TOWARD

INDEPENDENCE:

The Emergence of the U.S. Air Force

1945-1947

Herman S. Wolk

DITS JTIO IT ATEME NTA

Approved for Public Release

Distribution Unlimited

Air Force History and Museums Program

1996

20050429 020
Toward Independence

From the Wright Brothers' first flight, a long,

convoluted road led to the creation of the modern independent United States Air Force. Despite frustrating bureaucratic delays and

political maneuvering, the ultimate goal was

clear. Two world wars had devastated whole

continents and threatened long-term global

peace. Only a well-prepared American military

establishment, fully utilizing its Air Force,

could provide a strong national defense and

help ensure world peace. As aerospace technology took off, an independent Air Force would

lead the way into the atomic age, and a new

military structure would be required. Just as

important as technology, however, would be the

vision and energy of air power advocates. Over

five decades, Air Force people would build the

world's finest air organization by following a

simple creed: putting service above self.
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14. ABSTRACT

This booklet describes the political, military, and technological context during 1945-1947 that led to the establishment of the

independent United States Air Force. The author emphasizes the interaction of service disputes with Congress .Holding center stage

in this fast-paced narrative are Symington, Truman, Forrestal, Norstad, Sherman, Arnold, Spaatz, and other key players in the

struggle for air independence.

38 pp., diagrams, photos, suggested readings

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Early Advocates for an Independent Air Arm

Nearly a century ago, U.S. Army aviators began experimenting

with balloons and airships and eagerly anticipated the military use of

the new "heavier-than-air" flying machines developed by the Wright

brothers. As new technologies and capabilities emerged, a new organization would be needed to exploit aviation's military potential.

In August 1907 the U.S. Army Signal Corps took the first step, forming an Aeronautical Division under Capt. Charles deF. Chandler to

take "charge of all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines and all kindred subjects." Some early visionaries foresaw that

the airplane would revolutionize warfare, and they became advocates

of a more prominent, more independent air arm. It would take forty

years for this dream to come true. The intervening decades would see

air power advocates wage legislative battles to give the Army's air

arm status equal to that of the other Army branches-and eventually

to create an independent United States Air Force.

World War I demonstrated the usefulness of the air element in

various roles-observing troop movements, supporting ground action, and even strategic bombing. To military aviators, the strategic

role seemed a harbinger of air power's future. The trench warfare of

World War I had proven costly and self-defeating; aerial bombing

behind the lines, the theory went, could destroy the enemy's supply

network and break his will to fight. One out-spoken airman, Brig.

Gen. William [Billy] Mitchell, argued that the airplane was more

economical and militarily effective than the battleship and that an independent air service was the best way to exploit aircraft, especially

for strategic missions and coastal defense. Mitchell seemed to prove

his point in 1921 when bomber planes under his command destroyed

obsolete warships off the Virginia Capes including the battleship Ostfriesland, thought to be unsinkable.

Despite this evidence, the War Department continued to believe

that the Air Service's main role was the support of ground troops,

and thus it should remain subordinate to Army ground commanders.

The wartime Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, expressed the predominant War Department view: "The war had taught

many lessons; the principles of warfare, however, remained unchanged. It was not won, as some had predicted it would be, by some

new terrible development of modem science; it was won, as has

every other war in history, by men, munitions and morale." Textbooks at Army schools still described the airplane's primary role as

being observation. Between 1916 and 1920, eight different bills to

establish a separate Department of Aeronautics were introduced in

Congress. The resulting law, the Reorganization Act of 1920, recog-
nized the Air Service only as a combatant branch of the Army. For

the time being, the Navy remained the nation's first line of defense.

Eventually, another key piece of legislation-the Air Corps Act of

1926--elevated the air arm's status within the Army, but it failed to

satisfy the air advocates. The Act sanctioned Air Corps representation on the War Department General Staff and created the Office of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, first held by F. Trubee

Davison. Yet there was still little appreciation of the idea of an independent air mission. The Air Corps remained subject to the control of

the War Department, which considered support of ground troops as

aviation's major function. Meanwhile, the aviation community quietly developed a concept of air power that looked to the future. "We

were just sort of voices in the wilderness," General Ira C. Eaker recalled. "A great many military people considered us crackpots." At

the air arm's premier service school, the Air Service Field Officers

School (subsequently, the Air Corps Tactical School) at Langley

Field, Virginia, instructors espoused an air doctrine based upon independent air operations. In future wars, they maintained, American attack planes and bombers would cripple the enemy's air force and

strike the "vital centers" of the national economy.

Gaining Control over Air Operations

Throughout the 1920s, several boards considered the question of

the organization of military aviation. Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick,

Chief of the Air Service, favored air autonomy within the structure of

the War Department. He opposed permanent assignment of air units

to the ground forces. The Lassiter Board report of 1923, which recommended the establishment of a General Headquarters [GHQ] Air

Force, marked the Army's first acknowledgement that the independent air mission might serve an important role. Two years later,

the Morrow Board, appointed by President Calvin Coolidge, opposed

the creation of a separate Department of Aeronautics. The Board's

report of November 1925 emphasized that:

No airplane capable of making a transoceanic flight to our

country with a useful military load and of returning to safety

is now in existence .... with the advance in the art .... it does

not appear that there is any ground for anticipation of such

development to a point which would constitute a direct menace to the United States in any future which scientific

thought can now foresee.

2
In December 1925 yet another group, the Lampert Committee, recommended that a Department of National Defense be established under a civilian secretary. This finding implied the creation of three

coequal services and foreshadowed the modem Department of Defense. Unfortunately, neither the War Department nor the Congress

took action. Then, in the 1930s a breakthrough occurred. Both the

Drum Board and the Baker Board proposed formation of a centralized General Headquarters Air Force to control air units. Based on

the Baker Board report, the GHQ Air Force was established on

March 1, 1935, with Brig. Gen. Frank M. Andrews as commanding

general. A renowned air commander, Andrews had served as commandant of the Advanced Flying School and Chief of the Training

and Operations Division in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps,

as well as with the Operations and Training Division of the War Department General Staff.

Before the creation of the GHQ Air Force, Air Corps units in the

United States had been under operational control of the Army Corps

area commanders in whose territory they were stationed. There were

nine such corps areas, each commanded by a ground officer. In similar fashion to the Chief of Infantry and the other Chiefs of Arms or

Services, the Chief of the Air Corps had been responsible for support

of his units-the design and procurement of aircraft, personnel, training, and doctrine. The Air Corps Chief therefore, was not really an

operational commander. But with creation of the GHQ Air Force,

General Andrews gained operational control of tactical units, formed

into three wings. Brig. Gen. Henry H. Arnold headed the 1 st Wing at

March Field, California; Col. Henry Conger Pratt commanded the

2nd Wing at Langley Field, Virginia; and Lt. Col. Gerald C. Brant

led the 3rd Wing at Barksdale Field, Louisiana. The Chief of the Air

Corps and the GHQ Commander were on the same echelon of command, and each reported separately to the War Department. Thus, the

Office of the Chief of the Air Corps controlled funds, personnel, and

procurement of equipment, while GHQ Air Force was responsible for

combat efficiency and results, without the authority over the resources needed to accomplish its mission. Administratively, tactical

bases came under the Army corps area commanders. When handling air matters, the Army Chief of Staff and the War Department General

Staff dealt with all three echelons: the commander of GHQ Air

Force, the Chief of the Air Corps, and the corps area commanders.

This type of organization severely divided authority between the Office of the Chief of Air Corps and GHQ Air Force.

3
Organizing for World War II

In response to Nazi aggression in the late 1930s, President

Roosevelt called for a massive buildup of American air power. "Military aviation," Roosevelt observed, "is increasing at an unprecedented and alarming rate." General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the

Air Corps, was anxious to move to counter the threat from the air.

Arnold and Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air

since April 1941, agreed with General George C. Marshall, Army

Chief of Staff, that the question of air independence should be put on

hold while war clouds intensified over Europe and the air buildup

proceeded.

Mobilization for war led to the establishment of the Army Air

Forces (AAF) on June 20, 1941, by revision of Army Regulation 95-

5. This consolidation of the air mission marked the first major step

toward air autonomy since establishment of the GHQ Air Force, and

according to the official Army history, "constituted the most radical

change in War Department organization before World War II." General Arnold became Chief, Army Air Forces (he had previously been

designated Deputy Chief of Staff for Air) and would coordinate the

Office, Chief of Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command, a

redesignated GHQ controlling four continental air forces and their

subordinate bomber and interceptor forces. Also critical to success,

Arnold formed his own Air Staff as part of AAF Headquarters. The

formation of the AAF within the War Department was designed to

create an autonomous entity similar to the Marine Corps within the

Navy Department.

New command arrangements also pointed to greater recognition

and an increasing role for the Army's air arm. In July 1941, General

Arnold and the Chief of the Navy Bureau of Aer6nautics became

members of the Joint Army-Navy Board, a kind of national military

high command. And in August, Arnold participated in the Atlantic

Conference meeting between President Roosevelt and British Prime

Minister Winston Churchill. The British air, ground, and naval chiefs

accompanied Churchill, so that Arnold in effect took his place at this

conference table as a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. "I

tried to give Arnold all the power I could," emphasized Marshall, "and tried to make him as nearly as I could Chief of Staff of the Air."

In October 1941, Arnold asked his confidant, Brig. Gen. Carl A.

Spaatz., Chief of the Air Staff, to craft a reorganization plan which

would formally recognize the AAF as an autonomous entity coequal

with the Army's ground and service forces. The War Department rejected Spaatz's plan, but Arnold in November proposed to the War

Department a similar reorganization, stressing the need for unity of

command:

4
President Franklin D.

Roosevelt ordered a massive buildup of air forces

in response to Nazi aggression in Europe.

The development of the Air Force as a new and coordinated

member of the combat team has introduced new methods of

waging war. Although the basic Principles of War remain unchanged, the introduction of these new methods has altered

the application of those Principles of War to modem combat.

In the past, the military commander has been concerned with

the employment of a single decisive arm, which was supported by auxiliary arms and services .... Today the military

commander has two striking arms. These two arms are capable of operating together at a single time and place, on the

battlefield. But they are also capable of operating singly at

places remote from each other. The great range of the air arm

makes it possible to strike far from the battlefield, and attack

the sources of enemy military power. The mobility of the air

force makes it possible to swing the mass of that striking

power from those distant objectives to any selected portion of

the battlefront in a matter of hours, even though the bases of

the air force may be widely separated.

The War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff approved Arnold's plan, but before it could be fully coordinated and

5
implemented, the Japanese attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl

Harbor and the United States immediately entered the war.

Three War-Fighting Forces

The movement toward air independence regained its momentum in

January 1942, when General Marshall appointed Maj. Gen. Joseph T.

McNarney to head a War Department Reorganization Committee,

with the objective of decentralizing the responsibilities of the War

Department Staff while granting the air arm increased autonomy. The

result was the so-called "Marshall reorganization" of March 1942, by

which the Army Air Forces became coequal with the Army Ground

Forces and the Services of Supply [subsequently the Army Service

Forces]--essenti ally the structure that had been proposed by Spaatz

and Arnold. This reorganization, under War Department Circular 59,

stipulated the AAF's mission was "to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide Air Force units

properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations. Procurement and related functions will be executed under the direction

of the Under Secretary of War."

After March 1942, the Air Corps-which had been established by

law-remained the primary component of the AAF, but the Office

Chief of the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command were

abolished, their functions becoming part of AAF Headquarters. Officers would continue to be commissioned in the Air Corps. The Army

Air Forces had thus gained a position of significant autonomy within

the War Department, a move that Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., of

the War Department General Staff, called "the most drastic and fundamental change which the War Department had experienced since

the establishment of the General Staff by Elihu Root in 1903." However, the air arm's near-autonomy could be short lived: the reorganization was due to expire six months after the end of the war, in

accordance with the First War Powers Act of December 18, 1941.

During World War 11, because of its quasi-autonomous position

within the War Department, the Army Air Forces held representation

on all Joint Chiefs of Staff committees in Washington. This flowed

from General Arnold's presence on both the councils of the Joint

Chiefs and the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. Thus, Arnold and the Air Staff put forward their views in high-level strategic

planning sessions. According to the official Army history: "It was

clearly in the interests of the common military effort, as it was clearly

the intent of General Marshall, to preserve the system whereby the

Army Air Forces exercised great influence in determining the way in

which U.S. Army air units were employed." The AAF's repre6
Gen. Henry H. (Hap) Arnold and Gen. George C. Marshall at the Allies' Cairo Conference in 1943. Arnold's participation in high-level

meetings increased the AAF's stature within the War Department.

sentation in the highest joint planning and strategy councils

amounted to an acceptance of the Army air element as a military

service virtually equal to the Army and Navy. For example, in the

Joint Plans Committee, AAF representatives were assigned directly

by Arnold or the Air Staff, rather than being assigned from the Operations Division of the War Department. As Arnold noted in June

1943: "The AAF are being directly controlled by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff more and more each day.

Consequently, AAF representation in the joint and combined planning staffs has become a position of paramount importance to me."

The independent character of AAF planning and staff activities in

wartime extended to strategic operations worldwide. Arnold had long

advocated conducting "independent" strategic bombing operations,

exempt from the control of theater commanders. In Europe this concept led to the establishment of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in

Europe. Centralized control of air forces by airmen became a reality

in April 1944, with the creation of the Twentieth Air Force, a strategic bombing force directly under Arnold's command as executive

agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Twentieth's all-important mis7
sion was to take the war to the Japanese by conducting a B-29 longrange bombing campaign against the home islands. This arrangement, in effect, gave the AAF equality with the ground and naval

forces in the Pacific. Arnold was authorized by the JCS "to implement and execute major decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative

to deployment and missions, including objectives, of the Twentieth

Air Force."

Planning for the Postwar Military

Throughout the long years of World War II, the issue of the organization of military services in postwar America-and the place of

the Army air arm within this structure-remained ever-present. Wartime organization in the theaters of operations, the evolving relationships between the military high commands, and the drive for unity of

command gave considerable impetus to the need to determine a

workable postwar structure. Also, as noted, the War Department's

wartime organization, under the First War Powers Act, would expire

six months after the end of the war.

Even as the Western allies prepared for Operation Overlord, the

massive cross-channel invasion of the European continent, the Congress in April 1944 again considered the question of how best to

structure the nation's postwar military forces. The Woodrum Committee focused on the importance of the principle of unity of command. "In one form or another we have acquired a degree of unity of

command in all the theaters of war," Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell,

Jr., emphasized to the committee. But, he noted that "the achievement of that unity on the field of battle has been reached with great

difficulty." Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett observed that the allocation and disposition of forces must be determined by a unified staff, "and not on the tortured interpretation of

antiquated documents dealing with vague theories and doctrines

which have to be thrown away the moment war breaks out." A separate Air Force should be created in the postwar period, Lovett said,

but the Navy should maintain its fleet air arm.

Reluctant to commit to the creation of a single department of national defense, naval leaders told the Woodrum Committee that the

postwar options needed further study. The importance of the fleet air

arm remained central to the Navy's position. Eventually, the committee recommended a careful examination of the views of theater military commanders. For his part, Under Secretary of War Robert P.

Patterson expressed the opinion that everyone should get on with the

business of winning the war.

8
Key War Department

officials addressed the

Woodrum Committee.

Assistant Secretary of

War for Air, Robert

A. Lovett (right) and

Brig. Gen. Haywood

S. Hansell, Jr., Twentieth Air Force Chief

of Staff, (below) testified that future wars

would require unified

command on the field

of battle.

:•'9 
The Joint Chiefs, however, saw no reason for delay. They wanted

a postwar plan ready when the war ended, so in May 1944 they appointed a JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense to gather the opinions of commanders in the theaters and in

Washington. After a ten-month study, the committee's report of

April 1945 was signed by Maj. Gens. William F. Tompkins (War Department General Staff) and Harold L. George (AAF); Rear Adm.

Malcolm F. Schoeffel (USN); and Col F. Trubee Davison (AAF).

The document also included a dissenting opinion by the committee

chairman and senior naval member, Adm. James 0. Richardson. In

short, the committee recommended establishment of an independent

United States Air Force coequal with the Army and Navy. Except for

Richardson, the members of the committee proposed a Department of

National Defense, headed by a civilian secretary.

Based on wartime experience (particularly problems in joint operations), the committee endorsed unified command in Washington

and in future theaters of war. National security in the postwar era

would require integration of land, sea, and air operations. Committee

members warned that once the war ended, if "the armed forces were

still operating under the present system, with no wartime compulsion

to get together, even the existing degree of cooperation can be expected to disappear. This situation will be aggravated by the forced

readjustment to peacetime conditions." As General Marshall often

noted, with a tight budget in the postwar period, service parochialism

would increase.

Having studied current wartime operations, the JCS committee

found that American forces were not fully integrating land, sea, and

air operations. Under these conditions, parochialism tended to increase. Each Army and Navy component within a specific theater belonged and owed allegiance to a separate department. Hence, the

theater commander could not carry out his command decisions as efficiently as he wanted. Significant additional progress was impossible

under the existing system. A single Department of Defense at the

outset of war would have fostered much better coordination and

teamwork between the services. Also, the present system would not

work nearly as well in peacetime as in war.

The Navy's Opposition

Admiral Richardson, the senior Navy member of the committee.

filed a minority report opposing the recommendation for a single Department of National Defense. He argued that the plan was "theoretically better than any yet proposed, but from a practical point of view

it is unacceptable." Richardson favored the status quo, arguing that

10
the lessons of war were not yet clear. After the war the military

would face the monumental task of demobilization, and for this reason it would also be inappropriate to reorganize prematurely.

Richardson contended that the effectiveness of combat forces in

the field bore no direct relation to the existence of a single department in Washington. Nor did he support the proposals for a Secretary

of the Armed Forces and a Commander of the Armed Forces. He was

wary of such powerful positions, fearful of their adversely affecting

the Navy. Richardson likewise found himself in opposition to an Air

Force coequal with the Army and Navy. He freely admitted that his

chief concern was that the Navy would lose its air arm to the Air

Force.

Though against the creation of a single department, Admiral

Richardson advocated that the organization of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (along with wartime organizational changes by the War and

Navy Departments) be perpetuated by statute. A joint secretariat

should be set up, and the subject of reorganization given further

study. This reflected the Navy's view that for coordination the services should rely on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various JCS committees. Other members of the special committee disagreed with the

Navy, observing that matters referred to the Joint Chiefs or to a joint

secretariat would then be sent to subcommittees and to groups within

the separate departments. The committee doubted that efficiency

could be attained by this kind of group action. Also, it had weighed

and discarded the idea of having the Chairman, JCS, act as the Chief

of Staff to the President, to decide controversial issues. Under this

system, the committee felt that the Chief of Staff to the President

would have authority to decide matters but not be charged with their

execution. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff would not have to report

to the Secretary of National Defense, thus infringing upon the responsibilities and powers of the service secretaries.

Senior naval leaders-Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President; Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; and Adm.

Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet--considered

the committee's recommendations radical. They resisted the concept

of a "super-secretary," claiming that one man could not effectively

administer both the Army and Navy. Neither economy nor enhanced

efficiency would accrue under a single department system. Besides,

in their view the Navy's power and influence would suffer under

such a reorganization. They recalled that in 1918 Britain's Royal Naval Air Service had been fused into the Royal Air Force. The reorganization advocated by the special committee would subject the

Navy's requirements to review by officials who had no responsibility

for initiating them. Ultimately, sea power would be weakened by

people who did not understand its potential.

11
Making the Case for Air Force Independence

The airmen's struggle to develop air power's full potential had begun in the era of the Wright brothers and over the decades had centered on the drive for air autonomy within the Army, and finally,

separation. Although the AAF leaders had put the drive for air independence on hold during the war, the conflict itself, as they saw it,

made the case for separation. All forms of air power-tactical, strategic, airlift, reconnaissance-demonstrated in totality the need for a

separate service which could draw up its own requirements and present its own budget to the Congress.

During the war General Arnold prepared well for peacetime by

forming postwar planning groups within AAF headquarters. The

over-riding objective was the creation of an independent Air Force

which, Arnold believed, would form the linchpin of America's postwar national security organization. Given that the nation had never

adequately been prepared for war, Arnold made the case to Congress

for separate "fundamental" air power as part of a revolutionary

American military policy-that the United States required a peacetime military establishment designed and structured to deter war.

"Each new crisis in our history," Arnold noted, "has found our armed

The Army and Navy

took opposing sides on

the issue of creating a

single Department of

Defense. Adm. Ernest

J. King (left) believed

that unifying the

Army, Navy, and Air

Force would breed

friction among the

services. Gen. George

C. Marshall (right),

however, argued that

unification would be

necessary for comprehensive planning in

peacetime.

12
services far from effectively, efficiently, or economically organized.

With each crisis, modernization and coordination have been hammered out under war pressure at great waste of resources, to be allowed in large measure to lapse when the crisis is over."

Arnold believed that the war had ushered in a new era that would

be dominated by air power, both conventional and atomic. Japan had

been forced to surrender without invasion after atomic bombs had

been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The use of atomic weapons, the AAF Chief believed, had given the Emperor "a way out," after the B-29 conventional bombing offensive had destroyed Japan's

ability to make offensive war. The objective of the B-29 campaign

had been to knock the Japanese out of the war without having to resort to an invasion. Thus, the most important lesson for America in

peacetime was that "our security can in the future be threatened suddenly and with terrific destructive power." The new peacetime military establishment must be geared to deter conflict by maintaining

adequate forces in-being.

America's armed forces need to be coordinated under unified command-a theme also struck by General Eisenhower-with the Air

Force as a coequal service to the Army and Navy. Arnold went out of

his way to reassure Congress that not all forms of air power needed

to be concentrated in a single arm. Air power should continue to be

an "auxiliary" of land and sea power. The development and employment of "fundamental" air power however, must be carried out by a

service having this as its primary responsibility. Arnold defined "fundamental" air power as land-based strategic and tactical air forces. At

the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was no independent Air Force. However, under the enormous pressure of global

war, Arnold noted, Secretary of War Stimson and Army Chief of

Staff, General George Marshall, had the foresight to give the Army

Air Forces coordinate status with the ground forces through the

March 1942 reorganization. This made possible advanced strategic

planning. Only with coequal status with the ground and naval forces

"could the air commander authoritatively present before the Supreme

Commander what he could accomplish, assume the responsibility for

its accomplishment, and be free to carry out that responsibility with

full appreciation of air capabilities and limitations."

During the war a large degree of coordination had been achieved

through the Joint Chiefs and the board and committee system, but

there remained important matters which could not be resolved. Thus

General Arnold, stressing unity of command, advocated a single defense department headed by a civilian Secretary, with a military

Chief of Staff to the Secretary, and three coequal military departments:

13
... the security of this country and the maintenance of world

peace demand that our military establishment include a coequal component devoted exclusively to the problems of the

air-to their exploration and their solution-to assurance of

control of the air over our country and, if necessary, over that

of an aggressor.

Eisenhower and Truman Lend Support

As General Arnold and the AAF staff made their case for an independent air arm, other key leaders stood up in support. Foremost

were General Dwight D. Eisenhower and President Harry Truman.

Both the President and the wartime Supreme Commander of Allied

Forces in Europe had learned an important lesson from the disaster at

Pearl Harbor and the experience on both fronts-that unified command (component commanders in the theaters of war working under

a supreme commander) was absolutely essential for an effective and

efficient postwar military establishment. Both leaders also strongly

advocated a separate Air Force.

Eisenhower had led the massive allied forces to victory in Europe,

capped by the stunningly successful invasion of the Continent. Having commanded the greatest unified force in history, he spoke from

the crucible of hard experience. Eisenhower's road had not always

been easy, marked by conflicting strategies and contentious personalities, but he came to the unalterable conclusion that the nation required an Air Force coequal to the land and sea forces and capable of

integrated air-ground operations. Beyond this, Eisenhower was a political-military statesman of the highest order. He realized that the

military would be cut down to size after the war ("We should be

good-natured about it," he told his staff.) and he believed that efficiency and economy would best be served by a unified defense establishment.

When General Eisenhower testified in November 1945 before the

Senate Military Affairs Committee he emphasized unity of command. the importance of air power to victory, and the necessity of

creating a United States Air Force in the postwar world. Pointing to

the success of the cross-channel attack, Eisenhower made clear that:

The Normandy Invasion was based on a deep-seated faith in

the power of the Air Forces in overwhelming number to intervene in the land battle, i.e., that the Air Forces by their action could have the effect on the ground of making it possible

for a small force of land troops to invade a continent. ..

14
without that Air Force, without its independent power, entirely aside from its ability to sweep the enemy air forces out

of the sky, without power to intervene in the ground battle,

that invasion would have been fantastic .... Unless we had

faith in air power as a fighting arm to intervene and make

safe that landing, it would have been more than fantastic, it

would have been criminal.

Common sense, Eisenhower stressed, dictated that the postwar national security organization feature a single Department of National

Defense and a separate Air Force. "I cannot perceive," he told the

Congress, "any logic behind the objections which are voiced against

this proposal." In the modem world, success rested on an integrated,

unified air-ground-sea team: "At one time I was an infantryman, but I

have long since forgotten that fact under the responsibility of commanding combined arms."

General Eisenhower knew that after the war the massive military

force that the United States fielded would be broken up and sent

home. The citizen army would be no more. Economy would be the

theme for postwar organization. "If we are to afford an adequate security establishment," the American fighting team must be integrated. "Competition is like some of the habits we have-in small

President Truman and

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, two powerful

figures who advocated a

unified command structure and an independent Air Force.

15
Demonstrating his commitment to U.S. air power, President Truman

signs the proclamation designating August 1, 1946, as Air Force Day.

The date marked the 39th Anniversary of military aviation. On hand

for the occasion were Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, AAF Commanding General, (center) and Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander.

amounts they are very, very desirable; carried too far they are ruinous." The armed services must be unified in Washington as well as in

the combat theaters, so that their requirements can be considered as a

whole rather than piecemeal. Postwar economy would dictate this.

And the Air Force must forward its own requirements as an independent, coequal service: "No sane officer of any arm could .contest

that thinking. The Air Forces have long ago grown up and if anything

was needed to show their equal status with all others, we certainly

have proved it in Europe, and from all I hear they have certainly

proved it in Japan."

As Commander-in-Chief, President Truman had a keen interest in

postwar military organization. Convinced that a lack of proper command organization and faulty communications contributed to the

Pearl Harbor disaster, Truman after the war came out strongly for

unification and establishment of a separate Air Force. "One of the

strongest convictions which I brought to the Presidency," Truman

emphasized, **was that the antiquated defense setup .... had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future safety and preserving world peace."

16
Truman was particularly critical of strategic planning during the

war, undertaken by the Joint Chiefs via joint committees. On December 19, 1945, he delivered a special message to Congress which underlined the important lesson of World War II-the need for unified

direction of the military services. "We came to the conclusion, soon

confirmed by experience," the Chief Executive noted, "that any extended military effort required overall coordinated control in order to

get the most out of the three armed forces. Had we not early in the

war adopted this principle of a unified command for operations, our

efforts, no matter how heroic, might have failed."

President Truman disagreed with the Navy's position that the JCS

committee system would be satisfactory for the postwar period. He

considered the Joint Chiefs a committee, not a unified command system. While the Joint Chiefs made the system work under the pressure

of a global war, this would be difficult if not impossible during

peacetime: "As national defense appropriations grow tighter, and as

conflicting interests make themselves felt in major issues of policy

and strategy, unanimous agreements will become more difficult to

reach." Truman determined after much deliberation that it was time

to build a unified defense establishment. The nation required an integrated national security organization whereby the military services

no longer went their separate ways "in splendid isolation." To Truman, there was no question about this. He proposed a Department of

National Defense headed by a civilian with three "coordinated"

branches representing the land, sea, and air forces. An integral part of

such a "unified" defense establishment would be a separate Air

Force:

Air power has been developed to a point where its responsibilities are equal to those of land and sea power, and its contribution to our strategic planning is as great. In operation, air

power receives its separate assignment in the execution of the

over-all plan. These facts were finally recognized in this war

in the organizational parity which was granted to air power

within our principal unified commands.

In Truman's view, true unification was an evolutionary process,

with creation of a Department of National Defense as a first step.

"Unification is much more than a matter of organization," the President emphasized: "It will require new viewpoints, new doctrine, and

new habits of thinking throughout the departmental structure." Truman's special message was designed to energize the services to start

working and cooperating on draft unification legislation.

The Navy vehemently opposed the plan delineated in Truman's

December message. "As the President knows," Secretary of the Navy

17
Forrestal said, "I am so opposed to the fundamental concept expressed in the message that I do not believe there is any very helpful

observation that I could make." The Navy's leadership remained unreconstructed, fearful that an independent Air Force would make a

grab for naval aviation and that the Army might even attempt to take

over the Marine Corps. Forrestal favored a gradual approach towards

unification, proposing coordination through joint committees as opposed to legislating a single Department of National Defense and a

separate Air Force.

Crafting Unification Legislation

Despite the Navy's objections, in January 1946 Senator Elbert D.

Thomas, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, formed

a subcommittee to draft unification legislation. Senators Warren R.

Austin and Joseph Lister Hill joined Thomas on the subcommittee.

Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, and

Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, newly appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), were named as advisors. As the War Department's representative, Norstad met immediately with Eisenhower,

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, and Assistant Secretary of War

for Air Stuart Symington to plot strategy.

Norstad brought impressive credentials to the task. As the Air

Staff's chief planner under Arnold, and then Spaatz, he had crafted

the AAF's positions on postwar reorganization and unification. "I

was intensely interested in this," Norstad later recalled, "and I got an

extra office in the Pentagon, and I put up paragraph by paragraph, all

of the proposals that had been made on every one of the pertinent

subjects, on organizational relationships .... this did not require a hell

of a lot of staff work. It required a little leg and arm work."

In early 1946, Norstad and Radford sat in on the subcommittee's

sessions, and in April the subcommittee reported on a bill (S.2044) to

the Military Affairs Committee that combined features of the socalled Eberstadt report (given to Forrestal) and the War Department's

Collins plan. The full committee in May 1946 recommended to the

Senate that S.2044 be passed. The Common Defense Act of 1946

called for the creation of a Department of Common Defense, coequal

military services, and a Chief of Staff of Common Defense serving as

military advisor to the President.

Though the Navy's leadership remained opposed to the legislation,

President Truman. becoming impatient, wanted action. He decided

against establishing a Chief of Staff to the President and made clear

to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy that he expected

them to resolve the major issues. On May 31 Patterson and Forrestal

18
submitted their report to Truman, finding agreement on eight points,

but failing to resolve several crucial issues. The eight points of agreement primarily reflected the creation of various agencies in the national security establishment. Patterson and Forrestal, however, could

not work out the fundamental questions of a single defense department, creation of a separate Air Force, the future of land-based aviation, and the status of the Marine Corps.

The Navy still opposed a single department, arguing that it needed

full control over whatever resources it deemed necessary to fulfill its

mission. A civilian Secretary of National Defense might ultimately

make decisions prejudicial to the Navy's interests. Eisenhower,

Spaatz, and Norstad, on the other hand, held that the nation could not

afford duplication. The services should not be self-sufficient, but instead mutually supporting. For example, Spaatz emphasized that using Navy aircraft for long-range reconnaissance, protection of

shipping, and antisubmarine operations would duplicate the mission

of the AAF's land-based air forces.

Truman welcomed agreement on the eight points, but frustrated by

the lack of progress, immediately charged Patterson and Forrestal

with crafting legislation for a Department of National Defense

headed by a civilian secretary. The President's guidance also stipulated three military departments, each led by a civilian secretary. The

Navy would retain important air elements: the Marine Corps would

continue to be part of the Navy Department, and the Navy could operate aircraft essential for its operations. The military services, Truman emphasized, "should perform their separate functions under the

Frustrated by the impass on unification

legislation, President

Truman spelled out

his concept for a Department of National

Defense.

19
unifying direction, authority and control of the Secretary of National

Defense. The internal administration of the services should be preserved in order that the high morale and esprit de corps of each service be retained."

The Sherman-Norstad Agreements

At this point, Forrestal asked Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman (Admiral Nimitz's Deputy for Operations) to replace Radford in the unification negotiations. The Joint Chiefs then directed Norstad (now

Director of Plans and Operations for the War Department General

Staff) and Sherman in July 1946 to write a unification plan. Radford

had been considered a "hard liner," even in the Navy. Forrestal and

Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, believed that Sherman, who did

not oppose creation of a separate Air Force, could work more effectively with Norstad. Admiral Radford later noted that Sherman and

Norstad "removed the impasse between the services."

Norstad's move to the War Department General Staff, at the specific request of General Eisenhower delivered impressive clout to the

AAF. Norstad became only the second airman ever to hold the War

Department's key Plans and Operations post, Brig. Gen. Frank Andrews having occupied it a decade earlier. Eisenhower's move

showed his personal confidence in Norstad and it marked the War

Department's recognition of the air arm's maturity.

In the summer of 1946, Norstad and Sherman first tackled the

question of how best to structure unified commands in the overseas

theaters. This was an urgent task because during the war in the Pacific the question of unified command had never been resolved. The

Army had wanted joint commands comprised of separate land, sea,

and air forces, while the Navy preferred command arrangements

structured according to geographical areas. For his part, Norstad argued that commands should be set up by functions, rather than geography.

The Joint Chiefs approved Norstad and Sherman's Outline Command Plan and sent it to President Truman on December 12. The

document called for a system of unified command in which a single

commander would control land, naval, and air forces within a specific geographical area. The first plan of its kind, it reflected the war

experience in which unified command had evolved by necessity. The

leadership of the Army and Navy agreed that unified command was

absolutely vital to successful combined operations. Norstad called it

"an idea whose time had come," and with Sherman, defined a Unified Command as a single theater commander responsible to the Joint

Chiefs, with a joint staff and three service commanders under him.

20
Vice Adm. Forrest P.1

Sherman (right) and "

Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad (below) were chosen to help draft a 4

defense unification

plan, which would address the problems of

combined operations,

among other issues.

21
Based on the Norstad-Sherman plan, the JCS created several unified

commands: Far East Command; Pacific Command; Alaskan Command; Northeast Command; Atlantic Fleet; Caribbean Command;

and European Command. In addition, the Joint Chiefs noted that a

Strategic Air Command (SAC) had been created in March 1946,

comprising strategic air forces not otherwise assigned. In effect, this

established SAC as a specified command, although the JCS did not

formally recognize it as such until several years later. The commander of the Strategic Air Command, like the unified commanders,

would be responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs.

The JCS would exercise strategic direction over the unified commands and assign them missions and tasks. The component commander would deal directly with his own service on issues of

administration, supply, training, finance, and construction. For each

command operating under JCS missions, either the Army Chief of

Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Commanding General,

AAF, would be named executive agent for the Joint Chiefs. On December 14, 1946, President Truman approved the Command Plan.

Next, Norstad and Sherman began working out the details of a

draft agreement on functions and organization. Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal soon informed Truman

that they had prepared draft legislation and a proposed executive order describing service functions. The draft national security bill featured a new arrangement for civilian-military control of the armed

services. It would create an Office of the Secretary of National Defense, a civilian post, as well as three civilian service Secretaries. The

Departments of the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps and naval aviation), and Air Force would be under the overall direction of

the Secretary of National Defense, but they would be administered as

a separate entities, each with its own military chief. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff would comprise the military heads of all three services, subject to the direction of the Secretary of National Defense and supported by a full-time Joint Staff.

Despite this broad agreement, several issues remained unresolved.

The Navy, for example, wanted roles and missions written into the

unification legislation. The War Department and the AAF disagreed.

General Eisenhower emphasized that the unification bill should simply lay out fundamental principles and not get bogged down in an effort to describe the rules by which each service would operate. The

War Department Chief feared that the Navy's attempts to specify

service functions in the bill would succeed only in arousing resentment.

22
The National Security Act of 1947

In late February 1947, President Truman sent Congress a draft of

the National Security Act of 1947, which was introduced into the

Senate as S.758 (H.R. 2319 in the House). The bill called for a National Military Establishment, headed by a Secretary of National Defense and consisting of Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air

Force. The Marine Corps would remain part of the Navy Department,

and naval aviation would be responsible for naval reconnaissance,

antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. This legislation

was essentially a compromise: Truman, Eisenhower, Norstad, Spaatz,

and Symington succeeded in creating an independent Air Force, but

the Navy won its point in creating a relatively weak Secretary of National Defense who would be a coordinator rather than an administrator.

Following Congressional hearings, on June 5, 1947, the Senate

Committee on Armed Services approved S.758 with amendments. In

July the Senate and House passed the bill by voice vote. A conference committee worked out some differences, and on July 26, 1947,

President Truman approved legislation known as the National Security Act of 1947. Among its provisions, the Act established the Office

of the Secretary of National Defense and a United States Air Force.

On the same day, Truman signed Executive Order 9877, which outlined the functions of the armed forces.

This executive order was identical to the draft order that Patterson

and Forrestal had sent to the Chief Executive in January 1947. Truman described it as an assignment of primary functions and responsibilities. The order did resolve much of the Navy's concerns over its

air and ground functions. The Navy would retain the Marine Corps

and naval aviation, including the missions of naval reconnaissance,

antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The air aspects of

these activities would be coordinated with the Air Force, particularly

aircraft development and procurement. Air Force personnel, equipment, and facilities would be used "in all cases where economy and

effectiveness will thereby be increased." Subject to this proviso, the

Navy would have no restrictions in the aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes. In the area of air transport, the Navy would

have the aircraft necessary for internal administration and for flying

routes of sole interest to the Navy, where requirements could not be

met by normal air transport.

Air Force functions encompassed all military aviation, combat and

service, not otherwise assigned. Specific USAF functions were: air

23
operations including joint operations; gaining general air supremacy;

establishing local air superiority; responsibility for the strategic air

force and strategic air reconnaissance; airlift and support of airborne

operations; air support to land and naval forces, including support of

occupation forces; and air transport, except for that furnished by the

Navy. The order further charged the Air Force with supplying the

means to coordinate air defense among the services.

In the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253), Congress

declared its intent to provide

a comprehensive program for the future security of the

United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated

policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and

functions of the Government relating to the national security;

to provide three military departments for the operation and

administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their

authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective

strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation

under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces.

The Act created a National Military Establishment, to include the

Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (to be administered

as individual executive departments) and to provide for coordination

and direction by the civilian secretaries of these departments. The

law stipulated that the Secretary of Defense would be a civilian appointed by the President as his principal assistant for national security.

A Civilian Secretary of Defense

The powers of the Secretary of Defense were to establish general

policies and programs for the military establishment; to exercise general direction and control over the three departments; to abolish duplication in procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and

research; and to supervise and coordinate the defense budget. These

broad powers appeared to deliver on President Truman's desire for

firm civilian direction of the armed forces. Nevertheless, an impor24
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tant proviso considerably negated the control and powers of the Secretary of Defense:

nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of the

Army, Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of the Air

Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of

the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense,

any report or recommendation relating to the Department

which he may deem necessary.

Since the law in effect made the President the arbiter of last resort,

the final appeal became not only the right but the duty of the incumbent service secretary. Nor could the President, in turn, refuse to hear

such an appeal. By permitting appeal, the Act implied the duty of the

Chief Executive seriously to entertain it.

The law also restricted the Secretary of Defense's powers by stating that powers and duties not specifically conferred on the Secretary

of Defense should be retained by the service secretaries. Without any

residual power of his own, the secretary was severely limited in his

authority. The secretary's charter to exercise "general direction"

placed him in a weak position at the start. The language reflected the

Navy's idea of the secretary as a coordinator rather than as an administrator, and it revealed the naval leadership's fear of the secretary as

a potential man on horseback.

The act specified that the Navy retain the Marine Corps and naval

aviation. Naval aviation consisted of combat, service, and training

forces, and embraced "land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved

in the operations and activities of the.. .Navy." Also, the Navy would

be "generally" responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine

warfare, and protection of shipping. The National Security Act required the Navy to develop aircraft, weapons, and tactics of naval

combat and service forces. Matters of joint concern would be coordinated between the services. Like the Army and Navy, the Marine

Corps would be allowed "such aviation as may be organic therein."

The United States Air Force is Born

According to the act, the United States Air Force

shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained and equipped

26
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primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive

air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the

preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the

expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to

meet the needs of war.

Hence, the National Security Act used broad terms in setting up

the United States Air Force, affording the Air Force considerable latitude in organizing its headquarters and field structure. Like the Army

and Navy, the Air Force would be constituted as an executive department. The new Department of the Air Force would be headed by the

Secretary of the Air Force, a civilian appointed by the President and

confirmed by the Senate. The Department of the Air Force was further authorized an Under Secretary and two Assistant Secretaries,

also civilians appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. As to USAF personnel and functions, either formerly under the

Department of the Army or "deemed by the Secretary of Defense to

be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the

Air Force or the United States, these shall be transferred to and

vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the

Air Force." The transfer of personnel, property, and installations

from the Army to the Air Force would take place over two years, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The United States Air Force was established under the Department

of the Air Force. The Chief of Staff, USAF, would be appointed by

the President for a four-year term. All officers, warrant officers, and

enlisted men of the Air Corps or Army Air Forces would be transferred to the United States Air Force. Others serving in the Army

components, but under the authority or command of the Commanding General, AAF, would also be transferred.

The New Joint Chiefs of Staff

Under the Act, the principal responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff were to prepare strategic plans and give strategic direction to

military forces; to prepare joint logistics plans and to assign to the

services logistic tasks in accord with such plans and when in the interest of national security, to set up unified commands in strategic areas. The Joint Chiefs would also act as the key military advisers to

the President and the Secretary of Defense.

28
Aside from the military departments and the JCS, the Act created

several key organizations. A War Council, consisting of the Secretary

of Defense (chairman), the service secretaries, and the military heads

of services, was formed to advise the Secretary of Defense on broad

policy matters. A new National Security Council (NSC) would advise the President on national security, with the support of a Central

Intelligence Agency. Also organized were a Munitions Board, a Research and Development Board, and a National Security Resources

Board (NSRB) to advise the President on coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. National Security Council members included the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the

Chairman, National Security Resources Board. The NSC had the

duty, under the President, to ensure that the United States had a military establishment strong enough to support the country's foreign

policy. Thus, the NSC advised the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies. Reporting to the NSC the CIA

coordinated all intelligence activities and evaluated the intelligence

collected.

A Workable Compromise

Though the National Security Act of 1947 gave the Army Air

Forces independence, it was not exactly what any of the services

originally wanted. Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker said the act really "legitimized four military air forces." However, the architects of Public

Law 253 had to maneuver within the realm of the possible-which

meant compromise. In February 1947, Symington (to become Secretary of the Air Force in September) had written James E. Webb, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, that a better bill could have been

drawn, but "a bill which we considered better could not have gotten

everybody's approval; and therefore would not have given the President the opportunity to show agreement to the Congress and the people. I don't say this is a good book, but I do say it is a good chapter."

The legislation was a starting point, a first step toward a truly integrated military establishment. Its passage had taken a long time, a

great deal of effort, and much give-and-take by all concerned.

Symington differed with those critics who believed that the Navy had

succeeded in structuring the unification bill expressly to suit its own

purposes. Nor did he share the resentment of those who felt that Norstad had capitulated to the Navy's demands in structuring the post of

Secretary of Defense as a coordinator. The first Secretary of the Air

29
Force argued that under the circumstances Norstad had done an outstanding job. It had not been easy. Of all the Air Force participants,

Symington said, "Norstad should get the most credit for unification.

In the days when it looked grim, he stuck to it."

In their deliberations on functions and organization, Norstad and

Sherman had faced some hard realities. They realized that President

Truman had laid out the major tenets of unification organization,

namely a single department of national defense and three coequal

services, including a separate Air Force. The Navy lost on the issue

of Air Force independence, but won its point of the individual services maintaining their "integrity" and thereby their flexibility of action and administration. Under the National Security Act, the

Secretary of Defense would be a coordinator as the Navy wanted, not

a strong administrator as desired by the Army and the Air Force.

As the War Department representative negotiating with the Navy,

General Norstad found himself in the middle of sensitive and emotional issues. He and Sherman could not completely satisfy both the

War Department and the Navy. Unfortunately, Norstad's especially

good relations with Sherman did not extend to the rest of the naval

hierarchy. In general the Navy fought the unification legislation right

up to the enactment of the final bill.

Not surprisingly, Norstad came under fire within the War Department for his unification role. Sometimes he had to reject what he

considered to be selfish interests within the War Department. Norstad

recalled that just prior to passage of unification legislation, General

Devers, the Army Ground Forces commander, told him that the

Army thought he was deliberately compromising its best interests.

There was some similar feeling within the Army Air Forces itself.

The antipathy did not disappear after enactment of the legislation, so

disheartened, Norstad asked Spaatz for a transfer out of Washington.

Specifically, Norstad suggested that he leave Washington, preferably

with a reduction of one grade; or if he were kept on the Air Staff, that

he not be promoted in grade or position. Spaatz and Symington

turned down Norstad's recommendations.

While the National Security Act was a major achievement, it was

also an obvious compromise in which the services yielded on matters

of principle to achieve a common goal. Neither the Army, the Army

Air Forces, nor the Navy was entirely satisfied with the legislation.

The outcome left unresolved some basic points of disagreement between the services-roles and missions and the absence of requisite

authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After the unification bill cleared Congress, Admiral Leahy wrote in July 1947: "If the

30
James Forrestal, the nation's first Secretary of Defense, in his office

at the Pentagon, September 1947.

history of the British Royal Air Force is valid evidence, the removal

of our Air Arm from control by the Army will result in a definite reduction in the efficiency of our national defense establishment." Still,

the 1947 act was probably the best legislation that could have been

secured at that time. It was clear to Spaatz, Symington, and Eisenhower, among others, that in the future the defense establishment

would continue to evolve toward unification.

President Truman's first choice as Secretary of Defense was

Robert P. Patterson, the Secretary of War, a man highly respected in

the defense community and in the government. Patterson declined,

explaining that his financial condition dictated that he leave the government. The President then named Forrestal to the position, even

though the Secretary of the Navy had fought determinedly against

unification and a separate Air Force. In certain important respects,

however, Forrestal was a logical selection. He had headed the Navy

Department, and as Secretary of Defense he might be expected not

only to get along with the naval leaders-men he knew and had

worked with-but to enlist them as supporters of unification. Having

championed legislation featuring coordination as opposed to administration, Forrestal now had the chance to head a National Defense Establishment in the major role of coordinator. The New York Times

31
commented that Forrestal was the logical choice and "the happiest

one that could be made." Forrestal's selection:

is the best guarantee that could be given that unification of

the services will be carried out intelligently and efficiently....

Selection of any other man than the former Secretary of the

Navy would have sent unification on its way with a handicap.

It has been painfully evident that all through the long hearings and debate in Congress that there are many in the Navy

who still distrust the whole idea. With Mr. Forrestal as the

Secretary, the Navy opponents of unification will know that

there is at the top a man who has an intimate knowledge of

their branch of the service and one to who it will not be necessary to spell out in detail their side of the case when difficulties arise.

As Forrestal and the naval leaders desired, the services had managed not only to preserve their integrity, but to hold in effect a veto

power over the Secretary of Defense. On the issue of defense itself,

Hon. W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, and Gen. Carl

A. Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, announcing the new organizational set-up for the Department of the Air Force, October 1, 1947.

32
Forrestal had warned of the perils of instant demobilization. He believed deeply in a strong national defense.

After appointing Forrestal, Truman named Symington to be Secretary of the Air Force; John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy; and

Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army. Having been Assistant

Secretary of War for Air since January 1946, Symington brought topflight management credentials to his new post. He had also shown

uncommon ability to work effectively with Congress and had nurtured an excellent working relationship with General Spaatz. The

Symington-Spaatz combination held the promise of unusually fine

leadership for the new independent Air Force.

Fifty Years of Air Force Independence

The long struggle for a United States Air Force suggests a certain

historical evolution, from the beginning of flight after the turn of the

century; the instructive experience of World War I; the advancement

of military aviation in the years between the World Wars; and finally,

the culminating event of World War II, marked by a spectrum of successful air operations-tactical, strategic and support.

The experience of the Second World War convinced not only air

leaders, but President Truman and such military giants as Eisenhower

and Marshall, that the nation's security demanded an independent Air

Force to take its rightful place alongside the Army and Navy. Prior to

the war, the leadership of the War Department had taken various halting steps in this direction. The War Department did not unthinkingly

oppose separation, but basically it failed to foresee the impact of

military aviation upon future conflict. "The treatment of the Army

Air Corps prior to World War II by Army decision makers," observed General Jacob E. Smart, who held key staff positions in the

postwar Army Air Forces, "stemmed from their perceptions of how

the next war would be fought and their limited understanding of the

potential capabilities of air power. Those conscientious men were the

products of their respective experiences, education, and imagination.

Thus, they were unable to foresee air warfare becoming significant

other than as a supporter of ground warfare and were skeptical of the

airmen's assertions about potential air capabilities."

At the war's end, Generals Marshall and Eisenhower held no such

doubts about the future impact and importance of air forces. They

provided the Army experience and a healthy dose of statesmanship to

the postwar campaign for a separate Air Force. The third major figure

and leader of the drive for postwar independence, General Arnold

33
Generals Carl A. "Tooey" Spaatz (left) and Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, architects of the postwar Air Force.
was an advocate and visionary who began his aviation lessons in the

era of the Wright brothers. Eisenhower and Arnold shared a firm belief, based on their wartime experience, that the United States needed

to build an integrated national security structure based on unity of

command in Washington and in the theaters of operations. The creation of a United States Air Force was fundamental to this concept of

unified command. Honored as the founder of the Air Force, Arnold

was really much more than that. He had a vision of air power that allowed him to chart the Air Force's future role and structure and its

research and development efforts long after the war.

The dawn of the atomic age and the complexity of modern air operations and air-ground integration required an Air Force led by airmen who understood how to build an efficient and effective force,

one that could be melded to the other services in a unified defense

structure. Secretary of the Air Force Symington proved correct; the

National Security Act of 1947 amounted to a first step. As President

Truman foresaw, making the National Defense Establishment work

effectively would require new ways of thinking. By 1948-1949, it

was clear that the 1947 legislation was too weak to allow the Secretary of Natonal Defense to operate his department properly. Forrestal

had become a victim of his own concept of the Secretary of National

Defense as coordinator rather than administrator. In 1949 several

amendments to the National Security Act gave the Secretary more

authority, personnel and power and downgraded the services from

executive to military departments. The service secretaries would no

longer attend meetings of the National Security Council, but would

advise the Secretary of Defense.

Passage of the 1949 amendments occurred almost simultaneously

with the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals," in which high-ranking

naval officers protested against Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's

cancellation of construction of the aircraft carrier United States. An

official in the office of the Under Secretary of the Navy desseminated

an anonymous document charging the Air Force with fraud in procuring the B-36 bomber, Congressional hearings were called, and the

Navy and Air Force presented their positions to the Congress on

strategy and weapons. The House Committee on Anned Services

gave the Air Force a strong vote of confidence on the B-36; the Navy

official who leaked the anonymous document was dismissed; a Secretary of the Navy resigned following cancellation of the carrier; and

a Chief of Naval Operations was forced to resign.

In the five decades since the creation of the Department of Defense

and the separate United States Air Force, controversies over roles and

35
missions have continued to divide the services, especially when they

competed for shrinking defense funds. Yet the national security chain

of command and the unique role of the Air Force have remained intact. In the 1990s it would be difficult to imagine a "Revolt of the

Admirals." Throughout Korea, Vietnam and now in the post-Cold

War era of joint operations and interdependence, the revolution in defense organization that occurred fifty years ago has continued to

serve the nation well.

36
Suggested Readings

Jeffrey G. Barlow. Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-

1950. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1994.

Demetrios Caraley. The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the

Policy Process. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Vincent Davis. Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946. Chapel

Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Jeffrey M. Dorwart. Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership,

1909-1949. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991.

James Forrestal. The Forrestal Diaries. Walter Millis, ed. New York: The Viking

Press, 1951.

Robert F. Futrell. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the

United States Air Force, 1907-1964. 2 vols. Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air University,

1989.

Paul Y. Hammond. Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment

in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley. Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of

James Forrestal. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992.

R. Earl McClendon. Autonomy for the Air Arm. Washington, DC: Air Force History

and Museums Program (Reprint), 1996.

Phillip S. Meilinger. Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General. Bloomington: In- diana University Press, 1989.

Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. New York: Free Press, 1984.

Walton Moody. Building a Strategic Air Force. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996.

Steven L. Rearden. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol I, The

Formative Years, 1947-1950. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the

Secretary of Defense, 1984.

James F. Schnabel. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947. Washington, DC: Historical Division,

Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979.

Perry McCoy Smith. The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945. Baltimore: The

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.

George M. Watson, Jr. History of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,

1947-1965. Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1993.

Richard I. Wolf. The United States Air Force Basic Documents on Roles and Missions. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987.

Herman S. Wolk. The Struggle for Independence, 1943-1947. Washington, DC:

Air Force History and Museums Program (revised edition), 1996.

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