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01inside_front.indd 1 11/17/06 12:21:40 PM
AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Near Space

Should Air Force Space Command 

Take Control of Its Shore?

KURT D. HALL

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 38

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 2006

02frontmatter.indd 1 11/17/06 12:22:28 PM
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web 

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press 

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

02frontmatter.indd 2 11/17/06 12:22:29 PM
iii

Foreword

In a time of transformation, the Department of Defense 

is pursuing a future force that will continue to adapt and 

build to meet new challenges. As the department shifts its 

capabilities across the four categories of challenges—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive—joint concepts and capabilities develop. After learning of significant 

shortfalls during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a capstone concept for joint 

operations that attempts to integrate the full spectrum 

of military efforts to meet any possible threat to security. 

These shortfalls include beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communication and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR)—enabling mission areas that support 

joint operations.

To solve such shortfalls, Gen John P. Jumper, former Air 

Force chief of staff, tasked Air Force Space Command with 

the responsibility of developing, fielding, and executing tactical and operationally responsive space capabilities near and 

through space. The newly created initiative known as Joint 

Warfighting Space focused on near space due to the advantage of achieving spacelike capabilities at a lower cost. Such 

capabilities could offer continuous, organic, survivable, and 

“stay and stare” persistence to theater commanders, thus 

potentially relieving the need for national and strategic systems. Effects-based operations, network-centric warfare, 

and rapid maneuver demand this persistence.

However, when one attempts to solve shortfalls, looking 

toward new technologies becomes just one of many possibilities. Optimizing existing capabilities, changing organizational structures, and refining tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) emerge as other options. Fully defining the 

capability within the context of the platforms, processes, 

organizations, and TTPs ensures the proper application of 

effort. This remains true when one defines persistent ISR, a 

more detailed definition of which would clarify the changes 

and investments that have the greatest impact on mission 

effectiveness.

This paper recommends caution before developing the 

near-space capabilities required for stay and stare, persis02frontmatter.indd 3 11/17/06 12:22:29 PM
iv

tent ISR, and BLOS communications. The technical challenges can prove more daunting than those associated with 

development of the high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle, 

a similar program lasting a decade and costing close to 

$2 billion. Several lessons from recent operations provide 

greater improvements to persistence and do not require additional collection systems. Finally, the paper offers several 

recommendations concerning the way ahead for near-space 

development.

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the 

spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and the serious 

consideration of issues. We encourage your responses.

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College

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v

About the Author

Lt Col Kurt Hall, USAF, is an action officer with Force 

Application, Joint Functional Capabilities Board, Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operational Requirements, Washington, DC. 

A command space and missile officer who has worked both 

air and space programs, he served as a test officer and project manager for the Space Test Office, Los Angeles AFB, 

California, and a special-projects manager in theater missile defense for the Fighter/Bomber Mission Area Office, 

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. After commanding the 45th

Operations Support Squadron, he became deputy operations group commander, Cape Canaveral AFS and Patrick 

AFB, Florida. Colonel Hall is a 2006 graduate of the Air War 

College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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02frontmatter.indd 6 11/17/06 12:22:29 PM
Abstract

Last century, the United States successfully translated 

lessons learned from past conflicts into needed capabilities 

to prepare for future threats. These capabilities took the 

form of new weapon systems, facilities, doctrine and training, and organizations. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

balanced limited resources to meet challenges across the 

entire range of military operations, accepting risk in some 

areas with the lowest probability of occurrence. The DOD 

examines this century’s conflicts, develops solutions, and 

balances resources in the same way. US armed forces demonstrated new technologies and approaches to conducting 

military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. They also supported disaster relief and humanitarian efforts, both in the 

continental United States and abroad. However, because 

the military still experienced inadequacies in some mission 

areas designed to combat the global war on terror, defend 

the homeland, and support federal and international agencies, the cycle of translating lessons learned into needed 

capabilities and balancing resources continues. From the 

myriad of lessons learned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a capstone document for joint operations that attempts 

to integrate the full spectrum of military efforts to meet any 

possible security challenge, thereby allowing effective development of joint capabilities with an efficient use of limited resources. Services develop and lead joint capabilities 

in their respective core competencies to ensure that all can 

access, share, and use these capabilities.

One lesson the DOD realized from recent conflicts as well 

as humanitarian and relief operations involves significant 

shortfalls in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), 

the enabling mission area that supports joint operations 

across the range of military operations. These shortfalls include tactical beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications 

on the move, persistent ISR, red-force tracking, change 

detection, detection of mines and improvised explosive devices, and all-weather imaging. To correct these shortfalls, 

Gen John P. Jumper, the former Air Force chief of staff, 

tasked Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) with the responvii

02frontmatter.indd 7 11/17/06 12:22:29 PM
sibility of developing, fielding, and executing tactical and 

operationally responsive space (ORS) capabilities near and 

through space. Although it has expertise in providing capabilities through and in space, AFSPC possesses no such 

skills in near space—the portion of Earth’s atmosphere 

above internationally controlled airspace (65,000 feet) and 

below the recognized limit of orbital space (60 miles).

Thus, AFSPC created the Joint Warfighting Space (JWS) 

initiative, which focuses on near space due to the claim of 

achieving spacelike capabilities at a lower cost and providing them directly to tactical commanders. AFSPC claims that 

future near-space systems will have BLOS communications 

and ISR persistence measured in days, weeks, and months, 

greatly exceeding the capabilities of long-endurance vehicles 

such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). These systems will 

look like neither satellites nor launch vehicles but more like 

balloons and blimps. The United States has had experience 

with the latter two since the 1930s—but at aircraft altitudes. 

Accordingly, the JWS team galvanized universities and commercial companies to improve current near-space capabilities, and recent experiments with balloons and tactical radios for BLOS communications show promise.

Certainly, effects-based operations, network-centric warfare, and rapid maneuver demand persistent C4ISR, but 

this paper urges AFSPC to exercise caution before investing in the development of near-space capabilities required 

for “stay and stare,” persistent ISR, and BLOS communications. It points out that daunting technical challenges exceed those encountered in the development of high-altitude 

UAVs, a similar program that began with significantly more 

technical maturity but took a decade and close to $2 billion to develop. The vehicle’s planform as it transits the atmosphere to its mission altitude, payload mass fraction at 

these altitudes, and gas management represent just a few 

of near space’s technical challenges. Investing in the development of near space would require the Air Force to drastically delay or terminate existing air and space systems, 

which offer dramatically more support and more return on 

investment. The need for and support of UAVs has grown 

exponentially since they first appeared in conflict six years 

ago. ORS initiatives such as transformational satellites have 

support at the highest levels of defense.

viii

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The paper also notes that several lessons from recent operations point to better solutions with more return on investment and do not require additional collection systems. 

Not investments in materiel, they are what the DOD refers 

to as doctrine, organization, training and education, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTLPF). Finally, the paper 

offers several recommendations regarding AFSPC’s monitoring of improvements in near-space technology as well as 

advances in C4ISR, all the while enhancing C4ISR support 

to the war fighter with existing space capabilities.

ix

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02frontmatter.indd 10 11/17/06 12:22:29 PM
1

Near Space

Should Air Force Space Command

Take Control of Its Shore?

Globalization and the Cold War’s end fundamentally 

changed the US security environment. In addition to traditional enemies such as hostile nation-states with large military formations, new foes now include asymmetric actors—

terrorists, weapons proliferators, organized criminals, cyber 

criminals, and drug traffickers—that represent small, fleeting targets. Higher demand for natural resources will lead to 

tension, migration, exploitation, and desperation. Causes of 

future disputes will reflect those of the last 15 years—borders, religion, ethnicity, culture, and resources—but will become more complex. Furthermore, as recent events have 

shown, strife will extend far beyond the affected region.

The Department of Defense (DOD), which demonstrated 

new approaches to conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, continues to digest lessons from recent 

conflicts as well as humanitarian-assistance efforts. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a capstone document for joint 

operations that attempts to integrate the full spectrum of 

military efforts with other instruments of national power to 

meet any possible security challenge. The document seeks 

to lead fiscally constrained force development and employment by providing a broad description of future joint operations.1

Key characteristics of this new concept include knowledge, networking, interoperability, expeditionary capability, 

adaptability/tailorability, endurance, precision, agility, and 

lethality.2 The enabling mission area known as command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) makes these characteristics possible.3 The need for intelligence gathering and target acquisition is as old as warfare itself. In the last century, 

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft as well as satellites performed 

this function. Having launched new ISR systems such as 

high-altitude-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (HAE 

UAV) during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the DOD began to realize these key characteristics. 

03newartice.indd 1 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
2

However, it also continued to experience C4ISR shortfalls, 

including those involving tactical beyond-line-of-sight 

(BLOS) communications on the move, persistent ISR, redforce tracking, change detection, detection of mines and improvised explosive devices, and all-weather imaging.4

To solve these shortfalls, Gen John P. Jumper, former 

chief of staff of the Air Force (CSAF), tasked Air Force Space 

Command (AFSPC) with the responsibility of developing, 

fielding, and executing tactical and operationally responsive 

space (ORS) capabilities near and through space. AFSPC 

created the Joint Warfighting Space (JWS) initiative, based 

on combatant commanders’ feedback that requested improvement in the tailoring and responsiveness of space.5

The JWS team focused on the near-space realm since it offered the prospect of achieving spacelike capabilities at lower 

cost. Moreover, AFSPC claims that future near-space systems will have BLOS communications and ISR persistence 

measured in days, weeks, and months.6 The command anticipates solving this need by operating communications 

and ISR payloads from near-space balloons and airships.7

Will near space be the final solution to persistence? Should 

AFSPC lead the near-space effort? This author urges caution before proceeding. Near space is not a panacea for difficulties with BLOS communications and persistent ISR; in 

fact, it may actually exacerbate current problems. An examination of Iraqi Freedom provides an overview of the current 

transformation of military operations and the capabilities required by the joint force commander (JFC). Like past transformations, this one demands C4ISR. Lessons learned from 

Iraqi Freedom also show the need for near-space capabilities. Effects-based operations, network-centric warfare, and 

rapid maneuver demand BLOS communications and persistent ISR. Admittedly, near space may offer a lower-cost solution than other capabilities.

Analysis of the technical and cost challenges of utilizing 

near space as compared to HAE UAVs provides an estimate 

of future investment by AFSPC. Despite the numerous potential benefits of near space, the associated technical hurdles are more substantial than those faced by UAVs (thus 

generating greater development and unit costs). In addition, overselling near-space capabilities before solving these 

problems could lead to cancellation of other AFSPC pro03newartice.indd 2 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
3

grams. This paper compares near-space vehicles with HAE 

UAVs only for the purpose of evaluating cost and technical 

concerns. Its focus remains on assessing near space’s contribution to BLOS communications and persistent ISR 

against all parts that comprise those systems. Shortfalls lie 

more within processing, exploitation, and dissemination. 

Smaller investments such as training make a greater contribution to solving the “intent” of persistence. Finally, this 

paper offers recommendations on how AFSPC should pursue near space.

Historically the Air Force has tried to solve problems with 

technology before fully optimizing organizational structure 

and operational concepts from newly fielded systems. Services also separately developed many systems that support 

inherently joint mission areas. As one of these areas, C4ISR 

has experienced these problems. Full realization of the 

characteristics of the joint concept of operations, within fiscal constraints, proposed by the chairman of the Joint Chief 

of Staff will require greater integration, system trade-offs, 

and better-trained personnel.

Operation Iraqi Freedom:

New Concepts Support Old Demands

According to Adm Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., JFC, the 

US military has gone through another transformation. Over 

the last 15 years, it transformed from “overwhelming force” 

to “overmatching power.” The former calls for the fielding of 

well-trained and well-equipped forces to ensure victory, and 

the latter involves the harnessing of all DOD capabilities in 

a coherently joint way, providing the attributes of knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality.8 The DOD shifted from 

service-centric forces needing deconfliction to a well-trained, 

integrated joint force. One mission area underpins these 

attributes: C4ISR.

National and theater C4ISR allowed rapid maneuver of 

Army and Marine forces toward Baghdad in a coordinated 

land campaign that covered ground in one quarter of the 

time it took to do so during the first Gulf War. According to 

the Air Force, assigned UAVs—part of the JFC’s theater ISR 

assets—augmented the U-2 Dragon Lady aircraft and provided continuous intelligence collection to support the com03newartice.indd 3 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
4

bined force commander’s operational and strategic objectives.9

Of the 1,801 coalition aircraft used during the campaign, 

80 supported the ISR mission—more than in any previous 

conflict.10 From airborne ISR alone, aircraft flew 1,000 sorties and collected 3,200 hours of streaming video; 2,400 

hours of signals intelligence; and 42,000 images.11 It is impossible to analyze these figures in relation to the separate 

parts of the operation. The combined force air component 

commander did not count apportionment percentages by 

mission for ISR assets, referring to ISR as “the cost of doing 

business.”12 However, all services agreed that UAVs played 

a critical role in the coalition’s success.

The introduction of UAVs as a new C4ISR system, integrated with other ISR platforms, helped transform the first 

Gulf War’s creed of “one plane, one target” to today’s “one 

bomb, one target,” demonstrated during Iraqi Freedom.13

The Air Force achieved regional ISR persistence by using 

distributed operations and reachback for smaller footprint, 

flexibility, and analytical capability.14 UAVs proved integral 

to operational planning and execution for the first time in a 

large-scale surface war. The MQ-1 Predator, for example, 

provided battlefield commanders real-time intelligence and 

demonstrated the feasibility of “hunter-killer” operations. 

Ground commanders relied heavily on Predators’ performing 24-hour operations and sorties averaging 20 hours.15

US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners based their 

daily war plans on the RQ-4 Global Hawk, which conducted 

strategic reconnaissance by flying 40-hour sorties.16

The Marines employed two UAV squadrons using RQ-2 

Pioneers to scout the road ahead, allowing sought-after battlefield flexibility necessary for rapid maneuver.17 The Army 

used the RQ-5 Hunter and the RQ-7 Shadow in a similar 

fashion.18 Gen T. Michael Moseley, combined force air component commander for Iraqi Freedom, stated that “we’re at 

a threshold of something very, very exciting and very, very 

new with unmanned aerial vehicles, whether they are unmanned combat aerial vehicles or reconnaissance vehicles.”19 UAVs proved so successful for employment of ISR 

that Congress provided more funds than the DOD requested. 

Thus the department plans to have 14 different UAVs in the 

force structure to perform a variety of missions, such as offensive combat using Hellfire missiles, sea-based opera03newartice.indd 4 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
5

tions, and improved situational awareness for force protection.20 Apparently UAVs are here to stay.

Marine and Army units operated new C4ISR communication systems during Iraqi Freedom. The Army’s 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) successfully communicated over 

greater distances using mobile command posts equipped 

with multiple single-channel radios, Iridium, and International Maritime Satellite communication systems. The division acquired and outfitted three M4 command-and-control 

vehicles, each possessing a tailored communications package including frequency modulation, high frequency, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System, tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios, Iridium phones, Force XXI Battle 

Command Brigade and Below information system, blueforce tracking, International Maritime Satellite data connection, and external connections for more robust data and 

phone connectivity.21 “The single channel TACSAT, [Force 

XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below], and Iridium 

served to provide a minimal [command-and-control], onthe-move capability.” The 1st Marine Division used similar 

satellite communication equipment, including devices for 

data transfer.22 Even with these capabilities, the 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) and 1st Marine Division experienced 

significant C4ISR shortfalls.

The numerous lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq offered conflicting information as to what went 

well and what needed improvement. Admiral Giambastiani 

undertook a pathfinding approach to lessons learned during 

Iraqi Freedom, deploying over 30 members of US Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) to the CENTCOM area of responsibility 

to observe the major combat operations phase.23 Lessons 

from special operations, the Army’s 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), and the 1st Marine Division (the major ground 

force during Iraqi Freedom) confirm the JFCOM lessons that 

require enhancement or new initiatives.

JFCOM identified ISR as a capability that needs enhancement. Repeated shortfalls from conflicts since the first Gulf 

War include knowledge of enemy-force composition and 

disposition in support of targeting.24 Neither the Army nor 

Marines had enough ISR assets to achieve conditions for 

effects-based operations, and only some of their battalions 

had organic UAV support for ISR.25 The Marines faced three 

03newartice.indd 5 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
6

Iraqi divisions without theater priority for ISR, and the Army 

had similar problems.26 Marines relied on nontraditional 

reconnaissance augmentation such as Cobra helicopters so 

that effects-based targeting assessment could keep up with 

rapid maneuver.27

Battle damage assessment and fratricide prevention continue to recur as lessons learned. According to JFCOM, 

these capabilities require new initiatives.28 Gen Tommy R. 

Franks, former CENTCOM commander and JFC for Iraqi 

Freedom, described fratricide prevention as an area requiring “additional work.”29 Army and Marine units voiced a 

need for better BLOS communications as well.

Admiral Giambastiani summarized lessons from Iraqi 

Freedom by detailing our force’s inability to perform effects 

or battle damage assessments during a high-speed, fastmoving campaign. Whether special operations need to look 

over the next ridge in search of insurgents, or whether Army 

brigades require rapid maneuver for conventional forces using unconventional tactics, or whether Marine platoons need 

to look around the next corner in urban operations, all of 

them require C4ISR. To conduct those operations in an effects-based and network-centric manner requires persistence. The Air Force claims that near space is the solution.

Near Space

Near-space platforms carrying critical systems into 

the far reaches of the atmosphere could include 

balloons, airships, or anything else that is persistent, cost-effective, survivable, and responsive.

—Gen Lance Lord, USAF, Retired

The Air Force’s charter calls for commanding the “vertical dimension,” which begins at Earth’s surface and extends to over 22,000 miles, capturing the furthest orbiting 

military satellites. Near space, which encompasses altitudes from 65,000 to 325,000 feet, remains the least exploited part of this dimension.30 The lower limit of near 

space begins above the internationally accepted ceiling of 

controlled airspace, where the air becomes too thin for most 

air-breathing aircraft. Its upper limit ends where air fric03newartice.indd 6 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
7

tion becomes too strong for low Earth satellites to maintain 

an orbit.

As mentioned above, General Jumper asked AFSPC to explore ways “to provide tailored, tactical-level space effects to 

combat forces.”31 The former CSAF highlighted the need for 

persistent ISR capabilities resulting from Iraqi Freedom.32

AFSPC’s Joint Warfighting Space initiative asserts that current technology shows promise in exploiting near space. Toward that end, the Air Force Space Battlelab conducted 

technology demonstrations using commercial technologies 

requiring minimal modifications.33

Current near-space vehicles take the form of heliumfilled balloons. Interestingly, the Air Force has 50 years’ experience working with high-altitude balloons.34 Tests of numerous space probes use them.35 Moreover, the DOD has 

used these aerostats in border protection and coastal radars.36 Business people, academicians, and hobbyists with 

an interest and experience in near space have developed 

prototypes for military applications. For example, students 

at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory 

built a 17-foot steerable helium blimp to help professional 

engineers who will build a full-scale military airship.37

Services within the DOD recently developed missionneeds statements for near space. A comparison of the need 

for UAVs with the Marines’ need for near-space vehicles 

highlights two solutions to the same shortfall—both of them 

unmanned systems (table 1). The key feature or selling 

point of each such statement entails how a new technology 

or capability can solve apparent weaknesses of fielded systems or gaps in capabilities. Systems providing extended, 

high-altitude surveillance and communications include 

HAE UAVs and high-altitude, long-loiter airships. The Marine Corps’ near-space mission-needs statement of 2004 

suggests recognizing the weaknesses of space as well as 

manned and unmanned air systems in delivering kinetic 

and nonkinetic combat functions from a stationary platform above the battlefield.38 The need for UAVs arose from 

gaps in space and manned ISR air capability in providing 

the same combat functions. How does near space solve 

weaknesses in the current system?

03newartice.indd 7 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
8

Table 1. Comparison of mission-needs statements

ISR Platform Statement of Need

Endurance UAVs

Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council 

Mission-Needs 

Statement 003-90 (1990)

War-fighting commanders in chief have a need 

to provide lower-level tactical units real-time, 

responsive reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition; electronic warfare; battle 

damage assessment; and nuclear, biological, 

and chemical detection capability against 

defended areas in close proximity to friendly 

forces. This capability is urgently needed 

to provide Army brigade commanders with 

improved situational awareness, to permit 

maneuver forces to move to points of positional 

advantage with greater speed and precision, 

avoiding enemy strengths, and then combine 

the effects of direct and indirect fires to seize 

and retain terrain or destroy enemy forces. 

Additionally, the close-range/tactical UAV will 

give maneuver-brigade commanders superior 

situational awareness for improved wide-area 

target acquisition and tracking of high-value 

targets to conduct both shaping and decisive 

operations with greatly increased lethality. 

The need is for a day/night, adverse-weather, 

multisensor collection system with improved 

connectivity to joint forces that provides 

needed, real-time battle information that cannot 

be observed from standoff airborne-sensor 

systems, ground-collection systems, and 

scouts.

Multimission 

Expeditionary Overhead 

Platform

(2004)

Overhead-platform capabilities are critical, 

and the need for multimission expeditionary 

overhead platforms recognizes the weaknesses 

of current space, UAV, and manned-aircraft 

solutions to the tactical needs and challenges. 

Specifically, there is a capability gap—an 

unfulfilled need for the maintenance of 

continuous, unobstructed line of sight between 

operators in compartmented, urban, and 

otherwise denied terrain and overhead systems 

that are fielded to support those operations. 

Space, UAV, and manned-aircraft limitations 

highlight this capability gap.

Adapted from Dr. Gerardo Melendez et al., “Real Time Simulation Experiment of an Integrated 

Concept for UAV / Direct Fire Weapons Systems,” http://cpof.ida.org/Uavpap~1.doc; a concept of 

operations for various classes of endurance UAVs, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/conops_

uav/part01.htm; and deputy commandant for plans, policies, and operations, to deputy commandant, Marine Corps Combat Development Center, memorandum, 22 November 2004, 2.

03newartice.indd 8 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
9

Benefits of Near Space

Near space appears to offer compelling advantages. Lt 

Col Edward Tomme, with AFSPC’s Tactical Exploitation of 

National Capabilities program, characterizes near space as 

a combat-effects enabler that offers survivable, organic, 

and continuous persistence to theater commanders for 

“stay and stare” space capabilities. One achieves such persistence in space only by means of either constellations or 

very distant and expensive geostationary orbits. Near-space 

vehicles could stay and stare for weeks or months as opposed to UAVs, whose missions last 24–40 hours.39

Communications have immediate utility. The services experienced a shortage of single-channel TACSAT ultrahigh 

frequencies to support all of CENTCOM’s needs during Iraqi 

Freedom.40 Recent demonstrations of the Space Battlelab’s 

Combat SkySat offer potential satellite augmentation by extending ground-force communications from line of sight to 

400 miles.41

With this capability, near-space systems could function 

as surrogate satellites, offering the advantages of shorter 

transmission distances and shorter ranges for sensor surveillance. Near-space advocates also suggest economic benefits. Estimates for low-end near-space vehicles run approximately $1,000 per platform, excluding payload, whereas 

those for high-altitude airships—the high end of near space—

come to $50 million per platform.42 Advocates claim that, 

compared to manned and unmanned ISR satellites, near 

space “easily win[s] the cost competition.”43

Near space also offers more responsiveness than space 

systems. After attaining their orbits, satellites can take 

months for system calibration and checkout, whereas a 

near-space vehicle requires only two hours to arrive at an 

altitude of 120,000 feet and can then reach Korea or Afghanistan from the continental United States within a 

week.44 Proponents of near space also point to coverage as 

an advantage. Near-space vehicles could possess imagery 

footprints similar to those of satellites in low Earth orbit 

but house smaller payloads because they do not need to 

work through the ionosphere.45 Thus near space offers 

unique opportunities for communications, reconnaissance, 

and surveillance.46

03newartice.indd 9 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
10

Employment in Near Space

At the low end, employment benefits of near space include disposable free-floating balloons, launched by Air 

Force tactical-air-control-party Stryker units, with organic 

BLOS communications capability for better close air support. Typical weather-style balloons could place tens of 

pounds to altitudes up to 20 miles.47 Because of their very 

low unit cost, balloons maintain persistence through replenishment.

At the high end, airships launched and maintained from 

the continental United States by US Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) forces as global ISR assets would offer zero footprint in-theater. The command’s forces would assign geostationary locations prior to launch, based on requests from theater commanders. Once an airship arrived in-theater, its 

adaptive C4ISR node would provide the JFC with a programmable radio-frequency system as well as signals-intelligence, 

electronic-warfare, and imagery-intelligence architectures.48

The combined force air component commander would own 

the asset as well as the payload operated and managed by the 

air and space operations center’s ISR division. As the theater 

commander’s “eye in the sky,” an airship hovering at 90,000 

feet produces a line of sight to the horizon of approximately 

325 nautical miles.49 Thus one airship could monitor almost 

all of Afghanistan, sending data to the Distributed Common 

Ground/Surface System—a new joint-service, Internet-like, 

intelligence-sharing network. Since airships are operationally 

similar to UAVs, the potential exists for sharing facilities and 

communications for flight control.50

Clearly, one sees great opportunities for near space. Vehicles operating there could also apply kinetic effects, as 

did UAVs in Pakistan against suspected al-Qaeda leaders. 

Although these craft could perform a variety of missions, 

this paper limits itself to BLOS communications and persistent ISR—the focus of current JWS and Missile Defense 

Agency demonstrations.

Investments

Near space could provide the theater commander with 

organic stay-and-stare ISR and BLOS communication ca03newartice.indd 10 11/17/06 12:22:59 PM
11

pabilities at both a lower cost and a smaller deployed footprint. However, can the Air Force invest in near-space development, given its present space systems and ISR 

commitments? In actuality, making smaller investments in 

ISR can produce greater returns in a shorter time.

Limitations

As mentioned earlier, near-space technologies offer tremendous benefits. At the low end of technology/cost, minor 

modifications would make some systems available today, 

but as technology moves toward the high end, limitations 

and vulnerabilities become daunting. The maneuver airships required to house U-2, Global Hawk, or TACSAT communication packages remain on the drawing board because 

engineers must solve a number of technical issues.

Structure may pose the greatest challenge. According to a 

RAND study, helium leakage will likely represent the “binding constraint to high-altitude, long-loiter airship endurance,” and ultraviolet radiation degrades hull fabric.51 Designers and engineers must allow for the hazardous and 

turbulent lower atmosphere, where vehicles ascend and descend. Although metallized and reflective coating in the fabric might increase hull strength, the increased radar cross 

section could make the craft vulnerable to air defenses.52

Operating at near-space altitudes also presents a massfraction challenge for airships.53 Lowering altitude to below 

65,000 feet would help, but overcoming atmospheric gusts 

requires an increase in hull strength (and empty weight) 

and decreases available payload mass.54 Because gust criteria significantly influence an airship’s hull strength and 

shear feasibility, high-altitude, long-loiter vehicles would 

then fall under the same air-defense vulnerabilities as do 

HAE UAVs.

Controllability represents another significant concern. 

An airship, which must take off and land through the normal atmosphere, requires greater downwind segments because engineers match its propulsion system to the vehicle’s operating altitude. Since air is less dense at operating 

altitudes, designing a maximum speed of 90 knots at 65,000 

feet results in a top speed of only 38 knots at sea level.55

Furthermore, if the vehicle launches in the United States, 

03newartice.indd 11 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
12

air-traffic control becomes an issue. Additionally, the effects of airspace, weather, and the airship’s large inertia 

create a need for power and lift controls. Trade-offs among 

safety factors, weight, and operating altitudes will occur, 

possibly driving the reduction of operating ceiling and endurance and thereby negating the benefits.

Power, gas, and heat management present smaller challenges but require innovative solutions. Fossil fuel adds 

more weight; thus solar cells become the power source of 

choice, especially for the endurance benefit. However, propellers, gas pumps, compressors, and, of course, payloads 

increase the demand for power. Engineers must also design 

helium cells to expand and contract at the same rate for 

load distribution, hull stress, and control.56 Again, tradeoffs may drive lower operating altitudes and endurance.

Despite its smaller radar cross section, an airship possesses a distinctive infrared signature due to the high temperature of the skin and internal gases. Moreover, normal 

communications broadcasting or surveillance-radar emissions produce radio-frequency signatures. If the design 

drives the operating ceiling to 65,000 feet, Russian SA-5, 

SA-10, SA-12, SA-20, and Chinese MIM-104 2000 missiles 

could reach these vehicles. Although tests show that a 

small, nonrigid airship could withstand numerous bullet 

holes and perform a controlled landing, the design requires 

sufficient strength to prevent “unzipping” or a tear propagating across the fabric.

Cost

Development and employment of airship systems will resemble those procedures for UAV systems. Indeed, the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 2005–2030 uses UAV 

development and unit costs to obtain an idea of the investment required for airship systems. Comparing airships to 

HAE UAV systems (Global Hawk and DarkStar, see below) 

provides an understanding of the complexity of airship development in relation to other such efforts. Before proceeding, 

however, one should realize that (1) airship design appears to 

have more development challenges than the HAE UAVs of the 

1990s and (2) UAVs saw three decades of poor performance. 

Technical difficulties led to cost increases and schedule ex03newartice.indd 12 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
13

tensions, resulting in the cancellation of programs in almost 

every case. Although near-space initiatives can benefit from 

these lessons, advocates should not become overly optimistic 

about easily overcoming technical challenges.

The Global Hawk system consists of several mission segments: an air vehicle, payload, engine (power and propulsion), communications, and ground element. Airships will 

have similar segments. Additionally, airships could use many 

of the Global Hawk’s key components, available as commercial off-the-shelf equipment. The Global Hawk’s basic airvehicle planform was not revolutionary and did not pose any 

difficulty to speak of.57 In the case of the DarkStar UAV’s 

planform, engineers relied on F-117 and B-2 technologies to 

demonstrate a multiaspect, low-observable capability.58 As 

described above, this will not hold true for an airship’s planform. The most significant challenge for Global Hawk and 

DarkStar entailed integrating payload with the aircraft and 

developing connectivity required to move data (imagery, signals, etc.) from the aircraft to multiple users.59 Development 

of airship connectivity can benefit greatly from the work already accomplished for UAVs, but airships will also face sophisticated software and systems-engineering hurdles.

Airship designers must also develop and integrate reliable sensors for on-site or onboard meteorological data by 

which controllers or onboard computers can predict turbulence, icing, and violent gusts, any of which can jeopardize 

the vehicle.60 No current database predicts aerostructural 

interactions of large airships with turbulence and gust criteria.61 The Navy’s airship program came to this realization 

during the 1930s, when 73 crew members lost their lives 

when the USS Akron crashed in a storm off the New Jersey 

coast in 1933.62

Airship-acquisition strategy will likely be the same as 

that for HAE UAVs, which used a multiphase Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstration approach. These programs originally called for completion of the first three 

phases in five years, but Global Hawk needed seven. After 

five years, several cost increases, and schedule extensions, 

the Air Force cancelled the DarkStar program. After one 

rules out 30 years of development woes, it appears that at 

the low end, the DOD needs to invest $1.4 billion to develop 

an airship system. Considering the daunting technical chal03newartice.indd 13 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
14

lenges, $2 billion plus and almost a decade may come closer 

to the actual expenditure and time required (table 2).

Best Bang for the Buck

As we have seen, Iraqi Freedom forces had at their disposal 80 ISR aircraft that provided thousands of hours of 

information and tens of thousands of images. When one 

adds these aircraft to satellite and nontraditional collectors, 

the amount of information and imagery rises by well over 

an order of magnitude. Having access to an unprecedented 

amount of data, the JFC allowed ground forces to maneuver more rapidly than in past operations. This information 

also permitted the military to realize the beginnings of effects-based operations and network-centric warfare, the 

foundations for overmatching power. Fully supporting these 

concepts, senior military leaders continue to press for persistent ISR. But what exactly is persistent ISR, and which 

direction should the DOD take to obtain it?

Although no joint definition for this concept exists, James 

Roche, former secretary of the Air Force, observes that persistent ISR is “a matter of integrating various and sundry 

sensors into a portfolio of sensors, making them all work 

together.”63 Michael Keebaugh offers another, perhaps more 

Table 2. Cost comparison of HAE UAVs versus near-space vehicles

Vehicle Estimated Development Costs ($) Estimated Unit Costs ($)

Global Hawk 1.4–1.9 billion 70 million

DarkStar 324 million program cancelled

Near-Space 

Airship

2 billion+ 50 million

Derived from Lewis Jamison, Geoffrey S. Sommer, and Isaac R. Porche III, High-Altitude Airships for 

the Future Force Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_ 

reports/2005/RAND_TR234.pdf; and Robert S. Leonard and Jeffrey A. Drezner, Innovative Development: Global Hawk and DarkStar—HAE UAV ACTD [Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration] 

Program Description and Comparative Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), http://www.rand.

org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1474.

03newartice.indd 14 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
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accurate, definition: “an uninterrupted flow of information 

over extended periods to provide knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions.”64 Although accurate, 

neither is complete.

All combatant commanders agree that persistent ISR is 

mandatory across the spectrum of military operations, so 

successful operations require a better definition. Responding to the enemies of today demands adaptability through 

rapidly mobilized, specialized local knowledge; the capability for networked, multilateral threat analysis; and the quick 

delivery of rapidly packaged information to the operator. 

Thus, one can describe persistent ISR as the uninterrupted 

flow of actionable intelligence over extended periods that remains accessible to the operator and that provides knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions. Having 

further defined persistent ISR, we can now inquire about 

the existence of better investments with quicker returns 

than high-altitude, long-loiter systems.

Maj Gen James “Spider” Marks, USA, the senior intelligence officer during combat operations in Iraqi Freedom, 

recalls that trained analysts had trouble deciphering data in 

the battle zone because enemy forces were changing their 

organization and grouping.65 As a result, analysts lost track 

of what was happening. Lt Gen William S. Wallace, USA, V 

Corps commander during Iraqi Freedom, stated that “the 

intelligence analysts were trying to fit a pattern we were seeing into an order of battle that was increasingly irrelevant. 

You had this squirrelly combination of foreign fighters in different forms and Iraqi paramilitary. The paramilitary forces 

. . . had no discernable pattern.”66 Gen T. Michael Moseley, 

the current CSAF, also subscribes to intelligence analysts 

who possess more in-depth culture and red-team training. 

Adding more collection systems cannot solve this problem.

A related issue concerns the training of junior intelligence officers in basic analysis and targeting. A team from 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned observed intelligence 

functions during Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 

finding that intelligence officers did not understand the targeting process, could not build products that supported the 

process, lacked briefing skills, had few to no analytical 

skills, and did not understand ISR planning.67 Again, collection systems will not solve this problem.

03newartice.indd 15 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
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One must also raise the issue of poor collection management due to the lack of formal training of managers. During 

Iraqi Freedom, collection managers did not have a full understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the ISR 

assets tasked.68 For example, they tasked UAVs to find buried aircraft and either ignored or forgot collection-control 

measures.69 Adding more collection systems would compound this problem.

Human intelligence (HUMINT), one of our most valuable 

assets, is critical not only for urban, stability, and support 

operations, but also for humanitarian and shaping operations. US armed forces did not have enough tactical HUMINT teams, and combat-arms commanders did not understand how to use them.70 We lacked even simple HUMINT 

functions (e.g., interpreters). If the sources prove credible, 

this asset provides the catalyst for all-source intelligence in 

determining the adversary’s intent. Adding more collection 

systems will not solve this problem.

Though not as critical as HUMINT, bandwidth and connectivity are essential for network-centric operations. According to Lt Gen Harry D. Raduege Jr., USAF, retired, former director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, 

US and coalition forces had 30 percent more bandwidth 

supporting 45 percent fewer troops than they did in the first 

Gulf War. Even with this increase, commanders demanded 

more, claiming that the bandwidth restriction limited the 

numbers of targets war fighters could engage.71 Sufficient 

bandwidth seemed available at the operational level but 

clearly not enough to push the network down to the tactical 

level.72 The large size of the weapon-system video demanded 

high bandwidth not available to many tactical units.73 Units 

then e-mailed video using the Secret Internet Protocol Router 

Network or file transfer protocol to the combined air operations center and then to CENTCOM’s Joint Intelligence Center in Tampa via file transfer protocol. These file transfers 

eventually hindered collection and targeting efforts due to 

overlapping and duplicative requirements and analyses.74

For example, the combined air operations center imaged 

one target with three different ISR assets on one day even 

though intelligence did not exploit the previous day’s image 

of the same target and could have satisfied the requirement.75 Adding collection systems could help support this 

03newartice.indd 16 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
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increased demand but could also compound it by pushing 

more data and information “in the pipe.”

Since we may never have enough bandwidth, we need 

bandwidth management and synergistic connectivity. Again, 

the military rushes to solve problems with technology and 

then pushes it to the war fighter without integration and 

optimization. For example, according to a member of the 1st 

Marine Division,

members of my force often had to use a helmet headset, four radios 

and two laptop computers—all crammed into a light armored vehicle—all at once. . . . We were overwhelmed with communications 

systems for every eventuality, but these did not really integrate with 

each other. For example, a Marine commander riding aboard a [light 

armored vehicle] had to use a headset to use the intercom to talk 

to his driver and gunner, answer his squad leaders by grabbing [a] 

hand-held radio and speak to accompanying infantry by another 

radio, all this while monitoring two laptop positions of friendly and 

hostile forces!76

As one senior commander mentions in his report, “No matter 

how perfect a future network and CP [mobile commandpost operations] we build, it won’t do us much good until we fix the overarching problem of bandwidth management.”77 Adding collection or repeater systems will not solve 

this problem.

Caution

Elevated bandwidth alone is not the answer. More and 

faster does not always equate to better. Seeing everything all 

the time is a lofty but unrealistic goal. What value is raw 

imagery data to a pilot, tank driver, or Marine infantryman? 

Such data provides no value-added intelligence information, 

especially to a nonimagery analyst. C4ISR, probably the 

most complex mission area, requires balanced solutions that 

provide the best return on limited dollars. Given the need to 

recapitalize the Army, Marines, and special forces, the Air 

Force will have to make some tough budget decisions.

Should the DOD continue to pursue near space? Yes, the 

Air Force should explore its entire realm and exploit any 

opportunity. Near space could provide persistence over a 

given area, but it will not solve all communication or ISR 

shortfalls. Near space could augment other mission areas 

as well as expand to other roles, such as force application. 

03newartice.indd 17 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
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Should AFSPC take the lead and invest heavily in near 

space? Before answering, advocates should consider the 

C4ISR trade space.

First, the DOD (especially the Air Force) invests heavily in 

UAVs. For the Predator, Global Hawk, and Joint Unmanned 

Combat Air System, the Air Force has budgeted $1.4 billion 

for fiscal year 2006 and about $9.6 billion for years 2007 to 

2011.78 This translates to fielding and operating 120 Predators, 58 Global Hawks, and six Joint Unmanned Combat Air 

Systems. Combined with the other services’ UAV investments, the DOD could control close to 900 UAVs.79 Interestingly, of the airships listed in the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Roadmap, 2005–2030, only the Avenger airship operates in 

the near-space realm, and the Air Force cancelled the program in November 2004.80 The Missile Defense Agency’s 

high-altitude airship operates within UAV altitudes.

Second, the DOD (especially the Air Force, with AFSPC 

as lead) invests heavily in the operationally responsive 

space program, which has both congressional support and 

the full backing of the secretary of defense’s Office of Force 

Transformation. Examples of this program include the Tactical Microsatellite Experiment (TacSat) program sponsored 

by the Office of Force Transformation, the Naval Research 

Laboratory, the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center, and several other agencies. The program has four satellites in various stages of development. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has such confidence in this program that 

it funded the first experiment—TacSat-1.81 The experiments 

run from exploitation of the Secret Internet Protocol Router 

Network, through tactical and hyperspectral imaging, to an 

all-communications payload. The space segment of ORS offers unique capabilities (fig. 1).

Third, the Air Force and AFSPC invest in optimizing existing capabilities—another segment of ORS. Recent examples from Iraqi Freedom include improving accuracy by 

means of the global positioning system’s enhanced theater 

support and the Defense Support Program’s backing of 

combat-search-and-rescue missions.82 Also included are 

increasing military-satellite theater communications by repositioning the Defense Satellite Communication System 

and accelerating early checkout of that system’s new satellites and Milstar satellites.83

03newartice.indd 18 11/17/06 12:23:00 PM
19

Even with the planned reduction in Air Force personnel 

to help increase the service’s investment, operations, and 

maintenance portfolios, it still faces tough decisions on future programs. Based on heavy investments in UAVs, congressional support for ORS, and the optimizing of existing 

space systems (coupled with the Air Force’s substantial 

commitments to air and space systems), we may have no 

room left for a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program.

Recommendations

Stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, hurricane-relief efforts in the United States, and 

force transformation are creating a fiscally constrained environment for new investments. Tight budgets are projected, 

and General Moseley believes that trade-offs are inevitable 

Figure 1. Proposed capabilities set for tactical microsatellites. (From briefing, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Applied 

Physics Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory, subject: A TacSat Update and the ORS/JWS Standard Bus, Third Responsive 

Space Conference, 26 April 2005.)

03newartice.indd 19 11/17/06 12:23:01 PM
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for the Air Force’s strike, mobility, and space/C4ISR portfolios: “If we have programs that have had exponential [cost] 

growth and we need to roll that money back, it’s time to be 

killing some things.”84 Space radar and the transformational 

communications satellite program fall into this category of 

trade-offs due to large cost overruns.85 According to the Congressional Budget Office, financing the current space portfolio for “unclassified space systems” will require an increase 

of 40 percent, estimated at $6.9 billion. By 2010 the budget 

will almost double to over $10 billion.86 With increases this 

large, further trade-offs are inevitable. Thus, the Air Force 

will have two internal competitions: one between Air Combat 

Command and AFSPC concerning manned and unmanned 

aerial systems versus space-based ISR (what the author 

calls “big space” programs) and another within AFSPC concerning near-space airships and tactical microsatellites.

With regard to the first competition, the Air Force is 

clearly investing in UAVs, HUMINT, and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). The assistant 

deputy chief of staff for air and space operations believes 

that contributions made by UAVs during Iraqi Freedom 

were the most significant made by the Air Force.87 Almost 

all the airships and aerostats within the Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems Roadmap, 2005–2030 operate in the air regime although some operate slightly above controlled airspace. The 

CSAF commented that the JSTARS could track the Iraqi 

Republican Guard in a sandstorm and that it provided “a 

tremendous asymmetric advantage.”88 Almost every Army 

lesson learned praised this system’s achievements. General 

Moseley also stated that the Air Force needs more HUMINT 

resources to keep pace with technology.89

With regard to the second competition, ORS has the highest level of support, resembling the joint/multiagency consolidation required to focus effort and save money. The JWS 

office claims that this initiative involves ORS plus near 

space, each complementing the other. However, near space 

does not appear to have the same support as ORS, nor have 

near-space experiments and demonstrations of the past 

been truly joint. A search of briefings and papers in the Responsive Space Web site (http://www.responsivespace 

.com)—which includes a collection of material from the first 

three ORS conferences—found no detailed concepts that 

03newartice.indd 20 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
21

link ORS and near-space capabilities operationally. Given 

these issues, AFSPC should keep near-space investment 

low in the short term to midterm.

This paper offers a way ahead. First, AFSPC should participate in STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command ISR process, one of whose primary functions calls for 

adapting ISR collection strategies to satisfy revolving requirements.90 As the joint community demonstrates, tests, 

and fields ISR solutions, AFSPC can continue to assess 

shortfalls and weaknesses against near-space benefits. 

Second, we should ensure that the joint community engages 

in near-space concepts and demonstrations. The Space 

Battlelab is moving in the right direction by participating in 

JFCOM’s Joint Experimentation, Test, and Evaluation Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration for fiscal year 

2006.91 By not participating in the JFCOM experimentation 

process, near-space demonstrations such as Combat SkySat require independent and close coordination with the 

Army’s new doctrine for battle command on the move, the 

Joint Tactical Radio System, changes in Marine and special 

forces doctrine, and the J6 communications community on 

architecture and interference issues—and a service-specific 

capability would emerge.

For example, the Space Battlelab’s Combat SkySat project claims it can help close-air-support controllers in the 

tactical air control party. The demonstration uses a PRC-148 

tactical radio; however, units already have the AN/PRC-150 

high-frequency and low-band very-high-frequency tactical 

radios, capable of automatically selecting the correct frequency to bounce off the ionosphere and thus offering BLOS 

communications.92 The radio uses a transmission technique called near-vertical-incident sky wave, which launches 

signal energy toward the sky at angles between 45 degrees 

and the zenith and returns to Earth after ionospheric reflection. The returning signal comes down from above at 

high angles in an omnidirectional pattern that has no gaps 

and a radius of hundreds of miles. The DOD must weigh 

the benefits of continuously launching balloons to extend 

range against new fielded capabilities that offer the same 

advantage.

Third, the Air Force intends to establish a program office 

in 2008, based on demonstrations of Combat SkySat.93 But

03newartice.indd 21 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
22

we should delay establishing such an office for near space 

until the commercial and civil communities bring the technology to maturity, which will take a number of years. Since 

near-space systems in the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Roadmap, 2005–2030 operate in the air regime, the Aeronautical Systems Center’s Reconnaissance Office would be 

the best program office—an established organization that 

manages the Air Force’s UAV programs.

As stated earlier, AFSPC appears to have an internal competition between near space and ORS. Both initiatives offer 

significant organic capabilities to the theater commander. 

The fourth recommendation calls for using ORS conferences 

to vigorously debate the capabilities of near space versus 

those of tactical satellites. Even with a significant level of 

support and the potential for early success, it may prove difficult for AFSPC to receive procurement authority for ORS 

capabilities due to fiscal realities. However, the command 

must consider the United States’ space race with Asia and 

Europe. Investing in lower-cost access to space as well as 

lower operations from space offers a much greater return.

AFSPC’s Detachment 12 can continue as the command’s 

virtual program office, coordinating efforts from the Air 

Force Research Laboratory and Space Battlelab. Detachment 

12 can monitor commercial, civil, and Missile Defense Agency 

development efforts until a controllable vehicle can operate 

successfully at altitudes at or above 100,000 feet. It may take 

five to seven years to attain this level of maturity. Until then 

the primary focus should remain on ORS lift and operations.

One finds a good many resource issues with space even 

in doctrine. Air Staff experts disapproved using the term 

near space in space-operations doctrine, evidently because 

they feared that such inclusion, combined with the overselling of its capabilities and potential in the press, might 

drive unwanted resources decisions.94 Near space must 

wait for the next decade, when the DOD fields sister services’ recapitalization and current Air Force investments.

Summary and Conclusion

US armed forces demonstrated new technologies and approaches to conducting military operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. They also supported disaster relief and humani03newartice.indd 22 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
23

tarian efforts both in the continental United States and 

abroad. From the myriad of lessons learned, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff developed a capstone document to guide the 

services on how to integrate their competencies across the 

full spectrum of military efforts for a truly joint effect.

Shortfalls in capability drove new doctrines, new technologies, and the optimization of existing capabilities. The 

key lies in balancing these drives and prioritizing which 

technology investments can offer the greatest benefit. Although the US military saw unprecedented capability in 

C4ISR during the last five years, it also experienced its 

share of shortfalls. General Jumper, former CSAF, responded to theater commanders’ feedback by articulating 

the need for a JWS initiative to make space more tailored 

and responsive and by directing AFSPC to lead this effort. 

The JWS team focused on near space due to the potential 

advantage of achieving spacelike C4ISR capabilities at a 

lower cost—near space’s greatest benefit.

This paper has urged that AFSPC exercise caution in investing in near space for the near term. The technical challenges of developing a UAV-like capability for airships are 

daunting. An examination of HAE UAV cost data suggests 

that estimates for airship development approach $2 billion 

and that the process would require nearly a decade to 

achieve capabilities similar to those of UAVs. Unit costs for 

airships are comparable to those for Global Hawks.

After defining persistence accurately and analyzing lessons learned in greater detail, one can realize cheaper investments with a quicker return. Those investments include 

better training of intelligence officers as well as more HUMINT, bandwidth management, and connectivity. Adding 

more collectors and repeaters will neither determine an adversary’s intent nor necessarily place actionable intelligence 

down to the tactical level. By better integrating the mosaics 

of all forms of space intelligence in near real time with airborne-platform coverage, combined with HUMINT and data 

from open sources, one could create a new form of spacecentered joint intelligence that would lead to improved situational awareness and targeting capability.95

All services invest heavily in C4ISR. By 2011 the inventory will swarm with close to 900 UAVs. The Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, AFSPC, and other agencies have in03newartice.indd 23 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
24

vested in ORS in a truly joint effort. Developing low-cost 

access to space and operations from space not only will 

provide tailored, responsive support to the theater but also 

will help the United States maintain its global lead in space. 

Finally, AFSPC continues to optimize existing space capabilities to meet the theater commander’s needs. All big-space 

programs currently in development must do the same.

Since these investments—combined synergistically with 

the training, bandwidth management, and connectivity investments outlined above—could better solve persistence, 

AFSPC should exercise caution when investing in near 

space. The author has offered several recommendations for 

monitoring near-space development and preparing the joint 

community for its integration when the technology matures. 

Participating in STRATCOM’s ISR process as well as JFCOM’s experimentation regime, allowing commercial and 

civil organizations together with the Missile Defense Agency 

to bring the technology to maturity, and debating the merits of near space with ORS will ensure a fully vetted and 

fully joint C4ISR capability. Given the Air Force’s investments in ORS and significant increases in the cost of bigspace programs expected over the next five years, the Air 

Force cannot afford any other large obligations. AFSPC 

should control its shore—but at a distance for the near 

term. That is, it should let commerical companies and universities mature the technology and monitor their progress 

rather than invest large budgets and man-hours. When the 

technology reaches maturity (most likely 10–15 years from 

now), then AFSPC should begin investing. 

Notes

1. Gen Richard B. Myers, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2005), vii, http://

www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf.

2. Ibid.

3. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

(CJCSI) 3151.01A, Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements, 19 January 2003, command, 

control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems consist 

of “integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, 

personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander’s exercise of command and control across the range of 

military operations” (GL-7). Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense 

03newartice.indd 24 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
25

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended 

through 14 April 2006), defines intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as “an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and 

operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations” (269). 

Thus, C4ISR entails an integrated intelligence, command, control, and 

operations function.

4. Final briefing, Air Force Space Command, subject: National Defense 

Industrial Association (NDIA) Near-Space Summer Study, 9 November 

2005.

5. TSgt Jennifer Thibault, “Near-Space Programs to Provide Persistent Space Capability,” SpaceWar, 15 March 2005, http://www.spacewar 

.com/news/milspace-05g.html.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. House, Statement by Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., Commander, United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO) before the House Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2 October 2003, http://armedservices 

.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-10 

-02giambastiani.html.

9. Lt Gen T. Michael Moseley, Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers

(Shaw AFB, SC: Combined Forces Air Component, Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 April 2003), 4.

10. Ibid., 3.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 4.

13. Patrick E. Clarke, “Nerve Centers for Air Warfare,” Military Information Technology Online Edition 7, no. 7 (1 September 2003), http://www 

.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=183.

14. Maj Gen Ronald F. Sams, USAF, director of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, “Presentation to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, United States Senate” [testimony on Air Force fiscal year 2005 

ISR programs], 7 April 2004, 3, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004 

_hr/040704sams.pdf.

15. Bill Yenne, Attack of the Drones: A History of Unmanned Aerial Combat (Saint Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Co., 2004), 97.

16. Ibid., 99.

17. Ibid., 101.

18. Ibid., 102.

19. Ibid., 103.

20. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved Strategic 

Planning Can Enhance DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Efforts, GAO-04-

342 (Washington, DC: GAO, 17 March 2004), 1, http://www.gao.gov/new 

.items/d04342.pdf.

21. 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), After Action Report, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, chap. 17, “Communications,” http://www.strategypage 

.com/articles/3IDAAR/default.asp.

22. Ibid.

23. House, Statement by Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr.

03newartice.indd 25 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
26

24. Sams, “Presentation,” 13.

25. 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), After Action Report, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, chap. 9, “Intelligence,” http://www.strategypage.com/

articles/3IDAAR/default.asp.

26. Lt Col Daniel R. Johnson, Enabling Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Effects for Effects-Based Operations Conditions, Maxwell 

Paper no. 34 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, June 2005), 5, http://

www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Maxwell_Papers/Text/Johnson 

_MP34.pdf.

27. [1st Marine Division, G-2], “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Lessons Learned” [May 2003], 4–5, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

library/report/2003/1mardiv_oif_lessons_learned.doc; and idem, “Brief 

on 1 MARDIV Operations” [May 2003], 3, http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/library/report/2003/1mardiv_brief.doc.

28. House, Statement by Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr.

29. Senate, Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander, 

US Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 108th 

Cong., 1st sess., 9 July 2003, 6, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/

congress/franks_09july03.pdf.

30. Although the author could not find an official statement of what 

altitudes define near space, the International Aeronautics Federation was 

likely the first official organization to set limits, which the Air Force then 

adopted under AFSPC’s Joint Warfighting Space initiative. For more information, see “Near Space: The Shore of Our New Ocean,” HobbySpace.com, 

http://www.hobbyspace.com/NearSpace/index.html.

31. Hampton Stephens, “Near-Space,” Air Force Magazine 88, no. 7 

(July 2005): 37, http://www.afa.org/magazine/july2005/0705near.pdf.

32. Ibid., 38.

33. Ibid.

34. Taylor Dinerman, “Near Space: Balloons, Satellites, and Suborbital 

Rockets,” Space Review, 25 July 2005, http://www.thespacereview.com/

article/416/1.

35. Ibid.

36. The author worked at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Plans Branch from June 1999 to May 2002, inside the 

Cheyenne Mountain Complex, supporting the US Coast Guard and the 

Drug Enforcement Agency. Aerostats are tethered, balloonborne radar 

systems that operate at 15,000 feet. NORAD has used aerostats from eight 

sites around the United States since 1980.

37. “Students Steer a Blimp to Test Near Space Military Technology,” 

ScienceDaily, 21 July 2005, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/07/ 

050720065446.htm.

38. Deputy commandant for plans, policies, and operations, to deputy 

commandant, Marine Corps Combat Development Center, memorandum, 

22 November 2004, 2.

39. Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, The Paradigm Shift to Effects-Based 

Space: Near-Space as a Combat Space Effects Enabler, Research Paper 

2005-01 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Airpower Research Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Air University, 2005), 13–15, 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cadre/ari_2005-01.pdf.

03newartice.indd 26 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
27

40. “Tactical Operations Center Performance: Operation Iraqi Freedom 

C4ISR Lessons Learned/VI,” Defense Update [25 October 2005], http://

www.defense-update.com/features/du-1-05/oif-c4-6.htm.

41. Combat SkySat is a “proof of concept” demonstration that carries 

commercial off-the-shelf two-way radios, potentially boosting communications capability BLOS for forces on the ground.

42. Tomme, Paradigm Shift to Effects-Based Space, 23.

43. Ibid., 24.

44. Ibid.

45. The ionosphere is an electrically charged portion of the atmosphere 

that is also affected by Earth’s magnetic field. Phenomena known as Faraday rotation and scintillation can have a significant effect on ground-tosatellite signal paths. Faraday rotation (discovered as an interaction between light and a magnetic field) occurs when elements of a signal travel 

in different ways, causing the signal to decompose into two circularly polarized rays traveling at different speeds with a phased offset. Ionospheric 

scintillation, caused by electron density in the ionosphere, can also change 

signals. For more information about these phenomena, see “The Ionosphere Explained,” Project Horizontal E-Region Experiment, http://www .uaf 

.edu/asgp/hex/ionosphere.htm; and “Satellite Signal Propagation,” Radio 

Electronics.com, http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/satellite/satellite 

_sig_prop/satellite_signal_propagation.php.

46. Strict use of terminology requires making a distinction between reconnaissance and surveillance. According to Air Force Doctrine Document 

(AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, “surveillance is a 

continuing process, not oriented to a specific target. . . . Reconnaissance 

complements surveillance by obtaining specific information . . . through 

visual observation and other detection methods” (55–56).

47. Lewis Jamison, Geoffrey S. Sommer, and Isaac R. Porche III, HighAltitude Airships for the Future Force Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 

2, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR234.pdf.

48. Ibid., 17.

49. Ibid., 19.

50. Ibid., 22.

51. Ibid., 23.

52. High-altitude airships are superpressure helium vessels. Temperature 

variations can alter internal pressures and place added stress on the hull. 

A RAND report suggests that this avoids flight-path and gas-management 

problems but at the expense of higher stresses in the hull fabric. For more 

information, see Jamison, Sommer, and Porche, High-Altitude Airships.

53. Mass fraction for airships is the design criterion between the system weight (airframe, support/control systems, and fuel) versus the payload weight. The more the system weight increases, the less weight allowed 

for the payload. One may trade decreasing altitude for increased weight.

54. Jamison, Sommer, and Porche, High-Altitude Airships, 24.

55. Ibid., 25.

56. Ibid.

57. Robert S. Leonard and Jeffrey A. Drezner, Innovative Development: 

Global Hawk and DarkStar—HAE UAV ACTD [Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration] Program Description and Comparative Analysis (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 47–48, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph 

_reports/MR1474.

03newartice.indd 27 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
28

58. Ibid., 48.

59. Ibid.

60. Jamison, Sommer, and Porche, High-Altitude Airships, xv.

61. Ibid., 24.

62. Ibid.; and “USS Akron Airship, United States Navy,” Arlington National Cemetery Website, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/uss-akron 

.htm.

63. Quoted in James W. Canan, “Military Networks Take Center Stage,” 

Aerospace America, October 2002, http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article 

.cfm?issuetocid=267&ArchiveIssueID=31.

64. Michael D. Keebaugh, “Horizontally Integrated ISR: IntelligenceSharing Increases Information’s Value,” Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Journal 3, no. 9 (October 2004), http://www.raytheon.com/

businesses/stellent/groups/iis/documents/content/cms01_052732.pdf.

65. Pfc Joy Pirante, “Wallace Outlines Lessons-Learned, Role of Intelligence in Iraq War,” Scout, US Army TRADOC News Service and Web Operations, Fort Huachuca, AZ, 2 February 2004, http://www.tradoc.army 

.mil/pao/TNSarchives/February04/020204.htm (accessed 15 November 

2005).

66. Ibid.

67. “Operation Outreach: Tactics, Training and Procedure,” Newsletter [US Army Center for Lessons Learned], no. 03-27, October 2003, [11], 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/03-27_call 

_op-outreach.pdf.

68. Ibid., [8].

69. Ibid. Collection control is the ability to understand the capacity, capabilities, and limitations of collectors and the process of tasking a system.

70. Ibid., [14–15].

71. SSgt Jason L. Haag, “OIF Veterans Discuss Lessons,” Air Force Print 

News, 31 July 2003, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_prfr/is 

_200307/ai_3527593274; and Lt Gen Harry D. Raduege Jr., “Net Centric 

Warfare Is Changing the Battlefield Environment,” Defense Standardization Program Journal, July/September 2004, 16, http://www.dsp.dla.mil/

newsletters/journal/DSPJ-07-04.pdf.

72. “Tactical Operations Center Performance.”

73. Carl M. Bradley, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in 

Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Challenges for Rapid Maneuvers and 

Joint C4ISR Integration and Interoperability (Newport, RI: National War College, 9 February 2004), 7.

74. Ibid., 8.

75. Headquarters Central Command Air Forces, “Intelligence Database Management,” Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLS) no. 41434-

62689, 13 April 2003.

76. “Tactical Operations Center Performance.”

77. Ibid.

78. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 2005–2030 (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4 August 2005), 4–37, http://www 

.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf.

79. Ibid. The Joint Unmanned Combat Air System was cancelled in 

early 2006. See “J-UCAS Program,” Air-Attack: News and Facts on Mili03newartice.indd 28 11/17/06 12:23:02 PM
29

tary Aviation and Space Projects, http://www.air-attack.com/page/72/J 

-UCAS-Program.html (accessed 11 July 2006).

80. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 35.

81. Senate, Statement of Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, 25 March 

2004, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 16, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004 

_hr/032504cebrowski.pdf.

82. Briefing, Space and Missile Systems Center, subject: Responsive 

Space: Meeting War Fighters’ Needs, Third Responsive Space Conference, 

26 April 2005.

83. Ibid.

84. Stew Magnuson, “Service Pondering Future Roles,” National Defense, December 2005, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/ 

2005/Dec1/Service.htm.

85. Patricia Moloney Figliola, Carl E. Behrens, and Daniel Morgan, U.S. 

Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial, CRS Issue Brief for 

Congress no. IB9201 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

Library of Congress, 13 June 2006), CRS-1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

space/IB92011.pdf.

86. Peter Grier, “Curtain Up on Space Modernization,” Air Force Magazine 88, no. 12 (December 2005): 58, http://www.afa.org/magazine/

Dec2005/1205CBO.pdf.

87. Magnuson, “Service Pondering Future Roles.”

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Briefing, STRATCOM, subject: Joint Functional Component Command—Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) Update, 11 

October 2005.

91. Briefing, CDR Bob Laubengayer, United States Joint Forces Command Capabilities Group, subject: Joint Experimentation, Test and Evaluation, and Advanced Technology Concept Demonstrations [sic] (JETA) 

Alignment for Fiscal Year 2006, 1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ 

wjtsc05_actd_jeta.ppt#292.

92. “Tactical Air Control Party: ‘Death On-Call,’ ” GlobalSecurity.org, 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/tacp.htm; and David 

M. Fiedler and Edward Farmer, “AN/PRC-150 HF Radio in Urban Combat: 

A Better Way to Command and Control the Urban Fight,” Army Communicator, Spring 2004, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAA/

is_1_29/ai_n6355496.

93. Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Air Force Prepares to Buy Near Space Vehicles,” C4ISR: The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare, 6 May 2005, http://www 

.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=831726.

94. Maj Ray Hernandez, Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, AL, 

interview by the author, 5 December 2005.

95. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report,” 11th working draft (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 July 2003), 160, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/

pubs/iraq_instantlessons.pdf.

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