Counterair

Operations

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.1

26 April 2002

This document complements related discussion found in Joint

Publications 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats; JP 3-01.1, Aerospace

Defense of North America; JP 3-01.2, Offensive Operations for Countering

Air and Missile Threats; and JP 3-01.3, Defensive Operations for Countering

Air and Missile Threats.
Supersedes: AFDD 2-1.1, 6 May 1998

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Maj Mark Douglas)

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DR (Col Ronald E. Baughman)

Pages: 40

Distribution: F

Approved by: DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR., Major General, USAF

 Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.1

26 APRIL 2002

BY ORDER OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This change defines air superiority as a subset of air and space superiority

(page 1); explains how any action by any force taken to gain air superiority falls

under counterair operations (page 1); corrects the use of the term area of

operations (AO) to the term airspace control sector when pertaining to the

discussion on the Command and Reporting Center (CRC) (page 8); adds

surface forces to the forces available for offensive counterair operations (page

17); structures the document similar to JP 3–01, Joint Doctrine for Countering

Air and Missile Threats; updates theater air and missile defense within

the counterair construct and incorporates it within the definitions of offensive and defensive counterair operations (Chapter One); clarifies operational

control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) authorities (Chapter Two); changes

JFACC to JFASCC and clarifies his authorities (Chapter Two); and adds details

of the JSTARS role in Operation ALLIED FORCE (Chapter Two).

Items in Bold Blue indicate added emphasis.
i

FOREWORD

The mission of the United States Air Force (USAF) is to defend the United States by gaining and

exploiting air and space superiority. Air and space superiority provides the freedom to operate

in the air, space, and information mediums. Unless we can freely maneuver in each of these

environments while denying the enemy the same, we do not have air and space superiority. The

methods and objectives of achieving air superiority differ from space and information superiority, thus

requiring separate documents. Therefore, this counterair publication addresses how the COMAFFOR can

best employ his assets within a joint force to achieve the effect of air superiority as part of the overall air

and space superiority effort.

Counterair is more than just force protection or air and missile defense. It also includes offensive actions against an enemy’s capabilities, thereby seizing the initiative and forcing them into a

defensive posture. Furthermore, counterair is executed by more than just air assets. Counterair

is a joint team effort, gained and maintained by a combination of command and control systems,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft and

missiles as well as surface-to-air air defense weapons. Counterair is the function used to gain

and maintain the effect of air superiority.

The effect of air superiority is not normally an end unto itself. Air superiority provides

enormous military advantages, allowing all our forces greater freedom of action to carry out

their assigned missions (freedom to attack) while minimizing their vulnerability to enemy

detection and attack (freedom from attack). The success of any major air, land, or sea operation

may depend on the degree of air superiority achieved. This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD)

provides guidance for planning, integrating, coordinating, and executing counterair operations. It

provides operational doctrine to gain and maintain control of the air. As such, it focuses on how air

forces can be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct counterair operations.

DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR.

Major General, USAF

Commander, HQ Air Force Doctrine Center

26 April 2002
ii
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................. v

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS .................................................................................. vi

CHAPTER ONE—Counterair Operations ................................................................................................ 1

General ..................................................................................................................................................... 1

Counterair Objectives .............................................................................................................................. 1

Counterair Operations .............................................................................................................................. 2

Offensive Counterair (OCA) ............................................................................................................... 3

Defensive Counterair (DCA) .............................................................................................................. 3

Air and Missile Threats ....................................................................................................................... 4

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Requirements ..................................................... 4

CHAPTER TWO—Command and Control (C2).................................................................................... 5

General ..................................................................................................................................................... 5

Command Relationships .......................................................................................................................... 5

Joint Force Commander (JFC)............................................................................................................. 5

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) ................................................................................... 6

Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander (JFASCC) .......................................................... 6

Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) .............................................................................................. 7

Airspace Control Authority (ACA) ..................................................................................................... 7

Command, Control, Communications, Computers,Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Resources and Requirements .......................................................................... 7

Theater Air Control System (TACS) ................................................................................................... 7

Air Operations Center (AOC) .............................................................................................................. 8

Control and Reporting Center (CRC) .................................................................................................. 8

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) .............................................................................................. 9

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) .............................................................................. 9

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) ........................................................ 10

Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) .............................................................. 10

RIVET JOINT.................................................................................................................................... 10

Rules of Engagement (ROE) .................................................................................................................. 11

Airspace Control .................................................................................................................................... 11

Friendly and Enemy Combat Identification (CID) ............................................................................ 11

Coordination and Integration of Airspace Control and Counterair Operations ................................. 12

CHAPTER THREE—Offensive Counterair Operations ................................................................... 13

General ................................................................................................................................................... 13

OCA Targets ........................................................................................................................................... 13

OCA Resources and Forces .................................................................................................................... 15

OCA Missions ........................................................................................................................................ 17

Planning and Execution of OCA Operations ......................................................................................... 18

CHAPTER FOUR—Defensive Counterair Operations ...................................................................... 21

General ................................................................................................................................................... 21

Active Air Defense Operations .............................................................................................................. 21

Active Air Defense Targets ................................................................................................................ 21

Active Air Defense Resources and Forces......................................................................................... 22
iv

Active Air Defense Measures ............................................................................................................ 22

Passive Air Defense Operations ............................................................................................................. 23

Execution and Integration of DCA Operations ...................................................................................... 24

Control and Coordination of DCA Weapons ..................................................................................... 25

DCA Weapons Employment .............................................................................................................. 26

Suggested Readings ............................................................................................................................................ 27

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................................... 29
v

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.1 provides Air Force doctrine for counterair operations and

supports basic air and space doctrine. It replaces AFDD 2-1.1, dated 6 May 1998.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force

personnel. This doctrine is authoritative but not directive; commanders are encouraged to exercise judgment in applying this doctrine to accomplish their missions.

SCOPE

Counterair operations will be necessary to a greater or lesser degree throughout the range of

operations. These operations run the gamut from the defense of the North American continent to

striving for air supremacy in a major theater war, to enforcing a no-fly zone in a peacekeeping operation,

to passive defensive measures in a humanitarian relief operation.

TERMINOLOGY

The term joint force air and space component commander (JFASCC) is the term the Air Force believes

best describes what the functional component can contribute to the joint force. Hence, we use JFASCC

instead of joint force air component commander (JFACC). In joint publications the approved term is JFACC.

Over time we hope to incorporate the JFASCC term into joint doctrine.

If you don’t control the air, you’d better not go to war.

General Charles Horner
vi

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS

 Air and space superiority is achieved by gaining control of the air, space, and information

mediums. Only by gaining control of all three do we have true air and space superiority.

 Any action taken with the intent of gaining air superiority falls under counterair operations. These

actions are not limited to the air component: land, maritime, and special operations forces

routinely take actions in support of that objective.

 The JFASCC is normally the supported commander for counterair operations. Other

components support that objective in accordance with the JFC’s directives. The JFASCC

normally assumes the roles of Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC).

 Counterair operations are subdivided into offensive counterair operations (OCA) and defensive

counterair operations (DCA).

 OCA is comprised of surface attack, fighter sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy

air defenses.

 DCA includes actions taken against enemy aircraft and missile attacks and are executed by the JFASCC acting as the AADC.
1

CHAPTER ONE

COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

GENERAL

Control of the air and space environment is a necessity for providing the joint force with

greater freedom of action while reducing its vulnerability to enemy detection and attack. Air and space

superiority consists of three elements: air superiority, space superiority, and information

superiority. If a joint force commander (JFC) isn’t able to attain a level of superiority in each of these

mediums, he will not be able to gain or maintain air and space superiority. Each medium provides its

own challenges, but the Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander (JFASCC) must be able to

provide the JFC with a plan that incorporates different joint force elements to achieve superiority in all

three. At the direction of the JFC, any capability can be used to achieve the effect of air and space

superiority.

This counterair publication addresses air superiority, a core competency of the United States Air Force,

and is normally the first priority of US forces whenever the enemy possesses air and missile

assets capable of threatening friendly forces or inhibiting their ability to use the air and space

medium to apply force. Counterair consists of offensive and defensive operations to ensure freedom from

attack, freedom to maneuver, and freedom to attack. Although the effect of air superiority is tied to space

and information superiority, the methods, objectives, and tasks employed to achieve these effects warrant an

examination of these functions in separate documents. The distinguishing factor between these concepts is

the desired effects, not the method of force application. Within the counterair construct, any action

taken to achieve the effect of dominance above the

Earth’s surface yet within the atmosphere fits into

counterair operations. Whether this action takes the

form of an information attack, air attack, surface attack,

or space-based attack does not matter. If the effect

is air superiority, you are talking counterair operations.

COUNTERAIR OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the counterair function

are to enable friendly operations against the

enemy and protect friendly forces and vital

The first objective of all commanders in the Pacific war, whether ground, sea or air, whether American,

Allied, or Japanese, was to assure control of the air.

The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys

The war in the Persian Gulf provided a textbook example of what air supremacy means both for the

country that gained it, and for the country ceding it.

General A. Malyukov

Soviet Air Force Chief of Staff

Air superiority enables friendly operations

through the battlespace.
2

D-Day, 1944

Over the decades, the Normandy invasion and breakout

have become the classic example of Second World War

combined-arms, mechanized, air-land, coalition warfare.

Fortunately, the Allies possessed not merely air superiority, but air supremacy, making victory on the ground

that much easier. The Allies had won the critical battle for

air supremacy, not over the beachhead, but in several years

of air war that had gutted the Luftwaffe.

In June 1944, John S. D. Eisenhower, the general’s son,

(pictured with his father) graduated from West Point—ironically

on the same day that Allied forces stormed ashore at

Normandy. June 24 found the new lieutenant riding through Normandy with his father,

observing the invasion’s aftermath:

The roads we traversed were dusty and crowded. Vehicles moved slowly, bumper to bumper. Fresh

out of West Point, with all its courses in conventional procedures, I was offended at this jamming up

of traffic. It wasn’t according to the book. Leaning over Dad’s shoulder, I remarked, “You’d never

get away with this if you didn’t have air supremacy.” I received an impatient snort:

“If I didn’t have air supremacy, I wouldn’t be here.”

John S. D. Eisenhower

Strictly Personal

assets through control of the air. Counterair is directed at enemy forces and target sets

that directly (airborne aircraft, surface-to-air missiles) or indirectly (airfields; petroleum,

oils, and lubricants; command and control facilities) challenge control of the air. Airmen

conduct in tensive and continuous counterair operations aimed at gaining varying degrees of air

superiority at the place and time of their choosing. Air superiority can range from local

superiority in a specific area to control over the entire theater of operations. Control may

vary over time. As seen during the Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE, air superiority may

not totally eliminate air and missile opposition. Some enemy aircraft may continue to fly and

some enemy missiles may be launched in spite of air superiority. However, air superiority

provides a favorable environment for friendly forces to perform their tasks without prohibitive

interference from enemy air and space forces, while limiting the enemy’s ability to function effectively. The commander must balance the level of air superiority necessary to conduct operations with an acceptable level of risk versus the effort required to achieve that level of air

superiority. For instance, the level of effort necessary to eliminate all mobile SAMs may be too

high when the joint force requires close air support (CAS) or air interdiction (AI) missions to be flown.

COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

Counterair consists of offensive and defensive operations. Counterair operations are conducted

across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war by the entire joint force. As the supported commander for counterair operations, the joint force air and space component

commander (JFASCC) will use more than just his organic air, space, and information
3

resources. He will also take advantage of those forces made available for tasking by other

components (tactical control) and set the timing, priority, and effects for the other component commanders contributing to the counterair effort. Operations are conducted over

enemy and friendly territory exploiting the full benefit of both the offensive and the defensive.

They range from seeking out and destroying the enemy’s ability to conduct air and missile attacks

to taking reactive measures to minimize the effectiveness of enemy air and missile attacks. The

overall situation and the concept of operations determine when, where, and how these operations are

used to gain the desired degree of air superiority.

Offensive Counterair (OCA)

OCA consists of offensive operations aimed at destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy

air and missile threats. Ideally, most OCA operations will prevent the launch of aircraft and

missiles by destroying them and their supporting systems on the ground. Otherwise, OCA operations seek out and destroy these targets as close to their source as possible. These operations range

throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. OCA

includes targets such as enemy air defense systems (aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and

surface-to-air missiles), airfields and supporting infrastructure, theater missiles (cruise

and ballistic), ground-, sea-, and air-based launch platforms and its supporting infrastructure as well as command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

(C4I) nodes. OCA operations enable friendly use of contested airspace and reduce the air

and missile threat posed against friendly forces. OCA is often required to enable the successful

execution of other air operations such as strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support.

Defensive Counterair (DCA)

The objective of DCA is to protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy air

and missile attacks and is synonymous with air defense. DCA consists of active and passive

air defense operations including all defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy

air and missile threats or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attacks should they

escape destruction. The basic active defense criteria to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy

remains the same for air and missile threats. DCA generally reacts to the initiative of the enemy forces

and is subject to the weapons control procedures and measures of the area air defense commander

(AADC). For further explanation see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

μ Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking air and missile

threats or to reduce their effectiveness against friendly forces and assets. Engaging enemy

aircraft or missiles with friendly aircraft or SAMs is an example of an active air defense measure.

μ Passive air defense includes all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile attacks or measures used to minimize

the effectiveness of enemy attacks. Camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD); dispersal;

and the use of protective construction (hardening) are examples of passive air defense measures.

Stealth and low-observable (LO) technology are growing technologies used to minimize the

enemy’s air defense effectiveness.
4

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms such

as the U–2 increase battlespace awareness.

Air and Missile Threats

The continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) makes air superiority more

important than ever. Several nations are expected to have advanced surface-to-air and surface-tosurface missiles by 2005. These advanced systems will have longer ranges and improved command

options. Mobile theater missiles pose a significant threat to friendly forces, and the ability

to locate and destroy these systems prior to launch remains a challenge for effective

counterair operations. A dramatic increase in new generation fighters, along with older airframes

with improved avionics and weapons packages, will make achieving and maintaining air superiority

even more complex.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

REQUIREMENTS

Effective counterair operations

require timely collection, processing,

analysis, production, and dissemination of reliable and accurate intelligence. Near-real-time and real-time

information from air-, surface-, and

space-based sensors is used to

provide warning, situational

awareness, targeting, and combat

assessment. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information is also needed to identify and

either attack or exploit emerging

targets which pose a substantial threat

to friendly operations. Timely target

detection and geo-location, target

development, weapon selection,

mission planning, and combat assessments depend on integrated collection and analysis.

Proper intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is a crucial step in conducting

counterair operations. Without an accurate, well-defined enemy air order of battle (AOB),

friendly forces will operate under increased risk. Other component intelligence resources provide

valuable information concerning any air operations within their area of operations (AO). In addition

to developing the AOB, IPB can enable a predictive analysis to help determine likely enemy actions or

reactions, thus optimizing ISR effectiveness and combat air patrols.
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DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE

CHAPTER TWO

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

GENERAL

Centralized control and decentralized execution is a fundamental tenet of airpower.

Command and control (C2) systems are tailored to support this tenet. Centralized control is

exercised from the appropriate command level while permitting decentralized execution of counterair operations. Integrated communications systems enhance unity of effort and enable the

C2 needed to effectively execute counterair operations. These systems expedite C2 functions through fast, reliable, flexible, and secure exchange of information throughout the chain of command. Effective and interoperable C2 systems are vital to planning, employing, and sustaining

successful counterair operations.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Command relationships for counterair are in accordance with JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces and

JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. US armed forces generally fight as a joint team. Airmen

should expect most counterair operations to be joint efforts. The Commander, Air Force Forces

(COMAFFOR) normally exercises his command function through the air and space operations center (AOC). If the joint force commander (JFC) designates the COMAFFOR as the joint

force air and space component commander (JFASCC), the AOC will become the core of

the joint air operations center (JAOC). When assigning JFASCC duties, the JFC normally

assigns the airspace control authority (ACA) and area air defense commander (AADC) duties to the JFASCC. The authority and responsibilities associated with each designation associated

with counterair operations follows.

Joint Force Commander (JFC)

The JFC is responsible for the employment of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made

available to accomplish the assigned mission or objective. Key to the JFC’s responsibilities is the development of objectives and priorities for the joint forces. These objectives and priorities

provide the basis for all subordinate and supporting plans.

The JFC may be a combatant commander, a subunified combatant commander, or a joint task force

commander. The combatant commander derives the operational authority to employ forces in combat

from the Secretary of Defense and may delegate that authority as a whole or in part to a subordinate joint force commander. That command authority is normally delegated to a subordinate joint

force commander for those forces made available to accomplish the assigned mission. Normally

Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy

its greatest asset—its flexibility.

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

The air ocean and its endless outer space extension are one and indivisible and should be controlled

by a single homogeneous force.

Alexander P. de Seversky
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DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE

operational control (OPCON) entails the proper authority to

employ forces in combat and includes authoritative direction

over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.

OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands

and forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON

does not, in and of itself, include authoritive direction

for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)

Anytime Air Force forces are assigned to a JFC, a

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) will be

identified as the Air Force component commander subordinate to the JFC. The COMAFFOR normally exercises

OPCON of all Air Force Forces presented (assigned or

attached) as part of the Air and Space Expeditionary Task

Force (AETF). The COMAFFOR advises the JFC on all

issues affecting his forces, performs missions assigned by the

JFC, and provides forces as directed to the JFASCC for tasking. Additionally, the COMAFFOR exercises those specified aspects of administrative control (ADCON) for those

forces Air Force Forces assigned or attached.

Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander

(JFASCC)

The JFASCC, when designated by the JFC, is the

Service component commander having the preponderance of air and space assets and the capability to

plan, task, and control joint air operations. In most

cases the COMAFFOR will be the JFASCC. Although

assets capable of performing counterair missions

are assigned to different components, the JFASCC is

normally the supported commander for counterair operations. Routinely, the JFASCC has TACON and/or a supported relationship to conduct counterair

operations employing augmenting forces that remain assigned to other components. The

JFASCC derives his authority from the JFC who has authority to exercise operational

control, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, and redirect and organize

forces to ensure unity of effort. The JFASCC’s responsibilities are assigned by the JFC

and normally include, but are not limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and

tasking based on the JFC’s apportionment guidance. The JFASCC’s responsibilities

include air defense, airspace control, and ISR efforts. Using the JFC’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with component and supporting commanders, the JFASCC recommends to

the JFC apportionment of the air effort.

Joint Force Priorities

The air planners’ first priority

was gaining command of the air.

This goal was a basic tenet of air

operations, and its achievement

would generate at least three

specific advantages in the war.

First, the incapacitation of airfields and the air defense system

would allow sustained prosecution of attacks against the

other target sets. Second,

command of the air would

prevent Iraqi offensive strikes

against Coalition forces, in

particular strikes delivering

chemical weapons. Third, the

Coalition would prevent Iraqi

reconnaissance flights that

might uncover the shift of

ground forces to the west, the

surprise to be sprung at the

start of the ground offensive.

The planners therefore directed

their most intense and immediate attention to destroying the

Iraqi defensive systems through

the use of F–117s, other aircraft

employing antiradiation missiles

to attack radar systems, and a

vast array of electronic countermeasures.

Gulf War Airpower Survey
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DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE

Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)

Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the JFC normally

assigns overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander designated as the

AADC. Normally the JFASCC should be designated the AADC. The AADC is responsible for integrating the entire air defense effort and should be the component commander with the C4I capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations with

other air operations. The JFASCC dual-hatted as the AADC has the responsibility to integrate

the counterair effort, offensive and defensive, from all components into one cohesive effort. Splitting

the assets among multiple commanders can only reduce effectiveness. Any attempt to separate

missile defense from the overall air defense structure has the potential to seriously degrade the overall

air defense effort.

Airspace Control Authority (ACA)

The ACA is responsible for airspace control within the joint operations area and for coordinating and integrating the use of the airspace. Normally, the JFC will designate the JFASCC as

the ACA. The ACA develops policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination

required among components within the theater. The ACA establishes an airspace control system for the

JFC, integrates the airspace control system with host nations, and coordinates and deconflicts user

requirements. The ACA develops these procedures into an airspace control plan (ACP)

and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the theater. The ACP is then

implemented through the airspace control order (ACO). A key responsibility of the ACA is to

provide the flexibility needed within the airspace control system to rapidly employ forces.

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE,

SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (C4ISR) RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS

Effective counterair operations require a reliable C4ISR capability. C4ISR assets should be

capable of exchanging information rapidly with other Services, components, and coalition

partners. The information flow supports the chain of command and should be as complete, secure, and

near real time as possible. The system should be flexible enough to redirect selected forces, even when

they are airborne.

The information exchange between different Services and components and between all levels of

command should be survivable, interoperable, and flexible, even if an intermediate level is disabled. The

JFASCC uses the following C4ISR resources to conduct counterair operations.

Theater Air Control System (TACS)

The TACS provides the JFASCC/AADC/ACA an overarching means of controlling counterair

operations. It includes the personnel, procedures, and equipment necessary to plan, direct,

and control air operations and to coordinate air operations with other components. It is composed of agencies and communications nodes to provide centralized control and decentralized

execution for air operations. The radar-equipped C2 elements of the TACS provide mobility and communication information interface, as well as automation. TACS ground elements rely on the Modular

Control System (MCS) while the airborne elements include the Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS); airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC); joint surveillance,
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DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE

target attack radar system (JSTARS); and RIVET JOINT (RJ). Figure 2.1 depicts the TACS counterair

function.

Air Operations Center (AOC)

The AOC is the principal air operations system from which aircraft and air warning functions of combat air operations are directed, controlled, and executed. As the senior element

of the TACS, the AOC coordinates command and control of air operations with other Services and components. If the COMAFFOR is appointed JFASCC, then the AOC becomes the core

of the joint air operations center (JAOC). The AOC includes the equipment and personnel

necessary to accomplish the planning, directing, controlling, and coordinating theaterwide

air operations. Within the AOC, the airspace control management team coordinates and integrates the

use of airspace in the theater. It displays the current air and surface situation, using data from many

sources, and is responsible to the ACA for developing airspace control procedures through the ACP and

coordinating airspace control activities. The AOC ensures that the ACP is compatible with current

operational requirements and capabilities and relies on the ACP to ensure missions are deconflicted.

Normally each participating Service and functional components have liaison teams in the AOC.

These include such liaison teams as: the Army battlefield coordination detachment (BCD),

the special operations liaison element (SOLE), and the Navy/Marine naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE). The COMAFFOR and the JFASCC should consider reciprocal

liaisons with other allied, Service, or functional components.

Control and Reporting Center (CRC)

The CRC is the control and surveillance radar facility directly subordinate to the AOC and

provides theater mission control through employment of C2 elements of the TACS. The CRC

is assigned an airspace control sector by the AOC. It manages and directs activities of all

deployed Air Force surface radars within that sector.

The CRC’s primary mission is to provide airspace management and airspace control to

include: air traffic detection, tracking and identification, scramble or airborne orders, data link

management, and management of air defense activities within its sector. Additionally, it

Figure 2.1. Key Elements of theater air control system for the counterair function.

Ground Elements Airborne Elements

Air Operations Center

Senior Element

Air

Support

Operations

Center

Control

and

Reporting

Center

Subunits Subunits

AWACS

ABCCC

JSTARS

RIVET

JOINT
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DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE

establishes C2 liaison, mission control, navigational air rescue assistance, aircraft threat warning, and

coordination with artillery warning control centers and the friendly artillery warning service. The CRC

may further delegate control and surveillance areas to subordinate radar units or AWACS within its

sector for optimum radar and radio coverage and management of air operations.

Within the TACS, the CRC communicates up to the AOC, down to subordinate units, and laterally to

other TACS/joint/allied units. It provides management of air operations, weapons control, air surveillance and identification functions, and also directs the region or sector air defense. The CRC

relays instructions and information from the AOC to subordinate or lateral units, determines operating

procedures, and coordinates assignment of targets to ensure defensive assets of all components are

employed in mutually supporting roles within its assigned sector. The CRC also detects, identifies, collects, and reports all air activity within its assigned sector and provides the digital data link

interface between Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps joint tactical air operations systems, as

well as those of allied nations. The CRC performs the airspace control function within the sector.

The CRC battle staff directs fighter aircraft and air defense artillery assets necessary to defend its

assigned area. The CRC battle commander normally establishes operating procedures for initial

assignment of airborne targets to air defense artillery. All air defense elements coordinate continuously with air defense artillery fire coordination units to eliminate duplication of efforts

and ensure adequate commitment of assigned weapons against hostile threats. Execution

authority for air defense systems may be provided to the CRC. The authority to declare a hostile

in the area of surveillance and identification may also reside in the CRC.

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)

The ASOC is the air component element responsible for planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing air operations that directly support ground combat forces. ASOCs

are normally located at the Corps level, report to the JAOC, and provide expertise on how and when air

operations can enhance the effectiveness of ground operations.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

The AWACS provides the TACS with a flexible and

capable airborne radar platform. It provides an initial

battle management function and command and control

capability and is normally among the first systems to

arrive in any new theater of operations. Through voice

and data connectivity, AWACS issues air defense warning,

directs aircraft, manages air refueling, monitors counterair missions, provides an air picture to joint air defense

forces, assists with navigation, and coordinates air rescue

efforts. AWACS can detect and identify hostile airborne

threats and assign weapon systems to engage enemy targets.

AWACS may carry an airborne battle staff or airborne command element (ACE) authorized

to redirect forces under the authority of the JFASCC. When employed with an ACE, AWACS can

scramble and divert aircraft conducting counterair operations and recommend changes in air defense

warning conditions. The AWACS can perform many, but not all, CRC functions.

E–3 Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS) aircraft are a key

element of C2.
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Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC)

The ABCCC is an integral part of the airborne elements of

the TACS. It is a specialized airborne command, control, and communications (C3) center equipped with

extensive communications systems providing the

capability to perform some AOC and ASOC functions.

ABCCC’s primary function is battle management of

tactical air operations—directing air support to ground

operations in the forward area. As an extension of the

AOC, ABCCC can scramble or divert assets as mission

requirements dictate, while assisting the ASOC by providing C2 services in the forward area beyond the ASOC’s

communications range.

Continuous communications with most air and ground agencies in the TACS keeps the ABCCC

battlestaff abreast of developing air and ground situations and maintains higher headquarters coordination for positive control of counterair assets. Although not radar equipped, ABCCC’s computerized tactical battle management system (TBMS) is linked with the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) and other intelligence, surveillance, and information fusion systems providing capability for improved situation awareness. The ABCCC can deploy in an initial response to world events and

to provide C2 services as the theater situation matures.

Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

The JSTARS is a long-range, airborne sensor system that provides real-time radar surveillance information on moving and stationary surface targets, via secure data links to air

and surface commanders. By identifying and locating such targets as SCUD missiles and launchers, SAM sites, and AAA sites (among others), JSTARS can play an important role in the effort to

gain air superiority. The system has expanded into an integral part of the TACS function. JSTARS

provides updates on enemy force disposition, identifies opportunities for rapid interdiction and

retargeting of enemy ground forces, and performs limited battle management functions. JSTARS

information builds situational awareness for the JFC and JFASCC to manage air operations,

to update target information, and to provide real-time targeting.

RIVET JOINT

RIVET JOINT is an airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and reporting

platform. Working in conjunction with the AWACS

and JSTARS aircraft, RIVET JOINT provides near-real-time assessment of hostile

airborne-, land-, and sea-based electronic emitters

via secure communications. RIVET JOINT

capabilities “round out” the radar tracking information provided by the AWACS and JSTARS

by correlating location, type, and mode of emitted

signals.

Airborne Battlefield Command and

Control Center (ABCCC) provides

critical C3 functions in the Theater Air

Control System.

RC–135 RIVET JOINT provides battlespace

awareness.
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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

ROE are “directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces initiate and/or continue combat

engagement with other forces encountered” (JP 1-02). Effective operations require the

establishment and promulgation of easily understood ROE. Optimum weapons employment

depends on early separation of friend from foe. Positive identification of hostiles allows for maximum beyond-visual-range engagement and minimizes fratricide. Just as important, ROE related to

air-to-surface and surface-to-air threats for both OCA and DCA operations must be defined and clearly

understood. The JFC is responsible for developing and implementing ROE unless it is established

by higher authority. The components and supporting commanders are then responsible for ensuring compliance with established ROE.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

Theater airspace control can become very complex since all military components, and possibly civilian

traffic, can execute operations in the same airspace. The timely exchange of information over

reliable, interoperable means of communication is required to effectively coordinate,

integrate, and deconflict the airspace used for friendly air operations. The airspace control

authority (ACA) develops and implements an airspace control plan (ACP) based on the JFC’s

guidance. Execution of the plan is accomplished through airspace control orders (ACOs) which

provide specific airspace control procedures applicable for defined periods of time. The main goals

of the ACA are deconfliction of all airspace users and their air assets, enhancement of

combat operations, and protection of friendly forces from enemy air and missile attacks.

Standardized procedures and close coordination help to facilitate common understanding, reduce the

possibility of confusion, and contribute to the overall effectiveness of counterair operations. The JFC

establishes the geographic boundaries within which airspace control is to be exercised and

also provides priorities and restrictions regarding the use of the airspace. Airspace control

is normally one of the primary functions of the Air Force TACS. The Air Force’s C2 system is structured to conduct airspace control, OCA and DCA operations, and other air operations to minimize the

risk of harm to friendly forces. Since different components have OPCON of specific counterair

assets, the C2 structure is designed to integrate with other components to provide responsive

and timely support. Integration with host-nation airspace and air defense control structures is

also essential.

Friendly and Enemy Combat Identification (CID)

The objective of CID is to maximize mission effectiveness by providing high confidence,

positive identification of friend or foe. Accurate and timely identification (ID) enhances

real-time tactical decisions and optimizes weapons employment, allowing timely engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles, conserving resources, and reducing risk to friendly forces.

CID information may be obtained from onboard or off board surface, air, and space systems, and through

airspace control measures documented in the ACP or ACO. To be most effective, this CID “system

of systems” requires a common data link backbone with the goal of seamless near-real-time

information sharing between theater platforms. To avoid a single point of failure, no one node

will act as an exclusive conduit of all CID information. Electronic methods, which provide the most
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rapid and reliable means of identification, are normally used when available. Visual and procedural means

of identification are not as practical but may be essential in some scenarios. Some individual weapons

systems retain an autonomous CID capability.

Airspace control requires an effective combination of positive and procedural ID. Both are

intended to effectively provide safe and flexible use of the airspace. Positive identification relies on

a high confidence ID derived from visual observation, radar observation of point of

origin, and/or electronic means by an authorized control facility. Procedural control

relies on a combination of airspace control measures documented in the ACP or ACO. For

most scenarios, a combination of positive and procedural ID techniques is used to identify friendlies,

neutrals, and foes.

Coordination and Integration of Airspace Control and Counterair Operations

Unity of command is imperative to employ forces effectively. Because of the integrated

nature of airspace control and counterair operations, the ACA and AADC duties should

normally be performed by the JFASCC. These functions often rely on the same resources and

are frequently executed simultaneously in the same airspace. Assigning responsibility and authority to

coordinate and integrate airspace control and counterair operations to one air commander greatly

enhances the effort to gain and maintain control of the air. The ACP is integral to all air

operations and provides a framework for joint coordination and integration.
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CHAPTER THREE

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

GENERAL

Offensive counterair (OCA) will likely be the highest payoff air component mission for as long

as the enemy has the capability to significantly threaten friendly forces. The commander’s risk

assessment, both the risk to surface forces from enemy air and missile threats and the threats to friendly

aircraft from the enemy’s air defense system, determines when the air component commander can reduce

the OCA effort in favor of other missions. Successful OCA operations limit the risk of enemy

attacks and allow friendly forces to concentrate more on mission accomplishment and less on

self-defense.

OCA TARGETS

OCA target sets are those which directly or indirectly challenge our control of the air environment. The JFC’s guidance and objectives, coupled with intelligence assessments of enemy threats,

locations, and capabilities help determine OCA target selection, target priority, and sequencing. Airmen

may plan targets prior to hostilities and keep them current based on the latest intelligence. Planners evaluate

target defenses, to include active and passive systems, and determine the vulnerability of each target. They

consider means and resources available to reduce collateral effects—especially if WMD may be present.

Ideally, OCA concentrates on attacking targets as close to their source as possible (e.g.,

aircraft on airfields, theater missiles and SAMs in storage). Otherwise, OCA missions seek and

attack targets wherever found: on the ground, in the air, or at sea. The following are examples of

OCA target sets:

 Airfields and Operating

Bases. Damaging runways

or taxiways may prevent

use of an airfield for short

periods, thus preventing

subsequent takeoffs

and reducing the enemy’s

offensive capabilities.

Destruction of hangars, shelters, maintenance facilities,

POL, and other storage

DESERT STORM’s dominating offensive counterair strikes left the

Iraqis with no effective command and control and little offensive or

defensive air capability.

Offense is the essence of airpower.

General “Hap” Arnold

The best way to defend the bombers is to catch the enemy before it is in position to attack. Catch

them when they are taking off, or when they are climbing, or when they are forming up. Don’t think

you can defend the bomber by circling around him. It’s good for the bombers morale, and bad for

tactics.

Brigadier General Robin Olds
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areas degrades the enemy’s ability to generate aircraft

sorties.

 Aircraft. This category includes enemy fixed-wing

and rotary-winged aircraft, and unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAV). In many situations, aircraft on the

ground are the most lucrative targets for OCA operations. With advanced technology, timely intelligence,

and precision-guided munitions, aircraft on the ground

can be destroyed whether they are in revetments, shelters,

or in the open.

 Theater Missiles (TMs) and Support Infrastructure.

Theater missiles refer to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface missiles whose potential

targets are within a given theater of operations. TMs

pose a significant threat to friendly forces. These missiles

may possess conventional as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capabilities. OCA

operations destroy or disable these missiles before they are launched. Destruction of

known missiles, launch platforms, support facilities, and infrastructure greatly limits effective

TM attacks against friendly forces. Usually, OCA missions should be capable of being rapidly

retasked to attack time sensitive targets (TSTs), such as mobile launchers, once they are located.

 C4ISR Systems. C4ISR systems are critical to the effective employment of forces and assets and

should be given a high priority during OCA targeting. Intelligence gathering, warning, and control

systems include ground-controlled intercept, early warning, acquisition, and other sensors

together with their supporting facilities. Destruction of such sites would substantially

reduce the enemy’s capability to detect, react, and bring forces to bear against friendly

forces. Nonlethal means may also be used to achieve similar effects. Attacks on C4ISR sites can

be planned with appropriate weapons to increase the probability of kill. For example, destroying

the associated ground facilities (receiving and tracking stations or launch facilities) may deny the

enemy effective use of some space-based systems. Clearly, attacking C4ISR systems may

be part of OCA but it may also contribute to strategic attack or counterspace operations

depending on the intended effects.

 Air Defense Systems. Disruption or destruction of enemy air defense systems and the

personnel who control, maintain, and operate them may render those systems ineffective

against friendly forces. For more detailed information on suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD),

refer to the SEAD portion of this chapter.

In the Pacific, the Battle of Wewak

in August 1943 dealt a crippling blow

to the Japanese air forces. After the

war, General Tanikawa of the Fourth

Air Army testified, “We lost 100

planes...it was a decisive Allied

victory...our air power was severely

crippled. Consequently our air power

was rapidly diminishing and was

unable to aid our ground forces

effectively which, in the end, constituted one of our chief reasons for

losing the war.”

George Odgers

Air War Against Japan, 1943–1945
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OCA RESOURCES AND FORCES

The effectiveness of OCA operations to destroy the array of targets previously listed depends on the

availability and capabilities of certain resources and systems. The choice of system depends upon

the situation, threats, weather, and available intelligence. Whenever possible, use systems and

methods which minimize risk to friendly forces. For example, do not insert ground SOF for a

direct action mission when aircraft employing standoff weapons can accomplish the mission. The

following are some of the forces and weapon systems used to conduct OCA:

 Aircraft. Fighter and bomber aircraft provide the bulk of the forces for OCA operations. Other types

of aircraft are often critical enablers of the counterair function.

 Missiles. Missiles include surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, air-to-air guided missiles, as well

as air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles. Many of these weapons have long launch ranges

and some have very quick reaction times which can eliminate or reduce the risk of harm

to friendly forces.

 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). UAVs may be used in counterair operations to provide

surveillance, reconnaissance, deception, jamming, or harassment of enemy forces and

air defense systems. Although UAVs are primarily used in an enhancement role, they are now

capable of carrying some weapons. These vehicles may be preprogrammed or remotely piloted.

They provide valuable intelligence to friendly forces and may now be used to attack some targets

either too dangerous for manned aircraft or where manned aircraft are not present to respond.

Unmanned aerial vehicles:

Global Hawk (above left),

Predator (above right) and

unmanned combat air vehicle

(right).
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 Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF conduct or enhance OCA operations in a number of

ways. SOF can conduct direct attacks, collect intelligence, and provide terminal guidance

for attacks against valuable enemy targets. Examples include targets concealed by triple canopy

jungle or “safe haven” targets. SOF may also be used in a synergistic attack role with other air operations to locate, positively identify, and then designate targets for friendly forces to destroy. JFASCC

planners in the AOC coordinate with the SOLE for timely integration, coordination, and

deconfliction with special operations assets.

 Surface Fire Support. Artillery and naval surface fire support may be employed in OCA

operations when enemy targets are within their range. With the proper coordination, this may

be a very effective way to destroy enemy targets while minimizing risk to friendly forces.

 C4ISR Systems. These systems include early warning and surveillance systems, satellites,

radar, identification systems, communications systems, and surface-, air-, and space-based

sensors. These systems enhance OCA operations by providing early warning, intelligence,

and targeting data, as well as C2 of friendly forces.

As the F–117s headed south from Baghdad, Col David Livingston’s missile crew at Aa’ar and

Hafar al-Batin were primed to fire. The BQM–74 target drones that were mounted on the crew’s

launchers were not the most sophisticated weapons that had been developed. But they did not have to

be. The missiles were not meant to destroy Iraqis, only to fool them.

The plan was straightforward. Livingston’s men would launch the drones while Navy A–6s fired

TALDs (tactical air-launched decoys), the unguided decoys. The hope was that the drones would

prompt the Iraqis to turn on their antiaircraft radars and fire their antiaircraft missiles. Like turning

on a spotlight in a darkened room, activating the radars would expose them to attack by allied

antiradiation missiles, which home in on enemy radar beams. After the radars were blown up, the

Iraqi ground-to-air capability would be blunted. The F–117s would then come back for another

round of attacks. In essence, the aim was to get the Iraqis to fight shadows while the F–117s wound

up for another punch.

At 3:48 A.M., Livingston’s crew fired the drones toward Baghdad and Basra, while the Navy A–6s

launched their decoys. Meanwhile, flights of Air Force F–4G Wild Weasels and Navy FA–18s,

A–7s, and A–6s closed in on Baghdad. Armed with HARM [high-speed] antiradiation missiles,

the planes waited for the Iraqis to respond.

 They did not wait long. With much of the capital in darkness and panic, the Iraqis were

determined to stave off another attack. The Iraqi radars were up and running, and the missile crews

began to launch their SAMs at the drones. American intelligence later concluded that the Iraqis had

taken the falling drones for downed enemy airplanes. The Iraqis thought they were protecting their

capital, but they were simply setting themselves up for a fall.

As the Iraqis fired off their SAMs, the HARM carrying planes pulled up short of Baghdad and

unleashed a lethal rain of antiradiation missiles.

Triumph Without Victory
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 Information Warfare (IW). IW is another resource which can reduce the demand for sorties.

Many OCA targets, such as C4I, theater missiles and support infrastructure, and airfields/operating bases can be affected by various IW techniques such as malicious codes, electronic warfare, or

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generators. Some of these IW techniques afford the JFASCC

access to a target that may be inaccessible by other means.

 Surface Forces. The ability to occupy and secure key areas, as well as the lethality of supporting

surface fires, can achieve significant counterair effects. By occupying an airfield or securing a

vulnerable area from surface threats, surface forces can provide vital support for counterair operations.

OCA MISSIONS

Different types of OCA operations are used to achieve specific counterair objectives. Tasked

units have decentralized execution authority and are given much latitude in the detailed planning and

coordination of the tasks. Primary OCA missions are shown in figure 3.1.

 Surface Attack. Surface attack

missions are intended to destroy,

disrupt, or degrade select targets

on the ground. These missions

are directed against enemy air

and missile threats and their support infrastructure (e.g., airfields,

launch sites, launchers, runways)

before launch. The main goal

is to prevent enemy air and

missile assets from being

employed.

Figure 3.1. Offensive Counterair Missions

Fighter

Sweep

Offensive Counterair

Surface

Attack Escort

Suppression

of Enemy

Air Defenses

Typical offensive counterair weapons systems: F–117,

F–15E, B–52, B–1, and F–16 (clockwise from upper left).
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 Fighter Sweep. The fighter sweep is an offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and

destroy enemy airborne target sets such as aircraft,

airborne missile launch platforms, and airborne

targets of opportunity.

 Escort. Escort missions are protection sorties

flown over enemy territory against enemy aircraft and air defense systems. Friendly aircraft, en

route to or from a target area, may be assigned

escort aircraft to protect them from enemy air-toair and surface-to-air threats. Escort aircraft may

be tasked to protect such missions as interdiction,

reconnaissance, airlift, search and rescue, aerial

refueling, airborne C2, and electronic warfare.

 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).

SEAD is an OCA mission designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy

surface-based air defenses by destructive or

disruptive means. SEAD requirements may

vary according to mission objectives, system capabilities, and threat complexity. SEAD objectives are

specified by the JFC, who considers the unique

capabilities of each component to contribute to

counterair operations.

SEAD operations fall into three categories: AOR/JOA

(area) air defense suppression, localized suppression,

and opportune suppression. Area air defense suppression consists of operations conducted against specific enemy air defense systems to

destroy, disrupt, or degrade or destroy their effectiveness. It targets high payoff air defense

assets that result in the greatest degradation of the enemy’s total system and permits effective friendly

operations. Localized suppression is normally confined to geographical areas associated with

specific ground targets or friendly transit routes, contributing to local air superiority. Finally,

opportune suppression is usually unplanned and includes aircrew self-defense and attack

against targets of opportunity. The JFC will establish ROE for opportune suppression. Each of

these categories reduces attrition and creates favorable conditions for friendly air operations by disabling enemy air defense systems or major capabilities of those systems. Therefore, SEAD is an integral

part of planning and executing air operations.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OCA OPERATIONS

Planning for OCA operations involves making choices similar to those made for all air and space

operations. The planner must prioritize objectives, determine targets, and integrate the entire

counterair effort. Understanding how counterair operations will contribute to achieving the JFC’s overall

objectives is essential. The planner must balance the level of effort required to gain and maintain

air superiority against the potential delay in achieving other JFC objectives.

Counterair on the Ground

In World War II the British sent

commandos to knock out an effective

German bomber unit on Crete;

MacArthur and Kenney used ground

forces to seize airfields.

From the war of 1973 to the 1982

Lebanon incursions, the Israelis used

naval and ground forces to knock holes

in ground-based air defense systems. The

Israelis even won complete air superiority without use of air weapons during

their rescue raid at Entebbe. On that

operation, a group of commandos by

themselves destroyed the enemy’s air

force.

Col John Warden III, USAF

The Air Campaign
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Target selection is another critical aspect of planning OCA

operations. Simply stated, targeting is a process through which

installations and forces or their component parts are selected for

attack. The following five considerations are important in

establishing target priorities. (See figure 3.2.)

 Threat. The threat posed by enemy forces includes an assessment of the urgency or the need to counter them. An

NBC capable SCUD launcher would normally merit diversion

of assets from a lesser threat, such as a SAM site.

 Direct Effects. Immediate, first-order effects (e.g., weapons

employment results). They are the results of actions with no

intervening effect or mechanism between act and outcome.

 Indirect Effects. Those effects, which are created through

an intermediate effect or mechanism, producing a final outcome or result. They are 2d, 3rd, and

nth order effects, which may be functional, systemic, or psychological in nature. Indirect effects

tend to be delayed and typically are more difficult to recognize than direct effects.

 Forces Available. The forces available are assessed against the number, types, and priority of targets that can be attacked. Sufficient and capable forces must be provided to ensure

that the desired results are obtained.

 Risk Calculation. Risk calculation involves weighing the risk to friendly forces against expected

gains from target attack.

OCA operations are often flown deep within enemy territory, relying on integrated C4ISR

systems for deconfliction with other operations. Against fixed targets, OCA operations place great

emphasis on detailed planning, accurate and timely intelligence, target selection and time-over-target

deconfliction, and ROE. This emphasis enhances mission effectiveness while minimizing fratricide and

interference with other operations. Based on the latest intelligence, strike packages can be

augmented with dedicated escorts or fighter sweep, while AWACS and other C4I platforms warn of

real-time, air-to-air threats.

A responsive, integrated C4I system is required to assign the optimum weapon system

against mobile targets such as SAMs or ballistic and cruise missile launchers. Because the situation

is constantly changing, C4I systems constantly monitor the status of offensive weapons, sensors, and

many other systems to maintain the flexibility to execute timely attacks. With proper planning, timing,

and weapons loads, most aircraft can be retasked to conduct attacks against time-sensitive and high-value

targets as the situation warrants.

Targeting

Considerations

Threat

Direct Effect

Indirect Effect

Forces Available

Risk Calculation

Figure 3.2. Offensive Counterair

Targeting Considerations
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21

CHAPTER FOUR

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

GENERAL

Defensive counterair (DCA) operations provide a secure area from which all elements of the joint

force can operate effectively. DCA operations defend friendly lines of communication and protect

friendly forces and assets while denying the enemy the freedom to carry out offensive air and

missile operations. DCA encompasses both active and passive air defenses. Active air defense operations are

conducted using a mix of weapon and sensor systems supported by secure and highly responsive C4I systems to

detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or track enemy aircraft and missiles in flight. Active air defense

actions are taken to destroy and reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces

and assets. Passive air defense measures are required by all commanders to provide maximum protection for friendly forces and assets and to complicate the enemy’s

identification, surveillance, and targeting processes. It includes

such measures as camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD);

hardening; reconstitution; dispersal; and low observable (LO) or stealth

technologies.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Active air defense neutralizes or degrades the effectiveness of

enemy attacks and protects friendly forces and interests

through the direct employment of weapons systems. Integrated

employment of air-to-air and surface-to-air defense systems

through coordinated detection, identification, engagement,

and assessment of enemy forces is necessary to blunt enemy

attacks and protect friendly forces. Airspace control in an

active air defense environment is extremely difficult. Rapid, reliable, and secure means of identification are critical to the survival

of friendly aircraft and to facilitate effective defense against enemy air

and missile attacks.

Active Air Defense Targets

Active air defense targets may include airborne fixed-wing or

rotary-wing aircraft and theater missiles. Because no air defense

system is guaranteed to be 100 percent effective, active air defense is

conducted in close coordination with passive air defense operations to

minimize the effectiveness of enemy systems that escape destruction.

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On Air Defense

Because of hostile

domination of the

air, travel anywhere

in the forward area

was an exciting

business. Lookouts

kept a keen watch of the skies and

the appearance of any plane was the

signal to dismount and scatter....

Truck drivers, engineers, artillerymen and even the infantrymen in

the forward areas had constantly to

be watchful. Their dislike of the

situation was reflected in the

constant plaint, “Where is this

bloody Air Force of ours? Why do

we see nothing but Heinies? W h e n

the enemy has air superiority

the ground forces never hesitate

to curse the aviators.”

Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower

Crusade in Europe

The whole art of war consists of a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive followed by a rapid

and audacious attack.

Napoleon Bonaparte

It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one’s readiness to meet

him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one’s self invincible.

Sun Tzu
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Active Air Defense Resources and Forces

Air defense systems are integrated to provide efficient control and exchange of essential real-time

information to all air defense resources. Counterair is normally a joint operation. Services work in unison

and provide a mix of dedicated weapon systems to maximize the effectiveness of air defense

operations. When working in unison, the limitations of some assets are balanced by the advantages

of other assets. Some of the primary assets used in conducting active air defense missions are discussed below.

 Aircraft. Aircraft include fighter interceptors; armed helicopters; and early warning, reconnaissance

and surveillance platforms such as AWACS and RIVET JOINT.

 Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs). These weapons include antiaircraft artillery and short-, medium-, and long-range SAMs.

 C4ISR Systems. These systems include early warning and surveillance systems using a combination of

sensors, satellites, radar, and identification systems.

Active Air Defense Measures

Units employed to achieve air defense objectives have decentralized execution authority and latitude

in the detailed planning and coordination of the assigned DCA tasks. The following missions are directly

connected to active air defense operations.

 Area Defense. Area defense missions are conducted for the defense of a broad area using a

combination of weapon systems. There can be specialized applications of area defense when friendly

assets are dispersed over a large geographical area with defined threat boundaries.

Typical defensive counterair weapons

systems: E–3, Patriot missile, Standard

missile, and F–22 (clockwise from upper

left).
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 Point Defense. Point defense missions are conducted for the protection of a limited area,

normally in defense of the vital elements of forces and installations.

 Self-Defense. Self-defense missions are conducted by friendly units to defend themselves against

direct attack or threat of attack through the use of organic weapons and systems. Inherent to all

ROE and weapon control procedures is the right of self-defense.

 High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) Protection. HVAA protection uses fighter aircraft to protect

critical airborne theater assets such as AWACS, RIVET JOINT, and JSTARS.

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Passive air defense includes all measures, other than active air

defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile

attacks. Tactical warning initiates many passive defense measures.

Warnings are general or specific. General warnings indicate that

attacks are imminent or have occurred. Specific warnings signify that specific units or areas are in danger of attack. Passive

air defense does not involve the active employment of any

lethal weapons, but it improves survivability of friendly

forces by reducing the potential effects of enemy attacks.

Depending on the situation and time available in the AO, a

variety of actions can be taken to improve the passive air defense

posture of friendly forces such as listed in figure 4.1. Passive air

defense requires preplanning and practice during peacetime.

 Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CCD). CCD deny

accurate location and targeting of friendly assets by misleading and feeding false information to the enemy. These

measures reduce vulnerability of friendly assets by limiting

their exposure to targeting. They are conducted continuously over

time, in response to warning, or under the cover of darkness to deny

an enemy vital data about friendly forces. Timely and accurate

intelligence concerning the overflight of enemy satellite and

aircraft collection systems enhances the effectiveness of

CCD. This may cause enemies to abort, delay, or modify an

attack, or deplete valuable resources by attacking false targets. CCD measures are primarily associated with actions taken to alter or hide the appearance of personnel or fielded equipment. They are

often, but not exclusively conducted in the RF, IR, and visual ranges of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum.

 Hardening. Valuable assets and their shelters are hardened to protect against hostile attacks.

Hardening actions should be accomplished during peacetime. However, hardening may be a continual

process throughout operations.

 Reconstitution. This capability provides for the rapid repair of damage resulting from enemy attacks

and the return of damaged units to a desired level of combat readiness. Reconstitution includes the

ability to repair valuable assets such as airfields, communications, warning and surveillance systems,

and to restore essential services such as power, water, and fuel supplies.

Passive Defense

Camouflage

Concealment

Deception

Hardening

Reconstitution

NBC Capability

Redundancy

Detection & Warning

Dispersal

Mobility

Stealth

Low Observables

Figure 4.1. Passive Defense
24

 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defensive Equipment and

Facilities. NBC equipment and facilities allow collective protection from

WMD by providing contamination detection and avoidance, identification, and decontamination. Use of individual protective equipment

such as full-body ensembles for friendly forces ensures continuous

operations in an NBC environment.

 Redundancy. Duplication of critical capabilities keeps vital systems

functioning even when critical nodes are destroyed or damaged. Redundancy includes dual, contingency, or back-up capabilities which can

assume primary mission functions, in whole or in part, upon failure or

degradation of the primary system.

 Detection and Warning Systems. Timely detection and warning of air and missile threats provide maximum

reaction time for friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate action against enemy attacks. Missile warning is especially vital to friendly forces when considering the compressed timelines for detection and warning

of TMs. Connectivity of available communications and sensor systems is required to transmit accurate,

real-time data to friendly forces. A combination of air-, space-, and surface-based detection and communication assets is established to maximize opportunities for missile detection and warning times.

 Dispersal. Dispersal complicates the enemy’s ability to locate and target friendly assets by spreading them out and bringing them together in concentration only at the time and place of our

choosing. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases uncertainty as to whether a location is

occupied or will remain occupied. It forces the enemy to search more locations, requiring more resources and

time.

 Mobility. Mobility is the capability of easily moving from one location to another and is facilitated by

keeping a small footprint. Frequent movement of units, inside the enemy’s decision cycle, can be of critical

importance. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability of friendly assets by complicating

enemy surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting.

 Stealth and LO Technology. Stealth and LO technologies are those measures, normally designed into a

weapon system, which attempt to hide its presence during mission execution or reduce the envelope of

vulnerability to enemy threat systems. Stealth and LO technology are often, but not exclusively conducted in

the RF, IR, and visual ranges of the EM spectrum.

EXECUTION AND INTEGRATION OF DCA OPERATIONS

Joint forces practice and employ all levels of defensive measures to provide maximum protection for friendly forces and assets. The AADC is responsible for the integration of all air defense efforts

regardless of system ownership in the theater of operations. The AADC develops engagement procedures for

all air defense weapons based on the JFC’s objectives and guidance. Execution of efficient air defense operations requires a surveillance and reporting system capable of near-real-time production and dissemination of

tracking data necessary for the effective engagement of targets. Target track production is a sequential process

that begins with the surveillance function. Near-real-time surveillance and threat analysis is dependent upon our

ability to fuse all source sensor data, whether from ground-based radar, sea-based radar, or space-based sensors, into

an accurate theater attack assessment. As a track is detected, it is identified and labeled; this information is disseminated as rapidly as possible. The track data provided is sufficiently detailed and timely to permit the C2 system to

evaluate the track, determine the significance of the threat, and either designate air defense forces for interception

or engagement, or advise units of the passage of friendly aircraft.

We must be able to conduct

operations in a nuclear, biological

and chemical environment.

DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE
25

The effective use of counterair forces requires clear and concise ROE. The AADC assists the JFC

in establishing and implementing these rules. The component and supporting commanders are responsible

for ensuring compliance with the established ROE. To be effective, engagement control procedures

are centrally imposed, requiring standardized ROE. The optimum employment of air defense weapon

systems involves the earliest possible discrimination of friend from foe to maximize beyond-visual-range engagement and to avoid fratricide.

Control and Coordination of DCA Weapons

An integrated execution system that provides real-time or near-real-time information to all

DCA assets provides optimum effectiveness. DCA weapon systems are normally capable of autonomous

operations if they become separated from the integrated execution system, but their effectiveness will be degraded.

In the absence of an integrated defense system, procedural means are used to permit the safe passage of friendly

aircraft and to enable the use of air defense weapons. Since many DCA assets are owned by different

Services and allies, integration, coordination, and normal airspace control procedures are required

to enhance the synergistic capabilities of the various systems.

Area control measures include fighter engagement zones and missile engagement zones. These zones

are defined as dimensions of airspace in which the responsibility for engagement rests with a particular weapon

system. The ideal aim of area control measures, based on advanced signature technology, is to have a joint

engagement zone where all air and ground defense systems employ and operate simultaneously, in the

same airspace. Advanced technologies will allow for the identification of all airborne objects. Only those

airborne objects positively identified as hostile will be targeted and engaged. This reduces fratricide and minimizes

overly restrictive airspace control procedures. ROE remains simple, giving air defense systems the flexibility

to operate beyond the current constraints of procedural control measures.

 Fighter Aircraft. When the CRC or AWACS detects a hostile, potentially hostile, or unknown target, they

can assign or commit fighter aircraft to intercept the target. When possible, aircraft remain under the

direction of the initiating control agency and are continuously directed until the pilot confirms

visual or radar contact. If required, this control may be transferred to adjacent sectors of responsibility.

Intercept control can be transferred to the pilot when the aircraft is in positive contact with the target or when

the environment precludes positive direction by the controlling agency. In the latter situation, alternative procedures such as a broadcast “air picture” of enemy activity or autonomous action by the aircrew may be required.

 Armed Helicopters. Armed helicopters may conduct limited DCA operations when required. Command and

control relationships regarding these armed helicopters performing DCA missions will be determined by the JFC.

 Surface-to-Air Weapons. Surface-to-air weapons effectiveness requires a highly reliable centralized linkup with air operations and an adequate identification process. This precludes engagement

Short-range air defense weapon systems: Avenger, left, and

Stinger, right.

DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE
26

DRAFT -- NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OR COMPLIANCE

of friendly aircraft and unnecessary expenditure of valuable resources. Weapons control measures and

ROE are used to control surface-to-air engagements. Therefore, all available surface-to-air defense

assets in the theater of operations are incorporated into the overall DCA plan and are subject to the integrated procedures and weapons control measures imposed by the AADC.

DCA Weapons Employment

Defense-in-depth, the siting of mutually supporting defensive positions designed to absorb

and progressively weaken the enemy, is invaluable to DCA. Early warning of enemy attack

is vital if defense-in-depth is to be obtained. Airmen develop defenses to permit the destruction of

intruding enemy aircraft and missiles as early as possible and as far away as feasible. To maximize attrition

to the enemy force, the engagement process is continuous throughout the threat’s approach, entry

to, and departure from the friendly operational area.

 Fighter Aircraft. DCA missions for fighters include HVAA protection, point defense, and area

defense. A combat air patrol (CAP) can be used to accomplish these missions, with the objective

of intercepting and destroying hostile missiles and aircraft before they can reach their intended targets.

These CAPs ensure rapid reaction to enemy intrusion and may be positioned well ahead of forces

being protected. HVAA protection sorties are generally flown to protect high-value assets such

as refueling aircraft and AWACS to ensure their freedom of operation.

 Armed Helicopters. Armed helicopters can engage such suitable targets as enemy helicopters, battlefield air defenses, and other targets within their combat range.

 Surface-to-Air Weapons. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are employed in area or point

defense operations. These weapons can offer tremendous firepower and quick responsiveness

to defended assets. Since optimum range and altitude capabilities of each weapon system are different, the employment of various types of surface-to-air weapons must be fully coordinated

and integrated into the overall air defense system for maximum effect. This coordination

and integration ensures minimum risk to friendly aircraft and the means to deconflict employment

of surface-to-air weapons and aircraft.

Integration of surface-to-air systems provides mutual support and the most efficient coverage available.

Normally, surface-to-air weapons made available to the AADC for DCA are provided in direct support.

Regardless of the command relationship, all active defense forces are subject to the ROE, airspace, weapons control measures, and fire control orders established by the AADC. The

AADC is granted the necessary authority to deconflict and control engagements and to exercise realtime battle management.

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. . .

The future battle on the ground will be preceded by battle in the air. This will determine

which of the contestants has to suffer operational and tactical disadvantages and be forced

throughout the battle into adopting compromise solutions.

General Erwin Rommel
27

Suggested Readings

Cooling, Benjamin F., Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority (Center for Air Force History).

1994.

Dempster, Derek and Derek Wood, The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Airpower,

1930-40 (Smithsonian Institution Press). 1990.

Finney, Robert T., History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940, USAF Historical Study 100 (Air

University Press). 1955.

Futrell, Robert Frank, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Vol I (Air

University Press). 1989.

Gulf War Air Power Survey, (GWAPS), Vol II (US Government Printing Office). 1993.

Hudson, James J., Hostile Skies: A Combat History of the American Air Service in World War I (Syracuse

University Press). 1968.

McFarland, Stephen and Wesley Phillips Newton, To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority

over Germany, 1942-44 (Smithsonian Institution Press). 1991.

Mets, David R., “To Kill a Stalking Bird,” Air Power Journal (Air University Press). Fall, 1998.

Thompson, Wayne, To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973 (Smithsonian

Institution Press). 2000.

Warden, John A. III, Col (Ret.), The Air Campaign (to Excel). 1998.

Weyland, O.P., “The Air Campaign in Korea,” Air University Quarterly Review, Vol 6 (Air University Press).

Fall, 1953.
28
29

Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AADC area air defense commander

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control center

ACA airspace control authority

ACE airborne command element

ACO airspace control order

ACP airspace control plan

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AO area of operations

AOC air operations center

AOR area of responsibility

ASOC air support operations center

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BCD battlefield coordination detachment

BMD ballistic missile defense

C2 command and control

C3 command, control, and communications

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

CAP combat air patrol

CCD camouflage, concealment, and deception

CIC combined intelligence center

CID combat identification

CINC commander in chief

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COMAFFOR commander Air Force forces

CONUS continental United States

COP common operational picture

CRC control and reporting center

CSAR combat search and rescue

DCA defensive counterair

DOD Department of Defense

EMP electromagnetic pulse

EW electronic warfare

GCCS Global Command and Control System

HARM high-speed antiradiation missile

HVAA high value airborne asset
30

ID identification

IO information operations

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ITW/AA integrated tactical warning and attack assessment

IW information warfare

JAOC joint air operations center

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFASCC joint force air and space component commander

JFC joint force commander

JOA joint operations area

JP joint publication

JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system

JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

MCS modular control system

NALE naval and amphibious liaison element

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCA national command authorities

NMCC National Military Command Center

OCA offensive counterair

OCS offensive counterspace

OPCON operational control

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

RAOC regional air operations center

ROE rules of engagement

SAM surface-to-air missile

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SHORAD short-range air defense

SIGINT signals intelligence

SOF special operations forces

SOLE special operations liaison element

SROE standing rules of engagement

TACON tactical control

TACS theater air control system

TBM theater ballistic missile

TBMS tactical battle management system

TM theater missile

TST time-sensitive target
31

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Definitions

active air defense. Direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action.

It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, weapons not used primarily in an air

defense role, and electronic warfare. See also air defense. (JP 1-02)

aerospace defense. 1. All defensive measures designed to destroy or nullify attacking enemy aircraft and

missiles and also negate hostile space systems. 2. An inclusive term encompassing air defense, ballistic

missile defense, and space defense. See also air defense; space defense. (JP 1-02)

air defense. All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the Earth’s

envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attacks. See also active air

defense; aerospace defense; passive air defense. (JP 1-02)

air defense operations area. An area and the airspace above it within which procedures are established

to minimize mutual interference between air defense and other operations; it may include designation of

one or more of the following: air defense action area, air defense area, air defense identification zone,

and/or firepower umbrella. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the

operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

airspace control in the combat zone. A process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting

the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to prevent fratricide,

enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not

infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also

called combat airspace control; airspace control. (JP 1-02)

air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the

conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without

prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (JP 1-02)

air supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective

interference. (JP 1-02)

allocation (air). The translation of the air apportionment decision into total number of sorties by aircraft

type available for each operation or task. (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment of the total expected air effort by percentage

and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations or geographic areas for a given

period of time. (JP 1-02)
32

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task

force, the commander assigns overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this

is the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command,

control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved is provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander’s

headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10

(“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or

specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant

commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative

direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish

the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised

through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant

command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as

the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is

inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant

command; combatant commander; operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-02)

control. Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the

activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1-02)

counterair. A mission which integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired

degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and

missiles, both before and after launch. See also air superiority; defensive counterair; offensive

counterair. (JP 1-02)

defensive counterair. All defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate

enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. Also called DCA. See also

counterair; offensive counterair. (JP 1-02) [Defensive counterair operations are synonymous with air

defense operations. Defensive counterair encompasses both active and passive measures and is normally

conducted near or over friendly territory and generally reacts to the initiative of enemy forces.] {Italicized

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity}

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to

control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major

subdivisions within electronic warfare are:

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed

energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading,

neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to

prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy

as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).
33

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect

personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic

warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under

direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of

intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat

recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions

involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting,

and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), which includes both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic

intelligence (ELINT).

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while

defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02) The Air Force

believes that in practice a more useful working definition is: [Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend

or attack information and information systems and include both information-in-warfare and information warfare.] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

information warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crises or conflict to achieve or

promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW. (JP 1-02) The Air

Force believes that, because the defensive component of IW is always engaged, a better definition is:

[Information operations conducted to defend one’s own information and information systems, or to

attack and affect an adversary’s information and information systems.] {Italicized definition in brackets

applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander. The JFASCC derives authority from the Joint

Force Commander (JFC) who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct

coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in

the accomplishment of the overall mission. The JFC will normally designate the component with a

preponderance of the air and space assets and the ability to command and control them as the JFASCC.

The JFASCC’s responsibilities will be assigned by the JFC (normally these would include, but not

be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the JFC’s apportionment decision).

Using the JFC’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the JFASCC will recommend to the JFC

apportionment of air sorties and use of space assets to accomplish various missions or geographic areas.

The JFASCC will serve as the JFC’s designee for ensuring prompt and sustained offensive and defensive space operations and ensuring the integration of those operations into JTF activities in support of

the JFC’s objectives and strategy. Also called JFACC in joint doctrine.

offensive counterair. Offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,

launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, but as close

to their source as possible. Offensive counterair operations range throughout enemy territory and are

generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. These operations include attack operations, fighter

sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy air defenses. Also called OCA. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant

command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those
34

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the

mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and

joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be

exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational

control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as

the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

passive air defense. All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of

hostile air action. These measures include deception, dispersion and the use of protective construction. See

also air defense. (JP 1-02)

space defense. All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy vehicles (including

missiles) while in space, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. See also aerospace

defense. (JP 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses. That activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades

surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also called SEAD. (JP 1-02)

weapon engagement zone. In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system. (JP 1-02)