese forces now

began to strike back at the 1st Battalion,

126th Infantry, which, on 1 June, was able
122 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

to advance only 400 yards beyond Parakovio

before it was stopped by enemy machine

gun and artillery fire. At 1115 General

Martin ordered the unit to retire to Yakamul. Using Yakamul as a base, the battalion

was to develop the enemy situation along

the Harech River from the coast to the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains, five miles

inland.

During the night of 1-2 June, Japanese

artillery shelled the battalion command post

and enemy patrols drove in outposts which

had been set up just east of Yakamul. The

next morning the battalion was divided into

two parts. At Yakamul was stationed Company A, Headquarters Company, and part

of Company D. (Map 4) This combined

group, numbering about 350 men, was put

under the command of Capt. Gile A. Herrick of Company A and designated Herrick

Force. The rest of the battalion, now called

Bailey Force, moved south down the trail

from Yakamul to patrol along the Harech

River.

The Japanese soon became very active

around the perimeter of Herrick Force. On

3 June the enemy launched a series of minor

attacks against Company A, which was separated from the rest of Herrick Force by a

small, unbridged stream about four feet

deep and varying in width from ten to

fifty yards. Under cover of these attacks,

other Japanese groups bypassed Herrick

Force to the south and on the next morning

appeared west of Yakamul, between Herrick Force and the two-mile distant perimeter of Company G, 127th Infantry.

Sporadic small arms fire, intensifying

during the afternoon, was directed at all

parts of the Herrick Force perimeter during

4 June. About 1640 this fire was augmented

by mortar and artillery shells, a development which seemed to presage an imminent

Japanese infantry attack. At 1830 an enemy

force of more than company strength surged

out of the jungle on the southeast side of

the American perimeter in an apparent attempt to drive a wedge between Company

A and the rest of Herrick Force. The attack

was halted by automatic weapons fire and

the barrier presented by the small stream.

The enemy then turned northeast from the

creek against Company A. Simultaneously,

a small group of enemy attacked west along

the beach.

Because Company A was in danger of

being surrounded, Captain Herrick ordered

the unit to withdraw across the small stream

to Yakamul. Since the Japanese had the

stream covered with small arms and at least

one well-concealed machine gun, the withdrawal was a slow process and consumed

over an hour. During the movement the

Japanese continued to attack and, toward

the end of the hour, succeeded in overrunning some of Company A's automatic weapons positions. Deprived of this support, most

of the remaining troops retreated rapidly

across the stream, leaving behind radios,

mortars, machine guns, and twenty to

twenty-five dead or wounded men. Most of

the wounded managed to get across the

stream after darkness, which was approaching at the time of the enemy's final attack.

By 1940 the Japanese were in complete

possession of the Company A position,

whence they could send flanking fire toward

the Yakamul perimeter. Captain Herrick

ordered his men to dig in deeply. He reorganized his positions and even put some of

the lightly wounded on defensive posts.

Japanese ground attacks kept up until 2200,

and sporadic bursts of mortar, grenade, and

machine gun fire continued throughout the

night.

When he learned of the situation at Yakamul, General Martin ordered Bailey Force

to return to the coast and relieve Herrick
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 123

Force. Radio communication difficulties

prevented delivery of this order until 2000

and it was 2200 before Colonel Bailey could

organize his force in the darkness and heavy

jungle and start it moving north. By that

time the Japanese had a strong force blocking the trail to Yakamul. Bailey Force therefore had to swing northwest toward the

perimeter of Company G, 127th Infantry,

two miles west of Yakamul. After an arduous overland march through trackless,

heavily jungled terrain, the leading elements

of Bailey Force began straggling into Company G's perimeter about 1130 on 5 June.

General Martin then ordered Bailey Force

to move east and drive the Japanese from

the Yakamul area, but this order was

changed when the East Sector commander

learned that Bailey Force had been marching for over thirteen hours on empty stomachs and was not yet completely assembled

at Company G's perimeter. Bailey Force was

thereupon fed from Company G's limited

food supply and sent west along the coastal

trail to the Driniumor River. Company G

and the battery of the 126th Field Artillery

Battalion which it had been protecting

moved back to the Driniumor late in the

afternoon.

Meanwhile, the evacuation of Herrick

Force from Yakamul had also been ordered,

and about 1115 on 5 June small boats arrived at Yakamul from Blue Beach to take

the beleaguered troops back to the Tadji

area. Insofar as time permitted, radios, ammunition, and heavy weapons for which

there was no room on the boats were destroyed. As this work was under way, a few

light mortars and light machine guns kept

up a steady fire on the Japanese who, now

surrounding the entire perimeter, had been

harassing Herrick Force since dawn. At the

last possible moment, just when it seemed

the Japanese were about to launch a final

infantry assault, Captain Herrick ordered

his men to make for the small boats on the

run. The move was covered by friendly

rocket and machine gun fire from an LCM

standing offshore, while the Japanese took

the running men under fire from the old

Company A positions. So fast and well organized was the sudden race for the boats

that the Japanese had no time to get all

their weapons into action, and only one

American was wounded during the boarding. The small craft hurriedly left the area

and took Herrick Force back to Blue Beach,

where the unit was re-equipped. By 1500

the troops had rejoined the rest of the 1st

Battalion, 126th Infantry, on the Driniumor

River.

Losses of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, during its action in the Yakamul area

were 18 men killed, 75 wounded, and 8

missing. The battalion estimated that it had

killed 200 to 250 Japanese and wounded

many more.33

Operations Along the Driniumor

While the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry,

had been patrolling in the Yakamul area,

elements of the 127th Infantry had been

operating to the west along the Driniumor

River from the coast six miles upstream to

Afua.34 Until the end of May little Japanese

33

 A Japanese postwar estimate sets Japanese losses

in the Yakamul area from 31 May through 6 June

at 100 men killed or wounded. Whatever the true

figures, the estimate of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, appears rather high. 34

 Unless otherwise indicated, material in this subsection is from: PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28

Jun 44, pp. 3-10; PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44;

127th Inf Jnl files, 15-31 May, 1-11 Jun, 12-18

Jun, and 19-27 Jun 44; 1st Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4

May-28 Jun 44; 3d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4 May-28

Jun 44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun

44, pp. 4-9; Martin Comments, pp. 2-4.
MAP 4

YAKAMUL AREA. Reproduction of original sketch (top), prepared in the field by

S-3, 1st Batallion, 126th Infantry. Aerial photography of the same area (bottom).

126 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

activity had been noted in the Anamo-Afua

area, but on the 31st of the month a ration

train carrying supplies up the west bank of

the Driniumor to two platoons of Company

L, 127th Infantry, at Afua was ambushed

and forced back to the coast. Later in the

day a party of Japanese estimated to be of

company strength was seen crossing the

Driniumor River from east to west at a

point about 1,000 yards north of Afua. By

dusk it appeared that at least two companies

of Japanese had crossed the river near Afua

and had established themselves on high,

thickly jungled ground north and northwest

of the village.

During the next four days elements of the

1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, maneuvered

in fruitless attempts to drive a Japanese

group, 75 to 100 strong, off a low, jungled

ridge about a mile and a half north of Afua.

Colonel Howe, concerned about the lack of

success of his troops, early on the morning

of 5 June radioed to the battalion commander: "This is the third day of maneuvering to drive the enemy off that ridge. So

far today we have had no report of enemy

firing a shot and we are not sure they are

even there. I have been besieged with questions as to why we don't fight the enemy.

Unless we can report some accomplishment

today I have no alibis to offer. Push either

Fulmer [Company C] or Sawyer [Company

B] in there until they draw fire."

 35

 During

the morning Companies B and C organized

a final attack and occupied the ridge, which

the Japanese had abandoned during the

night.

Meanwhile the PERSECUTION Task Force

had decided to establish an outer defensive

line along the Driniumor River. Originating in the Torricelli Mountains south of

Afua, the river ran almost due north through

many gorges and over steep falls to a sharp

bend at Afua. From Afua to its mouth, a

six-mile stretch, the river had an open bed

varying from 75 to 150 yards in width. Except during tropical cloudbursts, this section

of the river was not much more than knee

deep. Dense rain forests extended to the

river's banks at most places, although there

were some areas of thinner, brushlike vegetation. Islands, or rather high points of the

wide bed, were overgrown with high canebrake or grasses, limiting visibility across

the stream.

The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, dug

in for 3,600 yards along the west bank of

the river north from Afua, while the 1st

Battalion, 126th Infantry, covered the same

bank south from the river's mouth about

2,000 yards. A gap of some 3,000 yards

which was left between the two units was

covered by patrols. On 7 June, when the 1st

Battalion, 128th Infantry, replaced the 1st

Battalion, 126th Infantry, on the northern

portion of the defense line, a company of the

former unit was strung out along some 500

yards of the gap.

On the same day Japanese activity broke

out anew in the Afua area, this time about

1,300 yards west of Afua on the Afua—

Palauru trail, which had now become a

main supply line for troops stationed in the

Afua area. Two days later the Japanese had

disappeared from the Afua-Palauru trail,

much to the surprise of the PERSECUTION

Task Force. The task force G-2 Section decided that the enemy had withdrawn when

his ration and ammunition supply was depleted, and this belief was strengthened

during the next day or so when, contrary to

previous sightings, all Japanese patrol movements in the Driniumor River area seemed

to be from west to east.

35

 Msg, 127th Inf to 1st Bn 127th Inf, 5 Jun 44,

in 127th Inf Jnl file, 1-11 Jun 44.
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 127

For a couple of days some thought had

been given to withdrawing the 1st Battalion,

127th Infantry, from Afua because of the

apparent threat to the Afua-Palauru supply

line, but on 10 June Headquarters, PERSE-.

CUTION Task Force, decided to leave the

battalion in place. On the same day the

East Sector was ordered to speed development of strong defensive positions along the

Driniumor. The river line was to be held as

long as possible in the face of a Japanese

attack and, if forced back, the East Sector

troops were to delay enemy advances in

successive positions—one along the line

X-ray River-Koronal Creek, about halfway

to the Nigia River, and the other at the

Nigia itself—before retreating to the main

line of resistance around the airfields. The

East Sector was to patrol east of the

Driniumor in order to maintain contact with

the enemy.36

After 10 June Japanese patrols in the

Driniumor area became less numerous and

less aggressive, but more determined enemy

parties were located in hilly and heavily

forested terrain along the southern branches

of Niumen Creek, which lay about 3,000

yards east of the Driniumor. The Japanese

appeared to be forming a counterreconnaissance screen along Niumen Creek in order

to prevent East Sector troops from finding

out anything about deployments farther

east. So successful were the enemy efforts

that few patrols of the 127th Infantry (the

3d Battalion replaced the 1st at Afua on 22

June) managed to push beyond Niumen

Creek.

In the area covered by the 1st Battalion,

128th Infantry, some patrols were able to

move east along the coast as far as Yakamul,

but about 20 June the Japanese put more

forces into the Yakamul area and stopped

American patrolling in the region. In an

attempt to gather additional information,

one patrol was carried far down the coast

to Suain Plantation. There a landing was

made in a veritable hornet's nest of Japanese activity and the few men who reached

the beach were hurriedly withdrawn. No

more such long-range efforts to obtain information were made.

The closing days of June found the PERSECUTION Task Force still in firm possession

of the Tadji airfield area. Operations on the

west flank had overcome all Japanese opposition in that region, and no more enemy

activity had been encountered there after

early May. On the east flank, however, the

situation was far different. All elements of

the PERSECUTION Task Force which had

moved east of the Driniumor River had

been gradually forced back until, at the end

of the month, even small patrols were having difficulty operating east of the river. As

the month ended, the task force's eastern

defenses were along the west bank of the

Driniumor, where the 1st Battalion, 128th

Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, were digging in, anticipating future

attacks by elements of the 18th Army. Except for minor outposts, the rest of the PERSECUTION Task Force was encamped behind

the Tadji airfield main line of resistance.

Support of East Sector Operations

East Sector forces were supplied by a

variety of methods. Units along the coast

were supported directly by small boat from

Blue Beach or by native ration trains moving along the coastal track. Supplies to the

Afua area went south from the coast along

the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the

inland track from the Tadji fields through

36

 PTF FO 4, 10 Jun 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May28 Jun 44; Martin Comments, pp. 2-3.
128 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport

was impracticable except along short

stretches of the coastal track. In early June,

when the Japanese ambushed many ration

parties which attempted to reach Afua, experiments were made with air supply from

the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were

heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became

more successful as pilots gained experience

and ground troops located good dropping

grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the

west bank of the Driniumor about 2,200

yards north of Afua soon became the principal source of supply for troops in the Afua

area.37

Communications during operations east

of the Driniumor were carried out principally by radio, but between units along

the river and from the stream back to higher

headquarters telephone became the principal means of communication. Keeping the

telephone lines in service was a task to which

much time and effort had to be devoted.

The Japanese continually cut the lines, or

American troops and heavy equipment accidentally broke the wires. The enemy often

stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the

line, thus making repair work dangerous.

Usually, it was found less time consuming

and less hazardous to string new wire than

to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a

result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the

ground along the trails or was strung along

the trees in the Driniumor River area and

back to the Tadji perimeter.38

Before mid-June most telephone messages in the East Sector were sent "in the

clear," but evidence began to indicate that

the Japanese were tapping East Sector lines.

On 19 June, therefore, the PERSECUTION

Task Force directed that no more clear text

telephone messages be used in the East Sector. As in the case of the telephone, all radio

messages, of which some concerning routine

matters had been previously sent in the

clear, were encoded after mid-June.39

Radio communications presented no particular problems in the coastal region, but

inland radio trouble was chronic and sometimes acute. Radio range was limited,

especially at night, by dense jungle and atmospheric conditions, while almost daily

tropical storms originating over the Torricelli Mountains hampered both transmission

and reception. At times the only way radio

could be employed in the Afua area was by

having artillery liaison sets transmit to artillery liaison planes flying directly overhead.

There were some indications that the Japanese tried to jam East Sector radio circuits,

but there was never any proof that the suspected jamming was anything more than

static caused by adverse atmospheric conditions.40

Principal naval support for units in the

Aitape area after the end of April was pro37

 PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp.

12-19; 127th Inf Jnl files, 1-11, 12-18, and 19-27

Jun 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44. 38

 Intervs with Brig Gen Julian W. Cunningham,

ex-CG 112 Cav RCT, and Capt Leonard Lowry, exCO Company I, 127th Inf, Apr 47, copies in

OCMH files. Many of the remarks concerning telephone and radio communications in this section are

based on the experience of the 112th Cavalry in

operations along the Driniumor River after 28 June.

According to Captain Lowry, who had been in the

Aitape area since 23 April, the remarks apply equally

well to the period before 28 June. The journals of

all units of the PERSECUTION Task Force during the

period 22 April to 28 June contain many entries

concerning the difficulties of communication, especially radio, in the Aitape area. 39

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44. 40

 The suspicion that the Japanese tapped telephone lines and jammed radio circuits is to be found

in the journals and reports of most of the American

units which operated in the Aitape area. However,

no Japanese documents captured at the time, no onthe-spot interrogations of prisoners, and no postwar

Japanese reports contain any evidence that the enemy engaged in either practice.
PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 129

TADJI FIGHTER STRIP after 28 April.

vided by Seventh Fleet PT's. These speedy

craft devoted most of their attention to

Japanese barge traffic east of Aitape, sinking or damaging so many of the enemy craft

that the 18th Army units were forced to

limit their westward movements to poor

overland trails. One of the largest single

"bags" was obtained during the night of

26-27 June when fifteen Japanese barges

were sunk near Wewak. In addition to their

antibarge activity, the PT's also undertook

many reconnaissance missions both east and

west of Aitape, and, from time to time, provided escorts or fire support for East Sector

units operating east of the Driniumor. PT's

also carried out many daylight patrols in

co-operation with Australian aircraft based

on the Tadji strips. The principal targets of

these air-sea operations were Japanese

coastal guns and troop concentrations along

the beach between the Drindaria and

Danmap Rivers.41

Close air support and other air missions

requested by the PERSECUTION Task Force

were carried out under the direction of No.

10 Operational Group, Royal Australian

Air Force. From 24 April through 12 May

this group's combat planes comprised three

P-40 squadrons of No. 78 Wing. The wing

moved out of the Aitape area toward the

end of May and from the period 25 May to

9 June only the 110th Reconnaissance

Squadron, U. S. Fifth Air Force, was stationed at Tadji. On the 9th a squadron of

Beaufighters (twin-engined fighters) of the

Royal Australian Air Force's No. 71 Wing

41

 PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp.

10-11.
130 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

arrived at Tadji and by the 15th two

more squadrons of the same wing, both

equipped with Beauforts (twin-engined

fighter-bombers), had reached Aitape. On

the 22d of the month, Headquarters, No.

10 Operational Group, left Tadji and control of air operations in the Aitape area

passed to Headquarters, No. 71 Wing.

In May the Australian aircraft flew over

1,600 sorties and dropped almost fifty-seven

tons of bombs of all types on ground targets

from Aitape to Wewak. During June the

pace of air operations was stepped up and

from the 7th of that month until 6 July the

two Beaufort squadrons alone flew 495

sorties and dropped about 325 tons of

bombs. When more bombing than the

Tadji-based Beauforts could provide was

needed, A-20's and B-25's of the Fifth Air

Force, flying first from Nadzab in eastern

New Guinea and later from Hollandia,

swung into action. The Australian Beauforts were also occasionally pressed into service as supply aircraft, dropping rations and

ammunition to American forces along the

Driniumor. Most supply missions were,

however, undertaken by Fifth Air Force

C-47's from Nadzab or Hollandia or sometimes employing one of the Tadji strips as a

staging base. Both Fifth Air Force and

Australian planes also flew many reconnaissance missions between Aitape and Wewak.

These operations, together with the bombing of coastal villages occupied by the Japanese, suspected enemy bivouac areas,

bridges over the many streams between the

Driniumor and Wewak, and Japanese field

or antiaircraft artillery emplacements, materially assisted the East Sector in the execution of its delaying and patrolling

missions.42

42

 Ltrs, F/Lt Davies, Officer-in-Charge, War Hist

Sec., Hq RAAF, to author, 2 Apr and 8 May 48, in

OCMH files; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 10-11.
CHAPTER VI

Deployment for Battle

Reinforcement and Reorganization of the

PERSECUTION Task Force

Prior to 22 April the PERSECUTION Task

Force had little information concerning the

intentions of the 18th Army, but soon after

that date the task force learned that the

Japanese unit had planned to move from

Wewak toward Hollandia. In May and

June, East Sector operations had produced

many indications that a westward displacement of the 18th Army was in full swing.

The Decision to Reinforce Aitape

For some time the G-2 Section of Headquarters, ALAMO Force, did not believe that

the movements noted by the PERSECUTION

Task Force presaged a Japanese attack on

the Aitape perimeter. Instead, ALAMO Force

considered it more probable that the 18th

Army was merely establishing strong points

along the coast west from Wewak in order

to delay Allied pushes eastward or to provide flank protection for the main body of

the 18th Army which might attempt to bypass Aitape and Hollandia to the south and

join the 2d Army in western New Guinea.1

Strength was added to these beliefs when

patrols of the Allied Intelligence Bureau

(AIB),2 operating far inland beyond the

Torricelli Mountains, reported westward

movement of many small Japanese parties

along inland trails.3 Because more definite

information was lacking, ALAMO Force, until mid-June, clung to the idea that the 18th

Army might bypass Aitape.4

The first identifications of organized

enemy units east of Aitape had been secured

during operations near Marubian in midMay, when it was found that elements of

the 20th Division were operating in that

area.5 Later the same month the PERSECUTION Task Force discovered from captured

1

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 40, 10 May 44,

copy in G-2 Dof A files.

2

 The AIB was an operating agency of G-2 GHQ

SWPA. It sent patrols behind enemy lines to gather

information by a variety of means. Most of the white

personnel of AIB parties operating in eastern New

Guinea were Australians familiar with the terrain

by reason of prewar residence or exploration. Native

police were also used, but only occasionally were

American personnel attached to the AIB parties in

eastern New Guinea. In the Aitape area, the PTF

sent out a few long-range American patrols. A few

radio intelligence teams, operating to some extent

under PTF direction and for other purposes on missions for GHQ SWPA, were also sent inland from

the Tadji perimeter. 3

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Daily Rpt, 18 May 44, in

ALAMO G-2 Jnl Hollandia, 10 May-15 Jun 44. 4

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 45, 14 Jun 44,

copy in G-2 DofA files, indicates a final change of

attitude on the part of the ALAMO G-2 Section. 5

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-3134, 15 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 14-15 May 44; Rad,

PTF to ALAMO, AE-3361, 16 May 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 16-18 May 44.
132 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

documents and prisoners that elements of

both the 20th and 41st Divisions were along

the Dandriwad River.6 Documents captured by AIB patrols at the end of May indicated that the two divisions were to attack

both Hollandia and Aitape. At that time

the ALAMO Force G-2 Section estimated

that the 18th Army might be mounting a

two-pronged assault on Aitape,7 and by

early June the G-2 Section believed that the

20th Division was in place east of Aitape,

waiting only for the 41st Division to move

up before launching an assault against the

PERSECUTION Task Force. The other division of the 18th Army, the 51st, was thought

to be at Wewak, and it was believed that

the unit was not to move westward. Thus,

by early June it seemed evident to ALAMO

Force that the Japanese parties previously

encountered south of the Torricelli Mountains comprised service troops no longer

needed at Wewak or troops who had started

moving westward before 22 April.

The ALAMO Force G-2 Section expected

that the 20th and 41st Divisions could be

in position to attack the PERSECUTION Task

Force by the end of June.8 General Krueger

believed that a Japanese assault could gain

only temporary containment of Allied forces

at Aitape and that an attack would be a

diversionary measure aimed at delaying

further Allied advances in western New

Guinea. Such action would have much to

recommend itself to higher Japanese headquarters which, the ALAMO Force G-2

Section correctly believed, had already become reconciled to the loss of the 18th

Army.9

On 17 June General MacArthur questioned ALAMO Force concerning the advisability of reinforcing the PERSECUTION Task

Force. Though he considered it improbable

that an 18th Army assault could seriously

menace the Allied position at Aitape, he

thought it possible that the PERSECUTION

Task Force might need reinforcing if the

18th Army should muster all its available

strength for an attack. He informed General

Krueger that the 43d Infantry Division was

scheduled for an early move to Aitape in

order to stage there for operations farther

west. But that division could not arrive at

Aitape before the end of the first week in

July. General MacArthur therefore suggested that if it appeared necessary to reinforce the PERSECUTION Task Force before

July, a regiment of the 31st Infantry Division might be made available immediately.10

To these suggestions General Krueger replied that many preparations had already

been made at Aitape to meet any attack by

the 18th Army. For instance, both ammunition supply and hospitalization facilities had

recently been increased. General Krueger

believed that the forces already at Aitape

6

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-958, 21 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 19-21 May 44; Rads,

ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-3604 and WF-3526,

22 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 22-25

May 44; Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1152, 29 May

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 26-29 May 44. 7

 Rads, ALAMO to PTF, WF-5374 and WF-6412,

30 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 30 May-2

Jun 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May

44, copy in G-2 DofA files. 8

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1450, 10 Jun 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 7-12 Jun 44; Rad, PTF

to ALAMO, AE-1491, 12 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ

SWPA, WF-3097, 15 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly

Rpt 45, 14 Jun 44, copy in G-2 DofA files.

9

 Rad, ALAMO to PTF, WF-6412, 30 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 30 May-2 Jun 44;

ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May 44, copy

in G-2 DofA files. 10

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, CX-13847, 17

Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun

44. The 43d Division had previously been in combat

in the South Pacific Area. The 31st Division had not

yet been in action and was finishing amphibious and

jungle training at Oro Bay, New Guinea.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 133

could, if properly handled, beat off any Japanese attack that might occur prior to the

43d Division's arrival. If it looked necessary,

however, he might send the 112th Cavalry

Regimental Combat Team to Aitape. He

considered that unit preferable to a regiment of the 31st Division, since he wanted

to keep that division intact for a future operation. He requested an early decision from

General MacArthur as to which unit should

be moved to Aitape.11

While higher headquarters was reaching

a decision concerning reinforcements, new

information obtained by the PERSECUTION

Task Force prompted a change in plans.

Documents captured after mid-June indicated that the Japanese were to complete a

thorough reconnaissance south, southeast,

and east of the PERSECUTION Task Force's

perimeter by the end of June in preparation

for an attack by the 20th and 41st Divisions.

This attack, it now appeared, awaited only

the completion of the reconnaissance and

the arrival of the bulk of the 41st Division

in the forward area.12

By this time the PERSECUTION Task

Force's 155-mm. artillery had been sent to

new operational areas in western New

Guinea and tentative plans had been made

to send the Beaufighter and Beaufort squadrons of No. 71 Wing westward also. General

Gill, upon receiving the new information

concerning enemy intentions, requested

that the air support squadrons be retained

or replaced; that a battalion of 155-mm.

howitzers be sent to Aitape; and that the

112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team

be moved forward immediately.13

A few days later General MacArthur's

headquarters, which had secured the information from radio intercepts, informed

General Krueger that the 18th Army

planned to attack about the end of the first

ten days in July, employing 20,000 troops

in the forward area and another 11,000 in

reserve.14 ALAMO Force and the Allied Naval

Forces immediately rounded up ships to

send the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat

Team to Aitape, where the unit arrived on

27 June. A 155-mm. howitzer battalion was

shipped to Aitape a few days later and No.

71 Wing was ordered to remain there. At

the same time General Krueger reconsidered his decision not to employ part of the

31st Division and ordered preparations

made to move the 124th Regimental Combat Team of that division to Aitape. Efforts

were also made to speed the shipment of

the 43d Division from its New Zealand staging area to Aitape.15

When all the reinforcements arrived, the

PERSECUTION Task Force's strength would

equal two and two-thirds divisions. General

Krueger therefore decided that a corps

11

 Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-3592, 18

Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun

44. The 112th Cavalry RCT comprised the 112th

Cavalry Regiment, the 148th Field Artillery Battalion, and supporting troops. The RCT, which was

a separate unit not part of any division, had been

in action on New Britain. 12

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1659, 19 Jun 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44; Rad,

PTF to ALAMO, AE-1694, 20 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 20-25 Jun 44; ALAMO Force, G-2

Wkly Rpt 46, 21 Jun 44, copy in G-2 DofA files.

13

 Rads, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1699 and AE-1711,

20 Jun 44, and AE-1806, 24 Jun 44- Rads, ALAMO

to PTF, WF-3970, 20 Jun 44, and WF-4060, 21

Jun 44. All in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-25

Jun 44. 14

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO Adv Hq, C-14133,

24 Jun 44, and Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO

Adv Hq, WF-4646, 24 Jun 44, both in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 20-25 Jun 44. At this time ALAMO

Advance Headquarters was at Hollandia, while the

rear echelon of the headquarters remained in eastern

New Guinea. 15

 Rads, ALAMO to PTF, WF-3970, 20 Jun 44,

and WF-4060, 21 Jun 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 20-25 Jun 44.
134 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

headquarters would be needed at Aitape.

He chose for the command at Aitape Maj.

Gen. Charles P. Hall who, together with

his staff of XI Corps headquarters, had recently arrived in New Guinea from the

United States. The change in command was

not to entail a change in the principal mission of the PERSECUTION Task Force—defense of the Tadji airstrips. To carry out his

mission, General Hall was instructed to

break the initial impetus of the apparently

impending 18th Army attack and, when the

strength of the PERSECUTION Task Force

and the tactical situation permitted, undertake a vigorous counterattack. With these

instructions in mind, General Hall assumed

command of the PERSECUTION Task Force

as of midnight 27-28 June.16

While this change in command was being

effected, more information concerning the

plans of the 18th Army was obtained from

radio intercepts and captured documents.

It became known that the 20th Division was

to cross the "Hanto" River on 29 June, executing attacks toward Afua and East Sector headquarters installations, which were

located at Anamo, on the beach just west of

the Driniumor's mouth.17 General Headquarters forwarded this information to

ALAMO Force with little attempt at interpretation, but the ALAMO Force G-2 Section

decided that the Hanto River was probably

the Driniumor. The prospective attack,

ALAMO Force believed, would be launched

during the night of 28-29 June at a point

about two miles inland from the mouth of

the Driniumor. It was considered probable

that the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, would

aim for control of the Afua-Palauru trail,

while the 80th Infantry moved on Anamo.

Assuming the success of its initial attack,

the 20th Division apparently planned to assemble at "Hill 56," tentatively located

about 4,000 yards northwest of Afua, and

then push on toward the Tadji airfields.

ALAMO Force estimated that the maximum

strength with which the 20th Division could

attack was about 5,200 men.18

If this interpretation of available information was correct, General Hall had but

one day to prepare his new command to

meet the attack of the 18th Army.

Reorganizations and Redispositions

As soon as General Hall and the few

members of his XI Corps staff that he had

brought forward became acquainted with

the situation in the Aitape area, Headquarters, XI Corps, assumed the role of PERSECUTION Task Force Headquarters, using

many men of Headquarters, 32d Division,

until the rest of the corps staff could reach

Aitape. Next, the command structure of the

task force was rearranged, some changes in

names were made, and several troop redispositions were effected.

The western part of the main line of resistance around the airfields—the area previously assigned to the West and Center

Sectors—became the responsibility of the

Western Sector, under Brig. Gen. Alexander

N. Stark, Jr. The eastern section of the main

line of resistance was held by the Eastern

Sector under General Gill. This unit also

set up an outpost line of resistance along the

Nigia River. General Martin's command,

redesignated the PERSECUTION Covering

Force, was to continue to hold the delaying

position along the Driniumor River. The 16

 Ltr OI, Comdr ALAMO to CG XI Corps, 25 Jun

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 27-29 Jun 44. 17

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, C-14205, 26 Jun

44, and Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1884, 28 Jun 44,

both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 27-29 Jun 44.

18

 Rad, ALAMO to PTF, WF-1027, 27 Jun 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 27-29 Jun 44.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 135

western boundary of the covering force was

a line running south from the coast along

Akanai Creek and the X-ray River, a little

over halfway from the Driniumor to the

Nigia.

Since no attacks were expected from the

west, troops assigned to the Western Sector

comprised principally engineers. The Eastern Sector was composed of the 32d Division

less those elements assigned to the PERSECUTION Covering Force. Supply, administration, and evacuation for the covering force

were responsibilities of Headquarters, 32d

Division, which, for these purposes, acted in

its administrative capacity rather than in its

tactical role as Headquarters, Eastern Sector. All three tactical commands operated

directly under General Hall's control.19

While these changes were being made,

the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat

Team (less the 148th Field Artillery Battalion) had arrived at Blue Beach and had

been assigned to General Martin's operation

control. The combat team was commanded

by Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, while

the dismounted (and oft disgruntled about

it) men of the 112th Cavalry Regiment

were led by Col. Alexander M. Miller, III.20

The cavalry regiment was about half the

strength of an infantry regiment. It comprised only two squadrons, each composed

of three troops, as opposed to the three battalions of four companies each in an infantry regiment. Instead of the three heavy

weapons companies organic to the corresponding infantry unit, the 112th Cavalry

had only one heavy weapons troop. Moreover, the cavalry unit had arrived at Aitape

with less than its authorized personnel. At

no time during operations at Aitape did it

number more than 1,500 men, in comparison with the 3,000-odd of an infantry

regiment.21

Initially, it was planned that the 112th

Cavalry would take up positions in the

Palauru area to defend the right rear of the

PERSECUTION Covering Force and act as

General Martin's reserve. General Hall, deciding that the Driniumor River line needed

strengthening, changed this plan and on 29

June sent the regiment forward to the X-ray

and Driniumor Rivers. Leaving the rest of

the regiment at the X-ray, the 2d Squadron

moved on to the Driniumor and took up

defensive positions in the Afua area. Upon

the arrival of this squadron at the river, the

extent of the Driniumor defenses that were

previously the responsibility of the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, was reduced and at

the same time operational control of the

infantry battalion passed to General Cunningham. This addition still did not bring

the strength of the latter's command up to

that of an infantry regiment.22

About the same time, the mission of the

PERSECUTION Covering Force was changed.

19

 PTF FO 5, 29 Jun 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun3 Jul 44; miscellaneous orders and memos in PTF

G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44. General Stark, Assistant Division Commander, 43d Division, had just arrived at

Blue Beach with an advance echelon of division

headquarters. As originally set up on 29 June, the

three commands were named, from west to east, the

Western Defense Command, the Eastern Defense

Area, and the Eastern Defense Command. The similarity in the names of the two eastern components

soon proved confusing and the final changes, as outlined above, were effected on 8 July. 20

 The 148th Field Artillery (105-mm. howitzers)

reached Aitape in mid-July, and operated as part of

the general artillery support under PTF (XI Corps)

artillery.

21

 Interv, author with Lt Col P. L. Hooper, exExec Off, 112th Cav RCT, 25 Mar 48, in OCMH

files. 22

 Ibid.; PTF G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun-3 Jul 44; 112th

Cav Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-4. The 112th Cavalry

RCT did not submit a report for the Aitape campaign, but merely indorsed that of the 112th Cavalry Regiment.

DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 137

General Krueger, who was maintaining

close touch with the situation at Aitape,

wanted the Japanese to be met and fought

to a decision as far on the east flank as possible. Previously, Generals Hall and Gill had

assumed that the covering force might be

gradually forced back from the Driniumor,

but now General Hall ordered the force to

retreat only in the face of overwhelming

pressure. The 112th Cavalry had been released to General Martin's control to aid in

the execution of this new mission, and the

2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, was also made

available to him. On 29 June the infantry

battalion took over about 3,000 yards of the

Driniumor line between the 1st Battalion,

128th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 127th

Infantry. Close artillery support for the covering force was provided by the 120th and

129th Field Artillery Battalions, which emplaced their 105-mm. howitzers near Anamo. Company B, 632d Tank Destroyer

Battalion, moved forward to the mouth of

the Driniumor at the same time. All units

reconnoitered routes of withdrawal back to

the next delaying position, the Koronal

Creek-X-ray River line, and planned defenses along that line so that in case withdrawal became necessary, confusion would

be minimized. General Martin issued orders

that no unit was to leave the Driniumor

line without his instructions.23

Gathering Combat Intelligence

General Hall had strengthened the Driniumor line in the expectation that the 20th

Division would attack on or about 29 June.

But there was no attack on that date. It was

therefore decided that the information upon

which the expectation was based had been

incorrectly interpreted. If so, greater credence had to be placed on conflicting

evidence from radio intercepts and captured

documents indicating that the 18th Army

was to attack on 10 July. This interpretation

was given some corroboration when a prisoner captured on 30 June divulged that the

20th Division was planning to move against

the Driniumor line between 1 and 10 July.24

Reconnaissance in Force Eastward

General Hall, in an attempt to locate the

20th Division, ordered the PERSECUTION

Covering Force to send strong patrols east of

the Driniumor to the Harech River. A few

patrols, moving along the coast, got almost

as far as Yakamul, but so efficient had Japanese counterreconnaissance operations become that this was as close as any Allied

patrols came to the Harech River during the

period 30 June through 10 July. In the

southern sector of the Driniumor line patrols

confirmed previous reports that the Japanese maintained a counterreconnaissance

screen along Niumen Creek. Here Japanese

units were digging in and holding wherever

and whenever patrol contacts were made.

These enemy groups were not large, however, nor did the Japanese patrols encountered in the Yakamul area appear to be

particularly strong. All American patrol

efforts failed to disclose any evidence of

large, organized Japanese units or movements. Yet both the task force and ALAMO

Force were sure that at least two regiments

of the 20th Division and elements of the

23

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun-3 Jul 44; Martin Comments, pp. 4-6.

24

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Ests of Enemy Sit, Aitape,

30 Jun and 1 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

30 Jun-3 Jul 44; Rads, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1948,

AE-1953, and AE-1957, 30 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Hollandia, 30 Jun-3 Jul 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA

to ALAMO Adv Hq, C-14133, 24 Jun 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-25 Jun 44.
138 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

41st Division were located somewhere in the

area between the Harech and Driniumor

Rivers.25

The fact that no large enemy units could

be located east of the Driniumor caused

considerable worry at ALAMO Force headquarters, and General Krueger was unhappily aware that the development of the

situation in front of the PERSECUTION Covering Force was being left to the volition of

the Japanese. It is also possible that he

wished to hurry the battle he knew was impending at Aitape in order that some of the

forces there could be freed for operations

farther westward once the Japanese attack

had been turned back. Whatever the case,

on 8 July he instructed General Hall to seize

the initiative by sending a strong reconnaissance in force across the Driniumor to ascertain the enemy's intentions and dispositions.26

These instructions got a cool reception at

the headquarters of the PERSECUTION Task

and Covering Forces. General Hall had

planned to send at least two battalions of

the 124th Infantry on an amphibious enveloping movement down the coast to Nyaparake to land in the rear of the 20th

Division. General Martin was deeply disturbed when he learned that the reconnaissance units would have to be taken from the

Driniumor line, which he already considered

inadequately manned to meet the expected

Japanese attack. Although he preferred the

amphibious plan to the overland movement,

General Hall could not argue the point with

ALAMO Force and, by the same token, General Martin, realizing that General Hall was

under pressure from higher headquarters,

chose not to argue with his immediate superior. General Hall postponed the 124th

Infantry's operation until 13 July, and he

ordered General Martin to begin the reconnaissance in force on the morning of 10

July.27

General Hall now had at his disposal

fifteen infantry battalions and two understrength, dismounted cavalry squadrons.

Three infantry battalions of the 32d Division and the two cavalry units were assigned

to General Martin's PERSECUTION Covering

Force. To accomplish his primary mission—

defense of the Tadji strips—General Hall

felt it necessary to hold at least six infantry

battalions of the 32d Division near the airfields. The three battalions of the 124th Infantry (which had arrived in echelons at

Blue Beach beginning on 2 July) he decided

to hold out of action temporarily either as

a reserve or, when possible, to execute the

amphibious envelopment already planned.

Having thus committed the 124th Infantry

and six battalions of the 32d Division to

stations in the Tadji-Blue Beach area, General Hall had no choice but to take the

reconnaissance in force units from General

Martin's Driniumor River troops. By this

action, the PERSECUTION Covering Force's

defenses were weakened along the very line

where the Japanese were first expected to

strike.28

25

 PTF G-3 Jnls, 4-8 and 8-11 Jul 44; Rads,

PTF to ALAMO, 6 and 7 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Hollandia, 4-9 Jul 44. 26

 Interv, author with Gen Hall, ex-Comdr PTF

and XI Corps, 27 Mar 47, copy in OCMH files;

Martin Comments, pp. 6-7; Rad, ALAMO to PTF,

WH-1120, 8 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia,

4-9 Jun 44.

27

 Interv, author with Gen Hall, 27 Mar 47; Martin Comments, p. 7; Ltr, Gen Hall to Gen Ward,

29 Nov 50, in OCMH files; PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul

44; 124th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-3. 28

 Interv, author with Gen Hall, 27 Mar 47; Martin Comments, p. 8; 124th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, pp.

1-3. Throughout the Aitape operation infantry

units were disposed by battalion, often in ad hoc

organizations. Regimental cannon companies were

often employed for guard or labor duties at the airfields or Blue Beach.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 139

For the reconnaissance in force eastward,

General Martin chose the 1st Battalion,

128th Infantry, and the 2d Squadron,

112th Cavalry. The infantry was to advance

along the coast and the cavalry overland

from Afua. The maneuver was to be carried

out in an aggressive manner. Minor opposition was not to slow the reconnaissance, and

the forces were to push rapidly eastward to

the Harech River. Once on the Harech, the

two units were to consolidate, patrol to the

south and east, and prepare for further

advances upon orders from General Hall.

Units remaining along the Driniumor were

to send out patrols to their respective fronts

in the area between the reconnaissance units

in order to locate any Japanese forces in that

area.29

The reconnaissance started about 0730

on 10 July as the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, Company B leading, waded across

the mouth of the Driniumor. Progress down

the coast was rapid and uneventful until

1000 when, at a point about three miles east

of the Driniumor, the leading elements were

held up by a Japanese unit estimated to be

a company in strength, which was dug in

along the coastal trail. The infantry could

not take the enemy position by assault, and

artillery support from the 105-mm. howitzers at Anamo was requested. This fire,

quickly and accurately delivered, killed

some Japanese and scattered the rest. Company B resumed the advance but was

stopped again at enemy positions on the

banks of a small stream 300 yards farther

east. This time one artillery concentration

failed to dislodge the Japanese and, finding

it impossible to outflank the enemy defenses,

the forward infantry units were disengaged

while a second concentration was brought

down on the enemy positions.

After the artillery fired, Company B continued the advance until 1745, by which

time it had reached a point less than a mile

west of Yakamul. In terrain that afforded

good positions for night defenses, the company dug in, while the rest of the battalion

established a perimeter running westward

along the coastal trail. Not more than fifty

Japanese had actually been seen during the

day. Casualties for the 1st Battalion were

five killed and eight wounded.30

At the southern end of the Driniumor line

the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, right arm

of the reconnaissance in force, delayed its

departure until the 1st Squadron moved up

to the Driniumor from the X-ray and did

not leave Afua until 1000. The 2d Squadron

did not follow any trail but, having been

ordered to avoid contact with the enemy

during the first part of the movement eastward, cut its way through heavy jungle over

alternately hilly and swampy terrain. The

nature of the terrain slowed progress so

much that at 1445, when the advance was

halted for the night, the squadron was not

more than a mile east of the Driniumor. No

contact with enemy forces had been made

during the day.31

29

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44; Martin Comments,

pp. 8-9; Rad, PTF to PCF, 9 Jul 44, copy in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 10-12 Jul 44; Rads, PTF to

ALAMO, AE-1053 and AE-1200, 9 Jul 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnls Hollandia, 4-9 and 10-12 Jul 44, respectively.

30

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44; 1st Bn 128th Inf

Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-27

Jul 44. The battalion's casualty figures are from the

battalion journal and do not agree with other

sources. 31

 112th Cav Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 5-9; PTF G-3

Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44; interv, author with Col Hooper,

25 Mar 48; Martin Comments, p. 11. The records

state that the squadron advanced one and threefourths miles during the day, but the figure used in

the text is that provided by Colonel Hooper. Orders

to the squadron to avoid contact were apparently

given verbally, presumably by the regimental commander, and do not appear in the records.
140 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

General Hall was not satisfied with the

progress the two arms of the reconnaissance

had made during the day. He was especially

disappointed in the 1st Battalion, 128th

Infantry, which, he felt, should have been

able to move farther eastward. Both the

infantry and cavalry units were ordered to

resume the advance eastward in a more

aggressive manner on the morrow. Further

efforts were to be made by both units to

maintain contact with forces back on the

Driniumor. The 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, had been unable to maintain contact,

either physically or by radio, with regimental headquarters.32

Redispositions Along the Driniumor

Back on the Driniumor sweeping changes

in dispositions had taken place.33 (Map 5).

The 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, had to

assume responsibility for the positions vacated by the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion's sector now extended from the mouth

of the Driniumor to the junction of the

Anamo-Afua trail with the river bank. This

was a straight-line distance of about 5,000

yards, but configurations of the Driniumor's

west bank made it over 6,000 yards (almost

three and a half miles) on the ground.

Company F, 128th Infantry, was on the

left of the 2d Battalion guarding the west

bank from the mouth inland about 3,900

yards or over two miles. The northern portion of the company zone was very well

organized, having been developed by various units since the middle of May, but

positions in the southern quarter of the

sector had not been completed. To the right

of Company F was Company E, in position

along a front of 1,250 yards. South of Company E, tying its right flank into the left of

the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, was

Company G, spread over a front of about

1,000 yards. Company G's machine gun

positions and riflemen's foxholes were closer

together—about sixty to seventy-five yards

apart—than those of the other 2d Battalion

companies. The company also had some low

barbed wire strung in front of its position.

Company E had little or no wire and its

strong points were about ninety yards apart.

Company G's lines were shortened about

100 yards late in the afternoon when a rifle

platoon of the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry,

assumed responsibility for that much of the

company's area.

By nightfall all the riflemen of the 2d

Battalion, 128th Infantry, were in the new

defensive positions. The heavy machine

guns of Company H were disposed along

the bank of the river between infantry strong

points (bunkers or groups of foxholes), their

lines of fire tied in with those of the rifle

companies' light machine guns and automatic rifles (BAR's). Company H's 81-mm.

mortars were emplaced about 200 yards

west of the river and were registered in on

area targets along the bed and the east bank

of the Driniumor. The 60-mm. mortars of

the three rifle companies had targets overlapping those of the larger weapons. The

forward battalion command post was about

800 yards west of the Driniumor, behind the

center of Company E's sector. The remainder of the battalion headquarters, together

with a tank destroyer platoon, was located

on the coast just west of the river's mouth.

The battalion had no reserve which it could

move to meet a Japanese attack.

32

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44. 33 Information in this subsection is from: PTF G-3

Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44; PCF G-3 Jnl, 9-12 Jul 44; Interv,

author with Capt Lowry, Apr 47; 3d Bn 127th Inf

Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-27

Jul 44.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 141

MAP 5

South of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry,

the 3d Battalion of the 127th Infantry had a

sector about 2,500 yards or almost a mile

and a half long. Company I was on the left,

with every available man in position along

1,400 yards of curving river bank. Strong

points were about 100 yards apart and the

company had no protecting wire. Company

K, with a nearly straight stretch of bank

about 1,100 yards in length to hold, was on

the right of Company I. The dispositions of

Company M's heavy weapons were similar

to those of Company H, 128th Infantry.

Company L of the 127th, which had sent

many patrols east of the Driniumor during

the day and which had lent one of its rifle

platoons to Company G, 128th Infantry,

was not on the line. Instead, the unit
DRINIUMOR RIVER, in area held by the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 143

guarded the battalion command post, which

was situated about 700 yards west of the

Driniumor behind Company K.

The 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, south

of the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, was responsible for about 3,000 yards of the Driniumor line. This distance was divided

about equally between Troop B on the left

(tying into the lines of Company K, 127th

Infantry) and Troop A on the right. The

line extended to a point about 500 yards

south of Afua, where Troop C took up support positions. Troop C did not place many

men along the river but concentrated at

Afua to refuse the south flank of the PERSECUTION Covering Force and to provide a

reserve for the 112th Cavalry. Weapons

Troop's heavy machine guns were disposed

for the most part in the sectors of Troops A

and B. Headquarters of the 112th Cavalry

and General Cunningham's command post

were situated about 200 yards west of the

Driniumor behind Troop B. A small rear

echelon group of the 112th Cavalry remained on the X-ray River at the AfuaPalauru trail crossing to protect the overland

line of communications back to Blue Beach.

Along the coast west of the Driniumor, at

Anamo, Anopapi, and Tiver, were located

field artillery units, tank destroyers, and the

headquarters installations of the PERSECUTION Covering Force.34

 Communications

from these units to those on the Driniumor

were carried out for the most part by radio,

although some telephone wire was used.

Units along the river communicated with

each other by means of sound-powered telephone.

Intelligence, 10 July

Many bits of information concerning the

intentions of the 18th Army were now available to the PERSECUTION Task Force. Corroborating evidence for the idea that an

attack might take place on 10 July was

secured that day when the 1st Battalion,

128th Infantry, captured a member of the

237th Infantry, 41st Division. This prisoner

divulged to interrogators in the forward area

that the Japanese attack would come that

night, but back at task force headquarters,

where final interrogations were made, his

information was evaluated as indicating the

assault would be made within the next day

or two. The prisoner believed that the attack was to have two axes, one along the

coast and the other across the Driniumor

about midway between Afua and the river's

mouth.35

In addition to the foregoing information,

the units remaining on the Driniumor reported increasing enemy activity east of that

river during the 10th. Japanese movements

seemed especially intensified in the zone patrolled by the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry.

One battalion patrol, returning to the

Driniumor on 10 July after three days along

Niumen Creek, reported having seen at least

two large groups of Japanese, one about

fifty-five strong, along the east bank of the

Niumen. These troops appeared to have

been moving in a purposeful manner along

freshly cut trails and were said to have been

in good condition, well clothed, and strongly

armed. Another patrol of the same battalion

worked its way east of the Niumen on the

morning of 10 July and discovered a re- 34

 General Martin's headquarters was at this time

made up of men from Headquarters, 128th Infantry,

the remainder of which headquarters was controlling

the 128th Infantry (less two battalions) at the Tadji

main line of resistance. Martin Comments, p. 11.

35

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1339, 10 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 10-11 Jul 44; 32d Div

G-2 Rpt 11, 10 Jul 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul

44; Martin Comments, pp. 10-11.
144 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

cently established Japanese bivouac area,

capable of holding about sixty-five troops.

On its way back to the Driniumor, this patrol ambushed two small, well-armed parties

of Japanese only 700 yards east of the 3d

Battalion's lines.36

Another patrol, moving east in the northern sector of the 3d Battalion zone, encountered two groups of Japanese on the west

bank of the Niumen. These two parties,

both of platoon size and well armed, were

moving rapidly south along new trails. The

American patrol saw only a few more Japanese during the day but discovered many

signs of heavy enemy movement between

the Niumen and Driniumor. The patrol

leader, an unusually imperturbable sergeant

of Company I, 127th Infantry, who had had

extensive patrol experience, was greatly excited by these signs of Japanese activity.

Although his patrol had not actually seen

more than fifty enemy soldiers, the sergeant

felt that a strong attack on the lines of Company I, 127th Infantry, or Company G,

128th Infantry, was imminent.37

On the basis of this and other patrol

reports Lt. Col. Edward Bloch, 3d Battalion

commander, alerted his force to expect a

Japanese attack during the night. The sergeant's information and conclusions also

prompted Colonel Bloch to assign a rifle

platoon of his reserve company, L, to Company G, 128th Infantry, on his left flank.

There is no evidence that Colonel Bloch

informed higher headquarters of his actions

and there is no indication that the Company

I patrol sightings were reported to an echelon higher than General Cunningham's

headquarters.38

North of the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, patrols of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, reported only one unusual contact

during the 10th. A party from Company G,

operating near Niumen Creek, encountered

a combat patrol of twenty Japanese. A running fire between the two groups ensued,

and the American patrol was forced back to

the Driniumor. A report of this action was

sent to regimental headquarters, but there

is no evidence that it was relayed to any

higher echelon of the task force.39

In the zone of the 112th Cavalry, a patrol

from the 1st Squadron, moving east along

a line parallel to and north of the 2d Squadron, surprised a party of ten Japanese about

1,200 yards east of Afua. These enemy

troops, who were armed with at least one

machine gun, retired to prepared defenses

after a sharp skirmish. The American patrol

leader estimated that there were at least

forty Japanese, all well armed, milling

around in the same vicinity. This information reached task force headquarters late in

the afternoon.40

Despite the fact that cumulative intelligence now presented strong evidence that a

major Japanese attack was about to be

launched against the Driniumor River line,

the G-2 Section of Headquarters, PERSECUTION Task Force, apparently did not believe

that such an attack was imminent. Some

sort of attack was expected at an indefinite

future date, but the PERSECUTION Task

Force daily intelligence report for 10 July,

published about 1800 that day, gave little

36

 3d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; PTF

G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44. 37

 Interv, author with Capt Lowry, Apr 47. 38

 3d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; PCF

G-3 Jnl, 9-12 Jul 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44;

112th Cav Sum of Msgs, 1 Jul-29 Aug 44. 39

 2d Bn 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 128th

Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-27 Jul 44; PCF G-3 Jnl, 9-12 Jul

44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44. 40

 112th Cav Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 5; 112th Cav

Sum of Msgs, 1 Jul-29 Aug 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11

Jul 44.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 145

indication that an immediate Japanese assault could be expected:

Westward movement of strong enemy patrols including intense activity just E [east] of

NIUMEN CREEK indicates possible strong

outposts to cover assembly of main body in

preparation for attack.41

At PERSECUTION Covering Force headquarters the prevailing opinion was more

apprehensive. General Martin was concerned about the possibility of a Japanese

attack during the night of 10-11 July, and

he was worried over the disposition of the

forces along the Driniumor, which had been

seriously weakened by the movement eastward of the reconnaissance-in-force units.

What the attitude of most of the rest of the

staff officers and unit commanders of the

PERSECUTION Task and Covering Forces

was is unknown, although General Martin

had warned the Driniumor River units to

be on the alert and Colonel Bloch of the 3d

Battalion, 127th Infantry, certainly expected some action during the night.42

Back at task force headquarters, General

Hall had little choice but to accept his G-2's

estimate at face value. Although he had

been expecting a Japanese attack ever since

5 July, he had little or no reason to believe

that the night of 10-11 July might pass any

differently than those immediately preceding it.43

 About 2330 he radioed to General

Krueger that the situation in the PERSECUTION Covering Force's area gave every indication that the reconnaissance in force

eastward could be resumed the next morning according to plans.44

 Within fifteen

minutes after the dispatch of this message,

it became evident that the situation along

the Driniumor was anything but well suited

to the plans of the PERSECUTION Task Force.

The 18th Army Moves West

At approximately 2350 Japanese light

artillery (70-mm. or 75-mm.) began lobbing shells into river bank positions occupied

by elements of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry. This fire, giving the first indication

that the Japanese had artillery so far west,

was augmented within a few moments by

mortar and machine gun fire. At 2355 the

Japanese artillery became silent. At this

signal, Japanese infantry began charging

across the Driniumor into the 2d Battalion's

defenses.45

The 18th Army's Plan

The 18th Army had been long preparing

its attack and had developed elaborate plans

for the "annihilation" of the PERSECUTION

Task Force. Prior to 22 April the 18th Army

had started withdrawing westward from

Wewak, but after the Allied landings at

Hollandia and Aitape, plans for the future

employment of the 18th Army had to be

revised. On 2 May Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 18th Army to bypass

Hollandia and Aitape and join the 2d Army

in western New Guinea. General Adachi,

the 18th Army's commander, had no stomach for such a maneuver. A previous by- 41

 PTF G-2 Daily Rpt 10, 10 Jul 44, in PTF G-3

Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44. 42

 Martin Comments, pp. 10-12; Interv, author

with Capt Lowry, Apr 47. 43

 Interv, author with Gen Hall, 27 Mar 47; Ltr,

Gen Hall to Gen Ward, 29 Nov 50, no sub, in

OCMH files.

44

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1339, 10 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 10-11 Jul 44. 45

 3d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 2d Bn

128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; PCF G-3 Jnl,

9-12 Jul 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Jul 44; Interv,

author with Capt Lowry, Apr 47.
146 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

LT. GEN. HATAZO ADACHI,

Commanding General of the Japanese

18th Army.

passing withdrawal from the Huon Peninsula in late 1943 and early 1944 had cost

his army dearly, and movement across the

Ramu and Sepik Rivers in March and April

gave promise that his losses of men and

supplies would increase at an alarming rate.

He believed that a withdrawal through the

hinterland to western New Guinea might

literally decimate the 18th Army and perhaps result in much greater loss than would

an attack on Hollandia or Aitape. On the

other hand, should it remain immobile at

Wewak, the 18th Army could contribute

nothing to the Japanese war effort and

would lose all vestiges of morale. Terrain

in the Wewak area was not suited to protracted defense nor to farming which could

make the 18th Army self-sufficient, and supplies available there could only last until

September. The only means by which more

supplies could be obtained, morale kept

high, and the Japanese war effort furthered,

was to attack and seize Allied positions.46

Although his orders to bypass and withdraw to western New Guinea were not

canceled until mid-May,47 General Adachi,

apparently on the basis of earlier broad directives from the 2d Area Army,48 had already produced an outline plan of an attack

against the Hollandia-Aitape area. At first

he considered retaking Hollandia, with the

seizure of the Aitape region as a necessary

preliminary step. However, he soon realized

that the Hollandia venture was overambitious and he therefore limited the project

to an attack on Allied forces at Aitape.

The initial plans for a move against

Aitape, evolved at 18th Army headquarters

on 26 April, set 10 June as the date for the

completion of attack preparations. The assault units were to be the 20th and 41st

Divisions supported by the 66th Infantry of

the 51st Division.49 On or about 1 May the

first outline plan was supplemented by an

attack order setting forth details of objectives, assignments, and timing. The 20th

46

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 111-

13; 18th Army Opns, III, 28-32, 40-41, 47, 56-64. 47

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 55-58; Hist of Army

Section, Imperial GHQ, p. 113; 18th Army Opns,

III, 61-64. The date for both the origination and

cancellation of the orders for the 18th Army to

withdraw to western New Guinea varies according

to the source. From internal evidence, the best dates

seem to be 2 May for the origination and 16 May

for the cancellation. 48

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 48-51, 66-67. On 22

April the 2d Area Army issued General Adachi a

broad order to defeat promptly the Allied forces

which had landed at Aitape and Hollandia. On

pages 66 and 67 of the source cited here, it is indicated that General Adachi first suggested an attack

on Aitape and that the 2d Area Army thereupon

assigned him the task. 49

 18th Army Opns, III, 56-64, 66-76.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 147

Division, already ordered to secure the

Yakamul area and screen the deployment

of the rest of the 18th Army, was now instructed to soften all Allied resistance east

of the Nigia River by the end of June. It

appears that General Adachi believed the

PERSECUTION Task Force's main line of resistance to be located along the Nigia, and

there are indications that as early as the first

week of May he thought that the first strong

Allied defensive positions would be encountered along the Driniumor River.

After securing the ground west to the

Nigia River, the 20th Division was to throw

its strength against the Nigia defenses while

the 41st Division, after the 20th had broken

through the Nigia line, was to move from

Chinapelli northwest toward the Tadji airfields. The 20th Division's attack was apparently to be made along a narrow front at

some point between Chinapelli and the

mouth of the Nigia. Provision was also

made for a simultaneous assault along the

beach to divert Allied attention from the

main offensive. The date for the assault on

the supposed main line of resistance of the

PERSECUTION Task Force was now set for

10 July.50

The first step in mounting the offensive

against Aitape was to concentrate most of

the available strength of the 18th Army at

Wewak. By the end of May over 50,000

troops of that army had been withdrawn

across the Ramu and Sepik Rivers and, with

the exception of the regiments of the 20th

Division already dispatched toward Aitape,

were reorganizing at Wewak.51 By no means

were all the troops available to General

Adachi trained in ground combat. Many of

them were service personnel, others belonged to air force ground units, and some

were naval troops which had recently passed

to the control of the 18th Army. The 20th

Division's three infantry regiments were

greatly understrength and probably totaled

few more than 3,000 trained infantrymen.

The entire strength of the division, including about 1,000 men of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and other organic or attached

troops, was about 6,600 as of the end of

May. The 41st Division contained less than

4,000 infantry effectives and a total strength

of some 10,700. The 66th Infantry of the

51st Division, also scheduled to participate

in the attack on Aitape, did not number

more than 1,000 men. Altogether, General

Adachi mustered for service in the attack

about 20,000 troops. Of these, not more

than 8,000 were trained infantrymen.

About 2,500 were artillerymen with 70-mm.

and 75-mm. guns, some 5,000 were to be

engaged in supply operations in direct support of the infantry and artillery, and the

remaining 4,500 were various types of overhead and service personnel who were to

fight as infantry or engage in normal duties

such as signal operations, maintenance,

headquarters work, and the like. Another

15,000 troops were to be engaged in the

movement of supplies forward from Wewak

toward the front. The remaining 20,000

troops of the 18th Army were to garrison

the Wewak area or, because of shortages of

supply and poor physical condition, could

not be expected to engage in active operations.52

Considering his supply situation, General

Adachi was possessed of a rather remarkable degree of aplomb when he ordered the

50

 18th Army Opns, III, 77-80. 51

 The strength of the 18th Army at this time is a

highly debatable point, but 50,000-55,000 for the

number of men finally moved to Wewak or westward toward Aitape is probably not far off.

52

 18th Army Opns, III, 56-61, 156-59; 18th

Army Opns, Annex A—Statistics, Chart I.
148 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

18th Army to attack. He considered that

his men had enough infantry weapons—

though there were only 13,142 rifles, 726

machine guns, 561 grenade dischargers, 22

light mortars, thirty-six 75-mm. mountain

guns, and forty-two 70-mm. guns—but only

half enough ammunition. Ammunition for

the 70-mm. and 75-mm. guns was critically

short. Communications equipment was

nearly gone and was not expected to last

through June. There were serious shortages

of clothing, blankets, and mosquito nets.

The last-named deficit promised a high incidence of malaria, and there was a critical

shortage of malaria preventives. Other types

of medical supplies were sufficient except

those for diarrhea and skin diseases. Food,

even with half-rations for all troops, would

not last beyond the end of August. Except

for a single submarine mission late in May,

the 18th Army could get no more supplies

by sea or air, and General Adachi knew it.

The army had few trucks or barges with

which it could move the supplies it possessed

and had little equipment with which to improve existing roads or build new ones.

Barge and truck movements westward could

be made only at the mercy of Allied air and

sea patrols (mostly Australian aircraft and

Seventh Fleet PT boats based at Aitape)

while heavy rains further hampered troop

and supply movements over all roads and

trails west from Wewak.53

General Adachi soon found that his sanguine expectations of clearing the PERSECUTION Task Force from the area east of the

Nigia River by the end of June were not to

be realized. The 20th Division's westward

movement had been delayed in the series of

skirmishes along the coast east of the Driniumor in late May and early June. Further

delay occurred as inclement weather and

increasing Allied air and PT activity made

the 18th Army depend entirely upon handcarry for supply movement. The 20th Division's forward units ran out of supplies in

mid-June and halted, as did advance elements of the 41st Division. The bulk of the

41st Division, slowly moving westward from

Wewak, was now assigned the task of handcarrying supplies forward.54

Practically the only result of the employment of the 41st Division as a service unit

was a complete loss of troop morale. The

division's efforts to improve the supply situation proved futile, the physical stamina of

the troops dropped because of unsanitary

conditions, and the units engaged in supply

movements found it next to impossible even

to sustain themselves. Part of the 20th Division had to exist temporarily on less than

eleven ounces of starchy food per day, and

some of the forward units subsisted for a

short while solely on sago palm starch. No

reserve of supplies could be built up in the

forward area.

By mid-June General Adachi realized

that he was almost certainly going to encounter a strong American force along the

Driniumor, but even an attack against that

river line could not be mounted by the end

of the month. On the 19th he therefore postponed efforts to attack the expected defenses

along the Driniumor until at least 10 July,

leaving to an undetermined date an attack

on the Nigia line.55

Deployment for the Attack

By the end of June General Adachi, taking a realistic view of the situation, knew

53

 18th Army Opns, III, 56-61, 89-93.

54

 18th Army Opns, III, 89-97; 2d Bn 80th Inf

Field Diary, 31 May-14 Jul 44, as translated in 32d

Div G-2 files, in ORB AGO collection; PW interrog

and trans of enemy docs in PTF and Eastern Sector

[32d Div] G-2 Jnls, Jun and Jul 44. 55

 18th Army Opns, III, 89-97.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 149

MAP 6

that his supply problems alone had already

defeated him. Nevertheless, he felt that he

could not withdraw without offering battle

and, exhorting his troops to overcome Allied material and numerical advantages by

relying on spirit, he ordered the 20th and

41st Divisions to attack the Driniumor defenses on the night of 10-11 July.56

The final attack plan was issued at 1500

on 3 July from the 18th Army's forward

command post somewhere among the upper

reaches of the Harech. (Map 6) The focal

point of the 18th Army's attack was an island in the Driniumor on the left of the

sector held by Company E, 128th Infantry,

an island designated by the Japanese "Kawanaka Shima" (literally, Middle of the

River Island). The main body of the 237th

Infantry, Col. Masahiko Nara commanding, was to cross the Driniumor at Kawanaka Shima beginning at 2200, 10 July.

Support fire was to be provided by the 1st

Battalion, 41st Mountain Artillery, and was

scheduled to start at 2150. Elements of the

8th Independent Engineers were to reinforce the 237th Infantry. After crossing the

Driniumor, Colonel Nara's force was to

move west toward Koronal Creek and

56

 18th Army Opns, III, 97-99; MO (18th

Army's code name for Opns against Aitape) Opn

Order 5, 3 Jul 44, as cited in 18th Army Opns, III,

100-101.
150 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

northwest to clear Anamo and the other

Paup villages, on the coast west of the

Driniumor's mouth.

South of Kawanaka Shima, on the left of

the 237th Infantry, the 20th Division was to

begin its attack at 2300, under cover of

support fire from the 26th Field Artillery.

The 20th Division's units were divided into

two groups. The Right Flank Unit, under

Col. Tokutaro Ide and comprising the 80th

Infantry, with attached engineers, artillery,

and medical personnel, was to line up across

the river from the right of Company E,

128th Infantry. Also operating under Colonel Ide was the Yamashita Battalion, which,

though positive identification cannot be

made, was probably the 1st Battalion, 237th

Infantry. Below Colonel Ide's command

and opposite Company G, 128th Infantry,

was the Left Flank Unit, under Maj. Gen.

Sadahiko Miyake, Infantry Group commander of the 20th Division. General

Miyake's force consisted of the 78th Infantry (under Col. Matsujiro Matsumoto) and

attached engineers, artillery, and medical

units. After forcing a way across the

Driniumor, the Right Flank Unit was to

move directly overland to Chinapelli, while

the Left Flank Unit was to seize and clear

the Afua area and move on to Chinapelli

over the Afua-Palauru trail.

There was a fourth Japanese assault unit,

the Coastal Attack Force, under Maj.

Iwataro Hoshino, the commanding officer

of the 1st Battalion, 41st Mountain Artillery. Major Hoshino's group comprised the

headquarters and the 1st Battery of his battalion; a machine gun section of the 6th

Company, 237th Infantry; and the Regimental Gun Company, 237th Infantry. The

Coastal Attack Force (the unit which had

delayed the advance of the 1st Battalion,

128th Infantry, along the coast on 10 July)

was to co-operate with the attack of the

237th Infantry and pin down with artillery

fire the Allied units located on the coast east

and west of the Driniumor's mouth.

Assuming the success of the initial attack

on the Driniumor line, the Japanese assault

units were to prepare to drive on the Tadji

airstrips. The 237th Infantry was responsible

for initial reconnaissance of Allied defenses

expected to be encountered along the Nigia

River, while the 20th Division was to regroup at Chinapelli. The 66th Infantry,

51st Division, was to move forward as

quickly as possible after the attack on the

Driniumor line, and, bypassing the Tadji

area to the south, was to strike the Allied

main line of resistance from the Kapoam

villages, southwest of the airfields.57

During 10 July the two assault echelons

of the 20th Division moved slowly into position. Part of the 78th Infantry got into an

area allocated to the 80th, causing considerable confusion and probably accounting

for the movements of Japanese troops in

various directions as observed by PERSECUTION Covering Force patrols during the day.

57

 The foregoing plan is reconstructed from: MO

Opn Order 5, 3 Jul 44, and 10, 15, and 16, 10 Jul

44, as cited in 18th Army Opns, III, 100-106; 18th

Army Opns, III, 107-09; 2d Bn 80th Inf Field

Diary, 31 May-14 Jul 44; PW interrog and trans

of enemy docs in PTF and Eastern Sector [32d Inf

Div] G-2 Jnls, Jul and Aug 44. A Yamashita Battalion was mentioned in radio intercepts, captured

documents, and by prisoners, and one source identifies it as the 2d Battalion, 79th Infantry, but according to available Japanese documents, the latter

unit was not in the forward area on 10 July. The

1st Battalion, 237th Infantry, had been operating

under 20th Division control in the forward area for

some time, and since the rest of the 41st Division

was late getting up to the Driniumor, may have remained under the 20th for the attack. In any case,

Yamashita Battalion disappears from enemy sources

dated after 10 July. It may have been wiped out or,

as seems most likely, if it was the 1st Battalion, 237th

Infantry, it rejoined its parent unit, which was west

of the Driniumor.
DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 151

Because of communications difficulties, the

237th Infantry and the 41st Mountain Artillery were not alerted for the attack until

7 July. The units were delayed further in

last-minute attempts to secure supplies and,

as a result, did not start moving forward to

the line of departure until 9 July. Their final

attack orders were not issued until the afternoon of the 10th, and the 237th Infantry's

rear elements were just moving into line

along the Driniumor when the guns of the

supporting artillery opened fire at the scheduled hour, 2350.58

58

 18th Army Opns, III, 109-14. Japanese accounts of action along the Driniumor use times two

hours earlier than those employed by Allied documents. This discrepancy is probably due to differences in the time zones being used by the two forces.
CHAPTER VII

The Battle of the Driniumor

Phase I: The 18th Army Attacks

Withdrawal of the PERSECUTION

Covering Force

Action During the Night

of 10-11 July

The first Japanese unit to swing into

action against the Driniumor defenses of the

PERSECUTION Covering Force was the 1st

Battalion, 78th Infantry, which, about 2355,

charged across the river along a narrow

front against Company G, 128th Infantry.1

(Map 7) The Japanese attacked in two or

three screaming waves, broadening the front

after the first assault by throwing in the rest

of the 78th Infantry and possibly elements

of the 80th Infantry. Japanese reconnaissance had been good—the attackers knew

the locations of company and battalion command posts all along the American defenses—but not quite good enough. The

enemy did not know that Company G had

been reinforced during the afternoon of 10

July nor, apparently, had he discovered that

the company's front was protected by low

barbed wire.

The attacks of the 78th Infantry were

thrown back with heavy losses. Machine

gun and mortar fire from the 2d Battalion,

128th Infantry, accounted for many Japanese, numbers of whom were caught as they

tried to cross the barbed wire in front of

Company G. According to Japanese sources,

the results of American artillery fire were

even more disastrous. As soon as the enemy

attack had begun, the 120th and 129th

Field Artillery Battalions had started firing

previously prepared concentrations along

the bed and east bank of the Driniumor.

The Japanese units in or near the impact

areas suffered heavy casualties. The 1st

Battalion, 78th Infantry, was quickly reduced from 400 to 30 men, principally as a

result of the American artillery fire, which

also destroyed large numbers of artillery

weapons, machine guns, and mortars.

Late arrival of many units on the line of

departure across the Driniumor, together

with confusion among elements of the 78th

and 80th Infantry Regiments, prevented

1

 Information in this subsection is based principally on: 2d Bn 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44;

128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-27 Jul 44; 3d Bn 127th Inf

Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; PCF G-3 Jnls, 9-12 and

12-14 Jul 44; PTF G-3 Jnls, 8-11 and 11-15 Jul

44; Interv, author with Gen Hall, 27 Mar 47;

Interv, author with Capt Lowry, Apr 47; 18th

Army Opns, III, 109-14; 2d Bn 80th Inf Field

Diary, 31 May-14 Jul 44. The narrative after action

reports of American units for this and most other

phases of the operations along the Driniumor are

inadequate and sometimes misleading, and it was

necessary to reconstruct the action from journals

and journal files.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 153

MAP 7

the Japanese from executing their planned

attack of three regiments abreast. Thus,

about twenty minutes after the initial attack

and while fighting continued in front of

Company G, 128th Infantry, another enemy

force struck Company E. This assault probably marked the entry of the 80th Infantry's

main body into the action. Although Company E's men were spread thinly over a

front of 1,250 yards, the initial attack was

thrown back. But a second wave of attackers, probably comprising the 237th Infantry

and heretofore uncommitted elements of

the Right Flank Unit, began pouring across

the Driniumor toward Company E at approximately 0200. The new attackers overran the company command post and surrounded most of the unit's widely separated
154 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

strong points. Fighting continued in the

company sector for a little while, but the

unit could not long withstand the overwhelming enemy pressure. Company organization and communications broke

down. Worse still, the troops began to run

out of ammunition. A general withdrawal

commenced.

Company E's headquarters, the 1st Platoon, and the Weapons Platoon retreated

northwest. About dawn on 11 July they

moved into the 2d Battalion's command

post, which had been forced to move 500

yards northwest of its original position to

get out of the impact area of Japanese artillery and mortar fire. About twenty-five men

of the 2d and 3d Platoons withdrew north to

Company F's positions, as did a few Company H troops who had been manning supporting weapons in the Company E sector.

Some Company E men made their way independently to the coast up the AnamoAfua trail, and a few stragglers found refuge

with Company G, to the south. Some Company E troops remained hidden in the midst

of the Japanese for three days. No accurate

count of the unit's casualties is available,

but it appears that the company suffered

about 10 men killed and 20 wounded. Casualties had not caused the withdrawal. The

main factors were lack of ammunition and

the physical impossibility of holding an extended line against the numbers of Japanese

who pushed across the Driniumor. On its

immediate front, Company E had probably

been outnumbered nearly ten to one.

By 0300 the Japanese had punched a hole

some 1,300 yards wide in the American

lines and had physically occupied that area.

The initial impetus of the enemy attack had

been spent, and the scene of action quieted

down for about two hours. Company G took

this opportunity to restore some of its left

flank positions while Company F discovered

and reported to General Martin's headquarters that Company E had disappeared from

the river line. All units remaining on the

Driniumor prepared for further attacks.

These began on the left of Company G and

the right of Company F about 0500, and

continued in Company G's area until after

dawn.

This second Japanese outbreak probably

marked the movement across the Driniumor

of rear elements of the assault regiments,

headquarters personnel, medical troops,

and artillery units. The new action may also

have entailed movements by the 237th Infantry, which had become confused during

the initial attack. Reorganization of that

regiment was no easy task. The Japanese

were in unfamiliar terrain and Colonel

Nara, who had lost his way, did not rejoin

his regiment until 12 July. The two assault

regiments of the 20th Division had less trouble once they had crossed the Driniumor.

By dawn on 11 July the remaining men of

these two units had reassembled on heavily

forested high ground about 800 yards northwest of Company G, 128th Infantry.

Other than the action in the areas of

Companies E and G, 128th Infantry, there

had been very little fighting along the

Driniumor during the night. Company F

had a few minor skirmishes at its right flank

positions. Units south of the 128th Infantry's battalion were struck only by stray

artillery shells or machine gun and rifle fire.

Much of the night had been moonlit, though

a tropical ground haze somewhat limited

visibility. Men of the 3d Battalion, 127th

Infantry, could see some of the action on

their left, but the battalion could not leave

its positions to succor the units on its flank,

for it had its own defensive missions. Communications had been disrupted all along
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 155

the Driniumor during the action, and the

battalion commander had no way of learning the extent of the attack nor, for some

time, of finding out where or when to move.

Finally, the battalion could not leave its

positions without orders from higher headquarters, and such instructions were not

immediately forthcoming.

The Decision to Withdraw

General Martin, of course, knew that the

Japanese were attacking, and he knew that

the attack was taking place near the middle

of the Driniumor line.2 The covering force

commander soon learned that the Japanese

had broken through his Driniumor defenses,

but he did not know how large was the gap

in the lines. He had no reserve with which

he could close the gap, unless he pulled the

reconnaissance-in-force units back from

their positions east of the Driniumor. Feeling that the Japanese had themselves accomplished the principal missions of the

reconnaissance in force by revealing their

locations and intentions, General Martin

obtained permission from General Hall to

pull back to the Driniumor the 1st Battalion,

128th Infantry, and the 2d Squadron, 112th

Cavalry. Since it would take some time for

the two links to move west, he determined

to wait until dawn before making any attempt to restore the Driniumor line.

The 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, received its withdrawal orders from General

Martin about 0135. Rapidly assembling

from its night defensive dispositions, the

battalion started westward at 0200. Because

of communications difficulties, the 2d

Squadron, 112th Cavalry, did not receive

the word until 0800, 11 July. After a forced

march along the coast, the 128th Infantry's

unit reached Anamo about 0530, just as

dawn was breaking. General Martin ordered the battalion to counterattack down

the Anamo-Afua trail to restore the 2d

Battalion's lines.

Movement south started at 0700, and

there was no opposition for the first 1,500

yards. But about 1030 machine guns

manned by elements of the 237th Infantry

opened fire on the 1st Battalion's leading

platoon from positions on the south bank

of a small stream which cut the trail. The

terrain and enemy small arms fire made it

impossible to attempt wide, rapid flanking

maneuvers, and the advance platoons soon

found themselves in an ambush. A few

Japanese, who had been in the area at least

since dawn, threatened to cut the leading

company's line of communications. The

unit withdrew from its exposed salient just

as Japanese infantry attacked out of the

jungle on both sides of the trail and up the

stream bed from the southwest. Realizing

that the trail was held by a strong Japanese

force, the intentions of which were unknown, General Martin ordered the entire

1st Battalion back to Tiver. The abortive

action cost the unit 13 men wounded, 3

killed, and 3 missing.3

Even before the 1st Battalion's attack had

been launched, General Martin had believed that strong Japanese forces were

across the Driniumor, and the opposition

encountered by the 1st Battalion convinced

him that his forward dispositions were not 2

 This subsection is based on: 1st Bn 128th Inf

Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-27

Jul 44; 112th Cav Sum of Msgs, 1-29 Jul 44; PTF

G-3 Jnls, 8-11 and 11-15 Jul 44; PCF G-3 Jnl, 9-

12 Jul 44; Martin Comments, pp. 12-15; 18th

Army Opns, III, 111-14.

3

 For covering the withdrawal of the leading

platoon and helping to bring out wounded, Staff

Sgt. Gerald L. Endl of Company C was awarded

the Congressional Medal of Honor. Sergeant Endl

was himself killed bringing out one of the wounded.
156 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

favorable for further counterattack measures. The enemy's Kawanaka Shima salient

threatened the rear of American units still

on the Driniumor and, worse still, provided

the enemy force with an opportunity to

push directly westward, almost unmolested,

to the Tadji strips. Since his mission was to

delay any such westward movements, General Martin decided to remove the rest of

his forces from the Driniumor quickly and

to reorganize along the second delaying position at the X-ray River-Koronal Creek

line, there to await the Japanese and prepare for further counterattacks.

Withdrawal to the Second

Delaying Position

The 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, quickly

withdrew up the Anamo trail and moved

west along the coast to Tiver, from which

village it pushed a new defense line about

1,500 yards south along the west bank of

Koronal Creek.4 Company F, 128th Infantry, which held its positions near the mouth

of the Driniumor until the 1st Battalion

started withdrawing up the Anamo trail,

was assigned part of the new line. Other elements of the 2d Battalion, as they straggled

into Tiver during the 11th, strengthened the

1st Battalion's lines.

The 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, arrived back at Afua, at the southern end of

the Driniumor line, shortly after 1000 on

the 11th. Less than an hour later General

Martin alerted General Cunningham, the

commander of the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, to prepare the 112th

Cavalry and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, for movement back to the second delaying line. The movement was scheduled to

start at 1500, but General Cunningham

requested and received permission to withdraw in two echelons. The first, comprising

regimental and combat team headquarters

and the 1st Squadron, was to begin moving

as soon as possible. The second echelon was

to comprise the 2d Squadron and the 3d

Battalion, 127th Infantry.

The first echelon cleared Afua about

1130 and closed on the X-ray River at the

Afua-Palauru trail crossing about four

hours later. The 2d Squadron started west

over the trail about 1500, by which time a

rainstorm had turned the track into a quagmire. Leading elements of the 2d Squadron

took more than five hours to reach the X-ray,

and the regimental Weapons Troop did not

arrive at the stream until 2330. Troup F remained on the trail about midway between

Afua and the X-ray and did not join the rest

of the regiment until 0730 on the 12th.

Once on the X-ray, the cavalry units

spread themselves over their portion of the

second delaying line. This sector, some 4,500

yards long, ran along the west bank of the

river northward from a point nearly 1,500

yards south of the trail-crossing to a swamp

where the X-ray divided to form Akanai

and Koronal Creeks. This long defense line

could not be fully manned because a change

in plans had delayed the arrival of the 3d

Battalion, 127th Infantry, at the X-ray.

Any concerted Japanese attack along the

Afua-Palauru trail could probably have

driven the 112th Cavalry still farther west,

4

 Information in this subsection is from: PTF G-3

Jnl, 11-15 Jul 44; PFC G-3 Jnl, 9-12 Jul 44; 1st

Bn 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 2d Bn 128th

Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 112th Cav Opns and Int

Diary Aitape; 112th Cav Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 6:

112th Cav, Sum of Msgs, 1-29 Jul 44; Interv, author

with Col Hooper, 25 Mar 47; Interv, author with

Gen Cunnin gham, Apr 47; Interv, author with Capt

Lowry, Apr 47; Martin Comments, pp. 14-15; 3d

Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; MO Opn

Orders 5, 3 Jul 44, and 15 and 16, 10 Jul 44, in 18th

Army Opns, III, 100-106; 18th Army Opns, III,

109-11.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 157

but the night of 11-12 July proved quiet

at the X-ray.

While the main body of the regiment was

withdrawing, small patrols were sent east

of the Driniumor and up the west bank of

that river south of Afua. A patrol east of

Afua saw many signs of enemy activity and

was followed back to the village late in the

afternoon by a strong party of Japanese

which, however, did not choose to engage in

a fire fight. Another patrol, late in the morning, had a brush with an enemy party near

a waterfall of the Driniumor about 2,000

yards south of Afua. This enemy group

appeared to be the point of a much larger

force. About 1500, other patrols reported

that the Japanese were crossing the river in

some strength about 500 yards south of

Afua. It was the opinion at General Cunningham's headquarters that this enemy

force, the strength of which was estimated

as high as 1,200 troops,5 was a strong

flanking unit. Efforts were made to delay

the enemy movement by placing artillery

fire on the suspected crossing point. Rear

guard patrols reported at dusk that the

Japanese forces had moved up to the AfuaPalauru trail from the south and were occupying the Kwamagnirk area, about one

and one fourth miles northwest of Afua.

No Japanese accounts of the action, captured documents, nor interrogations of

prisoners tell of any large enemy force being

south of Afua on 11 July. It is probable that

the Japanese unit was merely a reconnaissance group probing the south flank of the

PERSECUTION Covering Force in conjunction with action in the center of the

Driniumor line or in preparation for flanking movements. Had any large enemy force

been in the Afua area on the 11th, it would

undoubtedly have followed the retreating

112th Cavalry toward the X-ray River, for

the Japanese had orders to move on to

Chinapelli as soon as possible.

General Cunningham originally planned

to have the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry,

close to the right on Afua and follow the

1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, to the X-ray.

But poor communications between General

Cunningham's headquarters and the infantry unit, together with infiltration of Japanese patrols between the infantry and cavalry organizations, prevented execution of

such a plan. Finally, General Cunningham

ordered the 3d Battalion to move directly

overland to the X-ray. By 1530 Colonel

Bloch had gathered his headquarters and

the bulk of Companies K, M, and L on high

ground about 800 yards west of Company

K's river position and had begun moving

that group westward. Terrain difficulties,

aggravated by the rain, forestalled progress

that night, and at 1845 Colonel Bloch's

group bivouacked for the night on East

Branch, Koronal Creek, only one and a half

miles west of the starting point. The group

started moving again at 0700 on the 12th

and about 1400 that day reached the X-ray

at a point some 1,000 yards north of the

Afua-Palauru trail crossing. The group,

which had met no Japanese on its way westward, then went into defensive positions on

the left of the 112th Cavalry.

The remainder of the 3d Battalion, 127th

Infantry, together with Company G, 128th

Infantry (which had been attached to the

battalion for the purpose of withdrawal)

and miscellaneous other groups such as field

artillery forward observer parties, was led

back to the X-ray by Capt. Leonard Lowry,

5

 This high estimate was made by one of the patrols and no such figure was relayed to higher headquarters.
158 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the commanding officer of Company I,

127th Infantry.6

Captain Lowry's force, numbering about

500 men of all ranks, withdrew westward

overland from Company K's river positions.

This group, which had to fight its way

through a Japanese trail block, spent two

nights in the jungle. The leading elements

did not reach the X-ray until 0730 on 13

July, and it was midafternoon before the

entire force had closed on the river. Then

Captain Lowry found that the rest of the

3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, and most of

the 112th Cavalry had already started back

to the Driniumor. His force was instructed

to rest and regroup along the X-ray and to

follow the rest of the command to the

Driniumor on the 14th.

Restoration of the Driniumor Line

By morning on 12 July the PERSECUTION

Covering Force was redisposed in positions

favorable to stopping any further Japanese

advance. The 112th Cavalry was on the

X-ray north and south of the Afua-Palauru

trail crossing and part of the 3d Battalion,

127th Infantry, was on the cavalry's left.

The 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, and

available troops of the 2d Battalion of the

same regiment were along the west bank

of Koronal Creek south from Tiver. In the

center of the new line was a gap almost

4,000 yards long, but the terrain in this area

was very swampy, heavily jungled, and impassable for any large body of troops. During the 12th, patrols maintaining contact

over this gap encountered only a few enemy

stragglers.7

Preparations for Counterattack

General Krueger did not believe that the

withdrawal from the Driniumor had been

necessary. He felt that the troops at General Hall's disposal, plus available air and

naval support, should have enabled the

PERSECUTION Task Force to halt the Japanese at the Driniumor. Acting on this assumption, he ordered General Hall to take

aggressive action to drive the enemy back

across the river.8

Even before receiving these orders, General Hall had taken preliminary steps to

launch a counterattack. He attached the

124th Infantry (less one battalion) to the

PERSECUTION Covering Force in preparation for a counteroffensive. The regiment

was to move to Tiver, clear the coast between that village and Anamo, and, on the

morning of the 12th, attack south along

the Anamo-Afua trail. About the same time

General Hall ordered General Martin to

retire no further except before overwhelming enemy pressure, and he forbade the

6

 Captain Lowry, an American Indian of California's Modoc Tribe, had a heterogeneous force

under him which comprised:

Company I, 127th Infantry

Company G, 128th Infantry

HMG Platoon, Company M, 127th Infantry

HMG Platoon, Company H, 128th Infantry

81-mm. Mortar Observer Party, Company M,

127th Infantry

81-mm. Mortar Section, Company H, 128th Infantry

Forward Observer Party, 120th Field Artillery

Battalion

Forward Observer Party, 129th Field Artillery

Battalion

Ten or twelve stragglers of Companies E and H,

128th Infantry

7

 PCF G-3 Jnl, 9-12 Jul 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 11-15

Jul 44; 1st Bn 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44;

112th Cav Opns and Int Diary Aitape. 8

 Rads, ALAMO to PTF, WF-1545 and WF-1498,

11 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 10-12

Jul 44.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 159

withdrawal of any unit not in actual contact

with superior forces.9

With the addition of the 124th Infantry

to the PERSECUTION Covering Force, the

latter unit would approximate the size of a

division. To take charge of this enlarged

force and to give General Martin a rest from

long duty in the front lines, General Hall

decided to place General Gill, the commander of the 32d Division and the Eastern Sector, in control of the covering force. At the

same time General Martin took General

Gill's place as the commander of the Eastern Sector.10

Taking part of Headquarters, 32d Division, forward with him, General Gill set up

a new PERSECUTION Covering Force headquarters at Tiver. The covering force he

now divided into two sections—North Force

and South Force. General Stark, previously

in charge of the Western Sector, was placed

in command of North Force. Units under

his control were the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, and the 1st and 3d Battalions, 124th

Infantry. South Force was assigned to General Cunningham, who was to control the

112th Cavalry and the 3d Battalion, 127th

Infantry. PERSECUTION Covering Force Reserve was the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry,

which was to reorganize at Tiver and hold

a perimeter around that village. The 120th

Field Artillery Battalion was to support

South Force, while the 129th and the 149th

(the latter of the 31st Division) were to

support North Force. These three battalions

were equipped with 105-mm. howitzers.

Their fires would be augmented as necessary

by the 155-mm. howitzers of the 181st Field

Artillery Battalion.11

General Gill found it expedient to postpone the counterattack. The two battalions

of the 124th Infantry could not get into

position in time to start an attack early on

12 July, and the other elements of the PERSECUTION Covering Force could well use an

extra day for reorganization and resupply.

General Gill therefore decided to delay the

124th Infantry's movement in favor of a

co-ordinated counterattack by the entire

PERSECUTION Covering Force (with the exception of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry) at 0800 on 13 July.

Then the two battalions of the 124th Infantry were to clear the Anamo-Afua trail

south to the point at which that track met

the Driniumor. The 1st Battalion, 128th

Infantry (attached to the 124th Infantry),

was to clear the coast from Anamo to the

mouth of the Driniumor and then move

down the west bank of the river and establish contact with the 124th Infantry. South

9

 Rads, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1052 and AE-1512,

12 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 1-12 Jul

44; 124th Inf Jnl, 12 Jul-10 Aug 44; Ltr, Gen Hall

to Gen Ward, 29 Nov 50, in OCMH files. 10

 Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-1550, 12 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 10-12 Jul 44; PTF FO

7, 12 Jul 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 11-15 Jul 44; Martin

Comments, pp. 16-21; Ltr, Gen Hall to Gen Ward,

29 Nov 50, and Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 2

Jan 51, no sub, copies of last two in OCMH files.

The exact terms and chronology of changes incident

to this change in command later created some confusion at higher headquarters because the initial

orders were so phrased as to make it appear that

General Gill had been relieved of the command of

the 32d Division. Such, of course, was not the intent, and on 20 July FO 7 was changed to clarify

the situation. General Martin remained on as Commander, Eastern Sector, and Assistant Division

Commander, 32d Division. Some time after the

Aitape operation, he was promoted to major general and given the command of the 31st Infantry

Division.

11

 PCF FO 1, 12 Jul 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 11-15

Jul 44. General Stark's post as Western Sector commander was taken over by Brig. Gen. Joseph C.

Hutchinson of the 31st Division, who had arrived at

Aitape with the 124th Infantry. South Force was

also called Baldy Force—a rather uncomplimentary

reference to the condition of General Cunningham's

pate.

BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 161

Force was to start moving east at 1000 on

the 13th. It was to attack along the AfuaPalauru trail to the Driniumor and restore

the river line from Afua north to the 124th

Infantry's positions.12

Action in the Coastal Sector

In order to secure a line of departure for

the 1st Battalion's attack on 13 July, Company B, 128th Infantry, moved from Tiver

to Anamo just before dark on the 12th.13 At

0730 on the 13th the rest of the 1st Battalion, supported by a platoon of Company

B, 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion, and

from offshore by fire from LCM's, moved

out of Tiver toward the east. The 1st Battalion marched through Anopapi and Anamo, passing through Company B, without

incident. About 1000, Companies A and C

arrived at Chakila, 1,000 yards east of

Anamo. On the far side of a small stream

entering the ocean just east of Chakila, the

jungle grew almost to the edge of the beach

and at the stream crossing only one platoon

could be deployed. The rest of the battalion

had to follow in narrow column. The leading platoon crossed the stream about 1050

and immediately found itself in the midst of

a Japanese ambush.

Major Hoshino's Coastal Attack Force

had crossed the Driniumor during the night

of 11-12 July, bringing 70-mm. and 75-

mm. weapons across the river and setting

them up to support an advance by the 237th

Infantry to the Paup villages and the Nigia

River. Apparently communications to the

Coastal Attack Force had broken down,

and the morning of 13 July found Major

Hoshino's unit dug in along the coast east

of Chakila awaiting further orders and preparing to defend the beach approach to the

Driniumor.

The Coastal Attack Force let the leading

platoon of the 128th Infantry pass through

its first defenses. As the rest of the advance

company started to cross the small stream,

Major Hoshino's men opened up with rifles,

machine guns, light mortars, and 75-mm.

howitzers. The American platoon hastily

retreated into the bed of the small stream,

where banks five feet high afforded protection from the Japanese fire. Another

platoon deployed along the west bank of the

creek to establish a base of fire. Tank destroyers were brought up to the west bank

and began bombarding the Costal Attack

Force's positions. One tank destroyer was

almost immediately damaged by Major

Hoshino's artillery, the fire from which soon

became so intense that the tank destroyers

and LCM support craft were forced to

retire to the west.

Artillery counterbattery fire was called

for, and the 129th Field Artillery Battalion

was quickly successful in putting out of

action most of Major Hoshino's field pieces.

The 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, then

resumed its advance behind continuing field

artillery fire which was placed as close as

fifty yards in front of the leading troops.

Two infantry platoons, one each from Companies A and C, forced a second crossing of

the creek at 1300. Two tank destroyers followed immediately and, from the beach,

delivered enfilade fire on positions of the

Coastal Attack Force at the edge of the

12

 PCF G-3 Jnl, 11-15 Jul 44; 124th Inf Jnl, 12

Jul-10 Aug 44; PCF FO 1, 12 Jul 44; 112th Cav

Opns and Int Diary Aitape. 13

 The principal source for the operations of the

1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, described in this subsection is a narrative account of the action written

by the 1st Battalion S-3 and filed in the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, Journal, 28 June-25 August

1944. Information on the Japanese side of the story

is taken principally from 18th Army Operations,

III, 111-14.
162 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

jungle. As the rest of the 1st Battalion

crossed the stream, Major Hoshino and his

men, having lost their artillery, fled inland.

Behind an improvised rolling barrage,

Companies A and C pushed on eastward.

One tank destroyer moved along the beach

and another along the coastal track, which

here ran through the jungle about seventyfive yards inland. The two forward companies reached the mouth of the Driniumor

about 1800 and the rest of the battalion

closed on the river shortly thereafter. Company A pushed down the west bank of the

river about 2,000 yards without finding any

sign of the 124th Infantry, which was driving south along the Anamo-Afua trail.

Since it was getting dark, the company set

up night defenses. Company B moved into

position on A's right rear to refuse the

battalion's south flank, and the rest of the

battalion dug in near the mouth of the

Driniumor.

In the course of the day's fighting the

Coastal Attack Force had lost all its artillery

and had suffered heavy casualties (the 1st

Battalion had counted over sixty dead Japanese during the day). Additional losses were

sustained on succeeding days, but Major

Hoshino and his men were not completely

removed as an irritant until the night of

16-17 July. During that night remnants of

the Coastal Attack Force, about thirty-five

men strong, attacked North Force and

124th Infantry command post installations

at Anamo. At 2300 the group charged out

of the jungle southwest of the Anamo perimeter. Repulsed by machine gun fire, the

enemy temporarily disappeared, only to

reappear at 0300 on 17 July moving west

against Anamo along the beach. Machine

gun fire from the American positions broke

up this second attack, but about ten minutes later the Japanese tried again, this time

moving on Anamo from the north by wading in from the sea.

Once ashore, Major Hoshino's men broke

up into small groups, attempting to destroy

mechanized equipment, automatic weapons

positions, and communications installations.

The Coastal Attack Force remnants had apparently scouted well, for they were reported

to have moved purposefully toward the most

important installations and they easily found

their way about in terrain they had vacated

only four days previously. Whatever Major

Hoshino's plans were, they were not realized.

About forty of his men were killed and the

rest dispersed.14

While this final debacle wiped out the

Coastal Attack Force, that unit had ceased

to exist as an effective support force on 13

July, when its artillery was destroyed or lost.

Without the artillery support it had expected, the 237th Infantry, still somewhere

south of Anamo and west of the Driniumor,

could no longer seriously endanger PERSECUTION Covering Force positions on the

coast.

The Attack South from the

Paup Villages

The 124th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion) had started its attack toward the

14

 The story of the attack on Anamo is reconstructed from: PTF G-2 Daily Rpt 17, 17 Jul 44,

PCF G-2 Daily Rpt 18, 17 Jul 44, and Msg, G-2

Eastern Sector to 126th and 128th Inf Regts, 17

Jul 44, all in 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-27 Jul 44;

ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 58, 13 Sep 44, copy

in G-2 DofA files; 18th Army Opns, III, 111-14.

Allied estimates of the strength of the Japanese

force engaged in this action range from 35 to 80

men. The Japanese source gives a figure of "Major

Hoshino and 30 survivors." Major Hoshino was

himself killed during this action.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 163

Driniumor about 0700 on 13 July.15 The

3d Battalion struck south from Anopapi

along a route 1,000 yards west of the Anamo-Afua trail. The 1st Battalion began

moving down that trail from Anamo about

1000 hours. Documents captured by early

morning patrols disclosed that the 237th

Infantry was preparing an attack on

Anamo, and both 124th Infantry units expected some fighting.

Shortly after 0800 the 3d Battalion began

to encounter opposition, and not more than

500 yards south of Anopapi the point was

held up by a Japanese force of platoon

strength. In the dense jungle it was almost

an hour before the Japanese could be dispersed and the advance continued. Half an

hour and another 500-odd yards later, a

well-concealed but lightly held enemy ambush again halted the battalion. Allowing

the bulk of the unit to pass through the ambush position, Japanese machine gunners

and riflemen opened fire on the rear guard.

Finally Company L drove the enemy force

(probably elements of the 1st Battalion,

237th Infantry) into the jungle and at 1000

the advance was resumed. Now the 3d Battalion swung southeast toward the AnamoAfua trail, encountering only scattered rifle

fire the rest of the day.

The 1st Battalion had met no strong, organized resistance as it advanced south

along the Anamo-Afua trail, but there was

a good deal of scattered rifle fire from Japanese stragglers. Somehow the battalion had

moved off the main trail during the early

afternoon and when, about 1700, it reached

the Driniumor, it was at a point some 1,500

yards north of the trail-river junction. Its

position in relation to that of the 3d Battalion is not clear. Apparently the 3d Battalion had crossed the 1 st's axis of advance

to the 1st Battalion's rear sometime during

the afternoon and at 1700 hours reached

the Anamo-Afua trail at a point about

1,000 yards west of the Driniumor and 2,000

yards north of the trail-river junction. So

much, at least, seems clear from the 3d Battalion and regimental records, although the

1st Battalion's records indicate that the 3d

bivouacked at a point about 2,000 yards

due west of the 1st's position on the river.

Suffice it to say that 1st Battalion patrols

could find no trace of the 3d Battalion before dark on the 13th.

During the night of 13-14 July, there

were four separate perimeters in the North

Force sector of the Driniumor line. The battalions of the 124th Infantry, with Colonel

Starr's approval, remained out of contact

with each other, although both had radio

contact with North Force headquarters.

Companies A and B, 128th Infantry, were

in a separate perimeter on the river some

600 yards north of the 1st Battalion, 124th

Infantry. Patrol contact was established between the two perimeters before dark but,

again with Colonel Starr's approval, no attempt was made to set up a firm line be15

 Information in this subsection is from: 124th

Inf Jnl, 12 Jul-10 Aug 44; 124th Inf Opns Rpt

Aitape, pp. 5-6; Ltr, CO 124th Inf to CG 31st Inf

Div, 22 Jul 44 (copy of this ltr was lent to the

author by Col Edward M. Starr, CO 124th Inf, but

no copy exists in official files) ; PTF G-3 Jnls, 11-

15 and 15-19 Jul 44; PCF G-3 Jnl, 14-16 Jul 44;

128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-27 Jul 44; 1st Bn 128th Inf

Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 2d Bn 128th Inf Jnl, 28

Jun-25 Aug 44; Ltr, Col Starr to Gen Ward, 21

Aug 51; Ltr, Maj Edward A. Becker [S-3 1st Bn

124th Inf] to Col Starr, 13 Nov 50, atchd to Ltr,

Starr to Ward, 21 Aug 51, copies of both ltrs in

OCMH files; Contribution of First Battalion 124th

Infantry in Aitape Campaign, British New Guinea,

1944, pp. 4-8. The latter document, essentially the

diary of the S-3 1st Bn 124th Inf, was lent to the

author by Major Becker through Colonel Starr, and

no copy exists in official files. It is cited hereafter as

1st Bn 124th Inf in Aitape Campaign. The principal

source of Japanese information is 18th Army Opns,

III, 111-14.
164 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tween the two for the night. Instead of

spreading men thinly along the river, the

units in the two perimeters set up all-around

defenses against the possibility of Japanese

attack from the west. The fourth perimeter

was that of the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, at the mouth of the

Driniumor. The 128th Infantry units, like

those of the 124th, had radio contact with

North Force headquarters.

Early on the morning of 14 July the 3d

Battalion, 124th Infantry, moved on to the

Driniumor to the right of the 1st Battalion

of that regiment. During the same time the

1st Battalion extended its left northward

while the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry,

pushed its right south to establish a firm line

along the river, simultaneously consolidating its own lines.

The attack of the 124th Infantry had disrupted plans of the 237th Infantry to clear

the Paup villages, but not before that unit

had caused some trouble at Tiver. There the

2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, reorganizing

after its withdrawal from the Driniumor,

had established a defensive perimeter. Colonel Nara, commanding the 237th Infantry,

had rejoined his regiment (having been lost

since the night of 10-11 July) about noon

on 12 July. In compliance with previous

orders, he immediately sent scouts out toward the Nigia River. Finding the new

Allied defensive line around Tiver and south

along Koronal Creek, he ordered his 1st and

2d Battalions to attack. Shortly after dark on

12 July the 1st Battalion struck Company F,

128th Infantry, and succeeded in overrunning one machine gun position. A sharp fire

fight continued and Company F was ultimately reinforced by Company A, which,

however, did not arrive until most of the

Japanese had already withdrawn.

Colonel Nara tried to organize more attacks for the 13th, but his deployment was

partially frustrated by the advance of the

124th Infantry's battalions, which struck his

right flank. Finally, late on the afternoon of

the 13th, the 2d Battalion, 237th Infantry,

bypassing 124th Infantry elements, fell

upon the lines of Company E, 128th Infantry, a few hundred yards south from Tiver.

Giving ample proof that it had not lost its

combat effectiveness after its disaster during

the night of 10-11 July, Company E held

firm and drove off the Japanese. But the

237th Infantry elements now swung to the

northeast in an attempt to reach less swampy

terrain near the beach. By 1900 the entire

front of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry,

was being subjected to a series of small-scale

attacks which, combined with sporadic

outbreaks of enemy machine gun fire, continued throughout the night of 13-14 July.

At dawn on the 14th the remaining elements

of the 237th Infantry withdrew into the

jungle south and southeast of Tiver. They

had suffered heavy losses and had found the

combination of swampy ground along the

Koronal and the defensive fires of the 2d

Battalion, 128th Infantry, too much for

them. Colonel Nara abandoned his plans to

clear the Paup villages, and after 14 July

only a few minor patrol skirmishes occurred

in the Tiver area.

South Force and the Gap

General Cunningham's South Force had

begun moving eastward from the X-ray

River on schedule at 1000 on 13 July.16

 The

16

 This subsection is based on: 112th Cav Opns

Rpt Aitape, pp. 6-8; 112th Cav Opns and Int Diary

Aitape; 112th Cav Sum of Msgs, 1-29 Jul 44; 124th

Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 6; 124th Inf Jnl, 12 Jul-
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 165

1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, led out over

the Afua-Palauru trail, followed by the 2d

Squadron and part of the 3d Battalion,

127th Infantry. At a stream-crossing on the

trail about 2,200 yards east of the X-ray,

the leading troop was halted by approximately seventy-five Japanese who were dug

in across the track. This force, probably elements of the 78th Infantry, faded away as

Troop A crossed the stream at a point north

of the trail and threatened the enemy's

right. A second Japanese position was encountered at another stream-crossing about

1,500 yards west of Afua, but the 1st Squadron, after a short but sharp fire fight, broke

through this opposition also. About 1430

Australian aircraft based on the Tadji strips

bombed and strafed the Afua area. Fifteen

minutes later the South Force column

reached the Driniumor at the village.

The 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry (less

Captain Lowry's group), pushed north up

the Driniumor to its old defensive positions,

while the 112th Cavalry spread out along

the Driniumor near Afua. Patrols of the 3d

Battalion moved down the river as far as the

junction of the Anamo-Afua trail with the

Driniumor, but could find no sign of the

124th Infantry. The latter unit had reported

earlier in the day that it had reached the

trail-river junction, but, unfamiliar with the

terrain along the Driniumor, had undoubtedly erred in estimating its position. On the

morning of 14 July General Cunningham

sent patrols 1,500 yards north of the junction, but still no trace of the 124th Infantry

could be found. The South Force commander thereupon dispatched Troop E,

112th Cavalry, north beyond the lines of the

3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, to close the

wide gap which obviously existed in the

Driniumor line. The gap had probably been

at least 2,500 yards wide during the night of

13-14 July but was narrowed on the latter

day by South Force's extension northward.

However, it remained about 1,500 yards

wide at nightfall on the 15th.

The Japanese had some knowledge of this

weakness in the American lines and took advantage of it, especially during the hours of

darkness. During daylight the enemy stayed

away from the river for the most part, permitting American forces to move through

the gap with only occasional rifle fire to oppose them. Their own use of the gap sometimes cost the Japanese dearly, and during

the night of 14-15 July about 135 of the

enemy were killed in the area by the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry.17

By nightfall on the 15th General Cunningham was becoming sensitive about the

gap. He could not convince General Gill, at

PERSECUTION Covering Force headquarters,

that South Force had already extended its

lines almost 1,000 yards beyond its assigned

sector without finding any elements of the

124th Infantry. General Cunningham felt

that the 124th Infantry was not giving him

much co-operation. He claimed that without his permission the infantry regiment had

held Troop E within its lines during the

night of 15-16 July and he complained that

the infantry was giving no protection to

10 Aug 44; 3d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44;

Interv, author with Gen Cunningham, Apr 47;

Interv, author with Col Hooper, 25 Mar 47; Interv,

author with Capt Lowry, Apr 47; PTF G-3 Jnls,

11-15 and 15-19 Jul 44; PCF G-3 Jnls, 14-16 and

16-20 Jul 44; 18th Army Opns, III, 107-15; Ltr,

Becker to Starr, 13 Nov 50; 1st Bn 124th Inf in

Aitape Campaign, pp. 7-9. Additional information

was supplied by General Cunningham and Colonel

Hooper who, during January 1950, read and made

notes on draft chapters concerning operations at

Aitape. These notes, a copy of which is in the

OCMH files, are hereafter cited as Cunningham

Notes.

17

 This enemy casualty figure is from Ltr, CO

124th Inf to CG 31st Div, 22 Jul 44.
166 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

South Force wire parties which were trying

to establish telephone communications with

headquarters installations on the coast.18

PERSECUTION Covering Force headquarters was also critical of South Force's communications, but General Cunningham did

not believe criticism was justified. He

pointed out that his wire parties received no

help, that wire was continually being cut

by the enemy or by accidents, and that atmospheric conditions caused radio malfunctioning in the South Force area after dark.

In view of his communications difficulties

and the trouble in closing the gap, General

Cunningham requested that South Force be

reinforced by an infantry battalion. This request could not be complied with for some

days.

Meanwhile the 124th Infantry continued

to report that it had pushed far south of the

trail-river junction without encountering

any troops except Japanese stragglers. Headquarters, PERSECUTION Covering Force, apparently accepted the 124th Infantry's reports at face value, but there is little doubt

that the 124th Infantry incorrectly reported

its locations. On the other hand, the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had been operating

along the river since late June. It can be presumed that the men of that unit could recognize on 13 July the positions they had occupied as late as the morning of the 11th.

On the afternoon of 15 July, Colonel Starr,

commanding the 124th Infantry, apparently

concluded that his regiment had not moved

as far south as earlier reported. At that time

he ordered the unit to adjust its lines to the

south and extend its defenses up the Driniumor to the left flank of South Force.

At 0800 on the 16th, the 3d Battalion,

124th Infantry, using Troop E of the 112th

Cavalry as point and guide, started moving

south to close the gap. Troop E had scarcely

moved out of its night bivouac when it was

met by heavy fire from enemy positions on

both sides of the Driniumor. Learning that

the 237th Infantry was in serious danger of

being cut off west of the Driniumor by the

American restoration of the river line, the

18th Army had made efforts to keep the

original crossing point open. For this purpose two companies of the 1st Battalion,

239th Infantry, had been hurriedly sent forward from the Marubian area. At the same

time, Colonel Nara, defeated in his attempts

to clear the Paup villages, had turned the

237th Infantry back toward the Kawanaka

Shima area and ordered the remnants of his

3d Battalion to attack the American rear.

Most of the fire on Troop E evidently

came from the two companies of the 1st

Battalion, 239th Infantry, on the east side

of the river. While Troop E was seeking

cover from this fire and fighting off a few

Japanese who attacked from the left flank,

the 3d Battalion, 237th Infantry, hit the

right of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry,

close behind Troop E. The Japanese succeeded in splitting the American force.

Companies I and K, 124th Infantry, halted

to face the enemy attack from the west,

while Troop E, Company L, and most of

Company M pushed on southward through

increasing opposition from the 239th Infantry's companies. Fighting every foot of

the way, the three American units reached

South Force lines about 1500. They killed

18

 Major Becker, S-3 of the 1st Battalion, 124th

Infantry, indicates (in Ltr, Becker to Starr, 13 Nov

50) that he feels some of General Cunningham's remarks were unjustified: first, because it would have

been impossible for Troop E to have returned to

South Force before dark; second, because the Troop

E commander was only advised to stay in North

Force's lines; and third, because the 124th Infantry

had not been asked by South Force to provide protection for wire parties.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 167

about forty Japanese during the move south

and closed the larger portion of the gap.

To the north, Companies I and K, 124th

Infantry, dug in for the night. During the

next day, 16 July, attempts made to close a

remaining 500 yards of the gap were unsuccessful, although an additional forty-five

Japanese were killed as elements of the

237th or 239th Infantry Regiment continued their efforts to keep the gap open. Late

on the 17th the gap was temporarily closed,

but it was reopened during the succeeding

night for a distance of about 300 yards,

probably by elements of the 237th Infantry.

The last small portion of the gap was closed

by the 124th Infantry on the morning of 18

July. Then the remnants of the 3d Battalion,

237th Infantry, withdrew to the west, while

the 239th Infantry's force, its commander

killed, withdrew eastward. The PERSECUTION Covering Force's Driniumor River line

was once again solid from Afua to the coast,

a week after the 18th Army had made its

first break-through.

Operations West of the Driniumor

General Hall realized that the re-establishment of the Driniumor line might leave

strong Japanese units west of the river.

These enemy troops, although cut off from

their sources of supply, could harass the rear

of the Driniumor line, move south to cut the

Afua-Palauru trail, or continue to annoy

the North Force command post area. Notwithstanding the fact that he had been ordered to counterattack when the impetus of

the 18th Army's initial assault had been

spent, General Hall did not feel that the

time for counterattack beyond the Driniumor was at hand but decided that the most

immediately pressing problem was to clear

all Japanese units from the area west of the

river. Furthermore, he wished to await the

arrival at Aitape of at least one regimental

combat team of the 43d Division, a reinforcement which would make possible the

release of units already acquainted with the

terrain in the Driniumor area from positions

on the main line of resistance. Finally, the

task force commander believed it necessary

to locate the main body of the 20th Division

before launching a counterattack. Only the

78th Infantry of that division had so far

been identified in the Driniumor area, but it

was believed that the rest of the division had

participated in the attack during the night

of 10-11 July.19

For the purpose of clearing the enemy

from the area west of the Driniumor, General Hall released the 1st and 2d Battalions,

127th Infantry, from their positions on the

main line of resistance and placed them under General Gill's control.20

 By morning of

the 16th, both battalions had closed at

Tiver. The 2d Battalion was to clear the

Japanese from an area between Koronal

Creek and the Driniumor to a depth of one

and a half miles inland, while the 1st Battalion was to set up a patrol base south of

the 2d between the two streams. After clearing its sector, the 2d was to follow the 1st

south and aid the latter in driving any Jap19

 Interv with Gen Hall, 27 Mar 47; Rads, PTF

to ALAMO, AE-1914, 14 Jul 44, and AE-2145, 16

Jul 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-16

Jul 44. 20

 The action behind North Force is based on:

PTF G-3 Jnls, 12-14 and 15-17 Jul 44; PGF G-3

Jnl, 16-20 Jul 44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, Sec.

II, pp. 4-6; 127th Inf Jnl file, 10-31 Jul 44; 1st Bn

127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 2d Bn 127th Inf

Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 124th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape,

pp. 6-8; 124th Inf Jnl, 12 Jul-10 Aug 44. There

now remained on the main line of resistance the

126th Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 128th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was being

held by General Hall at Blue Beach as a mobile

reserve.
168 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

anese it could find south into the Torricelli

Mountains.

In a series of complicated and sometimes

un-co-ordinated company actions on 16-18

July, the 2d Battalion overran the area assigned to it, encountering a few small groups

of the 237th Infantry and helping to disrupt

that regiment's plans for continuing attacks

on the Paup villages and keeping open a

crossing over the Driniumor. The activities

of the 2d Battalion actually resulted in a

mixed blessing. On the one hand, the battalion cleared many Japanese from the rear

of North Force, but on the other, in driving

elements of the 237th Infantry south and

eastward, it inadvertently caused the 124th

Infantry much difficulty in its mission of

closing and keeping closed the gap in the

Driniumor line.

After the operations of the 2d Battalion,

127th Infantry, and the closing of the gap

between North and South Forces on 18 July,

the 124th Infantry's sector remained quiet

for a few days.21 On the 21st, the 2d Battalion of the 169th Infantry, 43d Division,

arrived on the Driniumor to strengthen the

124th Infantry.22 The new arrivals took over

about 1,000 yards of the river line on the

right of the 124th Infantry. They had

arrived none too soon.

General Adachi still had plans to reopen

a crossing of the Driniumor near Kawanaka

Shima in order to send supplies across the

river and to continue efforts to divide the

Allied defenders. For this purpose he instructed the 239th Infantry, supported by

elements of the 238th Infantry and the 41st

Mountain Artillery, to move against the

Kawanaka Shima area on 27 July. For reasons unknown, he changed these orders on

the 19th and ordered the same 41st Division

elements to strike immediately and dispatched the 66th Infantry, 51st Division,

westward to participate in the attack.

It was not until the night of 21-22 July

that the Japanese forward units were able to

organize for any sort of attack. During that

night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun,

and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor.

This fire increased the next morning, and

about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements

of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ."

 23

 conducted by elements

of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but

other attacks followed as troops of the 1st

Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move

across the Driniumor from the east, striking

both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of

the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before

dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in

its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion,

169th Infantry, reported their own losses as

five killed and twenty-five wounded.24

Further attempts to reopen the river crossing were made by the 1st Battalion, 239th 21

 The following story of Japanese attempts to reopen a crossing of the Driniumor is based on: 2d

Bn 169th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 2-3; 124th Inf

Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 6-9; 124th Inf Jnl, 12 Jul10 Aug 44; PCF G-3 Jnl, 22-26 Jul 44; 3d Bn

127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 18th Army Opns,

III, 114-20; PW interrogs and trans of captured

docs in PTF and Eastern Sector G-2 Jnls, Jul and

Aug 44. 22

 The 169th Infantry had arrived at Blue Beach

from New Zealand on 20 July.

23

 124th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 8. 24

 The report of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry,

states that 274 Japanese were killed in the area of

the night and day action. This figure appears to be

a rather high estimate. The American figure is that

given in the Journal of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry. A 124th Infantry regimental report, later on

the 22d, gives total American casualties in the 24-

hour action as 11 killed, 24 wounded, and 20 nonbattle.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 169

Infantry, on the night of 23-24 June, but

these efforts were thwarted by the troops

along the river and support fire by the 149th

Field Artillery Battalion from the coast

near Anamo. There was another minor

flare-up the next night near the point where

the lines of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry,

and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, joined.

With this last effort, the 18th Army gave up

attempts to reopen a river crossing in the

North Force area, which remained relatively quiet thereafter.

Meanwhile, the 1st and 2d Battalions,

127th Infantry, had continued mopping-up

operations west of the Driniumor.25 From 16

through 18 July the 1st Battalion had moved

slowly south from Tiver along Koronal

Creek, driving scattered elements of the

237th Infantry before it or pushing them

eastward toward the river lines of the 124th

Infantry. On the 18th the 1st Battalion,

127th Infantry, now on the X-ray River

some 6,000 yards south of Tiver, started

moving east to set up a patrol base on East

Branch, Koronal Creek, at a point about

2,000 yards north of the Afua-Palauru trail

and an equal distance east of the X-ray. Patrolling thoroughly in heavily jungled terrain, the battalion bivouacked for the night

of 18-19 July some 400 yards west of its

objective.

During the evening, Headquarters, PERSECUTION Covering Force, informed the

battalion that the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, was located between East Branch and

the 112th Cavalry's positions at Afua, to the

southeast. This was easy to believe, for the

1st Battalion's right flank patrols had encountered many Japanese during the afternoon, and the 112th Cavalry reported that

its patrols had discovered large groups of

Japanese in the vicinity of Kwamagnirk,

about midway between the 1st Battalion

and Afua. Although opposition was expected, the 1st Battalion moved on to its

patrol base site during the 19th without encountering any Japanese. The unit was

joined at its new base on the 20th by the 2d

Battalion, which had moved south from

Tiver against little opposition.

The two battalions were now isolated in a

heavily jungled area and insofar as they

knew might have been surrounded by a

strong enemy force. Overland supply was

both dangerous and slow, and for the next

two days the units were supplied principally

by airdrop. Communications with Headquarters, PERSECUTION Covering Force, or

with units along the Driniumor were at best

sporadic. Telephone lines could not be kept

in service and radios would not work much

of the time.

The battalions had not yet located any

large body of enemy troops west of the

Driniumor. Therefore, on the morning of 20

July, General Gill ordered the units to prepare to move southeast toward the 112th

Cavalry and Afua, where a great deal of

enemy activity had broken out two days

earlier. Time was to be taken before departure from the patrol base to co-ordinate

plans with South Force and to make additional attempts to locate the main body of

the 20th Division, which, General Hall still

suspected, might be west of the Driniumor.

During the next three days the two 127th

Infantry battalions sent out patrols in all

directions. No large bodies of Japanese

troops were located, but a number of small

parties of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division,

25

 Information on further operations of the 127th

Infantry west of the Driniumor is based on: 127th

Inf Jnl file, 10-31 Jul 44; 1st Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 28

Jun-25 Aug 44; 2d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25

Aug 44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, Sec. II, pp.

4-6; PTF G-3 Jnls, 15-19 and 19-21 Jul 44.
170 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

were encountered. This patrolling continued

while efforts were made by Headquarters,

PERSECUTION Covering Force, to obtain

some understanding of the steadily deteriorating situation of South Force in the Afua

area.

The Japanese Attack on the South Flank

Even while South Force had been going

about the business of restoring its section of

the Driniumor line and helping to close the

gap between South and North Forces, the

Japanese had begun new offensive maneuvers in the Afua area. The night of 13-14

July—South Force's first night back on the

Driniumor—was quiet, and only scattered

contacts were made with enemy forces the

next day. But on the 15th there was a noticeable increase in Japanese activity in South

Force's area, especially in the vicinity of

Afua.

Japanese Attack Preparations

On 15 July patrols of the 112th Cavalry

encountered many small parties of Japanese

near Afua and found indications that many

more enemy troops were in the same region.26

 The next day, groups of Japanese

were observed crossing the Driniumor in

both directions at a fording point about

2,500 yards south of Afua. About the same

time it was discovered that the enemy had

blazed a rough track south of the AfuaPalauru trail and running along the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains from the

Driniumor to the headwaters of the X-ray

River.

While it would obviously have been desirable to block this new trail, especially at the

point where it crossed the Driniumor, General Hall did not feel he could spare any

troops for the task. He was not greatly concerned about enemy movements on the right

of South Force and he did not believe that

the enemy could or would move any large

force west along the new trail. He also knew

that the enemy could find other routes to

bypass South Force even if the one trail

were cut. Nevertheless, South Force was

ordered to do everything in its power to stop

Japanese westward movements. General

Cunningham was instructed to send strong

patrols south of Afua to harass Japanese

forces on the new trail and he was also

ordered to keep the Afua-Palauru trail clear

of enemy troops in order to keep open the

overland line of communications to Blue

Beach via Chinapelli and Palauru.

Before receiving these instructions, General Cunningham, who believed that South

Force was being outflanked by large numbers of Japanese, had wanted to shorten his

lines by retiring north of Afua. The new

orders disapproved such a withdrawal. In

order to protect his south flank, General

Cunningham therefore bent his right back

along the Afua-Palauru trail west approximately 600 yards from the Driniumor. On

high ground at the western extremity of this

new line he stationed Troop A, 112th Cavalry. The remainder of the 1st Squadron

was posted at Afua and along the Driniumor

to a point about 800 yards north of that

village. All South Force units were alerted

26

 Information in this and the following subsection

is based principally on: 112th Cav Opns Rpt Aitape,

pp. 7-9; 112th Cav Opns and Int Diary Aitape;

112th Cav Sum of Msgs, 1-29 Jul 44; PTF G-3

Jnls, 15-19, 19-21, and 21-26 Jul 44; PCF G-3

Jnls, 14-16, 16-20, and 20-22 Jul 44; Interv, author

with Gen Cunningham, Apr 47; Interv, author with

Col Hooper, 25 Mar 48; 18th Army Opns, III, 110-

23. In the last-named source, upon which reconstruction of Japanese plans is principally based, are cited

MO Opn Orders 17, 14 Jul; 21, 16 Jul; 22, 19 Jul;

23, 21 Jul; and 24, 21 Jul 44.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 171

to the possibility of attack from the south

and west. The Japanese had been preparing

just such an attack.

On 11 July the assault units of the 20th

Division had begun assembling on the high

ground west of the Driniumor and had

started preparations for further movement

westward. The overland withdrawal of the

3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, and Company

G, 128th Infantry, on 11-13 July had apparently prevented the Left and Right Flank

Units from reorganizing as rapidly as

planned. The return of South Force to the

Driniumor, beginning on the 13th, had

found the two Japanese attack forces still

trying to concentrate for movement westward. On the 15th the two units were combined as the Miyake Force under General

Miyake, who was ordered to secure Afua

and the high ground to the west in preparation for a concerted drive northward toward

the coast when the rest of the 20th Division

arrived in the forward area.

Although General Miyake was unable to

organize any rapid assault on Afua—his first

objective—the contacts which the 1st

Squadron, 112th Cavalry, made with Japanese units in the Afua area on 15 and 16

July probably marked Miyake Force preparations for attack. By evening of the 16th,

however, General Adachi realized that the

18th Army's initial break-through along the

Driniumor had not achieved decisive results.

Instead, the PERSECUTION Covering Force

had managed to wipe out the Coastal Attack Force, cut off and inflict heavy losses

on the 237th Infantry, greatly reduce the

78th Infantry's strength, restore the Driniumor line with greater strength than had

been employed on the river prior to 10 July,

and seriously threaten the Miyake Force's

lines of communication. Under such conditions the 18th Army commander knew it

was impossible to execute an attack on the

Allied main line of resistance around the

Tadji airfields, in preparation for which the

Miyake Force's drive to the coast had been

ordered. General Adachi therefore abandoned his original plan in favor of another

attack against the United States forces along

the Driniumor, forces which he now believed

to comprise most of the Allied troops in the

Aitape area.

To start this new attack, those elements

of the 20th Division still east of the Driniumor were ordered to cross the river and drive

on Afua from the south. Earlier orders to

the 66th Infantry, 51st Division, to aid the

forward elements of the 41st Division to the

north were canceled, and the regiment was

attached to the 20th Division for operations

in the Afua area. The new efforts by the

20th Division were to be carried out in conjunction with the attack against Afua which

the Miyake Force had already been ordered

to undertake.

The Japanese Retake Afua

On 17 and 18 July the Miyake Force

slowly maneuvered into position to the right

and rear of the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry. On the evening of the 18th the 3d Battalion, 78th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion,

80th Infantry, poured out of the jungle west

and northwest of the 1st Squadron's command post and the contiguous perimeter

held by Troop A, west of Afua. The two

South Force units were pushed 250 yards to

the northeast, where they rapidly established

new positions. Reinforcements—two rifle

platoons from the 1st Squadron and one

from the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry—

arrived at the new perimeter at dusk. The

next morning the composite force attacked

south and regained the ground vacated the
172 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

previous night. The Miyake Force units fled

northwest into the jungle without firing a

shot.

Early in the afternoon of 19 July fresh

Japanese units began to surround the Troop

A position, moving in from the north, northwest, west, and southwest. The 1st Squadron commander called for artillery fire to

break up this enemy maneuver. Upon cessation of the fire, Troop A attacked to the

south and west for a second time. Driving

at least a company of Japanese before it,

the troop pushed 600 yards southwest of its

original positions astride the Afua-Palauru

trail and temporarily disrupted enemy

plans to seize the position.27 About 140

Japanese had been killed during the two

days' operation around Troop A. South

Force, at the same time, lost 8 men killed

and 29 wounded, all from the 1st Squadron,

112th Cavalry.28 There were strong indications that more attacks might occur in the

1st Squadron area, but Troop A was not

destined to take part in any of these actions.

It was replaced on the 21st by Troop C.

After this change, South Force positions

were as follows: The 3d Battalion, 127th

Infantry, held about 1,200 yards along the

river south from the junction of the AnamoAfua trail with the Driniumor. On the right

of the 3d Battalion was the 2d Squadron,

112th Cavalry, with two troops on the river.

Troop E was in reserve about 200 yards west

of the river near an open space employed for

air-dropping supplies to South Force. In a

patch of banana trees just south of this dropping ground were Headquarters, South

Force, and Headquarters, 112th Cavalry.

The 1st Squadron defended the west bank

of the river north from Afua 1,200 yards,

tying its left into the right of the 2d Squadron. About 550 yards west and slightly north

of Afua were Troop C and Headquarters,

1st Squadron. Most of Troop C's defenses

faced north and northwest. The troop's

southeast flank was tied loosely into the lines

of Troop B, at Afua, but this connection was

more theoretical than actual and contact

between the two was maintained principally

by patrols and sound-powered telephone.

Even as Troop C was replacing Troop A,

the Japanese were making new plans for attack. Orders were issued on 19 July for the

entire 20th Division immediately to attack

and clear the Afua area. The Miyake Force

(to which was now attached the remnants of

the 237th Infantry, 41st Division, in addition to the 78th and 80th Infantry Regiments of the 20th Division) was to attack

from the north and west, while the rest of the

20th Division, including the 79th Infantry,

was to attack from the south. The 66th Infantry, having difficulty moving forward

and suffering from a series of changes in

orders, was to remain in reserve east of the

Driniumor and turn its supplies over to the

Miyake Force.

Although the co-ordinated Japanese attack was to have been on 19 July, only the

isolated action in the area of Troop A, 112th

Cavalry, occurred that day. Probably the

Japanese were unable to get organized on

schedule, an occupational disease which

27

 The Japanese account has these actions occurring on 17 and 18 July but all American sources

state that the attacks against Troop A and the 1st

Squadron command post occurred on the 18th and

19th of the month. 28

 The American casualty figures are from 112th

Cavalry records. According to the Cunningham

Notes, the figure for Japanese casualties is based on

a count of Japanese dead by Colonel Miller, the

commander of the 112th Cavalry Regiment. For a

series of heroic actions and outstanding leadership

during the period 16-19 July, 2d Lt. Dale Eldon

Christensen, a platoon leader of Troop A, was

awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Lieutenant Christensen was killed on 4 August while

leading his platoon in another attack.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 173

marked all Japanese operations in the

Aitape area. The 79th Infantry and Headquarters, 20th Division, did not cross the

Driniumor until 18 and 19 July. Moreover,

the 237th Infantry remnants had not yet

joined the Miyake Force, the other two components of which apparently had some difficulty reorganizing after their operations on

the evening of the 18th and the morning of

the 19th. By evening on 21 July, however,

the Japanese were ready.

At 1645 a Japanese 75-mm. mountain

gun opened point blank fire on the semiisolated perimeter of Troop C, 112th Cavalry. After a few rounds from this weapon,

an enemy force (estimated by the cavalrymen to be about a battalion strong and

probably part of the 79th Infantry) attacked Troop C from the south and west,

cutting it off from the rest of South Force.

Troop B, at Afua, tried to re-establish contact with Troop C, but was prevented from

so doing by enemy parties now stationed

along the Afua-Palauru trail. Two rifle

platoons of Company I, 127th Infantry,

were sent southwest from their river positions to aid Troop C. One reached the cavalry unit during the night, but the other was

forced to fall back to South Force's command post.29

 Heavy rifle, machine gun, and

mortar fire, and even hand-to-hand fighting,

continued in the Troop C area throughout

the night. At the same time elements of the

Miyake Force attempted to overrun the

South Force command post area.

At dawn on the 22d Troop B made several more efforts to reach Troop C and General Cunningham sent out his reserve, Troop

E, in another attempt to relieve the beleaguered unit. Both actions were futile, for the

Japanese had managed to secure control

over all the commanding ground west and

northwest of Afua. Not knowing what other

plans the Japanese might have in mind,

General Cunningham was unwilling to pull

any more troops away from the river defenses. Moreover, he now considered the

position of his right flank untenable. He

therefore withdrew Troop B north of Afua

about 1,000 yards and used the unit to form

a new defense line which ran westward

about 500 yards from Troop A's right flank,

anchored on the Driniumor. South Force's

right flank was now refused and additional

protection had been secured for medical,

supply, and command post installations at

the dropping ground banana patch. Troop

C was left isolated behind Japanese lines,

and Afua was again released to the enemy.

Changes in PERSECUTION

Task Force Plans

American forces had been back on the

Driniumor since 13 July and the Driniumor

line had been restored from Afua to the

coast by evening on the 18th. Only four days

later, the PERSECUTION Covering Force had

found it necessary to give up a portion of

the restored line. Even before this second

retreat, General Hall had again considered

strengthening the units along the Driniumor, a step made possible when, on 20 July,

elements of the 43d Infantry Division began

arriving at Aitape. General Hall decided

that he could employ the fresh units to stabilize the situation in the Afua area and to

stop Japanese attempts to seize control of

the Afua-Palauru trail.

29

 On 22 July Pvt. Donald R. Lobaugh of Company I, 127th Infantry, succeeded, at the cost of his

life, in knocking out a Japanese machine gun nest

which held up the withdrawal of the Company I

platoon that had been forced back toward the command post, an action for which he was awarded the

Congressional Medal of Honor. The platoon had

spent the night of 21-22 July on an isolated perimeter, surrounded by enemy units.
174 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

At first General Hall planned to move the

112th Cavalry west from Afua to new positions astride the Afua-Palauru trail about

midway between the Driniumor and X-ray

Rivers. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 127th

Infantry, were then to move to the Driniumor from their recently established patrol

base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek,

join the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, on

the river, and take over all of South Force's

Driniumor defenses. The 2d Battalion,

124th Infantry, still in reserve at Blue Beach,

was to join the rest of its regiment on the

Driniumor while one battalion of the 169th

Infantry, 43d Division, was to move to

Palauru to provide additional outer security southwest of the airfield main line of

resistance. The remainder of the 43d Division, upon its arrival at Blue Beach, was to

man defenses along the main line of resistance or stand by in task force reserve.30

These plans were never realized. First, it

was discovered that the 169th Infantry had

brought to Aitape many unserviceable or

badly worn automatic weapons and mortars. Then it was found that days would be

required to unload many of the regiment's

crew-served weapons. The unit had not

been combat loaded, since it and the rest of

the division had moved forward from New

Zealand expecting to stop at Aitape only for

staging, and not for combat with the PERSECUTION Task Force.31

 Some replacements for

unserviceable weapons could be found in

limited stocks at Aitape, but the rest had to

await shipment from Services of Supply

bases in eastern New Guinea.

The condition of the 169th Infantry's

weapons, combined with the delays in unloading the regiment, limited that unit's

usefulness. General Hall, who deemed the

immediate dispatch of one battalion to

Palauru to be urgently necessary, therefore

sent the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, to

that village, where it arrived on the afternoon of 21 July. The 2d Battalion, 169th

Infantry (first unit of the 43d Division to

arrive at Aitape), was sent to Anamo the

same day and on the 22d had moved to the

right flank of the two 124th Infantry Battalions already on the Driniumor.32

While these dispositions were being effected, Japanese activity in the Afua area so

increased that General Hall decided that

it would be unwise to move the 112th Cavalry away from the Driniumor. Instead, he

now ordered the 1st and 2d Battalions,

127th Infantry, to move southwest from

their East Branch patrol bases to strengthen

South Force and relieve Troop C, 112th

Cavalry.33 The 1st Battalion, 127th Infan30

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 19-21 Jul 44; PTF FO 9, 20

Jul 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 19-21 Jul 44. 31

 43d Div MO 16, 17 Jun 44, in 43d Div Opns

Rpt Aitape; Interv, author with Maj Joseph L.

Manz, ex-Adj, 169th Infantry, 11 May 48, copy in

OCMH files; Interv, author with Gen Hall, 27

Mar. 47.

32

 PTF G-3 Jnl, 19-21 Jul 44; Interv, author with

Gen Hall, 27 Mar 47. From internal evidence in task

force documents, it appears that the 2d Battalion,

169th Infantry, was originally moved to Anamo as

reserve for the PERSECUTION Covering Force. General Gill moved it into the line, still without some

of its crew-served weapons, possibly to strengthen

the 124th Infantry's two battalions with the leaven

of a more experienced unit. The 169th Infantry's

battalion had had a good deal of combat in the

South Pacific, while the 124th Infantry was in its

first combat. 33

 PCF Fragmentary FO, no number, 22 Jul 44,

in PGF G-3 Jnl, 27-31 Jul 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 21-26

Jul 44. The original plans for the employment of the

127th Infantry were never formally revoked but

seem to have died a natural death after it proved

impracticable to move the 112th Cavalry away from

the Driniumor. Plans for the movement of the 127th

Infantry's two battalions were drawn up by General

Cunningham and Colonel Howe (the commander

of the 127th Infantry) during the afternoon of 22

July. Colonel Howe, with a small escort, made his

176 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

try, left its East Branch base at 0745 on 23

July and moved directly eastward through

dense jungle to the lines of the 3d Battalion,

127th Infantry. Then the unit turned south

and about 1530 reached the South Force

command post area at the banana patch.

The battalion's arrival was welcome and

timely. Troop E, 112th Cavalry, had been

attempting all day to move south from the

command post to relieve Troop C, which

was still cut off. But Troop E had met with

little success and was pushed back by increasingly aggressive Japanese units which

now threatened to attack the South Force

command post, capture the dropping

ground, and overrun the entire right flank

of the PERSECUTION Covering Force.34

The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, crossed

to the right bank of East Branch about 0800

on the 23d and struck southeast toward the

Afua-Palauru trail, passing through many

recently abandoned Japanese bivouacs. In

midmorning the battalion found a narrow

track leading toward Kwamagnirk and at

1200 the unit was atop a low ridge just south

of that village, which had been obliterated

by artillery and mortar fire. The 2d Battalion was now almost within view of Troop

C's isolated perimeter and had attained

an apparently excellent position from which

to launch a counterattack to relieve the cavalry unit.35

way overland through enemy-infested territory from

the East Branch patrol base to South Force headquarters during the morning of the 22d. 34

 127th Inf Jnl file, 10-31 Jul 44; 112th Cav

Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 9-10; 112th Cav Opns and

Int Diary Aitape; PTF G-3 Jnl, 21-26 Jul 44.

35

 127th Inf Jnl file, 10-31 Jul 44; 2d Bn 127th

Inf, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44. Kwamagnirk was originally

a hamlet of five or six native huts. It and two other

even smaller settlements in the same area had been

so pounded by artillery and mortar fire that its exact

location was and is impossible to determine, but it is

assumed to be in the position depicted on the 1:63,

360 map used by the PERSECUTION Task and Covering Forces.
CHAPTER VIII

The Battle of the Driniumor

Phase II: The 18th Army Retreats

Securing the Afua Area

With the arrival of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 127th Infantry, in his area, General

Cunningham decided to make another attempt to relieve Troop C, 112th Cavalry.1

The latter's position had been uncertain for

two days, but it was definitely located on the

morning of the 23d on the basis of a report

from the platoon of Company I, 127th Infantry. Having reached Troop C on the

evening of the 21st, this platoon had succeeded in fighting its way through Japanese

lines to South Force's command post on the

23d. General Cunningham now sent part of

the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, to relieve

Troops A and B, 112th Cavalry, from their

positions north of Afua. The two cavalry

units were to attack west toward Troop C

and, simultaneously, the 2d Battalion, 127th

Infantry, was to push southeast toward the

isolated troop.

The Relief of Troop C

The double envelopment started early in

the afternoon of the 23d. At first, the attacks

of the cavalry and infantry units were

closely co-ordinated, orders to both being

issued through a radio aboard an artillery

liaison plane hovering overhead. But shortly

after the combined attack began, Troops A

and B had to retire eastward to avoid fire

from the advancing infantry battalion.

Troop A thereupon turned south and retook

Afua against light opposition. During the

afternoon the two cavalry units established

new defenses around Afua, extending their

lines about 300 yards west of the village.2

About 1500 the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, having encountered only scattered

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this

section and its subdivisions is from: 112th Cav Opns

Rpt Aitape, pp. 9-14; 112th Cav Opns and Int

Diary Aitape; 112th Cav Sum of Msgs, 1-29 Jul

44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, Sec. II, pp. 7-11;

127th Inf Jnl file, 10-31 Jul 44; 1st, 2d, and 3d

Bn 127th Inf Jnls, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; PTF G-3

Jnls, 21-26 Jul and 26 Jul-1 Aug 44; PCF G-3

Jnls, 22-25, 25-27, 27-31 Jul, and 31 Jul-5 Aug

44; 18th Army Opns, III, 107-08, 111, 120-25,

130-38, 156-59 (which include, inter alia, translations of MO Opns Orders 24, 34, 37, and 49, dated

between 21 and 31 Jul 44) ; PW interrogs and trans

of enemy docs in PTF and Eastern Sector G-2 Jnls,

Jul and Aug 44; Japanese Studies in WW II, 47,

18th Army Operations, Annex B, Maps 32, 36, and

37, copy in OCMH files.

2

 During the early part of Troop A's action, 2d

Lt. George W. G. Boyce, Jr., one of the troop's platoon leaders, threw himself on an enemy hand grenade which fell between him and some of his men.

Saving these men from almost certain death or serious wounds, Lieutenant Boyce was himself killed.

For this action, he was awarded, posthumously, the

Congressional Medal of Honor.
THE AFUA AREA
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 179

resistance, moved into Troop C's perimeter

from the northwest, just as the Japanese

launched a strong attack from the southwest. Darkness came before all the enemy

had been repulsed, and plans for the battalion's further advance had to be abandoned.

The combined perimeter was harassed by

mortar fire throughout the night, as were

the two cavalry units at Afua.

Early on 24 July the 2d Battalion sent

patrols out from the perimeter—patrols

which reported strong enemy defenses on

high ground to the north and south. Attempts by the 2d Battalion and Troop C to

break through enemy lines to the southeast

and the Afua-Palauru trail were unavailing, as was an effort by Company B, 127th

Infantry, to move southwest from General

Cunningham's command post area to the

combined infantry-cavalry position. Company E, 127th Infantry, trying to move

northeast from the perimeter to establish

contact with Company B, could get no place.

The Japanese were tenaciously defending

all tracks, trails, and ridge lines in the

heavily jungled ground northeast of the

perimeter.

General Gill, who thought South Force

had sufficient troops to drive off the Japanese without difficulty, was by now dissatisfied with the situation in the Afua area. He

apparently believed that South Force was

not making a strong enough effort to clear

the ground north and northwest of Afua,

and there was a definite feeling at his headquarters that the situation around Afua was

by no means critical. His G-2 Section estimated that the Japanese in the Afua area

comprised only remnants of the 78th Infantry trying to break back through the

restored Driniumor line to the east. If this

were not the case, said General Gill's G-2

officers, then the Japanese at Afua were

merely stragglers attempting to raid South

Force bivouacs for food.

But General Cunningham thought that

the Japanese on his right and rear comprised

elements of both the 78th and 80th Infantry

Regiments, which, he believed, were trying

to outflank South Force and seize control of

the Afua-Palauru trail. He felt that South

Force was doing everything possible to drive

the Japanese away, but, as he pointed out to

General Gill, the enemy was dug in on commanding ground throughout hilly and heavily jungled terrain northwest, west, and

southwest of Afua, making it necessary to

reduce each position by slow and costly infantry assault. Finally, said General Cunningham, the 127th Infantry had not yet

been able to deploy its entire strength for

further attacks and was therefore not bearing a full share of the necessary fighting.3

General Cunningham's estimates were

far closer to the truth than those at PERSECUTION Covering Force headquarters, although even the South Force commander

was underestimating the Japanese scale of

effort. By 24 July the Miyake Force had

been concentrated north and northwest of

Afua behind South Force. General Miyake

had under his command over 1,000 men—

remnants of the 20th Division units which

had crossed the Driniumor on the night of

10-11 July and during the next day or two.

Moreover, relatively fresh troops of the 79th

Infantry, 20th Division, and division headquarters were now in the Afua area. By evening of the 24th, there were at least 2,000

3

 The account of the attitude at General Gill's

headquarters is based on statements made in PCF

G-2 documents and in messages from PCF to South

Force in PCF G-3 Jnls. Evidence of General Cunningham's attitude is derived from: Interv, author

with Gen Cunningham, Apr 47; Interv, author with

Col Hooper, 25 Mar 47; Ltr, Comdr South Force to

RANGOON Six [Comdr PCF], 30 Jul 44, sub; Opns

South Sector, copy in OCMH files.
180 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Japanese troops on South Force's right flank

and rear.

South Force operations on 25 July met

with more success than had been anticipated, for very heavy fighting had been expected. Early that morning Companies B

and E, 127th Infantry, established contact

about 500 yards north-northeast of the 2d

Battalion-Troop C perimeter. Over the

escape route thus opened, Troop C withdrew to the dropping ground, ending its

four days of continuous combat against superior Japanese forces. The unit had lost

about thirty men from Japanese action and

from sickness during the period.

Afua and the Triangle

With Troop C relieved, General Cunningham decided to exploit the success of

the early morning action and launch an attack south and west from the dropping

ground. His plan was to clear the area between that ground and the 2d Battalion's

position by pushing all Japanese found in

the area to the region south of the AfuaPalauru trail and on into the Torricelli

Mountains.

About 1100 Company A, 127th Infantry,

moved into position at the western edge of

the dropping ground and faced south. Company B lined up on A's right and Company

E on B's right, at the edge of a series of

jungled ridges. Company C was in reserve.

One platoon of Company G was to maintain contact between Companies B and E,

which were separated by some 200 yards of

thick jungle. The 2d Battalion (less Company E and the Company G platoon) was

to remain at the old Troop C perimeter until

sure that no more Japanese were in that

area. Then it was to push south to the AfuaPalauru trail west of Company E.

The attack began about 1130. Companies B and E soon met strong opposition,

but Company A, closely followed by Company C, moved rapidly toward the AfuaPalauru trail, encountering only scattered

rifle fire and reaching the trail late in the

afternoon at a point about 300 yards west

of Afua. There it tied its left into the lines

of the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry (back

in Afua since the 23d), and pushed its right

about 200 yards west along the trail to the

left flank of Company B, which had not yet

been able to bring its entire strength up to

the Afua-Palauru trail. On B's right, the

Japanese held a strong point on a low

ridge over which the trail passed, and the

company had to bend its lines about 150

yards to the north and west around this

enemy position.

Company E and the Company G platoon,

meeting increasing resistance, reached the

2d Battalion perimeter in the early afternoon and joined the rest of the battalion in

a drive south toward the Afua-Palauru trail.

By dusk the battalion had crossed the trail

and was digging in about 100 yards south of

that track. There was a gap of at least 100

yards between the left of the 2d Battalion

and the lines of Company B, and there was

another gap on the battalion's right, or west,

flank, where Company G had been cut off

during the move south. At nightfall the company was located on a ridge crossing the trail

about 150 yards northwest of the main body

and about 800 yards west of Afua, near the

old Troop C perimeter.

The advance south had been generally

successful, but by late afternoon there were

clear indications that many Japanese troops

remained in a triangular area formed by the

dropping ground, Afua, and Company G's

ridge-line position. Rifle fire, intensifying

as darkness approached, harassed the rear
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 181

and right flank of the two battalions, and

the Japanese began intermittently to drop

light artillery or mortar shells into the banana patch area, where the command posts

of South Force, the 112th Cavalry, and the

127th Infantry were now located. Finally,

Japanese patrols, coming in from the west,

had scouted the banana patch area during

the day, action which seemed to presage an

enemy attack during the night. To get out

of range of the enemy fire and danger of

enemy attack, General Cunningham moved

the command post installations 500 yards to

the north before dark.

During the night an unknown number of

Japanese troops moved around the right rear

of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, joining enemy units which had been bypassed

the preceding afternoon. By early morning

on the 26th, these troops had secured control

of trails leading southeast through heavy

jungle from the banana patch to a point on

the Afua-Palauru trail near the 2d Battalion's command post. Meanwhile, 127th Infantry patrols had found a Japanese map

which indicated that the 66th Infantry, 51st

Division, was concentrating in the Kwamagnirk area.

As a result of the information concerning

the 66th Infantry and because of the growing Japanese activity south and west of the

banana patch, General Cunningham decided to change South Force dispositions.

The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, was withdrawn from its lines along the Afua-Palauru

trail and sent back to the dropping ground

where it established a new westward-facing

perimeter in expectation of Japanese attacks

from that direction. The 2d Battalion extended its lines to the east to cover the area

vacated by the 1st, and at the same time

managed to eliminate the Japanese salient

which had held up Company B the previous

afternoon. Efforts to extend the 2d Battalion's lines west to Company G were unsuccessful, and at nightfall on the 26th that unit

was still in its isolated ridge outpost 150

yards from the main body.

All day on the 26th Japanese troops

milled around in the rear—north and northwest—of the 2d Battalion. At the same time

the battalion received continuous harassing

rifle and machine gun fire from the south,

its front. It was expected that the Japanese

might attack from the south and west during

the afternoon, and plans were made for the

2d Battalion's withdrawal to Afua if the

enemy attacked from more than one direction. However, the enemy scale of effort in

the afternoon did not seem to warrant such

a withdrawal. The battalion therefore remained in its positions and managed to push

its lines slightly south. General Cunningham

alerted all South Force to expect an enemy

attack on the night of 26-27 July, but the

hours of darkness proved almost abnormally

quiet.

Nevertheless, General Cunningham's redispositions and plans to withdraw the 2d

Battalion, 127th Infantry, had been well

advised. Despite heavy losses from combat,

starvation, and disease in the Driniumor

area, General Adachi was still determined to

clear the Afua area, and continually sent

fresh troops across the river south of that

village. The 66th Infantry, which, with attached units, was at least 1,000 men strong,

had crossed the Driniumor on or about 24

July. Bypassing the right flank of South

Force, the regiment had moved into the

heavily jungled high ground west of the

banana patch and dropping ground. In addition, the remnants of the 237th Infantry,

probably about 300 men strong, had finally

arrived in the Afua area on 25 July and had

passed to the control of the Miyake Force.
182 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Rear elements of the 20th Division, including additional men from the 26th Field Artillery and engineer units, had also crossed the

Driniumor south of Afua. The number of

Japanese troops in the South Force area by

nightfall on the 26th of July was at least

2,500 and may have been over 3,000.

Actually, neither the Japanese nor South

Force had any accurate knowledge of each

other's strengths and dispositions in the Afua

area. Each side complained that the other

held isolated strong points, none of which

appeared to be key positions. Both sides employed inaccurate maps, and both had a

great deal of difficulty obtaining effective

reconnaissance. In the jungled, broken terrain near Afua, operations frequently took

a vague form—a sort of shadow boxing in

which physical contact of the opposing sides

was ofttimes accidental.

On the morning of the 27th General Cunningham decided to use the 2d Battalion,

127th Infantry, to resume an advance southward to locate Japanese forces below the

Afua-Palauru trail and to overrun an enemy observation post on high ground about

500 yards southwest of Afua. After artillery

fire on suspected enemy assembly areas south

of its lines, the 2d Battalion started moving

at 1000. Only scattered rifle fire was encountered and by 1245 the battalion had

taken the observation post. A new defensive

line, anchored on the Driniumor near Afua

and lying generally 400 yards south of the

Afua-Palauru trail, was set up. The battalion's right flank was about 800 yards west

of the river, near the outpost of Company

G, which had not participated in the southward drive.

General Cunningham had wanted the 2d

Battalion to develop its new line as a base

for future operations, but Japanese troops

moved onto the Afua-Palauru trail behind

the battalion, threatening its communications, and the unit was therefore ordered to

return to the morning line of departure.

Since the enemy made little effort to hold

his trail positions, this withdrawal was accomplished without incident by 1800. An

outpost of platoon size was left on a ridge

about 200 yards southwest of Afua. The

rest of the battalion, still less Company G,

dug in along the Afua-Palauru trail in essentially the same positions it had occupied

the previous night. Meanwhile, the 66th Infantry had become active in the high ground

300 yards west of the dropping ground and

banana patch, and elements of that unit or

the Miyake Force again began patrolling

along the jungle tracks leading southwest

from the banana patch. During the morning

Japanese patrols armed with light machine

guns occupied two low ridge lines west and

southwest of the dropping ground, while

other enemy groups moved into high ground

immediately west of South Force's new command post area.

Since these Japanese maneuvers seriously

threatened the safety of South Force command and supply installations, General Cunningham ordered the 1st Battalion, 127th

Infantry, and part of the 1st Squadron,

112th Cavalry, to clear the enemy from the

high ground. By late afternoon these units,

by dint of foot-by-foot advances against

stubborn opposition, had cleared the Japanese from three strong ridge-line positions

west and southwest of the dropping ground.

This action gained at least temporary security for South Force's supply base and apparently discouraged the 66th Infantry from

making any more attacks for the time being.

The next morning, 28 July, the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, continued mopping

up west of the dropping ground and occupied some enemy ridge defenses which
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 183

had held out overnight. The rest of South

Force engaged in local patrolling without

finding any trace of sizable, well-armed

groups of Japanese, but General Cunningham remained certain that large-scale Japanese attacks were imminent. He therefore

decided to shorten his lines to obtain stronger

defenses and to secure a base of operations

for further attempts to clear enemy troops

from the Afua-dropping ground-Company

G triangle.

Late in the afternoon, in accordance with

these plans, the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry,

moved north and set up a new westwardfacing defensive line running south from the

dropping ground and the 1st Battalion's left.

This line lay generally 200 yards west of the

Driniumor. The 3d Battalion and the 2d

Squadron, 112th Cavalry, remained in their

river defenses. The 1st Squadron withdrew

north and northwest from Afua, tied its

right into the 2d Battalion's left, and established a new line running generally southeast

to the 2d Squadron's right, anchored on the

Driniumor about 2,000 yards north of Afua.

With the exception of Company G, which

remained in an isolated perimeter on the

ridge west of Afua, South Force was now in

a long, oval-shaped perimeter, ready to meet

Japanese attacks from any direction. For the

third time in seventeen days Afua had been

abandoned to the Japanese.

The next morning the 1st Squadron and

the 2d Battalion started a co-ordinated attack south and west into the Afua-dropping

ground-Company G triangle. The 1st

Squadron encountered no opposition as it

pushed south along the west bank of the

Driniumor and quickly reoccupied the river

line to within 300 yards of Afua. The cavalry unit then halted until the infantry

battalion had moved equally far south. The

latter had been delayed along the diagonal

track leading southwest from the banana

patch, and a dangerous gap had been created between the two arms of the advance.

The 2d Battalion's attack had started at

0900, with Company F on the left (east)

and Company E on the right. Small patrols,

moving along ridge lines west of the main

line of advance, protected Company E's

right. The battalion's progress was slow

since the Japanese had set up trail blocks

along the diagonal track, and since it was

also necessary to probe the rough, jungled

terrain on both sides for hidden enemy

strong points. Company E, about 1015,

found itself halted by a Japanese position

containing infantrymen estimated at company strength. In an attempt to carry this

position by fire and movement, the unit lost

7 men killed and 9 wounded. Company E

withdrew about 200 yards to the north and

called for artillery and 81-mm. mortar support. This fire was soon forthcoming and

Company E moved forward again at 1400.

A few slight gains were made, but the Japanese, who had established a defense in

depth, clung tenaciously to every foot of

ground and the advance was again halted.

More artillery fire was placed on the suspected locations of enemy strong points, and

Company E started southward for a third

time about 1530.

While Company E was deploying to begin its third attack, the entire right flank

of the 2d Battalion was harassed by Japanese patrols. As a result the 1530 advance

could not develop, and about 1800 the right

flank units of the battalion withdrew. While

this withdrawal was under way, an estimated two companies of enemy infantry

struck from a low jungled ridge immediately west of Company E. Company F had

not met much opposition during the day but

had moved slowly southward so as not to
184 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

lose contact with the rest of the battalion.

Now it was withdrawn into the main battalion perimeter to aid in throwing back the

enemy attack from the west. A sharp fire

fight took place on the battalion's right, and

2 men were killed, 39 wounded, and 9 were

counted as missing. Total casualties for the

day were 11 killed, 50 wounded, and 9

missing.

Though harassing by enemy patrols continued, the 2d Battalion was successful in

beating back the main attack after some

twenty minutes of hard fighting. General

Cunningham felt that the battalion had

done all that could be expected of it during

the day and ordered it to withdraw to the

dropping ground. This retreat, begun about

1930, was accomplished during the night of

29-30 July, and the battalion reached the

dropping ground about 0830 on the latter

day. Because this withdrawal left the 1st

Squadron exposed to attacks from the northwest and west, the latter unit was withdrawn

to the lines of the 2d Squadron, north of

Afua.

During the 30th and 31st of July only

local patrol action was carried out by most

units of South Force as General Cunningham prepared plans for another offensive

into the triangle. Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company

G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost

west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th

the unit had been driven more than 400

yards east of its original position by Japanese

attacks and had established new defenses on

high ground about 300 yards west of Afua.

On the 30th the company was surrounded

and spent all day fighting off a series of

small-scale attacks. The next morning it

fought its way north to the dropping ground,

where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it

moved on to the Driniumor and joined the

rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry,

which had switched positions with the 3d

Battalion.

South Force's oval-shaped perimeter now

varied in depth from 400 to 800 yards. The

2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, was on the

north, facing the river but with its left flank

bent westward. On the Driniumor south of

the 2d Battalion was the 2d Squadron, 112th

Cavalry, the lines of which now reached to

within 1,500 yards of Afua. Extending

about 400 yards west of the 2d Squadron's

right flank was Troop C of the 1st Squadron. The rest of the 1st Squadron faced west

and anchored its north flank on the banana

patch. North of the 1st Squadron were the

1st and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry, extending the western side of South Force's

perimeter north through the dropping

ground, 500 yards beyond to General Cunningham's command post, and to the north

tip of the 2d Battalion's lines.

During the period from 13 to 31 July,

South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by

the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength

cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of

over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th

Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in

need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment—needs which had prompted General

Cunningham to change the places of the 2d

and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South

Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed,

386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South

Force estimated that it had killed over 700

Japanese.4

4

 These casualty figures are from Ltr, Comdr

South Force to Comdr PCF, 30 Jul 44, sub: Opns

South Sector, copy in OCMH files.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 185

Allied and Japanese Plans

General Cunningham planned to start a

new attack on 1 August, with Company K,

127th Infantry, and Troop G, 112th Cavalry, moving southwest from the dropping

ground in a reconnaissance in force to the

Afua-Palauru trail. The two units were to

probe for enemy defenses, avoid battle, and

return to the dropping ground to report

their findings before dark on the 1st. The

entire 3d Battalion and one cavalry troop

were to be combined in a striking force for

an attack into the triangle on 2 August, aiming for objectives selected during the previous day's reconnaissance. Not even the

preliminary steps of this plan could be executed. For days the Japanese had been

bringing reinforcements forward to the Afua

area to make further efforts to roll up South

Force's right flank, efforts which were to

necessitate many changes in General Cunningham's plans.

Despite continued lack of success in

achieving decisive results at Afua, and

though by the 25th of the month it had begun to appear to General Adachi that the

20th Division and Miyake Force could not

secure even the Afua area, the 18th Army

had not given up along the Driniumor. The

18th Army commander had already devised

a plan to send all elements of the 41st Division still east of the Driniumor across that

river via the Kawanaka Shima crossing. This

move was to entail operations by the 238th

Infantry, the 239th Infantry, the 41st Engineer Regiment, the 41st Mountain Artillery

Regiment, and the bulk of the 8th Independent Engineer Regiment, part of which was

already west of the Driniumor with the 20th

Division. Once across the Driniumor, the

41st Division units were to establish contact

with the remnants of the 237th Infantry,

send some men south toward the 20th Division to help cut American lines of communication, and mount new attacks on the

Anamo-Tiver area.

On the afternoon of 25 July General

Adachi himself moved up to the 41st Division's command post (apparently located on

Niumen Creek east of Kawanaka Shima) to

supervise that unit's preparations for attack.

The 18th Army commander soon discovered

that the 41st Division was in no condition to

assault the center of the Driniumor line and,

at the same time, he learned that the operations of the 20th Division in the Afua area

were not going as well as had been expected.

Considering how best to employ the 41st

Division, he decided to send that unit south

along the east bank of the Driniumor, have

it cross the river south of Afua, join the 20th

Division on the west side, and participate in

a two-division attack to secure the Driniumor area from Afua north to the junction

of the Anamo-Afua trail with the river.

Accordingly, on the morning of 26 July,

General Adachi issued orders for the 41st

Division to start moving south. The 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, was left in the Kawanaka Shima area to set up a counterreconnaissance screen and to put up a show

of strength designed to deceive the PERSECUTION Covering Force as to the intentions

of the rest of the division. The remainder

of the 239th Infantry, together with division

headquarters, the 238th Infantry, and the

engineer and artillery troops started south at

1600 on the 26th, aiming for a ford across

the Driniumor south of Afua.

Final orders for the two-division attack

west of the Driniumor were issued by the

18th Army on 28 July, orders which were

based on expectations that the 41st Division
186 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

could complete its redeployment in time for

the attack to begin on the evening of the

30th. This was too optimistic. The 238th

Infantry, the 41st Mountain Artillery, and

the 8th Independent Engineers were across

the river in time but the 2d and 3d Battalions, 239th Infantry, had missed the crossing point on the Driniumor and were lost.

Fortunately for the 18th Army, the South

Force withdrawals on 29 and 30 July gave

the 20th and 41st Divisions time to complete

their organization. New orders were issued

for the attack to start on 1 August, with the

20th Division on the west and the 41st Division on the east. The strength that the 20th

Division (including the 66th Infantry, the

26th Field Artillery, the bulk of the 37th

Independent Engineers, the 20th Engineers,

remnants of the 237th Infantry, and various

small service units) could muster for the

attack was a little over 2,000 men. Most of

these troops had been without food for some

time. They were suffering from starvation,

malaria, and skin diseases, and morale was

cracking. They were short of both ammunition and weapons. The 41st Division and its

attached units, totaling nearly 1,750 men

by the morning of 1 August, were in equally

bad shape. Nevertheless, General Adachi

was determined to make one last attack with

the nearly 4,000 troops now available to

him in the Afua area.5

The Japanese Retreat from Afua

At 0620 on 1 August, about two companies of Japanese attacked from the southwest against the lines of Troop C, 112th

Cavalry, situated about 1,500 yards north of

Afua. General Cunningham immediately

canceled the planned reconnaissance in force

into the triangle area and turned his attention to this new threat. The first Japanese

assault units were quickly reinforced, and

the enemy moved forward against Troop C

in massed waves along a narrow front. A

bloody battle ensued as the enemy, apparently determined to commit suicide, continued his mass attacks. South Force called

for artillery support, which was quickly

forthcoming and which greatly helped

Troop C to throw back the enemy assaults.

By 0800 the Japanese had withdrawn

and the battle area had become strangely

quiet. Patrols were sent out from the cavalry perimeter to reconnoiter. These parties

counted 180 dead Japanese in front of

Troop C's lines, and it was considered probable that the enemy had carried off many

more dead and wounded. Troop C, on the

other hand, had lost but 5 men killed and 6

wounded. Examination of the enemy dead

disclosed that elements of both the 80th and

238th Infantry Regiments had participated

in the attacks.

About 0830 Troop G moved southwest

out of the Troop C area to undertake part

of the planned reconnaissance in force. The

troop patrolled 600 yards to the southwest

and returned to Troop C early in the afternoon, having encountered only scattered

rifle fire. Meanwhile, a platoon of Company

K, 127th Infantry, had patrolled to high

ground west of the dropping ground. Upon

its return to South Force lines at 1600, this

unit reported only minor opposition.

5

 The foregoing strength figures have been derived from a mass of contradictory data, both Allied

and Japanese, and it is impossible to determine how

many of the Japanese troops could be called infantry effectives. It appears, however, that about

2,200 of the troops across the river as of 1 August

were members of infantry regiments. The total estimate of nearly 4,000 men may be wrong by as

much as 1,000 in either direction, but the evidence

tends to indicate that the figure is too low rather

than too high. By no means all of the 4,000 actually

participated in the 1 August attacks.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 187

General Cunningham interpreted the lull

in fighting after 0800 as an indication that

the Japanese might be assembling stronger

forces for another attack. Documents captured by Troop G and Company K patrols

during the day supported this idea, and disclosed that the Japanese might launch an

offensive during the night of 1-2 August or

early on the 2d. About 0300 on the 2d,

Troop G (which had moved to the southwest edge of the dropping ground the previous evening) was subjected to a small attack. This action turned out to be but a

minor skirmish and General Cunningham

suspected that it was a reconnaissance maneuver in preparation for a stronger attack.

In anticipation of such an assault the remainder of the 2d Squadron was removed

from its river positions and disposed as a

mobile reserve at the South Force's command post. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, stretched its lines to cover the river

positions vacated by the cavalry.

Although the movement of the 2d Squadron had apparently been well advised, the

Japanese did not attack the command post

area. Instead, at 1900, elements of the 41st

Division struck the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, at its lines south of the dropping

ground. This attack was preceded by fire

from a 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery piece

which the Japanese had managed to sneak

into the area within 150 yards of Company

B, 127th Infantry. Following a few rounds

from this weapon, Japanese infantry

charged forward in four separate waves, employing perhaps 300 men on a very narrow

front. Few of the enemy got near Company B's positions, for the attack was thrown

back with artillery, mortar, and machine

gun fire, which caused heavy losses among

the enemy forces. By 2030, action in the

dropping ground area stopped for the night.

The 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, on the

left rear of the 1st Battalion, was attacked by

another group of Japanese at 1945. This action was probably meant to have been coordinated with the attack on Company B,

but, if this were the enemy's intention, something had gone wrong. Apparently there had

also been some mix-up in unit dispositions,

for both enemy efforts had entailed the use

of elements of the 78th, 80th, and 238th Infantry Regiments. After the day's action was

finished, the combined effective strength of

the first two units was probably not more

than 250 men, and the 2d Battalion, 238th

Infantry, was practically wiped out. The

desperate attacks during the day had been

carried out with a complete disregard for

self-preservation, and had probably cost the

Japanese 300 men killed and at least twice

that number wounded.

During the early hours of the next morning, 3 August, the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, again heard enemy activity to its

front, and about 0730 a small Japanese

party struck between Companies A and C.

This attack was quickly repulsed, principally

by mortar fire from 1st Battalion units. By

noon all activity in the 1st Battalion area

had ceased, and the Japanese had withdrawn to the southwest. The rest of the day

was quiet in the South Force sector. In the

afternoon reinforcements arrived for South

Force as the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry,

moved into the perimeter from Palauru. The

new arrivals took up defensive positions on

the north flank, facing west behind the river

lines of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry.

The arrival of reinforcements did not

result in any relaxation of vigilance on General Cunningham's part, for he expected

more enemy attacks. A great deal of Japanese movement across the Driniumor south

of Afua had been observed by patrols dur-
188 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ing the day, and recently captured prisoners

reported that the 238th and 239th Infantry

Regiments were to resume the offensive on

4 and 5 August. The South Force commander warned all his units to remain alert.

At 0615 on the 4th, elements of the 41st

Division, probably supported by a few men

from the 20th Division, streamed out of the

jungle southwest of the 1st Squadron, 112th

Cavalry, in a last desperate charge apparently designed to cover the withdrawal of

other 18th Army remnants east of the

Driniumor. The initial Japanese attacks

were well co-ordinated but they soon degenerated into a series of small, independent,

suicidal assaults. Violent action continued in

front of the 1st Squadron for about two

hours, during which time nearly 200 Japanese were killed at the very edge of the

squadron perimeter, principally by machine

gun and rifle fire. How many more of the

enemy were killed by artillery and mortar

fire during the period cannot be estimated,

but the banzai tactics undoubtedly cost the

Japanese more than the 200 dead counted

in front of the 1st Squadron which, in the

same two hours, lost only 3 men killed and

4 wounded.

By 0900 the last enemy attacks had ceased

and the remaining Japanese had withdrawn

generally to the south. Troop E, moving

south across the front of the 1st Squadron

in pursuit of the retreating enemy, encountered only scattered rifle fire and could find

only nine enemy stragglers, all of whom they

killed. In the afternoon other patrols of the

2d Squadron, operating on the east bank

of the Driniumor opposite Afua, established

contact with elements of the 124th Infantry,

which was completing a wide enveloping

movement east of the Driniumor. On orders

from Headquarters, PERSECUTION Covering Force, General Cunningham now began

to plan final mopping up in the Afua area

by co-ordinated operations of South Force

and the 124th Infantry.

Envelopment to the East

Even before the Japanese had begun to

withdraw from the Afua area, General Hall

had prepared plans to carry out the final

part of the mission assigned to him by

ALAMO Force—a strong counteroffensive

against the 18th Army.6 On 29 July, despite

(or perhaps because of) the still unsettled

situation around Afua, General Hall had

decided that the time was ripe to launch the

counterattack. For this purpose, he decided

to employ the entire 124th Infantry, reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry.

The 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, which

had been patrolling in the Palauru-Chinapelli area, was relieved from that duty by

the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry, and on

the 30th joined its regiment at the Driniumor. The 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, was

already at the river.7

South Along Niumen Creek

The plan of attack for the first phase of

the counteroffensive was for the 124th Infantry, reinforced, to move directly east

from the Driniumor beginning at 0800 on

31 July.8 This attack was to be carried out

6

 Ltr OI, CG ALAMO Force to CG XI Corps [PTF],

25 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 27-29

Jun 44. 7

 The relief of the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry,

was accomplished on 29 July, and the battalion

moved to Anamo the next day. On the afternoon of

the 30th the battalion moved up to the mouth of

the Driniumor. 8

 The description of the plan and the command

for the envelopment to the east is based on: 124th

Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 11-12; PCF FO 3, 29 Jul

44, and TED Force, Plan of Opns, 30 Jul 44, last

190 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

with three battalions abreast along a front

of 3,000 yards, and the fourth in reserve

and in position to protect the right flank of

the advancing force. The four battalions

were to move east to the line of Niumen

Creek, destroying all enemy found between

that stream and the Driniumor within the

3,000-yard-wide zone of responsibility.

Upon their arrival on the Niumen the battalions were to reorganize and prepare for

further advances either east or south upon

orders from General Hall.

Tactical control of the counteroffensive

was vested in Col. Edward M. Starr, commanding officer of the 124th Infantry,

whose counterattack organization was to be

known as TED Force.9 The 1st Battalion,

124th Infantry, was commanded by Maj.

Ralph D. Burns;10

 the 2d Battalion by Lt.

Col. Robert M. Fowler; the 3d Battalion by

Lt. Col. George D. Williams; and the 2d

Battalion, 169th Infantry, by Maj. William

F. Lewis. To avoid confusion, the four battalions were referred to by the last names of

their commanders rather than by their number designations.

Fowler's battalion, attacking along the

coast, was to be supplied by ration trains

moving along the coastal trail from Anamo.

The rest of TED Force, pushing through

trackless, dense jungle, was to be supplied

by airdrop. The 149th Field Artillery Battalion, augmented by the Cannon Company, 124th Infantry, was responsible for

artillery support, but when necessary the

129th Field Artillery was to add its fire to

that of the 149th. All the artillery units were

emplaced on the beach west of the Driniumor's mouth. The positions which the

124th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 169th

Infantry, left vacant on the Driniumor were

to be occupied by the 2d and 3d Battalions,

128th Infantry.

All three battalions of the 124th Infantry

began crossing the Driniumor on schedule

at 0800, 31 July, moving into terrain concerning which only incomplete and sometimes inaccurate information was available.11

 (Map 8) As a result, the records of

two in PCF G-3 Jnl, 27-31 Jul 44; Ltrs, CO 124th

Inf to CG 31st Div, 22 Jul and 13 Aug 44. Copies

of these letters were lent to the author by Colonel

Starr, ex-commanding officer of the 124th Infantry,

but no copies exist in official files. According to the

Starr letter of 13 August the plans for the envelopment were drawn up by the staff of the 124th Infantry and approved in toto by task force headquarters prior to 29 July. 9

 Colonel Starr had succeeded General Stark as

commander of North Force on 18 July when the

arrival of elements of the 43d Division at Aitape

made it necessary for General Stark, the assistant

division commander, to move back to Blue Beach for

administrative duties. General Stark apparently also

reassumed command of the Western Sector, in

place of General Hutchinson, Assistant Division

Commander, 31st Division, who had rejoined his division when it, less the 124th Infantry, moved to a

new operational area in western New Guinea. When

TED Force was organized, North Force as such apparently ceased to exist, and the 128th Infantry took

over the defensive functions previously assigned to

North Force on the Driniumor. The name TED Force

originated from the diminutive for Colonel Starr's

first name. There were always so many units from

different divisions and regiments operating along the

Driniumor that the task force usually found it more

convenient to use names rather than numbers for

unit designations. The names, usually derived from

the commanding officers, served not only to lessen

confusion but also did double duty as code names.

10

 Placed in command of the 1st Battalion on the

30th, the assigned commander having been sent to

the hospital with a high fever. 11

 Principal sources used for the action of American troops in this and the following subsections are:

124th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 12-20, 124th Inf

Jnl, 12 Jul-10 Aug 44, 12 Jul-10 Aug 44; Rpt by

Maj Edward O. Logan [Ex-S-2 124th Inf], sub:

The Enveloping Maneuver of the 124th Inf Regt

East of the Driniumor, Aitape, New Guinea, 31 Jul10 Aug 44, written at The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga., for The Advanced Officers' Course, 1946-

47, copy in The Infantry School files; Extracts from

3d Bn 124th Inf Jnl, Aitape, as cited in the Logan

Rpt; 2d Bn 169th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 7-15;
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 191

TED Force are often inadequate and contradictory. Narrative reports and journals

of the units engaged record many map and

grid locations that are obviously erroneous

and many others of doubtful value. It could

hardly be otherwise. The available maps did

not accurately depict the terrain and the two

available sets, one a 1:20,000 photographic

mozaic produced in May and the other a

1:63,360 terrain map dated in January,

were mutually irreconcilable at many points.

Again, the units involved did not maintain

as complete records as they would have in

more static situations, for they did not have

the means or time to do so. Each battalion

engaged operated more or less separately,

communicating almost entirely by radio

without sending written reports and overlays

back to higher headquarters.

The situation in regard to locating units

east of the Driniumor is well described by

Maj. Edward A. Becker, the S-3 of the 1st

Battalion, 124th Infantry, during the

operation:

We discovered, after leaving the Driniumor,

that the only features that could be recognized

on the map were the river, the coast line, and

a trace of Niumen Creek; the rest of the operational area was just a mass of trees. . . .

Because of this we knew we would have to find

other means of identifying our location. We

found the answer by using the two methods

outlined below:

(A) Twice a day the . . . [artillery liaison]

plane would fly over our position and contact . . . [the artillery liaison officer]; he

would let the pilot know when he was directly

over us. The pilot would then fly to the Driniumor, turn around and fly directly E [east]; as

he passed over us he would give us the distance from the R [river]. He would then repeat the procedure from the ocean by flying S

[south]—the intersection of these lines would

be our position.

(B) To check the above method (the whole

area was dotted with artillery registrations

which had been previously fired) the pilot

would circle our position and get the concentration number from the [artillery] intersection

towers located on the coast. He would then relay the number to us in this manner—200 yds

E [yards east] of concentration 250 (we had

these concentration No.'s [numbers] plotted

on our maps). This again would be our position ; if there was any appreciable difference in

these two methods, then we would repeat the

procedure until the error was found. . . .12

Determining which artillery units fired

specific missions for TED Force also presents

difficulties, inasmuch as the records of both

the artillery and infantry units provide contradictory information concerning times

and concentrations and because the infantry

units did not keep complete records of requests for artillery fire. It would appear that

the available maps were so inaccurate that

only by a major miracle was TED Force

saved from destruction by its own supporting artillery. Actually, however, the situation was not that bad. Most of the artillery

fire was controlled quite accurately through

the use of liaison planes. TED Force infantry

units would fire a few rounds of mortar fire

into the area where an artillery concentration was desired. The ubiquitous liaison

planes would fly over the point and men in

the observation towers on the coast, taking

sights on the plane, would order fire on previously mapped concentrations. Necessary

adjustments were made by radio through

the liaison aircraft.

Such was the communications and mapping picture that faced TED Force as it

169th Inf S-3 Daily Rpts, 21 Jul-10 Aug 44; PGF

G-3 Jnls, 27-31 Jul, 31 Jul-5 Aug, 5-9 Aug, and

9-15 Aug 44; PTF G-3 Jnls, 26 Jul-1 Aug, 1-7

Aug, and 7-16 Aug 44; Ltr, CO 124th Inf to CG

31st Inf Div, 13 Aug 44; Ltr, Starr to Ward, 21 Aug

51; Ltr, Becker to Starr, 13 Nov 50; 1st Bn 124th

Inf in Aitape Campaign, pp. 11-17; 124th Inf, Our

Regiment in 1944, pp. 47-54. 12

 Ltr, Becker to Starr, 13 Nov 50.
192 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

moved eastward from the Driniumor on

31 July. Colonel Fowler's 2d Battalion advanced along the beach, meeting no opposition. Shortly after 1200 the main body

reached the most westerly of Niumen

Creek's two mouths—actually a swampy

area about 3,000 yards east of the Driniumor. During the afternoon Fowler's lines

were extended almost 1,200 yards up the

Niumen, but no trace of Burns' 1st Battalion

could be found. The latter unit's advance

company had been held up about 800 yards

east of the Driniumor by elements of the 1st

Battalion, 239th Infantry, which had been

left along the river when the rest of that

Japanese regiment had moved south to

Afua on 26 July.13 Burns' men continued to

encounter strong opposition from 239th Infantry elements throughout the day and did

not break off contact until 1730, when the

battalion bivouacked for the night still 800

yards west of Niumen Creek. Company A

had become separated during the day and

remained some 550 yards northwest of the

main body for the night. Both sections of

the battalion were out of touch with the rest

of TED Force.

The 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry (Williams), crossed the Driniumor at a point

about 3,000 yards inland and reached the

Niumen about 1400, having encountered

only scattered rifle fire. Lewis' 2d Battalion,

169th Infantry, which followed Williams'

command, made no contact with the enemy

and bivouacked for the night about 500

yards west of Williams. All battalions spent

the next day, 1 August, consolidating and

patrolling along Neumen Creek, and Burns'

unit moved up into line with the others.

While this consolidation was going on,

General Hall reached a decision as to further operations by TED Force. Since the intensity of Japanese attacks on South Force

had not yet decreased, the task force commander directed TED Force to move south

along Niumen Creek to the foothills of the

Torricelli Mountains, nearly six miles inland. All Japanese encountered were to be

destroyed and the east-west trails which the

enemy was using to supply and reinforce his

troops at Afua were to be cut. After reaching the hills, TED Force was to swing west

toward a point on the Driniumor about

2,000 yards south of Afua. If the Japanese

activity near Afua had not abated by the

time TED Force reached the Driniumor,

then the unit would cross the river, move

northwest, and fall upon the rear of Japanese units harassing South Force.

Colonel Starr's interpretation of the general mission and of the situation was as

follows:

To me, my first priority was to cut off the

line of Japanese retreat, wherever it was, as

well as the supply route of the enemy forces

concentrating on Afua. Second priority was to

destroy all enemy forces en route. Further

based on my estimate of the situation and the

enemy forces opposing me, as well as the terrain, I was convinced that any one of the four

battalions under my control could take care of

itself until support arrived if it became isolated

or cut off. If properly handled this is a sound

principle, of course, but considering the obstacles of terrain and weather, and the absence

of a supply line and evacuation route, it was

open to question.14

It was expected that movement south

could start by 1100 on the 2d, but supply

difficulties and the amount of time the battalions consumed getting into position along

the line of departure (a small western trib13

 Information cm Japanese units in this and the

following subsections concerning TED Force operations is based on 18th Army Opns, III, 126-31, 134-

39, 140-51, 156, 160. These pages include MO

Opns Orders 38-56, 26 Jul-4 Aug 44. 14

 Ltr, Starr to Ward, 21 Aug 51.
Map 8
194 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

utary of the Niumen about 3,000 yards east

of the junction of the Anamo-Afua trail

with the Driniumor) prevented the realization of these hopes. Instead, Burns' and

Fowler's units slowly moved south through

heavily jungled terrain to Williams' perimeter. Colonel Starr moved his headquarters

from the mouth of the Driniumor to Williams' area, and supplies were laboriously

carried inland from the coast or airdropped

at Williams' position. The night of 2-3 August proved quiet, and TED Force made

final preparations to attack south at 0800 on

3 August.

The advance started on schedule, with

Williams' battalion on the left and Lewis'

on the right. Burns' men followed Lewis'

while Fowler's unit temporarily remained in

reserve. Not more than 100 yards south of

the line of departure both Williams' and

Lewis' battalions encountered strong opposition from troops of the 239th Infantry,

The Japanese, depending for the most part

on well-concealed riflemen to delay the advance, maintained a tenacious defense

throughout the day. Lewis' battalion outflanked the Japanese in its zone and was

able to advance about 900 yards by nightfall. Williams' unit gained only 300 yards

during the day and bivouacked about 500

yards to the left rear of Lewis' battalion.

Contact between the two was tenuous because of enemy patrol action and the jungled terrain. Just before dark both battalions

dropped slightly back from their most advanced positions in order to allow supporting artillery to place fire on the still resisting

enemy.

Before noon Colonel Starr realized that

Williams' and Lewis' battalions were probably not going to break through the Japanese opposition on 3 August. Ordering them

to continue their fights, he instructed Burns'

command to bypass the engagement and

strike overland on an azimuth of 195 degrees (roughly, south-southwest). By dusk

Burns' command had advanced unopposed

900-1,000 yards and dug in for the night

nearly abreast but 400 yards west of Lewis'

battalion and out of contact with it.

Fowler's unit bivouacked for the night at the

line of departure, protecting the dropping

ground, which was vital to continued advance since TED Force could by now be supplied only from the air. Casualties during

the day had been incurred only by Williams'

and Lewis' units and totaled 14 men killed

and 14 wounded.

During the night strong artillery concentrations were placed in front of Williams

and Lewis and at 0800 on 4 August both

resumed the advance. The terrain encountered on 4 August and subsequent days during the operations of the TED Force east of

the Driniumor proved next to impassable.

Dense jungle undergrowth covered the

ground; the area was thick with heavy rain

forest; low but knifelike ridges, separated

from each other by deep gullies, were encountered ; and swampy spots were plentiful. To add to the difficulties, rain fell during

the day—a downpour which turned much

of the ground into a quagmire and flooded

many dry stream beds. A few new, rough

trails, recently cut by the Japanese, were

found, but mud made them nearly useless as

routes of advance. Low clouds coming in

from the Torricelli Mountains to the south

prevented ration and ammunition drops and

increased communication difficulties. All

battalions ran low on drinking water, for

weather conditions prevented resupply of

water purification tablets and the assault

companies had neither time nor equipment

to clean water by other means. Radio communication between battalions, from battalions to TED Force headquarters, and
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 195

from the latter to higher echelons was nearly

nonexistent, for the heavy jungle and the

damp weather cut down the efficiency of all

radio equipment.

First contact on 4 August was made by

Williams' men, who surprised a platoon of

Japanese in bivouac scarcely 100 yards south

of the line of departure. Eight Japanese were

killed and the rest fled. Williams' and Lewis'

battalions then continued southward against

only scattered rifle fire. The units covered

about 1,000 yards in a southerly direction

during the day and bivouacked on a clearly

defined east-west trail. Fowler's battalion

was not committed during the day, but remained in reserve at the dropping ground

with the regimental command post.

On the west, Burns' battalion had moved

southwestward away from the rest of TED

Force. The unit encountered no opposition

but found itself in such a maze of steep

ridges and deep gullies that the pace of advance was slowed to little more than 100

yards per hour. After marching over ten

hours and covering over 1,000 yards, the

battalion set up night defenses on the same

trail upon which Williams' and Lewis' commands had bivouacked about 1,300 yards

to the east-northeast. Casualties for all parts

of TED Force had been light on the 4th. Only

8 men had been wounded as opposed to

about 50 Japanese killed and 3 captured.15

It had been hoped that the advance on

the 4th would carry TED Force south to the

main Japanese supply route, but the trail

reached by Burns', Lewis', and Williams'

battalions was another route which had not

been used by military traffic for some time.

Possibly, it was a section of the native trail

to Afua and, as such, purposely avoided by

the Japanese inasmuch as parts of it could be

seen from the air. In any case, the track cut

on the 4th lay about 1,200 yards north of the

east-west trail which most of the Japanese

forces moving to and from the Afua area

had been using. Colonel Starr, realizing that

the main Japanese supply route had not yet

been severed, ordered his units to continue

southward on the 5th, on which day the advance was resumed about 0800 hours with

Williams leading and Lewis' battalion about

400 yards to the rear. Pushing south along

now precipitous and mountainous banks of

the upper Niumen, Williams' unit was opposed by only scattered rifle fire until 1100,

when it was decisively halted by a strong

Japanese force conducting a stubborn

defense.

TED Force and the Withdrawing 18th Army

Unknown to any part of the PERSECUTION Task Force, the 18th Army had been

seriously considering withdrawal from the

Driniumor since at least as early as 28 July.

Supplies for 18th Army units in the Afua

area were nearly exhausted, and General

Adachi estimated that every last crumb of

food would be gone by 3 August. No more

supplies could be brought forward. Moreover, the front-line units were suffering increasingly heavy casualties from combat,

starvation, and disease; they had no more

artillery support and could obtain none;

weapons of all kinds were either being destroyed or rendered useless by lack of lubrication oil; and no reinforcements were

available.

Disturbed by the heavy casualties and

plagued by insoluble logistic problems, General Adachi, on the afternoon of 31 July,

issued orders alerting his forward units to

15

 What happened to these prisoners is unknown.

There is no record that TED Force either sent back

or brought back any prisoners.
196 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

prepare for withdrawal, which apparently

was to begin on 4 August. The assaults on

South Force after 31 July were actually a

part of General Adachi's withdrawal plan,

which was designed to throw the PERSECUTION Covering Force off balance, to put

forth one last "glorious" effort to overrun

American positions (and perhaps secure

supplies), and to cover the withdrawal. On 1 August General Adachi learned

that American forces were active in the

Yakamul area. It was erroneously reported

to him that this was an amphibious operation, a maneuver which the 18th Army commander had feared for some time (actually,

the report referred to patrolling by the 2d

Battalion, 124th Infantry, along the coast

from the mouth of Niumen Creek). He

therefore ordered the remaining elements of

the 237th Infantry to extricate themselves

from the operations in the Afua area and

hurry back to Yakamul to reinforce service

units in that vicinity. Events moved so rapidly that the remnants of the 237th Infantry

never got to Yakamul. Instead, the advance

of TED Force made it necessary for General

Adachi to change his plans and accelerate

a general withdrawal.

Communications within forward units of

the 18th Army had so broken down that it

was not until 3 August that General Adachi

learned of the TED Force movement across

the Driniumor, although the 1st Battalion,

239th Infantry, had been in contact with

TED Force since 31 July. When General

Adachi did hear of the American movement, he grossly underestimated the

strength of TED Force. Thinking that the

American operation was being carried out

by only 400 troops, General Adachi merely

changed the orders of the 237th Infantry

and instructed that regiment to hold the

18th Army's crossing point on the upper

Niumen Creek.

On the same day, 3 August, General

Adachi issued detailed plans for the withdrawal of all 18th Army units to the east

side of the Driniumor, a withdrawal which

was to begin on 4 or 5 August. The 66th

Infantry, 51st Division, was to protect the

20th and 41st Division units as they crossed

the Driniumor. The continued advance of

TED Force on 3 August prompted General

Adachi to change his plans and early on the

4th he ordered the 20th Division to start retreating at noon that day and the 41st Division to break contact on the 5th. On the

latter day, learning that TED Force was approaching the point at which the 18th

Army's main line of communications

crossed the upper reaches of Niumen Creek,

General Adachi ordered the 8th Independent Engineers to aid the remnants of the

237th Infantry in holding the crossing point.

It was this combined 237th Infantry—

8th Engineers force that Williams' 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, had encountered

about 1100 on 5 August. The composite

Japanese unit was dug in along a 1,000-foothigh ridge across Williams' line of advance

and threatened to outflank the battalion by

occupying other high ground nearby. Despite artillery and mortar support, Williams'

men were unable to advance. Colonel Starr

ordered Lewis' unit to bypass the fight and

continue south to locate and cut the Japanese main supply route. Fighting at Williams' front continued through most of the

afternoon, and Colonel Starr realized that

the Japanese force could not be dislodged

that day. Fowlers' battalion was brought up

to the rear of Williams' and late in the afternoon set up a new perimeter with the

regimental command post. Before dark, Wil-
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 197

Hams' men withdrew slightly from their

most forward positions so that artillery concentrations could be placed along the front.

Lewis' unit, which had moved off to the

southeast to bypass Williams' fight, made

little progress in very rough terrain and was

cut off from the rest of TED Force before it

could swing westward. Burns' battalion, still

far to the west of the other three, had encountered little opposition during the day

and had reached the main Japanese supply

route late in the afternoon at a point about

1,500 yards east of the Driniumor. The position of Lewis' unit for the night is not certain, but it was apparently near the same

trail some place east of Williams' unit, which

had done its fighting on or near one section

of the main trail.

Despite the fact that hopes of reaching

the Driniumor had not been realized, the

TED Force advance on the 5th had been successful within the limitations imposed by

terrain, logistic problems, communications

difficulties, and Japanese opposition. The

main Japanese line of communications had

been severed, although the section held by

Burns' battalion showed signs of having been

abandoned for some time. Over 100 Japanese had been killed at a cost to TED Force

of only 3 men killed and 14 wounded. Plans

for the 6th were for Lewis' battalion to continue its flanking movement while Fowler's

unit, bypassing Williams' fight, was to envelop the Japanese left. Williams' men were

to continue their attack and Burns' battalion was to hold its position astride the trail.

Action on the 6th started earlier than

TED Force expected. About 0300 approximately 400 Japanese attacked Williams' perimeter. This enemy force comprised elements of the 41st Division, supported by men

of the 26th Field Artillery of the 20th Division and some remnants of the 8th Independent Engineers. Attacking under cover

of fire from machine guns, mortars, and 75-

mm. mountain guns, the Japanese force was

attempting to secure fords over the upper

reaches of Niumen Creek and protect the

withdrawal of other elements of 18th Army

units from Afua. Though surprised, Williams' men held back the initial onslaught.

Reportedly, Japanese riflemen then climbed

trees surrounding Williams' perimeter to

pin down the American troops while other

Japanese continued to attack on the ground.

Fowler's unit, under orders to bypass Williams' fight and move around the enemy left,

started moving about 0800 hours but soon

found the terrain made it impossible to

avoid contact with the Japanese opposing

Williams. The Japanese, having control of

most commanding ground in the area,

stopped Fowler's leading company. Action

was not rapid. The terrain made all movements slow and laborious, and much time

had to be taken to co-ordinate artillery support fire properly. Under cover of artillery

fire, another company of Fowler's battalion,

creeping slowly through ravines and up an

almost vertical cliff, worked around to unoccupied high ground on the Japanese left.

The rest of the battalion was successfully disengaged to secure more commanding terrain in the same area. The Japanese, finding

themselves outflanked and subjected to increasingly heavy artillery and mortar fire,

began to withdraw southward in midafternoon, relieving the pressure on Williams'

front.

Fowler's battalion, in enveloping the

Japanese left, had moved north and then

westward and the maneuver had carried

the unit by dark to a point just north of the

main trail about 750 yards east of Burns'

battalion. Williams' men withdrew to reorganize, after disengaging from the enemy
198 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ARTILLERY SUPPORTING TED FORCE. C Battery, 129th Field Artillery

Battalion, firing from the coast near Anamo.

forces late in the afternoon; at dark, having

resumed the march westward, they secured

high ground north of the trail. The ground

covered during the day by Williams' battalion was little more than 500 yards west

of the position it had occupied the previous

night. The unit probably could have moved

farther, but Colonel Starr halted it so as not

to increase the distance from Lewis' battalion which was, in effect, lost. The unit had

laboriously struggled over extremely rough

and trackless ground during the day, fighting in the afternoon against a number of

Japanese who had withdrawn from Williams' front. For the night, Lewis' men set

up a perimeter about 800 yards south-southeast of the scene of Williams' fighting.

Burns' men, patrolling from their perimeter astride the main trail, discovered a

new trail about 800 yards to the south. The

Japanese, having abandoned the western

section of the trail on which Burns' battalion was bivouacked, had recently cut the

new trail in order to escape from artillery

and aerial bombardment, and had been using this new trail since late July. Plans were

made to send a strong force south to cut the

new route, but Major Burns decided to have
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 199

artillery interdict the Japanese who had

been discovered by patrols on the new trail.

Artillery fired throughout the night while

Burns' battalion prepared to move in force

south to the new trail the next morning.

TED Force action on the 6th probably

accounted for some 350 Japanese killed or

wounded,16 while the TED Force battalions

lost only 11 men killed and 2 wounded.

Again, the advance had not carried to the

Driniumor although General Gill, at PERSECUTION Covering Force headquarters, had

been pressing Colonel Starr to move on to

the river. But Colonel Starr, not sure that all

the principal Japanese escape routes had

been cut, asked that he be allowed to continue advancing southward, ultimately to

approach Afua from the southeast. This

plan was approved by General Gill. Plans

were made to push on to the Driniumor on

the 7th—plans which again could not be

carried out.

On the 7th movement began at 0800,

and Burns' unit pushed rapidly south toward the new trail. Fowler's command, initially moving west along the main trail,

encountered some stiff opposition from Japanese who were attempting to escape from

Burns' men. Fowler's battalion turned south

and southwest from the main trail and, advancing at a fairly good speed over very

rough terrain, joined Burns' unit on the new

trail about 1130. By noon the two battalions

had killed over 75 Japanese. Pushing generally westward toward Afua and moving

the bulk of the battalion to high ground

south of the new trail, Burns' unit bivouacked for the night still about 1,100 yards

east of the Driniumor, and Fowler's men

were in the same general area.

Williams' unit, with regimental headquarters, pushed laboriously westward and

by nightfall, having met little opposition,

bivouacked on the main trail at a point almost due north of Burns' and Fowler's new

positions. Lewis' progress was again painfully slow over the incredibly rough terrain

in which the unit found itself. There was

some opposition from 41st Division remnants, and Lewis' movement was also slowed

by the necessity for carrying along thirteen

wounded men on litters. By dark the battalion had progressed scarcely 500 yards in a

westerly direction and was still south of the

main trail. Casualties in TED Force from

enemy action were light on the 7th: only 1

man killed and 3 wounded. Faulty mortar

ammunition, however, killed 8 more men

and wounded 14 others, and early the next

morning misplaced artillery fire from the

120th Field Artillery Battalion killed 4 men

and wounded 22 others in Burns' unit.17

On the 8th, Burns' and Fowler's battalions pushed on to the Driniumor, reaching

the river at a point about 1,000 yards south

of Afua. On the way, Burns' men discovered

a Japanese hospital area. Most of the Japanese there indicated no willingness to surrender but, on the contrary, began to commit

suicide or fire at the advancing American

troops, who summarily dispensed with

those Japanese failing to commit suicide.18

Williams' unit reached the Driniumor at

1700, but Lewis' battalion, which had

reached the main trail during the morning,

was again delayed by scattered Japanese opposition and the necessity of carrying

16

 During the two days of fighting in the WilliamsFowler area on the upper Niumen, about 425 Japanese were killed, most of them by mortar and artillery fire.

17

 According to Ltr, Becker to Starr, 13 Nov 50,

Burns' battalion had not called for any artillery fire.

The artillery shells were apparently sent out when

the fires which Burns' men lit to cook breakfast were

observed by the artillery observation towers on the

coast. 18

 There is no record that any prisoners were taken

in the hospital area.
200 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

wounded men. The battalion remained

more or less lost until 1100 on 10 August,

when it reached the Driniumor at a point

about 300 yards north of Afua. The same

day all of TED Force moved back to the Blue

Beach area for a well-deserved rest.

Results of TED Force Operations

TED Force reported that during its wide

envelopment maneuver it killed about 1,800

Japanese. Most of these casualties TED

Force inflicted upon the 18th Army while

the four American battalions were moving

westward toward the Driniumor, and many

included the sick, wounded, hungry, exhausted, and dispirited Japanese troops who

were unable to keep up with the rest of the

retreating 18th Army. Combat losses within

TED Force were about 50 men killed and

80 wounded, of whom about 15 were killed

and perhaps 40 wounded by misplaced

American artillery fire or faulty mortar ammunition.19

 How many TED Force men were

rendered hors de combat by tropical fevers,

psychoses, and other ailments is unknown,

although it is known that all four battalions

lost some men from such causes.

The relatively low battle casualty rate (little more than 2 percent from enemy action),

while indicative of the ineffectiveness of Japanese opposition, is also a tribute to the leadership within TED Force and to the teamwork of all ranks under the worst possible

climatic and terrain conditions. It is especially noteworthy that the bulk of the personnel engaged in the enveloping maneuver

were members of the 124th Infantry, a unit

on its first combat mission, and that the 2d

Battalion, 169th Infantry, had been extensively reorganized and had received many

inexperienced replacements since its last action against the Japanese.

To summarize, the objectives of the TED

Force maneuver had been to cut the Japanese lines of communication to the east in

order to render the enemy's positions around

Afua untenable, and, if necessary, to fall

upon the 18th Army's Afua forces from the

flanks and rear. While the envelopment was

not as successful in accomplishing these missions as had been anticipated, or as it was

thought to be at the time of its completion,

the maneuver did force the 18th Army to

accelerate its already planned withdrawal

from the Driniumor.

The End of the Aitape Operation

While TED Force had been moving toward the Driniumor, South Force had been

mopping up in the Afua area. The banzai

attacks against the front of the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, on the morning of 4

August had been undertaken by the 18th

Army to cover the withdrawal east of the

Driniumor and marked the last co-ordinated efforts made by the Japanese in the

Driniumor area. General Cunningham

could now execute his plans to clear the

enemy remnants from the Afua region.

A combined attack by TED Force and

South Force had originally been scheduled

for 4 August, but had been postponed because TED Force could not reach the Driniumor by that day.20

 On 5 August it was decided that South Force would attack south

19

 Records concerning TED Force casualties are

very incomplete and contradictory.

20

 This section is based on: 112th Cav Opns Rpt

Aitape, pp. 14-15; 112th Cav Opns and Int Diary

Aitape; 2d Sq 112th Cav Jnl, 29 Jun-11 Aug 44;

PCF G-3 Jnls, 31 Jul-5 Aug, 5-9 Aug, and 9-15

Aug 44; 1st Bn 169th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 2-

3; 3d Bn 128th Inf Jnl, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44; 127th

Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, Sec. II, pp. 14-15; 127th Inf

Jnl file, 1-25 Aug 44; 2d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 27 Jun25 Aug 44.
NATIVE LITTER BEARERS evacuate a casualty across the Driniumor River near

Afua Village.
202 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the next day, whether or not TED Force

reached Afua in time to participate. It was

in preparation for this attack that the 1st

Battalion, 169th Infantry, had been sent to

the Driniumor from Palauru, and at the

same time General Gill released the 3d Battalion, 128th Infantry, to General Cunningham for participation in the 6 August action.

The South Force commander ordered

three of the infantry battalions available to

him to clear the ground south and west of

his command post area to the Afua-Palauru

trail. One of the battalions was to move

south along the west bank of the Driniumor,

clear Afua, and then move on to a Japanese

fording point about 2,000 yards upstream

from Afua. Simultaneously, on the east

bank, a Composite Squadron, comprising

two cavalry troops and an infantry company, was to advance south to the ford.

Tactical control over all these attack operations was vested in Colonel Howe, the commander of the 127th Infantry.

The Composite Squadron crossed the

Driniumor at 0800 on the 6th and pushed

south through heavy but disorganized Japanese rifle fire. It halted for the night about

500 yards north of the ford and reported

that many Japanese were crossing the ford

to the east. West of the river, one infantry

battalion reached the Afua-Palauru trail

late in the afternoon at a point about 300

yards west of Afua, having encountered only

scattered resistance. Another battalion

pushed units south along the west bank to

a point opposite the Composite Squadron,

and the third continued operations it had

begun on the 5th of August to clear the

jungled, broken terrain west of South

Force's command post.

Patrolling in the same areas continued

for the next two days, as South Force waited

for TED Force to reach the Driniumor.

South Force patrols reported ever decreasing opposition and found increasing evidence that the Japanese were in full flight

to the east. On the evening of 9 August

General Gill reported to General Hall that

no more resistance was to be expected along

the Driniumor or in the Afua area. The

Japanese, said General Gill, had retreated

and the PERSECUTION Covering Force

could be relieved. The Battle of the Driniumor was over.

On 10 and 11 August most of South

Force and all of TED Force returned to Blue

Beach and on the latter day the 103d Infantry, 43d Division, began to relieve all units

of the PERSECUTION Covering Force still on

the river. The relief of the 127th Infantry

was completed on the 13th, and the 128th

Infantry, which was still holding the old

North Force positions, returned to Blue

Beach three days later. The PERSECUTION

Covering Force ceased to exist as a separate

unit on the 15th and its missions were assumed by a new organization which, designated the Tadji Defense Perimeter and

Covering Force, was commanded by Maj.

Gen. Leonard F. Wing, the commanding

general of the 43d Infantry Division.21

From 16 to 25 August principal combat

missions in the Aitape area were carried out

by the three regiments of the 43d Division.

The 169th Infantry operated on the west

flank, the 172d Infantry south of the Tadji

strips and along the Nigia, and the 103d

21

 Actually, during the period 25 July to 25 August, there were many changes in the command

structure of the PERSECUTION Task Force, none of

which materially affected operations. These changes

are to be found in orders and memos in the PTF G-3

Jnls, 21-26 Jul, 7-16 Aug, and 16-25 Aug 44; PCF

G-3 Jnl, 5-9 Aug 44. General Wing's command

comprised the 43d Division and the 112th Cavalry

RCT. General Gill became the commander of the

PERSECUTION Task Force Reserve, which included

the 32d Division and the 124th RCT.

204 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Infantry along the Driniumor. The latter

regiment sent patrols east from the Driniumor along the coast as far as Marubian,

and up the Drindaria River to Charov and

Jalup, where no American troops had been

since early June. As far east as the Drindaria

there was no sign of organized Japanese resistance, and all Japanese in the area seemed

to be withdrawing in confusion to the east.

At the mouth of the Dandriwad River, however, the Japanese maintained organized delaying positions, through which American

patrols did not attempt to push.22

On 25 August General Krueger, ALAMO

Force commander, convinced that the 18th

Army no longer constituted any threat to the

Aitape perimeter or the Tadji airstrips, declared the Aitape operation over.23

Conclusions

The most obvious result of the Aitape

operation was that two and one-third reinforced divisions of the 18th Army had been

shattered in vain attempts to recapture the

Aitape area and delay the Allied drive toward the Philippines—neither of which objectives had been achieved. Instead, the

18th Army had suffered a decisive and costly

defeat; it could no longer be a serious threat

to Allied forces anywhere in New Guinea.

The Aitape operation had served a number of other purposes for the Allies. First,

the Tadji airstrips had provided a base from

which planes could have flown support missions for ground operations at Hollandia,

had such support proved necessary. Second,

the PERSECUTION Task Force's victory over

the 18th Army prevented the latter unit

from threatening more important Allied positions at Hollandia. At Aitape, one regimental combat team of the 31st Infantry

Division received its first combat experience,

and the whole or parts of three other divisions and all of another regimental combat

team had further experience in combat

which helped prepare those units for subsequent operations in the drive toward the

Philippines or in the latter islands themselves. Finally, the Aitape area served as a

staging base for troops engaged in three later

operations along the New Guinea coast and

in the Philippines.

Securing the Aitape area and defeating

the 18th Army had cost Allied forces to 25

August approximately 440 men killed,

2,550 wounded, and 10 missing.24 According to American counts, Japanese losses in

the Aitape area from 22 April to 25 August

were 8,821 killed and 98 captured, of whom

2,669 were killed and 34 taken prisoner dur22

 43d Inf Div Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 2; Tadji Defense Perimeter and Covering Force, G-3 Per Rpts

1-10, 16-25 Aug 44. One noteworthy action was

undertaken by the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry,

which on 11 August returned to Yakamul whence

it had been driven by Japanese forces early in June.

The battalion recovered the bodies of 6 of the 9 dead

it had left behind in June. The unit was accompanied by a platoon of Company B, 44th Tank Battalion. The action is described in PTF Opns Rpt

Aitape, 28 Jun-25 Aug 44, p. 17. 23

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Aitape-Hollandia, p.

35. General Krueger, "for historical purposes," set

a terminal date on each of the operations along the

New Guinea coast. This meant that unit after action reports as required by Army regulations were to

be closed as of that date. Often these dates coincided

with administrative changes in the area concerned,

as in the case of Hollandia when the termination

date also marked transfer of responsibility in the

area from Headquarters, RECKLESS Task Force,

to Headquarters, Base G, a Services of Supply

installation.

24

 The casualty records of all major units involved

in the Aitape operation are incomplete and contradictory. The figures given above are close to those of

ALAMO Force and were derived from data in the

records of all major units engaged in the Aitape

area.
BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR: THE 18TH ARMY RETREATS 205

ing the period 2-9 August.25 According to

Japanese sources, the American figures are

a little conservative, for the Japanese estimated that the 18th Army lost about 9,000

men of the 20,000 employed in the forward

area just for the period 1 June through 5

August. As the 18th Army units withdrew,

effective combat strength of the 20th Division's three infantry regiments was down to

an average of less than 100 men; the regiments of the 41st Division averaged about

250 men; and the 66th Infantry, 51st Division, was reduced to 150 effectives. All Japanese infantry units lost most of their battalion, company, and platoon commanders,

and the bulk of their crew-served weapons.

All the artillery brought to the Aitape area

was lost, and rations and supplies of all

other types were completely exhausted in

the forward area.26 The sacrifices were in

vain.

Although a major battle—essentially defensive in character—had developed at

Aitape, this action proved but incidental to

the progress of the Southwest Pacific Area's

drive toward the Philippines. Even while

the battle along the Driniumor was being

fought, other forces under General MacArthur's command had been moving northwestward up the coast of New Guinea. This

drive had progressed as rapidly as the assembly of supplies and the availability of

ground forces, air support, amphibious craft,

warships, and cargo ships would permit. On

17 May, long before anyone at Aitape knew

that the 18th Army was going to attack or

that a battle was going to be fought along

the Driniumor River, Allied forces had

landed in the Wakde-Sarmi area of Dutch

New Guinea, about 275 miles northwest of

Aitape.27

25

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Aitape-Hollandia, p.

35; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 871, 10 Aug 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 10 Aug 44. 26

 18th Army Opns, III, 156-59-

27

 American forces continued active patrolling in

the Aitape area for some time, the 43d Division being the last relieved. The division staged at Aitape

for operations in Luzon. Late in October 1944, Australian units started taking over at Aitape, the first

one to arrive being the 2/6th Cavalry (Commando)

Regiment. Later, the 6th Australian Division arrived, and on 27 November the command in the

area passed from General Wing to Maj. Gen. J. E.

S. Stevens (AIF), the Australian division commander. In mid-December the Australians began a

slow but steady drive toward Wewak, which fell on

10 May 1945 after stubborn resistance. Japanese

remnants were still holding out in mountains south

of Wewak on V-J Day. General Adachi delayed giving himself up for some days, but finally came in on

13 September 1945 to surrender the few thousand

men of the 18th Army still alive. Australian losses

during this drive were 451 men killed, 1,163 wounded, and 3 missing. Japanese losses were 7,200 killed

or found dead and 269 prisoners. General Adachi

was taken by the Australians to Rabaul where he was

tried for war crimes by an Australian military tribunal and, on 27 April 1947, sentenced to life imprisonment. He committed suicide in prison at

Rabaul during the night of 8-9 September 1947.

This info is from: 6th Austr Div, Rpt on Opns,

Aitape-Wewak Campaign, 26 Oct 44-13 Sep 45,

Part 1, Rec of Events, pars. 7-166, copy in OCMH

files; Ltr, Mr. John Balfour, Australian War Historian's Office, to author, 22 Dec 48, no sub, copy in

OCMH files; tel conv with Lt Col Peter S. TeesdaleSmith, Australian Military Mission, Washington,

D. C., 22 Jun 50.
CHAPTER IX

The Seizure of Wakde Island

The seizure of the Hollandia and Aitape

areas had consummated one step in the

Southwest Pacific's strategic plan for the approach to the Philippines—advancing the

land-based bomber and fighter line by the

seizure of air-base sites along the north coast

of New Guinea. Long before Allied troops

had set foot ashore at Hollandia and Aitape,

General MacArthur's planners had been

looking toward the Geelvink Bay region of

western Dutch New Guinea as the next airbase site objective after Hollandia. From

airfields constructed on islands in Geelvink

Bay, operations still farther to the northwest

could be supported.1

The Sarmi-Biak Plan

The Strategic Background

The 200-mile-deep indentation that Geelvink Bay makes into the land mass of New

Guinea scoops out the neck of the bird-like

figure of that island. Cape D'Urville, lying

over 200 miles northwest of Hollandia, is the

bird's shoulder and marks the eastern limit

of Geelvink Bay. From Cape D'Urville the

distance westward across the bay to Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula (the bird's

head) is about 250 miles. Across the northern entrance to Geelvink Bay lie many small

islands and islets. Among the Schouten

Group are Biak, Soepiori, Owi, and Mios

Woendi; Japen, Mios Noem, and Noemfoor

lie south and west of the Schoutens. Many

of the bay islands are large enough to provide airdrome sites, some of which had been

developed by the Japanese. Allied attention

was focused on Biak. The terrain on the

southeastern shore of that island is well

suited for airfields, and the Japanese had

begun airdrome construction there late in

1943.

Biak Island is located about 325 miles

northwest of Hollandia. On the New

Guinea mainland approximately 180 miles

southeast of Biak and 145 miles northwest

of Hollandia lies the town of Sarmi. Prior to

World War II, Sarmi was the seat of the

local Netherlands East Indies government

and a small commercial center. In the closing months of 1943, the Japanese began to

develop in the Sarmi area supply, troop,

and air bases of some importance, for the

region was to be a major defensive installation on Japan's withdrawing strategic main

line of resistance. Six miles east of Sarmi

the enemy constructed Sawar Drome, which

was operational by 1 April 1944. (Map 9)

Three miles still farther east, on the shores

of Maffin Bay, the Japanese hastily began

constructing another airstrip early in 1944.

About twenty miles east of Sarmi and approximately two miles offshore lie the

Wakde Islands, Insoemoar and Insoemanai.

1

 RENO I, 25 Feb 43; RENO II, 3 Aug 43; RENO

III, 20 Oct 43.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 207

MAP 9

On the former, designated throughout the

operation as Wakde Island, the Japanese

had completed an excellent airfield by June

1943.2

Although General MacArthur's planners

had given up thoughts of seizing Wakde

Island as an adjunct to the Hollandia operation, they did not drop the Wakde-Sarmi

area from consideration. First, the area was

apparently capable of development into a

major air base for the support of subsequent

operations. Second, as more information

from various intelligence sources became

available at General Headquarters concerning Japanese airdrome development, troop

dispositions, and supply concentrations at

Wakde-Sarmi, the area began to acquire a

threatening aspect. It was a base from which

the enemy could not only endanger the success of the Hollandia operation, but also

imperil Allied progress into the Geelvink

2

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp. 5-7;

AGS SWPA Terrain Handbook 26, Sarmi, 20 Apr

44, copy in OCMH files.
208 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Bay area. Indeed, the Allied Air Forces considered that an early seizure of the WakdeSarmi region after the capture of Hollandia

was a prerequisite to continuing the drive

toward the Philippines.3

Finally, when in March 1944 the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had instructed General

MacArthur to provide air support for operations in the Central Pacific Area,4

 occupation of both the Wakde-Sarmi area and

Biak Island assumed importance in intertheater strategy. From air bases in northwest New Guinea the Allied Air Forces

could provide support for the Central Pacific's Mariana and Palau operations by

helping to neutralize enemy bases in the

western Carolines and keeping under surveillance enemy shipping and fleet units in

the waters north and northwest of the Vogelkop Peninsula. In addition, an early advance

by Southwest Pacific forces to the WakdeSarmi-Biak region would keep Japanese attention diverted from impending operations

in Admiral Nimitz' area of responsibility.5

Prior to May 1944 the only good heavy

bomber bases in the Southwest Pacific's forward area were on the Admiralty Islands

and at Nadzab in eastern New Guinea. Both

these bases were too far south or east to permit execution of an effective bombing and

reconnaissance program to support either

the Central Pacific's advances or the Southwest Pacific's drive to the Philippines. It had

been expected that the newly won Hollandia

fields would furnish excellent bomber bases

farther west and north, but the terrain and

weather at Hollandia made it impossible to

provide airfields suitable for extensive employment by heavy bombers without a great

deal more engineering work than had been

anticipated. The necessary air support missions therefore became contingent upon

rapid development of heavy bomber fields

in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region.6

The First Wakde-Sarmi-Biak Plan.

Even before plans for Hollandia-Aitape

had been completed, General MacArthur

had warned principal subordinate headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area that

the operation might soon be extended to include the seizure of the Wakde-Sarmi area.

Since Admiral Nimitz had not then made

any specific requests for Southwest Pacific

air support of his operations, the objectives

of the Wakde-Sarmi undertaking at first

had principally local applications. Japanese

forces at Sarmi were to be prevented from

interfering with construction at Hollandia,

and bases were to be developed in the Sarmi

area to support subsequent Southwest Pacific operations to the northwest.7

General MacArthur's G-2 Section expected that the Allied seizure of Hollandia

and Aitape would stir the Japanese into efforts to reinforce western New Guinea. It

was estimated that one enemy division was

3

 Ltr, AAF SWPA to GHQ SWPA, 12 Apr 44,

sub: Wakde-Sarmi Opns, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 12-22 Apr 44. As they had for the

Hollandia-Aitape operations, the staff sections of

Headquarters, ALAMO Force, maintained separate

journals for operations at Wakde and Biak. For part

of the time, the ALAMO Force headquarters was divided into two echelons, advanced and rear, both of

which maintained independent journals for the

Wakde-Biak operations. 4

 Rads, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 5171

and 989, 12 Mar 44, CM-OUT 5137. 5

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, AAF SWPA, et al.,

CX-12504, 14 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 14-18 May 44.

6

 USSBS, Naval Analysis Div, The Campaigns of

the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), pp. 180-210;

Rad, GHQ SWPA to CINCPOA, CX-12551, 15

May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 15 May 44. 7

 Ltr, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO Force, ANF SWPA,

et al., 10 Apr 44, sub: STICKATNOUGHT Operation,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 12-22 Apr 44.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 209

spread between Sarmi and Biak, and it was

believed that two more divisions were scheduled for early movement to New Guinea.

Allowed freedom of movement, such enemy

reinforcements could become a strong threat

to the success of advances westward beyond

Hollandia. It therefore seemed of utmost

Urgency that the Wakde-Sarmi area be

seized and cleared of enemy forces as soon

as possible.

The G-2 Section estimated that about

6,500 Japanese troops were stationed at

Wakde-Sarmi. Of these, some 4,000 were

considered combat elements of the 36th Division, probably including the entire 224th

Infantry and possibly a battalion of the 223d

Infantry. The 222d Infantry of the same

division was thought to be on Biak Island.

Within 350 miles west of Sarmi (considered

easy reinforcing distance), there were estimated to be approximately 14,000 enemy

troops, of whom 7,000 were believed members of combat units. These forces were

thought to be concentrated at Manokwari,

on Biak, and on other islands in Geelvink

Bay. The exact dispositions of the Japanese

at Wakde-Sarmi could not be foretold, but

it was considered probable that most were

concentrated at Sarmi and around the three

airfields in the vicinity.8

Basing his decision on the estimated Japanese strength in the Wakde-Sarmi area and

on the possibility that the enemy might reinforce the area before the Allies could land

there, General MacArthur decided that a

full infantry division should be sent against

Wakde-Sarmi. One regimental combat

team was to land near the town of Sarmi,

another on the mainland opposite Wakde

Island, and the third was to be in reserve.

The unit landing near Wakde was to seize

that island by a shore-to-shore maneuver

after securing the initial mainland beachhead.

General Krueger, who was to direct the

operation, planned to employ either the

6th or 31st Infantry Division. Both of these

units had recently arrived in the theater, and

neither had combat experience. This plan

was opposed by General MacArthur, who

considered it necessary to withdraw the 24th,

the 32d, or the 41st Division from its commitment to Hollandia-Aitape. The theater

commander felt that it would be impossible

to stage and supply the Wakde-Sarmi operation from rear areas, since all available

large amphibious and cargo ships were

needed to support the Hollandia-Aitape

operation and build up the air and supply

base at Hollandia. Thus, an early advance

to Wakde-Sarmi was contingent upon combat developments at Hollandia and Aitape.

If none of the divisions committed to the

latter operations could be relieved, WakdeSarmi might have to be postponed until at

least mid-June.

With this information at hand General

Krueger decided to assign the 32d Division

to Wakde-Sarmi. One regimental combat

team of the division was scheduled for early

arrival at Aitape and the remainder of the

unit was at Saidor, in eastern New Guinea.

However, the unexpected weakness of Japanese opposition at Hollandia, the shortage

of shipping, and the lack of adequate staging facilities at Saidor combined to prompt

a change. The 41st Division, with one regimental combat team at Aitape and the re8

 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, WakdeSarmi Area, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 8 Apr 44;

GHQ SWPA, G-2 Monthly Sum of Enemy Dispositions, 30 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Apr 44; Int

Annex to ALAMO Force FO 16, 30 Apr 44, filed with

other materials atchd to ALAMO Force Opns Rpt

Wakde-Biak.
210 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

maining units at Hollandia, was substituted

for the 32d.9

Setting D Day for Wakde-Sarmi depended not only on combat developments at

Hollandia and Aitape but also upon the

availability of naval and air support. Naval

escort vessels and sufficient amphibious craft

were expected to be on hand by 30 April.

Air support was not so easily obtained. The

carriers which were to support HollandiaAitape had to leave the Southwest Pacific

within a very few days after that invasion.

Wakde-Sarmi was too far from eastern New

Guinea air bases to permit proper landbased air support. For these two reasons, the

advance to Wakde-Sarmi had to await establishment of land-based air units on the

Hollandia fields. It was expected that these

fields would be operational by 12 May. To

allow for unforeseen circumstances, the target date for Wakde-Sarmi was set for three

days later, 15 May. This date was set by

General MacArthur in operations instructions published on 27 April.10

 The target

date and selection of forces for Biak were

left for later determination, but a move to

Biak early in June was contemplated.

The Plan is Changed

By the first week in May preparations for

Wakde-Sarmi were rapidly approaching

completion. The 41st Division's three combat teams had been relieved at Hollandia

and Aitape and were busily loading supplies.

Naval and amphibious organization had

been settled, and shipping and supplies were

being gathered at the two staging areas. The

Allied Air Forces had begun preassault

bombardments of the targets, and all units

participating in the operation were putting

finishing touches on their tactical plans. On

4 May, however, Admiral Barbey, who was

responsible for the co-ordination of naval

planning, started a chain of events which

precipitated a broad change in the WakdeSarmi plan.

Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be

postponed until 21 May and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would

be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than

on the 15th. Second, postponement would

allow orderly and complete preparations to

be made. Congestion was severe at the

Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the

41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of

equipment, supplies, and troops which were

pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of

which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi,

seriously interfered with mounting the 41st

Division.11

General Krueger, responsible for co-ordinating all planning for the Wakde-Sarmi

operation, immediately called a conference

of representatives of ALAMO Force, Allied

Air Forces, and Allied Naval Forces to discuss Admiral Barbey's proposal. The conferees, meeting on 6 May, decided that the

operation could be started no earlier than

16 May (a day later than the date already

set) but that unless important strategic con9

 Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-2393, 14 Apr

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 14 Apr 44; Rads, GHQ SWPA

to ALAMO, C-10671, 14 Apr 44, and ALAMO to CTF

76, WF-2584, 15 Apr 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 12-22 Apr 44; ALAMO Force Opns

Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 8. 10

 GHQ SWPA, Stf Study, Occupation of WakdeSarmi Area, n. d., atchd to GHQ SWPA ltr to

ALAMO et al., 10 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, OI 51, 27

Apr 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 22-30 Apr

11

 Rad, CTF 76 to CG ALAMO and Com7thFlt, 4

May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 1-7 May

44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 9.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 211

siderations dictated otherwise, 21 May

would be much preferable. Such a delay

would considerably ease the congestion at

Hollandia and give the Allied Air Forces

time for many more strikes against the target area. General Krueger immediately informed General MacArthur of the recommendations made at the conference.12

General MacArthur, who approved the

proposed delay, investigated the problem

more fully and on 6 May recommended that

the entire concept of the Wakde-Sarmi operation be recast. Interpretation of new

aerial photographs of the coastal area from

Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated that

ground conditions on the mainland in that

region were not suited to construction of

airdromes adequate for heavy bomber operations. General MacArthur therefore decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be canceled. Wakde Island

would be seized as planned and aircraft

would be sent there as soon as possible. Within eight or ten days after the capture of

Wakde, or as soon as the airfield there was

repaired, Allied forces would advance to

Biak, where more suitable airdrome sites

were known to exist. The move to Biak

would be covered by Wakde-based fighters

and bombers.13

To arrange the details under this revised

concept, a new planning conference was

held at ALAMO Force headquarters on 9

May. Conferees included General MacArthur's chief of staff; the commanders of

ALAMO Force, Allied Air Forces, and Allied

Naval Forces; and representatives of the

Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, and the

VII Amphibious Force. After considerable

discussion the conferees decided that the

proposed Wakde-Biak operation could be

carried out. The forces originally scheduled

to take Wakde-Sarmi were believed sufficient. One regimental combat team was

considered strong enough for the Wakde

phase and it was expected that the rest of

the 41st Division could seize the airdrome

areas on Biak.

In order to assure that the Wakde field

would be ready to base aircraft supporting

the Biak operation, it was determined that

an interval of ten days would be necessary

between the two phases of the new operation. Such an interval was also dictated by

logistic problems, since many of the assault

ships used for Wakde would also be needed

in the Biak phase, and a ten-day interval

would be necessary for the turnaround and

reloading of these vessels. Finally, a number

of engineer and air force organizations were

scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on 12 May,

either for employment there or to be staged

for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing

these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation,

which could not begin until the vessels were

reloaded. This reloading could not be accomplished quickly, for beach congestion at

Hollandia remained a major problem. It

was therefore proposed that the Wakde

landings be postponed still another day. On

the other hand, the strategic urgency of providing the Central Pacific with land-based

air support for the invasion of the Marianas

was by now becoming evident and a delay in

the target date for Biak might threaten the

success of Admiral Nimitz's undertakings.

After consideration of all these problems,

the conferees finally decided that D Day for

12

 Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-843, 6 May

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 1-7 May 44. 13

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, AAF SWPA, et

al., CX-12253, 6 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 1-7 May 44.
212 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINE$

Wakde should be set for 17 May and Z Day

for Biak for 27 May.14

The Wakde Plan

On 10 May General MacArthur approved the proposed dates for the new

Wakde-Biak operation.15 All units concerned immediately began revising their

Wakde-Sarmi plans—plans which proved

remarkably flexible. New loading and staging schedules had to be drawn up, and some

changes in organization, command, and

troop assignments were found necessary.

Despite the fact that some confusion inevitably resulted from the sudden change in

the original concept of operations, all major

headquarters were able to perfect new plans

within a few days.

The Amphibious Plan

Under the revised concept the ground

forces moving into the Wakde-Sarmi area

were to limit operations to the occupation

and defense of Wakde Island and the adjacent mainland. The ground mission was primarily defensive in nature—to prevent

Japanese interference with construction activities on Wakde and air operations from it.

There was one additional task. The Allied

Air Forces desired that radar warning stations be established in the Wakde area. For

this purpose, Liki and Niroemoar Islands,

about fifteen miles off Sarmi, were to be

seized.

The nucleus of the force moving to

Wakde was the 163d Regimental Combat

Team of the 41st Division. For the operation

the reinforced combat team was designated

the TORNADO Task Force, to be commanded

by Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe who had directed

the operations of the 163d at Aitape. The

TORNADO Task Force was to start landing

on the mainland opposite Wakde Island at

0715 on 17 May. The seizure of Wakde

Island was to be undertaken on 18 May,

and the capture of Liki and Niroemoar on

the 19th.16

Planners devoted much time to the selection of a landing beach for the TORNADO

Task Force. Though the principal objective

of the task force was Wakde, that island was

too small and its beaches were too limited to

permit the landing of a reinforced regimental combat team. Furthermore, a landing

on Wakde might be subjected to fire from

hidden enemy artillery on the mainland.

Landing the task force on the mainland

would largely eliminate any danger of beach

congestion, and at the same time the Japanese would be denied positions from which

they could shell Allied forces on Wakde.

Conversely, the TORNADO Task Force could

secure positions on the mainland from

which its own artillery could hit Japanese

defenses on Wakde.

It was decided that a landing at Toem, on

the mainland directly opposite Wakde,

would not be sensible. There the landing

craft and cargo ships would be subjected to

even small-caliber fire from Wakde. In such

14

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO et al., CX-12253,

6 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 1-7

May 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p.

10; Rad, ALAMO to CTF 76, WF-1405, 9 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; CTF

77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; Ltr, Gen Kenney [USAF],

to Gen Ward, 4 Nov 50, no sub, copy in OCMH files. 15

 GHQ SWPA OI 51/1, 10 May 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44.

16

 ALAMO Force FO 17, 12 May 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; TTF FO 1, 12 Mav

44, atchd to TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25

May 44.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 213

restricted waters the enemy could place enfilade fire on the ships, but in more open waters to the west naval fire support ships and

amphibious vessels would have freedom of

movement and could maneuver to neutralize both Wakde and the Toem area while

the TORNADO Task Force moved ashore and

set up its artillery. After consideration of all

these factors, it was finally decided that the

initial beachhead would be at Arare, a native settlement on the coast about three miles

west of Toem and four and one-half miles

southwest of Wakde Island.17

The 163d Infantry, in column of battalions, the 3d Battalion leading, was to initiate

the assault at Arare. LCVP's, furnished by

Engineer Special Brigades and manned by

Company B, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment, were to take ashore the first four

waves, which were to land at five-minute

intervals beginning at H Hour. The four

waves were to contain 8 LCVP's each, the

fifth wave 4 LCM's, and the next two waves

6 LCI's each. LST's were to move in to the

beach beginning at H plus 60 minutes.18

The 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, was to

take up positions on the right (west) flank

of the Arare beachhead. The 1st and 2d

Battalions, following the 3d ashore, were to

move east along the coast from Arare, 6,000

yards to Tementoe Creek and prevent Japanese interference from the east. One rifle

company of the 3d Battalion was to move

west from Arare to the Tor River, another

6,000 yards distant.

As soon as the initial beachhead was secured, a reconnaissance of Insoemanai

Island, about 3,500 yards offshore, was to

be undertaken. If that islet proved unoccupied, a Provisional Groupment of heavy

weapons was to be transported to it. The

Provisional Groupment consisted of Company B, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion

(4.2-inch mortars), and all the 81-mm.

mortars, .50-caliber machine guns, and .30-

caliber heavy machine guns available to the

163d Infantry. As soon as these weapons

were emplaced, they would begin firing on

Wakde Island.

The artillery of the TORNADO Task Force

included the 167th Field Artillery Battalion

(105-mm. howitzers), which was part of

the 163d Regimental Combat Team; the

218th Field Artillery (155-mm. howitzers);

and the Cannon Company, 163d Infantry

(105-mm. howitzers, M3). These units

were to operate under the control of Headquarters, 191st Field Artillery Group, the

commanding officer of which, Col. George

M. Williamson, Jr., was also task force

artillery officer. Following the infantry

ashore as rapidly as the tactical situation

permitted, the artillery was to set up near

Arare to provide support for the ground

troops moving toward the flanks of the

beachhead and for the shore-to-shore movement against Wakde Island on D plus 1.

The latter maneuver was to be undertaken by the 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry.

The Wakde assault was to be covered not

only by the task force artillery but also by

the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai

and by naval fire support ships. The landing

was scheduled to begin at 0830, 18 May.19

17

 ALAMO Force FO 16, 30 Apr 44; ALAMO Force

Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 8. The name Arare is also

spelled Arare, Arareh, and Arrara. 18

 CTG 77.2 [Eastern Attack Group] Attack Order

1-44 (Rev), 13 May 44, and Wakde TF, Tentative

Plan for the Seizure of the Wakde Island Area, 12

May 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14

May 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, chart

after p. 18; TTF FO 1, 12 May 44, atchd to TTF

Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May 44.

19

 TTF FO 1, 12 May 44; 191st FA Gp, Hist Rpt

TORNADO Landing Force, pp. 1-2. The tank destroyers' 4.2-inch mortars were actually part of the

TORNADO Task Force artillery, under the 191st

Field Artillery Group, but operated in a semide-
214 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

The naval organization for the WakdeBiak operation centered on the Naval Attack Force, commanded by Rear Adm. William M. Fechteler (USN).20

 The admiral

delegated responsibility for the Wakde phase

of the operation to Capt. Albeit G. Noble,

(USN), whose command was designated

the Eastern Attack Group. Captain Noble

divided his fire support ships into three

groups: Fire Support Group A (two heavy

cruisers and four destroyers), Fire Support

Group B (three light cruisers and six destroyers), and Fire Support Group C (ten

destroyers). These ships were to begin firing

on assigned targets at H minus 45 minutes

and were to continue bombardment until H

minus 3. The bulk of the D-Day fire was to

be aimed at Sawar and Maffin Dromes, west

of the landing beach. No resistance was expected at the beach and a light bombardment to be directed on it was purely precautionary. Some fire support ships were

assigned counterbattery missions and others

were to aim their shells at Wakde and Insoemanai Islands.

Other ships assigned to participate in the

landing phase were 3 submarine chasers, 2

destroyer-escorts, 4 mine sweepers, 2 rocketequipped submarine chasers, and 3 rocketequipped LCI's. Rocket fire was to begin at

H minus 3 minutes and was to be directed

principally against the beachhead area. At

H minus 1, all fire on the beach was to cease

and the landing craft were to make their

final dash to the shore. After the landing,

the fire support ships were to shift bombardment to targets on the beach flanks and were

to be prepared to deliver call fire upon request from the troops ashore. The landing

on Insoemanai was to be supported by two

LCI(G)'s and two destroyers. Throughout

the night of 17-18 May, cruisers and destroyers were to bombard Wakde and on the

morning of the 18th they and the rocketequipped vessels were to support the assault

on that island. On the 19th a few destroyers

were to support the landings on Liki and

Niroemoar Islands.21

The Air Support Plan

Prior to 17 May the Allied Air Forces was

to undertake intensive bombardment of the

Wakde-Sarmi area and other Japanese installations along the north coast of New

Guinea. Special attention was to be given

enemy fields east of the Vogelkop Peninsula

and on Biak Island. Japanese waterborne

supply and reinforcement movements in the

Geelvink Bay area were to be stopped insofar as weather, time, and the availability of

aircraft permitted. The surface convoys

moving toward the target were to be furnished air cover, and close support during

the landings was also to be made available.

Most of these missions were assigned to

the U.S. Fifth Air Force, but other elements

of the Allied Air Forces had their own tasks

in support of the operation. The XIII Air

Task Force was to take part in the WakdeBiak operation by assuming responsibility

for many air activities in eastern New

Guinea and New Britain in order to relieve

Fifth Air Force units for movement forward

to Hollandia and, ultimately, to Wakde Island. The XIII Air Task Force was also to

bomb Japanese installations on such Caroline Islands as were within range of the

unit's new base on the Admiralties in order

tached manner while with the Provisional Groupment. 20

 At this time Admiral Fechteler was also Deputy

Commander, VII Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet.

21

 CTG 77.2 Attack Order 1-44 (Rev), 13 May

44, and Wakde TF, Tentative Plan for the Seizure

of the Wakde Island Area, 12 May 44, both in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14 May 44; CTG 77.2

Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde, p. 3.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 215

to forestall enemy interference with the

Wakde-Biak operation from the north. The

task force's long-range bombers were to supplement Fifth Air Force sorties against Japanese fields in western New Guinea, including those at Wakde, Sarmi, and Biak.

Australian air units also had important

support missions and were to strike all Japanese airfields in northwestern New Guinea

(west of and including Noemfoor Island)

within range of the bomber bases at Darwin, Australia. While the Fifth Air Force

was primarily responsible for the enemy

fields east of Noemfoor, Fifth Air Force

bombers were also to participate in the

strikes on the more westerly targets. Insofar

as range, weather, and time permitted, Australian bombers, aided by a Dutch squadron

of B-25's, were to neutralize enemy air bases

on the Arafura Sea islands and on other

islands of the Indies southwest of the

Vogelkop.22

On D minus 1 Fifth Air Force bombers

were to attempt detonation of possible land

mines on the mainland beach and subsurfaces mines in the waters surrounding

Wakde. On the morning of D Day there

was to be additional bombing west of the

landing area, but there was to be no bombing or strafing of the beach immediately

before the assault.23 Fighters were to be on

air alert, weather permitting, over the

Wakde area from first light to dusk on D

Day. During part of the day A-20's would

also be on alert over the area and were to

strike Wakde. Such daily cover was to continue until aircraft could use the Wakde

strip.24

Supply and Reinforcement

By evening on D plus 2, considered the

end of the assault phase, the TORNADO Task

Force on Wakde and the mainland opposite

would comprise some 9,700 troops. Of this

number, about 7,000 were to be landed at

Arare on D Day. The ships for the D-Day

echelon included 2 APA's, 12 LCI's, and 8

LST's. The first Reinforcement Group,

scheduled to arrive on D plus 1, was to bring

forward engineers and other service troops

aboard eight additional LST's. After D plus

2, the task force was to be built up by air

force and ground combat or service units

until it numbered close to 22,500 men.25

Units moving to Arare on D Day and

D plus 1 were to carry with them ten days'

supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment,

fuels, and lubricants. Engineer construction

matériel was to be shipped in sufficient

quantities to assure a quick start on airfield

repairs and preparation of roads, bivouacs,

and storage areas. The amounts and types

of such matériel were left to the discretion of

the task force commander. Ammunition 22

 AAF SWPA, OI 51, 1 May 44, and GHQ

SWPA OI 51/1, 10 May 44, both in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44. 23

 Available documents produce no information

concerning the reasons for eliminating the usual

beach bombing and strafing. It is possible that both

were considered unnecessary, or that both might endanger landing craft and ships operating in relatively

restricted waters near Wakde. Finally, fighters had

to fly long distances to cover the landings, thus

limiting their time over the target. The AAF SWPA

may have considered it more important to conserve

ammunition against the possibility of Japanese air

attack than to strafe beaches.

24

 ALAMO Force FO 17, 12 May 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; Wakde TF, Tentative Plan for the Seizure of the Wakde Island Area,

12 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14 May

44; AAF SWPA OI 51, 1 May 44. 25

 CTG 77.2 Attack Order 1-44 (Rev), 13 May

44; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde, p. 4; Ltr,

Gen Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, no sub, copy in

OCMH files. Although it is not clear from available

records, the figure 22,500 apparently included the

158th Regimental Combat Team, which was to

reach Arare by 23 May.
216 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

carried by assault units was to consist of six

units of fire for 4.2-inch mortars and three

units of fire for all other weapons, both infantry and artillery. Additional ammunition

for field artillery units and for the 4.2-inch

mortars was to be shipped separately to

arrive on D plus 1 and D plus 2. All troops

arriving after D plus 2 were to bring with

them thirty days' supply of rations, unit

equipment, clothing, fuels, lubricants, and

three units of fire for all weapons.26

Initial responsibility for the transportation of troops and supplies to the Wakde

area rested with the Allied Naval Forces

which exercised this responsibility through

the VII Amphibious Force and the Eastern

Attack Group. The Services of Supply was

to relieve the naval forces of this duty as

quickly as possible after D Day. The target

date for the transfer of responsibility was

set for D plus 11, 28 May.27

ALAMO Force Reserve for Wakde-Biak

was set up to support either phase of the

operation, and there were two reserve units.

One was the 128th Regimental Combat

Team of the 32d Division, which was to

stage at Aitape should its services be required in the forward area. The other was

the 158th Regimental Combat Team, an

organization not part of any division. This

combat team, which was built around the

separate 158th Infantry, was to move from

eastern New Guinea to the Wakde area on

or about 23 May, ready to reinforce either

the TORNADO Task Force or units on Biak.

The nucleus of the force scheduled to invade Biak was the 41st Infantry Division,

less the 163d Regimental Combat Team at

Wakde. The most logical reinforcing unit

for Biak would be the 163d. Tentative plans

were therefore made to have the LCI's of

the Biak assault convoy return thence to

Wakde, pick up the 163d in the latter area,

and move the unit forward to Biak on or

about 3 June. The plan to move the 158th

Regimental Combat Team to Wakde by 23

May was evolved in order to assure the

availability of the 163d for Biak.28

The TORNADO Task Force had no specific

separate reserve units set aside for D Day.

However, the 27th Engineer Battalion (C),

scheduled to come ashore in the fifth wave

at Arare, was to be prepared to assemble in

task force reserve in addition to its other

duties. The 1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company, though part of the force scheduled to

invade Wakde Island on D plus 1, would

also be available as a reserve on D Day.

Finally, the three rifle companies of the 1st

Battalion, 163d Infantry, were not assigned

any combat missions on D Day. They were

to assemble near Toem in preparation for

the next day's assault on Wakde but could

also be considered an emergency reserve for

mainland operations.29

Airfield Construction Problems

Even before the Wakde-Biak plans were

completed, increasing importance was being

given to the early capture and repair of the

Wakde airstrip. The principal mission of the

airdrome construction units due to arrive at

Wakde on D plus 1 was to prepare rapidly

facilities on that island to accommodate one

fighter group. Initially it was planned that

facilities would also be constructed on 26

 TTF FO 1, 12 May 44, atchd to TTF Opns Rpt

Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May 44; ALAMO Force Adm

O 9, 13 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

8-13 May 44. 27

 Ibid.; GHQ SWPA OI 51/1, 10 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44.

28

 ALAMO Force FO 17, 12 May 44; ALAMO Force

Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 12; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ

SWPA, WH-63, 25 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26

May 44. 29

 TTF FO 1, 12 May 44.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 217

Wakde to permit staging (as opposed to basing) an additional fighter group, one flight

of night fighters, and a reconnaissance

squadron. Such facilities were thought to be

the minimum necessary to support the Biak

operation.30

While these plans were being formulated,

new information was received at General

Headquarters indicating that the Japanese

might react strongly, with both air and naval

forces, to an invasion of Biak. Therefore the

Allied Air Forces recommended changing

the Wakde airdrome to permit one P-47

fighter group and one Navy PB4Y patrol

bomber squadron

 31

 to be permanently based

on the island. General Kenney, the theater

air commander, also considered it necessary

to extend staging facilities on Wakde to include space for one B-25 tactical reconnaissance squadron, another fighter group, and

two B-24 heavy bomber groups. Plans had

to be made to improve the Wakde strip to

meet the new requirements by 25 May, two

days before landings were to be made on

Biak.32

A few days before the Wakde operation

began, Admiral Nimitz requested air support from the Southwest Pacific for his impending operations against the Mariana Islands. The mission which Admiral Nimitz

desired to be initiated immediately was longrange reconnaissance from Hollandia for a

distance of 800 miles over the HollandiaHalmaheras-Yap triangle. He further requested that the Allied Air Forces undertake

to neutralize enemy airdromes on the Palau,

Yap, and Woleai Islands of the Caroline

chain from the 9th through the 15th of June

in order to cover the approach of Central

Pacific convoys to the Marianas.33

Since the Hollandia area could not meet

requirements for extensive operations of B24's and PB4Y's, General Kenney decided

that the Wakde Island strip would have to

bear much of the bombing and reconnaissance load. Air operations from Wakde

would have to begin not later than 2 June,

in order that the missions Admiral Nimitz

requested might become routine to Japanese intelligence well before Central Pacific

convoys set out for the Marianas.

To fit the Wakde strip into these plans,

staging facilities would have to be constructed on that island beyond the extent

deemed necessary by General Kenney for

the proper support of the Biak operation.

Provision also had to be made for shipping

forward to Wakde additional fuels and lubricants, together with bombs and other aircraft ammunition. After much discussion,

the headquarters concerned with the development of an air base on Wakde decided

that most of the necessary improvements

could be made on the island by 2 June. A

judicious juggling of ship loading and sailing

schedules also made it possible to send the

necessary equipment and ammunition forward to Wakde by the same date. Fulfillment of all Admiral Nimitz' requests would,

however, have to await the capture and repair of airdromes on Biak Island. In the

meantime it remained of the utmost impor30

 ALAMO Force FO 17, 12 May 44. 31

 The PB4Y was a naval version of the Army

B-24, and was land based. The particular squadron

under consideration (VB-115) was administratively

a part of the Seventh Fleet but was assigned to the

operational control of the AAF SWPA. 32

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, AAF SWPA, et

al., CX-12690, 19 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 19

May 44; Rad, ALAMO to TORNADO TF, WF-3377,

20 May 44, and Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-174, 21

May 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

16-22 May 44.

33

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO SWPA, et al.,

CX-12504, 14 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 14-18 May 44.
218 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tance that the Wakde strip be seized and

repaired quickly.34

Preparations for the Capture of Wakde

Island

General Doe and his TORNADO Force

planning staff learned of the change from

the Wakde-Sarmi plan to the Wakde-Biak

concept on 10 May. The planners returned

to Aitape, where the bulk of the TORNADO

Task Force was to stage, on 12 May after a

conference at ALAMO Force headquarters.

Although the new Wakde-Biak plan delayed the date for the landings in the Wakde

area from the 15th to the 17th of May, there

was still scant time for perfecting new plans,

revising orders and issuing new ones, and

changing loading instructions and schedules.

A series of untoward circumstances hampered loading. LST's on which TORNADO

Task Force units at Aitape were to be loaded

were some eight hours late reaching the

staging point. When these vessels finally

reached Aitape, adverse surf conditions and

congestion on the shore prevented their

beaching until late in the afternoon of 13

May, and loading was delayed another

twelve hours. There was also some trouble

about units scheduled to take part in the

Wakde operation. The Shore Battalion,

533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

an important element of the TORNADO Task

Force, did not arrive at Aitape until the

afternoon of 12 May. The battalion and its

equipment could not be unloaded from the

ships which had brought it to Blue Beach

from eastern New Guinea and be reloaded

on LST's of the Wakde convoy in time for

the departure of the task force from Aitape,

scheduled for no later than midnight on 14

May. In view of these logistic difficulties,

General Doe recommended to ALAMO Force

that the Wakde operation be delayed at least

another forty-eight hours.35

Captain Noble, Eastern Attack Group

commander, had wanted the Aitape vessels

to depart that staging point by 1800 on 14

May. ALAMO Force had already persuaded

him to postpone the departure to midnight,

but would not request the further delay proposed by General Doe. The task force commander was therefore forced to drive his

troops to the limit of their endurance in

order to get the loading finished on time. He

solved the problem of the Shore Battalion,

533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

by substituting for that unit the Shore Battalion, 593d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment, which was already stationed at

Aitape.36

By working throughout the night of

13-14 May, all units of the Aitape convoy

were loaded by about 2200 on the latter day.

The vessels left for Hollandia at 0100 on

15 May, arriving at Humboldt Bay about

1000. At Humboldt Bay the rest of the

TORNADO Task Force's assault echelon

(mostly service troops) was quickly loaded,

despite chronic beach congestion in the area.

About 0200 on the 16th the LST's and their

escorts left Humboldt Bay for Tanahmerah

Bay, reaching their destination about daylight. The LST section spent the rest of the

34

 Ibid.; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-2339,

15 May 44, and Rad, AAF SWPA to Advon 5AF,

ALAMO, et al., AX-33325, 15 May 44, both in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14-18 May 44.

35

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May 44,

p. 2; Rad, PTF to ALAMO, AE-714, 13 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44. 36

 Ibid.; Rad, ALAMO to PTF, WF-2156, 13 May

44, and Rad, ALAMO to CTF 76, WF-2157, 13 May

44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May

44; Rad, CTF 76 to ALAMO, 13 May 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14 May 44. Both EB&SR's

were part of the 3d Engr Special Brigade.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 219

day at Tanahmerah Bay and moved out for

Wakde during darkness of the night 16-17

May. The APA's and LCI's with their

escorts left Humboldt Bay for Wakde about

1900 on the 16th.

The cruisers and destroyers of Covering

Forces A and B did not assemble with the

rest of the convoy in the Hollandia area.

Instead, in order to escape detection by

Japanese air patrols, they rendezvoused off

the Admiralty Islands on 15 May. During

the night of 16-17 May the two covering

forces maintained contact with the assault

shipping by radar. At dawn on the 17th the

fire support ships closed with the rest of the

convoy and took up their firing positions off

Arare and Wakde Island.37

Dawn brought with it a cold drizzle, but

the fire support ships had no difficulty picking up their landmarks and the naval fire

started on schedule.38 Designated targets

were well covered and there was no answering fire from Japanese shore-based weapons.

Troops aboard the assault ships arose early,

breakfasted quickly, and by 0530 had begun

loading on their assigned landing craft. The

sea remained calm and the rain gave way to

the sun shortly after dawn. Men of the 3d

Battalion, 163d Infantry, transferred from

the APA's which had brought them from

Aitape to the eight LCVP's of the first wave.

The beach was clearly visible and its limits

had been marked by colored smoke grenades

dropped by cruiser-based seaplanes of the

fire support units. Landing craft carrying

the leading wave, Company I, 163d Infantry, touched the shore near Arare on schedule at 0715. Succeeding waves formed

rapidly and beached without difficulty.

There was no Japanese opposition.

The mainland area of immediate concern

to the TORNADO Task Force extended west

from Arare about four miles to the Tor

River, and east an almost equal distance to

Tementoe Creek. Between these two streams

is a hard, sandy beach about 250 yards

deep, unbroken except by one small creek.39

Behind this coastal strand there is a low,

somewhat swampy area, covered with jungle undergrowth and patches of dense rain

forest. This low area extends from two and

one-half to six miles inland to foothills of

mountain ranges. The men of the TORNADO

Task Force found a coastal track, which

almost reached the dignity of a road at some

points, running along the beach. There is no

high ground near Arare. The main drainage

system of the area is the Tor River, which,

together with Tementoe Creek, offered natural obstacles to lateral movement.

Upon landing, the 3d Battalion, 163d

Infantry, fanned out along the shore and

quickly secured the Arare beachhead area.

Company A of the 116th Engineer Battalion and the 27th Engineers were the

next units ashore, and they were followed

about 0735 by the 1st and 2d Battalions of

the 163d Infantry. The 2d Battalion, passing through the 3d, immediately moved eastward toward Tementoe Creek. By 0930,

37

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May 44,

p. 2; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde, p. 7;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 29; Rad,

CTF 76 to ALAMO, 10 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Wakde, 8-13 May 44. 38

 Information in this and the following subsection

is taken primarily from: CTU 77.2.6 [TF 75, or

Covering Force A] Opns Rpt Wakde-Toem, p. 1;

CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde, pp. 7-8; TTF

Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May 44, pp. 2-3;

TTF G-3 Jnl and Jnl file, 6-25 May 44; 163d Inf

Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde, p. 2; 163d Inf Jnl, 13-30

May 44; Ltr, Gen Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, in

OCMH files; 191st FA Gp, Hist Rpt TORNADO,

pp. 2-3.

39

 This creek lies about midway between Arare and

the Tor River. It was referred to by the TORNADO

Task Force as "The Unnamed Creek" and called

by the Japanese the Tenbin River.
220 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

BRIG. GEN. JENS A. DOE and his

aide, 1st Lt. Rob D. Trimble, of the 41st

Infantry Division, during the landing at

Arare.

against no opposition, Company G had secured Toem, about 4,500 yards east of

Arare. At 1010 the battalion commander,

Maj. Robert L. Irving, reported that his

men had reached their D-Day objective, the

west bank of Tementoe Creek. The 1st Battalion, under Maj. Leonard A. Wing, followed the 2d east along the coastal road to

Toem. At the latter village the 1st Battalion

established a bivouac and began preparing

for its attack on Wakde Island the next day.

The 3d Battalion, under Maj. Garlyn

Munkres,40 dispatched Company L west to

the Tor River. The company found a good

foot bridge over the small creek between the

Tor and Arare and, moving on against only

scattered rifle fire, reached the Tor late in

the morning. During the afternoon other

elements of the 3d Battalion reached the

river. The bulk of Company I, however, remained at the beachhead, where the men of

the unit were assigned to labor details such

as unloading shipping or to local security

guard duties. The heavy weapons of Company M also remained near Arare, for these

weapons were part of the Provisional

Groupment scheduled to support the next

day's assault on Wakde.

Within a few hours after the mainland

beachhead had been secured, the TORNADO

Task Force was ready to execute the second

phase of the D-Day plan—the capture of

Insoemanai Island, a little over 3,500 yards

offshore. About 1045, under cover of fire

from two destroyers and two rocketequipped LCI's, a platoon of Company E,

163d Infantry, was transported from the

mainland to Insoemanai. There was no opposition to this maneuver and the islet

proved to be unoccupied. Four LCM's, an

LCVP, and two LCS's immediately took

the rest of the company and the Provisional

Groupment of heavy weapons to Insoemanai. The landing of the force was rendered difficult only by the fact that a coral

fringing reef made it necessary for the troops

to wade ashore from about seventy-five

yards out. The mortars and machine guns

of the Provisional Groupment were quickly

set up and began firing on Wakde.

Insoemanai had been easily taken and

mainland opposition had been very light.

Moreover, no signs of enemy activity had

been observed on Wakde and information

obtained prior to 17 May had indicated that

the Japanese might have withdrawn their

garrison from that island. Enthusiastically,

40

 Lt. Col. Walter R. Rankin, who had commanded the 3d Battalion at Aitape, was now executive officer of the 163d Infantry.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 221

some subordinate officers within the task

force suggested that Wakde could be seized

immediately and with little difficulty. But

General Doe and Captain Noble vetoed such

suggestions. They considered it probable

that the enemy still retained a strong garrison on Wakde and believed that attacking

the island prior to concentrated artillery and

naval bombardment would be a needless

risk. General Doe decided that there would

be no landing on Wakde until after intensive

preparatory fire from the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai, and from naval support ships, aircraft, and shore-based field

artillery.

The 218th and 167th Field Artillery Battalions and the Cannon Company, 163d Infantry, had come ashore near Arare in midmorning. By noon the units had set up firing

positions about 2,000 yards east of Arare

and had begun dropping shells on Wakde

Island. This fire apparently goaded the Japanese on Wakde Island into answering, and

during the afternoon the enemy began putting mortar and machine gun fire into the

positions of the Provisional Groupment on

Insoemanai.

The fire from Wakde was the only Japanese ground opposition worthy of the name

encountered by the TORNADO Task Force on

D Day. There was no naval or air reaction

on the part of the enemy. The task force

antiaircraft artillery, which had moved

ashore before 0900 hours and had set up

positions along the beach between Arare

and Toem, found no targets.

Task force engineers started work on the

beach track as soon as they came ashore. By

1400 the 27th Engineers had bulldozed a

two-way road, capable of bearing heavy

trucks, along the shore between Arare and

Toem. The battalion, with Company A of

the 116th Engineers attached, rapidly enlarged the scope of its activities and began

clearing bivouac and dump areas and aiding the Shore Battalion, 593d Engineer Boat

and Shore Regiment, to unload ships. The

latter unit devoted its attention principally

to moving cargo ashore, but also had men

working on dump areas and construction of

sand jetties from the beach to LST's. The

1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company, came

ashore at midmorning, went into bivouac

near Arare, and prepared to move on call

to either flank of the beachhead. The platoon's services were not required.

The few casualties incurred on D Day

from enemy action totaled one man killed

and four wounded, all as a result of Japanese fire on Insoemanai from Wakde. American artillery shorts41

 killed another and

wounded six on Insoemanai. One man accidentally wounded himself during the landing at Arare. Total American casualties for

the day were 2 killed and 11 wounded, as

opposed to 21 Japanese killed or found dead

on the mainland. These Japanese appeared

to be stragglers rather than members of an

organized defense force.

By 1800 all troops of the TORNADO Task

Force were dug in for the night. At task

force headquarters final details of plans for

the seizure of Wakde Island on the morrow

were discussed and agreed upon. Shorebased artillery, the Provisional Groupment

on Insoemanai, and some of the naval fire

support ships were to deliver harassing fire

on Wakde throughout the night. At 0715

on 18 May, Fifth Air Force planes were to

start an hour-long aerial bombardment of

Wakde. At 0830 a heavy naval and artillery

41

 According to the 191st Field Artillery Group's

report, page 2, the short rounds were fired by the

Cannon Company, 163d Infantry, and were attributed to that company's inexperience with its

weapons.
222 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

barrage was to begin. Until 0857 this gunfire was to be aimed at the proposed landing

beach on the southern shore of Wakde, and

was then to be lifted to the northern side of

the island. The Provisional Groupment on

Insoemanai was to provide close support

for the landings.

H Hour for the assault was set for 0900

hours, 18 May. Infantry forces consisted of

four rifle companies—A, B, and C of the

1st Battalion, 163d Infantry, and F of the

2d Battalion. Four Sherman tanks (M4

mediums, armed with 75-mm. guns) of the

1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company, were

also assigned to the assault force. The force

commander was Major Wing of the 1st

Battalion. The troops were to be transported

to Wakde in six waves of four LCVP's each,

the boats to be coxswained by Company B,

542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.

LCM's were assigned to take the tanks from

the mainland to Wakde.42

Small-Island Warfare, Southwest Pacific

Style

The Target—Terrain and Defenses

Wakde Island, roughly 3,000 yards long

and 1,200 yards wide, had been a coconut

plantation before the war (Map 10). The

airstrip and associated installations constructed by the Japanese covered almost one

half of the island's surface, the remainder of

which was left to neglected coconut trees.

The island is generally flat, except for a knoll

about twenty-five feet high on a small peninsula jutting out from the southeastern shore.

The rest of the island is not more than fifteen

feet above sea level, but even this slight elevation is enough to produce a number of

small coral caves along the eastern shore. A

coral reef completely surrounds the island.

One of the three places at which this reef

was found to be broken was in a sheltered

bay west of the small peninsula, near the

base of which a small jetty projected into the

bay. The beach at the jetty was chosen as

the landing site for the 1st Battalion, 163d

Infantry.43

The nucleus of the Japanese garrison on

Wakde Island was the 9th Company, 3d

Battalion, 224th Infantry. This company

was reinforced by a platoon of mountain artillery (75-mm. guns) and a few mortar and

both light and heavy machine gun squads

from other 224th Infantry units. The

strength of this combat force was about 280

men. There was also a naval guard unit of

about 150 men, and a battery of the 53d

Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, most

of whose weapons had long since been demolished. Miscellaneous airdrome engineers

and other service personnel, both Army and

Navy, brought the total of Japanese strength

on the island to nearly 800 troops.

While most of the arms possessed by the

Wakde defenders were light mortars or rifles

and machine guns not over .30-caliber in

size, there were a few heavier weapons.

Such weapons included a few 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, and machine cannon and .50-

caliber machine guns taken from damaged

Japanese aircraft. Apparently, none of the

Japanese 75-mm. mountain guns survived

the preliminary bombardment of Wakde

Island.

The Japanese had constructed many defensive positions on Wakde. There were 42

 The 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment

was part of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. Many

of the men of Company B had had previous experience in minor shore-to-shore operations in eastern

New Guinea.

43

 Terrain information from ACS SWPA, Terrain Handbook 26, Sarmi, 20 Apr 44, copy in

OCMH files.
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 223

MAP 10

about a hundred bunkers of various sizes

and constructions. Some were made of coconut logs and dirt, others utilized cement in

sacks, and a few contained concrete or

lumps of coarse coral. There were many foxholes and slit trenches, and the Japanese had

improved some of the bomb craters to make

defensive positions. There were at least two

well-constructed concrete air raid shelters

and the Japanese were prepared to use the

few coral caves on the eastern shore for both

defense and storage.

Many of the defensive positions were well

camouflaged, and some were dug deep into

the ground to present a low silhouette. Coconut trees toppled by preassault bombardments added more natural camouflage and

protection to the enemy's defensive positions. The majority of the many bunkers

were mutually supporting, but, on the other

hand, some had been built with no apparent

relationship to others. Some of the bunkers,

most of the field and antiaircraft gun positions, the airstrip, and many buildings had

been severely damaged or destroyed by U. S.

Fifth Fleet carrier-based aircraft during
224 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

their attacks on the Wakde-Sarmi area in

support of the Hollandia operation. Army

aircraft had taken up the bombardment

after that, and, according to Japanese reports, the Wakde strip had been damaged

beyond all hope of repair (that is, with

equipment available to the Japanese) by 2

May. Allied naval and air bombardment of

Wakde, beginning on 17 May, added to the

earlier destruction. However, the Japanese

Wakde garrison was still capable of a

tenacious defense.44

The First Day

Naval fire started on schedule on 18

May.45 By the time it ended, 400 rounds

of 6-inch and 1,950 rounds of 5-inch

ammunition had been expended against

Wakde's defenses. In addition, rocketequipped LCI's threw 850 4.5-inch rockets

on the island, and 36 A-20's of the Fifth

Air Force bombed and strafed the Japanese

defenses. The 191st Field Artillery Group

fired for twenty-three minutes on Wakde,

and this bombardment was supplemented

by 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons aboard

naval support vessels upon completion of

the latters' fire from heavier weapons.

The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai

joined in.

The first wave of LCVP's, Company B

aboard, began to receive Japanese rifle and

machine gun fire from about 300 yards out,

but pushed on toward Wakde to hit the

beach a few yards to the left of the jetty at

0910. The other three rifle companies and

two tanks were ashore in the same area by

0925.46 A third tank had shorted its electrical system while loading from the mainland

and a fourth dropped into seven feet of

water as it left its LCM's ramp. Neither got

to Wakde on 18 May. All landing waves

were subjected to increasing fire from Japanese machine guns and rifles in hidden

positions on the flanks of the beachhead.

Luckily, the Japanese, for unknown reasons,

failed to bring into play .50-caliber and

20-mm. weapons. As it was, three company

commanders were lost during the landing,

one killed and two wounded.

Despite this opposition, the beachhead

was quickly organized. Company executive

officers assumed command of the leaderless

44

 The foregoing information was compiled from:

Army Section, Imperial GHQ, Special Report on

Lessons from the War, No. 33, Operations of the

Yuki Group (36th Division, reinforced) in the Biak

Island and Sarmi Areas, 3 Oct 44 (hereafter cited

as Opns of Yuki Group), pp. 12-13, translation in

OCMH files; Naval Operations in the Western New

Guinea Area, pp. 7-8; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt

45, 14 Jun 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; S-2, 1st

Bn 163d Inf, Rpt on Wakde Island Defenses, n. d.,

in 163d Inf Jnl, 13-30 May 44; CO, Co B 163d

Inf, Rpt to S-1, 1st Bn 163d Inf, sub: Tank Attack

on Wakde Island, 30 Jul 44, and CO Co A 163d

Inf, Rpt to CO, 163d Inf, sub: Inf and Tank Coordination, 12 Aug 44, both docs in files of 163d

Inf, 41st Div, in ORB RAC AGO collection. See

also Japanese Studies in WW II, 117, General Outline of 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev),

pp. 6, 14-17.

45

 This section is based principally on: CTG 77.2

Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde, pp. 8-10; TTF Opns Rpt

Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May 44, pp. 3-7; 163d Inf

Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde, pp. 2-4; TTF G-3 Jnl

and Jnl file, 6-25 May 44; 163d Inf Jnl, 13-30 May

44; 1st Bn 163d Inf, S-1 Jnl, 15-30 May 44, in

files of 163d Inf, 41st Div, in ORB RAG AGO collection; CO, Co A, 163d Inf, Rpt to CO, 163d Inf,

12 Aug 44; "One Step Westward," The Infantry

Journal, LVI, 3, 8-13 (the article is signed, "By a

Battalion Commander," but was actually written

by Maj. Leonard A. Wing, ex-CO 1st Bn, 163d Inf). 46

 Documents concerning the action provide contradictory information about the times and places

of landing, but it appears that Company B went

ashore at 0910, Company F at 0913, Company A at

0916, Company C at 0921, and the two tanks about

0925. Elements of Company B apparently tried to

land or started to land about 0903. Some sources indicate that only Company B landed on the left of the

jetty, and others state that only Company A landed

on the right of the jetty.
THE ASSAULT ON WAKDE ISLAND, against Japanese machine gun and rifle fire.
226 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

units, and the two tanks, with Companies B

and F, started moving west to widen the

initial hold. Company C struck north

toward the airstrip and Company A pushed

to the southeast along the small peninsula

to destroy a troublesome machine gun nest

on the little knoll. Company A reached the

top of the knoll about 0935. The unit's progress was temporarily halted ten minutes

later at an enemy bunker, the occupants

of which were finally killed with hand grenades, but by 1045 the company, employing

fire and movement, had finished clearing

the peninsula and had assembled for further

missions. Companies B and F, after meeting

initial heavy resistance on the west flank,

found that most opposition collapsed once

the ruins of prewar plantation houses had

been cleared by hand grenades and rifle fire.

The two companies thereupon left the beach

and swung north toward the airfield. Company C, meanwhile, had encountered strong

resistance in its drive up the center of the

island.

About 200 yards inland Company C had

come upon a number of mutually supporting pillboxes. The first group of bunkers was

found about 0915, and the company spent

nearly an hour clearing them out with hand

grenades and infantry assault. About 100

yards farther north, at 1015, a second set

of pillboxes held up the advance. All these

defensive positions were found to be well

concealed by Japanese efforts, by underbrush of the neglected coconut plantation,

or by coconut trees toppled in the preassault

bombardments. Finding progress against

such bunkers laborious, Company C called

for tank support. The two available tanks,

which had been operating on the left flank

with Companies B and F, had returned to

the beachhead to replenish ammunition at

1030, and were now ordered to aid C Company. Just before 1130 hours the tanks

joined the infantry unit, which had now

pushed halfway from the beach to the airstrip. With this added strength Company

C reduced each bunker in a series of separate actions which included 75-mm. fire

from the tanks, lobbing hand grenades into

the bunkers' fire ports, and killing with rifle

fire all Japanese who showed themselves.

While Company C's drive continued,

Company B, about 1030, had reached the

southern edge of the airfield near the center

of that strip. A few minutes later Company

F, less one platoon left to mop up around

the plantation houses, pulled up on B's left.

The two companies had encountered only

scattered opposition after leaving the plantation house area, and Company F had

found the western portion of the strip clear

of enemy forces. Company B pushed east

along the south side of the drome, crossed

Company C's front, and helped the latter

unit destroy some of the bunkers which had

been slowing its advance. With Company

B's aid and the continued support of the two

tanks, Company C was able to push on to

the airstrip, where it arrived shortly after

1130.

The Company F platoon which was clearing out the nearly demolished remnants of

the prewar coconut plantation buildings

about 300 yards northwest of the initial

beachhead was halted and pinned down by

enemy machine gun fire. Company A was

therefore withdrawn from the small peninsula and sent to the platoon's aid, and the

two tanks rumbled back from Company C's

front to assist. Shortly after noon, following

about half an hour of close-in fighting with

rifles, grenades, tank machine guns, and

even bayonets, the plantation houses were

cleared. The Company F platoon then rejoined its parent unit at the airstrip, while
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 227

Company A and the two tanks moved northwest to clear the western end of the island.

Company A pushed along the beach road

and down a dispersal lane running off the

southwest side of the strip. About 1245 the

advance was held up by three Japanese

bunkers on the right flank. Tank 75-mm.

fire, delivered from as close as 20 yards, soon

eliminated the Japanese defenders. Small

groups of Japanese, originally hiding in foxholes behind the three pillboxes, attempted

to assault the tanks with hand grenades and

bayonets. Company A's automatic riflemen quickly dispersed or killed these men,

and the unit pushed on around the west end

of the airstrip. Little opposition was encountered in this movement and the company

reached the north shore of Wakde Island

about 1330 hours.

In the northeast corner of the island the

Japanese forces maintained a tenacious defense, and Companies B, C, and F were

subjected to considerable small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire originating from

positions at the eastern end of the airstrip.

Movement eastward along the south side

of the strip was slow, even though Companies B and F had been reinforced by Company D's heavy machine guns, which had

arrived on Wakde from Insoemanai late

in the morning. To overcome the enemy

opposition and secure the rest of Wakde,

Major Wing planned a complicated maneuver. Company A, from the northwest corner

of the island, was to move east along the

northern side of the field to clear the Japanese from the area between the strip and

the north shore. Company C was to cross

the strip and then swing east toward the

northeast corner of Wakde in co-operation

with Company A's drive. Company B was

to continue pushing east along the southern

edge of the airfield, clear the eastern third

of the drome, and then push around the end

of the strip into the northeast corner of the

island. Company F was initially to follow

Company B. When the latter unit reached

the eastern end of the strip, Company F was

to move to the island's eastern beaches and

thence north along the shore line to the

northeast tip.

This attack was slow in getting under

way. Several officers and key noncommissioned officers, including three company

commanders, had been killed or seriously

wounded during the morning's action, and

all four rifle companies faced problems of

reorganization. Major Wing therefore decided to await the arrival of two more tanks

from the mainland and the redisposition of

Company D's weapons before attacking

what promised to be the strongest Japanese

defenses on Wakde. The two additional

tanks were to be used wherever opposition

proved heaviest, while the heavy weapons of

Company D were to be equally divided between Companies B and F. Finally, an additional delay was incurred when Company

C, which had managed to move less than

half its men across the airstrip, came under

intense machine gun fire from the east. This

fire made it impossible for more troops to

cross the open airfield.

Artillery fire from the 218th and 167th

Field Artillery Battalions on the mainland

temporarily silenced the enemy machine

guns, and more men of Company C crossed

the airfield about 1545. At approximately

the same time the other three companies

started the drive eastward. Company A

rapidly moved forward from the western

end of the strip, passed through Company

C at the halfway point, and pushed cautiously eastward. Movement after passing

Company C was slowed by increasingly

heavy machine gun and mortar fire from
228 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the northeast section of the island. At 1800,

when Major Wing ordered his men to dig

in for the night, Company A had not quite

reached the northeastern corner of the

airfield.

Meanwhile, south of the strip Company

B had scarcely started its attack when fire

from hidden Japanese machine guns held

up the advance. Company F was immediately pulled out of its reserve role and committed to action on B's right flank. Two

tanks were moved forward to Company B's

front at the same time. Despite their best

efforts and even with the tank support,

Companies B and F were unable to progress

more than 300 yards east of the lines of

departure. Major Wing decided that since

dusk was approaching it would be useless

to continue the attack. The two companies

were therefore halted and instructed to take

up night defensive positions.

Company A had set up its night perimeter

about 100 yards short of the northeast corner of the airdrome. Company B was on the

south side of the strip about 450 yards from

the eastern end, and Company F was on

B's right. Company C was pulled back to

the southern side of the field and extended

Company F's line to the southeast beach at

the base of the small peninsula. The battalion command post was about 400 yards

behind the lines of Company F. There was

no connection across the strip between Companies A and B. The former was in a

dangerously exposed position. However,

Japanese fire against the company perimeter

ceased before dark, and the Japanese did

not attack.

Army casualties on Wakde during the day

totaled 19 killed or died of wounds and 86

wounded, while Navy casualties were 2

killed and 8 wounded. Among the Army

losses were 7 officers and 14 noncommissioned officers of the rank of staff sergeant

and higher. Heaviest casualties were in

Company B which lost 42 men, most of

them during the later afternoon attack. No

accurate count of Japanese dead could be

made, but it was estimated that at least 200

had been killed and many more wounded.

There were no prisoners.

Back at the beachhead, four LST's (including one used as a front-line hospital)

and numerous smaller craft had unloaded

engineer construction units and equipment

during the afternoon in the hope that repair

work could begin on the airdrome. The stubborn Japanese defense had forestalled the

attainment of this objective, and Major

Wing laid careful plans to secure the rest

of the island on the morrow so that the vital

repair work could be started. Company C,

preceded by all available tanks (there were

now three in action) was to push along the

east shore into the northeast pocket of Japanese resistance. Companies B and F were to

continue their drives from the point at

which they were halted on the 18th, cooperating with Company C in rolling up the

Japanese left. Initially, Company A was to

remain on the defensive to prevent any

Japanese from escaping to the western portion of the island around the north side of

the airfield.

A New Air Base on the Road

to the Philippines

Luckily for Company A, the night of 18-

19 May passed mostly without incident in

the company sector.47 The battalion com47

 In addition to the sources used for the previous

subsection, the following sources were also used for

this subsection: CO, Co C 163d Inf, Rpt to CO,

1st Bn 163d Inf, 31 Jul 44, sub: Infantry-Tank Assault Teams, and CO, Co B 163d Inf Rpt to S-1, 1st

Bn 163d Inf, 30 Jul 44, both in files of 163d Inf, 41st

Div, in ORB RAC AGO collection.
ENEMY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ON WAKDE. Shelters made of coconut logs

and dirt (top). Concrete air raid shelter (bottom).
230 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

mand post, which was protected by elements

of Company D, was not so fortunate. About

0230 on the 19th a small group of enemy

attacked the command post, and a half-hour

fire fight raged in the darkness. Twelve Japanese were killed while three Americans, all

of D Company, were wounded. This night

battle did not delay the next day's attack

which started, after an artillery and mortar

preparation of one hour's duration, at 0915.

Company C was the first unit under way

on the 19th. Two tanks were assigned to the

3d Platoon and one to the 2d. The 3d Platoon was on the left, the 2d on the right, and

the 1st and Weapons Platoons were in support. The 3d Platoon pushed eastward up

a slight rise, harassed by light rifle fire from

the front and left flank. Once on top of the

rise the platoon met heavy Japanese fire

from behind fallen coconut trees and from

a number of bunkers, bomb craters, and demolished buildings to the east. The 75-mm.

guns of the tanks methodically destroyed

each enemy position, and the few enemy

that escaped from the bunkers were cut

down by 3d Platoon riflemen. The 2d Platoon, followed by the rest of C Company,

moved on toward the eastern beaches, and

was slowed only by heavy brush near the

shore. Upon turning north at the beach the

company found that the Japanese had converted a number of small coral caves into

minor strong points. These were slowly

cleared by riflemen, tank fire, and flame

throwers as the company pushed on.

Meanwhile, Company B, moving east

along the south edge of the airstrip, had also

encountered many Japanese defensive positions. Progress was at a snail's pace. Company F, in reserve during the early part of

the drive, was thrown into the fight on B's

right flank about 1130 and two tanks were

sent from Company C's front to support

Company B. The latter, with its zone of responsibility now nearly halved, was able to

concentrate its forces for more effective operations. A rifle platoon was assigned to each

tank and the remaining rifle platoon was in

support. Some Japanese were found hidden

in wrecks of aircraft, some of which covered

bunkers, and others were in foxholes in

heavy brush. This brush was difficult for

soldiers afoot to penetrate but the tanks,

spraying every likely hiding place with machine gun fire, rapidly broke paths through

it. The advance, even with the tank support,

was slow, because it was necessary to comb

every square foot of ground for Japanese

riflemen. It was not until 1400 that Company B reached the southeast corner of the

strip.

On B's right, Company F and one tank

encountered similar opposition but managed to keep abreast of Companies B and C.

Late in the afternoon both F and C turned

north and about 1600 hours reached a line

extending almost due east from the southeast corner of the strip to the east shore.

Meanwhile, since the Japanese were maintaining a static defense and making no attempt to counterattack or escape to the west,

Company A's holding mission had been canceled. The unit moved away from the northeast corner of the airfield, sending part of its

strength to the north shore and the rest

around the eastern side of the strip to make

contact with Company B. This contact was

established near the northeast corner at

1640. The principal objective of the TORNADO Task Force was thereby secured.

With the clearance of the eastern end of

the field, organized Japanese resistance

collapsed. Companies B, C, and F pushed

rapidly northward and by 1800, when the

day's action ceased, the Japanese were compressed into a small triangle, about 500
THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 231

yards long on the inland leg, at the northeast corner of the island. It was estimated

that 350 Japanese had been killed during

the day. Major Wing made plans to mop

up the remaining few on the 20th, and

pulled most of his units back to the center

of the island for the night for a hot meal

and rest.

Action on the 20th opened with a banzai

charge by 37 Japanese (who had apparently

slipped through Company C's lines during

the night) against engineer units at the

beachhead. Within minutes after this attack

started at 0730, there were 36 dead and 1

wounded Japanese—the latter was taken

prisoner. At 0900 Companies A, C, and F

started patrolling in the northeast pocket.

A few Japanese were killed, others were

buried by demolition charges in coral caves

along the northeast shore, and many committed suicide. During the afternoon Major

Wing's men moved back to the mainland

and turned over control of Wakde Island to

the Allied Air Forces. Two days later Company L, 163d Infantry, was sent to Wakde

to mop up a few Japanese snipers who were

hindering work on the airdromes. The company returned to the mainland on 26 May,

after killing 8 Japanese.

At 1500 on 19 May, even before the

island was declared secure, the 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion had begun repairs

on the western end of the Wakde airdrome

while it was still subject to occasional enemy

fire. The work was resumed the next day

and, despite one or two minor interruptions

from Japanese rifle fire, the strip was operational by noon on 21 May. The first planes

landed on the island that afternoon, two

days ahead of schedule. Within a few more

days the Wakde strip was sufficiently repaired and enlarged to furnish the needed

base from which bombers could support the

Biak operation on 27 May and the Central

Pacific's advance to the Marianas in midJune. Wakde-based fighters were to provide

close support for continuing operations on

the mainland opposite that island.

The final count of Japanese casualties on

Wakde Island was 759 killed and 4 captured. An additional 50 or more of the enemy had been killed on the mainland

through 20 May. In action on Wakde the

U. S. Army lost 40 men killed or died of

wounds and 107 wounded. Total American

casualties, including naval, on Wakde, Insoemanai, Liki, Niroemoar, and the neighboring mainland through 20 May were 43

killed and 139 wounded. During the same

period the Japanese lost at least 800 men.

The TORNADO Task Force had secured an

extremely valuable stepping stone on the

road back to the Philippines at a low cost in

men and matériel.48

48

 USN casualties included in the foregoing figures

are for 18 May only. Apparently, the only naval

losses for the entire period 17-20 May were incurred

on the 18th.
CHAPTER X

Lone Tree Hill: The Initial Attacks

The Japanese at Wakde-Sarmi

Japanese Plans for Western New

Guinea, April-May 1944

When in late 1943 and early 1944 the

Japanese had withdrawn their strategic

main line of resistance westward to WakdeSarmi, Lt. Gen. Fusataro Teshima's 2d

Army had been ordered to hold that area

at all costs, employing for this purpose the

36th Division, less the 222d Infantry on

Biak Island. But with the loss of Hollandia

in April, Wakde-Sarmi had become an exposed salient without protection from the

east, north, or south. The next base westward was 200-mile-distant Biak Island, only

partially developed. With the Wakde-Sarmi

area no longer defensible, Imperial General

Headquarters on 2 May informed the 2d

Area Army that the strategic main line of

resistance in the New Guinea area was to be

withdrawn to the line Biak-Manokwari.1

On 2 May it probably appeared to Imperial General Headquarters that this new

line might be held for some time. The 32d

and 35th Divisions (the latter minus the

219th Infantry, reinforced, sent to the

Palaus) had been dispatched from China to

western New Guinea in mid-April and, at

the time of their sailing, it seemed probable

that they had a good chance to arrive safely

at their destinations. But from the beginning, bad luck dogged the path of the Takeichi Convoy, as the two-division lift was

called. One regimental combat team of the

32d Division was practically wiped out when

the ship carrying it was sunk in the South

China Sea by an American submarine on 26

April. The remaining ships stopped at

Manila, in the Philippines, before sailing

on for Halmahera and western New Guinea.

The Takeichi Convoy suffered further

disasters on 6 May, when three more ships

were sunk by American submarines off Manado in the Celebes. These losses left the 32d

Division with but two infantry regiments

(one of which lacked a battalion) and about

one half its normal artillery. The 35th Division (exclusive of the units in the Palaus)

was reduced to four complete infantry battalions and little more than a single battery

of division artillery.2

After the Takeichi Convoy disasters, Lt.

Gen. Korechika Anami, commanding the

2d Area Army, recommended a whole new

1

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 111-

13; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 53-55; Naval Opns

in the Western New Guinea Area, pp. 2-3.

2

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 111-

13; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 53-55; Naval Opns

in the Western New Guinea Area, pp. 3-4; The

Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee [JANAC],

Japanese Naval And Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II By All Causes (Washington,

1947), pp. 58-59; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 58,

13 Sep 44, copy G-2 DofA files; Kawakami Comments.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 233

series of redispositions for western New

Guinea. He suggested that the 219th Infantry be brought from the Palaus to Biak and

that another regiment of the 35th Division

be dispatched from Halmahera, where its

remnants had finally landed, to New

Guinea. General Anami also had some plan

to send one regiment of the 32d Division to

Biak to reinforce the 222d Infantry or at

least to move the division to the Vogelkop

Peninsula. He also proposed that the 2d

Amphibious Brigade, a recently organized

unit trained for small-boat transportation

and amphibious warfare, be moved from

the Philippines to Manokwari or Biak.

General Anami's plans were overambitious, for, as Imperial General Headquarters

well knew, shipping simply was not available to undertake all the redispositions he

had suggested. Moreover, Imperial General

Headquarters was convinced that it would

be foolhardy to risk any large ships forward

of Sorong. The high command therefore

approved only the concentration of the 35th

Division at Sorong, which was accomplished

by the end of May. Higher headquarters

also decided to keep the 32d Division at

Halmahera and reorganize it there.3

Meanwhile, Allied Air Forces bombers

and long-range fighters, based on the newly

won Hollandia fields, had begun to appear

over Wakde, Sarmi, Biak, Noemfoor, and

Manokwari in such large numbers that the

Japanese found it next to impossible to use

those bases for air operations or supply

storage. Even Sorong, the Japanese knew

full well, was within range of Allied attack

bombers from Hollandia. These Allied air

operations, coupled with increasing Allied

submarine activity, such as that which had

caused the 6 May disaster to the Takeichi

Convoy in waters which had previously been

relatively safe for Japanese shipping, convinced Imperial General Headquarters that

another strategic withdrawal was necessary.

Accordingly, on 9 May, the high command

informed the 2d Area Army that a new strategic main line of resistance was to be set

up along the line Sorong-Halmahera. The

new line represented a strategic withdrawal

of nearly 600 miles from the Wakde-Sarmi

area since March.

Biak and Manokwari, forward of the new

line, were to be held as long as possible as an

outpost line of resistance. But the WakdeSarmi area forces were for all practical purposes written off as a loss and instructed to

hold out as best they could. This high command attitude duplicated that taken earlier

in the year when the Japanese had recognized that the 18th Army was irredeemably

lost.4

The Japanese garrison at Wakde-Sarmi

was commanded by Lt. Gen. Hachiro Tagami,5

 who was also the commander of the

36th Division. That division had begun

arriving in western New Guinea from North

China in December 1943, and by mid-January 1944 the 223d and 224th Infantry

Regiments (less small detachments left at

Manokwari or sent inland) had closed at

Wakde-Sarmi and the 222d Infantry had

reached Biak Island. In addition to the

organic units of the 36th Division, General

Tagami had under his command in the

Sarmi area some antiaircraft units and mis3

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 111-

13, 120-23; The Palau Opns, pp. 57-61; Hist of

2d Area Army, pp. 53-55; Kawakami Comments.

4

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 55-58; Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 61-64; Hist of Army Section,

Imperial GHQ, pp. 111-13. 5

 The Japanese characters of the general's family

name can also be read as Tanoue or Tanouye, in

which readings it appears in some translated documents. The reading used in this volume is the most

common.
234 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

cellaneous airdrome engineer, medical, and

other service organizations, including men

of naval guard detachments. The entire

force in the Sarmi area was designated the

Yuki Group.6

Dispositions of the Yuki Group

It will be recalled that when the Allies

had landed at Hollandia, the 2d Army had

sent the Matsuyama Force (comprising the

headquarters and the 2d and 3d Battalions

(less two rifle companies) of the 224th Infantry and a battalion of 36th Division

mountain artillery) toward Hollandia from

Sarmi.7 This group, commanded by Col.

Soemon Matsuyama, the commanding officer of the 224th Infantry, was at Armopa,

about half-way between Sarmi and Hollandia, when the Allies landed on the mainland opposite Wakde Island on 17 May.

The 51st Field Road Construction Unit,

which had been building roads and bridges

for the Matsuyama Force, was also in the

Armopa area.

Almost coincident with the departure of

the Matsuyama Force for Hollandia, General Tagami divided the Wakde-Sarmi area

into three defense sectors. (See Map 9.)

The Right Sector Force was responsible for

Wakde Island and for thirteen miles of

coast line from Tementoe Creek west to the

Woske River. Besides the Wakde Island

garrison, the Right Sector Force comprised

300 men of the 3d Battalion, 224th Infantry, under a Captain Saito, the 16th Field

Airdrome Construction Unit, and a fivegun battery of 75-mm. mountain artillery.

It was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel

Kato, also the commander of the airdrome

engineers, and numbered (not counting the

troops on Wakde) about 1,200 men.8 The

bulk of the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry,

was also in the same area, but it was apparently engaged in moving supplies forward

to the Matsuyama Force and was not under

Colonel Kato's control.

West of the Woske River was the area of

the Central Sector Force, under Col. Naoyasu Yoshino, also commanding officer of

the 223d Infantry. The sector ran from the

Woske west about four and a half miles to

Sawar Creek and included within its boundaries Sawar Drome. The principal combat

forces comprised the 223d Infantry, less the

2d Battalion and the 2d Company of the

1st Battalion. Other units were a battery of

three 75-mm. mountain artillery guns, the

103d Field Airdrome Construction Unit,

some antiaircraft organizations, and possibly a platoon of light tanks.9

 The strength

of the Central Sector Force was approximately 2,500 men.

The Left Sector Force, also about 2,500

men strong, was responsible for a defense

6

 Opns of Yuki Group, p. 13; Hist or 2d Area

Army, pp. 26-27; Japanese Studies in WW II, 32,

2d Army Opns in the Western New Guinea Area, pp.

1-2, copy in OCMH files. Yuki (literally: Snow)

Group was apparently a code name for both the 36th

Division and the whole of General Tagami's command in the Sarmi area. It is not clear whether General Tagami retained any control of the 222 d Infantry on Biak, but the probability is that the Biak

force operated directly under 2d Army command. 7

 Information in this and the following subsection

is from: Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 12-15 and Map

3; Miscellaneous orders of the 36th Division and

224th Infantry, dated late Apr and early May 44,

as translated in ALAMO Force G-2 Wkly Rpt 48, 5

Jul 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; Hist of 2d Area

Army, pp. 51-53, 57-59; Hist of Southern Area

Army, pp. 61-64; 2d Army Opns, pp. 1-6; 2d Army

Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 10-26.

8

 Strength figures in this and the following subsection are the author's estimates, based upon conflicting and incomplete sources. 9

 The existence of this tank platoon is open to

question, because it is known that the 36th Division's

tank company was on Biak and only one tank was

ever found in the Sarmi area.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 235

sector extending westward from Sawar

Creek six and a half miles to Tevar Creek,

which empties into the sea immediately west

of Sarmi. Troops consisted of the 2d Battalion, 223d Infantry (less two companies

but with a company of the 1st Battalion attached), most of a battalion of 75-mm.

mountain guns, a number of engineer units,

and some antiaircraft artillery. The commander was Maj. Gen. Shigeru Yamada,

also the commander of the 4th Engineer

Group, a headquarters which controlled the

activities of many engineer and other service

units in the area. The commander of the

223d Infantry's battalion was Capt. Yoshio

Toganae.

In addition to the three defensive sectors

and the Matsuyama Force, there were a

number of detached units operating under

the Yuki Group. Some of these units patrolled the coast far west of Sarmi, while

others were stationed at points deep inland.

Service troops not specifically assigned to

the defensive sectors were concentrated for

the most part near Sarmi or bivouacked

along the banks of the Orai River, which

entered the ocean about two miles east of

Sarmi.

The total Japanese troop strength in the

Sarmi area, including the temporarily absent Matsuyama Force, was about 11,000

men. Of these, a little more than half were

trained and effective combat troops. The

most accurate Allied estimates made prior

to 17 May accounted for a total of 6,500

Japanese, of whom about 4,000 were

thought to be combat troops.10

Reactions to the Allied Landings

After the Allied landings, the first action

taken by General Tagami was to instruct

the Matsuyama Force to retrace its steps to

Sarmi. This order was issued on 17 May,

but for the next two days the general took

no other decisive steps. He had lost about

250 men killed and a like number wounded

before 17 May as a result of Allied air action. Operations on the 17th had caused

many more casualties and had created a

great deal of confusion. On that day, troops

of the Right Sector Force in the ToemArare area fled beyond the Tor River and

Tementoe Creek. On a hill near Maffin

Drome, General Tagami could but sit helplessly by and watch as his 800-man garrison

on Wakde Island was annihilated. Continued Allied air and naval bombardments

added to his casualties, and the Yuki Group

probably lost over 1,000 men from the 17th

through the 20th of May. General Tagami's

food and ammunition supply, already low,

was being destroyed by Allied naval and air

operations and by such shore-based artillery fire as the TORNADO Task Force was

able to bring to bear on his storage dumps.

His situation was anything but enviable. On

19 May the 2d Army ordered him to attack.

General Tagami planned a pincers movement. The Matsuyama Force was ordered

to concentrate at Masi-masi, a coastal village about four and a half miles east of

Tementoe Creek, and to prepare to attack

the Allied positions at Toem. On the west

flank, the Central Sector Force was reorganized. The service troops were placed under

the command of a Captain Fujimura while

the combat elements (two battalions of the

223d Infantry with supporting artillery)

were assigned to Colonel Yoshino for offensive operations. The new combat organiza10

 Allied figures are from ALAMO Force FO 16, 30

Apr 44; TTF FO 1, 12 May 44. The Allied figures

perforce included the Matsuyama Force since the

Allies did not learn until after 17 May that any large

body of Japanese troops had been dispatched from

the Sarmi area toward Hollandia.
236 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tion, designated the Yoshino Force, was to

cross the Tor at the confluence of that river

and the Foein (a point about four miles

upstream) during the night of 22-23 May.

From the ford, the force was to attack the

Toem area from the south and southwest.

Simultaneously, the Matsuyama Force was

to attack from the east. The double envelopment was set for the night of 25-26 May.

While the two arms of the pincers were

moving into position, the reorganizing Right

Sector Force assembled along the west bank

of the Tor River to prevent Allied advances

toward the Maffin and Sawar airdromes.

The rest of the combat troops and armed

service personnel that General Tagami was

able to muster he organized as a new battle

force to which he gave the confusing title

Yuki Group, a name which by now apparently bore three connotations—the new

force, the entire garrison of the Sarmi area,

and the 36th Division. The nucleus of the

new Yuki Group was probably the 2d Battalion, 223d Infantry,11 which was reinforced

by parts of various units from the Left and

Central Sector Forces. The Yuki Group was

to move into the hills south and southeast of

Maffin Drome to defend that area in cooperation with the Right Sector Force, to

which was also temporarily attached the 1st

Battalion, 224th Infantry. Within a few days

the TORNADO Task Force was to be put on

the defensive by the Yoshino and Matsuyama Forces. But before that happened, one

part of the task force was to encounter the

well-prepared and skillfully manned defenses of the new Yuki Group and the Right

Sector Force.

The 158th Infantry Against Lone Tree Hill

As they awaited the outcome of the battle

for Wakde Island, TORNADO Task Force

units on the mainland had restricted combat

operations to patrolling. Engineers had continued construction and road improvement,

and the D plus 1 convoy had arrived and

had been unloaded without incident. The

2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, sent patrols

across Tementoe Creek on the east flank

without finding any signs of organized

enemy units. The 3d Battalion, on the west

flank, was ready to move across the Tor

River to expand the initial beachhead and

discover enemy intentions.

Preliminaries to a Mainland

Campaign

Since there was a possibility that strong

enemy forces might oppose an advance west

of the Tor, General Doe, who did not believe it prudent to commit his small task

force to more than one offensive at a time,

postponed movement across the Tor until

the capture of Wakde Island was assured.

Late on the afternoon of 18 May, when it

appeared to the task force commander that

the situation on Wakde was well in hand,

he gave the 3d Battalion permission to push

patrols to the west side of the river, but before dark there was only time for one platoon

to cross. That unit established a bridgehead

on the west bank in preparation for a crossing by the rest of the battalion.12

On the 19th, 3d Battalion patrols found

evidence that the Japanese intended to hold

11

 There is some confusion as to whether the 2d

Battalion, 223d Infantry, was initially assigned to the

new Yuki Group or to the Yoshino Force. In any case

it did not join the Yoshino Force during the offensive phase of Japanese operations in the Sarmi area.

The name Central Sector Force was retained by

Captain Fujimura's organization of service troops.

12

 TTF G-3 Jnl, 6-25 May 44; 163d Inf Jnl, 13-

30 May 44.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 237

the ground west of the river. Two organized

and well-armed enemy patrols were encountered near Maffin No. 1, a native village on the beach about 3,000 yards beyond

the Tor, and another enemy patrol was

located at Maffin No. 2, a hamlet about

2,500 yards upstream. The next day a Japanese infantry force supported by mortars

and machine guns launched a series of small

attacks against the 3d Battalion's bridgehead but failed to dislodge the Company I

platoon which was holding the river crossing. Intermittent Japanese machine gun and

mortar fire continued throughout the 20th,

and three rifle platoons of Company K were

sent across the river to relieve the Company

I unit. There was a threat of more serious

fighting. ALAMO Force, on the basis of new,

special intelligence, radioed to the TORNADO

Task Force that the Japanese were planning

a major counterattack against the ToemArare beachhead.13

The night of 20-21 May passed quietly,

but about midmorning on the 21st the 3d

Battalion's positions at the mouth of the Tor

were bombarded by large-caliber mortar or

high-angle artillery fire. The battalion was

alerted to expect an enemy attack, but no

assault materialized. The remainder of the

day was therefore spent in strengthening defenses, while at the Arare area the time was

devoted to reorganizing and re-equipping

the various 163d Infantry units which had

by now returned to the mainland from

Wakde, Insoemanai, Liki, and Niroemoar

Islands.14

Early on the morning of 21 May the convoy bearing the 158th Regimental Combat

Team, ALAMO Force Reserve, for the

Wakde-Biak operation arrived off Toem.15

The 158th Infantry went into bivouac near

Arare, while the combat team's 147th Field

Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers)

quickly set up its guns near the same village

to reinforce the 191st Field Artillery Group's

fire on targets west and south of the bridgehead across the Tor River.16

Almost coincident with the arrival of the

158th Regimental Combat Team, the mission of the TORNADO Task Force was enlarged. Originally the task force had been

charged only with the seizure of Wakde Island and the immediately adjacent mainland area. These tasks had been accomplished by 22 May, but on the same date

General Krueger changed the mission and

assigned a new one which was reminiscent

of the original concept of the Wakde-Sarmi

operation. General Krueger now felt that

Wakde Island would not be secure until

more information concerning Japanese intentions could be obtained. Furthermore, he

believed that the arrival of the 158th Regimental Combat Team would allow the task

force to mount an offensive which would

break up the known Japanese attack plans

and would place the enemy on the defensive.

13

 Ibid.; Rad, ALAMO to TTF, WF-3246, 20 May

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 16-22 May 44. 14

 The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai had

been disbanded on 19 May and its troops either returned to the mainland or sent to Wakde. Liki and

Niroemoar had been captured according to plan by

Companies E and I on 19 May. The two companies

had been transported to the objectives by two APD's

and two LCT's, protected by DD's. The islands

proved to be unoccupied by the Japanese and the

Fifth Air Force radar detachments were immediately

set up. The only casualty was the native chieftain

of Liki, who was wounded by the preassault naval

bombardment. Detachments of the 163d Infantry

were left on both islands to protect the radar installations. TTF G-3 Jnl, 6-25 May 44; 163d Inf Jnl,

13-30 May 44. 15

 The unit reached the area a day ahead of schedule, thereby causing some confusion. The beaches

were not ready to receive the troops and supplies,

and some of the ships, without awaiting instructions

from task force headquarters, started unloading over

the1 wron 6 g beaches. TTF G-3 Jnl, 6-25 May 44.
238 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Accordingly, he ordered the TORNADO Task

Force to institute a vigorous overland drive

toward Sarmi, sixteen miles west of the Tor

River.17

This decision, based upon the scanty, incomplete information concerning Japanese

strength and dispositions available to General Krueger at the time, was destined to

precipitate a protracted and bitter fight.

The Japanese had no intention of abandoning Sarmi and the two airstrips between the

town and the Tor without a desperate struggle. The fighting was not, however, to be

carried out under the direction of General

Doe or by the 163d Regimental Combat

Team. The task force commander decided

to use the 158th Infantry to start the westward drive which ALAMO Force had ordered, and elements of the recently arrived

regiment began relieving the 3d Battalion,

163d Infantry, at the mouth of the Tor

River on 23 May.

Meanwhile the 41st Division, scheduled

to invade Biak Island on 27 May, had found

that it needed another general officer for

that operation. General Doe, whose administrative assignment was assistant commander of the 41st Division, was the logical

choice to fill the division's command requirement. Accordingly, on 25 May, he left

the Wakde area and his place as commander

of the TORNADO Task Force was taken by

Brig. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick.18

The 158th Regimental Combat Team

was organized on 11 May 1944 at Finschhafen in Australian New Guinea. At that

time its component parts were the 158th

Infantry Regiment, the 147th Field Artillery Battalion, the 506th Medical Collecting Company, and the 1st Platoon, 637th

Medical Clearing Company. Other units

were assigned to the combat team from time

to time during its combat operations. In the

Wakde-Sarmi area the combat team commander was General Patrick and the commander of the 158th Infantry was initially

Col. J. Prugh Herndon.19

West to the Tirfoam River

On the morning of 23 May Company L,

158th Infantry, began advancing westward

from the Tor River bridgehead. (Map 11)

Plans for the day were to complete the relief

of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, extend

the bridgehead to the west, and establish a

road block at Maffin No. 1. The remainder

of the 3d Battalion, 158th Infantry, was to

cross the Tor during the day and follow

Company L to Maffin No. 1. At that village

the battalion was to assemble and prepare

to attack westward toward Sarmi at daylight

on 24 May. This attack was to be supported

by the remainder of the 158th Infantry,

which was scheduled to move across the Tor

on the 24th and 25th.20

During the 23d the advance of Company

L met increasingly strong resistance.21 Japa17

 TTF G-3 Jnl and Jnl file, 6-25 May 44; Rad,

ALAMO to TTF, WF-3772, 22 May 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 18-22 May 44; Ltr, Gen

Krueger to Gen Ward, 2 Jan 51, no sub, in OCMH

files.

18

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May 44,

p. 8; TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun

44, p. 1; Rad, ALAMO to TTF, WF-3972, 24 May

44, and Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq,

WF-4062, 24 May 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl,

Wakde-Biak, 23-24 May 44. There are five separate

reports bearing the title TORNADO Task Force, each

dated according to the length of tenure of various

units as task force headquarters, 19158th RCT Opns Rpt Sarmi-Wakde, 11 May21 Jun 44, pp. 1-3. 20

 158th Inf FO 2, 23 May 44, in 158th Inf Jnl,

9 May-21 Jun 44. 21

 Unless otherwise indicated, information in the

rest of this subsection is from: 158th Inf Jnl and

Jnl files, 9 May-21 Jun 44; TTF G-3 Jnl, 6-25
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 239

nese defenses were centered around three

small, brush-bordered lakes near the beach

about 1,800 yards west of the Tor. The rest

of the 3d Battalion, 158th Infantry, across

the Tor before 1130, quickly moved forward to assist Company L, which had been

pinned down along the main coastal track

west of the lakes by Japanese machine gun

and rifle fire. Company K pushed up to the

left flank of Company L, while Company I

moved toward L's rear. With the aid of mortar fire from the 81-mm. weapons of Company M, Companies K and L were able to

push gradually forward during the afternoon, advancing on a front about 400 yards

wide.

Finding that the attack was not progressing as rapidly as he had expected, Colonel

Herndon ordered his 1st Battalion across the

Tor. The 1st Battalion did not start moving

until 1400 and could not get far enough

forward to join the attack before dark.

Tanks would probably have been of great

help to the 3d Battalion, but by the time

the mediums of the 1st Platoon, 603d Tank

Company, moved across the Tor, the forward infantry troops had already halted for

the night.

Companies L and K dug in for the night

across the main coastal track at a point

about 400 yards east of Maffin No. 1. Here

the road swung away from the beach, and

Company L extended the perimeter about

500 yards north to the shore of Maffin Bay.

Company I was in position along the road

east of Companies L and K. The 1st Battalion bivouacked for the night on the west

bank of the Tor at the river's mouth. The

3d Battalion had lost 8 men killed, 12

wounded, and 1 missing during the day,

while 6 Japanese had been killed and 1 captured. Plans for the morrow were to have

the battalion continue the attack westward.

Shortly after 0700 on the 24th, the

81-mm. mortars of Company M laid down

a brief concentration in front of Companies

K and L, and at 0715 the 147th and 218th

Field Artillery Battalions began a fifteenminute support bombardment. When a few

artillery shells fell on Company L, the 3d

Battalion commander thought that his own

artillery was falling short, and he had the

fire stopped quickly. Actually, this was Japanese artillery fire. The infantry unit was

mistaking Japanese artillery for its own, a

failing not uncommon with troops not previously subjected to enemy artillery fire. Despite the lack of extended artillery support,

Companies K and L moved out as planned

at 0730. Company L, on the right, advanced

along the beach encountering only scattered

rifle fire but Company K, on the main road,

had hardly started when Japanese machine

gun and rifle fire from concealed positions

in a wooded area on the left front halted its

advance. Unable to gain any ground, Company K called for tank support. Two tanks,

together with a flame-thrower detachment

from Company B of the 27th Engineers,

arrived at Company K's lines about 1000.

With the flame throwers and tanks blasting

the way, the infantrymen overran the Japanese defenses, killing ten of the enemy and

capturing two machine guns. The remainder

of the Japanese force, probably originally

some forty men strong, disappeared into the

jungle south of the road, whence scattered

rifle fire continued to harass Company K.

Company L reached the outskirts of Maffin No. 1 about 1400. The movement had

been slow, not as a result of Japanese oppoMay 44; TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 17-25 May

44, pp. 7-9; TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May12 Jun 44, pp. 1-6; 158th RCT Opns Rpt SarmiWakde, 11 May-21 Jun 44, pp. 2-4; Ltr, Col Herndon to Gen Ward, 23 Dec 50, no sub, in OCMH

files.
Map 11

242 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

sition but because the battalion commander

did not believe it prudent for Company L

to advance far beyond Company K. Deploying to find a crossing over the Tirfoam River,

just west of Maffin No. 1, Company L was

subjected to intense machine gun fire from

enemy positions on the west bank. The company then moved southwest away from the

beach toward the main road and up the

Tirfoam. This maneuver was greeted with

new outbursts of machine gun fire from Japanese positions on both sides of the river.

The company commander called for tank

support, and the 1st Platoon, 603d Tank

Company, sent four of its mediums forward.

As the tanks moved into position elements

of the Right Sector Force, comprising Captain Saito's men of the 3d Battalion, 224th

Infantry, and a company of the 223d Infantry, charged out of the jungle. The Japanese

were under Colonel Kato, Right Sector

Force commander, who was killed as he personally led a small detachment against the

American tanks. The enemy was quickly

thrown back with heavy losses by the combined fire of the four tanks and Company

L's riflemen and machine gunners. However, under cover of their infantry attack,

the Japanese had dragged a 37-mm. antitank gun forward out of the jungle. As the

enemy infantrymen withdrew to the southwest after the death of Colonel Kato, the

antitank gun opened fire. It was soon destroyed and its crew killed, but not before

three of the American tanks had been so

damaged that they had to be withdrawn for

repairs.22

The separate actions of Companies L and

K during the morning had created a gap

between those two units, and the battalion

commander sent Company I forward to fill

the Void. The reinforcing company moved

west along the road to Company K's right

rear. The latter had been unable to advance

because of continued enemy fire from its left

flank, and, therefore, shortly after 1200,

Colonel Herndon ordered the 1st Battalion

forward. The 1st was to bypass opposition

on Company K's left by a deep envelopment to the south across the Tirfoam. Once

beyond the river the battalion was to push

northwest to a jetty which projected into

Maffin Bay about 600 yards west of the Tirfoam's mouth.

Company A started the flanking maneuver about 1330 but was soon halted by machine gun and rifle fire from dense jungle

south of the main road. Company C was

ordered to reinforce Company A. However,

by the time Company C got into position to

continue the attack, darkness was approaching and the battalion commander stopped

the flanking maneuver for the night. Meanwhile, Company K, upon the arrival of

Company A at its left flank, had extended its

right front to Maffin No. 1, establishing

contact there with Companies L and I.

Company L had sent patrols across the Tirfoam late in the afternoon, but these parties

were withdrawn before dark and the company began setting up night defenses about

200 yards east of the river.

For the night Company L's right flank

rested on the beach, and the unit's left was

tied into Company Fs perimeter farther inland. To the left rear of Company I was

Company K, with its lines stretching across

the coastal track. Companies A and C were

south of the road on K's left. Company B

had moved forward late in the day to rein22

 Japanese information here and in the rest of

this subsection is from Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 15-

16; and 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev),

pp. 20-22.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 243

force the 3d Battalion's three rifle companies

and was apparently located for the night

near Companies I and L.

Casualties during the day had been

heavy—28 men were killed and 75 wounded. Many others, including the commander

of Company I, had dropped from heat exhaustion and had to be evacuated. The officer strength of Company I was reduced to

two. Japanese casualties were undoubtedly

higher, especially as a result of the Right Sector Force's suicidal attacks against the four

American tanks. Colonel Kato's place as

Right Sector Force commander was taken

by Maj. Yasake Matsuoka, formerly a battalion commander of the 233d Infantry,

who was ordered to continue to defend the

approaches to Maffin Strip.

The sacrifices of the Right Sector Force

had not been in vain. Under cover of the

unit's holding action the Yoshino Force continued its wide envelopment south of the

158th Infantry toward Toem and Arare, a

maneuver of which the TORNADO Task

Force was as yet unaware. At the same time

the delaying action of the Right Sector Force

gave the Yuki Group ample time to move

into the hills south and east of Maffin Strip.

The 158th Infantry, ordered to continue the

advance on the 25th, was soon to engage the

Yuki Group and the remnants of the Right

Sector Force, which had withdrawn south

into the jungle and west into hills beyond

the Tirfoam.

Discovering the Japanese Defenses

Action on the 25th started with the withdrawal of the 158th Infantry's forward units

to a point 350 yards east of the Tirfoam,

while artillery and mortar concentrations

were laid on the banks of the river and on

suspected enemy defenses west of the

stream.23 Under cover of these fires the 1st

Battalion relieved the 3d, and Company E

was sent forward to reinforce the left of the

1st Battalion. The 3d Battalion reverted to

regimental reserve.

Patrols of the 1st Battalion moved out

about 0830, and the main body followed

fifteen minutes later. The artillery and mortar fire had been effective. Japanese defenses

east of the Tirfoam, strongly held the previous day, were found to be destroyed or abandoned. With only scattered rifle fire opposing

its movement, the 1st Battalion reached its

initial objective—a bridge which crossed the

Tirfoam about 200 yards inland—at 0915.

Patrols moved north and south along the

east bank, dispersing enemy stragglers and

securing Maffin No. 1. At 0930 Colonel

Herndon decided to send the battalion

across the river. The next objective was the

jetty 600 yards to the west.

Preparatory to movement across the Tirfoam, the 1st Battalion's machine guns and

60-mm. mortars (the latter attempting to

get tree bursts) sprayed a heavily wooded

area just west of the bridge. Patrols crossing

the river shortly after 0930 reported only

sporadic rifle fire which did not seem to

represent an organized defense, and Companies B and C crossed the bridge without

incident about 1115. Company E followed

and deployed on the left flank of the 1st Battalion. By noon Company B had reached the

jetty. There the 1st Battalion paused to

23

 Unless otherwise indicated this and the following subsections are based on: TTF Opns Rpt

Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun 44, pp. 1-4; 158th

RCT Opns Rpt Sarmi-Wakde, 11 May-21 Jun 44,

pp. 4-9; 1st Bn 158th Inf Jnl, 11 May-21 Jun 44;

2d Bn 158th Inf Jnl, 9 May-21 Jun 44; 3d Bn 158th

Inf Jnl, 12 May-18 Jun 44; TTF G-3 Jnl, 25-31

May 44; 158th Inf Jnl and Jnl file, 9 May-21 Jun

44; Ltr, Herndon to Ward, 23 Dec 50. Enemy info

is principally from Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 15-16,

and 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak, p. 22.
244 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

reorganize and lunch while the 2d Battalion

crossed the Tirfoam. By 1300 both battalions had been fed and were ready to push

onward. Colonel Herndon set the next objective as Lone Tree Hill, a terrain feature

which rose from the flat coastal plain about

2,000 yards west of the jetty.

Lone Tree Hill had been named for a

single tree which was depicted on its crest

by the map then employed by TORNADO

Task Force. Actually, the hill's coral mass

was covered with dense rain forest and

jungle undergrowth. Lone Tree Hill was

about 175 feet high, 1,200 yards long north

to south, and 1,100 yards wide east to west.

The north side dropped steeply to a rocky

shore on Maffin Bay. The hill's eastern slope

was fronted by a short, violently twisting

stream which was promptly dubbed the

"Snaky River" by the 158th Infantry. The

main road curved away from the beach to

pass south of the Snaky River and Lone

Tree Hill through a narrow defile. The

southern side of this defile was formed by

two noses of Mt. Saksin, a terrain feature

about 100 feet higher than Lone Tree Hill.

The more westerly of these noses was named

"Hill 225" after its height in feet. No name

was given to the eastern ridge line, which

pointed toward Lone Tree Hill from the

southeast. There was a small native village

at the eastern entrance to the defile and another at the pass's western outlet.24

Mt. Saksin was a name given to an indefinitely outlined hill mass which forms the

northern extremity of the Irier Mountains,

extending inland from the coast at Lone

Tree Hill. The name Saksin was specifically

applied to a prominent peak about 2,000

yards due south of Lone Tree. On or about

23 May General Tagami had moved his

headquarters into the Mt. Saksin area, apparently on the southwest side of the central

peak. As the 158th Infantry pushed forward

on the 24th, elements of the Yuki Group and

Right Sector Force moved onto Hill 225 and

Lone Tree Hill. On these two terrain features the Japanese began constructing hasty

defensive positions. These, together with the

natural terrain barriers in the area, effectively guarded the land approaches to Maffin Strip, which lay less than 1,000 yards

west of Lone Tree Hill.25 A sea approach

was at least temporarily out of the question,

since the TORNADO Task Force did not have

sufficient landing craft to execute and support such a maneuver. Finally, it was not

considered probable at task force headquarters that the Japanese land defenses of the

Maffin Strip area would be strongly held.

On the other hand, Colonel Herndon, as the

result of patrol reports, did believe that a

large Japanese force might be on Hill 225

or Mt. Saksin's eastern nose.

About 1500 on 25 May, Companies B

and C had reached a point on the main road

a few yards below the southernmost bend of

the Snaky River. There, enemy machine

gun fire from the native village at the eastern

entrance to the defile between Lone Tree

Hill and the two noses of Mt. Saksin halted

the advance. As the forward troops deployed

to find cover from the Japanese fire, they

were subjected to an intermittent artillery

bombardment, which the battalion thought

was coming from TORNADO Task Force

weapons emplaced east of the Tor River;

24

 The past tense is used in this paragraph because

the entire cast of the terrain in the Lone Tree Hill

area was changed during the next two months by

continuous artillery and air bombardment.

25

 In addition to the Yuki Group and 2d Army

sources, the foregoing enemy information is derived

from operation orders of the 36th Div and 223d

Inf, Apr-May 44, as translated in ALAMO Force,

G-2 Wkly Rpt 48, 5 Jul 44.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 245

but no American artillery unit was placing

fire within 1,000 yards of the 1st Battalion,

158th Infantry, at the time.26 For a second

time part of the regiment was mistaking

Japanese artillery fire for its own.

General Patrick, who had succeeded to

the command of the TORNADO Task Force

during the morning, was informed of the

opposition encountered by the 1st Battalion.

He ordered the advance stopped for the

night and instructed the 158th Infantry to

remain well east of the Snaky River so that

American artillery could register on the

native village and the defile without endangering the forward troops. Harassed by a

few artillery shells, which by now had been

recognized as originating from Japanese

70-mm. or 75-mm. weapons, the 1st Battalion pulled back about 500 yards east of

the Snaky. A perimeter was set up with the

battalion's left resting on the road and its

right on the beach. The 2d Battalion established a series of company perimeters back

along the road to the east. Casualties for the

day had been 22 men killed and 26

wounded, almost all in the 1st Battalion,

while about 50 Japanese had been killed.

When the attack orders for the day had

been issued, it had been hoped that the 1st

Battalion could reach the top of Lone Tree

Hill before nightfall. Since the unexpectedly

strong enemy opposition had prevented the

realization of this hope, plans were made to

continue the advance westward on the 26th.

The ultimate objective was the east bank of

the Woske River, 2,000 yards west of Lone

Tree Hill, and the intermediate objective

was the native village at the eastern entrance

to the defile. The advance was to be preceded by naval shelling of the northern

slopes of Lone Tree Hill from 0630 to 0700.

A fifteen-minute artillery preparation was

also to precede the advance, and the infantry was to start moving at 0845.

On the morning of the 26th the naval

fire started ten minutes late. Two destroyers

lying offshore shelled the northern slopes of

Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Bay area,

firing on known or suspected enemy defensive positions and assembly points. After a

twenty-minute bombardment the two support vessels withdrew. Artillery fire did not

begin until 0830. The time lag gave the

Japanese ample opportunity to prepare for

the infantry attack which had been heralded by the destroyer fire. The artillery,

aiming its shells into the defile and against

the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill, ceased

firing about 0845. A few moments later the

1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, Company B

again leading, started moving westward.

The infantry's line of departure was nearly

1,000 yards east of the village at the southeast foot of Lone Tree Hill, and the advance

had to be slow because the road ran through

heavily jungled terrain. The enemy therefore had sufficient time to reoccupy positions

in the defile and on Lone Tree Hill which

might have been vacated during the American artillery barrage. The value of both the

naval and artillery bombardment had been

lost.

Company B moved forward to the point

at which it had been held up the previous

afternoon and was again stopped—this time

by fire from the southeastern corner of Lone

Tree Hill. Company D's heavy machine

guns were brought up to spray a densely

wooded area in front of the point rifle

platoon. The fire dispersed the Japanese

riflemen, and Company B moved forward

26

 As checked in: 147th FA Jnl, 21 May-14 Jun

44; 191st FA Gp Jnl, 17 May-26 Jun 44; 191st FA

Gp S-3 Rpts, 18 May-26 Jun 44; 167th FA S-3

Work Sheets, 25 May 44. The firing records of the

218th FA are included in the records of the 191st

FA Gp.
246 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

again. Less than 100 yards of ground had

been gained when the company again encountered machine gun and mortar fire

originating in the native village.

Company A, initially off the road to the

right rear of Company B, turned north to

the mouth of the Snaky River. One platoon

crossed at the river mouth at 1030 but was

quickly forced back to the east bank by

Japanese machine gun fire from the rocky

beach below the north face of Lone Tree

Hill. Artillery support was called for, supplied, and proved successful in stopping the

enemy fire, and about 1350 all Company A

crossed the Snaky. Orders were to move

down the west side of that stream to establish contact with Company B and to send

one platoon up the eastern slope of Lone

Tree Hill to probe enemy positions.

Other efforts were meanwhile being made

to scatter the Japanese opposing Company

B. Company E (less a platoon which was

patrolling on Mt. Saksin) moved up to the

left flank of Company B and on the south

side of the main road. The combined efforts

of the two rifle companies proved insufficient to dislodge the Japanese from their

positions at the eastern entrance to the

defile, and the enemy fire forced the American units to seek cover. Company F was

therefore ordered to pass through B's left

flank and proceed to Hill 225 to take the

Japanese positions from the rear.

Company F's attack could not be started

before dark and Company A, moving up

the west side of the Snaky, was unable to

relieve much of the pressure on Company B.

Finally, Company A was forced for a second

time to withdraw to the east bank of the

river as a result of enemy fire from Lone

Tree Hill. Tanks would have been of great

help to Company B, but the bridge over the

Tirfoam could not bear their weight, and

the road west of the stream was in such disrepair that tanks probably could not have

negotiated it.

Casualties on the 26th had been lighter—

only 6 men were killed and 10 wounded—

while an estimated 35 Japanese had been

killed. To prevent further casualties from being inflicted by Japanese patrols which were

expected to roam around the flanks of the

forward elements during the night, a semicircular perimeter was established. Company B anchored its right flank near the

eastern edge of the native village and extended its lines southwest across the road for

a distance of about 100 yards. Company E

refused the south flank by stretching the line

southeast from B's left, 500 yards up the

slope of Mt. Saksin's eastern nose. Company

A tied its left into B's right and extended the

defense northeast about 300 yards from the

road to a large bend in the Snaky River. The

remainder of the 1st and 2d Battalions was

strung out along both sides of the main road

to the rear of the three forward companies.

Operations during the day had secured

less than 1,000 yards of ground in a westerly

direction and about the same distance inland from the beach. However, the 158th

Infantry had located and probed some of the

principal Japanese defenses in the area—

defenses which indicated that the Japanese

guarding the land approaches to Maffin

Strip were in greater strength than had been

expected. Company B had discovered that

the enemy was firmly dug in along both sides

of the defile. A platoon of Company A had

found Lone Tree Hill to be honeycombed

with enemy defensive positions, especially

on its northern and northeastern faces. The

regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance

Platoon and a platoon of Company E patrolled in the vicinity of Mt. Saksin and Hill

225. The Company E platoon found many
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 247

deserted Japanese positions along the eastern slopes of Mt. Saksin and on that hill's

eastern nose, but the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon had a less optimistic

report. Probing into rugged, heavily forested terrain between the east nose and Hill

225, the platoon had been ambushed. Extricating itself with difficulty, it reported that

the Japanese were dug in in great strength

all over Hill 225.

Orders for the next day reflected a still

prevailing notion at task force headquarters

that the Japanese defenses were weak. The

1st Battalion was to push on through the

defile and at the same time secure Lone

Tree Hill. The 2d Battalion was to clear

Hill 225. Prior to the 26th, field artillery

had been supporting the 158th Infantry

from positions 8,000 to 10,000 yards to the

east. Once the infantry had debouched from

the western end of the defile, it would move

into an area beyond the most effective range

of artillery support. Therefore the 147th

Field Artillery Battalion's 105-mm. howitzers were displaced forward to Maffin No.

1 to support the advance of the 158th Infantry on the 27th.

The Defile

At 0700 hours on 27 May two destroyers,

firing on Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin

Strip area, started scheduled fire support

for the day's advance. Artillery and infantry action on this morning was much more

closely co-ordinated than on the previous

day. The destroyer fire lasted until 0745,

at which time the field artillery and all the

81-mm. mortars of the 158th Infantry laid

concentrations on suspected and known

enemy positions in the defile, on Lone Tree

Hill, and on Hill 225. At 0830 Company F,

moving around Company E on the south

flank, started its attack. Behind close artillery support, apparently controlled by artillery liaison planes for the most part, Company F pushed up a terrain feature initially

believed to be Hill 225. It was not discovered until late the next day that F Company

was actually on the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin and about 700 yards east of its reported

location.

Since artillery fire had knocked out two

enemy machine gun nests which had been

delaying the advance, patrols of Company

F were able to reach the top of the eastern

ridge. The rest of the company moved up

the hill at 1000, encountering scattered rifle

fire from enemy positions to the southwest.

Company E, just before noon, arrived atop

the same hill on F's right. Company E had

orders to secure the southern slopes of the

defile between Hill 225 and Lone Tree Hill.

Company B, still at the eastern entrance

to the defile, was again unable to make any

progress and during the morning was held

up by machine gun and mortar fire from

concealed enemy positions on the southern

and southwestern slopes of Lone Tree Hill.

No sooner had some of these positions been

eliminated by American artillery and mortar fire than Company B was subjected to

enemy machine gun and mortar fire originating from the northeast side of Hill 225,

the reported location of Companies E and

F. Actually, the artillery fire had not been

entirely effective, because it had not reached

into deep draws or caves in which many of

the Japanese weapons were emplaced.

Company E, attempting to move down

the northern slopes of the eastern ridge to

Company B's aid, was soon forced back by

enemy rifle fire and infantry counterattacks

from the west. At the same time small parties

of Japanese, under cover of their own machine guns, started a series of minor counter-
248 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

attacks against Company B. Company F

did not become engaged in this action. Instead, the company dug in on the ridge it

was holding and sent patrols to the south

and west to probe Japanese defenses. It was

soon discovered that the combination of

rugged terrain and Japanese machine gun

and rifle fire limited patrolling to a very

small area.

North of Company B, Company A patrolled along the west bank of the Snaky

River and on the eastern slope of Lone Tree

Hill during the morning and early afternoon. About 1630 the company moved in

force up Lone Tree, finding the eastern

slope of the hill to be unoccupied. Most of

the fire that had harassed the company during the morning had apparently originated

on the beach below the northern face of

Lone Tree Hill. For the night the unit dug

in at the crest of the hill. Again, little ground

had been gained, although the eastern nose

of Mt. Saksin and Lone Tree Hill had been

at least partially occupied.

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 158th

Infantry had now been engaged in heavy

combat for three days against an enemy

force which was aggressive and clever on

the defense. The combined Right Sector

Force-Yuki Group troops were well led,

taking every advantage of heavily forested

terrain for cover and concealment, yet retaining their mobility. The Japanese were

tried and trained troops, having had considerable experience in China and having

been in the Sarmi area for over six months.

The 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, on the

other hand, was in combat for the first time.

The 2d and 3d Battalions had been in combat on New Britain against lesser opposition

and in different terrain, and both had undergone some reorganization and had received many untried replacements since. By

evening on 27 May the 158th Infantry had

lost almost 300 men killed, wounded, or

evacuated as nonbattle casualties—the latter principally as a result of heat exhaustion.

American artillery support had not been all

that could be desired. Maps were so inaccurate that the artillery had difficulty finding designated targets, and it was impossible,

even with the aid of spotting aircraft and

forward observers, to lay fire into the enemy's defile positions without endangering

the forward troops. Finally, tank support

had not been obtainable, much as it was

needed by Company B, which was bearing

the brunt of the defile warfare.

So important did Colonel Herndon now

consider tank support that he secured permission to have two tanks brought forward

to the beach at the mouth of the Snaky

River. The tanks were to be transported by

LCM's (all of which were badly needed at

the Arare-Toem beachhead and at Wakde

Island for lightering purposes) to the mouth

of the Snaky on the morning of the 28th and

were to move south along the stream to aid

the units trying to break through the defile.

Two rifle companies, one each from the 1st

and 2d Battalions, were assigned to the defile battle on the 28th. Two other rifle companies of the 1st Battalion were to advance

over Lone Tree Hill and down its western

slopes. The first objective of the latter units

was the point at which the main road, after

winding south around Lone Tree Hill, again

reached the shores of Maffin Bay. This point

was about 700 yards northwest of the hill

crest and about 100 yards from the northeastern edge of Maffin Strip. In a simultaneous movement the 2d Battalion (less one

rifle company) was to move across Hill 225

to the western outlet of the defile. Thence

the battalion was to strike north along the

road to the eastern end of Maffin Strip to
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 249

establish contact with the 1st Battalion's two

companies.

This two-pronged attack was designed to

seal off Lone Tree Hill and render Japanese

positions on the hill untenable. At the same

time, combined infantry-tank action was to

clear the defile and open the main overland

supply route to Maffin Strip. The road,

which engineers had been repairing forward

from the Tor for the last three days, would

then be opened for traffic from the river

to the airfield. The ultimate regimental

objective was still the east bank of the Woske

River.

On the 28th, after a well-timed preliminary artillery bombardment, Company C

moved forward to the crest of Lone Tree

Hill and joined Company A. The latter unit

then attempted to move down the steep

northern face of the hill to the rocky beach

below. Japanese defenders in caves and

crevices on this clifflike side stopped the attack before it was well under way. It was

impossible to place fire on the Japanese positions from above, and Company A had to

withdraw to the crest of Lone Tree. Company C, at midmorning, started moving in

densely jungled, irregular terrain along the

western slope of the hill, attacking generally

to the north. About 1300 a Japanese patrol,

coming out of a wooded area at the western

base of the hill, fell upon Company C's left

flank. The American unit beat off this attack, principally by rifle fire, without too

much difficulty, but as soon as the enemy

party was dispersed Company C was pinned

down by mortar and machine gun fire originating near the eastern edge of Maffin

Strip. Elements of Company A then tried to

move down the west side of the hill along

a route south of Company C's positions.

This effort was also greeted with Japanese

machine gun and rifle fire and was abandoned. The two companies could now see

Japanese movements to the southwest,

movements which seemed to presage an imminent enemy attack in force against the

west side of Lone Tree Hill. The terrain on

the west side of Lone Tree was not well

suited for defense. Moreover, both Company

A and Company C were running low on

water and ammunition and the 1st Battalion

commander considered it probable that the

terrain would prevent successful resupply

efforts. He therefore ordered the two companies to withdraw to the line of the Snaky

River. This maneuver began about 1600.

Meanwhile, south of Lone Tree Hill,

Companies B and E had been making determined efforts to break through the defile.

Patrols probing forward during the morning

reported steadily increasing Japanese resistance on both sides of the pass. About noon

further efforts were temporarily abandoned,

while the heavy weapons of Company H and

the 81-mm. mortars of Company D laid a

new barrage into the Japanese positions.

After this fire, B Company moved west

along the road and Company E, attempting

to clear ravines on the south side of the defile, followed along to B's left rear. Company

B could not get beyond the native village

and the attack was unsuccessful. For the

fourth or fifth time in three days the Japanese had thrown back an assault at the

defile.

At 1145 Company E relieved Company B

near the village. The latter unit was ordered

to move to the beach at the west side of the

Snaky River. There the company was to set

up a defensive perimeter to protect an engineer platoon which was blasting out of the

beach coral an approach for the two tanks

scheduled to be unloaded there from LCM's.

While Company B was digging in at its new

location it was subjected to heavy mortar,
250 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

machine gun, and rifle fire from Japanese

on the north face of Lone Tree Hill. At 1800

the company therefore withdrew to the east

side of the river mouth. The engineer platoon withdrew from the Snaky River about

the same time, but not before a tank approach had been completed on the beach

east of the river mouth.

On the southern flank Company F had

run into strong enemy opposition during the

morning. In the afternoon the company discovered that it had not been on Hill 225, but

that it was now in a difficult position in a

ravine between that hill and the eastern nose

of Mt. Saksin. When it was noticed during

the afternoon that enemy troops on Hill 225

were maneuvering to attack, Company F

withdrew up the western slopes of the eastern nose. The Japanese, forestalled in their

attempt to trap Company F in the ravine,

then turned their attention to Company E

at the native village. An enemy force estimated to be fifty men strong moved from the

southwest against Company E, which drove

the Japanese back only after a sharp fire

fight.

Colonel Herndon now felt that his forward positions were rapidly becoming untenable. The Japanese were apparently moving eastward and northward in some

strength and the terrain west of the Snaky

River made supply of the two forward battalions extremely difficult. The colonel

therefore radioed to the task force commander that he intended to withdraw to the

line of the Snaky River for the night. The

1st Battalion was to be on the north of the

night's defensive positions and the 2d Battalion was to refuse the left flank by extending the lines south of the road along the

eastern nose of Mt. Saksin. Colonel Herndon also planned to relieve the 1st Battalion

with the 3d on the morrow. These plans

were approved by General Patrick who,

early the next morning, also ordered Colonel Herndon to cease offensive efforts.

The 158th Infantry Withdraws

On 27 May General Patrick had been

informed by General Krueger that two battalions of the 163d Infantry, which was still

protecting the Toem-Arare beachhead,

were soon to be shipped to Biak. At the

same time General MacArthur's headquarters and ALAMO Force were considering

plans to stage a division in the WakdeSarmi area in preparation for operations

farther to the west. The two headquarters

decided that the 6th Infantry Division,

which had recently completed jungle and

amphibious training in eastern New Guinea,

would be the most logical unit to send forward. General Krueger knew that the 163d

Regimental Combat Team was scheduled to

leave the Wakde-Sarmi area for Biak, but

he did not want operations in the former

region to be halted for lack of troops. He

therefore recommended that a combat team

of the 6th Division be dispatched to WakdeSarmi immediately, even without its artillery

if leaving the latter out of the shipment

would speed the movement of the infantry

regiment.27

Because of the danger of overextending

his lines, General Patrick had already decided to halt the westward movement of the

27

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to TTF, WH-98, 26 May

44, in TTF G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44; Rad, ALAMO

Adv Hq to GHQ SWPA, WH-63, 25 May 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26 May 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to

ALAMO, G-12888, 24 May 44, and Rad, ALAMO

Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF-4263, 25 May 44,

both in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl, Wakde-Biak,

24-26 May 44.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 251

158th Infantry. He felt that with a garrison

of two regimental combat teams the fifteenmile-long perimeter which the TORNADO

Task Force was occupying could be held.

Before westward advance could be resumed,

however, Japanese forces which were harassing the southern and eastern flanks of the

Toem-Arare beachhead defenses would

have to be dispersed. As a result of an attack

by some 200 Japanese on Toem during the

night of 27-28 May and because there were

indications that the enemy was to make

further assaults against the beachhead, the

task force commander recommended that

no elements of the 163d Regimental Combat Team be shipped to Biak until after the

arrival at Toem of a combat team of the

6th Division.

But on the morning of 29 May, General

Krueger notified General Patrick that the

two battalions of the 163d Infantry would

have to leave for Biak the next day. General

Patrick considered that the one remaining

infantry battalion of the 163d Regimental

Combat Team would not be sufficiently

strong to hold the Toem-Arare beachhead

area. He therefore ordered the 158th Infantry to send one of its battalions back

across the Tor River.28

On the morning of 29 May the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, at Arare. General

Patrick ordered the rest of the 158th Infantry to improve its positions along the Snaky

River and to defend that line until the arrival of a 6th Division regimental combat

team on or about 4 June. The 1st Battalion,

158th Infantry, was replaced on the Snaky

River line by the 3d Battalion of the same

regiment.29

Early the same morning Company F of

the 158th Infantry, holding an exposed position on the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin,

found itself surrounded by enemy patrols.

The Japanese appeared to be maneuvering

for an attack and Company F hurriedly

withdrew. The unit had to fight its way back

to the perimeter of Company G, which was

located on the main road about 800 yards

northeast of the eastern nose.

As a result of this action, and because the

Japanese were continuing pressure against

the 3d Battalion's Snaky River lines from

both the south and west, Colonel Herndon

felt that his river positions could not be held

much longer. Worse still, from his point of

view, his 1st Battalion had been withdrawn

east of the Tor. Without this strength he

believed his forces insufficient to hold the

line at the Snaky and, at the same time, prevent the Japanese from outflanking his units

to the south and cutting his line of communications back to the Toem-Arare beachhead area. Therefore, after consultation with

his battalion commanders, he ordered the

2d and 3d Battalions to withdraw to the

east bank of the Tirfoam River, 2,000 yards

to the rear, and form a new defense line.30

Just past 1500 Colonel Herndon informed General Patrick of the decision to

redispose the forward area forces. At first

General Patrick was not inclined to consent

to this withdrawal, but upon reconsideration

28

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to TTF, WH-173, 29

May 44, and Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-542, 28 May

44, both in TTF G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44; TTF Opns

Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun, p. 2.

29

 Rad, TTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, Y-573, in TTF

G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44; TTF Opns Rpt WakdeSarmi, 25 May-12 Jun 44, p. 2; 158th Inf Jnl,

9 May-21 Jun 44. 30

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun

44, pp. 2-3; 158th RCT Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi,

p. 6; Ltrs, Herndon to Ward, 8 Nov and 23 Dec 50,

no sub, in OCMH files.
252 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

gave his approval. The movement began immediately, under continuing Japanese pressure from the south.31

 About 1600 General

Patrick arrived at Colonel Herndon's command post, which by then had been moved

away from the Tirfoam, where the new

defense line was taking shape, to a point

approximately 1,800 yards east of that

stream.32 Shortly thereafter General Patrick

reported to General Krueger: "Investigation convinced me that [the] withdrawal

[was] unwarranted."

 33

 General Patrick relieved Colonel Herndon and placed in command of the 158th Infantry Col. Earle O.

Sandlin, who had recently arrived in the

area and who had been acting as his chief

of staff.34

Meanwhile, under Colonel Herndon's direction and in the face of continued harassing from Japanese on the south flank, the

withdrawal had been completed without the

loss of a single man or piece of equipment.

Companies E, K, L, and M set up defenses

along the east bank of the Tirfoam, with

Company E echeloned slightly to the left

rear of the other three. Within the perimeter

were 3d Battalion headquarters, the Cannon

Company, and Company C, 27th Engineers, the latter about 900 yards east of the

Tirfoam. The rest of the 158th Infantry

maintained defenses back along the main

road to the mouth of the Tor, where were

located the 147th Field Artillery, Company

I, and various medical units.

At the Tirfoam Company E had not

completed digging in when it was subjected

to heavy mortar and machine gun fire.

The troops manned their weapons, but the

Japanese withdrew without attacking.

About midnight approximately fifty Japanese bypassed Company E and fell upon

Company C, 27th Engineers. Colonel Herndon's fears of attack along his line of communications had been well taken, for the

Right Sector Force had begun flanking

movements designed to recapture the entire

Maffin Bay area. However, the combat engineers quickly proved their versatility by

driving off the enemy force with rifle, carbine, and machine gun fire. Five of the engineers were killed. Enemy casualties could

not be estimated since the Japanese removed

their dead and wounded during the night.35

The remainder of the night was more

quiet, and the next morning the defenses

along the Tirfoam were improved. There

were a couple of minor attacks during the

afternoon and desultory rifle and 70-mm.

or 75-mm. artillery fire was directed against

all American units still west of the Tor. The

147th Field Artillery Battalion, withdrawing to the east bank of the Tor late in the

afternoon, was struck by some of this enemy

artillery fire and lost one man killed.36

31

 Ltr, Herndon to Ward, 23 Dec 50; Rad, TTF

to ALAMO, Y-601, 29 May 44, in TTF G-3 Jnl,

25-31 May 44; 158th Inf S-3 Opns Rpt 7, 29

May 44, in 158th Inf Jnl file, 9 May-21 Jun 44;

TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun 44,

p. 3. 32

 Ltr, Herndon to Ward, 23 Dec 50; 158th RCT

Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, p. 6. 33

 Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-601, 29 May 44, in

TTF G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44, copy also in ALAMO

Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 29-30 May 44. 34

 Ibid. Gen Krueger approved Gen Patrick's action in: Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to TTF, WH-234,

30 May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 29-30 May 44. At General Patrick's request,

no reclassification proceedings were carried through

against Colonel Herndon, who later received another responsible post of command in the theater.

See Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-745, 2 Jun 44, and

Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF-311,

2 Jun 44, both in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 1-3 Jun 44.

35

 158th Inf Jnl and Jnl file, 9 May-21 Jun 44;

2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), p. 22. 36

 Ibid.; 158th RCT Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi,

p. 7.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 253

LCM FERRY across mouth of Tor River, looking west.

Final Operations of the 158th Infantry

While the new line along the Tirfoam

was being developed on 30 May by the

158th Infantry, the 1st and 3d Battalions

of the 163d Infantry, together with regimental headquarters, departed for Biak.

The 2d Battalion remained on the west bank

of Tementoe Creek, which marked the eastern flank of the TORNADO Task Force, but it

and the rest of the 163d Regimental Combat Team were soon to follow the other

battalions. Through 30 May, after which

elements of the 163d Infantry engaged in

little activity in the area, the regiment had

lost 46 men killed and 154 wounded. Other

elements of the combat team lost 8 men

killed, 10 wounded, and 1 missing.37

Redispositions of the TORNADO

Task Force

Upon the departure of the 1st and 3d

Battalions, 163d Infantry, many changes

37

 163d Inf Jnl, 13-30 May 44; 163d Inf Casualty

Rpts, atchd to 163d Inf Opns Rpt Toem-Wakde.
254 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

MAP 12

Twenty-one separate perimeters were maintained by the TORNADO Task Force

along approximately twelve miles of coast line during the night of 30-31 May 1944.

The Yoshino Force fell upon the isolated antiaircraft gun positions.

were made in the dispositions of the TORNADO Task Force until, by the end of the

day, the task force was spread out over almost twelve miles of coast line between

Tementoe Creek and the Tirfoam River.

(Map 12) The 2d and 3d Battalions, 158th

Infantry, and other attached or organic

units held perimeters west of the Tor. Various field artillery units were emplaced at

the east side of the Tor's mouth. Task force

headquarters was at Arare, close to the principal supply and ammunition dumps, and

was protected by the 1st Battalion, 158th

Infantry. At no point did the lines of any

task force elements extend inland as much

as a mile from the beach.

At dusk there were twenty-one perimeters

of varying sizes, strengths, and distances

from each other. Antiaircraft units were

especially spread out in an effort to secure

the maximum possible protection against

low-flying Japanese planes. The 40-mm.

guns and some .50-caliber weapons of Batteries A and B, 202d Antiaircraft Artillery

Battalion, were strung out in beach emplacements between the Tor River and Tementoe

Creek. Between the task force headquarters

perimeter at Arare and the position of Headquarters, 191st Field Artillery Group, near

the mouth of the Tor, a distance of almost

5,000 yards, there were six separate antiaircraft gun emplacements. Only one of these
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 255

perimeters, that at the mouth of the Unnamed River west of Arare, contained other

than antiaircraft troops, and these were men

of the Cannon Company, 163d Infantry,

and Battery A, 167th Field Artillery Battalion. The fifteen other perimeters included

infantry positions or some engineer and

artillery posts which were over 2,000 yards

from the nearest infantry units. The perimeters east of the Tor were all-around defenses, and those west of the river were

oriented principally toward the west, where

most of the Japanese strength was apparently located.38

 These widespread dispositions presented the Japanese with an opportunity to destroy all or parts of the TORNADO

Task Force in detail.

Even while the 158th Infantry had been

engaged in heavy fighting around Lone Tree

Hill, the two arms of General Tagami's

planned double envelopment had been

slowly closing in on the Toem-Arare area.

Bypassing the 158th Infantry by moving

along routes up to four miles inland, the

Yoshino Force had crossed the Tor at the

junction of the river with the Foein on the

night of 25-26 May. On the 26th, leading

elements of the Matsuyama Force, advancing from the east, had moved into position

about two and a half miles south of Toem.

About 200 men of the Matsuyama Force

38 158th Inf Jnl, 9 May-21 Jun 44; TTF G-3

Jnl, 25-31 May 44; 158th RCT Opns Rpt SarmiWakde, p. 7; 167th FA Opns Rpt Wakde, p. 7.
256 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

had attacked the positions of the 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry, near Toem during the

night of 27-28 May and had killed two

Americans and wounded fourteen others.

Friendly fire during the confusion of the

night action killed four other American soldiers. The 1st Battalion killed about thirty

Japanese by rifle and machine gun fire and

hand grenades, and before dawn on the 28th

the enemy had withdrawn southeastward.39

It was this attack, coupled with a suspicion that such assaults might be repeated

in the near future, that had prompted General Patrick's 28 May request that the 163d

Regimental Combat Team be retained in

the Wakde area until a regiment of the 6th

Division arrived. But, despite the fact that

this request was disapproved and the bulk

of the 163d Infantry left his area on 30 May,

it appears that General Patrick was not

particularly alarmed about Japanese forces

on his south flank. He had halted the advance westward until the few Japanese he

believed to be on the south flank could be

dispersed, and he had brought one battalion

of the 158th Infantry east of the Tor to replace the two of the 163d Infantry which

had left for Biak. On 28 May General Patrick estimated Japanese strength in his area

to be 2,000-3,000 on the west flank, 300

east of Tementoe Creek, and 300 "in roving

bands" south of Toem and Arare.40

The TORNADO Task Force had underestimated the strength of Japanese forces in the

area. The figure for the number of enemy

east of Tementoe Creek was three or four

days old on 28 May and, apparently, had

been estimated on the basis of a single aerial

reconnaissance. Instead of roving bands

south of the Toem-Arare perimeter, there

were over 2,000 organized troops of the

Yoshino and Matsuyama Forces within

three miles of the coast at Toem. Total enemy strength in the Wakde-Sarmi area was

still over 8,000 men rather than the maximum of less than 4,000 estimated by the

TORNADO Task Force.41

American patrols found no signs of large,

organized enemy forces south of the central

perimeter for the two or three days following the attack during the night of 27-28

May, an attack which marked the beginning

of a series of minor assaults against the

Toem-Arare area. As a matter of fact, few

American patrols were sent out. On the

28th a party from Company F, 163d Infantry, moving about three quarters of a

mile up the east bank of Tementoe Creek,

found one small Japanese bivouac area. A

patrol of Company B, 163d Infantry, found

a recently cut trail 1,200 yards south of

Arare, but saw no Japanese. The next day

the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, sent two

patrols up and across Tementoe Creek, but

neither encountered any Japanese.

The only patrol which operated in the

area west of Tementoe Creek on the 29th

seems to have been sent out by the 218th

Field Artillery Battalion. This party moved

about 3,000 yards up the east bank of the

Tor past Maffin No. 2. Thence the patrol

marched overland back to its base, where it

reported that it had found no signs of enemy 39

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun

44, p. 3; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 14-16; 2d Army

Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 25-26. 40

 Rads, TTF to ALAMO, Y-542 and Y-573, 28

and 29 May, respectively, both in TTF G-3 Jnl,

25-31 May 44.

41

 The figures for the Japanese are the author's

estimates and are based on information from both

Allied and Japanese sources which were not then

available to the TORNADO Task Force.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 257

activity. There are no indications in the

TORNADO Task Force's records that any

American patrols were sent south in the area

between the Tor River and Tementoe Creek

on 30 May.42

Japanese Attacks East of the Tor

Gun position No. 6 of Battery B, 202d

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, was located

in an isolated perimeter on the beach about

900 yards west of Arare. The position was

approximately 500 yards distant from the

two nearest friendly units, both of which

were other isolated antiaircraft gun posts.

At 1830 on 30 May, No. 6 gun position

was attacked by a squad of Japanese infantrymen from the Yoshino Force. The antiaircraft artillerymen, after losing one man

killed, killing ten of the enemy, having their

.50-caliber machine guns jam, and running

out of rifle ammunition, retired to gun position No. 7 of Battery A, 500 yards to the

east. The latter position was attacked intermittently from 1840 to 0430, but the combined gunners of the two positions threw

back each assault with rifle and machine

gun fire. About 500 yards west of Battery

B's No. 6 position was situated Battery A's

No. 6. The latter perimeter was harassed by

mortar, rifle, and machine gun fire from

shortly after 1830 hours throughout the

night. It was attacked by Yoshino Force

troops at least twice, but the antiaircraft

gunners managed to drive the enemy back

each time. Gun position No. 8 of Battery B,

another 400 yards to the west, was also attacked about 1830. The .50-caliber multiple

machine gun in the position became overheated and jammed. The men in the position, running low on rifle ammunition,

scurried out of the gun pit and took cover

in the brush along the beach. Here they

stayed until the enemy withdrew at 0430.

In the action against the four gun positions, the Japanese captured one .50-caliber

machine gun, damaged a multiple .50-caliber mount and removed the gun barrels,

damaged two 40-mm. guns, and destroyed

miscellaneous electrical and communications equipment. Using the captured .50-

caliber machine gun to good advantage, the

enemy force which attacked Battery B's No.

6 position and A's No. 7 moved away from

those two gun pits toward the task force

supply dump and the perimeter of Company

B, 158th Infantry.43

One group from the Yoshino Force began

delivering machine gun and rifle fire on the

1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, about 1900,

and at 2200 the Yoshino Force launched a

furious, suicidal attack against Company B.

This assault continued until 0430, while the

Japanese tried to fire the task force supply

dumps with "Molotov Cocktails" and demolition charges and engaged in hand-tohand fighting with the men of Company B,

who used rifles, hand grenades, pistols,

knives, and bayonets to beat off the assault.

At 0430 the attack abated and the enemy

withdrew to the south. Total American

losses during the night action were twelve

42

 The foregoing information on patrol activity

is from: TTF G-2 Jnl, 25 May-3 Jun 44; TTF

G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44; 158th Inf Jnl, 9 May-21

Jun 44.

43

 Information concerning action against the antiaircraft units is taken from a file entitled: Correspondence, Wakde-Sarmi-Toem Task Force, in the

files of the AA Sec., Hq Sixth Army, in ORB RAC

AGO collection. Info about the Japanese side is

from Opns of Yuki Group, p. 16, and 2d Army Opns

at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), p. 26.
258 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

killed and ten wounded. At daylight fiftytwo dead Japanese were counted in front of

the antiaircraft and infantry positions.

There were signs that the enemy had carried away dead or wounded men and it

was therefore estimated that the Japanese

losses were much higher than those actually

counted.44

On the morning of 31 May the TORNADO

Task Force, in expectation of more night

attacks, set to work to strengthen the defenses between the Tor River and Tementoe

Creek and to reduce the number of separate

perimeters along the beach. This action was

given added impetus during the day by receipt of a message from ALAMO Force which

was interpreted to mean that the remainder

of the 163d Regimental Combat Team (the

2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, the 167th Field

Artillery, engineer units, etc.) was to be sent

to Biak immediately.45 General Patrick

thereupon ordered the elements of the 158th

Infantry still west of the Tor to withdraw to

the east side of that river and take over the

perimeters still held by parts of the 163d

Regimental Combat Team. A bridgehead

was to be maintained on the west bank of the

Tor, but the main task force perimeter was

to be reduced to the area between Tementoe

Creek and the Tor and no further offensive

efforts westward were to be undertaken until the arrival of a combat team from the 6th

Division.46

Colonel Sandlin, commanding the 158th

Infantry, was made responsible for setting

up the new task force defenses. He decided

to leave the 2d Battalion, 158th Infantry,

west of the Tor. The 3d Battalion, less Company K, was to move to Tementoe Creek to

relieve the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry,

while Company K was to reinforce the perimeter around the task force supply and

ammunition dumps at Arare. The total

number of separate perimeters was to be

drastically reduced and those left were to be

strengthened. All units assigned defensive

missions, especially the infantry elements,

were to undertake intensive patrolling south

of the Toem-Arare beachhead area.47

By nightfall redispositions had been completed. In contrast to the situation the previous night there were now only eight separate

perimeters. One, held by the 2d Battalion

(reinforced) of the 158th Infantry, was west

of the Tor. General Patrick decided to keep

the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, ashore during the night. Therefore, the 3d Battalion,

158th Infantry, did not move to Tementoe

Creek but remained on the east bank of the

Tor at the river's mouth. In the same perimeter were regimental headquarters and field

artillery, antiaircraft, and engineer units.

The next perimeter to the east was at the

mouth of the Unnamed River, west of Arare.

At the latter village and at Toem were

other defensive positions. Another large perimeter stretched back along the beach from

the mouth of Tementoe Creek. The antiaircraft gun positions, with but two exceptions, were well within the perimeters of

44

 1st Bn 158th Inf Jnl, 11 May-21 Jun 44; TTF

G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44. 45

 Rad, ALAMO to CRO GHQ SWPA (with info

copy to TTF), WF-6416, 31 May 44, in TTF G-3

Jnl, 25-31 May 44; TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi,

25 May-12 Jun 44, p. 3. 46

 Ltr Order, CG TTF to CO 158th Inf, 31 May

44, and Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-667, 31 May 44,

both in TTF G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44.

47

 Ltr, CO 158th Inf to CG TTF, 31 May 44, sub:

Plan for Defense of Beachhead between the Tor

and Tementoe Rivers, in TTF G-3 Jnl, 25-31

May 44.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 259

larger units and the two exceptions were

within 400 yards of supporting forces. The

precautions taken by Colonel Sandlin were

undoubtedly well advised, but in comparison with the previous night, the night of 31

May-1 June proved abnormally quiet.48

The Japanese Withdraw

On the morning of 1 June General Patrick was informed by ALAMO Force that the

2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, and the other

remaining elements of the 163d Regimental

Combat Team were not to leave for Biak

until a regimental combat team from the

6th Infantry Division arrived at Toem.

General Patrick, who by now considered

that the Japanese operations on the south

constituted a real threat to the TORNADO

Task Force, decided to make no major

changes in dispositions until the arrival of

the 6th Division unit. Instead, for the next

few days the task force further strengthened

its positions in expectation of strong Japanese attacks.

But the Yoshino and Matsuyama Forces

had already missed whatever chance they

may have had to destroy the TORNADO Task

Force in a piecemeal fashion. Apparently

neither Colonel Yoshino nor Colonel Matsuyama could co-ordinate operations of the

two arms of the double envelopment, and

because of communication and supply difficulties and the distance involved, General

Tagami, still ensconced in his command post

in the Mt. Saksin area, could exercise no

tactical control over the two forces, which

could organize no more effective attacks.

The Japanese, having suffered heavy losses

in vain, now decided that further efforts to

seize the Toem-Arare beachhead would be

futile.

On 10 June the Yoshino Force started

withdrawing southwest across the Tor to

take up new positions in the Maffin Bay

area. The Matsuyama Force, having difficulty reorganizing and collecting food, did

not begin retiring westward until two days

later. Meanwhile, the TORNADO Task Force

had settled down to await the arrival of a

combat team from the 6th Infantry Division

before resuming offensive operations.49

While enemy attacks east of the Tor gradually stopped after 1 June, many small attacks had to be beaten back west of the

river at the bridgehead held to 3 June by

the 2d Battalion, 158th Infantry, and after

that by the 3d Battalion. During the first

week in June, all elements of the TORNADO

Task Force undertook extensive patrolling

which was productive of definite evidence

that the entire 223d Infantry, 36th Division,

was in the Sarmi area.

Prior to the landings near Wakde on 17

May, the Allies had believed that only parts

of the 223d and 224th Infantry Regiments

were stationed in the Sarmi area, but shortly

after D Day all three battalions of the 224th

Infantry had been accounted for. On the

basis of this information and the discovery

during the first week of June that the entire

223d Infantry was also in the area, Allied

intelligence officers raised their preassault

estimates of Japanese strength from 6,500

men to 10,776—the latter estimate being

remarkably close to the Japanese figure of

11,000. The Allies believed that of the original 10,000-odd less than 4,750 Japanese,

including 3,500 combat troops, were still

48

 TTF Maps and Overlays, 25 May-12 Jun 44;

TTF G-3 Jnl, 25-31 May 44; 158th Inf Jnl, 9

May-21 Jun 44.

49

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun

44, p. 4; TTF G-3 Jnls, 25-31 May and 1-12 Jun

44; 158th Inf Jnl, 9 May-21 Jun 44; Opns of

Yuki Group, pp. 16-18; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi

and Biak (Rev), pp. 25-29.
260 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

alive by the end of the week. According to

Japanese sources, this estimate was low and

should have read a total of 8,000 men and

over 4,000 combat troops.50

The Relief of the 158th Infantry

General Patrick now believed, as Colonel

Herndon had previously, that the enemy

would maintain a strong defense against any

new offensive westward from the Tor and

considered it probable that resistance would

center in the Lone Tree Hill area. He had

already made plans to bypass that area by

a shore-to-shore movement to Sarmi Peninsula, whence Lone Tree Hill could be attacked from the rear. This plan had been

temporarily abandoned when the 163d Infantry left for Biak Island and the Japanese

started their attacks east of the Tor. However, the new strength estimates, coupled

with his belief that Lone Tree Hill and Hill

225 would be strongly held, prompted General Patrick to revive the bypassing plan.

The imminent arrival of reinforcements

from the 6th Division would, he thought,

provide the troop strength necessary to carry

out the maneuver.

The TORNADO Task Force commander

planned to send one battalion to Sarmi Peninsula on 9 June and another the following

day. Scouts had already landed on the peninsula and had reported it undefended. It

therefore seemed possible that the proposed

movement would meet with no opposition.

Once the peninsula had been secured, the

two battalions (both of which were to be

from the 6th Division) were to move southeast down the coast ten miles to Lone Tree

Hill. This movement was to be co-ordinated

with a simultaneous drive westward from

the Tor River by the 158th Infantry.51

Again the shore-to-shore movement had

to be postponed when it was discovered that

necessary naval support vessels could not be

made available because they were engaged

in operations off Biak Island, 200 miles to

the northwest. Then, when the 6th Division

began to reach Toem on 5 June, that division's commander requested that none of

his troops be employed offensively until at

least two regimental combat teams were

ashore and his men could become acquainted with the terrain and situation in

the area. Finally, landing craft to be used

in the bypassing maneuver had to be used

to unload the large ships which brought the

6th Division to Toem.52 The first units of the

6th Division to arrive in the Wakde-Sarmi

area were the 1st Infantry Regiment and the

6th Engineer Battalion (C). The 1st Infantry immediately relieved that part of the

158th Infantry which was holding the

Toem-Arare beachhead perimeter.

General Patrick, although he had canceled the amphibious movement to Sarmi

Peninsula, now decided to resume the advance westward with the 158th Infantry

moving overland from the Tor. This attack

was to begin on the morning of 7 June. The

first regimental objective was the Lone Tree

50

 TTF G-3 Jnl, 1-12 Jun 44; ALAMO G-2 Wkly

Rpts, 44, 7 Jun, and 45, 14 Jun 44, copies in G-2

DofA files; Opns of Yuki Group, p. 13; Hist of 2d

Area Army, pp. 55-58; 2d Army Opns, pp. 2-6.

51

 TTF Rpt, Wakde-Sarmi, 25 May-12 Jun 44,

p. 9; Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-817, 3 Jun 44, in TTF

G-3 Jnl, 1-12 Jun 44. 52

 Ibid.; Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to TTF, WH-123,

4 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

3-4 Jun 44; Rads, TTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, Y-1116

and Y-1117, 11 Jun 44, in TTF G-3 Jnl, 1-12

Jun 44.
LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 261

Hill-Hill 225 area, and the final objective

was the Woske River, as it had been on 25

May.53

The 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, crossed

the Tor on 6 June and relieved the 3d Battalion, which moved back to the east bank,

and the 2d Battalion joined the 1st on the

next day. The enemy west of the Tor remained inactive on 7 June while the 1st

and 2d Battalions patrolled toward Maffin

No. 1 and made preparations to move westward in force the next morning. The 1st

Battalion was to advance along the coastal

road while the 2d, on the left, was to push

cross-country in a deep enveloping maneuver south of the beach. The advance was to

be cautious, and the progress of the 1st

Battalion was to depend upon that of the 2d.

All units were to halt at 1600 each day to

begin organizing night defensive positions.54

Both the 1st and 2d Battalions, 158th

Infantry, jumped off in the attack at 0830

hours, 8 June.55 The advance was supported

by a platoon of the 603d Tank Company

and was preceded by a brief concentration

fired by the 167th Field Artillery. During

most of the morning there was little opposition. About 1100, however, enemy rifle

and machine gun fire began forcing the 2d

Battalion back toward the main road, and

Company E, south of the main body of the

battalion, lost contact with the rest of the

attacking force for two or three hours.

After 1200, resistance also began to stiffen

on the 1st Battalion's front. The attack

bogged down at a line of bunkers and pillboxes which guarded the coastal road just

west of the small lakes 1,500 yards east of the

Tirfoam. These defensive positions had been

constructed, repaired, or reoccupied since

the last time the 158th Infantry had covered

the same terrain. Tank support was requested. Two tanks arrived at the front late

in the afternoon and soon reduced the pillboxes, but by the time this mission had been

accomplished, it was time to start digging in

for the night. The 1st Battalion set up its defenses along the line of destroyed positions

and extended its perimeter from the road

north to the beach. The 2d Battalion, reassembled on the road by 1600, refused the

south flank. Casualties during the day had

been 4 men killed and 13 wounded, while

27 Japanese had been killed and 1 captured.

A quantity of enemy arms and ammunition

had also been seized.

The night passed without incident and

early on 9 June patrols began to probe westward toward the Tirfoam. Scouts reported

that the Japanese were holding another defense line, including reoccupied bunkers, on

a slight rise at the west bank of the river.

About 1000 hours, tank-infantry teams began to destroy the Japanese-held positions

along the new line. While tank 75-mm. fire

was destroying bunkers or forcing the Japanese to seek cover, infantrymen crept forward to toss grenades into bunker gun ports

or shoot down Japanese who tried to escape

from the area. While these tank-infantry

team operations were taking place, the rest

of the two infantry battalions rested. Japanese 75-mm. fire, from a weapon emplaced

on the beach between the Snaky River and

53

 1st Inf S-3 Per Rpt 1, 5 Jun 44, in TTF G-3

Jnl, 1-12 Jun 44; Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-911, 6

Jun 44, in TTF G-2 Jnl, 1-12 Jun 44; TTF FO 3,

6 Jun 44, filed in TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 25

May-12 Jun 44. 54

 TTF FO 3, 6 Jun 44; 1st Bn 158 Inf Jnl, 11

May-21 Jun 44; 158th Inf Jnl, 9 May-21 Jun 44;

158th RCT Opns Rpt Sarmi-Wakde, 11 May-21

Jun 44, p. 9. 55

 Information in the remainder of this section is

from: 1st Bn 158th Inf Jnl, 11 May-21 Jun 44; 2d

Bn 158th Inf Jnl, 9 May-21 Jun 44; TTF G-3 Jnl,

1-12 Jun 44; 158th Inf Jnl, 9 May-21 Jun 44; 158th

RCT Opns Rpt Sarmi-Wakde, pp. 9-10; 2d Army

Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 23-24.
262 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Lone Tree Hill, harassed the 1st Battalion

for a while, but this fire was summarily

stopped when a 155-mm. howitzer of the

218th Field Artillery Battalion scored a direct hit on the enemy piece.

By 1130 the enemy defensive positions

had been cleaned out and the 1st and 2d

Battalions resumed the advance westward.

Aided by fire from the 147th Field Artillery,

which had supplanted the 167th in the close

support role, the two infantry units probed

cautiously forward, and it was not until

1530 that both reached the east bank of the

Tirfoam. Opposition was scattered, but the

American units lost 6 men killed and 6

wounded. It was estimated that 50 of the

enemy had been killed and one was

captured.

Undoubtedly the 158th Infantry could

have crossed the Tirfoam River during the

afternoon, but, late in the morning, the

unit's mission had been changed as a result

of new orders from General Krueger, who

planned to employ the 158th Infantry for

an assault on Noemfoor Island, 300 miles

northwest of Sarmi, in late June or early

July. It was necessary that the unit be prepared to move from Wakde-Sarmi on short

notice and General Krueger ordered General Patrick not to involve it deeply in offensive operations. Advances west of the

Tirfoam had therefore been postponed until

a second combat team of the 6th Division

could arrive in the area to relieve the 158th

Infantry.

On 10 and 11 June the 158th Infantry

limited its activities to patrolling, consolidating defensive positions, and driving

Japanese outposts westward. One outpost,

lying southeast of the 2d Battalion, was

manned by about a hundred Japanese and

had to be cleared by tank fire and infantry

assault. The Japanese, who were members

of a 223d Infantry company assigned to the

Right Sector Force, fled toward Mt. Saksin,

leaving behind 4 heavy machine guns, 1

light machine gun, 2 70-mm. howitzers, and

1 37-mm. antitank gun. Patrolling after the

11th was productive of one strange piece of

enemy equipment—a pair of Japanese ice

skates.

On 14 June the 20th Infantry, 6th Division, relieved the 158th Infantry at the Tirfoam. The 158th recrossed the Tor and

went into a defensive perimeter on the west

bank of Tementoe Creek. Patrols sent south

and east during the next week encountered

a few stragglers from the Japanese garrison

at Hollandia or from the Matsuyama Force.

On the 22d the entire regimental combat

team was relieved of all combat responsibility in the Wakde-Sarmi area and began

final preparations for the Noemfoor Island

operation.

During its operations in the Wakde-Sarmi

area the 158th Regimental Combat Team

lost 70 men killed, 257 wounded, and 4

missing. The unit took 11 Japanese prisoners

and estimated that it killed 920 of the enemy.
CHAPTER XI

Lone Tree Hill and Beyond

The 6th Division's 20th Infantry, together with the 6th Medical Battalion, the

1st and 51st Field Artillery Battalions, and

miscellaneous other division units arrived at

Toem on 11 June. The 1st Infantry and the

6th Engineers were already in the area and

the rest of the division, including the 63d Infantry and the 80th Field Artillery Battalion, began unloading on 14 June. With the

11 June convoy had come the division commander, Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, and

his headquarters. Under General Sibert's

command the TORNADO Task Force was to

continue the drive westward toward Sarmi.

The capture of Sarmi and the destruction of

Japanese forces west of the Tor River were

to be accomplished rapidly, for plans were

already being made by ALAMO Force to employ the 6th Division in another operation

which, scheduled for late July, involved seizure of an air-base site on the northwestern

tip of the Vogelkop Peninsula.1

The 6th Division Against Lone Tree Hill

General Sibert assumed command of the

TORNADO Task Force on 12 June.2 His first

problem was to get the various units of the

6th Division unloaded. The division had

been hastily and unsystematically loaded at

Milne Bay, in eastern New Guinea, because

the ships which were to carry it to Toem arrived at Milne Bay so late that comprehensive loading plans could neither be made nor

executed. Moreover, the Toem beaches were

mediocre, unloading and storing facilities

inadequate, and lighterage was insufficient.

Unloading therefore proceeded very slowly,

and the 20th Infantry had to borrow many

crew-served weapons from the 158th Infantry before it could relieve the latter unit at

the Tirfoam.3

The Objective

General Sibert believed that it would be

tactically and logistically unsound for his

division to engage in offensive action until

all its units were unloaded, settled, and acquainted with the combat area. Therefore

he planned to have the 1st Infantry mop up

south of Toem and Arare until unloading

1

 TTF G-3 Jnl, 1-12 Jun 44; Ltr, OI, Comdr

ALAMO Force to CG 6th Inf Div, 10 Jun 44, in

ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 10-11 Jun

44; Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF3060, 15 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 15-16 Jun 44. 2

 On the same date Headquarters, 6th Infantry Division, began operating as Headquarters, TORNADO

Task Force, in place of Headquarters, 158th Regimental Combat Team, which had held that role

since it, in turn, had replaced Headquarters, 163d

Regimental Combat Team, on 25 May. 3

 Rad, TTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, Y-1117, 11 Jun

44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 11-13

Jun 44; Ltr, Gen Sibert to Gen Krueger, 18 Jun 44,

in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-31

Jul 44. While in command of the TORNADO Task

Force, General Sibert wrote almost daily personal

letters to General Krueger.
264 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

was complete, and he instructed the 20th

Infantry to limit its action to sending patrols west of the Tirfoam to locate enemy

defenses. After the 20th received its own

equipment, it would push westward in conjunction with a series of battalion shore-toshore movements along the coast toward

Sarmi. General Sibert's staff estimated that

unloading, mopping up, and patrolling

would be completed in time for the 20th

Infantry to begin a major offensive on 1

July. 4

General Krueger would not sanction such

a delay in initiating an advance westward.

Surf, beach, and terrain conditions in the

Toem-Arare area had proved unsatisfactory for the establishment of a staging base,

but it was known that the shore of Maffin

Bay afforded better conditions. General

Krueger realized that quick control over the

Maffin Bay area was necessary if the theater

were to make any use of the Wakde-Sarmi

region as a staging base. On 18 June he

therefore ordered General Sibert to start an

immediate offensive, and the latter accordingly changed his plans.

The 1st Infantry was instructed to relieve

20th Infantry elements at the Tor bridgehead, and the 20th Infantry was directed to

concentrate at the Tirfoam in time to attack

westward on 20 June. The initial objective

was the Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225 area, but

the advance was to continue until all Japanese in the coastal area between the Tirfoam

and Sarmi town had been destroyed or dispersed inland.5

The 158th Infantry had spent but four

days in the vicinity of Lone Tree Hill and

had not been able to explore the terrain

thoroughly.6

 Such information as the regiment had acquired was turned over to the

6th Infantry Division but proved sketchy

and not altogether accurate. Beginning on

21 June, the 20th Infantry was to gain a

new and more detailed picture of the Lone

Tree Hill area.

At the top of Lone Tree Hill was a stretch

of rough but generally level ground lying

mostly along the western part of the hill.

This flat ground, about 700 yards long north

to south, was shaped like a crude dumbbell.

At its northern end, the level area was about

300 yards wide. It narrowed at the center

of the hill to less than 100 yards but broadened again on the south to a width of about

250 yards. There were many coral outcroppings, potholes, and small crevices, while on

the north the hill terminated in a very rugged

prominence called Rocky Point. This terrain feature, which extended into Maffin

Bay from the central mass of Lone Tree Hill,

was about 300 yards wide east to west. Its

northern face was not as heavily overgrown

4

 Rads, TTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, Y-1116 and Y1117, 11 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 11-13 Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO

Adv Hq, WF-3060, 15 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 15-16 Jun 44. 5

 Rad, ALAMO to TTF, WH-3478, 18 Jun 44, in

TTF G-2 Jnl, 12-23 Jun 44; Ltr, Sibert to Krueger,

18 Jun 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 27-31 Jul 44; Rad, TTF to ALAMO, Y-1268,

18 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 18-19 Jun 44; TTF FO 7, 18 Jun 44, in TTF,

FO's and Daily Opnl Orders, 13 Jun-18 Jul 44;

TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44,

p. 10. 6

 Terrain information in the rest of this section is

compiled from: TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 12

Jun-18 Jul 44, pp. 2-4; Sketches in TTF Opns Rpt

Wakde-Sarmi, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44; Ltrs, Sibert to

Krueger, 18 and 26 Jun 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-31 Jul 44; Ltrs and atchd

sketches, Sibert to Krueger, 27, 28, and 29 Jun 44,

in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 17-20

Jul 44; G-2 TTF, Rpt to Comdr TTF, 26 Jun 44, in

ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-31 Jul

44; Rad, TTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, no number, 26

Jun 44, in TTF G-2 Jnl, 24 Jun-2 Jul 44. The past

tense is used in the description because the terrain

was extensively changed by air, naval, and artillery

bombardment and by engineer demolitions and construction.
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 265

as the rest of Lone Tree Hill. Although

Rocky Point's northeast slope was steep,

foot troops could climb that face with more

ease than they could approach the top of

Lone Tree Hill from most other points.

A deep ravine ran southwest into the central mass of Lone Tree Hill from a sandy

beach on the east side of Rocky Point. The

floor of the ravine varied from 20 to 30

yards in width and its nearly vertical western

wall was 40 to 50 feet high. Both sides were

honeycombed with natural or man-made

tunnels, caverns, and small caves, most of

which were connected with each other by

underground or deeply defiladed passages.

Some caves reached a width of 40 feet, a

depth into the hillside of 50 feet, and a

height of 20 feet. The ravine terminated on

the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill in a

steep grade at the narrow central portion of

the hilltop.

East of the ravine and extending to the

west bank of the Snaky was an oval-shaped,

low, and generally flat shelf about 250 yards

wide east to west and almost 450 yards long.

Its eastern and northern sides lay about 20

feet above the surrounding sea-level plain.

The approaches from the beach or the

Snaky River were very steep and in places

were sheer, low cliffs. On its southwestern

side the shelf led to precipitous grades

reaching to the top of Lone Tree Hill. South

of the narrow section of the hilltop plateau

these grades flattened into a wide draw with

gradual slopes.

West of Rocky Point was a beach not

more than twenty feet deep, behind which

was a vertical rock and clay ledge varying

from three to five feet in height. Between the

ledge and the western face of Lone Tree Hill

was a heavily forested swampy area extending more than 300 yards inland. The western face of the hill was an almost vertical

cliff, 60 to 80 feet high, and was rock-faced

but covered with heavy jungle undergrowth.

The steepest part, about 700 yards long,

gave way at the southwest corner of Lone

Tree Hill to less precipitous heavily forested slopes extending through the defile

between Lone Tree Hill and Hill 225.

Lone Tree Hill contained a veritable

maze of Japanese defenses. There were

many caves and bunkers on the western

cliff—positions which were hidden from

ground observers by tall trees or undergrowth on the cliff face. There were also a

few pillboxes or bunkers in the swampy area

between the cliff and the beach west of

Rocky Point. Two 75-mm. field pieces, defiladed by rocky outcroppings, were emplaced by the enemy on this beach. On the

face of Rocky Point and on the rocky shore

below were other defensive positions and at

least one other artillery piece. In the ravine

east of Rocky Point were five 75-mm. mountain guns hidden in various caves or crevices. Although none of these guns could be

traversed, they were so emplaced that they

covered most of the northwestern, northern,

and northeastern land and sea approaches

to Lone Tree Hill.

On the hilltop plateau Japanese defensive

positions included log and earth dugouts

which, presenting low silhouettes and covered with undergrowth, were very difficult

to locate. Atop the hill rough holes were also

dug under or between the roots of large

trees. Some of these defenses were arranged

in lines across the ravine and wide draw

leading to the hilltop from the northeast and

east, respectively. One of the most troublesome installations was a Japanese observation post at the northern part of the hilltop

plateau. This post, about one hundred feet

off the ground in the branches of a huge

tree, was sturdily constructed and cleverly
266 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

camouflaged. It had withstood air, naval,

and artillery bombardments aimed at Lone

Tree Hill prior to 20 June. From the post

the Japanese could observe movements

along the main road to the east of Lone Tree

Hill, the entire beach area from Sarmi to

Arare, and maneuvers on most of the hill

itself.

Information available to the TORNADO

Task Force on 20 June indicated that Lone

Tree Hill was defended by 700 to 800 Japanese. Most of these troops were believed to

be members of the 3d Battalion, 224th Infantry, plus a few men and weapons of 36th

Division artillery—75-mm. mountain guns.7

The strength estimate was reasonably accurate—there were actually near 850 Japanese

on the hill—but it did not take into account

the Japanese south of Lone Tree Hill on Hill

225 and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin, from

which enemy troops could move rapidly to

reinforce Lone Tree Hill and from which

they could defend the southern approaches

to that hill. Moreover, there were elements

of many more 36th Division units in the

immediate Lone Tree Hill area. (Map V)

Command in the area was exercised by

Headquarters, Right Sector Force, now

under Colonel Matsuyama of the 224th Infantry who, as his regiment arrived west of

the Tor, took over the sector command from

Major Matsuoka. By 20 June the troops on

Lone Tree Hill proper comprised the 1st

Battalion, 224th Infantry, less one company; the remnants of Captain Saito's 300-

man company of 3d Battalion, 224th

Infantry, riflemen and 36th Division artillerymen (Captain Saito had long since been

killed); probably a company from the 3d

Battalion, 223d Infantry; elements of the

16th Field Airdrome Construction Unit;

36th Division artillery weapons and crews;

and, finally, a few men of antiaircraft and

service units who had been armed as auxiliary infantry. South of Lone Tree Hill, on

Hill 225 and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin,

were emplaced most of the rest of the 224th

Infantry, the bulk of the 16th Field Airdrome Construction Unit, probably another

company of the 223d Infantry, and an antiaircraft battery converted to infantry. The

total Japanese strength in the Lone Tree

Hill-Hill 225-eastern nose area was probably at least 1,800 men. The 1st Company,

224th Infantry, down to about 30 men, was

initially left east of the Tor to conduct reconnaissance and guerrilla warfare around

the TORNADO Task Force beach positions,

but moved across the river some time after

20 June to rejoin the rest of the Right Sector

Force. Two companies of the 2d Battalion,

224th Infantry, were between the Tirfoam

and the Tor, with instructions to harass the

Allied line of communications along the

coastal road west from the Tor.

About the same time that Colonel Matsuyama assumed command of the Right

Sector Force, the Yoshino Force and the

new Yuki Group were apparently disbanded

as such and combined to form a new Central Sector Force under Colonel Yoshino,

the commander of the 223d Infantry.

Colonel Yoshino's new sector ran west from

the west side of Lone Tree Hill to the old

western boundary at Sawar Creek, where

the Left Sector Force, still under General

Yamada, took up. Except for the one or two

companies assigned to the Right Sector

Force, Colonel Yoshino's entire 223d Infantry was assigned to the Central Sector

Force. Also under his command were various artillery, antiaircraft, and service units,

7

 Rad, TTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, Y-1268, 18 Jun

44, in TTF G-2 Jnl, 12-23 Jun 44.
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 267

including whatever was left of the 103d

Field Airdrome Construction Unit. The

remnants of the 51st Field Road Construction Unit, formerly attached to the 224th

Infantry, were sent to the area of the Left

Sector Force. The bulk of Colonel Yoshino's

troops were on the western slopes of Mt.

Saksin, although some were in defensive

positions along the coast immediately west

of Lone Tree Hill. The strength of the force

was about 2,000 men.8

To the Top of Lone Tree Hill

The attack west from the Tirfoam River

jumped off on schedule at 0800 on 20 June.

The 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved

along the main coastal road. The 3d Battalion followed closely, while the 2d remained in reserve at Maffin No. 1. Shortly

after 1200 the 1st Battalion, having encountered no opposition, reached the Snaky

River. Company B pushed on toward the

village at the entrance to the defile between

Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mt.

Saksin. This advance was greeted by a hail

of fire from Japanese automatic weapons

emplaced in the defile—fire reminiscent of

the opposition encountered by Company B,

158th Infantry, at the same place more than

three weeks earlier.9

The 20th Infantry's Company B tried to

outflank the enemy position to the south but

was halted by intense Japanese machine gun

fire. Tanks sent forward to aid the infantry

were unable to reach the enemy guns because the terrain was impassable to tracked

or wheeled vehicles, which could scarcely

negotiate the rough road, let alone the thick

jungle and rising ground to the south. Late

in the afternoon Company A was sent forward to Company B's position, but both

units encountered heavy fire and soon lost

contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion.

The two companies remained for the night

in an isolated perimeter near the village and

about 400 yards west of the main body.

The 3d Battalion had moved north off the

coastal road during the morning, and late in

the afternoon it had established a perimeter

extending south 200 yards from the beach

along the east bank of the Snaky River. The

battalion had encountered little opposition

during the day, but patrols which had

crossed the Snaky before dark reported finding many Japanese defensive positions on

the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. A gap

which existed between the 1st and 3d Battalions was partially filled just before nightfall by elements of the 2d Battalion, which

were sent forward late in the afternoon. Casualties during the day were four killed and

twenty-eight wounded.

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Infantry,

moved across the Tor River in the morning

of 20 June and took over the positions in

the vicinity of Maffin No. 1 vacated by the

20th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, assumed responsibility for the protection

of the bridgehead across the Tor. The regiment was to remain east of the Tirfoam in

reserve on 21 June while the 20th Infantry

moved on against Lone Tree Hill.10

Operations of the 20th Infantry during

the morning of 21 June consisted principally

of patrolling designed to locate enemy strong

points on and around Lone Tree Hill.11 The

8

 Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 16-18; 2d Army Opns,

pp. 3-6; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev),

p. 30 and Sketch 11. 9

 20th Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 14 Jun-16 Aug 44; TTF

G-3 Jnl, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44.

10

 Ibid.; 1st Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 11 Jun-16 Jul 44. 11

 Information in the rest of this section is from:

Ltr, Sibert to Krueger, 23 Jun 44, in ALAMO Rear

Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-31 Jul 44; TTF G-2

Jnl, 12-23 Jun 44; TTF G-3 Jnl, 12 Jun-18 Jul

44; 1st Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 11 Jun-16 Jul 44; 20th
268 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

1st and 3d Battalions undertook most of

this scouting while the remainder of the 2d

Battalion, together with the regimental Antitank Company, closed up on the 1st. Companies A and B moved south of the main

road through the defile toward Hill 225,

and both units encountered strong opposition. By the end of the day the 1st Battalion's

positions were essentially the same as they

had been in the morning, except that Company B was south of the road and about 600

yards distant from the rest of the battalion.

The battalion's mission was primarily defensive: to probe Japanese defenses on the

southern side of Lone Tree Hill and protect

the south flank of the 2d and 3d Battalions

as the latter units assaulted the hill.

Patrols of the 3d Battalion reached the

northeast face of Lone Tree Hill during the

morning and observed enemy activity on the

rough beach below Rocky Point. Other patrols, working toward the eastern slopes of

the hill, brought back negative reports which

contradicted those obtained at dusk the previous afternoon. However, as a result of

these negative reports, it was decided that

the 3d Battalion should attack in force during the afternoon. At 1345, after a fifteenminute artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparation, one company moved across the

Snaky River, immediately finding the

twenty-foot cliff along the eastern side of

the shelf which lay between the Snaky River

and the central mass of Lone Tree Hill. The

morning patrols had not, apparently, reported the existence of this cliff, and naturally it was not known that Japanese defenses were established along it. Machine

gun and rifle fire from the 1st Battalion,

224th Infantry, soon pinned down the 3d

Battalion's leading platoon.

The company commander quickly sent

part of his unit northward to find the Japanese left flank. Moving around the northeast

end of the shelf, this group discovered the

beach entrance to the deep ravine between

the western side of the shelf and Rocky

Point. Progress into or across the ravine was

impossible in the face of the intense Japanese small arms fire which greeted the advancing American unit. Company B, 6th

Engineers, then in the forward area to cut

a road from the mouth of the Snaky River

to Rocky Point, was brought up to the ravine

to help clean out caves and crevices with

flame throwers and demolitions, but could

not reach the enemy positions through the

continued machine gun, mortar, and rifle

fire. Infantry bazooka squads also tried to

blast the Japanese out of their caves but

failed when their ammunition ran out. Since

there was no time to bring additional rockets forward before dark, all elements of the

3d Battalion and the engineer company

were withdrawn to the east bank of the

Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the assault on the morrow with the 3d Battalion moving against

Lone Tree Hill from the northeast, the 2d

Battalion in reserve, and the 1st Battalion

remaining in its holding position.

American casualties during the day were

two men killed and twenty-four wounded.

Initially it was thought that some of these

casualties had been caused by friendly mortar fire covering the 3d Battalion's patrolling. Later investigation proved, however,

that the losses had been caused by enemy

fire. Japanese artillery and mortars usually

remained silent throughout the fighting on

Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 14 Jun-16 Aug 44; TTF Opns

Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44, pp. 5-6; 6th

Inf Div Arty Opns Rpt Sarmi-Maffin Bay, 11 Jun17 Jul 44, pp. 3-4; 20th Inf, The Battle of Lone

Tree Hill, n. d., copy in OCMH files. Enemy information is from 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak

(Rev), pp. 30-31.
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 269

Lone Tree Hill except when American mortars and artillery began firing. The psychological effect of this trick on the troops of the

6th Division was obvious, and for a long

while they thought that part of their losses

resulted from friendly fire. It is probable

that many Japanese were killed during the

day but, because of the confused nature of

the fighting along the cliff on the eastern

shelf and in the ravine, the 3d Battalion

could attempt no estimate of Japanese losses

in its zone. The 1st Battalion estimated that

its patrols south of Lone Tree Hill had killed

about thirty-five of the enemy.

Task force artillery and the 20th Infantry's 81-mm. mortars fired on Lone Tree

Hill intermittently throughout the night,

concentrating on the Rocky Point area.

Operations on 22 June started at 0800 when

eighteen Wakde-based P-47's strafed Lone

Tree Hill, dropped full belly tanks, and set

them afire. The air action, which ceased at

0820, was followed by an intense artillery

concentration, of ten minutes' duration,

fired by two 105-mm. and one 155-mm.

howitzer battalions. The artillery sent 720

rounds of 105-mm. ammunition and 360

rounds of 155-mm. shells into an area 400

yards wide and 600 long on the northeast

side of the hill.

Infantry action started about 0830 with

Company K, two platoons abreast, leading

the advance and Company I following close

behind. Company K approached the hill

from the northeast and from a point on the

beach just west of the deep ravine. Only

scattered rifle fire marked the first part of

the ascent, for the Japanese were stunned

by the weight of the preparatory air and

artillery fire. About 1115 the advance platoons had to seek cover from enemy light

mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire, most

of which seemed to originate in caves and

crevices along the sides of the ravine. Company I, which had been waiting in reserve

on the beach, was now dispatched up the

hill to reinforce Company K. The combined

fire power of the two units was sufficient to

drive the Japanese back into their caves,

and the assault companies reached the top

of Lone Tree Hill just south of Rocky Point

at 1240.

Company L, about 0930, had begun an

attempt to reach the top of the hill from

the southeast corner. The company passed

through 1st Battalion units near the village

at the entrance to the defile and pushed

northwestward. Japanese infantrymen were

seen moving about near the village, and

Company M's 81-mm. mortars were called

upon to protect Company L's rear by lobbing shells into the hamlet. Four tanks were

also brought forward along the main road

to aid in clearing the village and the ground

between the settlement and Company L.

Since marshy terrain and heavy undergrowth prevented the tanks from accomplishing their mission, Company F was

called forward and attached to Company

L to protect the latter's flanks and rear.

Together the two companies tried to force

their way up the southeast slope of Lone

Tree Hill, but they were subjected to intense

machine gun and rifle fire from the northwest, west, and southwest. The two units

thereupon withdrew from that face, moved

back to the eastern edge of the oval shelf,

and marched north to the point at which

Companies K and I had started up the hill.

Company F followed K's route to the hilltop,

meeting little opposition on the way. Company L pushed across the ravine about 200

yards south of F's line of march and, since

the Japanese remained hidden in the ravine's many caves, had little difficulty reaching the top of the hill. By 1500 Companies
270 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

F, I, K, L, and part of Company M had

established a common perimeter near the

north end of the hilltop.

The 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, relieved

during the morning by the 2d Battalion of

the 1st Infantry, had been sent forward

about 1400 to complete the occupation of

Lone Tree Hill. Following the route employed by Companies F and L in the forenoon, the battalion (less Company F)

moved across the southern end of the shelf

and along the southeastern slope. Advancing

cautiously through heavily forested, tangled

terrain, at 1700 the battalion reached the

head of the wide draw which led to the narrow central part of the hilltop. Little opposition was encountered and the battalion

moved up the hill and along the hill crest to

a point about 400 yards south of the 3d Battalion. Increasingly strong enemy opposition

made it impossible to close the gap between

the two before dark. Hasty positions were

set up for the night defenses.

Despite the fact that part of Company K

had been temporarily pinned down by enemy fire during the morning, neither that

unit nor Company I had had any real difficulty reaching the top of Lone Tree Hill.

Companies F and L, after they had changed

their direction of attack, had also made

their way to the top against negligible opposition, and the 2d Battalion had been delayed more by the terrain than by enemy

action. For the second day in succession the

task force commander had reason to believe

that the Lone Tree Hill area was not

strongly held, and he expected that the hill

would be secured shortly.

The 3d Battalion, during the afternoon,

found indications that the Japanese had

other plans. The battalion perimeter was

within sight of the enemy's observation post,

which was almost continuously manned

although four or five Japanese were shot

out of it in the course of the afternoon. So

close was the observation post to the 3d

Battalion's perimeter that friendly artillery

was unable to fire on it, but well-directed

enemy artillery fire, which harassed the 20th

Infantry's rear installations, indicated that

the Japanese were putting their observers to

good use. There was also some reason to

suspect that the many caves and crevices

along the ravine and Rocky Point contained

numerous enemy troops who had apparently

deliberately permitted the 3d Battalion to

reach the top of the hill without offering

serious battle.

The suspicion proved well founded.

About 1730 approximately two companies

of Japanese, under the personal leadership

of Colonel Matsuyama, poured out of

hidden positions on Rocky Point or in the

ravine and fell upon the 3d Battalion's

perimeter with suicidal fury. Confused fighting, sometimes hand-to-hand, continued

well into the night, until it was thought that

every Japanese soldier in the northern section of Lone Tree Hill must have been killed.

Although the 2d Battalion's positions were

not attacked, the unit could not move to

the 3d Battalion's aid. Such a maneuver

would have been foolhardy in the darkness

and tangled undergrowth, and the 2d soon

found that it, too, was surrounded. Thus,

by 2400, the Japanese had completely reversed the tactical situation atop Lone Tree

Hill. Early in the afternoon the 20th Infantry had been at the Japanese rear. Now

the enemy was at the 20th Infantry's rear,

had isolated both the 2d and 3d Battalions

of that regiment, and had cut all lines of

communication to the base of the hill.

Casualties on the 22d could not be

counted because of the confusion resulting

from the night attack. However, it was esti-
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 271

mated that about 30 Americans had been

killed and another 100 wounded, most of

them in the 3d Battalion, before the enemy

attack waned at midnight. There were but

40 known Japanese dead, the majority of

whom had been counted by 1st Battalion

patrols on the southern side of Lone Tree

Hill. The number of the enemy killed by the

3d Battalion after 1730 could not be estimated, but it is known that Colonel Matsuyama was wounded during the action.

Holding Lone Tree Hill

The 3d Battalion expected that the enemy

withdrawal during the night presaged reorganization for another attack.12

 This expectation was correct, for Colonel Matsuyama did have plans to continue the attack.

On the 22d the two companies of the 2d

Battalion, 224th Infantry, which had been

east of the Tirfoam, had arrived to reinforce

him, as had the 7th Company of the same

regiment, previously on detached duty at an

inland post.

Action on the 23d began at dawn when

Japanese troops, some of whom were using

American weapons and wearing parts of

American uniforms, attacked the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, from the deep ravine.

The battalion initially held its fire, thinking

that the enemy force might be a friendly

patrol, and the Japanese were able to advance to within fifteen yards of the battalion

lines before being recognized. It was an hour

before the results of this error could be corrected—an hour during which both the 2d

Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy

losses. The hour ended with an enemy

retreat.

At 0800 the 2d Battalion was instructed

to make contact with the 3d, clear the Japanese from the rest of the northern section

of the hilltop plateau, and form a two-battalion' perimeter. Moving north along the

hill crest soon proved impracticable, for the

Japanese held strong positions in the 400-

yard interval which still separated the two

battalions. The 2d Battalion therefore decided to bypass the opposition. The unit

marched back down the hill, crossed the

oval shelf, and turned north along the west

bank of the Snaky. About 250 yards south

of the beach, the battalion turned west and,

at 1000, was held up by enemy fire from

the same twenty-foot-high cliff which had

stalled the 3d Battalion's attack on 21 June.

The 2d Battalion then withdrew from the

cliff north to the beach east of Rocky Point

and reorganized. At 1120 the movement up

Lone Tree Hill was resumed, this time along

the same route employed by Companies I

and K on the previous day. The advance was

opposed by enemy machine gun, mortar,

artillery, and rifle fire, but the 2d Battalion,

with Company G suffering especially

"heavy casualties,"

 13

 slowly fought its way

upward by fire and movement. At 1400 the

leading elements began reaching the top of

the hill, but it was not until 1630 that the

battalion had assembled in an organized

perimeter. The new position was just northwest of the 3d Battalion's lines, overlooked

the west cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and appar12

 Sources for this section are: Ltr, Sibert to Krueger, 23 Jun 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 27-31 Jul 44; TTF G-2 Jnls, 12-23 Jun and

24 Jun-2 Jul 44; TTF G-3 Jnl, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44;

1st Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 11 Jun-16 Jul 44; 20th Inf

S-3 Per Rpts, 14 Jun-16 Aug 44; TTF Opns Rpt

Wakde-Sarmi, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44, pp. 6-8; 6th Inf

Div Arty Opns Rpt Sarmi-Maffin Bay, 11 Jun-17

Jul 44, pp. 4-6; Rad, TTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, Y1268, 18 Jun 44, in TTF G-2 Jnl, 12-23 Jun 44;

2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 31-32,

34, 41.

13

 This statement is from a 20th Infantry S-3

Periodic Report, but exact figures are not available.
272 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ently was not connected with the 3d Battalion perimeter. The latter unit had held and

strengthened its positions during the morning while it sought cover from continuous

Japanese mortar and rifle fire and awaited

the arrival of reinforcements before beginning mopping-up operations.

The 3d Battalion had received few supplies since reaching the top of Lone Tree

Hill on 22 June. The unit had run out of

water, and only a heavy rainfall during the

night of 22-23 June had prevented thirst

from becoming a major problem. To relieve

this situation Company L, 1st Infantry, was

ordered to take ammunition, water, and rations to the hilltop plateau. The company

received the order late on 22 June but managed to move only as far as the northeastern

corner of Rocky Point before dark. At 0800

the next morning the relief company started

up the hill, meeting little opposition until

it reached the top of Rocky Point. There it

was pinned down as Japanese forces moved

in behind it to cut the line of communication down the hill. Company L soon ran

out of ammunition for, in addition to the

supplies, the men had carried to the hilltop

only their loaded weapons, with no extra

ammunition. Despite help from elements

of the Antitank and Service Companies,

20th Infantry, Company L was able to

maintain only intermittent contact with the

3d Battalion, 20th Infantry.

It was not until late afternoon, after the

2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, had arrived

atop Lone Tree Hill that Company L, 1st

Infantry, was relieved. By that time the company had suffered many casualties and had

lost much of the matériel it had been carrying up the hill. Neither the 2d nor 3d Battalions, 20th Infantry, received appreciable

amounts of supplies during the day, and

only the heroic efforts of small volunteer

groups kept these units supplied with enough

food and ammunition to carry on the fight.

The 1st Infantry, to support the operations

of the small carrying parties, sent two machine gun platoons and two 37-mm. antitank guns forward to the foot of Rocky

Point. With this cover the supply groups

managed to fight their various ways up and

down the hill and evacuated 300 wounded

men during the day.

The evening of 23 June brought another

224th Infantry counterattack which was

aimed at both the 2d and 3d Battalions'

perimeters. These attacks came from the

east side of Lone Tree Hill, the Japanese apparently having moved around the north

side of the hill along Rocky Point. The

initial assault culminated in a bayonet

charge, which was repulsed by rifle and

machine gun fire with heavy losses to the

Japanese. Despite this defeat, small groups

of the enemy continued suicidal attacks

throughout the night of 23-24 June.

It would probably have been much easier

to bypass Lone Tree Hill, isolate it, and

starve out the Japanese garrison, but there

were two reasons why General Sibert did

not do so. First, as long as the Japanese held

Lone Tree Hill, which dominated the

Maffin Bay area, the shores of that bay

could not be safely employed for a staging

area. Second, operations from 20 to 22 June

had apparently convinced the task force

commander that Lone Tree Hill was not

strongly held, and he had therefore ordered

the frontal assault. That this estimate was in

error was realized when dawn of 23 June

brought with it the information that the 2d

and 3d Battalions of the 20th Infantry were

cut off atop Lone Tree Hill. When the hill

had still not been captured by dark on 23

June the general decided to outflank it by

a shore-to-shore maneuver and then con-
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 273

tinue the attack from both west and east. He

ordered the 1st Infantry, reinforced by the

6th Reconnaissance Troop, to seize the

beach just west of Rocky Point on the morning of 24 June. The regiment was to clean

out the western side of Lone Tree Hill and

prevent any more Japanese reinforcements

from reaching it.

For the shore-to-shore maneuver, the 1st

Infantry chose Companies K and I. Company K boarded ten LVT's at the beach

near the Tirfoam River and moved to the

west side of Rocky Point. The LVT's were

protected by the 6th Reconnaissance Troop

aboard thirteen LVT(A)'s armed with

37-mm. guns. Both groups of amphibian

vehicles were fired on by Japanese 75-mm.

guns emplaced on Rocky Point, but Company K made a safe landing at 0900 hours.

Attempting to move inland, the company

was immediately pinned down on the narrow beach by enemy fire of all types which

originated along the west face of Lone Tree

Hill and Rocky Point.

The LVT's, again protected by the

LVT(A)'s, made a return trip with Company I, 1st Infantry, which landed on the

right of Company K at 1200. About 1330

four tanks of Company C, 44th Tank Battalion, transported by LCT's, arrived at the

hard-pressed beachhead, which was subjected to ever increasing machine gun and

rifle fire. Upon their arrival the tanks covered the evacuation of wounded and the

landing of supplies by firing on Japanese

positions in the swampy woods between the

beach and the west cliff of Lone Tree Hill.

One LVT, loaded with wounded men, was

sunk about 175 yards off Rocky Point by

Japanese 75-mm. fire. All the men were

rescued by an LVT (A), which succeeded

in silencing the enemy artillery weapon.

Companies I and K were unable to make

any progress inland. Japanese defensive positions in the swampy woodland, occupied

by elements of the 223d Infantry, prevented

an advance. The four tanks attempted to

move off the beach to attack these positions

but found that they could not negotiate the

low clay and rock bank behind the shore

line. The tanks remained on the beach for

the night to protect the exposed infantrymen, but the 6th Reconnaissance Troop

returned to the vicinity of the Tirfoam River

mouth at darkness.

On top of Lone Tree Hill during the day

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 20th Infantry, in

the face of enemy mortar, rifle, and machine

gun fire, began to clear the Japanese from

the many caves and crevices on Rocky

Point, the deep ravine east of the point,

and the hilltop plateau. For the mission of

clearing Rocky Point, assault teams were

formed by personnel of the Antitank Company, Headquarters Company of the 2d

Battalion, Company H, and a few men from

Company F. Elements of the 3d Battalion,

1st Infantry, including most of Company L,

also were engaged in the mopping up. The

assault teams were armed with a variety

of weapons, including flame throwers,

bazookas, rifle grenades, hand grenades,

BAR's, TSMG's, high explosives, and even

gasoline. While this action continued, the

2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, aided by Company L of the 1st Infantry, secured the

supply route up the hill.

By nightfall there were definite signs that

Japanese resistance in the northern section

of Lone Tree Hill was weakening, and during the night of 24-25 June there were no

major counterattacks, although harassing

mortar, grenade, and rifle fire continued.

Headquarters of the 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry, and Company M of the same regiment moved across the Snaky River in the
274 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

afternoon and established a perimeter on the

beach at the east side of Rocky Point, from

which Company M's heavy weapons could

aid in the mopping-up operations.

Despite the weakening of Japanese resistance, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 20th Infantry, and Company L, 1st Infantry, continued to suffer heavy casualties during the

day. At dusk 2d Battalion effectives numbered only 330 men, and the 3d Battalion

had only 322 effectives left. The losses of

Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, could not

be ascertained because not all the wounded

and dead had been evacuated and because

communications had broken down at intervals throughout the day. However, it was

known that at least 9 men had been killed

and 37 wounded, and that the dead included 2 Company K officers.

The next day, 25 June, the 2d and 3d

Battalions, 20th Infantry, now reinforced by

both Companies L and M, 1st Infantry, and

Company B, 6th Engineers, continued clearing Rocky Point, the deep ravine, the northern part of the hilltop plateau, and the eastern shelf, where a few scattered Japanese

still held positions along the twenty-foot-high

cliff. Flame throwers, demolition charges,

bazookas, and hand grenades all proved

successful in eliminating Japanese resistance

and sealing or clearing caves and crevices.

The task was easier on the 25th, for the Japanese slowly gave up the fight and were

killed or sealed off in their caves. Casualties

continued to mount—the 2d Battalion, 20th

Infantry, had only about two hundred effectives by the end of the day—but many of the

losses were not due to Japanese action.

Many men were evacuated over the now

secured supply route to the top of the hill as

they fell from exhaustion or became sick.

On the beach west of Rocky Point Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, had little success in expanding their beachhead. The

tanks proved useless in the area and were

therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. The

two infantry companies, pinned down during the morning, kept up a continuous

mortar barrage against Japanese positions

in the swamp to the south, against the western cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and, when certain such fire would not endanger troops

atop the hill, against the northwest comer

of Rocky Point. This mortar fire, coupled

with the operations on the plateau, began to

have the desired effect during the afternoon,

and Companies I and K were able to push

their defenses beyond the narrow beachhead

slightly southward and westward and toward the shore beneath Rocky Point. Once

or twice during the afternoon, patrols were

able to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill from

the northwest corner of the point and established contact with 20th Infantry units.

Late in the afternoon Company M, 1st Infantry, operating from the east side of the

point, managed to push a patrol around the

shore to establish contact with Company K.

Though Companies I and K could find

little tangible evidence of the results of their

operations, they had actually wiped out the

223d Infantry's defense force in the area

just west of Lone Tree Hill. By dusk on the

25th, it had become obvious that the combined efforts of the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 20th

Infantry, had either cleared out the northern half of Lone Tree Hill or had forced

the Japanese to withdraw. The latter conclusion was the more nearly correct. The

36th Division decided on 25 June to withdraw the bulk of the Center and Right Sector Forces west of the Woske River and

establish new defensive positions, thereby

keeping the 223d Infantry, the bulk of

which had not been committed to action in
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 275

the Lone Tree Hill area, more or less intact.

Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry

were to remain east of the Woske, and they

were to withdraw into rough terrain southwest of Mt. Saksin.

At nightfall on the 25th, General Sibert

estimated that his three forward battalions

had lost approximately 140 men killed and

850 wounded and evacuated, including

those who had to be sent back to the rear

because of wounds, sickness, heat exhaustion, or psychoneurotic disorders. Known

Japanese dead in the northern part of the

hill numbered 344, but it could not be estimated how many more had been thrown

over the west cliff, sealed in caves, or carried

off by withdrawing remnants of the Japanese defense force. According to Japanese

sources, the Japanese had lost about 500

men killed and another 300 wounded in the

Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225-Mt. Saksin area.

By noon on 25 June it was apparent to

General Sibert that only mopping-up operations remained to be accomplished on and

near Lone Tree Hill. For all practical purposes, that area had been secured.

Final Operations in the Wakde-Sarmi Area

Mopping Up by the 6th Division

As the 2d and 3d Battalions, 20th Infantry, were in no condition to undertake the

mopping up, General Sibert decided to relieve those two units with the 3d Battalion,

63d Infantry.14 The latter unit and the 3d

Battalion, 1st Infantry, were to clear the

Lone Tree Hill area and all enemy west to

the Woske River and inland for a distance

of 800 yards. The 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, was to continue its holding mission south

of Lone Tree Hill and, in co-operation with

the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, was to clear

the defile, Hill 225, Mt. Saksin, and Hill

265, which lay about 1,000 yards southwest

of Hill 225. The relief of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 20th Infantry, was accomplished by

1500 on 26 June. To that time the regiment

had lost 83 men killed, 484 wounded, and

10 missing. The unit estimated that it had

killed 781 Japanese, by far the majority of

them in operations on Lone Tree Hill during the period 22 through 25 June.

On 27 June the 3d Battalion, 63d Infantry, began mopping up on the top of Lone

Tree Hill. These operations proved more

difficult than anticipated, for a few Japanese

machine gun nests were still active on the

southern section. But by dusk on 30 June, no

more live Japanese were to be found. On the

same day the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry,

pushed through the defile south of the hill

and found only a few stragglers in its zone.

A continuous perimeter, running from the

western exit of the defile north along the

main road to the beach, was now established

around Lone Tree Hill.

During operations at the Lone Tree Hill

area from 20 through 30 June, American

losses were approximately 150 killed, 550

wounded, and 400-500 evacuated from the

forward area as a result of sickness, noncombat injuries, and combat fatigue. During the same period, the TORNADO Task

Force claimed, 942 dead Japanese were

actually counted in the area from the Snaky

14

 Information in this subsection is based on: TTF

Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44, pp. 5-

9; 6th Div Arty Opns Rpt Sarmi-Maffin Bay, 11

Jun-17 Jul 44, pp. 6-7; TTF G-3 Jnl, 12 Jun-18

Jul 44; TTF G-2 Jnl, 24 Jun-2 Jul 44; 1st Inf S-3

Per Rpts, 11 Jul-16 Jul 44; 20th Inf S-3 Per Rpts,

12 Jun-16 Aug 44; 63d Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 17 Jun17 Jul 44; Ltr, Sibert to Krueger, 26 Jun 44, in

ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-31 Jul

44; Ltrs, Sibert to Krueger, 27 Jun-10 Jul 44, in

ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 17-20 Jul

44; Opns of Yuki Group, p. 18; 2d Army Opns at

Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 34-37.
276 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

River west to the Woske and from the beach

to the southern slopes of the defile, and the

TORNADO Task Force estimated that 400

more had been sealed in caves at Lone Tree

Hill. How these casualties were divided

among the Japanese units is impossible to

ascertain, but it is probable that at least

750 of the dead were members of the 224th

Infantry and most of the rest from other

units of the Right Sector Force. The 16th

Field Airdrome Construction Unit, for instance, had been practically wiped out, as

had the two companies of the 223d Infantry

which had been placed under Colonel

Matsuyama's command. That over 1,300

Japanese were killed in the coastal area from

the Tor to the Woske by 30 June does not

appear to be an exaggerated claim.

Although clearing enemy forces from the

Lone Tree Hill area practically assured the

security of the Maffin Bay staging area,

General Sibert believed that in order to

make the region entirely safe, it would be

necessary to drive the enemy out of the terrain between the Woske and Tor for a distance of at least 3,000 yards (about one and

three-fourths miles) inland. Operations for

this purpose began on 1 July when the 1st

Infantry extended the perimeter along the

coast to the Woske. On 4 July elements of

the 63d Infantry occupied Hill 225 and on

the next day seized the crest of Mt. Saksin.

Both these terrain features were found to

contain numerous well-organized, strong

defensive positions, all of which had been

abandoned. Hill 265, southwest of Hill 225,

proved a tougher nut to crack because of

Japanese opposition and terrain difficulties.

But on 8 and 9 July the 1st Battalions of

the 1st and 63d Infantry Regiments finally

secured the hill crest, which had been held

by elements of the 224th Infantry. With the

fall of Hill 265, the last enemy strong point

in the Maffin Bay region had been taken.

Meanwhile, the remaining Japanese

forces were busily withdrawing west of the

Woske. On 12 July General Sibert sent a

reconnaissance in force (comprising Company A, 1st Infantry, the 6th Reconnaissance Troop, and elements of Company C,

44th Tank Battalion) across the river. This

force moved rapidly beyond Sawar Drome

and across Sawar Creek, which lay a little

over three miles beyond the Woske, At the

banks of Metimedan Creek, about 1,500

yards beyond Sawar Creek, the force was

halted by Japanese fire from positions held

by the Left Sector Unit and the 3d Battalion,

223d Infantry, along the Metimedan and

from highlands beyond that stream. The

6th Division group returned to the Woske

before dark, there to receive the welcome

news that elements of the 31st Infantry

Division were about to reach Maffin Bay to

relieve the 6th Division.

The End of the Operation

When General Krueger chose the 6th

Division to seize an air-base site on the

Vogelkop, he decided to retain one of the

division's regimental combat teams at

Wakde-Sarmi as a reserve. But even if this

combat team were not required on the

Vogelkop, it would hardly suffice to defend

the Maffin Bay-Wakde area and, at the

same time, undertake the offensive patrolling necessary to maintain contact with

Japanese forces in the area and to keep those

forces away from Maffin Bay. Both the 25th

and 33d Infantry Divisions could be moved

to Maffin Bay, but neither could arrive by

15 July, when the 6th Division had to start

loading for the Vogelkop operation. How-
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 277

ever, the 31st Infantry Division, which was

scheduled to stage at Hollandia for another

operation in September, could be moved to

Maffin Bay by the 15th. General Krueger

therefore recommended that the 31st Division (less the 124th Regimental Combat

Team, at Aitape) be sent to Maffin Bay.

General MacArthur quickly approved this

proposal.15

The 31st Division began unloading at

Maffin Bay on 14 July and by the 18th,

when the division commander, Maj. Gen.

John C. Persons, assumed the position of

Commander, TORNADO Task Force, all the

6th Division, with the exception of the 20th

Regimental Combat Team, had been relieved. The latter unit remained attached to

the 31st Division until 21 August and left

the area for the Vogelkop on the 26th. The

remainder of the 6th Division began leaving

on 27 July. Except for the 124th Regimental

Combat Team, the 31st Division closed in

the Wakde-Sarmi area by 15 August.16

The two regimental combat teams of the

31st Division, the 155th and the 167th,

which operated at Wakde-Sarmi had no

previous combat experience but received

much valuable training in a series of patrol

actions, company-sized scouting missions,

and battalion reconnaissances in force. General Persons wanted to mount an offensive

to drive the Japanese from a main line of

resistance which they had established in the

low hills between Metimedan Creek and

Sarmi, but the demands for labor at the

Maffin Bay staging area and the necessity

for committing many troops to the defense

of that area made it impossible to assemble

sufficient strength for such an attack. Then,

by the time the 6th Division's requirements

had been met, the 31st Division itself had

to begin preparations for another operation.

The 31st Division therefore had to confine itself principally to its patrolling missions, both west and east of the perimeter.

Patrols east of the perimeter were sent out

to hunt down stragglers from the Japanese

Hollandia garrison, and most of them, comprising armed natives of the Wakde-Sarmi

area, were led by a Dutch officer, 1st Lt.

C. J. Sneeuwjagt. Meanwhile, work went on

at the Maffin Bay staging area, and during

the period 18 July-31 August there was unloaded at Maffin Bay a daily average of

2,500 tons of various supplies. During the

same period the 31st Division lost 39 men

killed, 195 wounded, 34 injured, and 3

missing. The division killed 294 Japanese,

found 497 dead, and captured 14 others.17

Since the 31st Division would need protection as it staged for its mid-September

invasion of Morotai Island, northwest of the

Vogelkop, General Krueger recommended

to General MacArthur that a regimental

combat team of the 33d Infantry Division

(another unit without combat experience)

be moved from eastern New Guinea to Maffin Bay. The theater commander approved

this suggestion, and the 123d Regimental

Combat Team, under Brig. Gen. Donald J.

Myers (also assistant division commander),

arrived at Maffin Bay on 1 September. The

next day General Krueger declared that the

Wakde-Sarmi operation was over.18

15

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 26. 16

 Ibid., pp. 27-28; TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi,

12 Jun-18 Jul 44, pp. 9-10; TTF [31st Inf Div]

Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 18 Jul-1 Sep 44, pp. 2-4.

17

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 18 Jul-1 Sep 44,

pp. 2-4; 115th Inf Opns Rpt Maffin Bay-Toem, pp.

1-2; Ltrs, Gen Persons to Gen Krueger, 18 and 20

Jul 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl 21-23 Jul 44;

Ltr, Gen Persons to Gen Ward, 6 Nov 50, no sub,

in OCMH files. 18

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 28;

ALAMO Force FO 23, 21 Aug 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 16-24 Aug 44. As usual General Krueger closed the operation for the purpose
278 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Epilogue

All elements of the 31st Division left Maffin Bay early in September and on the 25th

of the month the TORNADO Task Force was

disbanded as such, Headquarters, 123d

Regimental Combat Team, assuming all

operational and administrative duties in the

area. Late in September the Allied Air

Forces began to close out the Wakde Island

air base and to move its men and equipment

forward until, by December, the Wakde

field was relegated to the status of an

emergency strip.19

In October, command of all American

forces left in the Wakde-Sarmi area passed

from General Krueger to the recently established U. S. Eighth Army, which was commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger,

formerly the commander of the RECKLESS

Task Force and I Corps. The 123d Regimental Combat remained in the region until

relieved by a composite battalion combat

team from the 93d Infantry Division on 26

January 1945. The 93d Division elements

undertook some local security patrolling,

but their main mission was to speed the

evacuation of remaining supplies from the

Maffin Bay staging area. This job was finished by 6 February, when all the remaining

troops left the mainland for Wakde Island.

One company of the 93d Division remained

on Wakde, sending a few amphibious patrols to the mainland, until the first week in

October 1945. Then the company—the last

American troops in the area—left to join its

division in the Philippines.20

The Results of the Wakde-Sarmi Operation

Though the importance of the WakdeSarmi operation cannot be measured in

terms of casualties, the casualty figures are

of interest. From 17 May through 1 September American losses in the area were

approximately 400 men killed, 1,500

wounded or injured in action, and 15 missing.21

 During the same period about 3,870

Japanese had been killed in the area and 51

Japanese had been taken prisoner. How

many more of the original Japanese garrison of some 11,000 had died of sickness and

starvation, or had been buried in caves at

Lone Tree Hill, could not be determined.

It was estimated, however, that as of 1

September only 2,000 effective Japanese

combat troops were left in the WakdeSarmi area.22

 Much more important than

of ending certain requirements for historical records.

Again, this termination coincided with an administrative change in the area concerned, for on 1 September General Myers assumed the duties of Commander, TORNADO Task Force, in place of General

Persons. 19

 123d RCT Opns Maffin Bay, 1 Sep 44-27 Jan

45, pp. 1-2. Information on closing Wakde was furnished by Capt. B. L. Mortensen (USAF), Air Hist

Gp, Hq USAF, 22 Nov 48.

20

 368th RCT Opns Rpt, 5 Jan 44-1 Sep 45, pp.

3-9; 368th Inf Opns Rpt Maffin Bay, 19-24 Mar

45, pp. 1-3. One other infantry unit also spent a

little time at Maffin Bay. This was a battalion of the

136th Infantry, 33d Division, which spent about a

month, September-October 1944, working as a labor

organization at the Maffin Bay staging area. 21

 TTF G-3 Per Rpt 107, 1 Sep 44; TTF G-1 Per

Rpts 15 and 16, 30 Aug and 5 Sep 44, respectively;

TTF G-1 Sum, 18 Jul-1 Sep 44, p. 2. The G-1 and

G-3 figures do not agree and cannot be reconciled.

Furthermore, various sets of G-3 figures are mutually irreconcilable as are different sets of G-1 figures. The figures given in the text are the author's

approximations from the sources cited. 22

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 57, 30 Aug 44,

copy in G-2 DofA files; Ltr, Persons to Ward, 6

Nov 50; 123d RCT Opns Rpt Maffin Bay, 1 Sep

44-27 Jan 45, p. 2. The last ALAMO Force figures for

Japanese casualties (from ALAMO Force G-2 Wkly

Rpt 61, 4 Oct 44, copy in G-2 DofA files) are 3,963

Japanese killed and 55 captured. In addition, according to various sources, there were 2 Korean, 2

Javanese, 1 Chinese, and 36 Formosan prisoners.

Total known casualties were thus 4,059. Colonel

Yoshino, Colonel Matsuyama, and General Yamada
LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 279

the enemy casualties was the fact that two

reinforced Japanese regimental combat

teams had been destroyed as effective fighting forces and eliminated as a threat in the

Southwest Pacific.

In return for their losses, the Allies had

obtained a valuable staging and air-base site.

The Wakde Island airdrome quickly proved

its value by enabling the Allied Air Forces

to support not only operations within the

Southwest Pacific but also those in the Central Pacific. The Fifth Air Force flew bombardment missions from Wakde against

Biak, Noemfoor, enemy installations on the

Vogelkop, Halmahera, Morotai, and, in the

Central Pacific Area, against the Palaus and

other islands in the Carolines. Fifth Air

Force planes and Seventh Fleet land-based

reconnaissance bombers from Wakde made

substantial contributions to the success of

the Central Pacific's mid-June invasion of

the Marianas by striking enemy air and fleet

installations in the Palaus and reporting the

movements of Japanese fleet units within

flying range. Since the Japanese fields on

Biak were not captured in time for Southwest Pacific aircraft to undertake from that

island any missions in support of the Mariana operation, the Wakde field had to carry

a far greater load than was originally intended for it. Finally, from Wakde, Seventh

Fleet PB4Y's initiated the first regular air

reconnaissance of islands in the Philippines

since early 1942.

The Fifth Air Force controlled operations

from Wakde until late August, when the

Thirteenth Air Force took over the field.

The latter unit afterwards supported the

mid-September invasions of Morotai and

the Palaus with numerous bombing and reconnaissance missions from Wakde.23

For ground forces, the Wakde-Sarmi

area proved equally valuable. In operations

there the 6th Infantry Division, the 31st

Infantry Division (less one regimental combat team), the 123d Regimental Combat

Team of the 33d Infantry Division, part of

the 158th Regimental Combat Team, and

innumerable attached units received their

first combat experience. The value of the

area for training was thus obvious, but the

region was equally valuable as a staging

base. The whole or parts of five different

task forces—sent to Biak, Noemfoor, the

Vogelkop Peninsula, and the Philippines—

were staged from the Arare-Toem beaches

or the shores of Maffin Bay. Had available

assault shipping been used for long trips

from eastern New Guinea bases to objectives beyond Wakde, the pace of operations

in the Southwest Pacific would certainly

have been slowed. Instead, many units were

moved to Maffin Bay by noncombatant vessels, picked up there by assault ships, and

taken on to new objectives to the north and

west, the nearest of which was Biak Island.24

survived the war, but what happened to General

Tagami cannot be ascertained from available documents.

23

 Information on Allied Air Forces use of Wakde

was provided by Capt. B. L. Mortensen, Air Hist

Gp, Hq USAF, 22 Nov 48. 24

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 28;

TTF Opns Rpt -Wakde-Sarmi, 12 Jun-18 Jul 44,

pp. 9-10.
CHAPTER XII

Biak: The Plan, the Landing,

and the Enemy

When, on 10 May 1944, General

Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area,

changed the original concept of the SarmiWakde-Biak plan no significant changes

were made in the assignment of units to the

operations for the seizure of Wakde and

Biak Islands. The 163d Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Infantry Division was

ordered to capture Wakde Island and the

adjacent New Guinea mainland beginning

on 17 May. Ten days later, on 27 May, the

remainder of the 41st Division was to land

on Biak Island, 180 miles northwest of

Wakde. The target date for the landings at

Biak was designated Z Day.

The Biak Plan

The Objective

Biak is shaped roughly like an old-fashioned high-topped shoe.1

 (Map 13) The

sole is on the south, the back of the shoe on

the west, and the instep runs southeast to

northwest. Off the northwest corner of Biak

(and about one third its size) lies Soepiori

Island. The two are separated by a small

creek-like strait. Off southeastern Biak lie

a number of islets, including Owi, Aoeki,

Mios Woendi, and others of the Padaido

Group. In May 1944 Biak's principal towns

lay along its southern shore. About fourteen miles west of the southeast tip was Bosnek, prewar administrative and commercial

center.

Biak was formed as the result of underwater disturbances which in prehistoric

times had brought part of the ocean's floor

above the surface. Much of the island is cut

by broken coral terraces, ridges, and shelves

which in the course of centuries acquired a

thick cover of tropical rain forest and dense

jungle undergrowth. There are some extensive inland flat areas at the southeastern

third of the island. Little fresh water is

readily available on Biak, since most of the

streams run through underground channels

that drain even the heaviest rainfall from the

surface. The island lacks good harbors,

1

 Information in this section is based principally

on: ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp. 6-7;

HURRICANE Task Force [41st Inf Div] Opns Rpt

Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 3; CTF 77 [Comdr,

Biak Attack Force] Opns Rpt Biak, p. 3. With

regard to terrain on Biak it is necessary to bear in

mind that many of Biak's coral ridges are very

similar to levees, while many others are actually

steps of a series of terraces which rise to inland

heights. But the Allied forces which fought at Biak

usually referred to all terrace steps or levee-like formations as ridges, and the latter term is generally

employed in these chapters. The term terrace is generally reserved for flat though sometimes gradually

sloping areas between the steps or ridges.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 281

MAP 13

almost all its shore line being fringed by

rough coral reefs.

A high, rough, and narrow coral ridge,

lying in front of a generally flat inland terrace in levee-like fashion, parallels Biak's

southern shore from a point about five miles

east of Bosnek to Mokmer, a village located

ten miles west of Bosnek. (Map 14) The

seaward face of this ridge is from 180 to 250

feet high, while its landward slope rises only

100 feet or so above the flat but rough-surfaced inland terrace. Near Mokmer the

coral ridge turns northward and inland for

about a mile and a half, and then west again

toward Biak's southwestern corner. At

Parai, some 2,000 yards east of Mokmer,

one spur of this coastal ridge comes down

almost to the shore line to form a twentyfoot-high cliff. This cliff runs along the

water line from Parai to a point about 1,000

yards west of Mokmer.

The turning of the main coastal ridge

combines with a protrusion of the coast line

beginning near Parai to form a plain about

eight miles long and up to one and a half

miles wide. The Japanese had begun to construct airfields on this plain late in 1943, and

by April 1944 had completed two strips.

The most easterly was Mokmer Drome, near

the village of Mokmer. About two and onehalf miles west was Sorido Drome, located

near the village of the same name. Both

these strips were close to the southern shore

of Biak. Between them, but about three

quarters of a mile inland, was Borokoe

Drome, which became operational early in

May 1944. A site for a fourth airfield had

been surveyed on flat land north of the coral
282 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

MAP 14

Note the location of the coral ridge line in relation to the coast and in relation to

the plain upon which Mokmer, Sorido, and Borokoe Dromes were constructed.

ridge behind Bosnek, and for a fifth between

Sorido and Borokoe Dromes.

There were few good localities for amphibious assaults along the shores of Biak,

and the best lay far from the airstrips.

Since these airfields were the principal Allied

objectives, it was necessary to choose relatively poor landing points in order to put

assault forces ashore close to the fields.

ALAMO Force knew that reasonably good

beaches, though fronted by coral reefs, were

located at Bosnek, Mokmer, and along

the coast between those villages. But the

Mokmer area was known to be the most

heavily defended on Biak. It would be foolhardy to land at the point of the enemy's

greatest strength if other usable beaches

could be found at near-by but more lightly

defended areas. East from Mokmer, coral

cliffs or mangrove swamps lie immediately

behind the beach. These obstacles would

prevent a landing force from maneuvering

or finding room to disperse its supplies. The

lessons of the Hollandia campaign were

fresh in the minds of planners, who had no

desire to find the troubles of the 24th Division at Tanahmerah Bay or those of the

41st Division at Humboldt Bay repeated on

Biak. From aerial photographs, Bosnek appeared to be the point nearest to Mokmer
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 283

Drome where cliffs or swamps did not back

the beach. It was also known that some

roads or trails led both inland and along the

coast in both directions from Bosnek. Moreover, at Bosnek two possibly usable jetties

led to deep water beyond the coral reef

which fringed the entire southern coast.

The men planning the Biak operation

could obtain little definite information

about this fringing reef, which was estimated to vary from 200 to 600 feet in

width. According to aerial reconnaissance,

much of the reef was dry at low water, but

no information was available concerning the

amount of water over the reef at high tide.

In any case, reef conditions off Bosnek appeared to be no worse than elsewhere along

the south coast of Biak. Since this was true,

and because jetties, apparent lack of strong

enemy defensive installations, and maneuver room on shore offered advantages not

found any place else, General Krueger, in

agreement with the air and naval commanders, decided that the initial landing

would be made at Bosnek.

Organization, Logistics, and

Intelligence

The organization designated to secure

Biak was named the HURRICANE Task Force,
284 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the principal combat component of which

was the 41st Infantry Division, less the 163d

Regimental Combat Team. Both the task

force and the division were commanded by

Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller, who had commanded a similar organization at Humboldt

Bay. For Biak, the 41st Division was reinforced by two field and two antiaircraft artillery battalions, a 4.2-inch mortar company, a medium tank company (less one

platoon), an engineer boat and shore regiment (less one boat company), and a number of antiaircraft batteries. Service troops

assigned to the HURRICANE Task Force, in

addition to those organic to the 41st Division, were three engineer aviation battalions

(for airfield construction work), other miscellaneous engineer units, and many medical, quartermaster, and signal corps organizations.2

Control of the amphibious phases of the

operation was vested in Rear Adm. William

M. Fechteler (USN) as the Commander,

Attack Force. Admiral Fechteler divided his

combat vessels into four support groups,

which totaled 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 21 destroyers. Assault shipping,

comprising 5 APD's, 8 LST's, 8 LCT's, and

15 LCI's, was placed in a separate unit

which Admiral Fechteler designated the

Main Body. Smaller craft, such as LVT's,

LVT(A)'s, DUKW's, and LCVP's were to

be carried to Biak aboard LST's and APD's.

A Special Service Unit of the Main Body

contained 4 SC's, 3 rocket-equipped LCI's,

1 LCI carrying underwater demolition

teams and their equipment, and 1 seagoing

tug (ATF). The Special Service Unit,

among other duties, was to provide close

support and control for landing waves. A

naval beach party, which was to control the

landing of troops and supplies once the first

waves were ashore, was also part of the Attack Force.

The First Reinforcement Group, consisting of 3 LST's and 8 LCI's, protected by 3

destroyers and 2 destroyer escorts, was to

arrive at Biak on 28 May, Z plus 1. On the

next day the Second Reinforcement Group,

made up of 7 LST's, 3 destroyers, and 2

frigates (PF's), was to reach Biak. Aboard

the cargo vessels of these two convoys were

to be artillery units, service troops, and supplies of all kinds.3

Close air support for the invasion of Biak

was primarily the responsibility of the Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, which was

to operate from bases at Hollandia and

Wakde Island. The Fifth Air Force, the

Thirteenth Air Force, and Australian and

Dutch aircraft were assigned long-range and

strategical support missions similar to those

they had undertaken prior to the landings

at Wakde-Sarmi.4

ALAMO Force Reserve for Biak consisted

of the 128th and 158th Regimental Combat

Teams, which had also been in reserve for

the Wakde-Sarmi operation. HURRICANE

Task Force Reserve consisted of two units.

The first of these was a battalion (less one

rifle company and the heavy weapons company) of the 186th Infantry, and the other

was the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance

Troop.5

Those elements of the HURRICANE Task

Force scheduled to land on Biak on 27 and

2

 HTF FO 1, 15 May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3

Jnl Wakde-Biak, 24-25 May 44.

3

 Ibid.; CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 23-24 May 44;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, chart following p. 37. 4

 AAF SWPA OI 51/1, 11 May 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14-18 May 44; see also above,

Ch. IX. 5

 ALAMO Force FO 17, 13 May 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; HTF FO 1, 15

May 44
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 285

28 May were to carry with them to the

objective ten days' supply of rations, clothing, equipment (but only organizational

sets of spare parts), fuels, and lubricants.

Sufficient engineer construction equipment

was to be landed on Biak during the first

two days of the operation to assure a rapid

start on airfield rehabilitation, road construction, and clearance of dispersal areas.

All weapons except 4.2-inch mortars arriving at Biak through Z plus 1 were to be

supplied with two units of fire, while the

mortars were to be supplied with six units of

fire. Organizations arriving at Biak after

28 May were to bring with them thirty

days' supply of rations, clothing and equipment, fuels and lubricants, medical, engineer, and motor maintenance supplies, and

three units of fire for all weapons. Initial

responsibility for the transportation of troops

and supplies to Biak rested with the Allied

Naval Forces. It was planned that the

Services of Supply would relieve the Navy

of this duty late in June.6

ALAMO Force was able to supply the

HURRICANE Task Force with little detailed

information concerning the enemy situation

on Biak Island. It was known that early in

May the Japanese had ordered the defenses

of Biak to be strengthened. Aerial reconnaissance disclosed that some effort was being

made on Biak to comply with these orders

and that a large amount of matériel had

reached the island during the early months

of the year. The extent of the Biak defenses

however, was unknown. The enemy garrison on Biak was thought to total about 4,400

men, including the bulk of the 222d Infantry Regiment, 36th Division, and the effective combat strength of the 222d Infantry

would probably not exceed 2,500 men. It

was further believed that the principal Japanese strength was concentrated in the

vicinity of Mokmer Drome, and it appeared

likely that enemy troops which had once

been stationed in the Bosnek area had been

moved west to Mokmer early in May.

The landing on Biak was expected to

elicit a strong aerial reaction from the Japanese. However, it was not probable that the

enemy air attacks could reach very damaging proportions because all Japanese fields

within range of Biak could be subjected to

heavy bombardment by Allied aircraft. Allied Naval Forces did not believe that the

enemy would risk major fleet units in an

attempt to retake Biak once Allied forces

had established a firm foothold on the

island. Finally, though the seizure of Wakde

might give the Japanese some indication

that the next Allied target would be Biak,

it was thought possible that the HURRICANE

Task Force might achieve local tactical surprise as to the date and place of landing.7

The Landing Plan

The HURRICANE Task Force was to land

in the Bosnek area on beaches designated

Green 1, 2, 3, and 4. Green Beach 1, 200

yards long, began at a point about 500 yards

east of Bosnek. Green Beach 2 was 300

yards long and extended west from Green 1

to the most easterly of the two jetties which

crossed the coral reef in front of Bosnek.

Green Beach 3 was located between the two

jetties and was about 750 yards long. Green

6

 ALAMO Force Adm O 9, 13 May 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; GHQ SWPA

OI 51/1, 10 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27 Apr 44.

7

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Biak

Island, 7 May 44, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl, Wakde-Biak,

13 Apr-19 May 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Photo Int

Sec, Rpt 122, 22 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Wadke-Biak, 23-24 May 44; CTF 77 Opn Plan

5-44, 16 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

23-24 May 44.
286 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Beach 4 extended 300 yards along the shore

beyond the western jetty.8

Since little was known about the coral

reef fronting the four Biak beaches, the

landing plans differed from those for most

previous operations within the Southwest

Pacific Area. Amphibian vehicles such as

LVT's and DUKW's were to make up the

initial waves, because it was obvious that

standard landing craft could be counted on

for only limited use. The amphibian vehicles

of the first waves were to be carried to Biak

aboard LST's and were to unload in the

stream outside the reef. After putting the

initial waves ashore, the vehicles were to return to the LST's and shuttle supplies to the

beaches. LCPR's, considered light and small

enough to find channels through the reef,

were to take some troops ashore after the

first few waves had landed.

Eight LCT's were supplied by Allied Naval Forces for the express purpose of taking

ashore tanks, 105-mm. howitzers, trucks, and

bulldozers. The LCT's were to be driven

as far up on the reef as possible and over it

it feasible, and it was hoped that there would

be enough water shoreward of the reef to

float them. The equipment these craft were

to take ashore was so important to the success of the operation that the risk of damage

to them on the coral reef had to be accepted.

The LCT's and LCPR's were to be Navymanned while the DUKW's were to be

driven by men of the 3d Engineer Special

Brigade. Some of the LVT's were to be

manned by the latter unit and others were

to be driven by specially trained men of the

41st Division.9

At first, H Hour was set for 0745. But the

planners lacked knowledge of wind, tide,

current, and offshore conditions at Biak, and

therefore decided to keep the landing time

flexible, dependent upon the conditions

found at Biak on Z Day. Therefore, the naval and ground commanders objected to a

Fifth Air Force plan to support the landing

by having twelve B-24's bomb the beaches

immediately before H Hour. However, General MacArthur's headquarters considered

it inadvisable to eliminate the air bombardment, and the Fifth Air Force offered to increase the number of B-24's from twelve to

fifty-two. The Biak planners thereupon decided that it was worth while to sacrifice

H-Hour flexibility to secure the additional

air support, a decision which General

Krueger quickly approved.

Some conditions, accepted by the Fifth

Air Force, were made in the final agreement between the air, naval, and ground

force commanders. First, bombs were to

be dropped from a high level in order to

avoid having the B-24's interfere with naval

fire. Second, the bombers were not to hit

the two jetties, which might be found in

good enough condition for use by assault

ships. Finally, no bombs were to be dropped

on the reef lest chunks of coral be dislodged

and, rolling in the surf, endanger landing

craft and amphibian vehicles.10 The aerial

bombardment was to be co-ordinated with

an H Hour which was finally set for 0715.

Even at this earlier time the bombers would

be able to see their targets (sunrise at Biak

being at 0655) and the change in H Hour

would gain a half hour of daylight for ship

unloading. The half-hour change would also

reduce the time the assault shipping would

8

 CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44. 9

 Ibid.; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 4; MTF Opns

Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 2-3.

10

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p.5; Rad, ALAMO to

GHQ SWPA, WI-3521, 21 May 44; Rad, GHQ

SWPA to ALAMO, AAF SWPA, and ANF SWPA,

CX-12843, 23 May 44, both in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 23

May 44.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 287

have to remain off Biak during daylight and

might increase chances for tactical surprise.11

Other than the beach bombardment by

B-24's, close, air support for Biak on Z Day

was similar to that undertaken for the

Wakde landing. Medium bombers and

fighters were to maintain an air alert over

the Biak landing area from first light to

dusk on Z Day. The convoys from eastern

ports to Biak were to be given cover by Fifth

Air Force planes. At Biak the medium bombers and fighters would fly close support missions for the forces ashore and would also

undertake artillery spotting roles until an

artillery liaison plane strip could be constructed on the island.12

Naval fire support was to begin at H

minus 45 minutes, 0630. From that time

until H Hour, cruisers and destroyers were to

expend 400 rounds of 8-inch, 1,000 rounds

of 6-inch, 3,740 rounds of 5-inch, and 1,000

rounds of 4.7-inch ammunition on targets in

the airfield area west of the landing beaches.

After H Hour the cruisers were to continue

intermittent fire on the airfields, bombard

targets of opportunity, and respond to calls

for support from the forces ashore. Because

there were many known or suspected Japanese gun emplacements along the south

shore of Biak, counterbattery fire was to take

precedence over all other types of fire.

Bombardment of the landing beaches

was also to begin at H minus 45 minutes.

Five destroyers were to bombard the beaches

and adjacent areas until H minus 30 minutes, when they were to move westward to

join the cruisers firing on the airfield area.

Then four other destroyers were to continue

beach bombardment until H minus 3 minutes. Total ammunition allowance for beach

bombardment was 4,900 rounds of 5-inch

and 4.7-inch shells, while 40-mm. and

20-mm. ammunition was to be expended at

the discretion of individual ship commanders. Rocket and automatic weapons

fire from three rocket-equipped LCI's and

two SC's was to provide close support for the

assault waves. This fire was to begin at H

minus 5 minutes and was to last until H

Hour or until the initial wave was safely

ashore.13

The first landings on Biak were to be

made by the 186th Infantry of the 41st Division. The regiment was to land in column of

battalions, the 2d Battalion leading, on

Green Beaches 2 through 4. The first three

waves, consisting of sixteen LVT's each,

were to land at five-minute intervals beginning at H Hour. DUKW's, with Company

D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion (4.2-

inch mortars), and the 121st Field Artillery

Battalion (75-mm. pack howitzers) aboard,

were to follow the 2d Battalion ashore beginning at H plus 15 minutes. Twelve

LCPR's were to take elements of the 3d Battalion to the two jetties at H plus 20 minutes.

Simultaneously, Green Beach 1 was to be

seized by a rifle company and the heavy

weapons company of the 1st Battalion.

Once the two jetties were secured, LCI's

bearing the 162d Infantry, supporting

troops, and the task force reserve were to

move inshore and unload. LST's were also

to move to the jetties when the beach area

surrounding them had been cleared by the

186th Infantry. LCM's bearing artillery,

tanks, and engineering equipment were to

move to the beaches as soon as channels

11

 Rad, CTF 76 to ALAMO, 22 May 44, and Rad,

41st Div to ALAMO Force, DD-383, 23 May 44, both

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 23-24 May 44. 12

 HTF FO 1, 15 May 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak,

p. 5.

13

 CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44; CTF 77

Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 4-5; HTF FO 1, 15 May 44. The 4.7-inch ammunition was to be fired by Australian destroyers and the 8-inch by Australian heavy

cruisers.
288 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

MOKMER DROME, BIAK, under air attack.

through the coral were found or made, or to

the jetties in waves following the 186th Infantry's assault companies.14

As soon as it reorganized ashore, the 162d

Infantry was to advance rapidly west along

the coast from Bosnek to seize the three airdromes. This drive was to be supported by

eight tanks of the 603d Tank Company and

the 146th Field Artillery Battalion (105-

mm. howitzers). The fields were to be repaired quickly to accommodate one fighter

group and then expanded to receive an

additional fighter group, a heavy bomber

group, a reconnaissance group, a night

fighter squadron, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Mokmer Drome was to be

the first field developed.15

It was obviously impossible, for tactical

reasons, to set a specific date by which the

HURRICANE Task Force was to seize the Biak

airfields. However, the urgency of quickly

securing these fields was impressed upon

General Fuller. One of the reasons for

scheduling the Biak operation only ten days

after the Wakde-Sarmi landing was to provide, from Biak, additional air support for

the Central Pacific's invasion of the Marianas on 15 June. The Allied Air Forces intended that one heavy bomber group and,

apparently, some reconnaissance aircraft

would be in operation from Biak before that

date. The inadequate size of Wakde Island

and the terrain and geographical position

of Hollandia inclined Southwest Pacific

planners toward the belief that only from

Biak could all the bombing and reconnaissance missions necessary to the support of

the Marianas operation be properly executed. Finally, the faster the Biak fields were

secured and made operational the more

14

 CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44; HTF FO

1, 15 May 44; 186th Inf FO 2, 22 May 44, atchd to

186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44. 15

 HTF FO 1, 15 May 44; ALAMO Force FO 17,

12 May 44; Advon5AF OI 1, 12 May 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14 May 44.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 289

rapidly could Allied forces of the Southwest

Pacific undertake subsequent advances in

their own theater.16 While it is not clear how

soon after its landing the HURRICANE Task

Force was expected to secure the Biak fields,

it is probable that General Headquarters

anticipated that at least one of the fields

would be operational by 10 June.

The Landing

Preparations and Approach

Most of the HURRICANE Task Force

staged at Humboldt Bay, where preparations for departure were made under difficult circumstances. Terrain considerations

forced most of the task force to assemble on

the southern of the two sandspits dividing

Humboldt and Jautefa Bays. On this spit

the beach had a steep slope which made it

impossible for more than a very few LST's

to be held against the shore line long enough

to load bulk stores. The LST's had to beach

on the northern spit, where clearing and

salvage after the fires and explosions which

had ravaged that beach during the early

phases of the Hollandia operation had not

been completed. In addition, the northern

spit was being used to unload supplies

destined to be used at Hollandia, to load

supplies being sent to the TORNADO Task

Force at Wakde-Sarmi, and to unload cargo

for the HURRICANE Task Force.

No road connected the northern and

southern sandspits. Consequently, most of

the supplies and equipment, as well as many

of the troops, had to be transported by water

from the southern to the northern loading

area. There were only a few LCT's available

for this work and only by working twentyfour hours a day from 15 May on were all

the troops and supplies transported to the

loading beach in time for departure on the

25th. Some elements of the HURRICANE

Task Force, principally the 1st and 3d Battalions, 186th Infantry, were loaded by

small craft from the southern spit onto the

LCI's and APD's which were to take them

to Biak.17

Most of the assault troops of the HURRICANE Task Force were trained and experienced in amphibious operations but not in

landing on a hostile shore from LVT's and

DUKW's launched from LST's in deep

water. Rehearsals for the assault waves were

therefore desirable, but there was time only

for limited drills. A rehearsal with about 65

percent of the LVT's and DUKW's (the

rest were either undergoing repairs or being

used for lighterage at Humboldt Bay) was

held at Humboldt Bay on 23 May, Z minus

4. Serious deficiencies were discovered in

forming waves, timing, and communication

between control vessels (SC's and LCI's)

and the amphibian vehicles.

There was no time for more rehearsal.

Therefore a conference of amphibian-vehicle drivers, assault-unit officers, and naval

control-boat officers was immediately held.

Detailed methods of control were planned,

and illustrated by rehearsing on dry land

with a few vehicles. It was decided that the

timing of assault waves could best be accomplished by having each LST control the moment of launching of its component of each

wave.18

16

 Ltr, Col W. J. Paul [Dir, USAF Hist, Hq Air

Univ] to Gen Ward, 7 Dec 50, no sub; and Ltr, Gen

Krueger to Gen Ward, 2 Jan 51, no sub, both in

OCMH files.

17

 HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 2;

Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 ALAMO to ACofS G-3

ALAMO, no sub, 9 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; 186th Inf Opns Rpt

Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44 pp. 1-2. 18

 HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 2;

CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 6-7.
290 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

The HURRICANE Task Force left Humboldt Bay on the evening of 25 May. Supporting cruisers and their accompanying

destroyers joined the assault shipping offshore the following morning. Thereafter,

since it seemed futile to attempt to evade

enemy search planes (the large convoy

moved at only 8.5 knots) the force proceeded to Biak by the most direct route. No

contacts, visual or by radar, were made with

enemy aircraft on 26 May. During the following night some radar contacts were

made with Japanese planes, but none of

the aircraft so spotted seemed to have discovered the Allied convoy and the force

arrived off Biak early the next morning

apparently without having been detected

by the enemy. (Map V)

A westerly current had been expected in

the Biak area and, on the basis of available

hydrographic information, some allowance

had been made for it. Long before first light

on 27 May, the convoy found itself in the

current. The hydrographic information

now proved to be wrong. The current was

stronger than anticipated, and despite subsequent reduction of cruising speed the convoy arrived off Bosnek about fifteen minutes

early. In an amphibious operation, better

early than late. Assault shipping and combat

vessels immediately deployed in the transport and fire support areas. At 0629 Admiral Fechteler ordered the landing plan to

be executed.19

The Assault

The naval fire support and the air bombardment were carried out as planned. All

targets were well covered and there was little

answering fire from Japanese shore installations. Local tactical surprise was complete.

The first wave of LVT's, with elements of

the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, aboard,

formed rapidly and crossed the line of departure exactly on schedule.20

 From that

time on, the landing operations did not proceed according to plan.

Since the westerly current off Biak proved

to be much stronger than had been anticipated, during the air and naval bombardment the transport group had been set over

3,000 yards west of its proper location. Although some of the ships' officers realized

that the transport group was being carried

west, nothing could be done to rectify the

situation without causing a great deal of

confusion and delaying the landing. More

difficulties were caused by the morning twilight and the smoke and dust raised by the

preliminary bombardment. The correct

beaches were obscured, and the shore line

could not be seen from more than 400 yards

out.

A rocket-equipped LCI, which began firing on the beaches about H minus 4 minutes, led the first LVT wave toward the

shore. The LCI fire, consisting of rockets

and fire from automatic weapons, continued

until H plus 2 minutes, when it was lifted

because it began to endanger the troops who

were unloading and pushing inland. Then

it was discovered that the LVT's had

touched shore at a mangrove swamp almost

3,000 yards west of Green Beach 4. The

next two LVT waves of the 2d Battalion also

landed at the mangrove swamp, as did the

fourth wave's DUKW's. Nevertheless, the

19

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 7-8; Ltr, Adm

Fechteler to Gen Ward, 8 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH

files.

20

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; HTF Opns Rpt

Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 4.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 291

entire battalion was ashore by 0730 and was

pushing beyond the mangrove swamp to the

main coastal road connecting Bosnek and

the airfields. Five minutes later, Companies

I and K of the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry,

landed about 700 yards east of the 2d Battalion.

By this time the effect of the westerly current had been realized by all commanders,

and naval control boat officers had started

to turn succeeding waves eastward to the

proper beaches. Some thirty minutes passed

before the resultant confusion could be

straightened out. For instance, part of an

LCPR wave which was scheduled to land

Company B of the 186th Infantry on Green

Beach 1 at 0735, hit Green Beach 3 at 0742.

The jetties, scheduled to be seized by Companies I and K at 0735, were not secured

until after 0800, when the rest of the 3d

Battalion began landing on them.21

Col. Oliver P. Newman, commanding the

186th Infantry, had the 2d Battalion and

most of the 3d Battalion organized under

his direct control near Mandom, 2,000

yards west of Bosnek, by 0740. With more

than half of his regiment already far west

of the proper landing beaches, and knowing

that the landing had become disorganized

and that the rest of the boat waves were

being delayed, he asked the task force commander if the 186th Infantry should continue with its original mission (securing the

beachhead) or whether it might be feasible

to switch missions with the 162d Infantry

and start moving west toward the airfields.

General Fuller, the HURRICANE Task Force

commander, ordered the 186th Infantry to

continue with its original mission. As events

turned out, it might have been better had

the regiment continued west, and it is possible that a great deal of time might have

been saved if the missions had been

switched. In the first place, the maps with

which the task force was supplied were so

inaccurate that both regiments soon came

upon terrain features that threw much

planning out of gear. Secondly, most of the

186th Infantry had landed so far west that

both it and the 162d (the latter had to cross

the 186th's line of march) consumed much

valuable time getting to their proper locations. Finally, an exchange of missions

might have been executed without much

difficulty, for, in amphibious training, the

41 st Division had learned to switch missions

when such mistakes were made.22

By 0745 the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry,

and the two companies of the 3d Battalion

had started moving eastward. Meanwhile,

the proper beaches had been located and

waves going ashore after 0745, although

late, proceeded to the right beaches at correct intervals. These waves had to land

without the anticipated cover of the first

waves and the results might have been serious had there been strong enemy opposition

in the Bosnek area. But Japanese resistance

was only nominal, and the temporary disruption of the 186th Infantry did not prove

dangerous.23

21

 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44,

p. 2; 186th Inf S-3 Overlay A, in Annex 4-E to

186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44;

CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; CO USS LCI(L)

73 Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 1-2; CO USS Kilty (APD

15) Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 6-7; CO USS Schley

(APD 14) Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO LCT Gp 23

Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; Co K 186th Inf, Record of

Events, 18 Apr-16 Jul 44, in ORB RAC AGO

collection.

22

 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44,

p. 2; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44, atchd to

186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44;

Newman Notes; Ltr, Gen Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec

50, no sub, in OCMH files. 23

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; HTF Opns Rpt

Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 4; 186th Inf Opns Rpt

Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, p. 2.
BIAK COAST LINE near Mandom. In left foreground is mangrove swamp where

2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, landed.

294 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Companies I and K moved east to their

planned location 1,000 yards west of Old

(west) Jetty, arriving there about 1030. As

the two companies took up their positions

and began probing inland to the coral ridge

behind Bosnek, the 2d Battalion passed

through them on its way to the east flank of

the beachhead. As the 2d Battalion approached the jetty area, the rest of the 3d

Battalion, together with regimental headquarters personnel, began moving west and

inland from the jetties to their proper positions, crossing the 2d Battalion's line of

march. To add to the difficulties of movement, at 0915, just as the 2d Battalion was

clearing New Jetty, the task force reserve

and task force artillery units began landing.

It was 0930 before the 2d Battalion, the 3d

Battalion, and the task force reserve were

completely untangled and could move without further confusion to the planned limits

of the initial beachhead. The line marking

these limits was an arc centering on Bosnek

and curving inland from a point on the

beach 1,000 yards west of Old Jetty to the

top of the ridge behind Bosnek. Thence it

swung back to the beach 1,500 yards east

of New Jetty. The area thus enclosed was

secured by the 186th Infantry by noon on

Z Day.24

The face of the coral ridge behind Bosnek

was found to be rough and honeycombed

with small caves. Companies F and G, aided

by elements of the Support Battery, 542d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, sent

patrols along the steep slope and to the top

of the ridge to investigate many of the caves,

most of which proved to be unoccupied,

though three Japanese were killed near

caves directly north of New Jetty. The companies moved over the first slope to a second

ridge line which was parallel to and about

seventy-five yards north of the first. Company G started looking for a trail which was

thought to lead over the ridges to the plateau

north of Bosnek, but it was Company E

which, shortly after noon, found the ill-defined track. A few Japanese in a pillbox

temporarily prevented the two companies

from securing the trail, which was not

cleared until 1400 hours, after the pillbox

had been destroyed. During the late afternoon, patrols were sent north of the ridges

to the area which the Japanese had surveyed

for an airdrome. A few Japanese, most of

whom fled upon being sighted, were found

at the airdrome site, but there were no signs

of large organized enemy groups north,

northeast, or east of Bosnek insofar as the

186th Infantry could ascertain during 27

May.25

The 162d Infantry on Z Day

The 162d Infantry had begun landing

shortly after 0900 on Z Day.26 The regiment

quickly assembled and immediately started

moving west along the main coastal road toward the task force objectives, the three

Japanese airdromes. Two alternatives had

been planned for this advance. The first was

to send the three battalions in column along

the coastal road in the order 3d, 2d, and 1st.

The other was to have only the 3d Battalion

attack along the road while the 2d Battalion

24

 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; 186th Inf

Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, p. 2; 3d Bn

186th Inf Jnl, 14 May-24 Oct 44, in ORB RAC

AGO collection.

25

 Ibid.; 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, p. 3. 26

 Information in this subsection is taken principally from: 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May19 Aug 44, pp. 1-3; 162d Inf FO 1, 15 May 44,

and 162d Inf Jnl 22 May-19 Aug 44, both atchd

to 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 295

moved over the ridges to the inland plateau

and pushed west, echeloned to the right rear

of the 3d. In case the latter plan was used,

the 1st Battalion was also to advance over

the inland plateau on the 2d Battalion's

right rear. This second plan was to be used

only if the Japanese appeared to be holding

the ground behind the initial beachhead in

great strength, for it was realized that the

echelon movement would probably be more

time consuming than a column attack along

the road, and speedy occupation of the airdromes was the principal mission of the

162d Infantry.

Since there had been few contacts with

the enemy by the time that the 162d Infantry was ready to start its attack westward, it was decided that only one company

of the 2d Battalion need be sent inland to

protect the right flank. The rest of that battalion and all of the 1st were to follow the

3d along the main road. The 1st Battalion

was to maintain contact with the 186th

Infantry in the Bosnek area until such time

as the tactical situation permitted this contact to be broken. Should the advance of

the 2d and 3d Battalions be rapid, the 1st

would have to stretch its companies west

along the road from the positions of the 1st

Battalion, 186th Infantry, at Mandom.

It was 0930 before the 3d Battalion had

passed the point at which the first assault

waves of the 186th Infantry had come

ashore about 0715. An hour later, the battalion had passed through the village of

Ibdi, west of the 2,000-yard-long mangrove

swamp. Beyond Ibdi the coral ridge which

paralleled the southern shore of Biak fell

steeply to within 100 feet of the beach. At

this point the ridge was a vertical cliff about

200 feet high, below which the main road

ran along the coast. The defile between the

beach and the cliff, not shown on any maps

then available to the 162d Infantry, began

about 1,500 yards west of Ibdi and ran in a

generally southwesterly direction for almost

2,000 yards along the shore of Soanggarai

Bay. At the village of Parai, on the beach

just beyond the western end of the defile,

the cliff broke into a series of parallel ridges

which formed a continuation of the main

coastal ridge.

It was about 1115, when the regimental

Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon

discovered an enemy position on the face

of the cliff west of Ibdi, that the 162d Infantry first learned of the existence of the

Parai Defile. At 1300 the 3d Battalion, with

six tanks of the 603d Tank Company leading the advance, arrived at the eastern entrance to the defile. There was no large

Japanese force stationed along the cliff, but

the few Japanese had such a tactical advantage over troops moving along the coastal

road that they were able to delay the 162d

Infantry's advance for some time. The tanks

fired on enemy-occupied caves along the

cliff, and rocket-equipped LCI's, lying offshore, pounded the main road and ridge

west of Parai. By 1500 the 3d Battalion had

pushed through the defile and had secured

Parai and a large jetty at that village.

Meanwhile Company E, which had been

attempting to advance along the ridge north

of the rest of the regiment, had found that

the terrain and thick vegetation made progress along that route next to impossible.

Since the company was lagging far behind

the rest of the advance and since strong

enemy opposition had not yet been encountered either inland or on the coastal

route, it withdrew to join the rest of the 2d

Battalion on the beach, and by the time

that battalion had reached Parai, Company

E was back in place. Progress west of the

Parai Defile was without noteworthy incident during the rest of the afternoon, though

scattered small groups of Japanese were seen
296 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

and fired upon. At the close of the day the

2d and 3d Battalions started digging in

around Parai and along the coast west

toward the village of Mokmer. The 1st Battalion remained at Ibdi.

Supporting Arms and Services,

Z Day

The first artillery unit ashore on 27 May

was Battery C, 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which, landing from amphibian vehicles, was set up and ready to fire by 0730.

The rest of the battalion, together with the

entire 146th Field Artillery Battalion, was

ashore by 1100. Battery C, 947th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers), in

general support, came ashore during the

morning and went into position east of New

Jetty early in the afternoon. The 121st Field

Artillery Battalion was prepared to support

the operations of the 186th Infantry, but

only Battery C, which did some firing on the

coral caves behind Bosnek, got into action.

By early afternoon the westward advance of

the 162d Infantry had progressed so far that

two batteries of the 146th Field Artillery

Battalion were displaced to Ibdi. Other than

the few shots by Battery C of the 121st, artillery fire during the day was limited to registration on check points, and no defensive or

harassing fires were requested until 0115 on

28 May. Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer

Battalion, landed its 4.2-inch mortars at the

jetties at 0815. The company followed the

162d Infantry to the west and bivouacked

for the night near the 1st Battalion, 162d

Infantry. It did no firing during the day.27

Naval support vessels, in addition to furnishing rocket fire west of the Parai Defile,

hit other targets. The cruisers and destroyers

of Fire Support Groups A and B kept up harassing fire on the airdrome areas throughout the day until 1700. One destroyer sank

six enemy barges west of Bosnek during the

morning. Another destroyer, operating east

of the beachhead, fired on many targets of

opportunity, including enemy troops in

caves along the water line and supply, ammunition, and fuel dumps.28

 Not all the

B-24's scheduled to engage in the prelanding bombardment reached Biak, but the

principal targets were adequately covered

by the planes which did reach them. The

medium bombers, whose action was controlled by the Naval Attack Force commander on Z Day, arrived over Biak on

time. These support aircraft delivered requested attacks accurately and promptly.

Fighter cover could not be established over

Biak until 1110 because a front of bad

weather west of Wakde Island, where the

fighters were based, delayed the planes' arrival. Fortunately, no determined enemy air

attacks were made before 1110.29

Antiaircraft artillery, under the control of

Headquarters, 208th Antiaircraft Artillery

Group, quickly set up its guns in the beachhead area during the morning. A few enemy

planes which flew over Biak around noon

fled before antiaircraft guns from ship or

27

 41st Inf Div [MTF] Artillery, Opns Rpt Biak,

27 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 2-3; 947th FA Bn Jnl Biak,

23 May-20 Aug 44; 121st FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak,

27 May-18 Jul 44, pp. 1-2; Co D 641st Tank

Destroyer (TD) Bn Jnl, 24 May-7 Jul 44 (this

unit's records are variously entitled: Reconnaissance Co, 641st TD Bn; Co D, 641st TD Bn; Co C,

98th Chemical Mortar Bn; Co D, 98th Chemical

Mortar Bn), in ORB RAC AGO collection; 146th

FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, 22 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 3-4. 28

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 9; CO USS Reid

(DD 369) Opns Rpt Biak, 27-28 May 44, p. 1;

CO USS Kalk (DD 611) Opns Rpt Biak, 25 May-4

Jun 44, p. 2. 29

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 10.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 297

shore could be brought to bear. But all antiaircraft crews were on the alert to expect

further Japanese air action late in the afternoon. Because of the difference in time of

sunset at the closest Allied and Japanese

bases, Japanese aircraft could remain in the

Biak area about half an hour after Allied

planes had to leave.

The expected attacks developed shortly

after 1600, when four Japanese two-engined bombers, accompanied by three or

four fighters, approached the beachhead

from the north, flying low over the ridge

behind Bosnek and thus escaping radar detection. Some excellent targets were ready

for the Japanese. Admiral Fechteler had

permitted four LST's to tie up side by side

at one of the jetties. Although he knew this

move to be tactically unsound, he considered it justified because of the importance of

the cargo aboard the LST's and because the

jetty provided the only good spot for LST

beaching. The Japanese bombing was accurate, but the LST's were lucky. None of

the Japanese bombs exploded!

Though the Japanese planes also bombed

and strafed the beaches, none of the bombs

dropped ashore exploded, while the strafing

runs killed only one man and wounded two

others. All four bombers were shot down by

ground or ship-based antiaircraft, and the

Japanese fighters were driven off by some

Allied fighter planes which had remained

late in the area. One Japanese bomber

crashed into the water, sideswiping an SC

which was standing offshore. Two of the

ship's crew were killed and nine wounded.

The SC had to be towed away for repairs,

and a few other naval vessels suffered minor

damage from strafing. There was negligible

damage to supplies and equipment ashore.

Total Allied losses as a result of the air raid

were three killed and fourteen wounded,

most of them naval personnel.30

Unloading on Z Day was accomplished

by a variety of means. Some of the LCT's

were able to reach the beach over the coral

reef, from which the craft received little

damage during the day. Other LCT's, after

a partially destroyed wooden pier off one

of the large jetties was knocked down, unloaded artillery, tanks, trucks, and engineering equipment on the earth and rock section

of the jetty. All LCT unloading was completed by 1000, after which hour the LCT's

aided the LVT's and DUKW's to unload

LST's still standing in the stream outside the

reef. Calm water permitted the LCT's to

fasten ramp to ramp with the LST's, allowing cargo to be transferred directly from the

larger craft to the smaller. Most of the cargo

so handled was brought ashore over the

reef to Green Beach 1. Five of the LST's

were unloaded at the two jetties, as were

most of the LCI's. After they had put troops

ashore, some the LCPR's which had been

brought to Biak aboard APD's aided in unloading LST's. These LCPR operations

ceased at 1000, when the APD's formed a

convoy to return to Hollandia.

Unloading stopped at 1715, about half

an hour earlier than had been planned, because of the threat of more Japanese air

attacks. By that time all the Z-Day troops

30

 Ltr, Adm Fechteler to Gen Ward, 8 Nov 50;

CO LCT Gp 23 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO USS

Kalk Opns Rpt Biak, 25 May-4 Jun 44, p. 2; CTF

77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 10; CO USS LST 463 AA

Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May 44, pp. 1-2; HTF G-3 Jnl,

15 May-21 Aug 44; History of First Battalion, One

Hundred Eighty-Sixth Infantry, While Detached

From Regimental Control, Task Force Reserve, 27

May-2 June 44 (hereafter cited as 1st Bn 186th

Inf Hist, 27 May-2 Jun 44), p. 1, in Annex 4 to

186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44,

pp. 1-2.
298 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

UNLOADING AT BIAK. In the background are two LST's discharging at Old

Jetty. In the foreground are LVT (A)'s.

of the HURRICANE Task Force, some 12,000-

odd, were ashore, as were twelve medium

tanks, five 155-mm. howitzers, twelve 105-

mm. howitzers, twelve 75-mm. pack howitzers, and about 500 vehicles of all types.

An estimated 3,000 tons of bulk cargo (including about 600 tons aboard vehicles)

had been landed, and only 300 tons of bulk

cargo had not been put ashore when unloading operations ceased for the day.31

Principal responsibility for moving the

supplies ashore and establishing dumps was

assigned to the 542d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment, which operated under the

supervision of the Shore Party commander.

Attached to the regiment for these purposes

were the Cannon and Antitank Companies,

162d Infantry; the Cannon Company,

186th Infantry; Company B, 116th Engineers ; four quartermaster companies of various types; a port company; an amphibian

truck company; and an ordnance company.

The Bosnek beachhead held by the 186th

Infantry was ideal for the location of the

initial task force supply dumps and there

31

 CO LCT Gp 23 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CTF 77

Opns Rpt Biak, p. 9; CO USS Kilty (APD 15)

Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO USS Schley (APD 14)

Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO USS LST 463 Opns Rpt

Biak, p. 1; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug

44, p. 5.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 299

was no difficulty finding dispersal areas.

Movement of supplies from the beach to the

dump areas was initially somewhat hampered by lack of wheeled vehicles, but the

Japanese air raids had no effect upon these

activities.32

The 116th Engineers (less Company A)

upon landing devoted its attention to constructing and improving roads in the beachhead area and clearing the ground for supply dumps. Company C supported the westward advance of the 162d Infantry by repairing the road bed and bridges along the

main coastal track. These repairs were necessary so that motor vehicles and the 603d

Tank Company (which, coming ashore at

H plus 50 minutes, had been attached to the

162d Infantry) could follow the infantry

toward the airfields. Company B, 116th Engineers, in addition to working with the

542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

devoted some of its time to clearing and repairing the two jetties at Bosnek. The 116th

Engineers also established task force water

points on the beachhead.33

By nightfall General Fuller, who had assumed command ashore at 0930,34

 had good

reason to be optimistic about the outcome

of the Biak operation.35 The landing, although confused, had been unopposed.

Troops and supplies had come ashore without undue difficulty and had been well-dispersed. Japanese air defense had been ineffective. The 162d Infantry, although it

had discovered unmapped terrain features

and had been temporarily delayed at the

Parai Defile, was well on its way to the airfields. The ridges behind Bosnek had been

cleared. Artillery was well emplaced to support further advances both to the west and

north. No large, organized bodies of Japanese had been encountered. Despite the fact

that information gathered on Z Day indicated that the Japanese garrison on Biak

was larger than had been estimated prior to

the landing,36 no determined enemy ground

defense had been encountered.

The Japanese were soon to change to pessimism any optimism the HURRICANE Task

Force may have possessed on the evening of

Z Day.

The Japanese on Biak

The Japanese, who had occupied Biak in

early 1942, had paid little attention to the

island until late 1943. Then they decided

to convert Biak into a key air base which

would be within fighter range of many other

of their air bases in western Dutch New

Guinea. To protect and hold the island, the

Japanese sent to Biak one of their best regiments, the veteran (of China) 222d Infantry, 36th Division, which arrived on Biak in

December 1943. It is probable that the Japanese initially intended to make Biak into a

tremendous ground stronghold as well as a

32

 HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 5 ;

542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 1-2; G-4 HTF,

G-4 Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May G-20 Aug 44, p. 6

(atchd to HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44). 33

 HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 5;

116th Engr Opns Rpt Biak, 10 May-20 Aug 44, Ch.

III, pp. 1-2; Ltr, CO 162d Inf to CO 116th Engrs,

13 Sep 44, sub: Commendation of Company C,

116th Engrs, in 116th Engrs Opns Rpt Biak, 10

May-20 Aug 44, Ch. I; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt

Biak, p. 1, copy in OCMH files. 34

 Rad, CTF 77 to Com7thFlt, 26 May 44, in

ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-28 May

44; Rad, HTF to ALAMO, no number, 27 May 44,

in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 25-28

May 44. 35

 Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF4546, 28 May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 28-29 May 44, states that Gen Fuller

had some hope of taking the airstrips on 28 May. 36

 G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part I.

Historical Narrative, p. 4.
300 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

major air base. However, when on 9 May

Imperial General Headquarters moved the

southeastern strategic main line of resistance

west of Biak to Sorong and the Halmaheras,

Biak was left as an outpost which was to be

held as long as possible.

Japanese Defenses on Biak

The command of Japanese Army troops

on Biak was vested in the commander of the

222d Infantry, Col. Naoyuki Kuzume.37

As Commander, Biak Detachment, Colonel

Kuzume had under his control approximately 3,400 men of the 222d Infantry,

company of the 36th Division's light tanks,

miscellaneous field and antiaircraft artillery

units, and numerous service organizations,

the largest of which were the 17th, 107th

and 108th Field Airdrome Construction

Units of about 500 men each. Also stationed

on Biak and under Colonel Kuzume's operational control were about 1,500 naval

troops, among whom the senior officer was

Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Senda, the commanding officer of the 28th Naval Special Base

Force. Most of the naval troops were members of service organizations, but the approximately 125 men of the 19th Naval

Guard Unit had received some combat

training. The strength of Colonel Kuzume's

command on 27 May was some 11,400 men,

of whom about 4,000 were combat effectives. Insofar as supplies allowed him to do

so, Colonel Kuzume armed his service troops

as auxiliary infantry and so used them

throughout the Biak operation.38

The Allied landings at Aitape and Hollandia on 22 April had prompted the Biak

Detachment commander to draw up detailed defense plans and to begin work on

fortifications which would help his troops

to hold the island. About mid-May Colonel

Kuzume was warned by the 2d Area Army

that an Allied advance to the Schouten

Islands was a certainty. After the landings

of the TORNADO Task Force at WakdeSarmi on 17 May, Colonel Kuzume ordered

a cessation of all work on the Biak airdromes, started an ambitious program of

fortification, and began deploying his troops

for a protracted land defense.

Colonel Kuzume based his plans on the

sound assumption that the principal Allied

objective would be the airfield area along

Biak's southern coast. Faced with the problem of defending an extensive coast line with

a small body of troops, he chose to concentrate his defenses on terrain from which he

could prevent Allied use of the airstrips for

the longest possible time. For this purpose,

he placed emphasis on high ground immediately north and northwest of Mokmer

Drome.

Where the main coastal ridge turns

sharply north just west of Mokmer village,

it leaves in its wake a series of gradually

rising small terraces, many of which have

steep seaward sides and some of which have

a levee-like formation similar to that of the

main ridge. The forward edge of the first 37

 Information in this subsection is from: MID

WD, Military Reports, 24, pp. 1-9, copy in G-2

DofA files; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 53, 9 Aug

44, copy in G-2 DofA files; G-2 MTF, G-2 Hist of

HTF, Vol. I, Part II, Enemy Opns, pp. 1-6; Opns of

Yuki Group, pp. 1-2; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and

Biak (Rev), p. 49.

38

 Incl 2, List of Corrections, to Ltr, Maj Gen

Charles A. Willoughby, ACofS G-2 FEC, to Gen

Ward, about 10 Mar 51, no sub, in OCMH files.

According to this list, there were at least 12,000

Japanese on Biak on 27 May, but this figure seems

high.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 301

prominent terrace rises steeply from the

coastal plain in the form of a narrow ridge

averaging sixty feet in height and lying a

few hundred yards north of Mokmer and

Borokoe Dromes. From this ridge and the

rising terraces beyond it, the Japanese could

look down on any activity along the coastal

road west of Mokmer village and could observe activity at and near the three airfields.

In this amphitheater-like terrain and

along the low ridge, both of which were covered with thick growth (scrub on the terrace

and rain forest on the ridge), the Biak Detachment emplaced many field artillery and

antiaircraft weapons. There were also many

automatic weapons and a few mortars. All

these weapons were located within range of

Mokmer Drome and most of them could

also fire on Borokoe Drome. The key to Colonel Kuzume's defenses in this area was the

West Caves area, located about 50 yards

north of the low ridge and about 1,200 yards

north of the western end of Mokmer Drome.

The West Caves were actually three large

sumps, or depressions in the ground, which

were connected by underground tunnels and

caverns. The caves were ringed with pillboxes, bunkers, and foxholes, and an extensive system of coral and log emplacements

was built along the spur ridge above Mokmer Drome. Biak naval headquarters was

originally located in the West Caves, which

could shelter 1,000 men, and Colonel Kuzume planned to move Biak Detachment

headquarters to the caves for the final defense of the airdromes. As long as the West

Caves and the positions along the low ridge

were occupied by the Japanese, Allied

planes could not safely use the airfields.

On the main coastal ridge between the

village of Ibdi and the Parai Defile the Biak

Detachment developed another center of

resistance which came to be known as the

Ibdi Pocket. The terrain in the area was a

series of knifelike east-west ridges separated

by depressions and crevices up to fifty feet

deep. These ridges were connected in places

by cross-ridges, and the entire area was covered with thick rain forest and dense jungle

undergrowth which had found a foothold in

the coral. Pillboxes of coral and logs, hasty

emplacements of the same materials, small

caves and crevices, and foxholes at the bases

of large trees were all utilized by the enemy

to defend the area.

On the main ridge north of Mokmer the

Japanese constructed a third strong point,

which was called by the Japanese the East

Caves. Behind Mokmer the ridge rose to a

height of 240 feet. It was not so steep a cliff

as the Parai Defile barricade, but it could

not be climbed without the use of hands.

About three quarters of the way to the top

was a flat ledge from which two large caverns, similar to those in the West Caves area,

could be entered. The Japanese constructed

pillboxes on the ridge both below and above

the ledge, and in the caverns they emplaced

mortars, 20-mm. guns, and heavy machine

guns. Observation posts were also set up at

the East Caves, from which an unobstructed

view of the coast from Parai to the west end

of Mokmer Drome could be obtained. The

Biak Detachment used the East Caves principally as living quarters, supply dumps, and

as a connecting link between the Ibdi Pocket

and the West Caves. Continued Japanese

occupation of the East Caves would endanger Allied troop and supply movements

along the coastal road from Parai to Mokmer Drome.

Surprisingly, Colonel Kuzume made no

attempt to set up a defense in depth along

the road from Bosnek to the airfields. A haphazard beach defense, based on improved

natural caves along the water line, was es-
302 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tablished west of Mokmer and east of Bosnek. Between Opiaref, 6,000 yards east of

Bosnek, and Saba, 3,000 yards west of Opiaref, such shore-line positions were well constructed and camouflaged. They could be

entered from defilade and they were backed

by prepared mortar positions. However,

these beach defenses had no depth, and the

pillboxes or improved caves along the water

line consisted of a single line of positions,

not all of which had overlapping fields of

fire. Four large steel pillboxes, only one of

which had been emplaced by 27 May, were

to cover the open beach at Bosnek.

Dispositions of the Biak Detachment

Colonel Kuzume's initial plan for the defense of Biak was published on 27 April, just

five days after the Allied landings at Hollandia and Aitape.39

 The 1st Battalion, 222d

Infantry, was responsible for the defense of

the southeastern section of the island east

of a line drawn northwestward from Opiaref. The 10th Company, 222d Infantry, reinforced with artillery and mortar units, was

to secure Korim Bay, located halfway up the

southeast-northwest side of Biak. The area

between Opiaref and Bosnek was assigned

to the 19th Naval Guard Unit. The bulk of

the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry, was to defend the airfields and the coast from Bosnek

west to Sorido. The 3d Battalion (less two

companies and some artillery and mortar

detachments) was to be held in reserve near

the airfields, and the tank company was

ordered to assemble near Saba.

The Biak Detachment was not in its selected defensive positions on Z Day but was

apparently being held mobile. Detachment

headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the 222d

Infantry (less elements), about half of the

19th Naval Guard Unit, and miscellaneous

service organizations were all located in a

cave and garden area on the inland plateau

about 3,000 yards north-northwest of Bosnek. Outposts at Saba and Opiaref were

held by the 1st Company, 222d Infantry,

and a platoon of the 2d Company was stationed along the main ridge behind Bosnek.

The bulk of the 2d Battalion, the rest of the

naval guard unit, and some naval antiaircraft organizations were located at the East

Caves. Naval headquarters, various naval

service units, and the 6th Company, 222d

Infantry, were at the West Caves. Most of

the army service units were at Mokmer

Drome or disposed along the low ridge north

of that field. The bulk of the 3d Battalion

was posted at the west end of the same airfield. One platoon of the 10th Company was

at Sorido, guarding the southern terminus

of a trail which led north across the island

to Korim Bay. The tanks had not yet moved

to Saba but were assembled on the terrace

north of the eastern end of Mokmer Drome.

At various points along the terrace and

low ridge were emplaced a battery of mountain guns, four 120-mm. naval dual purpose

guns, three or four 3-inch antiaircraft guns,

and a large number of mortars and automatic weapons of all calibers. One 6-inch

naval coast defense gun was located on the

beach south of Mokmer Drome, from which

position it could cover the coast line for

about five miles to the east and west. Some

large guns were awaiting emplacement on

the Bosnek beaches, while others in the same

area, including a second 6-inch coast defense gun, had been destroyed by Allied air

and naval bombardment prior to the land39

 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this

subsection is from: MID WD, Military Reports, 24,

pp. 5-14; G-2 Hist of RTF, Vol. I, Part II, Enemy

Opns, pp. 5-7; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 3-4; 2d

Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 50-56.
BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY 303

ings. At least one mortar company was at

the East Caves and a few more mortars, together with a small body of riflemen, were in

the Ibdi Pocket area.

Reactions to the Allied Landings

Despite the fact that Colonel Kuzume

had been warned that an Allied attack on

Biak was imminent, the Biak Detachment

was unprepared on 27 May. The troops

were not in the best available positions, units

were scattered, and the emplacement of

artillery had not been completed. The bulk

of the 2d Company platoon which was stationed on the ridges overlooking Bosnek

committed suicide during the morning of

Z Day, and survivors were either killed by

186th Infantry patrols or fled inland. The

wasteful suicide of the 2d Company platoon

was apparently the only action taken by any

part of the Biak Detachment until the night

of 27-28 May.

Caught out of position as he was, it is

doubtful whether Colonel Kuzume either

could or would have carried out his original

defense plans. However, the problem was

soon taken out of the colonel's hands. The

27th of May found on Biak Lt. Gen. Takazo

Numata, Chief of Staff of the 2d Area

Army, who happened to be present on an

inspection trip from army headquarters.

General Numata, who remained on Biak

until 15 June, immediately assumed direction of the island's defense. It is probable

that many of the sweeping changes which

were later made in the Biak Detachment's

original plans were undertaken upon his

orders.

The first offensive reaction on the part of

the Biak Detachment was a night raid on

the positions of Batteries B and C, 146th

Field Artillery Battalion, which were located near Ibdi in thick scrub growth north

of the main coastal road. Sometime before

midnight a Japanese patrol of the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, had crossed the road

to the south, and shortly after that time

parts of this group charged with fixed bayonets into Battery C's wire section. Two artillerymen were immediately stabbed to

death and others were wounded before the

enemy was driven back by American machine gun fire which was aimed along the

road. More men of the 3d Battalion, 222d

Infantry, renewed the attack with grenades

and rifle fire, some circling to the north

around Battery C and a few others moving

against Battery B, located 200 yards to the

east. Attacks on Battery C continued until

daylight, when the last Japanese withdrew.

The action cost Battery C 4 men killed and

8 wounded, while a near-by antiaircraft detachment lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded.

Over 15 of the enemy had been killed during the night and an unknown number

wounded.40

The action was but a minor prelude to a

larger battle in which the 162d Infantry,

continuing its advance west on the 28th, was

soon to become involved.

40

 The story of this night action is from: 146th

FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, 22 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 4-6;

Opns of Yuki Group, p. 3; 2d Army Opns, at Sarmi

and Biak (Rev), pp. 55-56.
CHAPTER XIII

West to Mokmer Drome

After spending a night disturbed only by

a few Japanese mortar shells, the 162d Infantry resumed its westward advance at approximately 0730 on 28 May. (See Map

V.) Just past the Parai Defile the seaward

side of the main coastal ridge gives way to

an inclined terrace about 500 yards wide

and a mile and a half long. Slanting toward

the shore, this terrace ends in the twentyfoot-high cliff located along or near the

water line from Parai west beyond Mokmer

village. The 162d Infantry planned to send

part of its 3d Battalion along the terrace,

inland, while the rest of the unit advanced

along the coastal road, which runs from the

Parai Defile partly beneath the cliff and

partly along its crest. The 2d Battalion was

to move along the terrace to the right rear

of the 3d, while the 1st Battalion was to take

up reserve positions at Parai. The advance

was to be supported from the shore by the

146th Field Artillery and the 603d Tank

Company. Destroyers were to stand offshore

to provide fire support on call.1

An Initial Reverse

Prelude to Retreat

The 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, proceeded through Mokmer village without opposition.2

 Company L and some of Company M's heavy machine guns then moved

on to the terrace above Mokmer, leaving the

rest of the battalion to continue toward the

airdromes along the coastal road. By 0930

the main body of the battalion was at a

road junction nearly 1,500 yards west of

Mokmer. Slight resistance along the road

from Mokmer had been easily brushed aside,

but at the road junction enemy resistance

stiffened sharply and machine gun and mortar fire pinned down Company K, which

was leading the advance. As the 146th Field

Artillery Battalion tried to silence this fire

elements of Company K pushed westward

to within 200 yards of Mokmer Drome. This

was as close as any troops of the HURRICANE

Task Force were to approach that airfield

for over a week.

About 1000 hours, Japanese infantry,

1

 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44,

p. 2; 146th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, 22 May-20 Aug

44, p. 7; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; Ltr,

Col Harold Haney (ex-CO 162d Inf) to Gen Ward,

Chief of Mil Hist, 20 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH

files.. For additional information on terrain in this

area, see above, pp. 300-301. 2

 Information in this subsection is principally

from: 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44,

pp. 2-4; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; 603d

Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; 146th FA Bn Opns

Rpt Biak, 22 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 7-9; CO USS

Reid (DD 369) Opns Rpt Biak, 27-28 May 44,

pp. 2-3; CO USS Wilkes (DD 441) Opns Rpt

Biak, 28 May 44, pp. 2-5; CO USS LCI(L) 73

Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-5 Jun 44, p. 2; 162d Inf,

Rpt of Supply Opns, Biak, pp. 2-3, atchd to 162d

Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44; 542d

EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, p.. 4; Ltr, Haney to Ward,

20 Nov 50.
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 305

EAST CAVES AREA where the 162d Infantry first encountered the Japanese.

elements of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry,

counterattacked from the west.3 The forward units of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, withdrew 600 yards along the coastal

road to the point at which the twenty-foot

cliff left the shore line, but Japanese infantry attacks, which were supported by

automatic weapons fire, continued. The

enemy threw more troops into the battle

(more of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry)

from the East Caves area until the attackers

were coming not only from the west but also

from the northwest and north. The Japanese split the 3d Battalion by driving a

wedge along the cliff between the troops on

the shore and those on the terrace. Companies L and M were cut off. The 2d Battalion, attempting to get on the terrace to

the north of the 3d Battalion, was pinned

down by Japanese fire from the East Caves

and was unable to advance.

By 1100 the 3d Battalion was in sore

straits. The main body was on the coast in

an area about 200 yards deep and about

500 east to west. Behind the battalion, the

shore line was a twenty-foot cliff. The entire area was covered with secondary growth

thick enough to prevent good observation

along the ground but open enough to allow

the Japanese in their higher East Caves

position to view every American movement.

The Japanese had excellent cover and concealment in the thick vegetation, coral caves,

and crevices of the East Caves area and, at

the same time, were able to subject the 3d

Battalion to intense mortar, grenade, machine gun, and rifle fire. Because of poor

3

 Identifications of enemy units in this and the

following subsections are based on: Opns of Yuki

Group, p. 4; MID WD, Military Reports, 24, p.

14; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp.

56-59, 62.
306 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

observation and the defiladed enemy positions, the fire of neither the 146th Field

Artillery Battalion nor the offshore destroyers was able to silence the enemy's weapons.

Most of Company L and the Company M

detachment which was also on the coral

terrace managed to find a covered route

back to the rest of the 3d Battalion on the

shore, but one platoon, initially surrounded,

had to fight its way eastward into the lines

of the 2d Battalion, north of Mokmer village. Company G, on the terrace north of

the main road and between the 2d and 3d

Battalions, was also cut off and withdrew to

the 2d Battalion only with difficulty, and

after it had suffered many casualties from

Japanese fire. The 1st Battalion was ordered

to move north from Parai onto the main

coastal ridge to outflank the enemy positions, but efforts to do so were halted by

enemy fire from the East Caves. Two companies patrolled in the broken terrain along

the main ridge but were unable to move

westward.

During the afternoon the 3d Battalion

stood off two more concerted enemy counterattacks, one at 1200 and another

shortly after 1400, and suffered more casualties from the enemy mortar and artillery

fire. During the latter attack, the Japanese

began moving some light tanks forward from

the Mokmer Drome area. The 3d Platoon,

603d Tank Company, engaged these tanks

at a range of 1,200 yards and, with the aid

of fire from destroyers lying offshore, drove

the enemy tanks back into defilade positions.

Three tanks of the 603d were damaged by

Japanese artillery fire and three men of the

same organization were wounded during the

action.

Meanwhile, General Fuller had decided

to reinforce the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry.

The 1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company,

moved west along the coastal road. At the

same time small boats manned by the 542d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were

also sent forward with ammunition and

medical supplies, both dangerously low. The

small craft moved along the shore out of

range of Japanese mortar and artillery fire

until opposite the 3d Battalion's position and

then shot inshore at full speed, one by one.

Supplies were replenished and the worst

casualties evacuated despite continued shelling of the 3d Battalion's position by the

Japanese. The 1st and 2d Battalions continued their efforts to clear the Japanese

from the terrace behind the 3d but met with

little success.

By late afternoon the 3d Battalion's position was becoming untenable. Japanese

mortar and artillery fire increased and enemy patrols cut the coastal road to the rear.

Obviously, no further advance could be

made until the enemy fire from the East

Caves area could be stopped by ground attack from the north, by naval fire from the

south, or by artillery fire from emplacements

to the east. Thus far, artillery fire had had

little apparent effect upon the volume of

Japanese fire. Only one artillery battalion

was in position to fire on the East Caves

area and the effect of its fire was limited by

the location of the Japanese emplacements,

most of which were either in deep defilade

or were in caves and crevices facing seaward. Offshore destroyers and rocket LCI's

were in the best position to fire on the Japanese emplacements. The best expedient

would have been increased fire from these

naval vessels, but such fire was now impossible to obtain.

The naval fire support officer with the

162d Infantry had been killed at the 3d

Battalion's position about noon. Direct shipto-shore communications immediately broke
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 307

down, and no replacement for the liaison

officer was immediately available. Communications to the offshore destroyers and

rocket LCI's remained erratic and slow

throughout the 28th and the next day—

messages had to be passed back from the 3d

Battalion to regiment, then to HURRICANE

Task Force headquarters, to naval attack

force headquarters, and finally to the naval

fire support groups and individual ships. It

was impossible to concentrate sufficient support fire on the Japanese positions to neutralize the artillery, mortar, and machine

gun fire still falling on the 162d Infantry's

forward elements.

About 1600 General Fuller gave up plans

for further attempts at reinforcement of the

forward units and ordered Colonel Haney

to withdraw his 3d Battalion to the positions

held the previous night. The withdrawal

started slowly because communications difficulties still prevented concentration of supporting fires. However, at 1700 the regimental commander finally ordered the 3d

Battalion to start moving back along the

coastal road. Tanks were to act as point,

and rear guard and close-in artillery fire

was substituted for a disengaging force. The

battalion was to continue eastward until it

had passed through the 2d, which was setting up a new defensive position east of

Mokmer village.

The men of the 3d Battalion moved in

small parties along the beach and main road,

which was intermittently swept by Japanese

mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. Many

troops were unable to use the main road, but

had to drop down to the beach below the

overhanging cliff. Four tanks brought up

the rear and protected the north flank. Between 1830 and 1900 all elements of the 3d

Battalion reached safety beyond the 2d Battalion's lines and began digging in for the

night east of the latter unit. Casualties for

the day, almost all of them suffered by the

3d Battalion, were 16 killed and 87

wounded.

The First Attack Ends in Retreat

Sometime between dawn on 28 May and

first light on the 29th, the 1st Battalion, 222d

Infantry, and the headquarters of the Biak

Detachment had moved overland to the

West Caves from their previous positions

north of the surveyed drome behind Bosnek.4

 With the 1st Battalion in reserve, Colonel Kuzume could throw the entire 2d and

3d Battalions against the 162d Infantry. For

the American regiment the night of 28-29

May proved quiet in comparison with the

action during the previous day, but the Japanese were ready to launch strong counterattacks against it on the morning of the 29th.

The first Japanese attack began at 0700

on the 29th and was directed against the 2d

Battalion, 162d Infantry. This attack, which

was carried out by men of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 222d Infantry, was beaten off by

mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire without

loss to the American unit. About 0800, new

waves of Japanese infantry, now supported

4

 Information in this subsection is from: MID

WD, Military Reports, 24, p. 14; 162d Inf Opns

Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 4-5; 162d Inf

Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; 41st Inf Div, Tng Notes

5, 12 Sep 44, sub: Japanese Tactics—Biak Opn,

pp. 9-10, in files of the 41st Inf Div, in ORB RAC

AGO collection; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak,

p. 2; 146th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 10-11;

542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, pp., 4-6; 1st Plat Co

D 641st TD Bn Jnl, 28 May-5 Jul 44, atchd to Co

D, 641st TD Bn Jnl, 24 May-7 Jul 44, in ORB

RAC AGO collection; 2d Plat Co D 641st TD Bn

Jnl, 27 May-7 Jul 44, atchd to Co D, 641st TD

Bn Jnl, 24 May-7 Jul 44, in ORB RAG AGO

collection; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; CO

USS LCI(L) 73 Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-5 Jun

44, pp. 2-3; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak

(Rev), pp. 58-62.
SCENE OF THE TANK BATTLE. Coastal road is depicted crossing the cliff

in left corner of photograph.

310 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

by four tanks, appeared west and north of

the 2d Battalion, thus beginning the first

tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area.

The 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, with the

1st Platoon, 503d Tank Company, in support, was astride the main coastal road

1,000 yards east of Mokmer. The battalion's

left flank was on the beach while its right

was against the coastal cliff and less than

forty yards inland. (The right had been

drawn in from an initial position on the terrace above the cliff after the 0700 attacks.)

Between the beach and the cliff was a coconut grove. The main coastal road crossed

the rise of the cliff at a point about 475

yards west of the 2d Battalion's lines.

Shortly after 0800 the Japanese tanks, followed by an infantry column, advanced

down the incline where the main road

crossed the cliff and deployed in echelon left

formation in the coconut grove. The Japanese vehicles were light tanks, Model 95

(1935), weighing about nine tons, carrying

a crew of three men, and armed with one

37-mm. cannon and two 7.7-mm. machine

guns. They were opposed by two General

Sherman M4A1 medium tanks, the heaviest

armament on which was the 75-mm. gun.

Each Japanese tank was stopped by one

round of 75-mm. armor-piercing ammunition, while the enemy infantry was literally

mowed down by the machine guns and mortars of the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry.

Armor-piercing 75-mm. shells passed right

through the Japanese light tanks, and the

Shermans followed with a few rounds of 75-

mm. high explosive, which tore holes in the

Japanese vehicles and blew loose their turrets. During this action several hits scored

on the Shermans by the Japanese 37-mm.

guns caused no damage.

About thirty minutes after the first attack

the Japanese sent in a second wave of three

tanks, which used the same route of approach and the same formation in the coconut grove. These three were quickly destroyed by three Shermans. One enemy

37-mm. shell locked the 75-mm. gun of one

Sherman in place, but the American tank

backed part way into a shell hole to obtain

elevation for its weapon and, despite the

damage, managed to destroy one of the

enemy tanks. The Japanese tanks having

been stopped and the leading elements of

the second infantry wave killed, the attack

disintegrated and the enemy withdrew.

For an hour or so the Japanese were

quiet, but late in the morning, under the

cover of machine gun fire and mortar barrages, they began to circle north of the 2d

and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry. New infantry attacks began about 1200. The enemy

was unable to dislodge the 162d Infantry,

but his mortar fire caused many casualties

within the regimental perimeter and the

Japanese managed to cut the coast road

east of a large T-jetty at Parai. Company B

and the Cannon Company (which was not

armed with its usual 105-mm. howitzers but

acted as an additional rifle company

throughout the Biak operation) counterattacked the Japanese road block behind

close-in mortar support and succeeded in

dislodging the enemy by fire and movement.

By noon it had become apparent that no

attack launched against the airdromes

would be successful until the Japanese could

be cleared from the high ground overlooking the fields and the approaches thereto

or until Japanese fire from the East Caves

area and the ridge line east of that position

could be neutralized. On 29 May it was

impossible to neutralize these enemy instal-
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 311

lations because the infantry troops were so

close to them as to prevent effective artillery fire and because communications from

the ground to support aircraft and naval

vessels were, at best, sporadic. In view of

these facts, Colonel Haney instructed his

staff to prepare plans for withdrawal to

Ibdi and Mandom by amphibious craft or

by march through the Parai Defile. He then

returned to the HURRICANE Task Force command post near Mandom to explain the

situation to the task force commander and

to confer on possible lines of action. At 1200

Colonel Haney returned to the forward

area with approval for a withdrawal.

Colonel Haney's plan was to have his 1st

Battalion cover the withdrawal from positions at Parai, while the other two battalions

and attached units moved both overland

and by water back to Ibdi. One platoon of

Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion (4.2-inch mortars), was to remain in

place to maintain supporting fire during the

withdrawal. The 542d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment was to supply small craft

and amphibian vehicles for the overwater

withdrawal.

It was some time before all elements of

the 162d Infantry could get ready for the

withdrawal, and Colonel Haney could not

issue orders to execute his plan until 1350.

Ten minutes later all troops had begun

moving eastward. The 2d Battalion, less

Company G, loaded on LVT's and

DUKW's at Parai Jetty, was shuttled to

LCM's and LCT's lying offshore, and

moved back to Bosnek. Company L and

part of Company I were withdrawn by the

same method. The rest of the 162d Infantry,

led by the 3d Platoon, 603d Tank Company, moved overland through the Parai

Defile and took up positions at Ibdi. The 1st

Platoon, 603d Tank Company, brought up

the rear of this echelon. The 2d Platoon,

Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, destroyed its mortars and ammunition

and moved eastward with the tanks, while

the 1st Platoon of the same mortar unit

managed to get its weapons out. Company

D, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, armed with rifles and light machine

guns, was sent up the cliff north of the

Parai Jetty as a holding force. After the

overland echelons of the 162d Infantry had

moved east through the Parai Defile, the

engineer company joined the rearguard

tanks and mortar units on the main road.

Close support for the withdrawal was provided by task force artillery and by two

amphibious tanks, an antiaircraft LCM

(these three manned by the 542d Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiment), and a Seventh

Fleet rocket-equipped LCI. By nightfall the

1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, regimental

headquarters, the Cannon and Antitank

Companies, a few tanks, the 205th Field

Artillery Battalion, Company G of the 186th

Infantry, and Company D of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were in a

thousand-yard-long perimeter beginning

about 500 yards west of Ibdi. The 3d Battalion had moved on to Mandom, while the

2d Battalion remained in the Bosnek area.

The 162d Infantry's casualties during the

day were 16 killed, 96 wounded, and

3 injured. The regiment estimated that it

had killed over 500 Japanese during the day.

The enemy, despite his losses, followed up

the advantage he had gained and quickly

pushed troops forward to Parai and into the

cliffs along the Parai Defile. This action

clearly indicated that the Biak Detachment
312 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

intended to take advantage of the natural

defensive position in the Parai Defile area.5

Preparations for a New Attack

Reinforcement of the HURRICANE

Task Force

Even before the 162d Infantry had been

forced to retreat on 29 May, General Fuller

had begun to feel that the situation on Biak

was serious. He, like Colonel Haney, believed that an advance along the coast to

the airdromes would be impossible until the

ridges north of Mokmer and Parai could be

cleared of enemy troops. The task force commander further considered it impossible, because of the danger of overextending his

lines and thereby jeopardizing the beachhead, to outflank the Japanese positions

along the ridges unless he could obtain reinforcements. On 28 May General Fuller had

therefore asked for at least one infantry regiment, one 105-mm. artillery battalion, a

battalion of combat engineers, and another

tank company.6

General Krueger had already planned to

send two battalions of the 163d Infantry

from the Wakde-Sarmi area to Biak to arrive at the latter island on 3 June. Now it

was planned to speed the shipment so that

the two battalions would reach Biak on 1

June. They were to be shipped from WakdeSarmi by LCI and were to carry with them

ten days' rations and three units of fire for

all weapons. The additional units that General Fuller had requested could not be dispatched to Biak right away, although one

155-mm. gun battery could be sent immediately.7

 At the same time, General Krueger

made plans to move the 503d Parachute

Regiment from eastern New Guinea to Hollandia where it was to remain on the alert

for movement by air to Biak in case of need.

The ALAMO Force commander also pressed

for quick movement of 6th Division units

from Milne Bay to Wakde-Sarmi to replace

the elements of the 163d Infantry which

were scheduled to leave the latter area for

Biak.8

Pending the arrival of reinforcements,

General Fuller planned to use his available

troops to hold the west flank at Ibdi and

expand the beachhead at Bosnek. The 162d

Infantry was to establish a semicircular perimeter beginning on the beach west of Ibdi,

reaching north to the main ridge, and returning to the beach at the village. The 1st

Battalion, 186th Infantry, would maintain

a perimeter around Mandom, where Headquarters, HURRICANE Task Force, was located, while the 3d Battalion moved over

the ridge behind Bosnek to set up defenses

on the inland plateau. The 2d Battalion,

with part of the 3d attached, would remain

at the Bosnek beachhead. When the first 5

 The foregoing estimate of Japanese losses is from

HTF G-2 Per Rpt 3, 1800 hrs 28 May-1800 hrs 29

May 44, in G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol II,

Part II, G-2 Per Rpts. The figure for the 162d Inf

is from 162d Inf, Rpt of Casualties, 27 May-17 Jul

44, in Per Sec., 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19

Aug 44. 6

 Ltr, Comdr HTF to Comdr ALAMO Force, 28

May 44, no sub, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 29-30 May 44; Rad, HTF to ALAMO, TD-20,

28 May 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 25-28 May 44; Rad, HTF to ALAMO Rear

Hq, no number, 28 May 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3

Jnl Wakde-Biak, 25-28 May 44.

7

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to HTF, WH-172, 29 May

44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 25-28

May 44; Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to HTF, WH-167, 28

May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

28-29 May 44; Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 2

Jan 51, no sub, in OCMH files. 8

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to GHQ SWPA, WH-170,

29 May 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 29-31 May 44; Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to ALAMO

Rear Hq, WH-171, 29 May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 28-29 May 44.
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 313

two battalions of the 163d Infantry arrived,

they would take over the 186th Infantry's

beachhead positions, and the beachhead

area was then to be extended to include the

surveyed airdrome on the flats north of

Bosnek. Upon completion of these redispositions, the HURRICANE Task Force would

make final preparations for a new drive to

the west.9

On 30 and 31 May the 162d Infantry

patrolled around the main ridge near Ibdi

for a route over which large bodies of troops

might move north to the inland plateau in

preparation for the second attack westward.

During the course of this patrolling, it was

discovered that the main ridge from Bosnek

to the Parai Defile actually comprised a

series of seven sharp coral ridges, the crests

of which were 50-75 yards apart and separated by gullies 50-100 feet deep. These

separate ridges were honeycombed with

small natural caves, potholes, and crevices.

There was little soil on most of the coral,

yet the area maintained a cover of dense

rain forest containing trees 8-20 inches thick

and 100-150 feet high.

The 162d Infantry discovered two native

trails over the ridges. The most easterly of

these, designated "Old Man's Trail," began

on the beach road about 1,200 yards west

of Mandom. It was a fairly well defined

track which swung north over the seven

ridges along a comparatively easy route. Another track began 1,200 yards to the west,

near Ibdi. Called "Young Man's Trail," the

latter followed a very difficult route over

the ridges to the inland plateau. Both of

these trails ran through the outer defenses of

the Ibdi Pocket, into which the Biak Detachment, on 30 May, moved the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry. On 30 and 31 May

the 162d Infantry's patrols along the ridges

north of Ibdi and Mandom were harassed

by the Japanese in the Ibdi Pocket, which

had not yet been recognized as a major enemy strong point.10

On 30 May the 162d Infantry located a

water hole near the beach terminal of Old

Man's Trail. A regimental water point established there was constantly harassed by

Japanese rifle fire from the Ibdi Pocket area

or by small enemy parties which moved

down out of the ridges north of Ibdi and

Mandom. The Cannon Company, 162d Infantry, was therefore assigned the missions

of clearing the enemy from the water point

area and protecting that important installation from Japanese attacks.

Halfway through the Parai Defile, a little over a mile west of the 162d Infantry's

main perimeter, an underground stream ran

from the base of the cliff into Soanggarai

Bay. At the point where the main road

crossed the stream, the 162d Infantry set

up an ambush to prevent Japanese infiltration from the west along the beach. The

ambush site was also used as a patrol base

from which small parties reconnoitered

along the cliffs of the Parai Defile to discover enemy dispositions in the area. Patrolling on 30 and 31 May cost the 162d

Infantry 6 men killed, 17 wounded, and 4

injured.11

While the 162d Infantry had been meeting reverses near Mokmer, the 186th Infantry had been expanding the Bosnek

beachhead. On the 28th, patrols secured

Opiaref (on the coast about four miles east

9

 Rad, HTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, TD-77, 30 May

44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 30

May-1 Jun 44.

10

 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44,

p. 5 ; MID WD, Military Reports, 24, p. 14. 11

 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44,

pp. 5-6; 162d Inf, Rpt of Casualties, 27 May-17

Jul 44, in Pers Sec., 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15

May-19 Aug 44.
314 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

THE PARAI DEFILE

of Bosnek) where a number of well-prepared but deserted enemy positions were

found. Other patrols were sent north to the

surveyed drome behind Bosnek. A few Japanese were killed in that area, but no signs

of organized resistance were found. Other

elements of the regiment patrolled along the

ridge north of Ibdi and Mandom, finding

that area strongly held, while still more patrols maintained contact with the 162d Infantry along the coastal road. On 29 and 30

May the 186th Infantry continued patrolling from the Parai Defile east to Opiaref,

from which village a motor road was discovered to run inland to the surveyed

drome. In all this activity few contacts were

made with organized Japanese forces, and

during the three-day period the regiment

lost but 2 men killed and 18 wounded.12

On 28 May the 205th Field Artillery Battalion and the rest of the 947th arrived on

Biak. Elements of these two units, together

with the 146th Field Artillery Battalion, had

moved forward to the Ibdi area to support

12

 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44,

pp. 2-5; Company L, One Hundred and EightySixth Infantry, APO #41, Rec of Events, Co L,

from 25 May 44, p. 1, in ORB RAC AGO collection

(hereinafter cited as Co L 186th Inf, Rec of Events,

Biak) ; Hist of Biak Campaign, Co K 186th Inf,

pp. 1-2, in ORB RAC AGO collection (hereafter

cited as Co K 186th Inf Hist of Biak Campaign, and

not to be confused with Co K 186th Inf, Rec of

Events, 18 Apr-16 Jul 44) ; Co I 186th Inf, Hist of

Biak Campaign, n. p., in ORB RAC AGO collection; 1st Bn 186th Inf Hist, 27 May-2 Jun 44, pp.

1-3.
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 315

the drive of the 162d Infantry and had been

withdrawn to Bosnek when the latter regiment was forced back. An antiaircraft battalion (less one battery) and two batteries

of another antiaircraft battalion also landed

on Biak during the period. These units

rapidly went into position to supplement the

fires of the antiaircraft units already protecting the beachhead and dump areas. Enemy

air raids were a daily occurrence and, although causing little damage and few casualties, demanded augmented antiaircraft

protection. The antiaircraft units and Seventh Fleet ships lying offshore shot down

most of the enemy raiders.13

During the period in which the HURRICANE Task Force was awaiting reinforcements, the Biak Detachment redisposed its

troops to meet new Allied attacks. The 800

well-armed men of the 3d Battalion, 222d

Infantry, in the Ibdi Pocket, made only

harassing attacks with small groups against

the positions of the 162d Infantry. Colonel

Kuzume moved most of his 1st Battalion

back into the cave and garden area north of

the surveyed strip, a position which the bulk

of those units had vacated on 28 May. The

2d Battalion was left in the Mokmer Drome

area to reorganize after its heavy losses on

the 28th and 29th and to hold the coastal

approach to the airfields. Naval troops

and a mortar company of the 2d Battalion

manned the East Caves, north of Mokmer

village.14

On 31 May the 1st and 3d Battalions, the

Antitank Company, and Headquarters,

163d Infantry, arrived on Biak. The planned

redisposition of the HURRICANE Task Force

began immediately and was completed by

1800. The task force was ready to execute

a new plan of attack on 1 June.15

Plans for a New Attack

Upon the arrival of the two battalions of

the 163d Infantry on Biak, General Krueger

radioed to General Fuller that the HURRICANE Task Force was expected to regain the

initiative with a new offensive. This offensive, said General Krueger, was to be pushed

vigorously "with a view to carrying out your

mission effectively and expeditiously."

 16

 To

execute these instructions, General Fuller

planned a two-pronged attack. One regiment, the 186th Infantry, was to advance

west over the inland plateau, while the 162d

Infantry was again to attack west along the

coast. The two battalions of the 163d Infantry were to remain in reserve at the

Bosnek area. Essentially, this was a return

to and an enlargement of the alternative

regimental attack plan discarded as unnecessary by the 162d Infantry on Z Day,

27 May. The 162d Infantry had originally

proposed using battalions as General Fuller

now intended to employ regiments.17

On 1 June the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, was to move directly over the ridge

13

 HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 6;

G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 1-5, 27 May-1 Jun 44, in

G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; 41st

Div Arty Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-20 Aug 44, pp.

4-6.

14

 MID WD, Military Reports, 24, p. 14; G-2

HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part II, Enemy

Opns, pp. 7-8; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak

(Rev), p. 62.

15

 Memo, CofS HTF for ACofS G-3 ALAMO

Force, no sub, 1 Jun 44, atchd to HTF G-3 Per

Rpt 12, 29-30 May 44, in HTF Opns Rpt, 17 May20 Aug 44; 163d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 31 May-20

Aug 44, p. 2; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44. 16

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to HTF, WH-39, 1 Jun

44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 1-3

Jun 44. 17

 Memo, CofS HTF for ACofS G-3 ALAMO

Force, 1 Jun 44; 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May19 Aug 44, pp. 1-3; 162d Inf FO 1, 15 May 44,

atchd to 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug

44; Plan of HTF, 1 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28

May 44.
316 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

behind Bosnek to the surveyed airdrome.

There it would be joined by the 2d Battalion, which was to advance west along the

inland road from Opiaref, and by the 1st

Battalion on the morning of 2 June. Five

tanks of the 603d Tank Company, one platoon of the 116th Engineers, and the 12th

Portable Surgical Hospital were to be attached to the regiment. Close support would

be provided by the 121st Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm. pack howitzer), which was

to follow the 186th Infantry to the surveyed

airfield area.

While the 186th Infantry moved into

position, the 162d Infantry was to patrol

west along the coastal road and north into

the ridges behind Ibdi and Mandom. On

2 June the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

would move north across the ridge at Ibdi

and then west along the inland plateau and

ridges, maintaining contact with the 186th

Infantry. The rest of the regiment was to

push through the Parai Defile again in preparation for another concerted attack toward

Mokmer Drome. The 162d Infantry's operations were to be supported by Company C,

116th Engineers; seven tanks of the 603d

Tank Company; the 146th and 947th Field

Artillery Battalions; Company D, 641st

Tank Destroyer Battalion, with 4.2-inch

mortars; 1 antiaircraft LCM; two LVT

(A)'s, with 37-mm. guns; and two rocketequipped LCV's and one LCI (G). The

205th Field Artillery Battalion and offshore

destroyers were to be in general support for

both regiments.

The 186th Infantry was to sweep the inland plateau and, securing a route over the

main ridge north of Mokmer village, clear

the high ground north and northeast of

Mokmer Drome. The 2d Battalion, 162d

Infantry, would seize part of the high

ground northeast of the airfield. When the

other two battalions of the latter regiment,

attacking westward along the shore south

of the ridge, began approaching Mokmer

Drome, the 2d would aid them in seizing the

airstrip. The two battalions of the 163d Infantry were to protect the beachhead and

supply installations and patrol behind the

186th Infantry.18

The Seizure of Mokmer Drome

Action at the Surveyed Strip

At 0830 on 1 June the 3d Battalion,

186th Infantry, left its bivouac area near

Bosnek and marched north over the coastal

ridge.19 By 1100 the unit had reached the

west end of the surveyed strip and had set

up a defensive perimeter. Company K, together with two guns and crews from the

Antitank Company, established defenses at

a trail crossing some 400 yards northwest of

the rest of the battalion. The 2d Battalion

left Opiaref about 0800 and by 1100 was

preparing positions near the center of the

surveyed airfield. Company F and the Cannon Company arrived from Opiaref, where

18

 Memo, CofS HTF for ACofS G-3 ALAMO

Force, 1 Jun 44; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May19 Aug 44, pp. 5-6; 162d Inf FO 1, 15 May 44,

atchd to 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug

44; Plan of HTF, 1 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

28 May 44. 19

 This subsection is based principally on: 3d Bn

186th Inf Jnl, 14 May-24 Oct 44, in ORB RAC

AGO collection; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27

May-19 Aug 44, pp. 6-8; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May20 Aug 44; Co K 186th Inf, Hist of Biak Campaign; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 2-3;

121st FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 2-3; 146th FA

Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 14-15; MID WD, Military

Reports, 24, p., 15; G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 6-9, 31

May-4 Jun 44, in G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part

II, Per Rpts; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 5-7; 2d

Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 62,

66-67.
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 317

they had remained until relieved by the

163d Infantry late in the afternoon.

The Cannon Company, operating as a

rifle unit, protected the 121st Field Artillery

Battalion, which had also displaced forward

to the surveyed drome. The 1st Platoon,

603d Tank Company, joined the two battalions of the 186th Infantry at the airstrip

about 1530. All these units used the road

which ran east and west along the inland

plateau on the north side of the surveyed

strip. Company B, 116th Engineers, worked

all day to repair the road from Opiaref to

the forward units. By 1630 the most urgent

repairs had been made, and wheeled vehicles could laboriously make their way east

along the coast from Bosnek, over the ridge

at Opiaref, and thence west to the surveyed

area.

The Biak Detachment had no intention

of allowing the 186th Infantry to advance

unopposed and at 1330 had sent about

twenty-five men of the 1st Battalion, 222d

Infantry, against Company K. These Japanese, who were supported by machine guns

and mortars emplaced northwest of the trail

crossing, continued attacks until 1700, when

a platoon of Company K, by a flanking

movement, forced their withdrawal northward. Company K and two platoons of the

Antitank Company remained at the trail

crossing for the night. Company I was

moved forward to K's left and left rear, and

Company L extended K's perimeter east

along the main road toward the surveyed

drome. Battalion headquarters and Company M stayed near the strip's western end.

The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company, the 2d Battalion, regimental

headquarters, the attached engineers, and

the tanks remained near the center of the

airfield.

The first part of the night passed without

incident, but at 0330 the entire area held

by the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, flamed

into action. About a company and a half of

the 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry, moved

from the south against the semicircular perimeter held by Companies I, K, and L, having outflanked the 3d Battalion on the west.

Simultaneously, other elements of the 1st

Battalion attacked from the northwest, attempting to drive a wedge between Companies L and K. By rapid adjustment of its

lines, the 3d Battalion trapped most of the

enemy group which had attacked from the

south. Under the support of mortar and

machine gun fire from both the northwest

and southwest, the encircled Japanese desperately tried to fight their way north. Four

hours of confused hand-to-hand fighting,

marked by the use of bayonets, machetes,

and grenades, ensued. At daylight a count

revealed that 86 dead Japanese were within

and around the 3d Battalion's perimeter.

The dead included the commander of the

1st Battalion, 222d Infantry. Losses to the

American unit (including attached Antitank Company men) were 3 men killed and

8 wounded.

Despite the confusion resulting from the

night action, the 186th Infantry was ready

to resume the westward advance by 0900

on 2 June. The 1st and 3d Battalions, supported by five tanks and an antitank platoon, were to advance abreast, while the 2d

protected the right flank by patrolling north

of the main road. The 121st Field Artillery

Battalion was to provide continuous close

support and was to displace forward with

the infantry. Neither artillery nor air bombardment seems to have been provided for

or delivered prior to the attack. However,

both the 121st and 146th Field Artillery
318 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Battalions (the latter from emplacements

south of the ridge, near Bosnek) were registered on targets north and west of the 186th

Infantry. Air support was available from

Wakde Island upon call.

The speed of the advance was contingent

upon the arrival of water from Bosnek and

upon improvements which engineers could

make on the supply road west of the surveyed drome. The inland plateau was devoid of water, and extensive repairs were

necessary before the road could bear wheeled

vehicles. Tentatively, the objective for 2

June was set at a point on the road 5,000

yards west of the surveyed strip. Upon

reaching this point, the 186th Infantry

would be about 1,500 yards north of the

3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, which was located in the Ibdi Pocket.

West Toward the Airdromes

The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry (less

Company A, attached to the 162d Infantry)

broke camp at its beach defense area at

0800 on 2 June and moved north over the

ridge to join the rest of the regiment.20 The

1st and 3d Battalions then advanced with

two companies abreast against scattered but

determined opposition from elements of the

1st Battalion, 222d Infantry. Small enemy

patrols aimed machine gun and rifle fire at

the advancing American units and held

their positions until killed or dispersed by

tank or artillery fire. Most of the enemy

parties were located on the north flank and

apparently many of them had been driven

westward out of the cave and garden area

north of the surveyed drome by fire from

the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which

destroyed Biak Detachment headquarters

installations in that area. By nightfall the

186th Infantry had killed 96 Japanese and

had itself lost 6 men killed and 10 wounded.

The unit halted shortly after 1600 and

began digging in at a point about 600 yards

northeast of the day's objective. The advance had carried the regiment west until

it was almost abreast and north of the 162d

Infantry, at the Ibdi Pocket.

The latter regiment had attempted to

move west along the coast from Ibdi during

the day. The 2d Battalion had been dispatched on 1 June into the ridges north of

Ibdi with orders to clear Young Man's Trail

and, maintaining contact with the 186th

Infantry, advance west along the ridges toward Mokmer Drome. Companies E and G

had started over the trail on 1 June and by

1300 had reached the crest of the third of

the seven parallel ridges which formed the

main ridge above Ibdi. Further progress

during the afternoon was rendered nearly

impossible by increasingly rough terrain and

intensifying Japanese small arms fire, which

kept the companies pinned down. Company

E remained on the third ridge for the night

and set up an outpost at the base of the

fourth. The company had bypassed a few

small parties of Japanese, while other en20

 Information in this subsection is from: 186th

Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 8-12;

Newman Notes; 3d Bn 186th Inf Jnl, 14 May-24

Oct 44; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; Co K

186th Inf, Hist of Biak Campaign; 603d Tank Co

Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 2-3; 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak,

15 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 5-6; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May19 Aug 44; Co B 186th Inf, Rec of Events, AprJul 44, n. p., in ORB RAC AGO collection; HTF

G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; 186th Inf, S-3 Sit

Overlays, 2-8 Jun 44, in Annex 14 to 186th Inf

Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44; 121st FA Bn

Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 3-4; 146th FA Opns Rpt Biak,

pp. 15-16; 116th Engrs S-3 Activities, Biak, pp.

2-3, in 116th Engrs Opns Rpt Biak, Ch. III; HTF

Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 8-9; MID

WD, Military Reports, 24, p. 15; G-2 HTF Per

Rpts 8-14, 2-9 Jun 44, in G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol.

II, Part II, Per Rpts; Opns of Yuki Group, pp.

6-9; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev),

pp. 67-71.
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 319

emy troops moved around its flanks to cut

the trail south of the third ridge. To protect

the line of communications over the Young

Man's Trail, Company G moved its forward elements back to the first ridge, and

Company F pushed up that ridge to G's

right. Company E was left isolated for the

night.

The advance northward had been resumed on 2 June against increasingly strong

opposition from the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, and various service units armed as

infantry. Communications between Company E and other elements of the 2d Battalion were re-established early in the morning, and the company had pushed on to the

crest of the fifth ridge by 0930. There the

unit was pinned down by enemy fire from

both flanks. Company F was ordered forward to E's right, and arrived on the fifth

ridge about 1150. Thereafter, better progress was made as the combined fire power

of the two rifle companies kept most of the

Japanese under cover. In the afternoon

Company G moved forward also and the

three rifle companies pushed on over the

seventh ridge, bypassing numerous enemy

strong points, to establish contact at 1500

with Company E, 186th Infantry, on the

inland plateau.

By the time this contact was made, two

facts had become obvious. First, it was evident that only by a long series of laborious

small unit infantry assaults could the Japanese be cleared from the Ibdi Pocket, which

was now recognized by the HURRICANE Task

Force as a major enemy strong point. Second, the terrain along the main ridge had

been found so rugged that it was evident

that no large body of troops could move

west along it as long as the Japanese retained

any control of the Ibdi Pocket. Therefore

the 2d Battalion (less Company H) was attached to the 186th Infantry for use as the

commander of that regiment saw fit. Company H remained south of the ridge.

The addition of the 2d Battalion, 162d

Infantry, to the 186th Infantry helped to

complicate the supply problems of the troops

on the plateau. No water had yet been found

inland. Heat and humidity were intense, and

thick scrub growth, about twelve feet high,

stopped any breezes. Despite the best efforts

of Company B, 116th Engineers, the supply

road could not be repaired fast enough to

keep pace with the advancing infantrymen.

Water had to be brought around from Bosnek via Opiaref to the forward units, and

there were not enough water trailers nor

five-gallon cans available to supply all the

water needed. At night each man received

only one canteen of water for the next day,

an inadequate amount under the conditions

which prevailed inland. The water situation

and the necessity for hauling all other supplies north through Opiaref did more to delay the 186th Infantry's progress westward

than did the opposition of the 1st Battalion,

222d Infantry.

The advance was to be resumed at 0730

on 3 June, the first objective being the point

at which the main ridge left the coast and

turned inland near Mokmer village. To

gain this point, which lay about three miles

west-southwest of the night bivouac, three

battalions were to advance along a front 900

yards wide, with the 1st Battalion, 186th

Infantry, on the north, the 3d in the center,

and the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, on

the south. The latter unit was to look for

trails over the ridge to Parai and was to be

ready to cross the ridge to the south upon

order from Colonel Newman. The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry (less Company F),

was to assist the engineers and the 41st

Quartermaster Company to move supplies
320 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

forward. Company F was to be regimental

reserve.

The reinforced regiment moved off on

schedule, but progress was painfully slow.

The road over the plateau deteriorated into

a mere footpath, the high scrub growth limited visibility to ten yards, and no landmarks, not even the main ridge along the

coast, could be seen from the flat inland

plain. Again, no water could be found, although the engineers tried blasting for wells.

The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, brought a

few supplies forward by hand, and the engineers worked feverishly to extend the road

behind the forward troops so that wheeled

vehicles could be sent westward: The 2d

Battalion, 162d Infantry, was unable to find

any trails over the ridge to the south. Neither

that unit nor the 186th Infantry suffered

any battle casualties during the day. The 1st

Battalion, 222d Infantry, had disappeared.

Only three Japanese were killed and but few

more had been sighted. At 1500 all units

began digging in at a point a good half mile

short of their objective.

General Fuller instructed the 186th Infantry to send one battalion over the main

ridge between Mokmer and Parai on 4 June.

The battalion, once over the ridge, was to

advance east along the coastal road to take

from the rear enemy positions which had

been holding up the 162d Infantry's advance westward from Ibdi. Colonel Newman replied that all trails leading south

from his regiment's night position had been

thoroughly investigated and that none led

over the main ridge, the north side of which

was precipitous and thus impossible for a

large body of men to scale. The regimental

commander's own plan was to move west

and slightly north from his night position

to find a crossing over the main ridge at

some point northeast of Mokmer Drome.

One element of his command he planned to

send southwest to the bend of the main

ridge behind Mokmer village, whence it was

to patrol northwest along the ridge toward

the rest of the regiment.

Before this disagreement was resolved,

General Fuller was prompted to change his

orders on the basis of information received

from ALAMO Force and aerial reconnaissance indicating that the Japanese were

about to attack Biak from the sea. The night

of 3-4 June proved quiet in the 186th Infantry's area, but the next morning's advance was delayed until supplies and water

arrived from Bosnek. Then, about 1000,

just as the regiment was starting forward,

General Fuller instructed it to hold its positions pending the outcome of the possible

Japanese attack. The 186th Infantry therefore limited its operations to patrolling

during which no enemy troops were located.

Colonel Newman's plan for the 5th of

June entailed sending three battalions forward toward the north-south section of the

main ridge northwest of Mokmer village.

The three units were to halt about 500 yards

from the base of the ridge while one company pushed on to find a route up the high

ground. As soon as the company's mission

was accomplished, a battalion was to follow

it to the ridge top and secure the crossing

point. From the crossing, patrols were to be

sent north and south along the main ridge.

The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, was to remain in reserve, ready to reinforce any of

the three leading battalions or to bring supplies forward. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which had already displaced westward once from the surveyed drome, was to

move forward again on the 5th. Late at

night on 4 June, the threat of Japanese attack from the sea having passed, the G-3

Section of Headquarters, HURRICANE Task
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 321

Force, gave Colonel Newman permission to

execute his plan.

Warned by the regimental commander

that it was important to secure a foothold on

the ridge before the Japanese could deny it

to the 186th Infantry, the three assault battalions started westward about 0800 on 5

June. Lack of water again slowed the advance. No water had been received in the

forward area since the morning of the 4th,

and Colonel Newman had ordered the

troops westward against the advice of his

staff and battalion commanders. About

noon, however, a heavy rain fell. The regimental commander ordered all troops to

halt, catch the rain in ponchos, and fill their

canteens. "Had it not been for this lucky

break, we would undoubtedly have had to

halt in midafternoon."

 21 As events turned

out, no Japanese opposition was encountered, and by 1500 the 3d Battalion, 186th

Infantry, was within 500 yards of the main

ridge. The 1st Platoon of Company K was

sent forward and found a rough approach

to the ridge top. Following this route, the

entire 3d Battalion moved up the ridge and

dug in for the night. Through the thick

jungle growth atop the ridge, the men of

the 3d Battalion could catch occasional

glimpses of Mokmer Drome, 2,500 yards to

the southwest.

The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry (less

Companies F and G), moved up to the base

of the ridge below the 3d Battalion to protect the latter's rear. The 1st Battalion bivouacked near the base of the ridge about 700

yards south of the 2d, while the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, remained in the flats 700

yards to the southeast. Company F, 186th

Infantry, was placed astride the supply

road, 1,000 yards east of the rest of the 2d

Battalion, in order to protect the line of

communications. Company B, 116th Engineers, harassed by occasional Japanese rifle

fire but protected by Company G, 186th Infantry, labored far into the night to extend

the supply road westward to each battalion

perimeter. The 121st Field Artillery moved

forward again during the afternoon and

took up new firing positions about 3,500

yards east of the ridge.

To the Beach

Before his men could start the planned

ridge-clearing maneuvers on the morning of

6 June, Colonel Newman received a telephone call from General Fuller which forced

the 186th Infantry commander to change

his plans.22 The task force commander ordered the 186th Infantry to seize Mokmer

Drome and a beachhead on the coast directly south of that strip. Neither Colonel

Newman nor the Assistant Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe, liked this

plan, for they considered it more important

to secure the dominating terrain north and

northwest of the airfield before seizing the

strip. Colonel Newman put it later: "I objected very strenuously to this plan and told

[General Fuller] of my prior planning. However, I was overruled." But General Fuller

was anxious to seize at least one of the airstrips—and according to plans Mokmer

Drome was to be the first developed—as

soon as possible and, in fact, he was under

21

 Newman Notes.

22

 Information in this and the following subsections is from: Newman Notes; HTF Opns Rpt Biak,

17 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 8-10; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15

May-21 Aug 44; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27

May-19 Aug 44, pp. 11-18; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May20 Aug 44; 3d Bn 186th Inf Jnl, 14 May-24 Oct

44; Co K 186th Inf, Hist of Biak Campaign; 603d

Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 3-4; 121st FA Bn

Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 3-5; 146th FA Bn Opns Rpt

Biak, pp. 16-19; 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak,

pp. 8-11; 41st Div Arty Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 9-11;

2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 71-73.
322 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

pressure from General Krueger to do so.

His orders stood.23

The 186th Infantry's right flank was to

be protected during the move to the airfields

by Fifth Air Force aircraft strikes against

the Borokoe Drome area, while the 163d Infantry was to safeguard the line of communications back through the inland flats. As

soon as the 186th Infantry secured a beachhead at Mokmer Drome, tanks and general

supplies would be sent overwater from Bosnek in preparation for subsequent advances

to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes.

Throughout the morning of 6 June the

186th Infantry directed most of its efforts

to bringing supplies up to the forward units.

Almost the entire 2d Battalion was engaged

in hand-carrying supplies to the 3d Battalion atop the ridge, while the latter unit sent

patrols toward Mokmer Drome seeking

good routes of approach to that objective.

About noon Colonel Newman reported to

task force headquarters that no good route

had been found and that supplies, especially

the ever-needed water, had not been brought

forward in sufficient quantities to allow a

regimental attack to be launched that day,

and he therefore recommended that the attack be postponed until 7 June. General

Fuller approved this suggestion.

About 1430 on 6 June, 3d Battalion patrols finally found a reasonably good trail

leading toward Mokmer Drome and, about

the same time, water arrived at the forward

area after the long trip overland from Bosnek. At 1500 the 3d Battalion, followed by

the 1st, began moving down the west side

of the main ridge to take up positions along

a line of departure for the next morning's

attack. The 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

was to follow the first two closely, and the

2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, was to bring

up the rear, after carrying supplies to the

top of the ridge. The Cannon, Service, and

Headquarters Companies were to aid the 2d

Battalion and were to move with it to Mokmer Drome. The 12th Portable Surgical

Hospital (which had been accompanying

the 186th Infantry), the Antitank Company, the 121st Field Artillery Battalion,

and the regimental trains were to move back

to Bosnek. Thence they were to move either

along the coastal road or overwater to rejoin the regiment at Mokmer Drome.

In preparation for the infantry attack on

7 June, a thirty-minute artillery concentration began at 0700 that morning. The

146th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery

Battalions, from positions along the coast to

the east, were registered on targets in the

airfield area ready to support the advance,

but most of the firing was undertaken by

the 121st Field Artillery from its location

behind the 186th Infantry. While the artillery fired on Mokmer Drome and along the

low ridge between that field and the 186th

Infantry, Fifth Air Force bombers attacked

the Borokoe Drome area and also struck

some targets along the low ridge. The two

assault battalions jumped off at 0730, and

by 0850 both had crossed Mokmer Drome

and had reached the beach. Neither had encountered any resistance. The 2d Battalion

of the 162d Infantry arrived at the shore

about 0930. The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, together with the Cannon, Service,

and Headquarters Companies of the same

regiment, all hand-carrying supplies and

water, began moving south from their night

positions at 0915. All closed at the beach

before noon.

23

 Newman Notes; Ltr, Gen Doe [ex-ADC 41st

Div] to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, no sub, in OCMH

files; Ltr, Krueger to Ward, 2 Jan 51, no sub, in

OCMH files. The quotation is from the Newman

Notes.
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 323

When, on 5 June, the 186th Infantry had

reached the crest of the main coastal ridge,

it had been on the left rear of the Japanese

defenses on the low ridge and terraces above

Mokmer Drome. Thus, the regiment had

been in a favorable position to take these

defenses from the rear. But in its move to

the airfield, the 186th Infantry had bypassed the Biak Detachment's principal defensive positions. The bypassing had not

been intentional. Colonel Newman had instructed both leading battalions to halt on

the low ridge, reconnoiter along it in both

directions, and report on Japanese defenses

before moving on. According to Colonel

Newman: "I received a negative report

from both [battalions], and ordered the

movement to the airdrome. Evidently, the

right [battalion had] failed in this patrolling

effort."

 24

As a result of the failure of reconnaissance

on 6 and 7 June to discover the Japanese

positions, the 186th Infantry had lost a

grand opportunity to outflank the Japanese.

Indeed, had even one battalion halted on the

low ridge, the story of later operations in the

Mokmer Drome area would probably have

been far different.25 Instead, when it reached

the beach on the 7th and turned around,

the 186th Infantry found itself facing the

Biak Detachment's strongest defenses. As

fate would have it, the attacker had placed

himself where the defender most wanted

him to be. This was soon to become obvious.

No fire had been received by the 186th

Infantry from the Japanese ridge and terrace positions during the advance south to

the beach, nor had any fire come from the

Japanese in the East Caves area, the source

of trouble to the 162d Infantry during the

first, abortive attempt to seize Mokmer

Drome. But suddenly, about 0945 on the

7th, the entire Mokmer Drome area was

subjected to Japanese artillery, antiaircraft,

mortar, and automatic weapons fire from

the northwest, north, northeast, and east.

This fire, coming from emplacements which

were well-camouflaged, concealed in dense

scrub growth, or protected in defilade or

caves, continued for about four hours. Almost all the HURRICANE Task Force's artillery was called upon to fire on known or

suspected Japanese installations in the area,

while the 186th Infantry's mortars blasted

away whenever a Japanese gun flash disclosed the location of a position. Japanese

mortar and 20-mm. fire from the area of the

East Caves was especially troublesome, for

the task force's artillery could not reach

those weapons. From the northwest, along

the low ridge beyond the West Caves, came

75-mm. artillery or dual-purpose antiaircraft artillery fire, the point of origin of

which could not be located.

The 121st Field Artillery fired over 2,000

rounds during the 7th, and it adjusted fire

for the 205th and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, also engaged in the counterbattery

fire. Late in the afternoon it was estimated

that the Japanese fire had been decreased

by about 40 percent. At least six enemy gun

positions had been silenced and mortar fire

had become lighter. Before dark the Japanese, apparently feeling that they had received enough counterfire, began moving to

new locations most of the mobile weapons

they had emplaced north of the airdrome.

Indications were that HURRICANE Task

Force artillery would probably be called

upon for heavy concentrations again on

the 8th.

Meanwhile, the 186th Infantry had completed occupation of the airdrome area and

had organized the beachhead, flushing a

24

 Newman Notes. 25

 Ltr, Gen Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50.
324 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

few Japanese from small caves along the

shore line. It had been planned that the 2d

Battalion, 162d Infantry, would push east

from the airfields to aid its parent regiment

to eliminate Japanese resistance at the Parai

Defile. However, Japanese in the East Caves

covered the road from Mokmer Drome to

Parai with automatic weapons fire. Colonel

Newman therefore recommended to Headquarters, HURRICANE Task Force, that the

162d Infantry's battalion remain in place

until this fire could be reduced. He pointed

out, moreover, that the 186th Infantry did

not have enough rations or ammunition to

supply such an attack. General Fuller approved this recommendation and the battalion remained at the Mokmer Drome

beachhead for the night.

By evening of the 7th, it had become impracticable to supply the 186th Infantry

over the inland plateau road, which ended

on the east side of the main ridge. From

that point all supplies would have to be

hand-carried to Mokmer Drome, and supply parties would be endangered by Japanese patrols, a few of which moved in

behind the 186th Infantry as the regiment

moved to the beach. Overwater supply appeared easier, and the main supply line was

therefore changed to a water route which

ran from Bosnek to the village of Sboeria,

located on the beach south of Mokmer

Drome.

The first attempt to run supplies over this

water route was undertaken during the late

afternoon of 7 June by three LCM's and a

few LCV's, each of the former carrying a

Sherman tank. These craft were supported

by an antiaircraft LCM and an LCS, and

all were manned by the 542d Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiment. As the first

boats approached the shore they were

greeted by machine gun and rifle fire from

Japanese whom the 186th Infantry had not

yet cleaned out of caves along the water

line in front of Mokmer Drome. The small

craft returned the fire, but were finally

forced to withdraw. The 186th Infantry,

according to Colonel Newman, was "glad

to see them withdraw since they had our

troops running for cover."

 26

At 1400 another attempt was made to

land supplies at Sboeria. The three LCM's

managed to put their tanks ashore in the

face of continuing Japanese fire, but accompanying LCT's were driven off by Japanese

artillery. Two of the LCM's were so damaged by enemy fire that they could not fully

retract their ramps and had to proceed the

nine and a half miles back to Bosnek in

reverse. Plans were made to effect all delivery of supplies and evacuation of casualties at night until the enemy fire on the

Sboeria beachhead could be neutralized.

The tanks which had been landed lumbered along the shore road fronting Mokmer Drome, destroying several small bunkers along the beach. Then they wheeled

toward the low ridge north of the airfield,

taking under fire a Japanese 75-mm. mountain gun and a 20-mm. piece which had

opposed their landing. These two weapons

were silenced. Moving cautiously northwestward from the field along a road which

crossed the low ridge, the tanks destroyed

two large pillboxes. By the time this operation was completed, dusk was approaching,

and the tanks returned to the beach to bivouac with the 186th Infantry.

The regiment dug in along a semicircular

perimeter. The 3d Battalion was on the

western edge of Sboeria, extending from the

26

 Newman Notes.
WEST TO MOKMER DROME 325

beach to the south side of the airfield, while

the 1st Battalion occupied a similar line east

of Sboeria. The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

were between the first two, but on the north

side of the field. As night fell, the enemy fire

slackened and a count could be made of

casualties. It was found that the day's operations had cost 14 men killed and 68

wounded, almost all as a result of Japanese

artillery and mortar fire.

During the night of 7-8 June more badly

needed supplies were brought forward to

Sboeria by small craft of the 542d Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiment in an operation

concerning which widely different stories are

told. According to the engineers' reports, no

one from the 186th Infantry was on hand

at the beach when, about 2330, a convoy

of 1 LCS, 14 LCV's, and 8 LVT's arrived

at Sboeria. After waiting almost half an

hour for unloading aid, the engineers transferred the LCV cargo to LVT's which

pushed ashore and finally found some representatives of the 186th Infantry, who were

eagerly awaiting the rations and ammunition.27

The commander of the 186th Infantry

tells a different tale:

I personally was at the beach, with my S-4.

. . . We had given Division Headquarters

flashlight recognition signals, but evidently

these were probably not communicated to the

boat group commander. . . . They [the boats]

did not reply to our signals and proceeded on

down the coast before returning and sending

in the LVTs. Failure to properly coordinate

signals and overcaution on the part of the boat

commanders was apparently responsible. . . .

28

Whatever the case, the welcome supplies

were put ashore, and the LVT's returned to

Bosnek with the most seriously wounded

men of the 186th Infantry.

Thus, by daybreak on 8 June, the 186th

Infantry was firmly established on Mokmer Drome, and, despite difficulties incident to moving supplies forward by water

from Bosnek, it was obvious that the regiment could be supplied. The first of the

three Japanese airfields on the southeast

shore of Biak had been seized, but the area

north of the airfield had not yet been secured. Until it was, Mokmer Drome could

not be repaired and Allied planes could not

use the field.

27

 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 10-11. 28

 Newman Notes.
CHAPTER XIV

Frustration at Mokmer Drome

Reinforcements for the 186th Infantry

Japanese Reactions to the

Westward Advance

During its advance west from the surveyed drome, the 186th Infantry had met

little opposition after 2 June.1 While it is inconceivable that the Biak Detachment had

not anticipated the possibility of an American flanking maneuver through the inland

plateau, there are many possible explanations for the failure of the Japanese to oppose this movement strongly after the initial

battle at the surveyed drome. Colonel Kuzume and General Numata had reason to

believe that the Americans might make an

amphibious attack at Mokmer Drome.

Small craft of engineer and artillery units

attached to the HURRICANE Task Force

continuously patrolled along the coast west

of Bosnek to Sorido, and Seventh Fleet fire

support vessels kept up harassing fires on

all known and suspected enemy installations

in the airfield area. Therefore, the Biak Detachment kept the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry, and most of the armed service personnel immobilized on the low ridge and

terraces north of Mokmer Drome and at

the West Caves. Colonel Kuzume's principal responsibility was the defense of the airfields. While the best defense is usually a

good offense and while it is often more sensible to defend an area from a distance, the.

Biak Detachment had strength neither to

launch a large-scale offensive nor to defend

every approach to the airfields. The attacks

against the 162d Infantry on 28 and 29 May

had resulted in the loss of most of the Biak

Detachment's armor and had cost the 2d

Battalion, 222d Infantry, many casualties,

including its commander. Colonel Kuzume

could ill afford any more such Pyrrhic

victories.

The 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry, had

made no serious attempt to stop the 186th

Infantry's progress westward because the

inland plateau was nearly indefensible and

because the battalion would have been decimated in battle with the superior strength

of the reinforced American regiment. The

1st Battalion was withdrawn from the surveyed drome area on 2 June, initially in

preparation for counterattack against the

Bosnek beachhead. While no such counteroffensive was mounted, the withdrawal of

the 1st Battalion at least had the advantage

of keeping the unit intact.

Upon the arrival of the 186th Infantry

at Mokmer Drome, the 1st Battalion, 222d

Infantry, began moving back to the West

1

 Information in this subsection is from: MID

WD, Military Reports, 24, pp. 15-18; G-2 HTF,

G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part II, Enemy Opns, pp.

7-9; G-2 HTF Per Rpts 10-15, 4-10 Jun 44, in

G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; Opns

of Yuki Group, pp. 7-9; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi

and Biak (Rev), pp. 72-80.
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 327

Caves area, after a long march through the

jungle and rising ground north of the inland

plateau. Colonel Kuzume and Headquarters, Biak Detachment, reached the West

Caves during the night of 9-10 June, and

the 1st Battalion began closing in the same

area the next day. On the evening of 9 June,

General Numata transferred the control of

further operations on Biak to Colonel Kuzume. The general left next day for Korim

Bay, whence he was evacuated by seaplane

and returned to the 2d Area Army's command post at Manado, in the Celebes.

Colonel Kuzume knew that as long as he

could hold the low ridge and terrace north

of Mokmer Drome, he could prevent the

HURRICANE Task Force from repairing and

using that field or Borokoe and Sorido

Dromes. To conduct his defense he had under his control north of Mokmer Drome by

the evening of 10 June the remaining elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 222d

Infantry, totalling about 1,200 men; most

of his armed service troops; the bulk of the

19th Naval Guard Unit; and most of the

field and antiaircraft artillery pieces, mortars, and automatic weapons still serviceable. Some naval troops and a 222d Infantry mortar unit manned the East Caves positions, while the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, remained isolated at the Ibdi Pocket.

Even without the Ibdi Pocket and East

Caves groups, the Biak Detachment was well

disposed to conduct a stubborn defense of

the airfields, as the HURRICANE Task Force

was soon to learn.

The Decision to Reinforce the

186th Infantry

On the morning of 8 June the 186th Infantry consolidated its positions around

Mokmer Drome and cleared a number of

small caves on a coral shelf located along

the water line.2 At 0830 the 2d Battalion,

162d Infantry, started to move east to rejoin

its parent regiment. The battalion had

marched scarcely 800 yards east of Mokmer

Drome when it was pinned down by Japanese automatic weapons and mortar fire

from the East Caves. Finally, the 81-mm.

mortars of Company D, 186th Infantry,

from emplacements near Sboeria, stopped

enough of the Japanese fire to permit the

2d Battalion to push on. Company G, 186th

Infantry, was sent northeast from Mokmer

Drome to find the source of the Japanese

fire and to protect the left of the 162d Infantry's Battalion. The latter dug in for the

night only a few yards east of the point

where it had first halted, while the 186th

Infantry's company set up defenses on the

main ridge north of the East Caves.

Japanese mortar fire fell into the area

held by the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

intermittently throughout the night. Many

minor casualties occurred until, toward

morning, the battalion's 81-mm. mortars

succeeded in silencing most of the enemy

weapons. Japanese from the 2d Battalion,

222d Infantry, harassed the battalion rear

all night, and small parties made abortive

attacks from the north. All these Japanese

groups were beaten back with mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire, and during the

scattered firing the new commander of the

2d Battalion, 222d Infantry, was killed.3

2

 This subsection is based principally on: 186th

Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May19 Aug 44; Co G 186th Inf Opns Rpt, 8-11 Jun

44, in Annex 17 to 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27

May-19 Aug 44; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug

44; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 10;

603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, p. 4. 3

 Company H, 162d Infantry (the heavy machine

guns and 81-mm. mortars), had not gone over

Young Man's Trail with the 2d Battalion on 2 June

but had rejoined the battalion on the inland plateau
328 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

On the west flank the 3d Battalion, 186th

Infantry, also had some trouble during the

night. Shortly after dark, Japanese mortar

fire began falling on the elements of the

battalion dug in north of the coastal road,

and later this fire shifted to the battalion

positions south of the road. By either accident or design, a number of native dogs,

running around and barking outside the

battalion perimeter, helped the Japanese

locate the unit's lines and, about 2100, as

the enemy mortar fire moved eastward,

troops of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry,

attacked from the west and northwest. A

few Japanese managed to infiltrate the battalion's outposts and several American soldiers were bayoneted before the battalion's

60-mm. mortars, together with machine gun

and rifle fire, broke up the Japanese attack.

The Japanese continued to harass the perimeter until 0530. Japanese losses were 42

counted dead, while the 3d Battalion, 186th

Infantry, lost 8 killed and 20 wounded.

Total casualties for the 186th Infantry and

attached units during the night were 13

men killed and 38 wounded.

On the morning of 9 June Company B,

186th Infantry, was sent from the beachhead to a point on the low ridge directly

north of the center of Mokmer Drome to

clear that ridge westward 1,200 yards and

secure the point at which a motor road ran

northwestward over the ridge. It soon became evident that the company was trying

to bite off more than it could chew. Hardly

had the leading platoon arrived atop the

low ridge than it was pinned down by Japanese machine gun fire and then almost surrounded by Japanese infantry. When

Japanese patrols threatened the rear of the

company, all elements were withdrawn 400

yards south to set up a new base, from

which patrols moved along the foot of the

ridge in an attempt to determine the extent

of the enemy's defenses. Results were inconclusive, and at dusk the unit moved back to

the beachhead. It could report only that the

low ridge was strongly held. Meanwhile,

another company patrolled northeast to the

point at which the regiment had crossed the

main ridge, and established contact there

with units of the 163d Infantry, which had

pushed over the inland plateau behind the

186th. Tank-infantry patrols were sent west

along the beach from Sboeria. A few bunkers and some small ammunition dumps were

destroyed, but few Japanese troops were

seen and there was no opposition. On the

east flank, Japanese fire from the East Caves

again kept the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

immobilized. Patrolling by elements of the

162d, 163d, and 186th Infantry Regiments

in the East Caves area was productive of

little information concerning the location

of the principal Japanese positions.

On 10 June the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on

the low ridge where Company B had been

halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little

progress and were themselves pinned down

about 1030. Japanese rifle and mortar fire

was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm.

mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour

machine gun fire from a number of bunkers

and pillboxes which proved impervious to

bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units

withdrew while more artillery fire was

placed along the low ridge. On the east

flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had

died down, and the 2d Battalion, 162d Inon or about 5 June, after it had marched overland

from Ibdi, through Opiaref, and west along the inland road. The original commander of the Japanese

unit had been killed in action on the coast at the end

of May.
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 329

fantry, was able to move on eastward. But

before that battalion had gone very far, and

before the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry,

could mount another attack against the low

ridge, Headquarters, HURRICANE Task

Force, had evolved a new plan of operations.

During the period 7-10 June little progress had been made in securing the Mokmer

Drome area, and aviation engineers, brought

forward by water from Bosnek on the 9th

and 10th, had so far been unable to work

on the strip because it was still exposed to

Japanese fire from the low ridge and terrace

north of the field. General Fuller had therefore decided to throw two infantry regiments

against the enemy defenses north of the

field. For this purpose the 2d Battalion,

162d Infantry, was returned to regimental

control, and the remainder of the 162d Infantry started westward from the Parai area

toward Mokmer Drome.

The 162d Infantry Moves

to Mokmer Drome

While the 186th Infantry had been driving to the airfield over the inland plateau,

the 162d Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, and

with Company A, 186th Infantry, attached,

had been attempting to move westward in a

co-ordinated drive along the coastal road.4

This attempt had not proved successful, for

Japanese opposition at the Ibdi Pocket and

the Parai Defile kept the 162d Infantry tied

up.5

On 7 June, when the 186th Infantry

reached Mokmer Drome, it became a matter of urgency to open an overland line of

communications to the airfield area. The

186th Infantry could be supplied overwater

with some difficulty, but overland movement

was faster and more efficient. Therefore

General Fuller initially decided to outflank

the enemy's positions in the Parai Defile by

a drive from west to east along the cliffs

above the road through the defile. For this

purpose two companies of the 3d Battalion,

162d Infantry, were to be transported overwater from Ibdi to the Parai Jetty, whence

they were to drive east in conjunction with

a westward push by the rest of the battalion.

On 7 June the proposed landing area at

Parai Jetty (but not the jetty itself) was

subjected to artillery and naval preparation

fires. Three LVT{A)'s and eighteen LVT's

picked up Companies I and K (reinforced)

at the 3d Battalion position. They moved

far out in the stream to avoid enemy mortar

or artillery fire and, at 1315, started moving inshore toward the jetty. The first wave

was delayed when two LVT's stuck on the

reef fronting Parai, and the first amphibian

tractors did not reach the beach until 1420.

Fifteen minutes later, both the reinforced

companies were ashore. As soon as the two

companies landed they came under fire from

Japanese weapons in the East Caves and

along the ridge between that position and

the Parai Defile. They then called for reinforcements. The Cannon Company arrived

at the jetty about 1610 and six tanks of the

603d Tank Company reached the area

about 1730. Patrols were then sent into the

Parai Defile, meeting opposition which

steadily increased as they moved eastward.

4

 Information in this subsection is based principally on: 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug

44, pp. 6-8; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; Co B

162d Inf, Diary of B Co in Biak Campaign, in ORB

RAC AGO collection; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt

Biak, pp. 3-4; Co A 186th Inf, Rec of Events, 17

Apr-6 Jul 44, in ORB RAC AGO collection; Antitank Co 186th Inf, Rec of Events, 19 Apr-17 Jul

44; HTF G-3 Jnl Biak, 15 May-21 Aug 44; HTF

Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 9-10; 542d

EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, p. 11. 5

 See Ch. XVI below.
330 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

A concerted drive could not be organized

before dark, and plans had to be made to

continue the attack on the morrow.

Meanwhile, General Fuller had evolved

his plan to move all the 162d Infantry to

the Mokmer Drome area. By this time it

had become evident that the 1st Battalion

had isolated the principal remaining enemy

strong points in the Ibdi Pocket and the task

force commander had decided to leave only

one company as a holding force in that area

to prevent the Japanese from cutting the

coastal road. The remainder of the 1st and

3d Battalions were to move to Parai and

push west toward Mokmer Drome to establish contact with the 186th Infantry and the

2d Battalion, 162d Infantry.

At 0900 on 8 June, Companies C, I, and

K, supported by tanks, began moving west

from Parai into the ground where the

Japanese had counterattacked the 162d

Infantry on 28 and 29 May. Company C

advanced along the coastal road, while

Companies I and K pushed up the low cliff

at the coast from Parai to Mokmer village

and attacked along the terrace above Company C. By noon, when they stopped to

lunch and rest, the three companies were

within 500 yards of Mokmer village and in

the coconut grove through which the Japanese had launched the 29 May tank attack.

At 1330, just after the advance companies

had resumed their attack, they were pinned

down by heavy mortar fire from the East

Caves. Another infantry company was requested, and Company B moved forward

to the right of the units on the terrace.

There were indications that the enemy was

preparing a counterattack similar to the one

he had launched in the same area ten days

earlier, but such an offensive did not

develop.

Meanwhile, it had been discovered that

the Japanese had mined the main road west

from Parai. Tank progress was slowed as the

mines (most of them actually 6-inch naval

shells) were removed or the vehicles guided

around them. As the tanks approached

Mokmer village, they came under mortar

and automatic weapons fire from the East

Caves. Since these weapons were masked by

trees, the tanks were unable to deliver counterbattery fire against the enemy positions

and were finally forced to seek cover. Continuing mortar and small arms fire made the

forward units of the 162d Infantry seek

shelter also and they dug in for the night

along a curving perimeter which began on

the beach 500 yards east of Mokmer and

stretched northeastward some 800 yards almost to the base of the main ridge. A gap of

about 1,800 yards remained between these

forward companies and the 2d Battalion,

162d Infantry, west of Mokmer.

On the morning of 9 June the 1st and 3d

Battalions again began pushing westward.

Despite heavy concentrations by the regiment's 81-mm. mortars, the 4.2-inch mortars of Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer

Battalion, and the 105-mm. howitzers of the

205th Field Artillery Battalion, Japanese

fire from the East Caves steadily increased.

The infantry could move forward only in

small groups and were forced to seek cover

behind every slight rise in the ground. At

1330 Company C established patrol contact

with the 2d Battalion at a point 500 yards

west of Mokmer village, and at 1700 the 2d

Battalion reverted to regimental control

after a week's operations under the 186th

Infantry. More than 1,000 yards still separated the main body of the 2d Battalion

from the 1st, which dug in for the night at

Mokmer village. The 3d Battalion, in re-
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 331

MEN OF THE 162D INFANTRY seeking cover as they move westward along the shore.

serve during the day, had not moved far

beyond its bivouac of the previous night.

On 10 June Company L and rear detachments of the 3d Battalion were moved

forward by small craft to Parai. The 2d and

3d Battalions then began moving west along

the coastal road to Mokmer Drome while

the 1st Battalion was left at Parai with the

mission of defending that area and clearing

the remaining enemy from the Parai Defile.

West from Mokmer village the coastal road

was still subjected to heavy interdictory fire

from the Japanese in the East Caves. Therefore, the 2d and 3d Battalions had to move

along the beach under the protection of a

low coral shelf. The march was accomplished in column of files and most of the

troops waded through the edge of the surf,

which was waist deep much of the way. The

movement therefore progressed very slowly,

and it was not until 1600 that the two battalions reached an assembly area at the eastern end of Mokmer Drome. The next day

there began a new offensive which was

aimed at clearing the Japanese from the

ridges and terraces north and west of the

airfield.

Operations North of Mokmer Drome

The Plan of Attack

The new attack to secure the Mokmer

Drome area was to start at 0930 on 11 June
332 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

with two regiments abreast, the 162d Infantry on the right, or north. The line of departure began on the beach at Menobaboe,

whence it ran north-northeast through the

western end of Mokmer Drome and over

the low ridge. The boundary between regiments paralleled the coast and lay about 400

yards north of Mokmer Drome's main runway. The first objective was a first phase line

lying about 1,350 yards beyond the western

end of the runway. A second phase line was

roughly 1,000 yards farther west and included Borokoe village, on the beach some

2,300 yards west of Menobaboe. The inland

end of the second phase line lay about 2,000

yards north of the coast. Occupation of the

third phase line would bring the two attacking regiments into line with the eastern end

of Borokoe Drome.

The 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, was responsible for clearing the low ridge. The 1st

Battalions of both regiments were to remain

in reserve. Details of artillery support are not

clear but it appears that at least initially the

121st Field Artillery Battalion was to give

close support to the 186th Infantry while

the 205th, from positions near Ibdi, was

to support both regiments. The 205th's fire

would be directed from a floating observation post in an LCV furnished by the 542d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. The

947th Field Artillery Battalion was also assigned general support missions.6

While the attacks in the Mokmer Drome

area were under way, the 3d Battalion, 163d

Infantry, would continue patrolling west and

south along the main ridge. One company

of that battalion and Company G, 186th

Infantry, were to maintain pressure on the

East Caves from the north and west. The 1st

Battalion, 163d Infantry, was to patrol

north, east, and west from the surveyed

drome on the inland plateau behind Bosnek,

while the 2d Battalion cleared remaining

Japanese from the Ibdi Pocket. Support for

the operations of the 1st and 2d Battalions,

163d Infantry, was the responsibility of the

146th Field Artillery Battalion, emplaced

near Bosnek. The 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, was apparently to be supported by

those artillery units supporting the attacks

in the Mokmer Drome area.7

Meeting Resistance on the Low Ridge

At 0830 on 11 June the two assault battalions of the 186th Infantry began moving

out of their bivouacs up to the line of departure, which they reached by 0915.8

 (Map

15) The 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

started moving forward from the eastern

end of Mokmer Drome toward the line of

departure about the same time that the

186th Infantry got underway. The 162d

Infantry met stiff resistance before it could

get to the line of departure, and the 186th

Infantry's attack was therefore halted until

the 162d Infantry could move its two leading battalions up to the line. The principal

Japanese forces along the low ridge were

the 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry, now re6

 162d Inf FO 3, 10 Jun 44, atchd to 162d Inf

Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44; Jnl entry, 1310,

10 Jun 44, in 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44;

121st FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 4-6; 205th FA Bn

Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 5-6; 947th FA Bn Opns Rpt

Biak, p. 6.

7

 163d Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44; Jnl entry,

1310, 10 Jun 44, in 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug

44; 146th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 19-20. 8

 This subsection is based principally on: 186th

Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 17-19;

186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; Co G 186th Inf

Opns Rpt, 8-11 Jun 44; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21

Aug 44; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44,

pp. 10-11; 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19

Aug 44, pp. 7-8; 162d Inf, S-2 Sit Overlays, 10-12

Jun 44; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; 121st

FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, p. 6; 2d Army Opns at

Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 74-75, 80.
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 333

MAP 15

duced to about 120 effectives; a company or

two of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry;

elements of various engineer units, fighting

as infantry; and some field and antiaircraft

artillery weapons and crews. All in all, there

were probably some 600-700 Japanese

along the ridge.

The 162d Infantry, employing close

mortar support and steady rifle fire from

the leading troops, appeared to be breaking

through the resistance to its front about

1330, and the 186th Infantry was thereupon ordered to renew its attack. Accordingly, at 1345, the 2d and 3d Battalions,

186th Infantry, pushed across the line of

departure. The 3d Battalion, moving along

the coastal road, encountered no enemy

opposition and closed along the first phase

line in its zone at 1530. The 2d Battalion

met little Japanese resistance on its front

but was intermittently forced to seek cover

from enemy fire which came from the low
334 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ridge on the battalion's right. The unit

therefore did not reach the first phase line

until 1620.

The two 186th Infantry battalions dug

in for the night about 600 yards apart, both

on the east side of a trail marking the first

phase line. The terrain there was solid coral

with only a thin layer of topsoil covering it.

In such ground three hours was the minimum time a man needed to prepare a satisfactory slit trench, and darkness arrived before all the units could dig in. Colonel Newman therefore recommended that on subsequent days forward movement cease at 1500

so that time would be available to prepare

night defenses and to undertake essential

evening reconnaissance. This recommendation was approved by Headquarters, HURRICANE Task Force.

For the night of 11-12 June, the headquarters of the 186th Infantry, the 1st Battalion, and an advanced command post of

the HURRICANE Task Force dug in at

Sboeria village, on the beach south of Mokmer Drome. Company G, 186th Infantry,

came down off the ridges near the East

Caves during the day and set up its bivouac

at Sboeria. At the same location were the

Cannon and Service Companies, 186th Infantry, and the 863d Engineer Aviation

Battalion, which was responsible for repairing Mokmer Drome.

In the 162d Infantry's zone of responsibility, the day's action had been marked by

stubborn Japanese resistance. The 3d Battalion, trying to gain the top of the low

ridge and to move west along that ridge to

the line of departure, was halted and forced

to seek cover almost the moment it started

to move. Even with support from the 947th

Field Artillery Battalion, it was midafternoon before the battalion's attack really got

under way. Then the unit found that the

terrain along the top and southern slope of

the low ridge was rough and covered by

dense rain forest and thick scrub growth.

Visibility and maneuver room were severely

limited, and the Japanese defenders made

excellent use of every advantage the terrain

offered.

The 2d Battalion had been halted about

600 yards short of the line of departure to

await the outcome of the 3d's efforts, but

about 1245 was ordered to push on. The 2d

Battalion reached the line of departure

about 1320 and moved on to the first phase

line, drawing abreast of the 2d Battalion,

186th Infantry, at 1720. The 3d Battalion

fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number

of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty

automatic weapons and rifle emplacements

of all kinds. Dusk found the unit still some

100 yards short of the line of departure and

about 1,300 yards east of the 2d Battalion.

The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the

action during the day, moved forward to

Mokmer Drome from Parai.

For 12 June, Colonel Haney planned to

put his 2d and 3d Battalions on the low

ridge, while the 1st took over the 3d's positions near the line of departure and patrolled

west, north, and east. During the afternoon

of the 11th, the 162d Infantry had learned

from Javanese slave laborers who had come

into the lines that the Japanese headquarters installations were located in large caves

approximately 1,000 yards northwest of the

3d Battalion's lines. This, apparently, was

the first information obtained by the HURRICANE Task Force concerning the enemy's

West Caves stronghold. The significance of

the information was not yet realized, but

the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was ordered to patrol north on the 12th to attempt

to confirm the Javanese reports.
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 335

In order to permit the 162d Infantry to

place more troops on the ridge, the 186th

Infantry was instructed to assume responsibility for an additional 300 yards on its right

flank. On the 12th that regiment was to advance as far as the second phase line, maintaining close contact with the 162d Infantry. The latter was also expected to reach the

second phase line, but no advance beyond

that line was to be undertaken until

Headquarters, HURRICANE Task Force, so

ordered.

On the morning of the 12th, the 186th

Infantry had already started moving toward

the second phase line when, at 0830, it received orders to halt until the 3d Battalion,

162d Infantry, could reach the first phase

line. Although no Japanese were to be found

in the 186th Infantry's sector, an advance

by that regiment without concurrent progress by the 162d Infantry would leave a

large and dangerous gap in the lines.

Through such a gap the enemy could move

to outflank and cut off the 162d Infantry.

But the 162d Infantry was able to make little progress during the day. As a result, the

186th Infantry remained on the first phase

line and limited its operations to patrolling.

The 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, had

started moving both toward the low ridge

and westward about 0830, but it also had

been halted until the 3d Battalion could

fight its way up to the first phase line. The

3d Battalion sent Company L north of the

ridge to outflank troublesome Japanese positions while the rest of the battalion continued a frontal assault. But Japanese resistance was even stronger than it had been

the previous afternoon, and the battalion

was again unable to make any progress. At

0940 it pulled back some 300 yards southeast of its previous night's bivouac to allow

Company M's 81-mm. mortars to lay a

concentration on enemy bunkers and foxholes at the point where the line of departure

crossed the low ridge.

At 1035 the advance was resumed with

Company I on the ridge, Company L on the

terrace north of I, and Company K along

the ridge slopes south of I. Company K

moved forward 200 yards by 1100, having

encountered little opposition, and then

halted to wait for the other two companies

to draw up. Company I, meanwhile, had

found that the mortar fire had been effective but that new Japanese positions were

located west of the mortar impact area.

From 1100 to 1130 the company fought its

way through these second defenses, but no

sooner had it broken through when a third

set of positions was discovered 50 yards farther west along the ridge. It was also learned

that a fourth strong point was located beyond the third. Company L, north of the

ridge, met few Japanese and by 1230 had

passed through some minor opposition to a

position north of but opposite Company K.

Company L then cautiously probed southwestward and southward to locate the flanks

and rear of the positions in front of Company I.

Meanwhile, Company L, 163d Infantry,

had established an observation post on Hill

320, a high point on the main ridge about

1,500 yards northwest of the lines of the 3d

Battalion, 162d Infantry. At 1530 this observation post reported that Japanese were

occupying a number of antiaircraft gun

positions along the low ridge west of the

162d Infantry unit. Fearing immediate

enemy artillery fire, the 162d Infantry

withdrew all its troops from the low ridge

into defilade positions.

After American artillery had fired a short

concentration on the suspected enemy gun

emplacements, the 3d Battalion, 162d In-
336 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

fantry, returned to the low ridge. By nightfall Company L was dug in on the ridge

about 300 yards west of the line of departure, and Company I was almost 100 yards

to the east. In order to prevent the Japanese

from reoccupying their defensive position

near the line of departure—positions which

had been so laboriously cleaned out during

the day—two platoons of Company K

moved into the vacated enemy defenses.

The rest of Company K, together with 3d

Battalion headquarters and Company M,

remained south of the ridge about 400 yards

east of the line of departure.

During the late afternoon the 2d Battalion had sent a number of patrols north from

its position on the first phase line to the low

ridge, and Company F set up night defenses on the ridge at the point where the

first phase line crossed. A gap of almost 900

yards, in which were many strong Japanese

defenses, separated Company F from Company L. For the next day, plans were made

for the 162d Infantry to close this gap while

the 186th Infantry remained in position

along the first phase line.

The 162d Infantry resumed its attack

about 0730 on 13 June when Company L

started pushing east and west along the low

ridge in an attempt to establish contact with

both the 2d Battalion and Company I.

Contact was made with the latter unit about

1300, after a small Japanese pocket had

been cleaned out. Company K, meanwhile,

had been forced to mop up a few enemy

stragglers near the line of departure and had

sent one platoon westward to help Company

I. Late in the morning, the 1st Battalion

moved on to the low ridge east of the 3d

in order to protect the regiment's right and

rear and relieve 3d Battalion troops from

that duty. Though this realignment freed

3d Battalion units for a new drive westward,

by the end of the day little progress had

been made in closing the 900-yard gap between that battalion and the 2d. Not only

had the 3d Battalion been unable to move

westward, but 2d Battalion units had also

been unable to make any progress eastward.

During the 13th, the 186th Infantry had

limited its activities to patrolling while it

again awaited the outcome of the 162d's

attack. The regiment had also provided

local security for engineers who were working hard to repair Mokmer Drome. The

engineers had begun steady work about

1030 hours on 12 June, and by evening of

that day they expected to get the strip into

shape for fighter aircraft before noon on the

13th. But work on the latter day was thrice

interrupted by Japanese artillery or mortar

fire, most of which originated along the

ridge between the lines of the 2d and 3d

Battalions, 162d Infantry. Despite these

interruptions, about 2,300 feet of the eastern

end of the airfield had been repaired sufficiently for use by fighter planes by evening

of 13 June. More of the strip had been

cleared, filled in, and prepared for final

grading by the same time. The first plane to

land on the field was an artillery liaison

aircraft, which came down about 1000

hours on the 13th. Because of Japanese

harassing fire, the airstrip still could not

safely be used by larger planes.

To the Rim of the West Caves

General Doe, assistant commander of the

41st Division, had inspected the forward

combat area during the afternoon of 13

June.9 After his trip he advised the task force

9

 This subsection is based upon: HTF G-3 Jnl, 15

May-21 Aug 44; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20

Aug 44, pp. 10-11; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27

May-19 Aug 44, p. 9; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 337

commander that the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, was becoming worn out and had

already lost much of its effectiveness. To

relieve the 3d Battalion, General Doe recommended sweeping changes in the attack

plan which had been in effect since 10 June.

He proposed that the 1st Battalions of the

162d and 186th Infantry Regiments move

around the right flank of the 3d Battalion,

162d Infantry, to the terrace above the low

ridge. Reports from friendly natives indicated that the Japanese were guarding a

water hole—the last one remaining in the

area—near a Japanese encampment about

midway between the positions of Company

L, 162d Infantry, on the low ridge, and

those of Company L, 163d Infantry, on

Hill 320 to the north. Although the HURRICANE Task Force had not yet located the

West Caves, the reported existence of the

water hole and other miscellaneous bits of

information prompted General Doe to believe that a major enemy strong point

existed near the Japanese encampment. He

felt that if the new two-battalion attack

succeeded in eliminating this strong point,

the remaining enemy positions along the low

ridge would be untenable and the Japanese

might retire. Then the 3d Battalion, 162d

Infantry, would not have to continue its attacks and, indeed, would be pinched out by

the new advance and could revert to a

reserve role.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was to

move north over a trail which would take it

through the rear of the 3d Battalion. When

the 1st Battalion had reached a point on the

terrace about 500 yards north of the low

ridge, it was to turn and attack to the west

and southwest. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, was to follow a trail leading north

from the eastern end of Mokmer Drome

and, making a wider envelopment, was to

follow an azimuth taking it east of the 1st

Battalion, 162d Infantry. Then it was to

draw up on the right of the latter, ready to

attack westward.

For the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, operations on 14 June began about 0600 when

Company B, at the base of the low ridge

about 800 yards east of the 3d Battalion's

lines, was attacked by about fifteen Japanese

infantrymen. Within ten minutes nine Japanese were killed, but patrolling and reorganizing after the attack delayed the battalion's movement to the line of departure for

the new attack. Following the infantry assault, the Japanese began to throw antiaircraft, small arms, and mortar fire into the

American unit's positions, keeping it pinned

down on the southern slopes of the low ridge

until 1100. The battalion was further delayed when American artillery fire was

placed on Japanese troops seen maneuvering on the terrace north of the 3d Battalion.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, had also been delayed. The 162d Infantry unit had to wait for the 186th's battalion

to come into line before the attack westward

could begin.

With Company C leading, the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, had started its advance

at 0800, crossing the low ridge at a point

about 500 yards east of the 1st Battalion,

Aug 44; History of First Battalion, One Hundred

Eighty-Sixth Infantry (While Detached From Regimental Control) Mission with 162d Infantry, 13

June-18 June, pp. 1-2 (hereafter cited as 1st Bn

186th Inf, Hist with 162d Inf, 13-18 Jun 44), in

Annex 23 to 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19

Aug 44; 121 st FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 6-7; 205th

FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, p. 7; 162d Inf Opns Rpt

Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 8-9; 162d Inf Jnl, 22

May-19 Aug 44; Co B 162d Inf, Diary in Biak

Campaign; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 8-9; G-2

HTF, G-2 Per Rpts 18-21, 13-16 Jun 44, in G-2

Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; 2d Army

Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 80-81.
338 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

162d Infantry. Then it moved northeast

over the terrace along a rough trail leading

toward the main ridge-crossing employed

by the 186th Infantry on 7 June. First contact with the enemy came at 0930, when

Company C killed two Japanese on the trail

about 800 yards north of the low ridge. The

march continued until 1030 when, as the

units began to turn westward, Company C

was pinned down by fire from rising ground

100 yards east of the trail. Company A patrols undertook to stop this fire, but it was

two hours before the advance could be continued. Only 400 more yards had been

gained by 1300 when the advance was again

held up by a small group of Japanese dug

in across the trail. But this opposition was

broken through within half an hour, and by

1430 Company C had moved another 800

yards west and was in line with Company

B, 162d Infantry, 300 yards to the south.

Both 1st Battalions now resumed the advance abreast.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, continued to meet opposition on its right and

front during the afternoon, and did not establish physical contact with the 186th Infantry's battalion until 1735. The 162d

Infantry unit then dug in northeast of the

West Caves and about 250 yards north of

Company L, on the low ridge. The battalion's perimeter was about 400 yards short

of its objective for the day, as was that of the

1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, now located

on a slight rise 50-75 yards to the right rear

of the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry. Patrols

sent out before dark brought back proof

that the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was

on the periphery of the West Caves, now

recognized by the HURRICANE Task Force

as a major Japanese strong point. The task

force G-2 Section estimated that the West

Caves held about 1,000 Japanese, including

naval and army headquarters.

Colonel Kuzume, realizing full well the

value of the West Caves position as a base

for counterattacks, was determined to hold

that area. At 1930 on the 14th, he sent

available elements of the Biak Detachment

against the two forward American battalions in an attempt to drive them southward

and eastward away from the caves. A combined infantry-tank attack drove Company

B of the 162d Infantry out of its semi-isolated position at the northwestern end of the

1st Battalion's perimeter. The company

withdrew in an orderly fashion into the battalion lines. The Japanese now turned their

attention to the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry. Small Japanese groups, moving along a

road which entered the battalion's perimeter from the west, harassed the unit all night.

No attacks were pressed home, but the Japanese maneuvers were interpreted as presaging a more determined counterattack on the

morrow.

At 0730 on the 15th the expected counterattack began, just in time to disrupt plans

for the 1st Battalions of the 162d and 186th

Infantry Regiments to continue advances

north and west. Three Japanese tanks

started south down a road running below

the western slope of Hill 320. Two tanks,

each accompanied by an infantry platoon,

swung onto an east-west road north of the

West Caves and into the positions of the

1st Battalion, 186th Infantry. The tanks

opened fire with their 37-mm. guns from a

range of 250 yards, but before they could

move closer were driven off by .50-caliber

machine guns of the 1st Battalion's Antitank Platoon. The third tank and more

infantrymen charged the lines of Company

B, 162d Infantry, then attempting to close
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 339

DISABLED JAPANESE TANK

the gap between the two harassed battalions.

In the ensuing melee, Company B suffered

heavy casualties, for it had no weapons with

which it could easily drive off the tank and

stop its 37-mm. and machine gun fire. However, when the accompanying infantrymen

were scattered by Company B's fire, the tank

maneuvered out of range. At 1400 the same

day, two more tanks advanced toward the

1st Battalion, 186th Infantry. The tanks

again moved along the east-west road north

of the caves but did not press home their

attack. Apparently, no Japanese infantry

accompanied these tanks.

During the day three Japanese tanks were

knocked out—two by bazookas of Company

C, 186th Infantry, and the other by a combination of .50-caliber and small arms fire.

The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, while it

had hit no tanks, had proved a real aid

during the battle. It prevented Japanese infantrymen from forming for the attack and

neutralized a number of enemy machine

guns by firing 600 rounds into the area

northwest of the 1st Battalion, 186th

Infantry.

In the time intervals between the various

enemy attacks only local advances could be

made, but the two forward battalions managed to establish one continuous line. Patrolling south was forestalled during the

morning when artillery and automatic

weapons fire was placed on enemy positions

between the 2d and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry, on the low ridge. When this fire was

finished, the day's plans were changed. The

1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was ordered

to move south onto the low ridge west of the
340 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

3d Battalion. Once on the ridge, the 1st Battalion was to do an about-face and extend

its left to the 2d Battalion's lines. The 1st

Battalion, 186th Infantry, was to protect the

rear of the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, during the latter's displacement southward.

The new plan proved impossible of execution. Fighting in the area between the

2d and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry, on the

low ridge continued unabated all afternoon.

Steady fire from friendly artillery and mortars, combined with Japanese automatic

weapons and mortar fire from positions between the West caves and the low ridge,

kept the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, pinned down much of the time and slowed its

movement southward. The 2d and 3d Battalions continued to try to close the gap and

managed to overrun or destroy a number of

enemy defensive positions. They were unable to entirely clear the area, however, and

by nightfall the gap was still some 500 yards

wide and was apparently occupied by a

strong enemy force which was well dug in.

The 15th of June, on which date forces

of the Central Pacific Area landed in the

Mariana Islands, had come and gone, and

still no planes of the Allied Air Forces,

Southwest Pacific Area, had been able to

support the Central Pacific's operations

from an airfield on Biak Island. The 863d

Engineer Aviation Battalion, which had

managed to repair about 2,300 feet of Mokmer Drome by evening of 13 June, had been

forced to stop work on the morning of the

14th, when Japanese fire on the strip became

so intense that the engineers could not stay

on the field and Allied planes could not use

it. The 15th had ended on a note of frustration in the Mokmer Drome area. The Japanese still held part of the low ridge, and from

their positions there and on the terrace to the

north, could continue to prevent the Allies

from using the Biak fields.

Allied Command at Biak

Air and Naval Base Development

to Mid-June

Almost from the outset of the Biak operation, delays in seizing and repairing the Biak

Island airfields had worried Generals MacArthur and Krueger. After the initial reverse suffered by the 162d Infantry, the tactical situation on Biak had made it appear to

General Krueger that it might be some time

before the HURRICANE Task Force would

capture Mokmer Drome. Therefore, on 30

May, he instructed General Fuller to investigate the possibility of quickly constructing

a fighter strip at the surveyed drome area on

the inland plateau north of Bosnek. The task

force completed an engineer reconnaissance

of the surveyed drome the next day. General

Fuller decided that an airfield could not be

completed there in less than three weeks. He

considered it undesirable to assign any of his

few engineer units to such extended work at

the surveyed drome, for he still expected

that Mokmer Drome could be seized and

repaired much sooner.10

The attention of air force planners then

turned to the Paidado Islands, off the southeast corner of Biak. Allied Naval Forces had

already planned and secured approval from

General MacArthur's headquarters to establish a PT and seaplane base in a reef-fringed

lagoon on the eastern side of Mios Woendi

Island, which lies about twelve miles east10

 Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF5272, 30 May 44, and Rad, HTF to ALAMO, TF111, 31 May 44, both in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 30 May-1 Jun 44.
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 341

southeast of Bosnek. On 28 May ALAMO

Force instructed the HURRICANE Task Force

to secure not only Mios Woendi but also the

entire Paidado group.11

Reconnaissance was made of Mios

Woendi, Aoeki, and Owi Islands in the

Paidado group by naval and engineer personnel of the HURRICANE Task Force on 1

June. The next day Company A, 163d Infantry, secured Owi and Mios Woendi, and

a more detailed engineer reconnaissance of

Aoeki and Owi was made a few days later.

Aoeki proved unsuitable for an airfield, but

Owi was found to be an excellent site. Beginning on 3 June, engineers, together with

antiaircraft and radar units, were taken to

Owi. Heavy artillery (155-mm. guns) was

also set up on the island to support operations on Biak.

The 860th and 864th Engineer Aviation

Battalions started constructing a strip on

Owi on 9 June but it was not until the 17th

that enough of the field was completed to

allow some P-38's, blocked by a front of

bad weather from reaching their base on

Wakde Island after a strike on Sorong, to

land at Owi. On 21 June two P-38 squadrons of the 8th Fighter Group, Fifth Air

Force, started arriving at Owi to remain for

future operations. Meanwhile, naval construction battalions (CB's) had cleared the

land and beach at Mios Woendi in time for

Seventh Fleet PT boats to begin operating

from that base on 8 June.12

The Owi Island strip was not ready in

time to support Central Pacific operations

and, despite expectations to the contrary,

neither was any other field at Biak. The

Wakde Island airfield had to bear a larger

share of such support than had been

planned. Moreover, the delay in making

ready the fields on Biak threatened the

speed of subsequent operations within the

Southwest Pacific. The HURRICANE Task

Force had failed in its principal mission—

rapid seizure and repair of airfields from

which the Allied Air Forces could support

the Mariana operation and further advances

along the New Guinea axis.

Changes in Command

General Krueger had been dissatisfied

with operations on Biak ever since the 162d

Infantry had been forced to withdraw from

the Mokmer village area on 29 May. At

first he was dissatisfied because he believed

that the 162d Infantry's advance had been

imprudently conducted without adequate

reconnaissance. Later, he had expected that

the reinforcement of the HURRICANE Task

Force by the 163d Regimental Combat

Team would have permitted General Fuller

to resume the offensive with renewed vigor

and rapidly to seize the airfields. Events did

not so transpire.13 On 5 June, five days after

11

 Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WH4263, 25 May 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 24-26 May 44; Rad, ALAMO Rear

Hq to HTF, WH-136, 27 May 44, in ALAMO Adv

Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-28 May 44; Ltr OI,

Comdr ALAMO Force to CG USF APO 920 [Comdr

HTF], 28 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28 May 44. 12

 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 7-9; HTF

G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; 163d Inf Jnl, 31 May19 Aug 44; Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to GHQ SWPA,

WF-1228, 6 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 6-7 Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to

GHQ, SWPA, WF-1521, 8 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv

Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-9 Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO

Rear Hq to GHQ SWPA, WF-2105, 10 Jun 44,

in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 10-11

Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to HTF, WF-864, 5

Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

5-6 Jun 44. Information on types of aircraft and

dates they arrived at Owi was furnished by Capt.

B. L. Mortensen, Air Hist Gr, Hq USAF, 22 Nov 48. 13

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to HTF, WH-39, 1 Jun

44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 1-3

Jun 44; Ltr, Krueger to Ward, 2 Jan 51, no sub,

in OCMH files.
342 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the two battalions of the 163d Infantry had

reached Biak, General MacArthur indicated

that he, too, was concerned over the continued delay in securing the Biak airfields.

The theater commander asked General

Krueger if he thought operations on Biak

were being pushed with determination, and

he requested General Krueger's views on

the situation.14

As a result of these queries, General Krueger was again prompted to inform General

Fuller that progress on Biak was disturbingly slow and to instruct the task force commander to make new efforts to seize the airfields quickly.15

 At the same time, the ALAMO

Force commander told General MacArthur

that he had for some time felt that operations on Biak were not going well and that

consideration had even been given to putting in a new commander. However, said

General Krueger, he had been dissuaded

by his observers on Biak, who had told him

that replacement of the task force commander would be unwarranted. The terrain

and stubborn Japanese defense had slowed

the attack, General Krueger went on, and

he had therefore decided to await more

complete information before taking any further action.16

On 6 June General Krueger received

somewhat disturbing reports from new observers whom he had sent to Biak. These

officers indicated that there had been some

lack of determination in the execution of

HURRICANE Task Force plans, especially at

the battalion and company level. The troops

striving to clear the Ibdi Pocket and the

Parai Defile were reported to be "herdbound." The observers' reports also indicated that reconnaissance had been ineffective; and that little definite information had

been obtained concerning the Japanese

strength and dispositions. Finally, the observers stated, General Fuller was not

making full use of his assistant division commander (General Doe) and, moreover,

so few members of the task force staff had

visited the front lines that General Fuller

could not possibly have obtained complete

and accurate information concerning the

fighting.17

Despite these unfavorable reports General Krueger, probably influenced by the

fact that the 186th Infantry had established

a foothold on Mokmer Drome on 7 June,

again decided to take no action for a few

days. But by 10 June he had received new

information telling of the strong resistance

the Japanese were maintaining along the

low ridge north of Mokmer Drome. Three

days of fighting had failed to eliminate this

resistance, and General Krueger again

urged upon General Fuller the importance

of rapid rehabilitation of the Biak airfields,

impossible as long as the Japanese held their

positions on the low ridge.18 Then, on 13

June, General Fuller, on the grounds that

the HURRICANE Task Force troops were suffering from fatigue and that he suspected

the Japanese had landed sizable reinforce14

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, C-13275, 5 Jun

44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Boak, 4-5

Jun 44. 15

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to HTF, WH-182, 5 Jun

44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 4-5

Jun 44. 16

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to GHQ SWPA, WH183, 5 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 4-5 Jun 44.

17

 Memo, ALAMO AA Officer for CofS ALAMO, 6

Jun 44, sub: Obsn on Biak, and Memo, ALAMO FA

Obsr Biak for Comdr ALAMO, 6 Jun 44, sub: Obsr's

Rpt on Biak, 2-5 Jun 44, both in ALAMO Adv Hq

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-9 Jun 44; Ltr, Doe to

Ward, 4 Dec 50, and Ltr, Krueger to Ward, 2 Jan

51, both in OCMH files. 18

 Rad, HTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, TD-544, 10 Jun

44, and Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to HTF, WH-343,

10 Jun 44, both in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 10-11 Jun 44.
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 343

merits on the island, requested ALAMO Force

to send a fresh infantry regiment to Biak.19

While at this time General Krueger placed

little credence on the reports of enemy reinforcements, he decided to approve the HURRICANE Task Force's request for additional

strength. Accordingly, on 13 June, he

alerted the 34th Infantry, 24th Division,

then at Hollandia, for shipment to Biak,

where it was to arrive on 18 June.20

By this time General Krueger had come

to the conclusion that General Fuller was

overburdened by his dual function of task

force and division commander. He had thus

far deferred taking any action, hoping that

the airdromes would soon become available.

But by 14 June it had become obvious that

this hope would not materialize. Moreover,

General Krueger was himself under pressure from General MacArthur, who had indicated to the ALAMO Force commander

that the delays on Biak were seriously interfering with the execution of strategic

plans and who had already publicly announced that victory had been achieved on

Biak.21 Finally, on 14 June, General Krueger decided to relieve General Fuller of the

command of the HURRICANE Task Force,

apparently with the idea that General Fuller would remain on Biak to devote his full

time and attention to the operations of the

41st Division. General Krueger took this

step, he asserted, because of slowness of

operations on Biak and the failure to secure

the Biak airdromes at an early date.22 Lt.

Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, commanding

general of the U. S. I Corps (and of the

RECKLESS Task Force, at Hollandia) was

ordered to Biak to assume command of the

HURRICANE Task Force.23

General Eichelberger arrived at Biak late

on the morning of 15 June and at 1230 assumed command of the HURRICANE Task

Force.24 It was an angry and unhappy General Fuller who greeted General Eichelberger at Bosnek. The division commander

felt that General Krueger had been unjustifiably critical of the operations on Biak, and

he believed that his relief as task force commander indicated that his services had

proved unsatisfactory to his superiors. General Fuller had already requested in a letter

to General Krueger that he be relieved of

the division command as well as that of the

task force and he asked for reassignment

outside the Southwest Pacific Area.

General Eichelberger was in an embarrassing position, for he had been a classmate

of General Fuller at West Point, and the two

had been life-long friends. Believing that the

division commander still had a good chance

to receive a corps command, he tried to persuade General Fuller to change his mind.

But General Fuller was adamant, and followed his letter with a radio asking for quick

action on his relief from the division command. This tied General Eichelberger's

hands and left General Krueger no choice

but to approve General Fuller's request—a 19

 Rad, HTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, TD-654, 13 Jun

44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 13-14

Jun 44. 20

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to GHQ SWPA, WH418, 13 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 13-14 Jun 44. 21

 Ltr, Krueger to Ward, 2 Jan 51; Lt Gen Robert

L. Eichelberger and Milton MacKaye, "Biak:

Battle of the Caves," The Saturday Evening Post,

CXXII, 10 (3 Sep 49), 26, 99; same, Our Jungle

Road to Tokyo (New York, 1950), pp. 137-38,

142-43.

22

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to HTF, WH-465, 15

Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

14-15 Jun 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt WakdeBiak, p. 43. 23

 Ibid., Ltr OI, Comdr ALAMO Force to CG I

Corps, 14 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 14-15 Jun 44. 24

 Rad, HTF to ALAMO, TD-720, 15 Jun 44, in

ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14-15

Jun 44.
344 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

step he was extremely reluctant to take—

and forward it to General Headquarters,

where it was also approved by General MacArthur. General Fuller left Biak on 18 June,

and, after departing from the Southwest Pacific Area, became Deputy Chief of Staff at

the headquarters of Admiral Lord Louis

Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command.

At General Eichelberger's suggestion, command of the 41st Division on Biak passed to

General Doe.25

Upon leaving Biak, General Fuller addressed the following letter to his former

command:

To the Officers and Men of the Forty-first

Infantry Division.

1. I am being relieved of command for my

failure to achieve the results demanded by

higher authority. This is in no way a reflection

upon you or your work in this operation. I, and

I alone, am to blame for this failure.

2. I have commanded the Forty-First Division for better or worse for over two years and

one-half. During that period I have learned to

respect you, to admire you, and to love you, individually and collectively. You are the finest

body of men that it has been my privilege to

be associated with in thirty nine years of

service.

3. I part with you with many pangs of heart.

I wish all of you the best of luck and God Bless

You, for I love you all.26

Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was

entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time

of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy

at those two fields, and General Fuller knew

they could be occupied with ease. But he

had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer

Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low

ridge so that repair work could continue

and at least one strip could be put in service.

By 14 June it was only a question of time

before the West Caves area and the low

ridge would be secured. Indeed, General

Eichelberger, who took three and one-half

days to acquaint himself with the situation

at Biak, drew up new attack plans according

to which the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area

and in much the same manner as General

Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that

Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no

safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the

Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves

positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick

seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields,

had not been accomplished by 15 June. No

airfield in the Biak area was yet available

for use by the Allied Air Forces.27

There can be no doubt that the two forward regiments were becoming fatigued—

they had been in continuous combat for

eighteen days in an enervating climate—

but it is doubtful that this fatigue was the

only trouble. There is some evidence that

25

 Gen Eichelberger, notes entitled "Background

for the Biak Operation," dictated by the general,

4 Apr 48, copy in OCMH files; Eichelberger and

MacKaye, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p. 142; Rad,

ALAMO Adv Hq to GHQ SWPA, WH-500, 16 Jun

44, Rad, HTF (personal from Gen Fuller) to

ALAMO (for Gen Krueger), TD-746, 16 Jun 44,

and Rad, HTF (from Gen Eichelberger) to ALAMO

(for Gen Krueger), TD-762, 16 Jun 44, all three

rads in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 16-

18 Jun 44. Ltr, Krueger to Ward, 2 Jan 51. 26

 Ltr, CG 41st Div to O's and EM of 41st Inf

Div, 16 Jun 44, no sub, certified true copy in 163d

Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44.

27

 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; Eichelberger and MacKaye, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

pp. 141-46; Eichelberger Notes; Ltr, Krueger to

Ward, 2 Jan 51.
FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 345

there was a lack of aggressiveness at the battalion and company levels of the command,28

 and there are definite indications

that General Fuller may not have put as

much pressure on his regimental commanders as he might have. One regimental commander later stated:

I was never informed that there had been a

deadline set for the capture of the Biak Airfields, nor that there was any pressure being

applied on Gen. Fuller from higher headquarters. I only learned of this after his relief. As

far as I knew the operation was proceeding

with fairly satisfactory speed. Had I known of

the need for speed in supporting the Marianas

attack I might have acted differently on several occasions.29

One of the reasons that the HURRICANE

Task Force had had such difficulty in securing the Mokmer Drome area was that fresh

Japanese troops had been arriving on Biak

since 27 May and had been thrown into the

action at the airfields. General Fuller, on

the basis of aerial reconnaissance reports

and intelligence received from ALAMO

Force, had for some time suspected that

Japanese reinforcements were reaching

Biak. This suspicion, coupled with the growing fatigue of 41st Division troops on the

island, had, on 13 June, prompted the HURRICANE Task Force commander to request

ALAMO Force for an additional American

regimental combat team. General Fuller's

suspicions concerning Japanese reinforcements were correct. Unknown to the HURRICANE Task Force, the Japanese had developed and partially executed ambitious plans

for the reinforcement of Biak.30

28

 Memo, ALAMO AA Officer for CofS ALAMO

Force, 6 Jun 44, sub: Obsns on Biak, and Memo,

ALAMO FA Obsr, Biak, for Comdr ALAMO Force, 6

Jun 44, sub: Obsr's Rpt on Biak, 2-5 Jun 44, both

in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-9

Jun 44. 29

 Newman Notes; Col Haney, commanding the

162d Infantry, agreed in Ltr, Haney to Ward, 20

Nov 50, with Col Newman's statement here.

30

 HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; Opns of

Yuki Group, pp. 8-9.
CHAPTER XV

The Japanese Reinforce Biak

Biak and Japanese Naval Plans

As the Biak operation began, both ALAMO

Force and General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, estimated that the principal Japanese reaction to the landing of the

HURRICANE Task Force would be aerial in

nature. Since it was believed that the Japanese were committed to a policy of conserving their remaining naval strength, it

was considered improbable that they would

risk major fleet elements to counterattack

at Biak or reinforce this island in the face

of Allied land-based aircraft which were

either at fields within range of Biak or which

were expected soon to be flying from strips

captured there. Attempts by the Japanese

to reinforce Biak by barge movements from

more westerly bases were also considered

improbable. Such movements would have

to be made at the mercy of Allied Naval

Force PT boats operating from Mios

Woendi or Allied aircraft from the Biak

fields. Finally, it was considered improbable

that the enemy would choose to weaken his

garrisons at Noemfoor Island and Manokwari by sending reinforcements from those

bases to Biak.1

These estimates of enemy intentions were

incorrect. The determined defense by the

Biak Detachment prevented the Allies from

using the Biak airfields as soon as had been

expected. Therefore, all aerial efforts to locate and destroy Japanese seaborne reinforcement movements had to be made from

Wakde Island or Hollandia. Moreover, not

only had the Japanese made ambitious plans

to reinforce Biak, but they were also willing

to risk important naval air and surface units

to make sure that the reinforcements

reached their destination.

Japanese Naval Planning,

Early 1944

The 9 May withdrawal of Japan's southeastern strategic main line of resistance to

the line Sorong-Halmahera meant, in essence, that no reinforcements were to be

sent to Biak and Manokwari, now relegated

to the status of strategic outposts. But the

landing of the HURRICANE Task Force on

27 May engendered a change in attitude at

Imperial General Headquarters concerning

the importance of Biak. Prior to this time,

the defense of Biak had been principally a

responsibility of the Japanese Army, but now

the Navy Section, Imperial General Headquarters, began to take a decisive hand in

the planning for operations in the western

New Guinea area.2

Allied carrier operations against the

Palaus and Sarmi in early 1944, coupled

with continued Allied advances along the

1

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Daily Rpt 164, 27 May 44,

in ALAMO G-2 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 16 May-2 Jun 44;

GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI's 800 and 802, 31 May

and 2 Jun 44, respectively, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 31

May and 2 Jun 44.

2

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 111-

13; Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 61-64; Hist of

2d Area Army, pp. 53-58. Upon the Allied landings

in the Wakde-Sarmi area on 17 May, General Anami, commanding the 2d Area Army, had renewed

earlier pleas for strengthening the Biak-Manokwari

line, but these pleas had fallen on deaf ears at Imperial GHQ.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 347

New Guinea coast and the concomitant

weakening of Japanese Army air strength in

western New Guinea, prompted the Japanese Navy to reinvestigate Biak's defensive potentialities. The Navy decided to

strengthen its rather meager forces on Biak

and, apparently early in April, sent airdrome

construction units, a few antiaircraft troops,

and some supply units to the island. In May

the 19th Naval Guard Unit elements arrived there.3

 One of the airfields on Biak

apparently was to have been used solely by

the Japanese Naval Air Service. Be that as

it may, the Navy's interest in Biak during

April was insignificant compared with that

aroused by the Allied landings on the island.

The background of this interest lay as far

distant in time as the disastrous defeats suffered by the Japanese Navy in mid-1942

and in plans formulated by Imperial General Headquarters during the fall of 1943 to

develop bases in the western New Guineaeastern Indies area from which to launch a

major counteroffensive in the middle of

1944.4

Having suffered heavy losses of ground

troops, aircraft, and pilots, the Japanese

Army was unable to assume its share of preparations for the counteroffensive. Moreover,

continuous shipping losses and Allied air attacks against the prospective bases made it

impossible for the Japanese to send enough

army troops forward even to defend those

bases properly, let alone develop them to

support major counterattacks.

Ever since its heavy losses in the middle

of 1942, the Japanese Navy had been endeavoring to rebuild its air and surface

strength for a naval showdown in the Pacific. Despite continued serious losses from

Allied air and submarine operations through

early 1944, the Japanese Navy was induced

by the series of Allied carrier attacks and

advances in the first four months of 1944 to

speed preparations for the showdown. On

this potential battle, the Japanese Navy conferred the code name Operation A or, as it

was more euphoniously known, the A-GO

Operation.5

The Japanese Navy initially planned to

meet the U. S. Pacific Fleet for the A-GO

Operation in the waters around the Palaus,

but the possibility that the battle might have

to be fought off the Marianas or near Geelvink Bay was not overlooked.6

 Whatever the

expected locale of the battle, the Allied invasions of Hollandia and Aitape on 22 April

gave impetus to final preparations for

A-GO. On 3 May the Navy Section of

Imperial General Headquarters issued a

warning order for all units of the Combined

Fleet to start assembling for the A-GO Op3

 Naval Opns in the Western New Guinea Area,

pp. 2-3, 7-9; Incl 2, List of Corrections, to Ltr,

Willoughby to Ward, 10 Mar 51. Although Biak had

apparently been an army base practically from the

time it was first occupied by the Japanese, the prin- cipal administrator for the Biak natives was a Japanese civilian naval employee. This was in accordance with agreements reached by the Japanese Army

and Navy before the outbreak of war. 4

 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 90-

96; see also above, Ch. IV.

5

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 60, The A-GO

Operation, 1944, pp. 1, 3-6, copy in OCMH files. The "GO" in this sense is roughly equivalent to

"No." in the English "Operation No. A." 6

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 55-68; Interrog of

Capt Mitsuo Fuchida [IJN] [Air Stf O, Hq Combined Flt], 10 Oct 45, in USSBS, Naval Analysis Div,

Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 122-32; Interrog of Vice Adm Shigeru Fukudome [IJN] [CofS

Combined Flt, etc.], 9-12 Dec 45, ibid., II, 500-30;

Incl 2, List of Corrections, to Ltr, Willoughby to

Ward, 10 Mar 51; Interrog of Capt Toshikazu

Ohmae [IJN] [CofS 1st Task Force], 25 Nov 45, in

USSBS, op. cit., II, 409-10. The 2d Area Army and

the Southwest Area Fleet hoped (or perhaps even

expected) that A-GO would be undertaken in the

Geelvink Bay area.
348 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

eration. For the battle, the Japanese Navy

organized the bulk of the Combined Fleet's

striking power into a unit called the 1st Task

Force,

7

 under Vice Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa.

Admiral Ozawa's force was divided into two

major sections: the 2d Fleet, containing the

battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of the

battle line, and the 3d Fleet, which was a

carrier striking force comprising nine carriers and their escorts, and based approximately 500 aircraft. Also scheduled to take

an important part in the A-GO Operation

was the land-based 1st Air Fleet, commanded by Vice Adm. Kakuji Kakuta.

The 1st Air Fleet, with an authorized

strength of over 1,600 planes (the bulk of

them land-based types), had been organized

in Japan in mid-1943. Comprising initially

the 61st and 62d Air Flotillas, it was to have

had at least a year's training which, apparently, was to emphasize land-based operations in support of fleet action. Continued

Allied advances in the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas, the loss of the Japanese

Navy's carrier-based air strength at Rabaul,

and Allied carrier attacks against Truk

prompted Imperial General Headquarters,

in February 1944, to send the bulk of the

61st Air Flotilla (accompanied by Headquarters, 1st Air Fleet) to the Marianas.

Some of the 61st's aircraft were simultaneously deployed to the Carolines and Palaus,

while the 62d Air Flotilla, lacking sufficient

training for combat, remained in Japan.8

On 22 April, when the Allies landed at

Hollandia and Aitape, the 1st Air Fleet was

assigned the operational control of the 23d

Air Flotilla, then the only Japanese Naval

Air Service unit based in New Guinea.

Based since February 1942 variously at

Kendari, in the Celebes, and at Davao,

Mindanao, the 23d's headquarters moved

to Sorong, at the northwest tip of the Vogelkop, in mid-April 1944. At that time the

flotilla sent a number of its combat planes

forward to Biak and Wakde.

Most of these planes were lost during the

Allied carrier- and land-based air operations

which prepared the way for the landings of

the RECKLESS and PERSECUTION Task

Forces. The 1st Air Fleet, when it took over

operational control of the 23d Air Flotilla,

therefore sent to the latter unit fourteen

land-based bombers. Earlier plans to send

additional aircraft to the 23d from the 61st

Air Flotilla's detachment in the Palaus had

to be abandoned when the 61st lost over

100 planes during the U. S. Fifth Fleet

carrier raids on the Palaus at the end of

March.

The 23d Air Flotilla could undertake no

major counterattacks against Hollandia and

was unable to do anything to prevent the

Allied advance to Wakde-Sarmi on 17 May.

Instead, trying to save its remaining

strength, it withdrew most of its aircraft to

Sorong, leaving only a few reconnaissance

planes at Biak. Between the Allied landings

at Hollandia and Biak, the flotilla devoted

much of its time to maintaining air bases in

the western New Guinea area in the expectation that more reinforcements would be

sent to it from the 1st Air Fleet. But such

additional strength was not immediately

forthcoming. Instead, the 23d Air Flotilla

suffered still more losses from Allied aircraft

based at Hollandia and Wakde. When the

7

 The characters of this name are also rendered

into English as the 1st Striking Force, the 1st Task

Fleet, and the 1st Mobile Fleet. 8

 The A-GO Operation, pp. 3-7; Southeast Area

Naval Opns, III, 2-9; Interrog of Capt Mitsuo

Fuchida, 25 Nov 45, in USSBS, op. cit., II, 428-31.

Initially under Imperial GHQ, the 61st Air Flotilla

passed to the control of Combined Fleet on 15 Mar

44. It picked up a few experienced pilots and some

additional planes upon arrival in the Marianas.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 349

HURRICANE Task Force landed on Biak, the

flotilla still had only twelve fighters and six

medium bombers.9

The Japanese Decision

to Reinforce Biak

Meanwhile, final preparations for the

A-GO Operation had been going on

apace.10 The 1st Task Force assembled on 16

May at Tawitawi, outermost island of the

Sulu Archipelago, which extends southwest

from Mindanao toward Borneo. Then, just

after the Allied landings in the WakdeSarmi area, the 1st Air Fleet was ordered to

begin final deployment for A-GO. The U.S.

Fifth Fleet attack on Marcus Island, northeast of the Marianas, on 20 May, apparently convinced the Japanese Navy that a

major Allied advance was about to take

place in the Central Pacific, bringing the

U. S. Fifth Fleet into waters where the 1st

Task Force, supported by the 1st Air Fleet,

would have some advantages. Whatever the

case, on 20 May the 1st Task Force was

alerted to be ready to sally forth from Tawitawi to execute A-GO at a moment's notice.

During conferences at Imperial General

Headquarters in late April and early May,

the question of what steps might be taken

in case the Allies advanced to Biak before

they moved in the Central Pacific had been

considered by the Japanese Navy. The Japanese were apparently convinced at this time

that the next major Allied target in the Central Pacific would be the Marianas, the seizure of which the Japanese Navy believed

would be an unparalleled calamity which

would foreshadow the loss of the war. Moreover, the Japanese Navy realized full well

that A-GO was going to be fought on a

shoestring, for it knew that available landbased air strength in the Marianas and Carolines was really inadequate for proper fleet

support. If part of that already insufficient

strength were redeployed to western New

Guinea to protect Biak, the disparity between the striking power of the 1st Task

Force and the surface vessel and carrierbased air strength available to the Allies

would become even more decided than it

was estimated to be.

The Japanese Navy therefore decided to

send no more aircraft to western New

Guinea other than the fourteen bombers

which had been dispatched to the 23d Air

Flotilla late in April. It was planned, moreover, that there would be no naval reaction

to an Allied landing on Biak beyond attacks

which could be mounted from Sorong by

the wholly inadequate 23d Air Flotilla.

Thus, possibly gambling that the A-GO

Operation would take place before an Allied

attack on Biak, and obviously considering

the Marianas more important than the western New Guinea area, the Japanese Navy

reconciled itself to the probable loss of the

bases in the Geelvink Bay area.

But on 27 May there occurred the event

which the Japanese Navy had possibly

feared. The HURRICANE Task Force began

9

 Naval Opns in the Western New Guinea Area,

pp. 4-8; The A-GO Operation, pp. 2-3; Interrog of Capt Hirouchi Komoto [IJN] [Opns O, Stf,

23d Air Flotilla], 12 Nov 45, in USSBS, op. cit., II,

287-90. 10

 This subsection is based principally on: The

A-GO Operation, pp. 13-16; Japanese Studies in

WW II, 97, A-GO Operations Log (not to be confused with the A-GO Operation), pp. 1-6, copy in

OCMH files; Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ,

pp. 123-26; Naval Opns in the Western New

Guinea Area, pp. 9-14; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp.

61-62; Interrog of Capt Mitsuo Fuchida, 25 Nov

45, in USSBS, op. cit., II, 428-31; Interrog of Capt

Hirouchi Komoto, 12 Nov 45, ibid., II, 287-90;

Interrog of Capt Momochio Shimanouchi [IJN],

[Stf of 16th Cruiser Div], 26 Nov 45, ibid., II,

450-54; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev),

pp. 60-61.
350 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

pouring ashore at Biak at a time when Allied

forces in the Central Pacific had made no

move toward the Marianas. Suddenly the

Japanese Navy had a change of heart and

decided that the 1st Task Force would be at

a marked disadvantage during A-GO if it

had to cope with Allied aircraft using Biak

fields.

To counter the Allied advance to Biak,

the Japanese Navy decided upon two drastic steps. First, it dispatched from one third

to one half (the figures vary according to

source) of its available naval land-based air

strength from the Central Pacific to reinforce the 23d Air Flotilla in western New

Guinea. On 28 May, 70 carrier-type fighters

(50 of these were to stage in from Japan

through the Philippines and were probably

from the 62d Air Flotilla), 4 reconnaissance

bombers, and 16 medium bombers were

ordered to western New Guinea. It also

appears that another group of planes, comprising 48 fighters, 8 reconnaissance aircraft,

and 20 bombers, was likewise ordered to

move to western New Guinea and Halmahera from the Carolines on or about 31 May.

Thus, the Japanese Navy apparently

planned to reinforce the 23d Air Flotilla

with 90 to 156 aircraft, the bulk of them

fighter types. It is not known how many of

these aircraft actually reached Sorong or

other Vogelkop area bases, but it is known

that most of the pilots, upon arrival in New

Guinea, were immediately stricken with

malaria or other tropical fevers and became

liabilities rather than assets to the 23d Air

Flotilla. From the scale of the Japanese air

effort against Biak,11 it would appear that

few of the reinforcing planes were ever used

in attacks on that island.

The Japanese Navy next decided that it

was just as important to attempt to hold

Biak as to stage air raids against the Allied

forces on the island. The Biak Detachment

was obviously not strong enough to prevent

the Allies for long from occupying the entire

island. Therefore, as the second step, the

Japanese Navy, in agreement with the Army

Section, Imperial General Headquarters,

decided to transport to Biak the Army's 2d

Amphibious Brigade. Moreover, the Navy

was willing to risk major elements of the 1st

Task Force to insure the brigade's safe arrival on Biak. Orders to begin moving the

2d Amphibious Brigade from the Philippines to Biak, an undertaking which the

Japanese called Operation KON,12 were issued by Headquarters, Combined Fleet, on

30 or 31 May. At the same time it was decided to move three infantry companies of

the 35th Division from Sorong to Biak, presumably by barge. Execution of these orders

began immediately.

The KON Operation

The 2d Amphibious Brigade, a relatively

new unit of the Japanese Army, had been

formed and trained for assault landings and

transportation by small craft. Originally, it

had been about 4,000 strong and comprised

three infantry battalions, a 75-mm. mountain artillery battalion of twelve guns, a

tank company, and attached engineer, signal, medical, and other service-type units.

11

 As derived from the enumeration and description of Japanese air attacks against Biak recorded

in G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II,

Per Rpts.

12

 The component parts of the Japanese ideograph

"kon" are "water" and "army." Thus the ideograph

lent itself well as a code name for waterborne reinforcement movements. The actual meanings of the

ideograph appear to have no pertinence to the

nature of the operation.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 351

The brigade had lost some of its infantry

personnel and the entire tank unit as a result of Allied submarine action during the

organization's movement from Japan to the

Philippines in April or May. Most of the

brigade was finally moved from Manila to

Zamboanga, while some of the unit was apparently sent to Davao.13

The First KON Operation

The KON Force, as the ships detailed

from the 1st Task Force for the purpose of

reinforcing Biak came to be called, was divided into four sections.14

 The largest and

most important was the Transport Unit,

consisting of 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser,

and 3 destroyers. Next were the 1st Screening Unit, 2 heavy cruisers and 3 destroyers,

and the 2d Screening Unit, 1 old battleship

and 2 destroyers. A Detached Unit15 contained two mine layers and an unknown

number of submarine chasers, patrol craft,

and landing craft or barges. The Transport

Unit was to move 1,700 troops of the 2d

Amphibious Brigade to Biak, while the Detached Unit took 800 more men of the same

organization to the island. It appears that

the Transport Unit and the 1st and 2d

Screening Units were also to shell Allied positions on Biak and attack Allied transport

ships and naval vessels found in Biak waters.

According to orders, KON Force was to

reach Biak on 3 June. There is no indication

that the Japanese expected the KON Operation to evolve into an A-GO Operation in

the Geelvink Bay area. Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, even as KON Force sailed

toward Biak, were keeping under surveillance U. S. Pacific Fleet units stationed in

the Marshall Islands. Should the scouting

planes report that large groups of the American vessels had left the Marshalls, the Japanese would immediately put into effect their

plans for A-GO, In accordance with these

plans, the 1st and 2d Screening Units of

KON Force would hurry to rejoin the 1st

Task Force in Philippine waters.

The KON Force's Transport Unit left

Tarakan, Borneo, on 30 May and arrived at

Zamboanga, Mindanao, the next day. At

Zamboanga, the unit's cruisers and destroyers took aboard the 1,700 troops of the 2d

Amphibious Brigade and then moved on to

reach Davao, Mindanao, on 1 June. The

1st and 2d Screening Units departed the

Tawitawi fleet anchorage on 30 May and

assembled with the Transport Unit in

Davao Gulf on 1 June. The three units left

the gulf about midnight on 2 June, the 2d

Screening Unit following a course generally

parallel to but some fifty miles east of the

other two groups. To allow more time to embark troops and make final plans, there was

a delay of one day in Davao Gulf, after

which the ships of the three KON Force

units were not expected to arrive off Biak

until approximately 2200 hours on 4 June.

So far, various Allied intelligence agencies

had kept fairly accurate track of Japanese

ship movements in the Mindanao area by

means of aerial reconnaissance and submarine reports. On 30 May the 1st and 2d

Screening Units had been sighted as they

sailed east from Tawitawi. General Mac13

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpts 52, 54, and 56,

2, 16, and 30 Aug, respectively, copies in G-2 DofA

files; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 61-62; Naval

Opns in the Western New Guinea Area, p. 10. 14

 In addition to the Allied sources cited below,

this subsection is based upon the following Japanese

sources: The A-GO Operation, pp. 15-16; A-GO

Operations Log, pp. 5-9; Hist of 2d Area Army,

pp. 61-64; Naval Opns in the Western New Guinea

Area, pp. 10-12; Interrog of Capt Momochio Shimanouchi, in USSBS, op. cit., II, 450-54; 2d Army

Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 61, 65-66. 15

 The names of these various components of KON

Force vary with the source and translation.
352 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Arthur's G-2 Section, interpreting this

sighting, considered it probable that the

Japanese ships were heading for Davao or

the Palaus on supply or transport missions.

At this time apparently little consideration

was given to the possibility that the Japanese

fleet units might have been sallying forth

with offensive intent. The next day, 31 May,

the ALAMO Force G-2 Section stated: "Enemy naval intervention at this stage of the

[Biak] operations is impossible."

 16

On 1 June Allied air or submarine (the

record is not clear) sightings accounted for

twelve of the thirteen ships comprising the

three KON Force units then assembled in

Davao Gulf. But, despite the fact that the

G-2 Section of General MacArthur's headquarters had also received information from

radio intercepts indicating that the Japanese were planning to send the 2d Amphibious Brigade to Biak, that section was still

disinclined to believe that the Japanese

fleet movements presaged offensive intent.

Instead, it was considered more probable

that the combat vessels at Davao Gulf were

merely preparing to take supplies or reinforcements to Halmahera or perhaps to

northwestern New Guinea.17

Early on the morning of 3 June, at a

point just east of the Talaud Islands, between Mindanao and Morotai, a Seventh

Fleet submarine sighted the Transport and

1st Screening Units and was in turn sighted

by ships of the latter organization. Seventh

Fleet PB4Y's, operating from Wakde Island,

kept the Japanese vessels under surveillance

the rest of the day, reporting that the course

and speed of the enemy ships could bring

them into range of Biak during the evening

of 4 June.18 Their discovery by Allied aircraft so far from Biak (about 650 nautical

miles) apparently had not been anticipated

by the Japanese, who later reported that

they had not known Allied aircraft were

capable of such long-range reconnaissance.19

Nevertheless, the three KON Force elements steamed on toward Biak, probably

hoping that friendly aircraft might drive off

the Allied reconnaissance planes and also

protect the sea approaches to Biak.

In connection with KON Force's advance, the Japanese had planned heavy air

strikes against Biak which were to be carried

out by the recently reinforced 23d Air Flotilla and the few army aircraft which remained at bases within range of Biak.

Between 1645 and 1700 on 2 June, from

eleven to fifteen Japanese planes bombed

Allied positions on Biak, causing a few casualties and some light damage. Seven of

these planes were shot down by shore-based

antiaircraft weapons, while guns aboard

Seventh Fleet ships lying off Bosnek accounted for at least one more. Later during

the same night, a few more enemy planes

dropped some bombs harmlessly on and

near Owi Island. Still more approached

Biak during the night, causing many red

alerts but not dropping any bombs. The

next night, that of 3-4 June, no Japanese

planes attacked Biak, although an unknown 16

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May 44,

p. 10-d, copy in G-2 DofA files; GHQ SWPA, G-2

DSEI 800, 31 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 31 May

44; Incl 2, List of Corrections, to Ltr, Willoughby

to Ward. 10 Mar 51. 17

 GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI's 800 and 802, 31

May and 2 Jun 44, respectively, in G-3 GHQ

Jnls, 31 May and 2 Jun 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to

ALAMO, G-13158, 1 Jun 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq

G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 1-2 Jun 44.

18 Rad, ALAMO to HTF, WF-612, 4 Jun 44, in

ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 3-4 Jun 44. 19

 This ignorance of the capabilities of Allied

reconnaissance planes was professed after the war

and seems to be tongue-in-cheek ex post facto reasoning, PB4Y's had been flying such distances (a

round trip of about 1400 miles from Wakde) for

some time, both in the Southwest and Central

Pacific Areas.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 353

number bombed Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Again, however, enemy aircraft flew many reconnaissance flights around Biak, causing an almost

continuous red alert until the early morning

hours of 4 June.20

The Japanese reconnaissance aircraft

around Biak probably lost for the Japanese

their best opportunity to reinforce and

bombard the island. Already worried at

being sighted by an Allied submarine and

shadowed by PB4Y's, the KON Force, late

on 3 June, received reports from Japanese

scouting planes that an impressive Allied

naval force, including carriers, was lying off

Biak. How such a report could have originated is unknown—the pilots must have

mistaken destroyers for battleships and

LST's for carriers—for there were no Allied

naval vessels larger than destroyers at Biak

on 3 June. The Japanese now believed that

the surprise value of KON had been lost

and they began to fear attacks from carrierbased aircraft. Therefore, at approximately

2000 hours on the 3d, the KON Operation

was called off.

Meanwhile, Allied General Headquarters, acting on the basis of new secret intelligence, had re-evaluated the available information concerning sightings of Japanese

combat vessels. On 3 June the theater headquarters warned ALAMO Force, Allied Naval

Forces, and Allied Air Forces that there

were strong indications that the Japanese

were going to make attempts to land reinforcements on Biak during the night of 4-5

June or on nights immediately following.

The same day the Allied Naval Forces

formed a special task force comprising 1

heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers, and 10 destroyers—most of the readily available combat strength of the Seventh Fleet and the

Royal Australian Navy except for a few destroyers already at Biak providing support

for ground operations.

The ships of the hastily assembled task

force were to rendezvous off Hollandia and

depart that station in time to arrive at Biak

by 1915 on 4 June. The small fleet was to

destroy or drive off an equal or inferior enemy force attempting to bring reinforcements to Biak. In case a Japanese force of

superior strength came within range, the

Allied groupment was to retire toward Hollandia, presumably under cover of Fifth Air

Force planes from Wakde. In connection

with these plans there was set up a northsouth boundary near Biak to separate areas

of naval and air responsibility. Naval or air

elements were not to cross this boundary

except in cases of emergency or when in hot

pursuit of Japanese vessels.21

Long before the Allied task force reached

Biak on 4 June, the Japanese had canceled

the KON Operation. Had the enemy force

continued toward Biak, it might well have

found the waters around that island free of

Allied vessels. Moreover, the small Allied

task force, under orders to withdraw in case

a superior enemy fleet showed up, would

have been opposed by 1 battleship, 3 heavy

cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 8 destroyers of

the Japanese Navy. The Allied group would

have had one more ship but would have been

far outclassed in range and weight of fire

20

 G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 9-11, 4-7 Jun 44, in G-2

Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; Rad,

ALAMO Rear Hq to GHQ SWPA, WF-420, 3 Jun

44, and Rad, 14th ALP to Advon5thAF, NO-64,

3 Jun 44, both in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 3-4 Jun 44.

21

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to AAF SWPA and ANF

SWPA, CX-13203, 3 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

3 Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv

Hq, WF-551, 3 Jun 44, and Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq

to HTF, WF-613, 3 Jun 44 (paraphrasing another

radio from Com7thFlt to CTF's 74 and 75), both

in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 3-4

Jun 44.
354 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

power. The Allied force might have had

some support of land-based air power from

distant Wakde Island, but the boundaries

between air and naval zones would have

limited the use of this help and the planes

could not, in any case, be expected to operate with maximum efficiency during the

night hours when the naval engagement

would have taken place. Be that as it may,

the Japanese resolved the question of an

Allied naval withdrawal from Biak by failing to press home their planned attack.

When the Japanese called off KON on 3

June, the Transport and the 1st and 2d

Screening Units were a little over 500 miles

northwest of Biak and about 250 miles eastsoutheast of the Talaud Islands. At this

point, the three forces were reorganized.

The Transport Unit, accompanied by the

three destroyers of the 1st Screening Unit,

changed course for Sorong, while the 2d

Screening Unit and the two heavy cruisers

of the 1st turned back toward Davao, which

they probably reached late on 5 June. Of the

ships moving to Sorong, the Fifth Air Force

claimed to have sunk one destroyer and

damaged at least two others. No substantiation of these contemporary claims is to be

found in Japanese sources or later Allied

reports. The Transport Unit and the 1st

Screening Unit's three destroyers arrived

safely at Sorong during the evening of 4

June.22

The Detached Unit, which had been moving toward Biak from Zamboanga on an independent course far to the west of the other

three sections of KON Force, had also

changed its direction during the night of

3-4 June, and reached Sorong sometime on

the 4th. At Sorong the Transport Unit unloaded the 1,700 men of the 2d Amphibious

Brigade. The six destroyers of the Transport

and 1st Screening Units then proceeded

southwest to Ambon where they refueled.

The Transport Unit's one heavy cruiser and

one light cruiser sought shelter in Kaboei

Bay, Waigeo Island, about 60 miles northwest of Sorong. On 6 June the heavy cruiser

Aoba was attacked there by fifteen B-24's

of the Fifth Air Force. First reports were

that at least two hits were scored on the

cruiser, but it was later learned that the

ship suffered no damage. Instead, it was

able to take part in a second KON Operation.23

The Second KON Operation

After noting the Japanese invasion fleet

scattering to the north and southwest on 4

June, the G-2 Section of ALAMO Force estimated that the Japanese had at least temporarily dropped all plans for reinforcing

Biak.24 It was realized that the enemy could

send troop-carrying barges to Biak if he

chose to risk running the Allied air and

naval blockade of that island, but further

large-scale naval intervention was not expected.25

 The G-2 Section was due for another surprise—the Japanese had no intention of giving up so readily.

22

 Memo, AdvonSAF to ALAMO, sub: Ship Sightings, 4 Jun 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 3-4 Jun 44; Incl 2, List of Corrections, to

Ltr, Willoughby to Ward, 10 Mar 51.

23

 Rad, COIC GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, no number, 7 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 7-8 Jun 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 45,

14 Jun 44; Incl 2, List of Corrections, to Ltr, Willoughby to Ward, 10 Mar 51. 24

 In addition to the Allied sources cited, the following Japanese sources were used for this subsection: A-GO Operations Log, p. 10; Naval Opns

in the Western New Guinea Area, pp. 12-13; Interrog of Capt Momochio Shimanouchi, in USSBS,

op. cit., II, 450-54; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and

Biak (Rev), pp., 64, 70, 76-77. 25

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Daily Rpt 172, 6 Jun 44,

in ALAMO G-2 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 3-16 Jun 44.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 355

The enemy had discovered, probably as

a result of aerial reconnaissance early on 4

June, that the Allied naval force in the Biak

area contained no carriers. Therefore, sometime on the 4th, Headquarters, Combined

Fleet decided to make another effort to reinforce and bombard Biak. For the second

attempt, KON Force units were again divided into four elements. The first was the

Transport Unit, containing three destroyers

which had been part of the first KON Operation Transport Unit. The second section

was the Screening Unit, also comprising

three destroyers. For the second KON Operation there were two detached units—the

1st had one heavy and one light cruiser

while the 2d Detached Unit included the

small craft and patrol boats which had put

into Sorong at the end of the first KON.

The three destroyers of the Transport

Unit were each to embark 200 infantrymen

at Sorong. In addition, the destroyers of

either or both the Transport and Screening

Units were each to tow to Biak one landing

barge crammed with troops, probably 30

to 50 men to a barge. It cannot be definitely

ascertained to what organization the infantrymen of the second KON Operation belonged but it appears that the second KON

Force planned to move the bulk of the 2d

and 3d Battalions, 219th Infantry, 35th Division, from Sorong to Biak. Elements of

both units were later identified on Biak.

On the morning of 7 June the Transport,

Screening, and 1st Detached Units rendezvoused off Misoöl Island, about 100 miles

southwest of Sorong. The Japanese now decided that only destroyers would be used for

the reinforcement run to Biak. Leaving the

two cruisers at Misoöl, the Transport and

Screening Units proceeded to Sorong where

they embarked troops and picked up their

tows. The 1st Detached Unit moved to Ambon for fuel and supplies while the 2d Detached Unit was ordered to be ready to sail

toward Biak at a moment's notice.

The Transport and Screening Units left

Sorong about midnight on the 7th, following a northeasterly course parallel to the

coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula. The course

was to bring the ships about 25 miles off

Kaap de Goede Hoop (Cape of Good

Hope), which, lying about midway between

Manokwari and Sorong, is the northernmost

point of the Vogelkop. After dawn on the

8th, air cover was to have been provided

by planes of the 23d Air Flotilla. But the

cape area was being patrolled by Allied aircraft on 8 June and, about 1330, the 23d

Air Flotilla cover of six planes was shot

down or driven away by Fifth Air Force

P-38's.

Finding the air now free of enemy planes,

American B-25's dived to the attack, reporting the convoy as 2 light cruisers and

4 destroyers. Initially, it was claimed that 1

destroyer was sunk, 2 were left sinking, and

the fourth was damaged. A few days later,

destruction was reassessed as 4 destroyers

sunk and 2 light cruisers chased to the

northwest.26 These claims were exaggerated.

One destroyer, the Harusame, was holed by

a near miss and sank rapidly, the bulk of its

crew being saved. Another destroyer was

damaged by a bomb and took some water;

two others were slightly damaged by strafing. Neither speed nor navigation was impeded for any of the three. The two light

cruisers reported by the Allied planes were,

of course, the other two destroyers. These

26

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 45, 14 Jun 44,

copy in G-2 DofA files; Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to

ALAMO Adv Hq, WF-1620, 8 Jun 44, in ALAMO

Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-9 Jun 44; Rad,

ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF-2030, 10

Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

10-11 Jun 44.
356 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

two might have taken some evasive action

by heading northwest for a short time, but

as soon as the Harusame crew had been rescued and the Allied planes had disappeared,

the convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak.27

About 1800 on the 8th, the Transport

and Screening Units received a report from

a Japanese aircraft that an Allied naval

force comprising 1 battleship, 4 cruisers,

and 8 destroyers was moving west at high

speed from an undesignated point east of

Biak. This report was at least partially correct. The Allied task force which had been

formed on 3 June had again assembled on

the 8th, having been alerted by reports of

the air-sea battle off the Kaap de Goede

Hoop. But the Japanese convoy commander

apparently took this air reconnaissance report with at least one grain of salt—had not

similar information received on 3 June

proved inaccurate? The Transport and

Screening Units steamed on, despite the

fact that the Kaap de Goede Hoop action

had put the force behind schedule.

At 2330 the two enemy groups were approximately forty miles off the north coast

of Soepiori Island, ready to turn southeast

toward Korim Bay, on the northeast side of

Biak. Minutes later a destroyer in the van

sighted the Allied task force heading northwest around Biak. The convoy commander

quickly realized that he was badly outnumbered and decided that discretion was

called for. The destroyers with tows cut the

barges loose and joined in a general flight

northwest toward the Mapia Islands, almost

200 miles distant, with Allied destroyers in

pursuit.28

Principally because the enemy had a long

head start and was taking evasive action

over miles of open sea, the Allied destroyers

were unable to close with the Japanese ships.

Moreover, the strength of the enemy force

was unknown, and the Allied destroyers

rapidly drew away from their cruiser support. Land-based air support was not available because of increasingly threatening

weather, darkness, and the fact that previously assigned boundaries between aircraft zones and naval action could not

readily be changed. Finally, at 0230 on the

9th, when the two opposing groups of destroyers were in the vicinity of the Mapia

Islands, contact was broken and the Allied

ships withdrew toward Biak.

The results of the engagement, during

which only long-range destroyer fire had

been exchanged, were inconclusive. A Japanese destroyer—one which had been hit on

the 8th when the Harusame had been

sunk—received more damage but again was

able to continue on course without much

loss of speed. In addition, Allied destroyers

sank at least one of the barges which the

Japanese destroyers had cut loose. Nevertheless, other barges of the group certainly

managed to set reinforcements ashore, probably at Korim Bay, during the night.29

Japanese air cover at Biak for the second

KON Operation had been practically non27

 The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee

[JANAC], Japanese Naval And Merchant Shipping

Losses During World War II By All Causes (Washington, 1947), p. 12.

28

 Rad, COIC GHQ SWPA to G-2 ALAMO, WM264, 10 Jun 44 and Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO

Adv Hq, WF-1891, 10 Jun 44, both in ALAMO Adv

Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 9-10 Jun 44. 29

 Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF1891, 10 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 9-10 Jun 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Daily

Rpt 178, 10 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-2 Jnl Wakde-Biak,

3-16 Jun 44.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 357

existent. Early on the morning of 8 June a

lone enemy plane dropped a few bombs near

shipping anchored off Mios Woendi and on

the HURRICANE Task Force's amphibian

tractor pool. No damage to equipment resulted from this raid and only one man was

wounded. About 2030 on the 8th, one

fighter and two bombers attacked searchlight positions on Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Other enemy

planes approached within radar range of

Biak during the early morning hours of 9

June, but did not attack the island.30

During the melee in the Biak-Mapia

area, the second KON Force's Transport

and Screening Units became separated, but

even so, both steamed westward on divergent courses under cover of bad weather on

the 9th. The Transport Unit's destroyers

proceeded to Sorong and there unloaded the

600 infantrymen so futilely carried toward

Biak. The destroyers then rendezvoused

with the cruisers of the 1st Detached Unit

and the two groups sailed to Batjan Island,

where they arrived on 10 June. The Screening Unit's remaining two destroyers reached

Batjan either late on the 9th or early on the

10th. Meanwhile, two heavy cruisers and

two destroyers of the first KON Force had

moved from Davao to Batjan and, during

the movement, lost the destroyer Kazegumo

to a Seventh Fleet submarine. The remaining three ships arrived at Batjan sometime

on 9 June.

During these scurryings over vast

stretches of the western Pacific, the small

craft of the 2d Detached Unit had perhaps

been ordered to Biak. Whatever its original

orders, the unit's instructions were changed

and the small craft apparently put back into

Sorong on 10 June. There the 800 men of

the 2d Amphibious Brigade, who had been

in transit from Zamboanga since 1 June,

disembarked.31

A final and unexplained movement occurred during the night of 9-10 June, when

Allied aircraft reportedly sighted between

three and five unidentified warships about

150 miles north of the Mapia Islands. When

first sighted the vessels were heading southeast toward Biak, and a later report, which

identified the ships as Japanese destroyers,

placed them fifty miles southeast of the

Mapia group, still heading toward Biak at

high speed. Japanese sources make no mention of a destroyer force at the specified time

or place. Allied naval vessels, based at Mios

Woendi, searched in vain in waters north

of Biak for the Japanese ships during the

early morning hours of 10 June.32 The

maneuvering may have been an unrecorded

Japanese attempt to entice Allied surface

forces away from Biak so that barges could

slip reinforcements into Biak from the

southwest. More likely, however, the sighting reports were inaccurate as to location

and course.

Whatever the facts concerning the shipping sighted on the night of 9-10 June, the

HURRICANE Task Force reported to ALAMO

Force that the enemy warships were five

destroyers which were moving reinforcements to Biak. It was partially on the basis

of this report that General Fuller, on 13

June, requested ALAMO Force to send an

additional infantry regiment to Biak.33

30

 G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 12-13, 8-9 Jun 44, in G-2

Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts.

31

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 56, 30 Aug 44,

copy in G-2 DofA files. 32

 Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF1891, 10 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 9-10 Jun 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Daily Rpt

178, 10 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-2 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 3-

16 Jun 44; Rad 7thFlt Adv PT Base (Mios Woendi)

to ALAMO, 10 Jun 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 10-12 Jun 44. 33

 Rad, HTF to ALAMO, TD-654, 13 Jun 44, in

ALAMO G-2 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 3-16 Jun 44.
358 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

The second KON Operation had cost the

Japanese 2 destroyers sunk, 1 badly damaged, 2 lightly damaged, and at least 1

bargeload of infantrymen lost. In return for

these losses, the enemy managed to land perhaps 100 fresh troops on Biak from the

barges towed by the destroyers of the second

KON Force. Finally, the Japanese had tied

up a small Allied Naval task force for some

days and had prompted the HURRICANE

Task Force to call for reinforcements—a

fact which the enemy did not learn for some

days. But, despite the obvious lack of success of two attempts to reinforce Biak, the

Japanese were determined to try again.

The Third KON Operation

During the second KON Operation the

Japanese had not neglected to keep track of

U.S. Fifth Fleet movements.34 On 9 June

Japanese aerial reconnaissance noted that

strong American carrier task forces had departed from the Marshall Islands. The Japanese realized that this movement presaged

a new amphibious attack or, at least, a

heavy carrier strike by Allied fleet units. But

the enemy was not yet sure where the blow

would fall. Nonetheless, on the morning of

10 June all units of the Combined Fleet were

alerted to make final preparations for the

A-GO Operation. Some naval air units had

at this time started from Central Pacific

bases toward Halmahera, presumably to

support the KON Operation or to give

added strength to enemy air deployment in

the western New Guinea area. Now, these

movements were canceled and the air units

which had already started changing their

stations were called back to the Marianas,

Palaus, and central Carolines. Either on the

10th or a few days later, other air organizations which had already arrived in western

New Guinea to reinforce the 23d Air Flotilla were also ordered to return to their

Mariana and Caroline bases. But, pending

arrival of more information concerning intentions of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the Combined Fleet decided to go ahead with a third

KON Operation. In fact, plans for a third

attempt had been initiated even as the destroyers of the second KON Force had been

fleeing toward Batjan Island.

On the morning of 10 June the Combined Fleet issued orders organizing the

third KON Force. Again there were to be

four elements. The first was designated the

Attack Unit and contained 2 battleships—

the Yamato and Musashi, then the most

powerful battleships in the Japanese or any

other navy—2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser,

and 3 destroyers. A 1st Transport Unit comprised 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, and

4 destroyers, while a 2d Transport Unit included the small craft which had carried the

800 men of the 2d Amphibious Brigade to

Sorong. A Supply Unit was made up of two

destroyer-escorts and two small cargo-transport ships.

Available sources provide somewhat incomplete and contradictory information on

Japanese plans for the employment of the

powerful task force assembled for the third

KON. Apparently, the first priority was to

34

 This subsection is based principally on: A-GO

Operations Log, pp. 10-11, 14-15; The A-GO Operation, pp. 17-18, 30; Naval Opns in the Western

New Guinea Area, pp. 14-15; Hist of 2d Area Army,

p. 64; Interrog of Capt Momochio Shimanouchi, in

USSBS, op. cit., II, 450-54; Interrog of Capt Hirouchi Komoto, ibid., II, 287-90; "Impressions

and Battle Lessons (Air) in the 'A' Operations," in

USSBS, The Campaigns in the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), App. 81, pp. 260-70; CINCPACCINCPOA, Bulletin 146-45, 10 Jun 45, Names of

Japanese Naval Vessels, copy in OCMH files; Incl

2, List of Corrections, to Ltr, Willoughby to Ward,

10 Mar 51.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 359

move reinforcements to Biak regardless of

cost to ships or men. The second priority was

for the Attack Unit to destroy Allied warships and merchant vessels found in Biak

waters and to deliver a heavy bombardment

against the HURRICANE Task Force's shore

positions. Some enemy sources indicate that

the 1st and 2d Transport Units were to take

the 2d Amphibious Brigade from Sorong to

Biak, but only if an excellent opportunity to

do so were presented.

The KON Force commander decided to

gather his forces for the third KON Operation at Batjan Island. Most of the ships of

the Attach Unit left the Tawitawi fleet anchorage on 10 June and arrived at Batjan

on the 11th, rendezvousing there with the

vessels of the second KON Force and with

the first KON Force's cruisers and destroyers. By morning of the 12th all elements

of the third KON Force had assembled and

were making final preparations for the third

attempt to reinforce and bombard Biak.

But on 11 June carrier-based planes of

the U. S. Fifth Fleet began heavy strikes

against Japanese installations on the Mariana Islands. These attacks continued on the

12th. Apparently the Japanese were not

sure at first what these raids portended, and

they merely delayed the sailing of the third

KON Force until more information concerning American intentions could be obtained. On the 13th, however, evidently

satisfied that a full-scale invasion of the

Marianas was about to take place, the Combined Fleet decided that the time had come

to assemble all available forces for the

A-GO Operation. The 1st Task Force had

started northeastward from Tawitawi on the

12th. Now, on the 13th, the bulk of the

third KON Force vessels left Batjan Island

and headed northeast at full speed toward

the Palaus to rendezvous with the 1st Task

Force. The third and final threat to Allied

naval and ground forces at Biak was over.

Reinforcements by Barge

During KON

In attempting to follow the various phases

of the KON Operation, it is all but impossible to separate the wheat from the chaff.

On the surface it appears that the enemy's

major ambition was to reinforce Biak by

means of large-scale naval intervention.

But—although Japanese records give no

inkling of this—the movements of the three

KON Forces may also have been designed

to confuse Allied naval units at Biak and

draw them north of the island while barges

slipped reinforcements into Biak from the

southwest without naval protection. Whatever the facts of possible Japanese deception

measures may be, suffice it to say that the

2d Area Army dispatched other reinforcements to Biak by barge while Allied and

Japanese naval vessels were maneuvering

north and northwest of the island.

On 30 or 31 May, as the first KON Force

was being organized, approximately 375

men of the 2d Battalion, 221st Infantry,

35th Division, were loaded on barges at

Manokwari and sent off toward Biak. The

provisional groupment, known as the Ozawa

Force, apparently contained the 6th and

7th Companies, the 2d Machine Gun Company, 2d Battalion headquarters, and possibly a detachment of the 221st Infantry's

signal section. Probably making an overnight run from Manokwari, the Ozawa

Force reached Noemfoor Island on 1 June,35

35

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 46, 21 Jun 44,

copy in G-2 DofA files; G-2 MTF, Per Rpt 45, 12

Jul 44, in G-2 Hist HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts;

Rad, HTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, TD-851, 19 Jun 44,

in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 18-19 Jun
360 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

but from Noemfoor on, the unit's movements are harder to trace.

Apparently, part of the Ozawa Force

(comprising the 6th Company, two light

artillery weapons, and Captain Ozawa's

headquarters) reached Korim Bay, Biak,

on the night of 3-4 June and then proceeded

southwest overland to reach the West Caves

area on the 9th. Some troops were lost on

the way to Biak and other barges may have

turned back to Noemfoor. The rest of the

Ozawa Force seems to have left Noemfoor

about 10 June, reaching Korim Bay on the

12th. Other elements of the 2d Battalion,

221st Infantry, including the bulk of the

5th Company, apparently left Manokwari

for Biak on or about 7 June, and some men

of this echelon may have reached Biak. It is

impossible to ascertain how many men of

the 2d Battalion, 221st Infantry, finally

arrived on Biak, but it appears that the total

did not exceed 400.36

Either the 2d or 3d Battalions of the 219th

Infantry, originally at Sorong, had been involved in the second KON Force's destroyer

run and barge tow to Biak during 7-9 June.

On the night of the 8th perhaps 100 men

of one of these battalions had managed to

reach shore at Biak when the destroyers had

cut loose their tows and fled toward the

Mapia Islands. The remaining elements of

the 219th Infantry, aboard the destroyers,

returned to Sorong on the 9th. On the same

day most of the 2d Battalion (which may

or may not have been involved in the destroyer run) was loaded on barges at Sorong

and sent to Biak via Noemfoor Island. It

is not known when the Nishihara Force, as

the unit organized for the barge run was

designated, reached Noemfoor, but it must

have been about 12 June. One company

apparently left for Biak the next day, while

the rest of the force seems to have waited

until the 16th. In any case, the Nishihara

Force began reaching the fighting area

north of Mokmer Drome on 23 June.37

The 5th and 9th Companies of the 222d

Infantry, Colonel Kuzume's own regiment,

had not been on Biak when the HURRICANE

Task Force began landing on 27 May. The

5th Company, garrisoning Noemfoor since

early April, was ordered to Biak about 30

May, while the 9th Company, which was

either at Noemfoor or Sorong, was apparently alerted for the move to Biak about the

same time. How the two units moved to

Biak is not certain, but it seems most probable that the 5th Company sailed from

Noemfoor with the Ozawa Force. At any

rate, it arrived in the West Caves area on

the 10th of June, having lost some men in

transit. The 9th Company probably moved

with the Nishihara Force to Noemfoor (if

it had been at Sorong) and left the island

aboard three large barges on or about 20

June. One of these barges, carrying about

thirty men and all the heavy weapons and

supplies of the company, was sunk by a

Seventh Fleet PT boat not far from Noemfoor. The other two apparently put back to

Noemfoor to try again a few days later, the

44; Hist of 2d Area Army, p. 64; 2d Army Opns at

Sarmi and Biak (Rev), p. 64. The Ozawa Force was

probably led by Capt. Kyukri Ozawa. 36

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpts 46 and 49, 21

Jun and 12 Jul 44, copies in G-2 DofA files; G-2

HTF, Per Rpts 24 and 45, 21 Jun and 12 Jul 44, in

G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; Rads,

HTF to ALAMO Adv Hq, TD-832 and TD-851, 18

and 19 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 18-19 Jun 44; Rad, HTF to ALAMO Rear Hq,

TD-997, 23 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-2 Jnl WakdeBiak, 16 Jun-10 Jul 44; Opns of Yuki Group, pp.

8-9; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp.

64-65, 70, 75.

37

 G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 34 and 45, 1 and 12 Jul 44,

respectively, in G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II,

Per Rpts; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 49, 12 Jul

44; 2d Army Opns At Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp.

79, 83.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 361

remnants of the company reaching Biak

about 25 June, possibly in company with

part of the Nishihara Force.38

Thus, over a period of about one month,

the Japanese managed to reinforce the Biak

Detachment with approximately 1,200

men—about 225 troops of the 222d Infantry, some 400-odd of the 221st Infantry, and

probably a little over 500 of the 219th Infantry. Considering their naval, air, personnel, and supply losses during the KON Operation and the barge runs, and also considering the fact that the reinforcements were

too few and too late to affect the outcome of

operations on Biak, the Japanese attempt

was hardly worth the effort.

Results of the KON Operation

Facts and Speculation

It is difficult to assess the effect the Japanese Navy's attempts to hold, reinforce, or

attack Biak may have had on subsequent

naval operations throughout the Pacific, especially during the A-GO Operation, which

was known on the Allied side as The Battle

of the Philippine Sea and which occurred

off the Marianas in mid-June. It is known

that Combined Fleet plans for A-GO had

placed a great deal of dependence upon the

support of naval land-based aircraft. Units

of the 1st Air Fleet, based in the Marianas,

Carolines, and Palaus, had been expected

to effect reconnaissance ahead of the 1st

Task Force and attack Allied shipping, aircraft, and combat vessels as the 1st Task

Force sallied forth to battle against the U.S.

Fifth Fleet.

But when the Allies landed on Biak, one

third to one half of the 1st Air Fleet's planes

had been sent to western New Guinea to

support KON. Other elements of the 1st

Air Fleet were evidently dispatched from

Central Pacific bases toward Halmahera

and western New Guinea on or about 10

June. Of the first group, at least half the

pilots were lost as the result of malaria or

action in support of KON. Most of the remaining pilots were lost to Allied air action

or bad weather as they tried to get back to

Central Pacific bases after 13 June, when

the Japanese started A-GO. The pilots and

planes which had started redeployment

southwestward about 10 June were similarly

lost or were caught out of position.

Bad weather had prevented the Japanese

from sending additional air reinforcements

from Japan to the Marianas, and U. S. Fifth

Fleet strikes against those islands beginning

on 11 June accounted for most of the remaining planes of the 1st Air Fleet. According to Japanese figures, only 20 percent of

the 1st Air Fleet strength originally deployed in the Central Pacific was available

for A-GO, the rest having been lost during

operations in western New Guinea, caught

out of position as a result of untimely redeployments in support of KON, or destroyed

by U. S. Fifth Fleet carrier raids before the

1st Task Force could get in position for its

own attack. Indeed, the latter's deployment for A-GO had possibly been delayed

as a result of preoccupation with KON.

What the outcome of A-GO might have

been had not so much of the 1st Air Fleet's

land-based strength been redeployed for

KON can only be conjectured. It is possible

that A-GO might have been much less disastrous for the 1st Task Force; the U. S.

Fifth Fleet might have suffered severe

losses; it might have been next to impossible

38

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 49, 12 Jul 44;

G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 59 and 74, 26 Jul and 10 Aug

44, respectively, in G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part

II, Per Rpts; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak

(Rev), pp. 64-65, 80, 83.
362 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

to supply the Allied forces of the Central

Pacific ashore on the Marianas; and Allied

operations throughout the Pacific might

have been delayed. Whatever the facts, Japanese sources almost uniformly lament redeploying so much of the 1st Air Fleet's

strength southwestward to support the

KON Operation.39

The Central Pacific's invasion of the

Marianas, with the concomitant withdrawal

of the KON Force for A-GO, could hardly

have occurred at a more auspicious moment

for the Allied forces of the Southwest Pacific. While the Allied Air Forces were prepared for the eventuality that Japanese fleet

units might reach Biak, air operations might

well have been curtailed by range and

weather factors, as, indeed, they had been

during the second KON Operation. In any

case, the Allied Air Forces would have had

a tough job driving the KON Force away

from Biak, especially if the 1st Air Fleet's

strength in the western New Guinea area

had been built up as planned. Had the

powerful task force which the Japanese assembled for the third KON attempt reached

Biak, it probably could have overwhelmed

any naval force the Allied Naval Forces

could have mustered there. Even had the

third KON Force not landed any troops at

Biak, its fire power might have made untenable the HURRICANE Task Force's coastal

positions and its hold on Mokmer Drome.

Had the Allied vessels at Biak been sunk or

driven off, supplying Biak would have been a

major problem until the Japanese fleet units

were forced to retire and the Allied ships

were replaced. Although the total force the

Japanese hoped to land on Biak—probably

some 5,000 men, all told—could not have

driven the HURRICANE Task Force into the

sea, such reinforcements would have rendered the Allied unit's task infinitely more

difficult and inevitably would have necessitated its reinforcement, perhaps by as

much as an entire infantry division.

In June 1944, the Allied Forces of the

Southwest Pacific Area probably had little

idea how potentially dangerous the situation

was at Biak, and it remained for postwar

Japanese reports to reveal how narrowly

greater losses and strategic delays were

averted. Without doubt, success for the

Japanese during KON would have seriously

delayed the pace of Allied operations in the

Southwest Pacific Area, if not throughout

the Pacific. The "if" connection between

KON and A-GO is obvious—the success

of either would have been a devilish blow.

The close relation between the two operations is a striking illustration of the mutual

interdependence of the Allied Southwest

and Central Pacific Areas.

Effects of KON at Biak

Insofar as Japanese ground forces in the

Southwest Pacific were concerned, the cancellation of KON and the departure of

KON Force vessels to the Central Pacific

battle area left the 2d Area Army in an unenviable position. General Anami had

pinned his strategic hopes on reinforcing

Biak, but now the best means of so doing

had been taken away. On orders from

higher headquarters, he had to concentrate the 2d Amphibious Brigade at Sorong,

39

 Interrog of Capt Fuchida, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 428-31; "Impressions

and Battle Lessons (Air) in the 'A' Operations," in

USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, App.

81, pp. 260-70; The A-GO Operation, p. 26.
THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 363

but he determined to send the rest of the

35th Division to Biak. Apparently this was

to be accomplished by barges, aided by such

escort vessels as might be left to the Southwestern Fleet.

Since it was becoming increasingly dangerous for barges to move beyond Sorong,

General Anami finally decided to await the

outcome of the A-GO Operation before

sending any more elements of the 35th Division to Biak, although he continued to

move parts of the division from Sorong to

Manokwari. When the Japanese Navy was

defeated in A-GO, General Anami realized

he would have no further opportunity to

send large bodies of troops to Biak. He therefore ordered the 35th Division to remain at

Manokwari. Hoping for the longest possible

delay of Allied operations at Biak or subsequent advances, he instructed the Biak Detachment not to commit suicide in fruitless

banzai attacks, but rather to prolong the

action by protracted defense and, in the end,

by guerrilla warfare. The last significant attempts to reinforce Biak were the movements of the Nishihara Force and the 9th

Company, 222d Infantry, late in June.

On Biak Colonel Kuzume committed the

reinforcements which reached the island

piecemeal to operations along the low ridge

north of Mokmer Drome. At least one company of the 221st Infantry was in position

there on 10 June and the rest of the Ozawa

Force, initially held in reserve at the West

Caves, was sent into defenses along the low

ridge by the 13th. The 5th Company, 222d

Infantry, also moved into the line in the

same area on the 10th, and 100 men of the

219th Infantry were in the vicinity of the

West Caves by the same date. Late in the

month, the Nishihara Force and the remnants of the 9th Company, 222d Infantry,

were slipped in the line near the West

Caves.40

Most American analyses of Japanese operations on Biak condemn Colonel Kuzume

for misuse of his reinforcements, stating that

he should have concentrated them for a

counterattack. But whether, in fact, the Biak

Detachment commander could have used

his additional strength in other than defensive activities is problematical. The reinforcements arrived on Biak in small increments, none over 400 men strong. The total

was not more than 1,200 troops, most of

whom brought ashore only light infantry

weapons. Moreover, Colonel Kuzume undoubtedly knew something of the difficulties

attending the KON Operation. He had no

assurance that strong reinforcements would

reach him, nor did he know when they

might arrive. Therefore, as fresh troops

landed on Biak, Colonel Kuzume put them

into the line north of Mokmer Drome, where

he apparently thought they would do the

most good. Under continuous artillery

bombardment and infantry attack, the Biak

Detachment's forces along the low ridge

were suffering great losses. The Japanese

commander's primary mission was to prevent the Allies from employing the Biak airfields—a mission which he could accomplish

from positions along the low ridge—and he

used his reinforcements to aid him in this

task.41

Although the Japanese were unable to

send sufficient reinforcements to Biak to af40

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 64-67; 2d Army

Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 73, 75, 80; see

also above, subsection entitled "Reinforcements by

Barge During KON"; ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt

54, 16 Aug 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. 41

 G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part III,

Enemy Order of Battle, p. 2; MID WD, Military

Reports, 24, p. 18; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 3-5, 9.
364 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

fect the ultimate outcome of operations

there, enough fresh troops did reach the island to delay Allied employment of the Biak

airstrips; to prompt General Fuller to ask

for reinforcements on 13 June; and, at least

indirectly, to have something to do with

changes in the Allied command at Biak. Under the new command—General Eichelberger in control of the HURRICANE Task Force

and General Doe in command of the 41st

Infantry Division—the attack was continued.
CHAPTER XVI

Biak: The Reduction of the

Japanese Pockets

When General Eichelberger assumed

command of the HURRICANE Task Force

on 15 June, he chose to make no changes

in plans General Doe had already made for

an attack north of Mokmer Drome the next

day. Instead, the new task force commander

decided to observe operations on the 16th

and await their outcome before determining what new courses of action might be

necessary.1

The Reduction of the West Caves

When operations along the low ridge

above Mokmer Drome had ended in frustration on the afternoon of 15 June, General Doe had decided to give the tired 2d

and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry, a rest

while the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry,

made a new effort to close the 500-yardlong gap which still existed along the low

ridge. The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was

to aid this effort by sending patrols southwest from its perimeter near the West Caves.

The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, located

northeast of the West Caves, was to secure

the lower end of the road west of Hill 320

with the aid of elements of the 3d Battalion,

163d Infantry, from the east. The 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, would remain in

reserve.2

The Attack Continues

The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, started

moving toward the low ridge at 0700 on 16

June and by 0815 had relieved the two companies of the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

which had been holding positions on the low

ridge west of the point where the Japanese

road crossed.3

The 186th Infantry's unit began attacking eastward along the ridge shortly after

0900. Company E led, with the 2d Platoon

1

 Eichelberger and MacKaye, Our Jungle Road

to Tokyo, pp. 141-42.

2

 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44,

p. 9; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug

44, p. 19; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; 163d

Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44; Newman Notes. 3

 This subsection is based on: Eichelberger Notes;

Eichelberger and MacKaye, op. cit., pp. 142-45;

Newman Notes; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May19 Aug 44, pp. 20-22; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20

Aug 44; 1st Bn 186th Inf, Hist with 162d Inf,

13-18 Jun 44, p. 4; Co E 186th Inf, Rec of Events,

24 May-16 Jul 44, in ORB RAC AGO collection;

162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44, p. 9;

162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44, 121st FA Bn

Opns Rpt Biak, p. 7; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt

Biak, p. 4. Available sources are not adequate to

provide identifications of Japanese units engaged in

the actions described in this and the following subsection. Suffice it to say that Colonel Kuzume was

using all the troops available to him except those

committed to holding the East Caves and the Ibdi

Pocket.
366 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

on the ridge, the 3d Platoon in flats 100

yards to the north, and the 1st Platoon 100

yards beyond the 3d. The 2d Platoon

quickly found itself in a maze of Japanese

positions and was halted by Japanese automatic weapons fire. The 1st Platoon of

Company G thereupon moved up on Company E's right and began advancing along

the southern slope of the low ridge. Together, the two platoons continued eastward

against slackening resistance. They cleared

innumerable enemy slit trenches, foxholes,

and bunkers, destroyed several machine

guns of various calibers, and at 1050

reached the lines of the 3d Battalion, 162d

Infantry. The task of closing the ridge line

gap was completed in less than two hours,

many of the previous Japanese defenders

apparently having withdrawn north into

the West Caves the preceding night.

In the flat ground north of the ridge,

operations had not been so successful. The

3d Platoon, Company E, gained about 500

yards in an easterly direction but was then

pinned down for almost two hours by Japanese machine gun and mortar fire originating from woods and high ground near the

enemy encampment area north of the West

Caves. The 1st Platoon, moving up to the

3d's left, was subjected to the same fire.

Finally, the 2d Platoon, Company G, was

sent forward in an attempt to outflank the

enemy positions north and northeast of the

two Company E platoons. This maneuver

was ineffective, and by 1115 all movement

in the flat had bogged down. The battalion

commander ordered a new attack with four

rifle platoons (two each from Companies

E and G) abreast with the intent of clearing the ground northeastward to the lines

of the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, north

of the West Caves. The new advance, beginning shortly after 1200, followed a 600-

round concentration by the 121st Field

Artillery Battalion on the area whence the

Japanese mortar and machine gun fire had

originated.

The 3d Platoon, Company G, aimed for

the high ground at the Japanese encampment. Crossing the main road which ran

north from Mokmer Drome through the

bivouac area, the platoon secured its objective shortly after 1400, bringing to a halt

most of the automatic weapons fire which

had prevented the advance of the other

three platoons during the morning. The 2d

Platoon, Company G, on the 3d's right, also

crossed the road. As the platoon pushed on

toward the northwest corner of the West

Caves, it was halted by enemy fire, as was

the 1st Platoon, Company E, 150 yards to

the south. The 3d Platoon of Company E,

right of the 1st, advanced along the north

side of the low ridge. There it encountered

little opposition and, apparently passing

south of the West Caves unmolested, established contact with the 3d Battalion, 162d

Infantry, about 1400.

The 1st Platoon of Company E and the

2d Platoon, Company G, had obviously located the western side of the West Caves

positions. However, they could hardly be

expected to seize a strong point which the

1st Battalions of the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments had been vainly trying to

secure from the east for the past two days.

They therefore established a line on which

a new attack into the West Caves might be

based, and Colonel Newman ordered the

forward elements to dig in for the night,

pending the arrival of the rest of the 2d

Battalion. But General Doe thought there

was danger that enemy units might counterattack the left rear (northwest) of the three

forwardmost platoons. Indeed, as the three

had moved up to the west side of the caves
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 367

INFANTRYMEN MOVING UP to the attack on a ridge north of Mokmer Drome.

The tank is a Sherman.

at 1400, a number of Japanese infantrymen

had been observed milling around up the

main road to the north. Therefore, about

1420, General Doe ordered all four platoons

to withdraw to the low ridge. Beginning at

1830, the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry,

started forward to relieve the 2d Battalion,

186th Infantry, and by 1900 the latter was

back to the bivouac area it had left at 0700.

The unit could look back on the day's

operations with a good deal of satisfaction.

It had closed the gap on the low ridge; it

had located the western limits of the enemy's West Caves positions; it had discovered that more Japanese troops were

located north of the enemy encampment

area both along the main road and on ridges

west and northwest of Hill 320; it had eliminated most of the machine gun nests and

rifle pits in the encampment area and many

of those on high, forested ground near that

bivouac; it had destroyed many Japanese

automatic weapons and rifles; and it had

killed at least 65 Japanese. The 2d Battalion

itself had lost 15. men killed and 35

wounded. There had been only local patrolling by the rest of the units in the forward

area during the day, for the 1st Battalions

of the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments

had been kept in place by American artillery

and mortar fire which supported the operations of the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry.

For the 17th General Doe planned to

send the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry,
368 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

northwest to high ground at the Japanese

encampment area while the 1st Battalion,

162d Infantry, pushed south and southwest

to the West Caves. Ten tanks, two field artillery battalions, and a company of 4.2-inch

mortars were to provide close support.

On the morning of 17 June the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, in order not to overlap the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, took a

circuitous route toward its objective, leaving

its bivouac in an easterly direction and then

swinging north to approach the high ground

from the northeast. The 162d Infantry's battalion, supported by the 1st Platoon, 603d

Tank Company, started westward about

0945 with Company A in the lead and Company B echeloned slightly to A's right rear.

At 1045 the two leading companies were

stopped by heavy automatic weapons fire

from the objective of the 1st Battalion, 186th

Infantry. Company C, 162d Infantry, was

then sent north toward high ground which

had not been included in the area patrolled

by Company G, 186th Infantry, on the 16th.

Company C managed to knock out several

pillboxes, but about 1140 it was forced back

to the south. The tank platoon now moved

up toward the high ground and succeeded

in destroying an artillery piece and two machine guns, enabling Company C to renew

its attack about noon. Simultaneously, the

1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, began approaching the high ground from the east.

On that side there was little resistance, and

at 1330 Company A reached Company C,

162d Infantry. The latter unit, which had

been continuing its efforts from the south,

had just succeeded in reducing the last important enemy position on the hill.

Companies A and B, 162d Infantry, now

resumed the attack westward but soon were

subjected to scattered rifle and machine gun

fire from positions southwest of Company C.

These positions had been cleared on the

16th by Company G, 186th Infantry, but

had been reoccupied during the night by the

Japanese. Company C, 162d Infantry, was

called back from the hill it had just helped

to secure and started reclearing high ground

from which the new fire originated. Minor

gains were achieved the rest of the afternoon, and at dark the 1st Battalion set up

defenses in a long, L-shaped perimeter with

Company C on the north, about 75 yards

from the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry,

which was also digging in for the night.

About 125 yards of Japanese-held territory

lay between the south flank of the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, and the low ridge

above Mokmer Drome.

Preparations For a New Attack

The 1st Battalions of the 162d and 186th

Infantry Regiments had gained high ground

overlooking the West Caves and were in a

favorable position from which to launch a

concerted attack on that enemy strong point.

General Doe had such a plan. He intended

to send the entire 162d Infantry to clean

out the West Caves and, with the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, to secure north-south

ridge lines west of Hill 320. But this plan was

canceled by General Eichelberger.

The latter had observed much of the action on the 17th from a vantage point on

high ground and had not been satisfied with

the results. He therefore called off all fighting for the 18th—Sunday—in favor of reorganization and redispositions in preparation for a co-ordinated attack by the entire

162d and 186th Infantry Regiments on the

19th. The new attack was to drive the Japanese from all terrain whence they could
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 369

fire on Mokmer Drome and was to secure

favorable ground from which to launch

future advances designed to eliminate the

last Japanese resistance around the three

airfields.4

The first area to be cleared included the

West Caves, the Japanese encampment

area, and all the ground north from the low

ridge to Hill 320. The objective area was

about 1,000 yards long southeast to northwest and some 500 yards wide. The main

effort was to be made by the 186th Infantry,

the 2d and 3d Battalions of which were to

attack from the southwest and west while

the 1st Battalion struck from the east. The

162d Infantry would hold its positions. The

3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, was to assemble along the northern slopes of the main

ridge in the vicinity of Hill 320 to prevent

the movement of enemy reinforcements from

the north into the 186th Infantry's zone. An

egg-shaped terrain feature on the low ridge

1,000 yards northeast of Borokoe Drome

and on the left flank of the 186th Infantry's

prospective line of advance was to be seized

for flank security and as a line of departure

for subsequent attacks north and northeast.

The 34th Infantry of the 24th Division,

scheduled to reach Biak from Hollandia on

18 June, would take over the positions west

of Mokmer Drome which the 186th Infantry vacated. During the latter's attack, the

34th Infantry was to be in reserve and

would be ready to seize Borokoe and Sorido

Dromes upon orders from General Eichelberger.5

On 18 June only local patrolling was

undertaken, while the bulk of the troops

rested or redeployed in preparation for the

attack on the 19th. (Map 16) The eggshaped feature was secured against no opposition and a few Japanese stragglers along

the low ridge in the area were mopped up.

The 34th Infantry began moving into the

Mokmer Drome area and the 186th Infantry drew up final plans for its attack. The

regiment was to advance east from the eggshaped protrusion of the low ridge with the

2d Battalion leading, two companies

abreast. The 3d Battalion was to follow the

2d, and the 1st Battalion would start moving northwestward once the other two had

begun moving east. The attack, which was

to begin at 0630 on the 19th, would be supported by the 121st, 167th, 205th, and

947th Field Artillery Battalions, Company

D of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion,

and ten tanks of the 603d Tank Company.6

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 186th Infantry, had assembled at the egg-shaped feature

by 0900 on the 19th. The terrain in the

area was rough and overgrown and the two

battalions took more time than expected to

get into their proper positions for the attack.

At 1040, after preparation fire by the four

artillery battalions had ended, the 2d Battalion started eastward, and the 3d Battalion went into reserve 500 yards to the rear.

Redeployments had been completed. The

attack had started.7

The Fall of the West Caves

Company F, followed by Company G,

was on the left, and Company E was on the

4

 I Corps (HTF), Hist of Biak Opn, 15-27 Jun

44, pp. 6-8 (not to be confused with the HTF Opns

Rpt Biak, which, during the period 15-27 Jun, is

actually only the report of the 41st Div) ; 162d Inf

Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; Eichelberger Notes; Eichelberger and MacKaye, op. cit., pp. 145-47. 5

 Eichelberger Notes; HTF FO 2, 17 Jun 44,

atchd to HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44.

6

 HTF FO 2, 17 Jun 44; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May20 Aug 44; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44;

41st Div Arty Opns Rpt Biak, p. 13; 603d Tank

Co Opns Rpt Biak, p. 4. 7

 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44.
Map 16

372 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

right.8 At 1105, having encountered only

scattered rifle fire, Company F reached the

motor road running from the Japanese encampment area generally northwest along

the base of a rugged, heavily forested coral

ridge lying west of Hill 320. Company E

pulled up on the road to F's right five minutes later. The battalion objective was a

long, narrow, and sharp rise which formed

the first slope of the coral ridge.9 As Companies E and F began moving toward this

first crested rise, fire from Japanese 90-mm.

antiaircraft guns in an unlocated emplacement to the north began falling near the

leading troops and along the road. But the

two companies pressed on and reached their

objective about 1130. The 3d Battalion

quickly pulled up on the 2d's left.

About noon Colonel Newman ordered

the 1st Battalion to clear the southern extension of the coral ridge line and to push

through the Japanese encampment area up

the road to the 2d Battalion's position. This

movement was under way by 1230, and late

in the afternoon the 1st Battalion (less two

rifle companies) reached the 2d's right

flank. The other two companies, advancing

over rough and heavily jungled ground below Hill 320, were unable to make contact

with the rest of the regiment before dark

and set up a night perimeter about 250

yards southeast of the remainder of the 1st

Battalion.

Against only scattered resistance, the

186th Infantry had enveloped the rear of

the Japanese in the West Caves and could

prevent their reinforcement or escape. With

one regiment thus athwart the enemy's

main north-south line of communication,

the HURRICANE Task Force could turn its

attention to securing the other airfields and

clearing the West Caves. Accordingly, General Eichelberger issued a new attack order

late on 19 June. The 186th Infantry was to

continue its operations in the Hill 320 area

and the ridges to the west, aided by the 3d

Battalion, 163d Infantry. The 162d Infantry was to undertake the final reduction of

the West Caves, while the 34th Infantry

seized Borokoe and Sorido Dromes.10

On the morning of 20 June the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, and two tanks of the

603d Tank Company moved to the surface

area around the many caverns and sumps

constituting the West Caves. It was found

that the operations of the 186th Infantry

had eliminated most of the Japanese from

the high ground north and northwest of the

8

 This subsection is based on: 186th Inf Jnl, 27

May-20 Aug 44; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May19 Aug 44, pp. 23-26; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt

Biak, pp. 4-15; 116th Engrs Opns Rpt Biak, Ch.

III, p. 3; 167th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 1-2;

205th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp, 7-9; 121st FA Bn

Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; 41st Div Arty Opns Rpt Biak,

pp. 13-14; I Corps Hist of Biak Opn, 15-27 Jun

44, pp. 7-14; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44;

162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 12 May-19 Aug 44, pp.

9-10; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 10-11; MID WD,

Military Reports, 24, p. 16; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May21 Aug 44; 41st Inf Div, G-2 Per Rpt 32, 29 Jun

44, in G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts;

2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 82-

83. During the period that Headquarters, I Corps,

operated as Headquarters, HTF, Headquarters, I

Corps, did not maintain a separate G-3 journal,

but used one jointly with Headquarters, 41st Infantry Division. During the same period, Headquarters, 41st Infantry Division, retained the same serial

numbers for its G-2 periodic reports that had been

previously employed by Headquarters, HTF. Headquarters, I Corps, did not begin a separate series of

G-2 periodic reports. 9

 Although the plan does not make it clear, it

seems obvious that the battalion was to seize high

ground overlooking the motor road in order to prevent the Japanese from using the road any longer

as a means of reinforcement or escape to and from

the West Caves area.

10

 HTF FO 3, 19 Jun 44, in I Corps Hist of Biak

Opn, 15-27 Jun 44, p. 36.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 373

caves, and only occasional rifle shots from

those directions harassed the 1st Battalion as

it moved forward. But from a multitude of

crevices and cracks around the caves, and

from the interior of the sump holes themselves, came a great deal of rifle and light

automatic weapons fire, and the battalion

was unable to get any men down into the

sump depressions. Drums of gasoline were

rolled into many caves and then ignited in

the hope that most of the Japanese would

be killed. But the enemy fire continued almost unabated and the battalion withdrew

to its previous positions before dark.

During the night, Japanese from the

West Caves launched a number of small

harassing attacks against the 1st Battalion,

162d Infantry, and, moving north up the

main road, struck the south flank of the

186th Infantry. The enemy also dragged

mortars or light artillery out of the caves

and lobbed a few shells on Mokmer Drome

and the road along the beach. Before daylight on the 21st, these Japanese and their

weapons had disappeared back into the

West Caves.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, again

moved up to the West Caves on 21 June

and sent patrols out to clear Japanese riflemen from brush and crevices on hillocks

north and northwest of the caves. The

patrols, actually flame thrower teams supported by riflemen, accomplished their

mission without much difficulty while the

rest of the battalion, again covered by two

tanks from the 603d Tank Company, surrounded the sump depressions. The infantry

and tanks concentrated on the most westerly

of three large sink holes comprising the West

Caves. The tanks fired into cave entrances;

the infantrymen lobbed hand grenades into

holes and crevices within reach; and all

Japanese observed were quickly killed by

rifle fire. But the battalion was unable to

force its way into the main entrance to the

underground caverns. Fire into this entrance was also ineffective, for the opening

was shielded by stalagmites and stalactites.

Engineers poured the contents of five gasoline drums into the cavern through crevices

or seepage points found on the surface of the

ground. Flame throwers then ignited the

gasoline and the 1st Battalion withdrew to

await developments. There were no immediately apparent results and, since it was

believed that the West Caves were still

strongly held, the battalion did not attempt

to send any more men into the entrance.

In the late afternoon the unit again pulled

back to its bivouac area.

During the night of 21-22 June, Japanese poured out of the caves and rushed

northwest up the road toward the lines of

the 186th Infantry, attempting to escape to

the west or north. At 2100 Japanese infantry, supported by light machine guns and

light mortars, hit the southeast flank of the

American regiment. When the Japanese

were about fifty yards away, the 186th Infantry's .50-caliber machine guns opened

fire and broke up the attack. Undaunted,

the Japanese made another break-through

attempt about midnight, this time supported

only by light mortars. Machine guns, both

.50- and .30-caliber, aided by Company G's

60-mm. mortars, forced the enemy to withdraw for a second time.

At 0400 on the 22d the Japanese again

attacked, now employing stealth, hand

grenades, and bayonets as their principal

weapons. The intensity of this final attack

was such that the enemy reached the 186th

Infantry's foxholes, and hand-to-hand combat ensued all along the regiment's south
374 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

flank. Since the enemy's leading elements

were so close, Company G's mortars could

not be used. Instead, the 60-mm. mortars of

Company I, emplaced at the extreme northwestern end of the regimental perimeter,

were brought into action to place their shells

close to the regiment's front lines and immediately to the rear of the leading enemy

troops. This fire prevented the Japanese

from sending reinforcements forward to aid

their attack elements, and the battle, which

was nip and tuck for about half an hour,

quickly became disorganized and the enemy

scattered. Individual Japanese infantrymen

and small groups continued to attack in an

un-co-ordinated fashion until daylight.

Early in the morning, the 186th Infantry

began mopping up southeast of the perimeter, killing a few Japanese who were hiding

or playing 'possum along the roadside. A

final count revealed that 115 of the enemy

had been killed, and it was believed that

109 of these had been slain during the reckless attacks beginning at 0400. The Japanese attackers had numbered about 150,

according to Japanese sources. The 186th

Infantry lost only 1 man killed and 5

wounded during the night.

The 162d Infantry had by no means

spent a quiet night, for other parties of Japanese from the West Caves had attacked the

1st Battalion and also Company F, which

was located on the low ridge southwest of

the sump holes. Most of the enemy activity

was confined to the front of Company A,

against which small groups of Japanese,

armed only with rifles and hand grenades,

moved beginning about 0200. But the Japanese did not attempt to press home their

attacks, which in this area were probably

only covering operations for the main assault

against the 186th Infantry. The 162d Infantry killed seventeen Japanese during the

night but suffered no casualties itself.

The attacks during the night of 21-22

June had apparently resulted from a decision on the part of Colonel Kuzume, Biak

Detachment commander, to acknowledge

defeat. In an impressive ceremony in the

West Caves, Colonel Kuzume, surrounded

by his staff, burned the colors of the 222d

Infantry and, according to some American

reports, disemboweled himself in the tradition of the Samurai. Japanese reports of the

Biak action state that Colonel Kuzume did

not die then but was killed in action or committed suicide some days later. Whatever

the cause and date of his death, on the night

of 21-22 June Colonel Kuzume had instructed the forces remaining in the West

Caves to withdraw to the north and west.

Many of the remaining troops of the 1st

and 2d Battalions, 222d Infantry, who had

originally held the low ridge north of Mokner Drome, had already been killed or had

moved north, and most of the Japanese

killed by the 186th Infantry during the

night of 21-22 June were identified as members of the 221st Infantry, elements of

which had been included in the reinforcements sent to Biak after Z Day.

While it was believed that the Japanese

force which attacked the 186th Infantry

represented the bulk of the enemy troops

remaining in the West Caves, the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, soon found that opposition had not ended. As the battalion approached the caves early on the morning

of 22 June, it managed to catch out in the

open a number of Japanese who had been

manning heavy weapons during the night

attacks and who had not had time to move

themselves and their weapons back into the

caves. After killing these enemy troops the
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 375

battalion again moved up to the sink hole

rims, which were found littered with enemy

dead.

During the morning a number of explosions were heard inside the caves, and it

was considered probable that gasoline, still

burning after being poured into the caves

the previous day, had reached some ammunition dumps. Again flame throwers were

used, although these weapons had not

proved very effective because they had a

tendency to flash back on the operators

from the cave walls. Finally, a demolition

detail from the 116th Engineers lowered

two 500-pound charges of TNT into one

of the cave entrances. The explosives were

fired electrically. A few Japanese, at least

one of whom had been driven insane by

the explosions, came running out of the

caves and were quickly killed. At 1555 the

1st Battalion, having heard no signs of

enemy activity from within the caves for the

previous two hours, reported that the caves

had been cleared out.

This report was proved optimistic during

the night of 22-23 June when another small

group of Japanese unsuccessfully tried to

break through the lines of the 186th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, itself

killed seven Japanese who attempted to

move from the caves to Hill 320. The next

morning the battalion established a permanent bivouac around the various caves and

depressions and continued to probe the area.

The remaining Japanese were capable of

defending themselves, hopeless though their

situation was, and no troops were able to

enter the caves until the afternoon of 25

June. No deep penetration was attempted,

however, and it was not until 27 June that

patrols of the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry,

accompanied by members of the 41st Counter Intelligence Detachment, penetrated to

the innermost recesses of the West Caves.

The stench of rotting Japanese bodies was

revolting, and the sight nauseating. The entire cave area was strewn with Japanese

bodies or parts of bodies. One gruesome area

had apparently been used as an aid station

and another possibly as a butcher shop for

cannibalistically inclined survivors of the

carnage since 18 June. Three more Japanese were killed in the caves during the day,

and large quantities of equipment and documents were found. Because of the advanced

stage of decomposition of many of the dead,

a complete count of Japanese bodies could

not be made, but before overpowering odors

drove the patrols out of the caves 125 more

or less whole bodies were counted. This was

considered a minimum figure, for no estimate could be made of the numbers of Japanese represented by separated arms, legs,

or torsos and it was impossible to guess how

many Japanese had been sealed in smaller

caves or crevices by artillery and mortar fire

or by explosions of TNT and Japanese ammunition within the caves.

The number of Japanese dead left within

the West Caves was not of great moment,

but it was important that the last position

from which the enemy could seriously

threaten Mokmer Drome had been secured.

Even before the West Caves had fallen, the

operations of the 162d and 186th Infantry

Regiments had so reduced Japanese fire on

the airdrome that on 20 June, after six days

of inaction, the 863d Engineer Aviation

Battalion was able to resume work on the

field. Two days later, Fifth Air Force P-40's

began operating from the 5,000-foot-long

completed section of the strip. One of the

three fields on Biak was at last operational.11

11

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp. 42-

44; Base H, USASOS, Office of the Engr, Rpt of

HTF Engr Office, pp. 1-3, in folder entitled HTF

Stf Rpts, 27 May-19 Aug 44.
ENTRANCES TO THE WEST CAVES
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 377

Securing the Western Area

Operations to drive the Japanese from

positions they still held north and west of the

West Caves had begun on 19 June when the

186th Infantry moved into the ridges west

of Hill 320. They continued on 20 June

when the 34th Infantry, supported by the

167th Field Artillery Battalion, occupied

Borokoe and Sorido Dromes and Sorido

village almost without opposition. To prevent more enemy reinforcements from

reaching the battle area, Company I, 34th

Infantry, set up a road block at a trail

junction about 3,000 yards north of Sorido.

The rest of the regiment outposted the road

back to Sorido, trails along the southwest

coast of Biak, and the low ridge west of the

egg-shaped feature over which the 186th

Infantry had passed on 19 June.12

Hill 320 and The Teardrop

When the 186th Infantry reached the

base of the ridge west of Hill 320 on 19

June, it had blocked the road running south

to the West Caves by placing on the road

and along the western slopes of the ridges

all three battalions, in order from south to

north, the 1st, 2d, and 3d.13 The regiment

was to clear the high ground east to Hill

320 and patrol north and east to maintain

contact with elements of the 3d Battalion,

163d Infantry. The latter unit was holding

the crossing of the main ridge which the

186th Infantry had used on 7 June, maintaining an outpost on Hill 320, and patrolling north along the main ridge from the

crossing and south from the same point toward the East Caves. On the morning of

the 20th, for unknown reasons, the outpost

on Hill 320 moved north off that terrain

feature. General Eichelberger, concerned

lest the Japanese occupy Hill 320 and subject the 186th and 162d Infantry Regiments

to enfilade fire, immediately ordered the hill

reoccupied. Fortunately, the Japanese did

not discover that the hill had been abandoned, and Company L, 163d Infantry,

restored the outpost during the afternoon.

Patrolling by the 186th Infantry and the

3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, on 20 June

produced no traces of large concentrations

of Japanese troops. However, on the western slopes of Hill 320 and on a long, forested ridge running north from the 186th

Infantry's bivouac area, a number of abandoned enemy positions were located. Off

the northwest corner of Hill 320 was discovered a cul-de-sac over 300 yards long north

to south, some 100 yards wide, and open

only on the north. Japanese machine gun

nests were located on ridges along the west

side of this cul-de-sac which, because of

its shape, was called "The Teardrop" by

American troops. Colonel Newman proposed that on 21 June the 3d Battalion, 163d

Infantry, move into The Teardrop from the

northwest and north while the 186th Infantry maintained pressure from the south

and southwest. This plan was based on

erroneous information concerning the location of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry,

which was actually patrolling in thickly jun12

 HTF G-3 Jnl 15 May-21 Aug 44; 34th Inf

Jnl, 13 Jun-15 Jul 44; 167th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak,

pp. 1-2. 13

 This subsection is based principally on: 186th

Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 24-28;

186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; 163d Inf Opns

Rpt Biak, 31 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 3-5; 163d Inf

Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44; Newman Notes; 603d Tank

Co Opns Rpt Biak, p. 5: 167th FA Bn Opns Rpt

Biak, p., 2; 121st FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 8-9;

41st Div Arty Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 13-15; HTF

G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; I Corps Hist of Biak

Opn, 15-27 Jun 44, pp. 9-12, 16; Eichelberger and

MacKaye, op. cit., pp. 146-47.
378 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

gled flats two or three miles due north of

The Teardrop. The unit could not, therefore, mount any attack into The Teardrop

and did not even establish patrol contact

with the 186th Infantry from the north

until 23 June.

Meanwhile, the 186th Infantry had discovered new Japanese positions northwest

of its perimeter and on 22 June was harassed

by fire from two or three enemy 75-mm.

guns from a point some 750 yards away in

that direction. Efforts to capture the guns

on 22 and 23 June were unsuccessful, but

on the 24th Companies L and K, 186th Infantry, supported by two tanks and the

947th Field Artillery Battalion, managed to

get within a few yards of the enemy weapons. The next day Company L overran the

gun positions, capturing one Japanese artillery piece and finding four others destroyed

by friendly artillery fire.

Back at The Teardrop patrolling had

continued at a slow pace. On 23 June new

low-level aerial photographs of the area

were examined at regimental headquarters.

After all patrol leaders who had led men

into The Teardrop during the previous days

had delivered their interpretations of the

new pictures, it was concluded that the principal Japanese positions in the cul-de-sac

were on the west rather than the east side,

as had been believed previously. Colonel

Newman, who had waited in vain for three

days for the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, to

attack from the north and northwest, therefore proposed an attack from the west. General Doe approved this proposal and on the

morning of 24 June the new attack began.

The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, moved

north some 500 yards up the road along

which the regiment was bivouacked and

sent Company E east over the ridges toward

The Teardrop's northern end. Broken terrain and heavy jungle delayed the company's progress, and it was midafternoon

before the northwest corner of the Japanese

positions was located. On the same day

Company K, 163d Infantry, sealed the

northern exits of The Teardrop, and Company C of the same regiment took up new

positions on the east side. By nightfall, all

routes in and out were closed. The stage

was set for final mopping up.

Early on the 25th Company E, 186th

Infantry, overran the enemy defenses on the

west and northwest, while Company A

pushed into The Teardrop from the south,

quickly establishing contact with the 2d

Battalion unit. The entire area was carefully

combed during the rest of the day, but no

signs of organized resistance could be found.

Most of the Japanese positions had been

evacuated two or three days previously—a

large and well-armed enemy force had

extricated itself from an almost impossible

position. Had earlier efforts of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, to block the northern

exits of The Teardrop been successful, the

story might have been different. As it was,

only thirty-eight Japanese were killed or

found dead in The Teardrop area during

the day. A Japanese force probably over

200 strong had escaped.

Mopping Up in the Western Area

During operations at The Teardrop, the

HURRICANE Task Force headquarters had

drawn up plans for mopping up west of

Mokmer. The 41st Division, less the 163d

Infantry but with the 34th Infantry attached, was to secure the entire area west

of Mokmer village to Impendi, a native

settlement on the coast about five miles west

of Sorido village. The northern boundary

of the division's zone generally followed the
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 379

main coastal ridge from Impendi to

Mokmer. The 34th Infantry (less the 1st

Battalion) was to secure the area west of

and including Borokoe Drome; the 186th

Infantry, with the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, attached, was to clear the terrain

from Hill 320 north to high ground about

2,000 yards distant; and the 162d Infantry,

assembling near Mokmer Drome, was to

send one company to Hill 320 to replace

163d Infantry units there. The 163d Infantry was made responsible for securing

the area east of Mokmer village.14

On 26 June the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, less Company C, occupied abandoned enemy positions on a long finger-like

ridge running north from the northwest

corner of The Teardrop. Company C,

which had taken a different route north,

was ambushed by a Japanese force of unknown strength and pushed back south, but

rejoined the rest of the battalion the next

day. From reports brought back by 1st Battalion patrols sent north on the 27th, it was

concluded that a Japanese unit was preparing for a determined stand along, or a suicidal counterattack from, sharp cliffs

northwest of the battalion area. General

Doe therefore assigned the 1st and 2d Battalions, 34th Infantry, the task of clearing

the cliff area, the 2d Battalion to move in

from the southwest and west, while the 1st

Battalion approached from the southeast.15

On 28 June the 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, encountered little opposition as it

mopped up in flats south of the cliffs but

Company A, moving west from the 1st Battalion area into terrain between the 1st and

2d Battalions, was attacked by a group of

Japanese who were apparently trying to

break out of the trap the two American

battalions were forming. At 1600 the company was forced back to the battalion command post area, where it dug in for the

night. Most of the Japanese met in the area

were probably members of the Nishihara

Force of the 219th Infantry16

General Eichelberger, who had known

for some time that he was to return to Hollandia when he thought that the most important areas on Biak had been secured,

decided on 27 June that he could leave and

took his departure on the 28th. General Doe

took over command of the HURRICANE Task

Force, retaining his command of the 41st

Division. On the same day, information was

received from higher headquarters that the

34th Infantry would soon have to be pulled

out of action and assembled as ALAMO Force

Reserve for another operation. Redispositions on Biak were necessary.17

General Doe decided to give the 34th

Infantry two days to complete mopping up

north of the 186th Infantry, after which it

would assemble on the beach south of Borokoe Drome. The 41st Division would then

redispose itself along main and reserve lines

of resistance to prevent further Japanese

interference with the development of air

and logistic bases on Biak. The main line of

resistance began on the west at Sorido vil- 14

 Ltr of Instructions, CG HTF to CG 41st Inf

Div and CO 163d Inf, 24 Jun 44, in I Corps Hist

of Biak Opns, pp. 37-38; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May20 Aug 44; 34th Inf Jnl, 13 Jun-15 Jul 44. 15

 34th Inf Jnl, 13 Jun-15 Jul 44; 186th Inf Opns

Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 28-29; 41st Div

FO's 1 and 2, 27 Jun 44, in HTF G-3 Jnl, 15

May-21 Aug 44; 34th Inf FO 2, 27 Jun 44, in 34th

Inf Jnl, 13 Jun-15 Jul 44; 167th FA Bn Opns Rpt

Biak, pp. 3-4.

16

 34th Inf Jnl, 13 Jun-15 Jul 44; 2d Army Opns

at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), p. 83. 17

 Eichelberger Notes; I Corps Hist of Biak Opn,

15-27 Jun 44, p. 18; HTF GO 8, 29 Jun 44, in

HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44. The I Corps

History states that General Eichelberger relinquished command of the HTF on 27 June, but

General Order 8 does not place General Doe in

command of the task force until the 29th.
380 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

lage, followed the main ridge east to Hill

320, then ran east along the supply road

which the 186th Infantry had constructed

through the flats north of the main ridge

during the first week of June, and finally

curved southeastward to end on the beach

at Opiaref. The reserve line of resistance followed the low ridge north of the airfields to

the East Caves and then ran along the north

side of the main ridge to Opiaref. The 162d

Infantry was to hold the area west of Borokoe Drome, the 186th Infantry the area east

to Mokmer village, and the 163d Infantry

the ground from the East Caves to Opiaref.18

On 29 and 30 June only the 2d Battalion,

34th Infantry, located any signs of organized resistance in the area north of the 186th

Infantry, and during the two days killed or

found dead about 135 Japanese, most of

them poorly armed and incapable of strong

resistance. On the afternoon of the 30th, all

elements of the 34th Infantry began withdrawing to the beach while the 162d and

186th Infantry Regiments began taking up

planned positions along the main and reserve lines of resistance, from which they

instituted patrolling designed to hunt down

enemy stragglers and prevent scattered elements of the Biak Detachment from reorganizing for harassing raids or suicidal attacks.19

The Biak Detachment remnants had

been moving north since 22 June in a withdrawal that apparently had been directed

by Colonel Kuzume on his own initiative.

Another mass withdrawal was begun on the

28th, the day General Eichelberger left

Biak. This second withdrawal was started

upon orders from the 2d Area Army, which

instructed the Biak Detachment to reorganize for guerrilla warfare.20

 Whatever he

hoped to accomplish by guerrilla action,

General Anami was to be disappointed. The

remnants of the Biak Detachment had lost

most of their supplies and for the remaining

Japanese it was soon to become a case of

sauve qui peut. Aggressive patrolling instituted by the HURRICANE Task Force on

1 July was to prevent any reorganization

for guerrilla warfare on the part of the Biak

Detachment.

The Reduction of the East Caves

The fall of the West Caves on 27 June

and the completion of mopping up operations by the 34th Infantry on 30 June

marked the end of the most important phase

of the Biak operation. The airdromes, to

secure which Allied forces of the Southwest

Pacific Area had landed on Biak on 27 May,

were now safe, and Allied aircraft were already operating from Mokmer Drome. But

the Japanese still held the East Caves and

the Ibdi Pocket. True, these positions now

had little more than nuisance value, and

during operations in the Mokmer Drome

area they had been kept fairly well neutralized by artillery and mortar fire. Until both

areas could be cleared, however, the coastal

road from Bosnek to the airfields would not

be entirely safe, for the road could be subjected to harassing fire and raids which

would impede the transportation of important supplies and equipment to the airfields.

The most significant part of the East

Caves, tactically speaking, was the flat ledge

about three quarters of the way to the top

of the main ridge immediately north of

18

 41st Div FO 3, 28 Jun 44, atchd to HTF Opns

Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15

May-21 Aug 44. 19

 34th Inf Jnl, 13 Jun-15 Jul 44; 186th Inf Jnl,

27 May-20 Aug 44; 162d Inf Jnl, 22 May-19

Aug 44.

20

 Opns of Yuki Group, p. 10; Hist of 2d Area

Army, pp. 65-66.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 381

Mokmer village. On this ledge were located

two large depressions similar to the sumps

of the West Caves. Both of these depressions

were at least 50 feet wide, and one of them

measured roughly 75 by 200 feet. Each was

honeycombed with tunnels, at least one of

which led to a large opening on the seaward

side of the ridge. This opening, with other

unconnected caves and crevices on the seaward face, held some of the most troublesome Japanese weapons. Near the main

sumps were two Japanese observation posts

from which an unobstructed view of the

coastal area from Parai Jetty to the eastern

end of Mokmer Drome could be obtained.

Behind the sumps, up the slope to the top of

the ridge, were five strong pillboxes which

were held by riflemen and machine gunners.

In the sump holes were 81- or 90-mm. mortars, 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, heavy machine guns, and numerous light mortars.

There were tents in the larger caves and

tunnels, and quantities of food and clothing

were stored in some tunnels.21

Information concerning the Japanese order of battle in the East Caves is contradictory and incomplete, and it appears that

at the time of the landing few troops were

actually stationed there. The 2d Battalion,

222d Infantry, had used the area as a base

of operations on 28 and 29 May, when the

HURRICANE Task Force discovered the existence of the caves during the Japanese

counterattacks which had driven the 162d

Infantry back to Ibdi. After that action

nearly 1,000 Japanese were left in the East

Caves. Included were some 300 naval

troops, most of them from antiaircraft or

service units. The 500-odd army troops comprised mostly airdrome engineers who were

reinforced by a mortar unit of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry, and a few riflemen of

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 222d Infantry.

Finally, there were about 200 Japanese civilian laborers. The forces were under the

control of a Lieutenant Colonel Minami,

the commander of the 17th Field Airdrome

Construction Unit.22

What happened in the East Caves from

29 May to 7 June is unknown, but on the

latter day, as the 186th Infantry moved

over the main ridge to Mokmer Drome, the

position came to life and from it mortar and

machine gun fire was directed on the Americans at the airfield. As the 2d Battalion,

162d Infantry, tried to move east during

the next two days, it was pinned down by

this fire, as were elements of the same regiment attempting to move west from Parai.

Companies of both the 186th Infantry and

the 162d Infantry were sent north from the

Mokmer Drome area toward the East Caves

during the period 9-11 June, but these units

had not closed with the main Japanese positions when, on the 11th, they were called

back to join their regiments at Mokmer

Drome. During the same days, a company

of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, patrolled

south toward the East Caves from the inland flats. At the end of the period all this

patrolling had succeeded in locating the

west flank of the enemy's principal positions, destroying a few machine guns and

some large mortars, and killing perhaps

fifty Japanese.23

21

 G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part X,

Enemy Defenses, section entitled "The Mokmer

Caves."

22

 Ibid.; Opns of Yuki Group, p. 3; G-2 HTF,

G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Enemy Opns,

p. 8; G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 50 and 59, 17 and 26 Jul

44, respectively, in G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II,

Part II, Per Rpts; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and

Biak (Rev), p. 71. 23

 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44: 162d Inf

Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; 163d Inf Jnl, 31 May-19

Aug 44; Co G 186th Inf Opns Rpt, 8-11 Jun 44,

in Annex 17 to 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May19 Aug 44.
382 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Since it was more urgent to secure the

Mokmer Drome area than to clear the East

Caves, no large infantry force could be committed to the latter mission and, therefore,

more attention was devoted to neutralizing

the East Caves with artillery, mortar, and

naval fire. From 7 through 10 June the

4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion,

lobbed over 1,000 shells into the East Caves

area. On the 9th and 10th, tanks in LCT's

cruising offshore added their fire, and on the

latter day the 205th and 947th Field Artillery Battalions swung into action against

the East Caves.24 Bombardments by artillery, mortars, tanks (both on the ground

and afloat), and destroyers continued from

11-13 June, but the Japanese still managed to deny to the HURRICANE Task Force

the use of the coastal road during much of

the period. In between artillery and naval

gunfire concentrations, elements of the 3d

Battalion, 163d Infantry, probed more

deeply into the Japanese positions from the

north and northeast and located the north

flank of the main enemy defenses. By noon

on the 13th, the combination of American

fire and infantry action had succeeded in

silencing enough of the Japanese fire so that

truck convoys could safely use the coastal

road without interruptions for the first

time.25

Infantry patrolling and all types of

bombardment continued from 14 through

23 June, but the Japanese still occasionally

harassed truck convoys along the coastal

road. On the 23d or 24th (the records are

contradictory) there was undertaken a series

of aerial bombardment missions which are

among the shortest on record. Fifth Air

Force B-25's, based on Mokmer Drome,

took off from that field to skip-bomb the

East Caves. Although most of the bombs

missed the main sump holes, the air missions

did cause many explosions and started a

number of fires in the East Caves. For a few

days, at least, almost all the enemy fire was

silenced.26

On 27 June Company E, 542d Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiment, started to construct a jetty near Mokmer, and in connection with this mission began working a

gravel pit at the base of the ridge northwest

of the village. Japanese mortar and rifle fire

from the East Caves impeded the latter

work and on 29 June 4.2-inch mortars and

tanks had to be moved back into the area

to shell the caves and protect the engineers.

Within three days the mortars fired over

800 rounds into the caves. The engineer

company, borrowing bazookas from an infantry unit, sent its own patrols into the

caves, and Company I, 163d Infantry, sent

patrols back into the area from the north.27

On 30 June the 205th Field Artillery Battalion sent one gun of Battery C to a position

near Mokmer village to place about 800

rounds of smoke and high explosive shells

into the caves.

Light harassing fire continued, however,

and on 3 July elements of Company E,

542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

24

 2d Plat Co D 641st TD Bn Jnl, 24 May-7 Jul

44, atchd to Co D 641st TD Bn Jnl, 24 May-7 Jul

44, in ORB RAC AGO collection; 41st Div Arty

Opns Rpt Biak, p. 11; CO LCT Group 23 Opns

Rpt Biak, p. 4; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, pp.

3-4.

25

 163d Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44; G-2 HTF,

G-2 Per Rpts 16 and 19, 12 and 15 Jun 44, in G-2

Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; G-3 HTF,

G-3 Per Rpt 27, 14 Jun 44, atchd to HTF Opns

Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44; 603d Tank Co Opns

Rpt Biak, p. 4.

26

 163d Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44; 34th Inf Jnl,

13 Jun-15 Jul 44; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug

44; 146th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, p. 23; Ltr, Gen

Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, in OCMH files. 27

 2d Plat Co D 641st TD Bn Jnl, 24 May-7 Jul

44; 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 12-13; 163d

Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 383

ENTRANCE TO THE EAST CAVES.

moved into the caves under cover of tank

fire from the base of the ridge. Some tunnels

were sealed shut, twelve Japanese were

killed, and two light machine guns were

captured.28 Almost simultaneously, Company E, 163d Infantry, pushed into the caves

from Mokmer village. Neither the engineer

nor the infantry unit met as much resistance

as had been anticipated. Patrolling throughout the caves was continued on the 4th and

5th, and on the latter day a platoon of

Company E, 163d Infantry, entered the

larger sump holes, where were found many

automatic weapons, mortars, rifles, all types

of ammunition, food, clothing, cooking

utensils, and pioneer equipment. The next

day loud-speakers and interpreters were sent

into the caves to persuade the few remaining Japanese to surrender. Only ten Japanese, of whom eight were killed, were seen

in the area. The Japanese who had lived

uninjured through the heavy bombardments since 7 June had evacuated the East

Caves.29

Japanese evacuation had started about

28 June, on which day Colonel Minami

28

 205th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; 205th FA

Bn Int Summary, Biak Opn, p. 6; 542d EB&SR

Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 12-13; 603d Tank Co Opns

Rpt Biak, pp. 5-6.

29

 163d Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44; HTF G-3

Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; 116th Engrs Opns Rpt

Biak, p. 4; G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 37-41, 4-8 Jul 44,

in G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts.
384 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

committed suicide and outposts of the 163d

Infantry began reporting that small groups

of enemy were escaping over the flats north

of the main ridge, and all but about forty

sick or wounded had left before 3 July. Why

the Japanese evacuated is not known but,

in any case, the enemy had not been making

efficient use of the troops in the East Caves

since 10 June. After that date the Japanese

had fired principally on targets of opportunity moving along the coastal road, and

this fire soon deteriorated into the light harassing type. Had the Japanese properly used

their East Caves weapons, they could have

denied use of the coastal road to the HURRICANE Task Force for a much greater period

of time and might have made it necessary

for the task force to divert large infantry

units from the vital airdrome area.

The reasons for the enemy's apparent

listlessness in the East Caves are difficult to

fathom. From the amount of ammunition,

food, and clothing captured there, it is clear

that a shortage of supply was not a major

problem. It is possible that there was no unified command in the caves; perhaps the

service troops did not know how to use the

weapons properly; or it may be that Allied

artillery, mortar, air, tank, and naval bombardment kept the enemy stunned and

under cover. Whatever the reason, the Japanese chose to evacuate rather than use their

weapons effectively.30

The few Japanese left alive in the East

Caves after 6 July were still capable of causing some trouble. On 15 July six souvenir

hunters of the Royal Australian Air Force

(elements of which were staging through

Biak for operations farther west) were killed

near the caves. Tanks and infantry were sent

into the area to mop up the remaining Japanese and recover the Australian dead. On

the 16th and 17th, three badly mutilated

bodies of Australian airmen were found and

two Japanese machine gun nests were wiped

out. On the 20th the infantry and tanks returned to the caves, found the other Australian bodies, and eliminated the last enemy

resistance.31

The Reduction of the Ibdi Pocket

The fall of the East Caves left the Ibdi

Pocket as the only remaining center of

organized Japanese resistance on Biak. (See

Map V.) Operations against the Ibdi

Pocket had been started on 1 June by the

162d. Infantry in conjunction with the 186th

Infantry's inland drive to Mokmer Drome.

The 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, had fought

its way through the Ibdi Pocket via Young

Man's Trail on its way north to join the

186th Infantry inland, while the rest of the

162d Infantry, with Company A, 186th Infantry, attached, had remained on the

coastal road to start a drive westward along

the beach. But the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, reinforced by elements of various

engineer and other service units, as well as

some artillery, firmly ensconced in Ibdi

Pocket positions, had had other ideas, for

Colonel Kuzume had ordered the unit to

hold the coastal approaches to Mokmer

Drome.

Operations of the 162d Infantry

at the Ibdi Pocket

When, on 1 June, the 2d Battalion, 162d

Infantry, started north, the rest of the regiment patrolled westward from Ibdi, sent

30

 G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part II,

Enemy Opns, p. 8; G-2 HTF, Per Rpts 41 and 54,

8 and 21 Jul 44, respectively, ibid., Vol. II, Part II,

Per Rpts; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev),

p. 84.

31

 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, p. 6; 162d Inf

Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 385

small patrols north into the ridges to protect

the rear of the 2d Battalion, and endeavored

to hold a water hole at the beach terminus of

Old Man's Trail, 1,200 yards east of Young

Man's Trail.32 At 1450 on 1 June about

fifteen Japanese from the 3d Battalion,

222d Infantry, drove the Cannon Company,

162d Infantry, away from the water hole

and established a road block on the main

coastal road. At the same time Japanese

mortar and artillery fire drove off the tanks

of the 3d Platoon and Headquarters, 603d

Tank Company, initially located 300 yards

west of the water point. To escape from their

exposed position, the tanks moved east

through the enemy road block toward Bosnek, but were unable to force the Japanese

away from the water hole.

On the morning of 2 June the Cannon

Company, 162d Infantry, and Company A,

186th Infantry, cleared the road block and

retook the waterhole, killing some of the

Japanese in the area with rifle, mortar, and

machine gun fire and driving the rest up

the ridges into the Ibdi Pocket. The Antitank Company, 162d Infantry (which, like

the Cannon Company, operated as a rifle

company throughout the Biak operation)

set up a trail block on Young Man's Trail

atop the third of the seven ridges which constituted the main coastal ridge at Ibdi. The

regimental attack westward had meanwhile

been postponed until the morning of 3 June,

pending the outcome of the fight at the

waterhole and the 2d Battalion's movement

over Young Man's Trail to join the 186th

Infantry.

Action on 3 June started earlier than anticipated when, before daylight, elements of

the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, pushed the

Antitank Company back to the beach. Between them, the Antitank and Cannon

Companies managed to secure Young

Man's Trail back to the top of the second

ridge line during the day. The 3d Battalion,

162d Infantry, had meanwhile started westward, intending to clear the coastal road as

far as the stream crossing located about halfway through the Parai Defile. By 1300, patrols of the 3d Battalion had moved past the

stream crossing to a fork in the coastal road

about 900 yards east-northeast of Parai

Jetty. Then enemy fire from the cliffs on the

right and from high ground to the northwest pinned down the entire battalion, and

Japanese infantry, infiltrating through a

narrow stretch of dense woods between the

road and cliff, cut off the point platoon.

With the aid of two tanks, the forward

platoon managed to extricate itself. During

the withdrawal a Japanese soldier climbed

atop one of the tanks and dropped a hand

grenade into the driver's hatch. The driver

was killed and the rest of the tank crew

wounded, but the assistant driver managed

to get the tank out. Meanwhile, the intensity

of Japanese fire on the rest of the 3d Battalion had increased, despite artillery concentrations on the enemy cliff positions. About

1635 the battalion started to withdraw and

by 1700 had come out of the defile. Back

at the Ibdi Pocket area Japanese fire had

also increased, and small parties of Japanese

had harassed the 1st Battalion all afternoon.

The task force commander now decided

that the Ibdi Pocket area would have to be

32

 This subsection is based upon: 162d Inf Opns

Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 5-7; 162d Inf

Jnl, 22 May-19 Aug 44; 162d Inf S-2 Sit Overlays,

1-7 Jun 44, atchd to 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15

May-19 Aug 44; Co B 162d Inf, Diary in Biak

Campaign; Co A 186th Inf, Rec of Events, 17 Apr6 Jul 44; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 2-3;

41st Div Arty Opns Rpt Biak, pp., 7-10; 205th FA

Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 3-5; 947th FA Bn Opns

Rpt Biak, pp. 4-5; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 5-8;

G-2 HTF Per Rpts 7-12, 1-7 Jun 44, in G-2 Hist

of HTF, Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; 2d Army Opns

at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 67-70.
386 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

cleared before the coastal attack could be

resumed. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion,

162d Infantry, was instructed to clear all

enemy from the ridge lines east of Young

Men's Trail, where the principal enemy

strong points were thought to be located.

The Antitank and Cannon Companies were

to drive west from the trail while the 3d Battalion remained at the eastern entrance to

the Parai Defile and sent patrols to the

northwest and through to the stream

crossing.

The 1st Battalion started its attack at

0800 on 4 June, pushing two companies

north along Young Man's Trail. By noon

one company had reached the sixth of the

seven separate ridges over which the trail

passed, but progress to the seventh was impossible, as was movement east toward Old

Man's Trail. During the afternoon, after

pushing over extremely rough terrain, one

rifle platoon finally reached Old Man's Trail

via the second ridge line. Other elements of

the 1st Battalion could gain little more than

150 yards east from Young Man's Trail over

ridge lines 3 through 6. The Cannon and

Antitank Companies had been unable to

move west from the trail, and 3d Battalion

patrols had made little progress in the Parai

Defile.

During the next morning the 1st Battalion

succeeded in clearing all Young Man's Trail

and established patrol contact on the inland

flats with the 186th Infantry. Little more

progress could be made west of the trail or

in the area between it and Old Man's Trail.

Patrols sent along the ridge lines east of the

latter discovered no Japanese, but late in the

afternoon a Japanese strong point in caves

near the north end of Old Man's Trail was

located. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion had

begun another effort to break through the

Parai Defile, supported this time by fire from

offshore destroyers, a rocket LCI, and craft

of the Support Battery, 2d Engineer Special

Brigade. All this support proved unable to

reduce much of the Japanese fire which was

directed against the 3d Battalion from the

north, northwest, and west, and, except for

outposts left near the stream crossing, all

units withdrew to the battalion perimeter

for the night.

On the 6th, the 1st Battalion cleared

many positions on ridge lines 4 through 7

between Young and Old Man's Trails, but

was unable to dislodge the Japanese from

the strong point near the north end of the

latter track. Company A, 186th Infantry,

and the Antitank Company, 162d Infantry,

attacked west from Young Man's Trail and

gained about 900 yards before being stopped

in front of previously unlocated Japanese

defensive positions. The two units held for

the night along the first four ridge lines, directly north of the 3d Battalion's beach perimeter. The latter unit again had made no

appreciable progress in the Parai Defile.

Meanwhile General Fuller had evolved

his plan to move the 162d Infantry to Mokmer Drome to reinforce the 186th Infantry

and to clear the Parai Defile by simultaneous pressure from the east and west.33

 On

7 and 8 June the bulk of the 1st and 3d

Battalions, 162d Infantry, moved overwater

to Parai and ultimately west to Mokmer

Drome. Back to the east, only Company A

was left along Old Man's Trail, where little

resistance was encountered at the previous

Japanese strong point after 7 June, although

the position was not entirely reduced until

11 June. From 7 through 9 June the Antitank Company, 162d Infantry, and Com33

 For the details of this plan and its execution see

above, Ch. XIV.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 387

pany A, 186th Infantry, tried unsuccessfully to gain more ground along the ridge

lines west from Young Man's Trail. The

units were pulled off the ridges on the 10th

and relieved two days later by elements of

the 163d Infantry.

Generally, from 7 through 11 June, only

moderate pressure was maintained against

Japanese positions in the Ibdi Pocket area,

major combat effort being diverted to clearing the last vestiges of Japanese resistance

from the Parai Defile so that the coastal road

could be employed for transportation of

supplies to Mokmer Drome. The Cannon

Company, 163d Infantry, and the Antitank

Company, 186th Infantry (both acting as

rifle companies), began new pressure from

the west against the Parai Defile on the

evening of 7 June, while Company L, 162d

Infantry, continued attempts to push

through from the east. By dusk on the 8th,

despite the efforts of all three companies, the

Japanese still maintained control of some

300 yards of ground in the defile. On the

9th, three Shermans of the 603d Tank Company, aboard LCT's and directed from an

LVT of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment, fired on the cliffs in the defile

for an hour. This fire did not help the units

on the west side of the cliffs very much, and

infantry pressure was continued on the 10th.

The next day a rifle company of the 1st

Battalion, 162d Infantry, attacked from the

west into the defile while, simultaneously,

the Antitank Company of the same regiment pushed in from the east. These attacks

were finally successful, and by late afternoon

on the 11th the road through the defile was

clear of Japanese. Not until the 12th were

the few remaining Japanese dispersed from

woods north of the road, enabling truck

convoys to move through the defile.

The 163d Infantry at the Ibdi Pocket

On 12 June the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, arrived at Biak from the WakdeSarmi area and relieved those elements of

the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments

still holding positions at the Parai Defile

and the Ibdi Pocket.34 The latter units then

moved west to rejoin their parent regiments

at Mokmer Drome, and responsibility for

mopping up at the Ibdi-Parai area passed

to the 163d Infantry. With the clearing of

the Parai Defile and the almost simultaneous reduction of Japanese fire from the East

Caves, the road from Bosnek to the airfields

was finally safe. At the Ibdi Pocket proper,

the Japanese garrison had been generally

quiet since 7 June except for a little harassing rifle and machine gun fire directed at

Allied movements along the coastal road.

Although the remaining Japanese were by

now relegated to the status of a nuisance,

the 163d Infantry was going to find mopping up a difficult and time-consuming

process.

From 12 through 20 June the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, undertook extensive

patrolling in the Ibdi Pocket area to become

acquainted with the terrain and situation in

its new zone. The unit soon discovered that

whatever positions had been held by the 3d

Battalion, 222d Infantry, during the period

of 162d Infantry action, the remaining Japanese strong points were concentrated west

34

 Information in this subsection is based principally on: 163d Inf Jnl, 31 May-19 Aug 44; 163d

Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 31 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 3-7;

HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 10-

13; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; I Corps

Hist of Biak Opn, 15-27 Jun 44, pp. 15-17; 146th

FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 23-28; 603d Tank Co

Opns Rpt Biak, pp., 6-7; Co D 641st TD Bn Jnl, 24

May-7 Jul 44; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 10-11;

Ltr, Doe to Ward, 4 Dec 50, in OCMH files.
388 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

of Young Man's Trail. Action against this

pocket began on 21 June, when Company F

attacked south from a point on the north

side of the main ridge about 900 yards west

of the trail. Japanese mortar, machine gun,

and rifle fire forced Company F back and by

noon it had become obvious that a single

rifle company could not overrun the remaining pocket. The regimental commander decided to organize a larger infantry effort,

in preparation for which extensive artillery

and mortar bombardment was undertaken.

From the evening of 21 June through the

night of 23-24 June the 146th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers), the

Cannon Company, 163d Infantry, the 4.2-

inch mortars of the 1st Platoon, Company

D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the

heavy machine guns and 81-mm. mortars

of Companies D and H, 163d Infantry,

bombarded the area steadily. Two infantry

companies probed west from Young Man's

Trail on the morning of the 24th, only to

find that the Japanese still held the remaining pocket in some strength. After two more

days of artillery and mortar bombardment,

four rifle companies were sent against the

pocket. Moving slowly and painfully forward through tangled jungle undergrowth

and fallen trees, and over jagged and precipitous coral spines, the four units gradually

compressed the remaining resistance. By

nightfall the assault companies had lost 8

men killed, 3 missing, and 32 wounded,

while killing 38 Japanese.

The next day more units were brought

forward until, by noon, almost all of the 1st

and 2d Battalions, 163d Infantry, were in

action against the pocket, and advances

were continued over the ridge lines from

both the east and west. By the end of the

day, at the cost of 4 men killed and 14

wounded, the two battalions had compressed the Japanese into an area approximately 600 yards square. Attacks were continued on the 28th, but little more progress

was made. By this time, steady attrition since

12 June, coupled with a lack of replacements was telling on the 2d Battalion. Company F was now down to 42 effectives and

Company G to 65.35

The 28th of June marked the end of

large-scale infantry action at the Ibdi

Pocket. Instead, extensive patrolling was

undertaken in order to pin-point targets for

artillery, mortar, and air bombardments.

From 4 July to the morning of the 7th, for

instance, the 146th Field Artillery fired over

5,500 rounds into the pocket and during

the same period the 163d Infantry's 81-mm.

mortars lobbed some 2,400 shells into the

area. On the morning of the 7th an infantry

company tried to move back into the Japanese-held area, but found the Japanese repairing old fortifications and even building

new ones! Artillery and mortar bombardments were resumed, and on 9 July Allied

Air Forces P-39's and P-40's dive-bombed

and strafed the pocket area.

Companies K and L attempted to move

into the pocket on the 10th and found that

the Japanese defenders had thinned out.

Moreover, they discovered the visibility in

the pocket area had been greatly improved

as a result of the long mortar and artillery

bombardments. The once dense jungle and

rain forest, in which visibility had previously

been limited to ten yards, was now reduced

to shattered stumps. From the 21st of June

through the morning of 10 July the 146th

Field Artillery Battalion alone had thrown

35

 Company E and the rest of the 2d Battalion

were little better off, and the 1st and 3d Battalions

were also greatly understrength. The 163d Infantry

had received no replacements other than a few officers since it had entered combat at Wakde-Sarmi

on 17 May.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 389

about 20,000 105-mm. shells into the Ibdi

Pocket, and at least as many rounds had

been fired by 4.2-inch, 60-mm. and 81-mm.

mortars.

Beginning on the 11th, the 3d Battalion,

163d Infantry, steadily compressed the remaining Japanese into a smaller and smaller

area. Bazookas and flame throwers were

used to good purpose in close-in operations

against bunkers, pillboxes, improved caverns, and small caves. Tanks fired their

75-mm. weapons at enemy positions now

visible from the northern side of the main

ridge, and on the 12th 155-mm. howitzers

of Battery C, 947th Field Artillery Battalion, were brought forward to fire on the

pocket. The next day about 200 Japanese,

in four separate groups, sneaked through a

net of ambushes and patrol bases set up by

the 163d Infantry on the flats north of the

main ridge. Despite this exodus, which must

have represented most of the remaining ablebodied members of the 3d Battalion, 222d

Infantry, and its reinforcing units, American

infantry moving back into the pocket on the

15th could not report that the going was

much easier.

Artillery bombardment was resumed, and

now the artillery could employ close-in precision fire where previously only area fire

could be used because of the limited visibility. From 10 to 20 July the 146th Field

Artillery Battalion threw in over 4,000 shells

and Battery C of the 947th, fired 2,000

rounds into the pocket. On 22 July eight

B-24's swept over the pocket in three waves,

dropping sixty-four 1,000-pound bombs.

Artillery units followed with 1,000 rounds

of 105-mm. and 275 rounds of 155-mm.

ammunition, while the 163d Infantry's

81-mm. mortars threw uncounted shells into

the pocket. These bombardments halted at

0945 on the 22d and five minutes later two

understrength companies of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, started moving toward

the enemy's remaining defensive installations. The 1,000-pound bombs had paralyzed the Japanese, and the two American

units encountered almost no opposition. At

1835 the 3d Battalion commander reported

that the Ibdi Pocket was cleared of all organized resistance.

The next day, final mopping up was begun, and engineer demolition experts were

brought forward to seal caves and destroy

the remaining bunkers and pillboxes. By

dusk on the 28th, all positions had been rendered useless, enemy weapons either carried

away or broken beyond use, and the last

traces of resistance had disappeared. From

22 to 28 July, according to one estimate,

about 300 Japanese were killed by bombardments and infantry action, or sealed in

caves by the engineers. An actual count of

dead bodies found during the same period

came to 154 men. Whatever the correct figures, the Ibdi Pocket, initially manned by

some 800 fresh, well-equipped men of the

3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, reinforced by

about 200 troops of mortar, machine

gun, artillery, and service units, was now

finished.36

Upon examination after the battle the

central portion of the Ibdi Pocket was found

to cover a rectangle about 400 yards wide

north to south and 600 yards long. In this

area the Japanese had constructed defensive

installations varying in type from heavily

constructed pillboxes of log, coral, and con36

 Information in the remainder of this subsection

is from: MID WD, Military Reports, 24, pp. 15-18;

G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part X, Enemy

Defenses, section entitled "The Ibdi Pocket"; G-2

HTF, Per Rpts 10-14, 4-10 Jun 44, and 57-58,

24-25 Jul 44, ibid., Vol. II, Part II, Per Rpts; G-2

HTF Enemy Opns, pp. 7-9, ibid., Vol. I, Part II;

Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 10.
390 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

crete to hasty trenches in the coral and

brush. There were 21 major natural fortifications, including 4 large caves and 17

small ones. Caverns and crevices had been

improved for defense and some were used as

living quarters and aid stations. There were

75 well-constructed log and coral pillboxes,

each having a capacity of 4 men, and among

a few larger similar emplacements was 1

pillbox having 9 layers of logs. The minimum heavy armament, either found or estimated to have existed from scattered parts

located during mopping up, was eight 90-

mm. mortars, three 75-mm. mountain guns,

two 37-mm. guns, two 20-mm. weapons,

and three heavy machine guns. There were

also several small mortars, numerous light

machine guns, and over 100 rifles. These

figures cannot be considered as representing

the total enemy armament in the Ibdi

Pocket. The 200-odd Japanese who had

escaped on the 12th of July had carried

many small arms with them, and other

weapons had been so broken up by artillery,

mortar, naval, and air bombardments that

no accountable trace of them could be

found. Still more were undoubtedly sealed

in caves blown shut by engineer demolition

experts from 22 through 25 July.

Though Colonel Kuzume's defense of

Biak was on the whole admirably executed,

leaving the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, isolated at the Ibdi Pocket after 10 June seems

to have been a major mistake. By that date

the bulk of the 162d Infantry had moved

on to the airfields and the value of the Ibdi

Pocket as a coastal delaying position had

been lost. Worse still, the 3d Battalion did

not use its available weapons and manpower

to good advantage after 10 June. By placing

concentrated mortar, automatic weapons,

and artillery fire on Allied roads and supply

dumps, the battalion and attached units

could have made the coastal area from

Parai east to Mandom difficult to hold and

use. Instead, the troops in the Ibdi Pocket

chose to conduct a passive defense. From a

potentially dangerous threat, the pocket was

relegated to the status of a localized nuisance

which could be contained with a minimum

of troops until the battle for the airdromes

was over, when it could be reduced at leisure.

The tenacity of the Japanese defense of

the Ibdi Pocket, though pointless and even

wasteful after 10 June, was almost incredible, and it was not until the 1st Marine

Division and the 81st Infantry Division met

the 14th Division on Peleliu and Angaur,

in the Palaus, that American troops were

again to encounter such defense in similar

terrain.37 The 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry,

was both clever and fanatic on the defense.

If holding the Ibdi Pocket had had any

point after 10 June, its defense as executed

might well have added a significant chapter

to military annals.

The End of the Operation

Mopping Up

While the fall of the Ibdi Pocket marked

the end of major organized resistance on

Biak, there were still some 4,000 Japanese

on the island who were capable of harassing

American lines.38 It was obviously important

37

 See below, Chs. XXI-XXIV. 38

 This subsection is based principally on: 162d

Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 10-11;

186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, pp.

31-36; 163d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 31 May-20 Aug

44, pp. 6-7; 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 15-

16; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, pp.

13-14: 41st Rcn Tr Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 2-5; 41st

Div, Enemy Opns During Mopping-Up Period, 20

Sep 44-20 Jan 45, pp. 1-9, in folder entitled Enemy

Opns—Biak Campaign, filed with other 41st Div

Rec in ORB RAC AGO collection.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 391

to prevent these Japanese from reorganizing for eleventh-hour suicide attacks. Operations with such an object in view had

begun well before the Ibdi Pocket fell when

the 186th Infantry, early in July, began patrolling far north of the main ridge toward

the Sorido-Korim Bay track. A number of

dispirited Japanese were chased away from

or killed at native gardens far inland by

both the 186th Infantry and the 162d

Infantry.

On 7 August the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, was started north along the Korim

Bay-Sorido track to the Wafoerdori River,

about midway between the track termini.

There the battalion was to establish contact

with elements of the 163d Infantry, the 2d

Battalion of which had landed at Korim

Bay from LCM's of the 542d Engineer Boat

and Shore Regiment on 2 August. Few

Japanese were found in the Korim Bay area

or south along the track to the Wafoerdori,

where contact between the 162d and 163d

Infantry Regiments was made on 15 August.

Apparently in a last desperate effort to

delay complete Allied control over Biak,

Biak Detachment headquarters, sometime

in July, had ordered all remaining Japanese

units to reassemble at Wardo Bay, on the

west coast, by 15 August. The intent appears to have been to reorganize for a final

counterattack. At least one unit still organized, comprising approximately 200 men

of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry, ignored

this order and continued to forage for itself

in native gardens east of the Korim-Sorido

track and some seven miles north of Mokmer Drome, but other enemy units attempted the trek from their scattered positions to Wardo Bay. The operations of the

2d Battalions of the 162d and 163d Infantry Regiments along the Korim-Sorido

trail had caught many of these units in transit and had split the remaining enemy forces.

The last hope that the Japanese might

have had for reorganizing was dashed on 17

August, when the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry (less Company B but with Company

E attached), landed at Wardo Bay. Transported by LCM's of the 542d Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiment and supported by

a short naval and air bombardment, the

battalion moved ashore against negligible

opposition. Subsequently, patrolling was undertaken north to Soepiori Island and south

.along the west coast of Biak. The coastal

patrols and others sent inland pushed many

Japanese southeast into ambushes maintained by the 162d Infantry along the

Korim-Sorido track. The Wardo Bay landing apparently broke whatever spirit the

Japanese may have had left, and all enemy

units rapidly split into small parties which

wandered over the island in search of food.

While the three infantry regiments were

directing their efforts toward breaking up

real and potential enemy concentrations,

other patrolling and mopping up was being

undertaken on Soepiori Island by Netherlands Indies Civil Administration parties,

groups from the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, and the 41st Reconnaissance

Troop, all of which also operated in the

southeast corner of Biak and along the

Korim-Sorido track. Elements of the 163d

Infantry also patrolled in the southeast section of the island, where small boats manned

by the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment supported many patrolling operations.

Netherlands officials brought the native

population back under Dutch control as

rapidly as each area was cleared of enemy

troops. Some native laborers were supplied

to the HURRICANE Task Force, and native
392 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

scouts proved of real help during moppingup operations.

Medical Problems and Casualties

Medical units of the HURRICANE Task

Force went ashore with the assault waves

on 27 May and immediately began the work

assigned to them. During the landings,

wounded and injured personnel were taken

aboard LST's for treatment beyond first aid.

When medical facilities were set up on the

beach near Bosnek, casualties were treated

ashore and then moved to LST's for evacuation. Because of Japanese air and artillery

action, evacuation hospitals and many other

medical facilities were transferred to Owi

when the latter island was secured. From

Owi, casualties were transshipped to LST's

and later to larger ships. After the airdromes

became operational air evacuation was

employed.39

Within the HURRICANE Task Force there

were 6,811 casualties from disease, aside

from 423 hospitalized psychoneurosis cases.

About 3,500 of the cases were diagnosed as

"fever, undetermined origin," and over

1,000 casualties resulted from an epidemic

of scrub typhus. The first case of scrub

typhus, a mite-borne disease, was diagnosed

at the 92d Evacuation Hospital on or about

1 July. From Owi Island, where the epidemic broke out, the disease spread rapidly

to Biak, reaching its peak there during the

last week of July. Stringent control measures

designed to prevent the spread of typhus

were quickly instituted. Clothing was impregnated with dimethyl-phthalate, bivouac

areas were cleared of vegetation, rodents

of all types were hunted down and destroyed, camp areas were kept scrupulously

clean, and troops were kept out of the brush

except when on combat duty.

During the first week of August, the incidence of scrub typhus began to decrease.

Of the 1,000-odd cases to the 20th of the

month, only 7 men died, a mortality rate of

less than 1 percent. Although the death rate

was extremely low, scrub typhus at Biak

took a virulent form which made sufferers

particularly ill. The majority of those taken

sick were lost to service for four to six

months, and many were expected to be relegated to a limited duty status.40

It is next to impossible to establish accurate battle casualty figures for the HURRICANE Task Force, but examination of all

sources indicates that from 27 May through

20 August approximately 400 men were

killed, 2,000 wounded, 150 injured in action, and 5 missing. In addition, sickness of

various types accounted for 7,234 nonbattle

casualties, many of whom were returned to

duty. Thus, the total casualties of the task

force were about 9,790 men. Of this total

the three infantry regiments of the 41st Division lost 325 men killed and 1,700

wounded.41 Conflicting information provides a total of 4,700 Japanese killed and

220 captured on Biak through 20 August.

39

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp.

53-54.

40

 41st Div Surgeon, Medical Hist of Biak Campaign, pp. 7-14, in folder entitled HTF Stf Rpts,

27 May-19 Aug 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt

Wakde-Biak, pp. 53-54. 41

 These casualty figures are reconstructed from:

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp. 53-56;

HTF G-1 Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; 41st Div Surgeon, Medical Hist of Biak Campaign, pp. 7-14;

163d Inf, Casualty Rpts Biak, atchd to 163d Inf

Opns Rpt Biak, 31 May-20 Aug 44; 162d Inf Rpt

of Casualties Biak, atchd to 162d Inf Opns Rpt

Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44; Annex 62, Casualties, to

186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44.

Losses of the regiments of the 41st Div were as follows: 162d Inf, 155 killed and 778 wounded or injured; 163d Inf, 67 killed and 408 wounded or injured; 186th Inf, 103 killed and 514 wounded or

injured.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 393

In addition, almost 600 Javanese and British Indian slave laborers were recovered,

while 2 Chinese and 1 native of Guam were

released from Japanese custody.42 The remaining Japanese were without hope of

succor. They could choose surrender, death

by combat during Allied mopping up operations, death by disease, death by suicide, or

death by starvation.

Logistics and Base Development

The first operational airfield in the Biak

area was that on Owi Island, which Fifth

Air Force planes began using regularly on

21 June. By 12 July the 860th and 864th

Engineer Aviation Battalions had extended

the strip to 7,000 feet and had constructed

7,500 feet of taxiways. By 20 August the two

engineer units and the 60th Naval Construction Battalion had completed a second

7,000-foot runway on Owi. In addition,

there were then available on the tiny island

some 20,000 feet of taxiways and 130

hardstandings.

P-40's had begun operating from 5,000

completed feet of Mokmer Drome on Biak

on 22 June. By 1 August the 863d Engineer

Aviation Battalion and the 46th Engineer

Construction Battalion had extended the

field to 7,000 feet and had completed 27,000

feet of taxiways and 122 hardstandings. On

1 August the 46th Engineers completed a

4,000-foot runway at Borokoe Drome, which

was used principally by transport aircraft,

and by the 20th had extended it to 5,500

feet. Some work was also undertaken on

Sorido Drome, which by 12 August consisted of a 4,000-foot strip being used by

transport planes. Terrain difficulties and a

shortage of engineers made it impractical to

extend Sorido, and the field was finally

abandoned.43

While none of the Biak fields was ready in

time to support the Central Pacific's invasion of the Marianas in mid-June, they did

prove extremely valuable in the support of

subsequent operations to the west and north

by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area and

in the support of the Central Pacific's landings in the Palau Islands in mid-September.

The Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces also

flew many missions from Biak over Japanese-held targets in the Netherlands East

Indies and on Mindanao, in the southern

Philippines.

As of 20 August, eight LST slots were

being constructed along the south coast of

Biak by the 1896th Engineers; two floating

docks for Liberty Ships (one each at Owi

and Biak) were completed; the Parai Jetty

had been improved and extended; and two

more fixed docks or jetties were under construction. On Owi Island over 12 miles of

roads had been completed, while approximately 30 miles had been constructed on

Biak. An additional 22 miles of roads were

being improved on Biak. There was available over 1,130,000 square feet of storage

space, including about 300,000 square feet

under cover. Finally, one 400-bed hospital

had been completed and a second was under

construction. All these construction activities had been instituted under the direction

of Headquarters, 1112th Engineer Combat

Group, which was succeeded early in July

by Headquarters, 1178th Engineer Construction Group.

42

 HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 14;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, p. 56; ALAMO

G-2 Wkly Rpt 55, 23 Aug 44, copy in G-2 DofA

files.

43

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp. 42-

44, 50-51; Base H USASOS, Rpt of HTF Engr

Office, pp. 1-3, in folder entitled HTF Stf Rpts, 27

May-19 Aug 44.
394 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

DOCK AREA, BIAK

Construction units at Biak encountered

few major difficulties other than those occasioned by the enemy fire on Mokmer Drome.

Wood was plentiful, although lumbering

was made somewhat difficult because the

best stands of timber were located at scattered points along steep ridges and precipitous hills. The prevailing coral of Biak and

Owi was hard on equipment, but when

processed it proved excellent material for

airstrip and road paving. There were no

drainage problems and ultimately enough

fresh water was found to adequately supply

the entire task force.44

Major supply problems of the HURRICANE

Task Force were associated with unloading

delays caused by enemy air raids, insufficient

wheeled transportation during early phases

of the operation, and an abnormally heavy

expenditure of artillery ammunition. The

shortage of transportation on shore was

alleviated by the capture and use of about

sixty enemy trucks, and additional wheeled

transportation was later brought to Biak

from rear bases.

Japanese air raids caused the Allied

Naval Forces to permit only two LST's to

unload at a jetty at one time after Z Day.

This order sometimes delayed unloading,

but few LST's left the island without being

discharged in the time allotted. Until locally

based fighter protection was available, no

ships larger than LST's were sent to Biak,

and it was 22 June before the first big cargo 44

 Ibid.
BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS 395

BASE H AND HOSPITAL AREAS ON BIAK

ships arrived. Then, daily discharge rates

began to climb from a few hundred tons

daily to a peak of 4,073 tons on 12 August.

A shortage of lightering craft was apparent

for some time, but the arrival of the first

floating dock on 22 July greatly relieved

the strain on available lighterage.

The nature of the combat on Biak accounted for the abnormal expenditure of artillery ammunition—an expenditure which

created a pressing problem in terms of shipping space. The shortage of shipping in the

Southwest Pacific made movement of all

supplies and equipment to Biak necessarily

slow at times. A great deal of juggling of

ship sailing schedules and hurried changes

in loading plans at rear bases were necessary

to keep the HURRICANE Task Force adequately supplied with artillery ammunition.

Evidently there was some misunderstanding

between Biak and the task force Rear Echelon at Hollandia concerning the requisitioning of ammunition, for, as the task force

G-4 Section report put it:

The procedure of requisitioning ammunition by units of fire proved unsatisfactory because there was no way for the Rear Echelon

to determine the quantity of ammunition desired when so requisitioned. It was recommended that ammunition be requisitioned by

rounds.

This statement is difficult to understand.

The Rear Echelon must have had available

to it War Department or Services of Supply
396 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

publications which specifically set forth the

number of rounds per unit of fire for all types

of weapons.45

Resupply of the HURRICANE Task Force

was initially a responsibility of ALAMO Force,

but on 7 June this responsibility passed to

Services of Supply Base G, at Hollandia.

Control of ships moving forward to Biak

remained a responsibility of the Allied Naval

Forces until 20 August, when the Services

of Supply took over. In mid-August, Services of Supply personnel began moving up

to Biak to establish a new headquarters,

Base H, which, on 20 August, took over all

responsibility (or the logistic support of air

and ground forces on Biak. Ultimately,

Base H was capable of providing full logistic

support for 70,000 ground and air force

troops. The Allied Naval Forces remained

responsible for its own construction and supply operations in the Biak area and centered

most of its activities at Mios Woendi Island,

near Owi.46

On 20 August, the same day that Base H

began operations at Biak, General Krueger

of ALAMO Force, satisfied that Japanese

resistance was broken, declared the Biak

operation at an end.

For the Allies, the Biak operation was not

an unparalleled success, for objectives were

not taken as soon as anticipated. But the outcome was never seriously in doubt, though

the battle was rough and the fighting was

hard from Z Day through the fall of the

Ibdi Pocket, two months later. As usual, the

Allies won the last battle, and Biak proved

an invaluable air and logistic base along the

road back to the Philippines.47

45

 G-4 HTF, Sum of Opns of HTF, pp. 6-15, in

folder entitled Historical Records, A/CofS G-4,

HTF, 27 May-20 Aug 44. The quotation is from

page 9 of the summary. 46

 Rad, Adv Base G to ALAMO, ON-6054, 6 Jun

44, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 6-15 Jun 44;

USASOS LI 51/4/SOS, 16 Aug 44, in ALAMO G-4

Jnl Wakde-Biak, 20 Jul-13 Aug 44; G-4 HTF,

Sum of Opns of HTF, p. 16.

47

 The 41st Division remained in Biak until early

1945 when it moved forward to the Philippines. It

continued mopping up operations after 20 August,

first under ALAMO Force-Sixth Army and, after

mid-October, under the Eighth Army. About the

time of the change in command, Sixth Army stated

that Japanese casualties on Biak included 6,127

killed or found dead, 462 Japanese PW's, and 304

Formosan PW's. In addition, it was estimated that

there were 2,000 unlocated dead. (ALAMO Force,

G-2 Wkly Rpts 57 and 61, 6 Sep 44 and 4 Oct 44,

respectively, copies in G-2 DofA files). Much of

the most lucrative mopping up occurred in northern

Biak and on Soepiori Island, where many of the

Japanese apparently fled in the vain hope of being

evacuated. By the time the 41st Division moved

away from Biak, probably less than 1,500 men of

the Japanese garrison remained alive.
CHAPTER XVII

Operations on Noemfoor Island

Even before the HURRICANE Task Force

had landed on Biak, planners at General

MacArthur's headquarters had considered

the possible necessity for occupying additional islands in Geelvink Bay to protect the

gains achieved at Biak. With the initial reverses of the HURRICANE Task Force, continuing enemy air attacks against Biak, and

growing indications that the Japanese might

be attempting to reinforce that island, expansion to near-by enemy bases began to

appear an imminent necessity. Moreover,

occupation of another island near Biak

would provide an additional air base from

which the Allied Air Forces could dominate

the Vogelkop Peninsula, where another operation was soon to take place. If, as appeared likely during the first week of June,

there was to be considerable delay in making the fields on Biak operational, the move

to the Vogelkop might have to be postponed.

On 4 June, therefore, General Headquarters began preparations for the seizure of

Noemfoor Island, which lay about midway

between Biak and the Japanese base at

Manokwari on the northeast tip of the

Vogelkop Peninsula.1

The Noemfoor Plan

Noemfoor was used by the Japanese as a

staging area for troops moving to reinforce

the Biak Detachment. Japanese barges could

make the run from Manokwari to western

Noemfoor, a distance of about 60 nautical

miles, during the hours of darkness, and

another overnight run would take reinforcements the additional 75 nautical miles to

western Biak. Two other reasons dictated

the choice of Noemfoor. First, the Japanese

had constructed or partially completed three

airdromes on the island. The Allies could

quickly repair those fields for fighters and

bombers which could cover the advance to

the Vogelkop. Finally, Allied occupation of

Noemfoor would deny to the Japanese a

base from which the sea lanes west of Biak

could be threatened.

The Terrain and the Enemy

Noemfoor, roughly circular in shape, consists of a series of limestone and coral terraces, a topography in many ways similar to

that of Biak but not as rough. The highest

point on Noemfoor is about 670 feet above

sea level, its greatest north-south length is

about fifteen miles, and its width approximately twelve and a half miles. Most of the

natives, about 5,000 in all, lived in a number of coastal hamlets. The island had experienced little commercial development be1

 Memo, G-3 GHQ Plng Sec for ACofS G-3 GHQ

SWPA, no sub, 4 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 4 Jun

44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, C-13296, 5 Jun

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44. As

it had for previous operations, ALAMO Force kept

a separate set of records concerning the Noemfoor

operation.
398 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

fore the war, there were no towns of any

importance, and port facilities were lacking.

Land communications consisted of native

tracks skirting the coast line and connecting

the many villages. (Map 17)

Inland, the terrain is fairly rugged, although there are some large flat areas on the

northern and southwestern sections of the

coast. Dense rain forest grows everywhere

except along a few strips of the beach, and

along the banks of tidal inlets where heavy

mangrove swamps are found. The island is

completely surrounded by coral reefs, behind which are beaches of many types—

sand, forest, mangrove swamp, or rocky

shore. Seaward approaches to the island are

deep and free of navigational hazards, permitting large ships to draw up to the outer

edges of the reefs both day and night. The

best landing areas, considering both reef

and beach conditions, are on the northwest

shore, near Menoekwari West and Kamiri.2

It is not known when the Japanese first

occupied Noemfoor, but early in 1944 they

began to construct airfields there in accordance with their policy of strengthening their

new strategic main line of resistance in western New Guinea. By the end of May the

Japanese had completed two fields on

Noemfoor: Namber Drome on the southwest coast and Kamiri Drome on the northwest. On the north-central coast, about four

miles east of Kamiri Drome, the Japanese

had left unfinished a third airfield, designated Kornasoren Drome. The only other

construction of note was some widening of

native trails to serve as motor roads between

the airfields.

In mid-June, realizing that the Japanese

were using Noemfoor as a way station for

troops moving to reinforce Biak and considering it probable that the Japanese would

expect an Allied invasion of the island, the

ALAMO Force G-2 Section estimated that

the Japanese garrison on Noemfoor comprised 2,850 to 3,250 troops, with a combat

strength of 1,600 to 2,000 men. Most of

the combat troops were believed to be members of the 3d Battalion, 219th Infantry,

35th Division. Other combat units of that

division and at least a company of the 36th

Division were also thought to be stationed

on the island. The Japanese were known to

have concentrated their strength at the airfields, and the largest single body of Japanese was believed to be stationed at Kamiri

Drome.3

Intelligence officers estimated that since

the Japanese probably considered Noemfoor

only a delaying position, they would make

few efforts to reinforce it. No naval interference was expected because, after the

fiascos of the KON and A-GO Operations,

most of the Combined Fleet had retired to

homeland or Philippine waters, leaving only

a few destroyers and one light cruiser in the

western New Guinea area. Some reaction

by Japanese aircraft was expected, but not

on the scale attempted at Biak. Allied aircraft could keep Japanese fields within range

of Noemfoor out of operation most of the

time and, in co-operation with Seventh

Fleet PT boats, could stop most overwater 2

 ACS SWPA, Terrain Handbook No. 27, "Schouten Islands," 12 May 44, copy in OCMH files;

ALAMO Force, G-2 Photo Int Sec Rpt 135, 13 Jun

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44.

Menoekwari West is not to be confused with Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula nor with Menoekwari South, a village located on the southern

coast of Noemfoor.

3

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to Noemfoor Island, 15 Jun 44, in ALAMO

G-4 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 6-15 Jun 44; ALAMO Force,

G-2 Daily Rpt 200, 2 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl

Noemfoor, 27 May-8 Jul 44; ALAMO Force FO

19, 21 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Jun 44.
Map 17
400 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

reinforcing movements of the scale the

Japanese could mount.4

Allied estimates of Japanese strength on

Noemfoor were too high, for there were not

more than 2,000 Japanese on the island.

Probably not more than 900 of these could

be counted infantry effectives. In addition

to the 2,000 Japanese, there were 600-odd

Formosan laborers and approximately 500

Javanese slave laborers. The 3d Battalion,

219th Infantry, contained the bulk of the

combat troops, but there were also present

about 180 men of the 2d Battalion, 219 Infantry, and a like number of the 222d Infantry, 36th Division, troops which had been

unable to reach Biak. The Japanese garrison

on Noemfoor was commanded by a Colonel

Shimizu, who was also the commanding officer of the 219th Infantry. Another unit,

commanded by a Major Mori, but apparently under Colonel Shimizu's operational

control, seems to have been a provisional

organization containing mostly armed service personnel and numbering about 600

men.5

The ALAMO G-2 Section was correct in

assuming that an invasion of Noemfoor

would come as no surprise to the Japanese.

Colonel Shimizu had estimated as early as 1

June that the Allies would soon invade the

island in the vicinity of Kamiri Drome. For

reasons unknown, the colonel later changed

his guess and began making extensive defensive preparations along the north coast at

Kornasoren Drome. During the night of

22-23 June, the colonel's men discovered

an Allied reconnaissance party which,

brought to Noemfoor by PT's, was attempting to obtain accurate information concerning reef and tide conditions off Kamiri.

When no American landing was immediately forthcoming, Colonel Shimizu re-estimated that the invasion of Noemfoor would

occur at the Kamiri Drome area during the

first week of July.6 His estimate was soon to

prove remarkably accurate.

Organization of the Forces

On 5 June 1944 General Mac Arthur informed General Krueger that the Noemfoor

operation was to take place under ALAMO

Force direction. At the same time General

Krueger was warned that operations on the

Vogelkop Peninsula were to follow close

upon the occupation of Noemfoor. General

MacArthur's planners wanted to use a regimental combat team of the 6th Infantry

Division at Noemfoor,7 but General Krueger planned to employ that division for the

Vogelkop invasion, and therefore secured

General MacArthur's approval to send the

158th Regimental Combat Team against

Noemfoor. The latter unit was then at

Wakde-Sarmi, and provision had to be

made to speed shipment of the 6th Division

4

 Annex G, Int, to CTF 77 Opn Plan 6-44, 22

Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27 Jun 44; ALAMO Force

FO 19, 21 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Jun 44;

Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to ALAMO Rear Hq, WH-723,

23 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 19-24 Jun

44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to Noemfoor Island, 15 Jun 44, in ALAMO

G-4 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 6-15 Jun 44. 5

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 58, 67; 2d Army

Opns, p. 6; S-2, 503d Prcht Inf Regt, Enemy Order

of Battle Noemfoor Island, 20 Sep 44, in 503d

Prcht Inf, S-2 Rpt, Noemfoor Opns; CyTF Hist

Rpt Noemfoor, p. 16. The complete names of

Shimizu and Mori cannot be ascertained from available records.

6

 CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 17-18; CTF 77

[Comdr, Naval Attack Force], Noemfoor Opn—Rpt

on, 16 Jul 44, pp., 1-2; ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of

Enemy Sit with Respect to Noemfoor Island, 15

Jun 44, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Wakdke-Biak, 6-15

Jun 44. 7

 Memo, G-3 GHQ Plng Sec for ACofS G-3

GHQ SWPA, no sub, 4 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 4 Jun 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, C-13296,

5 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 401

there so that the 158th could prepare for

the Noemfoor operation.8

As in previous operations along the New

Guinea coast, General Krueger was made

responsible for co-ordinating air, naval, and

ground planning for Noemfoor. He scheduled an interservice planning conference for

16 June, a date to which Allied Naval Forces

planners objected. Most of the important

naval planners were at least a day away from

ALAMO Force headquarters, and, moreover,

the Allied Naval Forces did not believe that

enough intelligence data was on hand for

planning purposes. General Krueger, on the

other hand, considered available data sufficient, and held the conference as scheduled.

The Allied Naval Forces was represented

only by one officer from the staff of the VII

Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet.9

At the conference it immediately became

apparent that, as usual, the provision of air

support for the landing was the major problem. Allied Air Forces held that since carrier-based aircraft were not available, a

minimum of two fighter groups would have

to be based at Biak before the Noemfoor

operation could be initiated. General Kenney, the air commander, estimated that

Mokmer Drome could be used by 20 June

without further interference from the Biak

Detachment and that the airfield then being

constructed on Owi Island, off southeastern

Biak, would be ready on 25 June. Upon

completion, each field would be able to accommodate one group of fighters. These

aircraft would need a few days to become

acquainted with the target areas on Noemfoor. Finally, while the concentration of

troops and supplies for ground elements

scheduled to land on Noemfoor could be

accomplished by 26 June, it would be necessary to allow these forces time for rehearsal, and more time would be needed for

loading. The combination of these factors

led General Krueger to believe that 30 June

would be the earliest practicable date upon

which the Noemfoor landing could take

place. This date was approved by General

MacArthur.10

On 20 June a second planning conference

was held at General Krueger's headquarters, this time attended by the commanders

of all the major air, ground, and naval units

participating in the Noemfoor operation. It

was discovered that the 30 June target date

was optimistic. First, additional time was

needed for rehearsing the amphibious phases

of the operation. Next, General Kenney

wanted the landing delayed until a second

runway could be completed on Owi Island.

It still appeared possible that the Biak Detachment might delay full use of Mokmer

Drome for some time, and the expansion of

the Owi strip was believed necessary to provide a safe airfield for fighters supporting

8

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to ALAMO Rear Hq, WH227, 6 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 6-7 Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to TTF,

WH-315, 9 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 9-10 Jun 44; Memo, ACofS G-3

ALAMO to ACofS G-4 ALAMO, ALAMO AAO, and

ALAMO FAO, no sub, 7 Jun 44, and Rad, GHQ

SWPA to ALAMO, G-13742, 15 Jun 44, last two

docs in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44.

See also above, Ch. X. 9

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to AAF, SWPA, ANF SWPA,

ALAMO, and USASOS, CX-13693, 14 Jun 44, Rad,

Com7thFlt to ALAMO, 15 Jun 44, and Rad, ALAMO

to CTF 76, WF-8059, 15 Jun 44, all three in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44; Rad,

ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-3357, 17 Jun 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 17 Jun 44.

10

 Rad, ALAMO Adv Hq to ALAMO Rear Hq, WH494, 15 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl WakdeBiak, 15-16 Jun 44; Ltr, AAF SWPA to GHQ

SWPA, sub: TABLETENNIS Opn, 17 Jun 44, and

Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-3357, 17 Jun

44, last two docs in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 17 Jun 44; GHQ

SWPA OI 55, 17 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18

Jun 44.
402 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the Noemfoor landing. The additional construction on Owi could not be completed

until 30 June. Finally, more time was

needed to move forward to the staging area

(Wakde-Sarmi) a number of LCM's and

LCT's which were to participate in the

landing. Therefore, General Krueger secured approval from General MacArthur

to postpone the landing until 2 July. With

the date settled, other points of air, ground,

and naval co-ordination were discussed by

the conferees, and agreement on all important issues was soon reached. The commanders returned to their respective headquarters which, within a few days, produced

the necessary field orders, operations instructions, or other final plans.11

For the Noemfoor operation the 158th

Regimental Combat Team, reinforced, was

designated the CYCLONE Task Force. The

task force and combat team commander

Was Brig. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, who had

commanded the same combat team and the

TORNADO Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi. The

CYCLONE Task Force staff was formed by

members of ALAMO Force headquarters, the

158th Infantry, No. 62 Works Wing of the

Royal Australian Air Force, and other units

attached to ALAMO Force for the operation.

The total combat strength of the task force

was approximately 8,000 men, of whom

over 7,000 were to land on D Day.12

The principal mission of the CYCLONE

Task Force was to seize airdrome sites which

were to be quickly developed so that Allied

aircraft could support operations west of

Noemfoor. The task force was initially to

prepare facilities for two groups of fighters

and half a squadron of night fighters and

later to expand these facilities for an additional fighter group, two squadrons of medium bombers, and two squadrons of light

bombers. To accomplish the necessary airfield construction, service units of the

CYCLONE Task Force were to include two

American engineer aviation battalions and

No. 62 Works Wing. With an excellent record of achievement at Aitape as engineer of

the PERSECUTION Task Force, the commander of the Australian works wing,

Group Capt. W. A. C. Dale (RAAF), was

appointed engineer of the CYCLONE Task

Force.

The service units assigned to the task

force numbered about 5,500 men, among

whom approximately 3,000 were to be engaged in airdrome construction. Other service troops included the usual medical,

quartermaster, ordnance, and signal units

needed for a small amphibious operation.

Air force units scheduled to arrive on Biak

after the airfields were completed totaled

some 10,000 men. Air operations from

Noemfoor were to be controlled initially by

No. 10 Operational Group, Royal Australian Air Force, and later by the Fifth Air

Force's 309th Bombardment Wing (H).

The first aircraft scheduled to operate from

Noemfoor were to be Australian, and Fifth

Air Force planes were to follow on a date

11

 Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-3961, 20

Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 19-24 Jun

44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, ANF SWPA,

AAF SWPA, et al., CX-13999, 21 Jun 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 21 Jun 44; GTF 77 Noemfoor Opn Rpt,

p. 2. 12

 Major combat units were the 158th Infantry,

the 147th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm.), the

116th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (of two battalions and three additional batteries), a platoon of

the 603d Tank Company, a 4.2-inch mortar company of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, the

27th Engineers, the Shore Battalion of the 593d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, a boat company of the 543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (both the latter from the 3d Engineer Special

Brigade), and the Support Battery, 2d Engineer

Special Brigade.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 403

governed by the extent of airfield construction.13

The amphibious phase of the Noemfoor

operation was to be directed by Rear Adm.

William M. Fechteler as the Commander,

Naval Attack Force.14 Admiral Fechteler

divided his Attack Force into three groups.

The Covering Force, under the command of

Rear Adm. Russell S. Berkey (USN), contained 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and

10 destroyers. Admiral Fechteler retained

command over the Main Body, consisting of

15 destroyers, 8 LST's, 8 LCT's, 4 patrol

craft (PC's), 1 tug, and 14 LCI's (including 3 rocket-equipped LCI's and 2 LCI's

transporting demolition experts and their

equipment for blasting approaches for landing craft through the reefs). An LCT-LCM

Unit, commanded by Lt. Comdr. James S.

Munroe (USNR), contained 3 PC's, 5

LCT's, and 40 LCM's, the latter manned

by Company A, 543d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment. A Beach Party and two

Reinforcement Groups (the latter arriving after D Day) completed the naval

organization.15

The bulk of the air missions in support of

the landing were to be flown by the U. S.

Fifth Air Force, now under Maj. Gen. Ennis

C. Whitehead. The newly arrived Thirteenth Air Force, under Maj. Gen. St. Clair

Streett, was to have a share in the support,

as were Australian and Dutch planes. Also

available was Task Force 73, the Seventh

Fleet's land-based aircraft, which flew under

the operational control of the Allied Air

Forces.16

Initially, ALAMO Force Reserve for the

Noemfoor operation was the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. This unit, stationed at Hollandia, was to be prepared for

airborne movement to Noemfoor on C-47's

of the 54th Troop Carrier Wing, Fifth Air

Force. Since there were not enough C-47's

available to move the entire regiment at

one time, provision was made to fly it forward in battalion groups.17

 Late during the

planning for Noemfoor, General Krueger,

concerned lest the ground situation on

Noemfoor on D Day require overwater

reinforcements as well, alerted the 34th

Infantry, then on Biak, to prepare for waterborne movement to Noemfoor on twentyfour hours' notice. He requested and 13

 GHQ SWPA OI 55, 17 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 18 Jun 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor,

pp. 3-5; CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 1-5; 3d

ESB Opns Rpt, Jul 44, n.p.; 5th AF OI 3, 22 Jun

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Jun 44; CyTF FO 1, 23

Jun 44, in file of CyTF's FO's. 14

 The Attack Force was administratively designated Task Force 77, and contained the bulk of the

combat elements of the VII Amphibious Force, U. S.

Seventh Fleet, as well as Australian units. Admiral

Fechteler, deputy commander of the VII Amphibious Force, was in command of that force from May

until early July, its regular commander, Rear Adm.

Daniel E. Barbey, being temporarily absent on other

duty. 15

 CTF 77 Opn plan 6-44, 22 Jun 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 27 Jun 44: CTF 77 Noemfoor Opn Rpt,

p. 3. The Covering Force had two sections: one

under Commodore John A. Collins (RAN), containing 1 heavy cruiser and 4 destroyers, was known

administratively as Task Force 74; the other section,

under Admiral Berkey and containing 2 light cruisers and 6 destroyers, was Task Force 75. The destroyers of the Main Body were also divided into

Fire Support Groups. 16

 5th AF OI 3, 22 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25

Jun 44; ANF SWPA Opn Plan 8-44, 17 Jun 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 20 Jun 44; 13th AF OI 2, 27 Jun 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 1 Jul 44; AAF SWPA OI 55, 20

Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 20 Jun 44. General Kenney had previously commanded the Fifth Air Force,

but, on 15 June, the headquarters of that unit became Headquarters, Far Eastern Air Force, under

which were placed both the Fifth and Thirteenth Air

Forces. General Whitehead's previous command,

the Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force [AdvonSAF],

then became Headquarters, Fifth Air Force. 17

 ALAMO Force FO 19, 21 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 25 Jun 44; 5th AF OI 3, 22 Jun 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 25 Jun 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt

Noemfoor, p. 7.
404 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

obtained from the VII Amphibious Force

the use of ten LCI's, which were to stand

by off Biak at Mios Woendi pending a

decision on the necessity for moving the

34th Infantry to Noemfoor.18

The CYCLONE Task Force had no specific reserve set aside as such for the landing.

The Task Force Shore Party, however, consisting of engineer and quartermaster units,

was to assemble the equivalent of three rifle

companies for combat missions upon call

from General Patrick. The reserve for the

158th Infantry was to be Company K, reinforced by a heavy machine gun platoon

from Company M. The 1st Platoon, 603d

Tank Company, once ashore, was to assemble to assist the attack of the 158th Infantry

and, until needed for this task, could be considered as a mobile reserve.19

Logistics and Tactics

The logistic plan for Noemfoor was similar to that for earlier operations along the

New Guinea coast. As usual, the transportation of men and supplies to the forward

area was a responsibility of the Allied Naval

Forces until relieved by the Services of Supply. The date for the transfer of this responsibility was not set prior to D Day.20

 The

assault elements of the CYCLONE Task Force

were to carry with them ten days' supply of

rations, clothing, unit equipment, fuels, lubricants, medical supplies, and motor maintenance matériel. All weapons except the

4.2-inch mortars were to be supplied with

two units of fire; the mortars were to have

four units. Provision for resupply was similar to that of previous operations. Ultimately, thirty days of supply of all matériel

(except engineer construction equipment)

and three units of fire for all weapons were

to be built up at Noemfoor. Engineer construction supplies were to be brought forward as necessary.21

There were no critical shortages and no

supply problems other than relatively minor

difficulties concerned with loading and unloading. The Naval Attack Force did not

want any bulk supplies loaded on LST's of

the D-Day echelon, but planned that all

supplies would be carried packed on vehicles

transported by the LST's. This plan was

prompted by Admiral Fechteler's wish to

pull the LST's away from Noemfoor as

quickly as possible, since he felt there might

be a strong enemy air reaction to the landing, a reaction which, because of possibly

adverse weather conditions, the Fifth Air

Force might not be able to counter. After

conferences with the task force and ALAMO

Force supply sections, however, Admiral

Fechteler agreed to bulk-load 200 tons of

cargo on each LST of the D-Day echelon,

provided that a 100-man unloading detail

for each ship were made available. The 6th

18

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 7; Rad,

ALAMO to CTF 77 and 76, WF-1172, 28 Jun 44,

and Rad, GTF 76 to ALAMO, 29 Jun 44, both in

ALAMO G-2 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 16 Jun-10 Jul 44. 19

 CyTF FO 1, 23 Jun 44, in file of CyTF's FO's;

158th Inf FO 1, 26 Jun 44, in 158th Inf Jnl file, 22

Jun-31 Aug 44. The Shore Party consisted of the

Shore Battalion, 593d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment, an amphibian truck company, a company

of the 27th Engineers, and various quartermaster detachments. It was under the Commanding Officer,

593d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Naval

plans and reports for the Noemfoor operation consistently refer to the 3d Battalion, 158th Infantry,

as the reserve battalion. Actually, this battalion was

to follow the other two ashore and assemble for offensive operations rather than hold itself ready as a

reserve.

20

 GHQ SWPA OI 55, 17 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 18 Jun 44. The transfer of responsibility from

ANF SWPA to USASOS SWPA was not made until

1 Sep, according to GHQ SWPA OI 55/2, 26 Aug

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Jun 44. 21

 CyTF Adm O 1, 24 Jun 44, atchd to CyTF FO

1, 23 Jun 44, in file of CyTF FO's.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 405

Infantry Division, at Wakde-Sarmi, was

called upon to provide 800 men for the unloading. These men were to return to

Wakde-Sarmi on the LST's they unloaded

and were not to be committed to combat

operations on Noemfoor. Admiral Fechteler

also believed it necessary to make roller conveyors available to unload the bulk cargo at

Noemfoor, and ALAMO Force procured adequate lengths of these conveyors from stocks

in eastern New Guinea bases.22

In many essentials, the landing plans for

Noemfoor were very similar to those used at

Biak. Like the latter island, Noemfoor was

surrounded by coral reefs which were barely

covered by water even at high tide. Therefore, as at Biak, LVT's and DUKW's were

to make up the assault landing waves for

Noemfoor. Again, LCM's and LCT's were

to be run up on the reef and over it if possible, probable damage to these craft having

to be accepted because of the importance

of their cargoes of tanks, trucks, bulldozers,

and engineer equipment. LCI's and LST's

were to beach at the outer edge of the reef,

their troops and vehicles to go ashore over

the reef. DUKW's and LVT's were to aid

in the unloading of the LST's.

In one major essential the Noemfoor

landing plan differed radically from that employed at Biak. At the latter island the

HURRICANE Task Force had used a beach

which, while within easy marching distance

of the principal objectives and the main concentration of enemy troops, was relatively

undefended. But at Noemfoor, the landing

was to be made in the face of the enemy's

strongest defenses, known to be located in

the Kamiri Drome area. Yellow Beach, as

the landing area was designated, extended

approximately 800 yards along the western

end of the airfield, which was situated almost at the high water mark. The reef presented fewer hazards there than elsewhere,

since it was somewhat narrower than at most

other points along the island's coast. The

relative narrowness of the reef at Kamiri

would also permit LCI's, LCT's, LCM's,

and LST's to approach to within 450 yards

of the beach, which, at the airfield, was believed to be firm. Moreover, landing at Yellow Beach had the advantage of placing the

assault troops immediately on their objective, permitting a rapid seizure of Kamiri

Drome before the Japanese could recover

from the shock of the naval and air bombardments. Enemy forces on the island

would be split, and those stationed at

Namber and Kornasoren Dromes would be

isolated.

To insure that the assault troops would

get ashore with minimum casualties, the

landing plan demanded the heaviest naval

bombardment yet delivered in the Southwest Pacific area. Two and one-half times

the amount of ammunition normally

thought necessary to neutralize the landing

area was to be expended against Yellow

Beach and its environs. Any miscarriage of

plans, it was realized, would allow the Japanese to recover from this bombardment

and inflict serious losses on the landing

waves. Admiral Fechteler recognized that

the landing plan called for ideal conditions

of wind and sea, and he planned to postpone

the assault if unfavorable weather conditions prevailed on the morning of 2 July.

The landing itself was scheduled for 0800,

fifty-seven minutes after sunrise. This hour

was later than customary for landings along

the New Guinea coast, but it had the double

22

 Memo, Asst ACofS G-4 ALAMO for QM ALAMO,

no sub, 20 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Noemfoor, 27

May-8 Jul 44; Rad, ALAMO to TTF (for CG 6th

Inf Div) WF-4393, 22 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Noemfoor, 19-24 Jun 44.
406 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

purpose of allowing more naval gunfire to

be laid on the beach with accuracy and insuring proper beach identification. The plan

of naval support fire, except for its volume,

was similar to that of previous operations, as

was the composition and timing of assault

waves.23

The Landing

The CYCLONE Task Force was formally

organized on 21 June, when General Patrick, in order to co-ordinate his final planning with that of other organizations concerned with the Noemfoor operation, set up

a temporary command post near ALAMO

Force's rear headquarters at Finschhafen.

General Patrick's plan of operations was

approved by General Krueger on 22 June

and published as CYCLONE Task Force Field

Order No. 1 the next day. General Patrick

and his staff then returned to the WakdeSarmi area to complete final preparations

for the Noemfoor operation. A rehearsal for

amphibian vehicles was held on 28 June,

and final loading of the assault ships was

finished soon thereafter.24

Approach and Bombardment

The LCT-LCM Unit, escorted by three

PC's, left Toem on 29 June and sailed for

Biak, where the landing craft had a twentyfour hour layover. Two LCI's, carrying most

of the troops who were to move to Noemfoor

aboard LCM's, accompanied the unit as far

as Biak. The Main Body of the Attack Force

departed Toem at 1800 on 30 June, arriving

off southeastern Biak about 1740 hours on

1 July. The LCM troops then left the LCI's

for their own craft, and 8 of the 13 LCT's

were taken in tow by LST's of the Main

Body, which immediately sailed for Noemfoor. The 8 LCT's were towed to Noemfoor

in order that they might be available to unload equipment from the LST's during the

first phases of the assault. The rest of the

LCT-LCM Unit, consisting now of 5

LCT's, 40 LCM's, and 3 PC's, proceeded

behind the Main Body at best speed, arriving off Noemfoor not much more than half

an hour after the Main Body.25

The Main Body began deploying off Yellow Beach about 0500 on D Day, 2 July.

Various sections of the Main Body, including accompanying destroyers, were released

from formation during the predawn hours

to take up assigned control or fire support

stations. About 0700 the assault ships

stopped while the LST's cast off their LCT

tows. As a result of this halt, the Main Body

arrived at the transport area, about 3,000

yards offshore, approximately ten minutes

late, and the LST's were delayed an additional five minutes in completing their deployment. However, the LST's then steamed

on to their stations with bow doors open and

ramps half lowered, thus speeding launching of LVT's and DUKW's of the assault

waves and making up all the lost time.

Four control craft had already arrived on

station, two at the line of departure about

1,000 yards beyond the outer edge of the

reef and two more at the reef's edge. Heavy

haze, caused by the smoke and dust of the

prelanding air and naval bombardments,

obscured Yellow Beach and the control

23

 CTF 77 Opn Plan 6-44, 22 Jun 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 27 Jun 44; CTF 77 Noemfoor Opn Rpt,

pp. 4, 20-21; CyTF FO 1, 23 Jun 44, in file of

CyTF FO's; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p.

8; CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 7. 24

 CTF 77 Noemfoor Opns Rpt, p. 8; CyTF Hist

Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 7-8; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt

Noemfoor, p. 3.

25

 CTF 77 Noemfoor Opn Rpt, p. 9; Ltr, Maj

Robert M. Luby [3d ESB Obsr] to CG 3d ESB, sub:

Obsr's Rpt, Noemfoor Opn, 11 Jul 44, in binder

entitled 3d ESB Opns Rpt, Jul 44.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 407

boats, which could not be seen from a distance of more than 500 yards. The control

boats therefore turned on white flood lights,

enabling the assault craft to obtain correct

bearings for the run to the beach.

The naval bombardment was carried out

by the Covering Force, augmented by destroyers of the Main Body. The Covering

Force had formed at the Admiralty Islands,

whence it had sailed westward to reach a

point about thirty miles southeast of Biak

at 1900 hours on 1 July. Proceeding toward

Noemfoor about ten miles ahead of the

Main Body, the Covering Force made a few

radar contacts with Japanese aircraft, but

its trip was otherwise without incident. The

force moved into assigned fire support areas

in time to begin its bombardment on schedule at H minus 80 minutes.

One heavy cruiser (HMAS Australia)

and four destroyers bombarded Yellow

Beach and its flanks from H minus 80 to H

minus 30 minutes, while two American light

cruisers and six destroyers threw the weight

of their fires on target areas east of the

beach, including Kornasoren Drome. Four

additional destroyers hit Yellow Beach and

its right flank and four more fired on the

left flank of the beach. Among the most

important targets were low coral ridges immediately behind Kamiri Drome. Three destroyers stood by for call fire, and two others

set course south along the west coast of

Noemfoor to place harassing fire on Namber

Drome and its environs.26

The Allied Air Forces had been bombing

Noemfoor and enemy air bases on the

Vogelkop Peninsula for some days in preparation for the landing of the CYCLONE Task

Force. On 1 July, 84 B-24's, 36 A-20's, and

12 B-25's were over the island, dropping

195 tons of bombs, while 22 P-38's glidebombed Kamiri and Kornasoren Drome installations with 11 tons of 1,000-pound

bombs. On D Day 33 B-24's, 6 B-25's, and

15 A-20's expended 108 tons of bombs and

32,000 rounds of ammunition in strafing

runways. In addition, two squadrons of

fighters were on air alert over the landing

area to protect the assault shipping and

drive off any Japanese planes which might

appear. Immediately before the landing, air

bombardment, like much of the naval gunfire, was directed against the low coral

ridges and hills behind Kamiri Drome. It

was believed that the most determined enemy opposition would come from positions

in these ridges, and to neutralize these possible defenses the 33 B-24's, at approximately H minus 15 minutes, dropped 500-

pound bombs along the ridge lines.

As this bombing ended, the first wave of

troop-carrying LVT's began approaching

the outer edge of the reef. About the same

time, rocket-equipped LCI's launched

almost 800 rockets into the immediate

beachhead area, adding final touches to the

bombardment. Automatic weapons aboard

four LVT(A)'s of the Support Battery, 2d

Engineer Special Brigade, accompanying

the leading assault wave, kept up a steady

fire on Yellow Beach as the troop-carrying

LVT's, also manned by the Support Battery,

clambered over the reef toward the beach.27

The Assault

There was no opposition to the landing.

The LVT's of the first wave, ashore on

26

 CTF 77 Noemfoor Opns Rpt, pp. 5-6, 9, 12.

27

 CTF 77 Noemfoor Opns Rpt, pp. 10, 12-13;

CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 8; AAF SWPA, Int

Sum 222, 5 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 4 Jul 44; Ltr,

Pvt Frank E. Burnside, 2d ESB photographer, to

CG 2d ESB, no sub, 8 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl,

2 Jul 44.
408 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

schedule at 0800, continued from the beach

line across Kamiri Drome to the base of a

coral ledge overlooking the field. There the

assault riflemen of the 1st and 2d Battalions,

158th Infantry, dismounted, the 1st Battalion on the west and the 2d on the east. Subsequent waves of LVT's and DUKW's (the

latter manned by the 464th Amphibian

Truck Company) brought the rest of the

two battalions ashore quickly. The troops

assembled at the coral ridge and rapidly began advancing west, east, and south to extend the beachhead.

First resistance was encountered by the

2d Battalion about 500 yards from the eastern end of Kamiri Drome, when without

warning about forty Japanese ran out of a

cave in the ledge and began milling around

in a rather aimless fashion. Showing no

tendency either to surrender or to flee, the

Japanese were killed by rifle fire or the automatic weapons of the Support Battery's

LVT(A)'s. Beyond the area of this encounter, a number of lightly manned caves and

prepared defenses were found. There was

little organized resistance from these positions, but the 2d Battalion, advancing

slowly, halted its attack to mop up each cave,

dugout, and foxhole. These methodical

operations were supported by the Support

Battery LVT(A)'s, later joined by the 1st

Platoon, 603d Tank Company. On the west

flank the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, encountered less opposition and had no difficulty securing a low hill off the southwest end

of Kamiri Drome. While part of the battalion cleared that hill, the rest of the unit

pushed south from the airfield about 1,000

yards to the north bank of the Kamiri River.

Meanwhile the 3d Battalion, 158th Infantry, had come ashore. It marched rapidly

westward after the 2d and joined the latter

unit in the mopping-up operations along

the low, jungled, coral ridges at the east end

of the airstrip. Upon the arrival of the 3d

Battalion, most of the 2d turned south from

the field toward the Kamiri River, meeting

no opposition on its way over more ridges

and through dense jungle to the north

bank of the tidal stream. By 1600 hours the

three infantry battalions had secured a

rectangular area about 3,000 yards wide

and some 800 deep, extending south to the

banks of the Kamiri. It had been expected

that the 158th Infantry would have moved

some 1,800 yards farther east toward

Kornasoren Drome on D Day, but progress

had been delayed because the advance elements of the 2d and 3d Battalions had lost

momentum as they stopped to mop up minor

points of enemy resistance instead of leaving

such defenses to follow-up forces.28

While the assault battalions had been

seizing the beachhead, the rest of the CYCLONE Task Force had been pouring ashore.

The first seven landing waves, consisting almost entirely of LVT's and DUKW's,

moved to the beach in good order, slowed

only by the difficulty experienced by some

DUKW's in negotiating the reef. The eighth

wave, comprising four LCT's with the 1st

Platoon, 603d Tank Company, aboard, followed the last DUKW wave to the outer

edge of the reef where the tanks unloaded

and lumbered ashore, reaching the beach by

0850. LCFs carrying the 3d Battalion and

other nonassault elements of the 158th Infantry, closed on the reef about 0825. Some

of the men debarked into water about waistdeep, but most of them waded ashore in less

than a foot of water. Small rubber boats,

inflated aboard the LCI's, were used by some

28

 CyTF G-3 Per Rpts, 23 Jun-31 Jul 44; CyTF

Hist Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 9-10, 23; 158th Inf Opns

Rpt Noemfoor, 22 Jun-31 Aug 44, pp. 1-2; CTF

77 Noemfoor Opns Rpt, p. 18.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 409

troops to drag ashore heavy equipment such

as ammunition and mortars. The debarkation of all elements of the 158th Infantry

was completed by noon.

LCM's, carrying engineer equipment,

trucks, and bulldozers, began coming up to

the reef about 0815 and three hit the reef

at full throttle to see if it could be jumped.

This proving impossible, the LCM's unloaded their cargo at the reef edge. It had

been planned to keep the LCM's clear of the

approach lane until the LCT's had finished

unloading. Somehow, orders to this effect

had either gone astray or been misunderstood, and within fifteen minutes after the

first LCM's hit the reef, the approach lane

began to be clogged with these craft, jockeying for position with LCT's and LCI's.

Crowded out, the LCM's moved west of the

lane to an unmarked section of the reef.

This proved a happy circumstance, for at

the new area wheeled vehicles found a

smoother reef crossing.

Nevertheless, during the first stages of the

landing, practically all wheeled, nonamphibian vehicles, whether waterproofed or

not, had to be towed over the reef by

DUKW's, LVT's, tanks, or bulldozers.

After H plus 2 hours, ebbing tide permitted

most of the vehicles to move ashore under

their own power without drowning out their

engines. During the course of the landing,

6 trucks, 2 jeeps, and 5 small trailers were

lost in pits in the reef. All but one truck and

one trailer were later salvaged.

As soon as the assault waves were on the

beach, naval demolition personnel began

blasting operations along the outer edge of

the reef so that LST's could move closer inshore, and the Shore Battalion, 593d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, began constructing temporary causeways over the

reef. Some vehicles aboard the LST's were

set directly on the reef, but most of them

were transshipped to the reef edge from the

landing ships by LCM's. Bulk cargo aboard

the LST's was manhandled into LVT's and

DUKW's which returned from the beach

for the express purpose of aiding unloading.

The 27th Engineer Battalion was responsible for unloading three LST's and getting

the cargo thereof ashore, and troops of the

6th Division handled most of the bulk cargo

aboard the others. By a combination of all

the foregoing methods, four LST's were

completely unloaded on D Day and most

of the cargo of the others had been sent

ashore. The latter moved out to sea at dusk

and returned on D plus 1 to complete

unloading.

The 105-mm. howitzers of the 147th

Field Artillery Battalion were brought

ashore from LST's by DUKW's and were

dropped into position on land by a few

DUKW's which were especially equipped

with A-frame cranes. The battalion was

ashore and in position by 1100, ready to

provide hasty support to the 158th Infantry; registration for more accurate fire was

completed by 1145. Antiaircraft artillery

units began coming ashore about 0810, and

all were landed and set up to defend the

beachhead by 1600.

The first sign of enemy Countermeasures

came about 0905, when Japanese mortar or

70-mm. artillery shells began falling in the

beachhead area and on the coral reef beyond. Few casualties were suffered from

this fire which, far from slowing the landing, probably did much to speed unloading.

The enemy's shells set one DUKW afire and

destroyed a truckload of ammunition. The

fire continued intermittently for about two

hours, despite efforts of naval support ves-
410 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

DUKW BURNING ON THE BEACH AT NOEMFOOR

sels and planes of the air umbrella to locate

and destroy the Japanese weapons.29

The Shore Battalion of the 593d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, the Naval

Beach Party, and other elements of the

Shore Party quickly organized the landing

beach. Matting was laid on the beach so

that wheeled vehicles could find traction,

dispersal areas were located and cleared on

the south side of Kamiri Drome, supplies

were sent off the beach to these dumps, shell

holes were filled in, and Japanese supplies

piled up out of the way. Some of the 27th

Engineers participated in these Shore Party

activities while other elements of the battalion moved inland with the infantrymen

to supply flame thrower teams for mopping

up operations. The rest of the battalion,

working under the direction of Headquarters, No. 62 Works Wing, began repairs

on Kamiri Drome, pending the arrival of

the rest of the Australian engineer unit and

American engineer aviation battalions.30

29

 CTF 77 Noemfoor Opns Rpt, pp. 11-13, 15, 20;

CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 9; 158th Inf Opns Rpt

Noemfoor, 22 Jun-31 Aug 44, p. 2; 27th Engr Bn

(C) Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 1; Maj Robert M.

Luby, op. cit.; 593d EB&SR Opns Rpt Noemfoor,

pp. 2-3, in binder entitled 3d ESB Opns Rpt,

Jul 44.

30

 27th Engr Bn (C), Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 2;

593d EB&SR Opns Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 3, 5; Noemfoor Opns Hist of No. 62 Airfield Construction
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 411

Despite extensive enemy defensive preparations in the Kamiri Drome area, the

CYCLONE Task Force's losses on D Day were

only 3 men killed (1 accidentally), 19

wounded, and 2 injured. This is a tribute to

the heavy air and naval bombardment,

which succeeded in driving most of the

Japanese away from the beach or keeping

those that remained pinned down as the

assault waves moved ashore. The Japanese

suffered much more heavily. About 115

were killed or found dead and 3 were

captured.31

The CYCLONE Task Force had expected

to meet about 3,000 of the enemy, most of

whom were considered combat troops. By

evening on D Day, the task force had put

ashore over 7,000 men, nearly all of them,

including the 3,300 of the 158th Infantry,

classed as combat troops.32 So far, there had

been no evidence of organized resistance

and few Japanese had been located or observed. In the evening, however, General

Patrick concluded that 3,500 to 4,500 Japanese combat troops were on Noemfoor and

that the enemy garrison totaled about 5,000

men. This new estimate was apparently

based upon the evidence of a Japanese prisoner who had heard that 3,000 Japanese

infantry reinforcements had arrived on

Noemfoor about 25 June. The prisoner admittedly had not seen any of these troops

and his information was either uncorroborated or flatly contradicted by two other

prisoners and a recovered Javanese slave

laborer.33

Since little organized resistance had been

encountered, plans for 3 July were to institute patrolling designed to locate the main

body of Colonel Shimizu's Noemfoor Detachment. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 158th

Infantry, were to continue eastward toward

Kornasoren Drome. These units began moving at 0900 on the 3d. The 3d Battalion was

temporarily delayed at a mine field which

the 27th Engineers cleared, but advanced

over 1,800 yards by late afternoon. A number of well-prepared defensive positions,

situated both to defend the beach and prevent lateral movement between Kamiri and

Kornasoren Dromes, were found, but none

was manned by the Japanese. On the west

flank the 1st Battalion patrolled south of

the Kamiri River but located only a few

enemy stragglers. By the day's end the 158th

Infantry had lost only 2 men wounded and

1 injured, while 14 Japanese had been

killed.34

While the 158th Infantry had been expanding the beachhead, American paratroopers began to drop on Kamiri Drome

Wing, p. 1. No. 62 Works Wing's designation was

changed late in July to No. 62 Airfield Construction Wing. 31

 CyTF G-3 Per Rpts, 23 Jun-31 Jul 44; 158th

Inf Jnl and Jnl file, 22 Jun-31 Aug 44; 1st Bn

158th Inf, Rpt entitled: Oriental Obliteration—

A Japanese Night Attack, covering the period 2-5

Jul 44, p. 1, filed with other 158th Inf materials

concerning Noemfoor; 158th Inf Opns Rpt Noemfoor, 22 Jun-31 Aug 44, p. 2. Losses of the 158th

Inf were 1 killed, 11 wounded, and 2 injured; the

rest of the casualties were apparently suffered by

27th Engrs or 2d ESB units. Of the Japanese dead,

it appears that not many more than 60 were killed

by the 158th Inf. 32

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Daily Rpt 200, 2 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-4 Jnl Noemfoor, 27 May-8 Jul 44; 158th

Inf FO 1, 26 Jun 44, in 158th Inf Jnl file, 22 Jun31 Aug 44; ALAMO Force FO 19, 21 Jun 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 25 Jun 44.

33

 Rads, CyTF to ALAMO, NF-248, NF-249, and

NF-252, 2 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor,

30 Jun-3 Jul 44, and in CyTF Out-Msg file, 22

Jun-31 Aug 44. Where one file gave a garbled or

incomplete version, the other was used as a check.

The first of these radios was dispatched at 1859 and

the last about 2030. They were received at ALAMO

Force between 2355, 2 Jul, and 0455, 3 Jul. 34

 CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 11; 158th Inf

Opns Rpt Noemfoor, 22 Jun-31 Aug 44, p. 2; CTF

77 Noemfoor Opns Rpt, pp. 15-16.
412 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

to reinforce the CYCLONE Task Force. This

reinforcing operation was to have tragic results for the airborne soldiers.

Ordering the 503d Parachute

Infantry Forward

One of the missions assigned to the

CYCLONE Task Force had been to secure

a suitable dropping ground for paratroopers.

From study of maps and aerial photographs

before the landing, General Patrick had decided that he would use Kamiri Drome if

that field were found reasonably free of shell

holes and other obstacles. Examination of

the ground on the morning of the landing

confirmed General Patrick's decision and at

1028, three minutes after he assumed command ashore, he radioed to General Krueger

that Kamiri Drome was a satisfactory dropping ground.35

At 1115 General Patrick dispatched another radio to General Krueger recommending that the 503d Parachute Infantry be

sent forward to Noemfoor and dropped on

Kamiri Drome. General Patrick gave the

following reasons for requesting reinforcements: ". . . to guard against unknown

situation as to enemy strength and to speed

up operation on island."

 36

 This radio was

decoded at ALAMO Force headquarters at

1410.37 Twenty minutes later the 503d

Parachute Infantry received verbal instructions from ALAMO Force's advance headquarters at Hollandia to the effect that one

battalion of the regiment was to drop on

Noemfoor on 3 July and that the other two

battalions would drop on the succeeding

two days.38

This drop plan meant that it would be

midmorning of 5 July before all the 2,000-

odd men of the 503d Parachute Infantry

could reach Noemfoor. The other ALAMO

Force Reserve for Noemfoor—the 34th Infantry, 24th Division, at Biak—was assembled on the beach at Biak Island on the

afternoon of 30 June and could load for

Overwater movement to Noemfoor on less

than twenty-four hours' notice. LCI's taking the 34th Infantry to Noemfoor could

cover the 75-80 nautical miles from the

beach at Mokmer Drome, Biak, to the reef

off Kamiri Drome, Noemfoor, in not more

than nine hours.39 Figured from 1115 on 2

July, when General Patrick first asked for

reinforcements, the 2,700 men of the 34th

Infantry could have reached Noemfoor not

later than 2000 hours on the 3d. By that

time, in accordance with the air reinforcement plan, only one battalion of less than

750 men of the 503d Parachute Infantry

would be on the island.

General Patrick's request for paratroop

reinforcements and ALAMO Force's speedy

acquiescence and subsequent orders to the

503d Parachute Infantry probably surprised no one. Apparently, the parachute

35

 CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 10; Ltr, Comdr

CyTF to Comdr ALAMO Force, 7 Jul 44, no sub, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 31 Jul-6 Aug 44; Rad,

CyTF to ALAMO, NF-223, 2 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul 44. The letter of 7

July states that on D-Day morning a paratroop

officer of the Canadian Army, who was an observer

at Noemfoor, advised General Patrick that Kamiri

Drome was a suitable dropping ground. 36

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO, NF-228, 2 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul 44. 37

 The time of decoding is from a notation on the

copy of NF-228 in the ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor,

30 Jun-3 Jul 44.

38

 503d Prcht Inf Opns Rot Noemfoor, p.. 2. 39

 Rad, ALAMO to CTF 77 and CTF 76, WF-1172,

28 Jun 44, and Rad, CTF 76 to ALAMO, 29 Jun 44,

both in ALAMO G-2 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 16 Jun-10

Jul 44; Rad, ALAMO to HTF, WH-1426, 30 Jun

44; Rad, HTF to ALAMO, TD-1239, 30 Jun 44;

Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 ALAMO to ACofS G-3

ALAMO, 30 Jun 44, sub: Proposed Plans for Reinforcement of CYCLONE Task Force. Last three docs

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul 44.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 413

unit was to have been sent to Noemfoor unless General Patrick was strongly opposed

to its movement; only the 1115 radio from

the CYCLONE Task Force was awaited before the machinery for the movement

started. In fact, the 503d Parachute Infantry had known at least as early as 1615 on

1 July—the day before D Day—that one

battalion of the regiment was to drop on

Noemfoor on 3 July. Orders to that effect

had been sent to the regimental command

post at Hollandia during the afternoon of 1

July by the ALAMO Force G-3 section.40 The

only alteration in plans made necessary by

the receipt of jump orders at 1430 on 2 July

Was to change the dropping ground. The

503d had expected to jump at Kornasoren

Drome, but now it had to restudy available

information in preparation for the drop on

Kamiri Drome.41

The 503d Parachute Infantry

Drops at Noemfoor

About 0515 on 3 July regimental headquarters and the 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, began loading at Cyclops

Drome, Hollandia, on thirty-eight C-47's of

the 54th Troop Carrier Wing, Fifth Air

Force. At the same time, three B-17's, from

which supplies and ammunition were to be

dropped on Kamiri Drome, were loaded.

The first C-47 took off from Cyclops Drome

at 0630, and by 0747 all forty-one planes

were in the air. The commanding officer of

the parachute regiment, Col. George M.

Jones, and most of his staff were in the lead

C-47. The planes were to fly over Kamiri

Drome in flights of two each, the first plane

at a height of 400 feet and the second echeloned slightly to the right rear at 450 feet.

Subsequent flights were to follow at a distance of 300 yards.42

About 0600 on the 3d, almost twenty

hours after he had been advised on the

point by a paratroop officer, General Patrick

radioed to ALAMO Force that it would be

wise if the C-47's flew over Kamiri Drome

in single file.43 He made this recommendation because he feared that the falling paratroopers might suffer casualties if they

landed on obstacles along the sides of the

narrow airfield, which comprised a 250 by

5,500-foot cleared area and a 100-foot-wide

runway. The radio was received at Headquarters, ALAMO Force, about 0740 but apparently was not delivered to the G-3 Section until 0915. Sometime between 0740

and 0915 the radio was passed to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, by the ALAMO Force

message center.44 By then, the troop-carry40

 Entry timed 1615, 1 Jul 44, in 503d Prcht Inf

Jnl, 29 Jun-29 Aug 44. 41

 503d Prcht Inf FO 1, 28 Jun 44, in 503d Prcht

Inf S-3 Rpt Noemfoor.

42

 503d Prcht Inf Jnl, 29 Jun-29 Aug 44; 503d

Prcht Inf Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 2; 5thAF OI 3,

22 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Jun 44; Noemfoor

Air Plan, atchd to CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor; 503d

Prcht Inf FO 1, 28 Jun 44, in 503d Prcht Inf S-3

Rpt Noemfoor; Ltr, Col Jones to Gen Ward, 22

Nov 50, in OCMH files. 43

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO (for 5th AF), NF-253, 3

Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul

44 and in CyTF In-Msg file, 22 Jun-10 Jul 44; Ltr,

Comdr CyTF to Comdr ALAMO, 7 Jul 44, no sub,

in ALAMO G-3 Noemfoor, 31 Jul-6 Aug 44. According to the CyTF In-Msg file, NF-253 originated at

0600, but the ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl notation says

it originated at 0603. In the letter of 7 July, the

CyTF commander stated that at midmorning of 2

July the Canadian Army paratroop officer advised

him that the troop-carrying aircraft should fly over

Kamiri Drome in single file. 44

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO (for 5thAF), NF-253, 3

Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul

44. A penciled notation on the ALAMO Force G-3

Jnl copy of this radio states: "Passed by Msg Ctr to

5thAF," but no time is given for this passing. The

time of receipt of the radio at the ALAMO Force G-3

Sec is noted on the index sheet to the ALAMO G-3

Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul 44. The dimensions of
PARATROOPERS LANDING ON NOEMFOOR. Note equipment along the airstrip.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 415

ing planes were airborne and well on their

way to Noemfoor.

No attempt seems to have been made to

establish radio contact with the 54th Troop

Carrier Wing's C-47's to effect the desired

change in formation. Whether such an

eleventh-hour alteration could have been

made is a difficult question. Last-minute attempts to change plans might have created

confusion which could have delayed or

postponed the parachute drop. Moreover,

the radio traffic necessary to effect the

change might have brought every Japanese

plane within range of Noemfoor over that

island. In any case, no change in formation

was made, and the thirty-eight C-47's flew

into sight of Kamiri Drome about 1000. Ten

minutes later, the 'troopers from the leading

C-47 were on the ground, followed closely

by the men in the neighboring plane.

Contrary to plans, the first two C-47's

flew over the strip at a height of about 175

feet, and the next eight planes all flew below 400 feet. Dropping from this low altitude caused the paratroopers in the first ten

C-47's to suffer many casualties; more

casualties resulted because the planes flew

over the strip two abreast. The broad formation caused many 'troopers to land off the

southern edge of the 100-foot-wide runway

in an area where Allied vehicles, bulldozers,

supply dumps, and wrecked Japanese aircraft were located. Additional hazards beyond the cleared area were jagged tree

stumps, trees partially destroyed by preassault air and naval bombardments, and a

number of antiaircraft gun emplacements.

Altogether, there were 72 casualties among

the 739 men who dropped on 3 July. Included in this number—a rate of almost 10

percent—were 31 severe fracture cases,

most of whom would never again be able to

make a parachute jump.45

The first reports of the 3 July jump received by ALAMO Force stated that there had

been only 1 percent casualties during the

drop.46 Later information, received at Hollandia about 0200 on the 4th, raised that

rate to 6.7 percent.47

 But even before these

reports began to filter back to Hollandia,

the 503d Parachute Infantry was informed

that another battalion was to drop on 4

July.48 In preparation for this second jump,

General Krueger instructed General Patrick

to make sure that the edges of Kamiri

Drome were clear of vehicles and the 54th

Troop Carrier Wing was ordered to fly its

C-47's in single file over the airfield.49

Kamiri Drome are from ALAMO Force, G-2 Photo

Int Sec, Rpt 135, 13 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44.

45

 503d Prcht Inf Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 2; 503d

Prcht Inf Jnl, 29 Jun-29 Aug 44; Rad, CyTF to

ALAMO, NF-275, 3 Jul 44, in CyTF In-Msg file, 22

Jun-10 Jul 44; Rpt, Board of Officers to Comdr

CyTF, 7 Jul 44, sub: Report of Investigation by

Board of Officers on Casualties Resulting from Parachute Drops on 3-4 Jul 1944, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Noemfoor, 10-16 Jul 44; Ltr, Jones to Ward, 22

Nov 50. The Board of Officers comprised Lt Col

John J. Tolson (Inf), Executive Officer of the 503d

Parachute Infantry, acting as president of the board;

Lt Col Francis L. DePasquale (MC), of Headquarters, CYCLONE Task Force; and Maj Franklin E.

Carpenter (FA), of Headquarters, Sixth Army

(ALAMO Force). The board was convened on 7 Jul

by CyTF SO 4, 7 Jul 44. 46

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO, NF-265, 3 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul 44. 47

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO, NF-275, 3 Jul 44, in

CyTF In-Msg file, 22 Jun-10 Jul 44 and in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 4-6 Jul 44. Time of receipt

stated in the text is taken from the copy of NF-275

in the ALAMO Force Journal. 48

 503d Prcht Inf Jnl, 29 Jun-29 Aug 44; Rads,

ALAMO to CyTF, 5thAF, TF 77, et al., WH-424

and WH-425, 3 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 30 Jun-3 Jul 44. 49

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO, NF-275, 3 Jul 44, in

CyTF In-Msg file, 22 Jun-10 Jul 44; Bd of Off Rpt

to Comdr CyTF, 7 Jul 44; Rad, ALAMO to CyTF

and 5thAF, WH-426, 3 Jul 44, in CyTF In-Msg file,

22 Jun-10 Jul 44.
416 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

At 0955 on the 4th the 3d Battalion, 503d

Parachute Infantry, and the rest of regimental headquarters began dropping on

Kamiri Drome; by 1025 the 685 men of this

echelon were on the ground. This time all the

C-47's flew at a height of at least 400 feet

in single file formation, and, although the

flight pattern of five to seven planes was not

entirely satisfactory, nearly all the 'troopers

landed on the airstrip.50

Even with the new precautions there were

56 jump casualties, a rate of over 8 percent.

Most of the injuries on the second drop were

attributed to the hard coral surface of

Kamiri Drome, on which considerable grading, rolling, and packing had been accomplished since the morning of 3 July. So far,

1,424 officers and men of the 503d Parachute Infantry had dropped at Noemfoor.

There had been 128 jump casualties, a final

rate of 8.98 percent, among them 59 serious

fracture cases. There had been no casualties

from enemy action. The parachute regiment

had lost the services of one battalion commander, three company commanders, the

regimental communications officer, and a

number of key noncommissioned officers.51

Colonel Jones, the regimental commander, considered that injuries had been

excessive on both the 3d and 4th of July,

and he therefore requested General Patrick

to arrange for water shipment of the remaining battalion.52

 The task force commander agreed that no more drops should

be attempted, but he suggested to ALAMO

Force that the remainder of the regiment

be brought forward by air as soon as Kamiri

Drome was sufficiently repaired to receive

C-47's. With these recommendations, General Krueger agreed.53

 However, torrential

rains and a shortage of heavy equipment at

Noemfoor combined to keep the airfield inoperational longer than had been expected.

Finally the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute

Infantry, was flown from Hollandia to Mokmer Drome on Biak. Disembarking from

C-47's at Mokmer, the 'troopers moved

aboard LCI's for the trip to Noemfoor,

which they reached on 11 July.54

The Occupation of Noemfoor Island

Possibly the only valuable result of the

parachute drop was that mopping-up operations on Noemfoor could begin sooner than

might otherwise have been possible. The 1st

Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, upon

its arrival on 3 July, assumed responsibility

for about 2,000 yards in the center of the

defenses around Kamiri Drome, thus permitting the 2d and 3d Battalions, 158th Infantry, to concentrate at the eastern end of

the field and extend the perimeter. The 3d

Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, when

it landed on 4 July, relieved elements of the

3d Battalion, 158th Infantry, as the latter

unit pushed east to Kornasoren Drome.55

50

 Bd of Off Rpt to Comdr CyTF, 7 Jul 44; 503d

Prcht Inf Jnl, 29 Jun-29 Aug 44; 503d Prcht Inf

Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 2; Rads, CyTF to ALAMO,

NF-291 and NF-302, 4 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Noemfoor, 4-6 Jul 44. 51

 Bd of Off Rpt to Comdr CyTF, 7 Jul 44;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 11. 52

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO (CO 503d Prcht Inf

to Rear Ech, 503d Prcht Inf), NF-307, 4 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 4-6 Jul 44.

53

 Rad, CyTF to ALAMO, NF-302, 4 Jul 44, and

Rad, ALAMO to CyTF, WH-618, 5 Jul 44, both in

CyTF In-Msg file, 22 Jun-10 Jul 44. 54

 503d Prcht Inf Jnl, 29 Jun-29 Aug 44; Rad,

CyTF to ALAMO and 5thAF, NF-399, in CyTF G-3

Jnl, 30 Jun-6 Jul 44; Rad, ALAMO to HTF, WH1023, 7 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-10

Jul 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 11. 55

 503d Prcht Inf Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 2;

CyTF G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun-6 Jul 44.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 417

Hill 201

The 3d Battalion, 158th Infantry, moving

eastward along the coastal road, encountered no opposition on 4 July.56

 The battalion found a number of well-prepared, but

abandoned, enemy defensive positions along

both sides of the road, and the entire area

around Kornasoren Drome and the village

of Kornasoren was discovered to be mined

in a haphazard fashion, principally with

200-pound aerial bombs, many of which

were incompletely buried. The infantry

unit had little difficulty picking its way

through the mine fields, which the engineers

rapidly cleared. At evening on the 4th, the

battalion dug in at the eastern end of Kornasoren Drome. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion (less Company A) had crossed the

Kamiri River by LVT and LCM and occupied Kamiri village without opposition.

Out of Kamiri, the battalion followed a

road leading southeast to a large Japanese

garden area 1,700 yards distant. The battalion's leading elements began approaching

a terrain feature designated Hill 201, in the

western section of the garden area, about

1330. So far, only scattered rifle fire had opposed the march from Kamiri village.

The Japanese garden area was about 600

yards long, east and west, and 350 yards

across, north to south. The ground was devoid of large trees except for a few atop Hill

201, but thick, secondary jungle growth covered the eastern and southern slopes of the

hill, while the rest of the garden area was

overgrown with partially cultivated papaya,

taro, and cassava, all averaging about eight

feet in height. The trail from Kamiri village

passed over the southern slope of Hill 201,

and 300 yards away, near the eastern edge

of the gardens, joined the main road from

Kamiri Drome to Namber Drome, located

about six miles to the south. Another trail

ran along the eastern side of the hill, branching to the north and northwest at the northeastern corner of the low terrain feature.

As the 1st Battalion approached the western side of Hill 201, a small group of Japanese, heavily armed and carrying packs,

was seen hurrying south along the main road

below the hill. Fearing that Hill 201 might

be occupied in some force, the battalion

commander halted the advance and prepared a double envelopment, to be supported by heavy machine guns from positions west of the hill and south of the

Kamiri-garden trail. First, Company C

seized a knoll called Hill 180, lying 300

yards north of the gardens. Then Company

B surprised a Japanese platoon in a mangrove swamp at the southwest corner of the

garden area and pushed the Japanese southeast over Mission Hill, a low terrain feature

lying east of the main road and southeast of

Hill 201. With the ground on both flanks

of Hill 201 secured, the battalion, at 1515,

began concentrating around the hilltop for

the night, setting up a tight defensive

perimeter.

Company C protected the northern and

eastern slopes; Company B was on the south

and southeast; and Company D, together

with battalion headquarters and headquarters company, dug in along the western

slope. One heavy machine gun was sighted

to cover a trail leading up the southern slope

of the hill from the mangrove swamp, and

a section of heavies was emplaced to fire on

the main road and Hill 170, 600 yards east

56

 This subsection is based principally on: CyTF

Hist Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 11-12; 158th Inf Opns Rpt

Noemfoor, 22 Jun-31 Aug 44, p. 3; 1st Bn 158th

Inf, Oriental Obliteration Rpt, pp. 2-10; CyTF

G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun-6 Jul 44; CyTF G-3 Per Rpts, 23

Jun-31 Jul 44; 158th Inf Jnl and Jnl file, 22 Jun-31

Aug 44.
418 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

of Hill 201. Company D's 81-mm. mortars

registered on the edge of the mangrove

swamp and on the trail to Kamiri at the

point at which that trail entered the garden

area. Three guns of an attached platoon of

4.2-inch mortars (641st Tank Destroyer

Battalion) registered on the eastern slopes

of Hill 180, on a trail leading north past

that hill, and on a target area on the main

road to Kamiri Drome at the point where

the road entered the north edge of the garden. A battery of the 147th Field Artillery

Battalion's 105-mm. howitzers, emplaced

near Kamiri Drome, registered along the

main road through the gardens, on the west

side of Hill 170, and on Mission Hill, where

the main road left the garden area. By 1800,

with the accompanying hazard of occasional

rifle fire from hidden Japanese, all defensive preparations were completed. Moonset

was at 0500 on the 5th, and the battalion

commander called his men's attention to the

danger of a Japanese attack between that

hour and first light. The warning was well

taken.

About 0430 a few Japanese were heard

moving around at the northeast edge of the

perimeter. Near the same time, more enemy

approached Hill 201 from Mission Hill and

through the mangrove swamp south of the

perimeter. At 0520, without the warning of

preparatory fire, Japanese infantry began

pressing forward all along the southern and

southeastern sides of the perimeter. As the

attack started, some enemy light mortars

began firing, but all the shells from these

weapons landed about 200 yards west of

Hill 201. As soon as the enemy attack began,

the 1st Battalion requested that the prearranged artillery and mortar concentrations

be fired. The battalion's 81-mm. mortars

immediately began throwing shells into the

mangrove swamp and along the trail approaching Hill 201 from the south. Cries of

wounded or dying Japanese attested to the

effectiveness of these fires, and the enemy

was driven off the trail into the secondgrowth jungle and overgrown gardens.

Now, two Japanese light machine guns

opened up, one from the western slope of

Hill 170 and another from Mission Hill.

Both these weapons were firing from positions on which the 147th Field Artillery

Battalion had previously registered. They

were quickly put out of action.

Some Japanese managed to get through

the mortar and artillery barrages and continued up the sides of the trail from the south

through fire from Company D's machine

guns. The enemy found cover behind a low,

150-yard-long log fence which led from the

southeast toward the center of the 1st Battalion's defenses. While the fence afforded

some protection, the attacking infantrymen

were silhouetted as they tried to clamber

over the top. The main body of the attacking force therefore kept down behind the

fence, trying to crawl along it to the top of

the hill. But the fence did not extend beyond

the 1st Battalion's outer defenses and the attackers soon found themselves debouching

into steady machine gun and rifle fire from

the defenders atop the hill. The attack soon

degenerated into a series of small suicide

charges by groups of three to six Japanese,

all of whom were cut down as they tried to

climb the fence or move beyond its end. By

0630 the last enemy efforts had ceased and

all firing had stopped.

The 1st Battalion now sent patrols out

over the battlefield. From prisoners it was

determined that the attacking force had consisted of 350 to 400 men—the 10th and 12th

Companies, 219th Infantry, reinforced by

approximately 150 armed Formosan laborers. During the morning over 200 dead
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 419

Japanese were counted around the 1st Battalion's perimeter, and the number of

enemy dead found or enemy wounded captured on subsequent days along trails leading south from the hill indicated that virtually the entire original attacking force had

been annihilated.

Mopping Up

At Hill 201, the Noemfoor Detachment

made its only significant offensive effort, and

after that affair operations on Noemfoor

evolved into a series of patrol actions as the

Allied forces extended their control over the

island and rapidly expanded the airdrome

facilities.57 On 5 July, the 1st Battalion,

158th Infantry, mopped up the garden area,

while the 3d Battalion patrolled in northeastern Noemfoor, finding no Japanese. The

2d Battalion, relieved at Kamiri Drome by

the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry,

started preparing for an amphibious landing

at Namber Drome, on the southwest coast.

This operation got under way about 0900

on 6 July. LCM's of Company A, 543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, moved

the 2d Battalion, 158th Infantry, from

Kamiri Drome to the north side of Roemboi

Bay, at the lower end of Namber Drome.

The Support Battery, 2d Engineer Special

Brigade, covered the landing with antiaircraft boats, and three destroyers and a

rocket-equipped LCI were also on hand.

Following a short naval bombardment,

which was accompanied by bombing and

strafing by six B-25's, the 2d Battalion

poured ashore without opposition. Namber

Drome was secured by 1240, not a shot having been fired by the 2d Battalion and not a

single casualty having been suffered. Fifteen

minutes after Namber Drome was taken, a

liaison plane of the 147th Field Artillery

Battalion landed on the strip.

From 7 through 10 July vigorous patrolling by all elements of the CYCLONE Task

Force was continued, but only small Japanese parties were encountered. The conclusion was therefore reached that no organized

large enemy force remained on Noemfoor

and that future operations would consist

of hunting down small enemy groups. For

the latter purpose, it was decided to divide

the island into two parts, making the 503d

Parachute Infantry responsible for the

southern section and the 158th Infantry for

the northern.

Regrouping of units according to this

plan started on 11 July, when the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, reached

Namber Drome from Biak, via LCI's. During the next day or so the 158th Infantry

reconcentrated in northern Noemfoor. The

regiment's activity to 31 August was confined to extensive patrolling, which produced contacts only with small groups of

enemy stragglers. To the end of August the

regiment killed 611 Japanese, captured 179,

and liberated 209 Javanese slave laborers.

During its operations on Noemfoor, the

158th Infantry lost 6 men killed and 41

wounded.

To the 503d Parachute Infantry fell the

task of mopping up the remnants of the

Noemfoor Detachment, which, after the

abortive attack at Hill 201, concentrated

in southern Noemfoor. The largest organized group of Japanese (400-500 strong)

57

 Information in this subsection is from: CyTF

FO 3, 5 Jul 44, in CyTF G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun-6 Jul

44; CyTF G-3 Per Rpts, 23 Jun-31 Jul and 31 Jul31 Aug 44; CyTF G-3 Jnls, 7-10, 11-14, and 14-17

Jul 44; CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 12-16; 158th

Inf Opns Rpt Noemfoor, 22 Jun-31 Aug 44, pp.

3-5; 503d Prcht Inf Opns Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 3-4;

503d Prcht Inf S-3 Rpt, Noemfoor, n. p.; 2d Bn

503d Prcht Inf Opns Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 1-3.
420 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

gathered under Colonel Shimizu's command at Hill 670, in the west-central part

of the island about three miles northeast of

Namber Drome. The 1st Battalion, 503d

Parachute Infantry, made contact with this

enemy group on 13 July. Finally reaching

the top of Hill 670 on the morning of the

16th, the 'troopers found that the Japanese

had evacuated the hill the previous night.

Contact with the main body of Colonel

Shimizu's force was lost until 23 July, when

patrols of the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute

Infantry, located the group about four miles

northwest of Inasi, a native village on the

shore of the lagoon which cuts into Noemfoor's eastern coast.58

 Contact was again

lost on the 25th and not regained until 10

August, when the main Japanese force was

found near Hill 380, two and a half miles

south-southwest of Inasi. From the 10th

through the 15th, the 3d Battalion, 503d

Parachute Infantry, supported by the 147th

Field Artillery Battalion and a few B-25's

of the 309th Bomb Wing, converged on Hill

380. At the same time, elements of the 1st

Battalion moved toward the hill from

Menoekwari South to prevent enemy escape. Though boxed in by the bulk of five

companies of the 503d Parachute Infantry,

Colonel Shimizu, during the night of 15-16

August, slipped through the cordon around

Hill 380 and withdrew his remaining force,

now not much over 200 men strong, southsouthwest toward Pakriki, on the southcentral coast.

Colonel Shimizu's party was not again

located until 17 August, when two brisk

engagements resulted in the capture or destruction of the last machine guns left to the

Noemfoor Detachment and broke the last

organized resistance. At least 20 Japanese

were killed, bringing to 342 the total of Japanese killed in the series of actions southwest

from Inasi to Pakriki during the period 10

through 17 August. In the same week, 43

Japanese were captured. Colonel Shimizu

was not among those killed or captured, and

was at large at the end of the month.

On 23 August the 503d Parachute Infantry, less three companies, began concentrating at a new camp near Kamiri Drome. The

three companies, which had been left in the

southern part of the island to continue patrolling, were finally relieved on the 27th by

elements of the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry. According to one report, the last paratroopers left the southern section of Noemfoor with some regrets:

As the troops left the area in which they

had chased SHIMIZU so relentlessly, their

disappointment was not so much at their failure to apprehend SHIMIZU the man, nor

even to capture the regimental colors of the

219th Infantry. It was rather that they missed

their chance of retrieving the colonel's 300

year old saber which prisoners said he still

carried when last seen near PAKRIKI. When

the operation officially closed on 31 August

this same saber was still inducing the most

vigorous patrolling by the 1st Battalion, 158th

Infantry.59

By 31 August, when General Krueger declared the Noemfoor operation over, the

CYCLONE Task Force had lost 63 men killed,

58 For heroic action and signal leadership on 23

July, Sgt. Ray E. Eubanks, a squad leader of Company D, 503d Parachute Infantry (Company D was

in the 2d Battalion), was awarded the Congressional

Medal of Honor. Leading his squad to the relief of

a platoon isolated by the Japanese, Sgt. Eubanks

was wounded and his rifle rendered useless by Japanese fire. He continued to lead his squad forward,

using his rifle as a club. By this means he killed four

more Japanese before he himself was again hit and

killed.

59

 CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 16. There is no

indication in available records that either Shimizu

or his saber was ever found.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 421

343 wounded, and 3 missing. Approximately 1,730 Japanese had been killed and

186 were captured. Most of the Allied casualties were suffered by the 503d Parachute

Infantry during its clashes with the Noemfoor Detachment in southern Noemfoor

after 11 July, and the regiment can claim

credit for killing about 1,000 Japanese. In

addition to the Japanese losses, 1 Korean,

1 Chinese, and 552 Formosan prisoners of

war were taken. Finally, 403 Javanese slave

laborers were recovered on the island.60

Base Development on Noemfoor

Civil Affairs and Atrocities

For the purpose of supervising the civil

population of Noemfoor, a Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) Detachment was attached to the CYCLONE Task

Force, just as NICA parties had been attached to previous Allied task forces operations in Dutch New Guinea.61

 Initially,

the Noemfoor NICA Detachment consisted

of 4 officers and 35 enlisted men, but it was

later augmented by 10 local policemen recovered on the island. The detachment assisted in obtaining intelligence information,

recruited and supervised native labor, and

administered the native population. Only

400 of the total native population of some

5,000 were ever used as laborers, the rest

being either women or children or men too

old or too ill to work.

The Japanese had never brought the

Melanesians of Noemfoor entirely under

their control, for the natives had either

offered a passive resistance or had faded into

the interior to live off the land. A few were

impressed into service by the Japanese, while

others who were captured but still refused

to co-operate were executed. The natives

greeted the Allied landings with great enthusiasm and came out of hideaways in the

hills carrying Dutch flags which they had

concealed from the Japanese. Under the direction of NICA, the natives were gradually

resettled in their old villages, where they

were protected by CYCLONE Task Force outposts. Late in July the village chiefs gathered in formal council and officially declared

war on the Japanese. Thereafter, native cooperation increased. Up to 31 August the

natives had captured and brought to Allied

outposts more than fifty Japanese and had

killed an equal number.

One tale of horror concerns the Javanese

on Noemfoor. According to information

gathered by the NICA Detachment, over

3,000 Indonesians were shipped to Noemfoor in late 1943, mostly from Soerabaja and

other large cities on Java. The shipment

included many women, children, and teenaged boys. The Japanese, without regard to

age or sex, put the Javanese to work constructing roads and airfields almost entirely

by hand. Little or no clothing, shoes, bedding, or shelter was provided, and the Javanese had to supplement their very inadequate allowance of rations by shifting for

themselves. Driven by hunger, many attempted to steal Japanese rations but for

their pains were beheaded or hung by their

hands or feet until dead. Starvation and disease (the Japanese provided no medical

60

 CyTF G-3 Per Rpts, 31 Jul-31 Aug 44; ALAMO

Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 19; CyTF Hist Rpt

Noemfoor, pp. 16-17. 61

 This subsection is based principally on: ALAMO

Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 19; CyTF Hist Rpt

Noemfoor, pp. 21-22. Specific evidence concerning

atrocities (in addition to the general outlines provided by the foregoing documents) is to be found

in messages and other documents in the G-3 Journals of ALAMO Force and the CYCLONE Task Force,

as well as in the journals of the 503d Parachute

and 158th Infantry Regiments.
422 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

care) took a steadily increasing toll. The

dead were periodically collected for mass

burial, and survivors alleged that many of

the sick were buried alive. It was considered

probable that not more than ten or fifteen

Javanese were killed accidentally by Allied

forces. Yet only 403 of the 3,000-odd

brought from Java were found alive on

Noemfoor by 31 August. The physical condition of these survivors almost defied description—most of the others had succumbed to Japanese brutality within a

period of eight months.

The story of Formosan labor troops

brought to Noemfoor, ostensibly as part of

the Japanese armed forces, is also tragic.

Originally the Formosans had numbered

about 900 men. They had been worked for

months on airfield and road construction, on

half the ration of rice issued to the regular

Japanese troops. When they collapsed from

exhaustion or hunger, or became victims of

tropical diseases, they were herded into what

the Japanese euphemistically called a labor

convalescent camp, actually a sort of prison

stockade into which the Formosans were

placed to die. There, their rations were

again cut in half, and the shelter and blankets provided covered but a fraction of the

inmates. Medical care was given only to the

worse cases, and then was inadequate. Upon

the arrival of Allied forces on Noemfoor,

most of the remaining Formosans were

rounded up, armed, and forced to fight. But

these attempts at compulsion were fruitless.

Over 550 Formosans voluntarily surrendered to the Allies, more than half of them

suffering from starvation and tropical diseases. Not more than twenty had been killed

by Allied action, but about 300 had died

before 2 July.

To complete the story of the dire straits

to which the Japanese on Noemfoor had

been reduced, it is necessary to tell of cannibalism. About 1 August CYCLONE Task

Force patrols began to discover Japanese

bodies from which portions of flesh had

been cut. Initially, this was not considered

direct evidence of cannibalism, although increasing numbers of bodies with fleshy portions removed were later found. Finally,

some American dead, left outside defensive

positions overnight, were discovered in like

condition. The prisoners began to report

that cannibalism had been generally practiced since 1 August, principally on freshlykilled Formosans. Some prisoners admitted

eating human flesh themselves. In at least

one instance a two-day-old cadaver had

been used for food.

Construction and Unloading

Airfield construction on Noemfoor Island

began on D Day, 2 July, when elements of

the 27th Engineers used improvised drags

and rollers rigged behind six-by-six trucks to

start grading Kamiri Drome. This work continued until the afternoon of 4 July when,

in the opinion of the task force engineer,

Group Captain Dale, the strip was ready to

receive a few aircraft. But because of bad

weather and existing plans for parachute

drops, no planes used the strip until the

afternoon of 6 July, when an Australian P-40

squadron landed to remain for future

operations.62

It was not until 16 July that sufficient

facilities were completed at Kamiri Drome

to accommodate an entire fighter group.

Ultimately, the 1874th Engineer Aviation

Battalion and No. 5 Mobile Works Squad62

 27th Engrs Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 2; ALAMO

Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 13; Rad, CyTF to

ALAMO, NF-454, 7 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-10 Jul 44.
OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 423

ron of No. 62 Works Wing extended the

Kamiri runway to 5,400 feet. Sufficient taxiways and aircraft dispersal facilities for the

two groups of fighters were also completed.

All except maintenance work on the field

was finished on 9 September.63

At first, it had been planned to improve

Namber Drome, and some work started

there immediately after the field was secured. But Group Captain Dale, finding the

site rough and badly graded, recommended

that Namber be abandoned in favor of

Kornasoren, although he realized that this

would increase construction needs at the

latter field. General Krueger approved the

new plan and preliminary surveys were immediately begun at Kornasoren. Plans were

made to construct there two parallel runways 7,000 feet long, with correspondingly

large taxiways and dispersal areas.64

On 14 July, General MacArthur directed

that by 25 July minimum facilities would

have to be prepared at Kornasoren Drome

to accommodate fifty P-38's in order to

provide additional air cover for the impending invasion of the Vogelkop Peninsula. Except for continuing work at Kamiri Drome,

all remaining engineer units, all available

heavy equipment, all service troops who

could possibly be spared from ship unloading, all available native labor, and large

numbers of combat troops were concentrated at Kornasoren Drome to complete

the necessary new construction on schedule.

For ten days all hands worked around the

clock and by 1200 on 25 July had completed

a 6,000-foot-long strip which, with associated dispersal facilities, could accommodate one fighter group. Two days later this

strip was extended to 7,000 feet, and the

second 7,000-foot runway was completed on

2 September.65

Ultimately, Allied aircraft based on

Noemfoor supported not only operations on

that island but also the invasions of the

Vogelkop Peninsula and Morotai Island.

Soon after Kornasoren Drome was completed, B-24's began flying from the field

to conduct the first large-scale bombing attacks on Japanese sources of petroleum

products at Balikpapan, Borneo.66

Ship unloading operations at Noemfoor

were hampered by the surrounding reefs,

but gradually, by the construction of jetties

or temporary ramps and by extensive demolitions at the outer edges of the reefs, the

difficulties attending supply operations were

reduced. Service troops and native labor

were both inadequate at Noemfoor, and

throughout the operation a daily average of

some 600 combat troops had to be used for

ship unloading, while others were used on

various construction projects.67

63

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, p. 15; No.

62 Airfield Constr Wing Noemfoor Opns Hist, p. 1. 64

 CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 20; ALAMO Force

Opns Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 13, 15-16; Rad, CyTF

to ALAMO, NF-669, 12 Jul 44, and Rad, CyTF to

ALAMO, NF-680, 13 Jul 44, last two in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Noemfoor, 10-16 Jul 44.

65

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, 5thAF, and

USASOS, CX-14883, 14 Jul 44, and Rad, ALAMO

to CyTF, WH-2255, 15 Jul 44, both in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Noemfoor, 10-16 Jul 44; CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, p. 20; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Noemfoor, pp.

15-16. 66

 27th Engr Constr Bn [a redesignation of 27th

Engr Bn (C)], "Going Hard: History of Overseas

War Service of 27th Engineer Construction Battalion," Dec 43-Oct 45, p. 17. The heavily loaded

B-24's (of the Thirteenth Air Force) were unable

to take off until high trees on the approaches to

Kornasoren Drome were cleared by the 161st Parachute Engineer Company, which had recently arrived at Noemfoor to form part of the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team, then being organized around the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. Ltr, Jones to Ward, 22 Nov 50. 67

 CyTF Hist Rpt Noemfoor, pp. 19-20; 27th

Engr Constr Bn, "Going Hard . , .," pp. 14-17.
424 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

The reefs at Noemfoor created another

hazard concerning which a classic remark

is attributed to Group Captain Dale. The

story goes that on D Day Group Captain

Dale, after striding up and down Kamiri

Drome to ascertain the extent of repairs necessary to that field, returned to his temporary command post, looked out to sea over

the reef, and said, "Bad show this—no

bloody place for a swim!"

 68

68

 This story, perhaps apocryphal, was heard by

the author when in the Southwest Pacific during

1944-46. A quotation from an unnumbered issue of

Ramp, the 3d Engr Special Brigade's newspaper,

cited in the 3d ESB's Opns Rpt for July 1944, provides essentially the same tale, without mentioning

names.

General Krueger closed the Noemfoor Operation

for historical records purposes on 31 August. On

6 September Brig. Gen. Hanford MacNider took

over command of the task force and the 158th RCT.

The island remained under ALAMO Force control

until 9 October, when it passed to the U. S. Eighth

Army. The 503d Parachute RCT moved from Noemfoor to Leyte, in the Philippines, in mid-November, and the 158th RCT left for Luzon in January

1945. By October, 1,957 Japanese had been killed

or found dead on Noemfoor and 247 had been captured, while 623 Formosans, 2 Koreans, and 1

Chinese were prisoners of war. These figures are

from ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 61, 4 Oct 44,

copy in G-2 DofA files.
CHAPTER XVIII

Airfields on the Vogelkop Peninsula

Strategically and tactically the most important result of the Noemfoor operation

was that airfield development on the island

permitted the Allied Air Forces to increase

slightly the breadth and depth of air penetration, bringing Japanese bases to the

southwest, west, and northwest within a little shorter range for fighters and bombers.1

The nearest of these bases were on the

Vogelkop Peninsula, and the Japanese

stronghold at Manokwari, at the northeast

corner of the Vogelkop, was less than 70

nautical miles west of Noemfoor.

Early Plans for the Vogelkop

General MacArthur's strategy for the

drive to the Philippines—successive occupation of air and supply bases along the north

coast of New Guinea—had from its inception envisaged the capture of an air-base

site on the western Vogelkop as the final

large-scale operation in New Guinea. From

such a base the Allied Air Forces could support subsequent operations to the northwest, either directly to Mindanao in the

southern Philippines, or if necessary via the

islands between the Vogelkop and Mindanao.2

Oil

While General MacArthur's planners

made many changes in their choice of specific objectives on the Vogelkop, by late

October 1943 they had determined to seize

the large Japanese troop and supply base at

Sorong, on a small island just off the peninsula's northwest shore. Simultaneously, airand naval-base sites would be secured on

Waigeo Island, about sixty miles northwest

of Sorong. Manokwari was not considered a

profitable target. From fields on the near-by

Geelvink Bay islands—such as Biak and

Noemfoor—Allied Air Forces planes could

accomplish virtually the same missions they

could from Manokwari, and from those

islands, which could be secured at less cost

than Manokwari, the Allied Air Forces

could easily keep inoperational Japanese air

and naval bases in the Manokwari area.

Since the Sorong-Waigeo area was within

support range of Allied land-based aircraft

flying from airdromes on the Geelvink Bay

islands, the Japanese at Manokwari could

safely be bypassed.

In conjunction with the advance to Sorong and Waigeo, General MacArthur

1

 Other less tangible results were the destruction

of the Japanese garrison; the elimination of Noemfoor as a way station for Japanese reinforcements

moving toward Biak, thus perhaps allowing quicker

mop-up on the latter; and the reduction of airdrome

construction requirements at Biak, enabling the Allied Air Forces to send more planes into the forward

area without potentially dangerous crowding at Biak.

2

 RENO I, 25 Feb 43, copy in OCMH files; RENO

III, 20 Oct 43, copy in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific,

Sec. 8-A.
426 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

planned to occupy and develop the Klamono oil fields, inland on the Vogelkop

some thirty miles southeast of Sorong. Allied plans to exploit the oil resources of the

Vogelkop and other petroleum centers in

the Netherlands East Indies had a long history. The Japanese advance south through

the Indies in 1942 had cut off one of the

world's richest sources of petroleum products, forcing the Allies to depend on Western

Hemisphere and Middle East supplies, the

latter of which had long been threatened by

the German and Italian Armies. Oil from

both sources had to be transported through

dangerous waters before it could reach its

proper destinations. Shortages of petroleum

products were soon in evidence throughout

the countries controlled by or friendly to the

Allied nations.

Most of the petroleum production and

refining facilities in the Netherlands East

Indies had been partially or wholly destroyed by retreating Dutch forces or by

civilian oil companies themselves. Many of

the civilian oil experts, escaping south to

Australia, were integrated into United

States or Netherlands armed forces. At General MacArthur's headquarters some of

these men soon began making plans for the

rehabilitation of the lost fields, once Allied

forces had wrested them from the Japanese.3

Suggestions emanating from General MacArthur's headquarters concerning oil rehabilitation projects expressed the view that

necessary equipment should be furnished by

the United States Government and turned

over to civilian organizations for the actual

task of bringing wells and refineries back

into production.

Meanwhile, in the United States, similar

planning was going on, much of it without

reference to General MacArthur and independently of related civilian or military

agencies of the government. The Headquarters, Army Service Forces; the Office of the

Chief Engineer, U. S. Army; the Office of

the Quartermaster General, U. S. Army;

the Army-Navy Petroleum Board; various

civilian oil companies with prewar interests

in Netherlands East Indies oil fields; and,

finally, U. S. Navy logistical agencies were

all interested in oil rehabilitation projects.

Ultimately, in December 1942, the somewhat chaotic situation in regard to the planning for oil field exploitation in the Indies

was brought to the attention of the U. S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff.4

The Joint Chiefs quickly assumed responsibility for the direction and co-ordination of

oil rehabilitation projects in the Netherlands

East Indies and undertook necessary liaison

with British and Dutch agencies. By midFebruary 1943 they had decided that, contrary to General MacArthur's recommendations, military units would at least start all

oil rehabilitation and exploitation projects

in the Indies, although the final development of the oil resources might be left to

civilian agencies. General MacArthur was

instructed to plan the location and timing

details of oil rehabilitation projects in the

Indies, and, subject to the Joint Chiefs' approval, execute those plans. At the same

time, the Joint Chiefs directed that the organization of special military petroleum

production and refining units begin. The

3

 Some of the foregoing material is based upon the

contents of the various GHQ SWPA RENO plans;

some is based on personal knowledge acquired by the

author while serving on the staff of GHQ SWPA

during 1944-46; and the rest is general knowledge.

4

 Memo, Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, ACofS

OPD, for CofS USA, 31 Dec 42, no sub; JCS 190,

Rehabilitation of Petroleum Resources in the Netherlands East Indies, 9 Jan 43, and atchd papers, in

OPD file, ABC 350.05 NEI (2-7-42), Sec. 1. All

the papers of the JCS 190 series cited hereafter bear

the same title.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 427

requisite troops, most of them U. S. Army

engineers and many especially recruited

from civilian pursuits, soon began to assemble and train in California. Orders were also

placed with manufacturers for the special

production and refining equipment, which

was sent to California as it was obtained.5

While these steps were being taken to coordinate oil rehabilitation projects, it had

become obvious that in accordance with

General MacArthur's plans the first significant oil producing region that could be recaptured in the Netherlands East Indies

would be the Klamono district on the Vogelkop Peninsula. Before the war, civilian oil

companies had found oil in commercial

quantities at the Klamono fields, but there

had been little production other than that

necessary to prove the discoveries. Insofar

as was known, Dutch forces on the Vogelkop

had not destroyed many of the Klamono

production facilities when they left the region in 1942. Nor had the Japanese made

any use of the fields—they found all the oil

their limited shipping could handle in more

accessible places such as Java, Sumatra, and

Borneo.

The Klamono district oil was especially

valuable in that it could be used as fuel

for naval vessels without refining beyond a

little "topping" to remove excess naphtha.

With limited effort, the wells could be expected to bring in some 16,000 barrels of

crude oil per day; with additional development, about 25,000 barrels. Such production would presumably save the Allies considerable shipping space and time, for, instead of the long haul from United States

ports, navy bunker fuel could be produced

and topped as necessary much nearer to the

scene of combat.6

Early in February 1944 General MacArthur requested that the troops and equipment of the Engineer Petroleum Production

Depot (as the unit then forming in California was designated) arrive in the Southwest

Pacific by 1 November, ready to start work

at the Klamono oil fields.7 This arrival date

was based on General MacArthur's current

planning assumption that operations on the

Vogelkop would begin about 1 October.

Shortly after General MacArthur made this

request, sweeping changes in plans were

made for the entire program of operations in

the Southwest Pacific following the decision

to bypass Japanese bases in eastern New

Guinea in favor of the jump to Hollandia

and Aitape on 22 April. In March General

MacArthur was able to amend his plans to

provide for the invasion of the Vogelkop no

later than 15 September.8

While this change did not materially

affect General MacArthur's plans for the

development of the Klamono oil fields, the

February, March, and April acceleration

of operations throughout the Pacific theaters

did affect the thinking with regard to oil

rehabilitation projects on the part of various headquarters and boards back in Washington.9

 Anticipating that the new schedule of operations might end the war against

Japan sooner than previously expected,

Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and

the Army-Navy Petroleum Board began to

5

 JPS 107/3, Rehabilitation of Petroleum Resources in the Netherlands East Indies, 15 Feb 43,

and atchd papers; JCS 190/2, 19 Feb 43, and

atchd papers, both sets of sources in OPD file, ABC

350.05 NEI (2-7-42), Sec. 2.

6

 The Enemy Oil Committee for the Division of

Fuels and Lubricants, Office of The Quartermaster

General, "Petroleum Facilities of New Guinea and

Ceram," Jun 44, in OPD file, ABC 463.9 New

Guinea, 5 Feb 44. 7

 JCS 190/4, 5 Feb 44, and atchd papers, in OPD

file, ABC 463.9 New Guinea, 5 Feb 44. 8

 RENO IV, 6 Mar 44, in OPD file, ABC 384

Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A; see also above, Ch. I. 9

 See above, Chapter 1.
428 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

consider it possible that the Klamono oil

wells could not be brought into production

soon enough to assist the war effort. Moreover, doubts were being raised concerning

the justification of the proposed use of

troops, equipment, and ship tonnage. The

Engineer Petroleum Production Depot, as

organized in California, was to contain

3,300 men, to which number the Southwest

Pacific Area was to add 1,700 troops and

heavy equipment of all sorts. Restudy of the

ship tonnage needed to transport and support these 5,000 men and their special equipment made it obvious that the Klamono oil

project would tie up more ships than originally expected. Simultaneously, new estimates of the time which would be consumed

in getting oil produced in appreciable quantities from the Klamono wells made it appear that it would be mid-1946 before the

Klamono oil would begin to save any shipping space for the Allies. This might well

be too late to affect the outcome of the war

materially. At the time, the Allies could ill

afford to tie up the shipping needed to

support the Engineer Petroleum Production Depot from late 1944 to mid-1946.10

By April 1944 about 90 percent of the

Engineer Petroleum Production Depot's

special equipment had been gathered in

California and 60 percent of the unit's men

had been assembled and were in training.11

The stockpiling, organizing, and training

continued for three more months, while the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and other interested

government agencies went on with new

studies of the entire problem of oil field

rehabilitation projects in the light of the

revised plans for the Pacific war. General

MacArthur's opinions concerning the cancellation of the Klamono project were

sought. He raised no objections to its abandonment.12

 Finally, on 26 July, the Joint

Chiefs decided to cancel the Klamono oil

exploitation plans and to disband the Engineer Petroleum Production Depot.

The standard service units attached to the

depot were sent overseas to perform their

usual duties. The specialized production and

refining organizations were disbanded, and

their troops were used as fillers for other engineer units or were partially re-equipped

and retrained to perform other duties, such

as maintaining bulk petroleum storage facilities at overseas bases. The Army engineers turned over some of the special equipment to the U. S. Navy, and a little of it

was found useful for the Army's standard

engineer units. The bulk of the production

and refining equipment was kept in a stockpile on the west coast for postwar disposal

by the government in the most profitable

manner possible.13

Cancellation of the SorongWaigeo Plan

While the cancellation of the Klamono oil

project removed some of the necessity for

seizing the Sorong-Waigeo area, the abandonment of that project actually played a

relatively minor part in subsequent changes

in General MacArthur's plans for operations

on the Vogelkop.

In accordance with instructions from the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur

10

 OQMG, "Petroleum Facilities of New Guinea

and Ceram," Jun 44; JPS 374/2/M, Rehabilitation

of Petroleum Resources in the NEI, 12 Apr 44, and

atchd papers, in OPD file, ABC 350.05 NEI (2-7-

42), Sec. 2. 11

 Ibid.

12

 JCS 190/6, 10 Jun 44; JCS 190/7, 26 Jun 44;

JCS 190/8, 14 Jul 44, and papers atchd to each,

all in OPD file, ABC 350.05 NEI (2-7-42), Sec. 2. 13

 JCS 190/8, 14 Jul 44, and atchd papers, in

OPD file, ABC 350.05 NEI (2-7-42), Sec. 2, supplemented by author's personal observation.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 429

was continually looking for ways and means

to accelerate operations within his theater.

His planners were reported to have thought

it possible that if sufficient carrier support

and assault shipping could be made available from Central Pacific sources, the target

date for the advance to the Philippines

might be greatly accelerated by jumping

from Hollandia to the Wakde-Sarmi area,

thence to the western Vogelkop, and then

directly to Mindanao. Without such additional means, intermediate stops at the Geelvink Bay islands and at other islands such as

Halmahera, between the Vogelkop and

Mindanao, would be necessary.

Although the support from Central Pacific sources was not forthcoming and it was

found necessary to seize Biak and Noemfoor,

General MacArthur, in May, was able to

inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that operations on the Vogelkop could be moved forward to start about 1 August, a month and

a half prior to his previously estimated target

date. From air bases at the western Vogelkop, he went on, a subsequent advance

northwest to Halmahera could be supported. The jump to Halmahera could be

made about 15 September, in conjunction

with an invasion of the Palaus in the western

Carolines by forces of the Central Pacific.14

In June, when General MacArthur

alerted ALAMO Force for the Noemfoor operation, he simultaneously informed General Krueger that landings in the SorongWaigeo area would begin on or about 25

July. General MacArthur believed that the

Sorong-Waigeo operation would entail the

use of an entire infantry division, and General Krueger selected the 6th Division,

which, in June, was in active combat at the

Wakde-Sarmi area. In addition to making

this choice, General Krueger set his staff to

work preparing tentative plans for the Sorong-Waigeo operation, and by 10 June

had ready an outline tactical plan and a

troop list.15

Beyond anticipating that the proposed

air-base site at the northwestern Vogelkop

would be located some place on Waigeo

Island, General MacArthur's planners had

not yet been able to reach any decision concerning the exact locations of the airfields.

To obtain information upon which to base

such a decision, the Fifth Air Force attempted to fly many special photographic

missions over Waigeo. In addition, on 6

June, General MacArthur ordered ALAMO

Force to conduct a ground reconnaissance

of the north coast of Waigeo at Kabarei Bay

where, about this time, elements of the

KON Force found refuge during the Japanese attempts to reinforce Biak. The reconnaissance party was to comprise ALAMO

Scouts, Allied Intelligence Bureau agents,

terrain experts of the Fifth Air Force, and

hydrographic survey men of the VII Amphibious Force. The group was to be transported by submarine from the Admiralties

to Waigeo, and its terrain report was to be

ready by 15 June.16

14

 Rad, CG USAFISPA to CofS USA [Maj Gen

Laurence S. Kuter, AAF representative on tour in

the SWPA and SPA, to Gen Henry H. Arnold, CG

AAF], WAR-7, 2 Apr 44, CM-IN 1174; Rad,

CINCSWPA to CofS USA, G-12287, 8 May 44,

CM-IN 6163.

15

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, G-13296, 5 Jun

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44;

Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-1900, 10 Jun

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 10 Jun 44; ALAMO Force

Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 2. Plans for a July invasion

of the Western Vogelkop are also outlined in General MacArthur's RENO V plan of 15 June 1944, a

copy of which is in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific,

Sec. 8-C. 16

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to AAF SWPA, ANF SWPA,

and ALAMO, CX-13332, 6 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 6 Jun 44. ALAMO Scouts were specially trained

troops who conducted reconnaissance and patrolling

missions, often behind enemy lines.
430 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Before the reconnaissance party could

carry out its mission, reasonably good aerial

photographs had to be made available to it.

But from 6 through 11 June, Fifth Air Force

planes were prevented by bad weather from

obtaining the necessary coverage.17 Finally,

on the 12th, some pictures were taken. The

next day General MacArthur informed

General Krueger that the new photographs

showed little likelihood that airfields could

be developed on the shores of Kabarei Bay.

The reconnaissance area was therefore

changed to the southwest section of Waigeo

Island and the coast east from Kabarei Bay.

Photographic coverage of these areas left

much to be desired, but the reconnaissance

project was deemed of such importance that

almost immediate action was necessary.

General Krueger, hoping for better photographs, delayed the sailing of the reconnaissance party for some days, but the submarine finally got under way from the Admiralties on the 17th, expecting to reach Waigeo

on the 23d. The reconnaissance report was

to be ready by 2 July.18

On 20 June General MacArthur told

General Krueger that new studies were being made regarding the possibility of airfield

construction on the northwest coast of the

Vogelkop at Sansapor and Mar, two mainland villages located about 70 miles northeast of Sorong and some 60 miles east of

Waigeo Island. The next day General MacArthur announced to the headquarters concerned that late photographs indicated unsuitability of airdrome sites at the newly

assigned Waigeo reconnaissance areas. The

Allied Naval Forces was thereupon instructed to divert the reconnaissance to the

Sansapor-Mar area to seek other airfield

sites.19

General Krueger believed that insufficient

photographic coverage was available for

the new study and the Fifth Air Force considered that on the basis of available photography the Sansapor-Mar area was devoid

of airfield sites. General Krueger therefore

concluded that the results of ground reconnaissance at Sansapor-Mar would not justify the risks, and he recommended that the

project be abandoned.20 But General MacArthur ordered the reconnaissance to be

undertaken and, on 23 June, the submarine

put the scouting party ashore near Mar. The

group remained in the area for almost a

week, discovering good landing beaches and

finding one or two sites where airfields might

be developed after time-consuming hard

work. The party's report was ready on 30

June, upon which date General MacArthur

directed ALAMO Force, with the support of

Allied Air and Naval Forces, to secure the

Sansapor-Mar area instead of the SorongWaigeo region. The Sansapor-Mar landing

was to take place on 30 July.21

17

 Rad, ALAMO to Advon 5thAF, WF-2212, 9 Jun

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor, 6-19 Jun 44;

Rad, Advon 5thAF to ALAMO and GHQ SWPA,

U-3204-D, 11 Jun 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl

Wakde-Biak, 11-13 Jun 44. 18

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to AAF SWPA, ANF SWPA,

and ALAMO, CX-13631, 13 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Sansapor, 6 Jun-11 Jul 44; Rads, ALAMO to CG

U. S. Forces APO 324 [Admiralties], WF-2643 and

WF-2686, 13 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-2 Jnl WakdeBiak, 3-16 Jun 44; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA,

WF-3538, 18 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Noemfoor,

6-19 Jun 44.

19

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, AAF SWPA, et

al., GX-13950, 20 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 6 Jun-11 Jul 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to

ALAMO and ANF SWPA, CX-14009, 21 Jun 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 21 Jun 44. 20

 Draft of unnumbered, unsent Rad, ALAMO to

GHQ SWPA, 22 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-2 Jnl WakdeBiak, 16 Jun-10 Jul 44. 21

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, CTF 72, and

Com7thFlt, S-57, 30 Jun 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Sansapor, 6 Jun-11 Jul 44 (this rad apparently is
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 431

MAP 18

The Sansapor-Mar Plan

At the Sansapor-Mar area, an air base

and minor naval facilities were to be established to support subsequent operations

northwest toward the Philippines. (Map

18) The air construction task called for the

development of fields upon which two

fighter groups, five squadrons of medium

bombers, and a half squadron of nightfighters could be based. To seize and protect

the air-base area, the 6th Infantry Division,

less one regimental combat team but reinforced with service and antiaircraft units,

was considered sufficient force. General

Krueger was made responsible for the direca redispatch of a msg originated by the submarine

during the night of 29-30 Jun); ALAMO Force

Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 10; GHQ SWPA OI 56,

30 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Jun 44.
432 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tion of the operation and for co-ordination

of air, naval, and ground planning.22

Plans and Planning

Mar lies in flat, swampy ground at the

mouth of the Wewe River, which flows into

the Pacific about 18 miles west-southwest

of the Kaap de Goede Hoop, northernmost

point on the Vogelkop. About 7 miles northeast of Mar is Cape Opmarai, and 7 miles

to the southwest is Cape Sansapor, situated

2 miles northeast of Sansapor Plantation

and the native hamlet of the same name.

At many points along the 25 miles of coast

line between Kaap de Goede Hoop and

Cape Sansapor, spurs of the Tamrau Mountains, which dominate most of the Vogelkop,

descend to the shore. Densely forested

coastal flats are to be found near Mar and

along the shore line northeast of Cape Sansapor. Off Mar lie the Mios Soe Islands,

Amsterdam and Middleburg, respectively

5 and 3 miles from the coast.23

Little detailed information concerning

the target area was available to ALAMO

Force other than that brought back by the

23-30 June reconnaissance party. Japanese

activity appeared to center at Sansapor

Plantation, where the Japanese were known

to maintain a staging base for barges moving along the coast from Sorong to Manokwari. The ALAMO G-2 Section estimated

that unless a clearing noted near the mouth

of the Wewe proved to be airdrome construction, few more than 100 Japanese

would be found at Sansapor-Mar. If the

clearing was in preparation for an airfield,

then a Japanese airdrome construction unit

of perhaps 700 men might be stationed at

the objective. The terrain reconnaissance

and photographs indicated that good landing beaches existed near Mar and above

Cape Sansapor. Potential airdrome sites had

been reported at both places and, in addition, it was believed possible that a fighter

strip might be constructed on tiny Middleburg Island, the flat surface of which was

given over to a neglected coconut tree plantation.24

When on 8 July principal air, ground,

and naval commanders gathered at General

Krueger's command post to discuss plans for

the new operation, it immediately became

apparent that more intelligence and terrain

information would be needed before detailed landing, supply, and engineer plans

could be evolved. As a result, only general

discussions were held and the conferees

reached only tentative conclusions, which

they realized might be changed after further reconnaissance at the objective area.

The first question taken up at the 8 July

conference was that of setting H Hour, the

target date of 30 July being agreeable to all

concerned. To assure tactical surprise, General Krueger wanted the landing made at

first light, even though Maj. Gen. Ennis C.

Whitehead, now in command of the Fifth

Air Force, could not promise air cover until

forty-five minutes later. Admiral Fechteler,

in charge of the amphibious phase of the

operation, was willing to forego air cover

since no enemy opposition was expected, but

he would approve the early landing hour

22

 Ibid.

23

 AGS SWPA, Terrain Handbook 29, "Dutch

New Guinea, Sorong Area," 1 Jul 44, copy in

OCMH files; ALAMO Force, G-2 Photo Int Sec.,

Consolidated Rpt 144, 18 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-4

Jnl Noemfoor, 21-29 Jul 44.

24

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Photo Int Sec., op. cit.;

Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, et al., S-57, 30 Jun

44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to Cape Sansapor-Cape Opmarai Area, Northwest Vogelkop, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 6 Jun11 Jul 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp.

5, 10.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 433

only if an advance party could be put ashore

to guide LST's to the proper beaches. The

conferees concluded that putting an advance party ashore might destroy chances

for tactical surprise and bring Japanese aircraft over the area. Therefore, H Hour was

tentatively set for 0700, about fifteen minutes before sunrise at Mar.

Preliminary naval bombardment was considered unnecessary in the light of expected

Japanese dispositions. Without naval bombardment, chances for tactical surprise

seemed good. The nearest enemy garrison

was at Sansapor, only twelve miles from the

proposed landing points near Mar, and the

nearest Japanese radio facilities were also

thought to be located at Sansapor. If no

bombardments were delivered and if the

naval forces maintained radio silence until

some Japanese opposition was encountered,

there would be a good chance to land the

entire D-Day force before the Japanese realized a landing was under way. Thus, the

possibility of harassing attacks by Japanese

troops from Sansapor would be reduced, as

would the probability of air attacks from

Japanese bases within range of Mar.

Much time at the conference was devoted

to discussing airdrome construction. The

ALAMO Force engineer officer thought Middleburg Island offered the best site for quick

construction of an airfield from which local

fighter cover could be provided. The Mar

area, according to available information,

did not appear well suited to airdrome development, although a landing at Mar

seemed best from the naval point of view

since that area provided favorable beaches

for LST's. The conferees therefore thought

that the main landing would have to take

place near Mar. A shore-to-shore operation

to seize the Cape Sansapor area, apparently

better suited for airfields, would follow, as

might another minor landing to secure the

Mios Soe Islands.25

Since lack of detailed terrain information

made further planning almost impossible,

another reconnaissance party was slipped

ashore near Cape Opmarai during the night

of 14-15 July. This group, which went forward by PT boat from Noemfoor, encountered no Japanese in the area and found the

natives friendly. After spending three days

in the Sansapor-Mar area, the group

brought out a terrain report which considerably changed tentative plans. First, the

reconnaissance disclosed that there was no

Japanese airdrome construction in the area

and that the previously located cleared strips

were actually overgrown native gardens.

The best airdrome site was found near two

small, reef-bound capes about one and

three-fourths miles northeast of Mar. The

beaches near and between the two capes

were found to be excellent for landing although not too satisfactory for heavy truck

traffic. The rain forest in the region was

noted to be less dense than anticipated.

Finally, the party's airdrome engineers estimated that a 6,000-foot runway could be

constructed near the capes within twentyfive days after the landing, providing heavy

rains did not impede the work.26

With the new information at hand, final

plans were rapidly drawn up by all units

concerned. The landing was to be made at

0700 on D Day, 30 July, between the two

small capes northeast of Mar. The first

25

 ALAMO Force, Conf Rpt, Hq ALAMO Force,

1045-1410, 8 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor,

6 Jun-11 Jul 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor,

p. 12; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 1-5. 26

 Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WH-1654, 12

Jul 44, in ALAMO G-2 Jnl Sansapor, 11-13 Jul 44;

Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WH-2882, 18 Jul 44,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 19-27 Jul 44; ALAMO

Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 5, 10.
434 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

airstrip would be constructed in a partially

cleared area immediately inland from the

westernmost promontory. The Cape Sansapor area, now deemed unsuitable for an

airstrip, was selected by naval planners as a

PT base site, and plans were made to secure

that area by a shore-to-shore operation on

D plus 1. Middleburg Island would be

seized at H plus 35 minutes on D Day so as

to assure another airfield site. Final determination of airfield locations was left to

Brig. Gen. Earl W. Barnes, who was to accompany the assault echelon to Mar as the

commander of the XIII Air Task Force.

This organization was, in effect, an advance

echelon of the Thirteenth Air Force, from

which was to be drawn the air garrison for

the Sansapor-Mar area. General Barnes

built his headquarters around men selected

from his previous staff, that of the XIII

Fighter Command.27

In charge of the ground forces was Maj.

Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, commanding general of the 6th Infantry Division and previously of the TORNADO Task Force at

Wakde-Sarmi. For the Sansapor-Mar operation General Sibert was to command an

organization designated the TYPHOON Task

Force, which comprised the 6th Division,

reinforced, less the 20th Regimental Combat

Team. The latter unit was to remain at

Wakde-Sarmi as ALAMO Force Reserve for

the new operation. Combat units for the DDay echelon of the TYPHOON Task Force

were the 1st Infantry, the 1st Battalion of

the 63d Infantry, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Troop, a company of the 6th Engineers, and

four antiaircraft batteries. There was to be

a high percentage of service troops, especially engineers, among the approximately

7,300 men who were to land on 30 July.

The assault on Red Beach, as the landing

point was named, was to be undertaken by

the 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Infantry, going ashore in LCVP's from the APD's taking them forward from Wakde-Sarmi. The

3d Battalion was designated TYPHOON Task

Force Reserve for the landing, and, if necessary, it would aid the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop to secure Middleburg

Island. The reconnaissance unit was to move

ashore in LVT's and LVT (A)'s launched

from LST's. The 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry, was initially to operate as part of the

Shore Party with the Shore Battalion of the

543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

3d Engineer. Special Brigade, and was then

to revert to a reserve role.28

Admiral Fechteler's Attack Force (Task

Force 77) was to have a D-Day groupment

comprising 11 destroyers, 5 APD's, 16

LCI's, 3 rocket LCI's, 8 LST's, 4 PC's, and

1 ATF. A Covering Force (Task Force 78),

consisting of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers,

and 9 destroyers under the command of

Admiral Berkey, was to be available for support fire if needed. In addition to covering

the main landing, the naval elements would

support the operations against the Mios Soe

group on D Day, and on D plus 1 provide

LCI and destroyer support fire to cover the

27

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 5; TYPHOON Task Force [TyTF] FO 1, 15 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 13-18 Jul 44; Rad,

GHQ SWPA to ALAMO CX-15141, 21 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 19-27 Jul 44; 5thAF

OI 4, 11 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 14 Jul 44.

28

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 5; TyTF

FO 1, 15 Jul 44; History of the TYPHOON Task

Force in the Opmarai-Sansapor Area, Vogelkop

Peninsula, Dutch New Guinea, 30 July-31 August

1944, p. 10 (hereafter cited as Hist of TyTF, 30

Jul-31 Aug 44).
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 435

SANSAPOR PLANNERS. Left to right (across table): Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger,

Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, Rear Adm. William M. Fechteler, Brig. Gen. Charles

E. Hurdis.

shore-to-shore operation against Cape Sansapor. The Allied Naval Forces was responsible for the movement of all troops and

supplies from rear bases to Sansapor until

relieved by the Services of Supply on 1 September.29

Units of the TYPHOON Task Force reaching the objective area on D Day, D plus 2,

and D plus 4 were to take with them a tenday supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment, fuels, and lubricants, and two units

of fire for all weapons. After D plus 4, amphibious craft were to bring forward with

each unit aboard a ten-day supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment, petroleum

products, medical supplies, engineer construction equipment, and motor maintenance supplies. Large cargo ships to arrive

after D plus 4 were to carry thirty days'

supply of these items, and both types of

shipping were to bring forward three units

29

 GHQ SWPA OI 56, 30 Jun 44, and 56/10,

27 Aug 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Jun 44; CTF 77

Opn Plan 7-44, 15 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 22

Jul 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 1, 3, 5;

ComCruDiv 15 [CTF 78] Opn Order 3-44, 21 Jul

44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26 Jul 44; ALAMO Force Opns

Rpt Sansapor, p. 12; TyTF FO 1, 15 Jul 44.
436 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

of fire for all weapons of the organizations

aboard.30

Staging and Rehearsing Problems

The TYPHOON Task Force staged at the

Wakde-Sarmi area, where many problems

arose. General Sibert had known since late

June that his division was to undertake another operation, but it was not until 14 July

that elements of the 31st Infantry Division

began to arrive at Wakde-Sarmi to relieve

the 6th from combat responsibility there,

and it was the 18th of the month before

General Sibert could relinquish command

of the TORNADO Task Force to his successor

and before all the troops of the 6th Division

were out of combat. Staging was further

hampered by the necessity for moving service unit and port installations from the exposed Toem-Arare beaches westward to

Maffin Bay, where more sheltered waters

and better beaches were to be found.

Thus, staging was slowed from the start

by three major factors—the relief and assembly of the 6th Division, the arrival of the

31st Division's units over beaches the TYPHOON Task Force was using for staging,

and the movement of the staging area itself.

Moreover, since the danger from Japanese

air attacks made it impossible to plan to

send any large cargo ships to Sansapor for

at least a month after the initial landings

there, it was necessary to establish a troop

and cargo transfer point at Maffin Bay.

With the exception of the 6th Division and

the supplies already available at Maffin Bay,

almost all troops and equipment for the

TYPHOON Task Force were brought forward

to Maffin Bay on noncombat vessels from

rear bases, unloaded, and then reloaded on

LST's and other landing craft. The beaches

at Maffin Bay soon became crowded with

numerous units and tons of equipment,

many of which were not to move to Sansapor-Mar until weeks after the initial landings. Finally, to add to the other difficulties,

heavy rains intermittently stopped or slowed

all staging operations at Maffin Bay.31

At Maffin Bay the 31st Infantry Division

supplied many troops for labor to help the

TYPHOON Task Force mount out. ALAMO

Force Reserve for the Sansapor-Mar operation, the 6th Division's 20th Regimental

Combat Team, devoted almost all its time

to labor, and the rest of the 6th Division,

although busy re-equipping, planning, and

trying to train and rehearse, also had to furnish many labor details.32

Rehearsals for the TYPHOON Task Force

were curtailed by the cargo transshipment

activity at Maffin Bay and also because

many tons of supplies and equipment arrived there barely in time to be reloaded on

LST's of the D-Day echelon. The APD's

and LCI's which were to carry assault infantry forward reached Maffin Bay on 24 July

and, after embarking their troops, put out to

sea overnight. The next morning the assault

battalions had a practice landing near

Toem. Most of the LCI's, which had re30

 ALAMO Force Adm O 11, 11 Jul 44, in ALAMO

G-4 Jnl Sansapor, 8 Jun-3 Aug 44.

31

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp. 26-

28; TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 12 Jun-18 Jul

44, pp. 9-10; TTF [31st Inf Div] Opns Rpt

Wakde-Sarmi, 18 Jul-2 Sep 44, pp. 2-4; Memo,

ACofS G-4 ALAMO for CofS ALAMO, no sub, 6 Jul

44, and Ltr, ALAMO G-4 LO with TyTF at Maffin

Bay to ACofS G-4 ALAMO, no sub, 20 Jul 44, both

in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Sansapor, 8 Jun-3 Aug 44.

See also above, Ch. XI. 32

 TTF Opns Rpt Wakde-Sarmi, 18 Jul-2 Sep 44,

pp. 2-4; Hist of TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, p. 21;

20th Inf Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 1; Memo, ACofS

G-4 ALAMO for CofS ALAMO, no sub, 6 Jul 44;

Memo, ACofS G-4 ALAMO for CofS ALAMO, sub:

Re Cargo Handling in the Toem Area, 10 Jul 44,

in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Sansapor, 8 Jun-3 Aug 44. See

also above, Ch. XI.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 437

cently arrived in the theater, had trouble

keeping formation, and were therefore given

additional training on succeeding days. It

was impossible for the LST's to participate

in rehearsals, since they were engaged in

final loading. Although he believed that

even the incomplete rehearsals proved of

". . . considerable benefit to both the Army

and Navy in preparation for the operation,"

Admiral Fechteler observed that more complete rehearsals were needed, especially for

the LST's.33

One aspect of the loading was unusual

for the Southwest Pacific Area's forces. The

6th Division had come to New Guinea from

Hawaii, where, in final amphibious training, it had studied and developed a great

enthusiasm for pallet loading, an enthusiasm which it carried so far as to pallet-load

LST's. The latter practice was undertaken

against the advice of the ALAMO G-4 Section's liaison officer with the TYPHOON Task

Force at Maffin Bay. He felt that LST's

should be so loaded that every pound of

cargo could be easily manhandled, and he

pointed out that much of the cargo put

aboard LST's on pallets might be ruined by

sea water as the pallets were dragged aboard

during loading or towed ashore at the objective. He also believed that the pallets

took up too much space on LST's and that

they were extremely difficult to load on such

ships. Finally, he noted, mud brought

aboard the LST tank decks by the pallets during loading immobilized fork-lift

trucks.34

Critical shortages of most supplies were

made up before the TYPHOON Task Force

left Maffin Bay, but sufficient supplies of

engineer explosives, sandbags, and wire

mesh beach mats did not reach the staging

area in time to be loaded on ships of the

D-Day echelon. These items had been requisitioned by ALAMO Force in late June and

early July, but for some reason shipment

from Services of Supply rear bases to Maffin

Bay was delayed. The explosives shortage

might have slowed airfield construction at

Sansapor-Mar had not provision been made

to ship the explosives by air to Maffin Bay

and load them there on ships moving to the

objective area on D plus 2 and D plus 4.

The wire mesh could not be shipped forward in time to be of use during the

landings.35

Engineer Problems

One of the most difficult problems faced

by the TYPHOON Task Force was setting up

a schedule for shipping engineer units to the

objective. As staging and construction plans

were continued, it began to appear that

sweeping changes in construction directives,

schedules for the arrival of engineer units,

and choice of airdrome sites at SansaporMar would have to be made. The first construction task at Sansapor-Mar was to complete by D plus 20, 18 August, one airfield

with a 5,000-foot runway and associated

facilities for a group of fighters and a half

squadron of night-fighters. The remaining

airfield construction was to be finished by D

plus 35, 3 September. The principal units

33

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 6-7, 14;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 9. Quotation

from page 7 of the CTF 77 report. 34

 Ltrs, ALAMO G-4 LO with TyTF at Maffin

Bay to ACofS G-4 ALAMO, no subs, 16 and 20 Jul

44, both in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Sansapor, 8 Jun-3

Aug 44.

35

 Ltrs, ALAMO G-4 LO with TyTF at Maffin Bay

to ACofS G-4 ALAMO, no subs, 16, 20, and 24 Jul

44, all in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Sansapor, 8 Jun-3 Aug

44; Rad, ALAMO to InterSec USASOS, WH-4466,

26 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 27 Jul-3

Aug 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 10-11.
438 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

scheduled to engage in airdrome and other

construction activities were the 836th and

1897th Engineer Aviation Battalions, the

43d Engineer Construction Battalion, the

96th Engineer General Service Regiment,

the 617th Engineer Base Equipment Company, and the 571st Engineer Dump Truck

Company. All were to operate under the

supervision of Headquarters, 1112th Engineer Construction Group.36

Most of the engineer units had to be

moved up from rear bases and reloaded at

Maffin Bay. The staging situation there, the

schedule of arrival of various units at Maffin

Bay, and the construction program at Sansapor-Mar made it necessary to set up a

complicated schedule of engineer shipment

to the objective—a schedule which the

TYPHOON Task Force completed by 15

July.37 Hardly had this initial plan been finished when various interested headquarters

began making proposals which led to many

changes in it. Restudy of information concerning the terrain at the objective made it

appear to General Headquarters and ALAMO

Force that the construction target dates

could not be met unless many revisions were

made in the task force's proposed schedule

for shipping forward engineer units. Moreover, the airfields at Sansapor-Mar would

have to be built on unbroken ground (previously, forces of the Southwest Pacific had

for the most part utilized sites where Japanese construction had already been begun

or completed), a factor which might lead to

serious delays in the completion of airfields

of utmost importance to the success of subsequent operations. On the other hand,

making extensive revisions in shipping

schedules would complicate lighterage problems at the staging and objective areas at a

time when provision of many more lightering craft was out of the question.

Arguments and counterproposals for

revisions of the engineer unit shipping

schedules continued until, by 18 July, various agencies had evolved the following

plans:

 38

36

 ALAMO Force FO 20, 10 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Sansapor, 11-13 Jul 44; GHQ SWPA OI 56,

30 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Jun 44. 37

 TyTF FO 1, 15 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 13-18 Jul 44.

38

 Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 ALAMO for ACofS G-3

ALAMO, 18 Jul 44, sub: Engr Units for GLOBETROTTER [Sansapor], in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor,

19-27 Jul 44; TyTF FO 1, 15 Jul 44.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 439

By 21 July, although the ALAMO Force

Engineer thought it might be 8 September

rather than 18 August before a fighter strip

could be prepared in the Sansapor area, new

terrain information and some eleventh-hour

revisions in the plans for movement of engineer units made it appear that construction

schedules at the objective might be met. The

revised movement plans provided for

arrivals at Sansapor-Mar as follows:39

One final difficulty arose concerning the

43d Engineer Construction Battalion. The

unit's men were at Sydney, Australia, in

mid-July, while the bulk of its equipment

was at Oro Bay, New Guinea, and it was

found impossible to move the unit forward

for transshipment at Maffin Bay in time for

it to reach Sansapor at a date by which it

could be of much aid for meeting construction target dates at the latter objective. General MacArthur therefore released to ALAMO

Force the 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion. This unit, stationed at Hollandia, was

to move directly from the latter base to arrive at Sansapor-Mar on D plus 8. The 43d

Engineers were to be moved forward when

the shipping situation allowed its men and

equipment to be assembled.40

The demands of the airfield construction

schedule also promoted many changes in

plans for the number and types of landing

craft to be sent forward to Sansapor-Mar

with early echelons. General Sibert requested that four LCT's be assigned to the

D-Day echelon to move engineer equipment, antiaircraft units, and other supplies

and troops to the proposed PT-base site at

Cape Sansapor and to the airdrome site on

Middleburg Island. He pointed out that it

might prove necessary to construct a fighter

strip on Middleburg in order to meet the

first airfield project's target date, and he

noted that LCM's would not be able to

move large, heavy engineering equipment

to the island.41

39

 Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WH-3073, 19

Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 19-27 Jul 44;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 10; Rad,

TyTF to ALAMO, MS-10, 21 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Sansapor, 19-27 Jul 44; TyTF FO 1, 15 Jul 44 40

 Rad, ALAMO to TyTF, WH-2894, 18 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 18-19 Jul 44; Memo,

Asst ACofS G-3 ALAMO for ACofS G-3 ALAMO, 18

Jul 44, sub: Engr Units for GLOBETROTTER; Memo,

Asst ACofS G-3 ALAMO for ACofS G-3 ALAMO, 21

Jul 44, no sub; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, CX15141, 21 Jul 44; Rad, ALAMO to TyTF, WH-3556,

22 Jul 44. Last four docs in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 19-27 Jul 44. 41

 Rad, TTF (from Comdr TyTF) to ALAMO,

YA-398, 17 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor,

13-18 Jul 44.
440 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Initially, General Krueger disapproved

General Sibert's request upon advice from

the ALAMO Engineer Officer that a strip

could be built on the mainland, thus making unnecessary transshipment of heavy

equipment. Moreover, available LCT's

were sorely needed in rear areas. But General Sibert argued that there would be no

way of moving engineer equipment to Middleburg in the event that construction of a

fighter strip there proved necessary. Finally,

General Kruger made arrangements with

Admiral Fechteler to have two LCT's towed

to the objective by LST's of the D-plus-2

echelon.42

Operations in the Sansapor-Mar Area

The Landing

Air support for the Sansapor operation

was provided principally by planes of the

Fifth Air Force, which, in order to preserve

tactical surprise at the objective, carried out

no bombardment missions against the Sansapor-Mar area before D Day. Instead, the

Fifth Air Force, aided by Australian and

Dutch aircraft, conducted many heavy

strikes against Japanese air bases at Manokwari and Sorong and in the HalmaheraCeram-Ambon region. On the morning of

D Day, night-fighters and B-25's were over

the objective area to give support if necessary as the ships of Admiral Fechteler's Attack Force began moving shoreward, but no

preassault bombardment or strafing missions were undertaken.43

In order to deceive the Japanese, the

Main Body had approached Sansapor on a

rather roundabout route, sailing first from

Maffin Bay into the waters between Noemfoor and Biak and then along the line of the

equator as if heading toward Sorong or

Halmahera. The Main Body made several

radar contacts with Japanese aircraft on

D minus 1 while in waters beyond Noemfoor, and protecting land-based fighters intercepted three or four Japanese aircraft

about twenty miles south of the convoy

route. The air battle, during which one or

two Japanese planes were shot down, took

place out of sight of the Main Body, which

reached Sansapor apparently undetected.

The Covering Force's cruisers and destroyers rendezvoused off Hollandia and

sailed north and west well behind the Main

Body until some forty miles off Manokwari.

Then it passed the Main Body and began

moving in toward the Sansapor-Mar landing beach at 0200 on D Day, keeping its

guns and radios silent. The Main Body

arrived in the transport area about 0500.

The assault ships were all on station by

0630, at which time Admiral Fechteler gave

the order to execute the landing plan.44

Control craft rapidly found their proper

positions and showed colored lights seaward

to mark the landing craft approach lanes.

The assault troops of Col. Forbie H. Privett's

1st Infantry were soon aboard the twelve

LCVP's of the first wave, but, since the

landing craft had left the assembly area too

soon, they had to be held about ten minutes

at the offshore line of departure, where they

were especially vulnerable to fire from Japa42

 Rad, ALAMO to TyTF, WH-2895, 18 Jul 44,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 18-19 Jul 44; Memo,

ALAMO G-3 LO with TyTF at Maffin Bay for

ACofS G-3 ALAMO, 21 Jul 44, no sub, and atchd

notes from ACofS G-3 ALAMO to CofS ALAMO and

from CofS ALAMO to ACofS G-3 ALAMO, 22 Jul

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 19-27 Jul 44; Rad,

ALAMO to TyTF, WH-3731, 23 Jul 44, in ALAMO

G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 19-27 Jul 44.

43

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 12; CTF

77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 7. 44

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 7-8.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 441

nese aircraft or shore-based weapons. Fortunately, no such opposition developed and

the first wave was ashore at 0701, one minute late. The second wave was a minute and

a half late, -but subsequent waves made up

the time. LCI's began moving shoreward

about H plus 10 minutes, to beach with

ramps in about two feet of water. The troops

waded the short distance to shore without

difficulty. The LCVP's quickly retracted

and were hoisted back aboard the APD's.

The APD unit left for Hollandia at 0732,

28 minutes ahead of schedule, while the

LCI's were unloaded so rapidly that they

were able to set sail for Hollandia 17 minutes early, at 0813.45

While the unopposed mainland landing

was taking place, one LST moved toward

Middleburg Island and at 0730 (fifteen

minutes late) began launching 12 LVT-

(A)'s and 4 LVT's, aboard which was the

6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, together with a 60-mm. mortar section and a

squad and a half of riflemen from the 1st

Battalion, 63d Infantry. All these troops

were ashore on Middleburg by 0800. There

was no opposition to this landing and the

amphibious group quickly re-formed and

set sail for Amsterdam Island, two miles

away. A landing was effected on Amsterdam, which also proved unoccupied by any

Japanese, at 1130. Small detachments were

left on each island, while the rest of the

force returned to the mainland. On Middleburg was incurred the TYPHOON Task

Force's only D-Day casualty—one man

was wounded fatally by the accidental discharge of an LVT (A)'s 37-mm. gun.46

Back at Red Beach, tactical operations

had been going equally well. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, landed on the east (left)

sector and before 0830 had pushed inland

and eastward about three-quarters of a mile

from the beach's center. Defenses were set

up along low hills about 800 yards inland.

About 0820 the 2d Battalion had killed three

unarmed Japanese near the east end of the

beach. It was not until the report of this

first contact was relayed to the command

ship offshore that radio silence was broken

and higher headquarters was informed of

the TYPHOON Task Force's situation.47

On the west flank the 1st Battalion, 1st

Infantry, found rougher going in dense jungle undergrowth, but located no Japanese.

The 3d Battalion, ashore at 0740, pushed

west along the beach to the mouth of the

Wewe River, 2,500 yards distant. There the

unit, having encountered no opposition,

assembled as task force reserve and began

preparations for the D plus 1 shore-to-shore

operation to secure Cape Sansapor.48

The 1st Field Artillery Battalion was

ashore and ready to fire at 1107; antiaircraft units were set up as quickly as they

came ashore, but had no targets on D Day.

The 6th Engineers immediately began

working on roads and bivouacs, while men

of the 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion

started airdrome site surveys. The 543d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment's troops,

assisted by men from many other units,

unloaded supplies, constructed beach exits,

and cleared dump areas. The available air

support was not needed, and as flights of

45

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 9; Hist of

TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, p. 12; CTF 77 Opn Plan

7-44, 15 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 22 Jul 44. 46

 6th Cav Rcn Tr Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 2-3;

CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 9; ALAMO Force

Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 11.

47

 1st Inf Opns Rpt Sansapor, 15 Jul-31 Aug 44,

pp. 1-2; 1st Inf Jnl, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44; TyTF G-3

Opns Rpt 1, 31 Jul 44, in folder entitled TyTF G-3

Opns Rpts, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt

Sansapor, p. 13. 48

 TyTF G-3 Opns Rpt 1, 31 Jul 44; 1st Inf Opns

Rpt Sansapor, 15 Jul-31 Aug 44, p.. 2; Hist of

TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, p. 12.
442 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

B-25's reported on station during the day

they were sent off to hit targets of opportunity south of Cape Sansapor or in the Sorong

area. General Sibert, who assumed command ashore at 1020, could be well pleased

with the tactical situation.49 With conditions at the landing beach, he could not

have been so happy.

Red Beach, though excellent for LST's

and landing craft, left much to be desired

for wheeled vehicles and dispersal facilities. When the sand proved soft and loose,

the lack of wire mesh beach mats began to

be felt keenly and many trucks (some of

which were reported to have been overloaded) had to be pulled out of the sand by

tractors. Dispersal was difficult because the

area behind the beach was forested and

densely overgrown with thick jungle flora

of all types. Admiral Fechteler learned that

LST unloading was being delayed by lack

of troops and trucks, and the senior LST

commander stated that available troops were

not making all the effort they could. By

noon LST unloading was threatened with

serious delay, and Admiral Fechteler

brought the situation to General Sibert's

attention.

General Sibert immediately took steps to

get assigned troops and vehicles back on the

job and he sent more men to the aid of the

Shore Party. Thereafter, cargo handling

proceeded more rapidly, although it was

soon found that earlier criticism of loading

pallets on LST's was justified. LST commanders declared that pallets moved slowly,

wasting both time and space. Moreover,

tractors and roads soon began to break down

under the strain of dragging pallets around

the beach, and many bulldozers had to be

assigned to dragging missions when they

might have been employed to better advantage improving roads or dump and

bivouac areas. Nevertheless, one LST was

unloaded by 1600 and the rest were unloaded in time to start back to Maffin Bay

by 1730. The initial slowness of unloading

and early congestion at the beaches did not

prove serious nor dangerous, although the

situation might have been different had

there been any Japanese air action.50

Despite the minor difficulties of unloading, Admiral Fechteler reported: "The operation on the whole was carried out with

a precision of execution which reflected a

high state of training and morale throughout the Force. It is considered that the operation could and would have been successful

against determined opposition."

 51

 An observer from the Alaskan Department—of all

places—noting the lack of opposition ashore

and the smoothness with which most of the

landing activities were executed, expressed

similar sentiments: "Globetrotter [Sansapor] expedition was a well organized, well

executed and entirely unexciting amphibious operation."52

Post-D-Day Operations

at Sansapor-Mar

At 0650 on 31 July the 3d Battalion, 1st

Infantry, left its assembly area at the mouth

of the Wewe aboard LCM's and LCVP's,

bound for Green Beach at Cape Sansapor,

49

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 9-10; Hist

of TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, pp. 12-13; TyTF G-3

Opns Rpt 1, 31 Jul 44.

50

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 10-12, 15;

Hist of TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, p. 13; TyTF G-4

Sec. Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 2; Memo, ACofS G-4

ALAMO for CofS ALAMO, ALAMO QM, et al., 5

Aug 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 3-8

Aug 44. 51

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 15. 52

 Obsr's Rpt GLOBETROTTER Opn [Rpt of Maj

Robert J. Bertrand, Hq., Alaskan Dept], 6 Aug 44,

in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 3-8 Aug 44.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 443

five miles down the coast.53 Escort was provided by 4 destroyers and 2 PC's. Since information from natives indicated that the

Japanese garrison had evacuated Sansapor,

preliminary bombardment was limited to

light fire by a single destroyer. Company I

was on the beach at 0844 and, meeting no

resistance, rapidly deployed to cover the

landing of the rest of the battalion. Encountering no Japanese troops, the battalion

marched south along the beach and before

1000 hours secured Sansapor Plantation and

Village. Large quantities of Japanese supplies were captured and there were many

evidences of hasty departure of Japanese

troops from the Sansapor area. Antiaircraft

weapons and a platoon of the regimental

cannon company soon arrived to reinforce

the 3d Battalion, which quickly set up a

defensive perimeter around the plantation

and village. There had been no casualties.

The shore line at Cape Sansapor proved

too reef-bound and the beaches too poor

for the planned PT boat base, but upon investigation Amsterdam Island proved an

excellent location. When the PT squadron

arrived on D plus 2, 1 August, it was sent to

the new site and began operations from

Amsterdam the same night. The Cape Sansapor area became the site of a radar warning installation.

Subsequent combat operations in the

Sansapor-Mar area consisted mainly of patrolling to hunt down scattered, small groups

of Japanese, expanding the beachhead, and

protecting the airfield installations upon

which work was soon started. On 3 August

92 sick or wounded Japanese and Formosan

troops were captured at a Japanese hospital

area near Cape Opmarai, and on the same

day at other locations 23 more Japanese

were captured and 4 were killed. This was

the largest single day's "bag" to 31 August.

Patrols of the 63d Infantry and the 6th

Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop were sent as

far east along the beach as Kor village, about

11 miles from Mar. On the southwest, patrols of the 1st Infantry penetrated as far

as the Mega River, some 30 miles from Red

Beach. Other small 6th Division patrols,

accompanied by members of a Netherlands

Indies Civil Administration Unit, pushed

along the coast and inland to even more

distant points to re-establish Dutch control

over the native population and to seek information concerning Japanese movements.

During the middle of August, patrols

based at Kor were sent up the Kor River

and northeast along the coast two miles to

Cape Waimak. Soon these patrols began to

report that large groups of enemy were

moving toward Kor from the east. On the

15th ALAMO Force (which had received the

information from General Headquarters)

warned the TYPHOON Task Force that about

250 men of Headquarters, 35th Division,

had been moving overland along the north

coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula from Manokwari to Sorong.54

 These troops and per- 53

 Information concerning American units in this

subsection is based on: Hist of TyTF, 30 Jul-31

Aug 44, pp. 14-22; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Sansapor,

pp. 12-13; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp.

11-17; 1st Inf Opns Rpt Sansapor, 15 Jul-31 Aug

44, pp. 3-8; 20th Inf Opns Rpt Sansapor, 20-31

Aug 44, p. 1; 63d Inf Opns Rpt Sansapor, 30 Jul-31

Aug 44, p. 1; 6th Cav Rcn Trp Opns Rpt Sansapor,

pp. 3-18.

54

 Enemy information in this subsection is based

principally on: Hist of TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44,

pp. 20-22; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 65-69;

ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpts 48, 54, and 55,

5 Jul, 16 Aug, and 23 Aug 44, respectively, copies

in G-2 DofA files; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 865,

4 Aug 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 4 Aug 44; 2d Army

Opns Orders, 3 and 9 Jul 44, as cited in DSEI 865.
444 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

haps other scattered groups from the 35th

Division could be expected to reach the

Sansapor-Mar area almost any day.

The ALAMO Force warning had a good

foundation. It will be remembered that

after the failure of the KON Operation, the

2d Area Army had evolved a plan to send

all or part of the 35th Division from Sorong

and Halmahera to Biak. When, after the defeat suffered by the 1st Task Force during

the A-GO Operation, it proved impossible

to move the 35th Division to Biak, the 2d

Area Army had decided to concentrate that

division at Manokwari, and the unit soon

began to move eastward by small ship and

barge. With the Allied seizure of Noemfoor

and an increasing tempo of Allied air attacks against Manokwari from Wakde, Biak,

and Noemfoor, the 2d Area Army realized

that positions at the northeastern section of

the Vogelkop were no longer tenable or useful. The displacement of the 35th Division

was accordingly halted.

The standard of living at Manokwari,

site of command posts of the 2d Army and

the 35th Division, slipped rapidly during

the last weeks of June. The 12,000 to 15,000

Japanese troops stationed there were fast

consuming the supplies which Allied bombing raids left undamaged, while Allied air

and naval action prevented the Japanese

from sending supplies by water eastward

from Sorong or Halmahera. Therefore, on

3 July, the 2d Army ordered the 35th Division to retrace its steps and concentrate at

Sorong, where other elements of the division

were arriving from Halmahera. About the

same time, Headquarters, 2d Army, began

an overland trek from Manokwari south

150 miles to Windehsi, located on the narrow neck of land which separates the Vogelkop Peninsula from the rest of New Guinea.

Other small garrisons at points along the

western shores of Geelvink Bay were withdrawn. Most of these troops concentrated

in the Windehsi area where natural food

supplies, such as sago palm and coconuts,

were more plentiful than at Manokwari. At

the latter base there was organized the 1st

Independent Brigade, which apparently

consisted principally of service personnel,

perhaps strengthened by a few elements of

the 220th Infantry, 35th Division.

The commanding general of the 35th

Division, Lt. Gen. Shunkichi Ikeda, was

evacuated from Manokwari, presumably by

aircraft, on or about 1 July and on the 15th

of the same month the division headquarters

began the long overland march along the

north coast of the Vogelkop to Sorong. The

division was made responsible for the defense of the area between Sorong and

Kaironi, the latter located some forty miles

west of Manokwari. The 1st Independent

Brigade, under Maj. Gen. Yuki Fukabori,

and other units of the Manokwari Garrison

were left to hold the Kaironi-Manokwari

zone. It is impossible to trace the movements

of the 35th Division headquarters westward

from Manokwari, but it appears that the

march was expected to take forty days. Such

was the supply situation at Manokwari that

the command group could leave that base

with provisions for only twenty days. It is

easy to imagine that in such circumstances

the headquarters personnel and attached

troops were not in the best of shape as they

approached Kor and tried to strike inland

to bypass the TYPHOON Task Force's

positions.

The TYPHOON Task Force quickly increased the number of its outposts, ambush

positions, and patrols. On 16 August, the

day after it was learned that the 35th Division headquarters was approaching Sansapor, elements of the 63d Infantry in the
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 445

Kor-Cape Waimak area killed 17 Japanese

and captured 4. Identified were members of

Headquarters, 35th Division, some troops

of the 219th Infantry, the 2d Army Band,

and, within a few more days, the Signal

Company, 35th Division. By 31 August the

63d Infantry had killed 155 Japanese and

taken 42 prisoners. The American regiment

lost only 3 men killed and 4 wounded.

The 1st Infantry, on the west flank, had

similar experiences as it sent patrols up the

rivers and inland in its sector. By the end

of the month the regiment had killed 197

Japanese and captured 154, while losing

only 4 men wounded itself. The 20th Infantry, which arrived at Mar from Maffin

Bay on 23 and 25 August, had scant time

to participate in the patrolling before the

end of the month, but the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, during its series of farflung patrols, killed 42 Japanese and captured 5 others. Total battle casualties for the

TYPHOON Task Force from 30 July through

31 August were 14 killed, 35 wounded, and

9 injured. Japanese losses during the same

period were about 385 killed and 215 captured (a good many in both categories were

actually Formosans).55

General Sibert had been unable to remain

at Sansapor-Mar to applaud the success of

his troops' patrolling. On 24 August he had

left to take command of the X Corps, headquarters of which had recently arrived in

the theater from the United States. His place

as a commanding general of the 6th Infantry Division and commander of the TYPHOON Task Force was taken over by Brig.

Gen. Charles E. Hurdis, previously commander of the 6th Division Artillery.56

Medical Problems

Although the TYPHOON Task Force's battle casualties were abnormally low, tropical

disease posed a serious problem. On 9 August the first cases of dreaded scrub typhus,

which had been epidemic at Biak and Owi,

were diagnosed at Sansapor. On the 9th, 6

scrub typhus cases were admitted to the

hospitals, 27 the next day, and 62 on the

11th. Daily admittances continued to rise

rapidly for two weeks. At the same time,

"fever, undetermined origin" became prevalent, some cases later to be diagnosed as

scrub typhus or believed to be mild attacks

of that disease. The 1st Infantry was especially hard hit, and by 31 August had lost

9 men dead of scrub typhus, 121 in the hospital with the same disease, and 258 hospitalized with unknown fevers. The epidemic

was no respector of rank. Colonel Privett,

the regimental commander, was laid low, as

were the regimental executive officer, the

S-1, the S-2, the S-3, several rifle company

commanders, and a number of high-ranking

noncommissioned officers.

The scrub typhus had begun among

troops bivouacked at Mar village, and upon

investigation it was found that typhus was

invariably found among troops who had

slept on the ground at one time or another in

native villages or clearings. Immediate steps

were taken to control the spread of the disease. First, most of the medical installations

were moved to healthier locations on the

beach west of the Wewe River. Then, all

bivouac areas were cleared, brush and grass

burned, and large areas around the beach55

 As usual, figures for both American and Japanese casualties vary widely according to the source

and cannot be reconciled. The TYPHOON Task

Force's breakdown for prisoners was 56 Japanese,

154 Formosans, and 3 Koreans. ALAMO Force lists

American casualties as 34 killed and 85 wounded,

but since these are so divergent from the task force's

own figures, they are believed to include nonbattle

casualties. 56 Hist of TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, p. 5.
446 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

head sprayed with oil. Clothing was impregnated with insect repellent and orders

were issued for all men to wear complete

uniforms at all times.57

The antityphus measures were rigidly enforced by officers and noncommissioned officers such as 1st Sgt. James H. P.

Daugherty of the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, who addressed his men in

language doubtless hallowed by Caesar's

centurions: "It's the specific order of General MacArthur, General Krueger, and

General Sibert that all men shall at all times

wear a complete uniform consisting of shirt

or jacket, trousers, leggins and cap, and

that mosquito repellent shall be used about

leggin tops, sleeve cuffs and shirt or jacket

collars. This is to stop scrub typhus. Now—

I don't make these rules but I sure as hell

enforce them—and I enjoy doing it. Are

there any questions? Then—move out."58

By the end of August the strictly enforced antityphus measures began to show

results and daily admissions dropped rapidly. As of the 31st, 275 cases had been diagnosed as scrub typhus, 530 men had been

hospitalized for fever, undetermined origin,

and there had been 9 deaths. The mortality

rate (presumably including men still in the

hospital and not expected to recover) was

about 3 percent.59

Scrub typhus cases, other fever patients,

and battle casualties were evacuated from

Sansapor-Mar by a variety of means. Initially, LST's were employed for the duty,

taking men back to Maffin Bay or Hollandia

hospitals. The hospital ship Tasman arrived on 31 August and began loading patients, while air evacuation began on 23

August. By this combination of means 504

officers and men were evacuated from the

area by the end of August.60

Airfield Construction

Air evacuation had been made possible

because the TYPHOON Task Force's first

construction objective, a 5,000-foot runway,

had been more than met on schedule. On

D Day it had quickly become apparent to

General Barnes of the XIII Air Task Force,

responsible for selecting the location for the

first field, that Middleburg Island offered a

more promising site than the mainland near

Red Beach, where the soil was loose,

swampy spots abounded, and stands of

heavy forest would obstruct the work. General Barnes put off a final decision until he

could make a reconnaissance of the Cape

Sansapor area on D plus 1, but he decided,

after viewing that region, that Middleburg

was the best site, and he decided to go ahead

with a 5,000-foot fighter runway on that

island. The medium bomber field, he determined, would be constructed on the mainland immediately west of Red Beach.

LCT's, which arrived at Mar on D plus

2, immediately began shuttling the men and

heavy equipment of the 836th Engineer

Aviation Battalion and the 617th Engineer

Base Equipment Company to Middleburg,

where the two units were concentrated by 3

August. General Sibert's foresight and insistence that LCT's be included in an early

convoy now paid handsome dividends. With

hard work, the strip on Middleburg had

reached such a stage of completion by 14

August that a crippled B-24 was able to use

it for a successful emergency landing. On

57

 6th Medical Bn Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 2-4;

1st Inf Opns Rpt Sansapor, 15 Jul-31 Aug 44, pp.

4-8.

58

 6th Cav Rcn Trp Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 8. 59

 6th Medical Bn Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 2-4;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 16; Scrub

Typhus Graphs, atchd to Hist of TyTF, 30 Jul-31

Aug 44. 60

 TyTF Surgeon Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 1-2.
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 447

17 August, a day ahead of schedule, General

Barnes was able to report that the strip was

ready to receive fighters. As of that day the

runway was 5,400 feet long and boasted one

alert apron some 1,600 feet in length. Other

alert aprons, taxiways, and hardstandings

were completed by 25 August, the day of the

first Japanese bombing attack on the area

held by the TYPHOON Task Force.

There had been some red alerts before 25

August at Sansapor-Mar and a few Japanese planes had been sighted, but the raid

of the 25th was the first during which the

enemy attempted to bomb or strafe the area.

The only result of this initial effort was damage to a single fighter on the new Middleburg Drome. During the night of 27-28 August, there was a heavier attack, during

which four P-38's on Middleburg were destroyed, an antiaircraft machine gun position wiped out, and two men killed and ten

wounded. Another raid occurred on the

morning of 31 August, when light damage

was incurred at the Middleburg strip and

one man on that island was injured.61

On the mainland, the construction of

Mar Drome did not at first proceed as rapidly as had work on Middleburg Island.

First reports from Allied Air Forces' engineers returning from the Mar site to Hollandia indicated that a field could not be

made ready for bombers until 12 October,

over a month later than had been planned.

It was felt that problems of soil packing,

drainage, and extensive clearing would prevent realization of an earlier completion

date, and it was recommended that the necessary engineer effort be diverted to extension of airdrome facilities on Noemfoor

Island.62

Upon investigation, however, it was

found that the engineers' estimates had apparently been based on a faulty assumption

that the Mar field was to be prepared for use

by heavy bombers. Furthermore, it was discovered that only one half of one engineer

battalion was working at the site when the

examination was made. It was unnecessary

to station heavy bombers at Mar because

such planes could undertake missions against

targets even as far distant as the southern

Philippines from Biak and Noemfoor bases

or from fields which were expected to be

constructed at Halmahera or Morotai. On

the other hand, a forward medium bomber

base on the western Vogelkop was necessary, for only from such a base could strafing

planes—light and medium bombers—reach

Japanese air, troop, and supply installations

in the Celebes, at Ambon, on Halmahera,

and on Morotai.

More optimistic estimates for construction

were possible when additional engineer units

began working at the Mar location. Then,

to avoid some of the worst swampy spots, the

strip site was moved slightly inland, where

it was found that the jungle undergrowth

and forest were not as dense as anticipated.

Finally, it was concluded that the Mar

Drome could be ready for medium bombers

within five days of the target date, 3 September.63

61

 Rad, TyTF to ALAMO, MS-106, 30 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 27 Jul-3 Aug 44; Ltr,

Comdr TyTF to Comdr ALAMO Force, 1 Aug 44,

no sub, and Rad, TyTF to ALAMO, MS-140, 2 Aug

44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 3-8 Aug 44:

Rad, TyTF to ALAMO, MS-137, 1 Aug 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 27 Jul-31 Aug 44;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, pp. 13-14; Hist

of TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, pp. 20-22.

62

 Rad, 5thAF to GHQ SWPA, A-17777-A, 10

Aug 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Sansapor, 8-15 Aug 44;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 14. 63

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, CX-16007, 11

Aug 44, and Rads, TyTF to ALAMO, MS-324 and

MS-387, 11 and 14 Aug 44, all in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Sansapor, 8-15 Aug 44.
448 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

BULLDOZER CLEARING JUNGLE UNDERGROWTH for the construction of

Mar Drome.

The 1879th and 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalions, the 43d Engineer Construction Battalion, the 96th Engineer General

Service Regiment, and the 571st Engineer

Dump Truck Company all spent long hours

of labor on Mar Drome to make the construction target date. The first plane, a

C-47, landed on the field on 2 September.

The next day, exactly on schedule, the field

was declared operational for medium bombers. There was then available a 6,000-foot

steel-matted runway, 4 alert aprons, 2,800

feet of taxiways, and 7 dispersal lanes. By

the 18th of the month, dispersal sites had

been increased to 85, taxiways to 10,820

feet, and the strip had been lengthened to

7,500 feet.64 From the Middleburg and Mar

Dromes innumerable missions were flown in

support of the Morotai landings on 15 September and against Japanese oil installations, shipping, troop concentrations, and

airfields throughout the northern part of the

Indies.65

64

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Sansapor, p. 14; Hist

of TyTF, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44, p. 22. Ltr, Capt

B. L. Mortensen, Hist Div Dept of AF Library, to

author, 27 Oct 49, in OCMH files. 65

 ALAMO Force closed the Vogelkop operation

for historical records purposes as of 31 August 1944.

The 6th Division continued patrolling in the area

until it left for Luzon in January 1945. Elements
AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 449

Insofar as Japanese ground forces were

concerned, the Allied development at Sansapor-Mar completed a circle of air bases

around 2d Army units in western Dutch

New Guinea. That army's troops on the

Vogelkop Peninsula—most of the 35th Division, the bulk of the 2d Amphibious

Brigade, two provisional infantry brigades

formed from miscellaneous combat and

service units, and various service organizations—were cut off, their effectiveness destroyed. They could not mount an offensive;

they could only "sweat it out" to the end

of the war at bases such as Manokwari and

Sorong, or they could attempt to retreat

south and west from those bases to islands

such as Ambon, Geram, and the Celebes.

The Allied landing had caught some of these

forces in transit across the Vogelkop from

Manokwari toward Sorong. In the end, few

Japanese troops were able to escape from

the Vogelkop. Gradually running out of food

and other supplies, they awaited the end of

the war at Manokwari and Sorong or, after

a laborious overland trek, at minor bases

south of the Vogelkop on the Bomberai

Peninsula.

of the 93d Infantry Division took over the defense

of the airfields and some Australian air units ultimately moved into the area, but the fields there

were abandoned before mid-1945. By 4 October

1944, shortly after which date ALAMO Force turned

over control of the area to the U. S. Eighth Army,

Japanese casualties in the area were 695 killed, 94

prisoners, 160 Formosan prisoners, and 7 Korean

prisoners. ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 61, 4 Oct

44, copy in G-2 DofA files.
CHAPTER XIX

The Palaus and Morotai:

Strategic and Tactical Planning

The Strategic Setting

The capture of the Sansapor-Mar area

and the development of airfields there was

the last significant offensive undertaking

executed by Southwest Pacific Area forces

in the Dutch New Guinea region, and with

this operation the campaign in New Guinea

and the offshore islands was strategically, if

not tactically, completed.1 Some 650 miles

of Japanese-dominated islands and sea areas

lay between the Vogelkop Peninsula and

the first objective in the Philippines—Mindanao—toward which forces of the Central

Pacific were also preparing to move. While

the Sansapor operation had been going on,

troops under Admiral Nimitz' control had

completed occupation of the Mariana

Islands and had begun making ready for

the seizure of the Palaus and other islands in

the western Carolines.

General MacArthur's Planning

General MacArthur's plans called for an

advance to the Halmahera area, about midway between the Vogelkop and Mindanao,

on 15 September, and Admiral Nimitz

planned for his forces to invade the Palaus

on the same day. The premises upon which

an advance to the Halmahera region were

based are clear. First, an air base between

the Vogelkop and Mindanao would be

necessary to provide left (south) flank protection against whatever air power the

Japanese could bring to bear from Ambon,

Ceram, and the Celebes against Allied

forces advancing to Mindanao. Second, the

Halmahera air base would be needed to provide land-based air support for the invasion

of Mindanao which, in mid-June, General

MacArthur tentatively rescheduled to begin

on 25 October.

Because it would be impossible to secure

prolonged carrier-based air support for

operations ashore in the Halmahera region,

the target area there had to be within range

of fighters and medium bombers based at

Sansapor. If, before the Halmahera opera1

 The only other important offensive undertaken

in the western New Guinea region was the seizure,

in mid-November, of the Asia and Mapia Island

Groups, lying respectively 100 nautical miles northwest and 160 northeast of Sansapor. Loran and

radar stations were established on these islands,

which were captured by elements of the 31st Infantry Division operating under the control of the

newly established U. S. Eighth Army, commanded

by General Eichelberger. This was the Eighth's first

offensive operation. The naval commander during

the capture of the Asia and Mapia groups was

Captain Lord Ashbourne (RN), In eastern New

Guinea, Australian forces maintained an offensive

against remnants of the Japanese 18th Army in the

Wewak area until the end of the war.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 451

tion were undertaken, it appeared that these

aircraft and longer-range planes from Biak,

Noemfoor, and Darwin, Australia, could not

sufficiently reduce Japanese air power at

Ambon, Ceram, and the Celebes to assure

the safety of Allied forces ashore in the

Halmahera area, then the Arafura Sea

islands might have to be seized also. By June

General MacArthur was beginning to

change his mind about the necessity for

seizing air bases in the Arafura groups, especially since the occupation of those islands

might delay the advance to Halmahera.

Ultimately the Allied Air Forces proved

capable of neutralizing the Japanese air

power in the Ambon-Ceram-Celebes area,

and plans to seize the Arafura islands were

canceled. The Japanese there remained undisturbed except by air raids until the end

of the war.

While the range from Sansapor was an

important factor in the choice of a target in

the Halmahera region, other considerations

also influenced the final decision. The target

had to provide adequate space for airdrome

development and a base area for light naval

vessels such as PT's. Finally, the objective

area had to be a location not too strongly

held by the Japanese, so that in seizing it

General MacArthur would not have to commit such large forces that the invasion of

Mindanao might be delayed.

The requirements limited the choice to

northern Halmahera Island or Morotai Island, lying about twenty-five miles off the

northern end of Halmahera. Since available

intelligence indicated that a strong Japanese

combat garrison was on Halmahera, the

capture of that island would involve a larger

force than General MacArthur was willing

to commit. Moreover, northern Halmahera

could be subjected to Japanese counterattacks from both land and sea. On the other

hand, Morotai Island was thought to be but

lightly defended. Available information indicated that Morotai had ample space for

airdrome and light naval base facilities. The

Japanese could not reinforce the island by

barge traffic once Allied Naval Forces' PT's

and Allied Air Forces' planes began operations from Morotai bases. After consideration of all these factors, General MacArthur, in mid-July, decided that the objective

in the Halmahera region would be Morotai.2

While General Headquarters, Southwest

Pacific Area, was selecting Morotai as the

target in the Halmahera region, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff requested General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to submit comments on the possibility of accelerating the

Pacific war by moving forward all current

target dates or bypassing selected objectives

(including Halmahera, the western Carolines, and the Philippines) in favor of direct

jumps to either Formosa or the Japanese

home islands.3

Neither General MacArthur nor Admiral

Nimitz was willing or able to give approval

to such proposals. General MacArthur, who

felt that bypassing the Philippines would be

tantamount to abandoning those islands, be2

 The foregoing discussion is based principally

on: RENO V, 15 Jun 44, copy in OPD file, ABC

384 Pacific, Sec. 8-C; GHQ SWPA, Outline Plan

for Occupation of Southwest Morotai, 19 Jul 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 19 Jul-2 Aug 44. As it

had for previous operations, ALAMO Force maintained a separate set of records for Morotai. The

decision reached by GHQ SWPA to bypass Halmahera was similar to that reached in June by the

Joint Staff Planners, who concluded that the occupation of Halamhera would be too costly for the

results achieved. See JPS 404/3, 3 Jun 44, Future

Opns in the Pacific, A Report by the Joint War

Plans Committee, in OPD file, ABC 384 Formosa

(8 Sep 43), Sec. 1-C. 3

 JCS 713/8, 13 Jun 44, Future Opns in the

Pacific, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (8 Sep 43),

Sec. 1-C; Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 131401/Z Jun 44, CM-OUT 50007.
452 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

lieved that a move to Formosa would be impossible until land-based air support was

available in the northern Philippines, and

he then considered a direct move to Japan

impracticable.4 Admiral Nimitz, like General MacArthur, pointed out that logistic

and tactical problems made it impossible

to assure meeting current target dates for

scheduled operations, and he felt that Southwest Pacific air forces would have to be

firmly established in Mindanao before any

attempt could be made to move to Formosa.

At the same time, he believed that General

MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by

25 October was too optimistic.5 At the Joint

Chiefs' level, further proposals for radical

revisions in the schedule of operations for

the Pacific were dropped, pending developments in the general situation in General

MacArthur's and Admiral Nimitz' areas.6

Admiral Nimitz' fears concerning the

optimism of the 25 October target date for

the invasion of Mindanao were well

founded, a point also realized by General

MacArthur. During conferences at Pearl

Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of

Admiral Nimitz to co-ordinate Southwest

and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai,

Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest

Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could

be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy

of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the

ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide

air support for Southwest Pacific forces on

Mindanao after carriers had to leave the

latter area and before airdromes could be

developed there. To obtain adequate landbased air support for the Mindanao invasion force, General MacArthur returned to

discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the

Talaud Islands, about equidistant from

Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao,

where the first landings in the Philippines

were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the

Talaud operation would delay preparations

for Mindanao, as would the development of

airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have

the invasion of Mindanao take place much

before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated

employment of assault shipping and carrier

support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first

week in October. General MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on 15 September, the

Talauds on 15 October, and Mindanao on

15 November.7

Central Pacific Plans

Admiral Nimitz' plan to secure Yap and

Ulithi was part and parcel of his program

4

 Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS USA, CX-13891,

18 Jun 44, CM-IN 15058. 5

 Ibid.; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 4 Jul 44,

CM-IN 2926. 6

 JPS 404/6, 9 Jul 44, and JPS 404/10, 29 Jul 44,

both entitled Future Opns in the Pacific, in OPD

file, ABC 384 Formosa (8 Sep 43), Sec. 1-C.

7

 Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH and CINCSWPA, 25 Jun 44, CM-IN 23957; Rad,

CINCSWPA to CINCPOA and CofS USA, C14271, 29 Jun 44, CM-IN 25033; Rad, CINCSWPA

to CofS USA, CX-15229, 23 Jul 44, CM-IN

19231; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Joint Staff Study

STALEMATE, 14 Jul 44 (STALEMATE II), in OPD

file, A49-95; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 4

Jul 44, CM-IN 2926. Neither the Talauds nor the

Mindanao operations were carried out as scheduled.

For details concerning General MacArthur's many

revisions of plans for the return to the Philippines,

see M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: Return to the

Philippines, a forthcoming volume in the series

U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 453

for securing air and naval bases in the

western Carolines to assure the neutralization of Truk and to co-operate with Southwest Pacific forces in gaining control over

the eastern approaches to the Luzon-Formosa-China coast region, the strategic

target area designated by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Originally, Admiral Nimitz' planners

contemplated the seizure of the entire Palau

Islands group, a reef-bound chain that extends about seventy-seven miles in a northnortheast to south-southwest direction and is

twenty miles across at its widest point.8

But operations in the Marianas were taking longer than expected, employing troops,

shipping, and supplies needed for the Palau

operation. This fact, coupled with information that the enemy garrison in the Palaus

was being greatly increased, prompted Admiral Nimitz to abandon plans for seizing

the entire group. Instead, the three largest

islands in the southern section—Angaur,

Peleliu, and Ngesebus—would be taken; the

other islands would be neutralized; and,

finally, Kossol Passage, near the northern

end of the chain, would be secured as an

emergency anchorage. Thus, time and

forces would be saved, for it would be unnecessary to invade the Japanese strongholds in the central section of the archipelago. On Angaur and Peleliu, and possibly

on Ngesebus, airdromes would be developed

to extend Allied control over the western

Pacific and support the invasion of the

Philippines.

To secure an additional airfield to aid in

maintaining control over the western Pacific and in neutralizing the central

Carolines, Admiral Nimitz decided to seize

Yap Island, which lies about 300 miles

northeast of the Palaus. The occupation of

Yap would have the additional advantage

of denying to the Japanese air and submarine base facilities there. Since Kossol

Passage, in the Palaus, would not satisfy all

requirements, Admiral Nimitz also determined to seize for a fleet base Ulithi Atoll,

400 miles northeast of the Palaus. The invasion of the southern Palaus would begin

simultaneously with the Southwest Pacific's

landing on Morotai, 15 September, while the

seizure of Yap and Ulithi would start on 5

October. On 7 July Admiral Nimitz ordered

his subordinate commanders to begin

preparations accordingly.9

Thus, by late July, General MacArthur

and Admiral Nimitz had set and agreed

upon the sequence of operations in the

Southwest and Central Pacific Areas for

the last stages of the approach to the

Philippines:

 10

Morotai and the southern

Palaus 15 September

Yap Island and Ulithi Atoll 5 October

The Talaud Islands 15 October 8 Mindanao (at Sarangani Bay) 15 November CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in the POA During the Month of Sep 44, 7 Mar 45, pp. 30-33,

copy in OCMH files; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Campaign Plan GRANITE, 13 Jan 44, in files of the Navy

Dept; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Jt Stf Studies STALEMATE, 20 Mar, 18 May, 3 Jun, and 14 Jun 44, as

cited in Maj. Nelson L. Drummond, Jr., The Palau

Campaign, Ch.. I, copy in OCMH files. This incomplete manuscript was written by Major Drummond

during a tour of duty with the Historical Division,

SSUSA, in 1946-47. For additional information

concerning the choice of the Palaus as an objective

in the western Pacific, see Ch. I, above.

9

 Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 4 Jul 44,

CM-IN 2926; Rad, CINCPOA to Com3dFlt,

ComIIIPhibFor, et al., 7 Jul 44, CM-IN 6450;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Jt Stf Studies STALEMATE,

14 Jun and 5 Jul 44, as cited in Drummond, The

Palau Campaign, Ch. II; CINCPAC-CINCPOA,

Jt Stf Study STALEMATE, 14 Jul 44 (STALEMATE

II), in OPD file, A49-95. 10

 Rad, CINCPOA to ComSdFlt, et al., 7 Jul 44,

CM-IN 6450; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS,

CX-15229, 23 Jul 44, CM-IN 19231.
454 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Strategic Air Support

With the dates for the final stages of the

drive to the Philippines firmly established,

planners of the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas turned their attention to the provision and co-ordination of strategic air

support missions during the Palau and

Morotai operations. The planners kept in

mind that the major objective of the two

operations was very broad in scope—to secure control over the eastern approaches to

the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area.

Strategic air support had to be planned with

this task in mind, as well as the more

obvious tasks of securing bases from which

future operations could be supported and

preventing enemy interference with the occupation of the Palaus and Morotai.11

It was not expected that the Japanese

could or would retain any significant number of aircraft in the Palaus or the rest of

the Carolines during the weeks immediately

preceding 15 September; what few aircraft

might remain on those islands could easily

be destroyed or driven away by land- or

carrier-based planes prior to that date. Much

the same situation would prevail, it was believed at General MacArthur's headquarters, in the Morotai area. The Allied Air

Forces was expected to be able to neutralize

remaining enemy airfields in western New

Guinea, Ambon, Ceram, the Arafura Sea

islands, and to a lesser extent in the northwestern Celebes, before 15 September. The

remaining Japanese air power would probably withdraw from those targets to the

southern Celebes or to the Philippines.12

The Japanese could be expected to organize some aerial counterattack to the

Allied invasions of the Palaus and Morotai,

since the fall of those islands would signify

the loss of the last strategic defensive positions in front of the Philippines. The Japanese maintained large air centers in the

southern Celebes and Mindanao from which

they could send strong counterattacks

against Allied forces at Morotai unless these

fields were neutralized before 15 September.

Less concern was felt about the possibility of

aerial counterattack against the Palaus,

since the Japanese were not believed capable

of employing effectively many long-range

bombers across the 600 miles of ocean

which separated the Palaus from the principal enemy air centers on Mindanao. No

aerial attacks of any significance could be

launched by the Japanese against the Palaus

from any other direction.13

A program for strategic air support missions to be executed by land-based aircraft

was soon agreed upon by General MacArthur's and Admiral Nimitz' planners.

Shore-based planes of the Central Pacific

were to neutralize Japanese fields at Yap,

Woleai, Truk, and Ponape in the Carolines; to prevent the Japanese from using

airfields on islands of the Gilbert and Mar11

 GHQ SWPA OI 60, 29 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 30 Jul 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Jt Stf Study

STALEMATE, 14 Jul 44, in OPD file, A49-95; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opn in POA Sep 44, p. 34;

JCS 713/4, 12 Mar 44.

12

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44,

p. 27; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Morotai, p. 2; Memo,

GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 28 Jul 44, sub: Coordination of Opns Between POA and SWPA, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27 Jul 44. 13

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Morotai, p. 2; ALAMO Force

G-2 Wkly Rpt 52, 2 Aug 44, copy in G-2 DofA

files; ALAMO Force G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to Morotai Island, Halmahera Group, 1 Aug

44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 3-8 Aug 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44, pp. 27-28.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 455

shall groups not yet occupied by Allied

forces; to hit the Bonin Islands and Marcus

Islands, north and northeast of the Marianas, respectively; and to destroy enemy

installations on Pagan Island, in the northern Marianas. Central Pacific land-based

aircraft were also to fly reconnaissance missions in front of carrier task forces and assault convoys moving toward the Palaus.14

The Allied Air Forces was to reinforce

strikes flown against Yap, Woleai, and Truk

by Central Pacific land-based planes; execute heavy bombing attacks against the

Palaus; and provide Admiral Nimitz' planners with photographic coverage of these

islands. The approach of Central Pacific

carrier forces and assault convoys to the

Palaus would be covered by Southwest Pacific planes flying strikes against southern

Mindanao and Halmahera, and by longrange reconnaissance over the Celebes Sea,

the Banda Sea, and the western reaches of

the Philippine Sea.15 Within the limits of the

Southwest Pacific Area, the Allied Air

Forces was to continue the neutralization of

Japanese air centers in western Dutch New

Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands,

Ceram, Ambon, Boeroe, and the Arafura

Sea islands. Heavy strikes against targets in

the Celebes were also to be undertaken in

order to neutralize Japanese air bases there

insofar as range permitted the Allied Air

Forces' land-based planes to do so.16

Missions assigned fast carrier task forces

of the U. S. Pacific Fleet were even more

widespread, geographically speaking, than

those allotted land-base planes, and they

entailed strikes on enemy installations which

available land-based aircraft could not

reach. Moreover, the carriers' tasks included

strikes of a type not previously executed—

sustained attacks on ground targets where

Japanese land-based air power was deployed in depth and was easily reinforceable,

namely the Mindanao area. Such carrier

operations had previously been considered

unacceptable risks except in case of dire

necessity, but Admiral Nimitz proposed to

send his carriers on what he still believed to

be a hazardous undertaking because he

hoped the attacks on the Philippines might

precipitate another fleet action. Moreover,

he felt that the Philippine strikes would result in widespread damage to Japanese air

power, thereby creating an opportunity for

the Allies to secure control over the approaches to the Luzon-Formosa-China

coast area earlier than might otherwise be

possible.17

Strategic air support missions by the Pacific Fleet's fast carriers were to begin with

a strike against the Bonin and Volcano

Islands, between the Marianas and Japan,

late in August. This strike had a twofold

objective: the temporary neutralization of

Japanese airfields on those island groups

and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger

attacks against targets in the Philippines and

western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with

strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The 14

 Appendix B, Air Plan, to CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Jt Stf Study STALEMATE, 14 Jul 44. 15

 Ibid.; AAF SWPA OI 60, 31 Jul 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 1 Aug 44; Memo, GHQ SWPA, no

addressee, 28 Jul 44, sub: Co-ordination of Opns

Between POA and SWPA, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27

Jul 44; GHQ SWPA OI 60/10, 29 Aug 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 30 Jul 44. 16

 AAF SWPA OI 60, 31 Jul 44; RENO V, 15

Jun 44.

17

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44,

p. 35; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opn Plan 6-44, 21

Jul 44; Appendix B, Air Plan, to CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Jt Stf Study STALEMATE, 14 Jul 44; Annex

E, Air Plan, to Comdr Western Pacific Task Forces

[Com3dFlt, or CTF 30], Opn Plan 14-44, 1 Aug 44,

in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 1 Aug 44.
456 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the

western Carolines on the afternoon of the

8th to take up positions off Mindanao.18

Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were

scattered over that large island, but it was

believed that the cluster of airfields and

associated installations in the Davao area

would provide profitable targets for carrierbased aircraft attacks. The Davao and

Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese

shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga

and thence north toward Manila, were also

expected to provide profitable targets.

Strikes against airdromes and shipping in

the Mindanao area were to be carried out

on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th

and 11th part of the carrier force was to

hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again.19

At first, plans for carrier strikes called

for raids on the Talauds, Halmahera, and

Morotai from 12 through 14 September,

but Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific

Area, was confident its planes could neutralize the Halmaheras and Talauds, and

General MacArthur, hoping to preserve

chances for local tactical surprise, wanted

no strikes against Morotai prior to 15 September. These tentative attacks were therefore canceled in favor of additional strikes

in the Mindanao area.20 On D Day, 15

September, one group of fast carriers was

to hit Japanese air bases at the northeastern

Celebes early in the morning. Thereafter,

this group was to stand by to provide close

air support at Morotai if necessary, strike

Japanese airfields on Halmahera upon

General MacArthur's request, and carry

out general reconnaissance and covering

missions in the Celebes Sea region. At the

Palaus one group of fast carriers, which

would have completed additional strikes

against that island chain from 12 through

14 September, was to be available for close

air support on D Day. The rest of the fast

carriers were to stand by in position between the Palaus and Mindanao ready to

execute whatever close or distant support

missions proved necessary. Close air support at Morotai and the Palaus was primarily the responsibility of escort carrier

groups.21

Final plans for land- and carrier-based

strategic air support of the Palau and Morotai operations were completed by 20 August. The finished program provided for

the most widespread and thoroughly integrated series of strategic air support missions

yet undertaken within the Pacific theaters.

The Objectives

The Terrain

Morotai Island is not unlike Noemfoor

except that everything at Morotai is on a

larger scale.22 The roughly oval-shaped is18

 CTF 38 [Comdr 1st Carrier TF] Opn Order

10-44, 20 Aug 44; Comdr Western Pacific TF's,

Battle Plan 1-44, 9 Sep 44; Annex E, Air Plan, to

Comdr Western Pacific TF's Opn Plan 14-44, 1

Aug 44. 19

 CTF 38 Opn Order 10-44, 20 Aug 44; Annex

E, Air Plan, to Comdr Western Pacific TF's Opn

Plan 14-44, 1 Aug 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA,

Opns in POA Sep 44, p. 74. 20

 GHQ SWPA OI 60, 29 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 30 Jul 44; Annex E, Air Plan, to Comdr Western Pacific TF's Opn Plan 14-44, 1 Aug 44; Memo,

GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 28 Jul 44, sub: Coordination of Opns between POA and SWPA.

21

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44,

pp. 58, 81; Supplement 2, 12 Sep 44, to CTF 38

Opn Order 10-44, 20 Aug 44; Annex E, Air Plan,

to Comdr Western Pacific TF's Opn Plan 14-44,

1 Aug 44; Appendix B, Air Plan, to CINCPACCINCPOA, Jt Stf Study STALEMATE, 14 Jul 44. 22

 Terrain information concerning Morotai is

based principally on: ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of

Enemy Sit with Respect to Morotai Island, Halmahera Group, 1 Aug 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai,
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 457

land is about forty miles long north to south

and some twenty-five miles wide. The coast

line, like that of Noemfoor, has many indentations and all types of beaches, including many that are reef-bound. Inland, most

of the island is very rough and has peaks

rising to 3,500 feet or more. The interior is

covered with thick rain forest. The largest

of the few lowland areas, called the Doroeba

Plain, is located at the southwest corner.

Morotai had come under Portuguese

rule in the late 16th century but passed to

the Dutch early in the next. The Dutch controlled the 9,000 natives indirectly through

the Sultanate of Ternate, Halmahera. Most

of the natives lived along the east, south, and

west coasts, leaving the interior virtually

uninhabited. There was no commercial development before the war and the only white

residents were a Dutch missionary and his

family. The Japanese took over control in

early 1942.

The Doroeba Plain, the only area where

military development is practicable, is about

nine miles wide, east to west, and extends

inland about four miles. From the southwest

corner of the plain the Gila Peninsula extends into Morotai Strait, which separates

Morotai from Halmahera. The peninsula

is about five miles long from the mainland

to Cape Dehegila, at its southern tip, and

has a maximum width of one mile. On the

east side of the peninsula lies Pitoe Bay, the

sea approaches to which are generally free of

obstacles. The bay is deep and exposed to

the weather, leaving much to be desired as a

site for landings. Beaches on the west side

of the peninsula are better protected and,

although reef-bound, appeared prior to the

landing to be better than those on the Pitoe

Bay side. The western beaches provided easy

access to the Doroeba Plain, where, it was

believed, airdromes could be developed

without undue difficulty.

The Palaus were more civilized than

Morotai and some commercial development had been undertaken in the islands

ever since they were occupied by the Spanish early in the 17th century.23

 Spain sold

the group along with the rest of the Carolines to Germany after the Spanish-American war. The Germans lost the chain to

the Japanese during World War I, and

Japan held the islands under League of

Nations Mandate from 1920 to 1935, when

she quit the League and began exercising

de facto sovereignty over the islands. In the

Palaus the Japanese undertook intensive

development of bauxite and phosphate deposits. Colonization was promoted until

by 1941 there were about 16,000 Japanese

in the islands as opposed to some 6,250

natives of Micronesian stock. Over half the

natives lived on the largest island, Babelthuap, while most of the Japanese were

located on the smaller islands to the south,

such as Peleliu and Koror. Koror Town,

on the island of the same name, was the

site of Japanese administrative and military

headquarters. (Map 19)

All the islands of the Palau group are

very irregularly shaped and most of them

are quite hilly. The northern islands are of

volcanic basalt, while those on the south

2-8 Aug 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Typographical Sec.,

Rpt 151, Morotai Island, 23 Aug 44, in ALAMO G-4

Jnl Morotai, 29 Aug-13 Sep 44; ALAMO Force Opns

Rpt Morotai, pp. 4-5.

23

 Information concerning the Palaus is based

principally on: R. W. Robson, The Pacific Islands

Handbook, 1944 (North American Edition, New

York, 1946), pp. 132-46; JICPOA Bul 87-44, 1

Jun 44, Palau Islands; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bul

124-44, 15 Aug 44, Southern Palaus; Maj Frank O.

Hough (USMCR), The Assault on Peleliu (Washington, 1951), pp. 5-9. The latter publication is

the U. S. Marine Corps' excellent official history of

operations in the Palaus.
Map 19
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 459

consist principally of coral and limestone.

Peleliu, the most southerly island enclosed

within the reefs surrounding most of the

Palau group, is about five and three-fourths

miles long northeast to southwest and a little

over two miles wide. On the west, an arm

some 3,500 yards long and 1,000 wide extends northeast from the main portion, and

on the east a short peninsula and reef-connected islets form another arm. Between the

two arms are shoals and swamps. A Japanese airfield was located in the southwest

section of Peleliu.

The western side of Peleliu bears strong

similarity to the southeastern section of Biak

Island. Beginning just north of the airfield

and running northeast up the western arm

is a rough, broken, and densely forested

ridge line like that running along the south

shore of Biak. Equally broken, the Peleliu

ridges presented much the same problems

as those on Biak and provided the Japanese

with similar defensive advantages. Landings

on Peleliu are feasible at many points, but

from the point of view of terrain and proximity to the airfield the best beaches are on

the southwest coast.

Angaur Island, lying about ten miles

south of Peleliu and outside the Palau reefs,

is shaped like a very broad crescent, with

its tips pointing northwest and southwest.

The island is two and a quarter miles long

north to south and about one and a half

miles wide east to west. Flatter than Peleliu,

Angaur's highest point—about 200 feet—

lies in wooded coral ridges at the northwest corner, where the terrain was as broken

and as easily defensible as that in the Ibdi

Pocket on Biak. The Japanese had extensively strip-mined phosphate deposits on

Angaur, and water-filled diggings in the

north-central and northwestern sections

formed two small lakes. Narrow-gauge railroad tracks, running through dense underbrush in many places, connected the various

mine sites.

Angaur has many reasonably good landing beaches, including some that are reeffree. Existing reefs are generally narrow and

drop steeply off into deep water. There was

a pier for small craft at a protected cove on

the west-central coast, and about 400 yards

to the north was a conveyor belt pier extending into the sea with its outer end attached

to buoys. From this apparatus large cargo

vessels were loaded with the product of the

phosphate diggings. No protected anchorages exist off any part of Angaur. The best

beaches are on the southwestern and

northeastern coasts. Ngesebus Island, lying

off the northern tip of Peleliu, is flat, sandy,

and reef-bound. Site of a Japanese airfield,

the island had no defensive potentialities

except for a short, very low ridge along the

western shore.

The Japanese

The Palaus and the Halmahera area were

closely related in Japanese defense plans at

one time or another during the war. Halmahera fell within the 2d Area Army's zone

of responsibility. To defend that island and

western New Guinea Imperial General

Headquarters once laid plans to send the

32d and 14th Divisions to the 2d Area

Army, while dispatching the 35th Division

to the Palaus. As a result of various changes

in plans, previously recounted,24 the 32d

Division and two regiments of the 35th Division (less elements sunk in transit) landed

in Halmahera early in May 1944. One regiment of the 35th Division was first sent to

the Palaus, where it arrived in April. Since

24

 See above, Chs. IV and X.
460 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the Japanese desired to have more strength

in the latter islands, the 14th Division was

dispatched there in April. The 35th Division's regiment then sailed south to rejoin

its parent unit, then on the move to Sorong

and Manokwari from Halmahera, where

the 32d Division remained.25

Lt. Gen. Sadae Inoue, the 14th Division

commander, was also appointed Commander, Palau Sector Group, in which

capacity his area of responsibility included

Yap and Ulithi as well as the Palaus. He

was ordered by Imperial General Headquarters to hold the Palaus at all costs, to

protect the airfields there and deny their

use to the Allies. The main air base—that

on Peleliu—had existed before the war, and

had undoubtedly been employed by the

Japanese for scouting and reconnaissance

missions at the outbreak of war. The

Palaus had also been used as a base by a

small carrier task force which executed the

first Japanese air raids against the Philippines in 1941, and later they were used as

a staging base for units moving to Luzon,

Mindanao, and the Netherlands East

Indies.26 Afterwards, the Japanese had used

the islands as an intermediate staging base

and supply point for troops moving eastward to the 8th Area Army's zone. Upon

the withdrawal of the Japanese strategic

main line of resistance westward in the

spring of 1944, base troops in the Palaus,

under Maj. Gen. Takeo Yamaguchi, passed

to the control of the 2d Area Army, and,

when General Inoue assumed command of

the Palau Sector Group, to the latter's

control.27

The Halmahera-Morotai area had not

assumed much importance to the Japanese

until early 1944, when they began to develop

Halmahera as a focal point for the defense

of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the

Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable

service organizations, and they completed

or had under construction nine airfields on

the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated

nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000

combat troops. Morotai was neglected except for some work at Doroeba Plain. There

the Japanese started an airstrip which they

soon abandoned, apparently because of

drainage problems.28

On Morotai the Japanese had stationed

about 500 men of the 2d Raiding Unit,

which was commanded by Maj. Takenobu

Kawashima. The officers were Japanese but

most of the enlisted men were Formosans,

and the unit was divided into four companies, the dispositions of which on 15 September are unknown. The Japanese had

some grandiose schemes for counterattack

from Halmahera in case Allied forces landed

on Morotai, but by 15 September Morotai

was isolated and there was no chance to reinforce it. Allied air power had destroyed Japanese air strength on Halmahera, brought

to a stop ship movements to and from that

island, and, after D Day, with the aid of

PT boats, should be able to prevent barge

traffic between Halmahera and Morotai. 25

 Details of these movements are set forth in

Ch. X. 26

 For additional information concerning Japanese use of the Palaus during the early months of

the war see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, and Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, both

forthcoming volumes in the series U. S. ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II.

27

 For additional details see above, Ch. IV. 28

 ALAMO Force, G-2 Wkly Rpts 44, 51, and 56,

7 Jun, 26 Jul, and 30 Aug, respectively, copies in

G-2 DofA files; Amendment 1, 1 Sep 44, to ALAMO

Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to Morotai, 1 Aug 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 3-7

Sep 44; ALAMO Force FO 22, 15 Aug 44; ALAMO

Force Opns Rpt Morotai, p. 5.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 461

The Japanese made no attempts to reinforce Morotai in the weeks immediately

preceding 15 September and, possibly in

the vain hope that the Allies might make a

landing in northern Halmahera—an eventuality for which the Japanese were well prepared—apparently forgot Morotai.29

Not so in the southern Palaus, on which

General Inoue had prepared elaborate defenses, nominally in co-operation with Japanese Navy units in the islands.30

 General

Inoue planned to stop invaders at the

beaches, but, in case of defeat at the shore

line, his forces were to fall back on previously prepared positions inland. To aid

beach defense, many offshore obstacles were

constructed and many mines were laid. Inland, there were more mines. Antitank obstacles were constructed ashore, and weapons as well as defensive positions were

concealed. Artillery pieces were well emplaced to oppose landings, and excellent use

was made of natural terrain features for

defense. The ridge lines of northwest Angaur and western Peleliu were honeycombed

with defensive works on an even greater

scale than those on the similar terrain of

southern Biak.

By mid-May the Palau Sector Group had

already taken up many defensive positions.

Headquarters, 14th Division (also Group

headquarters) was at Koror; the division's

2d Infantry was on Peleliu; the reinforced

59th Infantry, less one battalion, was on

Angaur; and the 15th Infantry, with the

other battalion of the 59th attached, was

on Babelthuap and the remaining islands.

Many supporting weapons were already

emplaced, and other gun positions were

rapidly nearing completion. Both Angaur

and Peleliu were divided into four defensive

sectors and each maintained a central

reserve.

Babelthuap and the central islands were

placed under the command of General

Yamaguchi who, in addition to the various

14th Division units disposed in his area, also

had under his command the Sea Transport

Units (probably landing craft and crews)

of the 1st Amphibious Brigade and the various staging base troops previously attached

to the 2d Area Army. On 30 May these

latter troops were reorganized into the 53d

Independent Mixed Brigade (IMB), over

which General Yamaguchi retained command. One of the 53d IMB's six infantry

battalions was sent to Peleliu to reinforce the

2d Infantry, as was the 3d Battalion, 15th

Infantry. The Peleliu garrison also included

artillery, mortar, and signal units, and a

tank organization containing twelve light

tanks. The garrison totaled about 10,500

men, of whom almost 6,300 were combat

troops. The Peleliu Sector Unit, as the

Peleliu garrison was designated, was commanded by Col. Kunio Nakagawa, also the

commander of the 2d Infantry.31

29

 Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 70-74; Japanese

Studies in WW II, 33, 32d Div Opns in the Halmaheras, pp. 2-4, copy in OCMH files; ALAMO Force,

G-2 Wkly Rpts 56 and 58, 30 Aug and 31 Sep 44,

copies in G-2 DofA files. 30

 Information in the rest of this subsection is

principally from: Central Pacific Opns, pp. 20-35,

38, 72; The Palau Operations, pp. 25-40, 45-47,

57-61, 72-74, 78-80; Interrog of Vice Adm Shigeru Fukodome, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 500-30; Drummond, The Palau

Campaign, Ch. V; Encl C, Intelligence, pp. 2-4, to

III Amph Corps Opns Rpt Palau; Hough, The

Assault on Peleliu, pp. 14-18.

31

 Maj. Gen. Kenjiro Murai, probably the commander of the Infantry Group, 14th Division, was

also on Peleliu. His position appears to have been

advisory and served to provide the Army troops

with an officer of rank comparable to that of the

Peleliu Navy garrison commander, Vice Adm. Itou.

Whatever the case, Colonel Nakagawa exercised

the actual operational command. A detailed discussion of General Murai's status is found in Appendix

F, "The Mysterious Mission of Murai," to Hough,

The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 200-202.
462 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Late in July, for unknown reasons, General Inoue withdrew the bulk of the 59th

Infantry to Babelthuap, leaving only the

reinforced 1st Battalion of that regiment on

Angaur. This battalion, commanded by

Maj. Ushio Goto, was the nucleus of the

Angaur Sector Unit (also under Major

Goto), and had attached to it a few heavy

artillery pieces, a battery of mountain artillery, some antiaircraft and antitank guns,

a heavy mortar platoon, an engineer platoon, and miscellaneous service troops. The

garrison totaled about 1,400 men.

Until August the Palau Sector Group

was attached to the 31st Army (command

post on Saipan), in turn under the operational control of the Central Pacific Fleet.

But after the fall of the Marianas Imperial

General Headquarters reassigned the Group

administratively to the Southern Army and

operationally to Headquarters, Combined

Fleet. On 3 September Southern Army informed General Inoue that an Allied invasion of the Palaus was imminent. But the

general apparently took this news with at

least one grain of salt, for on the 8th he

interpreted Allied carrier strikes on the

Palaus as a diversion intended to cover

landings elsewhere. It was not until the 11th

that he changed his mind and alerted his

command to make final preparations to defend the islands to the death.

And by 11 September about all the Palau

Sector Group could look forward to was

death or surrender. Sometime during the

summer of 1944, probably not long after the

Allied invasion of the Marianas and the concomitant naval battle, the Japanese had

come to the conclusion that the Allies might

not land in the Palaus and that seizure of

those islands was not a necessary prerequisite

to an Allied advance to the Philippines. But

shipping could not be risked to take the

Palau Sector Group away from the islands,

and, moreover, should the Allies finally decide to take the Palaus, even a hopeless defense might delay Allied use of the Palau

air bases. On the other hand, the Japanese

were concentrating all their efforts on preparing the defense of the Philippines; they

could spare no planes, ships, or troops to

strengthen islands which they thought the

Allies might bypass.

Therefore, after July 1944, only the

barest trickle of the most necessary supplies

was shipped to the Palaus. And even this

trickle diminished toward September, for

increasingly effective Allied air and submarine operations in the western Pacific did

not encourage the Japanese to dispatch so

much as a landing barge to the Palaus. The

Palau Sector Group was a hopeless case

indeed. It could look forward on the one

hand only to death or surrender in case of

an Allied landing, or on the other hand to

being bypassed and left behind, useless, like

garrisons in New Guinea and the Bismarck

Archipelago that had been isolated earlier

in the war.

Accurate information concerning enemy

defenses in the Palaus was not available to

the Allies until many highly classified documents from the files of Headquarters, 31st

Army, were captured in the Marianas during July.32

 One such document in particular, dated 8 June 1944, gave detailed supply data for Japanese forces in the Palaus

and provided the initial basis for Allied estimates of the enemy situation in the islands

as well as for much of the tactical planning.

32

 This paragraph is based on: Encl C, Int, p. 7,

to III Amph Corps Opns Rpt Palau, Annex D,

Int, to CTF 31 Opn Plan A-302-44, 4 Aug 44;

Annex B, Int, to 1st Mar Div Opn Plan 1-44, 15

Aug 44, and Supplement 1, 24 Aug 44; Annex B,

Int, to 81st Inf Div FO 7, 5 Aug 44, and Supplement 1, 31 Aug 44.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 463

In mid-August new information permitted

remarkably accurate revisions in the Allied

June estimates. By that time, however, the

principal Allied units concerned with operations in the Palaus had completed and issued their final tactical plans. The revisions

were too late or lacked sufficient corroboration to materially change these approved

plans.

Organization, Tactics, and Logistics

The Organization and Missions

of the Forces

The organization of Southwest Pacific

Area forces for the Morotai operation differed little from that for previous operations in the theater. As usual, ALAMO

Force was responsible for the seizure and

development of the objective area, with the

support of the Allied Air and Allied Naval

Forces. The Morotai plan called for the

occupation of a perimeter about fifteen

miles long around airfields to be constructed in the southwest section of the

island. To hold this perimeter, to establish

and protect radar stations around the

island's shores, to seize a beachhead against

a possible regiment of Japanese (which, it

was estimated, could be on Morotai), and

to defend against whatever counterattacks

the Japanese might strain themselves to

mount from Halmahera, General MacArthur considered that no less than a reinforced division plus another regimental

combat team would be needed.33

For this operation General Krueger

chose the 31st Division (most of which was

at Wakde-Sarmi except for one regimental

combat team at Aitape) and the 126th

Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Division (at Aitape). Headquarters, XI Corps,

under Maj. Gen. Charles P. Hall, was

chosen to co-ordinate the operations of the

31st Division, the 126th Regimental Combat Team, and various attached combat

and service units. As Headquarters, PERSECUTION Task Force, General Hall's command had been in action at Aitape from

late June to late August. For Morotai, his

corps was designated the TRADEWIND Task

Force. The 31st Division, under Maj. Gen.

John C. Persons, was to execute the initial

landings as the TRADEWIND Assault Force.

The 126th Regimental Combat Team was

named TRADEWIND Task Force Reserve.

ALAMO Force Reserve for the operation was

the 6th Infantry Division (less one regimental combat team) at Sansapor.34

Other major combat units of the TRADEWIND Task Force were an antiaircraft group

of 3 automatic weapons battalions, 2 gun

battalions, and 1 searchlight battalion; a

medium tank company; a 4.2-inch mortar

company; a signal battalion, less 2 companies; a military police company; the

534th Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

less the Boat Battalion; and the 544th Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, less 1 boat

company. These combat components (including the reinforced 31st Division and the

126th Regimental Combat Team) numbered almost 28,000 men. The bulk of the

service units assigned to the task force were

engineer organizations destined to construct

airfields and related installations. Service

troops totaled about 40,200 men.35

33

 GHQ SWPA, Outline Plan for Occupation of

Southwest Morotai, 19 Jul 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl

Morotai, 19 Jul-2 Aug 44.

34

 ALAMO Force FO 22, 15 Aug 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 15 Aug 44; TRADEWIND Task Force (hereafter

cited as TrTF) FO 1, 22 Aug 44, in ALAMO G-3

Jnl Morotai, 19-23 Aug 44. 35 Ibid.
464 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Naval organization was headed by Rear

Adm. Daniel E. Barbey of the VII Amphibious Force as Commander, Task Force

77, the Attack Force. His amphibious command was divided into two groups totaling

12 destroyers, 2 APA's, 5 APD's, 1 LSD, 39

LCI's, 12 LST's, and 12 LCT's. Also under

Admiral Barbey was a Close Support and

Covering Force, commanded by Rear Adm.

Russell S. Berkey and containing 2 heavy

cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 10 destroyers.

Close air support was to be provided by

Rear Adm. Thomas L. Sprague's Task

Force 78—6 CVE's and 10 DE's.36

 One fast

carrier group of 2 CV's, 2 CVL's, 3 heavy

cruisers, and 12 destroyers—Task Group

38.1—under Vice Adm. John S. McCain,

was to provide additional air support as

needed. This group was not under Admiral

Barbey's control, but was to operate with

his Attack Force by co-operation.37

The Allied Air Forces, charged with the

conduct of land-based air support for Morotai, designated the U. S. Fifth Air Force as

the assault air force for that operation. This

unit was not to conduct strikes on Morotai

before D Day but was to hit near-by Japanese installations on that day and during

the weeks preceding the landings. In addition, the Fifth Air Force was to aid the

CVE's in protecting convoys moving toward Morotai and was to be ready to fly

such close support missions over that island

as might be necessary on and after D Day.

The other echelons of the Allied Air

Forces—the Thirteenth Air Force, the Royal

Australian Air Force Command, and landbased planes of the Allied Naval Forces—

had no close support missions but were assigned many strategic missions. The air

garrison at Morotai was to be provided by

the Thirteenth Air Force and included an

advanced echelon of that unit's headquarters.38

The organization of Central Pacific units

for the move to the Palaus centered on Admiral William F. Halsey as the Commander,

Western Pacific Task Forces, or, administratively speaking, the Commander, U. S.

Third Fleet.39 Admiral Halsey's missions

were as follows: to occupy the Ulithi-Palaus

line; to destroy or contain Japanese naval

and air forces threatening interference with

such occupation; to protect sea and air communications through the forward areas of

the Central Pacific; and to provide air cover

for the Morotai operation in the Southwest

Pacific Area.

Admiral Halsey divided his Western Pacific Task Forces into two major combat

echelons. The first of these was the Covering Forces and Special Groups (Task Force

30), over which Admiral Halsey retained

direct command. The other section was

designated the Joint Expeditionary Force

and was placed under Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson, who was also the commander of the Third Fleet's III Amphibious Force (Task Force 31).

The principal combat component of the

Covering Forces and Special Groups was

36

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 3-4; CTF 77

Opn Plan 8-44, 20 Aug 44. 37

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44,

p. 81, Plate IV; CTF 77 Opn Plan 8-44, 20 Aug 44.

38

 AAF SWPA OI 60, 31 Jul 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 1 Aug 44; 5thAF OI 5, 11 Aug 44, in G-3

GHQ Jnl, 20 Aug 44; 13thAF OI 5, 11 Aug 44, in

G-3 GHQ Jnl, 17 Aug 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt

Morotai, pp. 12-13. 39

 The remainder of this subsection is based on:

CINCPOA Opns in POA Sep 44, pp. 34-35, Plates

IV, V, and VI; Com3dFlt Opn Plan 14-44, 1 Aug

44; CTF 38 Opn Order 10-44, 30 Aug 44; CTF

31 [Comdr Jt Expeditionary Force] Opn Plan

A-302-44, 4 Aug 44, and Change 2, 27 Aug; CTF

32 [Comdr Western Attack Force] Opn Plan A-501-

44, 8 Aug 44, and Changes 1-4, 15, 23, and 31

Aug 44.

466 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force, Task Force 38. Admiral

Mitscher was responsible for conducting

strategic air support missions, for hitting

enemy naval forces threatening landing

operations in the western Carolines, and

for providing close air support for the

Morotai and Palau landings. Also included

within the Covering Forces and Special

Groups was a Heavy Surface Striking Force

of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers

which, in case of fleet action, would be

formed by ships otherwise assigned to Task

Force 38's four fast carrier groups. A Light

Surface Striking Force of light cruisers and

destroyers was to be formed from fire support ships otherwise assigned to Admiral

Wilkinson's Joint Expeditionary Force. In

case of fleet action, this latter striking force

would be transferred to the Covering Forces

and Special Groups. The Special Groups

comprised a flagship group, a service group

of repair ships, an oiler and transport

group, and a hunter-killer group of 1 CVE

and 4 DE's organized to hunt down Japanese submarines. In addition to the specific

missions assigned its component parts, the

Covering Forces and Special Groups had

the general task of utilizing all possible opportunities which might be presented or

created to destroy major portions of the

Japanese fleet.

Under Admiral Wilkinson's Joint Expeditionary Force were the Western and Eastern Attack Forces, assigned the task of securing the southern Palaus and Yap-Ulithi,

respectively. Other components of Admiral

Wilkinson's command were a Fire Support

Group, an Escort Carrier Group, and a

Minesweeping Group. The Western Attack

Force, commanded by Rear Adm. George

H. Fort, had three parts—the Peleliu and

Angaur Attack Groups and the Kossol Passage Detachment. Admiral Fort retained

command over the Peleliu Attack Group

and delegated the control of the Angaur

Attack Group to Rear Adm. William H. P.

Blandy.

Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith (USMC), as

Commander, Expeditionary Troops, was to

be in control of all ground action in the

western Carolines. His position was roughly

analogous to that of General Krueger of

ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific, and

was equivalent to that of an Army commander. The ground force commander for

the southern Palaus was Maj. Gen. Roy S.

Geiger (USMC), who commanded the

Western Landing Force and Troops, or, as

his headquarters was otherwise known, the

III Amphibious Corps.40 The principal

ground combat elements assigned to the III

Amphibious Corps were the 1st Marine Division, under Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus (USMC), and the 81st Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Paul J.

Mueller. The former was to seize Peleliu

and the latter, less one regimental combat

team in corps reserve, was to take Angaur.

In general reserve for operations in the western Carolines were the 5th Marine and 77th

Infantry Divisions. The 1st Marine Division

had seen action on Guadalcanal in the South

Pacific and on New Britain in the Southwest

Pacific. Some 30 percent of the unit's men

had been in both operations and 60 percent

had been in one or the other. The 81st Infantry Division had no previous combat experience and, when assigned to the Palau

operation, was finishing jungle and amphibious training in Hawaii. The 77th Infantry

40

 Not to be confused with the Third Fleet's III

Amphibious Force. The latter was a naval command responsible for the amphibious assault phases

of an operation, while the corps was a Marine organization having functions generally parallel to

those of an Army corps.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 467

MAJ. GEN. PAUL J. MUELLER (left), with Rear Adm, Robert B. Carney

(center) and Admiral William F. Halsey (right).

Division had seen action on Guam in the

Marianas, while the 5th Marine Division

was without combat experience.

Once all objectives in the western Carolines had been secured, responsibility for

their defense and development would pass

to the Forward Area Central Pacific (Task

Force 57), commanded by Vice Adm. John

H. Hoover. The latter delegated his duties

in the Palaus to Rear Adm, John W. Reeves

as the Commander, Western Carolines Defense and Service Forces (Task Group

57.14).

The Palau Tactical Plan

The production of all plans concerned

with the seizure and development of the

Palaus was complicated by many changes in

objectives within the island group and by

many other changes in headquarters, commanders, and units assigned to the operation.41

 Plans started with the concept of

41

 Information in this subsection is based on:

CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Jt Stf Study STALEMATE,

14 Jul 44; 1st Mar Div, Opn Plan 1-44, 15 Aug 44,

and Addendum 3, 4 Sep 44; Com3dFlt Opns Rpt
468 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

securing the entire Palau group, passed

through many changes to a concept of seizing only the southern Palaus, with Angaur

first and Peleliu second, and, ultimately,

called for the seizure of Peleliu first and

Angaur within a day or two thereafter. Although study of operations in the Palaus had

been under way in various headquarters in

the Pacific Ocean Areas since early 1944,

it was not until late May that Admiral Halsey was made responsible for the planning

and execution of those operations. On 1 August he issued an outline plan for the invasion of the western Carolines and left

detailed tactical planning to subordinate

agencies.

Admiral Wilkinson's Joint Expeditionary

Force headquarters started its planning in

May, while the staff of III Amphibious

Corps, located at Guadalcanal, started

work on its planning late the same month.

About mid-June the III Amphibious Corps

headquarters learned it would probably not

be released from missions in the Marianas

in time to participate in the Palau operations. Therefore, a provisional corps headquarters was set up at Pearl Harbor to finish the planning and to carry out the operation. But the III Amphibious Corps was

through in the Marianas earlier than was

expected and was reassigned to the Palau

operation on 15 August. Most of the men

of the provisional corps headquarters thereupon formed the nucleus for the staff of

General Smith's Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops. Final plans of both headquarters were revised as necessary and were

completed within a few days.

The 1st Marine Division began its planning at its camp in the South Pacific early

in June, but it was not until the second

week in August that members of Admiral

Fort's Western Attack Force staff could

reach Guadalcanal for essential joint planning. The division's landing plans were

therefore not completed until late August.

The 81st Infantry Division started its

planning in Hawaii during early July, making many changes as the concept of the

operation was changed. Two regimental

combat teams were finally assigned to the

invasion of Angaur upon their release from

a feinting and reserve role during the assault on Peleliu. The remaining regiment,

initially in reserve for the 1st Marine Division, became III Amphibious Corps Reserve

late in August. At the same time, the 81st

Division was relieved of an earlier assignment to commit one combat team to Yap

or Ulithi. This last revision made it necessary for the division to make provision to

unload the entire unit on tiny Angaur. A

final change was made on 16 September,

when one regimental combat team, assigned

to corps reserve, was redesignated the assault force for Ulithi. Despite such troubles,

and many others for which lack of space

Palaus-Ulithi-Morotai, pp. 1-2; CTF 31 Opns Rpt

Palaus-Ulithi, pp. 1-5; Encl A, Plng, pp. 1-4, to

III Amph Corps Opns Rpt Palaus; CTF 36 [CG

Expeditionary Troops Third Fleet] Opns Rpt Palau,

pp. 1-4; Sec. 1, Plng, pp. 1-3, of Phase I, Plng and

Tng Annex, to 1st Mar Div Opns Rpt Palau; 81st

Inf Div Opns Rpt Angaur, pp. 5-8; 81st Inf Div

FO 7, 5 Aug 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in

POA Sep 44, p. 39; CTF 38 Opn Order 10-44, 20

Aug 44, and changes thereto; CTF 32 Opn Plan

A-501-44, 23 Aug 44; Sec. 2, Narrative, p. 2, of

Phase I, Plng and Tng Annex, to 1st Mar Div Opns

Rpt Palau; Annex G, Naval Gunfire Rpt, p. 2, to

III Amph Corps Opns Rpt Palau; CTG 32.1 Attack

Order A-502-44, 20 Aug 44, and changes thereto;

CTG 32.2 [Comdr Angaur Attack Group] Attack

Order A-264-44, 6 Aug 44, and changes thereto,

in USMC files; Drummond, The Palau Campaign,

Ch. II; extracts and notes from personal diary of

General Mueller [CG 81st Inf Div], 6 Jul-25 Nov

44, prepared by Major Drummond, copy in OCMH

files; Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 10-20.

Further details of 1st Marine Division planning are

to be found in Hough.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 469

prohibits detailed description, most of the

units assigned to the Palau operation had

their plans completed by mid-August, and

final details were settled before the end of

the month.

The 1st Marine Division was to begin

landings on Peleliu at 0830, 15 September,

with five battalions abreast over White

Beaches 1 and 2 and Orange Beaches 1

through 3 on the southwest shore of Peleliu,

opposite the Peleliu airfield. (See Map

VII.) The assault waves were to be carried

ashore in LVT's and LVT (A)'s. The 1st

Marines was to land on the left (north) to

drive up the western shore and clear the

Japanese from the ridges overlooking the

airfield. The 5th Marines was to land in

the center, securing the airfield and dividing the island, while the 7th Marines was

to seize the southern end of the island. The

11th Marines (artillery), reinforced by two

155-mm. battalions of III Amphibious

Corps artillery, was to start moving ashore

at H plus 60 minutes. One 155-mm. battalion was to find positions whence it could

provide support for the 81st Division's

landing on Angaur.

Two beaches were selected for the landings of the 81st Infantry Division at Angaur

on F Day, as the day for landing on that

island was designated. (See Map VII.)

Red Beach, located on the northeast coast,

was about 250 yards wide and was flanked

on its left by a small promontory and on

its right by rough shore at the northern tip

of the island. About 200 feet off the center

of this beach was located a tiny rocky islet.

The 322d Regimental Combat Team was

to land on Red Beach at 0830 with two

infantry battalions abreast, each carried

ashore in LVT's. There was some discussion of whether to commit the assault battalions abreast or in column over narrow

Red Beach, but it was decided that the

landing abreast would have the advantage

of bringing each battalion's heavy weapons

into action sooner than might otherwise be

possible and would prevent confusion that

might result from one battalion's passing

through the lines of another on its way forward. The remaining battalion of the 322d

Infantry was to move ashore on LCVP's or,

alternatively, on LVT's to which they would

transfer in the stream from the LCVP's.

Blue Beach, where the 321st Regimental

Combat Team was to land, was located

southeast of Red Beach and on the eastcentral shore of Angaur. The two were separated by nearly 2,000 yards of rough coast

line and eastern capes of the island. It was

realized that such widely separated landings

were not particularly desirable, but the

choice of beaches was dictated by the nature

of the Angaur terrain and known or suspected Japanese defensive dispositions.

Aerial photography had indicated that an

excellent beach near the northwest tip of

Angaur was backed by terrain which would

make progress inland extremely difficult;

beaches on the southwestern and southeastern shores of the island, although wider and

backed by more favorable terrain than Red

and Blue Beaches, were more strongly defended and more distant from important

objectives, including the northwest hill mass,

which was expected to be the center of

Japanese resistance. Finally, the chosen

beaches had no wide barrier reefs in front

of them.

Division reserve for the landing was the

3d Battalion, 321st Infantry, which was to

land on either beach on call. The III Amphibious Corps Reserve (the 323d Regimental Combat Team) was to make a feint

at a beach not used by the rest of the division

in order to keep the enemy defenders con-
470 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

fused as to the location of the principal

landings. It was hoped that this feint would

also immobilize any enemy reserve.

Once ashore, the two assault regiments

were to drive directly inland to secure a first

phase line, which was drawn approximately

300 yards from the beaches. Not until the

first phase line had been secured in each

regiment's sector were flank units to make

contact between the two assault forces.

Elements of each regiment were then to

sweep back toward the beaches and the

northeast cape to secure the terrain which

had been bypassed on the way inland. The

boundary between regiments began at the

east capes (about midway between the two

landing beaches) and ran west-southwest

about 2,200 yards across the island to a

junction of many of the island's narrowgauge railroad lines at a point about 1,000

yards inland from the west-central coast.

Thence the boundary went south-southwest

until it hit the southwest beach of the island

at Garangaoi Cove, about 600 yards above

the island's southern tip.

The boundary line was arbitrarily drawn

without reference to existing features, such

as some of the narrow-gauge railroads. One

of the principal reasons for selecting such

a line was to place Cape Ngatpokul, one

of the east capes, in the 322d Infantry's

zone of action. Cape Ngatpokul projected

toward Red Beach, and from it the enemy

might pour down enfilade fire on the 322d's

landing operations. One battalion of the

regiment was to swing sharply left upon

landing to secure the cape, while the 321st

Infantry was made responsible for securing

Cape Ngariois, the more southern of the

east capes. The 322d Infantry was also to

secure Cape Pkul A Mlagalp, at the north

tip of the island; the hill mass at the northwest corner of the island; and Saipan Town,

which, lying on the west-central coast, was

the principal Japanese settlement on the

island and the only population center of

any note. The 321st Infantry was to secure

the entire southern section of the island, excluding Saipan town.

The 81st Infantry Division's artillery was

faced with a peculiar problem in providing

support for ground action on Angaur, for

the island was extremely narrow. If the

105-mm. battalions landed on the beach

behind the infantry regiment each was to

support, both would have to fire on targets

less distant than minimum effective support

ranges or from positions from which good

angles of fall could not be obtained. But

there were no near-by islands where the

105-mm.'s could land, and they could not

safely land on Angaur except at the beaches

the infantry was to secure. Therefore, the

105-mm. battalion which was to support

the 321st Infantry was to land on the 322d

Infantry's beachhead, and the latter's artillery was to land behind the 321st Infantry.

Each 105-mm. battalion would fire diagonally across the front into the zone of the

regiment it was to support, thereby gaining sufficient range and trajectory clearance for effective close support and

reducing the danger of range deviations.

Two of the division's 105-mm. battalions

were to land on call at the beaches, while

the third remained afloat as part of the

323d Regimental Combat Team unless it

was needed on Angaur. The division's

155-mm. battalion was to land on Angaur

on F plus 1 day. To provide some heavy

support until the two 105-mm. battalions

could get ashore, a battery of 4.2-inch mortars was to be landed on Blue Beach with

the leading waves.

It is well-nigh impossible to clearly distinguish between the strategic and close air
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 471

support missions flown by carrier-based aircraft in the Palaus area. Fast carrier strikes

were to begin on D minus 9, 6 September,

and were to be preceded by attacks from the

Southwest Pacific's Fifth Air Force, which

was to continue night attacks on the Palaus

while the carriers were in the area. From

D minus 9 through D minus 4, area targets

were to be covered, while attacks on pinpointed targets were to begin on 12 September, in conjunction with naval gunfire

support and mine-sweeping activities.

Fast carriers were also to provide some

close air support on D Day at Peleliu and

F Day at Angaur, in addition to the support

to be obtained from CVE-based planes. No

strikes against Angaur were scheduled for

15 September, but on F Day supporting aircraft were to hit known or suspected gun

emplacements and defensive installations.

There were also to be strafing attacks on the

beaches. Because of the peculiar angle at

which Red and Blue Beaches lay in relation to each other, the strafing groups would

fly a fine collision course if they executed

their strafing perpendicular to the beaches,

as was most desirable. Therefore, both

groups were to head into the beaches almost

due west, with the Red Beach group pulling

up to the right and the Blue Beach group

pulling up to its left.

The original gunfire support plan for the

Palaus called for two days of bombardment

prior to D Day, but the III Amphibious

Corps, concerned over the possibility of

strong defenses near the landing beaches,

especially on Peleliu, asked for four days.

Admiral Wilkinson could not entirely accede

to this request since ammunition was lacking, but he did add one more day's bombardment. This did not increase the actual

weight of ammunition, but rather called for

the expenditure of the same amount over a

longer period of time and in a more deliberate fashion.

The Peleliu Fire Support Unit, comprising 4 old battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light

cruiser, and 9 destroyers, was to start firing

at 0530 on D minus 3. The destroyers and

LCI's (rocket and gunboat) of the assault

convoy were also scheduled to engage in fire

support missions. The bombardment from

D minus 3 through D minus 1 was to be

divided between Peleliu and Angaur. On F

Day the Angaur Fire Support Unit (2 old

battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers,

and 4 destroyers) was to start its work two

hours before the landing. From H minus 30

minutes to H Hour the ships were to hit the

beaches, gradually spreading their fires to

the flanks and inland as the landing waves

approached the shore; from H Hour to H

plus 20 the fire was to be directed inland in

front of the advancing infantry.

Four LCI mortar boats and two LCI

gunboats were to support the landing on

Red Beach, while seven LCI gunboats were

to be in support at Blue Beach. The LCI

mortar boats were to begin firing about H

minus 25 and were to stop when the leading

boat waves were about 1,200 yards from

shore, or H minus 8 minutes. The LCI gunboats were then to fire rocket salvos, after

which they were to continue 20-mm. and

40-mm. fire on the beaches as the leading

waves moved shoreward. Five of the gunboats were to devote special attention to the

area between the two landing beaches.

Logistics of the Palau Operation

Approximately 49,500 troops were assigned to the III Amphibious Corps to execute the occupation and development of
472 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the Palaus during the assault phase of operations on those islands. These troops were

divided between services as follows:

U. S. Army 19, 800

U. S. Marine Corps 24, 300

U. S. Navy 4, 800

Most of the naval personnel were either

organic to or attached to the 1st Marine

Division, although a few were attached to

the 81st Infantry Division or Headquarters,

III Amphibious Corps. The approximate

breakdown among major tactical units was

as follows:

Headquarters, III Amphibious Corps 150

1st Marine Division, reinforced 28,400

81st Infantry Division, reinforced 21,100

About 63,800 tons of supplies and equipment were scheduled to be sent ashore for

the III Amphibious Corps. Of this amount,

the 81st Division was to unload about

29,500 tons of supplies, while the 1st Marine Division, some 7,000 men stronger, was

to put ashore on Peleliu about 5,000 more

tons of cargo. The ships assigned to move

the 49,500 men and 63,800 tons of supplies

to the Palaus were:

 42

The III Amphibious Corps' assault units

were to take with them to the Palaus 32

days' supply of rations, 5 days' supply of

water, 20 days' supply of clothing and unit

equipment, 20 days' supply of fuels and

lubricants, 30 days' supply of medical material, and 20 days' supply of small boat

and motor maintenance equipment. Five

"CINCPOA" units of fire for all weapons

were to be taken ashore during the assault

phase. The 105-mm. howitzers were to be

supplied with two additional units of fire,

while 57-mm. antitank guns were to get

four additional units.43

Such was the general supply plan as determined by Headquarters, Expeditionary

Troops. The 1st Marine and 81st Infantry

Divisions' individual supply plans varied

42

 End A, Consolidated Pers and Tonnage Date,

to Encl G, Transport QM Rpt, to CTF 36 Opns

Rpt Palau; Encl A, Strength of Units, to Encl E,

Pers Rpt, to III AC Opns Rpt Palau; Annex A,

Pers, p. 2, to Phase I, Plug and Tng Annex to 1st

Mar Div Opns Rpt Palau; CTF 32, Opn Plan

A-501-44, 8 Aug 44, and changes thereto. All

personnel figures are approximate since the sources

do not agree in detail and the discrepancies in the

personnel tabulations given above cannot be reconciled from available documents. The shipping listed

under the 1st Marine Division apparently included

that for various III Amphibious Corps units attached to the 1st Marine Division for operations. 43

 CTF 36 Adm O 1-44, 22 Jul 44, in USMC

files. A CINCPOA unit of fire contained an assortment of ammunition selected on the basis of previous operations in the Central Pacific Area.

Among other types, it contained 100 rounds of Ml

rifle ammunition, 1,500 rounds for .30-caliber machine guns, 600 rounds for .50-caliber machine guns,

275 rounds for 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, 250

rounds for 105-mm. howitzers M2, and 150 rounds

of 155-mm. howitzer ammunition. See also Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Okinawa: The

Last Battle (Washington, 1948), p. 38 (n. 68), in

the series U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 473

somewhat in detail, but in one way or another carried out the provisions of the general supply directive. The 81st Division was

to put its supplies ashore in three phases—

(1) in boats of the assault waves; (2) in

floating reserve offshore in LST's or in

LVT's and DUKW's which unloaded the

LST's, to be called ashore when possible or

necessary; and (3) on cargo ships such as

APA's and AKA's, also lying offshore. The

ships of the latter category were to be unloaded as soon as possible after the Angaur

beaches had been secured.44

The 1st Marine Division's supply plan

called for placing ashore within a few days

after the first landings all supplies as required by the general plan. Suspecting that

the terrain on Peleliu might call for extensive use of weapons not usually employed

in open land warfare, the division decided

to take with it ten extra units of fire of

flame thrower fillers and ten additional

units of fire of explosives.45

To unload supplies at the far shore, the

1st Marine Division organized four separate shore party groups, one for each regimental combat team and one to act as

division shore party headquarters. To man

these four groups, six different units organic

or attached to the division were divided sixteen different ways. The 81st Infantry Division assigned to each of its regimental

combat teams for shore party work an engineer combat battalion. These three battalions were not split up, but operated as

integral units under the general direction

of an engineer group headquarters.46

The 81st Division, while loading, reported as its only critical shortage spare

parts for LVT's. At first there was a shortage also in organizational equipment, the

division having arrived in Hawaii with far

less equipment than was needed for operations in the Palaus. Most organizational

equipment shortages were made up prior

to embarkation, though at the last possible

moment.47 Early shortages of the 1st Marine Division included amphibian tanks,

tank spare parts, signal equipment, bazookas, BAR's, pack-type flame throwers,

and submachine guns. By the time the division's ships were loaded all these shortages had been made up, although some

equipment arrived so late that it could not

be properly loaded and had to be crammed

aboard transports in the most expeditious

method available.48

Initial engineer missions, in addition to

shore party activities, were those common

to all amphibious operations—establishing

beach roads, clearing dump areas, cutting

roads inland from the beaches, destroying

enemy defensive installations, and supporting infantry action with demolitions. Two

U. S. Navy construction battalions (CB's)

were to rehabilitate the field on Peleliu for

the use of fighter aircraft, at least, as soon

as possible after landing. This field was to

be extended for bombers, and the Japanese

fighter strip on Ngesebus Island was also to

be repaired. On Angaur, where no airdrome

had previously existed, two U. S. Army

engineer aviation battalions were assigned

the task of constructing, by F plus 30, an

44 airfield and associated installations ade- 81st Inf Div Adm O 3, 7 Aug 44. 45

 1st Mar Div Adm O 1-44, 7 Aug. 44. 46

 Annex E, Shore Party Plan, to 1st Mar Div

Adm O 1-44, 7 Aug 44; Annex F, Tactical Groupings, to 81st Inf Div FO 7, 5 Aug 44; Annex K,

Engr-Shore Party Opns, pp. 2-3, to III AC Opns

Rpt Palau.

47

 Encl D, Supply Rpt, p. 1, to III AC Opns Rpt

Palau; 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Angaur, p. 17. 48

 Encl D, Supply Rpt, p. 1, to III AC Opns Rpt

Palau; Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 31.
474 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

quate for the operations of a heavy bomber

(B-24) group.49

Rehearsals for the 81st Division began on

31 July at Maui Island, Hawaii.50 The first

day was spent on debarkation drills, formation of boat waves, and transfer of troops

from LCVP's to LVT's. The next day the

323d Infantry (less one battalion, which

could not participate because ships were

lacking) made a practice landing, remaining ashore to act as an enemy force while

the other two regiments made their practice

landings on 2 and 3 August. By staggering

landings, all assault elements were able to

participate in reasonably complete rehearsals. However, only 25 percent of the supplies were unloaded and not all the division

artillery could take part, since not enough

DUKW's were available to provide all units

with opportunity to practice unloading

weapons from such vehicles.

Final rehearsals were undertaken in the

Guadalcanal area beginning on 30 August.

On that day the 321st and 322d Infantry

Regiments participated, but artillery and

tanks were not landed. Another landing was

carried out on 1 September by the same

units, this time with some of the artillery

participating and, for the first time, with

actual naval gunfire and aerial support. A

third exercise was executed on 3 September

for the benefit of the 323d Infantry.

Throughout the Guadalcanal rehearsals,

the number of vehicles unloaded was drastically limited, principally because waterproofing material had to be husbanded for

the actual assault on Anguar.

The 1st Marine Division carried out its

rehearsals in the Guadalcanal area, where

training was complicated by lack of space;

by the fact that the division was receiving

40 percent replacements; by the necessity

for organizing new LVT (A) units; and,

finally, by a shortage of some types of

equipment. Artillery units had little time

to practice loading and unloading their

weapons into LVT's and DUKW's. Furthermore, the training area at Pavuvu

Island had in common with Peleliu only a

wide fringing reef, and the last rehearsal

area, the Tassafaronga region of Guadalcanal, lacked even the reef.

The 81st Division's loading, which took

place in Hawaii, was complicated by a

number of factors, notably the many

changes in the concept of the Palau operation. The division's tactical groupings were

not definitely settled until two weeks before

the unit left Hawaii for Guadalcanal; before that time only theoretical loading plans

could be worked out. In the end, almost

all troop loading tables had to be revised,

largely on the basis of inquiry as to which

units were actually loaded on each ship

during a series of staggered staging dates.

About 60 percent of the cargo was loaded

from 26 through 28 July, after which the

loaded vessels took part in the Maui rehearsals. Loading was completed after 5

August, and much cargo had to be readjusted in holds to conform with final tactical plans. It was impossible for the division

to combat-load all its cargo, for many supplies were not received at the docks until

the day the division left Hawaii. As a result,

some low priority cargo was placed in holds

49

 MS, The Pacific—MATTERHORN to Nagasaki

[tentative title], Vol. V of the series THE ARMY

AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, Ch. IX, p. 47. Copy of draft chapter in OCMH files. 50

 The remainder of this subsection is based principally on: Drummond, The Palau Campaign, Ch.

III; Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 20-24, 25-

35; 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Angaur, pp. 14-16;

Encl H, Logistics, pp. 2-3, to CTF 31 Opns Rpt

Palau. Hough, op. cit., provides many additional

details concerning 1st Marine Division staging and

rehearsing difficulties.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 475

above high priority matériel. But sufficient

high priority cargo was available when

needed.

Dispersion of units and supplies at Hawaii created other problems. Most of the

supplies had to be gathered and palletized—

the division pallet-loaded the bulk of its

supplies—at a depot some six miles from

loading piers. Some troops were bivouacked

even farther away. Some confusion resulted

because the division Transport Quartermaster, faced with many changes in tactical plans and groupings, had insufficient

time to publish and distribute loading tables

far enough in advance to permit subordinate units properly to prepare their own

plans. General Mueller finally directed regimental commanders to assume the loading

responsibilities for their regiments and attached combat team units. Final loading

was greatly decentralized, and the G-4 Section did not have a complete picture of the

situation. There were many last-minute improvisations, such as employing one AKA

as a cargo overflow vessel and drawing up

new storage charts as ships were loaded. By

12 August, however, the division was completely loaded except for some medical matériel, not immediately available, which was

flown to Guadalcanal for last-minute stowing aboard ships.

The 1st Marine Division, like the 81st

Division, was plagued by necessity to load

and rehearse simultaneously and by the late

arrival of many cargo ships at Guadalcanal.

Detailed planning for loading was impossible until the last moment, and inevitably

many compromises and improvisations had

to be made. Loading operations were undertaken at five widely separated points in the

Guadalcanal area, and many ships had to

pick up parts of their cargoes at two or

more places. Finally, shortage of lighterage

and docking facilities at some loading areas

complicated staging.

For large cargo vessels, no unusual loading methods were employed. Insofar as possible, all were combat-loaded and much

cargo, especially rations, ammunition, and

medical supplies, was palletized. For

LST's, loads averaged from 500-750 tons.

Bulk cargo was placed along one side of the

LST tank decks, care being taken not to

block door entrances, and was so arranged

that three rows of vehicles could be stowed

on the tank decks. Some bulk cargo was

placed under DUKW's; some was placed in

bins in the after section of the tank decks;

and none was stowed to a height of over

four feet. All loading and cargo readjustment for amphibious craft was completed

before 4 September, upon which date the

Palaus assault convoys began leaving the

Guadalcanal area.

The Tactical and Logistic Plan

for Morotai

Since little opposition was expected at

Morotai and since it was extremely important to develop airfields on that island rapidly, the landings there were to take place

close to the prospective airfield sites on the

Doroeba Plain of southwest Morotai. (Map

20). General Krueger originally wanted

landings to be made on both sides of the

Gila Peninsula, jutting south into Morotai

Strait from Doroeba Plain, but Admiral

Barbey was opposed to this plan. First, exposed waters and lack of good anchorages

on the east side of the peninsula would make

unloading difficult, and second, landings on

both sides would interfere with naval gunfire support and endanger the troops pouring ashore. It was therefore decided that the

first landings would be made on two
Map 20
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 477

beaches—White Beach on the west side of

the Gila Peninsula and Red Beach on the

mainland coast above the west head of the

peninsula.

The 124th Infantry, 31st Division, was to

begin landing on White Beach at 0830, 15

September, in column of battalions. One

battalion was to swing south to secure the

Gila Peninsula while the other two drove

inland and northeast along the south coast

of Morotai to secure a beachhead area about

1,000 yards deep. The 167th Infantry, 31st

Division, was to land in column of battalions on the south half of Red Beach beginning at 0830. This beach, located some

1,500 yards north of White Beach, was

nearly opposite the seaward end of Pitoe

Drome, as the abandoned Japanese airstrip

on Morotai was designated. Two battalions

were to drive inland to secure the drome

while the other assembled in reserve. On the

north (left) half of the beach the 115th Infantry, 31st Division, was to land in column

of battalions to drive inland north of Pitoe

Drome in conjunction with the advance of

the 167th Infantry. The D-Day objective

line for both regiments was situated about

2,200 yards inland.51

Leading waves at Red Beach were to

consist of LVT's, while the assault on White

Beach was to be made in LCPR's. These

waves were to be supported by LCI rocket

and gun boats, which were to move as close

inshore as the fringing reef would permit.

Plans for the landing of artillery, engineers,

and other supporting arms and services were

similar to those employed in previous operations in the Southwest Pacific. There was,

however, one unusual feature concerning

the employment of the 126th Regimental

Combat Team, TRADEWIND Task Force Reserve. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry

(less its heavy weapons company), was to

go ashore on D Day at White Beach expressly for the purpose of providing labor

at the beachhead. The rest of the combat

team was to reach Morotai on D plus 1.52

As usual, the Allied Naval Forces was

to move the first troops and supplies of the

TRADEWIND Task Force to Morotai. General Headquarters expected that the Services of Supply would relieve the Allied

Naval forces of this responsibility on D plus

15. Allied Naval Force units were responsible for providing their own supplies, but

in an emergency could draw from Services

of Supply stocks. Most of the Allied Air

Forces supplies were to be provided through

air forces supply channels, but others were

to be provided by the Services of Supply.

At Morotai, Australian engineer units attached to the TRADEWIND Task Force were

to be provided with rations and clothing by

the task force upon request. Netherlands

Indies Civil Administration units were to

draw all their supplies in the forward area

through the task force quartermaster.

The various ground elements of the task

force were to draw their initial supplies

from Services of Supply bases or ALAMO

Force supply points at which each unit

staged for the operation. ALAMO Force was

responsible for resupply. Typical among the

measures taken by ALAMO Force to carry

out this responsibility was a provision to

have one unit of fire for all weapons of assault units sent to Morotai on each of two

troop-carrying ships on D plus 1. Another

example was provision for sending forward 51

 ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Morotai, p. 6; CTF 77

Opns Rpt Morotai, p. 3; TrTF FO 1, 22 Aug 44;

TRADEWIND Assault Force (hereafter cited as TrTF)

FO 1, 28 Aug 44, filed with other materials atchd

to the TrTF Opns Rpt.

52

 CTF 77 Opns Plan 8-44, 20 Aug 44; CTF 77

Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 10-11; TrTF FO 1, 22

Aug 44; TrTF FO 1, 28 Aug 44.
478 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

twenty-five tons of rations on each LST

scheduled to arrive at Morotai on D plus

1, D plus 2, and D plus 4. The Allied Air

Forces was to be prepared to transport

supplies by air to Morotai in an emergency.53

The assault echelons of the TRADEWIND

Task Force (units reaching Morotai from

D Day through D plus 4) were to be provided with 10 days' supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment (except ordnance and

engineer unit equipment), fuels, and lubricants. Ordnance equipment was limited to

organizational sets of spare parts, while 30

days' supply of engineer unit equipment

was to be taken forward. Because of anticipated rain and dampness at the objective,

all units were to take 30 days' supply of

cleaning and preserving materials for all

weapons. Provision for engineer construction matériel was the same as that for previous operations. A schedule of shipment

for such cargo was established to coincide

with anticipated progress of construction at

that island.

The assault units were provided with two

units of fire for all weapons and five units

of fire of fragmentation hand grenades. At

Morotai, ammunition dumps were to be

established to provide three units of fire for

all weapons. After D plus 4, additional supplies were to be sent forward to furnish 30

days' supply of rations, clothing and unit

equipment, fuels and lubricants, medical

supplies, engineer equipment, and motor

maintenance equipment. Most troops of the

assault echelons were to go ashore with two

full canteens of water on each man's belt.

This practice had become general in the

Southwest Pacific, since there was no means

of ascertaining in advance how long it might

take engineers to set up water supply points

at the various objectives.54

Rapid air-base development was required

at Morotai, since the Talaud operation was

scheduled to follow within a month and

Mindanao within two months. An immediate local requirement at Morotai was the

quick construction of a fighter strip from

which the island's troops and development

projects could be protected after carrierbased aircraft left the area. The latter program called for the construction of facilities

on Morotai for two fighter squadrons by D

plus 2, 17 September, and this objective required a fighter strip 5,000 feet long and

100 feet wide.

The long-range program provided for

construction of another strip 7,500 feet long,

with associated facilities, by D plus 25, 10

October. By that date the Morotai fields

were to be ready to take care of fighters,

medium bombers, night-fighters, and the

large PB4Y reconnaissance bombers. By D

plus 45, in time to support the landings on

Mindanao, another strip 6,000 feet long

and capable of extension to 7,000 feet was

to be ready to provide space for more medium bombers and two groups of heavy (B24) bombers. Other construction requirements included fuel storage facilities,

wharves and jetties, storage warehouses,

hospital facilities, light naval base facilities

for PT's, roads, camps, and headquarters

buildings for both ground and air units.55

53

 USASOS SWPA, Logistics Instructions 60/

SOS, 9 Aug 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 10 Aug 44;

ALAMO Force Adm O 12, 16 Aug 44, in G-3 GHQ

Jnl, 15 Aug 44; TrTF Adm O 1, 23 Aug 44, in

ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 23-24 Aug 44; Annex F,

Logistic Plan, to CTF 77 Opn Plan 8-44, 20

Aug 44.

54

 USASOS SWPA LI 60/SOS, 9 Aug 44; ALAMO

Force Adm O 12, 16 Aug 44; TrTF Adm O 1, 23

Aug 44. 55

 5thAF OI 5, 11 Aug 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 20

Aug 44; Annex 8, Engr Plan, to ALAMO Force FO

22, 15 Aug 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 15 Aug 44.
THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: PLANNING 479

As had been the case in the Sansapor operation, an engineering officer of the Allied

Air Forces (Brig. Gen. Donald R. Hutchinson (USA) for Morotai) was attached to

the TRADEWIND Task Force for the sole purpose of selecting airdrome sites and establishing priorities for the construction of airfields and associated facilities. His decisions

were to be binding upon the Commander,

TRADEWIND Task Force. However, if General Hall thought that General Hutchinson's selections might interfere with the

ability of the task force to meet assigned

construction target dates, the task force commander would refer any disagreements to

ALAMO Force for decision.56

56

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO and AAF SWPA,

CAX-1335, 6 Sep 44; Rads, ALAMO to TrTF, WH1616 and WH-3203, 6 and 8 Sep 44, respectively.

First two rads in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 3-7 Sep

44, third in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 8 Sep 44.
CHAPTER XX

The Morotai Operation

The Landing

With the logistic, tactical, and airfield

development plans completed, Morotai unit

commanders turned their attention to solving final problems of staging and to conducting rehearsals. Unforeseen difficulties

made it necessary to draw up intricate staging schedules, which resulted in the most

complicated staging plan employed in the

Southwest Pacific since the HollandiaAitape operations.

Final Preparations and the Approach

Initially, General Krueger had hoped to

stage the entire TRADEWIND Task Force at

Maffin Bay, but as early as the 22d of July

it began to appear to his planners that the

crowded conditions and inadequate facilities at Maffin Bay would make such a plan

impossible of execution.1 Therefore, the

ALAMO G-4 Section recommended that

staging be divided, with task force headquarters, task force artillery, the 124th

Regimental Combat Team of the 31st Division, and the task force reserve staging

at Aitape, where all were already located.

The 31st Division, less the 124th RCT,

would be mounted at Maffin Bay, where

no more than 1,000 men of the Allied Air

Forces would also load. Most of the air

force units would be staged at Hollandia or

Biak, while various engineer units would

be staged at Hollandia, Aitape, Maffin Bay,

Sansapor, and Finschhafen. Realizing that

no other solution was possible, however desirable, General Krueger and Admiral

Barbey approved the split staging plan.2

In order to prepare the necessary airfields and associated facilities at Morotai

on schedule, the staging and shipment of

engineer units was planned so that most of

these organizations would reach Morotai

by D plus 3. Nearly all the rest of them

were to arrive by D plus 6, and rear echelons of all were to close at Morotai by D

plus 16.3 By 3 September these staging

plans, as well as the tactical and logistic

1

 Memo, Lt Col F. L. McDonald [with ALAMO

Plng Gp at GHQ SWPA] to ACofS G-3 ALAMO, 22

Jul 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 5-19

Jul 44.

2

 Memo, ACofS G-4 ALAMO to CofS ALAMO, 23

Jul 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Morotai, 5-19

Jul 44; Memo, ACofS G-4 ALAMO to Deputy CofS

ALAMO, 23 Jul 44, no sub, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl Morotai, 16 Jul-28 Aug 44; Memo, Asst ACofS G-3

ALAMO to ACofS G-3 ALAMO, 24 Jul 44, no sub;

Memo, Actg ACofS G-3 ALAMO to CofS ALAMO,

25 Jul 44, no sub; Memo, Col McDonald to Asst

ACofS G-3 ALAMO, 26 Aug 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt

Morotai, p. 8. 3

 Memo, Col McDonald to Asst ACofS G-3

ALAMO, 26 Jul 44. No final shipment plan for the

engineers can be found. The plan given above is

based on the dates the various units reached

Morotai as established from their after action

reports.
THE MOROTAI OPERATION 481

plans for all air, naval, and ground units,

had been completed. The bulk of the assault shipping and landing craft had

reached the two principal staging areas—

Aitape and Maffin Bay—on 2 and 3 September to begin loading and to conduct

rehearsals.4

Rehearsals were carried out at Aitape on

4 September for the 124th Regimental

Combat Team and smaller units scheduled

for the assault on White Beach. The Shore

Battalion, 534th Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment, for the especial benefit of which

the rehearsal was undertaken, came ashore

in good order. Despite the fact that the

battalion had had no previous assault experience, General Hall, the task force commander, terminated the rehearsal at midmorning. By that time no bulk stores had

been unloaded and many vehicles had not

been sent ashore. General Hall had called

off the rehearsal because it was difficult to

find dispersal room for all the supplies and

equipment which had been unloaded; because some scarce equipment was in danger

of being damaged; and, finally, because

much time would be needed to reload the

ships. Admiral Barbey believed that none

of these considerations outweighed the

value of complete rehearsal, particularly in

view of the large tonnage of supplies and

equipment to be unloaded at Morotai during the assault phase. However, actual landing conditions at Morotai later indicated

that more complete rehearsals might have

had little value.5

Red Beach assault units carried out a

rehearsal on the mainland east of Wakde

Island on 6 September. Landings again proceeded smoothly and rehearsals were curtailed. Some LST's did not beach and

others could not discharge all their vehicles

because the rehearsal beaches were not particularly good. Many other vehicles were

not unloaded because the 31st Division, like

the 81st, did not have sufficient waterproofing material for both extended rehearsals

and the assault.6

Final loading took place generally without difficulty except at Aitape, where adverse surf conditions made it necessary to

use LCT's to ferry troops from the beach to

ships lying offshore. At Maffin Bay most of

the embarkation was carried out directly

from the beach except that some troops were

ferried from the shore to LCI's by DUKW's.

Loading was completed at Aitape on the

8th, and that section of the assault force left

the area the next day to rendezvous on the

11th with the Maffin Bay group. Departing

Maffin Bay on the 12th, the convoy was

joined on the 13th by the Covering Force

and the escort carriers. To achieve as much

secrecy as possible, the convoy was routed

forty miles north of Biak and thence northwest out of sight of the Asia and Mapia Islands, where the Japanese were believed to

maintain garrisons and radio stations.

Movement beyond Biak was practically

without incident. There was one suspected

submarine contact, but the undersea boat

could not be found; one soldier fell overboard from an LCI during a dark night,

but he, fortunately, was picked up by another LCI. An unexpectedly strong westerly

current was encountered, forcing the convoy to reduce speed in order not to reach

4

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Morotai, p. 7; TRADEWIND

Task Force, Hist of the INTERLUDE [Morotai] Opn,

4 Aug 44 to 4 Oct 44, p. 12 (hereafter cited as

TrTF Hist of INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44). 5

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 7-8; 4th Engr

Special Brigade, Monthly Hist Rpt, 30 Sep 44,

Sec. I, Opns, p. 2. 6

 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
482 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Morotai too early. Landfall was made as

scheduled on the morning of the 15th.

Apparently, neither the destination nor the

approach of the attack force had been detected by the Japanese.7

Air Support and Naval Bombardment

In order to preserve chances for tactical

surprise at Morotai, there was no preliminary air or naval bombardment of that

island prior to D Day.8 However, for fourteen days preceding 15 September landbased planes of the Allied Air Forces had

carried out especially heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai.

Halmahera Island, the northern Celebes,

and Ceram received most attention. In addition, Japanese fields on the Vogelkop and

Bomberai Peninsulas of western New

Guinea were kept neutralized, and raids

against Davao on Mindanao had been undertaken in conjunction with the strikes of

the Third Fleet's carrier task groups against

the Philippines.

As a result of the land-based and carrierbased aircraft operations, Morotai was virtually isolated from possible Japanese air

counterattacks when D Day dawned. But,

in order to take no chances that the enemy

might have managed to keep a few planes

operational within range of the island, attacks on enemy air bases in the Morotai area

were executed as planned during the morning of D Day. Planes of a supporting fast

carrier task group executed a bombing and

strafing sweep over Japanese air bases in

the Manado area of the northeastern Celebes, about 250 miles west-southwest of

Morotai. The carrier-based planes, which

destroyed twenty-eight Japanese aircraft on

the ground, met no aerial opposition. After

that strike, the fast carriers stood off Morotai the rest of the day, providing combat air

patrols.

Early on D-Day morning, land-based

bombers of the Allied Air Forces hit Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, off

the southern end of Halmahera. At 0715

cruisers and destroyers of the Covering Force

moved into Galela Bay, at the northwestern

end of Halmahera, to bombard enemy airfield installations and ground defenses along

the shores of that bay. The shelling cratered

the airfields and set fire to a number of

buildings and supply dumps in the same

area. A few troop and cargo barges also

were destroyed. Following the surface bombardment, which lasted about an hour,

CVE-based planes swept over northern

Halmahera. Beginning at 0900 land-based

bombers took over the task of keeping the

enemy fields in that area neutralized. As a

result of the combined efforts of aircraft

from the Third Fleet, the Seventh Fleet, and

the Allied Air Forces, not a single Japanese

plane approached within range of Morotai

during the day.

Naval fire support at Morotai began two

hours before landing time. Two destroyers

opened up on Cape Dehegila, at the southern tip of the Gila Peninsula, and Mitita

Island, about three miles off the cape, to

cover the movement of the assault convoy

northwest through the strait between the

two. This harassing fire lasted for half an

hour. From H minus 100 to H minus 40

minutes 2 heavy cruisers threw 400 rounds

of 8-inch ammunition on Red and White

7

 Ibid., p, 2; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Morotai, pp.

9-10; TrTF Hist of INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44,

p. 15; British Combined Operations Observers

SWPA, Report of Naval and Army Observers on the

Morotai Operation, 30 Sep 44, pp. 9, 14-15, 74,

filed with other TrTF records. 8

 This subsection is based principally on CTF 77

Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 10-15; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44, pp. 80-81.
THE MOROTAI OPERATION 483

Beaches, and destroyers hit the area with

2,400 5-inch shells. After the destroyer fire

ceased, LCI rocket boats and gunboats

kept up a steady stream of 20-mm., 40-mm.,

and 3-inch fire on the beaches and, beginning at H minus 5 minutes, started a barrage of 4.5-inch rockets. All this fire was

actually precautionary, since no enemy

defenses had been found and no opposition

was expected.

While the naval bombardment was going

on, assault shipping moved into assigned

positions west of the landing beaches,

quickly and without confusion. Visibility

was excellent, the sea was calm, and there

were only light surface winds. APD's

quickly launched LCPR's which were to

take the assault troops of the 124th Infantry to White Beach, and LST's were equally

fast in putting into the water the LVT's

of the Red Beach assault waves. The leading waves formed rapidly and moved on an

accurate course toward the proper beaches.

The Landing Beaches

LVT's carrying the assault troops of the

155th and 167th Infantry Regiments to

Red Beach were on shore at 0830, H Hour.9

(See Map 20.) Men of the 124th Infantry

disembarked from LCVP's on the coral

fringing reef some eighty yards offshore

and waded through water one to five feet

deep to White Beach, where the first troops

were reported ashore at 0831. There was

no opposition to the landings and the assault troops, once ashore, rapidly re-formed

their tactical units and started moving inland or along the shore line to perform assigned missions. The lack of opposition was

indeed fortunate. Had the Japanese been

prepared at Morotai, Allied casualties

would probably have been extremely heavy.

Offshore conditions and, to a lesser extent, beach terrain at Morotai were not at

all what had been expected. Available intelligence was not faulty—it was nonexistent. In order to preserve the element of

local tactical surprise, no beach or reef reconnaissance had been attempted at Morotai before 15 September, and even aerial

photographic missions had been few and far

between lest the Japanese suspect that the

Allies were interested in the island. Thus,

the landing was planned on the assumption

that Red Beach would prove to be 40 to 50

feet deep and composed of firm sand and

that the fringing reef, 100 to 135 yards wide,

would be rough but firm and covered in

spots with a light sand deposit. White Beach

was expected to be 15 to 20 feet deep and

fronted by a rather rough fringing reef about

80 yards wide. There was some suspicion

that these estimates might prove optimistic.

In point of fact, offshore conditions at

Red Beach were undoubtedly the worst encountered in the Southwest Pacific Area

throughout the entire war. The expected

light sand deposits proved to be principally

a deep mixture of glutinous clay and mud,

much of which had only a thin covering of

sand. The inshore side of the reef was covered with many loose coral boulders. Finally,

the beach itself was much less deep in

spots—especially at high tide—than had

been anticipated.

At Red Beach all the landing craft waves

touched the outer edge of the reef approxi9

 This subsection is based on: CTF 77 Opns

Rpt Morotai, pp. 12, 19-22; British Combined

Opns Obsrs SWPA, Rpt on Morotai, pp. 12-13,

30; TrTF Hist of INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44, pp.

15-17; 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 30 Sep 44,

Sec. I, Opns, pp. 3-5; 544th EB&SR Opns Rpt

Morotai, Secs. IV and V, n. p.; 534th EB&SR

Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 1-3; 31st Inf Div [TrTF]

Arty Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 1-2.
484 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

LCI'S AT MOROTAI unloading troops at Red Beach.

mately on schedule and the LVT's had little

difficulty negotiating the reef. LCI's moving

up to the outer edge of the reef at H plus

15 minutes disgorged troops in from 3 to 5

feet of water. Some of the LCI's stuck on

coral heads near the outer edge of the reef

and troops had to disembark in neck-deep

water. Several LCI's were unable to retract

and had to be towed off the reef later in the

day. LCT's did somewhat better and many

of them got to within 40 yards of the beach.

But about 75 percent of the engineer vehicles and equipment from the LCT's

bogged down in the clay or sand on the

reef. LCM's bringing artillery and engineer

weapons, equipment, and vehicles ashore to

Red Beach had little better luck, and most

LCM cargo had to be towed ashore. Some

vehicles drowned out as they awaited towing.

It had been intended that LST's would

move into the left flank of Red Beach, but

some misunderstanding of orders caused

three LST's to come in on the right flank,

approximately 1,000 yards south of the center of the beach. These three dropped their

ramps about 80 yards offshore and started

unloading into four and a half feet of water.

As had been the case with the cargo aboard

smaller landing craft, many of the vehicles
THE MOROTAI OPERATION 485

aboard the LST's quickly got stuck in the

clay and mud or were hung up on coral

heads. Ultimately, many had to be towed

ashore by bulldozers, tractors, or LCT's.

Three more LST's later tried to beach at the

same place. Conditions were so bad that

these three were moved to positions off the

center of Red Beach and unloaded over

their ramps into LCT's. At 1130 two additional LST's scheduled for D-Day unloading at Red Beach were diverted to White

Beach.

The latter was not much better than Red

Beach. Clay and mud conditions were not

quite as unfavorable as on the reef fronting Red Beach, but the White Beach reef

was 150 yards wide, 70 more than had been

anticipated, and it was much rougher than

expected. As a matter of fact, the leader of

the first LCVP wave had decided, upon approaching the shore, that White Beach

would be an impossible landing point. He

swung his wave about 300 yards to the

north where, unfortunately, conditions were

no better. The rest of the landing waves

moved up to the offshore edge of the reef

opposite the proper spot. But anywhere in

the immediate vicinity of White Beach

movement ashore was difficult. The reef was

so rough that at one step an infantryman

would have little more than the soles of his

shoes under water, but at the next he would

find himself up to his shoulders.

The experience of LCI's at White Beach

was similar to that at Red Beach. At the

extreme outer edge of the reef there was a

low ridge one to two feet higher than the

rest of the reef. This ridge stopped landing

craft such as LCT's and LCM's about 100

yards offshore. As a result, many vehicles

were discharged into about four feet of

water, most of them to drown out or bog

down in mud and clay. Even some DUKW's

got caught in the mud, while many others

became hung up on coral heads.

Before noon the reefs in front of both

Red and White Beaches were literally

dotted with wheeled vehicles of all types,

artillery pieces, tractors, bulldozers, and

trailers that had bogged down in the mud,

dropped into holes, or had caught on coral

heads or coral boulders. Some, not recovered for days, were completely submerged at high tide. It was impossible to

do a great deal on D Day to speed unloading operations. For instance, U. S. Navy

demolition experts were available but to

use them to blast the reefs would have delayed unloading and would not have

effected any significant improvement on D

Day. Again, at Red Beach only three of

eight Shore Party bulldozers launched from

LST's were able to reach the beach. At

White Beach all the Shore Party bulldozers

reached shore but the necessity for employing them in towing other vehicles to shore

delayed clearing beach exits and dispersal

of supplies on the mainland.

By 1445 conditions on Red Beach were

accepted as impossible and direct unloading of LST's was practically stopped. Four

LST's were withdrawn from the reef but

unloading of mobile loads was continued

over their ramps into LCT's or LCM's.

Then, with the afternoon rise in tide, three

LCT (6)'s and one set of ponton causeways were beached. Thereafter, LCT's and

LCM's discharged LST cargo across these

emergency piers. Even so, the six LST's at

Red Beach were only 40 percent unloaded

by dark on D Day; unloading continued

throughout the night. The six were not

completely discharged until D plus 1.

At White Beach, about 1000, a trial LST

beaching was undertaken but the ship was

only able to get within 100 yards of the
UNLOADING AT MOROTAI. The clutter off the original beaches (top) . LST's

at Blue Beach (bottom).
THE MOROTAI OPERATION 487

shore, dropping its ramp in nearly 5 feet of

water. The Beach Party undertook a rapid

hydrographic survey and discovered a much

better beach about three quarters of a mile

to the south. New White Beach, as the area

was designated, had clear approaches and a

much smoother offshore reef. One LST ran

into New White Beach at 0930 and by noon

six LST's, including the two diverted from

Red Beach, were unloading there. Cargo

discharge at New White Beach proceeded

rapidly and by 1800 all six LST's were

empty and had retracted. LCT's were also

diverted to New White Beach from White

Beach.

Conditions were so poor at Red and

White Beaches that during the morning of

D Day a survey party was sent overland to

the eastern side of the Gila Peninsula and

the shores of Pitoe Bay. There an excellent

LST landing area was found. Blue Beach,

as the new site was designated, was located

at the upper end of the Gila Peninsula. It

had a good slope, though about twenty-five

yards offshore there was a flat coral shelf on

which LST's rested at low tide. At high

tide, however, LST's were able to beach

with dry ramps. Beginning with D plus 1,

Blue Beach was used to the exclusion of

other areas for unloading LST's and for

many LCT's and LCM's lightering supplies

ashore from cargo ships. As a ponton pier

and earth jetties were constructed at Red

Beach lightering continued in that area also.

Operations at White Beach were stopped on

D plus 3 until Navy demolition crews blasted

approach channels through the reef, a task

which was accomplished on D plus 4.

Conditions on land were practically perfect except for a few spots on Red Beach

where very thin crust covered a watery bog

in which many vehicles sank almost out of

sight. All such spots were located quickly

and thereafter avoided. Inland, the ground

at Red, White, and Blue Beaches was dry

and generally well drained. As Admiral

Barbey reported: "Track making under

these conditions was child's play, and vehicles on landing moved direct to dispersal

area. No surfacing material was required."10

 Shore Party operations, organized around the 534th and 544th Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiments of the 4th Engineer Special Brigade, went smoothly after

the first slow start during the morning. All

things considered, unloading of troops and

supplies, supply dispersal, and dump establishment proceeded remarkably well in the

face of many unforeseen difficulties.

Ashore, the 155th Infantry secured its

northern half of Red Beach without difficulty and moved rapidly inland some 2,000

yards to the D-Day objective line. The

167th Infantry, on the southern half of the

beach, had no trouble either, and occupied

Pitoe Drome by 1300 hours. The 124th

Infantry's 1st Battalion met no opposition

at White Beach as it landed and swung

south to secure the Gila Peninsula, a job

completed at 1500. The rest of the regiment, making few contacts with the enemy,

pushed rapidly inland to the D-Day objective line and established contact on the left

with the 167th Infantry late in the afternoon. The day's action cost the 124th Infantry 7 men wounded, while 12 Japanese

had been killed and 1 had been captured.

There is no record of casualties in the rest

of the 31st Division on D Day.

General Persons, commanding the 31st

Division and the TRADEWIND Assault Force,

established his command post ashore at

1235. More than satisfied with the results

of operations on D Day, he laid plans to

10

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt Morotai, p. 21.
488 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

expand the beachhead to the assigned

perimeter line around the airfield area on

the 16th. The night of 15-16 September

was generally quiet in the beachhead area.

Securing and Developing Morotai

Expanding the Hold

Operations on 16 September began at

0800, when all three regiments of the 31st

Division resumed their advances.11 By 1300,

against negligible opposition, the division

had secured a perimeter around the Pitoe

Drome area over 7,000 yards wide, east to

west, and about 5,000 yards deep north to

south. At 1000 General Hall established his

command post ashore on the east coast of

the Gila Peninsula, near the point where

that peninsula joined the mainland. The

126th Regimental Combat Team started

landing at 0930 and took up station along

the Gila Peninsula, relieving 124th Infantry elements still there.

After 16 September combat operations on

Morotai resolved themselves into a series of

patrol actions designed to hunt down small

Japanese parties. In addition, radar stations and observation posts were established

on many offshore islands and at various

points around Morotai's shore. Responsibility for most of the latter undertakings was

assigned to the 126th Infantry, which on

the 17th began occupying islands off the

southwestern and western coasts of Morotai

as well as various capes on the southwestern

and southeastern shores. During the next

two days additional outposts were set up

on capes at the northeastern and northern

shores, and a radar station, the last set up

in the area, was established on 21 September

at Race Island, off the west coast about

twenty-five miles north of Red Beach.

Evidence of previous Japanese occupation and of some current Japanese activity

was discovered by many of the outposts on

the mainland, especially those at the northern capes and along the west coast. Patrols

in the northern capes area made many contacts with small parties of Japanese and

captured or destroyed much enemy equipment, including about ten truckloads of

radar equipment, fuel oil, clothing, and

(shades of red tape!) a duplicating machine. Most of the patrols and outposts in

all areas reported that the Japanese fled

inland to Morotai's rugged interior when

fired upon.

While the outposts and radar stations

were being set up, the 31st Division had

extended the original task force perimeter

to occupy additional space for bivouacs and

supply installations, a step made necessary

when General MacArthur's headquarters

had decided to expand airfield construction

on Morotai beyond that originally contemplated. The new perimeter, secured by the

evening of the 20th, extended the old some

1,500 yards north, and east along Morotai's

southern shore about 10,000 yards to the

Sabatai River. The average inland depth of

the eastward extension was one and onefourth miles. Inland, the perimeter extended east and west over twelve miles.

The Japanese on Morotai showed little

offensive spirit, choosing to escape rather

than to attack or even defend prepared positions.12

 Some of them attempted to flee 11

 This subsection is based on: TrTF Hist of

INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44, pp. 16-32; ALAMO

Force Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 14-16; 124th Inf,

"Our Regiment in 1944," pp. 74-79; 126th Inf

Opns Rpt Morotai, n. p., Annex 16 to TrTF Hist

of INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44.

12

 Enemy information in this subsection is based

principally on: ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Morotai,

pp. 20-21; Annex 2, G-2 Report, pp. 4-8, to TrTF

Hist of INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44.
THE MOROTAI OPERATION 489

from Morotai by barge, apparently trying

to reach the relative safety of Halmahera.

The Japanese commander on Halmahera,

when he belatedly learned of the Allied

landing on Morotai, gave up whatever plans

he may have had to reinforce that island by

barge. The Japanese Navy was not about

to risk any ships for such purposes—ships

weren't available and, moreover, similar attempts to reinforce Biak during the KON

Operation had not met with much success.

Barges available to the Japanese at Halmahera could reach Morotai only by running a blockade that was soon established by

the Allied Air and Naval Forces. Indications are that no more than three or four

barges were sent to Morotai during the period 15 September to 4 October, upon which

date General Krueger declared the Morotai

operation over. During subsequent months

a few barge-loads of troops did manage to

slip through the Allied blockade to reach

Morotai from Halmahera. Although these

reinforcements caused some trouble, especially by harassing Allied outposts, their arrival had no real effect upon the situation

at Morotai.

The most significant Japanese reaction

to the Allied landing came in the form of

frequent but generally ineffective air raids,

the first of which occurred when a lone enemy plane dropped three bombs on the Red

Beach area on the morning of D plus 1. No

damage or casualties to Allied forces resulted. Damage was negligible in subsequent

raids and, insofar as can be ascertained,

only twelve Allied soldiers were wounded as

a result of the air attacks in the period to 4

October. A few subsequent air attacks

caused more extensive damage to Allied aircraft on the island.

The total number of Japanese killed on

Morotai was 104, and 13 were captured.

PT boat skippers estimated that they had

accounted for at least 200 more in sinking

Japanese barges between Morotai and Halmahera. Allied casualties to 4 October numbered about 30 men killed, 85 wounded,

and 1 missing.

Supporting Arms and Services

Field artillery of the TRADEWIND Task

Force began reaching the beaches quickly

on D Day despite the necessity for towing

ashore almost all artillery weapons and

equipment.13 Artillery units were soon emplaced, but, since Japanese resistance was

practically nonexistent, there were few calls

for artillery fire. Because the Japanese were

believed capable of major aerial counterattack, antiaircraft artillery was put ashore

as soon as possible. Acting with remarkable speed in the face of the difficult landing conditions, the 383d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons battalion had

some of its weapons emplaced on the beach

by H plus 20 minutes. The remainder of

that unit and one battery of the 744th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion were ashore

and emplaced before dark. The rest of the

214th Antiaircraft Artillery Group began

moving ashore on D plus 1. To the intense

fire which the group was able to throw into

the air over the beachhead and airdrome

areas goes much of the credit for preventing

Japanese aircraft from causing extensive

damage.

Medical problems at Morotai were not

13

 This subsection is based on: ALAMO Force Opns

Rpt Morotai, pp. 16, 23-25; 31st Inf Div Arty

Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 2-3; CTF 77 Opns Rpt

Morotai, pp. 25-26; Annex 10, Surgeon's Rpt, p. 2,

to TrTF Hist of INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44;

Annex 2, G-2 Rpt, pp. 2, 6-8, to same; Ltr, Gen

Persons to Gen Ward, 6 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH

files.
490 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

as serious as expected, since Japanese opposition was light and careful control measures

against tropical diseases were soon instituted.

The entire beachhead and airfield area was

sprayed with DDT on D Day as a prophylaxis against scrub typhus. Antimalaria and

antityphus measures were strictly enforced

within the 31st Division. The effectiveness

of these measures and the air spraying is

demonstrated by the fact that not one case of

scrub typhus was found among Allied troops

on Morotai to 4 October. To that date there

were only 49 cases of malaria and 22 cases

of dengue fever, most of them outside the

31st Division. About 990 men of the task

force were hospitalized to 4 October: approximately 710 for other, mostly minor,

diseases and sickness; 175 for injuries not

incurred in combat; and 103 for battle

wounds or injuries. By 4 October almost

all these cases had been evacuated by Seventh Fleet LST's.

Civil affairs on Morotai were handled,

as usual, by a NICA Detachment. Moving

ashore on D Day, the detachment quickly

brought the natives back under Dutch sovereignty—an easy task in light of the fact

that the natives proved friendly and co-operative. Working through NICA, many

natives provided information concerning

Japanese dispositions on Morotai and Halmahera, while others acted as guides for

patrols ranging over Morotai. Since it was

necessary for the NICA Detachment to establish new native villages outside the airfield perimeter, few natives could be secured

to work for Allied forces until after 1 October, on which date about 350 were ready.

On 25 September the TRADEWIND Task

Force was dissolved as such. Its missions,

including air-base development, were continued by General Hall in his capacity as

Commanding General, XI Corps.

Airfield Construction

The Morotai planners had expected that

a fighter strip could quickly be prepared at

the site of the abandoned Japanese field,

Pitoe Drome, in southwest Morotai, and a

strip there was to be in operation no later

than D plus 2, 17 September.14 No work

was done on the site on D Day for two reasons. First, the landing problem delayed

getting engineer equipment ashore and second, when survey parties examined the site,

they found it not as suitable as anticipated.

During the next two days it was determined that a fighter strip could be constructed in the Pitoe Drome area but that

no bomber field could be developed there.

A search for bomber field sites, of utmost

importance for the support of subsequent

operations, was begun immediately, and on

D plus 3 it was determined that first priority

should be given to a site adjacent to the

beach at Gotalalamo village, on the north

shore of Pitoe Bay east of the Gila Peninsula. Clearing was begun at this site the

next day, and the airfield ultimately

constructed there was designated Wama

Drome.

Meanwhile, work had continued at the

Pitoe Drome site, which was not ready to

receive fighters until 29 September, D plus

14. The site was finally abandoned and

relegated to the status of an emergency field

which came to be known as Pitoe Crash

Strip. A number of factors influenced the

14

 Unless otherwise indicated this subsection is

based on: TrTF Engr Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 2-4;

ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Morotai, pp. 22-23; 931st

Engr Avn Regt Opns Rpt Morotai, n. p., Annex

27 to TrTF Hist of INTERLUDE, 4 Aug-4 Oct 44;

MS, The Pacific—MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, [tentative title], Vol. V of the series THE ARMY AIR

FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, Ch. IX, pp. 48-

52, Ch. X, pp. 41-45, copies of draft chapters in

OCMH files.
THE MOROTAI OPERATION 491

decision to abandon the site. Japanese air

reaction had been so ineffectual that the

need for a fighter base on Morotai was not

as urgent as had been expected. Aircraft

based on CVE's, some of which remained

in the Morotai area for weeks, were able to

keep away most of the Japanese planes, and

their efforts were supplemented by longrange land-based fighters from Sansapor.

Moreover, the line of approach which

planes had to use to land on Pitoe Crash

Strip interfered with that of the more important bomber base at Wama Drome.

Finally, the terrain at the crash strip was

by no means as well drained as that at other

locations on the Doroeba Plain, and it was

necessary to expend much engineer effort to

keep the strip operational.

Construction at Wama Drome was seriously delayed from D plus 5 through D plus

10 by a series of heavy rain storms; on some

of those days it was too wet even to clear

brush. Japanese air attacks and many red

alerts, sounded whenever enemy aircraft

approached Morotai, also stopped construction from time to time. But perhaps the

most serious delaying factor was a lack of

good surfacing material. It had been anticipated that good surfacing material

would be found on Morotai as it had been

on other islands with a coral base, but the

Morotai coral alternated between a fine

sand practically useless for airdrome surfacing and coral rocks which, almost as

hard as granite, required much time and

effort to break up. Only a few small deposits

of intermediate grade coral could be found.

Battling almost continuously with soggy

ground and tropical cloudbursts, engineers

managed to have 4,000 feet of Wama

Drome operational by D plus 19, 4 October.

On that day the first planes to be based

permanently on Morotai began using the

field, on which emergency landings had

been made since 30 September. With the

arrival of the permanent fighter aircraft

garrison on the 4th, the last CVE's were

finally able to leave the Morotai area.

So far, neither the first nor second construction objectives for Morotai had been

met. Pitoe Crash Strip was not ready to

receive fighters until D plus 14 instead of D

plus 2 and was abandoned shortly after

Wama Drome was ready for fighters. Wama

Drome did not satisfy the second construction objective—completion of a 7,500-foot

strip for medium and reconnaissance bombers by D plus 25, 10 October—although

ultimately it was extended to 5,000 feet.

Clearing aimed at the accomplishment of

the third objective, a strip 6,000 feet long

capable of extension to 7,000 feet, by D

plus 45, started on 23 September. The new

field, which acquired the designation Pitoe

Drome, was located about 1,200 yards north

of Wama Drome. Construction proceeded

slowly at Pitoe Drome because so much engineer effort had to be devoted to the completion of Wama Drome. By 4 October almost 7,000 feet at the new site had been

cleared, but it was not until the 17th, D

plus 32, that even one runway was surfaced,

let alone taxiways and dispersal lanes.

Meanwhile, rapid development of a large

air base on Morotai had assumed much

greater importance than had been anticipated. According to General MacArthur's

and Admiral Nimitz' plans for the final

steps in the approach to the Philippines,

there was to have been an interval of two

months between the Morotai and Palau

operations and the initial invasion of the
492 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Philippines, at Mindanao. During these two

months, air and light naval bases were to

have been prepared to support the final

advance into the Philippines. Radical

changes had to be made in these plans.

As Third Fleet carriers ranged far and

wide early in September providing strategic

air support for the Palau and Morotai operations, carrier pilots striking targets in the

central and southern Philippines reported

Japanese strength there weaker than had

been supposed. Admiral Halsey found in

these reports a welcome opportunity to

recommend to his superiors that objectives

in the western Carolines, except Ulithi, be

bypassed in favor of an immediate and direct move into the central Philippines. Admiral Halsey, who made no recommendations concerning Morotai, believed that

Ulithi would have to be taken to provide a

forward area fleet anchorage in the western Pacific.

These suggestions were received with

some enthusiasm at General MacArthur's

and Admiral Nimitz' headquarters. The

latter commander agreed with Admiral Halsey's proposal to bypass Yap in the western

Carolines, and he released troops and amphibious means committed to that operation

to General MacArthur for employment in

an early invasion of Leyte in the central

Philippines. General MacArthur, with these

means placed at his disposal, decided that he

could move directly to Leyte, canceling the

Talaud Islands and Mindanao operations.

But the two commanders did not believe it

possible to bypass the Palaus, for they considered air bases on those islands necessary

to protect Allied lines of communication in

the western Pacific and they hoped that

land-based air support for the invasion of

the Philippines might be provided from the

Palaus. Morotai had to be taken to provide

left-flank protection for forces moving into

the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

agreed generally with the proposal to cancel

the Yap, Talaud, and Mindanao operations

and they approved a 20 October target date

for the invasion of Leyte.15

Principally as a result of terrain difficulties and inadequate gasoline storage

facilities, fields in the Palaus were not ready

in time to provide any support for the invasion of Leyte.16

 This fact, coupled with

the cancellation of the Talaud Islands

operation, made it obvious that if any landbased air support for the invasion of the

Philippines was to be made available, it

would have to come from Morotai. Actually, Morotai-based aircraft flew no sorties

against Leyte, but they did provide support

by flying many missions over Mindanao and

other islands in the southern Philippines.

On 7 October Morotai-based fighters began

flying cover for Allied Air Forces bombers

which, based at fields further to the rear,

were striking Mindanao and the Visayan

Islands. Medium bombers (B-25's) began

operations against Mindanao from Morotai

on the 13th. Six days later Allied Naval

Forces' Ventura and PB4Y reconnaissance

bombers, operating under Allied Air Forces

15

 Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, 13 Sep 44, CMIN 12893; Rad, CINCSWPA to JCS, CX-17697,

14 Sep 44, CM-IN 12636; Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA, OCTAGON-24, 13 Sep 44, CM-IN 12198;

Flt Adm William F. Halsey and Lt Comdr J. Bryan,

III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York, 1947),

pp. 199-201. For additional details concerning this

change in plans see: M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte:

Return to the Philippines, a forthcoming volume in

the series U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 16

 MS, The Pacific—MATTERHORN to Nagasaki,

Ch. IX, pp. 30, 48, Ch. X, p. 74.
THE MOROTAI OPERATION 493

control, began missions against targets in

the Philippines and the Netherlands East

Indies. During early October, Morotaibased fighters also flew cover for a number

of large-scale bombing attacks against the

Japanese oil center at Balikpapan, Borneo,

and ultimately Allied planes based on

Morotai completed neutralization of Japanese air power throughout those sections

of the Indies within range. The Morotai

fields, secured at an extremely low cost,

were well worth the taking.17

17

 Early in 1945 Australian units began moving

to Morotai, and a large part of the Australian

ground force which invaded Borneo was staged

through that island. Between 15 September 1944

and 1 February 1945, the Japanese raided Morotai

82 times. The heaviest Japanese raid occurred on

22 November, when 2 men were killed, 15 injured

or wounded, 15 planes were destroyed, and 8 were

severely damaged. The last Japanese raid was carried out on 22 March 1945.
CHAPTER XXI

The Landings On Peleliu and

Angaur

On the same day that forces of the Southwest Pacific Area poured ashore over the

reefs at Morotai, Central Pacific troops

began landing in the southern Palau

Islands. Operations in the Palaus, more

time consuming than those in the south,

continued while Morotai was secured and

the air base on the latter island was developed.

Preliminary Air and Naval Bombardment

The U. S. Third Fleet's fast carriers, the

activities of which over the Philippines had

promoted the radical changes in plans for

the final phase of the approach to the Philippines, began strikes against the Palaus on

6 September, executing part of the program

of strategic air support for the Morotai and

Palau operations.1 These were by no means

the first strikes against the Palau area. Fast

carriers, then operating as part of the U. S.

Fifth Fleet, had hit the Palaus at the end

of March 1944 while providing strategic

air support for the Southwest Pacific's April

landings at Aitape and Hollandia.2 In midJuly another heavy carrier attack was

executed against the Palaus. These two

raids resulted in much damage to shore installations and in the destruction of a few

Japanese aircraft.

Land-based air attacks against the Palaus

had been going on since early June, when

U. S. Fifth Air Force planes based at Hollandia and Wakde Island began hitting targets in the western Carolines in support of

the Central Pacific's landings on the Marianas. The U. S. Thirteenth Air Force sent

bombers against the Palaus from the Admiralty Islands during the period 8-28

August and from Noemfoor Island during

the second week of September. Other Thirteenth Air Force planes, based on Wakde,

struck the Palaus from 25 August through

5 September. In its series of attacks from 8

August, the Thirteenth Air Force dropped

approximately 885 tons of bombs on targets

in the Palaus. In addition, these and other

Allied Air Forces planes executed many

1

 Information in this section is based on: CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44, pp. 39-40,

42-47, 70-80; MS, The Pacific—MATTERHORN to

Nagasaki, Ch. IX, pp. 34-36; Com3dFlt Opns Rpt

Palau-Ulithi-Morotai, pp. 3-4; Encl B, Results of

Carrier Air Strikes, n. p., to same; Annex F, Air

Rpt, pp. 2-3, to III Amph Corps Opns Rpt Palau;

Encl G, Naval Gunfire Rpt, p. 2, to same; Annex

K, Naval Gunfire Support, p. 8, to Phase II, Opns

Annex, to 1st Mar Div Opns Rpt Palau; Drummond, The Palau Campaign, Ch. II; Hough, The

Assault on Peleliu, pp. 24-25, 36. 2

 See above, Ch. II.
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 495

valuable photographic missions for Admiral

Nimitz' forces.

When fighter planes of three fast carrier

groups started sweeping over the Palaus on

6 September, they found that the efforts of

the Southwest Pacific's land-based bombers

had succeeded in eliminating many ground

targets. Nevertheless, fighters and bombers

of the three groups started full-scale attacks

on all the principal islands in the Palaus the

next day. There was no air opposition, nor

had there been any on the 6th. On the 8th,

because observable targets were scarce, the

weight of attack was reduced, and the carriers began preparing to move to Philippine waters. During their three days at the

Palaus, the carrier-based planes flew about

1,470 sorties, causing extensive damage to

ammunition and supply dumps, barracks,

warehouses, and a number of miscellaneous

buildings. The groups claimed destruction

of only four enemy aircraft, while losing

eight of their own.

No attacks were made on the Palaus on 9

September, but the next day another fast

carried group arrived from the Yap-Ulithi

area, which it had struck on the 7th and

8th. On the 10th and 11th the new force,

Task Group 38.4, operated principally

against antiaircraft gun positions and beach

defenses at Peleliu and Angaur. The next

day the Western Fire Support Group of

Admiral Fort's Western Attack Group arrived to begin naval gunfire bombardment.

Reaching the Palaus on the same day was

an escort-carrier force, which co-operated

with Task Group 38.4 in flying cover for the

bombardment ships, striking additional targets on the islands, and providing close support during the landings.

Some naval bombardment had been

undertaken by cruisers and destroyers accompanying the fast carrier groups which

struck the Palaus during 6-8 September,

but much remained to be done by the

Western Fire Support Group. From D

minus 3 through D minus 1 some 2,200 tons

of naval projectiles were fired on Peleliu.

The more obvious targets were covered, and

special attention was directed to known or

suspected Japanese artillery and mortar

positions and beach installations. The shelling knocked down vegetation along Peleliu's

central ridge, revealing numerous caves

which had not been known to exist prior

to the bombardment. During the bombardment, the Western Gunfire Support Group

reported that it had run out of targets, and

ammunition expenditure figures showed

that fewer projectiles were fired on Peleliu

than had been planned.

In contrast to previous operations within

the Pacific theaters, mine sweepers had a

great deal of work to do in the Palaus, for

the Japanese had laid about 670 mines in

the Peleliu-Angaur region and at least 240

more in Kossol Passage. Mine sweeping off

Peleliu and Angaur was undertaken on the

12th, 13th, and 14th, while from 13 through

15 September Kossol Passage was swept.

Nearly 175 mines were destroyed during

the four days, and the location of the remainder was marked. Underwater demolition teams (UDT's), which also found

some difficult tasks, began work on 12 September on the Peleliu beaches. The northern

section of the landing area proved to have

few obstacles, but much work was required

on the southern part. Little work was necessary at Angaur beyond blasting away some

steel rail obstacles off Red Beach.

The three days the UDT's spent working off the Peleliu beaches probably gave

the Japanese some idea of the Allied land-
496 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ing plans, a supposition supported by the

fact that many hastily-laid land mines were

found by the 1st Marine Division on or

immediately behind its landing beaches.

The marines had more reason to be unhappy about the results of naval gunfire,

which had not been successful in destroying many mortar, artillery, and machine

gun positions, including some on or near

the shore. Japanese positions which the fire

support ships pinpointed were generally demolished, but many hidden by natural or

man-made camouflage remained intact, as

did others in areas not accessible to naval

gunfire.

While the preliminary air and naval

bombardment had been going on, the assault convoy carrying the III Amphibious

Corps to the Palaus had been approaching.

Slower-moving groups (LST's, LCI's, and

screen) had left Guadalcanal on 4 September, making an average speed of 7.7 knots.

The faster transports and the LSD's, moving

at 12.1 knots, left on the morning of the 8th.

The course was generally northwestward

through the Solomons, across the equator,

and then northwest parallel to the New

Guinea coast. Early on the morning of 15

September, both groups rendezvoused off

the Palaus, and by 0515 had found assigned

stations in the transport areas. The 1st Marine Division was ready to begin landing

on Peleliu, while the 81st Infantry Division

remained on ships offshore, ready to land

on Angaur when so ordered.

The Peleliu Beachhead

Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus, commanding the 1st Marine Division, believed

that the Peleliu operation would be tough

but short, and he anticipated that the

island could be secured in four days.3 This

prediction, to quote the Marine Corps' history of the operation, was a ". . . striking

manifestation of that preoccupation with

speedy conquest at the highest division

level which was to color tactical thinking

ashore for a month to follow."

 4

The weather at Peleliu on D Day was

ideal for landing operations; it was warm,

visibility was almost unlimited, and only a

light surf was running. Small craft and amphibian vehicles of the assault waves had

no difficulty forming waves and moving toward the reefs fronting White and Orange

Beaches. The Western Fire Support Group,

which began firing at 0530, carried out its

D-Day missions as planned. Air attacks,

executed by carrier-based planes, were

conducted from H minus 40 through H

minus 25 minutes. The first assault wave

(LVT(A)'s) began moving shoreward at

0800, under the protection of an LCI rocket

barrage and aerial strafing attacks. Naval

bombardment gradually rolled inland and

to the flanks. The first wave touched shore

about 0832, two minutes behind schedule,

with the 1st Marines on the left, the 5th

Marines in the center, and the 7th Marines

on the right. There was little frontal fire, but

as the troops pushed inland from the

3

 This section is based principally on Hough, The

Assault on Peleliu, pp. 36-64, 67-70, 74-75. The

following were also consulted for the landing phase:

CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44, pp.

51-55; End B, Opns, pp. 2-3, to III Amph Corps

Opns Rpt Palau; CTF 32 Opns Rpt Palau, pp.

2-3; Narrative, pp. 2-3, to Phase II, Opns Annex,

to 1st Mar Div Opns Rpt Palau. Enemy information

is based upon the cited pages in Hough, op. cit.,

and on The Palau Operations, pp. 80ff. Since this

phase of the operation is a Marine Corps story,

excellently recounted in detail in Hough, op. cit.,

no attempt is made in this volume to provide more

than the bare highlights. 4

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 35.
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 497

beaches and as the amphibian vehicles

crossed the fronting reef, both were subjected to mortar, artillery, and automatic

weapons fire from the high ground of Peleliu's central ridge system, from a small point

of land on the 1st Marine's left, and from

previously unlocated positions south of the

7th Marines. (Map VI)

As succeeding waves pushed ashore, Japanese fire steadily increased, providing ample evidence that preliminary air and naval

bombardment had not been as effective as

hoped. Soon, like the reefs at Morotai the

same day, the reefs in front of Orange and

White Beaches were littered with halted

amphibian vehicles—DUKW's, LVT's,

and LVT (A)'s. But the reason at Peleliu

was far different. The amphibians there

were put out of action by Japanese fire, not,

as at Morotai, by mud and rough reefs.

Nevertheless, the landing continued. As

the infantry pushed inland, opposition continued to stiffen, especially on the fronts of

the 1st and 7th Marine Regiments. Elements of one company, on the extreme left,

were cut off from the rest of the 1st Marines

for over thirty hours, leaving a potentially

dangerous gap on that flank of the regiment.

The Japanese, fortunately, did not take full

advantage of this gap to counterattack the

beachhead area. In the center, the 5th Marines met only scattered resistance while

pushing rapidly inland to the western edge

of the Peleliu airdrome area. More trouble

was encountered by the 7th Marines, on

the south, both from strong Japanese defensive positions and from unmapped terrain features, such as a swamp which split

the 1st Battalion as it advanced south from

Orange Beach 3. The attack on the south

stalled.

General Rupertus, who remained aboard

ship until D plus 1, was by early afternoon

more concerned with the situation in the 7th

Marines sector than he was with developments in the 1st Marines area, where opposition had been growing ever stronger and

from which counterattacks threatened. At

first the general had received no reports

from the 1st Marines—the bulk of that regiment's communications equipment and

troops had been destroyed while moving

shoreward over the reef—and later he obtained such optimistic or incomplete reports

that he could form no clear picture of the

situation on the north. He expected that all

southern Peleliu up to the northern side of

the airfield—the most important immediate

objective—could be secured by dark on

D Day, and on the basis of the information

available to him, it appeared that operations were slowest in the 7th Marines area.

He therefore committed the division reserve

to that sector, but before dark only one

company could get ashore.

About 1645 the Japanese began a series

of counterattacks, the impetus of which was

directed against the 5th Marines. An initial tank attack proved ineffective, as did

later attempts by infantry-tank teams or

infantry alone. After these attacks were

over, one battalion of the 5th Marines advanced to the center of the airfield, producing a salient which marked the most

substantial advance of the day by any element of the division. At dark the 5th Marines had also surrounded most of the airfield on the west, south, and southeast, and

had extended its lines to a mangrove swamp

on the eastern shore of the island. The 7th

Marines had a line almost across the island

from a point over 400 yards south of

Orange Beach 3. The 1st Marines, less the

isolated company on a promontory just off

the north end of White Beach 1, was almost

to the northwest edge of the airfield.
498 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

About two thirds of the division's artillery

had been landed, but the rest, as well as

the III Amphibious Corps Artillery's

155-mm. units, could not get ashore on D

Day. The destruction of amphibian vehicles was so great that only with difficulty

had priority equipment and supplies been

put ashore. Landing by amphibians was

necessary, because small boats could not get

over the reefs and no causeways or channels to open water could be constructed.

Landing problems were further complicated by beach congestion resulting from

enemy fire, mine fields, lack of good dispersal areas, and insufficient transportation

ashore.

At nightfall the division had secured a

perimeter roughly 2,800 yards long north

to south. The depth, except where the 5th

Marines had pushed across the island, was

from 400-700 yards. This hold, ". . . so

disappointing when viewed beside preliminary predictions . . . ,"5

 had been secured at the cost of 210 men killed and

901 wounded, plus unnumbered heat prostration and combat fatigue cases.

Col. Kunio Nakagawa, tactical commander of the Japanese garrison, had

planned a defense in depth and had available a mobile reserve. He managed to withdraw some troops from Peleliu's eastern arm

on D Day, but the operations of the 5th and

7th Marines had cut off his southern defending force, built around the 3d Battalion,

15th Infantry. With this reverse and the

failure of the afternoon counterattacks,

Colonel Nakagawa decided to withdraw

the bulk of his remaining forces to the ridge

lines and high ground north of the airfield,

there to hold out as long as possible, much

as Colonel Kuzume had defended similar

terrain with his Biak Detachment. The 1st

Marine Division, spending a night harassed

by Japanese mortar and artillery fire, was

to be subjected to heavy fire from the ridge

line defenses on D plus 1.

On this day the 7th Marines extended

the hold on the south, seizing all that part

of the island with the exception of two

small promontories at the southern tip. The

5th Marines cleaned out most of the remaining part of the airfield area, setting up

defenses at night in a hangar and shops

center on the north side of the field. The

2d Battalion, 1st Marines, secured the

northwest section of the airfield, including

some headquarters buildings and barracks.

But the rest of the regiment could make

little progress north near the central ridges

and had to content itself with closing the

gap on its left and straightening out its lines.

By dark, at the cost of about 30 more men

killed and 115 wounded, the division had

secured a perimeter over 3,000 yards long

north to south and approximately 2,000

yards deep at the farthest penetration. In

two days the 1st Marine Division and attached units had suffered almost 1,500 casualties, over 1,000 of them in the 1st Marine

Regiment and its combat team attachments.

Nonetheless, the most important objective,

the Peleliu airfield area, had been secured,

and the Japanese defenders had been split.

One tough pocket of resistance remained on

the two promontories at the island's southern tip, and the division realized that the

principal remaining enemy strong point was

located in the central ridges.

The Decision to Land on Angaur

General Rupertus assumed command

ashore at Peleliu about 0950 on 16 September, D plus 1. Immobilized by a broken 5

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 57.
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 499

ankle suffered during training at Guadalcanal, he could not travel about the perimeter to ascertain the situation for himself

and he had to depend upon often cryptic,

incomplete, and overoptimistic reports from

front-line units. From these he apparently

formed an opinion that operations were

going fairly well. Whatever the case, he saw

no reason on D Day nor D plus 1 to request

that part of the 81st Infantry Division be

sent ashore to reinforce the 1st Marine Division. All or part of the Army unit was available—one regimental combat team as III

Amphibious Corps Reserve and the remainder until the tactical situation on Peleliu would permit it to land on Angaur.6

 It

is possible that the general's feelings may

have been colored by a desire to make

Peleliu an all-Marine operation, for he displayed a ". . . reluctance to employ Army

troops. . . ."7

On the afternoon of D Day, elements of

the Angaur Attack Group, which had

brought the 81st Division to the Palaus, had

feinted landings at Babelthuap to divert

Japanese attention from the Peleliu action.

No landing craft were launched from transports or LST's, but accompanying destroyers

fired on possible landing beaches and some

of the ships maneuvered off the northern

islands throughout the afternoon.8

By noon on D plus 1, since General Rupertus had made no call for reinforcements,

it appeared to higher commanders that 81st

Division troops were not needed on Peleliu.

Moreover, Rear Adm. William H. P.

Blandy, the commander of the Angaur Attack Group, reported that from the results

of air and naval bombardment, hydrographic surveys, and UDT activity, a successful landing on Angaur seemed feasible.

After conferring, the commanders of the

Western Attack Force (Admiral Fort) and

the III Amphibious Corps (General Geiger)

agreed that the Angaur landing could be

executed on the morning of 17 September,

as originally anticipated. Orders to that effect were issued at 1432 on D plus 1.9

The Assault on Angaur

During the early morning hours of 17

September, the ships of the Angaur Attack

Group moved onto station off Angaur Island.10

 At 0530 the Angaur Fire Support

Group started its bombardment, employing

for the most part slow, methodical area fire

rather than shooting at specific targets. The

fire was characterized by the 81st Division

as being "very satisfactory,"11 and it accounted for about 40 percent of all naval

shells thrown at Angaur from 12 through 17

September. The bombardment continued

beyond the scheduled hour because support

aircraft were late reporting on station. Dawn

brought with it almost perfect weather, with

unlimited visibility, little wind, and light

surf. The 81st Division's assault troops had

little trouble debarking from transports and

LST's into the landing craft and amphibian

vehicles which were to carry them ashore.

By 0800 the LVT assault waves had begun

6

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 30, 54-56,

61; Encl B, Opns, pp. 1-2, to III Amph Corps Opns

Rpt, Palau. 7

 Hough, op. cit., p. 106. 8

 CTG 32.2 [Comdr Angaur Attack Group] Action

Rpt—Capture of Angaur Island, 1 Oct 44, p. 1.

9

 Ibid., pp. 1-2; 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Angaur,

p. 19; Encl B, Opns, p. 1, to III Amph Corps Opns

Rpt Palau; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA

Sep 44, p. 55. 10

 The remainder of this chapter is based principally on Drummond, The Palau Campaign, Ch.

V, for both American and Japanese information.

The reports and supporting documents of the 81st

Division and its component and attached units were

also consulted for additional information. 11

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Angaur, p. 80.
500 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

moving into position along the line of departure, 3,000 yards offshore.

The Landing

At 0810 the assault vehicles began moving toward the shore, keeping about 300

yards behind LCI rocket and mortar boats.

The naval bombardment was turned

against the beaches, and strafing planes began reporting on station. Flanking LCI's

launched their rockets against the beaches

when the first LVT wave was about 1,100

yards offshore, and from other LCI's 4.2-

inch mortars fired on the beach areas. The

rocket boats proceeded to a point about

600 yards off the beaches and then swung

to the flanks to let LVT's pass through.

Strafing planes carried out assigned missions. At the last safe moment, naval fire

shifted inland and to the flanks of the two

beaches. (Map VIII) The first wave of the

321st Infantry hit Blue Beach, on Angaur's

eastern shore, at 0831, one minute behind

time. The first assault wave of the 322d

Infantry, either delayed at the line of departure or thrown off schedule by offshore

currents, was six minutes late reaching Red

Beach, on the northeast shore of Angaur

north-northwest of Blue Beach. The only

opposition to either landing consisted of a

few rounds of Japanese mortar fire and

some erratic small arms fire, neither of

which caused any damage or casualties.

The 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry, landed

on the left (south) half of Blue Beach and

the 2d on the right. Leading troops rushed

up some 20 yards of slightly inclined, rubble-strewn beach to the crest of a low embankment, where a firing line was quickly

established. Receiving negligible fire from

Japanese weapons, these men soon became

concerned over the danger of fire from the

LVT's of succeeding waves, and their advance inland was further impeded by beach

rubble, wire entanglements, and land

mines. On Red Beach the 322d Infantry

landed with the 1st Battalion on the right

and the 3d on the left, or southeast. Again,

troops quickly gained the crest of the beach

slope against no opposition. Troops of succeeding waves, taking cover on the beach

until their leaders learned something about

the situation to the front, soon started inland

after the men of the first wave.

Meanwhile, the 323d Regimental Combat Team (III Amphibious Corps Reserve) was feinting a landing off Angaur's

western shore. Landing craft were launched

from transports, attack waves were formed,

destroyer and LCI fire was laid on the prospective landing area, aircraft produced an

offshore smoke screen, and boat waves

started moving toward the beach. This action may have diverted Japanese attention

from the main landings and helped prevent

Maj. Ushio Goto, the commander of the

Angaur Sector Unit, from organizing an

immediate large-scale counterattack. Also

helping to prevent enemy organization were

destroyer fire and aerial strafing or bombing

missions directed against potential assembly

areas inland.

At Blue Beach all LVT's had been unloaded by 0900. LCVP's moved toward

shore to disgorge troops into a few feet of

water. Five LCVP waves reached the beach

easily, but then the approach channel, narrowed by Japanese mines, became so congested with incoming and outgoing boats

and amphibian vehicles that traffic was practically halted. This problem was soon solved

by establishing tighter control over landing

waves and by removing more mines and

underwater obstacles. About 0930 LCM's

and LCT's began landing medium tanks
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 501

and bulldozers, and before 1000 all the

mediums of Company A, 710th Tank Battalion, were ashore. The battalion's Provisional Mortar (81-mm.) Platoon was also

landed. Before tanks could move inland to

take over the task of infantry support from

LVT (A)'s, roads and exits had to be bulldozed through the debris and rubble with

which the naval bombardment had littered

the beach. Bulldozers of the 154th Engineers (Shore Party on Blue Beach) accomplished these tasks rapidly.

Harassing Japanese mortar fire began

falling on Blue Beach shortly after 0900,

and continued throughout the morning

despite efforts of supporting surface and air

forces to locate and destroy the mortar

positions. As a result of this fire and because

beach exits were still insufficient, the 321st

Infantry, at 1030, requested that no more

vehicles be landed. But General Mueller

wanted to set the division reserve (3d Battalion, 321st Infantry) ashore as soon as

possible, and at 1145 he ordered the battalion to land on Blue Beach, where it was

assembled by 1300.

In the meantime, the Blue Beach Shore

and Beach Party commanders had surveyed

conditions on land. Finding that debris

covered many of the proposed supply dump

areas and that the arrival of the division

reserve greatly taxed the capacity of available space, the two commanders recommended that supply unloading for the rest

of the day be limited to the minimum necessary assault equipment and material and

suggested that general unloading be delayed

until the next day. Admiral Blandy and

General Mueller approved these recommendations.

On Red Beach the first four assault waves

had moved ashore with ease, but beginning

with the fifth wave, machine gun fire from

a pillbox on the left flank started to harass

the troops. Several infantry squads and an

LVT(A) neutralized the position for varying periods of time, but it remained sporadically active until engineers closed all

entrances with several tons of bulldozed

sand and coral debris. Enemy mortar fire,

probably originating at high ground in

northwest Angaur, also harassed unloading.

Efforts to deny observation to the enemy

mortars by laying smoke screens failed, and

supporting naval vessels and aircraft were

unable entirely to silence the Japanese fire,

which continued intermittently through the

day.

Difficulties arising from boat traffic congestion and inadequate beach space hampered unloading at Red Beach just as they

had at Blue Beach. Red Beach was also

debris-laden, and the limited space available was soon clogged with vehicles and

troops. The 52d Engineers (Shore Party at

Red Beach), started moving its heavy

equipment ashore about 0850 and bulldozers immediately set to work to clear exits

through the rubble. This was slow work,

and congestion was not relieved quickly.

Then three LCVP's broached at the water

line and further restricted landings until

they could be towed off. About 0930, all

in-traffic had to be temporarily halted.

By 1000 enough LCVP's had been

dragged off the beach or sufficient vehicles

and troops had been moved away from the

water line for unloading to resume. Medium

tanks of Company B, 710th Tank Battalion,

began coming ashore about 1000 hours,

and by 1030 all were 200 yards inland.

About the same time the regimental commander decided that the beach had been

sufficiently cleared to move his reserve, the

2d Battalion, ashore. Before 1130 all elements of the battalion had landed and were

assembled just off the right flank of the
502 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

RED BEACH UNLOADING OPERATIONS. Note steepness of beach gradient.

beach. As had been the case at Blue Beach,

it was decided not to attempt any general

unloading over Red Beach on the 17th.

Despite delays, the minimum necessary

assault units and supplies were brought

ashore during the day to make certain of

having secure beachheads for the night. The

316th Field Artillery Battalion, which was

to support the 321st Infantry's drive inland

from Blue Beach, began landing on Red

Beach about 1600 and was in position,

ready to fire, just before dark. The 906th

Field Artillery Battalion, in general support,

was emplaced at the same beach before

1630. All tanks of the 710th Tank Battalion

were ashore by 1615. No artillery could be

landed on Blue Beach during the day because space was lacking and because proposed firing positions were not completely

cleared of Japanese. The 317th Field Artillery Battalion, the mission of which was to

support the 322d Infantry's drive inland

from Red Beach, was finally set ashore on

Blue Beach about 1600 on the 18th. The

155-mm. howitzers of the 318th Field Artillery Battalion also reached Red Beach on

the 18th. As a result of heavy opposition

encountered by the 1st Marine Division on

Peleliu, the III Amphibious Corps Artillery's 155-mm. gun battalion was not in

position on that island in time to support

the 81st Division's landing on the 17th. The

battalion was emplaced on Peleliu by midmorning, but its fire was not called for by

the 81st Division. Since opposition on Angaur was not serious, the loss of this 155-

mm. fire during the landing and the loss of

expected support from the 317th Field Artillery Battalion was not of great importance.
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 503

Operations Inland on 17 September

By 0930 troops and bulldozers of the

306th Engineers had filled a Japanese antitank ditch behind Blue Beach, assuring

armored support for the 321st Infantry

which, already reorganized after the landing, was ready to follow its advance patrols

inland. Company A, 321st Infantry, drove

straight ahead to the west, while Company

B pushed toward Rocky Point. On the right

the 2d Battalion pushed north and northwest, one company moving along the coast

toward Cape Ngariois, 500 yards beyond

the north end of the beach. The division

had begun to execute its plan to drive inland some 300 yards to a first phase line

before establishing contact between regiments.

The advance in the 321st Infantry's sector at first proceeded slowly and cautiously—all units were in combat for the

first time and were being subjected to intermittent mortar and machine gun fire

from inland Japanese positions. The 2d Battalion gained 150 yards to the north and

250 to the west by 1000 hours, while the

1st Battalion had secured Rocky Point and

was about 200 yards inland. An hour later,

the center of the 1st Battalion reached the

first phase line, here about 350 yards beyond the beach, but the regiment's flanks

were still short of the line. Less than three

hours after landing, however, the regiment

had secured a beachhead about 1,200 yards

long, north to south, and approximately

350 yards deep.

From the right flank of Red Beach the

1st Battalion, 322d Infantry, moved rapidly

north and inland through less dense undergrowth than that in the 321st Infantry's

area. Company C, 322d Infantry, pushed

north on the right flank toward Cape Pkul

a Mlagalp, almost 800 yards distant, at

Angaur's northeast tip. Passing by many

abandoned bunkers and dugouts, the unit

rounded the northwest cape shortly before

1100. By noon it was at the northern end

of the first phase line, located on the north

coast 450 yards west of Cape Pkul a Mlagalp. One platoon, sent south along the

phase line to establish contact with the rest

of the battalion, returned about 1300 to

report that numerous gaps existed along

the 1st Battalion's front.

These gaps had developed because other

1st Battalion units, driving straight inland

from the beach, had found the terrain so

rough and overgrown that they had channeled their movements along a narrowgauge railroad track leading generally southwest from the beach toward the first phase

line. Following this track, which was designated the Seaboard Railroad, two companies reached the first phase line before

noon. They spread north and south along

the phase line, but a large gap remained

between Company A, on the right, and

Company C.

On the left of Red Beach, the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, had meanwhile been

expanding the beachhead in its sector.

Here, strong opposition from enemy bunkers built into jagged coral on the shore off

the left of the beach caused some trouble,

although elements of two companies attacked. So as not to become bogged down,

the infantry left the positions to the tender

mercies of engineer bulldozers and proceeded south and west inland. Company I

pushed on to the 550-yard-distant first phase

line quickly, establishing contact there with

Company B. The unit's advance had carried

along another narrow-gauge track known

as the Pacific Railroad and through a network of defensive positions, most of which
504 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

proved to be unoccupied. Company K,

which struck south-southwest from the

beach, was still about 100 yards short of the

first phase line at noon, while Company L,

moving over very rough terrain along the

coast south toward Cape Ngatpokul (1,000

yards below Red Beach) and the regimental

boundary (terminating on the shore between Capes Ngatpokul and Ngariois) was

about 400 yards short of the phase line. Its

position was some 600 yards north of the

regimental boundary.

By noon the troops of the 321st and 322d

Infantry Regiments, though new to combat, harassed by intermittently heavy Japanese machine gun and mortar fire, and initially delayed somewhat by the difficulties

of reorganizing on the rubble-covered

beaches, had both secured firm beachheads.

But progress inland, except in the case of

the 1st Battalion, 322d Infantry, was far

less than General Mueller, the division commander, had hoped. Moreover, a gap, of

some 700 yards still existed along the first

phase line between the regiments. General

Mueller was faced with a choice of pushing

the 322d Infantry on toward the high

ground at northwest Angaur or halting the

inland advance until both regiments could

bring all elements up to the first phase line

and establish and maintain contact along

that line. The first choice had the undesirable feature of pushing a narrow, exposed

salient into Japanese-held terrain. On the

other hand, not to push the 322d Infantry

forward might lose an opportunity to exploit the success on that regiment's right.

Finally, he made a logical decision. About

1245 he ordered the 322d Infantry to push

its right on to the second phase line, which,

in the 1st Battalion's zone, lay roughly 400

yards beyond the first. At the same time, in

order to help the 321st Infantry's attack and

establish a solid front along the first phase

line, he instructed the 322d Infantry to drive

its left south to gain contact with its sister

regiment.

At 1430 the advances were resumed. The

1st Battalion, 322d Infantry, pushed westward into increasingly rough terrain along

the coast and into a densely overgrown basin

around the north end of Lake Aztec, the

east shores of which marked the center of

the second phase line in the regimental zone.

But enemy opposition was light at this point,

and within an hour and a half the battalion

had reached the second phase line, forming

a front along that line from the upper end

of Lake Aztec to the coast. To the south,

in a series of patrol actions against isolated

Japanese positions, part of the 3d Battalion

began execution of another part of the division's attack plans, taking the coastal area

between Red and Blue Beaches from the

rear. One company advanced generally

southwest toward the regimental boundary

and the first phase line, and one platoon of

that unit reportedly crossed the regimental

boundary well into the 321st Infantry zone

without finding any sign of the latter regiment. Actually, little ground was gained by

the bulk of the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry,

during the early afternoon.

Neither did the 321st Infantry have

much success in taking new ground. The

2d Battalion continued to be held up by

difficult terrain and by Japanese opposition centered around defenses about 300

yards northwest of Blue Beach's right flank.

Elements of the battalion moving north

from the beach, taking advantage of a

trail rather than attempting to push

through extremely thick jungle undergrowth, advanced in column, thus allowing a few rounds of enemy rifle fire to delay

progress. Company G moved north along
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 505

the shore, a maneuver contrary to the division's plan to send the 321st Infantry inland

to the first phase line before turning units

north to clear the coastal area between Red

and Blue Beaches. Whatever the reason for

the advance north, the 2d Battalion, by

1500, had gained little over 100 yards

north and northwest from its reported position at 1100. On the south flank the 1st

Battalion made little progress inland, for

the unit had to mop up in the Rocky Point

area lest Japanese be left free to attack the

battalion's rear. Mopping up in the Rocky

Point defenses—comprising a few reinforced concrete pillboxes and numerous

coconut log revetments—was slow and laborious work which could hardly be speeded

in the heavy jungle undergrowth inland

and south from the point.

Action inland to establish contact between regiments was using up valuable time

during which beachheads were supposed to

have been deepened in anticipation of night

counterattacks. General Mueller therefore

decided to ignore the gap along the first

phase line and about 1530 he ordered the

two regiments to move independently on

the second phase line in their zones. Quickly

the 322d Infantry sent one column southwest along the Pacific Railroad and another

down the Seaboard, about 350 yards north

of the Pacific. Again the attacks were

channeled along railroad beds and gaps

developed all along the line. But no enemy

opposition was encountered and most units

of the 3d Battalion were on the second

phase line before dark, by which time the

regiment's front extended south along that

line from the north coast to the Seaboard

Railroad. Thence it jumped about 450

yards over a gap from a point a few yards

south of the Seaboard to another a few

yards north of the Pacific. One company

extended the line back northeast along the

Pacific Railroad toward Blue Beach. On

the north the 1st Battalion, just before dark,

withdrew slightly from the second phase

line to ground where it could obtain better

fields of fire for its night defenses.

In the 321st Infantry's zone three companies, on the right, had also begun advancing toward the second phase line at 1530.

The regimental commander, Col. Robert

F. Dark, found after a visit to the front that

there was little chance that his units could

push to the second phase line before dark

and that the terrain beyond the first phase

line would not provide good fields of fire.

With General Mueller's permission, he

therefore ordered his men to move beyond

the first phase line only to the point at which

good fields of fire could still be obtained.

This decision actually meant that before

dark only a few men pushed beyond the

phase line.

About 1700 the regimental reserve, Company C, was committed to aid units on the

right flank. The reserve company pushed

north and secured Cape Ngariois just before dark. For the night the unit dug in with

its right on the cape and its left extending

southwest and inland. Company G was on

the shore behind Company C, while Company F was between Company C and the

right of Company E, on the first phase line.

Company A was on the same line on E's

left, and Company B extended from A's

left rear to the coast at Rocky Point. The 3d

Battalion, released from division reserve to

regimental control during the night, went

into positions behind the 2d Battalion.

Plans for the 18th were for the 322d Infantry to continue its attack and seize the

entire northern portion of Angaur while the

321st Infantry advanced to and held at the

second phase line. There it was to act as a
506 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

SAIPAN TOWN AREA on the west coast of Angaur; phosphate plant and Lighthouse Hill in background.

pivot upon which the 322d Infantry would

wheel around Angaur's northwest tip and

south to the west coast at Saipan Town.

Action on the 18th was to be preceded by

three hours of preparatory air, naval, and

artillery bombardment.

Enemy Reactions

The Angaur Sector Unit might have

taken advantage of the many gaps in the

81st Division's lines at almost any time after

the initial landings. But Major Goto, instead of ordering his troops into an immediate mass counterattack, apparently spent

most of the day trying to ascertain the number of American troops ashore and to discover American intentions. His defensive

strength was concentrated in the southern

section of the island where apparently he

had expected an amphibious assault. About

0830 he ordered one of his companies

(probably his central reserve) to attack the

American beachheads, but made no effort

to move the rest of his command. He believed that the 81st Division was going to

land at more beaches—the feinting attack at

the northwest coast had perhaps been successful in deceiving the Japanese. If defensive operations during the day proved
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 507

inadequate to prevent the invading forces

from securing beachheads, Major Goto

planned to counterattack during the night

of 17-18 September. Neither this attack nor

the one-company effort ordered earlier—

which was apparently broken up by air and

naval gunfire before it got under way—

materialized.

By late afternoon it must have become

obvious to the Angaur Sector Unit commander that the Americans were firmly

established ashore. At any rate, he started

moving his units and withdrew the southern

defense force to the northwest hills, where

he had decided to make his final stand. The

strong southern defenses were abandoned.

Artillery pieces, ammunition, and supplies

of all types were left behind except for such

extra ammunition as individuals could

hand-carry. Moving north generally parallel to the 81st Division's front, the southern

units probably reached the northwest hills

during the early morning hours of 18 September. With his headquarters and some

miscellaneous troops, Major Goto temporarily remained on Lighthouse Hill, located

on the west-central coast of Angaur. From

Lighthouse Hill he had good observation

of the eastern part of the island and from

it he could move rapidly into the northwest

hills. With displacements to effect these new

dispositions well under way, Major Goto

apparently ordered his central reserve

and an infantry company originally stationed at the northeast section of the island

to attack or harass the 81st Division during

the night of 17-18 September.

In the 321st Infantry's defensive sector,

action on the part of the Japanese was limited during most of the night to patrolling,

but early on the 18th they organized an

attack. For about half an hour, the Japanese

intermittently lobbed mortar shells into the

lines of the 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry.

Then, at 0550, a wave of enemy infantry

broke out of cover below Rocky Point and

fell upon Company B. The enemy quickly

set up light machine guns and light mortars

to support continuing infantry assaults. The

company was forced back 50-75 yards toward Blue Beach, and, as daylight came, established a new line slightly north of the

Southern Railroad.

Now the 81-mm. mortars of the 710th

Tank Battalion's Provisional Mortar Platoon laid a heavy concentration across the

company front. At 0600 seven Navy planes

strafed the entire Rocky Point area. Temporarily, at least, the Japanese attack was

halted, although another slight withdrawal

was necessary about 0700. The enemy, however, could not effect a general breakthrough and by 0745 the impetus of the

attack had been spent. The 1st Battalion

had suffered many casualties from enemy

mortar fire, and the battalion commander

with his S-2, S-3, and S-4 had to be evacuated for treatment of wounds. Company B,

because it had incurred so many casualties,

was replaced in the line by Company G, until then regimental reserve. Preparations

continued for the scheduled 0900 offensive,

while the Japanese on the left flank withdrew to occupy new defensive positions

south of Rocky Point.

In the 322d Infantry's area, small groups

of Japanese struck repeatedly during the

night of 17-18 September against the defensive line south of Lake Aztec, near the

boundary between the 1st and 3d Battalions. Confused fighting, concerning which

reports are conflicting, ensued all along the

front, but there was no general breakthrough. One small Japanese group worked

its way toward Red Beach along the Pacific

Railroad, falling upon one of Company M's
508 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

machine gun positions near the first phase

line. After killing one of Company M's men,

the group was repulsed. Only one small

party pushed into the gap between the 321st

and 322d Infantry Regiments' fronts. This

was indeed fortunate, for had the Japanese

exploited their opportunity at the gap, they

could have moved on to the coast, possibly

to create much damage at supply and command installations at the beaches, although

the 81st Division was prepared for any such

moves. The one Japanese group that did

move into the gap withdrew at daylight

without attacking any 81st Division perimeter.

Most of the Japanese who had maneuvered in the 322d Infantry's sector during

the night apparently retired toward the

northwest hills shortly after dawn, although

one group—possibly that in the gap—

swung south to the right of the 2d Battalion,

321st Infantry, north of Blue Beach. This

force attacked about 0900, just as the 2d

Battalion was preparing to start its scheduled 18 September advance. Combined machine gun and mortar fire, aided by air attacks, broke up the enemy effort and by

1000 the Japanese had withdrawn.

The 1st Battalion's advance had been

postponed until the situation in front of the

2d Battalion was clarified and Company G

could complete the relief of Company B.

No sooner had the latter task been finished

than, at 0935, another Japanese attack originated from the Rocky Point area. Company G was pushed back from the line it

had just established along the Southern

Railroad and its left was thrown back to

Blue Beach. Air attacks, mortar fire, and

LCI automatic weapons fire finally forced

the Japanese to withdraw, and by 1045 the

front had quieted down. The 321st Infantry

could begin its attack.

Just what Major Goto hoped to gain by

the night action is not clear. He may have

ordered the attacks to cover the withdrawal

of the bulk of his forces, with supplies and

ammunition, to the northwest hills. On the

other hand, he may have underestimated the

strength the 81st Division had put ashore

and thus believed that his counterattacks,

which were carried out by less than two

companies, could create serious damage

among the American units. Whatever the

case, he sacrificed the bulk of one company

in the fruitless attacks on the left of the

321st Infantry. The unit which harassed the

322d Infantry apparently withdrew more

or less intact into the northwest hill mass

early on the morning of the 18th. Finally,

Major Goto was successful in withdrawing

his main force to new defenses, moving into

the hills as large a quantity of supplies and

ammunition as was humanly possible during

the course of the night, and delaying the

321st Infantry's F plus 1 attack by two

hours.

Securing Southern Angaur

While the 321st Infantry's attack was delayed principally as the result of Japanese

action, the 322d Infantry's advance was

nearly delayed without much help from the

enemy.12 Sniper scares set off frenzies of

wild, indiscriminate firing—principally on

the part of LVT crews and engineer or service units at the beach—two or three times

before 0900. Front-line units were pinned

down by friendly fire from the rear and at12

 This section (and its subsections) is based principally on: Drummond, The Palau Campaign, Ch.

VI; Ltr, Maj Nelson L. Drummond to Gen Ward,

n. d., no sub, copy in OCMH files. The records of

the 81st Division and its component parts and

attached units were consulted for additional information.
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 509

tack preparations were slowed. When General Mueller arrived on land about 0930 to

assume command ashore, the 322d Infantry's attack was still not fully developed.

Extending the Hold

Despite indications that the rest of the

regiment might be delayed, Company K,

322d Infantry, started southwest along the

Pacific Railroad on time. A platoon of

mediums from Company B, 710th Tank

Battalion, led the way. Forced by the nature of the terrain to move along the railroad bed, each tank was followed by an

infantry squad which designated targets

for the tank gunners. The tanks blasted

suspicious-looking clumps of dense foliage,

hit a few caves and bunkers, and fired at

some buildings, most of which showed signs

of hurried abandonment. Opposition was

limited to scattered rifle and mortar fire.

By 1100 the tank-infantry force had advanced some 500 yards to a clearing where

the Southern and Pacific Railroads joined

at a small railroad marshalling yard. Since

supporting artillery fire was falling dangerously close, the advance elements pulled

back about 75 yards, to be joined by Company L which had been moving down the

Pacific Railroad driving a few Japanese

before it.

At this juncture, apparently as a result

of confusion of landmarks, six Navy fighter

planes accidentally bombed and strafed the

front lines of the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry. Before the troops could find cover

and the air strike could be stopped, 7 men

had been killed and 46 others wounded.

General Mueller, when he learned the extent of the damage, ordered air attacks

against Angaur discontinued until further

notice. The psychological damage was not

undone for some days, for many officers and

men of the 322d Infantry, having had their

fill of indiscriminate firing by rear units

before the morning attack, were prompted

by the results of the air strike to distrust all

friendly support fire. Their attitude was

not helped by the Japanese trick of firing

artillery and mortars principally when the

81st Division's own heavy weapons were

firing. This trick had been used consistently

by the Japanese throughout the Pacific war,

and the 81st Division was no exception to

the general rule that troops new to combat

took a few days to learn to differentiate between friendly and enemy fire. It was some

time before the 322d Infantry regained its

confidence in supporting artillery, air, and

mortars.

Despite the air strike contretemps, the 3d

Battalion resumed its advance within half

an hour after the last planes had ceased

firing, pushing on to a Japanese phosphate

plant and setting up defenses along a low,

sandy hill immediately north of the shattered buildings. On the regiment's right, the

2d Battalion took over the advance while

the 1st reverted to reserve. The battalion

soon found that available maps did not furnish an accurate picture of the terrain in

northwestern Angaur. West from the second

phase line, the island's north coast comprised terrain not unlike that of the Ibdi

Pocket area on Biak, with similar rough

coral pinnacles, shallow shelves, and small

ridge lines running in all directions. Like

the Biak ridges, Angaur's northwestern terrain was honeycombed with natural crevices

and covered by large tropical trees and thick

jungle undergrowth.

One company moved forward inland expecting to find a gradual slope running westward about 1,000 yards to Lake Salome

and the phosphate diggings at the southeast
510 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

edge of Angaur's highest ground. Instead,

broken coral terrain, which made impossible the employment of the 710th Tank

Battalion's supporting tanks, slowed the advance. Suffering from increasing heat, the

unit could make only 300 yards west from

the second phase line by noon. On the north

coast another company pushed forward

some 1,000 yards to the north end of the

third phase line, where it found itself at the

surf-washed base of a 75-foot-high cliff, a

position similar to that at the Parai Defile

on Biak. One platoon, meeting no opposition, pushed on to Angaur's northwest

tip, Cape Pkulangelul, but no part of the

company could locate any passage south

over the cliffs.

It soon appeared to the regimental commander, Col. Benjamin W. Venable, that

supply and evacuation along the rugged

north coast presented at least temporarily

insoluble problems. He therefore ordered

the forward units to move back to the second phase line, but before dark all the 2d

Battalion could not get back. Two companies remained strung out along the coast

between the second and third phase lines

while a third established contact at the second phase line with the 1st Battalion, which

had extended its left south along the east

shore of Lake Aztec and then southwest

down the Northern Railroad to the 3d Battalion's area. The latter had pushed its

right up the Northern from the phosphate

plant late in the afternoon, but not far

enough to establish physical contact with

the 1st Battalion's left.

In the 321st Infantry's zone the 2d Battalion (comprising Companies C, E, F, H,

and I) pushed north and northeast during

the morning to mop up around Capes

Ngariois and Ngatpokul and inland along

the regimental boundary to the first phase

line. The mopping up was not arduous except for terrain difficulties, and late in the

morning the battalion made contact with

rear elements of the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, along the regimental boundary. The

2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, then tried to

push farther inland through the jungle

parallel to the Pacific Railroad, but was

slowed by heavy undergrowth, increasing

heat, and scattered fire from hidden enemy

riflemen. Shortly after noon the battalion

commander changed the direction of march

to due south toward the Southern Railroad.

By late afternoon the main body was still

100 yards short of the second phase line,

but advance patrols had made contact with

322d Infantry units near the junction of the

Pacific and Southern Railroads. The 321st

Infantry unit set up night defenses along

the Southern Railroad and trails or abandoned railroad beds leading northeast.

On the southern flank of the 321st Infantry zone the 1st Battalion (Companies

A, D, and G) headed inland during the

morning along the Southern Railroad. Numerous antitank mines along the railroad

bed held up supporting tanks and when,

during midafternoon, the unit turned south

off the railroad bed to take from the rear

and flanks enemy positions on the coast

below Rocky Point, heat and thick jungle

undergrowth further slowed movement.

Elements of Company G managed to push

forward to the north end of Green Beach

3, about 600 yards below Rocky Point, but

lost physical contact with the rest of the battalion and were therefore called back to

the Southern. For the night, the units set

up defenses along the railroad bed, tying

the battalion's right into the left of the 2d.

The 3d Battalion (Companies B, K, L, and

M) remained in reserve near the left side

of Blue Beach.
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 511

Advances during the day, except for the

salient to the phosphate plant produced by

the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, had gained

little ground. General Mueller was especially anxious that the southern part of the

island be secured as quickly as possible, for

it was there that the proposed airfield was

to be constructed. Enemy information

available to the division commander indicated that the main body of Japanese was

still in the south, and exaggerated reports

of heavy resistance on the 321st Infantry's

front during the day probably did nothing

to dispel such an opinion. Finally, optimistic reports from the 322d Infantry indicated

that the regiment had occupied all of northwest Angaur except a tiny area of high

ground. Apparently convinced that the

enemy still held southern Angaur in some

strength, General Mueller ordered the emphasis of attack on the 19th to be placed

on a drive southward by both regiments to

clear that area and to divide the remaining

enemy forces.

The Occupation of Southern Angaur

The night of 18-19 September was noisy

and nerve-racking all along the front and

few troops got much sleep. Minor Japanese

attacks harassed the exposed salient held by

the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, while bats

and large land crabs helped the Japanese

to create distraction and started troops firing

on nonexistent enemy infiltrators. Apparently no casualties resulted either from Japanese action or indiscriminate small arms

fire. Friendly artillery fire did, however,

cause some casualties. About 2030, four or

five 105-mm. shells from the 316th Field

Artillery Battalion hit the lines of the 2d

Battalion, 321st Infantry, killing 4 men and

wounding 15 others. The artillery fire was

stopped before further damage could be

done.

About 0730 on the 19th, after an extensive artillery preparation, the offensive was

resumed. The 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry,

advancing from the phosphate plant toward

Saipan Town, found a number of pillboxes,

bunkers, and other defensive installations so

situated as to command the western beaches

and the southern approaches to Saipan

Town but presenting relatively harmless

rear entrances to the American troops. Most

of the positions were unoccupied and the

battalion moved rapidly into the town

against only scattered resistance. By noon

the entire settlement area had been secured

and the unit had regrouped along a road

which ran southeast and inland from the

southern edge of the town. The 2d Battalion

(Companies C, E, F, H, and I), 321st Infantry, had meanwhile met only negligible

resistance driving south from the Southern

Railroad. The unit pushed through Middle

Village (about 400 yards east of Saipan

Town) keeping pace with the 2d Battalion,

322d Infantry, and by noon began pulling

up on the same road where the latter was

regrouping.

While these two advances had been going

on, General Mueller, who had made quick

reconnaissance of the front, decided that

the rest of southern Angaur could be taken

quickly and ordered the southern push continued. The 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry,

moved down a narrow-gauge railroad line

lying about thirty yards inland parallel to

the west coast. Brushing aside a few small

Japanese groups, the battalion moved on to

Cape Ngaramudel and the north shore of

Garangaoi Cove, about 1,300 yards above

Angaur's southwest tip. There, about 1600,

the unit started setting up night defenses,

utilizing many deserted Japanese beach for-
512 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

tifications. The inland flank was bent back

along a road leading northeast toward Middle Village and the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry. The latter unit encountered no opposition as it moved south from Middle

Village early in the afternoon, but advance

elements were halted at the edge of a large

mangrove swamp which covered much of

southeastern Angaur. The troops stopped to

probe for routes through this obstacle and

to wait for the 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry,

to advance equally far south.

The 3d Battalion (Companies G, K, L,

and M) had replaced the 1st at the front

lines during the morning and had started

south from the line of the Southern Railroad

with one column on the beach at Rocky

Point. It had to wait, however, for tanks to

be brought up through difficult terrain before two Japanese 75-mm. gun positions

could be knocked out. Attacks on other defenses in the Green Beach 3 area immediately brought down accurate Japanese mortar fire from emplacements to the northwest,

indicating that the Japanese still maintained

some communication between the isolated

defenders on the southeast coast and mortars set up inland.

The other 3d Battalion column pushed

south from the Southern Railroad until it

hit the upper side of the mangrove swamp,

whereupon it turned east toward the coast

to join forces with the group already on

the shore. Many unlocated Japanese mortars and machine guns continued to cause

casualties, and by early afternoon the entire attack was stalled. Even additional

mortar and artillery support failed to make

the 3d Battalion's going much easier in the

maze of Japanese defenses northeast of

the mangrove swamp.

With the southward displacement of the

2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, from Middle

Village, a gap had developed at the north

end of the regimental lines. To fill this gap

part of the 1st Battalion (now containing

Companies A, B, and D) was sent south

and southeast toward the 3d Battalion and

the rest was moved forward to reinforce

the 2d. Before dark, the units moving south

into the gap could make little progress and

established a night perimeter on the northwest edge of the swamp at a point about

600 yards inland from the 3d Battalion. The

latter had been able to drive a few more

yards south to set up defenses about 650

yards below Rocky Point.

Earlier in the afternoon it had been decided to outflank the mangrove swamp on

the west and establish a line across Angaur

south of that obstacle. The commander of

the 710th Tank Battalion saw in this decision an opportunity to make an armed reconnaissance of southern Angaur, and he

recommended sending some of his mediums

south beyond the infantry lines. Colonel

Dark approved this recommendation, and

a company of tanks, six infantrymen of the

2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, aboard each,

started south around the northwest edge of

the swamp about 1330 hours. The rest of

the 2d Battalion followed afoot.

Turning southwest down the Garangaoi

Cove-Middle Village road, the tank column reached the cove apparently before

the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, had advanced that far. The column then swung

southeast and, following sandy trails, pushed

on to the southeast coast below the mangrove swamp. So far, no opposition had

been encountered. The 2d Battalion's infantrymen set up a defensive line which

stretched across the island from the southeast coast below the swamp to the left flank

of the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, which

was now at Garangaoi Cove, while the
THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 513

tanks pushed north along a narrow strip of

dry land to the lines of the 3d Battalion,

321st Infantry. The tank column encountered little opposition as it passed through

terrain where strong enemy defenses had

been reported as holding up the 3d Battalion all day. Perhaps the Japanese preferred to let the tanks pass unmolested in

favor of waiting quietly until infantry assaults were resumed. Just before dark the

tanks completed a circuit of the mangrove

swamp and took up defensive positions behind the 2d Battalion's new line.

Although the tank column had pushed

through southern Angaur with unexpected

ease, there was still some doubt at division

headquarters concerning the location of the

Angaur Sector Unit's main body. This

doubt was engendered at least in part by a

number of erroneous reports from front-line

units. For example, the 2d Battalion, 321st

Infantry, reported that about 1735 its right

flank was struck by a banzai attack carried

out by 200 Japanese. Actually, a small attack did take place at the specified time,

but it was apparently conducted by fewer

than 20 Japanese who had been cornered

near Angaur's southwest tip. Another report, reaching division headquarters just

before dark, located a number of rubber

boats maneuvering around the southern tip.

This report apparently originated in hasty

aerial observation of surf-washed beach obstacles. Finally, about 1900, the 321st Infantry reported that 300-400 Japanese

were still in southern Angaur.

General Mueller, concerned lest the Japanese reported on the south break through

gaps or weak points in the forward lines,

had special defenses in depth set up at Red

and Blue Beaches, utilizing Shore Party and

antiaircraft troops. All units were alerted to

expect Japanese attacks during the night.

The division expected (and perhaps hoped)

that the Japanese still believed to be located

in southern Angaur might launch a suicidal

desperation charge during the night or at

dawn on the 20th. The night proved very

quiet until, toward morning, some small,

scattered Japanese parties infiltrated

through the lines of both regiments. There

was no banzai effort—rather, these Japanese

troops were apparently attempting to escape

to the northwest hill mass from positions in

the mangrove swamp and Green Beach 3

areas. Action at dawn was limited to a mopping-up operation directed against four

Japanese discovered in the headquarters

area of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry.

The attack on the 20th began about 0800

when the 2d Battalion (Companies A, C,

E, F, H, I, and part of D), 321st Infantry,

began pushing south from its night line. Attached to the composite battalion were two

companies of the 710th Tank Battalion.

The unit swept rapidly southward over the

final 600 yards to the south coast and 800

yards to the southwest tip. Throughout the

area there were numerous pillboxes, bunkers, dugouts, antitank trenches, dual purpose guns in strong emplacements, antitank

weapons, and defensive barriers of all types.

The Japanese had been well prepared for

any Allied landing on southern Angaur, but

only a few enemy soldiers were encountered

during the final sweep south. By 1100 the

entire southern area had been secured.

Along the southeast coast the 3d Battalion (Companies G, K, and L) resumed its

advance about 0800. The 1st Battalion

(now Company B and part of Company

D) initially tried to advance southwest

through the east edge of the mangrove

swamp, but finding the terrain impassable,

joined the 3d. The latter found that most

of the Japanese who had manned defenses
514 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

in the Green Beach 3 area during the previous days had evacuated during the night.

There was still some isolated, stubborn resistance from a few enemy positions, but

progress was delayed principally by terrain

and the necessity to explore thoroughly each

enemy installation. By 1500 the coastal advance had progressed 1,400 yards to the

southern edge of the mangrove swamp. To

mop up a few Japanese who remained in

the swamp and southeast coastal areas, the

2d Battalion was reformed and directed to

move back up the east coast to Blue Beach.

Before dark, all battalions had reorganized

and the final mop up on the east coast had

begun.

All three battalions of the 321st Infantry

continued mopping up in the south during

the morning of the 21st, while the 81st Reconnaissance Troop searched through the

heavily wooded terrain along the coast and

inland between Red and Blue Beaches, killing nine or ten Japanese. In the afternoon

the 321st Infantry was alerted for movement

to Peleliu, where the 1st Marine Division's

operations had been slowed by strong opposition. Responsibility for patrolling in

southern Angaur passed to the 322d Infantry, which already had its hands full trying

to eliminate Japanese resistance in the

northwest hills.
CHAPTER XXII

The Reduction of Northwestern

Angaur

About 1100 on 20 September, General

Mueller had reported to Headquarters, III

Amphibious Corps, that all organized resistance on Angaur had ceased and that the

island was secure.1 That the island was "secure" by that time there can be no doubt.

The area on the south and east, where the

bomber airfield and other base installations

were to be constructed, had been cleared

of Japanese, the remainder of whom, General Mueller now realized, were compressed

into a pocket in northwest Angaur from

which they could not escape. As of 20 September, the 81st Division's G-2 Section estimated that 850 Japanese had already been

killed on Angaur. In accordance with preassault estimates, this figure indicated that

not many more than 350 of the enemy remained alive in the northwest hill mass.

With a reinforced infantry regiment—the

322d Regimental Combat Team—available for the job, mopping up in the northwest corner seemed to pose no great problem.

Into the Main Defenses

Locating the Japanese

While the 321st Infantry, the 3d Battalion of the 322d Infantry, and reinforcing

elements such as the bulk of the 710th Tank

Battalion had been securing southern Angaur, the rest of the 322d Infantry had been

probing the enemy's northwestern defenses.

Company E, 322d Infantry, had spent the

night of 18-19 September in a semi-isolated

perimeter on the north coast, its rear protected by Companies F and G in position

near the northern end of the second phase

line. The 1st Battalion's left was extended

southwest down the second phase line and

the Northern Railroad toward the phosphate plant and the 3d Battalion. On the

19th the 1st Battalion was to attack south

to join the 3d, while the 2d Battalion was

to advance south on the 1st's right. The 2d

Battalion was also to be prepared to swing

westward into the high ground on regimental order. (Map VIII)

The 1st Battalion's attack started on

schedule at 0730 on the 19th, but the 2d

Battalion delayed to reassemble its scattered

companies. As the 1st moved south with

two companies abreast, it was subjected to

1

 This chapter is based principally on Drummond, The Palau Campaign, Chs. VI and VII

(Ch. VII incomplete). The records of the 81st

Division and attached units, especially those of the

322d Infantry and the 710th Tank Battalion, were

employed to complete the story.
516 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

enfilade small arms and machine gun fire

from high ground on its right front, but the

enemy made no attempt to press home an

infantry attack nor to fire artillery or heavy

mortars. Because of the nature of the terrain between the Northern and Milwaukee

Railroads, into which the two forward companies first moved, supporting tanks had to

be dropped off. Then a swampy area was

discovered southwest of Lake Aztec, and the

infantry movement was channeled along

the Northern Railroad. Continuing along

this track and passing through many abandoned enemy positions, the battalion

reached the phosphate plant and established

contact with rear elements of the 3d Battalion about 1100. Since the latter unit

needed no help in its drive south on the 19th,

the 1st Battalion passed to regimental reserve.

The 2d Battalion had meanwhile reformed and started south. The unit moved

in column around the north end of Lake

Aztec, pushed west of the Milwaukee Railroad, and continued south to the junction

of that line and the Western Railroad. At

this junction, located approximately 450

yards north of the phosphate plant, contact

was established with the 1st Battalion, and

the 2d pushed on into the phosphate plant

area without opposition. Colonel Venable,

the regimental commander, now pulled

Company G out of the battalion for a regimental reserve and ordered the rest of the

unit to attack back up the Western Railroad

and north along the west coast.

On the coast west-northwest of the phosphate plant rose two prominent hills, each

about 100 feet high. On the southernmost

was a Shinto shrine. About 175 yards to the

north was Lighthouse Hill, the lighthouse

itself having been toppled by preassault

naval gunfire. The two hills were connected

by heavily overgrown, broken, coral ridge

lines along which Major Goto had stationed

a detachment of some forty men with orders

to hold the coastal approaches to the northwest hill mass.

Shortly after 1200 Company E started

moving on Shrine Hill to capture and hold

it as a base of fire while the rest of the 2d

Battalion attacked Lighthouse Hill and

other high ground in the immediate vicinity. Fire from supporting tanks and weapons

from the remainder of the battalion kept

Japanese defenders under cover as Company E started up Shrine Hill, and no

serious opposition was encountered until the

hilltop and shrine had been taken. Then,

probing along the western slopes, the company prompted about thirty of the enemy

to counterattack from a large cave. With

some difficulty the Japanese were killed,

dispersed, or pushed back into the cave.

Protected by tanks and riflemen, engineers

then blocked the cave entrance. The rest of

Shrine Hill was secured against only scattered rifle fire from higher ground to the

north.

Company F, sent to occupy both Lighthouse Hill and a smaller knoll about 175

yards to the southeast, accomplished both

missions by late afternoon against negligible

opposition. A patrol was sent up a trail

leading north from Lighthouse Hill but encountered heavy automatic weapons fire

from Japanese positions on wooded broken

ridges 200 yards to the north. Since there

was no time before dark to attack these

ridges, the patrol was withdrawn. Enemy

fire, probably from the same positions,

started to sweep the partially bare northern slopes of Lighthouse Hill. All of Company F was withdrawn to form a line running northeast from Shrine Hill to the knoll

southeast of Lighthouse Hill.
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 517

While this action had been going on,

Company G, released from regimental reserve early in the afternoon, had started up

the Western Railroad. About 300 yards

above the junction of the Western and Milwalkee Railroads, the Western entered a

deep cut, banked on both sides by steep

slopes about 50-75 feet high. At the entrance to the defile, the company halted

to send patrols to the tops of the slopes.

Once atop the slopes, the infantrymen

could see into a deep, broad bowl, where

lay a maze of abandoned phosphate diggings, many short railroad spurs, and Lake

Salome. The bowl was backed on all sides

by overgrown, jagged coral ridge lines and

cliffs 50 to 100 feet high.

Noticing a small Japanese party moving

in the southern section of the bowl, Company G opened fire with light machine

guns. Immediately, hidden Japanese light

artillery, mortars, machine guns, and rifles

opened fire from the backing ridges and the

bowl floor. The ridge-top patrols found

their positions untenable and hurriedly descended into the defile. The Japanese fire

continued, some of it getting into the railroad cut. The company finally was recalled

to join the rest of the 2d Battalion in night

defenses, but not before five men had been

seriously wounded by the enemy fire.

Colonel Venable, who now felt that the

Japanese held the northwest hills in some

strength, became concerned about the security of Red Beach. Two of his battalions

were concentrated near the phosphate

plant, while the third had moved south below Saipan Town. Since there were no defenses between the phosphate plant and the

beach, Colonel Venable sent the 1st Battalion back up the route it had traveled in

the morning to re-establish defenses along

the second phase line between Lake Aztec

and the north coast. A gap remained between Lake Aztec and the phosphate plant,

but no attack was expected in that sector

because the terrain consisted principally of

swamp and nearly impassable wooded ridge

lines. The Japanese either did not know

of this gap or chose to ignore it in favor of

withdrawing men from the 321st Infantry's

front to the northwest hills.

The attack on the northwest was resumed

on 20 September by the 2d Battalion, 322d

Infantry. During the morning the unit reoccupied Lighthouse Hill and slowly probed

into many abandoned Japanese positions in

the surrounding rough, hilly terrain. By

midafternoon the bulk of the battalion was

on its way toward the southwest side of the

Lake Salome bowl, which lay uphill from

Lighthouse Hill. The terrain between the

latter feature and the bowl's rim gave every

advantage to Japanese defenders, who

countered each forward movement with

mortar or machine gun fire, and Companies

E and F, leading the attack, could gain little

ground north of Lighthouse Hill before

dark. The battalion (less Company G) dug

in for the night in much the same positions,

except for the addition of Lighthouse Hill,

as those it had held the previous night.

Company G, during the morning, had

again attacked up the Western Railroad and

set up mortar and machine gun positions on

the ridges above the railroad defile, which

later became known as Bloody Gulch, in

preparation for infantry movement into the

bowl. Self-propelled 75-mm. weapons

(SPM's) of the Cannon Company, 322d

Infantry, then lumbered up and into the

defile. Two of the SPM's pushed through

the 50-yard-long defile to the northern end,

which opened into the Lake Salome bowl,

encountering no resistance other than scattered small arms fire. As a third SPM moved
518 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

out of the defile's northern exit, one of the

earlier arrivals was disabled by a land mine

and another was temporarily put out of

action by fire from a Japanese antitank gun

brought into position on the bowl's eastern

slopes. The entire crew of the SPM was

wounded but was successfully evacuated in

the face of increasingly heavy small arms

fire. The SPM was restarted and brought

back into the railroad cut.

By early afternoon Colonel Venable realized that Company G needed more support,

and he sent forward a platoon of medium

tanks. These vehicles could not get through

the defile, which was still blocked by disabled SPM's. Without the additional support the infantry could make no progress,

and the attack stalled. The colonel thereupon decided to start an advance from a

new direction, and at 1400 he ordered Company B to move overland from the Milwaukee Railroad northwest toward the eastern

side of the bowl. Company B reached its

line of departure (on the Milwaukee about

400 yards north of that line's junction with

the Western) without difficulty. Progress

from the railroad toward the bowl's eastern

rim was painfully slow, because it was necessary to cut trail through swamp or dense

jungle undergrowth. The attack from the

east therefore bogged down. Company G,

without expected support on its right, could

make no progress either. Finally, at 1500,

the two forward units were ordered to withdraw to allow ample space for artillery registration on the bowl.

Although General Mueller had announced the end of organized resistance on

Angaur, the 322d Infantry, by dusk on the

20th, had learned enough about the Japanese positions in northwest Angaur to take

exception to the division commander's view.

As the regiment had begun to suspect, organized resistance had by no means ceased.

Indeed—for the 322d Infantry—it had just

started.

General Mueller's statement was probably prompted by his realization that the

remaining Japanese were compressed into

the northwest hills and by the reports that

about 850 of the enemy had been killed

through the 20th. This casualty figure was

an overestimation. Probably fewer than 600

Japanese had been killed through the 20th,

and Major Goto still had possibly 750 men

with which to conduct an organized defense in the northwest. On orders from General Inoue, commander of the Palau Sector

Group, Major Goto planned no final banzai attack which would decimate his forces.

Instead he withdrew over half his force

to rugged terrain and emplaced them in

natural or prepared fortifications. His lines

of defense in the northwest were well conceived; many of his positions were mutually

supporting; the amphitheater configuration of the bowl provided him with defensive areas whence heavy cross fires could

be directed at attackers; the broken coral,

with its crevices, fissures, caves, and ridgelets, gave him defensive advantages at least

as good as those at the Ibdi Pocket on Biak;

and he had available a number of artillery

and antitank weapons, heavy and light mortars, and heavy and light machine guns,

most of them so emplaced as to give maximum support to his riflemen. In addition,

he could still exercise effective control over

the men he had gathered in the Lake Salome bowl. For whatever it was worth,

Major Goto was ready to conduct a protracted defense, though the best he could

hope for was to tie down the 322d Infantry.

The real issue at Angaur—securing the

prospective airfield area—had already

been decided.
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 519

The First Push Into the Bowl

What was hoped to be the final attack on

Angaur was scheduled to begin at 0800 on

21 September. Companies E and F, 322d

Infantry, were to push up the coast from

Lighthouse Hill, find a break in the bowl's

western wall, and attack eastward. Company G, with a tank platoon in support, was

to strike again from the south through the

railroad defile. The entire 1st Battalion was

to attack west from the Milwaukee Railroad, while the 3d Battalion was to remain

on the defensive along the northern end of

the second phase line.

During the night of 20-21 September

artillery fire was directed into the bowl area.

Only 155-mm. shells could cause much

damage there, but the 155-mm. battalion

ashore was so emplaced that the northwest

hills were short of its minimum range. One

battery was therefore displaced backward

to a better position at southern Angaur

from which it and a 105-mm. battalion

continued the fire, augmented for half an

hour by rocket, automatic weapons, and

4.2-inch mortar fire from offshore LCI's.

The attack on the 21st was preceded by

artillery concentrations lasting an hour.

Then there was a half-hour bombing and

strafing attack by Navy planes and, finally,

another half hour of artillery fire. As they

formed for their attack, the infantrymen

of the 322d Infantry were confident that

the artillery and aerial bombardments must

have reduced Japanese resistance in the

bowl area to the vanishing point.

Company G, moving back up the Western Railroad's narrow bed, found that on

the contrary the Japanese were determined

to defend the steep banks of the defile. The

unit could not even get into the railroad

cut, let alone reoccupy the banks. By 0900

the entire advance had halted, and fifteen

minutes of artillery and mortar fire support

was called for. About 0945 the infantry attack was resumed. The support fire had

been effective and patrols gained the top

of the cut, on both sides, with little difficulty. Heavy weapons were set up to fire

into the bowl, and the troops waited for

tanks to make their way through the defile

and for the 1st Battalion to pull up on line

to the north.

Lead tanks got to the northern exit of

the defile without encountering any enemy

fire but found egress blocked by the SPM

which had been abandoned the previous

afternoon. Explosives and 75-mm. fire from

the lead tank failed to move the SPM, which

finally had to be towed to one side. This

job took so long that it was not until after

1200 that the mediums of the 710th Tank

Battalion were able to start moving into

the bowl.

Eight tanks, accompanied by a rifle platoon from Company G, filed through the

railroad cut and out into the bowl. There

was scattered small arms fire from the Japanese, but enemy heavy weapons remained

silent as the tanks pushed forward, compelled by the nature of the terrain to follow

the narrow-gauge railroad beds. In the bowl

the railroad spurs were laid along raised

beds from which two tanks slid, one falling

twenty feet to overturn and catch fire and

the other getting into such a position that

it had to be disarmed and abandoned.

Three additional tanks moved about fifty

yards into the bowl and halted to provide

fire support to Company G men who were

working along higher ground to the right

along the southeast rim. Tank fire was directed mainly into the center of the bowl

and toward the high slopes of the north rim.

One enemy antitank gun was located and
ENTRANCE TO LAKE SALOME BOWL
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 521

knocked out before it could cause serious

damage, but, for the most part, definite targets were impossible to find. Previous artillery fire had done little to clear vegetation.

The infantrymen moving along the crevices and fissures of the southeast rim found

progress impeded both by terrain and by

enemy fire from the northern rim. Hidden

machine guns and light mortars increased

the tempo of their fires as Company G

moved forward. The terrain made co-ordinated infantry-tank attacks impossible.

Companies C and I were ordered forward

to reinforce Company G but arrived at the

defile exit too late in the afternoon to be

employed. By 1600 it had become apparent

that little further advance could be made

before dark. It also appeared that additional

progress into the bowl would produce a

salient which the Japanese could destroy at

their leisure during the night. Such a salient

could receive no support from either the east

or west sides of the bowl, for the attacks in

those areas had also failed.

Companies E and F, pushing up the coast

from Lighthouse Hill, had been unable to

find any route over the western ridges—

which in many spots were sheer cliffs 50 to

100 feet high—into the eastern side of the

bowl. On the other hand, by 1045, the companies had moved 250 yards up the west

coast without opposition. From a base at

Black Beach, where the 323d Infantry had

feinted on F Day, patrols were sent on up

the coast to Angaur's northwest tip. Many

unoccupied enemy positions along the coast

were found and destroyed, but still no route

over the cliffs could be located.

The 1st Battalion had started westward

on schedule from the Milwaukee Railroad

in an attempt to co-ordinate an attack from

that direction with Company G's effort. The

battalion had to cut its way through dense

undergrowth and found that the terrain

became increasingly rough toward the

southeast rim of the bowl. Only light resistance was encountered from enemy

ground troops, but some Japanese 150-mm.

mortar shells fell near the head of the battalion column. By 1600 the bulk of the unit

had moved only 200 yards forward, although Company B had managed to cut a

rough trail most of the way to the bowl's

southeast rim.

Believing that night action in exposed

positions and rough terrain—almost entirely

bare coral at the bowl's southern entrance—

might result in heavy casualties, the frontline battalion commanders recommended

withdrawal from the forward areas before

dark. To this Colonel Venable agreed, and

by nightfall defenses had been re-established

generally along the same lines which had

been held the previous night.

For the morrow it was decided to send

three rifle companies, a tank company, and

a 4.2-inch mortar company into the bowl

through the southern defile entrance. Two

rifle companies of the 1st Battalion were to

conduct holding attacks against the eastern rim, but the effort to move the entire

1st Battalion into the bowl from that direction was to be abandoned. Finally, two

other rifle companies, reinforced with engineer demolition teams, were to push up the

west coast from Black Beach to destroy all

enemy positions that could be located and

to find or make a route over which an attack could be made into the bowl from

the west. The 3d Battalion (less Company

I) was to take over the defense of the rest

of Angaur from the 321st Infantry. Company I was attached to the 2d Battalion.

Shortly after 0730 on the 22d, both the

coastal and southern defile attacks were

resumed. The coastal effort met little op-
522 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

position, but again no feasible route over

the western cliffs and ridges could be located. At 1500 the two companies were

withdrawn to take up new positions at the

southern defile entrance. In the railroad

cut the experience on the morning of the

21st was repeated, for the Japanese had reoccupied the ground abandoned the previous evening. Three tanks pushed back

into the bowl along the railroad beds and

by noon were in position to provide fire

support for infantry units penetrating

deeper. By the same time, the 2d Battalion

had secured the southern rim of the bowl

for a distance of about 200 yards both east

and west of the defile entrance.

Units were now regrouped for another

co-ordinated effort, which began at 1300.

The main strength was placed on the right

(southeast) section of the bowl, and tanks

fired along the eastern rim about 200 yards

in front of the leading elements. The mediums had been undisturbed by enemy fire

all morning, but, apparently attracted by

an incautious grouping of officers and men

near the lead tanks and defile exit, a Japanese antitank gun opened fire from a hidden

emplacement along the east rim. Three officers (including Colonel Venable, who was

in the forward area to observe the new attack) and one enlisted man were severely

wounded and had to be evacuated.

Meanwhile, the attacking companies had

moved slowly forward from the south and

southeast. Leading elements reached the

shore of Lake Salome and proceeded north

along the east side of the depression in which

the lake lay. By midafternoon the advance

had gained over 250 yards and much of the

ground around the lake had been at least

temporarily cleared of Japanese. But the

troops in the depression and on surrounding

higher ground were in an extremely precarious position. Their location made it impossible to provide them with any close artillery or tank support, whereas they could

be subjected to vicious cross fire from nearly

inaccessible Japanese positions hidden in

almost incredibly rough terrain to the north,

east, and west. Again, it was decided to

pull back to more tenable positions for the

night.

Frustration at the Southern Entrance

During the retirement on the 22d, one

of the three forward tanks was so badly damaged by a mine or buried shell that it could

not be moved through the defile. This tank

blocked the defile's northern entrance and

prevented the withdrawal of another medium, which had to be destroyed to keep

it from falling into Japanese hands. In four

days of fruitless effort to push into the bowl

from the south, three tanks and two 75-mm.

SPM's had been lost. Heavier infantry losses

also began to be sustained now that the

Japanese, cornered, were fighting to the

death. On the 22d, for instance, the 2d Battalion lost 2 men killed and about 35

wounded.

The regimental commander, Colonel

Venable, was replaced after his evacuation

by his executive officer, Lt. Col. Ernest H.

Wilson. The 2d Battalion's commander

wanted to make another complete withdrawal out of the defile before dark, but

this was not approved. General Mueller

had directed that night defenses be set up

at the point of deepest penetration each day.

However, when Colonel Wilson learned of

the dangerously exposed position of the two

companies around the shores of Lake

Salome, he authorized them to move back
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 523

to higher terrain near the defile entrance.

The rest of the troops held their ground.

As if in vindication of the judgment that

the 322d Infantry could hold the rugged

terrain in the forward area during the hours

of darkness, the night passed with only

minor attempts at infiltration on the part

of the Japanese. The forward units gained

some measure of confidence that they could

operate during the night as effectively as

the enemy could.

At 0730 on the morning of the 23d, the

2d Battalion, with Companies B, C, and E

attached, continued the attack into the bowl

from the south. Companies B and C worked

up the east shore of Lake Salome. Companies I and G pushed toward the southwest and western shores, while Company F

paid particular attention to caves along the

southwest rim of the bowl. During the first

part of the attack all companies moved forward rapidly, and Company I reached the

northwest corner of the lake without much

trouble. But Company B, pushing forward

against increasingly heavy Japanese fire

from the north, was pinned down by this

fire when it reached the northeast corner

of the lake. Company C was sent north on

B's right to try to outflank the enemy machine gun and mortar positions from which

the fire on Company B originated. The intention was to flush the Japanese from their

positions and push them southwest and

south against the main body of the 2d Battalion. But Company C could make little

progress toward the northern section of the

bowl, and its own position became precarious as Japanese mortar and machine gun

fire increased and the 1st Battalion's own

81-mm. mortar ammunition ran out, making further mortar support impossible.

Japanese fire continued to increase and the

positions of all forward companies became

untenable. A general withdrawal to the

defile entrance was ordered.

The withdrawal was painfully slow; companies were broken up; all units suffered

more casualties. One small group of Company I, separated from its parent unit,

worked over the cliffs and ridges at the

bowl's western rim to the coast at Black

Beach. Company B, retreating in small segments, lost men as it withdrew from the

northeast corner of the lake. All told, the

2d Battalion and attached companies lost

18 men killed and over 75 wounded during

the day.

Overcoming the Last Resistance

The withdrawal to the defile on the afternoon of the 23d was the culmination of five

days' effort to get into the bowl from the

south, effort that had proved so costly that

it was decided that continued attack from

the south would not be worth the results

achieved. Artillery close support for the infantry attack from the south was severely

limited by the nature of the terrain; infantry was channeled into two narrow lines of

approach around the shores of Lake Salome

toward the enemy's strongest positions, at

the northern side of the bowl; and, finally,

no support could yet be provided by other

overland attacks from the north, east, or

west. A major change in plans seemed to be

necessary.

A Change in Tactics

First, it was decided that on Sunday, 24

September, an effort would be made to entice the remaining Japanese into surrender

by means of propaganda broadcasts over a

public address system. If this effort proved

fruitless, then all available artillery would
524 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

bombard the entire bowl area while preparations were made to attack into the bowl

from the north or northeast.

The propaganda effort was made on the

morning of the 24th, but only two Japanese

surrendered. Claiming that 300-400 Japanese remained in the bowl under Major

Goto's control, these prisoners told of shortages of food and water among the bowl

defenders. The prisoners' estimate—later

proved reasonably accurate—was not accepted by the 81st Division's G-2 officers,

who, on the basis of reports of Japanese already killed on Angaur and realizing that

Japanese enlisted men seldom had much

knowledge of the general situation, concluded that not more than 150 Japanese

were left in the bowl.

With the failure of the broadcasts, a

155-mm. battalion and two 105-mm. battalions began concentrated bombardment

of the bowl and the surrounding ridges and

cliffs. The fire continued throughout the

afternoon of 24 September and the ensuing

night, greatly changing the appearance of

the bowl interior and the inner rims. Much

of the thick foliage was knocked off the tops

and sides of cliffs and ridges into crevices

and gullies. The contours of the rough,

broken terrain emerged more clearly and

visibility was greatly improved. It was expected that the artillery fire would have

reduced Japanese defenders to a mere handful, most of whose fortifications would have

been destroyed or laid bare, and the 322d

Infantry hoped that one final infantry

attack would reduce the last enemy stronghold.

Colonel Wilson planned his next strong

attack at the north. The 3d Battalion (less

Company I but plus Company A) was to

attack south over the northern rim from

the north coast. If necessary, a road would

be built along the north coast west from

the first phase line to the point of attack

and thence south into the bowl so that tanks

and supplies could be brought up.

On the morning of the 25th, the 3d Battalion assembled at the northern end of the

first phase line and moved west along the

coast, following the route taken by elements

of the 2d Battalion a week earlier. The battalion pushed on, looking for routes south

over the cliffs, to a point within 500 yards

of Angaur's northwest tip. No route was

found. Moreover, it was estimated that the

terrain along the north coast was so rough

that it would take weeks to blast a tank and

supply road forward to the point where the

3d Battalion had halted. After personal

reconnaissance by LVT along the north

coast, Colonel Wilson decided that further

effort on the north would be impracticable,

and he therefore ordered the 3d Battalion

to move back to the morning assembly

area. A new line of advance had to be

chosen. As a result of ground and aerial

reconnaissance, it was decided to push the

new attack west-southwest from a point

near the northern end of the Milwaukee

Railroad. This route was chosen for two

reasons. First, the reconnaissance had disclosed that a road could be bulldozed

through the proposed area of advance and

second, a successful attack into the bowl

from the new direction would have a good

chance of splitting the remaining Japanese

force.

In accordance with the new plan, Company B, 306th Engineers, started road construction during the afternoon of 25 September. The attack along the new route was

to begin on the 26th, with the 3d Battalion,

322d Infantry, leading. The 2d Battalion,

the bulk of which had spent the 25th disposed around the southeast and southern
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 525

INTERIOR OF LAKE SALOME BOWL

rims of the bowl, was to conduct a supporting attack from the southeast with two companies. Two other companies were to remain at the southern defile entrance to prevent Japanese escape in that direction.

The 3d Battalion's attack on the 26th

began about 0730, with Companies A and

K advancing abreast. There was little opposition and shortly before noon the advance platoons of Company A gained the

top of the bowl's eastern rim northeast of

Lake Salome. From this new vantage point,

the troops could obtain their first clear view

of formidable-looking ridges and cliffs at

the northern rim of the bowl.

As Company A arrived at the top of the

eastern rim, Japanese defenders to the north

and northwest discovered the new threat.

Major Goto had either no time or no desire

to shift troops to meet the advancing Americans, but the enemy did begin to direct small

arms, mortar, and machine gun fire at Company A. Using available cover from this

fire, Company A moved slowly down the

inner side of the eastern rim, reaching the

bowl floor at a point north-northeast of Lake

Salome and some 250 yards north of the

farthest penetration during the attacks from

the southern entrance. Not much more than

250 yards to Company A's right lay the

rough terrain of the north rim, and beyond

that the broken, jagged ridges between the

bowl and the north coast. But now vision

to the north was blocked by a thickly overgrown nose protruding from the east rim

and lying on Company A's immediate right

flank. To the left and left front lay broken

terrain of abandoned phosphate diggings
526 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

and an overgrown coral mound about

twenty feet high and seventy-five yards in

diameter. Between this mound (which soon

came to be known as "The Island") and the

east rim lay an open draw.

As Company A slowly moved along the

east rim ridges, cautiously probing into

abandoned or partially destroyed enemy positions, K Company came over the rim,

shifted to A's left, and started moving toward The Island and into the draw. As the

leading elements crossed the draw, Japanese

automatic weapons opened up from the

northern cliffs, positions to the northeast,

and from The Island. The ensuing cross

fire quickly pinned down Company A and

most of Company K. Withdrawal was necessary but nearly impossible. Finally, it was

executed with the aid of supporting mortars,

which placed smoke shells on the enemy

positions along the north and northeast

ridges, and with the help of approaching

darkness. New positions for the night were

found slightly to the south and southeast

along the inner base of the east rim.

During the day Companies E and F, executing the supporting attack, had managed

to get to the top of the southeast rim at a

point about 350 yards south of Companies

A and K. The 2d Battalion companies found

themselves in the rear of positions from

which the Japanese had done much to prevent successful earlier attacks through the

southern defile entrance, but they pushed on

down into the bowl against increasingly

heavy opposition, clearing out many cave

positions. Many of these caves were still

occupied, and before dark the companies

had suffered thirty-seven casualties from

enemy fire. As night fell, the two units established a defensive perimeter which extended from the southeast corner of Lake

Salome to the defile entrance.

All in all, operations on the 26th had

been quite successful. The 3d Battalion had

secured a foothold in the northern section

of the bowl; the Japanese forces were at

least partially split; the 2d Battalion had

destroyed many enemy installations along

the southeast rim; and apparently excellent

positions had been obtained for a resumption of the attack on the morrow. On the

other hand, the forward companies suffered

about forty casualties. The night of 26-27

September was by no means restful. A heavy

tropical downpour lasted most of the night

and was accompanied by a number of sharp

but un-co-ordinated Japanese attacks

against Company A. These attacks were

beaten back only after the company lost a

few more men.

On the morning of the 27th the attack

was continued on all fronts. Two companies

of the 1st Battalion again moved up the

west coast toward the northwest corner of

the bowl; Companies A, K, and L pushed

into the northern section of the bowl from

the east; Companies E and F continued

pressure from the southeast; and Companies I and H remained at the southern

defile entrance. Operations during the

morning were extremely laborious. Each

enemy position, of which there were seemingly an ever-increasing number, had to be

reduced individually in the face of heavy

automatic weapons fire from the north rim

and high ground beyond. Company L,

which had followed the route of Companies

A and K over the east rim, had to mop up

a number of Japanese who had either infiltrated behind the two more forward units

during the night or had emerged from bypassed or insufficiently blasted caves.

By midafternoon Companies A and L had

reached the base of the north rim. In the

south it had become obvious that Japanese
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 527

opposition was weakening, since Companies

E and F found the going easier along the

inner side of the east rim. Company I

moved in through the defile entrance to the

southwest ridges and found that most of the

Japanese who had previously held that area

had either been killed or had evacuated.

By dusk, a perimeter extended clockwise

around the inside of the bowl from a point

on the north rim 300 yards north-northwest

of Lake Salome to Company I's new position on the southwest. Japanese escape

from the unguarded portions of the bowl

and northwest ridges was impossible. To

the north lay the sea; to the west was Company C, strung out along the coast north

of Black Beach; and to the east was Company G, which extended from the coast

northeast of the bowl over the rough terrain to tie in with Company L's lines at the

bowl's northeast corner. The new tactics

of attack from the northeast had isolated

Japanese resistance, split the enemy forces,

and secured for the 322d Infantry a firm

foothold inside the bowl.

Mop Up in the North

The fight at northwest Angaur now resolved itself into an infantry slugging match

for a few days, with minor reverses and

local gains occurring almost each day. But

different from most action in the next week

was that on the 28th of September. Companies B and I, which had started up the

northwest rim from inside the bowl, were

subjected to an intense enemy mortar barrage and were forced to withdraw for reorganization and officer replacements.

There were about eighty casualties on the

28th, the highest number suffered by the

322d Infantry during any single day of

action on Angaur.

Despite these casualties, by dusk on the

29th the entire bowl floor was cleared of

enemy and all organized opposition was

isolated on the northwest rim and on higher,

broken ground between that area and

Angaur's northwest tip. Another co-ordinated attack toward the last enemy stronghold now seemed possible, and on 1 October

all three battalions began a new effort. The

2d Battalion moved west along the coast

between the sea and the north rim, while

the 1st and 3d Battalions attacked generally

north into the high ground from the inside

of the bowl. Tank support was now available, for the new road from the northeast

had been completed and the mediums of

the 710th Tank Battalion could make their

way into the northern section of the bowl.

The 1 October attack, which cost the

322d Infantry some thirty more casualties,

was not as successful as had been anticipated. Companies B and K drove through

the Japanese defenses in the northwest hills

to the north coast, but in so doing missed

many of the strongest defenses. But the

day's action did succeed in discovering the

boundaries of final resistance. The remaining Japanese were compressed into an area

measuring less than 500 yards from east to

west and 150 yards north to south in the

northwest ridges between the bowl's northwest rim and the sea.

After the 1 October attack it was decided that there would be no more costly

all-out infantry assaults. Instead, tanks,

4.2-inch mortars, and artillery were brought

into the bowl for close-in fire. A few 155-

mm. howitzers were brought up to the

southern defile entrance to lay direct fire

on the enemy positions at a range of 700

yards. On 6 October artillery and mortars

undertook an especially heavy bombardment. From 0700 to 1030, 155-mm. how-
MOPPING UP IN NORTHWEST ANGAUR. Note coral outcroppings.
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 529

itzers fired at especially chosen targets, including a suspected Japanese observation

post, while 105-mm. howitzers, 4.2-inch

mortars, 81-mm. mortars, and 60-mm.

mortars laid concentrations on the flanks

and rear of the remaining Japanese-held

area to prevent any Japanese from escaping.

At 1030 the artillery and mortars switched

to smoke shells to blanket the Japanese area

and at 1035 these weapons ceased fire.

Automatic weapons and small arms then

took up the fire to indicate the beginning

of an infantry assault, while two infantry

companies began moving toward the Japanese flanks. The Japanese fell for the bait

and began moving out of covered positions

to set up machine guns to forestall the infantry attack they apparently expected.

Allowing a little additional time for more

Japanese to move to exposed positions, the

81st Division's 155-mm. howitzers laid

down another heavy concentration, while

the 105-mm's. and mortars resumed their

fires around the periphery of the Japanese

positions.

This type of firing continued until 1400,

by which time a large concrete and steel emplacement, probably Major Goto's command post, had been uncovered and destroyed by direct fire from 155-mm. howitzers. How many more Japanese positions

were knocked out and how many casualties

were caused is unknown, but it is certain

that the Japanese did not escape unscathed.

After 1400, infantrymen of the 1st and 2d

Battalions, 322d Infantry, moved back to

positions from which they had withdrawn

immediately before the day's bombardment

and succeeded in killing a few more Japanese before dark.

Infantry action was limited to extensive

use of sniper teams, small combat patrols,

ambushes, and booby trapping. The intention was to hem in the remaining Japanese

and close all possible routes of supply and

escape. Since the proximity of American

troops to the Japanese positions now prevented use of 81-mm. mortars, 60-mm. mortars were used exclusively. These weapons

were for the most part removed from the

rifle companies and placed in one battery

which fired under regimental control.

The Japanese had under their control in

the final pocket a number of Angaur natives, three of whom had managed to make

their way into 322d Infantry lines after a

surrender broadcast on 1 October. These related stories of hardships suffered in caves

where the Japanese had kept them closely

guarded and also told the 322d Infantry

that more natives were being held in the

northwest pocket. First attempts by native

volunteers to lead some of the others out

were unsuccessful, but on the 8th of October

87 more natives made their way out of the

pocket to an area where elements of Company B, 306th Engineers, were working. The

next day, three native volunteers led 90

more out of the pocket. About one-fifth of

the total of 183 natives rescued from the Japanese needed extensive medical attention

and all the rest were suffering from malnutrition. The healthier ones rebuilt their own

village and some were ultimately used as

labor on various projects at Angaur.

On 13 October a final concerted attack

was begun. The 1st Battalion moved against

the last enemy positions from the west, while

the 2d Battalion pushed forward from the

north and northeast. By the 18th of the

month the new effort had succeeded in

compressing the remaining Japanese into a

pocket roughly 100 yards long and 50 yards

wide. The next night Major Goto was

killed. Two days later the last isolated

pockets of resistance were overcome, and
530 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

by the 23d it was evident that all but a few

Japanese stragglers had been wiped out.

The infantry battalions were withdrawn

from the northwest area and the Antitank

and Cannon Companies were left in the

bowl to track down and kill the few enemy

who might still be alive there.

Results of Operations on Angaur

From a number of conflicting statements,

it is impossible to assign a definite termination date to the Angaur operation. General Mueller had declared the island secure

and organized resistance over on 20 September. The island was secure then but, as

the 322d Infantry soon discovered, organized resistance was far from over. On 14

October Headquarters, III Amphibious

Corps, terminated the attack and occupation phase of operations on Angaur. At that

time certain administrative responsibilities

passed to the garrison force commander, but

the 81st Division retained control over defense and operations at the northwest

pocket. From a tactical point of view, the

operation did not end until 21 October,

when the 322d Infantry overran the last

organized Japanese defenses in the northwest.

Through 21 October approximately

1,300 Japanese had been killed on Angaur

and 45 had been captured. The 321st Infantry's part in the operation had cost that

regiment 26 men killed and 135 wounded.

The 322d Infantry, which fought longer

and against stiffer opposition, lost 211 men

killed and 772 wounded. Total battle casualties for all units on the island during the

period 17 September through 21 October

were 264 men killed and 1,355 wounded or

injured. In addition, there were 244 cases

of battle fatigue and 696 hospital cases from

various types of sickness and disease. Thus,

total casualties were 2,559, of which number 1,394 were ultimately returned to duty

at Angaur, and the rest evacuated.2

The capture of Angaur, however costly,

helped to secure the Palaus and to eliminate

that island group as a threat to Allied lines

of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. Moreover,

Angaur provided the Allies with another

air-base site in the forward area. Airdrome

construction on Angaur was begun on 20

September, F plus 3, by the 1884th and

1887th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The

first plane, a C-47, landed on the field on

F plus 28, 15 October. Four days later two

6,000-foot landing strips were completed

and work on taxiways, gasoline storage, and

other air-base installations was well along.3

Air-base construction on Angaur presented difficult problems. There was available no conveniently located Japanese airfield which the Allies could repair, improve,

and expand. Instead, the work had to begin

at the beginning. Jungle had to be cut away,

swamps filled, and rough terrain leveled.

There was no hope that an airstrip could be

prepared in three or four days as had been

the case on many other islands in the Pacific.

The completion of two 6,000-foot runways

by 19 October, F plus 32, represented a considerable accomplishment.

The Japanese Army, when it decided to

conduct a protracted delaying action in the

Palaus, also chose to defend Angaur. The

enemy apparently considered Angaur as a

sort of outpost, the early loss of which might

have rendered more difficult the defense of

2

 Casualty figures are from: 81st Div Opns Rpt

Angaur, p. 112; 321st Inf Opns Rpt Angaur; Ltr,

Gen Mueller to Gen Ward, 29 May 51, no sub, in

OCMH files. 3

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Angaur, pp. 99-100;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in POA Sep 44, p. 65.
THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR 531

the remainder of the island group. In defending Angaur, the enemy lost a heavily reinforced infantry battalion which was well

equipped, splendidly trained, and admirably

led. While this force might better have been

used elsewhere in the Palaus, it accomplished

the delaying mission for which it had been

stationed on Angaur. For three days it delayed the greatly superior strength of two

American regimental combat teams from securing Angaur, and it delayed the start on

Allied airdrome construction an equal length

of time. Finally, Major Goto's Angaur Sector Unit immobilized for over a month the

322d Infantry, which might well have been

used to better advantage on Peleliu, where

the 321st Infantry had been fighting for a

month.
CHAPTER XXIII

Securing Peleliu Island

Marine Operations in Southern Peleliu to

22 September

The Need for Reinforcements

The evening of 16 September had found

the 1st Marine Division maintaining a

beachhead on Peleliu about 3,000 yards

long, north to south, and approximately

1,800 yards deep, east to west, with one

penetration of 2,000 yards. (See Map VI.)

The 1st Marines held the division left in

lines not far north of White Beach 1 and

at the northwest corner of the airfield area.

In the center, the 5th Marines had secured

the airfield and had taken some additional

ground north and east of that field. On the

south, the 7th Marines had only to take

Peleliu's two small southern promontories

in order to accomplish its initial missions.

The 11th Marines (artillery) was ashore

and emplaced, and other reinforcing elements, such as tanks, were also ashore.1

On the morning of 17 September, the

7th Marines resumed its attacks on the

south, securing the southern promontories

by evening of the 18th. In four days of

fighting the regiment wiped out the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, the southern defense

force of Colonel Nakagawa's Peleliu Sector Unit. Meanwhile, elements of the 5th

Marines had started a drive eastward to

Peleliu's eastern arm, a drive which culminated in the seizure of that arm against only

scattered opposition by evening of the 19th.

The Japanese who had originally manned

formidable defenses on the eastern arm had

evacuated to join the remainder of Colonel

Nakagawa's force in Peleliu's central ridges.

Leisurely mopping up was undertaken on

the eastern peninsula from 19 through

23 September. The beaches there were organized for defense against possible counterlandings by Japanese from more northerly

islands in the Palaus, and the peninsula was

finally designated a defense area. Here assault elements were sent for rest from arduous combat in the central ridges, where, as

the 1st Marine Division had already discovered, Colonel Nakagawa's strongest defenses were located.

The 1st Marines had encountered heavy

fire from Japanese defenders along the

southern portion of the central ridges on 15

and 16 September, but this opposition was

nothing compared to that which the regiment began to meet on the 17th. On the

latter day, part of the regiment succeeded in

pushing to the top of the first heights at the

southern end of the ridge system, suffering

heavy casualties as it fought doggedly forward. On the right (east) flank, some marines moved east and later north along East

1

 See above, Ch. XX. The remainder of this subsection is based on Hough, The Assault on Peleliu,

pp. 64-93, 98-103, 104-06, 198-99.
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 533

Road, which ran from the northern part of

the airfield up Peleliu's western arm, hugging the eastern base of the central ridges.

Meantime other marines advanced up West

Road, which, skirting the southwest nose of

the ridge system, ran north along the western base. Neither of these flanking movements went beyond the point at which

contact could still be maintained with 1st

Marines units fighting in the high ground

in the center.

The 1st Marines suffered about 240 casualties during the 17th and in Japanese

counterattacks the ensuing night; the 3d

Battalion was reduced to about one third

of its original strength; and two companies

of the 1st Battalion were practically finished

as fighting units. On the other hand, there

was some reason for optimism. Progress on

the 17th had been measured in hundreds of

yards in the rough, high ground at the

southern end of the central ridges and

strong Japanese resistance had been overcome. Whatever optimism may have existed

was not to last too long.

On the 18th, in what the Marine Corps'

history of the operation characterizes as

"savage and costly fighting,"

 2 elements of

the 1st and 7th Marines managed to advance more than 500 yards in the center,

principally along the ridge lines and hills

oriented north and south. But the advance

during the day was held up at a group of

peaks which seemed at first to form a continuous ridge line that was oriented more

east and west than the rest of the Peleliu

ridges. Soon, the name Five Sisters came

to be applied to a cluster of peaks forming

the western side of the terrain feature. A

towering hill at its eastern extremity, separated from Five Sisters by a saddle, was

designated Hill 300, or Old Baldy. With

the 7th Marines held up in the center, at

Five Sisters, the units on both sides of the

central, ridges halted so as not to create

exposed flanks.

Similar action continued the next day,

when an effort to take Five Sisters proved

abortive. One element of the 1st Marines

pushed up East Road through the village

of Asias and along the eastern base of a long

hill known at Walt Ridge. By the morning

of the 20th, Company C, after action on

Hill 100 at the south end of Walt Ridge,

was reduced to 16 men. Companies F and

G, hard hit in the center, had to be combined with a squad of men from the 4th

War Dog Platoon to form one understrength company. Company A, fighting

over high ground on the 1st Marines' left,

was reduced by evening on the 19th to six

men who had not been wounded or killed.

On the 20th the 1st Marines had to fall

back from Walt Ridge to the southern side

of an East Road causeway north of Asias.

From this position these right-flank elements

faced a 150-yard-wide valley bounded on

the right by Walt Ridge and on the left

partly by Five Sisters and partly by another

ridge designated Five Brothers. This depression, known to the 1st Marine Division as

Horseshoe Valley, was renamed Mortimer

Valley by men of the 81st Infantry Division

who later fought in the same area. In the

center, during the 20th, elements of the 7th

Marines pushed through strong defenses to

high ground at the southwestern corner of

a narrow defile which, lying west of Five

Sisters, came to be known as Death Valley.

Left-flank units of the 1st Marines advanced

up West Road a little farther, sending some

troops up rising ground from the road to

narrow the front of 7th Marines units in the

center. 2

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 83.
534 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Despite some local advances, by evening

on 20 September the 1st Marines had been

stopped and, ". . . as an assault unit on the

regimental level, had ceased temporarily to

exist,"

 3 having suffered almost 1,750 casualties, well over half its strength. Relief was

absolutely necessary, not only because casualties were heavy but also because the

survivors were physically exhausted from

heat, lack of water, and continuous combat.

Elements of the 7th Marines therefore relieved all 1st Marines units except those

along West Road.

During the next two days 7th Marines

units in the center of the line could gain less

than 175 yards; on the right Walt Ridge

was again attacked to no avail; and on the

left 1st Marines troops fighting along high

ground above West Road suffered more casualties. Another attack against Five Sisters

was forced back on the 22d, and at dark

containing lines were set up north of Asias,

facing Walt Ridge and the mouth of Horseshoe Valley. After a week of extremely

arduous combat over incredibly rough and

well-defended terrain, the 1st Marine Division had been at least temporarily halted.

The division had lost just under 4,000 men.

The 1st Marines had been virtually eliminated from the fight (the 1st Battalion, for

instance, was reduced to two understrength

companies), the 7th Marines were little better off, and the 5th Marines as well as other

units, especially Shore Party troops and

combat engineers, had not escaped unscathed.

Despite the heavy casualties, there was

much on the credit side of the ledger. All

of southern Peleliu had been captured; the

airfield, the most important single objective,

was secure, and division observation planes

had begun operations from the field on the

22d; there was room ashore for supplies and

artillery, and all the 11th Marines and the

III Amphibious Corps Artillery were ashore

and emplaced.4 Finally, the 1st Marine Division enthusiastically estimated, about two

thirds of the original Japanese garrison had

been killed or rendered ineffective from

wounds.

General Rupertus, the division commander, well knew that organized resistance was far from over, and he realized that

rooting out the remaining Japanese from

the defenses along the central ridges would

be a difficult task. One of the division's objectives, Ngesebus Island and its fighter

strip, lying off northern Peleliu, had not yet

been captured. Worse still, it was discovered

during the night of 22-23 September that

the Japanese were reinforcing Peleliu by

sending troops in from more northerly

islands.

The general had for some time desired

to push up the west coast and jump over to

Ngesebus, a drive that could outflank the

Japanese center of resistance, making it possible to attack from the north as well as the

south. This step had not yet been undertaken

because of the danger of overextending the

division front and because a general breakthrough on the south had been almost momentarily expected. By the 22d it had

become obvious that there was going to be

no general break-through. Yet, with Japa3

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 88. The

casualty figure is that reported on the morning of

the 21st. The regiment had lost 56 percent of its

men while the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, during

three days' attachment to the 1st Marines, had

lost approximately 300 men, about 25 percent of

its strength.

4

 III Amphibious Corps Artillery at Peleliu comprised the 3d 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion and the

8th 155-mm. Gun Battalion, both Marine Corps

units.
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 535

nese reinforcements probably coming

ashore, the need to move troops north was

becoming even more urgent. But the 1st

Marine Division could not maintain pressure against known enemy positions, defend

all southern Peleliu, and, at the same time,

drive north up West Road. Reinforcements

were sorely needed.

The Arrival of the 321st Regimental

Combat Team

Whence would come the troops to mount

a drive to the north? The III Amphibious

Corps Reserve, the 323d Regimental Combat Team of the 81st Infantry Division, had

been committed by Admiral Halsey to the

capture of Ulithi and had left the Palaus

area on 21 September. The rest of the 81st

Division was on Angaur.5 But there, luck was

with the 1st Marine Division. By 22 September, resistance on Angaur had been compressed in the northwest pocket, where the

322d Infantry was to fight for another

month.6 The 321st Infantry and its regimental combat team attachments had secured

southern Angaur. It had received its baptism of fire, beaten the enemy who opposed

it, and played a major role in the capture

of Angaur. Its casualties were low and its

morale and confidence high. Finally, it was

available for reinforcing the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu.7

Calling upon the 321st Regimental Combat Team was not a step which General

Rupertus was eager to take. His ". . . reluctance to employ Army troops had become increasingly apparent from the outset... ,"

 8

 and the deteriorating situation on

Peleliu apparently had done nothing to

change his mind. But on the afternoon of

21 September the III Amphibious Corps

commander, General Geiger, who had previously been hesitant to impose any specific

course of action upon General Rupertus,

reluctantly took matters into his own hands.

He directed General Rupertus to prepare

plans for the evacuation of the 1st Marines

from Peleliu and took steps to attach the

321st Regimental Combat Team to the 1st

Marine Division. Upon question from General Geiger, General Mueller immediately

informed the corps commander that the

321st was readily available for action on

Peleliu and for transference to General

Rupertus' operational control on arrival.

Brig. Gen. Marcus B. Bell, Assistant Division Commander of the 81st Division, was

appointed liaison officer to General Geiger's

headquarters to co-ordinate details of the

321st's move.9

The 321st Regimental Combat Team,

still under the command of Col. Robert F.

Dark, began loading at Red Beach, Angaur,

at 0700 on 22 September and at 1200 the

next day began unloading over Orange

Beaches on Peleliu. Debarkation was completed before dark. In addition to the 321st

Infantry, Colonel Dark's command included an engineer company and two medical companies (less two platoons) of

organic 81st Division units; an LVT company; an engineer battalion less one company; and the 710th Tank Battalion's

Company A and 81-mm. Provisional Mortar Platoon. There was no artillery initially. 5

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 105-06,

108; Ltr, Lt Gen Julian C. Smith (USMC) to

Gen Ward, 14 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH files. 6

 See above, Ch. XXII. 7

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu, p. v; Hough,

The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 106, 109.

8

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 106. 9

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu, pp. 5-15; Hough,

The Assault on Peleliu, p. 106, n. 4, p. 109, and p.

109, n. 14.
536 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Dividing the Island

The mission assigned by General Rupertus to the 321st Regimental Combat

Team was to drive up Peleliu's western

coastal flat north about 1,750 yards from

a third phase line to a fourth. (Map IX)

The third phase line (the phase lines

marked out on Peleliu were oriented generally northwest to southeast) was located

about 1,000 yards north of the West Road

village of Ngarekeukl, which lay near the

southwest corner of the central ridges. The

fourth phase line was just north of another

West Road village called Garekoru, lying

beyond Ngarekeukl.

The 321st's left was to be anchored on

the beach, while its right was to extend east

of West Road about 250 yards into the high

ground of the main ridges. The 7th Marines

were to co-operate in the Army unit's drive

northward by having the 1st and 2d Battalions maintain pressure against the Japanese from the south-center and pushing the

3d Battalion along the high ground to the

321st's right rear. If necessary, the Japanese

central pocket was to be bypassed while the

Army units advancing northward probed

eastward over the ridges for a route by

means of which the pocket could be isolated

on the north.10

The 321st Infantry Moves North

By 1500 on 23 September the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, had relieved the battered remnants of the 1st and 3d Battalions,

1st Marines, at the latters' positions just

north of the third phase line.11 The 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry, drew up behind the

2d in close support, while the 1st Battalion,

designated regimental reserve, assembled on

the coastal flat about 500 yards southwest

of Ngarekeukl.

As soon as the relief of the 1st Marines

elements was completed, the 2d Battalion,

321st Infantry, sent patrols on a reconnaissance north up the coastal flat to Garekoru.

The patrols traveled for the most part along

the shore line left of West Road. No Japanese opposition was encountered, but fire

was received from enemy positions on the

central ridges east of West Road. At Garekoru many land mines, or aerial bombs emplaced as mines, were found, and there were

a few defensive positions at the village.

These positions were not defended in any

strength and at 1700 the reconnaissance

patrols reported that the entire area north

from the third phase line to Garekoru was

generally free of Japanese. Upon receiving

this information, General Rupertus ordered

the 321st Infantry to push forward as far

as possible before dark.

The 2d Battalion started moving north

about 1730 but soon found that the patrol

reports were too optimistic. Only the terrain

close to the shore had actually been reconnoitered, and this ground had been partially

screened from the Japanese on the main

ridge lines by a low coral ridge paralleling

West Road.12 Left of West Road, beneath

the cover of the low ridge, one company

was able to advance without opposition. But

to the right of the road another company

found itself attempting to move over open

ground in plain sight of the Japanese on

10

 1st Mar Div FO 3-44, 22 Sep 44, in USMC

files; Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 109-10. 11

 This subsection is based principally on: The

81st Wildcat Division Historical Committee, The

81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II

(Washington, 1948), pp. 138-45; 321st RCT, Jnls

and Jnl files, Peleliu; 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu,

pp. 15-19; Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 110-

18.

12

 Earlier patrols of the 1st Marines had covered

much the same territory left of West Road and had

sent back equally optimistic reports.
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 537

the central ridges. Advance through the intense small arms and machine gun fire which

the Japanese now began to direct at the

right company was impossible, and the unit

was quickly pinned down. Since darkness

was approaching, the company dug in along

its line of departure. The left company,

which had advanced 100 yards before halting to maintain contact on the right, was

withdrawn to establish a continuous defense

line at the starting point.

At 0700 on 24 September the 2d Battalion resumed the advance, after an hour of

air and naval bombardment and fifteen minutes of artillery fire, most of which had been

directed at the west side of the central

ridges and suspected defensive installations

near Garekoru. A few casualties were caused

by Japanese fire from the central ridges but

by noon the battalion's left had reached a

point on West Road south of Garekoru,

discovering a trail leading eastward over

swampy ground toward the central ridge

system. The trail-road junction was held by

a few Japanese in prepared positions, but

after an exchange of rifle and machine gun

fire, the Japanese were killed or driven off.

Leaving rear elements to explore the trail to

the east, Company G pushed rapidly north

through Garekoru to reach the fourth phase

line about 1530 hours.

East of West Road, right flank elements

of the 2d Battalion had encountered strong

opposition along the low ridge parallel to

the road and had finally withdrawn from

that ridge to maintain contact with the rest

of the battalion. The 3d Battalion, which

had been following the 2d closely, now

made some effort to cover the ridge, occupation of which was important for the protection of the regiment's flank. But the 3d Battalion, also under pressure to hurry northward, was deflected off the ridge by Japanese opposition and moved west to follow

the route of the 2d. The 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, which had initially started out behind the right flank elements of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, therefore pushed

troops over the low ridge. Efforts of the

Marine battalion to maintain contact with

the 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry, and to

cover the ground which should have been

secured by the 321st Infantry, caused the

marines some casualties and slowed their

advance considerably.

The leading elements of the 3d Battalion,

321st Infantry, continuing northward, began probing up the central ridges farther

north in an attempt to find a route over

which troops could move to cut off the Japanese pocket. This effort brought the 321st

Infantry's battalion out into open ground

below the central ridges, and it too began to

suffer casualties from Japanese fire. One

company secured a foothold on the first ridge

line east of the road at a point about 600

yards south of the fourth phase line, but most

of the battalion dug in for the night along

West Road. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,

held for the night on the high ground at and

immediately north of the third phase line.

There was a gap between the Marine and

Army battalions during the night.

Meanwhile, patrols of the 2d Battalion,

321st Infantry, accompanied by Marine and

Army tanks, had pushed north up West

Road from the fourth phase line almost

2,000 yards to a fifth phase line. Moving forward an additional 200 yards, the advance

elements came within sight of Japanese

radio installations lying about 600 yards beyond the fifth phase line. Many caves, pillboxes, bunkers, and other defensive installations were observed along West Road and at

the radio station, but opposition to the patrol's advance was negligible and the patrol
538 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

withdrew to Garekoru before dark without

enemy interference. It appeared that Japanese strength was concentrated in the

southern section of the central ridges, and

that American forces might be able to move

freely over the rest of Peleliu.

While the reconnaissance north was being

undertaken, Company E pushed eastward

over the trail which had been discovered

leading toward the main ridges from a point

on West Road just south of Garekoru. This

route eastward, soon designated 321st Infantry Trail, led over a swamp and up a

narrow, relatively low part of the central

ridge system, north of the principal Japanese pocket. If the trail were found to run

through the central ridges to East Road, its

seizure would isolate the Japanese pocket

to the south and cut off enemy routes of

reinforcement, escape, and supply.

A knoll designated Hill 100 13 dominated

the point at which 321st Infantry Trail

entered the central ridges, and Company E

was ordered to seize the terrain feature before the Japanese to the south could realize

their danger and reinforce the area. Moving

forward quickly against scattered but stubborn resistance, Company E clambered up

the rough slopes of Hill 100 and secured the

summit before dark. Late in the afternoon

Company I, from its foothold on the west

side of the central ridges, pushed its left

northeast to establish contact with the right

flank of Company E. Companies F and G

extended the line back along 321st Infantry

Trail to West Road and thence north to

Garekoru.

About 1700 a Japanese counterattack at

the fourth phase line forced Companies F

and G south almost 200 yards. There was,

however, no general break-through and

much of the ground thus lost was quickly

retaken. Japanese troops were observed

grouping again north of the fourth phase

line about 1800 hours, but the force was

broken up by well-placed artillery fire before another counterattack, if any had been

planned, could develop. For the rest of the

night the enemy was generally quiet all

along the 321st Infantry's front.

The next day the advance was resumed,

the first objective being to isolate the main

Japanese pocket by pushing across the central ridge system via 321st Infantry Trail.

To make all the 321st Infantry available for

offensive action, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, extended its left north along the central ridges an additional 300 yards above

the third phase line, freeing elements of the

3d Battalion, 321st Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was brought up West

Road to a position behind the 3d Battalion,

321st Infantry, to support the latter's attack

eastward and to drive south against the

Japanese pocket from 321st Infantry Trail

as soon as that trail was secured.

Company E, 321st Infantry, began moving from Hill 100 toward East Road at

0700. Just beyond the hill East Road ran

through a saddle dominated on the west

by Hill 100 and on the east by a larger

height known as Hill B,14 the capture of

which was necessary if Peleliu's western peninsula was to be bisected via 321st Infantry

Trail.

Working slowly around the northeast

shoulder of Hill 100, Company E reached

East Road at a point below that shoulder

13

 Not to be confused with Hill 100 at the south

end of Walt Ridge.

14

 Many of the hills on Peleliu were numbered

after their estimated height, while others were given

names locally adopted. Hill B was so named because

on the target maps it was located in grid square

142-B.
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 539

about 1030. So far, no Japanese had been

encountered, although there had been some

rifle and machine gun fire from Hill B. The

company now halted, for indications were

that Hill B was held in some strength and

any further advance would be subjected to

plunging fire not only from that hill but

also from the ridges to the south and a rough

hill mass to the north called Kamilianlul

Mountain. Finally, it was decided that Company E would wait until the 3d Battalion,

321st Infantry, could move up to the heights

southwest of Hill B and Hill 100 to provide

support of both fire and movement for a

continued attack.

But the 3d Battalion had little success

trying to fight over ridge lines (later known

to the marines who fought in the same area

as Wattie and Baldy Ridges) southwest and

south of Hill 100. There was strong enemy

fire from many emplacements along the

ridges, while the terrain was such that a gap

developed between Companies I and L, in

the van. Company K was moved into this

gap late in the afternoon, but this addition

had no effect on the fight. The left of the

battalion moved forward barely far enough

to maintain contact with Company E, on

Hill 100, and the battalion's right made no

appreciable progress. For the first time, the

321st Infantry had come upon defenses similar to those the marines had been attacking

at the southern end of the Japanese pocket

during the previous week.

North of Garekoru, action during the

day was faster and more spectacular. A

strong combat patrol comprising infantry,

tanks, and LVT flame throwers moved up

West Road to destroy installations found

north of the fourth phase line the previous

afternoon and to extend the area of reconnaissance. The patrol quickly pushed north

almost all the way to the fifth phase line,

destroying four pillboxes and two large supply dumps, at the same time killing thirty

Japanese soldiers while suffering no casualties. The weak resistance encountered by

the patrol seemed added proof that remaining Japanese strength was concentrated in

the pocket south of 321st Infantry Trail. It

now seemed possible to exploit this weakness

by sending a strong force forward to secure

all of northern Peleliu, seize a staging area

for the operation against Ngesebus, and

complete the isolation of the southern

pocket. Therefore, at 1030, General Rupertus ordered northern Peleliu above the

fourth phase line to be divided into two sectors. The 5th Marines were to secure the

ground west of Kamilianlul Mountain and

East Road while the 321st Infantry, after

completing the drive over 321st Infantry

Trail, was to take the ground east of the 5th

Marines.

The 5th Marines quickly reassembled

from scattered defensive positions at southern Peleliu and the island's eastern arm. Before dark, one battalion had passed through

Garekoru, where Company G, 321st Infantry, was still holding, and had reached the

Japanese radio station area against light

and scattered resistance. The 3d Battalion,

5th Marines, struck overland from West

Road just south of the fifth phase line to set

up night defenses on East Road and along

the western slopes of Hill 80, an isolated terrain feature lying between Kamilianlul

Mountain, on the south, and another hill

mass named Amiangal Mountain, located at

the northern end of Peleliu. The 5th Marines

were ready to begin cleaning up northern

Peleliu the next day, 26 September, while
540 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the 321st Infantry was prepared to finish the

break-through over the central ridges via

321st Infantry Trail.

The Japanese Reinforce Peleliu

During its attack northward and eastward

on 24 and 25 September, the 321st Infantry had encountered Japanese troops who

had not been on Peleliu when the 1st Marine Division landed on that island.15

 The

original Japanese garrison on Peleliu had

comprised about 10,500 troops, including at

least 4,500 first-line infantrymen of the 2d

Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry. The latter unit was destroyed by the 7th

Marines in southern Peleliu, while the 2d

and 3d Battalions, 2d Infantry, had lost over

half their strength by 17 September in operations against the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments. As of that date, the 1st Battalion, 2d

Infantry, was probably still relatively intact

in the central ridge pocket. Another unit, the

346th Independent Infantry Battalion of the

53d Independent Mixed Brigade was apparently not committed to action in the

south but was stationed on high ground at

the northern tip of Peleliu.

By 21 September effective Japanese infantry strength in the central ridges was

down to 1,300 men. That, of course, does

not paint a true picture of the situation in

the central pocket. A trained soldier, well

armed, can be tenacious on the defense in

such terrain as the central ridges of Peleliu

whether or not he be trained for infantry

service. There were probably 4,000 Japanese troops (including the 1,300 infantrymen) still firmly ensconced in the central

pocket as of 21 September, and there were

at least 1,000 more troops in the Amiangal

Mountain area at northern Peleliu. Nevertheless, Colonel Nakagawa, commanding

the Peleliu Sector Unit, clearly needed reinforcements if he was to hold out much

longer. There were perhaps 30,000 Japanese

troops in the northern Palaus to draw from,

including two battalions of the 59th Infantry, two battalions of the 15th Infantry, and

four or five recently organized infantry battalions of the 53d Independent Mixed

Brigade.

But General Inoue had no intention of

sending strong reinforcements to Peleliu.

That was just one of many islands in the

Palaus, and the general feared that the

American forces might move northward to

Babelthuap and Koror. Moreover, there

was a good chance that reinforcements

might be destroyed on the way to Peleliu

by American air or naval units. General

Inoue's belief that the Americans would

move north from Peleliu seems to have been

an obvious error in judgment. The III Amphibious Corps had already secured two excellent air-base sites, Angaur and southern

Peleliu, where a multitude of planes could

be based. From the air-base point of view

alone, Babelthuap and Koror would not be

needed by the Allies. Moreover, General

Inoue must have known that Allied practice

throughout the Pacific theaters had been to

bypass the most strongly defended Japanese

positions whenever possible in favor of seizing more lightly held areas. In the last

analysis, General Inoue's thinking seems to

have been wishful. He claimed, after the

war, that his defenses at Babelthuap and

Koror were much stronger than those on

Angaur and Peleliu; he was confident he

15

 This subsection is based principally upon:

Drummond, The Palau Campaign, Ch. VIII (incomplete); Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 93,

104-05; The Palau Operations, pp. 86-117.
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 541

could have held the northern islands against

a force of the size which the III Amphibious

Corps had available in the Palaus.

Whatever his belief, General Inoue, on or

about 21 September, reluctantly decided to

send one reinforced infantry battalion to

Peleliu. The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, on

Babelthuap, was chosen for the hazardous

trip south. One company

 16

 of the 2d Battalion left Babelthuap about 2230 on 22

September and reached the northern tip of

Peleliu, Akarakoro Point, about 0520 the

next morning. At least three of the barges

which took these troops to Peleliu were sunk,

but the bulk of the company got ashore and

most of those whose transportation was lost

managed to wade to land over the reefs. The

main body of the 2d Battalion moved to

Peleliu on the night of 23-24 September,

losing six or seven of fifteen barges.17 Again,

however, most of the troops managed to get

ashore, although most heavy equipment was

undoubtedly lost. During ensuing nights,

through 26-27 or 27-28 September, a few

more troops landed on Peleliu, most of them

probably stragglers who had hidden out on

small islands between Babelthuap and their

objective. All in all, some 500 fresh Japanese

riflemen reached Peleliu. Perhaps 200 more

men from an engineer platoon, an infantry

gun company, and artillery detachments

also arrived, though none of them managed

to get heavy equipment or large weapons

ashore.

Most of these troops moved south to the

main Japanese pocket in the central ridges,

and at least one new infantry company occupied defenses in the area where the 3d

Battalion, 321st Infantry, had attempted to

hack its way east over the ridges southwest

of 321st Infantry Trail. Headquarters and

the 6th Company, 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, were prevented from moving south

by 5th Marines action at Hill 80 and

Amiangal Mountain and by operations of

the 321st Infantry at Kamilianlul Mountain. Some members of this group probably made their way south by infiltration

during the nights following 24 September,

but most of them, over 200 strong, probably remained at Amiangal Mountain.

After dispatching the 2d Battalion, 15th

Infantry, and attached units to Peleliu,

General Inoue sent no more reinforcements

to that island. The 600-700 fresh Japanese

who did reach Peleliu could have no effect

upon the ultimate outcome of the battle—

they could only prolong the operation.

Isolating the Japanese Pockets

Continuing its fight to secure the trail

which bore its name, the 321st Infantry encountered elements of the 2d Battalion,

15th Infantry, on 26 September.18

 But before action on that day began, redispositions

were made so that the entire 321st Infantry

could concentrate on the drive eastward.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines,

took over more ground along the west side

of the central ridges north of the third phase

line to narrow the front of the 3d Battalion,

321st Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines (less one company), prepared to

advance in close support of the 3d Battalion,

16

 Probably the 4th Company, under 1st Lt. Toshishige Murahori (or Murabori). Most of the battalions in the 14th Division appear to have contained

three companies rather than the more usual four

companies. 17

 American and Japanese accounts of barges lost

during the reinforcement runs do not agree, and

American reports from various sea and land units

are mutually irreconcilable.

18

 This subsection is based on: 321st RCT Jnls and

Jnl files, Peleliu; The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division

in World War II, pp. 145-47; Hough, The Assault

on Peleliu, pp. 115-18; 81st Div Opns Rpt Peleliu,

pp. 23-27.
542 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

321st Infantry, ready to exploit any breakthrough the latter unit might achieve.

The 321st Infantry jumped off against

Hill B at 0700, with the 2d Battalion attacking from the west and the 3d Battalion moving in from the south and southwest. Company I, on the 3d Battalion's left and in contact with Company E on Hill 100, was unable to make any progress eastward, and was

again pinned down by heavy Japanese mortar and machine gun fire from Wattie and

Baldy Ridges, where the attack had stalled

the previous afternoon. About 0815 Company L was moved up on I's right, but it,

too, was pinned down before any advance

could be made.

The 2d Battalion, waiting for progress by

the 3d, had not yet started its attack toward

Hill B but had assembled in the Hill 100

area. Shortly after 1200, by which time it

was apparent that the 3d Battalion was to

make no more progress, a new attack plan

was prepared. The 2d Battalion was directed

to press home its attack from the west, using

Hill 100 as a line of departure. The 3d Battalion was to continue pressure and to provide as much fire support as possible from

the south and southwest. For the attack from

the north a separate group under Capt.

George C. Neal, the 2d Battalion's S-3, was

organized. This unit, known as the Neal

Task Force, comprised 45 infantrymen

from Company F, 7 medium tanks, 6 LVT's,

and 1 LVT mounting a flame thrower.

In preparation for the new attack, the

Neal Task Force had started north from

the Garekoru area about 1000 hours. It

moved up West Road approximately 2,200

yards to the junction of West Road and

East Road (the junction was then held by

elements of the 5th Marines) and then

turned south down East Road. The group

moved rapidly southward along the east

side of Kamilianlul Mountain to a point

within 150 yards of Hill B before any opposition was encountered. Then about 1500, a

party of fifteen Japanese made a suicidal

attack on the small armored force. All the

enemy were quickly killed and the Neal

Task Force moved up to provide support

fire for the 2d Battalion's attack from the

west.

Companies E and F had meanwhile

maneuvered into positions along ridges and

on East Road south and southwest of Hill

B; the 1st Battalion had moved north to

take over the positions vacated by the 2d at

Garekoru; Company K had relieved Company E on Hill 100. An artillery, mortar,

and machine gun concentration was then

laid on Hill B, and at 1600 the infantry attack began. Company F struck due east

while Company E attacked north. Against

stubborn resistance and over very broken,

rough terrain, Companies E and F gradually fought their way up the hill. At 1645

advance elements reached the summit and

by dark all but a few scattered Japanese

riflemen had been cleared from Hill B. The

break-through over the central ridge system

via 321st Infantry Trail was complete—the

principal enemy pocket had been isolated.

North of 321st Infantry Trail, the 5th

Marines had divided Peleliu in another

place. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, attacking at 0700 on the 26th, secured Hill 80

by 0830 against scattered but resolute resistance. The Marine unit then moved to

the eastern shore of Peleliu's western arm,

here indented by a dense mangrove swamp,

thereby completing the second division of

the island. Late in the afternoon most of

the battalion moved back from Hill 80 to a

reserve position near the junction of East

and West Roads. The unit's southern flank

extended south from the junction along
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 543

East Road to Hill 80, where Company I was

stationed for the night. Between Company

I, 5th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 321st

Infantry, at Hill B, lay a gap approximately

1,800 yards long through which only the

321st Infantry's Neal Task Force had

passed. In this gap lay 1,500-yard-long

Kamilianlul Mountain, held by an unknown

number of Japanese and as yet not even

reconnoitered by American units.

Southwest of 321st Infantry Trail, operations had not gone so well. Companies I

and L, 321st Infantry, directed to provide

support for the 2d Battalion's attack on

Hill B, lost their footholds on the extremely

rough ground near Wattie and Baldy Ridges

during the afternoon, principally as the result of intense Japanese mortar, machine

gun, and rifle fire, against which it was

nearly impossible to find cover. Supply difficulties had added to the 3d Battalion's

problems, for the ground in its zone was so

broken that everything had to be laboriously

manhandled over razor-back ridgelets, steep

slopes, and narrow draws. Finally, in the

evening, Company I was able to regain

contact with Company K, atop Hill 100,

but Company L could not push its way

back into the broken terrain on I's right.

Instead, Company L remained at the bottom of the ridges, near West Road, for the

night.

Despite the loss of ground in the 3d Battalion's area, operations on 26 September

were the most successful since the 321st

Infantry had been on Peleliu. The island

had been cut in two places, one by the 2d

Battalion, 321st Infantry, and one by the

3d Battalion, 5th Marines; and the rest of

the 5th Marines had driven almost to

Peleliu's northern tip. The Japanese were

now isolated in two major pockets, the

principal one south of 321st Infantry Trail

and the other at Amiangal Mountain, on

northern Peleliu. To aid the 5th Marines

in reducing the latter pocket, General

Rupertus ordered the 321st Infantry to send

one battalion north from 321st Infantry

Trail on the morning of 27 September to

secure Kamilianlul Mountain and, if necessary, to push on to Amiangal Mountain.

Northern Peleliu and the Offshore Islands

Amiangal Mountain

The drive to secure northern Peleliu had

begun late on 25 September when elements

of the 5th Marines had moved up West

Road beyond the fifth phase line to the

Japanese radio installations.19 At 0900 the

next day, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

started out from the radio station toward

Amiangal Mountain. The northern section

of the L-shaped hill mass comprised ridges

running generally northeast to southwest

for a distance of some 1,000 yards, while

the southern section ran northwest to southeast. Having no well-defined ridge lines, the

southern leg consisted of four semiseparated

knobs, designated from northwest to southeast Hill 1, Hill 2, Hill 3, and Radar Hill,

the latter the largest and highest. Located

at the edge of the east coast swamp, Radar

Hill had contained the principal Japanese

radar installations on Peleliu.

On the 26th the 5th Marines secured Hill

2 against determined resistance but marines

moving north of the southern leg along West

Road were subjected to heavy Japanese fire

from Ngesebus Island and the northern leg

19

 This subsection is based principally on: Hough,

The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 118-29, 132-33; 321st

RCT, Jnls and Jnl files, Peleliu; 81st Inf Div Opns

Rpt Peleliu, pp. 27-37; The 81st Infantry Wildcat

Division in World War II, pp. 147-54.
544 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

and could make little progress. The next

day, 27 September, the 5th Marines continued operations at Amiangal Mountain

while the 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry,

started north from the Hill B area to close

the long gap which existed between 321st

Infantry Trail and Hill 80. Company C,

321st Infantry, moved north along Kamilianlul Mountain, and Company A, followed by Company B, pushed up East Road,

here lying on a narrow strip of land between

the mountain and a swamp along the eastern shore of the peninsula. Surprisingly, no

enemy opposition of note was encountered

on Kamilianlul Mountain, although many

abandoned enemy defensive positions were

found. Progress during the morning was

slowed principally by the rough terrain atop

the mountain and by the swamp on the right

of East Road. By noon, advance elements of

Company C had moved nearly 1,000 yards

forward to the highest point of the mountain, 600 yards short of the northern nose.

Company A had made a similar advance

along East Road.

About 1230 new attack orders were issued. The 1st Battalion was directed to extend its line up East Road from the northern

tip of Kamilianlul Mountain to the junction

of East and West Roads. Company I, 5th

Marines, on Hill 80, was to be relieved, and

the Army battalion was to form a defense

line running south from the road junction

along East Road to Kamilianlul Mountain, maintaining contact on the north with

the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, at the junction.

Advances during the afternoon were

slower, although little opposition was encountered until Company A was pinned

down by Japanese fire from a pillbox located at a sharp bend of East Road about

100 yards north of Kamilianlul's nose. Companies A and C both halted until armor

could be brought forward to support an

attack against the pillbox and associated lesser defenses. Not waiting for the outcome of

this action, Company B passed through

Company C and struck up East Road, establishing contact with the 5th Marines

near the road junction before dark. It was

well that Company B had not waited, for

armor could not be brought forward soon

enough to support a concerted attack before

dark against the pillbox in front of Company A.

During the ensuing night there were apparently some gaps between Companies B

and A, on the north and south respectively,

and Company C in the center. The latter

unit had moved up East Road toward Hill

80 late in the afternoon, but in so doing had

lost contact with Company A to the south

and did not move far enough north to reach

Company B. No American troops occupied

Hill 80 during the night. Company C was

only as far forward as the southern base of

that terrain feature, which had been vacated

by Company I, 5th Marines, early in the

afternoon.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had pushed up the west side of Amiangal Mountain's northern leg until halted by

fire from caves at the northwest tip of the

leg. Since the cave entrances could not be

reached by mortar or artillery fire, a novel

method of attack was evolved. First, artillery, tanks, and naval fire support vessels

threw high explosive and smoke on Ngesebus and other offshore islands from which

heavy fire was being directed at the Marine

unit. Under cover of this support, five

LVT (A)'s moved about 350 yards out on

the reef between Peleliu and Ngesebus, from

which position they poured fire into the most

troublesome cave entrance. This fire was not
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 545

unlike that employed by the 41st Infantry

Division at Biak, where tanks in LCT's had

fired on shore-line ridges. It enabled marines

to move around the mountain's tip to seize

Akarakoro Point before dark. The last place

where the Japanese could be landed on Peleliu had been captured and suitable positions from which to launch a shore-to-shore

operation against Ngesebus had been secured. To the south, other elements of the

5th Marines took Hill 1, on the mountain's

southern leg. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,

until now in reserve at the junction of East

and West Roads, made preparations to land

on Ngesebus on the morrow.

After a night marked by the killing of

about 25 Japanese infiltraters in its sector,

the 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry, resumed

its attack north on the morning of 28 September. Company A, now supported by two

medium tanks and some flame throwers,

struck out against the pillbox at the East

Road curve where the advance had halted

the previous evening. Resistance was so stubborn that it was not until 1100 that the

reinforced company could overrun the pillbox, but even this achievement did not signify the collapse of all Japanese resistance in

the area. Minor installations in the same vicinity and some bypassed positions along the

base of Kamilianlul Mountain's northern

nose continued to give trouble and had to be

knocked out one by one in a series of infantry-tank-demolitions-flame thrower assaults.

Meanwhile, Company C had found it

necessary to fight its way back up Hill 80,20

which Company I, 5th Marines, had left

late the previous afternoon. Some Japanese

had apparently been overlooked by the 5th

Marines' troops or, more probably, elements

of the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, attempting to move south to the principal Japanese pocket, had reoccupied the hill during

the night of 27-28 September, when no

American units were on the knoll. Whatever

the cause of the new resistance, it was almost

noon before Company C, 321st Infantry,

had resecured Hill 80 and the surrounding

ground and had reoccupied the line held by

the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, two days

earlier. By nightfall on the 28th all the

ground between Kamilianlul Mountain and

the junction of East and West Roads (except for a small pocket in Company A's

zone) had been secured, some of it for a

second time.

To the north, the 5th Marines secured

Hill 3, on Amiangal Mountain's southern

leg, and isolated more formidable Radar

Hill, about 150 yards to the southeast.

Other elements of the regiment landed on

Ngesebus and Kongauru Islands, offshore,

putting a stop to Japanese fire which had

been harassing marines working over the

northern leg and Akarakoro Point. During

the day most of the northern leg was secured,

leaving Radar Hill as the only remaining

center of organized resistance on Amiangal

Mountain. Mopping up along the northern

leg and on flat ground to its east was undertaken by 5th Marines elements on the 29th,

as was an attack on Radar Hill. A complex

cave system on the latter made it impossible

to take all the hill before dark.

Preparations had been made during the

29th for the 321st Infantry to relieve the

5th Marines at northern Peleliu and on the

offshore islands. The first step in this program was the relief of the 3d Battalion,

321st Infantry, by elements of the 7th Ma20

 The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World

War II and the 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu both

state that Company B retook Hill 80, but the 321st

RCT's overlays and sketch maps place Company C

on the hill as of 28 September and place Company

B at the East-West Road junction at dark that day.

Since Company C had spent the night of 27-28 September near Hill 80, the regimental records are

apparently correct.
546 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

rines at the northern side of the principal

Japanese pocket, below 321st Infantry

Trail. The 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry, then moved north up Kamilianlul Mountain and East Road, following the routes

taken by the 1st Battalion of the same regi- ment two days earlier. Many bypassed or

reoccupying Japanese were found and

killed; progress was slow as the 3d Battalion

moved cautiously northward probing into

and then sealing each cave entrance it dis- covered. At nightfall the unit dug in some

200 yards north of 321st Infantry Trail.

Meanwhile the 2d Battalion had relieved

Marine units on Ngesebus and Kongauru

Islands, while the 1st Battalion had reconnoitered in the Amiangal Mountain area in

preparation for the relief of Marine troops

there the next day. On the morning of 30 September, ele- ments of the 5th Marines continued mopping up along Amiangal's northern leg

while other parts of the regiment gained

the summit of Radar Hill. At 1000, when

the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, withdrew

from the hill, the terrain feature had not

been completely overrun. The marines knew

that Japanese were still in caves beneath the

summit, although the main cave entrances

had been blasted shut. Mopping up along

the northern leg also had not been com- pleted when, during the afternoon, the 2d

Battalion, 5th Marines, withdrew from that

area, while its relief, the 1st Battalion, 321st

Infantry, took over. The 5th Marines departed the Amiangal area confident that

only a few scattered Japanese riflemen remained there. The regiment reported that

it had killed or captured over 1,170 Japanese (it had been estimated on 27 September that there were only 500 in the area) on

and around Amiangal Mountain. The 1st

Battalion, 321st Infantry, moved into the

marines' vacated positions expecting only

minor mopping up to be necessary. The Army battalion was in for some disillusionment. As Company B, 321st Infantry, moved forward to occupy the four hills

along the southern leg of Amiangal Moun- tain, one platoon was dispatched to secure

Radar Hill. When the platoon started up the

hill about 1330 hours, it was met by a fierce

counterattack from Japanese who had dug

their way out of a large cave which the 5th

Marines had once blasted shut. The 321st

Infantry's platoon was soon forced back and

all Company B got into the action which,

lasting until 1500, assumed the proportions

of a major fire fight. With the help of artil- lery, mortars, and tanks, the Japanese were

forced back into their cave, and the forward

elements of Company B set up night defenses

at the base of the hill. Company A, 321st Infantry, had mean- while encountered some strong opposition

from bypassed Japanese who were holding

out along a low ridge which, lying west of

West Road, ran north from the junction of

East and West Roads to Hill 1 on Amian- gal's southern leg. Some tough fighting en- sued, but the ridge was secured before dark

and Company A established contact with

Company B elements at Hill 1. Company C, moving up to Akarakoro Point and into the

flat ground east of Amiangal's northern leg, had somewhat similar experiences. This

area, reported cleared by the 2d Battalion,

5th Marines, was strongly held by Japanese

who had reoccupied prepared positions

which the marines had not destroyed. Company C, 321st Infantry, fighting for every

foot of ground, killed 40 Japanese in the

area between 1500 and dark.

It is certain that the fighting on 30 September at northern Peleliu did not endear

the 5th Marines to the 1st Battalion, 321st
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 547

Infantry, which had not expected to encounter still organized resistance. But such feelings were prevalent throughout the fighting

on Peleliu, where the Japanese continually

reoccupied positions which one unit had secured and, sometimes, even resecured. Nor

were all similar cases limited to situations in

which Army troops took over positions from

Marine units. The casualties suffered by the

3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on 24 September,

when it became necessary to move into an

area which the 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry, should have covered on the high ground

along West Road between the third and

fourth phase lines, had somewhat embittered

that Marine unit. Again, the 3d Battalion,

321st Infantry, mopping up behind the 1st

Battalion, 321st Infantry, along Kamilianlul Mountain's ridges on 29 and 30 September, undoubtedly took a very dim view of

the efficiency with which the 1st Battalion

had previously "secured" the same area.

Other such incidents, involving every conceivable combination and alternation of

Marine and Army units, were common.

The difficulties of thorough mopping up

in Peleliu's broken terrain were manifold.

Not only did the terrain itself create these

difficulties, but the Japanese had also improved upon nature, connecting many caves

with underground tunnels and digging multiple entrances in many concealed positions.

The enemy not only had a propensity for

sneaking back into positions that had been

cleared, but he also maintained excellent

fire discipline combined with an ability to

lie doggo while American troops walked

past or even through defensive installations.

One day, not a shot would be fired from a

Japanese position, but the next day an

Army or Marine unit would find its rear

fired upon, making it necessary to have a

company or even a battalion back-track to

capture or recapture the installation.

Under such conditions, the 1st Battalion,

321st Infantry, continued mopping up at

northern Peleliu on 1 October, often encountering spasmodic suicidal attacks by

small groups of Japanese. Companies C and

D, 321st Infantry, killed an additional 40

Japanese on the flat ground near Akarakoro Point, but by dusk they were able to

report that area and Amiangal's northern

leg cleared except for a few stragglers. To

the south, Company B continued its operations at Radar Hill, reinforced by demolition squads from Company A, 306th Engineers, and the Antitank Company, 321st

Infantry. Many cave openings were sealed

or resealed and the principal cave entrance,

located on the hill's eastern side, was rediscovered. During the afternoon a platoon of

Company B and an engineer demolition

squad attempted to move into this entrance

but were greeted by a counterattack executed by some 60 Japanese. The hill had to

be vacated after about 30 Japanese had

been killed and 15 casualties had been suffered by the reinforced Company B platoon.

Colonel Dark, the regimental commander,

requested reinforcements and, with General

Rupertus' permission, Company G, 321st

Infantry, was brought back to the mainland

from Ngesebus (where it had relieved Marine units) to help in a new attack on Radar

Hill on 2 October.

Early on the 2d, Company G moved into

position along Hill 3 to provide Company

B with fire support during the renewed attempt. Tanks were brought into position

north of Radar Hill for the same purpose,

and a battery of Marine 155-mm. guns

stood by to furnish additional fire support

as necessary. At 1000 Company B, rein-
548 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

forced by demolition and flame thrower

teams, attacked up the southern and western

slopes. Quickly reaching the summit from

those directions, the troops began working

down the northern and eastern sides, where

major resistance was now isolated. After the

use of extensive demolitions, the hill was

declared secure at 1700. The last vestiges of

organized resistance in northern Peleliu had

disappeared and mopping up was completed. The 321st Infantry killed at least

175 Japanese during its operations in the

Amiangal Mountain area, bringing to approximately 1,350 the known Japanese

killed or captured in that region. How many

more were sealed in caves or blown to unaccountable bits is unknown, but it seems

reasonable to believe that the Amiangal

area was defended by nearly 1,500 Japanese, three times the number the 1st Marine

Division originally estimated.

Ngesebus, Kongauru, and Other

Islands

It is probable that the operations at Amiangal Mountain and Akarakoro Point would

not have ended as soon as they did had it

not been possible to eliminate the Japanese

artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons

fire which had been falling on northern

Peleliu from Ngesebus and Kongauru Islands.21

 With the successful advances made

by the 5th Marines and the 1st Battalion,

321st Infantry, in northern Peleliu on 27

September, General Rupertus felt it feasible to undertake the long-delayed assault on

Ngesebus.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, with

aerial, naval, and artillery fire support,

moved across the reefs from Peleliu shortly

after 0900 on 28 September, transported

by LVT's and LVT (A)'s. There was little

or no opposition to the assault, and fifty

Japanese were killed or captured at beach

positions before they could recover from the

shock of the support fires. Major resistance

on Ngesebus centered along a low, rough,

coral ridge paralleling the west coast. Despite some tough opposition there, by dark

all the island except for a small pocket at

the northern tip had been overrun and the

Japanese fighter strip had been secured. Elements of the same Marine battalion moved

to Kongauru Island, off the eastern side of

Ngesebus, secured it against minor opposition, and then moved on to Murphy Island,

off the northeast tip of Kongauru.22

The marines continued mopping up on

Ngesebus until 1500 on 29 September, when

the island was declared secure. An hour

later the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, began

coming ashore to relieve the marines and

complete mopping up. By 1700 hours the

relief at Ngesebus had been completed, and

Company F, 321st Infantry, had relieved

Marine units on Kongauru and Murphy

Islands. The next day the 321st Infantry

units encountered some resistance from bypassed Japanese along the low ridge at

Ngesebus' western shore. Mopping up there

continued simultaneously with the organization of defenses against possible Japanese

counterlandings. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had killed or captured about 470 Japanese on Ngesebus, Kongauru, and Murphy

Islands, while the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, had accounted for approximately 100

more on the same islands.

One of the principal reasons for seizing

Ngesebus had been to construct a fighter 21

 This subsection is based on: Hough, The Assault

on Peleliu, pp. 123-26; 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt

Peleliu, pp. 33-37; 321st RCT, Jnls and Jnl files, Peleliu.

22

 Murphy Island was a name given the islet by the

81st Division.
SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 549

strip on that island. But the existing Japanese field was found to be surfaced with

sand so soft that an airdrome could not be

built there without such extensive labor

that the results would not be worth the

effort, especially with the Peleliu field already operational and the new Angaur field

well on its way to completion. The island

was therefore abandoned as an airfield

site—the principal results of its capture being the elimination of harassing fire on

northern Peleliu and the denial of its use

to the Japanese as a staging point for troops

who might attempt to reinforce Peleliu. At

the same time, Ngesebus provided the III

Amphibious Corps with a staging base from

which minor shore-to-shore operations

against other small islands farther north

could be launched.

Peleliu at the End of September

On 30 September the Commander,

Western Attack Force, Admiral Fort, announced that Angaur, Peleliu, Ngesebus,

and Kongauru Islands had been captured

and occupied.23 This was true enough to

the extent that only some tough mopping

up remained to be done in northern Peleliu,

at northwestern Angaur, and on Ngesebus

and Kongauru. It was also true to the extent that the principal remaining Japanese

pocket on Peleliu had been greatly compressed.24

 Accomplishments through the

30th of September had cost the 1st Marine

Division 5,044 casualties, including 843

men killed, 3,845 wounded, and 356 missing.25

 By the same time, the 321st Infantry

had lost on Peleliu 46 men killed, 226

wounded, and 7 missing, for a total of 279

casualties.26

The 1st Marine Division estimated that

it and the attached 321st Infantry had

killed nearly 9,000 Japanese by the end of

the month. In addition, 180 prisoners,

mostly Koreans or Okinawans, had been

taken. Less than 2,500 Japanese were left

alive on the island.27 Except for those killed

by the 321st Infantry during arduous mopping-up operations at northern Peleliu and

on offshore islands, the Japanese left alive

on 30 September were concentrated in the

central pocket. Against this area the 5th and

7th Marines were to move, relieving elements of the 321st Infantry, while the battered 1st Marines, the 1st Tank Battalion,

the two 75-mm. pack howitzer battalions of

23

 CTF 32 Opns Rpt Palaus, p. 22. 24

 Narrative, p. 13, to Phase II, Opns Annex to 1st

Mar Div Opns Rpt Palau. This compression, accomplished by the 321st Infantry, is described in Ch.

XXIV, below.

25

 Ibid., p. 13. The Marine Corps' history of the

campaign states that these figures are not entirely

accurate and that the figure for missing is especially

misleading. Many marines reported as missing were

actually evacuated from Peleliu during the first two

or three days of the action, when very incomplete

records were maintained. Later, many of these men

turned up in hospitals all over the Pacific. 26

 321st RCT Unit Rpt 7, 30 Sep 44, in 321st RCT

Jnl file, Peleliu. These figures are as of 1200, 30

September. 27

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 135; The

Palau Operations, p. 142. The figure for remaining

Japanese is derived as follows: best estimates were

that about 10,500 Japanese were on Peleliu as of 15

September and that 600-700 arrived after that date

as reinforcements from the northern islands, giving a

total of a possible 11,200. As of 13 October, according to Japanese sources, there were less than 1,500

Japanese alive and fighting on Peleliu. With the

fighting that went on from 1 through 12 October, it

does not seem unreasonable to believe that over 800

Japanese were killed in that period and that something less than 2,500 were alive on 30 September.

The Marine Corps estimate of about 9,000 Japanese

killed to 30 September therefore appears reasonably

accurate.
550 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

the 11th Marines, and other smaller Marine

units left the island for rehabilitation.28

Thus, by the end of September, Peleliu

had been secured—at the cost of some 5,300

American casualties. The Peleliu airdrome,

the development of which had been the

primary purpose of the seizure of the island,

was operational for fighter planes, and the

Kossol Passage emergency anchorage was in

use. Organized resistance by the remaining

Japanese was concentrated at the Umurbrogol Pocket, as the area still held by the

Japanese in the central ridges was called.

28

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 135. Loading

of the 1st Marines and attached regimental combat

team elements, including part of division headquarters, began on 29 September, but bad weather delayed the units' departure until 2 October.
CHAPTER XXIV

Peleliu: The Last Resistance

While northern Peleliu and the offshore

islands were being secured, pressure had

been maintained against the principal

pocket of Japanese resistance on Umurbrogol Mountain, as that section of the

central ridges lying south of 321st Infantry

Trail was designated on the maps supplied

to the Allied forces fighting in the Palaus.

After the 321st Infantry had divided the

island, the Umurbrogol Pocket was about

1,900 yards long north to south on its eastern

side; approximately 1,200 yards long on the

west; and, on the average, 550 yards wide

east to west. No offensive operations were

undertaken against the pocket from 22 September—the date of 7th Marines' last

strong efforts—until the 27th of the month,

when elements of the 321st Infantry began

attacks on the north side. On the latter

date the pocket was being contained on the

south, southwest, and west by Marine units;

on the northwest, north, and northeast by

Army troops. There were no troops on the

east side, where the central ridges fell steeply

to East Road, itself bounded on the east by

a dense swamp which lay along the shores

of the shallow bay separating Peleliu's

eastern and western arms.

Compressing the Umurbrogol Pocket

The Terrain

Umurbrogol Mountain was no mountain

in the usual sense of the word.1 (Map 21)

It was, rather, a chaotic jumble of steep

coral ridges, the tallest peak among which

was about 300 feet high. There were innumerable caves throughout the pocket, ranging from large caverns with small entrances

to open, shallow shelters big enough for only

one man. Some caves extended through

ridges; these and many others had two or

more entrances, permitting the Japanese to

move from one position to another without

appearing above ground.

As left by nature, the Umurbrogol Pocket

was much like the Ibdi Pocket area on Biak

Island, but larger and rougher. Like the

Ibdi Pocket, the Umurbrogol originally had

a thick cover of tropical trees and dense

jungle undergrowth which, as the result of

continued air, naval, and artillery bombardment (including extensive employment

1

 This subsection is based on: Incl 1, Terrain and

Int Sura, pp. 1-2, to 323d Inf Opns Rpt Peleliu;

Sketch maps and sketches included in 81st Inf Div

Opns Rpt Peleliu; George McMillan, The Old

Breed, A History of The First Marine Division in

World War II (Washington, 1949), sketch map p.

34; Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 136-40, 149-

52, 159-61, 194-97. The terrain configuration shown on Map 21 gives

only a general impression of the extremely twisted

and broken terrain of the area. The relief was taken

from the best map available, one prepared in 1945

from aerial photographs. Some of the terrain features

that appear on hasty maps and sketches drawn by

participating units cannot be readily identified on

this map. Nor do the units' maps and sketches themselves agree on the terrain configuration of the area.

Compare with Maps 22, 23, and 24.
Map 22
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 553

of aerial napalm strikes), was gradually

knocked down or burned away. Again, as

on Biak, the Japanese had improved upon

nature. There were many artificial or semiartificial caves which had been constructed

to protect approaches to the inner sections

of the pocket, and the Japanese had improved almost every natural cave. Where

no caves were available or could be constructed, the enemy employed rock faults

and crevices for defensive positions. Digging

new entrances to existing caves or even cutting new levels within some caves, the Japanese were well prepared to execute a long

and bloody holding action along the many

ridges. These ridges, with the exception of

the Five Sisters group at the southern side

of the pocket, were generally parallel and

oriented north-northeast to south-southwest.

Steep-sided and fissured, many of them had

razor-back summits upon which no cover

could be found. The ridges were separated

by deep draws, gullies, and wider valleys,

the floors of which were strewn with coral

boulders or coral outcroppings similar to

stalagmites. Steep as they were, the sides of

some ridges also were covered with such

chunks and outcroppings.

At the southeast corner of the pocket,

paralleling East Road, lay Walt Ridge; to

the north, across a 70-yard-wide draw, was

Boyd Ridge,2 beyond which lay an unnamed, broken ridge line extending north

to 321st Infantry Trail. Lying west of Boyd

and Walt Ridges was Mortimer Valley,3 the

western wall of which was named Five

Brothers Ridge. West of the Five Brothers

was Wildcat Bowl,4 bounded on the west by

China Wall, on the southwest by the Five

Sisters, and on the southeast by a 225-foothigh peak designated Old Baldy.5

 West of

Five Sisters and China Wall lay a narrow

defile known as Death Valley, beyond which

was a coral plateau comprising broken

ridgelets, sink holes, and jumbled coral formations overlooking West Road.

At the northern end of the pocket area the

ridges were closer together, often less well defined, narrower, and sharper, and generally

more broken. Above (north) of China Wall

lay Wattie and Baldy Ridges, on or near

which elements of the 3d Battalion, 321st

Infantry, had already fought. Wattie Ridge

abutted the cliffs above West Road, Baldy

Ridge lay east of Wattie, and, east of Baldy,

across a narrow gorge from the north end

of Boyd Ridge, was Ridge 120.6 North from

the line Wattie-Baldy-Ridge 120 lay 700

yards of unnamed ridgelets, peaks, ravines,

and deep draws extending to 321st Infantry

Trail. From the trail, the 321st Infantry

started moving south against the Umurbrogol Pocket on 27 September.

The 321st Infantry at the Umurbrogol, 27-29 September

After its important tactical success in dividing Peleliu at 321st Infantry Trail, the

321st Infantry was ordered to send one battalion to northern Peleliu and to employ the

rest of the regiment in a drive south from the

trail into the northern end of the Umur- 2

 Names varied on Peleliu according to the unit

operation. The names in this chapter generally follow the usage employed by the 81st Division. 3

 So called by the 321st Infantry. The 1st Marine

Division knew it as the Horseshoe or Horseshoe Valley; Marine air units called it Big Slot; the 323d

Infantry called it East Valley.

4

 Known to the 323d Infantry as Main Valley and

to Marine air as Little Slot. 5

 Known to the Marines as Hill 300 and considered by them a part of Five Sisters. 6

 Also known as Hill 120, a terrain feature which

formed the bulk of the ridge.
554 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

SOUTHEAST CORNER OF UMURBROGOL POCKET. East road and Walt

Ridge in right foreground. Five Brothers Ridge in center, between Mortimer Valley

and Wildcat Bowl. China Wall, abutting Five Sisters, forms the western rim of

Wildcat Bowl.

brogol Pocket.7 On the evening of 26 September the 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry,

was designated for the push north. At the

same time the 2d Battalion (less Company

G, but with Company A, 710th Tank Battalion, and Company K, 321st Infantry, attached) was ordered to move south from

321st Infantry Trail to secure the ground to

the X-ray phase line. (See Map IX.) This

new line, lying roughly midway between the

third and fourth phase lines, was drawn

northwest to southeast across the central

ridges south of 321st Infantry Trail and

marked what was believed to be the northern edge of the inner core of Japanese defenses. While the 2d Battalion attacked

south toward the X-ray phase line, the 3d

Battalion (less Company K but plus Company G) was to hold at Hill 100 and at the

area around the north end of Wattie and

Baldy Ridges.

The 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, started

south at 0700 on 27 September, with Company K advancing on the right along the

ridges above East Road. Company F, with

the still-organized Neal Task Force of tanks,

LVT's, and infantry in support, pushed

south from Hill B along East Road. Company E remained on Hill B, while Company

H provided fire support from positions near

the same hill. In Company K's sector, ex7

 This subsection is based principally on: 321st

RCT Jnls and Jnl files, Peleliu; 81st Div Opns Rpt

Peleliu, pp. 25-33.
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 555

tremely broken terrain was the chief obstacle to progress during the morning

(although plenty of small arms fire was received) and by noon the unit had moved

only 200 yards south from 321st Infantry

Trail. Company F, keeping pace, was harassed by Japanese small arms fire from

positions to its right front beyond Company K.

During the afternoon, Japanese fire on

Company K increased and the unit suffered

numerous casualties, including the company

commander. Harassing fire from Japanese

on the east slopes of the central ridges continued against Company F. Direct fire from

tanks, which used many white phosphorus

shells, and fire from a flame thrower

mounted on an LVT of the Neal Task

Force, helped to reduce many of the enemy

positions, but others were inaccessible to

such fire or to infantry assault from the low

ground along East Road. By late afternoon

the intensity of fire on both companies had

not appreciably diminished.

Company K suffered so many casualties

during the afternoon, and the forward positions of that unit and Company F seemed

so dangerously exposed, that a withdrawal

for the night was ordered. Company K managed to push west and north over the central

ridges to Company I's positions on the ridge

lines at the southwest base of Hill 100.

Company F and the Neal Task Force

moved back to the base of Hill B and set up

defenses along East Road.

Early the next morning, 28 September,

Company K was withdrawn from the forward combat area because of losses and

fatigue. The company then moved to Hill

B, where it replaced Company E. To continue the attack south a composite unit,

under the commander of the 3d Battalion,

was organized around Companies E, F, and

I

 8

 of the 321st Infantry, and Company A,

710th Tank Battalion. The objective for the

day was to secure and organize for defense

all the ground between 321st Infantry Trail

and the X-ray phase line.

Company I pushed south along the ridges

and Company E, with tanks in support, advanced down East Road. Both units quickly

resecured the ground which had been taken

the previous day, and by noon advance elements of the two companies were within 200

yards of the X-ray phase line. Company L,

on the west side of the ridges and north of

Baldy and Wattie Ridges, joined the advance in midafternoon, swinging south in

contact with Company I's right. Systematically attacking and cleaning out each

Japanese cave or crevice position found,

the three companies reached the X-ray phase

line late in the afternoon. This time there

was no withdrawal, and the units set up

night defenses on the ridges or along East

Road.

On the morning of the 29th, the 2d and

3d Battalions, 321st Infantry, were relieved

of further responsibility for operations

against the Umurbrogol Pocket and moved

north to replace the 5th Marines at northern

Peleliu and on the offshore islands. The 7th

Marines took over along the X-ray phase

line.

Marines Versus the Umurbrogol

Pocket 29 September-15 October

When the 321st Infantry's elements left

the pocket, it was estimated that the Japanese had been compressed into an area aver8

 The 321st Infantry seems to have had a penchant for splitting up its infantry battalions, a practice

which it had previously undertaken extensively on

Angaur. Apparently the Neal Task Force was disbanded on the evening of the 27th or on the 28th.
556 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

aging 400 yards in width and 900 yards in

length.9 This estimate was somewhat misleading and, in regard to the width, actually

in error. On the east the pocket was some

1,000 yards long from the X-ray phase line

south to the East Road causeway north of

Asias, where the Weapons Company of the

7th Marines was holding containing lines.

On the west, along the ridges between the

western ends of the X-ray and third phase

lines, elements of the 7th Marines and other

troops from Marine artillery, amphibian

tractor, engineer, and pioneer units were

holding a line about 750 yards long. The

distance between the Weapons Company

north-northwest across the ridges to the

third phase line was over 900 yards, a distance along which the 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines, held containing lines.10 On the

northern side, across the ridges at the X-ray

phase line, the pocket was only 400 yards

wide. A few hundred yards farther south a

line drawn with the same northwest to southeast orientation as the X-ray would have

been about 650 yards wide.

General Rupertus planned to have the 1st

and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines, attack south

from the X-ray phase line, while other Marine units on the western and southern sides

of the pocket held their positions. Company

A, 710th Tank Battalion, was made available to the 7th Marines for this new push

because the Marines' own 1st Tank Battalion had already left the island. The new

attack began at 0800 on 30 September.

(Map 22)

From 30 September through 2 October,

Japanese opposition, heavy rain, fog, and

sickness, prevented the 1st and 3d Battalions,

7th Marines, from making much progress

south. The 1st Battalion, down to 90 riflemen fit for duty, had to be relieved after securing an area 150 yards wide and 300 long

on East Road and flanking ridges below the

X-ray phase line. On 3 October the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, began new attacks from

the south, securing a foothold along the

eastern side and top of Walt Ridge, with the

help of mediums of the 710th Tank Battalion. Other tanks of the same unit, co-operating with men of the Weapons Company, 7th

Marines, probed into the southern end of

Mortimer Valley, but had to retire before

dark. On the same day the 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, brought partially up to strength

by men pulled out of Marine engineer and

amphibian tractor units, seized the eastern

slope of Boyd Ridge, north of Walt Ridge.

The next day, 4 October, elements of the

3d Battalion, 7th Marines, secured a temporary foothold on the northern end of

Ridge 120, but were forced to withdraw

through a draw lying between Boyd Ridge

and the unnamed ridges to the north. At the

end of the day Companies I and L, 7th Marines, were down to a combined strength of

about 80 men from an authorized number

of 470. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was

through; the 1st Battalion could muster few

more than 100 men fit for duty; and the 2d

Battalion reported in at 30 percent of efficiency. Like the 1st Marines before it, the

7th Marines was finished as a regiment, and

on 5 October the 5th Marines began moving into positions to relieve the 7th.

There was little action on the 5th or 6th

other than some attacks into ground which

9

 Narrative, p. 13, of Phase II, Opns Annex, to 1st

Mar Div Opns Rpt Palau. The remainder of this

section is based principally on: Hough, The Assault

on Peleliu, pp. 143-67; 710th Tank Bn Opns Rpt

Peleliu, pp. 1-12. 10

 The battalion had been holding these lines

since 21 September, limiting its activities to patrolling. When it came out of these lines on 2

October, it had suffered about 150 casualties,

including 33 men killed, during that period of

comparative inactivity. Hough, The Assault on

Peleliu, p. 144.

558 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

could not be held at Baldy Ridge and Ridge

120. On the 7th,11 six tanks of Company A,

710th Tank Battalion, together with most

of the infantrymen of the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines, moved into Mortimer Valley behind an hour-long artillery and mortar barrage. At 0700, four of the six tanks pushed

up into the west side of the valley's mouth.

Two were hit but not severely damaged by

Japanese antitank fire from a position impossible to find. The four then moved out

of the valley, south of a water-filled sink

hole at the mouth, and, with the remaining

two, reapproached the mouth from the east,

behind the cover of the south end of Walt

Ridge. Moving back into the mouth about

1030, the lead tank struck a mine and lost a

track. The next three passed around the

damaged vehicle, firing 75-mm. ammunition at all likely enemy positions. About 100

yards into the valley, another tank was hit

by a Japanese antitank gun located at the

western base of Walt Ridge and was forced

to retire to repair its jammed 75-mm. gun.

A third tank moved forward and received

three hits, none of which caused much damage. It was then decided to pull the tanks

back out so that artillery could fire on Five

Brothers and the western base of Walt

Ridge. In withdrawing, four tanks received

minor damage.

About 1400, six tanks with two companies of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,

attempted a second push. Company L

moved northwest into Wildcat Bowl and

Company I started into Mortimer Valley.

No penetration could be made at Wildcat

Bowl, although Company I managed to

get about 200 yards into Mortimer Valley.

This time, when the tanks were stopped by

the troublesome antitank gun at the base of

Walt Ridge, the gun was discovered and

destroyed. As the tanks began running out

of ammunition during the late afternoon,

the infantry positions in Mortimer Valley

became untenable, and under cover of

smoke which the tanks' guns provided, withdrawal was made to the morning line of departure. It was ten days before American

troops again attempted to operate in the

valley.12

No other offensive action was undertaken

on 7 or 8 October, but pressure was maintained against the Japanese pocket by continued artillery fire and aerial bombardment, which now began to destroy so much

foliage and undergrowth that visibility along

the various ridges was greatly increased. On

the 9th the attack was resumed on the northern side of Wattie and Baldy Ridges, where

no firm foothold could be secured. Patrols of

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, probed into

a deep gulch between Wattie and Baldy

Ridges, finding there the bodies of twelve

321st Infantry soldiers, grim reminders of

the previous efforts of the 3d Battalion, 321st

Infantry, in the same area during the period

of 25-27 September.13

On 10 October elements of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, secured Wattie, Baldy,

and 120 Ridges and pushed south the next

day to gain the top of tactically important

11 The action described here as taking place on 7

October is placed on 8 October by the 710th Tank

Battalion's report, but the regimental and battalion

records of the 5th Marines set it on the 7th. The

tank unit's report was written in December (none

of its journals can be found), whereas the Marine

records, which were checked, were maintained

during the action.

12

 According to the Marine Corps' account, the

sortie into Mortimer Valley had not been made to

establish a permanent foothold but merely to reduce

fire from Japanese guns which were harassing the

airdrome and the lines of the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines. The report of the 710th Tank Battalion

states that after the day's action, the marines decided that Mortimer Valley could not be taken from

the south, and that no further effort was to be

made from that direction. 13

 See above, Ch. XXIII.
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 559

Hill 140, lying immediately north of the

northern end of Five Brothers Ridge. On

the 12th a Marine 75-mm. pack howitzer

was dragged up Hill 140 to fire on Five

Brothers. Sandbag fortifications were

erected for the protection of the weapon

and its crew.

Exactly who should be credited with carrying the first sandbag into the Peleliu ridges had

never been clearly established, but he started

something which was to become increasingly

important. . . . The lack of cover and impossibility of digging-in had repeatedly obliged

attacking troops to relinquish hard-won gains

as untenable. Obviously, the sandbag provided

an answer of a sort, and many were in use at

this time ... so long as the operation remained essentially one of movement, the problem of sandbagging successive positions . . .

presented formidable difficulties. Nowhere was

there any sand inland . . . the heavy bags

had to be carried into position already filled,

no small undertaking in that crazily upended

country. It remained for the 81st Division, following relief of the Marines, to develop a technique with such ingenious refinements as to

make the sandbag into something closely resembling an offensive weapon, in which capacity it played a crucial part in the final reduction of the Pocket.14

On 13 and 14 October, elements of the

5th and 7th Marine Regiments secured

much additional ground on the western side

of the central pocket between the third and

X-ray phase lines, terrain so rough and

broken that it was deemed useless as a route

of attack into the Umurbrogol. Two days

later these elements were pulled out, having

cleared an area some 700 yards long north

to south and as much as 200 yards east beyond the earlier containing lines above West

Road. Men from Marine artillery, engineer,

and amphibian tractor units moved up from

the old lines to occupy the additional

yardage.

Entr'acte: The Relief of the 1st Marine

Division

From 12 through 15 October, when elements of the 321st Infantry began moving

up to relieve Marine units, there was little

action at the Umurbrogol Pocket beyond the

clearing of the ridges overlooking West

Road. To the 15th, the 321st Infantry had

spent its time mopping up at northern Peleliu and on the offshore islands already seized,

and had taken a few more islets off Ngesebus

and Kongauru. At northern Peleliu, debris

was cleared, defenses were constructed,

roads and trails improved, and enemy dead

buried. Mopping up was a continuing process. During the period 4-8 October, for instance, the 321st Infantry killed 171 Japanese in the north or on the offshore islands,

losing 8 men killed, 30 wounded, and 1 missing. Many of the Japanese killed during this

period appeared to be stragglers who were

attempting to escape from the Umurbrogol

Pocket.15

About mid-October, a number of command changes occurred in the Palaus area.

On the 12th, for instance, the 1st Marine

Division was relieved of all responsibilities

other than continuing the fight in the Umurbrogol Pocket. The 321st Infantry took over

the defenses along the eastern arm, while the

Island Garrison Force assumed responsibility for the area south of the pocket. On the

14

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, pp. 164-65. The

321st Infantry installed an overhead cable system

powered by a 21⁄2-ton truck. This system, later expanded and improved by the 323d Infantry, was

employed to move sandbags, ammunition, and supplies up ridges and across ravines to front-line units,

and was also used to move down to West Road (by

means of Stokes litters which the 81st Division

borrowed from naval forces) many of the more

severely wounded men, whose lives were probably

saved by this relatively rapid means of evacuation. 15

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu, pp. 39, 41-45.
560 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

morning of 12 October, the command post

of the III Amphibious Corps moved ashore

and General Geiger, the corps commander,

declared that the assault and occupation

phase of operations on Peleliu was ended.16

The exact meaning of this announcement

is not clear, especially in relation to Admiral

Fort's somewhat similar declaration of 30

September, stating that Angaur, Peleliu,

Ngesebus, and Kongauru had been captured and occupied. However, General

Geiger's announcement seems to have been

made in preparation for the 1st Marine Division's imminent departure from the Palaus. The statement also bears relation to

the passing of control of operations in the

Palaus from the U. S. Third Fleet and Admiral Halsey (as then represented by Admiral Fort's Western Attack Force headquarters) to the Headquarters, Forward

Area Central Pacific (Task Force 57), under Admiral Hoover. On the 13th General

Geiger issued orders alerting the 321st Regimental Combat Team to relieve the 1st

Marine Division elements still at the Umurbrogol Pocket. The next day, control over

all operations in the Palaus passed from Admiral Fort to Admiral Hoover's command.17

On 12 October, in accordance with General Geiger's orders, the 321st Regimental

Combat Team began occupying new defenses on Peleliu's eastern arm. These movements were hardly well started when, on the

14th, the combat team had to begin execution of the corps commander's new orders to

relieve Marine elements still at the Umurbrogol Pocket. During the morning of the

14th, the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry,

withdrew from Ngesebus and other offshore

islands to move to an assembly area near

Hill 100 on 321st Infantry Trail. Simultaneously the 1st Battalion, 323d Infantry,

fresh from unopposed operations at Ulithi

Atoll, began preparations to relieve Marine

units at the southwest corner of the pocket.18

Actual relief of Marine units began on 15

October, when the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, took over the lines held by the 5th

Marines across the northern side of the

pocket and on the salient at Hill 140. The

next day the 1st Battalion, 323d Infantry,

took over the containing lines on the western and southwestern sides of the pocket

while the 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry, relieved the Marine units on Walt and Boyd

Ridges, along the eastern edge. The relief of

Marine elements in central Peleliu was almost complete, and control of operations at

the Umurbrogol passed to Colonel Dark, the

commander of the 321st Regimental Combat Team.19

With the relief of marines at the Umurbrogol, the remainder of the battered 1st

Marine Division began preparations for

leaving the Palaus. The 7th Marines left

for rest and rehabilitation in the Solomons

on 22 October. The 5th Marines, attached

16

 Ibid., p. 47; III Amph Corps Opn Plan 12-44,

10 Oct 44, in Encl L, Opns Orders, to III Amph

Corps Opns Rpt Palaus; Encl B, Opns, p. 11, to

III Amph Corps Opns Rpt Palaus. 17

 III Amph Corps Opns Order 13-44, 13 Oct 44,

in Encl L, Opns Orders, to III Amph Corps Opns

Rpt Palaus; CTF 32 Opns Rpt Palaus, pp. 95-96;

Ltr, Adm Fort to Gen Ward, 15 Nov 50, no sub, in

OCMH files. On 29 September command in the

western Carolines had passed from Admiral Wilkinson's Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 31)

to Admiral Fort's Western Attack Force (Task

Force 32), and Admiral Wilkinson was assigned a

new command for the invasion of the Philippines.

On 20 October responsibility for ground operations

in the Palaus passed from the III Amphibious

Corps to the 81st Division, and General Geiger and

his staff moved off, ultimately to take part in the

invasion of Okinawa.

18

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu, p. 47: 321st

RCT Unit Rpts 21 and 22, 14 and 15 Oct 44,

respectively, in 321st RCT Jnl file, Peleliu. 19

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu, pp. 49-51:

Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 167.
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 561

operationally to the 81st Infantry Division,

remained in defensive positions in northern

Peleliu and offshore islands until 27 October, when it began loading. The regiment

left on the 30th.20 By 18 October, when the

last marines had been relieved from their

Umurbrogol Pocket positions, the 1st Marine Division and attached units had suffered 6,526 casualties—1,252 killed (including perhaps 115 missing, presumed

dead) and 5,274 wounded.21

Overcoming the Final Resistance

Of the 1st Marine Division's total casualties, about 1,000 were incurred as the 5th

and 7th Marine Regiments compressed the

Umurbrogol Pocket during the period 29

September through 16 October. The action

of the two regiments succeeded in reducing

the pocket to a rough oval averaging about

400 yards east to west and about 850 yards

north to south.22 Some 2,000 Japanese had

been defending the pocket when the marines

began their final offensive, and estimates of

enemy strength remaining in the pocket

after the marines left varied from 300 to

2,000. From Japanese sources, it appears

that the marines killed some 850-1,000 Japanese during the period 29 September-16

October, leaving approximately 1,000 Japanese alive in the pocket as the 321st Infantry moved back in.23

The 321st Infantry to 20 October

Offensive operations against the Japanese

remaining in the Umurbrogol Pocket were

resumed about 1500 on 16 October, when

elements of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, made an attempt to move from their

new positions on Hill 140 across a deep

draw to Brother No. 1, the northernmost of

the five peaks on Five Brothers Ridge.24

(Map 23) The intent was to secure a position for supporting weapons and observation in preparation for a general attack

south by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 321st

Infantry, on the morning of 17 October.

The plan for the latter day was to have the

1st Battalion push south along the broken

ridges west of Hill 140 while the 2d Battalion seized Five Brothers. The rest of the

reinforced regiment was to hold its positions and provide fire support whenever

possible.

At midafternoon on the 16th, one platoon

of Company G, 321st Infantry, went down

into a deep ravine between Hill 140 and

Brother No. 1. The platoon expected to re20

 Narrative, pp. 19-21, of Phase II, Opn Annex,

to 1st Mar Div Opns Rpt Palaus; Hough, The

Assault on Peleliu, pp. 168-70; 81st Inf Div Opns

Rpt Peleliu, pp. 49-57, 69-71. 21

 Hough, op. cit., p. 183; Narrative, pp. 19-20,

of Phase II, Opns Annex, to 1st Mar Div Opns

Rpt Palaus. The 1st Marines lost 1,749 men, the

5th Marines 1,378, and the 7th Marines 1,497, a

total of 4,624 casualties in the three infantry regiments. These figures are from the 1st Marine Division's report and are cited in Hough, op. cit.

page 183. 22

 321st RCT S-2 and S-3 Overlays, in 321st

RCT Jnl file Peleliu. Hough, The Assault on

Peleliu, p. 166, n. 73, has it that the pocket was

reduced to an area about 400 by 500 yards, an

estimate which appears small on the basis of the

evidence in the 321st RCT's records. The 81st

Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II, p. 161,

states that the pocket was about 750 by 500 yards

in size on 15 October, but this estimate has been

ripped out of context from an estimate made by

the S-2 of the 323d Infantry on 26 October, as

contained in Incl 1, Terrain and Int Summary, p.

1, to 323d Inf Opns Rpt Peleliu.

23

 The Palau Operations, pp. 142, 161. This

Japanese source states that there were about 1,150

Japanese left on Peleliu as of 13 October and that

as of the 23d there were 700 effectives left, including slightly wounded men. 24 This subsection is based on: 321st RCT Jnls

and Jnl files, Peleliu; 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt

Peleliu, pp. 49-69; The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II, pp. 162-79.
Map 23
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 563

ceive fire support for its attack up Brother

No. 1 from Company F, which was located

on a ridge immediately west of Hill 140, but

once in the ravine the platoon was met by

strong enemy machine gun and rifle fire

originating at positions in defilade from

Company F's supporting weapons. The

Company G platoon soon suffered casualties

which included the company commander,

who had gone forward to direct the attack.

The platoon had to be withdrawn, leaving

behind some dead and wounded who could

not be brought out until after dark and then

only by individual acts of heroism. During

the night Japanese troops, either foraging

for food or trying to harass the American

lines, were active all along the Umurbrogol

front. In retaliation and in preparation for

the next morning's attack, American artillery and 4.2-inch mortars

 25

 placed intermittent fire on known or suspected enemy positions and also employed area fire.

The 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry, started

south from its previous positions behind the

2d Battalion at 0700 on the 17th. Resistance

during the morning was limited to scattered

rifle fire, but the terrain proved almost impassable and by noon the leading elements

had gained little more than 100 yards. During the early afternoon, after moving about

50 yards farther south, Company A was

stopped by fire from a pillbox and near-by

cave positions located on the second of seven

more or less parallel but extremely broken

ridges which lay between Hill 140 and West

Road. Company B was now committed on

the first ridge (to A's left) in an attempt to

provide fire support for A's attack. But as

it moved forward, Company B's rear and

flanks were exposed to fire from enemy rifles

and heavier weapons on Five Brothers

Ridge. Further progress in the 1st Battalion

zone proved impossible, and late in the afternoon both companies withdrew about fifty

yards to covered positions. The day's efforts

had gained about 125 yards in a southerly

direction. On the other hand, about 150

yards of new ground had been taken east to

west in the broken terrain west of Hill 140.

The 2d Battalion's attack against Five

Brothers was led by Company E, but again

no advance across the ravine from Hill 140

to Brother No. 1 could be made. When this

assault stalled, other elements of the 2d

Battalion, supported by 710th Tank Battalion armor, entered Mortimer Valley

through a draw between Walt and Boyd

Ridges in an effort to reduce Brothers Nos.

1 and 2 by attack from the east. Delays

incident to bulldozing a tank road through

the draw prevented significant progress

from the new direction, but tanks and flame

throwers, late in the afternoon, neutralized

some caves along the western base of Walt

Ridge and on the east side of Brother No. 1.

It was estimated that these efforts accounted

for about forty Japanese.

Action against Five Brothers was resumed at 0900 the next morning, 18 October. Tanks and LVT-mounted flame

throwers again pushed through the gap between Walt and Boyd Ridges to reduce

caves along the east side of the Brothers and

the west side of Walt Ridge. Meanwhile, a

heavy concentration of 4.2-inch and 81-

mm. mortar fire was placed along the top

of Five Brothers Ridge by a platoon of

Company D, 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion, and the Provisional Mortar Platoon,

710th Tank Battalion. Company E followed

the mortar fire southward and at 1000

25

 The mortars were from Company D, 88th

Chemical Weapons Battalion, a platoon of which

had arrived from Angaur during the afternoon and

had been emplaced on the southwest side of the

pocket near the lines of the 1st Battalion, 323d

Infantry.
564 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

LVT FLAME THROWER IN ACTION at Umurbrogol Pocket.

reached the top of Brother No. 1. About

forty-five minutes later, part of the company

scrambled up the summit of Brother No. 2,

seventy-five yards to the south.

This success, achieved with unexpected

ease, made it possible to send Company F

forward to pass through Company E and

seize Brother No. 3. By 1315 Company F

had gained the northern slopes of the third

peak, but was almost immediately pinned

down by enemy fire which broke out from

positions on Brothers Nos. 4 and 5, to the

south and southwest, and from the southern

base of Walt Ridge, to the southeast. At

approximately 1500 hours about two

platoons of Japanese infantry began a wellorganized counterattack from Brothers Nos.

4 and 5. Company F had no cover on the

razor-back summit of Brother No. 3 and

was subjected to increasingly heavy fire

from enemy supporting weapons. Company

E, on Brothers Nos. 1 and 2, was in like

straits. Neither company had yet had time

to bring forward sandbags, without the protection of which it was impossible to hold

ground gained on the now bare slopes of

the Umurbrogol Pocket's broken ridges and

gorges. Constant artillery and mortar bom-
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 565

bardment, as well as high explosives and

napalm strikes by planes of Marine Air

Group II, based on the Peleliu airdrome,

had knocked down, burned away, or otherwise destroyed almost the last vestiges of

vegetation in the pocket area. There was

no cover or concealment other than that

which could be provided by sandbags.

Reinforcements sent forward from the 1st

Battalion could not reach Companies E and

F in time to be of help, for by 1600 the

Japanese counterattack was fully developed.

Within an hour Companies E and F were

forced off the three peaks, unable to hold

their exposed positions against the combination of infantry assault and fire from Japanese supporting weapons. Most of the men

withdrew northward to set up defenses at

the base of Brother No. 1, but some, cut off,

slid down the eastern slopes of the peaks and

made their way across Mortimer Valley and

out through the draw between Walt and

Boyd Ridges. There, the men were provided

with covering fire from tanks and elements

of the 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry.

Operations had not been much more successful in the 1st Battalion's zone, where

strong enemy resistance was again encountered by Companies A and C along the

rough ground west of Hill 140. Both units

discovered many occupied caves and enemy

fortifications of varied types, including one

large cave boasting steel doors. The latter

position, once an enemy communications

center, was neutralized and overrun during

the afternoon, but no other appreciable

gains could be made. Most of the day was

spent constructing sandbag fortifications

and emplacing 75-mm. pack howitzers for

direct fire on the many enemy defensive installations in the battalion area.26

The Japanese, even before their counterattack against Five Brothers, had sent infiltraters into action on the southwest side of

the pocket, chiefly by means of tunnels and

connecting caves, to points some 300 yards

outside the recently established containing

lines of the 1st Battalion, 323d Infantry.27

Late on the afternoon of the 17th, such infiltraters had forced mortar units in position

behind the lines of the 1st Battalion, 323d

Infantry, to withdraw. Company I, 7th

Marines, which had not yet left the island,28

was sent into the area to mop up, meeting

stronger resistance than had been anticipated. The next morning Company L, 7th

Marines, supported by one tank of the 710th

Tank Battalion, resumed mopping up. The

tank hit an aerial bomb buried as a mine

and was destroyed by ensuing fires and explosions. The Marine company commander,

who had been riding in the tank, was killed,

as were three members of the tank crew.

Two men escaped. Company L, 7th Marines, withdrew at dusk.

The next morning, 19 October, a company of the Army's 154th Engineer Battalion, supported by artillery of the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, moved back into the

area to blow up or seal remaining caves.

Opposition was still strong and on the morn26

 The 75-mm. pack howitzers had been turned

over to Army units by the 1st Marine Division.

Many of the weapons had been left on the island

more by accident than design. The men of the 11th

Marines' two pack howitzer battalions had left

Peleliu, but heavy seas had made it impossible to

load their weapons. Hough, The Assault on Peleliu,

p. 161, n. 62. Other Marine 75's had been taken

over in place by Army troops at the request of the

81st Division. 27

 The following story of action at the Southern

Pocket, as the area was designated, was reconstructed from: Incl II, 1st Bn Rpt, 20 Oct-3

Nov 44, n. p., to 323d Inf Opns Rpt Peleliu:

Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 169. 28

 Operations from 17-20 October were still under

the control of Headquarters, 1st Marine Division,

and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was division

reserve.
566 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ing of the 20th, Company C, 323d Infantry,

had to be withdrawn from its containing

lines near Five Sisters to support the engineer demolition teams. Tanks were again

moved into the area, now known as the

Southern Pocket, but mopping up was still

no easy task. During the night of 22-23

October, the remaining Japanese even

forced one platoon of Company C, 323d Infantry, back about 100 yards. Company E,

323d Infantry, which had recently arrived

on Peleliu, was thereupon sent up from defenses along West Road to reinforce Company C. The next morning the two rifle

companies pushed most of the remaining

Japanese north toward Death Valley and

China Wall, but final mopping up at the

Southern Pocket was not completed until 3

November, after the line of attack had been

changed from north to south. Altogether,

over 100 Japanese were killed in the Southern Pocket, at the cost of 22 Army and Marine Corps troops killed and 51 wounded.

While the action had no significant effect

upon operations farther north, it is indicative of the Japanese ability to infiltrate over

(and literally through) the Umurbrogol's

broken terrain and to hold reoccupied positions against great odds.

While this minor operation had been

going on, pressure had been maintained

against the Umurbrogol from the north.

The 19th, the day after the 2d Battalion,

321st Infantry, had been driven off Five

Brothers Ridge, was marked principally by

patrolling in preparation for new attacks,

while Marine air units undertook napalm

strikes against Five Brothers and Wildcat

Bowl, to the west. The strike was principally

effective in driving into the open a few

Japanese who, running out of overheated

caves, were summarily shot down by alert

321st Infantry riflemen. The 1st Battalion,

321st Infantry, gained 25-50 yards along

the ridges west of Hill 140 with the aid of

75-mm. pack howitzer fire and the now

omnipresent sandbags. The battalion's men,

prone on the ground, inched their sandbags

forward with rifle butts or sticks, laboriously

expanding a hold and almost realizing the

infantrymen's dream of portable foxholes.

Thus far, operations of the 321st Infantry

and attached units had been conducted

under General Rupertus' direction, but on

the morning of 20 October responsibility for

all ground operations in the Palaus passed to

General Mueller of the 81st Division. The

next higher echelon was the Western Carolines Sub-Area, commanded by Rear Adm.

John W. Reeves, the local representative of

Admiral Hoover's Forward Area Central

Pacific.

The first day of operations under the control of the 81st Infantry Division was spent

principally in reconnaissance, and on the

morning of 21 October, after another napalm strike, the 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry, resumed the attack. Company A, on the

right, gained almost 100 yards along its front

during the morning, progressing farther

toward the north end of China Wall and the

northwest corner of Wildcat Bowl. No progress was made by Company C on the left

(east), but the unit maintained contact with

2d Battalion elements at Hill 140. During

the afternoon all elements of the 1st Battalion were held up by intense enemy fire from

Brother No. 3 and ridges at the north end

of China Wall. In the 2d Battalion area a

volunteer patrol fought its way back up to

the summit of Brother No. 1, practically by

infiltration, late in the afternoon. Company

E rushed forward to consolidate this hold

and a human chain was formed to pass sandbags up the hill. By dark, sandbag fortifications were completed and preparations were
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 567

under way to attack south again on the next

day.

The plan of attack for 22 October was

ambitious. The 1st Battalion (less Company

B, which had replaced Company C, 323d

Infantry, on containing lines at the southwest corner of the pocket) was to continue

forward to seize additional high ground

northwest of Wildcat Bowl. The 2d Battalion was to seize all of Five Brothers Ridge.

The 3d Battalion was to take all remaining

enemy positions on the west side of Walt

Ridge and was to occupy Mortimer Valley.

The 1st Battalion, 323d Infantry (less Company C, but with Company B, 321st Infantry, attached), was to push from the south

and west against Five Sisters and Death Valley. In preparation for this attack, all available mortars plastered Japanese-held areas

from 0515 to 0530, and from 0545 to 0615

Marine air units delivered another napalm

strike against Wildcat Bowl and the southern end of Five Brothers. At 0645 ground

action began.

By 0845 the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry,

had secured all of Brothers Nos. 1 and 2;

fifteen minutes later one platoon was atop

No. 3. During the rest of the day, sandbag

fortifications were built on this new ground,

but the expectation of securing the entire

ridge was not realized. To the west, the 1st

Battalion could make little progress in a

series of bazooka and rifle grenade attacks

against numerous Japanese cave and crevice

positions. Company A, 323d Infantry,

moved north over broken terrain west of

Death Valley in an attempt to outflank or

take from the rear some of the enemy positions holding up the 321st Infantry's 1st

Battalion. Although the two 1st Battalions

managed to establish contact in the rough

ground, their combined efforts failed to gain

much ground west of Death Valley. During

the night a Japanese counterattack from

the north end of China Wall forced the left

(north) platoon of Company A, 323d Infantry, back to West Road, creating a gap

between the two 1st Battalions' lines. Fortunately, the Japanese made no attempt to

exploit this success and at dawn on 23 October Company A was able to reoccupy its

abandoned positions without difficulty.

More spectacular advances had been

made by the 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry.

Company I, supported by two platoons of

tanks, three M-10 tank destroyers, and two

LVT's mounting flame throwers, pushed

into Mortimer Valley via the gap between

Walt and Boyd Ridges. Delayed but a little

while by Japanese who fought from holes

and fissures around Grinlinton Pond, at the

base of Brother No. 4, the infantry-armor

force completed a sweep down the valley by

1100. Caves and crevices along the bases

of Five Brothers and Walt Ridges were

blasted, and then attention was devoted to

caves on the northeast slopes of Five Sisters.

At least thirty-four of the enemy were

known to have been killed by these operations, and it was believed that many more

were sealed in caves. At dusk, with the aid

of sandbags, Company I formed a defense

line along the western base of Walt Ridge,

while Company L, previously holding the

eastern slopes, moved over the crest to the

western side. Company K remained on Boyd

Ridge. On the south, no permanent gains

could be made by elements of the 1st Battalion, 323d Infantry, operating in the Five

Sisters-Death Valley area.

The Japanese, still strong enough to react vigorously to the 321st Infantry's advances, attempted to infiltrate through the

lines Company I had set up on the floor of

Mortimer Valley, probably in an effort to

reoccupy caves on Walt Ridge's western
568 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

MOVING INTO MORTIMER VALLEY. Grinlinton Pond, right foreground; Walt

Ridge, right background; Five Brothers, left background.

base. These efforts were unsuccessful, as

was an attack against Company F, on

Brother No. 2. The latter attack cost the

Japanese at least 20 men killed.

On 23 October the only significant advance was made by Company E, 321st

Infantry, which proceeded south along Five

Brothers Ridge to secure Brother No. 4 and

fortify it with sandbag emplacements. In

the 3d Battalion's zone, redispositions were

effected to close the southern entrance to

Mortimer Valley, but in the 1st Battalion's

area progress was negligible and resistance

apparently undiminished. On the 24th, the

1st Battalion gained 50-75 yards, laboriously inching forward its sandbags; the 3d

Battalion continued sealing caves along

both sides of Mortimer Valley; and the 2d

Battalion consolidated its gains on Five

Brothers Ridge. The next day, the 323d

Infantry, all of which had now arrived from

Ulithi, began relieving the 1st and 2d Battalions, 321st Infantry. On 26 October

control of further operations against the

Umurbrogol Pocket passed from Colonel

Dark to Col. Arthur P. Watson, the com-
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 569

mander of the 323d Regimental Combat

Team. To that date the 321st Infantry had

lost 146 men killed and 469 wounded on

Peleliu.29

The 323d Infantry Finishes the Job

Company I, 323d Infantry, replaced

those elements of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, that were holding along Five Brothers Ridge, while Companies K and L took

over the sandbagged positions of the 1st

Battalion, 321st Infantry, at the northwest

corner of the Umurbrogol Pocket.30 (Map

24) The 2d Battalion, 323d Infantry, went

into lines south of Five Sisters and the 1st

Battalion held its positions at the southwestern and western sides of the pocket.

The 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry, attached

operationally to the 323d, remained in its

sandbagged emplacements along Walt

Ridge and the floor of Mortimer Valley.

As the 323d Infantry took over, Japanese

strength in the Umurbrogol Pocket was estimated at "anywhere between 300 and

1200,"31 but according to Japanese sources,

there were only 700 effective troops still

alive, including those lightly wounded. The

321st Infantry had probably killed about

400 Japanese in the pocket during the previous ten days. The pocket was now reduced

to an average north-south length of approximately 600 yards. On the north it was still

about 475 yards wide, but deep salients had

been driven south into Mortimer Valley

and along Five Brothers Ridge. On the east

Japanese resistance was limited to a few

caves along the eastern base of the Five

Brothers. At the south, across the mouth of

Mortimer Valley to the west side of the

entrance to Death Valley, the width was

less than 350 yards.32 The gains made by the

321st Infantry and the attached 1st Battalion, 323d Infantry, had cost those units

392 casualties — 74 men killed, 315

wounded, and 3 missing.33 There was an

unknown number of battle fatigue and

sickness cases.

During the period 26 October through

1 November heavy rains, fog, and accompanying poor visibility severely limited the

323d Infantry's operations at the Umurbrogol Pocket. The time was employed

principally to improve defenses, extend

sandbag fortifications, and to enclose with

sandbags the 75-mm. pack howitzers for

support of later offensive action. Throughout the period mortar barrages and napalm

strikes continued, but little artillery could

be brought to bear because of the proximity

of the American front lines to the remaining

Japanese positions.

The Japanese made almost nightly counterattacks during the six days, aiming most

of their efforts against Five Brothers. One

such attack, on the night of 26-27 October,

forced Company I, 323d Infantry, off the

forward slopes of Brother No. 4, but the

company retook the positions at dawn the

next day and the effort cost the Japanese 29

 Casualty figures from Ltr, Gen Mueller to Gen

Ward, 29 May 51. 30

 This subsection is based on: Sec. II, Narrative,

pp. 3-37, to 323d Inf Opns Rpt Peleliu: Incl 9,

Unit Jnl, to 323d Inf Opns Rpt Peleliu; Incl 10,

Periodic Rpts, to 323d Inf Opns Rpt Peleliu; 81st

Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu, pp. 71-97; The 81st

Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II, pp.

177-200; The Palau Operations, pp. 161, 198-200. 31

 Incl 1, Terrain and Int Sum, p. 1, to 323d Inf

Opns Rpt Peleliu.

32

 These figures, based on information provided

by the overlays of the 321st and 323d Infantry

Regiments, do not agree with the dimensions given

in the 323d Infantry's Terrain and Intelligence

Summary. 33

 321st RCT Unit Rpt 23, 16 Oct 44, as compared

with 321st RCT Unit Rpt 33, 26 Oct 44, both in

321st RCT Jnl file Peleliu.
Map 24
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 571

34 men killed. During the next night an

estimated 35 Japanese were killed by Company K on the ridges near the northwest

corner of Wildcat Bowl. The enemy was

obviously short of water, for each night a

few more men were killed as they attempted

to get water from Grinlinton Pond, around

which first Company I and later Company

L, both of the 321st Infantry, held a sandbag perimeter.

More active operations were resumed on

2 November when the 2d Battalion, 323d

Infantry, attacked Five Sisters from the

southwest; elements of the 1st Battalion

moved north along the ridges west of

Death Valley, pursuing the last Japanese

from South Pocket; and part of the 3d

Battalion started south along ridges and

broken terrain at the north end of China

Wall. The latter's attack gained only 25-50

yards as Company L sandbagged its way

forward literally inches at a time. The 2d

Battalion met with more success and established troops atop Old Baldy and the Five

Sisters peaks. The 1st Battalion's Company

C got nowhere in the Death Valley region.

From 3 to 12 November no significant gains

were made by any unit, as slow patrolling

and sandbagging continued. Heavy rains

began to fall on the 4th, culminating in a

typhoon which did not blow itself out until

the 8th. During this period the 81st Cavalry

Reconnaissance Troop and elements of the

321st Infantry secured additional offshore

islets north of Peleliu.

Attacks at the Umurbrogol started in

earnest again on 13 November, with the 1st

Battalion, 323d Infantry, pushing eastward

from the ridges west of Death Valley and

the 2d Battalion moving north into that

gorge and Wildcat Bowl. The 1st Battalion's

attack gained little ground, and that only by

sandbagging almost every foot of the terrain. In the 2d Battalion's zone Company G

moved about 75 yards north along the more

easterly of the two razor-back ridges which

formed the China Wall, but no other advances were made. No gains of any significance were made on the 14th or 15th,

but on the latter day there was discovered

in the 1st Battalion's area what appeared

to be an important center of resistance in

rough, broken ground west of the center of

Death Valley. On the 16th, oil was sent forward through a hose from fuel tanks set up

in covered positions 300 yards distant and

poured into a large cave which seemed to be

the center of the new-found defenses. Ignited

by white phosphorus hand grenades lobbed

into the cave, the flaming oil produced such

promising results in driving Japanese into

the open or killing them, that the same

method of conquest continued to be used by

the 1st Battalion and in other parts of the

pocket.

During the period 16-21 November

patrolling continued in all areas, with

tanks and LVT-flame throwers operating

throughout Wildcat Bowl and Death Valley, attacking enemy caves at the bases of

China Wall and Five Brothers. Engineer

flame throwers and demolition teams, sometimes accompanied by armored bulldozers,

followed the tanks and LVT's closely, destroying or sealing all enemy caves which

could be reached. The tank-LVT sorties

prompted many of the Japanese remaining

in the pocket to make desperate efforts to

escape and during the night of 17-18 November, for instance, about 33 were killed

trying to flee. On the next day, according to

enemy sources, there were only 150 Japanese

still capable of fighting left in the Umurbrogol Pocket.

By noon on 21 November infantry patrols

were able to operate without encountering
572 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

much resistance throughout Wildcat Bowl

and the southern half of Death Valley; the

last Japanese on Five Brothers Ridge were

killed on the 23d. The remaining Japanese

held final defenses on China Wall and on

the broken ridges west of the northern half

of Death Valley. By dusk on 23 November

further resistance was confined to the China

Wall, still a nearly impregnable position.

Steep sides, both east and west, made it impossible for wheeled or tracked vehicles to

gain access to China Wall from Death Valley or Wildcat Bowl, and the terrain at the

north end of China Wall was so broken as to

be impassable for armor. A scooped-out area

between the two sides of China Wall gave

the remaining Japanese protection from direct fire, and the proximity of the 323d Infantry's forward elements to the enemy

positions now made it too dangerous to use

mortar fire against the hollow.

On 22 November one company had ascended the north end of China Wall; another had closed in an additional 75 yards

from the west-northwest; and a third had

gained 25-50 yards at the southern end of

the Wall. By the end of the day the remaining Japanese were compressed into an area

125 yards wide east to west and 285 yards

long north to south. There were no gains on

the 23d, but the next day a few more yards

were made on all fronts. In order that tanks

and LVT-flame throwers could reach the

central hollow of China Wall, engineers began constructing a ramp up the east wall at

the north end of Wildcat Bowl. This ramp

was completed on the afternoon of the 25th,

and the 323d Infantry was ready to make a

final attack.

Unknown to the 81st Division, the 57

Japanese still remaining alive in the pocket

had given up the fight on the 24th and had

burned the 2d Infantry's colors, traditional

sign of final defeat. The 57 survivors were

split into 17 small teams which were instructed to hide out during the day and

raid American lines at night. A last message

was sent to General Inoue, the Palau Sector

Group commander, still on Koror Island,

advising him of the end. The next day, 25

November, a prisoner reported that Colonel

Nakagawa and General Murai had committed suicide the previous night. Subsequently,

the 81st Division established positive identification of the bodies.

The 323d Infantry had noted on the afternoon of the 24th that resistance had almost

completely vanished, and rapid gains were

obviously possible on the next morning. But

the troops advanced cautiously, carefully

searching every foot of ground, for they expected perhaps a trap or at least a last, desperate, banzai charge by the remaining Japanese. On the 26th, tanks and LVT-flame

throwers moved up the completed ramp to

begin blasting away at caves and other defenses along China Wall's hollow center.

Again gains were rapid, but the 323d's men,

realizing the fight was over and not wishing

to take unnecessary risks, were prevented by

scattered rifle fire from clearing the last tiny

pocket of resistance before dark. The next

morning the attack was continued by eight

rifle companies which closed in from all directions. There was no resistance—not a shot

was fired on either side. At 1100 Colonel

Watson declared that hostilities were over.

The operation which General Rupertus,

commanding the 1st Marine Division, had

expected to last only four days,34 had actually continued for almost two and one-half

months. In the words of the 81st Infantry

Division, "The enemy had fulfilled his determination to fight unto death."35

 That fight

34

 Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, p. 35. 35

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt Peleliu, p. 97.
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 573

had cost the 323d Infantry 118 men killed

and 420 wounded.36

Results of Operations in the Palaus

In the Palaus—on Angaur, Peleliu, and

the smaller islands off Peleliu—approximately 13,600 Japanese were killed, over

11,000 of them on Peleliu alone. In addition, some 400 enemy prisoners were taken,

chiefly Korean and Okinawan troops. During its operations the 81st Infantry Division

and attached units suffered over 3,275

battle casualties—542 killed and 2,736

wounded or injured in action. The reinforced 1st Marine Division's battle casualties were approximately 1,250 killed (including about 115 missing) and 5,275

wounded, a total of about 6,525. Thus,

Army and Marine Corps troops killed or

captured approximately 14,000 Japanese

during the Palaus operation while incurring

around 9,800 battle casualties themselves.

Many more American troops were rendered

temporarily or perhaps permanently hors de

combat through nonbattle injuries, battle

fatigue, heat exhaustion, sickness, or disease. The 81st Division, for instance, had

about 2,500 men hospitalized for these

reasons.37

The Palaus operation was extremely

costly—it was one of the bloodiest battles of

the war. It was so costly, in fact, that one

wonders if the results were worth the effort.

Doubts are easily raised in the light of the

fact that eleventh-hour changes in plans for

subsequent operations—notably the invasion of the Philippines—made it impossible

to fit the Palaus into the operational role

originally planned for them.38

Air support for the Philippine landings

as originally planned was to have been provided from a heavy bomber field on Angaur

Island. Shorter-range planes based on

Peleliu were to fly missions against the

Palaus themselves and also against other

Japanese-held islands in the western Carolines in order to keep Japanese air and

naval bases in that area neutralized. The

Angaur field was to have been completed on

15 October, on which date Army B-24's,

of the Seventh Air Force's 494th Bomb

Group (H), were to have begun strikes

against targets in the Philippines. But as a

result of terrain difficulties and inadequate

gasoline storage facilities, the Angaur field

was not ready for use by bombers until 21

October, the day after American forces had

landed on Leyte, in the central Philippines.

Then it was found that the 494th Bomb

Group needed more training (which it acquired by flying missions over the Palaus

and Yap) before it could carry out combat

missions over the Philippines. In the end,

it was not until 17 November that the first

bomber mission was flown against a Philippine target from a field in the Palaus.39

The Angaur field did become a useful

heavy bomber base and aircraft staging

point for later phases of the Philippine campaign, especially during operations on Lu36

 Casualty figures from Ltr, Mueller to Ward,

29 May 51. 37

 These statistics are reconstructed from numerous

mutually irreconcilable and contradictory sources

including, among others, the G-1 and G-3 Jnls

and Jnl files of the 81st Inf Div; the Rpts and Jnls

and Jnl files of the 321st, 322d, and 323d Inf Regts

and RCT's; the 81st Inf Div's Opns Rpt; the 1st

Mar Div's Opns Rpt; the III Amph Corps Opns

Rpt; The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World

War II; Hough, The Assault on Peleliu; Ltr,

Mueller to Ward, 29 May 51.

38

 See above, Chs. XIX and XX. 39

 MS, The Pacific—MATTERHORN to Nagasaki,

Ch. IX, pp. 30, 48; Ch. 1, p. 74.
PELELIU, showing base development. At the time photograph was taken, jungle

growth had again covered the ridges of Umurbrogol Pocket. (Aerial view, October

1946.)
PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 575

zon.40 Employment of the Palaus as a fleet

base was negligible, although Kossol Passage at the northern end of the group was

successfully used as an emergency fleet anchorage. Ulithi Atoll, seized by the 323d

Regimental Combat Team of the 81st Infantry Division in an unopposed operation

during 22-24 September,41 proved an extremely valuable base for the U. S. Pacific

Fleet during various phases of operations in

the Philippines. Later in the war Ulithi also

served as a staging area for fleet and amphibious forces moving against Okinawa.42

Thus, operations in the western Carolines,

including the Palaus, did secure for the Allies

valuable air and naval bases. The Palaus

were not as valuable as had been anticipated

nor were the islands used as extensively or

for quite the same purposes as originally

planned.

There remains the possibility of conjecture as to whether the Philippines could

have been invaded without the Palaus in

Allied hands. Among the highest-ranking

Allied commanders in the Pacific, only

Admiral Halsey, commander of the U. S.

Third Fleet, believed it safe to bypass the

Palaus, and he expressed such an opinion as

early as mid-June.43 From the vantage point

of hindsight, it would appear that Admiral

Halsey was right and that it may not have

been absolutely necessary to take the Palaus.

Nevertheless, with the information available to them in the summer and early fall

of 1944, Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all

believed that only by securing the Palaus

could the Allies dominate Japanese bases in

the western Pacific and insure the safety of

forces moving toward the Philippines.44

40

 Ibid., Ch. IX, p. 48. 41

 81st Inf Div Opns Rpt, Ulithi Atoll and Other

Western Caroline Islands, 21 Sep 44-4 Jan 45, pp.

11-23. 42

 Roy E. Appleman, and others, Okinawa: The

Last Battle, in U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1949), p. 43. 43

 Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey and Lt Comdr

J. Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York,

1947), pp. 194-95. This is not hindsight on Admiral Halsey's part, since he cites his War Diary

for 18 June 1944 to prove his point. Admiral Halsey

based his objections to the Palaus operation at least

partially on a belief that the invasion would result

in prohibitive casualties. Other commanders, notably

Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge, commanding the XXIV

Corps, apparently early expressed the belief that

it would be possible to bypass Yap, at least, well

before the Yap operation was canceled during the

eleventh-hour changes in the concept for the final

steps of the approach to the Philippines. The opinion

concerning Yap was possibly shared by one of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff's subordinate committees, the

Joint Staff Planners, well before September 1944. 44

 The 81st Infantry Division, with the exception

of the 321st Regimental Combat Team, left the

Palaus for New Caledonia in December 1944 and

January 1945. The 321st RCT was finally relieved

by the 111th Infantry (a separate regiment not part

of any division) and left for New Caledonia early

in February 1945. In addition to operations in

the Palaus and Ulithi, elements of the 81st Division seized Ngulu Atoll, between Yap and the

Palaus, on 16-17 October 1944; Pulo Anna Island

in the Sonsoral Group, between the Palaus and

Morotai, on 20 November; Kayangel Atoll, north

of Kossol Passage in the Palaus, on 28 November-1

December; and Fais Island, southeast of Ulithi, on

1-4 January 1945. On all these islands radar or

loran stations were set up. See 81st Inf Div Opns

Rpt, Ulithi and Other Caroline Islands, 21 Sep

44-4 Jan 45, pp. vi, 33-78.
Conclusion: The Results

and the Costs

With the seizure of air-base sites in the

Palaus and on Morotai, the Allied forces

of the Pacific theaters completed the strategic and tactical steps of the approach to

the Philippines; they were now poised to

move on into those islands. Eleventh-hour

changes in plans concerning the date and

place for the invasion of the Philippines

were consistent with the strategic concept

upon which the approach had been based.

The occupation of Morotai and the southern Palaus fulfilled the concept of two

drives—one westward across the Central

Pacific and the other northwestward up the

north coast of New Guinea—toward the

Philippine Islands. One phase of the war in

the Pacific was ended. Another was soon to

begin.1

Since April 1944, forces of the Central

Pacific Area, in their part of the drive, had

moved 1,625 nautical miles westward from

the Marshalls to the Palaus and were about

3,250 nautical miles southwest of Hawaii.2

During the same time, the forces of the

Southwest Pacific Area, in a rapid succession of seven major operations, had moved

some 1,300 nautical miles3 from the Huon

Peninsula of eastern New Guinea to

Morotai Island.

The costs had not been low. The Allies

had suffered more than 20,000 battle casualties, including over 3,600 killed. The Japanese had lost at least 43,000 men, including some 40,000 killed. Seven Japanese

divisions and the combat equivalent of at

least one more division had been destroyed

or cut off—losses which the Japanese could

not replace. A Japanese air army, the theoretical equivalent of a U. S. air force, had

also been wiped out. The Japanese could ill

afford this loss of trained pilots and first-line

aircraft. Losses of Japanese naval landbased aircraft were such that Japanese surface-vessel action was seriously hampered.

Few naval surface craft were sunk by either

side,4 but the Japanese could not replace the

vessels they lost.

The Allies had employed nine divisions—

eight Army and one Marine, and the equivalent of another Army division in separate

regimental combat teams. The entire U. S.

Pacific Fleet, comprising the Third, Fifth,

and Seventh Fleets, had been used, together

1

 See M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to

the Philippines, a forthcoming volume in the series

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 2

 This, of course, excepts the seizure of the Marianas, an operation which was not, strictly speaking,

strategically part of the approach to the Philippines.

See Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas,

a forthcoming volume in the series U. S. ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. The distances given are,

respectively, about 1,870 and 3,735 statute miles.

3

 Approximately 1,500 statute miles. 4

 Except during the Battle of the Philippine Sea,

off the Marianas in June 1944. The major Japanese

surface-vessel losses during the operations along

the New Guinea coast and in the Palaus were a

few destroyers.
CONCLUSION: THE RESULTS AND THE COSTS 577

TABLE 1—AMERICAN CASUALTIES DURING THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES:

APRIL-DECEMBER 1944

a

 Includes missing in action. b

 Army figures, because of conflicting sources, are deliberate approximations. The figures do not include AAF casualties

except for engineer aviation battalions. c

 Navy figures for Hollandia and Aitape are combined, as are figures for the Palaus and Ulithi. d

 See Ch. XIX, n. 1. e

 Casualty figures for Ulithi and other western Caroline islands cover the period 22 September 1944-4 January 1945.

Source: Table is based on sources and figures given in the text, except for U. S. Navy figures, which were provided by the

Statistics Branch, Bureau of Naval Personnel.

with available combat vessels of Allied nations. Three U. S. Army air forces—the

Fifth, Seventh, and Thirteenth—and at least

the equivalent of another air force in U. S.

naval land-based aircraft, U. S. Marine

planes, and aircraft of Allied countries had

also participated in the approach to the Philippines. Allied naval and air losses were replaceable, and at the close of this part of the

Pacific war, Allied naval and air strength in

the Pacific theaters was growing rapidly.

While some of the U. S. divisions and separate regimental combat teams had suffered

heavy casualties, all of them were still intact

and could be brought back up to strength.

They had received invaluable combat experience which was to serve them well in

later operations.5 They were ready to move

on to the Philippines or other combat areas.

Allied forces in the Pacific had successfully completed one phase of the Pacific

war. They were prepared to push on toward

the ultimate defeat of Japan.

5

 All the divisions and regimental combat teams

that participated in the drive up the New Guinea

coast later served in the Philippines. The 1st Marine

Division re-entered combat on Okinawa in April

1945. Only the 81st Infantry Division did not participate in another major operation, but even

elements of that unit engaged in minor mopping-up

operations in northwestern Leyte while retraining

for the proposed invasion of the Japanese home

islands.
578 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

TABLE 2—JAPANESE CASUALTIES,a DEFENDING THE APPROACHES TO THE PHILIPPINES:

APRIL-DECEMBER 1944

a

 All figures are deliberate approximations except for Korean prisoners of war. Figures for Japanese wounded are not

available. b

 Figures cover the latest dates for which they are available. In the case of New Guinea and Morotai they extend to early

October 1944; in the Palaus, to the end of November. "Killed in Action" includes those found dead of starvation or disease. c

 Includes non-Japanese prisoners, since no breakdown by nationality is available for the Palau operation. The reports

state that most of the prisoners were Korean or Okinawan labor troops.

Source: Table is based on sources cited in the text.
Bibliographical Note

Official Records

This volume is based principally upon

official records of the United States and

Allied armed forces. These records comprise

six major categories: records of the United

States-British Combined Chiefs of Staff

(CCS); the United States Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS) and subordinate committees,

such as the Joint Staff Planners (JPS); the

U. S. Army; the U. S. Navy; the U. S.

Marine Corps; the Allied armed services.

Since the U. S. Air Force was part of the

U. S. Army during the war, its records are

here classed as Army records.

Records of the Combined

Chiefs of Staff

Information concerning decisions at the

highest Allied level is in the records of the

CCS, copies of which are in the files of the

wartime Operations Division, General Staff,

U. S. Army (OPD), in the custody of the

Historical Records Section, Departmental

Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office,

U. S. Army (HRS DRB AGO). The principal body of the CCS records relating to

this volume are in bound volumes containing the papers and minutes of the following

CCS meetings:

SYMBOL (Casablanca, January 1943)

TRIDENT (Washington, May 1943)

QUADRANT (Quebec, August 1943)

SEXTANT (Cairo-Tehran, November-December 1943)

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Since, under the CCS, the JCS were responsible for the direction of the war in the

Pacific, the background material for the

major strategic decisions relating to that

war is in the records of the JCS and their

subordinate committees, filed in the same

place as those of the CCS. The JCS records

consulted included minutes of JCS and JPS

meetings and the numbered JCS and JPS

papers containing material relevant to the

approach to the Philippines.

Records of the U. S. Army

General Staff, U. S. Army

a. The Chief of Staff's Log, 1942-

1944. This log, filed in the Staff Communications Branch, Office of the Chief of Staff,

U. S. Army, contains communications between General Marshall and ranking Army

commanders in overseas theaters, such as

General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific and General Richardson in the Central

Pacific. Since General Marshall acted as

the JCS executive for the Southwest Pacific,

the log also contains copies of many messages originated by the JCS. Also included

are records of radio-telephone conversations between General Sutherland (General

MacArthur's Chief of Staff), who attended

many JCS conferences in Washington, and

General R. J. Marshall (General MacArthur's Deputy Chief of Staff), at the overseas end in the Southwest Pacific. The log
580 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

also contains daily reports from the major

Army overseas commanders.

b. Operations Division, General Staff,

U. S. Army, 1942-1944. These files are in

the custody of the HRS DRB AGO. Arranged according to the Army's decimal system, they contain much material on OPD

planning and proposals in regard to the

conduct of the war in the Pacific and, in

addition, many papers providing background for the Army's point of view as presented at meetings of the JCS and subordinate committees. All OPD files containing

material relevant to the approach to the

Philippines were consulted.

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific

Area.—While these records are technically

Joint and Allied papers, they are, with a few

relatively minor exceptions, in the custody

of the U. S. Army. The most important records of GHQ SWPA thus far returned to

the United States are those of the G-3 Section. This collection is divided into two

parts: the G-3 Journal file and the G-3

Administration Division decimal files. The

Journal file contains daily, weekly, monthly,

or other serially distributed intelligence and

operations reports of various sections of

GHQ SWPA and major subordinate commands within the theater. There is also

much planning material and there are copies

of most of the communications between

GHQ SWPA and other theater headquarters in the Pacific and Far East. The G-3

Administration files contain similar material and, in addition, copies of GHQ

SWPA correspondence with the War Department and the Australian Government

concerning such matters as labor, tables of

organization, and logistics. The G-3 papers

originally classed Top Secret have not, for

the most part, been returned to the United

States, but have been retained by U. S.

Army headquarters in Tokyo. That headquarters has also retained the G-3 Historical Division and G-3 Planning Division

files, although copies of some of these records have been obtained on special request

by the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH). The G-3 Journals are in

the HRS DRB AGO, while the G-3 Administration files are in the Organization Records Branch, Records Administration

Center, Adjutant General's Office (ORB

RAC AGO). Other important records collections of GHQ SWPA in the United States

are The Adjutant General's decimal files

and the records of the Allied Translator and

Interpreter Section (ATIS), a subordinate

operating agency of the G-2 Section, GHQ

SWPA. The former collection is filed under

the title General Headquarters, Far East

Command (GHQ FEC) in the ORB RAC

AGO, while the ATIS documents are in the

HRS DRB AGO. The ATIS collection comprises many valuable translations of Japanese documents, copies of interrogations of

prisoners, and special studies concerning

various aspects of the Japanese military

services. An almost complete collection of

the publications (terrain handbooks and

terrain studies) of the Allied Geographic

Section (AGS), another agency of G-2

GHQ SWPA is in the custody of the

OCMH, and provides much excellent geographic information on various localities in

New Guinea and the Netherlands East Indies. The papers, photographs, maps, interviews, etc., upon which the AGS documents

were based are in the custody of the Australian Army. Most of the records of the G-2

and G-4 Sections of GHQ SWPA are at

this writing still in the custody of U. S.

Army headquarters in Tokyo.

ALAMO Force (U. S. Sixth Army).—

ALAMO Force, a special task force operating
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 581

directly under GHQ SWPA, was actually

Headquarters, Sixth Army, a role which it

reassumed in September 1944. As ALAMO

Force, the headquarters maintained separate sets of records for each operation or

group of operations in the SWPA described

in this volume. Thus, there are separate

ALAMO collections for Hollandia-Aitape,

for Wakde-Biak, for Noemfoor, for Sansapor, and for Morotai. The most important records in these five collections comprise the After Action Reports and the G-1,

G-2, G-3, and G-4 Journal files. For the

Wakde-Biak group, there are three sets of

G-3 Journals—for ALAMO Force Headquarters, Advance Headquarters, and Rear

Headquarters. The reports and general staff

section documents are in the HRS DRB

AGO, filed under the title ALAMO Force,

while many records of the special staff sections are in the custody of the ORB RAC

AGO, where they are filed under the title

Sixth Army. The ALAMO G-3 Section

records are particularly valuable in that

they contain much important planning material not found in other collections and

include many GHQ SWPA papers which,

originally classed Top Secret, are not to be

found in GHQ SWPA files at present available in the United States. The G-3 Section

papers also contain material concerning intelligence and logistics. The G-1 and G-2

Journal files are not as voluminous nor as

valuable as those of the G-3 Section, but

those of the G-4 Section contain much important supply data and, strangely enough,

many copies of intelligence records not to

be found in the G-2 Journals. The ALAMO

After Action Reports provide brief, fairly

accurate summaries of operations. The

Japanese and Allied casualty figures contained in these narratives appear to be quite

accurate. Another extremely valuable collection of ALAMO Force material is the

ALAMO G-2 Weekly Reports, filed in the

library of the G-2 Section, General Staff,

U.S. Army. This serial publication includes

translations of many Japanese unit orders,

weekly estimates of the enemy situation,

corrections and addenda to previous estimates, Japanese order of battle information,

and evaluation of Japanese tactics and

equipment. All in all, the various ALAMO

Force records collections have proved to be

the most valuable single source of information for the preparation of this volume.

Ground Task Forces and Landing

Forces.—For the Southwest Pacific operations described in this volume there were

set up under ALAMO Force various special

ground task forces, in turn sometimes subdivided into landing forces. Strictly speaking, these were Joint and Allied commands.

However, they were built around U. S.

Army corps, division, or regimental headquarters and their records are in the custody of the U. S. Army, the bulk of them in

HRS DRB AGO. While most of these task

force records are filed under the task force

title, many of them are filed under the numerical designation of the U. S. Army unit

headquarters around which the task force

headquarters were built. This is especially

true for the records of the various task forces'

subordinate echelons, attached units, and

special staff sections. Each task force was

dissolved as such by ALAMO Force and the

records for the period following such dissolution are to be found under the U. S.

Army unit numerical designations.

The official records of the ground task

forces for actions described in this volume

vary greatly in quality and quantity, depending both upon the unit and upon the combat

situation obtaining at the time the records

were being maintained. The After Action
582 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Reports of the ground task forces or numerically designated units were usually

found to be inadequate, and it was often

necessary to reconstruct the operational

story entirely from the Journals and Journal

files of participating units, especially infantry regiments and battalions. These Journals

and Journal files also varied considerably in

quality and quantity and had to be supplemented in many cases by interviews or written comment on portions of the manuscript

by officers who took part in the actions described. The collections of the ground task

forces and their principal subordinate units

are as follows:

a. PERSECUTION Task Force

(PTF). The records of this task force and

its principal subordinate units are to be

found under the following titles, most of

them in the HRS DRB AGO:

PERSECUTION Task Force

XI Corps

32d Infantry Division

163d Infantry, 41st Infantry Division

112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team

124th Infantry, 31st Infantry Division

43d Infantry Division

The records of task force headquarters are to

be found filed variously under the task force

title, under 32d Infantry Division, and under XI Corps. These headquarters records

comprise After Action Reports and the Journals and Journal files of the general and special staff sections. The Journals contain communications between higher and lower echelons, daily reports from subordinate units,

intelligence and operations maps and overlays, casualty lists, and supply data. The

After Action Reports generally provide only

sketchy outline accounts, the best among

them being the report for the period during

which Headquarters, 32d Infantry Division,

operated as PTF Headquarters. The story of

operations at Aitape can only be developed

by close study of the records of subordinate

units, especially those of infantry regiments

and battalions. By far the best of these are

the records of the 127th Infantry, 32d Infantry Division, and the battalions of that

regiment. This collection contains copies of

all messages between that regiment and

other echelons of the PTF, maps, overlays,

and even some material concerning other

PTF units not to be found in those units'

own records. The 112th Cavalry's records

for Aitape are good, but lack detail at the

small-unit level. The records of the 124th

Infantry, 31st Infantry Division, and those

of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, 43d Infantry Division, for the period of TED Force

operations at Aitape are inadequate. Generally speaking, all artillery records of the various echelons of the PTF are poor—the narratives tell little and the Journals and Journal files are most difficult to work with. Engineer reports are, on the other hand, quite

good and of great value. One of the major

deficiencies in the records of all echelons of

the PTF is a lack of material concerning air

support of ground operations.

b. RECKLESS Task Force (RTF).

The RTF records include those of the

NOISELESS Landing Force, the LETTERPRESS Landing Force, and the RTF Reserve. The bulk of the RTF Headquarters

records are filed under the RTF title in the

HRS DRB AGO, although some scattered

material is found in the ORB RAC AGO

under the title I Corps. RTF's After Action

Report is an excellent one and the headquarters' Journals arid Journal files are

good. The NOISELESS Landing Force records are filed under the title 24th Infantry

Division in the HRS DRB AGO. The 24th

Division's After Action Report for Hollandia is by far the best single After Action
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 583

Report for any operation discussed in this

volume. It includes planning material, information on unit training and rehearsing,

details of operations, personnel records, valuable data on supply, and important intelligence material. A 24th Division Planning

Journal, found in the division's files in the

ORB RAC AGO, also proved a valuable

source of information. The records of the

24th Division's organic units contain sufficient detail for the operations described.

RTF Reserve was the 34th Infantry, 24th

Infantry Division, and its records are filed

with those of the division in the HRS DRB

AGO. Records of the LETTERPRESS Landing Force are filed under the title 41st Infantry Division in the HRS DRB AGO. The

division headquarters records leave much to

be desired but those of the 162d and 186th

Infantry Regiments are good and provide

more than enough material. The records of

RTF artillery units either lack detail or are

extremely difficult to use.

c. TORNADO Task Force (TTF).

The records of the TTF and its subordinate

echelons are filed for the most part in the

HRS DRB AGO and are located variously

under the TTF title or, according to whatever numerically designated U. S. Army

headquarters controlled operations at

Wakde-Sarmi during each period, under

the following titles:

163d Infantry, 41st Infantry Division

158th Regimental Combat Team

6th Infantry Division and component

parts

31st Infantry Division and component

parts

123d Infantry, 33d Infantry Division

The TTF records vary from good to poor

according to both the unit concerned and

the combat situation obtaining. The task

force general staff section Journals are fair,

but lack detail on small-unit actions. In the

ORB RAC AGO there are some special reports and records of the 1st Battalion (and

its companies) of the 163d Infantry, 41st

Infantry Division, which permit the reconstruction of the story of the seizure of Wakde

Island in some detail. These records are

filed in the 41st Division collection. The

best After Action Report for Wakde-Sarmi

is that for the period during which Headquarters, 6th Infantry Division, operated as

TTF Headquarters. The records of the 6th

Division's 1st, 20th, and 63d Infantry Regiments are also good. Artillery records for

the TTF and its various changing and subordinate echelons are among the best for

any operation described in this volume, and

it is generally possible to ascertain without

difficulty which artillery unit fired what

mission when. Information on antiaircraft

action is also complete. It is not with the

TTF collection but in a file of the Antiaircraft Section of Headquarters, Sixth Army,

in the ORB RAC AGO.

d. HURRICANE Task Force

(HTF). The bulk of the HTF records are

filed under the task force title in the HRS

DRB AGO, although some material is filed

under the titles 41st Infantry Division or

I Corps. The HTF After Action Report for

the period during which Headquarters,

41st Infantry Division, acted as HTF Headquarters provides only the barest outline of

HTF Operations. The most valuable source

among the HTF Headquarters records is

the G-3 Section Journal, which provides a

summary of messages between the headquarters and higher and lower commands.

The HTF After Action Report for the period during which Headquarters, I Corps,

was at Biak is poorly organized, vague, and

none too accurate. The best records for

operations at Biak are those of the 162d
584 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

and 186th Infantry Regiments, 41st Infantry Division, most of which are filed under

the HTF title in the HRS DRB AGO. The

162d Infantry's is the best regimental After

Action Report, but its Journals and Journal files are far surpassed by the S-2 and

S-3 records of the 186th Infantry. The

latter collection contains messages, overlays,

maps, situation reports, intelligence material, and operations resumes, all excellently

arranged for easy employment during research. A number of valuable records of

the companies of the same two regiments

are located in 41st Infantry Division files

in the ORB RAC AGO, and can be used

to advantage. The 163d Infantry's records

for Biak, filed with those of the HTF, are

poorer in quality and quantity. The 34th

Infantry's records are filed with other 24th

Division material in the HRS DRB AGO.

Artillery records for all echelons of the HTF

vary from bad to good. For instance, one

artillery battalion After Action Report,

some five and one-half pages long, devotes

a good half of that space to describing the

escape of two men from behind Japanese

lines.

e. CYCLONE Task Force (CyTF).

The records of Headquarters, CyTF, are

generally adequate for the operation described. Most of them are filed under the

task force title in the HRS DRB AGO, but

some are to be found in the files of the 158th

Infantry in the same place. The records of

the CyTF's other major subordinate echelon—the 503d Parachute Infantry—are

found under that unit's numerical designation in the HRS DRB AGO. The 503d's

records are not as complete as those of the

158th Infantry.

f. TYPHOON Task Force (TyTF).

Most of these records are filed under the

task force title in the HRS DRB AGO and

are sufficient for the operation described,

although lack of planning material leaves a

noticeable gap. The documents of some subordinate units, such as the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and the 6th Medical

Battalion, are with the 6th Infantry Division

files in the HRS DRB AGO. Other miscellaneous materials are filed with the 6th

Division records in ORB RAC AGO.

g. TRADEWIND Task Force

(TrTF). The most important records of

this task force and its major subordinate

units are filed under the task force title in

the HRS DRB AGO. These records lack

planning information but otherwise provide

enough material for the operation described.

Additional material is to be found in the files

of XI Corps, 31st Infantry Division, and

the 126th Infantry of the 32d Infantry Division in the HRS DRB AGO and the ORB

RAC AGO.

Other U. S. Army Combat Records

a. The 81st Infantry Division. The

major body of U. S. Army combat records

not mentioned in the foregoing classification

are those of the 81st Infantry Division and

its organic and attached units engaged in

operations in the western Carolines. The

81st Division's After Action Report for these

operations has three parts: Angaur, Peleliu,

and Ulithi and other Caroline islands.

These three provide an excellent summary,

but gloss over points of error or poor performance, as do most After Action Reports.

The division headquarters' general staff

sections' Journals and Journal files are voluminous and provide excellent material on

operations, intelligence, personnel, and logistics from which to write a detailed story

of the division's operations. The records of

the 321st Infantry for Angaur were lost, and
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 585

the story had to be reconstructed from other

available sources. For Peleliu, the 321st Infantry's files are more than adequate, as are

those of the 323d Infantry for that island

and for Ulithi. The 322d Infantry's records

for Angaur are good. The division's artillery

records are outstanding—by far the best

used in preparing this volume.

b. Miscellaneous. In addition to the

numerically designated ground task force

units, the records of many other units were

used in the preparation of this volume.

These records fall into two categories: the

records of task force subordinate units not

organic to divisions; the records of Southwest Pacific units which, originally designated as task forces, reverted to their numerical designation after ALAMO Force

"closed" the task force period of operations.

For the latter group, the relevant bodies of

records not discussed under the ground task

force classification are those of the Eighth

Army, the X Corps, and the 93d Infantry

Division, all of which provide valuable information concerning the mopping-up periods following the close of task force operations and the transfer of responsibility in

the areas concerned from the Sixth Army to

the Eighth Army. The most important

group of records of units not organic to

divisions is that of the 2d, 3d, and 4th Engineer Special Brigades and their boat and

shore regiments. These records are especially valuable for information concerning

the landing phases of Southwest Pacific

Area operations described in this volume.

The records are filed variously in the HRS

DRB AGO and in the collection of the

Office of the Chief of Engineers, U. S.

Army. Other useful records are those of

nonorganic tank, engineer, tank destroyer,

chemical, and field artillery units.

U. S. Navy Records

Seventh Fleet.—The largest single body

of U. S. Navy records employed in the preparation of this volume were the plans and

reports of Task Force 77, U. S. Seventh

Fleet, for operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. These and the other records of

the Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific

Area, are in the custody of the U. S. Navy,

although copies of most of the Task Force

77 reports are in the HRS DRB AGO, filed

separately or in ALAMO Force and GHQ

SWPA Journals. Such reports as are not

located there are in The Office of Naval

Records and Library. For each of the SWPA

operations discussed, there is available a

Task Force 77 report which covers briefly

naval planning, ship bombardment, and

landing operations. Additional material for

more detailed coverage of the naval phases

of the various operations is found in the reports of task groups, task units, and relevant individual ships of Task Force 77.

Third and Fifth Fleet.—Plans and reports of the Fifth Fleet provide material for

that unit's operations at Hollandia and

those of the Third Fleet for the operations

in the western Carolines. Copies of most of

the relevant records are in the HRS DRB

AGO, either filed separately or in the Journals of the G-3 Section GHQ SWPA.

CINCPAC - CINCPOA .—While Admiral Nimitz' Pacific Ocean Areas headquarters was technically a Joint and Allied

command, its records are in the custody of

the U. S. Navy, just as the records of GHQ

SWPA are in the custody of the U. S. Army.

Copies of most of the important CINCPACCINCPOA documents used in the preparation of this volume are located in the files of

the HRS DRB AGO, although some were
586 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

obtained from The Office of Naval Records

and Library. The records include intelligence estimates, campaign plans, staff

studies, and monthly operations reports,

most of them adequate for the purpose of

this volume.

U. S. Marine Corps Records

Marine Corps records used in the preparation of this volume were principally the

plans and reports of the 1st Marine Division

and the III Amphibious Corps for operations in the Palaus. These documents were

employed mainly to obtain planning information, for which they were invaluable. The

story of Marine participation in the Hollandia operation is found in the report of

Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine

Division, for that operation. Copies of most

of the Marine Corps records consulted are

filed in the HRS DRB AGO, and the rest

are in Marine Corps files.

Records of Allied Forces

Some of the Australian source material

employed in the preparation of this volume

was obtained by the author through the

courtesy of Australian services historical

groups, and copies are on file in the OCMH.

The most important of these records are the

report of the 6th Australian Division for operations from Aitape to Wewak, the report

of Task Force 74 (the Australian cruiserdestroyer component of Allied Naval Forces,

SWPA) for operations at Aitape in July

1944, and a summary of Royal Australian

Air Force (RAAF) airfield construction

squadron activities in New Guinea. Copies

of other Australian reports are to be found

in U. S. Army collections. Among these is

the report of the Chief Engineer of the PTF

at Aitape, actually the report of No. 62

Works Wing (RAAF), which is filed in the

collection of the Office of the Chief Engineer, GHQ AFPAC. Another report of the

same unit (then redesignated No. 62 Airfield Construction Wing) for its operations

at Noemfoor is included among the records

of the CyTF. These two reports were invaluable for information concerning engineer activities at Aitape and Noemfoor. An excellent source for details of landing operations

at Morotai is a British document entitled

British Combined Operations Observers,

SWPA, Report of Naval and Army Observers on the Morotai Operation. A copy of this

report is filed with the TrTF collection in

the HRS DRB AGO.

Sources of Japanese Information

Japanese source material falls into three

major categories: a series of postwar studies

prepared by former Japanese officers; Japanese documents captured and used in wartime; and interrogations of Japanese prisoners.

Japanese Studies in World War II

The most comprehensive available accounts of Japanese operations described in

this volume are those contained in the series

entitled Japanese Studies in World War II,

prepared by former Japanese Army and

Navy officers in Tokyo under the direction

of the Historical Section, G-2 GHQ FEC.

Translations of most of these studies—which

total about 125 separate reports—were accomplished by the Allied Translator and

Interpreter Section, Supreme Commander

for the Allied Powers (ATIS SCAP), in

Japan. Parts of many of these studies were

reorganized and retranslated by Japanese
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 587

language experts of the Pacific Section,

OCMH, and questionable parts of all translations were checked against the original

Japanese by the same men. The studies provide invaluable information concerning

Japanese high level command decisions,

planning, orders, personnel, order of battle,

dates, and times, much of which cannot be

found in other records. The Japanese who

prepared the studies relied upon available

official Japanese records, on personal

diaries, on their own memories, and on the

memories of other Japanese officers participating in the actions described. Wherever

possible, information in the studies was

checked against other sources of information, such as captured documents and U. S.

Army combat records. Such checking indicated that the studies are remarkably accurate except for minor discrepancies of

dates and times. The major deficiency of

the Japanese Army studies used in the preparation of this volume is their lack of data

concerning the decisions of division or regimental commanders and the activities of

smaller units. A number of the studies fall

into subseries. For instance, there are five

separate studies covering the planning, operations, and logistics of the 18th Army during that unit's activities in New Guinea, and

there are two annexes to these five, one of

them providing maps and the other supply

and personnel statistics. Among the most

valuable of the studies is the third of the

18th Army group—18th Army Operations

III—which contains much detailed information concerning Japanese operations at

Aitape. The most valuable single source for

Japanese strategic planning was the study

entitled History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-1945,

which contains summaries of plans, resumes

of high command conferences, and the story

of decisions at the highest Japanese command levels. Some of the studies concerning

Japanese naval operations were also valuable, particularly for the development of

the story of Japanese attempts to reinforce

Biak. Copies of both the translated and Japanese versions of these studies are in the

OCMH files. Since there were many

changes in the numbering and title system

of the studies during their preparation, the

OCMH copies have different numbers and

a few different titles (in translation) from

the numbers and titles initially assigned by

the G-2 Section, GHQ FEC.

Contemporary Official Japanese

Records

Official Japanese documents captured

during the war are to be found in translated form in various U. S. Army files.

Among the most important of these translations are those found in the ALAMO Force

G-2 Weekly Reports in the files of the G-2

Section GSUSA; the 24th Infantry Division's report for the Hollandia operation,

in the HRS DRB AGO; the files of the

G-2 Sections of the PTF and its major

subordinate echelons in the HRS DRB

AGO; and the files of other task forces or

divisions in the same collection. One of the

most valuable of the official Japanese captured documents was the Field Diary of the

2d Battalion, 80th Infantry, 20th Division,

for that unit's operations in the Aitape area.

This diary is filed with other records of the

G-2 Section, 32d Infantry Division, in the

custody of the ORB RAC AGO. The Current Translations and Enemy Publications

of ATIS GHQ SWPA, copies of which are

filed in the HRS DRB AGO, also contain
588 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

valuable translations of official Japanese

records captured during the war. Discussion

of such records would not be complete without mention of a Japanese wartime document entitled Army Section, Imperial

GHQ, Special Report on Lessons from the

War, No. 33, Operations of the Yuki Group

[36th Division] in the Biak Island and

Sarmi Areas. A translation of this official

Japanese report is filed in the OCMH.

Interrogations of Japanese Prisoners

Wartime Interrogations.—Wartime interrogations of Japanese prisoners fall into

two categories: the preliminary "tactical"

interrogations made at the front by Japanese language experts attached to combat

units; and interrogations undertaken at

prisoner of war compounds in rear areas.

Copies of the former interrogations are in

the files of the tactical units concerned in

the custody of the HRS DRB AGO. Many

of these are of value for checking information obtained from other sources, such as

Allied intelligence estimates, the Japanese

studies, and wartime translations of captured documents. The principal body of interrogations of the second category used in

the preparation of this volume are those

filed with the ATIS GHQ SWPA records

in the HRS DRB AGO. Since many of these

rear area strategic interrogations are nontactical in nature, they add little new information for the ground combat story at a

given time. On the other hand, they are

invaluable for material concerning the development of Allied intelligence estimates

of the Japanese situation with respect to

future operations and Japan's ability to

wage war at a given time or place. They

contain, for instance, much information

upon which Allied forces based their estimates of Japanese war production.

Postwar Interrogations.—The most important postwar interrogations are those of

the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), some of which have been

published and are listed below under published works. In addition to this group,

many special interrogations were conducted

by ATIS SCAP in Japan. At the time of this

writing, no complete file of the latter group

is available, but copies of those employed

in the preparation of this volume, as well

as some unpublished USSBS interrogations

similarly used, are located in the files of the

OCMH or the G-2 Section, GSUSA. Such

interrogations are especially valuable for

material concerning Japanese planning.

Miscellaneous Sources of Japanese

Information

In this category are included publications

of the Military Intelligence Division, War

Department General Staff, especially those

concerning Japanese Order of Battle and

articles on Japanese defenses on Biak and

Peleliu. The latter are found in the MID

WD serial publication Military Reports for

December 1944 and January 1945, respectively ; various Japanese documents now

filed with the Central Intelligence Agency

collection in the National Archives, many

of which were perused or translated by

Japanese language experts in the Pacific

Section, OCMH; and, last but not least,

an ATIS GHQ SWPA publication providing a translated list of Japanese Army officers, giving rank and position as of September 1942. The U. S. Navy Historical Section

maintains a roster of Japanese Navy

Officers.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 589

Unpublished Studies

Manuscript Histories

As indicated in the preface to this volume

there was no contemporary historical coverage of U. S. Army unit operations in the

Southwest Pacific Area other than that

provided for by U. S. Army regulations.

However, a historian accompanied the 81st

Infantry Division during that unit's operations in the Palaus and later prepared an

incomplete manuscript entitled "The Palaus Campaign." Written by Maj. Nelson

Drummond, Jr., this MS provides a detailed

account of 81st Division activities on Angaur, especially for the 321st Infantry—an

extremely fortunate circumstance since that

unit's records were lost. The work relies for

the most part on official records of the 81st

Division and those of its attached units,

but it also includes some material which

Major Drummond obtained by observation

and interview. The manuscript does not

finish the story of Angaur and has little information on operations of 81st Division

units on Peleliu. A copy is on file in the

OCMH.

Special Studies

A number of special studies and reports

produced by students at advanced officer

courses in the various U. S. Army service

schools—principally The Infantry School

and the Command and General Staff college—were perused in the preparation of

this volume in an attempt to find additional

material not included in official wartime

records. Despite the obvious potential value

of such studies written by officers who participated in the operations, most of them are

only reworkings of unit After Action Reports and are hence of little value. Two

notable exceptions are as follows:

Maj. Edward O. Logan (formerly S-2,

124th Infantry), The Enveloping Maneuver of the 124th Infantry Regiment, East

of the Driniumor, Aitape, New Guinea, 31

July-10 August 1944. This report, written

at The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.,

for the Advanced Officer's Course, 1946-

1947, was supplied to the author through

the courtesy of the library of The Infantry

School, where the report is filed. It supplements the sketchy information concerning

TED Force operations found in official records and provides valuable extracts from

the Journal of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, 31st Infantry Division, that are not

in other files.

Lt. Col. Cecil C. Snoddy, Jr., et al., of

Committee No. 14, Armored Officers' Advanced Course, 1949-1950, Armor in Angaur-Peleliu Campaign. This research

report, prepared at The Armored School,

Fort Knox, Ky., provides material concerning tank operations in the Palaus not to be

found in official records. A copy is filed in

the OCMH.

AAF History

A valuable manuscript source is found in

Dr. Robert F. Futrell's draft of chapters

concerning the approach to the Philippines

and the invasion of Leyte from a projected

fifth volume of the series THE ARMY AIR

FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, bearing

the tentative title, "The Pacific—MATTERHORN to Nagasaki." Two manuscript chapters were made available to the author

through the courtesy of Dr. Futrell, and a

photostatic copy of this material is in the

files of the OCMH. The chapters provide

valuable data with regard to air force plan-
590 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

ning and operations immediately preceding

the invasion of the Philippines and are especially useful for coverage of air activities

during the Morotai and Palau operations.

Miscellaneous Sources of Information

Interviews

In order to obtain additional information, especially concerning command decisions, the author interviewed a number of

officers who participated in the operations

described. Copies of all interview notes are

filed in the OCMH. Interviews with the

following officers, listed according to the

positions they held, produced much valuable information:

Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger. CG I

Corps and Eighth Army; Comdr. RECKLESS and HURRICANE Task Forces.

Lt. Gen. Charles P. Hall. CG XI Corps;

Comdr. PERSECUTION and TRADEWIND

Task Forces.

Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham. CG

112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team.

Col. Oliver P. Newman. CO 186th Infantry, 41st Infantry Division.

Col. Edward M. Starr. CO 124th Infantry, 31st Infantry Division.

Lt. Col. Peter L. Hooper. Executive Officer, 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat

Team.

Maj. Joseph L. Manz. Adjutant, 169th

Infantry, 43d Infantry Division.

Capt. Leonard Lowry. CO Company I,

127th Infantry, 32d Infantry Division.

In connection with these interviews, it

must be pointed out that none were undertaken until the spring of 1947, by which

time memory had perhaps dulled or events

of one campaign had become mixed in the

mind with those of others.

Correspondence

A number of letters written to the author

in answer to specific questions provided additional information used in preparing this

volume. These letters, with inclosures, are

in the files of the OCMH. Some wartime

correspondence, part of it of a semiofficial

nature and some of it personal, was also lent

to the author. Copies of such letters are not

to be found in official files. The most important correspondence used in the preparation of this manuscript consists of the

following:

Letters, John Balfour, Office of the Official War Historian, Australia, to author,

21 May 1947, 1 October 1947, 30 April

1948, 26 May 1948, 15 March 1949. Copies

in OCMH.

Letters, Flt. Lt. Arthur L. Davies

(RAAF), War History Section, Headquarters RAAF, to author, 8 March 1948, 2

April 1948, 7 July 1948. Copies in OCMH.

Letter, Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham (CG 112th Cavalry RCT and Comdr.,

South Force, PERSECUTION Task Force) to

RANGOON Six (Maj. Gen. William H. Gill,

CT 32d Infantry Division and Comdr.,

PERSECUTION Covering Force, PERSECUTION Task Force), 30 July 1944. Copy filed

in the OCMH.

Letters, Col. Edward M. Starr (CO,

124th RCT, TED Force of PERSECUTION

Task Force) to Maj. Gen. John C. Persons

(CT, 31st Infantry Division), 6 July 1944,

22 July 1944, 13 August 1944. These letters

were lent to the author by Colonel Stair, but

are not to be found in official files.

Miscellaneous Notes

Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger. Dictation dated 4 April 1948, entitled Back-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 591

ground for the Biak Operation. A copy of

these notes, which were prepared by the general for his use during the writing of a series

of articles in The Saturday Evening Post, is

on file in the OCMH.

General Eichelberger, memorandum

dated 10 February 1949, entitled The Biak

Operation. This memorandum was for Mr.

Milton MacKaye, who collaborated with the

general in the preparation of The Saturday

Evening Post articles. A copy is on file in the

OCMH.

Extracts and Notes from the Personal

Diary of Maj. Gen. Paul J. Mueller, CG,

81st Infantry Division, covering the period

6 July-25 November 1944. These notes and

extracts were prepared by Maj. Nelson L.

Drummond and used in the preparation of

his manuscript on the Palau operation. A

copy of the notes is on file in the OCMH.

Capt. Leonard Lowry, CO, Co. I, 127th

Infantry, 32d Infantry Division, notes entitled Actions of 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, During Aitape Campaign, 1944. Copy

in OCMH files.

Notes and Comments on Volume

Prior to publication of this volume, almost fifty officers (or ex-officers, now civilians) who participated in the events described, or who otherwise had some intimate

knowledge of some of those events, read all

or parts of the manuscript, supplying additional material and making suggestions.

Copies of all these notes are on file in the

OCMH, as are copies of reviews from

official historical agencies of the U. S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Navy, Marine Corps, Air

Force, and the Australian Army. In the

footnotes, these comments are cited as

letters to Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief of

Military History.

Published Works

General

While not all the published works listed

below are cited in this volume, all furnish

background information bearing on the

approach to the Philippines.

Arnold, General of the Air Force Henry

H. Global Mission. New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1949. An interesting and valuable

source of information concerning the Army

Air Forces' plans and policies.

Arnold, General of the Army Henry H.

Second Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary

of War. Washington: War Department,

1945. An official, summary account of

Army Air Forces action during the last two

years of the war.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and Cate, James

Lea (Eds.). The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944. Vol. IV

in the series THE ARMY AIR FORCES

IN WORLD WAR II. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950. This, the Air

Forces' official history, provides information

concerning Army Air Forces planning and

operations.

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L., and

MacKaye, Milton. "Our Bloody Jungle

Road to Tokyo," The Saturday Evening

Post, CXXII, Nos. 7-13, (13 August

1949-24 September 1949). A series of seven

articles concerning General Eichelberger's

experiences during the war. Written principally from the public relations angle, these

articles are not always objective and they

contain minor inaccuracies.

Eichelberger, Robert L., and MacKaye,

Milton. Our Jungle Road to Tokyo. New

York: The Viking Press, 1950. An extension of The Saturday Evening Post articles
592 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

in book form. There are many minor inaccuracies concerning both operations and

planning. By no means scholarly, the volume does provide many interesting sidelights on the operations in which General

Eichelberger participated.

Feldt, Comdr. Eric A. (RAN). The Coast

Watchers. Melbourne: Oxford Press, 1946.

Interesting and authoritative accounts of

intelligence activities behind the Japanese

lines. There is also a shorter American

edition.

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., and

Bryan, Lt. Comdr. J., III. Admiral Halsey's

Story. New York and London: Whittlesey

House (McGraw-Hill Book Company,

Inc.), 1947. A well-written and interesting

account of Admiral Halsey's activities providing, inter alia, the story of Admiral Halsey's opposition to the invasion of the Palaus.

Heavy, Brig. Gen. William F. Down

Ramp! The Story of the Army Amphibian

Engineers. Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1947. A summary account.

Hough, Maj. Frank O., USMCR. The

Island War: The United States Marine

Corps in the Pacific. Philadelphia and New

York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947.

Although based on official records, this unofficial account is written from the Marine

Corps' point of view. It provides a reasonably accurate summary account of Marine

action.

Hough, Maj. Frank O., USMCR. The

Assault on Peleliu. Washington: Historical

Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps,

1950. An excellent detailed account of

Marine action in the Palaus. This is the

Marine Corps' official history of the Palau

operation.

Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, The. Japanese Naval and Merchant

Shipping Losses During World War II, By

All Causes. Washington: Navy Department

(NAVESOS P-468), 1947. A detailed listing based on official Allied and Japanese

records available at the time of publication.

Information obtained since publication indicates that there are a few errors in the

listings.

Kenney, Gen. George C. General Kenney

Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific

War. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,

1949. Based on personal papers, memory,

and official records. This account presents

the picture as General Kenney saw it from

his position as Commander, Allied Air

Forces, SWPA, 1942-1945. There are some

minor inaccuracies, but much information,

especially concerning personal relations, is

included that is not to be found in official

records.

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. United

States Navy at War: Second Official Report

to the Secretary of the Navy, Covering Combat Operations March 1, 1944, to March 1,

1945. Washington: The United States

News, 1945.

Marshall, General of the Army George C.

Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June

30, 1945, to the Secretary of War. Washington: War Department, 1945.

Office of the Chief Engineer, General

Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific. ENGINEERS OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945. Engineers in Theater

Operations. Washington: OCE GHQ

AFPAC, 1946. This is Vol. I of an eightvolume work bearing the same series title,

some other volumes of which have already

been published. The series is ostensibly the

report of the Chief Engineer, GHQ SWPA

and GHQ AFPAC, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.

Casey. Most of the research and writing for

the volume was accomplished by Dr. Karl
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 593

C. Dod, under the direction of Lt. Col.

George A. Meidling, general editor. This

official account is based on official Allied

records and on interviews; it is a valuable

and accurately documented account.

Robson, R. W. (Ed.). The Pacific Islands

Handbook, 1944 (North American Edition). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(USSBS). Summary Report (Pacific War}.

Washington: USSBS, 1946. A brief account emphasizing the part of air power.

USSBS, Military Analysis Division. Air

Campaigns of the Pacific War. Washington: USSBS, 1947. A summary account

useful for general information.

USSBS, Military Analysis Division. Employment of Forces Under the Southwest

Pacific Command. Washington: USSBS,

1947. A brief account from the high command level. Almost a verbatim copy, with

certain organizational changes, of manuscripts prepared overseas in 1945 by the

author and other members of the Historical

Division, G-3 GHQ SWPA. It is accurate

and authoritative insofar as the original authors were able to make it so from documents available to them.

USSBS, Naval Analysis Division. Interrogations of Japanese Officials. Two vols.

Washington: Navy Department (OPNAVP-03-100), 1946. Extremely valuable interrogations of Japanese high commanders

and cabinet members. Some of the interrogations must be used cautiously, for the Japanese who were interrogated tried to please

and sometimes responded according to the

interrogators' branch of service.

USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division. The Campaigns of the Pacific War.

Washington: USSBS, 1946. Emphasis is

given to summaries of naval engagements.

There are a few minor errors discovered

from study of sources not employed by the

writers.

Unit Histories

After the war many unit histories were

published, most of them written by and for

the wartime members of the various units.

Most of these books are not very scholarly

and contain a great deal of material written

from the public relations point of view.

Many of them, however, contain interesting

sidelights on unit operations and bits or

pieces of information not appearing in official records, especially exploits of individuals or small units. The most important ones

consulted are as follows:

McCartney, 1st Lt. William F. The Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry Division. Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1948.

McMillan, George. The Old Breed: A

History of the First Marine Division in

World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949.

The Division Public Relations Section.

The 6th Infantry Division in World War II,

1939-1945. Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1947. Among the best of the unit

histories.

The 81st Wildcat Division Historical

Committee. The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. An outstanding

unit history which is based primarily upon

official records.

The 33d Infantry Division Historical

Committee. The Golden Cross: A History

of the 33d Infantry Division in World War

II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press.
594 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Based upon a manuscript prepared by Capt.

Sanford H. Winston and reflecting some

sound research.

Zimmer, Col. Joseph E. The History of

the 43d Infantry Division, 1941-1945.

Baton Rouge: The Army and Navy Publishing Co., n. d.

Anon. History of the Second Engineer

Special Brigade, United States Army,

World War II. Harrisburg: The Telegraph

Press, 1946. This volume is obviously based

on extensive research into official records

and provides a good summary account.

Anon. Surf and Sand: The Saga of the

533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment

and 1461st Engineer Maintenance Company, 1942-1945. Andover: The Andover

Press, Ltd., 1947.

Anon. History of the 31st Infantry Division in Training and Combat, 1940-1945.

Baton Rouge: The Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1946.
List of Abbreviations

The method of citing Army and Navy documents employed in this volume and

others of the Pacific series is designed for brevity and to furnish relevant information concerning the source, character, date, and subject matter of the documents.

Unless otherwise indicated, all documents cited are in the custody of the Historical

Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division,

Office of the Adjutant General, U. S. Army. Most of the abbreviations used in the

footnotes in this volume are based upon the U. S. Army's Technical Manual

20-205, Dictionary of United States Army Terms. Unfamiliar official or unofficial

abbreviations and the short titles of commanders and units are explained in the

following list:

AAA

AAF SWPA

AAO

AC

ACofS

ADC

Adm O

Advon5AF

AF

AGS SWPA

AIB SWPA

AIF

AK

AKA

ALF SWPA

ALP

AMF

ANF SWPA

APA

APD

Arty

ATF

ATIS SWPA

AW

Antiaircraft Artillery

Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area

Antiaircraft officer

Amphibious Corps (A Marine command corresponding to the Army's corps)

Assistant Chief of Staff

Assistant Division Commander

Administrative Order

Headquarters, Advanced Echelon, U. S. Fifth Air

Force

Air Force

Allied Geographic Section, Southwest Pacific Area

Allied Intelligence Bureau, Southwest Pacific Area

Australian Imperial Force

Cargo ship, auxiliary

Cargo ship, attack

Allied Land Forces, Southwest Pacific Area

Air liaison party

Australian Military Forces

Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area

Transport, attack

Transport (highspeed)

Artillery

Ocean tug, fleet

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest

Pacific Area

Automatic weapons
596 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

BAR

CA

CB

CCS

CG

CINCPAC

CINCPOA

CINCSWPA

CL

CM-IN

CM-OUT

CofS

COIC

COMGENCENPAC

COMINCH

COMSOPAC

CRO

CruDiv

CTF

CTG

CTU

CVE

CVL

CyTF

DofA

DD

DE

DSEI

DUKW

EB&SR

ESB

ExecO

FAO

FEC

F/Lt

FO

G-1

Browning automatic rifle

Heavy cruiser

Naval Construction Battalion

Combined Chiefs of Staff

Commanding General

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas

Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area

Light cruiser

Classified message, incoming

Classified message, outgoing

Chief of Staff

Combined Operations and Intelligence Center, General

Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area

Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet

Commander, South Pacific Area

Chief Regulating Office (r), General Headquarters,

Southwest Pacific Area

Cruiser Division

Commander, Task Force

Commander, Task Group

Commander, Task Unit

Aircraft carrier, escort

Aircraft carrier, small

CYCLONE Task Force

Department of the Army

Destroyer

Destroyer escort

Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence, G-2 Section,

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area

Amphibian, 21⁄2-ton, 6x6 truck, used for short runs

from ship to shore

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment

Engineer Special Brigade

Executive officer

Field artillery officer

Far East Command

Flight Lieutenant

Field Order

Personnel Section of divisional or higher headquarters;

the ACofS for Personnel
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 597

G-2

G-3

G-4

GHQ AFPAC

GHQ SWPA

GSUSA

HMG

HRS DRB AGO

IJN

Int

InterSec

JAAF

JANAC

JCS

JICPOA

Jnl

JPS

JSSC

JWPC

LCI

LCI(G)

LCM

LCPR

LCS

LCT

LCVP

LF

LI

LO

LSD

LST

LVT

LVT(A)

MC

MID

MLR

Mtg

Military Intelligence Section; the ACofS for Intelligence

Operations and Training Section; the ACofS for Operations and Training

Supply and Evacuation Section; the ACofS for Supply

and Evacuation

General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area

General Staff, U. S. Army

Heavy machine gun

Historical Records Section, Departmental Records

Branch, Administrative Services Division, Office of

The Adjutant General, U. S. Army

Imperial Japanese Navy

Intelligence

Headquarters, Intermediate Section, U. S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area

Japanese Army Air Force

The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas

Journal

Joint Staff Planners

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Joint War Plans Committee

Landing craft, infantry

Landing craft, infantry gunboat

Landing craft, mechanized

Landing craft, personnel, ramp

Landing craft, support

Landing craft, tank

Landing craft, vehicle & personnel

Landing force

Logistics instructions

Liaison officer

Landing ship, dock

Landing ship, tank

Landing vehicle, tracked

Landing vehicle, tracked (armored)

Medical Corps

Military Intelligence Division

Main line of resistance

Meeting
598 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

NEI

NICA

OCE

OCMH

OI

OPD

Opns

ORB RAC AGO

Ord

PC

PCF

Per

PF

Plng

POA

PT

PTF

PW

QM

RAAF

RAN

Rcn

RCT

RN

RTF

S-1

S-2

S-3

S-4

SCAP

SOPAC

SPM

Sqn

SSUSA

TD

TF

Tng

TSMG

TrTF

Netherlands East Indies

Netherlands Indies Civil Administration

Office of the Chief of Engineers

Office of the Chief of Military History

Operation (s) instruction (s)

Operations Division, War Department General Staff

Operations

Organization Records Branch, Records Administration

Center, Office of The Adjutant General, U.S. Army

Ordnance

Patrol vessel, submarine chaser

PERSECUTION Covering Force of the PERSECUTION

Task Force

Periodic

Patrol vessel, frigate

Planning

Pacific Ocean Areas

Patrol vessel, motor torpedo boat

PERSECUTION Task Force

Prisoner of War

Quartermaster

Royal Australian Air Force

Royal Australian Navy

Reconnaissance

Regimental Combat Team

Royal Navy

RECKLESS Task Force

Personnel Section of regimental or battalion headquarters; officer in charge of the Section

Intelligence Section; officer in charge of the Section

Operations Section; officer in charge of the Section

Supply Section; officer in charge of the Section

Submarine chaser (110-foot)

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan

South Pacific Area

Self-propelled mount

Squadron

Special Staff, U. S. Army

Tank destroyer

Task Force

Training

Thompson submachine gun

TRADEWIND Task Force
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 599

TTF

TyTF

UDT

USA

USAFISPA

USAFMIDPAC

USAFPOA

USASOS

USF

USSBS

WD

WO

VMS

TORNADO Task Force

TYPHOON Task Force

Underwater demolition team

U. S. Army

U. S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific

U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas

U. S. Army Services of Supply (Southwest Pacific

Area)

U. S. Forces

U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey

War Department (now Department of the Army)

Warning Order

Mine sweeper (district motor)

Basic Military Map Symbols*

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within a

triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armored Command

Army Air Forces

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service

Coast Artillery

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corps

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corps

Veterinary Corps

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing symbol

with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry

*For complete listing of symbols see FM 21-30, from which these are taken.
602 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or above

the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying arm or service

symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following

identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force Wing .

Division or Command of an Air Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the unit

designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent unit to which

it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below boundary lines designate

the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry

8th Field Artillery Battalion

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry

Weapons

Machine gun

Gun

Gun battery

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gun
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

Riviera to the Rhine

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Matériel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
INDE X

Adachi, Lt. Gen. Hatazo: 48, 86-87, 87n, 90, 93,

95, 97-98, 99, 145-46, 147-49, 168, 171,

185-86, 195-96, 205n. See also Japanese

units, 18th Army.

Admiralty Islands: 31, 39, 49, 51-52, 87, 90, 91,

214-15, 494

seizure and development: 26, 89, 208

strategic importance: 5-9, 90

Afua: 111-202, passim.

A-GO Operation: 347-49, 351, 358, 359, 361-62,

398, 444

Air attacks, Allied, carrier-based. See also Air

plans; Close air support; Strategic air support.

Aitape: 117, 130

Hollandia: 61, 68, 90

Marianas: 8, 358-59

Palaus: 90

Philippines: 455-56, 491-92

Truk: 8

Wewak: 130

Air attacks, Allied, land-based. See also Air plans;

Close air support.

co-ordination with artillery: 221, 224, 519

destruction of vegetation: 244n, 558, 564-65

effect on fortification: 382, 410

on Japanese combat vessels: 354

on Japanese shipping: 86, 347

skip bombing: 382

strafing: 103, 117, 215n, 355, 388, 447, 471,

482, 500, 509

Air attacks, Allied, targets. See also Air plans;

Close air support; Strategic air support.

Aitape area: 117, 130

Arafura Sea islands: 455

Biak: 290, 296, 382

Caroline Islands: 49, 494

Celebes: 455, 481-82

Ceram: 455, 481

Halmahera: 455, 481-82

Hollandia area: 49-50, 92

Noemfoor: 407, 410, 419

Palaus: 494-95, 519

Vogelkop Peninsula: 407

Wakde-Sarmi: 24, 50, 223-24

Western New Guinea area: 49-50, 232-33 455

Wewak: 48, 49-50

Air attacks, Japanese

Biak: 296-97, 315, 352, 357, 394

Hollandia: 73, 78

Morotai: 491, 493n

Air attacks, Japanese—Continued

Owi: 352-53

Sansapor-Mar area: 447

Air dispositions, Japanese, SWPA: 92

Air force units. See Fifth Air Force; Seventh Air

Force; Thirteenth Air Force.

Air losses, Japanese: 50-51, 348-49

Air observers. See Reconnaissance.

Air plans

Biak Operation: 286-87

Central Pacific: 453-54

Halmahera region: 450-52

Hollandia and Aitape Operation: 19-24, 43

Noemfoor Operation: 401, 402-03

Palaus and Morotai Operations: 453, 456,

464-66

Sansapor-Mar Operation: 431, 432-33

Wakde-Sarmi Operation: 214-15

Air reconnaissance and photography. See Reconnaissance.

Air reinforcements, Japanese: 348-50

Air supply: 34, 67, 81, 127, 478

Air support. See Close air support; Strategic air

support.

Airborne operations

at Noemfoor: 411-16

dummy parachutists dropped: 49

plans to drop paratroopers: 20

Aircraft. See B-24's; B-25's; B-29's; Beaufighters; Beauforts; C-47's; PB4Y's.

Airfield development, Allied

Aitape: 23, 34, 36, 103, 108-10

Biak: 281-82, 288-89, 300-301, 340, 344, 375,

392-94, 401-02

Hollandia: 34, 36, 77, 81, 108, 108n, 109

Morotai: 478-79, 490-91

Noemfoor: 397, 402-03, 410, 422-23

Palaus: 530, 548-49, 550, 573-75

Sansapor-Mar: 437-40, 446-49

Wakde-Sarmi: 211, 278-79

Airfield development, Allied, construction problems

construction on virgin terrain: 530

drainage: 108, 108n, 394, 491

heavy equipment: 439-40

obtaining engineer units: 402, 437-39

responsibility for selection of sites: 479

shipping problems: 32-34, 35-36, 437-40

soil conditions: 549

steel matting: 108, 448

surfacing material: 394, 491

unloading equipment: 490
606 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Airfield development, Japanese

Aitape: 22

Biak: 281-82

Hollandia: 18

Noemfoor: 398

Philippine Islands: 456

Wakde-Sarmi: 20

Western New Guinea: 20

Airfields, Allied

advancing the land-based bomber line: 10-11,

13, 425, 425n, 450-52

position in strategic planning: 10-11, 13, 207-08,

279, 425, 425n, 449, 452-53

relation of SWPA airfields to operations in Central Pacific: 26-27, 208, 211, 217, 379

Aitape, use as Allied staging area: 218, 480-81

Aitape Garrison Unit: 113

Aitape Operation: 103-205. See also PERSECUTION Task Force.

battle for the Driniumor: 152-205

beachhead and airfield seizure: 103, 105-08,

passim.

casualties: 204-05, 577, 578

forces, organization of: 25, 28, 33, 103, 115, 136,

160, 175, 189, 203

planning and preparation for: 19-42, 51-52,

103-05, passim.

terrain and airfield development: 22

troop dispositions, Allied: 114-17, 134-37, 138,

139-43, 155-56, 173-174

troop dispositions, Japanese: 116, 145-50, 166,

167

troop strength, Allied: 29, 32, 133, 135, 138

troop strength, Japanese: 29, 113, 147, 186, 186n

AK (Cargo ship, auxiliary)

employment as fire support ship: 104-05

use in assaults: 36-37, 38-39, 109-10, 110n

AKA (Cargo ship, attack)

employment as cargo overflow vessel: 475

use in assaults: 36, 37, 58

ALAMO Force: 29-32, 34-35, 82-83, 131-34, 137-

38, 204, 210-12, 218, 237-38, 258, 259, 282,

284, 285, 320, 341, 342-43, 345, 346, 400-

401, 402, 403, 412-13, 430, 438-39, 448n- 49n, 479

Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger in command of: 14-16, 33

organization of: 14-16, 30, 208n, 463

position in SWPA chain of command: 15, 33

Reserve: 31, 32

supply and replacement responsibility: 396, 437, 477-78

ALAMO Scouts: 429, 429n

Aleutian Islands: 1, 85, 85n, 86

Allied Air Forces, SWPA: 32, 34, 48, 50-51, 83,

104, 208, 210-11, 212, 214, 217, 278, 279, 288, 340, 341, 344, 353, 362, 388, 397, 401,

Allied Air Forces, SWPA—Continued

407, 425, 425n, 451, 454, 455, 456, 464, 489,

492-93, 494-95

organization and command: 14, 15, 25, 463

responsibility for and selection of air base sites:

479

subordinate commands: 403, 464

supply responsibilities: 34, 477-78

Allied Naval Forces, SWPA: 49, 210-11, 285, 340-

41, 346, 394-95, 401, 430, 451, 463, 464, 489,

492-93. See also Amphibious Forces; Fifth

Fleet; Naval strength; Naval task organizations,

U. S.; Seventh Fleet; Third Fleet,

organization and command: 14, 28

supply responsibilities: 34, 35-39, 216, 285, 396,

404, 477

Ambon Island (Amboina): 4, 11, 89, 447

Ambush operations: 61, 128, 144, 155, 163, 247,

313, 389, 394, 395, 529

Ammunition. See also Logistics; Units of fire,

armor-piercing projectiles: 310

defective: 42, 199

expenditure by air units: 407

expenditure by artillery: 111, 269, 323, 388, 389

expenditure by mortars: 382

expenditure by naval vessels: 53, 224, 287, 405,

471, 482-83, 495

for assault units: 35

Japanese shortages: 147-48

losses due to Japanese air attacks and fire: 73, 79

shortages: 41-42, 66, 154, 324, 471

Amphibian tank. See Landing Vehicle, Tracked

(Armored).

Amphibian tractor. See Landing Vehicle, Tracked.

Amphibious forces

III Amphibious Force: 464, 466n. See also

Naval task organizations, U. S., Task Force 31.

VII Amphibious Force: 14, 211, 214n, 216,

403-04, 403n, 429, 464

Amphibious operations

air support: 54, 68, 224, 290, 407, 440, 482,

495-96, 499, 500

beachheads: 43, 55-59, 68-72, 224-26, 228,

290-96, 298-99, 407-10, 440-42, 487, 489,

496-98, 500-505

congestion at landing beaches: 72, 82, 210-11,

498, 501-02, 504

execution of landings: 53-59, 68-70, 224-26,

290-94, 407-11, 440-42, 483-87, 496-98,

500-502

on inland lake: 74-76

Japanese beach defenses: 301-02

Japanese opposition to landings: 224, 409-10,

496-98

logistics: 32-42, 215-16, 284-85, 404-05,

437-40, 471-78
INDEX 607

Amphibious operations—Continued

naval gun fire support: 27-29, 45, 47, 48-49,

53-55, 68, 78, 128-129, 214, 219, 221-22, 224, 287, 290, 296, 302-03, 403, 406-07, 411, 419, 434-35, 440, 464-66, 471, 482-83, 495-96,

500

organization of forces: 14-16, 24, 27, 28, 114,

116, 211-16, 283-84, 400-404, 434, 463-67

plans for landing: 42-48, 208-18, 285-88,

400-406, 432-36, 468-71, 475-79

rehearsals and training: 51, 289, 291, 436,

474-75, 481

ship-to-shore movement: 80, 104, 219, 221-22,

224, 228, 287, 290-94, 296, 297-99, 306-07,

311, 407-10, 440-41, 442, 473, 474-75, 477, 483-88, 496-98, 499-502

shore-to-shore movement: 260, 273, 433, 441

terrain conditions at landing beaches: 17-18, 56,

57-58, 71-72, 442, 469, 483

unopposed landings: 53-55, 68-70, 290-99,

407-11, 440-42, 483-87, 500-502, 548

Amphibious trucks. See DUKW's.

Anami, Lt. Gen. Korechika: 88-89, 95-97, 99-100,

232-33, 362-63. See also Japanese units,

2d Area Army.

Anamo: 123-26, 127-28, 134, 137, 140, 149-50,

158, 159, 162, 163, 169, 172, 174, 185, 190,

192-94

Anchorages: 13, 16, 18, 475, 575

Angaur Island. See Palau Islands Operation.

Angaur Sector Unit: 462, 500, 531

Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied

antiaircraft LCM: 311

defense positions: 254-55, 257, 258-59

Japanese bombers shot down: 297, 315, 352

Japanese ground attack against: 257

in landings: 47, 56, 110, 489

units reinforce Biak: 345

90-mm.: 56

Antiaircraft artillery battalions

744th: 489

383d: 489

Antiaircraft artillery groups

116th: 402n

208th: 296-97

214th: 489

Antiaircraft artillery, Japanese: 61, 65, 335, 337

3-inch guns: 302

90-mm. dual purpose: 61

90-mm. guns: 372

Antitank guns: 242, 272

Aoeki Island: 280, 341

APA's: 219, 464

APD's (destroyer-transports): 9

as fire support vessels: 104

in landing operations: 68, 284, 434, 436, 441,

464, 483

Arafura Sea islands. See also Air attacks, Allied,

targets.

air neutralization of Japanese strength: 24, 26,

215, 454, 455

planning for capture: 451

strategic importance: 4, 6-7, 10-11

Arare: 213, 215-16, 219, 219n, 220, 221, 237, 243,

251, 254-55, 257, 258, 266

Army Service Forces: 426, 427-28

Artillery, Field, Allied: 213. See also Field Artillery units; Howitzers; Mortars.

co-ordination with air attacks: 221-22, 519

co-ordination with infantry units: 191, 239, 243,

244-45, 246, 268-69, 322

co-ordination with naval support fire: 221-22,

224

covering withdrawals: 311

fire delays Allied advances: 76, 337, 339-40

destruction of vegetation: 244n, 524, 558, 564-

65

during amphibious landings: 296, 409, 470, 489

effectiveness against caves, draws, ravines, defiles: 247, 248, 306, 310-11, 323, 330, 544

emplacements: 254-55, 519

against Japanese infantry attacks: 152, 168—69

misplaced fire: 199, 199n

in mopping-up operations: 527-29

observation: 199n, 332, 335

self-propelled 75-mm. weapons (SPM): 517-19,

522

75-mm. (howitzers): 161, 316, 559, 565, 565n,

566

105-mm. (howitzers): 56, 61, 66, 70, 111, 135,

139, 159, 237, 247, 269, 286, 388, 389, 409,

418, 470, 472, 511, 519, 529

155-mm. (gun): 341, 502

155-mm. (howitzers): 133, 159, 262, 268, 389,

470, 519, 524, 527, 529

Artillery, Field, Japanese

effectiveness: 76, 261-62, 324, 390, 409-10

emplacement: 518

70-mm.: 147, 245, 409-10

75-mm.: 147, 222, 261-62, 265-66, 324, 378, 512

Artillery liaison aircraft: 191, 247

Ashbourne, Captain Lord: 450n

Asia Islands: 450n, 481, 577, 578

Asias (Peleliu): 533, 534, 556

Australia: 426

as staging base: 4, 29, 34

strategic importance: 5-6, 86, 88

Australia, HMAS: 53, 407

Australian units: 15. See also Royal Australian

Air Force.

2/6 Cavalry (Commando) Regiment: 205n

6th Australian Division: 205n
608 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

B-24's: 217, 423, 423n, 573

close-support operations: 286-87, 296, 389, 407

long-range support missions: 26-27, 407, 423

operations against Japanese shipping: 354

B-25's air supply operations: 67, 67n

close-support operations: 24-26, 104, 130, 382,

419

long-range support missions: 26, 215, 407, 492

operations against Japanese shipping: 355-56

skip-bombing attacks: 382

B-29's: 5, 7-8, 11

Babelthuap: 457, 461, 499, 540-41

Bailey, Lt. Col. Cladie A.: 121

Bailey Force: 115, 122-23

Baldy Ridge (Peleliu): 539, 542, 543, 553-54, 555,

558-59

Banzai tactics: 188, 200, 231, 363, 513, 518

Barbed-wire defenses: 140, 141, 152

Barbey, Rear Adm. Daniel E.: 14, 27, 30-31, 36-

37, 39, 48, 103, 110n, 210, 403n, 464, 475-77, 480, 487. See also Naval task organizations,

U. S., Task Force 77; Amphibious forces, VII.

Barges, Japanese: 113, 296, 346, 397, 432, 460

in RON Operation: 355, 356, 358, 359-61

losses in reinforcing Peleliu: 541

use at Morotai: 488-89

Barnes, Brig. Gen. Earl W.: 434, 446-47. See also

Thirteenth Air Force, U. S. XIII Air Task

Force

Bases. See Airfields, Allied; Logistics, staging

areas.

Batjan Island: 357, 358-59

Battleships: 27-29, 353-54, 358, 466, 471

Bayonet charge: 168

Beach defenses. See Amphibious operations.

Beach mats: 442

Beach sleds: 39-40, 57

Beaches. See Amphibious operations.

Beachheads. See Amphibious operations. Beauforts: 129-30, 133

Beaufighters: 129-30, 133

Becker, Maj. Edward A.: 191

Bell, Brig. Gen. Marcus B.: 535

Berkey, Rear Adm. Russell S.: 28, 403, 434

Biak, use as Allied staging area: 480

Biak Detachment: 300-03, 307, 311-12, 313, 315,

317, 318, 323, 326-27, 338, 346, 350, 361, 363, 374, 380, 391, 397, 401-02, 498

Biak Island, as airbase: 450-51

Biak Island Operation: 280-396. See also HURRI- CANE Task Force.

casualties: 392, 577, 578

importance in intertheater strategy: 208

Japanese naval plans: 346-50

Japanese use and defense of Biak: 299-303

KON Operation: 350-64, 443, 489

Biak Island Operation—Continued

Noemfoor landing plan compared with: 405

planning and preparation: 280-90

reduction of Japanese pockets and caves: 365-90

securing of Mokmer Drome: 304-45

seizure of beachhead: 290-99

terrain: 280-82, 295, 300-301, 304, 305, 313,

334

troop dispositions, Allied: 315, 316

troop dispositions, Japanese: 300, 315, 381

troop strength, Japanese: 285, 300, 361, 363, 381

Bismarck Archipelago: 32, 86, 90. See also Admiralty Islands; New Britain.

air missions against: 26, 27

Japanese isolated: 16

Japanese units and strength: 93

Blarney, Gen. Sir Thomas: 14-16, 32

Blandy, Rear Adm. William H. P.: 465, 466, 499,

501

Bomber planes. See B-24's; B-25's; B-29's; Beauforts.

Bonin Islands: 90, 454-55

Borneo: 423, 493

Bosnek: 280-99, 302, 311-16, 332, 340-41, 352,

380, 385, 387, 392

Bostock, Air Vice Marshal William D.: 14, 15, 26

Bottcher, Capt. Herman: 120, 120n, 121

Boyce, 2d Lt. George W. G., Jr.: 177n

Boyd Ridge: 553, 556, 563

Bridges, Japanese: 110, 246

Brisbane: 19-20, 39

Bulldozers: 56, 442, 485, 563, 571

against bunkers: 503

against pillboxes: 501

clear beaches: 500-501

fill antitank ditch: 503

Bunkers. See Fortifications, Japanese.

Burns, Maj. Ralph D.: 190, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198-99, 199n

C-47's: 81, 130, 403

transport paratroopers: 413-16

Cannibalism: 375, 422

Capes

Cretin: 40, 41, 52

Delegila: 457, 482

Good Hope. See Kaap de Goede Hoop. Ngariois: 503, 504, 505, 510

Ngatpokul: 470, 504, 510

Opmarai: 433, 443

Pie: 45, 70, 72, 82

Pkul a Mlagalp: 470, 503

Sansapor: 432, 434-35, 441, 442-43, 446

Soeadja: 45, 47, 77

Tjeweri: 45, 70, 72, 82

Cargo planes. See C-47's; B-25's.

Caroline Islands: 455-56, 457. See also Palau

Islands Operation; Yap; Ulithi.
INDEX 609

Caroline Islands—Continued

air neutralization: 24, 26, 49, 208, 214-15, 217,

279, 454-55, 494

Allied invasion plans: 429, 450, 452-53, 466-67

Japanese strength and dispositions: 85, 87, 89,

91, 348, 349, 350, 358, 361

strategic importance: 1, 3-4, 8, 492, 575

Carriers. See Air attacks, Allied, carrier-based;

CVE's.

Casualties, summary

American: 576, 577

Japanese: 576, 578

Cavalry units

Composite Squadron: 202

1st Cavalry Division: 9, 31, 39

6th Reconnaissance Troop: 434, 441, 443, 445

32d Reconnaissance Troop: 114-16, 120-21, 175

112th Cavalry Regiment: 128n, 132-33, 133n,

135, 139, 140, 143, 144, 155, 156-57, 158,

160, 164-65, 169, 170, 171, 172, 172n, 174,

174n, 175, 180-81, 182, 183, 184, 187, 189,

200, 202n, 203

Cave warfare

description of caves: 222, 265, 375, 380-81, 547,

553, 565

difficulties: 249, 269, 270, 323, 373, 546, 547

methods of reducing caves: 230, 268, 273-74,

306, 372-73, 374-75, 382-83, 384, 389,

544-45, 563, 566, 567, 571, 572

CB's. See Naval Construction Battalions.

Celebes Islands: 447-49. See also Manado.

air neutralization: 450, 451, 454, 455, 482

strategic position: 4, 6-7

Celebes Sea: 455, 456

Center Sector. See Aitape Operation.

Central Pacific Area: 80, 464, 465, 472n. See also

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.

Allied Air Force SWPA support: 208, 217, 279,

288-89, 340, 341, 393

Allied offensive: 6-9, 88, 348, 349, 450, 452-53

strategic value: 1-12, passim.

Central Pacific Fleet: 93, 100, 462, 465

Central Sector Force: 234, 235-36, 236n, 266-67,

274-75

Ceram: 87, 449, 450-51, 454, 455, 482

Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in

Chief of the U. S. Fleet. See King, Admiral

Ernest J.

China: 85

source of Japanese reinforcements: 86, 88, 89,

91, 232, 233

strategic position: 1, 12, 452-53, 454, 455

China Wall (Peleliu defense position): 553, 566,

567, 571, 572

Chinapelli: 112, 116, 127-28, 147, 150, 157, 170

Christensen, 2d Lt. Dale Eldon: 172n

Civil Affairs. See Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.

Clifford, Lt. Col. Thomas E., Jr.: 59-61

Climate: 22, 344. See also Communications difficulties.

affects communications: 128, 194-95

affects operations: 62, 275, 319, 321, 510

affects weapons: 195

hampers construction: 110

hampers Japanese supply movements: 148

Close air support. See also Air attacks; Air plans;

Strategic air support.

carrier-based: 13, 20-21, 23, 24-26, 43-45, 47,

53, 54, 61, 68, 103-04, 403, 450, 464-66,

470-71

land-based: 23-26, 104, 129-30, 211, 217, 284,

287, 296, 382, 407, 419, 432-33, 451-52

Coastal Attack Force: 150, 161-62, 171

Combat loading. See Logistics.

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 1, 8

Combined Fleet: 89-90, 95, 100, 347-48, 348n,

350, 355, 358, 359, 361, 398, 462

Communications difficulties: 76, 128, 154-55, 165-

66, 169, 194-95, 196, 497. See also Radio;

Telephone; Ship-to-Shore communications;

Lines of communications.

Congressional Medal of Honor Awards

Boyce, 2d Lt. George W., Jr.: 177n

Christensen, 2d Lt. Dale Eldon: 172n

Endl, Staff Sgt. Gerald L.: 155n

Eubanks, Sgt. Ray E.: 420n

Lobaugh, Pvt. Donald R.: 173n

Control boats: 406-07, 440

Convoy movement: 51-52, 100, 290, 481-82, 49

Coral Sea, Battle of: 85

Corps, U. S. Army

I: 29, 278, 343

X: 445

XI: 134, 463, 490

Counterbattery fire: 287, 323

Cruisers

Allied: 27, 45, 47, 53, 214, 284, 296, 353, 356,

403, 403n, 407, 440, 464, 466, 471, 482-83

Japanese: 353, 354, 355, 357, 358, 398

Crutchley, Rear Adm. V. A. C.: 15, 53

Cunningham, Brig. Gen. Julian W.: 135, 143, 144,

156-61, 164-66, 173, 177-89, 202

Currents. See Hydrographic information.

Cutler, Capt. Roger, USN: 80

CVE's (Escort carriers): 23, 24, 27, 103, 104n,

464, 466, 482, 491

CYCLONE Task Force: 402, 404, 406, 407, 408,

411-13, 419, 420-21, 422

Cyclops Mountains: 16, 17, 77

Dahlen, Lt. Col. Chester A.: 60

Dale, Group Captain William A. C.: 109, 422, 423,

424
610 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Davao: 351, 352, 354

Japanese staging area: 88, 92, 348, 351

Allied air attacks: 456, 482

Dark, Col. Robert F.: 505, 512, 535, 547, 560,

568-69

Darwin: 26, 215, 450-51

Daugherty, 1st Sgt. James H. P.: 446

Davison, Rear Adm. Ralph E.: 24, 28, 104n

Dazai: 59-67

Death Valley (Peleliu): 533, 553, 566-71

Defense, Allied

perimeters: 72, 119-20, 122, 163-64, 184, 228,

250, 254-55, 258-59, 312-13, 316-17, 335-36,

417-18, 505, 511-12

positions: 114-16, 126-27, 140-43

Defile and defilade: 60, 247-49, 265, 305-06, 335.

See also Biak Island Operation; Parai Defile.

Delaying action, Allied: 156-58

Demolition: 65, 80, 274, 389, 390

caves: 547-48, 571

UDT's: 495-96, 499

used in clearing passage through reefs: 58, 80,

403, 485, 487

Demta Bay: 77, 101

Dépapré: 48, 58, 61, 62, 64

Destroyer-escorts: 214, 358

Destroyer-transport. See APD's

Destroyers

Allied: 27, 45, 47, 53, 54, 55, 104, 105, 214, 220,

245, 247, 284, 296, 304, 306, 353, 356, 386, 403, 403n, 419, 440, 443, 464, 466, 471,

482-83, 500

Japanese: 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 360, 398

Disease. See Medical problems.

Dispositions. See Troop dispositions.

Doe, Brig. Gen. Jens A.: 29, 31, 103, 111, 212, 218,

221, 236, 238, 321, 337, 342, 344, 364, 365,

366-67, 368, 378, 379. See also HURRICANE

Task Force; PERSECUTION Task Force; TORNADO Task Force; Infantry divisions, U. S.,

41st.

Doreaba Plain: 457, 460, 475, 491

Drindaria River: 112, 121, 129

Driniumor River: 103-30, 147, 134-51, 152-205

DUKW's (amphibious trucks): 77

in landing operations: 284, 286, 287, 297, 405,

408, 485

crossing reefs: 408, 409, 485

howitzers dropped in position by: 409

rehearsals: 289, 474

use in withdrawals: 311

East Caves (Biak): 301, 303, 305, 306, 310-11,

323, 324, 327, 328-29, 330, 332, 380-84, 387.

See also cave warfare.

East Sector. See PERSECUTION Task Force.

Eastern Defense Area. See PERSECUTION Task

Force.

Eastern Defense Command. See PERSECUTION

Task Force.

Eastern Sector. See PERSECUTION Task Force.

Echelon formations: 61, 156, 294-95

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L.: 29, 30, 33, 43,

48, 58, 79, 80-81, 278, 343-44, 364, 365, 368,

369, 372, 377, 379, 450n. See also HURRICANE Task Force; RECKLESS Task Force;

Eighth Army, U. S.; Corps, U. S. Army, I.

Eighth Army, U. S.: 278, 396n, 424n, 449n, 450n

Endl, Staff Sgt. Gerald L.: 155n

Endo, Vice Adm. Yoshikazu: 95, 98-99

Enfilade fire: 212-13, 377

Engineer Petroleum Production Depot: 427-28

Engineer units

Engineer Aviation Battalions

187th: 422-23

836th: 231, 437-38, 439, 441, 446

860th: 341, 393

863d: 334, 340, 375, 393

864th: 341, 393

872d: 108-09

875th: 108-09

1881st: 439, 448

1884th: 530

1887th: 530

1896th: 393

1897th: 437-38, 439, 448

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments

532d: 68-70, 72, 78

533d: 218, 221

534th: 463, 481, 487

542d: 53, 54, 55, 56, 222, 222n, 294, 298, 299,

306, 311, 324, 325, 332, 387, 391

543d: 434, 441-42

544th: 463, 487

593d: 109, 218, 402n, 404n, 409, 

Engineer Combat Battalions

6th: 260, 263, 268, 441

27th: 216, 219, 221, 404n, 409, 410, 411, 411n

116th: 70, 78, 221, 299, 316, 375

154th: 501, 565

306th: 503

Engineer Combat Groups

1112th: 393

Engineer Construction Battalions

43d: 437-38, 439, 448

46th: 393

Engineer Construction Groups

1112th: 438

1178th: 393

Engineer General Service Regiments

96th: 437-38, 439, 448

Engineer Special Brigades

2d: 222n, 411n
INDEX 611

Engineer units—Continued

Engineer Special Brigades—Continued

3d: 286, 434

4th: 487

Engineers. See also Engineer units.

missions of: 47, 105, 299, 473-74

repairing airfield under enemy fire: 336, 340

shipping and landing construction equipment:

34-35, 39, 215, 285, 437-40, 484

Envelopment operations: 177-200, 235-36, 243,

259, 261

Escort carriers. See CVE's.

Etamin, AK: 109-10, 110n

Eubanks, Sgt. Ray E.: 420n

Expeditionary Troops: 465, 466, 468, 472

Fechteler, Rear Adm. William M.: 28, 80, 214,

214n, 284, 290, 297, 403, 403n, 404-05, 432,

440, 442. See also Naval task organizations,

U. S., Task Force 77; Amphibious forces, VII.

Field Artillery units, Allied. See also Artillery,

Field.

Battalions

1st: 75, 76, 263, 434, 441

11th: 76

51st: 263

52d: 61

80th: 263

120th: 137, 152, 159

121st: 287, 296, 316, 317-18, 320, 322, 332,

339, 366, 369

126th: 110, 121

129th: 137, 152, 159, 161, 190

146th: 70, 288, 296, 304, 314-15, 316, 317-18,

322, 332, 388-89

147th: 237, 238, 239, 247, 252, 262, 402n, 409,

418, 419

148th: 133n, 135, 135n

149th: 159, 169, 190

167th: 42, 110, 213, 221, 227, 255, 258, 261,

262, 369, 377

168th: 76

181st: 159

205th: 72, 77, 311, 314, 322, 323, 330, 332,

369, 382

218th: 72, 213, 221, 226, 239, 256, 262

316th: 502, 511

317th: 502

318th: 502

906th: 502

947th: 296, 314, 316, 322, 323, 332, 334, 369,

382

Groups

190th: 110

191st: 213, 213n, 221n, 224, 237, 254

Provisional Groupment: 220, 221, 224

Field Artillery units, Japanese. See Japanese Army

units.

Fifth Air Force, U. S.: 23, 26, 49-50, 83, 130, 214,

215, 221, 224, 279, 284, 286, 287, 322, 353,

354, 375, 382, 393, 402, 403n, 404, 429, 430,

432, 440, 447, 464, 471, 494, 577

Advance Echelon: 26, 211, 284, 403n

Group, 8th Fighter: 341

organization: 15, 27

Squadron, 17th Reconnaissance: 67

Squadron, 110th Reconnaissance: 129

Wing, 54th Troop Carrier: 403, 415

Wing, 309th Bombardment (H): 402, 420

Fifth Fleet, U. S.: 20, 26, 28, 90, 91, 103, 223-24,

348, 349, 358, 359, 361-62, 494, 576

Fiji Islands: 85, 85n

Finschhafen: 35, 52, 109, 238, 406, 480

Five Brothers Ridge (Peleliu): 533, 553, 559, 561,

563-71

Five Sisters (Peleliu): 533, 534, 553, 553n, 566-71

Flame throwers: 410, 473. See also Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Flame thrower).

against caves: 268, 273, 274, 373, 375, 389, 563

reduction of pillboxes: 545

Flank security

strategic: 3, 4, 7, 11, 22, 85, 450, 492

tactical: 60, 73, 74, 103, 110-12, 117, 131, 170,

173, 188-90, 250, 268, 295, 317, 321, 322,

340, 369, 537

Flanking movement: 118, 197, 272-73, 326, 329,

533, 534

Floating dock: 395

Foein River: 235-36, 255

Formosa: 1, 12, 452, 453, 454, 455

Formosan laborers: 400, 422, 445n

Fort, Rear Adm. George H.: 466, 468, 495, 499,

549, 560

Fortifications, Japanese: 226, 230, 261, 265-66,

294, 301-02, 324, 328, 335, 381, 388, 389,

390, 501, 503, 505, 511, 539, 544, 545, 563.

See also Cave warfare.

Fowler, Lt. Col. Robert M.: 190-99, passim.

Fujimura, Captain: 235, 236n

Fukabori, Maj. Gen. Yuki: 444

Fuller, Maj. Gen. Horace H.: 29, 33, 70, 73, 74,

284, 288, 291, 299, 306, 307, 312, 315, 320,

321, 322, 324, 329, 330, 340-45, passim, 357,

364, 386. See also Infantry divisions, U. S.,

41st; PERSECUTION Task Force.

Fulmer, Capt. Talley D.: 117-20, 126

G-2. See Intelligence, Allied.

G-4. See Logistics.

Geelvink Bay area: 4, 6, 10, 11, 16, 26, 88, 89, 206,

207-08, 209, 214, 347, 349, 351, 397, 425, 429

Geiger, Maj. Gen. Roy S.: 466, 499, 535, 560, 560n.

See also Marine units, Corps, III Amphibious.

General Headquarters, SWPA: 15, 280, 438, 451,

451n. See also MacArthur, General Douglas.
612 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Genjem: 77, 101

Gila Peninsula (Morotai): 457, 475, 477, 482, 487,

488, 490

Gilbert Islands: 86, 88, 454

Gill, Maj. Gen. William H.: 114, 120, 121, 133,

134, 137, 159, 159n, 165, 174n, 179, 193, 199,

202, 202n. See also PERSECUTION Task Force,

Covering Force, Reserve; Infantry divisions,

U. S., 32d.

Goodenough Island: 29, 35, 41, 42

Goto, Maj. Ushio: 462, 500, 506-07, 508, 516, 518,

524, 525, 529

Grenades. See Hand grenades.

Guadalcanal: 86, 466, 468, 474, 475, 496, 499

Guam: 163, 467

Hall, Maj. Gen. Charles P.: 134-40, passim, 145,

155, 158-59, 167, 169, 170, 173-74, 188, 190,

192, 202, 463, 479, 481, 488, 490. See also

PERSECUTION Task Force; TRADEWIND Task

Force; Corps, U. S. Army, XI.

Halmahera Island: 88, 91, 92, 93, 232, 233, 299,

350, 352, 358, 361, 440, 457, 459, 460, 461,

463, 490

air neutralization: 279, 444, 447, 455, 456, 482

blockade of: 489

decision not to seize: 451

strategic importance: 4, 10-11, 429, 450, 451

Halsey, Admiral William F.: 1, 464, 465, 468, 492,

560, 575, 575n. See also Third Fleet, U. S.

Hand grenades: 226, 257, 261, 273, 373, 385, 478,

571

Hand-to-hand combat: 257, 317, 373

Haney, Col. Harold: 307, 311, 312, 334

Hansa Bay area: 19, 29, 48, 87, 88, 91, 93, 97, 98,

99

strategic position: 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13-14

Harech River: 122, 137-38, 139

Harusame: 355, 356

Hawaii: 437, 466, 468, 473, 474, 576

Herndon, Col. J. Prugh: 238, 242, 243, 244,, 248,

250, 251-52, 260

Herrick, Capt. Gile A.: 122, 123

Herrick Force. See PERSECUTION Task Force.

Hodge, Maj. Gen. John: 575

Hollandia Operation: 49-52, 53-83, 204n, 207-08,

209, 282, 284, 297, 300, 346, 347, 348, 353,

379, 395, 396, 412, 413, 415, 427, 428, 440,

441, 446, 447, 494. See also RECKLESS Task

Force.

casualties: 101-02, 102n, 577, 578

Hollandia as a staging area: 210, 211, 276-77,

288-89, 312, 369, 416, 439, 480

Japanese use and defense of Hollandia: 91-92,

93-102, 235n

planning and preparation for: 13-49

strategic importance of: 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 206,

232

Hollandia Operation—Continued

terrain and airfield development in Hollandia

area: 16-18

troop strength, Allied: 29, 32

troop strength, Japanese: 29, 84

Hollekang: 70, 77

Hoover, Vice Adm. John H.: 467, 560, 566

Hoshino, Maj. Iwataro: 161, 162, 162n

Howe, Col. Merle H.: 116, 117, 120, 121, 126,

174n, 175, 202, 203

Howitzers

75-mm.: 161, 316, 559, 565, 565n, 566

105-mm.: 56, 61, 66, 70, 111, 137, 139, 159, 237,

247, 269, 286, 388, 389, 409, 418, 470, 472,

511, 519, 529

155-mm.: 133, 159, 262, 269, 389, 527, 529

Humboldt Bay: 16-17, 18, 42-47, 58, 59, 68-71,

77-80, 100, 104, 218, 219, 282, 284, 289, 290

Huon Peninsula: 32, 34, 89, 90, 93, 146, 576

Hurdis, Brig. Gen. Charles E.: 445

HURRICANE Task Force: 285-397, passim, 405

organization: 283-84

reserve: 284, 304

Hutchinson, Brig. Gen. Donald R.: 479

Hutchinson, Brig. Gen. Joseph C.: 159n, 160, 190n

Hydrographic information: 23, 27, 210, 286, 290,

291, 487, 499

Ibdi Pocket: 295, 296, 301, 312-16, 318, 319, 320,

327, 327n, 329, 330, 332, 342, 365n, 380, 381,

384-90, 391, 396, 459, 509, 518, 551

Ide, Col. Tokutaro: 150

Ikeda, Lt. Gen. Shunkichi: 444

Inada, Maj. Gen. Masazumi: 98-99, 100-101

Imperial General Headquarters: 86, 89, 90, 91, 92,

94, 96, 145, 348, 348n

decisions involving Biak: 346, 347, 349

decisions involving the Palaus: 91, 459, 460, 462

orders strategic withdrawals: 86, 87, 88, 232-33,

300

Infantry divisions, U. S.

6th: 31, 33, 209, 250, 251, 256, 258, 259, 260,

262, 263-76, 277, 279, 312, 400, 404-05,

409, 429, 431, 434, 436, 437, 443, 445, 448n,

463

24th: 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 41-42, 43, 47, 51, 52,

53-83, 99, 209, 282, 369

25th: 276

31st: 132, 133, 159, 159n, 190n, 209, 276-77,

278, 279, 436, 450n, 463, 480, 481, 487, 488,

490

32d: 31, 32, 33, 111, 114, 115, 121, 135, 136,

138, 159, 159n, 160, 202n, 209-10

33d: 276, 277, 279

41st: 29, 30, 31, 33, 41, 42, 43, 47, 51-52,

68-81, 209-10, 211, 216, 238, 280, 282, 284,

286, 291, 336, 343-44, 364, 378, 379, 392,

396n, 545
INDEX 613

Infantry divisions, U. S.—Continued

43d: 132, 133, 173, 174, 175, 189, 190n, 202,

202n, 203, 205n

77th: 466-67

81st: 390, 466, 468, 469, 470, 472, 473, 474,

475, 481, 496, 499, 502, 506, 507, 508, 509,

515, 529, 533, 535, 548n, 559, 559n, 560n,

561, 566, 572, 573, 575, 575n, 577n

93d: 278, 449n

Infantry regiments, U. S.

1st: 260, 263-64, 267-68, 270, 272, 273, 274,

275, 276, 434, 440, 441, 442, 443, 445

19th: 48, 55, 62-64, 77, 101

20th: 262-64, 267-75, 277, 434, 436

21st: 48, 55, 59-68, 76-78

34th: 32, 33, 43, 74, 80, 369, 377, 378, 379,

380, 403-04, 412

63d: 263, 275-76, 434, 441, 443, 444, 445

103d: 160, 202-04

111th: 575

115th: 477

123d: 277-79

124th: 136, 138, 158-59, 159n, 160, 162-69,

174, 174n, 175, 188-92, 196, 200, 203, 477,

483, 487, 488

126th: 115, 116, 121-22, 123, 126, 203n, 463,

477, 488

127th: 31-32, 105, 110, 112-13, 114, 115,

116-17, 123, 127, 135, 136, 140-41, 143-45,

156, 157-58, 159, 160, 165-66, 167-68, 169,

171-72, 174-85, 187, 202, 203

128th: 114-16, 126-27, 136, 137, 139, 140,

141-43, 144, 145, 153, 154, 155-56, 158,

159-61, 163-64, 175, 189, 190, 202, 203, 216,

284

155th: 483, 487

158th: 236-52, 253-62, 263, 279, 284, 400, 402,

402n, 403, 404, 404n, 408, 409, 411, 411n,

419, 420, 424n

162d: 45, 68-71, 77, 78-79, 288, 291, 294, 296,

299, 303-41, passim, 344, 365-91, passim.

163d: 30, 32, 33, 42, 103-08, 110-13, 114, 116,

212, 213, 216, 219-20, 222, 236-37, 238, 250,

253, 255-56, 258-60, 280, 284, 312, 315, 316,

317, 322, 328, 332, 341, 342, 365, 369, 372,

377, 378, 379, 381, 382, 384, 387-90, 391

167th: 277, 477, 483

169th: 160, 168-69, 174, 174n, 175, 187-92,

200-204

172d: 203, 362

186th: 45-47, 68-81, passim, 284, 287, 288,

289-96, passim, 312-40, passim, 342, 344,

365-81, passim, 384, 386, 387, 391

219th: 398

321st: 469, 470, 474, 500-17, passim, 521, 530,

535-71, passim.

322d: 469, 470, 474, 500, 502-35, passim.

Infantry regiments, U. S.—Continued

323d: 469, 470, 474, 521, 535, 553n, 559n, 560,

563n, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569-73, 575

503d Parachute: 31, 402, 412-16, 419, 420,

420n, 421, 423n, 424n

Inoue, Lt. Gen. Sadae: 460, 461, 462, 518, 540

541, 572. See also Palau Sector Group.

Insoemanai Island: 206, 213, 214, 220, 221, 224,

227, 231, 237, 237n

Intelligence, Allied: 18, 21, 22, 29, 31, 47, 48, 55,

70, 75, 113, 116, 117, 131-32, 133, 134, 137,

143-45, 157, 179, 182, 187-88, 207-09, 235,

235n, 237, 238, 244, 246-47, 256, 259-60, 266,

272, 285, 299, 320, 323, 337, 338, 345, 346,

351, 353, 354, 366, 378, 379, 398-400, 401,

411, 412, 419, 430, 432, 433, 451, 463, 483,

499, 513, 524, 536, 561, 569

gathering: 113, 117, 131-32, 133, 134, 137-45,

150, 150n, 163, 187-88, 334, 337, 411, 418,

462-63, 490, 524. See also Reconnaissance.

Intelligence estimates, Japanese: 50, 86, 88, 98,

147, 152, 165, 182, 303, 353, 355, 356, 358,

359, 400, 462, 463

Irving, Maj. Gen. Frederick A.: 29-30, 33, 42,

42n, 48, 55, 57, 59, 60, 64, 65-67. See also

Infantry divisions, U. S., 24th.

Irving, Maj. Robert L.: 220

Itou, Vice Adm.: 461n

Jangkena: 59-60, 62, 64, 65

Japanese Army air units

Air Army, 4th: 18, 87, 91, 92, 95, 97, 98, 100

Air Division, 6th: 18, 50, 86, 87, 92, 95, 98, 99,

101

Air Division, 7th: 87, 89

Japanese Army units: 94. See also Aitape Garrison

Unit; Angaur Sector Unit; Biak Detachment;

Central Sector Force; Coastal Attack Force;

Left Sector Force; Matsuyama Force; Miyake

Force; Nishihara Force; Noemfoor Detachment; Ozawa Force; Palau Sector Group;

Peleliu Sector Unit; Right Flank Unit; Right

Sector Force; Yoshino Force; Yuki Group.

Area Armies

Southern Area Army. See Southern Army.

2d: 84n, 88-90, 95-98, 99, 146, 146n, 232-

33, 300, 303, 327, 359, 362, 380, 444, 459,

461

8th: 86, 87, 88, 89, 90-91, 93, 97, 460

Armies

Southern Army: 87, 87n, 92, 99-100, 462

2d: 88-89, 93, 99, 131, 145, 232, 234, 234n,

235, 444, 449

14th: 87, 93

16th: 87

17th: 86, 88, 91, 93
614 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Japanese Army units—Continued

Armies—Continued

18th: 18, 22, 23, 31, 32, 48, 84n, 86, 88, 90, 91,

92, 93, 95, 97-99, 103, 113-134, passim, 137,

145-51, 152-176, 177-205, 233, 450n

19th: 87, 89, 89n, 93

31st: 90, 93, 462

Divisions

3d: 88, 89

4th: 89n

5th: 93

14th: 91, 93, 390, 459, 460, 461, 461n, 541n

16th: 93

20th: 86, 93, 97-98, 113, 116, 131, 132, 133,

134, 137-38, 146-47, 148, 149-50, 150n, 154,

167, 169-70, 171, 172-73, 179, 182, 185, 186,

188, 197, 205

29th: 90

32d: 92, 93, 232, 233, 459, 460

35th: 91, 92, 93, 232, 233, 350, 363, 443-44,

445, 449, 459, 460

36th: 88, 89, 93, 95-97, 100, 209, 232, 233-34,

234n, 236, 266, 274-75

38th: 93

41st: 86, 93, 97, 116, 132, 133, 137-38, 146-47,

148, 149, 150n, 168, 171, 185-86, 187, 188,

196, 197, 205

43d: 90, 93

46th: 88, 89, 93

48th: 93

51st: 86, 93, 97-98, 235

52d: 89, 93

Brigades

1st Amphibious: 461

1st Independent: 444

2d Amphibious: 233, 350, 351, 352, 354, 357,

358, 359, 362, 449

53d Independent Mixed: 461

Regiments

2d Infantry: 461, 540, 572

8th Independent Engineers: 149, 185, 186, 196,

197

15th Infantry: 461, 498, 532, 540, 541, 545

20th Engineers: 186

26th Field Artillery: 121-22, 147, 150, 182, 186,

197

37th Independent Engineers: 186

41st Engineers: 185

41st Mountain Artillery: 149, 150, 168, 185, 186

59th Infantry: 461, 462, 540

66th Infantry: 98, 146, 147, 150, 168, 171, 172,

181, 182, 186, 196, 205

78th Infantry: 119, 121, 134, 150, 152-53, 165,

167, 169-70, 171, 172, 179, 187

79th Infantry: 150n, 173, 179

80th Infantry: 98, 121, 134, 150, 152-53, 171,

172, 179, 186, 187

115th Infantry: 86

Japanese Army units—Continued

Regiments—Continued

219th Infantry: 91, 233, 355, 360, 361, 363,

379, 400, 420, 445

220th Infantry: 444

221st Infantry: 359, 360, 361, 363, 374

222d Infantry: 89, 209, 232, 233, 234n, 285,

299, 300, 302-20, passim, 326, 327, 328, 333,

360, 361, 363, 374, 381, 384, 385, 387, 389.

390, 391, 400

223d Infantry: 209, 233, 234-35, 236, 236n,

243, 259, 266, 273, 274, 276

224th Infantry: 99, 209, 233-34, 236, 242, 259,

266, 267, 268, 271, 272, 275

237th Infantry: 143, 149-50, 150n, 153, 154,

155, 161, 162-63, 164, 166-67, 168, 169, 171,

173, 181, 185, 186, 196

238th Infantry: 168, 185, 186, 187-88

239th Infantry: 166, 167, 168-69, 185, 186,

187-88, 192, 194, 196

Miscellaneous units

2d Field Base Unit: 98

2d Guerrilla Unit: 460

3d Field Transportation Unit: 99

4th Engineer Group: 235

16th Field Airdrome Construction Unit: 234,

266, 276

17th Field Airdrome Construction Unit: 300,

381

51st Field Road Construction Unit: 234, 267

103d Field Airdrome Construction Unit: 234,

266-67

107th Field Airdrome Construction Unit: 300

108th Field Airdrome Construction Unit: 300

346th Independent Infantry Battalion: 540

Japanese counterattacks: 85-87, 89-90, 93-98,

170-72, 186-87, 564-65. See also A-GO

Operation.

Japanese counterreconnaissance screen: 127, 137,

185

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. See

Imperial General Headquarters.

Japanese naval air units

1st Air Fleet: 348, 349, 361, 362

23d Air Flotilla: 348, 349, 350, 352, 355, 358

61st Air Flotilla: 348, 348n

62d Air Flotilla: 348, 350

Japanese naval forces. See also Central Pacific

Fleet; Combined Fleet; Operation A; Southeast Area Fleet; Southwest Area Fleet; Japanese naval air units.

1st Task Force: 348, 348n, 349, 350, 351, 359,

361, 444

2d Fleet: 348

3d Fleet: 348

4th Expeditionary Fleet: 95

9th Fleet: 95, 98-99

19th Naval Guard Unit: 347

28th Naval Special Base Force: 300
INDEX 615

Japanese strategic plans: 84-102. See also Strategy, Allied.

strategic defense lines: 86-92, 95-97, 233, 346

strategic objectives: 84-85

Jautefa Bay: 43, 45, 68, 70, 71, 289

Java: 421, 427

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1, 4-6, 8, 9, 10, 11-12, 20,

23, 208, 426, 428, 429, 451, 453, 492, 575,

575n

Jones, Col. George M.: 416

Kaap de Goede Hoop (Cape of Good Hope): 355,

356, 432

Kakuta, Vice Adm. Katuji: 348

Kamilianlul Mt. (Peleliu): 539, 541, 542, 543,

544, 545, 547

Kantome: 59, 60, 61

Kapoam Villages: 111, 112

Kato, Lt. Col.: 234, 242, 243

Kavieng: 6, 8, 9, 11-12

Kawanaka Shima: 149-50, 156, 166, 168

Kawashima, Major Takenobu: 460

Kazegumo: 357

Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.: 14, 15, 217, 401,

403n. See also Allied Air Forces, SWPA.

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 5, 11

Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C.: 14, 15, 27, 28.

See also Allied Naval Forces, SWPA: Seventh

Fleet, U. S.

Kitano, Lt. Gen. Kenzo: 88n

Kitazono, Maj. Gen. Toyozo: 99

Klamono oil fields: 426-28

Koejaboe: 73, 74, 82

KON Operation: 350-64, 398, 429, 444, 489

Allied naval strength in opposition to: 353

Japanese naval strength committed to: 353, 354,

355, 357, 358

naval engagement: 356

Kongauru Island: 545, 548-49, 559, 560

Korim Bay: 302, 327, 356, 360

Koronal Creek: 149-150, 156, 157, 158, 164, 167,

169

Kossol Roads: 453, 495, 550, 575, 575n

Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter: 14, 15, 29-40, 111,

114, 132-34, 137, 138, 145, 158, 204, 204n,

210, 237-38, 250, 251, 263, 276, 277, 277n,

278, 283, 286, 312, 315, 322, 340, 341-44,

396, 401-02, 403, 412, 415, 416, 420, 423,

424n, 429, 430, 431, 432, 446, 463, 466, 480,

489, 573. See also ALAMO FORCE.

Kuzume, Col. Naoyuki: 300-303, 307, 315, 326,

327, 338, 360, 363, 365, 365n, 374, 380, 384,

390, 498

Kwamagnirk: 157, 169, 176, 176n, 181

Lae: 91, 154

Lake Aztec (Angaur): 504, 507, 510, 516, 517

Lake Salome (Angaur): 509, 517-27, passim.

Lake Sentani: 16-18, 21, 43, 48, 67-77, passim.

81, 100

Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI): 213, 284, 289,

290, 297, 404, 405, 406, 408, 409, 436, 441,

464, 484, 485, 496, 500

fire support by: 45, 47, 54, 68, 220, 224, 287, 295,

306, 311, 407, 471, 477, 483, 500, 519

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM): 38-39, 68-70,

123, 161, 213, 224, 311, 324, 405, 406, 409,

417, 419, 449, 484, 485, 487, 500

Landing Craft, Personnel, Ramp (LCPR): 68, 105,

286, 287, 291, 297, 477, 483

Landing Craft, Support (LCS): 54, 324, 325

Landing Craft, Tank (LCT): 38-39, 80, 273, 286,

289, 297, 311, 324, 387, 405, 406, 408, 409,

439-40, 446, 464, 484, 485, 487, 500

Landing Craft, Vehicle (LCV): 324, 325, 332

Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP):

55, 68-70, 213, 284, 434, 440, 469, 474, 485,

500, 501

Landing Ship, Dock (LSD): 39, 464, 496

Landing Ship, Tank (LST): 37, 56, 57, 58, 72,

105, 109, 218, 228, 284, 286, 297, 392, 394,

404-05, 406, 409, 433, 436, 437, 440, 441, 442,

464, 473, 475, 496, 499

in landings: 79, 80, 297, 483, 484, 485

rehearsals for landings: 289

speed of: 496

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored) (Amphibian

tank) (LVTA): 273, 284, 329, 407, 408, 434,

441, 469, 474, 496, 497, 501, 544

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Amphibian tractor)

(LVT): 45, 55, 58, 71-72, 73, 74, 75, 76-77,

273, 284, 286, 287, 289, 290, 297, 311, 325,

329, 387, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 434, 441,

469, 472, 474, 483, 484, 497, 500, 542

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Flame thrower): 539,

542, 555, 563, 571, 572

Landings. See Amphibious operations.

Left Flank Unit: 150

Left Sector Force: 236, 266, 276

Lewis, Maj. William F.: 190-99, passim.

Leyte: 424n, 492, 577n

Liaison aircraft. See Artillery liaison aircraft.

Lighterage. See Logistics, unloading.

Lighthouse Hill: 507, 516, 517, 519, 521

Liki Island: 212, 214, 231, 237, 237n

Lines of communication

strategic: 1, 3, 85

tactical: 60, 65, 155, 196, 233, 319, 322, 344

Lines of departure: 161, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336,

337, 369, 518

Loading. See Logistics.

Lobaugh, Pvt. Donald R.: 173n

Logistics

air supply operations: 34, 67, 67n, 81-82, 128,

130, 169, 194, 403, 478

ammunition: 41-42, 66, 154, 324, 471

combat loading: 38, 174, 475

fuel supplies: 426-28
616 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Logistics—Continued

hand-carrying of supplies: 58, 62, 63, 64, 65-66,

67, 81, 126, 127-128, 148, 322, 324, 559n

Japanese supply operations: 18, 22, 29, 49, 86,

87, 88, 92, 99-100, 147-49, 233, 347, 397,

432, 460

land transportation problems: 61-67

loading operations: 38-40, 79, 174, 211, 289,

404-05, 409, 437, 442, 474-75, 481

planning for amphibious operations: 13, 34-38,

40, 78-79, 82, 211-12, 215-16, 283-85, 395,

404-05, 434-40, 446, 471-78, 480

rations: 34-35, 81, 148, 312, 404, 435, 472, 478

responsibilities, SWPA: 34, 61-70, 285, 363, 389,

396, 404, 437, 477

roller conveyors: 99, 126, 405

Services of Supply, SWPA, responsibility of: 14,

15, 32-35, 42, 83, 216, 285, 395, 396, 404,

427-28, 435, 437, 477-78

shipping and landing construction equipment:

34-35, 39, 215, 285, 437-40, 484-85

shipping problems: 21, 32, 35, 38, 61-67, 77,

437-40, 472

shortages of equipment and supply: 41-42,

61-62, 66-67, 79-80, 81, 101, 147-49, 186,

194, 195-96, 272, 319-20, 321, 322, 324, 337,

385, 394, 473, 477, 523

special problems in amphibious operations:

32-33, 77-82, 211-12, 218-19, 393-96, 437-38

staging areas: 13, 24, 32, 35, 41, 79, 83, 114,

133, 205n, 209, 210, 211, 216, 218, 276-77,

279, 289, 312, 369, 387, 400-401, 402, 405,

416, 434, 436, 439, 480-81

staging defined: 13n

units of fire: 34n, 285, 312, 323, 339, 396,

435-36, 472, 472n, 473, 478

unloading: 38-40, 210, 263, 286, 297-99, 395,

404-05, 409, 423, 442, 474, 477, 481, 484,

485, 490, 500-501

Lone Tree Hill: 232-276, passim.

Lowry, Capt. Leonard: 158-59, 159n, 165

Luzon: 366n, 424n, 448n, 453, 454, 455, 460,

573-75

Lyman, Col. Charles B.: 60-61, 63-64, 65, 66, 67

MacArthur, General Douglas: 1-12, 14, 15, 20-21,

23, 27, 31, 32, 84, 88, 132, 133, 205, 206-11,

passim, 250, 277, 286, 340-43, passim, 397,

400, 401, 423, 425-30, 439, 446, 450-52, 456,

463, 488. See also General Headquarters,

SWPA.

McCain, Vice Adm. John S.: 464

Machine guns and machine gun fire:

Allied: 54, 61, 118, 119, 123, 140, 152, 230,

243, 245, 257, 272, 303, 339, 373, 508, 517

Japanese: 121-22, 147-48, 222, 226, 227-28,

239, 242, 246, 247-48, 249, 267, 366, 367, 368,

381, 418, 529, 542

MacNider, Brig. Gen. Hanford: 424n

Madang: 9, 48, 90, 91, 93, 97, 98

Maffin Bay area: 237, 238, 239-42, 243, 244, 245,

246, 247, 248-49, 252, 256, 259, 260, 264,

267, 272, 276-79, passim, 436-40, passim, 442,

445, 446, 480-81

Malaria. Set Medical problems.

Malaya: 1, 85

Manado: 95, 98, 232, 327, 482. See also Celebes

Islands.

Mandom: 291, 295, 311-16, passim, 390

Manila: 232, 351, 456

Manokwari: 206, 359-60, 397, 398n, 432, 440, 443

air neutralization of Japanese strength: 425,

440, 444

as Japanese base: 88, 93, 233, 346, 363, 444,

449, 460

Manokwari Garrison: 444

Mapia Islands: 356, 357, 360, 450n, 481

Maps. See Reconnaissance.

Mar: 432-33, 443, 445, 447. See also SansaporMar Operation.

Mariana Islands: 347, 349, 361-62, 450, 453, 455,

462, 467, 468

air strikes against Japanese: 358, 454-55

Allied Air Forces, SWPA, support of CPA Marianas Operation: 208, 211, 217, 231, 279, 288,

341, 393, 494

Japanese strategic withdrawals: 86, 87-88

Japanese troop dispositions: 90, 91, 348, 348n,

349, 358

strategic importance: 6, 7, 9-10, 11, 85, 349

Marine units: 465. See also Expeditionary Troops.

Air Group, II Marine: 564-65

Corps, III Amphibious: 466, 468-72, 496, 498,

499, 500, 502, 515, 530, 534, 534n, 535, 540,

549, 559-60, 560n

Division, 1st Marine: 31, 390, 466, 468-69, 472-

73, 474, 474n, 475, 495-96, 497, 498, 502, 532,

533, 534, 534n, 535, 540, 548, 549, 553n, 559-

60, 561, 565n, 573, 577n

Regiment, 1st Marine: 496, 498, 532, 533, 534,

535, 536, 536n, 540, 549-50, 556

Regiment, 5th Marine: 466, 469, 496, 497, 498,

532, 534, 539, 540, 541, 542-546, 548, 549,

555, 556, 556n, 558, 558n, 559, 560n, 560-61,

562

Regiment, 7th Marine: 469, 496, 497, 498, 532,

533, 534, 536, 537, 538, 540, 541-42, 545-46,

547, 549, 555, 556, 559, 560, 560n, 561, 565n

Regiment, 11th Marine: 468, 532, 534, 549-50,

565, 565n

Marshall Islands: 89-90, 351, 358, 454-55

strategic importance: 1, 3-4, 6, 8, 9, 85

Martin, Brig. Gen. Clarence A.: 115, 121, 135, 136,

137, 138-39, 143n, 145, 154, 155-56, 158-59,

160, 175, 189. See also Infantry divisions, 31st

Infantry Division, 32d Infantry Division; PER-
INDEX 617

Martin, Brig. Gen. Clarence A.—Continued

SECUTION Task Force, Covering Force, East

Sector.

Marubian: 117-20, 131, 166, 204

Mason, Col. Francis W.: 105, 111

Matsumoto, Col. Matsujiro: 150

Matsuoka, Maj. Yasake: 243, 266

Matsuyama, Col. Soemon: 100, 234, 266, 270, 271,

276

Matsuyama Force: 100, 234, 235, 235n, 236, 255-

56, 259, 262

Medical problems, Allied

antityphus measures: 445-46, 490

casualties from disease: 392, 445-46, 490

heat exhaustion: 248, 573

nonbattle injuries on Peleliu: 573

Medical problems, Japanese

casualties from disease: 101, 102n, 186, 195, 278,

350, 361

shortage of malaria preventives: 148

starvation: 101, 102n, 186, 195, 278

Medical units

6th Medical Battalion: 263

12th Portable Surgical Hospital: 573, 586

92d Evacuation Hospital: 728

Middle Village: 511, 512

Middleburg Island: 432-34, 439, 441, 446

Midway, Battle of: 85

Miller, Col. Alexander M., III: 135

Milne Bay: 31, 263, 312

Minami, Col.: 383-84

Mindanao: 349, 351-52, 393, 425, 429, 450, 455,

456, 460, 492

Japanese strength: 88, 348, 455

in Pacific strategy: 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 429, 450,

452, 452n, 453, 454, 478, 491-92

Mine sweepers: 27, 58n, 214, 495

Mines, Japanese

antitank mines: 510

land mines: 45, 215, 330, 411, 417, 461, 495-96,

510, 517-18, 536

submarine mines: 49, 215, 461, 495, 500

Mios Woendi Island: 206, 280, 340-41, 346, 357,

396, 404

Mitscher, Vice Adm. Marc A.: 24, 27, 28, 466.

See also Naval task organizations, U. S., Task

Force, 38, 58.

Miyake, Maj. Gen. Sadahiko: 150, 150n, 171.

See also Japanese Army units, Divisions, 20th;

Miyake Force.

Miyake Force: 171-73, 179, 181, 182, 185

Mokmer: 282-83, 285, 296, 300-301, 304, 306,

310, 312, 313, 315, 316, 320, 330, 378-79,

380, 382, 383

Morale factor, Japanese: 146, 148

Morotai Operation: 277, 279, 352, 423, 447, 475-

93, 494, 497, 575n, 576, 578

casualties during: 490, 577-78

Morotai Operation—Continued

landing on Morotai: 480-88

securing and developing Morotai: 488-93

strategic and tactical planning for: 450-78,

passim

troop strength in: 460-61, 463

Morotai Strait: 457, 475

Mortars: 213, 330, 335, 382, 527-29

against Japanese infantry attacks: 119, 374, 418

co-ordination of, with infantry units: 119, 243,

247, 268, 310, 327, 418

effectiveness against Japanese fortifications: 330

emplacement of: 140, 417-18, 563n

expenditure of shells: 382

Japanese: 122, 302-03, 310, 330, 418, 501

movement of: 66

use of smoke shells: 526, 529

60-mm.: 42, 118, 119, 140, 243, 328, 373-74,

389, 529

81-mm.: 42, 118, 119, 120, 140, 239, 247, 249,

269, 327, 335, 388, 389, 417, 529, 563

4.2-inch: 66, 268, 285, 368, 382, 388-89, 418,

470, 519, 529, 563

Mortimer Valley (Peleliu): 533, 553-69, passim

Mt. Saksin: 244-51, passim, 259, 262, 267, 275,

276

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis: 344

Mueller, Maj. Gen. Paul J.: 465, 466, 475, 504,

505, 509, 511, 513, 515, 518, 530, 535, 566.

See also Infantry divisions, U. S., 81st.

Munkres, Maj. Garlyn: 220

Murahori, 1st Lt. Toshishige: 540n

Murai, Maj. Gen. Kenjiro: 461n, 572

Musashi: 358

Myers, Brig. Gen. Donald J.: 277, 277n

Nadzab: 130, 208

Nakagawa, Col. Kunio: 461, 461n, 498, 532, 540,

572

Nara, Col. Masahiko: 149, 154, 164, 166

Natives: 49, 131, 391-92, 421, 490, 529

Naval battle: See A-GO Operation; KON

Operation.

Naval Construction Battalions (CB's): 341, 393

Naval gunfire support. See also Amphibious

operations,

co-ordination with infantry: 245, 247, 306, 307,

386

tactical surprise: 433

Naval losses, Japanese: 87. See also KON

Operation.

Naval strength

Allied: 353, 464, 471

Japanese: 351, 358

Naval task organizations, U. S.

Angaur Attack Group: 465, 466, 471, 499

Attack Force (Hollandia-Aitape): 27, 30-31, 52

Attack Force (Morotai): 464, 482
618 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Naval task organizations, U. S.—Continued

Attack Force (Noemfoor): 403, 403n, 404, 406,

407

Attack Force (Sansapor-Mar): 425, 436, 440

Attack Force (Wakde-Sarmi-Biak): 214, 215,

284, 296

Central Attack Group (Hollandia): 27, 28, 31,

52, 80

Eastern Attack Force (Yap-Ulithi): 466

Eastern Attack Group (Aitape): 27, 28, 30-31,

52, 103, 105

Eastern Attack Group (Wakde-Sarmi): 214,

216, 218

Forward Area Central Pacific: 465, 467, 566

Joint Expeditionary Force (Palaus): 464, 465,

466, 468, 560n

Peleliu Attack Group: 465, 466, 471

Task Force 30: 464, 465, 466, 482

Task Force 31. See Naval task organizations,

U. S., Joint Expeditionary Force (Palaus).

Task Force 32. See Naval task organizations,

U. S., Western Attack Force (Palaus).

Task Force 38: 465, 466, 495

Task Force 57. See Naval task organizations,

U. S., Forward Area Central Pacific

Task Force 58: 20, 22-23, 24-26, 27, 28, 43,

47, 49, 50-51, 53, 61, 68, 72, 103

Task Force 73: 15, 403

Task Force 74: 28, 403, 403n, 407

Task Force 75: 28, 403n

Task Force 77: 27, 28, 103, 403, 403n, 406,

434, 464

Task Force 78: 24, 104n, 434, 440, 464

Task Group 38.1: 464

Task Group 38.4: 495

Western Attack Force (Palaus): 464-67, 468,

495, 496, 549, 560, 560n

Western Attack Group (Hollandia): 27, 28, 31,

52

Western Pacific Task Forces: 464, 465

Neal, Capt. George C.: 542

Neal Task Force: 542, 554, 555

Nefaar: 74, 75, 76, 82

Netherlands East Indies: 1, 3, 7-8, 16, 18, 20,

49-50, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 95, 206, 393, 426,

427, 460

Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service: 391

Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA):

391, 421, 443, 477, 490

New Britain: 1, 31, 34, 86, 87, 89, 133, 248

New Caledonia: 85, 85n, 575n

New Guinea Force: 32

New Zealand: 133, 174

Newman, Col. Oliver P.: 72-76, 291, 319-24, 334,

366, 372, 377, 378

Ngarekeukl: 536

Ngesebus Island: 453, 459, 473, 534, 544, 546,

547, 548, 549, 559, 560

Nigia River: 108, 110, 112, 116, 127, 135, 147,

148, 150, 161, 164

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.: 1-12, 20, 23, 26, 208,

211, 217, 451-52, 453, 454, 455, 465, 491, 492

Niroemoar Island: 212, 214, 231, 237, 237n

Nishihara Force: 360, 361, 363, 379

Niumen Creek: 127, 137, 143-45, 185, 188-95,

197

Noble, Capt. Albert G., USN: 30-31, 103, 104n,

214, 218, 221

Noemfoor Detachment: 411, 419, 420, 421

Noemfoor Island Operation: 206, 262, 279, 346,

359, 360, 397-424, 429, 440, 444, 447, 451,

457

air attacks on Noemfoor Island: 215, 233, 279

approach and bombardment during: 406-07

casualties in: 420-21, 577-78

decision to seize Noemfoor Island: 397

important results of occupation: 425, 425n

landing and securing beachhead: 407-12

logistics and tactics: 404-06

occupation of Noemfoor Island: 416-20

organization of the forces in: 400-404

paratrooper drop during: 412-16

troop strength, Allied in: 402, 411

troop strength, Japanese in: 398, 400, 411

Numata, Lt. Gen. Takazo: 98, 303, 326, 327

North Force. See PERSECUTION Task Force.

Nyaparake: 112, 116, 118, 120-21

Nyaparake Force. See PERSECUTION Task Force.

Obata, Maj. Gen. Hideyoshi: 90

Observation

posts: 265, 270, 332, 335, 381

visibility: 53, 119, 126, 154, 209, 334, 388, 389,

406-07, 483, 496, 558, 569

Oil. See Klamono oil fields.

Onizuka, Capt. Tetsuo: 95

Operation A. See A-GO Operation.

Opiaref: 302, 313-14, 316, 317, 327n, 380

Oro Bay: 40, 439

Outposts: 60, 76, 108, 111, 114-16, 117, 118, 119,

120, 262, 302, 346, 377, 384, 488

Owi: 206, 280, 341, 352, 353, 393, 396, 401, 445

Ozawa, Vice Adm. Jisaburo: 348

Ozawa Force: 359, 360, 363

P-38's: 23, 341, 355, 407, 447

P-39's: 388

P-40's: 23, 108, 117, 129, 388

P-47's: 217, 269

Paidado Islands: 280, 340, 341

Palau Islands Operation: 26-27, 49, 208, 217, 279,

346, 347, 352, 358, 390, 393, 450-79, 576,

576n. See also Ulithi Atoll; Yap Island.

casualties in: 573, 577, 578
INDEX 619

Palau Islands Operation—Continued

Japanese deployment in the Palaus: 87, 88, 90,

91, 232, 233, 348, 361

Peleliu and Anguar operations: 494-514, 515-31,

532-50, 551-72

results of: 573-75

troop dispositions, Japanese: 459-60, 461

troop strength, Allied in: 472

troop strength, Japanese in: 461, 462, 540, 561,

569

Palau Sector Group: 91, 460, 461, 462, 572

Palauru: 117, 127-28, 135, 170, 173, 174, 187, 202

Pallet-loading. See Logistics, loading operations.

Pancake Hill: 43, 68, 70-71, 72

Parachute infantry units. See Infantry regiments,

U. S.

Parai: 281, 296, 301, 304, 306, 310, 311, 312, 319,

329, 330, 331, 386, 390

Parai Defile: 295, 296, 301, 304, 311, 313, 316,

324, 329, 331, 342, 385, 386, 387

Paratroops. See Airborne operations.

Patrick, Brig. Gen. Edwin D.: 238, 245, 250-52,

256-262, passim, 402, 403, 406, 411, 412, 416.

See also CYCLONE Task Force; TORNADO Task

Force.

Patrol activity, Allied. See also Reconnaissance.

Biak Operation: 313, 332, 338, 365, 381, 388,

389

Hollandia-Aitape Operation: 49, 61, 64, 65, 72-

73, 74, 76-77, 105, 111, 112-13, 117, 120-21,

126, 127, 137-38, 143-44, 157, 169-71, 174,

202-04

Morotai Island Operation: 488

Noemfoor Island Operation: 419, 420

Palau Island Operation: 516-17, 529, 536, 537-

38, 539

Sansapor-Mar Operation: 443, 444, 445

Wakde-Sarami Operation: 243, 248, 256-57,

267-68

Patrol activity, Japanese: 120, 121, 194, 237

Paup Villages: 149-50, 161, 162-64, 166, 168

PB4Y's: 26-27, 217, 217n, 279, 352, 352n

PC's (Patrol Vessels, Submarine chaser): 443

Pearl Harbor: 7, 452

Peleliu. See Palau Islands Operation.

Peleliu Sector Unit: 461, 532, 540

PERSECUTION Task Force: 42, 103, 113-16, 120,

126, 127, 129, 131-134, 202n

Center Sector: 116, 134

Covering Force: 134-138, 143, 145, 150, 152-

166, passim, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174n, 175,

176, 176n, 179, 185, 189, 196, 199, 202, 203

East Sector: 114, 115, 116-120, 121, 127-130,

136, 159n

Eastern Defense Area: 135n, 136

Eastern Defense Command: 135, 136

Eastern Sector: 134, 160, 175, 189, 203

Herrick Force: 115, 122-23

PERSECUTION Task Force—Continued

North Force: 159, 162, 163-64, 166n, 167, 168, 170, 175, 189, 190n, 202, 203

Nyaparake Force: 112, 117-21, passim.

organized: 30

reorganization and redisposition of: 114-16,

134-37

Reserve: 32, 160, 175, 189, 202n

South Force: 159-61, 159n, 164-66, 166n, 168,

169-88, passim, 192, 196, 200-202

Tadji Defense Perimeter and Covering Force:

202, 203

TED Force: 189, 190-202, passim.

West Sector: 114, 115, 116, 134, 136

Western Defense Command: 115, 135n

Western Sector: 114, 134, 135, 159, 159n, 160,

175, 189, 203

Persons, Maj. Gen. John C.: 277, 277n, 463, 487.

See also Infantry divisions, U. S., 31st; TORNADO Task Force; TRADEWIND Task Force,

Assault Force.

Phase lines

Biak Island Operation: 332, 334, 335

Hollandia-Aitape Operation: 43, 59

Palaus Operation: 470, 503, 504, 505, 508, 509,

510, 517, 519, 524, 536, 537, 538, 539, 547,

554, 555, 556, 559

Philippines: 1, 16, 20, 83, 85, 86-87, 88, 88n, 90-91,

92, 93, 204, 205, 206, 208, 228, 231, 232, 233,

278, 279, 350, 351, 396, 396n, 398, 447, 451,

452, 453, 454, 455, 460, 462, 482, 491, 492,

493, 494, 530, 560n, 573, 575

Philippine Sea, Battle of: 671. See also A-GO

Operation.

Photography. See Reconnaissance, Air reconnaissance and photography.

Pillboxes. See Fortifications, Japanese.

Pim: 43, 45, 70-72, 73-74, 77, 78, 80, 82

Pitoe Bay: 457, 487, 490

Ponape: 90, 454

Port Moresby: 85, 85n

Prisoners, interrogation of. See Intelligence, Allied.

Privett, Col. Forbie H.: 440, 445

Propaganda: 49, 524

Provisional Groupment. See Field Artillery units,

Allied.

PT's (Patrol Vessels, Motor Torpedo Boats): 49,

117, 128-29, 148, 341, 346, 400, 433, 443, 451,

460, 489

Rabaul: 89, 205n

as Japanese base: 18, 86, 87-88, 90, 91, 348

strategic importance: 1, 4, 6-7, 11-12

Radar: 219, 290, 297, 440

Allied stations: 212, 443, 488

Japanese: 50, 488

Radar Hill (Peleliu): 543, 545, 546, 547
620 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Radio: 61, 128, 143, 191

communications difficulties: 59-60, 123, 128,

128n, 166, 169, 194-95

intercepts: 133, 134, 137, 150n, 352

radio intelligence teams: 131

Ramu River: 48, 146, 147

Rankin, Lt. Col. Walter R.: 220n

Rations. See Logistics.

RECKLESS Task Force: 33, 40-41, 77-78, 81, 105,

278, 343. See also Eichelberger, Lt. Gen.

Robert L.; Hollandia Operation.

logistics problems: 77-83

organization: 29-30, 32

Reconnaissance: 55, 182, 323, 400, 455. See also

Patrol activity, Allied,

air observation: 113, 513

air reconnaissance and photography: 18, 24,

26, 27, 55-56, 103, 211, 256, 282-83, 285,

320, 351, 352, 352n, 353, 355, 357, 358, 412,

430, 432, 469, 494-95

in force: 9, 137-45, 155, 185, 186, 276

Japanese: 133, 152

maps: 181, 182, 191, 248, 295

by PT's: 49, 400

by submarines: 27, 49, 351, 352, 430

terrain: 49, 341, 429-430, 432, 433, 483, 524

Reefs. See Terrain, problem of reefs.

Reeves, Rear Adm. John W.: 467, 566

Reinforcements, Allied: 133, 315, 343, 411-12

replacement problems: 388, 388n

Reinforcements, Japanese: 18, 87, 232, 345, 346,

350, 351, 363, 364, 541

Right Flank Unit: 150, 153, 171

Right Sector Force: 234, 235, 236, 242, 243, 244,

248, 252, 262, 266, 274-75, 276

Roadblocks: 45, 158, 183, 385

Roads and trails

condition: 47, 58, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 78, 267,

318

construction and repair: 47-48, 56, 58, 62, 67,

78, 82, 110, 221, 317, 318, 319, 320, 524,

527, 563, 572

Japanese: 398

use by vehicular traffic: 47, 58, 62, 67, 221, 267,

317, 318, 527, 572

Rockets and rocket Are: 54, 68, 123, 214, 290,

407, 471

Rocky Point, Anguar: 503, 505, 507, 508, 510,

512

Rocky Point, Wakde-Sarmi: 265-74, passim.

Roller conveyors: 56, 72, 405

Royal Australian Air Force: 14, 15, 26, 49-50, 384,

464

Royal Australian Air Force units

No. 5 Mobile Works Squadron: 422

No. 10 Operational Group: 129, 130, 402

No. 62 Airfield Construction Wing: 410n

Royal Australian Air Force units—Continued

No. 62 Works Wing: 31, 108, 402, 410, 410n,

423

No. 71 Wing: 129-30, 133

No. 78 Wing: 23, 108, 117, 129

Royal Netherlands East Indies Air Force: 26

Rupertus, Maj. Gen. William H.: 466, 496, 497,

498, 499, 534, 535, 536, 539, 543, 547, 548,

556, 566, 572. See also Marine units, 1st

Marine Division.

Saidor: 32, 114, 209

Saito, Captain: 234, 242, 266

Sandbags: 559, 564, 566, 567, 568, 569, 571

Sandlin, Col. Earle O.: 252, 258, 259

Sansapor-Mar Operation: 431-49

airfield construction: 446-48

casualties: 445, 577, 578

planning: 430-440

tactical operations: 440-45

Sarangani Bay: 452, 453, 456

Sarmi-Wakde-Biak Plan: 280. See also WakdeSarmi Operation; Biak Island Operation.

SC's. See Submarine chasers.

Schouten Islands: 206, 300. See also Biak Island

Operation.

Senda, Rear Adm. Sadatoshi: 300

Sepik River: 48, 97, 98, 146, 147, 150n

Services of Supply. See Logistics.

Seventh Air Force, U. S.: 577

Seventh Fleet, U. S.: 15, 28, 83, 217n, 279, 315,

326, 341, 352, 357, 360, 398, 403, 403n, 482,

490. See also Allied Naval Forces, SWPA.

Shimizu, Colonel: 400, 411, 420

Shipping. See Logistics.

Ship-to-Shore communications: 306-07, 311. See

also Amphibious operations.

Ship-to-shore operations. See Amphibious operations.

Shropshire, HMAS: 53

Sibert, Maj. Gen. Franklin C.: 263-64, 275, 276,

434, 436, 439, 440, 442, 445, 446. See also

TORNADO Task Force; TYPHOON Task Force.

Sixth Army, U. S.: 15, 83, 396n. See also ALAMO

Force.

Slave labor, Japanese: 334, 393, 400, 411, 419,

421. See also Formosan laborers.

Smith, Maj. Gen. Julian C.: 465, 466, 468. See

also Palau Islands Operation.

Smoke: 54, 290

screens: 500, 501, 558

shells: 382, 526, 529, 544

Snaky River (Wakde-Sarmi): 244-51, passim, 261,

265, 267, 271, 273-74, 275-76

Sneeuwjagt, 1st Lt. C. J.: 277

Soepiori Island: 206, 511, 727, 735n. See also

Biak Island Operation.

Solomon Islands: 1, 27, 32, 85-86, 85n, 88, 89,

90, 93, 496, 560
INDEX 621

Sorong: 233, 300, 341, 349, 350, 354, 355, 357,

358, 360, 363, 425, 430, 432, 440, 443, 444,

449, 460. See also Sansapor-Mar Operation.

Sorong-Waigeo area: 425, 428-30

South Force. See Aitape Operation.

Southeast Area Fleet: 95, 96

Southwest Area Fleet: 95, 96, 363

Southwest Pacific Area: 32, 88, 89, 205, 208, 286,

288, 289, 343, 346, 348, 352n, 362, 380, 393,

395, 437, 450, 452, 453, 454, 455, 463, 464.

471, 483

theater organization: 14-16

Sprague, Rear Adm. Thomas L.: 464

Staging. See Logistics.

Stark, Brig. Gen. Alexander N., Jr.: 134, 135n, 136,

159n, 160, 190n

Starr, Col. Edward M.: 136, 160, 163-64, 166, 175,

189, 190, 192, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203

Stevens, Maj. Gen. J. E. S.: 205n

Stowage. See Logistics, loading operations.

Strafing. See Air attacks.

Strategic air support. See also Air attacks; Air

plans; Close air support.

carrier-based: 8, 12, 359, 455-56, 492, 494, 495

land-based: 24-27, 48, 49-51, 208, 284, 407,

440, 494

Strategy, Allied: 1-12, 206-08, 450-56. See also

Japanese strategic plansStreet, Maj. Gen. St. Clair: 403

Strength of forces. See Troop strength.

Submarine chasers (SC): 105, 214, 287, 297

Submarines, Allied: 27, 49, 89, 91, 232, 233, 347,

351, 352, 357, 430

Submarines, Japanese: 100, 148

Supply operations. See Logistics.

Sutherland, Lt. Gen. Richard K.: 9, 10, 11

Tables of Equipment and Basic Allowances: 41

Tactical surprise: 285, 290, 433, 440, 456, 482

Tactical withdrawals, Allied: 111, 122-23, 156-58,

184, 250-52, 311, 523, 526, 558

Tactical withdrawals, Japanese: 259-60

Tagami, Lt. Gen. Hachiro: 233, 233n, 234, 235,

244, 255, 259

Commanding General, Yuki Group: 233-34,

234n

Commanding General, 36th Division: 233

Takari Hills: 58, 60, 63, 65-66

Takji Defense Perimeter and Covering Force. See

Aitape Operation.

Takeichi Convoy: 232-33

Talaud Islands: 352, 354, 452, 452n, 453, 455,

456, 478, 492

Tanahmerah Bay: 16-17, 47-48, 53-58, 68, 77,

80, 99, 104, 218-19, 282. See also Hollandia

Operation.

Tank battalions

1st (Marine): 31, 56, 58, 58n, 549, 556

710th (Army): 502, 510, 512, 513, 515, 519,

527, 556, 558, 558n, 563, 565

Tank Destroyer Battalion, 641st: 66, 402n, 418

Tanks, Allied

against field artillery weapons: 324, 512

against fortifications: 226-27, 230, 261, 324

battle: 310

bridge-crossing attempt: 246

in cave warfare: 372, 373, 383, 563, 571

cover evacuations: 273

destroyed or damaged by Japanese: 522, 558,

565

fire from LCT's: 387

Japanese antitank fire turns tank force back: 558

in landing operations: 56, 58, 224, 324, 387,

501

in perimeter defense: 58, 58n

in support of infantry: 227, 228, 230, 239, 242,

248, 288, 295, 307, 311, 317, 368, 385, 509,

513, 516, 519, 521, 522, 539, 542, 545, 555

and terrain: 269, 274, 510, 516, 518, 521

use of white phosphorous shells: 555

Tanks, Japanese: 306, 310, 339

Task forces. See Naval task organizations, U. S.

Tasman: 446

Tawitawi: 349, 351, 359

TED Force. See Aitape Operation.

Telephone: 269

messages tapped: 128, 128n

sound-powered: 119, 143, 172

wires cut by Japanese: 128

wire parties: 165-66

Terauchi, General Count Hisaichi: 93

Terrain, description

Aitape area: 22, 98, 103, 112, 126, 128, 139, 158,

161, 194, 195

Anguar: 503-04, 509, 510, 513, 516, 517, 519,

521, 524, 525, 526

Biak Island: 280, 281, 282, 295, 300-301, 304,

305, 313, 334, 388

Hollandia area: 16-17, 42, 43, 47, 55-56, 72, 78

Morotai Island: 483

Noemfoor Island: 417

Peleliu Island: 542, 543, 551-53

Sansapor-Mar area: 432, 433, 442, 446, 447

Wakde-Sarmi area: 219, 222, 244, 264-65, 267,

269

Terrain, problem of reefs: 47, 55, 57-58, 80, 220,

222, 283, 286, 329, 398, 405, 408, 409, 423,

459, 483-87, 497, 498

Teshima, Lt. Gen. Fusataro: 88-89, 232

Third Fleet, U. S.: 464-66, 482, 492, 560, 575, 576

Thirteenth Air Force, U. S.: 14, 24, 284, 403, 423n,

434, 464, 494, 577

XIII Air Task Force: 24, 214, 433, 446

XIII Fighter Command: 434
622 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES

Timor Island: 50, 87

Tirfoam River (Wakde-Sarmi): 238-44, 246, 251-

53, 261-64, 266, 267, 271, 273

Toem-Arare area: 212-13, 216, 219n, 220, 221,

235, 236, 237, 243, 248, 250, 256, 258, 259,

260, 263-64, 279, 436. See also WakdeSarmi Operation.

Toganae, Capt. Yoshio: 235

Tor River: 213, 219, 219n, 220, 235-39, passim,

244-45, 251-67, passim, 276

TORNADO Task Force: 212-13, 213n, 215, 216,

218, 219, 219n, 220-21, 230, 231, 235, 236-

38, 243-45, 253-60, 263, 263n, 266, 275-77,

277n, 278, 289, 300, 402, 434. See also

Wakde-Sarmi Operation.

Torricelli Mountains: 22, 112, 117, 122, 126, 132,

167-68, 170, 180, 192. See also Aitape Operation.

TRADEWIND Task Force: 463, 477, 478, 480, 489,

490. See also Morotai Operation.

Assault Force: 463, 487

Reserve: 463, 477

Trails. See Roads and trails.

Troop dispositions, Allied. See under individual

operations.

Troop dispositions, Japanese. See also under individual operations.

Halmahera Island: 459-61

Pacific: 85-86, 87, 88-89, 90-92

Southwest Pacific Area: 16

West New Guinea: 444-45

Troop strength, Allied. See also under individual

operations.

U. S. Army in Southwest Pacific Area: 16

Troop strength, Japanese. See also under individual operations.

armies in the Pacific: 93

Halmahera: 460

Manokwari: 444

Southwest Pacific Area: 16

Truk: 6-12, 90, 348, 452-53, 454-55

TYPHOON Task Force: 434, 436, 437, 438, 441,

443, 444, 445, 445n, 446, 447. See also

Sansapor-Mar Operation.

Ulithi Atoll: 49, 455, 456

casualties: 577, 578

planning: 10, 11, 452-53, 492

operations: 466, 468, 535, 568, 575, 575n

Umurbrogal: 550, 551-59, 560, 561, 564, 566,

568-69, 571. See also Palau Islands Operation.

Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT's): 495-96

Units of fire: 35, 215-16. See also Ammunition;

Logistics.

Unloading. See Logistics.

Visibility. See Observation.

Vogelkop Peninsula: 24, 50, 91, 206, 208, 214, 215,

277, 279, 355, 398n, 423, 450, 482. See also

Klamono oil fields; Sansapor-Mar Operation.

airfields on: 425-49

as Japanese strongpoint: 88-89, 233, 340, 350

plans and preparations to secure bases: 263, 276,

397, 400, 407

strategic position: 3, 5, 6, 7, 10-11

Volcano Islands: 90, 455

Waigeo Island: 354, 425, 429, 430. See also

Sansapor-Mar Operation.

Wakde Island. See Wakde-Sarmi Operation.

Wakde-Sarmi Operation: 206-79, 280, 284, 285,

287, 289, 300, 312, 348, 349, 388n, 429, 434,

443, 463

air strikes against Wakde-Sarmi area: 20, 24, 26

Allied ground operations: 206-31, passim,

237-79

Allied air operations from Wakde airfields: 279,

284, 296, 318, 341, 346, 348, 352, 353, 354

Allied planning and staging: 21, 32, 114, 207-14,

237-38

casualties: 278-79, 577, 578

Japanese plans: 20, 91-92, 95-97, 99, 232-36

staging base in Wakde-Sarmi area: 387, 400-401,

402, 405, 406, 434, 436, 481

troop dispositions and strength, Allied: 215,

237-38, 253-56, 258, 277-78

troop dispositions and strength, Japanese: 209,

222, 234-35, 256, 259-60, 266-67, 278-79

Wake Island: 85, 86

Walt Ridge (Peleliu): 553, 556, 560, 563, 565,

567, 569. See also Palau Islands Operation.

Watson, Col. Arthur P.: 568-69, 572

Wattie Ridge (Peleliu): 539, 542, 543, 553, 554,

555, 558. See also Palau Islands Operation.

Weapons. See also entries for various types of

weapons.

Japanese: 148, 195, 222, 262

replacement problem: 174

West Caves: 301, 302, 307, 323, 326-27, 334, 336-

40, 344, 360, 363, 365-75, 377, 380, 381.

See also Biak Island Operation.

West Sector. See PERSECUTION Task Force.

Western Defense Command. See PERSECUTION

Task Force.

Western Pacific Task Forces. See Naval task organizations, U. S.

Western Sector. See PERSECUTION Task Force.

Wewak: 16, 18, 32, 112, 113, 131

air attacks against: 50

capture by Allies: 205

as Japanese base: 31, 48, 86, 87, 90, 91-92, 95,

97, 98, 99, 103, 121, 129, 132, 146, 147, 148,

450n

and strategic considerations: 4, 9, 12, 13
INDEX 623

Wildcat Bowl (Peleliu): 553, 558, 566, 567, 571,

572. See also Palau Islands Operation.

Whitehead, Maj. Gen. Ennis C.: 26, 403, 403n, 432

Wilkinson, Rear Adm. Theodore S.: 464, 465, 466,

468, 471, 560n

Williams, Lt. Col. George D.: 190, 192, 194-99

Williamson, Col. George M.: 213

Wilson, Lt. Col. Ernest H.: 522-23, 524

Wing, Maj. Leonard A.: 175, 189, 203, 220, 222,

227-28, 231

Wing, Maj. Gen. Leonard F.: 202, 202n, 205n

Woleai Island: 10-11, 12, 49, 90, 217, 454, 455

Woske River: 234, 245, 249, 260-61, 274-76. See

also Wakde-Sarmi Operation.

X-ray River: 127, 134-35, 137, 139, 143, 156-58,

164-65, 169, 170, 174. See also Aitape Operation.

Yakamul: 112, 117, 120-23, 139, 146-47, 196.

See also Aitape Operation.

Yamada, General Shigeru: 266

Yamaguchi, Maj. Gen. Takeo: 90-91, 460, 461

Yamato: 358

Yap Island: 91, 452, 460, 575

air attacks against: 49, 454-55, 456

plans for seizure: 452-53, 466, 468, 492, 575n

Yoshino, Col. Naoyasu: 234, 235, 266

Yuki Group: 234-35, 236, 236n, 243, 244, 248, 266.

See also Wakde-Sarmi Operation.

Zamboanga: 351, 354. 357. 456

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996 400-047