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Thinking Effects

Effects-Based Methodology

for Joint Operations

Mann, Endersby, & Sea

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COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Thinking Effects

Effects-Based Methodology

for Joint Operations

EDWARD C. MANN III

Colonel, USAF, Retired

GARY ENDERSBY

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired

THOMAS R. SEARLE

Research Fellow

CADRE Paper No. 15

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil

October 2002
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those o

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States A

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for publi

release: distribution unlimited.

ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Mann, Edward C., 1947-

Thinking effects : effects-based methodology for joint operations / Edward C

Mann III, Gary Endersby, Thomas R. Searle.

p. cm. – (CADRE paper ; 15).

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents: Time for a new paradigm? – Historical background on effects 

Conceptual basis for effects – A general theory of joint effects-based operations – A

idealized joint EBO process – What are the major challenges in implementing the EBO

methodology?

ISBN 1-58566-112-0

ISSN 1537-3371

1. Operational art (Military science). 2. Unified operations (Military science) 

Planning. 3. Military doctrine – United States. I. Endersby, Gary. II. Searle, Thoma

R., 1960- III. Title. IV. Series.

355.4––dc21

This CADRE Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil

and the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.

af.mil.
CADRE Papers

CADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored by

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Dedicated to promoting the understanding of air and space

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All military members and civilian employees assigned to Ai

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iii
Contents

Pag

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM? . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EFFECTS . . . . 17

CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EFFECTS . . . . . . . . 29

A GENERAL THEORY OF JOINT EFFECTSBASED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

AN IDEALIZED JOINT EBO PROCESS . . . . . . . 55

WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES IN

IMPLEMENTING THE EBO METHODOLOGY? 77

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Illustrations

Figure

1 The Dual Nature of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2 Example of First/Second/Third Order Effects . . 32

3 Complexity of Higher Order Effects . . . . . . . . . 33

4 Fundamental Relationships of Various Effects . . 40

v
Figure Pag

5 Relationships between Objectives and

Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

6 Objectives-Based Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

7 The Effects-Based Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

8 Relationships between Indirect Effects

and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

9 Effects-Based-Planning Process Model . . . . . . . 56

10 Detail of National-Level Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

11 Joint Campaign-Level Process Cycle . . . . . . . . 74

Table

1 Relationship of Objectives, Effects, and

Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

vi
Foreword

The United States has a reputation for having the stronges

military force in the world—perhaps even the best in history

Still we continue to struggle with force application in an era

without the monolithic Soviet enemy. Our doctrine, written in

a paradigm seeking “total victory,” has been refined through

World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War. It has

been assiduously adapted for major theater warfare and wha

can be called the conquest paradigm. We need to change. We

need to adapt to a different world of continuing struggle

between and within nation-states, one where military strength

and political persuasion are applied with smarter flexibility. 

In Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Join

Operations, Col Edward C. Mann III, USAF, retired, Lt Col Gary

Endersby, USAF, retired, and Thomas R. Searle propose tha

military actions should be employed through effects-based

operations (EBO). These authors have developed an extended

explanation of EBO methodology earlier defined in an Ai

Combat Command white paper, “Effects-Based Operations.

Challenged by the white paper to define procedures in the EBO

methodology, they further codified the EBO way of thinking

Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they

recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both

service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be accom

plished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area o

command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how

intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are per

formed but also integrated into the planning process.

The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

(CADRE) is pleased to publish this study as a CADRE Pape

and thereby make it available to a wider audience within the

US Air Force and beyond.

DANIEL R. MORTENSEN

Chief of Research

Airpower Research Institute 

vii
ix

About the Authors 

Col Edward C. Mann III, USAF, retired (BS, Pepperdine

University; MA, University of Southern California), is head o

the Effects-Based Operations Research Team, Airpowe

Research Institute (ARI) in the College of Aerospace Doctrine

Research and Education (CADRE), at Maxwell AFB, Alabama

He flew the KC-135 aircraft with approximately 5,200 hours o

flying time. Colonel Mann was a research fellow at the Fletche

School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and has been

a past contributor to Military Review, Air Force Times, and Ai

and Space Power Journal (ASPJ)—formerly Airpower Journa

(APJ) and Aerospace Power Journal (APJ). 

Lt Col Gary P. Endersby, USAF, retired (BS, State University

of New York Maritime College; MPA, Golden Gate University)

is a senior defense analyst with Cubic Applications, Inc., a

Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He flew F-111 and F-16 aircraft and

served in numerous flying and command and staff positions in

Pacific Air Forces, United States Air Forces in Europe, and

NATO during his Air Force career. Colonel Endersby is a grad

uate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School and a past contrib

utor to ASPJ. 

Thomas R. Searle (BSE, Princeton University), a research

fellow at ARI in CADRE, is a doctoral candidate in Military

History at Duke University and an Army Reserve majo

assigned to the US Special Operations Command. He served

as an active duty Army officer for 10 years leading armor units

in Germany and Korea and serving as a special forces office

in the Middle East where he earned the Combat Infantryman’s

Badge during the Persian Gulf War. 
Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge the leadership of Ai

University (AU) and the College of Aerospace Doctrine

Research and Education (CADRE) for their wisdom and stead

fast support during this lengthy research effort—AU com

manders Lt Gen Lance Lord and Lt Gen Donald A

LaMontagne; CADRE commanders Colonels James Ruttle

and Bobby J. Wilkes; and the vice commander Col Stan Norris

The authors are most appreciative of the feedback provided by

the following individuals: Gen John Shaud, USAF, retired; L

Gen Lance L. Smith, commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

Maj Gen David F. MacGhee Jr., commandant, Air War College

and Maj Gen Charles Link, USAF, retired. Appreciation is also

expressed for the advice received from Mr. Sam Gardiner and

Mr. Robert Brodel and for the remarkable insight, encourage

ment, and guidance provided by Maj Gen David Deptula.

xi
Introduction

A notable shift in geopolitics began more than 10 years ago

with the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the perspective o

the US military, the primary thrust of this shift was to replace

a unitary, implacable, and constantly threatening foe—world

communism, represented by the Soviet Union, China and thei

allies—with more nebulous and multifarious threats. Com

bined with the experience of World War II, this long-enduring

face-off contributed to the development of a conquest para

digm in US military doctrine. Despite the experiences in

Korea, Vietnam, and other places over the ensuing decades

the majority of doctrine was written to deal specifically with a

major theater war (MTW) through the employment of the con

quest paradigm. 

While the cold war brought relative clarity and stability to

US military and foreign policy, the twenty-first century has

displayed a decidedly changed geopolitical climate. The US

military is undergoing a transformation to be prepared for op

erations across the spectrum of engagement. Consequently

this study proposes that part of the transformation should

deal with how the military thinks and operates. In this man

ner, military actions should be employed through effects

based operations (EBO), originally outlined in the May 2002

Air Combat Command (ACC) white paper on EBO. Both the

ACC white paper and this study stress that EBO is not focused

on conquest or necessarily even warfare as traditionally de

fined. Essentially, EBO represents those actions taken agains

enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects that con

tribute directly to desired military and political outcomes. In a

general sense, US forces have always had certain desired ef

fects in mind when conducting military operations. However

they often pursued military objectives without direct reference

to appropriate effects that would create the conditions fo

achieving them and with little consideration of other effects

that were created along the way. The EBO methodology is de

signed specifically to address these areas as well as provide a

better environment to assess the results of military actions.

1
EBO needs to be understood in the context of what it really

is and is not. EBO is not a new form of war fighting nor does

it displace any of the currently recognized forms of warfare

Attrition, annihilation, coercion, maneuver, and all other such

warfare concepts are unaffected by EBO. For consistent, sus

tained success, there must be a comprehensive, shared vision

of what EBO is and how it works. The study seeks to elaborate

on the following three specific areas: 

• a fully developed theory grounded in effects-based think

ing;

• a process to facilitate development of an organizationa

culture of EBO processes; and

• a lexicon that promotes understanding through a com

mon language.

To realize all that EBO offers, it must be incorporated into

military planning and operations. The EBO methodology is

simply a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing

operations designed to attain the effects required to achieve

desired national security outcomes. The EBO methodology is

actually a refinement or evolution of the objectives-based

planning currently incorporated in US military doctrine. The

objectives-based methodology utilizes a strategy-to-task ap

proach for planning military operations. An EBO methodology

takes this process a step further by allowing planners and

commanders to examine conditions and causal linkages

through which actions lead to objectives. Causal linkages, per

haps the most critical element of the methodology, explain

why planners believe the proposed actions will create the de

sired effects. 

The EBO methodology is much broader than solely military

applications. It incorporates all the elements of national power—

diplomatic, economic, military, and information—for a particula

situation and is applicable across the full spectrum of activi

ties from peace through global war. As with the objectives

based approach, EBO requires military commanders to explic

itly and comprehensively link—to the greatest extent possible—

strategic and operational objectives to each tactical action.

2
A proposed idealized planning model will enhance effects

based thinking before, during, and after operations. The

process is both continuous and iterative and contains five

phases: strategic environment research, determine policy

goals, developing a strategy, mission parsing and integration

and effects assessment. First, strategic environment research

attempts to gather relevant information regarding potentia

adversaries. Such background information may indicate po

tential centers of gravity (COG) and answer a number o

broad-ranging questions. For example: What type of effects

would be most appropriate in the given set of circumstances?

How might these effects be achieved, and what kind of indica

tors would determine the nature and extent of the effects?

Second, to determine policy goals include a statement of the

intended effects and outcomes that will lead to achieving those

goals. Third, developing a strategy is to employ the vast range

of resources available to achieve desired effects. Fourth, the

mission parsing and integration phase determines the ele

ments of national power best suited for each task and how al

the elements will work together to achieve the policy goals

This phase defines the mission for combatant and/or join

force commanders (JFC). Fifth, this phase is effects assess

ment, wherein information provided through intelligence col

lection and other sources is used to determine whether policy

goals are being achieved and what needs to be done next. This

series of phases requires interagency discussion and decisions

by the president or the secretary of defense. The military needs

to participate proactively in these deliberations and research

Although the military does not control this particular aspect o

the process, it can benefit from fully articulating a clearly de

fined effects-based process such as this one, even though i

might not be precisely implemented.

In summary, EBO represents actions designed to achieve

specific effects and can be incorporated into a methodology fo

planning, executing, and assessing operations required to at

tain desired national security outcomes. This methodology is

extremely promising, but at the same time it presents majo

challenges. To be fully successful it requires the developmen

and understanding of a comprehensive EBO theory and asso

3
ciated lexicon. The methodology itself will require changes to

processes and procedures within the joint/interagency arena

that have been in place for some time. The EBO methodology

should be viewed as an expansion of the current objectives

based process, which offers significant benefits for meeting the

challenges and exploiting the opportunities in the twenty-firs

century. 

Time for a New Paradigm?

Going into the second decade of the post-cold-war era, the

US military establishment is still struggling with the altered

geopolitics and the role it is asked to play in the new world

order. The military leadership, though trying hard, canno

seem to shake the legacy of World War II and its aftermath. I

is struggling with new understandings, but much of the con

ceptual thinking and development is stuck in an old paradigm

that the authors call the conquest paradigm. This paradigm

which may or may not have ever been appropriate, certainly

does not apply now. When Gen Douglas MacArthur said “there

is no substitute for victory,” he was not merely stating a sen

timent that many US military leaders adhered to throughou

the twentieth century but also voiced a central tenet of the

conquest paradigm. This tenet, expressed in many ways ove

the years since Korea and Vietnam, holds that use of the mil

itary should be a last resort when diplomacy and politics have

failed. At this point statesmen and politicians should turn the

problem over to the military and afford the armed forces free

dom of action. The military would then employ the required

force to reduce to ashes the adversary’s ability and will to re

sist, thereby achieving total victory as measured by the com

plete defeat of enemy forces and the unconditional surrende

of the enemy’s military and political leaders. That task com

pleted, the military would then relinquish control back to its

civilian masters.

That paradigm, however, fits only a narrow range of today’s

tasks and challenges. Our nation’s armed forces need to move

to a new paradigm; one based not on conquest, which is al

most never the goal today, but on achieving success across the

4
entire spectrum of engagement whether, political, military, hu

manitarian, or some combination thereof.1 Perhaps it can be

called the success paradigm. While Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020

moves US military thinking several steps closer to such a par

adigm, the military services, acting jointly, need to take a

least one remaining step: define an overarching implementa

tion concept for JV 2020. This construct will focus the four op

erational concepts of JV 2020—dominant maneuver, precision

engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protec

tion—on effects the military can create to produce the vision

of full-spectrum dominance articulated by chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

Each service and the joint staff have taken halting steps in

the direction of EBO by experimenting with, or discussing, a

least some aspects of EBO. The USAF has studied “effects

based targeting” for many years but, to date, has not codified

the concept in any formal sense. The joint services do no

share a commonly agreed lexicon of effects-based terminology

Such terms are commonly used as if they had clear defini

tions, but they do not. This study proposes correctives to in

corporate EBO in USAF and joint doctrine through an effects

based lexicon, theory, and process. 

The path to implementing the EBO concept and a corre

sponding EBO methodology along with comprehensive effects

based thinking for military actions will not be easy to traverse

Such a shift in operational concepts will not guarantee suc

cess, nor will these concepts clear the normal fog and friction

of war. An EBO methodology will provide a systematic ap

proach to planning, executing, and assessing results of mili

tary actions across the entire spectrum of engagement ranging

from peacetime to global war and back to peacetime. It will as

sist military planners to focus on output not input, and on na

tional goals rather than the capabilities and prerequisites o

the services, singly or collectively.2 This shift in thinking can

not help but make the US military better and more pruden

guardians of the nation’s peace and prosperity. This study

does not provide final answers, but it does start the process o

bringing together the conceptual debate that will move the US

5
military establishment firmly from the old paradigm to a new

more appropriate one.

The USAF has embarked upon a path to prepare for military

action in the current and future geopolitical environment

America’s Air Force: Air Force Vision 2020—Global Vigilance

Reach, and Power outlines the reorganization to an expedi

tionary air and space force, the movement to integrate the ai

operations center (AOC) as a weapon system, and the Force

Development—formerly the Developing Aerospace Leaders—

program, which is further explained later in this study. These

actions are aimed at developing a more agile, more capable

and more relevant Air Force. With an eye towards the future

an EBO methodology may be the final piece the Air Force

needs to fully implement AF 2020 and JV 2020.3

The Imperative to Change Now

The cold war brought relative clarity and stability to US mil

itary and foreign policy. Throughout the cold war the main for

eign policy goals of the United States were to contain the

spread of international communism and limit the influence o

the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, Communist China

The Soviet Union had extremely capable armed forces; and So

viet leaders were explicit and outspoken in their intention to

weaken and, if possible, destroy the United States. When So

viet premier Nikita Khrushchev angrily told the United States

“we will bury you,” he meant it; and though he and subse

quent Soviet leaders failed to do so, it was not for lack of try

ing. The Soviets posed an enormous threat to the United

States, perhaps the greatest threat the nation has ever faced

That threat was not only immense and imminent but also

clear and remarkably persistent. Against this backdrop, the

process of organizing, training, and equipping forces to mee

the threat was fairly straightforward. It was also fairly simple

to see who would be likely allies in the effort to contain com

munism. This clarity and stability extended to the entire in

teragency process.

The end of the cold war, following collapse of world commu

nism and subsequent disappearance of the threat from the So

viet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, changed everything. The

6
United States no longer faced an obvious threat to its very ex

istence, and many former adversaries became friends. Severa

former Warsaw Pact foes have since joined the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and become formal allies of the United

States. From a global perspective, the end of the cold war con

flict left the world with several local and regional conflicts

some new, some old, and each quite different from the others

The threats in the post-cold-war world are numerous; but they

are much less clear, persistent, and predictable than was the

Soviet threat.

The Korean War and Vietnam War were fought in the con

text of this global cold war. The communist governments in

Beijing and Moscow actively supported foes of US allies in

Korea and Vietnam. Communist China and the Soviet Union

hoped to use these wars to expand world communism, while

the United States fought in both places to contain interna

tional communism. In contrast, Operations Just Cause in

Panama and Desert Storm in the Middle East were not part o

any global conflict but were regional conflicts.4 More surpris

ingly, the foes in these actions—Manuel Noriega’s Panama and

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq—had not always been “enemies” of the

United States. In fact each had received significant assistance

from the United States prior to events that led to the interven

tions. Both cases represent the more transient nature of in

ternational relationships in the new geopolitics.

The New Environment

The cold war world was a black-and-white world in which

the United States had a clear understanding—from year to

year—of who were its foes and friends, with a relatively smal

number of states falling into the gray area between these two

poles. The US military knew without question who the poten

tial enemies were and war fighters studied Soviet and Warsaw

Pact doctrine, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures

Year after year, planners could simply revise plans to deal with

a massive Soviet invasion through the Fulda Gap in Germany

or through Iran into the Middle East. Today they face a much

grayer world with no clear-cut enemies and a handful o

“states of concern.” In Noriega’s Panama, enemy doctrine and

7
equipment were largely similar to those of the invading US

forces because President Noriega and many members of the

Panamanian military had attended US military schools, and

had bought a lot of US military equipment.5 Similarly in the

Persian Gulf War, Iraqi foes and coalition friends were often

armed with the same equipment and had been trained ac

cording to several different doctrines, sometimes similar

sometimes not. In contrast to the good old days, a single

friend-or-foe equipment quiz for the entire force would now be

unfeasible, since friends and foes can change dramatically

from scenario to scenario. Instead the military will need to tai

lor and conduct such training based on the contingency a

hand and the specific allies and foes involved. The notion o

universal, worldwide threat doctrine is clearly outdated.

In this changed climate, military actions will be radically

more complicated. US forces may have to respond with little

advance warning and little beforehand knowledge of who the

enemy is. They may need to switch rapidly between humani

tarian relief operations (HUMRO), peacekeeping, and fierce

combat. In Panama, in late 1989 and early 1990, Operation

Just Cause began with a few days of combat but quickly tran

sitioned to nation building. In Haiti in 1994, the United States

prepared to depose a government by force of arms but wound

up doing so without firing a shot. The force assembled to over

whelm the Haitian military immediately had to redirect its ef

forts to rebuilding a nation that had suffered neither war no

natural disaster but simply decades of extremely bad govern

ment. During 1993 in Somalia, the transition went the othe

way when a force sent to perform a HUMRO found itself in

combat against some of the very people they were originally

trying to assist.

Recently US military forces have been involved around the

world, helping people recover from natural and man-made dis

asters, acts of terrorism, and from armed conflicts. These

forces have been trying simultaneously to keep the peace in

places as diverse as the Sinai desert and the mountainous

jungles on the border between Peru and Ecuador. In all these

situations, US forces are making the world a better place and

contributing to US national security; but often terms such as

8
enemy, victory, and certainly conquest are not appropriate. In

fact, many familiar old cold war concepts are detrimental to

US national goals in this new environment. US forces need to

develop concepts of military action to meet the challenges and

exploit the opportunities presented by the current geopolitica

environment.

Perhaps one of the most striking changes in the geopolitica

environment is the fact that in this new era one cannot as

sume that future conflicts will typically be between nation

states. At the same time that globalization and new technolo

gies are bringing unprecedented prosperity to people around

the world, they are also facilitating transnational threats to

national security. These new threats include such groups as

drug cartels and international criminal and terrorist organiza

tions. Operation Enduring Freedom has shown that combat

ing the terrorist threat, in particular, requires unprecedented

levels of interservice, interagency, and international coordina

tion, as well as highly sophisticated understanding of the di

rect, indirect, intended, and unintended consequences of al

actions taken. Additionally, the United States has learned

through bitter experience that cracking down on drug produc

tion or money laundering in one country encourages the

spread of these activities to other countries. In the past the

United States has not always adequately anticipated these re

sponses, and the effectiveness of operations has been com

promised by the inability to prevent drug production moving

to new areas and new money laundering operations from re

placing old ones.

Humanitarian crises are another challenge encountered

more often in this new era. As prosperity increases around the

world, the international community and the US public have

developed a growing intolerance for human suffering and na

tional instability, sometimes in areas of little or no strategic in

terest. The US military finds itself increasingly involved in mit

igating natural and man-made humanitarian disasters around

the world. This trend will likely continue, and the United

States will need to improve its ability to conduct these kinds

of actions. Sometimes they will involve combat, such as Oper

ation Allied Force in 1999, and in other instances, action wil

9
be purely noncombat, as in flood relief efforts in Mozambique

The success of these actions requires a seamless melding o

capabilities into a joint, interagency, and international effor

that mitigates the immediate humanitarian crisis, creates the

basis for a sustainable long-term recovery, and improves liv

ing conditions. Traditionally the US military has been among

the first on the scene of a crisis and has emphasized address

ing the immediate problem. This is important, but the join

forces need to meet initial objectives for crisis response and

then work in concert with other appropriate agencies for a

smooth transition to normality.

A Revolution in Military Affairs?

Geopolitics is not the only thing that has been changing

Since the end of the cold war expanded application of rapidly

developing technologies (particularly information technolo

gies), combined with new business practices and organiza

tional concepts, have enabled commercial firms to radically

transform the way they do business. The end of the cold wa

and this expanding use of information technologies have pro

moted the globalization of economic activity. Economic and

commercial globalization promise to make both the interna

and external mechanisms of national economies more effi

cient, more prosperous, and more integrated than they were

previously. These changes have contributed enormously to the

new challenges and opportunities faced by the United States

and its military. Many of these developments have served as

force multipliers but also present new and different kinds o

vulnerabilities. On the one hand, networked information sys

tems have increased efficiency and effectiveness in organiza

tions that have embraced them. At the same time these tech

nologies have increased their user’s vulnerability to

destructive “cyber attacks” of types that were pure science fic

tion a few short years ago. US forces have taken advantage o

some originally commercial concepts, such as just-in-time de

livery, and are in the process of embracing information opera

tions. However, the implications of these changes have not ye

fully worked their way into institutional thinking.

10
For example, no one is sure how all these changes affect tra

ditional military actions. Economic globalization would seem

to make such traditional military actions as blockades dra

matically more effective than in the past because nation-states

are more dependent than ever on trade with other countries

The increased importance of international trade means tha

the unintended collateral effects of an embargo against a tar

get nation are more difficult to understand fully. Its trading

partners will also be more severely impacted than in the past

Who will be damaged more by a blockade: the target nation o

its trading partners, some or all of whom the blockading coun

tries may not intend to harm? Similarly, traditional strategic

attacks on weapons manufacturing plants and industrial tar

gets may be less effective than in the past if the equipment de

stroyed and any production lost can be quickly and easily re

placed in the international marketplace. Additionally, now

that capital flows are more global than ever before, it may

prove that an industrial facility in a hostile country is owned

either by a friendly country or a US-based firm. Deciding

whether or how to attack such facilities requires much more

sophisticated coordination and forecasting of collateral, indi

rect, and unintended consequences than anything faced in

planning attacks on the Soviet Union during the cold war.

Fortunately, the technologies that succeeded so spectacu

larly in Operation Desert Storm and the new technologies tha

have been emerging since may offer the tools to increase ef

fectiveness in this new global environment. As more accurate

and comprehensive real-time information about the world is

available, military planners and operators can—with in

creased precision—tailor activities to the evolving situation

Given the increased availability of precision tools such as air

borne lasers, small smart bombs, concentrated air-deliverable

humanitarian rations, and similar devices, US forces will be

able to achieve even more exact physical effects. These tech

nologies will dramatically expand military capabilities. To ben

efit fully, planners and operators must avoid the trap of sim

ply using new tools to do the same old things in better ways

Instead they must take a fresh look at everything to determine

what exactly they are trying to achieve and whether, in light o

11
these new capabilities, they can achieve assigned policy goals

more effectively by using new methods and organizationa

schemes.

The US military has undertaken several major initiatives to

help harness new and emerging capabilities to meet the chal

lenges of the post-cold-war world. The Air Force, for instance

established the Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC) at Langley

AFB, Virginia, in 1995 (moved to Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in

1997) to help the Air Force as a whole think clearly about doc

trine and speak with one voice. AFDC strengthened the USAF

doctrine development process, clarified and improved air and

space doctrine, and helped strengthen the entire training and

education program. Incorporating doctrine more thoroughly in

educational programs has improved USAF schools across the

board, is steadily improving the level of professional knowl

edge throughout the force, and has—in turn—enhanced the

USAF’s contributions to the joint and interagency team. 

The second major change in the Air Force has been adoption

of the concept of the expeditionary air and space force and its

embodiment in air and space expeditionary forces. The Ai

Force has embraced the expeditionary concept, recognizing

that in the future it will be increasingly required to reac

quickly to crises in areas where there are no forward deployed

US forces or developed bases. Air and space expeditionary

forces dramatically improve the USAF’s ability to operate on

short notice from austere bases. As Air Force people continue

to refine and practice expeditionary operations, the capacity to

conduct such missions will continue to mature.

Most recently the USAF began a third major program focus

ing on the issues discussed in this study. This initiative titled

Force Development—formerly Developing Aerospace Leaders—

takes a hard look at the way the Air Force selects, trains, ed

ucates, and assigns leaders. The goal is to cultivate the sort o

imaginative, widely knowledgeable, flexible, and sophisticated

leadership needed for the future. Still in its early stages, the

Force Development program builds on the doctrine, education

and expeditionary initiatives already under way. Force Devel

opment promises to transform the Air Force even more pro

12
foundly than earlier educational initiatives and to provide the

very type of leadership necessary to conduct EBO. 

The rest of the joint community has been working similar is

sues. The US Navy has changed its focus from control of the

seas to projecting power ashore. The Marine Corps has shift

ed from its previous doctrine of avoiding cities whenever pos

sible toward solving the problems of urban warfare. The US

Army is proposing a radical transformation of its force struc

ture away from heavy armored forces toward much lighter

more strategically agile expeditionary forces. These are just a

few representative examples of what the services are doing to

prepare for twenty-first century military action.

In addition to the initiatives within the individual services

the JCS have developed a new joint vision for the future. As

mentioned previously, JV 2020 lays out a broad vision of how

the military intends to achieve the nation’s goals in full part

nership with the other members of the interagency team and

coalition partners. Central to that vision is achieving full spec

trum dominance, which will enable US forces “to defeat any

adversary and control any situation across the full range o

military operations.”6 The Air Force intends to achieve ful

spectrum dominance by incorporating information superiority

and technological innovation—the key enablers—into all activ

ities, and capitalizing on the four operational concepts of JV

2020: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused lo

gistics, and full dimensional protection.7 Full spectrum domi

nance along with the key enablers and operational concepts

were originally spelled out in JV 2010, which was published in

1996. The services have progressed in these areas. Neverthe

less, a transition to a joint effects-based operations approach

would enable the United States to realize the potential se

forth in JV 2020. 

The Continuing Need to Revise Military Thinking

This study proposes a theory of military action that consid

ers the full spectrum of engagement, including MTW, but no

focused on conquest, or necessarily even warfare as tradition

ally defined. To gain the full benefit of this concept, approach

es to organizing, training, and equipping for military actions

13
must change. Most importantly, the thought processes used to

think through contingencies of all types must also change.

Most current military doctrine is rooted in the concept o

military action that the authors call the conquest paradigm. In

this theoretical framework, military actions are not viewed as

an extension of politics and diplomacy but rather the end, o

more specifically, the failure of politics and diplomacy. Such

actions are total wars fought by any and all means until vic

tory is achieved. The chief model of the modern era was World

War II, which resulted in total victory of the Allies over Axis

forces. The means available in these total wars are limited by

the laws of physics and national budgets, or more correctly

resources, and not much else. Under this paradigm, any tar

get that makes sense militarily can and should be attacked

and destroyed. In traditional theory, the ultimate goal o

ground action normally is the enemy capital, which armies

reach through the intermediate goal of destroying the capabil

ity and will of the enemy’s military forces to resist. Conques

results in total peace. Once the war is over, the politicians and

diplomats reclaim their prewar leadership roles while the

armed forces demobilize and resume peacetime training.

The conquest paradigm is rigorously fight-centric and al

most obsessed with the big fight, wherein the armed forces

concentrate on physically destroying opposing military forces

They also identify, target, and destroy infrastructure that sup

ports the ability of the enemy’s military to sustain opposition

Achieving both goals is the main, and perhaps only, importan

measure of effectiveness. This paradigm is often actively hos

tile to “unnecessary” (read any) political restraints on the use

of military force and to politically motivated actions. It ac

knowledges but has little tolerance for military operations

other than war (MOOTW). The conquest paradigm assumes

relatively clear and abrupt transitions between war and peace

and employs terms like desired end state—a useful term when

employed correctly and as Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine

for Joint Operations, carefully defines this concept.8 However

the term, taken on face value, seems to imply that military

forces can set the world right, then redeploy to peacetime

bases and readiness status until the next time a military cri

14
sis emerges. The truth in geopolitics is that nothing is ever re

ally over. Each resolution simply establishes a new baseline

for continuing interactions—some of which the United States

will like and others it will not.

The conquest paradigm has been prominent in airpowe

theories since the days of Giulio Douhet in the beginning o

the twentieth century. However, it does not provide an ade

quate basis for understanding the totality of military actions

Rather than clarifying military thinking, this approach to con

flict has led to deep confusion and dissatisfaction within the

US military because military actions almost never attain the

total war/total victory assumptions of the conquest paradigm

The Korean War, for example, ended in a stalemate not a po

litical or military victory. General MacArthur’s efforts to

achieve the goal of total victory by conquering North Korea led

to Chinese intervention and a 50-year-long standoff at the

38th parallel. MacArthur’s belief and training in the theories

of the conquest paradigm led him to contemplate transform

ing a small war against Chinese forces in a puppet state into

a large war in China. Even after MacArthur’s failures in Korea

US military leaders held fast to the precepts of the conques

paradigm and continued to ground military doctrine and

planning upon that paradigm. They found themselves just as

frustrated in Vietnam. Yet, even as late as the Persian Gul

War, some Air Force planners and theorists were still con

vinced that the proper role of airpower was to force the tota

collapse of the enemy. While the collapse of the Iraqi military

forces and society would have helped achieve the military goa

of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, it was not necessary fo

achieving that goal nor was it considered to be in the ultimate

political interests of the coalition arrayed against Iraq.

Conversely, some US military leaders in the Gulf War re

sented the Scud hunting operations of Desert Storm because

they did not consider those missiles militarily effective

weapons. Since the Scuds were not significant in terms of the

damage they could inflict on coalition military forces or indus

trial capacity, these leaders believed the coalition should ig

nore them rather than divert valuable resources to an objec

tive that would not contribute directly to defeat and

15
capitulation of the Iraqis. Because they grew up in the cold

war conquest paradigm, they did not fully recognize that the

entirety of military actions in the theater was only conceivable

within the political context of a fragile coalition, which migh

easily have been broken by Israel’s entry into the war agains

Iraq. This was precisely Saddam’s intent in launching the

Scuds into Israel. If Saddam broke the coalition, prosecution

of the war was likely to become much more difficult if not im

possible. The net result could have been a failure, regardless

of how militarily efficient coalition actions might otherwise be

If Scud hunting was critical to saving the coalition, then it was

one of the most important actions of the entire war, regardless

of its purely military implications.

Military actions in today’s geopolitical environment often re

quire considerable restraint, not necessarily using every avail

able weapon and not attacking every possible target but un

derstanding the full political context of all actions. Restrain

can be frustrating, and the political context within which the

military operates can be enormously complicated. Yet, military

actions are conducted in vain, if they do not serve real nation

al political goals.

With the end of the cold war, the conquest paradigm became

an almost wholly dysfunctional view of military actions. A

least until a hostile peer competitor appears, US national sur

vival is not likely to be at risk. When the military is called to

action as in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo

Afghanistan—and so many other places in recent years—there

usually will be political considerations more important than

military conquest. In such situations, the demands of military

efficiency often will have to be sacrificed in favor of more im

portant political concerns. It may not be welcome news tha

military efficiency will sometimes take a back seat to othe

considerations. In such cases, the military has a duty and re

sponsibility to explain and request all the things it believes i

needs to achieve national goals. At the same time, military

professionals need to learn to accept that sometimes other na

tional priorities will mean they do not get all the autonomy

they would like. 

16
None of these comments about the conquest paradigm and

the need for a new effects-based success paradigm is meant to

suggest that the military has been dropping bombs or march

ing around the countryside attacking enemy positions for no

valid reason. In a general sense, they have always had certain

desired effects in mind when conducting military actions

However, they have often pursued military objectives withou

direct reference to appropriate effects that would create the

conditions for achieving them and with little consideration o

other effects that would be created along the way. The EBO

methodology is designed to correct these deficiencies as wel

as provide a better environment to assess the results of mili

tary actions.

Historical Background on Effects

At least as far back as World War II, some air planners were

trying to implement the essential concepts of EBO. In the late

1930s, particularly at the Air Corps Tactical School, US Army

Air Corps (USAAC) thinkers had developed a number of theo

ries about air warfare, including one which came to be known

as the industrial-web theory. This theory was actually quite

well grounded in concepts that would later come to be known

as effects-based. In its essentials, the industrial-web theory

was not unlike many of the systems or system-of-systems the

ories of recent years. The basic idea was that a modern wa

machine, such as the German or Japanese armies of the time

required the support of a huge industrial complex comprised

of many interlinked subelements called the web. Manufactur

ing plants, transportation systems, power production, delivery

systems, and other critical elements made up this web. Fur

ther, there were thought to be a finite and determinable num

ber of vital links or what we now call critical nodes, which i

successfully destroyed or debilitated, would bring about col

lapse of the entire web.9 In 1941 the USAAC set out to define

these critical links in hopes that strategic bombardment, by it

self, could bring the German and Japanese war machines to a

grinding halt or, alternatively, “break the will of the people to

continue resistance.”10

17
Historical Examples of Effects-Based Thinking

In 1941 and 1942 the United States and Britain, working to

gether, developed plans for a strategic bombing campaign

against Nazi Germany. These plans were, in part, based on the

belief that the German economy—like the British economy—

was fully mobilized in support of the war effort. With this in

mind and for reasons stated below, the planners decided to

focus on the ball-bearing industry rather than “the electrica

power grid . . . transportation network . . . and the oil and pe

troleum industry” as stated in the earliest USAAC plans.11 The

German aircraft industry was actually listed as first priority

but principally as an intermediate objective to enable allied

bomber operations. While all these systems were considered

vital to German war production, ball-bearing production was

concentrated in a smaller number of facilities than the others

USAAC and Royal Air Force planners operated on the as

sumption that the German electrical power system was simi

larly constructed to the US system, which had a great deal o

redundancy, robust interconnection, and, therefore, high re

silience.12 If one sector of the power grid was damaged, it was

assumed the Germans would shuttle power from another. Ei

ther target set, in the end, could achieve the desired effect; bu

the ball-bearing industry seemed to offer the greater leverage

and the promise of a quicker end to Germany’s ability to sus

tain its war effort. 

The assumptions that Germany was on a full war footing

and that its electrical power distribution would prove resilien

were a result of mirror imaging. That is, in lieu of actual in

formation, planners deliberately accepted the US system as a

logically satisfactory model of the German system. They were

also reasonable assumptions, based on available data. Since

Hitler claimed to have achieved full employment in Germany

by 1939, presumably there was low probability that manpow

er could be expanded significantly. Hitler had begun a rapid

highly publicized, and apparently massive weapons-building

program before the start of the war; so it was also reasonable

to assume he was ahead of, not behind, the Allies in the pace

of industrial mobilization. American and British planners as

sumed that Hitler would not have started the largest war in

18
history without first fully mobilizing his economy to fight it

Rational or not, we know—in retrospect—that the German

economy was not fully mobilized until 1944, and by then the

war was already lost. This was fortunate for the Allied cause

and contributed substantially to the defeat of Nazi Germany

but it does not change the fact that Allied wartime planning

was based on more than one false assumption. Bombing low

ered maximum possible output at any given time but did no

result in reduced overall output until very near the end of the

war. In fact, German war production actually quadrupled be

tween 1942 and 1944 in spite of heavy and relatively accurate

British and US bombing of industrial and civilian targets.13

According to the US Strategic Bombing Survey, conducted

after the war, the German electrical power grid was not near

ly as robust as the US grid and was one of the few parts of the

Nazi economy that was operating near full capacity early in the

war. It may actually have been the magic thread USAAC plan

ners were looking for in the German industrial web. Heavy and

sustained attacks on power generation might have had the

disastrous effects on the Nazi war economy that USAAC plan

ners were seeking—had their initial plans prevailed—but othe

priorities intervened. Attacks on the ball-bearing plants pro

duced a great deal of damage to factories, but not as much

damage as was thought at the time, due to errors in assess

ment. The sole means of assessing damage was overhead im

agery in which a photointerpreter (PI) could only see building

exteriors, rather than the much more critical production ma

chinery and equipment inside the building. Using the tech

nologies of the time, PIs did an excellent job of assessing the

percentage of roof area destroyed in bombing raids, but this

turned out not to be a good gauge of the damage suffered by

such important production elements as heavy equipment and

machine tools under the roofs. For example, roofs of the build

ings at the Schweinfurt ball-bearing plants were judged by PIs

to be 75 percent destroyed after the second raid in Octobe

1943; yet later information indicated that only 10 percent o

critical equipment was damaged. Imports from Sweden and

Switzerland covered immediate German production shortfalls

In the meantime, the Germans were able to sufficiently dis

19
perse ball-bearing production so that it became a poor targe

set for the remainder of the war.14

This example illustrates the need to stay focused upon real

desired effects such as disruption of production in this case

Surrogates or extrapolations such as roof area destroyed are

not viable means of determining actual effects. Using the per

cent of roof area destroyed as the critical measure actually

proved counterproductive because the type of ordnance tha

will destroy the greatest amount of roofing (i.e., large numbers

of small bombs) is relatively ineffective against the critical ele

ment of production in this case, the heavy machinery. De

stroying the critical and hard to replace heavy equipmen

under the roofs required large, heavy bombs that could only

be carried and dropped in relatively small numbers with less

spectacular impact on the roof. Hard-learned lessons from

this experience would actually interfere with EBO analysis a

full 50 years later during the Persian Gulf War. The struggle

for valid poststrike analyses during World War II would create

another, similarly enduring problem for that same later con

flict. During the campaign in the European theater, PIs found

that photos taken during a raid tended to exaggerate the dam

age inflicted by the raid. The smoke, dust, and explosions cap

tured by photos taken during a raid looked spectacular bu

also made near misses look like direct hits. From this experi

ence the intelligence analysis community drew the conclusion

that only poststrike photos could provide valid analytic data

which became the primary, and usually only, means of deter

mining bombing effectiveness.

After years of round-the-clock bombing, the Allies succeed

ed in finding and seriously degrading two target systems tha

proved critical to the German war effort: transportation and

oil. Transportation was attractive for operational reasons; tha

is, the major rail yards were easier to hit in bad weather than

individual factories because they gave a very distinctive rada

return. Oil was particularly attractive for assessment reasons

the military units that relied heavily on oil also relied heavily

on radios the Allies could monitor, so they were able to inter

cept German assessments of the effectiveness of strikes. At

tacks on these two systems were also highly synergistic. At

20
tacks on the rail system took down phone lines, which were

colocated with the rail lines, thus forcing the Germans to

greater reliance on radio transmissions, which further en

hanced intelligence gathering against the oil target set. At the

same time, these attacks increased reliance upon less fuel

efficient road transport, which suffered from direct attack as

well as the attacks on petroleum production and supplies. The

leveraging effect here is obvious.

Again the USAF learned much from all these experiences

but some of the learning—such as the effectiveness of strike

versus poststrike photography—was influenced by the state o

technology of the time. During Desert Storm, the intelligence

system continued to insist that only poststrike imagery was

useful for determining strike effectiveness. This caused prob

lems because some heavy, penetrating bombs punched

through thick layers of reinforced concrete and earth to ex

plode inside shelters and bunkers, leaving behind only a rela

tively small entry hole and no external indication of blast o

heat. An analyst could tell little about probable damage inside

the structure from the relatively small penetration hole. Com

bining that evidence with a strike video showing the penetra

tion, explosion and resultant indications of overpressure in

side the bunker gave a much better idea of probable

effectiveness. However, the lesson that poststrike imagery was

the only reliable source for analysis was long held, and it was

very difficult to get analysts to consider other sources of intel

ligence for making battle damage assessments (BDA). As a re

sult, in some cases bombers revisited targets that did not need

to be attacked again. Because of an analytic bias toward phys

ical damage, it was very difficult to verify systemic effects such

as loss of electrical power in Baghdad.

Another problem that affected both planning and comba

analysis had to do with the approach employed for targeting

various systems, for example the electrical power system

World War II was a long war, fought with little concern fo

postwar consequences of the level of infrastructure destruc

tion necessary to victory. Because of limitations of then state

of-the-art bombing technologies, large bomber formations had

to be sent against single target complexes; and follow-up at

21
tacks were necessarily infrequent. The Allies simply did no

have the resources to continually attack the same complexes

Therefore, it was important to achieve maximum long-term de

struction from any one bombing attack. Since it was total war

very little in Germany was off limits to bombing and little or no

concern was given to postwar conditions. One specific learn

ing outcome was that the best way to create long-term effects

on the electrical power generating and distribution system was

to destroy the heavy generators that produced the power

Without them there was no power to distribute. Power gener

ators were big, expensive, and difficult to replace. Thus, thei

destruction would cause a relatively long-term loss of power

Under the conquest paradigm, this was a valuable lesson; but

once again, this lesson would haunt planners in a later, more

technologically advanced war.

Fifty years after World War II, armed with the best of late

twentieth-century hardware, the US military once again test

ed theories of strategic bombardment in what initially looked

like another “good war.” Under the tutelage of Col John A

Warden III, the Checkmate Division of the Air Staff had devel

oped a new conceptualization of strategic air warfare, late

dubbed parallel warfare. Their view of an adversary’s military

industrial capabilities and requirements were strikingly simi

lar to the industrial-web theories of five decades earlier, bu

they proposed to take down critical elements of the web so fas

that capability to support a war effort would collapse (an effec

they called strategic paralysis). Colonel Warden’s team pro

posed to attack the will of Saddam Hussein’s despotic regime

and perhaps the will of the people of Iraq as well. These plan

ners thought that such attacks might bring about a change in

the regime’s decision to claim Kuwait by force or turn the peo

ple against the regime and bring it down.15 Once again, as in

early planning for World War II, attacking the enemy’s electri

cal power production and distribution system was a key ele

ment of the plan. Air campaign planners considered the elec

trical power system a highly leveraged target set because no

only might it achieve the desired psychological effects men

tioned above but also “damage to it would likely affect othe

critical target sets (such as military communications and the

22
integrated air defense system).

16 During the planning and ex

ecution of the strategic air campaign portion of Operation

Desert Storm, much of the USAF was still responding to the

lessons learned in World War II, which did not always fit the

new circumstances.

Once again, as was the case with Germany in World War II

US planners did not really understand how the Iraqi political

social, and economic systems worked. As a result, the poten

tial impacts of certain coalition actions on Iraqi society were

mirror imaged, which resulted in perceptual errors. Whereas

in most of the world today, the opinions of the populace mat

ter, Saddam does not really care what the people think. So

long as his Republican Guards remain loyal, no one inside

Iraq is likely to overthrow him. Thus, neither the idea of pop

ular opinion pressuring him to change or of a popular revolu

tion overthrowing him is a very practical expectation. On top

of that, there was no real way to measure the will of the peo

ple or the leadership to determine whether the plan was work

ing. It was difficult to decide how much effort to keep putting

against this part of the plan. As far as the other effects on the

system, the coalition likely achieved a great deal of what was

expected but, once again, there is no real way to know with

any level of precision whatsoever. Consequently, analysts were

reduced to reporting what they could measure—physical de

struction.17 This is where the outdated lessons learned o

World War II really started to pay off in a negative way. Fifty

years after World War II, the USAF combat assessment system

was still looking for destruction of the heavy, hard-to-replace

power generators as it had in World War II. As previously men

tioned, this perspective was based partially on the need to de

stroy something expensive and hard to repair so frequent tar

get revisits would not be required. During Operation Deser

Storm, however, this was diametrically opposed to what the

planners—working under EBO concepts—hoped to do.

Unlike the combined bomber offensive (CBO) of World Wa

II, the Gulf War was planned and executed as a brief campaign

in a short war. In Desert Storm, the planners wanted to turn

off the power in Baghdad with the least possible physical dam

age and cost to repair. They were interested in operational ef

23
fects as opposed to the level of physical damage that would be

created. In fact, their ideal would have been to turn off the

power with a switch, so they could turn it back on again as

soon as Iraq was compliant with international demands. In

lieu of this capability, the military planners decided the bes

compromise between effect on electrical power systems in Iraq

and ability to rebuild was to target transformer yards. Repair

ing transformer yards would be much less expensive and take

less time than generator halls. The planners foresaw a dua

benefit from this approach. First, the potential for quickly re

building critical infrastructure would offer the carrot in thei

vision of a carrot-and-stick approach to operations—that is

“do what we want and we will help you quickly rebuild.” Sec

ond, the benefit was to save on future US aid expenditures or

in other words, the cost of the carrot that would reward Iraq’s

expected compliance.18 The planners eventually carried thei

point, but it was not easy.

Even after the operational planners had prevailed in thei

point with both the joint force air component commande

(JFACC) and theater combatant commander (formerly com

mander in chief), there was still a critical problem with as

sessment. The US combat assessment system was pro

grammed to credit effect on the power grid only when

generator halls were confirmed destroyed. Thus, while plan

ners were assured by other sources that the lights were out in

Baghdad, intelligence analysts were assessing only moderate

effectiveness against the electrical target set. Mission planners

at flying units soon figured out this disconnect and—when

given a generating plant as a target—some of them would

choose generator halls rather than the associated transforme

fields, as aim points, to get better BDA reports from the com

bat assessment system.19 While this created immediate con

flicts between desired and actual targeting outcomes that were

quickly recognized, a much larger disconnect between objec

tives and actions would not be fully appreciated until years

later.

The focus operational planners maintained on desired ef

fects and outcomes was commendable and productive, bu

neither the planning nor assessment system even considered

24
the potential long-term second- and third-order collateral ef

fects created by total loss of electrical power in a major city

like Baghdad. Resultant subsystem failures included wate

and sewage treatment plants and hospitals that ultimately

caused more devastating long-term effects on the Iraqi civilian

population than anything the coalition intended. Saddam

should get much of the credit for the magnitude and duration

of Iraqi civilian suffering, due to postwar neglect of the popu

lace and recalcitrant reactions to United Nations stipulations

However, he was able to use this unintended and unfortunate

effect of suffering by innocent citizens to hurt the public image

of the United States in the Arab world. In some quarters, i

may even have created sympathy for Saddam himself. If so

coalition actions against the Iraqi electrical system ultimately

achieved the opposite of the intended policy goal. Rather than

turning the people against Saddam, it allowed him to exploi

the suffering of his own people. 

A lot more could be said about USAF efforts to implemen

effects-based planning in the past, but these two examples

suffice to make the point. The USAF has been implementing

effects-based concepts for a long time, but doing it piecemeal

not coherently, and not really recording or codifying what has

been learned through these experiences. A different, more co

herent approach is required. Even today, little is known abou

imposition of systemic and psychological effects through mili

tary actions. The ability to affect morale and will, for instance

and the ability to coerce changes in behavior are still essen

tially matters of assertion. There is no comprehensive under

standing of how to create such effects, whether it is truly pos

sible or how to assess the progress and extent of such effects

This shortfall will remain true until the US military adopts an

agreed concept for EBO that addresses these and other criti

cal issues. 

The Premise for the EBO Methodology

Throughout history senior US decision makers have striven

to attain policy goals by creating desired effects. As noted in

the previous pages, civilian and military leaders normally have

objectives and a desired effect or effects in mind when con

25
fronting a crisis or conflict, although they may or may not be

willing—or even able in some cases—to articulate them. Fo

senior Air Force personnel, achieving effects often equates

solely to target destruction, which sometimes is referred to as

effects-based targeting. Attaining specific effects applies

across the full spectrum of engagement at all levels of employ

ment and entails a great deal more than simply destroying o

degrading selected targets.20 The underlying premise of an ef

fects-based concept asserts that affecting a particular targe

set in a particular way may have functional, systemic, and

psychological effects well beyond simple destruction or degra

dation of the target set. Rather than being an end in itself, the

destruction of targets should more logically be viewed as a

means (creating desired effects) to achieving an end (policy

goals).21 Military power, and airpower in particular, may stil

seek to destroy targets; but physical destruction is only one

possible desired effect within a wide spectrum of options

Specifically, it should be one of many possibilities available in

a process that seeks higher order effects. Other options migh

include maneuver, nonlethal attack to include information op

erations like intrusion into an adversary’s communications

systems or even logistics as in a HUMRO.

Viewed another way, the challenge is to shift from input- to

output-driven planning for military actions, or more specifi

cally in the case of targeting, away from a mentality of servic

ing targets to producing effects that accomplish specified ob

jectives.22 Overall, the premise of EBO is to use both letha

(e.g., target destruction) and nonlethal (e.g., information oper

ations) means at the tactical level to produce predetermined

direct (first order) and indirect (second and third order) effects

at the operational and strategic levels of employment. The ne

result of this precise application of military resources is to

generate effects that will ripple and cascade throughout the

system over time, thereby circumscribing options available to

opponents and increasing those available to friendly forces.2

Effects must not be an afterthought of the targeting process o

the sole domain of assessors attempting to determine if a tar

get was destroyed. Rather effects should be the integral linch

pin that binds together the planning, execution, and assess

26
ment of all military actions and the actions of other agencies

as well.

Arguably airmen have moved faster than others in the mili

tary to adopt effects-based concepts, principally in the form o

effects-based targeting.24 This stems partly from the differen

perspective inherent in air actions, which predisposes airmen

to view the entire battle space functionally, as opposed to ge

ographically.25 This functional perspective allows airmen to

see the battle space as a whole more similar to what a JFC

sees than does a surface force commander, who generally

fights his war in a clearly delineated area with boundaries

separating his area from those of other surface commanders

As a natural outgrowth of this perspective, airmen often ques

tion—in a way different from surface commanders—how ac

tions in one part of the battle space are linked with and af

fected by actions elsewhere. For instance, airmen have been

more inclined to see the possibility of operational and strate

gic outcomes as the result of individual tactical actions

Strategic attack is a prime example of tactical actions leading

to strategic outcomes. A considerable challenge for the EBO

methodology is to translate the effects-based targeting view

described above from a less air-centric view into a more join

EBO perspective that leads to effects-based thinking and

processes that are applicable across the entire spectrum of en

gagement. 

On the surface, the concept of EBO appears obvious and no

particularly new to many military people. On closer inspec

tion, though, it is not widely understood and worse yet, often

vastly misunderstood. Many of the wide variety of concepts ex

ploring one facet or another of EBO, such as effects-based tar

geting or fires and effects, are too narrowly defined. One pre

sumably informed source stated that disabling targets while

minimizing collateral damage was the goal of effects-based

targeting.26 All of these descriptions contain truth and, in fact

effects-based targeting is one necessary element of EBO. How

ever, such a focus excludes effects-based maneuver, logistics

mobility, and other important aspects of a real joint EBO con

cept. These and other such misunderstandings of EBO con

cepts partially explain the Air Force’s and other military ser

27
vices

 spotty track record in application of EBO across the

spectrum of engagement. 

Over at least the past three decades, the Air Force has

sought to enhance its ability to create ever more discrete ef

fects. Specifically, technological improvements for the Ai

Force centered on the development or improvement of stealth

precision, lethality, and command and control (C2) systems. In

light of all these technological advancements, American air

power can now destroy targets more reliably with greater pre

cision and lethality at a much lower risk to combatants than

it could at any time in the past. As significant as these ac

complishments are, they still have a limited impact on creat

ing effects throughout the battle space. Most of the technolog

ical improvements discussed here have exerted their greates

influence on military actions through the physical destruction

of targets. These advancements are absolutely necessary to

the concept of EBO but, to the extent that thinking about thei

application remains mired down at the tactical level of em

ployment, they fail to address the wide range of noncomba

military actions US forces are called upon to execute today. In

order to realize the full potential of EBO, both objectives and

effects must be linked across all three levels of employment—

strategic, operational, and tactical. In a similar fashion, it is

also important to think just as hard about the kinds of effects

necessary for success across the spectrum of employmen

from MOOTW up to and including MTW.

There are those who claim the EBO concept is already wel

and universally understood but has failed in the past simply

because intelligence has been unable to assess results prop

erly. Therefore, rather than further developing the concept

they believe it is only necessary to buy more sophisticated in

telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to

collect and disseminate more complete information for comba

assessment. Part of the confusion here results from the fac

that the US military has, in fact, over the last few decades

vastly improved the linkage of actions to objectives in planning

processes. Linking actions to objectives has similar connota

tions to linking them to effects but is not quite the same thing

Generally speaking, objectives do not specify operational ac

28
tions. As a result, focus can shift away from the operationa

objectives toward tactical outcomes. This kind of focal shif

may explain a problem identified by Gen John P. Jumper

commander of US Air Forces in Europe during Operation Al

lied Force. General Jumper lamented that Allied Force plan

ning had devolved to what he termed campaign-by-target-lis

management, wherein planners managed an approved targe

list on a day-by-day basis without reference to specific desired

effects.27 A further difference between objectives-based plan

ning and effects-based planning—not mutually exclusive—is

the relative focus on desired versus undesired outcomes. Ob

jectives are things the planning forces want to happen. Ef

fects-based planning also explicitly considers additiona

things beyond what the action is intended to accomplish tha

may happen as a result of planned actions. 

All of the foregoing material suggests that there is a long

way to go yet before EBO is really implemented. It is necessary

to document and codify what the concept really means for mil

itary applications, how to organize mentally and physically to

execute the concept, and what the various effects-based terms

that get tossed around actually mean. It makes sense to star

with an attempt to standardize terminology since it is difficult

at best, to debate a concept without agreed meanings to the

requisite terms.

Conceptual Basis for Effects

This section expands on the EBO foundation presented in

the May 2002 ACC EBO white paper. A definition for the term

effects requires a brief examination of the contextual frame

work surrounding the change in approach to military actions

proposed here. The current conceptualization of EBO reflects

primarily an airman’s perspective, but it should prove flexible

enough to be appropriate for all joint and combined actions

Although all the services use the term effects and have con

cepts associated with effects, only recently has a definition o

this term appeared in doctrine.28 Moreover, while effects-based

concepts exist throughout the joint community and appear to

29
be highly regarded in many quarters, these concepts are stil

not universally well understood.

Definitions and Categorization

The basis for the definition of the term effect, as described

in this paper, is “the power to bring about a result, i.e., to in

fluence.” This description requires some modification, howev

er, to be fully compatible with the overarching concept of EBO

In this case, it is important to note that the effect of a given

action may set off other changes or one event may trigger o

cause subsequent outcomes.29 Figure 1 illustrates this dua

nature of effects as related to military actions.30 As shown

planning centers on the effects or results desired to achieve

the stated objectives, while the execution portion of the figure

depicts how effects act as triggers that cause subsequent ac

tions or outcomes. Combining these two ideas provides a basis

for developing a comprehensive definition of effects.

30

Effects-Based Approach

• Plan for desired objectives with focus on results

• Select targets to generate effects/results desired

• Execution triggers secondary/tertiary outcomes

Planning

Execution

Figure 1. The Dual Nature of Effects

Policy Goals

Objectives

Desired

Effects Target

Action

Weapon or

Weapon System

3d Order

Effect

Triggers 2d Order

Effect

Triggers 1st Order

Effect

From what has been stated so far, it is apparent that the

term effects is both inherently complex and requires a com

plete definition to promote understanding among military

members. Based on the information presented above, the au
thors recommend the following concise definition for the term

effects: Effects consist of a full range of outcomes, events, o

consequences that result from a specific action. 

This definition provides a departure point for categorizing

and classifying associated concepts. In the most basic sense

effects can be broken down into direct and indirect effects.31 A

direct effect is the result of actions with no intervening effec

or mechanism between act and outcome. Direct effects are

usually immediate and easily recognizable. For example

bombing enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and associ

ated C2 facilities may produce the direct effect of physically de

stroying those targets. Direct effects can trigger additiona

outcomes referred to as indirect effects, which may be classi

fied as those effects that are created through an intermediate

effect or mechanism to produce a final outcome or result

Going back to the SAM site example, a possible indirect effec

might be the refusal of operators at other SAM sites to targe

aircraft out of fear of being attacked. Direct and indirect ef

fects may be physical, functional, or psychological in nature

Indirect effects also may be systemic and tend to be delayed

and/or may be difficult to recognize. Indirect effects are often

the cumulative or cascading result of many combined direc

effects.32

The relationship between direct and indirect effects can be

seen in the example of an attack on an enemy’s C2 system. De

stroying a single communications node creates a direct effect

that specific communications node is degraded or ceases to

function. The cumulative result (i.e., indirect effect) of multi

ple strikes against a number of similar and related targets

could result in achieving the air planners’ true objective: un

dermining the enemy’s ability to command military forces ef

fectively. During the Gulf War, attacks against Saddam Hus

sein’s C2 facilities forced his military into autonomous

operations, something they were neither trained nor equipped

to handle. As noted earlier, indirect effects usually occur ove

time, and it may take an indeterminate period of time before

the overall lack of communications has a deleterious effect on

the enemy.33 Overall, the combination of direct and indirect ef

31
fects can achieve the ultimate objective of any action—to com

pel or shape a desired result.

First, Second, and Third Order Effects

First order effects are synonymous with direct effects. Second

and third order effects constitute indirect effects (see fig. 2). Ma

Jay M. Kreighbaum provides the example of first/second/third

order effects.34

32

- Impact Point

- For fight-centric––For example, designated mean

- point of impact

- For mobility-centric operations––For example, aerial

- port of delivery or debarkation

- 1st Order Effect

- Destruction/neutralization of physical object

- Disaster relief––Initial distribution of aid

- Direct, immediate result

- Directly related to object and/or situation

- 2d/3d Order Effect

- Downstream result from a physical action

- Indirect result, delayed in time

- Indirectly or directly related to object and/or situation

Figure 2. Example of First/Second/Third Order Effects

First Order (Direct Effects). First order effects result im

mediately from an action. The results are directly attributable

to a military attack on a target or other actions at a specific lo

cation and occur immediately or very nearly immediately afte

the specific actions.35

Second/Third Order (Indirect Effects). Those effects tha

are created through an intermediate effect or mechanism

thereby producing a final outcome or result. Simply stated a

causes b, causes c, causes—see figure 3 for the relationship o

first, second, and third order effects.36 Furthermore, second

and third order effects are indirect effects, which may be func

tional, systemic, or psychological in nature. Indirect effects
tend to be delayed and typically are more difficult to recognize

than direct effects.37 Depending on the situation, indirect ef

fects may occur over an indeterminate period of time. An ex

ample of second and third order indirect effects would be dis

ruptions in the electric grid, which yields rolling blackouts

that disrupts petroleum deliveries to airfields and that dis

rupts air operations.

33

Action

A

1st Order

Effect

2d Order

Effect

3d Order

Effect

Direct

Indirect

Source: Briefing and paper, USAF Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: “Strategic and In

direct Effect: Defining and Modeling,” 11 August 2000.

Figure 3. Complexity of Higher Order Effects

Cumulative and Cascading Effects

Direct and indirect effects can be cumulative or they can

cascade through the course of an action. Cumulative effects

result from the aggregate of many direct or indirect effects

This aggregation of effects may occur at the same or at differ

ent levels of employment. Typically, a cumulative effect flows

from lower-to-higher levels of employment and occurs at the

higher levels; however, it may occur at the same level as a con

tributing lower-order effect. As an example, increased opera

tional-level air superiority could be the cumulative effect of de

stroying numerous SAM sites at the tactical level.38 A second

example would be the distribution of humanitarian aid at nu
merous airports throughout a country or region with the cu

mulative effect of providing the necessary food and disaster re

lief materials to the majority of the population requiring such

aid. Although cumulative effects may occur at the tactical leve

of employment, they most typically occur at the operational o

strategic levels of employment.

Indirect effects can ripple through an enemy target system

in a combat scenario or a situation in MOOTW and often af

fecting other systems. Most frequently indirect effects cascade

or flow from higher to lower levels of employment. For exam

ple, when an enemy central headquarters is destroyed the ef

fects cascade down through the enemy echelons to ultimately

disrupt numerous tactical units on the battlefield (an admit

tedly fight-centric example).39 Similarly, in an example involv

ing mobility operations, working directly with a host-nation

government can have a positive cascading effect on the overal

efficiency and success of humanitarian operations within tha

nation. When supplies are given directly to the government

distribution to the distressed populace may be enhanced

through a cascading effect.

Virtually no part of a target audience or its infrastructure is

truly isolated.40 In other words, effects, whether direct or indi

rect, have a ripple or distributive impact throughout the targe

environment or system whether a nation-state or a loosely kni

international terrorist group. The cumulative and cascading

nature of direct and indirect effects contributes to their dis

tributive character.41 With successive layers of indirect effects

it becomes increasingly difficult to precisely predict and mea

sure outcomes. Historically, it has proven extremely difficul

to predict with any degree of certainty beyond the third orde

effects discussed above. This characteristic highlights the fac

that there are few, if any, clear lines of demarcation for effects

beyond the third order. Table 1 shows the increasing com

plexity involved with such effects within an extremely complex

and interrelated system such as an enemy state.42 Nonstate

actors, such as terrorist organizations and networks also may

be inherently complex. Furthermore, Table 1 provides exam

ples of effects across the levels of employment and ties togeth

er the categories and concepts presented to this point.

34
Collateral Effects

Collateral effects are those outcomes that result when some

thing occurs other than what was intended. In a broad sense

collateral effects are any effects achieved beyond those fo

which the action was undertaken and may be either positive

or negative to the planners’ intent. In a negative sense, collat

eral effects may be incidental direct or indirect effects tha

cause unintended and unwanted injury or damage to persons

or objects. On the positive side collateral effects may generate

outcomes that prove beneficial to ongoing military actions. The

net result is that planned first order effects will invariably gen

35

Table 1

Relationship of Objectives, Effects, and Targets

Objectives Effects Targets/Actions

Objective Indirect/3d Indirect/2d Order Direct/1st Order Target/DMPI

Order Effects Effects Effects Distribution

(Systemic) (Functional) (Physical) Point

War making Movement of Road traffic halted Road bridge Specific aim

and sustain- military logistics accessing bridge; “functionally” points to drop

ment capacity delayed to front Traffic diverted destroyed bridge span

at front reduced

Friendly air C3 within region EW/GCI site disabled; Communications EW/GCI site

superiority disrupted and Sector acquisition relay van destroyed communications

advanced; disabled capability disrupted node

adversary air

defense disrupted

Sustain the Refugees receive Food and supplies Airlift bridge Mobility aircraft

populace through necessary food reach distribution established in land at airports

the winter and shelter points/refugee camps country for distrimonths bution

Desired Outcomes Trigger Cause Trigger Cause Trigger Cause Target/Action

Source: Jay M. Kreighbaum, “Force Application Planning: A Systems-and-Effects-Based Ap

proach,” Class 7 (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1997–98), 76.

Legend:

C3––command, control, and communications

DMPI––desired mean point of impact

EW––early warning

EGCI––ground controlled intercept
erate subsequent effects that were unintended and/or unan

ticipated. It is important to distinguish between collatera

damage and collateral effects. According to Air Force Instruc

tion 14-210, USAF Targeting Intelligence Guide, collateral dam

age is broadly defined as the unintentional or incidental dam

age affecting facilities, equipment, or personnel that were no

targeted. Such damage can occur to friendly, neutral, and

even enemy forces. This definition seems unnecessarily re

strictive as it implies collateral damage is solely negative and

never results in benefit to the plan. 

During operational planning, potential collateral effects

evaluation should consider second and third order effects tha

may impact outcomes either positively or negatively. World

War II provides an excellent example of collateral effects. In

preparation for the Normandy invasion, the Allies attacked

railroad marshalling yards in a major air action to disrupt the

reinforcement and resupply of German divisions in the inva

sion area. The direct effect of actions against the rail systems

of both France and Germany was successful interdiction and

disruption that, in turn, indirectly isolated the Normandy bat

tlefield from supporting forces and supplies. Additionally

there were two collateral effects associated with these air at

tacks. The destruction and disruption of the rail system had a

positive effect by contributing to the collapse of the overal

German war economy. Conversely, destroying these mar

shalling yards had the negative collateral effect of denying the

Allied forces use of the same railroad systems to move troops

and logistical supplies forward in the ensuing ground cam

paign in France. During World War II there may have been no

other choice, even had the negative collateral effects been an

ticipated. Today, however, planners might consider othe

means for achieving the desired effects. Perhaps targeting only

very key points of the rail system in a manner that would allow

quick repair by the Allies similar to the attacks against Iraq

electrical distribution in Desert Storm described earlier. Col

lateral effects should be a major, deliberate consideration in

planning, executing, and assessing military actions on any

scale.

36
Physical, Functional, Systemic,

and Psychological Effects

The definition proposed for effects previously alluded to

physical, functional, systemic, or psychological outcomes

events, or consequences as they relate to military actions. This

categorization—physical, functional, systemic, and psycholog

ical—most closely matches that used by the US Air Force in

assessing its wartime effects.43 Thus, this categorization

seems quite useful for the purposes intended here due to its

inherent relationship to current combat assessment (CA) ter

minology.44 These categories are an integral part of the argu

ment presented in this study. It is important, therefore, to

carefully examine each category of effects to comprehend thei

interrelatedness. 

Physical effects are created by the direct impact, through

physical alteration, on an object or system targeted by the ap

plication of military resources. In a conflict, the primary pur

pose of a physical effect is to damage, disrupt, or neutralize a

target or group of targets through the application of military

force to achieve the desired effect.45 In other actions it may ac

tually be construction of some key infrastructure or other pos

itive action that physically affects a target audience. In gener

al, physical effects are direct or first order effects. Physica

effects are closely related to, although much broader ranging

than, the physical-damage assessment performed by intelli

gence analysts. A physical-damage assessment is an estimate

of the extent of physical damage or change to a target based

on observed or interpreted alteration.46

Functional effects represent the direct or indirect effects o

a military action on the ability of a particular target or objec

to function properly and perform its mission. Moreover, in as

sessing these particular effects, there is this question: To wha

extent has the function of the particular target or target se

been degraded relative to the objective in the attack or othe

action? In both fight-centric and nonfight-centric scenarios

functional effects are extremely important, since these effects

may be key indicators of the overall success of the particula

action. Functional effects also have a direct relationship to as

sessment in that a functional-damage assessment estimates

37
the remaining operational capability of a targeted facility o

object. A functional assessment is more difficult and detailed

than a physical-damage assessment. In the EBO methodology

this area of analysis must be expanded to include the func

tional-impact assessment of positive events, such as con

struction of infrastructure to support friendly target audi

ences.

Systemic effects are those indirect effects aimed at affecting

or disrupting the operation of a specific system or set of sys

tems. The distinction between functional and systemic effects

hinges upon what exactly is affected as defined by the objec

tive. If it is a target such as a transformer yard, then a func

tional effect is what is desired. Conversely, if the desire is to

affect an entire system such as an electrical power grid, then

it is a systemic effect.47 The loss of power from an electrica

power plant could affect numerous systems including com

munications, C2, and petroleum production among others and

hence have cumulative or cascading effects. On the down side

destruction of main electrical power grids usually has the col

lateral effect of disrupting power to such facilities as hospitals

and sewage-treatment plants. With regard to assessment, Ai

Force Pamphlet 14-210, USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, 

February 1998, provides insight on what is termed target-system

assessment. Target-system assessment uses BDA information

that is then fused with functional damage to a target system

and an evaluation is made of the overall impact on the sys

tem’s capabilities. Once again, the EBO methodology will re

quire expanding the current view of target-system assessmen

to include positive effects on friendly systems for actions such

as MOOTW and HUMRO.

Psychological effects are the results of actions that influence

emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the be

havior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and in

dividuals. These effects may be either direct or indirect effects

resulting from such military actions. For example, strategic at

tacks—in particular—against an adversary may have the ef

fect of demoralizing enemy leadership, military forces, and the

population, thus affecting the enemy’s will to wage war. On the

other hand, it may be important in other types of actions to

38
achieve positive psychological effects on a given target audi

ence. In either case, achieving a psychological effect can be an

elusive goal and one that is extremely difficult to measure ac

curately.48 The concept is a very important one, however, and

should not be discarded or downplayed simply because of the

difficulties involved in defining and measuring success. 

There is a natural linkage among physical, functional, sys

temic, and psychological effects. The linkage may vary in de

gree but appears to always be present. For example, a bridge

may be physically destroyed. As a result, the bridge is no

longer functional, and its lack of functionality degrades the

transportation system. Furthermore, the loss of the bridge

may have a psychological impact on the adversary, especially

if it was one of the primary avenues of escape or retreat in the

face of advancing military forces. The important aspect is to

develop a better understanding of the inherent interrelation

ship of effects and to incorporate this understanding into

planning, execution, and assessment of operations.

Tactical, Operational, and Strategic

Level Effects

The so-called levels of war or spectrum of conflict are doc

trinal perspectives that clarify links between strategic objec

tives and tactical actions. This perspective tends to limit doc

trinal discussions to fight-centric scenarios. To avoid tha

limitation, as explained previously, the terms levels of employ

ment and spectrum of engagement are used in lieu of levels o

war and spectrum of conflict. Although there are no finite lim

its or boundaries between them, the three levels are generally

described as strategic, operational, and tactical. In a broade

sense the levels actually apply to both war and MOOTW, since

effects-based operations may be employed anywhere in the

spectrum of engagement, from peacetime through MTW.49 Ai

Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization and Em

ployment of Aerospace Power, captures the association pre

cisely when it states, “the focus at a given level of war is no

on the specific weapons used, or on the targets attacked, bu

rather on the desired effects.” Effects are the tactical, opera

tional, or strategic level outcomes that military actions are in

39
tended to produce. Overall, effects can be defined as strategic

operational, or tactical, based on their contribution to achiev

ing objectives. Interestingly, tactical, operational, and strategic

effects are interwoven throughout direct and indirect effects

In essence, tactical, operational, and strategic effects provide

an overarching umbrella encompassing all effects. The funda

mental relationship of these effects to that of direct, indirect

and other associated effects is portrayed in figure 4.

40

“Effects” are linked to desired outcomes/objectives, exert influence, cause

a result and/or trigger additional outcomes. The effects-based lexicon applies across the entire spectrum of engagement.

Tactical/Operational/Strategic Level Tactical/Operational/Strategic Leve

Indirect Effects

2d/3d Order

Direct Effects

1st Order

Physical

Collateral

Psychological

Cascading

Functional

Collateral

Psychological

Systemic

Cumulative

Figure 4. Fundamental Relationships of Various Effects

Strategic-level actions involve activities associated with the

effort as a whole. Strategic effects contribute to affecting a spe

cific target audience’s overall political, military, and economic

capacities as well as its psychological stability.50 In a comba

scenario, a strategic effect is the disruption of the enemy’s

Functional
strategy, ability, or will to wage war or carry out aggressive ac

tivity through destruction or disruption of his COGs or othe

vital target sets. COGs may typically include command ele

ments, war production assets, fielded forces, and key sup

porting infrastructure. Strategic effects can result from the ac

tions of air and space or surface forces at the lower levels o

employment. An example of the latter would be destruction o

the enemy army on the battlefield. Such a tactical and/or op

erational-level action would, in turn, impair the enemy strate

gy to the point where it is forced to cease fighting. In this case

the cumulative results from the tactical level are eventually

felt at the strategic level.51 Strategic effects in general require

a longer time to manifest than do effects at the operational and

tactical levels. However, it is important to note that there are

instances of employing military forces aimed at producing the

direct strategic effect of enemy defeat with no intermediate

level effects on enemy forces involved.52

The operational level describes activities associated with

campaigns, major actions, and activities that affect an entire

theater of operations. At this level, efforts focus either on the

war-making potential of the enemy or the ability to have theater

wide influence in a nonfight-centric scenario. The principa

focus at this level is on enemy forces, an enemy’s operationa

COG, or the conditions behind the specific circumstances in a

MOOTW. Operational-level effects contribute to reducing and

unbalancing an adversary’s capacity to conduct successfu

campaigns and wage war. These effects usually take less time

to be realized than do strategic ones but are less immediate

than effects at the tactical level.53

Tactical effects are the result of an action or actions at the

individual unit level. Such effects can be either direct or indi

rect and typically act in concert with other tactical effects to

produce results at higher levels of employment. Tactical ef

fects generally occur on a localized basis and are immediate

and of short duration. Most often they contribute to overal

success through cumulative outcomes of missions, engage

ments, and individual battles. Significant examples include ai

superiority, isolating enemy units on the battlefield, and rapid

deployment of forces to the arena of action.54

41
In fight-centric scenarios, force can be used to either destroy

or control the enemy. The use of force to control rather than

destroy an opponent’s ability to act lends a different perspec

tive to the most effective use of military power. However, the

ability to influence either an adversary or a situation depends

on the strategic events stemming from an overwhelming im

pact of direct and indirect effects. Creating the right effects

does not necessarily imply the ability to manipulate all indi

vidual events or actions at the tactical level of employment

For example, during the Gulf War, Iraq was able to launch in

dividual aircraft sorties; however, because Iraq’s C2 and air de

fense systems were rendered ineffective by coalition actions

such individual sorties were of negligible consequence.55 This

effect resulted not only because the Iraqi C2 system was se

verely disrupted but also because coalition systems detected

virtually every move they made. 

Effects-based terminology provides a useful foundation fo

EBO theory. The new terminology and information used here

in may appear a bit overwhelming and take time to fully digest

However, the abundance of terminology is an indicator of the

all-encompassing nature of EBO. Overall, the lexicon should

serve as a common reference point for EBO terms and defini

tions that may be incorporated in service and joint doctrine. A

full listing is presented of recommended EBO terms and defi

nitions in the final section of this study. 

A General Theory of Joint

Effects-Based Operations

While recognizing that military actions usually create im

mediate physical effects, the focus of the EBO construct pre

sented here transcends immediate physical results. Therefore

this concept does not address results in terms of destruction

but in terms of outcomes that may or may not include de

struction. EBO does not attempt to replace attrition or anni

hilation as goals of military actions in situations where they

may be appropriate. It simply recognizes them as two specific

types of military outcomes that might be useful in certain

cases but certainly not in all cases. Attrition and annihilation

42
play smaller and smaller roles in contingencies as they move

from the higher-intensity to the lower-intensity end of the

spectrum of engagement. They will rarely, if ever, play any role

in HUMRO and noncombatant-evacuation operations. Effects

in these kinds of contingencies will be more inclined toward

constructive—both physical and psychological—accretion o

positive factors and outlooks and protection of endangered

and/or beleaguered groups. 

Even where destruction, attrition, and annihilation are

used, the real desire is often to create higher-level psycholog

ical effects like decreasing the will of a people to resist (e.g.

World War II strategic bombing), or altering the decision-mak

ing process of a national leadership (e.g., Operation Deser

Storm). On the other end of the spectrum, building the will o

a people to defeat oppressive conditions may be the desired

goal (e.g., Berlin airlift). This highlights the fact that EBO is

not centered upon an adversary but, rather, on the conditions

necessary to achieve success in any action.

The EBO Methodology Overview

The EBO methodology appears to be an optimum way to

deal with the wide range of actions confronting the United

States today. It can be applied to virtually every national se

curity activity, including all military actions. It does not apply

only to targeting, fires, or attack. Effects-based supply, for ex

ample, can be the key to success in a HUMRO or peacetime

engagement with a friendly foreign government or military

force. For instance, “accumulation of sufficient foodstuffs and

medical supplies at forward distribution points to guarantee

100 percent availability through the winter months,” might be

a very useful effect to help achieve the objective of averting

starvation and disease in a population victimized by a majo

natural disaster. Focusing on just one aspect of military ac

tions, like targeting, would greatly reduce the overall efficacy

of the EBO methodology. 

Planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to

attain the effects required to achieve desired national security

outcomes necessarily implies foreknowledge of specific achiev

able conditions believed necessary for attaining specified ob

43
jectives. This requires military professionals to undertake a

wide range of studies to define the term desired effects possi

ble in given situations and how to create them. The taxonomy

of effects provided in this concept—physical, functional, sys

temic, and psychological—offers a starting point and some

guidance for undertaking these studies. For instance, it sug

gests that analysts will need to study some rather esoteric

subjects, such as psychology and decision-making theory, to

determine the range of psychological effects that might be at

tempted and how to approach them successfully. At the same

time more concrete studies will need to continue—like noda

analysis of military systems and organizations, war industry

and national infrastructure—to understand desired physical

functional, and systemic effects. However, important as it is to

understand the kinds of effects possible in given circum

stances, efforts must go well beyond this to also consider pos

sible consequences besides the desired effects.

The idea that a proposed course of action will result in a sin

gle desired outcome has been described as “folly” by at leas

one author.56 Indeed, it is folly, and yet military planners have

often been guilty of only focusing on the desired outcomes in

military actions. The current focus on objective planning in

joint doctrine contributes to this fallacious thinking. This is

not meant to imply that planning should not be based upon

clearly defined objectives. Planning to meet objectives is im

portant and must continue, but properly applied, effects

based methodology will add analytical rigor to greatly increase

the probability of success in any given case. Objectives define

an end state that actions are designed to achieve. The objec

tives themselves can be further defined by a set of conditions

or desired effects, that must be created to achieve each objec

tive. When actions are planned without reference to the con

ditions required to achieve policy goals, commanders and

planners tend to see only the relative probability of positive

outcomes, based upon their perception of past success or fail

ure when the planned actions were applied. For example

since destroying transportation nodes was useful in defeating

the German army in World War II, American planners tend to

think destroying transportation nodes will be useful in defeat

44
ing any army, anywhere, anytime. In a very generalized sense

this may actually be true, making the concept all the more se

ductive. In all cases however, even the World War II example

that leads down this path, there are negative collateral effects

associated with this approach. If planners carefully conside

the conditions (i.e., effects) that must be established to achieve

objectives in a given case and the underlying causal linkages

they expect will achieve these effects, they will sometimes find

potential negative collateral effects outweigh the positive in

tended effects. 

Relationship between Objectives and Strategies

One reason for the lack of consistency in applying effects

based thinking to military operations is reflected in service

and joint doctrine. The concept of effects-based operations is

discussed to a limited extent in US military doctrine today, bu

no methodology is offered to systematically apply it. For ex

ample, JP 3-0 states that the levels of war (strategic, opera

tional, and tactical) are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the

linkages between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Fur

thermore, these levels are defined by their effect or contribu

tion to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives

but no methodology for applying or analyzing these linkages is

offered.57 In addressing this issue, AFDD 2 explains and ex

pands on the objective-strategy-effect relationship by employ

ing what has been colloquially termed the Z-diagram (fig. 5)

This diagram is the result of much of the work done on the ob

jectives-based approach at the RAND Corporation and illus

trates the interrelationship between objectives and strategies

at the various levels of war. Each level should have a clear se

of objectives, which, through certain mechanisms form a

strategy for that particular level. Objectives normally are de

rived from the objectives at the next higher level of war and

may devolve from higher-level strategies.58 As the actual oper

ation progresses, assessment of lower-level results—or ef

fects—suggests modifications to higher-level strategies or ob

jectives. Unfortunately, neither service nor joint doctrine fully

clarifies how and why effects and mechanisms relate to objec

tives and strategy. There is no definition for effects in service

45
or joint doctrine; and no methodology that adequately cap

tures why effects are important considerations, how they

might be analyzed, and what they contribute to operations o

attainment of objectives. 

46

Level

Strategic: Objective Mechanism Strategy

Operational: Objective Mechanism Strategy

Tactical: Objective Mechanism Strategy

Figure 5. Relationships between Objectives and Strategies

The lack of such a methodology in doctrine explains why an

effects-based approach to warfare has not been prevalent in

military history and why a purely objectives-based approach

may be poorly executed. Fully articulating an EBO methodol

ogy would be extremely beneficial to military commanders in

planning, executing, and assessing campaigns. 

The first step must be to define certain fundamental terms

such as effect and EBO. As stated previously, the term effec

refers to a full range of outcomes, events, or consequences

that result from a specific action. EBO is defined as those ac

tions taken against enemy systems designed to achieve specif

ic effects that contribute directly to desired military and polit

ical outcomes. To expand on this definition slightly, decision

makers must have a clear idea of what it is they are trying to

accomplish, what actions might be taken, and how the pro

posed actions will contribute to the desired end state. They

must also have some reasonable explanation of why they ex

pect the operations to work, that is, an anticipated causa

linkage between action and effect.59

Based upon these definitions, the EBO methodology is a

means for planning, executing, and assessing operations de

signed to attain the effects required to achieve desired nation

al security outcomes. This methodology really is a refinemen

or evolution of the objectives-based planning methodology tha
has been clearly and carefully incorporated in US military doc

trine over the last decade by implementing a strategies-to

tasks approach for planning military operations.60 Objectives

based methodology connects clearly stated objectives to

proposed tasks or actions, essentially through a process o

historical analysis, and then refines them to operational plans

through the strategies-to-tasks approach (fig. 6).61 On the pos

itive side this methodology focuses on objectives at every leve

of employment and ties tactical events to operational and

strategic objectives. However, the major limiting factor in this

approach is it does not take into account why such tasks o

actions will cause the objectives to be achieved.

47

Strategies to Tasks

T OO CO NMO

MT = tasks (actions) MCO = campaign objective

OO = operational NMO = national military

OO = objective NMO = objective

• Focuses on objectives or tasks at every level

• Provides audit trail from tactical events to operational and

strategic objectives

• Considers the linkages only between objectives and the

strategies to achieve those objectives

Objectives-Based Methodology

With the objectives-based approach, past actions are re

viewed in order to look for examples that have achieved objec

tives similar to the current ones (either formally through an

established process or informally through individual though

processes). Even seemingly innovative actions are usually evo

lutions of past successful operations. For example, all permu

Figure 6. Objectives-Based Methodology
tations of attack on important national infrastructure are es

sentially based upon the same general assumptions; if nation

al functioning can be sufficiently disrupted, war-making ca

pacity or the national will to make war will also be disrupted

Attacking transportation systems, electrical power distribu

tion grids, petroleum production and storage, and similar in

frastructure has worked—to varying degrees—in the past and

can be expected to work, to varying degrees, in the future.

For example, the US attack on the Confederate economy

during the American Civil War made a major contribution to

victory and followed a two-fold approach by attacking capabil

ity and will. Toward the end of the conflict Gen Ulysses S

Grant continuously attacked Confederate capability by pursu

ing Gen Robert E. Lee’s army in Virginia.62 Two major cam

paigns were designed to break the will of the Confederacy

Sherman’s march to the sea and Sheridan’s devastation of the

Shenandoah Valley seriously weakened Confederate agricul

ture. Additionally, a naval blockade denied the South manu

factured goods, thus fostering inflation and reducing Confed

erate morale. Perhaps as important, the blockade restricted

southern exports of cotton, which undermined the financia

health of the South.63 Ninety years later, in a generally more

industrialized age, the UN attack on the North Korean econo

my did not have a similarly significant impact. While land, sea

and air operations devastated the North Korean economy, the

war continued in a long, bloody stalemate. Unlike the Confed

eracy, North Korea received critical logistical support from

protected sanctuaries in China and the Soviet Union tha

could not be interdicted by a naval blockade. Diplomacy and

airpower, the latter restricted to operations entirely within

Korea, could not halt the flow of supplies. Even though the

North Korean economy was destroyed and a sustained ai

campaign impeded communist operations, the communists

were able to support a larger army at the end of the war than

the original one that invaded South Korea in June 1950.64

The EBO Methodology Described

The EBO methodology takes the objectives-based process a

step further, allowing planners and commanders to examine

48
conditions and causal linkages through which actions lead to ob

jectives (fig. 7). This methodology makes it easier to understand

why a particular action may work well in some cases and not so

well in others. It may also highlight additional options. This poin

can be illustrated using the concept of information superiority as

discussed in US joint doctrine and JV 2020.

49

E

A CL

E

A CL O

E

A CL

E

A = action E = direct effect (condition)

CL = causal linkage O = objective

Figure 7. The Effects-Based Methodology

Information superiority as a military objective—such as ma

neuver dominance, freedom of navigation, or air and space su

periority—can be defined as a set of conditions or effects that US

forces desire to create in virtually all operations. This set of de

sired effects, once attained, is expected to achieve the objective

(information superiority). In a generalized sense, these effects are

the ability to collect, disseminate, manipulate, and use as much

valid information as possible, while denying the same ability to

an adversary. There are a number of different actions that can

contribute to achieving these desired effects. Causal linkages ex

plain why planners think the proposed actions will create desired

effects. Figure 7 illustrates the centrality of causal linkages to the
EBO methodology and how this kind of analysis can help plan

ners understand whether they may reasonably expect the pro

posed actions to create the desired effects under existing cir

cumstances.

To exemplify, disruption of enemy C2 networks has, in the

past, contributed to information superiority. One historically

proven action to attain this particular effect is to damage or de

stroy C2 centers. There are a number of potential causal linkages

connecting this action with the desired effect, but a couple of key

ones would be the enemy’s inability to receive and communicate

commanders’ orders and perhaps the death of key commanders

themselves. Another possible action to attain a similar effec

would be to intrude in the enemy’s C2 structure using informa

tion operations systems and techniques. If done cleverly, false or

ders and misdirections could be inserted into the enemy system

(action), causing the troops to draw false conclusions about thei

mission (causal linkage) which, in turn, brings them to act fa

vorably to friendly plans, thus disrupting the enemy command

ers’ plans (desired effect). Either action would contribute to at

tainment and maintenance of information superiority (objective

under the right circumstances, but each through entirely differ

ent causal linkages.

A real-world example may help to further illustrate this

point. During most of Operation Desert Storm in the Persian

Gulf, coalition forces enjoyed a favorable information differen

tial over Saddam Hussein’s army in Kuwait. This differentia

became obvious to both sides during the Battle of al-Khafj

when Iraqi forces occupied the evacuated Saudi border town

but were unable to hold it. Information superiority allowed

coalition forces to monitor Iraqi movements, while preventing

the Iraqis from acquiring information on coalition troop move

ments or properly coordinating their engaged and reinforcing

forces. Inside the town, a small contingent of trapped US

Marines was able to relay information on Iraqi dispositions

and movements.65 At the same time, in the air, an E-8 join

surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft was

able to monitor Iraqi supporting movements and pass that in

formation to a horde of attacking aircraft.66 As a result, the

Iraqis with six to eight times more artillery and four to six

50
times more armor available than the coalition were unable to

hold the town. By relentlessly attacking Iraqi communication

nodes and denying them useful information on coalition posi

tions and movements (action), the coalition was able to deny

Iraqi forces any useful information on the coalition forces and

disrupt their ability to communicate and coordinate movements

(effect). The coalition achieved this effect by destroying commu

nications equipment and intimidating Iraqi forces (causal link

age).67 Achieving the objective of information superiority con

ferred tremendous tactical and operational advantages upon the

coalition in this case. This vignette is not intended to tell the

whole story of al-Khafji but merely to illustrate how analysis o

the action-causal linkage-effect-objectives relationship can help

in understanding the potential contribution of a particular action

to achieving objectives by creating desired effects.

Not only does this type of analysis help to understand why

a given action may work but also it is likely to reveal the fac

that historically relevant actions may not work in a particula

case. This is true, once again, because it is not only the action

itself that achieves the effect but also the relevance of the

causal linkages activated by the action, in light of the curren

situation, that determines whether or not the effect is

achieved. In the case discussed earlier, given a decision be

tween destroying or exploiting enemy C2 nodes, this type o

analysis would also reveal the basic conflict in the two alter

natives. For example, destroying a C2 node that is being fruit

fully exploited through intrusion could actually impede

progress toward the objectives.

As noted previously, EBO itself is not new; certain brillian

commanders have recognized it at least since Sun Tzu’s time

Formalizing EBO in doctrine would simply bring analytic

methodology and planning processes into line with the way com

plex problems, like warfare and other military operations, are

solved in the real world. If current conditions are not serving na

tional objectives, actions are taken to create new conditions tha

are expected to achieve the national objectives. Causal linkages

subject to examination in light of relevant information, explain

why the proposed actions are expected to work. 

51
This examination, to be most useful, must look not only a

the probability of achieving the desired effects. It must also

ask what else may happen because, in a complex world, no ac

tion ever creates only a single outcome. Therefore planners

must always ask what else and never accept nothing for an

answer. There is always something else—collateral effects tha

may be positive or negative to desired outcomes. To the exten

possible their potential impact should be considered before

any action is taken rather than afterwards (fig. 8).

52

E 2d

A CL

E

A CL O

E

A CL

E

A = action E = direct effect (condition)

CL = causal linkage O = objective

2d, nth = indirect effects

nth

nth

nth

Figure 8. Relationships between Indirect Effects and Objectives

Of course, in recent years everyone has become very cognizan

of collateral damage, especially as it is often shown on nationa

television, sometimes within minutes of the action. Planners

today spend enormous amounts of time reviewing targets and

known weapons effects to ensure they do not unnecessarily

damage civilian targets. In fact, to many people especially jour

nalists, collateral damage has become synonymous with civilian

deaths. At a deeper level of analysis, however, planners are stil
prone to miss second and third order effects that do not directly

result in destruction of nonmilitary targets or danger to civilians

principally because they do not look for them. The Desert Storm

air campaign, a monumental intellectual effort, was brilliantly

planned; yet planners completely missed the second and third

order effects on the civilian populace caused by disruption o

electrical power to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In retrospec

it obviously was possible to have foreseen the closure of sewage

and water-treatment plants and hospitals, yet it would be wrong

to say their oversight resulted from deliberate neglect. The cur

rent objectives-based planning paradigm simply does not promp

planners to look for this type of collateral effects. The EBO

methodology moves objectives-based planning to the next level o

analysis, thereby providing the necessary analytic rigor. This

rigor comes more or less naturally with analysis of desired effects

and the underlying causal linkages by which planned actions are

expected to create the desired effects. 

The EBO methodology requires an ability to deal with com

plex interactions and to adapt rapidly to changing conditions

Not all effects are immediately or directly connected to specif

ic actions. The more complex the desired effect (e.g., psycho

logical versus physical), the more difficult it may be to see the

connection to precipitating actions. There is a whole array o

different types of effects to deal with: direct, indirect, cascad

ing, cumulative, and collateral (both positive and negative)

just to name a few (see final section of this study for EBO

terms and definitions). Effects of all types can be achieved a

all levels of employment: tactical, operational, and strategic.

As already indicated, some effects will be much more difficul

to measure than others. This holds true for anticipation, as well

Generally the higher order the effect (e.g., psychological versus

physical) and the further removed from precipitating actions

(e.g., 2d, 3d, nth order indirect effects), the more difficult it wil

be to anticipate and to measure. This is important to note, be

cause the ability to anticipate the effect(s) an action will bring

about and then measure to see if the anticipation was correct is

critical to adaptation, and adaptation is critical to success. The

eminent military historian, Michael Howard, once declared him

self “tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doc

53
trine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got i

wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter tha

they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to ge

it right quickly when the moment arrives.”68

In a similar vein, the EBO methodology will be more effec

tive if actions are executed, evaluated, and adapted quickly

Getting it exactly right the first time does not hold near the

promise of being able to adapt quickly, turning initial short

comings into ultimate successes. Rather than waiting for the

80 percent solution to act, it may be necessary to execute a 40

percent or 50 percent solution, then quickly assess and rap

idly adapt to the measured results. Paradoxically, a search fo

evidence that the plan is failing may be more productive than

a search for positively reinforcing evidence. Lack of positive ev

idence may indicate either that the plan is failing or that in

sufficient time has passed to achieve the effect. Whereas, rap

idly accumulating negative evidence suggests an immediate

need for adaptive response. 

The concept presented in this paper posits that joint forces

can achieve full spectrum dominance, a macro-level military

objective, by exploiting the four operational concepts outlined

in JV 2020 along with macro-level military actions to create

desired effects so powerful as to dominate any situation in

which the joint forces are directed to intervene. In this sense

dominance is not always related to an adversary. Joint forces

may be required to dominate situational or environmenta

conditions in many cases, especially in actions at the lowe

end of the spectrum of engagement. 

This perspective requires a broad view of effects in all types

of military action, not just selected ones. Effects-based target

ing, fires and effects, and rapid decisive operations (RDO) have

each been discussed at times as if they equated to EBO. How

ever, while each of these concepts is related in one way or an

other to EBO—and each probably has a role to play in the

larger construct—none of them comes close to the compre

hensive concept required to implement the EBO methodology

Effects-based targeting, for instance, has a role to play, but ef

fects-based movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuve

all have equivalent roles. Effects-based targeting and RDO are

54
likely to have little role in most HUMROs, but movement and

supply will usually have major roles. Joint action of any kind

must embrace the larger concept of EBO.

The USAF explored EBO concepts during the Air Force chie

of staff sponsored-global engagement (GE) IV wargame in Oc

tober 1999. According to senior game players and key over

seers, EBO worked well so long as the players stayed focused

on the concept. However, it broke down rapidly during actua

game play, as players became focused on the mechanics of op

erational planning—the air tasking order (ATO) cycle in the

specific case, since they were gaming joint air operations.6

The Naval War College experience in the Navy global wa

games appears to be quite similar.70 The challenge appears to

be to educate and train planning personnel to stay focused

upon the effects they are trying to create at each level of em

ployment. The best way to do this is to define a process tha

continually fosters effects-based thinking during planning, ex

ecution, and assessment of all actions.

An Idealized Joint EBO Process

The model described here is intended to idealize the process

national leaders, commanders, and planners at all levels fol

low in directing, planning, executing, and assessing EBO.7

Such an idealized model of the EBO process is useful for sev

eral purposes. This model, or a further refined version of it

could provide a standard for evaluation of the joint and ser

vice planning and execution processes that are currently de

scribed in doctrine. It could also serve as the standard for re

vision and improvement of the currently defined processes, i

revision proves necessary. This could help to appropriately

modify and perhaps expand such current processes as the

joint air operations planning (JAOP) process. It might also

identify gaps in and between the several planning processes

described in current doctrine and would almost certainly en

courage effects-based thinking throughout. If it proves desir

able, this idealized process could completely replace curren

planning processes with a single comprehensive one. This may

not be necessary, it remains a possibility for the military ser

55
vices to evaluate jointly. In the next few paragraphs the pro

posed idealized process model is first described and then ex

plained phase by phase.72

Any such process must begin with a definition of nationa

objectives. What is not so obvious, though, is that it should

begin not at the advent of a crisis, as seems to be envisioned

now, but well before a crisis develops. It must begin before the

need for a particular action is even known, where exactly i

may take place, or what its specific objectives may be. This

may seem implausible at first glance, but it is in truth quite

reasonable. The process is rooted in the overarching nationa

objectives stated in the National Security Strategy of the Unit

ed States and begins with a phase called “Strategic Environ

ment Research.”73 Figure 9 outlines the process along with

combatant commander’s planning cycle.

56

3. Strategy development

2. Policy goals/

effects/desired outcomes 4. Mission parsing/integration

1. Strategic environment

 research

5. Effects assessment

1. Combatant commander’s

assessment

2. Mission analysis

course of action (COA)

development

3. COA and effec

analysis

4. COA selection

CONOPS developed

5. Selected COA

converted to OPORD

6. Commander issues

OPORD and EXORD

7. Effects

assessment

Combatant

Command

Planning

Legend:

CONOPS––concept of operations

CEXORD––execution order

XOPORD––operations order

Figure 9. Effects-Based-Planning Process Model
Once a crisis actually begins to develop or the need for a

specific action is known, operational planning proceeds

through several additional phases.74 The next phase is the def

inition of the policy goals and objectives for the overall action

which, in order to develop useful measures of merit, must be

defined in terms of effects which might be achievable and

which will, in turn, accomplish the stated policy goals. Next is

the development of a national strategy to decide which tools o

diplomacy, information, military, and economics will be ap

plied in the specific instance to achieve the identified objec

tives and policy goals. Once the national leadership has de

cided what is to be accomplished (end state) and the elements

of national power to be employed, the missions must be dis

tributed (or parsed) to the appropriate agencies such as State

Defense, Commerce, and so on. To this point in this idealized

process the DOD, JCS, services, and combatant commanders

all participate heavily in deliberation, but final decisions are

the prerogative of the president and the secretary of defense

Once again the entire process should be viewed as continuous

and iterative, with feedback coming from the tasked agencies

to help assess progress toward the national-level desired ef

fects, objectives, and goals. The combatant commanders

and/or JFC control the next several phases in the process. As

depicted, this part of the process proceeds from and feeds

back to the national-level process.

The second cycle produces a joint operations plan, which en

visions how the joint force will employ available assets, and how

assessments will be developed and distributed up to the nation

al-level process and down to subordinate levels. With missions

assigned to appropriate agencies and an overall-lead agent cho

sen to maintain proper integration of all efforts, the military be

gins its own planning process as noted in by the combatant com

mand planning cycle. Although the procedure is described in

seemingly discrete phases, it should be noted that in reality al

phases must be integrated, continuous, and iterative. Thus the

final phase—assessment—actually continues right through and

beyond the end of operations. It is something that should be

going on even before specific actions begin and feeding all the

way back to the strategic environment research phase. In othe

57
words, assessment really is part of both the first phase of each

of the cycles and the final phase following execution. It also goes

on at all levels of employment—tactical, operational, and strate

gic—and, as stated before, assessment at each level informs the

levels above and below. 

Strategic Environment Research

US senior military leadership such as the CJCS, the JCS

and combatant commanders must be fully engaged in the policy

debates that end with development of the national security

strategy, as well as those that lead to specific military actions

Of course, once the combatant commander decides, good mil

itary commanders salute smartly and march; but until then

they must offer candid advice and recommendations based

upon their military expertise. Military commanders must be

aware of, and point out to national leaders, the implications o

various strategy options for potential military actions. They

must be sure to understand fully what is required of the mili

tary by the strategy that national leaders define, and they

must produce a national military strategy and operationa

plans that fully support the national strategy. Even during this

process, the military must be already engaged in the really hard

work of preparing for future actions, through strategic envi

ronment research. 

Strategic environment research begins well before any specific

crisis develops and really needs to be a national-level effort

yet one in which the military are major players. The military

can go it alone here if necessary, but it will not be as effective

in the long run. Strategic environment research consists o

three major types of research—contextual, nodal, and assess

ment—that are conducted on three different levels: generic

regional, and target audience specific. 

Contextual Research

In this EBO concept, contextual research is conducted to un

derstand audiences that are potential targets of future actions

and what capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses they possess

The carefully chosen phraseology—target audiences as opposed

58
to adversaries or enemies—is used because in many cases rathe

than trying to defeat these groups, US forces will be trying to as

sist them or simply avoid conflict with them while conducting

military actions. This is especially true for peacetime engagemen

and most MOOTW, which are expected to make up the vast ma

jority of all military actions in at least the next 15 to 20 years

The term target audiences is used also because not all groups the

United States wishes to influence will be national groups or for

mal military forces, as usually conceived in the conquest para

digm. These groups may be informal soldiers of a drug cartel, a

terrorist group, subnational ethnic group, or other nonnationa

group. In many (perhaps most) cases, there will be more than

one target audience, with different US objectives pursuant to

each. To Sun Tzu’s admonition to know the enemy and onesel

must be added friends, allies, other affected groups and, with

today’s immediate media, all identifiable elements of the entire

global community. This is a daunting task that can never be fully

completed, but there certainly is room for improvement over pas

efforts. This type of research must begin well before a specific ac

tion is ordered—it cannot be played as a pickup game. Failure to

do this research in a timely way leads to errors like mirror imag

ing how economics and production were organized in Germany

during World War II or misjudging how the people would react to

given stimuli in Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.75

Generic Phase. Subjects of the first or generic phase o

contextual research are the general geopolitical environmen

prevailing in the world, the nature of human interaction, and

general human psyche. Academic disciplines like the study o

international relations, law, and politics; military science and

history; and, psychology, among others, apply here. Severa

important questions must be asked such as the following:

• What are the various methods of international problem res

olution, how have they worked historically, and what does

this portend in the current and emerging geopolitical envi

ronment?

• What does the history of military operations teach abou

effective application of military capabilities to attain polit

ical objectives? Also, what does it say about developmen

59
of future capabilities and potential innovative uses of ca

pabilities currently or soon to be available? 

• What potential problems does the current geopolitical en

vironment suggest the United States might have to face in

the five-, 10-, 15-, 20-year timeframes? 

• What are the general kinds of physical, functional, sys

temic, and psychological effects the United States migh

need to create in target audiences to achieve national ob

jectives and have military forces been able to create those

kinds of effects in the past? If so, how? If not, how migh

they be created and how would one be able to test or ex

periment to determine their effectiveness and the capabil

ity to create them?

These are very wide-ranging studies that would require tap

ping outside expertise from universities, private and commer

cial think tanks, industry experts, and other similar places. 

As an example, consider for a moment the concept of influ

encing a people’s will to resist politico-military intervention

There has been a raging controversy for years between advocates

of strategic bombing and others on this subject. There are those

who say that bombing only strengthens the will of a people to re

sist, and that Germany’s reaction to strategic bombardment in

World War II lends credence to the point. Yet, by the end of World

War II, German industry was suffering as high as 25 percent ab

senteeism of workers.76 This would seem to be a reasonably

strong indicator of loss of will amongst the general populace, bu

what impact did that have on the final outcome or on the Ger

man military’s ability to conduct the war? No one really knows

although all kinds of assertions have been made. Overall, strate

gic attacks may produce shock that demoralizes enemy leader

ship, military forces, and population, thus affecting the enemy’s

desire to wage war. However, a demoralizing psychological im

pact can be an elusive objective.77

History has provided clear examples where military actions

have affected the will of soldiers to resist, and some in which

their will was unaffected by seemingly similar actions. A his

torical study of several of these cases indicates certain com

mon factors in the cases where soldiers were affected that are

missing in the unsuccessful attempts (such as maintaining

60
constant pressure on them, interdicting food supplies to make

them hungry, and so on).78 If one can reduce or destroy

trained soldiers’ will to resist, it stands to reason the same

would be true with civil populations, who are less likely than

soldiers to have the specific training and discipline necessary

to withstand such efforts. The question is how, and are there

any circumstances under which the how will be acceptable to

domestic and foreign audiences? Conducting this kind of re

search certainly is not easy, but these are exactly the kind o

studies needed to prepare for EBO. There are many cases

where target audiences have capitulated without being com

pletely defeated or exhausted, as well as cases where they

would not capitulate until they were decisively defeated and

under occupation. In many cases, even after occupation a

large segment of the populace continued to resist covertly. It is

important to try to understand why.

Obviously these are very complex issues. Different groups

have different psyches, which includes a stronger or weake

will to resist. They hold different values for the same things

They are frightened or intimidated by different things. In fact

different groups act differently when frightened or intimidated

and the same group may act differently under differing cir

cumstances? What common factors existed in groups tha

have capitulated and what differences? Are there relatively fi

nite and predictable conditions under which capitulation oc

curs or has occurred in the past? It might be possible to cate

gorize the will of a given people, and therefore the conditions

under which they might capitulate in a given instance. There

is no point in wasting effort trying to break their will if it can

not be done. On the other hand, in some cases it might be the

only thing that is necessary and might even prove relatively

easy. Generic contextual studies should help national leaders

and military planners to understand these issues and wha

the general rules are. Given a particular psyche and mind-se

in a target audience, when does it help and when does it hur

to turn off electrical power or telecommunications? Unde

what circumstances should intervening forces generally con

sider replacing a target audience’s telecommunications with

their own transmissions, and when should they leave wel

61
enough alone? All these questions and many more of simila

nature should be addressed during the generic contextual par

of strategic environment research.

Regional Phase. Nearly every geopolitical issue has global, re

gional, and subregional contexts. In most cases what can and

cannot be done in a given action, as well as what should and

should not, will be heavily influenced by regional and subregion

al issues. How do nations and subnational groups interact with

in the region and with those from outside the region? In this

realm there are cultural issues as well as geopolitical ones. How

is diplomatic, economic, and social intercourse normally carried

out in the region? Are decisions made by edict, consensus, o

majority rule? Who are traditional friends and who adversaries

both within the region and with the United States? Is there a

general psyche that can be applied? What will a particular targe

audience concede with token resistance, and for what, if any

thing, will they fight fiercely? Do they tend to enhance their ca

pabilities through training and education, and can they organize

effectively to conduct operations? These will be important as

pects to consider for several reasons. In adversarial cases, US

forces obviously need to know as much as possible about the an

swers to these questions, if they are to have any hope of creating

the effects necessary to achieve national policy goals. In all cases

the US military will need to understand the viewpoints, strengths

and weaknesses of friends, allies, and neutrals. Information op

erations may be necessary to ensure friends remain friendly dur

ing military actions and neutrals remain at least neutral. 

Normally during military actions some of the peoples of a

region will be friendly toward the United States and US inter

ests and some are likely to be neutral. One or more groupings

may be adversarial. When contemplating a course of action i

will be important to understand how each of these audiences

will react. If they share common cultural or religious beliefs

some of the peoples of the region may be negatively affected by

certain actions, even though they otherwise agree with the

United States concerning the issues in conflict. In this case

taking the contemplated course of action will create negative

collateral effects, and the United States will either need to pur

sue a different course of action or act to mitigate its friends

62
negative reactions to the intended one. This will require ex

panded-regional studies to help leaders and planners under

stand interactions of all the parties affected by the conflict o

military action. Additionally, it will be necessary to undertake

target audience-specific studies to try to understand how each

target audience will react to various stimuli and how to create

the desired moral and mental effects among them. 

Target Audience-Specific Phase. This phase addresses

many of the same issues but on an individual basis to determine

specific strengths and vulnerabilities of all potential target audi

ences. If the generic contextual research is done properly, it wil

reveal susceptibility of certain types of target audiences to spe

cific types of actions. Target audience-specific contextual re

search will try to elucidate characteristics of each potential tar

get audience, and those effects to which they may be susceptible

Also, it would help determine how those effects might be created

in the specific target audience. Each potential target audience’s

susceptibility to specific effects will change over time, depending

on many factors, so these analyses will require constant update

The necessary basis for this research, however, is as specific an

understanding as possible of the psyche of each potential targe

audience. In many cases outside resources, like regional experts

and historians, will need to provide the necessary detail; but i

will also be necessary for the military to have numbers of per

sonnel sufficiently trained to understand what the experts are

telling them. When US forces begin a military action they mus

know how the target audiences are organized, how they think

who makes decisions, how they make them, what they value

who has influence, and how their culture differs from others

This will help to avoid the mistake of assuming they will react as

some other group would in a given circumstance or stereotyping

their potential responses in some other defective manner. It wil

also give a much better feel for how easy or difficult it will be to

create a particular desired mental or moral effect within a par

ticular target audience.

Nodal Research

Nodal research must be conducted in parallel with contex

tual research and at all the same levels, although the levels

63
are more closely intertwined and less distinct. Nodal research

is the study of subsystems that make up a target audience

and their moral and physical infrastructure. Generic studies

and military experience will suggest the most interesting types

of subsystems for each case. To a great extent they are already

identified and similar to what was considered in the World Wa

II industrial web and Desert Storm’s system of systems ap

proach. The nature of nodal research can be illustrated by

simply continuing the previous discussion of electrical powe

production and distribution systems. These systems will con

tinue to be of interest in many military actions, so it makes a

convenient and useful example. US military forces will need to

understand how best to attack and defend such systems.

All power distribution systems, as they exist today, have

many common factors and similarities. Power-generating

plants are all constructed in much the same manner (o

course there are nuclear, hydro, oil, and coal powered plants)

but it is not difficult to distinguish which is which, and thei

construction is very similar by category. Transmission sys

tems are all constructed in very similar ways. Thus it is im

portant to understand the basics of power generation and

transmission. Power distribution systems have also become

quite ubiquitous in the modern era, and are fairly redundan

and interconnected, which is to say one can no longer consid

er most power distribution systems as discrete and/or self

sufficient. Most national power grids are now interconnected

with other national systems, and power can be rerouted

throughout the system whenever usage patterns change o

problems occur. Thus, if military planners are going to targe

a system for one reason or another, it will be important fo

them to know who else is connected to that system and how

through comprehensive regional analysis. Otherwise the plan

ners are likely to create undesired collateral effects in neutra

or friendly countries when attacking an adversary’s system.

Often the desired effects will be achieved through quite dis

crete actions, so analysts will also need to examine each po

tential target system in detail. This is the traditional noda

analysis US forces have learned to do over the years. The Join

Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) is becoming very sophisticat

64
ed at this type of analysis and can now determine very accu

rately what a particular type of attack will do, and how to

achieve very discrete physical and functional effects in a given

system. Planners want to know both how to create the effects

they desire and how to do it efficiently. They also want to know

what else is likely to happen when they act to create the de

sired effects, in both the short and long term. The next step is

to achieve a similar level of sophistication for systemic and

psychological effects. In a HUMRO, for instance, planners may

need to know how to convey the message that US forces are

there to help—not to control or suppress the populace—and

that when they are finished helping, they will go home. In this

case the planners would need to know, among many othe

things, the critical nodes and links to communicate with majo

population elements, as well as who the important elites are

that the people might listen to. Planners would also need to

know what specific modalities would convey the appropriate

message, without inadvertently conveying other messages

detrimental to their objectives. This problem, though simila

in basic construct, can prove considerably more complex than

nodal analysis of an electrical power grid. JWAC and others

have started work on this aspect of analysis already, but there

is a long way to go before the US military possesses the full ca

pability required to conduct EBO.

Assessment Research

The last, but certainly not least important, part of strategic

environment research is assessment research. It provides the

groundwork for analysis to determine how well the plan is de

veloping in actual operations. This area probably represents

the greatest planning challenge in transitioning to EBO. In the

past, combat assessment, which is commonly but incorrectly

referred to as BDA has been a sort of afterthought. Actually

BDA is only one particular piece of the overall combat assess

ment process. Airmen have often asserted the ability to

achieve functional, systemic, and psychological effects, which

would—in turn—achieve strategic objectives in a more direc

manner than ground forces. For instance, the oft-maligned

Douhet espoused, as early as the 1920s, that the advent of air

65
power had completely changed the nature of warfare by shift

ing the focus from ground to air actions. He thought tha

heavily armed strategic bombardment aircraft, which he called

battleplanes, would be able to directly attack and break the

will of a people to resist, while ground forces were still mobi

lizing and before they could move to the frontier to attack

enemy forces. Thus a political settlement would be forced be

fore surface forces even engaged.79

While the Army Air Corps Air War Plans Division (AWPD)-

document planners eschewed Douhet’s concept of direct at

tack on the civilian populace, they thought that airpower alone

could win World War II through strategic attack on the indus

trial web. Such an attack, they believed, would break both the

capability and will of enemy nations to resist. This proved

more difficult than predicted. After much debate, the Allies fi

nally agreed to conduct direct attack against civilians as par

of the CBO. Under this agreement US strategic bombers would

attack industrial plants and storage facilities in the daytime

while British bombers would attack adjoining city areas a

night, in hopes this would degrade the morale of the people by

keeping them under constant day and night pressure.80

Once again in Desert Storm, air planners intending to create

strategic paralysis through systemic attack included attack on

the will of the people as part of their plan. This time, however, no

physical attacks were deliberately directed against civilians. The

planners hoped instead—by disruption of electrical power, pe

troleum products, and transportation combined with a strategic

psychological campaign—to induce the people to turn agains

their leader, Saddam Hussein. The strategic psychological cam

paign never developed, however, apparently due to lack of clear

ly designated responsibility for mounting such a campaign and

resultant wrangling within the interagency community.8

Whether or not such a campaign would have made a difference

in the outcome is still a matter of debate. 

In both World War II and Desert Storm cases, US forces were

less than satisfactorily prepared to assess their level of effec

tiveness, especially as related to systemic or psychological ef

fects. The intelligence analysis system even had great difficul

ty delivering physical and functional-damage assessments in

66
time to be useful to planners.82 Years after the conflict, effec

tiveness of systemic and psychological effects assessment re

mains more a matter of debate than scientific study.83 Wha

really happens is that levels of physical destruction are mea

sured, and then a level of functional effectiveness is deter

mined based upon the percent of the facility destroyed. This is

what current combat analysis methodology is designed to do.8

Combat-assessment capability needs to be improved, bu

the entire conceptualization of assessment must also be ex

panded to include effects assessment at all levels of employ

ment and across the spectrum of engagement. Not all actions

include combat, but all actions can be related to effects plan

ners desire to create as well as effects they desire not to cre

ate. The concept of effects assessment, as contrasted to com

bat assessment, connotes this broader perspective. Comba

assessors must learn to measure functional, systemic, and

psychological effectiveness with much greater accuracy and fi

delity. This includes a need for functional, systemic, and psy

chological effectiveness models and simulations which wil

help planners and assessors both to better understand how to

create a particular effect and to determine whether they are

succeeding in a specific instance. Effects assessment research

must look for discrete indicators that will tell—with a signifi

cant level of fidelity based on appropriate analysis, modeling

and simulation—whether actions are moving toward achieving

objectives or not. These indicators will have to be things US

forces and intelligence agencies have the capability to detec

and that, at the same time, do not lend themselves to easy de

ception. One example, with respect to a physical effect, would

be measuring the distinctive infrared signature in a generating

plant that indicates the level of power being generated and

transmitted. In this way, it is possible to measure power gen

eration levels with high fidelity. It is also very hard to mimic

with sufficient accuracy to spoof properly trained analysts.

At the generic level analysts will need to know, in general

what kind of indicators can be useful for determining progress

toward or achievement of particular effects—including the ful

range of physical, functional, systemic, and psychological—

and how such indicators can be collected. Collection systems

67
will have to be redesigned to quickly and efficiently gather the

type of information identified in this analysis. The assessmen

system itself will need to be redesigned to more fully assess

functional, systemic, and psychological effects. This is going to

be a real challenge. In most cases physical and functional ef

fects will be quite generic and continue to be easier to deter

mine than systemic or psychological effects. Assessment o

damage to a power production plant will look similar wherev

er the plant is located, and the functional effect produced by

a given physical result will be relatively standard. Multi-spectra

sensing and algorithmic models will be very useful for these

kinds of analyses. 

Systemic and psychological effects are not so standard o

easy. These particular effects will vary greatly from one region

and target audience to another. Regional and cultural studies

will be required to predict and analyze these types of effects

with any level of accuracy. A lot of this preparation can be

done in conjunction with the other studies already mentioned

under strategic environment research by keeping one eye

specifically attuned to potential assessment measurements fo

the various effects studied. This particular problem is part and

parcel of one of the greatest challenges to fully adopting EBO

If the problem of predicting and assessing systemic and psy

chological outcomes with reasonable fidelity cannot be solved

EBO will lose much of its value for US military forces.

Determination of National Policy Goals

and Desired Strategic Effects

Basic national security objectives are established in the na

tional security strategy and the ensuing military objectives in

the national military strategy. When a crisis develops or peace

time actions are necessary to avoid one, the president and sec

retary of defense develop national policy goals and desired out

comes for the actions. The policy goals define the end state

desired and the specific objectives for the anticipated actions

Often this does not happen smoothly, however, and the mili

tary finds itself needing to develop operational objectives and

brief them back to the national leadership. In the case of EBO

68
the objectives should specify the effects the United States in

tends to create to accomplish the stated policy goals (fig.10). 

69

DIA

JWAC

State Dept

CIA

Defense

Attaché

Strategic

estimate

Strategic environment

research

Effects

assessment

Mission parsing/

integration

Policy goals/

effects/desired

outcomes

Strategy

development

Feedback from

operational

tactical levels Joint force

commander

Figure 10. Detail of National-Level Process

Legend:

CIA––Central Intelligence Agency

DIA––Defense Intelligence Agency

JWAC––Joint Warfare Analysis Center

By way of example, the United States may support a na

tional security strategy objective to encourage growth o

democracies. In a hypothetical example, the United States

might wish to support a struggling democratic government in

a nation that is experiencing civil unrest in the wake of a nat

ural disaster. A relevant policy goal would be to bolster the

government by providing support to alleviate the effects of the

natural disaster and thereby help quell the unrest. One de

sired effect to achieve such a policy goal could be phrased as

“stop the starvation and outbreak of disease caused by the
natural disaster.

 One of the militarys roles in achieving this

goal could be to provide sufficient foodstuffs and medical sup

plies to maintain a satisfactory level of health and welfare fo

the entire nation. Ensuring the distribution of the food and

medical supplies to remote regions of the country would re

quire the employment of substantial airlift forces. In such a

potentially volatile situation, another desired effect should be

to diffuse civil unrest fostered or encouraged by the crisis.8

There will always be a number of possible means to achieve

desired effects ranging from direct, massive intervention al

the way down to simply providing supportive friendship, ad

vice, and/or monetary assistance. During this phase of plan

ning, planners are not overly concerned with deciding how to

achieve the effects, except for a cursory review of feasibility

The actual decision as to which means to pursue comes in the

next phase, strategy development. 

Strategy Development

One of the commonly used definitions of strategy is “relating

means to ends,” which constitutes the principal thrust of this

specific phase in planning for EBO. There will be a number o

possible approaches to achieving the desired effects in the ex

ample introduced above. At the high end, the United States

could insert a major military force, declare martial law, and

take over management of the situation on behalf of the foreign

government until such time as it is ready to reassume contro

on its own. At the low end, the US government could simply

state its faith and confidence in the foreign government and

urge the people to give it a chance to handle the situation on

its own. In between is a wide range of possibilities including

but not limited to those outlined below:

• Generate sufficient airlift to bring in foodstuffs and med

ical supplies donated by the United States and coalition

partners.

• Undertake internal distribution of food and supplies by ei

ther the host government or the United States depending

on the situation.

70
• Encourage nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to pro

vide and/or distribute the necessary supplies.

• Provide financial support to either the host-nation gov

ernment or the NGOs for them to procure and distribute

supplies.

• Support host-nation internal security with counterinsur

gency or other military forces as required. 

• Encourage and advise the indigenous government as re

quested.

• Provide on-scene advisors to deal with the insurgency and

civil unrest issues.

Which strategy or strategies the United States chooses will be

based upon strategic environment research, analysis of the

current situation, and what each suggests as the best alter

native for the desired end state.

In strategy development, planners and analysts build a

comprehensive list of the range of possibilities and determine

which combination of actions is most likely to create the de

sired effects and achieve policy goals. Next they would com

pare capabilities to the range of strategy options based upon

the current situation and what is already known about the

host-nation’s situation from strategic environment research

This process is complicated by the fact that policy goals are

likely to include some less explicit, yet nonetheless equally im

portant, aspects than those outlined above. Considerations

such as a desire for few or no casualties and a reasonable limi

to the overall cost of the action must be taken into account

For each possible strategy, these costs must be balanced

against both the probability of achieving policy goals and the

valuation of those goals. For instance, the US government and

people are willing to pay higher cost for national survival than

they are to ensure humanitarian treatment of a foreign na

tional minority group. Strategy options must also be measured

against the capability to accomplish them successfully, and

the possibility that execution of these same options may cre

ate undesired collateral effects. There will be a large numbe

of considerations unique to each case, but the ability to dea

with them is enhanced by results of strategic environment re

search.

71
Mission Parsing and Integration

Once a national strategy for implementing policy goals is es

tablished, missions must be assigned to the appropriate agen

cies, an overall-lead agency should be determined, and the ac

tions of the various agencies integrated. This raises a point tha

will be one of the great challenges to US policy of the twenty-firs

century or at least the early decades of the century until it is

solved. US military forces have struggled for many years to

achieve a satisfactory level of jointness within and between the

respective services. However, for all the challenge that military

integration has been, the question of “interagency-ness” has al

the appearance of being yet much greater. In the current geopo

litical environment, US military forces will rarely be engaged in

strictly military actions in pursuit of national-policy goals. Mos

of the time military actions will have to be integrated with those

of other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The mili

tary will not be acting independently, as normally has been as

sumed under the conquest paradigm. Instead, they will nearly

always be operating alongside departments of State, Justice

Treasury, law enforcement, other agencies and, when warrant

ed, NGOs. Unless and until the interagency process is rational

ized, it will often be unclear who is in charge in such cases. The

key point here is that it will be necessary to determine which

agency has primary responsibility for which portions of the ac

tion, and, preferably, which has overall leadership responsibility

for the entire action. 

In the example of the democratic nation experiencing civi

unrest following a natural disaster, it is highly probable tha

the State Department would be given overall responsibility fo

the action. Specifically, the State Department would coordi

nate US participation in the natural disaster relief operations

with the Defense Department providing logistical and othe

types of support.86 The Defense Department arguably would

be in charge of counterinsurgency operations, either to provide

counterinsurgent forces or the appropriate equipment and ad

vice to the host nation. The Justice Department might be

called upon to advise and support the local government with

law enforcement and judicial procedure. The department in

charge might change over time, depending on which of the pol

72
icy goals and desired effects requires the predominant effor

and the approach chosen. In any event, the missions would

ideally be assigned to the agency or agencies with the most ap

propriate capabilities, concomitant with the overall strategy

for the action to achieve the desired effects. Inherent in al

these actions is the need to fully integrate wide-ranging, dis

parate but clearly linked actions to achieve maximum leverage

and avoid “objective fratricide.” This is to say that without de

liberate, careful integration, various actions may conflict with

one another and negate the very effects the United States is

trying to create in pursuit of policy goals and objectives. By in

tegrating and carefully considering the interaction of various

actions, US agencies can not only avoid the potential negative

collateral effects of uncoordinated actions but also more clear

ly focus the full range of resources available to achieve na

tional policy goals.

Effects Assessment

As agency actions proceed, effects assessment must provide

feedback to the overall process so that strategic-effects as

sessment of national-policy goals may proceed and the na

tional-level process can continue to cycle as was shown in fig

ure 10. Effects assessment is specifically discussed later as a

part of the joint planning and execution cycle. For now, suffice

it to say that all agencies must feed appropriate effects as

sessments back into the national process to properly inform

national decision makers, so they may determine if nationa

policy goals are being met and whether the goals may need to

be adjusted based upon the new information and/or changing

circumstances. 

The process to this point has been a national effort in which

the military does not and should not have the lead decision

making role. They should, however, be equally represented

and participate with other agencies in reaching this point

Once missions are assigned to the agencies and groundwork

laid for integrating their missions, each individual agency be

gins its own planning and action cycles. The joint planning

and execution process is idealized in the cycle depicted in fig

ure 11.

73
Agency-Level Process

With missions assigned to appropriate agencies and an overall

lead agent chosen to maintain proper integration of all efforts

the military begins its own planning process as depicted by the

Joint Campaign Planning Cycle in figure 11. With the exception

of an overt emphasis on effects, the depicted process follows a

model very similar to the Estimate process outlined as appendix

B in JP 3-0 and the Collaborative Planning at Combatant Com

mand process covered in JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Plans and

Policy. Additionally, the idealized functional planning process is

readily adaptable to the JAOP process as described in JP 3-56.1

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (to be redesignat

ed JP 3-30). The EBO methodology will require tight linkages in

planning, execution, and analysis cycles from the national down

to the tactical level. Component, joint, interagency, and coalition

actions must be fully integrated to produce desired effects and to

74

1. Combatant commanders

assessment

2. Mission analysis

course of action (COA)

development

3. COA and effects

analysis

4. COA selection

CONOPS developed

5. Selected COA

converted to OPORD

6. Commander issues

OPORD and

Execution Order

7. Effects

assessment

Joint

Campaign

Planning

Figure 11. Joint Campaign-Level Process Cycle

Legend:

CONOPS––concept of operations

POPORD––operation/operational order
assess progress toward creating the conditions necessary to

achieve national-policy goals. Planning cells must be integrated

at each level to produce a unified, interactive, anticipatory as

sessment, planning, execution, and effects analysis team. Any

“stovepipe” organizational walls that currently exist must be bro

ken down to facilitate effects integration at each planning level

focused by the vision of the commander at that level.

Execution

With the proliferation of mobile targets and the expansion o

efforts to carry out direct strategic actions, it is becoming eve

more imperative to conduct continuous, iterative planning. In

more ways than ever before, executing forces provide the im

mediate feedback of direct or first order effects necessary to

plan the next cycle of actions. Cockpit videotapes, for in

stance, are becoming a necessary postaction-assessment too

to judge immediate, direct effects. The assessment of direct ef

fects is imperative to the determination of an overall effects as

sessment. The tempo of operations is becoming so rapid that

in the very near future, replanning may begin within minutes

of initial execution.87 Executing forces will become more and

more part of the immediate planning process, as well as the

immediate and continuous effects assessment phase, which

will be necessary for success of EBO.

Assessment

As already mentioned several times, assessment should be

thought of as the beginning, middle, and end of the entire

planning, execution, and assessment cycle. Assessment, or a

least planning for assessment, begins long before an individ

ual action is even envisioned and continues long after it is

complete. It is critical that assessment is conducted at all lev

els of employment—strategic through tactical—and that it is

directly related to the effects desired at each level. To suppor

EBO, effects assessment will have to be much more compre

hensive and complete than the current CA process. Currently

CA assesses physical damage to a target or objective, the func

tional effect of the damage, and weapons effectiveness based

75
on the physical and functional effect. This assessment is, o

course, necessary, but what it does not do is even attempt to

assess systemic or psychological effects. To make EBO work i

will be necessary to assess these higher-level effects with a

reasonable level of fidelity.

Effects assessment must continuously feed back to the mil

itary planning cycle, beginning with phase one, combatan

commander’s assessment, to inform the operations planning

process. It must also feed back on a more occasional basis to

the national planning level so decision makers can see how ac

tions are developing relative to national objectives and

whether some or all of those objectives might need to be al

tered. This also provides an opportunity to evaluate whethe

some of those objectives may have changed for other reasons

To emphasize once more, the entire process is continuous and

iterative and each phase must be constantly informed by al

the other phases. The discussion of the process ends here, bu

the process itself never ends. 

Summary: The EBO Methodology and Process

In preparing for warfare or contingency actions, planners

must carefully examine the scenario and relevant circumstances

to determine the effects required for achieving the objectives es

tablished by the national leadership. The main challenge now

facing US defense planners is to consolidate recent and planned

future improvements in “battle space” awareness, C2, stealth ca

pability, rapid global mobility, and the capacity for precision en

gagement into the foundation for an effects-based approach

across the spectrum of military operations.88

An additional challenge for joint forces is to start any contin

gency with the ability to understand the situation fully and de

fine the desired effects that will achieve national policy goals. I

the contingency involves a real or potential adversary, then it is

critical to manipulate the adversary’s threat potential, reduce his

offensive and defensive options, limit his unpredictability, influ

ence his will and perspectives, and constrain his actions so tha

they can be recognized and exploited. The onus is on the JFC to

successfully orient a wide array of military and nonmilitary ac

tions toward a set of common objectives. 

76
The EBO methodology requires greatly expanded knowledge o

potential target audiences including a well-developed under

standing of the strategic environment background as a prelimi

nary phase. Subsequent phases include the determination of ob

jectives and by extension desired effects to achieve those

objectives. It is paramount that the military forces, and others

involved, be prepared to respond rapidly to a wide variety o

crises and apply all available lethal and nonlethal capabilities as

appropriate. It is equally important that they be prepared to fully

assess the resultant outcomes and provide requisite feedback to

evaluate progress toward the JFC’s objectives and current strat

egy. Applied properly, EBO can achieve results out of proportion

to the amount of military force applied. There are some very se

rious considerations in preparing to move in this direction, how

ever, which are discussed in the next section.

What Are the Major Challenges

in Implementing the EBO Methodology?

Implementing the EBO methodology, as described in this

study, will not be an easy task. For all of the past efforts to ori

ent on effects rather than destruction, actually moving to con

sistent effects-based thinking will require a culture change with

in the military forces. This undertaking is likely to prove

daunting and contentious, and building the new culture will take

many years. As previously mentioned, in the Air Force’s GE IV

war game, senior mentors and other participants found tha

EBO was very effective when planners stayed focused on it. Un

fortunately, it appeared difficult for them to remain focused due

primarily to their unfamiliarity with effects-based thinking and

processes. As a result, most players fell into the pitfall of revert

ing to their previous war-gaming or operational experiences and

got bogged down in the routines of the AOC. Many became mired

in the tactical-level targeting cycle and forgot to seriously con

sider the higher-level desired effects that GE IV planners had in

tended as their focus. Instead of effectively commanding air and

space power to attain desired effects, war gamers found them

selves managing the ATO to service targets.89 The Headquarters

USAF initial report titled The Air War over Serbia stated a simila

77
situation occurred in the combined AOC at Vicenza, Italy, during

the 78-day air campaign in 1999. While air commanders were at

tempting to execute an effects-based targeting campaign, it more

closely resembled a servicing of target lists. The result was simi

lar, as commanders found themselves concentrating primarily

on the ATO rather than the effective employment of air and space

power.90

The second pitfall observed during GE IV was a tendency to

focus on the input part of the process rather than output

Specifically, members concentrated on data such as numbers

of weapons systems, weapons of a certain type, sortie count

and amounts of ordnance available and expended, almost to

the exclusion of other important considerations. Consequent

ly, far too little emphasis was placed on the output part of the

process, which was concerned with achieving the stated ob

jectives. In particular, the functional, systemic, and psycho

logical effects—which were deemed important at the outset o

the war game—basically were disregarded during the game.9

If GE IV is any indicator, there are some very significant chal

lenges to overcome, especially in the education and training

associated with EBO. Although the challenges are substantial

the potential benefits are enormous, if an effects-based ap

proach to military operations is adopted. 

With the aforementioned problems as a starting point, the

authors recognize two major areas of challenge in fully imple

menting the EBO methodology. The first is modifying both

service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be ac

complished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the

area of C2 that must be addressed. C2 represents perhaps the

greatest of the three challenges discussed here, since effective

C2 for EBO depends on how both intelligence analysis and

combat assessment not only are performed but integrated into

the planning process. In the remainder of this section, each o

these issues will be addressed more fully.

Military Doctrine for EBO

From what has been stated to this point, it should be fairly ob

vious that one of the first orders of business is to agree upon a

definition of the process for effects-based planning and incorpo

78
rate this process into formal service and joint doctrine. In a sim

ilar fashion following the Gulf War, the air campaign planning

process used by the air planners became part of joint doctrine

This five-stage air campaign planning process, now known as the

JAOP process, was refined and became the centerpiece of JP 3

56.1. Just as it was with the JAOP, it does not matter if the EBO

methodology is articulated precisely as presented herein. The im

portant matter is the development of a comprehensive effects

based concept that can be agreed upon and implemented joint

ly. One of the potential criticisms of this proposal is that the ful

utility of the EBO methodology is heavily dependent upon na

tional level and interagency support. The criticism correctly as

serts that is there is no way to ensure the support of these agen

cies. However, significant benefits can still be realized even if ful

national level and interagency support is not secured from the

outset. The military as a whole will profit even if it must incor

porate the EBO methodology unilaterally, as almost certainly i

must. Hopefully as the dividends from the EBO methodology are

realized, other agencies will become more and more supportive

over time.

The next, and closely related, part of this challenge is to define

effects-based terminology. The military services and the join

staff have been talking a great deal about EBO in recent years

This is one of the key reasons it is the right time for the US mil

itary to adopt effects-based thinking. Nevertheless, it is apparen

that when EBO is discussed, all participants do not share the

same understanding. For example, much of what has been pu

forth to this point from the Army has revolved around a concep

called fires and effects. In this context EBO takes on a very nar

row definition of the effects of fires in support of maneuver. This

Army perspective does not address other areas where effects are

important, such as the effects created by maneuver. Almost di

rectly opposed to this view is the one that equates EBO only with

the results of operations other than those associated with tradi

tional fires and maneuver. Such effects may be achieved through

information operations and/or the use of nonlethal weapons

among a host of other possibilities. Others have defined EBO

wholly in terms of “disabling a target using lethal and nonletha

means while keeping collateral damage to an absolute mini

79
mum.

92 Suffice it to say that there is a plethora of ideas and

concepts surrounding EBO. Perhaps the closest parallel of all the

services to what is being proposed herein is the Navy’s develop

ing concept of EBO and network-centric warfare, which is very

similar to emerging Air Force and joint views of EBO and infor

mation warfare. There are more perspectives, however, and ex

perience suggests that those who understand best what is con

tained in this study regarding EBO readily admit that no one

fully understands the concept yet. Clearly defining effects-based

terminology can go far in establishing a mutual understanding.

A key step in implementing any EBO concept, then, would

be to get all the services and the joint community to agree on

usage of the relevant terms. Current USAF doctrine is laced

with effects terminology; and there are relatively frequent ref

erences to effects in sister-service and joint doctrine, bu

nowhere is the term effect even defined in any joint or service

doctrine document. Clearly, as a foundation, it is necessary to

define effect specifically and carefully describe how it relates

to the concept of EBO. With that as a starting point, there are

other terms that almost certainly need some joint definition, i

a common EBO language is to become a reality. For instance

USAF doctrine defines the terms strategic effect but not oper

ational or tactical effect. Besides strategic, operational, and

tactical effects, various publications have used terms such as

cascading, collateral, direct, indirect, intentional, and uninten

tional effects to describe specific aspects concerning the ef

fects-based concept. There are almost certainly other terms to

be defined as well. To help in that process a lexicon of perti

nent terms and recommended joint definitions has already

been presented. Following this final section of the study, terms

and definitions are presented for the readers’ review. 

Education and Training

Implementing the EBO methodology will require learning a

new mind-set from the ground up. Certainly, commanders and

planners should be the absolute and unquestioned experts in

military art and science. Expertise will have to cross multiple

domains, such as, military art and science plus politics, so

cioeconomics, culture, finance, psychology, physical science

80
and diplomacy, to name a few. While the primary focus mus

remain on military art and science, it also is important to

know at least enough about each of the other domains to

reach out into the various disciplines, find the necessary facts

and knowledge, and apply them to actions that will create the

desired effects to achieve national policy goals. The US mili

tary will have to grow the right kind of specific and general ex

pertise in future leaders from the moment they enter service

through the time they become operational planners until they

are ready to be component commanders, JFCs, and combat

ant commanders. Military leaders will then be prepared to ap

propriately advise national leadership on these issues, as wel

as to direct appropriate military operations in support of the

national policy goals. Therefore, the EBO methodology re

quires a new way of thinking. To consistently instill such a

mind-set in everyone, all professional military and continuing

education must incorporate the EBO methodology.

The Air Force is taking action regarding developing officers

with a much broader background in military operations

through the Force Development initiative. In late 1999 Ai

Force Secretary F. Whitten Peters and Air Force Chief of Staf

Michael E. Ryan commissioned the Force Development (then

called Developing Aerospace Leaders) study, under direction o

Maj Gen Charles Link, USAF, retired, to consider ways to im

prove the development of war-fighting skills within the USAF

officer corps. Secretary Peters and General Ryan felt that offi

cers needed a broader education in concepts of air and space

power employment and general war fighting than currently

was provided by the Air Force. While the Air Force had always

expended sizable resources training officers for their particu

lar career specialties, not a great deal was spent on educating

them in operational art, military strategy, and the art and sci

ence of warfare. Although these are the areas of military study

needed by those who might ultimately become war-fighting

commanders, the Air Force had traditionally left this kind o

education to chance and the initiative of the individual officer

Many Air Force officers knew only what they had learned on

the job. Certain post–Gulf War studies support the contention

that senior Air Force officers were not as schooled as thei

81
Army counterparts in the application of military power.93 The

purpose of the Force Development is to initiate a program tha

ensures subsequent generations of Air Force leaders have the

opportunity and incentive to develop a much broader back

ground along with their specialties. What is envisioned ap

pears to be the very kind of background necessary to plan and

direct EBO. This part of fully implementing the EBO method

ology will take perhaps as much as 20 years to fully complete

as a new generation of officers is brought through the educa

tional and training system and into positions of leadership. In

the meantime, today’s Air Force leaders will have to work hard

and incorporate these ideas and concepts into future wa

games, exercises, operations, and campaigns.

The Air Force has also already begun to address another as

pect of this educational challenge in initiating what is collo

quially referred to as the “AOC as a weapon system.” In the

past, training and education has been conducted in a wide va

riety of specialties, but it has not encompassed the work per

formed in an AOC, per se. Most importantly, Air Force per

sonnel have not been sufficiently educated and trained to

understand how all the areas within an AOC are interrelated

In such cases as Operations Desert Storm, Northern and

Southern Watch, and NATO’s Operation Allied Force, very

good people were selected to work in the AOCs. Unfortunate

ly, most of them had never been in an AOC before. There was

no standard configuration for AOCs for that matter, so almos

everyone was learning from scratch both how the AOC was

configured and what their individual job was. This situation

gave a shaky start to operations planning and control. 

Air and space power has become an increasingly powerfu

tool for the nation. However, to achieve the full potential of ai

and space power, especially in the many and varied operations

undertaken recently, it must be centrally controlled. The AOC

is at the very heart of operations planning and execution

Moreover, the AOC has become as important in achieving na

tional and military objectives as weapons systems and fighting

units operating in the battle space itself. It is logical to educate

and train the people who will work in AOCs as thoroughly as

those who operate complex weapons systems. In this sense

82
and for this purpose, the Air Force is now treating the AOC as

a weapon system itself and training a full complement of AOC

personnel to operate this weapon system. The other services

may want to consider adopting similar programs to develop

operations center “specialists” for future military actions.

As noted earlier in the discussion concerning GE IV war game

personnel invariably will rely on their training; therefore, the

EBO methodology must be incorporated into the training regi

mens of the services and joint staff. The need to rapidly cycle

through anticipatory assessment, planning, execution, and ef

fects analysis means Joint Task Force and Component Opera

tions Center personnel, for example, must be very carefully

trained for that specific role. Moreover, these personnel must be

able to understand the integration of the various roles within the

component or functional operations center. To work effectively

they must be trained in system (facilities, equipment, linkages

capabilities and limitations, as well as the EBO methodology

prior to experiments, exercises, and war games. 

Command and Control of EBO

As used here, C2 refers to all the resources and systems a

commander requires to be properly informed, to make and di

rect implementation of appropriate decisions, and to fully as

sess results of operations. In an attempt to be all-inclusive, C

is sometimes referred to as command, control, communica

tions, and computers intelligence (C4I), C4ISR, or in othe

ways; but for the sake of simplicity, the authors use C2 to en

compass the entire system and associated processes. The area

of C2 offers much promise in helping implement the EBO

methodology. Many of the difficulties experienced in past at

tempts to employ effects-based thinking resulted from inabili

ty to observe and analyze the outcomes of actions, especially

at the more esoteric levels of the effects hierarchy. Curren

and pending advances in C2—particularly in the areas of ISR

and intelligence fusion—are improving capabilities to observe

detect, analyze, and disseminate exactly the kind of informa

tion necessary to EBO. One of the challenges for implementa

tion will be buying, sustaining, and organizing the necessary

resources, and training and educating the people to exploi

83
these possibilities. It will take some time to get this right; bu

if it is done right, the payoff will be huge. 

The next challenge in this area for the military services is to

develop commanders and staff officers who can think in ef

fects-based terms and remain focused on the broad perspec

tive of EBO. In particular, it is imperative for planners, opera

tors, and assessors to develop synergistic ways of thinking

about the optimum employment of military power and in this

specific case, air and space power. Instead of having separate

cells in AOCs for intelligence, operations, and space among

others, a more generalist view needs to be adopted. For in

stance, rather than having intelligence collectors and analysts

working in their own cell and reporting to the planning staff

they need to work side by side with operators and have an

overall understanding of operations in addition to their partic

ular area of expertise. At the same time, operations experts re

quire a better understanding of intelligence processes and

products. The same is true for all the other specialists that are

gathered together in military operations centers today.

This point is critical to success with EBO because the entire

cycle of operations planning and execution must be fully con

nected. Intelligence analysts can contribute much by deter

mining what physical and perhaps functional effects have

been created by operations. However, there is no way for these

analysts to determine the systemic effects and their impact on

overall capability and psyche of a target audience unless they

also fully understand the objectives and intent of operations

and how they are unfolding. An effective approach to EBO re

quires a team of experts and individual specialties with a com

plete awareness of the objectives and intent of operations

Comprehensive education and training—combined with a fa

miliarity regarding the commanders’ intent and desired ef

fects—is necessary to assess whether the military is proceed

ing toward its goals and what alterations to the plan may be

necessary. It takes this same kind of team effort to perceive

subtle changes in policy goals, which sometimes occur during

operations. A shift in policy goals, even a slight one, can make

a perfectly reasoned EBO plan inappropriate to the new situ

ation. It often takes careful and informed assessment on the

84
part of operations planners to perceive these subtle changes

and their impact. 

The most vital C2 challenge in implementing the EBO

methodology is the intelligence cycle. A commander needs as

concise, accurate, timely, and complete information as possi

ble to make operational decisions and to assess the results o

operations. As already established, two of the most serious

shortfalls in past attempts at EBO have been the ability to col

lect and analyze information on results of operations and the

ability to determine what effects the operations have achieved

The current doctrinal concept of intelligence preparation of the

battle space partially addresses the first issue but does not go

far enough. Intelligence preparation of the battle space is quite

obviously born of the conquest paradigm and assumes all op

erations can be defined as battle. What is lacking is intelli

gence preparation for HUMRO, peacekeeping operations or, fo

that matter, peacetime engagement. Preparation of the battle

space assumes knowledge of where and when a military action

is planned and what its ultimate ends are. As pointed out pre

viously, by the time an operation is initiated, in many in

stances it is already too late for the basic background research

necessary for EBO. The EBO methodology requires much

preparation prior to crisis action planning, and it is incorrec

to assume all actions will be combat. 

Just as operations planners and commanders will have to

broaden their views, so will intelligence collectors and ana

lysts. They will have to become concerned with much broade

issues than tracking target lists, defining weapons effects, and

assessing physical and functional effects of combat opera

tions. Target audiences may be viewed as a system of systems

and it is vital to predict and assess systemic and psychologi

cal effects, as well as physical and functional effects. Obvi

ously, intelligence analysts working alone cannot accomplish

all of these functions. To achieve success at these higher lev

els of analysis, intelligence analysts will have to be more fully

integrated with operations planners. Together they will have to

understand how the higher-level effects can be achieved and

measured. This means a great deal of study for all partici

pants, beginning long before specific operations are envi

85
sioned. They will all have to be familiar with the pertinent in

formation from strategic environment research and be able to

apply this information during operational environment re

search to plan operations that will achieve the effects desired

by senior commanders. 

Modeling and Simulation

Another doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader

ship, personnel, and facilities implication is the requiremen

for enhanced modeling and simulation (M&S) tools to suppor

the EBO methodology. Most current tools—such as tactica

warfare, corps battle simulation, air warfare simulation, and

joint theater-level simulation—are based on algorithmic attri

tion models, which cannot model the higher-order effects tha

are critical to this methodology. In terms of supporting EBO

there are two basic aspects to M&S. First are physical systems

and their interconnections (e.g., water, electricity, and trans

portation). As we study and learn to better understand these

types of systems and interconnections, algorithmic M&S tools

will also become more sophisticated and allow modeling o

functional and systemic effects with satisfactory precision. Fo

those systems where human decision makers play key roles

(e.g., national leadership and military C2), a fundamenta

change in approach to M&S is necessary. Some help appears

to be on the way with new M&S concepts like “agent-based

modeling,” which incorporates “synthetic human” intervention

within the model. No matter how sophisticated M&S becomes

there is no time in the near future when it can be expected to

accurately model complex strategic or psychological effects

Modeling such complex effects will require development o

nonalgorithmic models, incorporating human judgment fo

some applications. It will also require great reliance on opera

tional art and the professional judgment of senior operationa

leaders. M&S technology can provide some answers if it is

properly focused and centrally managed to attack the prob

lems of effects simulation and analysis.

In fact, technology in general, is a principal enabler of the EBO

methodology. In the past, attempts to apply the EBO methodol

ogy to national security concerns were severely limited by avail

86
able technologies. The strategic air operations of World War II, fo

example, were limited by the ability to find valid strategic targets

achieve desired effects against them, and measure the results

Technological improvements made such an approach much

more feasible by the time of Operation Desert Storm, but there

were still major problems with anticipatory assessment and

high-order analysis. Properly applied today’s technologies and

those just coming on the horizon will reduce the technical chal

lenges dramatically. Stealth, precision, unmanned aerial vehi

cles, improved munitions, multispectral sensors, improved C

systems, focused and fused ISR, and other technologies can

solve many of the past inhibitors. Application of the EBO

methodology is within grasp, if embraced and instilled as an in

stitutional mind-set. Although technological progress will con

tinue to enable critical aspects of EBO, the institutionalized

mind-set of the commanders, planners, operators, and assessors

employing the technology is the most important factor in imple

menting the EBO methodology. This new approach must be in

stilled in personnel of all the services from their very earliest days

of service.

Obviously the challenges presented here do not exhaust the

full range of those that must be solved to implement the EBO

methodology in the US military, but they provide a good start

ing point. Such challenges may never be fully solved, however

initiating the fundamentals of an effects-based approach is a

huge step in the right direction. Such a step will pave the way

to a new paradigm in military operations—one better suited to

the uncertain world of the twenty-first century than the old

paradigm of conquest.

Conclusions

Though promising, implementing the EBO methodology wil

not be easy. Perhaps most challenging are the needs for antici

patory assessment and high-order analysis. Many will demand

perfect anticipatory assessment and high-order analysis, while

some will declare them impossible because they cannot be done

perfectly. Both positions proceed from a grain of truth. The EBO

methodology is vitally dependent upon these two functions, and

87
they will never be done perfectly. In fact, just doing them rea

sonably well will be a significant challenge requiring extensive

conceptual development, years of education and training, reor

ganization of many planning and assessment functions, and de

velopment and application of advanced technologies of many

kinds. However, the question is not, Can it be done perfectly?

The EBO methodology must be evaluated on its promise to pro

vide greater success in employing the instruments of nationa

power to achieve national objectives and policy goals. Nothing

can ever completely remove what Carl von Clausewitz termed the

fog and friction that surrounds and enfolds all political action

perhaps especially warfare. There are too many variables and

such activities always involve numbers of thinking, adaptive

human organizations. The problem would seem to be outthink

ing and out-adapting competing organizations. Properly applied

the EBO methodology offers tremendous promise for helping to

solve this problem.

Notes

1. The term spectrum of engagement is used throughout this study to de

scribe the continuum of peacetime through conflict to war and back t

peacetime. The term spectrum of conflict in other writings is sometimes used

but a more neutral term is used in this study to move away from conques

paradigm thinking. 

2. Military planners often seem most comfortable talking about wha

they will do in a given scenario: how many airplanes of what type will the

send, what and how many weapons will they employ, how many sorties wil

be flown against which targets or target sets, and so on. It is sometimes dif

ficult to get them to focus on what all this will accomplish, that is, what out

comes will be achieved by all this input. 

3. The other branches of the US armed services are pursuing effort

along parallel lines, but the authors are more qualified to examine th

USAF’s efforts and will defer to the other services to analyze and describ

their own undertakings.

4. Of course Desert Storm obviously had global implications, witness th

global coalition of forces arrayed against Iraq. However, even though Ira

was a longtime Soviet and Russian client, the Russians did not orchestrat

Saddam Hussein’s actions or directly enter the conflict in his support.

5. For example, one of the first prisoners of war captured by the US Arm

during Operation Just Cause was a Panamanian West Point graduate.

6. Joint Vision 2020, June 2000, 6.

7. For definitions of these terms see Joint Vision 2020.

8. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Februar

1995, III-2. The publication correctly notes that the desired end state repre

88
sents the set of conditions necessary to achieve strategic objectives and re

solve a crisis.

9. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920–1940

(1955; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1992), 65–66

10. Haywood Hansell, The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler (Atlanta: Higgins

MacArthur, 1972), 61–93.

11. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Force

in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to Decembe

1943 (1949; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983)

357.

12. Ibid.; and Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Ai

Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 t

August 1942 (1948; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force His

tory, 1983), 362.

13. Franklin D’Olier, chairman, The United States Strategic Bombing Sur

vey, Summary Report (European War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Print

ing Office [GPO], 1945), 8.

14. John F. Kreis, ed., Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Force

Operations in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Muse

ums Program, 1996), 202–3.

15. For a discussion of these goals and how planners hoped to reach

them, see Col Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and

the Airpower Debates (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 37, 41

16. Ibid., 41.

17. Lt Col David A. Deptula, Washington, D.C., transcript of interview

with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, Lt Col Richard T. Reynolds, and Lt Col Ed

ward C. Mann III, 12 December 1991, 96.

18. Although the planners were generally applying EBO though

processes, the idea that victory would most likely produce compliance ma

have been an artifact of the conquest paradigm. 

19. Deptula, 96.

20. Just as the authors have elected to use spectrum of engagemen

rather than spectrum of conflict or any other term, they also have chosen

the term levels of employment to refer to the term often called levels of wa

that is, strategic, operational, and tactical. This terminology better fits th

broad concepts of EBO as discussed here. Strategy, operations, and tactic

apply to military actions in all phases of the spectrum of engagement.

21. Col David A. Deptula, Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of War

fare (Arlington, Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 1995), 10. 

22. Maj Steven M. Rinaldi, Beyond the Industrial Web: Economic Syner

gies and Targeting Methodologies (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press

April 1995). Major Rinaldi develops the concept of an output (objective

based target process. Rinaldi’s objective-based approach starts with th

commander’s intent and theater objectives then works through what (effect

and) targets will contribute to the fulfillment of the selected objectives.

23. T. W. Beagle Jr., Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 2001), 8.

24. The term airmen refers here to members of the armed forces who ar

associated with the application of air and space power rather than the rank

of a noncommissioned officer in the Air Force.

89
25. Maj Gen Timothy A. Kinnan, as commander of the Air Force Doctrin

Center in 1999, explained the functional perspective in his briefing “Let’

Get Serious about Working Together.” He states that surface commander

have a geographic perspective wherein every commander below the join

force commander has an area of operations (AO). The Air Force contend

that the joint force air component commander (JFACC), as well as othe

commanders, such as the joint force special operations component com

mander, must perform numerous functions (e.g., counterair, strategic at

tack, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) that cannot be relegat

ed to any specific AO. Essentially, the JFACC has joint operating area o

theaterwide responsibilities in order to best utilize the inherent flexibility o

air and space power. 

26. Amy Butler, “DOD Urged Not to Forget Benefits of Attrition, Annihi

lation Strategies,” Inside the Air Force, 9 June 2000, 14.

27. Gen John P. Jumper explained his perspective regarding campaign

by-target-list management during his presentation on Operation Allied

Force, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 17 August 1999.

28. JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002; and Air Forc

Doctrine Document 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, 26 April 2002. These doc

uments address the impact of effects in military operations.

29. Maj Jay M. Kreighbaum, “Force Application Planning: A Systems

and-Effects-Based Approach,” Class 7 (master’s thesis, School of Advanced

Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1997–1998), 25.

30. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Itha

ca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 56–57.

31. Briefing and paper, USAF Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., sub

ject: Strategic and Indirect Effects: Defining and Modeling, 11 August 2000

11–14.

32. Ibid. The physical, functional, systemic, and psychological nature o

effects is discussed later in the paper, as are cumulative and cascading ef

fects.

33. Beagle, 6.

34. Kreighbaum, 75.

35. Beagle, 6.

36. While effects may theoretically extend to the fourth order and be

yond, this paper considers all effects beyond the second order under th

rubric of third order effects.

37. Modified from JP 3-60, “Joint Doctrine for Targeting,” 6 June 2000

preliminary coordination draft.

38. JP 3-60, final coordination draft, I-12, I-13.

39. Ibid., I-13. Fight-centric scenarios are, as the name implies, thos

operations involving combat on some scale. Conversely, mobility-centric op

erations are those normally associated with disaster response, noncombat

ant evacuation, or humanitarian aid. 

40. Rinaldi. Rinaldi extensively covers the interrelatedness of nationa

economic systems. Specifically, the interactions between sets must be par

of the overall decision-making process if the global effects of air and spac

power are to be realized.

41. Beagle, 10.

42. Ibid., 11.

43. Ibid., 7. 

90
44. Combat assessment (CA) is an overall evaluation of combat opera

tions in relation to command objectives. This link of objectives with assess

ment is laudable, but as will be seen, remains primarily at the tactical leve

of war. CA consists of three subassessments: battle damage assessmen

(BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and mission assessmen

(MA). MA addresses the effectiveness of broad apportioned missions, such

as interdiction, counterair, and so forth. MEA analyzes the effectiveness o

munitions damage mechanisms, for example, fusing against specific targe

types. The USAF guidance further subdivides the often, overshadowing pil

lar, BDA, into assessments of physical damage, functional damage, and tar

get system.

45. JP 3-60, preliminary coordination draft, GL-10.

46. Beagle, 7.

47. Ibid.

48. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-1, vol. 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of th

United States Air Force, March 1992, 12.

49. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, II-1.

50. Kreighbaum, 22–23.

51. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.2, “Strategic Attack,” draft

1 January 2000, 7.

52. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 7.

53. Kreighbaum, 23.

54. Briefing, USAF Doctrine Center. 

55. Deptula, Firing for Effect, 5.

56. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Lif

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 10.

57. JP 3-0, ix.

58. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 Feb

ruary 2000, 88.

59. Institute for Defense Analyses/Joint Advanced Warfighting Program

“New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations,” draft annotated briefing

22 March 2001, 23, 26–27.

60. Credit is due to many people for the discussion of EBO methodolog

and the information conveyed in figures 2, 3, and 4. A great deal of time and

effort were spent on developing the construct as presented here, so it is dif

ficult to determine exactly what credit is due to whom. Certainly the EBO

materials produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses/Joint Advanced

Warfighting Program and at the Air Force Research Laboratory are progeni

tors of many of the ideas contained herein. The authors are indebted t

those organizations.

61. David E. Thaler, “The Strategies-to-Tasks Framework,” RAND brief

ing at the Air Force’s Modernization Planning Conference, 23 March 1993

The figure also contains material extracted from the draft Concept of Oper

ations for Effects-Based Operations version 2.0 (9 October 2001) by Dr

Maris McCrabb, 7. 

62. Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1987), 413.

63. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, The Civil War Era (New

York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 817–20.

64. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–195

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 190–201.

91
65. Al Santoli, Perspectives, online at http://www.thehistorynet.com

Vietnam/articles/02963_text.htm, 11 June 2001.

66. Dr. James Titus, “The Battle of Khafji, An Overview and Preliminar

Analysis” (paper, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

Maxwell AFB, Ala., September 1996).

67. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Repor

to Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 1992), 200–201, 215.

68. Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” RUSI Journa

March 1974, 3–11.

69. Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, retired, Washington, D.C., interviewed b

Gary Endersby and Edward C. Mann III, 15 June 2000; and Sam Gardiner

interviewed by Gary Endersby, Thomas R. Searle, and Edward C. Mann III

20 April 2000, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

70. Discussions with various personnel who have participated in th

games rendered this opinion.

71. As is usually the case when discussing processes, this is both de

scriptive and prescriptive. It describes a process, which the authors believ

takes place either formally or informally, with or without our understandin

it, and whether or not in this precise form (description). Formalizing ou

thinking about how this process should work aids in decision making and

enables the achievement of desired outcomes (prescription) on a more fre

quent basis.

72. Use of the term phase may be slightly misleading here. These divi

sions of the process are necessary to describe the totality of the process, bu

they are sequential only in a very general sense. Many of them are occurrin

simultaneously during an operation, and the entire process is iterativ

based upon feedback received throughout the operations. For instance, a

already stated, strategic environment research is a continuous process be

fore, during, and after a given operation. Nonetheless, in order to describe 

process it must be segmented in some manner, so the term phase is used

here to differentiate the segments of the process.

73. Some readers are likely to try to equate this phase to the strategic es

timate that theater combatant commanders (formerly referred to as CINCs

develop for their areas of responsibility. That effort would necessarily be par

of, but only part of, strategic environment research, which would actually b

a much wider concept encompassing the efforts of a large number of agen

cies, the joint staff, service staffs, intelligence organizations (military and na

tional), and so on. It would also encompass study of a wider range of sub

ject matter, like the very nature of human psychology and efforts to chang

people’s minds, for one example. Greater detail is offered in later paragraphs.

74. EBO methodology will apply even in peacetime. Based on the nation

al military strategy, peacetime engagement requires the United States to en

gage in multilateral training exercises, nation assistance, foreign militar

sales, and other activities designed to support broad national objectives

These activities should also be based upon creation of desired effects with

in the target audiences, and planning for them should follow the same gen

eral outline as operational planning in a crisis. 

75. This is not meant to denigrate the effort of planners in those cases

who did the best they could with only limited information on the subjects

This makes the point precisely! This knowledge is needed in advance.

92
76. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.

1995), 132–33. Overy reports that industrial absenteeism in Japan rose t

more than 50 percent by the end of the war.

77. AFMAN 1-1, 12.

78. Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of US Air Operations in Fou

Wars 1941–1991: Lessons for US Commanders (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND

Project Air Force, 1996), 181–86.

79. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942

new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 261

293–394.

80. Craven and Cate, 2:370–76.

81. Deptula interview, 22–23 May 1991, 41–42.

82. Ibid., 11; Overy, 127–28; and Mann, Thunder and Lightning, 151. 

83. In both cases used here for examples, the USAF tried very hard t

make these studies scientific, both during and after the conflicts. In World

War II distinguished scholars and industrialists were brought together t

form the Committee of Operations Analysts who were to determine th

strategic vulnerabilities of Germany and Japan. See Robert Frank Futrell

Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol

1, 1907–1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1989)

143. The problem was that, even though the distinguished scholars and in

dustrialists contributed significantly to Army Air Forces (AAF) analytic abil

ity, there was a paucity of real information available on the German system

in question. See Craven and Cate, 2:362. Also, while the committee recom

mended on 8 March 1943 that the AAF make a “continuing analysis of th

successes and failures of air operations,” the AAF did not act on their rec

ommendation until the spring of 1944. See Futrell, 1:143. Thus, for most o

the war, air operations success was determined primarily through poststrik

photo analysis of individual strike missions (although Ultra intercepts pro

vided much of the contextual information on the generalized effects o

strikes. See Kreis, 76–78). After the war the United States Strategic Bomb

ing Survey tried to scientifically determine the impact, but even though the

had unparalleled access to damaged targets and German industrialists

their reports were mixed concerning results and have been interpreted in

different ways by different analysts to prove almost anything you might wan

proved. Futrell, 2:144–47. In the case of Desert Storm, once again durin

the war scientific analysis of functional effects was made very difficult by th

lack of intelligence collection of anything but photographs of physical dam

age, and by certain intelligence analysis methodologies that had developed

during the Cold War (for instance, the insistence of some intelligence agen

cies on confirming mobile target kills with overhead photography—some

thing that was almost never going to happen through our collection system)

Some of the planners tried mightily, but they were pretty thoroughly ham

strung by these limitations. After the war the USAF commissioned the Gul

War Airpower Study to take a more scientific look, but they were severel

constrained by availability of data. They could not go to the vast majority o

targets in Iraq (which included virtually all the strategic targets), and dat

on the tactical and operational targets was severely limited due to the dan

ger from clutter and unexploded ordnance on the battlefield. Once again

they were able to do a pretty good job analyzing levels of physical destruc

93
tion, but higher

level effects (functional, systemic, and psychological) often

proved too hard to do. Deptula interview, 22–23 May 1991, 11.

84. Defense Intelligence Agency, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Quick

Guide, PC-8060-1-96 (Minneapolis: Department of Defense Intelligence, Nava

Reserve Unit DIAHQ 0878, 1996), 5–7. The Quick Guide divides analysis int

three categories: Physical-damage assessment, functional-damage assessment

and target-system assessment. However, all of these assessments are directl

related to physical damage and it’s accumulation over a system. There are n

assessment criteria for effects other than physical damage.

85. These can be thought of as the national policy effects desired. At each

level of planning (grand strategic, strategic, operational, and tactical) the de

sired effects will need to be defined before the strategy and tactics ar

planned at that level. 

86. Note that the host-nation ambassador will play a significant role.

87. Efforts are ongoing to place control of ISR resources directly in th

hands of employing commanders (JFACC’s, JFC’s). Soon there will be link

from many ISR assets directly to the “shooters” in the field. This enhanced

situational awareness, combined with improved communications capabilit

will allow immediate replanning and retasking of operating forces. The plan

ning-execution-assessment cycle in some cases may take only seconds and

will require a very agile, continuous, iterative planning capability. 

88. Beagle, 39.

89. General Shaud interview, 15 June 2000, authors’ notes; and Gar

diner interview, 20 April 2000, authors’ notes.

90. Headquarters USAF, Air War over Serbia, 25 April 2000, ix, 38.

91. General Shaud interview, 15 June 2000, authors’ notes; and Gar

diner interview, authors’ notes.

92. Amy Butler, “DOD Urged Not to Forget Benefits of Attrition, Annihi

lation Strategies,” Inside the Air Force, 9 June 2000, 14, cited in Early Bird

10 June 2000.

93. See, for instance, Mann, Thunder and Lightning, especially chap. 10

94
Terms and Definitions

2d, 3d, nth order effects. a causes b causes c causes . . . Fo

example, disruptions in the electric grid . . . yields rolling

blackouts . . ., which disrupt petroleum deliveries to air

fields . . ., which disrupt air operations. (Air Comba

Command [ACC] Effects-Based Operations [EBO] white

paper)

battle damage assessment. An estimate of the damage o

degradation resulting from the application of military

force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a target or sys

tem. This estimate should be timely and accurate and can

be applied to the employment of all types of weapon sys

tems (e.g., air, ground, naval, special forces, and informa

tion). Battle damage assessment is composed of physica

damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and

target system assessment. Also called BDA. (Modified

from Joint Publication [JP] 3-60, “Joint Doctrine fo

Targeting,” 6 June 2000, preliminary coordination [PC

draft)

cascading effects. An indirect effect that ripples through an

adversary system, often affecting other systems

Typically, a cascading effect flows from higher-to-lowe

levels of employment and is the result of influencing

nodes that are critical to multiple adversary systems

(ACC EBO white paper)

causal linkage. Explanation for how a particular action con

tributes or leads to a given effect. It answers the question

“Why do planners believe this action will create or help

create the desired effect?” (ACC EBO white paper)

collateral effects. Outcomes that result when something

occurs other than what was intended. These outcomes

may be either positive or negative to the original intent. In

one sense, collateral effects may be the incidental direc

or indirect effects (usually unintentional) that cause

injury or damage to persons, objects, or systems. In a

broader perspective collateral effects cover a wide array o

possible downstream results. (ACC EBO white paper)

95
combat assessment. The determination of the overall effec

tiveness of force employment during military actions

Combat assessment is composed of three major compo

nents, (a) battle damage assessment (BDA), (b) munitions

effects assessment (MEA), and (c) mission assessmen

(MA). Also called CA. (Modified from JP 3-60 PC draft)

cumulative effects. The aggregate result of many direct o

indirect effects against an adversary. Typically, a cumula

tive effect flows from lower-to-higher levels of employmen

and occur at the higher levels; however, it may occur a

the same level as a contributing lower-order effect. (ACC

EBO white paper)

direct effects. Immediate, first-order effects (e.g., weapons

employment results). They are the results of actions with

no intervening effect or mechanism between act and out

come. (ACC EBO white paper)

effectiveness. The measurement of the results or outcomes o

military actions. (Modified from JP 3-60 PC draft)

effects. A full range of outcomes, events, or consequences tha

result from a specific action. (ACC EBO white paper)

effects assessment. The evaluation of the overall effective

ness of military actions in terms of measures of merit in

relation to stated objectives and policy goals. (Proposed

definition)

effects-based. An action taken with the intent to produce a

distinctive and desired effect. (ACC EBO white paper)

effects-based operations. Actions taken against enemy sys

tems designed to achieve specific effects that contribute

directly to desired military and political outcomes. (ACC

EBO white paper)

effects-based operations methodology. A methodology fo

planning, executing, and assessing operations designed

to attain the effects required to achieve desired nationa

security outcomes. (ACC EBO white paper)

effects-based strategy. The coherent application of nationa

and alliance elements of power through effects-based

processes to accomplish strategic objectives. Also called

EBS. (Proposed definition) 

96
functional assessment. The estimate of the impact of military

force to degrade/destroy or otherwise affects the func

tional or operational capability of a target or system to

perform its intended mission. Functional assessmen

includes the level of success of the force applied relative

to the operational objective established. (Proposed defini

tion)

functional effects. Direct or indirect effects of an attack o

operation on the ability of a target to function properly. In

essence, it answers the question, to what extent has the

function of the target been degraded or affected by those

actions. (ACC EBO white paper) 

indirect effects. Those effects, which are created through an

intermediate effect or mechanism, producing a final out

come or result. They are 2d, 3d, and nth order effects

which may be functional, systemic, or psychological in

nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed and typically

are more difficult to recognize than direct effects. (ACC

EBO white paper) 

measures of effectiveness. The indicators required to deter

mine whether or not individual component missions, join

campaign phases, and/or a theater campaign in genera

are meeting stated objectives. Assessment of such indica

tors normally takes place at the tactical-, operational-

and even strategic-levels of war. The key is to determine

when the predetermined conditions have been met tha

affect enemy operational employment or overall strategy

Also called MOE. (Modified from JP 3-60, PC draft)

munitions effects assessment. An assessment conducted

concurrently and interactively with battle damage assess

ment. This assessment applies to the weapon system and

munitions effectiveness to determine and recommend any

required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon

system, munitions, fusing, and/or weapon delivery

parameters to increase force effectiveness. Also called

MEA. (Modified from JP 3-60, PC draft)

operational effect. The link between tactical results and

strategy; typically, the cumulative outcome of missions

engagements, and battles. An operational effect also may

97
result from the disruption of systems or areas of opera

tional value. (ACC EBO white paper) 

operational effects assessment. The measurement of effects

at the theater level. Operational assessment determines

whether or not military action is properly supporting over

all strategy by meeting operational objectives. (Modified

from JP 3-60, PC draft)

physical damage assessment. The estimate of the quantita

tive extent of physical damage through munitions blast

fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects to a targe

resulting from the application of military force. This

assessment is based upon observed or interpreted dam

age. (JP 3-60, PC draft)

physical effects. Effects created by the direct impact through

physical alteration on the object or system targeted by the

application of military action. (ACC EBO white paper) 

psychological effects. The results of actions that influence

emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the

behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups

and individuals. (ACC EBO white paper) 

strategic effect. Disruption of the enemy’s overall strategy

ability, or will to wage war or carry out aggressive activi

ty. (ACC EBO white paper) 

strategic effects assessment. Strategic effects assessmen

represents the measurement of effects at the strategic

level of employment. Strategic effects assessment deter

mines whether or not overall strategy is working and if the

strategic objectives are being achieved. (Modified from JP

3-60, PC draft)

synergistic effects. The proper application of a coordinated

force, which can produce effects that exceed the contri

butions of the individual forces employed separately. The

precise, coordinated application of the various elements o

air, space, and surface forces brings disproportionate

pressure on adversaries to comply with our national will

US military power is able to accomplish synergistic effects

and thus dictate the tempo and direction of an entire war

fighting effort from military operations other than wa

98
through major conflict. (Modified from Air Force Doctrine

Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997)

systemic effects. Effects on the operation of a specific system

or systems. In essence, it answers the question to wha

degree has the system or systems been degraded or affect

ed by those actions directed against it. (ACC EBO white

paper) 

tactical effects. Effects, which are the result of action(s) a

the individual unit, mission, or engagement level. Tactica

effects influence activities at the tactical level of employ

ment and focus on battles and/or engagements to accom

plish military objectives. These effects can be either direc

or indirect, and typically are acts in concert with othe

tactical effects to produce results at higher levels o

employment. Examples include individual aircraft and

tank attrition, airbase denial, suppression of enemy fire

and so forth. (Modified from AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22

January 2000 and JP 3-60, PC draft)

unintended effects. Unanticipated effect that could impac

the campaign or have overall negative consequences. The

destruction of the adversary’s electric grid affects the

command and control of his military operations but also

disrupts power to water treatment plants, which leads to

increased levels of disease. (ACC EBO white paper) 

99
Thinking Effects

Effects-Based Methodology

for Joint Operations

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Hattie Minter

Copy Editor

Peggy Smith

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson