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AUTONOMY

of

the

AIR

ARM

R. Ead McClendon, Ph.D.

Air University

Air Force

History and

Museums Program

1996

20050429 029
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

McClendon, Earl R.,

Autonomy of the Air Arm

/Earl R. McClendon.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-16-045510-3 (alk. paper)

1. United States. Air Force-Aviation-History. 2. Air PowerUnited States. 3. United States-Armed Forces-Management-History.

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UG633.M324 1993

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This book was originally published by Air University as The Question of

Autonomy for the United States Air Arm, 1907-1945. In January 1954 it was

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14. ABSTRACT

Reprint of 1954 (Air University Documentary Research Study),

This book describes early efforts to create an independent Air Force. The Air Service became a combatant arm of the Army in 1920,

and in 1926 the Air Corps was created. Over the years, proposals to establish an independent air arm met stout resistance from the

War Department General Staff. The Army reorganized after Pearl Harbor, and the Army Air Forces gained autonomy within the

framework of the War Department.

199 pp., photos, notes, appendices, bibliography, index

GPO Stock No.008-070-00693-6 ISBN: 0160455103

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Foreword

The question of how best to organize the United States Army's air

arm had been contentious from the time of the First World War. Legislation

to give the air arm greater autonomy or even independence had been introduced in the Congress in the interwar years. Although independence would

not be achieved until after World War II, the air arm during the interwar

period made remarkable progress towards this goal. In 1926 the Army Air

Corps was established, and in 1934 the Baker Board directed the formation

of the General Headquarters Air Force, giving the Army air arm a measure

of autonomy. On the eve of the Second World War, the War Department created the Army Air Forces. Although falling short of independence, these

were important steps forward on the road to the creation of today's global

Air Force.

R. Earl McClendon's classic Autonomy of the AirArm describes the

Army air arm's struggle for autonomy over almost forty years, from 1907 to

the close of World War II. McClendon's narrative details the contentious

evolution of the Army Air Forces (AAF) in March 1942 as a fully coequal

branch with the Army Ground Forces (AGF). Following the end of the war,

President Harry S. Truman firmly positioned himself in favor of "air parity"

and an independent Air Force. McClendon emphasizes that "for the first

time in the history of American aviation the Commander-in-Chief of the

armed forces definitely took a stand in favor of an independent military air

arm." Truman's firm leadership on this issue ultimately resulted in passage

of the National Security Act of 1947. After four decades of prolonged gestation, the United States Air Force was born.

RICHARD P. HALLION

Air Force Historian

111ii
Preface

At the present time, in accordance with the provisions of the

National Security Act of 1947, the United States military air arm occupies a

position coordinate with the Army and Navy in the system of national

defense. As a part of the National Military Establishment the United States

Air Force under the Department of the Air Force corresponds, respectively,

to the United States Army under the Department of the Army and the United

States Navy under the Department of the Navy. Developments leading immediately to the adoption of the act in question, a complete analysis of the terms

of the measure, and a survey of the steps taken towards its implementation

await an appropriate study by way of objective examination and review. It is

reasonable to assume meanwhile that the innumerable problems which have

arisen, and will continue to arise, in connection with the present organization

of the United States Air Force, and its relation to the other branches of the

armed services, may be understood best against a background of knowledge

relating to the struggle for autonomy on the part of the military air arm, the

beginnings of which long antedated the adoption of the National Security Act

of 1947. Prepared primarily for the use of the faculty and students of the Air

University, the present work is an attempt to provide such a study.

Almost from the time in 1907 when the Aeronautical Division was

activated in the Signal Corps aviation enthusiasts, both within and without

the service, commenced agitation for a separation of military aeronautics

from its parent body. Through means of an executive order this was accomplished in 1918 as a war measure. Two years later by statutory action the

Air Service, as it then was called, became a combatant arm or line of the

Army. In 1926 the Air Corps was created. Meanwhile the movement for freedom or autonomy definitely had assumed two major forms: The suggestion

of a separate executive department of aeronautics (variously indicated by

such titles as "air" and "aviation"); and that of a department of national

defense, in which military aviation would be coordinate with the regular

ground and the sea forces. For more than twenty years after the end of World

War I such proposals encountered stout resistance on the part of those who

wielded the reins of authority in the traditional departments relating to

national defense and the respective units under their jurisdiction, particularly

the War Department General Staff; and they amassed but relatively little

strength in the halls of Congress.

v
PREFACE

During the middle thirties a "compromise" was effected in the

activation of the General Headquarters Air Force. Advocates of an independent air arm made considerable headway towards their ultimate goal with the

creation of the Army Air Forces shortly before the United States became an

active belligerent in World War I. Then by virtue of the reorganization of

the Army, which was effected soon after Pearl Harbor, and the exigencies of

the military situation the Army Air Forces gained what amounted virtually

to complete autonomy within the framework of the War Department. Since

this development was based fundamentally upon a temporary war measure,

however, without further action on the part of Congress the position of the

air arm eventually would have reverted to its former status.

Although having dealt with what at times proved to be a highly controversial subject, and one on which considerable warmth of feeling was

exhibited, the writer ventures to express the hope that an attempt to be altogether objective in his approach has been successful. A cursory examination of the attached bibliography will reveal the general nature and scope of

the sources which have been consulted. As may be noted, these cover mainly

various executive agencies of the government, particularly that of the War

Department; the Army itself; the air arm, indicated at different at times by

different titles; Congress; and public opinion in general. Off-hand it may

appear that the latter has been slighted somewhat, in view of the fact that the

bibliography does not carry a listing of newspapers. As a matter of fact, however, that important source of information has not been neglected altogether.

Many of the articles and editorials in the periodicals which have been listed

as references were based either directly or indirectly upon news stories and

editorials appearing in the daily press. Moreover, as is well known, members

of Congress are wont to buttress their arguments with these statements of

fact and opinion, with the result that in many cases the whole texts of such

documentary evidence find their way to the pages of the Congressional

Record.

R. EARL McCLENDON

December 1948

vi
NOTE TO THE REVISED EDITION

This study appeared originally in a limited number of typewritten

copies. Subsequent interest in a wider circulation prompted the preparation

of a second edition. The author then seized-the opportunity to elect a number of desirable though minor revisions throughout the entire work. By far

the greater portion of them were altogether insignificant with respect to the

subject matter involved, being restricted to slight changes in organization

and phraseology in the endless effort to improve composition and style. A

few were based upon documentary materials inaccessible to the writer at the

beginning. Though it tended to round out the purely narrative aspects, the

new evidence did not elect the main theme~nor alter in any wise conclusions

which had been drawn. A correction made in the title, incidentally, should

indicate clearly that the terminal date for the study (and this for both editions) approximates the beginning rather than the end of the year 1946.

It seems appropriate to state here that in the interval between the appearance of these two editions the author has spent considerable time working on what is expected will become a sequel to this volume. As presently

conceived, it consists principally in a history of the immediate background,

and the first two years of the "unification" of the armed forces of the United

States, as provided in the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent

amendments.

R. Earl McClendon

November 1950
Contents

Page

Forew ord ............................................. iii

Preface . ............................................ v

Chapter 1. Introduction ..................................... 1

Chapter 2. Early Developments, 1913-1917 .................... 13

Chapter 3. The Impact of the War Years, 1917-1918 ............. 25

Chapter 4. Preliminary Adjustments Following

W orld W ar I ................................. 35

Chapter 5. Creation of The Army Air Corps .................... 47

Chapter 6. The Establishment of the General

Headquarters Air Force ......................... 61

Chapter 7. The Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force,

1935-1941 .................................. 77

Chapter 8. Autonomy for the Army Air Forces .................. 93

Appendices ............................................ 109

N otes ............................................ 147

Bibliography ............................................ 181

Index ............................................ 195
AUTONOMY

ofthe

AR

ARM
Chapter 1

Introduction

The Genesis of the present United States Air Force as an organization

may be established as 1 August 1907 when Brig. Gen. James Allen, Chief

Signal Officer of the Army, upon the recommendation of his Executive

Officer, Major George 0. Squier, announced the creation of the Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corps. According to a pertinent office

memorandum, this unit was set up to handle all matters relating to "military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects." Captain Charles

deF. Chandler, long interested in military aeronautics, was placed in charge

of the new division; while two enlisted men were assigned to duty under

his immediate direction.' The Army's interest in and experimentation with

military aeronautics, however, long antedated the formation of the

Aeronautical Division in the Signal Corps. A Balloon Corps, for example,

was created during the period of the War Between the States; and then there

was the Balloon Detachment which served as a unit for a short period in

the Spanish-American War. Both of these organizations currently were

deactivated. Yet the Signal Corps, that branch of the Army most concerned,

maintained an active interest in the study of military aeronautics. Brig.

Gen. Adolphus W. Greely, who was appointed Chief Signal Officer in

1887, not only promoted the observation balloon service but also encouraged Dr. Samuel Pierpont Langley in his aeronautical researches. During

the period from 1892 to 1907 both Greely and his successor, General Allen,

called attention to the developments along this line at home and abroad,

and urged the adoption of appropriation measures which would enable the

Signal Corps to take full advantage of aeronautical experimentation as

related to military reconnaissance.

Immediately following the turn of the century interest in military aeronautics was enhanced somewhat by the experimentation of Langley and the

Wright brothers and the rise of ballooning as a sport. The latter was evidenced by the activities of the newly organized Aero Club of America

which, however, was interested as well in the more serious business of

helping to promote the progress of aviation in general. During the spring

1
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

of 1907 the Signal Corps purchased a balloon from the Louis Goddard firm

in Paris. and in June detailed two enlisted men to aeronautical duty.

Meanwhile, in view of the work of such men as Langley, the Wright brothers, and Alexander Graham Bell, the Army's interest in aeronautics had

turned chiefly to the heavier-than-air machine and controlled power flight.

It was not until August 1909, however, that the War Department acquired

its first airplane, which was purchased from Orville and Wilbur Wright

after having passed what for the time were rather rigid endurance and

speed tests.'

From its very inception the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps

was beset by two quite common though major problems. One was a lack of

sufficient funds, and the other inadequate personnel. As a matter of fact,

the money necessary for the purchase of the original military airplane

could not be secured through direct appropriation of Congress; but the

Army was able to divert funds which had been earmarked for more general

purposes. During the next four years the Signal Corps received annually

relatively minor sums for aeronautical purposes. The first legislative appropriation for military aviation as such, however, was not forthcoming until

March 1911 when for the fiscal year 1912 Congress voted to allow the

Signal Corps as much as $125,000 to purchase, maintain, operate, and

repair "airplanes and other aerial machines."3 As indicated by the records,

this figure was in line with the appropriations for 1913 and 1914.'

The financial problems which faced the Aeronautical Division of the

Signal Corps in its early history were no more critical than those which

were presented by the personnel factor. In his annual report for 1910 the

Chief Signal Officer pointed out that only one officer, a lieutenant, and

nine enlisted men were assigned duty in connection with aviation. By the

summer of 1912 the entire air service consisted of twelve officers and

thirty-nine enlisted personnel. As General Allen explained, moreover, all

officers detailed to the Aeronautical Division must of necessity be detached

from the regiments or branches of the service to which they belonged. With

such uncertain status, therefore, they were subject to relief or removal from

aviation duty at any time. A much needed remedy lay in legislation which

would provide sufficient personnel so that officers assigned to aviation service would be allotted regularly to the Signal Corps.'

Despite the repeated requests on the part of the cognate military

authorities, the national legislature was slow to make provision for the

increased personnel needs of the Signal Corps as related to the newly-organized Aeronautical Division. Between January 1909 and February 1913 no

less than five bills drawn up for that purpose made their appearance in

Congress, but none received the approval of that body. Eventually, on 2

March 1913 a general War Department appropriation bill allowed the aviation service a minimum of thirty commissioned personnel and provided

2
INTRODUCTION

also that the pay and allowances should be increased by "thirty-five per

centum for such officers as are now or may be hereafter detailed...on aviation duty."6 Specifying that they should consist of lieutenants selected from

the line of the Army, a law of 18 July 1914 increased to 60 the maximum

number of aviation officers and made as well an allowance of 260 enlisted

men. It arranged also for the training of aviation students selected from

among unmarried lieutenants, not over 30 years of age, from the line of the

Army; created the ratings of junior military aviator and military aviator; set

up a graduated scale of increases in flying pay for those classes; and provided for the payment of benefits to widows or other designated beneficiaries of aviators killed in line of duty. Each military aviator should have the

rank, pay, and allowance of one grade higher than his line commission. Not

to be overlooked in this connection is the fact that the law in question actually created within the Signal Corps an Aviation Section charged with the

responsibility of operating all military aircraft, together with pertinent

appliances, and the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters

relating to military aviation.7

The Act of 18 July 1914 not only gave the United States air arm statutory recognition for the first time, but also provided the basic pattern for

that organization during the next several years. In order to clarify the discussion immediately following, however, as well as to indicate the general

theme for the whole survey, it seems appropriate at this point to stress the

fact that this study is not designed as a complete history of military aviation in the United States, for the period indicated, nor even a treatise on the

different organizational forms assumed by the air arm. Rather, the aim is to

trace as accurately and concisely as possible the story of the struggle for

progressively greater degrees of autonomy on the part of this air arm,

denoted at different intervals by such titles as Aeronautical Division,

Signal Corps; Aviation Section, Signal Corps; Military Aeronautics; Air

Service; Air Corps (at times with the General Headquarters Air Force as a

coordinate component); and the Army Air Forces. The trends may be outlined briefly. First, there was a period of agitation for separation from the

Signal Corps, which extended well beyond the date of our entrance into

World War I. In point of time this dovetailed somewhat with a movement

for complete separation from the Army. The latter really took two forms.

Ardent enthusiasts insisted at first upon a Department of Aeronautics: but

when that appeared unlikely of attainment some urged the creation of a

Department of National Defense in which aviation would hold a position

coordinate with those of the Army and Navy. Neither was accomplished at

the time, of course, but in 1926 the air arm was organized as a Corps of the

War Department. Taking one form and then another, the controversy continued during the following years, but with varying degrees of intensity as

the Air Corps and the General Headquarters Air Force, subsequently orga3
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

nized as the Army Air Forces, achieved a considerable degree of freedom

of action and prestige based upon the concept of air power as an offensive

arm. After Pearl Harbor temporary autonomy within the War Department

was made possible by virtue of the President's special war powers. As

events developed, this proved to be the immediate precursor of parity, with

the Army and Navy, in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947

adopted early in the post-World War II period.

Naturally, no study of the struggle for autonomy on the part of the air

arm in the United States would be feasible without devoting some consideration to the broader aspects of military aviation in general. For the earlier part of the period, moreover, a preliminary discussion seems necessary,

even at the cost of a certain amount of repetition. As a prelude to the main

theme, therefore, the remaining portion of this introductory chapter will be

devoted to a brief resume of the history of military aeronautics down

through the passage of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920, with particular emphasis upon the changes which were made in the organizational

structure.

As has been noted, the Act of 18 July 1914 which created the Aviation

Section of the Signal Corps provided the basic organization for military

aeronautics in the United States over a period of several years. During that

time, however, due largely to events connected with World War I, there

were certain definite developments which paved the way for some material

changes in the structure. To these we now turn.

In a naval appropriation measure approved on 3 March 1915 Congress

created the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Its duty, as

stated succinctly, was to supervise and direct the scientific study of the

problems of flight. Consisting of a maximum number of twelve, the members of the Committee, subject to appointment by the President of the

United States, were to be allotted as follows: Two from the Aviation

Section of the Signal Corps; two from the office in the Department of the

Navy which had charge of naval aeronautics; one each from the

Smithsonian Institution, the United States Weather Bureau, and the Bureau

of Standards; and a maximum of five additional persons skilled in aeronautical engineering or its allied sciences.' As originally constituted one

month later, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had as representatives of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps Brig. Gen. George

P. Scriven, who in 1913 had succeeded General Allen as Chief Signal

Officer; and Colonel Samuel Reber. Its first naval aviation members were

Captain Mark L. Bristol, U.S.N., in charge of the Naval Aeronautic

Service; and Naval Constructor H. C. Richardson, U.S.N.' As a matter of

common knowledge, in the following years, especially in the early period

of its existence, this Committee rendered valuable advice and aid in matters relating to aviation in the armed forces.

4
INTRODUCTION

Partly as the result of a movement to separate aeronautics from the

Signal Corps and partly, one may say, because of the very poor showing

made by the air arm on the punitive Mexican expedition during the spring

of 1916, the National Defense Act adopted in June of that year included

provisions which affected advantageously the status of the Aviation Section

as related to personnel. Increasing the number of officers allowed, section

13 of this law distributed the total as follows: One colonel, one lieutenant

colonel, eight majors, twenty-four captains, and one hundred fourteen first

lieutenants. It also eliminated restrictions relative to the detail of married

officers and those over thirty years of age and offered inducements in the

form of rank and flying pay to men volunteering for aviation duty from

civilian life."0 Meanwhile a deficiency act of 31 March 1916 had allowed

the Aviation Section $500,000, the largest sum that had been appropriated

at any one time for Army aviation. This was followed in August, however,

by a grant of $13,281,666 for the fiscal year 1917."

Another board which had an important, though indirect, effect upon

the organization of military aeronautics in this country was the Council of

National Defense authorized by Congress on 29 August 1916 for the purpose of coordinating the "industries and resources for the national security

and welfare." Membership consisted of the secretaries of War, Navy,

Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The law specified that the

Council should be supplemented by an Advisory Commission made up of

a maximum of seven "civilian" members, each of whom should have special knowledge relative to some industry, public utility or the development

of some natural resources.' 2 In view of his subsequent services in the interest of military aeronautics, Howard E. Coffin, the automobile manufacturer

of Detroit, probably was the outstanding man on this Commission, although

it included such well-known figures as Bernard Baruch, Samuel Gompers,

Julius Rosenwald, and Daniel Willard."3

In March of 1917, just one month before the United States entered the

First World War, the Council of National Defense was reorganized so as to

include the Advisory Commission. Each of the seven members was made

chairman of a group of activities on which he was well-informed, with subcommittees created for particular lines or phases of activity. In theory at

least, one of these groups served as a nucleus for the composition of the

Aircraft Production Board which, upon the recommendation of the National

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, was created by the Council of

National Defense on 16 May 1917 to help meet the industrial needs of aviation by investigating the sources of supply and assisting in the standardization of materials and parts. Really an advisory board to the Aviation

Section of the Signal Corps, and that without legal status, the Aircraft

Production Board originally consisted of Brig. Gen. George 0. Squier,

Chief Signal Officer since February 1917; Admiral D. W. Taylor, Chief of

5
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

the Bureau of Construction of the Navy; and four civilian members:

Howard E. Cofin, E. A. Deeds, R. L. Montgomery, and S. D. Waldon.

Coffin became its first chairman.'4 With especial reference to the types of

planes selected for large scale production the Aircraft Board was ably

assisted by the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board, which was set up by

the secretaries of War and Navy.'5

The Aircraft Production Board existed as such for some four months,

during which time, incidentally, it sponsored the initial production of the

far-famed Liberty Motor. Meanwhile Congress, following frantic calls on

the part of our European allies for aircraft, and the subsequent increase in

public interest, passed what for the time were huge appropriation bills for

military aeronautics: $10,800,000 in May 1917; $43,450,000 in June; and

$640,000,000 in July. 6 Incidentally, however, the Signal Corps found itself

in the rather anomalous position of being wholly dependent in its most

important function upon the committee of a committee which was in itself

a purely advisory body. Consequently, several of the civilian members of

the Aircraft Production Board were commissioned as officers in the

Aviation Section. Among them were Deeds and Montgomery. General

Squier placed the former at the head of the Equipment Division, Signal

Corps, which was created on 29 August 1917 for the purpose of formulating the general aerial program of the Army."

At this time also, as will be taken up appropriately, there was further

demand for the formation of a separate department of aeronautics. Partly to

offset that movement, partly to alleviate further the awkward situation of

the dependence of the Signal Corps upon a committee of an advisory committee, and in an effort to make possible a greater degree of coordination

between the respective departments, the secretaries of War and Navy, with

the full consent of the Chairman of the Aircraft Production Board and the

approval of the President of the United States, recommended legislation

which would give the latter agency more authority than it held simply as a

subcommittee of the Council of National Defense.'" As a result, Congress,

by virtue of a law which was approved on 1 October 1917, created the

Aircraft Board. Strictly speaking, this act merely enlarged the old Aircraft

Production Board. Yet the new Aircraft Board was placed under the jurisdiction of the War and Navy departments rather than the Council of

National Defense; and instead of six its maximum membership was set at

nine. These included the Chief Signal Officer and two other Army officers

selected by the Secretary of War; the Chief Constructor of the Navy and

two other Navy officers chosen by the Secretary of Navy; and three civilians, one of whom was slated as chairman, to be appointed by the

President. The functions of the Aircraft Board, generally similar to those

laid down for its predecessor, were listed as expanding and coordinating

industrial activities pertaining to aircraft and parts thereof produced in the

6
INTRODUCTION

United States, and "to facilitate generally the development of the Air

Service." The law distinctly specified, however, that the power of actually

entering into contracts remained with the proper authorities in the departments making the purchases. 9

As indicated by the brief analysis of the act which has been given

above, the Aircraft Board was strictly an advisory body. This was recognized by the Judge Advocate General and by the Secretary of War who on

25 February 1918 issued a directive listing the specific duties of the Board

as those which made it an agency to study requirements and the placing of

contracts, and also identified it as a clearinghouse for information between

the Signal Corps and the General Staff of the Army, and between the Army

and Navy. 20 By this time too the press and public opinion in general over

the country began to seethe with criticism of the Aviation Section of the

Signal Corps and the Aircraft Board because extravagant claims previously

made with reference to the future production of aircraft simply could not

be realized. 21 These factors, not to say an effort to counteract another move

for a separate department of aeronautics, were responsible for some fundamental changes in the internal structure of the air arm.

A preliminary step in the virtual reorganization of military aviation

came on 24 April 1918 when the War Department announced that thereafter the Chief Signal Officer would devote himself exclusively to the

administration of signals. In effect also two new units were created in the

Aviation Section. The Division of Military Aeronautics, under Brig. Gen.

William L. Kenly, was placed in charge of the training of aviators and the

use of military aircraft. Production problems were assigned to a Division

of Production under the directorship of John D. Ryan, the President of the

Anaconda Copper Company, who a few days previously had taken charge

of the Equipment Division of the Signal Corps. Ryan at the time was also

Chairman of the Aircraft Board which continued to exist as an advisory

body. Separation of functions with respect to designing and engineering,

the announcement stated, would be worked out between the two divisions

as experience dictated.22

Changes effected by War Department action on 24 April were

enhanced by the provisions of an Executive Order issued some four weeks

later. The Overman Act, approved on 20 May 1918, authorized the President for the period of the duration of the war and six months thereafter to

make such "redistribution of functions among executive agencies" as he

might deem necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.23 By virtue

of this authority the Commander-in-Chief removed aviation from the

Signal Corps entirely, authorized the Division of Military Aeronautics to

procure and train the necessary flying and ground forces, and created the

Bureau of Aircraft Production to provide planes, engines, and equipment.

There was no change in key personnel. As a matter of fact the Director of

7
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARNI

the Bureau of Aircraft Production was the former Director of the Division

of Production, who ipso facto was the Chairman of the Aircraft Board." As

actually constituted, the Bureau of Aircraft Production was made up for the

most part of the former Equipment Division of the Signal Corps, which

now became the Equipment Division of the new component. 2

1 Commenting

favorably upon the reorganization which had been effected by authority of

the Overman Act, some twelve months later General Peyton C. March,

Chief of Staff, stated that the division of the "Aviation Section...into the

Bureau of Aircraft Production and the Department of Military Aeronautics...facilitated production and served to coordinate, for the first time, the

air program with the Army as a whole...[and] resulted in a marked and general crease in the efficiency of that service...2 1

Although those who had been responsible for the changes made in the

organization of the air arm during the spring of 1918 may have visualized

the ultimate fusion of the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau

of Aircraft Production to one unit under a single director, the phraseology

of the Executive Order of 21 May did not clearly indicate such. 27 A War

Department order issued three days later, moreover, stated that no "Chief

of Air Service" in charge of both agencies would be appointed as long as

the Bureau of Aircraft Production existed as a separate bureau. Meanwhile,

however, the duties of such a Chief of Air Service would be performed by

the Director of Military Aeronautics unless specifically assigned to the

other unit. 2

1

As may have been expected, immediately following the changes

which have been outlined, an inherent organizational defect showed up in

the form of inadequate liaison between the two branches of the aviation

service. The reason was obvious. The Bureau of Aircraft Production was

responsible for the production of airplanes while the Division of Military

Aeronautics was held accountable for their operation and military efficiency. Yet the method of selecting a type to be manufactured as well as

that of deciding whether a given plane was suitable for military use

remained undetermined. Thus neither set of officials could be held responsible for the final production of an acceptable plane for the front.

Eventually this situation was solved in part by agreement to the effect that

the types of plane to be put into production would be selected mutually by

the two agencies; but before a plane could be sent into combat it must

undergo a military test acceptable to the Division of Military Aeronautics.

Considerable time was lost, however, before the authorities agreed upon

this policy which might easily have been established in the beginning by a

unified agency. 2'

A definite step was taken in that direction when on 28 August 1918

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker announced the appointment of Ryan in

the dual role of Second Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Air Ser8
INTRODUCTION

vice. In this capacity he was given supervision, control, and direction over

both the Division, of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft

Production, with full power to coordinate their activities and develop their

programs. This really meant the responsibility of procuring and furnishing

to the Army in the field all material and personnel required for the Air

Service.3" Ryan's appointment as Director of Air Service was of especial

significance to the air arm since, in addition to uniting under one head the

two coordinate divisions in control of military aeronautics, it gave aviation

greater recognition in the council of the Secretary of War. Thus, in the

words of a contemporary observer of the period, the Air Service enjoyed "a

prestige above that or any other branch of the military establishment."31 Its

position, as well as that of Ryan, was enhanced even more by the fact that

during this same month the United States Spruce Production Corporation,

the successor to the Spruce Production Division of the Signal Corps,

formed earlier to facilitate the supply of airplane lumber from civilian

sources, was created under the control of the Director of aircraft

Production.32

As will appear also, the creation of the Office of the Director of Air

Service on 28 August 1918, with Ryan as the incumbent, was designed in

part to meet a renewed demand-both congressional and popular-for an

Air Service altogether separate from the War and Navy Departments. It so

happened that Ryan resigned soon after the signing of the Armistice on 11

November, before his new appointment had become fully effective in

actual operation. His resignation created a rather complicated situation, for

it left vacant not only the Office of the Director of Air Service but also

those of the Chairman of the Aircraft Board and the head of the Bureau of

Aircraft Production. Under existing laws and orders not all of his powers

could be transferred to a new Director of Air Service nor an Acting

Director of Aircraft Production. These circumstances brought about the initial step in the reorganization of the postwar Air Service to make it conform

to what the existing authorities regarded as the proper peacetime basis.

Following the recommendation of the secretaries of War and Navy, while

on the high seas bound for Europe in March 1919, President Woodrow

Wilson signed an executive order providing for the dissolution of the

Aircraft Board which no longer functioned as such. It also placed the

Bureau of Aircraft Production immediately under the Director of Air

Service and vested upon the office rather than the man (as was the case

with Ryan) the powers conferred by law and executive order upon the

Director of Aircraft Production, so that its functions and prerogatives might

be assumed by any duly appointed successor.3

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, who had served with distinction in the American Expeditionary Forces as Commander of the FortySecond (Rainbow) Division and later the Sixth Army Corps, was brought

9
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

home to succeed Ryan as Director of Air Service.3 Menoher's position was

strengthened somewhat, of course, by the Executive Order of 19 March

1919. For some time to come, however, the whole organization was to

remain upon a rather tenuous basis; for, as the reader will recall, both the

creation of the Air Service per se in May 1918 and the reorganization in

March of the following year were based upon executive order. It was not

until 11 July 1919 that it received even a temporary or semi-statutory

authorization for separate existence. This was in the form of an emergency

appropriation to suffice through the fiscal year 1920. A similar provisional

authorization permitting the Air Service to retain until 30 June 1920 its

emergency officers constituting some ninety per centum of the commissioned personnel was delayed until 17 September 1919.1' Complaints about

these conditions were registered by both the Chief of Staff of the Army and

the Director of Air Service, the latter stating that his organization during

this period suffered from the uncertainty of its future, losing many valuable

officers who would have remained had it "been possible to offer them such

certainty of opportunity as ...granted by the Army Reorganization Act of

June 4, 1920.""

Reference was made by General Menoher to a law passed by Congress

following extensive debates, hearings, and the reports of special investigating boards and committees during the latter part of the year 1919 and

the first half of 1920, all relating either directly or indirectly to the question of a separate department of aeronautics. The Army Reorganization Act

of 1920 "created" an Air Service which at the same time, along with the

Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, the Corps of

Engineers, and the Signal Corps, was made a combatant arm or line of the

Army. It became also a supply branch. Increasing the personnel involved,

the law allowed one Chief of Air Service with the rank of major general;

1,514 officers in grades from colonel to second lieutenant; and 16,000

enlisted men. It made further provisions for flying pay (an increase of 50

per centum while on duty requiring frequent and regular aerial flights),

specified that not more than 10 per centurn of the officers in each grade

below that of brigadier general should be non-fliers, and required that in all

cases flying units should be commanded by flying officers. 7

The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 made no changes in the existing organic structure of the Air Service other than to abolish the Division

of Military Aeronautics which, incidentally, had existed in name only during the fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1919." The Bureau of Aircraft

Production, however, for several years continued to function in the settlement of its war contracts and claims, and to discharge the responsibilities

placed upon it by the creation of the United States Spruce Corporation.3"

Stated briefly, the preceding pages represent an attempt to sketch the history of the organization of the military air arm of the United States through

10
INTRODUCTION

such initial stages as the Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps; the Aviation

Section, Signal Corps; the Division of Military Aeronautics-Bureau of

Aircraft Production Board combination; and, finally, the creation of the Air

Service. This discussion should provide a fairly adequate background for a

treatment of the different organizational structures in the period from 1920

to 1945. The latter, however, will be diffused appropriately with the central

theme of the whole study. Meanwhile the chapters which follow immediately will be devoted exclusively to the developments in the history of the

struggle for greater autonomy on the part of the air arm for the period covered by this introductory section.

11
Chapter 2

Early Developments, 1913-1917

According to the available evidence, the first official suggestion relating in any way to the idea of a greater degree of autonomy for the air arm of

the United States Army came some three years after the Aeronautical

Division of the Signal Corps had been created in August 1907. It was negative in character. Stressing the need for increased appropriations and additional personnel, matters previously touched upon in this study, the Chief

Signal Officer in his annual report for 1910 expressed the view that under

the existing circumstances it would be impossible to furnish more officers

and men for the absolutely necessary training required in "airmanship."

Apparently General Allen had in mind no plan to alter the structure of the

Aeronautical Division nor the relationship of that unit to its parent body; for

he believed that if adequate funds were made available and additional personnel allowed, the existing organization could be made to work efficiently.'

Almost three more years were to elapse before there was a definite proposal to change the fundamental basis of the aviation service in this country. This came on 11 February 1913 in the form of a bill introduced in the

House of Representatives by James Hay, the Chairman of the Committee on

Military Affairs. It offered as a substitute for the Aeronautical Division of

the Signal Corps an Aviation Corps which would be a part of the line of the

Army, subject equally with the other branches to the supervision of the

Chief of Staff. The Aviation Corps would be charged with the duty of operating all military aircraft and the responsibility of training all personnel in

matters pertaining to military aviation. All pertinent records in the Signal

Corps were to be transferred to the new unit, for which also the

Quartermaster Corps would be required to furnish the necessary material

and supplies. The measure called for a maximum of 33 officers, including

1 major, 2 captains, and 30 first lieutenants, to be detailed from other

branches of the service; specified that the commandant should be an officer

who had displayed especial skill and ability as a military aviator; and provided for the operation of an aviation school for officers and enlisted men.

Finally, the bill would allow additional flying pay in the amount of fifty per

13
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

centum for all aviator personnel, and the payment of benefits to the beneficiaries of flyers killed in the line of duty.'

For the time, the Hay bill was so extreme as to be called a "radical

measure" even by Henry Woodhouse, one of the most ardent aviation

enthusiasts in the country.' The War Department in general opposed the

measure; while, apparently quite perturbed over the prospects, the Acting

Chief Signal Officer, then Col. George P. Scriven, sought the opinion of Lt.

B. D. Foulois and other Signal Corps officers in an effort to bring about the

defeat of the proposal.' So far as the records reveal, the verdict at this time

was unanimous in opposition. From Lieutenant Foulois, for instance, came

an individual reply which, in view of his subsequent activities with military

aeronautics, proved to be quite interesting. He felt that at the time military

aviation had not developed to the point where it should be organized as a

separate unit of the Army. Until aviators had acquired special skill and ability in military aviation, moreover, Foulois believed that a non-flier should

remain at the head of the service.'

Complying undoubtedly with the request for a statement of their opinions, an undetermined number of Signal Corps officers expressed in no

uncertain terms their opposition to the Hay bill. These men believed that

the proposed legislation looking towards the transfer of aviation to the line

of the Army "is unnecessary, inadequate, and instead of increasing the efficiency of aviation, will set it back for a number of years." They asserted

that the Signal Corps was the first organization in the world to recognize

the utility of aeronautics and to take the steps necessary for applying it to

the military art. In the United States military aviation definitely was a part

of the Signal Corps, and dependent upon it. Continuing, this group of officers held that in

the administration and operation of military aeronautics the flier of the machine

is but a part of the entire organization. There must be facilities for proper theoretical and practical instruction; there must be suitable tactical organization;

and there must be a suitable engineering force connected with it to properly

select the machines and materiel, all of which exists in the Signal Corps. It

would seem that to properly administer and use this important adjunct to the art

of war, there must be an organization which is composed both of fliers and

those who are skilled in the important details of the art, but not necessarily

actual fliers of machines. While aviation is in its first stages of development in

the Army it would appear to be an act of folly to swap horses while crossing the

stream, or, in other words, to place aviation on a new and untried basis.6

This stand against a separate Aviation Corps was supported officially

by a board, composed of officers then on duty connected with aeronautics

in Washington, which Colonel Scriven called together as of 24 February.

14
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

Directed to study and report on legislation considered necessary for the

aeronautical work of the Signal Corps, this board recommended a measure

generally similar to Representative Hay's proposal with the conspicuous

exception of the suggestion that aviation be separated from the Signal

Corps and made a part of the line of the Army. Apparently, however, this

was a studied omission. Particularly significant is the fact that the group

included Henry H. Arnold, then a second lieutenant in the 29th Infantry.7

Meanwhile Brig. Gen. William Crozier, Chief of the War College Division

of the General Staff, voiced strong opposition to the Hay bill. He contended that the adoption of such a proposal would necessitate the duplication not only of airplanes, but also a system of procuring, storing, and handling aeronautical equipment. Trained personnel, moreover, were already

available in the Signal Corps. This officer also opposed making military

aeronautics a part of the line of the Army because he felt its functions more

appropriately fitted in with the work of a staff corps. In these opinions

General Crozier was upheld by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, Chief of Staff,

and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.8

As might have been expected in the face of such pronounced opposition, the Hay bill never emerged from the Committee on Military Affairs of

the House of Representatives. With the glaring exception of the provision

relating to an Aviation Corps as a separate line of the Army and the amount

of flying pay allowed, however, the essential provisions of the proposal

were included in the War Department appropriation bill which was

approved on 2 March 1913.1 Representative Hay doubtless was encouraged

by what little advantage in the interest of military aviation his previous

efforts may have gained; for on 16 May following he reintroduced his

Aviation Corps bill.1"

The opposition accorded the second Hay bill was no less intense than

that offered to the first. Assistant Secretary of War Henry S. Breckinridge

regarded military aviation as "merely an added means of communication,

observation and reconnaissance" which "ought to be coordinated with and

subordinated to the general service of information and not erected into an

independent and uncoordinated service."'1 In stating the views of the War

Department, Secretary Breckinridge asserted that the adoption of the measure in question would complicate matters by requiring that certain functions already being performed by one branch of service be divided three

ways-among the Signal Corps, the Aviation Corps, and the Quartermaster

Corps. The first would be called upon to transmit information which previously the second had secured, while the third must furnish all necessary

supplies. By such a division of functions, moreover, the type of technically

trained personnel already existent in the Signal Corps must be provided in

the other two branches. Destined for a long time to come to "be an auxiliary of the line," military aviation was still in an infant stage. Its immedi15
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

ate future. therefore, could best be handled by the Signal Corps.'2 Here

Secretary Breckinridge struck a note which sounded in the testimony of all

who appeared before the Committee in August to oppose the bill. That is

to say, with respect to the suggestion of separating military aviation from

the Signal Corps they confined their arguments to the immediate present,

reserving the right to change their point of view as a result of possible

developments.

This list included several Signal Corps officers headed by Colonel

Scriven. Although naturally favoring an increase in aviation personnel at

the time, the Chief Signal Officer felt that whatever might be the ultimate

disposition of military aeronautics in the United States its immediate future

rested with the Signal Corps. That branch of the service possessed the technical information and machinery necessary for the performance of the

work involved, as well as the personnel essential for duty as staff members

and administrative heads of the aviation service. Aviators, on the other

hand, were young men who did not have the requisite scientific knowledge

and mature judgment. Finally, enlarging upon a view expressed previously

by Secretary Breckinridge, Colonel Scriven asserted that, since military

aviation was merely an added means of reconnaissance, observation, and

communication (supplementary or additional to those effected by wire,

wireless telegraph, and the telephone), it should be coordinated with and

subordinated to the general service of information rather than erected as an

uncoordinated and independent unit."•

Lieutenant Foulois thought it was still too early to create an Aviation

Corps as a separate line of the Army, but stated that such a development

was only a question of time. Lieutenant Arnold felt that since under the circumstances the Signal Corps was doing all it could for aviation the situation was altogether satisfactory.'4 Of unusual interest in view of his subsequent fight for a separate air force was the stand against removing the control of aviation from the Signal Corps taken by Capt. William Mitchell at

these hearings. The two, he stated in substance, were not altogether different. Aviation had shown that as a branch of reconnaissance service it was

still in an experimental stage. If we are going to build up that service, he

asked, "What is the use of trying to create a separate branch for this purpose?" That would retard its development. On the other hand, the best thing

that could be done for military aeronautics at the time, Mitchell thought,

was to increase the number of officers in the Signal Corps and give aviators inducements in the form of rapid promotion. Mitchell believed, however, that eventually the Signal Corps might be absorbed by the Air

Service; or, as he said: "Instead, as some people think, of the aeroplanes

being an adjunct of the lines of information, the lines of information may

grow to be an adjunct to the aeroplanes, and very probably will."'5

16
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

Capt. Paul Beck was the only Signal Corps officer to testify in favor

of the Hay bill. It was his contention that aviation did not logically belong

to the Signal Corps, and never would. Of the four military purposes of the

airplane-reconnaissance, fire control for artillery, aggressive action, and

occasional transportation-only reconnaissance was a function of the Signal

Corps; and even it was not exclusive to that branch. Insisting that regular

Signal Corps officers were not trained to fly the machines, Beck claimed

that there should be as few intermediaries as possible between the men

doing the work and those controlling it. He stated that aviation should be

removed from the Signal Corps because there was no certainty that it

would attain size or importance under the existing organization. The longer

the Signal Corps controlled military aeronautics, he added, the stronger

would become its hold; and there would be less likelihood that aviation

would ever come into its own. Finally, Captain Beck asserted that the

Signal Corps claim to a technical knowledge of aviation was "a gigantic

bluff," a statement which General Scriven in subsequent testimony branded

as "not only offensive but...untrue."'" This little tiff between Beck and his

superior, incidently, might be regarded as a forecast of the friction which

was to grow so intense between the younger and older Army officers over

the general question of the place of aeronautics in the military machine.

Evidence seems to indicate that the members of the House Committee

on Military Affairs and other responsible officials, both civil and military,

were attempting conscientiously to make plans for a substantial air service

in this country. During the late spring and early summer of 1913 the principal question in the minds of all concerned was whether this could be done

best within or without the pale of the Signal Corps. The August hearings

left no doubt as to what was the majority view of the members of that

branch on the question. Because of that intense opposition Representative

Hay was willing to drop his current proposal."7 Prevailing opinion, generally speaking, held that the crying need of aviation was additional personnel for its parent organization which in that respect had become exceedingly hard-pressed after 1900 with the rapid development of radio-telegraphy and aeronautics. "Those who have witnessed the efforts made by the

heads of the Signal Corps to develop aviation without entirely slighting

other matters," wrote the aviation zealot Woodhouse in July 1913, "can

only admire their attitude."'" Some months later Secretary of War Lindley

M. Garrison said:

The more pressing needs of the service in other directions have limited the

activities of the department [War Department] in developing an adequate air

fleet and training personnel, but its intention is to develop this service in the

near future as rapidly as circumstances will permit...The most pressing need of

17
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

the aeronautical service is for trained officers and men. It has been impractical

in the past to detail a sufficient number for this important duty owing to the

demands of the service in other lines of work. The immediate requirements of

the aeronautical service have been met by the Military Committee of the House

in a bill which looks to the creation of an aviation branch in the Signal Corps

which will be given sixty officers and two hundred sixty enlisted men for this

purpose. If this matter receives the approbation of Congress, the department

will be in a position to push the development of this most important branch of

the military establishment."q

The bill to which Secretary Garrison made reference was one which

the House Committee on Military Affairs, acting upon the recommendation

made by the Chief Signal Officer following the hearings in August 1913,

had substituted for the Hay proposal."' Encountering relatively little opposition in either house of Congress, this was the measure which on 18 July

1914, instead of creating a separate air corps, gave statutory recognition to

the Air Service as the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, and provided

the basic organization for military aeronautics in the United States during

the next four years.

Within some two weeks after the passage of the Act of 18 July 1914

Europe went to war. This conflict itself plus the accompanying threats to

the peace and security of the United States, which eventually brought about

the entry of that nation into the maelstrom, naturally affected developments

in the American Air Service. Although for the most part these related to

general growth and organization per se, which have been sketched briefly

in the preliminary portion of this treatise, there was some further activity

bearing upon the question of a greater degree of autonomy for the air arm.

The relatively meager developments in that respect from the time of the

outbreak of the First World War until the United States became an active

belligerent in that struggle will be discussed in the remaining portion of

this chapter.

Basic to a clear understanding of any aspect of the question is a conception of the ever-widening rift between a number of young aviation officers and their superiors, because of certain restrictions placed upon the

former by the Chief Signal Officer and the general apathy of the General

Staff and high War Department officials towards military aviation in itself.

Aviators found considerable support among certain air-minded organizations, such as the Aero Club of America and its affiliate groups, as well as

numerous individuals, including some members of Congress. The net

result was the beginning of a concerted movement to separate the Aviation

Section from the Signal Corps.

The initial impetus to be recorded here seems to have emanated from

outside Congress or any other governmental agency, civil or military; and

18
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

was based upon the thesis, not to say statement of fact, that essentially aviation was larger than its parent organization. Thus, to use a trite figure of

speech, for the Aviation Section to remain any longer as a part of the Signal

Corps would permit the tail to wag the dog. Progress in the science of military aeronautics, particularly as was shown by the experiences of World

War I, indicated that much of the work of the aviator lay more appropriately outside the sphere of activities of the Signal Corps. Such, for examples, were range-finding, bombing, and aerial combat. Congress through

midyear 1916 at least had shown a disinclination to allow larger appropriations for the Aviation Section than for the rest of the organization, even

though such were justified; for (and here we are reminded of "Billy"

Mitchell's "prediction") that would make the Signal Corps an adjunct of

aviation. Thus for the good of the armed services as a whole the two should

be separated. Reflecting the attitude of an economy-minded administration

so far as military appropriations were concerned, however, Congress had

failed to take the necessary action because of the expenses involved. At

least, these were the opinions and conclusions reached by such aviation

partisans as the aeronautical editor of the New York Tribune, the AerialAge

Weekly, and Alan R. Hawley, President of the Aero Club of America.2"

Meanwhile, with the apparent view of helping to pave the way for legislation providing for an independent air service, early in January 1916

Senator Joseph T. Robinson introduced a resolution providing that a joint

committee of Congress investigate the Aviation Section of the Signal

Corps.22 By way of documentary and oral testimony before the Senate

Committee on Military Affairs in support of his resolution, Senator

Robinson made some father severe charges which may be summarized

briefly. True conditions relating to the Aviation Section, he said, had been

withheld deliberately from high authorities in the War Department.

Misrepresentations as to the progress being made by aviators, moreover,

purposely and repeatedly were made to the department. Favoritism had

been shown certain officers. Actual investigation showed that the number

of qualified flyers was but little over one-half that claimed by the Signal

Corps. Most of the deaths resulting from military flights were due to the

use of antiquated equipment. And, finally, the training received by aviation

personnel in many respects was quite defective. 23

Although it passed the Senate and received the approval of the

Committee on Military Affairs of the lower house of Congress, the

Robinson resolution failed to receive a majority vote in the House of

Representatives.24 Consequently, the joint committee to investigate the

Aviation Section never was created. Yet in a manner of speaking

Robinson's charges struck home. Shortly after they were made, the Chief

Signal Officer commented on the allegations in a communication to the

Adjutant General. Therein General Scriven blamed friction existing within

19
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

the Signal Corps upon a "personnel of aviation officers.. .unbalanced as to

grades, young in years and in service, and deficient in discipline and the

proper knowledge of the customs of the service and the duties of an officer." The motive behind their "unmilitary, insubordinate, and disloyal acts"

was an ambition to set up a new and independent organization for aviation.

The Chief Signal Officer denied the accusations made before the Senate

Committee on Military Affairs; but at the same time recommended that the

War Department initiate action to revise the law of 18 July 1914 with the

view of eliminating restrictions as to age and marital status imposed on

aviation personnel. This, he thought, would tend to bring into that service

older officers with more experience, and would reduce the number of difficulties which had beset the progress of military aviation.2

"

In the above report Scriven presented but little information regarding

the actual situation in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. Further evidence, however, reveals the fact that court-martial proceedings against Lt.

Col. Lewis E. Goodier, Judge Advocate of the Western Department, had

exposed "deplorable" conditions which may well have formed the bases of

Senator Robinson's charges. According to an announcement by Secretary

Baker on 17 April 1916, in addition to a presidential censure for Goodier,

the trial prompted the War Department to pass another upon General

Scriven because of his failure to supervise personally the disciplinary features of administration. Col. Samuel Reber, the Chief of the Aviation

Section, received an official reprimand for showing disrespect to a coordinate branch of government, failing to observe proper restraints with regard

to the personnel and pay of members of the aviation group, observing poor

business methods as related to disposal of government property in the form

of discarded machines, and for lacking that degree of loyalty to his superior officer which would have saved General Scriven and himself "from

censures now involved and this branch of the service from the public doubt

and criticism which has [sic] affected it unfavorably." Relieved from duty

in connection with aviation, this officer was supplanted temporarily by

Captain Mitchell.2

"

Meanwhile Secretary Baker had directed the General Staff to make a

thorough investigation of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps.

Appearing before the Committee on Military Affairs of the lower house of

Congress on 8 April, however, he stated the primary difficulty with the service as he understood it was the impatience of young and eager men at the

regulations and restrictions imposed by their superiors, officers who knew

little or nothing about flying. There had been some indiscreet comment,

"tall talk" as he described it, but this had never led to insubordination.

These young men, Baker continued,

20
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

are said to desire a separate service for aviation, separating it from Signal Corps

work. and that involves two questions. A very large part of the control of any

branch of the Army is administrative and disciplinary, and has nothing to do

with the technical question of actual operation. So what you need in the

Aviation Corps [sic] is not to have another Corps, but a man of mature yet

severe judgment and trained disciplinary ideas to restrain the exuberance of

youth.

The Secretary of War apparently had his man in mind; for he indicated

that Lt. Col. George 0. Squier, Signal Corps, then a military attache in

London and an official observer on European battlefields, had been

recalled to replace General Scriven as Chief Signal Officer. At the same

time he announced an intention, "so far as the War department is concerned, to reorganize the entire Aviation Section."27 This led to an impression that the War Department planned to separate military aviation from the

Signal Corps, which was enhanced by a statement made a few days later.

In an announcement on 17 April, the Secretary of War was reliably

reported as saying that although theretofore the military air arm had been

regarded as a purely auxiliary service for scouting, carrying messages, and

to a limited extent in controlling gunfire, experiences in the European war

had shown that it could serve effectively on the offensive as well. In the

near future, he predicted, the United States likely would add armored and

armed airplanes and other fighting craft to its air fleet. In such case a new

organization must be created to handle this new fighting arm in order that

its work might be coordinated with the other service forces. Therefore, the

time had come when it would be wise to consider changing the relations of

the Aviation Section to the Army-28

Regardless of whatever pertinent long-range plans Secretary Baker

may have had in mind, the fact remains that at this time the Aviation

Section was not divorced from the Signal Corps. Strictly speaking, then, it

may appear that Senator Robinson's resolution and the subsequent agitation failed to accomplish the desired end. Undoubtedly, however, they

served to direct attention on certain crying needs of aviation. These were

deficiencies which, as has been noted, were remedied in part by section 13

of the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916. Meanwhile a more ambitious

proposal to alter the status of military aviation in this country was initiated

by Congressman Charles Lieb of Indiana, who on 28 March 1916 introduced what proved to be the first of a long series of bills providing for the

creation of a Department of Aviation.

Stated somewhat succinctly, Lieb's proposal envisioned for aviation a

separate executive department with its head, the Secretary of Aviation, a

regular member of the President's Cabinet. Functions and duties of the new

department were to include the development and improvement of the sci21
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

ence of flying, the supervision and promotion of all aviation matters as

related to the Army and Navy, the expansion of commerce as might be found

practicable in the public interest, and the collection and dissemination of

related information. To the Department of Aviation would be transferred the

Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Aeronautics of

the Navy, together with all that pertained to those agencies. The latter

involved not only land, buildings, equipment of every kind, and all official

records; but also, for a temporary period, all personnel. Finally, within the

new department Representative Lieb would have the following bureaus:

Aeronautical Research, Construction, Land Operations, Learning, Motor

Power, Naval Aeronautics, Personnel and Accounts, and Signal Corps."

This was no fly-by-night idea with Lieb, who was tremendously

impressed with the needs of American aviation as accentuated by the outbreak and progress of the war in Europe. In a vein probably more prophetic

than he realized the congressman was reported to have said shortly after the

introduction of his bill that in "time it is possible... the new air warfare will

be perhaps of so tremendous a character that, who knows, it might supersede Armies and Navies."" Apparently few members of Congress accepted

Lieb's views; for on the same day it was brought up, this proposal to create a Department of Aviation was decently interred in the Committee on

Military Affairs of the House of Representatives.3' The fact that it was

introduced, however, indicated that a movement for a separate organization

for aviation had found sonie strength in the national legislature, though

probably not commensurate with that which had been generated outside the

pale of government.3 2 It was evident, too, that in case the United States was

brought into the whirlpool of war the question of a reorganization of the air

arm would be considered seriously by the executive branch of the government, more specifically that part of it immediately in charge of military

affairs.

Meanwhile after making a study of conditions prevailing in the

Aviation Section, the General Staff recommended the eventual separation

of the Air Service from the Signal Corps. This met the approval of both the

Secretary of War and the Chief Signal Officer. Writing as of 3 October

1916, however, the latter stated, that military aviation should not be separated from any technical corps until it was able to stand alone. That time,

he added, had not yet come. General Scriven felt that experiences gained

in this country and reports received from abroad revealed the necessity for

a number of changes and additions to any organic law contemplating a separate air service. He stood ready to recommend such alterations whenever

the question should be taken up.33 Consideration was renewed in Congress

again, probably before the Chief Signal Officer (in the person of Maj. Gen.

George 0. Squier after 14 February 1917) anticipated; for early in the following April Representative Murray Hulbert of New York and Senator

22
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

Morris Sheppard of Texas introduced in the House and Senate respectively

identical bills calling for the consolidation of american aviation into an

organization to be known as the Department of Aeronautics. Except for this

terminology the proposals were virtually identical to that which

Congressman Lieb had made twelve months earlier.' Hulbert's and

Sheppard's measure came on the very eve of the entrance of the United

States in World War I. Further discussion of this dual proposal logically

falls in the succeeding chapter.

23
Chapter 3

The Impact of the War Years,

1917-1918

The "joint bill" providing for a Department of Aeronautics with a cabinet member at its head, which was introduced in Congress just before the

United States entered the First World War, never emerged beyond the

committee stage. There is little reason to suppose, however, that this

proved to be a disappointment to its authors, Senator Morris Sheppard and

Congressman Murray Hulbert. In fact it is difficult to believe that the sponsors of the proposal really expected to succeed in altering materially the

organizational status of military aeronautics; but they did hope to arouse

public opinion to an awareness of its needs, so as to stir up an interest in

increased appropriations. At the outset, though, the proposal amassed surprising strength.

Hearings on the bills were conducted during June and July. One of the

leading witnesses to support the idea of a Department of Aeronautics was

Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary who, without deprecating the importance of

a command of the sea, believed that the American air service of the near

future would be more vital to our safety than the Navy and Army combined.1 In a brief flight of rhetoric designed to emphasize his conviction

that a separate department of aeronautics should be created the well known

naval officer said that the old maxim, attributed to Themistocles, "He who

commands the sea commands all," must in time give way to a new one, "He

who commands the air commands all."'2

Others who appeared before the Senate Committee in behalf of the

Hulbert-Sheppard bill included Lt. Col. W. B. Reese (an English officer),

Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, Howard E. Coffin, and Representative

Fiorello H. La Guardia.3 Although their efforts did not avail in securing the

adoption of the Hulbert-Sheppard proposal, it is clearly evident that the

enhanced importance attached to aviation as a result of these hearings was

responsible in large measure for the exceptionally large appropriations

which during the summer of 1917 Congress passed in the support of military aeronautics. As the reader will recall, the last of these bills, which was

25
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

approved in July, amounted to the unprecedented sum of $640,000,000.

Incidentally, in appreciation of his effort on behalf of aerial preparedness

President Wilson presented to Hulbert the pen with which this measure was

signed.'

Late in the summer Secretary of War Baker and Secretary of Navy

Josephus Daniels, acting with the concurrence of Coffin, recommended a

revised form of the Hulbert-Sheppard bill, which also met the approval of

President Wilson. The substitute measure proposed only minor changes in

the organizational structure of the Air Service. These involved a slight shift

in the composition of the Aircraft Production Board, and its transfer from

the jurisdiction of the Council of National Defense to the War and Navy

Departments. The functions of the board, however, were to be entirely

industrial, having no relation whatever to matters of personnel, maintenance, service, or repair. Such matters would remain under the control of

the regular military and naval authorities who normally would not be

expected to have an intimate knowledge of the manufacture of aircraft or

of the industrial organization necessary for such large-scale production as

were necessitated by the existing emergency. The increasing demands incident to American participation in World War I placed an unusually heavy

load upon the Signal Corps which, in the opinion of the high authorities

concerned, must be relieved of the purely industrial and manufacturing part

of the program. As he presented this proposal to the Senate Committee on

Military Affairs as of 1 August 1917, Chairman Coffin clearly indicated

what the heads of the War and Navy Departments thought of the

Hulbert-Sheppard bill when he wrote:

A separate department of aeronautics has been under consideration in committees of the Senate and House. The need for the coordination in the production

of aircraft for the various departments has been recognized. The creation of a

separate department of aeronautics would seem ill-advised at this time. That is,

I believe, the view of both the Secretaries of War and Navy. The establishment

of the "air board" as a coordinating influence between the departments would

seem the best means for meeting the imperative industrial necessities of the situation and will be supplem:ental to and work harmoniously with existing governmental machinery.6

Secretaries Baker and Daniels had their way. The draft of the proposal

they had prescribed was amended slightly by Congress and eventually

enacted into law as the Act of 1 October 1917 which created the Aircraft

Board.'

The year 1918 was replete with proposals and suggestions for a greater

degree of autonomy on the part of the military air arm of the United States.

For the sake of clarity however, these developments must be considered

against a background of inquiry and investigation. As has been noted

26
IMPACT OF THE WAR YEARS

briefly, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Aircraft Board

were subjected to considerable criticism over a period of several months

beginning around mid-February when it became apparent that exaggerated

claims which had been made relative to aircraft production simply were

impossible of fulfillment. The details of that disturbing story are not

strictly relevant to this review, however, and thus will not be related here.8

Suffice it to say that this circumstance was the primary cause for the series

of investigations which was set in motion.

Following a suggestion by the Chairman of the Aircraft Board, the War

Department on 12 March 1918 announced the appointment of an investigating committee headed by H. S. Marshall to make a survey of the industrial phases of the aeronautical program. Simultaneously the Aircraft Board

indicated that W. S. Gifford, Director of the Council of National Defense,

would act in a like capacity for the Board itself. Soon thereafter it was

revealed through the medium of the press that a "semiofficial," secret

investigation was being conducted by Gutzon Borglum who, in a sort of

preliminary report, charged gross inefficiency and even criminality in the

aircraft production program. On 28 March, after several days of debates on

the subject, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs began what proved

to be a rather hurried, superficial investigation of the situation. A more

extended inquiry by a subcommittee of this Committee started on 29 May

1918. Three weeks earlier the Department of Justice began a thorough

exploration of the whole subject, which, at the personal request of

President Wilson, was conducted under the immediate direction of former

Justice Charles Evans Hughes.'

Once more the Aero Club of America injected itself into the official

aviation picture. On 2 April the head of that organization by way of a letter to President Wilson asserted in substance that the aircraft production

program was at the point of collapse. Those in charge of it, Hawley said,

had failed to make good; and there was no reason to expect better results

without some organizational changes. He proposed as the "only solution to

all the problems of building the air forces needed to win the war" a separate Department of Aeronautics which, generally comparable to the British

plan, should be independent of but cooperate closely with the War and

Navy Departments. Until the time when such a permanent arrangement

could be elected the executive of the Aero Club urged as a temporary expedient the immediate appointment of an Assistant Secretary of War and an

Assistant Secretary of Navy to represent their respective departments on

the Aircraft Board.10

After making a hurried inquiry extending over a period of only thirteen

days, on 10 April the Senate Committee on Military Affairs announced certain findings and recommendations. The majority report blamed the

"gravely disappointing situation" with respect to the aircraft program

27
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

partly upon an alleged ignorance of the art of producing completed combat

planes, and the failure to organize the effort in such a way as to centralize

authority and bring about quick decisions. According to this opinion, the

production of aircraft should be removed entirely from the control of the

Signal Corps and placed in the hands of one executive officer, appointed by

the President and responsible to him. Doubtless having in mind a possible

future air organization completely divorced from the Army and Navy, these

senators deplored the fact that no broad plan looking to later development

had been laid down, and urged that those in charge of American aviation

should look ahead constantly and devise plans for continued expansion. It

should be explained here that these views did not represent the opinions of

all the members of the Committee. On the other hand, a minority report

after summarizing the major achievements incident to the aviation program

stated that since the Signal Corps was accomplishing an unparalleled task

with capacity, energy, enthusiasm, and patriotism, its record was "one of

which every American can be justly proud."" Incidentally, as a matter of

record, that segment of the American public which may have been confused by the misleading statements of government officials regarding airplane production must have been completely bewildered by the conflicting

opinions expressed in these two reports!

On 15 April Congressman Norman J. Gould introduced in the House

of Representatives a bill providing for an organization which would have

been a sort of compromise between the proposal of the Senate Committee

on Military Affairs a few days earlier and Lieb's suggestion of April 1916

for a Department of Aviation (largely duplicated in substance by the Hulbert-Sheppard measure). In lieu of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps

and the Office of Naval Aeronautics, Gould proposed an Office of Aircraft

Administrator, directed by an officer holding that same title to be appointed

by the President. Vested with full control over all government activities

dealing with aeronautics, the Aircraft Administrator would have as his general duties the encouragement of aircraft production and the development

of the science of flying. To his office would be transferred not only the

Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Aeronautics

of the Navy Department, but also in the discretion of the President, "from

time to time ...the whole or any part of any bureau, division, or other branch

of the Government engaged in work pertaining to aeronautics."'2

Killed by inaction in the House Committee on Military Affairs, the

Gould bill, like the immediately preceding recommendations, failed to

accomplish its immediate objective. One should not conclude, however,

that these proposals, the investigations, and the complaints relative to the

aviation program which were made in the late winter and early spring of

1918 were altogether ineffective. As expressed by Brig. Gen. William L.

Kenly, an officer who figured prominently in the subsequent changes

28
IMPACT OF THE WAR YEARS

which were consummated, it had become quite obvious by this time that

the system whereby the Aviation Section served as a subsidiary branch of

the Signal Corps was functioning inefficiently. Then, as he also pointed

out, the British and French, perceiving that the United States was encountering the same kind of obstacles which had plagued them, recommended

a separate, independent air service similar to the air ministries they had felt

obliged to establish. Consequently, an initial step was taken in a rearrange-

•ment of duties designed to effect more independence and a greater concentration of authority. 3 The reader will recall that on 24 April the War

Department issued a statement announcing the creation of two units within

the Aviation Section: A Division of Production under John D. Ryan and the

Division of Military Aeronautics with General Kenly in charge. Thereafter

the Chief Signal Officer would devote himself exclusively to Signals.

A second step in the process of reorganizing the administration of the

Air Service was made possible by the Overman Act of 20 May 1918 which

empowered the President to make such redistribution of functions among

executive agencies of the government as he might think necessary for the

successful prosecution of the war. This statute, as was previously pointed

out, enabled President Wilson to remove aeronautics completely from the

jurisdiction of the Signal Corps and to place the functions relevant to the

Aviation Section in the hands of two different units: The Division of

Military Aeronautics for securing the training of the necessary personnel

and the Bureau of Aircraft Production for providing the planes, engines,

and equipment. Thus was created "a fourth.. .arm of the Service," in the

opinion of General March, then Chief of Staff, who regarded it not as "a

staff corps or a supply corps, as the Signal Corps was primarily, but an

individual independent fighting unit."'4

General March's comment may be regarded as ill-advised; for, as

observed in the introductory section of this study there was a definite lack

of unity within the military air arm as reorganized by the Executive Order

of 21 May 1918. The existing division of authority between the Division of

Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production was minimized

in no wise, moreover, by the subsequent War Department Order specifying

that so long as the latter existed as a separate entity no Director of Air

Service in charge of both agencies would be appointed. It is true that during the ensuing weeks the two bureaus worked out a policy which provided

a fair degree of cooperation as related to their respective functions; yet a

divided authority still remained."5 This was clearly discernible to all

informed persons concerned, including members of the Senate Committee

on Military Affairs, which was still involved with its investigation of the

aircraft program. That applied particularly to Senators James A. Reed of

Missouri, and Harry S. New of Indiana, members of the subcommittee

actually conducting the inquiry, who were influenced in a large measure

29
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

also by General William S. Brancker, the Controller General of Equipment

for the British Air Ministry, then but recently on a special mission to the

United States.

As was but logical, the question quickly turned to the broader subject

of a separate department to deal with problems of aviation production. In a

statement made to the Associated Press just prior to his return to England

in midsummer of 1918 General Brancker urged that the United States profit

by the experience of his own government and create a cabinet position of

"Air Controller," without writing for public opinion to force the issue "as

in our case." Obviously, as he pointed out, despite the existence of various

subordinate agencies it was necessary to bring before the heads of the War

and Navy Departments for settlement certain general problems which

could be handled more efficiently by an official whose exclusive function

was aviation. This view received the hearty concurrence of Senators Reed

and New. By way of an interview as of 1 August the latter called attention

to the divided authority in our aircraft program which he felt must be eliminated before the number of planes necessary to win the war could be produced. The only solution, the spokesman said, "is to have some powerful

central authority that would take care of the entire program; for it was virtually impossible to coordinate perfectly two great departments. Suiting his

actions to his words, Senator New at the same time introduced in the upper

body of Congress a bill which would create for the period of the war and

one year thereafter a Department of Aeronautics in charge of a Secretary of

Aeronautics who would be a regular member of the President's Cabinet.

According to the proposal, this new department should have "direct and

complete control of all matters pertaining to the designing, purchase, and

manufacture and production of aircraft and aircraft equipment intended for

the use of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps of the United

States."•

Although the New bill would set up an independent Department of

Aeronautics only insofar as production of aircraft was concerned (and that

for a limited time), recommendations for a full-fledged Department of

Aviation were included in the report made by the entire subcommittee of

the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Besides Reed and New, the

group consisted of Senators Charles S. Thomas, of Colorado, Chairman;

Hoke Smith, of Georgia; and Joseph Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey. The

report in question was made on 22 August 1918 after the group had visited

a number of manufacturing plants in different sections of the country;

examined training and testing fields; and secured testimony from manufacturers, fliers, officers, and inspectors.'7

In view of all the circumstances the Thomas subcommittee report

deserves a rather full analysis. It charged that a substantial portion of the

$640,000,000 appropriation voted by Congress in July 1917 had been

30
IMPACT OF THE WAR YEARS

wasted. Because of many errors and blunders, which were recounted in

full, the report stated that "it must be admitted that our aeroplane program

has, up to the present, presented many aspects of failure." Nevertheless,

much good work had been accomplished for which credit should be given;

besides, due allowance must be made for mistakes of judgment which were

unavoidable in the organization of a new branch of service. Complete fairness, however, required the admission that Congress originally made an

error in placing the problems of aircraft production and administration

under the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps.

Coming nearer the heart of the matter so far as this study is concerned,

the' subcommittee report insisted that to a large extent failures in the aircraft program would have been avoided if it had been under the control of

one person, with production problems subordinated to skilled aeronautical

engineers and practical fliers who could design and test the machines. It

noted with satisfaction the efforts made for cooperation and coordination

between the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft

Production, and expressed the belief that definite progress had been made.

Yet so long as it remained dual in character a divided authority would continue to plague the whole organization. Influenced by the opinions of every

person consulted, the subcommittee agreed to recommend a one-man control. Continuing in this vein, the report read:

...Your committee therefore believes that the importance and magnitude of aviation as a permanent branch of our military organization requires one directing

and responsible head both for its efficiency and speedy development. Its classification with the Army and Navy as a distinct arm of the service is essential

to this end.

Even though it may have been comparatively insignificant when the

European hostilities broke out in 1914, the subcommittee held, aviation

had become indispensable in modern warfare. Without aircraft no army

could hope any longer to triumph, or even escape defeat; without aircraft

the most powerful navy must remain on the defensive. The report called

attention to the fact that Great Britain (and, as it said, France) but recently

had organized an air department whose minister held rank as an officer of

the cabinet. Then it continued:

We should do likewise-create a department of aviation under the control and

supervision of a secretary, and ranking with those of the Army and Navy. We

would thus place power and responsibility in the hands of a single man, organize a service not alone for this war but for all time, and establish for the forces

of the air the same policy of administration that has. so long governed those of

the land and of the seas.

31
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

Maintaining further that training for aviation was as distinct and technical as that provided at West Point or Annapolis, the senators making up

this subcommittee concluded this phase of their report by saying that:

The creation of the department of the air would unify the service, thus removing all friction between the Army and Navy divisions of the service by subjecting both to the control of a common head. Differences between them under present conditions are unavoidable, and, while more disagreeable than serious so

far, they will arise from time to time, tending to seriously disturb the service,

besides interfering with production."

It was on 28 August 1918, less than a week after the above recommendation was made, that the War Department announced the appointment

of John D. Ryan as Second Assistant Secretary of War and Director of the

Air Service. In this dual capacity he was given complete supervision and

control over both the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of

Aircraft Production. This action, of course, fell somewhat short of complying with the suggestion of the New bill, that of the subcommittee of the

Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and many previous proposals to set

up an independent executive department of air. As a matter of fact, it undoubtedly was designed in part at least to counteract the strong popular and

congressional demand for such an organization. At the same time, to a

greater extent probably than the authorities realized, this was a step in that

direction, a move towards a separate air service which might well have

been consummated during this period had the termination of the war been

delayed for any appreciable length of time. Assuming that the struggle had

continued longer, it is difficult to understand how the huge air strength

which was being built up could have been administered effectively by an

Assistant Secretary of War. The mere volume of work itself would have

prompted, not to say necessitated, a separate department. As it was, however, Ryan had hardly been settled in his new job when the Armistice was

signed. Ten days later he resigned before any further moves toward consolidation were made."9

Meanwhile on 25 October the report of the Hughes Investigating

Committee had been made public. It not only blamed the weaknesses and

failures of the aircraft program upon such factors as a lack of knowledge

and experience, ignorance as to precise equipment required, changes in

design and appliances, and a shortage of trained mechanics; but also, like

the two previous reports, called attention to the administrative and organizational weaknesses of the air arm.2 ' That arraignment, however, made but

relatively little impression upon a public which was more inclined simply

to breathe a sigh of relief that no serious charges of fraud and corruption

had resulted from the inquiry. This factor had a negative effect upon any

general demand for the creation of a separate department of aeronautics.

32
IMPACT OF THE WAR YEARS

The passing of the emergency with the signing of the Armistice a few days

later, moreover, seemed to eliminate it altogether for the time being. Within

the organization of the military air arm itself, however, the idea was not

allowed to slumber even while the initial celebrations incident to the close

of the war were still in progress; for on 15 November an inter-office memorandum recommended that everyone connected with the Air Service be

enlisted in an effort to establish by law an "Air Department, with a secretary who shall have the same relation to the Federal Government and the

same powers as every other Cabinet secretary."'" As will appear, moreover,

during the early stages of the postwar reconstruction period agitation was

to show up again, and that in a form more persistent than ever.

33
Chapter 4

Preliminary Adjustments

Following World War I

With the close of World War I a new element was injected into the controversy respecting the position of aviation in the armed forces of the

United States. This was the aviator returned from overseas service. A composite picture would represent him as one who, convinced that warfare in

the future would be increasingly dependent upon air power, regarded the

air force not only as an offensive weapon, but also a striking arm. In fact,

he believed that aviation represented a third and equal, not to say superior,

branch of warfare. Naturally, then, the tendency was for him to favor more

freedom for and fewer restrictions upon the administration of the organization to which he had belonged. This naturally would involve a separate

department of aeronautics; or, as developed in time, some form of a department of national defense in which military aviation would occupy a coordinate status. Since few of these experienced aviators possessed a formal

military or naval training and background, however, they were viewed

somewhat in the nature of "upstarts" by the old-line personnel steeped in

the traditions of the services.

The end of the First World War also brought into sharper focus this

older group as opponents of any move which would increase the position,

power, or prestige of the air arm. It was made up of high-ranking dignitaries, including the heads of the War and Navy Departments, members of

the General Staff, and others in responsible administrative positions of

leadership, who regarded aviation simply as an auxiliary to Army and Navy

operations per se, rather than a separate element of national defense.

Consequently, they wished to keep it in a subordinate role. Non-fliers for

the most part, some of them were inclined to be jealous of aviators and

regarded the air arm as a threat to their own established prerogatives.

Others tended to assume an attitude of indifference towards and contempt

for air power. By far the greater number of them were opposed to the establishment of any agency which would increase materially the autonomy or

freedom of military aviation. Being in the majority, and at the same time

35
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

occupying positions of dominance and control, at this stage of the conflict

they had a definite advantage over the crusaders for air power. The issue

was squarely joined between the two groups, however, as early as the spring

of 1919.'

With a view of gaining the maximum of advantage from the experiences of the war, while they were fresh in the minds of those who had participated in them, General John J. Pershing on 19 April 1919 appointed a

board instructed to consider the "lessons to be learned ...in so far as they

affect tactics and organization." Relevant conclusions of this Dickman

Board, as it was called, may be summarized briefly. Nothing brought out in

World War I indicated that aerial activities could be carried on independently of ground troops so as to affect materially the outcome of war as a

whole. Nor did it seem likely that air forces would ever supplant ground

and naval forces unless such a proportion of the population became "air-faring" as are now known as "sea-faring people." Until such time the question

of the expensiveness of material and provisions for aerial power in relation

to other forces must be considered. As long, moreover, as existing conditions prevailed ground forces would continue to be the dominant factor in

warfare. Under these circumstances, therefore, authority must be vested in

the commander of the ground forces, and "aviation must continue to be one

of the auxiliaries of the principal arm, the Infantry." For the present all

questions of air strategy and tactics as well as the employment of aviation

should be governed by the well-known and established principles of military art, in which superior officers must be thoroughly grounded, so that

this important air auxiliary would be used always in pursuance of the paramount object.2

A more thorough investigation of the whole question of the position of

the air arm in the system of national defense was initiated on 1 May 1919,

when Secretary of War Baker directed Assistant Secretary of War Benedict

C. Crowell to organize a mission for the purpose of studying aviation problems as they had developed in the principal allied countries during the war.

To aid him in executing the assignment Crowell selected an able group,

including Howard E. Coffin, still on the Council of National Defense; a

member of the General Staff; a representative of the Air Service; a naval

officer; and several executives of the aircraft industry. During the late

spring and early summer this group visited Great Britain, France, and Italy,

conferring with various cabinet ministers, high-ranking Army and Navy

officers, and leading aircraft manufacturers. Following this thorough investigation of all forms of organization, production, and development as

related to aviation, the American Aviation Mission, as it was commonly

called, submitted a report on 19 July 1919.-

The general tone of the findings of the Aviation Mission indicated a

keen awareness of the rapid development of aeronautics, together with its

36
PRELIMINARY ADJUSTMENTS

far-reaching effects upon the practice of warfare; a desire for the government of the United States to reap the greatest possible benefit from the

huge expenditures made during the late war; and considerable concern for

the prospects of commercial aviation. Members of the mission were favorably impressed with the steps taken in England, France, and Italy, by way

of centralizing the organization of military aeronautics. This applied particularly to the first-mentioned country where the Royal Air Force was

being built along lines which would make it co-equal with the Army and

Navy. America, the report warned, might well study the British organization, the product of the best brains in the British Empire, "which has been

born of five bitter years of trial, mistake, experience, and progress."'

The Crowell Mission recommended for the United States the concentration of all air activities, military, naval, and civilian, into a National Air

Service co-equal in importance and representation with the Departments of

War, Navy, and Commerce. It would have responsibility for development

and utilization of aircraft in the interest of national security, as well as the

advancement of commercial aviation and communication. In addition to a

Secretary for Air and an Assistant Secretary, both civilians, the National

Air Service would have by way of organization six or more divisions or departments, including Civil Aeronautics, Military Aeronautics, Naval Aeronautics, Supply and Research, Finance, and Technical, each under a chief

or director; and an Air Council made up of the afore-mentioned officials

and other persons as deemed advisable by the Secretary for Air.

An important part of the proposal of the Aviation Mission, though supplementary to the concept of the National Air Service itself, was the suggestion of an air college and other similar institutions, open alike to military, naval, and civilian personnel. The curricula in these schools, as well

as the matters of assignment, promotion, and pay in the National Air

Service, should be arranged so as to insure an attractive career to a capable

young man, whether he elected to remain in the Air Service or to return to

the Army, the Navy, or to civil life. It was stipulated further that all personnel and equipment as might be assigned by the National Air Service to

military or naval establishments should automatically pass under the control of such command. Under the operational direction of the National Air

Service itself would remain only independent projects unrelated to military

and naval fighting fronts, and such personnel and equipment as would form

a surplus to the needs of the land and sea forces.

The members of the Aviation Commission realized that many objections would be raised to their major proposal, but believed that none of

them should prove to be insurmountable. With the possible exception of the

naval officer, who attached several relatively minor reservations to his signature, all of them apparently were convinced of the need for a separate air

department.' Officially, however, the proposal did not advance beyond the

37
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

War Department. In making public the report Secretary Baker showed that

he had a clear conception of the significance of aircraft in general and the

fact that for a while at least the development of aviation of necessity must

depend upon government subsidy. He also appreciated the importance of

military aeronautics and believed that nothing should be left undone to

develop both its scientific and practical aspects, especially so as to make

possible quantity production in time of emergency. The Secretary of War

did not believe, however, that a centralized air service would solve the

problems. In his own mind at least, the reasons were obvious. Both the

planes and pilots required for defense purposes were different from those

needed in commercial aviation. Particularly did the necessary forms of

pilot training differ. Since service pilots were trained to operate in coordination with each other, their efficiency depended upon the "most intense

and constant associated training." Therefore, a separation of the Air

Service from the Army or Navy would eliminate that effectiveness in military operation which "rests upon the concentration and singleness of

authority, command, and purpose." As he viewed the whole question, in

other words, Secretary Baker was unwilling to sacrifice the science of military aeronautics upon the altar of government subsidy to aviation. He

maintained instead that aid for the new industry could be administered

through means of a special agency designed for that purpose; and in that

general connection he mentioned the activities of the Joint Army and Navy

Technical Board.'

Years later an aviator just returned from Europe in 1919, and who at

the time favored a separate department of air, wrote that the rejection of the

Crowell report gave American aviation a blow from which after two

decades it hardly had begun to recover. Busy mustering out four million

citizen soldiers and sailors, and "slightly dizzy with victory and post-war

security," he added, army and navy officials were either too preoccupied to

study the document or feared that the proposed agency would threaten their

prerogatives.7 Yet, as respects the War Department certainly, the objections

to a separate department of aeronautics cannot be brushed aside so easily,

not to say contemptuously. Officially, as a matter of fact, Secretary Baker

consistently opposed such a plan. For the purpose at hand additional statements which he made in that connection require brief analysis.

Touching upon the matter of an independent air service in his annual

report for the fiscal year 1919, the Secretary of War made it clear that in

his opinion the problems regarding the necessary degree of centralization

in the agencies of development and control posed questions to which suggested answers based either upon doubt or enthusiasm were open to objection. Dogmatism certainly would be out of place. Although calling attention to the relatively small-scale activities of the aeroplane as an implement

of direct attack in fighting maneuvers, strategic bombing, and low-flying

38
PRELIMINARY ADJUSTMENTS

machine-gun operations, Baker contended that its only indispensable roles

in the First World War were those relating to observation and the control of

artillery fire. He admitted that the picture might change at any time and

noted that air armament in use at the time of the Armistice already had

become practically obsolete. Yet there was no reason to believe that future

functions of the air arm would be other than "essentially military" in character. Certainly so far as concerned land operations at present, they were

simply an "extension into the air of the modes of attack, counter-attack,

and defense land armies are accustomed to use." Land forces, Secretary

Baker asserted, were essential for the maintenance and control of the air

arm, and in some measure for defense even against air attack. Those who

realized the extent to which victory in warfare depended upon concentration in the control of combined operations, he added,

will perceive the seriousness with which any proposal must be viewed which

undertakes to separate services which must be so instantly knit together when

the time for action arrives. Nobody would think of suggesting that artillery

should be a separate service, or cavalry, in any other sense than that they

should have their experts giving special attention to their development, but all

the time in immediate cooperation with the other services and under the control of a single command. Nor would temporary control, asserted merely for

the purpose of combined operations, be enough. The whole purpose of military training and discipline is to inculcate a series of habits of cooperation

and obedience which will leave as little as possible to be learned when the

hour of trial comes. The uniform, the spirit of membership in the Army, the

fellowship of constant association, the experience of constant cooperation,

the knowledge which each arm of the service has of the functions of the other

arms of the service, the ways they fit into, supplement, and support one

another, the extent to which they can be relied upon, all form parts of the

material of success.

For these reasons it would be preferable to have the military air arm

and the land army fight as one unit than as combined forces. To separate

the respective soldiers and officers into different commands would make

for rival services, with the whole train of evils which such competition created. Secretary Baker did not believe, moreover, that the future prospects

of the independent effectiveness of aircraft as an agency of warfare was

such as to justify reliance upon it, except to the detriment of the traditional

military arms. Finally, and here many would suggest that his sense of what

was dogmatic had deserted him, the Secretary of War asserted positively

that as yet the backbone of military effort was the infantry. To support its

functions of advance and occupation all other arms, on land, on the sea,

and in the air, should serve as mere auxiliaries.8

39
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

The views of the War Department on the question of a separate air service at this time coincided generally with those held by the Department of

the Navy. This showed up, for instance, in an article prepared for publication by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Therein

Roosevelt's primary interest, it appears, lay in the preservation intact of the

naval air arm; but he touched as well upon the broader aspects of the whole

question. He favored full cooperation and interchange of plans between the

army air service and the naval air arm; but not unification of the two, for

which there was absolutely no need. Disaster, Secretary Roosevelt thought,

would follow removal of command from either branch in favor of a third

organization. Further, with particular reference to the Army, he said:

...The Army must control its air service. The ability to coordinate all branches

of the service, combining its activities at the will of the Commander-in-Chief,

is one of the fundamentals of strategy. Scouting, patrolling, reconnaissance and

defensive programs in which the air force plays the predominant part, cannot

be divorced from a united command.... The separation of the air force of a great

army from the absolute control of the Commander-in-Chief would be disastrous and should no more be thought of than the separation of the Motor

Transport Service, the Chemical Warfare Branch or the Quartermaster

Department....9

Secretary Baker's official attitude towards a proposed independent air

service (not to say the Navy viewpoint) was influenced in large measure no

doubt by the views of high-ranking military personnel, particularly the recommendations of the Menoher Board, which was convened following the

introduction of additional relevant bills in Congress. Although a total of

eight such measures were brought up within fifteen months after the

Armistice, only three require analysis here." The first of these was introduced in the lower house on 28 July 1919 by Representative Charles F

Curry of California.

In broad outline the Curry bill was similar to the proposal which was

made by the Crowell Mission just a few days earlier: although, as may be

expected, it went into more detail. The suggested legislation provided for an

executive Department of Aeronautics under a Secretary of Aeronautics who

would be entrusted with the responsibility of promoting all matters pertaining to aeronautics, "including the purchase, manufacture, maintenance, and

production of all aircraft for the United States," and charged with the performance of "all duties heretofore assigned to the War, Post Office, and

Navy Departments in so far as they relate to aviation." By specific mention

this assignment included the administration of an aeronautical academy for

the training of cadets and of such aircraft factories as might be required for

the manufacture of aeronautical equipment and material.

40
PRELIMINARY ADJUSTMENTS

By way of an actual air arm the bill provided for a Regular Air Force,

under a Chief of Operations with a rank of major general; a Reserve Air

Force; and a National Guard Air Force, while in service of the United

States. The Regular Air Force should consist of a line and a staff. The line

was to be a combat force, operating independently or with land or sea

forces. In case of joint action, however, details of air units were to be subject to the command of the forces to which they were assigned. The Regular

Air Force staff would consist of several divisions, such as Operations,

Administration, Legal, Engineering, Supply, and Medical. The task of

preparing plans for national defense by the air force was to be performed

by the Operations Division of this air staff."

Somewhat similar to the Curry proposal, but more general and less

detailed in its provisions, was the bill introduced in the Senate on 31 July

by Harry S. New. It made provision for an executive Department of

Aeronautics, with the major function of handling all aeronautical matters

for the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Post Office, or any other government

agency which in the interest of the public might be regarded as desirable.

Senator New's measure provided also for a United States Air Force consisting of military personnel serving in or assigned to the Department of

Aeronautics. Under the direction of the President the head of the

Department of Aeronautics, to be known as Director, might assign aeronautical units to duty with the Army and Navy; but while so attached they

would be under the exclusive control of the respective military or naval

commanders.12

On 8 August 1919 the Secretary of War convened a board of Army officers consisting of Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, the Director of the Air

Service, and four artillerymen to investigate, with particular reference to the

New and Curry bills, the advisability of creating a separate department of air.

In order to become thoroughly acquainted with the problem the board studied

telegraphic reports requested from some fifty division, corps, and Army leaders, who actually had operated with air units under their command; examined

much additional written evidence from boards, commissions, and individuals;

and consulted a number of witnesses in person. Among those appearing

before the board was Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, now a veteran combat aviator with a brilliant record and formerly Chief of Air Service, A.E.F., who

along with General Leonard Wood and several other officers of high rank definitely took an affirmative stand on the question. A majority of those whose

testimony was considered, however, as well as the members of the board

itself, held the opposite view. At least the verdict which was rendered on 27

October counselled against a separate department of aeronautics. Yet it held

that a single agency should be made responsible for the procurement, though

normally not the production, of government aircraft and that another be created for the purpose of development work as related to research and experi41
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

mentation in all phases of aviation. Although regarding an air force as an

essential combat branch, the Menoher Board insisted that acting independently, it could not accomplish a decision against forces on the ground, much

less win a war against a civilized nation. Therefore, an air force should be

controlled by a commander-in-chief of operations on the same footing, so far

as practical, with the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. To do otherwise would

violate the fundamental principle of unity of command."

Although certain enthusiastic exponents of strong air power later

charged the Menoher Board with partisan tactics in securing the testimony

involved," its report carried weight not only with the War Department, as

was noted, but also, apparently, with Congress to which it was referred.'5

At least, all of the current proposals to create a department of aeronautics

eventually were allowed to die by inaction. In modified forms, however,

the Curry and New bills were reintroduced in October.' During the winter

of 1919-1920 extended hearings were held on these two, on the similar

bills subsequently introduced, and on various Army reorganization bills

currently under consideration, all of which elicited testimony both for and

against a separate department of aeronautics. 7 A detailed analysis of all

these proceedings cannot be presented here. For the purpose of the present

discussion it will suffice to give the names of the leading advocates of the

idea, the outstanding opponents, and summaries of the arguments offered.

Although in charge of a subcommittee conducting hearings and not a witness before it, Representative La Guardia, himself a returned aviator with

some renown, should be mentioned along with those favoring an independent air service at this time. Eliminating from consideration here a number

of both Army and Navy aviators who, according to La Guardia and others,

could not or would not express their convictions because of pressure from

above, the list included such as General Mitchell, Maj. Foulois, Col. C.

deF. Chandler, Col. Henry H. Arnold, Benedict Crowell, S. S. Bradley, and

Glenn L. Martin arrayed against them were Secretary Baker, General

Menoher, General March, General John J. Pershing, and Maj. Gen. [James

W.] McAndrew.'

Arguments presented pro and con produced few or no new ideas, and

are subject to quick summary. Proponents of the idea of a separate air

department held that military aviation no longer was a mere auxiliary of

other forces, but an important striking arm in itself. General Mitchell said,

for instance, that its principal function was to obtain a decision over the

aviation of the enemy, essentially an air problem. Then, touching briefly

upon what later became a near-crusading matter with him, Mitchell

asserted that if allowed to develop properly the air arm could carry the war

in the air to such an extent as to make navies almost useless. Next, from

both the strategic and tactical points of view, it was necessary to have final

authority for aviation vested in those who were interested in and operated

42
PRELIMINARY ADJUSTMENTS

an air force as such. More or less openly inviting court-martial, in this general connection Major Foulois charged that the General Staff, through lack

of vision, because of inadequate knowledge, or by deliberate intent, had

subordinated military aviation to the needs of the other combat arms. The

Air Service, he said, had developed entirely upon its own initiative.

Another argument presented on behalf of a separate air service was the

assertion that a duplication of expense was incident to a lack of central control. Again, England's experience had been successful; and to substantiate

this assertion, proponents of the proposal cited statements made by

Winston Churchill, Britain's Secretary of State for War and Secretary of

State for Air; Maj. Gen. Hugh Trenchard, Chief of Staff, R.A.F.; and certain British and French air attach6s. Lastly, an independent air service

would lend encouragement to a vitally necessary commercial industry and

prevent its breakdown."

Those who opposed an individual department of aeronautics held that

the major justification for the existence of an air force was its liaison with

other branches. This would be hampered by the creation of a separate air

organization. General Menoher, for instance, regarded the air service as a

mere auxiliary unit, and not a decisive one at that; while General Pershing

said that not for a long time to come could it be an independent arm. Next,

a decentralization of control, with the high command denied the power to

utilize the air service as it saw fit, would result in a decrease in the efficiency of the Army as a whole. The Quartermaster Corps, it was said, was

competent to make contracts for and purchase all the aircraft needed by the

Army in peacetime. The independent air service in Great Britain, opponents of the idea argued, had not been eminently successful. The majority

of the Navy air service, they pointed out, was opposed to a separate department of aeronautics. Any normal lack of cooperation between Army and

Navy authorities would be eliminated by the revived Joint Army and Navy

Board. And, finally, a highly centralized aerial organization would not be

conducive to the encouragement of aircraft manufacturing activities.20

A further observation on the views of the Commander-in-Chief of the

American Expeditionary Forces should be made here. He had appeared on

31 October before a joint session of the Military Affairs Committees of the

two houses of Congress. Apparently misinterpreting a statement in his testimony to the effect that it might be very well to include under one head the

appropriations for military and naval aeronautics and the development of

commercial aviation, the press and public in general seemed to conclude

that General Pershing favored a separate air organization.' In order to clear

up the misapprehension, General Menoher wrote to request further statement of his views. Pershing's reply left no doubt whatever as to his position in the matter. The only view he had expressed with respect to the air

service for military purposes, the General wrote, was that it should be

43
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

established as a separate branch within the Army, on the same basis as that

of the infantry or the field artillery. An air force should be created as a separate arm of the service, coordinate with the infantry, cavalry, and artillery;

but not as a combatant force distinct from the Army and Navy. Although an

essential, indispensable combat branch of the Army, a military air force,

General Pershing insisted, "acting independently can of its own account

neither win a war at the present time nor, so far as we can tell, at any time

in the future." Nor could it obtain a decision against ground forces. An air

force, therefore, should be trained and controlled under precisely the same

conditions of Army command as other combat arms. Like all branches of a

military organization, an air force must know the needs of the other units,

"be in full sympathy with them, think in the same military atmosphere, and

have the same esprit de corps in order that effective battle control may be

established ."2-2

Meanwhile the Senate Committee on Military Affairs reported favorably on the revised New bill, which was an attempt both to carry out the

recommendations of the American Aviation Mission and to meet the most

important objections which had been raised against the proposal to set up

a separate department of aeronautics, and was the second and last of the

eight relevant measures immediately under review to advance thus far in

the legislative process.2" After a short period of debate, which indicated that

the Senate would defeat the measure, Senator New asked that it be recommitted for further consideration. This was done,2

" but nothing came of it.

For the time being no other comparable legislation was brought up,'

although soon another congressional committee was to make strong recommendations for the accomplishment of the objectives common to the

several bills which have been reviewed.

In the early summer of 1919 the House of Representatives organized

the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, probably

better known as the Graham Committee by virtue of its chairman,

Representative William J. Graham. A subcommittee of three, with James A.

Frear as the chairman, was directed to investigate the expenditures specifically related to aviation during the period of World War I, after pursuing

its study over a period of more than six months,2

" the Frear subcommittee

made a report which was adopted by the whole body. By far the greater

portion of the findings of the aviation subcommittee is altogether irrelevant

to the subject specifically under review. The reverse holds true, however,

with respect to one of its major conclusions.

According to the majority report of this subcommittee, the "striking

failure of the War Department to rise to the aircraft emergency" had made

necessary the creation of a separate bureau or department of aeronautics,

with a capable, progressive official at the head, wherein all governmental

aerial activities should be centered. For the adequate development of avia44
PRELIMINARY ADJUSTMENTS

tion in this country such an agency should cooperate fully with the War,

Navy, Post Office, and Interior departments. This was the general opinion

expressed by virtually every witness examined on the subject of the future

of the American Air Service. The list included military officers from the

general class down through lieutenant; private citizens familiar with the

subject; and many experienced aviators. Among the latter should be mentioned such names as Foulois, Kenly, La Guardia, Mitchell, and, for the

first time in these pages, that of Capt. Edward V. Rickenbacker.27

As noted, Congress took no action on the recommendation of the

Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department relating to a

basic reorganization of military aeronautics. Nor, of course, did the administration. Instead, the War Department continued to push the proposals

which, as pointed out in the preliminary chapter of this study, were enacted

into law as a part of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920, thereby giving

statutory recognition to the Air Service and making it one of the regular

combatant arms or line of the Army. The act did not alter the existing relationship between the Air Service and the General Staff. After months of

agitation, therefore, the latter agency, representing the very epitome of the

old order in the War Department structure and military circles in general,

had won a veritable triumph over the proponents of a separate department

of aeronautics. At the end of the post World War I readjustment period,

however, the contest really had just begun.

45
Chapter 5

Creation of the Army Air Corps

Subsequent to the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 the first important

legislation affecting the general organization of military aeronautics in the

United States was the Air Corps Act of 1926. During this interval the controversy respecting the exact status of aviation within the armed forces was

to a large degree simply a continuation of that which had characterized the

period immediately preceding. Numerous bills found their way to the legislative hopper, followed by congressional hearings and committee reports;

special boards, after conducting extensive investigations, announced their

conclusions; and underneath it all the jurisdictional conflict between the Air

Service and the older military departments continued unabated. Although,

with major exceptions to be noted where applicable, the arguments and fundamental points of view remained about the same. It appeared that the

cleavage was more sharply pronounced between the trained aviators and the

old-line army men. At least the former, bound together by practical experiences as well as common grievances and objectives, eventually came to

control the Air Service as such. The traditional clique, however, continued

to dominate the General Staff, the major policy-controlling body of the War

Department.'

So much of the developments relating to the question of a greater

degree of autonomy for the air arm during this period revolved either

directly or indirectly around the colorful figure, not to say dramatist,

General "Billy" Mitchell, that a brief resume of some of his major activities seems necessary at this point. Assistant Chief of Air Service for the

greater part of the time, General Mitchell failed to persuade his superior

officers wholly to accept his point of view regarding the importance of military aviation. Then he tried other tactics. In addition to appearing before

congressional committees and special aircraft boards, he engaged in lecture

tours, gave interviews to the press, contributed magazine articles, and even

wrote books, in order to tell the public what he thought about air power.2 It

was also due largely to the initial prompting of this former commander of

World War I Air Service activities overseas that during the early years of

47
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

this decade the question of the effectiveness of aerial bombardment became

a subject of heated controversy between the Army and Navy. The major

issue was the vulnerability of naval vessels to attack from the air. The

means of reaching a decision took form in a series of bombing tests against "enemy vessels" off the Atlantic Coast, in some of which Mitchell himself

actively participated. Although at the time naval authorities may not have

been so ready to agree, and many years were to pass before their significance was fully appreciated, the experiments indicated that the "effectiveness of bombing aircraft against battleships of all types [was] very positive

and that against this means of destruction there is no adequate defense other

than that provided by pursuit airplanes."'

In military aviation circles it is a matter of common knowledge, of

course, that Mitchell's continued crusade in favor of military aeronautics

combined with his "feud" against the Navy eventually brought about not

only his dismissal as Assistant Chief of Air Service, but also a court-martial during the latter part of 1925, resulting in a suspension from rank, command, and duty, with a forfeiture of all pay and allowances for five years.

Soon thereafter he resigned his commission, but kept up the fight for air

power. Less well known perhaps is the extent to which Mitchell's activities

and influence actually effected the proposed changes in the organizational

structure of the Air Service during this period.

Whether "Billy" Mitchell was a prophet or a martyr is relatively immaterial so far as this study is concerned. Significant, however, is the fact that

a large section of the American public seemed to regard him as both.

Repeated series of Mitchell headlines in the press tended to swell the mailbags of members of Congress, thus producing indirectly flurries of what

President Calvin Coolidge contemptuously called "Mitchell Resolutions."

Although, naturally, most of them died in committee, they served as a

nucleus for subsequent significant legislation.4 For a person of Mitchell's

convictions and experiences in the realm of air power it was unreasonable

to suppose that the airplane would do anything less than revolutionize the

technique of modern warfare. The operation of the machines required a specialized knowledge and training not acquired at West Point or Annapolis.

Moreover, military aeronautics posed problems in administration and organization altogether unfamiliar to either of the existing departments. It was

but logical, therefore, that the Air Service should be given some form of a

separate administrative organization.

As late as 1921 General Mitchell still favored a separate Department of

Aeronautics, which he would charge with the responsibility of developing "all matters relating to the Air" and make co-equal in all respects with the

Departments of War and Navy. Stated succinctly, the plan envisioned three

major divisions. First, was the Air Force Division, to be responsible for the

administration and operation of an elective air force which could be mobi48
CREATION OF THE ARMY AIR CORPS

lized with rapidity in the event of an outbreak of war, inasmuch as the "first

battles of the future will be held in the air." With an adequate number of airplanes assigned to the Army and Navy, and a sufficient number of airplane

carriers for the latter, Mitchell believed that within a few years it would be

unnecessary to maintain most naval surface craft, such as battleships, battle

cruisers, and torpedo boats. The Air Force Division would be broken down

into five sections, as follows: Administration, Training and Operations,

Equipment, Medical, and Legal. Second, a Supply Division, designed to

devise, obtain, stock and issue all stores required by air troops, would be

divided into Engineering, Procurement, and Finance sections. Lastly, the

Division of Civil Aeronautics expected, as the designation implies, to foster

the development of commercial aviation, which would be subdivided into

such sections as Law, Air Traffic, Civil Air Development, and Operations.'

General Mitchell's plan was not wholly dissimilar to some which previously had been proposed in Congress, especially that of Representative

Curry, who on 24 February 1921 reintroduced his former measure with certain modifications, and presented it again on 19 April.6 Meanwhile Julius

Kahn of California, a member of the lower house, had submitted a similar

proposal on 11 April.7 Like so many of their precursors, however, each of

these bills died aborning in a committee of the legislative body in which it

originated. The incoming administration was quick to take its stand against

any such proposal. Within less than a month after his inauguration President

Warren G. Harding, acting upon recommendations worked out in a conference attended by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Commerce, the

Assistant Secretary of Navy, the Postmaster General, the Chief of Air

Service, the Director of Naval Aviation, and a representative of the National

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, called upon the chairman of the

last-mentioned organization to appoint a subcommittee to study the question of cooperation among the various branches of the government concerned with aviation; and to make an appropriate report on its findings. The

Chief of Air Service, still in the person of General Menoher, and Maj. W.

G. Kilner sat upon this subcommittee which maintained representation as

well from the Navy, Post Office, and Commerce Departments, and the aeronautical industry in general.

After deliberating over a period of less than two weeks the subcommittee made its report which included among other things certain things

pertinent to this study, summarized as follows: (1) Since aviation is inseparable from the national defense and necessary to the success of both the

Army and Navy, each should have complete control of the character and

operations of its own air service. The Army Air Service, therefore, should

be continued as a coordinate combatant branch of the Army, under the

Secretary of War, utilized in cooperation with the Navy Post, Office, and

other government agencies. Similarly the air service of the Navy and the

49
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

control of naval aeronautics should be centralized in a Bureau of

Aeronautics in the Department of Navy. (2) There should be created in the

Department of Commerce a Bureau of Aeronautics, for the purpose of regulating air navigation as well as executing such policies as may be adopted

for the encouragement of civil and commercial aviation. (3) The Air Mail

Service should be maintained and extended under the Postmaster General.

President Harding wholeheartedly approved this report of the subcommittee of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics which on 19 April

1921 he transmitted to Congress in close conjunction with a special message recommending the indicated legislation! In vain did several members

of the subcommittee, including Major Kilner of the Air Service, insist that

the President's assignment justified the consideration of a department of

air, a unified air service, or an independent air force.'

Considerably more than a year was to elapse before further serious

attempts were made by legislation to change the organic structure or relative position of the Air Service in the national defense system. These will

be taken up following a brief discussion of the Lassiter Board and its work.

In his annual report for 1932 the Chief of Air Service, now in the person of

Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, also one-time Chief of Air Service, A.E.F.,

made complaint, as stated in substance, that his organization was virtually

demobilized by way of both personnel and general facilities; and that thus

it was unable to meet many normal peace-time demands, much less play its

role in any national emergency. He explained that the general situation,

which previously had been called to the attention of the War Department,

could be remedied only by congressional action." Some months later,

General Patrick had occasion to make more detailed recommendations for

improvements in American military aviation. Basing his statements in part

upon the results noted in airplane war maneuver tests held in Hawaii during 1922, he asserted that the authorized strength of the Air Service was

wholly inadequate. General Patrick would divide this component of the

Army into two main groups: observation squadrons and balloon companies

whose function was to assist combatant branches of the Army; and pursuit,

bombardment, and attack units, designated as the Air Force, which operated more or less independently of the ground troops. Legislation providing for an increase in personnel was sorely needed, particularly for this second element which was woefully under-officered and undermanned.

Holding, finally, that air defense from land bases should be handled by the

Army, while the Navy limited its activities to the sea, General Patrick

stressed the need for a clearcut distinction between the mission of the

Army Air Service and that of the Navy air units in coast defense."

On 17 March 1923 Secretary of War John W. Weeks convened a board

of General Staff officers under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. William

Lassiter to consider Patrick's recommendation. Five days later, after inter50
CREATION OF THE ARMY AIR CoRPs

viewing numerous aviation experts, this group issued a report which concurred essentially with the views presented by the Chief of Air Service. In

order to bolster an aircraft industry regarded as already inadequate to meet

even peacetime requirements and diminishing so rapidly that soon it would

practically disappear, as well as to build up an Air Service which, due to a

reduced personnel and a lack of planes, was in a critical condition, the

Lassiter Board advocated a ten-year continuing program of expansion.

Probably the most significant phase of the report, however, was the general

indorsement of General Patrick's idea of a division of task forces.

According to the Lassiter Board, an observation air service should be an

integral part of divisions, corps, and armies; while an air force of attack and

pursuit aviation ought to bear the same relation to each field army. Yet both

should maintain a reserve under the command of general headquarters. A

bombardment and pursuit aviation force, on the other hand, would best be

retained under general headquarters for assignment to missions, either in

connection with or independent of ground troops, as circumstances might

warrant. This latter force, the board stated, should be organized into large

units, insuring great mobility and independence of action. 2 In the opinion

of a member of the General Staff, expressed some months later, from the

viewpoint of aerial combat this organization should meet the "desires of

the proponents for an independent Air Service," and that without sacrificing unity of command."3 Two decades later an Army Air Forces historian

pronounced it as the concept of the strategic air force which was hailed as

a new type of aerial combat unit when introduced in the North African

campaign during the spring of 1943.11

Although it met the approval of the Chief of Air Service and in substance eventually became the War Department's policy on Air Service

organization, as such the Lassiter Board recommendation never was translated into legislation. On sending it to the Joint Army and Navy Board for

consideration the Secretary of War suggested that in relation to their

respective needs the Navy air appropriation mentioned was larger than that

for the Army, and should be reduced proportionately. He also thought that

the Army and Navy aviation program should be considered by a joint committee in Congress rather than the usual pertinent subcommittees. These

suggestions did not meet the approval of the Secretary of Navy; so, technically speaking, the document remained with the Joint Army and Navy

Board. As late as September 1925, Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, the Chief of

Staff, inferred that the War Department would be willing to prepare for the

consideration of Congress proposed legislation based upon the Lassiter

Board report; but he insisted that it could not be done without an increase

in the budget." Certainly his immediate predecessor would have gone no

further; for in his last report as Chief of Staff, dated 12 September 1924,

General Pershing reiterated in no uncertain terms his well-known convic51
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

tion that military aviation should remain an auxiliary arm, available for

independent use or otherwise, but always under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the armies.' 6

The work of the Lassiter Board was not without its educational value,

for prior to the passage of the Air Corps Act its report was reviewed by several other groups intent upon investigating military aeronautics. The first of

these to be noted here was the so-called Lampert Committee, consisting of

nine congressmen taken from the House Military and Naval Affairs

Committees and named for its chairman, Representative F. H. Lampert of

Wisconsin. Known officially as the Select Committee of Inquiry into

Operations of the United States Air Services, it was organized on 24 March

1924 with the view of investigating the financial affairs of all branches of

aeronautics." Examining more than 150 witnesses during a period of something over eleven months, the Committee broadened its field of inquiry into

what may be regarded as an extensive examination of the Air Service organization per se. In the resulting testimony, which totals nearly 4,000 pages

bound in six volumes, can be found the now traditional complaints of Air

Service personnel; various plans and suggestions for an improved organization; and the numerous arguments of the experts who hoped to keep aviation subordinate to the Army and Navy. All in all, the hearings seemed to

revolve around the key testimony presented by General Mitchell."

Rating the United States at not above fifth place among the air powers

of the world, Mitchell placed the blame for the weakened condition of the

Air Service squarely upon the General Staff. It had been informed time and

time again of this situation by the Chief of Air Service. As was noted

above, however, the annual report of that official had become a sort of repetitious review of what had not been accomplished. This condition,

Mitchell asserted, was traceable to the fact that the Air Service was organized in such a way as to protect military agencies which had "vested interests against aviation." The Chief of Air Service, having responsibility but

little or no authority, was virtually powerless. Planning for aviation really

was in the hands of officers who neither by inclination nor training were

Air Service men."9 General Mitchell deplored the fact that, spread out

among three departments, War, Navy, and Post Office, aviation in each

instance was subordinated to another function regarded as a major aim.

Much of his testimony related, of course, to the Navy. He contended, for

instance, that if given and allowed to direct the annual expenditure of

$50,000,000, just one-half the sum required to build one battleship plus the

necessary supporting vessels, the Air Service could within two years control the air in any decisive theater of operations.

By way of specific suggestion for improvement of military aviation,

General Mitchell recommended a Department of Aeronautics, co-equal

with the Army and Navy, charged with the responsibility of handling all

52
CREATION OF THE ARMY AIR CORPS

aeronautical matters. At the same time he indicated his general approval of

an idea or plan which later he, along with others, was to espouse wholeheartedly. Stated in substance, this was a department of national defense,

administered by a secretary holding cabinet rank, with coordinate subdivisions for Air, Army, and Navy.20

It would be impracticable to present here even a list of the more important witnesses who at this time respectively upheld and decried General

Mitchell's views regarding the position of the air arm in the defense system

of the United States. Howard E. Coffin agreed with him, as did Major Reed

Landis. General Patrick offered his Air Corps plan, to be analyzed later, in

which he was supported among others by Maj. Carl Spaatz; but both of

them favored the ultimate establishment of the unified air service.2' There

were a few others who came out on Mitchell's side; but, generally speaking, War Department officials along with the General Staff, together with

the Navy Department and its General Board, took issue with his ideas.

Whether or not purposely and consciously, they undoubtedly influenced the

stand taken by some of the younger officers in the respective services.22

On 14 December 1925, some nine months after concluding the hearings, the Lampert Committee made its report to Congress. Therein, with

respect to the subject specifically under review in this study, it indicated

that consideration had been given to the following plans relating to Air

Service organization: (1) A unified air force operating independently of the

Army and Navy, but providing units to those services as needed; (2) a separate air force operating in addition to individual air units required for

Army and Navy tactics; (3) aviation corps in both the Army and Navy; (4)

the installation of assistant secretaries in the War, Navy, and Commerce

Departments; and (5) a Department of National Defense specially charged,

under a civilian secretary, with the coordination of the defenses of the

nation. After careful consideration the Committee agreed to endorse this

last-mentioned idea which, as stated,

through its unity of command would harmonize our national defense system,

reduce expenditures for supplies, and prevent needless duplications, promote

understanding, lessen friction between our different military arms, and provide

a uniform and equalized system of pay, promotion, and retirement. It should

decrease the overhead of maintenance and decrease the number of organizations

and bureaus within the departments. It should promote the interchange of effort

in peace and war; it should work for economy, and strength in our national

defense. It would train and habituate our military organizations in peace time,

for that cooperation that is essential in time of war I

Here, though not specifically stated in so many words, ardent devotees

of air power might argue that coordinate branches of Air, Army, and Navy

53
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

in the proposed department of national defense were definitely implied.

Certainly one member of the Committee had that in mind.2"

For more immediate action the Lampert Committee recommended that

Congress determine the respective fields of operation for the Army and

Navy air arms; the establishment of separate and all-inclusive budgets for

the two groups; and adequate representation of both air services on the

General Staff of the Army and the General Board of the Navy, respectively,

by members who would firmly "support the full use of aviation for the

defense of the country.""5

Neither Congress nor the War Department took any immediate action

upon the recommendations of the Lampert Committee, the effects of which

in fact to a large degree had been nullified by developments occurring even

before the report was presented. Reference is made primarily to matters

relating to the President's Aircraft Board, more commonly known as the

Morrow Board, which upon the request of the secretaries of War and Navy

President Coolidge appointed on 12 September 1925 for the purpose of

studying the "best means of developing and applying aircraft in national

defense." The group when convened consisted of Dwight W. Morrow, who

became chairman; Howard E. Coffin; Senator Hiram Bingham, formerly a

colonel in the Air Service; a retired major general of the Army, a retired

rear admiral; a judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals; two members of the

lower house of Congress; and a member of the National Advisory

Committee for Aeronautics."

During the course of the hearings, conducted over a period of four

weeks beginning near mid-September, the Morrow Board examined over

one hundred witnesses, including actual aviators who made up a majority

of the total; other military and naval personnel; cabinet heads and staff

members representing the departments of War, Navy, Commerce, and Post

Office; members of Congress: representatives of the National Advisory

Committee for Aeronautics: and leaders of the aircraft industry. As was

inevitable, the status of the Air Service as such in the over-all defense organization proved to be one of the foremost questions raised during these discussions. Again, "Billy" Mitchell, now reduced in rank to that of a colonel,

was a star witness. In addition to his regular oral testimony he proceeded

to read a thirty-thousand word statement reviewing the whole air power

muddle. At this time also Mitchell came out unqualifiedly in favor of a

department of national defense, a proposal for which he outlined in some

detail." Among the score of other witnesses who took a stand in support of

some form of an independent status for the Air Service were General

Patrick, Colonel Foulois, Maj. Henry H. Arnold, and Major Kilner2" On the

other hand, a much larger number of those who had occasion to express

themselves on the subject opposed any change in the status quo. These

included Secretary of War Weeks; Acting Secretary of War Dwight F.

54
Early Military Aviation: Leaders and Legends

TOP: Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois, in

1911 the Army's virtual "one-man"

air force, at the controls of one of its

first airpcraft, the Wright Model B.

He eventually became a major general and served as Chief of the Air

Corps from 1931 to 1935. In 1964

he was awarded a special Medal of

Recognition from Congress for his "more than fifty years of service to

the development of aviation."

BOTTOM, LEFT: Capt. Benjamin D. Foulois, fourth from left, with his fellow officers of

the 1st Aero Squadron in front of their Curtiss JN-3, 1915. Foulois almost single-handedly organized the 1st Aero Squadron when political chaos in Mexico led to trouble

along its border with the United States. The squadron took part in Gen. John J.

Pershing's 1916 punitive expedition into Mexico against the banditry of revolutionist

Pancho Villa. The squadron's less than spectacular operations there were, nonetheless,

instructive and demonstrated how seriously understaffed and underfunded the Army's

air arm actually was.

BOTTOM, RIGHT: Brig. Gen. Mason Patrick, 1918. He was appointed by Gen. John J.

Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force, to be Chief of its

Air Service during World War I. His outstanding leadership brought badly needed efficiency and improved management to an air arm whose Army had only fifty-five planes

when America entered the war. Most were obsolete and not combat worthy by European

standards.
Early Military Aviation: Leaders and Legends

OPPOSITE, TOP: Brig. Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell, the

prophet of air power, in his Thomas-Morse MB-3 fighter. He

was the son of a Wisconsin senator who became a tireless

champion of strategic bombing and one of the greatest and

most controversial figures in military air history. He began

his Army career as a private at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War and was later commissioned a lieutenant

in the Signal Corps. Before the United States entered World

War I, he was sent to France as an aeronautical observer with

British and French forces and was thus the first American

military representative to fly behind enemy combat lines.

During the war he commanded a brigade of the first U.S. air

units, reorganized and assigned to the Chateau-Thierry area,

to enter combat.

OPPOSITE, CENTER: The ex-German battleship Ostfriesland being hammered by air attack. During June and July of

1921, both the Navy and War Departments wanted to

ascertain how seacraft would stand up under aerial bombardment. Mitchell was certain that aircraft could sink even

the most powerful battleships. In a test held on July 21, 1921,

a flight of Martin bombers carrying 2,000-pound bombs sent

the derelict Ostfriesland to the bottom within twenty minutes.

The demonstration, held before dignitaries, reporters, and

observers, vindicated Mitchell and proved his contentions on

the potential of aerial bombardment. It also marked the end

of the battleship, a fact sadly highlighted when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

OPPOSITE, BOTTOM: The court-martial of Billy Mitchell,

1925. By 1924 Gen. Mitchell was waging a vocal and vigorous

campaign to convince the public of the importance of air power

and the necessity of an independent air force. Instead of

working quietly through normal military channels, he made

his case openly in speeches and writings, soon antagonizing

Congress, the President, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and

the General Staff. When his term as Assistant Chief of the Air

Service expired and was not renewed, he had to assume his

permanent rank of colonel and an assignment as Air Corps

Officer with the Eighth Corps Area at Fort Sam Houston,

Texas: He did not relent, but became more outspoken, charging that the losses of a Navy P-9 and the balloon Shenandoah were the fault of U.S. military "incompetency" and

"criminal negligence." In the end, he was court-martialed,

found guilty of insubordination, suspended from rank, command, and duty, and sentenced to forfeiture of pay for five

years. The President granted some relief regarding pay, but

Mitchell resigned from the Army on February 1, 1926, continuing his crusade on air power and its future in warfare in

articles, books, speeches, and interviews.

Early Military Aviation: Leaders and Legends

TOP: In World War I Capt. Edward

V. "Eddie" Rickenbacker, with his

ground crew and a SPAD XIII fighter

in France, 1918, achieved an outstanding twenty-six kills against enemy

aircraft as a member of the 94th Aero

Squadron. World War I created a

whole new kind of Army hero-the

air ace, whose exploits captured and

held an adoring public's attention

and generated support for the postwar continuation and integration of

aviation within U.S. military operations.

CENTER: Lt. Frank J. Luke and a

SPAD XIII fighter, France, 1918. During two weeks in September 1918 he

destroyed fourteen enemy balloons and

four aircraft in furious dogfights. He

shot down three more balloons before

being forced down over Germany, where

he was killed returning fire after refusing to surrender to his enemies. He

received a posthumous Medal of Honor,

the sole Air Service member so recognized while the war still raged.

BOTTOM: The first post-World War I

Director of the Army Air Service Maj.

Gen. Charles T. Menoher. After having

served as Commanding Officer of the

5th Field Artillery during the war, he

was named to his new position in 1918.

From it he was forced to confront a

demobilization that cut into the air arm Amp,

drastically. He also presided over an

investigative board, one of the earliest

of the numerous Army departmental

and congressional boards convened between 1920 and 1945, on the place of the

air arm in the nation's defense structure. Its recommendation against the

creation of a separate department of air

brought him into serious conflict with

his second in command, the fiery Brig.

Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell.
The Interwar Years: Technology and Testing

TOP: Flight of the Question Mark. The 1920s and 1930s brought a spate of outstanding flight records that made such names as Charles Lindbergh, Richard

Byrd, Amelia Earhart, Jimmy Doolittle, and Bernt Balchen famous. On New

Year's Day, 1929, with the flight of the Question Mark, the Air Corps, determined

to set the world flying endurance record and garner publicity and support, employed aerial refueling, introduced in an earlier historic 37-hour flight by Capt.

Lowell Smith and 1st Lt. John Richter. The arduous flight of the Question Mark, a

Fokker C-2A trimotor transport, began and ended at Los Angeles Metropolitan

Airport in Van Nuys, California. Shown being refueled by one of two Douglas utility tankers, the Question Mark stayed aloft for 150 hours, 40 minutes, and 40

seconds. Despite the flight's importance, its demonstration of aerial refueling's

promise in extending aircraft range was not fully exploited by the air arm until

1947.

BOTTOM: The Question Mark's crew. Its members became celebrated for overcoming fatigue, fog, rough weather, darkness, lack of radio communications with

the ground (the necessary equipment was deemed too heavy to include on the

flight), and the dangers of the refueling process. Left to right: Sgt. Roy Hooe, Lt.

Harry Halverson, Capt. Ira Eaker, Maj. Carl Spatz (later spelled Spaatz), and Lt.

Elwood Quesada.
The Interwar Years: Technology and Testing

TOP: Lt. James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle, left, and Harry F. Guggenheim, right,

with a Vought Corsair, one of the blind flying research aircraft of the Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics. Doolittle was detailed to

head the Fund's Full Flight Laboratory at Mitchel Field in New York.

There, on September 29, 1929, he made what was the most significant test

flight since the Wright brothers' at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in

1903-the first blind, instruments-only flight in aviation history. Blind

flying involved the use of instruments to aid flyers when fog or clouds

obscured the horizon-their vital reference point. The Air Corps worked

with private industry to develop various instruments-altimeters, artificial

horizons, gyrocompasses, and radio homing-range and marker-beacon

indicators. Doolittle performed the test in a Consolidated NY-2 with a

special hood over the forward cockpit; his sight was thus confined to the

instrument panel in which the experimental devices were installed. He was

accompanied by a safety pilot, Lt. Benjamin Kelsey, both in practice runs

and the actual test.

BOTTOM: The enclosed hood over the forward cockpit of the NY-2 in which

Lt. Doolittle tested the new navigational equipment being perfected for blind

flying.
TOP, LEFT: On July 19, 1934, Lt. Col. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, sent by Air Corps Chief

Gen. Benjamin D. Fulois, led a squadron of Martin B-10s from Washington D.C. to Alaska

to demonstrate that the air arm could move tactical units quickly to distant locales and

back. Ten planes landed in Fairbanks, Alaska, on July 24. They covered 8,290 miles

round-trip, 4,500 miles in just over twenty-five hours, 990 miles from Juneau to Seattle

non-stop. Arnold is shown wearing the insignia of the flight on his jacket.

TOP, RIGHT: One of the B-10s of the U.S. Army Air Corps' Alaskan Flight descends beneath the clouds to obtain air map images of the territory between Fairbanks and Anchorage known as Broad Pass.

BOTTOM: GHQ Air Force Commander,

Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, left, congratulates Maj. Caleb V. Haynes, right, for his

successful return to Langley Field, Virginia, after a special humanitarian mission

to Santiago, Chile. Flying Boeing's XB-15,

fully loaded with medical supplies to aid

victims of a powerful earthquake that had

struck there on January 24, 1939, Haynes

departed Langley February 4 and arrived

in Santiago February 6. Since 1920 the Air

Corps had engaged in several such goodwill flights which enhanced its prestige as

they tested its new long-range aircraft.
The Interwar Years: The Air Corps on Trial

TOP: In 1934 Secretary of War George H. Dern appointed a special board to discuss

both the Air Corps' overall ability to meet its many responsibilities and its eventual

autonomy. Besides defending the country from attack and invasion, the Air Corps

undertook numerous civil operations: relief and rescue, forest fire spotting, aerial

photographing and mapping, scientific research, assisting farmers, and flying the

mail. The Corps was experiencing some difficulties, particularly flying the mail,

which it had been ordered to take over under Executive Order, in February 1934,

from commercial carriers; their contracts had been cancelled when Congress expressed doubt about whether they had been won without favoratism. The Corps,

however, because of several tragic accidents, soon proved a disappointment. The

Baker Board (named for its chairman, former Secretary of War Newton Baker)

found, in essence, that while the Corps should not be separated from the Army, it

would, despite its best efforts to carry out its missions with the resources it was

allocated, require better training and equipment and the resolution of personnel

inequities. Seated, left to right: Maj. Gen. Benjamin Fulois, Carl Compton, Newton

Baker, George Dern, Maj. Gen. Hugh Drum, George Lewis, and Maj. Gen. George

Simonds. Standing, left to right: Brig. Gen. John Gulik, James Doolittle (at that

time a civilian), Edgar Gorrell, Brig. Gen. Charles Kilbourne, and Clarence

Chamberlin.

BOTTOM: Air Mail being loaded on board a Douglas B-7 at Oakland, California.

The Air Corps flew the mail from February 10 to June 1, 1934, when commercial

carriers again took up the task.
Advocates of Air Autonomy

From its earliest years the idea of the nation's military air arm as an independent

service, co-equal with the Army and the Navy, had many advocates, uniformed and

civilian, government and non-government. Those pictured (Assistant Secretary of War

for Air Robert A. Lovett, TOP LEFT; and leading Air Corps Officers Henry H. Arnold,

TOP RIGHT; Carl A. Spaatz, CENTER LEFT; Frank M. Andrews, CENTER RIGHT;

George H. Brett, BOTTOM LEFT; and Joseph T. McNarney, BOTTOM RIGHT)

favored full autonomy and were called to testify before numerous War Department

and congressional committees and investigative bodies which revisited the issue

throughout the interwar years. They realized as the United States headed inexorably

toward war that the push for full separation of the air arm from the Army should be

postponed until after the conflict was concluded and won by the Allies. However, they

were able through what was termed the McNarney Reorganization to achieve the

creation on March 2, 1942, of the U.S. Army Air Forces, an absolutely necessary

streamlining. The McNarney Reorganization recommended the provision, under the

Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, of a ground force, an air force, and a service of

supply and command, all with headquarters in Washington, D.C. The U.S. Army Air

Corps and GHQ Air Force effectively ceased to exist.
The Interwar Years: Aircraft Evolution

During the interwar years the Army air arm helped develop and test in astonishing

technological leaps every phase of aircraft. These ranged from the relatively fragile

wooden biplanes that introduced aerial bombardment to the combat of World War I, to

the sturdy all-metal fighters and bombers that flew in the deadly formations of World

War I.

Douglas World Cruisers.

The Boeing P-12 (shown camouflaged for war games), an early

Army Air Corps fighter.

The Curtiss P-36 Hawk, which led to the wartime P-40.
A formation of Douglas B-18As, among the first monoplane

bombers.

The Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, an excellent fighter-bomber.

A formation of North American P-51 Mustangs, developed in the

early years of World War II.
World War II: The Air Arm Proves Its Case

TOP: The United States was plunged sooner than it expected into World

War II when Imperial Japan's naval pilots proved, tragically and decisively, the effectiveness of air power over sea and ground power at Pearl

Harbor on December 7, 1941. The U.S. Army and Navy had to fight on two

fronts, the Atlantic and Pacific, holding the line in Asia while following a

"Europe First" war-waging strategy against the Nazis. The air arm went

all out to meet America's need for a long-range strategic armada and spectacularly demonstrated its importance to the nation's defense.

BOTTOM: The Casablanca Conference, January 12-23, 1942. Shown with

the U.S. delegation to the meetings between President Franklin D.

Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill is Army Air

Forces Commander, Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold. The air chief was

included among the highest-level Allied military and civilian aides involved in planning initiatives for Sicily and North Africa, the concentrated

aerial bombing of Germany, and the allocation of resources for the Pacific

Theater. Seated, left to right: Gen. George Marshall, President Roosevelt,

and Adm. Ernest King. Standing, left to right: Harry Hopkins, Gen.

Arnold, Gen. Brehon Somervell, and Averell Harriman.
TOP: On April 18, 1942, in a bold and imaginative joint operation, B-25

Mitchell bombers led by Lt. Col. James H."Jimmy" Doolittle launched from

the carrier Hornet and raided Tokyo, the capital and heart of the Japanese

empire. The Mitchells are shown prior to take-off on the carrier's deck.

BOTTOM: Lt. Col. Doolittle, center, with his crew of Tokyo Raiders after

force-landing in China, are hosted by government officials. Doolittle's raid

electrified and cheered America and forced Japan to withdraw large numbers of aircraft to defend the home islands.
World War II: The Air Arm Proves Its Case

TOP: The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. A mainstay of America's heavy

bomber strength, the B-17 was a further development of the XB-15. The F

variant was sent into action in Europe on January 27, 1943, with the Eighth

Air Force's first U.S. aerial attack of World War II against Germany's heartland over Wilhelmshaven. Grievous losses in its numbers and crews in bold

daylight raids against factories at Schweinfurt, Wiener Neustadt, and Regensburg in August and January 1943 led to modifications and the G variant,

the most-produced. Its "chin" turret below the nose holding two .50-inch machine guns greatly improved its defensive capabilities.

BOTTOM: The Consolidated B-24 Liberator, often referred to as the

workhorse of World War II's heavy bombers. More B-24s were produced, not only for the U. S. Army Air Forces, but U.S. Navy and Allied

Air Forces as well, than any other type of American aircraft. Its employment in Europe and in the Pacific, particularly in island-hopping

campaigns, hastened the end of hostilities considerably.

I ~ ,
TOP: The Boeing B-29 Superfortress. This long-range very heavy bomber was

not deployed until 1944 in the Pacific. In late 1943 the Allies decided against

using it in Europe, choosing instead to concentrate it in the new XX Bomber

Command from bases in India and China against targets in Japan. Its fireprone engines rendered it at first disappointing at high altitudes, but it was

very successful in low-altitude incendiary raids over Tokyo in March 1945,

where formations destroyed nearly one-quarter of the city in a single attack.

It was specially modified to undertake atomic missions with the 393d

Bombardment Squadron (VH) of the 509th Composite Group. From Tinian

Island its crews trained in it and conducted simulated missions. On August 6,

1945, seven B-29s were sent on the first atomic raid: Enola Gay (which

dropped its 9,700-pound bomb at 31,600 feet over Hiroshima), a reserve

plane, three weather reconnaissance planes, and two observer and recording

planes. Three days later Bock's Car dropped the second atomic bomb over

Nagasaki.

BOTTOM: Brig. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay.

LeMay, whose name is synonymous with

America's strategic air power, rose quickly

through the ranks of U.S. Army Air Forces

officers. Among his many war-time accomplishments were his pioneering initiatives

to improve the bombing accuracy of B-17s

in Europe with straight-in runs and formation patterns, and his organizing and heading of the B-29 bombardment activities of

the XX Bomber Command in the ChinaBurma-India Theater, where he became

Chief of Staff of the Strategic Air Forces in

the Pacific. He directed the fire-bombing of

the Japanese home islands, stripping down

the B-29 to lighter weight for low-level

action. His modification of the plane and

its effective employment in the Tokyo raids

contributed significantly to the defeat of

Japan.
World War II: The Air Arm Proves Its Case

The U.S. Army Air Forces bought its right to full autonomy with the blood of its

members. Because of their sacrifice, which did so much to end World War II,

opposition to a separate Air Force evaporated.

A u
CREATION OF THE ARMY AIR CORPS

Davis; Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, Chief of Staff; Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum,

Assistant Chief of Staff; the Secretary of Navy; Chief of Naval Operations,

E. W. Eberle; and many regular service personnel.29 The relative preponderance of Navy officers included on this side of the question may have

indicated a continued disinclination on the part of that group freely to state

their individual opinions contrary to Navy Department policy, despite official assurances that they do so in any event without prejudice."

In addition to the views expressed by the witnesses examined, while

preparing its report, dated 30 November 1925, the Morrow Board had the

opportunity to study the work of previous similar investigating agencies.

These included the hearings before, but not the report of, the Lampert

Committee, which, as noted, was not released until two weeks later.

Whether or not, as has been suggested, the Morrow Board was set up for

the purpose of nullifying the recommendations of the other with respect to

Air Service organization,3" it is difficult to understand how, after 'making

studies of the same general subject, two different groups could arrive at

such diametrically opposite conclusions.

On the question of a greater degree of autonomy for the air arm the

Morrow Board report represented the traditional military, General Staff,

War Department administrative point of view. It opposed the creation of an

independent department of aeronautics on the grounds that, in accordance

with hallowed American principles, military and civilian activities should

remain separate.32 Similarly, a department of national defense, consisting

either of only the Army and Navy, or one comprising those two plus a

department of air, fell under the ban, largely because of the "added complexity" necessitated by such a super-organization. Besides, in order to present their special views to the President and Congress both the War and

Navy Departments insisted on retaining their own cabinet members.33 The

objection of the Morrow Board to a separate department of air coordinate

with the Departments of War and Navy was based in large measure solely

upon the testimony of high-ranking officers that the Army and Navy each

needed its own air service which could not function efficiently unless it

trained and operated as an integral part of a single command. Then, with

regard to a separate independent air force, the report continued:

...We do not consider that air power, as an arm of the national defense, has

demonstrated that its value-certainly not in a country situated as ours-for

independent operations is of such a character as to justify the organization of a

separate department. We believe that such independent missions as it is capable

of can be better carried out under high command of the Army or Navy, as the

case may be.34

Morrow and his associates, however, recognized the fact that military

aviation performed the double function of rendering auxiliary services to

55
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

other branches of the Army, and that of providing an air force capable of

acting alone on separate missions. They recommended, therefore, that the

name be changed from Air Service to Air Corps. The board insisted that the

Air Service already maintained the same degree of independence, and was

subject to the same degree of control by the Secretary of War and the

General Staff, as other branches, such as the artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

It recommended however, that aviation be given a special representation on

the General Staff. Finally, for particular emphasis in this survey, the

President's Aircraft Board advocated the appointment of an additional

Assistant Secretary of War, with duties specifically related to aviation, and

suggested that it might be well to duplicate such an officer in the

Departments of Navy and Commerce. "

As between the Lampert Committee report and that of the Morrow

Board the issue was squarely joined. The one, representing generally the

point of view of the extreme protanogists of air power, precipitated in

Congress a series of bills providing for a department of national defense."

The other, although symbolizing the old order, did provide the suggestion

of a compromise to the War Department which could evade the issue no

longer.

Probably the most significant of those bills patterned after the recommendation of the Lampert Committee to be presented at this time was that

offered early in December 1925 by Representative C. F. Curry. In a manner of speaking, this proposal would reconstitute the original form of the

national defense organization by abolishing the Navy Department and

restoring its functions to the Department of War. The name would be

changed to the Department of Defense. At the head was to be a Secretary

of Defense, assisted by three undersecretaries representing respectively the

coordinate branches of the Air Service. Each undersecretary should have an

assistant secretary. A major contribution of this bill was a somewhat

detailed plan for the internal organization of the air branch, which would

be composed of four divisions: (1) Civil Aeronautics; (2) Supplies; (3)

Research; and (4) an Air Force. The latter would consist of a line (i.e.,

corps, divisions, brigades, wings, et cetera) and a staff made up of supply,

engineering, medical, and legal branches. Finally, the proposal provided

that the Air Force personnel receive training which would make possible a

combatant force capable of operating with either the armed land or naval

forces, with the two combined, or independently. 7

Fairly early during this session of Congress also Representatives John

P. Hill and W. F. James each introduced a bill proposing a department of

national defense generally similar to that offered by Curry.3 " Then the

so-called Air bill, which incorporated the recommendations of the Morrow

Board and bore the official sanction of the War Department, was submitted

by Representative John M. Morin."

56
CREATION OF THE ARmy AIR CORPS

The initial stages of the committee hearings on these bills revealed the

same line-up of opposing forces and the same arraignment of arguments for

and against the proposal to emancipate the Air Service as had accompanied

previous similar measures. Any form of independent status for aviation,

whether as an autonomous Air Service or a coordinate branch within a

department of national defense, would violate the fundamental principle of

unity of command. That, in general, was the position taken by the War

Department. The opposite view was upheld by such individuals as Mitchell,

La Guardia, Patrick, and Landis, with the latter speaking this time for the

American Legion.4' It is necessary at this point to clarify the view of

General Patrick, however, for the Chief of Air Service was indirectly

responsible for the introduction a few days later of a compromise measure

which placed him officially in a somewhat different position. This will

require a brief backward glance in point of time.

In a letter addressed to the Adjutant General on 19 December 1924

General Patrick had said:

I am convinced that the ultimate solution of the air defense problems of this

country is a united air force; that is, the placing of all of the component air units

and possibly all aeronautical development under one responsible and directing

head. Until the time when such a radical reorganization can be effected, certain

preliminary steps may well be taken, all with the ultimate end in view.

As one of the "preliminary steps" he recommended the creation of an

Air Corps under the Secretary of War somewhat along the same lines as the

Marine Corps under the Secretary of Navy. The principal changes to be

elected under such a reorganization may be outlined as follows: (1) An

all-inclusive budget showing definitely the entire cost of aviation activities;

(2) proper control and administration of related matters by officers competent as a result of air experience to handle them; and (3) a correction of the

injustices suffered by junior officers because of the operation of the existing single promotion list.4

"

As was brought out before the Morrow Board, after something more

than nine months the War Department had taken no action whatever on this

suggestion of the Chief of Air Service, and then it simply directed him to

make a complete exposition of his proposals "in about four working days."42

Mention has been made of the fact, however, that the War Department bill

subsequently introduced in Congress was patterned after the recommendation of the Morrow Board. Meanwhile, before that group General Patrick

had expressed his conviction that the "ultimate ideal solution" of the problem would be a department of national defense, with the three coordinate

branches-the Army, the Navy, and the Air. This he repeated in substance

on 26 January 1926 when appearing before the Committee on Military

57
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

Affairs of the House of Representatives which was considering the various

aviation bills then but recently introduced. At the same time he continued

to advocate as a temporary expedient the creation of an Air Corps directly

under the Secretary of War. Formulated at the request of the Committee,"3

his concrete suggestions on that score joined the other air force measures

in the form of a bill presented on 28 January by Representative J. M.

Wainwright of New York.

Although ostensibly an attempt at compromise between Morin's air

bill and a proposal for a department of national defense, the Wainwright

measure actually made but little concession to the War Department. It

would set up, under the direction of an Assistant Secretary of War for Air,

a "United States Air Corps" which was to draw up its own budget, control

all maintenance and training activities, and take over all aerial operations

from land bases. Appointed from among flying personnel by the President,

the Chief of the Air Corps was to have greater powers than the existing prototype. Although a near-autonomous organization, the Air Corps at the

direction of the President might provide units to serve with the Army,

Navy, or Marine Corps. Personnel and organizational details were similar

to those which had been suggested for the air unit in Curry's proposal for

a department of national defense."

Naturally, both the War and Navy Departments opposed the Wainwright measure.45 In fact, the expressions of disapproval on the part of Army

and Navy officers were so consistent and vehement as to raise again the

question of freedom of speech on the part of service personnel before investigating bodies. Even though it hastily assumed the proper stand in that connection, at the same time the War Department, as was reliably reported,

conducted an investigation into the alleged propaganda activities designed

to affect favorably legislation relating to the Air Service.4' Then, as though

to counteract the proposal of the Chief of Air Service and that of

Representative James (which, incidentally, had followed the Wainwright

bill in the legislative mill), it came out on 11 February with another measure which in reality was a revision of the Morin air bill.47

A quick summary at this point should clarify the major issues under

review. Through the medium of various bills which were introduced during

the first two months of the first session of the sixty-ninth Congress (that is,

from 7 December 1925 through 11 February 1926), the Committee on

Military Affairs of the lower house of the national legislature was called

upon to consider three distinct proposals relating to military aviation: 1) A

department of national defense, providing for an air force on a coordinate

basis with those on land and sea; (2) a department of air which would set

up a third defense agency in this country; and (3) an Air Corps in the Army

somewhat analogous to the Marine Corps in the Navy. In addition, there

were bills designed to effectuate the recommendations of the President's

58
CREATION OF THE ARMY AIR CORPS

Aircraft Board, the Lassiter Board, and other such agencies. The committee rejected all of them as such. The details of its actions do not concern us

here, with one major exception. The proposal for a single department of

national defense was rejected by a narrow vote of eleven to ten, at a time

when the House likely would have followed the committee in taking affirmative action.4

"

After having made a study of the principles underlying all the pertinent proposals which had been made, the House Committee on Military

Affairs on 29 March came out with a plan of its own. This was the Air

Corps bill, a compromise measure in which was incorporated "as many as

possible of the desirable features suggested," consistent with what a majority of the committee felt would be for the best interests of national defense

as a whole.49 Debated, amended, and then approved in the House, the proposal moved across the Capitol to the Senate where it went through the

same process. The debates, long and acrimonious at times, produced no

new arguments worthy of notice here, either on the part of those who

wanted an independent air arm or those who preferred to keep it subjected

wholly to the War Department. Eventually the matter was brought before a

conference committee for the purpose of ironing out the differences

between the versions passed by the two houses." Finally the bill became a

law on 2 July 1926.

Based fundamentally upon the recommendations made by the Morrow

Board, the Air Corps Act of 1926 changed the name Air Service to Air

Corps, thereby emphasizing as the major role of that branch the maintenance of an air force possessing great potential striking ability, rather than

the performance of auxiliary services to the other branches of the Army. The

regular strength of the new organization remained as had been established

by the Army Reorganization Act of 1920: that is, 1,514 officers in grades

from colonel to second lieutenant inclusive, and 16,000 enlisted men. In the

new set-up the administrative staff consisted of an additional Assistant

Secretary of War slated to perform such duties related to aviation as might

be assigned to him by his superior; a Chief of Air Corps with the rank of

major general; and three brigadier generals as assistants. Also, each of the

War Department General Staff divisions was to include an air section

headed by an Air Corps officer. That particular arrangement, however, was

to prevail for a period of only three years, at the end of which time, as was

anticipated, there would be a sufficient number of eligible Air Corps officers as to render unnecessary such a positive arbitrary provision.

Significant, too, is the fact that the Chief of Air Corps, at least two of his

assistants, and no less than 90 per centum of the officers in each grade

below that of brigadier general were to be flying officers. All flying units,

moreover, were to be commanded by such rated personnel. Additional pay

of officers and men engaged regularly and frequently in aerial flights was to

59
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

be continued. The law directed that the Secretary of War make a study of the

alleged injustices done Air Service officers by the single promotion list of

the Army, and later report to Congress thereupon. And, lastly, it authorized

a five-year program of expansion in Air Corps personnel and equipment."

This brief resume of the Air Corps Act of 1926 shows clearly that in

the final analysis the War Department had won another victory. The nearest

approach to administrative freedom for the air arm as provided in the law

was the addition of an Assistant Secretary of War to aid in fostering military aeronautics, with the possible implication that he would have complete

direction of the new corps. In due time the position was filled ably by the

appointment of F. Trubee Davison. Yet, since his duties were not specifically outlined, Secretary Davison's powers were limited to those which his

superior might be willing to delegate to him. The budget, moreover, was to

be controlled wholly from the office of the Secretary of War.

Naturally, despite certain advantages which had been gained, the act in

question did not satisfy those who desired autonomy for the air arm, either

in the form of a separate executive department or that of a branch in a

department of national defense coordinate with those of land and sea

forces. For instance, Representative La Guardia is reported to have said that

he would never quit fighting for a single department of national defense

with the three services, air, land, and water, on equal bases."2 Agreeing at

the time that the Air Corps Act would be "a long step in the right direction,"

General Patrick some two years later wrote that although conditions were

better than ever before, he did not feel that the final solution of the "vexing

question as to the best organization for our air forces" had been reached.

That, he still believed, should take the form of a "Department of National

Defense, with a Cabinet Minister at its head and under him the three military branches, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, each with an Assistant

Secretary in charge." Such an organization would make for both economy

and efficiency. 3

Writing two years later still, but long before any further fundamental

reorganization of the Air Corps had been effected, the intrepid "Billy"

Mitchell, now a private citizen, asserted that in all other leading countries

"air, land and water are under independent ministries," organized under

either a department of national defense or a committee. This made possible

a degree of coordination in which each branch of service had its own voice

in formulating plans and programs. In the United States, however, "there is

an indescribable mess about defense arrangements." Since there was no air

commander and no similarity of instruction between the air services of the

Army, Navy, Marines, or Coast Guard, he added, nobody knew who had

charge of anything."

60
Chapter 6

The Establishment of the General

Headquarters Air Force

As the result of a general insufficiency of appropriations the five-year

program of expansion for the Air Corps, as provided in the act of 2 July

1926, initially was delayed and subsequently subjected to continuous interference and postponement. During this period, however, as well as for the

next several years, the Air Corps made substantial progress. Climaxing a

series of related developments, moreover, the establishment of the General

Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force on 1 March 1935 marked a definite step

towards the creation of an autonomous air arm within the United States

Army. A survey of these events logically forms a specific unit in the history

of the struggle on behalf of an independent status for military aeronautics.

During the nine-year period between 1926 and 1935 the struggle for

what ardent military aviation enthusiasts regarded as a more efficient organization of the air arm logically divides itself into two distinct phases. Prior

to 1933 there was a continued strong effort to secure a unit which would be

separate from the War Department. This was characterized by specific proposals alternating between suggestions for a separate organization for aeronautics and plans for a department of national defense with air occupying a

position coordinate with those held by the Army and Navy. As will appear,

however, in the last two years a majority of the Air Corps officers seemed

reconciled to the idea that for the time being at least their attempt to gain

complete separation from the Army was a hopeless proposition. Shifting

their emphasis, therefore, they made more determined efforts to secure an

air tactical organization, such as later was provided in the GHQ Air Force,

and pressed demands for a separate promotion list, a separate budget, and

an air staff.

Events connected with the two distinct phases of the period will be

taken up appropriately. First, however, the reader's attention is directed to

certain general developments in aviation history which, though somewhat

removed from the central theme of this study, do have an important bearing

61
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

upon most any aspect of the subject. Then, certain related matters touching

on the history of the Air Corps require brief mention.

In the years immediately following the adoption of the Air Corps Act

remarkable progress was made in all phases of aeronautics. Both military

personnel and private fliers chalked up outstanding record-breaking flights.

Long range endurance tests and refueling experiments were conducted,

while the practicability of instrument flying was successfully demonstrated.

These achievements plus the personality appeal of outstanding airmen

aroused to unprecedented heights public interest in aviation, stimulated

technological developments in aeronautics, and brought about the organization of numerous aircraft companies which turned out planes with progressively increased cruising speeds and load capacities. As regards commercial aviation, definite progress was made in airline transportation with

the gradual emergence of a veritable network of transcontinental airways

across the United States. Concurrent developments in radio and in weather

reporting helped to increase the safety of flying and thus to build up public

confidence in aviation.'

Meanwhile the Air Force idea, involving the suggestion of observation,

bombardment, and pursuit units, which was planted by General Patrick and

the Lassiter Board as early as 1923, had begun to bear fruit in the form of

a development of the concept of military air power as a striking force. As

pointed out in the previous chapter, the jurisdictional conflict between the

Army and Navy and the internal struggle within the War Department itself

had prevented the early consummation of the relevant recommendations;

yet the idea persisted. Used more and more by military men, the expression "command of the air" came to mean an ability to strike effectively at the

enemy's bases of operations and supply, as well as to maintain superiority

in reconnaissance and combat. To members of the Air Corps especially this

concept of air power, enhanced as it was by the gradual evolution of the

heavy bomber capable of making long range attacks upon enemy installations, naturally seemed somewhat incongruous with the status of an air arm

organized as a mere auxiliary of the Army. Now more than ever regular airmen envisioned phases of modern warfare in which infantry movements

would be supported by advanced fleets of bombers operating under the

jurisdiction of an organization either wholly independent of or coordinate

with the existing War Department.2 In the Air Corps Training Center, moreover, flying cadets received instruction in the concept of offensive air

power; while those who long had fought for a separate air force never lost

sight of their ultimate objective.

The feeling of discontent and unrest among members of the Air Corps

was enlarged by the failure to maintain the five-year program. A few figures

will indicate the extent of this deficiency. As eventually set up the plan

(delayed one year at the beginning) provided that by 30 June 1932 the air

62
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ AF

arm should have 1,800 serviceable airplanes with an actual allotment of

1,650 officers and 15,000 enlisted men. This was calibrated so that at the

end of the first year there should have been 1,186 planes, 1,100 officers,

and 9,590 enlisted personnel. At that time, however, the Air Corps was short

247 planes (although the greater part of that number was on order), 86 officers, and 76 men below officer rank. Comparable shortages were revealed

for each of the succeeding years, until at the end of the five-year program

on 30 June 1932 they stood as follows: serviceable planes 129, officers 396,

and enlisted personnel 1,600 (an approximation).3

Dissatisfaction over the lagging five-year program was heightened by

the fact that the appurtenant Air Corps appropriations were scaled down in

the Office of the Secretary of War and the Bureau of the Budget, rather than

in Congress. 4 This naturally increased the demand on the part of the Air

Corps for a separate budget. At all times during the period immediately

under review, likewise, the single promotion list for the whole Army continued to be a source of grievance to the personnel of the military air arm.

Disregarding the normal World War I "hump," which tended to affect all

branches of service, the basic explanation is quite simple. Because of the

extensive training which was required during that earlier emergency, Air

Service trainees were delayed several months in receiving their commissions. Having thus been placed lower on the promotion list, Air Corps officers, generally speaking, remained junior to those of other arms who perhaps had entered service at the same time, or even later. The situation was

enhanced by virtue of the fact that subsequently some of the ground officers had transferred to the Air Corps. Since the performance of duties connected with this arm was more hazardous, on a proportional basis the

vacancies were more numerous in this arm than in the others. Yet the promotions among the lower grades resulting therefrom were spread among all

the branches of service. Stated succinctly, the net result was that many Air

Corps officers were performing duties all out of proportion to their rank.

This naturally lowered the morale of the airmen and caused the resignation

of many officers whose services the Army could ill afford to lose. In accordance with the Air Corps Act of 1926, the War Department early set up a

board of officers for the purpose of making a thorough investigation of the

whole matter and reporting therdon. Although accomplished, this produced

no conclusive action. Congress, which also wrestled with the thorny problem, fared no better. The Furlow bill providing a separate promotion list for

the Air Corps met with the approval of the House of Representatives, but

bogged down in the Senate, which later offered its own solution to the question. In the end, however, no legislation was enacted.'

During the period from July 1926 to March 1935, Congress actually

devoted but little time to consideration of legislation bearing directly upon

the organizational status of the Air Corps as a part of the armed forces of

63
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

the United States. True enough, a large number of such bills found their

way into the legislative hopper. The majority proposed a separate department of air. Others recommended a department of national defense. Some

of them would provide within this superstructure coordinate divisions for

Air, War, and Navy. The remainder simply would consolidate therein the

existing departments of War and Navy, and thus affect the Air Corps only

indirectly. None of these bills as such ever reached the floor of either house

of Congress; while but two were studied at length by any congressional

committee. Only the latter requires further consideration here.'

The two bills in question related to a department of national defense.

The relative emphasis placed on that form of organization at the time, coinciding as it did with the early stages of the economic depression which

began in 1929, indicated a shift in the basic argument of those who wished

to create a separate branch for aviation. Inasmuch as any reasonable proposal which gave promise of reducing government expenditures appealed to

both Congress and the general public the question of adequate defense was

subordinated to economic considerations; for undoubtedly there were

grounds for argument that it would be less expensive to operate two or more

units as coordinate divisions in one department than to maintain them as

individual organizations.

The two aforementioned bills providing for departments of national

defense were introduced on 8 December 1931 and 5 January 1932, respectively, by Congressman William Williamson and Representative Joseph W.

Byrns.' Instead of being referred to the Committee on Military Affairs,

which previously had proved to be the "grave-yard" of so many similar proposals, they were routed to the recently organized Committee on

Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Therein hearings commenced

on 21 January following. A perusal of the printed record of these proceedings, which were conducted at intervals over a period of four weeks, indicates that the only real proponents of the measure were their sponsors and

Representative John J. McSwain.' Their most vociferous opponent was

Congressman Charles H. Martin, a retired Army officer who was at one

time an Assistant Chief of Staff. It was his expressed opinion that if

Congress allowed greater freedom to "those air birds," whom he characterized as the "most extravagant, undisciplined, expensive people on earth," it

would have to organize "something like the Bureau of the Budget to take

care of the appropriation to keep them going." He urged the committee not

to turn the Air Corps officers loose on a "long-suffering public" and insisted

that to combine their air services would do incalculable harm so the Army

and Navy.

The leading military witness at the hearings was General Foulois who

but recently had succeeded Maj. Gen. J. E. Fechet as Chief of the Air Corps.

While refuting the charge of extravagance and inefficiency in his organiza64
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ AF

tion, General Foulois very properly took Congressman Martin to task for

his exaggerated statements, but was unwilling to sanction the proposed legislation under consideration. In lieu of the immediate creation of a department of national defense, for which he did not think existing conditions

were propitious, the Chief of Air Corps would take an intermediate step by

setting up an organization which might best be identified under the designation of a separate department of aeronautics.1 0 Both Secretary of Navy

Charles Francis Adams and Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley opposed the

bills, but in so doing, one may add, they contributed nothing new to the traditional arguments on that score.1

"

Although not appearing as a witness, General Douglas MacArthur,

Chief of Staff, wrote a member of the committee while the hearings were

in progress that no measure proposed in recent years seemed to be fraught

with "such potential possibilities of disaster for the United States" as a project for amalgamating the War and Navy Departments into one bureau of

government. This was particularly true in view of the existing international

situation, he said, for the prospect of victory on the part of the United States

would be endangered by the consummation of such a proposal. Do that, the

Chief of Staff concluded, "and every potential enemy of the United States

will rejoice." 2 A few months later General MacArthur devoted a considerable portion of his annual report to a denunciation of the plan to organize a

department of national defense, with subdivisions for Air, Army, and Navy,

primarily on the ground that what minor economies (if any) might result

would be more than offset by decreased efficiency on the part of the armed

forces of the United States. In summarizing one section of this discussion,

he said:

...Governmentally, we have today, from the standpoint of national strategy and

policy, the strongest possible organization for war. It seems almost incomprehensible that this organization, which incidentally has been the envy of soldiers,

sailors, and statesmen abroad, should be tampered with in its major elements in

favor of a highly speculative experiment. 3

Neither the Byrns bill nor that which had been offered by

Congressman Williamson made its way back to the floor of the House of

Representatives." Sometime later, however, the former was incorporated

bodily in a separate measure. Indicated as Title 6 of the Economy Bill for

1932, it came up for debate on the floor of the House the latter part of April.

As on the previous occasion, Representative Martin denounced the proposal in the most extreme terms. Its strongest advocates were Congressmen

La Guardia and Byron B. Harlon who stressed the economy features,

which, as estimated, would effect an annual saving of from $50,000,000 to

$100,000,000. After a rather stormy session, Title 6 of the Economy Bill

65
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

was eliminated completely by a vote of 163 to 135." Bringing to a close the

first regular Congressional debate on the question of a department of

national defense, this represented the only collective action taken prior to

1945 by either house of Congress on this succession of legislative proposals.' 6 Within the next two years other comparable bills were brought up.

They received but relatively little Congressional attention, however, for by

this time the majority of the Air Corps enthusiasts definitely had shifted

their interest towards the attainment (temporarily, at least) of the more limited objectives which have been mentioned-an air tactical organization; a

separate promotion list; a separate budget; and an air staff.

Prospects for the accomplishment of these aims were enhanced materially by a series of seemingly unrelated events which should be introduced

at this point. Reference is made to the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as

President of the United States; the reorganization of the Army, together

with the development of proposed defense plans; and, finally, the air mail

controversy which came to a climax in the winter of 1933-1934. These

developments will be discussed as appropriate in the order mentioned.

As a pioneer in the beginning of naval air strength while Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson administrations, President Roosevelt

early had developed an interest in flying which eventually made him an aviation enthusiast. In 1933 he became not only the first flying Chief

Executive, but also the first occupant of the White House to exhibit a cogent

interest in the possibilities of a striking air force. This naturally encouraged

the advocates of a strong Air Corps, not to say the aviation industry in general, as may be illustrated by the following excerpts from an "open letter"

which appeared currently in a well-known aeronautical journal:

The aviation industry is proud, Mr. President in the knowledge that in you

America has achieved its first flying Chief Executive. In the industry's struggle

of recent years not the least formidable of the obstacles in the path to progress

was the necessity of dealing.., with a great many people who had never flown,

who did not intend to fly, and who therefore were completely lacking in all of

that first-hand knowledge which is so essential to an honest understanding of

aviation. The handicap of proving the cause of flying to a non-flier long has

been recognized by everyone in the industry as the almost impossible task. In

the knowledge that they are dealing with an airplane owner and airplane

user...the men in aviation have cause for special confidence.....7

In the months immediately following Roosevelt's inauguration one of

the frequent visitors at the White House was William Mitchell, who was

quoted as saying on I September 1933 that the administration planned to

survey "the entire aviation situation of the United States this next winter."'" As the months passed, however, he seemed to become somewhat

66
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ AF

impatient at the slow progress which was being made in the interest of

military aeronautics.19 Yet there is no doubt that over a period of time the

President's influence was of inestimable value to aviation in general; and,

as we shall note, during his first administration he was responsible for the

creation of two major commissions which made a study of the nation's air

problem.

As a part of a general preparedness program, generally comparable to

that which engaged the attention of various democracies in view of the rising tide of fascist militarism, long before the election of Franklin D.

Roosevelt, the Army had launched a plan of reorganization. In this country

the General Staff consolidated into four field armies the tactical units hitherto under the jurisdiction of the nine corps areas. The motivation for the

creation of this "four-Army plan," as stated, was a desire to weld the existing military units into "an integrated machine capable of instantaneous

response" to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.20 Subsequently, elaborate secret defense plans were drawn up; and on 3 June 1933 the Air Corps

was called upon to indicate how the air arm might best participate in the

proposed program.2' Compliance with these instructions from the War

Department was made over the signature of Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover,

Acting Chief of Air Corps, following several weeks of intensive study.

Renouncing the idea that all air force activities must tie in with ground

operations and stressing the initial air defense of the coast to a distance of

200 to 300 miles off-shore, Westover's plan proposed as a means of protection for seven designated areas a detail of planes which, controlled by a

General Headquarters Air Force and coordinated with a radio communication and alarm system along the shore, would operate as a coastal defense

unit. Meanwhile the striking arm of the Air Force, consisting of either bombardment, attack, or pursuit planes (or in a combination of two or all three

of these types, as the occasion might warrant) would be held in abeyance

for use as needed. This suggested grouping of the Air Force units was not

intended as a permanent distribution: but rather was offered as a temporary

disposition pending the location of the main enemy threat, after which it

would be rearranged accordingly.22

At the instance of the Secretary of War, the Westover plan was reviewed by a typical General Staff board, headed by the Deputy Chief of

Staff, General Drum. With the exception of the Chief of Air Corps, the

Drum Board, as it was called, consisted altogether of ground officers.

Declaring that the Air Corps report was based upon a considerable misunderstanding of the problem," this group decided to formulate and present in

lieu thereof some recommendations of its own. On the whole the Drum

Board report, which came out in October 1933, minimized the importance

of air power, although it stressed the necessity of bases in all land operations. What is more important, moreover, the board recommended a

67
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

"General Headquarters Air Force" to be used as a strategic force for long

range reconnaissance, for the restriction of comparable movements on the

part of a foe, and for the demolition of major installations within enemy territory. From the tactical point of view it would be brought into play as a

support for ground forces before, during, and after battle. Naturally this

approval of the GHO Air Force idea served as a stimulus to further Air

Corps plans for that type of organization. Yet the Drum Board, though estimating that anything less than a force of 2,320 serviceable planes would be

insufficient to meet all "reasonably possible requirements," limited its recommendation in that respect to the relatively small number of 1,800 such

planes, on the grounds that it could not urge an increase in Air Corps

materiel at the expense of the other arms and services. Likewise, it refused

to recommend additional Air Corps personnel at the time, but did suggest

that appropriate estimates be kept on hand in case possible national defense

requirements indicated an increase in numbers.2

"

Before any final action had been taken with respect to the creation of

the GHQ Air Force public attention was focused in a large degree upon the

military air arm and its problems as a result of the air mail controversy. A

brief statement of that issue will suffice here. Prolonged criticism directed

against the method of awarding contracts to private companies for carrying

air mail was followed by several special investigations. Convinced thereby

that they had been drawn up not only in violation of law but also as a result

of collusion and fraud, the Postmaster General promptly annulled the existing agreements. In order to forestall a complete cessation of this service

President Roosevelt ordered the Air Corps to transport the air mail over

vital routes during the emergency. Something approaching a complete

debacle followed. Without proper equipment, adequate ground organization, or experience in handling scheduled transport service, and plagued by

extremely bad flying weather, the Air Corps faced an almost impossible situation. Numerous accidents within a period of three weeks resulted in a

loss of ten lives. Needless to state, the air arm was subjected to a tremendous barrage of criticism, emanating in large part from Republican critics

of the administration and from individuals who formerly had held fat air

mail contracts.2"

Had it not been for the tragic loss of life involved one might be

inclined to say that the air mail episode proved to be a blessing in disguise

for the Air Corps. Indirectly, at least, it influenced the creation of two more

special investigating bodies, which though discounting the idea of a separate department of the air or even a separate air force, did bring into sharper

focus the inadequacies of aviation in general and sanctioned some of the

more limited objectives of the Air Corps. Appointed on 17 April 1934, the

first of these was the War Department Special Committee on the Army Air

Corps, commonly known as the Baker Board in recognition of its chairman,

68
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ AF

the former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. The full complement all told

consisted of six civilians and six Army officers. Among the latter were

General Drum and General Foulois. As on previous similar War Department

commissions, among the military personnel the nonfliers far outnumbered

the aviators.'

Stated summarily, the Baker Board was convened for the purpose of

making a "constructive study and report" upon the operations of the Air

Corps as an agency of national defense in peace and war, together with an

analysis of its proper relation to civil aviation. Piling up well over 4,000

pages, it spent 25 days taking testimony from 105 witnesses (representing

the "best available civilian, naval, and military thought on aviation") who

supported their ideas with a total of 250 primary documents. These, along

with written statements presenting solicited views from over 500 different

Air Corps officers, were filed as exhibits to the record.26

Although it may not have been "the best study ever made of our Army

Air Corps," as characterized later by Secretary of War George H. Dern, the

Baker Board Report which was dated 18 July 1934 on several counts

proved to be a very significant document. Delving briefly into the history

of national defense since World War I, it stated that the most important consideration under review was the advisability of creating a department of air

or a department of national defense; and it listed fourteen bodies as having

made special studies of the question. Seven of them, as pointed out, had

concluded that aerial activity could not be carried on independently; and it

added that only one, the Lampert Committee, had recommended separation

through the organization of a department of national defense. Strangely

enough, however, the Baker Board failed even to mention the American

Aviation Mission which unequivocally had argued the creation of a department of air. 7

The board held that to concentrate the control of all aviation matters in

the hands of one executive department would "violate our traditional policy" of maintaining as separate functions civil and military agencies. A consolidation of all defense aviation either in a separate executive department

or as a coordinating unit in a department of national defense, identified as

a purely European arrangement, was regarded as entailing a "financial burden.. .far greater" than under the existing system." In addition, the matter of

efficiency should be taken into consideration. Admitting that aviation had

enhanced, the power of defense where the belligerent powers were geographically contiguous to one another, and the power of defense if they

were widely separated, Baker and his associates stressed, however, what

they deemed to be vital limitations of military aviation: The necessity of

either land or floating bases; the inability alone to capture and hold enemy

positions; problems of supply, including replacement of aircraft; contingency upon weather conditions for practicable operations; the necessity for

69
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

protection by other forces except when actually in the air; and the limited

load capacity of airplanes. Continuing in this general vein,. they declared

that the

"air invasion of the United States" and the "air defense of the United States" are

conceptions of those who failed adequately to consider the effect of ocean barriers and other limitations. Aircraft in sufficient numbers to threaten serious

damage can be brought against us only in conjunction with sea forces or with

land forces which must be met by forces identical in nature and equally capable

of prolonged effort.29

The Baker Board insisted that a separation of the air arm from the Army

would violate the principle of unity of command, which it held as indispensable in the successful prosecution of war. The military adviser to both

the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of War was the Chief of Staff.

Application of the "principle of unity of command and control...applies to

and must rest in" his hands. As advisers he had the General Staff; the chiefs

of various arms and services; the Army corps area, and overseas commanders. To organize the Air Corps into a body independent of this established

control and cooperation would lead to "failure resulting from lack of common objectives, confusion and cross purposes." The board admitted, however, that it might be well to increase the number of Air Corps officers on

the General Staff and suggested that such action be taken without delay?.

The Baker Board was inclined to blame the office of the Assistant

Secretary of War for Air (which, incidentally, had been left vacant following the inauguration of Roosevelt in 1933) for the emphasis placed upon the

proposal to make the Air Corps an independent branch in the War

Department, responsible solely to its head, and thus exempt from the supervision of the General Staff.' Coupled therewith, according to the report,

were the demands on the part of the Air Corps for a separate promotion list,

an individual budget, and direct command of all combat units. This apparent unanimity of opinion of the air officers who had urged these limited

objectives, it continued, likely was "influenced by action of those formerly

advocating complete separation of the Air Corps from the Army but who

had become convinced that such action could not be consummated."

Finally, an inimical attitude towards this group was indicated in the comment that the manner in which the written opinions submitted to the Board

"were gathered tends to weaken greatly the effect of the testimony."'32

Although it denied most of their claims for aerial warfare, the Baker

Board did make an important concession to the airmen. Expressing general

accord with the Drum Board as related to the conception of tactical employment, it recommended the creation of a General Headquarters Air Force,

made up of all air combat units and auxiliaries thereto, which would be

70
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ AF

trained as a homogeneous unit capable of operating either in close cooperation with the ground forces or independent thereof. Responsible to the

General Staff, the GHQ commander, preferably a leader with adequate flying experience, should have jurisdiction over such matters relating to his

component as organization, the maintenance and operation of technical

equipment, unit training, and maneuvers. No change was recommended for

the position of the Air Corps as a branch of the Army. According to the suggestion of the Baker Board, however, its combat force would be separated

from the supply and formal training functions. The latter, as suggested,

"would remain with the Chief of Air Corps, operating under normal War

Department coordination and direction.33

A study of the hearings and report concerned indicatesseveral probable reasons why the Baker Board recommended the GHQ Air Force. In the

first place, it appears that this proposed reorganization was intended to

weaken, not to say silence altogether, the clamor for a separate air force.

Secondly, there was a hope that it would head off a possible recommendation by the Federal Aviation Commission-to be discussed presently-for

a separation of the air arm from the rest of the Army. Finally, it was

designed to sirengthen the grip of the General Staff on the Air Corps. The

action has been viewed also as a rebuff to the Chief of the Air Corps, who

was regarded as favoring a separate Army and Navy air force.' General

Foulois, however, signed the report with no apparent reservations, as did all

the members of the Board with one exception. The lone dissenter in that

respect was at the time a civilian, James H. Doolittle, whose brief "minority report" is worth noting in some detail here. After expressing a firm

belief in aviation and its future, he said:

...I am convinced that the required air force [that necessary for national security] can be more rapidly organized, equipped and trained if it is completely separated from the Army and developed as an entirely separate arm. If complete

separation is not the desire of the committee, I recommend an air force as a part

of the Army but with a separate budget, a separate promotion list and removed

from the control of the General Staff. These are my sincere convictions. Failing

either, I feel that the Air Corps should be developed and expanded under the

direction of the General Staff as recommended above. 35

The second major investigating body to concern itself with aviation

problems during the period immediately under review was the Federal

Aviation Commission, which was created in accordance with the Air Mail

Act of 12 June 1934 for the purpose of making an appropriate survey and

then submitting to Congress, not later than 1 February 1935, its report in

the form of a recommendation for a "broad policy covering all phases of

aviation and the relations of the United States thereto." With Clark Howell,

71
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

editor of the Atlanta Constitution, as chairman. This group, consisting

exclusively of civilians, was appointed shortly before the report of the

Baker Board was released." Having made rather exhaustive preliminary

preparations, the Howell group late in September commenced a series of

hearings which eventually involved nearly 200 witnesses, including cabinet

members, congressmen, personnel from those branches of the government

service actively interested in aviation, representatives of the aeronautics

industry, and members of aviation societies. It also studied the records and

reports of the many previous similar investigating agencies, from the

Crowell Mission of 1919 on down through the Baker Board, and, in fact,

held personal consultations with several members of the last mentioned

group. 7

There is ample evidence to support the conviction that the Howell

Commission muted an excellent opportunity to do something for military

aeronautics. Its membership was free from dominance by the General Staff.

The information gathered was rather extensive. Public opinion in general,

moreover, certainly was not averse to a separate air force. Had their study

been completed prior to the publication of the Baker Board report and

before the plans to establish the GHQ Air Force had been formulated, it is

altogether probable that Howell and his associates would have recommended an autonomous air organization. As it was, their report, dated 22

January 1935, stated that the commission preferred to "refrain from comment" until the experiment in the form of a GHQ Air Force had been

allowed opportunity for adequate trial. It noted, however, that there was

good reason to believe that aircraft had passed "beyond their former position" solely as useful auxiliaries; and that thenceforth they should be utilized as important means of exerting directly the "will of the Commanderin-Chief." In that connection, the report continued:

We have no doubt that there will be a progressively greater measure of independent action of aircraft in military operation as the capacities of aircraft

increase. We interpret the present proposals as a step towards provision for such

increased independence...Further steps may in due course become necessary. If

the degree of independence provided under the present plan is so used as to lead

to the development of an effective strategy of air force employment...the desirability of further organizational changes may in due course become apparent."

Apparently the Howell Commission gave no consideration to the

oft-repeated proposal of a separate department of aeronautics. At the same

time, though generally counselling against a unified department of national

defense, it noted that the existing degree of mutual understanding between

the Army and Navy was less than might be desired. This difficulty, the

report held, was not the result of any peculiar defects in the division of

functions between the two services. In countries where there were three of

72
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ AF

them, with an independent air force providing the third, it continued, "opportunities for conflict of opinion about who is to do what and how

seem to be no less marked than under our own two-service arrangement."

Holding that the whole matter lay beyond the scope of its investigation, the

Howell group made no pertinent recommendation in that respect other than

that the question be made the subject of extended examination by some

appropriate agency in the near future.39

Meanwhile, acting in general accord with the suggestions of the Drum

Board and the recommendations of its Special Committee on the Army Air

Corps, the War Department was fast completing plans for the organization

of the new tactical unit. As announced in a letter issued by the Adjutant

General on the last day of the year 1934, the GHQ Air Force was scheduled

for activation as of 1 March 1935. Air combat units then scattered through

the corps areas were to be consolidated into one force which, with respect

to tactical instruction, training, and employment, would be under the control of a commanding general subject only to the General Staff (and theater

commanders in time of war). Corps area commanders would retain administrative jurisdiction, including courts-martial, in time of peace over bases

where such tactical units were stationed. Supply and training functions, as

indicated, would remain under the control of the Chief of Air Corps.

Headquarters of the GHQ Air Force was to be located at Langley Field,

Virginia, while those of the subordinate wings would be set up at Langley

Field; Barksdale Field, Louisiana; and March Field, California.4 0

At the appointed time the new organization came into being, under the

command of Brig. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, a member of the General Staff,

and one-time Chief of the Training and Operations Division, Office of the

Chief of Air Corps. An expedient and a compromise at best, the GHQ Air

Force left the military air arm with a number of problems which would not

have survived the creation of a separate air force. In the first place, its commanding officer was still subordinate to the high command of the Army.

Neither a separate budget nor a separate promotion list had been obtained.

The fact that the corps area commanders retained administrative control,

including courtsmartial jurisdiction, in their respective districts restricted

the authority to be wielded over his own personnel by the Commanding

General of the GHQ Air Force. Lastly, the division of authority between

that officer, who had jurisdiction over the purely combat element, and the

Chief of Air Corps, who controlled matters of supply and training, provided

a basis for future discord.

It would be too much to say that anyone connected with the Air Corps

was wholly pleased with the establishment of the GHQ Air Force. Few of

them, however, likely took such a dim view of the situation as that held by

William Mitchell. Testifying before the Federal Aviation Commission on 24

November 1934, the former brigadier general referred to the proposed orga73
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

nization as "nothing but a subterfuge" which "merely divides aviation into

more parts" than it already had.4' Probably the majority of the airmen at this

time agreed on the whole with the opinion attributed meanwhile to Col.

Henry H. Arnold. Although concurring generally with General Mitchell on

the desirability of an independent air force, the future Commanding

General of the Army Air Forces expressed himself as believing that under

the new arrangement soon to be set up conditions would change to meet

most of the objectives theretofore espoused by himself and others who felt

like him. The proper thing to do, therefore, was to give the GHQ Air Force

a trial for at least two years before insisting upon a complete separation of

the air arm from the rest of the Army.4" Six years later he took occasion to

state that in the light of intervening developments the creation of the GHQ

Air Force had proved to be a wise and forward-looking step." Soon after

that air component first was organized General Foulois expressed the same

general opinion, adding, in substance, that up until that time it was the best

thing that had been done to build up a proper air defense of the United

States;" but evidently he too hoped for a more fundamental change in the

future.

The attitude of Colonel Arnold, General Foulois, and other Air Corps

officers who at this early date apparently were reconciled to the existence

of the GHQ Air Force as a stepping stone to their ultimate objective, occupied a sort of intermediate position between the stand taken by the extremists who still insisted upon the immediate creation of a separate air

force on the one hand and that of the Army General Staff on the other. In

his succeeding annual report the Chief of Staff deplored the fact that for so

many years the matter of the higher organization of the Air Corps had been

the subject of continuous spirited contention and debate which, he said, had

produced a lack of continuity and stability in policy, impeded progress, and

created dissensions where perfect harmony should have prevailed. General

MacArthur felt, however, that an excellent solution had been reached in the

creation of the General Headquarters Air Force. This arrangement, he stated

categorically, under existing circumstances was "ideally suited to the country's needs"; and, so far as organization was concerned, it was fully capable of "performing every mission that could be carried out by an Air Force

organized separately from the Army." Besides, without the necessity of having to set up a complete supply and maintenance system, and being the

recipient of many essential services which otherwise it must provide for

itself, the GHQ organization was more economical than an independent air

force would be.4

"

The Chief of Staff expressed the hope that in order to insure a continuity in policy for a reasonable period the authorities concerned would

refuse to consider for at least five years any suggested change in the status

quo of the General Headquarters Air Force. With that understanding there

74
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ AF

would be no occasion for the introduction of what the Chief of Staff

regarded as "false or irritating issues that not only impede progress but for

the moment at least are inconsequential." Yet General MacArthur made a

definite concession to the future by adding that if after the five-year period

had elapsed existing conditions indicated the wisdom of analyzing once

again such matters as basic organization and control, a thorough consideration of appropriate proposals would be altogether in order.46 As events

were to prove, however, fundamental changes in the organic structure of the

military air arm were made earlier than was deemed best by the Chief of

Staff in 1935.

75
Chapter 7

The Air Corps and

the GHQ Air Force,

1935-1941

As was brought out in the preceding chapter, over and above the fact

that it failed to provide a separate organization for military aeronautics, with

the establishment of the General Headquarters Air Force on 1 March 1935

the War Department set up the basic conditions for two major problems

which served to plague the Air Corps at intervals over a period of more than

six years. Reference is made, first, to the arrangement whereby the corps

area commanders retained administrative control, including courts-martial

jurisdiction, in their respective districts. Restricting the authority exercised

over his own personnel by the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force,

of course, had a direct bearing upon the degree of autonomy wielded by the

military air arm. Then there was the division of responsibility between the

component comprising the purely combat element and the Office of Chief

of Air Corps which controlled matters of supply and training. As events

were to prove, this factor was a veritable source of discord within the Air

Corps itself. Discussions relative to these two problems will be taken up

next. Then follows a brief survey of the movement for an independent air

arm as it developed in the period from 1935 to 1941.

One of the most poignant current comments upon the unsatisfactory

relations between the Air Corps stations and the respective corps area commanders was that made by Lt. Col. Ralph Royce, Commanding Officer at

Selfridge Field, Michigan, on 25 November 1935. Writing the Commanding General of the Sixth Corps Area, Colonel Royce pointed out that he

was responsible to four different commanders: The Chief of Air Corps for

personnel and technical inspection; the Chief of the Materiel Division on

matters relating to maintenance; the Commanding General of the GHQ Air

Force with respect to technical training and development of group and service squadrons; and, finally, the corps area commanders for questions relating to court-martial and the non-Air Corps troops at the station. Insisting

77
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

that it was difficult even under the most favorable circumstances for the station commander to carry on his work without sometimes unintentionally

displeasing one of his four superiors, Royce favored a reorganization which

would bring the air arm under a unified command. Whether it be placed

under the Chief of Air Corps or the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force,

was relatively immaterial. Unity was the important consideration.' Six

weeks later the Browning Board which had been appointed to study matters

relating to Air Corps personnel digressed slightly in its report to comment

upon corps area problems. Although discovering no intentional interference

by any corps area commander with air force operations, it had noted some

minor misunderstandings. There was little or no reason for the existing

means of control, the report stated in substance, since the corps area commanders apparently could give the air force no help other than that which

they rendered "exempted" stations. Inasmuch as the arrangement imposed

a dual responsibility on station commanders as well as divided control over

them, moreover, the board believed that the proper solution would be to

place all air force stations with all their personnel and units "solely under

the Air Force chain of command."2

While the report of the Browning Board was under consideration the

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, came out in opposition to an exempted status

for the Air Corps stations. Holding that the confusion under the current

arrangement was more apparent than real, he suggested that the air force

combat units be placed under the field force army commanders.

Meanwhile, however, General Frank M. Andrews, the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force, had expressed himself as favoring the complete

exemption of the Air Corps stations from corps area control. Eventually the

Deputy Chief of Staff supported the Browning Board and General Andrews

in their recommendations; and on 8 May 1936, with the exception of

court-martial jurisdiction, the Air Corps stations were exempted from corps

area control.' As will appear, they were placed back under the corps area

commanders on 19 November 1940, but removed once more on 21 June

1941. The War Department attitude on this issue, incidentally, partially

reflected the stand it took on the larger question of a separate air force.

The problem presented by the division of authority within the Air

Corps per se received the attention of the high military authorities directly

concerned as quickly as did that which was involved in the exempted stations controversy. Eight months after the GHQ Air Force had been created

its commanding officer decried the fact that his organization, although

without an authorized voice in securing the means to the end, was responsible for combat efficiency; while, on the other hand, the Office of the Chief

of Air Corps, with no responsibility for achieving the desired results, controlled the funds, selected the equipment and personnel, and prescribed the

tactics and methods of employing combat units. Among several remedies

78
AIR CORPS AND GHQ AF

suggested for the more efficient coordination of Air Corps activities

General Andrews believed the best solution would be the creation of the

General Staff of an Air Division headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff

responsible for military aviation. Besides furnishing the necessary superior

control and equipping the General Staff properly to handle air matters, the

Air Division, he felt, would tend to quiet the move for a separate air force,

unify the Air Corps, and prevent the "recurrence of such conditions as made

it necessary" to create the GHQ Air Force.4 Although finding merit in some

of General Andrews' suggestions, General Westover, the newly appointed

Chief of Air Corps, on 17 January 1936 expressed a conviction that the best

way to achieve a unity of control would be to place the GHQ Air Force

under the Chief of Air Corps who would have full responsibility to the

Chief of Staff.'

A position generally similar to that held by General Westover had

been announced a few days earlier by the Browning Board which was mentioned above. This group pronounced the GHQ Air Force as a worthy organization which should be continued. Among other things, however, the

division of responsibility between it and the Office of the Chief of Air

Corps lacked simplicity, caused confusion, increased the overhead for

administration, and split the whole organization into factions. A consolidation of the military air arm under one head, preferably the Chief of Air

Corps, would permit the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, to "devote

his maximum effort to training and a minimum to administration."6 In April

1936 a special Air Corps board which had been convened to study the problem agreed substantially with the Browning Board report regarding a complete amalgamation of the major components of the air arm for administrative purposes. On such matters the Commanding General of the GHQ

Air Force should report directly to the Chief of Air Corps and not to any

lower echelon of his office. Yet because of a peculiar circumstance which

presented the aspect of a lack of complete unity on the part of the board,

the authorities deemed it best not to use this report as a basis of recommendation.7 Meanwhile in a memorandum to General Malin Craig, General

MacArthur's successor as Chief of Staff, the Chief of Air Corps again had

recommended that the GHO Air Force be subordinated to the jurisdiction

of his office. To this officer the reasons seemed quite logical. The War

Department desired that all air matters be decided within the air arm of

which the Chief of Air Corps was the head, and for which he was responsible. The GHQ organization, moreover, constituted only 40 per centum of

the Air Corps; and it was reasonable to assume that the larger element

should take precedence over the smaller. A few days later Maj. Gen.

George S. Simonds, the Deputy Chief of Staff, proposed that the Chief of

Air Corps be given some of the functions of a deputy chief of staff. In such

a position he would have more authority but no jurisdiction over the

79
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

Commanding General, GHQ Air Force.' Neither suggestion was accepted.

Continued inaction on the part of the higher authorities led General

Andrews to believe that the War Department was not making an honest

effort to settle the Air Corps problems. Because of what he regarded as the

failure of a study made under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-3, to come to grips with the real issues involved, the GHO Air Force

leader felt constrained to say it appeared that the G-3 section entertained a

fear that the Air Corps "might grow to overshadow other elements of the

War Department," even though for the time being the major effort in

national defense should consist in the maximum development of air

power.'

Following a dormant period of several months, as judged by the available evidence, the discussions relative to the division of responsibility

between the two components of the Air Corps were resumed late in the

spring of 1937. In a report dated 1 May, General Westover insisted that the

Chief of Air Corps during time of peace should be designated also as Chief

of Aviation, General Headquarters; and as such be placed in the chain of

command between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General, GHO

Air Force.' On the same day, however, the latter officer offered opposing

views. He insisted that the Office of the Chief of Air Corps was a service

unit, and thus should not be superior to a combat element. For all practical

purposes, with respect to the coordination of air activities the Chief of Air

Corps had assumed a function of the General Staff. Therefore, even though

it had no legal authority over the GHO Air Force, by acting as a superior

air general staff the Office of the Chief of Air Corps could "exert a high

degree of control over the instrument it is intended to serve." General

Andrews had no specific recommendations to offer at this time. He was

convinced, however, that divided as it was the air arm could not mold an

effective fighting force; and that the creation of an agency to remedy the

existing condition should not be regarded as preferential treatment for the

Air Corps."

Although disinclined to offer a detailed rebuttal to the charge that the

Office of the Chief of Air Corps had acted in the nature of a general staff

over the GHO Air Force, the following November General Westover indicated a strong conviction that the air arm should remain in a subordinate

position to the Army proper. Then in a report the the Adjutant General he

added:

The Chief of the Air Corps and his staff are a part of the War Department

and, as such, endeavor to advise the Chief of Staff personally and

thc...General Staff on all matters affecting the Air Corps as a whole in the

best interests of the Army and National Defense. The final decision is and

80
AIR CORPS AND GHQ AF

always has been that of the Chief of Staff and not the Chief of Air

Corps.... 21

A few weeks before the above "reply" was made by the Chief of Air

Corps, General Andrews had asserted that the weaknesses of the organization were accentuated by the "continual differences" over personnel, equipment, and funds. These problems were practically insoluble, he felt, as long

as the heads of the two elements remained on the same echelon of command. This time he had three possible solutions to offer: 1) The creation of

a Chief of Aviation with immediate jurisdiction over both the service and

the tactical units; 2) the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for

Aviation; or 3) the subordination of the GHQ Air Force to the Chief of Air

Corps. The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, considered the last of

these proposals as least desirable but felt that it would have the merit of

placing upon the Chief of Air Corps the direct responsibility for his actions

and recommendations affecting the GHQ Air Force and other tactical

units.'

3

The War Department took no remedial action following General

Andrews' latest suggestions. Nor does it appear that the specific issue was

raised again seriously for more than a year. On 23 February 1939, however,

the Chief of Air Corps (now in the person of Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold

who had succeeded to the post after the tragic death of General Westover in

an air crash in September 1938)'" again recommended that he be designated

Chief of Aviation, GHQ. This would enable the air arm to organize in such

a manner as to provide an operating staff which would be immediately

available in the event of hostilities without disrupting the normal routine of

the office. The existing command status and internal organization of GHQ

Air Force would remain unaffected; but the new arrangement would expedite the transaction of business between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of

Air Corps.'5 Immediate positive action followed General Arnold's proposal;

for on 1 March 1939 the Office of the Chief of Air Corps and the GHQ Air

Force were placed under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Air Corps, although

his command duties were not affected, the head of the combat element was

made responsible directly to the Chief of Air Corps rather than the Chief of

Staff, though in the event of hostilities the tactical air units were to be controlled by the theater commanders. 6

Thus after a period of four years the War Department finally decided

to eliminate the division of responsibility between the two elements of the

Air Corps. This action was extremely important at the time; for in view of

the accelerated expansion program then in the immediate offing it was

essential to have the utmost coordination with respect to equipment, training, and personnel." Unfortunately, however, this centralization within the

air arm was destined to be short-lived. Contrary to the advice of General

81
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

Arnold, on 19 November 1940 the GHO Air Force was removed from the

jurisdiction of the Office of Chief of Air Corps." The deleterious effects of

this redivision of administrative responsibility were ameliorated in part by

the appointment of General Arnold as acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air,

which put that outstanding airman in a strategic position to utilize his

strong qualities of leadership and influence in an attempt to coordinate the

efforts of the two elements of the military air arm."

It was on 19 November 1940 also that, as was noted previously, the

War Department again placed air station complements under the control of

the corps area commanders. With this removal of the exempted status of the

air stations the concept of the employment of air power as a separate force

naturally received a setback. To this reversal of policy, incidentally, many

airmen raised stronger objections than was indicated with respect to the

failure to keep the two elements of the Air Corps under one head.2

" In still

another way the relationship of the air arm to the War Department was

changed by the action taken in November 1940. The GHQ Air Force as an

element of the field units was placed under the control of the general commanding the field forces; and four air districts were created. The latter were

replaced four months later by a corresponding number of continental air

forces in four air defense commands. although he was given numerous

responsibilities, the Commanding General, GHO Air Force, still later was

placed directly under the control of General Headquarters, an agency established at the Air War College in July 1940 to assist the Chief of Staff in his

capacity as commanding general of the field armies.2

Although viewed with considerable disfavor by those who were

directly responsible for military aviation, the channels of control set up for

the Air Corps in November 1940 lasted for well over six months. One of

the first to offer an official protest was Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Acting

Chief of Air Corps, who on 26 December 1940 stated that the existing

arrangement would be disastrous in case of war. The "best brains" of the

military air arm, he maintained, must submit matters to a superior staff

which lacked an adequate knowledge of air problems. Since responsibility

and authority were not commensurate, it would be impossible to perform

the arduous tasks confronting the organization so long as the division

between the two elements existed. By way of a possible solution to some

of the problems General Brett proposed that the Undersecretary of War be

given more specific controls over procurement; and that three Assistant

Secretaries of War be appointed, one representing the ground forces:

another, the air arm; and a third, the services common to the other two.22

Although apparently no action was taken as a result of the suggestion of the

acting Chief of Air Corps, on the following day Robert A. Lovett received

appointment as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War to serve primarily

as a representative of the Undersecretary of War with regard to all matters

82
AIR CORPS AND GHQ AF

of Air Corps procurement. Incidentally, the redesignation of Lovett's position in April 1941 as Assistant Secretary of War for Air filled a vacancy

which had existed since 1933.23

Meanwhile, in the words of Secretary Henry L. Stimson, the War

Department had been giving consideration to a reorganization of the Air

Corps in "order to make it as modern as the instrument it uses." To that end

in March he directed that

steps be taken to place our air arm under one responsible head, and that plans

be worked out to develop an organization staffed and equipped to provide the

ground forces with essential aircraft units for joint operation, while at the same

time expanding and decentralizing our staff work to permit Air Force autonomy

in the degree needed.

Autonomy of the air arm rather than segregated independence, however, in the opinion of the Secretary of War was the best means of obtaining successful results. Nor, as he wrote three months later, could he see any "magic" in a separate or independent air force. 2

'

Wheels soon were set in motion in an effort to carry out the instructions of the Secretary of War; and an agreement was reached on 20 June

1941.25 This took form in Army Regulation 95-5, which created the Army

Air Forces. Headed by a Chief, who was also Deputy Chief of Staff for

Air, this organization was set up for the purpose of coordinating all activities relating to military aviation. The Chief, Army Air Forces, acting

through the Chief of Staff, was made responsible to the Secretary of War

for establishing and executing all relevant plans and policies. Under his

jurisdiction in turn the Chief of Air Corps and the Commanding General,

Air Force Combat Command (which had superseded the GHQ Air Force)

had charge, respectively, of matters relating to service and combat.

Incidentally, the administrative problems connected with the Air Force

Combat Command were simplified somewhat by the transfer to the commanding general not only station control but also court-martial jurisdiction over his personnel.

The Chief, Army Air Forces, was to have the assistance of an Air Staff,

the creation of which was in line with Secretary Stimson's policy of decentralizing staff work and providing the Air Forces a greater degree of autonomy. The current AR 95-5 also created an Air Council for the purpose of

reviewing and coordinating periodically all major aviation projects of the

Army. The Council consisted of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air; the

Chief of Army Air Forces; the Chief, War Plans Division, War Department

General Staff; the Chief of Air Corps; the Commanding General, Air Force

Combat Command; and such other members as might be appointed by the

Secretary of War. 26

83
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

Although the reorganization of June 1941 may be regarded as the

first significant advance in the movement for autonomy of the air arm

since the creation of the GHO Air Force in 1935, it left much to be

desired. In the first place the creation of the Army Air Forces did not solve

wholly the fundamental problem of a division of functions between the

Office of Chief of Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command. The

Chief of the one and the commanding general of the other remained on the

same echelon of command. Since the Chief of the Army Air Forces and

the Chief of Air Corps were charged with the fulfillment of many identical functions, moreover, it was but inevitable that conflicts would arise

because of the poorly delineated spheres of jurisdiction. Secondly, the

relationship between the new structure and the War Department was

defined none too clearly. For instance, the Air Staff, the War Department

General Staff, and the "staff' of the Office of Air Corps all were engaged

with supply and service problems; while the War Department General

Staff, General Headquarters, the Air Staff, and the Air Force Combat

Command Staff had divided responsibility with regard to tactical and

combat matters. These situations naturally tended to provoke friction

between the various units. Finally, as may be judged from the above-mentioned factors, the degree of autonomy granted the air arm was not

regarded as sufficient for satisfactory operations. Many felt that it still

was restricted to an unreasonable degree by the General Staff. The latter,

to mention a further complicating factor, was regarded as an administrative agency by General Headquarters which considered itself as responsible for strategic plans. The conflict between these two agencies weakened

still further the position of the Army Air Forces."

As will appear, the desire for further freedom of action and the

increased pressure of expansion (which were minimized in no wise, of

course, by the direct participation of the United States in World War II)

eventually resulted in sweeping changes relating to the organizational

structure of military aeronautics. The remainder of this chapter, however,

will be devoted to a consideration of the movement for its complete liberation from the War Department during the period from 1935 to 1941. This

discussion will center chiefly around the attitude of leading airmen, expressions of opinion from outside the bounds of official circles, and developments within Congress.

Up until the time of his death in September 1938 General Westover as

Chief of Air Corps consistently opposed any form of independence for the

military air arm. Speaking before a meeting conducted under the auspices

of the Air Defense League on 14 January 1937, for instance, he stated that

"any measures to create a separate air department of the government, or

even a separate set-up of aviation within the War Department, would at this

time be a step backward." Instead, the proper way to provide for air defense

84
AIR CORPS AND GHQ AF

would be to continue the development of the existing organization according to approved programs." In this address and in an article which he

released in October of the same year for the information of all flying personnel General Westover praised the War Department for the way in which

it had handled the administration of the military air arm since the creation

of the Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corps back in 1908. As a

part of the article also he wrote:

We of the arms and services must bear well in mind that there sits at the seat

of government a group of men who have impartially at heart the well being

of all of us and whose perspective is not clouded by too close an association

with any one element. Their programs and plans are more than likely to have

good reason and sound common sense in strong support. It behooves every

intelligent military man to find out what that program is and support it without equivocation. For several years now I have been in a position to be conversant with the War Department's plans and policies for military aviation

and I can say positively, I cannot emphasize too strongly, that the military

leaders are fully conscious of what the nation needs for air defense and they

are sparing no effort to provide it.

Here also, and once again in an address which he delivered before a

convention of reserve officers at Oakland, California on 23 September, the

Chief of Air Corps stressed the value of coordinated teamwork between the

various combatant arms of the service in a manner which would have done

credit to General Pershing or Secretary of War Baker back in post-World

War I days.'

Few or none of the other high ranking Air Corps officers shared

General Westover's extreme attitude regarding a separate or coordinated air

force. As judged by the available evidence, however, during this period

none of them openly advocated changing the basic relation between the Air

Corps and the War Department. In the early years this passive stand was

due in part, it seems, to a calm resignation after March 1935 that an independent air organization had been lost or at least postponed indefinitely,

which was coupled with a determination to allow ample time for the GHQ

Air Force to prove its merit. During the latter stages, as it appeared, the air

arm gradually was acquiring a fair degree of autonomy, if not independence. Then too there was a general reluctance, more particularly after the

outbreak of World War II, to commence any agitation which might interfere

in the least with the current general preparedness program.

Soon after the GHQ Air Force was established General Andrews prepared an address apparently intended for delivery to his subordinate officers

which contained the following statement:

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

Now just a word about the past. Some of us perhaps believed in an independent

air force. Some thought perhaps that an air defense could be best developed as

a separate part of the War Department not under the General Staff, and others

perhaps had still other plans, but now that the decision has been made, and by

the President himself, to develop our air power as an integral part of the Army,

it is up to us to get behind that plan and push it loyally to success. Gentlemen, I

give it to you as my sincere belief that a separate Air Corps is a dead issue for

many years to come. The GHQ Air Force is a part of the Army and it is our interest and duty to keep that fact constantly in mind, for therein for many years at

least I believe lies the best chance of developing Air Power and the best interest

of National Defense."

As has been indicated, late in 1934 General Arnold expressed the view

that before setting up an independent air arm it would be well to give the

GHQ Air Force a thorough trial; and that a few years later he felt that the

creation of that component had been a wise and forward-looking move.',

During the spring of 1935 he indicated his belief that "this thing called a

'department of national defense' is bound to come," but that it would

require several years and considerable planning before an efficient organization of that kind could be elected. At the same time he was quick to dismiss the suggestion of a separate department of aeronautics with a statement to the effect that as yet the Air Corps was unable to stand alone.12

Obviously, the next several years brought little or no change in

Arnold's position. While testifying early in 1939 before the Senate

Committee on Military Affairs with reference to a bill designed to provide

more effectively for the national defense, he was confronted with the

pointed inquiry as to whether the "air service" should be a separate department. His reply was, "I would prefer not to answer that question, sir."

Pressed further, however, he added:

With the expansion that is confronting the Air Corps now I would dislike very

much for us to be thrown out on our own without any of the help and assistance

we can get right now from the rest of the War Department. That is the way we

feel now.

Clearly enough, the trend of his whole testimony on this score indicated that, because of practical considerations, for the time being the Chief

of Air Corps opposed any basic change in the relationship between the military air arm and the War Department.3 Something over twelve months later

he evinced the same conviction in a purely personal note to a friend and fellow officer.' Writing early in 1941, following a period characterized by

considerable agitation for an air component coordinate and commensurate

with the Army and Navy, the then Deputy Chief of Staff for Air in con-

"junction with Col. Ira C. Eaker expressed the hope that if eventually accom86
AIR CORPS AND GHQ AF

plished the reorganization might be made in the relative calm of peace; or

at least in the preparatory rather than in the fighting stage of a war. Then,

continuing, they added:

The separate air force idea is not something to be rushed at pell-mell or

hell-bent-for-leather. It must not be approached with the state of mind that

everything now in existence, or which has been done is wrong. The Army and

Navy, the older services, deserve great credit for the tremendous strides they

have made in the development of military and naval aviation. There are many

essential services which older and established bureaus, departments or subdivisions of the Army and Navy now perform for the air arm.... It may be that there

are intermediate steps between the present organization and the ultimate which

it would be wiser to take than spring at once to a complete separation of the air

arm from the land and sea forces. The recent appointment of a Deputy Chief of

Staff for Air, to serve as advisor to the Chief of Staff in air matters, and in placing of the General Headquarters Air Force under the direct command of the

Commanding General of the field armies may be a step in that direction.35

Shortly after the above statement appeared in print, as the reader will

recall, with the establishment of the Army Air Forces another very important step indeed was taken towards the goal of an autonomous air force.

Their rank and position naturally gave considerable weight to whatever Generals Westover, Andrews, and Arnold had to say about a reorganization of the air arm, although it is not to be presumed that they spoke for

all military aviation personnel.36 Certainly the cause of an independent air

service, in the form either of a separate or a coordinate department of aviation, did not lack adherents during this period. Attention now is to be

focussed briefly upon a few of the leading private unofficial individuals and

unofficial organizations favoring such a change. Then follows a discussion

of the movement in Congress.

Extremely critical of the general organization of the air services, Ken

Dodge, President of the Air Defense League, early in 1939 made a distinction

between what he called Army and Navy special-purpose aviation and the air

forces in general. The latter he would place immediately under a separate

administration for air defense, for the time being allowing the Army and Navy

to retain their separate air segments. Later, Dodge thought, air power should

be made coordinate with the Army and Navy in a single department of

national defense which would include an additional unit for industrial mobi-.

lization.37 Early in his campaign Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential

nominee in 1940, advocated a unified air service. He would begin with a new

cabinet post, the Department of the Air Force; but his ultimate objective was

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

a single cabinet officer at the head of a Department of Defense, with Under

Secretaries for Army, Navy, and the Air Force."

One of the most forceful advocates of united air power at this time was

the former naval aviator Maj. Al Williams, world traveller and prolific writer

on the subject of aviation, who allegedly resigned his commission in the

Marine Corps Reserve as a result of pressure brought to bear because of his

frequent articles critical of the Navy's air policies which appeared in the

columns of the Scripps-Howard newspapers. 9 With an isolationist (not to say

anti-administration) point of view, but withal a background of experience and

a fund of information recently gained from first-hand observation abroad, as

a principal speaker on the 1940 National Defense Day program held under the

auspices of the National Aeronautics Association, Williams made some very

pointed remarks on the administration of the air services. Stating that it would

be the sheerest folly far the United States to set up a system of national

defense without first organizing a separate and independent air force "which

can plan, develop, and operate real American air power without interference

and restraint from the Army and Navy," he continued, in part:

The complete answer, as I see it, is (and I can almost feel the gallant spirit of

General Billy Mitchell at my shoulder as I say these words): The United States

must have a separate air force under a three-way Department of National

Defense-Army, Navy, and Air. The development of true American air power

must no longer be left in the jealous hands of the land Army and the sea Navy

and politicians. To do so is to court the present plight of England, and eventual

disaster.

In addition to a regular cabinet member at the head of each of the

three divisions of national defense Williams recommended a Supreme

Council of Defense headed by the President and consisting of members of

Congress.'

Not to be overlooked in this connection is the attitude of Maj.

Alexander P. de Seversky, the well known aeronautical engineer and former

pilot. Bitterly critical of the War Department's failure to give air power a

more important role, in an article prepared shortly before the Army Air

Forces organization was created Major de Seversky had among others the

following pointed remarks to make:

In the higher reaches of our military service the idea of an independent Air

Force has never been regarded as a matter for discussion. It has simply been

treated as insubordination and squelched...The martyrdom of General

William Mitchell was accomplished publicly and demonstratively in order

to warn other "rebels." The intimidation has in large measure been successful. Nevertheless, there are other "General Mitchells" today, kept down,

88
AIR CoRP's AND GHQ AF

"exiled" to distant posts, or forced out because they demand the emancipation of Air Power....This is not a dispute over a division of authority but a

basic question of organization which goes straight to the heart of our

defense program. The only question is whether we shall put our aviation

house in order now or wait until we are forced to do so by looming disasters. Those of us who see the handwriting in the skies know that what we

ask for cuts across the bureaucratic habits and comforts of a generation. But

we know also that the change must be made if we are to survive in this aviation age. America.. .cannot [take first place in the air] until Air Power is

recognized as a primary service rather than an auxiliary and adjunct of

older weapons, and divorced from the Army and Navy commands.4

'

High on any list of agencies finding fault with the subordination of the

air service to the War Department and the land Army was the Aero Digest,

a monthly publication issuing in New York, to which frequent citation has

been made in this study. Normally it carried an excellent general news coverage on aeronautical matters, and for several years had favored a change in

the organizational status of military aviation. During the six-year period

immediately under review, however, its interest in an independent air force

seemed to increase perceptibly. Although the journal had an anti-administration and an isolationist point of view, the vigorous and consistent campaign which it conducted in favor of the air arm by means of its editorial

policy and through numerous feature articles was impaired but slightly, if

any, by political prejudice and national bias.42

During the years immediately following the creation of the GHQ Air

Force relatively few attempts were made to change by law the relation of

the air arm to the War Department. Up until 1 March 1939, in fact, only two

bills proposing a separate department of air were introduced in Congress;

and these came early in the period. Neither was reported from committee,

while one of them was denounced actively by the Chief of Air Corps.43

Within the same four-year period also only five department of national

defense proposals were brought up in Congress. Introduced on 14 August

1935 by Representative Gerald J. Boileau, the first of these would have limited the activities of the proposed department to defense purposes only."

The bill never emerged from the committee, but its sponsor renewed his

proposal nearly two years later. Stymied once more by committee inaction,

Representative Boileau on 13 august 1937 in the Committee of the Whole

House offered an amendment to a bill for the reorganization of government

agencies which in effect would have accomplished the purpose of his earlier proposals. This time his effort was defeated by a count of 122 to 51."

Meanwhile, having been submitted on 19 March 1937, another department

of national defense bill was buried in committee.46 A similar fate likewise

awaited the other two which were introduced early in 1939.17

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

During the meantime the military authorities had occasion to pass judgment upon a proposal which would remove the Air Corps from the supervision of the General Staff and place it directly under the Secretary of War."

The bill met the wholehearted disapproval of the Chief of Air Corps, General Westover, who, as has been indicated thought the interests of national

defense could be served best by leaving the Air Corps as a part of the Army.,"

The Secretary of War likewise announced his opposition to the measure.

Characterizing it as a revival of the old controversy of a separate unified air

corps, which has been frequently agitated since the close of the World War,"

Secretary Harry H. Woodring asserted that he was unalterably opposed to

any changes in the existing organization of the War Department."

The period from 1 March 1939 until 19 November 1940, when the

Office of the Chief of Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force were under the

administrative jurisdiction of the Chief of Air Corps, was characterized

among other things by still further decreased activity on the part of congressional advocates of either a department of national defense or a separate

air force. During this interval only four bills of the former type and three of

the latter made their way into the national legislative mill. All of these proposals died in committee." So did two joint resolutions which would have

created special commissions for the purpose of surveying resources and

requirements relating to defense with a view to the advisability of establishing a department of national defense and supplementary agencies.-

As the aerial expansion program progressed, any existing duplication

of effort and overlapping of functions appeared more and more inexpedient.

Consequently, the removal of the GHQ Air Force from the administrative

jurisdiction of the Office of Chief of Air Corps on 19 November 1940 produced increased concern in Congress over the organizational status of the

military air arm. 3 This showed up in a veritable deluge of measures

designed to liberate the Air Corps from the control of the War Department.

Within the next seven months, to be more specific, there were no less than

six bills providing for a department of national defense, with Air, Army, and

Navy on coordinate levels, and seven for a separate department of aeronautics. In addition, there were two suggestions for the establishment of a commission or committee for the purpose of making a study on which to base

recommendations for a change in the position of the air arm in the system

of national defense."4 None of these proposals ever emerged from committee, nor during the period involved even formed the subject for public hearings. Some of the sponsors, however, never seemed to tire of plugging for

their respective measures at every opportunity. These efforts consisted

mostly in including by way of "extension of remarks" in the Congressional

Record copies of editorials, articles, and other documents endorsing the

cause they advocated. It was in such manner, for instance, that some of

Major de Seversky's opinions on the question of independent air power

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AIR CORPS AND GHQ AF

officially were called to the attention of Congress." Probably the strongest

congressional argument in favor of a separate or coordinate air force during

this session, however, was made by Representative J. G. Scrugham on 29

April 1941 in connection with a conference report on the naval appropriations bill for 1942. Attacking the existing organization as failing to develop

aviation tactics for offensive aerial warfare, he asserted that millions of dollars were being wasted through duplication; that the "hydraheaded air

authority" had committed many errors; and that the time had come for

Congress to take action in creating a separate air force. This was the only

solution, Scrugham insisted, because even though "the reasons for unified

air organization have increased tenfold.. .the powers of the dead hand of

entrenched bureaucracy have likewise multiplied and constitute a formidable opposition."'"

Despite the agitation carried on in Congress the War Department

remained adamant. Commenting as early as 20 February upon the proposals to create a department of national defense, acting Secretary Robert

Patterson asserted that the existing organization (which, he insisted, could

maintain a proper coordination of air and ground effort) was altogether satisfactory. Nothing so far had occurred in the current European struggle to

warrant a change to a department of national defense. Admittedly, there

were some advantages to the idea as well as to that of a separate air force;

but the disadvantages were greater. Besides, Secretary Patterson thought,

the confusion and delay incident to such a reorganization, if effected immediately, "might well result in a national tragedy."57 In a somewhat more

brusque manner Secretary Stimson a few weeks later indicated the department's disapproval of a committee or commission to make a study of

national defense as a basis of possible recommendations for organizational

changes. He felt that such an agency could be nothing more than an intermediary between regular congressional committees on the one hand and

executive agencies, including the War Department, on the other. After

reminding the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs that

in the past many investigating bodies had submitted recommendations

against a department of national defense, Secretary Stimson stated that

should a revision of the "National Defense Act appear to be desirable in the

interests of national defense, the War Department will request such revision

without delay."'" Then later, in expressing opposition to certain specific proposals for a separate department of air, but applicable to all, the Secretary

of War said:

The matter of the proper form of organization of military aviation has

been under careful consideration by the War Department for some time,

and a reorganization of the Air Corps has recently been elected, giving

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

the air arm reasonable autonomy within the framework of the War

Department.5

"

In this comment reference was made, of course, to the issuance on 20

June 1941 of AR 95-5, creating the Army Air Forces, an organization

which in contrast to an independent air force Stimson at the time described

as a more modern and efficient method of creating air power under the system of government prevailing in the United States."

92
Chapter 8

Autonomy for

the Army Air Forces

The action by which the War Department on 20 June 1941 had created the Army Air Forces was labelled by some air enthusiasts as an obvious stopgap designed to forestall a probable drastic shake-up on the part of

Congress.' It must be admitted that circumstances lend considerable credence to this point of view. Early in 1939, as will be recalled, after several

measures providing for some form of independence for the air force were

introduced, an inapt division of responsibility in the Air Corps had been

corrected. And then following the appearance of similar bills in much larger

number-considering the time element .nvolved-the military air arm was

granted a degree of autonomy greater than it had ever possessed. Too many

other factors were involved, however, to establish a close correlation

between the actions of the War Department in this respect and any attitudes

inherent in Congress. There is no proof, moreover, that up until this time

more than a relatively small minority of the members of that body actually

favored either a separate department of aeronautics or a department of

national defense in which air would occupy a position coordinate with each

of the other two major branches. Besides, as a matter of record, proposals

of such a nature had been appearing in the national legislature at intervals

over a period of more than twenty years.2

Regardless of what may have been the reasons, and again the factors

were numerous, a sharp decrease in the number of legislative measures concerning an independent or a coordinate air arm followed the reorganization

of military aeronautics on 20 June 1941. From that date until 9 March 1942,

when the Army Air Forces gained virtually complete theoretical autonomy

within the framework of the War Department, only two relevant bills were

introduced in Congress. Since they were jettisoned in the usual manner

these measures require no further consideration here.' During this nine

months period, however, air-minded members of Congress who favored a

change relative to the basic position of the Army Air Forces in the pattern

of national defense freely inserted their views in the Record, along with

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

statements of the opinions and actions of various agencies, associations,

clubs, newspapers, journals, and individuals advocating the same general

cause. Other than to point out that the measure of self control provided in

AR 95-5 was regarded as inadequate, an analysis of the arguments presented thereby would be repetitious in a degree wholly unwarranted at this

stage in the present study.' It may be said, however, that public support for

a separate air force increased greatly. At the same time, despite the fact that

the burden of proof fell upon those who wished to make a change, there

were some who took the opposite view. These included Capt. Eddie

Rickenbacker who felt that because of the existing emergency any immediate fundamental change in the relation of the military air arm to the other

armed forces would be a fatal mistake.'

The opinion of the prominent World War I ace on the matter of a separate air force seemed to coincide on the whole with the views of the leading administrative Army Air Forces officials, even though the latter were

not wholly satisfied with the progress which had been made in the reorganization of 20 June 1941.' Apparent concern, lest agitation in Congress for

action on the relevant measures then pending in that body affect adversely

the current preparedness program, led to special conferences with the

Assistant Secretary of War for Air which resulted in a decision to oppose

for the time being the creation of an independent air force.7 Closely connected therewith was a belief that though the War Department would

oppose all of the bills then before Congress, it might be willing to sponsor

legislation for the air arm if it were less fundamental in nature. Certain of

the air force officers, therefore, had undertaken to prepare measures with

the ultimate view of submission to the lawmakers. Preliminary to this

self-appointed task they prepared an analysis of the weaknesses of the

existing military air organization.

In the first place, they questioned the legality of the Army Air Forces

structure on two major counts. As alleged, there was a conflict between AR

95-5 and section 5 of the National Defense Act in that the former allotted

to the Air Staff functions which Congress previously had designated for the

War Department General Staff. Then in violation of sections 2 and 13a of

the statute in question the position of the Chief of Air Corps as head of the

combatant arm had been impaired by the superimposition of another

authority; viz., the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Since, unfortunately, his

power to reorganize the executive departments had expired, the President

was unable to correct the situation. Over, and above its legal status, moreover, the Army Air Forces did not possess real autonomy inasmuch as the

Air Staff was restricted by the General Staff, which in turn shared certain

responsibilities regarding the preparation of strategic plans with General

Headquarters. In a manner of speaking this gave the Army Air Forces two

masters. The military air arm, finally, had not been given direct access to

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AUTONOMY FOR THE AAF

the "housekeeping services," nor control over its budget and finances.

Whatever merits the organization possessed or hoped to retain depended

under existing law upon the War Department itself. Since, thereforce, the

Army Air Forces had decided to oppose a move for a separate status the

most feasible procedure seemed to lie in a frank admission of the existing

situation and the creation of a truly autonomous air force operating under

the principle of unity of command.

The War Department seemed to be less receptive to the idea of a "truly

autonomous air force" than the airmen had hoped; for it rejected outright a

proposal of the Chief of Air Staff, Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, for a reorganization which would eliminate General Headquarters and create three

autonomous arms: Ground forces; air forces; and a service command.' A

subsequent suggestion designed to accomplish the same general purpose,

and drawn up as a basis for congressional action, fared no better."°

Meanwhile, however, the Army Air Forces had submitted still another proposal which, favorably received by the General Staff, formed the basis for

the reorganization of the War Department as of 9 March 1942. To this we

now turn.

Primarily because of the effective manner in which it combined principles of organization and strategy, particular interest is attached to the plan

which General Arnold offered on 14 November. Therein he pointed out the

fact that the development of the air force as a new and coordinate member

of the combat team had altered the method of applying the basic principles

of modern warfare. Concerned in the past with only one decisive striking

arm, the military commander now had two. They could function together at

a single time and place, but also were capable of operating individually in

regions remote from each other. The Chief, Army Air Forces, therefore,

stressed the necessity of "streamlining" the war machine so as to provide

unity of command not only within each of these fighting arms, but also over

both of them. With the creation of the Army Air Forces, he said, this had

been accomplished so far as the air arm itself was concerned. To attain the

full objective, however, the various ground units should be placed under

one commander, and a superior coordinating staff set up to embrace both

air and ground personnel. This would prove to be of invaluable assistance

in enabling the General Staff to deal effectively and impartially with the

two coordinate fighting agencies, each of which would have its own individual staff. Finally, the plan proposed that the air forces and the ground

forces should have equal access to the common services and supply arms,

to be grouped under still another commander."'

The War Plans Division of the General Staff concurred in the broad

principles and the general organization which the Chief of the Army Air

Forces had outlined, and immediately initiated plans for a detailed study of

the whole proposal. Within a few days, however, the United States became

95
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

an active belligerent in World War 11. Although this development may have

emphasized the need for a thorough overhauling of the War Department

machinery, at the same time it injected the factor of delay into the program

dealing with the systematic or formal consideration of any fundamental

changes. Eventually Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, an air officer of exceptionally varied service who but recently had returned from a tour of duty

abroad, was designated to head the War Department Reorganization

Committee. Acting with characteristic efficiency and dispatch, on 31

January 1942 he submitted a brief memorandum outlining certain proposed

changes and suggestions for converting the new organization. The Chief of

Staff forthwith approved these recommendations. 2

In order to carry out the specific recommendations of the McNarney

Committee it was necessary, of course, to secure the sanction of the

Secretary of War and the President. after innumerable conferences-some

of which undoubtedly had been held prior to 31 January-this was accomplished in the form of Executive Order No. 9082, dated 28 February 1942,

which in turn was based upon the authority granted in Title I of the First

War Powers Act, 1941, signed on 18 December.'" The relevant Executive

Order was implemented on 2 March followed by War Department Circular

No. 59, the salient provisions of which as relate to the Army Air Forces lend

themselves to convenient summary.

Effective on 9 March 1942, the War Department and the Army were to

be organized so as to provide, under the Secretary of War and the Chief of

Staff, a War Department General Staff, a Ground Force, an Air Force, and

a Service of Supply Command, all with headquarters in Washington. The

duties, functions, and powers which theretofore had pertained to the

Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command (formerly the GHQ

Air Force) and the Chief of Air Corps were transferred to the Commanding

General, Army Air Forces. His complete jurisdiction, in accordance with

policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff, should involve the normal prerogatives of command-as authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom--over individuals and units assigned to the air forces. Of particular

significance, the stated "mission" of the Air Forces, as specified in the

Circular, was

to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to

provide air force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat

operations.

Procurement and related functions were to be performed in accordance

with the direction of the Undersecretary of War. The same held true with

respect to the mission of the Services of Supply, which was designed to pro96
AUTONOMY FOR THE AAF

vide requisites for military activities except those "peculiar to the Army Air

Forces."14

It should be noted in passing that this streamlined version of the War

Department organization, more particularly as related to the General Staff,

was somewhat similar to that which had prevailed in the Army Air Forces

since its creation on 20 June 1941. Just before the War Department Reorganization Act went into effect this was pointed out by General McNarney

who asserted that the arrangement whereby General Arnold had been

placed in charge of the Air Forces and given his own staff had "worked out

very well." Testifying before the Senate Committee on Military affairs, the

Chairman of the War Department Reorganization Committee presented an

excellent summary justification of the need for the changes which were in

the immediate offing, when he added:

We found that General Arnold made many decisions which formerly had to go

to the General Staff. However, there was one unfortunate result-we actually

had two General Staffs. We had an air staff and a ground staff. The recognized

War Department's General Staff was purely a ground staff and General Arnold's

the air staff, was concerned with aviation exclusively. In this day of air-ground

fighting, two isolated staffs cannot properly provide the commander with the

assistance he must have. Furthermore, the Army Air Forces were still to some

extent a stepchild in the War Department. All material decisions made by the

General Staff had to be presented to the Chief of Staff. They were worked out

by the General Staff which had the ground viewpoint. A change there was indicated."5

Designated as the "first team" to run the revamped War Department

machine were General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff; Lt. Gen. Leslie

J. McNair as Commanding General, Army Ground Forces; Maj. Gen.

Brehon D. Somervell as Commanding General Services of Supply; and, of

course, General Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The

streamlined General Staff, radically reduced in size, consisted about

equally of ground, service, and air personnel; while each of these commands had its own individual staff. Through the reorganization elected in

March of 1942, then, the Army Air Forces at last had achieved theoretical

autonomy within the framework of the War Department. On the very face

of it, however, this was a tentative arrangement; for both the First War

Powers Act, 1941, and Executive Order No. 9082 had fixed the terminal

date of such an organization as six months after the duration of the current

world struggle."6

In addition to its tentative status as a coordinate part of the military

machine the position of the Army Air Forces was minimized by still another

factor. This was the restatement of its mission. As it so happened, between

7 December 1941 and 9 March following, the Air Force Combat Command

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

as a combat agency really had ceased to exist. Two of the four air forces had

been assigned to actual theaters of operation, where air units had been

placed under the control of theater commanders, whether air, ground, or

naval officers; while the other two had become training agencies almost

exclusively. Thus with one of its components virtually eliminated and its

mission designated as an agency "to procure and maintain equipment peculiar" to itself, and to provide air force units, properly organized, trained,

and equipped for combat operations, it would appear that the Army Air

Forces was regarded primarily as a supply and training agency concerned

but indirectly with combat operations and strategic planning; and that the

jurisdiction of its commanding general was confined to certain of the units

within the continental United States."7 There is every reason to suppose,

however, that the key officers of the Army Air Forces regarded the latest

statement of its mission as nothing more than a "paper" restriction."

Developments proved that they were correct.

It is well known that the progress of World War II (and that before as

well as after the United States became actively engaged in the struggle)

proved beyond a doubt that air power, including defensive air supremacy,

was a vital factor in the successful conduct of any type of major operation.

This clearly indicated for the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces

a definite and direct influence in both the planning and operational stages

of combat activities. Such was recognized in no small measure, of course,

early in 1942 when General Arnold along with General Marshall, Admiral

William D. Leahy (Chief of Staff to the President), and Admiral Ernest 0.

King (Chief of Naval Operations) were established as members of the

newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff which was formed to resolve the military and related political and economic matters of mutual concern. This

group in association with the accredited Washington representatives of the

British Chiefs of Staff, when meeting for regular consultations, made up the

Combined Chiefs of Staff. Stated briefly, in formulating and supervising

the execution of over-all plans and policies relating to such matters as the

determination of general requirements based upon approved estimates,

allocation of critical materials, assignment of transportation facilities, and

the strategic conduct of the war, the work of these two bodies greatly

affected the functions of the General Staff and the War Department in the

United States. To say the least, therefore, the inclusion of its commanding

general in their deliberations enhanced the position of the Army Air Forces

far beyond the status implied in the stated mission of the air arm as given

in War Department Circular No. 59, 2 March 1942. President Roosevelt

himself made that quite clear when he wrote:

...My recognition of the growing importance of air power is made obvious by

the fact that the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces is a member of

98
AUTONOMY FOR THE AAF

both the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Air Forces, both in the Army

and in the Navy, have a strong voice in shaping and implementing our national

military policy. 9

The position actually held by the military air arm received still further

recognition on 21 July 1943 with the issuance of War Department FM

100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power. On the matter of the

relationship of the different forces this manual categorically stated that:

"Land power and air power are coequal and interdependent; neither is an

auxiliary of the other." With respect to the doctrine of employment it

asserted, among other things, that the first requirement of any major land

operation was to gain air superiority. By way of a preface to a statement on

command of air power the document pointed out that inherent flexibility

was the greatest asset of air power. In order fully to exploit this quality, as

well as the ability to deliver decisive blows, an air force commander should

exercise command of air power, although it might be delegated through a

superior commander who had charge of both ground and air operations in

a given theater. Air units were not to be attached to ground units, however,

unless the latter were operating independently or "are isolated by distance

or lack of communication."20 It would appear that this statement on the relative position and employment of military aviation provided adequate official sanction for the oft-repeated contention that far from being merely an

auxiliary of the ground forces the air arm in reality was a striking force in

its own right."'

The position which the Army Air Forces had attained through midsummer of 1943 remained substantially unchanged for the duration of the

war. Its permanent status, however, was as yet undetermined; for, as has

been pointed out, the most recent changes by which it had advanced toward

autonomy within the War Department, not to say equality with the ground

Army and the Navy, were based upon temporary war powers of the

President and general developments incident to the exigencies of the military situation. Consequently, there was but little respite in the movement to

secure congressional action, which would anchor the newly acquired gains

in the bedrock of statutory basis.

During the last nine months of 1942 and through the next two years

there was but relatively little congressional comment on the question of the

organization of the nation's armed forces. Even so, within that period

nearly twenty different measures, each looking towards the creation of a

separate air force or a three-way department of national defense, were introduced in Congress. Some of them were "repeat performances"; and all

died in committee, without benefit of hearing.22 Therefore, we may dismiss

them from further consideration here and turn our attention to the develop99
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

ments, mostly within the higher brackets of the Army and Navy establishments, which led eventually to unification in 1947.

Spurred in no small measure by a growing manifestation of public

interest in the question,23 Senator Pat McCarran on 20 August 1943 (after

the issuance but prior to the announcement of FM 100-20) wrote the

President a letter urging immediate action to provide a "unified, coordinated, autonomous air force that can make most effective use of the air

power with which we must win the war." If more authority than the

President already possessed were necessary, he said, then an appeal should

be made for Congress to take further action.2" It was in reply to this letter

that President Roosevelt stated, in substance, that the measure of his recognition of the increasing importance of the air arm was indicated by the

inclusion of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, on the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, however, the Chief Executive assured Senator McCarran that the whole subject

was under constant consideration at the White House. As he was careful to

point out, the Commander-in-Chief did not consider that the ultimate had

been accomplished with respect to the organization of the military machine.

Yet he feared that any drastic change in the structure "at a time when we are

bending every effort toward bringing the war to a rapid conclusion, might

result in serious disruption of the war effort."2'

It would be difficult to determine positively from the evidence available at present whether the President intended the statement addressed to

Senator McCarran as a definitive declaration of administrative policy on the

question of a separate air force at that time. Nor, since he was stricken

fatally in the spring of 1945, do we know what course of action he would

have taken in the immediate postwar period. Beyond a shadow of a doubt,

however, at the time of his death the Chief Executive had moved a long way

from the position which as Assistant Secretary of the Navy he had taken on

the same general question as it shaped up in the days following the First

World War.2"

The idea of a single department of national defense received a considerable boost in the late summer of 1943 with a pronouncement by Admiral

Henry E. Yarnell, former Commander-in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet,

who had been called from retirement to duty in the office of Admiral King.

Holding that the final test of war had shown that a separate air force would

be altogether inapt, Admiral Yarnell advocated a "Department of War" with

a civilian head and a military chief of staff. Stated succinctly, each of the

two main divisions of the department designated respectively as material

and operations, would have special branches for Army, Navy, and Air.2"

Incidentally, this plan agreed in broad principle with an "unofficial" suggestion made some months earlier by a group of officers on the War

Department General Staff, and it was followed by a somewhat elaborate

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AUTONOMY FOR THE AAF

examination of the question, together with a more detailed proposal, emanating from this same unit of the military organization.

Stressing the need of a single department of national defense to coordinate the various agencies of the nation's armed forces, the Special

Planning Division of the General Staff in a study dated 11 October 1943

asserted that the absence of a real unity of command had hampered the

prosecution of the war. Naturally admitting of compromise and delay, the

various stopgap arrangements such as temporary committees and coordinating agencies lacked the necessary quality of prompt and decisive action.

Both economy and national security, the report continued, demanded that

the armed services be coordinated under a unified command; and that each

should be assigned its proper role and mission, as a player on a well balanced team. Requiring the elimination of all overlapping functions, this

could be attained best in a single Department of War.

In brief outline, the plan generally recommended a "Department of the

Armed Forces" under a secretary directly responsible to the President.

Occupying coordinate ranks in the succeeding echelon would be three

Undersecretaries, one for the Army, another for the Navy, and the third for

Air. Each of these major branches would have a Chief of Staff. In conjunction with a Director of Common Supplies and a Chief of Staff to the

President they would make up a unit or council to be known as the "Chiefs

of Staff." Such an organization, the Special Planning Division of the

General Staff believed, would shorten the war; promote unity of command;

elect much needed economies; eliminate duplication in operations; and

improve general efficiency. It urged acceptance of the idea as a whole, but

cautioned the War Department to move slowly in working out the details.

When no action had been taken after six months, the Special Planning

Division insisted that intelligent planning for demobilization demanded an

immediate decision on the matter, and that the mission of the various components be defined at least in broad outline.28

Meanwhile an approach to the whole question of postwar planning had

been made from an entirely different angle. On 28 March 1944 the House

of Representatives set up the Select Committee on Post-War Military

Policy. A few days later this group, better known as the Woodrum

Committee (named for its chairman, Representative Clifton A. Woodrum of

Virginia), began hearings on the third item of its agenda, a single department of the armed forces. Stated more specifically, it was interested in

studying the principle of unity of command as practiced in World War II

with the view of determining how it might be "applied as a part of future

military policy." The first phase of the investigation was concluded on 19

May following.29

As viewed in relation to this present study, the key testimony before

the Woodrum Committee was that offered by Brig. Gen. Heywood S. Han101
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

sell, Jr., who in presenting the views of the Army Air Forces stressed the

need for a unification of land, sea, and air forces under one head for the purpose of flexibility and coordination in operation, together with economy

and simplicity in administration. Then, continuing, he added:

Those of us who have seen this war fought, either in the several theaters or on

the planning and executive staffs, realize that there is no place in modern war

for a separate air force, for a separate army, or for a separate navy. The Army

Air Forces advocate, and strongly recommend, the integration of the nation's

fighting forces into a single united organization. Hence, our conviction demands

unity rather than separation. We believe that current history supports this conclusion.

The advantages to be derived from unity of command in combat operations are

so apparent as to require little exposition. In one form or another we have

acquired a degree of unity of command in all the theaters of war today.

However, the achievement of that unity on the field of battle has been reached

with great difficulty, and has resulted in delay with its attendant wastage.

Furthermore, unity of command on the field of battle is not enough. In order to

achieve real unity of effort the foundations for that unity must stem from unity

in basic training, doctrine, and equipment."'

The Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, commented

favorably upon the degree of Army-Navy cooperation during the existing

world struggle, stating that in Washington alone there were well over seventy committees (topped by the Joint Chiefs of Staff) which functioned in

that connection. Such, however, was not sufficient; for, largely because of

the pressure by the two services to discharge somewhat overlapping responsibilities in the shortest space of time and in face of desperate need, there

"has been less efficient use of military manpower and facilities than would

be tolerated under peacetime conditions or in future wars." In the past there

had been a tendency to shy away from a serious consideration of a unified

service, primarily because of the differences of opinion as to the place of

the air arm in the system of national defense. Sober judgment had been difficult because of excessive partisanship, extravagant claims made by fanatics both in and out of the service, and a lack of "battle experience."

Secretary Lovett had been convinced that World War II was, as future wars

likely would be, "a series of combined operations in each of which Ground,

Sea, and Air Forces must be employed together and coordinated under one

directing staff and under one over-all command."'

Based upon the assumption that no immediate reorganization of the

armed forces would be effected, the views expressed by General Hansell

and Secretary Lovett were generally upheld by all War Department and

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AUTONOMY FOR THE AAF

Army personnel who appeared before the Woodrum Committee, including

such others as Secretary Stimson; Undersecretary of War Patterson;

General McNarney, now Deputy Chief of Staff; and General Somervell.3

"

That was not the case, however, with the Navy group. During the earlier

stages of the hearings Undersecretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal (soon,

upon the death of the Honorable Frank Knox, to become Secretary,

expressed complete accord with the desirability of a thorough examination

of the operation of the nation's war machinery, but explained that he was

"not prepared to say that the Navy believes that the consolidation into one

department is desirable."33 Generally speaking, the views of Secretary

Forrestal received the support of the several other witnesses for the Navy

Department, with the glaring exception of Admiral Yarnell who took this

occasion again to endorse his idea of a single department of national

defense. 4 Interestingly enough also, at this time, Josephus Daniels,

Secretary of the Navy during the period of World War I, offered testimony

in favor of a single department of national defense, but the available record

does not show whether he would advocate or even support an arrangement

whereby air would occupy a position coordinate with the two traditional

branches.35

At the conclusion of that phase of its hearings relating to a reorganization of the armed forces the Woodrum Committee submitted a report stating, among other things; that it did not believe the time opportune to consider legislation undertaking to write the pattern of any proposed unification, "even indeed if such consolidation is ultimately decided to be a wise

course of action." Before any final plan of reorganization should be elected

Congress ought to have the benefit of the judgment and experience of many

of the commanders in the field.36 A medium for securing that advice and

counsel on a fairly large scale had but recently been initiated; for on 9 May

1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a committee of outstanding army

and naval officers to make a thorough examination of the practicability of

maintaining the armed forces on the following basic systems of organization: 1) Two departments-War and Navy; 2) three departments-War,

Navy, and Air; and 3) one department-that of War or of Defense.37

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for the Reorganization of

National Defense made a careful study over a period of ten months, which

involved extended interviews, investigations, and discussions. The committee toured the European, Mediterranean, Pacific, and Southwest Pacific theaters of operation, consulting fifty-six key military and naval personnel;

while twenty-four such individuals appeared as witnesses before the group

in Washington, where it held nearly one hundred separate meetings. A

report was made 11 April 1945.38

The majority of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special

Committee paid due regard to the ever increasing degree of cooperation on

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

the part of the War and Navy Departments, together with their numerous

agencies and far flung forces, and coordination of effort between them as

World War 11 had progressed. Most important of all, the report held, the two

services had learned to understand each other better and to work together

as a team, which had caused them to realize that no one branch is sufficient

unto itself. Their own travels had indicated to the committee, however, that

in areas where unity of command had been established complete integration

of effort had not been achieved, because of the inconsistencies, lack of

understanding, jealousies, and duplications existing in all theaters of operation. The progress which had been accomplished, moreover, was effected

largely through the broad powers granted to the President. These would

lapse six months after the war; and unless comprehensive changes were

made prior to that time the two major services would revert to their pre-war

status, thus losing the gains in efficiency and cooperation which the tentative changes had made possible. For that reason the majority committee

report urged prompt statutory action so as to retain the improvements

obtained by executive order and administrative procedure."

The plan proposed was a "single department system of organization of

armed forces," embodying the following principal features: 1) A civilian

secretary, directly under the President, as the head of the Department of

Armed Forces; 2) an undersecretary, as chief assistant to the Secretary,

charged primarily with the administration of business matters; 3) several

assistant secretaries, with "such duties as may be assigned"; 4) a military

commander of the Armed Forces, who also would be Chief of Staff to the

President; 5) three coordinate combat branches, Army, Navy, and Air, with

a commanding general each at the head of the first and last, and an admiral

commanding the second; and 6) a U. S. Chief of Staff (consisting of the

Secretary of the Department, Commander of the Armed Forces,

Commanding General of the Army, Admiral of the Navy and Commanding

General of the Air Forces to advise the President on matters of military

strategy and the allotment of funds to the three divisions of the armed

forces.'

The committee maintained that the statutory creation of a coordinate

Air Force would merely give formal recognition to a situation which, having

evolved through practical experience, really existed already in the form of

the Army Air Forces. The complete military strength of the country could not

be applied without the full development of air power. So far as this report

was concerned, however, that concept embraced more than could be included

in the coordinate air division which it recommended. For, as stipulated, so

far as could be foreseen, naval aviation as then constituted, should remain an

essential part of the sea forces. Likewise, such air activities as those necessary for liaison, artillery-spotting, and technical reconnaissance, should be

an integral and essential part of the ground forces.'

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AUTONOMY FOR THE AAF

Although not accepted by the senior member, the recommendation of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for a single department of the

armed forces of the United States met the approval (as was stated in the text

of its report) of Generals of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D.

Eisenhower, Admirals Chester V. Nimitz and William F. Halsey and numerous other leading military and naval personnel. 2 The conclusions in question, however, were not revealed until well after the cessation of hostilities

with Hitler's forces in Europe and the Japanese empire in the Far East.

Meanwhile there were other significant developments in the history of the

movement for the unification of the armed forces.

On 6 January 1945 Senator Lister Hill had introduced a bill providing

for a Department of the Armed Forces in lieu of the existing War and Navy

Departments. A civilian secretary at the head of the organization would be

assisted by three undersecretaries, one each for Army, Navy and Air. The

bill made provision further for a United States Chief of Staff composed of

a Chief of Staff of the Army (and also the Chief of Staff to the

Commander-in-Chief); a Chief of Staff of the Navy; and a Chief of Staff of

the Air Forces. An officer of general or flag rank would be designated as

Director of Supply. The following October Senator E.C. Johnson offered a

bill which would substitute for the Departments of War and Navy a

Department of Military Security, with a secretary at the head, broken down

into the following six divisions, each in charge of an undersecretary:

Scientific Research and Development; Army; Navy; Air; Procurement; and

Military Intelligence. Until such time as otherwise provided by Congress,

the President would be empowered to take such action as he might deem

necessary, not inconsistent with existing laws, to perfect the organization

of the Department of Military Security and coordinate its activities.43 As

will appear, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs later conducted

hearings on these two proposals. During the year 1945, however, there

were two other single department of armed forces bills and four separate

department of air measures which failed to receive that degree of consideration.44

Meanwhile the Department of the Navy had sponsored a special investigation relative to the position of the military air arm in the machinery of

national defense. Motivated by a conviction that instead of merely offering

negative criticism the opponents of the proposal to consolidate the War and

Navy departments should attempt the formulation of a plan which would

be more effective in accomplishing the objective sought, on 15 May 1945

Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval

Affairs, suggested that Secretary Forrestal initiate a study with a view of

determining whether a planning and coordinating agency, with no executive authority whatever, might not be preferable to the proposed

Department of National Defense.45 The Secretary of Navy commissioned

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

Ferdinand Eberstadt, former Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions

Board and Vice Chairman of the War Production Board, to conduct the

investigation. He completed the study with the assistance of a large staff,

consisting mostly of naval personnel and employees, and made a report to

Secretary Forrestal during the latter part of September.'6

Somewhat involved with respect to the scope of the specific subject

matter treated, the Eberstadt report touched mainly upon such questions as

the conduct of World War II, with special emphasis upon Army-Navy cooperation; organizational trends within the two existing defense departments;

the history of military and naval air power; and national security and the

postwar military organization. In addition, it outlined the movement for the

unification of the armed forces during the previous twenty-five years; and,

of course, presented certain conclusions and recommendations. The

Eberstadt group counselled against a single department of national defense,

but at the same time it recommended the organization of the nation's military forces into three coordinate departments: War, Navy, and Air. This

would entail the creation of a separate "Military Department for Air," to

which would be transferred generally all of the existing functions, jurisdictions, operations, and powers of the Army Air Forces, as well as military air

transport. There should be no impairment, however, in the relations

between the fleet and the aircraft which "serve with it," nor should the

Army surrender control over such air components as were peculiar to its

needs. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the major link, the report recommended, furthermore, that the departments be knit together closely by committees; and it placed considerable emphasis upon the need for other similar agencies, funneling principally through a National Security Council,

immediately under the President, for the purpose of correlating the armed

forces with the civilian departments.'1

Secretary Forrestal was not ready at once to accept the pertinent conclusions and recommendations which were indicated in the Eberstadt

report. This was brought out on 22 October when he testifed before the

Senate Committee on Military Affairs on the Hill and Johnson bills. Then

the Secretary of Navy expressed his opposition to a Department of

National Defense; nor was he prepared to accept the proposal that air

power warranted the creation of a separate department on parity with War

and Navy. He did agree, however, that steps should be taken to prevent the

Army Air Forces from reverting automatically to its pre-war status.'" In

that respect Forrestal was in complete accord with an opinion expressed

three days earlier by General Arnold who sounded a note on which this

study may well be brought to a logical conclusion. Testifying in favor of a

single department of national defense, the Commanding General of the

Army Air Forces reviewed for the committee in brief, terse language the

developments which had occurred with respect to the military air arm dur106
AUTONOMY FOR THE AAF

ing the war years. At the time of the French collapse before the German

onslaught in 1940 it had consisted of two components: An Air Corps (corresponding to the Artillery, Cavalry, Infantry, and other such branches of

the Army) whose basic functions were procurement of materiel and operation of bases, subject to the supervision by Army Corps areas; and the

GHQ Air Force, a combat organization directly under the Chief of Staff.

There was no air command, nor an air force with the complete air mission.

After Pearl Harbor the President's war powers made possible certain

changes which theretofore could not have been accomplished. Then in the

reorganization of the Army Air Forces on 9 March 1942. Secretary Stimson

and General Marshall-to both of whom, incidentally General Arnold paid "sincere tribute"-took advantage of an opportunity to create an air arm

which was co-equal with the ground forces. At about the same time the

witness had begun his service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These various

steps provided for fundamental air power the nearest approach to a coordinate status with the Army and Navy that was possible under existing law.

Unless, therefore, "action is taken by this committee and the Congress,"

General Arnold forcibly pointed out, within "six months after the termination of hostilities" the Army Air Forces would revert to the status which

existed at the time the United States became an active participant in World

War II."

Hearings on the two unification bills continued over a period of two

months. In addition to that of General Arnold the proposal for a single

department of national defense received the endorsement of numerous other

War Department representatives, including Secretary of War Patterson

General Marshall; General Omar N. Bradley; General Spaatz; and Lt. Gen.

J.L. Collins who presented a specific plan which had been based generallv

upon the proposal previously submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Supporting Secretary Forrestal in opposition to a single department of

national defense and other features of unification, but in favor of a "coordination" principle as generally set forth in the Eberstadt report, were such

other Navy personnel as Assistant Secretary H.S. Hensel, Admiral King,

Admiral Leahy, Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Nimitz.5 °

The Senate Committee on Military Affairs failed to submit a report on

the unification bills which formed the basis of these hearings. Two days

after they had been concluded, however, President Harry S. Truman, in a

lengthy message to Congress advocated legislation which would combine

the War and Navy Departments into "one single Department of National

Defense," along the lines proposed by the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the plan outlined by General Collins. A detailed analysis of the

President's suggestions for the reorganization of the administration of the

nation's armed forces cannot be given here. Yet both timeliness and significance characterized some of the supplementary observations which he

107
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

made. Among these was a reminder to the effect that when the United

States entered World War II there were two separate and independent

departments, with no well-defined habits of collective action or coordination; nor was air power organized on a basis of parity with the ground and

sea forces. Expedients for overcoming these defects-improvisations

which may well have spelled the difference between defeat and victorytook form in the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and certain changes

made in the organization of the War and Navy Departments under the temporary War Powers Act. And then, as though echoing the words uttered a

few weeks earlier by General Arnold, President Truman asserted that unless

"the Congress acts before these powers lapse, these departments will revert

to their pre-war organizational status." The Chief Executive was interested

in providing "parity" for air power, which, he said, had developed to such

an extent that its responsibilities were equal to those of the land and sea

forces and its contributions to strategic planning fully as great. He asserted

that the appropriate status for the Army Air Forces could be achieved

advantageously either in one department or three, but not in two; and, as

between one and three, the former positively would be more desirable."

In such a manner for the first time in the history of American aviation

the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces definitely took a stand in

favor of an independent military air arm. Though far from providing the initial impulse, the President's message of 19 December 1945 contributed

considerable impetus to a series of developments within the executive and

legislative branches of the government which led directly, if belatedly, to

the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947. Thus, as events proved,

theoretical autonomy within the framework of the War Department established as an expedient during the war years, proved for the Army Air Forces

to be only the prelude to a permanent status coordinate with the Army and

Navy in a system of national defense, designated initially as the National

Military Establishment.

108
Appendices
Appendix A

WAR DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief Signal Officer,

Washington.

August 1, 1907.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 6

An Aeronautical Division of this office is hereby established, to take elect this

date.

This division will have charge of all matters pertaining to military ballooning,

air, machines, and all kindred subjects. All data on hand will be carefully classified and plans perfected for future tests and experiments. The operations of

this division are strictly confidential, and no information will be given out by

any party except through the Chief Signal Officer of the Army or his authorized representative.

Captain Charles DeE Chandler, Signal Corps, is detailed in charge of this division, and Corporal Edward Ward and First-class Private Joseph E. Barrett will

report to Captain Chandler for duty in this division under his immediate direction.

J. ALLEN

Brigadier General,

Chief Signal Officer of the Army

111
Appendix B

An Act To increase the efficiency of the aviation service of the Army, and

for other purposes.

Be it enacted by. the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress, assembled, that there shall hereafter be, and

there is hereby created, an aviation section, which shall be a part of the Signal

Corps of the Army, and which shall be, and is hereby, charged with the duty of

operating or supervising the operation of all military air craft, including balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said craft, and signaling

apparatus of any kind when installed on said craft; also with the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military aviation.

Sec. 2. That, in addition to such officers and enlisted men as shall be

assigned from the Signal Corps at large to executive, administrative, scientific,

or other duty in or for the aviation section, there shall be in said section aviation officers not to exceed sixty in number, and two hundred and sixty aviation

enlisted men of all grades; and said aviation officers and aviation enlisted men,

all of whom shall be engaged on duties pertaining to said aviation section, shall

be additional to the officers and enlisted men now allotted by law to the Signal

Corps, the commissioned and enlisted strengths of which are hereby increased

accordingly.

The aviation officers provided for in this section shall, except as hereinafter

prescribed specifically to the contrary, be selected from, among officers holding commissions in the line of the Army with rank below that of Captain, and

shall be detailed to serve as such aviation officers for periods of four years,

unless sooner relieved, and the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Act

of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one (Thirty-first

Statutes, page seven hundred and fifty-five) are hereby extended so as to apply

to said aviation officers and to the vacancies created in the line of the Army by

the detail of said officers therefrom, but nothing in said Act or in any other law

now in force shall be held to prevent the detail or redetail at any time to fill a

vacancy among the aviation officers authorized by this Act, of any officer holding a commission in the line of the Army with rank below that of captain, and

112
APPENDIX B

who during prior service as an aviation officer in the aviation section, shall

have become especially proficient in military aviation.

There shall also be constantly attached to the aviation section a sufficient

number of aviation students to make, with the aviation officers actually

detailed in said section under the provisions of this Act, a total number of sixty

aviation officers and aviation students constantly under assignment to, or detail

in, said section. Said aviation students, all of whom shall be selected on the

recommendation of the chief signal officer from among unmarried lieutenants

of the line of the Army not over thirty years of age, shall remain attached to

the aviation section for a sufficient time, but in no case to exceed one year, to

determine their fitness or unfitness for detail as aviation officers in said section, and their detachment from their respective arms of service which under

assignment to said section shall not be held to create in said arms vacancies

that may be filled by promotions or original appointments: Provided, that no

person, except in time of war, shall be assigned or detailed against his will to

duty as an aviation student or an aviation officer: Provided further, That whenever, under such regulations as the Secretary of War shall prescribe and publish to the Army, an officer assigned or detailed to duty of any kind in or with

the aviation section shall have been found to be inattentive to his duties, inefficient, or incapacitated from any cause whatever for the full and efficient discharge of all duties that might properly be imposed upon him if he should be

continued on duty in or with said section, said officer shall be returned forthwith to the branch of the service in which he shall hold a commission.

SSec. 3. That the aviation officers hereinbefore provided for shall be rated in

two classes, to wit, as junior military aviators and as military aviators. Within

sixty days after this Act shall take effect the Secretary of War may, upon the

recommendation of the Chief Signal Officer, rate as junior military aviators

any officers with rank below that of captain, who are now on aviation duty and

who have, or shall have before the date of rating so authorized, shown by practical tests, including aerial flights, that they are especially well qualified for

military aviation service; and after said rating shall have been made the rating

of junior military aviator shall not be conferred upon any person except as

hereinafter provided.

Each aviation student authorized by this Act shall, while on duty that

requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, receive an

increase of 25 per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under

his line commission. Each duly qualified junior military aviator shall, while so

serving, have the rank, pay, and allowance of one grade higher than that held

by him under his line commission, provided that his rank under said commission be not higher than that of first lieutenant, and, while on duty, requiring

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, he shall receive in

addition an increase of 50 per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his line of commission. The rating of military aviator shall not be

hereafter conferred upon or held by any person except as hereinafter provided,

and the number of officers with that rating shall at no time exceed fifteen. Each

military aviator who shall hereafter have duly qualified as such under the provisions if this Act shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowances

of one grade higher than that held by him under his line commission, provided

that his rank under said commission be not higher than that of first lieutenant,

and, while on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, he shall receive in addition an increase of 75 per centum of the pay

of his grade and length of service under his line commission.

The aviation enlisted men hereinbefore provided for shall consist of twelve

master signal electrician's, twelve first-class sergeants, twenty-four sergeants,

seventy-eight corporals, eight cooks, eighty-two first-class privates and

forty-four privates. Not to exceed forty of said enlisted men shall at any one

time have the rating of aviation mechanician, which rating is hereby established, and said rating shall not be conferred upon any person except as hereinafter provided: Provided, That twelve enlisted men at a time shall, in the discretion 145 of the officer in command of the aviation section, be instructed in

the art of flying, and no enlisted man shall be assigned to duty as an aerial flyer

against his will except in time of war. Each aviation enlisted man, while on

duty that requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights,

or while holding the rating of aviation mechanician, shall receive an increase

of fifty per centum in his pay: Provided further, That, except as hereinafter

provided in the cases of officers now on aviation duty, no person shall be

detailed as an aviation officer, or rated as a junior military aviator, or as a military aviator, or as an aviation mechanician, until there shall have been issued

to him a certificate to the effect that he is qualified for the detail or rating, or

for both the detail and the rating, sought or proposed in his case, and no such

certificate shall be issued to any person until an aviation examining board,

which shall be composed of three officers of experience in the aviation service

and two medical officers, shall have examined him, under general regulations

to be prescribed by the Secretary of War and published to the Army by the War

Department, and shall have reported him to be qualified for the detail or rating, or for both the detail and the rating, sought or proposed in his case:

Provided further, That the Secretary of War shall cause appropriate certificates

of qualification to be issued by the Adjutant General of the Army to all officers

and enlisted men who shall have been found and reported by aviation examining boards in accordance with the terms of this Act, to be qualified for the

details and ratings for which said officers and enlisted men shall have been

examined: Provided further, That except as hereinbefore are provided in the

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APPENDIX B

cases of officers who are now on aviation duty and who shall be rated as junior

military aviators as hereinbefore are authorized, no person shall be detailed for

service as an aviation officer in the aviation section until he shall have served

creditably as an aviation student for a period to be fixed by the Secretary of

War; and no person shall receive the rating of military aviator until he shall

have served creditably for at least three years as an aviation officer with the rating of junior military aviator: Provided further, That there shall be paid to the

widow of any officer or enlisted man who shall die as the result of an aviation

accident, not the result of his own misconduct, or to any other person designated by him in writing, and amount equal to one year's pay at the rate to

which such officer or enlisted man was entitled at the time of the accident

resulting in his death, but any payment made in accordance with the terms of

this provision account of the death of any officer or enlisted man shall be in

lieu of and a bar to any payment under the Acts of Congress approved May

eleventh, nineteen hundred and eight, and March third, nineteen hundred and

nine (Thirty-fifth Statutes, pages one hundred and eight and seven hundred and

fifty-five), on account of death of said officer or enlisted man.

Approved, July 18, 1914.

115
Appendix C

An Act For making further and more effectual provision for the national

defense, and for other purposes.

Sec. 13. THE SIGNAL CORPS.-The Signal Corps shall consist of one

Chief Signal Officer, with the rank of brigadier general; three colonels; eight

lieutenant colonels; ten majors; thirty captains; seventy-five first lieutenants;

and the aviation section, which shall consist of one colonel; one lieutenant

colonel; eight majors; twenty-four captains; and one hundred and fourteen first

lieutenants, who shall be selected from among officers of the Army at large of

corresponding grades or from among officers of the grade below, exclusive of

those serving by detail in staff corps or departments, who are qualified as military aviators, and shall be detailed to serve as aviation officers for periods of

four years unless sooner relieved; and the provisions of section twenty-seven

of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one,

are hereby extended to apply to said aviation officers and to vacancies created

in any arm, corps, or department of the Army by the detail of said officers

therefrom; but nothing in said Act or in any other law now in force shall be

held to prevent the detail or redetail at any time, to fill a vacancy among the

aviation officers authorized by this Act, of any officer who, during prior service as an aviation officer of the aviation section, shall have become proficient

in military aviation.

Aviation officers may, when qualified therefor, be rated as junior military

aviators or as military aviators, but no person shall be so rated until there shall

have been issued to him a certificate to the effect that he is qualified for the rating, and no certificate shall be issued to any person until an aviation examining board, which shall be composed of three officers of experience in the aviation service and two medical officers, shall have examined him, under general regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War and published to the

Army by the War Department, and shall have reported him to be qualified for

the rating. No person shall receive the rating of military aviator until he shall

have served creditably for three years as an aviation officer with the rating of

a junior military aviator.

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APPENDIX C

Each aviation officer authorized by this Act shall, while on duty that

requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, receives

an increase of twenty-five per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his commission. Each duly qualified junior military aviator shall,

while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowances of one grade higher than

held by him under his commission if his rank under said commission be not

higher than that of captain, and while on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights he shall receive in addition an increase of

fifty per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his commission. Each military aviator shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and

allowances of one grade higher than that held by him under his commission if

his rank under said commission be not higher than that of captain, and while

on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights

he shall receive in addition an increase of seventy-five per centum of the pay

of his grade and length of service under his commission: Provided further,

That the provisions of the Act of March second, nineteen hundred and thirteen,

allowing increase of pay and allowances to officers detailed by the Secretary

of War on aviation duty, are hereby repealed: Provided further, That hereafter

married officers of the line of the Army shall be eligible equally with unmarried officers, and subject to the same conditions, for detail to aviation duty, and

the Secretary of War shall have authority to cause as many enlisted men of the

aviation section to be instructed in the art of flying as he may deem necessary:

Provided further, That hereafter the age of officers shall not be a bar of their

first detail in the aviation section of the Signal Corps, and neither their age nor

their rank shall be a bar to their subsequent details in said section: Provided

further, That, when it shall be impracticable to obtain from the Army officers

suitable for the aviation section of the Signal Corps in the number allowed by

law the difference between that number and the number of suitable officers

actually available for duty in said section may be made up by appointments in

the grade of aviator, Signal Corps, and that grade is hereby created. The personnel for said grade shall be obtained for especially qualified civilians who

shall be appointed and commissioned in said grade: Provided further, That

whenever any aviator shall have become unsatisfactory he shall be discharged

from the Army as such aviator. The base pay of an aviator, Signal Corps, shall

be $150 per month, and he shall have the allowances of a master signal electrician and the same percentage of increase in pay for length of service as is

allowed to a master signal electrician.

The total enlisted strength of the Signal Corps shall be limited and fixed

from time to time by the President in accordance with the needs of the Army,

and shall consist of master signal electrician's, sergeants, first class; sergeants;

corporals; cooks; horseshoers; private, first class; and privates; the number in

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each grade being iced from time to time by the President. The numbers in the

various grades shall not exceed the following percentages of the total authorized enlisted strength of the Signal Corps, namely: Master signal electrician's,

two per centum; sergeants, first class, seven per centum; sergeants, ten per centurn; corporals, twenty per centum. The number of privates, first class, shall

not exceed twenty-five per centum of the number of privates. Authority is

hereby given the President to organize, in his discretion, such part of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps into such number of

companies, battalions, and aero squadrons as the necessities of the service may

demand.

Approved, June 3, 1916.

118
Appendix D

An Act To create the Aircraft Board and provide for its maintenance.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of expanding

and coordinating the industrial activities relating to aircraft, or parts of aircraft,

produced for any purpose in the United States, and to facilitate generally the

development of air service, a board is hereby created, to be known as the

Aircraft Board, hereinafter referred to as the board.

Sec. 2. That the board shall number not more than nine in all, and shall

include a civilian chairman, the Chief Signal Officer of the army, and two other

officers of the Army, to be appointed by the Secretary of War; the Chief

Constructor of the Navy and two other officers of the Navy to be appointed by

the Secretary of the Navy; and two additional civilian members. The chairman

and civilian members shall be appointed by the President, by and with the

advice and consent of the Senate.

Sec. 3. That said board and tenure of office of the members thereof shall

continue during the pleasure of the President, but not longer than six months

after the present war. The civilian members of the board shall serve without

compensation.

Sec. 4. That the board is hereby empowered, under the direction and control

of and as authorized by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy,

respectively, on behalf of the Departments of War and Navy to supervise and

direct, in accordance with the requirements prescribed or approved by the

respective departments, the purchase, production, and manufacture of aircraft,

engines, and all ordnance and instruments used in connection therewith, and

accessories and materials therefor, including the purchase, lease, acquisition,

or construction of plants for the manufacture of aircraft, engines, and accessories: Provided, That the board may make recommendations as to contracts

and their distribution in connection with the foregoing, but every contract shall

be made by the already constituted authorities of the respective departments.

Sec. 5. That the board is also empowered to employ, either in the District of

Columbia or elsewhere, such clerks and other employees as may be necessary

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to the conduct of its business, including such technical experts and advisers as

may be found necessary, and to fix their salaries. Such salaries shall conform

to those usually paid by the Government for similar service: Provided, That by

unanimous approval of the board higher compensation may paid to technical

experts and advisers. The board may rent suitable offices in the District of

Columbia or elsewhere, purchase necessary office equipment and supplies,

including scientific publications and printing, and may incur necessary administrative and contingent expenses, and for all of the expenses enumerated in

this paragraph there shall be allotted by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army

for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and seventeen and nineteen hundred and

eighteen the sum of $100,000, or so much thereof as shall be necessary from

any appropriation now existing for or hereinafter made to the Signal Corps of

the Army, and such appropriation is hereby made available for these purposes:

Provided further, That except upon the joint and concurrent approval of the

Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy there shall not be established

or maintained under the board any office or organization duplicating or replacing, in whole or in part, any office or organization now existing that can be

properly established or maintained by appropriations made for or available for

the military or naval services: Provided further, That a report shall be made to

Congress on the first day of each regular session of the salaries paid from this

appropriation to clerks and employees by grades, and the number in each such

grade.

Approved, October 1, 1917.

120
Appendix E

War Department Announcement, 24 April 1918

Mr. John D. Ryan has accepted the directorship of aircraft production for

the Army.

A reorganization of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps has been also

effected, of which the principal elements are as follows:

(Gen. Squier, as Chief Signal Officer, will devote his attention to the administration of signals; a Division of Military Aeronautics is created, under the

direction of Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly. The Aircraft Board, created by act of

Congress, remains an advisory body, as it has been in the past, with Mr. Ryan

as its chairman, This arrangement is made with the entire concurrence of Mr.

Howard Coffin, who remains a member of the Advisory Commission of the

Council of National Defense and will render assistance and counsel to the

Aircraft Board and Mr. Ryan.

The Division of Military Aeronautics will have control of the training of

aviators and military use of aircraft. The exact division of functions in the matter of designing and engineering will be worked out as experience determines

between the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Division of Production.

This announcement involves no change of personnel in the present

Equipment Division of the Signal Corps, of which W. C. Potter is chief, and

which will continue under his direction.

121
Appendix F

PRESIDENTIAL ORDER OF MAY 21, 1918

By virtue of the authority in me vested as Commander in Chief of the Army

and by virtue of further authority upon me specifically conferred by "An act

authorizing the President to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies, and offices, and for other purposes, in the interest of economy and the

more efficient concentration of the Government," approved May 20, 1918, 1 do

hereby make and publish the following order:

The powers heretofore conferred by law or by executive order upon and the

duties and functions heretofore performed by the Chief Signal Officer of the

Army are hereby redistributed as follows:

I.

(1) The Chief Signal Officer of the Army shall have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of all military signal duties, and of books, papers,

and devices connected therewith, including telegraph and telephone apparatus

and the necessary meteorological instruments for use on target ranges, and

other military uses; the construction, repair, and operation of military telegraph

lines, and the duty of collecting and transmitting information for the Army by

telegraph or otherwise, and all other duties usually pertaining to military signaling; and shall perform such other duties as now are or shall hereafter be

devolved by law or by Executive order upon said Chief Signal Officer which

are not connected with the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps or with the

purchase, manufacture, maintenance, and production of aircraft, and which are

not hereafter conferred, in special or general terms, upon other officers or

agencies.

(2) A Director of Military Aeronautics, selected and designated by the

Commander in Chief of the Army, shall hereafter have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps of the

Army, and as such shall be, and he hereby is, charged with the duty of operat122
APPENDIX F

ing and maintaining or supervising the operation and maintenance of all military aircraft, including balloons and airplanes, all appliances pertaining to said

aircraft and signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said aircraft, and

of training of officers, enlisted men, and candidates for aviation service in matters pertaining to military aviation, and shall hereafter perform each and every

function heretofore imposed upon and performed by the Chief Signal Officer

of the Army in, or in connection with, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps,

except such as pertains to the purchase, manufacture, and production of aircraft and aircraft equipment and as is not hereinafter conferred, in special or

general terms, upon the Bureau of Aircraft Production; and all airplanes now

in use or completed and on hand and all material and parts, and all machinery,

tools, appliances, and equipment held for use for the maintenance thereof; all

lands, buildings, repair shops, warehouses, and all other property, real, personal, or mixed, heretofore used by the Signal Corps in, or in connection with,

the operation and maintenance of aircraft and the training of officers, enlisted

men, and candidates for aviation service, or procured and now held for such

use by or under the jurisdiction and control of the Signal Corps of the Army;

all books, records, files, and office equipment heretofore used by the Signal

Corps in, or in connection with, such operation, maintenance, and training; and

the entire personnel of the Signal Corps as at present assigned to, or engaged

upon work in, or in connection with, such operation, maintenance, and training, is hereby transferred from the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Office and

placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics; it being

the intent hereof to transfer from the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer to

the jurisdiction of the said Director of Military Aeronautics every function,

power, and duty conferred and imposed upon said Director of Military

Aeronautics by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof all property of every

sort of nature used or procured for use in, or in connection with, the functions

of the Aviation Section, of the Signal Corps placed in charge of the Director of

Military Aeronautics by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof, and the entire

personnel of the Signal Corps in charge of the Director of Military Aeronautics

by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof.

(3) An executive agency, known as the Bureau of Aircraft Production, is

hereby established, and said agency shall exercise full, complete, and exclusive jurisdiction and control over the production of airplanes, airplane engines,

and aircraft equipment for the use of the Army, and to that end shall forthwith

assume control and jurisdiction over all pending Government projects having

to do or connected with the production of airplanes, airplane engines, and aircraft equipment for the Army and heretofore conducted by the Signal Corps of

the Army, under the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer; and all material

on hand for such production, all unfinished airplanes and airplane engines, and

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all unfinished, unattached, or unassembled aircraft equipment; all lands, buildings, factories, warehouses, machinery, tools, and appliances, and all other

property, real, personal, or mixed, heretofore used in or in connection with

such production, or procured and now held for such use, by or under the jurisdiction and control of the Signal Corps of the Army; all books, records, files,

and office equipment used by the said Signal Corps in or in connection with

such production; all rights under contracts made by the Signal Corps in or in

connection with such production; and the entire personnel of the Signal Corps

as at present assigned to or engaged upon work in or in connection with such

production are hereby transferred from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps and

placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Aircraft Production, it being the

intent hereof to transfer from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps to the jurisdiction of the said Bureau of Aircraft Production every function, power, and

duty connected with said production, all property of every sort or nature used

or procured for use in or in connection with said production, and the entire personnel of the Signal Corps, as at. present assigned to or engaged upon work in

or in connection with such production.

Such person as shall at the time be chairman of the Aircraft Board created

by the Act of Congress approved October 1, 1917, shall also be the executive

officer of said Bureau of Aircraft Production, and he shall be, and he hereby is,

designated as Director of Aircraft Production, and he shall, under the direction

of the Secretary of War, have charge of the activities, personnel, and properties

of said bureau.

II.

All unexpended funds of appropriations heretofore made for the Signal

Corps of the Army and already specifically allotted for use in connection with

the functions of the Signal Service as defined and limited by subparagraph (1)

of Paragraph I hereof shall be and remain under the jurisdiction of the Chief

Signal Officer; all such funds already specifically allotted for use in connection with the functions of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps as defined

and limited by subparagraph (2) of Paragraph I hereof are hereby transferred

to and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics for

the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said

section; all such funds already specifically allotted for use in connection with

the functions hereby bestowed upon the Bureau of Aircraft Production, as

defined and limited by subparagraph (3) of Paragraph I hereof, are hereby

transferred to and placed under the jurisdiction of said Director of Aircraft

Production for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures autho124
APPENDIX F

rized by said bureau in carrying out the duties and functions hereby transferred

to and bestowed upon said bureau; and in so far as such funds have not been

already specifically allotted to the different fields of activity of the Signal

Corps as heretofore existing, they shall now be allotted by the Secretary of War

in such proportions as shall to him seem best intended to meet the requirements of the respective fields of former activity of the Signal Corps and the

intention of Congress when making said appropriations, and the funds so allotted by the Secretary of War to meet expenditures in the field of activity of the

Aviation Section of the Signal Corps are hereby transferred to and placed

under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics for the purpose

of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said section; and the

funds so allotted by the Secretary of War to meet the expenditures in that part

of the field of activity of the Signal Corps, which includes the functions hereby

transferred to the Bureau of Aircraft Production, are hereby transferred to and

placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Aircraft Production for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said bureau.

III.

This order shall be and remain in full force and effect during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination thereof by the

proclamation of the treaty of peace, or until theretofore amended, modified, or

rescinded.

Under this order Mr. John D. Ryan continued as Director of Aircraft

Production and Maj. Gen. William L. Kenly became Director of Military

Aeronautics.

125
Appendix G

An Act To amend an Act entitled "An Act for making further and more

effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes," approved

June 3, 1916, and to establish military justice.

Sec. 2. COMPOSITION OF THE REGULAR ARMY.-The Regular Army

of the United States shall consist of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field

Artillery, the Coast Artillery Corps, the Air Service, the Corps of Engineers,

the Signal Corps. which shall be designated as the combatant arms or the line

of the Army...

Sec. 13a. AIR SERVICE.-There is hereby created an Air Service. The Air

Service shall consist of one Chief of the Air Service with the rank of major

general, one assistant with the rank of brigadier general, one thousand five

hundred and fourteen officers in grades from colonel to second lieutenant,

inclusive, and sixteen thousand enlisted men, including not to exceed two

thousand five hundred flying cadets, such part of whom as the President may

direct being formed into tactical units, organized as he may prescribe:

Provided, That not to exceed 10 per centum of the officers in each grade below

that of brigadier general who fail to qualify as aircraft pilots or as observers

within one year after the date of detail or assignment shall be permitted to

remain detailed or assigned to the Air Service. Flying units shall in all cases be

commanded by flying officers. Officers and enlisted men of the Army shall

receive an increase of 50 per centum of their pay while on duty requiring them

to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights; and hereafter no person

shall receive additional pay for aviation duty except as prescribed in this section: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as amending existing provisions of law relating to flying cadets.

Sec. 127a. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.-Hereafter no detail, rating or assignment of an officer shall carry advanced rank except as otherwise

126
APPENDIX G

specifically provided, That in lieu of the 50 per centum increase of pay provided for in this Act any officer or enlisted man upon whom the rating of junior

military aviator or military aviator, has heretofore been conferred for having

specially distinguished himself in time of war in active operations against the

enemy, shall, while on duty which requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, continue to have the rank, pay, and allowances and

additional pay now provided by the Act of June 3, 1916, and the Act of July

24, 1917.

Approved, June 4, 1920.

127
Appendix H

An Act To provide more effectively for the national defense by increasing

the efficiency of the Air Corps of the Army of the United States, and for other

purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act entitled. "An Act for

making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for

other purposes," approved June 3, 1916, as amended, be, and the same is

hereby, amended so that the Air Service referred to in that Act and in all subsequent Acts of Congress shall be known as the Air Corps.

Sec. 2. COMPOSITION OF THE AIR CORPS.-That section 13a of the

Act entitled "An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the

national defense, and for other purposes," approved June 3, 1916 as amended,

be, and the same is hereby, amended by striking out the same and inserting the

following in lieu thereof:

Sec. 13a. AIR CORPS.-There is hereby created an Air Corps. The Air

Corps shall consist of one Chief of the Air Corps, with the rank of major general; three assistants, with, the rank of brigadier general; one thousand five

hundred and fourteen officers in grades from colonel to second lieutenant,

inclusive; and sixteen thousand enlisted men, including not to exceed two

thousand five hundred flying cadets, such part of whom as the President may

direct being formed into tactical units or bands, organized as he may prescribe:

Provided, That the Chief of the Air Corps, at least two brigadier generals, and

at least 90 per centum of the officers in each grade below that of brigadier shall

be flying officers: Provided further, That in time of war 10 per centum of the

total number of officers that may be authorized for the Air Corps for such war

may be immediately commissioned as nonflying officers; Provided further,

That as soon as a sufficient number can be trained, at least 90 per centum of

the total number of officers authorized for the Air Corps for such war shall be

flying officers: Provided further, that hereafter in time of peace in order to

insure that the commissioned officers of the Air Corps shall be properly qualified flying officers and, for the purpose of giving officers of the Army an

128
APPENDIX H

opportunity to so qualify, the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail to

the Air Corps Officers of all grades and such officers shall start flying training

immediately upon being so detailed, but hereafter such officers shall not

remain detailed to the Air Corps for a period in excess of one year or be permanently commissioned therein unless they qualify as flying officers:

Provided further, That any officer who is specifically recommended by the

Secretary of War because of special qualifications other than as a flyer may be

detailed to the Air Corps, for a period longer than one year, or may be permanently commissioned in the Air Corps, but such officers, together with those

flying officers who shall have become disqualified for flying, shall not be

included among the 90 per centum of flying officers: And provided further,

That nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the number of officers in

each grade that may be detailed to the Air Corps for training as flying officers

except that the total number of officers allotted to the Air Corps shall not be

exceeded. Flying units shall in all cases be commanded by flying officers.

Wherever used in this Act a flying officer in time of peace is defined as one

who has received an aeronautical rating as a pilot of service types of aircraft:

Provided, That all officers of the Air Corps now holding any rating as a pilot

shall be considered as flying officers within the meaning of this Act: Provided

further, That hereafter in order to receive a rating as a pilot in time of peace an

officer or an enlisted man must fly in heavier-than-air craft at least two hundred hours while acting as a pilot, seventy-five of which must be alone, and

must successfully complete the course prescribed by competent authority: And

provided further, That in time of war a flying officer may include any officer

who has received an aeronautical rating as a pilot of service types of air craft

and also in time of war may include any officer who has received an aeronautical rating as observer. Officers and enlisted men of the Army shall receive an

increase of 50 per centum of their pay when by orders of competent authority

they are required to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, and

when in consequence of such orders they do participate in regular and frequent

aerial flights as defined by such Executive orders as have heretofore been, or

may hereafter be, promulgated by the President: Provided, That nothing in this

Act shall be construed as amending existing provisions of law relating to flying cadets. On and after July 1, 1929, and in time of peace, not less than 20 per

centum of the total number of pilots employed in tactical units of the Air Corps

shall be enlisted men, except when the Secretary of War shall determine that it

is impractical to secure that number of enlisted pilots.

Sec. 5. AIR SECTIONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF.-That section 5 of

the Act entitled "An Act for making further and more effectual provisions for

the national defense, and for other purposes," approved June 3, 1916, as

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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

amended, be, and the same is hereby, amended by adding the following paragraph at the end thereof:

"That for the period of three years immediately following July 1, 1926,

there is hereby created in each of the divisions of the War Department General

Staff an air section to be headed by an officer of the Air Corps, the duties of

which shall be to consider and recommend proper action on such air matters

as may be referred to such division."

Sec. 7. APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS.-That the

third sentence of section 4c of the Act entitled "An Act for making further and

more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes,"

approved June 3, 1916, as amended, be, and the same is hereby, amended by

adding thereto the following:

"And provided further, That during the period of seven years immediately

following July 1, 1926, any appointment as Chief of the Air Corps shall be

made from among officers of any grade of not less than fifteen years' commissioned service, and from those who have demonstrated by actual and

extended service in such corps that they are qualified for such appointment;

and as assistants from among officers of not less than fifteen years' commissioned service of similar qualifications: Provided, That the Chief of the Air

Corps shall make recommendations to the Secretary of War for the appointment of his assistants."

Sec. 8. FIVE-YEAR AIR CORPS PROGRAM.-For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the Air Corps of the Army and for its further development the following five-year program is authorized:

PERSONNEL.-The number of promotion-list officers now authorized by

law in the grade of second lieutenant of the Regular Army, is hereby increased

by four hundred and three, and the number of enlisted men now authorized by

law for the Regular Army is hereby authorized to be increased by six thousand

two hundred and forty: Provided, That the increase in the number of officers

and enlisted men herein authorized shall be allotted as hereinafter provided.

The present allotment of officers to the Air Corps is hereby authorized to be

increased by four hundred and three officers distributed in grades from colonel

to second lieutenant, inclusive, and the present allotment of enlisted men to the

Air Corps is hereby authorized to be increased by six thousand two hundred

and forty enlisted men. The President, is authorized to call to active service,

with their consent, such number of Air Corps reserve officers as he may deem

130
APPENDIX H

necessary, not to exceed five hundred and fifty, 90 per centum of whom shall

serve for periods of not more than one year, and 10 per centum for periods of

not more than two years. Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall

affect the number of reserve officers that may be called to active duty for periods of less than six months under existing law.

EQUIPMENT.-The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to equip and

maintain the Air Corps with not to exceed one thousand eight hundred serviceable airplanes, and such number of airships and free and captive balloons

as he may determine to be necessary for training purposes, together with spare

parts, equipment, supplies, hangars, and installations necessary for the operation and maintenance thereof. In order to maintain the number specified above,

the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to replace obsolete or unserviceable

aircraft from time to time: Provided, That the necessary replacement of airplanes shall not exceed approximately four hundred annually: Provided, That

the total number of airplanes and airships herein authorized shall be exclusive

of those waiting salvage or undergoing experiment or service tests, those

authorized by the Secretary of War to be placed in museums and those classified by the Secretary of War as obsolete: And provided further, That the total

number of planes authorized in this section shall include the number necessary

for the training and equipment of the National Guard and the training of the

Organized Reserves as may be determined by the Secretary of War.

METHOD OF INCREASE.-The total increase in personnel and equipment authorized herein shall be distributed over a five-year period beginning

July 1, 1926. Not to exceed one-fifth of the total increase shall be made during the first year, and the remainder in four approximately equal increments.

The President is hereby authorized to submit to Congress annually estimates

of the cost of carrying out the five-year program authorized herein: Provided,

That a supplemental estimate for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1927, may be

submitted to cover the cost of the first annual increment.

Sec. 14. That if any section or provision of this Act shall be held to be

invalid, it is hereby provided that all other sections and provisions of this Act

not expressly held to be invalid shall continue in full force and effect. No provision of this Act shall be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall take elect

upon date of approval thereof, except as otherwise provided for herein, and all

Acts or parts of Acts contrary to the provisions of this Act or inconsistent

therewith be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

Approved, July 2, 1926.

131
Appendix I

*AR 95-5

ARMY REGULATIONS WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 95-5 Washington, June 20, 1941.

ARMY AIR FORCES

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Com position ............................................ I

O rganization ............................................ 2

Duties of the Chief of the Army Air Forces ..................... 3

Duties of the Commanding General, Air

Force Combat Command ................................ 4

Duties of the Chief of the Air Corps .......................... 5

The Air Council ........................................ 6

Superseding of conflicting regulations ........................ 7

1. Composition.-The Army Air Forces shall consist of a Chief of the Army

Air Forces and such number of general and other officers, aviation cadets, warrant officers, enlisted men, and other personnel as may be prescribed by law,

or in the absence of such prescription, by the President.

2. Organization-a. The Army Air Forces shall consist of the Headquarters

Army Air Forces, the Air Force Combat Command, the Air Corps, and all other

air units.

b. The Headquarters Army Air Forces shall consist of the Chief of the Army

Air Forces and such staff as he may deem necessary.

c. The Air Force Combat Command shall consist of a commander thereof

with the necessary staff and subordinate agencies and facilities, together with

such tactical and auxiliary units and troops as may be assigned or attached

thereto.

132
APPENDIX I

d. The Air Corps shall consist of a Chief thereof with the necessary staff and

subordinate agencies and facilities, and the units, troops and personnel which

may be assigned or attached thereto.

3. Duties of the Chief of the Army Air Forces.-The Chief of the Army Air

Forces pursuant to policies, directives, and instructions from the Secretary of

War is charged with the following duties.

a. The control of the activities of the Air Force Combat Command and of

the Air Corps, the preparation of plans pertaining thereto, the supervision and

coordination of training of all other air units, and the inspection essential to the

fulfillment of these duties.

b. The determination of requirements of the Army Air Forces with respect

to personnel, materiel, equipment, supplies and facilities, and the preparation

of necessary plans for the development, organization, equipment, training, tactical operations, supply and maintenance thereof, including oversea garrisons

and task forces for theaters of operations and the assignment of personnel and

material thereto.

c. The determination of the Army Forces, financial requirements and the

control and supervision of funds appropriated for this purpose.

4. Duties of the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.-The

Air Force Combat Command, pursuant to policies, directives, and instructions

from the Chief of the Army Air Forces, is charged with the following duties:

a. The control of all aerial operations of the Air Force Combat Command,

except for those units thereof assigned or attached to task forces, oversea garrisons or other commanders.

b. The preparation of plans, when directed by the Chief of the Army Air

Forces, for defense against air attack of the continental United States.

c. Recommendations to the Chief of the Army Air Forces with respect to

requirements for personnel, materiel, equipment, supplies, and facilities to

maintain or improve the efficiency of the Air Force Combat Command.

d. The organization of the Air Force Combat Command, its preparation for

combat including operational training, and the development of doctrines of air

tactics and technique of the Air Forces.

e. The tactical inspection of Air Force units assigned or attached to other

commanders, when directed by higher authority.

f. Such supply and maintenance activities, essential to the operation of the

Air Force Combat Command, as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Army

Air Forces.

g. Recommendations to the Chief of the Army Air Forces relative to Tables

of Organization of all elements of the Air Force Combat Command.

133
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

h. The command and control of all Air Force Combat Command stations

(Air bases) and all personnel, units, and installations thereon, including station

complement personnel and activities.

i. Court-martial jurisdiction over all elements of the Air Force Combat

Command.

5. Duties of the Chief of the Air Corps.-The Chief of the Air Corps, pursuant to policies, directives, and instructions issued by the Chief of the Army

Air Forces, is charged with the following duties:

a. The supervision, unless otherwise delegated, of all activities in connection with research, development, procurement, storage, supply, maintenance,

and final disposition of military aircraft, accessories, supplies, facilities, and

appurtenances used in connection therewith (except for items which are specifically charged to other agencies of the War Department) including technical

inspection and the issuance of pertinent technical instructions.

b. Determination of the Army Air Forces' requirements in equipment, facilities, and other materiel supplied by other arms and services for installation in

military aircrafts, or for use in connection therewith; and passing upon the

design, specifications, and performance tests thereof; installing the same and

maintaining such portion thereof as is not required to be maintained by the arm

or service which supplied it.

c. Providing the War Department with the basis for requirements of personnel, equipment, and stores to be furnished by other arms and services to the

Army Air Forces.

d. Preparation of estimates for the Army Air Forces' appropriations and

such control and supervision of funds so appropriated, as may be delegated.

e. Preparation of proposals and recommendations for conducting the design

competitions authorized by section 10 of the act of July 2, 1926 (44 Stat,. 784;

10 U.S.C. 310; M.L., 1939, sec. 1942).

f. Preparation of plans governing the construction of stations of the Army

Air Forces.

g. Training of personnel in primary, basic, and advanced pilot functions and

specialized nonpilot functions of combat crews, and in all duties involving the

care, supply, and maintenance of aeronautical materiel, whether aircraft or

equipment and facilities installed thereon or used in connection therewith, and

the establishment, operation, and maintenance of schools and allied facilities

essential thereto.

h. Recommendations to the Chief of the Army Air Forces relative to Tables

of Organization of all elements of the Air Corps.

i. The command and control of all Air Corps stations and all personnel,

units, and installations thereon, including station complement personnel and

activities.

134
APPENDIX I

6. The Air Council.--a. Creation and-function.-For the purpose of periodically reviewing and properly coordinating all major aviation projects of the

Army, and passing on matters of current policy, there is hereby created The Air

Council.

b. Composition.-The Air Council will be composed of the Assistant

Secretary of War for Air, ex-official, the Chief of Army Air Forces who will be

president of The Air Council, the Chief, War Plans Division (War Department

General Staff), the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, the

Chief of Air Corps, and such other members as may be appointed from time to

time by the Secretary of War.

7. Superseding of conflicting regulations.-The provisions of other regulations in conflict with these regulations are hereby superseded.

(A.G. 321.91 (6-18-41).)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

E. S. ADAMS,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

135
Appendix J

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9082

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED

STATES AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE

WAR DEPARTMENT

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War

Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (Public Law 354, 77th Congress), and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and as President of

the United States, it is hereby otdered as follows:

1. The Army of the United States is recognized to provide under the Chief

of Staff a ground force, under a Commanding General, Army Ground Forces;

an air force, under a Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and a service of

supply command, under a Commanding General, Service of Supply; and such

overseas departments, war forces, base commands, defense commands, commands in theaters of operations, and other commands as the Secretary of War

may find to be necessary for the national security.

2. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chiefs of the following named

branches of the Army of the United States are transferred to the Commanding

General, Army Ground Forces: Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast

Artillery Corps (except those relating to procurement, storage, and issue).

3. The functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, General

Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) and of the Chief of the

Air Corps are transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

4. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chief of Coast Artillery relating

to procurement, storage, and issue are transferred to the Commanding General,

Services of Supply.

5. Any officers holding offices the functions, duties, and powers of which

are transferred by this order shall be reassigned to suitable duties but shall continue to hold their respective offices until vacated.

136
APPENDIX J

6. The Secretary of War is authorized and directed to prescribe such functions, duties, and powers of the commanders of the various forces and commands of the Army of the United States and the agencies of the War

Department and to issue from time to time detailed instructions regarding personnel, funds, records, property, rooting of correspondence, and other matters

as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this order. Such duties by

the Secretary of War are to be performed subject always to the exercise by the

President directly through the Chief of Staff of his functions as Commander

in-Chief in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations.

7. This order shall become effective on March 9, 1942 and shall remain in

force during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the

termination thereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 28, 1942.

137
Appendix K

Circular No. 59

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, March 5, 1942

WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION

1. The President has approved a reorganization of the War Department and

the Army, effective March 9, 1942. Pending the issuance of detailed instructions and changes in regulations, a summary description of the new organizations is furnished for the information and guidance of all concerned.

2.a. The War Department and the Army will be organized so as to provide

under the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff a War Department General

Staff, a Ground Force, an Air Force, and a Services of Supply Command, all

with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and in addition thereto such number of

oversea departments, task forces, base commands, defense commands, commands in theaters of operations, and other commands as may be necessary in

the national security. Charts A, B, C, and D, illustrate the organization of the

War Department, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the

Services of Supply. It is anticipated that the experience of the first three

months under the new organization will indicate the desirability of minor modifications within the principal subdivisions. Recommendations will be submitted accordingly.

b. The functions, duties, and powers of the chiefs of the following arms are

transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Ground

Forces: Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps (except

those relating to procurement, storage, and issue).

c. The functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, GHQ Air

Force (Air Force Combat Command) and the Chief of the Air Corps are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

138
APPENDIX K

d. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chief of Coast Artillery relating to procurement, storage, and issue are transferred to the jurisdiction of the

Commanding General, Services of Supply.

e. Supply arms and services of War Department offices and agencies will

come under the direct command of the Commanding General, Services of

Supply as indicated below:

(1) Those parts of the office of the Under Secretary of War engaged in

functions of procurement and industrial mobilization.

(2) The Budget Advisory Committee.

(3) The Surgeon General.

(4) The Chief of Engineers (except with respect to civil functions, for

which he will report directly to the Secretary of War).

(5) The Chief Signal Officer.

(6) The Quartermaster General.

(7) The Chief of Ordnance.

(8) The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service.

(9) Present supply functions of the Chief of Coast Artillery, and the military and civilian personnel assigned thereto.

(10) The Chief of Finance.

(11) The Judge Advocate General. (Except with respect to courts martial

and certain legal matters for which he will report direct to the

Secretary of War.) The Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces

and Army Air Forces may request legal opinions from The Judge

Advocate General direct.

(12) The Adjutant General.

(13) The Provost Marshal General.

(14) The Chief of Special Services.

(15) The Chief of Chaplains.

(16) All corps area commanders.

(17) All general depots.

(18) Ports of embarkation, staging areas, and regulating and reconsignment stations for oversea shipments.

6. ARMY AIR FORCES.-a. Under policies prescribed by the Chief of

Staff, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, is charged in general with

the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of command authorized by law,

Army Regulations, and custom over individuals and units assigned to the

Army Air Forces.

b. The mission of the Army Air Forces is to procure and maintain equipment

peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units properly orga139
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

nized, trained, and equipped for combat operations. Procurement and related

functions will be executed under the direction of the Under 'Secretary of War.

c. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Army Air Forces:

(1) The operation of Army Air Forces replacement training centers and

schools, including officer candidate schools, for the training of personnel in pilot functions and specialist nonpilot functions of combat

and ground crews and in all duties involving the care, supply and

maintenance of aeronautical materiel.

(2) The provision of basic training for individuals in the Army Air

Forces inducted in excess of replacement training center capacity.

(3) The organization of air force tactical units as directed by the War

Department.

(4) The training of all tactical units assigned to the Army Air Forces.

(5) The organization, equipment, and training of such task forces.

(6) The development of tactical and training doctrine, tables of organization, tables of basic allowances, military characteristics of aircraft,

weapons, and equipment and operational changes needed in equipment, aircraft, and weapons peculiar to the Army Air Forces.

(7) The discharge of personnel functions pertaining to the Army Air

Forces.

(8) The assignment of officers of the Army Air Forces including Army

Ground Forces and Services of Supply personnel on duty therewith.

(9) The supply of air force personnel and equipment peculiar to the

Army Air Forces, to the Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply,

defense commands, theaters of operation, and oversea forces in

accordance with policies announced by the Chief of Staff.

(10) The approval of general plans governing the construction of stations

of the Army Air Forces.

(11) The submission to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, of

such recommendations on construction, shelter, training aids, movements, supply, equipment, real estate, estimates of funds, and such

other matters as may be necessary.

(12) The control of the expenditure of funds allocated to the Army Air

Forces.

(13) The development jointly with the Commanding General, Army

Ground Forces, of ground-air support, tactical training, and doctrine

in conformity with policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff.

(14) The installation of such specialized air force equipment and materiel

as may be provided by the Services of Supply and the maintenance

of such portion thereof as is not maintained by the Services of

Supply.

(15) The preparation of proposals and recommendations for conducting

the design competitions authorized by law.

140
APPENDIX K

(16) The command and control of all Army Air Forces stations and bases

not assigned to defense commands or theater commanders and all

personnel, units, and installations thereon, including station complement personnel and activities.

(17) The supervision of all air force activities in connection with the

research, development, procurement, storage, supply, maintenance,

and final disposition of military aircraft, accessories, supplies, facilities, and appurtenances used in connection therewith, including

technical inspection and issuance of pertinent technical instructions.

(18) All aerial operations of the Army Air Forces except for those units

thereof assigned or attached to other commands.

(19) The minimization of the administrative activities of the Army Air

Forces by utilizing the services available in the Services of Supply

to the maximum degree consistent with proper control of the Army

Air Forces.

(20) The use of judicious shortcuts in procedure to expedite operations.

141
Appendix L

FM100-20

FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS

COMMAND AND EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

SECTION I

DOCTRINE OF COMMAND AND EMPLOYMENT

1. Relationship of Forces.-LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE

CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER.

2. Doctrine of Employment.-THE GAINING OF AIR SUPERIORITY IS

THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY MAJOR

LAND OPERATION. AIR FORCES MAY BE PROPERLY AND PROFITABLY EMPLOYED AGAINST ENEMY SEA POWER, LAND POWER,

AND AIR POWER. HOWEVER, LAND FORCES OPERATING WITHOUT

AIR SUPERIORITY MUST TAKE SUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT THEIR MOBILITY AND

ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY LAND FORCES ARE GREATLY

REDUCED. THEREFORE, AIR FORCES MUST BE EMPLOYED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE ENEMY'S AIR FORCES UNTIL AIR SUPERIORITY IS OBTAINED. IN THIS WAY ONLY CAN DESTRUCTIVE AND

DEMORALIZING AIR ATTACKS AGAINST LAND FORCES BE MINIMIZED AND THE INHERENT MOBILITY OF MODERN LAND AND AIR

FORCES BE EXPLOITED TO THE FULLEST.

3. Command of Air Power.-THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR

POWER IS ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY MAKES IT POS142
APPENDIX L

SIBLE TO EMPLOY THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR

POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN TURN; SUCH CONCENTRATED USE OF THE AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING

FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE. CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR

POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT

FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A DECISIVE BLOW ARE TO

BE FULLY EXPLOITED. THEREFORE, THE COMMAND OF AIR AND

GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED

IN THE SUPERIOR COMMANDER CHARGED WITH THE ACTUAL

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE THEATER, WHO WILL EXERCISE

COMMAND OF AIR FORCES THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER AND COMMAND OF GROUND FORCES THROUGH THE

GROUND FORCE COMMANDER. THE SUPERIOR COMMANDER

WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND

FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH GROUND

FORCE UNITS ARE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY DISTANCE OR LACK OF COMMUNICATION.

SECTION II

MILITARY AVIATION

4. GENERAL CATEGORIES.-Aviation of the United States Army,

referred to herein as military aviation, falls into two general categories as follows:

a. Aviation directly under command and control of the Commanding

General, Army Air Forces. Included in this category are-

(1) All nontactical elements of the Army Air Forces such as those used for

training, research, development, test, procurement, storage, issue,

maintenance, and transport.

(2) All tactical units of the Army Air Forces not assigned to a theater or

task force Commander.

b. Aviation directly under command and control of other commanders. (The

Commanding General, Army Air Forces, has such technical command of this

aviation as is necessary for the control and supervision of training and the supply and maintenance of equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces.) This category consists of air forces assigned to theater or task force commanders.

5. TYPES OF TACTICAL AVIATION.-In accordance with the purpose for

which various types of aircraft are ordinarily employed, tactical aviation is

organized, trained, and equipped to engage in offensive and defensive air operations. Corresponding to the means with which equipped, tactical aviation is

143
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

divided into bombardment, fighter, reconnaissance, photographic, and

troop-carrier aviation.

a. Bombardment aviation is the term applied to all aircraft designed for the

air attack of surface objectives, and the organizations equipped with such aircraft.

b. Fighter aviation is the term applied to all aircraft designed for offensive

air fighting, and the organzations equipped with such aircraft. (Fighterbomber

aircraft are fighters modified so that they may attack surface objectives.)

c. Reconnaissance aviation is the term applied to air units which perform

the service of information for military commands. The function of reconnaissance aviation is to secure information by visual and photographic means and

to return this information for exploitation.

d. Photographic aviation is the term applied to air units which perform photographic reconnaissance missions beyond the responsibilities or capabilities

of reconnaissance aviation and special photogrametric mapping missions for

engineer topographic troops.

e. Troop carrier (including gliders) is the term applied to air units which

carry parachute troops, airborne troops, and cargo.

f. The tactics and technique of performing the functions of air attack, air

fighting, and air reconnaissance are set forth in FM 1-10, 1-15, and 1-20.

Communication procedure essential to air force operations is contained in FM

31-35 and FM 1-45.

SECTION III

ORGANIZATION

6. IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS.-In a theater of operations, there

will normally be one air force. This air force will be organized in accordance

with the task it is required to perform in any particular theater and, therefore,

no set organization of an air force can be prescribed. However, the normal

composition of an air force includes a strategic air force, a tactical air force, an

air defense command, and an air service command. An air force may also

include troop carrier and photographic aviation.

7. OF AVIATION UNITS--a. Tactical air units of the Army Air Forces

from the smallest to the largest are designated fight, squadron, group. wing,

division, command, and air force. The method of assignment and employment

of the air forces necessitates a highly flexible organization within tactical units.

b.

(1) The flight is the basic tactical grouping or unit of the Army Air Forces

and consists of two or more airplanes.

(2) The squadron is the basic administrative and tactical unit and consists

144
APPENDIX L

of three or four flights, depending upon the type of aviation.

(3) The group, composed of three or more squadrons, is both tactical and

administrative; it contains all the elements essential for its air operations.

(4) The wing is the next higher unit of the Army Air Forces and its functions are primarily tactical.

(5) Two or more wings may be combined to form an air division.

.(6) An "air command," may include divisions, wings, groups, service and

auxiliary units, and is both tactical and administrative.

(7) The air force is the largest tactical unit of the Army Air Forces. It may

contain a strategic air force, a tactical air force, an air defense command, and an air service command. It requires aviation engineer units

for the construction and maintenance of air bags.

c. Units are designated according to their primary functions; for example,

reconnaissance squadron, Fighter group, bomber wing, air service command.

d. Ordinarily the group is the largest unit of the Army Air Forces that will

operate in the air as a tactical entity under the command of one individual.

Many air operations are conducted by smaller units. Reconnaissance and photographic missions, and less frequently bombardment missions, may be carried

out by single airplanes with the required fighter cover.

e. In addition to tactical units, units are organized for the purpose of maintenance and supply and for facilitating air operations. These units comprise

personnel of the Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces who are trained for

rendering service for the Army Air Forces. The maintenance and service units

serving an air force are collectively designated the air service command.

145
Notes

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. A copy of Office Memo, OCSigO, 1 History of the AAF (New York. 1947), pp

August 1907, is printed in Charles deF. 10-24.

Chandler and Frank P. Lahm, How OurArmy In this connection attention of the reader

Grew Wings (New York, 1943), pp 80-81, who may be interested is called to Orville

note 6. See Appendix A, this study. A recent Wright, "How We Made the First Flight,' in

diligent search in the Signal Corps files for Flying, 11 (December 1913), pp 10-12,

this period, now in the National Archives, 35-36, an article presenting for the first time

failed to reveal a manuscript of this memo- in print (as stated by the editor) some of the

randum. It may be substantiated, however, by details of, and incidents attending, the Wright

innumerable references in addition to that brothers' flight of 17 December 1903.

listed above. A contemporary source, for Accompanying the account are several phoinstance, is Memo for CSigO by Captain tographs of early flights reproduced for the

Charles deE Chandler, 15 August 1907, in first time.

Sig. C. files, 18067/30, in National Archives. 3. The Statutes at Large of the United

2. As may be judged, of course, this States of America, from...1789 (60 vols to

study makes no pretension of covering thor- date; vols 1-17, Boston, 1845-1873; vols

oughly the early developments in aeronautics 17-60, Washington, 1873- 1947), XXXVI, p

and military aviation. The same holds true 1038. The specific title of this work has varwith respect to a citation of authorities. ied slightly. It will be cited hereafter simply as

General substantiation for the above sum- United States Statutes at Large.

mary statements may. be found in the annual It should be explained here that the conreports of the Chief Signal Officer. For more tract for the Wright plane was drawn up in

specific references, see The Signal School, 1908. The delay in delivery was due to an

United States Army, Historical Sketch of the accident in September of that year during the

Signal Corps, 1860-1434 (Fort Monmouth., progress of the preliminary trials at Fort

N. J., 1934), pp 9-47, passim; Lt. Clayton Meyer, Virginia, a mishap which cost the life

Russell, Brief History of theAir Corps and Its of Lt. Thomas E. Selfridge, Aeronautical

Late Developments (Ft. Monroe, 1927), pp Division, Signal Corps, and resulted in seri3-9; Arthur Sweetser, The American Air ous injury to Orville Wright. See Annual

Service (New York and London, 1919), pp Report of the Chief Signal Officer 1908, p 3 9.

1-11; Chandler and Lahm, How Our Army Data relative to the paucity of funds

Grew Wings, pp 12-178, passim; and John allowed for aeronautical purposes during the

Goldstrom, A Narrative History of Aviation years 1907 through 1911 may be checked

(New York, 1942), pp 24-45. An extremely conveniently in ibid, p 38; ibid 1909, p 28;

brief account accompanied by appropriate ibid 1910, pp 24-25; and ibid 1911, p 23. It

pictures is to be found in Historical Office of appears that during these early years

the Army Air Forces, The Official Pictorial Congress rather freely voted all that was

147
NOTES TO PAGES 2-6

requested by the higher military authorities cited hereafter simply as AAF Historical

for the Aeronautical Division. One reason Studies No 25.

advanced for this apparent neglect of military 7. United States Statutes at Large,

aviation was the fact that a reorganization of XXXVII, pp 514-517. See Appendix Bofthe

the Army was in progress. The Chief of Staff present treatise.

and the Secretary of War felt that priority 8. United States Statutes at Large,

should be given to that matter, which, inci- XXXVIII, p 930.

dentally, included the problem of building up 9. Other members of the Committee

stores of such vitally necessary material, as included Charles D. Walcott, Secretary of the

ammunition, field artillery, and guns. Henry Smithsonian Institution; Charles F. Marvin,

Woodhouse, "Prospective Developments in Chief of the United States Weather Bureau;

U.S. Army Aeronautics," in Flying, H (July S.W. Stratton, Chief of the Bureau of

1913), pp 7-11. Extracts from this article- Standards; Byron R. Newton, Assistant

though somewhat erroneously cited-are Secretary of the Treasury; Joseph S. Ames,

printed in 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Johns Hopkins University; W. F Durand,

Representatives, Hearings fono H.R. 5304: Leland Stanford University; John F Hayford,

Aeronautics in theArmy (Washington, 1913), Northwestern University; and Michael I.

pp 259-262. See als [Secretary of War] Pupin, Columbia University. A complete list

Lindley M. Garrison, "Aircraft as a Military of the members is given in an editorial,

Asset," in Flying, III (June 1914).p 133. "President Appoints Advisory Board," in

4. Annual Report of the Chief Signal AerialAge Weekly, 1(12 April 1915), p 82.

Officer 1917, p 5; Sweetscr, The American 10. United States Statutes at Large,

Air Service, p 14. XXXIX. pp 174-176. Appendix C, this study

5. Annual Report of the Chief Signal is a copy of Section 13.

Officer 1910, p 26; ibid 1912, p 26; Bissell, 11. United States Statutes at Large,

History of the Air Corps and Its Late XXXIX. pp 45, 622.

Developments, p 10. It is interesting to note in 12. Ibid. pp 649-650

this connection that soon after the Army had 13. President Wilson made the appointacquired its first plane three officers were ments in October 1916. The other two memassigned to the Signal Corps: Lieutenants bers were Dr. Franklin H. Martin from

Frank P. Lahm, Frederick E. Humphreys, and Chicago and Hollis Godfrey of Philadelphia.

Benjamin D. Foulois. The first two were AerialAge Weekly, IV (23 October 1916). p

returned to their own branches of service, 141.

Calvary and Engineers respectively, before 14. See Resolution of the National

the third had completed his pilot training. Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 12

Under the circumstances then Lt. Foulois April 1917 in Third Annual Report of the

found it necessary to teach himself to solo. NationalAdvisory Committee forAeronautics

See AAF Historical Office, Pictorial History (No 3 in a series from 1915 to date,

of the AAF, p 26. Washington, 1918), p 17; and Resolution of

6. United States Statutes at Large, the Council of National Defense, 16 May

XXXVII, p 705. Dates for the introduction of 1917, in AAG 334.8, Aircraft Board. Cf also

the appurtenant bills which failed of passage Historical Section, Army War College, The

were 26 January 1909, 22 March 1909, 5 Signal Corps and Air Service (Washington,

January 1910, 9 March 1912, and 11 1922), pp 36-37; Bissell, Brikf History of the

February 1913. For brief but adequate state- Air Corps, pp 18, 19; and Sweetscr, The

ments concerning these proposed measures American Air Service, pp 48-49. Deeds, forsee Army Air Forces, AC/AS, Intelligence, merly with the National Cash Register

Historical Division, Army, Air Forces Company, was president of the Delco

Historical Studies No 25: Organization of Company; Montgomery was connected with

Military Aeronautics, 1907-1935 (MS, pre- a Philadelphia financial concern; and Waldon

pared in 1944), pp 6-10. This work will be had been associated with the Packard Motor

148
NOTES TO PAGES 5-9

Car Company. Army 1919, p 22. It should be explained that

15. Sweetser, The American Air Service, meanwhile the Aircraft Board continued to

p 50. serve the Navy in the same capacity as it had

16. United States Statutes at Large, XL, functioned formerly with relation to both the

pp 42, 187, 247. An interesting report on avi- Army and the Navy.

ation expenditures during World War I is 27. It is true that the Director of Military

given in Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell, "America's Aeronautics, according to this document, had

First World War Appropriation," in U.S. Air "charge, under the direction of the Secretary

Services, XVIII (May 1933), pp 24-27. of War, of the Aviation Section of the Signal

17. Sweetser, The American Air Service, Corps of the Army." Yet the Bureau of

pp 93-94; Historical Section, Army War Aircraft Production was given "full, coinCollege, The Signal Corps andAir Service, p plete, and exclusive jurisdiction and control

38. over the production of airplanes, airplane

18. See Howard E. Coffin to George E. engines:' et cetera.

Chamberlain, Chairman, Senate Committee 28. WD GO No 51, 24 May 1918.

on Military Affairs, 1 August 1917, in, and 65 29. Annual Report of the Director of

Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No 106; MilitaryAeronautics 1918, p 7. It appears that

and President Woodrow Wilson to S. Hubert fittingly enough the arrangement effected was

Dent, Jr., Chairman, House of Represen- the result largely of an aggressive stand taken

tatives Committee on Military Affairs, 3 by the Division of Military Aeronautics.

August 1917, in 65 Congress,.1 Session, Colonel Henry H. Arnold, the Assistant

House of Representatives Report No 161, p 2. Director prepared for his chief a memoran19. United States Statutes at Large, XL, dum stating in substance that this unit must

pp 296-297. A copy of the law is included control the determination of the design of the

herewith as Appendix D. equipment with which it was to operate. The

20. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, House question of which was the actual supply orgaof Representatives, Hearings on United Air nization was of no significance, he insisted,

Service (Washington, 1921), pp 366-367. The but the quality of the material used was of

Judge Advocate General had ruled that the vital concern. See memo for General William

functions of the Aircraft Board were advisory L. Kenly by Col. H. H. Arnold, 6 June 1918,

and recommendatory only. in AAG 321.9A, Organization of the Division

21. Sweetser, TheAmerican Air Service, of Military Aeronautics.

pp 74-84, 210-217; AAF Historical Studies 30. WD GO No 81, 28 August 1918.

No 25, pp 30-31. Technically speaking, as Second Assistant

22. A copy of the announcement Secretary of War, Ryan replaced Edward R.

included here with as Appendix E is printed Stettinius who was then a special representain Annual Report of the Director of Military tive of the War Department in France. See

Aeronautics 1918, pp 4-5. Cf also Historical also an editorial, "Second Assistant Secretary

Section, Army War College, The Signal of War, John D. Ryan, Given Full Charge

Corps andAir Service, p 35; and an editorial, Over All Aircraft Work," in Flying, VII

"New Heads of Aircraft Program," in Flying, (September 1918), p 720.

V i(May 1918), p 94. 31. Sweetser, TheAmerican Air Service,

23. United States Statutes at Large, XL, p 238.

pp 556-557. 32. The organization of the United

24. The text of Executive Order 2862, States Spruce Production Corporation was

21 May 1918, is included in Annual Report of based technically upon the Army appropriathe Director of Military Aeronautics 1918, pp tion Act of 30 June 1918, Annual Report of

5-7. See Appendix F, this study. the Chief of Air Service for the Fiscal Year

25. Historical Section, Army War College, Ending June 30, 1922, pp 3-4.

The Signal Corps andAir Service, p 38. 33. Cablegram, Gilbert E Close to S/W,

26. Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. 19 March 1919, in AAG 334.8, Aircraft

149
NOTES TO PAGES 9-14

Board; WD GO No 52, 18 April 1919. Cf had been appointed junior military aviator or

AAF Historical Studies No 25, pp 36-37. The military aviator might continue with the rank,

Chief of Staff had occasion later to state that pay, allowances, and additional pay provided

the consolidation at this time of the Division by the acts of 3 June 1916 and 24 July 1917.

of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of For pertinent provisions of the Army

Aircraft Production into the Air Service under Reorganization Act of 1920, see United

the Director of Air Service "still further States Statutes at Large, XLI, pp 719,

increased" the efficiency of the air arm. 768-769, and 785. Extracts are presented

Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1919, herewith in Appendix G.

p 22. 38. Annual Report of the Director ofAir

34. See an unsigned article, "General Service 1920, p 5.

Menoher New Air Service Chief," in Flying, 39. Annual Report of the Chief of Air

V71 (January 1919), p 1145. Service...1923, p 3. Major Oscar Westover

35. United States Statutes at Large, XLI, was appointed Director of the Bureau of

pp 108-109, 286-287. Aircraft Production on 10 February 1921. See

36. Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Annual Report of the Chief of Air

Army 1920, pp 41-42; and Report of the Service...1923, pp 3-4. As of the beginning of

Director of Air Service 1920, p 3 . the fiscal year 1924, however, the Bureau of

37. This law also discontinued the prac- Aircraft Production itself existed in name

tice of allowing advanced rank to aviation only, for the sole purpose of fulfilling its

personnel, except that in lieu of the increase duties relating to the Spruce Corporation. It

in flying pay men who for reasons of having was not even mentioned in the subsequent

performed distinguished service during war reports of the Chief of Air Service.

Chapter 2

Early Developments, 1913-1917

1. Annual Report of the Chief Signal mendation regarding establishment of aviaOfficer 1910, pp 26-27. It was at this time tion corps as part of the line instead of the

that the Signal Corps had only one lieutenant Signal Corps. Information needed immediand nine enlisted men on duty in connection ately for a hearing before Congressional

with aeronautics. Committee." At the same time telegrams were

2. 62 Congress, 3 Session, Congressio- sent to "Signals" at San Diego, California,

nal Record, 11 February 1913, p 3025. and Augusta, Georgia, directing that each

Designated as H.R. 28728, the bill did not officer prepare for immediate dispatch his

indicate the number of enlisted men to be recommendations regarding the proposal.

allowed for the Aviation Corps. Copies of these telegrams are in Sig. C. files,

3. See his "Prospective Developments 29278, in National Archives.

in U.S. Army Aeronautics" in Flying, H (July 5. Foulois to Scriven, 17 February

1913), pp 7-11. Woodhouse actually referred 1913, in Sig.C. files, 29278, in National

here not to the bill presented by Hay on 11 Archives. In addition to his telegram L.

February, but to one he introduced the fol- Foulois wrote the Acting Chief Signal Officer

lowing May. As will appear, however, the two a rather lengthy letter on the subject.

were identical. 6. See an undated and unsigned manu4. On 14 February Colonel Scriven script, in Sig.C. files, 29278, in National

sent the following telegram to Lieutenant Archives.

Foulois then stationed at Fort Leavenworth, 7. Sig. C. files, 360-Air Service, in

Kansas: "Telegraph tomorrow your recom- National Archives. Members of the group

150
NOTES TO PAGES 14-19

other than Arnold were Major E. Russell, sequent biographer of "Billy" Mitchell relates

Signal Corps; Captain T. B. Hennessy, Field that during the well-known court martial trial

Artillery; 1st Lt. Harry Graham, 22nd 12 years later when the crusader for air power

Infantry; 2nd IA. T. D. Milling, 15th Cavalry; was reminded of his earlier stand against a

and 2nd Lt. W. C. Sherman, Corps of separate Air Corps, he simply replied, "I never

Engineers. made a worse statement." Isaac Don Levine,

8. Chief, War College Division, Mitchell: Pioneer of Air Power (New York,

WDGS (approved by the C/S to S/W, 15 1943), pp 83-84.

February 1913, in Sig. C. files, 29278, in 16. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of

National Archives; and Stimson to Hay, 20 Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp

February 1913, in AG 321.91, Organization. 38-40, 45. Having in mind possible discipli9. See supra, p 4. To a certain extent nary action for Captain Beck because he

also those provisions of this law relating to "undoubtedly... intended to bring the Signal

the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps Corps of the Army into disrepute," Colonel

were influenced by a proposal made by the Scriven even went so far as to prepare for the

War Department on 14 March 1912. See 62 Chief of Staff a memorandum describing the

Congress, 2 Session, House Document No whole incident related to the "gigantic bluff"

718, p 80. charge. Memo for the Chief of Staff by the

10. Technically a new measure, of CSO, 14 August 1913, in Sig. C. files, 29278,

course, this time it was designated as H.R. in National Archives. There is evidence, how5304. See 63 Congress, 1 Session, Congres- ever, to support a belief that the memorandum

sional Record, 16 May 1913, p 1623. Note was never dispatched.

also Henry Woodhouse, "Prospective Devel- 17. See a statement he made some three

opment of United States Aeronautics," in years later. 64 Congress, 1 Session, House of

Flying, 1I (October 1913), pp 11-13. Representatives, Hearings of Army Appro11. Breckinridge to Scriven, 7 August priation Bill1917 (Washington, 1916), p 85 2

.

1913, in Sig. C. files, 29278, in National 18. "Prospective Developments in U.S.

Archives. Army Aeronautics" in Flying, II (July 1913),

12. Breckinridge's views on this bill pp 7-11.

were set forth in Asst. S/W to Hay,...18 19. "Aircraft as a Military Asset," in ibid,

August 1913, Sig. C. files, 29278, in National III (June 1914), p 133.

Archive; and 63 Congress, 1 Session, House 20. 63 Congress, 2 Session, House

of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, Report No 132; and Woodhouse, "Pro-specpp 22-23. tive Development of United States Army

13. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Aeronautics," in Flying II (October1913), pp

Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp 11-13. This substitute measure also took the

6-9. A summary of the hearings on this pro- designation of H.R. 5304.

posal, conducted from 12 through 16 August, 21. Statements of Gordon Bruce, aerois to be found in Major G. R. Perara, A nautical editor of The New York Tribune, are

Legislative History of Aviation in the United quoted in an editorial, "Flying Corps to be

States and Abroad (typed study prepared in Separated from the Signal Corps?", in Aerial

the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. 1940), pp Age Weekly, 1 (3 May 1915), p 149. See also

3-8. another editorial, "The Separation of the Air

14. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Service from the Signal Corps Great Britain's

Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp Latest," in ibid (31 May 1915), pp 245-246;

50-53, 89, respectively, and Alan R. Hawley, "The Inner Trouble in

15. Ibid, pp 76-85. For the quotation, see the U.S. Army Air Service," in Flying, V

p 83. Other officers who testified against the (May 1916), pp 163-164. In his article

Hay bill at this time included Lt. Col. Samuel Hawley states in substance that the Secretary

Reber, Major Russell, Captain Hennessy, and of War and the Chief of Staff wanted to ask

2nd Lt. Milling, Ibid, pp 26,62,97,99. A sub- for larger appropriations for the Air Service

151
NOTES TO PAGES 19-22

but were told "to conform with the adminis- paragingly the "gigantic bluff" statement

tration's policy to not spend for the Army made by Captain Beck before the House of

more than was spent the preceding year." Representatives Committee on Military

Otherwise, the Democrats might be defeated Affairs in August, 1913.

in the election of 1916. According to some of 26. The above summary statements of a

its own members, Congress, normally willing portion of the War Department announceenough to provide adequately for aviation, ment in question ore based upon an unsigned

was not likely to vote more funds than were article, "Flying Corps to be Separated From

asked by the administration. Therefore, for the Signal Corps"?, in Aerial Age Weekly, I1

the good of the service, the obvious thing to (24 April 1916), p 173. which apparently was

do was to change the administration. One edi- assembled from a news item in the public

torial, for the curiously illogical reason indi- press, as for instance, the New York Tunes, 18

cated in the title, went so far even as to sug- April 1916.

gest the election of Theodore Roosevelt as 27. 64 Congress, 1 Session, House of

President of the United States. "A Roosevelt Representatives, Hearings on Army

Administration in 1907 Gave the United Appropriation Bill 1917, pp 838-840.

States Army the First Airplane Ever Used for 28. See Alan R. Hawley,.The Inner

Military Purposes-Another Roosevelt Admi- Trouble in the U.S. Army Air Service," in

nistration Seems to be the only Hope to Give Flying, V (May 1916). pp 163-164; and Cf

the U.S. Army and Navy Their Much Needed New York Times, 18 April 1916.

Air Service," in Aerial Age Weekly, 111 (15 29. 64 Congress, 1 Session, CongressioMay 1916). See also two others; "Change the nal Record, 28 March 1916, p 5054. A copy

Administration!" , in ibid (8 May 1916), p of the bill is printed in Flying, V(April 1916),

237; and "Congress Allowed as Much for p 108, and is followed on the succeeding page

Aeros as Asked by Secretary Baker," in ibid by a warm approval in an article by Alan R.

(12 June 1916), pp 389-390. On 8April 1916 Hawley and Henry Woodhouse, "Why There

the Secretary of War himself said that despite Should be a Department of Aeronautics and a

some feeling in the Aviation Section, Secretary Cf Aviation." This in part takes the

Congress had, "been as generous as the state form of an open letter to Representative Lieb

of the art justified." 64 Congress, 1 Ses~sion, complimenting him for his efforts in behalf of

House of Representatives, Hearings on Army military aeronautics. See also Aerial Age

Appropriation Bill 1917, p 846. Weekly, III (10 April 1916), pp 109-110.

22. 64 Congress, I Session, Congressio- 30. See an editorial, "A Secretary for

nal Record, 5 January 1916, p 494. Aviation." in AerialAge Weekly, 111 (17 April

23. See 64 Congress, 1 Session, Senate 1916), pp 150-151.

Report No 153, pp 1-5, On 18 February 31. 64 Congress, 1 Session, Congressio1918, in one of his two appearances before nal Record, 28 March 1916, p 5054.

the Committee, Robinson buttressed some of 32. Here the reader's attention is called

his charges by producing copies of letters to the fact that largely motivated by one of its

which passed between Colonel Samuel members, Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary, the

Reber, the head of the Aviation Section of the Aero Club of America at its annual meeting

Signal Corps. and the officer in command of on 13 November 1916 adopted a resolution

the station at San Diego, California, concern- favoring a "Department of Aeronautics,"

ing which the charges that had been made which in essence would have been quite simlargely related. ilar to Congressman Lieb's Department of

24. 64 Congress, I Session, Houise of Aviation. See Aero Club of America 1917

Representatives Report No 369. (New York. 1917), pp 131-132; and an

25. Draft, 3rd Ind. (Basic unknown), unsigned article, "Constructive Program of

CSSigO to AG, February 1916, in Sig. C. Aero Club Announced," in Flying V,

files, 41804, in National Archives. At this (December 1916), pp 449-451. The president

time the Chief Signal Officer mentioned dis- of this organization was empowered to

152
NOTrES TO PAGES 22-27

appoint a committee to wait on the President 34. 65 Congress, 1 Session, Congressioof the United States with the view of encour- nal Record, 2 April 1917, p 121; ibid, 4 April

aging him to support such a program. 1917, p 189; and 65 Congress, 1 Session,

33. Annual Report of the Chief Signal Senate, Hearings on S.80: Department of

Officer 1916, p 35. Aeronautics (Washington, 1917), pp 3-5.

Chapter 3

The Impact of the War Years, 1917-1918

1. 64 Congress, 2 Session, Senate the present author's. Coffin accompanied

Document No 687 p 5. his own letter by one each from Secretary

2. Prior to his appearance before the Baker and Secretary Daniels approving the

Senate Committee on Military Affairs on substitute proposal. Baker to Chamberlain,

this occasion Peary at his own expense had 31 July 1917, and Daniels to Chamberlain,

toured the country from coast to coast deliv- 31 July 1917, in ibid, pp 2, 3. See also

ering addresses supporting the measure in President Wilson to S. Hubert Dent, Jr.

question. See W. H. Hobbs, Peary (New [Chairman, House of Representatives ComYork, 1936), pp 438-439. mittee on Military Affairs], 2 August 1917,

3. 65 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, in 65 Congress, 1 Session, House Report No

Hearings on S.80 :Department of Aeronau- 161, p 2.

tics, pp 19-23,65--68,29-38,89-92. 7. Supra, p 9. Amendments suggested

4. $10,800,000 had been appropriated by the Senate Committee on Military

in May, and $43,500,000 in June. See Affairs are given in 61 Congress, I Session,

supra, p 8. following these developments an Senate Report No. 106, p 3. See also an edieditorial in the Aerial Age Weekly read in torial. "Senators Favor Aircraft Board," in

part as follows: Appreciating the need of Aerial Age Weekly, V (20 August 1917), p

bringing out the facts about the tremendous 817. Amendments proposed by the House

value of aeronautics and the vital necessity Committee on Military Affairs are printed

of starting on a substantial aerial program in 65 Congress, 1 Session, House Report

Senator Sheppard and Congressman No. 161, pp 1-2. See also 65 Congress 1

Hulbert started the hearings ...on the Session, Congressional Record, 25 SepHulbert-Sheppard Bill and brought forth the tember 1917, p 438; and ibid, 26 September

endorsement of leading authorities of not 1917, p 447.

only the plan to train thousands of aviators 8. Sweetser, The American Air Serand build tens of thousands of aeroplanes vice, pp 210-218, presents a fairly complete

but also a strong general endorsement of the account of these disappointing revelations.

Hulbert-Sheppard Bill." "$640,000,000 9. Ibid, pp 213-218. Further and

Aeronautic Appropriation Passes House of more complete substantiation for the initiaRepresentatives Without Dissenting Vote," tion of these investigations may be noted in

in V (23 July 1917), p 627. a group of editorials or unsigned articles

5. See caption underneath a photo- published contemporaneously in a leading

graph of the Congressman which appeared aeronautical journal: "Investigations Into

in ibid (10 September 1917), p 962. the Aeroplane Situation," in Aerial Age

6. Coffin to George E. Chamberlain, 1 Weekly, VII (8 April 1918). p 207;

August 1917, in 65 Congress, 1 Session, "President Wilson Orders Judicial Aircraft

Senate Report No 106, pp 1-2. Italics are Investigation," in ibid (13 May 1918), pp

153
NOTES TO PAGFEs 27-32

435-437, 450-469; "Senate and Depart- copy of the Gould bill was printed as "The

ment of Justice Investigating Aircraft Aircraft Administrator Bill," in Aerial Age

Situation," in ibid (20 May 1918), pp 489- Weekly, VII (29 April 1918), p 344; and also

490, 510; "Charles E. Hughes to Cooperate as "Bill to Provide Aircraft Administrator

in Aircraft Investigation," in ibid (27 May Introduced," in Flying, VII (May 1918), p

1918), p 582; "The Aircraft Investigation," 339.

in ibid (3 June 1918), pp 578, 606; and "The 13. Report of the Director of Military

Aircraft Investigations," in ibid (10 June Aeronautics 1918, p 4.

1918), p 624. As revealed in the article 14. See his Nation at War (New York,

listed next to the last, an exchange of views 1932), p 11.

between Hughes, Attorney General Thomas 15. Supra, p 11.

M. Gregory, and the Chairman of th Senate 16. 65 Congress, 2 Session, CongresCommittee on Military Affairs, indicated an sional Record, 1 August 1918, p 9186. For

agreement for coordination between these the views of General Brancker and the two

two investigating agencies. It appeared that senators, as well as a copy of the New bill,

the Senate would limit itself to current see an unsigned article, "Senators Propose

developments, while Hughes would have a Air Ministry," in AerialAge Weekly, VII (12

clear field in dealing with the past. The August 1918), pp 1058-1059. As reported

broad scope of this inquiry may be noted in in amended form by the Committee on

[United States Department of Justice], Military Affairs in September, the measure

Abstract of Aircraft Investigation, by would give the proposed Department of

Honorable Charles E. Hughes and the Aeronautics control of the operation as well

Attorney General (Washington, 1919). as the production of aircraft. On the other

10. Hawley to President Wilson, 2 hand, it eliminated the chief of the departApril 1918, included in an unsigned article, ment from cabinet rank. 65 Congress, 2

"Inner Problems of Aircraft Situation and Session, Senate Report No 570, p 1. CfJ. M.

Their Solution," in Flying, VII (May 1918), Spaight, The Beginnings of Organized Air

pp 342-343. Hawley took this occasion to Power (London and New York, 1927), p

say that the British Government had passed 251.

through the same difficult phases which the 17. A full account of the investigation

United States was experiencing in connec- made is presented in 65 Congress, 2

tion with the Air Service. In England also Session, Senate, Hearings... on Aircraft

there had been "scandals and charges, Production (2 vols, Washington, 1918).

counter charges and confusion." After three 18. 65 Congress, 2 Session, Senate

years of trying different plans, however, Report No 555, pp 1-17. The longer quoted

"the military and naval authorities and other sections were taken from page 17. Full

branches of the...Government came to the copies of the report were printed in Aerial

conclusion that the only solution was a sep- Age Weekly, VIII (2 September 1918), pp

arate Department of Aeronautics with an 1213, 1214, 1235-1237, 1239, 1241; and in

Air Ministry at the head, whose functions Flying, VII (September 1918), pp 721,

are identical with the duties of the War 723-726, 736, 774.

Minister and the First Lord of the 19. With respect to these expressions

Admiralty." of opinion regarding the near "approach"

11. See 65 Congress, 2 Session, Senate towards an air department, Cf Spaight, The

Report No 380. The majority report is given Beginnings of Organized Air Power, pp

in Part I, pp 1-5; and the minority in Part II, 249-250; and Sweetser, The American Air

pp 1-5. Nine senators signed the first and Service, p 238. The latter quotes a part of

three the second; while three others failed to Ryan's letter of resignation as follows: "I

sign either. have not taken over the actual direction of

12. See 65 Congress, 2 Session, Con- Military Aeronautics and my connection

gressional Record, 15 April 1918, p 5117. A with it has not made any real change in its

154
NOTES TO PAGES 27-36

operations." He had spent the month of accomplished "the thorough inquiry which

September on an inspection trip to Europe. Judge Hughes had in mind" for Colonel

20. U.S. Department of Justice, Deeds ruled against an actual trial for that

[Report of the Hughes] Aircraft Inquiry former member of the Aircraft Board, a

(Washington, 1918). The report was printed finding which was approved by the

"serially" in the Aerial Age Weekly, VIII, Secretary of War. See Baker to Chairman,

beginning with the issue of 11 November Committee on Military Affairs, House of

1918, p 462, and ending with the 20 January Representatives, 16 January 1919. with

1919 number, p 962. enclosures, in Aerial Age Weekly, VIII (27

The investigators did recommend a January and 3 February 1919), pp 980,

court-martial trial for Colonel E. A. Deeds 996-997, 1009, 1040-1041, 1050.

and a criminal prosecution of three other 21. Memorandum Notes, Office of the

officers, all on relatively minor counts. Chief of Training, 15 November 1918, MS,

Subsequently, a War Department board Archives, U.S. Air Force Historical

which, in the opinion of Secretary Baker, Division.

Chapter 4

Preliminary Readjustments Following World War I

1. A few specific observations should Defense, there has never been a man on the

serve to substantiate and clarify the above General Staff...who knew anything about

generalizations. As expressed by Clinton the Air Service or cared whether he did."

Gilbert, the journalist, the Air Service had See 66 Congress, 1 Session, Senate,

been placed in the "command of a man Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.2715:

[General Menoher, an artilleryman] who Reorganization of the Army (2 vols.

had never flown. Above him was a General Washington, 1919), p 998. Testifying before

Staff which had never flown. Above it was a the same group two weeks later, Major B.

Secretary of War who had never flown and D. Foulois, who was at one time Chief of

who was bound to take his opinions from Air Service, A.E.F., said that during his

the highest uniformed officers. The same years of service in aviation work (which, as

was substantially true of the Navy. Rank in will be recalled, dated back to 1908) he had

both branches of the service, he jointed out, "heard many high ranking of officers of the

not only gave validity to opinions, but also Army frequently refer to aviators as being

silenced contrary views. Quoted in Levine, 'temperamental as prima donnas,' 'too

Mitchell, p 175. young for their rank,' 'lacking in discipline,'

Speaking as a witness before a subcom- etc." "I have always resented these

mittee of the Senate Committee on Military remarks," he added, "and always will." Ibid,

Affairs in the late summer of 1919, Howard p 1265.

E. Coffin asserted that the General Staff was 2. General Joseph T. Dickman

"not only not in favor of a progressive [air] presided over a board composed of superior

policy, but they have no appreciation of the officers of the American Expeditionary

value of it, or of the industrial and commer- Forces. It reviewed the findings of a number

cial development." With the exception of of subordinate boards, each of which consome veteran aviators who may have been sisted of senior officers in a given branch of

added to that body, Coffin continued, he service. A copy of the report of the

would "go further and say that since the Dickman Board is printed in 69 Congress, 1

beginning of my connection with the Air Session, House of Representatives,

Service, as a member of the Advisory Hearings on Department of Defense and

Commission of the Council of National Unification of Air Service (Washington,

155
NOTES TO PAGES 36-41

1926), pp 917-999. For the above summary were subject to change, however, for at the

statements, see pp 918, 953. time of embarking for Europe he had no

3. A record of the activities and find- definite opinion on the matter. Then, continings of this group is on file in AAG uing, the Assistant Secretary of War said,

321.9A-1, Separate Air Service. Under the "an intensive and careful study of the subtitle of Report ofAmerican Aviation Mission ject during all of last summer has made me

it was printed as Exhibit A, pp 18-31, in 66 change my mind entirely" in favor of an air

Congress, 2 Session, House of Representa- department. See 66 Congress, 2 Session,

tives, Hearings on United Air Service House of Representatives, Hearings on

(Washington, 1921), to which subsequent United Air Service, pp 5, 510.

citations in this study will be made. See p 30 6. This statement of the Secretary of

for the list of members involved which, in War was attached to the report of the

addition to the two that were mentioned Mission. See Report of the American

above by name, included Lt. Col. James G. Aviation Mission, p 31.

Blair of the General Staff; Colonel Halsey 7. Harold E. Hartney, Up andAt 'Em

Dunwoody, Air Service; Captain Henry C. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1940), p 307.

Mustin, United States Navy; S. S. Bradley, 8. Annual Report of the Secretary of

General Manager of the Manufac- War 1919, pp 68-75. Note also the testiturer's Aircraft Association; George H. mony of this cabinet officer before a conHouston, President of the Wright-Martin gressional committee on 15 December

Airplane Corporation; and C. M. Keys, 1919. At the time he referred, among other

Vice-President of the Curtiss Aeroplane and things, to his attitude towards a separate air

Motor Corporation. service as expressed in the pertinent annual

Incidentally, the work of the Crowell report. 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of

group was given rather wide current public- Representatives, Hearings on United Air

ity. In convenient form, for instance, it Service, pp 383-404.

appeared as a reprint from the Aircraft 9. Written by a future President of the

Journal, 23 August 1919, under the title United States, "Why Naval Aviation Won"

Report of the American Aviation Mission; first appeared in the U.S. Air Service for

and a copy of it was presented to the July of 1919. There is a reprint in the U.S.

English Parliament "by command of His Air Services, XXXIV (May 1949), pp

Majesty" as Report of the American 13-14. It may be assumed, of course, that

Aviation Mission (London, 1919). the author "cleared" the article with

4. Report of the American Aviation Secretary Daniels, a well-known opponent

Mission, pp 19-20. of a separate air service at the time.

5. For the significant proposal that 10. As a check on the proposals which

was made, see Report of the American will not be discussed individually, see H.R.

Aviation Mission, pp 21 ff. Stated in sub- 16195, 65 Congress, 3 Session, Congresstance, the reservations affixed by the one sional Record, 28 February 1919, p 4677.

member would preserve the identity of H.R. 9804, 66 Congress, 1 Session, Connaval and marine corps aviation personnel, gressional Record, 8 October 1919, p 6582;

give the Navy complete freedom in making H.R. 10380, ibid, 5 November 1919, p

provision for naval aviation equipment, and 7998: H.R. 11206, 66 Congress, 2 Session,

submit for further study a proposal for an Congressional Record, 15 December 1919,

independent defensive air force. p 611; and H.R. 12134, ibid, 29 January

The sincerity of the chairman of the 1920, p 2229.

Mission is indicated beyond a doubt by a 11. See 66 Congress, 1 Session,

statement made the following December: Congressional Record, 28 July 1919, p

"A year ago," he said, "I was thoroughly 3292. A copy of this bill, H.R. 7925, was

convinced that the Army ought to retain all printed under the heading. "Bill Introduced

its aviation activities." Apparently his views to Establish a Department of Aeronautics,"

156
NOTES TO PAGES 41-43

in AerialAge Weekly, IX (11 August 1919), written in conformance with certain views

pp 1003-1004, 1021, 1030. Incidentally, it presented in hearings before the Senate

set up a maximum commissioned and Committee on Military Affairs. See 66

enlisted strength for the Regular Air Force Congress, 2 Session, Senate Report No.

and the commissioned strength for the 325, p 2.

Reserve. 17. For the later bills providing for a

12. See 66 Congress, 1 Session, separate air organization, see supra, p 49,

Congressional Record, 31 July 1919, p note 10. As will appear, an Army

3390. A copy of the bill, S.2693, was Reorganization Act was approved eventuprinted under the heading, "Senate Bill for ally on 4 June 1920.

Department of Aeronautics," in Flying, VIII 18. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, House

(September 1919), pp 690-692. of Representatives, Hearings on UnitedAir

13. A copy of the Menoher Board Service. It appears that a subcommittee of

report is printed in 69 Congress, 1 Session. the House Committee on Military Affairs,

House of Representatives, Hearings on with La Guardia as chairman, turned its

Department of Defense and Unification of attention mainly to the suggestion for a sepAir Service, pp 908-917. A digest of it arate air organization; while a correspondappears in Perara, A Legislative History of ing Senate subcommittee, with Senator J.

Aviation, pp 25-26. See also Report of the W. Wadsworth presiding, concentrated

Director of the Air Service, 1920, pp 9-10. mostly on the broad question of a reorgani14. For instance, while testifying sub- zation of the Army.

sequently before a subcommittee of the With respect to the question of "free

Senate Committee on Military Affairs. speech" on the part of military and naval

Major Foulois asserted that of fifty personnel, La Guardia, testifying before a

telegrams requesting opinions on the sub- later congressional committee, said:

ject only four were sent to Air Service offi- Why, gentlemen, when I was on the

cers, of whom only two were practical Committee on Military Affairs, conducting

fliers. The others went to infantry and hearings on the Curry bill-I was acting

artillery personnel who knew nothing of chairman of the subcommittee-these

aviation. He said also that the Menoher Army men would come and tell me the

Board allowed twenty high ranking flying whole story, but they would not testify. The

officers who appeared before it only three Navy fliers would come and tell me the

and one-half hours to present their side of story, but they could not testify to it. It's the

the case. 66 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, old idea; the General Staff decides. And

Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.2715: whatever corresponds to the General Staff

Reorganization of the Army, pp 1268-1269. in the Navy they decide, and the younger

15. The Secretary of War approved the officers must go along.

Menoher Board Report, with certain minor See 68 Congress, 1 Session, House of

exceptions, and forwarded a copy of it to the Representatives, Hearings Before the Select

Chairman of the Senate Committee on Committees of Inquiry into the Operations

Military Affairs. See Baker to [Senator J. of the United States Air Services. (6 vols,

W.] Wadsworth, 31 October 1919. in 68 Washington, 1926), p 1667.

Congress, 2 Session, House of Represen- 19. 66 Congress, 2 Session. House of

tatives, Hearings on United Air Service: Representatives, Hearings on United Air

H.R. 10147 and H.R. 12285 (Washington. Service, particularly pp g, 18, 82, 125, 188,

1925), pp 39-41. 293-304, and 585-587. Perara, A Legis-lative

16. The revised Curry proposal has History of Aviation, pp 28-35, gives a fairly

been cited as H.R. 9804. For the second adequate summary of these arguments.

New bill (a revision of S.26939), see 66 As related to this fairly early period it

Congress, 1 Session, Congressional would appear that Major Foulois was a verRecord, 30 October 1919, p 7738. It was itable firebrand on the whole question. The

157
NOTES TO PAGES 43-44

General Staff he felt, had failed utterly to most cordial." Nor did Mitchell insist for the

accord aeronautics its just place in the mili- time being upon cabinet rank for the sugtary organization. Otherwise the United gested department of aeronautics. That, he

States would have had a relatively efficient felt, naturally would come later on. 66

air force even as early as 6 April 1917. As a Congress, 2 Session, House of Represenresult of practical experience, he said, "I can tatives, Hearings on United Air Service, pp

frankly state that in my opinion, the War 420, 47.

Department has earned no right or title to 20. 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of

claim future control over aviation or the air- Representatives, Hearings on United Air

craft industries of the United States." Service, pp 389, 406, 418, 425-426.

"Is it any wonder," the former Chief of General Menoher testified that he underAir Service, AEF asked, "that practical fly- stood the British separate air organization

ing officers who have been risking their was likely to "go under unless our separate

lives for the past 11 years in the develop- air service came through..."ln that case, he

ment and use of this new weapon are so felt the British should abandon their plan.

keenly anxious to see aviation and aircraft For a summary of the arguments in quesdevelopment taken away from the Army tion, see Perara, A Legislative History of

and placed under a separate control...? Is it Aviation, pp 28-31.

any wonder that a few of us dare to risk the 21. For instance, in connection with an

charge of insubordination...and the possible editorial devoted to Senator New's revised

charge of conduct prejudicial to good order bill providing for a separate department of

and military discipline in order that our aeronautics, which appeared in US. Air

cause may be heard?" Service, II (November 1919), p 5, General

Then with an attitude comparable to that Pershing was quoted as stating before the

which has been ascribed to Patrick Henry in joint meeting of the two congressional comhis address to the Virginia Burgesses, mittees that "it might be well to consolidate

Foulois added that if what he had said could the Air Force, military, naval and commerbe construed as insubordination he was cial, under a single head as an assistance to

ready to stand before any military court and progress." What he really said, according to

take his chances of punishment "in a cause the official record, is that if Congress is of

which, in my opinion, will develop and go the opinion that general aviation should be

ahead in spite of every effort to impede its encouraged, as I am, then the appropriations

progress." 66 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, for commercial, naval, and military aviation

Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.5715: might very well be included under one

Reorganization of the Army, pp 1260, head, to be used first for the development of

1265-1266. Major Foulois gave full public- observation, reconnaissance and combat

ity to his views. A large portion of his testi- service in the Army and Navy, and second,

mony from which the above extracts were for the development of commercial aviation

taken, for instance, was included in an arti- which would include procurement of planes

cle, "Past Failures-What to do about for all purposes and the encouragement of

Them," which he published in U.S. Air invention, and all that sort of thing. 66

Service, II (November 1919), pp 18-21. Congress, 1 Session, House of RepresenGeneral Mitchell at this time took an tatives, Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.2715:

entirely different attitude towards the higher Reorganization oftheArmy, p 1573.

military authorities. Testifying before La 22. Menoher to Pershing, 16 DecemGuardia's subcommittee on 20 December ber 1919, in AAG 321.9A, Separate Air

1919, he said that the relations of air offi- Service: New and Curry bills; Pershing to

cers, "insofar as aviation is concerned, with Menoher, 12 January 1920, in ibid. With

other branches of the Army, with the appurtenant comments these letters are

General Staff and the Secretary of War, and printed in Report of the Director of Air

with officers who are not flying officers are Service, 1920, pp 10-11. They also appear

158
NOTES TO PAGES 44-47

in numerous congressional documents, attempt was defeated. As eventually

23. The committee suggested certain adopted the law allowed the Navy to control

amendments. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, aerial "shore stations whose maintenance is

Senate Report No 325; 66 Congress, 2 necessary for operations connected with the

Session, Congressional Record, 8 Decem- fleet, for construction and experimentation

ber 1919, as amended by the committee, and for training personnel." See 66

provided for a department organized in four Congress, 2 Session, Congressional Redivisions: Military Aeronautics, Civil and cord, 24 May 1920, pp 7524, 7529; ibid, 2

Commercial Aeronautics, Supplies, and June 1920, p 8178; and United States StaResearch. Nothing in the measure would tutes at Large, XLI, p 954.

prohibit the Army and Navy from maintain- 26. 66 Congress, 1 Session, House of

ing specialized air units for observation, Representatives, Hearings Before Subcomdirection of gunfire, photographic purposes, mittee No 1 (Aviation) of Select Committee

et cetera. The Department of the Air would on Expenditures in the War Department (2

have charge of all other flying training. vols, Washington, 1919). The actual hearRegular air units might be attached to land ings, involving some six weeks, ended at

and sea forces; but in time of war or threat- Portland, Oregon on 13 September

ened hostilities any units so assigned should 27. The Frear subcommittee report on

be under the control of the respective army aviation was printed as, 66 Congress, 2 or naval commanders. Cf an editorial in U.S. Session, House Report No 637, in two parts.

Air Service, II (November 1919), p 5. Part I, accepted officially by the full Select

24. 66 Congress, 2 Session, Congres- Committee on Expenditures in the War

sional Record, 28 January 1920, pp Department, represents the findings of the

2153-2155, 2159-2160; ibid, 29 January majority of the subcommittees while Part II,

1920, pp 2185-2187; and ibid, 31 January which was signed by Representative C. F.

1920, pp 2301-2302. Lea, expresses the minority view. For the

25. Not altogether idle, however, the recommendation of the majority regarding a

proponents of an independent air service separate air service, see Part I, p 70.

did try in a rather circuitous manner to make Representative Lea, taking the contrary

some headway towards their objective. A position in that respect, presented in sumsuggested amendment to the Army appro- mary fashion the orthodox War Department

priation bill for 1921 provided that naval arguments to buttress his position. He did

aviation be restricted to operations actually favor what might be called a civilian air

attached to the fleet, leaving the Army in department. See Part II, p 70. The majority

control of such activities from all shore report, minus several appended documents,

bases. This would have constituted a minor was published "serially" in Aerial Age

step at least in the direction of a consolida- Weekly, beginning with X (1 March 1920),

tion of air power. Due partially to the oppo- p 720, and concluding with XII (20

sition of the War and Navy Departments the September 1920), p 52.

Chapter 5

Creation of the Army Air Corps

1. Lt. Col. B. D. Foulois was responsi- Army," the Air Service had only two out of a

ble for the statement that as late as September total of eighty-two officers on the General

1925, after seventeen years "of effort for Staff. See U.S. President's Aircraft Board,

proper recognition of the air branch of the Aircraft: Hearings Before the President's

159
NOTES TO PAGES 47-50

Aircraft Board (4 vols, bound in 2, Washing- 19 April 1921, p 461. Excerpts from the bill

ton, 1925), p 491. Hereafter this work will be as introduced in February, and comments

cited simply as Hearings Before the Presi- thereon by the author, are given in

dent's Aircraft Board Congressman [CF.] Curry, "The Necessity

2. Two books which General Mitchell for a Department of Aeronautics," in U.S. Air

published during this six-year interval were Service, V (March 1921), pp 28-29

OurAir Force: Keystone ofNational Defense 7. 67 Congress, 1 Session, Congres-

(New York, 1921), and Winged Defense: the sional Record, 11 April 1921, p 91. See also

Development and Possibilities of Modern Air an editorial, "American Aviation Policy," in

Power-Economic and Military (New York AerialAge Weekly, XIII (2 May 1921), p 171.

and London, 1925), Levine, Mitchell, pp 8. 67 Congress, I Session, House

402-403, under the general heading of Document No 17, pp 2, 3, 1. See in addition

"Mitchell's Own Writings," lists in complete an unsigned article, "President Harding

bibliographical form over forty magazine Indorses National Advisory Committee

articles which he prepared between July Policy," in US. Air Service, V (May 1921),

1920 and July 1926. pp 11-13.

3. Annual Report of the Chief of Air 9. Sidney B. Waldon to Charles D.

Service 1924 (Mimeograph form), pp 90-95. Walcott, 8 April 1921, a copy of which was

The list of vessels which were sunk or included in Memo for General Mitchell by

destroyed during these maneuvers included Major W. G. Kilner. Chief of Operations

several captured German destroyers and sub- Division, Air Service, 3 August 1921, MS,

marines; the German cruiser Frankfiirt; the U.S. Air Force Historical Division.

German battleship Ostfriesland; and the 10. Annual Report of the Chief of Air

obsolete American battleships Alabama, Service for 1922 (Mimeograph form), pp

New Jersey, and Virginia. The last two ships, 5-7, passim, and 41-46. Patrick blamed a

incidentally, were on the list to be scrapped part of his troubles upon what he regarded as

under the terms of the Four Power Treaty the, "unfortunate" phraseology of a provision

drawn up at the Washington Conference in of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920

1922. In addition to the reference given specifying that not more than "10 per centum

above further substantiation for this brief of the officers" in each grade below that of

statement regarding these bombing "attacks" brigadier general who failed within a year

may be found in an unsigned article, "Aerial after assignment to qualify as pilots or

Bombing Tests Now Historic," in US. Air observers could be allowed to remain in the

Service, VI (August 1924), pp 19-21; Air Service. While preferable that a high peranother, "2000-lb Bomb Sinks Alabama," in centage of the officers should be qualified for

ibid, (September 1921), p 13; Captain A. W. flying duty, it was the desire of this organizaJohnson. U.S.N., "Lessons from the tion that, in each grade, not to exceed

Bombing-a Navy View," in ibid, (October one-tenth of the total number should be

1924), pp 29-33; Maj. Gen. Mason M. non-fliers. A correct interpretation of the proPatrick [Chief of Air Service], "Without visions in question, however, carried an

Adequate Air Force We Invite A National entirely different meaning, eliminating

Disaster," in ibid, VIII (October 1923), pp potentially a number of officers extremely

11-14; and same, "The Airplane Versus the valuable to the service because of their speBattleship," in The Military Engineer, XV cial technical or administrative abilities. For

(November-December 1923), pp 530-531. similar complaints voiced by Patrick's prede4. Cf Historical Studies No 25, p 53. cessor. General Menoher, see Annual Report

5. See Mitchell, Our Air Force, pp of the Chief ofAir Service for 1924 (Mimeo199-210. graph form), pp 6-8, passim, and 49-52.

6. 66 Congress, 3 Session, Congres- 11. 1st Ind (AG to Chief of Air Service,

sional Record, 24 February 1921, p 3829; 67 25 November 1922), General Patrick to AG,

Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 6 February 192-3, in AG 319.12, Hawaiian

160
NOTES TO PAGES 51-53

Department (8-8-22). Cf, AAF Historical Committee, later stated that because of a fear

Studies No 52, pp 59-60. of failure to receive promotion or recognition

12. A full copy of the Lassiter Board there was a definite tendency among Army

Report may be noted in AG 334.7. Drum and Navy men to present what he called "colBoard. The ten year peacetime expansion lective evidence" indicating the doctrine of

program which it advocated would entail an their respective departments, rather than to

annual appropriation of $25,000,000; an give their own personal convictions. Asserincrease in personnel to 4,000 officers, 2,500 ting that they would not tell what they actuflying cadets, and 25,000 enlisted men; and ally thought, he said, three navy lieutenants

equipment totaling 38 balloons, 2,500 flying asked that they not be put on the witness

planes, and 20 airships. stand. Reminded that they were protected,

13. See a statement of Brig. Gen. Hugh one added, "It's a long distance from here to

A- Drum, 21 September 1925, in Hearings Guam." See 69 Congress, 1 Session, House

Before the President's Aircraft Board, p 25. of Representatives, Hearings on Department

14. Historical Studies No 25, p 60. of Defense and Unification of Air Service

15. See Hearings Before the President's (Washington, 1926), p 325. Comment upon

Aircraft Board, pp 97-98. Perkins' experience is to be found in an edi16. See excerpt of this report in 68 torial, "The Duty and Opportunity of the

Congress, 2 Session, House of Represen- N.A.A.," in Aeronautical Digest, VIII (May

tatives, Hearings on Air Service Unification: 1926), p 264. Admiral William S. Sims testiH.R. 10147 and H.R. 12285 (Washington, fled before the Committee that, of course, the

1925), pp 291-293. Secretaries of War and Navy would insist

17. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of that their officers were free to say what they

Representatives Report No 1653, p 1. pleased; "but," he added, "you take your

18. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of chances afterwards..." General Mitchell said

Representatives, Hearings Before the Select that the "services" looked with displeasure

Committee of Inquiry into the Operations of upon the expressions of individual opinions

the United StatesAir Services. AAF Historical when contrary to the policies outlined by the

Studies No 25, p 64, presents a good summary departments concerned. Consequently, fearstatement on these hearings. As stated, the War ing disciplinary measures, officers (particuDepartment was inclined to believe that the larly those in the naval service) hesitated to

sole purpose of the committee was the corrob- testify; and, he added, did not offer the best

oration of "Billy" Mitchell's views, evidence when they did. Representative La

19. For these pointed statements by Guardia amply corroborated the opinions of

Mitchell, see 68 Congress, 1 Session, House the other three men. For the views of Sims,

of Representatives, Hearings Before the Mitchell, and La Guardia on this score, see

Select Committee of Inquiry into the 68 Congress, 1 Session, House of RepresenOperations of the United States Air Services, tatives, Hearings Before the Select

pp 1915, 1888, 2777. Committee of Inquiry into the Operations of

20. Ibid, pp 2777, 1893-1894, 1896. the United States Air Services, pp 3007,

See also Mitchell, "Neither Armies nor 1652, 1667.

Navies can Exist Unless the Air is Controlled On the other hand, Commander Richard

over Them," in US. Air Services, X (May E. Byrd, Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy

1925), pp 15-18; and Mitchell, Winged Department, gave conflicting testimony on

Defense, preface, pp xviii-xix. this matter. Speaking before the House

21. Hearings Before the Select Com- Committee on Military Affairs, 3 February

mittee of Inquiry into the Operations of the 1925, he asserted that it was absurd to say

United States Air Services, pp 522-532, that naval officers were afraid to express their

1217, 1245, 1820, 2248. real convictions because of intimidation by

22. Representative Randolph Perkins, "higher-ups." "No man living," Byrd continprosecuting attorney for the Lampert ued, "could muzzle" Commander Kenneth

161
NOTES TO PAGES 53-56

Whiting or Commander H. C. Richardson. respective departments called as witnesses

The future Antarctic explorer felt that what were free to express their personal convicprogress he had achieved was due to his prac- tions. Davis to Morrow, 26 September 1925,

tice of speaking the absolute truth to his and Wilbur to Morrow, same date, in

senior officers. Before "the higher-ups" knew Hearings Before the President's Aircraft

anything about the subject" he and Coin- Board, 1, pp 366-367.

mander Whiting had decided against a united 31. AAF Historical Studies No 25, pp

air service, because they regarded 'it as 71-72.

absolutely unworkable. 68 Congress, 2 32. Report of the President's Aircraft

Session, House of Representatives, Hearings Board, pp 6, 12.

on Air Senrice Unification: H.R. 10147 and 33. Ibid, pp 12-13.

H.R. 12285, pp 221-222. 34. lbid, pp 13-14.

23. 68 Congress, 2 Session, House of 35. Ibid, pp 15, 19-20.

Representatives, Report No 1653, pp 6-8. 36. Not to be overlooked completely in

24. See the "Special Concurring Report this connection is the fact that during the preby Mr. [Frank E.] Reid," in ibid, pp 24-25. ceding session of Congress two bills provid25. Ibid, p 9. ing for a separate department of aeronautics,

26. Coolidge to Curtis D. Wilbur, Secre- H.R. 10147 and H.R. 12285, were introtary of the Navy, and Dwight E Davis, duced. The second. however, was a revision

Acting Secretary of War, 12 September 1925, of the first and had been offered by the same

in U.S. President's Aircraft Board, Report of member. Representative Curry. 68 Congress,

President's Aircraft Board (Washington, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hear1925), p 1. This report, which appeared also ings on Air Service Unification: H.R. 10147

as 69 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Document and H.R. 12285, pp 1, 363. Also during this

No 18, will be cited hereafter by title only. period the members of the lower house conFor additional information regarding the sidered a resolution providing for the investiappointment of the Morrow Board, see H. F gation of the advisability of creating a departRanney, "President Coolidge Names Board ment of defense with "undersecretaries of the

of Nine Men to Decide Aviation's Needs," in Army, Navy, and the air." 68 Congress, 2

U.S. Air Services, X (October 1925), pp Session, Congressional Record, 26 February

23-25, and a group photograph facing p 23. 1925, p 4793, and ibid, 27, February 1925,

27. See Hearings Before the President's pp 4931-4932.

Aircraft Board, I1, pp 495-633, for the 37. 69 Congress, I Session, Congresgreater part of Mitchell's testimony. sional Record, 7 December 1925, p 405. A

28. Ibid, 1, pp 72-73; I1, pp 476, copy of this bill, H.R. 447, is printed in 69

655-656; and I, p 371, respectively. Congress, I Session, House of Represen29. Ibid, I, pp 9-10, 8, 17; 1Ii, pp tatives, Hearings on Department of Defense

1268-1269; 1, pp 114-116, 190-191, partic- and Unification of Air Service, pp

ularly. Many witnesses had no occasion to 1329-1347. On the next day Curry introexpress themselves on this subject. duced another department of aeronautics bill

30. There is some evidence to indicate a which took the designation H.R. 4084, and

tendency on the part of the Morrow Board to was a modification of his previous H.R.

encourage witnesses who opposed plans 12285. See ibid, pp 1349-1367; and 69

which would give the Air Service any form Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record,

of independent status, and a belief that the 8 December 1925, p 530.

War Department itself dictated certain cor- 38. These were H.R. 46 and H.R. 9044,

roborative testimony given before it by Army respectively, ibid, 7 December 1925, p 396,

officers. See AAF Historical Studies No 55, and 8 February 1926, p 3579. Copies of these

p. 71. Both the Acting Secretary of War and bills are printed in 69 Congress, I Session,

the Secretary of Navy, however, assured House of Representatives, Hearings on

Chairman Morrow that personnel from their Department of Defense and Unification of

162
NOTES TO PAGES 56-58

Air Service, pp 1327, 1329 and 1382-1388. The Army Air Service (G-3 Course No 9,

One major difference between them and Mimeograph form, Washington Barracks,

Curry's bill is that Hill and James would have 1925).

four undersecretaries subordinate to the 44. 69 Congress, I Session, CongressioSecretary of Defense, one each for Army, nal Record, 28 January 1926, p 2936. A copy

Navy, Air, and National Resources, in Hill's; of the Wainwright measure, H.R. 8553, is

and for Army, Navy, Air, and Supply, in printed in 69 Congress, 1 Session, House of

James'. Cf George S. Carll, Jr., "Congress Representatives, Hearings on Department of

Struggling With the Air Problem," U.S. Air Defense and Unification of Air Service, pp

Services, XI (March 1926), pp 45-47. 1371-1381.

39. This was H.R. 7916,69 Congress, 1 45. See ibid, pp 448, 496-499. Included

Session, Congressional Record, 18 January here is a copy of a letter, Secretary of War

1926, p 2339. A copy of the bill is printed in Davis to Morin, 10 February 1926, presenting

69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Represen- pertinent criticisms of the bill. Therein Davis

tatives, Hearings on Department of Defense took occasion to list eight specific investigaand Unification of Air Service, pp 1367, tions relating to the question of a separate air

1370. It differed from the Morrow Board rec- organization, including some which have been

ommendation mainly in proposing the regarded as of sufficient significance to be

appointment of three assistant chiefs of Air included in this study: (1) The Crowell

Service (Air Corps) in, the rank of brigadier Mission; (2) the Dickman Board; (3) the

general, and providing that not more than ten Menoher Board; (4) the Congressional Cornper centum of the officers in each lower rank niiittee which drafted the Act of 4 June 1920;

might be non-fliers. The bill took form also (5) the Lassiter Board; (6) a Special Board

in S. 3321, which was presented by Senator convened by the Secretary of Navy, 1925; (7)

James W. Wadsworth of the Committee on the Morrow Board; and (8) the Lampert

Military Affairs. 69 Congress, 1 Session, Committee. Only the first one listed, he

Senate Report No 224. pointed out, had taken an affirmative stand on

40. Their testimonies are to be found in the matter. The next six definitely had opposed

69 Congress, 1 Session, of Representatives, the idea, while the last one recommended a

Hearings on Department of Defense and department of national defense but not a sepaUnification of Air Service. To give a com- rate air service. Here, of course, the Secretary

plete list of page citations here would be alto- of War ignored the pointed recommendation

gether impracticable. For statements in oppo- of one of the members of the Lampert

sition to the proposed changes, however, see Committee, which was included with the regparticularly pp 96-97, 173, 189, 344-345, ular report. See supra, p 68, note 24.

508, 511-512, 636, 831; and for voiced In connection with the opposition to the

approval, note especially pp 262-265, 278, Wainwright measure, see also George S. Carll,

383-388, 400, 419-423, 775. Jr., "Congress Will be Guided by Morrow

41. As a part of Colonel Mitchell's pre- Report," in U.S. Air Services, XI (April 1926),

pared testimony, the greater portion of this pp 21-25.

letter is printed in Hearings Before the 46. AAF Historical Studies No 55, p 77;

President's Aircraft Board, II, pp 603-604. George S. Carll, Jr., "Congress Struggling

42. This was in general Patrick's words, With the Air Problem," in U.S. Air Services,

ibid, I1 p. 1198. Xl (March 1926). pp 45-47. As stated, the

43. Ibid; 69 Congress, 1 Session, House investigation was ended by the decisions to

of Representatives, Hearings of Department reprimand Majors Henry H. Arnold and H.

of Defense and Unification ofAir Service, pp A. Dargue, and to transfer from duty in

260, 270-274. The ideas of the Chief of Air Washington the former who was "the chief of

Service on this subject were set forth clearly the information division" of General Patin a lecture at the Army War College on 9 rick's office. See also Levine, Mitchell, p 373.

November 1925, Maj. Gen. M. M. Patrick, 47. 69 Congress. 1 Session, Congres163
NOTES TO PAGFS 58-62

sional Record, 11 February 1926, p 3828. A study. In his article, "A Five-Year Developcopy of this bill, H.R. 9220, is printed in 69 ment Program for the Air Corps at Last," in

Congress, 1 Session, House of Reprcsen- U.S. Air Services, Xl (July 1926), pp 11-14,

tatives, Hearings on Department of Defense 45-47. Representative James not only

and Unification ofAir Service, pp 443-445. includes an excellent summary of the main

48. Congressman W. E James, a long- provisions of this Act, but also presents some

time member of the House Committee on interesting comment upon the introduction of

Military Affairs, acting chairman during the the bill and its adoption by Congress.

greater part of the period in question, and In this connection attention should be

chairman of its Subcommittee on Aviation, called to the fact that the functions of the milprepared an informative and interesting arti- itary air arm had been modified to a minor

cle, "A Five-year Development Program for degree by an aeronautics bill, which had

the Air Corps at Last," which was published become a law on 20 May 1926. This was the

in U.S. Air Services, XI (July 1926), pp Air Commerce Act which created a Bureau

11-14, 45-47. James, of course, favored the of Civilian Aviation in the Department of

single department of national defense. Commerce. Until that time the responsibility

Allegedly, the appearance of Dwight W. of supervising civil and commercial aviation

Morrow before the committee for a short was placed upon no particular bureau or

period influenced one doubtful member to department of government. The Air Service,

vote against the proposal. Otherwise it would however, had customarily made an annual

have been reported favorably. Cf George S. survey of the civil aeronautical field. See

Carll, Jr., "Congress Will be Guided by United States Statues at Large, XLIV, pp

Morrow Report." in ibid, (April 1926 ), pp 568-576; and Annual Report of the Chief of

21-2-5 and an unsigned article, "United Air Service 1976 (Mimeograph form), pp

States in Danger of Attack from the Air," in 186. 222-223.

ibid. Xli (July 1927), p 56. 52. 69 Congress, 1 Session, Congres49. 69 Congress, I Session. House sional Record, 5 May 1926, p 8754 As the

Report No 700, pp 1-2. The bill received the date indicates, this was during the advanced

designation H.R. 10827. stage of debate on the bill.

50. See the legislative history of the bill 53 Ibid, p 8751; Mason M. Patrick,

in abbreviated form. 69 Congress. 1 Session, The United States in the Air, (New York,

Congressional Record (Index), p 781. 1928), pp 190-191.

51. United States Statutes at Large, 54. William Mitchell, Skyways (PhilaXLIV, pp 780-790. See Appendix H, this delphia and London, 1930), pp 2-58-260.

Chapter 6

The Establishment of the General Headquarters Air Force

1. No attempt will be made here, of Committee on ArmyAir Corps (Washington,

course, to give adequate documentation for 1934), pp 5-7. This was the well-known

the above sweeping generalizations on the Baker Board Report and, subsequently, will

developments in aviation. A helpful brief be cited as such. On this matter, also see AAF

statement by a group of men who made a Historical Studies No 25 p 81.

thorough investigation of the subject is given 2. See draft of a study, "Development

in U.S. Special Committee on Air Corps, of the Heavy Bomber, 1918-1944," MS in

Final Report of Wac Department Special Archives, U.S. Air Force Historical Division.

164
NOTES TO PAGES 62-64

3. The above figures were derived motion list for the Air Corps sufficient for the

from annual reports of the Assistant Secre- purpose at hand may be gleaned from reports

tary of War for Air, as incorporated in those of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. See

of his superior. Annual Report of the Annual Report of the Secretary of War for

Secretary of War for 1927, p 41; Annual 1927, pp 43, 53; Annual Report of the

Report of the Secretary of Warfor 1928, p 68; Secretary ofWarfor 1928, p 67:AnnualReport

and Annual Report of the Secretary of War of the Secretary of War for 1929, p 87. and

for 1932, p 44. See also the Annual Report of Annual Report of the Secretary of War for

the Chief of Air Corps for 1935 (Mina- 1931, p 32. Cfan editorial. "They Have Earned

eographed form), chart facing page 4. It" inAero Digest, XII (April 1928), p 518: and

Exclusive of the totals on planes, which he Ralph W, Cram, "The Human Equation in the

omitted here, the Chief of Air Corps pre- Air Corps as Related to Its Claim for a

sented figures essentially substantiating Separate Promotion List," in ibid, (June 1928),

those which were cited. Slight variations pp 924-925, 1050-1052.A case illustrating the

depended largely upon whether at times a baneful effect of the single promotion list upon

count was made of officers detailed to the Air an Air Corps officer was brought out by Lt.

Corps and flying cadets in the case of Lester J. Maitland while testifying before a

enlisted men. These in no wise affect the gen- congressional committee in the spring of 1928.

eral picture of Air Corps strength. At that time he had been on flying status as an

One seeming discrepancy with respect to officer for over ten years. According to the

the whole situation, however, should be clar- existing list, however, he was not due for proified. As noted, the law of 2 July 1926, like motion as captain until July 1932; and would

the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 before not attain his majority until 1948. after 31 years

it, specified an enlisted strength of 16,000. of service! See 70 Congress, 1 Session, House

Yet the expansion program set up in the Air of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 12199:

Corps Act set a goal of 15,000 at the end of Promotion and Retirement (Washington,

five years (or six, allowing for the twelve 1928), pp 30-31.

months initial delay). The explanation lies in 6. All told, no less than a score of these

the fact that at the beginning of the five year bills were introduced during the period indiperiod there was an actual enlisted strength cated. In this instance it obviously would

of only 8,769 including flying cadets.Annual serve no useful purpose to give the specific

Report of the Chief of Air Corps for 1927 dates concerned or to list the precise legisla-

(Mimeographed form), p 16. The same gen- tive designations. For expressions of general

eral condition applied as respects the officer interest in the proposed revision of the orgastrength. As it so happened, though, the num- nization of military aeronautics during the

ber scheduled for the end of the five years period, however, see [Congressman] John J.

exceeded that which existed at the beginning. McSwain, "A Single Department of National

4. This seems amply demonstrated by Defense" in Aero Digest, X (January 1927),

data present in Army Air Forces, AC/AS, pp 9, 73-74; [Representative W. F.

Intelligence, Historical Division, Army Air James],"United States in Danger of Attack

Forces Historical Studies No 22: Legislation from the Air" in US. Air Services, XVI (July

Relating to the AAF Materiel Program, 1927), p 56; an editorial, "Unified Defense."

1939-1944 (MS, prepared in 1944), on chart inAero Digest, XIII (July 1928), p 76; Frank

between pp 3 and 4. and Appendix I, Table 1. A. Tichenor..."Air-Hot and Otherwise" in

The Assistant Secretary of War for Air drew ibid, XVII (September 1930), pp 50, 70; and

such a conclusion. Cf the Baker Board Re- Warren B. Francis, "Aeronautics and the Last

port, p 73. however, which held that the Session of Congress." in U.S. Air Services.

blame for the failure to provide the necessary XVI (April 1931), pp 44-45.

funds was due largely to the Bureau of the 7. 72 Congress, 1 Session, CongresBudge and Congress. sional Record, 8 December 1931, p 174.

5. Data on the subject of a separate pro- Ibid. 5 January 1932, p 1338. They were

165
NOTES TO PAGES 64-67

designated as H.R. 4742 and H.R. 7012 which the proposal for a department of

Copies of these bills are printed in 72 national defense was incorporated in the

Congress, I Session, House of Represen- Economy Bill of 1932.

tatives, Hearings on Department of National 17. Frank A. Tichenor, "A Message to

Defense: H.R. 4742 and H.R. 7012 (Wa- President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Members

shington, 1932), pp 1-2 and 280-282, in the of his Cabinet and to Members of the 73rd

order listed. Congress" in Aero Digest, XXII (March

8. Ibid. Making a point of what he 1933), p 22.

regarded as an unnecessary duplication of 18. Gavreau and I. Cohen, Billy

effort and expense, Congressman Byrns Mitchell (New York, 1942), pp 208-211,

called attention to the fact that the Army and 213, 216; Levine, Mitchell, p 392. When

Navy each had an airport, existing side by requesting a White House appointment later

side, at nearby Boiling Field. Then he added, that same month Mitchell wrote that he

"I have been told by gentlemen of reputation, believed "that the sooner we discuss aerothat it is impossible for one machine shop to nautical matters the better, as they are cerborrow a tool from the other machine shop tainly not improving. I think I can explain the

over there---because it is contrary to regula- whole matter to you in a comparatively short

tions." See p 13. time." Mitchell to Roosevelt, 24 September

9. Ibid, p 34. 1933, MS, Roosevelt Papers. Official File

10. For the testimony in question, see 249, Aeronautics, the Franklin D. Roosevelt

ibid, pp 103-134. Library.

11. See ibid, pp 49-80, 83-98, 19. After a conference with Roosevelt

263-278. in the summer of 1935 Mitchell when talking

12. MacArthur to Charles H. Martin, 18 with friends commented on the fact that the

February 1932, in ibid, pp 248-249. President's desk was covered with all sorts of

13. Annual Report of the Secretary of "gimcracks," including miniatures of ships'

War 1932, pp 94-112. See especially p 98. clocks, steering wheels, life preservers, and

14. They were defeated in committee by other things which reflect a man's love of the

the vote of eleven to eight. See 79 Congress, sea. "I wish," he was quoted as saying, "I

1 Session, Senate Committee Print, Unifica- could have seen an airplane model in that

tion of the War and Navy Departments and collection." Gavreau and Cohen, Billy

Postwar Organization for National Security Mitchell, p 291.

(Washington, 1945), p 243. This work is 20. Memo for Commanding Generals

familiarly known as the Eberstadt Report, of the Four Field Armies by General Douglas

the designation by which hereafter it will be MacArthur, Chief of Staff, 22 October 1932,

cited. in AG 320.2 (8-6-32) (1), See 1-a.

15. For the debates and final count see 21. AG to C/AC, 3 June 1933, in AG

72 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional 334.7, Drum Board.

Record, 30 April 1932, pp 9318, 9339. 22. Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, Acting

16. This was brought out in the Eber- C/AC, to AG, 13 July 1933, included at

stadt Report, p 185. True enough, soon after Exhibit I of Report of the Special Commithis bill had been rejected by the Committee tee, General Council on Employment of

on Expenditures in the Executive Depart- Army Air Corps under Certain Strategic

ments, Byms secured permission to speak Plant [Drum Board Report], in ibid.

briefly on it before the whole House. Then 23. See pertinent sections of the Drum

and there he criticized, among other things, Board Report as previously identified, in

the action by which the measure had been ibid. Members of the board other than Drum

referred to the committee in question. 72 and Foulois were Maj. Gen. John W Gulick,

Congress, I Session, Congressional Record, Chief of Coast Artillery, Brig. Gen. Charles

23 February 1932, pp 4515-4516. Inciden- E. Kilbourne, Assistant Chief of Staff, War

tally, this may have influenced the action by Plans Division; and Maj. Gen. George S.

166
NOTES TO PAGES 68-71

Simonds, Commandant, the Army War Secretary of War announced that the Office

College. Extracts from the Drum Report are of the Assistant Secretary of War for air had

printed in the Baker Board Report, pp 13-14. not been filled "because the Air Corps, like

24. See the copy of a speech delivered other branches of the Army, now functions

on 25 July 1934, by the Second Assistant directly under the Chief of Staff, to the

Postmaster General, in the form of a Post mutual benefit of the Air Corps and the Army

Office News Release, 26 July 1934, Ar- as a whole." Annual Report of the Secretary

chives, United States Air Force, Historical of War 1934, p 4. As expressed before the

Division. Note also the Baker Board Report, Finletter Commission, however, former

pp 60-61, and Exhibits 5, 6, 7. Secretary F. Trubee Davison held a different

25. Besides Baker, Drum, and Foulois, opinion about the matter. He believed that

the membership on the board included Karl failure to fill his office as well as that of the

T. Compton, Clarence C. Chamberlin, James corresponding position in the Navy DepartH. Doolittle, Edgar S. Gorrell. George W ment was due unquestionably to the "jealLewis, Maj. Gen. George S. Simonds, Brig. ousy of the older services." See his testimony

Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne, Brig. Gen. John on 1 December 1947, in U.S. President's Air

W. Gulick, and Major Albert E. Brown. The Policy Commission, Unclassified Testimony

latter acted as recorder. See Baker Board before the President's Air Policy CommisReport, p 1. sion, September 15-December 3, 1947,

26. For this analysis of the.purpose and Typescript form, 6 vols (Washington, 1947),

scope of the investigation undertaken by the pp 2644-2645.

board, see ibid, pp 1-3. Various subcommit- 32. Baker Board Report, pp 27-28.

tees made first-hand observations of out- 33. Ibid, pp 28-30.

standing developments in the art of aviation 34. AAF Historical Studies No 25, p 95

at such stations as Langley Field, Wright and note 19. Incidentally, this work presents

Field, and Randolph Field, and at different a fair summary of the Baker Board Report.

airplane factories. See pp 93-96; and CfPerara, Legislative His27. ]bid, pp 4-5. The investigating bodies tory of Aviation, pp 57--60. The brief review

listed included such as the Dickman Board, the of that document given in the present study

Menoher Board, the Lampert Committee, the purposely omits some of the more trite and

Lassiter Board, the Morrow Board, the House traditional criticisms made of the proposals

of Representatives Committee on Expendi- for a separate department of aeronautics. a

tures in the Executive Departments (1932), the coordinate air unit in a department of

Drum Board, et cetera, all of which have been national defense, and lesser changes, which

analyzed in the present study. Secretary Dem's had been urged by aviation enthusiasts.

opinion of the Baker Board Report was 35. Baker Board Report, p 75. General

expressed in Annual Report of the Secretary of Foulois who but recently had been under fire

War 1935, p 10. by the House Committee on Military Affairs

28. Baker Board Report. pp 15-18. The for alleged misconduct and inefficiency was

idea of merging all civil and Army aviation in criticized by some Air Corps officers for

one executive department, leaving the Navy signing the Baker Board Report. See an ediwith its own air component was also objec- torial, "General Benny Foulois" in U.S. Air

tionable to the board. It looked with favor, Services, XIX (July 1934), p 10; and another,

however upon the suggestion of a Federal "General Foulois Wants the Record" in ibid

commission relating solely to the control of (September 1934), p 16.

civil aviation. 36. 74 Congress. 1 Session, Senate

29. Ibid, p 15. See also pp 12, 14, 24. Document No 15: FederalAviation Commis30. Ibid, pp 24-26. sion, pp 1, 254. This document, which was

31. Ibid, p 27. It is interesting to note printed separately at Washington in 1934,

here that about the time the report of the will be cited hereafter as Federal Aviation

Baker Board was placed on record the Commission. Regular members besides

167
NOTES TO PAGES 71-74

Howell were Edward P. Warner, Albert J. report was devoted to the question of the

Berres, Jerome C. Hunsaker, and Franklin K. organization of national defense together

Lane, Jr. J. Carroll Cone acted as executive with that of military and naval aeronautical

secretary. For the provision of the law in material. Excellent digests of sections of the

question, see United States Statutes at Large, document and comments thereupon are

XLVIII, pp 933-939. found in an unsigned article. "Recommen37. Before the commission began tak- dations of the Aviation Commission," in Aero

ing testimony Chairman Howell visited Digest, XXVI (February 1935), pp 29-30,

Europe where he studied governmental 32, 34, 36, 75; and an editorial, "National

administration of aeronautical matters in four Defense Organization" in U.S. Air Services,

different countries. Meanwhile for the pur- XX (March 1935), pp 9-11.

pose of observing conditions relating to the 40. AG 320.2 (12-19-34) Misc (Ret)

assignment several other members of the -C. 31 December 1934. Cf Perara, A

group set out on a 13,000-mile aerial tour, Legislative History or Aviation, p 62. and

with stops in more than one-half the states in Exhibit A, p 1. The first 'draft of the

the American union, and in ten foreign coun- announcement was made on 19 December

tries within the Caribbean area. Federal 1934. With respect to the location of the

Aviation Commission, pp 1-2, 119. Upwards Headquarters, GHQ, and the three wings, see

of 4,000 typed pages of record resulted from Annual Report of the Chief of Air Corps for

the open hearings. U.S. Federal Aviation 1935, p 6.

Commission, Reporter's Minutes...Public 41. U.S. Federal Aviation Commission,

Hearings (Washington, 1934). In addition Reporter's Minutes...Public Hearings, pp

the executive hearings produced over 1,000 4135-4136. In a "My dear Franklin" letter,

pages which are still regarded as "confiden- written soon after offering the testimony

tial in nature," MS, in custody of the Civil mentioned above, Mitchell wrote that

Aeronautics Administration Library, United Howell had suggested that he see the

States Department of Commerce. President before the latter held a conference

38. Federal Aviation Commission, pp with the members of the Aviation

119-120. Commission, which was scheduled for 10

39. Ibid, p 123. The report of the December. The crusader for air power

Federal Aviation Commission included at expressed the belief, among other things, that

least three other recommendations which a constructive aviation policy could be inauought to be mentioned in this connection. gurated in the session of Congress then about

First, both the personnel and equipment of to convene; but he added, this could not be

the air forces (i.e., of the Army and Navy) done along the lines advocated by the Army,

should be further developed and, where nec- the Navy, or what he called the governessary, expanded in accordance with fixed ment-supported Manufacturers Aircraft

programs of regular growth. Next, though Association. Mitchell to Roosevelt, 1

not proposing separate budgets as such, it December 1934, MS, Roosevelt Papers,

suggested that funds for equipment should be Official File 249, Aeronautics, the Franklin

allocated directly to the authorities in charge D. Roosevelt Library.

of aeronautical development, and subse- More temperate criticism of the GHO Air

quently transferred to other branches or Force organization, which probably reflected

offices if necessary. Finally, since it had fairly accurately the better informed element

expired on 1 July 1934, the authority to select of public opinion on the question, may be

a Chief of Air Corps from among all the offi- noted in an editorial, "Not All Men Believe

cers of long service in that arm should be in the Baker Board" in US. Air Services,

reviewed and applied as well to the proposed XIX (November 1934), pp 7-8; and Cy

"Commanding General of the General Caldwell, "Our Air Force" in Aero Digest,

Headquarters Air Force." Ibid, pp 121, 124, XXVII (December 1945), pp 15-16, 70.

139-141. Fully one-fourth of the entire 42. U.S. Federal Commission, Repor168
NOTES TO PAGES 74-79

ter's Minutes...Public Hearings, p 4141. which he made, the Deputy Chief of Staff,

Here Chairman Howell summarized a por- Maj. Gen. George S. Simonds, took a position of Arno*d's statement made a few days tion on this matter which more nearly

earlier before the commission in what must approached the view of the Air Corps officers

have been an "off the record" testimony. than it did that of General MacArthur. As of

43. See Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold and 1 June 1935, General Simonds wrote that

Colonel Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare (New regardless of future developments in

York and London. 1941), p 91. It is assumed machines, weapons, tactics, and organizahere, of course, that each collaborator as- tion, the creation of the GHQ Air Force was

sumed equal responsibility for all that ap- the proper thing to do at the time. A step in

peared in the book. any other direction, he added, could be

44. This was brought out in an unsigned "compared to stepping off a precipice in

article, "Chief of the Air Corps Declares order to take the shortest line, whereas by

G.H.Q. Force a Forward Step" in Air Corps developing a road as we go along, we are

News Letter, XVIII (1 February 1935), p 31. more sure of reaching the proper destina45. General MacArthur's report for 1935 tion." See his article, "My Visit to the Air

is incorporated in Annual Report of the Sec- Corps," in Air Corps News Letter, XVII

retary of War 1935, pp 41-74. For the above (June 1935), pp 1-2.

appraisal of the GHQ Air Force, see p 61. 46. Annual Report of the Secretary of

Judging from a semi-official statement War 1935, p 62.

Chapter 7

The Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force, 1935-1941

1. 1st Ind (Basic unknown), Lt. Col. (9-13-34), pt 1. see 1-b; Memo for Chief

Ralph Royce to CG. Sixth Corps Area, 25 of Staff by Maj. Gen. E M. Andrews, 26

November 1935, in AG 320.2 (9-13-34), pt March 1936, in ibid; Memo for Chief of

1, see 1-b. See also Army Air Forces, Staff by Maj. Gen. G. S. Simonds, 29 April

AC/AS, Intelligence, Historical Division. 1936, in ibid; and AC 320.2 (5-5-36), Misc

Army Air Forces Historical Studies No 10: (Ret-MC, 8 May 1936). Cf AAF Historical

Organization, of the Army Air Arm, Studies No 10, pp 7-8.

1935-4943 (MS, prepared in 1944), pp 4. Memo for Chief of Staff by Brig.

6-7. This work will be cited hereafter sim- Gen. F. M. Andrews, 2 November 1935, in

ply as AAF Historical Studies No 10. AG 320.2 (11-2-35). This communication

2. Report of [Browning] Board was accompanied by a semi-personal letter

appointed to survey personnel situation of from Andrews to Simonds. See also Army

the Air Corps. 7 January 1936, in AG Air Forces, AC/AS, Intelligence, Historical

334.7, Boards, General. Cf AAF Historical Division, Army Air Forces Historical

Studies No 10, p 7. The Browning Board Studies No 46: Organization of Military

consisted of Colonel William S. Browning, Aeronautics, 1935-1945 (MS, prepared in

IGD; Lt. Col. Follett Bradley, AC; and 1946), p 4. The companion volume to AAF

Major Rosenham Beam, AC (recorder). Historical Studies No 25 will be cited

3. See, respectively, Summary of henceforth as AAF Historical Studies No

Opinions of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 in 46.

an unsigned copy of Memo for Deputy 5. Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff, 17 April 1936, in AG 320.2 by Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, 17 January

169
NOTES TO PAGES 79-82

1946, in AG 320.2 Force.

6. Report of [Browning] Board 16. A9G 320.2 (2-15-39) Misc C-M,

appointed to survey personnel situation of 1 March 1939; and Memo for AC/S, G-1 by

the Air Corps, 7 January 1936, in AAG Major C. E. Duncan, OAC, 3 March 1939,

334.7. Boards, General. in A41G 321.9C, GHQ Air Force...Air

7. Colonel Hugh J. Knerr, a represen- Corps. Cf Perara, Legislative History of

tative of General Andrews, signed the Aviation, ExhibitA, p III.

report but later withdrew his signature on 17. In a special message to Congress

the grounds that since his superior did not on 12 January 1939, President Roosevelt

agree wholly with the proposals involved, stated that military aviation was increasing

he had no right to sanction it. The majority at such a fast pace, with regard to range,

of the other members felt, however, that speed, and capacity of airplanes, that our

General Andrews' attitude in this instance aircraft defense estimates should be

should not affect Colonel Knerr's position; revamped completely. He recommended an

and, in fact, another representative of the appropriation of $300,000,000 to provide a

GHO Air Force, Brig. Gen. H. C. Pratt, minimum of 3,000 additional planes of varaccepted the board's findings. See AAG ious types; and a sum sufficient to train

321.9 Board Reports (Bulk); AAG 321.9B, annually 20,000 more pilots. This message

Organization GHQ Air Force...Air Corps; is printed in 76 Congress, 1 Session,

and AG320.2 (9-13-34) pt 1, see 1-b. Senate, Hearings on H.R. 3791: National

8. Memo for Chief of Staff by Maj. Defense (Washington, 1939), pp 1-3. In

Gen. Oscar Westover, 25 April 1936, in AG response thereto the House of Represen320.2 (9-13-34) pt 1, see 1-b; Memo for tatives on 15 February following passed a

Chief of Staff by Maj Gen. George J. bill authorizing the Secretary of War to

Simonds, Deputy Chief of Staff, 29 April equip and maintain for the Air Corps 5,500

1936, in ibid. serviceable planes, and provide for an ade9. Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff quate number of air personnel. Following

by Maj. Gen. F M. Andrews, 23 July 1936, approval by the Senate the bill became law

in ibid, sec 1. on 3 April 1939. See United States Statutes

10. Report of Maj. Gen. Oscar at Large, LIII, pp 555-560.

Westover to AG, I May 1937, in AAG 18. Unsigned copy of letter to Maj.

321.9B, GHQ Air Force...Air Corps. Gen. H. H. Arnold, 30 July 1940, and

11. Report of Maj. Gen. F. M. General Arnold's notes thereon, n.d., in

Andrews to AG, 1 May 1937, in AAG AAG 321.9B, GHO Air Force...Air Corps;

321.9C. GHQ Air Force...Air Corps. AG 320 2 (11-14-40) MCM. 19 November

12. Memo. AC/S, G-3 by Maj. Gen. 1940. See Perara, Legislative History of

Oscar Westover, 29 November 1937, in Aviation, ExhibitA, p IV

ibid. General Westover's attitude towards 19. Memo for AC/S, G-1 et al by Lt.

the question of a separate department of air Col. Orlando Ward, Sec/WDGS, 30

will be discussed in another connection. October 1940 as cited in AAF Historical

13. Maj. Gen. E M. Andrews to Brig. Studies No 46, p 16. General Arnold asGen. H. H. Arnold, 15 October 1937, in sumed his new duties on 11 November.

AAG 321.9, GHO Air Force Organization. 20. Memo for the Chief of Staff by

14. See an editorial. "Maj. Gen. Oscar Brig. Gen. Wade Haislip, AC/S, G-I, 15

Westover" in U.S. Air Services, XXIII March 1941, in AG 320.2 MCM

(October 1938), and another, "The Air (11-14-40); and 1st Ind (AG to Chief of

Services" in Aero Digest, XXXIII Air Corps, 17 February 1941), Brig. Gen.

(November 1938), p 21. Carl Spaatz, Assistant C/AC, Plans to AG,

15. Memo for AC/S, G-3, by C/AC, 12 March 1941, in ibid.

23 February 1939, in AAC 321.9A, 21. See AAF Historical Studies No 10,

Organization-Air Corps and GHO Air p 16; and Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson,

170
NOTES TO PAGES 82-86

National Security and the General Staff, of the Chief of Air Corps to supervise the

(Washington, 1946), p 317. A careful dis- activities of the Commanding General,

tinction should be made, of course, GHO Air Force and the Chief of Air Serbetween "General Headquarters" and vice. It was not until after numerous com-

"General Headquarters, Air Force." munications had passed between the

22. Memo for Chief of Staff (through responsible offices, and at least one major

Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air) by conference was held, that the plan which

Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, 26 December 1940, finally was adopted had emerged. Then it

cited in AAF Historical Studies No 10, p was far from being wholly satisfactory to

17. the air personnel. See AAF Historical Stu23. For Lovett's appointment as Spe- dies No 46, pp 20-22.

cial Assistant to the Secretary of War; see 26. A copy of AR 95-5, ArmyAir ForMemo for the Deputy Chief of Staff by the ces, 20 June 1941, is included herein as

Secretary of War, 29 December 1940, in Appendix I.

AAG 020.2, Office, Secretary of War. The 27. Generally paralleling the organizareader will recall that the position of tion of the War Department General Staff,

Assistant Secretary of War for Air origi- the Air Staff had divisions for personnel,

nally had been created and filled in 1926. military intelligence, operations and train24. Stimson to Robert R. Reynolds, ing, and material and supply; and also a

Chairman, Senate Committee on Military special war plans division, a budget section,

Affairs, 20 June 1941. Through the courtesy and a statistics section. Outside the Air

of Senator Pat MCCarran of Nevada, the Staff proper were an air adjutant general

writer was privileged to see the original of and an air inspector.

this letter, as well as other important docu- Substantial analysis of AR 95-5, 20

ments on the history of military aviation, in June 1941, and discussions thereof are to

an aeronautics file which Senator MCCarran be found in AAF Historical Studies No 10,

maintained in his Washington office, the pp 18-21; and AAF Historical Studies No

United States Senate Office Building. On the 46, pp 22-24. For an excellent brief consame day that he wrote Senator Reynolds, temporary statement, see an unsigned artiincidently, Secretary Stimson addressed an cle, "Army Sets up Autonomous Air

identical letter to Representative Andrew J. Command" in U.S. Air Services, XXVI

May, Chairman of the House Committee on (August 1941). p 19.

Military affairs. 28. See Maj. Gen. 0. Westover, "Avia25. It appears that early in May the Air tion and Its Place in a Modem Defense

Corps presented a plan embodying many Program" in U.S. Air Services, XXII (Febfeatures which eventually were adopted. mary 1937), pp 15-16, 34.

According to the suggestion the capstone 29. Maj. Gen. 0. Westover, "The

of the military air arm would be the Army is Behind Its Air Corps" in Air Corps

Assistant Secretary of War for Air, together News Letter, XX (1 October 1937), pp 1-5;

with the War Planning Staff. One of the and same, "An Adequate Air Arm for the

members of the latter group, the Deputy Nation's Defense" in ibid (15 October

Chief of Staff for Air, should be designated 1937), pp 7-10. The address before the

also as Chief of Aviation. Immediately sub- Reserve Officers' convention was embodordinate to him in the latter capacity would ied in the latter article.

be an Air Council composed of the Chief of 30. Quoted in U.S. Office of Air Force

the Air Corps (the presiding officer); the History, The Army Air Forces in World War

Chief of the Air Staff; the Commanding 11 (7 vols projected, 3 completed, Chicago,

General, GHQ Air Force; the Chief of Air 1948), 1, p 67, second note. There is a sugServices; and such other members as might gestion in the work cited that Air Corps

be appointed. Below the Air Council the leaders were influenced to accept a comproposal envisioned a Headquarters, Office promise on organization with the hope that

171
NoTEs TO PAGES 86-89

they might clear the way for a long-range (August 1941), p 46, which in part stated

bomber program in which General An- that "aviation officers in the Army and

drews was particularly interested. Navy simply cannot come out for an inde31. Supra, p 97. pendent Air Force. And whenever they are

32. See 74 Congress, I Session, House called upon to testify, you might bear this in

of Representatives, Hearings on 7041, mind and pay no attention to what they may

6810, 4348, 4336, 4351, 4911: To Promote have to say. The truth is in them. But the

National Defense by Increasing the Effi- welfare of their wives and their children,

ciency of the Air Corps (Washington, not to mention their own careers, will not

1936), pp 60-6. let it come out."

33. 76 Congress, I Session, Senate, 37. Dodge was testifying before the

Hearings on H.R. 3791: National Defense, House of Representatives Committee on

p 58. Military Affairs with reference to the bill

34. "There are so many pros and cons proposing increased appropriation for

to the question of establishing a Depart- national defense, 76 Congress, 1 Session,

ment of National Defense," he wrote, "that House of Representatives, Hearings on an

I cannot comment on it at this time. It Adequate National Defense as Outlined by

requires considerably more careful consid- the Message of the President of the United

eration than I can give. Right at this minute States (Washington, 1939), pp 113-122.

it looks to me as if it might be a serious 38. Willkie's plan was outlined genermistake to change the existing set-up when ally in an editorial in the Washington Daily

we are all using every facility available in News, 28 August 1940, reprinted in 76

order to take care of the present expansion Congress, 3 Session, Congressional Reof the Air Corps." Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold cord, Appendix, pp 5326-5327.

to General Walter P. Story, 14 June 1940, in 39. See an editorial, "Hitler Ahoy!", in

AAG 032 M, Legislation. This letter was in Aero Digest, XXXVII (August 1940), p

response to an inquiry from General Story, 100; and a section of Cy Caldwell's colthen but recently returned from abroad, umn, "Personalities," in ibid (September

seeking information regarding the attitude 1940), p 120. Williams' literary contribuof the Chief of Air Corps on S. 4050 which tions included articles for such magazines

proposed a Department of National Dc- as Cosmopolitan and the Saturday Evening

fense. See Story to Arnold, 8 June 1940, in Post. His book, Air Power, was published at

ibid. New York in 1940.

35. Arnold and Baker, Winged War- 40. A copy of Major Williams' address

fare, pp 244-245. In a previous section of is printed in 76 Congress, 3 Session,

their book the authors had presented a dis- Congressional Record, Appendix, pp

passionate summary of valid arguments on 3400-3402, An abbreviated form appears

both sides of the question relating to an as Major Al Williams, "Real Air Power for

independent status for the air arm. See pp the Defense of the United States" in U.S.

83-87. Air Services, XXV (June 1940), pp 18-19,

36. Again, during this period, there 40.

appeared the charge that many Army and 41. "Ordeal of American Air Power"

Navy officers, having in mind what had in American Mercury, Lill (July 1941), pp

happened to General Mitchell, refused to 7-14, 127. The text of this article appeared

express an honest conviction on the ques- in the Congressional Record as of 20 June

tion of an independent air force which they 1941, 77 Congress, I Session, Appendix, pp

thought might be contrary to the opinion of 2991-2993. Evidence of de Seversky's

the General Staff of the Army or the Navy direct efforts to spread his doctrines among

High Command. This was brought out, for members of Congress were noted in his letinstance, in an editorial, "The Sword of ters of 16, 17, and 23 June 1941, with

Damocles," in Aero Digest, XXXIX enclosures, to Senator Pat McCarran in the

172
NOTES TO PAGES 89-90

latter's aeronautics files, United States 13 August 1937, pp 8870-8871.

Senate Office Building. 46. Ibid, 19 March 1937, p 2532. H.C.

42. The titles of a few typical editori- Luckey, the sponsor of the latter bill, a few

als and articles which illustrate the point days earlier introduced a resolution which

may be cited here. Among the former were: among other things would have resulted in

"A Herculean Task For a Busy Executive," the appointment of a committee for the purXXXVII (October 1940), pp 80, 113; "An pose of recommending after appropriate

Air Secretary 'In' Order," ibid (November study the best method of organizing and

1940), pp 32, 41; and "A New Ministry of coordinating the three armed servicesthe Air," XXXVIII (February 1941), p 41. Army, Navy, and Air. Ibid, 1 March 1937, p

Pertinent articles, all by Cy Caldwell, were: 1710. The following August Representative

"United We Stand-Divided We Stand for H.P. Koppleman sponsored a resolution

Anything," XXVII (November 1935 ), pp looking towards the creation of a board to

16-17, 68, 70: "The New Deal in War... make a study respecting appropriate chanXXX (April 1937), p 21; "Phantom Wings ges, eliminations, or consolidation in the

of the Air Corps," ibid (July 1937) p 30; military, naval, and air forces. Ibid, 17

and "The Ghost of General Douhet," August 1937, p 9193.

XXXVIII (February 1941), pp 43, 45, 48. 47. Like Representative Boileau's

43. H.R. 7041 was presented by Con- bills, these two would have limited the

gressman J. J. McSwain. an ardent aviation activities of the proposed department to

enthusiast, on 27 March 1935, and H.R. defense purposes only. See 76 Congress. 1

8729 by Representative Ernest Lundeen on Session, Congressional Record, 30 January

29 June Following, 74 Congress, 1 Session, 1939, p 967; ibid, 15 February 1939, p

Congressional Record, 27 March 1935, p 1446.

4557; ibid, 29 June 1935, p 10458. Having 48. It was submitted by Representative

occasion to comment upon the latter bill, J.M. Wilcox of Florida on 18 January 1937.

General Westover stated that unamended it See 75 Congress, 1 Session, Con-greswould "wreck the National Defense of the sional Record, 18 January 1937, p 289.

United States," and thought that it should This bill also died in committee.

be opposed vigorously by both the Air 49. Memo for AC/S, G-3 by C/AC, 3

Corps and the War Department. 2nd Ind February 1937, in AG 580 (1-19-37). The

(Sam Rayburn to S/W. 15 July 1935), C/AC reader will recall that at this time within the

to AG, 23 July 1935 in AAG 032 1, Legis- air arm there was a division of responsibillation. Judging by his well known attitude, ity between the Chief of Air Corps and the

the Chief of Air Corps undoubtedly held GE4Q Air Force. General Westover felt that

the same attitude towards H.R. 7041. the purpose of that part of the bill in ques44. 74 Congress, 1 Session, Congres- tion which would place full control under

sional Record, 14 August 1935, p 13195, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps should

H.R. 7341 proposed by Congressman be elected in time of peace by a War

McSwain a few months earlier suggested a Department directive. The memorandum

"College of Defensive Strategy," to which cited above was in effect a long statement

Army, Navy, and Air Force officers would prepared for General Westover's use should

be detailed for instruction. Ibid, 8 April hearings on the bill be conducted by a con1935, p 5282. gressional committee.

For the whole period 1935 to 1941, inci- 50. H. H. Woodring to Lister Hill, 16

dentally, a fairly detailed discussion of the April 1937, ibid. As an interesting afterlegislative proposals for changing the status math, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps

of the military air arm is given in AAF on 12 May asked permission to circulate

Historical Studies No 4, pp 9-15, 24-36. this letter of the Secretary of War For the

45. 75 Congress, 1 Session. Congres- information and guidance of Air Corps offisional Record, 5 January 1937, p 31; ibid, cials. The request was returned with the

173
NOTES TO PAGES 90-92

suggestion that it be resubmitted on I the department of aeronautics bills, see

August. After this was done the decision H.R. 4192, ibid, 26 March 1941, p 2603;

announced-with no assigned reason- H.R. 4532, ibid, 25 April 1941, p 3335;

was to the effect that the information H.R. 4790, ibid, 19 May 1941, p 4234:

involved could be communicated by oral H.R. 4962. ibid. 4 June 1941. p 4729; H.R.

means only. This General Westover pro- 4987. ibid, 6 June 1941, p 4847; S. 1635,

ceeded to do. Memo for AG by Brig. Gen. ibid, 16 June 1941, p 5166; and H.R. 5101,

H. H. Arnold, 12 May 1937, (1st Ind AG to ibid, 19 June 1941, p 5380. Suggestions for

C/AC, 20 May 1937; 2nd Ind C/AC to AG, the investigations as mentioned above may

31 July 1937; 3rd Ind AG to C/AC, 24 Au- be noted in H.R. 2317, ibid, 16 January

gust 1937), in AAG 030, Misc President- 1941, p 183; and H. Res. 228, ibid, 5 June

Congress. 1941, p 4806. H.R. 2317 was identical with

51. For the department of national H. J. Res. 417 which had been presented in

defense measures, see H.R. 5139, 76 Con- 1940.

gress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 20 55. Reference has been made to the

March 1939, p 3013; S.4050, 76 Congress, article; "Ordeal of American Air Power,"

3 Session, Congressional Record, 27 May American Mercury, LIII (July 1941), pp

1940, p 6873; H.R. 10364. Ibid, 15 August 7-14, 127. See supra, p 115. For examples

1940, p 10462; and H.R. 10366. Ibid. of other extensions of remarks supporting

Those suggesting a separate department of the bills for a separate air force, and a

air may be listed as follows: S.4022, ibid, department of national defense, see 77

21 May 1940, p 6471; H.R. 10049, ibid, 10 Congress, I Session, Congressional ReJune 1940, p 7907; and H.R. 10121, ibid, cord, Appendix, pp 1201-1242, 2645-

20 June 1940, p 8759. 2646, 2725-2726, 2742-2743, 2792-2793,

52. H. J. Res. 417, 76 Congress, 3 Ses- 2798.

sion, Congressional Record, 10 January 56. Ibid, 29 April 1941, p 3406.

1940, p 262; and H. J. Res. 469, ibid, 22 57. Robert Patterson, Acting S/W, to

February 1940, p 1863. The author of the Robert R. Reynolds, Senate Committee on

first mentioned resolution, Representative Military Affairs, 20 February 1941, in AAG

J. E. Van Zandt, on several occasions called 032. Legislation, Army Air Forces. Evithe attention of the House of Represen- dence indicates that the basic portion of this

tatives to his proposal, thereby expressing letter was typed from a draft prepared in

his firm support for a single department person by General George C. Marshall, the

with coordinate subdivisions for Air, Army, Chief of Staff. It should be considered in

and Navy. Ibid, Appendix, pp 3229-3240, connection with another, Patterson to

3362, 3420, 3556. David I. Walsh, Senate Committee on

53. In this connection one should not Naval Affairs, 20 February 1941, in ibid.

overlook the effect of the evidences of 58. Stimson to Andrew J. May, 22

German air superiority as was indicated by March 1941, in AAG 032, Legislation,

victories in Greece and Crete. Army Air Forces.

54. The department of national 59. Stimson to James A. O'.Leary.

defense bills are listed as follows: H.R. House Committee on Expenditures in the

981, 77 Congress, 1 Session, Congressio- Executive Departments, n.d. [but after 20

nal Record, 3 January 1941, p 17; S. 277, June 1941], ibid.

ibid, 10 January 1941, p 81; H.R. 2824, 60. Stimson to Robert R. Reynolds.

ibid, 29 January 1941, p 386; H.R. 3584, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 20

ibid, 25 February 1941, p 1400; H.R. 3795, June 1941, noted in aeronautics file.

ibid, 4 March 1941, p 1784: and H.R. 4933, Senator Pat McCarran, United States Seibid, 2 June 1941, pp 4650, 4816-4818. For nate Office Building.

174
NOTES TO PAGES 93-94

Chapter 8

Autonomy for the Army Air Forces

1. See, for instance, an unsigned article, tion of a separate and independent air force

"General Arnold Heads Army Air Forces" in by such individuals as General Mitchell.

U.S. Air Services, XXVI (July 194 1), p 41. General Arnold, Congressman McSwain,

2. It is to be understood that many of Representative James, and its editorial writthe proposals which were submitted through- ers. For instance, XL' (February 1942), p 58,

out the period can be counted as separate reproduced an article, "Awake America," prebills only in a technical sense. That is, several pared by the then Colonel Mitchell for the

of them were introduced two or more times, July 1926 issue, in which the author came

with varied designations of course, in differ- out strongly in favor of a department of

ent sessions of Congress. As may have been national defense, with subdivisions for air,

noted, none of them as such amassed suffi- land, water, and munitions. In connection

cient strength as to receive official consider- with its reappearance the editor stated that

ation outside of committee. The content of had Mitchell's advice been followed the

one, which for tactical purposes had been "Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor would not have

incorporated in an entirely different bill, was suffered a $500,000,000 loss in less than one

killed by a decisive vote on the floor of the hour...See also Frank A. Tichenor's three diflower house. See supra, p 85. On this ques- ferent articles, all bearing the title, "An Open

tion of the relation between the moves in Letter to Congress," which were published in

Congress in the years 1939 to 1941 and the XL' (February 1942), pp 60, 62, 219-220;

actions of the War Department, however, Cf ibid (March 1942), pp 57-59; and XL' (May

AAF Historical Studies No 46, p 35. 1942), pp 59-60, 274.

3. S. 1702, one of the usual department 5. The news story in an interview with

of national defense bills, was introduced Captain Rickenbacker, dated 14 November

within a few days after the establishment of 1941, may be noted in 77 Congress, 1

the Army Air Forces. 77 Congress, 1 Session, Session, Congressional Record, Appendix, p

Congressional Record, 30 June 1941, p 5700. 5438.

The other, H.R. 6576, provided for the cre- 6. The following observation of a leadation of a department of national defense, in ing airman as related to the creation of a sepmodified form, to be set up as a regular post in arate air force may be of some significance:

the President's cabinet. It would include, "Organization is created for purposes of diamong other things, a central defense, com- rection and control and is not an end in itself.

mand, zone commands, and a department of It will never serve as a substitute for capable

air force. 77 Congress, 2 Session, Congres- leadership. On the other hand, a proper consional Record, 10 February 1942, pp cept of air-ground forces by task force com1183-1185. manders should enable effective conduct of

4. AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp field operations under the present or the pro35-39, presents a rather comprehensive dis- posed organization of the air arm." Memo for

cussion of this evidence. Again Major A] Brig. Gen. H. H. Arnold by Brig. Gen. Carl

Williams and Major Alexander de Seversky Spaatz, 22 August 1941, in AAG 321.9,

freely expressed their opinions as individu- Separate Air Service.

als, and likewise the Aero Digest as a publi- 7. See Notes on a Conference with Mr.

cation. Soon after Pearl Harbor in an "I told Lovett, 6 October 1941, in AAG 032 N-2,

you so" attitude this journal, delving into its Legislation. With respect to measures "pendfiles as far back as 1925, by way of quota- ing" in Congress reference is made primarily

tions and reprinted articles called attention to to bills and resolutions which had been preprevious expressions of opinion on the ques- sented prior to the issuance of AR 95-5.

175
NoTES TO PAGES 94-96

Some members were chafing because their Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and

proposals had received no attention at the Training actively opposed any major changes

hands of committees to which they had been in War Department Organization at this time.

referred. Before taking over the work of directing

8. For this brief analysis of the weak- the War Department Reorganization Comness inherent in the Army Air Forces organi- mittee, General McNamey served on the

zation as of 20 June 1941, see Notes on AR Roberts Commission designated to investi95-5 and present degree of autonomy of the gate the Pearl Harbor attack. During the two

Air Forces, by Major G. R. Perara, 25 Sep- month interval preceding the McNarney

tember 1941, in AAG 032 N-2, Legislation. memorandum of 31 January the Army Air

Proposed revisions of AR 95-5, 20 June Forces experienced some uneasy moments

1941, are filed in AAG 300.3, Army Regula- as plans for the reorganization were in the

tions. mailing. Soon after the declarations of war

9. Memo for AC/S. WPD, by C/AS, 24 General Headquarters was authorized to deal

October 1941, in AAG 321.9DH, Organiza- directly with both the Chief, AAF, and the

tion, Army Air Forces. See also AAF Commanding General, AFCC, regarding air

HistoricalStudies No 46, pp 43-44. enforcements. In the opinion of General

10. Ibid, pp 44-45. Generally speaking. Arnold this would tend to reduce the Army

this proposal made provision for an Army Air Air Forces to a planning, procurement, trainForces organization to be composed of a ing, and supply agency, with its combat and

combat command, a service command, vari- relevant service units under different comous air forces, and an air staff, all under the mands. Other conflicting spheres of jurisdicChief of Staff and the Secretary of War. A tion included the responsibility of air defense

Commanding General, AAF, would have of the United States. In this critical period

strategic direction of air operations in air the- General Arnold thought it was essential that

atres, as well as control of budgetary and fi- functions and responsibilities of the Army

nancial matters. No Air Force Combat Coin- Air Forces be clearly defined. See AAF

mand units could be detached without his HistoricalStudies No 46, pp 46-47, note 13.

approval. The ground and air forces would be There was evidence that otherwise the

on an equal status, and have the same acces~s opinions of many airmen on the subject of

to service and supply agencies. Several draft War Department structural changes were in a

copies of such a proposal are to be found in status of flux during the weeks immediately

AAG 032 N-2, Legislation. following American entrance into World War

11. A copy of General Arnold's plan is 11. For instance, in reply to a request from the

printed in Nelson, National Security and the Chief of Staff for recommendations for orgaGeneral Staff, pp 337-341. As explained in nizational changes that might be effected by

the preface to this work, General Nelson par- the President under the First War Powers Act

ticipated in the activities of the War Depart- of 18 Decembcr 1914, the Air War Plans

ment reorganization committee which culmi- Division submitted a plan which would

nated in the sweeping changes made on 9 remove the air arm from the jurisdiction of

March 1942. Much of the material in the the War Department, creating coequal air,

chapter devoted to this subject, moreover, ground, and naval arms, with unity of coinwas based upon personal knowledge, conver- mand provided by a coordinator of common

sations with other officers, and hitherto services. Stated briefly, this suggestion of the

unpublished documents. See p 396, footnote Air War Plans Division compared very favor2, Unless designated otherwise any part of it, ably with the proposed department of natiotherefore, may be regarded as a primary nal defense which often had been advocated.

source. In fact, it was coupled with the suggestion

12. Ne-son, National Security and the that legislation be initiated for the purpose of

General Staff, pp 314-348. Incidentally, setting up a Department of National Warfare.

because of the existing emergency the IbiS, pp 47-48.

176
NOTES TO PAGES 96-99

13. A copy of the First War Powers Act, Roosevelt, setting up the Joint Chiefs;" but,

1941, is included in United States Statutes at he added, "I never saw, it." I Was There (New

Large, LV, pp 838-841. The text of York, 1950), p 102. General Nelson, in his

Executive Order No 9082 is produced here- National Security and the General Staff, pp

with as Appendix J. 397-405, touches generally upon the devel14. A discussion of the immediate-devel-- opment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

opments leading to the-issuance of War Combined Chiefs of Staff, and discusses the

Department Circular No 59 is given in functions performed by them.

Nelson. National Security on the General 20. Italics as given above are the present

Staff, pp 350-371, followed by a complete author's. It seems worth noting, however,

copy of the text, pp 371-389. Appurtenant that most of that portion of the document

extracts thereof are included as Appendix K, which formed the basis of the above statethis study. ments were emphasized by the use of capital

15. 77 Congress, 2 Session, Senate, letters throughout. Chapter I of FM 100-20

Hearing on S. 2092; Department of Defense is included herewith as Appendix L.

Coordination and Control (Washington, 21. Another, if relatively minor, step

1942), pp 1-2. A portion of General which contributed to the freedom of the air

McNamey's testimony is quoted in Nelson. arm was initiated late in 1943 with the

National Security and the General Staff, pp approval of a plan to eliminate all arms and

394-396. service branch distinctions within the Army 16. Evidences of unofficial cognizance Air offices. This was characterized by Genand popular approval of the War Department eral Arnold as "a most important milestone"

reorganization of March 1942 may be noted which would enable the organization to build

in Arnold Kruckman's column, "Washing- a better integrated, a more efficient, and a

tonian" in Aero Digest, XL' (March 1942), harder hitting machine. The consummation

pp 70, 316-317; and an unsigned article, of the plan increased the strength of the AAF

"The Streamlined Army" in U.S. Air by some 600,000, including personnel of the

Services, XXVII (April 1942), pp 7-8. quartermaster, ordnance. signal, and other

17. In this connection note AAF Histori- arms and services already functioning within

cal Studies No 46, p 41. its ranks. At the same time it tended to con18. On 10 June 1942, for instance, the serve manpower and provide a greater degree

Chief of Air Staff wrote that the "main objec- of flexibility. See an editorial, "Arms and

tive of the Army Air Forces is to operate Services" in Air Force, XXVII (January

effectively against the enemy the maximum 1944), p 1; and H. H. Arnold to all Personnel

number of organized units and airplanes pos- of the Army Air Forces, [6 November 1943]

sible." Memo for all AAF units by Maj. Gen. in ibid, on back cover. Cf Army Air Forces,

M. E Harmon, 10 June 1942, in AAG381, AC/AS. Intelligence, Historical Division,ArWar Plans. my Air Forces Historical Studies No 28:

19. Roosevelt to Senator Pat McCarran, Development ofAdministrative Planning and

7 September 1943. Original noted in aero- Control of theAAF, (MS, prepared in 1945),

nautics file, Senator Pat McCarran, United pp 78-85.

States Senate Office Building. 22. These measures may be indicated as

Like Topsy, the war-time Joint Chiefs of follows: S. 2357, 77 Congress, 2 Session.

Staff, of course, "jest growed." No one, Congressional Record, 10 March 1942, pp

seemingly, had a clear understanding as to 2152-2153; S. Res. 238, ibid, 28 April 1942,

what actually constituted its charter or arti- pp 3745-3747; H.R. 7354, ibid, 6 July 1942,

cles of organization. Admiral Leahy, who as p 6003; H.R. 92, 78 Congress, 1 Session,

the representative of the Commander-in- Congressional Record, 6 January 1943, p 19;

Chief early presided over the body subse- H.R. 708, ibid, p 24; S. 30, ibid, 7 January

quently wrote, he had "heard that in some file 1943, p 34; S. 233, ibid, p 36; S. 234, ibid;

there is a chit or memorandum from H.R. 1246, ibid, 18 January 1943, p 231;

177
NOTES TO PAGES 99-103

H.R. 3226, ibid, 17 September 1943, p 7637; ceedings, LXIX2 (August 1943), pp 1099,

H. J. Res. 203, ibid, 7 December 1943, p 1101. See also a statement in R.E. Saunder's

10399; S. 1956, 78 Congress, 2 Session, column, "Washington Information" in Aero

Congressional Record, 29 May 1944 p 5074; Digest, XLIII' (September 1943), pp 130,

H.R. 86, 79 Congress, 1 Session, Congres- 138, 263-264.

sional Record, 3 January 1945, p 20; H.R. 28. For a brief, but well documented dis504, ibid, p 26; H.R. 549, ibid, p 29; H.R. cussion of the "unofficial" suggestion made

550, ibid, p 27; and S. 84, ibid, 6 January by officers of the General Staff, the more

1945, p 78. CfAAF HivtoricalStudies No 46, complete report and recommendations of the

p 52. Special Planning Division of that body, and

23. For the purpose at hand, AAF His- the subsequent statement relative to demobitorical Studies No 46, pp 54-56, 65-M, pre- lization plans, see AAF HistoricalStudies No

sents adequate evidence of this development 46, pp 58-61.

during the war years. through means of a sc- 29. 78 Congress, 2 Session, House of

tion of the press. Gallup poll indices, and Representatives, Hearings on Proposal to

other outlets. Also the Aero Digest, to men- Establish a Single Department of Armed

tion here only one journal, kept up its agita- Forces (Washington, 1944), Pt I, pp 1, 2,322.

tion for an independent air arm. See, for The personnel of this committee consisted of

instance, the following editorials: "To the seven members of the House Committee on

Members of the New Congress" in XLF Military Affairs; seven from its Committee

(December 1942), pp 117, 271; "Air Power on Naval Affairs; and nine "outsiders," in the

Fights Stupidity," XLIII' (August 1943), pp sense that they belonged to neither of the

145, 305; "A Golden Opportunity," XLV (1 major committees relating to the armed

June 1944), pp 65, 130; and "If the forces. Attention should be called to the fact

Administration Has Nothing to Hide...," that the Woodrum group was an investigatXLVI (1 September 1944), pp 71, 146-147. ing, not a legislative committee; for it was not

24. McCarran to Roosevelt, 20 August concerned with either a pending or future bill

1943, noted in aeronautics file, Senator Pat or resolution.

McCarran, United States Senate Office 30. Ibid, p 71.

Building. 31. Ibid, pp 48-49.

25. Roosevelt to McCarran, 7 September 32. Secretary Stimson thought it impor1943, in ibid. tant that the general principle of consolida26. His earlier attitude was diseussed in tion be adopted as soon as possible but added

Chapter IV, pp 48-49, above. Senator that a great military organization could not be

McCarran characterized the President's letter changed at a critical moment of war "anyas "non-committal, not encouraging, and at more than you could change the engine of an

the same time not discouraging." At least it airplane while it was in flight." General

stimulated him to persevere in the matter; for McNamey preferred that necessary enabling

some three months later, at a time when he at action provide for a consolidation not later

least thought such would not impede the war than six months after the close of hostilities.

effort, he urged the Chairman of the Senate Ibid, pp 32 and 41, respectively. McNamey

Committee on Military Affairs to conduct also furnished the committee with a chart of

hearings on S. 30, a department of aviation a proposed department of armed forces

bill which he had introduced the previous which, incidentally, proved to be identical

January. McCarran to Major Charles T. with that submitted by the General Staff on

Malone, 24 September 1943, and same to 11 October 1943. Ibid, p 38. Harold D.

Robert R. Reynolds, 20 December 1943 Smith, Director of the Budget, also favored

respectively, ibid. the single department. See his statement in

27. A complete analysis of Yarnell's plan ibid, pp 295-304.

is presented in his article, "A Department of 33. Ibid, pp 122, 124.

War," in United States Naval Institute Pro- 34. Ibid, pp 265--273. Other naval offi178
NOTES TO PAGES 103-106

cers to testify included Vice Admiral R. S. Admiral Richardson pointed out, were the

Edwards, Chief of Staff; Admiral E J. Home. result of experiences extending over a period

Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Ralph A. of more than 150 years. Existing agencies of

Bard, Assistant Secretary of Navy; Artemus such maturity and magnitude should not be

L. Gates. Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air; overhauled unless there were indisputable

and IA. Gen. A A. Vandergrift, Commandant, evidence that such changes were desirable

United States Marine Corps. Ibid, pp 137, and would accomplish the ends sought. Far

145, 171, 221, 177, ff, respectively, from being convinced that such would be the

35. For Daniels' testimony see ibid, pp result, Admiral Richardson gave it as his

241-253. opinion that since their interests were so

36. 78 Congress, 2 Session, House divergent and their activities so distinct, a

Report No 1645, p 4. single department of defense would hamper

37. For a copy of this directive, see the full and free development of both the

enclosure in William D. Leahy (For the Joint Army and Navy. He was charitable enough

Chiefs of Staff) to the Secretary of the Navy to say, however, that if those in authority

19 May 1944, as printed in 78 Congress, 2 decided to adopt such a system, he could

Session, House of Representatives, Hearings conceive of no better plan than that which

on Proposal to Establish a Single Depart- had been recommended by his colleagues on

ment of National Defense, Pt I, pp 141-144. the Committee. See ibid, pp 434-436.

38. The committee consisted of Admiral 43. Copies of these two bills, S. 84 and

J. 0. Richardson (retired) as senior member; S. 1482, in the order named, are printed in

Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel,' Staff Com- ibid, pp 2 and 2-4, respectively.

mander in Chief. U.S. Fleet; Maj. Gen. W. F 44. The first two of these six measures

Tompkins, Director, Special Planning were designated H.R. 86 and H.R. 550, and

Division, WDSS; Maj. Gen. H. L. George, may be noted in 79 Congress, 1 Session,

Commanding General, Air Transport Congressional Record, 3 January 1945, pp

Command; and Colonel E Trubee Davison, 20, 27. For the other four measures, H.R.

Chief, Special Projects, Army Air Forces, as 504, H.R. 549, H.R. 4949, H.R. 4950, see

alternates. Its report is printed in 79 Con- ibid, pp 26, 27; and ibid, 11 December 1945,

gress, 1 Session, Senate, Hearings on S. 84... p 11855.

[and] S. 1482...:Department of Armed For- 45. Walsh to Forrestal, 15 May 1945, in

ces [and] Department of Military Security Eberstadt Report, Preface, pp 3, 4.

(Washington, 1945), pp 411-439. For the 46. See Forrestal to Eberstadt, 19 June

pertinent data presented herewith, see pp 1945, in ibid, p 1; and Eberstadt to Forrestal,

412, 436-439. A list of all the witnesses 25 September 1945, in ibid, pp 1-2.

interviewed is included therein. 47. For the above general observations,

39. Ibid, pp 411-413,passim. see ibid, pp 3-47, 57-84, 198-240.

40. Ibid, p 419, and chart facing p 419. 48. See 79 Congress, 1 Session, Senate,

41. Ibid, p420 Hearings on S. 84...[and] S. 1482...;

42. Ibid, p 411. Admiral Richardson Department of Armed Forces [and] Departoffered a brief minority report which indi- ment of Military Security, pp 98-99.

cated that he opposed not only the creation of 49. Ibid, pp 69-70.

an air force coordinate with the Army and 50. See ibid, pp 156 ff, for the War DeNavy, but also the establishment of a single partment plan as presented by General

department of national defense. The former, Collins. The Table of Contents of this docuhe thought, would inevitably draw the naval ment furnishes a convenient guide to the

aeronautical units out of the "fabric of the page references for the testimonies of the

Navy into which it is ultimately woven," and other witnesses mentioned. It is to be noted

thus be prejudicial to the effectiveness of the that the positions assumed by Admirals

armed forces as a whole. The organizations Halsey and Nimitz represented a reversal of

making up the War and Navy Departments, policy over the stands they had taken with

179
NOTES TO PAGES 107-108

respect to the recommendation of the Joint Congress, 19 December 1945, is printed in

Chiefs of Staff. 79 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Re51. President Truman's message to the cord, Appendix, pp 12398-12401.

180
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AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

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183
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

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184
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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62 Congress, 2 Session, House Document No. 718.

63 Congress, 2 Session, House Report No. 132.

63 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Report No. 576.

64 Congress, 1 Session, House Report No. 369.

64 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No. 53.

64 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Document No. 687.

65 Congress, 1 Session, House Report No. 161.

65 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No. 106.

65 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No. 380.

65 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Report No. 570.

66 Congress, 2 Session, House Report No. 637.

66 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Report No. 325.

67 Congress, 1 Session, House Document No. 17.

68 Congress, 1 Session, House Report No. 1653.

69 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Document No. 18

69 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No. 244.

69 Congress, 1 Session, House Report No. 700.

78 Congress, 2 Session, House Report No. 1645.

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5304: Aeronautics in the Army. Washington, 1913.

64 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives. Hearings on Army

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65 Congress, 1 Session, Senate. Hearings on S. 80: Department of

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65 Congress, 2 Session, Senate. Report No. 555: Aircraft Production.

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66 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives. Hearings on H.R.

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66 Congress, 1 Session, Senate. Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S. 2715:

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185
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

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69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives. Hearings on Department of Defense and Unification ofAir Service. Washington, 1926.

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74 Congress, 1 Session, Senate. Document No. 15: Federal Aviation

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187
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

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A. Signed Articles

1. Caldwell, Cy, "The Ghost of General Douhet," Aero Digest, XXXVII

(February 1941), pp 43, 45, 48.

2. . "Phantom Wings of the Air Corps," Aero Digest, XXX (July

1937), p 30.

3. . "The New Deal in War," Aero Digest, XXX (April 1937), p

21.

4. . "United We Stand-Divided We Stand for Anything," Aero

Digest, XXXII (November 1935), pp 16-17, 68-70.

5. . "Our Air Force," Aero Digest, XXVII (December 1935), pp

15-16, 70.

6. "Personairlities," Aero Digest, XXXVII (September 1940),

p 120.

7. Carll, George S., Jr. "Congress Struggling With the Air Problem," U.S.

Air Services, XI (March 1926), pp 45-47.

8. "Congress Will Be Guided by Morrow Report," U.S. Air

Services, XI (April 1926), pp 21-25.

9. Cram, Ralph W. "The Human Equation in the Air Corps as Related to

Its Claim for a Separate Promotion List," Aero Digest, XII (June 1928),

pp 924-925, 1050-1052.

10. de Seversky, Major Alexander P. "Ordeal of Armerican Air Power,"

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14. Hawley, Alan R. "The Inner Trouble in the U.S. Army Air Service,"

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15. Hawley, Alan R. and Henry Woodhouse. "Why There Should Be a

Department of Aeronautics and a Secretary of Aviation," Flying, V

189
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

(April 1916), p 109.

16. Johnson, Captain A.W., U.S.N. "Lessons from the Bombing-a Navy

View," U.S. Air Service, VI (October 1921), pp 29-33.

17. Kruckman, Arnold. "Washingtonia," Aero Digest, XL1 (March 1942),

pp 70, 316-317.

18. Mitchell, General William. "Neither Armies nor Navies Can Exist

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19. Mitchell, Colonel William. "Awake America," [Reproduction), Aero

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21. . "The Airplane Versus the Battleship," The Military Engineer,

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22. Ranney, H.F. "President Coolidge Names Board of Nine Men to Decite

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23. Saunder, R.E. "Washington Information," Aero Digest, XLIII (September 1943), pp 130, 138, 263-264.

24. Stratemeyer, [Lt. Gen.] George E. "Administrative History of U.S.

Army Air Forces," Air Affairs, I (Summer 1947), pp 510-525.

25. Tichenor, Frank A. "Air-Hot and Otherwise," Aero Digest, XVII

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28. __ . "An Open Letter to Congress,"Aero Digest, XL' (March

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29. . "An Open Letter to Congress," Aero Digest, XL2 (May 1942),

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30. Westover, Maj. Gen. 0. "The Army is Behind Its Air Corps,"Air Corps

News Letter, XX (1 October 1937), pp 1-5.

31. . "An Adequate Air Arm For the Nation's Defense," Air Corps

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32. . "Aviation and Its Place in a Modern Defense Program," U.S.

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33. Williams, Major Al. "Real Air Power for the Defense of the United

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1. Aerial Age Weekly

"President Appoints Advisory Board," 1 (12 April 1915), p 82.

"Flying Corps to be Separated From the Signal Corps," 1 (3 May 1915),

p 149.

"The Separation from the Signal Corps Great Britian's Latest," 1 (31 May

1915), pp 245-246.

"A Secretary for Aviation?", 11 (17 April 1916), pp 150-151.

"Flying Corps to be Separated From the Signal Corps?", III (24 April

1916), p 173.

"Change the Administmtion!", III (8 May 1916), p 237. "A Roosevelt

Administration in 1907 Gave the United States Army the First Aeroplane

Ever Used for Military Purposes-Another Roosevelt Administration

Seems to be the Only Hope to Give the U.S. Army and Navy Their Much

Needed Air Service," III (15 May 1916), pp 261-263.

"Congress Allowed as Much for Aeros as Asked by Secretary Baker," III

(12 June 1916), pp 389-390.

"Council of National Defense's Advisory Board Appointed by President

Wilson-Council Expected to Encourage Development of Aeronautics,"

IV (23 October 1916), p 141.

"$64,000,000 Aeronautic Appropriation Passes House of Representatives

Without Dissenting Vote," V (23 July 1917), p 627.

"Senators Favor Aircraft Board," V (20 August 1917), p 817.

"Investigations Into the Aeroplane Situation," VII (8 April 1918), p 207.

"The Aircraft Administrator Bill," VII (29 April 1918), p 344.

"President Wilson Orders Judicial Aircraft Investigation," VII (13 May

1918), pp 435-437,450-469.

"Senate and Department of Justice Investigating Aircraft Situation," VII

(20 May 1918), pp 489-490, 510.

"Charles E. Hughes to Cooperate in Aircraft Investigation," VII (27 May

1918), p 582.

"The Aircraft Investigation," VII (3 June 1918), pp 578, 606.

"The Aircraft Investigations," VII (10 June 1918), p 624.

"Senators Propose Air Ministry," VII (12 August 1918), pp 1058-1059.

"Bill Introduced to Establish a Department of Aeronautics," IX (11 August

1919), pp 1003-1004, 1021, 1030.

"American Aviation Policy," XIII (2 May 1921), p 171.

"Secretary Denby Opposed to Unifed Control," XIII (9 May 1921), p 196.

191
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

2. Aeronautical Digest

"The Duty and Opportunity of the N.A.A.," VIII (May 1926), p 264.

3. Aero Digest

"They Have Earned It," XII (April 1928), p 518.

"Unifed Defense," XIII (July 1928), p 76.

"Recommendations of the Aviation Commission," XXVI (February 1935),

pp 29-30, 32, 34, 36, 75.

The Air Services," XXXIII (November 1938), p 21.

"Hitler Ahoy," XXXVII (August 1940), p 100.

"A Herculean Task for a Busy Executive," XXXVII (October 1940), pp

80, 113.

"An Air Secretary 'In' Order," XXXVII (November 1940), pp 32, 41.

"A New Ministry of the Air," XXXVIII (February 1941), p 41.

"The Sword of Damocles," XXXIX (August 1941), p 46.

"To the Members of the New Congress," XLI2 (December 1942), pp 117,

271.

"Air Power Fights Stupidity," XLIII (August 1943), pp 145, 305.

"A Golden Opportunity," XLV (1 June 1944), pp 65, 130.

"If the Administration Has Nothing to Hide...," XLVI (1 September 1944),

pp 71, 146-147.

"Congress and the Big Brass," L(15 July 1945), p 51.

"United Defense-When?", LI (15 October 1945), p 48.

4. Air Corps News Letter

"Chief of Air Corps Declares G.H.O. Air Force A Forward Step," XVIII

(1 February 1935), p 31.

5. Air Force

"Arms and Services," XXVII (January 1944), p 1.

6. Flying

"Constructive Program of Aero Club Announced," V (December 1916), pp

449-451.

"Bill to Provide Aircraft Administrator Introduced," VII (May 1918), p

339.

"Inner Problems of Aircraft Situation and Their Solution," VII (May

1918), pp 342-343.

"New Heads of Aircraft Program," VII (May 1918), p 34.

"Second Assistant Secretary of War, John D. Ryan, Given Full Charge

Over All Aircraft Work," VII (September 1918), p 720.

"General Menoher New Air Service Chief," VII (January 1919), p 1145.

"Senate Bill for Department of Aeronautics," VIII (September 1919), pp

690-692.

192
BIBLIOGRAPHY

7. U.S. Air Service

[No title], II (November 1919), p 5.

"President Harding Endorses National Advisory Committee Policy," V

(May 1921), pp 11-13.

"Aerial Bombing Tests Now Historic," VI (August 1921), pp 19-21.

"2.000-lb. Bomb Sinks Alabama," VI (September 1921), p 13.

8. U.S. Air Services

"United States in Danger of Attack from the Air," XII (July 1927), p 56

"General Benny Foulois," XIX (July 1934), p 10.

"General Foulois Wants the Record," XIX (September 1934), p 16.

"Not All Men Believe in the Baker Board," XIX (November 1934), pp

7-8.

"National Defense Organization," XX (March 1935), pp 9-11.

"Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover," XXIII (October 1938), p 9.

"General Arnold Heads Army Air Forces," XXVI (July 1941), p 41.

"Army Sets Up Autonomous Air Command," XXVI (August 1941), p 18.

"The Streamlined Army," XXVII (April 1942), pp 7-8.

193
Index

Adams, Charles Francis, Secretary of Aviation Section, Signal Corps, 3-7;

the Navy, 65 chap 1, n 27; 10-11, 18-19; chap

Aero Club of AmericaI, 19; chap 1, n 2, n 23; 19-22,27-29

32; 27

Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps, v; Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War, 8,

chap 1, n 32; 27 20-21, 26; chap 3, n 6; 36, 38-40,

Air Corps, v, 3, 56, 60-64, 66-71, 42, 68-69,85

73--80,81-82; chap 7, n 17, n 25; Baker Board (War Department Special

82-83,85-86,90-93 Committee on Army Air Corps),

Air Corps Act (1926), 47, 52, 59-63 68-73

Air Corps, Five-Year Program of Barksdale Field, Louisiana, 73

Expansion, 59-60, 62-63 Baruch, Bernard, 5

Air Defense League, 84, 87 Beck, Capt. Paul, 17; chap 2, n 16, n 25

Air Force Combat Command, 84, 96, Bingham, Senator Hiram, 54

97-98 Boileau, Representative Gerald J.,

Air Mail Act (12 June 1934), 71 88-89

Air Service, v, 3, 10-13,36,46, 52, Bradley, General Omar N., 107

54-56,58-59 Bradley, S.S., chap 4, n 3; 42

Aircraft Board, 6-9, 26-27; chap 3, n Brancker, General William S., 29-30;

20 chap 3, n 16

Aircraft Production Board, 5-7, 26 Breckinridge, Henry S., Assistant

Allen, Brig. Gen. James, 1-2,4, 13 Secretary of War, 15-16; chap 2, n

American Aviation Mission (Crowell 12

Mission), 36-40,44; chap 5, n 45; Brett, Maj. Gen. George H., 82

69 Browning Board, 78-79

Andrews, Brig. Gen. Frank M., 73,78,; Bureau of Aircraft Production, 7-8;

chap 7, n 7; 80-81, 85-87 chap 1, n 27; 9; chap 1, n 33;

Army Air Forces, v, 3-4, 74, 83-85, 10-11,29,31-32

87-88, 93-95; chap 8, n 12; 97-99, Byrd, Adm. Richard E., chap 5, n 22

101-102, 104, 106-107 Byms, Representative Joseph W, 64;

Army Regulation 95-,5 (20 June 1941), chap 6, n 8, n 16

Army 83, Reorganization 92, 94 Act (1920), 4, 10; Chandler, Col. Charles DeE, 1, 42

chap 2, n 37; chap 4, n 17; 47; Chief, Army Air Forces, 83-84, 94-96

chap 5, n 10; 59; chap 6, n 3 Chief of Air Corps, 59,64-65, 67,71,

Arnold, General Henry H., chap 1, n 73, 77-81; chap 7, n 25; 83-84, 86,

29; 15; chap 2, n 7; 16,42,54; 89; chap 7, n 43, n 49; 94

chap 5, n 46; 74, 81-82; chap 7, n Chief of Air Service, 8, 50-52, 57-58;

19; 86-87; chap 8, n 4; 97-98, chap 7, n 25

106-108 Chief of Air Service, A.E.F., 41, 50

Aviation Act (18 July 1914), 3, 18, 20 Chief Signal Officer, 1-2, 4-7, 13, 16,

195
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

18; chap 2, n 25; 21-22, 29 Division of Production, 7-8, 29

Coffin, Howard E., 5-6, 25-26; chap 3, Doolittle, James H., chap 6, n 25; 71

n 6; chap 4, n 1; 36, 53-54 Drum, Brig. Gen. Hugh A., 55, 67, 69

Collins, Lt. Gen. J.L, 107; chap 8, n 50 Drum Board, 67--68; chap 6, n 27; 70,

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 98-99; chap 73

8, n 19; 100

Commanding General, Army Air Eaker, Col. Ira C., 86

Forces, 96-99, 100, 106 Eberle, E.W, Chief of Naval

Coolidge, Calvin, President of the U.S., Operations, 55

48, 54 Eberstadt, Ferdinand, 106

Council of National Defense, 5-6, Eberstadt Report, 106-107

26-27, 36 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 105

Craig, General Malin, 79 Equipment Division, Signal Corps, 6-7

Crowell, Benedict C., Assistant Executive Order No. 2862 (21 May

Secretary of War, 36, 42 1918), chap 1, n 24; 8, 29

Crozier. Brig. Gen. William, 15 Executive Order of 19 March 1919, 10

Curry, Representative Charles E, 49, 56 Executive Order No. 9082 (28 February

1942), 96-97

Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the

Navy, 26; chap 3, n 6; chap 4, n 9; Fechet, Maj. Gen. J.E., 64

103 First War Powers Act (1941), 96-97,

Dargue, Maj. H.H., chap 5, n 46 108

Davis, Dwight E, Acting Secretary of Forrestal, James V., Under Secretary of

War, 54 the Navy, 103; Secretary of the

Davison, E Trubee, Assistant Secretary Navy, 107

of War for Air, 60; chap 6, n 31; Foulois, Maj. Gen. Benjamin D., chap

Col., chap 8, n 38 1, n 5; chap 2, n 4, n 5; 16; chap 4,

de Seversky, Maj. Alexander P, 88; n 1, n 14; 43; chap 4, n 19; 45;

chap 7, n 41; 88-89; chap 8, n 4 chap 5, n 1; 54, 65, 69; chap 6, n

Deeds, E.A., 6; chap 1, n 14; chap 3, n 35; 74

20 Frear, Representative James A., 44

Department of the Air Force, v Frelinghuysen, Senator Joseph, 30

Department of the Army, v Furlow bill (proposal for separate Air

Department of the Navy (post 1947), v Corps promotion list), 63

Dem, George H., Secretary of War, 69

Dickman, General Joseph T., chap 4, n Garrison, Lindley M., Secretary of War,

2 17-18

Dickman Board, 36; chap 4, n 2; chap General Headquarters (GHQ) Air

5, n 45; chap 6, n 27 Force, v, 3, 61, 67-68, 70-74; chap

Director of Air Service, 8-10, 41 6, n 41; 74; chap 6, n 45; 77-82;

Director of Aircraft Production, 8-9 chap 7, n 25; 83-87, 89; chap 7, n

Division of Military Aeronautics, 3, 49; 90

7-9; chap 1, n 29; 10-11, 29, Gifford, WS., 27

31-32 Goethals, Maj. Gen. George W, 25

196
INDEX

Gompers, Samuel, 5 6,38,43,51

Goodier, Lt. Col. Lewis E., 20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 98; chap 8, n 19;

Gould, Representative Norman J., 34 100, 102-103, 106-107; chap 8, n

Graham, Representative William J., 44 50; 108

Graham Committee (House of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special

Representatives Select Committee Committeefor the Reorganization

on Expenditures in the War of National Defense, 103-105

Department, 1919), 44

Greely, Brig, Gen, Adolphus W., 1 Kahn, Representative Julius, 49

Kenly, Brig. Gen. William L., 7, 28-29,

Halsey, Adm. William F., 105, 107; 45

chap 8, n 50 Kilner, Maj. W.G., 49-50,54

Hansell, Brig. Gen. Haywood S., Jr., King, Admiral Ernest 0., Chief of

101-102 Naval Operations, 98, 100, 107

Harding, Warren G., President of the Knox, Frank, Secretary of the Navy,

U.S., 49-50 103

Harlon, Representative Byron B., 65

Hawley, Alan R., 19, 27 La Guardia, Representative Fiorello H.,

Hay, Representative James, 13, 15, 18 25, 42; chap 4, n 18; 45; chap 5, n

Hennessy, Captain T.B., chap 2, n 25 22; 57, 60, 65

Hensel, H.S., Assistant Secretary of the Lahm, Frank P., chap 1, n 1, n 5

Navy, 107 Lampert, Representative F H., 52

Hill, Representative John P., 56; chap 5, Lampert Committee (Select Committee

n 38 of Inquiry into Operations of the

Hill, Senator Lister, 105-106 United States Air Services), 52,

Hines, Maj. Gen. John L., 51, 54-55 53-56; chap 5, n 45; 69; chap 6, n

Howell, Clark, 71-72,; chap 6, n 37, n 27

41, n 42 Landis, Major Reed, 53, 57

Howell Commission (Federal Aviation Langley, Samuel Pierpont, 1-2

Commission), 71-73; chap 6, n 39; Langley Field, Virginia, chap 6, n 26;

73; chap 6, n 41 73

Hughes, Justice Chas. E., 27; chap 3, n Lassiter, Maj. Gen. William, 50

9 Lassiter Board, 50-51; chap 5, n 12; 52,

Hughes Investigating Committee, 32; 59, 62; chap 6, n 27

chap 3, n 20 Leahy, Admiral William D., Chief of

Hulbert, Representative Murray, 22-26; Staff to the President, 98, 107

chap 3, n 9 Lieb, Representative Charles, 21-22;

Hurley, Patrick J., Secretary of War, 65 chap 2, n 29; 23, 28

Lovett, Robert A., Assistant Secretary of

James, Representative WF., 56; chap 5, War for Air, 82-83; chap 7, n 23;

n 38; 58; chap 5, n 45, n 51; chap 102-103

8, n 4;

Johnson, Senator E.C., 105-106 MacArthur, General Douglas, 65,

Joint Army and Navy Technical Board, 74-75; chap 6, n 45; 79, 105

197
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

McAndrew, Maj. Gen. James W, 42 Overman Act, 7-8,29

McCarran, Senator Pat, chap 7, n 24, n

41; 100; chap 8, n 26 Patrick, Maj. Gen. Mason M., 50; chap

McNair, Lt. Gen Leslie J., 97 5, n 10; 51, 53-54, 57, 60, 62

McNamey, Maj. Gen. Joseph T., 96; Patterson, Robert Acting Secretary of

chap 8, n 12; 97; chap 8, n 32 War, 91; Under Secretary of War,

McSwain, Representative John J., 64; 103; Secretary of War, 107

chap 7, n 43, n 44; chap 8, n 4 Peary, Rear Adm. Robert E., chap 2, n

March, General Peyton C., 8, 29,42 32; chap 3, n 2

March Field, California, 73 Pershing, General John J., 36, 42-44;

Marshall, General George C., chap 7, n chap 4, n 21; 51, 85

57; 97-98, 107

Marshall, H.S., 27 Randolph Field, Texas, chap 6, n 26

Martin, Representative Charles. H., Reber, Col. Samuel, 4; chap 2, n 15, n

64-65 23;20

Martin, Glenn L., 42 Reed, Senator James A., 20-30

Menoher, Maj. Gen. Chas. T., 9-10,41, Rees, Lt. Col. L.W.B., 25

42-43; chap 4, n 20; 49; chap 5, n Richardson, Commander H.C., 4; chap

10 5, n 22

Menoher Board, 40, 42; chap 4, n 14; Richardson, Adm. J.O., chap 8, n 38, n

chap 5, n 45; chap 6, n 27 42

Milling, 2nd Lt. T.D., chap 2, n 7, n 15 Rickenbacker, Capt. Edward V., 45, 94;

Mitchell, General William, 16; chap 2, chap 8, n 5

n 15; 19-20, 41-42; chap 4, n 19; Robinson, Senator Joseph T., 19; chap

43,47-48; chap 5, n 2; 48-49, 52; 2, n 23; 20

chap 5, n 18; 52-53; chap 5, n 22; Roosevelt, Franklin D., Assistant

57,60, 66; chap 6, n 18, n 19; Secretary of the Navy, 40, 66;

73-74; chap 6, n 41; chap 7, n 36; President of the U.S., 66-67, chap

88; chap 8, n 4 6, n 19; 68, 70; chap 6, n 41; chap

Montgomery, R. L., 6; chap 1, n 13 7, n 17; 98, 100-101

Morin, Representative John M., 56, 58 Roosevelt, Theodore, President of the

Morrow, Dwight W, 54; chap 5, n 48 U. S., chap 2, n 21

Morrow Board (President's Aircraft Rosenwald, Julius, 5

Board), 58-59; chap 6, n 27 Royce, Lt. Col. Ralph, 77

Ryan, John D., 7-9, 32; chap 3, n 7

National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics, 4-5, 49-50, 54 Scriven, Brig. Gen. George P., 4, 14;

National Defense Act (1916), 5, 21 chap 2, n 4; 16-17; chap 2, n 16;

National Military Establishment, v, 108 19-22

National Security Act of 1947, v, vi, 4, Scrugham, Representative J.G., 91

108 Selfridge, Ut. Thomas E., chap 1, n 3

New, Senator Harry S., 29-30,41, 44 Selffidge Field, Michigan, 77

Nimitz, Adm. Chester V, 105, 107; Sheppard, Senator Morris, 23-25; chap

chap 8, n 50 3, n 4

198
INDEX

Signal Corps, 1-8, 13-14; chap 2, n 4; War Department Field Manual 100-20,

15-17; chap 2, n 16; 18-21, 26, Command and Employmentof Air

28-29,31 Power, 99-100

Simonds, Maj. Gen. George S., chap 6, War Department General Order No. 51

n 25, n 45; 79 (24 May 1918), chap 1, n 28

Single Promotion List, Army, 63 War Department General Order No. 81

Smith, Senator Hoke, 30 (August 1918), chap 1, n 30

Somervell, Maj. Gen. Brehon B., 95, War Department General Order No. 52

103 (18 April 1939), chap 1, n 33

Spaatz General Carl, 53, 95, 107 War Department Reorganization

Spruce Production Division, Signal Committee, 96; chap 8, n 12; 97

Corps, 9 Weeks, John W., Secretary of War, 50,

Squier, Brig. Gen. George 0., 1, 5, 54

21-22 Westover, Brig. Gen. Oscar, chap 1, n

Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War, 39; 67, 79, 80-81, 84-85, 87; chap

15, 83, 91-92, 103; chap 8, n 32; 7, n 43; 90; chap 7, n 49

107 Whiting, Commander Kenneth, chap 5,

n 22

Taylor, Adm. D. W., 5 Willard, Daniel, 5

Thomas, Senator Charles. S., 30 Williams, Major Al, 88; chap 8, n 4

Thomas subcommittee (Senate Williamson, Representative William,

Committee on Military Affairs, 64-65

1918), 30-31 Willkie, Wendell, 87

Trenchard, Maj. Gen. Hugh, 43 Wilson, Woodrow, President of the

Truman, Harry S., President of the U.S., U.S., 9,26-27,29

107-108 Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard, 15,41

Woodhouse, Henry, 14; chap 2, n 3; 17

United States Air Force, v, 1 Woodring, H.H., Secretary of War, 90

United States Army (post 1947), v Woodrum, Representative A., 101

United States Navy (post 1947), v Woodrum Committee, (House of

United States Spruce Production Representatives Select Committee

Corporation, 9, chap 1, n 32; 11; on Post-War Military Policy), 101,

chap 1, n 39 103

Wright, Orville, 2; chap 1, n 3

Vandegrift, L1. Gen. A.A., chap 8, n 34 Wright, Wilbur, 1-2

Wright Field, Ohio, chap 6, n 26

Wainwright, Representative J.M., 58

Waldon, S.D., 6 Yamell, Admiral Henry E., 100, 103

Walsh, Senator David I., 105

War Department Circular No. 59 (2

March 1942), 96-98

199