1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-4012

___________

Edward S. Case, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of *

Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: January 20, 2006

Filed: January 30, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Edward Case (Case) appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the denial of

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Having carefully

reviewed the record and considered Case’s arguments, we affirm. See Draper v.

Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review). 
-2-

Case first argues the administrative law judge (ALJ) was precluded from

discrediting his complaints of disabling back pain because it is undisputed Case had

chronic back pain and the ALJ acknowledged it. We disagree. The ALJ gave

multiple valid reasons for finding Case’s subjective complaints not entirely credible,

and the ALJ could acknowledge Case’s back pain, but still find Case not credible as

to whether his back pain was disabling. See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 792 (8th

Cir. 2005) (this court will not disturb decision of ALJ who considers, but for good

cause expressly discredits, claimant’s complaints of disabling pain); Dolph v.

Barnhart, 308 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2002) (while there is little doubt claimant has

pain, issue is whether pain is so severe as to be disabling). 

We also reject Case’s challenges to the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

(RFC) findings. The ALJ considered Case’s chronic back pain in making his RFC

determination by including a sit-stand option, limiting Case to lifting no more than ten

pounds–which was consistent with Case’s 2002 testimony that he could lift five to ten

pounds–and restricting Case’s bending. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807

(8th Cir. 2004) (in determining RFC, ALJ must consider medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own description).

Further, the ALJ included in his RFC nonexertional limitations related to Case’s

chronic back pain and depression: he found Case moderately limited in social

functioning and daily activities, and he found Case could seldom bend, could not

climb stairs, and could not do repetitive activities with his right hand or overhead

work. To the extent Case suggests the ALJ should have found significant limitations

in concentration or memory, the psychological records do not support such

limitations. 

Finally, Case argues the ALJ should have included the need to lie down during

the day in his hypothetical to the vocational expert. We conclude the ALJ properly

relied on the testimony of a medical expert (ME) that he found no objective basis for

the need to lie down. See Goff, 421 F.3d at 794 (hypothetical is sufficient if it sets
-3-

forth impairments supported by substantial evidence in record and accepted as true);

Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2004) (whether there is need to lie

down is medical question requiring medical evidence; record did not contain any

evidence that medical condition required claimant to lie down for hours each day and

court could not fault ALJ for relying on ME’s testimony that record did not support

finding of significant fatigue). 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________