NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: 

SETTING OUR PHASERS ON STUN? 

Potential Strategic Blessings and Curses 

of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield 

by 

Erik L. Nutley, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

August 2003 

Occasional Paper No. 34 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air War College 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 
Non-Lethal Weapons: 

Setting Our Phasers on Stun? 

Potential Strategic Blessings and Curses 

of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield 

Erik L. Nutley, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

August 2003 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for 

Strategy and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect 

long-term strategic thinking about technology and its implications for 

U.S. national security. Copies of No. 34 in this series are available 

from the Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 

Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112, or on the CSAT 

web site at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awccsat.htm The fax 

number is (334) 953-6158; phone (334) 953-6460. 

Occasional Paper No. 34 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 
Contents 

Page

Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i 

Tables.......................................................................................................... ii 

Author........................................................................................................ iii 

Acknowledgements.....................................................................................iv 

Abstract........................................................................................................v 

I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 

II. Recent Developments in Non-lethal Weapons ......................................7 

III. State of the Science.............................................................................13 

IV. Strategic Advantages and Drawbacks of Non-Lethal Weapons.........25 

V. Outstanding Issues...............................................................................37 

VI. Non-Lethal Weapons in the War on Terrorism..................................47 

VII. Conclusion.........................................................................................53 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of

the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Air

University, the US government or the Department of Defense. In 

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is 

the property of the United States government. 

i
Tables 

Page

Table 1: Classification of Non-Lethal Weapons ......................................13 

Table 2: Existing and Emerging Non-Lethal Technologies.....................14 

Table 3: High Emphasis Non-Lethal Technologies..................................16 

Table 4: Summary of Treaties, Laws, and Regulations Concerning 

Non-Lethal Weapons........................................................................39 

Table 5: Advantages of Non-Lethal Weapons Against Terrorists............50 

Table 6: Drawbacks of Non-Lethal Weapons Against Terrorists ............51 

ii 
Author 

Lieutenant Colonel Erik L. Nutley is currently the Military 

Advisor, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) at the Pentagon. Colonel Nutley began his

military career as a Distinguished Graduate of Officer Training School in

1982. He then attended the University of Washington, where he earned an 

M.S. degree in aeronautical engineering. After serving as applied 

aerodynamics engineer in the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory at 

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, he attended pilot training at Williams AFB, 

Arizona. Colonel Nutley went on to serve as an EC-135 Post Attack 

Command and Control System aircraft commander at Ellsworth AFB, 

South Dakota. Next, he was Assistant Professor of Aeronautics at the U.S. 

Air Force Academy, Colorado, where he was also instructor pilot in the T41 flight-screening program. After graduating as a Distinguished Graduate 

from Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in

1996, he transitioned to the C-141B at McChord AFB, Washington. There 

he served as 62d Airlift Wing Current Operations Director, Commander of 

the 62d Operations Support Squadron, and Deputy Commander of the 62d 

Operations Group. Colonel Nutley is a 2002 graduate of the Air War 

College at Maxwell AFB. 

iii
Acknowledgements 

I would like to express my appreciation to my Air War College

faculty advisors Dr. Grant Hammond, Colonel (ret.) Theodore Hailes, and 

Lt Col John Geis for their invaluable encouragement and assistance. I also 

thank the personnel of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate,

particularly Major Noel Montgomery, Ms. Susan LeVine, and Mr. 

Humberto Rodriguez for their invaluable technical assistance. Finally, I

am deeply indebted to my patient and loving family—my wife, Mawi, and 

children, Monica, Ryan, and Marian. 

iv 
Abstract 

Though still in its infancy, the emergence of non-lethal technology

in recent years has the potential to change the way wars are fought. 

Whether non-lethal weapons become a key component of a revolutionary 

transformation of the military depends on an analysis of their likely 

strategic effects. This paper is intended to provide an overview of some of 

the key issues facing the development and employment of non-lethal 

weapons for senior military and policy leaders. The paper begins with a 

discussion of recent technology developments for non-lethal weapons.

Next, it describes current capabilities as well as the research, development, 

and procurement efforts needed to bring more non-lethal weaponry into 

the force structure. The discussion concludes that the current emphasis in 

non-lethal weapons is on defensive, tactical uses. The strategic 

advantages and drawbacks of non-lethal weapons—their potential to affect 

policy outcomes—are examined next. After that, topics including legal 

concerns and operational issues that need to be resolved before non-lethal 

weapons can be fielded on a greater scale are explored. The ability of 

non-lethal weapons to positively influence the global war on terrorism is 

also assessed. It is suggested that advantages of non-lethal weapons in 

these operations outweigh their drawbacks. Finally, a concluding 

assessment of the future of non-lethal weapons is offered. 

v

Non-Lethal Weapons ...1 

I. Introduction 

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center 

and Pentagon not only shattered lives and damaged America's sense of 

security, it also fundamentally altered notions about the best force 

structure to protect U.S. interests. The new administration was already

engaged in a process to redefine the nation’s defense structure to make it 

more responsive to challenges of the post-Cold War global security 

environment. The attack refocused attention on what is likely to be a 

major threat to U.S. interests for the foreseeable future. Hence, the 30

September 2001 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s most definitive statement to date about 

transforming America’s defense establishment for the 21st century, made 

special mention of the attacks as confirming the new emphasis on 

“homeland defense, on surprise, on preparing for asymmetric threats, on 

the need to develop new concepts of deterrence, on the need for a 

capabilities-based strategy, and on the need to balance deliberately the

different dimensions of risk.”1

 Further, the report stressed the need for 

transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces through “exploitation of new 

approaches to operational concepts and capabilities,” which can 

fundamentally change the ways war is waged.2

 Finally, the report noted

that the transformation has “intellectual, social and technological 

dimensions” and that “fundamental changes in the conceptualization of 

war as well as in organizational culture and behavior are usually required 

to bring it [transformation] about.”3

Given this call to consider new approaches to warfare, a fresh look 

at a variety of weapons designated “non-lethal” is in order. Are these 

weapons needed in order to keep U.S. armed forces viable in the 21st

Century? As will be shown, non-lethal weapons are not entirely new. 

However, the vast majority of weapons used throughout the history of 

warfare have been of the lethal variety—those designed to kill people and 

destroy materiel. Non-lethal weapons, though arguably still in their 

infancy, are now gaining momentum and receiving the attention of 

military leaders and national security thinkers. There is a growing 

consensus that this type of weapon is needed, at least in military 

operations such as peacekeeping roles. Whether they play a prominent 

role in tomorrow’s military force structure in a more wide-ranging set of
2...Non-Lethal Weapons 

circumstances spanning the spectrum of conflict depends on several 

factors, such as legal and operational issues. More fundamental, however,

is whether the benefits of using non-lethal weapons are deemed to

outweigh the drawbacks at the strategic level. These strategic issues, the 

potential pros and cons of fielding and using this type of weaponry, are the

central focus of this paper. Before any analysis can be made as to the 

usefulness of these weapons, it is important to make clear precisely what 

is meant by “non-lethal weapons.” 

Defining Non-Lethal Weapons 

Defining “non-lethal weapons” is no easy task, and there is 

widespread disagreement about the exact meaning and usage of the term. 

Department of Defense (DOD) policy defines non-lethal weapon systems

as those “that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to 

incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent 

injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the

environment.”4

 Though the DOD definition will be used throughout this

paper, there are several aspects of the term’s usage that bear clarification. 

First, unlike their lethal counterparts that are designed to destroy targets 

primarily through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, non-lethal 

weapons prevent their targets from functioning through means other than 

gross physical destruction.5

 Second, though the term “non-lethal” seems 

to imply that no fatalities will ever be caused by these weapons, this is not 

the case. Rather, non-lethal weapons are intended to significantly reduce

the probability of these consequences compared to traditional weapons. In 

fact, DOD policy explicitly states that non-lethal weapons “shall not be

required to have a zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent 

injuries.”6

 The policy goes on to point out, however, that “while complete 

avoidance of these effects is not guaranteed or expected, when properly 

employed, non-lethal weapons should significantly reduce them as

compared with physically destroying the same target.”7

 In short, just as

their lethal counterparts sometimes fail to kill, non-lethal weapons can 

sometimes be deadly. The description, therefore, applies to the intent 

rather than the effect.8

 Third, damage to property and the environment is 

not completely precluded by these weapons. In fact, many are designed to 

cause property damage. For example, a directed energy weapon targeting 

a missile system could disable its electrical components while remaining 

below the temperature threshold required to cause an explosion. Fourth, 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...3 

unlike lethal weapons, whose intent is to cause death, permanent injury, or 

irreversible destruction of a system, reversibility is an important aspect of 

non-lethal technologies.9

 While this is especially the case in counterpersonnel weapons, it also normally applies to those that target materiel. 

For example, in the case of the missile system mentioned above, much of 

the system could, in theory, be salvaged after a non-lethal attack. Fifth, as 

the term “weapon” implies, things rather than activities are being 

considered. Consequently, the definition does not include many nonlethal activities or operations that support the application of force on the 

battlefield. Therefore, information warfare, psychological operations, 

electronic warfare (except for non-lethal electronic attack),10 and

communications operations are all activities that are not included in the 

definition, even though some of the literature does include these activities 

under the rubric of non-lethal weapons. A final definitional issue to 

highlight is that the term weapon itself is open to interpretation. Oddly 

enough, no official definition of weapon is given in the Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Therefore, one 

could argue that certain non-lethal systems such as rigid foams,

obscurants, holograms, markers and the like are not actually weapons. 

The issue is not trivial, as it has the potential to influence policies 

concerning the use of non-lethal systems and even their legality relative to 

international law, which will be discussed later. For the sake of

consistency, this paper will regard all non-lethal systems, whether they are

technically weapons or not, as non-lethal weapons. 

To summarize, the principle characteristics of non-lethal weapons 

that distinguish them from their lethal counterparts and other non-lethal 

activities are as follows: 

• Delay, disrupt, disorient, deny versus destroy 

• Reversible effects 

• Weapons (things), not activities 

• Intent, rather than effect is important 

• Significantly reduce (rather than eliminate) death, destruction, and 

permanent injury 

Alternative Terms 

To avoid the perception that fatalities can be eliminated, many 

have proposed terms other than non-lethal. Alternative terms that have
4...Non-Lethal Weapons 

been put forward include less-lethal, less-than-lethal, and sub-lethal

effects weapons, all terms that more accurately describe the intent of these 

weapons. In 1989, non-lethal weapon proponent John B. Alexander put 

forward the words anti-materiel technology to describe weapons designed 

to stop the machines of war rather than to kill enemy soldiers.11 However, 

this term is obviously a sub-set of non-lethal weapons, since it does not 

include any anti-personnel class of non-lethal weapons. Another term, 

Soft Kill, was used to denote attacks that limit destructive effects, also a 

somewhat different idea.12 A similar concept was Mission Kill, which 

denoted rendering a military system, person, or unit incapable of 

performing its mission at a time or place required.13 This term, however, 

suffers from being overly broad and vague—there is a plethora of ways to 

“kill” a mission, including conventional, lethal means. United States Joint 

Forces Command uses the term non-kinetic technology to describe a 

similar, but arguably broader, set of weapons. One author has dubbed 

these “weapons that hinder the enemy, but don't go boom, such as ones 

that destroy computer files, disrupt communications or wipe out bank 

accounts.”14 It should be noted, however, that this term includes many 

weapons not normally included in the definition of non-lethal, such as 

computer viruses and lethal-power lasers, and conversely, would not 

include non-lethal kinetic weapons. Though the prevailing term of nonlethal clearly has serious drawbacks, changing it at this point would prove 

very challenging, as it has made its way into much of the literature, 

official military publications, and everyday usage. For this reason, the 

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, the organization that oversees 

DOD non-lethal weapon activities, concludes that the term non-lethal

seems to be well entrenched and would be difficult to change at this 

point.15

Historical Examples 

In order to more fully explore the meaning of non-lethal, it is 

instructive to consider examples that have been put forward as historical 

precedents for the use of non-lethal weapons. Many such examples have

been suggested; however, most of the weapons cited do not technically 

meet the definition of non-lethal adopted by the DOD and used in this 

report.16 For example, smoke has been proposed as an ancient precursor 

to today’s non-lethal technologies, but whether it qualifies under the

current definition depends on its usage. If used as a signal for 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...5 

communications, it would not conform to the current definition; smoke 

signals are clearly not intended to incapacitate the recipient. On the other 

hand, if a commander uses smoke to provide cover for attacking forces, it 

might qualify since its intent is to disable or restrict the vision of one’s

opponent. Such “obscurants” are, in fact, listed as non-lethal weapons. 

Smoke could also fit the current non-lethal definition if it were used to 

flush an enemy out of a building or cave. However, since smoke can also 

be highly toxic, the chief issue is that of intent. Some suggest that the 

defoliants used by the British Army in Malaya in the 1940s and 1950s and 

by the U.S. in Vietnam are examples of non-lethal weapons.17 In this

case, however, the objective for using these herbicides was to destroy the 

food sources and cover of communist insurgents. Since this employment 

is not fundamentally different from other time-honored procedures to 

destroy crops (such as “scorched earth,” for instance), their use is not 

consistent with the current definition either. Another proposed example of 

non-lethal weapons use occurred under Israel’s military leader, Joshua,

against Jericho circa 1400 B.C. However, since the sounding of trumpets 

caused the city’s wall to “fall down flat (see Joshua 6:20),” this would 

appear to be an example of a rather unconventional lethal weapon rather 

than a non-lethal one per the DOD definition.18 Finally, the U.S. military

used loud rock music to drive Manuel Noriega from the building he was 

holed up in in Panama.

19 However, whether this is truly disabling is 

debatable. It would probably be more accurate to classify blaring music as

a psychological weapon, which is usually not included as a category of 

non-lethal weapons. 

There are a few historical cases, however, that do accurately fit 

within the modern definition of non-lethal weapons. One example is CS 

gas (0-chlorobenzalmalononitrile), a white solid powder usually mixed 

with a dispersal agent like methylene chloride, which carries the particles 

through the air. CS is a tear gas used as a riot control device by British 

forces in Cyprus in 1958 and also by the U.S. Army to complement lethal 

force to flush combatants out of caves and tunnels during the Vietnam 

War. Rubber bullets used against Northern Ireland rioters in the 1970s are

another example.20 Obviously, both of these weapons types are used 

routinely by law-enforcement officials, as are wooden batons. Another 

excellent example is the non-lethal variant of the Tomahawk missile used 

during the 1991 Gulf War that released spools of carbon fibers above 

electrical plants, causing short-circuits which, in turn, disrupted electrical 

power production.21 Yet another operational use of non-lethal weapons
6...Non-Lethal Weapons 

was demonstrated on 4 April 2000, when soldiers of the 709th Military 

Police Battalion successfully employed non-lethal measures to disperse a 

hostile crowd during real-world operations in Kosovo.22

As can be seen from these examples, non-lethal weapons are not 

entirely new. With few exceptions, however, mankind’s experience with 

these types of weapons spans only the last few decades. Consequently, the 

non-lethal weapons being envisioned today mark a significant break with 

the past. Although they have been thought about in military circles since

the 1960s, as the next section will show, it was not until the 1990s that 

non-lethal weapons started to receive significant attention from senior

leaders. 23
Non-Lethal Weapons ...7 

II. Recent Developments in Non-lethal Weapons 

According to U.S. Army War College Professor Steven Metz, the 

Secretary of Defense’s formation of the Non-Lethal Warfare Study Group 

in 1991 marked a major milestone in the United States defense 

establishment’s interest in non-lethality.24 Overseen by the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy and chaired by the Assistant Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, the group supported 

policies and programs designed to foster the development and fielding of 

non-lethal weapons. However, the Pentagon was unwilling to make a

major commitment at the time, and when the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition argued that existing programs could adequately handle 

non-lethal weapons, the study group’s recommendations were shelved. 

More recently, the mounting operational interest in non-lethal 

weapons was spurred by the perceived need for such weapons during the

1995 United Nations Operation UNITED SHIELD in Somalia. Marine 

Corps Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni was charged with protecting the 

final withdrawal of forces from Somalia after Operation RESTORE

HOPE, which began as a humanitarian mission to disperse food and 

alleviate widespread starvation in December 1992.25 General Zinni 

explored the prospects of using non-lethal weapons and asked for a quick 

response to field a capability. The Marine Corps and the Army teamed to 

provide General Zinni with “off-the-shelf” non-lethal technologies, 

enabling the first operational use of these new technologies in and around 

Mogadishu.26 Specifically, low-impact 12 gauge shotgun shells, sticky 

and aqueous foams from Sandia National Laboratory, and a low-energy

laser system to intimidate suspected snipers were provided to

warfighters.27 “Although the effects of these non-lethal weapons were 

marginal, General Zinni's aggressive support added credibility to the effort 

to field non-lethal weapons.”28 He stated that he would never go to on 

another peace support mission without them and that there was an urgent 

need for more such weapons.29 The eighteen Rangers that lost their lives

fighting in the streets of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 is often cited as the 

primary impetus for developing non-lethal weapons. What is less often 

considered, in the United States at least, is that some 300 Somali citizens, 

many of them civilians, died that same night.30 Even more to the point, by 

the end of 1994, more than 130 U.N. peacekeepers would die attempting 
8...Non-Lethal Weapons 

to end the starvation in Somalia and scores of Somalis would share a 

similar fate.31

In a speech given at the Non-Lethal Defense Conference II on 7 

March 1996, General Sheehan, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and 

Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command, also expressed the need for new

capabilities in today’s changing security environment. He stated that “this 

nation should no longer tolerate dedicated, professional troops equipped 

with the wrong tools for new, more complex missions....It is time to 

accept the challenge to meet the changing realities before us. Non-lethal 

weapons must be part of today's tool kit.”32 The issuance of DOD Policy 

Directive 3000.3: Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons on 9 July 1996 

furthered the evolution of thinking on the use of non-lethal weapons on the 

battlefield. The directive established DOD policy for non-lethal weapons, 

laying out joint service responsibilities and providing guidelines for the

development and employment of non-lethal weapons. The directive 

designated the Commandant of the Marine Corps as Executive Agent (EA) 

for the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Program, with the responsibility of 

providing “program recommendations and for stimulating and 

coordinating non-lethal weapons requirements.”33 

On 21 January 1997, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate 

was established to manage the day-to-day activities of overseeing Joint 

Non-Lethal Weapons Program. The directorate, located at Quantico 

Marine Base, Virginia, was charged with conducting technology 

assessments, providing oversight of acquisition activities, and maintaining 

liaison with the services, combatant commanders, and other defense 

agencies and laboratories, as well as with foreign non-lethal weapon 

programs.34 

A major milestone in the conceptualization and development of 

potential non-lethal technologies was reached with the completion of the 

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program’s Joint Mission Area Analysis/Joint 

Mission Need Analysis [hereafter, abbreviated JMAA] report. The final 

report for this rigorous joint effort, begun in 1999, was published in the 

spring of 2001. The Commandant of the Marine Corps had recognized the 

need for a detailed, thorough end-to-end analysis of the potential military 

contributions of non-lethal capabilities. Consequently, he directed that an 

analysis be conducted to express the needs of Combatant Commanders, 

Joint Force Commanders and the Service forces they employ in executing

their assigned missions.35 The goals of the analysis included 

synchronizing non-lethal weapon efforts with Joint Vision Implementation 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...9 

Plan and Requirements Generation System, identifying non-lethal 

operational deficiencies and potential needs, assessing non-lethal weapon

technologies, examining science and technology requirements, and 

identifying common needs for the development of Joint Non-Lethal 

Weapons requirements.36 Concurrently, the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) endorsed the need for a study to identify Joint and 

Service requirements for non-lethal capabilities. Panel participants

included representatives from the Unified Commands, Services, Joint 

Staff, DOD agencies, and other departments within the government that 

have a stated interest in non-lethal capabilities. Based on analysis 

conducted over the course of six months, the panel developed a series of 

key findings and recommendations that constitute a major landmark in

DOD thinking regarding non-lethal weapons and lay the course for 

developing future capabilities. The panel findings include the following:37

• Non-lethal capabilities apply and have expressed utility across all 

types of Military Operations Other Than War and Major Theater War. 

• Non-lethal capabilities apply across the hierarchy of Joint and Service 

tasks—covering the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

• Non-lethal capabilities have clear applications for tasks associated

with Force Protection, Movement/Maneuver and Employing 

Forces/Fires, with fewer applications for Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Command and Control (C2). 

• Non-lethal capabilities complement lethal weapons and, for some

tasks, offer advantages or unique contributions. This is true across the

spectrum of threats and crises. 

• Non-lethal capabilities provide a unique capability that allows forces

to break the cycle of violence and revenge that provides the catalyst

for prolonged or systematic conflict. This has significant implications 

for U.S. forces conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict. 

• Non-lethal capabilities support the accomplishment of mission tasks 

and operational needs in combatant commander war plans at the 

tactical level and have potential non-lethal application at the 

operational and strategic levels. Treaties and conventions developed 

prior to the advent of military non-lethal capabilities may impact the 

development of selected technologies, e.g., calmatives. 

• National policy and domestic laws may require review. 

• High tech systems are necessary for needs satisfaction. 
10...Non-Lethal Weapons 

• A dedicated, focused joint science and technology (S&T) effort for 

non-lethal capabilities does not exist. 

• Existing modeling and simulation tools are not adequate for the full 

assessment and evaluation of non-lethal capabilities in regards to 

human effects. 

• Current acquisition regulations and guidelines may not embrace the 

peculiarities of non-lethal capabilities development (e.g., human 

effects assessments). 

• Ranges of current non-lethal weapons programs and systems only 

extend to 100 meters. 

The panel also found that there were several areas in which non-lethal 

capabilities may offer advantages or unique contributions relative to lethal 

weapons:38

• Attaining a military objective while minimizing unnecessary loss of 

human life and gross physical damage; 

• Countering the use of non-combatants used as human shields; 

• Achieving desired effects with precision accuracy on targets in

restrictive fire areas or in constrained environments such as Rules of 

Engagement (ROE) or treaty restrictions; 

• Reducing collateral damage; 

• Providing new capabilities to address features within the complex 

urban environment; 

• Attaining counter-mobility and area denial, with advantages stemming 

from reversibility of effects; 

• Degrading Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) production and 

delivery systems while reducing risks of NBC release; and 

• Protecting forces and facilities. 

Finally, the team evaluated non-lethal programs and resources and 

identified the following shortfalls:39

• No venue currently exists for joint funding of a dedicated, focused 

S&T effort for non-lethal capabilities. 

• Current tools are not adequate for the full assessment and evaluation of

non-lethal capabilities in regards to human effects and specific 

operational contributions. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...11 

• Current acquisition regulations and guidelines may not embrace the 

peculiarities of non-lethal capability development (i.e., human effect 

assessments). 

Based on their study, the panel members made several 

recommendations for future non-lethal development efforts. In addition to

advocating continued actions in the joint community to define the need for

the weapons’ capabilities, the panel made the following

recommendations:

40

• General support tools, such as models for human effects and 

operational analysis support, should be expeditiously advanced and 

developed. 

• Near-term acquisition efforts should be focused on providing a 

standoff capability to delivery of non-lethal capabilities beyond small 

arms range. Adaptation of current delivery systems is proposed for 

analysis. 

• A focused joint S&T effort that concentrates on state-of-the-art nonlethal technologies, such as directed energy, is needed. 

• The DOD and Services should review resource allocations for 

adequacy of addressing non-lethal weapon needs. 

• The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) should ensure the 

analysis of and subsequent development of non-lethal capabilities are

done in coordination with other capability assessments such as urban 

operations, psychological operations, information warfare and threat 

reduction. 

• The JNLWP should support the development of existing joint doctrine 

for the application of non-lethal capabilities at all levels of war. 

• The JNLWP, in coordination with the Joint Staff, should incorporate 

instruction in the military applications of non-lethal capabilities into 

the Joint Program of Military Education (JPME). 

• The Services, combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff should 

initiate Advance Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and Advance

Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) for mature non-lethal 

technologies. 

• The office of the Secretary of Defense, coordination with the Joint 

Staff and other government agencies review and modify/change 

policies as appropriate to allow for the early use of non-lethal 

capabilities in a preclusionary role. 
12...Non-Lethal Weapons 

The JMAA report signals an intensification of the level of effort invested 

in exploring non-lethal capabilities during the last few years. The next

section will present where the technology currently stands. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...13 

III. State of the Science 

As shown in Table 1, non-lethal weapons can be broadly divided 

into two major capability categories. As the name implies, counterpersonnel weapons are those designed to work against people, either by 

incapacitating them, or by compelling them to move or stay away. 

Similarly, counter-materiel weapons are designed either to disable or to 

deny an area to vehicles (ground, sea, or air). Within each of these core 

capabilities are functional areas that describe key desired roles for these

weapons. 

Table 1: Classification of Non-Lethal Weapons41 

Core Capability Functional Area with Core Capability 

Counter-Personnel Crowd control 

Clear facilities of personnel 

Incapacitate personnel 

Deny an area to personnel 

Counter-Materiel Deny an area to vehicles, vessels, aircraft 

Disable equipment and facilities 

Another way to classify these weapons is according to the 

technologies upon which they are built. Table 2 shows non-lethal 

technologies that have either been developed or are envisioned for the 

future. The table is the result of the JMAA’s Operations and Threat 

Working Group’s efforts to identify all existing, emerging, and collateral 

non-lethal technologies. The basic categories of technologies are 

electromagnetic, chemical, acoustic, and mechanical or kinetic.

Combined technologies make use of more than one of the technologies. 

Ancillary technologies refer to those that don’t fit neatly into the other 

categories or are weapon enablers. Note again that one could debate 

whether some of these items technically fit into the official DOD 

definition of a non-lethal weapon (markers, for example). 
14...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Table 2: Existing and Emerging Non-Lethal Technologies42

Electromagnetic Chemical Acoustic Mechanical and 

Kinetic 

ELECTRICALS 

Pulsed current 

Sticky Shocker

Stun guns 

Taser mine

Direct current 

RADIO FREQUENCY 

 Non-nuclear EMP 

MICROWAVE 

 High Power 

 Microwaves 

MILLIMETER WAVE

Millimeter wave 

 projector

INFRARED

Chem. oxygen iodine 

 lasers 

 CO2 lasers 

 HF/DF lasers 

Solid state lasers 

VISIBLE 

Laser scattering 

 obscuration 

Laser illuminators

Holograms 

Laser light bullets 

Isotropic radiators

Flashes and flares

Strobes 

ULTRAVIOLET 

Laser Ionizer 

OBSCURANTS 

Smokes 

REACTANTS 

Supercorrosives 

Combustion alterationair/fuel 

Combustion alterationfuel viscosity

Lubricant contaminants 

Depolymerizers 

Embrittlers 

Emulsifiers 

MALODERANTS

Skatole 

Mercaptan

CALMATIVES 

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS 

OC (pepper spray)

CS 

CN, Mace 

ANTI-TRACTION FOAMS 

Sticky foams 

Rigid foams 

THERMOBARRIC 

COMPOUNDS 

NANOPARTICLES

Magnesium oxide 

AUDIBLE 

INFRASONIC 

ULTRASONIC 

BARRIERS 

Caltrops 

Tire spikes and strips 

ENTANGLEMENTS 

Portable vehicle 

arresting barrier 

Running gear

entanglement system

Net mines 

CLOGGERS 

Vessel Exhaust stack 

blocker

BLUNT IMPACT 

DEVICES 

Rubber balls 

Modular crowd control 

munitions 

40mm crowd dispersal 

munitions 

66 mm vehicle launched 

NL grenade 

Liquid filled 

Bean bag 

Baton 

Water stream cannon

Combined Technologies Ancillary Technologies 

Flash Bang Devices

Multi-sensory Distraction Device 

66mm Vehicle Launched Grenade 

MARKERS 

Dyes – Liquid, foam, smoke 

Fluorescent

Invisible – UV light visible 

Paint ball guns

NON-LETHAL CASINGS 

ENCAPSULANTS 

TAGGERS – ACTIVE 

Italicized text signifies existing technologies
Non-Lethal Weapons ...15 

Having determined the master list of all current and future nonlethal technologies, the working group assessed what kinds of 

technologies might offer capabilities most useful to future military forces. 

They looked at major platforms, delivery modes that could be employed, 

and specific non-lethal payloads. They found that the greatest potential 

for near term application of existing and emerging technologies include, 

but are not limited to: 

• Electromagnetic Systems: High power microwaves, millimeter

waves, infrared, visible (lasers and lights), and emitting 

taggant/trackers. 

• Chemical-Based Substances: Malodorants, calmatives, riot control 

agents, anti-traction substances, foams, and nanoparticles 

• Mechanical and Kinetic Devices: Barriers, entanglements, doggers 

and blunt impact devices 

• Enabling Technologies: Microencapsulation, combustible/ frangible 

casings, and a variable velocity launch capability 

Finally, having identifying all the current non-lethal technologies 

as well as emerging and collateral technologies, the group set out to select 

a master list of candidate technologies that should receive special 

attention. The list was derived from a number of factors.43 First,

assessments were made as to where particular technologies offered the 

best opportunities for high payoffs. This involved determining the number 

of times the payload was chosen as an element of a candidate system for

all assessed mission tasks and how many delivery modes were deemed

feasible for each payload. In addition, selection criteria included

technologies that would provide a unique capability not available through 

other means, those that would be highly effective from a technical 

standpoint, and technologies that would have a higher probability of being 

successfully developed. The resulting list shown in Table 3 contains brief 

statements on the potential operational contribution, rationale for 

selection, and areas most needing concentrated research. 
16...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Table 3: High Emphasis Non-Lethal Technologies44

Technology Rationale 

1. Millimeter Wave

Electromagnetic 

Radiation 

Previously classified. See Active Denial System under Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstrations below.

2. Chemical 

Oxygen Iodine 

Lasers 

COIL technology offers unique contributions to the non-lethal counter-materiel and

counter-capability areas by providing the capability to strike targets with ultraprecision, controllable effects from long standoff ranges while minimizing collateral 

damage. A derivative of the technology being used on the Air Force Airborne Laser 

program, COIL has the highest technical maturity and offers the greatest potential for 

implementation in the near to midterm. It is the central element of the Advanced 

Technology Laser ACTD. Technical challenges include scaling down of the laser

gain module, beam conditioning and control in a dynamic motion environment, and

management of the chemical process effluents. Technical risk is considered medium.

 

3. Anti-Traction Anti-traction or slippery substances can provide the capability to inhibit the fire 

movement of vehicles or individuals through treated areas. This would provide a 

capability to deny access to or through an area in a number of operationally useful 

situations. Although some development has taken place and the concept has been

successfully demonstrated, additional work is necessary to improve the persistence

and concentration of these materials in operational environments. Anti-traction 

material payloads can be readily integrated into a number of existing ground and air

delivery systems and platforms and can be made operational in the near term.

4. Non-Lethal 

Delivery 

/Deployment 

Non-lethal munitions must be capable of deploying and dispersing their payloads in a 

non-lethal and controlled manner. Technologies that reduce the kinetics of the

delivery process such as frangible and combustible materials enable the development

of munition casings that break up into many low mass, low-velocity fragments. Other 

options include use of materials that are combusted during payload deployment and 

drogue parachute applications. The development of encapsulation materials that will 

activate/release their contents when subjected to specific stimuli such as a mechanical

pressure, a specific temperature, light of a specific wavelength, etc., would be very

useful operationally. This, coupled with the ability to produce capsules of various 

diameters down to 100 microns, could considerably broaden the range of options for

delivery and deployment of numerous non-lethal payloads. The existence of such 

materials will enable the development of common munitions capable of carrying

several types of non-lethal payloads fired from a large number of existing weapons

such as grenade launchers, mortars, field artillery, and aircraft ordnance. 

5. Malodorants Malodorous substances can be very useful operationally in counter-personnel 

applications where the minimum level of force is appropriate or as a first measure to

prevent escalation. By themselves, these extremely foul, putrid smelling substances 

can be very effective first-level discriminators of motivation and intent. In

combination with other non-lethal technologies, such as bright light flashes and loud

explosive bangs, malodorants can effectively produce multi-sensory overload of

individuals and groups to temporarily incapacitate/distract them. The technology of 

malodorous substances is mature.
Non-Lethal Weapons ...17 

Technology Rationale 

6. Calmatives This technology was selected because of its very broad applicability and utility. 

Sleep agents or calmatives that could render individuals incapable of continuing their

actions for various periods of time in a controllable fashion would be extremely 

useful in a very large number of operational scenarios. To make them most useful, 

calmative agents should be capable of being used in situations involving a mix people 

of varying ages and physical characteristics. Consequently, the primary technical

challenge will be in developing agents that produce consistent, safe effects over broad

ranges of the human population, and be made relatively insensitive to dosage. 

Additionally, mechanisms must be found to enable absorption into the body in a 

variety of ways such as inhalation or through skin. Research is also needed to 

accelerate the onset of the effects of these agents. This would enable the safe and 

quick incapacitation of individuals in certain critical situations. The technical

challenge associated with this effort is deemed to be significant. 

7. High Power 

Microwaves 

Classified. 

8. Rigid Foam Rigid foams provide significant utility for creating temporary barriers, particularly in

entryways, and for disabling the support functions of facility existence (i.e., power

distribution, communications, etc.). Additionally, they can be used to disable 

vehicles and other equipment by jamming moving parts. This capability has 

potentially broad application in the counter-materiel and counter capability areas. 

Technical challenges still exist to reduce the hardening/curing time and to increase 

structural strength. Additionally, other alternatives to deliver and deploy the foam

payloads, such as binary configurations, are needed to enable standoff and long-range

delivery when applicable. 

9. Tagging,

Tracking and 

Locating 

The technology associated with luminous or covert dyes and paints is mature with the 

majority of the effort required in developing delivery/deployment means (range and

non-disclosure) and integration into the necessary platforms. Significant work is 

required to develop minute tagging devices capable of being tracked and located, as

well as their delivery/deployment means.

10. Nanoparticles Nanotechnology was chosen because of its significant potential contribution in

reducing the harmful effects of releases of chemical and biological agents. Although

early in development, the concept using reactive nanoparticles to decompose 

chemical agents or to destructively absorb biological agents shows considerable 

promise, and results of experimentation are very encouraging. Nanotechnology also 

has significant potential of advancing materials development by enabling the

production of very high shear and tensile strength fibers that are extremely 

lightweight. Such material could enable the development of new, highly effective 

entanglement systems that can be used for both non-lethal counter-personnel and 

counter-materiel applications. Technical challenges include the development and 

testing of agents to counter the various threats, and developing the capability to

produce these substances in sufficient volume.
18...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Technology Rationale 

11. Low Energy

Laser Scattering

and Dazzling 

The capability to temporarily obscure an adversary’s vision can provide significant 

military advantage in a number of situations. The use of low power, eye-safe lasers 

against individuals for this purpose has been proven effective in evaluations 

conducted during military operations. However, low-power laser technology also has

the potential to provide this capability against large groups yielding similar non-lethal

operational utility at a larger scale. This can be done by either directly illuminating

the adversary group with an eye-safe, broader laser beam or by illuminating an 

external medium, such as an airborne aerosol cloud, resulting in the scattering of the

laser light and creating a “wall of light.” Challenges exist in the accurate

characterization of effects on the human eye and in overcoming issues of public 

perception associated with laser technology.

12. DF/HF Lasers Applications of pulsed Deuterium-Fluoride (DF) and Hydrogen-Fluoride (HF) laser 

technology have direct applicability in the non-lethal counter-personnel area by 

providing the unique capability to incapacitate individuals from standoff ranges of up

to 500 m. Mounted on a vehicle or eventually man-portable, these devices produce 

pulsed energy projectiles that travel instantaneously and produce controllable effects. 

Technical challenges include the development of a robust, practical field device, 

successfully developing the capability to control the effects and characterizing the

human effects.

Current Fielded Capabilities45

Though still new, non-lethal weapons have already begun to make

their way into the field. Currently, there are several non-lethal weapons 

that have been approved, operationalized, and added to the inventory for 

use by U.S. military forces. There are several non-lethal munitions in the 

inventory. Variants include 12-gauge shotgun shells equipped with “flashbang” projectiles designed to be fired over the heads of a violent or 

potentially violent crowd up to 100 meters away to deter or distract 

individuals and shells intended to stun or deter two or three people by 

delivering a strong blow to the body up to 30 meters. Similarly, a 40 mm 

round provides a capability to stun an individual with a sponge round up

to 50 meters. A stingball/stun grenade is a commercial off-the-shelf item 

that operates like a standard hand grenade but dispenses rubber balls in a 

circular pattern of approximately 50 feet. It is designed to clear an area of 

a violent crowd. Oleoresin Capsicum (pepper spray) dispensers of 

different sizes for use on individuals or crowds are also available, as are 

caltrops, or tire spikes for disrupting vehicular movement. In addition to 

munitions, protection and training items make up “capability sets” 

designed to provide all the assets required for use in an environment 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...19 

requiring the use of non-lethal weapons. Protection items include batons, 

body, face, and shin shields, searchlights, disposable forearm and ankle 

cuffs, and bullhorns. Training items include a padded riot baton training 

suit, inert pepper spray dispensers, training stingball grenades, and a 12-

gauge training round. As can be seen, all of these weapons are shortrange, tactical devices geared toward force protection operations. 

Acquisition Programs 

In addition to the weapons already fielded, there are numerous 

other technologies, components, and systems that are in various phases of 

development under the Defense Acquisition System. These are listed in 

the sections that follow and are intended to give the reader a brief 

overview rather than an in-depth understanding of the kinds of non-lethal 

capabilities currently under research, development, and procurement.46

Three programs are currently in production to be fielded in the 

near future. These include a Modular Crowd Control Munition (a nonlethal variant of the current Claymore mine which propels hundreds of 

small rubber balls for use in crowd control), a 66mm Vehicle Launched 

NL Grenade (a short-range, indirect fire, crowd control/area denial nonlethal capability employing either a flash-bang device or 32-caliber rubber

balls that can be employed from light vehicle), and a Portable Vehicle 

Arresting Barrier (PVAB) designed to stop a 7,500-pound vehicle 

traveling at speeds up to 45 miles per hour without causing permanent 

injury to the occupants. A 40mm Non-Lethal Crowd Dispersal Cartridge 

(NLCDC) similar to the 40mm round used against individuals is intended 

to disperse a group of people with rubber balls from a range of up to 30 

meters. Finally, the Mobility Denial System (MDS) is a “non-hazardous 

chemical spray system that spreads a highly slippery, viscous gel to inhibit 

the movement of individuals or vehicles on treated surfaces such as 

asphalt, concrete, grass, and wood.”47

Concept Exploration Programs 

Researchers across the DOD have proposed many innovative 

concepts for achieving desirable non-lethal effects, but the technical 

viability of these solutions is not always obvious. Hence, as the name 

suggests, Concept Exploration Programs are designed to refine a proposed 

concept and to reduce the technical uncertainties. Several of these 
20...Non-Lethal Weapons 

innovative concepts are being assessed to evaluate their viability for future 

military use. The first of these is the Clear Facilities (CFAC) program. 

Sponsored by the Marine Corps, the program’s objective is to develop 

alternatives to assist operating forces in the clearing of buildings or 

structures (including ships or boats) without harming personnel,

equipment or the structure. A second is the Non-Lethal Slippery Foam 

(NLSF) program, which is analyzing slippery foams to determine the 

degree and longevity of anti-traction capability on various surfaces. Both 

the Army and the Marine Corps are interested in the potential for NLSF to 

deny an area to pesonnel or vehicles. A third program, the Area Denial to 

Vehicles (AD-V) project managed by the U.S. Army, focuses on stopping 

vehicles in an urban or open environment, denying an area to land

vehicles, and channelizing vehicles. A fourth program, Area Denial to 

Personnel (AD-P), is a U.S. Army project that explores alternatives to land 

mines. The Disable Displacement Vessels (DDV) program explores 

technologies to non-lethally disable vessels. Focusing on large 

displacement, diesel engine powered ships ranging from 150-600 feet in 

length, the DDV program explores methods of affecting a ship system or 

subsystem to cause the vessel to stop and yet be capable of quick 

reconstitution. A sixth program, the Crowd Control (CC) device 

sponsored by the Army, explores containing or stopping a crowd from 

advancing, dispersing a crowd at ranges up to 1,000 meters, and directing 

a crowd movement, separating belligerents, and isolating specific

individuals within a crowd. Incapacitate Personnel (INCAP), a program 

under the auspices of the Marine Corps, seeks to develop capabilities to 

incapacitate individuals for the following tasks: distract an individual or 

group, seize an individual or group, render an individual or group 

unconscious, render an individual or group incapable of performing tasks, 

disorient an individual or group, facilitate deceptions and demonstrations, 

and facilitate the release of hostages. 

Component Advanced Development (CAD) Efforts 

A Component Advanced Development project is one in which a 

project leader has a concept for the needed capability but does not yet 

know the system architecture. The U.S. Marine Corps is sponsoring 

projects to develop two new non-lethal enabling technologies. One is an 

Anti-Traction Material (ATM) project aimed at developing water-cannonlike weapons that distribute slippery liquids or foams that preclude vehicle 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...21 

or personnel use of an area. The other project is a Clear Space Device 

(CSD), a grenade-like round that enables troops to shoot a number of 

different non-lethal substances into a building to clear it of its occupants. 

Pre-Milestone A Programs 

In the Defense Acquisition System, candidate technologies that 

meet certain criteria can be awarded Milestone A approval. This award 

can lead to concept exploration or advanced component development, but 

more work is needed on key sub-systems or components before a system 

architecture can be determined and the technologies can be demonstrated 

in a relevant environment.48 Several Pre-Milestone A non-lethal programs 

are currently underway. One is the Running Gear Entanglement System, a 

rope device designed to stop fast-moving boats by floating in the water 

ahead of the target vessel and becoming entangled around the propeller or 

rudder as the vessel runs over it. A second is a pulsed energy projectile, a

counter-personnel laser of which studied bio-effects include a disorienting 

“flash-bang,” a sensation of pain, or incapacitation. A third involves a 

non-lethal round for the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW). 

The OICW is a lightweight portable weapon capable of firing kinetic 

energy projectiles and an air-bursting fragmentation munition up to 1000 

meters.

49 The weapon is an advanced technology demonstrator currently

under development with a fielding planned for 2005. The non-lethal side 

of the project exploits the ability of the OICW to airburst munitions at a 

precise location in space with non-lethal liquid, aerosol, powder or object 

munitions which can be used for either counter-personnel or countermateriel applications.50 The fifth weapon is a Non-Lethal Mortar 

Munition, an 81 mm round designed to deliver and dispense non-lethal 

payloads up to 1.5 km. A sixth weapon is a non-lethal munition for the 40 

mm Mk 19 Grenade Launcher, an air-cooled, 40 mm fully-automatic 

machine gun, firing 40 mm grenades at a rate of 325 to 375 per minute to 

a range of 1500 meters. 

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations 

The DOD initiated the Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration (ACTD) program in 1994 to answer a long-standing 

criticism that developing and building weapon and information systems

was taking too long, costing too much, and not adequately involving those 
22...Non-Lethal Weapons 

who ultimately use the equipment. The ACTD program allows military

services or defense agencies to adapt new but mature technologies to build 

prototype equipment to meet a critical military need. The developed 

systems would then go to a unified command or service for evaluation in 

the field. After the two to four year ACTD project, the system would 

enter the formal acquisition process if larger quantities were needed.51

Two non-lethal demonstrations are currently underway or planned 

for the near term. The first is the Advanced Tactical Laser, which

includes a laser, optics, and control systems enabling existing fire control 

systems on fixed and rotary wing aircraft to precisely direct laser fire on 

targets to disable them from 15 kilometers.52 The second, proposed for a 

FY 02 start is the Active Denial System. Active denial technology is a

breakthrough non-lethal technology that uses millimeter-wave 

electromagnetic energy to stop, deter and turn back an advancing 

adversary from relatively long range.53 The current system is mounted on 

a Humvee, but other applications are envisioned. 

Technology Investment Projects 

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program has an annual solicitation 

for new ideas. Selected projects are given funding for a maximum of two 

years to conduct a study or demonstrate a concept that provides a decision 

point for pursuing the technology more formally. The following ideas are 

currently being studied (studies have been recently completed for the 

fourth through tenth items): 

• The Front-End Analysis of Riot Control Agents project seeks to

identify feasible non-lethal chemical materials with minimal side

effects for immobilizing adversaries in military and law enforcement 

scenarios. 

• The Thermobaric Technology study determines the feasibility of 

using thermobaric technology, which produces light, overpressure, and 

heat, to incapacitate humans. 

• The Veiling Glare Effects of Violet Laser Exposures in Humans

project is an initial effort to evaluate the ability of a violet laser to

create a veiling glare on isolated human lenses. 

• The Odorous Substances project investigates odorants and their 

effects on behavior as a riot control means, as well as to clear 

facilities, deny an area, or as a taggant. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...23 

• The Microencapsulation project identifies encapsulation techniques 

for anti-materiel and anti-personnel non-lethal weapons related to area 

denial and stopping vessels. Encapsulated techniques being pursued 

are those which will release and spread a variety of chemical payloads 

upon pressure, contact with water, or at a specific temperature. 

• The Bio-Materials Survey project of the University of New 

Hampshire is gathering information on the physical properties of

certain biomaterials applicable to non-lethal weapons, as well as on the 

organizations involved in their research or commercializing. 

• The Overhead Liquid Dispersal System project studies the ability to

rapidly disperse non-lethal chemical agents over large areas. 

• The Taser Landmine project explores an alternative to personnel land 

mines—a device that fires small darts attached to wires that deliver an

incapacitating electrical current. 

• In the Non-Lethal Weapon Guided Projectile project, Raytheon is 

studying the feasibility of employing its Extended Range Guided 

Munition (ERGM)54 and other long range delivery vehicles such as 

mortars, shoulder launched weapons, artillery, missiles, guided bombs, 

and unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver non-lethal payloads (such as 

foams and irritants) for area denial and clearing facilities missions. 

• The Non-Lethal Loitering Submunition project studies non-lethal 

payloads and a concept of operations for a loitering submunition. 

Additional Research Projects 

In addition to its nominal $25M annual budget, the Joint NonLethal Weapons Program received supplemental funding to conduct 

advanced prototype hardware, ruggedizing, packaging, and effects 

research in four areas.55 Directed energy research received funding for 

engineering and demonstration of launch and deployment options for nonlethal weapons used to repel belligerents. Navy force protection research 

aimed at evaluating technologies to stop small vessels at standoff distances 

was funded. Blunt impact and pulsed projectile research studies—nonlethal directed energy to deliver a controlled blunt impact on human 

targets at extended ranges, received funding. Finally, research into 

standoff delivery of non-lethal weapons seeks to identify specific delivery 

systems to deliver non-lethal payloads beyond 800 meters, for which there 

is no current capability, received supplemental funding. 
24...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Rejected Technologies 

There have already been some candidate non-lethal technologies 

that have been discarded due to technical problems. First, sticky foams 

were once seen as attractive candidates for both counter-personnel and 

counter-materiel applications. However, they have largely been dismissed 

due to concerns about the potential for accidental lethality (suffocating)

and difficulty in removing the substances after use.56 A second rejected 

technology is infrasound, a technology designed to create disabling 

physical responses, such as nausea and incapacitating pain through the use 

of inaudible very low frequency (below 20 Hz) noise. Anecdotal accounts 

exist of severe biological reactions due to this phenomenon. The Joint 

Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate sponsored extensive research in this 

area, but halted it in 1999 after the program failed to identify frequencies 

at which reliable, repeatable bio-effects could be produced.57

Having looked at the current state-of-the-art for non-lethal 

technology, we now turn our attention to some of the strategic issues that 

will need to be considered in assessing the future of these technologies as

components of America’s future military arsenal. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...25 

IV. Strategic Advantages and Drawbacks of NonLethal Weapons 

Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz spoke of the dominance of

political considerations in the employment of military power. Clausewitz

stated that “War should never be though of as something autonomous but 

always as an instrument of policy.”58 Noted political and military thinker

Colin Gray further argues that since war is “organized violence for 

political ends,” then the tools of war are necessarily strategic: “It is 

inherent in their nature.”

59 Consequently, any proper discussion of the 

usefulness of a weapon type should center on its potential to elicit strategic 

effects—that is, how it might contribute to the successful achievement of 

political goals. With that said, one could make the case that some 

weapons are more strategic than others. The current stated focus of the 

DOD’s non-lethal weapons program is for weapons and systems 

“designed primarily for use at the tactical level.”

60 As long as non-lethals 

remain as merely close-quarters, law-enforcement type tools comprising 

only a small fraction of the U.S. arsenal, it is difficult to foresee how they

could routinely bring about strategic effects. The Joint Non-Lethal 

Weapons Directorate is considering weapons that directly influence

operational or strategic targets.61 In fact, the JMAA study examined 

nearly 400 tasks listed in the Universal Joint Task List and service task 

lists that describe the capabilities required for warfighters to be able to 

successfully execute their assigned missions. The study found that an 

overwhelming majority of these tasks had either direct or indirect 

applicability for non-lethal weapons, even for tasks specified as “strategic 

national.”62 However, these strategic capabilities are only imagined at this

point, and actual development efforts are still for tactical level weapons. 

The following discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of non-lethal 

weapons, therefore, looks to a future state of military affairs in which nonlethal weapons have reached a state of maturity and level of employment 

that makes their existence a substantial factor in war. It seeks to provide 

senior leaders with important issues to consider regarding these weapons 

in order to make informed decisions about whether their wide-scale

development is an appropriate course of action. 
26...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Advantage #1: Non-lethal weapons are consistent with American values 

(and that of our allies). 

A prerequisite for the fielding of any new weapon should be that 

its use is consistent with American values. U.S. Civil War General 

William Tecumseh Sherman observed that “war is hell,” but the traditional 

(and prevailing) American belief is that human life is sacred and that pain 

and suffering should be limited, even on the battlefield, and especially in 

the case of non-combatants. This idea coincides with the internationally 

recognized concept of “right conduct in war,” or jus in bello, which has 

three criteria. The first is that the immediate object of war is not to kill, 

but to restrain. Thus, soldiers who surrender may not be killed. The

second criterion is that it is not legitimate to attack non-combatants 

directly or to use indiscriminate methods of warfare. Finally, causing 

unnecessary suffering is prohibited.63 These concepts originated with the 

religious culture of the Middle Ages and remain to this day the dominant 

military ethos of the Western world.64 The interpretation of these 

principles has not always been easy (the morality of nuclear deterrence,

for example), nor have they been perfectly applied (the My Lai massacre 

of the Vietnam War, for instance). Nevertheless, these ideals and

principles have consistently guided American war experience. As George 

Schultz pointed out, America’s strength ultimately derives not from our

military or economic potency, but from our passionate commitment to

ideals.65 Consequently, recognition and observance of those principles is

critical both to U.S. public support and the support of allies that share our 

values. Non-lethal weapons, which are specifically designed with the 

intent to minimize casualties, are self-evidently consistent with the

Western concept of minimizing unnecessary suffering on the battlefield 

and among non-combatants. 

Advantage #2: Non-Lethal Weapons can be a synergy-producing force 

multiplier. 

A second strategic advantage of non-lethal weapons is their 

potential for contributing synergies when they are employed with 

traditional lethal means. Synergy, the concept that the effects of 

coordinated forces can exceed the individual contributions of forces 

applied separately, is a fundamental of the military operational art as 

defined in joint doctrine.66 Examples of non-lethal means being used

synergistically with lethal weapons may be as follows: an active tagger 

used to mark a target for later destruction, employing a counter-mobility 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...27 

weapon to demobilize assets in order to render them more vulnerable to 

lethal fires, or using a multi-sensory distraction device to provide tactical 

distraction and then bringing lethal force to bear. Combining non-lethal 

weapons with conventional weaponry, then, has the potential to provide 

warfighters with a key force multiplier. This is consistent with current 

DOD policy that “non-lethal weapons may be used in conjunction with

lethal weapon systems to enhance the latter's effectiveness and efficiency 

in military operations. This shall apply across the range of military

operations to include those situations where overwhelming force is 

employed.”67 As mentioned earlier, current policy is that non-lethal

weapons are not a guarantee against casualties. In fact, from the 

perspective of synergy, the availability of non-lethal technology can even 

potentially increase lethality—albeit to those upon which lethal effects are 

intended. The Council on Foreign Relations’ 1999 Independent Task 

Force Report, Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects, made

just this point: 

It is not the primary purpose of non-lethal weapons to 

prevent death or major injury to opposing troops. Instead, 

they are intended to increase the lethality of force used

against combatants, while reducing death and injury among 

noncombatant civilians. For example, [non-lethal] 

weapons can prevent a crowd from approaching closely 

enough to be a serious threat to U.S. forces. They can also 

unmask snipers or other combatants in a crowd of civilians, 

opening a field for U.S. lethal fire. In short, [non-lethal 

weapons] are important because they permit military 

engagement at a lower level of violence. And in political 

terms, less violence equals more acceptability.68

Advantage #3: Non-Lethal weapons are precise—they put the “bottom 

rung on the ladder” of force escalation 

A third strategic advantage, and one of the greatest potential 

benefits of non-lethal weapons, is their ability to produce precision effects 

that are tailored to the needs of the warfighter. Joint Vision 2020 calls for 

the development of “full spectrum dominance” in which military

operations are “persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any 

form of conflict.”69 Precision engagement is described as a key 

component of full spectrum dominance. It is in this area that non-lethal 
28...Non-Lethal Weapons 

weapons provide the greatest potential contribution. Without the 

availability of non-lethal weapons, soldiers can be forced to choose 

between unacceptable alternative courses of action. For example, in

human shield or crowd-control situations, commanders can face the choice 

of having to kill civilians in order to not lose an opportunity to destroy an 

important target or to protect their units in ambiguous urban combat 

settings. Consequently, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) 

FY00 Master Plan noted “deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and, 

most recently, Kosovo demonstrated the operational need for [non-lethal 

weapon] capabilities to supplement and/or augment lethal force in the 

battlespace.”

70 DOD policy on non-lethal weapons recognizes this 

potential to increase the options available to commanders: “Non-lethal 

weapons, doctrine, and concepts of operation shall be designed to 

reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to 

commanders”71 From this perspective, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 

Directorate sees non-lethal weapons as a means to “facilitate 

discrimination.”72 Without access to non-lethal means, commanders have 

no intermediate choices on the continuum between “detect” and “destroy.” 

Non-lethal weapons add “delay,” “deny,” and “defeat” as intermediate 

steps in the range of options available to the commander.73 If full

spectrum dominance can be described as a ladder, non-lethal weapons put 

the bottom rung on that ladder by allowing warfighters’ the potential to 

smoothly ratchet up the level of force as the situation warrants. 

Advantage #4: Non-lethal weapons can be the right weapon for the

blurred environment between war and law enforcement 

A fourth strategic advantage of non-lethal weapons is their unique 

ability to contribute to military operations at the low end of the

spectrum—in situations that can look more like law enforcement activities

than combat. U.S. armed forces are expected to perform operations across 

the spectrum, from military operations other than war to large scale 

combat operations. Future conflicts are likely to frequently enter that

realm of warfare described by General Wesley Clark when he spoke of the 

1999 Kosovo air campaign, “not quite war—not quite peace.”74 Activities 

such as peace enforcement, counter-drug, and counter-terrorism operations 

are likely to create scenarios in which apprehending suspects and 

preserving evidence play a vital role. By their nature, non-lethal weapons 

minimize death and destruction and therefore are well suited to this 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...29 

function. Additionally, the reversibility of non-lethal weapons allows for 

recovery from, for example, a case of mistaken identity. Finally, nonlethal weapons improve the chances of apprehending suspects and 

bringing them to justice and may also allow soldiers to capture key 

evidence or enemy materiel that might, alternatively, have been destroyed 

by conventional weapons. 

Advantage #5: Non-lethal weapons minimize opportunities for

adversaries to provoke negative public opinion against our cause. 

A fifth strategic benefit comes in the area of public relations. 

Since military operations are carried out to accomplish political objectives, 

modern commanders are increasingly asked to keep one eye on the 

battlefield and the other on the newspaper headlines. Negative press, 

particularly the advertising of large numbers of civilian casualties, can 

have a direct and sizeable negative effect on our ability to conduct 

successful military operations. By reducing noncombatant casualties, nonlethal technology offers the ability to reduce these adverse effects. 

Advantage #6: Non-lethal weapons limit collateral damage and post-war 

rebuilding and aid. 

A sixth strategic advantage of non-lethal weapons is their ability to

reduce collateral damage. This is related to the public relations issue

mentioned above since destruction of homes, hospitals, schools, and 

cultural and religious buildings produces some of the same kind of effects

as images of children injured or killed by stray bombs. Another factor is 

also involved here—the economic costs of the destruction. Rebuilding the

infrastructure of a nation destroyed by war has often been borne, either 

directly or indirectly, by the U.S. and her allies. Even in cases where we 

have not stepped in to rebuild, costs associated with refugees losing their 

homes or losing their ability to take part in meaningful economic activity 

can have an adverse effect on the world’s economy, especially in our 

increasingly interdependent world. The potential indirect cost associated 

with the destruction of a country’s economic base can obviously be 

substantial. Since poverty often breeds discontent, this can come back to 

haunt us. It is for this reason that DOD non-lethal policy states, “nonlethal weapons should also be designed to help decrease the post-conflict

costs of reconstruction.”75
30...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Advantage #7: Non-lethal weapons are potential WMD neutralizers 

A seventh and final strategic benefit of these weapons is their 

potential to neutralize Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Operation 

Desert Storm highlighted the serious drawback of attempting to destroy 

WMD or WMD production facilities with conventional kinetic devices—

namely the risk of spreading poisonous materials that can harm friendly 

forces, civilians, or the environment. Seeking a technical solution to this

problem, in 1999 the Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions 

Directorate issued a Program Research and Development Announcement 

(PRDA) seeking a contractor to work the problem. The program’s 

objective was to produce an “Agent Defeat Warhead” capable of

demonstrating “an ability to generate widespread damage within fixed 

ground targets associated with the development, production and storage of 

chemical and biological weapons, while limiting the potential for 

collateral damage (i.e., human casualties resulting from the unintentional 

release of [chemical and biological] agents beyond the confines of the 

target structure)....”76 The proposal specifically called for lethal 

incendiary and low blast fragmenting warheads, but it also mentioned 

“neutralizing chemicals and other mechanisms” as candidate kill 

mechanisms. Though the laboratory did not receive an acceptable 

proposal by the PRDA closing date of 29 April 1999, the issue continues 

to receive considerable defense department attention.77 If a non-lethal 

weapon solution can be found, it would have the dual advantage of 

minimizing both the collateral human casualties and unintended damage to 

facilities. If preemptive strikes are envisioned, this feature will be 

particularly important, as it will reduce the negative reaction at home and 

abroad in what is likely to be a controversial action. 

Potential Drawbacks 

The advantages outlined above potentially offer significant 

enhancements to our ability to bring about desired political outcomes via 

military means. As mentioned earlier, there is a growing demand from 

combatant commanders for these capabilities. However, employment of 

these types of weapons does present numerous challenges and concerns as 

described below. 

Drawback #1: Non-lethal weapons may produce unrealistic 

expectations. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...31 

The first concern is that the weapons might present unrealistic 

expectations about the prospects for bloodless war. As mentioned earlier, 

part of the problem arises from the term “non-lethal” itself, leading some

in the defense community to advocate adoption of substitute terms such as

“less-lethal” or “sub-lethal effects weapons.” An example of the trend 

toward unrealistic expectations can be seen in the current attitudes toward

the use of precision munitions. Although weapons such as Global 

Positioning System (GPS) or laser-guided bombs make up a small fraction 

of the U.S. arsenal, dramatic footage of the accuracy and effects of these 

weapons has led to an expectation for extreme accuracy. For example, in 

the Gulf War, where precision munitions made up less than ten percent of 

the total weight of bombs dropped by the coalition, Benjamin Lambeth 

pointed out the following transcript: 

...cockpit video images of LGBs [laser-guided bombs] 

homing with seemingly unerring accuracy down the air 

shaft of enemy bunkers were spellbinding to most

observers. Yet thanks to that same seemingly unerring 

accuracy, such performance has since come to be expected 

by both political leaders and the public alike.78

Consequently, when any weapon, precision-guided or otherwise, misses 

its target and causes unintended death and destruction, the political fallout 

can be substantial. The diplomatic crisis caused by the inadvertent

bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Kosovo provides one of the most 

glaring examples. As noted earlier in this paper, the DOD policy on nonlethal weapons represents an aggressive attempt to combat the false notion 

that non-lethal weapons will eliminate casualties by declaring,

Non-lethal weapons shall not be required to have a zero 

probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries. 

However, while complete avoidance of these effects is not 

guaranteed or expected, when properly employed, nonlethal weapons should significantly reduce them as 

compared with physically destroying the same target.79 

Incidentally, the JMAA report recommends employing “perception 

management” to counter false impressions about the intent and anticipated 

results of these weapons. 80
32...Non-Lethal Weapons 

A related yet flip-side concern is also possible. There is a potential 

for negative public reaction to U.S. forces employing lethal force when 

non-lethal means may be available. Martin Stanton foresees scenarios in 

which an adversary manufactures an incident specifically for the purpose 

of causing casualties that can be leveraged for political gain.81 In the

media examination that follows the event, the rioters could be described as 

“peaceful protesters,” and considerable speculation could occur as to why

rubber bullets or other non-lethal means were not used. The bottom line is 

that aggressive efforts will be needed to combat these potentially dire 

political attitudes and effects. 

Drawback #2: Non-lethal weapons offer the potential for the enemy to 

fight again. 

A second concern regarding non-lethal weapons is the potential for

opposing forces to return to the battlefield to fight again. Mercy on the

battlefield sometimes backfires. For example, some of the prisoners 

paroled by General Grant at Vicksburg during the U.S. Civil War fought 

him again in later battles.82 Clausewitz warned that, in general, the

enemy’s “fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in 

such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight.”83 This is an

issue that must be considered if increasing reliance on non-lethal weapons 

becomes a reality. 

 

Drawback #3: Non-lethal weapons can diminish deterrence. 

A third concern is that the deterrent value of military force may be

diminished. One way of preventing war is by “rendering the use of arms

so unattractive that a nation would rather tolerate existing conflicts and 

frustrations than start a war.”84 Although DOD policy states, “non-lethal 

weapons, doctrine, and concepts of operation shall be designed to 

reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to 

commanders,” the perception that the U.S. is hesitant to use lethal force

could embolden a potential adversary. For example, terrorist mastermind 

Osama bin Laden has stated, 

We think that the United States is very much weaker than 

Russia. Based on the reports we received from our brothers 

who participated in jihad in Somalia, we learned that they

saw the weakness, frailty, and cowardice of U.S. troops. 

Only 80 U.S. troops were killed. Nonetheless, they fled in 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...33 

the heart of darkness, frustrated, after they had caused great 

commotion about the new world order.85 

The perception that the U.S. lacks resolve can lead to conflict that

otherwise would be deterred. Clausewitz warns, “Kind-hearted people 

might of course think there is some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an 

enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine that this is the true 

goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be 

exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes from kindness 

are the very worst.”86 Martin Stanton puts it this way: 

Far from strengthening our position in these places, nonlethal weapons further convey to our potential adversaries 

that we are too squeamish to hurt even our enemies, let 

alone take casualties ourselves. Arrayed against people who 

have nothing to lose, we are saying in effect that we will go 

to extraordinary lengths to keep from harming them. This 

conveys neither strength nor resolve, the two traits that gain 

the most respect in the anarchic world. The new non-lethal 

technologies are the epitome of “tepid shows of force.87

Drawback #4: Non-lethal weapons may inhibit our ability to overcome 

our adversary’s hostile will. 

A fourth concern is that use of non-lethal weapons may 

unnecessarily extend a war because the enemy’s hostile will has not been 

overcome. Clausewitz reminds us that men fight out of two motivations: 

“hostile feelings and hostile intentions.”88 Short of removing an

adversary’s ability to resist, overcoming these hostilities is an important 

factor in bringing a conflict to a conclusion. Removing the cost of war 

(that is, the destruction of lives and property) could, therefore, remove an

important ingredient in bringing war to a conclusion. This is not always

the case. In fact, a war may be prolonged because the public or

government may believe that the outcome of the war must justify past 

sacrifices.89 However, this potential adverse effect of the use of non-lethal 

weapons must be considered. In contemplating his famous raiding march 

from Atlanta to Savannah, General William Tecumseh Sherman declared, 

“I would not coax or even meet them half way but make them so sick of 

war that generations would pass before they would again appeal to it....”

90

That statement may clash with modern sensibilities, but it illustrates the 
34...Non-Lethal Weapons 

idea that wars sometimes end only when nations reach a threshold of pain

sufficient to cause them to desire to bring the war to an end. 

Drawback #5: Non-lethal weapons may proliferate and be used against 

us. 

A fifth concern relates to proliferation—the potential that as these 

non-lethal technologies proliferate, they could be used against us. This is 

something that must be considered in the development of any new 

weapon. However, these concerns are mitigated by two factors. One is

that technologies don’t drive decisive effects on the battlefield without 

being integrated into weapon systems and also having the doctrine and 

training necessary to make their use effective. The other is that the U.S. 

has developed and maintained decisive military power, not only by merely 

developing technological advancements, but also by continuing to invest 

in technologies to stay ahead of competitors and adversaries. The concern 

over proliferation does, however, point to the need to consider defenses 

against these weapons should they fall into the wrong hands. A related 

concern is that an adversary might use them as a torture device, since 

many of them can inflict pain without necessarily causing permanent

disfiguring or dismemberment. This may be an unwarranted fear,

however, since numerous ways already exist to torture prisoners without 

permanently injuring them.

91 Another concern is that in the hands of an 

unscrupulous police force these weapons could provide a tyrannical leader 

with a tool to oppress his or her own people. Again, however, many of 

these leaders have already demonstrated a willingness to commit even 

genocide against their own people; providing such a regime a non-lethal 

weapon would seem to be a far less evil. 

Drawback #6: The availability of non-lethal technology may lure

adventurism. 

A sixth possible criticism of reliance on non-lethal weapons is that 

they may make us more prone to commit to military action that may have 

negative economic or diplomatic consequences or may escalate to become 

an unintended major conflict. The argument goes that since bloodshed 

and destruction can be greatly reduced with these weapons, we may be 

tempted to intervene at an earlier point.92 Two counter points offset this 

concern. One is that if political leaders are made aware of the potential for

this adverse consequence, they will be in a position to make an informed 

decision about whether to commit forces. This fear would only seem 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...35 

warranted if leaders have unrealistic expectations about these weapons, as 

mentioned in drawback number one above. Current DOD policy makes it 

clear that “in all cases, the United States retains the option for immediate 

use of lethal weapons, when appropriate, consistent with international 

law.”93 A second counter to this concern is there may be situations in 

which the U.S. has a very real desire to get involved in a volatile situation 

but fails to do so because it lacks the expanded range of options provided

by non-lethal weapons. 

As the preceding discussion shows, there are no simple answers 

when it comes to non-lethal weapons. They may provide revolutionary 

new capabilities, enabling the precision application of force to bring about 

positive political outcomes with minimal injury, death, and destruction. 

On the other hand, they may fuel unrealistic expectations, cause us to 

commit to action prematurely, or even prolong a war. A careful and 

continuous assessment of the strategic advantages and disadvantages of 

non-lethal weapons is needed as we move along a path toward making 

them a more important part of our military forces structure. 
36...Non-Lethal Weapons 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...37 

V. Outstanding Issues 

The preceding discussion attempts to anticipate the potential 

strategic effects, both positive and negative, of non-lethal technology. 

Before widespread use of these weapons can be realized, however, there

are a number of issues that need to be addressed. Legal and ethical

concerns as well as operational issues will need to be dealt with

thoroughly. Efforts to sort out these issues in the joint community are 

accelerating; however, substantial work still remains to take these 

weapons beyond what the Director of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 

Directorate, Marine Colonel George Fenton, describes as the “rubber 

bullet modality.”94 The following sections will describe the challenges in

bringing these weapons to fruition. 

Legal and Ethical concerns 

Legal and ethical issues are central to the effort to develop nonlethal weapons. The U.S. Constitution enshrines the principle that, along

with the Constitution and domestic law, international law agreed to by

treaty “shall be the supreme law of the land.”

95 For this reason, DOD 

policy requires that non-lethal weapons be consistent with international 

law.96 It is the view of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate’s 

JMAA panel that existing treaties NOT be modified to accommodate nonlethal weapons.97 A counter view is that all laws need to be continually

adjusted to maintain relevance to new situations. Laws that perpetuate

human suffering or ones that are inconsistent with the shared values of the

U.S and her international allies should be reexamined. One might even 

skeptically opine, as an international diplomat once did, “international 

law is the law which the wicked do not obey and which the righteous do 

not enforce.”

98 It is an irony that legal constraints on these types of 

weapons, which by their very nature are intended to minimize unnecessary

loss of life and destruction of property, may cause commanders to select 

more lethal forms of warfare. 

Arguments on whether these laws should be changed 

notwithstanding, the current laws must be adequately addressed. There 

are two broad areas of international law dealing with the acceptability of a 

weapon or method of warfare. The first is the Law of Armed Conflict, the 

guiding principle of which is that of humanity, which demands that 
38...Non-Lethal Weapons 

combatants and non-combatants should not be subject to unnecessary 

suffering. Under this broad umbrella is the more specific concept of 

proportionality, which states that any suffering caused must be weighed 

against the military necessity of the action.99 The second and related area 

of international law is the Principle Governing Weapons, which includes 

the following three principles.100 The first is the unnecessary suffering

principle, which prohibits employment of “arms, projectiles, or material 

calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”101 The second, the 

discrimination principle, holds that weapons must be directed against 

military objectives. It prohibits attacks against targets in which the 

anticipated civilian injuries or death or destruction of property exceeds the 

anticipated military advantage of the attack.102 A third concept, known as 

the treachery or perfidy principle limits the perfidious use of weapons that 

are inherently treacherous.103

In addition, generally accepted principles of acceptable conduct in 

war are captured in Protocol I of Geneva Conventions Art I (2) of 1977: 

In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other 

international agreements, civilians and combatants remain

under the protection and authority of the principles of

international law derived from established custom, from the 

principles of humanity and from the dictates of public

conscience. 

In addition to these general principles, other treaties and conventions 

limiting specific types of weapons apply also to the non-lethal varieties. 

Table 4 is a list of declarations and conventions with relevance to nonlethal weapons. 

DOD policy dictates that every new weapon will undergo legal 

reviews during several phases of the acquisition process to ensure that the 

weapon or weapon system complies with all applicable treaties, 

international law, and the law of armed conflict.104 Service instructions

implement the DOD instruction. For example, Air Force Instruction 51-

402: Weapons Review states that the Judge Advocate General will ensure 

all weapons being “developed, bought, built, or otherwise acquired, and 

those modified by the Air Force” are reviewed for legality under 

international law prior to their use in a conflict.105 The Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) also carries 

responsibilities for ensuring legality of all weapons.106
Non-Lethal Weapons ...39 

Table 4: Summary of Treaties, Laws, and Regulations Concerning 

Non-Lethal Weapons107

Treaties 

1. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:

Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18

October 1907. 

2. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 

and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925. 

3. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and

Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. 

4. Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick

and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949. 

5. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12

August 1949. 

6. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. 

7. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Opened

for Signature at London, Moscow and Washington. 10 April 1972. 

8. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental

Modification Techniques. 10 December 1976. 

9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to

the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

[The United States is not a party to this Protocol. Many of its provisions are 

acceptable to us as customary international law, but we strongly object to several. 

Most of our allies have ratified this Protocol.]

10. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to

the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June

1977. [The United States is not a party to this Protocol, but we deem most of it as

customary international law. President Reagan forwarded it to the Senate for 

ratification, but the Senate failed to act on it.] 

11. United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 

Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to

Have Indiscriminate Effects (UNCCW). Geneva, 10 October 1980.

12. UNCCW Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I). Geneva, 10 October 

1980. 

13. UNCCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps

and Other Devices (Protocol II). Geneva, 10 October 1980. 

14. UNCCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons

(Protocol III). Geneva, 10 October 1980. [This Protocol was forwarded to the 

Senate for ratification. If ratified, it will be accompanied with reservations.] 

15. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 

of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Paris, 13 January 1993.
40...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Treaties (continued) 

16. UNCCW Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980

Convention), 13 October 1995. [This Protocol was forwarded to the Senate for 

ratification.] 

17. UNCCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps

and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Mines Protocol). [This

Protocol was forwarded to the Senate for ratification in Jan 97 along with Protocols

III and IV. It has been ratified, while the Senate has not yet acted on the other two.] 

18. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of

Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997. [The United

States is not a party to this Convention, but the vast majority of our allies have 

ratified it.] 

19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998. [The United States 

is not a party to this Treaty, but the Treaty will allow the ICC to obtain jurisdiction 

over non-Party nations. The Treaty will enter into force once 60 nations have

ratified it. So far, 30 nations have done so.]

Domestic Law 

1. Biological Weapons Anti-terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 175. 

2. Chemical Weapons Anti-terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229 (1998). 

3. Defense Authorization Act of 1996, § 219.

Policies and Regulations 

1. DODD 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, 9 July 1996. 

2. DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 23 October

2000. 

3. DODD 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program, 9 December 1998. 

4. DODD 3216.2, Protection of Human Subjects in DOD-Supported Research. 

5. DOD Policy on Blinding Lasers, 17 January 1997. 

6. Department of Health and Human Services Regulation, “Protection of Human

Subjects,” 45 CFR 46, 1 October 1999. 

The Department of the Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) has 

completed final legal reviews on several non-lethal weapons, including 

stinger grenades, 12-gauge shotgun bean bag/rubber pellet/wood baton 

rounds, 40 mm rubber pellets, foam rubber, bean bag, and wood baton 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...41 

rounds, sticky restraining foam, barrier foam, and a 40 mm practice M781 

round modified with foam rubber projectile.108 The Department of the 

Navy JAG also performs preliminary legal reviews of candidate 

technologies before extensive research and development takes place.109 

Several other candidate non-lethal weapons have received preliminary 

approval. Anti-personnel technologies passing preliminary legal review 

include gastrointestinal convulsives, calmative agents, sticky foam, 

aqueous foam, adhesives, malodorous agents, Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) 

cayenne pepper spray, smokes and fogs, riot control agents (CS & CN),

slick coatings and superlubricants. Anti-material technologies receiving 

preliminary legal approval include viscosity/surface polymerization 

agents, corrosive agents, caustic agents, embrittling agents, 

depolymerization agents, combustion modifiers, sticky foam, adhesives, 

microbes, and slick coatings and superlubricants. Calmative and 

gastrointestinal convulsives, if classified as riot control agents (and not 

used on combatants), can be acceptable within the context of the 

Biological Weapons Convention.110 Once these technologies evolve into

actual weapons and weapon systems, the host service Judge Advocate 

General will then review and analyze them in light of their toxic properties 

and compliance with international laws and treaties as well as domestic 

restrictions before granting final approval or rejection. 

One aspect of the legal discussion regarding non-lethal weapons is 

the meaning of the term weapon. Oddly enough, no official definition is 

given for the term in official DOD publications, and there are many nonlethal products (for example, the ancillary technology items given in Table 

2 above) that would probably not be considered weapons. As a result, 

their employment may not face the same policy restrictions as systems 

classified as bona fide weapons. Hence, the JMAA report recommends 

developing a definition of weapon that allows for the distinction between 

non-lethal weapons and other non-lethal capabilities.111

Chemical Weapons 

The Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC), to which the U.S. is a 

party, is one of the most important international agreements relating to

non-lethal weapons. As was seen previously, many candidate weapons are

based on chemicals. A special case that illustrates the ability of the CWC

to restrict chemical weapon development and use is riot control agents. 

The CWC specifically prohibits the use of riot control agents “as a method 
42...Non-Lethal Weapons 

of warfare.”112 The convention defines riot control agents as chemicals 

that can “produce sensory irritation or disabling physical effects in 

humans, which disappear within a short time following termination of 

exposure.”113 The convention recognizes “law enforcement including 

domestic riot control purposes” as specifically not prohibited, and U.S. 

policy has been to use these agents for law enforcement purposes, in 

support of rear area operations, against rioting prisoners of war, to protect 

convoys and nuclear weapons, and during search and rescue operations.114 

Though the U.S. Senate ratified the convention, their concern over its 

potential to restrict legitimate uses of riot control agents in peacekeeping 

operations led to the Senate requiring the President to certify that riot 

control agents may be used in peacekeeping operations. On 25 April 

1997, President Clinton certified to the Congress that the U.S. is not 

restricted in its use of riot control agents in “various peacetime and

peacekeeping operations” and informed the U.N. Secretary-General that 

the United States would become an original party to the convention by 

ratifying the treaty before its 29 April 1997 entry-into-force deadline (180 

days after the 65th signatory deposited its instrument of ratification).115

Biological Weapons 

The Biological Weapons Convention, signed by the U.S. in 1972 

and ratified in 1975, is even more restrictive than the Chemical Weapons 

Convention. The parties to the convention undertake “never in any 

circumstances” to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 

retain...microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their 

origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 

justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”116 

Microbes represent the only technology undergoing a legal review by the

Navy JAG that did not receive approval for development since this 

category of weapon violates the Biological Weapons Convention. Though 

a signatory to the convention, the U.S. has resisted recent attempts to 

institute compliance mechanisms. At a July 2001 meeting of the Ad Hoc 

Group negotiating the final text of the verification protocol that would 

attempt to strengthened the Biological Weapons Convention, U.S. 

Ambassador Donald Mahley announced that the U.S. would not support a 

draft protocol to the convention because it “would not improve our ability 

to verify compliance with the treaty's global ban on biological weapons 

and would put national security and confidential business information at 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...43 

risk.”117 It was also announced that the U.S. “would pursue alternative 

ways to enforce the BWC that do not pose risks for U.S. bio-warfare

defense preparations, sensitive commercial information and multilateral 

export regimes.” Though the debate will continue regarding how to be 

enforce the treaty, it is clear that it will be a significant factor in future

efforts to develop new non-lethal weapons. 

Environmental concerns 

Environmental concerns are also an issue. Though environmental 

issues have historically taken a backseat to winning a war, compliance 

with environmental law, both international and domestic, poses 

restrictions to U.S. efforts to develop certain classes of non-lethal 

weapons.118 For example, when sticky foam was being considered, it was 

deemed acceptable under the Chemical Weapons Convention since the 

foam disables through its binding property rather than its toxicity. 

However, an environmental issue was raised related to the Montreal

Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer since Freon-12 (an 

ingredient comprising approximately 30% of sticky foam) was banned 

after 31 December 1995 by the Clean Air Act (which implements the 

Montreal Protocol).119 Environmental law will continue to be a constraint

in the further development of non-lethal technology. 

Operational concerns 

In addition to the legal concerns, there are numerous operational 

issues that will need to be carefully considered before fielding non-lethal 

weapons. A detailed explanation of these issues is beyond the scope of 

this paper; however, a brief outline of some of the operational challenges

facing the development and fielding of non-lethal weapons is provided.

These issues were explored as part of the effort to produce the JMAA, and

they continue to be an integral part of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 

Directorate’s endeavors. First, with each of the weapons, tactical issues 

must be resolved. As just one example, Martin Stanton has pointed out 

that anti-traction technology it is a double-edged sword.120 Though 

turning a road into a skating rink could be a very effective way of slowing 

down rioters or enemy combatants, it has the same effect on friendly 

forces that intend to use the same street. Also, anti-traction material

would be relatively ineffective on dirt roads. The bottom line is that the 
44...Non-Lethal Weapons 

risk to friendly forces must be considered. Second, a determination needs 

to be made as to whether specialized non-lethal weapons or multi-purpose 

weapons are most appropriate. One point of view is that having visible, 

non-lethal-only weapons reduces the chances of escalation where use of 

lethal force is undesirable (it also reduces the logistics and training 

complications, which can be another major concern). The reverse 

argument is that taking away the option to go lethal also reduces 

deterrence.121 A related concern is what to do about a lethal response if

friendly forces have only non-lethal weapons readily available. A third 

operational issue relates to rules of engagement for non-lethal weapons. 

The Policy Working Group of the JMAA panel noted that in past 

operations, “authorization to use non-lethal capabilities has often been 

coincident with authorization to use lethal force.”

122 The simplicity of this

policy, however, reduced some of the flexibility gained by the presence of

non-lethal weapons. By treating non-lethal weapons exactly the same as 

their lethal counterparts, much of the unique potential of non-lethal 

weapons to prevent or reduce escalation and to provide the commander in 

the field with a “set of tools between a warning and the actual use of 

force” is lost.123 A related concern is whether non-combatants can be 

targeted with non-lethal weapons, for example, in the case of “human

shields” being used to protect an otherwise viable military target. Future

rules of engagement involving non-lethal weapons need to carefully weigh 

the unique capabilities of these weapons. Interoperability with coalition 

members is a fourth operational issue that needs to be addressed. U.S. 

defense policy emphasizes going to war as part of a multinational effort. 

Consequently, interoperability of non-lethal weapon systems with

coalition or alliance partners needs to be considered. Also, coalition 

members may offer different interpretations to international law relating to 

these weapons or have different doctrines regarding their use, which could 

further complicate the situation. A fifth issue is the cost of these weapons. 

The Programs and Resources Working Group of the JMAA panel was 

tasked to examine current and future “resource trends and forecasts and 

prepare resource assessments.”124 The group assessed eight representative 

systems to obtain rough cost estimates for research and development, 

acquisition, and procurement of these non-lethal systems. Total system 

cost estimates ranged from approximately $100M for an indirect guided 

(non-line-of-sight) system to deliver nanoparticles to neutralize a 

biological or chemical agent WMD to approximately $11.5B for a longrange system to deliver a directed energy device via proximity fusing 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...45 

technology to disable a vehicle.125 What were even more striking than the 

steep price tags for these weapons were the comments the resources group 

had regarding the overarching and specific constraints of non-lethal 

weapons. Among the constraints the group highlighted were the 

following: 

• POM initiatives of multiple services would be required to efficiently 

fund these weapons. 

• Testing and evaluation requirements of non-lethal technology 

represent significant investments. 

• Non-lethal weapons are not seen as a core competency of military

forces and may not compete well for resources.

• Current funding is inadequate for full development of state-of-the-art 

technical concepts and the necessary doctrinal evaluations of such 

concepts. 

• No avenue currently exists for the joint funding of a dedicated, focused 

science and technology effort for non-lethal capabilities. 

• There are no tools available to fully evaluate human effects and 

specific operational concepts, and funding constraints do not give

adequate improvement in this area without heavily cutting into

acquisition efforts. 

• Current core funding for the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program of 

approximately $24M is not adequate to address the needs for 

development of future technologies.126 

The 2001 QDR report calls for “selectively recapitalizing legacy 

forces to meet near-term challenges and to provide near-term 

readiness.”127 Perhaps refitting certain legacy systems with non-lethal 

payloads offers at least a partial answer to these substantial funding 

challenges. A final operational concern is the need to have confidence 

that these weapons are going to achieve their advertised effects. This is a

special concern for anti-personnel non-lethal weapons, as human effects 

can be very difficult to predict with precision. This is an area for which 

the JMAA panel urges aggressive action, as current human effects models

are not adequate to give confidence in repeatable results.128 Clearly, a 

significant number of operational issues will need to be considered in 

developing a major non-lethal capability. 
46...Non-Lethal Weapons 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...47 

VI. Non-Lethal Weapons in the War on Terrorism 

As mentioned earlier, the events of September 11, 2001, have 

forced the defense community to rethink the nature of the threats facing 

the United States and the means for defending against future attacks. The

Secretary of Defense’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review confirmed this 

new priority. The report begins “On September 11, 2001, the United 

States came under vicious, bloody attack,” and the attack is mentioned 

thereafter no less than fifteen times. Similarly, the general topic of

terrorism receives attention thirty-two times in the short report. Since the 

campaign against terrorism is likely to be an important task assigned the 

U.S. military for the foreseeable future, it is appropriate to consider how 

non-lethal weapons might contribute to the success of that campaign. The 

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate’s JMAA panel concludes that nonlethal weapons can contribute capabilities across the spectrum, from 

Military Operations Other Than War to Major Theater Wars.129 An

important question to reflect on, however, is whether non-lethal 

technologies are particularly suited to the specific operating environments 

likely to be encountered in combating terrorism. 

In order to judge the value of non-lethal weapons in this regard, 

one must first determine the salient characteristics of the operating 

environment. Title 22 of the United States Code defines terrorism as 

“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 

noncombatant targets by sub-national group or clandestine agents,”

usually intended to influence an audience.”130 According to the U.S.

Department of State report “Patterns of Global Terrorism—2000,” U.S. 

counter-terrorism policy is first, to make no concessions to terrorists and 

strike no deals; second, to bring terrorists to justice for their crimes; third, 

to isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them 

to change their behavior; and fourth, to bolster the counter-terrorism 

capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require

assistance.131 That short statement provides a great deal of information 

regarding what future operations against global terrorism might look like. 

Although one military campaign is too small a sample set to ascertain a 

pattern, the actions against Afghanistan provide other important clues 

about how the more widespread war against terrorism may progress. 

ENDURING FREEDOM began with conventional bombing of Taliban 
48...Non-Lethal Weapons 

command and control, air defense systems, and Taliban air assets, 

followed by aerial attacks on Taliban ground forces. The next major 

feature placed heavy emphasis on Special Forces to locate and root out 

terrorist operatives, representing another pattern that is likely to be a

central feature of the ongoing counter-terrorist operations. As President 

Bush proclaimed in his September 20, 2001 address to the joint session of 

Congress, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end 

there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 

found, stopped, and defeated.” He stated further that this war would not 

look like the war against Iraq a decade ago or like the air war in Kosovo. 

Rather, the response would involve “far more than instant retaliation and 

isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy 

campaign, unlike any other we have seen. It may include dramatic strikes, 

visible on television, and covert operations, secret even in success.” Mr. 

Bush laid out that U.S. objectives were not only to “starve terrorists of 

funding, turn one against another, drive them from place to place, until 

there is no refuge or rest,” but also to “pursue nations that provide aid or 

safe haven to terrorism.”132 A final characteristic of the war against 

terrorism involves the nature of terrorism itself. Specifically, it is highly 

political in nature. As discussed earlier, all war is dominated by political 

considerations. With terrorism, policy issues are even more pronounced. 

The reason for this is that the materiel effects of terrorism (with the 

obvious exception of cases where weapons of mass destruction are 

involved) are small compared to their political effects. Take as just one 

example the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. A suicide 

bombing (or the retaliatory strike that ensues) that kills a dozen people 

makes headlines around the world. As horrible as these events are in 

terms of the pain and heartache they cause the individuals and families 

affected, the political effects they engender go far beyond the physical 

effects of the attacks. To illustrate, consider the fact that twice as many

Israelis died in automobile accidents than died from terrorist attacks 

during 2001.133 Terrorist attacks, unlike conventional war, are not able to 

directly threaten state survival. Since the war on terrorism is more

sensitive to political issues, then the ability of non-lethal weapons to affect 

political outcomes takes on a heightened importance. This discussion 

leads us to the point where we can draw some conclusions about the key 

aspects of the war on terrorism. To summarize what future military

counter-terrorism operations might involve from the counter-terrorism 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...49 

policy statement, the war in Afghanistan, and President Bush’s statements,

the following military tasks or operations seem likely: 

• Special Operations Forces used synergistically with conventional 

forces such as air power 

• “Bringing terrorists to justice” for their crimes 

• Isolating and applying pressure on states that sponsor terrorism

• Bolstering the counter-terrorism capabilities of partner nations 

• Protracted operations 

• Emphasis on political factors 

Given these characteristics, it would be helpful to consider whether 

any of the characteristics of non-lethal weapons presented in the previous 

section hold special relevance in the war on terrorism. To reiterate, this

paper is not focused on tactical issues. Rather, it concerns itself with the

strategic issues of non-lethal weapons. Though the tactical advantages

may be sizeable (for example, an effective non-lethal method of subduing 

an airline hijacker may prove to be of great importance), that analysis will 

be left to others. Following the same topic areas discussed in the previous 

section, Tables 5 and 6 below shows suggested strategic advantages and 

disadvantages of non-lethal weapons for counter-terrorism operations.

As seen from the analysis in Tables 5 and 6, the operational 

realities and highly political nature of the war on terrorism suggests that 

non-lethal weapons may indeed be of special utility. Both the positive 

and negative potentials of these weapons seem to be magnified when 

applied to counter-terrorism operations. However, the advantages nonlethal weapons offer at the strategic level seem to outweigh the negatives

and make them a particularly valuable tool for the war against terrorism. 
50...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Table 5: Advantages of Non-Lethal Weapons Against Terrorists

Advantage Relevance to Counter-Terrorism Operations 

Consistent with American 

values (and that of our allies) 

Especially relevant. Public support must be

maintained for campaign that could be protracted. 

Perceptions that use of military force is consistent

with American values will help maintain that support. 

Force Multiplier—Synergy Especially relevant. Synergistic use of airpower and

Special Forces has already proven to be effective. 

Creative blend of traditional lethal and non-lethal 

might produce similar positive, asymmetric results. 

Precision Weapon—Putting

the bottom rung on the ladder 

Especially relevant. Gives commanders the potential

to apply force very precisely, discriminating between 

known terrorists and bystanders. 

The Right Weapon for

Blurred Environment

between War and Law 

Enforcement 

Especially relevant. Operations may include activities 

such as apprehending terrorists to be tried in civil or

military courts. As noted earlier, the reversibility of

non-lethal weapons allows for recovering from a case 

of mistaken identity. This is particularly applicable to

counter-terrorism, where forces are likely to possess 

incomplete knowledge of who the enemy is. Nonlethal weapons improve the chances of apprehending 

terrorism suspects and bringing them to justice, and

may also allow soldiers to capture key evidence or 

enemy materiel that might have been destroyed by

conventional weapons. 

Minimize opportunities for 

our adversaries to provoke 

negative public opinion

against our cause 

Especially relevant. Sensitivity to casualties could be

heightened and heavy-handed tactics could be seen to

blur distinction between U.S. and terrorists, 

undermining public support and support of allies. The 

potential for non-lethal weapons to reduce casualties 

among innocent civilians is particularly important

here. Especially important too for preemptive strikes,

as these tend to provoke negative international 

reaction. 

Limiting collateral damage

and post-war rebuilding and 

aid for which the U.S. often

feels responsible 

Some relevance, depending on the nature of the 

particular operation. For example, special operations 

raids, whether using lethal or non-lethal means, are 

unlikely to cause the kind of damage that might

become a significant economic issue. Non-lethal 

weapons, on the other hand, could provide an

alternative to the destruction of property caused by, 

for example, a large-scale bombing campaign. 

WMD neutralizer (pre-empt 

w/o collateral damage) 

Especially relevant. WMD are seen as greatest danger 

posed by terrorists.134
Non-Lethal Weapons ...51 

Table 6: Drawbacks of Non-Lethal Weapons Against Terrorists

Drawback Relevance to Counter-Terrorism Operations 

Unrealistic expectations Possible special relevance since war against terrorism in 

less likely to feature large force-on-force engagements 

where casualties are expected. 

Potential for the enemy to

fight again 

Especially relevant. The threat created by terrorists, 

who often display fanatical devotion to their cause and a 

willingness even to commit suicide, may only be 

stopped by a forceful application of lethal force. 

Deterrent value diminished Depends on motivation of terrorists. As death is not a

deterrent for many terrorists, it is possible that the 

humiliation caused by their capture using non-lethal 

weapons may be an even greater deterrence. This

psychological aspect of non-lethal weapons needs more 

research. 

Failure to overcome our

adversary’s hostile will 

Another unknown. What is required to cause terrorist 

organizations to give up terrorism as a means for 

achieving their objectives needs to be considered. 

Proliferation issues Potentially relevant. Non-lethal technologies falling 

into the hands of those we intend to use them against 

could create a danger that they use them against us. 

However, the utility of these weapons may be only 

effective if combined with a high degree of doctrine 

development and training. As the U.S. places special 

emphasis in this area, it may neutralize an adversary’s

ability to make an effective counter to our forces. 

The lure of adventurism No special relevance as presumably U.S. forces would 

be committed to action whenever the threat of terrorism

is perceived to warrant the risk, regardless of whether 

non-lethal technology is available. 
52...Non-Lethal Weapons 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...53 

VII. Conclusion 

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report describes a shift 

from a “threat-based” to a “capabilities-based” approach to defense—one

that focuses on the capabilities the U.S. might have to face in the future, 

rather than specifics about which opponents we might face. It calls for 

identifying capabilities that U.S. forces will need to deter and defeat

adversaries who will “rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric 

warfare” to achieve their objectives.135 To achieve these goals, the report 

calls for a “broad portfolio” of military capabilities that exploit the U.S. 

technological advantages and its ability to “integrate highly distributed 

military forces in synergistic combinations for highly complex joint 

military operations.”136 Further, the defense strategy calls for the 

“transformation of the U.S. military and defense establishment over time,” 

and urges DOD leaders to recognize that continuing “business as usual...is 

not a viable option given the new strategic era and the internal and

external challenges facing the U.S. military.”

137 Whether non-lethal 

weapons present a significant answer to this call to redesign national 

defense needs to be seriously considered. In this regard, the JMAA 

panel’s report marks a significant leap forward in the assessment of nonlethal weapons and their applicability on tomorrow’s battlefield. While

highlighting their potential, the report also noted the deficiencies of the 

current capabilities and efforts to field non-lethal weapons. It stated that 

current non-lethal capabilities are “extremely restricted in range” and are 

“distinctly oriented towards self-protection.”

138 Further, the panel noted 

that systems under development do not address large or area targets and 

that non-lethal capabilities aimed at addressing an adversary’s WMD 

production, transportation, and employment, deemed to be a critical 

contribution of these weapons, are shortfalls not being addressed. Though 

not a substitute for lethality, a thorough examination of the potential 

advantages and disadvantages they offer at the strategic level is needed to 

determine whether their unique capabilities make them a suitable 

candidate for broad inclusion in our 21st Century capabilities-based force 

structure. There is a growing consensus that non-lethal weapons are 

needed, at least at the tactical level, and for operations at the lower end of 

the spectrum of conflict, such as for peacekeeping operations. And as 

seen from the previous section of this report, they may offer substantial 
54...Non-Lethal Weapons 

strategic advantages as a component of the war on terrorism. Whether 

they will become a more fundamental component of America’s military 

capabilities, stretching across all the full spectrum of conflict including 

offensive operations, depends on the emphasis given them by senior 

leaders. We’re off to a good start, but it’s only a start. Non-lethal 

weapons may not ever become the wonder weapons envisioned by their 

most optimistic proponents, but boosting the effort dedicated to bringing 

them to the battlefield seems like a prudent investment for a technology 

that may prove to be an extremely useful tool in achieving our national 

objectives. In time, as technology, doctrine, and experience with these

new tools of warfare coalesces and matures, they may indeed prove to be 

the weapons of choice for tomorrow’s warrior. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...55 

Notes 

1

 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

(QDRR) 2001 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 

September 2001), v. 

2 Ibid., 29. 

3 Ibid., 29. 

4 DOD Policy Directive (DODPD) 3000.3, Policy for Non-lethal 

Weapons, 9 July 1996, 3.1. 

5

 John B. Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in TwentyFirst-Century Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 5. 

6

 DODPD 3000.3, 4.2. 

7 Ibid. 8

 John L. Barry, et al., Non-Lethal Military Means: New Leverage for 

a New Era, Harvard University National Security Program Policy

Analysis Paper 94-01, 5. 

9

 DODPD 3000.3, 3.2. 

10 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, defines electronic warfare as “any military

action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control 

the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.” A subdivision of 

electronic warfare is electronic attack, which uses “electromagnetic 

energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, 

facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or 

destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires.” 

11 Alexander, 16. 

12 Ibid., 17. 

13 Ibid., 17. 

14 R.W. Rogers, “Kernan Tasked with Transforming Military,” 

Newport News, 5 August 2001, available on-line from 

Hhttp://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/dailypress/index.htmlH. 

15 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program Non-Lethal Weapons Joint 

Mission Area Analysis/Joint Mission Need Analysis (JMAA/JMNA),

Final Report, December 2000, A-25. 

16 Barry, 5. 
56...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Notes 

17 Nick Lewer and Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons: A Fatal 

Attraction?: Military Strategies and Technologies for 21St-Century 

Conflict (London: Zed Books, 1997), 63. 

18 Though the intent and result of the Jericho attack was evidently 

destruction of the city, and therefore it is not an example of a non-lethal

weapon, acoustic weapons tuned to non-lethal energy levels meet DOD 

criteria. For an excellent discussion on this type of weapon, see John B. 

Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First-Century 

Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). 

19 Barry, 5. 

20 Lewer and Schofield, 59-65. 

21 Ibid., 66. 

22 Specialist T.S. Jarmusz, “Soldiers Train with Non-Lethal 

Weapons,” Talon 7, no. 26, (30 June 2001): 6, available from 

Hhttp://www.tfeagle.army.mil/tfetalon/talon_archive/2001/talon%202001-06-30.pdfH. 

23 For example, see Air University Library bibliography compiled by 

Joan Hyatt at Hhttp://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/soft/softkill.htmH. 

24 Steven Metz, “Non-Lethal Weapons: A Progress Report,” Joint 

Force Quarterly 28, (Spring/Summer 2001): 19, available from 

Hhttp://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/spring01.htmH. 

25 Alexander, 22. 

26 “Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program History,” Joint Non-Lethal

Weapons Directorate website, 15 July 2003, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 31 July 

2003, available at Hhttp://www.jnlwd.usmc.mil/history.aspH. 

27 Alexander, 24. 

28 JNLWP History. 

29 Alexander, 24. 

30 Ibid., 20. Editor’s note: Many reliable sources present Somali 

casualty numbers in the 1000-3000 range for the battle of Mogadishu. 

31 Ibid., 23. 

32 From the Joint Non-Lethal Warfare Directorate webpage located at: 

http://www.jnlwd.usmc.mil/default2.htm 33 DODPD 3000.3, 5.7. 

34 Joint Service Memorandum of Agreement for the DOD Non-Lethal 

Weapons Program, 23 June 1999, 3.5.4. Editor’s note: The JS MOA for 

the DOD NLW Program was updated on 10 May 2002. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...57 

Notes 

35 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, i. 

36 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02, 

15 April 2001, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP), states, 

“The purpose of the JIMP is to define a process that will translate 

emerging joint operational concepts into joint warfighting capabilities as a 

result of joint experimentation and assessment recommendations. The 

JIMP describes the generation, coordination, approval, and 

implementation process for joint Doctrine, Organizations, Training, 

Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities 

(DOTMLPF) recommendations and defines roles and responsibilities 

within that process.” Also, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01B, April 2001, Requirements Generation 

System states: “the Requirements Generation System, along with the 

Acquisition Management System and the Planning, Programming, and 

Budgeting System, form the Department of Defense’s three principal 

decision support systems. The requirements generation system produces 

information for decision makers on the projected mission needs of the 

warfighter. These mission needs are defined in broad operational terms in 

an Mission Needs Statement (MNS) document. MNSs are prepared for 

needs that develop into warfighter’s operational requirements that could 

result in new defense acquisition programs.” 

37 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, ii-iii. 

38 Ibid., iii. 

39 Ibid., v. 

40 Ibid., v-vi. 

41 Ibid., A-1. 

42 Ibid., 15. 

43 Ibid., 14. 

44 Ibid., 16-18. Source quoted in entirety. 

45 Susan D. Levine, Deputy Director for Technology, Joint Non-Lethal 

Weapons Directorate, personal email “Re: NLW,” 4 Feb 2003. 

46 Ibid.

47 “Marines, SwRI to demonstrate new anti-traction system for

controlling crowds and securing facilities,” Southwest Research Institute 

News Release, 10 December 2001, available from 

Hhttp://www.swri.org/9what/releases/mds.htmH. 
58...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Notes 

48 DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, Operation of the Defense

Acquisition System (Including Change 1), 4 January 2001, 4.7.2.4.2.4. 

49 “Objective Individual Combat Weapon,” Federation of American 

Scientists Military Analysis Network, 8 August 2000, n.p.; on-line, 

Internet, 31 July 2003, available from Hhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/land/oicw.htmH.

50 Camilo A. Sanchez, “Non-Lethal Airburst Munition(s) for Objective 

Individual Combat Weapon,” 2001 NDIA Joint Services Small Arms

Symposium, Little Rock, Arkansas, 15 August 2001, available from 

Hhttp://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2001smallarms/sanchez.pdfH. 

51 “The Department of Defense’s Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstrations,” Congressional Budget Office, September 1998, 

available from

Hhttp://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=865&sequence=0&from=1H. 

52 “Fiscal 2001 Advanced Concept Technology Demos Announced,” 

US DOD News Release No. 051-01, 2 February 2001, available from 

Hhttp://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2001/b02022001_bt051-01.htmlH. 

53 “Active Denial Technology Fact Sheet,” Air Force Research 

Laboratory Directed Energy Directorate, March 2001, available from 

Hhttp://www.de.afrl.af.mil/factsheets/activedenial.htmlH. 

54 Raytheon Missile Systems, “Extended Range Guided Munition 

(ERGM) Fact Sheet,” (Tuscon, AZ: 2001-2003), available from 

Hhttp://www.esys.com/products/ergm/ref_docs/ergm.pdfH. According to 

the Raytheon Fact Sheet, the ERGM is a precision-guided projectile with a 

range goal of greater that 50 nautical miles and accuracy of less than 20M

circular error probability. It features fast global positioning system 

acquisition and a high anti-jam design that enables use of a low-cost 

inertial measuring unit. The ERGM will support the simultaneous impact

of multiple projectiles. 

55 Levine, personal email. 

56 Major N.D. Montgomery, Chief, Health Effects Assessment, Joint 

Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, interviewed by author 9 December 

2001. 

57 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, B-1-11. 

58 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...59 

Notes 

59 Colin S. Gray, “Weapons for Strategy Effect: How Important is 

Technology?” (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Center for Strategy and Technology 

Occasional Paper No. 21), 2001, 2. 

60 “Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons,” USMC Warfighter 

Requirements Division, 5 January 1998, available from 

Hhttp://192.156.75.102/nonleth.htmH. 

61 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, Annex B. 

62 Ibid., Annex A, Appendix 4. 

63 Louis A. Manzo, “Morality in War Fighting and Strategic Bombing 

in World War II,” Air Power History, Vol. 39, No. 3, Fall 1992, 35-50, in 

Air War College Resident Programs Leadership and Ethics Book 2, 

AcademicYear 2002, 60. 

64 Ibid. 65 George P. Schultz, “The Ethics of Power,” Ethics and American 

Power, 1985, Chapter 2, in Air War College Resident Programs Strategy, 

Doctrine and Air Power Course Book, Academic Year 2002, 579. 

66 Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United

States, 14 November 2000, V-2. 

67 Ibid., 2. 

68 Richard L. Garwin, et al., Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and 

Prospects, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council 

on Foreign Relations, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 

1999), executive summary. 

69 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, 

(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), available 

on-line from Hhttp://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/H, 1. 

70 Ibid., 2. 

71 Ibid. 72 Levine, personal email. 

73 Ibid.

74 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 

2001), 458. 

75 DODPD 3000.3, 2.

76 Draft Program Research and Development Announcement of The 

Air Force Research Laboratory, Munitions Directorate Ordnance Division
60...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Notes 

(AFRL/MNMI), available from Hhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/smart/docs/Adwprda.htmH. 

77 See, for example, the Global Security, Inc. website available from

Hhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/adw.htmH. 

78 Benjamin S. Lambath, The Transformation of American Air Power 

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 205. 

79 DODPD 3000.3, 4.2. 

80 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, D-10. 

81 Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton, What Price Sticky Foam?, 

Naval Institute Proceedings 122, no. 1 (January 1996). Available from 

Hhttp://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96autumn/stanton.htmH. 

82 C. T. Clyne, “Andersonville and Other Civil War Prisons, North and 

South,” available from http://users.aol.com/cinticwrt/anders.html

83 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 90. 

84 Fred C. Ikle, Every War Must End, (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1991), 108. 

85 “Transcript of ‘Usamah Bin-Ladin, the Destruction of the Base’ –

Interview with Usamah Bin-Ladin,” conducted by Jamal Isma’il (no date) 

and presented by Salah Najm, 10 June 1999, on-line, Internet, 1 August 

2003, available from Hhttp://www.robertfisk.com/usama_interview_jamaal_ismail.htmH. 

86 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75. 

87 Stanton. 

88 Clausewitz, 76. 

89 Ikle, 12. 

90 Quoted in Howard M. Hensel, The Sword of the Union: Federal 

Objectives and Strategies during the American Civil War, (Montgomery, 

Alabama: USAF Air Command and Staff College, 1989), 220. 

91 Lewer and Schofield, 97. 

92 Alexander, 180. 

93 DODPD 3000.3, 4.5. 

94 Fenton, Overview Briefing. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...61 

Notes 

95 Article 6, Constitution for the United States of America, available 

from Hhttp://www.usconstitution.com/Read.htmH. 

96 DODPD 3000.3, 5.6.2. 

97 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, D-10. 

98 Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the United States, 1957, quoted 

by Robert J. Bunker in “Non-Lethal Weapons: A British View,” Military

Review 78 (July-August 1998): 86-87. 

99 Lieutenant Colonel Margaret-Anne Coppernoll and Xavier K.

Maruyama, “Legal and Ethical Guiding Principles and Constraints 

Concerning Non-Lethal Weapons Technology and Employment,” 

Proceedings to the NDIA Non-lethal Defense III Conference, Johns

Hopkins University, MD, 25 February 1998, 2. 

100 Lewer and Schofield, 83. 

101 Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); 

October 18, 1907, Article 23, available from 

Hhttp://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htmH. 

102 “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 

1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 

Conflicts (Protocol 1),” Article 51, Office of the High Commission for 

Human Rights, adopted 8 June 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on the 

Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 

applicable in Armed Conflicts. Available from 

Hhttp://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htmH 

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: 

(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 

(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 

directed at a specific military objective; or 

(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of

which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, 

in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 

civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 

Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 

indiscriminate: 

(a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as 

a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct

military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area 

containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and 
62...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Notes 

(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 

civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 

combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 

concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 103 Protocol 1, Article 37. 

104 DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, Operation of the Defense

Acquisition System (Including Change 1), 4 January 2001, states the 

following:

4.7.3.1.4. DOD acquisition and procurement of weapons 

and weapon systems shall be consistent with all applicable 

domestic law and all applicable treaties, customary 

international law, and the law of armed conflict (also

known as the laws and customs of war).... The Head of 

each DOD Component shall ensure that the Component's

General Counsel or Judge Advocate General, as 

appropriate, conducts a legal review of the 

intended acquisition of a potential weapon or weapon 

system to determine that it is consistent with U.S. 

obligations. The review shall be conducted again before the 

award of a system development and demonstration contract 

for the weapon or weapon system and before the award of 

the initial production contract. Files shall be kept 

permanently. Additionally, legal reviews of new, advanced 

or emerging technologies that may lead to development of 

weapons or weapon systems are encouraged. 

105 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-402, Weapons Review, 13 May 

1994, 1.1.1. 

106 AFI 51-402, Weapons Review, para. 1.1.2. states, “The Office of

the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) will 

ensure TJAG, or TJAG's designee, reviews, for legality, all weapons, 

whether new acquisitions or modifications of existing weapons, at the 

earliest possible stage in the acquisition process, including the research 

and development stage.” 

107 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, D-1-1.

108 Coppernoll and Maruyama, 1-2. 
Non-Lethal Weapons ...63 

Notes 

109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, D-6. 

112 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction

(CWC), Paris, 13 January 1993, Article 1, para. 5, available from 

Hhttp://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.htmlH. 

113 CWC, Article 2, para. 7. 

114 The Naval Treaty Implementation Program website is an excellent

source of information for the various chemical and biological agreements

and is available from 

Hhttp://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~treaty/index.htmlH. 

115 Ibid. 116 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 

Their Destruction, Article 1, 26 March 1975, available from 

Hhttp://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-mainpage.htmlH. 

117 Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. Special Negotiator for Chemical 

and Biological Arms Control Issues, “Statement by the United States to 

the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties,” 

Geneva, Switzerland, 25 July 2001, available from 

Hhttp://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htmH. 

Also see Hhttp://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~treaty/BWC.htmlH. 

118 Coppernoll and Maruyama, 1. 

119 Ibid., 3. 

120 Stanton. 

121 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, A-41. 

122 Ibid., D-7. 

123 Ibid., D-7. 

124 Ibid., C-1. 

125 Ibid., Annex C. 

126 Ibid., C-21-22. 

127 QDRR 2001, 40. 

128 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, 43. 

129 Ibid., ii. 
64...Non-Lethal Weapons 

Notes 

130 United States Code, Title 22-Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 

Section 2656f(d), quoted in U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global 

Terrorism 2000,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

April 2003), xiii, available from 

Hhttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/H. “Noncombatants” are 

interpreted to include off-duty military personnel and attacks on armed 

military personnel or installation when a state of military hostilities does

not exist. 

131 Ibid. xi. 

132 President George W. Bush, address to a Joint Session of Congress 

and the American People, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 

September 2001, available from

Hhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htmlH. 133 Boaz Ganor, Executive Director of International Policy Institute for

Counter-Terrorism, remarks to Air War College Regional Studies Group 

at Tel-Aviv, Israel, 12 March 2002. 

134 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “21st Century 

Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces,” remarks to National Defense

University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 31 January 2002, available 

from Hhttp://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-

secdef.htmlH. 

135 QDRR 2001, 14. 

136 Ibid., 15. 

137 Ibid., 16. 

138 JMAA/JMNA Final Report, 40.