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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Cultivating National Will

An Introduction to National Will

LAWRENCE E. KEY

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 5

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 1996
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

This compelling study by Lt Col Lawrence E. Key exa

ines how national will plays a decisive role during a

application of US military power and not just the empl

ment of forces to fight America’s wars. Because of the de

sive role national will plays, leaders need to understa

what it is and----beyond its definition----the ways in wh

they can articulate and cultivate it. To gain this und

standing, leaders must look at various means by which 

American public expresses its collective will; the most 

portant means being public opinion. However, the aut

argues that only mature collective opinion can repres

national will. This nation’s leaders need to understand h

this maturation process works; they also need to und

stand how the media report events because this report

can have an impact on how opinion evolves. Finally, lead

need to understand how to cultivate public opinion, a

this paper presents several guidelines to aid them in t

endeavor. Colonel Key illustrates his thesis by discuss

the failure of the national leadership during the Somal

military operation to fully understand the nature of 

tional will and how it could have been cultivated. One c

only hope that future leaders will have a better und

standing of national will as a vital component of natio

power.

D. Bruce Smith

Major General, USAF

Commandant

Air War College

iii

About the Author

Lt Col Lawrence E. Key earned his MS in meteorol

from Pennsylvania State University, his MSA in mana

ment from Georgia College, and his commission in 19

through Officer Training School at Lackland Air Force B

(AFB), Texas. The first operational assignment for t

North Carolina native was in 1978 to Robins AFB, Georg

where he served as duty forecaster and wing weather offi

for the 19th Bombardment Wing (Strategic Air Comman

In 1981 he transferred to Shaw AFB, South Caroli

where he served as 3d Weather Squadron forecasting se

ices officer. He then served an Air Force Institute of Te

nology tour as a student at Pennsylvania State Univers

between 1982 and1984. Following this assignment, 

served from 1984 to 1988 as senior research meteorolog

at the Air Force Engineering and Services Center, Tynd

AFB, Florida. Lieutenant Colonel Key then served as co

mander, Detachment 7, 20th Weather Squadron, Schofi

Barracks, Hawaii, from 1988 to 1991. In addition to 

duties as commander, he served as the staff weather offi

to the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division (Light). After atten

ing Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) in-residen

from 1991 to 1992, he served on the ACSC faculty fr

1992 to 1994. His decorations include the Meritorio

Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters and the Air Fo

Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster. Lieuten

Colonel Key is a graduate of the Air War College, class 

1995.

v
Cultivating National Will

An Introduction to National Will

‘‘You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the Amer

can colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark 

moment. ‘‘That may be so,’’ he replied, ‘‘but it is also irrelevant.’’

----Harry G. Summer

On Strategy 

Harry Summers’ account of this verbal exchange 

tween two adversaries reveals the essence of the relati

ship between American national will and the use of milit

force during the Vietnam War. Although possessing su

rior military strength, the people of the United States 

not possess the collective will to prosecute the war ind

nitely. As a result, a militarily inferior force achieved 

objective of unifying the two Vietnams.

The relationship between American national will and 

use of military force has its roots in the founding of 

nation. Dating back to The Federalist Papers, the Found

Fathers wanted to ensure the people’s control of the m

tary and to guarantee that the United States would not 

to war without the support of the American people. 1

Gen Fred C. Weyand points out,

The American Army really is a people’s Army in the sense that i

belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary

interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed th

American people are committed, when the American people los

their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In

the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of th

Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people. The Army

therefore, cannot be committed lightly.2

General Weyand’s statement implies that American 

tional will plays a decisive role during any application 

US military power, not just the employment of forces 

fighting America’s wars. This decisive role means that 

leaders, including senior military leaders, must und

stand the nature of national will when they contempl

the employment of American military power. This und

standing is especially important not only because 

American people have an aversion to placing troops 

harm’s way unless the national interests are direc

threatened, but also because declining defense budgets 

1
the post-cold-war era will make our national leaders th

hard about committing troops to costly deployments. Th

cannot afford to deploy troops unless the national will su

porting that deployment is present. In addition, natio

leaders must understand that the national will is not j

part of the backdrop against which force employment de

sions are made; these leaders can actually cultivate 

national will to support a decision to deploy US forces i

potentially hazardous situations. To cultivate the natio

will does not mean to lie to the American people to g

support for an ill-considered decision to deploy troops

does mean to articulate for the American people the rati

ale for their use (i.e., the national interests at stake), 

objectives they hope to accomplish, and an estimate as 

how long the troops will be employed. In essence, cultiv

ing national will simply means that the national leaders

explains to the American people why they would like 

borrow (to use General Weyand’s metaphor) US milit

forces and when they expect to return those forces to th

rightful owners.

This paper addresses the need to understand the nat

of national will by first defining what is meant by natio

will. It then discusses how the nation articulates its coll

tive will, emphasizing the nature of public opinion as 

articulation of this collective will. A discussion of the i

portance of cultivating the national will follows, includ

guidelines on how to do this. The paper then conclud

with a look at the role of national will played in the S

malian military operation, arguing that American lead

ship did a poor job of cultivating the national will in su

port of that operation. It also argues that, despite t

failure, the American national will did not necessarily fa

on the issue of US military involvement in Somalia; rath

the national leadership perceived that the national w

evaporated. It was that perception that prompted them 

reduce the US presence there.

Definitions

A traditional view of international politics holds that 

tional will is ‘‘the degree of determination with which 

2 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
nation supports the foreign policies of its government 

peace or war.’’

3

 Put another way, national will is the ‘‘po

lar dedication to the nation and support for its polici

even when that support requires sacrifice.’’

4

 These view

national will imply that it serves as an intangible, but 

tremely important factor without which the nation’s g

ernment cannot pursue its policies fully (if it can purs

them at all).5

 Though not constant, this intangible fac

can vary within the population, and it can vary overtime

The strength of the nation’s will can vary among vario

segments of the population. For example, any segment 

the population which believes itself deprived of its rights 

whose aspirations do not match the policies pursued 

the majority of Americans will tend to be less patriotic th

those who do not feel this way; therefore, their willingn

to support the nation’s policies will likely be weaker th

that of the rest of the nation. Whenever dissensions div

people of a nation, popular support for a foreign policy w

be tenuous at best, especially if the success or failure 

the foreign policy bears directly on the nation’s inter

conflict.6

The strength of the national will can also vary in tim

As Hans J. Morgenthau states, ‘‘A nation’s will tends 

manifest itself most clearly in times of national cris

when the existence of the nation is at stake or an issue 

fundamental importance must be decided.’’

7

 Measuring 

strength of national will even during a crisis, is difficu

but there are clearly conditions under which national w

could persevere, while in other situations that could dim

ish. For example, a people can be brought close to 

breaking point by tremendous and useless losses in w

such as the French after the Nivelle offensive of 1917

great military defeat also can undermine the national w

such as the Italian defeat in 1917 at Caporetto. The n

tional will can also break under the impact of a combin

tion of tremendous war losses in men and territory a

governmental mismanagement, such as in Russia in 19

Finally, perhaps as with the Romans, national will c

slowly decline and ‘‘corrode at the edges----not break at 

in one sudden collapse, even when exposed to a rare co

KEY 
bination of governmental mismanagement, devastation, 

vasion, and a hopeless war situation.’’

8

In general, though, the more the nation’s people iden

with the actions and objectives of their government, 

more likely it is for national will to be strong. One indi

tion of a strong national will is ‘‘a patriotic feeling wit

the nation’s people that can be rallied when the nation 

attacked or insulted, even when the nation’s governm

may not be particularly popular.’’

9

 An obvious example 

this is the US reaction to the Japanese attack on Pe

Harbor in December 1941. A second indicator is ‘‘a be

that the government places the nation’s welfare first a

pursues policies compatible with the nation’s histo

role.’’

10 However, to fully understand this relationship 

tween the nation’s current welfare and the nation’s hist

role, we must dig a little deeper and examine what con

tutes the nation.

A nation does not exist as a monolithic entity; it exi

as a collection of individuals. To constitute a nati

though, this collection of individuals must be tied toget

by an idea. This unifying ‘‘idea’’ is reflected in the conc

of ‘‘national character.’’ As Samuel Taylor Coleridge puts 

There is an invisible spirit that breathes through a whole people

and is participated by all, though not by all alike; a spirit which

gives a color and character both to their virtues and vices, so tha

the same action, such I mean as are expressed by the same words

are yet not the same in a Spaniard as they would be in a

Frenchman.11

In the case of the United States, this unifying idea or the

has been expressed in many ways. Henry A. Kissinger 

pressed it with these words,

Though other republics have existed, none had been consciousl

created to vindicate the idea of liberty. No other country’

population had chosen to head for a new continent and tame it

wilderness in the name of freedom and prosperity for all. Thus th

two approaches, the isolationist and the missionary, s

contradictory on the surface, reflected a common underlying faith

that the United States possessed the world’s best system o

government, and that the rest of mankind could attain peace and

prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adoptin

America’s reverence for international law and democracy. 12

It follows, then, that to understand the concept of n

tional will one must first understand the ideas that tend 

4 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
unify the people of the nation, and second, one must u

derstand what is meant by the people who are unified 

make up the nation. When Walter Lippmann examined 

concept of the people, he argues that the term the peo

can have different meanings: one can speak of the peop

as voters expressing their will through the ballot box, 

one can speak of the people as ‘‘a community of the en

living population, with their predecessors and succ

sors.’’

13

In Lippmann’s view, the people as voters cannot tr

represent the people as the past, present, and future pop

lation of the nation. The primary reason for this is that 

voters have never been and can never be more than 

fraction of the total population. For example, voters con

tuted less than 5 percent of the American population wh

the Constitution was ratified.14 Further, the sum of 

interests of all the members (not just voters) who compr

the nation cannot represent the interests, desires, and w

of the people (hereafter referred to in this paper as the tr

nation, according to Lippmann, because ‘‘the several me

bers who compose’’ the community are never identic

the same members from one hour to another.

If a community were what they say, then in theory it should b

possible to make a directory of its members, each with his address

But no such list could ever be compiled. While it was bein

compiled, new members would be being born and old member

would be dying.15

The true nation, then, is not only the aggregate of liv

persons. The true nation is also the stream of individua

the connected generations of changing persons, that E

mund Burke was talking about when he invoked 

partnership ‘‘not only between those who are living’’ 

also with ‘‘those who are dead, and those who are to 

born.’’ The true nation is a corporation, an entity wh

lives on while individuals come into it and go out of it. 16

Put another way, besides the happiness and the secur

of the individuals currently belonging to the nation, th

are also the happiness and the security of the individu

of whom generation after generation the nation will 

comprised. If we think of it in terms of individual perso

the corporate body of the true nation is for the most p

invisible because so many of the individuals which co

KEY 
prise it are dead or not yet born. Yet, in Burke’s words, t

intangible corporate being binds a man to his country w

‘‘ties which though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. 

The problem facing national leaders trying to gauge 

national will is how to translate this intangible, thou

important, concept into something on which they can b

policy. This problem, as implied above, results from 

fact that the true nation as a corporate body is the tr

owner of the sovereign power, and, thus, the national w

However, the people, as an aggregate of persons hav

diverse, conflicting self-centered interests and opinio

are the only individuals available to represent the true n

tion. The question for the national leadership is whet

there is some means by which the needs, desires, a

tudes, and will of the individuals comprising the peo

can be translated to represent the will of the true nati

Answering this question requires an examination of h

the people articulate their collective will.

Modes of Articulation

The American national will can be expressed or arti

lated to their leaders several ways. But the best way is 

lump these means into two broad groups: formal and inf

mal. Formal means of articulating national will inclu

those that are prescribed by the Constitution or by la

while informal means comprise all other methods of arti

lating the national will. Examples of these methods 

discussed below; the list is not exhaustive by any mea

but it does point out ways by which the will of the Ame

can people reaches those in a position of responsibility.

The most formal method of expressing the public’s c

lective will is by polling public opinion at the ballot box, 

in a democratic republic such as the US, the desires of 

citizens (at least those who vote) are most explicitly ma

known on election day. A second formal means is throu

the judicial system. This involves court decisions that

theory, mirror the decisions that society in its entir

would probably have reached if it had been given the 

portunity. A third formal means of articulating the natio

will is by allocating the nation’s resources among vario

6 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
groups and organizations. The federal budget process i

formal means in that the law prescribes the procedures 

be followed, although informal pressures and influen

obviously play a role.

In addition to these formal methods, there are also n

merous informal means by which the collective will of 

people is made known. One of these means is throu

communication with elected decision makers or other 

fluential individuals. Included in this category are letters 

congressmen, letters to the editor of the local newspap

and even ‘‘auditoriums’’ with on-line computer services 

which subscribers can chat with each other about vario

issues or express their opinions to various organizatio

Another such means of articulating a collective will occ

when parents allow their children to enlist in the arm

forces. One effective way to observe this is simply by ta

ing to those officers responsible for basic training. Yet 

other similar means of informally articulating the collect

will is by the spontaneous reaction of an influential gro

to an activity they feel is not in the best interests of th

community, such as the reaction of moderate southern

to the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. Another inform

means a group can use to articulate their collective wil

by voting with their feet. The exodus of South Vietnam

from their homeland in the aftermath of the takeover 

the North was partly an expression of their will not to l

in a brutally repressive society.

The most important informal means of articulating 

collective will is by public opinion. This means is import

because, rightly or wrongly, national leaders pay attent

to it. It is important because modern polling techniqu

track the public’s opinion on almost any issue almost 

stantaneously. It is also important because changes 

opinion from one issue to the next can be followed. F

ther, public opinion poll results do not suffer from some 

the drawbacks inherent with the other means of articu

ing the national will.

Among the drawbacks of other means of articulating 

tional will is that, while elections are the most dir

means of indicating the national will, they occur too inf

quently to consistently assist national leaders in gaug

KEY 
the will of the people. In fact, many eligible voters cho

not to participate in the electoral process. Using the le

system to get a sense of the national will is also less th

ideal because it is too episodic and too dependent on 

specifics of the legal question involved during any one p

ceeding. The budgeting process is useful, but it also suff

from a lack of timeliness; an event of concern to natio

leaders because of its dependence on the national will m

not coincide with milestones in the budget debate. Wh

useful when viewed in retrospect by decision makers, th

means of articulating national will may not provide use

or timely information. This leaves public opinion as 

only viable, routinely available indicator of national will.

One must resolve a fundamental issue, however, bef

attempting to use public opinion as an indicator of n

tional will. That issue is whether there is a link betwe

national will, as defined earlier, and the results of pub

opinion polls. Put another way, are public opinion poll

means by which the needs, desires, attitudes, and wil

the individuals comprising the people can represent 

people? The traditional view of international politics, 

implied earlier, agrees that this cannot be the case.

As discussed earlier, the traditional view of internatio

politics holds that the public does not have the ability 

contribute to democratic policy-making. For examp

Rousseau maintained that the public really is not int

ested in the affairs of state because they are occupied w

their own problems; therefore, by implication, the publi

not really interested, much less capable, of articulating 

true national will.

What matters principally to every citizen is the observance of th

laws internally, the maintenance of private property, and th

security of the individual. As long as all goes well with regard to

these three points, let the government negotiate and make treatie

with foreign powers.18

According to the traditional view, another reason for t

inability to reflect the true national will and to play 

important role in international affairs is that public op

ion moves much more slowly than events themselv

Again, according to Lippmann,

The movement of opinion is slower than the movement of events

Because of that, the cycle of subjective sentiments on war and

8 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
peace is usually out of gear with the cycle of objectiv

developments. Just because they are mass opinions there is an

inertia in them. It takes much longer to change many minds than to

change a few. It takes time to inform and to persuade and to arous

large scattered varied multitudes of persons.19

Compounding the relatively slow movement of pub

opinion, according to Lippmann, is the fact that the pub

also lacks the knowledge needed to make the appropri

decisions that affect the national interest.

Strategic and diplomatic decisions call for a kind of knowledge ----no

to speak of an experience and a seasoned judgement ----whic

cannot be had by glancing at newspapers, listening to snatches o

radio comment, watching politicians perform on television, hearin

occasional lectures, and reading a few books. 20

In sum, then, the traditional view of the link between pu

lic opinion and national will minimizes that link. 

Lippmann’s terminology, public opinion is not capable 

representing the interests of the ‘‘invisible communi

which it must do if it is to represent the national will. 21

Recent research, however, counters this view. That 

the US public is actually rational and capable of contrib

ing to the sensible conduct of foreign affairs, thus refle

ing the national will in doing so. 22

The collective policy preferences of the American public ar

predominantly rational, in the sense that they are . . . generally

stable, seldom changing by large amounts and rarely fluctuatin

back and forth; that they form coherent and mutually consisten

(not self-contradictory) patterns, involving meaningful distinctions

that these patterns make sense in terms of underlying values an

available information; that, when collective policy preference

change, they almost always do so in understandable and indeed

predictable ways, reacting in consistent fashion to internationa

events and social and economic change as reported by th

mass-media; and, finally, that opinion changes generally constitut

sensible adjustments to the new conditions and new information

that are communicated to the public.23

Because the policy preferences of the American pub

‘‘make sense in terms of underlying values and availa

information,’’ public opinion, then, can be linked to 

tional will.

There are several reasons these recent findings cont

dict the traditional view as espoused by Lippmann. O

reason is that the traditional view tends to equate the pu

lic’s collective opinion with that of its individual membe

However, the research indicates that because collect

KEY 
opinion represents a summation of individual views, it c

cels out the distortions that appear when one focuses 

individual opinions alone. ‘‘Not only are various individ

irrationalities mutually offsetting through aggregation, 

opinions examined over a sufficient span of time revea

central tendency of popular preference, amid various 

consistencies that fluctuate randomly across time.’’

24

A second reason for the difference in views is that m

public opinion polls that claim to gauge public awaren

of various issues amount to little more than trivia quizz

These polls fail to convey that ‘‘although Americans m

not grasp much factual detail, they do understand the 

sentials of important matters, once the issues are fa

presented to them.’’

25 There is further evidence disput

the claim that the public is too ignorant to participate v

idly in the national security policy-making process. Ma

public opinion survey questions which suggest popular 

norance are misleading because they confuse the ‘‘ac

recall of factual information with a more latent recog

tion’’; accordingly, actual knowledge levels are higher th

indicated by quiz show questioning.26

Another reason for this difference in views is the imp

of improving levels of formal education on the ability of 

public to discern the importance of foreign policy and 

develop opinions concerning those policies. According 

Miroslav Nincic,

The reasonableness, stability, and coherence exhibited by popula

opinion are even more intimately connected to processes o

collective deliberation within the United States----the complex system

of organizations devoted to the collection and analysis o

information, as well as the social networks involved in the diffusion

of information. The result is an efficient division of labor in th

processing of politically relevant information on matters the

consider important. By this process of collective deliberation, th

public has an aggregate reason about policy, and collective opinion

becomes more than the sum of its individual parts. 27

More than the sum of its individual parts implies that 

lective opinion distilled through some form of collective 

liberation can represent the national will as defined earli

Further support for collective public opinion as a 

tional expression of the public’s desires and feelings 

foreign affairs is that ‘‘the coherence, political relevan

and general sophistication of opinions is not entirely c

10 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
tingent on the information on which it is based. ’’

28 

another way, not only is a huge amount of informat

nonessential to understanding foreign policy, but detai

information, in fact, may not always be desirable. A mod

ate level of policy-relevant information within the ranks 

the public may better encourage consensus and comp

mise (and thus a convergence on a true national will) th

one where detailed information is widely held. 29

Another reason for the difference in views is how m

sages from the media reach the public today. A traditio

view of the formation of public opinion rests on the 

sumption that the transfer of information from the me

to the public can be represented by a two-step model. A

cording to this model, messages coming from the media 

not generally reach the mass public directly, but via th

effect on opinion leaders (e.g., teachers, community le

ers, and ministers) who, then, directly convey the m

sages to those within the general public whom they are 

a position to influence.30 Recent research indicates t

model no longer adequately describes the process. 

Bruce Russett’s view, messages emanate from the me

are almost instantaneously transmitted to the public; 

other words, opinion is diffused directly rather than vi

two-step process.31 Once it reaches the public, opin

change is best described by analogy to ‘‘the epidemiolog

model, because change spreads to people in approxim

order of their susceptibility to new information (depend

on such circumstances as personality and ideologi

bent).’’

32 The two-step model is also weak because of 

speed with which the media message is transmitted a

because of the frequent direction in which opinion chan

works its way through society. These researchers find

fact, that the more educated tend to be influenced by 

less educated in terms of foreign policy decisions. 33

Given that the public, despite its improved level of ed

cation, is not a very keen observer of foreign affairs, 

appropriate question to ask is, ‘‘On what does the pub

base its opinions?’’ According to Benjamin I. Page a

Robert Y. Shapiro, responses to foreign policy informat

depend, for any given member of the public, ‘‘on a relativ

stable core of values and beliefs that constrain the man

KEY 
in which information is interpreted, and on the source 

the information received and the manner in which it 

presented.’’

34 While there is still ample room for furt

investigation in this area, one clear message from the 

search is that individual self-interest plays only a relativ

small role in responses to these polls and that even gro

identifications are generally less important than a perso

conception of the common good and the national interes

The fact that collective public opinion on foreign affa

is based heavily on ‘‘a person’s conception of the comm

good and the national interest’’ implies that those opini

resulting from collective deliberation represent a reas

ably accurate picture of the national will in a particu

area of foreign policy. Given that the public is capable 

representing and articulating the national will, it is 

perative that the national leadership understand the 

portance of cultivating this will to support US foreign p

icy decisions if they want to achieve success.

Prerequisites for Cultivation

To effectively cultivate the American national will in su

port of a foreign policy decision, especially those involv

the use of military forces, national leaders first must u

derstand some basic concepts. One of these concepts is 

nature of public opinion; that is, how does public opin

evolve on an issue? and At what point in its evolution c

public opinion be considered to represent the national w

A second concept these leaders need to understand is h

the media reports a story, especially a story like Soma

Since public opinion can depend on how the informat

on which it is based is reported to the public, this und

standing is important. A third concept relates to the way 

which Americans typically react to foreign policy decisio

An understanding of this allows national leaders to bet

interpret the results of opinion polls and avoid reach

erroneous conclusions.

The Nature of Public Opinion

As argued earlier, collective public opinion can repres

the national will. However, to fully understand how to c

12 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
tivate this will, national leaders need to look more clos

at public opinion and clearly understand how it wor

Daniel Yankelovich views public opinion on any issue 

‘‘less like a physical process than a biological one, evolv

in seven stages.’’ He states that it is wrong to assume t

‘‘public opinion is some kind of phenomenon like wind 

locity, whose variations can be measured, and that 

measurement is valid.’’ In fact, polling results are usua

misleading unless public opinion concerning that iss

has had time to fully mature. 36

According to Yankelovich, public opinion on any iss

develops slowly over a long period----at least 10 years fo

complex issue. It evolves from ‘‘incoherent globs of opin

toward fully integrated, thoughtful, and considered pub

judgement.’’ On issues in early stages of development, 

quality of public opinion is raw and unformed; people 

press strong feelings, but this does not mean they h

settled on their view of the issue. Their opinions are uns

ble and can vary at the slightest provocation. In the ea

stages, people have not thought through the consequen

of their views, but when public opinion has progres

through all seven stages, it is solid and stable, not mus

Yankelovich’s views support the research cited earlier; t

is, public opinion which has progressed through all sev

stages of development best represents the national will. 3

Yankelovich labels Stage 1 in the development of pub

opinion as ‘‘Dawning Awareness.’’ Here people beco

aware of an issue and start ‘‘the long and tortuous jour

toward public judgment.’’

38 During Stage 2, ‘‘Greater 

gency,’’ the public moves beyond awareness to a sense 

urgency about an issue. But even at this stage, the pub

can be aware of a problem without feeling it is important 

that anything needs to be done about it. In Stage 3, ‘‘D

covering the Choices,’’ the public begins to focus on alt

natives. Timing here varies depending on the issue. 

some issues, according to Yankelovich, choices beco

clear almost immediately, but on most they do not. It tak

years on some issues before feasible choices appear. D

ing this stage, the public tends to focus on choices th

leaders offer without insisting upon alternatives. Of

these choices are not the best choices, and they are c

KEY 
tainly not the only choices available. Yankelovich sa

though, that Stage 3 represents progress ‘‘because it 

gins the process of converting the public’s free-float

concern about the need to do something into proposals 

action.’’

39

Evolution continues in Stage 4, ‘‘Wishful Thinkin

Most of the time on most issues, the public raises a ba

cade of wishful thinking that they must overcome befor

comes to grips with issues realistically. This wishful thin

ing can occur because people feel excluded from decisio

on matters that affect their lives. Yet, people tend to 

most responsibly when they are personally involved in 

process. To make sacrifices willingly, people must und

stand why sacrifices are needed, and they must have so

say in the sacrifices their leaders ask them to make. Ev

at this point, though, the bulk of the public has not 

cused on the hard choices.40

The hard choices start in Stage 5, ‘‘Weighing 

Choices.’’ Here the public weighs the pros and cons of 

ternatives. Stages 4 and 5 actually overlap, with peo

thinking through how they feel at the same time that th

continue to resist coming to grips with the hard choic

Wrestling with complex issues requires getting in tou

with one’s deepest values and often realizing that th

values may conflict with one another on a particular qu

tion. People naturally resist having to compromise or ab

don cherished values. Stage 5 embodies hard work, 

work that the public must do for itself ----there are no sh

cuts. In earlier stages the media and experts do most of 

work. The media do well at consciousness raising, a

leaders can formulate the policy choices, but, according 

Yankelovich, the public must invest the time and effort 

grasp the choices, understand their consequences, a

wrestle with the conflicts of values these choices involve

The last two stages----Stage 6, ‘‘Taking a Stand Intellec

ally,’’ and Stage 7, ‘‘Making a Responsible Judgement M

ally and Emotionally’’---- are linked, but they differ in s

eral respects. One way to look at these two stages is th

people are quicker to accept change in their minds than 

their hearts. Intellectual resolution requires people to r

oncile inconsistencies, consider relevant facts and new 

14 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
alities, and grasp the full consequences of choices. Em

tional resolution requires people to confront their own a

bivalent feelings, accommodate themselves to unwelco

realities, and overcome an urge to procrastinate. In ar

ing at moral resolution, the first impulse of people is to p

their own needs and desires ahead of ethical comm

ments. But once they have time to reflect on their choic

especially if the larger society provides moral support, 

ethical dimension asserts itself, and people struggle to 

the right thing, often successfully. However, according 

Yankelovich, inevitably resistance toward a policy cho

grows as people learn more about the options and the 

tent to which each involves higher costs and less choice 

the individual.42

By the time public opinion has evolved to Stage 7, th

the public as a whole has gotten in touch with its ba

values and wrestled intellectually, morally, and emoti

ally with the decision about the right thing to do. It is t

contact with basic values that links fully evolved pub

opinion with national will. It is only when public opin

has evolved to Stage 7, then, that we can refer to pub

opinion as the national will. However, a full understand

of how this evolution takes place requires an und

standing of how the public receives information on which 

bases its opinions. More often than not, information 

various issues reaches the public through the media, a

national leaders need to understand how the media co

and report these issues.

Impact of the Media

As mentioned earlier, the media plays an important r

as opinion develops through Yankelovich’s Stages 

through 4. Innumerable studies have shown how the m

dia cover stories. One way to view the media’s role in 

evolution of public opinion, though, is to review the me

coverage of Somalia; the reporting of this operation c

serve as a template for how similar operations could 

covered by the press.

Media coverage in Somalia followed a progression of f

steps, and these steps can be applied to other poten

contingency operations that may involve US forces or ot

KEY 
assets. There is no limit on how long these steps m

take; they can occur gradually or quickly----sometimes e

simultaneously. Reports of famine in Somalia in 1992 a

in Ethiopia in 1984-85 completed the five-step cycle, b

reports on other famines, such as those in the Sud

never move beyond the first step or two. Generally, wh

press coverage of a particular famine reaches Step 3 

beyond, it typically has gathered enough momentum 

resist facts that do not fit the popular story line. 43

During Step 1, ‘‘The Early Predictor Story,’’ a news st

about famine for example, usually appears as a wire se

ice piece from Rome (headquarters of the United Natio

[UN] World Food Program) or Geneva. Such stories warn 

huge populations in danger of famine if something is 

done, and say more donations are needed to avert disast

Sometimes there are follow-ups to this story, but unl

photographs of the famine appear the early predictor st

remains just a small news item. 44

The second step occurs as the few relief organizatio

working in a region persuade some members of the ne

media----especially those who work in television----that 

press is ignoring a famine story. A few news organizatio

show up----usually at the invitation and with the assistan

of the relief organizations----and produce stories with p

tures. These stories focus not just on the hunger but h

it has been ignored. Having discovered the famine, the c

respondents vigorously publicize it.45

The third step develops as more news organizatio

show up and, with the story now thoroughly simplifi

expose the famine, commenting on forgotten people in 

mote and dangerous places. News accounts will imply t

neglect by the West is partly responsible for the mass st

vation. Readers and viewers are supposed to be concern

even feel guilty. Television coverage dominates, and ne

reports are saturated with graphic descriptions of hun

and misery along with the number of people dead or 

danger.46

Step 4 occurs as the numbers of starving and dy

people grow. This is the key moment in the evolution 

famine coverage. How many people have to die before 

famine becomes a major media event? There doesn’t 

16 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
pear to be a set number. But one can be sure of a turn

point when words like holocaust or hell or famine of 

century are found regularly in media accounts. 47

Step 5 is reached when more journalists arrive fr

smaller papers and local television stations. Now the cr

has become a cause. An international public has been m

bilized; donations flow to relief organizations; newspa

articles include lists of relief agencies accepting donatio

and during newscasts television networks provide the t

free numbers of the agencies.48

In reality, parts of Africa are always at Step 1, thou

often the predicted famines fail to materialize either 

cause the people predicting the famine are wrong or 

cause governments find other ways to circumvent fo

shortages. Understanding how the media reports eve

like famines is important for national leaders, but it is l

than useful unless these same leaders understand how 

American public reacts to this reporting and to decisio

reached by their leaders.49

Reaction of the Public to Foreign Policy Decisions

Given that national will can be represented by the coll

tive public opinion of the American people and that it 

important to cultivate this opinion, national leaders a

must understand how Americans react to foreign po

decisions----particularly those that involve the commitm

of American troops. It is also important that these lead

understand that several myths have arisen involving h

Americans view such commitments. To cultivate the 

tional will effectively, they must be able to recognize th

myths and address the true American view of such co

mitments. Before examining these myths, however, it 

useful to summarize previous studies and experiences 

garding the typical American reaction to foreign policy 

cisions.

First, almost every general foreign policy survey in 

past five years shows that the American public is incre

ingly well informed about global issues, devotes attent

to evolving international events, and has opinions on m

major foreign and defense policy questions. Americans 

take into account moral issues in evaluating foreign pol

KEY 
choices, but they are pragmatic when deciding on supp

for overseas initiatives, including the use of force. That 

they evaluate these choices on a case-by-case basis rat

than following universal principles or ideology when 

dressing these decisions. Americans typically prefer sho

term actions with a high probability of success over lon

term involvements with uncertain prospects for achie

ment (but, then, most other nations probably feel this way

Related to this preference for short-term actions is t

Americans remain resistant to new Vietnam-like milit

involvements which seek to enforce nation-building or 

tervene in civil wars. However, they are more willing to u

force for humanitarian ends or to counter blatantly aggr

sive behavior. Most Americans object to providing milit

aid overseas, but, again, humanitarian assistance clea

outranks all other international initiatives in popular su

port. Americans consistently support nonmilitary inter

tional involvement, although they continue to have res

vations about a ‘‘blanket intervention policy.’’

51

Americans are clear, however, about the general strat

they believe the president and the nation should purs

the use of military force is the exception in US fore

policy. The public usually supports multilateral and co

erative operations with support and contributions from 

lies and other countries. The costs and risks involved 

any overseas military option should be explained, and 

longer can there be blanket approval for military prepa

tion against a range of unlikely threats. Many view the l

of American life----even when in the tens and not the hu

dreds----as intolerable, but most also recognize there 

international commitments and national interests beyo

simple self-defense for which the risk of war is justifiable

As implied above, a key factor shaping the Americ

public’s attitude toward a decision to use force is whet

military action is unilateral or multilateral. While Am

cans are more likely to support US military involvement 

part of a coalition or a United Nations-sanctioned effo

there are profound reservations about placing US troo

under UN command. While a majority of Americans 

percent) still believes the United States should cooper

fully with the UN, most Americans are reluctant to pl

18 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
US troops under permanent UN command. Americans 

more comfortable having US troops under the command 

NATO allies or in UN missions for only limited period

Keeping these generalities in mind, it is appropriate to 

view now several myths regarding public reaction to fore

policy decisions.

Myth 1. The first myth is that the US public belie

every war is different. However, US public reaction in ev

case is surprisingly consistent as public support rises a

falls predictably. This is particularly true of limited w

fought in distant parts of the world. Of all the comp

variables governing public opinion, the single overwhe

ing factor is casualties. For example, as the number 

dead, wounded, and missing in action rose, support 

both the Vietnam and Korean wars fell at an identical ra

In fact, this simple relationship explained virtually all 

the change in attitudes during both wars: other facto

such as the initial public support for the war, the vagar

of domestic politics, and different levels of public diss

have little to do with changing public attitudes. In b

wars, when casualties rose from 100 to 1,000, support 

the war dropped 15 percentage points. 53 As casualties r

from 1,000 to 10,000, support declined by another 15 p

centage points.54

Myth 2. A second myth is that, for Americans, ‘‘st

mates quickly become stale.’’ The myth is that if a conf

reaches a stalemate, Americans will tire of it and dema

that troops be brought home. Little historic evidence su

ports this view. For example, the US has kept troops 

South Korea for over 40 years with little dissent from 

public.55

Myth 3. A third myth holds that ‘‘in times of war 

aren’t Republicans or Democrats, we’re Americans,’’ or, 

another way, ‘‘dissent ends at the water’s edge.’’ The pu

clearly rallies around the president in times of crisis a

that rallying occurs more readily when a conflict ‘‘(1

international and (2) involves the United States and p

ticularly the President directly (especially when he pers

ally informs the public, usually through the dramatica

effective medium of television), and (3) is specific, drama

and sharply focused,’’ especially when it involves a de

KEY 
sive----and usually military----response at the president’s 

rection.56 John E. Mueller also found that the Korean a

Vietnam wars both produced rally effects initially but t

ultimately the rally began to subside with increases 

casualties and the emergence of internal opposition

Other research involving polls conducted during the 

rean and Vietnam eras suggests that party members

significantly affected individual perceptions of the ove

success or failure of the war effort. Members of the pre

dent’s political party, in other words, tended to be m

supportive than opposition party members. Therefo

among the first cracks to appear in public support fo

military operation are those associated with partisan dif

ences.58

Myth 4. A fourth myth holds that Americans need 

strong reason to believe in a war. As implied earlier, pub

opinion of recent wars----even those the populace does

completely understand and later will reject ----typic

starts high. This myth can probably be traced to Vietna

In 1967 Gallup asked Americans this question: ‘‘Do y

feel you have a clear idea of what the Vietnam war is 

about----that is, what we are fighting for? ’’ Fewer th

half----48 percent----thought they knew. To many, this res

suggested the government’s failure to justify the war to 

citizens. But another explanation might be that America

typically are simply ill-informed about foreign relations, 

cluding war policy. Thus, the 48-percent figure may refl

acknowledged ignorance. Consider what happened wh

Gallup asked the same question six months after the Ja

nese had attacked Pearl Harbor. Barely half ----53 percen

of those interviewed said they had a clear idea of why 

United States was in World War II. (The percentage did r

considerably later in the war.)59

Myth 5. Another generally accepted myth is that the 

cannot fight a war in the television age. This myth sho

have died 15 years ago when studies began showing t

increases in casualties had almost precisely the same 

fect on public attitudes toward Vietnam----America’s first 

war----as they did for Korea, perhaps the last newspa

war. If television had a pronounced effect on attitudes, 

rate of decline during the Vietnam War should have be

20 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
greater.60 In Mueller’s words, ‘‘War, after all, is a singula

unsubtle phenomenon, and the assumption that peo

will know how they feel about it only if they see it regula

pictured on their television screens is essentially naive a

patronizing.’’

61

Myth 6. Finally, another myth is that Americans do

like being the aggressors and won’t tolerate an offens

war. Except in extraordinary circumstances, most Am

cans dutifully follow the commander in chief on such m

ters as foreign relations where the public has little kno

edge or firmly held views. Remarkably, this tenden

prevails even when Americans initially may have dou

about the direction in which they are being led. A clas

example occurred in 1989. An October Gallup sur

asked respondents whether they favored or opposed us

‘‘U.S. military forces to invade Panama and overthrow No

ega.’’ Only 26 percent supported committing troops. Bar

two months later, President George Bush did comm

troops to Panama in Operation Just Cause. The pub

reaction was immediate: 89 percent of those questioned 

a Gallup Poll days after the invasion supported the pre

dent’s actions; just 13 percent were opposed. 62

Assuming that our national leaders understand th

concepts, they are in a position to cultivate the natio

will in support of a foreign policy decision. While no che

list exists to guarantee success, there are certain gui

lines to follow that will help them to at least conserve 

not to cultivate----the national will in supporting such 

decision.

National Will and Use of Military Force:

How to Cultivate It

The first concern for a leader who wants to cultivate 

national will is to understand the basic ideas on which 

United States is based. Kissinger was quoted earlier as 

described the basic ideas on which this nation w

founded and said ‘‘that the United States possessed 

world’s best system of government, and that the rest 

mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandon

traditional diplomacy and adopting America’s reverence 

KEY 
international law and democracy.’’

63 While national lead

must find their own words if they hope to garner supp

for their decisions to commit troops, they must build th

words on these basic ideas.

A second, related prerequisite for marshalling the 

tional will is to ensure the public has confidence in 

government. As Morgenthau argues, ‘‘A government tha

truly representative, not only in the sense of parliament

majorities, but above all in the sense of being able to tra

late the inarticulate convictions and aspirations of the p

ple into international objectives and policies, has the b

chance to marshal the national energies in support 

those objectives and policies.’’

64 This is, obviously, mu

easier said than done, but unless the American peo

perceive that the government places the nation’s welf

first, public support will be difficult to generate. It is eas

for a popular government to cultivate the national will th

for an unpopular one to do so. For example, it was pr

ably much easier for Ronald Reagan to cultivate the n

tional will in early 1984 than it would have been for Rich

Nixon in early 1974.

A corollary to this recommendation is that, to maxim

the national will in support of a policy, the executive a

legislative branches should work closely together and 

mutually supportive in developing and executing that p

icy. This is also obviously easier said than done, but 

Congress is the only organization within the governm

whose primary purpose is to articulate the will of the p

ple. If the government is to present itself as being tr

representative, as Morgenthau recommends, then the 

ecutive branch must consult frequently with Congress 

ensure the will of the people is taken into account wh

policy is made. To do otherwise is to appear either arroga

or incompetent or both, neither of which builds the con

dence of the people.

The national leadership also must understand how pu

lic opinion and the media work, as mentioned earlier. T

leadership should avoid being swayed by the results of q

show polling methods, especially shortly after a policy de

sion is made and announced. If polls are commissioned 

the leadership to gauge the national will, the leaders

22 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
should demand that the pollsters report to what stage pu

lic opinion has evolved on an issue. Unfortunately, opin

polls as presently reported do not indicate this. Lead

attempting to communicate with the public without t

information risk gridlock and frustration. Why? Because 

communicate with the populace, a leader has to kn

where people stand in their thinking and where they 

headed.65 Only on issues which they have thoroughly 

gested, as discussed earlier, can the public be expected 

register anything close to resembling a collective will. Si

larly, the leadership should pay attention to the news s

ries involving the issues and the policies in question a

determine the stage of media reporting. This method wh

combined with the stage of public opinion, will help 

leadership to interpret better the polling reports they 

receive and the media reports they review.

If the decision is reached to commit US troops, the n

tion’s leaders should prepare the public by laying out 

actly what these troops will be doing and why ----with 

concern for security considerations. Of great importance 

both the public and the military is the unambiguous sta

ment of clear, attainable, and measurable military obj

tives that will satisfy the policy objectives. Not only d

this procedure permit the military to provide a force app

priate to the mission, but it also establishes the guidelin

for the desired end-state that will signal the end of 

military phase of the operation and the withdrawal 

American forces.66

The nation’s leaders also need to communicate why 

deployment of forces is essential. If they do not, the g

ernment’s reactions to foreign events will appear disc

nected, and individual setbacks will appear to define 

whole.67 The leadership must not wait to do this becau

public opinion abhors a leadership vacuum. For examp

this hesitation hurt Lyndon B. Johnson in his reaction 

the Tet offensive. We need to recognize that there will be 

initial groundswell of support for the president ( ‘‘the r

effect’’) but also that support will erode with time. It w

erode because the opposition party and others not supp

tive of the president will debate the president’s actions a

question whether the same objective could be acco

KEY 
plished without the use of troops. In fact, that is what 

opposition party should do in the American system. Su

port also can erode as public opinion on the issue evol

through Yankelovich’s seven stages.

As the people think more about the issue, inevita

they will question its appropriateness. Naturally, they w

ask when the troops will be brought home. While stat

an exact date for the withdrawal of American troops is 

a good idea, it is a good idea to describe exit criteria th

will be used to measure success. That is, the leaders

must have a desired end-state for the operation in m

prior to committing troops, and they must describe t

desired end-state to the American public. If they cannot 

this, then perhaps the operation should not be undertak

in the first place. Again, following General Weyand’s log

the American people deserve to know why the leadership 

borrowing their army.

When putting out this message to the American peop

keep it relatively simple, make sure everyone is telling 

same story, and tell the story repeatedly. In Novem

1990 the Wall Street Journal hosted a roundtable disc

sion with a group of average Americans to talk about w

the US had deployed troops to the Middle East. During 

discussion ‘‘every one of the voters urged Mr. Bush to 

the American people much more about why hundreds 

thousands of US troops [had] been sent to the Pers

Gulf, and what they’re supposed to do there.’’

68 A comm

theme throughout the discussion was, ‘‘Don’t hold a

thing back, we can take it.’’ Just about all the participa

in the discussion were prepared to believe there were va

reasons for the deployment, but they were divided o

whether the reasons that had been given by the leaders

to that point actually explained US actions. Those w

believed the overriding reason was to curb Iraqi aggress

could accept that as a reason, but those who believed 

was the real reason for the operation had more difficulty

This point illuminates the importance of the leaders

understanding the basic ideas on which the nation 

based. The closer the reason for deployment approach

these core ideas, the more likely it is that American n

tional will will support them.

24 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
Finally, during and after the operation, the natio

leadership should reinforce success. For example, in 

malia when 18 Army Rangers were killed, the natio

leadership failed to point out that, on that same day, o

1,000 people were saved from dying from starvation (us

UN figures). This does not mean exaggerating success 

trying to sell the American public a bill of goods, as w

the case during the months preceding the Tet offensive

does mean accurately pointing out to the American peo

what has been accomplished and what remains undone

failure occurs, national leadership will be unable to hide 

given the omnipresent news media in today’s world. It h

to accept responsibility and explain what happened. Ag

though, in either case, the leadership should not overre

to overnight polling results. As Yankelovich points out

takes time for the public to fully digest an issue, and, ev

if failure occurs, it does not necessarily mean that 

national will to complete the mission has evaporated. 

us examine the Somalia operation.

Case in Point:

Somalia and United States National Will

The Somalia operation had its roots in UN Secur

Council Resolution 688, adopted on 5 April 1991. With t

resolution the Security Council declared for the first ti

that a member government’s repression of its own peopl

resulting in urgent humanitarian needs----constitute

threat to international peace and security. Following t

guideline the Security Council attempted to arrange 

cease-fire among the warring factions in Somalia but 

mid--1992 had made little progress. The civil war there c

tinued unabated, humanitarian assistance could not 

delivered, thousands of Somalis died of disease and star

tion, and the threat to hundreds of thousands more gr

daily. Somali gangs freely attacked UN facilities, steal

trucks, food, and fuel supplies.70

A 500-man Pakistani battalion was finally deployed 

October 1992, but they were immediately pinned down 

the Mogadishu airport. Other nations contemplated se

ing additional forces to assist with the peacekeeping, b

KEY 
they hesitated since there was no peace to keep. In Nove

ber the US State Department urged that a ‘‘major U

military force’’ should be sent, including US troops to d

tribute humanitarian assistance directly. The Departm

of Defense argued instead that a US-led coalition, not u

der UN jurisdiction, be dispatched to distribute aid. Th

plan had the UN replacing US forces after ‘‘a very sh

time.’’ On 25 November 1992 President Bush approved t

plan, provided the UN secretary general agreed. 71

The US plan presented to Boutros Boutros-Ghali 

volved deploying up to 30,000 troops (including those fr

other nations) to secure key ports, airports and roads, a

aid distribution centers in central and southern Soma

This limited mission was intended to stabilize the milit

situation only to the extent needed to avoid mass star

tion, and the US expected to hand the operation over to 

UN after three or four months. The mission was to 

conducted peacefully, but harsh force would be used 

prevent interference from Somali factions. The plan clea

stated that the US deployment would be under US co

mand. There also was no consideration of disarming 

various Somali factions nor any discussion of a US pr

ence in the northern secessionist region of Somaliland n

any mention of nation-building. The Security Council 

proved the US proposal and adopted Resolution 794 on 

December 1992. Authorizing US plans, the resolut

sought to establish ‘‘as soon as possible the necessary c

ditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.’’

72

US forces entered Somalia on 9 December 1992. On t

same day, however, the secretary-general told a delegat

sent from Washington to brief the secretariat that 

wanted the coalition not only to disarm the Somali factio

but also to defuse all mines in the country, set up a c

administration, and begin training civilian police. Over 

next few days the State Department reminded the UN t

the US saw its mission as limited but wanted to cooper

with the secretariat to hand over the operation to the U

When this hand-over took place, the US would consi

requests for logistical support but made no promises. 73

By late December-early January 1993, humanitarian 

sistance was regularly flowing to critical areas. Mediat

26 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
efforts were progressing, with all major factions agreeing 

a conference on national reconciliation to be held in m

March. US forces already were withdrawing and being 

placed by troops from other nations. By 20 January 19

the original plan and schedule were still on track, althou

the Somalia problem was definitely not solved. 74

By late February, with the new Clinton administration 

place, fighting among the Somali factions and with 

international force led some US officials to believe an ev

larger American contingent was needed to remain in 

malia to assist the UN forces. On 26 March the Secur

Council, under US pressure, adopted Resolution 8

which called on the secretary-general’s special rep

sentative ‘‘to assume responsibility for the consolidati

expansion, and maintenance of a secure environm

throughout Somalia.’’ The resolution also requested t

the secretary-general seek financing for ‘‘the rehabilitat

of the political institutions and economy of Somalia.’’ T

resolution essentially endorsed the concept of nati

building in Somalia; further, the resolution projected t

8,000 US logistical troops would remain along with 

1,000-member quick-reaction force. It, in effect, rep

sented a major change from the original objectives of 

operation. There was no consultation by the administ

tion with Congress about this major change, nor was 

reported heavily by the press. The actual hand over fr

the US-led coalition to the UN-led coalition then dragg

on until 4 May 1993.75

Shortly afterward, fighting broke out again in Mogadis

and other parts of Somalia. On 5 June forces believed to 

under the command of Gen Mohamed Farah Aideed 

tacked UN troops. At least 23 Pakistani peacekeepers w

killed, and many more were wounded. The Security Cou

cil immediately authorized the arrest of Aideed and oth

responsible for the attack, and US combat forces stru

positions believed to be held by Aideed followers. In eff

the UN had now taken sides against Aideed. Again, th

was little or no consultation with Congress. 76

Military operations continued throughout the summe

sometimes directed against civilians----and US and 

casualties mounted. Aideed, however, remained at lar

KEY 
More US forces were committed, including Army Ran

units. Despite these problems, the Clinton administrat

maintained its broad policy objectives, but ‘‘all of th

events were taking place in the context of confused admi

stration efforts . . . to articulate more fully what its lar

peacekeeping policies actually were.’’

77

Amidst these efforts to explain the administration’s 

jectives in Somalia, disaster struck. On 3 October18 Ra

ers were killed and many more wounded in a firefight 

Mogadishu. One American was taken hostage, and one 

his dead comrades was dragged naked through the ca

tal’s streets, appearing in media pictures around the wor

Bipartisan congressional anger erupted, and the Clin

administration tried to defend itself. However, according 

the Wall Street Journal in a 7 October report, lawmak

who attended a congressional briefing on 5 October s

Secretary Les Aspin was ‘‘confused and contradictory’’ a

that Secretary of State Warren S. Christopher ‘‘sat virtu

silent.’’ The administration immediately decided to dou

the US presence in Somalia and announced its intention 

withdraw entirely by 31 March 1994. 78

The conventional wisdom regarding the US decision 

withdraw had it that the US ‘‘lost its will to continue 

Somalia.’’ While there was an uproar in Congress over 

loss of the Rangers in Mogadishu and much criticism l

ied at the Clinton administration for its handling of 

affair, there is no convincing argument that US natio

will evaporated and that this evaporation was the reas

for the pullout. Rather, it was the administration’s perc

tion of the national will evaporating that percipitated wi

drawal. To support this argument, the guidelines propo

in the last chapter will be reviewed to determine whet

the national leadership did or did not follow them.

The first guideline involved the national leadership u

derstanding the basic ideas on which the nation is bas

Both the Bush and Clinton administrations understo

this, although they had different notions on policies t

best supported these basic ideas. They do not score as w

with the second guideline, however, in ensuring pub

confidence in the government. There was little coordinat

with Congress, and the Clinton administration’s perfor

28 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
ance when meeting with congressmen in the aftermath 

the Ranger debacle was less than professional. The c

gressional session with Christopher and Aspin was, in fa

a disaster and contributed as much to their problems w

the legislative branch as did the lack of coordination pr

to the operation.

As to public opinion polls, the Clinton administrat

demonstrated a lack of understanding of the relations

between public opinion and national will and overreac

in the aftermath of the disaster. For example, results of 

opinion poll published in the 18 October 1993 issue 

Time ostensibly demonstrated the deep public concern o

the Mogadishu incident. However, a closer look at 

questions suggests that, while there was justifiable c

cern, a definitive judgement on the state of the natio

will cannot be made. For example, when asked, ‘‘Wh

should be an important goal of the U.S. in Somalia? ’’ 

percent of the respondents said it should be ‘‘making s

U.S. soldiers taken prisoner are released.’’ While it in

cates reasonable concern over the health and well-being 

US troops, this question does not address the issue of 

national will. In fact, 63 percent said ‘‘capturing the Som

warlord responsible for attacking U.S. troops’’ should be 

important goal. This was the reason the Rangers went i

Mogadishu in the first place. Further, 43 percent said 

tablishing a stable government in Somalia’’ should be 

important goal.79 While certainly less than one-half of 

respondents, this total does not really indicate a wholes

abandonment of even the newer objectives set forth by 

Clinton administration. Also, the respondents may 

have really understood what was meant by stable gove

ment (such a lack of understanding is reasonable given 

administration’s apparent confusion over the term), so 

57 percent not choosing this as an important goal co

have been simply registering their confusion or ignoran

as to the definition of this term.

In another example, an ABC poll was conducted imm

diately following the fire fight. This poll showed that 

percent of Americans did not approve of President Clinto

handling of the situation, and two out of three responde

favored withdrawal of US troops. Even at that point, ho

KEY 
ever, one-half of those who favored withdrawal believed 

should be carried out gradually----over six months----a

with concern for a final peaceful settlement. Compara

polling results taken days and weeks later ----after Clinto

speech to the nation----demonstrated support for grad

disengagement and continued international monitoring 

political outcomes. While Congress reacted to the Ran

losses in Mogadishu with anger, the avalanche of deman

from the public for withdrawal did not really material

The principal public concern seemed to rest with pol

drift and confusion about the limits of American enga

ment.80 The point is that public opinion polls conducted 

the aftermath of Mogadishu did not gauge the natio

will. In fact, the public had not had time to really digest t

nature of the Somalia operation, so they had not ev

come close to Yankelovich’s seventh stage. There is no w

that these polls (and others like them) could have gaug

the true nature of the national will, despite the fact th

many in positions of responsibility interpreted these 

sults as the national will.

Similarly, there was a lack of understanding of how 

media was reporting the famine in Somalia, which was o

of the key sources of international pressure on the Bu

administration and, therefore, one of the reasons the 

got involved in the first place. Media reports, in fact, c

flicted on the severity of conditions in Somalia. A care

reading of press reports would have allowed readers 

notice the situation in Baidoa was improving, while 

situation in Bardera was getting worse, yet the overall i

pression created by these reports was that the entire cou

try was starving. Television cameras tended to seek 

and broadcast the worst cases, while the print me

played only a secondary role in the reporting. On 11 Oc

ber 1992, before US troops went in, Reuters reported t

the international relief efforts had turned the tide of de

in Baidoa, a symbol of Somalia’s agony. ‘‘The known d

death rate has dropped from 400 to around 100 in rec

weeks, [the Red Cross] says.’’

81

At the same time that conditions in Baidoa were impr

ing without international military intervention, news 

counts conveyed that 1,000 people were dying every day 

30 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
Somalia. Most news accounts echoed this 29 October 

port from the United Nations as found in the Washing

Post: ‘‘The new UN plan comes amid growing concern t

unless international relief efforts intensify, an estima

250,000 Somalis could die by the end of the year and 

additional 4.5 million could face starvation.’’

82

The intent of the UN report appears to have been 

generate big numbers to provoke a response. Further, 

actly what does it mean to face starvation? Nomads, 

example, probably face starvation all the time. Nor did a

one in the press point out that dire predictions did 

materialize. Typical of summertime newspaper stories w

this Associated Press dispatch: ‘‘The United Nations e

mates 1.5 million people are in imminent danger of sta

ing to death in Somalia while another 4.5 million are ne

ing a food crisis.’’

83

Contributing to the problem was that few corresp

dents put their observations in context. Most of them w

reporting from the so-called triangle of death that enco

passed the towns of Bardera and Baidoa. The report

were brought there, housed, and fed by relief agenc

working in those towns. The agencies travelled on the sa

roads that four armies had passed as Mohamed Far

Aidid battled first with the forces of Siad Barre and la

with soldiers loyal to Barre’s son-in-law, Mohamed He

Morgan. Bardera experienced a large increase in deaths 

mid-October 1992 after Aidid’s forces pulled out and M

gan’s fought their way in. This temporary surge in 

death rate coincided with a huge increase in media att

tion that made all of Somalia seem like Bardera. In ad

tion, relief camps were set up in major towns, presenting 

visiting reporters a concentration of misery that w

shocking to viewers.84

However, a different perspective could have resulted fr

talking to aid workers who had worked in Somalia but w

not providing relief at the time. ‘‘If you drove ten miles 

the main road, you found people living normal lives, ’’ s

Willie Huber of the Austrian agency SOS-Kinderdorf. Hu

had been in Somalia since the early 1980s and is the only 

worker who did not leave Mogadishu during the civil war. 8

KEY 
This discussion of media reporting underscores 

Bush administration’s overreaction to these media repo

Yes, conditions were bad in certain parts of Somalia, b

conditions also were actually improving before any troo

were sent. Had the national leadership a better und

standing of the nature of these media reports, they co

have better tailored their message to the American peo

to help in cultivating national will in support of the tro

deployment.

In preparing the public by articulating as clearly as p

sible exactly what the troops will be doing and why, t

was an obvious failure by both administrations. The Bu

administration never clearly laid out for the American pu

lic why the US was going into Somalia. The Clinton 

ministration complicated things even further by chang

the goals midstream, then not articulating them clearly 

the public. They even had difficulty articulating their obj

tives during their meeting with congressmen af

Mogadishu.

Contributing to this public confusion over the US go

in Somalia was the absence of a clearly articulated desi

end-state. As stated earlier, rather than identifying an e

point, a set of exit criteria should be defined as part of 

overall objectives of the operation so that the disenga

ment of peacekeeping forces should commence once c

tain critical objectives have been met. In Somalia, th

could have included creating local police forces; reactiv

ing local, district, and regional councils; completing ba

infrastructural repairs in the fertile region between 

Juba and Shebeele rivers; and, finally, offering clear e

dence that the process of national reconciliation, based 

the institution of clan elders, had taken root. 86

A final point regards the failure to point out the s

cesses that had been achieved when the Rangers di

Based on the figures the UN was advertising (if they can 

believed), on the day the 18 Rangers died in Mogadish

approximately 1,000 people were prevented from starvi

Had the administration reminded the US public of this

would have helped conserve the national will to contin

the humanitarian efforts in that country. Even with

that reinforcement, the American national will did not n

32 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
essarily evaporate when the Rangers died. There were r

sonable questions asked by Congress and others and cr

for withdrawal, but public opinion polls, while indicat

these same concerns, did not indicate an overwhelm

desire to depart Somalia. The national leadership made 

decision to depart based on a perceived lack of Ameri

national will to continue the operation.

Conclusion

National will plays a decisive role during any applicat

of US military power, not just the employment of forces 

fight America’s wars. Because of the decisive role of n

tional will, the nation’s leaders must understand what it 

not just its definition, but the ways in which this will c

be articulated and how it can be cultivated. That is, 

national will is not just part of the backdrop against wh

foreign policy decisions are made; it is an element of n

tional power that can be cultivated or groomed to gar

support for those decisions. This cultivation does not me

lying to the American people to justify irrational empl

ment of their army; rather, it involves clearly explaining 

them why the nation’s leaders need to borrow their ar

and when the people can expect to get it back.

In the case of the United States it is difficult to ma

definitive statements about the American will. The t

world wars were on foreign soil; there was no physi

damage to the homeland through invasion or bombi

and civilians were not endangered. The loss of Americ

life was small compared with that of the other combatan

Moreover, the standard of living at home was maintain

at a fairly high level. Sacrifices were minimal and las

just over a year in World War I and a bit over three a

one-half years in the Second World War ----compared w

four years for Britain and France in World War I and 

years for Britain in World War II. The Vietnam War ---

cause it was considered a limited war in response to 

limited threat----was never perceived by the public to p

much danger to American security, and life went on pre

much as usual in the United States. There is still no reco

on how the national morale will hold up when sacrifice 

KEY 
demanded in a real crisis.87 Because of this lack of exp

ence, one must look at various means by which the Ame

can public expresses its collective will. In the context 

foreign policy decision making, the most important mea

by which the American people express this will is throu

public opinion. Public opinion, though, infers opinion t

has fully evolved through all seven stages, as defined 

Yankelovich. Only this fully mature collective opinion c

represent national will. The nation’s leaders must und

stand how this evolution process works; they also need 

understand how the media report events because this 

porting can have an impact on how opinion evolves. 

nally, they need to understand how public opinion can 

cultivated. This paper presents several guidelines to 

them in this. Unfortunately, in Somalia the national le

ership did not understand the nature of national will a

how it can be cultivated. The lack of a clear explanation 

the American people as to why the US was involved, 

apparently changing objectives of the operation which w

undertaken without consulting with the people’s elec

representatives, and the overreaction to both public op

ion polls and media reporting reveal this lack of und

standing. One can only hope that future leaders will hav

better understanding of this vital component of natio

power and will avoid mistakes like those prevalent in 

malia.

Notes

1. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of 

Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing, 1982), 37.

2. Ibid., 33.

3. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Kn

1985), 134.

4. John Spanier, Games Nations Play (Washington, D.C.: Cong

sional Quarterly Press, 1986), 177.

5. Morgenthau, 134--40.

6. Ibid., 129.

7. Ibid., 134--40.

8. Ibid., 140.

9. Ibid., 135.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 129.

34 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL
12. Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: International Crea

Management, 1994), 18.

13. Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: L

Brown & Co., 1955), 31.

14. Ibid., 31.

15. Ibid., 34.

16. Ibid., 32.

17. Ibid., 34.

18. Miroslav Nincic, ‘‘A Sensible Public: New Perspectives on Pop

Opinion and Foreign Policy,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (Decem

1992): 773.

19. Lippmann, 19.

20. Ibid., 24.

21. Ibid., 41.

22. Nincic, 775.

23. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, ‘‘Effects of Public Opi

on Policy,’’ American Political Science Review 77 (1983): xi.

24. Nincic, 777.

25. Ibid.

26. Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governan

National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 89

27. Nincic, 777.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 776.

30. Elihu Katz, ‘‘The Two-step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-

Report on an Hypothesis,’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 11, 61--78.

31. Russett, 91.

32. Nincic, 781.

33. Page and Shapiro, 317.

34. Ibid., 319.

35. Ibid.

36. Daniel Yankelovich, ‘‘How Public Opinion Really Works,’’ For

126 (5 October 1992): 102.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 103.

40. Ibid., 104.

41. Ibid., 108.

42. Ibid.

43. Michael Maren, ‘‘Feeding a Famine,’’ Forbes Media Critic 2 

1994): 32.

44. Ibid., 33.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Catherine M. Kelleher, ‘‘Soldiering On,’’ Brookings Review 

(Spring 1994): 20.

51. Ibid., 27.

KEY 
52. Ibid., 29.

53. Ibid., 28.

54. Richard Morin, ‘‘How Much War Will Americans Support?’’ W

ington Post, 2 September 1990, B1-2.

55. Ibid.

56. John E. Mueller, ‘‘Presidential Popularity from Truman 

Johnson,’’ American Political Science Review 64 (May 1970): 18--34.

57. Ibid.

58. Morin, B2.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Mueller, 18.

62. Morin, B2.

63. Kissinger,18.

64. Morgenthau, 134.

65. Yankelovich, 102.

66. Edwin J. Arnold, Jr., ‘‘The Use of Military Power in Pursu

National Interests,’’ Parameters 24 (Spring 1994): 11.

67. Anthony Lake, ‘‘From Containment to Enlargement: Current For

Policy Debates in Perspective,’’ Vital Speeches, 15 October 1993, 14.

68. James M. Perry, ‘‘Voters Confused about U.S. Stand against I

Want Bush to Spell Out Reasons for Being in Gulf, ’’ Wall Street Jou

21 November 1990, A16.

69. Ibid.

70. John R. Bolton, ‘‘Wrong Turn in Somalia,’’ Foreign Affairs 

(January--February 1994): 57.

71. Ibid., 58.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., 60.

74. Ibid., 61.

75. Ibid., 61--65.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., 65.

79. George J. Church, ‘‘Anatomy of a Disaster,’’ Time 142 (18 Oct

1993): 42.

80. Kelleher, 22.

81. Maren, 36.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., 37.

85. Ibid., 36--37.

86. Mats R. Berdal, ‘‘Fateful Encounter: The United States and 

Peacekeeping,’’ Survival 36 (Spring 1994): 112.

87. Spanier, 177--78.

36 CULTIVATING NATIONAL WILL