# FILED
July 31, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF A

PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON
THE CIT GROUP/SALES FINANCIN G, ) INC., as successor in interest to ) General Electric Capital A sset ) Management Corporation as ) Servicing A

gent for Govern mental ) National Mortgage Association, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Madison Chancery No. 49906 ) VS. ) Appeal No . 02A01-9706-CH- 00120 ) LESLIE R. WILLIAMS, ) ) Defendant/Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM

THE CHANCE RY COURT O F MADISON COUNTY AT JACKSON, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE JOE C. MOR RIS, CHANCELLOR

JAMES DA

VID NAVE HIX GRAY &

NAVE Nashville, Tennessee Attorney for Appellant

NATHAN B. PRIDE Jackson, Tennessee Attorney for Appellee

REVERSED AND

REMANDED

ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR: W. FRANK CR

AWFORD, P.J., W.S . DAVID R. FA

RMER, J.2

P laintiff CIT Group/Sales Financing , Inc. (CIT), the success or-in-interest to th e original plaintiff, General ElectricCapital Asset Management C orporation, appeals the tri al court’s order awarding Defendant/Appellee Leslie R. Williams damages in the amount of $4,464.00 relative to CIT’s removal of a mobile home from Williams’ property pursuant to
a writ of possession. F or the reasons stated hereinafter, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History

In the absence of

a transcript, the partie

s agreed to the following statement ofthe evidence and proce edings be low:

1. On April 1 3, 1 992, Richard D. Swil ley and Ruth A. Swilley, w

ho are not parties to this lawsuit, purchased a 1992 Southern Hospitality double w id e mobile home . . . (hereinafter “the mobile home”). 2. The Swilleys executed a Retail I nstallment Contract and Secu ri ty Agreement dated April 13, 1992 (hereinafter

“the Security Agreement”). [CIT] held a valid and properlyperfected secu ri ty interes t in said mob ile home pursuantto t he Sec urity Agreement, [and] t wo Tennessee Certificatesof Title noting [CIT’s] li en on the mobil e home

. . . . 3. After

executing the Securit y Agreemen t an d purchasing the mobile home, the Swill eys moved th e mobile home to real property

located in Madison County, Tennessee known as 149 Iris Roa d in Jackson. The Swill eys had purchased this property from the Defendant, Leslie R. Williams. In purchasing the real property from hi m, the Swi lle ys executed a Trust Deed gr anting Williams a lien against the real property to s ecure an indebtedness they ow ed him in the original pri ncipal amount of $4,500.00. . . . 4. On November 30, 1992, the Swilleys filed a p etition for relief under Chapter 13 of the U nited States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bank ruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Eastern Division. During the course of the bankruptcy proceedi ngs, t he Swilleys abandoned the mobile home and surrende red their interest in the mobile home to [CIT]. On November 1, 1994, the bankruptcy court entered an Order granting [CI T] relief from the automatic stay in that case and p ermitting [ CIT] to proceed with the enforcement of its security i nterest in the mobile home. 5. Befo re [C IT] obtained relief from the autom atic stay in the Swilleys’ bankruptcy case so that it could repossess the mobile home, [Willi ams] foreclosed upon his lien ev idenced byth e T ru st

De ed . [ Wi lliams] purchased the real property at the foreclosure sale.3 6. Also, before [CIT] had obtained relief from the automatic stay in the Swill eys’ bankruptcy cas e, [Williams], by and through an attorney named R . Bradley Sigler, asserted

an intere st in the mobile [home] superior to [ CIT’s] and took the legal position that because [Williams] had purchased the real property at the foreclosure sale and was now the owner of the real property on which the Swilleys’ mobile home was located, [CIT] could not take possession of the mobile home. . . . Over the course of several months, [Williams] continued towithhold his consent to a ll ow [CIT] to repossess the mobile home. Because [Williams] asserted this legal pos ition, [CIT] could not exercise its rig hts to repossess the mobile home and remove it from [Williams’] property and had no alternative but to file th e complaintagainst [Willia m s] to recover the mobile home and thus initiate this civ

il action. 7. [CIT] initiate d this lawsu it by f iling a complaint against [Williams] o n D ecember 5, 1994 to recover per sonal pro perty pursuant to [Tennessee Code Annotated s ection] 29-30-101 et seq

. 8. [Williams] filed an answer to [CIT’s] complaint on December

22, 1994 denying that [CIT] was entitled to possession of the mobile home as serting th at the mobile

home had become affixed to the real propert y now owned by

him. In his answer, as well as [his] Motion for Summary Judgment and all other proceedings filed with the Court, [Williams] req uested that the Court ma ke a determination as to any losses and damages that he may have suffered as a r esult of the actions of [CIT]. 9. At the possessory hearing in this case held on January 4, 1995, [the Chancellor] r uled thatthe i ssue of possession should be decided on motionforsummary judgment. 10. [Will i ams] filed a motion for summary judg ment on May 22, 1995. 11. Followingthe hearing on the motion for summary jud gme nt, . . . the Chancery Cour t entered an Order denying [Wi lliams’] motion for sum mary judgment an d awarding [ CIT ] a judgment for

possession of the mobile home for which a Writ of Posse ssion cou ld issue if necessar y. 12. On September 8, 1995, the Clerk & Master, Madison County issued a Writ of Possession dir ecting the Sheriff of Madison County, Tennessee to deliver poss ession of the mobile home to [CIT]. 13. The Sheriff

of Madison County executed the Writ and delivered possession of the mobile home to [CIT]. 14. On December 13, 1996, [Williams] filed a Motion to Determine Damages. . . . [I]n the motion, [Williams] asked the Court to determine

whether or not damages did accrue as a result of [C IT’s] remov al of the mobil e home from t h e real property.4 15. On January 14, 1997, the Court co nduct ed a hearing on [William s’ ] Motion to Determine Damages. Defendant Williams was t he only witness w ho testified at the hearing. [Williams] testified that he had purchased the real property at the foreclos ure sale and that, at the time he purchased the real property at this sale, he was aw

are thatthe mob i le home was located on it. [Williams] tes tified that he thoughtit would cost about $1,500.00 to re move de bris from the property, including the remains of the foundation of the mobile home and a driveway w hich the Swilleys

had installed, which remained afte r t he Sheriff of Madison County had executed the Writ and delive red possession of the mobile home to [CIT]. [Williams] offered into evidence pictures of the real property as it exi sted after the Sh erif f had executed the Writ. [Will iams] als o testif ied that he did not actually pa y the appro ximately$1,500.00 to remove these items from the property but he still claimed this amount as damages because he had, by the time o f the hearing, sold the property to a third party and [Williams] thought t hat his sale price had been affected to that extent. [Williams] also test ified that he had paid taxes assessed against the real property by virtue of the mobile home being located thereon. [W il liams] testified that the mobile home was not loca ted in a mobile home park owned by him. [Williams] al so cl aimed that he had been deprived of the use of the real property by virtue of the mobile home being located on the property and claimed damages in the amount of $1,600.00. [Williams] testified that he had sustained damages in the total amount o f $4,4 64.00. Upon cross examinat ion, [W illiams] acknowl edged that he had refused [CIT] access to hi s property to allow it to remove the mobile home. . . . 16. Immediately following the he a ring, from the bench, the Chancellor ru le d that [Williams] was entitled to recover damages in the total amount of $4,464.00. On February14, 1997 , the Chan cery Co urt entered an Order granting [Williams] a judgment against [CIT] in the amount of $4,464.00 consisting of $1,500.00 for diminution of value of the real prop e rty, $1,364.00 for taxes assessed upon the mobile home an d $1,600 for loss o f use of the real p roperty. 17. [CIT] filed its Notice of Appeal of the Order awarding [Williams] damages in the amount of $4,464.00 o n March 13, 1997.

II. Discussion of the Law

Inasmuch as this case was tried by the court below sitting without a jury, this court’s review o n appeal is governed by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d), which directsus to review the case de novo upon the record, with a presumption that any factual findings made by the trial court are correct. Roberts v. Robertson County Bd. of Educ. , 692 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tenn. App. 1985); Haverlah v. Memphis Aviation, Inc. , 674 S.W.2d 297,5

300 (Tenn. App. 1984); T.R.A.P. 13(d). Under this standard of review, we must affirm the trial court’s decision unless the trial court committed an error of law affecting

the result or unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Roberts , 692 S.W.2d at 865.
Applying this standard, we first conclude t ha t the trial court erred in awarding Williams damages which allegedly were caused by the r

emoval of the mobile home from Williams’ property. In order to recover f rom CIT f or any dam ages to hi s real prop erty, Williams was required to demonstrate that such damages were proxi mately caused by the acts of CIT or

its agents. Simmons v. O’Charley’s, Inc. , 914 S.W.2d 895, 903 (Tenn. App. 1995); Fortune s Untold, Inc. v. Watson , No. 03A01-9705-CV-00164, 1997 WL 674783, at *2 (Tenn. App. Oct. 31, 1997). Here, Williams fail ed to show that CIT’s acti ons caused the damages to his property. Williams testified that he suffered damagesbecause “it would cost about $1,500.00 to remove de bri s from the property, inclu ding the remains of the foundation of the mobile home and a driveway which the Swille ys had insta lled, which remained after the Sher iff of Madison County had executed the Writ and delivered possession of the mobile home to [CIT].” Alternatively, Williams testified that his property had depreciated in value by the amount of $1,500.00 by virtue of the debris remaining on his property. The only tes timony on this issue tends to show that the Swille

ys, and not CIT, caused t h e damages to Williams’ property. The Sw illeys apparently

built the foundation and driveway which later h ad to be removed, and the recor d contains no evidence that CIT’s action of removing the mobile home caused any additional d amages to Williams’ p roperty. According ly, we r everse tha

t portion of the trial co urt’s judg me nt awardin g Williams $1,500.00 for damages caused b y CIT’s removal of the mobile home fro m Willi ams’ prop erty.

On appeal, Williams

contends that the photographs he placed into evidence clearly showed the “[r]uts, deb ris and overall condition that made the land less valuabl e” after CIT’s removal of the mobile home. The rec ord on appeal, however, fails to cont ain an y photographs, and, thus, we have no way of knowing what damages, if any, these6

photographsmay have shown. Mo reover, evenif the photogra phs did show some damage to Williams’ property, the agreed statement of evidence c ontains no testimony to support the conclusi on that these damages we re proxima tely cause

d by the act

s of CIT.

We similarly rev

erse that porti on of the tria l court’s j udgment awa rding Williams $1,600.00 for his loss of use of the property. At the

January 1997 hearing on damages, Williams testified that he had been deprived of the use of the real property by vi rtue of the mobile home being located on the property. Upon cross-examination, however, Williams acknowledgedthat he had refused to permit CIT to r emov e the mobile home from the property. In light

of this evidence, we can only conclude that Williams’ loss es were caused either by the Swill eys’ plac

ement of the mobi le homeon his property in the first instance,
or by Williams’ own refusal to permit CIT to remove the home, rather than by any actions of CIT.

On appeal, Williams contends that his $1,600.00 l oss of use claim actually was based on his loss of use of the property after CIT’s removal of the m obile home from the premises. According to Williams, he claimed a loss of use for the eight-month period fr om September

1995 to April 1996 because “he c ould notuse his property due to the condition in which it was le

ft” after CIT’s removal of the mobil e home. The record, however, fails to support Williams’ description of his loss of use claim made below. Instead, the record reveals that Williams based his loss of use claim on the fact that he was “deprived of the use of th e real pro perty by virtue of the mobile home being located on the property .”

As a final matter, we r everse the trial court’s aw ard of damages to Williams for $1,364.00 in proper

ty taxe s which were all ocable to the mobile home. We cannot determine from the record before us what por tion of these taxes

may have been incurred during the time in w

hich Williams

refused to permit CIT to remove the mobile home from the property. Moreover, we have been cited to no authority whic

h would shift the burden of paying these taxes from the real property owne r to the mobile home owner. The parties have dire cte d our attention to Tennessee Code Annot ated 67-5-802, which shi fts the7

responsibility

for paying these taxes

to the mobile ho me owner in cases where the mobile home is located in a mobile home park. See T.C.A. § 67-5-802(1994); see also Belle-Aire Village, Inc. v. Ghorley , 574 S.W.2d 723 (Tenn. App. 1978); City of Gallatin v. Delinquent Taxpayers , 1987 WL 18068 (Tenn. App. Oct. 8, 1987); Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. Nos. 95-071, 94-048. In l ight ofWilliams’ testimony below that the mobile home was not located i n a mobile home p arkowned b y him, h oweve r, we c

onclude that Willi ams coul d not shift responsibi lity for pa

yment of the t

axes to CIT.

We are mindful that our limited st andard of review as an appel late court requires us to affirm the trial court’s decision unless the trial court committed an error of law affecting the result or unless the evidence preponderates against the tr ial court’s findings. Roberts
v. Robertson County Bd. of Educ. , 692 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tenn. App. 1985). Thus, even where the trial court reaches the correct result based on erroneousreasoning, this court will affirm the trial court’s ju dgment on any proper basis

. Allen v. Nat ional Bank of Newport , 839 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tenn. App. 199 2). In thi s case, ho wever, we have been presented with no lega l theory whic h wo uld supp ort the award of damages in Williams’ favor, and we can conceiv e of no proper basis for affirming the judgment.

The trial court’s judg ment is hereby rever sed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings c o nsistent with this opi nion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellee, for which execu tion may is sue if ne cessary.

HIGHERS, J.

CONCUR:8

CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S.

FARMER, J.