IUK U. S. ARMY CHEMI CSTORICAL STUDIES

A5

2c6

C64 GAS WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I

1957

1 o.3

co.03 THE 1st DIVISION IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE

1-12 October 1918

U. S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office

Office of the Chief Chemical Officer

Washington, D.C. No. 3 August 1957
1The lot Division in the Mouse-Argonne

1-12 October 1918

by

Rexmond C. Cochrane

GAS WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I

Study Number 3

U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS

HISTORIC"L STUDIES

U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office

Office of the Chief Chemical Officer

Army Chemical Center, Maryland

1957

WPRI' OF US ARM.
23.

The lst Division in the Meuse-Argonne

C 3 October 1918

Prepared by

Rexmond C. Cochrane, Ph.D.

Under contract DA-18-108-CML-6214

with

U.So Army Chemical Corps

This is an accepted draft study on gas warfare in World War I

Brigadier General, USA

Asst CCmlO for Planning & Doctrine
Foreword

This is a tentative study of the gas experience of

the 1st Division in the Meuse-Argonne during World War I.

This study is not presented as a definitive and official

history, but is reproduced for current reference use within the Military Establishment pending the publication of

an approved history.

The author was assisted in his research by Mro Walter

0. Moeller and Mrs. Charlotte Bolino

Note to Readers Comments and suggestions relative to

accuracy and adequacy of treatment are invited, and may be

transmitted to the Chief, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical

Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland.
THE let DIVISION IN THE MEUSE-ARUOiNE

by Renmond C. Coohrane

Narrative

The First Division Comes Up to the Line................ 2

Bursts of Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Gas Casualties ...... . . . . . . . . . 13

The Advance is Resumed o ........ . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 19

East of the Argonne and West of the Meuse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

The Argonne Forest is Reduced . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 40

Analysis

Shook Division . . .. .. . . . ... . I . . . . . . . . . . 50

HE and Gas Casualties. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . 52

First Division Gas Operations and German Gas Casualties. . . . . .... 58

Sketch and Maps

Map No. 1 Operation West of the Meuse, Oct 1-12. ....... .. . 5a

Map No. 2 Group Argonne Situation Map, 1 Oct . . . . . . . . . ... 6a

Map No. 3 5th Guard Division Situation Map, 2 Oct, 5100 a.m. . . 6b

Map loo 4 DOO Map Showing Enemy Gas Attacks of 1-2 Oct . . . . ... 15a

Map Noo 5 1st Division Combat Sector . . . . . . . . . . .. 24a

Mapap, 0oa 5 a . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . 24b

Map No. 7 Order of Battle, let Div, 4-9 Oat . . .. . . . . . . . 26a

Map No. 8 Group Argonne Infantry Dispositions, 11 Oct, 5100 a.mo . 47a
THE 1st DIVISION IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE

1-12 OCTOBER 1918

As a result of gas attacks on the four succeeding nights after its

arrival in the sector, while awaiting orders to advance, the 1st Division

suffered more than 900 gas casualties. Many of the 480 additional gas

casualties incurred during the week of operations that followed appear to

represent delayed cases or new casualties as a result of occupying previously contaminated terrain.

In the attack of First Army on 4 October, the let Division was

charged with flanking the enemy out of the Argonne Forest. The advance

made by the left flank of 1st Division on the first day represented its

maximum effort until 9 October. Without the assistance of its neighboring divisions, it drove the wedge for the flanking maneuver, but had to

leave completion of the maneuver to the 82nd Division, while it fought to

hold the ground over which it had advanced.

The focus of this narrative is on the series of gas attacks on the

division prior to the assault, when the attack and support battalions of

the division were held in ravines that were natural gas traps, within

easy reach of the enemy artillery. These gas attacks were unquestionably

a contributing factor not only to the inability of the division to effect

the decisive flanking maneuver, but to excessively high casualties it had

to take subsequently when it proved unable to assault and silence the

German guns on its flank.
The 1st Division Comes Up to the Line

On 14 September, having advanced fourteen kilometers in less than a day

in closing the Sto Mihiel salient, the 1st Divison, under Major General

Charles P. Summerall, bivouacked in the luxurious former German rest camp

in the Bois de la Belle Oziere. Five days later it was placed in Army reserve at Benoit-Vaux as plans were made to use the division east of the

Mouse in the coming Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The first objective of Foch's "greatest of battles" that opened on 26

September was the breaching of the Hindenburg Line. The British armies

stood before that line in the Cambrai-St. Quentin sector, but in the MeuseArgonne sector, the American army was eight miles from the Hindenburg Line,

represented in that sector by the Kriemhilde Stellung.

Of the nine American divisions along the line of assault, only one

was a regular army division and only three had had previous battle experience. Nevertheless, Pershing expected his troops"to reach and break

through the Kriemhilde line on the first day. . .and to exploit the success

during the night, so that the second morning would find them in open

country, and almost half-way to Sedan and the lateral railway." 1

The natural obstacles of the terrain, the difficulties of supply, the

stubborn defense of the German forces, and the nature of the German defenses

in the sector thwarted the plan. In mid-1917, the Germans had largely

abandoned the linear system of trenches for a system of disconnected strong

points distributed in great depth. Machine guns, thickly sown, held these

Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918, p. 464.

- 2 -
forward stellugen or fortified positions, with troop reserves concentrated

in the rear for counterattack.

In its first two days, the 35th Division, like the other divisions

along the front, had overrun, at high cost, the foremost of these positions,

penetrating four miles or more, but as Liggett was to say, the Germans, although surprised, were able to throw in reserves so rapidly as to block the

original breach by the third day. As a result, the American attack came to

a standstill on 28 September. This was nowhere more evident than in the

1st Corps sector, where, even before the German counterattack, the disorganization of its divisions made a halt at once imperative .

The initial German forces before the American army were war weary--

they had been sent to that sector for rest and re-organization--and they

were temporarily demoralized by the onslaught. They held on while reserves

were rushed to them from Metz, even as the American forces waited for help

from the veterans of St. Mihiel. The attack, which lost its impetus on 28

September, was not to be resumed until the morning of 4 October.

Still in the 3rd Corps sector, near the Meuse, on 29 September and

still uncommitted, the 1st Division was suddenly assigned to 1st Corps and

ordered to move that night by truck to Neuvilly, on the far side of the

First Army front0 Early on the morning of the 30th, General Summerall arrived at the 355th Division CP at Choppy with orders to relieve that division

by 5s00 a.m., 1 October.

The position reported occupied by the 35th Division extended from

Baulny to near the Apremont-Epinonville road, one kilometer east of Chaudron

Ferme, and thence to Eclisfontaine -- a front of more than four kilometers.

-3-
Messages were dispatched ordering three lines of the let Division into the

ravines in the sector, the Baulny-Serieux Fermes ravine (the reported first

line of the 35th Division), the Charpentry-Eolisfontaine ravine, and the

Very ravine (Map No. 1). 2

The infantry columns approached the Varennes-Cheppy line at dark on

30 September, the 16th and lBth Regiments of the 1st Brigade, under Brig.

Geno Frank Parker, and the 28th and 26th Regiments of the 2nd Brigade,

under Brigo Geno Frank E. Bamford, in line from left to righto They advanced until a battalion of each regiment was in position in the three

ravines, with the 1st Engineers in reserve southeast of Very.

At midnight, the 1st FA Brigade under Col. Henry W. Butner reached

the vicinity of Cheppy and the next night began the relief of the 35th

Division artillery. The batteries of the 6th FA Regiment were put on the

western slope of the sector where, though screened from frontal fire, they

were exposed to direct fire from the Argonne, Just across the river Aire.

The 7th FA went into positions southwest of Eolisfontaine, and the 5th FA

(155s) took up positions near Charpentry and Very. At the former positions

of the 35th Division artillery, the incoming brigade found 3,000 gas shells

and 3,000 smoke shells neatly stacked in their oases. 3

2

Hist Sketch of the let Div During the World War, compiled by slet Div

Society (214 pp.), n.d., pp..138-14 6 (lst Div Box 11, 1104). This mimeographed account appears essentially unchanged in the published History of

the 1st Division During the World War (Philas J. C. Winston Co., 1922)o

3

All 6,000 rounds were expended on 4 Oct, per let FA Brig Ammo Rpts, 20

Jan - 11 Nov; they were expended on 6 Oct0 per Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by 1st

FA Brig, Jan - Nov 19180 See World War Records, 1st Division, Vole 140 These

bound vols with preface by General Summerall, dated 28 Mar 1928, are hereafter cited as Records0

-4-
The let Division came into the line with orders to continue the First

Army attack immediately upon oomrletion of the relief. The assault battalions were to assemble by midnight on the Charpentry-Eclisfontaine road, and

proceed through the foremost line of 35th Division troops, ready to continue

the advance to the Combined Army First Phase line (Chehery-Fleville-Cote de

Maldah) at 5:30 &mo on I October. At 8sOO por., Army orders cancelled the

attack, but the troops, in line between Baulny and Eclisfontaine, remained

in place. 4

In affecting the relief, the let Division commented on the disorganization of the 35th Division, and reported that a patrol of its 26th Infantry,

probing while the relief was in progress, found a number of men from the 35th

lost in the Ravine de Esayashe, south of Tronsal Ferme. 5

The German 5th Guard Division also reported the capture that day of 11

men from the 137th, 138, and 139th Infantry, found inside its lines. 6

4

FO 43, 1st Div, 30 Sep (Records 3). Jnl of Opns, kept by Lt A. Bo Butler,

ADC to Gen. Summerall, 30 Sep (Re-oords 11). Hereafter ADC Jnl Opns.

Shipley Thomas, The Histor o--f the A.E.F.,pp. 288 - 289, says, "The fnsuing_ delay was due to the necessity of building roads. . .for the transport

of artillery and ammunitiono"

FO 43; "Found an awful mess at Charpentry"; Extracts from Diary of Maj.

Edw Ro Coppack (CO 16th Inf), 1 Oct (lst Div Box 12, 11 4/9).

6

Noon rpt, 1 Oct (Item 97, 5th Gd WD&A).

NOTEs The principal source of German data for this narrative is the bound

volume, World War Records, let Division-German Documents, Vol. 4s Meuse-Argonne

(preface dated 30 Mar 1933). All refs to German records, unless otherwise

specified, are to this volume.

Most of the volume consists of the translated records and diaries of the

5th Gd Div and its units, with scattered data for the 37th, 45th Res, 41st, and

52nd Divs at the backo More complete records of the 5'i-Div are said-'nthis

volume to be in the War Diaries of German Units OpposTnthreSeoond Division

but the 2nd Div project to translate these war diaries apparently ceased with

the Chateau Thierry eampaign; no records of the 52nd Div are to be found there.

It has therefore been neaessary to translate pertinent material for the 52nd

Div from its available records in the German Files of the National Archiveso

-5-
VB Lanes etSC Ceov5 . Bethev;ile

197 V 5N Id in tifie

d , Apre~.o at, 

-O e tSommeirac or P/)e1e Romr 3

n

Scal- lo D e C; \ <se

Coy

8 b2 Nh Div

90-

7*-

ci, Ap;er Jore

Oper at ion oon e eyC

Scale 1:5oooo 0S.oc., ." tD e"O 4$. ./(---'

5a
Reconnaissance patrols of the 1st Brigade quickly learned that Chaudron

Ferme and Montrebeau woods were strongly held by 5th Guard Division elements.

Facing the 2nd Brigade with multiples of machine guns and supporting troops

above the L'Esperance-Eolisfontaine road was the 52nd Division (see Maps Nos.

1, 2, 3). 7 Although the condition of the 52nd Division, fully committed for

the first time on 1 October, in relief of the 1st Guard, was "effective and

excellent," the 5th Guard, to its left, Was soon to be reported "completely

,exhausted," and the 2nd Landwehr, facing the 28th Division, was still

"effective despite losses and fatigue." 8

The first two positions of the German forces on the First Army front

had been penetrated, and on 1 October the Army faced the Giselher Stellung,

the enemy defense line through the Argonne near Binarville-south of ApremontEolisfontaine-Nantillois-Brieulles sur Maise. Despite their recent success

against the left flank of First Army, the German forces opposite the 1st

Division on 1 October were not sanguine. "The operative situations seems

indicative that a further withdrawal is not unlikely," reported Group Argonne,

and that same day a German Third Army memo saids "Army Headquarters has only

a very limited number of reserves at its disposal and cannot count upon further

reinforcements." 9 "Army reserve elements inserted for counterattack must be

7

Items 102-104, 5th Gd War Diary A Annexes, show the arty support of the

5th Gd Div by the artry--othe 2nd Ldw and 52nd Div, and 5th Gd arty support

of those two divisions.

8

Est of situ, Gp Arg to 3rd A, 4s15 p.m., 4 Oct (Item 25, Annexes to War

Diary, Gp Arg); of Survey of situ, 5 Oct, Item 121o

9

Gp Order, 1 Oct (Item 67, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg); Item 199, 3rd Army

WD&A.

-6-
5cole ': 8, o00o

Stiuntto, 9J-uAppe Ck-t9owner%

:l1O.1qit Tacths from (Ycap 28a

u. fpp e jQjo,,er He.Nbst 191i I Hochwuad Taefl

/ F>~lrr d, St.JuvS. 1 5st

G6 Ai Fil 8o3s
500 alt 2lfa

5ource , Ite m r3. a 3^a"~~~S Gd W DA

N4tF/evi //e

\T \ \\T

\ /L /2 r .\ LI2 3

ewz \

4- '

2 " Ldu Div 9 9 \3;d 6uard

tpvemnont k Touenr tZer

~ \ ~>E//6et4 \

( MAP NO. 3

b . .-
relieved immediately after....Gravity of situation demands sparing use."10

The mission of the lst Division was to drive a deep wedge into the high

ground east of the Aire valley, forcing the enemy to loosen his hold on the

Argonne, and so carry the whole of the Army line forward.1 1 The principal

obstacles before the 1st Division were Montrebeau woods, Exermont ravine,

Montrefagne woods with Hill 240, and as a culminating barrier, the great

ridge of Hill 272° These taken, the Argonne would be flanked and First Army

would be ready to assault the Kriemhilde Stellung. But, as Group Argonne

said, "The enemy, cautious since the 29th of September, will have to silence

the enfilade fire from the Argonne before he again renews his attacks east

of the Aireo" This mission Army assigned to the 28th Division, to the left

of lst Divisioni 1 2 Meanwhile, the troops consolidated their positions,

brought up supplies, and waited for the order to attack.

Bursts of Gas

"The Army," Lto Butler, Aide de Camp to General Summerall, wrote in his

journal, "says the Boaseh have withdrawn, but we know better. We found the

10

Item 23, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg.

11

Hist Sketch, po 151, Shipley Thomas, po 291, adds, disregarding the

intervening 77th and 28th Dives "...and to effect a Junction with the French

Fourth Army at Grand Pre.o

12

Gp Arg WD, 3 Oat, FO 33, 1st A, 12 Hr, 1 Oct, said lst Corps LT°eo, let

Divr was to continue the attack and capture the heights NE and N of Exermont,

thus assisting 5th Corps in the capture of the heights W of Romagne. It /T.eo,

28th Divjwas to seize and hold Hill 180 S of Cornay, Hill 244 W of ChateT

Chehery, and the main crest .f the Foret d'Argonne, "thereby cutting off

hostile enfilade fire against the attack east of the Aire River."

- 7 -
enemy with machine guns in the Montrebeau woods & in the woods to the east

of the Montrebeau woods ....many fere killed and wounded in the patrols."

But the enemy artillery was to take a greater toll of troops. For four

nights and three days, while the division waited, the German guns pounded

the area. The troops, as Lt. Butler said, were concentrated along the front

line, without cover, and the enemy's batteries on the front and those in the

Argonne, west and north of Apremont, were highly effectiveo On 2 October,

he saids "If we are not to attack it is poor business to leave our men in

attack formation subject to this heavy artillery fire." Not until the 3rd

did he report that some of the units had been moved back.

The 1st Division was not aware of the enemy's range-finding on 30

September, in preparation for gas shoots on Baulny and Ernst ravine to the

northeast, nor did Major Wise, the 35th Division Gas Officer, apparently

mention to the incoming division his suspicion, following a tour on the

30th of the troop and artillery positions in the Charpentry area, that

"conditions were most favorable for the enemy to use Mustard Gas on these

positions and lines of supply. 1 3

The Gasschiessen began normally enough. Late in the evening of the

30th9 while the relief was still in progress, Lt. Butler wrotes "It is a

clear night & the enemy is only throwing over a few shells. He is throwing

over single gas shells from time to time to harass." By morning it was

obvious that some sort of systematic gas shelling was under way, and orders

13

5th Gd Arty Order 12, 0530, 30 Sep (Item 111, 5th Gd War Diary, German

Files Bax 151). Rpt, Wise, nod., 36th Div Box 10, !6f-

- 8 -
went outs "Regimental commanders will issue the necessary warning to their

troops that the enemy is shelling along the entire front with phosgene and

mustard gas, 1

l4 Between 3s00 and 5s30 a.m., 1 October, a battery of the

German 1st Guard heavy artillery had put 300 rounds of yellow cross on

Ernst valley, from Buanthe creek at Baulny up to Serieux Ferme, while

another battery, between 4s30 and 5s00 a.m.,fired two sudden bursts of gas

totaling 70 blue cross rounds (diphenylohlorarsine) and 40 green cross

(phosgene) on Baulny.1 5

Expecting a renewal of the American attack on 2 October, Group Argonne

ordered continuous harassing fire through the night of 1 - 2 October, the fire

to be "increased from 5sOO am. At that time gas will be delivered on the probable assembly areas; this gas will be delivered as close to our lines as

weather conditions permit....of primary importances ravines at Bouzon,

Ernst ravine, commune woods of Baulny, commune woods of Cierges. The gas

must be sufficiently denser" The 5th Guard artillery order, prepared two

14

Memq,2nd Brig 1st Div, 1 Oct subs Gas Shelling (Records 8). Sent to all

orgns; see 1st Div Box 65, 32.15.

15

Arty 0 14, 8 pm, 30 Sep (Item 99, 5th Gd WD&A). "During the night, assembly places gassed, especially ravine near Bouzon, Ernst ravine, Commune Baulny

woods, Commune Cierges woods" (Gp Arg War Diary, 1 Oct). "Yellow cross fires

were carried out on the southern part of the Ernst draw" (5th Gd Art Comdr to

5th Gd, noon rpt, 1 Oct, Item 105. See also 3rd Gd Foot Regt, Diary, 1 Oct

(5th Gd-Regts-WD&A).

Unaccounted for in arty orders is the evening rpt, 4th Gd FA Rest 1 Oct

which said the 2nd Bty 1st Gd Regt delivered 270 rounds of yellow cross from

8-9s15 on southern part of Ernst ravine. Similarly, ist Bn 1st Gd Res Foot

FA, Diary, 1 Oct rpts 204 rounds of gas and harassing fire during the day

W'oth items in 5th Gd-Sub Units-WYWA).

16

GP Order, 10s30 p.m., 1 Oct (Item 39, Annexes to WD).

-9-
hours earlier, called for 450 rounds of yellow cross to be fired from l30-

300 aomo by two heavy batteries of lot Guard artillery on the valley from

Baulny to the entrance of Karl KfuantheJravine. In addition, sudden bursts

of lethal gas -- 20 rounds of blue cross by each of five light batteries, 30

rounds of green cross by a sixth battery -- were to be fired at 11s30 pomr,

12s15, 12s30, 2S15, 2s30, and 4s15 aSmo on Baulny -- a total of 780 lethal

shellso1 7 In his morning report on 2 October, the artillery commander saids

"From 100 amoe the valley between Baulny and Charpentry was gassed with

yellow cross; bursts of gas were delivered on Baulny itselfo" 18

The extent of German gas intentions then in progress is evident in the

instructions issued for the continued defense of the 5th Guard sectors

Preparations will be made for the delivery of gas so that they can be

carried out at any time, particularly against Hoffung valley above Chaudron

Fermeyto Chaudron farm, Baulny and Charpentry ravines, Ernst ravine 5ortheast of Baulny_7 to Serieux farm, Franz draw 5orth of Charpentry 7, Karl

ravine guanthe ravine].

During the gassing of ravines the surrounding heights will be systematically covered with harassing fire of HoE. at the same time0

If possible, during the harassing fire important traffic points will be

gassed frequently and thoroughly with yellow crosso 9

All during the day of 2 October, the troops and batteries in the ravines

of the let Division sector were pounded with high explosives An enemy report

17

Arty 0 16D 8s30 p.mo, 1 Oat, Item 74.5.

18

Item 76; 5th Gd Morning Rpt, 2 Oct, Item 73o The morning Rpt of the

4th Gd FA said-T-i5rounds of yellow cross were put on Baulny valley and

Ba-ulny 262 rounds onBuzanoy valley to the entrance of Karl ravine (in 5th

Gd-Sub Units-WD&A)o

19

Instructions, 2 Owt, Par VIo5 (Item 65/4, 5th Gd WD&M).

- 10 -
that night saids "The attack that was expected today did not develop, apparently on account of the copious harassing fire during the night, gassing

and due to the waves of annihilation filre." 2 0

That evening the gassing was resumed when a single heavy battery was

ordered to fire 160 rounds of green cross in "sudden bursts...on Charpentry

about 9s30, 10s25, 10s45, and ll50," 40 rounds each time. Another 195

rounds of green cross were to be fired in sudden bursts on Baulny at 3200,

3030, and 4s15 aomo by two heavy batteries0 Then, about 4s40 aomo on the

3rd, six batteries were to fire "bursts of gas, suddenly...on the roadforks and bridges 200 meters southeast of Baulny." Four light batteries

would fire 50 rounds of blue cross each, two heavy batteries would fire 25

rounds of blue cross and 40 rounds of green cross between them, for a total

of 265 roundso2 1

Reports on the 3rd confirmed the "Harassing fireoo.against batteries,

bursts of gas on Charpentry and Baulny," with later "bursts of gas on the

roadforks southeast of Baulny and on Baulnyo" 2 2 In response to requests of

the infantry, two batteries of the 4th Guard FA fired an additional 200

rounds of blue cross on Baulny between 4s30 and 0s30 on the afternoon of the

3rdo23

20

5th Gd Art Comdr to 5th Gd, Evening Rpt, 2 Oct (Item 82.1, 5th Gd WD&A).

21

Arty 0 17, 7s30 p.m., 2 Oct, Item 53°

22

5th Gd Morning Rpt, 3 Oct, Item 129; Noon Rpt, 12s40 p.m., 3 Oct, Item

142; 5th -d Art Comdr, Noon Rpt, 10slO aom., Item 54. 1st Bn 1st Gd Res Foot

FA, Diary, 3 Oct, confirms burst of gas on Baulny, 40 rds, 3s00 aomo; bursts

oT gas on Baulny & bridge, 113 rds, 3,50-4:40 aomo

23

Supplement to final rpt, 3 Oct (in 5th Gd-Sub Units-WD&A).

- 11 -
Warning that an immediate resumption of the attack must be expected, a

German divisional order for 3 October asked for additional "Yellow cross on

Baulny, and if the ammunition situation permits, on the Ernst ravineo"2 4 The

artillery order that evening said that "sudden bursts of gas, at the maximum

rate of fire" were to be put on the region between the two bridges at the

southwest corner of Charpentry. A heavy battery would fire 25 rounds of

green cross at 9s30 and again at 1024, 10s45, and 11:50 p.m. Each of two

light batteries would also fire 50 rounds of blue cross at 10s45 and 11s50,

for a total of 300 lethal gas shells°

In addition, from lI00 to 3s00 on the morning of 4 October, a light

battery, moved from northeast of Fleuville into an advanced position east

of Montrefagne for that purpose, was to fire 580 yellow cross shells on

the northwest slope and bottom of Ernst ravine, from the Baulny-Charpentry

road to 700 meters north, Farther back, a heavy battery would fire another

330 rounds of yellow cross on Baulny from 2s00 to 4s00 aomo 25

Completion of this gas mission was confirmed in the 5th Guard morning

report of 4 Octobers "Bursts of gas against the bridges on the southwest

corner of Charpentry. From 2:00 to 4s00 Lomo gas firing on Baulny....Searching and sweeping fire into the rear area with gas."2 6

Stl- Gd Div 0, 3 Oct, par 5d, Item 37.

25

Arty O 18, 8s30 pomo, 3 Oct, Item 340

26

Item 174, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg; also 5th Gd Morning Rpt, 4 Oct (Item

'3, 5th Gd WIDA)o

4th Gd FA, Morning Rpt 4 Oct (5th Gd-Sub Units) confirms firing of 40

rds blue cross by 9th Bty 270th FA betw 9,30-1's00 p.m. against Amer arty.

3rd Bn 4th Gd FA, Diary, 3 Oct, confirms displacement of three guns of

7th Bty to fire yellow cross between 12 m-1s45 a.m. 5th Gd Art Comdr, Morning

Rpt, 5856 aom., 4 Oct, Item 35, confirms the 330 rds 7TTow c~ross; 1st Bn lst

Gd Res Foot FA, Diary, 4 Oct, says 344 rds yellow cross were fired between

2-4 aomo on Baulty and Charpentry bridges.

Unaccounted for is 3rd Gd Foot Rt, Diary, 3-4 Oct (5th Gd-Regts-WD&A)s "During the night of 3/4 DBTtle Montreeau and the ravineg or tne sector had

been gassedo"

- 12 -
It is estimated that before the slet Division began its attack on the

morning of 4 October, it had been shelled with at least 1660 yellow cross

rounds, 1135 blue cross, and 675 green cross, or a minimum total of 3470

gas shells.

The Gas Casualties

The divisional Summaries of Intelligence for the period tend to minimite the extent of this gassingo The report for the 24-hour period ending

4s00 p.m., 1 October, admitted heavy HE fire that day from north of Cornay

and Hills 233, 240, 212, and 269, but said the "gas shells...mixed in with

HIIoEoLs erej7 not in sufficient numbers to cause damageo" On 2 October

the division reported only that "Gas shells, mixed in with HoEo's and

occasional shrapnel' were coming in "to the rear as far as the Divisional

P.Co" And on the 3rd, "Many gas shells fell on all of our positionso Few

casualtieso" 27

The divisional Operations Report for 1 October, mentioning "A few gas

shells" in addition to the HE fire, said that nine men had been reported

killed, twenty-eight wounded and only two gassed up to noon that dateo28

Earlier that morning, a 26th Infantry battalion commander, below Serieux

Ferme, reported that "Mustard gas has been fired intermittently on my left

front company. At noon, however, a platoon leader of the 3rd MG Battalion,

27

SOI 16 h to 16 h, 30 Sep-3 Oct (Records 4).

28

Opns Rpt, n to n, 30 8ep-1 Oct (Records 13), NOTEs DORs after mid-September cease to estimate the number of its own and enemy arty HE and gas

rounds fired each day0

29

PM CO let En 26th Inf, 9s25 aom., 1 Oct (Records 15). NOTEs Almost all

FMs in 1st Div files are 'true copies." They have been edited, and there

are few or no originals.

- 13 -
with the 2nd Brigade, signalleds "Please send over 1 Sgt & 3 runners0 Everybody over here is gassedb 4 or 5 officers and quite a few men have evacuated

includirgrunnero Most everybody 5icJ. the Bn will not be able to make an attack in this shape. The Major & Adj. have both been evacuated (FM CO 2nd Plat

to CO Co D 3rd MG BEn 5&te supplied in post-war note, 7oecords 15)." There

are ro messages from the most heavily gassed unit on 1 - 2 October, the 16th

Infantry.

If the Summary of Intelligence for 1 October did not report sufficient

gas shells coming in that day to cause damage, it added that Company L, 18th

Infantry, had been gassed while digging in. There were "few casualtieso" Lt.

Butler, in his Journal entry for that same day, wrotes "Some of our men dug

into ground saturated with gas & became well saturated before they realized

it....We have about 400 casualties this first day. Mostly gas." The oommander of the 18th Infantry was more explicits

150 men, 98 being from one company were evacuated this afternoon, all

having been gassed with mustard gas. This company moved into trenches as

support company this morning about 3s00 a.m. and Jug in7 while there was

some shelling, mixed HoEo and Gaso About 100 gas shells reported in an area

of about a kilometer square0 It was necessary for the whole battalion to

pass through the gassed area. They all adjusted their masks and none showed

signs of being gassed as a result. But this afternoon this whole company

showed signs of being gassed with mustard gas, burning eyes and vomiting0

No gas shells had hit at the particular place where this company dug in nor

yet to windward of ito Apparently this place had been bombarded with gas

and throwing the earth up in digging and this being exposed to the sun the

gas was given off, as there was no sign of gas when the company took its

positions As soon as it was noticed that there was gas, the company took

up position out of the gassed area. 30

30

Ltr, Hunt CO 18th Inf to COG 1st Brig, 1 Oct, subs Rpt on Gas (Records 13).

lst Ind to CG 1st Div9 2 Oct, suggested that the men had dug in saturated

ground and became subjected unawares to the accumulated influence of

mustard fumeso

- 14 -
On 2 October, Major Coppack, commanding the 16th Infantry, wrote in his

diary of gas shelling some hours before 5s00 aomo, the hour Group Argonne

ordered gas on the Baulny area. "My headquarters is only 1500 yards from

the enemyo Last night he shelled us with gas, HoEo and shrapnel0 We wore

our masks from midnight at 2 AoMo Yet there were 70 casualties from gaso I

am sick at my stomach today on account of it." At 6s00 a.m. on the 2nd, the

let Division reported 254 gas casualties. 31 By noontime, a total of 409 gas

oases had been reportedo3 2

Capto Go Jo Sielaff, the Division gas Officer, in his first gas attack

reports, makes no mention of gas on the morning of 1 October, but refers to

the gasping between 10sOO pomo and 3:00 a.m. on 1-2 October0 Following that

attack, he says, there were 392 mustard gas casualties out of a thousand men

exposed in the 18th Infantry, as a result of failure to recognize the

presence of the gas, and 17 out of two thousand men, taken by surprise, in

the 16th Infantry. Six hundred yperite shells were said to have fallen on

33

the 16th Infantry reserve position.

31

Tele G-3, 2 Oct (Records 13) reports 118 wounded, 254 gassed, 6 PN, 44

sick for period 12m-6asm 1-2 oto.

32

Opns Rpt, 1-2 Oct, reporting "Heavy harassing fire especially during

night on front lineo HoEo shell and gas," shows 14 killed, 97 wounded,

409 gassedo

Lt. Butler, at Cheppy, noted on 2 Oct only that that town "was shelled

slightly last night with single gas shells," and on the 3rd, thst "The enemy

is dropping a gas shell in Cheppy from time to time. Just enough to cause

'Gas Alarms'o"

33

Rpts on Gas Atk, 2 Oct (GAY-lst Div Atks)o Spencer, Pt I, p. 75, repeating these same DGO rpts adds 700 gas shells in the 18th Inf sector, not

in DGO rpto

- 15-
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MOP Shoonny hEnty 6 Offensove: / 

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15a
The itemized casualty lists of the division field hospital show by

actual count 189 men gassed in the 16th Infantry, 3 officers and 117 men in

the 18th Infantry, 52 men in the 26th Infantry, and 3 officers and 105 men

gassed in the 28th Infantry -- a total of 469 casualties among its admissions

on 1-2 Octobero 34

It appears that Captain 8ielaff was confused about the extent of the gas

attacks, as well as in error about when and where they occurred. This is

clear from his post-action account of the gassing, with attached map (see

Map Noo 4), wherein he dates the relief of the 35th Division and the first

gas attack as the night of 1-2 October, instead of 30 September-1 Octobero

On the night of the relief the enemy began shelling at 1000 p.m.

October 1st and continued until 4t00 a.mo of the 2ndo In the area of Charpentry the ravines were shelled with yellow cross containing a large amount

of high explosives making it impossible to distinguish the gas shells from

the high explosive° The fuses used were probably slight delay, as in nearly

all cases small craters showed that the shells had penetrated the earth from

two to four feet before exploding.

It was in this area that the 16th Infantry was bivouacked and their

casualties were caused by surprise and then by not keeping on the gas masks

long enougho The night was cold and the odor of the gas was very, very faint,

but shoes and clothing were evidently contaminated. The troops were moved

forward over ground that had been shelled with yellow cross0

The 18th Infantry in passing toward the front lines, one battalion was

compelled to dig in on the brow of the hill Ceast of Chaudron Ferme2 at

the edge of the small woods. This ground was shell torn and about one hundred gas shells were fired on them along with the high explosive shells.

They dug in without wearing their masks, not knowing that gas was being usedo

The 26th and 28th Infantry apparently did not suffer casualties until the

following day when they passed over gassed ground. The 28th passed3 over flat

ground covered with tall grass which had been shelled with mustard.

34

Mad Dept Box 34060

35

Memo, DGO to C CWS, 18 Oct, subs Rpt of gas attacks from Oct 2nd to

11th, 1918 (GAF-lst Div Atks).

- 16 -
Resuming the lot Division account of the gas attacks, on the night of

2-3 October, it reported "the ravine northwest of Charpentry Cwas again_7

shelled with mustard gaso Roads leading to Very and Charpentry Cwere

shelled continuously throughout the day and nighto".36 At 6:00 a.m., 3

October, the division triage at Choppy recorded a cumulative total of 1,182

casualties to date, of which 84 were 1st Division wounded, 561 gassed, with

another 220 wounded and 164 gassed belonging to other divisions, principally

35th Division artilleryo3 7

In the next 24 hours, another 27 wounded and 66 gassed were reported

by the triage, as well as 79 wounded and 9 gassed from other divisions 3 8

During the night of 3-4 October, Major Coppack wrote in his diary, "My PC

was hit twice with shells and gassed twice. An awful night....Before we

started (the attack] 192 men -of the 16th Infantry] had been gassed."

Reports of casualties resulting from men digging in mustard-contaminated

ground, as had the 18th Infantry earlier, continued to come inc A company

36

OR 2-3 Oct also rpted approx 5 killed, 100 wounded, 150 gassed as a

result

37

Ltr, CO Field Hosp 3 to Div Surg, 3 Oct, subs Rpt of Casus thru Triage

(Records 13)o The DGO reports on gas atks after 2 Oct are all on a noon to

noon basis and make no attempt to give the number of rounds fired or units

affected0 His rpt for 2-3 Oct shows 409 gas cases (as in the Opns Rpt for

the day before), all mustard gas, occurring NE of Charpentryo Spencer, Pt

1,; p 77, recording this same rpt says 600 77mm. shells were fired in that

atko

38 /

Ltr, CO Field Hosp 3 to Div Surg, 4 Octo The DGO rptd 50 gas casu for

3-4 Oct and 38 for 4-5 Oct (produced, adds Spencer, by 500 gas shells), with

a note to see his rpts of 2 and 3 Oct for further details0

- 17 -
of Engineers reported 15 of its men were slightly gassed on 4 October while

working on the roads between Charpentry and Baulny and Route 4603 9 On 5

October, the Gas Officer of the Engineers reported 80 casualties from mustard

in low concentration in the valley south of Charpentry, where the men had

"sought shelter in shell holes during bombardment of H.EoS.," and where

troops were continually passing through the area.4 0 And on 6 October, the

Engineers reported additional casualties, when approximately 120 men in

Company C were burned while working on the road near Baulny without their

maskso The area had been subjected to yellow cross, said the report, about

ten hours previous to their arrival. The officer in charge had been in

France only two months and had had no gas experience, and was therefore

unaware that subsequent shelling with high explosives could volatilize

41

mustard gas in contaminated ground.

The 1st Division was later to say, somewhat selectively, that during

this period "The ravine northeast of Charpentry was constantly drenched with

mustard gas," although the gassing was not limited to that area.4 2 Unquestion39

Rpt of Co D 1st Eng during Recent Opns, 14 Octo See ltr CO 1st Eng

to CG 1st Div, 20 Oct, Rpt on Recent Opns, which said nothing of gas or gas

attacks but reported total casus for the period of 21 killed, 72 wounded,

and 156 gassedo

40

Ltr, RGO 1st Eng to DGO 1st Div, 5 Oct (Records 14).

41

Ltr, RGO 1st Eng to CO 1st Eng, 6 Oct, subs Rpt (1st Div Box 114, 66.

3)0 This gassing is confirmed in DGO ltr of 18 Oct. It appears to be the

same that is said to have occurred on 4 Oct, in ltr, CO 1st Bn 1st Eng to CO

1st Ehg,14 Oct, Rpt on Opns in AtkE W of Meuse, Sep & Oct 1918 (Records 14)o

42

Hist Sketch, po 151.

- 18 -
ably, many of the casualties that resulted from the successive attacks were

owing to the failure to recognize the potential effectiveness of yellow cross

when mixed with harrasing fire, particularly when much or perhaps all of that

yellow cross was in the new German mustard-HE shell. The Summary of Intelligence for 4-5 October guessed at the hazard when it reported that "Many

HoE's contain C-a] strong mustard gas composition."

In its three-day wait for the order to attack, the division had taken

almost 1,500 casualties, of which over 900 were caused by gas.4 3

The Advance is Resumed

Resumption of the Army offensive was ordered for 5J30 a.m., 4 October.

For the attaek, two companies of tanks (actually, 47 in number) and three

troops of cavalry were made available to the division, Company C of the

1st Gas Regiment was attached, to put down a smoke screen along the southern

edge of the Bols de Montrebeau for four minutes beginning at H hour, but

this was apparently cancelledo 44

43

Opns Rpt, 3-4 Oct, gives only the est. of total casuso The Amer Battle

Monu Comm study, 1st Division Sum of Opns (1944), p. 95 shows 125 killed,

107 died of wounds, and 1,257 wounded in the period 29 Sep-3 Oct. The

wounded apparently include gas casualties. The DGO reports through 4-5 Oct

indicate a total of 906 casualties,all represented as mustard gas cases. No

mention is made of phosgene or diphenylohlorarsine cases.

In his gas atk rpts, the DGO notes a total of 223 gas oases at the

triage from other divisions, but does not indicate whether these are included

in his daily figureso They are apparently excluded in his ltr to C CWS, 5

Oct, subs Preliminary Rpt on Gas Atk of Oct 1st and 2nd (let Div Box 57, 63.

33), which rpts 863 "casualties suffered by the First Division," as reported

between 2-4 Oot.

44

FO 47, 1st Div, 2 Oct, pars 5B, 30G; Memo G-3, 1058, 3 Oct (Records 3).

The Co C mission was changed twice in orders, but Hist of 1st Gas Meg Pt

III, p. 17, makes no mention of this smoke mission. Yet 4n4 Sketch, p. 160,

said, "The Chemical Warfare Company...aided powerfully al initial assault

but the casualties soon became disabling for so small a l

- 19 -
The divisional artillery was augmented by the 219th FPA (French), making

a relatively small total of 84 75mm.guns and 24 155mm. howitzerso These were

to open the attack without any preparation other than a standing barrage, to

allow the troops to close up before both advancedo Two field pieces were

put at the disposal of each attack battalion for use as forward gunso4 5

Counter-battery and interdictory fire were to be conducted by two groups of

105's and one group of 155's of the 1st Corps Artillery Grouping, in liaison

with divisional artillery0

In the assault, the first infantry objective was a line along the

northern edge of Montrebeau woods, where the barrage would stand for thirty

minutes, to stun the enemy on the crests of Exermont ravine and to permit

the troops to reform after passing through the woodso The second objective

was a line along the base of the northern slope of Montrefagne woods, where

another barrage would stand for thirty minutes. The final objective for

the day was a line Just north of Fleville, where the barrage would fall for

twenty minutes and then cease, while the guns came forward.4 6

The order, that "Noo 5 shells (Lethal gas) will be used freely on favorable targets and under favorable weather conditions" 4 7 was carried out by the

attached 219th FA which, on the evening of 3 October, began "throwing over

45

Forward guns were ordered in FO 63, lst C, 17 hr, 1 Oct and implemented

in Attack Order, Opns Noo 4, 1st FA Brig, 2 Oct (Records 9). Memo 00 1st FA

to CO 6th and 7th FA, 6 Oct, reduced this to one gun per bn.

46

FO 47; Hist Sketch, ppo 153 - 154.

47

FO 33, 1st As 1 Oct; FO 63, 1st C, 1 Oct; 'FO 47, 1st Div.

- 20 -
concentrations of lethal gas from time to time, Cto continue until 2s00

AoMo tomorrow morning" 4 8

Both the 5th Guard and 52nd Infantry Divisions reported the heavy gas

and incendiary fire on their forward lines and rear areas on 3-4 Octobero

Elisabeth Regiment of the 5th Guard reported. "At 2 am the enemy commenced to

shell the entire terrain below the front line and north of Fleville with gas

end smoke ....At 7 am the terrain had been so heavily gassed and smoked that

there was no observation from the Regimental CP. It was possible to see for

only 5-10 paces. The gas and artificial fog moved to the north in heavy

swaths, making any observation impossible." The 3rd Battalion of the same

regiment saids "At 5030 am the preparatory fire of the enemy commenced

suddenlyo...Our men had to suffer much from laohrymatory gas with which the

rear area was shelled in particular. "4 9 Yet a summary report of losses in the

5th Guard Division between 1-7 October shows only a single gas casualty for

the period, a member of the Elisabeth Regiment. 50

At 5s25 a.mo on the morning of the attack, the barrage opened 200 meters

above the L'Esperanoe-Chaudron Forme road and then northeast to the Bois

48

ADC Jnl Opns; Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by 1st FA Brig, shows 1620 gas

rounds fired on 4 Oct by the French unit. Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg,

po 45, says it was 1800 phosgene shells.

49

3rd Gd Gren Regt War Diary, 4 Oct; 3rd Bn War Diary, 4 Oct (5th GdRegts-Diarles and Annexes) o

50

Items 112, 113, 5th Gd WD&A. A summary of oasus in the 20th Inf

(Tauentzein) Reg 5tW for 21 Sep-10 Oet, showed 24 killed, 181 wounded,

175 missing, none gass-e(6th Gd-Regts)o

- 21 -
Communale de Baulny. When the barrage began to advance five minutes later, the

brigades moved with it. At once enemy batteries that had been brought up and

emplaced in secret during the week opened up on the advancing troops and immediately knocked out at least two of the 75mm. guns moving up with the assault

battalionso The others found no opportunity to fire in the subsequent actiono5 1

Interlooking machine guns and a determined thin line of supporting troops

met the advancihg waveso It was the impression, repeated again and again later

that day, that Uall the Bosch who didn't have machine guns had cannons."5 2

"Bodies of American soldiers...dotted the ground over which the attack progressed," and there was evidence in the bandaged dead "that many of the wounded

of the 35th Division had been left by the enemy to die where they fell."5 3

51

G-3 Memo, 17 Oct, Rpt on Opns of lot Div...Oct 1-10 incl (Records 13),

said these guns were 'too often lost or disabled and in general they are not

considered effective."

The difficulties of advancing in an infantry attack with a gun, 2 caissons,

18 horses, and 19 men are described in ltr, 2nd Lt. Cross, 7th FA to CO 7th FAD

25 Nov, subs Rpt on accompanying gun (Records 14). He moved out about 2 am, 4

OctD to advance with the 3rd Bn, 28th Inf, carrying HE and gas shell, was gassed in Epinonville, reached position an hour late, was not allowed to fire, and

at 1 pm the next day returned the gun to the battery. See also ltr, 1st Lt.

MoVicker, 7th FPA, 26 Nov, subs Aoot of forward gun, who reports a similar experience at Sto Mihiel, where he could not follow the infantry and did not fire

a shot, and in the Argonne with the 1st Bn, 26th Inf, wherA h^ at once lost his

gun in the attack, 11 of his 12 horses, and 9 of his 13 men.

52

ADC Jnl Opns.

53

Hist Sketch, p. 155o "The fields between the Exermont ravine & our jumping off line are covered with the dead bodies of men from the 35th Div which

fell back across it. Many of these had on their first aid bandages, showing

they had been wounded & died after falling back. The Bosch does not look after

our wounded" (ADC Jnl Opns, 5 Oct). The division was later to say that "Due to

the number of dead left by the preceding division, burial of the dead was not

completed until after the division left the line" (G-3 Memo, 17 Oct, Rpt on

Opns of let Div, op. cite).

- 22 -
Despite high casualties, the 1st Brigade reached its first objective,

above montrebeau woods, at 7sOO o'clock. In the first hour of the attacks

both battalion commanders and all company commanders of the 16th Infantry

were wounded, but the regimental units continued their advance.5 4 On the

right, the 2nd Brigade met greater resistance from the machine gun nests and

the entrenched enemy troops than it had anticipated and did not reach

Exermont ravine until 7s30 aom.

The second barrage began on schedule and the line moved out. Braving

the flanking fire from the Argonne heights, the assault battalion of the

16th Infantry cleared the snipers and machine guns out of Forme des Granges,

crossed Exermont ravine, and entered Flevilleo Anticipating the bombardment

of the town, at 1100 p.mo the troops withdrew to the reverse slope below

Fleville. The battalion had lost 18 of its 20 officers and 560 of its 800

men that morning, but it was "the only unit in the First American Army to

reach its final position" on schedule that day.5 5 Its support battalion

came up to the north slope of Exermont ravine, while working parties of

Engineers were sent up that night to consolidate the position, four kilometers from the line of departureo And there the 16th Infantry waited for

the other regiments to come abreast of ito

54

Coppack Diaryo

55

Hist Sketch, pp. 165-157o Gp 'Arg WD, 4 Oct, said the counter-attack

by a part of the 45th Div and the 37th late that afternoon retook Montrefagne and drove the enemy out of Flevilleo But as a result of the "acute

danger for the Aire valley .... the withdrawal of the Argonne front to in

rear nhad to be 7 taken under consideration."

- 23 -
To the right of the 16th Infantry, the remains of the assault and support battalions of the 18th Infantry became embroiled on the slopes of

Montrefagne woods. after having suffered at Exermont the close range punishment that the 35th Division had met there from the ridge above the town and

from the guns in the Argonne° Only remnants of companies were left as the

two battalions penetrated the dense growth on the slope of Cote 2400 Elements that reached the summit were beaten back and at nightfall the assault

forces dug in on the south and west slopes of Cote 240. Two companies of

the reserve battalion of the 18th crossed Exermont ravine, on the left of

the main force, and dug in to support a possible counterattack.5 6

In the 2nd Brigade sector, the 28th Infantry had advanced that morning across open fields against a 77 battery above Exermont ravine and a network of machine gun nests around La Neuville le Comte Ferme. When these

were finally taken late in the afternoon, the assault battalion dug in between Beauregard and le Comte farms and established liaison with the regiments to its left and right. 5 7

The assault battalion of the 26th Infantry, on the far right, was so

badly mauled by frontal fire, as well as by flanking fire from the hills on

its right, that it had to halt at the first objective, in line with the top

of Montrebeau woods, and let its supporting battalion pass through to continue the assault0 Like the 28th Infantry battalion to its left, the

56

Hist Sketch, ppo 157-158; ADC Jnl of Opns, 4 Oct; Op Arg WD, 4 Oct.

57

Hist Sketch, po 158o

- 24 -
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support battalion at once came under fire from the artillery above txermont

ravine end the machine guns at le Comte Ferme. When those two sources of

fire had been silenced with the help of thermite fired by First Gas Regiment

troops, the 26th Infantry troops turned and attacked the enemy position in

the wood to the east, outside the 1st Division sectors At nightfall, the

26th Infantry was dug in between le Comte Ferme and the edge of the Bois

de la Morine, two kilometers from the line of departureo5 8

That evening, with all troops holding fast, the gap between 1st and

2nd Brigades was filled by the 18th Infantry at Montrefagne. "There was

no confusion or disorganizationoU 5 9 The division reported its line from

Fleuville-south slope of Cote 240-south edge of Bois de Boyon-Ferme Beauregard-Hill 212 (see Map No. 5; of. Map No. 1). On its left, said Lt. Butler

in his Journal, the 28th Division, between Ferme des Granges and Apremont,

and on the right, the 32nd Division somewhere below Gesnes-Cierges, '"were

far behind" (see Map No. 6)o6 0

The statement in the divisional history for 4 October that "During

the afternoon and nightocothe battery positions and valley suffered especially from gas" probably referred to the effects of the 900 rounds of yellow

cross fired Just prior to the attack, and was reflected in the report from

the triage at Cheppy of 318 wounded and 94 gassed in the Division that day,

58

Hist Sketoh, pp. 158-159; G-3 Memo, 4 Oot (Records 3). This thermite

mission does not appear in the Hist of the 1st Gas Regt, Pt. III, p. 170

59

Hist Sketch, po 161.

60

ADC Jnl Opns; FM 2039 1st C to 1st A, 2215 hr, 4 Oct (Records 15)o

- 25 -
61 with another 103 wounded and 39 gas cases from other divisions. The emergenoy triage at Varennes on the 4th reported an additional 800 wounded and

82 gassed in the let Division, 85 wounded and 7 gassed from other divisionso

That triage was later to say that it had treated but not recorded another

177 wounded on the 4th and had had to send 400 or more wounded back to the

hospitals at Clermont and Lee Islettes without treating them. 62

Of the 47 tanks that had accompanied the assault forces that day,

only three remained. 6 3 The accurate and well-sited German guns had taken

them out one by one. But the German troops on that front had been pushed

back a distance of between two and four kilometerso The gaps made on both

flanks of the 5th Guard that day were to be filled the next day by two

regiments of the 37th Division and elements of the let Guard Division, sent

61

Hist Sketch, p. 162; SOI 16h 4 Oct-12h 5 Oct; ltr, CO Fld Hosp 3 to

Div Surg, 5 Oct, for period 6 a.m.-6 a.m., 4-5 Oct.

62

Triage rpt, Fld Hosp 2, 5 Oct, for period 10 a.m.-5 por., 4 Oct;

ltr supplement, Fld Hosp 2 to Div Surg, 6 Oct, and 1st Ind to G-3 1st Div,

6 Oct (let Div Box 16, 12.3). Opns Rpt, 4-5 Oct, was to estimate casus at

800, with total casus to date of approx 2300.

63

Memo. Capt C. H. Barnard, Tank Corps, to CG Camp Dix, N.oJo 17 Dec

20, subs Opns of 1st Brig Tank Corps, with 1st Div in M-A Offensive (lst

Div Box 48, 33.6/11)o On 26 Sep his gp had 96 tanks. On 1 Oct the remaining 47 were put at 1st Div disposal. At the close of 4 Oct the brigade had

suffered "almost complete annhilation," with 84% of its officers and men

killed or wounded.

- 26 -
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in to counterattack Montrefagne and Fleville (see Map Noo 7).6 4

The order for the attack on 5 October directed the 18th Infantry and

the 2ad Brigade to advance to a line parallel with the 16th Infantry at

Fleville and then proceed to the Corps Objective (which was also the Combined Army First Phase line), one kilometer above Fleville to the Cote de

Maldaho65

64

SOI, 5-6 Oct (Records 4). The next day, 5 Oct, von Eleist's Gp Arg

(a part of von Ninem's3r s1rmY) was trfd to von der Marwitz's 5th Army

(Item 19, 3rd A War Diary.o The trf may have resulted from a difference in

the conduct of defensive tactics, as is suggested in Army Group Commander

von Gallurtz's statements "More than once before I felt the necessity of

close cooperation between the West Group of the Fifth Army and Group Argonne

of the Third Army. It was for this reason that the supreme commaini orderei

Group Argonne to be attached to the Fifth Army." (As They Saw Us, editor

G.S. Viereck, po 250).

"With the trf of Gp Arg today, rpt of losses and of booty, final rpt

and spec rpt of 3s00 p.mo are done away with" (Memo, Gp Arg to 52nd, 37th,

2nd Ldw Divs, 2s35 pomo, 5 Oct f/tem 100, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg-77 -

An estimate of the Gp Arg divs on 5 Oat reported the 1st and 5th Gd Divs

On the left front of 1st Div no longer effective for defe-nsive action; f on

the right front of 1st DivtNe 52nd Div was still fully effective, but the

45th Res Div behind it was effective for defense only (Item 16, 3rd A WD&A)o

On the left front, the 37th Div was inserted on 4 Oct and replaced the

Ist and 5th Gds the next day {Div-O- 10s30 p.m., 4 Oct jtem 17, 5th Gd

WIA7. o All three regts of the 41st Div the counterattack div of --p MeuseWest, were found on the north slope of Hill 272 on 10 Oct (FM 2797, 1st C to

1st A, 4s50 pom., 10 Oct).

On the right front, the 211th Regt, Reh Res, the counterattack div of

Gp Arg, was first identified on the night of 9 Oct (FM G-2 to G-2 5th C, 9

Oct)o Though exhausted, this div replaced the 2nd Ldw on 12 Oct (Gp Order,10

p.mo, 11 Oct Item 110, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg7T elO9th Regt, 28th Divewas

first identified in L4Petit Bois on 9 Oct, and all regts the next morning when

they counterattacked lIill 269 (FM 1st Div to 5th C, 14 hr, 9 Oct; SOI 9-10

Oct)0 The 115th Div was used briefly in the unsuccessful counterattack on Hill

269 on 8 OCTe stlDiv Order, 2 a.mo, 7 Oct jtem 4, Annexes to WD GP Arg_7)o

65

FO 48, 1st Div, 5 OctS Memo, G-3, Item 1068 for CG 2nd Brig, 4 Oct

(Records 3)o

Army's FO 36, 4 Oct, that 3rd C by a maneuver to the west and 1st C by

a maneuver to the east, were to assist 5th C in capturing the heights west of

Ramogne, was not put into effect until 9 Oct.

- 27 -
At 6s15 acmo, in heavy fog, the 26th Infantry moved up to Hill 212,

the support battalion passing through the assault battalion on its crest, and

continued to the edge of the Bois de Moncy before it was stoppedo To its left,

the 28th Infantry advanced in the valley east of Montrefagne woods against

enemy positions above Beauregard Ferme and intense enemy artillery fire from

the crests of the valley. Climbing the slopes of Montrefagne to Coto 240,

the 28th Infantry joined the 18th and assaulted the counterattack battalion of

the German 37th that had come up during the night. 66

Clearing the hilltop at high cost, the 1st Division, in line again, attempted to continue on towards its second objective that day. Assault troops

of the 26th Infantry captured Arietal Ferme but got no farther as heavy fire

poured down from Hill 272. On the right, the 32nd Division had relieved the

91st Division that morning, and to assist its advance, in accordance with

Corps order, the 26th Infantry proceeded to extend its line well over a kilometer, from Areital Forme east to the Bois de Monacy 6 7 In the maneuver, a

patrol was put on the heights of Cote 269, found partially unoccupied, in the

rear of the enemy position. During the afternoon, another patrol of the 26th

Infantry appears to have got as far as Cote 263, from whose heights they announced that if someone would give them a brigade, they would "clean out the

whole business" that eveningo68

66

Hist Sketch, pp. 163-164o

67

FO 65, 1st C, 2300, 4 Oct, said 1st Div was to assist the 32nd by

"carrying the west edge of Bois de Romagne."

68

5th C considered sending reinforcements to the patrol. See FM (Tele

rpt) 1st C to lit A, 4s48 pors., 6 Octo

- 28 -
The 28th Infantry, advancing with the 26th and 18th to its right and

left, was stopped by intense machine gun and artillery fire from Cote 272 and

from the woods and trenches north of Montrefagne. The 18th Infantry too was

stopped in the low ground beyond Montrefagne woods. With the 16th Infantry

immobile, the let Division had come to a halt from Fleville to Arietal Ferme

and the Bois de Moneyo But "the wedge was driven and the Argonne was

flankedo.,6 9

The Argonne was flanked but it was not reduced* The division was

pinned down all along the front, too depleted by gas and HE casualties, too

battered by the two days of fighting to execute the movement that would

actually rout the enemy out of the Argonneo Its line, along the north slope

of the ridge southeast of Fleville, north edge of woods on the north slope

of Hill 240, through the woods northeast to Arietal Ferme, could only be

held until help came to extricate the division. 70 Equally battered were

the German 1st and 5th Guards on the Fleville front, replaced that afternoon with the insertion of the 37th Division and moved to the vicinity of

Cornay for rehabilitation.

No estimate of the casualties could be made for that second day of

battle. Throughout the day, enemy artillery had been highly active with

"H.E's, 77's, Gas....his artillery strength greatly superior to our

69

Hist Sketch, ppo 166-167.

70

FM 2193, lit C to 1st A, 2230 hr, 5 Oct (Records 15). FM 2183, 1st

C to 1st A, 6s35 p.mo, said that 1st Div connected with the 28th Div one

or two km So of Fleville on Rt 46.

- 29 -
own*"71 In particular, "The 16th Infantry (at FlevilleoJ lay under a constant rain of shell and gas from the enemy's well placed batteries. The

losses mounted high..." 72 The Division Gas Officer, reporting 162 gas casualties among troops back in the gassed ravine east of Charpentry, said the

enemy had "harassed the entire sector, especially all roads and ravines, as

far back as Charpentry, with Yperite. Some phosgene was used on roads between Baulny and Flevilleo"73

The Operations Report for the day said nothing of gas or HE casualties,

but only that to date it was estimated that 500 men had been killed, 3,000

wounded in the division° An estimate the next day was at considerable variance when it said that up to midnight, 6 October, there were approximately

5,050 wounded, 200 dead and buried, and 500 unburied.74

71

SOI, n to n, 5-6 Ooat No German arty records have been found to confirm

this gassing or that of the night of 4-5 Oct. There is, however, a memo from

von Kleist to the 2nd Ldw, 37th, and 52nd Divs, 10 a.mo, 5 Oct (Item 81, Annexes to WD, Gp, Arg), sayings "I desire that the pauses in the combat be

utilized to fortify and methodically organize the defenses...as well as to

crush the enemy's will to attack by having the arty gas the assembly areas and

harass the hostile arty." The next evening, 5th A signalled Gp Arg (Item 163):

"Attention is again directed to orders for the mos- persistent artillery

counterbattery work (H.E. - gas ammunition and with the use of our long range

artillery) o"

72

Hist Sketch, p. 167. Major Coppack wrote in his diary that days "My regiment is the most advanced of the Division....Loss has been heavy -- about

20 officers and 1,000 men from the 16th Inf."

73

Rpt on Gas Atk, 6 Oct, for period noon to noon 5-6 Oct (GAF-lst Div

Atkso) Spencer, Pt. I, p. 79, adds to his copy of the DGO Rpt that possibly

500 77mm, 105mm, & 150mm gas shells were fired.

74

Opns Rpt 5-6 Oct; Memo,lst Div to G-3 1st C, rec'd 1st A 9 Oct (Records

13) o

- 30 -
On the evening of 5 October, Army ordered all three corps to halt and

prepare for a counterattack. The whole line had been hit hard by heavy

gas and HE casualties, and German infantry and artillery reinforcements were

reported moving down, preparatory to a general counterattack. Army was particularly concerned for its left flank, then threatening the strategic German

position in the Argonne-Aire sector, and the possibility of another setback

like that suffered the week before. While holding their forward positions,

the corps were at once to organize for defense a general line of resistance

to their rears from the advance position of the 77th Division-Le Chene TonduApremont-Montrebeau-Bois de Baulny-Bois de Cierges-Bois de Emont-Bois de

Beuge-Nantillois-Bois de Brieulles.7 5

The 1st Corps order implementing this decision referred to its order

to the 35th Division on 30 September and said the line of resistance was to

be le Chene Tondu-Apremont-Esperance-Chaudron Ferme-Serieux Ferme-Cote 231.7 6

Lto Butler wrote in his journal of 5 Octobers "We...received orders tonight

to organize the line from which we originally jumped off & to be ready to

fall back to ito This order makes us all feel exceedingly low. Let us hope

we are relieved before our men have to drop back. We never yet have fallen

back0 " That night the 1st Engineers were brought up to Charpentry and Baulny

and began construction of a defensive line between Chaudron and Serieux

Fermes 7 7

75

FO 43, 1st A, 22 hr, 5 Oct.

76

FO 66, 1st C, 24 hr. 5 Oct; Cf FO 61, 1st C, 1 hr, 30 Septo

77

ADC Jnl Opns; Hist Sketch, p. 168; Memo, Capt Johnson to Col Fiske, 6

Oct (Records 14).

- 31 -
Aware that the American forces had been hurt, the German Third Army

indeed planned a large-scale counterattack on the 6th, determined to regain

the Exermont-Gesnes line, but at the last moment could not execute it "because of the unfavorable ammunition situation."7 8 All along the front, the

American forces were now at the approaches to the Kriemhilde Stellung. Sixteen German divisions had arrived or were on their way to stop the American

advance, and despite the temporary ammunition situation, the German commani

for a time had hopes that it could hold out in the trenches and strong

points there through the winter, protecting its vital communications, and

perhaps regain lost ground in a successful spring offensive0

Conforming to Corps orders for 6 October, the 1st Division held its

positions without trying to advance that day, and brought its 7th FA up to

La Neuville le Comte Ferme. Efforts to push patrols to the front and infiltrate from Arietal Ferme towards Hill 272 were promptly repulsed, but else-

.where small gains were made as the enemy counterattack failed to develop0

Lto Butler wrote, "We will not have to drop back. 2nd Brigade advanced

about 500 meters....The Divisions on our right and left are doing nothingo"

East of the Argonne and West of the Meuse

The divisional history was later to say that "There was never a more

trying period than October 6, 7, and 8, when the 1st Division waited for

First Army to renew the assault... uring which time the troops_ lay under

a ceaseless downpour of shell, gas and bullets...Every valley was drenched

78

Gp Arg War Diary, 6 Oct.

- 32 -
with gas." The Division Gas Officer reported 68 gas casualties, mostly

from mustard gas, with some phosgene, occurring throughout the division

sector on 6-7 October, as a result of the inability of troops to evacuate

contaminated ground. Another 24 mustard gas cases were reported for 7-8

October0 All these oases, like the 31 reported for 8-9 October, among

troops advancing over shelled areas and lying in shell holes, seem to indioate the effects of residual mustard rather than new attacks0

No German record has been found of any gassing on 6-7 October, but

on the 7th a German artillery order said that between 6s30-9;00 a.m. on 8

October, "the lOom and the 15om gun batteries will neutralize the annoying

hostile batteries with blue cross -- in case of lack of this ammunition --

with high explosive ammunition."8 0 There is no further mention of this

shelling in either German or 1st Division records, but 1st Division casualties for 7-8 October were variously reported as 4 killed, 94 wounded, 24

gassed, and 122 wounded, 36 gassed. 81

If the enemy fired no gas on 6 October, early that morning the French

and American batteries of the 1st Division reportedly fired the 3,000 rounds

of gas shell left by the 35th Division putting it on Lichtenauer Hill JHill

79

Hist Sketch, pp. 170-171.

80

Item 7, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg; also Item 28. Item 103, 8 Oct repeated the order to engage hostile batteries with blue cross.

81

Opns Rpt, n to n 7-8 Oct; FM G-3 1st Div to G-3 5th C, 8:30 aomo

8 Oct 0

- 33 -
272_], the ravine to its north, and around Sommeranoeo8 2 The artillery report

that day, however, shows but 300 rounds of gas scheduled for eight enemy targets "some time before 6sOO PM," as directed by the regimental oommanders.8 3

To the 1st Division, its troops exhausted and with thinning ranks, it

seemed that the fate of battle rested on the capture of the guns at Cornay,

across the Aire, and the capture of Hill 272. It was obvious that the enemy,

whose flanking fire had mauled the 16th Infantry since the 4th, must be

cleared from the north end of the Argonne if Corps and Army were to advance0

To this end, Army ordered the 82nd Division to move into the right sector of

the 28th Division, to the immediate left of 1st Division during the night of

6-7 October, with orders to assault the heights of Cornay along the line Chatel

Chehery-Hills 180-223-244, the strong points of the Aisne Switch in the

Argonne, and then turn south and link up with the 77th Division. All the

rest of the front was to remain in place while this maneuver was executed°84

82

Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by 1st FA Brig, opo cit.; 37th Div War Diary,

6 Oct (37th Div & Sub Units, WD&A).

83

Memo 00, 1st FA Brig to COs 6th & 7th FA, 6 Oct (Records 9). The

tracing showing the targets is rptd lost.

84

FO 44, 1st A, 18 hr, 6 Oct. FO 67, 1st C, 18 hr, 6 Oct, said the

82nd would relieve the 28th Div before midnight on 6 Oct on the line La

Forge-north to Fleville. See also Gp Arg War Diary, 7-8 Oct; Hist Sketch,

p. 168.

Coppack, CO 16th Inf, wrote in his diary on the 7th: "Only half a

regiment left....Our mission is to hold on till the balance of the Division

can come up. The 28th Division on our right has failed to come up to us0

They are being relieved by the 82nd Division."

- 34 -
While the 82nd Division worked its way north through storm and rain

up the edge of the Argonne on 7 October, the 1st Division fought off local

counterattacks and clung to its position without advancing. With the arrival

of the 82nd at Hill 180-Chatel Chehery late that morning, the flanking fire

from the west oeasede 85 Group Argonne confirmed the disasters "The occupation of the heights at Chatel Chas_7 limited our flank observation and

artillery effect in the Aire valley." More than that, the Argonne was now

effectively flanked, and without sufficient fresh troops to counterattack,

the German 3rd and 5th Armies agreed that evening to withdraw the defense

line to Humberg Croad Junction W of Cornayj-Cornay valley-Bavarian ridge

>CL of LanconJ on the night of 8-9 October. 86

The, fall of Schoene Aussicht hill 180_7 and the consequent flanking

threat to the German 37th Division was the vital preliminary to the battle

of 9 October which, as Group Argonne was to say later, was an attempt "to

penetrate both sides of the Aire towards Juvin and Landre, cut off the

Argonne front, and attack in rear of the Brunhild position to effect decisive

action on the Group tArgonne7." 87

At noon on the 7th, in a planned change of front, First Army transferred

the lot Division to 5th Corps and the 181st Brigade, 91st Division (relieved

in the line by the 32nd on 4 October), was attached to 1st Division, to enable

85

ADC Jnl Opns, 7-8 Oct, also rptd that "the six companies of the 77th

Division (i.e. the Lost Battalion) cut off in Apremont Forest for several days

are now relieved." 5th Army War Diary, 7 Oct, said the 2nd Ldw gave up Chatel

at 10s30 a.m.

86

Gp Arg War Diary, 8 Oat.

87

Rpt, Corps Hq to 6th Army, 10 Oct (Item 14, 5th A WD&A).

- 35 -
it to extend its right to the line Hill 269-Tuilerie Forms, and so assist the

32nd Division on the right by clearing Le Petit Bois, Hill 263, and the Bois

de Romagne. The plan to advance 5th Corps in the center the next day, while

let and 3rd Corps held their positions, had to be postponed, to allow the

82nd to consolidate its gains on the heights east of the Aisne and west of

the Aire 0

8 8

That night all Engineer work on the Chaudron Ferme defense line ceased

as the entire regiment was ordered to move up to Tronsal Forms and advance

to selieve the companies of the 127th Infantry (32nd Division) as well as the

26th Infantry patrol on Hill 269.89 The relief was completed before morning

of the 8th, but as the Engineers discovered, only several of the knobs on the

hill were occupied by friendly forces. There were "Germans all around up

there," and although they were finally cleared from the summit that day, they

continued to hold the slopes of the hill. To support the Engineers, the

181st Brigade (91st Division) was sent to hold the line Hill 255-Hill 269

(see Map No. 1).90

That day, 8 October, 5th Corps issued orders to renew the assault the

next morning. In the advance, the change of front was to be completed,

85

FO 46, 1st A, 12 hr, 7 Oct; FO 64, 5th C, 18 hr, 7 Oct; FO 49, 1st Div,

21 hr, 7 Oct; Hist Sketch, pp. 168-169.

FO 65, 1st C, 18 hr, 6 Oct, said it had info that the enemy was withdrawing to the Kriemhilde Stellung from the Aisne to the Meuse.

89

FM CO 26th Inf to CO 1st Bn 26th Inf, 2150, 7 Oct.

90

Ltr, CO 1st Bn let Eng, 14 Oct, Rpt on Opns; Ltr, Div Eng to CE 5th C,

9 Oct, Rpt of Eng tpns (Records 14). Memos 1084, 1086, G-3 1st Div, 8 Oct

(Records 3).

- 36 -
releasing the Aire valley to let Corps by extending let Division two kilometers easto To do this, the 1st Brigade was to attack between the sensi-,

tive line Fleville-Sommerance and Hill 272z, the 2nd Brigade attacking towards the northeast between Hill 272 and the line Hill 269--Tuilerie Fermeo91

The 1st Engineers would hold their position on Hill 269 and clear the Bois

de Moncyo The 361st Infantry (181st Brigade9 91st Division) was to hold the

gap between the 2nd Brigade and 1st Engineerso

The initial objective of the 1st Division was a line north of Hill

272, its second objective a line north of Cote de Maldah and the Bois de

Romagneo The reserve battalion of the 16th Infantry, nearly 1,000 strong,

which up to this time had been held intact near Charpentry and was the only

unused element in the divisions was placed under Lto Col. Hunt, commander

of the 18th Infantry, and assigned to take Hill 272, whose defenders had so

successfully stopped the advance of the division. This battalion would

pass through the 28th Infantry on its way to Hill 272, whereupon the line

would reform, with the 26th Infantry at Arietal Ferme and the 28th Infantry

at Sto Germain Ferme. 92

In preparation for the assault on Hill 272, the artillery was ordered

to keep the hill under shell, shrapnel, and non-persistent gas fire throughout 8 October, while a battery each of the 317th FA (155mm) and 4 51st FA

91

FO 51, lst A, 18 hr, 8 Oct; PF 66, 5th C, 22 hr, 8 Oct°

92

FO 49, let Dlv9 8 Oct; Opns Instr 72, let Brig, 8 Oct (Records 8)0

This maneuver was not unlike that executed by the 1st Div inthe race for

Sedan early in November, when the whole division, in center corps, raced

through the 42nd Div (capturing its comdr in its enthusiasm), only to be

stopped before the city by Liggett, in order to let the French have the

honor of taking Sedan0 See Hart, The Real War, pa 469>

- 37 -
(10Sm), brought up to the Ravine de Mayache for the attack, fired on the

Sommerance area and north of St Georges et Landres, Juvin, Marcq, and

Champigneulle.9 3

Company C, 1st Gas Regiment9 was ordered to Hill 240 on the night of

8 October, to fire thermite for 15 minutes preceding H hour on the woods

south and east of Hill 176 and into the trenches east of Hill 176o9 4

Instructions for the assault reported the German line 200 to 500

meters to its front, the enemy troops showing great vigilance and alertness, confirming information that the forces on that front had orders to

hold at any costo The depletion of 1st Division troops was indicated by

the order that regimental commanders were to utilize every man in their

headquarters companies and similar elements in order to strengthen their

fighting unitso 95

That nights the reserve battalion of the 16th Infantry took its

position at the north base of Montrefagne woodso Before it was a valley

with no vestige of cover, every foot of it swept by tiers of machine gun

pill boxes and hidden batteries of field guns and trench mortars, and

flanked east and west by patches of machine gun-infested woodso It was

expected that the advance of the troops on the right and left would clear

the woods and protect the battalion's flankso The 28th Infantry, on the

right of the battalion, was to pass through the 26th Infantry and attack

93

FHist Sketch .170, Rpt, 10 Oct, Employ of Heavy Arty of Groupement

C (Fr), Opn of 9 Oct (Records 14)o

94

FO 49; Hist Sketch, po 170o Hist of 1st Gas Regt, Pt. III, p. 17, says

60 rds thermite were fired with success on three MG nests on 7 Oct0 There is

no mention of missions on 4 Oct or this one on the 9th.

95

Opns Instru 72.

- 38 -
Hill 2630 Further to the right those units of the 26th Infantry in the

Bois de Money were also to advance to Hill 2635 The 18th Infantry on the

left was to attack Hill 176 and along the valley between that hill and Hill

2720 On the far left, the 16th Infantry would continue through Fleville

and advance with the rest of the line. 96 In order to secure density of

fire, the entire artillery available would assist, in succession, the attack battalion of the 16th Infantry, then the 3rd Brigade, and finally the

2nd Brigade 97

During the night of 8-9 October, "all gas on hand," approximately

3,000 rounds, was fired into the German positions, except for 100 rounds

which were put into the Bois de Gesnes Just before the attack.9 8 The

German gassing in return was not so much retaliatory as defensive0 A

Group Argonne order saids In view of the general situation the line Z f the

2nd Landwehr, from hill north of Wolf ravine (south of Marcq)-Huserberg (west

of Cornay)-Cornay-AireJmust be held no matter how many troops have to be insertedo...The artillery /of the 2nd Landwehr and 37th Infantry 7will heavily

gas the most important points occupied by the enemy, assembly points, etoo,

with the available yellow cross ammunitiono9 9

96

Hist Sketch, pp. 172-173.

97

See note on this technique in.Dupuy, Military Heritage of America (NY8

McGraw Hill, 1956), pp. 391-392.

98

1st FA Brig, Rate of Fire for D Day (Records 9); Firing schedule, 1st

FA Brig, 9 Oct0 Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by 1st FA Brig, Jan-Nov 1918 (Records

14), shows 366 rounds fired on 8 Oct, 2617 fired on 9 Oct.

37th Div Diary, 8 Oct (37th Div & Sub Units) rpt heavy fire mixed with

gas on Lichtenauer Hill Lfill 2727_as well as on forward lines and rear areas.

On the 9th, it rptd that the ravines in its sector were gassed during the night.

There is no report of casualties.

99

Gp Order, 12s30 a.m., 9 Oct (Item 113, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg)o

- 39 -
Major Coppaok, reporting on the experience of the 16th Infantry that

night, said in his diary under 9 October: "This place was one hell last

night, Big 6 inch HBoo's fell on our position at intervals all nighto

Gassed twice0 Masks saved uso" 10 0 The German 37th Division acknowledged

that its artillery had gassed the 1st Division ravines. The German 52nd

Division reported both the 1st Division gas attack and its own gas fires

"During the night (enemy artillery put downJ strong harassing fire mixed

with gas, especially in the Kleiner Wald Z-le Petit Bois_, on account of

which the 18th Inf Regt 741st Division 7suffered considerable losses0 ....

Our own artillery....gassed...the Morine woodo "1 0 1

The Division Gas Officer reported 134 mustard gas casualties for the

period 9-10 October and another 57 the next day. The casualties were among

troops in the woods above Hill 272 and reportedly resulted from their failure

to wear masks in low concentrations of the gas. He added that the division

medical gas officer believed many of the first group of casualties were

fatigue cases rather than gas caseso 1 02

The Argonne Forest is Reduced

At 8230 aomo on 9 October, in heavy fog and with the howitzers pounding

Hill 272, the assault battalion of the 16th Infantry crossed the valley to

100

SOI 8-9 Oct rptd only "Gas mixed with HoE. shells."

101

Noon rpts, 37th & 52nd Divs, 9 Oct (Item 111, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg).

Noon rpt, Gp Arg, 9 Oct (Item 32, WD&A Gp Arg), saids "Assembly areas of the

enemy were gassed upon several occasions."

No arty orders or firing rpts for the 2nd Ldw, 37th or 52nd have been

found to show the number and kinds of rounds firedo

102

Rpts on Gas Attack, 10, 11 Oct (GAF-lst Div Atks)o

- 40 -
the base of the hill, reportedly captured more than 50 machine guns on its

slope and took the hill on scheduleo 10 3 On the left, the remainder of the

16th Infantry and the 18th Infantry; "with cooks and mule drivers in the

line,' advanced against heavy machine gun and artillery fire and despite

great losses reached their first objective above Fleville.l04 On the right,

the 2nd Brigade Jumped off at 8s52 aomo and assaulted Hill 263, with the 1st

Engineers completing the capture of Hill 269, assisted by a company each of

the 361st (91st Division) and 28th Infantryo But that afternoon, only the

16th Infantry battalion was on its objective line, north of the Cote de

Maldah. The remainder of the 1st Brigade curved up to Join the lineo1 0 5

At 1s00 p.m. that day, von Kleist frantically signalled his division

oommandersl

The gravity of the situation demandsooothe expenditure of the last

effort by officers and men as well as the sharpest decisive action so that

drlcinline will not slacken and the morale sink. Otherwise t h e r e

w i 1 1 b e a a a t a s t r o p h e A There is no time now for

fatigue and weakness....The artillery, even though it only has gas ammunitioh, must be so active that it takes the burden off the infantry before

the enemy assaults....Bring all available rifles in rear into actiono 10

103

Hist Sketch9 po 173; Gp Arg War Diary, 9 Oct, said Lichtenauer Hill

tgill 2727fell at 2 pom. when enveloped from the easto FM 2739 G-3 1st C

to G-3 1st A, 1155 hr, 10 Oct, said Hills 272 and 263 were finally captured

as of 9.45 aomo on 10 Octo

104

Coppack Diary, 10 Oct0

105

Hist Sketch, ppo 174-175o~ At mid-afternoon, said Lt. Butler on the

9th, the line was Fleville-So of Cote de Maldah-Cote 263-Cote 269, and the

181st Brig had been put between Hills 255 and 269 to close the gap between

the 1st and 32nd Divisions.

Ltr, CO 1st Bn 1st Eng to CO 1st Eng, Rpt on Opns...(Records 14), said

the Eng reverted to their normal status at dark on 11 Oct, when they were

relieved on Hill 269 by VOCO 2nd Brig.

106

GHQ Gp Arg to Comdrs 2nd Ldw, 45th Res, 41st, 37th, 52nd Divs (Item

115, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg)o

- 41 -
Neither side yielded, but the enemy position was no longer tenable.

The position of the let Division at the end of the day ran from a point half

a kilometer north of Fleville, along the top of the Cote de Maldah, the north

edge of Le Petit Bois, through the Bois de Romagne, to the line Hill 269-

Tuilerie Fermeo That night a regiment of the 82nd Division took over the

left sector above Fleville, and the light guns of the ist Division came up

to the line Fleville-Hill 272.107

The Operations Report admitted that it had been the "bitterest day of

fighting yet," and even an approximate estimate of the casualties was impossible, although they were reported to be above normal, partly as a result

of the intense barrage, counter-battery, destructive, and harassing fire

throughout the sector0 Casualties for the period noon to noon, 9-10 October,

were later estimated at more than 160 killed or missing and 19 officers and

954 men woundedo10 8 There was no mention of gas or gas casualties other than

in the Division Gas Officer's reports, previously cited0

What the 1st Division -- and First American Army -- lacked in artillery

and machine guns, by comparison with the enemy forces on that front, it made

up in superior numbers of troops, and it had succeeded in "smashing the front

by incessant blows without regard to....losses....Each day at least one

JGermanj division Jwasj withdrawn as no longer effective for defensive

1T07

Hist Sketch, ppo 174-175.

108

Opns Rpts, 8-10 Oct; Memo, G-1 1st Div to G-1 5th C, which gave the

9-10 data, is dated 9 Oct (Records 13). Total oasus to date were said to be

1,003 killed, 5,996 woundedo

- 42 -
actions" That day, 9 October, as Group Argonne later saids

The turning point came with the overruning of Cornay, the capture of

Lichtenauerhohe FHill 272 7 and the Marienhohe (Hill 269] .....Due to the

influence of his failure Lto effect decisive action on Group Argonne 7 the

enemy ceased his infantry attack in the evening (of the 9th7, did not

once feel forward and so made it possible for us to disengage...and withdraw on the whole Group front to the Brunhild-Kriemhild position° 110

That night the 2nd Landwehr and 37th Infantry withdrew to the forward

edge of the Brunhilde position on the north edge of the Airs valley, the

52nd Division, with the 41st inserted on its left, to the BrunhildeKriemhilde position, as Group Argonne moved its headquarters back from

Buzancy to Beaumonte 1 1 1

Since the 5th Army, contrary to the 3rd Army, deems it expedient to

withdraw the Argonne front rapidly in rear of the Aire...troops of the 3rd

Army will withdraw to in rear of the Aire the night of the 9/10, the rearguards the night of the 10/11 JandJ Group Argonne will retire in conformity

therewitho The main line of resistance for the night of the 10/n11 is 7

HUtten farm r-Ferme des Log s7-St Juvin-Sommerance-Sommerberg-Kleiner WaldMoncy wood-Robinette farm / north of Gesnes7. 1 12

During the night of the 9th, "the Kriemhild position Bois des Logessouth limit of Juvin-hill south of St Georges-Cote de Chatillon-Romagne was

109

3rd Army War Diary, 5 Oct.

110

Rpt, Item 14, Corps Hq to 5th A, 10 Oct (5th A WD Annexes). See also

draft of this Rpt, 10 Oct, Item 178.

111

Gp 0, 11s45 p.m., 9 Oct; Gp 0, 7s30 p.m., 10 Oct (Items 130, 35, Annexes

to WD, Gp Arg).

112

Army Order extracted in 5th A War Diary, 9 Oct. Cf. Army Order, 11:45

p.m., 9 Oct (Item 108, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg) ordering withdrawal of Gp Aisne

and Gp Argo

- 43 -
occupied without interference from the enemy. " 1 3 The Brunhilde position in

the zone of Group Argonne had previously been designated as the Kriemhilde

position, with Group Argonne responsible for its reinforcement, and the

Freya position was to be commenced without delay on the line Authe-BuzancyBayonville T 4

With considerable elation, First Army reported late on 9 October that

the enemy was retreating before the British on a fifty-kilometer front at

Cambral, just as it was retreating in the Argonne Forest. The Army would

continue the attack the next day on the entire front from the Aisne to

Beaumonto "No objectives are assigned. All troops will take advantage of

the enemy's retreat...." On the night of the 10th, 1st Corps announced,

"The Foret d'Argonne has been reduced," and Army said the hostile third

position in the vicinity of Romagne and Cunel had been pierced and its

troops were north of the line Sommerance-Mareq. First Army would continue

with all speed its advance towards Briquenay-Buzanoy-Clery le Petit. 11 5 The

British had the enemy in seeming full retreat, and First Army must match them.

But the end of the war wasn't that near.

On 10 October, badly used up, the Division intended to remain in place,

from Just west of Sommerance to the crossroads in the Bois de Romagneo But

Corps ordered it to continue its advance by expliotation. Patrols prodded

the front along the line Sommeranoe-Tuilerie Ferme and held points of vantage

113

Op Arg War Diary, 10 Oct°

114

Army Memo, 6 Oct (Item 1, 5th Army WD Annexes).

115

FO 53p 1st A, 21 hr, 9 Oct; FO0 71, 1st C, 20 hr, 10 Oct; FO 56, 1st A,

18 hr, 10 Oct0

- 44 -
until the forward battalions came up. One hundred rounds of gas were fired

during the expliotation by the 7th FA.1 1 6 An advance of between one and two

kilometers was made in this fashion, and by nightfall the line ran from just

north of Sommerance to the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne.1 17

How badly used up the division was may be seen in the messages of the

26th Infantry that day. The 1st Battalion reported 192 men and 23 machine

gunners left on the morning of the 10th. The 2nd Battalion had 200 riflelen,

with 70 men remaining in its machine gun company. They were without water or

rationso The 3rd Battalion, in the line, was down to 245 men and 55 machine

gunners, with only 7 officers. All its companies had become badly mixed up

and disorganized by the enemy fire the day before. 1 1 8 That evening the 3rd

Battalion reached the foot of the hills south of the Bois de Romagne and

found them "powerfully held with machine guns." By the morning of the 11th,

its commander thought his men were approaching exhaustions "Most of the men

have had nothing to eat in 48 hours and no water. Some of my officers and

many of my men are sick and cannot go much farther. I do not want to complain

but I would like the CO to know the situation we are in. Will move forward as

soon as possibleo"(FU Frasier to CO 26th Inf, 6s35 p.m., 10 Oct; FM Frasier,

8s15 a.m., 11 Oct>) Nevertheless, that forenoon it was the 3rd Battalion that

116

FO 67, 5th C, 2300 hr, 9 Oct; Rpt, Spec Shells Fired by 1st FA Brig.

117

Memos, Items 1092-93, G-3 1st Div, 9 Oct (Records 3); FO 50, 1st Div,

2330 hr, 9 Sep; Hist Sketch, p. 175.

At 11s30 p.m., the front line was rptd from north of Sommerance-Ravine

de Gras Faux-northern part of Bois de Romagne-west edge of Bois de Romagne

(FM 1st Div to G-3 5th C, 10 Oct).

118

FM Legge CO 1st Bn to CO 26th Inf, 8s45 a.m., 10 Oct; FM Youell CO 2nd

Bn, 6s30 a.m., FM Frasier CO 3rd Bn, 6s53 a.m.

- 45 -
continued as assault battalion, when the 362nd Infantry (91st Division),

itself down to 200 men and no machine guns, came up behind it to relieve

the 2nd Battalion0

1 1 9

The only message in that period indicating even momentary panic was

on the afternoon of the 9th, when the 26th Infantry commander admitted some

stragglings "Lt. Hyde reports Bosche coming in on his left. He seems very

much excited on account of this. Several of our men have straggled to the

rear. Not enough of officers and NCO's to watch them (FM CO 26th Inf to CO

2nd Bn 26th Inf, 2s50 pom., 9 Oct). Straggling in the German ranks was a

far more pressing problem at the time, as their division reports indicate0

The order to retire on the night of 9 October started a rearward movement

clearly depicted in a 52nd Division order of 11 Oct.s "Stragglers will be

assembled in Bayonville by regiment and forwarded to their regiments in

detachments of 50 men each."1 2 0

The order to continue the advance by exploitation was repeated for 11

October, the division pushing out patrols, supported by artillery, to the

second line of exploitation at Landres et St. Georges. Lt Butler wrote in

his Journal that nights "With less than 2,500 effectives we were unable to

gain much ground0 It was wicked to order our men to attack again this

morning ....Since we entered this sector ...we have lost between nine and ten

thousand men"' During those two days of expliotation, enemy artillery

119

FM CO 26th Inf to CG 2nd Brig, 10 a.m., 11 Oct; FM Ridgely 00 26th Inf

to CO 26th Inf, 11 acm., 11 Oct.

Lt Butler (ADC, Jno Opns, 11 Oct) was to report that one company of the

18th Inf came out of the line on the 11th with only 4 men.

120

Item 117, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg.

- 46 -
activity was "confined principally to the advanced battalions with gas and

HE," and it was probably this as much as actual encounter with the enemy

that resulted in 210 men killed, 134 wounded, and 57 gassedo1 21

In the absence of German artillery records, the only indication that

enemy artillery fired gas on both 11 and 12 October is a series of messages

in the War Diaries of the 37th and 45th Reserve Divisions and in a combat

report of the 52nd Division that a number of gas rounds fell short both lays

and presumably gassed their own troops.

This morning our artillery often fired too short. The men had to put

on their gas masks early today on account of similar short firing (FM CP to

150th Regt, 9s40 aomo, 11 Oct, Item 189 b. 2, Hq 150th Inf Regt).

The 211th Int 45th Res 7has retired....The retirement is said to have

been cause by -our own artillery and gas, which, however, came from the

enemy (FM 2nd Bn 150th to 150th Regt, 11s00 aom., 11 Oct, Item 189 bo 6).

Our artillery fired too short, at times delivered gas shells in rear

of our line (Combat Rpt, 1st Bn 170th Regt, 11 Oct -52nd Div & Sub Units 7)o

Our artillery fired gas and HE considerably too short (2nd Bn 211th Inf

Diary, 8:50 atm., 11 Oct 5-45th Res WD&A7D.

Our artillery placed annihilation fire on hostile positions from 5 aomo ;

in doing so several rounds, including gas shells, fell on and in rear of our

line (1st Bn 151st Regt Diary, 12 Oct)o

At 500 aomo our artillery shelled the hostile line with gas. The gas

drifted towards our troops0 Gas masks had to be put on (2nd Bn, 151st Regt

Diary, 12 Oct).

Just below Landres et Sto Georges and St. Georges, at the approach to

the Kriemhilde Stellung, patrols met such determined resistance that it was

121

Opns Rpt, 10-11 Oct, also estimated total killed and missing during the

opn as 1,813, total wounded 7,243, for a grand total of 9,056. Memo, G-1 to

G-1 5th C, 11 Oct, estimated 210 killed, 4 officers and 244 men wounded between n-n 10-11 Octo Total casualties to date were estimated at 1,213 killed,

6,243 wounded, or 7,456 men (let Div Box 16, 12o3 Casu Rpts).

- 47 -
- V

pn 47S E

'I .c I . VII

2 i

C 4 o l a

'V -

(LJ C

47a

OZ~~~~ O co~*-
clear that a special preparation would be necessary before an infantry assault

could be made against this position (see ?Map Noo 8). 122 At the time, that

resistance was probably relative, for the German command in the Kriemhilde

was much concerned about the continued effectiveness of its divisions, reduced "in part by bloody losses and sickness, in part by the morale of the

troops that, in view of the political situation, is continually decreasing

slightly." The German Fifth Army had only two effective divisions left on

11 October9 the newly arrived 1st Landwehr and the 123rd Saxon. The next day,

however, "a number of new divisions -Cwere 7 placed at the disposal of

Armyo" 123

On the night of 11 Octobers First Army knew there was to be no further

pursuit of the enemy and ordered its division to "hold the ground gained and

prepare for further attack." The next night Army ruefully reported:

The enemy is resisting our advance between the Meuse and the Aisne by

the skillful use of machine guns and artillery. The Allied armies to our

left are continuing their advance and the enemy is giving way before them....

First Armyo..will attack on 14 October at H hour....Corps and division commanders will utilize to the fullest extent possible the advantages of lethal

gas in preparing for and assisting the infantry attack, and in causing casualties in the rear areas and along lines of communication.l24

122

FO 519 1st Div, 2230 hr. 10 Oct; FO 33, 26th Inf, 11 Oct, (Records 10).

123

5th Army War Diary, 11, 12 Oct. Rpt on battle eff of Gp Arg Divisions,

Item 79 A Uct said the 37th, 41st, 45th and 52nd Divisions were all thoroughly

exhausted0 A detailed survey o-f -P Arg strengt appears in postscript to Evening Rpt, 11 Oct, Item 34, WD&A, Gp Arg.

124

FO 58, 1st A, 21 hr, 11 Oct; FO 59, 1st A, 11 hr, 12 Oct, esp. par. o48

- 48 -
On the night of 11-12 October, the exhausted and depleted 1st Division

was relieved by the 42nd Division.125 It came out, as its historical accounts

suggested without irony, "with an excellent nucleus as a fighting unit." The

troops assembled near Cheppy that night, went on to Les Islettes on the 13th,

and continued their march to Vavincourt, 75 kilometers south, arriving there

on 16 October. There it received more than 8,000 replacements to fill its

ranks again and on 31 October the division was pronounced ready for combat

again°

The 1st Division was placed in reserve at Gesnes-Cierges and on 6

November relieved the 80th Division on the Stonne-Beaumont road, from whence

it took part shortly after in the wild race for Sedan.1 2 6

125

FO 52, 1st Div, 11 Oct. In his diary for 11 & 19 Oct, Maj Coppack

said his 16th Inf went in with 68 officers, 3,650 men, and came out with 32

officers, 1,799 men, a loss of 36 officers, 1,851 men. A later reckoning

revised this loss to 35 officers, 1,540 men, as follows, 7 officers and 129

men killed, 23 officers and 812 men wounded, 4 officers and 298 men gassed, 1

officer and 301 men missing.

Memo, 2nd Brig to G-3 1st Div, 4 p.m., 10 Oct (Records 13), rptd 32

officers, 713 men left in the 26th Inf, 28 officers, 665 men left in the 28th

info

126

Hist Sketch, ppo 176, 183, 189.

- 49-
ANALYSIS

Shook Division

It seems evident, considering the nature and condition of its opposition, and the degree of assistance that the division required, that the

Meuse-Argonne exploit of the 1st Division was not in the same class with

its earlier successes. Liddell Hart has said of the operations

A renewed general attack on October 4 made little progress, except

on the left, and revealed once more the folly of trying to overthrow

machine-guns by sheer weight of human bodies without adequate fire support

or surprise0 But the value of training was also shown by the regular 1st

Division in Liggett's Corps which drove in a deep if narrow wedge on the

east bank of the Aire. This enabled Liggett, on October 7, to try a

manoeuvre both original and daring; bringing the 82nd Division up in the

wake of the 1st, he swung it against the enemy's flank west of the Aire and

then northward0 If the execution fell below the conception -- only a tithe

of the division came into action -- so that the chance of cutting off the

enemy troops in the Argonne was lost, the threat at least persuaded the

enemy to retire from the forest while there was time, and by Octobyr 10 the

American line had passed and was clear of this hampering obstacle. 1 27

This account emphasizes rightly the contribution of the 1st Division

in reaching Fleville on the first day of the attack and staying there. Perhaps only the 1st Division, with its vaunted pride, could have remained so

relatively immobile for so long a while, enduring such casualties. The gas

casualties of more than 1,400, with the 5,225 killed and wounded, which it

took in three days of advancing and five of holding or exploiting, were comparable to the 1,350 gas casualties and 5,100 killed and wounded suffered by

the 35th Division in a similar advance in the sectoro

The comparison with the 35th Division is inevitable, because the histories

of the 1st Division, recounting this operation in the Meuse-Argonne, seem

127

Liddell Hart9 The Real War, 1914-1918, p. 466.

- 50 -
almost to have been written as a deliberate counterpart to the record of the

35th thereo 12 8 The number of coincidences in the experience of the two divlj

sions, and the emphasis given those aspects of preparation and performance

that distinguish well trained from poorly trained troops, seem too great to

be accidental.

With half the guns that had been available to the 35th Division for

its preparation, the let Division began its assault with no other preparation

than a barrages But field pieces accompanied each assault battalion with

some psychological, if not actual, benefit, and the remaining artillery advanced beginning three hours after H hour and remained in close support of

the infantry throughout the operation.

Advancing in fog and rain against the same formidable enemy positions

attempted by the 35th, the slet Division maintained tight control over all

its units. Forward elements were halted and reorganized after penetrating

woods, before advancing again. Despite decimating casualties, companies and

battalions held the ground they had taken. Corps, consequently, was willing

to send reinforcements to the division, as it would not to the 35th.1 2 9

Although the 1st Division took more HE and gas casualties than the

35th Division, as the self-styled "shock division" of the AEF, the "Wheelhorse" of the Corps, it could not retreat. It is interesting to note that,

128

Cf. Shipley Thomas, The History of the A.E.F., pp. 296-297. (Captain

Shigley Thomas was RIO, 26th Infantry.)

129

A number of items in 1st Div orders and memos for this opn are either

not found in previous divisional orders or appear to receive more detailed

treatment, seemingly as a result of the 35th Div experience. See for example

the warning against mixing of units (FO 47, 2 Oct, par. 2), the order to reform and report at each objective, halting for two hours at the objective for

that purpose (FO 48. 5 Oct, par. 3,), the order to reorganize battalions after

engaging the enemy temo G-3, item 1073, 5 Oct), and the special instructions

to RIOs (Anex to SOI, 1-2 Oct).

- 51 -
unlike the 35th Division, the 1st Division in its history freely acknowledged

(narrative, ppo 18, 25) and perhaps .even exaggerated (pp. 29, 33) the amount

and the effects of the gas fired into its sector.

HE and Gas Casualties

If fairly complete gas shell data are possible for the gas casualties

in the 1st Division between 1-5 October, similar data for its machine gun

and artillery casualties are at best fragmentary. No estimate is possible

for the fire of the thickly-sown German machine guns, and only two of the

four 5th Guard Division artillery orders in the period show the number of

HE rounds to be fired on specific days. The artillery order prepared on

the evening of 30 September gives only targets and hours for night-long

harassing and annihilating fire waves. That on the evening of 1 October

is the same, with the note that "The sub-group commanders will determine

the expenditure of ammunition according to the supplies of their batteries."

The first artillery order giving detailed HE data is that issued at

7?30 pomo, 2 October, which ordereds

150 rds, harassing fire, Hoffnung valley, night of 2-3 Oct.

150 rds, harassing fire, Ernst Ravine, night of 2-3 Oct.

No rds given, harassing fire, on 4 targets, night of 2-3 Oct.

20 rds, each battery, on Esperance ravine, at 5s20 a.m.

30 rds, each battery, on the whole front, at 5s30 a.m.

50 rds, long range fire, Hoffnung valley, no time given.

50 rds total, long range fire, on 4 targets in Charpentry area.

Thus0 something over a thousand HE shells of large and small caliber were fired

on the night of 2-3 October.

130

Arty 0 17, 7s30 p.mo, 2 Oct. Available to the 5th Gd in its three close

range groups were a total of 12 batteries; in its long-frang group, 4 batteries

(5th Gd Div 0, 3s30 pom., 1 Oct, Item 94).

- 52 -
For the night of 3-4 October, the fire mission wass

300 rds, harassing fire, on 10 targets during the night.

20 rds, each battery, annihilation fire, on Esperance draw, at 5s30 a.mo

30 rds, each battery, annihilation fire, on the whole front, at 6,00 a.mo

90 rds, long range fire, on 6 targets during the night.1 31

Again, approximately a thousand rounds of large and small caliber HE were fired

during that nights

In the absence of other data in these relatively complete records of

5th Guard artillery, it may be assumed that a minimum of between 4-5000 rounds

of HE were fired into the 1st Division ravines during the four nights while

the troops there waited for the order to attack. (There are no records available for the German 52nd Division artillery, which may or may not have had

fire missions for the right flank of 1st Division.) On the same four nights,

approximately 3,470 gas shells, divided almost evenly between mustard gas

and nonpersistent agents, fell in the same area.

While machine gun and rifle casualties among the patrols during this

period cannot be distinguished, their numbers were probably small by comparison with the casualties caused by the German artillery. The reports of the

two hospital triages for the early period shows

1st Division Other Divisions

Wounded Gassed Wounded Gassed

FH3, 6am-6am 2-3 Oct 84 561 220 164

FH3, 6am-6am 3-4 Oct 27 66 79 9

FH2, 10am-5pm 4 Oct (800) 82 (103) 7

FH3, 6am-6am 4-5 Oct (318) 94 (85) 39

(1118) (188)132

131

Arty 0 18, 8s30 p.m., 3 Oct.

132

A large proportion of the figures in parentheses unquestionably represent casualties in the assault on 4 October. NOTEs The triage opened on 1

Oct and began recording cases on 2 Oct. Gas casus on 4-5 Oct probably represent for the most part delayed oases.

- 53-
In this tabulation, the gas casualties in the 1st Division and among

the 35th Division artillerymen between 30 September and 4 October total

1,022, produced by approximately 3,470 gas shellso The wounded prior to

the hour of attack total 410 (incomplete Operation Reports show only 28

killed, 225 wounded between 30 September-3 October), as the result of approximately 4,000 HE shells. Some proportion of the 1,306 total wounded on

4-5 October doubtless should be considered, but it would appear that it required but three gas shells to produce a gas casualty, as opposed to eight

to ten HE shells to produce a wound casualty.

The total casualties reported for the 1st Division in the MeuseArgonne campaign from 1-12 October range between 8,554 and 9,387.133 Only

the total of 8,554 is broken down to distinguish gas casualties, as follows$

35 officers and 816 men killed, 103 officers and 4,271 men wounded, 29 officers and 1,585 men gassed, 10 officers and 1,705 men captured or missing.

133

Memo, 21 Dec 18, Brief His of Opns of 1st Div (lst Div Box 11, 11o4;

also Records 13) has a total of 177 officers, 8,377 men, or 8,554. This

total is attributed to the Div Stat Sec in the Hist of the Med Dept, 1st

Divooo1917-18, forwarded by ltr, Div Surg to Hist Br, War Plans Div, GS, 14

Jan 20 (Med Dept-lst Div, Box 3398 fol. 1)

Opns Rpt, 10-11 Oct, estimates casualties of 1,613 killed,7,243 wounded,

or 8,856o Hist Sketch, po 178, estimates 49 officers and 1,480 men killed,

175 officers and 6,951 men wounded, 280 men captured or missing, for a total

of 8,935° G-3 Memos, 17 Oct & 24 Nov, same subs Rpt on Opns of 1st Div...

Oct 1-12 incl (Records 13J 1st Div Box 48, 33.6/10), show total casus of

9,387 officers and men. This is the figure used by Shipley Thomas, p. 317,

who says it represents "the heaviest casualties suffered by any American division in the Meuse-Argonne offensive."

Frederick Palmer, Our Greatest Battle (NYs Dodd, Mead, 1919) pp. 307-

08, accepts 8,554 casus, sayings "Three-fifths of its infantry was out of

action from death and wounds; theremainder had been fully 'expended' in exhaustion and sickness. Surely no division in all our history had evero..

suffered more losses in a single action."

-54-
A later compilation, reportedly based on records in the Surgeon

General's Office, indicates a still smaller total of 7,726 casualties, but

with a surprising number of gas oasess 1,252 killed, 4,576 wounded, and

1,898 gassedo 13

Neither the gas casualty total of 1,898 nor that of 1,614 (29 f 1,585)

is borne out by other records of the 1st Division. In the eleven gas attack

reports by Captain Sielaff, DGO, the gas casualties total 1,382. His monthly

Gas Casualty Report, however, showed 32 officers and 1,394 men gassed, for a

total of 1,426 of which 182 or 15% were later returned to duty.1 3 5 A comparison of these two totals is as followss

Date Gas Atk Rpts Gas Casu Rpt

Casus Rtn to Drty

1 October 392 409 28

2 17 404 29

3 409 50 6

4 50 38 13

5 38 162 17

6 162 78 13

7 68 24 11

8 24 31 12

9 31 134 10

10 134 57 21

11 57 36 15

12 nort 13 7

1382 nTM4 TId

134

Battle Losses, 14 Dec 21 (lst Div Box 15, 12.3). By comparison the

American Battle Monuments Commission study, let Division Summary of Operations (1944)9 po 95, has a total of 7,803 casualties 1,296 killed, 472

dfed-of wounds, 6,035 wounded (and gassed).

135

Gas Casu Rpt, 31 Oct, with notes "Not possible to get the casus by

separate units" (GAF-lst Div Miso)o This is also the total reported in ltr,

DGO (Capt A. H, Beags) to C C8S, 27 Jaa 19, subs Rpt on Circ Ltr 89 (GAFslet Div Misc)0

- 55 -
Of the totals of 1,382, 1,426, 1,614 and 1,898 gas casualties, only the first

two figures ares in a sense, documented.

The search for data on the number of enemy gas rounds required to produce these casualties has not been entirely satisfactory. The only indication of the total number of gas shells fired by the enemy during the period

1-12 October is that offered by the Division Gas Officers

Approximately 700 gas shells were fired on our troops on the night of

October lst=2ndo During the succeeding days gas shells were fired into the

valley of the Aire and the ravines East of Charpentry and in front of Exermont, the woods /of Montrebeau, those above Hill 212, and Bois de la

Morine 7, Le Petit Bois and battery positions....I estimate that the enemy fired 1000 gas shells the first night and approximately 500 on each of the

following days, 77mm,. shells being used with mustard and blue cross, 105mmo

shells with blue cross and 150mm. on the back area near the Division PoCo

and on the road from Cheppy to Varennes; these latter shells.contained

yellow cross o..

The oases of phosgene gassing were very few and might have been attributed to the men passing through the areas which had been shelled by our

own gyug previously, as I found no evidence of the enemy employing phosgene.

To be noted in Captain Bielaff's contradiction in the number of rounds

fired the first night (700 vs. 1000), his difference with German artillery

records concerning the number of gas shells fired onthe night of 1-2

October (i.e., 30 September-l October), and his disagreement with German

artillery reports on the amount of phosgene shell fired into the 1st

Division sector (narrative, pp. 9-14, 16).

If it is assumed that the estimate of 6,000 rounds is approximately

correct, then the German artillery claimed a gas casualty for every four

136

Memo DGO 1st Div for C C1S, 18 Oct, subs Rpt of gas attacks from

October 2nd.to 11th, 1918 (GAF-lst Div Atks). In copying this memo by

Sielaff in his postwar letter to C CWS, 27 Jan 19, subs Rpt on Ciro ltr 89

(GAF7lst Div Misa), Capt Bengs summarized the shellings Approximately 6000

gas shells were fired by the enemy during this entire operation."

- 56 -
gas rounds firedO

In an effort to explain the large number of gas casualties suffered by

the division, the medical historian of the division was later to say that the

gas oasualties, for the most part,

were incurred in the narrow ravines in the vicinity of Charpentry; the

enemy knowing these positions well and what perfect gas traps they made, frequently filled these ravines with gas, especially during the night hours, and,

as the gas shells were also accompanied with high explosive shells, or the gas

was in the high explosive shells, it was impossible to recognize the fact that

gas shells were being used until the odor of the gas was actually detectedo137

In extenuation, the Division Gas Officer saids "Quite a number of Junior officers....o ame] to the division without any gas training....J and7 mostly

through ignorance of the subject, Jdid] not appreciate the full danger of

gas, especially low concentrations." 138

The fact of 868 mustard gas casualties over a period of three days"

was brought to the attention of the Army Inspector General, and there was

talk of an investigation of the gas discipline and gas defense procedure of

the let Division0 As the Army Gas Officer said, these gas casualties

are a striking example of what can be expected in open warfare unless

the gas discipline is enforced even more rigidly than heretofore. It is believed that an informal inquiry by your department may be of assistance in

directing attention of officers to the importance of taking the proper protective measureso

Mustard gas is the most dangerous gas used to-day, as it causes more

casualties than any others Its odor is fairly difficult to detect, and men

have a tendency to take chances with mustard gas, going without masks, negleoting (frequently unavoidably) to take proper prophylactic measures by the

137

Ltr, Col W. Mo Phelps, Medical History of the 1st Div, po 46 (Med

Dept- 1st Div-Box 3398, fol.l1)

138

Ltr, DUO to C CWS, 31 Oat, subs Monthly Rpt-Oot 1918 (Records 13)o

- 57 -
use of sag paste, bathing the hands and body, etco Its effects are cumulative

so that a man can remain in a light congentration for some time before becoming a casualty, often a serious one. 3 9

No more has been found concerning this investigation.

1st Division Gas Operations and German Gas Casualties

First Division artillery, which fired over 7,700 gas shells during 4, 6,

8, 9 and 10 October for its own troop operations continued gassing enemy

positions for the 42nd Division, which was brought up on 11 October to crac'e

the forward positions of the Kriemhilde Stellung. In its operations through

31 October, the 1st FA Brigade fired an additional 8,097 gas rounds, for a

grand total of 16,228. 140 note in its report on the firing of special

shell said. "#5, 6, 9, 14 employed effectively. Prisoners continually complained of gas casualties in great numbers. Concentrations on ravines,

villages, quarries9 woods, etog by quick surprise fires." A post-war letter

on the offensive use of gas by the 1st FA Brigade saids

Very satisfactory results were obtained from the extensive use of gaso

fIt fired a total of 66,706 gas shells during the war.J_ Ix fact its value

was considered so great that ammunition of this nature was in continual demand and was never supplied in the quantities desired. This was especially

true before the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Special shells #4 and f5 were the

most extensively employed, #3, #20, #6, and #8 followed in the order enumerated0

139

Memo, COO 1st A for Insp Gen, 21 Oot (let A-COO-Box 340, let Div)o

140

Rpt, Speo Shell Fired by lit FA Brig, Jan-Nov 1918 (Records 14), shows

4483 gas rounds fired by 6th and 7th FA, 3220 by the 219th-FaLntrw 4-10 Oct,

and a combined total of 11,329 smoke rounds in that same period.

This rpt seems denied by memo 6th FA j o CotArty ARF , 24 Jan 19, which

rptd firing only 1200 rds, all on 11-12 Oct, and by similar memo 7th FA, 23

Jan , reporting only 1000 rds on the morning of 3-4 Oot against machine gun

positions behind the Qerman trenches.

In these same memos the 6th FA rptd no record of gas atks against it during the opun the 7th FA rptd 6 men gassed due to 200 gas shells on 1 Oct. 3

casus on 3-4 Oat due to 200 phosgene shells, and no casus in atks of 5-6 Oct

and 8-10 Oct with mustard, phosgene, and sneezing gaso Memos in GAF-lst Div

Misc.

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These proportions were governed by the supply, not by the needs of the occasion0 Numbers 4 and 5 were considered as being better than nothing and hence

employed in considerable quantities because of the fact that no other varieties were obtainable.

The use of gas by the Artillery is considered an unquestionable value,

especially when defensive missions are assigned. For rapid neutralization of

enemy batteries, for harassing fire, for use against the enemy in probable

assembly points during periods when attack bv the enemy is imminent, extensive employment of gas concentrations constitutes a means of injuring the

enemy which should never be disregarded. The value of smoke screens during

offensive operations is too generally recognized to warrant comment here.

The use of smoke was generally limited by the supply, as in the case of gas.

Of interest is a word of advice on good relations by the 6th FA liaison

officers "When the infantry reports that the enemy is sending over 500 shells

of gas let them know that we are sending back a thousand. That is what he

likes to know."1 4 2 But this concern for gas retaliation did not extend to the

proper employment by the division of its company of gas troops. According to

the History of the First Gas Regiment, Company C fired a single mission of

60 thermite bombs in its 12 days with the 1st Division. Its casualties, said

the division history in extenuation, "soon became disabling for so small a

unit" (see narrative, ppo 19, 25, 37-38). A postwar note by a division Chief

of Staff who had not been there was not so kinds "One gas company was assigned, but so far as known was of no benefit." l4 3Z

The Chief Gas Officer, 5th Corps, was to say of the 1st Division's attitude towards its gas troopss

141

Ltr 00 1st FA Brig to DGO 1st Div, 12 Feb 19, subs Offensive Use of

Gas by 1st FA Brig (Records 14).

142

LO Instructions, Some Helpful Hints, no date, ca May 1918 (Records 14).

143

Hist Sketch, p. 160, Fuqua CofS 1st Div, Rpt on Opns of 1st Divo..Oct

1-12, 24 Nov 18 (let Div Box 48, 33.6/10).

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A general lack of information existed concerning the use of special

gas troops in connection with an infantry advance, and this the Insnecting

Officer sought to remedy in part by a talk to the officers of the 16th Infantry, arrangement for same talk to the officers of the 28th Infantry the

following day, and for a demonstration before both regiments of the use of

Stokes mortar with high explosive, thermite and smoke screen, to take place

October 30th.1 4 4

The instructions for this demonstration would seem to imply that the use of

gas by the 1st Gas Regiment had been ruled out of consideration by late

October 1918s

Your attention is invited to the plan of introducing to troops,

where practicable, the use of Thermite, smoke screens and high explosive

bombs, as used by the special Gas and Flame troops, prior to the actual

attack in which these weapons are employed for the purpose of masking an

advance or eliminating machine gun nests or strong-points....The object

sought is familiarization of the Infantry with the activity of the special

troops so that they will not hesitate, as they heretofore have on several

occasions, to take full advantage of the very effective preparation afforded

by elements of the Gas Regiment which may be assigned to their organization0

Although more than seven thousand gas shells fell on enemy positions

during the period under discussion, even the most complete collection of

German records (i.e., that of the 5th Guard Division) offers only questionable or incomplete data concerning their effectiveness. An examination of

the records of both the 5th Guard and 52nd Divisions does not reveal more

than a total of 40 or 50 admitted gas casualties as a result of the 7,700

gas shells fired by the let FA Brigade. These questionable figures are

like the total casualties reported by the 5th Guard Division, which seem,

by comparison with lit Division losses, disproportionately meager, even allowing for the skeletal composition of the German units. The 3rd Guard

Foot Regiment of 5th Guard Division, for example, admitted losses between

144

Ltr, CGO 5th C to CofS 5th C, 29 Oct, subs Inspection of 1st Div (lest

A-CGO-lst Div Boe 340)0

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1-10 October of no more than 10 men killed, 4 officers and 68 men wounded,

and 5 men gassed.14 6

The statistics of a machine gun sharp shooter detachment,of which

there were at least four attached to the German units opposite 1st Division,

are interesting. By 12 October, 88 Detachment No. 47, which had come into

the Group Argonne sector on 6 October, had lost 2 officers, 17 NCO's, 68

men, and 12 machine guns, causes not specified. The remainder of the detachment, completely exhausted on 12 October, were combined into two

companies with six machine guns and consisted of 2 officers, 9 NCO's, and

44 men, "including the men who are slightly sick on account of gas and are

able to remain on dutyo" 146

Exceptional is the report of the 18th Infantry Regiment, 41st DivisionD

which admitted 29 gas casualties on 9 October, following the 1st FA Brigade

gas shoot with 2,617 rounds on its positions 17

145

3rd Guard Diary, 10 Oct (5th Gd-Regts-lD&A).

146

Rpt on Condition of Det, 12 Oct (Item 174, Annexes to WD, Gp Arg).

147

18th Inf Annexes to WD (Item 197, 74th Brig -41st Div 7).

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