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fNfMY SITUATION OVfl\LAY TO ACCOMPANY 

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT 

N26 

NAPS: &ELGIUM,GSGS4040 

SCALf: VSO,OOO 

.sHfETS: 1~1,lt2,J06,I07 

DANAHY 

G-2 

u.s. ARMY IN ACTION SERIES 

BASTOGNE 

1he Story 0/ the First Eight Days 

In Which the 101 st Airborne Division Was 

Closed Within the Ring of German Forces 

By 

COLONEL S. L. A. MARSHALL 

Assisted by 

CAPTAIN JOHN G. WESTOVER 

AND LIEUTENANT A. JOSEPH WEBBER 

(DRAWINGS BY TECHNICAL SERGEANT OLIN DOWS) 

CONTENTS 

PAGE 

FOREWORD V 

UNITS, CoMMANDERS, STAFF MEMBBRS, AND MEMBERS OF 

UNITS, MENTIONED IN THIS NARRATIVE • vii 

Chapter 1 

THE SITUATION • 

Chapter 2 

THE CoNCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 

C1urpter3 

TEAM CHERRY . 

Chapter 4 

FIRST MEETJNG WITH TIn! ENEMY • 

Chapter 5 

EAsT OF BASTOGNE . 

Chapter 6 

HOLDING mE CHATEAU • 

Ch~ter7 

TEAM I)ESOBRY AT NOVILLE • 

Chapter 8 

ATI'ACK AND WITHDRAWAL • 

Chapter 9 

I)OUBTS AND I)ECISIONS • 

Chapter 10 

THE REPULSE . 

iii 

1 

8 

22 

· 30 

· 39 

· 49 

51 

· 62 

67 

73 
CONTENTS-Continued 

Chapter 11 

RUNNING BA'ITLE 

Chapter 12 

FmsT ACTION AT MARVIE . 

Chapter 13 

THE RESPITE • 

Chapter 14 

"NUTS!" . 

Chapter 15 

THE SECOND MARVIE A'ITACK . 

Chapter 16 

Low EBB OF SUPPLY 

Chapter 17 

SUPPLIES AruuvE 

Chapter 18 

THE SITUATION IMPROVES . 

Chapter 19 

WEST OF BASTOGNE 

Chapter 20 

CHRISTMAS EVE 

Chapter 21 

THE RELIEF. 

ApPENDIX: THE ENEMY STORY. 

KEy TO NOTES 

PLATES 

iv 

PAGE 

86 

99 

107 

· 115 

· 119 

· 133 

· 137 

140 

147 

155 

170 

174 

199 

215 
Forward 

The Center of Military History is pleased to present the second 

volume in the U.S. Army in Action series, a facsimile reprint of 

Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall's Bastogne: The First Eight Days. 

Originally published in 1946, this brief study provides a combat history 

of a critical battle during the Allied liberation of Europe in World 

War II. Outnumbered and surrounded for five days, a U.S. Army 

combined arms force of airborne infantry, armor, engineers, tank 

destroyers, and artillery conducted a successful defense of the Belgian 

crossroads town of Bastogne in late December 1944. They separated 

the German combined arms formations and destroyed the pieces, 

halting the offensive. The outcome of this battle was critical to the 

successful Allied defense against the German Ardennes offensive. 

Bastogne offers unique insights, capturing the immediate impressions of the soldiers who fought in this harsh winter engagement. The author penetrates the "fog of war" with a coherent narrative that clearly captures the strategy, tactics, and leadership of the 

battle. This action strangled the German logistical flow to their forward assault divisions, disrupting their offensive tempo and slowing 

their advance. What emerges is a vivid case study of how decisive 

leadership and incidents of individual heroism can contribute to overcoming enemy forces and weather. 

Historians and professional soldiers will find Bastogne a valuable 

addition to their reading list. The Center of Military History recommends it highly for use in conjunction with Staff Rides. Although later 

studies provide more depth of research and detailed analysis concerning the Battle of Bastogne, Marshall's book, with its excellent 

maps, provides a superb one-volume narrative which can be utilized 

as a guide for officers and noncommissioned officers when visiting the 

Ardennes battlefield. 

The Center wishes to thank Mrs. S.L.A. Marshall for her kind 

assistance with our efforts to reprint Bastogne as well as her continued 

support of the U.S. Army Historical Programs. 

WASHINGTON, D.C. WILLIAM A. STOFFT 

Brigadier General, U.S. Army 

Chief of Military History 

UNITS, COMMANDERS, STAFF MEMBERS, AND 

MEMBERS OF UNITS MENTIONED IN THIS 

NARRATIVE 

HIGHER UNITS 

SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) 

Commanding General: General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower 

Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith 

A. C. of S., G-3: Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley 

12TH ARMY GROUP 

Commanding General: Gen. Omar N. Bradley 

FmsTARMy 

Commanding General: Gen. Courtney H. Hodges 

THIRD ARMy 

Commanding General: Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. 

VIII CORPS 

Commanding General: Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton 

XVIII CoRPS (Airborne) 

Commanding General: Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway 

Acting Commander at the beginning of the Bastogne concentration: Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin 

Chief of Staff: Colonel Ralph D. Eaton 

THE BASTOGNE FORCES 

101sT AnmORNB DIVISION 

Commanding General: Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor 

Acting Division Commander during the first phase of Bastogne 

operations: Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe 

Assistant Division Commander: Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins 

A. C. of S., G-l, and Acting Chief of Staff: Lt. Col. Ned D. 

Moore 

A. C. of S.> G-2: Lt. Col. Paul A. Danahy 

A. C. of S., G-3: Lt. Col. H. W. O. Kinnard 

A. C. ofS., G-4: Lt. Col. Carl W. Kohls 

Surgeon: Lt. Col. David Gold 

Civil Affairs Officer: Capt. Robert S. Sniith 

Aide to the Commanding General: Lt. Frederic D. Starrett 

vii 
Division Artillery Commander: Col. Thomas L. Sherburne, Jr. 

50lsT PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Julian J. Ewell 

S-4: Maj. William H. Butler 

1ST BATTALION (Companies A, B, C and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Major Raymond V. Bottomly, Jr. 

2D BATTALION (Companies D, E, F and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Major Sammie N. Homan 

3D BATTALION (Companies G, H, I and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. George M. Griswold 

Members of this regiment who figure in the narrative: 

Company A: Capt. Stanfield A. Stach; Lt. James C. Murphy; Lt. Joseph B. Schweiker; Sgt. Lyle B. Chamberlain; 

Pfc. William C. Michel 

Company D: Cpl. Frank Lasik; Pvt. Manzi 

S02D PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis 

Executive: Lt. Col. Patrick J. Cassidy 

8-3: Capt. James J. Hatch 

Surgeon: Major Douglas T. Davidson 

Commander, Hq. Co.: Capt. James C. Stone 

1ST BATTALION (Companies A, B, C and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Major John D. Hanlon 

8-2: Lt. Samuel B. Nickels, Jr. 

Company A: Capt. Wallace A. Swanson 

Company C: Capt. George R. Cody. 

2n BATTALION (Companies D, E, F and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Thomas H. Sutliffe 

3D BATTALION (Companies G, H, I and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. John P. Stopka 

506TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT 

Commanding Officer: Col. Robert F. Sink 

S-4: Capt. Salve H. Matheson 

1ST BATTALION (Companies A, B, C and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. James L. LaPrade 

Commanding Officer (after Col. LaPrade was killed in action): Major Robert F. Harwick 

Commanding Officer (after Major Harwick was wounded 

in action): Lt. Col. Robert L. Strayer 

viii 
2D BA'ITALION (Companies D, E, F and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Robert L. Strayer 

Commanding Officer (after Col. Strayer took over 1st Battalion): Major Lloyd E. Patch 

3D BA'ITALION (Companies G, H, I and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Major Gus M. Heilman 

327TH GLIDER INFANTRY REGIMENT 

Commanding Officer: Col. Joseph H. Harper 

Executive: Lt. Col. Thomas J. Rouzie 

1ST BATTALION (Companies A, B, C and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Hartford F. Salee 

2D BA'ITALION (Companies E, F, G and Hq.) 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Roy L. Inman 

Executive (and Commanding Officer, following the wounding of Col. Inman): Major R. B. Galbreaith 

3D BA'ITALION (Companies A, B, C and Hq.) 

Note: Though carried as the 3d Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry, in this narrative, and considered such by the command, 

this battalion was actually the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, which accounts for the presence within the one regiment 

of two battalions with A-B-C letter companies. This battalion 

had served as the 3d Battalion of the regiment since the Normandy landing. 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Ray C. Allen 

Members of this regiment who figure in the narrative: 

Company F: Capt. James F. Adams; Lt. Leslie E. Smith; 

Tech. Sgt. Oswald Y. Butler; Staff Sgt. Carl E. Dickinson. 

Company G: Capt. Hugh Evans; Lt. Stanley A. Morrison 

Company A, 3d Battalion: Lt. Howard G. Bowles 

Company B, 3d Battalion: Capt. Robert J. McDonald; Tech. 

Sgt. Mike Campano 

Company C, 3d Battalion: Capt. Preston E. Towns 

321sT GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BA'ITALION 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Edward L. Carmichael 

907TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BA'ITALION 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Clarence F. Nelson 

377TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Harry W. Elkins 

ix 
463D PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATI'ALION 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. John T. Cooper, Jr. 

8IsTAIRBORNE .ANnAmCRAFT BATI'ALION 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. X. B. Cox, Jr. 

326TH AIRBORNE ENGINEER BATI'ALION 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Hugh A. Mozley 

426TH AIRBORNE QUARTERMASTER CoMPANY 

Commanding Officer: Capt. George W. Hom 

lOisT AIRBoRNE SIGNAL CoMPANY 

Commanding Officer: Capt. William J. Johnson 

80IsT AIRBORNE ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANY 

Commanding Officer: Capt. John L. Patterson 

326TH AIRBoRNE MEDICAL CoMPANY 

Commanding Officer: Major William E. Barfield 

ATTACHED UNITS 

CoMBAT CoMMAND B, 10TH ARMORED DIVISION 

7d5TH TANK DESTROYER BATI'ALION 

755TH FmLD ARTILLERY BATI'ALION 

CoMPANY C, 9TH ARMORED ENGINEERS 

969TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATI'ALION 

CoMBAT COMMAND R (37TH BATI'ALION), 4TH ARMORED 

DIVISION 

COMPOSITlON AND COMMAND OF MAJOR 

ATTACHED UNITS 

Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division. This unit operated independently in conjunction with the lOlst Airborne 

Division until December 21, when it was attached to the lOlst 

and came under its command. 

Commanding Officer: Col. William L. Roberts 

Combat Command B was divided for tactical purposes into 

four main parts: the units held directly under the commander, 

and Teams Cherry, Desobry and-O'Hara. The following units 

of Combat Command B were directly under the commander: 

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS· CoMPANY 

3D TANK BATI'ALION (LESS COMPANY C) 

CoMPANY C, 21sT TANK BATI'ALION 

x 
54m ARMORED INPANTRY BATI'ALION (LESS COMPANIES 

A AND C) 

20TH ARMORED INFANTRY BATI'ALION (LESS CoMPANY C) 

COMPANY C, 609m TANK DESTROYER BATI'ALION (LESS 

PLATOONS WITH TEAMS) 

CoMPANY C, SSm ARMORED ENGINEER BATI'ALION (LESS 

PLATOONS WITH TEAMS) 

420m ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY BATI'ALION 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Barry D. Browne 

BATI'ERY B, 796m ANTIAIRCRAPT BATI'ALION 

TROOP D, 90m RECONNAISSANCE (CAVALRY) SQUADRON 

(LESS PLATOONS WI'nI TEAMS) 

Team Cherry 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Henry T. Cherry (also 

commanding officer of 3d Tank Battalion) 

3D TANK BATI'ALION (LESS COMPANY B AND 2D PLATOON, 

CoMPANY D) 

CoMPANY A: Lt. Edward P. Hyduke 

CoMPANY C, 20m ARMORED INPANTRY BATTALION: 

Capt. Willis F. Ryerson; Lt. Earl B. Gilligan 

3D PLATOON, COMPANY C, 55TH ARMORED ENGINEER 

BATI'ALION 

ONE PLATOON, CoMPANY C, 609TH TANK DESTROYER 

BATI'ALION 

2D PLATOON, TROOP D, 90TH RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON 

Team Desobry 

Commanding Officer: Major William R. Desobry (also 

commanding officer, 20th Armored Infantry Battalion). 

Major Charles L. Hustead took command after Major 

Desobry was wounded. 

20m ARMORED INFANTRY BATI'ALION (LESS CoMPANIES 

A AND C) HEADQUARTERS CoMPANY: Capt. Gordon 

Geiger; Lt. Eugene Todd 

COMPANY B: Capt. Omar M. Billett 

CoMPANY B, 3D TANK BATI'ALION 

ONE PLATOON, COMPANY C, 609TH TANK DESTROYER 

BATI'ALION 

ONE PLATOON, COMPANY D, 3D TANK BATI'ALION (LIGHT 

TANKS) 

xi 
ONE PLATOON, COMPANY C, 55TH ARMORED ENGINEER 

BATTALION 

ONE PLATOON, COMPANY C, 609TH TANK DESTROYER 

BATTALION 

ONE PLATOON, TROOP D, 90TH RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON 

Team O'Hara 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. James O'Hara (also commanding officer of 54th Armored Infantry Battalion) 

S-2: Capt. Edward A. Carrigo 

54TH ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION (LESS COMPANIES 

A AND C) 

COMPANY B: Lt. John D. Devereaux 

CoMPANY C, 21ST TANK BATTALION 

ONE PLATOON, CoMPANY C, 55TH ARMORED ENGINEER 

BATTALION 

ONE PLATOON, COMPANY D, 3D TANK BATTALION (LIGHT 

TANKS): Lt. Sherwood D. Wishart 

ONE PLATOON, TROOP D, 90TH RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON 

FORCE CHARLIE 16: Lt. Richard C. Gilliland 

705th Tank Destroyer Battalion. This unit operated independently in conjunction with the lOist Airborne Division 

until December 21 when it was attached to the lOist and 

carne under its command. 

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Clifford D. Templeton 

Headquarters Company (less the battalion trains which 

were ordered to "find a haven in the west") 

Reconnaissance Company 

Company A (less one platoon detached to guard the road 

junction at Laroche) 

Company B: Lt. Robert Andrews; Lt. Frederick Mallon; 

Sgt. Floyd A. Johnson; Sgt. George N. Schmidt; Sgt. 

Darrell J. Lindley 

CompanyC 

Ninth Air Force (members of liaison group attached to lOist 

Airborne Division during Bastogne operation): Capt. 

James E. Parker; Lt. Gorden o. Rothwell; Sgt. Frank B. 

Hotard 

xii 
CHAPTER 1 

THE SITUATION 

THE SIEGE OF BASTOGNE is one chapter in the history of 

the battle of the Ardennes. On December 16, 1944, the Germans launched their greatest offensive of the war in the west. 

Achieving a considerable success in their first attacks, they broke 

through, penetrated 65 miles into Allied territory, halted the 

Allied offensive then going on, and threatened the entire front 

in the west. The failure of this Gennan drive was due in part to 

the American resistance at St. Vith and Bastogne. 

The background of Bastogne dates from the fall of 1944. At 

that time three American armies, forming the 12th Army Group, 

were in position on the central part of the western front. The 

U. S. First and Third Armies were along the Siegfried Line and 

the U. S. Ninth Army was facing the Roer River in Germany 

some thirty miles from the Rhine. All three armies were pushing for the Rhine over difficult terrain, across swollen rivers, and 

against determined enemy resistance. Except in the Aachen sector, where an advance was made to the Roer, the line did not 

move during October and November. The Third Army fought 

near Metz; the First and Ninth Armies made their advance farther north, near Aachen. In between these two major efforts the 

First Army held an extensive line of defense. Of this line the 

southern and major part was maintained by the U. S. VIII Corps. 

On December 16, VIII Corps, under the command of Major 

General Troy H. Middleton (plate 1) had its headquarters in 

Bastogne, Belgium (Map 1, pages 2-3). Its area extended from 

Losheim, Germany, north to a peint where the Our River crosses 

the Franco-German border. Generally parallel to the German 

frontier along eastern Belgium and Luxembourg, its front was 

88 miles wide. The country, the Ardennes, has rugged hills; there 

are high plateaus, deep-cut valleys and a restricted road net. 

The mission that First Army gave VIII Corps was to defend 

this line in place. New divisions were brought into this part of 

the front for battle indoctrination, and battle-worn divisions were 

[ I ] 
Map 1: Total Extent 01 

[ 2] 
'otal Extent of the Bulge 

[ 3 1 
4 BASTOGNE 

sent to VIII Corps for reequipment and rest. As divisions were 

rotated into the sector, they took over existing wire nets and other 

facilities. 

At the beginning of the German attack in December, the VIII 

Corps front was held by two batde-weary divisions, a green infantry division, part of a green armored division, and a cavalry 

group. The battle-tested divisions (they had both seen months 

of fighting) were the 4th Infantry Division, which in November had fought a cosdy action through the Hurtgen Forest below 

Duren, Germany, and the 28th Infantry Division, which had sustained heavy casualties in the First Army drive to the Roer. The 

106th Infantry Division, newly arrived on the Continent, entered 

the Corps line four days before the German offensive began. The 

14th Cavalry Group, consisting of the 18th and 32d Cavalry 

Squadrons, held the north Hank of VIII Corps, and the 9th 

Armored Division, minus Combat Command B which was with 

V Corps, had the most of its units attached to the divisions. 

The enemy facing the VIII Corps was estimated at four divisions. From north to south these were the 18th, 26th, 352d and 

212th. Early in December the 28th Division took prisoners and reaffirmed the presence of the 26th and 352d Divisions, but rumors 

that one or more panzer units were in rear of these infantry divisions were not confirmed. From December 12 on, the American 

outposts along the VIII Corps front heard sounds of a great volume of vehicular movement behind the enemy lines. 

On the morning of December 16, the VIII Corps front, which 

had been quiet since the latter part of September, suddenly Hared 

up. For more than a month the enemy had been concentrating 

some 25 divisions. It had been skilfully done and the extent of 

the concentration was not fully known to our forces. At 0500 

heavy artillery concentrations struck along the entire VIII Corps 

front and these were soon followed by tank and infantry attacks. 

The strongest attacks were in the north. near the V and VIII 

Corps boundary. 

The infantry-tank attack on the north Hank of the VIII Corps 

began at 0800 on the 16th, and in three hours the enemy had 
THE SITUATION 5 

penetrated the position of the 14th Cavalry group three miles. 

Group reserves were committed and the I06th Division put out 

flank protection to the north. Through the right of the 106th 

Division the enemy advanced rapidly for a mile and a half, but 

then as reserves were brought up his progress was slowed. The 

German gains threatened to isolate two regiments of the I06th 

Division. Captured documents showed that on this day the enemy 

hoped to take St. Vith. This he did not do. 

Against the 28th Division the enemy used two panzer divisions, 

three infantry divisions and one parachute division in an infantry-tank attack on the "Ridge Road" just west of the Our River. 

In this operation, two enemy divisions assaulted each regiment 

of the 28th. In the center and right of the 28th the enemy made 

advances up to four and a half miles and crossed the north-south 

highway at several points. In the southern part of the VIII Corps 

the 9th Armored and the 4th Infantry Divisions were also attacked by the enemy. These attacks were diversionary to prevent 

our shifting troops to the north. 

At the start of the German offensive the VIII Corps reserve 

consisted of an armored combat command and four battalions 

of combat engineers. The engineers were assembled during the 

first morning, and as the seriousness of the enemy thrust became 

apparent, additional troops were made available. In the north 

on December 17, Combat Command R of the 9th Armored Division was released from V Corps and the 7th Armored Division 

was ordered to close into an assembly area near St. Vith. In the 

south the 10th Armored Division was moved toward an assembly area near the city of Luxembourg. Orders were also issued to 

move the 10Ist and 82d Airborne Divisions to the general area 

threatened. 

From captured documents and from the direction of early 

thrusts it seemed evident to VIII Corps that the objective of the 

attacks was Liege and possibly Namur. This, however, was a 

clear case of VIII Corps misunderstanding the enemy's intent, 

though the same misunderstanding prevailed in the entire Army 

for months afterward. It was finally found, however, that Hitler 
6 BASTOGNE 

had given his commanders in the Bulge attack specific and inHexible orders to stay to the south of Liege.1 lf. 

On the 17th, the second day of the offensive, the enemy increased his pressure along the whole front especially in the north. 

The right Hank of V Corps was forced back and in the VIII 

Corps, German infantry and armor had by 0900 cut off two regiments of the 106th Division. To stem the advance on St. Vith 

the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion fought a delaying action 

north and east of that town, Combat Command B of the 9th 

Armored Division was put into the line, and the 7th Armored 

Division was committed piecemeal to defensive action as it arrived during the evening. 

In the 28th Division sector the Germans began their attacks 

early and made large gains. The left Hank of the 28th was forced 

to withdraw to the west bank of the Our River and the right was 

pushed back an additional one to four miles. But it was in the 

center of the division that the enemy made his deepest penetrations, thursting one salient of eight miles and another of six. 

Everywhere the American withdrawal had been four to six miles. 

At some points the enemy was within 11 miles of :aastogne. 

On the southern Hank of the VIII Corps the 4th Infantry Division defended against strong attacks, but the enemy did not make 

the heavy effort here that he had made farther to the north~ The 

10th Armored Division reached the Luxembourg area in time to 

assure its defense. 

On December 18, the third day of the offensive, the enemy 

increased the momentum of his drive in the center of VIII Corps. 

The Corps north Hank was bolstered by the arrival of the 7th 

Armored Division but remained extremely critical because of the 

deep German penetrations into the V Corps sector. But the weight 

against the 28th Division was so overwh~lming that its thin defenses disintegrated and the enemy achieved a breakthrough. 

The right Hank of the 28th, which pulled back across the Our 

River on the upper eastern border of Luxembourg the previous 

night, was unable to stabilize its lines. In the withdrawal a wide 

*Key to notes begins on page 199. 
THE SITUATION 7 

gap was created through which the enemy pushed a great deal 

of armor. In the center, enemy thrusts between strongpoints encircled companies and destroyed or captured them one by one. 

To the 28th Division headquarters the picture was obscure 

throughout the day because of lost communications, but the appearance of many enemy column!; behind the regimental sectors 

and the tragic tales of stragglers indicated a complete disintegration of regimental defenses. The 28th Division command post 

itself was attacked when the enemy approached Wiltz. The 44th 

Engineer Combat Battalion, the 447th Antiaircraft Battalion, 

and miscellaneous headquarters personnel from the division were 

used to defend the town. The command post had communications 

left with only one regiment. 

Direcdy behind the 28th Division, on the St. Vith-Bastogne 

road, were roadblocks established by the Combat Command Reserve of the 9th Armored Division. One block, known as Task 

Force Rose, was attacked by the enemy in the morning and was 

overrun by 1400, December 18. A roadblock on the Wiltz-Bastogne road, known as Task Force Hayze, came under heavy attack by 1815. The Germans overran this roadblock during the 

night of December 18-19 to come within three kilometers of Bastogne. The defense of Bastogne now became the task of airborne 

infantry and armored units which had been ordered into the 

sector. I 
CHAPTER 2 

THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 

ON THE MORNING of December 17 at SHAEF two membets of the Supreme General Staff looked at the map and 

pondered the question of where best to employ SHAEF Reserve, 

which at that moment consisted of the two American divisions, 

the 82d Airborne and the lOIst Airborne, recently withdrawn 

from the lines in Holland. 

"I think I should put them there," said Major General J. F. M. 

Whiteley, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "the place has the 

best road net in the area." } 

Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief 

of Staff nodded and said to go ahead and do it. He based his 

decision purely on the thought of how advantageous Bastogne's 

radial highway net appeared on the map. It was his idea at the 

time that both IOIst and 82d Airborne Divisions should be employed in the Bastogne area. It was in this way that the Airborne 

C~rps happened to make its start toward Bastogne. 

SHAEF's general concept was subsequently modified by decisions made at lower headquarters although the initial impetus 

had been given in the required direction. The change in direction for the 82d Division, which was to have some of its greatest 

days in the fighting around Werbomont on the northern Hank 

of the Bulge, came after the XVIII Airborne Corps (82d and 

lOIst Divisions) had passed from SHAEF Reserve into the command of 12th Army Group, which was already forming other 

plans both for the defense of Bastogne and the employment of 

the airborne strength. But out of the difference in the SHAEF 

concept of how to employ the airborne force and the ideas which 

were already forming at 12th Army Group there came some early 

confusion to the two Corps commanders directly concerned and 

to their forces. However (as later reported in this chapter) the 

situation was clarified before any real harm was done.1A 

On December 17 and 18, three battle-tested organizations, by 

different routes and under separate authority, began their moves 

[8 ] 
THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 9 

toward the town in the Belgian Ardennes with whose name their 

own fame was to be thereafter inseparably linked. Orders from 

12th Army Group were received on the 16th directing the 10th 

Armored Division to be temporarily attached to VIII Corps, First 

Army, to counter the serious German attempt at a breakthrough.1B 

At 1320 on December 17, in compliance with the order, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, took its first step toward Bastogne when it moved from a rest area at Remeling, 

France, to the vicinity of MerI in Luxembourg. 2 That evening 

at 2030 the 10 I st Airborne Division, which was then re-outfitting 

in a training area at Camp Mourmelon (near Reims, France, and 

roughly 100 miles from Bastogne) received telephone orders 

from Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps that it was to move 

north though at that time Bastogne was not the destination 

given.s On the following night, December 18 at 1800, the 705th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion, then in position at Kohlscheid, Germany (about 60 miles north of Bastogne) was ordered by the 

Ninth Army to march to Bastogne and report to VIII COrpS.4 

Bastogne, then the Headquarters of VIII Corps, was the natural place for rendezvous and for stabilizing the defense. The 

town is the hub of the highway net covering the eastern Ardennes 

-a countryside that is forbidding to the movement of mechanized 

forces except when the. roads are available. By holding at Bastogne the VIII Corps could unhinge the communications of the 

Germans who were striking west toward the line of the River 

Meuse. 5 

Combat Command B closed into the vicinity of MerI at 2155 

on the 17th. On the following morning it was ordered to move 

independently of the 10th Armored Division to join VIII Corps. 

It took the road through ArIon to Bastogne. 011 the way Colonel 

William L. Roberts, the commander (plate 2), received a request 

from Major General Norman D. Cota, commanding the 28th 

Infantry Division, to support his force at Wiltz by putting Combat Command B into position south and southeast of the town. 

But this Colonel Roberts could not do and comply with his Corps 

orders, so he took his column on into Bastogne and reported 

there to Major General Middleton at 1600 on the 18th.s 
10 BASTOGNE 

At Camp Mourinelon, the WIst Division was short many of 

its soldiers who were on leave in Paris. The commander of the 

XVIII Airborne Corps, Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, 

was at the rear headquarters of the Corps in England. The WIst 

Division commander, Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, was 

in the United States (plates 3, 4, 5). Upon hearing of the attack 

~nd of the fact that the WIst had been committed to battle, he 

immediately took a plane for Europe. The assistant division commander, Brigadier General Gerald J. Higgins, was giving a lecture in England on the earlier airborne operation in Holland. 

With him were five of the senior commanders of divisional units 

and sixteen junior officers. The night would pass before these 

men were to hear that the division had been alerted for movement 

to the front and it would be noon of the next day before they 

were all rounded up and ready to emplane for Mourmelon. 

So the senior division officer present in France, the artillery commander, Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe, got the division staff together at 2100 on December 17 and outlined the 

prospect in these words: 

"All I know of the situation is that there has been a breakthrough and we have got to get up there." 

General McAuliffe directed the Division to move out in combat teams without waiting for the men on pass in Paris or elsewhere to get back. However, the destination of the WIst as given 

at this time was not Bastogne but Werbomont to the northwest 

of Bastogne.7A 

At 2030 on the 17th, Lieutenant Colonel Ned D. Moore, Chief 

of Staff of the WIst, had been called on the telephone by Colonel 

Ralph D. Eaton, Chief of Staff of the XVIII Corps, and the mission had been outlined in that manner. In mov~ng to Werbomont, the WIst would pass within a short distance of Basto~e 

and to the westward of it. There was no later modification of 

this order while WIst remained at Camp Mourmelon. 

On the following morning, December 18, the Acting Commander of the XVIII Corps, Major General James M. Gavin, 

attended a meeting at First Army at which it was decided to 

attach the 82d Division to the V Corps (since the XVIII Air-
THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 11 

borne Corps could not move in and. become operational until the 

morning of December 19), and the IOl$t Division to the VIII 

Corps. However, no word of this change got down to the WIst 

Division; throughout that day its staff was unaware either that 

Bastogne was the destination or that VIII Corps was now their 

next higher headquarters. 7B 

An advance party was then set up to precede the WIst Division to Bastogne. In the party were a representative from each 

major unit and a company of Engineers who were to be used 

as guides to lead the combat teams into their Bastogne assembly 

areas.8 During the morning of December 18, there had been no 

time to brief the advance party. Just as the party was pulling 

away from Camp Mourmelon (plate 30) during the noon hour 

Colonel Moore ran out of the division command post and advised them that XVIII Corps was to handle the operation and 

that they should go to a rendezvous with a part of the XVIII 

Corps staff. They were to meet them at the crossroads in Werbomont. This they did.9A 

General Ridgway arrived at Mourmelon about an hour later, 

having flown from England. He went to the command post of 

the WIst and Colonel Moore gave him the situation as he had 

given it to the advance party. Then occurred an odd sequence of 

events in which Fate might have played a stronger hand against 

WIst Division had it not been for several providential circumstances. Ridgway went into General Taylor's empty office and 

called a higher headquarters-presumably his own Corps. In this 

conversation he learned that WIst's destination was Bastogne, 

not Werbomont. On the heels of this conversation, Genera] 

Higgins entered the room, having just reported from England. 

Ridgway told him that WIst Division was to go to Bastogne. 

Ridgway then left Mourmelon for the front. Higgins soon followed. McAuliffe had left an instruction that Higgins was to get 

forward as rapidly as possible, so he picked a route via Sedan, 

figuring that it would be less encumbered with traffic. But the 

word that Bastogne was the Division's destination was not passed 

to Colonel Moore and the units remained alerted for movement 

to Werbomont.IIB 
12 BASTOGNE 

On reaching Werbomont on the night of December 18 the advance party were told that the operation was being handled by 

VIII Corps and that they were even then due in Bastogne. In 

this way the advance party failed in its mission and did not reach 

the objective until 0300 on the morning of December 19. But 

others were doing their work for them.l.O 

Some few minutes before the advance party had left Mourmelon, General McAuliffe had started for Werbomont taking 

with him his G-3, Lieutenant Colonel H. W. O. Kinnard (plate 

7) and his aide, First Lieutenant frederic D. Starrett.ll They 

drove as fast as they could, passing many elements of the 82d 

Airborne Division along the route. The 82d had been out of the 

lines in Holland longer than the WIst and was more fully 

equipped. The 82d was therefore ordered to move out ahead of 

the WIst. Come to the road juncture south of the Bois de Herbaimont (nine miles northwest of Bastogn~) General McAuliffe 

turned southeast to Bastogne instead of continuing north along 

the road leading to Werbomont, which is some 25 miles north 

of Bastogne. He had decided to go to the VIII Corps headquarters and get briefed on the general situation. It was some time 

following his arrival at General Middleton's VIII Corps command post that he heard definitely for the first time that the WIst 

was to fight at Bastogne. General Gavin, who had left Werbamont late in the afternoon of the 18th to hand-carry the message 

to VIII Corps did not arrive until after dark. The delay caused 

General.Middleton a considerable doubt; he had learned from 

higher authority that the WIst Division would fight at Bastogne 

but he did not know that the Division was his to use as he saw 

fit. General McAuliffe's party arrived at the VIII Corps command post, which was located in a former German barracks at 

the northwestern edge of Bastogne, at 1600 and from that time 

forward its members concerned themselves with getting ready 

to receive the Division.1.2 At that same moment Colonel Roberts, 

who had arrived ahead of his column, presented himself to General Middleton and reported that Combat Command B was on 

the road and would soon be in Bastogne.18 

Middleton asked Roberts, "How many teams can you make 

up?" 
THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 13 

CD ~-= ~-:.=~..::-: ........ Q) =1~=a=T:;,o IIOVIU.I 

c» !r" ...... ~aco .. sa,. .. '......, 

Roberts replied, "Three." 

, er 

SCALE IN YARDS 

Map 2 

The General then said, "You will move without delay in three 

teams to these positions and counter enemy threats. One team 

will go to the southeast of Wardin, one team to the vicinity of 

Longvillyand one team to the vicinity of Noville (Map 2, above). 

Move with the utmost speed. Hold these positions at all costs."14 

Roberts accepted the order without demur though at that moment he believed that the distribution of his force over so great 

an area would make it ineffective. But he made the ment,al reservation that the Corps commander must know the situation much 

better than he did himself.1G Middleton's decision was the initial 

tactical step which led finally to the saving of Bastogne.18 Com-
14 BASTOGNE 

bat Command B continued on its way moving north and east to 

carry out its orders.l1A 

The first two teams got through the town during daylight. 

The lead team, Team Cherry, under Lieutenant Colonel Henry 

T. Cherry, proceeded toward Longvilly, which was considered 

to be in the direction of the most immediate danger. The second 

team under Lieutenant Colonel James O'Hara headed toward 

the village of Wardin in the southeast. It was dark when the last 

team began moving through Bastogne. Its youthful commander, 

Major William R. Desobry, went to see Colonel Roberts with 

whom he had an especially close· relationship. For a number of 

years Desobry had known the older man well; he was talking 

now to a man who was not only his commander but whom he 

regarded as a second father. Roberts pointed northward on the 

map to the village of Noville and told Desobry that he was to 

proceed there and hold the village. "It will be a close race to get 

there before the enemy," Roberts said. "You are young, and by 

tomorrow morning you will probably be nervous. By midmorning the idea will probably come to you that it would be 

better to withdraw from Noville. When you begin thinking that, 

remember that I told you that it would be best not to withdraw 

until I order you to do so." 

There were no maps at hand; one of Colonel Roberts' staff 

officers grabbed a Corps MP and sent him along with Desobry to 

put the team on the Noville road. A cavalry platoon leader from 

Desobry's column was sent on ahead to reconnoiter Noville, clear 

it if there were any enemy present, and then outpost it until the 

arrival of the main battle group. Desobry then dismounted one 

platoon of armored infantry, placed them on the backs of the 

three lead tanks and gave the word for the column to move north. 

Small groups of stragglers were already passing them, drifting 

southward. The column paid them no heed. The dark had 

already slowed the armor to a five-mile-per-hour pace and Desobry 

figured that he had no time to waste.l1B 

While McAuliffe and his party were on the road, at Mourmelon the Division was working on the problems of the move. 

The few hours before the Division began its march were utilized 
THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 15 

in preparations for departure and in partly providing those combat supplies which had been lost in Holland. Such things as 

mortars, riDe ammunition, entrenching tools, arctic overshoes, 

blankets and gas masks had fallen far below the normal and 

needed amounts in the tables of basic allowances. IS In the great 

emergency, Transportation Corps and Oise Base Section acted 

with utmost dispatch and nillied truck groups from Rouen and 

Paris. Many of the truckers had already been long on the road 

when they were ordered to Camp Mourmelon. They were intercepted, the trucks unloaded on the spot, and the drivers directed 

to their new destination. The first trucks arrived at 0900, December 18. The last of the 380 trucks needed for the movement of 

11,000 men arrived at the camp at 1720 the same day.19 At 2000, 

eleven hours after the arrival of the first vehicles, the last man 

was out-loaded. As far as Bouillon, Belgium, the column ran with 

lights blazing. It. was a calculated risk, taken by lOlst for the 

sake of speed. The night was clear and the stars shone brightly. 

Had the Luftwaffe come on then, the story of Bastogne might 

have taken a different turn.20 

In Bastogne, General Middleton sketched the situation to General McAuliffe and Colo9-el Kinnard very roughly, telling them, 

"Th h b . . . "d" . ere as een a major penetratIon . . . an ... certain 

of my units, especially the lO6th and 28th Divisions, are broken." 

In the absence of the advance staff party Kinnard tried to function as a whole division staff during the conference. But after 

discussing matters with both the G-2 and G-3 sections at VIII 

Corps, he had only the vaguest picture of what was happening 

and felt altogether uncertain about both the friendly and enemy 

situations. 21 He gathered that some of our armored elements-the 

9th Armored Division and 10th Armored Division were mentioned-were out in front of Bastogne, but he could not pinpoint 

the spots where their roadblocks were. Because of their own uncertainty, both he and General McAuliffe became acutely concerned over plans for the night bivouac. Further than that, they 

worried that the column might be hit while it was still on the 

road or that it might even be caught by the German air while 

still a long way back.22 
16 BASTOGNE 

While there was still light, they took a quick swing out over 

the area west of town and McAuliffe pointed out to Kinnard 

where he wanted the Division placed. It was a snap decision, 

yet it influenced the campaign importantly because it placed the 

Division in a sheltered forward assembly area until it was ready 

to strike. In the emergency Kinnard grabbed an MP private 

from the Corps and sent him to the crossroads at Sprimont to 

meet the division as it came on. He and General McAuliffe then 

went to the junction of the ArIon and Ne\lfcMteau roads in Bastogne to make another attempt to find the advance party. Colonel 

Kinnard had with him nine 1: 100,000 and six 1: 50,000 maps 

of the area. This was all that the Corps staff could give him with 

which to fight the operation ahead. When he returned from the 

reconnaissance, Kinnard searched at Corps headquarters for more 

maps but found that the map section was already moving out. 

From Corps he obtained an administrative order giving him the 

location of ammunition dumps, water points, evacuation hospitals and other installations.2SA 

However, despite Colonel Kinnard's best efforts, in the speed 

of the preparations to receive the Division, a good many points 

had not been securely pinned down. Trailing the last of the 82d 

Division's column through Sprimont, Colonel T. L. Sherburne, 

acting commander of the IOIst Division's artillery, and an assistant, Captain Cecil T. Wilson, arrived at the vital crossroads 

where one road leads off toward Bastogne and the other toward 

Bertogne at about 2000, December 18. Along the way leading 

north the rear elements of the 82d Division were blocking and 

stopping. Colonel Sherburne then wondered whether he couldn't 

get north and on to Werbomont more rapidly by veering from 

the Bertogne road and taking the long way through Bastogne. 

He asked an MP at the intersection whether any units of the 

IOIst had gone that way; the MP wasn't certain about anything 

but referred him to an MP sergeant in a near-by house. The sergeant told him that General McAuliffe and his party had come 

along some hours before and had gone into Bastogne. So Colonel 

Sherburne returned to the man who was directing traffic and 

told him to tUrn all lOist Division parties toward Bastogne 
THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 17 

when they came to the intersection. He then continued on.28B 

It appears likely that this small incident smoothed the whole 

path for the lOist Division. Two officers from the 502d Regiment, who were supposed to have gone with the advance party 

to Werbomont but had missed it, were re-routed by the MP a 

few minutes behind Sherburne to VIII Corps Headquarters. 

They joined Kinnard and Starrett and drove west to MandeSt.-Etienne. Here they met a jeepload of 327th Infantry officers 

who had also missed the advance party. Kinnard now had enough 

personnel to set up the assembly area. An officer guide was posted 

on the Mande~St.Etienne road to direct the incoming column 

and Starrett went to work setting up a Division command post in 

a near-by farm house. The other officers reconnoitered their regimental areas and made their plans for the night dispositions. The 

hour was a little after 1800 on the 18th and there was not yet 

any sound of combat in the vicinity. A heavy maintenance company from 28th Division was already in Mande-St.Etienne. The 

company commander told Kinnard this was his area and he could 

not leave. Kinnard had to return to Bastogne to get an order from 

the corps commander to clear the area. Around General Middleton in the Corps command post there were now only six or 

eight officers.24A. 

From First Army, General Courtney Hodges, its commander, 

had called General Middleton and advised moving VIII Corps 

Headquarters to the rear. This had been done but General Middleton had stayed on in Bastogne with Colonel Stanton, his Deputy Chief of Staff, and several other members of his staff for the 

purpose, as he thought, of acquainting Major General Matthew 

B. Ridgway, the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, with the 

situation, and of helping General McAuliffe get his situation in 

hand. 

General Ridgway arrived at General Middleton's command 

post in Bastogne about 2030. He was still acting on the not 

wholly complete information which he had received from his 

several sources while at Camp Mourmelon. He understood that 

the lOist Division was to fight at Bastogne, but he thought that 

it was to operate under his Corps (the XVIII Airborne) though 
18 BASTOGNE 

some 25 miles of distance intervened between the two airborne 

divisions. His acting corps commander, General Gavin, who 

had corne and gone by this time, had brought the word to the 

101st that it was to fight in the VIII Corps under General 

Middleton. But the situation still had not been clarified by 

higher authority. From Bastogne, General Ridgway called 

Headquarters First Army. It was at this time that the two 

Corps commanders got the new instructions which changed the 

problem of each and which at last set the lines along which the 

82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, late of the SHAEF reserve, 

would operate in the Ardennes. Bastogne was to remain an VIII 

Corps problem and the 101st Division would operate under that 

Corps in that town. General Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps, 

less the 101st Division-so General Ridgway now learned for 

the first time-was to operate on the other side of the Bulge. 

On the strength of this new assignment, General Middleton subsequently called General Omar Bradley, Commanding General, 

12th Army Group, and gave it as his estimate that the 101st 

Division and other troops assigned to defend Bastogne would 

probably be surrounded, since he had no reserve. General Bradley said that would be all right with him-to stand and defend 

even though it appeared probable that Bastogne would become 

encircled. 24B 

General McAuliffe decided to stay at Corps headquarters to 

get his mission for the next day. During the conference of the 

two corps commanders, Brigadier General Gerald J. Higgins, assistant division commander of the 101st, who had been called 

from England by General McAuliffe, arrived.25 

General Higgins and Colonel Kinnard went out to the Division assembly area. Lieutenant Starrett had found that the local 

schoolhouse was a better command post than the dwelling which 

Kinnard had designated and on his own initiative had made the 

change. He already had telephone lines strung to VIII Corps 

Headquarters and to the 501st Parachute Infantry area. An officer from the 506th Parachute Infantry who had missed the advance party reported at the command post and was given his 

sector. 
THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 19 

In general, things were now looking a little more snug although 

one point of irritation had not been entirely eliminated. That 

was the captain commanding the heavy maintenance company 

who had refused to move his people out at Colonel Kinnard's 

request until Kinnard brought an order direct from General 

Middleton. General Higgins found him now completely blocking the highway over which WIst Division was coming in. His 

vehicles were parked three abreast and six or seven rows deep. 

It was an absolute impasse. General Higgins sought out the 

captain and made his protest. "I can't do anything about that," 

said the captain. "I have received an order from the General to 

move my vehicles out. I've made this block to make sure that 

none of my vehicles get by and get lost; it's the best way to collect 

them." Even after the situation was explained to him, he said 

he'd stay where he was. General Higgins then gave him a direct 

order to get his vehicles in single file along the road at once and 

himself set about urging the drivers over to the side of the 

highway. 

This was but one incident in a night-long fight with the outgoing traffic. Every time the column of retreating vehicles came 

to a halt for a few minutes, some of the drivers fell asleep from 

exhaustion. When the road was again free for a few minutes 

and the forward vehicles got in motion, these sleeping drivers 

formed new traffic blocks back along the column. To keep things 

moving at all, it was necessary for officers and MPs to continue 

patrolling up and down the column, ready to rouse any slumberer 

who had tied things Up.26 

That night in Bastogne was quiet, largely because the 28th 

Division was holding in place on commanding ground around 

Wiltz and fighting the enemy off for a few vital hours. Many 

stragglers were falling back through the town and the roads were 

jammed to the south and west but no attempt was made to hold 

any of these men at the time. VIII Corps was busy with its evacuation and Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division 

and the WIst Division were engrossed in their own problems. 

Colonel Roberts, who had set up his command post in H6tel 

Lebrun at 1800, December 18, found that it was difficult to per-
20 BASTOGNE 

suade other units that were about to withdraw out of the Bastogne area even to give up their motor parks so that he could 

get his own vehicles off the streets.21 

The third major part of the Bastogne garrison, the 705th Tank 

Destroyer Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Clifford D. Templeton, got its marching orders at 1800 on December 18. It left 

Kohlscheid, Germany, at 2240, but could not proceed by the 

shortest route-Liege, Houffaljze, Bastogne-because the enemy 

was already around Houffalize. The column of the 705th therefore moved by way of Laroche where it went into a defensive 

position along the heights six miles south of the town at 0915 

on December 19. Colonel Templeton looked Laroche over and 

was thoroughly alarmed at what he found. American units were 

in confusion along the road. They were making little or no effort 

to adjust themselves to the situation or to set up a local defense. 

So in mid-morning Templeton sent two platoons with four tank 

destroyers to set up a roadblock to the north of the town. Leaving 

the battalion at Laroche, he then went on to Neufchateau, where 

VIII Corps Headquarters was newly established. There General 

Middleton told him to get on into Bastogne and attach his outfit 

to the WIst Division. An officer was sent back to Laroche to bring 

the battalion on but to leave the roadblock force in place.28 

Colonel Templeton and his c.ommand section, after reporting 

to General McAuliffe, started northwest to meet the oncoming 

column. At Bertogne the section was ambushed by a German 

party armed with two machine guns, one self-propelled gun and 

several small antiaircraft guns. The opening fire wounded three 

men, destroyed a jeep and forced the abandonment of the armored 

command vehicle. Templeton's men withdrew along the road for 

about half a mile with all their weapons engaging the enemy. 

This action took place about 1500 on the 19th and was over in 

twenty minutes.29 

Templeton radioed to his battalion to expect the German roadblock at Bertogne. He then told them, however, that the roadblock could be overwhelmed and the battalion was to "come 

any way possible to Bastogne, but get there." He did not know 

that the Bastogne road was impassable because the bridge above 
THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 21 

the town was out. In the late afternoon the command section 

returned to Bastogne to establish its command post. Templeton 

then radioed the commander of the supply train to "find a haven 

in the west and hook up with some big friends." He felt quite 

certain that his train would get through safely because the one 

MIS accompanying it was capable of dealing with any roving 

enemy tank or infantry group along the way. Colonel Templeton's 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion reached Bastogne at 2030, 

December 19, by the route Laroche-Champlon-Bastogne.8o 

With the arrival of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, all 

the major elements which would be present in Bastogne during 

the siege (the first phase of the defense of the town) were gathered. The lOlst Division and Combat Command B had begun 

the fight that morning and the tank destroyers were now ready 

to link their power with that of the armor and the infantry. Men 

of every unit had morale of the highest quality and with their 

weapons each was capable of stiffening the other. It was a matter 

of finding the way through courage, resource, and good will. 
CHAPTER 3 

TEAM CHERRY 

ON THE EVENING of December 18, Roberts ordered 

Team Cherry of his Combat Command B to move out along 

the road leading east and go into position near Longvilly (Map 3, 

page 23). It thereby became the first of the Bastogne reinforcements to move out and engage the enemy. The force under command of Lieutenant Colonel Henry T. Cherry (Commanding 

Officer, 3d Tank Battalion, 10th Armored Division) included 

the 3d Tank Battalion, Company C of the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, the 3d Platoon of Company C of the 55th Engineer Battalion and the 2d Platoon of Troop B of the 90th Cavalry 

Squadron.1 

They went on into the darkness, knowing only this of their 

situation, that some parts of Combat Command Reserve of the 

9th Armored Division were supposed to be in the vicinity of 

Longvilly and that the enemy was reported advanCing toward 

that town from the east. Their march was uneventful. First Lieutenant Edward P. Hyduke (Commanding Officer, Company A, 

3d Tank Battalion), who had the advance guard, came to a halt 

just short of Longvilly at 1920. The town is on low ground and 

its streets seemed to be already jammed with the vehicles of Combat Command Reserve. LeaVing the main body, Colonel Cherry 

went forward to the command post of Combat Command Reserve 

to learn their intentions. But they had no plan and did not know 

whether they would stay or get out. So Cherry returned to his 

force, which was then refueling on the road, and told Hyduke 

to make a reconnaissance and occupy ground west of Longvilly 

before dawn came. The main body was to stay one thousand 

yards west of the town until there was a change in the situation 

of the Combat Command Reserve. At 2300 on the 18th Cherry 

returned to headquarters in Bastogne to tell Colonel Roberts how 

things were going. As he went through Mageret he noticed 

that Combat Command Reserve's trains were headed for the 

rear. Roberts told him that he was to cover the main body of the 

[22 ] 
TEAM CHERRY 23 

Situation 20 De CD ___ 

....... ..c&~ ..... ~ • ..uAnIICIIID..-.c .... 1IOO. • ____ ............ ..-1OIaII- ........... ",,..,, 41 __ ATUCIII_ATIID. 

................ " ~l'.u-) 

T V SCALE IN Y"RDS . 

Map 3 

Combat Command Reserve if it withdrew, but in any case he 

was to hold at Longvilly. 

The road was already plagued with stragglers, most of them 

moving in trucks and half-tracks back toward Bastogne. They 

knew nothing except they had last seen the enemy about six 

miles east of Longvi1ly along the main road. When asked what 

the Germans had, they repeated: "Tanks, tanks, tanks," and then 

moved on to the rear. 

Combat Command Reserve set up roadblocks to the north and 

east of Longvi1ly, with one battalion of infantry and another of 

tanks supporting the blocks, and two batteries of artillery helping to cover them from a position next to the town. But there was 

no close-in defense around the houses. Looking these disposi-
24 BASTOGNE 

tions over, Lieutenant Hyduke decided there was danger that 

the enemy might come in from the south. So he sent his platoon 

of cavalry in that direction with instructions to withdraw quickly 

if the pressure became heavy. Seven light tanks were placed forz 

ward with four medium tanks to the right covering them. Infantry units fonned an outpost north of the position. One of the 

field artillery batteries from Combat Command Reserve tied in 

with Lieutenant Hyduke's party and shortly thereafter opened 

fire to the eastward, though Hyduke never learned what they 

were firing at. 

At 2340, Combat Command Reserve, 9th Annored Division, 

began its withdrawal from Longvilly, though it was not until two 

hours later, while Colonel Cherry was returning to his team, 

that he got word by radio from Hyduke that Team Cherry was 

now holding alone. 

The next few minutes brought some more distressing news to 

the commander. In Neffe he met a wounded enlisted man who 

said that his vehicle had been shot up near Mageret. Then a 

sergeant told him that a strong German patrol had entered Mageret just after midnight. This meant that the Germans were 

across the road between Cherry and his Team. Cherry radioed 

Captain William F. Ryerson (Commanding Officer of Company 

C, 20th Annored Infantry Battalion, lOth Annored Division), 

who had been left in command at Longvilly, to get a patrol to 

Mageret and reopen the road. Two squads of infantry were sent 

in a half-track on this mission. They dismounted before reaching 

the village and approached it stealthily. Within a few minutes 

they had located three enemy tanks and an infantry force which 

they guessed to be about one company, in positions around the 

crossroads at Mageret. They had come in along the one side of 

the town that was not being covered by an enemy tank, and while 

they waited there they heard another annored vehicle coming 

up behind them. For a few seconds they were in a cold sweat, 

thinking they were about to be trapped by a fourth tank. Instead, 

it proved to be an American tank destroyer. The infantrymen 

and the tank destroyer crew discussed their chances and decided 

they weren't strong enough to attack Mageret. So they returned 
TEAM CHERRY 25 

to Ryerson. By then Captain Ryerson had heard from Colonel 

Roberts that he was to commandeer any American men or equipment which he could use. So he dmfted the tank destroyer into 

his outfit. 

The discovery that the enemy was across the Combat Team's 

rear, quickly followed by Ryerson's report of the enemy strength 

which his patrol had found at Mageret, convinced Colonels 

Roberts and Cherry that the situation was now such that Longvilly could not be held. Colonel Cherry ordered the advance 

guard under Lieutenant Hyduke to hold its ground at Longvilly 

while the main body tried to heat its way back through Mageret. 

These orders, which arrived at 0830, December 19, turned the 

advance guard into a rear guard. Colonel Cherry went back to 

his command post which was in a stoutly walled ch~teau three 

hundred yards south of Neffe, and stayed there awaiting developments. The command post force, the rear guard and the main 

body were each engaged during the entire day in widely sepamted 

actions. 

By daybreak of the 19th Hyduke was set up on three sides of 

Longvilly and ready to defend the rear. However, the closing of 

the road at Mageret by the Germans had kept many of Combat 

Command Reserve's vehicles from withdmwing, and after taking to the road, they sat there, blocking all traffic. There was a 

heavy nebelwerfer shelling of Hyduke's lines in the early morning and the area then quieted until 1000. The position was reasonably safe from frontal assault for the ground to the north of 

the main road was marshy for ten yards and facing toward the 

marsh was an embankment much too steep for tanks to cross. 

On the right of the road the ground fell away too sharply for 

tanks. A large culvert a short distance ahead of the position was 

set for demolition. 

The morning engagement opened with the sighting of two 

enemy tanks about 1500 yards southeast of Longvilly but the 

visibility was so poor because of fog that only the vague outlines 

of the tanks could be seen. A shot from the Germans hit a tank 

in the Combat Command Reserve group along the road, locking the turret. All of the American armor returned the fire and 
26 BASTOGNE 

both enemy tanks went up in Bames. After this there was a prolonged shelling of Longvilly. 

At 1400 the enemy armor put direct fire on Lieutenant Hyduke's position from front and left Bank, disabling two half-tracks 

and one light tank at the tail of the column. Five minutes later 

the enemy knocked out two more medium tanks 150 yards in 

front of the burning half-track. An enemy antitank gun on the 

enemy's right hit a Combat Command Reserve tank which had 

remained in position with the lone artillery battery. The battery 

then promptly took off. 

The groups on the road were now almost in a state of panic 

and when some of the vehicles tried to swing around the column, 

the road became more jammed than ever. One group of stragglers 

which had been organized to cover the left Bank Bed their position, leaving that part of the ground to only 23 infantrymen of 

Company C, 20th Armored Infantry Battalion. 

Lieutenant Hyduke had been given authority to take over any 

portion of Combat Command Reserve which withdrew but he 

found that it was impossible to do so. However, despite the 

panicky state of the stragglers he was able to maintain close control of his own force and continued to engage the enemy until 

1430 when Colonel Cherry ordered him to fall back on Captain 

Ryerson's force. 

But that order couldn't be carried out. The road was absolutely 

blocked. Moreover, he couldn't order his men out of their vehicles 

because enemy foot troops were now moving in on his flanks and 

the whole area was under heavy bullet fire. Some of the tanks 

turned around on the road and tried to get back to the ground 

they had defended. 

In this period of threshing around, five of his seven light tanks 

and one tankdozer and a tank recovery vehicle were destroyed. 

The half-tracks at the front of the column had to be abandoned 

and soon after the men got out of them, two more medium tanks 

were hit by artillery fire. One medium tank got cut off and when 

last seen was trying to fight off an attack by German infantry. 

The last medium tank received a direct hit on its track as it tried 

to get out. The three remaining light tanks, including one that 
TEAM CHERRY 27 

had belonged to an artillery forward observer, were destroyed by 

their crews to prevent capture. By 1500 most of the survivors 

had escaped tho scene of all this wreckage and joined Captain 

Ryerson. 

Ryerson had had a tough time carrying out his mission because 

of the traffic jam along the road, but by 0945, December 19, his 

column had reached a point 300 ya~ds east of Mageret. As his 

lead tank came round the last bend m the road a shell from an 

enemy antitank gun in Mageret hit it frontally, burning up the 

tank and killing or injuring all members of the crew. The road 

ran through a cut at this point and the burning tank plugged it 

completely. The stalled column then became a general target for 

intense shelling and small-arms fire from the Gennan armor and 

infantry force in the village. 

Captain Ryerson's infantry then dismounted from their vehicles and moved forward to reconnoiter the enemy position. The 

high ground on both sides of the burning tank protected them 

for a little way but they could not go on past the ridge because 

the down-slope was getting heavy bullet and mortar fire. Two 

105mm. assault guns maneuvered up to the ridge and shelled a 

tree line where they thought the German infantry was holding. 

The small-arms fire from the village soon slacked off a bit. 

From the rear, two antiaircraft half-tracks from the 9th Armored Division came on past Captain Ryerson's force, moving 

toward Bastogne. Ryerson's men tried to stop them but they 

drove on heedlessly until they turned the curve and saw the 

burning tank. The crews then jumped for safety without trying 

to save their vehicles. The Germans shelled both vehicles and 

now they blocked the road doubly. 

Next the gun crews along the ridge saw an American command car and a Sherman tank, complete with cerise panels, 

whip out of Mageret and move north. They were quite startled 

for a moment and held their fire. By the time they had decided 

these vehicles were being used by the enemy, it was too late to 

do anything; they had moved out of range. 

Two batteries of the 73d Armored Field Artillery came up 

behind the column and on finding the road blocked moved out 
28 BASTOGNE 

north and west and going by way of Bizory got into the line of 

the main American position (the 50lst's lines). 

By about 1500 the fire from Mageret had subsided so appreciably that a force composed of 18 infantrymen, two medium tanks 

and a 105mm. assault gun were sent against the village, moving 

through the fields on the right flank. One of the Shermans got 

hung up on an embankment and drew a great deal of fire but 

was able to return to the column. The rest of the force worked 

its way into the northeast part of the village, receiving some shellfire from the southeast of the village as they went. At the main 

crossroads they could see a roadblock with one German tank and 

an American M4. This armor did not move or fire and the party 

concluded that it was already destroyed. In the southern part 

of the village they could see two more German tanks, an American half-track, a jeep and a German ambulance. The heavy guns 

with the party could not find a position from which to fire and 

the infantry could not do anything effective. 

From the rear of his column Captain Ryerson was called by 

his antitank officer, 2d Lieutenant Earl B. Gilligan, who told him 

that twenty half-tracks loaded with men had just come in. Ryerson said for Gilligan to get these men forward dismounted and 

send along any tanks that he might see. The new men consisted 

of about 200 stragglers from different units who had retreated 

into the Bastogne area from other actions. They were mosdy 

tankers. Lieutenant Gilligan got them out of the half-tracks, but 

only forty of them, with three captains and two lieutenants from 

Combat Command Reserve and a few officers from Hyduke's 

section, moved up toward the fire fight. The others fled across the 

fields to the north. 

The forty men who stuck were organized into four squads 

and at 1600, December 19, this force moved against the southeast part of the village, supported by a section of medium tanks. 

But the tanks could not get over the ground that lay south of the 

road and the men were not inclined to go far ahead of the tanks. 

Within the village several of the German vehicles which had 

been to the south started to move north toward the main crossing. 

To the amazement of Ryerson's men, the German tank forming 
TEAM CHERRY 29 

the roadblock, which they had thought to be dead all the time, 

suddenly started up and moved out of the way. Captain Ryerson's 

force had been for hours within plain view of this tank at a range 

of 600 yards without receiving any attention from it. The American tank now put it under fire at once and set the Gennan tank 

ablaze. 

There was still so much shelling from the south of the village 

however, that the American guns had to stay immobile and the 

small force of infantry could not get forward. Prisoners they had 

taken said that the enemy infantry group comprised about 120 

men. The 40-man. force which had attacked toward the south of 

Mageret had no communication with Captain Ryerson's main 

force and later that evening somewhat less than half of them 

came back. They had made no real progress. 

Since noon Captain Ryerson had been aware that infantry 

forces were coming to his aid from Bastogne. He didn't know 

which units were coming but the expectation of relief encouraged 

his efforts to take Mageret. 

Through its various misadventures, Team Cherry as a whole 

had come to a pass where it could no longer confront the oncoming enemy and where most of its energies would be directed 

to saving its remaining elements, and covering its own Hanks 

and rear. Whether the Gennan advance into Bastogne from the 

eastward could be checked and thrown into recoil now depended 

on the forces of the lOIst Division itself. 
CHAPTER 4 

FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 

AT BASTOGNE, the 10ist Division played in luck from the 

n beginning and the luck began weeks before the siege started. 

In the early part of November a young lieutenant colonel, Julian 

Ewell (plate 8), commanding the 501st Parachute Infantry on 

the Nedet Rijn front in Holland, took a busman's holiday and 

spent two days of his leave at Bastogne.1 

It was the luck of war that in giving the march order before 

leaving Camp Mourmelon, General McAuliffe had put the 50 Ist 

Parachute Infantry at the head of the column. 2 It was the luck 

of war again that Ewell got away well in advance of the column 

on December 18 and was the first commander to arrive in the 

vicinity of the bivouac.8 He ran into a wire-stringing detail there, 

asked what they were doing, found that they were men from the 

WIst Division and then followed the wires into the Division 

command post. Then he got ready to guide his own men in.4 

(Plates 9 to 17 in the picture section show Bastogne and vicinity from the air and ground, and the WIst Airborne Division 

Headquarters. ) 

All down the route over which he had come Colonel Ewell 

had found the traffic blocking and stopping, and he didn't expect his 501st to come up to him before 2300 because of this congestion.' But it beat that schedule by half an hour and Ewell's 

u~it was closed into its area by 2400. General McAuliffe knew at 

midnight that by then he had one regiment ready.6 

Earlier in the night (December 18) Ewell had talked to Generals McAuliffe and Higgins. The one thing on which all three 

commanders agreed was that no one could be sure of anything. 

Ewell said of himself that he was as much in the dark as any 

man present. But he told his commander, General McAuliffe, 

that he thought he should be given a definite assignment. It was 

a big request, the situation considered. McAuliffe and Middleton 

conferred on it. 

The commander's index finger pointed out along the road run-

[30 ] 
FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 31 

ning eastward-toward the ridges where Ewell had walked in 

November-although neither General Middleton nor General 

McAuliffe ever knew that he had seen the ground. T The enemy 

was coming that way. At Corps headquarters the 9th Armored 

Division was thought to have a roadblock somewhere around 

Longvilly and the 10th Armored Division a block farther west 

toward Neffe. The 9th's block was thought to be surrounded; 

the 10th's block was supposed to be engaged but not yet surrounded.a 

General Middleton had described the situation at these blocks 

when General McAuliffe had reported to him, and he had said: 

"There is a battle now going on for Bastogne."9 He spoke of the 

block out along the Longvilly road as "surrounded" and indicated the positions of the three blocks which Combat Command 

B of the 10th Armored was maintaining to the east, northeast 

and southeast of the city.10 The Corps commander had no specific 

plan for the employment of the lOIst Division. The news that 

he was to have that division had come so recently that he had 

had no time to prepare a plan. At first General McAuliffe could 

think of nothing.ll At 2200 he suggested to General Middleton 

that a combat team be sent east to develop the situation.12 That 

idea appealed to General McAuliffe simply as a "good old leavenworth solution of the problem."lB It was wholly consistent with 

General Middleton's concern for the preservation of the other 

elements of his command.uA As General Middleton reasoned 

the problem, so long as the 10th Armored team was already employed in the east, it was not urgent that the lOIst Airborne Division develop the situation there, although it was sound practice 

to reinforce the armored team's roadblock, since it was becoming 

evident that the weight of the enemy attack was coming down 

the Longvilly road.14,B 

Middleton and McAuliffe sent for Ewell. He had been spending a pmt of his time unprofitably at the road intersections trying 

to get information from men who were straggling in from the 

north and northeast. All talked vaguely and dispiritedly. Man 

after man said to him: 'We have been wiped out," and then stumbled away through the dark. They did not know where they had 
32 BASTOGNE 

been. They had no idea where they were going. Colonel Ewell 

and his officers tried several times to draw these men out, then 

gave them up as a bad job and paid no further attention.15 Ewell 

reached his separate conclusion that any quest for information 

concerning the enemy, other than going out bodily after it, was 

useless.16 

The exact mission given Ewell was to "seize the road junction 

at 676614 and hold it."17 That would put him out the eastern 

road well beyond Longvilly. Middleton told him that combat 

Command Reserve of the 9th Armored Division had a roadblock 

~t that point which was supposed to be "isolated" and that the 

I 10th Infantry was supposedly still maintaining a command post 

at Allerborn.18 From the assembly area of the 50lst Parachute 

Infantry, it was nine and a half miles to the road junction. However, that distant point did not enter into General McAuliffe's 

instructions to Ewell or into Ewell's estimate of what the 50lst 

would be able to accomplish. McAuliffe was not sure where the 

enemy would crowd him first, but he thought it most likely that 

they would roll on him from the east. That had as much to do 

with his assignment of Ewell as did the fact that the armored 

roadblocks were involved with the enemy. 

Then General McAuliffe simply pointed to the map and 

moved his finger along in the direction of Longvilly. He said: 

"Ewell, move out along this road at six o'clock, make contact, 

attack and clear up the situation."19 

Ewell didn't ask a question. He said: "Yes, sir," saluted and 

went on his way.20 

Recalling that scene some days afterward, General McAuliffe 

was to remark: "There were many men and commanders in my 

operation who did outstanding things. But Ewell's was the greatest gamble of all. It was dark. He had no knowledge of the 

enemy. I could not tell him what he was likely to meet. But he 

has a fine eye for ground and no man has more courage. He was 

the right man for the spot I put him in."21 

Of the few maps which the WIst Division had obtained from 

VIII Corps headquarters, twenty went with Ewell's combat team 

as it started to march.22 It wasn't enough to go around. Lieutenant 
FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 33 

Colonel Clarence F. Nelson, commanding the 907th Glider 

Field Artillery Battalion, had only one map scaled I: 100,000 

from which to provide his firing data. So as the movement got 

under way, he had sketches drawn up for the forward observers. 

On the sketches all control points and critical features-such as 

crossroads, bridges, woods and towns-were marked and numbered. The observers knew the locations of the batteries. In this 

way the artillery operation was c06rdinated.23 

The offensive mission was limited to the one combat team, 

Ewell's. McAuliffe had decided right at the beginning that a 

successful defense of Bastogne depended on the utmost harboring of his reserves at every stage of operation, and having sent 

Ewell forth, he decided to sit on Bastogne with the rest of his 

Division until something new developed.24 

That same idea-conservation of force-guided Colonel Ewell 

in his opening moves. In giving his battalion commanders the 

march order, he told Major Raymond V. Bottomly, Jr., who was 

leading out with the 1st Battalion of the 501st, that he was not 

to put out Hank security until he reached Mageret; otherwise, 

the progress of the column would be much too slow. But in 

line with the governing principle he added the instruction to all 

commanders that if they met opposition, they were to "take it 

slow and easy." Being familiar with his men and their methods 

in past campaigns, he knew that they tended to throw themselves 

directly on the target. These methods had worked in Normandy 

and Holland. But from what he had seen of the Bastogne terrain in November, he had concluded that his main chance lay 

in "fire and maneuver" rather than in shock action. He felt that 

his whole operation should be guided by this principle. He said 

to them; "I don't want you to try to beat the enemy to death."25 

(Plate 17.) 

The regiment took off at 0600, December 19, passing its command post on the minute. 26 Battery B of the 81st Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion-seven 57mm. guns-moved out behind 1st 

Battalion.21 The lOlst Airborne Division's Reconnaissance Troop, 

which had been attached to Ewell's 50lst Parachute Infantry, 

started through the town ahead of Major Bottomly's men.28 The 
34 BASTOGNE 

observers and the liaison party from the artillery moved out with 

the lead infantry company. The artillery battalion stayed in the 

bivouac area two miles west of Bastogne waiting for the infan~ 

to find the enemy. 29 

Ewell went forward at 0700. The light was just beginning to 

break. Already, he felt vaguely familiar with the terrain and the 

first thing that happened strengthened his confidence in his 

memory. At the first intersection past the town, he found the 

1st Battalion moving down the wrong road-toward Marvie. He 

saw from memory of the ground, without looking at the map, 

that they were going the wrong way. He recalled them and got 

them pointed toward Longvilly. The Reconnaissance Platoon, 

having proceeded farthest along the wrong road, thus got behind the battalion column, and raced to catch up. so 

Ewell's column passed on down the road that follows the line 

of the creek toward Neffe. (Plates 19,21.) To their left the hills 

rose evenly from the edge of the right-of-way-fairly easy slopes 

up which an infantryman might run without undue exertion. 

Ahead, they could see very little. The road dipped and turned 

around the hill facings of the little valley and the morning fog 

lay so thick that the visibility toward the south, where the land 

opens up beyond the line of the creek, was limited to 500 yards.81 

The 1st Battalion had been on the march for a little more than 

two hours, and tha advance party was being passed through by 

the Reconnaissance Platoon, when the column was fired on by 

a machine gun from along the road and just westward of Neffe. 

(Map 4, page 35.) The first burst of fire did no damage but the 

battalion hit the dirt. They had need to, for they were looking 

straight down the groove toward the enemy position; for the last 

700 yards the road runs straight and almost level into Neffe. To 

right of the road, the ground fell off sharply to the creek. To 

the left were the gently sloping hills, and Bottomly deployed his 

men that way. Ewell told him to go ahead and develop his situation. Shells began whipping along the road and Bori:omly sent 

word back to Ewell that he thought he was being opposed by two 

tanks and two platoons of infantry. 

Colonel Ewell took himself off, leaving Bottomly to direct his 
FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 35 . 

501 

AND TEAM CHERRY 

190600-191600 

December 1944 

IPHASE 11 -:.. _ 0 100 'fo t====u=:!k:~ 

lGALI III 'AIIDI 

Map 4 
36 BASTOGNE 

own fight. He had already tasted the shell fire and he didn't want 

to tempt it, unnecessarily. Back beyond the road's first turning, 

about 100 yards from Bottomly's skirmish line, there was a pocket 

in the hillside to left of the road where a stone house fitted snugly. There Colonel Ewell set up his command post.82 

It soon became clear to him! that his 1st Battalion would not 

be able to overcome the roadblock because of the German tanks. 

The tanks were firing from a defilade close into the hillside where 

the road runs down to Neffe from Bizory. Bottomly couldn't 

bring the 57mms. to bear because the Neffe-Bastogne road ran 

so straight for the last half mile. About 1000, convinced that his 

1st Battalion was stopped, Ewell decided to bring the rest of his 

regiment out of Bastogne. But this was easier said than done. 

The VIII Corps was rushing the evacuation of its last units 

and their troops were streaming through town across the line of 

march the rest of the 501st Parachute Infantry would have to 

take. The 2d Battalion fought its way through this traffic during 

the next hour and Colonel Ewell ordered them on to an assembly area on the reverse of the gently sloping ridge north of Major 

Bottomly's position. He figured that he would put them out to 

the left, closed up so that they could be deployed at the most advantageous moment. ss 

Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, commanding officer of the 907th 

Glider Field Artillery Battalion, and Captain Gerald J. McGlone, 

commanding officer of Battery B, 907th, had gone forward to 

Colonel Ewell the minute the radio Hashed word that the 1st 

Battalion of the 501st had met fire at Neffe. McGlone got his 

battery into position 500 yards northeast of Bastogne on the left 

of the Longvilly road, and opened fire as soon as he was in position, which was only a few minutes after 1000, December 19. 

The fog was still thick and the battery was working under several 

other handicaps-its radios had never been tested and five of its 

guns had never been fired. But they spoke now from a distance 

of only 1,000 yards behind Bottomly's skirmish line. Having 

weighed the risk that the enemy might How on around Ewell's 

narrow front-and accepted it-Nelson decided that one battery 

was enough in that particular position. He put Battery A, under 
FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 37 

Captain Lowell B. Bigelow, into the action from a position near 

the battalion command post, 1,000 yards west of Bastogne. Luck 

rode with him. The defilade where he had placed Battery B on 

the spur of the moment was so well chosen that the guns were 

to work there for almost a month without receiving a single round 

of German counter-battery fire. B' (Plate 22.) 

This day, however, the batteries had no need to worry about 

anything coming in on them. The only heavy support for the 

German attack was from their tanks and it was all close-up fire 

directed against Ewell's infantry units. The American artillery 

fire was turned mainly against the tanks and the small groups of 

German infantry. There were many such targets.11 

Colonel Ewell sized up his situation. In 1st Battalion, Companies Band C were in skirmish line, while Company A was 

collected in reserve. Major Bottomly had deployed most of his 

strength to the north of the highway but he had managed to find 

room for one platoon in the ground south of the creek and rail 

line. The battalion had put two mortars into operation almost 

immediately and their fire was shaking down the houses around 

the enemy roadblock in Neffe.8a 

But an attempt to get the 1st Battalion's left flank forward had 

failed. From Neffe, the north road climbs gradually through a 

shallow draw to the small farming community of Bizory. The 

country hereabouts is all uninterrupted grazing land except for 

the small but thick tree plantations and clusters of farmhouses 

which appear as villages on the map. The dominant terrain features are the long and quite regular ridges which run generally 

in a north-south line. These hills are gently undulating and the 

hillsides are quite smooth. From the tops of the commanding 

ridges one can see great distances on a clear day. The reverse 

slopes of the hills are smooth and are usually accessible from 

either end of the hills, making them highly useful to artillery 

and armor. The roads are close enough together so that vehicles 

can move to the ridges from either direction. When the country 

is covered with snow, nothing obtrudes on the landscape except 

the small black patches of forest. The ridges fall away in gently 

sloping draws which provide clear fields of fire to the flank and 
38 BASTOGNE 

make it easily possible to cover the main lines of communication.87 

The road from Neffe to Bizory rises gradually for a distance, 

providing a perfect slot for fire from the low ground around 

Neffe. Bottomly had made one pass in this direction and shells 

from the enemy armor had fairly blistered the little valley.8s 

Ewell decided that as long as the enemy tanks were in Neffe, 

his 1st Battalion couldn't move in any direction. He ordered the 

2d Battalion to seize Bizory.89 That hamlet is in the same draw 

up which the tanks had shot at Bottomly's men, but the ground 

Battens out at Bizory so that the place can't be seen from Neffe. 

This detail, however, Ewell couldn't see from the rear, but he 

was curious to find out about it. The map told him that the ridge 

adjacent to Bizory was the high ground and would be of use to 

him. He wanted to see if the enemy force east of there was holding a continuous position and he sent his 2d Battalion forward 

to find out.40 

His decision, so casually made, probably contributed as much 

to the salvation of Bastogne as anything that happened during 

the first few critical days. Colonel Ewell was still strongly of the 

opinion that he was being opposed by only a minor roadblock.41 

But when he determined to extend the 50lst and sweep forward, 

he made it a certainty that the oncoming Germans would suddenly collide with Americans who were attacking along a broad 

front. This was the thing the Germans least expected. Until it 

happened they had been meeting small or disorganized units, 

which they quickly encircled and overcame. 42 

The shock of the discovery threw them off stride. They recoiled, hesitated and lost priceless, unreclaimable hours and opportunity because of their own confusion. In that action, a few 

American platoons hardened the fate of armies. But Ewell 

thought of none of these things as he ordered his 2d Battalion, 

501st Parachute Infantry, to seize Bizory. He reflected on them 

later in his command post in the Bastogne monastery which the 

German artillery had made one of the best-ventilated buildings 

in all of Belgium.48 
CHAPTER 5 

EAST OF BASTOGNE 

THE THIRD BATTALION of the 501st Parachute Infantry 

had been caught in the traffic snarl west of Bastogne and was 

at a standstill. Colonel Ewell checked on them at 1200, December 19, and found that they had scarcely moved at all. After trying to get out of town, the battalion had backtracked, only to 

find that other routes were likewise clogged with outgoing troopS.l 

Yet even this delay had its benefits. Some of the infantrymen 

lacked helmets, riRes and ammunition. They begged them from 

the armored troops of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, who were in the town, and thus in the interval the battalion 

became somewhat better equipped.2 Colonel Ewell ordered Lieutenant Colonel George M. Griswold, commanding the 3d Battalion, to march his battalion to Mont, a little hamlet lying south 

of the Neffe road. (Plate 20.) It seemed like the best opportunity 

to get the battalion out of Bastogne. Ewell also directed that one 

of Griswold's companies be sent down the Wiltz road to cover 

the 3d Battalion's right Rank as it moved. Colonel Griswold was 

told to send the company to the bend in the road directly east 

of the village of Marvie. Colonel Ewell planned to send the 3d 

Battalion against Neffe from the southwest after it had reached 

Mont, but he issued no orders to the effect at the time. He followed his usual plan of giving his subordinate commanders only 

a limited objective.8 

At 1203 the 2d Battalion took Bizory (Map 4, page 35) without opposition except for unobserved fire from the German tanks 

in Neffe. Still convinced that the Neffe roadblock was the only 

immediate threat to his front, Ewell ordered his 2d Battalion to 

advance and seize Mageret. By this move he figured he would 

box the tanks in so that he could then move against them either 

from front or rear according to the advantages of the ground. 

But he specified that Major Sammie N. Homan, commander of 

the 2d Battalion, send one of his companies to seize the patch 

of woods directly north of Mageret. This wood is a small planta-

[39 ] 
40 BASTOGNE 

tion of very tall spruces. Ewell saw that the long ridge running 

across to the spruces dominated Mageret in the valley. It seemed 

to him that putting one company there might cover the approach 

to Mageret. ~ 

Major Homan started out by road from Bizory to Mageret, but 

his route march ended, quickly. At the crest of Hill 510 he ran 

into German infantry in dug-in positions: they were the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division. Homan 

took this first jolt almost without loss; not so, the enemy. Their line 

was moving forward from the foxholes and comi~g over the hill 

when the 2d Battalion mortars and Nelson's artillery caught them 

with full blast. The paratroopers saw a number of the enemy fall 

before the survivors ran back. Deploying the rest of his battalion, 

Homan sent Company F to the left to seize the coveted wood. 

When this extension was completed he reported to Colonel Ewell 

by radio that his hands were full and he was now engaged along 

his entire front. "For the time being," he said, "I cannot think of 

taking Mageret."5 

Colonel Griswold's 3d Battalion reached Mont and found one 

of the engineer roadblocks outposting that point, but the further 

operation of the main body of the battalion was compromised by 

the nature of the ground between Mont and Neffe. The two 

villages are little more than a mile apart and from Neffe one can 

look right down the little valley and see Mont clearly. The tanks 

of Panzer Lehr, which were at Neffe,6 were shipping a few shells 

toward Griswold's infantry. It seemed possible that a small party 

might work its way toward Neffe but the ground was much too 

naked for the exposure of any large force. Colonel Griswold 

stopped his 3d Battalion where it was. 

Company I, which had drawn the assignment on the extreme 

right Hank, was instructed to prowl the three large woods west 

and northwest of the village of Wardin. At 1330 Company I reported that they had checked the three woods and found no 

enemy. Colonel Ewell then told Company I to advance to Wardin and make contact with a friendly armored roadblock that 

was supposed to be there. Ewell had not been told officially of 

the existence of this force but had heard of it quite casually from 
EAST OF BASTOGNE 41 

someone walking down the road. 1 The company went on to make 

the contact Ewell had ordered. But for all practical effect, the 

stranger who had mentioned that there was a friendly roadblock 

near by might just as well have left his words unsaid. 

This was Team O'Hara of Combat Command B, lOth Armored 

Division, which on the night of December 18 had taken up position on the high ground south of Wardin just short of the woods. 

The night had been quiet except for the stragglers coming 

through-mostly rear echelon people from the 28th Division 

whose idea of the enemy situation was confused. The morning 

of December 19 opened with fog. About 1000 the trickle of stragglers stopped altogether. This worried Team O'Hara for they 

figured it must mean that the enemy was coming next. They put 

out a platoon as a reconnissance screen to the east which moved 

slowly along the road to Bras. At 1140 they engaged and destroyed 

a Volkswagen on the Wiltz-Bastogne highway. Just as they 

opened fire they saw the head of the enemy column break through 

the fog a few hundred yards away-two Mark IV tanks and a 

personnel carrier. The platoon had nothing with which to fight 

armor and so it cleared out rapidly, reporting its findings by radio. 

As a result of the message, unobserved fire was put on Bras by the 

420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 

At about the same time Captain Edward A. Carrigo, Team 

S-2, and First Lieutenant John D. Devereaux, commanding Company B of the 54th Armored Infantry Battalion, were entering 

Wardin from the southwest and finding it unhealthy (Map 5, 

page 42). The town was wrapped in fog; they could scarcely see 

anything at fifty yards' range. But they prowled on through the 

town and just as they got beyond it a projectile of antitank size 

hit the front bumper of their jeep. Nothing was hurt, but the 

two officers increased their speed and reported that there were 

people moving into Wardin who were quite unfriendly.8 

By noon of the 19th the visibility lengthened to 800 yards. 

Second Lieutenant Theodore R. Hamer, observer for the 420th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion, moved forward to the top of 

a small hill. There were five tanks of T earn O'Hara on the crest 

when he got there. But before he had a chance to observe for 
42 BASTOGNE 
EAST OF BASTOGNE 43 

fire, his own tank was hit twice from the left by a high-velocity 

gun, wounding Hamer and three other crew members. One man 

was incinerated inside the tank. Another medium tank was hit 

in the turret by a shell that killed the gunner. The driver backed 

the tank down the hill wildly, not stopping until his vehicle became bogged; the tank could not be salvaged and later had to be 

destroyed. The other tanks cleared away from the hill as rapidly 

as they could. Direct-fire artillery began to hit the force's main 

position from north across the valley. On the road ahead, the team 

had hastily set up a minefield. At 1300 a few Germans jumped 

from a Volkswagen and tried to remove the mines. From only 

200 yards away to the west, five of the infantry half-tracks and 

five medium tanks opened fire on the German party. But they 

were able to jump in their car and make a clean getaway. Shortly after, an outpost at the south of the position saw another enemy 

group moving through woods northeast toward Wardin. One of 

the medium tanks moved up and put them under fire. 9 

These were the things that had happened before the time when 

Team O'Hara saw men coming toward them from the woods at 

their rear. These men were in patrol formation and wore an unfamiliar green uniform, which looked tight around the legs. 

The tankers were just about to fire and then someone in the approaching party yelled. The approaching men (Map 6, page 44) 

were the point of Company I, 501st Parachute Infantry. Their 

green jump suits had almost been their undoing. The main body 

of the Company was right behind them in the woods and the 

company was on its way to Wardin-good news to the tankers. 

The first infantry support had arrived and they could now withdraw their own patrols which had been reaching out toward the 

town. 

Some fateful minutes passed and nothing was done to unify 

the action. With the enemy crowding in on them, the forces 

acted like two ships passing in the night. The paratroopers went 

on. Two medium tanks were placed so as to cover the exits from 

Wardin. That was all.10 

Lieutenant Colonel James O'Hara, commander of the 54th 

Armored Infantry Battalion, 10th Armored Division, and Team 
44 BASTOGNE 
EAST OF BASTOGNE 45 

O'Hara of Combat Command B, had thought that the enemy 

would push west on the Wiltz-Bastogne highway. But he was 

wrong about it. The Gennans bypassed his group-except for a 

few who squeezed a litde too far over to the west and got themselves killed for their pains-and went on to Wardin. moving 

along a deep gully where O'Hara's tanks couldn't bring their fire 

to bear. The tankers could see the Gennan infantry infiltrating 

by twos and threes, moving northwest toward the town, until a 

hundred or more had passed. They asked that artillery be put 

on the gully but the Bastogne artillery was occupied with the 

defense of Noville. Then the enemy began to fret O'Hara's immediate front again: one group came close enough to fire at a 

tank with a rocket that fell five yards short. Half-tracks sprayed 

the area with machine-gun fire and the tanks pounded away 

with their 75mms. Thus preoccupied, Team O'Hara paid no 

mind to Wardin. They knew there was fighting going on but 

the situation was "obscure."l1 

At 1415, December 19, Colonel Ewell heard that Company I 

was being fired on in Wardin. The reports trickling in during 

the next few minutes indicated that the company was doing 

pretty well. Annor was now opposing them, but they had already 

knocked out two tanks and were pushing the enemy infantry 

from the town. By 1600, Ewell was pretty much content with his 

general situation. He had three battalions apprOximately abreast; 

he was in contact with the enemy aU along his front and there 

was a friendly roadblock-Team O'Hara-on his extreme right 

Bank. But he felt that he had gone as far as he could with his 

offensive action and that such strength was now being committed 

against him that he could no longer think about his specific mission (to" seize the road junction at 6 7 6614 and hold it.") He therefore ordered his battalions to make plans to break contact at 

dark and draw back to defend a general line along the high 

ground to the west of Bizory-Neffe, and in an approximate extension of this line to the southward of the creek. At Division 

headquarters, General McAulliffe and Colonel Kinnard looked 

over his plan and approved it.12 

As he was walking back through Bastogne he met a sergeant 
46 BASTOGNE 

from Company I who said to him, "Have you heard about Company I? We've been wiped out." Ewell got to his radio; he didn't 

believe the sergeant, but the story was nearer right than he 

thought. Company I had lost 45 men and 4 officers at Wardin 

and the survivors had scattered so badly that it was no longer 

possible to form even a platoon. The news was a shock. When 

he first heard that Company I was becoming involved in: Wardin, Colonel Ewell had ordered it to disengage and withdraw. 

But before the company could comply, it had come under the 

full shock of an attack by seven tanks and one infantry battalion 

from Panzer Lehr. The survivors got out as best they could.18 

This news simply strengthened Ewell's conviction that he 

must abandon all further offensive intention and tighten up his 

position. Colonel O'Hara had reached the same conclusion and 

for much the same reason. Four of the walking wounded who 

had gotten out of Wardin had come into his lines and told him 

the news. He saw his force now in an exposed position with no 

one on his right, an aggressive enemy on his left and pressure 

along his whole front, and he asked Combat Command B headquarters for permission to withdraw. 

By radio he received his reply, "Contact friends on your left, 

hold what you have." This told him that headquarters still didn't 

understand the situation. 80 he sent his 8-3, Captain George 

A. Renoux, to Bastogne to explain in person what he couldn't 

with safety discuss over the air, and then went to his rear to reconnoiter a better position. At 1715 he was ordered to withdraw to 

the high ground north of Marvie-the place he had by then 

already picked as the best defensive line in the area. The Headquarters Company, Heavy-Weapons Company and engineers 

were first to start digging into the new slope. When they were 

in place, the rest of the force came along, except for four medium 

tanks and one platoon of infantry which covered the withdrawal. 

Throughout the whole move, the 420th Armored Field Artillery 

Battalion put a heavy covering fire inta the ground where the 

enemy had been seen during the day. Not a shot was fired in 

retum.14 

Because of the loss of Company I and his feeling that the 
EAST OF BASTOGNE 47 

Map 7 
48 BASTOGNE 

enemy was building up on his right, Colonel Ewell asked Division headquarters to attach one battalion to his regiment for a 

right Hank and reserve. He was given the 1st Battalion of the 

327th Glider Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Hartford F. 

Salee. They were put in behind Ewell's 3d Battalion which put 

them next to Team O'Hara.lI 

Between 1700 and 1800, December 19, the 501st Parachute 

Infantry fell back to the new defensive line. Estimating his gains 

and losses, Ewell didn't give his regiment too much credit. He 

thought that Company I had probably killed some Germans at 

Wardin, but since the enemy still held the town he couldn't be 

sure. His impression was that the execution done by his own 

right and center had not been very great. The honors of the day 

belonged to the artillery.16 Colonel Ewell said, "Any actual killing of the enemy that day was due to the artillery." 

Captain Ryerson's force (Company C, 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, lOth Armored Division) of Team Cherry (Map 7, 

page 47), having spent the day hoping that the infantry would 

get up to them, clung to three houses in the northwest edge of 

Mageret after dark. The enemy shot up Hares and blazed away 

at Ryerson's vehicles with antitank guns, destroying three of 

them. Their infantry then came on but was driven back by the 

fire of the 420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 

At 0030, December 20, Combat Command B Headquarters 

sent orders for Ryerson to withdraw before dawn, and to make 

contact with Colonel Ewell at Bizory. One line in the special 

instructions said, "The lead vehicle will inform outpost line of 

number of vehicles in his column to insure that no Germans 

follow column into our lines." 

Captain Ryerson got ready to move his wounded to a point 

beyond the crest of the first hill-the first step on the way out.1T 
CHAPTER 6 

HOLDING THE CHATEAU 

COLONEL CHERRY had been sitting on the hot seat. Having failed to get to his forward elements the night of December 18, he went to his command post, which was set up in the 

ch~teau 300 yards south of Neffe. A signal company from VIII 

Corps which had hastily pulled out of this building had scribbled 

signs on the walls saying, 'We'll be back-The Yanks." One of 

Cherry's men read it and snorted, 'We'll be back-Hell! We're 

here to stay."l 

At 0600 on December 19-just as Ewell's men were passing 

the initial point-Cherry's Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Tank Battalion, which was outposting the road junction at Neffe, was hit 

by enemy tanks and infantry from the east. The platoon knocked 

out one tank with a bazooka but the enemy kept coming, and 

after taking some losses, the line broke back under a storm of 

German riSe, machine-gun and direct artillery fire. Most of the 

outpost fell back along the Bastogne road up which Major Bottomly's men (1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry) were coming. But three of them were able to get through to Cherry in 

the chateau and they carried the word that the enemy had come 

to Neffe with two tanks and two infantry plato<,>ns. 2 

At 1000, while Colonel Ewell was committing his 2d Battalion 

of the 501st, Colonel Cherry saw four more German tanks (one 

was a Tiger Royal), an armored car and 97 more infantrymen 

enter Neffe from the direction of Mageret. Right after that they 

hit his force, and they spent the rest of that day trying to crush 

him with their left while poking at Ewell's troops with their 

right. The chateau was stoutly built and this somewhat compensated for Team Cherry's depleted numbers. Cherry had to see it 

through with his headquarters personnel who moved from one 

side of the building to another as the attack shifted. The automatic weapons had been taken from the vehicles and placed in 

the windows and at other points where they could cover the 

ch~teau yard and walls. From three sides, the enemy infantry 

[49 ] 
50 BASTOGNE 

pressed in against the building; the west side of the ch!teau was 

raked with 20mm. and machine-gun fire. 8 But though some died 

within five yards of the walls, not one German got into the 

cMteau. 

There was only one somber note in the defense. A depleted 

platoon of engineers, which had arrived from the direction of 

Mont early in the morning, was ordered to the south of the 

cMteau at the height of the action. The enemy was moving 

through woods toward the high ground in that direction. The 

engineers started on their mission but kept on over the hill and 

Team Cherry never saw them again.' 

Some time around mid-afternoon on the 19th a platoon from 

Ewell's 3d Battalion of the 501st in Mont worked its way. carefully forward, taking advantage of the cover afforded by the 

forest patches and the rise and fall of the ground, and entered 

the ch!teau.B It had turned out this way, that whereas the fire of 

the German tanks had kept Colonel Griswold's 3d Battalion from 

closing on Neffe, his infantry fire had compelled the Germans 

to release their tight hold on the cMteau. Too, the enemy must 

have felt mounting concern for what was occurring on their right. 

The platoon had come as reinforcements-to help Cherry hold 

the fort. But by that time the roof was blazing over his head and 

his men were being smoked out by another fire lighted by German HE shells.6 He waited until the approach of darkness and 

then led all hands out of Neffe and back to the infantry lines 

at Mont. 

Before leaving, Colonel Cherry sent Combat Command B this 

message, 'We're not driven out ... we were burned out. We're 

not withdrawing . . we are moving."7 
CHAPTER 7 

TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 

THE CONTEMPORARY accounts which attempted to apportion the credit for the saving of Bastogne had much to 

say about the lOIst Airborne Division and relatively little about 

any other units. There was irony in the fact that a paratroop 

outfit which had already done equally brilliant work in Normandy and Holland won world recognition for the first time, 

and in so doing eclipsed the splendid help given by the other 

victors, at Bastogne. It was the belief of the commanders at Bastogne that the 28th Infantry Division had absorbed much of 

the shock of the attack before the enemy reached their front on 

that first day, and that the harassing of the German flank and rear 

by the armored forces that had gone out the Longvilly road 

further lightened the burden upon their own men of the 101st 

Airborne Division.1 In those critical hours the armor out along 

the roads leading north and east was to the infantry in Bastogne 

like a football end throwing himself in the path of interference 

so that the secondary defense can have a clean chance to get at 

the man with the ball. 

One of the most desperately placed of these small armored 

forces was Team Desobry which assembled in the Noville area 

at 2300 on December 18. The town of Noville (Map 8, page 52) 

is on relatively high ground. Yet it is commanded by two ridges 

from about 800 yards, one in the southeast and the other running 

from north to northwest. Because the team arrived in the darkness, full advantage of the natural defenses of the area could 

not be taken immediately. Major William R. Desobry (Commanding Officer of the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, lOth 

Armored Division) set up a perimeter defense of the town under 

Captain Gordon Geiger of Battalion Headquarters Company. He 

sent forward three outposts, each consisting of a depleted platoon 

of infantry and a section of medium tanks. One went east on 

the Bourcy road, one went northeast on the Houffalize road and 

the third set up its roadblock at some crosstrails on the road to 

[ 51 ] 
52 BASTOGNE 

MapS 

TEAt.! DESOBRY, CCB, lOAD 

182300-191400 DEC. 1944 

SCA&.I til Y""" u.u.u (j) .. ~,_~.Cil.~N 

(J) CIllJII Q) ... IIBI~ 

(i)·IIl.. !I)-ill· 

Vaux. This outpost line was about 800 yards from the main body. 

The engineers were instructed to install minefields in support of 

the roadblocks but found it impossible to comply with the order 

because of the How of American stragglers back over these same 

roads. They came on all through the night-men from scattered 

engineer units, from Combat Command Reserve of the 9th 

Armored Division and from the 28th Infantry Division. Colonel 

Roberts had told Major Desobry to draft into his organization 

any men he could use. 

Every vehicle that came down the road was searched for infantry soldiers. Desobry had already decided that he would incorporate any infantrymen or engineers into the local defense; he 

needed engineers to set up obstacles. But he ordered his men to 

let any armored vehicles pass through the lines and continue on 

to Bastogne. He figured that additional vehicles would merely 
TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 53 

clog the streets of Noville and increase his vulnerability to enemy 

artillery fire. The infantry strays came into the line usually in 

groups of three or four. Many of them had discarded all fighting 

equipment; few were able to say where they had been; none had 

maps and none was able to pinpoint the area where he had last 

seen the Germans. It became the experience of T earn Desobry 

that these stragglers who came to Noville singly or in small 

groups were of almost no value to the defense; when the action 

started, they took to the cellars. 

This was not true of a platoon of armored infantry from CCR 

which fell back into Noville near midnight. Their lieutenant had 

held them together during a running 36-hour fight with enemy 

armored forces. He gave Major Desobry a vivid picture of his experience and of the action of the enemy forces moving toward 

Noville from the east. He volunteered to move his platoon into 

position at Noville and throughout the defense there, it fought 

courageously. 

On the strength of what the lieutenant had told him about the 

enemy armor, Desobry decided that his own vehicles were overcrowding the village. He ordered the main streets to be cleared 

and the vehicles to be parked along the side roads. Detailing one 

officer to stand watch, he then suggested that the rest of the force 

within the village try to snatch some sleep. 

At 0430 on December 19 the How of stragglers abruptly ceased 

and Desobry's men grew tense as they waited for an enemy attack. At 0530 a group of half-tracks could be heard and dimly 

seen approaching the block on the Bourey road. In the darkness 

the outpost could not tell whether they were friend or enemy. 

The sentry to the front yelled "Halt!" four times. The first vehicle pulled to a grinding halt within a few yards of him. Someone in the half-track yelled something in German. From a bank 

on the right of the road, Desobry's men showered the half-track 

with hand grenades. Several exploded as they landed in the vehicle. There was loud screaming as some of the Germans jumped 

or fell from the half-track and lay in the road. The rest of the 

enemy column quickly unloaded and deployed in the ditches 

along the road. There ensued a 20-minute close-up fight with 
54 BASTOGNE 

grenades and automatic weapons and although the roadblock 

crew was greatly outnumbered, the bullet fire did them no hurt 

because of the protection of the embankment. Staff Sergeant 

Leon D. Gantt finally decided that too many German potatomashers were coming into the position and ordered his men to 

withdraw about 100 yards. At this the Germans turned their halftrack around and ran for safety; they were apparently a reconnaissance element and had completed their mission by finding 

the American outpost. During the action the two tanks had done 

nothing although they were within 100 yards of the German 

column. Sergeant Gantt went to Second Lieutenant Allen L. 

Johnson and asked him why. Johnson replied that he hadn't been 

sure what to do. He then fired a couple of Parthian shots down 

the road but the enemy had already disappeared into the fog 

and darkness. At dawn the outpost fell back on Noville according to instructions. 

Twenty minutes after the fighting had died on the Bourcy road 

three tanks approached the outpost on the Houffalize road. The 

sound of their motors seemed familiar to Staff Sergeant Major 

I. Jones who was out by himself some 75 yards in front of the 

roadblock. He thought they were American. When the tanks 

were 75 yards away Jones yelled, "Halt!" and fired a quick burst 

with his BAR over the turret of the lead tank. It stopped 50 yards 

from him. He heard the occupants conversing in English. Then 

fire from the tank's caliber .50 broke around Jones' foxhole in 

the sloping bank on the side of the road. He Battened quickly 

and the fire missed his back by inches. The men at the roadblock 

fired on the tanks. Suddenly a cry of "Cease fire, they're friendly 

troops!" was heard. Jones was not certain whether the cry came 

from the force in front of him or behind him. The small-arms fire 

ceased. But the two medium tanks which were supporting the 

roadblock and were standing about 100 yards from this new 

armor were less sanguine. The tank on the right side of the road 

fired its 75mm. The first round hit the bank 15 yards from Jones 

and almost blew him out of the hole. The foremost tank confronting Jones fired six quick rounds in reply. The first round 

knocked out the American tank on the right. The second round 
TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 55 

knocked out the other one. The succeeding rounds also scored 

direct hits. Yet none of the tankers was killed though several 

were hard hit. One man had his right leg blown off and his left 

badly mangled. Private John J. Garry, an infantryman, moved 

over to the ditch to help the wounded tankers and was hit in the 

shoulder by a shell fragment. 

Jones and the other men in the advanced positions were pinned 

to their foxholes by the grazing fire from the enemy guns. The 

American half-tracks were in line behind the Shermans. The 

position of the ruined armor not only blocked the enemy from 

coming down the road but gave the half-tracks partial cover so 

that they could tum their machine guns against the enemy column. A bazooka team tried to get forward but couldn't find a 

route by which they could bring their rockets to hear. Under 

these conditions of deadlock the two forces continued to slug it 

out toe-to-toe while the fog swirled around them and at last closed 

in so thick that they could scarcely see the muzzle Hashes of the 

guns. At 0730 the platoon disengaged and withdrew to Noville, 

acting on the orders given by Major Desobry the night before. 

They had held to the last minute and so complied with the order, 

but they were about through in any case, as enemy infantry 

was now coming up around the Hank. The roadblock on the Vaux 

road was not attacked. But while that party likewise was withdrawing at 0730 they heard the enemy coming down from the 

north. 

During the night of December 18-19 Captain Geiger had set 

up roadblocks on all roads entering Noville and had placed a 

thin screen of infantry in a circle just beyond the buildings. The 

position was particularly weak on the south and west-the sides 

which the enemy seemed least likely to approach. One tank was 

posted on the road leading to Bastogne and two were put on the 

other main exits from the town. In addition, one 57mm. gun 

and a 75mm. assault gun were placed to cover each of the roads 

which had been outposted during the night. The survivors of 

the two opening skirmishes had just drawn back within this defensive circle when 88mm. fire from the northward ripped out 

of the fog which by this time completely enveloped the village. 
56 BASTOGNE 

From Noville's main street the north-running road is straight 

for miles. The defenders figured that German tanks were sitting 

out there on the road somewhere and firing right down the slot. 

The fire was very heavy for half an hour. It destroyed three halftracks and a jeep and blew the machine gun from an M8 car. 

But miraculously, no one was hurt. 

At 0830 on the 19th two Tiger tanks nosed out of the fog and 

stopped within 20 yards of the machine-gun positions covering 

the northern sector. The 57mm. gun to the right of the road was 

within 30 yards of the tanks. A medium tank with a 75mm. gun 

was looking straight at them. The machine gunners alongside 

the road picked up their bazookas. All fired at the same time 

and in a second the two Tiger tanks had become just so much 

wrecked metal. Later, all hands claimed credit for the kill. 

A few Germans jumped out of the tanks and started to flee. 

Machine gunners and riflemen in the outposts cut loose on them. 

But they could not be sure whether their fire found the targets 

because the fog swallowed the running men within 30 or 40 

yards. Some German infantry had come along behind the tanks 

and Desobry's men had caught only a glimpse of their figures. 

But they turned back the moment the skirmish opened. 

About 0930 the enemy began to press against the west sector 

with a series of small probing actions which lasted until 1030. 

The officer in charge of this ground, Second Lieutenant Eugene 

E. Todd, was new to action and began to feel that he was sustaining the weight of a major attack by the whole German Army. 

When he asked Captain Geiger for permission to withdraw, 

Geiger replied, "Hell, hold your ground and fight." He did. 

The real thing started at 1030. The defenders had heard the 

rumblings of tanks and the puttering of smaller vehicles out in 

the fog as if a tremendous build-up were going on. Quite suddenly the fog lifted like a curtain going up and revealing the 

stage. The countryside was filled with tanks. From the second 

story of his command post in the Noville schoolhouse, Captain 

Omar R. Billett (Commanding Officer, Company B, 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, 10th Armored Division), saw at a glance 

more than 30 tanks. Others saw as many more from different 
TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 57 

points of vantage. In an extended skinnish line along the ridge 

short of Vaux were 14 tanks. Desobry's men looked at this 

scene and knew that they were standing square in the road of 

an entire panzer division. At that moment they might well 

have uttered the words of Oliver, "Great are the hosts of these 

strange people, and we have here a very little company," but 

instead they picked up their anns. The leading enemy fonnations were 1,000 yards away. The distance made no difference 

even to the men working with caliber .50 machine guns; they 

fired with what they had. When they had closed to 800 yards 

out, the 14 tanks on the ridge halted and shelled the town. Other 

tanks were swinging around the right Hank but on the left the 

enemy annor was already within 200 yards of the American 

position when the curtain went up. 

The events of the next hour were shaped by the Hashes of 

the heavy guns and the vagaries of the ever-shifting fog. The 

guns rolled in measure according to a visibility that came and 

went in the passage of only a few seconds. But it never became 

an infantryman's battle. Little knots of men on foot were coming up behind the German tanks and the batteries of the 420th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion hammered at those afoot. It is 

doubtful if the American artillery stopped a single tank. About 

the time that the enemy army became fully revealed, a platoon 

from the 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion rolled into Noville, 

and added the gunpower of its four tank destroyers to the guns 

already shooting. The sudden, sharp focus given to the line of 

Mark IVs and Mark Vs as the fog cleared along the ridge line 

made them stand out like ducks in a shooting gallery. Nine were 

hit straightaway, three exploding in Hames. One came charging 

down the highway and was turned into a Haming wreck 500 

yards out. At a range of 600 yards an American cavalryman 

engaged a Panther tank with his annored car and knocked it out 

with one shot from his 37mm. gun-the most miraculous hit of 

the morning. 

Two tanks that had been close in the foreground, ahead of 

the ridge, also charged the town at a speed that brought momentary confusion to Desobry's command post. But at 30 yards' range, 
58 BASTOGNE 

a 105mm. assault gun fired its first round, stopping one tank, 

but not disabling its gun. The German fired but missed, then 

tried to withdraw, but with a quick round the assault gun finished 

him off. The other German tank had been stopped by one of 

Desobry's mediums at a range of 75 yards. Looking in the direction from which they had come, observers in the taller buildings 

of Noville could see four more tanks lying in a draw-almost concealed. The ground cover was good enough so the Noville guns 

couldn't get at them-until one of these tanks made the mistake 

of pulling out onto the road. It was a shining mark, 300 yards 

away. A tank destroyer fired and the tank exploded in a blaze. 

The fog swirled back, screening the draw, and the other three 

tanks ran off into it. 

To the east of town, the run down the Hank by the enemy 

armor ended with the destruction of three of the tanks. German 

infantry had appeared on that side in fairly large numbers, but 

when the lifting of the fog exposed them, they turned and ran, 

and bullet fire from Noville thinned their ranks while they were 

running. In Noville, the defending infantry company had lost 

13 wounded; four of our vehicles had been wrecked and one 

tank destroyer smashed-mainly from indirect artillery fire with 

which the Germans had harassed the town as their tanks came on.2 

By 1130 the fight had died, though inte~ittent shelling continued to worry the garrison. sA. Its effect on Desobry had been 

as Colonel Roberts had predicted on the night before. The sudden lifting of the fog and revelation of the enemy position had 

made him acutely conscious that the conditions of ground imposed an inordinl;lte handicap on his own force. From their positions along the ridges on three sides of Noville, the Germans 

could put their tanks in hull defilade and keep the village under 

a close artillery fi~e until all the walls were leveled. Desobry could 

see nothing but disaster ahead if he tried to hold the present 

ground. He figured he had better withdraw, but at the same time 

he remembered the counsel that Colonel Roberts had given him. 

In mid-morning, at the height of the German attack, he called 

Roberts and asked for permission to withdraw to the high ground 

around the village of Foy.8B 
TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 59 

This was an act of near fatal consequences though in the end 

it saved the situation. What happened was that at Major Desobry's CP no effort was made to keep the message secret from all 

save its handlers. The operator spoke loudly and all others in the 

command post heard what he said. The word spread quickly to 

the troops out on the fighting line. In the course of the action 

these vague rumors hardened into a positive report that the command had received permission for a withdrawal to Foy. The wish 

had fathered the thought; the intensifying of the German fire 

made it very easy to believe. Groups of armored infantrymenand nearly all of the stragglers who had been plugging gaps in 

the line-came drifting back into Noville; they had heard the 

story and had quit their foxholes. It seemed to Desobry that his 

line was about to disintegrate. He rallied his command post officers and noncoms and they began working frantically with these 

groups, bullying them, swearing that the rumor was false and 

turning them back to the action. 

Reluctantly the men faced back toward the enemy but others 

kept on coming. There was no end to the problem. That one 

lapse in the CP kept the team off balance during the deadliest 

part of the day. Yet Desobry noted that his subordinates were 

accepting even these extra odds cheerfully. From the commander 

on down, not a man had any idea of the over-all importance of 

the engagement; it was just another local affair and they had 

scarcely related it even to the defense of Bastogne. What buoyed 

their spirits was that the Germans were coming in with their 

chins down; their own armor was remaining open. The difference was telling clearly in the marksmanship of the two sides 

and in the comparative losses in fighting vehicles. Every fair hit 

on an enemy tank produced a lift of enthusiasm for the fight 

partly offsetting the ill effect of the withdrawal rumor. Not all 

of those who drifted back to the village were bent on withdrawal; 

some came for just a moment to boast of what they had done to 

the enemy in their sector and then to return to their work again. 

Witnessing this strangely disordered contest and catching its 

wild notes of dismay and triumph, Major Desobry was reminded 

of a barroom brawl. His concern, however, was not solely due to 
60 BASTOGNE 

the power of the Gennan attack. That morning he had sent 

patrols out to reconnoiter his rear and the patrols had not 

returned.BO 

Colonel Roberts sparred with the request from Noville. He 

still possessed authority to sanction the withdrawal of his own 

elements but he reckoned that the situation required steadfastness for the time being and until the Wist Division was solidly 

established in Bastogne. So at first he gave no answer. He left 

his own CP and started for General McAuliffe's headquarters to 

see what could be done. Before he had gone halfway he ran 

into Brigadier General Higgins, assistant division commander of 

the WIst. Even as he rapidly sketched the situation to Higgins 

(the time was 1050) the 1st Battalion of 506th Parachute Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel James L. LaPrade, passed by in 

the street. At the head of the regimental column, accompanying 

LaPrade, was the 506th's commander, Colonel Robert F. Sink. 

Convinced by Roberts' words that the Noville situation was fully 

desperate, Higgins on the spot ordered Sink to send a battalion 

to Noville and LaPrade automatically drew the assignment.4, 

Colonel Sink was further directed that his 2d and 3d Battalions 

should be put in Division reserve just north of Bastogne on the 

Noville road.5 At the same time the 1st Battalion, which had 

been given the Noville mission, was detached from Regiment 

and put under Division control.6 Colonel Roberts returned to his 

CP and called Major Desobry. "You can use your own judgment about withdrawing," he sajd, "but I'm sending a battalion 

of paratroopers to -reinforce you." 

Desobry replied, "I'll get ready to counterattack as soon as 

possible." 

Colonel LaPrade and his staff got up to Major Desobry at 1130 

and told him the battalion was on the way.7 It was -not quite 

clear to either of the local commanders whether there had been 

an attachment of one force to the other but they decided that for 

the time being they would keep it a "mutual affair." Colonel LaPrade and his command had just one I: 100,000 map to serve 

them for the forthcoming operation.9 

The commanders agreed that the next order of business was 
TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 61 

to attack due north and seize the high ground the enemy had 

tried to use as a springboard during the morning. Infantry and 

armor would jump off together at 1400. However, Colonel LaPrade's battalion didn't arrive until 1330 and couldn't get ready 

that soon. So the jumpoff was postponed until 1430, December 

19, since meanwhile there was a small matter of supply to he 

finally adjusted.10 

The 506th Parachute Infantry had left Mourmelon in such a 

hurry that many of the men did not have helmets and others were 

short of weapons and ammunition. Colonel LaPrade told Major 

Desobry about this embarrassment and the armored force's S-4, 

Second Lieutenant George C. Rice, was sent packing to Foy to 

bring up ammunition. On the way he met the upcoming 1st 

Battalion and asked for their supply officer; but this officer was 

in Bastogne beating the woods for weapons and ammunition. 

So Lieutenant Rice asked the company officers what they needed 

most, and found that rocket launchers, mortars and all types of 

ammunition were the critical shortages. He then dashed on to 

Foy and loaded the jeep with cases of hand grenades and M 1 

ammunition. The jeep was turned around and the stuff was 

passed out to the paratroopers as they marched. On his next 

shuttle, Rice got back to the moving' battalion with a jeep and 

a truck overloaded with weapons and ammunition. The materiel 

was put alongside the road in five separate piles so that the men 

could pick up the things they needed as they went by. He made 

one more trip and caught the head of the column just before it 

reached the limits of Noville. A load of 81mm. mortar ammunition came into town after the battalion got there.11 

These details caused a slight delay in getting the battle under 

way again. 
CHAPTER 8 

ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL 

COLONEL LAPRADE and Major Desobry wanted the high 

ground and this was their plan-that three tanks would strike 

northward along the Houffalize road and four tanks would hit 

east toward the high ground west of Bourey (Map 9, page 63). 

With this group of tanks would go one and one-half platoons 

of infantry fOl' their close-in support. In between these two 

armored groups moving along the road, laPrade's paratroopers 

would spread themselves over the middle ground. One company 

would advance south over the Bourey road, another .off to the 

left of it would extend to the Houffalize road and the third company would go toward the high ground at Vaux. In this way, 

armor and infantry would spread out fanwise as they left Noville 

and started for the commanding ridges.1 

However, the preliminaries were not propitious. Noville was 

already taking a pounding from the enemy artillery. The Germans were firing by the clock and dropping twenty to thirty shells 

into the defensive position every ten minutes. The houses and 

several of the vehicles were afire. A proper reconnaissance became impossible; the assembly went off badly. Still, the attack 

got away at 1430, December 19, though somewhat unsteadily.2 

The line had scarcely moved out from the houses when an 

artillery concentration landed in the middle of Company C of 

the 506th Parachute Infantry, which was on the right Bank.8 A 

number of men were hit but the company kept moving. Bullet 

fire from enemy positions on the high ground bit into the infantry ranks and slowed their advance. The little groups worked 

their way along, dashing on to favorable ground, stopping there 

to fire, then making a rush on to the next point of cover.& 

But elsewhere along the line, except .on the far left where 

Company B kept moving, the attack was already Bagging. The 

tanks and armored infantry decided the attack was impossible 

so moved back to their holes, not even realizing that the paratroopers were continuing to attack in any strength. I Company 

[62 ] 
ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL 63 

506-1 

PLAN OF 1430 ATTACK 

,. roe 

Map 9 

A was blocked by heavy tank fire immediately and after a small 

advance was forced to return to the village. But on the flanks, 

B and C went on until they reached the lower slopes of the 

objective ridges and started to climb. At that moment the enemy 

tanks came against them, supported by some infantry. A few 

of the paratroopers kept going; their snow-covered bodies were 

found on the ridges weeks later.6 But the greater part of the two 

companies went to earth and sought whatever cover was at hand. 

Then they continued to slug it out with their small arms as best 

they could. They could hardly see the enemy at any time. The 

fog was closing down again and it was mixed with the smoke 

drifting over from the fires of Noville. 

They held the ground until dark. 7 Then Colonel LaPrade's 

men fell back on Noville. The fighting on the slopes had cost 

the battalion heavily but the; men thought they had caused equal 
64 BASTOGNE 

losses to the enemy. From the town itself three tank destroyers 

had exchanged fire at about 1500 yards with the enemy tanks 

and had kept them from coming on. But whether they had done 

any real hurt to them could not be seen. 8 

For about an hour after the return to Noville the front was 

deathly quiet.9 LaPrade's men·had had no chance to dig in prior 

to the attack so they sought refuge in the houses.lo Colonel laPrade improved his command post by moving a heavy clothes 

closet in front of the window.ll The Germans resumed their 

bombardment of the town and in the middle of the shelling a 

platoon of tank destroyers from the 706th Tank Destroyer Battalion reported for duty.12 Further tightening the defense, General Higgins, having arrived at Noville just as the American 

counterattack was fading, took the essential steps toward unifying 

the local command. Major Desobry and Colonel LaPrade were 

in agreement that one man should be in control, and laPrade, 

being the senior, drew the assignment. LaPrade told General 

Higgins that he thought he could hold on until dark but that he 

was convinced that the enemy would attack in strength shortly 

thereafter. Soon after that, Colonel Sink got up to Noville for 

a personal reconnaissance. He talked to LaPrade and the latter 

shortly issued his orders for the combined defense.1S The plan 

was for Company B to defend to the northwest and Company A 

to the northeast and Company C was to cover the southern half 

of the perimeter while the armored group was held in the center 

of the town ready to strike out in any direction.14 A few minutes 

after LaPrade was placed in command, an 88 shell landed in the 

street outside the command post. The explosion shattered the 

clothes closet and both commanders were struck down by fragments.15 Colonel LaPrade was killed and Major Desobry 

wounded. Major Robert F. Harwick, LaPrade's executive, who 

had rushed back from a leave in Paris to join his battalion and 

had arrived in Noville just at the close of the afternoon fighting, 

took command of the combined force. The armor passed into 

the hands of Major Charles L. Hustead.16 

For the men of Combat Command B who were within the 

town the rest of the night (December 19-20) was comparatively 
ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL 65 

quiet. Their peace was punctured at times by the dropping of a 

few artillery shells and out beyond the wall of fog they could 

hear the noise of an enemy build-up.17 There was little quiet, 

however, along the infantry perimeter. Enemy tanks in twos and 

threes, supported by infantry, probed toward them. When 

warned by small-arms or bazooka fire, they checked and blazed 

away at the positions from which they had seen the Hashes. The 

accompanying Germany infantry tried to infiltrate through the 

lines. These small penetrations and the resulting fire were such 

that it was almost impossible to maintain wire communication 

with the outposts. For the paratroopers those hours were a nightmare of surprise fire, ominous noise and confusion. But when 

morning came the light revealed that two of the enemy tanks had 

been knocked out by bazooka fire.18 

These opening blows in the first round at Noville had been 

enough to convince General McAuliffe that the enemy was full 

of fight.19 After that first day they would never seem as strong 

to him again and the impression would deepen that their attacks 

were coming on in diminishing volume.20 But on the first day he 

looked toward his northern sector with increasing concern. In the 

afternoon of December 19, the 3d Battalion of S06th had been 

ordered to move up to Foy between Bastogne and Noville and 

establish a line there, with the 2d Battalion moving to Luzery as 

a regimental reserve. When this move was made, Company H on 

the right made contact with the 501st Parachute Infantry by 

patrol and Company G on the left joined with the 502d Parachute Infantry, maintaining a strong point in Recogne. That 

night all platoons of Company C of the 70Sth Tank Destroyer 

Battalion were attached to the S06th Parachute Infantry and 

General McAuliffe got ready to employ as much of the strength 

of 502d along his northern Hank as the morrow would prove 

necessary.21 

This small, confused action had reverberated all the way back 

to Corps. On returning to Bastogne, Higgins had reported to 

McAuliffe as follows: "I think we're way out on a limb. There 

is too much distance between LaPrade in Noville and Strayer in 

Foy. It is my judgment that the Noville force had better get out." 
66 BASTOGNE 

Colonel Sink, having carried out his independent reconnaissance, had reached exactly the same conclusion. At around 1820 

he called Division and said that it was getting very hot at Noville; 

he urged that his forward battalion be withdrawn to a point north 

of Foy.22 But in view of the fact that General Middleton had 

ordered that Noville be defended and that the armor which had 

gone forward in response to that direction was still acting under 

Roberts's orders, it looked like a matter for decision by the higher 

headquarters. General McAuliffe called General Middleton and 

relayed Higgins's and Sink's reports of the situation, adding his 

personal recommendation that the force be withdrawn. Middleton said, "No; if we are to hold on to Bastogne, you cannot keep 

falling back." Sink was called and told that the Noville force 

would have to stick. 2S By then, Major Desobry had ceased to 

worry about the local problem. He was unconscious when they 

removed him from the CP to the nearest field hospital. He was 

still out, when, a few hours later, the Gennans overran the hospital and took him prisoner.2' 
CHAPTER 9 

DOUBTS AND DECISIONS 

YET ON THE WHOLE, that first night in Bastogne, the 

situation was good, and it was largely the intuition and 

hunch and driving energy of the leaders that had made it so. 

The day of the 19th had proved that in the few minutes allowed 

him the night before, General McAuliffe had sized up the position properly.l He had been tossed into a battle in which nearly 

all the major facts about the movement of forces were either unknown or obscure. He had rejected Corps' idea that the lOlst Airborne Division be assembled to the southwest of Bastogne.2 It was 

a point that didn't give particular concern to General Middleton 

so long as General McAuliffe got his troops in where they were 

best placed to defend the town. However, VIII Corps Headquarters' reasoning was based on the long-range thought that after 

the enemy found he could not get through Bastogne, his next 

important move would be to the southwest. In his hasty reconnaissance out to the westward with Colonel Kinnard, his G-3, 

late in the day on the 18th, General McAuliffe had selected the 

ground for his camp from the short-range point of view. He 

wanted an assembly area which would place him at maximum 

advantage with respect to his own immediate deployments and 

the movements of the enemy in the immediate future.s Though 

he had no way of knowing it at the time, his center of equilibrium was on the ground farthest removed from the early dangers of the encirclement although his two eastward-facing regiments were pointed directly toward the avenues along which the 

Germans would make their first approaches. The first day's results proved that the angels had been with him as he made his 

first decisions. 

In the opening arrangements one decision was taken which 

worked out adversely. Lieutenant Colonel David Gold, the surgeon of the WIst Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Carl W. 

Kohls, the Division supply officer, had picked out a conveniently 

located crossroads to the westward of the Division assembly area 

[67 ] 
68 BASTOGNE 

and decided thatthis must be the rear, if there were such a thing.' 

The Division hospital was set up on the crossroads. Near midnight of December 19 the 327th Glider Infantry was told to send 

a motorized patrol to crossroads X-the site of this evacuation 

center. 5 The patrol was to investigate and clear up reports of 

machine-gun fire in that vicinity. They encountered no fire but 

the hospital was gone-Colonel Gold and all his officers and the 

men of the clearing company had been captured by the enemy. 

The 327th patrol decided that there must have been a fight, for 

dead Germans dressed in civilian clothes were found strewn over 

the ground, though there were no bodies of American soldiers.8 

The bulk of the Division medical supplies had been captured 

or destroyed.7 

Division then called on VIII Corps for medical help, and all 

10 1st Division units were notified that casualties would be evacuated to the aid station of the 50lst Parachute Infantry in Bastogne itself. One platoon of the 429th Medical Collecting Company, then located at Jodenville (about one mile west of Sibret), 

was made available to the 101st.8 Until the night of December 

21 the platoon used its five ambulances and two weapons carriers 

to carry some of the wounded back to the 635th Medical Clearing Company. Then the Germans cut across the road and contact was lost with the clearing unit. An abandoned medical supply dump and the chance discovery of another depot in Bastogne 

containing blankets, litters, splint baskets and other hospital items 

helped the situation. Yet there continued to be a critical shortage 

(plates 23, 24) of bed clothing, litters, penicillin, surgical instruments and surgeons.9 

The losses of the first day of battle had not, however, put any 

unusual stress on the medical facilities.10 But later in the fight 

when Bastogne became encircled, many of the wounded would 

have to lie on concrete floors with little or no cover. The blankets 

of the dead were collected so that there would be a chance for 

the living, and the shattered homes of Bastogne were searched 

for any kind of quilting.ll 

Colonel W. L. Roberts, commanding Combat Command B, 

10th Armored Division, had been at Chdteau-Thierry in 1918 
DOUBTS AND DECISIONS 69 

and he well remembered the things that happen during the rout 

of an army.12 In his first conversation with General Middleton 

in which the VIII Corps commander had outlined the missions 

that sent the three combat teams of Combat Command B to Wardin, Longvilly and Noville on the night of December 18, Colonel 

Roberts had foreseen one of the main problems. 

General Middleton said to him, "The 28th Infantry Division 

and the 9th Armored are ahead of us. They are badly cut up. 

The situation is fluid." 

Colonel Roberts replied, "Sir, there will be stragglers. I want 

authority to use these men."18 

Middleton agreed orally and later confirmed it with a written 

message: "Major General Middleton directs that you have authority to take over all or any part of Reserve Command, 9th 

Armored Division, in case they show the slightest inclination to 

retire. Anything you do to prevent falling back in that area will 

be given fullest backing."14 

Colonel Roberts set his net to catch those drifting back. His 

Headquarters Company was instructed to keep hot food ready 

all day at a central point in Bastogne. A detail stood by to get 

these men from other units into billets around the town square. 

MPs were stationed at the road crossings in the south of Bastogne with instructions to stop every soldier who was trying to 

get away from the battle and tum him back to the Combat Command B area. About 250 stragglers were thus reorganized in Bastogne on December 19. Some were men from the 9th Armored; 

most were from the 28th Division. In this way Team Snafu was 

born, and within the next week it came to include 600 men, led 

by casual officers; but this outfit was severely handicapped by the 

fact that they were short of equipment and transportation as 

long as the siege lasted.1s Team Snafu was mainly a reservoir 

for the defending force. The stragglers went into it; the regular 

units drew from it as they had need. 

Any organized units heading south were also commandeered. 

At 1400 on December 19 the 73d Armored Field Artillery Battalion of Combat Command Reserve, 9th Armored, moved 

through Bastogne. Colonel Roberts watched it go by before sud-
70 BASTOGNE 

denly realizing that it was his for the taking.16 He sent a .staff 

officer to bring the battalion back and within a few minutes the 

battalion commander reported at his command post. Roberts 

told him to put the battalion in position with the 420th Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion. The commander returned to his battalion but found that there was insufficient fuel for his vehicles 

and could not make the return trip.17 The 58th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion was stopped and put into position with the 

420th,' where its twelve guns fired during the next day. Just before the Germans closed the roads to the southward, this unit 

heard that it had been cut off from Bastogne so it moved to the 

west.18 The 771st Field Artillery Battalion-a Negro unit-was 

commandeered on December 21 and their 155mm.howitzers 

gave body to the artillery throughout the siege.19 Colonel Roberts 

also found in Bastogne eight new undelivered tanks, complete 

with their Ordnance crews, and he inducted them forthwith into 

his organization.2o 

Colonel Roberts had worried a lot about the security of the 

town itself for he had only part of his Engineer battalion and 

the Antiaircraft Artillery battalion as reserve.21 General McAuliffe wanted to keep his own reserve as mobile as possible and 

couldn't see assigning one of his battalions to garrison the town. 211 

A task force from Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, 

entered Bastogne to learn the situation but was ordered by higher 

authority to withdraw to Leglise, six miles southeast of NeufcMteau.2B A request to 10th Armored for the use of the Reserve 

Command was turned down. 24 So finally Colonel Roberts committed Team Snafu, under command of Captain Charles Brown 

of llOth Infantry, to the close-in defense of Bastogne.2G Team 

Snafu's complexion was somewhat changed on the following 

morning, December 20, when Brigadier General George A. Davis 

of the 28th Division arrived in Bastogne with a request that Combat Command B attack toward Wiltz. It couldn't be done, for 

by that hour all of Colonel Roberts' forces were fully committed. 

Not long after General Davis departed, Combat Command B 

was ordered by Corps to release all 28th Division stragglers ·to 

their own command.28 
DOUBTS AND DECISIONS 71 

Throughout the first day of battle there had been losses and 

a few minor gains in the WIst Division's already strained supply 

situation. In the 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion, lieutenant Colonel Nelson, worried because his ammunition supply 

was rapidly reaching the vanishing point, dispatched searching 

convoys toward what he thought was the Division rear. They 

moved westward and had been gone about six hours before 

Colonel Nelson grew aware that he had actually sent his trucks 

into enemy ground and that they were cut off .. A second convoy 

of five trucks and trailers was sent toward NeufchAteau under 

Staff Sergeant Vincent Morgan, a supply sergeant. Sergeant 

Morgan was told that if he could not get M3 ammunition (standard for the 105mm. M3, a gun especially adapted for glider use) 

he was to bring back same M2 ammunition which the manual 

said could be used in an emergency.21 The fortitude with which 

this young noncom carried out his assignment was one of the 

finest things of the siege. He returned late that night through 

heavy shelling and small-arms fire about one hour before the 

Germans cut the road of his inbound journey. He had first gone 

to Neufch~teau and on being disappointed there he had driven 

far to the northwestward, covering in all about 75 miles. On his 

trucks were 1,500 rounds of M2. It was the only resupply of 

ammunition received by the 101 st Airborne Division before the 

air resupply came in.28 

That partly compensated for a stroke of bad luck. The two 

convoys of the Division Quartermaster and Ordnance companies 

reached the Division rear area late at night and were told to 

remain at a crossroads in the woods (P448630). Lacking time 

in which to reconnoiter the area, the two companies left all trucks 

parked on highway N4 facing west. 2S Shortly after midnight on 

December 20, Division headquarters was notified that the service 

area was receiving machine-gun fire, and a few minutes later 

came the messag~ "Evidence indicates service troops have disappeared."80 

That alarm was enough; within five minutes a message was 

on its way to Corps headquarters asking for Quartermaster and 

Ordnance help.81 
72 BASTOGNE 

Mter being Bushed by the fire the two companies had headed 

west and then south. Most of the trucks got through to the Corps 

rear and on the next day Captain John L. Patterson of one of 

the units, the 80lst Ordnance Maintenance Company, taking a 

different route, got into Bastogne with two trucks bringing 500 

gallons of gasoline. He then turned south again to bring the rest 

of the convoy forward. But by that time the Germans had already 

closed the road.82 Such was the shortage of gasoline in Bastogne 

through most of the siege that vehicles were fueled only just 

before they went out on a run so that there would be no loss of 

gasoline if any standing vehicle was hit.88 
CHAPTER 10 

THE REPULSE 

I T WAS A NIGHT FOR DRIFTERS, the night of December 19-20. As the darkness grew, more men from the elements which had been shattered to the east of Bastogne came 

moving back through the regimental lines of the lOlst. Few of 

them stayed. Colonel Ewell and his officers talked to these men. 

They could tell very little of what had happened to them. Many 

of them were inarticulate. Infantrymen from units of the 28th 

Division still trickled into the area in groups of three or four. 

They made no attempt to organize themselves and they did not 

for the most part wish to be organized by anyone else. Some of 

these straggling infantrymen would ask Ewell's men, 'What are 

you doing?" Upon being told, 'We are fighting Germans," they 

would look at the paratroopers as if they were stark mad. 

But not all were like that. Some who seemed utterly wretched 

and spent when they came to within the lines, upon being 

handed a K ration, would eat it and look around and ask where 

they could get a rifle. They were ready to fight again. But to 

others food and companionship made no difference. They had 

been shocked so badly that they wanted only to keep on drifting. 

They were allowed to do so. This disorder had no ill effect on 

the combat force. The demoralization did not seem to bother 

the nerves of the men who were still fighting and they accepted 

it as the natural product of battle it often is.1 

A battalion of Field Artillery, the lO9th of the 28th Division, 

came through as a unit and attached itself to the 907th Glider 

Field Artillery Battalion. Those groups from the 9th Armored 

Division which had been compelled to withdraw from the advanced ground along the Longvilly road were in good order and 

high spirits when they reached the lines around Bastogne. One 

platoon of armored infantry attached itself to Major Homan's 

battalion (2d Battalion, 50lst Parachute Infantry) and helped 

them carry the fight during the next several days.2 Seven tanks 

arrived from the 9th Armored Division and constituted them-

[73 ] 
74 BASTOGNE 

selves a small task force operating in support of the battalion. 

At 0200 the 2d Platoon of Company B, 705th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion arrived with four tank destroyers and took position on 

the south edge of Bizory.8 

These reinforcements got there in the nick of time. At 0530, 

December 20, while the 50lst Parachute Infantry was patrolling 

toward its front, the 2d Battalion got an attack over the same big 

hill to the east of Bizory where they had been stopped by the 

German reconnaissance force the day before. At a range of 3,000 

yards, the tank destroyer men saw six enemy tanks rolling toward 

them from the southeast. Sergeant Floyd A. Johnson led his 

section to the hill north of Bizory and put the two tank destroyers 

on either side of the road. First Lieutenant Frederic Mallon led 

the second section to the higher ground southeast of town and 

waited for the German tanks in an open field.' 

The firing opened at 0730, the tank destroyers withholding 

their fire from the enemy infantry so as not to compromise an 

engagement with the enemy armor, which by this time comprised 

one Mark IV, one Mark V and two 75mm. self-propelled guns. 5 

These were following the infantry line by 400 yards-it was a full 

battalion of infantry, the 2d of the 76th RegimeI\t, 26th Volksgrenadier Division.6 In the first long-range exchange of fire, one 

tank destroyer was disabled and its loader killed by a direct hit on 

the turret; it limped away to the rear. The second tank destroyer 

in this section, after knocking out the Mark IV tanks, pulled back 

into Bizory where, in taking up another position, it damaged the 

tube. of its gun by running against a building and became incapacitated. The other tank destroyer section opened fire at 600 

yards on the Mark IV tank and one self-propelled gun, destroying 

both.' 

This was the crux of the engagement: most of the in-fighting 

of that morning of December 20 was done by the heavy guns. 8 

Major Homan's machine guns had opened up on the German 

infantry while the tanks were coming on and by so doing had 

kept them at a distance. Within a few minutes of this first body 

check to the German battalion, all the artillery that General McAuliffe could tum eastward from Bastogne blasted them (Plate 
THE REPULSE 75 

Situation 20 De C»II'IIIIIIION\NNIGI~nIOIIlIIACIM' GUO. .. IIIMJI,Ymlalll IIIIDC DIll allTltaQ. 

~2PZ(-) 

S<tALE IN YAROS 

Map 10 

25). Homan's infantry along the ridge was too far distant to do 

much bullet damage to the advancing German formations but 

his men had a clear view of the German ranks coming on slowly, 

of the automatic fire making them hesitate, of the shells falling 

among them, of the attack gradually spending itself and of the 

enemy that was left then breaking away to the northward to 

escape the fire. 9 

Colonel Ewell's own infantry losses were almost nothing, but 

two tank destroyers were out of action for the time being and the 

defense had also lost two tanks. So ended the first, though not 

the most ruinous, of the piecemeal efforts which on this day 

presaged the failure of the German battle. This particular fighting had lasted about two hours, the artillery barrage perhaps 
76 BASTOGNE 

twenty minutes.1o Prisoners-of-war letters captured from the 

76th Regiment said that their losses had been terrible.t1 

There followed a day-long wait along Colonel Ewell's 501st 

Parachute Infantry front. About 1900 the Germans put a heavy 

shelling from tanks and self-propelling guns on sensitive points 

over the ground held by the 50Ist-Bizory, Mont and the road 

junctions. The bombardment severed all the telephone wires 

connecting the battalions with the rear.12 

As the German artillery slacked off, the 1st Battalion of the 

50lst radioed to Ewell that the enemy was charging straight 

down the road from Neffe (Map 10, page 75). Major Raymond 

V. Bottomly's 1st Battalion could hear the tanks coming on but it 

was so dark that they could tell little else.18 All the guns from 

the eleven artillery battalions in Bastogne dropped a dam of fire 

across the road one or two hundred yards west of Neffe-the 

heaviest and most effective American defensive fire during the 

siege. Three German tanks, two of them Panthers and one a 

Tiger Royal, were hit and destroyed just as they drew past the 

last houses in the village.14 Some German infantry, which had 

moved down the Bastogne road before the barrage dropped, met 

their fate from machine guns Company B had posted in a house 

by the side of the road. That company took the shock without 

having to yield one yard of ground. Their strongpoint controlled 

the terrain so well that not one German drew near enough to 

close on the infantry line.15 They were killed to the last man, 

and for weeks later, their grotesque forms along the roadside, 

heaped over by the Ardennes snows, showed where the German 

death march ended. The most forward of these bodies was 300 

yards ahead of the shattered tanks.16 

The German thrust from Neffe coincided with an assault on 

the 3d Battalion's position at Mont, though here the battle took 

a quite different form because of Major Templeton's tank destroyers.l1 The 1st Platoon of Company B, 705th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion, under command of First Lieutenant Robert Andrews, 

had arrived to reinforce Colonel Griswold's 3d Battalion position 

on the evening of December 19. One tank destroyer was posted 

at the bend in the road. From here it could cover both the dirt 
THE REPULSE 77 

road winding across the valley from Neffe and a draw leading off 

to the southward. A second tank destroyer took position by the 

last house, which put it somewhat behind, but in line with, the 

tan~ destroyer blocking the Neffe road. The other section was 

placed on the north side of Mont to check any tank advance from 

directly across the valley. The tank destroyers held these positions until the hour came when they were most needed, on the 

night of December 20.18 

Between 1900 and 1930 on th~t night the enemy struck 

through the fields lying between Neffe and Mont, advancing 

against Colonel Griswold's left. But the presence of the tank 

destroyers had intimidated the German armor. It took refuge in 

the little wood lying just west of the Neffe cMteau and from the 

grove it shelled Mont. The German infantry advanced under 

this fire. 19 Enemy self-propelled guns moved along the railway 

line from Neffe a short distance (the rails here ran through a 

cut) and went to work on the same target. 20 These two lines of 

fire converged on Griswold's positions at almost a right angle; 

the men in the forward line had to give ground, falling back on 

the village. 21 The most forward of the tank destroyers, commanded by Sergeant George N. Schmidt, became their rallying 

point. Schmidt unloaded most of his crew and told them to join 

the fight with small arms. He then joined the infantry machine 

gunners who were already searching the down slopes with every 

automatic gun the Battalion could bring to bear; in the n~t few 

minutes he threw 2,000 rounds of caliber .50 at the enemy. Lieutenant Andrews used a radio-equipped jeep as his command post 

and central control station, and used his security section as ammunition carriers to feed the stuff up to whichever tank destroyer 

was calling for it most urgently. The other three tank destroyers, 

under Sergeant Darrell J. Lindley, were shooting at the railway 

line. They tried at first to spot the self-propelled guns by firing 

at muzzle blasts; when that failed, they put Hares up over the 

valley.22 

The fighting died about 2300. 28 By that time, the three selfpropelled guns were out, and lines of German dead littered the 

hillside. 24 Because of the dark the defenders of Mont had no 
78 BASTOGNE 

clear idea of why their automatic fire had made such a clean reaping of the German attack or of where the attack had broken. But 

in the light of the next morning, December 21, they could see 

what had happened. The hillside between Neffe and Mont 

(Plate 26) is crossed in both directions by barbed-wire fences 

spaced between thirty and fifty yards apart, with five or six 

strands in each fence. In ordinary times they were used, apparently, as feeder pens for cattle. With the tank fire behind 

them the Germans tried to come right through this fenced area 

without first destroying the fences in any way or equipping infantry to cut them. On coming to the fences they tried to climb 

through but the spaces were small and their individual equipment was bulky. Griswold's men had perfectly clear fields of 

fire and so did the tank destroyer supporting them. The fences 

were as effective as any entanglement. The evenly spaced lines 

of dead told the story. They had charged right into a giant 

mantrap. 211 

Colonel Ewell had the impression that night that the 901st 

Pallzer Regiment had about expended itself and that it could no 

longer muster enough men to be an effective offensive force. 

They had been somewhat roughly handled before they got to 

Neffe and his own men furthered the good work.26 

So on December 19 the Germans, having gained contact with 

the 501st Parachute Infantry on a wide front, at first drew back 

to defensive positions. On December 20 the enemy made three 

attacks and the infantry, armor and tank destroyers in Colonel 

Ewell's sector beat them all down.27 One of these fights was tactically less spectacular but strategically more useful than the 

others. 

During the period of the fighting at Noville and NefFe there 

had been an action between the flanks of the 50 Ist and 506th 

Parachute Infantry regiments which, although just a minor affair 

in itself, was to have an important effect on the general situation. 

When the two regiments moved out to their positions on December 19, one going east and the other going north, they could not 

initially form a common front. In theory they were joined somewhere along the railroad track below Lahez (l ~ miles south of 
THE REPULSE 79 

Foy) but in fact there was a considerable gap between their 

closest elements. Each became so closely engaged in its local 

situation that the matter of contact was neglected. Colonel Sink 

was alarmed about the peril to his right flank from the beginning, 

but it was not until late on the night of December 19 that Colonel Ewell fully shared his apprehension. 

Company A of the 501st was'in reserve in a small wood just 

, north of the quarry on the Neffe road, which made it the most 

rearward element in the 501s1's general position. Several hundred yards to its rear were the guns of the 907th Glider Field 

Artillery Battalion's forward battery. 

At 2300, December 19, a German patrol of thirty men came in 

between the company and the battery, moving from out of the 

northeast. A man on outpost duty for Company A saw the patrol 

and alerted the company. The patrol was permitted to come on. 

As it drew near the wood where the company had bivouacked, 

both the artillery and the infantry opened fire. The enemy dispersed into a nearby wood, though one member of the patrol was 

taken prisoner. Upon being interrogated he said that the patrol 

had come forward through the gap between the two infantry 

regiments and that its mission had been to get in 'behind and cut 

the Bastogne road. ,The incident gave the artillery grave fears 

about the security of their base and it also called Colonel Ewell's 

attention to the most vulnerable sector of his front . 

. Sometime on the morning of December 20, after the Germans 

had attacked at Bizory and then Sideslipped northward, Company A of the 501st was attached to the 2d Battalion with the 

·mission of occupying the woods south of the railroad and making 

contact with the 506th Parachute Infantry. However, it did not 

proceed immediately on this assignment and during most of that 

day the effort to join with the 506th was limited to patrol actions 

. out of Company D, 501st, which was in reserve in the 2d Battalion. Four times during the day patrols from Company D tried to 

move north along the general line of the road running to Foy. 

But they were always turned back from the vicinity of Halt, 

where the enemy had taken up fire positions. 

At the same time Company D, 506th Parachute Infantry, was 
80 BASTOGNE 

pushing rightward toward the railroad station at Halt against 

stubborn resistance. When evening of the 20th came the company had reached the Foy-Bizory road. It stayed there with its 

right Bank some hundreds of yards distant from the railroad station at Halt, which was held by an enemy force. There had been 

no contact with the 501st. Colonel Sink (Plate 3), commander 

of the 506th, called both Headquarters, 501st Parachute Infantry, and Headquarters, 101st Division, and urged that the 501st 

swing leftward to meet him. He said that his force was standing 

on the railroad line which was supposed to be the regimental 

boundary-but this overstated the case. 

The first three patrols which had gone out from Company D 

of the 50lst to search for the 506th's Bank had been turned back 

by fire from the Bois Jacques. They got no idea of the enemy 

strength in the forest area for they were beaten back by a scattering small-arms fire at long range whenever they moved to right 

of the Foy-Bizory road in an attempt to gain the railroad. 

Corporal Frank Lasik of Company D, 501st, led out his fourth 

patrol of the day just as the evening twilight of the 20th came on. 

There were eight men with him, and instead of beating over the 

same ground as the earlier patrols they swung around to the 

westward of the Bizory-Foy road. When within a short distance 

of the railroad Lasik dropped six of his men and continued on 

with two others. They reached the rail line and moved east along 

it to within a hundred yards of the Halt station. At that point 

they saw a force of seven German tanks supported by a body of 

infantry moving straight toward them down the railroad track, 

and only 75 yards away. Private Manzi fired one shot toward the 

enemy force and then the three men withdrew as rapidly as they 

could. Lasik knew that Company A had been given an assignment and was supposed to be moving toward the same ground 

which the Germans were approaching. He rushed to the Battalion command post and told them to get word to Company A, 

501st, that tanks were coming down the railway track. 

Company A had moved out about 1600 on December 20 and 

was already engaged in clearing the woods that lay south of the 

railroad and west of the Foy-Bizory road. They found no enemy 
THE REPULSE 81 

in the first wood and so they continued on to the next plantation 

lying south of the tracks and between them and the station at 

Halt. In the middle of this journey they met a patrol from the 

506th Parachute Infantry. Until that meeting they had believed 

that the 506th was already on the railroad track. But from the 

patrol they learned that the actual flank of the 506th was about 

600 yards north of the railroad track and that Company D, 506th, 

had been having a running fight with small groups of the enemy 

for control of the station at Halt. 

From the second woods, Sergeant Lyle B. Chamberlain of 

Company A, 501st, was sent with a four-man patrol eastward 

along the tracks to search for the enemy. This was at just about 

the time that Lasik was getting back to warn the battalion. Sergeant Chamberlain's patrol moved through the swampy ground 

that lay to the left of the tracks and had gone but a short distance 

when they sighted a German patrol coming toward them. It 

looked to Chamberlain like the point of a company. Darkness 

was already closing around them and the German group did not 

see Sergeant Chamberlain's patrol. The patrol fell back on the 

company and reported what they had seen. Hastily, the 3d Platoon of Company A was deployed along the edge of the woods 

north of the railroad track to lay an ambush, for the enemy group 

which Sergeant Chamberlain had sighted was all northward of 

the track. While the platoon was deploying thick fog closed in 

around the woods and this coupled with the darkness reduced 

visibility to almost nothing. The Germans were allowed to approach within 10 to 15 yards before Company A opened fire. 

The surprise volley wholly disorganized the leading German 

platoon and the men who were not cut down ran to the rear to 

the swampy ground. 

The whole Company A front had by this time become engaged. The enemy had been advancing with two companies 

abreast astride the railway track. On Company A's right, the 

lst and 2d Platoons did not get the same chance to close with 

the enemy at short range, and after the dispersion of the German 

right, mortar, grenade and automatic fire from the German force 

south of the tracks beat heavily against the two platoons. Because 
82 BASTOGNE 

of the darkness and the fog the men of the company could get 

no idea what losses they were taking themselves and could only 

judge the progress of the action by the build-up of the enemy 

fire. They saw little or nothing of the Germans they were engaging. The skirmish went on with both forces firing toward 

the Bashes and sounds in the position of the opposite force. Company A lost fifteen men in the night engagements, three of whom 

were killed in action. But in the black darkness the men of the 

Company thought at the time that they were taking much heavier 

losses. The fog made more vivid their impressions of the opposing 

fire while keeping them from feeling their own strength. The 

murk was so thick by this time that it was only by the sounds of 

fire that a man could tell where his nearest comrade was fighting. 

While the fire fight on the south of the tracks continued, the 

Germans who had fallen back toward the swampy ground on the 

north of the track gradually collected themselves again. For half 

an hour or more there was a lull in the action on this side except 

that both forces tried to carry on at long range with hand grenades. Then the 3d Platoon of Company A heard the enemy 

moving out through the woods around their left Bank. 

Apprehensive that they would be outflanked if they maintained themselves in the forward ground, the 3d Platoon pulled 

back its own left Bank to the westward so as to cQver the rear of 

the company position. This change in the form of the enemy attack was also indicated on the right Bank. Private First Class 

William C. Michel, a German-speaking soldier who was with 

the company executive officer, Lieutenant Joseph B. Schweiker, 

could hear the enemy shouting commands and telling his men 

to move out around the left and right of the American force. The 

order may have been a ruse intended to cover a withdrawal, but 

as the fire fight began to build up again it seemed to Lieutenant 

Schweiker that the enemy was actively pushing out around the 

Banks of Company A and threatening his rear. 

At about 2230, December 20, Lieutenant Schweiker ordered 

the company to fall back to the line of the second woods. 

Lieutenant James C. Murphy called all of the squad leaders 

together and told them that the signal for withdrawal would be a 
THE REPULSE 83 

long burst of machine-gun fire and that all of the other machine 

guns were to be kept quiet until this signal came. The withdrawal was made in reasonably good order, the circumstances 

considered. 

When Company A took up its position in the second wood it 

was deployed to right of the railway line. The company was not 

pressed there at any time during the night. Apparently the Germans had ordered a withdrawal at about the same time. After 

staying in the woods for somewhat more than an hour the company withdrew a little to the southward and bivouacked in a 

third plantation. 

The advance of the enemy down the railroad track had put 

them on the rear of Company D, 506th Parachute Infantry, but 

it was not until 0400 that Company D, which was somewhat 

engaged by small groups hitting directly at its front, discovered 

that its flank had been turned. Lieutenant Colonel Strayer reported to Colonel Sink that he believed an enemy force of about 

two platoons had penetrated between his battalion of the 506th 

and the 50lst. But he did not know that Company D, 501st, 

was meeting this force frontally. Colonel Sink ordered Company 

D, 506th, to face some of its men toward the rear and hold their 

present ground. This, they did. The 1st Battalion, 506th, then 

in reserve at Luzery, was ordered to send Companies A and C 

forward to help contain the penetrating force. Both of these companies were badly depleted from their fight in Noville. 

When morning of December 21 came the situation was about 

as follows: Company A, 50lst, which had not been further disturbed during its bivouac, moved back up without opposition to 

exactly the same positions it had occupied during the night engagement. Company D, 501st, which had bivouacked just to 

the south of Company A's bivouac area under the mistaken impression that it had moved into the woods lying south of the 

railroad tracks, discovered its error when the light came. It immediately moved farther north, with one platoon going directly 

toward the objective woods and the others detouring east to clean 

out another small wood which they thought might contain enemy 

forces. 
84 BASTOGNE 

Through the accident of these shifts, the 501st Parachute Infantry thus had forces advancing from west, southwest and south 

as if to bring about a general envelopment of the German force at 

the Halt station. Coinciding with these movements from the 

south and west the two reserve companies CA and C) of the 

506th reached the area to the northward at about 0815 and were 

committed in companies abreast to beat through the forests lying 

south and west of Company D's position. The morning of the 

21st was heavy with fog; none of these approaching forces moving in on them from northeast, north, west, southwest and south 

was visible to the Germans dug in around the Halt station and 

in some of the plantations to westward of it. They were so 

completely misled as to their own position that when the platoons that had marched east for Company D, 501st, started their 

sweep north toward the Halt station, se'\teral of the enemy 

glimpsed them through the fog and came walking up to meet 

them, t~inking they were friendly troops. 

The line of the 506th came slowly but methodically on toward 

the railway tracks. Some of the Germans stayed to fight. Others 

gave up. Still others, in trying to get away were forced back into 

the killing ground established by the semicircular advance of the 

different forces of the 501st. By about 1100, December 21, the 

envelopment was complete and Companies A and C of the 506th 

had made full contact with units of the 501st along the railway 

line. The two companies were then ordered to return to Luzery, 

leaving Company D to solidify the front. 

But in moving south and westward through the forest Companies A and C, 506th, discovered that the job was by no means 

completed. The morning advance had forced many of the enemy 

into the woods to the westward beyond the lines of Company A, 

501st Parachute Infantry. The rat hunting continued throughout the day and it was almost dark before the 506th was convinced that the mop-up operation was complete. By that time it 

was realized that the original estimate of two platoons of enemy 

-these were troops of the 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment of the 

26th Volksgrenadier Division-had far undershot the mark. The 

German force was more nearly the size of a battalion. About 100 
THE REPULSE 85 

of the enemy were captured and 55 killed by the units of the 

506th Parachute Infantry in an operation that cost them only 

five or six casualties. About 80 Germans were driven into 501st's 

sector, where they were either killed or captured. Later, when the 

whole battle could be reviewed clearly, the senior commanders of 

lOIst reckoned that the enemy missed his finest opportunity on 

this ground and during these hours. A strongly weighted attack 

straight down the railroad track could have carried through to 

Bastogne and turned the flanks of 50lst and 506th Regiments. 28 

With the end of this engagement on December 21, the sectors 

of both the 50Ist and 506th became relatively quiet until after 

January 1. But there were other important consequences. Firm 

contact had been established between the two regiments, and it 

was never broken or weakened after that time. The Germans 

were served notice that the road to Bastogne from the east and 

north was not open. 

Out of these things also developed a new feeling of 'confidence 

among the artillery in the Bastogne area. They were now fully 

covered on the north and east by a reasonably strong shield and 

they could more easily direct their attention to the other parts 

of the defensive circle, wherever the danger mounted. 

From December 21 on, the Germans gave over their attack 

against the 50Ist Parachute Infantry's part of the Bastogne 

front. The road to Bastogne did not lie through Colonel Ewell 

and his 50lst. 
CHAPTER 11 

RUNNING BATTLE 

I N NOVILL~ ther were running short of armor-piercing shell 

as the mormng of December 20 dawned.1 In Bastogne, General McAuliffe was wondering whether Noville was worth what 

he might have to pay to hold it, and was about to reach a decision.2 Deprived of any support from the commanding ridges, 

Noville is not a military position but just another village on low 

ground, and a perfect sinkhole for fog. The issue was already 

hanging in. the balance because of the ammunition situation and 

the miscarriage of the American attack on Decem~r 19; only a 

little more pressure would tip it. S 

On left Bank of the S06th Parachute Infantry, the S02d had 

passed a quiet night. In midaftemoon of December 19 the S02d 

had moved to Longchamps and established a perimeter defense 

there. Its 3d Battalion deployed on a high hill to south of the 

village. Its 1st Battalion was in the Bois de Niblamont which 

was southward of the hill. Initially, the 1st Battalion had held 

half of the front, but at 2400 of the 19th General McAuliffe told 

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Chappuis, commander of the S02d 

Parachute Infantry, that inasmuch as his regiment was the Division reserve he could leave one battalion on the northward-facing 

line. The 2d Battalion drew the assignment. It made no difference in any case, for though the battalion was stretched seven 

thousand yards, there was no action anywhere along its front that 

night.4 

But to the eastward where S06th stood guard, the boys who 

had prayed for morning soon wondered why.5 At 0730 two 

enemy tanks came hell-roaring through the field along the Houffalize road, swung in beside the first building of Noville, wheeled 

so as to protect each other and then stopped. On their way in 

they had knocked out a jeep with one shell, and had sprayed forward with their machine guns as they rushed. Unseeing, they 

came to a halt within ten yards of a bazooka team and the first 

rocket fired set one of the tanks on fire. Staff Sergeant Michael 

[86 ] 
RUNNING BAITLE 87 

Lesniak, a tank commander, had heard the German armor roaring along. He dismounted from his tank, walked up the main 

street for a look, then went back and swung his gun in the right 

direction and moved to the center of the street. He fired before 

the enemy realized that he had gone into action and his first 

round finished the German tank. A third German tank that 

stayed just north along the road but out of sight in the fog threw 

a few loose shells into the town and one of them hit Sergeant 

Lesniak's tank, damaging the turret.8 

That was the beginning. Almost nothing that followed could 

be seen as clearly. During the next two hours the defensive 

perimeter was under constant attack from the German armor 

and infantry. But the enemy pressure developed quite unevenly 

as if their forces, too, were groping or were keeping active simply 

to conceal some larger design. It was battle with the bewildering 

shifts of a montage; there were momentary exposures and quick 

shiftings of scene. The enemy came on in groups of a few ta':lks 

supported by small parties of infantry and were held off by the 

armored infantry and paratroopers with their own weapons just 

long enough to let a friendly tank or tank destroyer get into firing 

position. Fog mixed with smoke from the burning buildings 

again mantled the country between the village and the ridges, 

diffusing the efforts of both forces. It was all but impossible for 

anyone to get any impression of how the tide was moving; the 

combatants could tell only what went on right before their eyes.T 

Curiously enough the tank destroyer men of 2.d Platoon, Company C, 705th TD Battalion, who had taken position in the south 

of Noville, had the impression that in these early morning hours 

the infantry was standing off a full-fledged attack.s They could see 

only a hundred yards beyond their own guns and they could hear 

large numbers of enemy tracked vehicles moving toward them 

through the fog. Their .imaginings were further stimulated by a 

direct hit on one tank destroyer at the outset which killed the 

gunner, Corporal Stephen Cook, and wounded several of the 

crew.' For two hours they fired in the general direction of where 

they thought the German armor was massing; they could see no 

targets but they thought their unobserved fire might have some 
88 BASTOGNE 

deterring effect.10 At 1000, December 20, the fog quite sudd~nly 

lifted and the sky became almost clear.ll In the field within 

view of the tank destroyer force were 15 German tanks; they were 

proceeding toward their own lines at about 1,000 yards range. 

Four of the tanks were hit and disabled and the tank destroyer 

men were confident that their own shells did it. They had seen 

their shots hit home and watched Private Steve E. Reed empty 

seven boxes of caliber .50 ammunition into the German crews as 

they tried to Hee across the fields. 12 

Just before the fog had cleared a Tiger tank had charged right 

into the heart of Noville. Visibility among the buildings was just 

about zero. The tank stopped in front of the command post 

of Company B, 20th Armored Infantry Battalion. The tankeI 

swung his gun uncertainly toward the door. Captain Omar Billett said a quick prayer.1S A joker beside him remarked, "Don't 

look now, but there is an 88 pointing at yoU."14 

Sergeant Lesniak's tank was within twenty yards but the German had failed to see him in the fog; by rotating his damaged 

turret just a short space to the right Lesniak had his gun dead on 

the Tiger. At twenty yards he fired three rounds of 75mm. at 

the German tank without doing any apparent damage. The German quickly put his tank into reverse. But the left track ran up 

and over a jeep. The jeep was completely crushed but at the 

same time it fouled the track and beached the tank. The German kept on pushing back-the jeep under him. He next collided with a half-track and the tank tipped dangerously over on 

its right side.15 That was enough for the German crew. They 

jumped from the tank and ran out of the town, going through the 

American lines without getting a shot fired at them, such was the 

thickness of the fog. 

The radio inside the Tiger was on a busy channel, and talk 

Howed on inside the dead tank. It looked like a wide-open opportunity, but before the command post could round up anyone who 

could understand German, the channel went out.18 The tankers 

destroyed this Tiger with thermite and later on they caught hell 

from Colonel Roberts for not bringing the tank back to Bastogne.l1 But they had a good excuse. The losses among the tank 
RUNNING BAITLE 89 

drivers were already such that they did not have enough men to 

maneuver their own armor. Two tanks were without drivers and 

partly without crews. So the tankers asked the paratroopers if 

there were any men among them who could handle tanks and 

two of Major Harwick's men of the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, climbed aboard and started out with the Shermans. Later on both men were killed in their tanks during the 

withdrawal.18 

They knew now that they would not be able to hold Noville 

much longer. The clearing of the fog revealed to Major Hustead 

(now commanding the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion) and 

his staff a situation they had already suspected. During the 

night of the 19th the men on the outposts had heard enemy armor 

moving across their rear, particularly to the southwestward.19 In 

the morning, patrols had gone out, and although they couldn't 

tell much because of the enveloping fog, they found enough to 

confirm the fact that enemy forces were between them and Bastogne. Hustead had lost radio contact with Combat Command B 

Headquarters during the night. 20 So in the morning he sent 

First Lieutenant Herman C. Jacobs to Foy; he was to get to Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, in Foy and use 

their radio to inform Combat Command B of the situation and 

request that the Noville garrison either be withdrawn or reinforced. He carried out the mission in a half-track and several 

times on the way to Foy he blundered into enemy parties and 

had to shoot his way through. But at Foy he found no one; by 

this time 3d Battalion was engaging the enemy to the south of 

the village. Lieutenant Jacobs continued on to Bastogne and 

found Colonel Roberts who sent his only available reserve-an 

antiaircraft platoon-forward. But the platoon was blocked by 

enemy forces before it could get to Foy.21 The Germans were 

corning across the road from both sides. When the fog rolled 

away the men in Noville could look southward and see the 

circling armor. To make their isolation more complete, they had 

lost all contact with the main' body of 506th Parachute Infantry 

and they did not know whether the situation at Foy was developing for or against them.22 
90 BASTOGNE 

The Germans had already made their onfall against Colonel 

Sink's support position. In early morning, December 20, the 3d 

Battalion of the 506th received light shelling and Hat-trajectory 

fire along its lines at Foy. During the night and through the first 

·hours of daylight the enemy had taken advantage of the heavy 

fog and moved in very close to the American outposts, though it 

seems probable that they knew very little about the location of 

the American lines and were only groping.23 

At 0800, December 20, a force of about two companies of in' 

fantry supported by three tanks attacked (Map 11, page 91) 

toward the ground defended by Companies I and H. By 0900, 

they had driven in far enough to put direct fire on the American 

positions with their supporting weapons. 24 The tank destroyers 

of 3d Platoon, Reconnaissance Company of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion were not in position to give the infantry any 

direct fire support during the engagement. They were in the 

woods south of Foy when the attack came on, and in the later 

stages of the action they were established as roadblocks, but during that morning they did not fire on any enemy armor.26 Company G in Recogne was engaged by another company of German 

infantry supported by three tanks. The command post of the 

3d Battalion in Foy came under direct fire from an enemy tank. 

Until 1030 the Battalion held its ground in Foy and then withdrew to the high ground south of the village. Here it reformed 

for the counterattack.28 

It was about mid-morning when WIst Airborne Division 

Headquarters called the 502d Parachute Infantry and directed 

that its 3d Battalion (under Lieutenant Colonel John P. Stopka) 

attack through Recogne and gain contact }Vith the American force 

at Noville, thus reestablishing the left Hank. The battalion 

crossed the line of departure at 1130 and then pushed right on, 

meeting little opposition. 

But when the 3d Battalion, 502d, reached Recogne a change 

in the order came. At somewhere around noon General McAuliffe had decided that Noville wasn't important enough to 

warrant a last-ditch stand on the inferior ground around the village. Colonel Stopka was accordingly instructed to make a lim-
RUNNING BATTLE 91 

ACTION AT FOY . ZO DECEMBER 

O. 5e ~O 

SCALE IN YARDS 

Sc/llull • .... llit ___ lSI 

Map 11 

Line of •• thdt ........... 13ZS 

in. of wlthdr ••• I. p.ratroo,.,...IJI. 

506-Z COMMITTED ON LINE FOY TO AAILAOAD,IIOO 
92 BASTOGNE 

ited attack forward to cover the extrication of Major Harwick's 

men of the 3d Battalion, 506th. That battalion was to fight the 

same kind of action on the other Bank. It was figured that the 

Noville force could sideslip into the area of the 502d once Stopka's 

battalion got up to it. However, his Battalion had fought its way 

only a short distance past Recogne when the plan was again 

changed. 

Colonel Sink, commanding the 506th, had looked the situation 

over and decided that the best way out was for Major Harwick's 

force to retire down the Bastogne toad. Colonel Stopka's battalion remained in position on a line running through Recogne with 

its left Bank extended westward to join the 2d Battalion of the 

502d. Its advance had been made wholly without artillery support because of the dense fog. 21 

Radio communication between Bastogne and Noville was not 

reestablished until 1300.28 The order then came through on the 

artillery radio net to Harwick and Hustead that their command 

would withdraw to the Bastogne perimeter of defense. They were 

told that an attack on Foy was being made immediately to relieve 

the pressure on Noville. When they saw that the attention of 

the enemy was diverted to the Foy attack, they were to make a 

break for the south.29 

A few local problems had to be solved in Noville preceding the 

withdrawal. A considerable amount of ammunition had to be 

destroyed. There were more than fifty wounded men awaiting 

evacuation.so But the shrinkage of manpower in the Noville 

force through battlefield deaths and casualties already evacuated 

had totalled so many men that, despite a steady loss in vehicles, 

there were enough tanks, half-tracks and trucks left to move back 

all the casualties and permit all the armored units and most of 

the paratroopers to ride out of Noville. 

Company C of the 506th was already south of Noville in a 

reserve position, and accordingly, it was nominated as the advance 

guard to move out on foot. 81 Three tanks would support Company C. The half-tracks and jeeps loaded with the wounded 

would come next in the column. Then would follow the main 

body, the personnel carriers and armor. Those of the infantry 
RUNNING BAITLE 93 

who couldn't find a ride would move out in file on both sides of 

the road. Company B of the 506th was to be the rear guard, supported by four tank destroyers. One platoon from that company 

was detailed to destroy everything useful that could not be 

evacuated.82 

At 1315, December 20, Company C took off. At 1325 the first 

vehicles quit Noville.a8 Major Hustead and his engineer officer 

had prepared the ammunition dump for demolition; the dump 

was alongside a building and they were hopeful that the blast 

would lay the building low and block the highway. Hustead 

waited until the last vehicle had passed the ammunition point. 

He then gave the engineer the Signal to set off the delayed charge. 

They heard the explosion as they moved on down the IQlld.84-

The start was good. Until 1300 the air had been crystal clear 

for most of the noon hour. Then, as if Providence again chose 

to intervene in their favor, the fog closed around them and 

screened their departure from the enemy. S5 They knew that they 

could be heard and they wondered whether the Germans would 

try to take them in Bank while they were on the move. S8 But the 

fire which might have been turned against the road was spared 

them and they moved along quite easily, except for an occasional 

flurry of bullets. 

A little protecting belt of armor-one armored MS, followed 

by four half-tracks and five medium tanks-moved in front of the 

vehicles containing the wounded.S? Just beyond the village, one 

ofthe tanks broke down and had to be destroyed with thermite. 

The armored car took off at full speed without waiting for the 

others, and got to Bastogne without receiving any fire. The column continued on toward Foy and the half-tracks had come 

abreast of a farmhouse within 500 yards of the village when 0ccurred one of those chance things which may change the whole 

course of a battle despite their own intrinsic unimportance. 

In the leading half-track the shutter dropped and the driver 

could not see. The driver ra,ised up and moved his arm to adjust 

the shutter and Major James B. Duncan mistook the gesture and 

thought that the man had been wounded and was holding his 

eyes. So Duncan quickly pulled the hand brake. That stopped 
94 BASTOGNE 

the entire column. 89 The first half-track was rammed from behind by the second half-track which had lost its brakes. The third 

half-track pulled up close. At that mome~t bullets and grenades 

bit into the column from both sides of the road. The men could 

not see clearly what they were fighting but they knew that some 

Germans were deployed in the ditches and that they were also 

drawing fire from the house. Major Duncan figured that he had 

to fight it out on that ground. The machine gunners in the halftracks put heavy fire on the ditches; and the dismounted riflemen, 

after flattening themselves, blazed away with their tommy guns. 

In ten minutes the skirmish was over. Some of the enemy had 

been cut down. Others had dispersed into the fog. 40 

The fourth half-track had withdrawn a short distance to keep 

fr{)m jamming the column. Major Duncan had gone back that 

way. The amount of firing that he could hear from forward 

among the half-tracks, mingled with the noise of the firing of the 

3d Battalion, 506th, which was attacking north toward Foy, gave 

Duncan an exaggerated idea of the importance of the action. He 

asked for the tanks to get forward and fire on the house.41 

Meanwhile the three half-tracks had shoved on. Back through 

the column all men had dismounted and taken to the ditches. 

Major Hustead came forward to see what was blocking the road 

and he met Major Duncan near the head of the column. Both 

officers then tried to get the tanks moving again. The crew of 

the first tank told Major Hustead they had no ammunition. The 

second tank couldn't fire either; there was no ammunition for the 

big gun and the machine gun was jammed. Duncan prodded two 

of the tanks into carrying out the order and they shelled the 

house until it caught fire. Thereupon, they backed away. Duncan was still worrying because he could hear small-arms fire, so 

he ordered them to go in.42 As they moved away they were caught 

broadside by fire from three German tanks which had slipped 

through the fog from the eastward. The first American tank 

caught fire. In the second American tank the driver was hit and 

the tank came to a halt. 43 

Because of the murk, men who were only a few yards back in 

the column could get no true idea of what was happening. Cap-
RUNNING BATTLE 95 

tain William G. Schultz, the tank commander, was in the fifth 

tank. He walked up to the third tank, which was short of personnel, and drove it on down the road past the two disabled 

tanks. They were beyond his help and he thought that if he kept 

moving the rest of the column would follow.44 

But in this he was mistaken. He drove through Foy alone and 

about a quarter-mile beyond the village his tank was hit by a shell 

from an enemy tank and disabled, but Captain Schultz and his 

men got out alive and walked on into Bastogne.45 Meanwhile, 

Major Hustead and Captain Billett were striving to get the column moving. A tank destroyer of the 705th TD Battalion 

whipped up from the rear of the column to try to get a line on 

the yet unseen German tanks. A Sherman tank from the forward 

group backed straight toward the tank destroyer and the tank 

destroyer, reversing direction to save itself, backed over and 

crushed a jeep.48 Then the Sherman moved on up to have another go at the house and it was hit by a shell from a German 

tank and exploded in flames. The turret blew off into the road 

and blocked the passage.47 The driver of the fifth tank, who had 

been with Schultz, had moved up and taken over the second 

tank just before it was demolished. This left the fifth tank driverless. As the road was now blocked by the turret, Hustead and 

Billett moved back and forth among the tankers looking for a 

driver so they could start the column moving across the field to 

Foy.4s There was not a single response. Every tanker replied 

that he was qualified for some other kind of work but couldn't 

move a tank. The paratroopers and the armored infantry jumped 

to the conclusion that the men were dogging it. They walked 

among the tankers cursing them and calling them "yellow bastards"; they threatend to beat up one man whom they suspected 

of being a driver. But they were all wrong about it. Most of 

these toen were new replacements. Some were cooks, some were 

mechanics and some were riflemen. They were tankers only in 

that they belonged to a tank organization.49 The impasse at Foy 

could only be charged to the replacement system. 

The paratroopers farther back along the road had picked themselves up and moved out through the fields on both sides. The 
96 BASTOGNE 

group on the right swept all the way to Foy, met no organized 

resistance but bagged a few Gennans whom they found wandering around in the fog. fiO The tank destroyer force at the rear also 

became restive and at 1430 First Lieutenant Tom E. Toms led 

his vehicles down a little stream line on the right of the road and 

by way of this defilade entered Foy from the west. fil He had 

gotten there in ten minutes. The paratroopers who had swung 

out to the right reached the village at the same time. The tank 

destroyers were not quite through for the day.fi2 

The foot troops who had swung out to the east of the road 

were stopped by the line of fire which the unseen Gennan tanks 

were throwing at the Shennans at the front of the column. They 

sent word back to the main body. fiB However, the danger was 

removed by help from an unexpected quarter. Private First Class 

Thomas E. Gallagher was driving one of the tank destroyers 

which had gone into Foy and was on his way to an assembly area 

in a woods south of the village when he was stopped by an officer 

of the 3d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry. He knew the location of the Gennan tanks and told Gallagher to go after theI)l. 

Gallagher said he had no crew and no one to work the gun. Two 

paratroopers climbed into the tank destroyer and took over the 

gun. Gallagher then moved forward and with the infantrymen 

doing the firing the tank destroyer engaged one tank at 200 yards 

range and destroyed it. The other Gennan tank escaped over the hill.fi~ 

Because of the fog Major Hustead and Captain Billett hadn't 

seen the infantry parties move out to right and left. Billett felt 

that he ought to clear a route for the tanks and vehicles to advance and he sent back for his outfit, Company B of the 20th 

Annored Infantry Battalion. One platoon stayed back in the 

column with the vehicles and he started out with the other two 

platoons moving through the fields to the right. Major Hustead 

had the same idea but didn't know that it had already been put 

into execution twice on this same Hank. He gathered about 20 

paratroopers together and made an additional hook to the right. 

The odd part of it was that although this party groped its way 

forward over the same ground as the others, they did so in time to 
RUNNING BATTLE 97 

reap part of the harvest. The enemy groups around Foy were 

now feeling the heat from both directions. Hustead's sweep toward Foy resulted in the capture of 43 Germans. 

In the village Hustead met troops of the 3d Battalion, 506th, 

who had advanced from the south and he asked them, "Has our 

armor come through?" 

The men had seen the three half-tracks and Captain Schultz's 

tank go by and they thought this was the armor Major Hustead 

was talking about. So they reassured him. Hustead borrowed a 

jeep and drove to Bastogne to report to Colonel Roberts that he 

had completed his mission. But when he got to town he learned 

that he was mistaken and could only tell Colonel Roberts that 

the column was on its way and should soon arrive. 55 

Major Hustead in Bastogne and Captain Billett in Foy were 

both on the radio urging the column to come around to the right. 

But Major Duncan and Second Lieutenant Burleigh P. Oxford 

were already jockeying the column through the fields. The fifth 

tank was on its way. A crew of paratroopers had climbed aboard 

after telling the tankers, 'We'll learn how to run the son of a 

bitch."56 When the column drew into Foy some of the vehicles 

got stuck in the soft ground. Lieutenant Oxford dismounted all 

of the men and got the winches and the manpower working first 

of all on extricating the vehicles that contained the wounded. At 

dusk of December 20 the column was finding its way through 

Foy and past the lines of the 3d Battalion, 506th.51 The command in Bastogne had intended that the force would go into a 

defensive position on the high ground south of Foy. But Hustead 

told Colonel Roberts that the column was dead beat and had 

better be brought into Bastogne.58 The tank destroyers under 

Lieutenant Toms stayed in Foy supporting the 3d Battalion.Be 

Team Desobry had gone to Noville with fifteen tanks; it limped 

back with only four.60 The 1st Battalion of the 506th Parachute 

Infantry was in full strength when it went to Team Desobry's 

support. It lost 13 officers and 199 enlisted men at Noville.81 By 

their combined efforts they had destroyed or badly crippled somewhere between twenty and thirty known enemy tanks of all types 

including not less than three Mark VIs.82 They probably dam-
98 BASTOGNE 

aged or destroyed many more. Headquarters of the 506th estimated that the assaults of the German infantry had cost the 

enemy the equivalent of half a regiment. 68 

Yet all of these material measurements of what had been 

achieved were mean and meager weighed against the fact that 

the men of Noville had held their ground for a decisive 48 

hours during which time the defense of Bastogne had opportunity to organize and grow confident of its own strength.M 
CHAPTER 12 

FIRST ACTION AT MARVIE 

.A T 0645 ON DECEMBER 20, the enemy shelled Team 

n O'Hara's roadblock on the Wiltz-Bastogne road about 1,300 

yards east of Marvie. (Map 12, pages 102-103, and plate 27.) The 

fog was thick and little could be seen of the enemy's movements 

out along the road. But as the light grew, the tankers could hear 

enemy armor moving somewhere in the fog up beyond the block. 

At around 0900 the fog lifted a little and they saw a dozen German soldiers trying to break up the block. A concentr~tion from 

the 420th Field Artillery Battalion caught this group while they 

were tugging away at the felled logs. Two were killed (they were 

later identified as part of an engineer working party) and the 

others Bed the fire. The enemy then put smoke on the roadblock 

-enough to conceal the block and the terrain right around it. 

Figuring that an infantry attack might be coming, Team O'Hara 

covered the block with fire from mortars and assault guns. It is 

believed that this fire fended off the thrust toward Colonel 

O'Hara's front and deBected it toward Marvie, where five of 

O'Hara's light tanks had taken up position the night before.1 

In the meantime Colonel Joseph H. Harper, commanding the 

327th Glider Infantry, had been getting acquainted with Colonel 

O'Hara. The 327th had taken over the command post at MandeSt.-~tienne at 1500 on December 19, and at 1630 its 1st Battalion 

had been attached to Colonel Ewell's 501st Parachute Infantry 

to support his right Bank. At 0400 on the 20th the 327th command post and the 2d Battalion of that regiment were ordered 

into Bastogne and at 0600 they marched on into the town. Z 

(Plate 28.) Without a pause, the 2d Battalion, 327th, moved 

straight on to Marvie and took over that village from the 326th 

Engineers. The 3d Battalion remained in Flamizoulle (some 

2,000 yards east of Flamierge) and established its command post 

in the woods at (494610). 

The 2d Battalion entered Marvie just about as the enemy first 

opened fire on Team O'Hara's roadblock. 8 Colonel Harper had 

[99 ] 
100 BASTOGNE 

been told by Division that the reconnaissance group of light tanks 

would be in support of his 2d Battalion.' Going straight away to 

see Colonel O'Hara, he said to him, "I've been told to hold this 

sector. I understand from Division that you are in support of me 

and I would like to go on a reconnaissance." 

O'Hara said, "Let's get started."5 With them when they went 

out was Lieutenant Colonel Roy 1. Inman, commanding the 2d 

Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry. The officers discussed the relationship of their respective forces as they made the reconnaissance. Under the existing arrangement, Colonel O'Hara's force 

was not under Colonel Harper's command, for the armored force 

was still not attached to the WIst Division but was in support 

only. Colonel Inman had moved his 2d Battalion, 327th, in on 

the right Hank of Colonel O'Hara's force with his line so extended 

as to secure the village and then bending southwestward to the 

main road just above Remoifosse. This was a distance of about 

2,500 yards. The Engineers had three outposts distributed over 

this southeastern facing arc and none of them had as yet been 

engaged. It was agreed that Colonel O'Hara would be responsible for the defense of his immediate front and that Colonel Inman, who would take over from the Engineers immediately, 

would be responsible for the sector to right of O'Hara's.8 Harper 

then left Inman and drove down the main road toward Remoifosse. He established the southwestward extension of his line 

on the forward slope of the hill over which the main road passes 

a little more than half way from Bastogne to Remoifosse. The 

position thus chosen was a few hundred yards north of where the 

original Engineer outpost had been. 

After looking over the situation and making sure that his men 

were where he wanted them, Colonel Harper drove back to 

Marvie. lhe jeep reached the road intersection just west of 

Marvie. There Harper stopped for a moment and debated with 

himself whether to go on into the village or take the west-running 

road and have a quick look at the high ground above the village. 

He decided in favor of taking a look and the jeep moved on up 

the hill.' 
FIRST ACTION AT MARVIE 101 

At 1125, December 20, Colonel Inman's command post in 

Marvie (2d Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry) reported to Colonel O'Hara that they were receiving a great deal of shelling and 

that they could see enemy tanks coming toward them.8 This movement had already been observed from within O'Hara's sector. 

Yet Harper, driving up the hill at the very moment of the attack, 

was unaware that anything untoward was breaking until he got 

to the crest of the hill. There he turned about and saw the enemy 

guns blazing from the edge of the woods directly southeast of 

Marvie and their point-blank fire hitting among the houses of the 

village. 

Harper could see that the fire came from tanks within. the 

wood but he could not be certain how many. The barrage was 

followed immediately by an advance out of the woods by four 

enemy tanks and six half-tracks. 9 They were well spread out and 

they advanced slowly, firing as they came, apparently drawn on 

by the prospect of an easy success over the light tanks. These 

tanks kept dodging in and out among the buildings and the 

enemy fire appeared to follow their movements closely. The light 

tanks replied futilely with their 37mm. guns and the enemy 

armor appeared to come on more boldly.lO Feeling that the presence of his unit, rather than helping Colonel Inman's men, was 

drawing more high-velocity fire into the town, the light tank 

commander asked Colonel O'Hara for permission to withdraw.ll 

It was granted. By then, one of the light tanks had been set afire 

by a shell burst; a second had been hit in the suspension system 

but could make its escape by backing up the hill. 

Yet Colonel Harper did not know all of these things. He saw 

the tanks quit the village· and concluded that they had been 

routed and were deserting his infantry.12 

Up on the hill behind Marvie, Colonel O'Hara's larger guns 

kept silent. In front of the oncoming armor a German selfpropelled 75mm. gun was pacing the advance. Its gunner 

spotted a half-track near O'Hara's command post and fired several quick rounds at it. The shells hit an Engineer jeep, demolished a one-ton trailer and blew through the lower portion of the 
[ 102] 
ACTION AT MARVIE 

20 DECEMBER 

o soo 

[ 103] 

Map 12 
104 BASTOGNE 

command post, killing a cow. The command post was in the first 

floor of the house and this fire was hitting into the basement 

right under the headquarters.l8 

The tanks were by now almost broadside to Team O'Hara at 

700 yards range. Fi~ng at right angles to their own front, two 

of Team O'Hara's medium tanks opened up on the line of 

Mark IVs and half-tracks. The Germans never saw what hit 

them for they were still shooting at the light tanks now pulling 

out through the end of the village.l4 One Mark IV was blown 

up by a direct hit from one of the mediums. The other. Sherman 

knocked out a second Mark IV and one of the half-tracks, the fire 

killing all of the tank crew and most of the men in the personnel 

carrier. One German tank Bed to the rear. The fourth tank 

dashed for Marvie where the infantry destroyed it with bazooka 

flre. l5 The self-propelled gun, having gotten almost into the village before the Sherman opened fire, tried to tum about. It was 

hit from all sides and it went up like a torch.ls 

In the last stage of the German advance, the half-tracks had 

sped forward and increased their interval so that they were almost 

closing on the first houses when the tank line was destroyed.l1 

They kept going. They got to the streets of the village and the 

infantry jumped down. With one small exception the glider 

troops stayed right where they were and met the German on-fall 

without flinching. The attack had come just as the relief of the 

Engineer units had been completed, and some of the Engineers 

were moving out of the north end of Marvie. Men from Inman's 

heavy mortar section, stationed in an apple orchard, saw the 

Engineer party leave as the fire began. They could not understand what the movement of troops was about and they thought 

that part of their own Battalion was withdrawing. And so they 

followed.ls 

Colonel Harper, watching all of these things from the hill, 

made the same mistake as his mortar section. He thought that 

his men had been stampeded and that the village was gone. He 

called General McAuliffe on' the radio, told him what he had 

seen and said that he was on his way to gather the men and that 

he would make a counterattack. His car sped back over the route 
FIRST ACTION AT MARVIE 105 

it had come and Harper started to rally his men. Then he learned 

that most of the party were Engineers and that only the mortar 

squad from among his command had displaced. He told that 

squad to get back into the battle and they moved at once.19 This 

error in judgment is the only instance during the siege of Bastogne when any American Infantryman is known to have left his 

position under fire and without orders. 20 

Colonel Harper, still outside the village, called Colonel Inman 

on his radio. The executive officer of the 2d Battalion, 327th 

Glider Infantry, Major R. B. Galbreaith, answered the call. He 

said that both Colonel Inman and Captain Hugh Evans, commanding officer of Company G, which was holding the village, 

had been hit by a tank shell while making a reconnaissance just 

as the German onslaught began. He did not know how badly 

they were wounded. Harper asked him, "Are you still in the 

village?" 

"Yes," Galbreaith answered. "Yes, but the Germans are here 

also. We expect to drive them out." 

The close-in fighting continued into the early afternoon. Inman's men stayed in their foxholes. Some died there, shot at ten 

yards' range by machine guns as they tried to stop the half-tracks 

with their rifle and tommy gun fire, their bodies almost cut in 

half where the machine guns had ripped them through. Their 

comrades found them later sitting stifHy at their weapons. Colonel Harper himself inspected these positions. He noted that 

every one of his dead was still facing forward as if trying to engage the enemy.21 The bazooka men had likewise met the attack 

head-on. Some of the German infantry, clearing away from the 

half-tracks, had ducked into the houses. The glider men went in 

after them and cleaned them out house by house. Within two 

hours twenty Germans were prisoners and thirty were dead in 

Marvie. First Lieutenant Stanley A. Morrison of Company G, 

who had been captured when the Germans first came into the 

village, was recaptured by his own men. Colonel Inman had lost 

five men killed, each of them killed in a foxhole while resisting 

the half-tracks. Fifteen men of Company G were wounded in 

the action. II 
106 BASTOGNE 

During all that time, Team O'Hara sat high and dry on the 

ridge, taking no part in the engagement except during the brief 

gun duel. On the right Hank that force received some small-arms 

fire but the enemy made no attempt to close on that side and the 

armored infantry in Team O'Hara's position was too far away to 

lend any support to the men in Marvie. That village was again 

clear by about 1300. At 1400 some of Colonel O'Hara's tankers 

saw an enemy half-track stuck in the mud about 150 yards southeast of Marvie. It had been with the striking force during the 

morning and had become bogged. In the previous excitement 

all hands had overlooked it. The tankers quickly knocked it out.23 

At 1420, December 20, the enemy put smoke on Marvie. Some 

of the tanks made another sally from the woods but changed their 

minds. The situation began to ease and Colonel Inman's men 

went about improving their positions, digging their foxholes narrow and very deep and right next to the foundations of the 

houses.24 The day ended fairly quietly but with a definite change 

in the weather. The Ardennes was cold and frozen. The ground 

had hardelled enough for the tracked vehicles to get about over 

the hills in almost any direction. Still no snow had fallen. 

Now, as the first skirmish. ended around Marvie, the first Hurries fell. Soon the ridges were whitening and the snows thickened during the next few days. Increasing cold, light winds and 

deep drifts changed many of the characteristics of the battle. One 

of the problems that now pressed most heavily on the commanders was to get their men indoors and keep them from freezing. 

Villages became places of refuge not only from enemy fire but 

from the cold. The Belgian villagers, clinging stubbornly to their 

homes even in the face of the German attack, had to be evacuated 

to provide shelter and cover for the infantry. In a world of white, 

the forest plantations were the only other areas of easy concealment for troops. The local actions swirled more and more around 

these two objectives-to capture a few houses or to take a line of 

fir trees.25 
CHAPTER 13 

THE RESPITE 

ON DECEMBER 21 and 22 the opposing forces around the 

northeast sector simply sparred with one another.l The 

enemy had been stopped cold at Neffe and Mont by Colonel 

Ewell's 501st Parachute Infantry and supporting units. The effort to slip through the ground held by the forces of Colonels 

O'Hara and Harper had been equally unsuccessful though less 

costly. After these futile passes, anc} following the shock action 

at Noville, the enemy seemed almost to abandon the effort to 

break through Bastogne and concerned himself with extending 

the westward How of his forces on both sides of it so as to complete the encirclement. 2 

The road to Neufchateau was cut by the Germans on the 

night of December 20, isolating Bastogne. General McAuliffe 

had gone that way just a few hours before to talk to the Corps 

commander.s 

It was a pregnant conversation. General McAuliffe said that 

he was certain he could hold on for at least 48 hours and maybe 

longer. General Middleton replied that in view of the fact that 

the hour would probably come when communications could not 

be maintained, General McAuliffe would have to be prepared to 

act on his own. He pointed out that the 116th Panzer Division 

was coming in on General McAuliffe's Hank-in addition to the 

three German divisions already fighting him. McAuliffe said, 

"I think we can take care of them." Middleton said that he certainly wanted to hold Bastogne but was not sure that it could be 

done in view of recent developments. It was important, General 

Middleton added, that the road to the southwestward be kept 

open as long as possible. 

As General McAuliffe walked out the door, Middleton's last 

comment was: "Now, don't get yourself surrounded." McAuliffe 

noticed that he said it very lightly and felt that the Corps commander was simply having a little joke in a tense moment.' 

General McAuliffe went on out, jumped in his car and told 

[107 J 
108 BASTOGNE 

the driver to make for Bastogne as fast as he could get there. & He 

figured he was already surrounded-or just about so. A half hour 

after he did come over the road, it was cut by the German armor. II 

That was not, however, an unmixed evil, for it brought an 

important change in the relationship of the forces in the defense. 

During its first two days the infantry and the armor had collaborated well but they had not been a team. On the first night, General McAuliffe had asked that the armor (Combat Command B, 

10th Armored Division) be attached to him and its commander 

Colonel Roberts had said, 'What do you know about armor?" 

General McAuliffe had replied, "Maybe you want the WIst 

Division attached to your Combat Command."7 

It was partly because of this division in the command authority, and partly because the armor and the infantry were units· 

strange and new to each other, that during the first stage there 

was a lack of cohesion. 8 That lack was felt more as a moral than 

as a tactical thing. To one staff officer of the Division the armor 

along the front seemed "like a will 0' the wisp."s 

The armor felt the same way about the infantry. Each force 

had the feeling those first few days that it was propping up the 

front pretty much unhelped. In general, neither force was feeling the presence of the other strongly nor having a clear idea how 

much support was being received from it. Liaison was fragmentary. Both tankers and infantrymen had had to come out of 

their comers fighting and during the first crucial hours they had 

no choice but to look straight ahead and slug. 

But with the cutting of the NeufcMteau road and the isolating 

of the Bastogne garrison, General Middleton called General McAuliffe and told him that the armor (Combat Command B) and 

all other troops within the circle were now under his command.10 

General Middleton also called Colonel Roberts and told him, 

"Your work has been quite satisfactory but I have so many divisions that I can't take the time to study two sets of reports from 

the same area." Colonel Roberts reported in person to General 

McAuliffe to do command liaison and from that time on until the 

siege was lifted his post was almost exclUSively at the WIst Division command post. The result was that the coordination was 
THE RESPITE 109 

complete. Roberts, a veteran tank commander, was particularly 

concerned that the armor be used properly, used to the maximum 

effect and not wasted. He strongly resisted the attempts of infantry commanders to use tanks as roadblocks. He worked specifically 

to get his armor quickly released after each engagement so that 

there would always be a maximum strength in General McAuliffe's mobile reserve for the next emergency. In the middle 

of the siege he published a mimeographed memorandum to the 

infantry officers on the right ways to use tanks.ll 

The order to Combat Command B on December 21 from VIII 

Corps to ''hold the Bastogne line at all costs" gives a key to General Middleton's view of the situation during this period. On the 

evening before, he had talked with McAuliffe and had expressed 

a doubt whether the strength at Bastogne was sufficient for the 

task.12 All along he had been willing to make the gamble of an 

encircled force at Bastogne, and for a few hours he may have felt 

that the gamble was dubious. Now he had come to believe the 

gamble would succeed and that the battle must be fought out on 

that line. There was no longer any doubt or question anywhere 

in the camp. From this hour the action of all concerned, the VIII 

Corps commander, the WIst Division commander, and the armored force commander of Combat Command B-Middleton, 

McAuliffe, and Roberts-became wholly consistent with the resolve that Bastogne could and would be held. IS 

General McAuliffe now had the answer to all of his questions. 

No 'situation could have been more clearly defined. During the 

first two days he had entertained many doubts and had continued 

to wonder just what the situation was. He had heard about various groups from the 28th and 106th Divisions which were still 

out fighting somt!where and might fall back upon him. The 7th 

Armored Division was supposed to be somewhere up around St. 

Vith. He had also had to worry about the organization of stragglers. At the first, part of the 28th Division had been screening 

him on the south Hank. Its commander, Major General Norman 

D. Cota, had called him on the morning of December 20 and 

said, "I'd like to see you," and McAuliffe had replied, "I'm too 

damned busy." Cota then said, "I'll come up to see yoU."14 
no BASTOGNE 

Now, on the 21st, McAuliffe knew that General Cota would 

not be coming to see him, and that the only situation involving 

American troops about which he would have to worry for a while 

was the situation right within the two-and-one-half mile circle of 

German forces closed around Bastogne. The only support he 

could expect for the time being was just what he had-all within 

ranging distance of his own 105mm. batteries. It was a nice, 

clear-cut position and it had materialized in just about the way 

that he had expected upon first reaching Bastogne.15 

But what he had not foreseen, something that came like a gift 

from the gods, was that after the first hard collision, the enemy 

would give him a comparative respite in which to reRect on his 

situation and knit his armor and infantry close together, now that 

both were his to work with as he saw fit. The Germans had spent 

two days trying to break on through Bastogne. They spent the 

next two riding hard around it. They had failed to crush it; they 

would try to choke it. But while they were building up around 

the west and south, the pressure against the city relaxed.16 

The Row of bubbles on the G-2 overlays, showing the extension of the enemy to the south and westward, was moving along. 

Panzer Lehr Division had been the first to break upon the Bastogne rock. But the 26th Volksgrenadier Division had also come 

in from the east. A captured map showed that it had failed in 

one of its appointments, for the 26th Volksgrenadier was to have 

had the honor of capturing Bastogne.l1 

The Germans were traveling light. Their commanders had 

told them that Bastogne was bursting with American food and 

that they could eat when they got there. IS Some had gone hungry for three days while trying to reach the American rations. Too, 

the enemy fire power manifested a certain weakness. While his 

heavy mortars and nebelwerfers were shaking down the store 

fronts in Bastogne and wounding a few soldiers and civilians, his 

artillery effort was largely limited to the covering fires given by 

the tanks and the fire of a relatively few self-propelled guns when 

his infantry charged forward. This, G-2 attributed to a critical 

shortage of ammunition.19 

The cutting of the NeufcbAteau road, closing the German 
THE RESPITE 111 

circle, appears in the WIst Division records as hardly more than 

an interesting incident. 20. Up till then, the Division's intelligence 

of the enemy strength and movements was more notable for its 

blanks than for its specific detailed entries.21 The G-2 section 

had, of course, moved cold into an unknown situation and was 

having to build up its picture of the enemy and friendly forces 

piece by piece. There had been no pretty "estimates of the situation" to take over and build upon.22 All that Division could 

know for certain was what it learned from examining the enemy 

dead or questioning prisoners. That was enough for Lieutenant 

Colonel Paul A. Danahy's (Division G-2-plate 29) main purpose and enough also to satisfy his taste for melodramatic utterance. 

Eleven dead men had been found on the ground where the 

hospital was captured. The corpses had civilian clothes-and 

German military dogtags. Colonel Danahy went out to make the 

identifications.2s A few hours after this find, a message from 10th 

Armored Division came through Combat Command B to WIst 

Division Headquarters saying, ''You can expect attacks from Sherman tanks, civilians and almost anything now."24 

Reports came into the G-2 office through the first day of Germans killed while wearing American uniforms and of Sherman 

tanks pouring fire on our lines. Danahy checked up. He found 

that invariably, where the enemy used American dress, it was 

mixed with some of their own clothing, so that they could maintain they were in uniform. 25 What he had seen gave him fresh 

inspiration for prophecy. 

"Their equipment is augmented by captured U. S. equipment 

which they do not hesitate to use," he wrote to the commander.211 

"Their morale is excellent but will disintegrate as they come in 

contact with American airborne troops. It is well known that the 

Germans dislike fighting. The false courage acquired during 

their recent successes has so far proved insufficient to prevent 

their becoming road-bound."27 

While this message was going out to the regiments of the 1 0 1 st, 

the enemy was crossing the NeufcMteau road and cutting the 

last line to the south, closing the circle around Bastogne. Recon-
112 BASTOGNE 

Situation 21' De 

~21WlM4 

~13O'Z UIII~) .. __ 

SCALE IN YARDS 

Map 13 

naissance and combat patrols reported strong enemy infiltrations 

in the areas west and southwest of the town. 28 

In the morning of December 21, a patrol from Troop D of the 

90th Reconnaissance Squadron went down the road to see what 

the Germans had there. The patrol, under First Lieutenant 

Arthur B. Amsdorf, consisted of one tank destroyer and two 

squads of infantry. They met a group of WIst Division men near 

Isle-Ie-Pre (a mile and a half southwest of Bastogne), then moved 

on some distance farther until they encountered a well emplaced 

enemy force which made them tum about. 29 

Another armored patrol under Captain Keith J. Anderson went 

to Clochimont where it observed a large enemy force-riding in 

American vehicles and dressed in American uniforms. so 
THE RESPITE 113 

Later in the morning of December 21 Team Pyle-14 medium 

tanks and 200 infantry, mostly from the 9th Armored-moved to 

the vicinity of Senonchamps to assist the 420th Armored Field 

Artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Barry D. Browne, in command of 

the 420th, had received reports that Sibret and Morhet (map 13, 

page 112) had fallen into enemy hands. He figured that he was 

out on a limb and that the enemy might come upon him from 

either Bank. So he turned one of his batteries to fire on Sibret 

and rushed a forward observer out to adjust on the village. At 

that moment, he saw the motorized column of the 333d Field 

Artillery Group as it came speeding up the road out of Sibret. 

Another column came driving hard behind the 333d-men in 

American clothes and riding American vehicles. They got fairly 

close to Senonchamps, then stopped, deployed and opened fire 

with an M8 assault gun. 

Even as Colonel Browne realized they were Germans, they 

started side-slipping off into the Bois de Fragotte which lies just 

south of Senonchamps. Team Pyle got there in time to help 

Browne fill those woods with fire; one battery from the 420th 

Field Artillery Battalion and one from the 755th Field Artillery 

Battalion (l55mms.) also engaged in this action. The infantry 

and tanks moved west into the woods. Almost immediately, one 

of the tanks knocked out an enemy 75mm. self-propelled gun. 

The force then advanced into a large clearing in the center of the 

forest. While crossing the clearing, one of the tanks was disabled by a shell from a high-velocity gun somewhere in the 

woods. The tank lost a track. A smoke screen was laid in an attempt to cover its withdrawal, but the tank wouldn't budge and 

had to be destroyed. 

The force then withdrew to a line farther to the east, but 

within the forest. Additional support kept coming to it until by 

night Colonel Browne was commanding 300 infantry and 19 

tanks, in addition to running two battalions of artillery.81 His 

troops were covering a sector more than 4,000 yards long (map 

14, page 114) and running from south of Senonchamps to the 

Bastogne-Neufchateau road. All of this had been built up dur-
114 BASTOGNE 

Situation 22 Dec 

~Z6VGH 

~'30PZI.DlllH f ¥r SCALE I N YAROS 

Map 14 

ing the day of December 21 as forces were shifted to meet the 

attack from the new direction. 82 

But the heavy increase of fire on the left found Danahy ready 

to meet the emergency. "The cutting of the roads," he wrote in 

his periodic report to the commanders that evening, "had had no 

effect upon our present situation except to make travel hazardous."·· 
CHAPTER 14 

uNUTSI" 

AT 1130 ON DECEMBER 22 four Gennans, a major, a captain and two enlisted men, came up the road to Bastogne 

from Remoifosse carrying a large white Bag. They were met on 

the road by Technical Sergeant Oswald Y. Butler and Staff Sergeant Carl E. Dickinson of Company F, 327th Glider Infantry, 

and Private First Class Eme$t D. Premetz of the 327th Medical 

Detachment. 

Premetz could speak German. The captain could speak English. He said to Butler, 'We are parliamentaires." 

The men took the Gennans to the house where Lieutenant 

Leslie E. Smith of Weapons Platoon, Company F, 327th Infantry, had his command post. Leaving the two Gennan enlisted 

men at the command post, Smith blindfolded the two officers and 

led them over the hill to the command post of Captain James F. 

Adams, commanding officer of Company F. Adams called 2d 

Battalion headquarters in Marvie, Battalion called Regiment in 

Bastogne, and the 327th Headquarters called the WIst Division, 

relaying the word that some Gennans had come in with surrender 

tenns. 1 The ruinor quickly spread around the front that the 

enemy had had enough and that a party had arrived to arrange a 

surrender. Quiet held the front. Many of the American defenders crawled out of their cover and spent the noon hour shaving, 

washing and going to the straddle trenches. 2 

Major Alvin Jones took the tenns to General McAuliffe and 

Lieutenant Colonel Ned D. Moore who was acting Chief of 

Staff. The paper called for the surrender of the Bastogne garrison 

and threatened its complete destruction otherwise.8 It appealed 

to the "well known American humanity" to save the people of 

Bastogne from further suffering. The Americans were to have 

two hours in which to consider. The two enemy officers would 

have to be released by 1400 but another hour would pass before 

the Gennans would resume their attack.6 

Colonel Harper, commanding the 327th, went with Jones to 

[ 115 ] 
116 BASTOGNE 

Division Headquarters. The two German officers were left with 

Captain Adams. Members of the staff were grouped around General McAuliffe when Harper and Jones arrived.5 McAuliffe 

asked someone what the paper contained and was told that it 

requested a surrender. 

He laughed and said, "Aw, nuts!" It really seemed funny to 

him at the time. He figured he was giving the Germans "one hell 

of a beating" and that all of his men knew it. The demand was 

all out of line with the existing situation.6 

But McAuliffe realized that some kind of reply had to be 

made and he sat down to think it over. Pencil in hand, he sat 

there pondering for a few minutes and then he remarked, 'Well, 

I don't know what to tell them." He asked the staff what they 

thought and Colonel Kinnard, his G-3 replied, "That first remark 

of yours would be hard to beat." 

General McAuliffe didn't understand immediately what Kinnard was referring to. Kinnard reminded him, ''You said 

'Nuts!' " That drew applause all around. All members of the staff 

agreed with much enthusiasm and because of their approval 

McAuliffe decided to send that message back to the Germans.1 

Then he called Colonel Harper in and asked him how he 

would reply to the message. Harper thought for a minute but 

before he could compose anything General McAuliffe gave him 

the paper on which he had written his one-word reply and asked, 

'Will you see that it's delivered?" "I will deliver it myself," answered Harper. "It will be a lot of fun." McAuliffe told him not 

to go into the German lines.8 

Colonel Harper returned to the command post of Company F. 

(Plate 29.) The two Germans were standing in the wood blindfolded and under guard. Harper said, "I have the American commander's reply." 

The German captain asked, "Is it written or verbal?" 

"It is written," said Harper. 

And then he said to the German major, "I will stick it in your 

hand." 

The German captain translated the message. The major then 
"NUTS!" 117 

asked, "Is the reply negative or affirmative? If it is the latter I 

will negotiate further." 

All of this time the Germans were acting in an upstage and 

patronizing manner. Colonel Harper was beginning to lose his 

temper. He said, 'The reply is decidedly not affirmative." Then 

he added, "If you continue this foolish attack your losses will be 

tremendous." The major nodded his head. 

Harper put the two officers in the jeep and took them back to 

the main road where the German privates were waiting with the 

white Bag. 

He then removed the blindfold and said to them, speaking 

through the German captain, "If you don't understand what 

'Nuts' means, in plain English it is the same as 'Go to hell.' And 

I will tell you something else-if you continue to attack we will 

kill every goddam German that tries to break into this city."9 

The German major and captain saluted very stilly. The captain said, 'We will kill many Americans. This is war." It was 

then 1350.10 

"On your way, Bud," said Colonel Harper, "and good luck to 

you. " 

The four Germans walked on down the road. Harper returned 

to the house, regretting that his tongue had slipped and that he 

had wished them good luck.ll 

The rest of the day was comparatively quiet. The wholesale 

destruction by artillery that the Germans had promised did not 

materalize. But, at 1555 there was an attack by some 50 of the 

enemy against Company F, 327th Glider Infantry, over precisely 

the same ground where the German mediators had come into our 

lines. The attack was broken up by small-arms and artillery fire. 

At 1700 another small attack was again pressed to within 200 

yards of Company F's lines but was beaten back by fire. 

The terrain at this spot formed a kind of bowl. The Germans 

came with their tanks into the bottom of the bowl and fired up 

against the foxholes along the slope. The men under Sergeant 

Butler, who had the riBe platoon, and Lieutenant Smith, who 

had the weapons platoon, held their ground and drove the attackers off with infantry fire alone.lI 
118 BASTOGNE 

The main event for that day was summed up, though not too 

neatly, in the G-2 Periodic Report No.4: 

"The Commanding General's answer was, with a sarcastic air 

of humorous tolerance, emphatically negative. The catastrophic 

carnage of human. lives resulting from the artillery barrage of 

astronomic proportions which was to be the fate of the defending 

troops failed to materialize. 

"The well known American humanity was considerate of the 

threatened possible civilian losses by firing artillery concentrations directed at the enemy's impudence."18 

It was a victory for eloquence at some expense to grammar but 

in keeping with the other grim humors of the day. 

That night, December 22, the Luftwaffe began its bombing 

attack which was x:epeated on the next four nights.1i 
CHAPTER 15 

THE SECOND MARVIE ATTACK 

THERE WERE TWO RELATIVELY quiet days on the 

Marvie part of the circular Bastogne front after the snows 

carne-December 21 and 22. Bastogne was searched for enough 

bedsheets to camouflage the patrols. Early in the afternoon of 

December 21 the Germans came across the main highway directly 

south of Bastogne and then began working north toward the battalion lines on the hill. 

Colonel Harper shifted the 2d Platoon of Company G, 327th 

Glider Infantry, from the ground immediately west of Marvie to 

a place west of the highway. Three of Team O'Hara's tanks were 

already on the hill where Harper had placed them the day 

before.1 

The armor and infantry together were able to turn this thrust 

. back before it became any real threat.2 The 1st Battalion, 327th 

Glider Infantry, was relieved from attachment to the 501st Airborne Infantry, reverting to direct Division contro},B It was moved 

to the southwest of Bastogne in the vicinity of the woods there 

and ordered to establish a roadblock along the main highway, 

and from this point to patrol westward to make contact with the 

326th Engineer Battalion.' They were also instructed to patrol 

to Villeroux and Chenogne and make contact with "friendly 

troops" but before they could do it the enemy had moved through 

these positions and driven back the 333d Field Artillery Group.5 

The Engineers then set up as small combat groups and covered 

the ground between Colonel Hartford F. Salee's 1st Battalion, 

327th Glider Infantry, which was over the Neufch~teau road 

and the platoon from Company G, 327th, which was west of the 

highway leading sout'b from Bastogne.8 

In Team O'Hara's part of the sector, too, there was a lull. 

Some time during the night of December 20 the Germans removed the trees from Team O'Hara's roadblock. At 1100 on the 

next day a combat patrol went forward to investigate. But on 

approaching the point where the blOCK had been they found that 

[ 119] 
NIGHT BATTLE AT MARVIE 

23-24 DECEMBER 

I PHASE I I 

~ -

tx:l 

~ 

~ Z 

tr1 
THE SECOND MARVIE ATTACK 121 

the enemy now had it covered with crossing bands of machinegun fire. They were able to withdraw without casualty and mortar fire was then put all around the road junction. 

In the early hours of December 22 one of Team O'Hara's patrols going forward saw an eleven-man patrol enter their own 

lines. The night was clear and crisp. The small group from the 

54th Armored Infantry first heard the crunching of the snow as 

the other patrol came toward them. They lay quiet, not firing 

because they were outnumbered. Too, the strangers were moving 

as if they were wholly familiar with the ground. They had no 

visible weapons and they did not carry themselves stealthily. 

They went boldly over the fences and entered the American lines 

along the ground that lay between the 327th and the 54th. They 

walked right by the sentries, moved to within 100 yards of the 

command post of the 327th Glider Infantry and within 200 yards 

of the command post of the 54th Armored Infantry. 

Four different groups reported the patrol later and all four said 

they had seen eleven men. Yet the patrol was not challenged 

anywhere simply because it had moved so confidently. They got 

in and out without provoking any fire or interest. When Headquarters heard casually how this group had been drifting about, 

they checked to see whether any nearby unit had put out such a 

patrol and found that none had done so. Whether the eleven 

were friend or enemy was never learned. The visitation and its 

mystery became one of the legends of Bastogne.7 

At 1725 on December 23, the 2d Battalion, 327th, in Marvie 

(plate 27) was heavily shelled by enemy tanks concealed in a 

small plantation of firs within the hollow just above the village of 

Martaimont.8 From their position the tanks could shoot directly 

into Marvie. It was a characteristic enemy action for throughout 

the siege it was the German practice to use tanks as artillery, perhaps from fear of hitting their own troops if they used field guns 

from far back. II 

At about 1735 the 2d Battalion, 327th, was attacked by tanks 

and infantry coming from the same general direction (map 15, 

page 120), though they had debouched from a larger wood lying 

a little farther away from Marvie.10 The attack developed very 
122 BASTOGNE 

slowly. The German infantry was clad in snow suits and a light 

snow was falling. They seemed to be waiting until the gloom 

deepened so they could make the most of their camouBage.l1 The 

enemy barrage had ignored Team O'Hara's part of the sector but 

the outposts of the 54th Armored Infantry spotted two enemy 

machine guns that were firing into Marvie. Flanking fire was 

placed on them and they were silenced. Heavy automatic fire 

then searched the position of the 54th. No enemy could be seen 

and the men of the 54th held their fire except for one heavy machine gun on the left. The enemy spotted that gun. A few minutes later a hand grenade dropped next to the gun killing the 

gunner and wounding one other man. The rest of the crew quit 

the position. Next morning a patrol returned to the gun and 

found the second man still alive but so nearly frozen that he 

could only nod his head to them. Both he and the dead man had 

been searched and stripped of their possessions by Germans who 

had come in fast upon the position after the grenade fire.12 

Within half an hour the attack was fully developed and soon 

after 1840, December 23, one platoon of Company G, 327th became surrounded on Hill 500 to the south of Marvie.18 The 

enemy had begun a gradual envelopment of the platoon's position 

by moving into and through houses and yards that were around 

the base of the hill on all sides. A few members of the platoon 

were able to withdraw along the Banks of the hill as the encirclement began. The others stayed in their positions and the time 

quickly came when they could not get out.14 

Four tanks, which had accompanied the German infantry advance to Hill 500, turned their fire against Marvie, adding to the 

bombardment that was still coming in from the armored guns in 

the big Wood.1S 

Colonel Harper had worried about this part of the perimeter. 

Earlier in the day he had asked Colonel O'Hara to put a tank on 

the hill.ls O'Hara agreed to station a 57mm. gun on the lower 

slope of the hill where a 37mm. gun had previously defended it. 

The half-track carrying the 57mm. gun was just going into position when the German tanks and infantry closed in on Hill 500. 

The first few German rounds that came his way were enough for 
THE SECOND MARVIE ATTACK 123 

the driver; he turned the half-track around and sped north toward 

Marvie. The troops in the village saw the half-track coming toward them from out of the body of the German attack. They 

thought it was a German vehicle and they fired at it with everything they had, demolishing the vehicle and killing the crew. 

Two German tanks that had followed along the same road crossed 

the stream south of Marvie and got into the village as far as the 

church. They saw then that the destroyed half-track blocked the 

road and that they could not advance any farther. So they turned 

around and withdrew.17 

Having begun the attack in stealth, the German infantry now 

came on toward the houses in a frenzy, yelling and firing as they 

advanced and shooting many Hares.18 To the men in Colonel 

O'Hara's position it looked as if the tracers were Hying in all 

directions. Bullet fire began to envelop them from the southern 

edge of the village. A self-propelled gun came charging toward 

them up the Wiltz road. As it rounded the bend and came abreast 

the farmhouse there, one of our medium tanks fired and the 

gun went up in Hames. The fire lighted the entire area. The 

enemy turned their artillery loose on the farmhouse. A loft filled 

with hay soon blazed like a torch. Because of the intense illumination from these fires, the tanks and infantry of Team O'Hara's 

line withdrew 100 yards to the west.19 

Counting an Engineer platoon on the right of Colonel Harper's 

327th Glider Infantry, there were 98 men defending Hill 500.20 

Already, a few had been killed or wounded. At the same time 

that a part of the German force pressed against Marvie from the 

south, twelve German tanks supported by infantry advanced 

north along the main road toward the position occupied by Company F, 327th. This body had debouched from the same woods 

from which the German tanks were firing. Instead of continuing 

along the Bastogne road, part of the German armor moved rightward toward Hill 500. The infantry were clad in white and were 

almost imperceptible. 21 

On the slopes of Hill 500 Lieutenant Stanley Morrison and 

his men of Company G, 327th Glider Infantry, had dug in 

around the base of the houses. Colonel Harper in his command 
124 BASTOGNE 

post got word that the enemy was attacking. He called Lieutenant Morrison and asked, 'What is your situation?" 

"Now they are all around me," Morrison replied. "I see tanks 

just outside my window. We are continuing to fight them back 

but it looks like they have us." To Colonel Harper's listening 

ear he seemed perfecdy calm and he spoke in a level tone. 

Harper called him back in about three minutes. Morrison r~ 

plied but he said only these words, 'We're still holding on." Then 

the line went dead. 

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Rouzie, the executive officer of 

the 327th Glider Infantry, said to Harper, "I guess that's the end 

of Morrison." 

The men of Hill 500 were never heard from again in the batde. They had been overwhelmed by troops of the 901st Panzergrenadier Regiment of the Panzer Lehr Division. The end came 

for Lieutenant Morrison's detachment some time after 1900, 

December 23.22 

There had been no tanks or tank destroyers in support of Morrison. Force O'Hara had not fired either in defense of the hill 

positions or against the German front moving into Marvie from 

the south. Colonel Harper couldn't understand it.2B He called 

Colonel O'Hara who said, ''They are attacking me also and are 

trying to come around my north flank."24 

This flank had a patch of woods lying just north of the bend 

of the road but not within the American position and the enemy 

was striking from out of those woods. Now the snow suits no 

longer helped them for they reflected the light of the blazing 

house. From 100 yards away O'Hara's men fired. Some of the 

figures pitched forward in the snow and others sought its concealment.25 

One of Colonel O'Hara's men had failed to withdraw in time. 

He played dead when the Germans came to his foxhole. They 

said, "Hello, Hello," then kicked him, sat on him, took his BAR 

and rifled his pockets. But he kept absolutely still. Some time 

later he heard them bring up two guns on the left, a large one 

and a small one. They fired the small gun indiscriminately, apparently with the expectation of getting return fire which would 
Map 16 

23-24 DECEMBER 

I PHASE.21 

o tPfO 

KALI IN YAltOS 

~ tr1 

(Il 

~ ~ 

S 

tr1 

~ 

~ 

-

N 

V1 
126 BASTOGNE 

provide a target for the large gun. Yet during the night the large 

gun never did fire. The man in the foxhole also heard the German ambulances make numerous trips into the area for the 

purpose of taking out their dead and wounded.28 

Major Galbreaith (executive officer of the 2d Battalion, 

327th), reported to Colonel Harper at 2000, December 23, that 

the German infantry were in the south end of Marvie and were 

working through the houses. 21 (Map 16, page 125.) The tanks 

which had been on Hill 500 and had shelled Marvie from there 

were now moving toward the houses. Galbreaith asked Harper, 

"Can't I get tanks?" Harper replied, "I'll try." But the line to 

Team O'Hara had gone out. Colonel Harper tried the radio but 

could only hear Team O'Hara headquarters faintly. 

Major Galbreaith called Colonel Harper again, and said, "They 

are all around us now and I must have tanks."28 "You call 

O'Hara on your radio," replied Harper, "and say 'It is the commanding general's order that two Sherman tanks move into 

Marvie at once and take up a defensive position.' It 

Colonel Harper had no authority for his action but he figured 

this wasn't the time to stand on ceremony.29 A few minutes later 

the two Sherman tanks move<t into Marvie on Colonel O'Hara's 

orders.ao The infantry of both sides were already locked in a fight 

for possession of the houses but the destroyed half-track kept 

the enemy armor from entering the south of the village.81 

Colonel Harper's force was now totally stripped of reserve.Jl2 

His line was buckled in and from Hill 500 the Germans were in 

good position to exploit the break in his center, roll back the 

Hanks of his position, and through this breach enter the heart of 

Bastogne. But once again in renewing their direct assault on the 

city the Germans had made the same error of engaging heavilv 

only along one part of the front. The front at Foy had cooled off 

and Colonel Ewell's forces along the Longvilly road could even 

doze a little.88 

At 2145 a platoon of paratroopers from Comoany A of the 

50lst Parachute Infantry under Captain Stanfield A. Stach was 

sent to reinforce Company F of the 327th Glider Infantry.84 That 

company was already in a pretty bad way. One of its squads had 
THE SECOND MARVIE ATTACK 127 

been in the small patch of woods just to the southwest of Hill 

500 and part of a platoon had been on higher ground to the 

squad's right rear. These positions had been overrun by the German armored advance from out of the woods around Martaimont.35 

A few of the men got away. Others had been killed or taken 

prisoner defending their ground. The bulk of the company, in 

position along the crest of the hill commanding the main highway 

into Bastogne from the south, had held like a rock. The German 

assault had come on with its right closing around Marvie, its center enveloping Hill 500 and its left lunging forward along the 

main highway. The armor that supported the advance of the 

German left could be stopped only by bazooka fire from Lieutenant Smith's platoon,36 for this was no place for tank destroyers. 

Anything that came over the skyline of the hill moving southward from Bastogne was immediately put under fire by German 

tanks or self-propelled guns firing from defilade. No tank destroyers could be risked at the position. 37 Three of Colonel 

O'Hara's tanks, known as Force Charley 16, were in support of 

our infantry line, but the night attack closed in in such manner 

that the fate of the line depended on the infantry weapons. There 

was a respite after Smith's fire beat back the first attack but the 

enemy tanks withdrew only a short distance.38 

The ruptured line north of Hill· 500 was quickly patched and 

strengthened before the enemy could exploit his opening success. 

One platoon of Company F, which had been astride the Bastogne road, was put in position to east of it (Map 17, page 128). 

The 327th Glider Infantry was also given Batteries D and E of 

the 81st Antiaircraft Battalion and Major Hustead's part of Team 

Cherry. Twelve guns were put in an arc along the high ground 

in the road triangle just above Marvie.3U 

Colonel Rouzie picked up twenty-four men of Company F and 

with the forty men under Captain Stach proceeded through 

Lieutenant Smith's position and took up a defense line corresponding with the distribution of the 81st's antiair~raft guns. 

These moves-made between 2400 and 0100 (December 24) 

-temporarily closed the breach.40 Colonel Rouzie took personal 
128 BASTOGNE 

Situation 23 De 

Mantle St Etienn ~villy 

~13D 

~VG(-J~3~9 ~f.§~~' 

a4,e 

Reflb#e\ \. 

t!kz..ral Fa ~1I8PZ\ .. ...g.. 0 100_ 

L2JI3IPZWlB SCALE IN YARDS 

Map 17 

charge of the defense of the threatened area. Upon reaching the 

ground he had decided he was in no position to attack. He felt 

that he would simply waste his strength if he tried to drive the 

Germans away from Hill 500. The best course open was to 

establish a defensive line on the "inner part of the cup."u Captain Adams reorganized the position of Company F so that the 

line bent back northeastward to join with the position covering 

the 81st's guns.'s 

Twice again that night the German armor lashed at the left 

Bank and always the fire fell heaviest, not on Colonel Rouzie's 

scratch force, but on the position held by the platoons of Lieutenant Smith and Technical Sergeant Butler. The regimental 

officers of the 327th Glider Infantry said later that Sergeant 
THE SECOND MARVIE A1T ACK 129 

Butler's courage and energy were the mainstay of the defense.'s 

In one of the assaults a pair of Gennan tanks got to within fifty 

yards of the foxholes held by Lieutenant Smith's men before they 

were turned back by bazooka fire. By then Smith's command 

post was blazing, for the tanks had fired fifteen rounds into the 

house as they came on. Smith and his assistants had set up in 

the basement and they stayed there while the upper structure 

burned." 

Rouzie's force patrolled southward to the small woods from 

where part of Company F had been driven and found that it was 

now held by an enemy outpost. A few Company F stragglers 

were trying to work their way out of the woods. The patrol mistook them for Gennanl; and fired on them. They hit the ground. 

One member of the patrol, suspecting that they were Americans, 

crawled forward, identified them and brought them out.'B The 

enemy had captured a number of American mortars around 

Marvie and through the rest of the night American mortar shells 

dropped on the ground which Smith and Butler were defending. 

In the early morning the Gennans asked and received pennission 

to remove their dead and wounded from in front of Smith's platoon. It was only when the Gennans came forward to collect their 

dead that the pressure slackened and the mortar fire ceased.'s 

Elsewhere along the sector the issue of the fight was still in 

balance. Two tanks which had ripped through Harper's forward 

line had gone right into Bastogne and shot up the houses around 

his command post, without doing any vital damage. In Marvie 

the arrival of the two Shennan tanks had stabilized the fighting.'T 

Near midnight, December 23, as the Shennans rolled south 

into the village, they could hear Gennan annor coming north. 

They could not see the force nor tell its numbers but the muzzle 

Hashes told them they were engaged at very short range. Again 

the dead half-track helped save the situation. The leading German tank got up to this accidental roadblock and then tried to 

tum around, but was knocked out by the two Shennans before 

it could do so. This loss checked the rest of the enemy annor.48 

Colonel Harper's infantry in Marvie had dug themselves in 

very deep right next to the foundations of the houses and they 
130 BASTOGNE 

stayed in their holes without flinching. They now had all the 

best of it because the village was blazing from many fires set by 

the artillery. Their foxholes were in heavy shadow while the 

snow-suited German infantry were highlighted as they came 

across the open spaces. The general assault was quickly checked 

by bullet fire but enemy parties got a lodgment in the houses at 

the lower end of the village and pushed slowly northward!9 

Along Team O'Hara's front things had quieted well before 

midnight. The enemy advance into the fire-lighted area was 

checked and then driven back by machine-gun and rifle fire. 

Later, after the scene had again darkened, an enemy tank was 

heard advancing along the road. 50 The artillery forward observer 

fired the 75mm. gun from his tank and a 105mni. assault gun 

fired in the direction of the rumble. Second Lieutenant Sherwood D. Wishart, tank platoon leader, reported that night that he 

was certain his shells had bounced off and the tank had backed 

away. But he had scored a bull's-eye in the darkness and in the 

morning the tank-a Mark IV -was found sitting to the left of the 

road with a 75mm. hole clear through it. 51 Not a single body was 

found on the ground which had been held by the enemy infantry, 

though the snow bore many other marks of death and confusion. 

The German medical units had done their tasks well. U 

Soon after dawn of December 24 Colonel Harper went down 

to look at his lines. He sent a patrol to the hill where Lieutenant 

Morrison had been and found it was still in enemy hands. His 

own men still held most of Marvie though the Germans were in 

some houses in the south of the village. Five men had been killed 

and seven wounded in the fighting there and one and one-half 

platoons had been wiped out on the hill. There were no further 

developments in the situation during the morning. 58 

At 0900 a patrol from Colonel O'Hara's force went to the old 

roadblock position and found that the enemy had withdrawn 

except for two Germans who were sitting fully exposed on a nearby pile of beets. They shot the two beet sitters and this drew 

machine-gun fire on themselves. So they pulled back. 54 

At 1340 six P-47s bombed Marvie, dropping six SOD-pound 

bombs among the American positions. Then they came in over 
THE SECOND MARVIE ATTACK 131 

the housetops and strafed the streets with caliber .50 fire. Colonel 

Harper was walking through the streets when the first bomb fell. 

Even as he jumped for a foxhole he saw that there were two 

cerise-colored panels clearly showing where the front of the position was.55 He thought he saw one of the bombs hit among a 

patrol that was working through the south of the village toward 

Hill 500 and he sent two runners after the patrol to see if any 

damage had been done. Then he walked in the same direction. 

A German wearing a dirty snow suit dodged out of one house and 

into another so that he could get into a position from which he 

could fire on the patrol. Harper fired his M 1 at the house in 

order to warn the patrol. The patrol, which seemed OK from the 

bombing, went to work on the house too, but on receiving riRe 

fire from the south of the village, they came on back. 56 

During their brief reconnaissance they had seen a German 

tank completely camouRaged as a haystack except that the Germans had made the error of leaving the gun muzzle sticking out 

of the hay. Colonel Harper went to the one Sherman tank remaining in the village and gave the gunner the target-just beyond the last houses.57 He continued on to the tanks of Team 

O'Hara along the Wiltz road and told them to start pounding the 

tank and the houses in the lower part of Marvie which concealed 

the German infantry. With their first fire the Shermans got direct 

hits on the tank and blew the hay away. 58 They kept on blasting 

it and the crews thought they knocked it out. Major Galbreaith 

(2d Battalion Exec, 327th) said, however, that he saw the tank 

get away under its own power. 

At 1645. the P-47 planes returned again and attacked Marvie 

with bombs and bullets.59 At 1945 Bastogne was bombed and 

strafed by several enemy planes.6o 

At 1800, December 24, Colonel Harper was told that he was 

in command of the perimeter all the way from Marvie to northwest of Hemroulle. 

Colonel Harper said to General Higgins, "Look at it! This is 

half of the Division perimeter." 

General Higgins replied, "It's all yours. Do what you can with 

it. There isn't any other solution."61 
132 BASTOGNE 

Higgins reasoned that it was a fairly safe gamble. He had 

studied the map carefully and had gleaned all that he could from 

firsthand study of the country just outside the Bastogne perimeter. The landscape to the south was heavily wooded and therefore not suitable for armor. He considered that the only place 

where the enemy was likely to strike Harper's sector in force was 

at the Wiltz road. But the opening there was a pretty narrow 

corridor and he felt that Harper had enough strength across the 

Wiltz road to deal with any fresh threat at that point. What concerned General Higgins most was the position in the northwest 

sector, a gently rolling hill country, with no natural obstacles and 

very little tree growth. Thus far it had been the quietest portion 

of the perimeter but that fact did not lessen Higgins' apprehension; he felt sure that if a real tank stroke was coming, this would 

be the point of danger. He remarked to General McAuliffe that 

they could expect to be entertained out there on Christmas Day. 

"The Germans are a sentimental people," he said, "and they 

are probably thinking about giving a present to Hitler."62 
CHAPTER 16 

LOW EBB OF SUPPLY 

DESPITE the deceptively inactive appearance of the front, 

the defenders of Bastogne had actually reached the lowest 

ebb of their fortune by the night of December 22. The crisis was 

a matter of supply.l. 

General McAuliffe's confidence thus far had been well 

founded: In manpower, he had been able to maintain a very favorable balance between his reserves and his deployments. His 

infantry losses had been light. The circle of defenses had been 

scarcely dented. The German forces, which as a whole had been 

rapidly moving in the Bulge offensive elsewhere, had so signally 

failed to put on a coordinated ~ttack against his all-around front 

that he had been able to beat down each of their separate thrusts 

by massing the.fire of his artillery.2 

The gun pits of all the defending 105mm. batteries were complete circles. At different times during the siege nearly all guns 

fired around the whole 6,400 mils of the compass. Most of the 

artillery fired in support of each infantry battalion against every 

major attack the Germans made.8 

More than that, however, the artillery could not do. All day 

long the infantry commanders witnessed the enemy build-up opposite their sectors. Tanks and half-tracks loaded with German 

infantry moved freely and contemptuously along the lateral roads, 

making no effort at concealment although they were within easy 

range of the howitzers. It made the defenders frantic." 

For by noon of December 22 the 463d Field Artillery Battalion, which was supporting the 327th Glider Infantry, had only 

200 rounds of ammunition left and the other battalions were in a 

similar plight.' During the first three days there had been shells 

enough. Now, in the face of the enemy build-up, the pinch was 

really hurting and General McAuliffe was about at the point 

where he would have to ration his guns to ten rounds per day.' 

There was a delightfully ironic touch even to that restriction, 

for the supply had dropped very low indeed. Checking the bat-

[ 133] 
134 BASTOGNE 

talions on that day, Colonel Sherburne, the artillery commander, 

found that with the exception of one battalion which had several hundred rounds of short-range 105mm. ammunition which it 

alone was equipped to fire, the batteries were down to less than 

ten rounds total per gun. Still, he kept his own counsel, and when 

men and officers asked him how the general supply of artillery 

ammunition was faring, he lied cheerfully and skillfully. At times 

members of the staff became confused between the true figures 

and the figures which Sherburne was quoting publicly for the 

sake of morale. The shell shortage continued to be General McAuliffe's worst, in fact, his only real worry. He told his batteries 

not to fire "until you see the whites of their eyes."1 

The infantry commanders and the few remaining artillery 

observers screamed their heads off about it. One commander 

phoned General McAuliffe, "We are about to be attacked by 

two regiments. We can see them out there. Please let us fire at 

least two rounds per gun." 

Colonel Kinnard listened to this plea and later recalled General McAuliffe's reply, "If you see 400 Gennans in a l00-yard 

area, and they have their heads up, you can fire artillery at them 

-but not more than two rounds." 

At the same time, the Bastogne defenders were running low 

on small-anns ammunition.8 

So with somewhat mixed feelings the word was received among 

the regiments at 1530 on that evening that a column from the 4th 

Armored Division was coming up from the southwest to support 

the WIst Airborne Division and would be able to give the IOlst 

relief in time.9 

It was still a neat question whether that relief would come 

before the ammunition ran out. 

In the smaller units which were attachments to the lOIst perhaps the strain was even greater.10 Confidence can come of numbers around the headquarters of a large organization. Talking 

with his staff, General McAuliffe gained the impression that 

none doubted the outcome.l1 But out on the fire line, friends 

shook hands as the darkness came, figuring that all might be 

overwhelmed before morning.12 They could take no measure of 
LOW EBB OF SUPPLY 135 

the reserve strength of the position. What they saw was how 

few rounds per gun they had left and how large were the numbers of the enemy. The paratroopers were somewhat accustomed 

to being surrounded by enemy, but it was a new experience for 

the units who stood with them, unwavering. 

The first message from the 4th Annored said, "Hugh is coming." When General McAuliffe had visited General Middleton 

(commander of VIn Corps) in Neufchateau on the night of 

December 20, he had been told that General Patton was attacking east of Bastogne. The two commanders then set up a simple 

code, each town along the route getting a letter. Bastogne was 

"K." Others were designated A, B, C. Now the word was that 

"Hugh [Major General Hugh J. Gaffey, commanding the 4th 

A~ored Division] is on his way."lS 

On the heels of that assurance came another message equally 

bright. VIII Corps radioed that pathfinders would arrive in Bastogne at 1600 and that resupply by air would start coming in at 

2000.14 Colonel Kohls, G-4, WIst Division, had waited all day 

long for that appointment, for on the day before VIII Corps had 

told him to prepare for "resupply tomorrow if weather pennits."15 

Directly west of the houses of Bastogne are large, clear fields 

on a gentle hillside, dose to where the WIst Division had made 

its command post. This was the designated spot. 

Under average operating conditions resupply bundles are recovered by Quartennaster and Ordnance companies and their 

items of materiel are then segregated in Class I, III and V dumps 

under Division control. At Bastogne, Colonel Kohls had no Division supply forces available either to pick up the resupply or manage the distribution. The regiments were therefore told to send 

at least five quarter-ton trucks ~o the field to handle the supplies 

directly and haul them to unit dumps. The units were told to 

report what supplies they had each recovered and then to distribute them according to orders which would be gi.ven by the 

G-4 Section.111 

At 0730 on December 22, the task of recovering the aerial 

resupply was given to Major William H. Butler, S-4 of the 501st 

Parachute Infantry, and Captain Matheson, S-4 of the 506th. 
136 BASTOGNE 

They went to the drop zone, got the crews and vehicles alerted, 

put but the panels to guide the plane and then waited. If 

Nothing happened during the day. In the late afternoon came 

the message from VIII Corps. At 1605 Corps said that the pathfinders would be dropped at 1723 and that the Bight would be 

two planes with ten men each.ls Captain John M. Huffman, Assistant to G4, went at once to the drop zone to notify Major 

Butler. However, at 1641 the operation was cancelled because of 

ice conditions. 

Then the Division rear base radioed at 1700 that sixty C-47s 

would drop supplies on the first flyable day. However, VIII 

Corps had not yet given up. At 2115, it radioed that an attempt 

"will be made to drop a portion of the supplies."18 

Colonel Kohls again alerted Butler who went to the drop zone 

and put out the fluor~ent panels. Nothing happened. Out of 

great expectation came only great disappointment. 
CHAPTER 17 

SUPPLIES ARRIVE1 

FROM DAYLIGHT on December 23 all guards stood alerted 

for the first appearance of the C-47s. At 0935 a military 

policeman on duty at the entrance to the 101st Division command 

post carried the word to Colonel Kohls that several large planes 

were circling the area. 

A few minutes later, the pathfinders jumped in the area where 

the 2d Battalion of Colonel Harper's 327th Glider Infantry was 

deployed. They were quickly rounded up by his men. One minute later, First Lieutenant Gordon o. Rothwell, commanding 

the pathfinder team, was on the telephone explaining to Colonel 

Kohls that the supply planes would arrive in about 90 minutes. 

Kohls told him how to get to the drop zone and where to put the 

radar set. Again the regimental supply men were alerted. Again 

Major Butler displayed the panels. At 1150 on the 23d, men all 

along the front saw the planes coming in; it was the most heartening spectacle of the entire siege. (Plates 31 to 33.) 

Men and vehicles were all set for it. The pathfinder mdar had 

given Captain Huffman and Lieutenant Colonel John T. Cooper, 

Jr. (Commanding Officer, 463d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion) a half-hour advance warning that the planes were coming 

in and the supply parties reached the field ten minutes before the 

Hight, in time for Huffman to assign zones of retrieving to each 

unit so that there would be a uniformly quick pick-up. There 

was very little enemy fire on any part of the field. 

Sixteen planes arrived in the first Hight, but these were just 

the beginning. By 1606 of that day, 241 planes had dropped 

1,446 bundles weighing 144 tons by parachute into the niilesquare drop zone. The drop pattern was excellent and there was 

about a 95 per cent recovery of the dropped material. 

Working against the approaching darkness, the supply crews 

threw whole bundles, parachute and all, into the jeeps and shuttled between the drop zone and their dumps as fast as they could 

tear over the ground. All supplies were in the unit dumps by 

[137 ] 
138 BASTOGNE 

1700, and even before that time ammunition had been rushed 

directly to the front lines and the battery positions. The artillery 

was firing part of the resupply ammunition at the enemy before 

the drop zone had been cleared. 

By the time darkness came on, Colonel Kohls had at hand reports from all the unit supply officers telling what quantities of 

materiel had reached their unit dumps. It took only a brief checking on his part to see that his supply problem was far from being 

solved. The contents of the bundles were not in balance with the 

real needs of the troops. They still desperately lacked certain 

items and they had received others which they did not need or 

want. A great amount of caliber .50 ammunition had been sent 

up but this was not much in demand. The new supply of caliber 

.30 for the MI, and of 76mm. APC and 75mm. ammunition was 

insufficient. The Division needed Jitters and penicillin badly and 

though it had collected all of the available bed clothing from the 

Belgian community, many of its men were still miserably cold at 

night and were asking for blankets. 

Colonel I~ohls talked to VIII Corps again at 0830 the next 

morning (December 24) and said he wanted these things. He 

asked for additional quantities of ammunition for the 75mm. 

pack howitzer and also of 105mm. M3 shell. He asked VIII 

Corps to investigate the possibility of using gliders in the further 

resupply. All the early resupply missions had been done by parachute. As they came in the Germans put up a terrific amount of 

flak. The troops saw a number of C-47s shot down, but these 

losses had not made other planes take evasive action. Colonel 

Harper said of the pilots who Hew these missions: 

"Their courage was tremendous, and I believe that their example did a great deal to encourage my infantry." 

While Kohls was talking, the first resupply planes of the day 

appeared over the drop zone and more bundles continued to rain 

down on the field until 1530. About 100 tons of materiel were 

parachuted out of 160 planes during that second day of resupply. 

Even so, the Division's stocking was not by any means full as 

Christmas Eve drew on. The shortaQ:es wei~hed more on Colonel 

Kohls than what had been accomplished. Only 445 gallons of 
SUPPLIES ARRIVE 139 

gasoline were on hand. The 26,406 K rations that had been received were only enough to supply the defenders of Bastogne for 

a little more than a single day. The troops were instructed, for a 

second time, to forage for any food supplies in their areas and to 

report them to G-4 so that they could be distributed where they 

were needed most. 

This had been done from the beginning and a large part of the 

subsistence of the defense had come from the ruined stores of 

Bastogne or from the stocks of the farming community. From 

an abandoned Corps bakery had come flour, lard, salt and a small 

quantity of coffee. Colonel Kohls got these things out to the 

troops and during the first days of the siege the favorite menu 

item along the firing line was flapjacks. The coffee, however, was 

saved for the hospital. The farmers had fairly good supplies of 

potatoes, poultry and cattle. These were taken. over on requisition, to be paid for later by the United States. In an abandoned 

Corps warehou~e were found another 450 pounds of coffee, 600 

pounds of sugar and a large amount of Oval tine. These things 

were all hoarded for the wounded. Prowling about Bastogne, the 

Civil Affairs Officer, Captain Robert S. Smith, found a large 

store of margarine, jam and flour in a civilian warehouse. This 

assured flapjacks for several more days. What was equally important, he found 2,000 burlap bags among the groceries and the 

bags were rushed out to the infantrymen in the foxholes to wrap 

around their feet where they lacked arctic overshoes. 

By Christmas Eve these supplementary stores were pretty well 

exhausted. Christmas was a K-ration day-for the men who had 

K rations. 
CHAPTER 18 

THE SITUATION IMPROVES 

WITHOUT FULLY REALIZING IT, the defenders of 

Bastogne passed their crisis on December 23 (Map 17, 

page 128). They could not measure the change, nor did they 

know how many elements were acting in their favor. But quite 

sudd~nly everything began to come their way. This was not a 

matter alone of successful local tactics against the enemy. Nor 

was it only that the measures taken by the VIII Corps and the 

larger forces concerned with the relief of the defenders were at 

last beginning to bear fruit, as evidenced by the arrival of the 

resupply missions. For one thing, such a vital matter as the 

weather continued to favor the defense. 

In the beginning there had been fog and acute dampness 

which appeared at first blush to doubly jeopardize the situation 

of a force that was having to feel its way to the enemy and was 

suffering from shortages of clothing and blankets. Yet all that 

happened in the opening encounters during the first two days 

Bastogne's fate was in the balance proved that the atmosphere 

served almost as a protecting screen for the defenders and 

wrought confusion among the oncoming forces.l Had there not 

been fog of course there could have been air support. 2 But it is a 

question whether that support could have been greatly effective 

during a period when it would have been difficult to distinguish 

between the retreating remnants of the broken American divisions 

and the advancing German columns.s Again, an early intervention by the air power might have forestalled those concentrations 

of German armor and other vehicles which were to provide such 

inviting targets when the opening at last came. 

On December 19 Captain James E. Parker, of the Ninth Air 

Force, reported into Bastogne as air controller for the defense. 

His equipment consisted of a pocket full of radio crystals; what 

he needed was a high frequency radio that would give him contact with American planes. He searched the whole 101 st Division 

without success, then found that the attached 10th Armored Di-

[ 140] 
THE SITUATION IMPROVES 141 

vision units had two radios of the type needed-one in a tank and 

the other in a jeep. The tank could not be spared but the jeep 

and a technician from Ninth Air Force, Sergeant Frank B. 

Hotard, were given to Captain Parker. By December 21 his radio 

equipment was complete and he was ready to work with supporting planes. But the fog still enveloped Bastogne to keep the 

planes away. Parker had to wait two more days.4 

While the fog held, the first snow flurries came and the weather 

grew increasingly cold. On the night of Dec~ber 21 came the 

first heavy snowfall, adding to the hardships of the front-line 

troops and the hazards of patrolling. 5 The overcast was still thick 

and the ground fog irregular. On the morning of December 23, 

for the first time since the Bastogne defenders were committed to 

action, a day dawned fair and clear though with freezing temperatures. It looked like the hour of opportunity.s 

By then the defenses of Bastogne had become so closely knit, 

and there was such compl~te harmony and mutual confidence 

among the oddly assorted groups of the defense, that it seemed 

certain that all of the changes in the natural conditions of the 

battlefield would work only to the disadvantage of the enemy. 

The defensive lines were set. The crisp clear air insured that if 

the Germans came on, their snow-suit camouflage would not be 

overly helpful; at least their features and their weapons could be 

seen.1 The roads from Bastogne to all parts of the perimeter were 

like the spokes of a wheel. They were generally good roads. But 

particularly around the northern half of the defense they entered 

the perimeter over ground where a stout roadblock might well 

hold up an armored regiment for hours.8 The German armor 

and its support had largely held to the roads during the period of 

build-up; and they were still out there, daring the lightning. 

Wire communications from Bastogne command post to all parts 

of the perimeter were working as strongly on behalf of the defense as was the axial highway system.s Only' a few times had 

the wire gone out. The lOIst's practice of emphasizing a net of 

lateral wires, which set up several ways of reaching the outfits on 

the perimeter, had saved a number of situations that might other-
142 BASTOGNE 

wise have been blacked out. And foresightedly, the Signal Company had brought in plenty of extra wire.iO 

Now that there was the sure prospect of air resupply, the artillery situation was looking up. It had suffered thus tar only from 

its fears that the ammunition wouldn't last.u By the 22d, General McAuliffe's supply had dropped down to twenty-odd rounds 

per gun and Colonel Roberts' about as low, and some guns were 

down to ten rounds.12 But both commanders were certain that 

as long as the artillery ammunition lasted, Bastogne would hold.18 

The opening engagements had reaffirmed the power of an 

ample artillery properly directed, and by committing their forces 

piecemeal the Germans had played right into the hands of the 

defense which had staked its life on the massed fire of its guns.a 

The guns of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, were 

capable of getting 11,000 yards out of their 105mm. ammunition 

while the same ammunition in the short 105 tubes of the Airborne Artillery units could only reach about 4,500 yards. The 

Armored Artillery was therefore the real power of the defense 

together with the twenty 155mm. howitzers of the Artillery bat~ 

talions that had been caught in the town15 (the 755th and part of 

the 333d Field Artillery Group); 

During the first stage, the great natural strength of the position 

and the vast superiority of the American artillery had worked together for the salvation of Bastogne. The German artillery had 

been little more than a cipher, save for the fire from the tanks 

and self-propelled guns. At times it seemed to consist of single 

guns and their shoots were never very 10ng.18 The town itself 

had not yet been given any steady shelling by the enemy guns 

and the command posts were able to maintain their liaison with 

little difficulty. 

This lack of power in the German artillery and the inability 

of the German foot and armor to coordinate their assaults against 

different parts of the perimeter-probably because their communication system had broken under the pressures of the advance-minimized the moral strain which would normally afHict 

a body of troops that found itself surrounded.17 The command 

and staff of the defense were not feeling what they had expected 
THE SITUATION IMPROVES 143 

to feel from the lessons they had learned at Leavenworth and 

Benning.l8 They knew they were cut off. The G-2 reports and 

the incessant patrol activities against all portions of the defensive 

circle told them so. But they did not feel cut off.a They remained 

mobile and mentally able to promote all of the tactical advantages 

of their interior position. The thought that there were Germans 

all around them brought no particular extra worry. They were 

confident that help from the outside was just around the corner.20 

However, the most decisive gains of the period had been in the 

work of the fighting men themselves and in their feeling about 

one another. In the beginning the different elements of the defense were almost out of communication one with the other. 

Things had happened so fast that they had been compelled to 

engage the enemy before giving a thought to their own liaison.21 

But in the course of battle the infantry, the armored force and 

the tank destroyer crews had taken full measure of each other and 

found the measure sufficient. 22 The birth of mutual confidence 

and respect had produced not only tactical cohesion but comradeship in such a degree that before the siege was over these units 

were to ask their higher commanders whether it wouldn't be possible for them to be joined permanently in one large force. They 

had come to believe that together they had become irresistible.2s 

Mter their first tilt in which each had spoken bluntly and made 

his point, General McAuliffe and Colonel Roberts tabled their 

feelings and worked together to perfect the team play of their 

respective forces. As McAuliffe's advisor on armor, Roberts 

found himself among "the best and keenest staff" he had ever 

seen. 2' Not only did they radiate extreme confidence but they 

proved to be "great bird dogs" in detecting early enemy buildUpS.25 As soon as the first signs of an enemy attack became 

apparent, Colonel Roberts would alert his Division reserve and 

get it moving toward the likely area of irruption. He would then 

concern himself with building another Division reserve. He 

never bothered General McAuliffe with these details. 26 If it 

chanced that Colonel Cherry, the Division reserve commander, 

got cut up, or if the 101st Division troops moved over during an 

action and drew parts of Team Cherry into the front line, there 
144 BASTOGNE 

was always Team O'Hara with 14 tanks which he could get out 

of line quickly in case of necessity.27 

Colonel Roberts' force had more than paid for itself during the 

first two days. He had taken his greatest losses in tanks and men 

in the opening engagement, but that sacrifice had staved off the 

Germans and gained the exact amount of time needed for the 

WIst to establish itself solidly.2s After the first two days Colonel 

Roberts' two chopped-up teams were consolidated as one and this 

part of the force became his Division reserve. The number of 

tanks available for it varied from day to day between six and ten.lID 

Lieutenant Colonel Templeton; the Tank Destroyer commander C705th Battalion), took hold in the same strong way, 

even having his men fight as infantrymen when they could not 

be employed otherwise.80 On the other hand he was never loath 

to make his point strongly any time he thought the higher commanders were planning to make an unwise employment of his 

forces.31 Colonel Templeton's command post was only a hundred 

yards from the command post of the 101st Division, so coordination was simple. In tum he received from the battalion commanders of the WIst the kind of support that rewarded all of his 

effort. During relief periods the infantry platoons covering his 

tank destroyers made the security of Templeton's guns their first 

concern.811 

Colonel Roberts, too, was learning from Templeton as they 

went along. He had reached the conclusion that, properly employed in a defense like Bastogne, some tanks must be up with 

the infantry and some in reserve in the "socker" role.s8 But what 

bothered him was .the discovery that while his tankers were actually having to work as tank destroyers about 98 per cent of the 

time, the tank destroyer men seemed so much better trained to 

get away with it. This was strongly reRected in the ratio of losses 

in the two forces when compared with the damage done to the 

enemy armor." 

At 1000 on December 23 Captain Parker at his radio heard 

that supporting planes were on their way. Within a few minutes 

he was telling them where to strike. The strongest enemy buildups at this time were west and northwest of the town, threatening 
THE SITUATION IMPROVES 145 

the sectors held by the 502d Parachute Infantry and the 327th 

Glider Infantry regiments. The infantry front lines had been 

hearing and seeing the arrival of these concentrations during the 

past two days. But because of the shortage of artillery ammunition, there had been no real check against them. The planes 

dropped low and came in fast against the enemy columns, gaining complete surprise.35 The German vehicles were on the road 

faCing toward Bastogne when the first bombs fell among them. 

Such was the execution that one of the pilots later said to General McAuliffe, "This was better hunting than the Falaise pocket 

and that was the best I ever expected to see."Se 

On that first day the Germans did not use their antiaircraft 

guns against any of the dive bombers.aT If this reticence was due 

to a desire to cover up the positions of the guns, it was a view 

quickly changed because of the damage the Ninth Air Force 

planes had done during the first day. For thereafter the German 

flak was intense over the front at all times and the air units had 

no further hours of unopposed operation.s8 

They made the most of their opening opportunity. The snow 

was a great aid. Clearly visible tracks pointed to forest positions 

which were prompdy bombed.s9 The fir forests burst into flames 

from the fire bombs and before the day was out the smoke from 

these blazing plantations and from the brewed-up enemy columns made a complete circle around the besieged forces until it 

seemed almost as if the fog was closing in again.40 The air people 

hit every nearby town at least once with explosive and fire bombs. 

Noville was hit ten times.'l 

The entire air operation was carefully systematized and then 

supervised in detail. As planes were assigned to the 101 st Division by VIII Corps, they checked in with Captain Parker by 

radio. He put them on a clear landmark such as a railroad or 

highway as they came in toward Bastogne. Several check points 

were then given to them from the map. When the approaching 

planes were definitely located, an approach direction was given 

that would bring them straight in over the target. This procedure 

eliminated all need for circling and searching and helped them 

surprise the enemy. When the bombs and gun ammunition were 
146 BASTOGNE 

expended, the planes were ordered up to a safe altitude to patrol 

the perimeter of the defenses or were given specific reconnaissance missions. Their reconnaissance reports were used as the 

basis for giving targets for succeeding Bights and for giving the 

ground forces advance infonnation on the build-up of enemy 

strength. Mter the first Bight there were always targets listed 

ahead. Captain Parker, carefully monitoring the air, also came 

across Bights assigned to other ground forces battling in the Bulge 

which had no missions for their bombs. He would then call to 

them and he often succeeded in persuading them to drop their 

bombs in the Bastogne area. In a few minutes these planes would 

be hack on their assigned missions.42 

During the first four days of their support, December 23 to 26, 

the planes averaged more than 250 sorties daily.48 Mter that 

there were two days of bad weather and then the weather came 

fair again. But it was on December 23 that the air support 

clanged the bell most loudly and thereby assured decision for the 

American forces. Colonel Roberts, watching the planes at work, 

said with enthusiasm that the effect was worth two or three infantry divisions. ~4 General McAuliffe bracketed their work with 

the overwhelming superiority of his artillery and the supreme 

courage of the men on the ground in his analysis of why Bastogne 

was saved.45 

It was not unusual during the siege to have an infantryman 

call in that five tanks were coming at him and then see six P-47s 

diving at the tanks within 20 minutes.46 
CHAPTER 19 

WEST OF BASTOGNE 

FOR SIX DAYS the enemy had made only a few swift passes 

at General McAuliffe's line facing toward the west. That 

was the way the command and staff had figured the battle was 

most likely to develop. Colonel Kinnard, who had worked out 

the tactical plan for the defense of Bastogne, felt that the forces 

could be spread thinnest toward the southwest.1 

Between Colonel Harper, commanding the 327th, and Lieutenant Colonel Ray C. Allen, commanding the 3d Battalion 

which held the attenuated lines covering toward NeufcMteau, 

there passed a jest typifying the situation. "How are you doing 

on yourleft?" "Good! We have two jeeps out there."2 

In the northwest sector, the Germans accommodated General 

McAuliffe's plan of saving the 502d Parachute Infantry for his 

Sunday punch and that regiment had relatively little fighting 

though it went through a great many motions.s 

In the beginning Colonel Allen's 3d Battalion, 327th, became 

engaged because 'Of the enemy penetration which on the night of 

December 19-20 reached the Bois de Herbaimont from the direction of Houffalize. and overran and captured the 326th Medical 

Company near crossroads "X." Nine men from the 28th Division 

-remnant of a group of more than 100 men-got back to Colonel 

Allen's command post at 2030 and told him how this same German force had anibushed and destroyed their company. It was 

the first information that the Bastogne-St. Hubert road had been 

cut and it meant the probable end of any possibility that supplies 

could be brought in from the northwest. The 101st Division 

Headquarters became alarmed. At 2200 Colonel Allen was told 

to move a company out against the roadblock which the enemy 

had established and destroy it. 

Company B under Captain Robert J. McDonald was two 

hours in preparing for the attack, but it moved out at midnight, 

December 20-21, and was approaching the roadblock after about 

a 90-minute march. The men moved down the ditches on either 

[147 ] 
148 BASTOGNE 

side of the St. Hubert road with two guides walking on the road 

to keep contact in the darkness. Ahead, they could see a number 

of vehicles burning and they could hear the enemy laughing and 

talking. The horns on several of the vehicles had become stuck, 

adding volume to the sounds which guided them toward their 

target. The company moved to a ridge within 75 yards of the 

roadblock, and there deployed. The din from the German position was such that they accomplished this movement without 

being detected. They formed up with the 2d Platoon on the left, 

the 3d Platoon on the right, and the 1st Platoon in the center, 

supported by the heavier weapons. One squad of the 2d Platoon 

moved to the Sprimont road and formed a block across it about 

100 yards from crossroads <IX." On the other flank a squad from 

the 3d Platoon established a block for the same purpose about 

100 yards outside the enemy outposts. 

Captain McDonald had figured that the roadblock on the right 

would take longest to establish, so he directed the squad leader to 

fire two quick rifle shots when his men were in position. The 

plan worked perfectly. When the two shots were fired, the center moved forward, the men shooting from the hip as they advanced. The Germans were taken wholly by surprise and most 

of them fled toward the Bois de Herbaimont just to the north 

whence they had come originally. So doing, they crossed the 

killing ground which was covered by the squad on the right 

under Technical Sergeant Mike Campano. They were in such 

numbers that Campano's men could hardly shoot fast enough. 

More than 50 Germans were killed. None was taken prisoner. 

Company B didn't lose a man. 

When the last German had been cleared from the area roadblocks were organized in all directions, with an esPecially strong 

block being set up on the highway to Salle (3t2. miles southwest 

of Bertogne). In this general position, Company B became the 

farthest outpost of the division. In their search of the area the 

company found three Americans who had been prisoners of the 

Germans. One was a Negro truck driver and the other two were 

from the Finance Department of the 28th Division. They also 

found two dead paratroopers whose throats had been slashed; 
WEST OF BASTOGNE 149 

they guessed that these men had been patients when the hospital 

was overrun. A number of American trucks were recovered, 

some containing medical supplies, one carrying a load of mail and 

another loaded with explosives. 

On finding an American light tank among the enemy booty, 

Company B incorporated it into their defenses along with several 

caliber .50 machine guns from the recaptured trucks. The noise 

of the skirmish had drawn an artillery observer from the 333d 

Field Artillery Group and he attached himself to Company Band 

stood ready to deliver supporting fire from the 155mm. howitzers 

when it would be needed. 

At 0700 on December 21 an enemy column was seen approaching from the direction of Salle. The men at the roadblock guessed 

it was an artillery battery for it contained hine half-tracks, seven 

75mm. guns and seven light vehicles. Captain McDonald's men 

were in a cut above the highway and their position was so well 

screened that the German column came to within 25 yards before the defenders opened fire. Then they let them have it with 

all weapons-their rifles, machine guns, a 57mm. gun and the 

guns of the light tank. Only one light vehicle from the column 

managed to tum and get away. All of the enemy guns were captured intact but they could not be moved to town and they were 

therefore destroyed with the aid of the recaptured explosives. 

Shortly thereafter, two tanks supported by a group of German 

infantry tried to flank the position from the northwest. Company 

B crippled one tank with a rocket and the other tank withdrew. 

The infantry group was driven back by small-arms fire from Company B's position, supported by artillery fire. 

At noon the roadbla<:k positions were put under fire by enemy 

tanks operating to the southward of Salle. The tank fire was 

silenced by two tank destroyers from the 705th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion which had just corne forward to help Captain McDonald's company. However, by this time it had become clear that 

the roadblock had little importance. Patrols had been sent out to 

the northwest and southwest and they returned with information 

that the highway bridges in both directions had been blown. 

Since the highway was of no further service as a supply route for 
150 BASTOGNE 

the Division, Company B was ordered to return to the battalion 

sector. It did so in the early evening.' 

At 0900 on December 22, one German group cut the road to 

Mont southeast of Flamizoulle. (Near Mande-St.-f:tienne.) The 

outpost which sighted it said that it had set up a roadblock with 

"two half-tracks, one jeep and a trailer." Just before noon, Colonel Allen put on an attack directly south to dear the road. He 

took twenty-five prisoners and drove the rest off. The motor 

vehicles turned out to be ordinary farm carts which the Germans 

had hooked together for use as a block. A platoon of Colonel 

Templeton's tank destroyers then reconnoitered the road, the sections covering one another alternately from one terrain feature to 

the next. They reported to Colonel Allen that the road was open. 5 

In the northwest sector, the 502d Parachute Infantry engaged 

directly without any long-range sparring with the enemy. That 

came of the order which initially took Colonel Stopka's 3d Battalion, 502d, to Recogne to help extricate the Noville force (See 

Chapter 7).8 Four tank destroyers accompanied the battalion to 

Recogne and stayed there, backing up the line. They got no action the first day though two m~n and a jeep from the 705th's RecQnnaissance Company set up as an evacuation team and shuttled the wounded out of the 502d area after a heavy shelling by 

the German tank artillery.1 

At 0730 on December 21, the 1st Battalion, 502d, moved to 

the area just east of Grosse-Hez (two mil~s east of Champs) on 

Division order, and with this shifting of the line, Company A was 

ordered back to its own battalion. (It had been attached to the 

2d Battalion to fill out the 2d's long front.) One hour later, the 

1st Battalion started up the road toward Recogne. Company G 

of the 506th Parachute Infantry had been hit at Foy and had 

pulled back its left Hank to high ground. This maneuver exposed 

Colonel Stopka's (2d Battalion) right Hank which was anchored 

in the first few buildings at the north end of Recogne. Stopka 

had already swung his reserve, Company G, around to his right 

and faced it south so as to cover the open Hank. He had been 

helped a little by one of the tank destroyers.s The morning was 

intensely foggy and enemy armor could be heard roaming around 
WEST OF BASTOGNE 151 

just beyond the murk. Sergeant Lazar.Hovland got a clear sight 

of one enemy tank and set it afire in four rounds. A second German tank fired on Hovland and missed; Hovland crippled it with 

a quick shot but it pulled back into the fog.1/ 

By the new order from WIst Division, the 1st Battalion was to 

clean out Recogne finally and then fill the gap between the 502d 

and 506th regiments. The order was changed a few minutes later 

when Colonel Sink (506th commander) reported to General 

McAuliffe that despite Company G's difficulty the 506th's position was pretty sound.10 General McAuliffe decided that it made 

little difference whether he held Recogne.ll The 1st Battalion, 

502d, which had been sweeping forward with two companies 

abreast, was told to keep on moving but in column of companies. 

General McAuliffe asked Colonel Stopka if he could disengage, 

pull back of Recogne and stand on a line running southeastward 

to where he could join Colonel Sink's flank. Inasmuch as Company G was already standing on this line which curved crescentfashion around a reverse slope, Stopka said he would be glad to 

make the move. At noontime the 1st Battalion was moved back 

to Grosse-Hez and Company A was moved to the south of longchamps to stop anything that might come that way. The 377th 

Field Artillery Battalion had given support to the 502d during 

the latter stage of this operation and had fired 60 rounds on the 

highway from Salle to Bertogne. The fire knocked out six vehicles 

of a German column which was turned back by these losses.12 

On December 22 the enemy build-up along the Salle-Bertogne 

road continued at such a pace toat at noontime Colonel Chappuis, the 502d's commander, moved Company A to Champs and 

the rest of the 1st Battalion to Hemroulle (two miles west of Bastogne), which faced them to the westward. A platoon from Company B was set up as a roadblock, where Company A had been, 

along the Longchamps-Bastogne road. 

The 3d Battalion received German probing attacks all day 

long, but on a limited scale. Two of the tank destroyers which 

had been with Colonel Stopka's 3d Battalion were switched over 

to support Company A in Champs. A patrol was sent to Rouette, 

a mile north of Champs, to check on enemy activities. It encoun-
152 BASTOGNE 

tered a small detachment of Germans in the village, engaged 14 

of them in a 20-minute fight, drove them off with machine-gun 

and rifle fire and withdrew under cover of fire from the 377th 

Parachute FA Battalion.1S 

On December 23, the positions were unchanged. Another patrol went into Rouette under the leadership of First Lieutenant 

David E. White. They got close enough to see that the enemy 

was occupying a line of outposts on high ground which overlooked the roads to Champs and Givry (two miles northwest of 

Champs). The -enemy was feverishly at work setting up roadblocks of farm carts bound together. There was a great deal of 

digging going on next to the positions.16 

Farther to the southward the signs were becoming equally ominous. Colonel Allen's 3d Battalion of the 327th Glider Infantry 

was situated in defense of the area of Flamierge, Flamizoulle and 

the St. Hubert highway west of Mande-St.-f:tienne. This put-it 

well to the west of any other unit, without friendly contact on 

either its right or. left. Feeling that his battalion was overextended, Colonel Allen issued a withdrawal plan to his units on 

December 21 which was known as Plan A. By this plan, Company C 'would move through Company B in Flamizoulle and 

Company B would then follow and go. through Company A. It 

was the responsibility of Company A to hold off the enemy until 

the two other companies were situated on the high ground west 

of Champs and Grandes-Fanges (a mile to the south). Company 

A would then withdraw through Company B and Company C 

would go into a reserve position. 

At noon on December 23, patrols reported enemy tanks approaching from the woods to the south of the St. Hubert road. 

On drawing nearer, this force revealed itself as twelve tanks accompanied by infantry in snow suits. About 1330 Colonel Allen's 

outposts began their withdrawal without trying to engage the 

German armor. Allen was fearful that the Germans would move 

to his right and cut him off from Bastogne. Instead, they moved 

to the left and halted on the ridge just south of the main road 

near Cochleval. From this ground they fired upon Company C's 

position, but upon trying to advance, were turned back by the 
WEST OF BASTOGNE 153 

American artillery. In one sortie they lost two tanks to artillery 

fire and the rest of the Gennan annor then withdrew to turret 

defilade and continued to fire into Company C for the rest of the 

afternoon. Six of Colonel Templeton's tank destroyers (of the 

705th), along with the reconnaissance platoon, had been in position where with good fortune they might have supported Company C in the first stage of this action. But as they pulled out of 

the cut just beyond Mande-St.-Etienne, enemy tanks shelled 

them from the woods off their flank and two tank destroyers were 

lost immediately. This caused a more cautious attitude on the 

part of the other tank destroyers and they withdrew slightly while 

the reconnaissance platoon went forward to screen them on the 

left flank. The other tank destroyers distributed themselves so as 

to block the roads leading into Mont and the reconnaissance platoon dug in along the same line. 

As darkness came on, Colonel Allen got word that his roadblock at Flamierge had been overrun by an enemy infantry force 

wearing snow suitS. This Gennan column had come down the 

St. Hubert highway from 0111 of the northwest. Allen's men had 

been under the mistaken impression that a friendly force-the 

4th Armored Divisiotl-would arrive by this same route. They 

mistook the identity of the group and let it come on until the 

time had passed for successful resistance. 

Four tanks moving along with the road column suddenly 

opened fire on Company C, hitting a number of men· and destroying the company aid station, an antitank gun and a pile of 

mortar ammunition with the first few rounds. The four tanks 

pressed on against the company position. At the same time the 

ten tanks to the southward began coming over the ridge. Company C withdrew as best it could. 

Colonel Allen figured that by now his whole battalion position 

was in jeopardy and he ordered Plan A put into effect. But Company C was in such confusion that it couldn't carry out the withdrawal exactly as planned. One platoon got out to the southeastward by way of the main road to escape being cut off. The other 

platoons pulled back along the predetennined route. Company 

B came through Company A as planned and took position on the 
154 BASTOGNB 

left Bank of the high ground where Colonel Allen had determined to make his stand. Company A moved to the rear in reserve. However, Company C's losses were such that Company A 

had to come back forward again and take Company C's place in 

the line. Fortunately, the enemy did not press the attack. 

Allen told his men, "This is our last withdrawal. Live or die 

-this is it." 

fie had spoken correctly; the battalion was never pushed from 

that ground though it was still to face its worst ordeal.lII 

The next day was quiet. The men cleaned their weapons and 

waited for Christmas Eve. 
CHAPTER 20 

CHRISTMAS EVE 

CHRISTMAS EVE WAS QUIET. The commanders and 

staffs took official notice of the occasion. To all of the command posts within Bastogne went a G-2 reminder from the WIst's 

chief joker, Colonel Danahy. It was a sitrep overlay in red> white 

and green, the red outlining the enemy positions completely encircling the town and the green showing only in the words "Merry 

Christmas" across the position held by the defenders.1 (Map 18, 

page 156.) 

General McAuliffe also rose to the occasion with an inspired 

communique in which he told his men about the German de~ 

mand for surrender and his answer to them. The rest of his 

Christmas message read as follows: 

What's merry about all this, you ask? We're fighting-it's cold-we 

aren't home. All true, but what has the proud Eagle Division accomplished with its worthy comrades of the 10th Armored Division, the 

705th Tank Destroyer Battalion and all the rest? Just this: We have 

stopped cold everything that has been thrown at us from the north, 

east, south and west. We have identifications from four German 

panzer divisions, two German 1nfantry divisions and one German 

parachute division. These units, spearheading. the last desperate 

German lunge, were heading straight west for key points when the 

Eagle Division was hurriedly ordered to stem the advance. How effectively this was done will be written in history; not alone in our 

Division's glorious history but in world history. The Germans actually did surround us, their radios blared our doom. Allied troops are 

counterattacking in force. We continue to hold Bastogne. By holding 

Bastogne we assure the success of the Allied armies. We know that 

our Division commander, General Taylor, will say: 'Well .donel" 

We are giving our country and our loved ones at home a worthy 

Christmas present and being privileged to take part in this gallant 

feat of arms are truly making for ourselves a merry Christmas. I 

Privately, on the phone that night to General Middleton, McAuliffe expressed his true feeling about Christmas in these words: 

[ 155 ] 
156 BASTOGNE 

Map 18: Christmas Eve at Bastogne 

"The finest Christmas present the WIst could get would be a 

relief tomorrow." 

But General McAuliffe's greeting to his troops proved to be in 

every part a prophetic utterance though the quiet of Christmas 

Eve did not last for long. 

That night the town was bombed twice. During the first raid, 

in the late evening, a bomb landed on the hospital of the 20th 

Armored Infantry Battalion near the intersection of the main 

roads from ArIon and Neufchateau. It caved in the roof, burying 

20 patients and killing a Belgian woman who was serving as a 

nurse. Another bomb landed on the headquarters of Combat 

Command B,. doing heavy damage and knocking down the 

Christmas tree in the message center. The men set up the tree 

again, and in an elaborate ceremony, one of the sergeants pinned 

the Purple Heart on a mangled doll. 2A 

Except for those bombings Christmas Eve passed without un-
CHRISTMAS. EVE 157 

usual pressure from the enemy. (Plate 35 A and B.) The journal entries of the different regiments all use the word "quiet" in 

describing the period. But that is a word that simply does not 

record the tumult in the thoughts and emotions of the men of 

Bastogne. Such was their reaction to the Christmas and to the 

memories surrounding it, that for the first time all around the 

perimeter men felt fearful. It seemed to them that the end was at 

hand. That night many of them shook hands with their comrades. They said to one another that it would probably be their 

last night together. Many of the commanders saw this happening. though they knew it had little relation to the still strong tactical situation.2B (Map 19, page 158, shows the situatioR.) 

In the 502d Parachute Infantry the officers heard Christmas 

Eve Mass in the tenth-century chapel of the beautiful Rolle 

CMteau (plate 34) which they were using for a command post .. 

It was a happy occasion, well attended by the neighboring Belgians who had rounded out the regimental messes with contributions of Hour and sides of beef from their own stores.' 

The regimental officers turned in about 0130 on Christmas 

morning.s 

At 0245 there was an intense shelling of the forward area by 

the Gennan artillery.s Lieut. Colonel Patrick J. Cassidy, the 

502d's executive officer, called Captain Wallace A. Swanson of 

Company A who reported that his front had suddenly become 

active (Map 20, page 159). But he added that the situation was 

obscure; he could not figure out yet what the Gennans intended.' 

At 0330 Colonel Cassidy called Captain Swanson again. Swanson said that the enemy was on top of him.8 While they were 

talking, the line went out. Colonel Cassidy awakened Colonel 

Chappuis, the regimental commander.9 Then all lines went out. 

Chappuis called his 1st Battalion by radio and told them to get 

ready to move, adding that the commander, Major John D. Hanlon, was to come to Rolle as quickly as possible.10 By radio Chappuis heard ,from Swanson that Gennans in large numbers were 

in Champs and that his men were locked in a hand-to-hand and 

house-to-house fight with them. Major Hanlon reported at the 

command post and was told by Colonel Chappuis to move Com-
158 BASTOGNE 

Situation 24 Dec 

~ 130 PZ L£HRI-f 

..... SCALE IN YARDS 

Map 19 

pany B to the Champs road just west of Rolle and then get forward ·into Champs and help Captain Swanson's Company A.ll 

While Swanson was becoming engaged, other German forces 

had filtered through the woods to the east of Champs on the 2d 

Battalion's left Hank. After reporting this to regiment, Lieut. 

Colonel Thomas H. Sutliffe; the 2d Battalion commander, shifted 

part of his force leftward against this threat. Colonel Chappuis 

supported his move by instructing Major Hanlon to send one 

platoon of Company B to the right to join hands with Company 

E. Hanlon called in at 054512 and said the Germans were still 

6ghtin~ in Champs. He did not want to put the rest of his battalion mto the village until it became light because the darkness 

and confusion were so bad that it was almost impossible to dis-
CHRISTMAS EVE 159 

tinguish friend from enemy. Colonel Chappuis told him to hold 

steady. 

As Chappuis and Cassidy estimated the situation at 502d 

Headquarters, Company B was already backing up Company A 

and would still he effective if Champs were lost, whereas it might 

lose its reserve value if it pushed on into the village and the Germans came around it. IS So they waited. They knew that somewhere a real blow was coming but they could not figure where.u 

So far the German pressure had jarred them only at the right and 

center of the S02d and was coming at them from the north. They 

looked anxiously to the westward where their sector joined that 

of the 327th Glider Infantry. Their command post was under 

SATTL£ AT OiAMPS 

2S DECEMBER 

I PHASE If 

Map 20 
160 BASTOGNE 

heavy aitillery fire and was no longer in either telephone or radio 

communication with Headquarters, WIst Division.1G 

Just as the first light of Christmas morning broke, the S-2 of 

the Ist Battalion, First Lieutenant Samuel B. Nickels, Jr., came 

at a dead run into the chateau where the Headquarters, S02d, 

was. "There are seven enemy tanks and lots of infantry coming 

over the hill on your left," he said.18 He had first sighted them 

moving along parallel to the ridge southwest of Hemroulle. 

(Plate 36.) They were striking toward the ground where the 

S02d and 327th joined hands.17 

The Rolle Chateau was emptied almost before Lieutenant 

Nickels had finished speaking. Cooks, clerks, radio men and the 

chaplains collected under Captain James C. Stone, the S02d 

headquarters commandant, and rushed west to the next hill.18 

From the chateau gate at Rolle, the road dips down through a 

deep swale then rises onto the ridge where it joins the main road 

into Hemroulle, about two miles northwest of Bastogne. The road 

line is on high ground. all the way until just before it reaches 

Hemroulle where it drops down again to the village.18 Captain 

Stone's scratch headquarters force ran across the swale and took 

up firing positions close to the road and facing westward. 20 Within 

a few minutes they were joined by the men of the regiment's 

wounded who were able to walk. Major Douglas T. Davidson, 

the regimental surgeon of the S02d, had run to the chateau stable 

that was serving as a temporary hospital, rallied his patients, 

handed them rifles and then led them out against the tanks. 21 

They could see the tanks coming on toward them now. From 

the archway of Rolle Chateau it was about 600 yards to the first 

line of Getman armor. (Plate 38.) Colonels Chappuis and CasSidy and the radio operator looked westward from the archway 

and could see just the outline of the enemy movement in the dim 

light. They were now the only men at the headquarters. 22 

Colonel Cassidy called Major Hanlon and told him to leave 

Company B where it was but to get the company ready to protect 

its own real' and then try to get Company C faced to the west to 

meet the German tanks as they came on.sa 

The 327th Glider Infantry was already engaged. At 0500 
CHRISTMAS EVE 161 

Colonel Harper had heard by phone from Company A of his 3d 

Battalion that 18 enemy tanks were formed for attack just east of 

Mande-St.-£tienne. 2' At 0710 the German armor supported by 

infantry of the 77th Grenadier Regiment smashed through the 

positions held by Companies A and B. 25 In coming through the 

companies, the tanks fired all their guns and the German infantrymen riding the tanks blazed away with their rifles. The spearpoint of the German armor had already broken clear through to 

the battalion command post.26 At the 327th regimental headquarters Colonel Harper heard by telephone of the breakthrough, 

and on the heels of that message came word from Lieut. Colonel 

Cooper that his 463d Parachute Field Arrillery Battalion already 

had the German tanks under fire.27 At 0715 Colonel Allen, the 

3d Battalion C327th) commander, called and said that the tanks 

were right on him. 

Harper asked, "How close?" 

"Right here!" answered Allen. "They are firing point-blank at 

me from 150 yards range. My units are still in position but I've 

got to run." But Colonel Allen's battalion had not been wholly 

taken by surprise. "Tanks are coming toward you!" Captain 

Preston E. Towns, commanding Company C, had telephoned to 

Allen. 

'Where?" Allen had asked. 

"If you look out your window now," said Captain Towns, 

"you'll be looking right down the muzzle of an 88."28 

Christmas Day was just then breaking. Colonel Allen stayed 

at his 3d Battalion, .J27th, command post only long enough to 

look out of his window, and prove what Towns had told him, and 

to call Colonel Harper and tell him he was getting out. Then he 

ran as fast as he could go and the German tanker fired at him as 

he sprinted toward the woods. He could see the muzzle blasts 

over his shoulder in the semidarkness. But all of the shots were 

leading him. The Germans were giving him credit for more 

speed than his legs possessed. 

Two members of Allen's staff followed him. As they all came 

out of the other end of the woods, men of Colonel Chappuis' 502d 

Parachute Infantry along the ridge road saw them and promptly 
162 BASTOGNE 

pinned them down with heavy riRe fire. The three then crawled 

back to the woods, circled south through a little valley and re--

turned to Hemroulle. 

As they came out of the woods the second time, they were fired 

on by artillerymen of Colonel Cooper's 463d Parachute Field 

Artillery Battalion who had formed a skirmish line in case the 

enemy broke through the infantry. But Colonel Allen was getting tired of all this and he waved his handkerchief vigorously 

until finally the gunners lowered their riRes and let the party 

come in. 

Colonel Harper, on getting the phone call made by Allen just 

before Allen had to dash from his headquarters, realized that 

there was now no control over the 3d Battalion, 327th. So he 

sent his own S-3, Major Jones, with his radio to Colonel Cooper's 

artillery command post and Jones got there just as Allen did, and 

he got through at once to the companies with the radio.29 

In the meantime the forward line had held (Map 21, page 

163), partly because of the quick thinking of Captain McDonald 

of Company B. He had heard Colonel Allen's urgent report to 

Colonel Harper over his own telephone and he at once called 

Companies A and C by radio. 'The battalion commander has 

had to get out," he said to them. "I can see you from where I am. 

Your best bet is to stay where you are. Hold tight to your positions and fight back at them."80 

That was what they did. The main body of the German armor 

rolled straight through Company A's lines-I 8 white-camouRaged 

tanks p10ving in column. The men of Company A, 327th (First 

Lieutenant Howard G. Bowles was the acting commanding officer), stayed in their foxholes and took it, replying with their 

rifles and whatever other weapons were at hand. After the tide of 

German steel had passed over and through them, 4 men of the 

company were dead and 5 lay wounded. But the 68 survi\fors 

were up and fighting, and in the next round of the battle they 

captured 92 German prisoners.81 

Having crashed through ,Colonel Harper's 327th front, the 

German armor split as it came on toward the ridge and half of it 

swung north toward Rolle where Lieutenant Nickels saw it and 
CHRISTMAS EVE 

BATTLE AT CHAMPS 

2S DECEMBER 

I PHASE 21 

SCALI IN ,AlIOS 

Map 21 

163 

warned Colonel Chappuis, commander of the 502d Parachute 

Infantry, in time for him to make his last-minute preparation. 

Companies Band C, 502d, were even then in column of twos 

moving up the road toward Champs.82 

Thus far Colonel Templeton's 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion 

had played only a minor part in the defense of the sector, hut their 

best moments were approaching. Two of the tank destroyers had 

been of some assistance to Captain Swanson (Company A, 502d) 

in his fight for Champs. They were already in position there 

when the German attack got under way, one destroyer in the 

center of Champs and another slightly to the west of it so placed 

that it could cover the road to the southwest and the ridge to the 
164 BASTOGNE 

north and northwest. Upon setting up, the tank destroyer crews 

manned four machine guns on the ground around their centrally 

located guns. This position held when the German infantry 

closed on Champs and the tank destroyer force even spared a few 

of its men to go forward and help the paratroopers root the enemy 

out of the houses.38 

Too, the heavy guns were used for close-up interdiction fire to 

keep the enemy from moving any deeper into the village. In this 

work, the 37mm. guns, firing canister, were especially effective. 

Captain Swanson got one of the tank destroyers, under Sergeant 

Lawrence Valletta, to go forward and blast a house where about 

thirty Germans had taken cover. Sergeant Valletta moved right 

in next to the building, trained his big gun on the doors and 

windows and blew the place apart. He then shelled two more 

houses and returned to his original position. Just about dawn, he 

made a second sortie of the same kind.84 

To the southward of Champs where the crisis of the Christmas 

action was swiftly maturing, the tank destroyers got away to a 

bad start but then staged a swift recovery.85 Two of them from 

Company B, 705th Battalion, had been in the 327th Glider Infantry area and were out along the road which runs from Rolle 

toward Grandes-Fanges, a mile to the southwest (this put them 

to the southward of Company C, 502d Parachute Infantry), when 

the German attack came over the hill.3e The crews had at first 

put their tank destroyers into concealment behind a haystack and 

from there had engaged the enemy armor at a distance, knocking 

out two or three tanks.37 Yet as the power of the German armor 

became more obvious, they decided to withdraw.8s That was how 

it happened that they were moving back toward Rolle and were 

directly in line with the German tank fire when Company C of 

the 502d Parachute Infantry faced toward the enemy.BD 

Both tank destroyers were knocked out almost instantly.40 The 

men of Company C saw them reel and stop from the enemy fire 

and realized that the loss of the tank destroyers had helped spare 

them the worst part of the blow. U 

The encounter had had one other powerful effect-two tank 

destroyers from Company C, 705th, were waiting in the woods 
CHRISTMAS EVE 165 

behind Colonel Chappuis' 502d infantrymen. The German armor, confident that it was now in full command of the field, 

came on boldly against the infantry line.42 Colonel Cassidy 

(executive of the 502d) had sent a runner sprinting toward the 

woods to alert the two concealed tank destroyers. The runner 

had been told to run from the guns on to Captain George R. 

Cody's Company C, 502d, position and tell him that the tank 

destroyers would be backing him up. But he didn't get there in 

time!a 

The guns of the seven Mark IV s were already firing into Company C. About 15 to 20 German infantrymen were riding on the 

outside of each tank, some firing their rifles. But the ground fog 

was bad and their fire was erratic. Captain Cody turned his men 

about and told them to fall back to the edge of the forest. Without any part of its line breaking into a general dash for the rear, 

Company C fell back to the shelter of the trees and there took up 

positions and opened fire on the tanks with machine guns, bazookas, and rifles. Despite the surprise of the German assault, 

this movement was carried out with little loss and no disorder.46 

Then swiftly, there was a complete turning of/the situation as 

Company C's first volleys from its new position took toll of the 

German infantry clinging to the tanks. Dead and wounded 

pitched. from the vehicles into the snow. As if with the purpose 

of saving their infantry, the tanks veered left toward Champs and 

the position held by Company B, 502d.45 

Until this moment the two tank destroyers in the woods behind 

Company C had not fired a round.4s But as the tank line pivoted 

and began to move northward along the top of the ridge, the 

flank of the German armor became completely exposed and the 

two tank destroyers went into action.41 So did Company B, which 

was now firing at the enemy front. Three of the Mark IVs were 

hit and knocked out by the ta~k destroyer fire before they completed their turning movement. One was stopped by a bazooka 

round from Company C. A fifth tank was hit and stopped by a 

rocket from Captain Stone's scratch group from Headquarters, 

502d.48 The infantry ridin~ on the tanks were cut to pieces by 

bullet fire. As Company C s part of the battle ended there were 
166 BASTOGNE 

67 German dead and 35 prisoners, many of them wounded, in 

the area around the ruined tanks.49 

One tank did break through Company B and charge on into 

Champs. Company A, 502d, fired bazookas at it and it was also 

shelled by a 57mm. gun which had taken position in the village. 

The tank was hit by both types of fire but which weapon made 

the kill is uncertain.fio 

Captain James J. Hatch, S-3 of the 502d, had gone forward to 

reconnoiter Company A's situation and was in the Company A 

command post at the time. He heard the fight going on outside, 

grabbed his pistol and opened the door. He was looking straight 

into the mouth of the tank's 75mm. gun at a range of 15 yards. 

Hatch closed the door and said to the others, "This is no place 

for my pistol."61 

The seventh tank in the German group-it was later determined that this was the same tank that had knocked out the two 

tank destroyers-was captured intact at Hemroulle.52 By 0900, 

December 25, the action was cleared up around Rolle. Headquarters of the 502d Parachute Infantry had called WIst Division Headquarters and asked about the situation of 327th Glider 

Infantry over on its left. Colonel Kinnard (iOIst Airborne Division G3) reported that the 327th's lines were generally intact 

and the situation there well in hand. 53 

In the 327th's sector there had been four tank destroyers behind Captain McDonald's Company B and four behind lieutenant Bowles' Company A. Captain Towns' Company C was unsupported by tank destroyers but Colonel Harper had sent him 

. two Sherman tanks on hearing that the German attack was coming.5' 

These guns, the bazooka fire of the 327th Glider Infantry outfits and the barrage fire of Colonel Cooper's 463d Parachute Field 

Artillery Battalion had dealt in detail with that part of the German armor that tried to ride on through toward Hemroulle after 

breaking Harper's front.55 The German tanks were fired at from 

so many directions and with such a mixture of fire that it was 

not possible to see or say how each tank met its doom.18 One 

battery from the 463d stopped two tanks at a range of 600 
CHRISTMAS EVE 

BATTLE A1 CHAMPS 

ZS DECEMBER 

I PHASE 31 

.,. 

Map 22 

167 

yards and then some men ran out from the battery position and 

captured the crews. Eighteen German tanks had been seen on 

that part of the 327th Glider Infantry's front that morning. 

Eighteen tanks had driven on through the infantry. But not one 

got away. When the fighting died at last there were eighteen 

disabled German tanks, many of them with fire-blackened hulls, 

scattered out through the American positions along the ridges 

running from Hemroulle to Champs. IT 

In the 502d Parachute Infantry area, the wire maintenance 

men had kept on working right tl).rough the fire fight and by 

0900 the lines were again in solid.IS None of the German infantry had managed an escape. III 
168 BASTOGNE' 

Situation 25 De 

• IT 

SCALE IN YAROS· 

Map 23 

The few survivors, upon recoiling, were rounded up by the 

members of Colonel Allen's overrun 3d Battalion, 327th. The 

German tankers died inside their tanks. 

Although Company C, 502d, had been compelled to engage 

without artillery support because of the closeness of the action, 

its losses were negligible. It was put in position along the high 

ground west of the scene of the skirmish. At about the same time 

the Company C fight ended, Company A, 502d, was getting 

Champs under control and was doing the last of its rat hunting 

through the village houses. Company B was put over to the eastward of Company A to fill out the line as far as the 3d Battalion. 

In getting to this position, Company B, 502d, took heavy losses 

from enemy artillery while moving across the high ground north 
CHRISTMAS EVE 169 

of Champs, but by 1500 the position was complete (Map 22, 

page 167). Company A counted 98 Germans killed and 79 enlisted men and 2 officers captured in the Champs action.60 

About 0800 on Christmas, WIst Division moved Force Cherry 

out through Hemroulle to a position on the high ground along 

the edge of the woods to the southward of the 502d Parachute 

Infantry. Colonel Cherry stayed there until after dark to cover 

the restoration of the 1st Battalion, 327th, position. He then 

pulled back to Hemroulle.81 A German field order captured during the morning fight showed that the German tank and infantry 

mission that came to grief along the ridge south and west of Rolle 

had been attempted by the 115th Panzergrenadier Regiment of 

the 15th Panzergrenadier Division (Map 23, page 168). Two 

battalions of the 77th Panzergrenadier Regiment, supported by 

the division artillery of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, had 

implemented the assault against Champs and to the southward 

which preceded the Panzer advance.82 

Christmas day closed with Colonel Chappuis and Colonel Cassidy of the 502d sitting down to a table spread with a can of sardines and a box of crackers. 81 

General McAuliffe, disappointed that no relief force had come, 

called General Middleton and said, 'We have been let down." 
CHAPTER 21 

THE RELIEF 

ON THE MORNING of December 26, the German forces 

renewed their pressure against the western side of the Bastogne perimeter (Map 24, page 171). But they did notlress their 

attack in real strength and the American lines held soli . Around 

the other parts of the defending circle, the day was relatively 

quiet though both sides intensified their air activity. 

The intervention of the air direcdy hastened the hour when the 

enemy encirclement of Bastogne was broken through by the arrival 

of the armored column from the south. Since 0600 on December 

22, the three Combat Commands of the 4th Armored Division 

had been fighting their way steadily toward Bastogne by three 

separate routes from their assembly areas north of ArIon. They 

had met intense resistance all the way along the line and had 

taken heavy losses in men and tanks. By 1500 on December 26, 

Combat Command Reserve of the 4th had arrived at the high 

ground overlooking Clochimont and was preparing to attack 

toward the village of Sibret. This put the command about four 

miles to the southwestward of Bastogne with their local objective 

about one mile to their own northwestward. As the attack was 

about to get under way, the men saw and heard what seemed to 

be "hundreds" of G47 planes coming direcdy over them and 

bound for Bastogne. The spectacle encouraged Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., commanding the 37th Tank Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel George L. Jaques, commanding 

the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion, to make a break for Bastogne, 

disregarding their original mission. They believed that Sibret 

was strongly held. Colonel Abrams' force had been cut down to 

twenty medium tanks and Colonel Jaques' force was short 230 

men. They figured that it might cost less to ignore Sibret and 

attack straight toward Bastogne. 

At 1520, December 26, Colonel Abrams ordered his S-3, Captain William A. Dwight, to take a light team composed of tanks 

and infantry, break northeast to the village of Assenois and keep 

[ 170] 
THERELlEF 171 

Situation 26 De 

~1lO PI LORl-) 

Q s,:;o SCALE IN YARDS 

Map 24 

moving until he reached the Bastogne lines. The artillery with 

Combat Command Reserve, 4th Armored Division-three battalions of 105mm. and one battery of 155mm. howitzers-was 

directed to stand ready to place a concentration on Assenoisas 

the team moved up to it. Such was the plan. 

In the execution of it, the commander of the leading tank 

called for artillery support as soon as he came within sight of the 

village. The guns poured ten rounds apiece against the target, 

concentrating their fire against the woods north of town and into 

an area in the southern edge of town where the enemy was supposed to be strongly fixed with antitank guns. Combat Command 

Reserve's shells were still dropping on Assenois when the first 
172 BASTOGNE 

tanks moved in among the houses. There were some infantry 

losses from our own fire. In the smoke and confusion, the infantry company of Captain Dwight's team dismounted and engaged 

the enemy in a fight for the village. 

But five tanks and one infantry half-track stuck to the letter of 

their assignment and kept moving toward Bastogne. Three of the 

tanks had forged several hundred yards to the fore and the enemy 

strewed Teller mines between them and the rest of the tank 

force as they were pulling out of Assenois. The half-track hit a 

mine and was destroyed. Captain Dwight jumped down from his 

tank to clear the other mines away, so that he could get forward 

with his two tanks. Meanwhile, the three lead tanks kept going 

and at 1650 First Lieutenant Charles P. Boggess, commanding 

officer of Company C, 37th Tank Battalion, drove the first vehicle 

from the 4th Armored Division to within the lines of the 326th 

Airborne Engineer Battalion, lOlst Division, .of the Bastogne 

forces. 

This was the beginning. The German encirclement was now 

finally broken, though some days would pass before the American 

lines to the south were again firm and several weeks of fighting 

would ensue before the siege of Bastogne was finally lifted. Captain Dwight, having followed Lieutenant Boggess on into Bastogne, radioed Colonel Abrams to come up with the rest of the 

breakthrough team. 

With them came Major General Maxwell D. Tayl<?r, commander of the lOlst Division, who had flown back from the. 

United States to join his Division. General Taylor had arrived in 

time to lead his men through their bitterest days of fighting on 

the Bastogne ground, the days yet to come. 

Captain Dwight then continued on to report to General McAuliffe and arrange for the convoys to enter the town that night. 

Assenois was cleared by 2000, December 26, with the capture 

of 428 prisoners. Before morning, the woods on both sides of 

the road running north from Assenois were cleared ·sufficiendy to 

assure relatively free use of this line of communication.1 

Much hard fighting still remained for the other two combat 

commands of 4th Armored Division before they, too, closed to 
THE RELIEF 173 

within the Bastogne perimeter. By their drive north, they had 

opened an avenue to the south which would insure that the victory won by the Bastogne defenders could be fully exploited by 

the United States Army 'and the forces of its Allies. 

The relief of Bastogne signaled the defeat of the German 

Army in ·the Ardennes offensive. But it had cost the 4th Armored Division a price compamble to that exacted from the defenders of Bastogne themselves. 2 In the seven days during which 

its forces were moving to the relief of Bastogne the Division lost 

about 1,000 men. Its total medium tank strength at the end of the 

period was equal to the full tank strength of a single battalion.' 

As for what this victory-won by the defenders of Bastogne and 

confirmed by the force that relieved them-availed the Allied 

cause, and as to how it influenced the emergency of December 

1944, there is an official estimate from the command of 12th 

Army Group. 

The Mter Action Report for December 1944 says: 

Preoccupation with the key position of Bastogne dominated enemy 

strategy to such an extent that it cost hiIQ the advanta~ of the initia· 

tive. The German High Command evidently considered further extension to the west or north as both logistically and stmtegically 

unsound without possession of Bastogne, as that town overlooks the 

main roods and concentration areas of the spearheads. By the end of 

the month, the all-out effort in the north had become temporarily 

defensive; in the west there was a limited withdmwal, and the array 

of German forces around Bastogne clearly exposed the enemy's 

anxiety over that position. Until the Bastogne situation is resolved 

one way or the other no change in strategy can be expected.· 

How well those words were sustained by the further passage 

of events is now history. 
APPENDIX 

THE ENEMY STORY 

I N ONE RESPECT, the Bastogne story is complete as told in 

the preceding chapters. There is the battle as it was seen by 

the defending forces from within the Bastogne perimeter and as 

it could be clarified for them by all of the normal and accessible 

sources of information such as our own official documents, captured enemy documents, interviews with our key personnel at 

all levels, and interrogation of such of the enemy as fell into 

our hands in the course of operations. To preserve the integrity 

of the narrative from the viewpoint of the defenders, it seemed 

essential that the material be presented in that form. Moreover, 

since it will be noted in reading this added chapter that the errors 

caused by so doing were minor indeed, the Bastogne story becomes tangible proof of the competence of our own methods of 

acquiring intelligence of the enemy and of estimating his capabilities. 

There remains, however, the question of exactly what was 

occurring among the enemy forces while our own forces were defending Bastogne so stoutly. What was their design? How did 

they view the American action? How did their estimate and 

judgment of the tactical events modify their own plan and 

movement? 

It has been said in high places that the enemy was not really 

trying to capture Bastogne. This judgment was taken after a 

cursory examination of his plan which fell into our hands in 

the course of ' the war. But that is not a final truth and if the full 

importance of all that happened in the first days of the Bastogne 

defense is to be accurately measured by history, the witnesses 

must speak from the opposing camp. 

In November and December 1945 there took place a series 

of conferences between the three chief actors in the attack on 

Bastogne and the author of the Bastogne story. Present were Lieutenant General Heinrich von Liittwitz, Commanding General 

of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Fritz Her-

[ 174] 
THE ENEMY STORY 175 

mann Bayerlein, Commanding General of the Panzer Lehr Division, and Major General Heinz Kokott, Commanding General 

of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division. Colonel Meinhard von 

Lauchert, the commander of the 2d Panzer Division, was not 

present nor was his presence deemed necessary. Of the three 

divisions, the 2d Panzer had hild least to do with the direct attack 

on Bastogne; and further, the Corps commander, having form" 

erly commanded that division and having a sentimental feeling 

for it and not too much faith in Von Lauchert, had directly 

supervised its operation during the German advance. With what 

at least appeared to be utmost candor, the three enemy commanders proceeded to discuss all that had happened to them. 

There were in all ten conferences on these matters, during 

which the commanders worked with all of the necessary maps 

and such staff notes as were available to them. Inasmuch as the 

data on the American operation were already complete, it was 

easy to provide the check points which would establish the accuracy of their story in all particulars. Colonel H. W. o. Kinnard, who had been G-3 of the 101st Airborne Division during 

the Bastogne operation, also attended these interrogations. The 

meeting with Kinnard was a visible shock to the German commanders. It seemed incredible to them that this boyish-faced 

soldier had been one of their principal antagonists. They asked 

several times for reassurance on this score. Liittwitz said, "Are 

you certain he was chief of operations? Isn't it possible that he 

was only the chief for one regiment?" 

Liittwitz is an old-time cavalryman. Now past fifty~ight. he 

is large. gross and paunchy. His monocle and his semi-belligerent 

manner of speech would suggest that he is the typically arrogant 

Prussian, but among other German commanders he had the 

reputation of being especially kind to troops. He would talk 

only when he had a map before him; then he liked to lay pencils 

on the map to represent the movements of his regiments. What 

was most remarkable about him was that in battle he seemed to 

have concerned himself more with the movements of squads 

and companies than with the employment of divisions. He was 

frequently hazy about how his regiments had been disposed 
176 BASTOGNE 

but he could invariably ~y what had been done by a particular 

patrol or outpost. Once he starts talking, he is extremely windy. 

He appeared to be chagrined over the fact that he authored the 

request to Bastogne to sUrrender; the other commanders concerned all regard that request as a military faux pas. But they 

believe that Liittwitz has the "Nuts!" message and that he has 

hidden it away somewhere as a valuable historical document. 

Bayerlein is a short, solidly built man of fifgr, sharp-featured 

and keen of eye. All of his ~ctions are vigorous and his aggressiveness in and out of conversation reminds-one of a terrier. This 

outward seemmg hides the fact that he is suffering from a fatal 

kidney ailment. He prides himself on the fact that in the past 

ten years he has taught, himself to speak English. While. working with the American Historical Section, he sat down one evening and wrote as a diversion a fifty-page history. of the United 

States which was quite accurate. His contempt for Liittwitz is 

obvious. When Liittwitz rambles in his conversation, Bayerlein 

waves a hand in his face and snarls, "Not important! Not important!" He believes that Liittwitz made the worst fumbles at 

Bastogne though the record indicates that Bayerlein's individual 

actions and estimates cost the Corps some of its finest opportunities. About those mistakes and the mistakes of all others, he is 

brutally frank. They become almost a mania with him. When 

confronted with his own gross blunders, he puts his head back 

and laughs with abandon; it seems to be about the one thing that 

thoroughly amuses him. 

Kokott is a shy, scholarly and dignified commander who never 

raises his voice and appears to be temperate in his actions and 

judgments. Now past fifty-two, he is doubtless the steadiest man 

of the three. In his account of battle, he is strictly objective. He 

shares Bayerlein's opinion of Liittwitz but is more amused than 

resentful. Better than any other commander, he saw the true 

situation at Bastogne though he also made his share of mistakes, 

as the record shows. He felt, even more strongly than the others, 

that adherence to the original plan at Bastogne became unwise 

on December 19 but he is a natural optimist and he expected 

to win the battle. 
THE ENEMY STORY 177 

The onfall of XXXXVII Panzer Corps against the front held 

by the American 28th Infantry Division and the general consequences of that onfall have been brieHly told in Chapter 1 of 

this book. Having made its penetration, the further movements 

of XXXXVII Corps were intended to be consistent with the overall policy of the Fifth Panzer Army throughout the German 

Ardennes offensive: The mobile divisions would by-pass points 

of resistance and remain free to continue the movement; the 

clearing out of islands of resistance would be done by the slowermoving infantry bodies. The policy of the Army was duly transmitted from Corps down to the divisions. It was believed that 

the two armored divisions could quickly overrun Bastogne before resistance there could solidify. In their sweep directly westward, the boundary between the 2d Panzer Division on the right 

and the Panzer Lehr Division on the left, for the attack on Bastogne, was an east-west line about halfway between Bastogne and 

Noville. The objective of the 2d Panzer Division was the same 

crossroads X south of the Bois de Herbaimont which figured so 

prominently in the American story. The purpose of the Panzer 

Lehr Division was to take Bastogne by attack from the south. 

This was the original order as established by the initial plan. 

It was not changed before the battle opened although it was in 

a degree modified. 

On December 12, Liittwitz called his division commanders together, and addressing his remarks especially to Bayerlein, the 

commander of Panzer Lehr, he said to all of them: "Bastogne 

must be taken. Otherwise it will remain an abscess on our lines 

of communication. We must clear out the whole of Bastogne 

and then march on." He added the instruction that if Bastogne 

was found to be relatively open, it should be attacked directly 

by the most feasible route, but that if it were defended in 

strength frontally, the two armored divisions should attempt to 

envelop and attack the rear or west. These two expedients failing and quick capture of the town appearing impossible, the 

two armored divisions were to continue their general advance 

and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was to undertake the investment and capture of Bastogne. The effect which this con-
.... 

"" 00 

....... 

Map 25: Bastogne Envelopment According to the German Plan 
THE. ENEMY STORY 179 

terence produced on the minds of the subordinate commanders 

is to be measured in the story of their separate actions and decisions. 

In the attack of December 16 against the general American 

front, the Corps attacked with 2d Panzer Division on the right 

Hank and 26th Volksgrenadier Division on the left, and Panzer 

Lehr Division in reserve. Penetrations into our lines having been 

made, during December 17 the Panzer Lehr Division moved 

ahead of the 26th Volksgrenadier (Map 25, page 178). On the 

right, the northern bridgeheads across the Clerf and Our rivers 

had been built by the 2d Panzer Division; these were the bridgeheads enabling the movement of enemy forces along the road to 

Longvilly. On the left the engineering units of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division had done the necessary bridging to enable 

Panzer Lehr to cross the Clerf and Our and push on for Bastogne. 

The two southern bridgeheads opened onto secondary roads by 

way of which Panzer Lehr could cut the lines of communication 

south of Bastogne and attack the town initially from that direction. 

The 2d Panzer Division advanced rapidly throughout that 

day and the next day. Heavy resistance from our 28th Division 

units in Clervaux slowed its pace on December 17; but after that 

there was no check to the progress of the 2d Panzer Division 

until it came almost to the road intersection to the east of Longvilly, where it intended to veer north and proceed toward Noville. 

In mid-afternoon of December 17, Liittwitz, the XXXXVII 

Corps commander, visited his front lines where his armor was 

pushing westward from the bridgeheads. He returned late in 

the day to his CP near Karlshausen on the east bank of the Our 

River to find a message from his communications officer lying 

on his desk. It read that he had intercepted an AmeriCan radio 

message saying that the American airborne divisions, then near 

Reims, had been alerted for a fast movement to the battle area. 

Liittwitz looked once more at the map and reasoned that they 

would be sent to Bastogne. 

To Liittwitz, this spoke volumes. In his own words: "Ever 

since the Arnhem operation our command had feared another at-
.-

~ ....... 

Map 26: Opening German Movements: December 18-19 
THE ENEMY STORY 181 

tack by airborne forces. When the message came in, we knew 

not only that there would be no such attack but that the Americali Army must be extremely short of reserves in the immediate 

vicinity. Otherwise, it would not commit airborne divisions of 

such high standing to the battle." But the. knowledge that those 

forces were bound by ground movement for the same objective 

as his own forces did not change his plan or his instructions. 

He was already proceeding toward Bastogne with all possible 

speed and he calculated that he could get there before our airborne units arrived, and he would be opposed by negligible 

forces in so doing. 

During December 18, the advance continued, with both German armored divisions adhering to the boundaries established 

in the original plan. Through the day there had been no interruption of progress in either lane that dimmed Liittwitz's hope of 

beating the opposing forces into Bastogne. As the night drew on, 

his divisions were promisingly poised: The forward elements of 

the 2d Panzer were at the point east of Lon2Villy where the division was to tum north from the main road. The forward elements of Panzer Lehr were at Niederwampach, to the south 

(Map 26, page 180). 

It is to be noted that the turning movement of the 2d Panzer 

Division was taking place at such a distance from the roadblock 

of our 9th Armored Division in Longvilly (which was in process 

of being supported and then replaced by the forces under Captain Ryerson of Team Cherry, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division) that both of these armored bodies could have 

carried out their assignments without head-on collision. The 

German force was, of course, turning a shoulder and then exposing a Bank toward the American armor in Longvilly; moreover, it was assumed by the German commander that the American armor was in march toward him. He therefore took steps 

to cover the avenues of approach leading toward his exposed 

Bank. At the same time the Americans in Longvilly, knowing 

nothing of the turning movement, took it for granted that this 

German column was coming on down the main road. It was therefore almost inevitable that the two forces would engage but the 
182 BASTOGNE 

extent of engagement was limited by the mutually exclusive 

character of their separate missions. 

Panzer Lehr, however, was under no such restriction, since 

Bastogne lay within its boundary. It was only a question of which 

was the most opportune road and hour, whether time was left 

to go directly at the town or whether it was the better part of 

wisdom to strike first at the lines of communication leading 

south. To do the former, Bayerlein, then at Niederwampach, 

would have to get his striking force moved northwest to the Longvilly-Bastogne road-the smoothest route into town. 

It seems altogether probable that the soaring ambition of this 

commander was responsible for his decision. He wanted to take 

Bastogne in person and the quick thrust was the only way to 

do it. He talked to some Luxembourg civilians in Niederwampach; they told him that the side road through Benonchamps to 

Mageret was in good condition and perfectly feasible for the 

passage of armor. They said, "It looks bad but will get better and 

better." In this they misled him but the intelligence was enough 

to get him started. The road was narrow and deep in mud and 

became steadily worse. But no resistance was encountered and 

having started from Niederwampachat 2200, the force crossed 

the Luxembourg-Belgium border at midnight and reached 

Benonchamp~ one hour later. In the force was one battalion of 

infantry from the 902d Panzergrenadier Regiment, fifteen Mark 

V tanks and one battery of artillery, all under the command of 

the 902d Regiment's colonel, although Bayerlein went along in 

one of the lead tanks and appears to have personally directed the 

task force. 

At 0200 the force reached Mageret on the main road. There 

a Belgian civilian told Bayerlein that two hours earlier an American force of fifty tanks and forty other armored vehicles under 

an American major general had passed through Mageret going 

east at about midnight. He was of course referring to Ryerson's 

scant force 'of tanks but the degree of exaggeration in the Belgian's statement was enough to offset all the damage that might 

have been caused by his disclosure. It shook Bayerlein badly 

and from that point on, the farther he moved forward the more 
THE ENEMY STORY 183 

he was constrained to worry about the security of his rear. 

Because he now knew that there was American armor operating along the Longvilly road between him and the German 

main body, Bayerlein set up a road block in Mageret composed 

of three tanks, some supporting infantry and a minefield covering the road from the east-the same roadblock that split Team 

Cherry and contributed so much to Ryerson's subsequent difficulties. The Germans at Mageret were certain that they could 

hear American armor moving around in their immediate vicinity but so dark was the night and such the confusion made bJZ 

the slow movement of the last of their own vehicles into Mageret 

that they could not be sure where the sounds were coming from 

and hesitated to open fire for fear of hitting their own. The 

passage of this armored striking force onto the Longvilly road 

with the object of capturing Bastogne was regarded by the 

Americans who partially observed it at the time as only a 

"strong patrol action." It was so reported to Colonel Cherry and 

by him to Colonel Roberts. The Americans were still expecting 

the main enemy thrust to come straight down the main road. 

At about 0400 the German force in Mageret began to draw 

fire from the near-by terrain. Though not greatly harassed,it 

fought back for about an hour and a half. At 0530 Bayerlein 

started his tanks On down the road to Neffe. As they worked 

their way cautiously along toward that hamlet they drew considerable fire from the high ground to right of the road. It is 

probable that this resistance came from retreating elements of 

the 9th Armored Division which had taken to the hills at the 

approach of the German column. The German force kept moving. The lead tank hit a mine at Team Cherry's roadblock just 

east of Neffe and blew up; the Germans did not receive any fire 

from the Americans who had been manning the block and saw 

no signs of these men. So far not a shot had been fired and they 

got the impression that Neffe was undefended. 

While the remaining mines were being cleared away from 

the road, one infantry company moved south of the tracks and 

advanced toward the Neffe CMteau. The company had no close 

tank support for the ground was still much too wet for armor. 
184 BASTOGNE 

So in this double-pronged fashion, the advance got under way 

again at 0550, with the armor (eleven tanks) riding the main 

highway. At 0700 the head of the armor reached the Neffe station and there it paused for almost an hour-an interlude that 

cost Bayerlein his one chance to strike Bastogne before Colonel 

Ewell could get started All of the dash had gone out of the man 

by this time. There was no good tactical reason for the pause. 

But his own doubt about the situation stayed him. When the 

order to proceed was at last given, the tanks advanced down the 

Bastogne road about 200 yards. Then they were struck by American fire. A machine gun in one of the leading German tanks 

had opened fire at about the same time. It was hard to say who 

had fired first. [Here note that what Colonel Ewell had considered to be an enemy roadblock was in fact a striking force 

in motion.] The German recoil was imme.diate. The loss to the 

German infantry from Colonel Ewell's opening fire was insignificant but the reaction among the foot forces was enough. to 

deny ,the tanks the prospect of immediate support. The infantry 

wOl,lldn't move and the tanks couldn't go forward alone. This 

deadlocked the advance for the necessary int~rlude. Then when 

Captain McGlone's battery went into action against l'he Neffe 

position an hour or ~ later; the impact was great. About eighty 

Germans were killed or wounded at Neffe within the first hour 

or so. Bayerlein, convinced by the sound (there w~s no observation because of fog and he was misled by the sound of the 

glider 105nuh. gun M3) that he was being opposed by armor, 

retired to a cave near the Neffe station. 

By noon, Bayerlein's mood was one of extreme pessimisJll. 

He had felt out the situation on his right and had found Colonel 

Ewell's left already advancing. Also, he had been impressed by 

fire that was coming at him from his left-the probable source 

of which was the small force of men under Colonel Cherry in 

dle Neffe ·Chdteau. He imagined that infantry battalions were 

advancing against both his Banks. . and· that th.e battalion on the 

north was about ready to close in on Neffe. So he returned to 

Mag6ret, where the American tanks rolling back from . Longvilly were continuing to hit against hi~ armored roadblock. He 
THE ENEMY STORY 185 

passed through the village during the noon hour, some time before Ryerson's force really went to work against the block. His 

men had captured an American hospital in Mageret and he 

asked one of the nurses to look after his wounded. His nerve 

was working better now. He noted that the nurse was "loung, 

blonde and beautiful." He no longer had any thought 0 pushing forward with his initial task force and he had about concluded that the capture of Bastogne would require the utmost 

effort on the part of his entire division. 

It is now necessary to follow the course of the 2d Panzer Division through these same hours. That division was under orders 

to capture Noville as soon as possible. Having made the northward tum to the east of Longvilly, the point of the division advanced rapidly toward Bourey, meeting no resistance en route. 

The small action at the Bourey roadblock (described on pages 53-

54), although seemingly inconsequential, was sufficient to convince the division commander that he was blocked in that direction and that Noville was probably strongly held. He so advised 

the Corps commander and the course of the division was turned 

north so that Noville could be attacked from several sides. The 

men at the Bourey block had mistaken this point for a "reconnaissance element" and concluded that they had made off after 

completing their mission. Instead, the block had changed the 

course of an entire division. There followed the heavy attacks 

against Noville on December 19 with the tactical results described earlier in the book. Its road temporarily blocked by this 

engagement, the 2d Panzer Division on the morning of December 19 was strung out along the road all the way from Noville 

back to the northwest of Allerborn. 

By afternoon of December 19, Bayerlein, commander of the 

Panzer Lehr Division, had begun to feel himself harassed from 

every side and was thinking of extricating what he co:p.sidered 

to be his "pocketed" forces. In his own words: liAs to my own 

position, I felt that the resistance on my Banks would have to be 

annihilated before I could again attack. The movement of the 

infantry regiment which had come out of Bastogne to attack 

me had reacted decisively on my thinking. Their fire superiority 
186 BASTOGNE 

at Neffe was something I had witnessed with my own eyes. I 

thought and said that we should attack Bastogne with the whole 

XXXXVII Corps." 

In these calculations, an overstrained imagination undoubtedly played a strong part. During the day, elements of Panzer 

Lehr (Bayerlein's reconnaissance battalion) covered on their 

south flank by the third regiment of Kokott's Division-the 39th 

Fusiliers of 26th Volksgrenadier-had pushed on toward Wardin. As we saw earlier, they had a limited success there and one 

of Colonel Ewell's companies of the 502d Parachute InfantryCompany I, on his extreme right-had been fragmented. But 

Bayerlein had eyes and ears only for the signs and sounds of 

enemy fire on his left, a state of mind aggravated no doubt by 

the activity of Team O'Hara's guns which had not supported 

Colonel Ewell's attack on Wardin but which were continuing 

to punish all enemy forces within sight or hearing. 

Bayerlein, by his own account, gained the distinct impression 

that strong American forces had arrived in Wardin and were 

about to envelop his left; he could not conceive that the American infantry had been defeated there and that the American 

armor was preparing to withdraw to ground closer to Bastogne. 

The time had come, Bayerlein concluded, to direct every energy 

to the extrication of his force. But this was not easy to do. He 

felt that retirement by the narrow, winding road on which' he 

had come-the road to Benonchamps-was now out of the question. If he were to make it at all, he would have to completely 

destroy and clear the American roadblock at Longvilly and move 

by the main highway. These were his thoughts after he had 

moved farther rearward from Mageret and he so reported them 

to his Corps commander, adding his personal urging that the 

plan be changed and that the entire Corps be thrown against 

Bastogne. 

During these same hours, the XXXXVII Corps commander, 

Lieutenant General Liittwitz, had received nothing but bad news 

from any part of his front. In sum, he had heard that Bayerlein 

had been stopped at Neffe, that parts of the 77th Regiment of 

the 26th Volksgrenadier Division had been stopped east of 
THE ENEMY STORY 187 

Bizory (by the 501st Parachute Infantry), and that the 78th 

Regiment of the 26th Division had been stopped at Hill 540, 

southeast of Foy (by Colonel Sink's forces). General Kokott, 

too, had expressed the same gloomy views as Bayerlein. He realized that the lOlst Airborne Division had beaten him to Bastogne. And feeling that his own division might not be equal 

to the task of dislodging them, he urged that the entire Corps 

be committed to the task. 

Liittwitz reported to Fifth Panzer Army that each of his division commanders had gathered the impression that the enemy 

was in extraordinary strength at Bastogne. He added his recommendation that the original plan be changed and that the 

XXXXVII Corps be solidly committed to the reduction of Bastogne. Army refused the request, but it added a strange amendment to the previous orders. The Corps as a whole was given 

permission to renew the attack on a limited scale, since the 

position of the Panzer Lehr Division had become seriously 

compromised and so had that of the two northern regiments 

of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division. This was how matters 

stood on the highest level at 1600 on December 19. 

But on the tactical plane, Corps and all three divisions had 

been harassed mainly by thoughts of what might happen unless 

they destroyed the Longvilly roadblock. They had gone to work 

on that problem in early afternoon with such results that they 

should have become convinced they had reduced it to a cipher. 

The consequences to the American armor of the German attack against the Longvilly position on the afternoon of December 19 have been described earlier in their bare detail. But 

neither Captain Ryerson nor Lieutenant Hyduke had any idea 

then what major forces had been arrayed against them. In the 

course of the forenoon, out of Panzer Lehr, the 90lst Panzergrenadier Regiment, one tank destroyer battalion with about 

twenty TDs, and an artillery battalion, had collected in the area 

of Benonchamps. Bayerlein, worrying about the Neffe-Mageret 

forces and the probable involvement of his reconnaissance battalion-the Panzer Lehr Division's reconnaissance training battalion-which had been shaken out farther to the south, seized on 
.... 

00 

00 

Map 27: Destruction of the Longvilly Block, December 19 
THE ENEMY STORY 189 

the Benonchamps forces to break the grip of the Longvilly block. 

Bayerlein did not realize at the time that a body of American 

armor was collected at the position which he was about to attack, 

for he had received principally mortar and small-arms fire from 

that direction. He had already begun to discount the story told 

him by the Belgian the night before and was now swinging 

around to the idea that there was no American armor on his 

rear. This is the reason why he weighted his attack heavily with 

infantry. He ordered the force to attack from Benonchamps 

through the woods toward Longvilly, going east. Fifteen of the 

TDs were to give strong preliminary and supporting fires; the 

other five TDs were directed to accompany the two companies 

of infantry to the high ground. It was a trick, he said, that he 

had learned from opposing our 4th Armored Division in Normandy. 

This assault force reached the top of Hill 490 a little time after 

1400. From there, they saw the .welter of American armor and 

motionless combat vehicles strung out along the Longvilly road, 

the tanks trying vainly to break away from their own trap. It 

was a target they had not expected at all, and it lay fully vulnerable at range of 1,500 to 2,000 yards. The other tank destroyers 

came forward. The twenty heavy guns of the TDs opened fire 

and so did all other weapons. (Map 27, page 188.) 

Nor was that all. To support Bayerlein's Neffe position on 

the right, Liittwitz had ordered one regiment from the 26th 

Volksgrenadier Division to move to Bizory via the most direct 

side road. The advance elements of that regiment, the 77th, had 

already taken the road from Oberwampach going through Niederwampach. The rear elemen~ were still within convenient 

reach to the southeast of the Longvilly block. Liittwitz, not knowing of Bayerlein's action, met the commander of the regiment 

on the road between Oberwampach and Niederwampach and 

directed him to collect all artillery and heavy weapons in the 

general area and attack Longvilly from the southeast. He did so, 

and the force which went forward was heavy in antitank guns. 

By accident rather than from design it arrived at the high ground 

south of Longvilly simultaneously with the opening of Bayer-
190 BASTOGNE 

lein's attack and its gunpower was added to the impact of the 

TDs. 

Colonel Meinhard von Lauchert, commanding the 2d Panzer 

Division, had talked with Liittwitz about the Longvilly block, 

but since his own people were turning north some distance short 

of the American armor, it hadn't concerned him overly in the 

beginning. But when he drew fire from the Longvilly direction 

(the action taken by the batteries supporting Hyduke) during 

the morning of December 19 and the shells threatened to interdict his turning movement, he directed that five or six 88mm. 

guns be set up at the road junction below Chilfontaine to counter 

the American fire. This battery had been in operation for perhaps two hours when the two attacks were launched against 

Longvilly from the southeast and southwest. Its guns continued 

to fire and do great execution upon the stalled American column 

during the hours when the guns along the southern line were 

raking the armor point-blank. Here was surely the strangest 

passage in the whole enemy attack on Bastogne-all three divisions engaged at one time, bringing together the greatest fire 

concentration produced during the first phase of the siege. And 

their luckless target was a force which already felt itself defeated 

and was simply looking for a way out! 

The bombardment lasted for about two hours, but even after 

that the German infantry did not close in. Mter Hyduke and 

his group fell back on Ryerson, who was trying to break through 

Mageret and so open a road of escape for what remained of the 

American force, some few American riflemen remained hidden 

amid the wreckage of the American armor and kept the enemy 

at bay with rifle fire-or at least that is the explanation of the 

German commanders. Dark was almost at hand when the Germans moved out onto the road. Liittwitz, fascinated by the spot, 

strolled among the riven hulls and noted that it was a strange 

place for a battle. This portion of the road was a kind of sacred 

way, lined on both sides with large stone crucifixes and a dozen 

or more heroic figures of saints. The burning armor was jammed 

in among these objects; the sacred images had served to block 

the way out. But Liittwitz looked the tanks over carefully and 
THE ENEMY STORY 191 

concluded that Von Lauchert' s guns had done most of the damage. 

It was a melancholy night for Liittwitz. He was under the 

impression that a strong American force had arrived at Wardin. 

And if that were true, it was a serious impingement on any effort 

to attack Bastogne from the south. His immediate problem was 

a kind of tactical monstrosity. He could use his entire corps 

against Bastogne and yet he had to commit it in such a way 

that there would be no chance of Itn involvement that would 

militate against the accomplishment of his basic mission to keep 

on advancing. He was dropping infiltration for the moment but 

he WitS not undertaking siege: there was no time to coordinate 

a general plan. 

In the morning he felt a little better. Word came that Bayerlein's reconnaissance battalion (Panzer Lehr Division) had taken 

Wardin. Liitt\0.tz felt that this eased his situation, though no 

one bothered to tell him that Wardin had fallen into his hands 

without struggle because there were no Americans there. On 

the right the 2d Panzer Division took Noville somewhere near 

the middle of the afternoon, and again the Corps commander 

grew confident that the Americans were yielding to his superior 

force. He thought that an outflanking movement directed at 

Noville by the 2d Panzer Division from the northwest had 

brought off the capture of the village. He didn't know that the 

pressure on the American right rear had anything to do with it 

-a ·pressure coming from one of Kokott's regiments. Kokott's 

men had come through the woods and were pressing on Foy. 

It was this pressure that persuaded Colonel Sink to ask for 

permission to withdraw. So during most of that day Liittwitz 

entertained an illusion that his hit-and-run effort was succeeding. 

His hopes were again dashed by what happened to his center. 

The 90lst Regiment, Panzer Lehr Division, tried for Marvie in 

the hours of the late morning and was repulsed. However, to 

Liittwitz that was no more than an incident in the battle; he 

hadn't expected much. But when Bayerlein hit again from Neffe 

just after dark fell, and his attack was stopped cold, the whole 
192 BASTOGNE 

command reacted gloomily. Again Bayerlein got a slightly exaggemted idea of the forces opposing him. "I was stopped by a tremendous artillery [true enough] and I also found myself opposing a great number of tanks [not accurate]. The effect was 

overpowering. We were stopped before we could begin." Again, 

to General Bayerlein the shock at Neffe was decisive. It also 

spelled failure for the Corps as a whole. 

The Corps, meanwhile, had been extending westward to the 

south of Bastogne. When Liittwitz heard that units of the Panzer Lehr Division 'had taken Wardin, he told General Kokott 

to take his reconnaissance battalion and the 39th Regiment, and 

swinging on a wide arc toward Sibret, make ready to attack Bastogne from the south. The advance followed the general line 

through Lutremange to Villera-Ia-Bonne-Eau to Hompre to 

Sibret but the roads on this line were so difficult for the armored 

cars that they had to advance well to the southward of the forest. 

Sibret. was captured about 2000. The 39th Regiment reached 

high ground one kilometer north of Remoifosse and the wood 

one kilometer north of Assenois and there was brought in check, 

chiefly through the efforts of Colonel Harper's 327th Glider 

Infantry and the engineers. Having taken Sibret, Kokott's reconnaissance battalion went on to Chenogne, where it was brought 

in check temporarily. 

Thus the Corps stood on the night of December 20, with Bastogne almost solidly in its embrace. On the south was Kokott's 

39th Regiment (26th Volksgrenadier Division). To the southeast, near Marvie, was Bayerlein's 901st Regiment (Panzer Lehr 

Division). And next to it, confronting Neffe, was hi's 902d. The 

77th and 78th Regiments of Kokott were on each side of the .railway running northeast out of Bastogne. Across the north, blocking all roads, were the elements of the 2d Panzer Division. That 

division was advancing to the west, and the extension of the generalline, in so far as it was concerned, consisted only of roadblock 

elements whose mission was to protect the flank of the marching 

column. 

Yet despite this apparently excellent situation of the Corps, 

Liittwitz felt that night that so far as Bastogne was concerned, 
THE ENEMY STORY 193 

he was temporarily defeated. His chief subordinates, too, with 

the exception of Kokott, believed that the enforced continuation 

of the advance of the mechanized divisions to the westward, leaving the Bastogne assignment to Kokott's division, dimmed the 

prospect for.a final victory. They had been impressed by the 

strength of the Bastogne forces and they felt that the task required unremitting pressure from the entire Corps. 

In the course of December 21, Kokott's reconnaissance battalion got almost to the highway near Mande-St.-£.tienne before being stopped by Colonel Harper's forces. The day was 

given over largely to the shifting of regiments as Kokott's division took over the general assignment which the day previous 

had been a Corps responsibility. Panzer Lehr was bound for 

Morhet. Bayerlein's 902d Regiment was replaced on the Bastogne line by Kokott's 77th, and his 78th Regiment took over 

the sector which had been held by the 2d Panzer Division. One 

regiment, the 901st, and some of the special elements of the Panzer Lehr Division were left behind, passing into Kokott's command. 

On that day, also, the reconnaissance group of the 2d Panzer 

Division got only as far as Tenneville. Liittwitz by now was devoting his entire attention to the progress of the 2d Panzer. He 

had wanted the reconnaissance group to move fast through the 

Bois de Bande and reach Bande by nightfall, but for some reason he couldn't get his lead forces rolling and the division strung 

out all the way from Tenneville to Bourcy. He found. out later 

that the head of his column had been stopped by "strong enemy 

forces" maintaining a roadblock at a crossing southeast of T enneville. This was, of course, the block maintained by Company B 

of Allen's battalion of the 327th Glider Infantry. It held up the 

progress of the 2d Panzer Division for one whole day, and of 

this delay much resulted subsequently. On December 22 and 23 

the division pushed on only a little way; it was for the 2d Panzer 

Division a day of endless stopping, starting and turning, the 

sounds of which gave the defending forces within the Bastogne 

perimeter the impression that a tremendous enemy build-up was 

taking place to the north of them. [The patrols into Rouette led 
194 BASTOGNE 

by Lieutenant David E. White of 502d Parachute Infantry were 

in fact hitting against the outposts covering the Hank of this withdrawing division.] Again word came to Liittwitz that the 2d Panzer Division's road was blocked by a stoutly held enemy roadblock. The report came from the same regimental commander 

who had engaged Company B, 327th, on December 21. 

On the night of December 23-24, Liittwitz went forward in 

person to examine the block. He received no fire as he came 

within range of it, so he rode on to the block and began taking 

the logs down. The block had been undefended throughout the 

entire time and the division had lost two days because of the 

hesitancy of this regimental commander who was subsequently 

court-martialed for cowardice. It cost the division dear, and not 

alone in time, for its vehicles were still strung out over these 

roads when the skies lifted and the American air strike came. 

Haltingly, and with other similar bad experiences, the division 

continued on its way toward Marche, Liittwitz accompanying 

them. 

Kokott, on taking over the main burden of reducing Bastogne, 

was at first Hushed with optimism. On the morning of December 20, he had been at Wardin, where an American shell hit 

his CP truck, killed the other occupants and propelled Kokott 

against the wall of the village church. He was badly stunned; 

it was his closest call of the war. But he had been encouraged 

by the taking over of the position. After briefing the 39th Regiment and the reconnaissance battalion for the move westward 

toward Sibret, he went with them, to make certain that they 

moved as he wanted. So dOing, he gained a first-hand impression that Bastogne was wide open on the south and west. He 

saw ~ertain of the American elements which, either in moral or 

physical dissolution, were attempting to move south away from 

Bastogne. But what he saw he mistakenly interpreted. He 

thought these retreating fractions signified that the Bastogne 

defense was now disintegrating. This suspicion became a convictio.n when at Sibret he talked to a Belgian who assured him 

that the Bastogne garrison was falling apart. Arriving at his CP 

at Bras at 0200 on the morning of December 21, he was further 
THE ENEMY STORY 195 . cheered by the news that the 5th Parachute Division on his left 

flank (to the south) was making good progress. Kokott had found 

the roads very muddy, greatly choked by disabled vehicles left 

behind by both armies and frequently disturbed by artillery fire 

from within Bastogne. 

The next two days were largely given over to maneuver, as Kokott's 26th Volksgrenadier Division extended westward in an attempt to complete the envelopment. The 77th Regiment was 

shifted to confront Bastogne from the northwest quarter; the 78th 

was to the 77th's left in the northeast sector; the 901st of Panzer 

Lehr Division still confronted the Marvie sector; the 39th Regiment was astride all roads leading into Bastogne from the southeast; the reconnaissance battalion had almost closed the circle 

on the west side and was moving toward the town from the southwest. On the west side between the reconnaissance battalion 

and the 77th Regiment, there was a small armored force from 

Panzer Lehr Division. But even so, where the road ran from 

Bastogne to ChampIon, the line had not been rounded out. The 

American fire upon this artery was so intense that Kokott's forces 

could not gain the road, though they had it under such fair o~ 

servation that they could interdict it effectively against American 

traffic. 

For the time being, the 26th Volksgrenadier Divison was 

sufficiently supplied with gasoline, having taken over some 

American stores during the swing through to Sibret. Mortar and 

artillery shells, however, were running short and this had become a drag upon operations. General Kokott didn't have the 

slightest suspicion that the opposing camp was plagued by the 

same problem. He noted that whenever the American artillery 

spoke, it did so in heavy concentrations. It was seldom that a 

single gun fired for in the interest of conserving ammunition 

there was little use of harassing fires. To Kokott's mind this suggested that the American artillery was being used with confidence 

and he reasoned that it must be amply supplied with ammunition. Heavy concentrations equal heavy supply: that was how 

he reasoned it. 

Matters worsened on December 23. To the southward there 
196 BASTOGNE 

was a near crisis when Kokott's rear began to feel pressure .from 

the" American thrusts northward to relieve Bastogne. Kokott's 

forces first became aware of the pressure when elements of the 

5th Parachute Division fell back into their area. There were 

five newly arrived Tiger tanks near Kokott's CPo He didn't know 

where they had come from and he didn't stop to inquire. He 

sent them on down the Clochimont road in an effort to restore 

the situation. Soon after the German tanks departed, Kokott 

saw the first American troop-carrier planes come over on the Bastogne re-supply mission. He and his officers saw the parachutes 

dropping; they thought that additional paratroops were arriving 

to swell the ranks of the defenders. The effect was, as he expressed it, "to increase the disorder in the ranks of the attackers." 

That night, on Corps order, he attacked Marvie, intending to 

smash through to Bastogne. The 90lst Regiment was sent against 

Marvie, while the 39th Regiment, on its left, moved along the 

main road from Assenois. In an extension of this same line, forming roughly a half circle, the reconnaissance battalion, 26th 

Volksgrenadier Division, also moved to the attack and for the 

first time was able to close its grip on the Bastogne-Champlon 

road. The attack failed, as related earlier in the book. Kokott 

received early reports that his forces had "captured" Marvie [an 

exaggeration] but he never knew that the Panzer Lehr Division 

had broken the line at Hill 500 that night or that some of its 

tanks had entered Bastogne. [Kokott's comment on this was: 

"They took only the first few houses and then reported to me 

that they had captured the village. I acted on the assumption 

that they were telling the truth. This is a very common type of 

error in our operations."] 

On the same night, while the Marvie attack was Bickering, 

Kokott was visited at his CP by General Hasso-Eccard Manteuffel, Commanding General of the Fifth Panzer Army. An 

order had come down from XXXXVII Corps that Bastogne would" 

be attacked again on Christmas Day and Manteuffel had come 

in person to give his instructions. By this time the German high 

command was thoroughly alarmed. The continued resistance at 

Bastogne and the southern action in support of it were holding 
THE ENEMY STORY 197 

up the advance of their entire Seventh Army. Manteuffel said 

it was necessary to hurry the conquest of the town because resistance from the south against the 5th Parachute Division was 

increasing hour by hour. He added, "Bastogne must be taken at 

all costs." 

Manteuffel asked Kokott what he proposed and Kokott said 

that inasmuch as he had tried from every other direction and 

had taken heavy losses, he would now attack from out of the 

northwest. The 77th, which was the freshest of his regiments 

and had taken the least losses, was holding this sector. He reasoned, too, that the Americans would be looking primarily to 

the east and south and that their strength would be deployed 

in these directions, with weakness in the northwest. [He was 

all wrong about this. The forces were strongest and freshest 

in the area he propOsed to attack.] HiS final argument was that 

the terrain in the northwest was the most favorable for the employment of armor, being relatively open and firm, so that the 

tanks would not have to be bound by the roads. 

Manteuffel then agreed to put the 15th Panzergrenadier Division at Kokott's disposal and directly under his command for this 

attack. The division was only then moving up, a v~teran division 

with considerable experience on the Italian front, and it would 

arrive in good condition. 

The forward elements of the 15th Panzergrenadier Division 

reached the sector confronting Champs and Hemro':llle about 

2200 on December 24. There were immediately available two 

artillery battalions, one tank battalion (with about thirty medium 

tanks and tank destroyers) and the spearheads (two battalions) 

of the first two infantry regiments. For the troops of that division, it was simply a question of how many could get forward 

to the assembly area before jump-off time. Kokott had decided 

that he had to attack in the dark because. of American air superiority and he had set the hour at 0300 on Christmas morning. 

He reasoned further that his troops would have to be in Bastogne 

by 0800, for he felt that he would no/1 be able to continue the 

attack advantageously after daylight. 

The greater part of the first two regiments of 15th Panzer-
198 BASTOGNE 

grenadier Division got forward in time to be fed into the attack, 

along with the tank battalion. SOme of these men rode the tanks; 

others followed in an infantry line that wavered from the beginning, because its members had had little chance to catch 

breath or get their bearings after arrival at the front. Kokott's 

77th Regiment attacked on the left against Champs, and he had 

the impression that this was the only part of the attack that got 

off strongly. His reconnaissance battalion, to the southward of 

the sector where the elements of the 15th Panzer Division struck 

against Colonel Harper's position, was also supposed to have 

joined in the attack, although this demonstration made almost 

no impression on the defenders. The troops confronting the eastern and southern parts of the perimeter were ordered to support 

the attack with continuing fires to prevent reinforcement of the 

westward-facing positions. 

Thus the plans and intentions of the enemy in the Christmas 

Day fight. The results were as described in an earlier chapter. 

By 1000 Kokott knew that his plan was irretrievably lost. At 

1200 he asked XXXXVII Corps for permission to stop the attack 

and reorganize. Corps refused, saying that it had become absolutely necessary to capture Bastogne, since the pressure on the 

south was becoming uncontainable. But the fight [at the hinge 

of our 327th Glider Infantry-502d Parachute Infantry front] 

had run its own course and was already dying. Kokott reluctantly 

renewed the attack, knowing now that the only effect would be 

to increase his losses. 
KEY TO NOTES 

(Notes begin on page 6) 

LIST OF THE 101 ST AmBORNB DIVISION RECORDS FOR DECEMBER 1944 

ABI-Annex 1, lOIst Airborne Division, L-450: G-1. AfteI Action 

report, G-l Journal 19-31, Strength and Casualty Reports, Chaplain 

Report, Civif Affairs Report, Surgeon Report, Provost Marshal Report, 

Post Office Report. 

AB2-Annex 2, WIst Airborne Division, L-450: G-2 AfteI Action 

Report, G-2 Journal 19-31, G-2 IPW Summaries, G-2 Periodic Reports 

19-31. 

AB3-Annex 3, lOIst Airborne Division, L-450: G-3 Journal 19-31, 

G-3 Periodic Reports IS-31. 

AB3A-lOIst Airborne Division SigO, L-450: After Action Report, 

Radio and Traffic Diagram, Field Order 1. 

AB4-Annex 4, lOIst Airborne Division, L-450: G-4 Report, G-4 

Journal, Report of Air Resupply, Administrative Orders. 

AB5-Annex 5, lOIst Airborne Division Artillery, L-450: AfteI Action 

Report, Journal and File, Maps and Overlays. 

AB6-Annex 6, 327th Glider Infantry: After Action Report, S-2 Periodic ReportS, S-3 Periodic Reports, S-1 Journal, S-2 Journal, OVeIlays; 

Field Order 2, Operations Memos. 

AB7-Annex 7, 50Ist Parachute Infantry, L-450: AfteI Action Report, 

OveIlays, Field Orders, Casualty Reports, Supporting Documents, Journal. 

ABS-Annex 8, 502d Parachute Infantry, 1..-450: After Action Report, 

Casualty Reports, Periodic Reports, Field Orders, Overlays, Journal. 

AB9-Annex 9, 506th Parachute Infantry, L-450: After Action Report, 

S-2 Journal, S-3 Journal, Casualty Reports, Overlays, Field Orders, Periodic Reports. 

ABIO-Annex lO, 32Ist Glider Field Artillery Battalion, L-450: AfteI 

Action Report, Critique, Journal, Casualty Reports, Maps. 

ABll-Annex 11, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, L-450: 

AfteI Action Report, Critique, Journal, Casualty, Awards, etc., Supporting Documents. 

AB12-Annex 12, 463d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, L-450: 

After Action Report, S-2 Journal, S-3 Work Sheet and File, PeIiodic Reports, OveIlays and Documents. 

AB13-Annex 13, 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion, J..,450: AfteI 

Action Report, S-1 Daily Reports, S-3 Daily Reports, Administration and Dis~ition Reports, Journal, Overlays and MaI?s. 

AB14-Annex 14, 8Ist Airborne Antiaircratt Battalion, L-450: AfteI 

Action Report, Casualty Reports, Awards, etc., Overlays. 

AB15-Annex 15, 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, L-450: After 

Action R~rt, Journal, Casualty Reports and Awards, etc., Periodic Reports, Field Onfers and Documents, Overlays. 

[ 199 J 
200 BASTOGNE 

ABl6-Annex 16, 101st Airborne Signal Company, L-450: After Action Report, Casualty, Awards. 

AB17-326th Airborne Medical Company, L-450: After Action Report, 

Casualty, Awarc4, etc. 

AB18-426th Airborne Quartermaster Company, L-450: After Action 

Report, Journal, Casualty, Awards, etc. 

AB19-801st Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company: After Action 

Report. 

AB20-101st Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon, L-450: Narrative, 

Awards and Decorations. 

AB21-101st Airborne Division, L-450: After Action Report and Maps. 

INTERVIEW RECORD, 101 ST AmBoRNE DIVISION 

The following interviews were recorded in Bastogne, Belgium, January 

1945 (unless otherwise noted) by the historian indicated in parentheses: 

M31-Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe,' Acting Commanding General, lOIst Airborne Division (Marshall). 

M32-Lieutenant Colonel H. W. O. Kinnard, G-3, lOIst (Marshall). 

M33-Lieutenant Colonel Carl W. Kohls, G-4, lOlst (Webber). 

M34-Colonel Joseph H. Harper, Commanding Officer, 327th Glider 

Infantry (Marshall). 

M35-Lieutenant Colonel Julian J. Ewell, Commanding Officer, 501st 

Parachute Infantry (MarshaIf). 

M36-Lieutenant Colonel Steve A. ChapJ>uis, Commanding Officer, 

502d Parachute Infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick F. Cassidy, 

Executive Officer, 502d (Marshall). 

M37-Lieutenant Colonel Clarence F. Nelson, Commanding Officer. 

907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (Marshall). 

M38-Captain James E. Parker, Air Control Officer (Westover). 

M39-Lieutenant Colonel Roy C. Allen, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry (March 1945; Westover). 

M40-Private First Class Elmer E. Lucas, 326th Medical Detachment. 

(This interview was held in Paris, France, April 1945; Westover.) 

INTERVIEW RECORD, COMBAT COMMAND B, 10TH ARMORED DIVISION 

The following interviews were recorded in Bastogne, Belgium, January 

1945 (unless otherwise noted), by the historian indicated in parentheses: 

M41-Colonel Wm. L. Roberts, Commanding Officer (Westover). 

M42-Letter from Colonel Roberts to Colonel MarshalJ, February 18, 

1945. 

M43-Lieutenant Colonel Henry T. Cherry, Commanding Officer, 3d 

Tank Battalion (Westover). 

M44-Lieutenant Colonel James O'Hara, Commanding Officer, 54th 

'Armored Infantry Battalion (Westover). 

, M45-Major William R. Desobry, Commanding Officer, 20th Armored 

Infantry Battalion (Westover). 
KEY TO NOTES 201 

M45A-Narrative Summary of Operations of 4th Armored Division in 

the relief of Bastogne December 22-29, 1944 (Clark). 

INTERVIEW RECORD,705TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION 

The following interviews of units were recorded in Bastogne, Belgium, 

January 1945, by Lieutenant Webber: 

M46-70Sth Tank Destroyer Battalion, with Lieutenant Colonel Clif· 

ford D. Templeton, Commanding Officer. 

M47-70Sth Supply. 

M48-1st Platoon Reconnaissance Company. 

M49-2d Platoon Reconnaissance Company. 

MSO-3d Platoon Reconnaissance Company. 

MSI-2d Platoon Company A. 

MS2-lst Platoon Company B. 

MS3-2d Platoon Company B. 

M54-3d Platoon Company B. 

MSS-2d Platoon Company C. 

M56-3d Platoon Company C. 

OrnER SoURCE MATERIAL (RECORD) 

S57-S06th Parachute Infantry Narrative (January 8, 1945). 

SSa-Field Order, 77th Grenadier Regiment. 

SS9-Diary Walcher (901st Panzer Lehr). 

S60-S01st Parachute Infantry Summary of Action (draft). 

S61-327th Glider Infantry Narrative (draft). 

S62-Transportation Corps Narrative. 

S63-Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, After Action Re· 

port (January S, 1945). 

S64-Combat Command B Journal excerpts. 

S6S-Request for Citation for 3d Tank Battalion, Combat Command B, 

10th Armored Division. 

S66-769th Antiaircraft Artillery (automatic weapons) "Battalion Journal (excerpts). 

S67-54th Armored Infantry Journal (excerpts). 

S68-420th Armored Field Artillery Journal (excerpts). 

S69-Team Hustead Journal (excerpts). 

S70-333d Field Artillery Group After Action Report. 

S71-Third Army-Notes on Bastogne, January IS. No signature, from 

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh M. Cole. 

S72-Brigadier General Gerald J. Higgins (February 5, 1946) (Marshall). 

S73-Major William R. Desobry (January 20, 1946) (Marshall). 

S74-Conversations with lOlst Division Staff (November 1945) 

(Marshall). 
NOTES 

Interviews and other source material, cited in the footnotes by· letter 

symbols (e.g. M31), are listed below. The interviews and excerpts from 

official records are deposited in the Historical Section, Headquarters European Theater of Operations. 

CHAPTER I-THE SITUATION 

1 This information is from the European Theater of Operations Historical File of interviews with high-rankiD..$ German commanders. It comes 

from interviews with Colond General Jodi and Field Marshal Keitd· and 

is connrmed by all subordinate commanders interviewed. 2 The entire chapter, except as indicated in the note just above, is based 

on After Action Report, VIII Corps, December 1944. 

CHAPTER 2-THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNB 

1A'From the file on the conversations of Lieutenant General W. B. 

Smith, Chief of Staff of SHAEF and Major General Harold R. Bull with 

historians on September 20, 1945. 

1B S71, December 16, 1944. 

2M41 and S64. Orders to pass initial point were as of 171215 December but the actual passing was at 1320. 8 AB21, Narrative, page 1; M32; records XVIII Corps. The time of 

0800 in the Kinnard interview is an obvious error for 2000. 

'M46. 

II This is the essence of the summary given in the 12th Army GroUp 

After Action Report for December 1944, Paragraph 13. 

'S64,M41. 

fA M32. Information from Colonels Moore and Kinnara, records XVIII 

Airbome Corps. . 7B Information from Colonels Moore and Kinnard, records XVIII AirbomeCOrps. 8 M32; IIA M32; aB S72, S74; 10 M32; 11 M32, AB21; 12 M32, AB21. 

Records XVIII Airbome Corps, information from Colonels Moore and 

Kinnard. M32, in error, gives General McAuliffe's objective as Bastogne. 

AB21 correctly explains the situation as it is described here. The facts 

concerning traffic in M32 agree with the known situation of AB21. 18 S64, M41; l'S64, M41; u M42; 18 Historian's observation; 17A M42; 

17B S73; 18 M33. 111 S62; AB4, Narrative, page 1; ABI. In the Strength Report for December 18, 1944, the Effective Strength of the lOIst Division is listed as 

805 officers and 11,035 enlisted men, a total of 11,840. The exact number 

who moved forward is not known as this total includes those not yet retumed from pass and those who remained in Mourmelon to maintain the 

base camp. 

20 S62, AB4. G-4's estimate of 2000 as the departure time is supported 

by the 327th After Action Report. 21 M32; III M31. 

lilA M32, and information from Colonels Moore and Kinnard. 

[202 ] 
KEY TO NOTES 

23B Information from Colonels Moore and Kinnard. 2~AM32. 

203 

2~B Letter from General Middleton to Colonel Marshall, July I, 1945. 

25 M32; 26 M32, S72; 27 M41; 28 M46; 29 M47; 30 M46. 

CHAPTER 3-TEAM CHERRY 

1 All the material from which this narrative is produced is based on the 

interview with the members of . Team Cherry. The records of Team 

Cherry were completely destroyed during the Christmas Eve bombings of 

Bastogne and consequently there is no official record of the operation of 

Colonel Cherry's force other than the interview and what Colonel Roberts, commanding officer, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, 

could say of Team Cherry's operation. 

CHAPTER 4-FmST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 

1 M35. Colonel Ewell told Colonel Marshall about this during their 

conversation. The two men had a close acquaintanceship extending back 

to the Normandy campaign. However, Colonel Ewell was rated this way 

by all of his fellows. He mentioned his visit to Basto.&ne as a matter only 

of passing interest. It seems likely that this remarkable coincidence would never have been brought to light except that Ewell had to explain how he 

knew his own troo'ps were on the wrong road initially. Colonel Ewell was badly wounded a few hours after the interview. . 2 AB3, M32. The order of march directed by General McAuliffe was: 501st, 506th, 502d, 327th, with Slst Antiaircraft Battalion following the 

50lst and 326th Engineers following the 506th. 

8 M32; ~ M32, M35; 5 M32. 

6 M31, M32. The paragraph that follows this is from the Ewell interview. 

7 M35. Colonel Ewell was asked whether he told them and he said no. 8 M32. This was the situation as Colonel Kinnard understood it to be 

and as he made note of it at the time. But it was not precisely the situation 

as it existed. 

9M3I. 

10 M31. The discrepancy between this and the preceding paragraph is a difference in Kinnard's and McAuliffe's understanding of the situation 

of the roadblocks. In any case it is inconsequential. 11 M31. McAuliffe in his interview stated this very positively. 

12 M31. His exact words. 

18 M31, M35. Ewell felt that McAuliffe was looking for a general solution. McAuliffe used the phrase "good old Leavenworth solution" in 

talking to Marshall. 

14A All of the interviews make this point obvious. 

ltB From letter to Colonel Marshall by General Middleton, July 1, 

1945. 11 M35; 18 M35; 17 M35. Quoting Ewell exactly. 

18M35. 

18 M31. McAuliffe's words were put down exactly as he said them. 
204 BASTOGNE 

20 M31; 21 M31; 22 M31; 28 M37; 24 M31, M35; u M35; 28 AB7; 

21 AB7; 28 M31; 29 M37; 80 M35. 

81 M35. The Historian's examination of the terrain verified this. 82 M35, AB7; 88 M35, AB7; 84 ABB, M37; 85 ABB, M37; 36 AB7, 

M35. 

81 From the Historian's observation of the country. 38 M35; 89 M35; 40 M35. Ewell's words are quoted exactly; 41 M35. 

'2 M35. This was Colonel Ewell's impression of what happened and it 

was supported by his conversation with prisoners of war. 

48 on the day of the interview the building was hit and shelled repeatedly. In the Nunnery yards that morning a_truck loaded with 200 mines 

was blown up. Not one particle of the bodies of the 12 men who were 

loading it could be found. Whether the truck had been hit by a shell was 

never determined. 

CHAPTER 5-BAST OF BASTOGNB 

1 M35; 2 M4I, 863. 

B M35. Colonel Ewell said he got better coordination this way. 

4AB7, M35. Ewell did not know what had been happening to Team 

Cherry around Mageret. 

5 AB7, M35; 6 AB2, M35. 

T M35. Ewell said he had no prior knowledge of this group. Yet Kinnard and McAuliffe had received the information from Middleton. 8 M44; 9 M44, 864; 10 M44; 11 M44; 12 AB7, M35. 

18 AB2, AB7, M35; 14 M44, 864; u M35; 18 M35; 17 M43. 

CHAPTBR 6-HOLDING THE CHATBAU 

IM43. 

2 As this is identical with Major Bottomly's estimate to Colonel Ewell it 

seems probable that men coming through gave Bottomly his information. 

8 8ince the chateau was west of the German roadblock and the west 

wall faced toward Major Bottomly, this may have been American fire. 

'There were supposed to be two Engineer roadblocks in the vicinity, 

one between Bastogne and Neffe and the other at Mont. Colonel Ewell 

says that he found no engineer group on the Longvilly road. The Mont 

block was intact when Griswold got there. The group that came to the 

chateau may have been driven off the Longvilly road by the German fire 

and after going to the chateau decided to rejoin the other group. Th~ Historian was not able to establish the fact. 

5 The work of this party was not known to Colonel Ewell and does not 

appear in the battalion journal. It appears in the Combat Command B 

Journal and the Team Cherry interview, and is confirmed in the interview with Colonel Kinnard. 

68uch is the confusion of battle that lOist Division command post had 

the impression that Team Cherry had burned the chateau before withdrawing in order to keep it from falling into enemy hands. 

1864. 
KEY TO NOTES 205 

CHAPTER 7 -TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 

1 M35. Colonel Roberts also expressed this view on the 28th Division 

to Westover, but it was not placed in the interview. II M45, 864, 873; aA M45, 864; 873; aB 872, 873; 80 873. 

~ M31, 872. McAuliffe likewise says that LaPrade was sent to Noville 

because of Desobry's predicament. 6 M45, 857; 6 M31; 7857,864. 8 M45. This is not the construction placed upon the advance by the, 

Journal of the 506th Parachute'Infantry which says that General McAuliffe told LaPrade to take command. The latter must be in error because General McAuliffe says nothing of the kind and the facts are that 

he didn't give authority to put LaPrade in command. 

11857; 10 M45. 

11 M45, 864. It is an interesting fact that the Journal of the 506th has 

almost nothing to say about this conspicuous service done the regiment by 

Rice although the Journal does make reference to their acute supply situation. However, this is somewhat characteristic of forces acting in Juncture. 

CHAPTER 8-ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL 

1 M45, 857, 564; 2 M45, 857, 864; a M45, 857, 864; 4. 857; 6 M45, 

857,864. 8 From 857, backed by statements made to Westover in an interview 

with battalion officers on March 13, 1945. 

7 There is a time discrepancy between the M45 and 864 with 857 at 

this 'p~int but darkness came early because of the bad visibility. 8 The 506th Parachute Infantry claims that five of these tanks were destroyed but the statement is considered insufficient because proofs were 

lacking and in view of the conditions already described. 

9 M45; 10 M45. 

11 From statement by Harwick to Marshall. This statement was never 

committed to writing because it was made in answer to a question prior to 

an interview which was to be held at a later hour. Before the interview 

could be held Harwick was hit. 

12 857, 864; 18 857, 864, 872; 14 857; 15 From Harwick. 

16 857, 864; 17M45; 18M45, 557; 19M31; 2°M31; 21M31, M36, 857. 22 872; 28 872; 24. 873. . 

CHAPTER 9-DOUBTS AND DECISIONS 

1 Examination of the assembly area overlay alongside of how the battle 

developed makes this fact self-evident. However there was considerable 

discussion between General McAuliffe and the Historian which is not included in the notes. General McAuliffe said that when the siege was over 

he felt that his choice of the assembly area was one of his most fortunate 

decisions and that he would not have altered it in any way looking at bat-· 

tIe retrospectively. He said that he had not given a great deal of thought 

to the situation before making his decision but that he "felt" that the area 

selected was the right place. 2M3!. 
206 BASTOGNE 

8 M31, M32, and letter to Colonel Marshall from General Middleton, 

July 1, 1945. 4 M33; 6 M32, S61; 6 M32; 1 M33; 8 M33; Ii M33; 10 M32. 

11 M33 and confirmed by the statements of many other witnesses to the 

historians. 

12M41; 13M4I; 14S64; 16M41, S64; 16M41, S64. 

11 Mter Action Report, 73d Armored Field Artillery, for December 

1944. 

18 Mter Action Report, 58th Armored Field Artillery, for December 

1944. 

19 When the newspaper correspondents at last reached Bastogne this 

battalion received more attention than all of the other artillery combined. 

20 S41; 21 S41; 22 S41. 

28 S41. Mter Action Report, VIII Corps, for December 1944, Mter 

Action Report, 4th Armored Division, for December 1944. 24 M41; 21 M41. 

28 M 41. Colonel Roberts said he was very sorry to see these men go. 

27 M3 7. The substitute ammunition proved quite satisfactory; Accord- i~ to Nelson its close-up position enabled Baker Battery to make more 

effective use of the M2 ammunition. The observers had remained with the 

forward platoons and this was true of most of the Bastogne operation with 

the result that casualties among forward observers ran very high. Nelson 

lost four observers killed. Many of the missions therefore had to be adjusted by infantry observers and Nelson said that the results were generally 

excellent. Due to atmospheric conditions the greater part of the adjustments had to be made by sound. When observation permitted time fire 

was used with good results. 

28 M3 7, but sustained by researches at all other points. Most of the supply points listed in VIII Corps' Administrative Orders Nos. 39 and 40 of 

December 18 and December 19 were either in enemy hands or had been 

moved to the rear by the hour the orders were received. VIII Corps radioed 

G-4 one time that there were 7,000 or more rounds of 75mm. howitzer 

ammunition in the abandoned ammunition supply point No. 128. G-4 

asked where that depot was located but never received a reply. On December 20, Captain Salve H. Matheson, S-4 of the 506th Parachute Infantry, 

drove to St. Hubert and to Bellauz in a fruitless search for small-arms ammunition. Major William C. Young, 10Ist Division Artillery S-4, reported 

that both the ammunition officer and the artillery officer of Corps said that 

the nearest ammunition supply point which had 105mm. M3 ammunition 

was Audun Ie Roman, which is in the south of Luxembourg. The 10 1st 

Division also received the slightly ironic information that a train loaded 

with ammunition of all the types desired by the IOIst was being unloaded 

at Bertrix. 

29 M33; 80 M33; 81 M33; 82 M33; 38 M41. 

CHAPTER IO-THE REPULSE 

1 M35. However, the Historian talked to perhaps a dozen of Colonel 

Ewell's officers to gather their general impression of how the stragglers 
KEY TO NOTES 207 

acted and how the combat force reacted and all statements were to the 

same point. 

2lVl35; 8 M52, M53; 4, M52, M53. 5 M52, M53. This disagrees with Colonel Ewell's statement of force 

engaged but Ewell said he was uncertain of the facts. 6 AB2; 7 M52, M53; 8 M35; 9 M35. 

10 M52, M53. The 50lst Parachute Infantry had no record of when 

action ended. 11 M35; 12 M35, S60; 18 M35. 

14 The Historian checked up on the location of these tanks. 

UM35. 

16 From the Historian's examination of situation. 

17 Ewell was convinced that the presence of the tank destroyers made 

this change. 

18 M52, M53; 19 M35; 20 M52, M53; 21 M35, M52, M53, S60; 22 M52, 

M53. 

28 M52, M53. S60 has no entry on this fact. 24 M35, M52, M53. 

26 M35. The Historian's observation of the terrain verifies this. 

26M32. 

21M36. 

28 Because of the fog, this action was especially "confused" and neither 

regiment had any clear idea of what had happened or how the killing 

ground had been established. To clarify the story, Colonel Marshall held 

a series of company and patrol after-battle interviews. The story was put 

together with the aid mainly of the enlisted participants. This episode 

and the action at the Longvilly block were at first regarded as minor incidents in the general battle. As additional facts came to light-particularly the enemy story-their pivotal nature was revealed. General Higgins 

was of the opinion that had both regiments seen and exploited this 0fPortunity more promptly and strongly, it would have produced one 0 the 

sharpest defeats to the enemy during the Bastogne battle. (Interview with 

Marshall February 5, 1946.) 

CHAPTER II-RUNNING BATTLE 

1M45, S"7. 2 This is shown by his conversation with Chappuis as reported in M36. 8 The Historian had several discussions with Colonels Sink, Ewell, Kinnard and others concerning the nature of the Noville position at the time 

when the IOIst Division attacked toward it in early January, and this was 

the estimate which all concerned placed upon it. ~ M36; a M36; 6 M45; 1 S57; 8 M55; 9 M55; 10 M55. 11 M45, M55, S57; 12 M55; 18 M45. a Harwick witnessed this incident and gave this detail during his informal interview with Colonel Marshall which was not committed to 

writing. 11 M45. Confirmed by Harwick's description to Marshall though Harwick also thought that a tank destro}'er came from the other direction and 

fired on the German tanks. In this he appears to have been mistaken. 
208 BASTOGNE 

16M45. 

11 Colqnd Roberts told Westover about this but Westover did not make 

note of it at the time. 

18 Harwick reported this to Colond Marshall and at the same time he was. tdling Colond 8ink about it and was expressing his regrets that he 

had lost some good men. He even named the men. However, the tankers 

did not report to Westover that they used any paratroopers at this time, 

and therefore the facts are not confirmed by the armored units. It is notable all the way through these reports that both forces minimize the help 

received from the oilier group. Often that is not an oversight on their 

part; they simply lacked the information. 

19 Members of the armored units reported these impressions to Westover 

but he did not write them down in his report. The facts are confirmed by 

857. 

20 M45; 21 M45; 22 M45, 857; 23 857; 24 857. 

25 M45. 857 reports that the tank destroyers did -engage the German armor but there was no confirmation of this from members of the tank destroyer units in connection with the opening fight at Foy. 26 857; 27 M36; 28 M45, 857; 29 M45, 857; 80 M45, 857. 

81 857. In M45 the locations of the paratroop companies are identified 

in a different order. All of th~ 506th statements, however, are to the point 

that Company C led the column. 

8Z 857. 

83 M45. This differs by a few minutes from 857. 

84 M45; 85 M45; 86 M45; 87 M45; 88 M45; 89 M45. 

40 M45. The 857 report of this whole episode is vague and confused. 

It is to he noted that both the infantry and the tank destroyer units re- ported that there was a German roadblock at Foy and that this was what 

checked the columrt. These forces were not up front and were not in position to see. The assumption was a natural one in view of the circumstances. 

41 M45; 42 M45; 48 M45; 44 M45; 45 M45. 

46 M45. Dun.can was not in the jeep at the time and no one was 

injured. 47 M45; 48 M45; 49 M45; 50 M45; 51 M55; 52 M55; 53 M45. 

54 M55; 55 M45; 56 M45; 57 M45; 58 M45; 59 M55; 60 M45; 61 857. 

62 Members of the armored units put a lower estimate on the damage 

done to enemy armor than the paratroopers did and the figures given here are a compromise of the two. It is obvious that the battle was such that an accurate count could not be made. 68 As to the identification of enemy units in the Noville action, the G-2 

report shows that by the night of December 20 six prisoners captured in 

the Foy-Recogne area had been identified as coming from 2d Panzer Division. 64 Conclusion of the historians after studying the entire Noville fight. 

CHAPTBR 12-pmST ACTION AT MARVIB 

1 M44; 2 S64. 8 This entry was made between 0630 and 0700. 

4 M34; 5 M34; 6 M34; T M34. 
KEY TO NOTES 209 

8 M44, made from Colonel O'Hara's journal. There was no time entry 

in the 327th Glider Infantry Journal covering this incident. Colonel 

Harper, commander of the 327th, had the impression that it occurred 

much earlier in the morning. 

9 M34; 10 M44; 11 M44; 12 M34; 18 M44; H M34; 15 M34, M44. 

18 M34 M44' 17 M34· 18 M34' 19 M34 

20 M34' and ~upported by Historian's' research through all Bastogne 

actions. 

21 M34; 22 S61; 28 M44; 24 M34; 25 Comment by the historical officers. 

CHAPTER 13-THE RESPITE 

1 This is perhaps an over-simplification. There were fairly heavy attacks 

against the north on December 21 and one running engagement in the 

southwest, but the failure of the enemy to press a general attack against 

the Bastogne defenses during the two days is conspicuous. 

2 The movement of the forces is outlined in the G-2 o:verlays. 3 M31. The precise hours of the cutting of the NeufcMteau road is not 

known and the statement on which this paragraph is based is taken from 

the interview with General McAuliffe. 

4 M31. Quoted directly. According to an interview with Colonel Walter C. Stanton, Deputy Chief of Staff, VIII Corps, General Middleton never weakened in his desire to hold Bastogne. On the 19th, however, 

Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., commanding general, Third 

Army, ordered a withdrawal. Colonel Stanton believed this order was possibly influenced by the weak showing of First Army. The VIII Corps 

order appeared on December 20. Interview by Captain L. B. Clark, 3d 

Information and Historical Service, and Captain K. W. Hechler, 2d Information and Historical Service, January 16, 1945, vicinity Assenois, Belgium. 5 M31; 8 M31. 

7 M31, but confirmed by other members of the staff who were present. 

This exchange of words, however, does not appear in the Westover interview with Colonel Roberts. 8 The conversations of the historical officers with members of both 

commands indicated this to be the case. 8M32; 10M31; llM41; 12M41, S64. 

13 This conclusion is supported by the proof that air resupply of the 

Bastogne position immediately became a foremost concern of VIII Corps, 

and that VIII Corps Headquarters labored throughout December 21 to 

make the operation possible. 14M3l. 

15 M31. General McAuliffe says specifically that from the ml)Inent he 

reached Bastogne he expe<o:ted to get cut off because there seemed to be 

nothing in front of him that would prevent it. 

18 It is notable that December 22 was the least active day on the Bastogne front. u AB2; 18 AB2; 19 AB2. 

20 This detail is almost overlooked in all the journals. 

21AB2. 
210 BASTOGNE 

22 Kinnard and Danahy both stated to Marshall that from their examination of Corps' situation maps upon reaching Bastogne they learned 

practically nothing of the enemy situation and decided they would have to 

build from the ground up. 

23AB2,M32. 

24 This message was received by Colonel Kinnard and appears in the 

interview with him. The exact reason for it being sent, however, is not 

known. 

25 AB2, M32. Danahy was convinced that while using every stratagem 

possible the enemy was trying to keep within the appearance of acting ac- cording to the laws of war for the purpose of protecting their men. He said 

that the prisoners taken in American uniforms said they had put on this 

extra clothing to keep from freezing. 26 AB2; 27 AB2; 28 AB2; 29 M41; 30 M41; 31 M41. 

82 Westover's estimate of the position covered. 38 AB2. 

CHAPTER 14-"NUTS!" 

1 861; 2M34. 

8 The complete surrender paper is in AB2. 

4M31, M34; 5M32; 6M31; 7M31; 8M34. 9 M34; 10 M34; 11 M34; 12 M34, 861; 13AB2; 14 86 I. 

CHAPTER 15-THE SECOND MARVIE ATTACK 

1 M34, 861. 

2 M34, 864. On the afternoon of December 20 a small task force under 

1st Lieutenant Richard C. Gilliland was sent to support 327th along the 

line covering the main highway. It was called Charlie 16 and included 

three tanks-two 75mm. and one 76mm. It remained away from the main 

group for a week, lost the 76mm. tank from a rocket, engaged in 15 skirmishes and destroyed much enemy equipment. 

8860,861; 4860; 5M34, 860, 864; 6M34; 7M44, 864; 8M34, 861. 

9 This is not the Historian's conclusion but is based on the interview 

with Colonel Harper and on statements by Major Templeton and Colonel 

Harper's battalion commanders. Colonel Harper said, "Most of the time 

when our troops were under shell fire the German gunners were in position to Jay directly on the target." 

10 M34. The battalion commander was present while these facts were 

reconstructed. 11 M34; 12 M44; 13 M34, 861. 

14 M44. Colonel Harper later had this to say of what happened to Morrison, "I'll never again put infantry on a forward slope unless I have tank 

destroyers or tanks where I can protect them. I lost two platoons separately 

in defense of the perimeter by making this mistake. In each case they were overrun when there were no tank destroyers to defend them." 15 M44; 16 M44. 

11 This incident was related during the interview with Colonel Harper 

and supported by the battalion commander. It was not brought to light, 

however, during Westover's conversations with Colonel O'Hara's force. 
KEY TO NOTES 211 

18 M34, M44; 19 M44; 20 M34; 21 M34. 

22 Morrison's body was not found and it was hoped that he was taken 

prisoner. Both Harper and Rouzie recalled the words of the conversations. 

23 M34; 24 M34, M44; 25 M44; 26 M44; 27 M34, S61. 

28 M44; 29 M44; 30 S61, S64; 31 M34; 82 M34. 

88 This general estimate of situation is supported by all the records and 

interviews. u S57, S61; 35 M34; 36 M34; 87 M34; 38 M34; 39 M34, S61; 40 M34; 

HM34. 

42 M34. Adams's command post was on the west side of the Bastogne 

road across from Smith's. 

43 M34; 44 M34; 45 M34; 46 M34; 47 M34. 

48 M34. The Combat Command B sources did not have this information. 

49 M34; 50 M44; 51 M44. 

52 M44. Colonel O'Hara made a thorough search in the interests of 

identification. 

53 M34; 54 M44, S64; 55 M34; 56 M34; 57 M34, M44. 

&8 M34, M44; 69 M34; 60 S61; 61 861; 62 872. 

CHAPTER 16-LOWEBB OP SUPPLY 

1 M31. General McAuliffe says that December 23 was the day of crisis. 

In this he appears to be mistaken. The artillery commanders all said that 

it was on the afternoon of the 22d that they were most worried about their 

supply. This checks with the fact that resupply began to arrive fairly early 

the next morning. 

2M31. 

3 From Colonel Marshall's interviews with Lieutenant Colonel John T. 

Cooper, Jr., and Colonel Nelson, and from General McAuliffe's statement on the employment of his artillery. 

4 M36. Also interview with Colonel 8ink and others. 5 From the Cooper interview. 

6 M31; 1 M31, 874. 

8 M31. ·General McAuliffe recollected this as happening on December 

23. Colonel Kinnard said it happened on December 22. The 22d appears 

to be correct inasmuch as resupply became assured on the morning of December 23. There is no doubt, however, about the validity of this quotation. Kinnard and Danahy both heard it, and when his memory was refreshed General McAuliffe recalled that he had said it. 

9M32,861. 

10 Westover was impressed by this difference in how the little units 

looked at the operation as compared with the .101 st Division Headquarters 

viewpoint. The observation was made on the basis of Westover's findings as contrasted with Marshall's. 

11M31. 

12 This comes from the statement of many of the officers through West- over. 18M31; 14M33; 16M33; 16M33; 11M33; 18M33; 19M33. 
212 BASTOGNE 

CHAPTER 17 -SUPPLIES ARRIVa 

1 M33 is the source of this material. 

CHAPTER IS-THE SITUATION IMPROVES 

1 This conclusion is based upon all of the evidence from the Noville, 

Marvie and Neffe engagements. 2 M3S; 8 Facts s.[>eak for themselves. 

4 M3S; 5857; 6857. 

1 This conclusion is drawn from numerous conversations the historians 

had with front line troops. 

8M42; 9M42; 10M42; llM3I, M4I. 

12M3l, M4l; 18M3.!, M4l; 14M3l, M4l; 15M4l; 18M4I. 

11 From General McAuliffe, Colonel Roberts and all others who were interviewed; however, the affirming statements are found in the interviews of the two commanders. 

18 M42; 19 M42; 20 M42; 21 M32; 22 M32, M4I. 

28 This note is added by the Historian. He was present on a number of 

occasions when officers in these different organizations discussed this matter quite seriously. 24 M42. 25 M42· 26 M42· 21 M42· 28 M42· 29 M42 

80 This 'happen~d at Ch~mps am~ng oth~ places .. 81 The historical officer makes this as a personal observation as he was present at a number of conferences where Major Templeton was taking a strong position. 

82 This is also an observation" made by the historical officer as an eyewitness. sa M42; 84 M42; 85 M3S. 

86 M31. As for the extent of the enemy build-up in the northwest, 

Colonel Chappuis says in the 502d Parachute Infantry interview that the 

most trying thing in those days on his troops was that they had to look 

out every day and see enemy trucks and men swarming up and down the 

roads all around them. He said, 'We could have murdered those Germans. 

The road intersections in front of us lookedJike 42d and Broadway after a football game. Most of the traffic seemed to be moving to the west. Thev were in easy reach and were quite contemptuous about it. But we could do 

nothing about it because we did not have the artillery ammunition." 

ITM3S; 88M35; 89M38; 40M38; uM3S; 42M3S; 48M3S; 4'M41; 

15 M31; 46 M3I. 

CHAPTER 19-WEST OF BASTOGNS 

1 M32; 2 M34; 8 M32; 4. M39; 5 M34; 6 M36; '1 M36; 8 M36. 9 M56; 10 M36; 11 M36; 12 M36; 13 M36; 14 M36; 15 M39. 

CHAPTER 20-CHRISTMAS Eva 

1 AB2. Danahy did this because he thought it would boost morale. It 

proved so popular with the commanders that many additional copies were printed to ootain a more general distribution. 2 This document is in the historical file. 
KEY TO NOTES 213 

tA863,864. 

2B Colonel Ewell, among other commanders, commented on this in the 

second interview. Many of the men spoke of how fearful they felt on 

Christmas Eve. 

s M36; 4 M36; D M36; 6AB8; 1 AB8; 8 AB8; 9 M36; 10AB8. 11 M36; 12 AB8; 18 M36; 14 M36; 15 AB8, M36; 18 M36; 11 M36; 

18M36. 

19 From the historical officer's observation of the ground. 

20 M36; 21 M36; 22 M36; 21 M36; 24 M36; 25 AB2, M34. (This identification by Americiln G-2 is incorrect. The 77th Regiment was engaging 

at Champs. 8ee the enemy story.) 26 M34, M39; 21 M34: 28 M34; 28 M34; 80 M34; 11 M34; 82 M36. 

II M49, M50, M56; 84 M49, M50, M56; 3D M34, M36, M49, M50, 

M56. 

88M36,M49,M50,M56; 81M49,M50,M56;88M49,M50,M56. 18 M36; 40 M36; 41 M36; 42 M36; 43 M36; 44 M36; 45 M36. 

48 M36. Colonels Chappuis and Cassidy were in a position to observe 

the relationship in time of the tank destroyer fire to the rest of the action. &7 M36. Tne tank destroyer account of this episode is not well rounded 

out but the crew were not in position to see the action clearly. 

48 M36. This is 502d Parachute Infantry's report of the detail. The 

tank destroyers themselves claim credit for a greater number of hits. 

49 M36; 10 M36; 61 M36; DZ M49, M50, M56; 58 AB8. 

54 M34; 16 M34; 56 M34, M39. 

11 M34. All hands agreed that this was the case. 18 AB8; 19 M36; 80 M36; 81 M36, 864. 

82 Copy of Field Order is in historical file. 88 M36. This was the high tide of the German attack against the 502d 

Parachute Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 502d, was again attacked and on 

December 27 was driven off the hill brieBy. By that time Division had 

been joined by the force from the south. During December 26, the 502d 

continued to maintain an all-around defense of the position. Six prisoners 

were taken near Champs. 

CHAPTBR 21-THB RBLIBP 

1 These extracts are made from the comprehensive narrative on 4th 

Armored Division's operation done by Captain L. B. Clark and based upon 

the ~urna1s of that organization. • The casualties of the lOlst Airborne Division up to January 6, 1945. 

in the Bastogne operation were as follows: 

Officers Enlisted Men 

Killed .............................. 29 312 

Wounded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 103 1,588 

Missing ........................... ,. 34 482 

166 2,382 

The Artillery losses were extremely light except among forward observers. The Engineer Battalion lost 26 enlisted men and one officer killed 
214 BASTOGNE 

and 84 enlisted men wounded up to January 6. Owing to the capture of 

the hospital, the 326th Medical Company showed the largest number of 

missinE of any unit at Bastogne with 125 gone. There was a surpnsingly 

even distribution of losses among the Infantry regiments: 

327th 501st 502d 506th 

Off EM Off EM OfF EM Off EM 

Killed ....... 2 60 9 68 8 66 5 67 

VVounded .... 13 279 29 477 22 246 28 359 

The total of German prisoners taken was 98 I. The estimated number 

of enemy killed is 7,000. 8 From the narrative by Clark. 

"From the 12th Army Group Mter Action Report for December 1944. 
J. Major General Troy H. Middleton, Commanding General, VIII 

Corps. 

[ 2 15 ] 
2. Colonel (now Brigadier Generall William L. Roberts, Commanding Officer, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division. 

[ 216 ] 
3. Major General Maxwell D. Taylor confers with officers of his 

Division after the Bastogne relief by the 4th Armored Division. They are Major James J. Hatch, S02d Parachute 

Infantry; Brigadier General Higgins, Assistant Division 

Commander; and Colonel Robert F. Sink, Commanding 

Officer, S06th Parachute Infantry. 

[ 217 ] 
4. Brigadier General (now Major General! Anthony C. McAuliffe, 

who was Acting Commanding General, 101 st Airborne 

Division, during the first phase of the siege of Bastogne. 

l 218 ] 
5. Brigadier General Gerald J. Higgins, Assistant Division Commander, 101 st Airborne Division. 

[ 219 ] 
6. Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Danahy, G-2, 101 st Airborne Division. 

[220 ] 
7. Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonell H. W. O. Kinnard, G-3, 

101 st Airborne Division. 

[ 221 ] 
8. Lieutenant Colonel (now Colon ell Julian J. Ewell, Commanding Officer, 501 st Parachute Infantry. 

r 222 ] 
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made movement difficult and living uncomfortable. 

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12. The Bastogne barracks, location of the 101 st Air borne Division Command Post. The C-47 s have just 

dropped their supply bundles. 
J 3 and J 4. Bomb damage in Bastogne. 

[ 227 ] 
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homes. 

[ 229 ] 
J 7. A column of men marching in the vicinity of Bastogne. The 

rolling ground and pine forest are typical of the area. 

[230 j 
[231 ] 

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[ 232 ] 
J 9. The village of Neffe. Early in the morning of December 19 

the enemy captured this crossroads village. During that 

day the position was held against the SOl st Parachute 

Infantry. The Neffe Chateau is in the clump of trees on 

the right; the road to the left leads to Bastogne. 

[ 233 ] 
• 

.. 

[ 234 ] 
20. The Bastogne road entering the outskirts of Mont. 

[ 235 1 
2 J. Neffe, scene of heavy flghting by the 501 st Parachute Infantry and Team Cherry, after it was recaptured. 

[236 ] 
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22. A 10Smm. M3 howitzer being fired by members of the 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion during 

the siege of Bastogne. 
23 (top'. Wounded in the hospitals of Bastogne had to lie on the 

floors because of lack of equipment. 24 (bottom'. A trailer 

is loaded with parachutes for use in the improvised hospitals in Bastogne. 

r 2381 
25. A 7Smm. M 1 A 1 howitzer being flred by paratroop artillerymen during the siege of Bastogne. 

[239 ] 
[ 240 ] 
26. On the night of December 20, the enemy struck at the left 

flank of the 3d Battalion, 501 st Parachute Infantry. This 

scene from the outskirts of Neffe shows the enemy preparing for the attack. The American position is on the 

crest of the hill to the left. The little village of Mont is in 

the center draw, and the barbed-wire fence s, so costly to 

the enemy, are to the right of the pine grove. 

[ 241 ] 
[ 242] 
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29. Command Post of Company F, 327th Glider Infantry, near 

Remoifosse. Here the German officer demanding the surrender of Bastogne was blindfolded before being taken 

to the 327th Glider Infantry Command Post. In the center are Colonel Harper and Major Jones exchanging 

salutes with the German officers as they were returned to 

their lines. 

[245 ] 
30. Paratroopers entrucking at Camp Mourmelon, France, December 18, 1944, to move to Bastogne. 

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32 (top). Members of the 101 st Airborne Division bring in a supply bundle. Recovery ran as high a s ninety-five per cent 

and the bundles were utilized immediately. 33 (bottom). 

This 155mm. M 1 A 1 howitzer has just received ammunition 

from the glider in the background. This' incident occurred 

during the siege of Bastogne. 

[ 248 ] 
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W e ll sold ier here you are in ·'No·Mans-tand" Just 

b efore Chr istmas far away h om home an~ your 

lo ved ones Your sweetheart or w ife, your Iinfe 

g irl, o r p erhap s even you r lillie boy. don', you 

feel them w orrying abOut you. p ray ing for you' 

Yes o ld b oy, p ray ing and hop ing you'll Come 

home again. soon W ill you come b ac"' , are you 

sure 10 see those d ear ones again' 

This is Christmas·time. Yule ,' ime the Yule·log. 

the M istleto e . the C hristmas· tree. whateve r it IS, 

it' s home and all that you th ink fi ne to celebra te 

the day o f o ur Savio ur 

Man. have y o u thou ght about it, what ,f you d o n ' 

come b ack . w hat of those d ear ones? 

JJf Well so ld ;er. " PEACE O N EA RTH GOOD Will 

TOWARDS M EN " for where there"s ,. will 

there's _ ... ,. o n ly 300 ydrds ahead and 

~ MERRY CHR ISTMAS! 

;:~ i::-

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35 A and 8. German propaganda leaflet (two sides) fired by artillery shell into the American lines on 

Christmas Eve. 
q J's have YDU ever iigured it DUt? 

70 American men out of a hundred are enjoying peace in civil life ; 

22 are training and slalioned back 

home ; 

8 are doing their bit overseas -

Omen Dut Df a hundred are 

engaged in actual fig(ltillq, 

Some 60 divisions have reached Ihe 

fronts; combal lroops as well as service 

units, lolalling more than 

2 155000 officers and men 

accompanied these divisions abroad 

Adding the million men of the Air Forces, 

there is a 10101 of 3055000 GI's on Ihe 

world's bailie fronis, 

(Stall and Stripe., Sept 21), poqe 4) 

And only about hall of these are doing 

the grim, nasly job of actual' fighting. 

Almost every day you fronl-line men 

read 01 people al home leaving war 

jobs for something more secure which 

will carry them hough Ihe posl-war 

period. 

For you the advice of these people is, 

Keep soldiers In Ihe Army after 

Ihe war 1111 lobs can be .ecured 

for Ihem, 

the dra,t-dodgers at home 

e~pect every goe to do hi" dutV f 

35 C and D. German propaganda leaflet (four sides) tlred by 

artillery shell into the American lines during the Bastogne 

siege. 

[ 25 1 ] 
36. Bazooka position in the 502d Parachute Infantry area. It 

was over this terrain on Christmas Day that enemy tanks 

moved on Rolle. The enemy tank in the foreground was 

destroyed in that flght. 

[ 252 ] 
37. Pine plantation near Bastogne, typical of the terrain in which 

the 101 st Airborne Division fought. Every forest was a 

defensive island. 

[253 ] 
[254 ] 

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38. After brea~ing through the position of the 3d Battalion, 

327th Glider Infantry, enemy tanks came across the hills 

to the left on Christmas Day to attack Champs and Rolle. 

The road leading to the right goes to Champs. Paralleling 

the second row of trees a road goes to Rolle. Company C, 

S02d Parachute Infantry was attacked while marching 

along the center road. It then fell back to join some tank 

destroyers of the 70Sth Tank Destroyer Battalion at the 

trees in the foreground. From this position many enemy 

tanks were destroyed. 

[ 255 ] 
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40. Men on guard in a pine plantation near Bastogne. 

[257 ] 
41. Security guard of the 1015t Airborne Division near the 502d 

Parachute Infantry Command Post. 

[ 258 ] 
42. Colonel Danahy, General McAuliffe, and Colonel Kinnard. 

[259 ] 
43. General George S. Patton, Jr., talking with Brigadier General 

McAuliffe and Lieutenant Colonel Steve A. Chappuis after 

awarding these officers the Distinguished Service Cross 

for their actions in the defense of Bastogne. 

[260 ] 
MEMORANDU 

VIII CORPS 

DATE 18 JA~ 194~ 

THE TOWN O~ ASTOGNE. LUXEMBOURG ~ROVINCE. BElGIUM. 

CONDITION: USED BUT SERVICEABLE. KRAUT DISINFECTED 

SIGNED ~,J,mt. 

TR Y H. MIDDLET~ MAJ GENERAL USA 

COMMANDING 

44. Memorandum receipt given by Major General Troy H. Middleton, Commanding General of the VIII Corps, to the 

101 st Airborne Division for holding Bastogne. 

[ 261 ] 

GV- u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFRCE: 201G-382489 




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