Author’s Note 

This work is the product of many minds 

and ideas, but I would like especially to 

thank my faculty and student colleagues in 

the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 

as well as the following who have been 

particularly helpful: Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr., 

Col. John Roe, Drs. Don LeVine and Dan 

Kuehl, Lt. Cols. Ernie Howard, Jason Barlow and Tim Gann, Maj. John Farquhar, 

Drs. Dave Mets and Hal Winton, and 

Group Captain Gary Waters (RAAF). 
Foreword 

Though we are still within the first century of powered flight, air power has already 

become the dominant form of military power 

projection in the modern world. The doctrinal underpinnings of air power thought 

are, of course, traditionally ascribed to the 

three great theorists of air power application, 

Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell. Since the 

Second World War, the air power community has not often explored the doctrinal implications of air power development. Lord 

Tedder’s Lee Knowles lectures at Cambridge, and the writings of Air Vice Marshal 

R. A. Mason, and Colonel John A. Warden 

I11 constitute notable-and noteworthy-exceptions. Now comes Colonel Phillip Meilinger, who has posited a group of provocative propositions that will instill an appreciation for air power for those who seek to understand it and challenge the assumptions of 

those who do not yet appreciate what it offers. This book has been deliberately de- 
signed in a small format so that it can be 

readily carried in the pocket of a flight suit 

or a BDU. Readers are encouraged to discuss 

these propositions and, if so moved, to communicate directly with Colonel Meilinger via 

the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama, or through the Office of the Air Force Historian, Bolling AFB, 

Washington, D.C. 

Richard P. Hallion 

Air Force Historian 

February 1995 
Ten Propositions 

Regarding Air Power 

1. Whoever controls the air 

generally controls the surface. 

2. Air Power is an inherently 

strategic force. 

3. Air Power is primarily an 

offensive weapon. 

4. In essence, Air Power is 

targeting, targeting is intelligence, 

and intelligence is analyzing the 

effects of air operations. 

5. Air Power produces physical 

and psychological shock by 

dominating the fourth 

dimension-time. 
6. Air Power can conduct parallel 

operations at all levels of war, 

simultaneously . 

7. Precision air weapons have 

redefined the meaning of mass. 

8. Air Power’s unique 

characteristics necessitate that it 

be centrally controlled by airmen. 

9. Technology and air power are 

integrally and synergistically 

related. 

10. Air Power includes not only 

military assets, but an aerospace 

industry and commercial aviation. 
1 * 

Whoever controls the air 

general I y con tro Is the 

surface. 

If we lose the war in the air we 

lose the war and we lose it quickly. 

-Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery 

Some refer to this concept as command of 

the air, others as air superiority, but the point 

is clear: the first mission of an air force is to 

defeat or neutralize the enemy air force so 

friendly operations on land, sea and in the air 

can proceed unhindered, while at the same 

time one’s own vital centers and military 

forces remain safe from air attack. Virtually 

all air theorists subscribe to this proposition. 

Douhet, for example, stated simply: “to have 

command of the air is to have victory.”’ In a 

similar vein, John Warden wrote: “Since the 

3 
German attack on Poland in 1939, no country has won a war in the face of enemy air 

superiority. . . Conversely, no state has lost a 

war while it maintained air superiority.”2 

Whether such a statement is true in unconventional warfare is debatable; but the armies of Germany, Japan, Egypt and Iraq 

would certainly agree that conventional 

ground operations are difficult if not impossible when the enemy controls the air. 

This emphasis on gaining air superiority 

often troubles ground commanders who tend 

to equate proximity with security. Rather 

than have aircraft attack airfields or aircraft 

factories in the quest for air superiority, they 

prefer to have them close by and on call in 

the event enemy planes appear. This is an 

understandable desire, but a misguided one, 

because it would be unwise to tether air 

power to a static, defensive role. An aggressive doctrine has been very effective for the 

United States: American troops have not had 

to fight without air superiority since 1942; 

the last American ground soldier killed by 

air attack was in 1953; and our army has 

never had to fire a surface-to-air missile at an 

4 
enemy aircraft-they have never been allowed to get that close.3 In actuality, our 

Army’s doctrine assumes friendly air superiority, and sees its achievement as one of air 

power’s biggest contributions to land operations. 

This need for air cover also extends to 

maritime operations. As early as the First 

World War naval aviators like John Towers 

saw the need for aircraft carriers to ensure air 

superiority over the fleet. For many years 

this view was not accepted by surface admirals, but Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the 

British capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse by Japanese land-based aircraft in 

1941 soon made it clear that ships required 

air cover to operate effectively. Aircraft carriers provided the mobile air bases for the 

planes that would help to ensure air superiority over the fleet, while at the same time 

increasing the ability to project power 

ashore! The armadas that conquered the 

central Pacific in World War I1 were based 

on aircraft carriers, not battleships, and this 

emphasis has been reflected in the U.S. 

Navy’s force structure ever since. 

5 
The clear implication in the writings of 

the air theorists is that gaining air superiority 

is so important it might bring victory: air superiority could be an end in itself. There are 

two problems with this construct. First, air 

superiority is only valuable if the political 

will is available to exploit it. United Nations 

aircraft can easily dominate the skies over 

Bosnia or Somalia, for example, but how can 

that air superiority be exploited? If intransigent opponents do not believe air strikes 

against their industry or military forces will 

follow, then control of the air becomes 

meaningless. Second, it re-introduces the 

concept of the decisive counter-force battle. 

Just as an army that invades another country 

and deliberately bypasses the enemy army 

while marching on the interior risks the occupation of its own country or the severing 

of its supply lines, so too an air force that 

goes straight for the heart of a nation while 

ignoring the enemy air force courts catastrcphe. Consequently, if the fate of nations 

hinges on the campaign for command of the 

air, then presumably a belligerent will focus 

his efforts and resources in that area. If that 

6 
occurs; the air battle can be just as prolonged, deadly, and subject to the grinding 

effects of attrition as any land war. This happened in World War 11: air power did not 

eliminate the trench carnage of the Great 

War; it just moved it to twenty thousand 

feet. In reality, the attainment of air superiority has not yet brought a country to its 

knees. Therefore, the proposition remains 

that air superiority is a necessary but insufficient factor in victory. It is the essential first 

step. 

7 
2 * 

Air Power is an inherently 

strategic force. 

Air power has become predominant, both as a deterrent to war, 

and-in the eventuulity of waras the devastating force to destroy 

an enemy’s potential and fatally 

undermine his will to wage war. 

-General Omar Bradley 

War and peace are decided, organized, 

planned, supplied and commanded at the 

strategic level of war. Political and military 

leaders located in major cities direct the efforts of their industry, natural resources and 

populations to raise and equip military 

forces. These “vital centers” of a country are 

generally located well behind the borders 

and are protected by armies and defensive 

8 
fortifications. Thus, before the invention of 

the airplane a nation at war generally hurled 

its armies against those of an enemy in order 

to break through to the more vulnerable interior. Some still think this way, as exemplified by a noted military historian who 

recently wrote: “According to Clausewitz 

and common sense, an army in wartime succeeds by defeating the enemy army. Destroying the ability of the opponent’s uniformed 

forces to function effectively eliminates what 

stands in the way of military ~ictory.”~ 

Sometimes a country was fortunate and was 

able to annihilate its opponent’s army, as 

Napoleon did at Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstadt, and this could bring quick capitulation. 

But more often battles were bloody and indecisive; wars were exercises in attrition or exhaustion. As wars became more total, armed 

forces larger, and societies more industrialized, the dream of decisiveness usually became an unattainable chimera. Armies 

became tactical implements that ground 

away at the enemy army, hoping that an accumulation of battlefield victories would po9 
sition them for decisive, strategic operations. 

To an extent, navies are also condemned 

to fight at the tactical level of war. Once 

command of the sea has been gained, a fleet 

can do more: bombard fortresses near shore, 

enforce a blockade, or conduct amphibious 

operations. In the first case, however, the results are limited by the range of the ships’ 

guns; in the second the results are felt only 

indirectly and over time. Certainly a blockade can deprive a belligerent of items needed 

to sustain the war effort; however, the blockaded party can substitute and redistribute its 

resources to compensate for what has been 

denied. In short, indirect economic warfare 

takes much time, and indeed, there are few 

instances when a blockade has brought a 

country to its knees.7 In the last instance, 

amphibious operations are generally only a 

prelude to sustained land operations, but this 

merely takes us back to the cycle of anny 

versus army. 

Air power changed things by compressing the line between the strategic and tactical 

levels. Aircraft can routinely conduct opera6 

10 
tions that achieve strategic level effects. To a 

great extent airplanes obviate the need to 

confront terrain or the environment because 

of their ability to fly over armies, fleets and 

geographic obstacles and strike directly at a 

country’s key centers. This capability offers 

alternatives to both bloody and prolonged 

ground battles and deadly naval blockades. 

In truth, although early air theorists often 

spoke of the potential of this concept, it was 

largely a dream for many decades. Air power 

did not remove the need for a land campaign 

in Europe during the Second World War, 

and although an invasion of Japan proper 

was unnecessary, the evidence was not clearcut-it took four years and the combined op 

erations of all the services to set the stage for 

the final and decisive air phase. Korea and 

Vietnam proved to many that air power was 

not an effective strategic weapon, although 

some would maintain it was never given the 

chance to prove itself.* Desert Storm, on the 

other hand, came close to realizing the 

claims of the early theorists. Whether it was 

the fulfillment of prophecy or an aberration 

remains to be seen. 

11 
If the former, then Desert Storm confirms 

the premise that the goal of the air commander is to maximize his intrinsic advantage by operating at the strategic level of war 

while forcing the enemy to fight at the tactical level. It is this type of mismatch that coalition air power achieved in the Gulf when, 

for example, Iraqi air defenses were deprived 

of centralized control and thus devolved into 

ineffectual tactical operations, devoid of 

strategic significance. Although air power 

can also be employed at the operational and 

tactical levels, such instances should be considered closely to ensure the effect intended 

is worth the candle. In essence, air war requires broad, strategic thinking. The air commander must view war in totality, not in a 

sequential or circumscribed fashion. 

Finally, it must be noted that air power 

has great strategic capabilities as a non-lethal 

force. In an interesting observation, John 

Warden noted that, basically, air power delivers strategic information: some of it is 

“negative” like bombs, and some is “positive” like food. For example, the Berlin Airlift of 194849 was perhaps the greatest 

12 
Western victory of the Cold War prior to the 

fall of the Berlin Wall itself. Yet, the Airlift 

was a demonstration of air power’s peaceful 

application. After the Soviets shut off all 

land routes into West Berlin, airlifters supplied all the food, medicine, coal and other 

essentials needed by the population over the 

next ten months. The result of the Airlift was 

enormous: the city remained free. This was a 

strategic victory of the first order, not in the 

least diminished because it was achieved 

without firing a shot. The evolving world 

calls for a greater reliance on airlift, both for 

force projection and humanitarian assistance. 

Advances in technology similarly emphasize 

the importance of space-based air assets such 

as communications and reconnaissance satellites that ensure nearly instantaneous command and control of military forces, highly 

accurate location reporting, intelligence 

gathering and treaty verification. Strategic 

air power is growing, not decreasing, in importance in our national security structure. 

13 
3 * 

Air Power is primarily an 

offensive weapon. 

War, once declared, must be 

waged offensively, aggressively. 

The enemy must not be fended off, 

but smitten down. 

-Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan 

It is an axiom of surface theorists that the 

defense is the stronger form of war. By this 

it is meant that a country or army that is in a 

weak position will generally assume the defensive because it offers certain advantages. 

A defender can dig in, build fortifications, 

and operate on interior lines in friendly, familiar terrain. An attacker therefore has to 

assault this well prepared enemy, usually by 

exposing himself to enemy fire. Moreover, 

the deeper one advances into enemy terri14 
tory, the farther he is from his sources of 

supply. These innate strengths led Sun-Tzu 

to comment: “Being invincible lies with defense; the vulnerability of the enemy comes 

with the attack.”’ The standard rule was that 

it took a three-to-one superiority at the point 

of attack to overcome a foe in prepared positions. As a result, emphasis was placed on 

assaulting the enemy where he was not expecting it, thus ensuring superior numbers at 

the crucial point. It must be understood, 

however, that the same theorists who believe 

the defense is the stronger form of war also 

admit that one seldom wins wars by remaining on the defensive; offensive action will 

eventually be essential. Thus, a defender 

must husband his resources in preparation 

for going over to the attack at a favorable opAir power does not fit this formulation. 

The immensity and tracklessness of the sky 

allows one to strike from any direction; armies generally move over well defined 

routes. Interception is the key issue here; 

certainly, radar will be watchful for an air attacker, but terrain masking, electronic measportunity. 
ures, careful routing and stealth technology 

make it extremely difficult to anticipate and 

prepare for an air assault. H. G. Wells commented in 1908 that there were no highways 

in the sky; all roads led everywhere. He was, 

and still is, correct. There are no flanks or 

fronts in the sky, so an air defender has little 

chance of channeling an enemy into a predictable path so his defenses can be more effective, or of building fortifications in the 

sky. It is virtually impossible to stop an air 

attack completely-some planes will get 

through. Even when Eighth Air Force bombers suffered “disastrous” losses in strikes 

against Schweinfurt in 1943, over 85 percent 

of the bombers penetrated enemy defenses 

and struck their targets. Surface forces, on 

the other hand, generally either break 

through or are repelled-all or nothing. 

Moreover, in order to defend all his vital 

areas, an air defender must spread his squadrons widely, and each point protected must 

have sufficient strength to drive back an attacker.” Unlike on the surface, the air defender has no implicit advantage-passive 

defense is impractical. Whereas the att,xker 

16 
can strike virtually anything, the defender is 

limited to striking the attackers. This is inefficient. In addition, an effective defense requires a well organized, responsive and 

survivable command and control network; 

the offense does not. Even if such a defensive system is in place, however, dispersion 

in an attempt to cover all a country's vital areas may grant de fucto local air superiority to 

an attacker. In short, in air warfare the defender is stripped of his innate three-to-one 

superiority, and an air defender theoretically 

needs more forces than the attacker, the precise o site of the situation on the 

grounde'nis line of reasoning led Douhet 

and others to term the airplane the offensive 

weapon par excellence. If true, then interesting conclusions follow. 

First, a reward is reaped by assuming the 

offensive. To wait in the air is to risk defeat; 

therefore, an overwhelming air strike offers 

great temptation. When such attacks are carried out, they can have devastating effects, as 

at Pearl Harbor, the Arab-Israeli War of 

1967, and Desert Storm. At the very least the 

need for maintaining the initiative necessi17 
tates a sufficient air force-in-being that is 

ready for immediate and decisive action 

upon the outbreak of hostilities. In air war 

there is no time for a mobilization that takes 

weeks or months; the conflict may be over 

before it can take effect. 

Similarly, Sun-Tzu's dictum that a wise 

commander defeats his enemy's strategy i? 

inappropriate in air war because it assumed 

one will wait to see what that strategy is, 

then move to counteract it. Not only is this a 

risky business-one can easily be mistaken 

in guessing the opponent's strategy and 

therefore counter the wrong move-but it 

once a ain surrenders the initiative to the enemy."Finally, the concept of offensive air 

power obviates the need for a tactical reserve. Land forces establish a reserve whose 

mission is to stand ready to either exploit 

success or reinforce a threatened point. Both 

of these scenarios imply a reactive and defensive posture. Air battles, on the other 

hand, occur and end so quickly that except in 

very limited circumstances, air commanders 

should avoid holding a reserve; instead, they 

should commit all available aircraft to com18 
bat operation^.'^ In truth, this issue is ambivalent enough to warrant further study. 

Clearly, a reserve as meant in land operations is not applicable to air war. But could 

one argue that aircraft based in a different 

country hundreds of miles distant yet only 

minutes away from the battlespace actually 

constitute a “tactical reserve+4 

In summary, the speed, range and flexibility of air power grant it ubiquity, and this 

in turn imbues it with an offensive capability. Because success in war is generally attained while on the offensive, the adage, “the 

best defense is a good offense,” is almost always true in air war. 

19 
4 * 

In essence, Air Power is 

targeting, targeting is 

intelligence, and 

intelligence is analyzing 

the effects of air 

operations. 

How can any man say what he 

should do himself if he is ignorant 

what his adversary is about? 

-Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini 

Air power-both lethal and non-lethalcan be directed against almost anything. The 

Gulf War showed that digging deeply and 

using tons of steel and concrete will not 

guarantee protection from precision penetration bombs. The hardened bunkers of the 

Iraqi Air Force were designed to withstand a 

20 
nuclear attack, but they could not survive a 

perfectly placed high explosive bomb. However, being able to strike anything does not 

mean one should strike everything. Selecting 

objectives to strike or influence is the essence of air strategy. Virtually all the air 

theorists recognized this; unfortunately, they 

were frustratingly vague on the subject. 

Douhet, for example, left it to the genius 

of the air commander to determine an enemy’s “vital centers.”15 He did, however, 

single out popular will as being of first importance. He predicted that if the people 

were made to feel the harshness of warthrough the bombing of urban areas using 

high explosives, gas and incendiaries-they 

would rise up and demand their government 

make peace. Other theorists had different 

candidates for which targets should be given 

priority. The Air Corps Tactical School devised a doctrine concentrating on enemy industry. Their “industrial web” theory characterized a nation’s structure as a network of 

connected and interdependent systems; like a 

house of cards, if just the right piece was removed the entire edifice would collapse and 

21 
with it a country's capacity to wage war." 

The MF's Jack Slessor emphasized the vulnerability of a country's transportation structure; he advocated the interdiction of troops 

and supplies as the best method of achieving 

 objective^.'^ John Warden stressed leadership. It was a country's leaders that made decisions regarding peace and war; therefore, 

all air efforts should be focused on the will 

of those leaders to induce them to make 

peace.18 The early writings of Billy Mitchell 

(pre-1925) saw the enemy army as the primary target of strategic air power." nus, all 

the classic air theorists have had similar notions regarding centers of gravity, but they 

diverged on singling out the most important 

one. Indeed, a skeptic could argue that a history of air strategy is a histo of the search 

for the single, perfect target?' Nevertheless, 

this basic framework for determining air 

strategy was a useful first step-but only a 

first step. 

Air power's ability to affect targets has 

always exceeded its ability to identify them. 

The Gulf War demonstrated that if one does 

not know a target exists, air power may be 

22 
ineffective. For example, although coalition 

aircraft destroyed most of the known nuclear, chemical and biological research facilities in Iraq, far more were unknown and 

not discovered until United Nations inspectors roamed the country after the war.21 It is 

an evasion for airmen to claim this was a 

failure of intelligence not of air power, because the two are integrally intertwined and 

have always been so. Intelligence is essential 

to targeting; moreover, intelligence specifically geared to air war is required. Military 

information-gathering agenxies have existed 

for centuries, but their products were of a 

tactical nature: how many troops does the 

enemy possess; where are they located; what 

is their route of march; what is the rate of 

fire of their latest weapons? Although such 

tactical information was also necessary for 

airmen to fight the tactical air battle, strategic air warfare demanded more; what was 

the structure of an enemy’s society and industry: where were the steel mills and power 

plants; how did civilian and military leaders 

communicate with their subordinates; where 

were the major rail yards; how far advanced 

23 
was their chemical warfare program; who 

were the key leaders in society and what 

were their power bases? These types of questions, essential to an air planner, had seldom 

been asked before the airplane because they 

did not need to be.22 One analyst even argues that intelligence has become “a strategic resource that may prove as valuable and 

influential in the post-industrial era as capital 

and labor have been in the industrial age.”23 

In this formulation, the key to all conflict is 

intelligence. 

The third step, and no less important than 

the first two, is analyzing the effects of air 

attacks. One aspect of this problem is termed 

bomb damage assessment (BDA), but it is 

only one aspect, and one with largely tactical 

implications. The simplest way of detennining BDA is through post-attack reconnaissance; however, with the advent of precision 

munitions this is often inadequate. During 

the Gulf War, for example, an intelligence 

headquarters building was struck by coalition aircraft; BDA reported the sortie was 25 

percent effective because one-quarter of the 

building was destroyed. Yet, the wing of the 

24 
building hit was precisely where the actual 

target was located, so in reality the sortie 

was totally effective. The BDA process was 

using a measurement technique appropriate 

to the past when precision was unobtainable 

so obliteration was necessary.24 In short, 

BDA is as much an art as a science, and it is 

aften difficult to determine the effects of a 

precision air strike. 

The assessment problem at the strategic 

level is far more complex. There are at present insufficient standards to measure the effectiveness of strategic airstrikes. In some 

instances, such as an electrical power network, the relationship between destruction 

and effectiveness is not linear. For example, 

during Desert Storm Iraq shut down some of 

its power plants even though they had not 

been struck, apparently hoping this would 

shield them from attack. Because the coalition’s intent was to turn off the power not to 

destroy it, the threat of attack was as effective as the attack itself. Thus, a small number 

of bombs produced an enonnous power 

loss?5 Unfortunately, although it can be ascertained that a power plant is not generating 

25 
electricity, it is far more difficult to judge 

how that will affect the performance of an air 

defense network-which may be the true 

goal of the attack. 

This assessment problem has haunted air 

plwners for decades. There are still heated 

debates as to the effectiveness of strategic 

bombing during World War 11. Were the targets selected the correct ones, or was there a 

better way to have fought the air war? Surprisingly, this question has not been answered by computer war games, which are 

unable to assess the strategic effects of air attack. Because of the visual impressiveness of 

computer war games, however, participants 

are mistakenly led to believe they are engaged in a scientific exercise. The challenge 

for airmen is to devise methods of analyzing 

the relationships between complex systems 

within a country, determining how best to 

disrupt them, and then measuring the cascading effect of a system’s failure throughout an 

economy.26 we are a quantitative society 

with a need to count and measure things, especially our effectiveness. In the military this 

tends towards body counts, tonnage figures, 

26 
sortie rates, percentage of hits on target, etc. 

Such mechanisms are especially prevalent ip 

air war because there is no clear-cut way of 

determining progress. Surface forces can 

trace lines on a map; airmen must count sorties and analyze sometimes obscure and conflicting intelligence data. The real air assessment usually comes after the war. How do 

we break out of this American penchant for 

“Nintendo warfare”? Because air power is a 

strategic force, we must better understand, 

measure, and predict its effectiveness at that 

level of war. For too long airmen have relied 

upon a “faith-based” targeting philosophy 

that emphasizes logic and common sense 

rather than empirical evidence. 

27 
5 * 

Air Power produces 

physical and 

psychological shock by 

dominating the fourth 

dimension-time. 

How true it is that in all military 

operations time is everything. 

-Duke of Wellington 

When discussing the reasons for his success at Austerlitz, Napoleon noted that he, 

unlike his opponents, understood the value 

of a minute. He understood the importance 

of time. In truth, Napoleon was referring 

more to timing. Synchronizing the actions of 

multiple units so as to maximize their effect 

is vital; this is timing. It is equally important, 

however, to think of time as duration. A 

commander must consider how long it will 

28 
take to move his units into position, and then 

to actually employ them. More importantly, 

he must realize that when force is applied 

rapidly it has both physical and psychological consequences that dissipate when it is 

employed gradually. Air power is the most 

effective manager of time in modem war because of its ability to telescope events. It produces shock. 

Although it is difficult to separate the 

physical and psychological components of 

shock, the two are decidedly different. 

Physical shock is produced when force collides with an object. It includes an element 

of overwhelming power; it is irresistible. 

Prior to this century shock was generally 

produced by heavy cavalry, although at 

times heavily armed infantry deployed in 

column could also achieve this effect. Indeed, when handled properly, a charge of 

mounted troops produced enormous shock, 

sometimes sweeping away the enemy force, 

as at Arbela and Rossbach. This was not always the case; firepower could at times repel 

such a cavalry charge, as at Crecy and Waterloo. Nonetheless, shock effect on the bat29 
tlefield is still important, although today it is 

generally provided by armored forces. Air 

power can similarly produce physical shock 

because of the enormous amount of fire 

power it can deliver in a concentrated area. 

The impact of a B-52 loaded with nineteen 

tons of high explosive bombs is legendary, 

and even one F-15E can drop four tons of 

bombs on a spot with a footprint no greater 

than a good-sized house. 

More importantly, air power can produce 

psychological effects. At its most fundamental level war is psychological. It may be that 

the best way to increase psychological shock 

is to increase physical shock, but one must 

be careful not to equate destruction with effectiveness. Rather, a commander should 

capitalize on air power’s speed and ubiquity-its ability to dramatically increase the 

tempo of combat operations. The importance 

of these characteristics can be realized when 

it is remembered that even the most energetic army is constrained by its speed of 

march. In studying thousands of campaigns 

over several centuries, one U.S. Army researcher discovered that mechanized and ar30 
mored forces stand still between 90 and 99 

percent of the time. While heavily engaged 

with the enemy, they generally advance at 

the rate of approximately three miles per 

day, about the same as for infantry. There 

have been exceptions over the years of 

course, but the study concludes that rates of 

ground advance have not appreciably 

changed over the past four centuries despite 

the advent of the internal combustion engine 

and the changes it has brought to the battlgAir power increases speed of movement 

by orders of magnitude. Aircraft routinely 

travel several hundred miles into enemy territory at speeds in excess of seven hundred 

miles per hour. Such mobility means a commander can move so rapidly in so many different directions, regardless of surface obstacles, that a defender is at a severe disadvantage. This conquest of time by air power 

provides surprise, and surprise in turn affects 

the mind, causing confusion and disorientation. John Boyd’s entire theory of the OODA 

Loop (observe-orient-decide-act) is based on 

the premise that telescoping time-arriving 

31 
at decisions or locations rapidly-is the decisive element in war because of the enormous 

28 psychological strain it places on an enemy. 

In addition, speed and surprise can sometimes substitute for mass: if an enemy is unprepared physically or mentally for an 

attack, then force, rapidly and unexpectedly 

applied, can overwhelm him: France in 1940 

and Russia in 1941. Moreover, surprise and 

speed can help reduce casualties because the 

attackers are less exposed to enemy fire. 

This is one reason jet aircraft quickly replaced piston-driven aircraft for most tactical 

air missions in the world’s air forces: speed 

equaled survival. 

Nuclear weapons offer the most compelling example of how psychological shock is 

produced by air power. Man has not increased the destructive power of his weapons 

in centuries. The Romans destroyed Carthage totally, razing its buildings, killing its 

inhabitants and sowing its soil with salt so 

nothing would grow. The destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused by blast pressure and radiation had similar results. The 

difference between these instances is that it 

32 
took several Roman legions over two decades to cause such destruction; it took a single B-29 only two seconds. It was this 

instantaneous destruction, this conquest of 

time not of matter, that so impacted the will 

of the Japanese people and the world in general. And indeed, it still does. 

This leads to an important insight regarding the effectiveness of air power in low intensity conflicts. Because guerrilla war is 

protracted war, by its very nature it is illsuited for air power, denying it the ability to 

achieve decision quickly.29 Campaigns like 

Rolling Thunder during the Vietnam War indicate that air power is particularly ineffective when denied the opportunity to telescope time. In these instances the limitations 

of air power are magnified. Indeed, when 

robbed of its time dimension, the psychological impact of air power may be virtually 

negative. 

33 
6 * 

Air Power can conduct 

parallel operations at all 

levels of war, 

simu Itaneously. 

Whereas to shift the weight of effort on the ground from one point 

to another takes time, the jlexibility inherent in Air Forces permits 

them without change of base to be 

switched from one objective to another in the theater of operations. 

-Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery 

The size of an army is usually determined 

by the size of the enemy’s army (or that of 

the coalition arrayed against him), because 

the goal of the commander is to win the 

counterforce battle. Once that is achievedand that can take a long time and be quite 

34 
costly-the army can be used for such things 

as occupation and administrative duties, but 

that is not its main purpose, and in any event 

such tasks can be effectively conducted by 

police or other paramilitary forces. On the 

other hand, the size of an air force is not so 

dependent on the size of the enemy air force 

because fighting the air battle is only one of 

the many missions that air power can conduct. More importantly, these other missions, such as strategic attack against centers 

of gravity, interdiction operations, or close 

air support of ground troops in combat, are 

of potentially greater significance and can be 

conducted contemporaneously with the air 

superiority campaign. 

Parallel operations occur when different 

campaigns, against different targets, and at 

different levels of war, are conducted simultaneously. Unlike surface forces that must 

generally fight sequentially and win the tactical battle before they can move on to operational or strategic objectives, air forces can 

fight separate campaigns at different levels 

of war. While carrying out the strategic mission of striking a country’s armaments in35 
dustry, for example, air power is able to conduct an operational level campaign to disrupt 

an enemy’s transportation and supply system. Meanwhile, an air force may also be attacking an opponent’s fielded forces at the 

tactical level. This is precisely what occurred 

in Desert Storm. While F-117s, F-15s, F111s and Tornados struck Iraqi nuclear research facilities, oil refineries and airfields, 

F/A-18s, F-16s and Jaguars bombed rail 

yards and bridges in southern Iraq to reduce 

the flow of troops and supplies to the Iraqi 

army. At the same time A-lOs, AV-8s and 

helicopters flew thousands of sorties against 

Iraqi troops and equipment in Kuwait. In 

sum, although one never refers to a tactical 

and strategic army or navy, one does talk of 

tactical and strategic air forces. It is of great 

significance that one can do so, acknowledging air power’s flexibility. 

Similarly, air power can concurrently 

conduct different types of air campaigns at 

the same level of war, such as an air superiority campaign and a strategic bombing 

campaign.. Indeed, it may even be implementing a third or fourth separate strategic 

36 
campaign as during World War I1 when at 

the same time it was bombing German industry and contesting with the Luftwaffe for 

air superiority over Europe, it was also winning the Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines and choking off the reinforcements to Rommel’s troops in North Africa. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, air 

power’s speed and range allow it to strike 

targets across the entire depth and breadth of 

an enemy country. Aircraft do not have to 

disengage from one battle in order to move 

to another-an extremely risky and complicated maneuver for land forces. Once having 

disengaged, aircraft do not have to traverse 

muddy roads, cross swollen rivers or redirect 

supply lines in order to fight somewhere 

else. An excellent example of this was given 

by the Israeli Air Force in the 1973 Yom 

Kippur War. The Israelis constantly shifted 

air power from the Sinai front to the Golan 

Heights front, from interdiction to close air 

support, and they were able to make these 

shifts on a daily basis over a period of several weeks. 

37 
Such parallel operations can also have 

parallel effects, presenting an enemy with 

multiple crises that occur so quickly he cannot respond effectively to any of them. The 

most devastating demonstration of this was 

during the first two days of the Gulf War 

when hundreds of coalition aircraft hit, 

among other targets, the Iraqi air defense 

system, electric power plants, nuclear research facilities, military headquarters, telecommunications towers, command bunkers, 

intelligence agencies and a presidential palace. These attacks occurred so quickly and 

so powerfully against several of Iraq’s tenters of gravity that to a great extent the country was immobilized and the war decided in 

those first few hours. It was extremely difficult to move troops and supplies, give orders, receive reports from the field, communicate with the people, operate radar sites, 

or plan and organize an effective defense, 

much less contemplate an offensive counterattack. Although some questioned the worthiness of Iraq as an opponent, the map on 

page 39 demonstrates how similar parallel 

attacks would have looked against Washing38 
Ft Belvoir 

Quantico 
ton, D.C. Could we have maintained our balance in the face of such an onslaught? 

Bearing in mind air operations were at the 

same time being carried out against Iraqi 

forces in Kuwait, one can appreciate the impact parallel operations can have on an enemy. It is the "brain warfare" envisioned by 

J. F. C. Fuller, only at the strategic rather 

than the tactical or operational levels of war. 

It has long been the goal of military commanders to paralyze an enemy rather than 

fight him, to sever his spinal column (the 

command structure) not grapple in hand-tohand combat. Parallel air operations now offer this opportunity. Flexibility, a key 

attribute of air power, is never more clearly 

illustrated than in the conduct of parallel operations. 
7 * 

Precision air weapons 

have redefined the 

meaning of mass. 

Of what use is decisive victory in 

battle if we bleed to death as a reSir Winston Churchill 

sult of it? 

Mass has long been considered one of the 

principles of war. In order to break through 

an enemy defense, one had to concentrate 

force and firepower at a particular point. As 

firearms became more lethal at greater 

ranges beginning in the mid-19th century, 

defensive fortifications grew in importance. 

Defenses became so strong, it took increasingly greater firepower and mass to break 

through them.30 Consequently, commanders 

were warned not to piecemeal or disperse 

41 
their forces: attempting to be strong everywhere meant they would be strong nowhere. 

Mass dominated land warfare, and planners 

focused on how to improve means of transportation and communication to ensure mass 

was available at the right place, at the right 

time, before the enemy was aware of it. F. 

W. Lanchester’s “N-squared law,” which 

postulated that as quantitative superiority increased for one side, its loss rate correspondingly decreased by the square root, lent a 

modicum of scientific credence to this belief 

in mass. 

This principle also seemed to hold true 

for air war. Early operations of the Eighth 

Air Force in World War I1 had only slight 

impact on the German war machine while 

also suffering high loss rates. General Ira 

Eaker, the Eighth’s commander, argued this 

was because his forces were not large 

enough. In order to ensure a target could be 

effectively struck, while at the same time 

providing defensive protection, bomber formations had to include at least three hundred 

aircraft.32 That figure proved low. German 

defenses were so formidable before the arri31 

42 
val of American escort planes that it took extremely large formations to ensure low casualty rates for the bombers-Lanchester’s 

“law” seemingly proved in practice. Moreover, bombing accuracy was far less than expected, due partly to German defenses and 

deception and partly to abysmal weather. As 

a consequence, to destroy a target the size of 

a small house, a force of 4,500 heavy bombers carrying a total of nine thousand tons of 

bombs was required.33 

Unfortunately, this process took time to 

neutralize a major system within a country. 

Hundreds of bombers were required to take 

down a single oil refinery, but then the strike 

force would have to move to another target 

on the next mission. Because there were 

hundreds of targets to be struck, each requiring a massive strike, the Germans were able 

to rebuild their facilities between attacks. In 

other words, the absence of precision forced 

air power into a battle of attrition that relied 

on accumulative effects, essentially driving 

it down to the tactical level. An outstanding 

example of this in World War II concerns 

the German oil refinery at Leuna. This im43 
portant facility had extremely powerful antiaircraft gun defenses as well as smoke generating machines to hide the refinery from 

Allied bombardiers. As a consequence, only 

2.2 percent of all bombs dropped on Leuna 

actually impacted in the refinery’s production area. Leuna therefore had to be struck 

twenty-two times during the last year of the 

war to put it out of commission. As the US 

Strategic Bombing Survey concluded, it 

would have been far more effective to drop a 

few bombs accurately than to “string 500-lb. 

bombs over the whole target.”34 Exactly 

true. 

The numbers regarding bomb accuracy 

changed over time. The Vietnam War saw 

the first extensive use of precision guided 

munitions (PGM) during the Linebacker 

campaigns of 1972, and this allowed American aircraft to demolish that proverbial 

“small house” with on1 190 tons of bombs 

carried by 95 aircraft?’Desert Storm introduced an improvement in accuracy, combined with stealth technology, that allowed a 

remarkably low loss rate per sortie (less than 

.05 percent). Aircraft could thus safely hit 

44 
more targets in a given time period-parallel 

operations were possible. Few will forget the 

cockpit videos of laser-guided bombs flying 

down air vents and into bunker doorways. 

Only a small percentage of the total tonnage 

dropped was precision guided, and even they 

sometimes missed their targets; nonetheless, 

when using PGM and in suitable weather, 

our house now only needed one bomb and a 

single aircraft.36 This combination of accuracy and stealth meant that targets were 

struck and neutralized quickly and safely. 

The result of the trend towards “airshaft 

accuracy” in air war is a denigration in the 

importance of mass. PGM provide density, 

mass per unit volume, which is a more efficient measurement of force. In short, targets 

are no longer massive, and neither are the 

aerial weapons used to neutralize them.37 

One could argue that all targets are precision 

targets--even individual tanks, artillery 

pieces or infantrymen. There is no logical 

reason why bullets or bombs should be 

wasted on empty air or dirt. Ideally, every 

shot fired should find its mark.38 If this sort 

of accuracy and continued stealth protection 

45 
are attainable on a routine basis, the political, 

economic and logistics implications are 

great. Objectives can be threatened, and if 

necessary attacked, with little collateral damage or civilian casualties, at low cost and low 

risk since few aircraft will be required. It 

will also require a vastly reduced supply tail: 

only a handful of cargo aircraft would have 

been necessary to supply all the PGM 

needed each day during the Gulf War. This 

may present air commanders with an unusual 

problem. 

Because precision is possible, it will be 

expected. Air warfare has thus become 

highly politicized. Air commanders must be 

extremely careful to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. All bombs are 

becoming political bombs, and air commanders must be aware of this emerging 

constraint. For example, as a result of U.S. 

strikes against Iraq during June 1993 in retaliation for an attempted assassination of 

former president George Bush, some European sources expressed concern because the 

cruise missiles used were “less than totally 

reliable.” Eight Iraqi civilians were report46 
edly killed in the thirty-missile strike, and 

39 this was considered by some as excessive. 

It is safe to assume the omnipresent eye of 

the CNN camera will be an integral part of 

any future military operation. Hundreds of 

millions of people worldwide will judge the 

appropriateness of everything an air commander does4’ This reality must be factored 

into the decision process, because in the future airmen may be required to wage war 

bloodlessly and delicately. The research in 

the area of non-lethal weapons is certainly a 

response to this trend. Although the ideal of 

bloodless war, sought by military leaders for 

centuries, has proven to be elusive, the quest 

continues!’ Air power, because of its intrinsically precise and discriminate natureproperties that are increasing-may finally 

produce that coveted grail. At the same time, 

the evolving world situation indicates that 

America will become more involved in operations short of war, such as peacekeeping 

missions or humanitarian relief. The airdrop 

of food to Muslims in Bosnia is an example 

of this trend. These “food bomb” operations 

may become increasingly prevalent as our 

47 
leaders turn to more peaceful applications of 

air power to achieve political objectives. 

48 
8 * 

Air Power’s unique 

characteristics 

necessitate that it be 

centrally controlled by 

airmen. 

Air warfare cannot be separated 

into little packets; a knows no 

boundaries on land and sea other 

than those imposed by the radius 

of action of the aircraj?; it is a 

unity and demands unity of command. 

-Air Marshal Arthur Tedder 

General Carl Spaatz once commented in 

exasperation that soldiers and sailors spoke 

solemnly about the years of experience that 

went into training a surface commander, thus 

making it impossible for outsiders to under49 
stand their arcane calling. Yet, they all felt 

capable of running an air force. That comment, echoed by American airmen for decades, was at the root of their calls for a 

separate air force. 

Many early air theorists believed air 

power would never be able to grow and 

reach its true potential if it was dominated by 

surface officers. Air power was so unlike traditional warfare, officers raised in the army 

and navy would have difficulty understanding it. (Obviously, the task was not insurmountable; virtually all the early airmen 

began their careers as soldiers and sailors.) 

On a more practical level, the question of 

who controlled air power became an administrative one. If the air force was subservient 

to the other services, then it was those services that determined such things as organization, doctrine, force structure and manning. 

The American Army Air Service, for example, was commanded by non-aviators, divided up and attached to individual surface 

units, was told what types of aircraft to procure and what missions to fly with those aircraft, and informed by non-flyers which 

50 
airmen would be promoted and which would 

not. To say that airmen believed such a setup 

stifled their potential would be an understatement. For fundamental bureaucratic reasons airmen wanted a separate service. At a 

higher level of abstraction, they also believed that air power was most effective 

when commanded by an airmen who understood its unique characteristics. 

Surface warfare is largely a linear affair 

defined by terrain and figures on a map. Although the modern battlespace has expanded 

dramatically, ground forces still have a primarily tactical focus and tend to be concerned primarily with an enemy or obstacles 

to their immediate front. Certainly, ground 

commanders worry about events beyond 

their immediate reach, but when operations 

move at an average of a few miles each day, 

such concerns are long term. New weapons 

have extended the range armies can strike, 

and subsequently expanded their area of concern; nonetheless, this extension is slight 

relative to air power. An airplane can deliver 

several tons of ordnance in a few minutes at 

a distance of hundreds of miles, and this re51 
quires an ability to think in operational and 

strategic level terms. Airmen must take a 

broader view of war because the weapons 

they command have effects at broader levels 

of war. Space-based assets, as well as airborne systems such as AWACS and 

JSTARS, help provide a theater-wide perspective. Moreover, Desert Storm was truly 

a global air war-the first of its kind-with 

personnel all over the world playing direct 

roles. For example, space operators in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, detected and 

tracked Iraqi Scud launches and then relayed 

that information to Patriot batteries in Saudi 

Arabia. Similarly, B-52s launched from air 

bases in Louisiana flew non-stop to bomb 

targets in Iraq. Finally, airlifters flew dozens 

of missions each day from the United States 

to the Middle East to deliver supplies and 

personnel. 

Airmen fear that if surface commanders 

controlled air power they would divide it to 

support their own operations to the detriment 

of the overall theater campaign. However, in 

a typical campaign operations ebb and flow; 

at times one sector is heavily engaged or ma52 
neuvering, while at other times it is static 

and quiescent-and this status is often determined by the enemy. As a result, if air power 

is parceled out it may be sitting idle in one 

location while flying continuously in another. Although this is also true of ground 

units, they generally have only a limited 

ability to assist their comrades on another 

part of the front. Air power can quickly intervene over an entire theater, regardless of 

whether it is used for strategic or tactical 

purposes. To mete it out to different surface 

commanders would make it virtually impossible to shift air power, rapidly and efficiently, from one area in the theater to 

another to maximize its effectiveness. 

To airmen, the necessity of centralized 

control has been amply demonstrated. Since 

World War I there has been an inexorable 

move towards greater centralized control of 

air power as aircraft have achieved greater 

range and firepower. Initially, all air forces 

were controlled by tactical surface commanders; today, virtually all of the world’s 

air forces are independent. This trend has 

been illustrated in several examples. In the 

53 
North African campaign of 1942 the RAF 

was divided into packages and controlled by 

ground commanders. The results were disastrous and led to fundamental doctrinal 

changes.42 On the other hand, the air campaigns of Genera3 George Kenney in the 

Southwest Pacific and those of Hoyt Vandenberg in Europe demonstrated an extremely effective use of air assets at the 

theater level. Korea was another negative example, with Air Force and Navy air assets 

fighting separate wars with little coordination. Vietnam saw this situation repeatedalthough the Air Force itself violated the 

principle of central control of air assets. Due 

to struggles within the service, Seventh Air 

Force in South Vietnam fought the air war 

in-country, Thirteenth Air Force directed air 

operations in Thailand, and Strategic Air 

Command fought yet another campaign with 

its B-52 strikes. 

In Desert Storm things finally came tcgether. A Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) was appointed, General 

Charles Horner, to control all fixed-wing assets in theater, including those of other coali54 
tion countries. The synergies gained from diverse air forces working together as a team 

with one commander to focus their efforts 

played a major role in victory. During this 

combat test the JFACC concept worked, and 

will therefore be the organizational option of 

choice in the future. This is especially important because future conflicts may not 

have the overwhelming air assets available 

that were present in Desert Storm. In such 

instances tough decisions regarding prioritization will have to be made by those who 

understand air power. 

55 
9 * 

Technology and air power 

are integrally and 

synergistically related. 

Science is in the saddle. Science is 

the dictator, whether we like it or 

not. Science runs ahead of both 

politics and military affairs. Science evolves new conditions to 

which institutions must be 

adapted. Let us keep our science 

-General Carl M. Spaatz 

dv. 

A recent U.S. Army pamphlet states that 

man, not technology, has always been and 

will always be the dominant force in war: 

"War is a matter of heart and will first; 

weaponry and technology second."43 The 

centrality of the infantryman and his rifle is a 

56 
recumng theme in the Army's culture. This 

vision depreciates the importance of technology, and is therefore not subscribed to by 

most airmen. 

Air power is the result of technology. 

Man has been able to fight with his hands or 

simple implements and sail on water using 

wind or muscle power for millennia, but 

flight required advanced technology. As a 

consequence of this immutable fact, air 

power has enjoyed a synergistic relationship 

with technology not common to surface 

forces, and this is part of the airman's culture." Air power depends upon the most advanced developments in aerodynamics, electronics, metallurgy, and computer technology. When one considers the space aspects 

of air power this reliance on technology becomes even more obvious. One has only to 

look at how land warfare has advanced this 

century; the evolution of machine guns, 

tanks and artillery has proceeded at a fairly 

steady pace. Certainly that pace has been 

more rapid than in any past comparable time 

period, but it pales in comparison to the ad57 
vance in air power from Kitty Hawk to the 

space shuttle. 

More importantly, the United States has 

achieved a formidable dominance in this 

area. Americans have a tendency to adopt 

technological solutions to problems, and this 

is evidenced in our approach to war.45 Consequently, we have developed the most technologically advanced military in the world. 

With some exceptions our equipment, in all 

branches, is unmatched. Indeed, in some areas our dominance is so profound few countries even choose to compete with us, and 

this superiority is especially true in air 

power. Iraq simply refused the challenge; it 

seldom rose to contest with coalition fighters, and after two weeks its planes began 

fleeing to Iran to escape destruction. Similarly, only the former Soviet Union was able 

to approach us in the size of strategic airlift 

and inflight refueling forces, and those capabilities have rapidly atrophied after the empire’s dissolution. The size and sophistication of American air power relative to the 

rest of the world is, at present, staggering. A 

recent RAND study found that the U.S. has 

58 
more F-15s in its inventory than the rest of 

the world (excluding our allies and the former Soviet Union) has front-line combat aircraft combined. Considering that air forces 

require a level of technology and economic 

investment that only the richest or most advanced nations can afford, this favorable balance can be expected to continue.46 Finally, 

none can duplicate American space infrastructure that has so revolutionized reconnaissance, surveillance and communications 

functions. Today, only the United States can 

project power globally, and that is a fact of 

enormous significance. 

There will always be surprises, but it is 

not likely this technological edge will significantly change over the next few decades. 

Although the U.S. defense budget is severely 

shrinking in the aftermath of the Cold War, 

that of Russia has been slashed far more, totaling barely one-sixth that of the U.S47 

Similarly, when considering the aeronautical 

R&D base, the United States has more than 

twice as many wind tunnels, jet and rocket 

engine test facilities, space chambers, and 

ballistic ranges than the rest of the world 

59 
combined, while at the same time maintaining a qualitative edge. Of note, however, this 

superiority is shrinking as countries in Europe and Asia are accelerating their own aerospace industries: complacency is not appropriate. 

It has been argued that warfare is presently experiencing a military-technical revohtion (MTR), and that this is the third such 

MTR in history; the first two being the invention of gunpowder and then the explosion 

of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 

centuries resulting in the railroad, machine 

gun, aircraft and submarine. John Warden 

goes farther, acknowledging the existence of 

the present MTR, but arguing it is actually 

the first such e~ent.4~ He maintains the current leap in technology is so profound it 

makes prior changes appear as minor evolutionary steps. Regardless of whether this is 

the first or third MTR, air power is most affected because advancing technologies in 

space, computers, electronics, low observable weapons and information systems will 

enhance those services that rely on technology to decide the issue of war. 

48 
10 * 

Air Power includes not 

only military assets, but 

an aerospace industry 

and commercial aviation. 

With us air people, the future of 

our nation is indissolubly bound 

up in the development of air 

power. 

-General Billy Mitchell 

A collection of airplanes does not equal 

air power, and almost all theorists have realized this. As early as 1921 Mitchell wrote 

about the importance of a strong civil aviation industry, the role of government in 

building that industry, and of the importance 

of instilling an “airmindedness” in the peo- 

~le.~’ His later writings made these points 

even more emphatically. Similar sentiments 

61 
were echoed by Alexander Seversky and 

most recently by air leaders who spoke of 

the United States-the inventor of the airplane-as an “aerospace nation.”51 The vast 

size of the United States and the need to connect the east and west coasts, and indeed 

Alaska and Hawaii, demanded a rapid, reliable and cost-effective method of transportation. The development of various airline 

companies-still the largest and most financially powerful in the world-were a direct 

result of American geography and the need it 

engendered. 

Recognizing such economic and cultural 

imperatives, men like Mitchell and Seversky 

stressed that air power was far more than just 

airplanes. As discussed above, the technology required to develop first-rate military 

aircraft was so enormous, complex and expensive, it was essential that government and 

business play active roles. In the early years 

this equated to government subsidy of airports, airway structures, location beacons, 

weather stations, and support for research 

and development. The investment required 

for this new industrial field was simply too 

62 
great for businesses to handle on their own. 

It was also assumed that military and commercial aircraft would have similar characteristics and thus would enjoy a symbiotic 

design relationship. Douhet and Seversky for 

example noted it was quite feasible to convert civilian airliners into military bombers 

or cargo aircraft.52 More importantly, the 

skills needed to build, maintain and pilot 

these aircraft were also similar. Theorists 

saw a close relationship developing in aviation that would produce a pol of trained 

personnel who passed back and forth between the military and civilian sectors-mechanics, pilots, navigators, air traffic controllers, etc. In essence, there was an interdependence between the two sectors that was 

not present in armies or even navies. The capability of an armored force, for example, 

did not rely on the automobile industry or 

the teamsters union to the same degree an air 

force was dependent on the aircraft industry 

and airline pilots associations. More importantly, the quality of this aerospace complex 

is crucial. If transportation is indeed the essence of civilization, then aviation is the one 

63 
industry in which America must remain 

dominant. The United States has often been 

in the forefront of emerging technologiesrailroads, shipbuilding, automobiles, electronics and computers-only to later retreat 

from the field, leaving it to competitors. She 

cannot afford to do that in the air and space. 

Although the current status is favorable, 

negative trends must be avoided. 

Aerospace industry sales topped $140 billion in 1991. The world’s airlines overwhelmingly fly American airframes. Although the European Airbus has been able to 

maintain a world market share of about 15- 

20 percent in the large commercial jet category, the remaining 80 percent belongs to 

Boeing and Douglas. Moreover, the new 

Boeing 777, although not yet having flown, 

has already garnered nearly 150 orders from 

airlines worldwide-coincidentally, 80 percent of the market?3 Internally, this means 

the aerospace industry has a percentage 

value of the U.S. gross national product behind only agriculture and automobiles. This 

has led to a trade surplus of over $30 billion 

in 1991, ahead of the traditional leader, agri64 
culture, by a wide margin. At the same time, 

the number of air passengers continues to 

rise, as does the value and weight of air 

cargo. In addition, approximately one million people are employed in the American 

aerospace industry making it the tenth largest in the co~ntry!~ All this comes at a time 

when railroads are in decline, and our commercial ship building industry has all but 

disappeared. These figures translate into an 

extremely powerful and lucrative aerospace 

industry dominated by the United States. As 

already noted, the superiority of American 

military air and space assets is even more 

profound than in the commercial sector. No 

country in the world can rival us in the size, 

capability, diversity and quality of our air 

and space f0rces.5~ Unfortunately, this dominance may be in danger as a result of massive downsizing after our victory in the Cold 

War. One source states that the U.S. is falling behind Europe and Japan in the race to 

maintain primacy in satellite communications. It is therefore important to remember 

that American dominance in air and space is 

65 
not automatic but must be constantly reasserteci.56 

Finally, the theorists urged that Americans think of themselves as an air power nation in the way generations of Englishmen 

had considered themselves a maritime nation. They must see their destiny in the air 

and in the space. To a great degree this may 

already be true. It is perhaps not just the allure of the special effects that has made 

movies like “Star Trek,” “Star Wars,’’ “The 

Right Stuff,” “Top Gun” and others of that 

genre so popular in America.57 In a very real 

sense, air power is a state of mind. 

66 
*** 

These then are my Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power. Most have an "ancient" 

pedigree: Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard and 

others from aviation's earliest years understood and articulated them. Others were 

mere prophecies and needed a trial in war to 

determine their veracity. In some cases, such 

as number four regarding the link between 

targeting and intelligence and number eight 

dealing with centralized control, they had to 

be tried and tested in several wars before 

they were understood. Other propositions, 

such as number seven regarding the importance of precision, are just beginning to 

show their significance, and await future 

conflicts to prove their correctness beyond 

doubt. 

Nonetheless, these propositions in their 

totality show air power to be a revolutionary 

force that has transformed war in less than a 

century. The fundamental nature of warhow it is fought, where it is fought, and by 

whom it is fought-has been altered. It is an 

67 
unfortunate characteristic of air theorists that 

they long promised more than their chosen 

instrument could deliver. Theory outran tech 

nology, and airmen too often were in the untenable position of trying to schedule inventions to fulfill their predictions.58 It appears 

those days are now past. Air power has 

passed through its childhood and adolescence, and the wars of the past decade, especially in the Persian Gulf, have shown it has 

now reached maturity. 

68 
On the Ten 

Propositions.. . About six years ago when Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 

U.S. Air Force, was being re-written, then-Lt 

Gen. Michael Dugan, the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Plans and Operations, proposed an 

unusual idea. Doctrine manuals were fine, 

but he wanted something brief and succinct, 

something that encapsulated the essence of 

air power. His ultimate goal: to produce a list 

of principles or rules of air power so succinct 

they would fit on a wallet-size card that airmen could carry in their pocket. My first reaction was one of skepticism. As a historian 

I had been taught to eschew simple solutions, formulas, models, and similar gimmicks that attempted to deal with complex 

problems. Yet, as one observer phrased it: 

“The consistency of the principles of war indicates that despite the doubts expressed by 

military theoreticians concerning their valid69 
ity, they satisfy a deep need in military 

thinking.”59 These “needs” are a psychological search for guidelines when in chaos, the 

tendency to apply scientific concepts of 

cause and effect to daily activities, and the 

desire for an understandable belief system to 

use as an educational tool for young officers. 

The general’s proposal faded, but in truth, 

it never left my mind. The more I thought 

about it, the more appealing it seemed. Truly 

good writing, in my view, should be short, 

swift, and to the point. As Mark Twain said: 

“If I’d had more time I would have written 

less.” Capturing the essence of what airmen 

believe about air power and putting it into a 

concise, understandable, but not simplistic 

format, was a challenge. 

A catalyst was introduced when I was 

preparing a course on the history of air 

power theory. Reading the works of the top 

theorists: Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, Slessor, the officers at the Air Corps Tactical 

School, Seversky, Warden, and others 

brought many similarities to light. Even 

though living in different times, different 

places and different circumstances, these 

70 
men had distilled certain principles, rules, 

precepts and lessons that seemed timeless 

and overarching. Some of these had been 

demonstrated in war, others were mere predictions. After seventy-five years, however, I 

think there have been enough examples of 

air power employment aNmis-employment 

to derive some propositions-"principles" 

would be too grand a term-from the theories. First, however, let me briefly describe 

some of air power's unique characteristicssome strengths and some weaknesses-from 

which these propositions derive. 

Even before the airplane was invented 

writers sensed that the medium of the air 

possessed intrinsic qualities that could be exploited for war, and it is quite amazing how 

quickly after the Wright Brothers first flew 

in 1903 that military men were positing its 

use as a weapon. During the 1911 war between Italy and Turkey in Libya, airplanes 

were used for the first time in combat. Virtually all of the traditional air missions were 

employed: observation, air defense, air superiorit , transport, ground attack, even bombing.6' The world war that erupted a few 

71 
years later saw all these air missions refined. 

By the end of the Great War there was general agreement, among both air and surface 

officers, regarding the unique strengths and 

weaknesses of airplanes. 

Air power’s attributes include rangeeven the flimsy planes of 191 8 could fly several hundred miles; speed-over one hundred miles per hour; elevation-the ability to 

fly over hills, rivers, and forests that would 

serve as obstacles to surface forces; lethality-concentrated firepower could be directed at specific points on and behind the 

battle area; and flexibility, a combination of 

the other attributes that allowed airplanes to 

be used in many ways, in many different 

places, quickly. The limitations of air power 

were also apparent early on: gravity-unlike 

surface forces, airplanes could not live in 

their medium and had to land in order to refuel and rearm. This in turn meant aircraft 

were ephemeral-air strikes lasted but a few 

minutes and therefore lacked persistence. Although airplanes could indeed fly over obstacles, they were limited by bad weather and 

the night. In addition, just like surface 

12 
forces, political restrictions could determine 

where aircraft flew, when, and for what purpose. Finally, aircraft could not occupy or 

hold ground. Even seventy-five years later 

these attributes and limitations generally 

hold true, although some have clearly been 

nibbled away at the edges. 

It is significant to point out here that these 

various characteristics, positive and negative, have been used by both air and surface 

proponents over the years to justify their 

own views on how aircraft should be used in 

war. Airmen magnified the importance of the 

attributes while minimizing the limitations. 

Their goal was a separate service not subordinate to surface commanders. For their part, 

ground and sea advocates noted the limitations inherent in airplanes, while downplaying the positive aspects. Their intent was to 

maintain dominance of the new air arm. This 

political debate over whether air power was 

revolutionary or evolutionary, and whether 

therefore it should or should not be a separate service, occupied decades of heated argument and caused needless animosity. 

Today, all major countries have an air force 

73 
as a separate service. More importantly, 

however, there is an awareness that separateness does not equal singularity. Wars are 

fought in many ways with many weapons. 

Seldom is one service used to wage a campaign or war, although one service may be 

dominant in them. The nature of the enemy 

and the war, the objectives to be achieved, 

and the price willing to be paid by the people 

will determine what military instruments 

will be employed and in what proportion. 

My purpose in this essay is to list and discuss what I see as propositions regarding air 

power in the hope that it will better inform 

those who employ military power to achieve 

the objectives established by the country’s 

leaders. 

74 
1. Giulio Douhet, “Command of the Air,” in 

Command of the Air (Washington: Office of Air 

Force History, 1983), 25. This is a reprint of the 

Din0 Fenari translation originally published in 1942. 

2. Col John A. Warden 111, The Air Campaign 

(NY: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 10. He later implies this may not necessarily be true in low intensity 

conflict. 

3. This does not apply of course to the new threat 

of ballistic missiles. Iraqi Scuds were a major menace in the Gulf War, and this threat will no doubt 

continue to grow in the years ahead. 

4. The classic work on the evolution of the aircraft carrier and naval air doctrine is Clark G. 

Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: Forging an Air Navy 

(NY: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 

5. Martin Blumenson, “A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz: Allied Operational Objectives in World War 

11,” Parameters 23 (Summer 1993), 16. Napoleon 

commented that European generals saw too many 

things; whereas, he saw only one thing, the enemy 

army. 

6. For a grimly pessimistic view regarding the inherently indecisive nature of land warfare, in any 

age, see Russell Weigley, The Age of Battles: The 
Quest for Decisive Walfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana Univ Press, 1991). 

7. Mancur Olson, Jr., in The Economics of the 

Wartime Shortage (Durham: Duke Univ Press, 

1%3), argues that Napoleonic and later German attempts in two world wars to starve Britain into submission were failures and never came close to 

success. On the other hand, naval embargoes can 

cause great hardship if imposed for a long period of 

time, as against Iraq since August 1990. Youssef M. 

Ibrahim, “Iraq is Near Economic Ruin but Hussein 

Appears Secure,”New York Times, 25 Oct 1994, 1. 

8. For the air power advocates, see Adm U. S. G. 

Sharp, Strategy For Defeat: Viemam in Retrospect 

(San Rafael: Presidio, 1978) and Gen William 

Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington: 

GPO, 1978). For the opposing view, see Maj Mark 

Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power (NY: Free Press, 

1989). 

9. Roger T. Ames, trans., Sun-Tzu: The Art of 

Warfare (NY: Ballantine, 1993), 115. 

10. A typical example used by early airmen was 

the London air defenses of 1918 that included over 

six hundred aircraft to counter a German bomber 

force of approximately forty planes. Sqdn Ldr J. C. 

Slessor, “The Development of the Royal Air Force,” 

RUSI Journal 76 (May 1931), 328. 

11. This ‘is an interesting instance where air 

power’s unique strength is also a weakness: aircraft 

generally “get through” because aircraft on the defensive lack “stopping power.” Precisely because a 

76 
ground defender can dig in and hold his position he 

can repel an attack; aircraft cannot. 

12. The Battle of Britain remains the major notable exception. Partial victories for the defense might 

include the retreat to night operations by Royal Air 

Force (RAF) Bomber Command to escape German 

defenses, and the temporary lull in American bombing operations in fall 1943 after severe losses in daylight strikes. 

13. The most notable exception to this principle 

was during the Battle of Britain when the RAF withheld a large portion of its forces from the air battle. 

However, this was done not for the traditional reasons for reserve employment, to exploit or to plug, 

but to husband scarce resources of men and planes. 

Had the RAF been equal to the Luftwaffe in numbers 

and possessed a ready supply of reinforcements, they 

would have gained little by holding back their forces. 

For a contrary view on the desirability of an air reserve see Warden, TheAir Campaign, 115-27. 

14. It may be as one airman put it, an air reserve 

should be considered while the battle for air superiority is still raging; once air superiority is achieved 

the need for a reserve loses its rationale. Gp Capt 

Gary Waters, RAAF, Itr to the author, 26 Jul 1993. 

15. Douhet, 50. 

16. Maj Gen Don Wilson, “Origins of a Theory 

of Air Strategy,” Aerospace Historian 18 (Spring 

1971), 19-25. 

17. Slessor should not be taken out of context. 

Air Power and Armies was a collection of lectures he 

77 
had presented while an instructor at the British Army 

Staff College in the early 1930s. Given his audience, 

he was forced to address air power in the context of a 

land campaign. Nevertheless, he reminded his readers that the primary role of air power was to conduct 

strategic bombing operations against an enemy’s 

centers of gravity. Wing Cmdr John C. Slessor, Air 

Power and Armies (London: Oxford Univ Press, 

1936), 3. 

18. Col John A. Warden 111, “Air Power in the 

Twenty-First Century,” in Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and 

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., The Future of Air 

Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell 

AFB: Air Univ Press, 1992), 65. 

19. Brig Gen William L. Mitchell, Our Air 

Force: The Keystone of National Defense (NY: Dutton, 1921), 15. 

20. Interestingly, not only have most air theorists 

had a single, key target theory, but they have also 

been surprisingly prescriptive: their target is the key 

in all types of wm, in all types of situations and 

against all types of opponents. 

21. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “Iraq’s 

Bomb: Blueprints and Artifacts,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, Jan/Feb 1992, 3040. 

22. For an overview of the origins of this subject, 

see Robert F. Futrell, “U.S. Army Air Forces Intelligence in the Second World War,” in Horst Boog, ed., 

The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World 

War (NY: Berg, 1992), 527-52. 

78 
23. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy 12 (Apr-Jun 

1993), 143. This is an interesting article that argues 

“netwar” and “cyberwar”-the attack on a country’s 

information and communications systems-will be 

the dominant feature of future wars. 

24. This was an example I observed while working on the Air Staff in the Pentagon during the Gulf 

War. For an excellent critique of BDA in the Gulf 

War see Lt Col Kevin W. Smith, “Cockpit Video: A 

Low Cost BDA Source,” CADRE paper, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, Dec 1993. 

25. Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol 11: Effects 

and Effectiveness Report (Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1993), 303. 

26. This subject was suggested to me by a student 

at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maj 

Jason Barlow. His seminal master’s thesis, “Strategic 

Paralysis: An Airpower Theory for the Present,” 

(1992) first raised my consciousness to the symbiotic 

relationship between centers of gravity and how best 

to impact that relationship. 

27. Robert L. Helmhold, Rates of Advance in 

Historical Land Operations (Bethesda: US. Army 

Concepts and Analysis Agency, Jun 1990), 1-3,4-9. 

28. John Boyd has remained a somewhat legendary figure among a small coterie of American military officers. He has never published his theories, but 

relies instead on lengthy briefings that include dozens if not hundreds of slides. For a good discussion, 

see James G. Burton, The Penrugon Wars: Reform79 
ers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993). 

29. For an excellent discussion see Col Dennis 

M. Drew, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: 

American Military Dilemmas and Doctrine,” 

CADRE paper, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala, 

1989,3940. 

30. At the Third Battle of Ypres (1917), the preliminary British artillery bombardment consisted of 

4,283,550 shells, costing $1 10,000,000, weighing 

107,000 tons, and requiring 35,666 truckloads to 

transport them from the railhead to the battlefield. 

Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller, Machine Warfare (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1943), 17. 

31. F. W. Lanchester, Aircraji in Warfare: The 

Dawn qf the Fourth Arm (London: Constable, 1916), 

39-65. 

32. James Parton, “Air Force Spoken Here”: 

General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air (NY: 

Adler & Adler, 1986), 290. 

33. Gen Michael Dugan, “The Air War,” U.S. 

News & WorldReport, 11 Feb 1991,27. 

34. US Strategic Bombing Survey, “Oil Division: 

Leuna,” Report no. 115. Washington, 1946,51. 

35. Dugan, 27. 

36. Ibid. Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: 

Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington: Smithsonian, 1992), 303-07. The potential downside of 

this situation is that one terrorist with a satchel 

charge could not have eliminated 4,500 bombers. 

80 
37. It should also be noted that stealthy effects 

can also be generated by speed-such as in a ballistic 

missile with fifteen meter accuracy like the Soviet 

SS-21. Such missiles are of course limited by their 

expense and non-reusable nature. 

38. An alternative view: the psychological effect 

of bombing is so devastating that even a miss can 

have a great impact. There is a story told of the Iraqi 

troop commander who when asked why he surrendered replied it was the B-52 strikes. When it was 

pointed out his division had never been attacked by 

B-52s, he responded that was true, but he had seen a 

division that had been hit by B-52s. Hallion, 218. 

39. Francis Tusa and Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., 

“Who Benefits from Baghdad Bombing?” Armed 

Forces Journal International, Aug 1993, 10. It 

should also be noted there may be countermeasures 

to at least some types of precision weapons. Miniature jammers that reportedly can disrupt the signals 

of GPS guidance systems have been developed and 

could be easy to mass produce. John G. Ross, “A 

Pair of Achilles Heels,” Armed Forces Journal Interndional, Nov 1994,21-23. 

40. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see 

Lt Col Marc Felman, “The MilitaryMedia Clash and 

the New Principle of War: Media Spin.” Master’s 

thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air 

University, 1992. In addition, the U.S. Army’s new 

doctrine manual emphasizes the importance of the 

media in shaping militby operations. Department of 

the Army, FM 100-5, Operatiom, Jun 1993, 3-11. 

81 
41. Lt Col Alan W. Debban, “Disabling Systems: 

War-Fighting Options for the Future,” Airpower 

Journal 7 (Spring 1993), 4450; Mary C. Fitzgerald, 

“The Russian Image of Future War,” Comparative 

Strategy, 13 (Summer 1994), 167-80. On the other 

hand, one study argues the American public has 

more often called for stern action against an enemy 

when casualties mount. Thus, an enemy who tries to 

shed American blood in the hope it will break public 

will has generally provoked the opposite response. 

Benjamin C. Schwarz, “The Influence of Public 

Opinion Regarding Casualties on American Military 

Intervention: Implications for U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies.” RAND draft paper, Santa Monica, 

Calif, 1993. 

42. Vincent Orange, Coningham (Washington: 

Center for Air Force History, 1992), 132-37. 

43. Gen Gordon R. Sullivan and Lt Col James M. 

Dubik, “Land Warfare in the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Institute paper, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, Feb 

1993, 27. 

44. To illustrate, when one visits an air museum 

the emphasis is on aircraft and weaponry displays; at 

an army museum the focus is on people, uniforms 

and personal armament and equipment. For an excellent discussion of these cultural differences, see Carl 

H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military 

Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns 

Hopkins, 1989). 

82 
45. Russell Weigley, The American Way of War 

(NY: Macmillan, 1973) advances this thesis most 

strongly. 

46. Christopher J. Bowie, et al, “Trends in the 

Global Balance of Airpower,” RAND Study, Santa 

Monica, Calif, Jun 1993, 2, 49. This is especially 

compelling when it is noted the F-15 is 95-0 in airto-air combat engagements. 

47. In 1992 the US. defense budget was $242.7 

billion; Russia’s total that year was $39.6 billion. 

Other major countries and their defense budgets in 

1992: China-$22.3b, France-$21.8b, UK- 

$20.7b, Germany-$1 9.2b, Japaw-$l6.9b, Saudi 

Arabia-$14.5b, Italy-$lO.6b and Kuwait- 

$lO.lb. (All figures are given in 1985 dollars and using IMF exchange rates.) International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1993-1 994 

(London: Brassey’s, 1993), 224-28. 

48. “An Aerospace Challenge and the Path Toward a New Horizon,” Arnold Engineering Develop 

ment Center paper and briefing, Jun 1993. 

49. Col Andy Krepinevich, “The Military-Technical Revolution,” unpublished OSD paper, Aug 

1992. Warden’s position is found in a letter to Paul 

Wolfowitz, no date but early Sep 1992, commenting 

on the Krepinevich study. 

50. Mitchell, Our Air Force, 143-58, 199-216. 

51. Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory Through 

Air Power (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1942), 329; 

Donald B. Rice, “Global ReacWGlobal Power,” Air 

Force White Paper, Dec 1992, 15. 

83 
52. Douhet, 124; Seversky, 2%. 

53. Harvey Elliot, “America Takes Over the 

Skies,” London Times, 10 Jan 94,21. 

54. All of these statistics come from James W. 

Chung, “Whither the U.S. Aerospace Industry?” 

Breakthroughs, Winter 1992/93, 12-18. 

55. The emerging dominance of air power within 

American military strategy is covered in Col Dennis 

M. Drew, “We Are An Aerospace Nation,” Air 

Force, Nov 1990,32-36. 

56. “Panel Says U.S. Losing Race for Next Generation Satellite Communications,” Aerospace Daily, 

30 Jul 1993, 168-69. For a good discussion, see Maj 

Steven Wright, “Aerospace Strategy for the Aerospace Nation.” Master’s thesis, School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, Air University, 1993. 

.57. For an excellent overview of the connection 

between aviation and American culture, see Robert 

Wohl, “Republic of the Air,” Wilson Quarterly 17 

(Spring 1993), 107-17. 

58. Of great interest, this has been precisely the 

opposite regarding military space operations, where 

the technology has far out paced any coherent doctrine on how to employ space systems effectively. 

59. Svi Lank, “The Principles of War and Military Thinking,” Journal of Strutegic Studies 16 (Mar 

60. Renato D’Orlando, trans., The Origin qf Air 

Warfare, 2nd ed. (Rome: Historical Office of the 

Italian Air Force, l%l). 

1993), 1-17. 

84 
Suggested Readings 

Gen. Henry H. Arnold. Global Mission. 

New York: Harper & Bros, 1949. 

Richard G. Davis. Carl A. Spaatz and the 

Air War in Europe. Washington: Center 

for Air Force History, 1994. 

Alexander de Seversky. Victory through Air 

Power. New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1942. 

Giulio Douhet. Command of the Air. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983. 

Robert F. Futrell. Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the 

United States Air Force, 1907-1964. Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1974. 

Richard P. Hallion. Storm Over Iraq: Air 

Power and the Gulf War. Washington: 

Smithsonian, 1992. 

Strikefrom the Sky: The History of Battle 

field Attack 191 1-1945. Washington: 

Smithsonian, 1989. 

I. B. Holley. Ideas and Weapons. Washing85 
ton: Office of Air Force History, 1983. 

Force: The Keystone of National Defense. 

New York: Dutton, 1921. 

Richard J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945. 

London: Europa, 1980. 

John C. Slessor. Air Power and Armies. Oxford: 1936. 

Brig Gen William L. Mitchell. Our Air 

Arthur William Tedder. Air Power in War. 

London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948. 

Col. John A. Warden 111. The Air Campaign. 

New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989, 

86