The Fairchild Papers are monograph-length essays of value to the 

Air Force. The series is named in honor of Muir S. Fairchild, the 

first commander of Air University and the university’s conceptual 

father. General Fairchild was part visionary, part keen taskmaster, 

and “Air Force to the core.” His legacy is one of confidence about 

the future of the Air Force and the central role of Air University in 

that future. 
AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY


WAR FROM ABOVE THE CLOUDS


B-52 Operations during the Second 

Indochina War and the Effects of the 

Air War on Theory and Doctrine 

WILLIAM P. HEAD, PhD


Robins Air Force Base, Georgia 


Fairchild Paper 

Air University Press


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615


July 2002 
Air University Library Cataloging Data 

Head, William P., 1949-

War from above the clouds : B-52 operations during the Second Indochina War and 

the effects of the air war on theory and doctrine / William P. Head. 

p. cm. — (Fairchild paper, ISSN 1528-2325). 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

Contents: Airpower theory and doctrine in the 1950s — Development of the B-52 

Stratofortress — Air Force theory and doctrine in the 1960s — Keeping a historical 

account — Menu bombing — Commando hunt operations — Air Force theory and doctrine in the early 1970s — Air Force doctrine after Vietnam. 

ISBN 1-58566-107-4 

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 — Aerial operations, American. 2. B-52 bomber. 

3. United States. Air Force — History. 4. Air warfare. 5. Air power — United States. I. 

Title. II. Series. 

959.704348—dc21 

Disclaimer 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of 

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air 

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. 

This Fairchild Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil and 

the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af. 

mil under “Books & Papers” then “AU Press Publications.” 

ii 
Contents 

Page 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii


FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v


ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii


INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


AIRPOWER THEORY AND DOCTRINE 

IN THE 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6


Airpower Enters the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8


America Is Drawn in Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10


DEVELOPMENT OF THE B-52 STRATOFORTRESS . . . 12


Insurgency War and Doctrine in


the Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


Arc Light (B-52 Raids, 1965–68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17


Modifying the B-52 Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22


Arc Light Expands and Airpower


Controversies Grow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23


Arc Light Operations Continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27


AIR FORCE THEORY AND DOCTRINE


IN THE 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32


KEEPING A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35


Project CHECO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35


Corona Harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36


Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38


MENU BOMBING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40


COMMANDO HUNT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42


AIR FORCE THEORY AND DOCTRINE 

IN THE EARLY 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61


Linebacker I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65


Linebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72


iii 
Page 

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AFTER VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . 87 

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 

Photographs 

B-52D Dropping a Load on the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 

B-29 Superfortress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

Gen Curtis E. LeMay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

B-52D and B-52G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

Arc Light Target Box after a Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

B-52Ds at U Tapao Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand . . . . . 22 

Porters Transporting Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 

AC-119G over Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN . . . . . . . . 59 

F-105 Thunderchiefs over Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

Lt Gen Gerald W. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

Crew Members in Linebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 

B-52Ds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

SA-2 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 

iv 
Foreword 

Dr. William P. Head’s War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air 

War on Theory and Doctrine is an examination of B-52 operations 

in Vietnam and how the air war affected airpower doctrine and 

theory. His study examines the evolution of this awesome 

manned strategic weapon in Vietnam to see how the design of 

the B-52s originally intended mission altered—if at all—the theories of airpower first put forward by Giulio Douhet and William 

“Billy” Mitchell. Dr. Head also analyzes how this same operational alteration affected official United States Air Force (USAF) 

doctrine first formulated by Army Air Corps and Army Air Forces 

leaders before and during World War II—later modified in the 

1950s after the USAF became a separate service. 

In the aftermath of World War II, airmen had to reevaluate 

the old theories. Would the bombers always get through? The 

lessons of the war seemed to indicate that the answer to this 

question was no, not without long-range fighter escorts such 

as the P-47 and P-51. Airpower leaders also rightly noted that 

bombing technology and the quantity of bombers had not been 

sufficient in World War II to allow airpower to be decisive. Dr. 

Head contends that the lack of a definitive test for the theory 

that airpower decisively affects the outcome of war continued 

during the Vietnam or Second Indochina War. 

Dr. Head initially conducted his research for a shorter presentation at the Air Force’s Fiftieth Anniversary Conference in 

Washington, D.C., during the summer of 1997. Air University 

Press is pleased to present the expanded essay—War from 

above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina 

War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine—as 

a Fairchild Paper. 

SHIRLEY BROOKS LASETER


Director


Air University Library/Air University Press


v 
About the 

Author 

Dr. William P. Head 

William P. Head (PhD, Florida State University) is chief, 

Warner Robins Air Logistics Center Office of History, Robins 

Air Force Base (AFB), Georgia. His prior positions include an 

assistant professor of history at the University of Alabama, 

Hunstville, and an adjunct instructor for Florida State University, Mercer University, Georgia Military College, and Macon 

State College. Dr. Head’s publications include Every Inch a Soldier: General Augustine Warner Robins and the Development of 

American Air Power (1995), Weaving a New Tapestry: Asia in 

the Post–Cold War World (1999), and Case Studies and General 

Trends (1999). He coauthored Time Capsule: A History of 

Robins AFB, Georgia, 1935–1995 (1997) and Crown Jewel of 

Georgia: A History of the Museum of Aviation at Robins AFB, 

Georgia (1998). This latter work was winner of the 1998 Air 

Force Heritage Publications Award. Dr. Head is also coeditor of 

Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective of Decisions, Combat, and Legacies (1993), Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on US Involvement in the Persian Gulf War (1996), and 

The Tet Offensive (1996). He has published more than 24 articles and book reviews in the Journal of American History, Journal of Military History, and Air Power History journal. His article titled “Air Power in the Persian Gulf: An Initial Search for 

the Right Lessons” was the outstanding article for 1992 and 

was published in the spring issue that year of Air Force Journal of Logistics. Dr. Head received the 1994 Air Force Most 

Outstanding Historian Award. He has been included, since 

1996, in Who’s Who in America, American Education, the South 

vii 
and Southwest, and Who’s Who in the World. Dr. Head contributed numerous articles to the 1999 ABC–Clio Encyclopedia 

of the Vietnam War, the 2000 ABC–Clio Encyclopedia of the Korean War and the Encyclopedia of Aerial Warfare, as well as the 

forthcoming ABC–Clio Encyclopedia of Naval Warfare and 

Facts On File Encyclopedia of Military History. 

viii 
Introduction 

This paper examines the B-52 Stratofortress operations in 

Vietnam and how the air war affected airpower doctrine and 

theory. It also examines the evolution of this awesomemanned strategic weapon in Vietnam to see how the structure 

of the B-52’s originally intended mission altered—if at all—the 

theories of airpower first put forward by Giulio Douhet and 

William “Billy” Mitchell. This paper analyzes how this same operational alteration affected official United States Air Force 

(USAF) doctrine first formulated by Army Air Corps and Army 

Air Forces (AAF) leaders before and during World War II and 

later modified in the 1950s after the USAF became a separate 

service. In defining airpower doctrine, Dr. Dennis M. Drew asserts that “doctrine has many functions, but it can adequately 

be defined as a ‘framework for understanding how to apply 

military power. It is what history has taught us works in war, 

as well as what does not.’”1 

The 1992 Air Force Manual (AFMAN 1-1), Basic Aerospace 

Doctrine of the United States Air Force, defines Air Force doctrine as “what we have learned about aerospace power and its 

application since the dawn of powered flight.” It also states 

that Air Force doctrine is “a broad conceptual basis for our 

understanding of war, human nature, and aerospace power.” 

The manual declares that doctrine is “the starting point for 

solving contemporary problems.”2 

The September 1997 document—which appeared in late 

1997—reaffirmed these points and the growing emphasis in 

the USAF on combat in space.3 In the very first chapter it 

states, “Air and space doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles that describe and 

guide the proper use of air and space forces in military operations.”4 This document emphasizes that “air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge gained primarily from 

the study and analysis of experience, which may include actual combat or contingency operations as well as equipment 

tests or exercises.”5 At the same time, this document declares, 

“it must be emphasized that doctrine development is never 

complete.”6 Dr. Drew concludes that “although doctrine may 

1 
not fulfill all of the requirements of a formal academic definition 

of theory, it fulfills most of the same functions and in that sense 

forms a ‘poor man’s’ theory of airpower.”7 

These definitions and their core components are not completely new. Following World War I, two airpower prophets— 

Douhet and Mitchell—wrote and spoke extensively on how airplanes should be used in war and how they would become the 

new primary military weapon. Douhet in The Command of the 

Air and Mitchell in Winged Defense and Our Air Force called on 

their nations to develop separate military air services and build 

vast armadas of bombers and fighters designed to take the war 

beyond the battlefront to the enemy’s heartland. These theories—born out of a desire to avoid a repeat of the bloody and 

costly trench and ground combat of World War I—hypothesized 

B-52D Dropping a Load on the Enemy 

B-52Ds—referred to as Big Bellies—played a major role in the Arc Light, Commando Hunt, Linebacker operations in Southeast Asia from 1965 to 1973. This 

version of the Stratofortress was decommissioned after the war, and it was 

placed at Andersen AFB, Guam, as a memorial to all B-52 crew personnel who 

lost their lives. 

2

that it was possible for a powerful fleet of bombers to attack 

and destroy the enemy’s industry, infrastructure, civilian 

morale, and socioeconomic leadership, thus leaving the 

armies in the field to wither and die. In doing so, the only need 

for ground forces was for air base defense and “mopping up” 

since, in this “perfect world theory,” enough bombers would 

always get through to destroy the targets necessary to force the 

enemy—unwilling to suffer any further domestic hardship and 

destruction—to sue for peace.8 

Since the 1920s, these theories of airpower have seen an extensive maturation process. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Air 

Corps and USAAF sought status as an independent service by 

arguing that they could be and later were a decisive force in 

winning World War II. In the postwar era the independent 

USAF became the strategic umbrella under which all other national defense policies were sheltered. In Korea and Vietnam 

the USAF believed it could have been a core component of victory by being a dominating factor on and beyond the battlefield. Since Vietnam, actions in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and 

Kosovo have apparently proven that—supported by appropriate 

weapons and technology—the current airpower theory and 

doctrine mentioned above is indeed the major component of 

modern military success. 

In 1999 President William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton and our 

European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) assumed the validity of this distilled theory by employing their air forces to pressure Serbian leadership to end 

genocide in the former Yugoslavian province of Kosovo. This 

time the matured theories actually worked and even those who 

had once decried the modern emphasis on airpower were left 

to applaud. For example, on 6 June 1999, the noted British 

military historian, John Keegan wrote: “Now there is a new 

turning point [in military history] to fix on the calendar: June 

3, 1999, when the capitulation of President [Slobodan] Milosevic proved that a war can be won by airpower alone.”9 

Prior to the Persian Gulf War, in the sum total of human history, not even powerful industrial nations such as the United 

States had had the ability or opportunity to realize this dream. 

World War II witnessed enormous numbers of Allied heavy 

3 
bomber strikes against German and Japanese industrial and 

civilian targets, daylight precision attacks, and nighttime urbansaturation fire-bombing raids. While these attacks brought great 

destruction upon the enemy and afforded the Allies air supremacy in support of land and sea operations, they did not 

fully realize the “Douhetian dream” of winning a war with minimal use of ground and sea forces. What airpower successes in 

World War II did achieve was to lead American political and 

military leaders to create a separate USAF in September 1947. 

In the aftermath of World War II, airmen had to reevaluate 

the old theories. Would the bombers always get through? The 

lessons of the war seemed to indicate that the answer to this 

question was no, not without long-range fighter escorts such 

as the P-47 and P-51. Airpower leaders also rightly noted that 

bombing technology and the quantity of bombers had not been 

sufficient in World War II to allow airpower to be decisive. 

Prior to the Korean War, US political isolationists had so 

curbed military initiatives and weapons development that the 

United States fought the entire war lacking a true heavy 

bomber. The B-29 performed well in 1950 before MiG-15 jet 

aircraft entered the war and shot down too many of the propeller bombers. From 1951 to 1953 they again performed well 

mostly at night. However, at no time was there sufficient opportunity to exercise new conventional bombing theories that 

had evolved with the earliest official USAF doctrine in the 

1940s and 1950s. 

The development of B-36 Peacemaker, B-47 Stratojet, and 

B-52 intercontinental bombers provided the United States with 

the capability to deliver a massive nuclear strike against the 

Soviet Union during the Cold War. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) did the same thing; and, more significantly, the 

strategic bomber force was designed as much to deter war 

(which it did) as it was to actually deliver a decisive strike. In 

this regard it succeeded very well. 

The lack of a definitive test for the theory that airpower decisively affects the outcome of war continued during the Vietnam or Second Indochina War. Airmen entered the war, in the 

mid-1960s, without adequate or sufficient tactical fighters or 

training to fight the “limited” conflict unfolding in the forbid4 
B-29 Superfortress 

The B-29 bombers (shown during the Korean War) often flew daylight bombing 

missions. 

ding jungles and mountains of Southeast Asia (SEA). Political 

restrictions on northern targets led to an aerial role reversal— 

Naval and Air Force tactical fighter and fighter-bomber air assets flew strategic missions during Operation Rolling Thunder, 

while B-52s reluctantly flew ground-support sorties at 30,000 

feet over South Vietnam and later aerial interdiction missions 

over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In spite of great courage and sacrifice, these airmen soon discovered that the limits their political leaders placed on them—as well as their own lack of adequate and appropriate weapons and tactics—left them short of 

their goals once again. 

Over the next two decades, airpower technology progressed 

rapidly; and in early 1991, the Persian Gulf War provided, up 

until then, the best opportunity to realize the full promise of 

airpower. With the level of success the air war was having, some 

5 
experts asked this question: Why ground operations were not 

delayed to allow airpower to realize total victory? Even though 

the dream was not quite realized, this time it was clear that 

the technical advances of the 1970s and 1980s—as well as the 

realistic training and increased professionalism and preparation undertaken by the USAF after Vietnam—made the ground 

combat in the Gulf much less bloody than even Allied leaders 

hoped it would be. While airpower did not win the war alone, 

clearly it was, along with President George Bush’s creation of 

the Allied coalition, the decisive factor in the victory. 

The events in southeastern Europe in the late 1990s—adjusted and refined by 80 years of history—proved the early theories of airpower pioneers were at least a good starting point. 

The difficult aerial interdiction campaign NATO forces undertook seemed, as Keegan noted, to alter the realities of military 

history since most experts believe that such operations work 

best when coordinated with ground operations. The frustrations of Vietnam would suggest that this is a daunting challenge. Only time will tell how much of these lessons will affect 

future warfare. Current trends would tend to indicate that the 

future belongs to aerospace forces. 

Airpower Theory and Doctrine in the 1950s 

It is important to realize that little had changed in airpower 

doctrine and theory by the time US airmen and airpower entered 

the Second Indochina War in 1965—the theories of Douhet 

and Mitchell were still the basis of Air Force strategy and doctrine. Air Force basic doctrine first officially appeared in 1953; 

modifications were made to the official manual in 1954, 1955, 

and 1959. Even though the first manual appeared on the heels 

of the Korean conflict and there were a growing number of 

brushfire conflicts unfolding in the developing former colonial 

nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, these basic doctrine 

manuals essentially ignored any concrete mention of insurgency conflict or the broader concepts of limited war.

10 Instead 

they focused on the tried and true theories of long-range 

strategic bombing and fighter escort revised for use against 

the new strategic enemy—Russian bear. As Dr. Drew contends, 

6 
“In each case it was as if the struggles of SEA did not exist 

and—for the most part—as if the Korean War had not happened. It took till 1955 for the official doctrine to even acknowledge the broader concepts of limited war.”11 

Even at the official levels below AFMAN 1-2, Air Force Basic 

Doctrine, there was a similar lack of attention paid to insurgency 

or counterinsurgency. Caught up in the Cold War, US airmen 

were all but totally focused on nuclear strategic conflicts with 

the Soviet Union and how best to fulfill their role as a component of America’s nuclear forces. One notable exception appeared in 1953 in the form of the AFMAN 1-3 doctrine manual. For the first time, an official publication alluded to what 

it called “special operations.” But while it mentioned the 

1950s’ catchphrase for what would later be called insurgency 

conflict, it defined special operations as “inserting agents behind 

enemy lines, supplying partisans, and delivering propaganda.” 

The 1954 revision continued this trend.12 

In professional airpower theory, the topic of insurgency received some attention in a few major journals but mainly as a 

peripheral topic. Predictably, much of the writing was by French 

authors. In late 1952, Gen G. J. M. Chassin, the French air officer commanding Far East, published an important article in 

the English-language journal Interavia. The primary topic dealt 

with the difficulty of locating guerrilla targets. General Chassin, 

recalling his own experiences, declared that, “the chief characteristic of the war in Indochina is the invisibility of the enemy.” 

He concluded that “it needs an unusual degree of skill and experience to detect the presence of Vietminh troops in the mountains and forests, where they live under perfect camouflage.”13 

Between 1954 and 1956, the French Supreme Command published a three-volume analysis of their efforts in Indochina. 

They contained captured Vietminh documents that detailed 

methods for thwarting superior enemy airpower. In turn, the 

French authors discussed in some detail “the difficulty of interdicting an enemy who required few supplies and relied on a 

very primitive and easily repairable logistic transportation system.” The work even went so far as to express fundamental 

doubts as to the efficacy of the basic tenets of US airpower 

theories based on the Douhetian model. They referred to this 

7 
conventional strategic bombing theory as applied to insurgency as “the extremist thesis of Douhetism.”14 

While these insights were available in the late 1950s and 

early 1960s, US attention to such matters remained secondary. For the most part, the 1950s marked—with some justification—a period of nuclear fascination for the Air Force. In all 

the years since Douhet, Mitchell, and others first introduced 

their theories—those who led the Air Force—built airpower 

weapons and developed theory and doctrine consistently embraced these fundamental concepts as inviolate means of conducting air combat. 

As the 1960s dawned and President John F. Kennedy’s attention turned first to the Laotian crisis and later to Vietnam, 

American air leaders had to rethink their role, at least with regard to these new kinds of conflict. Thus, US involvement in 

the Second Indochina War at least temporarily forced a minor 

alteration in US airpower theory and doctrine. The nature of 

that war and its development temporarily altered some of the 

official basic doctrine manuals and policy papers within the 

Air Force. 

Airpower Enters the Vietnam War 

Early in the Cold War, the US Air Force focused on its strategic role of delivering a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union 

(USSR) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Stratofortress was built and deployed for this mission during the 

1950s and 1960s—an era of massive retaliation, mutual nuclear force buildups, and US conventional force reductions. 

However, as former Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Ronald 

R. Fogleman noted, “The harsh realities of Korea and Vietnam 

showed us the limits of nuclear deterrence and revitalized our 

interest in, and support for, conventional capabilities.”15 

During the Kennedy years, US military forces became more 

conventional, since Army and Navy factions in the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS) believed that the future would see more limited 

wars. Thus, budgets of the early 1960s did not provide for a 

new bomber or even the production of more B-52s. They were 

supplanted by Minutemen and Polaris missiles, and tactical 

weapons such as the F-4 Phantom. The XB/YB-70 Valkyrie 

8 
supersonic bomber program—a pet project of CSAF Curtis E. 

LeMay (1961–65)—also ended because it was very expensive, 

vulnerable, and could not carry such things as the Skybolt airto-ground missile. Even Sen. W. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), former secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), disapproved the bomber. 

The entire tenor of US defense policy changed from the end 

of the Eisenhower administration to the beginning of the 

Kennedy years. This culminated when President Kennedy met 

with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in Nassau on 

18–21 December 1962. In what became known as the Nassau 

communiqué, the two leaders concluded that there was a need 

to reverse “the atomic ‘sword’ and conventional ‘shield’ strategy that had prevailed in Europe. They agreed that ‘in addition 

to having a nuclear shield it is important to have a non-nuclear 

sword.’”16 

US defense policy based on massed, manned-bomber retaliation against the Soviet Union, during the Dwight D. Eisenhower years, was replaced by a buildup of conventional 

weapons and forces to confront brushfire wars in the former 

colonial and developing nations of the world. With the Cuban 

missile crisis still fresh in everyone’s mind, President Kennedy 

was determined never again to be left in a situation in which 

he might have to commit nuclear forces. The thought of having to start a nuclear war about Cuba was indeed sobering; it 

had almost occurred because the United States had previously 

placed all its military eggs in the single basket of strategic nuclear response. Kennedy now moved to assure that in the future, the US would be able to use a measured and flexible response to such confrontations.17 

It was a change that did not please most airpower advocates. General LeMay, the chief of the Strategic Air Command 

(SAC), openly expressed concerns over dependence on ICBMs 

at the expense of funding for the B-70 program.18 John F. 

Loosbrok, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, went so far as to 

declare that “the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is being replaced by a doctrine of nuclear stalemate. The strategic umbrella, under the shelter of which major Soviet aggression has 

been deterred or repulsed at many times and in many places 

9 
Gen Curtis E. LeMay 

General LeMay became chief of staff of 

the USAF in the early 1960s during America’s initial involvement in Southeast Asia. 

since the end of World War II, is being replaced by a strategic 

ceiling—rigid, immovable, and possibly brittle.”19 

In the 1950s, the B-52 had already been developed and deployed to carry out the strategic roles and missions of nuclear 

deterrence. It was a policy that had begun to change as early 

as the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which declared, 

“the day of the separate ground, sea, and air warfare was gone 

forever.” In the 1960s USAF policy changed under the able 

leadership of SECAF Eugene M. Zuckert and eventually led to 

the creation of a new basic doctrine. Instead of following the 

pattern in the 1950s habit of changing words and updating 

catchphrases, the 1964 basic doctrine reflected a new centralized defense structure and a need for flexibility in the Air Force.20 

America Is Drawn in Deeper 

Even as the policy debate continued, the US defense establishment was drawn deeper into the escalating war in SEA. 

10 
While the USAF had concentrated on bombers and its strategic mission throughout the late 1950s and wrestled with 

changes in its roles, missions, and doctrine in the early 1960s, 

Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Lyndon Baines Johnson 

continued the buildup of material support and troop commitments to the US-supported anticommunist regime in South 

Vietnam headed at first by Ngo Dinh Diem.21 

On 1 November 1964, Vietcong (VC) forces attacked the Bien 

Hoa Air Base (AB) just outside Saigon, destroying six B-57s 

and killing five USAF personnel. President Johnson—outraged— 

wanted to retaliate. Air Force leaders recommended a massive 

B-52 raid on the Phuc Yen MiG-capable airfield just outside 

Hanoi. Johnson decided against the raid because of the upcoming presidential elections, but he asked for a postelection 

report so he could assess his options.22 

On 11 November 1964, Assistant Secretary of Defense John 

T. McNaughton and an advisory team drafted a report titled 

“Action for South Vietnam,” which presented three options. 

The first option proposed to take reprisal actions to punish the 

North for its actions in the South. The second option, which 

the JCS supported, called for “a full-court press” and a series 

of “systematic attacks on the North—bombing rapidly, widely, 

and intensely.” The third option required a “progressive 

squeeze and talk” policy that called for covert operations in 

Laos and bombing North Vietnam (NVN). This option proposed 

to begin at a low level of intensity in the panhandle area and 

move up in both latitude and in the level of violence toward 

more lucrative targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. Johnson favored the third option, since he believed it allowed him to increase pressure until he could reach a negotiated settlement 

that would leave the pro-US South to build a secure nation. It 

meant the United States could increase the “quotient of pain” 

at anytime, posing an implied threat of increased military violence to intimidate Hanoi and the southern antigovernment 

faction known as the National Liberation Front (NLF) into acting as the United States wished. It also avoided a direct confrontation with the USSR and PRC and provided a sense of 

consensus within the administration and Congress, which 

Johnson needed in order to carry out his policies elsewhere. 

11 
The third option eventually led to Operation Rolling Thunder, 

the first US air assault against the North. But President Johnson would not allow B-52s to carry out these strategic raids; 

instead it was left to tactical aircraft flying from land bases in 

the South and from US aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin.23 

Before he knew it, the president had his hands full with “a 

pi-- ant little war” in Vietnam, and the United States soon fell 

into a policy of gradual force buildup and limited use of airpower. It was a plan that ignored the need to stabilize South 

Vietnam socially, politically, and economically. It was a policy, 

coupled with the resilience of the enemy that—in retrospect— 

could not secure South Vietnam or defeat the VC Southern 

Communist guerrillas or the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). 

US airpower became a compromise weapon for Johnson. It 

limited the commitment of ground forces, especially reserves, 

and caused spectacular numbers and pictures of destruction. 

It also satisfied “hawks” like Senators Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) 

and John Stennis (D-Miss.) while mollifying moderates and 

defusing liberals. But even airpower had drawbacks; the 

president rightly feared that air attacks too close to China 

might cause a repeat of the Korean intervention, which for two 

years delayed the settlement of that war. Early US air operations were tightly restricted out for fear of war with the PRC or 

USSR. It was not until the 1970s that President Richard M. 

Nixon—with friendlier relations with China and the Soviet 

Union on the horizon—employed B-52s in a more conventional 

and effective fashion. By then the nature of the war had 

changed; “Vietnamization” was under way and air power was 

used to cover a US retreat. 

Development of the B-52 Stratofortress 

In order to understand the role of B-52s in Indochina and 

why their initial employment agitated USAF leaders, one must 

understand the background of the weapon system and know 

why it was built in the first place. On 28 June 1946, the Air 

Force designated Boeing’s 360,000-pound (lb), six-engine turboprop, straight-wing Model 462 heavy bomber—the XB-52. In 

October the XB-52’s designation was switched to the 230,000 

12 
lb, four-engine turboprop Model 464. In 1948 Boeing and 

USAF engineers agreed to change the design into a sweptwing 

jet bomber with eight Pratt & Whitney jet engines mounted in 

four wing pods and a four-unit tandem landing gear.

24 

In March 1949, a board of senior Air Force officers recommended buying the B-52 design. The original contract called 

for Boeing to build two prototypes—both without expensive 

tactical equipment—but Boeing and USAF officials later 

agreed to install tactical equipment on the second bomber, redesignating it as the YB-52 prototype. Contrary to normal procedures, it flew on 15 April 1952—before its XB cousin—when 

test pilot A. M. “Tex” Johnston flew it for two hours and 31 

minutes from Renton Field, Seattle, Washington, to Larson Air 

Force Base (AFB), Washington. By October it “had flown 50 

hours at speeds up to Mach 0.84 without full power at altitudes above 50,000 feet.” The USAF accepted the YB-52 on 31 

March 1953 but left it with Boeing for further testing. It made 

345 flights covering a total of 738 hours.25 

The XB-52 flew for the first time on 15 October 1952 and was 

accepted in 1953 for the Air Force’s Phase II flight test program. 

The biggest change in the B-52A production models was the 

expansion of the nose section, which provided side-by-side 

pilot seating to replace the original tandem seating arrangement. 

The B-52As flew for the first time on 5 August 1954. Originally, the Air Force agreed to buy 13, but only three were accepted while the other 10 were completed as B models.26 

To counter new Soviet intercontinental jet bombers in 1955, 

Boeing opened a second assembly line in Wichita, Kansas, to 

increase B-52 production by 35 percent.27 Fifty B-52Bs became the first BUFFs deployed to active duty units of SAC. On 

29 June 1955, B-52B serial number 52-8711 arrived at Castle AFB, California, and was assigned to the 93d Heavy Bomb 

Wing (BW). The wing became fully operational on 26 June 

1957.28 

Boeing built 35 B-52C and 100 B-52E models, but it was 30 

of the original 89 F models—with their J57-43 engines—that 

were the first B-52s deployed to SEA in March 1965. These 

were the last B-52s built in Seattle. Wichita built the last two 

models, assembling 193 Gs and 102 Hs between 1958 and 

13 
1962. The G models entered service in SEA during the Linebacker II campaign of 18–29 December 1972. They, along with 

the B-52Ds, became the weapon of choice during these raids. 

Of the 15 B-52s lost to northern air defenses during Linebacker II, seven were G models. Overall, Boeing built 744 B-52s. 

Vastly upgraded versions of the later models still remain the 

backbone of America’s manned bomber force. Their ability to 

deliver air launch cruise missiles has made them a particularly effective strategic air asset in the late 1990s. The B-52s 

are also the longest serving bomber in US history.29 

Arguably, the most significant B-52s in Vietnam were the D 

models. The Seattle plant built 101 Ds and the Wichita plant 69, 

the first flying on 4 June 1956. With US involvement in Vietnam 

growing by 1965, USAF officials initiated the $16-million 

“Hi-Density” or “Big Belly” modification program, which reconfigured Ds and provided the United States with the first 

bomber able to carry out massive strategic missions over the 

North, even though this would not occur for nearly seven years. 

B-52D and B-52G 

The B-52D is prepared for launch as a B-52G (background) lands during the 11 

days (18–29 December 1972) of Operation Linebacker II. 

14

It also afforded the United States with an aircraft capable of 

successfully carrying out the tactical mission to which B-52s 

would originally be assigned—Arc Light.30 

Insurgency War and Doctrine in the Early 1960s 

As the 1960s dawned, the B-52s were the backbone of 

America’s Cold War strategic strike force and a key component 

in the nuclear triad. They were weapons that the USAF could 

not possibly envision using in any other role, especially not in 

a guerrilla conflict in SEA. Even so—as noted earlier—during 

the early 1960s, conventional wars and tactical weapons development received more emphasis. Kennedy paid increasing 

attention internationally to brushfire wars in Asia and Africa. 

Within the inner circles of the Air Force—especially within 

the newly created Aerospace Doctrine Division of the Office of 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs—key leaders believed that a new, more clearly stated, basic doctrine was 

needed, as well as long-range planning. Instead of cosmetic 

changes in doctrine which had been the norm in the 1950s, 

many, like Maj Gen Dale O. Smith and Brig Gen Jerry D. Page, 

who headed doctrinal work in the Air Force, wanted substance 

and eternal vision incorporated into Air Force doctrine.31 

While this did not mean that insurgency issues would suddenly become a major focus, it indicated a growing need 

among airmen to define clearly their ever-evolving job. With 

the war in Vietnam growing this meant that such considerations had to include defining airpower’s role, since the Air 

Force—albeit reluctantly—would soon be involved in that war. 

Changes in basic thinking came slowly in the early 1960s, 

but they came. It was a shift that did not specifically address 

airpower’s role in limited brushfire wars, and it forced airpower leaders to reexamine and redefine their long-held beliefs 

and theories. In 1962, General LeMay wrote an article titled 

“Air Power in Guerrilla Warfare,” which recognized the need for 

airmen to examine low-intensity conflict. Still, this same study 

concluded that “general war poses the primary military threat 

to the security of the Free World, and it is under the umbrella 

of strategic superiority that the United States has freedom of 

maneuver in the lesser forms of conflict.”32 

15 
The interest in insurgency warfare among airmen grew hereafter. In September 1962 the newly created Special Air Warfare 

Center held a symposium on limited war as part of the Air 

Force Association (AFA) national convention. Within two years, 

the interest generated by this meeting and the growing role of 

the United States in Vietnam culminated in the publication of 

a new Air Force basic doctrine manual in August 1964. Within 

the manual, one brief chapter correctly described both insurgency and the goals of counterinsurgency. It delineated airpower’s role in both combat and noncombat missions and discussed the “difficulties in interdicting guerrilla lines of 

supply.”33 The latter concern would need to be addressed 

again during Commando Hunt operations (1968–72). Ironically, Commando Hunt would prove the efficacy of this part of 

the new basic doctrine manual. It also proved the relative merits and shortcomings of B-52s in attempting long-range interdiction missions over enemy-held territory, especially flying over 

imposing mountains and dense jungle terrain. 

But while the new basic doctrine manual of August 1964 

included a discussion of insurgency and counterinsurgency, 

like LeMay’s earlier article, its doctrinal emphasis remained— 

as Dr. Drew says, “where it had been since the advent of nuclear weapons and the creation of the independent Air 

Force”—on the strategic mission.34 The main reason for the 

new basic doctrine manual in 1964 was not because of insurgency but the change in foreign policy and the advances in 

military technology. In 1963 LeMay had directed Gen Bernard 

A. Schriever, commander of Air Force Systems Command to 

make “a comprehensive study and analysis of the Air Force 

structure projected into the 1965–1975 time period.”35 As Dr. 

Robert Frank Futrell contends in his monumental work on Air 

Force theory and doctrine, both Zuckert and LeMay recognized that the Air Force needed to “take stock of its capabilities and to look to its future potential.”36 To Zuckert the past 

had to be altered. The Kennedy administration’s policies were 

different, and the Air Force should adapt to them. He clearly 

believed that “Air Force doctrine should be designed to support 

national policy and strategy, which was a somewhat different 

concept from a pure aerospace power doctrine based on the 

16 
absolute capabilities and limitations of aerospace forces in 

peace and war.”37 

The result of Zuckert’s lobbying was the formulation of the 

previously mentioned new basic doctrine manual on 14 August 

1964—titled United States Air Force Basic Doctrine—designed 

to break with the past doctrines in substance and form. The 

basic doctrine manual was no longer designated 1-2, but 1-1. 

It moved USAF doctrine away from deterrence alone, assuming that nuclear war was less likely in the 1960s than it had 

been in the 1950s. As Futrell puts it, AFMAN 1-1 “adapted its 

doctrine to the concept of national security that had emerged 

from the new strategic situation in which thermonuclear 

weapons and an assured delivery capability in the hands of 

potential enemies had altered the use of total military 

power.”38 Perhaps equally important was the addition of the 

concept of flexibility of airpower in response and capabilities. 

This also led to the inclusion of a brief but important section 

on insurgency; but it did not mean that the basic theory of airpower, born at the beginning of the century, had changed— 

only that other aspects were being considered for the time 

being. The vast majority of airmen still believed in the employment of B-52s in their strategic role, the basic role of the 

Air Force.39 

Arc Light (B-52 Raids, 1965–68) 

General LeMay’s article and the 1964 AFMAN 1-1 notwithstanding, when the first B-52Fs arrived in Vietnam, much to 

the consternation of Air Force leaders, the flagship of the 

strategic air fleet was to be employed in a role contrary to their 

traditional concepts of strategic projection—namely Arc Light. 

Even though B-52s were and are strategic bombers, Arc Light 

was not primarily a strategic air campaign. They were ground 

support missions flown at high altitudes over South Vietnam, 

Cambodia, and Laos in support of Allied ground forces or missions to interdict northern infiltration of troops or supplies. 

Arc Light raids were B-52 operations flown out of Guam and 

Thailand (and some from Kadena AB in Okinawa, Japan) from 

18 June 1965 to 15 August 1973. Through 1968, most Arc 

Light sorties were flown below the 17th parallel, with only 141 

17 
missions flown in NVN, most near the demilitarized zone 

(DMZ) below the 20th parallel. It was not until the Linebacker 

operations of 1972—especially the December bombings— 

which the big bombers performed as strategic assets.40 

The first 30 B-52Fs arrived in Guam in February 1965. In 

March as US Marines landed near Da Nang, the JCS proposed 

melding B-52s into the new Operation Rolling Thunder campaign. The State Department opposed this proposal, believing 

it would send dangerous signals of escalation to the PRC and 

USSR. Many planners realized that B-52s—with only 1965 

technology—would have difficulty flying missions in Vietnam, 

since the terrain provided few offset aiming points or specific 

ground references to assure accurate bombing. US officials 

also feared that the loss of even one B-52 to enemy fire would 

be a major blow to America’s world image and to South Vietnamese morale.41 

Air Force leadership was displeased that the BUFFs—centerpiece of the US nuclear bomber force—were in SEA at all. Officials at SAC worried that if too many B-52s went to Asia, they 

might not have enough to fulfill their role as part of the US nuclear force.42 In early 1964, the JCS had amended the Joint 

Strategic Capability Plan to require that 30 B-52s be available 

for worldwide contingencies. During meetings with JCS leaders 

in Honolulu, Hawaii, in April, Gen William C. Westmoreland, 

commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) 

implored the JCS to allow him to use B-52s against VC base 

camps. He argued that B-52s were better suited for this job 

than fighters and fighter-bombers, because they could efficiently 

deliver a wide, even pattern over a large area.43 

In 1965 “the concept of operational bombing procedures for 

large scale non-nuclear strikes was inconsistent with existing 

SAC materiel concepts,” since B-52 crew training and doctrine 

were designed for strategic nuclear conflict. Luckily, “the basic 

Arc Light task of area bombing . . . required only a narrow 

spectrum of the available conventional weapons inventory,” 

which included M-117 750 lb bombs, MK-82 500 lb, BLU-3B 

and BLU-26B antipersonnel bomblets, and AN-M65A1 general 

purpose and AN-M59A1 semiarmor-piercing 1,000 lb bombs. 

At first the standard Arc Light load for B-52s based on Guam 

18 
was 42 M117s loaded internally and 24 MK82s loaded externally. B-52s in Thailand carried 84 MK82s internally and 24 

M117s externally. During the first three years of Arc Light, 

high explosive bombs accounted for 97.2 percent of the total 

bomb loads.44 

In May the JCS approved Westmoreland’s formal request. 

Plans now began for conventional B-52 raids over South Vietnam. However, as noted above, pilots were accustomed to using 

radar to locate ground targets; and in 1965 Vietnam, radar data 

was scarce, besides they had little experience flying over dense, 

three-canopy jungle. Air Force officials temporarily solved this 

ground-reference problem with homing and targeting beacons 

that they seeded in the target areas. Planners decided that 

once radar files had been built up sufficiently, they would go 

back to radar synchronous bombing.45 

On 15 June, VC forces were discovered near Ben Cat at a regional headquarters 10 miles north of Saigon, and a raid was 

scheduled for 18 June. Johnson, fearing negative world reaction from the use of the B-52s, demanded assurance that no 

civilian areas would be hit during the raid. Ambassador Maxwell 

Taylor instructed Brig Gen George Simler, chief of Operations, 

2d Air Division (AD), to accompany the mission in a C-123 

Provider to guarantee tight command and control so no bombs 

would accidentally fall on nearby villages.46 

Plans called for 30 B-52Fs of the 7th BW and 320th BW to 

launch from Guam at 0100 hours, rendezvous for aerial refueling over Luzon, Philippines, and meet over the target at 0730 

hours. There were 10 three-aircraft cells; 24 planes carried fifty 

one 750 lb bombs, while six carried 1,000 armor-piercing 

bombs. Things began as planned, but tailwinds from a typhoon in the eastern Pacific pushed the bombers ahead of 

schedule. When the first cell banked 360 degrees to slow for 

the arrival of the refuellers, they ran into the path of the second cell in the dark skies over the South China Sea. Two 

planes collided and crashed into the sea. Eight crew members 

perished, while the four survivors and one body were recovered. Only 27 of the bombers refueled. The 28th bomber, with 

a broken hydraulic pump and radar, landed in Okinawa. The 

remaining bombers crossed the Vietnamese coast at 0630 

19 
hours and dropped their first bombs 15 minutes later from 

about 20,000 feet. Guiding off a beacon placed in the area the 

night before, they bombed a one-by-two-mile target box with 

1,300 bombs. Half the bombs hit inside the box. They then 

flew south to avoid the Cambodian border, and near Saigon 

they turned east toward Guam. One bomber was forced to 

land at Clark AB (formerly AFB), Philippines, because of electrical problems. The last bomber landed exactly 13 hours after 

the first one had departed.47 

Shortly after the raid, three US-led 36-man Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) reconnaissance teams inspected the 

area and found no enemy bodies and little damage to the camp 

area. Later, MACV discovered that the VC had fled on a tip from 

a spy in the local ARVN unit. The raid made news headlines 

Arc Light Target Box after a Raid 

20

across the world, some terming it a “fiasco,” others comparing it 

to “using a sledgehammer to kill gnats” or using a “sledgehammer to kill fleas.”48 

While the results were less than spectacular, Westmoreland 

told the media he now had the perfect weapon to attack a 

“dug-in enemy target, saturate large areas, surprise the enemy, 

reduce his safe havens, and encourage the timid South Vietnamese soldiers to venture into Vietcong base areas.” The Air 

Staff was not pleased. One USAF report responded, “Of course, 

this would have to be balanced against the problem of fixing 

VC targets with enough accuracy to allow attacks on small target areas. Also, the longer reaction time of Arc Light forces 

does not allow for a response against transient VC targets.”49 

Despite these concerns, plans went forward for more Arc 

Light raids. B-52s flew five missions in July and 10 in August. 

On 2 August 1965 they returned to the use of radar synchronous bombing. By mid-August, the 30 bomber flights were replaced by fewer planes flying more missions. Raids no longer 

had to be preapproved; instead, five “free bomb zones” were 

created and target folders made up for short-notice missions. 

Two zones were located just north of Saigon, two were at the 

southern tip of South Vietnam, and the last was southeast of 

Da Nang near a suspected VC regimental headquarters. In addition, the JCS assumed final target approval for Arc Light; 

Westmoreland became involved only when US troops were in 

the target area to avoid alerting enemy agents again. The 

smaller-formation raids began 26 August; and by October, as 

few as five planes flew in formations that allowed the 30 B-52Fs 

to carry out multiple missions.50 

On 14 November, 1st Cavalry Division units—after repelling 

an attack against the Plei Me Special Forces camp in the Central Highlands and mopping up near Pleiku—uncovered a secret North Vietnamese Army (NVA) base defended by two regiments in the Ia Drang Valley near the Cambodian border. The 

allied ground forces called in air strikes, and 18 B-52s hit the 

area on the 16th dropping 344 tons of bombs. By the end of 

the month, they had flown 96 sorties and dropped 1,795 tons 

of bombs.51 

21 
Modifying the B-52 Fleet 

These early raids demonstrated to USAF officials that the 

B-52s needed to carry more bombs. As early as summer 1965, 

the USAF approved Engineering Change Proposal 1224-7 “HiDensity Bombing System” to modify 82 B-52Ds to carry 84 

rather than 27 500 lb bombs or 42 instead of 27 750 lb bombs 

internally. Including bombs fixed to the wings of the bombers, 

this increased the B-52’s total maximum bomb load from 

38,000 to 60,000 lbs. In February 1966, approval was granted 

to modify the remainder of the 155-bomber fleet. The first D 

model began modification on 16 December 1965; and the entire 

155-bomber force was completed by 8 September 1967. B-52Ds 

from the 28th BW and 484th BW deployed to Andersen AFB, 

Guam, in April 1966, gradually replacing F models in combat. In 

March 1967, Ds also began operating out of U Tapao Royal 

Thai AB (RTAB), Thailand. The new bombers were completely deployed by early 1968. Of these 155, 22 were lost in Vietnam.52 

The USAF selected the Ds for modification for several important reasons. There were only 82 Fs, and they were running out 

of flying time. The Fs had no reserve capability and could 

barely fly the ever-increasing monthly sortie requirements of 

B-52Ds at U Tapao Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand 

22

1965–66. Even though the Ds were older, they were being upgraded in other basic areas that increased their life expectancy 

by 2,000 hours—double that of the Fs. The G and H models 

were held back for their “more significant [single integrated 

operations plan] SIOP role”—delivering a strategic nuclear 

payload. The Ds were also refitted with all-weather capability; 

a major problem facing all US aircraft in 1965 and 1966. As 

one RAND Corporation report noted in 1966, “The Air Force 

has no (conventional weapon) capability for all-weather bombing in SEA.”53 

As noted, the 28th BW and 484th BW deployed the first B52D Big Bellies to Guam in April 1966, but when they arrived 

they discovered a lack of standard ordnance. Specifically, 

there were no MK-82 bombs left on Guam. Until the bombs 

were shipped from Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, the first Big 

Belly missions flew with 24 M-65 1,000 lb bombs internally 

and 24 M-117 750 lb bombs externally. The B-52s were not the 

only ones to suffer shortages. Naturally, in 1966–68, as the 

sortie rate for the BUFFs rose from 100 to 1,600 per month, 

so did the expenditure of bombs. Soon, this impacted Rolling 

Thunder as well. Some USAF officers even privately suggested 

that Army leadership in Vietnam was undertaking the Arc 

Light raids just to steal attention from what USAF leaders perceived to be the more important air campaign over NVN.54 

Arc Light Expands and Airpower Controversies Grow 

By spring 1966 President Johnson had become less concerned with the negative impact of the B-52s on public opinion, believing they were effectively curtailing enemy infiltration 

and hurting enemy morale in South Vietnam. Adm U. S. G. 

Sharp—commander in chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC)— 

was given approval for target designation. Instead of facilitating use of the powerful B-52 weapon, the new policy only compounded tensions between airmen and their Army and Navy 

counterparts. Airmen had been upset that Army ground commanders were ordering the greatest strategic bomber ever 

built into a ground support role, but now to have a naval officer pick targets was simply unbearable. Target restrictions 

and lack of target flexibility was nothing new for airmen; to 

23 
them it had always been an annoying feature of Rolling Thunder. In the case of Rolling Thunder, the restrictions and target 

approvals came directly from the White House, thus reducing 

target value and increasing response time. 

While General Westmoreland was pleased with the new Arc 

Light policies, Westmoreland’s direct control over these strategic 

air assets caused Gen William W. “Spike” Momyer, Seventh Air 

Force commander, to worry openly that the entire process not 

only violated the basic concept of a separate strategic and tactical air force run by airmen trained in such combat but that 

“Westmoreland’s employment of the B-52s as long range artillery 

to suppress ‘what may or may not be suspected concentrations 

or supply areas’ was questionable and relatively ineffective.”55 

Momyer wanted to use the B-52s against specific targets, reserving just two squadrons to fly approximately 150 sorties 

each month, while using tactical aircraft to strike enemy concentrations. This disagreement came about partly because no 

one had any hard evidence regarding how effective US air 

forces were; since there were no “quantifiable assessments, 

each general adopted a position that fit his preconception of 

the role of airpower.”56 

Normal Air Force intelligence and data collection were all 

but completely absent during the Vietnam War. In previous 

wars the Air Force had kept a data catalogue for airmen to use 

in planning operations. They did not do so in SEA until 1968 

during the Tet Offensive and siege at Khe Sanh. Their lack of 

ability to select ground targets or use their assets in close air 

support (CAS) roles also meant that it was all but impossible 

to commit reconnaissance assets to establish the effectiveness 

of Arc Light or any other raids in Vietnam. Perhaps World War II 

hero Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada—USAF, retired—put it best 

after returning from a special fact-finding tour of Vietnam in 

early 1966.57 In his evaluation of the use of airpower (especially B-52s) in Vietnam he declared, “Our effort in Vietnam . . . 

to me as far as air power was concerned was a little bit of what 

I used to refer to as operational masturbation. I have always 

felt that the B-52s were to a large extent bombing forests . . . It 

was just clear to me that tactical airpower as being exercised in 

that theater was the product of the Army and Army thinking.”58 

24 
There can be little doubt that Vietnam was a show produced 

and directed by Army leaders. The direction of the Kennedy and 

Johnson defense policy, as we have seen, moved away from 

strategic policies and nuclear bombers toward weapons and 

policies (mostly ground) designed to meet guerrilla wars. In the 

early 1960s, the buildup of Army aviation mirrored this new 

direction. Eventually, helicopter gunships and transports, as 

well as a myriad of observation aircraft, fit nicely into the JCS 

Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces. To the Air Force, 

this new direction was not only a violation of assigned roles 

and missions but also an expensive duplication of Air Force 

assets and capabilities. Perhaps worst of all was the fact that 

Air Force Regulation 1-1, Aerospace Doctrine: Responsibilities 

for Doctrine Development, also charged Tactical Air Command 

(TAC) to “work in coordination with the Army Combat Developments Command to develop mutually agreeable joint doctrinal manuals for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”59 

One of the main reasons B-52s had to do the job normally 

reserved for tactical air assets was that most tactical assets 

were being used in Operation Rolling Thunder. Another reason 

was the lack of fighters of the kind needed (ones that flew 

lower and slower) to carry out CAS or other important tactical 

roles, especially in the South. Tactical weapons development 

and fighter pilot training had reduced the US fighter advantage in all areas, especially air-to-air combat. As Dr. Futrell 

laments, “It was tragic irony that the air war in SEA would necessitate an agonizing relearning process and a hurried adaptation of weapon systems back into an arena thought to have 

been eliminated [conventional tactical fighter operations].”60 

The numbers show just how far the US fell between Korea 

and Vietnam. During World War II, the best figures available 

indicate that in Europe 7,422 enemy fighters were shot down 

while the US lost 1,691, a ratio of 4.4:1. In Korea, the numbers were 874 to 122, or a ratio of 7.2:1. In Vietnam, the North 

lost 195 fighters—139 to Air Force fighters and 56 to Navy 

fighters—while the US lost 61 Air Force fighters and 16 Navy 

fighters, totaling 77. The ratio was 2.53:1. The numbers 

changed once better aircraft, antiradar jammers, and targeting 

25 
systems like Teaball were employed. After 1972, the ratio 

reached 5:1, with better training also making a big difference.61 

It is also worth reiterating that many experts, especially airmen, believed that Vietnam was a ground war run by ground 

commanders, which excluded considerations from any other 

service. To many airmen like Momyer, not only was Westmoreland’s focus totally on the ground war but also the fact 

that Army forces had become too dependent on air cover. Maj 

Gen Theodore R. Milton went so far as to declare that “the Army 

became over-dependent on air support, and air support of a 

kind highly vulnerable against a modern force.”62 For these reasons, the B-52 became the weapon of last resort for Arc Light. 

Even so, the B-52s should have been placed directly under 

Momyer’s command; he was in the best position to decide 

which targets were most valuable and how best to use all air 

resources. In the end, the JCS concocted a compromise by 

which Momyer became Westmoreland’s MACV deputy for air. 

Under the new plan, operational control was given to Momyer, 

and most Air Force officers—especially intelligence personnel—were moved from MACV to Momyer’s staff. Much remained the same, since Westmoreland still picked the targets, 

and, as Momyer declared, “as long as Westmoreland picked 

the targets the aircraft would continue to be used for close air 

support rather than for interdiction.”63 

Throughout the years of Rolling Thunder (1965–68), controversy swirled over actual control of air assets. As noted, 

Momyer had long wanted a single manager for all tactical 

combat aviation—preferably an airman. But control of air assets 

remained a chaotic malaise of interservice rivalry, especially in 

South Vietnam. Finally, on 18 January 1968, General Westmoreland proposed placing all tactical and CAS assets under 

a single manager—the MACV deputy for air. When he revealed 

his plan to Maj Gen Norman J. Anderson, commander of the 

1st Marine Air Wing, and III Marine Amphibious Force commander, Lt Gen Robert E. Cushman Jr., they balked. As Westmoreland recalled, “Anderson became rather ‘emotional,’ declaring that the Marine Air Wing belonged to the Marines and no 

one else.”64 

26 
The disagreement went all the way to Washington, where 

Gen Leonard Chapman Jr., Marine commandant, supported 

his subordinates so vehemently that the overall area commander—Admiral Sharp—decided to have Westmoreland temporarily withdraw the proposal. However, the Tet Offensive 

soon made Westmoreland’s reorganization plan a requirement; 

and as a result, on 8 March Momyer was given mission direction, and the USAF was given overall command. It was a policy continued under Gen Creighton Abrams from 1968 to 

1972; and as Momyer remarked years later, it was a policy 

that “should have been done long before.” In many ways the 

turning point of the siege at Khe Sanh was the flexible air response under a single manager, which began in March. 

Momyer believed that it was.65 

Arc Light Operations Continue 

From the beginning of Arc Light in 1965 and throughout the 

remainder of US involvement in Vietnam, American leadership 

employed the B-52s in a number of ways. Primary among 

these was aerial interdiction, especially of the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail. It later became a key weapon during the Commando 

Hunt operations of 1968–72. 

One of the first interdiction missions came during 12–26 April 

1966 when B-52s bombed NVA infiltration routes through the 

Mu Gia pass between NVN and Laos. Among the targets were 

trucks, road work crews, and air defense sites. Westmoreland 

continued to rave over the results, declaring at one point that 

“we know, from talking to many prisoners and defectors, that 

the enemy troops fear B-52s.” The annual report by Headquarters Military Region (MR) VII—captured during Operation 

Silver City II, by the 173d Airborne Battalion on 14 March 

1966—seemed to confirm the general’s argument that “there 

was some evidence of reluctance [by enemy forces] of performing missions for fear of B-52 aircraft.”66 

While there can be little doubt that B-52 raids struck terror 

into the VC and NVA, one must question the effectiveness of 

these strikes. After two weeks of attacks along the Mu Gia 

pass, MACV requested that CINCPAC allow the strikes to continue because the traffic flow had returned to prestrike levels. 

27 
CINCPAC replied that while interdiction operations were important, he could “not allow additional B-52 strikes because of 

the increased danger from SA-2 missiles: ‘Past Arc Light 

strikes have closed Mu Gia for relatively short periods of time. 

Results of future strikes probably would not improve this situation significantly. As circumstances stand now, further 

strikes do not appear justified unless the results can be offset 

by reducing the threat anticipated.’ ”67 The reply not only 

demonstrated the potential futility of the entire interdiction effort but also demonstrated CINCPAC’s justifiable concerns 

over Soviet surface-to-air-missiles (SAM), which had been 

placed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

In 1966, B-52s dropped an average of 8,000 bombs per month 

and flew a total of 5,000 bombing sorties. By contrast, US tactical aircraft flew 355,000 sorties and 74,000 fixed-wing missions. In March the JCS had approved Westmoreland’s request 

to set the monthly B-52 sortie rate at 450, which he then 

raised to 800 in June 1966. The previously mentioned bomb 

shortage kept this number to 450 until August, while the actual sorties did not reach 800 until March 1967. By late 1967, 

Arc Light had already cost $780 million.68 

On 1 July 1966, the first Arc Light quick-run operations began 

when six B-52s of the 4252d Strategic Wing, Guam, and six 

KC-135s, Kadena AB initiated a modified alert system, which reduced response time to nine hours from notification to time over 

target. It allowed field commanders to concentrate bombing with 

the support of the Combat Skyspot rapid-response targeting system, a ground-directed-bombing system in South Vietnam employing SAC mobile ground radar units. It increased MACV targeting latitude, and the selection of targets no longer depended 

on a nearby prominent geographical feature. B-52s could be 

guided to targets as long as they were within range of a Skyspot 

radar point. One report noted, “Accuracy soon surpassed that of 

any previously used radar synchronous bombing.”69 While perhaps an exaggeration, clearly Skyspot upgraded bombing accuracy, especially regarding target location. 

As the sortie rates rose to 1,800 in March 1968, the turnover 

of trained pilots and crews soon caused a problem—the quantity 

of rated personnel was insufficient to fulfill SAC’s dual mission 

28 
role during the first three years of Arc Light. Pending separations, valid deferments, medical deferments, and so forth kept 

the number of qualified crews low, and since the skills necessary 

to fly nuclear and conventional bombers were different, training 

had to be altered in many cases to meet new requirements.70 

As early as 3 January 1967, overall Air Force pilot shortages 

required officials to recall 2,300 older pilots while instituting a 

new shorter and more intense training program to train 3,247 

new pilots per year. Continental US operations required fewer 

personnel to do similar jobs in SEA; thus the SAC units in theater drew on crews from all over SEA hampering other operations, such as Rolling Thunder. In one effort to solve this problem, SAC officials began assigning hundreds of personnel to 

179-day temporary duty assignments. The shortages continued while the divorce rate skyrocketed. In spite of every effort 

to remedy these problems, pilot and ground crew shortages remained a problem throughout the war.

71 

By mid-1967, B-52s began Arc Light operations from U Tapao 

RTAB, which meant they could fly two- to five-hour nonrefueled 

missions instead of the 12- to 15-hour missions from Guam, 

which included dangerous refueling rendezvous over the Pacific. 

On 13 September 1967, the final modified B-52D arrived in 

Guam; and even though crew training delayed the full use of 

these new large-capacity BUFFs, by the end of the year they 

were doubling the Arc Light bomb delivery rate. In late 1967, 

B-52 units in SEA were augmented by elements of the 306th, 

91st, 22d, 454th, 461st, and 99th BWs, allowing an increase 

in the number of Arc Light raids. B-52s flew nearly 9,700 

bombing sorties in 1967, twice the number flown in 1966. On 

6 May 1967, B-52s flew their 10,000th sortie having dropped 

190,000 tons of bombs.72 

By 1967 Arc Light was a growing enterprise. From 22 February to 14 May 1967—during Operation Junction City—B-52s 

flew 126 sorties and dropped 4,723 tons of bombs; of the 2,700 

enemy troops killed during the operation, 75 percent died under 

the rain of B-52 bombs, including Gen Nguyen Chi Thanh, commanding general, Central Office for South Vietnam.73 

Between 11 September and 31 October 1967, B-52s supported Marine units defending Con Thien and Gio Linh just 

29 
south of the DMZ. Fearing that enemy attacks were the prelude 

to a major offensive, allied forces countered these attacks with 

Operation Neutralize. B-52s flew 910 sorties during roundthe-clock operations against enemy gun positions six miles 

north of Con Thien. In total, 3,000 enemy troops were killed. 

In late 1967, B-52s flew 228 sorties against 32 targets during 

an engagement between the US 4th Infantry Division and the 

NVA 1st Division near the Special Forces camp at Dak To. The 

BUFFs also flew 36 more sorties in late November in support 

of US and ARVN forces fighting VC main force units near Loc 

Ninh. They made their deepest penetration into NVN up to that 

point when they attacked storage areas and truck traffic 102 

miles northwest of Con Thien.74 

In September 1967, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert S. 

McNamara requested a report on the air war from the Institute 

for Defense Analyses’ Jason Division, an ad hoc group of 87 

high-level scholars and scientists. Based on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) data, their December 1967 report declared, 

“the Jasons categorically reject bombing as an effective tool.” 

Rather than having been degraded, they determined that 

enemy transportation “actually had been improved because of 

added redundancy. Where one road had existed previously, 

several had been built.” Citing this evidence, they judged, “we 

are unable to devise a bombing campaign in the North to reduce the flow of infiltrating personnel into [South Vietnam] 

SVN.”75 

In spite of this compelling report, the JCS tenaciously clung 

to their belief in the effectiveness of the bombing and made 10 

new recommendations they believed would make the air war 

more effective. A few of these recommendations were removal 

of all restrictions on military targets, the ability to mine all 

ports, and the wider use of the B-52s throughout the theater. 

Johnson wrestled with both opinions. In spite of domestic and 

foreign political and economic pressure to end the costly war, 

he was still determined to see the war to a successful conclusion. He desperately wanted a conventional strategy to defeat 

the enemy; but every time the JCS demanded more freedom to 

bomb enemy sanctuaries, Johnson wondered if their next request would be to “bomb targets in China.” In a moment of 

30 
utter frustration, he lashed out at several officers, “bomb, 

bomb, bomb, that’s all you know.”76 

One of the most significant B-52 operations occurred during 

the NVA’s siege of the Marine base at Khe Sanh, which began 

in late January 1968. During Operation Niagara (14 January–31 March 1968), B-52s flew 2,707 sorties dropping 75,631 

tons of bombs—using a scheduling technique known as Bugle 

Note—in which ground radar and ground crews kept aloft an 

unbroken stream of three to six aircraft which struck enemy 

targets every three hours. The B-52 three-aircraft cells arrived 

over a predesignated interception point, where they were 

picked up by Skyspot ground radar and directed to a series of 

specific targets. This way, targets could be changed up to two 

hours prior to target time. These tactics also meant that the 

BUFFs could virtually bomb the enemy around the clock.77 

At first, the targets were staging areas, storage sites, and artillery positions 3,300 yards outside the Marines’ outer perimeter. Later, US reconnaissance units discovered an enemy bunker 

complex inside the buffer zone. Beginning on 26 February, B52s and other aircraft began strikes within one-sixth mile of US 

lines. The BUFFs proved their accuracy. During the 589 close-in 

sorties, there was no US damage.78 

Johnson referred to the Khe Sanh air campaign as “the most 

overwhelming, intelligent, and effective use of airpower in the 

history of warfare.” Westmoreland added, “The thing that broke 

their back basically was the fire of the B-52s.” A captured NVA 

officer estimated that 75 percent of his 1,800-man regiment 

had been killed by a single Arc Light strike.79 

In April, B-52s flew in support of Operation Pegasus, the 1st 

Cavalry Division’s (Mobile) spearhead to break through enemy 

positions on Route 9 and end the siege at Khe Sanh. Later in 

the same month, they supported Operation Delaware, a sweep 

of enemy positions near the Laotian border in the A Shau Valley west of Da Nang. The B-52s flew 726 sorties and hit 123 

targets. Between 19 April and 24 June 1968, B-52s supported 

Operation Turnpike, an effort to impede “the infiltration of the 

unprecedented volume of men and material flowing into South 

Vietnam” after the cessation of the Tet and Khe Sanh bombing 

raids. The targets were truck parks, storage areas, and troop 

31 
concentrations along the Laotian border. B-52s cut main artery roads in order to force traffic backups. Other B-52s then 

bombed the congested areas.80 

The pace of the air war changed in 1968 when Johnson 

halted US bombing of North Vietnam in an attempt to start serious peace negotiations. Even so, B-52 raids continued. Not 

only did regular Arc Light raids continue until 1973 but President Nixon would also later sanction secret Menu operations in 

Cambodia during 1969 and 1970, as well as six of the seven 

Commando Hunt Laotian interdiction operations that lasted 

from late 1968 to early 1972. For B-52s the coup de grâce would 

come during the Linebacker I and II strategic missions in 1972. 

Air Force Theory and Doctrine in the 1960s 

As air operations in SEA grew, established theory and doctrine had to wrestle with the realities of this kind of conflict. In 

the early 1960s, some USAF Academy and Air University (AU) 

papers and professional articles from the Air University Review 

examined the role of airpower in insurgency and guerrilla war. 

Most agreed with one 1962 Air Command and Staff College 

paper, “Air Power in the Fight against Guerrillas,” which declared that anyone who believed that conventional airpower 

was limited had “overlooked the inherent flexibility of the air 

vehicle. There is no such thing as limitations or impossible 

conditions, only incorrect tactics or poor employment.”81 While 

such a statement seems clear, the paper still does not fully 

elaborate on how airpower, particularly B-52s, should be applied. None of the other papers or articles from that era explained how airpower should be used in SEA, and none of the 

articles paid more than passing attention to the issues of nonconventional applications of airpower.

82 

During the late 1960s, only one significant study—”Counterinsurgency from 30,000 Feet”—appeared that examined the 

effects of B-52 antiguerrilla ground support operations on USAF 

doctrine. The study is an operational look at the subject in 

which Robert Kipp, a civilian historian with SAC, touted the effectiveness of the B-52 bomber in countering guerrilla forces. 

Unfortunately, the article was not an in-depth effort designed to 

32 
define any new airpower theory, clearly expound insurgency or 

limited war, or explain airpower’s role in such conflicts.83 

Official doctrine experienced a dramatic change with the 

publication in March 1967 of AFMAN 2-5, Tactical Air Operations Special Air Warfare. It was exclusively devoted to special 

air warfare; and it provided airmen with the first detailed and 

thoughtful analysis of special air warfare, defining it as the efforts to “strengthen or create resistance to enemy authority 

among the people within enemy territory.” The manual’s authors determined “that military and non-military counterinsurgency actions must be totally intertwined and mutually supporting.” They also called for the creation of “country teams,” 

which were to include diplomats, civilian aid personnel, information agents, military assistance advisors, and unified military command and military component command personnel. 

Such teams, they argued, should be used to establish and direct a unified strategy.84 

The manual also declared that the military component of 

strategy must be able to adjust to each phase of the insurgency conflict and that, within these phases, special air warfare endeavors should range from nation building to open 

combat. The manual emphasized that during combat it was 

very difficult to obtain totally accurate target identification. 

Such identification was very important, since “military actions 

by friendly units which kill or injure innocent civilians can 

lose the loyalty of an otherwise friendly village.” A clear understanding of insurgency theory led the authors to realize 

“the fact that both sides in an insurgency have the same ‘center of gravity’ [the people] and the objective of both sides is to 

capture the support of the population.”85 

This was no idle assertion. Throughout the Vietnam War one 

of the allies most difficult jobs was winning the hearts and 

minds of the common people. Most feared soldiers in any uniform because they had always brought death and destruction. 

The whole basis of the elaborate and expensive pacification program that the United States attempted with varying levels of 

success and failure throughout the war was the need to befriend 

the villagers of South Vietnam. Such an understanding by 

33 
airmen would seem to have been fundamental to air operations, 

especially in South Vietnam. However, in many ways it was not. 

Of import to this study is the fact that such notions ran, and 

still run, counter to basic and traditional theories of strategic 

airpower. In these Douhetian theories, centers of gravity must 

include industrial, geographic, and/or military targets. The 

kind of special air warfare described in AFMAN 2-5 was based 

on joint operations not only with military ground forces but 

also with civilian pacification personnel and in-country nationals. Therefore, the main job of the Air Force would predominantly range from airlift of supplies to friendly military forces 

and from humanitarian aid to local villages to tactical air and 

gunship CAS operations. This airpower would be a low and slow 

type, not high and fast. The use of strategic weapons—such as 

the B-52—and strategic missions would be limited under the 

tenets of AFMAN 2-5. It provided a set of suppositions and airpower concepts that would have taken time to plant and cultivate in the minds and hearts of airmen still almost totally immersed in traditional strategic theory and doctrine. Perhaps it 

was unreasonable to expect them to do so. 

Equal in importance to AFMAN 2-5 was the Air Force’s creation of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) 

in April 1961 at Eglin AFB, Florida. A year later, the 4400th 

CCTS was absorbed into the Special Air Warfare Center, also 

located at Eglin. Both were the product of the Kennedy administration’s genuine concerns over insurgency warfare. The 

4400th CCTS (also known as Jungle Jim) trained and indoctrinated foreign airmen, including South Vietnamese, and developed counterinsurgency tactics and methodology. The center enlarged this mission in 1962 and even developed specialized 

tactics and procedures to counter guerrilla techniques.86 

In late 1961, with the dispatch of air personnel to Vietnam 

during the Farmgate program, one would have expected that 

this exposure to insurgency to result in the inclusion of such 

issues in official doctrine, even if at a lower level. Although 

General LeMay’s policy paper on guerrilla war acknowledged 

the existence of such conflict, it defined it as a “lesser” conflict 

and not a “different” kind of war.

87 

34 
During the AFA national convention of 1962, the Special Air 

Warfare Center sponsored a symposium on limited war. Brig 

Gen Gilbert L. Pritchard spoke on counterinsurgency, which 

was later published by the Air Force. He discussed the formation of classic guerrilla strategies and tactics and proposed 

methods for countering these techniques and the forces using 

them. General Pritchard asked for “close coordination and cooperation of airpower with other forms of military power and 

with nonmilitary government agencies in a comprehensive and 

integrated campaign—including civic action and ‘nation-building.’ ”88 Clearly, the concepts of AFMAN 2-5 were already present 

in this speech. 

Keeping a Historical Account 

There were many researchers and historians in the Air Force 

who recognized important lessons. They recorded these lessons for future leaders to examine in both the Project Current 

Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations 

(CHECO) and Corona Harvest publications. 

Project CHECO 

Project CHECO was created by the Air Force on 3 March 1962 

“to secure an appropriate documentation of Air Force actions 

in SEA both for support of immediate on-going requirements 

and for eventual historical purposes.” A lieutenant colonel, 

major, and civilian historian originally staffed the primary offices. CHECO proved to be a remarkably frank group of writers and researchers. Lt Col Donald F. Martin became project 

chief on 1 May 1964, and by the end of the year he and his 

staff had completed the first project—a six-volume History of 

the War in Vietnam, October 1961–December 1963.

89 

In early 1965 the project was reorganized, and the CHECO 

Division established with Col Edward C. Burtenshaw serving 

as chief under the Directorate of Tactical Evaluation, DCS 

Plans and Operations, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), Saigon. The 

field chief in Vietnam was Kenneth Sams. In May 1965, officials changed CHECO’s designation to Current Historical 

Evaluation of Combat Operations. They also moved it under 

35 
the PACAF Office of Information and determined that CHECO 

publications should include current history appraisals of all 

Air Force combat operations, not just counterinsurgency. 

Under the direction of the Air Force director of Plans in Washington, CHECO’s ever-expanding staff processed requests 

from various commanders and Air Staff members for the creation of one-time studies of specific air campaigns, missions, 

or programs, as well as recurring, regularly produced histories 

of various units and programs.90 

Two-man teams were to take two months to research and 

produce reports. Some included trips into the field with air 

components. None of the reports had any historical perspective, but the field teams collected large amounts of raw data 

that proved historically valuable in later years. By the summer 

of 1968, the staff in Saigon totaled five civilians, three officers, 

and two airmen who were often augmented by USAF Academy 

instructors during the summer months. At the same time, the 

term Combat in CHECO was changed to Contemporary. 

By August 1968, the Air Force vice chief of staff had made 

CHECO the sole USAF document and data collection agency in 

SEA. Concurrently, members conducted dozens of interviews 

with key personnel. These documents later became a valuable 

source for books and articles written about the US air war in 

SEA, especially in South Vietnam. They also proved invaluable 

to airmen studying their difficult role in Vietnam during the 

war. While CHECO products were not used to formulate doctrine, the data in them was the component of both official and 

unofficial theory for many years.91 

Corona Harvest 

Of equal importance was the 1965 creation of Project Loyal 

Look, later known as Corona Harvest. The use of B-52s in Arc 

Light and the disagreement about its effectiveness played a direct role in the insistence, in late 1965, by Dr. Charles Herzfeld, 

director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, and Maj Gen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, retired, special assistant to the US 

ambassador, Saigon, on a bombing and firepower survey along 

the lines of the World War II Strategic Bombing Survey. Based 

on this suggestion, on 23 November 1966 Air Force Vice Chief 

36 
of Staff Bruce K. Holloway assigned AU personnel to undertake 

the survey under the designation Loyal Look.92 

Renamed Corona Harvest on 13 April 1967, AU Aerospace 

Studies Institute personnel were tasked to define lessons 

learned, measure airpower effectiveness, “assess the validity 

of current concepts and doctrine in light of airpower operations,” and recommend modifications to existing concepts and 

doctrine to ensure they were more effective. The first results 

came in 1969 with the Battelle Memorial Institute publication 

of a chronological compendium titled Communist Policy Towards 

Southeast Asia, 1954–1969.

93 

Beginning in the summer of 1967, AU faculty and students 

undertook numerous projects, including research and writing 

of publications using JCS, National Security Council, SECDEF 

files, Air Force senior-level papers, and major commands 

(MA JCOM) documents. They spent three months researching 

specific topics of interest, receiving input from 19 commands 

and agencies covering 47 functional areas grouped into tasks, 

hardware, personnel, support activities, and plans, concepts, 

and doctrine. These publications—which focused on more specific topics—were divided into four phases: Phases I and II, 

1954–64; Phase III, 1964 to mid-1968; Phase IV, mid-1968-

end of 1969; and Phase V, 1970–73. The last two were added 

after the original project began.94 

All publications were reviewed first by a panel of tactical and 

technical experts and later by a board of senior officers. The 

entire process proved very time-consuming and labor-intensive, expending more than 10,000 man-hours by 1970. Many 

of the opinions and conclusions ran counter to accepted Air 

Force policy; and when senior officers began their reviews of 

these reports, the “Pentagon Papers” were leaked to the public, thus making many in the Air Force nervous. In January 

1971, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff John C. Meyer directed that 

the conclusions be redone in-house.95 

AU was phased out of the process after completing 11 full reports and 45 backup working papers. From 1970 to 1973, 

PACAF produced 12 working papers. Little of the information 

was distributed to the USAF, much less to the scholarly community. In 1974 the new Vice Chief of Staff Richard H. Ellis 

37 
called General Momyer—the former TAC and Seventh Air Force 

commander, who had then recently retired—out of retirement 

to head a steering committee to publish, for public consumption, various conclusions from the Corona Harvest project so 

USAF personnel could use them. The committee assigned Lt 

Gen Felix M. Rogers, AU commander, to set up a review committee to declassify as much of the Corona Harvest data as 

possible. The primary working assignment eventually fell to 

three senior colonels who developed and disseminated 800 lessons learned and recommendations. The principal directors 

were Colonels John E. Van Duyn and Robert L. Gleason.96 

Summary 

While there were many positive lessons from which to draw in 

these reports, both men believed that the great efforts of 

Corona Harvest fell short in two important areas. Van Duyn 

and Gleason were particularly disappointed that the project 

was “unable to accomplish its principal purpose: a meaningful 

evaluation of overall airpower effectiveness.” Colonel Gleason 

admitted, “one of the ‘stark realities’ of Corona Harvest was 

the identification of the fact that ‘airpower effectiveness and 

airpower efficiency were two different things.’ ”97 

They concluded that old standards of measuring performance 

had to change because sortie rates, the number of bombs 

dropped, and so on equaled efficiency, not effectiveness. Gleason observed, “halting 90 percent of an enemy truck LOC 

[lines of communications] would be less than 90 percent effective if the enemy only needed 5 percent of those trucks to 

sustain operations.”98 This was a lesson that was lost in the 

numerical glut of truck kills, which flowed forth during Commando Hunt. The lack of precedence for such measurements 

and the lack of enemy feedback or reaction to the bombing 

hindered reporting in Vietnam—a significant point in view of 

the fact that the enemy had as much as anyone to do with the 

American defeat.99 

As General Momyer later declared, “the nature of the terrain, 

character of the fighting, and lack of conventional battle lines 

prevented the traditional measures of effectiveness of tactical 

air.”100 General Spike Momyer’s appraisal is undoubtedly correct, 

38 
yet the Corona Harvest project—while not as useful as hoped for 

at the time—has proved a vital source of raw data for those writing about the air war in Vietnam. Like the CHECO reports, 

Corona Harvest papers and books have been the basis for 1970s, 

1980s, and 1990s official Air Force publications and nonofficial 

academic writings. Both have had a great impact on Air Force 

doctrine and theory. Both have been at the center of the major 

changes made in leadership, technology, and doctrine within the 

USAF. At the time, this data had less effect on circumstances 

and policy decisions than they might have if the political atmosphere in the United States had been less charged. Even so, their 

effect on doctrinal and theoretical evolution in the post–Vietnam 

era is significant and worthy of examination by all scholars. 

Such policy statements and early data collection led to the 

previously mentioned two-page chapter in the 1964 basic doctrine manual and the AFMAN 2-5 manual of 1967 on special 

air warfare. But, by 1965, the continuous fluctuation of policies in Vietnam by US political leaders meant that most of 

these ideas were ignored. The Air Force was heavily committed 

to prepare for what it thought would be a classic strategic 

bombing campaign it originally hoped would be against NVN. 

Original Air Force plans required use of B-52s as the centerpiece of the blitz it believed would destroy Hanoi’s industrial 

capacity. The plan never unfolded the way airmen had hoped. 

Instead of strategic bombers pulverizing urban and industrial 

targets, President Johnson—fearing Chinese intervention and 

Soviet nuclear confrontation—used a cautious, measured air 

campaign employing tactical aircraft attacking the 94-target 

list. Airmen soon found themselves stymied by political restrictions and bombing pauses, the final pause ending Rolling 

Thunder in November 1968.101 

Many airmen argued that such restrictions did not provide 

a true test of the classic theories, especially since B-52s had 

been relegated to ground support missions in the South. Critics 

pointed out that the basic components necessary to carry out 

an effective strategic air war were missing in NVN because it 

was not a modern industrial state. 

Adding confusion to the airpower experience in Vietnam was 

the success of both 1972 Linebacker air campaigns, which 

39 
apologists viewed as vindication of the military policies used in 

Vietnam. Some even claimed that Linebacker was a clear sign 

that had they been given free reign from the outset, Linebackerstyle raids could have quickly and successfully prosecuted the 

conflict. But this ignored the major changes in the nature and 

tempo of the war and the change in the international political 

environment and the growing limitations of US goals. The fact 

that Nixon became president in 1969 and that Dr. Henry A. 

Kissinger began the processes for détente during the Nixon 

presidency changed the focus of the war. For airmen, these 

changes meant that by 1971 Air Force doctrine would ease 

away from insurgency issues and move back toward conventional airpower theories of the 1950s.102 

Menu Bombing 

While the focus of the air war—at least under President 

Johnson—seemed to be Rolling Thunder, in total, NVN absorbed 

only about one-million tons of bombs or about 12 percent of all 

bombs dropped in SEA during American involvement in 

Vietnam. By contrast, approximately four-million tons fell on 

South Vietnam, three million on Laos, and 500,000 on 

Cambodia. As Nixon became president, political circumstances 

constrained him from initiating a new bombing campaign over 

NVN, even if he had wanted to. There were exceptions to these 

restrictions, such as “protective reaction strikes” against targets 

in NVN’s southern panhandle and one-time raids such as 

Operation Proud Deep Alpha and the Son Tay raids; but for the 

most part, the air war shifted to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and 

Laos in 1969.103 

The program for the withdrawal of US ground forces, later 

known as Vietnamization, had not yet been articulated; but as 

Dr. Earl H. Tilford Jr. notes in Crosswinds, “The US Air Force 

had disengaged itself spiritually (but not physically) from the 

war.” The new SECAF Robert C. Seamans Jr. made this clear 

to the AFA convention on 19 March 1969: “There seems to be 

a trend toward viewing all national questions in the context of 

the frustrating struggle against aggression in Vietnam. . . . 

But there is no doubt that, however frustrated we are with the 

40 
conflict in Vietnam, the cost of failure to provide adequate 

forces for our security could be infinitely higher than the cost 

of Southeast Asia.”104 His remarks clearly mirrored the growing realization among senior leaders that, as important as Vietnam was, it was only one part of a larger strategic conflict 

against a competing ideology unfriendly to US interests. 

While Commando Hunt I began under Johnson in November 1968, the secret bombing of neutral Cambodia—known as 

the Menu operations—began during the Nixon years. This 

campaign was directed at enemy base areas and logistics networks supporting operations in and around the region of 

South Vietnam nearest to Saigon. Washington hoped Hanoi 

would curtail its resupply of forces after Johnson curtailed 

northern bombing. Instead, MACV reported that the flow had 

increased and that more than 10,000 tons of arms had been 

sent to “Sihanoukville” in Cambodia and then shipped south. 

Nixon was determined to cut this flow to gain time to disengage from the conflict and to prevent any Tet-style uprising 

that might delay this process. Nixon knew he risked antiwar 

protests by bombing the North, so he decided to send a message to Hanoi by bombing the Cambodian sanctuaries.105 

On 18 March 1969—after considerable internal debate—the 

first series of secret B-52 air strikes (code-named Breakfast) 

began against Base Area 353, a logistical supply and storage 

area three miles inside Cambodia. In May the president ordered further raids, dubbed Supper, Lunch, Dessert, and 

Snack—thus the name Menu bombing. B-52s flew 804 sorties 

against 140 targets in support of the ARVN Special Forces 

camp at Ben Het in Western Sector, II Corps. Raids continued 

for two months in both areas.106 

While the Arc Light raids were open and above board, Menu 

missions were not. For the USAF these missions went beyond 

even normal covert operations. Personnel involved had to deceive USAF officials and falsify official records. The White 

House, the source of this deception, even kept knowledge of 

the operations from the Air Force chief of staff and the SECAF. 

The plans worked out by Col Ray B. Sitton, a one-time SAC officer, used Arc Light raids to cover the Menu raids. Formations 

were sent together—sometimes in the same groups, sometimes 

41 
at the same time. While Arc Light groups hit southern targets, 

Menu groups crossed the border. Menu pilots later falsified reports, stating they had bombed South Vietnam.107 

Fourteen months after they began, the Menu raids were 

halted on 26 May 1970. The New York Times exposed the raids 

following the Cambodian invasion. During the raids, B-52s 

flew 3,630 sorties and dropped 100,000 tons of bombs. In addition, 763 Arc Light raids also supported US and ARVN forces 

as they overtly invaded Cambodia on 1 May 1970 near the 

Parrot’s Beak and Fishhook areas. During 1970, 8 percent of 

USAF combat sorties went into Cambodia increasing to 14 

percent the next year. This emphasis shifted in March 1972, 

when the NVA invaded the South. Overt bombing of Cambodia 

lasted from June 1970 to August 1973.108 

In 1970 as the US disengagement policy expanded, so did the 

war. That year, neutralist and procommunist Cambodian Prime 

Minister Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown. The Cambodian 

government, with its inadequate military, now openly supported 

the United States; but the Communists were not about to give 

up their Cambodian bases. Cambodia was now in the war, the 

goal of US policy was further jeopardized, and the only potentially positive aspect of Menu operations was that it possibly 

prevented a large-scale NVA attack that would have allowed the 

US political right or South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van 

Thieu to block US withdrawal. However, to date there is still no 

hard evidence that any such attack was imminent.109 

Commando Hunt Operations 

In the early 1950s, as the Vietminh struggled to dislodge the 

French from SEA, they built a rudimentary network of infiltration roads to supply their units to the South. After the 

French left and Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel, the 

new leadership in Hanoi formed contacts with southern factions to reunify Vietnam under a communist regime. In 1957 

communist guerrilla units supported by the North were established; and over the last two years of the decade, the NLF began 

to act as the political arm of this antigovernment movement in 

South Vietnam. Hanoi also created the 559th Transportation 

42 
Group to furnish the southern guerrillas with material support from the North. These dirt roads and footpaths were the 

origins of what later became known as Ho Chi Minh Trail.110 

By 1964 the circumstances in the South were in a state of 

flux; the intractable Catholic strongman Ngo Dinh Diem had 

been overthrown and killed during a coup in November 1963. 

The focus of US aid and hopes for preserving an anticommunist southern state in Vietnam, Ngo’s demise had left South 

Vietnam with a leadership void and soon near total collapse. 

At the same time, a special northern mission to the South, led 

by Col Bui Tin, determined that “there was little hope that the 

insurrectionists could, at their current level of support from the 

north, prevail against the Republic of Vietnam, which [is] . . . the 

object of lavish American subsidies.” Hanoi determined to up 

the ante and as Washington made plans to commit combat 

forces, NVN decided to send its regular forces to fight in South 

Vietnam.111 

Between April and December of 1964, more than 10,000 

NVA, including the first tactical units, traveled South to support the VC. At the same time, northern engineers, led by Col 

Dong Si Nguyen, began to upgrade the road network through 

Laos that would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In 

spite of the inhospitable terrain in the Laotian panhandle—or 

Steel Tiger as the United States dubbed the area—the NVA 

road builders carved roads through mountain passes from 

NVN into Laos during good or bad weather, across the limestone cliffs, and through the mountains as high as 5,000 feet. 

They pushed through jungles, cut through bamboo forests, 

and forded rivers like the Xe Pon. As Stanley Karnow writes, 

“the Communist had added a new dimension to the struggle.” 

But this was only the beginning, since the men and supplies 

that would move down the new infiltration routes in 1964 were 

“a trickle compared to the numbers three years later, when 

they were pouring into South Vietnam at the rate of twenty 

thousand or more per month.”112 

By 1971 the 559th Transportation Group, now the 559th 

Military Region, had expanded the Ho Chi Minh Trail from a 

fragile net of jungle footpaths into thousands of miles of welltended motor roads. Hanoi subdivided southern Laos into 15 

43 
semiautonomous military districts or Binh Trams, each with a 

commander responsible for all functions, including control of 

transportation, engineer, antiaircraft, liaison, and support battalions. The transportation battalions moved supplies through 

each district; engineer battalions built and repaired roads, and 

moved supplies if needed; liaison battalions managed the infiltration of personnel along trails separate from those used for 

supplies; while support groups provided food, shelter, medical 

services, and other staff functions.113 

In 1964 US leaders realized these supply routes had to be 

closed by aerial interdiction, but until November 1968 air assets were busy with Rolling Thunder. Most US efforts were 

aimed at southern ground operations while US ground forces 

attempted to destroy northern units and supplies once they 

reached South Vietnam. Laos was bombed, but the full brunt 

of US airpower was not felt in the Laotian panhandle until 

after Tet revealed the importance of the trail. 

On 31 October 1968, Johnson called a halt to US bombing 

operations in NVN, in an effort to restart negotiations in Paris. 

The next day, CINCPAC Adm John S. McCain Jr. communicated the halt to forces in SEA at 2100 hours Saigon time. An 

Air Force officer, Maj Frank Lenahan, in an F-4C flew the last 

Rolling Thunder mission over the panhandle area at 1930 

hours from the 8th Tactical Airlift Wing.114 

Ironically, on 15 November 1968, Commando Hunt I became the first of seven such operations, each lasting approximately six months and alternating from the winter/spring dry 

season (November–April) to summer/fall monsoon/wet season 

(May–September). Attacks concentrated on four primary kinds 

of targets: trucks traveling on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, using 

primarily AC-119 and AC-130 gunships; the road network, including truck parks, rest areas, et cetera; terrain, such as 

passes, river fords, and jungles; and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) 

and SAM sites which the enemy placed along the route. The 

USAF used laser-guided bombs on the later targets—usually 

delivered by tactical air (TACAIR) as well as bridges. The B-52s 

were particularly effective against the passes and stationary 

targets, such as trucks congregated at choke points.115 

44 
The Seventh Air Force bombed using one-square-mile boxes 

labeled A, B, C, and D representing the Ban Kari, Mu Gia, Ban 

Raving, and Nape passes. An average of 27 B-52 sorties per 

day attacked these boxes, while by Commando Hunt V tactical aircraft averaged 125 sorties per day. The Igloo White sensor system—created by Task Force Alpha at Nakhon Phanom 

RTAB in December 1967—guided the attacks. Originally set 

up to target enemy troop movements around Khe Sanh, it 

worked well for the Commando Hunt truck-killing campaigns. 

During 1968, B-52s supported this operation with 838 sorties 

in Laos, and 156 sorties to support Steel Tiger South below 16' 

30o north latitude. They averaged 21 sorties per day and flew 

twice as many during specific surge periods.116 

While these operations worked well at first, USAF schedules 

became predictable, and the enemy soon adapted their movements accordingly. Generally, the enemy used the trail from 

0400 to 0800 and 1600 and 2000 hours which “coincided with 

shift changes at US bases and with changes in the deployment 

of aircraft. Fighter-bombers usually arrived on station after 

dawn, at around 0800. Pilots preferred to bomb after the sun 

had fully risen to avoid visual misperceptions more common in 

the half-light of dawn or dusk.” It was better to be shot down 

early in the day—pilots had a better chance of rescue and 

would not have to risk spending the night in the jungle.117 

Initially, Commando Hunt operations were confined to a 

1,700 square mile sector of Laos bordering South Vietnam. 

Commando Hunt I employed 40 percent of its sorties to cut the 

narrow roads of the trail, while 35 percent attacked trucks and 

storage areas and 10 percent attacked antiaircraft sites. The 

campaign ended on 30 April 1969, when analysts decided that 

US air forces had inflicted enough damage to force the enemy 

to use “water routes including the Cambodian port of Kompong 

Som.” By then average monthly tactical sortie levels, which had 

been 4,700 in October, had risen to 15,100 in December. The 

B-52 levels began at 273 sorties in October and rose to 600 by 

December. During 1968, B-52s flew 3,377 sorties over Laos; 

but as one author put it, “notwithstanding their rising material 

losses, the Communists doggedly continued to send a substantial flow of supplies through Laos into South Vietnam.”118 

45 
As the southwest monsoon season began in May 1969, US 

aircraft attacked the Laotian panhandle again, this time using 

B-52s to drop 500 lb and 750 lb bombs, which caused mud 

slides along the wet mountain passes and helped the rains 

close the roads. The enemy used frequent bad-weather-bombing 

pauses to rebuild the roads and to stage troops, trucks, and 

supplies along the North Vietnamese border. They also imported more and newer trucks, began construction of a petroleum, oil, and lubricants pipeline, and set up AAA defenses. 

With bombing of the North curtailed, the enemy built up its 

convoys in safe havens. As Seventh Air Force commander Gen 

George S. Brown put it, “the enemy had a ‘free ride’ to the borders of Laos and South Vietnam.”119 

As the next dry season dawned, the third campaign used 

seismic and acoustic sensors to detect truck movements—sensors that were unaffected by darkness and allowed spur-ofthe-moment gunship attacks to catch the enemy exposed. 

From November 1969 to April 1970, B-52s supported Commando Hunt III; during April and May, they also supported 

ground operations in both Laos and Cambodia. However, “during Commando Hunt III the tempo of air operations declined 

gradually.” In early 1970 intelligence estimates indicated that 

infiltration was down more than 50 percent. With growing domestic dissent and the ever-draining expense of what seemed 

to be a never-ending war to consider, Nixon cut the sortie ceiling 

on 26 February 1970, as Commando Hunt III wound down.120 

What most US analysts apparently failed to understand was 

that the enemy was rebuilding and waiting. In this guerrilla 

war the enemy required almost no logistics lines; their troops 

lived off the land, the people, and in this case foreign resupply 

of vital materials. Throughout the Second Indochina War the 

VC and NVA often pulled back from conventional combat, or 

even uprisings like Tet, to conserve their men and supplies 

while they negotiated and prepared for later campaigns. Such 

was the case between 1970 and 1972.121 

As Commando Hunt operations unfolded for the fourth time, 

B-52s were diverted to Operation Barrel Roll in northern Laos, 

which supported Maj Gen Vang Pao and his US operative 

forces—the Hmong—in their ever-widening struggles with the 

46 
Pathet Lao and the PAVN. In late 1970, as Commando Hunt V 

began, intelligence discovered vast stockpiles of NVA supplies 

around Tchepone at the upper end of the trail, a supply hub 

for enemy forces headed south. Fearing this was the buildup 

for an attack on Thau Thien and Quang Tri provinces in 

northern South Vietnam, US leaders attacked the depot using 

ARVN ground troops and US aircraft. Like the earlier bombing 

of Cambodia, this Laotian incursion was designed to buy time 

for the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam.122 

Phase one of the Laotian invasion, code-named Lom Son 719, 

commenced on 30 October 1970 as US aircraft cleared Quang 

Tri and set up a logistics base on the Laotian border near the Khe 

Sanh and Vandegrift Marine bases. The USAF delivered 20,000 

tons of supplies and more than 12,000 ARVN soldiers in preparation for the ground attack. Phase two began on 8 February 

1971, and by the 23d more than 17,000 ARVN had entered Laos 

supported by gunships, TACAIR, and 399 B-52 sorties. 

On the 25th, 24,000 NVA combat troops counterattacked. This 

larger-than-anticipated force was also supported by 120 tanks, 

large numbers of AAA batteries, and dozens of mortars and artillery pieces. The ARVN offensive bogged down on 3 March, and 

a week later another enemy counterstroke forced the ARVN 

ground commander Lt Gen Hoang Xuan Lam to order a withdrawal. The retreat soon turned into a rout. Aided by US helicopters airlifting survivors and B-52 strikes covering the withdrawal, most of the ARVN were extracted by 24 March. 

BUFFs flew 1,358 sorties and dropped 32,000 tons of bombs, 

while TACAIR flew more than 8,000 sorties. Some bombs were 

used to blast open landing zones (LZ) for helicopters supporting the ground advance toward Tchepone. The operation officially ended on 6 April 1971. US helicopter crews saved thousands of ARVN soldiers, but the cost was high, with 107 

helicopters lost and 600 damaged. The United States lost 176 

killed, 1,042 wounded, and 42 missing—many dying to saving 

their South Vietnamese allies. Enemy losses—mostly due to 

air strikes—included 14,000 killed and 4,800 wounded as well 

as 20,000 tons of food and ammunition, 156,000 gallons of 

fuel, 1,530 trucks, 74 tanks, and 6,000 individual weapons 

captured or destroyed. The ARVN lost 1,519 killed; 5,423 

47 
wounded; 651 missing; 75 tanks; dozens of personnel carriers; 

198 crew-served weapons; and 3,000 individual weapons. Perhaps worst of all, during the ARVN retreat they abandoned 

large quantities of undamaged weapons and supplies, later 

salvaged and used by the enemy. 

Commando Hunt VI lasted from May to October 1971 as a 

diminished operation. Meanwhile, the enemy flow of traffic 

down the trail grew markedly. The Communists added 140 

miles of new roads; and by October they had more than 2,170 

miles of single-lane roads, multi-lane roads, parallel routes, 

bypasses, and spur roads in Laos. They also added 344 AAA 

batteries, new MiG bases in southern NVN, and dozens of SA2 SAM sites, most of which were along the Laotian–North Vietnam border. One estimate placed 96,000 NVA in Laos, 63,000 

in Cambodia, and 200,000 in South Vietnam. As a result, concerned US leaders planned one final massive campaign.123 

Plans for Commando Hunt VII called for US air forces to bottle up the enemy’s transport system within Laos, using B-52s 

to close the passes leading from NVN into Laos and then from 

Laos into Cambodia and South Vietnam. Planners hoped to 

force enemy vehicles to congregate in truck parks where they 

would be attacked and destroyed. Concurrently, BUFFs would 

bomb other roads to divert traffic to specific routes where gunships and tactical bombers could attack exposed vehicles with 

predictable success. These were the plans but as we have 

seen, operations do not always go as planned.124 

At the outset, plans had to be altered when US intelligence 

discovered 310 additional miles of uncharted main roads, as 

well as hundreds of miles of small back-road cutoffs and bypasses that helped to keep supplies rolling. In the early years, 

the enemy built roads along the paths of least resistance— 

usually near rivers or in valleys—which made them vulnerable 

to flooding and mud slides. As they gained experience and better equipment, roads were built at higher altitudes. Most were 

12–15 feet wide and surfaced with gravel, logs, or bamboo 

where drainage was poor; while this network could not sustain 

heavy traffic during the rainy season, some traffic always 

could pass through.125 

48 
Road maintenance during Commando Hunt VII required 

96,000 support personnel—an increase of 35,000 from 1971. 

When Laotian roads were unusable during the rainy season, 

the enemy partially compensated by developing rivers as alternative means of transportation because the rains that made 

the roads impassable provided the rivers with powerful currents to carry supply containers rapidly over long distances. 

The enemy often used the Kong and Banhiang rivers, whose 

tributaries flowed across the DMZ into Laos, locating transshipment points several miles apart where supplies were unloaded using nets and booms and stored for transport by 

trucks or porters.126 

The enemy also constructed pipelines. Three ran into Laos 

from Vinh in the North Vietnamese panhandle near dock facilities, where Communist bloc tankers docked, through the 

Mu Gia pass to points along the northern parts of the trail and 

serviced truck parks and other facilities in and around Ban 

Phanop. Another ran “through the Ban Raving Pass to a distribution point near Tchepone.” From here other lines “extended to the Lao Bao Pass and the A Shau Valley, both major 

entrances into South Vietnam.” They were made of Sovietimported plastic pipes connected with metal couplings. These 

Soviet-made pumps pumped motor oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, 

and kerosine. A variety of “petroleum products could be sent 

along the same line. Water mixed with detergent separated the 

shipments and prevented contamination.”127 

Of all the Commando Hunt operations, Commando Hunt VII 

(1 November 1971 to 31 March 1972) witnessed the greatest 

use of B-52s and also employed the latest airborne technology 

and weaponry available. OV-10 forward air control aircraft directed laser-guided bombs dropped by fighters directly on 

their targets. Target detection had been upgraded on most US 

aircraft, especially the AC-119, AC-130, and B-57Gs. Other 

upgrades included low-light-level televisions, illuminators, 

beacon-tracking radar, and infrared sensors. New F-4 fighter 

aircraft equipped with long-range electronic navigation 

(LORAN) position-fixing bombing systems provided all-weather 

bombing capabilities.128 

49 
Porters Transporting Supplies 

Porters are seen carrying supplies along one of the jungle footpaths that made 

up the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

50

Commando Hunt VII developed in three phases with initial 

operations centered in the Steel Tiger areas of Laos. Phase one 

began when US aircraft— primarily B-52s—struck the Mu 

Gia, Ban Karai, and Ban Raving passes as well as areas in the 

western DMZ. Concurrently, fighter-bombers with laserguided bombs attacked earth-moving equipment repairing 

roads. As the roads dried, the B-52s struck the southern 

routes at the Ban Raving pass and western DMZ to detour 

traffic through the northern Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes.129 

As planned, the B-52s bombed target boxes. The Mu Gia 

pass contained the “A” or Alpha boxes totaling 13 x 18 nautical miles (NM). The Ban Karai pass was designated with “B” or 

Bravo boxes that totaled 14 x 14 NM, while the Ben Raving 

pass had “C” or Charlie boxes that totaled 20 x 21 NM. The “D” 

or Delta boxes, located in the western DMZ, totaled 5 x 12 NM. 

During the first three weeks tactical aircraft and B-52s 

dropped 14,400 instantaneously fuzed 500 lb bombs, 17,100 

750 lb bombs, as well as a few dozen 2,000 lb laser-guided 

bombs, MK-36 magnetic-influence mines, and cluster bomb 

unit antipersonnel mines.130 

The initial bombing appraisal determined that enemy traffic 

had been slowed some of the time in some places. But by 4 November intelligence indicated that the Mu Gia pass roads were 

already being repaired, and that the traffic flow was near normal levels. During 10–17 November, bombing resumed, again 

making major cuts in the passes. Even so, the enemy proceeded to build up supplies in preparation for an offensive 

against South Vietnam.131 

During phase two, which began in late November, US aircraft struck the enemy units as they moved south. Roads were 

cut by B-52s, which left large craters and created choke points 

and blocking belts. As enemy truck traffic backed up, USAF 

fighters attacked with laser-guided bombs, using data gathered from Task Force Alpha sensors. They also seeded the area 

with air-dropped mines. As enemy units attempted to clear the 

mines or repair the roads, further attacks caught them exposed, causing great destruction.132 

During Commando Hunt VII, three major blocking belts were 

created—the Tchepone belt, composed of six blocking points 

51 
created from 23 November 1971 to 22 January 1972; the second, 40 miles south of Ban Bak with two points formed 24–26 

December; and the third belt near the Chavane pass first set 

up on 15 February and again on 2 March. The third belt 

proved nearly useless because the enemy abandoned this 

route at the outset. In the Tchepone belt, three blocking points 

were retained effectively until 2 February; however, point 427 

on Highway 92C was never actually closed because the NVA 

ignored other blocking points and concentrated on that one 

spot. Even though traffic slowed because of detours, the belt 

was always open. In spite of heavy bombing, neither of the Ban 

Bak points was closed for long. According to Seventh Air Force 

analysts, “the North Vietnamese were able to keep both points 

breached most of the time.”133 

The third phase began in early 1972 and shifted attacks to 

exit points from Laos into South Vietnam and Cambodia as 

well as against enemy AAA batteries. US TACAIR flew 31,500 

sorties, half by the USAF, while BUFFs flew 3,176 more; they 

lost 13 planes. Official reports claimed that large numbers of 

enemy vehicles were destroyed or damaged, thousands of NVA 

killed, and tens of thousands of tons of supplies destroyed. US 

officials declared the operations a success that prevented another Tet-style uprising.134 

On 31 March 1972, Commando Hunt came to a halt a day 

after Senior Gen Vo Nguyen Giap launched the Easter offensive 

into South Vietnam since “the resources of the US Air Force in 

SEA were insufficient, even with considerable augmentation, 

to continue interdiction in Laos while seeking to blunt the 

enemy’s bold thrust.”135 Concurrently, Seventh Air Force officials proudly claimed 4,727 truck kills and that only 5,024 of 

the 30,947 tons of supplies sent into Laos ever reached Cambodia or South Vietnam. Yet Brig Gen Alton D. Slay, who directed the operation, did not agree with this evaluation. He 

later declared that several factors explained, “the failure of the 

interdiction effort to produce a higher degree of success.”136 

Slay’s deputy—Brig Gen Richard G. Cross Jr.—echoed this in 

his end-of-tour report when he wrote, “this interdiction effort 

failed to prevent the enemy from positioning sufficient supplies 

to initiate an all-out offensive against South Vietnam.”137 

52 
For all the efforts of three and one-half years, Commando 

Hunt left many questions about its value. It probably helped 

buy time for the United States to withdraw its ground forces 

and begin Vietnamization, but as Dr. Tilford points out, “the 

strongest evidence against the reputed success of Commando 

Hunt was NVN’s launching of a major invasion against South 

Vietnam in late March 1972.” There are those who argue that 

the supplies and troops used in 1972 “had been carefully husbanded and stored in Laos over a period of four years.” Clearly 

many enemy soldiers and tons of supplies came south between 

the end of Tet and the start of Commando Hunt VII, which 

means that if Commando Hunt VII was a success, then the 

other Commando Hunt operations were not since the prepositioned supplies came through during the earlier operations.138 

Perhaps the greatest controversy comes from the vast claims 

of trucks destroyed. If one follows the official indices for success in all the operations (i.e., truck kills), then it should have 

been impossible for the enemy to ferry enough supplies south 

to launch any kind of offensive. After Commando Hunt V, 

MACV officials created a flurry of controversy when they estimated that 16,266 trucks had been destroyed and 4,700 damaged. In retort, the CIA pointed out that such a number “more 

than doubled the total number [of trucks] estimated in all of 

North Vietnam and Laos.”139 

Seventh Air Force officials claimed that US aircraft had destroyed 11,009 trucks and damaged 8,208—well above the 

4,727 destroyed and 5,882 damaged in Commando Hunt VII. 

In both cases, the criteria for truck damage claims were haphazard. If pilots saw a truck get hit and stop, they claimed it 

as destroyed. This basically proved nothing; when attacked, 

most truck drivers abandoned their vehicles to seek shelter. 

Thus most trucks hit by gunships might have holes in them, 

but they still might be usable. Later tests by US vehicle units 

proved that unless a truck blew up or burned, it could probably still be used. Besides, the enemy had many repair facilities 

along the trail, and trucks were quickly repaired.140 

It is worth noting that NVN was importing trucks from the 

Soviet bloc at a rate of between 4,500 in 1968 to around 

10,000 in 1972, and “even if the U.S. Air Force destroyed 

53 
4,727 trucks during Commando Hunt VII, such losses were 

probably insufficient to disrupt the logistical operations of the 

North Vietnamese for extended periods, if at all.” The Seventh 

Air Force estimated that at the beginning of Commando Hunt, 

there were 2,000 to 3,000 trucks in service along the trail. 

This estimate was probably based on how many trucks it 

would normally take to operate the infiltration routes. It ignores the fact that others—such as Task Force Alpha, using 

photographic reconnaissance—indicated that the Communists had about 9,850 trucks in storage. Eduard Mark, in his 

book Aerial Interdiction, argues that “even if it be assumed that 

the 3,000 [trucks] initially in Steel Tiger were destroyed twice 

over (which was not claimed), the North Vietnamese would still 

have been able to replace the trucks destroyed with those in 

reserve at the beginning of the dry season, to say nothing of 

those subsequently received from the Soviet Union and other 

Communist countries.”141 

The number of trucks getting through the trail was important mainly in regard to how much materiel got through to 

enemy troops in the South. Using sensors for detection, US 

analysts determined how many supplies were getting through 

from the number of trucks; they multiplied each truck by 

three tons in the wet season and by four tons, or the maximum payload of the communist trucks, when the roads were 

completely dry. The total number of estimated trucks was 

multiplied three or four tons to predict the tons of materiel 

starting out. Truck destruction, based on these figures, was 

then reduced by the number of trucks destroyed; and the 

throughput was then determined. Three tons were subtracted 

for each southbound truck hit, while 1.5 tons were subtracted 

for each truck in a truck park. An additional ton was subtracted if the truck was moving, but only one-half ton if it were 

stopped. If the direction of the truck could not be determined, 

the subtraction level was divided by two. An additional .2 tons 

was subtracted for observed fires at storage areas and one-half 

ton for an explosion.142 

The entire technocratic process was generally denounced by 

most intelligence operations, including the CIA, which dubbed it 

playing the numbers game since most of the factoring numbers 

54 
were purely arbitrary. Based on their own sources, usually 

agents inside the enemy forces, they concluded that “Communist forces in South Vietnam were only occasionally inconvenienced by interdiction.” The sensors were vulnerable to the 

damp climate and later to enemy circumvention, their reliability was and is suspect. The best evidence is that by March 

1972, 200 NVA tanks entered South Vietnam almost entirely 

undetected. The assumption of great materiel loss when a 

truck was disabled or damaged is also doubtful not only because trucks were easily repaired but also because of the simple, but effective, precautions the enemy took to save supplies, 

such as covering precious southbound supplies with bags of 

rice. If the trucks were hit with bullets or fragments, the bags 

absorbed them; and as long as the truck did not burn even if 

it was inoperable, the supplies got through.143 

Thousands of young men and women lived in work camps 

near the trail and quickly repaired it at night and during bad 

weather, extending the road network into small auxiliary roads 

through the dense jungle and underbrush, which diversified 

and actually improved it. The road system was too redundant 

and too easily repaired to be a good target. The communists 

also built an entire alternate route system in western Laos 

that was almost uncharted and nearly devoid of sensor coverage. Moreover, the years of bombing so defoliated the landscape that it “probably made it easier for the North Vietnamese 

to keep the passes open.” B-52 bomb patterns were so evenly 

distributed through a box that, on average, few bombs actually struck the narrow roads. Where they did, the enemy built 

temporary bypasses in defoliated areas where the soil, “tilled 

by thousands of bombs, had become easier to work.”144 

The enemy also traversed waterways and coastal water 

routes not often scrutinized or covered by US aircraft. The 

enemy floated, down the rivers, barrels and plastic bags of 

supplies that barely broached the surface and were difficult to 

detect from the air. Dams and channeling walls were also hard 

to hit and easy to repair, since after bombings the enemy collected the scattered dam stones, piled them back, and repaired the dams.145 

55 
The sensors, though effective at first, were soon discovered 

by the NVA forces who devised dozens of ways to circumvent 

or trick the sensors and those listening. Originally, the Commando Hunt VII sensor field consisted of 160 strings arrayed 

to monitor 33 potential target areas. Each string was to have 

eight sensors, five air delivered seismic intrusion detector 

(ADSID) and three acoustic seismic intrusion detectors 

(ACOUSID). However, Seventh Air Force experts—analyzing 

precampaign intelligence data—determined that the enemy 

had expanded its route structure. Thus at the last minute, 

Seventh Air Force commanders ordered Task Force Alpha to 

reduce the number of sensors in each string to five, three ADSIDs and two ACOUSIDs, which meant a reduction in accuracy but a necessary reduction to assure coverage.146 

Sensors had a short 60- to 160-day life span under normal 

conditions. The first strings were seeded on 8 September 

1971; but Commando Hunt VII did not begin until November, 

and many strings were not functioning. To add to the predicament, Commando Hunt VII was competing for sensors with 

Operation Island Tree, which was attempting to detect the infiltration of enemy soldiers. As the Commando Hunt operations began, Task Force Alpha units were reseeding at a rate 

of about nine per day, which greatly reduced the overloaded 

computer’s data output accuracy. 

Moreover, the communists soon realized that seeding aircraft dove differently than bombing aircraft, and they could fix 

the general location of many of the sensors. Some were neutralized, but more often they opted to deceive rather than disable the sensors. To fool the Black Crow ignition and exhaust 

detection sensors, enemy personnel wrapped their ignition 

systems in aluminum foil to suppress electromagnetic emanations. To counter infrared sensors, they placed layers of banana leaves and bamboo over hot spots on vehicles.147 

The air-dropped magnetic-influenced mines used by the 

USAF proved to be just as ineffective, since they had been designed to work against steel-hulled ships and thus had limited 

effect on wooden boats. The NVA most often cleared mines that 

formed the blocking belts by throwing rocks tied to ropes or 

cords into the minefield. As they retracted the ropes, they 

56 
caught the trip wires on the wide-area antipersonnel mines, 

causing them to explode. Sappers disarmed the pressure-sensitive gravel mines by picking them up and detonating them 

elsewhere. Many of these mines were not functioning due to 

the extreme dampness of the Laotian jungles. Once through 

these barriers, it was easy for sappers to defuse the MK-36 

magnetic-influence mines. Whenever the NVA were able to 

marshal resources, they cleared blocking points in “fewer than 

twelve hours.”148 

During Commando Hunt VII, enemy air defenses were far 

more vexing than during previous campaigns. The Seventh Air 

Force determined that the enemy had 345 23- to 57-millimeter 

(mm) guns at the outset of the campaign. This number increased to 554 during the height of operations, six of which 

were 85 mm weapons and one a 100 mm gun. Task Force 

Alpha disagreed with these numbers, estimating that the 

enemy had 600 to 700 guns by the end of Commando Hunt V 

and 1,500 at the height of Commando Hunt VII. Afterward, 

PACAF reported that a total of 18 aircraft were shot down over 

southern Laos: nine F-4s, five OV-10s, one Navy A-4 Skyhawk, 

one Navy A-7 Corsair II, one AC-130, and one A-1 Skyraider.

149 

One other major problem was the appearance of enemy 

SAMs near the target areas. During Commando Hunt V there 

had been only 49 firings reported, while during Commando 

Hunt VII there were 153. On 9 November, when Air Force intelligence sources first detected SAMs in the area, officials had 

to curtail B-52 operations until the threat could be assessed. 

TACAIR could not keep the route package closed because only 

the B-52s’ bombing caused the necessary cratering. Enemy 

traffic surged south as the roads dried and the passes opened. 

The B-52s returned to bombing on the 20th but once again 

were called off because one MiG-17 fired a single missile at the 

vulnerable old BUFFs. B-52s returned again on 21–22 November for the final days of phase one, but by then many 

enemy convoys had already escaped south.150 

Lost sortie rates due to SAM threats continued during phase 

two. Their real danger was demonstrated on 12 December over 

the Mu Gia pass when an F-105 was destroyed by a Sovietbuilt SA-2 with a 24-mile usable range. Not only did the B-52s 

57 
have to be cautious but also did the AC-130. On 13 January 

1972, with SAMs located near Tchepone, the lumbering gunships were withdrawn from the vital central Steel Tiger region. 

Only after intensive fighter-bomber attacks from 11 to 15 January reduced the threat did the AC-130s return. Even so, on 

29 March, 10 miles north of Tchepone, an SA-2 shot down an 

AC-130, killing the crew of 14. Damage to three other AC-130s 

and three AC-119s by AAA fire during March led to a standdown by gunships until the operation ended on 31 March.151 

As phase two shifted south and west in early December, 

forcing the enemy to take longer routes, the NVA shifted some 

of their SAM sites; thus, on 7 December B-52s were withdrawn 

from operations around the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes and 

neither target was attacked again during Commando Hunt VII, 

except for attacks on the Ban Karai, on 9 and 10 March 1972. 

Enemy road building had increased so dramatically by January 1972 that even if the B-52s had been available, it is doubtful they could have “kept pace with it.”152 

Not only were the B-52s pulled off bombing passes and 

routes in Laos for extended periods of time but the most effective antivehicle weapon—the gunships—also stood-down. 

Equally important was the USAF’s expenditure of 4,066 

fighter-bomber sorties attempting to suppress enemy AAA and 

SAM air defenses. Since fighter-bombers flew 4,209 sorties 

against vehicular targets, nearly one-half of all fighter-bomber 

sorties were diverted from their primary interdiction missions. 

While MiG-17s posed a lesser threat, their mere presence 

forced the USAF to plan for potential attacks, again diverting 

attention from the primary task.153 

The enemy also sought the shelter of night when US fighters and bombers did not usually fly. The United States soon 

overcame this tactic by using the AC-119K, AC-130A/E fixedwing gunships. The AC-119K Stingers used their four 7.62 

mm Gatling guns, their two 20 mm cannon, and infrared sensors to run up a remarkable truck kill ratio. Even more awesome were the AC-130s with their two 40 mm cannon and two 

20 mm cannon. Some later models even were fitted with a 105 

mm cannon, which replaced one of the 40 mm cannons. They 

carried a wide range of sensors, such as “infrared detectors to 

58 
AC-119G over Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN 

The gunship was a key weapon used to stop enemy infiltration along the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail. 

pick up the heat of engines and exhaust, low-light television, 

and ignition detectors to register the electrical emanations of 

operating internal combustion engines.”154 

The United States used 16 AC-119s and 18 AC-130s with 

the 130s, claiming 7,335 truck kills, and the 119s 940, compared to 461 by B-57s and 1,873 by fighter-bombers. Sensors 

made the AC-130s particularly deadly at night, but the enemy 

soon discovered that these sensors were blinded by daylight 

and heat which meant that they struggled to visually fix targets at dawn and at dusk. As Slay later noted, “we never did 

get a handle on the early movers at dusk and the late movers 

at dawn.”155 

US bombing efforts were never well coordinated; each group 

of attackers, gunships, night raiders (B-57Gs and A-26 Invaders), TACAIR, B-52s, and Task Force Alpha—all pulled in 

opposite directions. In typical bureaucratic fashion, during 

this time of withdrawal from Vietnam, each unit sought to justify its own existence and funding. But most damaging was the 

bombing halt over NVN that began in late 1968, which gave 

the enemy units a head start along the early part of the trail 

59 
and staging areas from whence they fanned out all over the bypass roads of Laos.156 

As French officers and authors had emphatically suggested 

in the mid-1950s and USAF authors declared in the 1960s, 

aerial interdiction—especially in the jungles of Vietnam—was 

difficult. Commando Hunt consistently experienced many of 

the frustrations of which these early writers had warned; and 

even though the B-52 and TACAIR raids seemed to destroy 

great numbers of trucks, they never seemed able to stem the 

flow of enemy supplies into South Vietnam. Since the enemy 

was able to stage vast quantities of supplies, tens of thousands of troops, and 200 tanks in preparation for launching 

the Easter offensive of 30 March 1972, even the two most ambitious operations—Commando Hunt V and VII—were not totally successful. This was due in part to the ever-growing 

(96,000 by the 1970s) and well-organized enemy repair forces 

stationed along the extensive and repetitive paved roads, dirt 

trails, footpaths, and waterways that made up the trail. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, keeping the infiltration 

routes (including waterways) open became a national obsession in NVN.157 

Spotting well-disguised enemy movements in dense jungles, 

fog-shrouded mountains, and the vast, sparsely populated regions of Laos and Vietnam proved difficult for US pilots. The 

torrents of the monsoon season also meant that the enemy 

had periodic relief from bombing raids. Not only finding the 

targets but also maintaining blocking belts and choke points 

as well as actually destroying trucks proved perplexing. The 

massive resupply of trucks from the Eastern bloc, and the 

growing sophistication of the enemy’s massive petroleum, oil, 

and lubricants pipeline complex throughout NVN and Laos 

made it nearly impossible to entirely cut off Communist movements into South Vietnam. Again, and it cannot be overstated, 

one of the major reasons for Commando Hunt’s lack of success was the fact that it began as Rolling Thunder ended, giving the enemy a head start down to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.158 

For the Air Force, the NVA invasion of 1972 changed the air 

war again. With the need to resupply 200,000 combat troops, 

the enemy employed long logistics networks that soon experi60 
enced the full fury of US airpower. In 1972, Linebacker I and 

Arc Light raids in South Vietnam would be the deciding factors 

in preventing the fall of the South. 

Air Force Theory and 

Doctrine in the Early 1970s 

The five and one-half years from mid-1965 to late 1971 not 

only witnessed a change in the pace and nature of the war but 

also witnessed a change in official Air Force theory and doctrine. By September 1971—when the next basic doctrine 

(AFMAN 1-1) appeared—the Vietnam War was becoming more 

conventional, and airpower emphasis had returned almost 

completely to the strategic focus of the 1950s. The Commando 

Hunt and Menu operations of 1968 through 1972 included 

numerous strikes by Big Belly B-52s carrying large bomb 

loads. The big bombers had been one of the main components 

of these interdiction efforts, especially during Commando 

Hunts V and VII; and as the new decade began, airmen determined that the best way to deal with the frustrating and bitter 

experiences of Vietnam was to reemphasize traditional theory 

and doctrine. Yet the 1971 basic doctrine manual was not a 

complete reversal of the mid-1960s publications, it was a 

move in a new direction.159 

The 1971 basic doctrine manual had a final chapter on nonconventional air combat but did not focus on airpower in 

counterinsurgency. Instead, its focus was on the broader subject of Air Force special operations. By 1971 special operations 

had become the latest catchphrase for insurgency conflict and 

was, in this case, designed to replace the old phrase special air 

warfare used in the 1967 AFMAN 2-5. The new 1971 AFMAN 

1-1 also introduced yet another new term, foreign internal defense, meaning “counterinsurgency.” While the examination of 

internal defense covered only one paragraph, it reiterated the 

earlier assertion that air operations should be coordinated 

with civil actions and surface force operations in a coordinated 

military-civilian campaign to eliminate the causes of popular 

discontent and create a sense of national unity. Here again, 

the B-52 was not the optimum weapon. According to AFMAN 

61 
1-1, the BUFF’s primary role was, as the authors believed it 

should have always been, to provide a strategic nuclear strike 

against the Soviet Union.160 

It was these concepts that led airmen through the last year 

of active combat. By 1972 President Nixon seemed no closer to 

a settlement than his predecessor, in spite of the diplomacy of 

Dr. Kissinger and the withdrawal of nearly 500,000 US troops 

from Vietnam. On 30 March, as Nixon considered his next 

move, 120,000 communist regulars supported by artillery and 

200 tanks invaded South Vietnam, threatening to overrun 

America’s ally. The invasion violated agreements between 

Washington and Hanoi when Johnson ended the northern 

bombing in 1968; but while Nixon was concerned that South 

Vietnam might fall, he now had an excuse to discard restrictions that prevented him from fully using US airpower.

161 

The Easter offensive lasted from 30 March to 16 September 

1972. The enemy named it the Nguyen Hue offensive, in honor 

of the Vietnamese emperor who had destroyed Chinese invaders in 1789. Using the rainy season to avoid US air attacks, 

General Giap ultimately committed 14 divisions and 26 separate regiments to the invasion. One division was placed in 

northern Laos to protect supply lines, while four others remained on the border in NVN in reserve.162 Communist goals 

were to erode flagging US public war support during an election year, to counter South Vietnamese successes in rural 

areas since 1969, and to win the war before Nixon’s détente 

policy affected Soviet and Chinese material support of 

Hanoi.163 What Hanoi failed to grasp was that the audacity of 

the attack “provided Nixon with the public support necessary 

to retaliate.”164 

US forces were not completely caught off guard, even 

though scheduled reductions in US troops from 200,000 to 

69,000 in May and aircraft from 500 to 375 left them reeling 

from the initial attack. In the spring of 1971, the CIA had 

warned of a potential election-year attack; but they believed 

the enemy could not “launch a nationwide military offensive 

on anything approaching the scale of Tet 1968.”165 Even so, 

200 NVA tanks were deployed undetected to various staging 

areas in 1971–72, and as one analysts later noted, “This 

62 
stealthy deployment, together with the persistent perception 

that the enemy’s logistical system was less efficient than it 

was, deflected American intelligence analysts from a correct 

understanding of Communist plans.”166 

The initial attack was launched by 50,000 troops from Laos 

against Quang Tri province in MR I. On day two, 160 miles 

south of the DMZ in the Central Highlands in MR II, 28,000 

more NVA attacked the Kontum province. The enemy opened 

a third front with 31,000 men attacking 375 miles south of the 

DMZ and 60 miles west of Saigon. Of the 200,000 enemy troops 

eventually involved, 120,000 were NVA regulars, 50,000 VC 

main-force troops, and 30,000 irregulars. Supported by tanks 

and artillery and protected by low-lying clouds, NVA units in 

MR I pushed ARVN units out of Quang Tri City by 1 May. The 

new ARVN commander, Gen Ngo Quang Truong, retreated 

south and set up a tenuous defensive line on the south bank 

of the My Chanh River. By 14 May, NVA units in MR II had 

overrun Dak To and placed Kontum City under siege, while in 

MR III the NVA had destroyed an entire ARVN division, taken 

Loc Ninh, and surrounded An Loc by 13 April.167 

At An Loc, the 9th VC Division fought the 15th and 21st 

ARVN. On 11 May, with the eastern part of the city under attack, one enemy prisoner of war recalled that B-52s struck 

about 0500 hours. They pounded the eastern approaches to 

the city every hour on the hour for 25 hours, bombing several 

targets more than once. Entire units were wiped out. Five days 

later, a PAVN column supported by 20 tanks attacked an 

ARVN force just south of Kontum City on route 14. Three cells 

of B-52s attacked each enemy column and obliterated them. 

On the 26th, the enemy made one last assault on Kontum 

City, which failed because of a tenacious ARVN defense and 

B-52 support.168 

In December 1971, Nixon—concerned by intelligence reports—had responded with Operation Proud Deep Alpha, during which USAF fighters flew more than 1,000 sorties against 

enemy staging areas just south of the 20th parallel. Additional 

attacks took place in February 1972 but were limited during 

the president’s trip to China. Simultaneously, the number of 

US aircraft in SEA increased with the dispatch of 207 USAF F-4 

63 
Phantoms from 29 December 1971 to 13 May 1972, bringing 

the total in theater to 374.169 

Nixon subsequently ordered 161 additional B-52s to Andersen AFB and U Tapao between 5 February and 23 May, creating a total force of 210 BUFFs in East Asia—which was more 

than one-half of SAC’s entire strategic-bomber force. This redeployment began under Operation Bullet Shot in February 

when 30 BUFFs were sent to Andersen. All totaled between 1 

April and 31 July 1972, the number of USAF strike aircraft increased from 375 to 900.170 By mid-April, Marine officials had 

deployed 40 F-4s to Da Nang and two squadrons of A-1s to 

Bien Hoa. Concurrently, Nixon sent the USS Kitty Hawk and 

Constellation to join the Coral Sea and Hancock in the Gulf of 

Tonkin. By late April, the Midway had also arrived, followed on 

27 June by the Oriskany, and 3 July by the America, which replaced the Constellation. By mid-July, three and one-half 

months after the offensive began, the United States had six 

carriers on station—each with 60 strike aircraft, a total of over 

350 naval aircraft. US strike aircraft in-theater now totaled 

1,380, up from the 495 present in March.171 

As Nixon himself assessed, he was now ready “to go for broke 

and bring the enemy to his knees.” He was determined to resume 

bombing NVN and mining Haiphong harbor. Having negotiated 

closer ties with both Moscow and Peking, he now believed he 

could afford to be bolder with Hanoi. Gen John W. Vogt Jr., on 

his way to assume command of the Seventh Air Force, met with 

the president and later described him as wild-eyed.172 

On 2 April, Nixon authorized air strikes against AAA and 

SAM sites, and logistics targets 25 NM north of the DMZ. Poor 

weather hampered operations until 5 April, when—as part of 

Operation Freedom Train—US fighters attacked supply and logistics targets south of the 18th parallel, 60 miles north of the 

DMZ. The results were disappointing. The major flow of enemy 

supplies and troops remained unimpeded, so the president expanded the area of operations to parallel 20' 25o or 231 miles 

north. On 16 April, using B-52s for the first time, Nixon sent 

18 BUFFs from the 307th Strategic Wing stationed at U Tapao 

to attack oil storage facilities near Haiphong. Four more April 

B-52 raids followed with impressive results.173 

64 
As Nixon prepared to send his foreign policy adviser back to 

Paris for a negotiating session with NVN’s lead negotiator, Le 

Duc Tho, on 2 May, he considered a three-day series of B-52 

raids against Hanoi, to commence on 5 May. But Kissinger, 

fearing domestic reaction, and General Abrams, commander 

MACV, declaring his need for the B-52s in the south to curb 

the enemy offensive, convinced the president otherwise. Instead, Nixon opted for a plan from Kissinger’s military assistant Maj Gen Alexander Haig that called for sustained bombing by tactical bombers and mining of Haiphong and other 

North Vietnamese harbors. Similar in design to Operation 

Rolling Thunder, its main force was to be tactical aircraft from 

the carriers of Task Force 77 and from the Seventh Air Force. 

Only a handful of B-52s were to be used, mostly in the south. 

The operation, called Linebacker, began on 10 May and officially ended on 15 October 1972.174 

Linebacker I 

Planners conceived Linebacker in four phases. The first involved an attack against railroad bridges and rolling stock in 

and around Hanoi and then northeast toward the PRC. The second phase targeted primary storage areas and marshaling yards 

near the northern capital. Phase three was aimed at storage and 

transshipment points created to cope with phases one and two. 

Attack planners envisioned these targets being hit at the discretion of local commanders, as often as necessary to impede 

the shipment of supplies south. Phase four targeted associated 

enemy defenses, such as ground control intercept radar sites, 

command and control, MiG airfields, SAM and AAA sites, and 

their logistics depots and support facilities.175 

Part two of the overall operations, code-named Operation 

Pocket Money, involved aerial mining of northern ports. On 9 

May at 0800 hours Saigon time (Monday, 8 May, 2000 hours 

Eastern Standard Time), the president announced on national 

television that US planes would begin mining ports and harbors at 0900 hours and that the mines would be activated on 

11 May at 1800 hours. Initially, the mining achieved its goal; 

“from the day the mines came alive through September, no 

vessels are known to have entered or to have left NVN’s ports.” 

65 
At first, the enemy stopped ships 12 miles from port and unloaded 6,000 tons per month from these freighters. However, 

highly effective US fighter attacks kept the unloading to night, 

thus restricting the flow of materials.176 

The risks of Linebacker were great. Nixon was scheduled to 

meet with Soviet leaders at the end of May, and there was fear 

among advisers that the public would react negatively. But the 

president’s instincts were that the public would accept a Soviet failure because of the fall of Saigon. In the end, the summit was a success and South Vietnam was saved; but ultimately this success was not a result solely of the air campaign 

in the North.177 

During Operation Freedom Train—April to June—US forces 

flew 27,745 attack and support sorties, 1,000 of which were 

flown with B-52s. The United States lost 52 planes—17 to 

SAMs, 11 to AAA, three to small arms, 14 to MiGs, and seven 

to unknown causes. The enemy fired 777 SAMs in April, 429 

in May, and 366 in June. At first, they used ripple firing tactics—one high, one low, and one in the middle—for total coverage. Early enemy successes were later offset by US countermeasures, including the use of chaff and especially by the 

B-52s. The United States also utilized Iron Hand anti-SAM 

tactics employing F-105 Wild Weasels, which used the enemy’s 

SAM radar rebound signals to direct laser-guided bombs to 

the target. The United States also used hunter/killer formations; 

Wild Weasels spotted sites, and F-4s dropped high-explosives 

and cluster bombs on them.178 

The enemy was well armed with 4,000 23 mm to 100 mm 

AAA weapons, half around Hanoi and Haiphong. Air Force analysts determined that these defenses were less dangerous 

than those faced during Rolling Thunder because Air Force 

laser-guided bombs “were dropped at a much higher, and 

therefore safer, altitude than unguided munitions.”179 Hanoi 

also had more than 200 MiG fighter aircraft including 70 MiG21s. The rest were MiG-17s and MiG-19s. The enemy used 

fewer sorties and aircraft than they did during Rolling Thunder—mostly in the vicinities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Only one 

US aircraft was lost to MiGs in the North during Freedom 

Train, while US pilots downed nine fighters.180 

66 
F-105 Thunderchiefs over Thailand 

Thuds—such as these flying over Thailand—were used to bomb enemy bridges 

in the North and troop concentrations in the South during Rolling Thunder 

1965–68. One specialized version was developed for defense suppression. 

As the campaign unfolded, the enemy revised its tactics 

using ground-control radar to direct MiG-21s onto the tail of a 

US formation heavy with fuel and munitions. They fired air-toair missiles as vulnerable US planes maneuvered on their 

bomb runs at lower speeds. MiG-21s also attacked from the 

rear to force formations to take evasive maneuvers while a second wave of MiG-19s attacked from the front. By July, enemy 

fighters had downed 26 US aircraft while losing 32 of their 

own in the process. The United States reacted by using the 

Teaball weapons control center in Thailand to coordinate data 

from airborne radars over Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin to warn 

US aircraft of enemy aircraft locations. As a result, from 1 August to 15 October, MiG losses totaled 19, while US losses 

dropped to five.181 

In early June, PACAF’s report on the air operations declared 

that “the enemy has ‘shown no signs of response to the inter67 
diction . . . ; therefore it is estimated that only a small amount 

of material is entering NVN via the highway system.’ ”182 As 

TACAIR struck the North, most B-52s continued to support 

ground operations in the South. Seventh Air Force, still responsible for support of defenders facing Route Package (RP) 1 

in southern NVN and the DMZ—concentrated B-52 raids 

against enemy storage areas, supply transportation choke 

points, and enemy staging areas. As the offensive slowed, it revised its role to attacks on bridges, ferries, and fords in MR I 

(northern South Vietnam), moving up to RP 1 in phase two. In 

phase three they created choke points around Dong Hai in RP 1 

by destroying bridges on Highways 101 and 1A. On average 

B-52s flew 30 sorties per day, mostly against the bridges in 

RP 1.

183 

Officials also revised campaign priorities, placing at the top, 

attacks against northern rail lines out of China; rail and road 

links between China and Hanoi and Haiphong moving south to 

the DMZ; oil and gas areas, power stations, and rolling stock 

and storage areas other than fuel storage. By late June, North 

Vietnamese industry, mine-clearing forces, and inland waterways were added to the priority list. In spite of this emphasis 

on the North, 86.6 percent of the missions were flown against 

road, rail, and storage targets in MR I and RP 1 to interdict the 

flow of supplies from NVN to its troops in the South. General 

Momyer later noted that Seventh Air Force operated this way 

since there were too few planes to cover ARVN defenses in the 

South and attack all targets in NVN. Once the ground fighting 

ended in late September, attacks moved north of RP 1.184 

As Linebacker began, air leaders were pleased by promises 

to lift restrictions that had hampered Rolling Thunder. But 

while political restrictions—such as legitimate fears of Soviet 

or Chinese intervention—had been reduced by the cooling of 

east-west tensions, the United States still had no desire to incite either into a rash act. Nixon understood that Vietnam, 

while important, was only part of a much larger “chess 

match”; and that détente benefited US interests more than 

anything short of what by now seemed to be an unlikely victory in Vietnam. Thus, while Linebacker I generally had fewer 

restrictions than Rolling Thunder, it was still subject to strict 

68 
guidelines. Linebacker restrictions included a no-bombingbuffer area on the Sino–Vietnamese border, as well as on 

northern dams, dikes, civilian watercraft, civilian population 

centers, and non-Vietnamese seaborne shipping. All attacks 

had to be initially approved by the JCS. Restrictions were especially tight from 21 May to 5 June during President Nixon’s 

trip to Moscow. Four strategically critical bridges and tunnels 

near the Chinese border received only minimal attention.185 

The most effective attacks against bridges and railroads employed MK-84 laser-guided bombs, which comprised over 90 

percent of the laser bombs used in SEA. They were 2,000 lb 

general-purpose bombs with a laser-seeking head, small computer, spiral tail assembly, and canard control surface. One 

other less effective electro-guided bomb was the Walleye 

launch and leave glide bomb, guided by a computer and television camera. Too often deceived by camouflage, clouds, or 

smoke, it was used only in daylight. Its very low 6,000-foot release point also proved to be a major drawback.186 

In May and June, F-4s—using MK-84s—destroyed the main 

bridges on the Sino–Vietnamese border, including the Thanh 

Hoa bridge over the Song Me River. The primary rail and road 

lines in the northwest remained interdicted through the end of 

June, while the northeastern passages were less effectively 

blocked. Nothing seemed to be very effective against less sophisticated targets, such as inland water traffic. One JCS report determined that it “was the most difficult system to attack.” Even mining inland streams and rivers with MK-36 

mines had little effect. Only armed reconnaissance or naval 

gunfire had effect. This was because these routes had no real 

choke points, and loading and unloading small vessels required only “a firm bank and a few planks.”187 

While mining northern harbors seemed to deter enemy shipping, the pipelines out of China were so widely dispersed that 

PACAF analysts concluded they were virtually immune to serious disruption; since they were too hard to find, too hard to 

hit, and too easy to repair. Linebacker also failed to effectively 

cut highways, which also proved to be very difficult targets to 

destroy. These well-defended targets required large fully escorted formations, which drained US resources. Night attacks 

69 
were limited because of technology lags, and there was never 

enough armed reconnaissance. On 28 June, PACAF admitted 

that the “tonnage involved in shipments from China to NVN 

could easily equate to the amounts received via North Vietnamese ports prior to US mining operations.”188 The CIA estimated that 85 percent of “North Vietnam’s needs could be 

supplied overland in the event of a blockade.”189 

The failure of Commando Hunt to interdict NVA supplies allowed them to preposition caches of supplies in South Vietnam; thus they had an adequate amount of supplies during 

the spring and early summer of 1972. As a result the most important air operations were carried out in the South in support 

of ARVN defenders, and many of the battles between ARVN 

and NVA troops were so intense that B-52s bombed within 

1,000 meters of the defenders. In April and May, B-52s flew 

1,682 sorties in MR II with 727 sorties flown in support of the 

An Loc siege defenders. In South Vietnam enemy air defense 

threats were less than in NVN, even though one hand-held 

SAM-7 did shoot down the first AC-130 gunship lost in the 

South. The reduced threat environment allowed the allies to 

use fixed-wing gunships, helicopter gunships, and other prop 

aircraft, including those of the South Vietnamese Air Force 

(SVNAF), which flew nearly 3,000 CAS sorties between April 

and October. Flying lower and slower at 500 feet, these aircraft 

proved very effective.190 

Concurrently, F-4s destroyed 45 bridges along the DMZ and 

11 of 23 PT-76 Soviet-built light tanks trying to outflank ARVN 

units at the My Chanh defense line near the South Vietnamese 

coastline. B-52s returned to RP 1 in July, flying 1,308 sorties 

by September destroying 109 supply depots, truck parks, and 

fuel storage sites. During Linebacker operations, US aircraft of 

all types flew over 6,000 sorties in RP 1, making it the most 

heavily bombed region during the spring and summer of 1972. 

The NVA offensive slowed in May and was nearly over by 

June. The last attack against the My Chanh line—on 25 May— 

was blunted by ARVN units supported by SVNAF and US air 

components. On 8 June ARVN units began a counteroffensive 

that eventually retook Quang Tri City on 16 September. 

Among the key elements in the NVA failure was their inability 

70 
to fully use their tanks because of constant allied CAS operations. The enemy suffered heavy casualties in taking Quang 

Tri City, and this delayed their original timetable and prevented them from moving on Hue. B-52 raids against advancing enemy units and their supply lines in the South also 

played a key role in creating so many casualties. The BUFFs’ 

constant attack on enemy logistics and communication lines 

delayed their advance at least two or three weeks expending 

far more of the prepositioned supplies than the NVA had 

planned.191 

Linebacker I and collateral air operations (5 April to 23 October 1972) dropped 155,548 tons of bombs on NVN or about 

25 percent of what Rolling Thunder had expended. General 

Vogt declared, “More damage was done to the North Vietnamese lines of communications during Linebacker than during all our previous efforts.” He claimed that US aircraft destroyed almost all fixed oil storage facilities and 70 percent of 

the electric power generating capacity in NVN, meaning that 

nearly all of Hanoi’s portable generated power had to go to military use. In addition, the psychological effect was great since 

20–40 percent of Hanoi residents had to be evacuated.192 Gen 

Bruce Palmer concluded that “The North Vietnamese appear 

to have had in South Vietnam and adjacent areas of Laos supplies sufficient to see them through their defeats, which were 

the accomplishments of the South Vietnamese infantry, tactical close air support, and the B-52s.”193 

In spite of their losses, the NVA made important gains: they 

held much of the countryside in South Vietnam and were still 

determining the tempo of the war. The NVA had not been defeated, only delayed. They slowed the offensive to preserve 

their remaining southern forces, which they planned to rebuild during a new series of negotiations with the Americans. 

Without doubt, US airpower played a decisive role in preventing a southern defeat in 1972. The offensive moved ahead with 

its prepositioned supplies until June, when the lack of resupply caused by US air raids forced the offensive to bog down. 

However, during the ARVN offensive to retake Quang Tri City, 

six NVA divisions (albeit under strength) were well supplied, 

especially with artillery shells, often an excellent indicator of 

71 
logistics strength. The communist defenders expended 3,000 

rounds per day against the three attacking ARVN divisions. As 

one analyst put it, “it is not likely the NVA in MR I were ever 

effectively interdicted.”194 

America’s prodigious Linebacker effort meant that Laotian 

interdiction ceased almost completely, since allied air forces— 

even after the spring buildup—were not sufficient to continue 

simultaneous operations against the trail and NVN. The CIA 

and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that the enemy 

still had 14,000 trucks available during the offensive and that 

from 55,000 to 75,000 tons of supplies per month entered 

NVN from China, effectively countering mining efforts. Thus 

their extensive use of inland waterways, the pipeline, and vast 

numbers of trucks—heavily defended by air defenses and hidden at night—meant that the enemy could, and did, weather 

Linebacker, to wait for a better day. 

US air forces could not afford even modest attrition rates, 

which meant that the Seventh Air Force was reluctant to conduct armed reconnaissance missions in the northern route 

packages not only because the enemy AAA and SAMs were 

highly effective but because to do so meant risking or diverting precious resources and weapon systems. The United 

States tried to compensate by using precision-guided munitions, which proved effective against bridges, structural features, and industrial targets. But the North was not totally dependent on such things.195 

Linebacker II 

In July Kissinger, encouraged by requests from the North 

Vietnamese for renewed talks, convinced the president to reopen negotiations in Paris. Hanoi accepted, but by now, 

Nixon—flush with the success of his Moscow trip and leading 

by a wide margin in the polls for the November elections—no 

longer believed he needed peace in Vietnam to win reelection. 

President Nixon believed he could gain better terms after the 

election when he would have a free hand to use more airpower. 

Kissinger did not agree fearing that the broad use of airpower, 

especially B-52s, “would cause a domestic outcry and that in 

any case such attacks were unnecessary.” Even so, Nixon 

72 
authorized B-52 and fighter-bomber attacks against storage 

and communications targets along the DMZ, which averaged 

30 sorties a day over the North through October.

196 

In the meantime, Kissinger held talks with an apparently more 

conciliatory Tho from 19 July to 14 August. But Tho would not 

relinquish his demand for a coalition government in the South. 

On 8 August, Nixon—convinced that the communists would not 

settle anything before the November elections—cabled Admiral 

McCain, telling him to “notify his subordinate commanders that 

Linebacker would begin to hit the North harder.” US military 

planners subsequently made plans for 48 sorties per day over RP 

5 and RP 6, with the Navy focusing on 6B and the USAF on 5 

and 6A. Periodic B-52 strikes over the North continued, but most 

missions were executed by TACAIR, using precision ordnance. 

One spectacular success for precision bombs came when a single flight of F-4s dropped laser-guided bombs on the Son Tay 

warehouse and storage area. Three buildings—300' x 260', 260' 

x 145', and 210' x 65', respectively—received direct hits that 

completely destroyed them.197 

On 25 September 48 new all-weather F-111 swing-wing 

figher (nicknamed Aardvark)—capable of flying at night, at low 

altitude, and at supersonic speeds—arrived in Thailand. By 13 

October the F-111s made one-half of all northern air strikes, 

averaging 24 sorties per night. Often scheduled at random and 

without warning, they were an awesome new weapon that had 

a growing impact on enemy planning.198 

On 15 September, US air forces upped the ante and Kissinger 

once again commenced negotiations in Paris. On 8 October, 

Tho made a major concession when he dropped the requirement for a coalition government. Instead, he seemed to accept 

Nixon’s April 1972 call for an in-place cease-fire, followed by 

the withdrawal of the last US combat troops. In retrospect, he 

could make such an apparent concession because 

150,000–200,000 NVA troops would be left in South Vietnam 

by such a peace settlement. As a result of this breakthrough, 

the president curtailed but did not halt US bombing.199 As Dr. 

Tilford notes in Crosswinds, “By early May it was clear that the 

invasion had not toppled the Saigon government. Fourteen 

new divisions of North Vietnamese troops had joined about 

73 
100,000 PAVN troops already in South Vietnam; they not only 

posed a considerable military threat but also constituted a 

grim political reality for the Saigon regime.”200 

In late 1972 one of the greatest impediments to ending US 

involvement was the 200,000 NVA troops that Hanoi argued 

had entered the South before 31 March. While Hanoi agreed to 

withdraw nearly 100,000 troops it claimed had entered the 

South after 31 March, they demanded the other 100,000 PAVN 

troops stay. Saigon demanded they leave. In the end, in order to 

end the war Nixon opted to ignore this issue, and the final 

peace document allowed 100,000 PAVN forces to stay. 

On 19 October Thieu read the new draft agreement for the 

first time and was indignant concerning the tenets, which allowed NVA troops to remain in the South and called for the 

creation of a National Council of Reconciliation and Concord 

with communist representatives. Realizing that this last provision was a coalition government in disguise, Thieu defiantly 

made 69 revisions he deemed absolutely necessary for his 

support. Nixon, reluctant to act without Thieu’s support, did 

not sign the draft agreement. But he suspended air attacks 

above the 20th parallel as an act of goodwill. While frustrated 

by Thieu’s hesitation, Nixon sympathized and assured him 

that no agreement would be signed without his prior knowledge and approval.201 

Northern leaders were outraged, and on the 26th, in an effort to force Nixon’s hand, Radio Hanoi publicly revealed the 

heretofore secret records of the negotiations. They condemned 

the United States for going back on their word and demanded 

that US negotiators sign the draft agreement immediately. 

Soon after, Kissinger held his first national television news 

conference declaring that peace was at hand, a declaration 

most Americans believed. While Nixon’s lead in the polls 

reached 25 percent, Kissinger’s own popularity seemed to 

eclipse the president’s. Many in the White House believed 

Kissinger was trying to take full credit for the peace—a perception Nixon could not tolerate. According to Kissinger, Nixon 

began to “look for ways of showing that he was in charge.”202 

In November Nixon won a decisive victory over Sen. George 

McGovern (D-S.D.), but the Republicans fell short of a majority 

74 
in the Congress. The president now had to rethink his peace 

timetable. With negotiations scheduled to resume on 20 November, Nixon had to end the war before the Democrats in Congress did. He did not want to end US commitments to Saigon 

and even was willing to risk the loss of public support to guarantee continued material aid for South Vietnam once US combat troops were gone. President Nixon also wanted to be sure 

that he, and not Kissinger, gained history’s credit for the peace. 

Nixon pressured Thieu to accept the best deal possible as 

soon as possible. To this end, he was determined that Hanoi 

accept at least a few of Thieu’s revisions. Concurrently General Haig was dispatched to Saigon to reassure Thieu that the 

United States would retaliate swiftly if the North broke the 

treaty. Nixon was resolved to conclude a “separate agreement 

if Thieu delayed much past 8 December” and now decided to 

use his trump card, airpower.

203 

Northern foot–dragging characterized the November negotiations; so by the end of the month, Nixon ordered plans for B-52 

campaigns against the North. As US military planners prepared for a three- or six-day strategic bombing campaign, Tho 

continued to run hot and cold. On 7 December he seemed 

ready to give in on all points, then on the 13th he delayed proceedings while staff personnel made 17 changes in the final 

draft. At this point the president was determined to increase 

in intensity the heat of battle. Some White House staffers like 

Haig wanted a repeat of Linebacker I, but Nixon decided to aim 

this air campaign at enemy morale.204 

President Nixon chose to use the B-52 because it was a 

powerful weapon that would send a message of US resolve to 

end the war to both North and South Vietnam. The psychological impact seemed to Nixon to be as important as the actual destructive power. The big bombers flew above 30,000 feet 

and when they attacked, those on the ground seldom saw or 

heard them before they dropped their bomb load. After the 

war, VC Minister of Justice Truong Nhu Tang described a B-52 

raid as follows: “It seemed, as I strained to press myself into 

the bunker floor, that I had been caught in the Apocalypse. 

The terror was complete. One lost control of bodily functions 

as the mind screamed incomprehensible orders to get out.”205 

75 
Nixon wanted northern civilians to feel the sheer terror US 

airpower could elicit. The full use of the B-52s stunned the 

JCS. Nixon told JCS chairman Adm Thomas H. Moorer, “This 

is your chance to use military power effectively to win this war 

and if you don’t I’ll consider you personally responsible.” Plans 

called for a three-day, around-the-clock, all-weather campaign 

against Hanoi. SAC planners—who had originally designed a 

Linebacker I-style campaign—rewrote the operations plan to 

focus on the B-52s. The final draft was approved in early December and sent to General Meyer, SAC commander. Admiral 

Moorer, on orders from Nixon warned General Meyer, “I want 

the people of Hanoi to hear the bombs . . . but minimize damage to the civilian populace.”206 

It was one thing to decide to use B-52s, it was quite another 

matter to plan and carry out the missions. As Dr. Futrell notes 

in volume two of his book on Air Force basic thinking, “Although B-52 strategic bombers had long been committed to 

single-integrated operational plan (SIOP), general war strikes 

against route and terminal air defenses in the Soviet Union, the 

problem confronting them in the Linebacker II strikes . . . was 

immensely more complex.”207 Like horseshoes, nuclear bombs 

do not have to be as precise as iron bombs in order to score. As 

Futrell concludes, “In the case of the Soviet Union, the number 

of potential targets was very large, and the air defenses had to 

be spread over a vast area. Moreover, Air Force bombers were 

to be penetrating at low altitudes and using short-range air 

missiles (SRAM) to suppress SAM defenses. They were to be 

using nuclear weapons, so that only a single bomber would 

need to penetrate to destroy the target and probably much of 

its defenses.”208 

In August General Meyer, anticipating further B-52 actions, 

had ordered Eighth Air Force planners to prepare an operations plan. In November Lt Gen Gerald W. Johnson, Eighth Air 

Force commander, sent the draft plan to Headquarters SAC for 

final approval. It approved extensive attacks against Hanoi 

and Haiphong using multiple-bomber formations simultaneously attacking from different directions. Meyer was particularly concerned that collateral bomb damage might cause 

large numbers of civilian casualties. President Nixon believed 

76 
Lt Gen Gerald W. Johnson


Commander of the Eighth Air Force during Linebacker II


77

such casualties might be a major propaganda setback, even in 

the United States. For this reason Meyer did not use the 

Eighth Air Force plan. Instead, he detailed his staff to create a 

new plan.209 

With few traditional strategic bombing targets around Hanoi 

or Haiphong, the B-52s needed to attack several times in concentrated groups to assure target destruction. With only three 

days, planners formulated an inflexible scenario that sent all 

three waves of bombers on the same route at the same altitude 

and at the same times for the first three days. To avoid civilian casualties, the scheme determined that crews would be required to adhere to the “planned course and fly in a trail formation with cells of three aircraft.” Moreover, the pilots were 

supposed to stabilize the flight four minutes prior to bomb release to avoid midair collisions.210 Staffers at Eighth Air Force 

were alarmed by the repetitive routing, and some feared casualty rates as high as 16 to 18 percent. General Meyer, using 

the SIOP used for planned attacks on the USSR, estimated 

losses at 3 percent.211 

The plan aimed the attack at “rail yards, storage areas, 

power plants, communications centers, and airfields located 

on Hanoi’s periphery.” In support, Seventh Air Force and Navy 

fighters, using “smart bombs,” were to strike targets in populated areas to avoid civilian casualties. The B-52s would hit 

targets within 10 miles of Hanoi. They would also make night 

raids to force the populace to seek shelter during sleeping 

hours, increasing the psychological discomfort and reducing 

the threat of MiG attacks.212 

Linebacker II would be different from any previous US air 

attack. One subsequent report noted “where Linebacker I had 

been an interdiction campaign directed against supply routes 

throughout NVN, Linebacker II was a sustained maximum effort using airpower to destroy all major target complexes located in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.”213 Planners conceived the operation as two distinct operations. The first had 

B-52s flying at night attacking the enemy’s war-making infrastructure and industry supported by F-111s and Air Force 

and Navy tactical air assets. The second operation was a day 

package employing Air Force A-7s and F-4s as well as Navy 

78 
and Marine A-6 Intruders, A-7s, and F-4s. The campaign, 

somewhat unintentionally, played out in three phases. The 

first lasted from 18 to 20 December and featured 314 nighttime B-52 sorties against rail and supply assets around Hanoi. 

The second lasted from 21 to 24 December and focused 120 

B-52 sorties against targets near Haiphong. The third phase 

followed the Christmas bombing pause and lasted from 26 to 

29 December. These attacks marked an increased effort during which 295 B-52 sorties attacked 13 targets and five SAM 

sites around Hanoi.214 

On 18 December, 129 B-52D and G crews from U Tapao and 

Andersen launched their first attack. At 1945 hours the first 

wave of 48 aircraft struck the Kinh No storage complex, the 

Yen Vien rail yard, and three airfields on Hanoi’s outskirts. 

Supported by 39 other US aircraft, the bombers flew in formation on a route west to east near the Sino–Vietnamese border, turning southeast to make their bomb run. Attacking in a 

trail formation of three-ship cells, later known as “an elephant 

walk,” they dropped their bombs with 10 minutes of separation between the cells. Pilots stabilized the flights four minutes 

before the bomb release to assure accuracy and destruction. 

After dropping their load, they turned west to avoid SAM attacks. The second wave struck at midnight and the third at 

0500 hours. The results were good. They had hit 94 percent of 

all targets, only losing three BUFFs to SAMs and having two 

severely damaged.215 

The president was exuberant and extended the operation indefinitely. Even before the bombing began, President Nixon 

had also made overtures to Hanoi for meetings anytime after 

the 26th based on the November draft augmented with a few 

negotiated changes. Nixon also hoped that his stick and carrot policy would force the North back to negotiations and 

demonstrate US resolve to Saigon.216 

On the 19th, 93 B-52s struck Thai Nguyen thermal power 

plant and Yen Vien rail yard, using the same tactics. Two more 

of the big bombers were damaged but none shot down. Now confident that the North had not made a fix on the routing scenario 

and realizing a change would require a long lead time, officials 

sent out a third strike on the 20th. The 99 B-52s attacked in the 

79 
Crew Members in Linebacker II 

B-52 crew members during a briefing early in Linebacker II 

familiar three-wave pattern. The targets were basically the 

same but this time the enemy SAMs downed six BUFFs and 

severely damaged another.

217 

Nixon, livid, railed at senior officials that such losses would 

cause Linebacker II to have the opposite effect of that which 

he desired. He “raised holy h--- about the fact that [B-52s] 

kept going over the same targets at the same times.” While 

Nixon later asserted that he had convinced the military to alter 

the bombing plans; Air Force personnel—especially General 

Meyer—recognized how unacceptable the losses were because 

the B-52s were also the centerpiece of the US nuclear strike 

force. Two more bombers went down on the 21st, while most 

Seventh Air Force raids of the 21st were canceled by bad 

weather. On the 22d, Meyer directed planners to change tactics and create plans for a new kind of raid for the 26th.218 

Based on Meyer’s initiative, CINCPACAF sent a message to 

Seventh Air Force headquarters stating that “Events of the 

past four days produced significant B-52 losses which obvi80 
ously are not acceptable on a continuing basis.” Among other 

things CINCPACAF recommended that local planners: “Vary B52 flight altitudes with the chaff corridor on ingress. Change 

release altitudes and the ingress/egress headings on a daily 

basis.”219 

It is also worth noting that the enemy fired large numbers of 

SAMs to gain its kills, expending a total of 1,240 to 1,250 during Linebacker II. One MACV report declared, “The most serious threat to US aircraft during Linebacker II was the SAM reaction. The total number of SAMs fired during the 12-day 

offensive was greater than during any previous month in the 

SEA conflict. Specifically, a total of 1,321 SAMs were launched 

at US planes over NVN, 1,250 of which were directed against 

Linebacker II forces. B-52s attracted 1,032 SAMs, to give the 

SAM operators a kill ratio of 68.8 to one (SAMs fired per B-52s 

downed).”220 The enemy “resorted to salvoing large numbers of 

missiles in a shotgun pattern into the calculated path of the 

on-coming aircraft.” Although wasteful, it was temporarily effective, “because all portions of Linebacker II got under way 

more or less concurrently, [and] the Air Force had no opportunity to send tactical aircraft to wipe out . . . the numerous 

SA-2 missile sites that encircled both cities [Hanoi and 

Haiphong].”221 At the same time, MiG interceptors were never 

much of a problem, since Linebacker II missions were flown in 

darkness and the only enemy fighters to challenge B-52 formations generally flew aimlessly through the bomber formations, causing little damage. B-52 tail gunners shot down two 

MiG interceptors.222 

As assistant deputy chief of staff, operations, MACV, General 

Cross, declared in an interview at the time: “For every action that 

we took there was a reaction by the North Vietnamese. They 

never waited to make some corrective action when they felt 

like they had failed the course. . . . If they were provided even 

more modern equipment they could certainly be able to make 

us stop and think about the worth of our continued bombing 

of the North, because the SA-3 and SA-4 missiles would present new and more complex problems to us and make our survivability more difficult in an unfriendly environment.”223 

81 
B-52Ds 

A flight of B-52Ds in a three-cell formation is seen from the cockpit of one of 

the BUFFs. 

While day three proved disastrous because the number of 

B-52s that went down, it also proved to be the turning point 

of the campaign. Upon examining aerial photos of the raid, of82 
ficials discovered that none of the SAM sites had spares. As a 

result, General Meyer decided to target SAM sites and SAM 

supply dumps to clear the skies over NVN of threats to the B52s.224 Meyer turned over planning responsibility to General 

Johnson in Guam and reduced the B-52 sortie rate to 30 per 

day until a new plan could be fully implemented. He also made 

U Tapao the sole Linebacker II base of origin. It could handle 

the sortie rate without B-52s from Andersen, and its B-52s did 

not require aerial refueling. The new primary targets became 

SAM sites and SAM munitions storage facilities. SAM gunners 

had few spares, which reduced the lethality of the enemy defenses. The immediate tactical change would avoid Hanoi and 

concentrate on Haiphong.225 

From 22 to 24 December, B-52s—escorted by Navy planes 

flew raids against rail yards and storage facilities—feinting attacks against Hanoi and then turning on Haiphong. Each 

route and altitude was different; thus results were excellent 

and only one aircraft was damaged. On the 22d, Nixon offered 

a new peace plan, calling for renewed meetings on 3 January 

1973. As a show of goodwill, President Nixon initiated a 36-

hour Christmas bombing pause and guaranteed that he would 

halt bombing above the 20th parallel if the North would agree 

to renew negotiations. Hanoi remained silent, and while many 

around Nixon urged a continuation of the pause after Christmas, he determined that only renewed pressure would gain 

the desired effect.226 

On 26 December, 120 B-52s struck 10 different targets in 

15 minutes. Four waves of 72 bombers hit four targets in 

Hanoi from four different directions; at the same time, two 

other waves of 15 bombers each struck Haiphong from the 

east and west, and 18 B-52s raided Thai Nguyen rail yards 

north of Hanoi. Even though the enemy fired dozens of SAMs, 

only two BUFFs were lost. In the largest effort of the campaign 

the United States staggered the enemy, shortly thereafter 

Hanoi notified Washington that it would accept Nixon’s offer to 

return to negotiations. 

On the 28th, Hanoi also agreed to Nixon’s demands that preliminary meetings between Tho and Kissinger begin on 2 January and that the North agree not to discuss matters already 

83 
resolved in the basic agreement. In turn, Nixon promised to 

end bombing above the 20th parallel once these demands were 

met. But he warned that negotiations had a time limit and the 

clock was ticking.227 

On the 27th, 60 B-52s attacked the Hanoi and Lang Dang 

rail yards near the Chinese border. A small-scale version of the 

previous day’s attack, the bombers again struck from various 

directions, hitting many targets simultaneously. Again the 

enemy fired numerous SAMs, downing two more BUFFs, thus 

bringing the total losses to 15. 

On the 28th, 60 more bombers struck SAM sites around 

Hanoi. As noted, that same day Hanoi agreed to begin preliminary talks on 2 January; and at 1900 hours the next day, the 

president ended Linebacker II after a final raid. As it turned 

out, there were no enemy air defenses on the 29th; and as one 

participant, Capt John R. Allen, affirmed in a subsequent interview with Lt Col Mark Clodfelter, “By the tenth day there 

were no missiles, there were no MiGs, there was no AAA— 

there was no threat. It was easy pickings.”228 

During the 11 days of Linebacker II, B-52s flew 729 sorties 

(741 had been planned) against 34 targets north of the 20th 

parallel and dropped 15,237 tons of bombs. Air Force and Navy 

fighters flew 1,216 sorties and dropped 5,000 tons of bombs. 

They destroyed 383 rolling stocks, made 500 rail cuts, leaving 

rail traffic in total disarray, demolished 191 warehouses 

around Hanoi and Haiphong, reduced electric power generation from 115,000 kilowatts to 29,000, and reduced petroleum, 

oil, and lubricants capacity by three-fourths. Perhaps of equal 

importance, NVA troops in the South were very low on food and 

supplies. US sources determined that civilian casualties had 

been relatively low, though enemy sources claimed 1,318 

killed; 1,216 more wounded; and 305 killed in Hanoi. As had 

been the US goal, enemy morale in Hanoi was hurt, while little 

damage was done to the city. A total of 15 B-52s were lost and 

nine damaged during Linebacker II—all because of the 24 SAM 

hits on the BUFFs. Of the 92 crew members, 26 were rescued, 

33 bailed out and were captured, 25 were listed as missing, 

and eight were killed outright or died of wounds. US air forces 

also lost two Navy A-7s, two Navy A-6s, two Air Force F-111As, 

84 
three F-4s (two USAF and one Navy), one EB-66, one RA-5C, 

and one HH-53 search and rescue helicopter. All totaled, they 

lost 27 aircraft. Of these, 26 aircraft were lost during actual 

Linebacker sorties and the EB-66 while in support. SA-2 SAMs 

accounted for 17 kills, while three aircraft were lost to daytime 

MiG attacks, four to AAA, and three to unknown causes. Later, 

evidence suggested SAMs or AAA also downed these. Even so, 

the official PACAF report correctly declared “the threat picture 

was heavier than US losses indicates and the 2.1 percent B-52 

attrition rate was far below that expected.”229 

On 27 January 1973, Secretary of State William P. Rogers 

signed a peace agreement with Hanoi, ending America’s active 

participation in the war. Later, when asked what effect Linebacker had had on achieving the Paris Peace Accords, then 

presidential foreign policy advisor, and soon to be secretary of 

state, Dr. Kissinger, declared, “there was a deadlock . . . in the 

middle of December. . . . There was a rapid movement where 

negotiations resumed . . . on January 8. These facts have to be 

analyzed by each person for himself.”230 

Nixon had won the right to disengage the enemy. Nixon’s 

war aims by December 1972 were limited, and the results 

were not the kind of military victory America had originally envisioned in the 1960s. Linebacker II and the heroic efforts of 

US aircrews had forced a reluctant group of northern leaders 

back to the negotiating table to finalize the peace accords. 

Even though it was a major reason for the peace, bombing was 

not the only reason. “Nixon’s threat of another Linebacker if 

the North refused to settle helped persuade the Politburo to 

accept terms that included some of Thieu’s provisions.”231 

Another reason behind the peace agreement was Hanoi’s 

concern for their troops in the South. Nixon’s offer of a settlement, leaving the NVA in control of major portions of the South, 

forced them to continue to fight a war of movement which left 

them susceptible to US air attacks until a final peace could be 

signed. As senior Gen Tran Van Tra put it years later, “Our 

cadres and men were fatigued, we had not had time to make 

up for our losses, all units were in disarray, there was a lack 

of manpower, and there were shortages of food and ammunition. . . . The troops were no longer capable of fighting.”232 

85 
SA-2 

SA-2 surface-to-air missile, Soviet-built, near Hanoi during Linebacker II 

Of equal importance was Nixon’s progress toward closer relations with the PRC and USSR. While both continued to support 

the North, they sacrificed support for NVN to achieve warmer 

relations with the United States. Not only had détente dismissed the very real menace of direct Chinese or Soviet intercession that had tormented Johnson but also it likely prevented the North from adequately resupplying its forces at 

critical junctures during the summer and fall of 1972. On 17 

August 1972, the Communist Party newspaper and mouthpiece in Hanoi, Nhan Dan, grumbled that “Nixon’s détente had 

saved South Vietnam from defeat. The failure of China and the 

Soviet Union to provide North Vietnam with adequate assistance, the newspaper stated, equated to ‘throwing a life-buoy 

to a drowning pirate . . . in order to serve one’s narrow national 

interests.’”233 

Hanoi also knew that the Nixon’s aims, unlike President 

Johnson’s, were limited by both potential congressional constraints and US public opinion. Johnson had fought the war 

to guarantee an independent South Vietnam. Rolling Thunder 

restrained by Cold War geopolitical considerations was aimed 

86 
at this long-term and, as it turned out, difficult goal. On the 

other hand, Nixon’s limited goal was to end US participation, 

while leaving the South intact—something he called peace 

with honor. Nixon was constrained by campaign promises of 

Vietnamization, and Hanoi staked final victory on the Easter 

gamble, believing that Nixon would not recommit US ground 

forces. Even though its effort to reunite Vietnam failed, Hanoi 

remained committed to the goal; and with bases in the South 

guaranteed by the basic agreement, it had no reason not to 

sign the Paris Peace Accords in January.234 

Even if those who argue that Linebacker II provided the 

United States an opportunity to win the war are right about 

the military change in momentum, the most likely follow-up to 

continued full-scale bombing would have been the recommitment of US ground troops to clear out the remaining enemy 

forces and assure southern stability. At best that would have 

returned Vietnam to a stalemate like the one that existed in 

the 1960s, only this time not with the VC in the South but 

with NVA forces all over SEA. Nixon would not and could not 

return one-half million American boys to such an uncertain 

future. Like the British in 1783, the US public and polity were 

weary of the fight and no longer saw any real need to sacrifice 

its youth or its wealth. As important as it was, Vietnam was 

only one aspect of a much larger struggle. In that regard, the 

impact of superpower diplomacy was as important as America’s military power.

235 

Air Force Doctrine after Vietnam 

How did this experience affect Air Force doctrine after the 

war? One might expect that such a bitter and protracted experience would have a long-lasting impact on the Air Force’s 

basic theories of airpower. In many ways it has. There has 

been no apparent self-examination similar to the Army’s with 

the publication of such books as On Strategy by Harry G. 

Summers Jr. In some ways—immediately following the conflict—US airmen dealt with Vietnam by ignoring it in their official theory and doctrine. Many could not decide what Vietnam meant historically to the development of airpower.

236 But 

87 
it was also important to realize that with détente and changes 

in the geopolitical landscape, Air Force attention had to refocus on missions that were not against insurrections and brushfire insurgents. It soon became clear that while Vietnam was 

important, it was only one part of a greater contest and only 

one part of overall US defense and foreign policy. 

The Air Force has changed dramatically subsequent to the 

Second Indochina War. Its force structure, emphasis, and 

funding priorities are different. Today’s leaders were deeply affected by their experiences and privately vowed to change the 

policy and technological circumstances in the Air Force to provide greater opportunity for success in future wars. Fighter pilots replaced bomber pilots in nearly all key Air Force positions 

after 1973. The mission of airpower has changed accordingly 

with SAC being combined with TAC to create Air Combat Command (ACC) that—unlike air forces in Vietnam—is not an 

army support group but a single air combat arm headed by a 

single air commander as was the case in the Gulf War. 

Circumstances surrounding US defense needs have caused 

airpower to look away from insurgency and focus on more traditional roles developed in the 1950s and roles created since 

Vietnam. Dr. Futrell’s exceptionally balanced and thorough 

work on Air Force theory and doctrine published in 1984 

found it difficult, and perhaps too painful, to examine the writings and theories of the mid- and late 1960s. He jumps from 

the basic doctrine manual of 1964 to the manual of 1979 with 

little, if any, mention of insurgency conflict or aerial counterinsurgency. For example, in chapter 4, titled “Insurgency 

and War in Southeast Asia,” there is no mention of AFMAN 2-

5 and barely a mention of special air warfare or special operations concepts from the 1971 AFMAN 1-1.237 

In this regard, the 1975, 1979, and 1984 basic doctrine 

manuals continued the 1971 trend away from examination of 

“Wars of the Third Kind,” only briefly mentioning such conflicts.238 Even though the 1980s and 1990s saw important new 

works on such conflicts and their relationship to airpower 

written by Colonels Clodfelter and Drew and other officers, the 

1992 and 1997 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 

Air Force—by now focused on new conventional and nuclear 

88 
issues—made essentially no reference to the analysis or arguments developed by such works.239 

This is not to say that authors, both official and unofficial, 

were not active in the area of theory and doctrine when it came 

to the USAF’s experience in Vietnam. As the years passed and 

interest in Vietnam was rekindled by other insurgencies such 

as Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, more analytical 

and balanced examinations of Vietnam appeared. Drew and 

other authors noted that while the catchphrase had changed 

to low intensity conflict, insurgency was still a topic for analysis. These authors stressed that protracted revolutionary warfare, insurgency, or low intensity conflict should concern policy makers and the military. One author reminded his readers, 

“the simple fact is that once armed insurgency has commenced, it becomes the functional equivalent of a total war of 

national survival in which only one of the two contenders for 

power will be extant at war’s end.”240 However, insurgency 

conflicts were not completely ignored. A few official conferences and publications in the 1980s and 1990s examined airpower’s role in insurgency conflicts. In December 1990, the 

Army and Air Force published a pamphlet focused on low intensity conflict that introduced a new strategy called internal 

defense and development (IDAD). Two years later, on 3 November 1992, the Air Force introduced an operational level 

manual for foreign internal defense, which examined counterinsurgency within the framework of the IDAD strategy.241 

The later publication opened its discussion of IDAD by declaring that “the aerospace role in development and mobilization focuses on administration and nation building.” To this 

end, the pamphlet’s authors stated that this is especially true 

“where ground lines of communication cannot be established 

and maintained because of terrain or enemy presence, aerial 

logistic and communication networks carrying information, 

supplies, and services to civilian elements establish a critical 

link between the government and the population.”242 

AFMAN 2-11, Foreign Internal Defense Operations, concludes, “aerospace power contributes most effectively when it 

functions as an integrated, joint component of the overall internal defense effort. It is least effective when employed uni89 
laterally as a substitute for ground maneuver or long-range artillery.” The author asserts that “in many instances, air support can be exploited to its greatest advantage by emphasizing 

surveillance and logistic mobility over firepower.” “Insurgents 

generally possess no air capabilities. They have no heartland, 

no fixed industrial facilities, and few interdictable lines of communication.” The manual also concludes that the enemy’s “irregular forces are deployed in small units that usually present 

poor targets for air attack.”243 While it is impossible to suppose 

the author’s motives for these statements, clearly such doctrinal theories seem to have been influenced—at least indirectly—by the US Air Force’s experience in the Vietnam War. 

There is an emphasis on joint operations and nonstrategic 

nonbomber airpower roles. B-52s are not mentioned in this 

context. In the AFMAN 1-1 of 1992, the role of such intercontinental aircraft is clearly laid out as a strategic strike weapon. 

Even though by 1992 the Soviet threat was all but mute and 

B-52s had once again been used in their ground support role 

in the Gulf War, according to doctrine they were still primarily 

a nuclear strike weapon. 

In spite of AFMAN 2-11’s concise statement of airpower insurgency doctrine, the manual was never very important to 

the overall formulation of Air Force doctrine or theory. AFMAN 

1-1 1992 did not carry this doctrinal view to a higher level. The 

theories mentioned in AFMAN 2-11 were buried in this operational manual that few even knew existed and fewer still bothered to read.244 The great changes in Air Force doctrine in the 

1990s were not about insurgency but a new look at the strategic role called parallel warfare. Col John A. Warden III and 

then Lt Col David A. Deptula (now major general)—authors of 

the Gulf War air campaign—developed what some experts 

called the most important new airpower theories since Douhet 

and Mitchell. Indeed, Warden and Deptula’s development of 

parallel warfare and the profound effect of high technology on 

modern and future wars has garnered most of the attention of 

official and nonofficial airpower thinkers since the Gulf War.

245 

In the late 1990s it was proved again in southeastern Europe 

on a much more determined and skilled opponent. 

90 
In Storm over Iraq, Dr. Richard P. Hallion notes, the greatest 

airpower lessons learned from Vietnam have been technological. The Gulf War demonstrated the vast array of technologically superior weapons that the United States has developed 

following Vietnam. Target detection and location systems are 

vastly superior, stealth technology, avionics systems, superior 

precision-guided munitions, and night capability are only a 

few of the important advances witnessed in Desert Storm. But 

the Gulf War was a conventional war, and thus insurgency issues did not filter into the official doctrine created just after 

the war.

246 

In many ways, the Vietnam experience has had a reverse 

impact on operations. Airpower has been applied in America’s 

most recent operations (e.g., the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, and 

Kosovo) not according to the old theory of tactical aircraft performing only tactical roles and strategic aircraft performing 

only strategic roles but bomber, fighter, and fighter-bomber air 

assets—often carrying precision ordnance—accomplishing a 

variety of tactical and strategic missions. In these cases, circumstances dictate usage. Airmen no longer refer to aircraft 

as tactical or strategic aircraft rather tactical or strategic assets 

that they realize can perform a variety of missions. Does this 

suggest that all future air campaigns will be fought under the 

same conditions as the Persian Gulf? The Bosnian and Kosovan 

intervention suggests, this will not be the case. Thus, one 

must ask: What if the United States finds itself in a low-intensity insurgency conflict containing jungle terrain and climate? 

Will Air Force doctrine and theory provide airmen with the 

foundation necessary to successfully prosecute such a war? 

But before continuing such speculation, it is worth mentioning again one additional implicit and subtle effect from the 

Vietnam War on the Air Force selection of senior officers and 

thus also indirectly on doctrine, theory, and policies. While it 

is difficult to prove that Vietnam was the primary cause, it is 

interesting to note that before 1973, the CSAFs were almost all 

strategic bomber navigators, advocates, pilots, and experts. 

Subsequently, all CSAFs have had little—if any—bomber 

background and have been far more familiar with transport, 

91 
fighter, and tactical airpower and alternative strategic and 

nonstrategic nonbomber airpower roles.247 

It is worth noting that General Fogleman, one of the most 

recent former CSAFs, commanded the USAF’s Air Mobility 

Command and US Transportation Command prior to assuming his CSAF position. He was also an advocate of the key role 

of joint operations in modern combat as well as a leading proponent of the need for sound airlift and sealift theory and doctrine.248 It is also worth reiterating that in 1992, SAC—the 

backbone of the Air Force’s strategic bombing role—was disbanded as a MAJCOM and incorporated into the ACC. As Dr. 

Drew declares, these changes most certainly seem to be “much 

more than mere coincidence.”249 

In spite of these implied influences, the overall and direct 

impact of the insurgency aspects of the Vietnam War on official Air Force doctrine has been negligible. In the case of B52s, this lack of influence on doctrine and theory can best be 

explained by the confusion and disagreement caused by the 

effectiveness of Linebacker II and the illusion of potential victory it created. While it is an issue that requires more discussion than this work allows, it is something serious scholars of 

airpower need to discuss. Some air officers and civilians have 

suggested that a Linebacker-style campaign, begun in 1965, 

might have brought the war to a successful conclusion. Such 

an argument is, of course, not historical in nature; it ignores 

a myriad of factors at work in Vietnam and internationally, 

factors which in the eight years of major US involvement mutated and changed totally or by degrees.250 

This argument also ignores the fact that the needed weapon 

system (B-52 Big Bellies) was not available in large quantities 

until 1967. Even then, SAC officials were not willing to commit the number of bombers Nixon committed in 1972 for fear 

of being unprepared to meet their strategic responsibilities. 

These are just a few of the factors that determined the outcome of the Second Indochina War and might have modified 

collateral events resulting in a different kind of air war. Even 

more to the point, between 1965 and 1972, the fact that the 

Cold War was altered by détente made overt actions against 

Hanoi easier. Over this same period, the nature of the war 

92 
changed from a counterinsurgency campaign—primarily 

against southern guerrillas—to a lull period following the Tet 

Offensive of 1968 and then to a conventional war of unification 

fought mostly by NVA forces, beginning with the Easter invasion 

of 30 March 1972. The changing domestic sociopolitical attitudes of the American public, as well as the fluctuating perspectives of government and military leaders, also affected the 

way the war unfolded and eventually came to an end. Yet these 

factors do not begin to examine the significant effect which 

enemy strategy, tactics, and political-diplomatic manipulation 

had on the outcome of the war. 

There are still other authors, experts, and historians—both 

civilian and military—who suggest that even as late as December 1972 had the United States had the resolve to continue the Linebacker air campaign and recommit US troops, a 

better resolution could have been attained. Not only does this 

ignore the aforementioned factors but it also ignores the parameters of limited war constraints that President Johnson 

seemed unable to grasp but which President Nixon clearly perceived as inviolate. Given the political climate of the time, no 

serious scholar would argue that Nixon could have recommitted troops. 

Conclusions 

Whatever the truth of the above speculations and while current theory and doctrine is well grounded in the current world 

situation, it has left it to others to examine and speculate on 

necessary policies should another Vietnam occur. One should 

ask, could this doctrine be adapted to another Indochina-style 

conflict, since current doctrine certainly does not fully address 

this issue? Perhaps what is needed first is a professional, impersonal examination of such issues not just with regard to 

Vietnam but also with regard to US airpower in all the major 

wars in which it has participated, both in victory and defeat. 

As for the B-52, one need only recall what its role was when 

US involvement in SEA escalated in 1964 and what Air Force 

leaders wanted it to be during the war. It was a classic strategic bomber whose job was to deliver nuclear death to America’s 

93 
primary Cold War enemy, the USSR. When plans for an expanded airpower mission in 1964, the Air Staff especially CSAF 

LeMay envisioned the B-52s are the focal point of an all-out 

attack on the heart and soul of NVN from whence came the 

sustenance for the enemies war effort in the South. 

Not long before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the JCS had directed the DIA to develop a list of strategic targets in NVN. The 

list better known as the 94-target list contained 94 targets, 82 

fixed and 12 rail routes. As General Momyer put it, “these 94 

targets were considered to have the most direct relationship to 

North Vietnamese war-making capacity and will to fight.”251 

Most of the targets were in what later became RP 6 near Hanoi 

and Haiphong. 

It was around this list that the Air Staff also created an allout air campaign against the North. While eventually, the list 

would grow to 244 active and 265 contingency targets by 

1967, it remained the original 94 targets which Air Force leaders urged the JCS and Department of Defense to use to defeat 

the Communists. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 

1964, General LeMay urged unsuccessfully for full-scale retaliation built around B-52s and the 94-target plan. When Gen 

John P. McConnell became CSAF on 1 February 1965, he convinced the JCS of a three-phase campaign based on the plan. 

President Johnson and SECDEF McNamara rejected this plan 

for fear of enlarging the war.

252 

Rolling Thunder—which began on 2 March 1965 and lasted 

until 31 October 1968—opened some of these targets to attack 

but under such restrictions and through such fits and starts, 

as to render far less effective. The B-52s that were supposed 

to be a part of these attacks were held south of the 20th parallel. Both Johnson and Nixon were hesitant to use the massive strategic weapon against northern targets that might have 

caused collateral damage and large numbers of civilian casualties. Johnson, with his overweening concern not to expand 

the war and to mollify world opinion—restricted airpower, especially the use of B-52s. 

This continued through much of Nixon’s early presidency. 

Added to this was his concern about domestic decent. However, Nixon did expand the interdiction role of the B-52s dur94 
ing Commando Hunt (1968–72). It was the Linebacker I attacks that began in May 1972, in response to the Easter invasion by the NVA, which opened up the target list to airpower 

and Arc Light raids. This was followed by Linebacker December bombing which forced the eventual peace. As Clodfelter 

notes in Linebacker II Nixon became the “mad bomber” able to 

use B-52s in campaigns that airmen had long envisioned in a 

strategic role for which it had been created. In the end, this 

was the only time these targets were hit with consistency or 

with the full fury of US airpower. In the end, B-52s gained the 

peace, but they nor the prevailing theory nor doctrine of the 

time could save South Vietnam. Instead, larger geopolitical 

and domestic issues ended the Second Indochina War. 

Ultimately, America did not lose in Vietnam for lack of an air 

effort, even though one can argue that the lack of a focused air 

effort over the North from 1965 to 1968 and the collateral 

damage wrought in the South by the air campaigns cost the 

allies popular support and squandered any real possibility of 

a military success. The fact remains that between 1964 and 

1973 US aircraft dropped eight million tons of bombs and lost 

over 2,000 aircraft, more than they deployed to fight in Desert 

Storm. Between 18 June 1965 and 15 August 1973, SAC 

scheduled 126,663 B-52 combat sorties and launched 

126,615. Of these, 125,479 actually reached the target, and 

124,532 released bombs. More than 55 percent of these sorties were flown in South Vietnam, 27 percent in Laos, 12 percent in Cambodia, and 6 percent in NVN. Altogether, the USAF 

lost 31 B-52s, 18 to enemy fire over NVN. Half of the American 

money spent on the war, about $200 billion, was spent on US 

aerial operations.253 

Johnson’s use of airpower grew out of his own preconceptions of history and was deeply influenced by the advice he received from his closest advisers, such as McNamara, McGeorge 

Bundy, and Dean Rusk. Vietnam presented Johnson and his 

advisers with a conflict that their experiences and expectations had not prepared them to fight. They had no theory of 

victory or political redress, no Gulf War coalition, and no understanding of what Edward E. Rice called “Wars of the Third 

Kind” from which to formulate tactics or policies.254 It left the 

95 
United States in a position of knowing what to achieve but unable to formulate a plan to reach the goal. It also caused them to 

employ airpower ineffectively. Under heavy restrictions, tactical 

planes flew mostly strategic missions while B-52s flew ground 

support and interdiction missions which Air Force leaders 

were justifiably loath to support. 

In the case of B-52s, they did not and could not win the Second Indochina War because there were no sound US theories 

of victory; and the policy derived from this malaise—especially 

in the 1960s—meant that no weapon no matter how powerful 

could overcome such shortcomings. Airpower doctrine gave only 

brief consideration to the problem of insurgency, and airmen— 

given the prevailing political constraints of the day—never really could turn airpower into a means to victory until 1972, 

when it could fight a conventional bomber war. And in spite of 

postwar hindsight dreams of victory, by late 1972 it was too 

late to win anything approaching a real victory. 

This raises a question similar to that eternal question of 

what came first, the chicken or the egg? In the case of the military in general and airpower in Vietnam specifically, it begs 

the equally difficult question of which comes first advances in 

weapons and technology or maturation of theory and doctrine. 

It is a question I do not propose to answer here, partly because 

it is a question that may not have an answer. The Vietnam War 

left most airmen and airpower experts frustrated by its conclusion and caused many to say, with some justification, this 

is what you get when airmen do not fully control air assets and 

run the air war. 

After America’s withdrawal from the war, these painful 

memories, bitter legacies, and misconceptions about the nature and conclusion of the war—as well as disagreements over 

the very nature of the remaining strategic role of the Air Force 

against the Soviet Union in the 1980s—made it easy for many 

students of airpower to assign the air war in Vietnam to the 

trash bin of history. Most airmen simply found it more comfortable to retire into the more familiar issues of nuclear warfare and the European scenario. But this is not an effort to 

condemn these airmen; rather, it is an explanation of why they 

did not choose to wrestle with the 500 lb Vietnamese guerrilla. 

96 
With this in mind, it is also worth recalling again that as important as Vietnam was, it was only part of a much larger 

geopolitical struggle whose main participants were by 1972 

more concerned with events in distant lands. Ultimately, one 

must remember that the primary role of B-52s was to act as a 

deterrent to a hot war with the USSR and, failing this, to evaporate them in a mushroom cloud. As a deterrent, eventually the 

BUFFs succeeded, and even if B-52s could not win this bitter 

sojourn in Vietnam, they ultimately helped the United States 

to win the larger Cold War conflict. But that is another story. 

Notes 

1. Col Dennis M. Drew, “Vietnam, ‘Wars of the Third Kind’ and Air Force 

Doctrine,” paper presented at Texas Tech University Center for the Study of 

the Vietnam Conflict, seminar on the Vietnam War, 18–21 April 1996, 1fn. 

For details on “Wars of the Third Kind,” see Edward E. Rice, Wars of the 

Third: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries (Berkeley, Calif.: University of 

California, 1988). 

2. Drew; and Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of 

the United States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, vii. 

3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Aerospace Doctrine, 1 September 1997. 

4. Ibid., 1 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid., 2. 

7. Drew. 

8. For details on these theories, see Giulio Douhet, trans. Dino Ferrari 

The Command of the Air (1942; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 

Force History [AFHO], 1983); Brig Gen William L. “Billy” Mitchell, Our Air 

Force: The Keystone to National Defense (New York: Dutson, 1921); idem, 

Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and Military (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1925). For a very clear and concise modern interpretation of traditional Air Force roles, policies, theories, 

and doctrine, see Col Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air 

Power (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995). 

9. John Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair, Never Take Such a Risk Again,” Daily 

Telegraph (London), 6 June 1999. 

10. Drew, 11; AFMAN 1-2, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1953; 

idem, Air Doctrine, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, April 1954 and 

April 1955; idem, and United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, December 

1959). Subsequent USAF basic doctrine manuals were marked AFMAN 1-1 

beginning with the following basic doctrine publication in the fall of 1964. 

11. Drew, 11. 

12. Ibid.; AFMAN 1-3, Theater Air Operations, September 1953 and April 

1954. The next edition of this publication did not appear until June 1965 

and was redesignated AFMAN 2-1. 

97 
13. Drew, 7; G. J. M. Chassin, “Lessons of the War in Indochina,” Interavia 7, no. 12 (1952): 670–75. 

14. Drew, 8; Bureau of Commander in Chief, Indo-China, Notes on Combat in Indo-China, vol. 1, 1954; Supreme Command, Far East, Lessons from 

the Indo-China War, vol. 2, 1955 and vol. 3, 1956. While the first official 

copies did not reach US defense officials until 3 January 1967, it is likely 

the English-language versions were available much earlier. 

15. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Aerospace Doctrine: More than Just a 

Theory,” Airpower Journal, Summer 1996, 41. 

16. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: vol. 2, Basic 

Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1961–1984 (Maxwell Air Force Base 

[AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1989), 63; and Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1963), 900–910. 

17. Futrell, 75–91. 

18. Ibid., 63–64; and Gen Curtis E. LeMay, CSAF, address to the Air 

Force Association Convention, Philadelphia, Pa., 21 September 1961, in Air 

Force Information Policy Letter for Commanders, supplement, 15 November 

1961, 1–6. 

19. John F. Loosbrok, editorial, Air Force/Space Digest, January 1963, 

28–31. 

20. Futrell, 155–60, 226–30. For more on Zuckert’s policy changes, see 

Eugene Zuckert, “Keeping the Organizational Engine in Tune,” Air 

Force/Space Digest, October 1964, 37–40. 

21. For details on this period, see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History 

(New York: Viking, 1983), specifically pages 161–348. 

22. Earl H. Tilford Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1993), 33–34, 66. 

23. Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, Department of Defense History of United 

States Decision Making in Vietnam, Sen. Mike Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon 

Press, 1971), 207. 

24. Marcelle Size Knaack, Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems, vol. 2, Post–World War II Bombers, 1945–1973 (Washington, 

D.C.: AFHO, 1988), 206–22; Year By Year: 75 Years of Boeing History, 

1916–1991 (Seattle, Wash.: Boeing Historical Archives, 1991), 72–73; Pedigree of Champions: Boeing since 1916, 6th ed. (Seattle, Wash.: Boeing Co., 

1985), 50–51; William W. Suit, “Utilitarian War Horse: Modifying the B-52 

for Conventional War,” Air Power History, Winter 1997, 38–39. 

25. Tilford, 11; Knaack, 222–23; Year By Year, 73; Suit, 39; Robert Frank 

Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air 

Force, 1907–1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989), 126. 

26. Knaack, 223–35; Pedigree of Champions, 50–51; and Year By Year, 

73–74. 

27. Tilford, 25; and Futrell 1:256, 271. 

28. Knaack, 235–44; Pedigree of Champions, 51; Kenneth L. Patchin and 

James N. Eastman, The B-52 Stratofortress, vol. 2, B-52 Logistical Support 

(Tinker AFB, Okla.: OCAMA/Office of Information [OI], History Office, July 

1961), 27–28 (quote p. 28). Some other early studies on B-52 development 

include Ron E. Caywood, Major Problems in the B-52 Conversion Program, 

1955–1958 (Offutt AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History Office, n.d.); Warren E. Greene, 

The Development of the B-52 Aircraft, 1945–1953 (Wright-Patterson AFB, 

98 
Ohio: AMC/History Office, 1956); Harland B. Moulton and Ron E. Caywood, 

The History of the B-52: Background and Early Development, 1946–1954 (Offutt AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History Office, n.d.); and Lloyd S. Jones, U.S. Bombers, 

3d ed. (Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero Publishers, 1980). It should be noted that the 

term BUFF, often used by airmen to lovingly describe the B-52, stood for 

“Big Ugly Fat Fellow.” To many airmen it also stood for “Big Ugly Fat F-----.” 

29. Knaack, 260–84, 288, 291; Pedigree of Champions, 51; Year By Year, 

74, 117; and Suit, 39–41, 43. 

30. Knaack, 245–57; Pedigree of Champions, 50–51; and Suit, 42–43. For 

details from an earlier publication see, US Air Force Fact Sheet, subject: B52 in Southeast Asia, Study no. 68-19, 1968. For an official history of the 

“Big Belly” see Kenneth L. Patchin and Bill B. Stacy, Southeast Asia, B-52 

Logistics Support for CY66 (Tinker AFB, Okla.: OCAMA/OI, August 1967), 

1–2, 22–36, 89–92. 

31. Futrell, 2:171–73, 242, 251–52. 

32. Curtis E. LeMay, “Air Power in Guerrilla Warfare,” Air Force Information Policy Letter for Commanders (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary 

of the Air Force, 15 April 1962); and Drew, 12–13. 

33. AFMAN 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 14 August 1964, 

chap. 6. 

34. Drew, 13–15. 

35. Futrell, 2:228. Original quote in Gen Bernard A. Schriever, “Forecast,” Air University Review, March–April 1965, 3. 

36. Futrell, 2:228. 

37. Ibid., 231. 

38. Ibid., 233. 

39. Ibid., 232–35. 

40. For general information on Arc Light, see John F. Guilmartin Jr., “Arc 

Light,” in Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, ed. Stanley I. Kutler (New York: 

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996), 48. For details on Arc Light operations, see 

J. C. Hopkins and Sheldon A. Goldberg, The Development of the Strategic Air 

Command, 1946–1986: The Fortieth Anniversary History (Offutt AFB, Nebr.: 

SAC/History Office, 1986); Headquarters SAC, “Activity Input to Project 

Corona Harvest–Arc Light Operations, 1 Jan 65–31 Mar 68,” USAF special 

study, 3 vols.; Carl Berger, ed., The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 

1961–1973: An Illustrated Account (Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1984); and 

John Schlight, The Air War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 

1965–1968 (Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1988). 

41. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968, pt. 2, 

24-1, 2; History, SAC, January–June, 1965, 198; and Schlight, 49. 

42. Ibid. 

43. SAC, “Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, Arc Light” (Offutt 

AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History Office, 1970), 2:2; History, SAC, January–June, 

1964; Message, 140805Z MAY 65, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) to Commander in Chief Pacific Command 

(CINCPAC), 14 May 1965; Schlight, 50; Larry Cable, Unholy Grail: The U.S. 

and the Wars in Vietnam, 1965–1968 (London: Routledge, 1991), 98–100, 

109. 

44. SAC, “Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, Arc Light,” 2:2–3, 5–9, 

12–13 (quote p. 5); History, 3d Air Division, January–June 1967, 134; History, CINCPAC, 1967, 2:711; Corona Harvest (CH), A Chronology of Important 

99 
Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 1950–1968 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1 May 1969), 222; and Director of 

Operations, DCS, Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF, study, “Analysis of B-52 Conventional Operations in SEA,” 29 October 1965. 

45. Message, 190330Z MAR 65, COMUSMACV to Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS), 19 March 1965; Message, 292147Z APR 65, JCS to CINCPAC, 29 

April 1965; Schlight, 50; and History, SAC, July–December 1965, 2:267. 

46. Schlight, 51–52; Message, 150305Z JUN 65, COMUSMACV to JCS, 

15 June 1965; and Air Force Plans Division (AFXOPJ), memorandum to 

Chief of Staff Air Force, subject: Changes in Planning and Execution of Arc 

Light I, 24 June 1965. 

47. Schlight, 51–52. 

48. Ibid., 52–53 (quote p. 53); Hopkins and Goldberg, 131 (quote p. 131); 

Message, 181004Z JUN 65, JCS to DIRNSA, 18 June 1965; CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 103. It should be noted 

that since this raid the gnat quote has been altered and retold in many variations such as it was like a “housewife using a sledgehammer to kill house 

flies.” 

49. History, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), January 

1972–March 1973, 191–92; Schlight, 53–54 (first quote); and CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 104 (second quote). 

50. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

114; Schlight, 54–55, 82–83; History, SAC, July–December 1965, 2:270–71; 

Message, Zippo 08-225, 02/1255Z AUG 65, 7th Bomb Squadron to Assistant Inspector General 673, 12 August 1965; and History, MACV, January 

1972–March 1973, 166–67. For precise details on every major ground operation and their Arc Light and air support components, see Cable, 41–47, 

98–99, 109, 191–92. 

51. For details, see William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), 283–88; Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), CH, Command 

and Control, bk. 2, pt. 2, 4–20; PACAF, CH, Out-Country Report, bk. 1, 31, 

83 and bk. 2, 60; Berger, 150; History, SAC, July–December 1965, 279–86. 

52. Suit, 41–42. For details, see Patchin and Stacy, 1–2, 22–92; SAC, 

“Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, Arc Light,” 2:10–11; Knaack, 

245–47, 257–59; Pedigree of Champions, 50–51; and OCNAO to OCPWA, letter: External Navy Mine Carriage, 2 August 1966. 

53. SAC, “Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, Arc Light,” 2:16–18; 

and Study, RAND Corporation, “Air Interdiction in Southeast Asia, 1966,” iii. 

54. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

167; SAC, “Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, Arc Light,” 2:16–17; 

Message, 15/1445Z MAR 66, Zippo 0731, SAC to JCS, 15 March 1966; and 

Suit, 42. For more on Rolling Thunder and interservice rivalries see Tilford, 

Crosswinds; Larry Cable, “The Operation Was a Success, but the Patient 

Died: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1969,” in An American Dilemma: Vietnam, 1964–1973, ed. Dennis Showalter and John G. Albert (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993), 109–58. 

55. Cable, “The Operation Was a Success,” quote on p. 149; Seventh Air 

Force, memorandum to PACAF, subject: B-52 Operations, 061234Z October 

1966; Momyer, 97–102; idem, “End of Tour Report [EOTR], Seventh Air 

Force,” 9. 

100 
56. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 99–102. Momyer laid out these issues in memorandum to Maj Oakah L. Jones, PACAF, subject: B-52 Concept, 7 August 1966; and Schlight, 149. 

57. Futrell, 2:301–2. 

58. Ibid., 302–3. Original in Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, 

eds., Air Superiority in World War II and Korea: An Interview with Gen. James 

Ferguson, Gen. Robert M. Lee, Gen. William Momyer, and Lt. Gen. Elwood R. 

Quesada (Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1983), 69–70. 

59. Futrell, 2:191. Original quote in Air Force Regulation 1-1, Aerospace 

Doctrine: Responsibilities for Doctrine Development, 20 March 1963. 

60. Futrell, 2:288. 

61. Ibid., 298. Original in United States Senate, DOD Appropriations for 

FY75: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

93d Cong., 2d sess. 1974, pt. 2, 4389–95. 

62. Futrell, 2:303. Original quote in Bruce Palmer, ed., Grand Strategy 

for the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprises Institute for Public 

Policy Research, 1978), 67. 

63. CH, In-Country Air Strikes Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 65–31 

Mar 68 (Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1971); Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars, 

101–3 (quote); idem, EOTR, 9; idem, memorandum to McConnell, 11 November 1966; Message, Seventh Air Force to PACAF, 22 September 1966; 

and Schlight, 149–50. 

64. Futrell, 2:283. Quote in William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports 

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 343. 

65. Futrell, 2:283; and Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, 

N.H.: University of Vermont Press, 1977), 62. 

66. History, SAC, January–June 1966, 138 (first quote); Schlight, 

152–53; and CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast 

Asia, 177–82, 186 (second quote). See also Message, 12/2331Z MAY 66, 

COMUSMACV to Defense Intelligence Agency, 23 May 1966; History, 3d Air 

Division, January–June 1966, vol. 1, xi; Message 12571, 11/1359Z APR 66, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 11 April 1966; Message, 12/0600Z APR 66, 

American Embassy Vientiane to CINCPAC, 12 April 1966; Message, 

14/0316Z APR 66, Zippo 0496, 4133 BWP to AIG 673, 14 April 1966; and 

Message, 15/1303Z APR 66, 13067, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 15 April 

1966. 

67. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

185–86; and Message, 13/0952A MAY 66, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 13 

May 1966. 

68. Schlight, 153, 213; History, SAC, January–June 1966, 106, 138; 

Charles K. Hopkins, SAC Bomber Operations in the Southeast Asia War, 

Study 204, vol. 1 (Offutt AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History Office, 1985), 168; and 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum to Chairman JCS, 1 September 

1966. 

69. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

197–99; Message, 0478 30/0448Z JUN 66, 3d Air Division to Headquarters 

SAC, 30 June 1966; Berger, 151; and History, SAC, January–June 1966, 

139. 

70. SAC, “Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, Arc Light,” 3:1, 15, 

49; CINCSAC to CSAF, letter, no subject, 26 August 1967; and Suit, 42. 

101 
71. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

221. 

72. Ibid., 227, 231; History, SAC, January–June 1966, 145; History, 

SAC, January–June 1967, 131; and Message, AFXOPDO 89449, 02/1942Z 

MAR 67, CSAF to SAC, 2 March 1967. 

73. Berger, 151–56; Schlight, 250–58; Cable, Unholy Grail, 191–93; CH, 

A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 235, 238; and 

Message, DITW 07560, 18/2205Z JULY 67, SAC to AIG 667 et al., 18 July 

1967, 10. The actual nature of Nguyen Chi Thanh’s death remains a controversy to this day. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam officially declares that 

he died of a heart attack. Some authors have recently intimated that internal political rivals assassinated him. Some have even suggested that he died 

of a heart attack brought on by a bombing raid. To me the best evidence 

strongly suggests that he died during a B-52 raid. How he died is debatable. 

74. Berger, 156; CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 252, 254; History, SAC, July–December 1967, 18; and History, 

Seventh Air Force, 1 July–31 December 1967, 21. 

75. “Jason Report,” Pentagon Papers, 4:227, 275; and Tilford, 88, 96, 97. 

76. Tilford, 96–97; and Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The 

First Twenty-Five Years (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 

1976), 181. For an excellent account of the tense relationship between Johnson and his military leaders see, Col Herbert Y. Schandler, “The President, 

the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Political Direction of the War,” paper presented to the 1996 Vietnam Symposium, Texas 

Tech University, 18 April 1996. During those fateful days Schandler, a liaison officer for the secretary of defense, saw many of these events firsthand. 

77. PACAF, CH, Command and Control, bk. 1, pt. 2, 25; History, SAC, 

July–December 1967, 152–53; CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower 

Events in Southeast Asia, 261–63, 268; Berger, 156–57; Message, 10/1830Z 

FEB 68, SAC/Vice Commander to CINCPAC, 19 February 1968. The Tet offensive also began in January. 

78. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

273–74; History, Seventh Air Force, 1 January–30 June 1968, xxii; Headquarters Seventh Air Force, “Weekly Air Intelligence Summary,” Report, no. 

6819, 11 May 1968; and Berger, 156–57. 

79. Quotes in Schlight, 292; and Berger, 157. 

80. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

276; History, Seventh Air Force 1 January–30 June 1968, xxiv; and Berger, 

157, 160. 

81. Drew, 10; and William R. Becker, “Air Power in the Fight against 

Guerrillas” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College [ACSC], 7 May 

1962), 91. 

82. See Becker. See also John L. Phipps, “Basic Problems in CounterGuerrilla Air Operations” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: ACSC, 7 May 1962); William C. 

Lockett Jr., “COIN in the Air: A Study of the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: ACSC, 22 April 1963); William J. Thorpe, 

“HUK Hunting in the Philippines, 1946–1953,” Airpower Historian, April 

1962, 95–100. 

83. Robert Kipp, “Counterinsurgency from 30,000 Feet,” Air University 

Review, January–February 1968, 10–18. 

84. Drew, 22; and AFMAN 2-5, 10 March 1967, 13, 18. 

102 
85. Drew, 22–23; AFMAN 2-5, 14–16. 

86. Drew, 12; and Futrell, 2:257–58. 

87. Drew, 13. 

88. Gilbert L. Pritchard, “Communism and Counterinsurgency: The Air 

Force Role in Combined Support Action,” Air Force Information Policy Letter 

Supplement for Commanders, no. 113 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 3 November 1962). 

89. Futrell, 2:316. 

90. Ibid., 316–17. 

91. Ibid., 317. 

92. Futrell, 2:317–18. 

93. Ibid., 318–19. 

94. Ibid., 320. 

95. Ibid. 

96. Ibid., 321. 

97. Ibid., 321–22. Original in Col John E. Van Duyn, chief, Corona Harvest Project, to commander (CC), Air University, letter, subject: EOTR, 16 

March 1972; and Col Robert L. Gleason, chief, Corona Harvest Project, to 

AU/CC, letter, subject: EOTR, 1 July 1973. 

98. Futrell, 2:322; and Gleason. 

99. Futrell, 2:322–23. 

100. Gen William W. Momyer, memorandum to Gen Richard H. Ellis, 

subject: Corona Harvest In-Country Air Strike Operations, Southeast Asia, 

1 Jan 65–31 Mar 68, 1 July 1974. 

101. Drew, 14–16. 

102. Ibid., 16–17. 

103. Earl H. Tilford Jr., “Bombing Our Way Back Home: The Commando 

Hunt and Menu Campaigns of 1969–1973,” in Looking Back on the Vietnam 

War: A 1990s Perspective of Decisions, Combat, and Legacies, ed. William 

Head and Lawrence Grinter (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993), 123–24. 

104. Ibid. Seamans’s original remarks appeared as SECAF Robert C. 

Seamans Jr., address, 1969 Air Force Association Convention, Houston, 

Tex., 19 March 1969; and “Continuing Cooperation between NASA and 

DOD,” Air Force Magazine, May 1969, 100. 

105. Seamans, 129; Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: 

Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 241–42. 

106. Berger, 160; Tilford, Crosswinds, 125–26; idem, “Bombing Our Way 

Back Home,” 129; and Kissinger, 247. Original in Gen John Ryan, USAF 

chief of staff, memorandum to Sen. John C. Stennis, chair, Senate Committee of the Armed Services, subject: Hearings before the Committee on Armed 

Services, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 26 July 1973, 121–22. 

107. Tilford, Crosswinds, 126–27; John Morrocco, Rain of Fire: Air War, 

1969–1973, ed. Robert Manning, Vietnam Experience Series (Boston: 

Boston Publishing Co., 1986), 12. Maj Hal Knight blew the whistle of the secret bombings when he wrote Sen. William Proxmire a letter on 18 January 

1973 requesting a “clarification” of US policies in Cambodia. The letter appears along with subsequent testimony in the Armed Services Committee 

Hearings mentioned in the previous note. 

108. Tilford, Crosswinds, 126–27; and Morrocco, 12. 

109. Kissinger, 240; Tilford, Crosswinds, 128; and idem, “Bombing Our 

Way Back Home,” 130–31. For enemy attitudes on the Cambodian bombing 

103 
see Truong Nhu Tang, A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam 

War and Its Aftermath (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1985). 

110. Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and Land Battle in Three 

American Wars (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 329. 

For more on the Vietminh struggle against the French, see Karnow, 

128–205. It should be noted that the National Liberation Front (NLF) was not 

an arm of the northern government. In fact, many members of the NLF were 

noncommunists and opposed reunification, even after the United States departed. Many scholars have noted this fact in such works as Cable’s Unholy 

Grail. 

111. Mark, 329–30. For more on Ngo Dinh Diem, see Karnow, 206–311. 

112. Mark, 330–31. For more on these deepening commitments, see 

Karnow, 319–48 (pp. 330–34 cover the NVA buildup, quotes on p. 334). 

113. Mark, 331–32; and History, MACV, January 1972–March 1973, 

35–36, 43–44. 

114. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

294. 

115. Berger, 109–19; Tilford, “Bombing Our Way Back Home,” 126–27. 

For more on gunships, see Jack S. Ballard, The United States in Southeast 

Asia: Development and Employment of Fixed-Wing Gunships, 1962–1972 

(Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1982). For more on Commando Hunt, see pp. 45, 

262. 

116. CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 

296; PACAF, CH Report, “United States Air Force Operations in Laos: 1 Jan 

70–30 Jun 71,” Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1971, 25; and J. William Gibson, The 

Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 

396–97. 

117. Tilford, “Bombing Our Way Back Home,” 127–28. 

118. Berger, 109–10. 

119. Ibid., 111. 

120. Ibid. 

121. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of North Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: 

Presidio Press, 1986), chap. 1 and Conclusion; and idem, Vietcong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam 

(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 85–105. 

122. Berger, 111–12, 114; and Tilford, Crosswinds, 114. 

123. Berger, 114–18. 

124. Maj Gen Alton D. Slay, deputy chief of staff, Operations, Seventh Air 

Force, “End-of-Tour Report, August 1971–August 1972,” 20, file K717.13, 

Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala.; and Tilford, “Bombing Our Way Back Home,” 132–33. 

125. Mark, 332–33; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt 

VII, June 1972. 

126. Mark, 333–34; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt 

VII, June 1972, 20. For an excellent study detailing the communist supply 

network see, Bernard C. Nalty, Interdiction in Southern Laos (Washington, 

D.C.: AFHO, 1988), 223–32. 

127. Mark, 334–35; and Nalty, 234–48. 

128. Berger, 118; Mark, 344; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando 

Hunt VII, June 1972. 

129. Ibid. 

104

130. Mark, 345–46; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt 

VII, June 1972, 23–27. 

131. Mark, 346; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, 

June 1972, 30–33. 

132. Berger, 118; Tilford, Crosswinds, 138; Mark, 344–45; and History, 

Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, June 1972, 14–17, 22–24. 

133. History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, June 1972, 

48–49, 118–27. 

134. Berger, 119; Mark, 345; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando 

Hunt VII, June 1972. 

135. Mark, 357–58. 

136. History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, June 1972, 61, 

80; and Slay, EOTR, (quote) p. 30. 

137. Quote in Mark, 358; and original in Brig Gen Richard G. Cross, Endof-Tour Report, 22 January 1973, file K740.131.2, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

138. Mark, 358; Berger, 119; Tilford, Crosswinds, 138–39 (quote p. 140). 

139. Tilford, “Bombing Our Way Back Home,” 127–28; PACAF, CH Report, “United States Air Force Operations in Laos: 1 Jan 70–30 Jun 71,” 

76–79; and Ballard, 173. 

140. Mark, 358–59; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt 

VII, June 1972, 80; and Nalty, 250–51. For details on Commando Hunt V, 

see History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt V, May 1971, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, 56–57. 

141. Col D. L. Evans, director of Intelligence, Task Force Alpha, EOTR, 6 

July 1972, 30, file 10015110, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; and Mark, 360 

(quotes). 

142. Evans, 16; and Mark, 361–62. 

143. Nalty, 148 (quote); Mark, 362–63; and Slay, 26. 

144. Mark, 335, 347 (quotes); Berger, 119; Tilford, Crosswinds, 138–39; 

Evans, 44, 59; and Slay, 26. 

145. Mark, 335; and Nalty, 228–30. 

146. Mark, 348–49; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt 

VII, June 1972, 66–67. 

147. Mark, 349–50; and Slay, 23–24. For details on sensors, see Michael 

Horrocks, The Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Sensor War, 1966–1971 

(Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1985), 17–19. 

148. Mark, 350; Slay, 28–29; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando 

Hunt VII, June 1972, 47, 133. 

149. Mark, 355; History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, June 

1972, 89–93; and Evans, 47–48. 

150. Mark, 346–47, 355–56; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando 

Hunt VII, June 1972, 33–40, 140–41, 231. 

151. Mark, 355–56; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt 

VII, June 1972, 139–41. 

152. Mark, 348; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, 

June 1972, 39–44. 

153. Mark, 356–57; History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, 

June 1972, 21–22, 51–58, 132–42; and Evans, 48. 

154. Mark, 336; and Ballard, 77–175. 

155. History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, June 1972, 67, 

80–82; Mark, 353 (quote); and original in Slay, 24. 

105 
156. Berger, 119; and Tilford, Crosswinds, 139. 

157. Mark, 329–34; Berger, 109–19; Tilford, “Bombing Our Way Back 

Home,” 126–33; Slay, 20; and History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt 

VII, June 1972, 14, 20, 89. For an excellent study detailing the communist 

supply network, see Bernard C. Nalty, Interdiction in Southern Laos (Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1988), 234–48. 

158. Mark, 358–60; Berger, 119; Tilford, Crosswinds, 138–40; History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt VII, June 1972, 80; Nalty, Interdiction in 

Southern Laos, 250–51; and Futrell, 2:266–67. For details on Commando Hunt 

V see, History, Seventh Air Force, Commando Hunt V, May 1971, 56–57; Tilford, “Bombing Our Way Back Home,” 127–28; Ballard, 173; and Evans. 

159. AFMAN 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 28 September 

1971, 6-1. 

160. Drew, 23–24; and AFMAN 1-1, 1971, 6-1. 

161. Richard M. Nixon, RN, vol. 2, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New 

York: Warner Books, 1978), 79, 259; and idem, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 335–37. 

162. Tilford, Crosswinds, 143; Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: 

The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), 

152–53; Mark, 365–66; and Futrell, 2:267–68. 

163. Truong, 200–202, 210–13. 

164. Kissinger, 1109; and Clodfelter, 153. 

165. Bruce Palmer, “U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence, special Spring issue, 1984, 91; and Mark, 368. 

166. Capt Charles A. Nicholson, The USAF Response to the Spring 1972 

NVN Offensive: Situation and Redeployment (Project CHECO, Seventh Air 

Force/DOAC, 1972), 21 (quote); and Tilford, Crosswinds, 143. 

167. Capt David Mann, The 1972 Invasion of Military Region I: Fall of 

Quang Tri and Defense of Hue (Project CHECO, Seventh Air Force/CDC, 

1973), 13–52; Capt Peter A. W. Liebchen, Kontum: Battle for the Central Highlands, 30 March–10 June 1972 (Project CHECO, Seventh Air Force/DOAC, 

1972), 28–44; and Maj Paul T. Ringenbach and Capt Peter J. Melly, The Battle for An Loc, 5 April–26 June 1972 (Project CHECO, Seventh Air 

Force/CDC, 1973), 1–16. 

168. Tilford, Crosswinds, 146; Slay, 51, 156; and Futrell, 2:275. For details see, Maj A. J. C. Lavalle, ed., Air Power and the 1972 Spring Offensive, 

USAF Monograph Series, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 58, 98. 

169. Nicholson, 38, 67; Mark, 373; History, Seventh Air Force, 1 Jul 71–30 

Jun 72, 273–77; Mark Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” in An American 

Dilemma: Vietnam, 1964–1973, ed. Dennis E. Showalter and John G. Albert 

(Chicago: Imprint Publishers, 1993), 169; and James R. McCarthy, George 

B. Allison, and Robert E. Rayfield, Linebacker II, vol. 6, A View from the Rock, 

USAF Southeast Asia Series, monograph 8 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 

1979), 11. Also used in this paper is the 1985 revised copy. 

170. Nicholson, NVN Offensive, 67; Mark, 373; History, PACAF, 1 July 

1971–30 Jun 1972, vol. 1, 121–22; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 

169; Tilford, Crosswinds, 145; and History, Seventh Air Force, Linebacker 

Operations, 10 May–23 October 1972, 1973, 3–5, file K740.04-24, AFHRA, 

Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

171. Nicholson, NVN Offensive, 123–24; Mark, 373; and Clodfelter, “Nixon 

and the Air Weapon,” 169. 

106 
172. Nixon, RN, 2:606; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 172; Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New 

York: Summit Books, 1983), 506; and Melvin F. Porter, Linebacker: Overview 

of the First 120 Days (Project CHECO, Seventh Air Force/DOA, 1973), 

14–15. 

173. Mark, 375; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 170, original in 

MACV, Linebacker Study (unofficial/uncoordinated draft report), 20 January 1973, chap. 2, 2, File K712.041-19, AFHRA; Nixon, RN, 2:64–65; and 

PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 1 Jul 71–30 Jun 72, 1973, 

52–61. 

174. Hersh, 568 (quote); Kissinger, 1118, 1176; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the 

Air Weapon,” 170–71; Mark, 375–76; and Nixon, RN, 2:81. 

175. PACAF CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 90–91; Momyer, Air 

Power in Three Wars, 33; Tilford, Crosswinds, 149–50; and PACAF CH, Command and Control, bk. 1, 1–24. Specifically the report determined that Linebacker I’s goal was to: “1) restrict resupply of North Vietnam from external 

sources; 2) destroy internal stockpiles of military supplies and equipment; 

and 3) restrict flow of forces and supplies to the battlefield.” 

176. Porter, 16–17; and Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 171. 

177. Nixon, RN, 2:79–80; and Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 171. 

178. Mark, 378–79; PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 65, 

121–31; and PACAF, SEA Report, “Air Operations Summaries, April, May, 

and June 1972,” File K717.3063, AFHRA. 

179. PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 131. 

180. Mark, 379. 

181. PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 132–36; and History, 

Seventh Air Force, Linebacker Operations, 1973, 51–52. 

182. PACAF, North Vietnamese Current Assessment, vol. 7, U.S. Air Force 

Operations in Defense of RVN, 1 June 1972, CH Document Collection, File 

K717.03-219, AFHRA. 

183. Mark, 382. 

184. PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 91–95; and Momyer, 

Air Power in Three Wars, 174–75, 183–96. 

185. Mark, 385–86; PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 

98–103; and Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 172. 

186. Mark, 386–88; and PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 

103–4. 

187. Porter, 25; and PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 

111–17. 

188. PACAF, CH, USAF Air Operations against NVN, 109–17 (quotes). 

189. Palmer, “U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam,” 97–98. 

190. Mark, 392–95; History, SAC, 1 July 1971–30 June 1972, 461–67; 

and PACAF, SEA Report, Air Operations Summaries, April–August 1972. 

191. Mark, 395–97. 

192. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 173 (quote p. 166). 

193. Palmer, “U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam,” 98–99. 

194. History, MACV, January 1972–March 1973, 15 July 1973, Saigon, 

Republic of Vietnam, 53, 74, 79. 

195. Mark, 399, 408. 

107 
196. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 172; idem, The Limits of Air 

Power, 159–60; Kissinger, 1102; and History, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, 

vol. 1, narrative, 148–49. 

197. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 159–61. 

198. Ibid., 161–62. 

199. Ibid., 165; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 172; and Tilford, 

Crosswinds, 153. 

200. Tilford, Crosswinds, 148. 

201. Nixon, RN, 2:188–93; Ted Szulc, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy 

in the Nixon Years (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 629. 

202. Kissinger, 1397, 1409–10; and Hersh, 604. 

203. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 173–74; Nixon, RN, 

2:222–27, 230; Kissinger, 1411–12, 1416; and Clodfelter, The Limits of Air 

Power, 177–79. 

204. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 179–82; Clodfelter, “Nixon and 

the Air Weapon,” 174–77; Nixon, RN, 2:224–31, 234–42; Kissinger, 1420–47; 

and Hersh, 619. 

205. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 182–83; and Truong, 168 (quote). 

206. Nixon, RN, 2:242 (quote); also Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air 

Weapon,” 177; idem, The Limits of Air Power, 183–84 (Moorer quote); McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 39–40 (revised); and Tilford, Crosswinds, 

164–66. 

207. Futrell, 2:296. 

208. Ibid. For more details on this issue, see United States Senate, DOD 

Appropriations for FY75: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d sess. 1974, pt. 1, 101. 

209. Futrell, 2:296; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 178; Maj 

Calvin R. Johnson, Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, Linebacker Operations, September–December 1972 (U), (Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1974), 

57–60. Much of this material came from Report (S), Headquarters 

PACAF/OA, “Linebacker II Air Operations Summary, 18–29 December 72,” 

March 1973. This report has since been declassified. 

210. Futrell, 2:296–97. 

211. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 178. Most of this information was obtained by Colonel Clodfelter in an interview with Col Clyde E. Bodenheimer, 7 January 1983, an interview with members of General Meyer’s 

staff, and USAF interview of Lt Gen Gerald W. Johnson by Charles K. Hopkins, 3 April 1973, AFHRA, File K239.0512-813, 6–7. 

212. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 184–85; and McCarthy, Allison, 

and Rayfield (revised), 41. 

213. Maj Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, 55. 

214. Ibid., 55, 57; and “Linebacker II Air Operations Summary, 18–29 

Dec 72,” 2–18. One important side note should be observed. From 18 June 

1965 until 22 November 1972, B-52s had flown 112,000 combat sorties 

without a combat loss. This information gave leaders a sense that the big 

bombers were not only the most effective weapon for this operation but also 

were less vulnerable too—which would prove, to some extent, a false sense 

of security. On 22 November 1972, a B-52D flown by DYE E-05—the lead 

crew in the Olive Cell (one of two nine-ship waves and three three-ship 

cells)—was struck by SA-2 SAM fragments under the right wing. The pilot, 

Captain Ostrozny, brought the damaged and limping plane to the Lao–Thai 

108 
border where the crew of six bailed out and was eventually rescued. This 

was a particularly ominous and prophetic event since the BUFF was hit during its final bomb run. Indeed, 15 more BUFFs and crews would suffer a 

similar fate during the 11 days of Linebacker II. See Maj Calvin R. Johnson, 

Linebacker Operations, 1974, 31–32. 

215. Tilford, Crosswinds, 165–66; Morocco, 149; Clodfelter, Limits of Air 

Power, 186; McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield (revised), 50–64; and Headquarters SAC/History Office, Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II (Offutt AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History Office, 12 August 1973), 95–96. 

216. Nixon, RN, 242–46 (quote p. 242). 

217. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 179; Headquarters 

SAC/HO, Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 106, 109–11, 121, 

140–43; and McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 41–44, 77, 89, 96 and 64–89 

(revised). 

218. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 179; and McCarthy, Allison, 

and Rayfield, 121. 

219. Maj Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, 1974, 62. The original sources are Message (TS), 082030Z JAN 73, CINCSAC/DO, to Seventh 

Air Force, 8 January 1973; Message (U), 221935Z DEC 72, AFSSO PACAF, 

to Seventh Air Force, 22 December 1972; and Message (U), 222020Z DEC 

72, CINCSAC, to CINCPACAF, 22 December 1972. 

220. Maj Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, 1974. The original 

source was History (TS), Headquarters MACV, January 1972–March 1973. 

221. Berger, 166–67. For numbers of SAMs fired see, Walter J. Boyne, 

“Linebacker II: A Look Back,” Air Force Magazine, November 1997, 57. 

222. Futrell, 2:297. 

223. Maj Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, 70. Original can be 

found in interview (U), Project CHECO staff with Brig Gen Richard G. Cross 

Jr., MACV/Assistant Duty Officer, 18 December 1972. 

224. Futrell, 2:297–98; and Maj Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, 64–66. 

225. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 187; Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 153–59, 185–86; and McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 91–98 (revised). 

226. McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 99–123 (revised); Chronology of 

SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 170–75, 187–90, 202–5, 223–27, 230; and 

Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 188. 

227. McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 121–39; idem, 126–44 (revised); 

Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 122; Tilford, Crosswinds, 

168–69; Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 188–89; and idem, “Nixon and 

the Air Weapon,” 179–80. 

228. McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 145–53; idem, 155–66 (revised); 

Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 277, 322; Clodfelter, “Nixon 

and the Air Weapon,” 180; idem, The Limits of Air Power, 189 (quote), original interview by Clodfelter with then–Maj John R. Allen who flew three missions held at Osan AB, Korea, 22 September 1981. 

229. Quote in Maj Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, 57; “Linebacker II Air Operations Summary, 18–29 Dec 72,” 19; Boyne, 57; Suit, 43; 

Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 191–95; McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 

171–75 (revised); Headquarters PACAF, Linebacker II Air Force Bombing Survey, 37; and Berger, 167. It should be noted that the Seventh Air Force alone 

109 
flew 613 tactical combat sorties and 2,066 support sorties losing one aircraft 

to a SAM, three to AAA, and two to MiGs. The 15 B-52s downed meant that 

based on the 729 sorties, the SAMs had a 1.7 to 1 kill ratio and 2.06 percent sortie loss rate. See Futrell, 2:297–98. 

230. Maj Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, 71. Original found 

in Article (U), no author, “SAC Chief Lauds US Raids,” Pacific Stars and 

Stripes, 24 March 1973, 23. 

231. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 180. Quote in Truong, 226, 

and Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975 (Novato, 

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988), 728. 

232. The original Vietnamese version of this quote can be found in Tran 

Van Tra, Viet Nam: History Bulwark B-2 Theatre, vol. 5, Concluding the 30-

Year War (Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe Publishing House, 1983). The English translation was reprinted in Arlington, Virginia, by Joint Publications 

Research Service in 1983, quote p. 33; also in Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a 

War: Vietnam the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New 

York: Pantheon, 1985), 444–45. See also Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 

196; and idem, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 181. 

233. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 181 (quote), original Editorial, Nhan Dan, 17 August 1972, also in Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam, vol. 2, 

The Definitive Documentary of Human Decisions (Sanfordville, N.Y.: Earl M. 

Coleman, 1979), 568. 

234. Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 181. 

235. Ibid., 182–83. 

236. For more on the Summers book, see Harry G. Summers Jr., On 

Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1981); and idem, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War 

(1982; reprint, New York: Dell, 1984). 

237. For more on this issue, see Futrell, 2:260–319. 

238. AFMAN 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 15 January 

1975; AFMAN 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air 

Force, 14 February 1979; and AFMAN 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1984. 

239. AFMAN 1-1, 1992; AFDD 1, 1997. Also, see Clodfelter, The Limits of 

Air Power; Col Dennis M. Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989); Cable, Unholy Grail; and idem, Conflicts of Myths: The 

Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War 

(New York: New York University Press, 1986). 

240. Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency; Larry Cable, “Reinventing 

the Round Wheel—Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping in the 

Post Cold War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, April 1990, 39–46 (quote p. 

46). 

241. US Army and USAF, Field Manual (FM) 100-20, AF Publication 3-

20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 5 December 1990; AFMAN 

2-11, Foreign Internal Defense Operations, 3 November 1992; and Drew, 

“Vietnam,” 32–33. 

242. AFMAN 2-11, 9. 

243. Ibid., 9–10. 

244. Drew, “Vietnam,” 35–36. 

110 
245. For more on parallel warfare and the future of high tech airpower 

as a result of the Gulf War, see John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (1988; reprint, New York: Pergamon–Brassey, 1989); idem, 

“Air Power in the Twenty-First Century,” in The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff 

Jr. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1992); David A. Deptula, “Parallel Warfare: What Is It? Where Did It Come From? Why Is It Important?” in 

Eagle in the Desert: A Look Back at U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War, 

ed. William Head and Earl H. Tilford Jr. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 

1996). 

246. For more details on this issue, see Richard P. Hallion, Storm over 

Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1992). 

247. Drew, “Vietnam,” 39–40. 

248. For more on General Fogleman’s role in TRANSCOM, see Dr. James 

Matthews, TRANSCOM historian, transcript of oral history interview by Gen 

Ronald R. Fogleman, USCINCTRANS, 20 January 1995, 65 pages; 

WR–ALC/History Office, History Warner Air Logistics Center, FY93 (Robins 

AFB, Ga.: WR–ALC/History Office, 1994), 274; and idem, History Warner Air 

Logistics Center, FY94, 116. 

249. Drew, “Vietnam,” 39–40. 

250. The best proponent of this theory is Adm U. S. G. Sharp, USN, retired, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (1978; reprint, Novato, 

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986). 

251. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 15. Original plan in study, by 

DOD, United States–Vietnam Relations, vol. 4, 1945–1967 (Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, 1971), 7. 

252. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 17, 19. 

253. William Head and Lawrence E. Grinter, Looking Back on the Vietnam 

War: A 1990s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies (Westport, 

Conn.: Greenwood, 1993), 119; Berger, 167; Tilford, Crosswinds, 178–80; 

and Thomas C. Thayer, War without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985), 26, 37. 

254. Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, 209. See also Edward E. Rice, 

Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries (Berkeley, Calif.: 

University of California, 1988); and Drew, “Vietnam.” 

111

Glossary 

AAA antiaircraft artillery


AAF Army Air Forces


AB Air Base


ACC Air Combat Command


ACOUSID acoustic seismic intrusion detectors (One of


Sensors four kinds used by Igloo White in Vietnam.) 

ACSC Air Command and Staff College 

AD Air Division 

ADSID air delivered seismic intrusion detector 

Sensors (One of four kinds used by Igloo White in 

Vietnam.) 

AFA Air Force Association 

AFB Air Force Base 

AFMAN Air Force Manual 

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

AU Air University 

BUFF Big Ugly Fat Fellow or F-----

CAS close air support 

CCTS Combat Crew Training Squadron 

CHECO Current Historical Evaluation of Combat 

Operations 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CINCPAC commander in chief Pacfic Command 

CINCPACAF commander in chief Pacific Air Forces 

Corona Code name for late 1960s Air Force 

Harvest	 analysis and history project examining the 

Second Indochina War (Corona was the code 

name for the CSAF and Harvest for the 

program.) 

CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force


DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 


DMZ demilitarized zone 


ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile


IDAD internal defense and development


JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff


LORAN long-range electronic navigation


LZ landing zone


113 
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 


MAJCOM major commands


MiG Mikoyan Gurevich Design Bureau (Soviet-


built fighter aircraft) 

MR Military Region 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NLF National Liberation Front 

NM nautical mile 

NVA North Vietnamese Army 

NVN North Vietnam 

OV observation aircraft designation 

PACAF Pacific Air Forces 

PAVN People’s Army of Vietnam 

PRC People’s Republic of China 

RP Route Package 

RTAB Royal Thai Air Base 

SAC Strategic Air Command 

SAM surface-to-air missile 

SEA Southeast Asia 

SECAF secretary of the Air Force 

SECDEF secretary of defense 

SIOP single integrated operational plan 

SRAM short-range air missile 

SVNAF South Vietnamese Air Force 

TAC Tactical Air Command 

TACAIR tactical air 

US United States 

USAF United States Air Force 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

VC Vietcong 

XB experimental bomber designation 

YB prototype bomber designation 

114

Selected Bibliography 

Primary Sources 

Some of the primary sources were found in files of government 

agencies such as the State Department, Defense Department, 

the US Senate and House of Representatives, including the 

Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services—Departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy as well as Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. Other documents came from the National Archives in 

Washington, D.C. and College Park, Maryland; the Kennedy, 

Johnson, and Nixon presidential libraries; and the Air Force 

archival holdings at the Air Force Historical Research Agency 

(AFHRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. Of equal 

importance are materials at local holdings such as the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center Archives and Museum of Aviation Archives both located at Robins AFB, Georgia. Both have 

a surprisingly large number of Vietnam-era holdings particularly CHECO, Corona Harvest, and Strategic Air Command 

histories and studies. 

Letters and Memoranda 

Air Force Plans Division (AFXOPJ). Memorandum. To Chief of 

Staff, Air Force (CSAF). Subject: Changes in Planning and 

Execution of Arc Light I, 24 June 1965. 

CINCSAC. To CSAF. Letter. No subject, 26 August 1967. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. Memorandum. To Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. No subject, 1 September 1966. 

Gleason, Col Robert L. Chief, Corona Harvest Project. To Commander, Air University. Letter. Subject: End-of-Tour 

Report, 1 July 1973. 

Knight, Maj Hal. To Sen. William Proxmire, Armed Services 

Committee Hearing. Letter. Subject: Hearings before the 

Committee on Armed Services, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 18 

January 1973. 

Momyer Gen William W. Memorandum. To Gen Richard H. 

Ellis. Subject: Corona Harvest In-Country Air Strike 

115 
Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 65–31 Mar 68, 1 July 

1974. 

———. Memorandum. To Maj Oakah L. Jones, PACAF. Subject: B-52 Concept, 7 August 1966. 

———. Memorandum. To McConnell. Subject: B-52 Arc Light 

Operations, 11 November 1966. 

OCNAO. To OCPWA. Letter. Subject: External Navy Mine Carriage, 2 August 1966. 

Ryan, Gen John, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Memorandum. 

To Sen. John C. Stennis, Chair Senate Committee of the 

Armed Services. Subject: Hearings before the Committee 

on Armed Services, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 26 July 1973. 

Van Duyn, Col John E., Chief, Corona Harvest Project. To 

Commander, Air University. Letter. Subject: End of Tour 

Report, 16 March 1972. 

Messages 

Message. 02/1255Z AUG 65, Zippo 08-225. 7th Bomb 

Squadron to Assistant Inspector General (AIG) 673, 12 

August 1965. 

———. 14/0316Z APR 66, Zippo 0496. 4133 BWP. To AIG 

673, 14 April 1966. 

———. 30/04482Z JUN 66. 0478 3d Air Division. To Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC), 30 June 1966. 

———. 190330Z MAR 65. Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). To Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 19 March 1965. 

———. 292147Z APR 65. JCS. To Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC), 29 April 1965. 

———. 140805Z MAY 65. COMUSMACV. To CINCPAC, 14 

May 1965. 

———. 150305Z JUN 65. COMUSMACV. To JCS, 15 June 

1965. 

———. 181004Z JUN 65. JCS. To DIRNSA, 18 June 1965. 

———. 15/1445Z MAR 66, Zippo 0731. SAC. To JCS, 15 

March 1966. 

———. 11/1359Z APR 66, No. 12571. COMUSMACV. To 

CINCPAC, 11 April 1966. 

116 
———. 12/0600Z APR 66. American Embassy, Vientiane. To 

CINCPAC, 12 April 1966. 

———. 15/1303Z APR 66, No. 13067. COMUSMACV. To 

CINCPAC, 15 April 1966. 

———. 12/2331Z MAY 66. COMUSMACV. To Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 12 May 1966. 

———. 13/0952A MAY 66. CINCPAC. To COMUSMACV, 13 

May 1966. 

———. Seventh Air Force. To Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), 22 

September 1966. 

———. 061234Z OCT 66. Seventh Air Force. To PACAF, 6 

October 1966. 

———. 02/1942Z MAR 67. AFXOPDO 89449, Chief of Staff, 

Air Force. To SAC, 2 March 1967. 

———. 18/2205Z JUL 67. DITW 07560, SAC. To AIG 667 et 

al.,18 July 1967. 

———. 10/1830Z FEB 68. SAC, Vice Commander. To CINCPAC, 10 February 1968. 

———. 221935Z DEC 72. AFSSO PACAF. To Seventh Air 

Force, 22 December 1972. 

———. 222020Z DEC 72. CINCSAC. To CINCPACAF, 22 

December 1972. 

———. 082030Z JAN 73 (Unclassified). CINCSAC/DO. To 

Seventh Air Force, 8 January 1973. 

Reports 

Cross, Brig Gen Richard G. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, assistant duty officer. “End-of-Tour Report,” 

Vietnam, 18 December 1972, 22 January 1973. File 

K740.131.2, Air Force Historical Research Agency 

(AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

Evans, Col D. L. Director of Intelligence, Task Force Alpha. 

“End-of-Tour Report,” 6 July 1972. File 10015110, AFHRA, 

Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces/Office of Information. “Linebacker II Air Operations Summary, 18–29 December 72” 

(U), March 1973. 

117 
Headquarters Seventh Air Force. “Weekly Air Intelligence Summary.” No. 6819, 11 May 1968. 

Momyer, Gen William W. “End of Tour Report, Seventh Air 

Force.” AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1970. 

Slay, Maj Gen Alton D. Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Seventh Air Force. “End-of-Tour Report, August 1971–August 

1972.” File K717.13, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

Speech 

LeMay, Gen Curtis E. CSAF. Address. Air Force Association 

Convention, Philadelphia, Pa., 21 September 1961, found 

in Air Force Information Policy Letter for Commanders, 

supplement, 15 November 1961. 

Studies 

Director of Operations, DCS, Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF. “Analysis of B-52 Conventional Operations in SEA,” 29 October 1965. 

RAND Corporation. “Air Interdiction in Southeast Asia, 1966.” 

Unpublished Papers and Lectures 

Becker, William R. “Air Power in the Fight against Guerrillas.” 

Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College 

(ACSC), 7 May 1962. 

Drew, Col Dennis M. “Vietnam, ‘Wars of the Third Kind’ and 

Air Force Doctrine.” Paper presented at Texas Tech University Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict, Seminar on the Vietnam War, 18–21 April 1996. 

Lockett, William C., Jr. “COIN in the Air: A Study of the Role 

of Airpower in Counterinsurgency.” Maxwell AFB, Ala., 

ACSC, 22 April 1963. 

Phipps, John L. “Basic Problems in Counter-Guerrilla Air 

Operations.” Maxwell AFB, Ala., ACSC, 7 May 1962. 

Schandler, Col Herbert Y., US Army, Retired. “The President, 

the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

118 
The Political Direction of the War.” Paper presented to the 

Second Triennial Vietnam Symposium, Texas Tech University, 18 April 1996. 

Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C., Jr. “Continuing 

Cooperation between NASA and DOD.” Address. Air Force 

Association Convention, Houston, Tex., 19 March 1969. 

Government Publications 

The following items are published reports by government 

agencies or institutions/individuals contracted by the government to publish reports and analyses for the US government. 

This also includes published (internal or otherwise) interviews 

of key leaders. Also included are official histories. 

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, September 1997. 

AFDD 2-1.2. “Strategic Attack.” 2d draft, 10 October 1996. 

Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 

United States Air Force, 2 vols., March 1992. 

———. Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air 

Force, 14 February 1979. 

———. United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 14 August 

1964, 28 September 1971, 15 January 1975, and 1984. 

AFMAN 1-2. Air Doctrine, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 April 1953, 1 April 1954, 1 April 1955, and 1 

December 1959. 

AFMAN 1–3. Theater Air Operations, September 1953 and 

April 1954. 

AFMAN 1-8. Strategic Air Operations, 1 May 1954. 

AFMAN 2-5. Tactical Air Operations Special Air Warfare, 10 

March 1967. 

AFMAN 2-11. Foreign Internal Defense Operations, 3 November 

1992. 

———. Strategic Aerospace Operations, 1 December 1965. 

Air Force Regulation 1-1. Aerospace Doctrine: Responsibilities 

for Doctrine Development, 20 March 1963. 

Ballard, Jack S. The Development and Employment of FixedWing Gunships, 1962–1972. Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Air Force History (AFHO), 1982. 

119 
Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 

1961–1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, D.C.: 

AFHO, 1984. 

Bureau of the Commander in Chief, Indo-China, Armed Forces 

of the Republic of France. Notes on Combat in Indo-China: 

3 vols., 1954–1956. 

Caywood, Ron E. Major Problems in the B-52 Conversion Program, 1955–1958. Air Force Monograph. Offutt AFB, 

Nebr.: Strategic Air Command/History Office, n.d. 

Corona Harvest Project. A Chronology of Important Airpower 

Events in Southeast Asia, 1950–1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1 May 1969. 

———. In-Country Air Strikes Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 

January 1965–31 March 1968. Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 

1971. 

———. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Command and Control 

Report Southeast Asia. Bks. 1 and 2. Washington, D.C.: 

AFHO, 1971. 

———. Out-Country Air Strikes Operations, Report Southeast 

Asia. Bks. 1 and 2. Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1971. 

———. USAF Air Operations against NVN, 1 July 1971–30 

June 1972. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1973. 

———. USAF Operations in Laos: 1 January 1970–30 June 

1971. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1971. 

Drew, Col Dennis M. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 

American Military Dilemmas and Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, 

Ala.: Air University Press, March 1988. 

Fabyanic, Thomas A. Strategic Air Attack in the United States 

Air Force: A Case Study. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 1976. 

Field Manual 100-20, Air Force Publication 3-20. Military 

Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 5 December 1990. 

Futrell, Robert Frank. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. Vol. 1, 1907–1960. 

Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1989. 

———. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine. Vol. 2, Basic Thinking in the 

United States Air Force, 1907–1984. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

Air University Press, 1989. 

120 
Gorn, Michael H. The Universal Man: Theodore von Kármán’s 

Life in Aeronautics. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. 

Greene, Warren E. The Development of the B-52 Aircraft, 

1945–1953. Air Force Monograph. Wright–Patterson AFB, 

Ohio: Air Force Materiel Command/History Office, 1956. 

Greer, Thomas H. The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army 

Air Arm, 1917–1941. New Imprint, Washington, D.C.: 

AFHO, 1985. 

Head, William, et al., Warner Robins–Air Logistics Center/History Office (WR-ALC/HO). History Warner Air Logistics 

Center, FY93. Robins AFB, Ga.: WR-ALC/HO, 1994. 

———. History Warner Air Logistics Center, FY94. Robins AFB, 

Ga.: WR-ALC/HO, 1994. 

Herring, George C. “Cold Blood: LBJ’s Conduct of Limited War 

in Vietnam.” The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military 

History. No. 33. Colorado Springs, Colo.: US Air Force 

Academy, 1990. 

Hopkins, Charles K. SAC Bomber Operations in the Southeast 

Asia War. Special Study 204, Vol. 1. Offutt AFB, Nebr.: 

SAC/History Office, 1985. 

Hopkins, J. C., and Sheldon A. Goldberg. The Development of 

the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986: The Fortieth 

Anniversary History. Offutt AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History 

Office, 1986. 

Horrocks, Michael. The Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Sensor 

War, 1966–1971. Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1985. 

Johnson, Maj Calvin R. Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO. 

Linebacker Operations, September–December 1972. Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1974. 

Knaack, Marcelle Size. Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft 

and Missile Systems. Vol. 2, Post–World War II Bombers, 

1945–1973. Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1988. 

Kohn, Richard H., and Joseph P. Harahan, eds. Air Superiority in World War II and Korea: An Interview with Gen. 

James Ferguson, Gen. Robert M. Lee, Gen. William Momyer, and Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada. Washington, D.C.: 

AFHO, 1983. 

121 
LeMay, Curtis E. “Air Power in Guerrilla Warfare.” Air Force 

Information Policy Letter for Commanders. Washington, 

D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 15 April 1962. 

Lavalle, Maj A. J. C., ed. Air Power and the 1972 Spring Offensive. USAF Monograph Series, Vol. 2. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office (GPO), 1977. 

Liebchen, Capt Peter A. W. Kontum: Battle for the Central Highlands, 30 March–10 June 1972. Project CHECO, Seventh 

Air Force/DOAC, 1972. 

McCarthy, Brig Gen James R., Lt Col George B. Allison, and 

Robert E. Rayfield. Linebacker II. Vol. 6, A View from the 

Rock. USAF Southeast Asia series, monograph 8. Maxwell 

AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1979 and 1985. 

Mann, Capt David. The 1972 Invasion of Military Region I: Fall 

of Quang Tri and Defense of Hue. Project CHECO. Seventh 

Air Force/CDC, 1973. 

Mark, Eduard. Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and Land Battle in 

Three American Wars. Washington, D.C.: Center for Air 

Force History, 1994. 

Meilinger, Col Phillip. 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power. 

Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Linebacker 

Study. Unofficial/uncoordinated draft report, 20 January 

1973, chap. 2, File K712.041-19, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

Momyer, Gen William W. Air Power in Three Wars. Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, 1978. 

Moulton, Harland B., and Ron E. Caywood. The History of the 

B-52: Background and Early Development, 1946–1954. 

Offutt AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History Office, n.d. 

Murray, Williamson. “Air Power since World War II, Consistent 

with Doctrine?” In The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath 

of the Gulf War. Edited by Richard H. Shultz Jr. and 

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University 

Press, 1992. 

Nalty, Bernard C. Interdiction in Southern Laos. Washington, 

D.C.: AFHO, 1988. 

122 
Nicholson, Capt Charles A. The USAF Response to the Spring 

1972 NVN Offensive: Situation and Redeployment. Project 

CHECO, Seventh Air Force/DOAC, 1972. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD), Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (CCC&I). 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Intelligence Dissemination Study. (Secret) Washington, D.C.: OASD, CCC&I, 

1993. Information extracted is unclassified. 

Office of History, MACV. Semiannual, Periodic, and Annual 

Histories of MACV. Narrative and Document Volumes, 

1965, January 1972–March 1973 (15 July 1973, Saigon, 

Republic of Vietnam. Document is now declassified). 

Office of History, PACAF. Annual Histories, PACAF, Narrative 

and Document Volumes, 1 July 71–30 Jun 72, Hickam 

AFB, Hawaii. 

Office of History, Pacific Command. CINCPAC. “Command History, 1967,” vol. 2. 

Office of History, Seventh Air Force. Semiannual and Annual 

Histories, Narrative and Document Volumes, 1 July–31 

December 1967, 1 January–30 June 1968, 1 July 

1971–30 June 1972, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. 

———. “Seventh Air Force History of Linebacker Operations, 

10 May–23 October 1972.” 1973, File K740.04-24, 

AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

———. History of “Commando Hunt V, May 1971.” Saigon, 

Republic of Vietnam. 

———. History of “Commando Hunt VII, June 1972.” Saigon, 

Republic of Vietnam. 

Office of History, Strategic Air Command. “Activity Input to 

Project Corona Harvest, Arc Light Operations, 1 January 

1965–31 March 1968.” 3 vols. Offutt AFB, Nebr.: 

SAC/History Office, 1970. 

———. Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II. Offutt 

AFB, Nebr.: SAC/History Office, 12 August 1973. 

———. Semiannual and Annual Histories and Narrative Volumes, January–June 1964, January–June 1965, 

July–December 1965 (vol. 2), January–June 1966, January–June 1967, June–December 1967, 1 July 1971–30 

June 1972. Offutt AFB, Nebr. 

123 
Office of History, 3d Air Division. Semiannual and Annual Histories. Narrative Volumes, January–June 1966, January–June 1967, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. 

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968. Parts I/II. Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, 1969. 

Pacific Air Forces. Headquarters PACAF. Linebacker II Air Force 

Bombing Survey. Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1973. 

———. Southeast Asia Report. “Air Operations Summaries, 

April, May, June, July, and August 1972.” File 

K717.3063, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

———. Southeast Asia Report. “North Vietnamese Current 

Assessment.” Vol. 7, “U.S. Air Force Operations in 

Defense of RVN,” 1 June 1972, Corona Harvest Document 

Collection. File K717.03-219, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

Patchin, Kenneth L., and James N. Eastman. The B-52 Stratofortress. Vol. 2, B-52 Logistical Support. Air Force Monograph. Tinker AFB, Okla.: Oklahoma City Air Materiel 

Area, Office of Information, History Office, July 1961. 

Patchin, Kenneth L., and Bill B. Stacy. Southeast Asia, B-52 

Logistics Support for CY66. Air Force Monograph. Tinker 

AFB, Okla.: Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area, Office of 

Information, August 1967. 

Porter, Melvin F. Linebacker: Overview of the First 120 Days. 

Project CHECO, Seventh Air Force/DOA, 1973. 

Pritchard, Gilbert L. “Communism and Counterinsurgency: 

The Air Force Role in Combined Support Action.” In Air 

Force Information Policy Letter Supplement for Commanders. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air 

Force, 3 November 1962. 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. 

Kennedy, 1962. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1963. 

Ringenbach, Maj Paul T., and Capt Peter J. Melly. The Battle 

for An Loc, 5 April–26 June 1972. Project CHECO, Seventh 

Air Force/CDC, 1973. 

Schlight, John. The Air War in South Vietnam: The Years of the 

Offensive, 1965–1968. Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1988. 

124 
Senate, United States. DOD Appropriations for FY75: Hearings 

before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 

93d Cong., 2d sess. 1974, pt. 1. 

Summers, Col Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in 

Context. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1981. 

Supreme Command, Far East, Armed Forces of the Republic 

of France. Lessons from the Indo-China War. 3 Vols., 

1954–1956. 

United States Air Force Fact Sheet, subject: B-52 in Southeast 

Asia, Study no. 68-19, 1968. 

Watson, George M., Jr. The Office of the Secretary of the Air 

Force, 1947–1965. Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force 

History, 1993. 

Watts, Barry. The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem 

of Friction in War. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 

1984. 

Secondary Sources 

Books 

The following are selected book length works (including dissertations and chapters in edited books. They are books 

directly or indirectly dealing with the topic, the military and its 

history, and/or Air Force theory and doctrine. 

Builder, Carl H. The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power 

Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force. 

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994. New 

Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994. 

Cable, Larry. Conflict of Myths: The Development of American 

Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War. New 

York: New York University Press, 1986. 

———. “The Operation Was a Success, but the Patient Died: 

The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1969.” In An American 

Dilemma: Vietnam, 1964–1973. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993. 

———. Unholy Grail: The US and the Wars in Vietnam, 

1965–1968. London: Routledge, 1991. 

125 
Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. 

———. “Nixon and the Air Weapon.” In An American Dilemma: 

Vietnam, 1964–1973. Edited by Dennis E. Showalter and 

John G. Albert. Chicago: Imprint Publishers, 1993. 

Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. 

Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988. 

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino 

Ferrari. 1942. New Imprint, Washington, D.C.: AFHO, 1983. 

Gibson, J. William. The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam. 

Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986. 

Gilbert, Marc Jason, and William Head, eds. The Tet Offensive. 

Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. 

Hallion, Richard P. Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War. 

Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. 

Head, William, and Lawrence Grinter, eds. Looking Back on the 

Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective of Decisions, Combat, 

and Legacies. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. 

Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon 

White House. New York: Summit Books, 1983. 

“Jason Report.” Pentagon Papers. Vol. 4, Department of 

Defense History of Decision Making in Vietnam. Sen. Mike 

Gravel ed. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1971. 

Jones, Lloyd S. U.S. Bombers. 3d ed. Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero 

Publishers, 1980. 

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983. 

Kinnard, Douglas. The War Managers. Hanover, N.H.: University of Vermont Press, 1977. 

Kissinger, Henry A. The White House Years. Boston: Little, 

Brown and Co., 1979. 

Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, 

and the Modern Historical Experience. New York: Pantheon, 

1985. 

Korb, Lawrence J. The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five 

Years. Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1976. 

Kutler, Stanley I., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. New 

York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996. 

LeMay, Curtis E., and MacKinlay Kantor. Mission with LeMay: 

My Story. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965. 

126 
Morrocco, John. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. Vietnam 

Experience Series, Ed. Robert Manning. Boston: Boston 

Publishing Co., 1986. 

Nixon, Richard M. In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, 

and Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. 

———. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. 2 vols. New York: 

Warner Books, 1978. 

Palmer Bruce, ed. Grand Strategy for the 1980s. Washington, 

D.C.: American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy 

Research, 1978. 

Pedigree of Champions: Boeing since 1916. 6th ed. Seattle, 

Wash.: Boeing Historical Archives,1985. 

Pentagon Papers: Department of Defense History of United 

States Decision Making in Vietnam. Sen. Mike Gravel ed. 4 

vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 

Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People’s Army of North Vietnam. Novato, 

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986. 

———. Vietcong: The Organization and Techniques of the 

National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge, 

Mass.: MIT Press, 1966. 

Porter, Gareth, ed. Vietnam: The Definitive Documentary of 

Human Decisions. 2 vols. Sanfordville, N. Y. : Earl M. Coleman, 1979. 

Rice, Edward E. Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1988. 

Sharp, Adm U. S. G. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. 

1978. Reprint, Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986. 

Showalter, Dennis E., and John G. Albert, eds. An American 

Dilemma: Vietnam, 1964–1973. Chicago: Imprint Publishers, 1993. 

Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the 

Vietnam War. 1982. Reprint, New York: Dell, 1984. 

Szulc, Ted. The Illusion of Peace Foreign Policy in the Nixon 

Years. New York: Viking Press, 1978. 

Thayer, Thomas C. War without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985. 

Tilford, Earl H., Jr. “Bombing Our Way Back Home: The Commando Hunt and Menu Campaigns of 1969–1973.” In 

127 
Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective of 

Decisions, Combat, and Legacies. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. 

———. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College 

Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1993. 

Tra, Tran Van. Viet Nam. Vol. 5, History Bulwark B-2 Theatre: 

Concluding the 30-Year War. Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe 

Publishing House, 1983. English translation reprinted in 

Arlington, Va.: Joint Publications Research Service, 1983. 

Truong Nhu Tang. A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the 

Vietnam War and Its Aftermath. New York: Harcourt Brace 

and Jovanovich, 1985. 

Wacker, Rudolph. “Managing the Infinities of Basic Doctrine.” 

Maxwell AFB, Ala.: ACSC, June 1967. 

Warden, John A., III. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. 

1988. Reprint, New York: Pergamon–Brassey, 1989. 

———. “Air Power in the Twenty-First Century.” In The Future 

of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War. Ed. Richard 

H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfattzgraff Jr. Maxwell AFB, 

Ala.: Air University Press, 1992. 

Westmoreland, Gen William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, 

N.J.: Doubleday and Co., 1976. 

Year By Year: 75 Years of Boeing History, 1916–1991. Seattle, 

Wash.: Boeing Historical Archives, 1991. 

Magazines and Journals 

Beisner, Robert L. “Patterns of Peril: Dean Acheson Joins the 

Cold Warriors.” Diplomatic History, Summer 1996. 

Boyne, Walter J. “Linebacker II: A Look Back.” Air Force Magazine, November 1997. 

Cable, Larry. “Reinventing the Round Wheel—Insurgency, 

Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping in the Post Cold 

War.” Small Wars and Insurgencies, April 1990. 

Chain, Gen John T., Jr. Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force. 

“Strategic Bombers Conventional Warfare.” Strategic 

Review, Spring 1988. 

Chassin, G. J. M. “Lessons of the War in Indochina.” Interavia. 

Vol. 7, no. 12 (1952). 

128 
Fogleman, Gen Ronald R. “Aerospace Doctrine More Than 

Just A Theory.” Airpower Journal, Summer 1996. 

Friedberg, Aaron L. “A History of the US Strategic ‘Doctrine’— 

1945 to 1980.” Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1980. 

Kipp, Robert. “Counterinsurgency from 30,000 Feet.” Air University Review, January–February 1968. 

Loosbrok, John F. Editorial. Air Force/Space Digest, January 

1963. 

Meilinger, Lt Col Phillip S. “The Problem with Our Air Power 

Doctrine.” Airpower Journal, Spring 1992. 

Palmer, Bruce. “U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam.” Studies in 

Intelligence, Special Spring Issue, 1984. 

Seamans, Robert C., Jr., SECAF. Address. Air Force Association Convention, Houston, Tex., 19 March 1969. In “Continuing Cooperation between NASA and DOD.” Air Force 

Magazine, May 1969. 

Suit, William W. “Utilitarian War Horse: Modifying the B-52 for 

Conventional War.” Air Power History, Winter 1997. 

Zuckert, Eugene. “Keeping the Organizational Engine in 

Tune.” Air Force/Space Digest, October 1964. 

Newspapers, Media Reports, and Press Releases 

Editorial. Nhan Dan, 17 August 1972. 

“SAC Chief Lauds US Raids.” Pacific Stars and Stripes. 24 

March 1973. 

Spector, Ron. “Cooking Up a Quagmire, An Army Scholar 

Assesses Responsibility for the Vietnam War.” Review of 

Maj H. R. McMaster. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, 

Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies 

That Led to Vietnam. New York Times Book Review, 20 

July 1997. 

129

Index 

1st Cavalry Division, 21, 31Ä

1st Marine Air Wing, 26Ä

II Corps, 41Ä

2d Air Division, 19Ä

III Marine Amphibious Force, 26Ä

4th Infantry Division, 30Ä

8th Tactical Air Wing, 44Ä

9th VC Division, 63Ä

17th parallel, 17, 42Ä

18th parallel, 64Ä

20th parallel, 18, 63, 74, 83–84, 94Ä

93d Heavy Bomb Wing, 13Ä

94-target list, 39, 94Ä

173d Airborne Battalion, 27Ä

307th Strategic Wing, 64Ä

559th Military Region, 43Ä

559th Transportation Group, 43Ä

4252d Strategic Wing, 28Ä

4400th Combat Crew Training SquadronÄ

(CCTS), 34Ä

Abrams, Creighton, 27Ä

acoustic seismic intrusion detectorsÄ

(ACOUSID), 56Ä

“Action for South Vietnam,” 11Ä

Aerospace Doctrine Division of the OfficeÄ

of Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans andÄ

Programs, 15Ä

Aerospace Studies Institute, 37Ä

Afghanistan, 89Ä

Africa, 6, 15Ä

Air bases 

Bien Hoa, 11, 64Ä

Clark, 20Ä

Kadena, 17, 28 Ä

Nakhon Phanom, 45Ä

U Tapao, 22, 29, 64, 79, 83Ä

Air Combat Command (ACC), 88, 92Ä

Air Command and Staff College, 32Ä

aircraft 

A-1, 57Ä

A-4, 57Ä

A-6, 79Ä

A-7, 57Ä

A-26, 59Ä

AC-119, 44, 49Ä

AC-130, 44, 49, 57–58, 70Ä

B-29, 4–5Ä

B-36, 4Ä

B-47, 4Ä

B-52A, 13Ä

B-52B, 13Ä

B-52C, 13Ä

B-52D, 2, 14, 21–23, 29, 79Ä

B-52E, 13Ä

B-52F, 13, 17–19, 21Ä

B-52G, 13–14, 49Ä

B-52H, 13Ä

B-70, 9Ä

C-123, 19Ä

EB-66, 85Ä

F-4, 8, 49, 63Ä

F-4C, 44Ä

F-105s, 57, 66–67Ä

F-111, 73Ä

HH-53, 85Ä

MiG-15, 4Ä

MiG-17, 57–58, 66 Ä

MiG-19, 66–67Ä

MiG-21, 66–67Ä

OV-10, 49, 57Ä

P-47, 4Ä

P-51 Thunderbolt IIÄ

RA-5C, 85Ä

air delivered seismic intrusion detectorÄ

(ADSID), 56 Ä

Air Force Association (AFA), 16, 35, 40Ä

Air Force bases 

Andersen, 2, 22, 64, 79, 83Ä

Castle, 13Ä

Eglin, 34Ä

Ellsworth, 23Ä

Larson, 13Ä

Air Force Manual (AFMAN)Ä

1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the


United States Air Force, 1, 17, 61,Ä

88, 90Ä

1-2, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 7Ä

1-3, Theater Air Operations, 7Ä

2-5, Tactical Air Operations Special


Air Warfare, 33–35, 39, 61, 88Ä

2-11, Foreign Internal Defense


Operations, 89–90Ä

131Ä
Air Force Regulation 1-1, Aerospace


Doctrine: Responsibilities for Doctrine


Development, 25Ä

Air Force/Space Digest, 9Ä

Air Force Systems Command, 16Ä

air launch cruise missiles, 14Ä

Air Mobility Command, 92Ä

“Air Power in the Fight against Guerril­Ä

las,” 32Ä

“Air Power in Guerrilla Warfare,” 15Ä

air and space doctrine, 1Ä

Air Staff, 21, 36, 94Ä

Air University, 32, 37–38Ä

Air University Review, 32Ä

Allen, John R., 84Ä

America, 6–7, 10, 14–15, 18, 62, 64, 72,Ä

85, 87, 91, 93, 95–96Ä

An Loc, 63, 70Ä

AN-M59A1, 18Ä

AN-M65A1, 18Ä

Andersen AFB, Guam. See Air ForceÄ

basesÄ

Anderson, Norman J., 26Ä

antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 44, 46–48,Ä

52, 58, 64–66, 72, 84–85Ä

antipersonnel mines, 51, 57Ä

Apocalypse, 75Ä

Arc Light, 2, 15, 17–21, 23–24, 26–29,Ä

31–32, 36, 41–42, 61, 95Ä

Army Ä

Air Corps, 1Ä

and Air Force, 89Ä

Air Forces (AAF), 1, 3Ä

aviation, 25Ä

Combat Developments Command, 25Ä

ground commanders, 23Ä

leaders, 25Ä

and Navy, 8, 23Ä

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN),Ä

20, 30, 41–42, 47–48, 63, 68, 70–72Ä

15th ARVN, 63Ä

21st ARVN, 63, 80Ä

A Shau Valley, 31, 49Ä

Asia, 2, 5–6, 10, 15, 18, 37, 41, 64, 88Ä

Assistant Secretary of Defense, 11Ä

Ban Bak, 52Ä

Ban Karai pass, 51, 58Ä

Ban Phanop, 49Ä

Ban Raving pass, 45, 49, 51Ä

Banhiang River, 49Ä

Base Area 353, 41Ä

Battelle Memorial Institute, 37Ä

Ben Cat, 19Ä

Ben Het, 41Ä

Bien Hoa Air Base (AB), Saigon, 11. See 

also air bases 

Big Belly, 14, 23, 61. See also aircraft:Ä

B-52Ä

Binh Trams, 44Ä

Black Crow ignition and exhaust detec­Ä

tion sensors, 56Ä

BLU-26B antipersonnel bomblets, 18Ä

BLU-3B antipersonnel bomblets, 18Ä

Boeing, 12–14 

Bomb WingsÄ

7th, 19Ä

22d, 29, 80, 83Ä

28th, 19, 22–23, 83–84Ä

91st, 29Ä

99th, 29Ä

306th, 29Ä

320th, 19Ä

454th, 29Ä

461st, 29Ä

484th, 22–23Ä

Bosnia, 3, 91Ä

Breakfast. See Menu bombings/opera­Ä

tionsÄ

Britain/British, 3, 9, 87Ä

Brown, George S., 46Ä

Bugle Note, 31Ä

Bui Tin, 43Ä

Bundy, McGeorge, 95Ä

Burtenshaw, Edward C., 35Ä

Bush, George, 6Ä

Cambodia, 17, 32, 40–42, 46–48, 52, 95Ä

Castle AFB, California. See Air Force 

bases 

Catholic faction in Vietnam, 43Ä

Central Ä

Highlands, 21, 63Ä

Intelligence Agency (CIA), 30, 33–54,Ä

62, 70, 72Ä

Office for South Vietnam, 29Ä

Chapman, Leonard, Jr., 26Ä

Chassin, G. J. M., 7 

132Ä
Chavane pass, 52 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF),Ä

8–9, 92, 94Ä

China, 8, 12, 19, 30, 63, 68–70, 72, 86Ä

Chinese 

border, 69, 84Ä

intervention, 39, 68Ä

invaders, 62Ä

material support of Hanoi, 62Ä

or Soviet intercession, 86Ä

Christmas bombing pause, 79, 83Ä

Clinton, William Jefferson “Bill,” 3Ä

Clodfelter, Mark, 84Ä

close air support (CAS), 24–26, 34, 70–71 

cluster bomb unit antipersonnel mines,Ä

51Ä

Cold War, 4, 7–8, 15, 86, 92, 94, 97Ä

Current Historical Evaluation of Counter-Ä

insurgency Operations (CHECO), 35–Ä

36, 39Ä

Command of the Air, The, 2Ä

commander in chief 

Pacific Command (CINCPAC), 23,Ä

27–28, 44Ä

Pacific Air Forces CommandÄ

(CINCPACAF), 23, 80–81Ä

Commando Hunt operations, 16, 27, 42,Ä

45–46, 49, 53, 56Ä

I, 41, 44–45Ä

III, 45–46Ä

V, 45, 47, 53, 57, 60–61Ä

VI, 48Ä

VII, 48–49, 51–54, 56–58, 60–61Ä

Communist bloc, 49Ä

Communist Policy Towards Southeast


Asia, 1954–1969, 37Ä

Con Thien, 29Ä

Congress, 11, 75Ä

Corona Harvest, 35–39 

“Counterinsurgency from 30,000 Feet,”Ä

32Ä

Cross, Richard G., Jr., 52Ä

Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in


Vietnam, 40, 73Ä

cruise missiles, 14Ä

Cuba, 9Ä

Cuban missile crisis, 9Ä

Cushman, Robert E., Jr., 26Ä

Dak To, 30, 63Ä

Da Nang, 18, 21, 31, 64Ä

December bombings, 18Ä

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 72, 94Ä

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 10Ä

demilitarized zone (DMZ), 18, 30, 49, 51,Ä

63–64, 68, 70, 73Ä

Democrats in Congress, 75Ä

Department of Defense, 94Ä

Deptula, David A., 90Ä

détente, 40, 62, 68, 86, 88, 92Ä

Directorate of Tactical Evaluation, DCSÄ

Plans and Operations, 35Ä

Dong Hai, 68Ä

Dong Si Nguyen, 43Ä

Douhet, Giulio, 1Ä

“Douhetian dream,” 4Ä

Douhetian model, 7Ä

Douhetian theories, 3–4Ä

Drew, Dennis M., 1, 6, 16, 88–89, 92Ä

East Asia, 64Ä

Easter Ä

invasion, 93, 95Ä

offensive, 52, 60, 62Ä

Eastern bloc, 60Ä

EB-66. See aircraftÄ

Eglin AFB, Florida. See Air Force basesÄ

Eighth Air Force, 76–78Ä

Eisenhower, Dwight D. and administra­Ä

tion, 9Ä

El Salvador, 89Ä

elephant walk, 79Ä

Ellis, Richard H., 37Ä

Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. See AirÄ

Force basesÄ

Engineering Change Proposal 1224-7Ä

“Hi-Density Bombing System,” 22Ä

European allies, 3Ä

Farmgate program, 34Ä

Fishhook areas, 42Ä

Fogleman, Ronald F., 8Ä

foreign internal defense, 61, 89Ä

forward air control, 49Ä

France/French, 7, 42, 60Ä

French Supreme Command, 7Ä

Futrell, Robert Frank, 16Ä

133Ä
German, 4Ä

Gio Linh, 29Ä

Gleason, Robert L., 38Ä

ground control intercept, 65Ä

Guam, 2, 17–20, 22–23, 28–29, 83Ä

Gulf of Tonkin, 12, 64, 67, 94Ä

Gulf War, 3, 5, 88, 90–91, 95Ä

air campaign, 90Ä

coalition, 95Ä

Hanoi, 11, 39, 41–43, 62, 64–66, 68,Ä

71–72, 74–76, 78–79, 81, 83–87, 92,Ä

94Ä

Haiphong, 11, 64–66, 68, 76, 78–79, 81,Ä

83–84, 94Ä

harbor, 64Ä

Haig, Alexander, 65Ä

Hallion, Richard P., 91Ä

Headquarters Military Region (MR) VII, 27Ä

Herzfeld, Charles, 36Ä

HH-53. See aircraft 

Highway 1A, 68Ä

Highway 92C, 52Ä

Highway 101, 68Ä

History of the War in Vietnam, October


1961–December 1963, 35Ä

Hmong, 46Ä

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 5, 27–28, 43–44, 50,Ä

59–60Ä

Hoang Xuan Lam, 47Ä

Holloway, Bruce K., 37Ä

Honolulu, Hawaii, 19Ä

Hue, 62, 71Ä

hunter/killer formations, 66Ä

Ia Drang Valley, 21Ä

Igloo White sensor system, 45Ä

Indochina, 4, 6–8, 12, 46, 88, 92, 95–96Ä

Indochina-style conflict, 93Ä

Institute for Defense Analyses’ JasonÄ

Division, 30Ä

“Insurgency and War in Southeast Asia,”Ä

88Ä

Interavia, 7Ä

intercontinental ballistic missilesÄ

(ICBM), 4Ä

internal defense and developmentÄ

(IDAD), 89Ä

Iron Hand anti-SAM tactics, 66Ä

Island Tree. See OperationsÄ

J57-43 engines, 13Ä

Japanese, 4Ä

JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed


Forces, 25Ä

Johnson, Gerald W., 76, 83Ä

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 11–12, 19, 23,Ä

25, 30–32, 39–41, 44, 62, 86, 93–95Ä

Johnston, A. M. “Tex,” 13Ä

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 8, 11, 18–19,Ä

21, 25–26, 28, 30, 37, 69, 76, 94Ä

Joint Strategic Capability Plan, 18Ä

Jungle Jim, 34Ä

Kadena. See air basesÄ

Karnow, Stanley, 43Ä

KC-135. See aircraftÄ

Keegan, John, 3Ä

Kennedy, John F., 8Ä

Kennedy administration, 16, 34Ä

Khe Sanh, 24, 27, 31, 45, 47Ä

Kinh No storage complex, 79Ä

Kipp, Robert, 32Ä

Kissinger, Henry, 40Ä

Kitty Hawk, 64Ä

Kompong Som, 45Ä

Kong River, 49Ä

Kontum City/Province, 63Ä

Korea, 3, 8, 25Ä

Korean War, 4–5, 7Ä

Kosovo, 3, 91Ä

landing zones (LZ), 47Ä

Lansdale, Edward G., 36Ä

Lang Dang rail yards, 84Ä

Lao Bao Pass, 49Ä

Laos, 11, 17, 27, 40, 43–49, 51–53, 55,Ä

57–58, 60, 62–63, 67, 71, 95Ä

Laotian, 8, 31–32, 43–44, 46–47, 49, 57,Ä

72Ä

border, 31–32, 47Ä

crisis, 8Ä

jungles, 57Ä

panhandle, 43–44, 46Ä

North Vietnam border, 48Ä

Larson AFB, Washington. See Air ForceÄ

basesÄ

laser-guided bombs, 44, 49, 51, 66, 69,Ä

73Ä

134Ä
Latin America, 6Ä

Le Duc Tho, 65Ä

LeMay, Curtis E., 9Ä

Lenahan, Frank, 44Ä

lines of communications, 38, 71Ä

Linebacker air campaigns, 39. See also


Operations: Linebacker I and IIÄ

Loc Ninh, 30, 63Ä

Lom Son 719, 47Ä

long-range electronic navigationÄ

(LORAN), 49Ä

Loosbrok, John F., 9 

Luzon, Philippines, 19Ä

M-65 1,000 lb bombs, 23Ä

M-117 750 lb bombs, 18, 23Ä

Macmillan, Harold, 9Ä

major commands (MAJCOM), 37Ä

Marine(s), 18, 26, 31 Ä

aircraft, 79Ä

Amphibious Force, 26Ä

Air Wing, 26Ä

base, 31, 47Ä

commandant, 27Ä

officials, 64Ä

unit, 29 Ä

Mark, Eduard, 54Ä

Martin, Donald F., 35 

McCain, John S., Jr., 44 

McConnell, John P., 94Ä

McGovern, George, 74Ä

McNamara, Robert S., 30 

McNaughton, John T., 11Ä

Menu bombings/operations, 32, 40–42,Ä

61Ä

Breakfast, 41Ä

Dessert, 41Ä

Lunch, 41Ä

Snack, 41Ä

Supper, 41Ä

Meyer, John C., 37Ä

MiGs, 66–67, 84. See also aircraft 

airfields, 11, 65Ä

attacks, 78, 85Ä

bases, 48Ä

losses, 67Ä

Military Assistance Command, VietnamÄ

(MACV), 18, 20, 26–28, 41, 53, 65, 81Ä

Military Region (MR) 

559th, 43Ä

MR I, 63, 68, 72Ä

MR II, 63, 70Ä

MR III, 63Ä

MR VII, 27Ä

Milosevic, Slobodan, 3Ä

Milton, Theodore, 26Ä

Mitchell, William B. “Billy,” 1Ä

MK-36 magnetic-influence mines, 51,Ä

57, 69Ä

MK-82 500 lb antipersonnel bomblets,Ä

18Ä

MK-84 laser-guided bombs, 69Ä

Model 462 heavy bomber, 12Ä

Model 464 four-engine turboprop, 13Ä

Momyer, William W., 24Ä

Moorer, Thomas H., 76Ä

Moscow, 64, 69, 72Ä

Mu Gia pass, 27–28, 45, 49, 51, 57–58Ä

My Chanh defense line, 70Ä

My Chanh River, 63Ä

Nakhon Phanom RTAB, 45Ä

Nape pass, 45Ä

Nassau communiqué, 9Ä

National 

Council of Reconciliation and 

Concord, 74Ä

Liberation Front (NLF), 11, 42Ä

Security Council, 37Ä

Navy, 8, 23, 25, 57, 73, 78, 83–85Ä

New York Times, 42Ä

Ngo Dinh Diem, 11, 43Ä

Ngo Quang Truong, 63Ä

Nguyen Chi Thanh, 29Ä

Nguyen Hue offensive, 62Ä

Nguyen Van Thieu, 42, 74–75, 85Ä

Nhan Dan, 86Ä

Nicaragua, 89Ä

Nixon, Richard M., 12 

North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationÄ

(NATO), 3, 6Ä

North Vietnam (NVN), 11, 18, 23, 27, 30,Ä

39–40, 43–44, 48, 53, 59–60, 62,Ä

64–65, 68, 70–72, 78, 81, 83, 86,Ä

94–95Ä

North Vietnamese, 52, 54–55, 71–72,Ä

81, 94Ä

135Ä
Army (NVA), 21, 27, 30–31, 42–43,Ä

46–48, 52, 55–58, 60, 62–63,Ä

70–74, 84–85, 87, 93, 95Ä

border, 46Ä

harbors, 65Ä

industry, 68Ä

lines of communication, 71Ä

panhandle, 49Ä

ports, 70Ä

troops, 72Ä

Okinawa, Japan, 17, 19Ä

On Strategy, 87Ä

OperationsÄ

Barrel Roll, 46Ä

Bullet Shot, 64Ä

Delaware, 31Ä

Desert Storm, 91, 95Ä

Freedom Train, 64, 66Ä

Island Tree, 56Ä

Junction City, 29Ä

Linebacker I, 32, 61, 65, 68, 71, 75,Ä

78, 95Ä

Linebacker II, 14, 72, 76–78, 80–81,Ä

83–87, 92, 95Ä

Neutralize, 30Ä

Niagara, 31Ä

Pegasus, 31 Ä

Pocket Money, 65Ä

Proud Deep Alpha, 40, 63Ä

Rolling Thunder, 5, 12, 18, 23–26,Ä

29, 39–40, 44, 60, 65–68, 71, 86Ä

Silver City II, 27Ä

Turnpike, 31Ä

Our Air Force, 2Ä

Pacific 

Air Forces (PACAF), 35–37, 57, 67,Ä

69–70, 85Ä

Ocean, 19, 29Ä

Page, Jerry D., 15 

Palmer, Bruce, 71Ä

parallel warfare, 90Ä

Paris 

negotiations, 44, 65, 72–73Ä

Peace Accords, 85, 87Ä

Parrot’s Beak, 42Ä

Pathet Lao, 47Ä

Peking, 64Ä

“Pentagon Papers,” 37Ä

People’s Ä

Army of Vietnam (PAVN), 12Ä

Republic of China (PRC), 8Ä

Persian Gulf War, 3, 5, 91. See also GulfÄ

WarÄ

petroleum, oil, and lubricants pipeline,Ä

46, 60Ä

Phantom. See aircraft: F-4Ä

Phuc Yen MiG-capable airfield, 11Ä

Plei Me Special Forces camp, 21Ä

Pleiku, 21Ä

Polaris missiles, 8Ä

Politburo, 85Ä

Pratt & Whitney jet engines, 13Ä

precision-guided munitions, 72Ä

prisoner of war, 63Ä

Pritchard, Gilbert L., 35Ä

Project CHECO, 35Ä

Project Loyal Look, 36Ä

Provider. See aircraft: C-123Ä

PT-76 Soviet-built light tanks, 70Ä

Quang Tri City/province, 63, 70–71 

Quesada, Elwood R., 24Ä

quick-run operations, 28Ä

RA-5C. See aircraft 

Radio Hanoi, 74Ä

RAND Corporation, 23Ä

Renton Field, Seattle, Washington, 13Ä

Republic of Vietnam (RVN), 20, 59Ä

Republicans, 74Ä

Rice, Edward E., 95Ä

Rogers, Felix M., 38Ä

Rogers, William P., 85Ä

Rolling Thunder. See Operations 

Route 9, 31Ä

Route Package (RP), 68, 70, 73, 94Ä

Rusk, Dean, 95Ä

Russell, Richard B., 12Ä

SA-2, 28, 48, 57–58, 81, 85–86Ä

SA-3, 81Ä

SA-4, 81Ä

Saigon, 11, 19–21, 35–36, 41, 44, 63,Ä

65–66, 73–75, 79Ä

Sams, Kenneth, 35Ä

Schriever, Bernard A., 16 

sealift theory and doctrine, 92Ä

Seamans, Robert C., Jr., 40Ä

136Ä
Seattle, Washington, 13 

Secretary 

of the Air Force (SECAF), 9–10, 

40–41 

of Defense (SECDEF), 11, 30, 37, 94 

of State, 85 

Second Indochina War, 4, 6, 8, 46, 88, 

92, 95–96 

Serbian, 3Ä

Sharp, U. S. G., 23Ä

short-range air missile (SRAM), 76Ä

Sihanouk, Norodom, 42Ä

“Sihanoukville,” 41Ä

Simler, George, 19Ä

single integrated operations plan (SIOP), 

23, 76, 78 

Sino–Vietnamese border, 69 

Sitton, Ray B., 41 

Skyspot 

ground radar, 31 

rapid-response targeting system, 28 

Skybolt air-to-ground missile, 9 

Slay, Alton D., 52 

“smart bombs,” 78 

Smith, Dale O., 15 

Snack. See operations 

Son Tay 

raids, 40 

warehouse and storage area, 73 

Song Me River, 69 

South 

China Sea, 19Ä

Dakota, 23Ä

Vietnam (SVN), 5, 11–12, 17, 19, 21,Ä

23, 26, 28–31, 33–34, 36, 40–49, 

51–53, 55, 60–62, 66, 68, 70–71, 

73–75, 86, 95 

Vietnamese Air Force (SVNAF), 70 

Southeast Asia (SEA), 4–5, 7, 10, 13–15, 

18–19, 23–25, 29, 32, 35–36, 40, 42, 

44, 52, 63–64, 69, 81, 87, 93 

southeastern Europe, 6, 90 

Soviet Union, 4, 7–9, 12, 54, 62, 76, 86, 

96. See also Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR) 

special 

air warfare, 16, 33–35, 39, 61, 88 

Air Warfare Center, 16, 34–35 

operations, 7, 61, 88 

State Department, 18 

Steel Tiger, 42–43, 45, 51, 54, 58 

South, 45 

Stennis, John, 12 

Storm over Iraq, 91 

Strategic 

Air Command (SAC), 9, 13, 18, 

28–29, 32, 41, 64, 76, 88, 92, 95 

Bombing Survey, 36 

Summers, Harry, Jr., 87 

surface-to-air missiles (SAM), 28, 35, 

57–58, 66, 72, 79–81, 83–85 

Symington, W. Stuart, 9 

Tactical 

Air Command (TAC), 25, 38, 88 

air (TACAIR), 44, 47, 52, 57, 59–60, 

68, 73 

Task Force 77, 65 

Task Force Alpha, 45, 51, 54, 56–57, 59 

Taylor, Maxwell, 19 

Tchepone, 47, 49, 58 

belt, 51–52 

Teaball weapons control center, 67 

temporary duty, 29 

Tet Offensive, 24, 27, 93 

Thai Nguyen 

rail yards, 83 

thermal power plant, 79 

Thailand, 17, 19, 22, 67, 73 

Thanh Hoa bridge, 69 

Thau Thien province, 47 

theory and doctrine, 3, 6, 8, 16, 32, 34, 

61, 87–89, 92–93, 96 

Thieu. See Nguyen Van Thieu 

Tilford, Earl H., Jr., 40, 53, 73 

Tran Van Tra, 85 

transportation, 44, 49 

choke points, 68 

Command, 92 

enemy, 30 

Group, 42–43 

system, 7 

Truong Nhu Tang, 75 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR), 8, 11–12, 18, 78, 86, 94, 97 

USAF Academy, 32, 36 

USS 

Constellation, 64 

137Ä
Coral Sea, 64Ä

Hancock, 64Ä

Kitty Hawk, 64Ä

U Tapao Royal Thai Air Base (RTAB),Ä

Thailand, 22, 29, 45, 64, 79, 83Ä

Van Duyn, John E., 38Ä

Vandegrift Marine bases, 47Ä

Vang Pao, 46Ä

Vice Chief of Staff, 36–37Ä

Vietcong (VC), 11Ä

Vietminh, 7, 42Ä

Vietnam, 1, 3–6, 8, 11–12, 14–36,Ä

38–49, 51–53, 55, 59–62, 66, 68,Ä

70–75, 86–93, 95–97Ä

Vietnamization, 12, 40, 53, 87Ä

Vinh, 49Ä

Vogt, John W. Jr., 64Ä

Vo Nguyen Giap, 52Ä

Walleye launch and leave glide bomb, 69Ä

Warden, John A., III, 90Ä

“Wars of the Third Kind,” 88, 95Ä

Washington, D.C., 27, 36, 41, 43, 62, 83Ä

Westmoreland, William C., 18Ä

White House, 24, 41, 74–75Ä

Wichita, Kansas, 13Ä

Winged Defense, 2Ä

World War I, 2Ä

World War II, 1, 3–4, 9–10, 24–25, 36Ä

XB/YB-70 Valkyrie supersonic bomberÄ

program, 8Ä

XB-52, 12–13Ä

Xe Pon River, 43Ä

YB-52 prototype bomber aircraft, 13Ä

Yen Vien rail yards, 79Ä

Yugoslavian province of Kosovo, 3Ä

Zuckert, Eugene M., 10Ä

138Ä
WAR FROM ABOVE THE CLOUDS 

B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and 

the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine 

Air University Press Team 

Chief Editor 

Hattie D. Minter 

Copy Editors 

Lula BarnesÄ

Rita B. MathisÄ

Carolyn McCormackÄ

Peggy SmithÄ

Book Design and Cover Art 

Daniel M. Armstrong 

Composition and 

Prepress Production 

Vivian D. O’Neal 

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil