STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND 

A RESURGENT RUSSIA:

AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 

TO DETERRENCE

A U.S. Army War College Integrated Research 

Project in Support of: 

U.S. European Command and 

U.S. Army Europe

R. Reed Anderson

Patrick J. Ellis

Antonio M. Paz

Kyle A. Reed

Lendy “Alamo” Renegar

John T. Vaughan

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

i

The United States Army War College

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iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT 

RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO 

DETERRENCE

A U.S. Army War College Integrated Research Project 

in Support of: U.S. European Command and U.S. Army 

Europe

R. Reed Anderson

Patrick J. Ellis

Antonio M. Paz

Kyle A. Reed

Lendy “Alamo” Renegar

John T. Vaughan

May 2016

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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vi

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Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

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The research team is indebted to many people for their incredible support and contributions to this project. First and foremost, the team is grateful to the project’s sponsors, Lieutenant 

General Ben Hodges, Commander, U.S. Army Europe, and Mr. 

Michael Ryan, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) J9, for the 

time they dedicated to initial discussions that set the direction of 

the work. The team is further grateful for the time, candor, and 

insights provided during the many hours of research discussions 

with the aforementioned staffs and organizations. The team is 

particularly indebted to the staff and faculty of the U.S. Army 

War College and the Strategic Studies Institute who served as 

our mentors, guides, and critical eyes as we developed, drafted, 

and refined this monograph. Finally, and most important to any 

endeavor, we are grateful for the understanding and dedicated 

support of our families who sacrificed time with us in order to 

allow us to complete our work. Behind every good soldier, sailor, 

airman, and marine is an even better family. To them we dedicate 

our work.

ISBN 1-58487-731-6
vii

CONTENTS

Foreword.......................................................................ix

About the Authors.......................................................xi 

Summary....................................................................xvii 

Methodology............................................................xxiii 

Introduction...............................................................xxv 

1. Understanding Russia’s Aims Through 

 the Lens of Vladimir Putin, History and 

 Culture........................................................................1

2. Deterrence Strategies in an 

 Increasingly Complex European 

 Security Environment.............................................39

3. The Time-Distance Challenge of 

 U.S.-Based Forces...................................................81

4. Theater Security Cooperation in Europe: 

 Key to Conventional Deterrence........................117 

5. The Information Environment: 

 A Critical Element Often Neglected...................143 

6. Conclusions and Recommendations..................163 

ix

FOREWORD

As noted in the U.S. Army Operating Concept,1 senior 

leaders and planners face a very complex, unpredictable world. Witness for example, Russia entering the 

fight against the Islamic State, and then its subsequent 

alleged withdrawal of forces from Syria. Russia’s actions certainly caught many by surprise—but should 

they have? Predicting Russia’s actions is indeed challenging, and the task has been made more so since 

many Russian experts, linguists, and scholars have 

left government service in recent decades. This postCold War trend may be changing though, as Russian 

actions are becoming increasingly important to policymakers, strategists, and military leaders. Some leaders have gone as far as saying that Russia is the only 

existential threat to the United States—mostly due to 

its nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, Russia’s actions over 

the past few years have shown that the United States 

needs to devote greater attention to Russia, its intentions, and its leaders. 

This monograph is one small—but important—

step in that direction. In direct support of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army Europe 

(USAREUR), six U.S. Army War College students 

from the resident class of 2016 spent much of this past 

academic year investigating whether and how the U.S. 

Army is prepared to respond to various forms of aggression from Russia. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, 

USAREUR Commander, Mr. Michael Ryan, EUCOM 

Director for Interagency Partnering, and their staffs in 

Wiesbaden and Stuttgart, Germany, gave generously 

of their time, and we are grateful to have had the opportunity to support them through scholarship. In 

conducting research in Washington, Brussels, Mons, 
Stuttgart, and Wiesbaden, the student research team 

confirmed that, in fact, the United States has implemented a wide range of actions to counter Russia’s 

actions. Yet their research brought to light questions 

over whether those actions are properly focused, particularly as it pertains to deterrence, as well as against 

a threat not entirely like that faced during the Cold 

War. This monograph seeks to flesh out the answer to 

these and other questions by exploring Russia’s intentions, laying out a more modern approach to deterrence, and presenting recommendations and policy 

options for senior leaders within the Department of 

Defense (DoD) and across the interagency. 

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to 

publish this monograph. We are confident that the 

research, analysis, and recommendations expressed 

within will contribute importantly to the ongoing 

debate over national security and America’s role in 

Europe.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ENDNOTES - FOREWORD

1. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Operating Concept, 

Win in a Complex World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Department of the Army, October 31, 2014.

x
xi

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LTC) R. REED 

ANDERSON entered military service in 1987 as a 

U.S. Army Reserve combat medic and was commissioned in 1994 through the Reserve Officer Training 

Corps (ROTC) program at Brigham Young University 

as a Field Artillery officer. Following the artillery basic course, he spent two tours with the First Infantry 

Division in Kansas and Germany. Following battery 

command, LTC Anderson became a Europe foreign 

area officer, which has taken him on tours to Portugal, where he attended Portuguese Army and Joint 

Staff courses; the U.S. European Command; the U.S. 

Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO); Afghanistan; and the Army staff. LTC Anderson holds a master’s degree in international security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. His 

previous publications include several articles in the 

Foreign Area Officers Association professional journal, International Affairs, to include a series of three articles on the trans-Atlantic relationship, and a treatise 

on strategic and operational planning for theater security cooperation at the geographic combatant commands. LTC Anderson is currently a member of the 

U.S. Army War College resident class of 2016, upon 

completion of which he will serve as the Chief of the 

Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in 

Tunis, Tunisia.

COLONEL (COL) PATRICK J. ELLIS received his 

commission in the infantry upon graduation from the 

U.S. Military Academy in 1994. He served as a platoon 

leader in both light infantry and U.S. Army Ranger 

units. Following these initial assignments, he served 
xii

as a staff officer and later as a company commander 

in the in 1-508th Airborne Battalion Combat Team in 

Vicenza, Italy. In 2001, COL Ellis returned to 2/75th 

Ranger Regiment. From 2001 to 2004, he served as the 

battalion logistics officer and Bravo Company commander completing several deployments in support 

of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Upon graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College in 2005, COL Ellis reported to 2/75th 

Ranger Regiment and served as the battalion executive officer and battalion operations officer. During 

this time, he conducted further deployments in support of both Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Following this assignment, COL Ellis reported to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where 

he served from 2007 to 2010 as a current operations 

officer and executive officer to the Commander. COL 

Ellis assumed command of 1-501 Infantry (ABN) in 

Anchorage, Alaska, on June 28, 2010. While serving 

as the battalion commander, COL Ellis deployed the 

battalion for 10 months to Khost, Afghanistan, in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In June 

2013, COL Ellis assumed command of 3/75th Ranger 

Regiment, a position he held until April 2015. During his time as the 3/75th commander, COL Ellis deployed twice to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

in Afghanistan. He is scheduled to take command of 

2nd Cavalry Regiment (Stryker) in Vilseck, Germany, in July 2016. COL Ellis holds a bachelor’s degree 

in Russian language from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s in management from Webster 

University.
xiii

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LTC) ANTONIO M. PAZ 

was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at San Jose State University in 1994 

as an infantry officer. He was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division in Schweinfurt, Germany, where he participated in deployments to Croatia and the NATO-led 

Implementation Force mission in Bosnia. He went on 

to join the 10th Mountain Division for another deployment to Bosnia and then commanded an infantry company and a brigade headquarters company. LTC Paz 

went on to receive training in psychological operations 

(PSYOP) and then information operations (IO). This 

training led to his tours as a tactical detachment commander deployed to Iraq; IO planner at the Joint Special Operations Command; two tours in Afghanistan; 

Battalion S3 at the 6th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne); 

division chief for Military Information and Support 

Operations (MISO) at Special Operations Command 

Europe. Most recently, LTC Paz commanded the 5th 

Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, NC. LTC Paz holds a bachelor’s 

degree in history and is currently a member of the U.S. 

Army War College resident class of 2016. Upon promotion to colonel and his graduation, he will go on 

to serve in the Washington, DC, area prior to taking 

command of a MISO unit next year.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LTC) KYLE A. REED was 

commissioned as a second lieutenant in the infantry, 

and began his professional military career in 1996 as 

a Bradley fighting vehicle platoon leader and later as 

a battalion support platoon leader at Fort Stewart, 

Georgia. Following completion of the Infantry Officer 

Advance Course in 1999, he was assigned to the 1st 

Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division at Fort 
xiv

Bragg, North Carolina. While there, he served in a variety of assignments including as a brigade and battalion assistant operations officer, command of Alpha 

and Headquarters Companies, 2nd Battalion, 504th 

Parachute Infantry Regiment, and commander of the 

United States Army Advanced Airborne School. During these commands, he deployed once to Afghanistan and twice to Iraq in support of the Global War 

on Terror, 2003 - 2004. After completion of the Army’s 

Command and General Staff College in 2007, he was 

assigned back to the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd 

Airborne Division to serve as the operations officer 

and executive officer, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute 

Infantry Regiment. From 2007 to 2010, he deployed 

to Iraq for two year-long deployments. From 2010 to 

2012, he served as an Infantry Branch assignment officer for majors and lieutenant colonels at Fort Knox, 

Kentucky. LTC Reed next served as a special assistant 

and speech-writer to the Commander, U.S. European 

Command/Supreme Allied Commander Europe. His 

last assignment was as the commander, 1st Squadron 

(Airborne), 91st Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) at Grafenwoehr, Germany. As a commander, he led operations in Atlantic 

Resolve, U.S. reassurance to the NATO Alliance and 

the Baltic Nations, and Fearless Guardian, a U.S. training mission in support of Ukraine military forces to 

increase the defense capabilities of their Nation. LTC 

Reed received his bachelor’s degree in business administration from Appalachian State University in Boone, 

North Carolina in August 1995. In 2007, he completed 

his master’s degree in business and organizational 

security management from Webster University.
xv

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (Lt Col) LENDY “ALAMO” RENEGAR first entered military service in 1991 

as a U.S. Army National Guard intelligence analyst 

and was later commissioned through the U.S. Air 

Force ROTC program at North Carolina State University in 1994 with a bachelor’s degree in meteorology. He holds a master’s degree in aeronautics from 

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Florida, and 

is a graduate of Air War College, Department of Distance Education. While commanding the 493d Fighter 

Squadron at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, his squadron won the 2014 Raytheon Trophy for the top Fighter 

Squadron in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) for its efforts 

in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing and Icelandic Air Policing missions during the Russian invasion of Crimea. 

Lt Col Renegar commanded three deployed Air Expeditionary Groups for NATO and served as the chief of 

the commander’s action group for the U.S. Air Forces 

in Europe. He has served in combat over the skies of 

Iraq and has piloted the F-15 aircraft in multiple operational active air scrambles and intercepts including 

the first night vision goggle identification of a Russian 

fighter in USAF history. Lt Col Renegar is currently a 

member of the U.S. Army War College resident class 

of 2016, upon completion of which he will serve as the 

chief of staff for the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, 

Train-Advise-Assist-Command-Air (TAAC-AIR) in 

Kabul, Afghanistan.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (Lt.Col.) JOHN T. 

VAUGHAN is an assault amphibious vehicle officer 

in the U.S. Marine Corps. He holds a master’s degree 

in security studies (Europe and Eurasia) from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a designated Eurasian 

regional area officer and a former accredited Marine 
Attaché to Kyiv, Ukraine. Upon graduation from the 

U.S. Army War College, he will assume duties as 

deputy G-3, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, in 

Manama, Bahrain.

xvi
xvii

 SUMMARY

Over the past century, U.S. relations with Russia 

have evolved from ally to enemy to strategic partner to 

competitor. The political landscape and national interests of the Russian Federation have changed since the 

breakup of the Soviet Union. As a result, relations between Russia and the United States today are strained, 

largely because of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Understanding Russia’s intentions has been challenging and 

difficult in the past for the United States. This monograph argues that Russia’s foreign policy is driven by 

four overarching factors: Russian President Vladimir 

Putin’s approach to the world around him; the Kremlin’s desire for centralized control of the population; 

Russia’s desire to protect its homeland through an 

outside “buffer zone;” and an enduring distrust of the 

West. 

Given these drivers of Russian foreign policy, deterring Russia without provoking conflict or creating a 

spiraling security dilemma is a difficult task. Russia’s 

actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have put the 

Baltic States and Eastern Europe on edge. The primary 

challenge for the United States and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) is to deter both a conventional threat and an ambiguous1

 threat as Russia 

works toward achieving its objectives. The most dangerous scenario facing the West is a Russian advance 

into Alliance territory with conventional forces, but 

many assume this is not very likely. Alternatively, an 

indirect Russian approach using ambiguous warfare 

to fracture the Alliance and increase Russia’s influence in Europe is far more likely. 

In attempting to devise solutions that would address both a conventional and an ambiguous threat, 
xviii

this monograph theorizes that based on current force 

structure, NATO lacks the capability to defeat a surprise Russian conventional attack into the Baltic States 

or Eastern Europe, regardless of the likelihood of such 

a scenario. However, this does not preclude the need 

to enhance conventional capabilities, modify force 

posture, and develop additional capabilities to counter both conventional and ambiguous threats, which 

will in turn underpin credible deterrence against Russian aggression.

To develop such capabilities requires a concerted 

effort on the part of NATO, the European Union (EU), 

and their member states, with the United States playing a key role. Yet Washington cannot afford, through 

its efforts, to reassure allies to the point where they 

solely rely on the United States to ensure their security. Therefore, European NATO members should 

continue searching for more effective ways to increase 

capabilities and progressively increase their defense 

budgets. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies 

must employ a coordinated, whole of government 

effort to address capabilities beyond the scope of the 

military, such as law enforcement, that are critical to 

addressing an ambiguous threat. Additionally, the 

United States European Command (EUCOM) and the 

United States Army Europe (USAREUR) must more 

effectively align their security cooperation activities to 

support capability development, especially through 

NATO’s defense planning process.

In doing these things, the United States and NATO 

must be careful that reassurance and deterrence activities, and associated policies, do not provoke further 

Russian aggression, or lead to a new security dilemma. To that end, any policy or strategy toward Russia 

must understand Russian intentions and the likelihood of a conventional attack—balanced against the 
xix

reality of potential ambiguous activities and Russian 

influence in Europe. 

In light of the key considerations outlined above, 

this monograph offers the following recommendations: 

• The Department of Defense (DoD) should assign, allocate, and apportion forces versus 

aligning them, in support of EUCOM’s Theater 

Campaign Plan and contingency plans.

• The U.S. Army should assign a Joint Task Force 

(JTF)-capable two-star headquarters (HQ) to 

USAREUR.

• The U.S. Army should establish a rotational allocation of an Armored Brigade Combat Team 

(ABCT) that provides a continuous armor presence in Europe.

• The U.S. Army should ensure its units receive 

the requisite security cooperation, and/or foreign internal defense-specific training for conventional units. 

• The National Guard’s State Partnership Program should focus more explicitly on building 

and maintaining allies’ resiliency in the face of 

ambiguous warfare. 

• EUCOM should re-examine its theater security 

cooperation (TSC) process to more effectively 

nest efforts between EUCOM and USAREUR.

○ EUCOM and USAREUR should more effectively make use of NATO capability targets, 

part of the NATO Defense Planning Process, 

to define the types of activities that will focus 

on lacking capabilities. 

○ EUCOM should reduce the number of exercises in order to focus on high-quality, fully 

integrated NATO operations. 
xx

○ EUCOM should synchronize country-specific 

sections of its Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) 

with the U.S. Embassy Integrated Country 

Strategies.

• EUCOM and USAREUR should ensure staffs 

are trained, particularly those involved in security cooperation, to conduct strategic and operational planning, and to understand the nesting of national security objectives with Alliance 

capability targets. 

• The Joint Staff and the U.S. Army should improve manning levels of appropriate staff expertise to plan and manage the inform and influence activities at EUCOM, subordinate units, 

and within the proposed two-star HQ. 

• The DoD and Department of State (DoS) should 

ensure they have effective mechanisms to coordinate information campaigns, and make necessary adjustments as the information environment evolves. 

• The DoD should reconsider its representation at the U.S. Mission to the EU in order to 

enhance its ability to synchronize efforts with 

NATO and EUCOM. 

• Washington needs to build a concerted effort 

among interagency partners to identify areas 

where the United States can assist European 

NATO members develop capabilities to deter 

Russia’s ambiguous warfare. 

• NATO should re-examine its Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) authority to 

reposition forces in Europe. 

• NATO should move toward a NATO multinational logistics capability. 
xxi

• NATO should streamline the timeline for approvals of counter-Russia actions. 

• NATO should reinitiate dialogue with Russia.

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY 

1. The use of the term “ambiguous” rather than the more 

common term of “hybrid” is discussed in Chapter 1, and is the 

term used throughout this monograph.

xxiii

METHODOLOGY

The research for this project began with an indepth study of available literature, to include a relatively vast amount of recent publications on Russia’s 

resurgence and U.S. responses. It also included a series of research discussions with various staff civilian 

and military personnel at the Army Staff, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense Staff, the U.S. Department of 

State, the U.S. Military Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. Mission to 

NATO, the NATO International Staff, the U.S. National Military Representative to Supreme Headquarters 

Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) staff, the SHAPE staff, 

the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) staff, and 

the United States European Command (EUCOM) staff. 

The research also included discussions and vetting of 

initial findings with members of various Washington, 

DC-based think tanks. 

xxv

INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War peace dividend in Europe 

seems to be coming to an end. Russia is demonstrating 

its military might, and a very savvy ability to influence 

European politics, economics, and the media. Meanwhile, much of 

Europe remains 

dependent on 

Moscow for energy security, 

creating vulnerabilities that 

affect civilians 

as well as military activities 

and operations. 

Elsewhere, the 

refugee crisis 

and recent terrorist attacks in 

Paris and Brussels have put Europe on edge. In the face of a major 

threat from returning foreign fighters, several Schengen agreement countries have recently reinstituted 

border controls.

U.S. policymakers clearly face a multitude of national security challenges in Europe, and all deserve 

some level of attention from the National Security 

Council. However, and even though the security landscape is indeed evolving, the United States has made 

it clear that Europe is no longer its primary security 

concern. Instead, Washington continues to pursue the 

rebalance to Asia while keeping a watchful eye on the 

Middle East. The challenge lies in how to prioritize 

“In the afternoon of August 8, 2008, 

then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 

ordered the military to start the ‘Operation to 

force Georgia to peace.’ Russian aircraft destroyed Georgian military bases and airfields, 

and Russian tanks rolled into the republic, 

quickly ousting the Georgian forces and forcing them far into Georgian territory, stopping just short of the capital, Tbilisi. Infantry 

and paratroopers followed, securing control 

on the ground. By August 12, the military 

stage of the operation was over.

The military casualties from the Russian 

side were over 70 people dead, while the Georgian military said they lost over 150 servicemen. Hundreds of people were wounded.”1
xxvi

increasingly limited resources to address these global 

threats. Bringing this down to the regional level in Europe, the United States must prioritize how and with 

what it should 

respond to the increasing multitude 

of challenges in 

Europe. Washington will need to accept some level of 

risk, while asking 

its European allies 

and partners to do 

more. The European Union (EU) and 

the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) are 

both working to 

address the challenges associated 

with the refugee 

crisis and terrorism. NATO is also 

considering how 

best to deter an increasingly aggressive Russia, which 

will likely be a major theme at its upcoming summit in 

Warsaw in July 2016. While the United States remains 

concerned with the numerous challenges in Europe 

to its national security interests, and to its relationships with its allies and partners, actions clearly point 

to a focus on reassuring NATO allies and deterring 

Russian aggression in the Baltic States and Eastern 

“In recent years, Russia has notably 

increased the size and frequency of its 

annual military exercises, and taken additional steps such as staging snap exercises and conducting surprise inspections 

of military units, steps aimed to improve 

the combat readiness of Russian forces 

for large-scale regional conflicts. Between 

February 2014 and September 2015, Russia conducted at least six snap exercises of 

various scope and size and two large-scale 

planned exercises involving forces in the 

Western, Central, and Southern Military 

Districts. A snap exercise in Kaliningrad 

consisted of 9,000 military personnel, 

along with hundreds of armored vehicles 

and artillery. Another snap exercise in 

the Western and Central Military Districts mobilized 150,000 personnel and the 

Baltic Fleet. These exercises demonstrate 

Moscow’s ability to rapidly move military forces along its borders and pose an 

immediate concern to NATO’s Eastern 

allies. Poland, for instance, was motivated 

to invoke Article 4 consultations at NATO 

headquarters in March 2014 given the perceived threat these exercises represented to 

its security.”2
xxvii

Europe.The United States recently 

sent a clear message with the 

dramatic funding 

increase for the 

European Reassurance Initiative 

in the President’s 

proposed fiscal 

year 2017 budget, 

from just under $1 

billion to $3.4 billion. 

Acknowledging the many 

challenges in Europe and their 

potential impact 

on U.S. national 

security and that 

of European allies 

and partners, and 

recognizing the 

role of the Department of Defense 

(DoD) in securing 

national security 

objectives, this 

monograph focuses on the threat 

from a resurgent 

Russia to the Baltic States and 

Eastern Europe. 

Russia Strengthens Western 

Military District.

“Russia’s defense leadership has signaled that among its priorities for 2016 will 

be the creation of ‘three divisions’ in the 

Western Military District (MD): a move 

sure to ignite further speculation concerning Moscow’s intentions toward its neighbors. This initiative has already prompted 

suggestions that it is a response to North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercises in the Alliance’s east. . . . On January 12, . . . Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu 

outlined some of the achievements of 2015 

as well as the challenges ahead. In particular, he noted that during the previous year, 

the level of modern equipment and weaponry in the Armed Forces had increased 

to 47 percent, with the 2016 target set at 51 

percent. Among the priority areas for the 

next 12 months, Shoigu gave prime position to . . . nuclear triad, continuing ‘snap 

inspections’ of the Armed Forces, improving strategic mobility, working on air defense. . .The idea that Shoigu had used the 

creation of three divisions in Western MD 

as a counter-move against NATO soon 

took hold in some Russian media coverage. 

Notably, an article by Aleksandr Goltz, the 

deputy editor of Yezhednevny Zhurnal, elevated Shoigu’s priority for the 20th Army 

as the ‘most important’ issue facing the 

Armed Forces in 2016. . . 

Clear evidence indicates that the General Staff uses the snap inspections to justify further changes to the Armed Forces, 

and in many cases quietly ‘refine’ the ‘New 

Look’ reforms. . .The latest reform in the 

Western MD is a limited or low-key effort 

to ‘respond’ to increased NATO activity, 

but its roots lie in the ongoing shifts in 

Russian military organization and trying 

to make sense of the reformed structures 

from the period 2008–2012.”3
xxviii

This monograph also addresses a specific element of 

Russian policy and strategy whilst recognizing that 

any U.S. policy or strategy toward Russia must consider the totality of Russia’s actions. Such consideration 

is essential since Russian actions, while geographically focused, may actually be in response to perceived 

adversarial action in another geographic location (e.g. 

Russia action in the Arctic or the Middle East could be 

“On February 8, President Vladimir Putin ordered a ‘snap inspection’ military exercise in the Southern Military District (MD). . . . The 

pattern of snap inspection exercises in Russia is now well established, 

introduced in February 2013 by Defense Minister Army-General Sergei 

Shoigu in an effort to raise combat readiness in the Armed Forces. These 

exercises are used to assess units and test various aspects of the military. 

Massive snap exercises are also frequently used to send signals to other 

actors, as exemplified by their regular use following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in February–March 2014. . . . According to defense 

ministry sources, the main theme of the February snap inspection in the 

Southern MD was to rehearse the defense of the Crimean Peninsula from 

a “massive air attack.” Consequently, the air force and air defense played 

a significant part. . . . However, the snap inspection in the Southern 

MD was staged in the context of an enduring period of tensions in Russia’s relations with the United States as well as NATO, stemming from 

Moscow’s behavior in Ukraine and disagreement over its intervention in 

Syria. Indeed, given heightened tensions between Ankara and Moscow 

since the Turkish downing of the Russian Su-24M bomber on November 

24, 2015, the snap inspection may have been calibrated to showcase Russia’s capability to respond to escalation, should the Turkish government 

take such risks. Moreover, the exercise coincided with Prime Minister 

Dmitry Medvedev warning about conflict escalation risks in Syria during the Munich Security Conference. Medvedev especially targeted his 

warnings toward other actors contemplating sending ground forces to 

the conflict in Syria. . .

Given the timing of the snap inspection, its composition, and the 

prominent role assigned to rebuffing an imaginary and highly improbable ‘massive air attack’ on Crimea, it is certainly possible that Russia’s 

political-military leadership wants the exercise to convey a warning of 

escalation risks to foreign powers considering a more direct military role 

in Syria—and one that crosses Moscow’s strategic aims and interest in 

the country. If so, that warning includes Turkey, a country covered by 

NATO’s Article 5. . .” 4
xxix

in response to Allied action in Eastern Europe). Thus, 

policies and strategies must consider intended effects, 

potential Russian responses and reactions, as well as 

second and third order effects on Russia and other relevant actors. Policy and strategy should also address 

ways to preclude or mitigate unacceptable Russian 

behavior. Additionally, although Russia indeed possesses the capabilities to pose an existential threat to 

the United States, this monograph begins from the assumption that current Russian actions are not a direct 

existential threat to the United States, but rather are 

an existential threat to European security institutions, 

and in particular to NATO and the EU. If those institutions fail, then so could the current order in Europe 

“Approximately 600 paratroopers, from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, deployed for training rotations in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 

Poland, April 23-28 [2014], to enhance ongoing military-to-military relationships and demonstrate assurance of America's commitment to its 

NATO allies. . . . April 24, paratroopers from Company A, 1st Battalion, 

503rd Infantry Regiment, arrived in Riga, Latvia, to conduct small unit 

and leader training with members of the Latvian Land Forces Infantry 

Brigade. . . . At [a] ceremony, attended by Latvian Prime Minister Laimdota Straujumaas, as well as other senior officials and the American ambassador, Straujumaas said that by hosting paratroopers from the 173rd, 

‘one of the best American military's best,’ Latvia feels NATO's solidarity 

and how important Latvia is to the other partners of the alliance. . . . On 

April 26, paratroopers from Company B, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry 

Regiment, 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), arrived at 

Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania, to begin training with the Lithuanian 

army's ‘Iron Wolf’ Mechanized Infantry Brigade at the Rukla training 

area. . . . ‘These exercises send a strong message: We stay true to our 

word with our NATO allies,’ said 2nd Lt. Joseph Dunfy, a paratrooper 

also with Company B. . .

‘This is an opportunity to reassure Lithuania that we are here to be 

committed to them and that we'll stand next to [our partners] no matter 

what,’ said Sgt. Jonathan Grant, a paratrooper with Company B. . . . 

These training rotations ‘are an obvious manifestation of the commitment between our countries and this alliance,’ said [Maj. Gen. Richard 

C. Longo, deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Europe].”5
xxx

with a potential second order effect that could significantly increase the threat to U.S. national security. 

Source: Central Intelligence Agency

Figure I-1. Map of Russia.

This monograph includes recommendations on 

how and where the U.S. Army, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and NATO should focus efforts to 

achieve defined effects. It does so fully recognizing that 

the United States has tried for many years to encourage its European NATO allies to pull a greater share 

of the burden. This monograph also recognizes that 

with global commitments, the United States can no 

longer afford to lift the bar from the allies when it becomes too heavy. While the solutions this monograph 
xxxi

proposes may not be 

politically palatable 

for many allies, they 

must nevertheless be 

considered in light of 

the current trajectory 

in European security. 

Winning in a complex 

world requires the 

U.S. Army to help allies succeed in pulling 

their share of the burden. Looking beyond 

the Army, this monograph also addresses 

where the U.S. DoD 

and other interagency 

partners play a role. 

This monograph sets 

aside any discussion 

on the role of nuclear 

deterrence, focusing 

instead on the role of 

conventional forces. 

Finally, holistic solutions to respond to 

Russian resurgence go 

well beyond the scope 

of the military, where 

even partial military 

solutions require Joint 

action. Consequently, 

this monograph analyzes the situation 

primarily from a landEstonians were fully engaged in 

their independence celebration hosting a parade and air display in the 

capital city of Tallinn. The viewing 

platform was full of distinguished 

visitors, including a representative 

of the Russian Federation. The crowd 

was waiting on a North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) fly-by 

that included four F-15 Eagle fighter 

jets from the U.S. Air Forces Europe. 

The Russian turned to the Estonian 

Air Chief with a smile and remarked 

that he expected the F-15s to be late. 

They weren’t. A few minutes earlier, over 100 miles away, they had 

completed an intercept of a Russian 

Federation Air Force aircraft violating Estonian airspace. They escorted 

it out of Estonia’s sovereign airspace 

and went supersonic over the Baltic 

Sea to make the fly-by on time much 

to the delight of the crowd. The Estonian ambassador to NATO, Lauri 

Lepik, later commented that the 

“intensity of Russian flights, and 

the fact that that they’ve been conducting patrols with strategic bombers, was completely unpredictable.” 

Ambassador Lepik went on to say “I 

do not recall ever having a Russian 

strategic bomber flying around us.” 

Russia is also using the land and 

maritime domains; in one instance in 

the spring of 2014, it deployed nearly 

50,000 soldiers on the NATO’s border in an unannounced snap exercise 

that appeared to “mimic a potential 

conflict with Europe.” Lithuania 

and Estonia have expressed concern 

at the growing number (and type) of 

Russian Navy exercises in the Baltic 

Sea. 6
xxxii

power perspective, to include most of the considerations and recommendations proposed within it. 

This monograph includes five primary chapters, 

followed by a concluding chapter. The first chapter 

frames the strategic environment in which Russia operates in order to provide a baseline understanding of 

its actions. It argues that effectively tempering Russia’s actions in the future is best accomplished though 

the persistent use of the diplomatic and economic 

instruments of national power. Given the zero-sum 

mindset of Russian leaders, using the military instru-

 —Photo courtesy of Lt. Col. Rex “Lurch” Lewis

A U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) assigned F-15C from the 

493d Fighter Squadron out of Royal Air Force Lakenheath, 

UK intercepts a Russian Federation Air Force Aircraft during NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission in 2014 shortly after the Russian invasion of Crimea. Forward-based combat 

power enabled these fighters to respond to trouble in the 

Baltics in under 14 hours, a time that European leaders insist 

can’t be accomplished from the United States.

Figure I-2. F-15 Intercepts.
xxxiii

ment of power in an overt way is likely to lead to escalation and conflict. Nonetheless, the military instrument should be used in a nuanced, indirect fashion 

that strengthens and reassures NATO allies and partners and galvanizes the Alliance, emphasizing the fact 

that NATO is a deterrent to Russia. Taking into consideration Russia’s willingness to use military force 

to achieve its objectives, the second chapter explores 

deterrence efforts. It does so in order to clearly define 

what deterrence is, and relies on the key tenants of 

deterrence theory to assess the United States’ ability 

to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic States and 

Eastern Europe. It then identifies conventional deterrence solutions, which also sets the foundation for the 

subsequent three chapters. 

Chapter 3 focuses on the time-distance challenge 

that a potential adversary could exploit to Washington’s disadvantage, especially in the absence of robust 

indicators and warnings. It argues that two key force 

structure elements should be returned to U.S. Army 

Europe: an assigned two-star headquarters (HQ) 

and a rotationally allocated Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) providing a continuous heel-to-toe 

presence of armor in Europe. These forces should 

remain in place until the strategic calculus changes 

again, for example, when Russia no longer threatens 

its neighbors or NATO’s new Wales Summit initiatives are in place and ready to respond to further Russian aggression. The third chapter also argues that 

NATO should consider several steps to mitigate some 

of the time-distance challenges, including augmenting 

the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in 

Europe (SACEUR), developing multinational logistics 

capabilities, and streamlining deployment approval 

processes.
xxxiv

Chapter 4 addresses how the Army and EUCOM 

can better leverage theater security cooperation (TSC), 

including foreign internal defense (FID), to build a 

credible conventional deterrent in Europe. It argues 

that the best way for NATO, EUCOM, and the U.S. 

Army to counter the most dangerous course of action 

posed by Russia without the return of large numbers 

of troops to Europe is through focused TSC, and in 

particular a refocusing of exercises in Europe. 

Chapter 5 briefly examines U.S. and NATO operations in the highly contested information battle-space. 

It also highlights key areas of Russian propaganda, 

identifies shortfalls in U.S. abilities and areas of risk, 

and offers recommendations to mitigate the associated shortcomings. This monograph then concludes 

by highlighting key points and recommendations for 

senior leaders to consider.

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. “5 years after 5-Day War: Russia and Georgia bury 

the hatchet,” RT (website), August 7, 2013, available from

https://www.rt.com/politics/ossetia-georgia-russia-media-166/, 

accessed April 4, 2016.

2. Kathleen H. Hicks et al., Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force 

Posture in Europe: Phase I Report, Roman and Littlefield: New 

York, February 2016, pp. 2-3, available from csis.org/files/publication/160203_Hicks_ArmyForcePosture_Web.pdf, accessed February 

24, 2016.

3. Roger McDermott, “Russia Strengthens Western Military District,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 13, Iss. 12, January 19, 

2016, available from www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44997&cHash=daa62f47a1dbb05ce883ba3ef

c391fab#.Vv7IiqQrLic, accessed April 1, 2016.
xxxv

4. Roger McDermott, “Putin Orders ‘Snap Inspection’ Exercise in Southern Military District,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 

13, Iss. 31, February 16, 2016, available from www.jamestown.org/

single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45097&no_cache=1#.Vv7GpaQrLic, accessed April 1, 2016.

5. A.M. LaVey, “173rd Paratroopers Arrive in Poland, Baltics for Unscheduled Exercises,” The Official Homepage of the 

United States Army, April 30, 2014, available from www.army.mil/

article/125040/, accessed April 1, 2016.

6. One of the authors commanded the NATO Baltic Air Police 

Mission from January 1, 2014 - May 1, 2014, during the Russian 

invasion of Crimea. High-ranking Lithuanian Air Force officers 

who were located on the viewing platform relayed this story to 

the same author.

7. Ibid.

8. Elisabeth Braw, “Bully in the Baltics: The Kremlin’s Provocations,” World Affairs, Vol. 177, No. 6, Mar-Apr 2015, p. 2.

9. Ibid.

10. “Russia Targets NATO with Military Exercises,” STRATFOR, March 19, 2015, available from https://www.stratfor.com/anal

ysis/russia-targets-nato-military-exercises, accessed March 21, 2016.

11. Damien Sharkov, “Conflict: Russian navy practices 

anti-submarine combat in Baltic and Arctic,” Newsweek, July 10, 

2015, available from europe.newsweek.com/russian-navy-practicesanti-submarine-combat-baltic-arctic-330131, accessed March 21, 

2016.

1

CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S AIMS THROUGH 

THE LENS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN, HISTORY 

AND CULTURE

Over the past century, U.S. relations with Russia 

have evolved from ally to enemy to strategic partner to competitor. Relations between Russia and the 

United States today are strained in light of Russia’s 

actions in Ukraine as well as each actor’s diverging 

interests. One question persists as the West tries to 

understand Russia. What motivates Russian President 

Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy approach toward the 

United States and Eastern Europe and how can the 

United States influence Russia’s foreign policy? The 

ability of the United States to understand Russia has 

been challenging and difficult in the past. Moreover, 

the political landscape and national interests of the 

Russian Federation have drastically changed since the 

breakup of the Soviet Union, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) enlargement, the Global War 

on Terror, and the current Islamic State in Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS) conflict in Syria. 

The United States consistently misunderstands 

Russia’s aims due to differences between U.S. and 

Russian political, social, and strategic culture. A common fallacy in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia is 

the belief that Russians think, behave, and make decisions like U.S. citizens. American policymakers are 

confused when Russian policymakers make decisions 

that are ambiguous and diverge from U.S. ideals and 

policy aims. Attempting to employ “mirror imaging” 

as a way of influencing Russian foreign policy is dangerous and has yielded little benefit.1

 The reset policy 
2

of 2009 validates the cognitive trap of mirror imaging 

specifically with the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) of 2010. New START sought to mutually reduce nuclear arms and launchers between 

the United States and Russia. Applying the principle 

of mirror imaging, if Russia thought like the United 

States, then both parties would likely agree to diminish their nuclear arsenals equally as part of the compromise. Conversely, since Russia thinks differently 

than the United States and more so in the mindset of a 

zero-sum game, New START required cuts to the U.S. 

nuclear arsenal while not reducing that of Russia.2

Sun Tzu professes that one must know oneself and 

the enemy. If one knows neither then one is always 

in peril.3 To understand the Russian mindset and influence it, one must be intimately familiar with the 

context of history, Russian/Soviet culture, and how 

these factors influence the Russian executive decisionmaking process. For example, the Russian desires to 

protect its homeland and a general distrust of outsiders have been unusually strong influences on Russian foreign policy. Careful examination of Russia’s 

national interests as well as the previous decisions of 

Russian leadership to meet those ends can assist U.S. 

policymakers in developing successful strategies and 

policies to deal with the Russian Federation in the 

coming century. 

In attempting to understand what has motivated 

and incentivized previous and current Russian leaders, this chapter argues that Russia’s foreign policy 

toward the West is driven chiefly by four overarching 

concepts: the psychological background of President 

Putin and the evolution of his thought process; the 

desire for Russian domestic control of the population 

through a centralized government; a general, enduring distrust of the West; and protection of the Russian 
3

homeland through an outside “buffer zone.”4 After 

specifying the nature of these concepts, this chapter 

will then assess the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools most likely to influence Russia’s foreign policy approach.

PUTIN: SHAPED BY CULTURE, HISTORY AND 

EXPERIENCE

The actions of President Putin illustrate decisionmaking trends of his foreign policy as well as his interactions with the United States and Europe. He has 

been called a tsar, an autocrat, and above all else a 

protector of the Russian Federation.5 Putin’s psychological background was shaped early in his career 

through Western interaction. Putin was the former 

head of Russian Federal Security Service, Federalnaya 

Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), a successor of the Committee for State Security Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti KGB), and also a self-proclaimed Chekist (from 

the abbreviation for Extraordinary Commision, ChK) 

who spent a considerable amount of time outside of 

the Soviet Union in 1985-1990 in East Germany. Chekists view themselves as top leaders in Russia who orchestrate the political and economic well-being of the 

state.6 Time spent out of Moscow proper gave Putin a 

more holistic approach to Russia’s place in the international order.7

 He has a strong sense of national pride 

and order from his KGB background, but his posting 

outside of Russia has given him a unique perception 

of Europe and the West. From this peripheral position, Putin gained an acute awareness of the widening 

economic, technological, and strategic gaps between 

Russia and the West.8 Putin saw this widening gap as 

a potential domestic threat. If the Russian population 

were exposed to a better way of life through economic 
4

and technological advances, then surely an uprising 

inside Russia would ensue. This exposure may have 

shaped his views that the Russian population should 

be insulated from the West and strictly controlled to 

ensure Russia’s preservation and status quo. Further, 

Putin’s desire to control the Russian population stems 

from his sense of preserving the state and keeping the 

system intact.9 This feeling of control and preserving 

the homeland was also evident in the way that Putin 

handled the conflicts in Dagestan and Chechnya in the 

late 1990s. Fearing the collapse of the Russian state, 

Putin moved Russian forces into Chechnya to keep 

Chechnya under Russian control. Should Chechnya 

gain independence, Putin feared it would only keep 

expanding and seize additional territories.10

Source: The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/18/

bilateral-meeting-president-putin.

Relations between the United States and Russia have become increasingly tense over the past decade. The actions of 

President Vladimir Putin illustrate decision-making trends 

of his foreign policy as well as his interactions with the United States and Europe.

Figure 1-1. U.S. President Barack Obama and 

Russian President Vladimir Putin.
5

Moving on from the FSB, Putin was appointed as 

Prime Minister in 1999. In 1999, President Boris Yeltsin stepped down and Putin became acting president. 

Putin came into the presidency in an era of instability 

and crisis. During Yeltsin’s tenure as president, Russia was in a period of decline. Russia struggled to define itself in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet 

Union. Russian agricultural and industrial production was half of its previous output, and death rates 

increased as birth rates declined.11 Russia’s political 

leadership lacked stability, strength, and continuity. 

Economically, Russia was trending downward. This 

was evident in several areas such as the country’s 

search for a post-Soviet identity and purpose, ineffective governance, and rampant corruption.12

Putin represented a much-needed return to stability and competence in governance and foreign policy, 

which was a stark contrast to Yeltsin’s mismanagement of foreign policy and string of domestic policy 

failures. Yeltsin’s presidency was plagued by failure 

to enact reforms in several key areas ranging from 

military and security reforms to energy sector and 

social entitlements.13 To the Russian people, Putin 

represented a return to an idealized world of stability 

and order.14 Putin moved away from Yeltsin’s ad-hoc 

management style and used his influence to return 

a significant amount of power back to the executive 

branch. Putin’s pragmatic leadership style has centered on one of centralized control and consistency.15

Because of Putin’s strong hand and institution of 

centralized government or a vertikal vlasti, he continues to enjoy popular Russian support. Vertikal vlasti is 

the single line of power that emerges from the executive branch of the Russian president down to federal 

and provincial levels of government. Additionally, a 
6

vertikal vlasti reduces the system of checks and balances on the executive by the legislative and judicial 

branches of government. Use of the single line of power has enabled Putin to advance his agenda, reduce 

opposition to his policies and maintain control of the 

Russian population, as well as maintain control of the 

strategic narrative in his foreign policy actions, a point 

that Chapter 5 will further explore. 

The enduring theme in Putin’s first term as president was that of a savior.16 The Russian population 

saw him as restoring order to governance, and establishing national identity and international rapport. 

The West saw him as a competent and amenable person. Putin’s rhetoric at this time was European leaning—he espoused that Russia was a European nation 

and was receptive to discussions on European security 

and economic integration.17 Putin’s initial aims were 

twofold—a calculated approach to restore Russian 

stability to government and a strategic approach to restore Russia’s former status in the international order. 

Putin has often been compared to Louis XIV and his 

mantra regarding France, “L’état c’est moi” (“I am the 

State”). Putin was seen domestically as a leader who 

was reviving Russia, but some questioned whether his 

policies would change under his successor. 

Dmitry Medvedev was Putin’s protégé and handpicked successor in 2008, much as Putin was chosen 

by Yeltsin. Similar to the Yeltsin years, prime ministers have been appointed and presidential successors 

are chosen prior to any democratic election. Because of 

this, there typically has not been a significant change 

in Russian governance from president to president 

since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it 

seems highly unlikely that Russian policy will change 

dramatically whenever Putin leaves the political stage, 
7

which is a key assumption in developing long-term 

policies and strategies toward Russia.

Additionally, studies of previous “democratic” 

processes in Russia illustrate a far different type of democracy than what is typically observed in the West. 

In Russia, democracy is more illiberal and managed. 

The system of government is more autocratic with 

elements of democracy. Democratic institutions such 

as free and fair elections and freedom of speech are 

“managed” in Russia to “maintain order.”18 The term 

hybrid regime is often used to describe the Russian 

Government with a combination of authoritarian and 

diminished democratic elements. The opposition to 

the incumbent rarely prevails, because it is difficult to 

mobilize enough support to wage a campaign in the 

extremely limited political space that the government 

makes available to “opposition” forces. 

In the case of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, 

there were very few deviations from Putin’s previous security policies.19 In his policy “National Security Strategy until 2020,” Medvedev stated that Russia 

should emphasize multi-polarity in a U.S.-dominated 

unipolar system, openness to diplomacy (even with 

the West), protection of Russians wherever they may 

live, and the assumption that Russia has privileged 

interests in the near abroad.20 Medvedev’s presidency 

was receptive to diplomacy with the West, yet it was 

also tempered with caution and distrust. 

In essence, Medvedev’s foreign and security policy 

did not vastly differ from that of Putin.21 Furthermore, 

Putin remained in the Russian Government as prime 

minister to monitor and mentor his successor. Medvedev’s presidency and security policies were remarkably consistent with the Putin years. Overall, Medvedev was criticized for an inability to gain control of his 
8

security administration’s apparatus during the tenure 

of his presidency. He did not wield the same power 

and control inside of the vertikal vlasti as Putin.22 This 

became clear during the 2008 Georgia-South Ossetia 

crisis when no Russian executive decisions were made 

until Prime Minister Putin returned from the Olympic 

Games in Beijing. 

Although not as effective as Putin, Medvedev did 

set the conditions in his security strategy for the international community to perceive Russia as a country 

that had persevered and overcome its domestic issues, 

was recovering economically and should be a peer 

amongst other world powers.23 Above all else, both 

Putin and Medvedev shared another common goal, to 

remain in power and to see Russian aims realized. Both 

leaders saw the need to maintain and preserve a veneer of legitimate governance that the Russian people 

could rely upon at any cost.24 The Western version of a 

legitimate government implies a system that elects its 

leaders through competitive elections, the presence of 

civil society, and an adherence to “rule of law.” Both 

Medvedev and Putin encouraged legitimacy with the 

ultimate goal to stay in power, but their actions run 

counter to a truly Western legitimate democratic government. Elections in Russia have never been truly 

competitive, free, or fair, and Russian control of the 

media continues. 

Each leader viewed the loss of control domestically as a loss of international respect. Both Putin and 

Medvedev believed that the appearance of a legitimate government must be maintained both at home 

and in the near abroad in order to quell the threat of 

a democratic uprising in Moscow. Neither Putin nor 

Medvedev wanted another color revolution happening in Moscow as they had in Kiev, Tbilisi, or Bishkek. 
9

According to the 2009 Russian security strategy and 

analysis by Dr. Hans-Henning Schroder, a professor at 

the University of Bremen, “an ‘orange scenario’—a development resembling that in Ukraine in 2004/2005—

is just as unacceptable to the Medvedev Administration as it was to Putin at the time.”25 Emerging color 

revolutions in Russia’s near abroad have increased 

Putin’s distrust of Western democracy, which he associates with a loss of order and control.

RUSSIAN DOMESTIC CONTROL IS 

STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT 

The Kremlin believes that a loss of internal control gives the perception of weakness and diminishes 

Russia’s international stature.26 Maintaining control of 

the population has been a cornerstone of Soviet and 

Russian governance. It has been a common thread 

from Yuri Andropov’s tenure as General Secretary of 

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1983 to 

President Putin’s three presidential terms. Soviet and 

Russian leaders have consistently believed that opposition and dissidence leads to violent uprising, a loss 

of control and weakening of the state.27 Putin maintains domestic control through the implementation of 

the vertikal vlasti, media control, and targeted violence 

to suppress dissidents. Recalling the Yeltsin years of 

the Russian presidency where disorder, economic 

collapse, and corruption abounded, Putin in his first 

term, implemented measures to reign in provincial 

leaders and other branches of government to restore 

order.28
10

Under the Putin Administration, control remains 

an integral part of his leadership style. Additionally, 

Putin has heavily influenced the State Duma29, Russia’s lower house of parliament, by eliminating the 

voting process for individual candidates. Voters can 

only vote via party lists for political parties, rather 

than individual candidates. The Duma has discretion 

to appoint party leaders arbitrarily.30 More importantly, international institutions such as the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) consider elections in Russia unfair. The OSCE found fault on four 

counts with Russia’s 2007 parliamentary elections and 

viewed these elections as neither free nor fair.31

Putin has also compromised independence of the 

judicial branch, subordinating it to the elites’ perception of state interests. Putin’s Russia can be summarized and graded on its level of freedom compared 

to other countries by its Freedom House rankings. 

Freedom House, a non-profit organization dedicated 

to spreading freedom and democracy ranks Russia as 

a “6” in political rights and civil liberties,32 with “1” 

representing the most free and “7” the least free. Furthermore, Putin has taken great measures to retain 

control, reduce democratic processes, and suppress 

the opposition in Russia. 

Moreover, under Putin, there have been several 

cases of targeted violence to control the opposition. 

Specific examples include the murders of Anna Politkovskaya, an outspoken journalist and political rights 

activist in 2006, and Boris Nemtsov, leader of the opposition in 2015. Both were outspoken in their opposition of President Putin and their murders speak 

volumes of the Russian population’s willingness to 

accept silence and cooperate.33 Anne Applebaum, Pulitzer Prize-winning author and noted journalist on 
11

communism, ascertains that because of Putin’s strong 

beliefs for the good of the state and desire for control, 

dissidents must be “carefully controlled through legal pressure, public propaganda and if necessary targeted violence.34” Putin has a long-standing distrust 

of the dissidents and has suppressed them effectively 

though media control and the fear effect through targeted violence.35 Furthermore, Putin is threatened by 

the rhetoric of Western democracy and views it as a 

catalyst to incite revolution from domestic Russians.36

A RUSSIAN LEGACY OF WESTERN MISTRUST 

Russia’s distrust of Western democracy is not a 

new concept. This distrust is heavily steeped in Soviet 

leadership culture and also in Putin’s upbringing. One 

of Putin’s mentors was Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1982-1983. Andropov 

also served as director of the KGB from 1967-1982. 

During Putin’s first presidency, he erected several 

plaques to honor Andropov. Andropov largely believed in population control, strict order, and suppression of the Soviet dissident movement.37 Andropov 

was also considered to be a protector of the ideals and 

interests of the communist state, much like Putin. Further, both men witnessed similar events that would 

forge their personal disdain toward democracy and 

dissident uprisings. Andropov witnessed this during 

the Hungarian uprisings in 1956. Putin had the same 

experience in Dresden with the ransacking of the Stasi 

police in 1989. Consequently, both men formed opinions that democracy leads to protest and protest leads 

to the destruction of law and order.38 They believe that 

the Russian homeland must be protected at all costs 
12

from the threats that emerge from dissidence and 

Western ideals. Moreover, Putin blames the West for 

a myriad of issues ranging from a reduction in arms 

control agreements to fomenting attacks on Russian 

soil and the creation of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He 

made telling comments during his “new world order” 

speech at Sochi denouncing the United States in 2014.

From here emanates the next real threat of destroying 

the current system of arms control agreements. And 

this dangerous process was launched by the United 

States of America when it unilaterally withdrew from 

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002...They (United 

States) once sponsored Islamic extremist movements 

to fight the Soviet Union. Those groups got their battle 

experience in Afghanistan and later gave birth to the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda.39

CREATING A BUFFER ZONE TO PROTECT THE 

HOMELAND

Defense of the homeland is a central theme in several countries’ national security strategies, but this 

concept intensely drives Russian foreign policy, and 

is critical to developing logical and effective military 

strategies to deal with Russia. Russia’s version of 

homeland defense extends much farther than Russia’s 

natural borders and permeates into the former Soviet 

republics. To defend the homeland, Russia desires 

a buffer zone to expand its borders and protect displaced Russians.40 Under Putin’s leadership, Moscow 

protects these communities of ethnic Russians, known 

as the Russian diaspora.41 The diaspora concept prevails in Putin’s foreign policy toward Crimea, Georgia, and Ukraine and further enables Russia’s effective 

use of hybrid warfare (sometimes referred to as gray 
13

zone challenges42) in an ambiguous manner, which 

this monograph will refer to as ambiguous warfare.43

Protection of the Russian diaspora may influence the 

Russian decision-making process. Russian President 

Medvedev’s security and foreign policy of 2009 made 

several mentions of protecting ethnic Russians abroad 

and asserted that Russia has privileged interests in 

certain regions, such as the former Soviet space.44

Furthermore, Russia asserts entitlement in protecting 

ethnic Russians in its near abroad (Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic 

States) and views Western intervention as an affront 

to Russia. 

Why is a Buffer Zone So Critical?

The Kremlin and Russian leadership feel compelled to maintain a “buffer zone” around its borders 

as a security measure to prevent the violation of Russian sovereign territory. Russian security thinking 

ascertains that the country is surrounded by enemies 

and must create a buffer zone against these outside 

threats.45 This is a logical response for a country that 

has experienced invasion and occupation throughout 

its entire history from the Mongol invasion of Kievan 

Rus in 1223, to the Polish invasion of 1609, to Napoleon’s destruction of Smolensk in the Great Patriotic 

War of 1812. Throughout history, Russia has been 

invaded, occupied, and forced to adopt different cultures. Over time, this has created the Russian perception of distrust of outsiders, isolation, and an overall 

intense xenophobia. This distrust and fear of encirclement manifests itself in Russia’s tense relationship 

with NATO during periods of NATO enlargement,46

especially with the entrance of countries formerly in 

Russia’s near abroad. 
14

Despite the West’s best effort, Putin and the Kremlin have consistently viewed NATO as an “anti-Russian” security institution and an organization that habitually reduces Russia’s buffer space through NATO 

enlargement actions. In the waning years of the 20th 

century and into the 21st century, Russia was invited 

to cooperate with international institutions. Although 

Russia indeed participated in various institutions as 

an invited partner, its influence was minimized due 

to the simple fact that it was not a voting member, 

particularly in NATO and the European Union (EU). 

NATO was specifically addressed in Russia’s current National Security Strategy with language stating 

“plans to extend the Alliance’s military infrastructure 

to Russia’s borders, and attempts to endow NATO 

with global functions that go counter to norms of international law, are unacceptable to Russia.47” 

Periods of NATO enlargement have consistently 

decreased the territory between Moscow and the 

West, which according to the Russian narrative, has 

threatened Russian security.48 This expansion of new 

NATO members extended all the way to Russia’s 

western border. NATO also sought to include Russia 

by inviting it to join the North Atlantic Cooperation 

Council in 1991; the Partnership for Peace program in 

1994; establishing the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 

1997; and establishing the NATO-Russia Council in 

2002.49 Yet what the West thought was an opportunity 

for promoting democratic values, increasing security, 

and building peaceful relationships became a point 

of contention for Russia.50 NATO’s expansion denied 

Russia its buffer zone, and placed NATO within 75 

miles of St. Petersburg. Russia increasingly saw this 

as a loss of its buffer zone and a perceived expansion 

of U.S. and NATO influence in global security issues 

(e.g., Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, the NATO Mediter-
15

ranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), while marginalizing its influence.51 As Robert 

Kaplan, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, notes, NATO actions further raised Russian concerns as it provoked historical memories of 

humiliating invasions by outsiders.52 History matters 

to Russians and Russia’s need for security is deeply 

rooted in its history. Add to that all that the shame of 

a lost empire with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 

is easy to understand why Russia was not happy with 

the developing situation. During a decade of decline, 

Russia could only wait until it was in a position to do 

something about it. 

Russian Use of Armed Forces and Other Means to 

Protect its Interests.

Russia, and in particular Putin, wants to regain 

its influence and limit what it perceives as security 

threats on its borders. Russia knows it is not the world 

power today it was during the Cold War, yet it is willing to give up a lot to regain this sense of security.53

In an effort to reduce what it perceives as a security 

threat in its near abroad, Russia is looking for ways 

to create its own rules that would give it primacy. 

According to Stephen Covington, the long-time International Affairs Advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Russia further believes 

that to compete with the other great powers, it needs 

to be able to influence fundamental change within the 

security, energy, economic, and financial systems that 

surround it.54 Although its methods to operationalize 

its strategy are not new,55 Russia is creating a new, 

dynamic, strategic security environment that creates 
16

unique challenges for U.S. national security policy 

and strategy.

Although Russia can employ many approaches in 

support of its goals, for discussion they are best simplified into three courses of actions: most likely, most 

disruptive, and most dangerous. 

Based on recent history, the most likely Russian 

course of action, an ambiguous warfare attack against 

one of the allies or partners in the region, could consist of information operations, limited covert special 

operations, and instigated civil unrest. Russia has already employed this course of action three times in 

recent history, with its illegal annexation of Crimea, 

its operations in eastern Ukraine, and its efforts in 

Georgia. Russia’s past success in employing ambiguous operations is likely to embolden their use in the 

future. The technique of inciting a Russian minority 

in a former Warsaw Pact or near abroad country and 

leveraging real (or more likely fabricated) ‘oppression’ as a pretext for Russian involvement has served 

Moscow well.56 Russia could use these attacks to generate confusion, spur a request for Russian assistance, 

or to deliberately cause a state to fail—allowing for 

a Russian-friendly government to take over. Ambiguous challenges, such as these, may be difficult to attribute to the Russian state, and would likely capitalize 

on the struggle within NATO to build a consensus for 

an immediate response. NATO considers civil unrest 

and most other ambiguous operations as internal security issues, which should be dealt with as a national 

responsibility under Article 3 of the North Atlantic 

Treaty.57 The key to countering this type of action is to 

build resilient allies in the border states that are able 

to absorb/counter this type of action internally or that 

are able to ascribe responsibility to Russia. 
17

In addition to assessing the most likely or the most 

dangerous course of action, NATO must also consider 

the most disruptive. This course of action, while it 

may ultimately assist with achieving the sponsor nation’s goals in the short term, serves to keep the targeted nation(s) off balance and focused internally.58 In 

the context of Russia in Europe, the most disruptive 

course of action likely would be for Moscow to continually challenge the Alliance by conducting actions 

that would cause it to convene the North Atlantic 

Council (NAC) for potentially contentious deliberations.59 All actions would remain below the Article 5 

of the North Atlantic Treaty threshold and repeated 

deliberations would put strain on Alliance members 

and NATO, generating “Putin fatigue.” These actions 

would target what both the Russians and NATO see as 

the center of gravity of the Alliance—the commitment 

of all members to Alliance-wide collective defense. 

While it is unlikely these actions would actually fracture the Alliance, they would certainly be disruptive 

and would put a strain on Alliance members.60 The 

disruptive effect would come from members focusing on ambiguous actions, while potentially ignoring 

or minimizing real threats to NATO’s territorial integrity. The best defense for NATO against this most 

disruptive course of action would be to recognize it 

and for all members to remain committed to collective 

defense of the Alliance.

The most dangerous course of action in Europe 

would be a conventional cross-border attack by Russia into NATO territory. Many authors have recently 

speculated on what exactly that would look like and 

under what pretenses it would occur. For the purposes of this monograph, the difference between the 

ambiguous warfare option and the conventional option is the presence of attributable Russian soldiers in 
18

the territory of another country, most likely the Baltic 

States. This is the most dangerous course of action for 

several reasons. First, “Russia’s military can rapidly 

field substantial numbers of high-quality conventional forces in the Baltic states....and can do so far faster 

than NATO can surge equivalent or superior forces 

garrisoned in Central and Western Europe, let alone 

those in North America.”61 In numerous war games 

run by RAND analyst and former Department of Defense (DoD) official, David Ochmanek, in a Baltic attack scenario, Russia was able to invade, seize, and 

establish an Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) bubble 

over the territory, making it incredibly challenging to 

get additional forces and logistics on the ground to assist with the fighting. Out of 16 iterations of the war 

game, the Alliance was unable to adequately defend 

the Baltic States.62

Russian’s actions in the 2008 invasion of Georgia 

and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 surprised the 

international community and demonstrated its use 

of these courses of action in achieving its objectives. 

Looking at them more closely, it is clear that familiarity with the Russian executive mindset would validate Russia’s invasion of Georgia and Ukraine, given 

Russia’s rhetoric under President Medvedev and his 

security strategy.63 As noted, Russian leaders place 

tremendous importance on defending the homeland 

and protecting the Russian diaspora abroad. In the 

2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, Moscow claimed that it 

was merely protecting ethnic Russians living in South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia, who were being attacked by 

Georgian forces. Additionally, Putin later commented 

at the 2014 Valdai symposium in Sochi, Russia, that 

the Georgian conflict and more importantly the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were legitimate actions for 

Russia due to the right of self-determination. 
19

The second point has to do with our actions in Crimea. 

I have spoken about this on numerous occasions, but 

if necessary, I can repeat it. This is Part 2 of Article 1 

of the United Nations’ Charter – the right of nations to 

self-determination. It has all been written down, and 

not simply as the right to self-determination, but as 

the goal of the United Nations.64

Examining Putin’s comments from Valdai, he saw 

the situation in Ukraine collapsing rapidly in February 2014 and deemed it necessary to intervene. Specifically, Putin believed that Ukrainian President Viktor 

Yanukovych was losing control of the country. Putin 

was sensitive to the Russian diaspora in Crimea and 

its requests to the Kremlin to be protected from Ukrainian civil unrest. Putin believed his actions in Ukraine 

were justified because Nikita Krushchev illegally gave 

Crimea as a gift to Ukraine in 1954.65 Putin ultimately 

believes that Crimea belongs to Russia and that the 

UN Charter allows him to protect the ethnic Russian 

diaspora that makes up the majority of Crimea’s population. Putin’s narrative is carefully crafted to put a 

veneer of legitimacy on Russia’s actions. However, 

these actions violate international laws and norms. 

Similarly, to achieve its objectives, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use conventional military 

force, along with other ambiguous warfare. As described by Dave Johnson, a NATO International Staff 

member in the Defence (sic) Policy and Planning Division, Russia’s approach includes a broad scope—encompassing diplomatic, informational, cyber, military 

and economic dimensions. It further seeks strategic 

depth by targeting adversaries’ centers of gravity, 

while at the same time exercising strategic patience 

in such a way that it operates on unpredictable time-
20

lines.66 Johnson refers to Russia as being in conflict 

with the West at a level short of openly declared war.67

Covington notes that Russia’s strategy uses the array 

of national power in an attempt to break apart and 

delegitimize European security institutions.68 In doing 

so, Russia is keen not to provoke the United States or 

NATO to a point of open armed conflict; by employing 

an ambiguous approach. According to Doug Mastriano, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, an 

ambiguous approach includes not confronting NATO 

directly, leveraging deception to retain strategic agility, and gradually reasserting influence without resorting to war.69 Frank Hoffman, a Washington-based 

national security analyst and senior research fellow at 

the National Defense University, similarly highlights 

Russia’s use of national and subnational instruments 

of power to achieve objectives without crossing the 

conflict threshold in an attempt to extend its influence without triggering an armed response.70 In so doing, Russia seeks to discredit NATO and ultimately 

fracture the Alliance, thus threatening European 

security.71

 Russia’s ambiguous strategy in Europe is comprehensive and includes capitalizing on European reliance 

on energy supplies, using the media as an influencing 

mechanism, influencing local and EU politicians, and 

leveraging ethnic Russian minorities. Russia conducts 

these activities below the provocation threshold, thus 

making it challenging to detect or to attribute any malicious intent to actions. The 2016 Global Forecast by the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 

cites examples of just how comprehensive Russia’s 

ambiguous approach is. The forecast cites the recent 

creation of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) 

faction in the European Parliament that consistently 
21

votes in support of Russian positions, and whose leader received a a €9 million loan from the Moscow-based 

First Czech-Russian Bank in November 2014. Russia 

is increasing its television, radio, and Internet incursions in Europe, to include buying up many of Europe’s independent news outlets. According to CSIS, 

these outlets target society via popular music and 

using human-interest stories to report on ways the 

West is in decline and portraying events in Ukraine 

that stoke fear among the populace. The media outlets 

also twist the relationship between the United States 

and Europe by suggesting that Europe is subservient 

to the United States.72 Finally, European dependence 

on energy resources opens doors for Russian influence 

and leverage, particularly on the NATO periphery.73

Kaplan draws similar conclusions.74 With its ambiguous approach, and focus on enhancing its military 

capabilities,75 Russia creates a unique and challenging 

problem for policy makers and strategists.

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER 

INFLUENCE RUSSIA DIFFERENTLY 

Instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)—can influence Russia’s behavior but some instruments are 

more effective than others. This is of particular note 

considering the Russian zero-sum mindset, in which 

Russia’s loss is the opponent’s gain and vice versa. In 

recent events however, the Russian zero-sum mindset 

is perhaps not absolute, evident with the Russian military pullout in Syria, which highlights the need to consider an approach that uses all instruments of national 

power. Diplomatic and economic instruments are 

strategic levers that have had some level of success on 
22

Russia, while the direct conventional military instrument of power has proven to be the least effective and 

will most likely lead to conflict escalation. Some carefully calibrated elements of the military instrument do 

have merit and are effective in strengthening NATO 

and its partner countries. Some of these aspects will be 

explored in greater depth in the following chapters, as 

will an in-depth exploration of the use of the information element of national power, set aside exclusively 

for Chapter 5, to mitigate risks associated with the 

approaches addressed throughout this monograph. 

Effective Use of the “D” in DIME.

Diplomacy between Russia and the United States 

has been somewhat restored following the reset policy 

of 2009.76 Little credit has been given to the reset policy since it did not result in compromises on missile 

defense in Europe or NATO expansion. However, restoring diplomatic channels was important. The reset 

laid the foundation for dialogue between the United 

States and Russia that contributes to the framework 

for the two countries to co-exist, and perhaps eventually become strategic partners. Often, U.S. policy toward Russia has faltered because of the poor state of 

diplomacy between the the two countries. 

Specifically, a lack of diplomacy contributed to 

Russian nuclear escalation during Operation ABLE 

ARCHER in 1983, where Russia misinterpreted a 

NATO exercise as an impending U.S.-led nuclear attack.77 The 2009 reset aimed to repair U.S.-Russian 

relations, which were at an all-time low during the 

George W. Bush administration and Putin’s first term 

as president.78
23

The United States should pursue a diplomatic 

approach with Russia that allows for strategic cooperation in areas of converging interests. Celeste Wallander, Special Assistant to the President and Senior 

Director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council, stated, “we keep the door open with 

Russia to work in areas such as non-proliferation, 

nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) security, combating violent extremism and terrorism.”79

These are areas in which the United States can partner 

with Russia to enhance diplomacy and advance strategic partnering. Current U.S. policy toward Russia 

desires a Russia that is secure, prosperous and also a 

constructive stakeholder in the international system.80

With Russia, the United States can and should agree 

to disagree on certain issues, but the fact remains that 

Russia’s nuclear capability makes it a more desirable 

strategic partner than a strategic adversary. There is 

much to lose with continued misperceptions resulting 

from poor dialogue between the two countries. The 

United States must face the challenge of working with 

the Russia it faces and not the Russia it hopes for.81

The Critical Nature of the “M” in DIME.

The military instrument of U.S. national power can 

be used effectively to indirectly influence Russia if it 

is scaled appropriately. The military instrument of national power is effective against Russia when used in 

a smaller continuum, such as theater security cooperation (TSC). These efforts work in concert to reassure 

NATO partner nations, improve their capability, and 

have a deterring effect on Russia. The nexus of the U.S. 

European Command (EUCOM) Theater Strategy focuses on six priorities, the top two being deterrence of 
24

Russian aggression and enabling the NATO Alliance.82

Multilateral exercises with NATO partners, such as 

those conducted under the auspices of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE and exercise Fearless Guardian, 

increase bilateral cooperation and interoperability 

and promote freedom of movement. Additionally, 

these exercises are designed to increase NATO allies’ resilience to outside threats and strengthen core 

functions to support NATO Article 3 (self-defense) 

and Article 5 (collective defense) responsibilities. This 

lesser scale of the military instrument provides resiliency and strengthens NATO, which can deter Russia. 

Indeed, the very existence of a strong NATO is a deterrent to Russia, a point further explored later in this 

monograph. 

The full-scale military response is the least preferred option due to the Russian mindset and the assumption that it will match military power with military power, leading to a security dilemma.83 This was 

the impetus for the Cold War and illustrated how a 

zero-sum mindset incentivized Russia to escalate until the other side capitulates. During the Cold War, 

Russia continued to escalate with nuclear weapons 

procurement until it was no longer feasible to do so 

economically. Russia exhausted its economic capital completely to maintain pace with U.S. military 

spending. 

Conventionally, Putin has continued to modernize Russia’s military to create a more capable force. 

Today, Russia can deploy professional, capable military forces rapidly to the Baltic States or the Black Sea 

and can mobilize faster than NATO forces.84 This is all 

the more reason why using the full spectrum of the 

military instrument of national power is not a suitable 

option. 
25

Moreover, the military instrument may not deter 

Russia’s use of ambiguous warfare.85 Russia has readily used military forces in areas of its near abroad, 

chiefly against non-NATO members (Georgia and 

Ukraine) in instances of ambiguous warfare with little 

to no consequences in terms of Western military reactions. Russia’s ambiguous warfare creates challenges 

for deterrence because they do not invoke a NATO 

Article 5 response, nor does the West view Russia’s 

actions as grave enough to intervene directly with the 

military instrument of national power. Clearly Russia 

has vital interests in the near abroad, whereas U.S. interests are secondary at best. Russia’s actions do have 

a destabilizing effect on NATO and have caused trepidation in several NATO members (chiefly the Baltic 

States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as Poland). Today, Russia uses ambiguous warfare to destabilize other actors where it believes the West would 

tolerate such aggression (e.g. Georgia and Ukraine).86

Full military engagement and conventional warfare 

against Russia would be an ineffective lever against 

Russia. This position will be explained in later chapters. Simply put, use of conventional warfare against 

Russia is ineffective because it could lead to an escalation of force and eventual full-scale warfare. The best 

strategy to fight Russia conventionally is not to begin 

the fight at all. Yet the Alliance must demonstrate to 

Russia, and other adversaries, that it is capable and 

willing to defend its members when needed. 

Leveraging the “E” in DIME.

Using the economic instrument of national power 

has had some effect on Russia’s behavior. Russian foreign policy—and specifically its ability to project power and gain international prestige—largely depends 
26

on Russia’s economic growth and its ability to generate revenue to modernize.87 The West has signaled 

unified disapproval of Russia’s actions in Ukraine by 

supporting EU sanctions on Russia, which have hindered Russia’s domestic economy. 

This limited response has been typical of the current U.S. Administration’s position toward Russia. 

The question remains of how effective the EU sanctions have been toward Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine. Putin found the sanctions more of a 

nuisance and has not really changed Russia’s position 

toward Ukraine, but the sanctions have opened Putin 

and Russia to further diplomacy and cooperation. In 

his 2014 “World Order” speech in Sochi, Putin stated 

that the EU sanctions were a hindrance and designed 

to force Russia into backwardness, however the sanctions would not dissuade Russia from pursuing continued dialogue with Europe and the United States.88 

One unknown factor is how far Putin will allow the 

Russian economy to weaken before he changes his foreign policy. His rhetoric of Russian nationalism and 

Western culpability only strengthens the Russian domestic appetite to endure a declining economy. 

To influence Russia, one must influence its economy, since economic power is the basis of its ability to 

maintain the Russian status quo and project power. 

Russia has continued to use its economy and status as 

an energy supplier to influence European countries. 

Furthermore, Putin has used economic pressure on 

Russian energy dependent countries in the EU to vote 

against renewing the EU sanctions through 2016.89

Economic sanctions will take time before they can 

influence Russia’s foreign policy. The key to success 

lies in their patient application and ability to hurt the 

Russian elite and middle class.90 Russia continues to 
27

counter the EU sanctions and has imposed retaliatory 

measures on EU trading partners. However, recent 

data suggests that Russia’s failing economy has had 

minimal impact on the EU.91 Furthermore, falling oil 

prices, the declining ruble, and the EU sanctions will 

have long-term effects on Russia’s economic capital 

and growth.92 The potential adverse impact of sanctions on the Russian economy is estimated at 8-10 

percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and that on 

the EU economy at some 0.5 percent of GDP.93 Over 

time, all of these factors coupled together will have an 

adverse effect on Russia’s economy and have the best 

potential to cause a shift in Russia’s foreign policy. 

CONCLUSION

Understanding Russian foreign policy aims and 

more importantly, what drives Putin’s decision-making process is critical for influencing Russia’s foreign 

policy. There has been considerable speculation that 

Russia’s foreign policy could perhaps change with a 

different president. This is highly unlikely as the incumbent habitually continues the foreign policy aims 

of the previous administration. Furthermore, Russia’s 

managed style of democracy does not allow the opposition to gain sufficient support or mobilize in either 

the executive or legislative branches. The executive 

branch continues to be the most powerful branch of 

government and controls the executive and judiciary 

as well as Russia’s provincial leaders through the vertikal vlasti system. 

The illusion of a strong Russia internationally is 

a critical component of its foreign policy. Domestic 

policy is largely tied to Russia’s foreign policy and 

the perception that Russia is still a dominant, cred-
28

ible state actor. Russia believes that a loss of internal 

control gives the perception of weakness and consequently a loss of international respect. United States 

and European actions that discredit or vilify Russia 

will erode U.S.-Russian relations. United States diplomacy toward Russia should be a firm yet cooperative 

approach, as Putin is a pragmatist. 

Russia’s desire to protect its homeland and the 

Russian diaspora will continue to present foreign policy challenges to the United States. Russia continually 

uses the rhetoric of self-determination to protect these 

entities even when they fall outside Russia’s borders. 

Russia’s version of homeland defense extends much 

farther than Russia’s natural borders and permeates 

the near abroad. To defend its homeland, Russia believes in creating a buffer zone to expand its borders 

and protect the Russian diaspora. Furthermore, NATO 

enlargement activities will only decrease Russia’s buffer zone and continue to strain relations between Russia and the West. The entrance of Georgia and Ukraine 

into NATO exacerbates this problem. 

Tempering Russia’s behavior and influencing its 

foreign policy will continue to present future challenges to the United States, but Russia can be a potential strategic partner. Across the DIME spectrum, 

using a more diplomatic and economic approach by 

the United States has had an influence on Russia and 

should be patiently pursued. The military element of 

national power should be used with particular care. 

At the extreme end of the spectrum, military escalation and conventional warfare should be discouraged as it may lead to full-scale warfare and perhaps 

nuclear escalation. Placing missile defense assets back 

into Europe will likely be matched by Russia and incite an effective Russian A2/AD shield over the Baltic 
29

States.94 The military option should be nuanced and 

used indirectly to influence Russia’s foreign policy. 

Military reassurance efforts that strengthen NATO 

partners and stabilize non-NATO member states’ borders can neutralize Russia’s use of ambiguous warfare. 

The appropriate integration of the U.S. and Western 

instruments of power, coupled with an understanding of Putin and Russian social and historic aspects, 

can further interests of the United States and its allies. 

Application of these factors can lead to an acceptable 

strategic partnership with Russia in the future. While 

all aspects of an acceptable approach to Russia merit 

exploration and analysis, the remainder of this monograph focuses almost entirely on the military element, 

with an emphasis on ways to achieve a balanced military response that effectively deters Russian aggression toward NATO and assures allies. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Lauren Witlin, “Of Note: Mirror-Imaging and Its Dangers,” 

SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter-Spring 

2008, pp. 89-90, available from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/233105, 

accessed January 16, 2016. 

2. Ruth Deyermond, “Assessing the Reset: successes and failures in the Obama Administration’s Russia policy, 2009–2012,” 

European Security, Vol. 22, Iss. 4, available from dx.doi.org/10.1080/

09662839.2013.777704, accessed December 31, 2015, p. 504

3. Sun Tzu, trans. by Samuel Griffith, The Art of War, New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 84. 

4. Summation of the perceptions of this monograph’s authors from the research discussions with North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR), and U.S. European 

Command (EUCOM), November 3-6, 2015. 
30

5. Paul Starobin, “The Accidental Autocrat,” The Atlantic, March 2005, available from www.theatlantic.com/magazine/

archive/2005/03/the-accidental-autocrat/303725/, accessed January 

16, 2016.

6. Robert Coalson, “Russia: Why The Chekist Mind-Set Matters,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 15, 2007, available from www.rferl.org/content/article/1078954.html, accessed 

March 18, 2016. 

7. Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign 

Policy, London, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 17.

8. Ibid., p. 16.

9. Stefan Hedlund, “Economic Reform Under Putin 2.0: Will 

Petrodollars Suffice to Keep the Ship Afloat?” in Stephen J. Blank, 

ed., Politics and Economics in Putin’s Russia, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute and United States Army War College 

Press, 2013, p. 76. 

10. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, Andrei V. Kolesnikov, and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s 

President Vladimir Putin, New York: Public Affairs, 2000, p. 142.

11. Boris Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: Neoliberal Autocracy, London, UK: Pluto Press, 2002, p. 3.

12. Lo, p. 10. 

13. Alexander Sokolowski, “Institutional Determinants of 

Chronic Policy Failure in Yeltsin’s Russia,” Demokratizatsiya Vol. 

11, No. 3, Summer 2003, p. 412, available from search.proquest.

com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/docview/237202586?accountid=4444, 

accessed March 17, 2016.

14. Lo, p. 1. 

15. Ibid., p. 4. 
31

16. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post Soviet Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2003, p. 291, available 

from dx.doi.org/10.2747/1060-586X.19.4.289, accessed March 17, 

2016. 

17. Lo, p. 17.

18. Daniel Beer, “Russia’s Managed Democracy,” History Today, Vol. 59, No. 5, May 2009, pp. 37-39, available from search.

proquest.com/docview/202818171?accountid=4444, accessed March 

1, 2016.

19. Marcel de Haas, “Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment,” Russian Analytical Digest, Vol. 62, Iss. 9, June 

18, 2009, p. 5, available from www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/

RAD-62.pdf, accessed December 21, 2015. 

20. Ibid., p. 3. Note: the term “near abroad” is a commonly 

accepted reference to now independent countries which were 

once republics of the former Soviet Union. See Robert Kagan, 

“New Europe, Old Russia,” The Washington Post, February 6, 

2008, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502879.html, accessed April 1, 2016.

21. de Haas, p. 5. 

22. Henning Schroder, “Russia’s National Security Strategy 

to 2020,” Russian Analytical Digest, Vol. 62, Iss. 9, June 18, 2009, 

p. 10, available from www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-62.pdf, 

accessed December 21, 2015. 

23. Ibid., p. 6. 

24. Anne Applebaum, “Putinism: The Ideology,” LSE Ideas, 

Strategic Update 13.2, London, UK: The London School of Economics and Political Science, February 2013, p. 7.

25. Schroder, p. 10.

26. Applebaum, pp. 7-8. 

27. Ibid., p. 2. 
32

28. Kryshtanovskaya and White, p. 301.

29. Ironically, the Duma is named after the Russian verb, 

dymat, which means, “to think.” 

30. Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, 

Arlington, VA: RAND, 2009, p. 12.

31. Ibid. 

32. Arch Puddington, “Freedom in the World 2015, Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist,” Freedom House 

Report, available from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2015#.VprsKVMrJPM, accessed January 16, 

2016.

33. Applebaum, p. 6.

34. Ibid., p. 2. 

35. Ibid., p. 6. 

36. Vladimir Putin, “Annexation of Crimea speech,” March 

18, 2014, available from en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, 

accessed February 29, 2016.

37. Applebaum, p. 2. 

38. Ibid., p. 3. 

39. Vladimir Putin, “The World Order: New Rules or a Game 

without Rules,” Lecture, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia, October 24, 2014.

40. de Haas, p. 3.

41. Maureen Laurele, “The ‘Russian World:’ Russia’s Soft 

Power and Geopolitical Imagination,” Center on Global Interests Report, May 21, 2015, p. 7 available from globalinterests.org/

wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FINAL-CGI_Russian-World_MarleneLaruelle.pdf, accessed March 17, 2016.
33

42. The United States Special Operations Command White 

Paper that introduced the concept that defines gray zone challenges as “competitive interactions among and within state and 

non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace 

duality.” As previously noted, this monograph will refer to such 

challenges and threats as ambiguous.

43. United States Department of the Army, Training Circular 

(TC) 7-100, Hybrid Threat, Washington, DC: United States Department of the Army, 2010, p. 1-1. It defines a hybrid threat as “the 

diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular 

forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually 

benefitting effects.” Russia has used such threats as part of its 

ambiguous approach. To more holistically capture the essence of 

Russia’s strategy, in that it used hybrid warfare and other actions 

in an umbrella of ambiguity, this monograph will use the terms 

“ambiguous threats” and “ambiguous warfare” and “ambiguous approach” in lieu of “hybrid threat” and “hybrid warfare” to 

underscore the difficulty of dealing with such threats emanating 

from Russia.

44. de Haas, p. 3. 

45. Ibid., p. 4. 

46. Doug Mastriano et al., Project 1704: A United States Army 

War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, and Appropriate U.S. Response and the Implications for U.S. Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2015, p. 21.

47. English translation of Dmitry Medvedev, “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” Russian Federation, May 2009, 

available from rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020, accessed December 21, 2015.

48. Nikolai Pishchev, ‘‘NATO Myths and Realities,’’ Krasnaya 

Zvezda, January 5, 1997, available from fas.org/man/nato/national/

msg00006c.htm, accessed March 18, 2016.

49. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Relations 

with Russia,” available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

topics_50090.htm, accessed December 12, 2015.
34

50. Michael C. Ryan, “A Second Chance to Miss the Same Opportunity: Post-Putin and the Potential Re-Emergence of a More 

Reasonable Russia,” American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 37, 

No. 3, 2015, p. 150.

51. Ibid., p. 151.

52. Robert D. Kaplan, “Countering Putin’s Grand Strategy,” 

Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2015, search.proquest.com.usawc.

idm.oclc.org/docview/1654552152, accessed January 14, 2016.

53. Ryan, p. 149.

54. S.R. Covington, Putin’s Choice for Russia, Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015, p. 3.

55. Mastriano et al., p. 77.

56. Elbridge Colby and Jonathan Solomon, “Facing Russia: 

Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe,” Survival, Vol. 

56, Iss. 6, November 2015, p. 23, www-tandfonline-com.usawc.idm.

oclc.org/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116146, accessed November 30, 2015.

57. Information derived from research discussions with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) staffers conducted 

by the author on November 4, 2015.

58. Nathan Friesel, “Hybrid Warfare; Four Challenges,” lecture to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) offsite conference, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army 

War College, December 2, 2015.

59. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprised of representatives of each NATO member states, is the alliance’s highest 

decision-making authority.

60. Information derived from research discussions with 

NATO International staff for policy member and a NATO staff 

officer on November 3 and 4, 2015.
35

61. Colby and Solomon, p. 23.

62. Julie Ioffe, “Exclusive: The Pentagon Is Preparing New 

War Plans for a Baltic Battle Against Russia” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com.usawc.idm.oclc.

org/2015/09/18/exclusive-the-pentagon-is-preparing-new-war-plansfor-a-baltic-battle-against-russia/, accessed January 3, 2016.

63. de Haas, p. 3. 

64. Putin, “The World Order: New Rules or a Game without 

Rules.”

65. Aleksandr Korolkov, “Out of the blue: Khrushchev’s ‘Gift 

on a Golden Dish’,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, supplement to 

The Telegraph, April 1, 2014, available from https://issuu.com/rbth/

docs/2014_03_dt_all?viewMode=magazine&e=1589469/7315023, 

accessed on April 24, 2016.

66. Dave Johnson, Russia’s Approach to Conflict—Implications 

for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence, Research Paper No. 111, April 

2015, Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, p. 2, available from 

www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=797, accessed November 

28, 2015.

67. Ibid., p. 12.

68. Covington, p. 6.

69. Douglas Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy of Ambiguity,” War on the Rocks website, November 6, 2014, available 

from warontherocks.com/2014/11/defeating-putins-strategy-of-ambi

guity/, accessed January 15, 2016. 

70.Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid 

Modes of War,” in Dakota L. Wood ed., 2016 Index of U.S. Military 

Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2015, p. 26.

71. It should be noted that not all NATO allies see the Russia 

threat equally. There is a clear east-west divide: eastern NATO 

members perceive Russia as a significant threat, and the western 
36

NATO members do not. Some European NATO members are 

afraid and feel the Alliance has an obligation to defend them—this 

inlcudes the Baltic States and some in allies Eastern Europe. This 

is in part due to the reality of Russian actions that demonstrate its 

willingness to use force (e.g., Ukraine), particularly when it perceives a risk to the Russian diaspora. Since some NATO members 

have significant populations of Russian diaspora, it is critical for 

the Alliance to be able to deter Russian agrression, but also for 

those NATO members with Russian diaspora to fully integrate 

them into society. This varying view on the Russian threat will 

create challenges for NATO to develop a common understanding 

of the threat and a commonly agreed response.

72. Heather A. Conley, “Putin’s Europe,” in Craig Cohan 

and Melissa G. Dalton eds., 2016 Global Forecast, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015, p. 39, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/151116_Cohen_GlobalFore

cast2016_Web.pdf, accessed November 28, 2015. 

73. Ibid., p. 39.

74. Kaplan. He highlights Russia’s use of such tools as buying media in Europe through third parties, criminality, bribing local politicians, and leveraging European dependence on Russian 

energy.

75. Doug Mastriano et al., p. 47.

76. Deyermond, p. 500.

77. Vojtech Mastny, “How Able Was ‘Able Archer’?: Nuclear 

Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Winter 2009, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 108.

78. Deyermond, p. 518. 

79. Celeste A. Wallander, Special Assistant to the President 

and Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia, National Security Council, “U.S. Policy on Russia,” Washington, DC: CNAS 

Annual Conference, June 26, 2015. 
37

80. Ibid. 

81. Ibid. 

82. GEN Philip M. Breedlove, United States European Command 

Theater Strategy, United States European Command, Headquarters, October 2015, p. 4, available from www.eucom.mil/, accessed 

February 6, 2016. 

83. From “IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories” The IR 

Theory Knowledge Base website, available from www.irtheory.

com/know.htm, accessed November 30, 2015:

A security dilemma refers to a situation wherein two or 

more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war, 

over security concerns, even though none of the states 

actually desire conflict. Essentially, the security dilemma 

occurs when two or more states each feel insecure in relation to other states. None of the states involved want 

relations to deteriorate, let alone for war to be declared, 

but as each state acts militarily or diplomatically to make 

itself more secure, the other states interpret its actions as 

threatening. An ironic cycle of unintended provocations 

emerges, resulting in an escalation of the conflict which 

may eventually lead to open warfare.

84. Colby and Solomon, p. 21.

85. Ibid., p. 42. 

86. Covington, p. 21.

87. Schroder, p. 10. 

88. Putin, “The World Order: New Rules or a Game without 

Rules.” 

89. Peter Baker and Steven Erlanger, “Russia Uses Money and 

Ideology to Fight Western Sanctions,” The New York Times, June 

7, 2015. 
38

90. Meeting with AMB. Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution, January 6, 2016, cited with permission by Mr. Pifer. 

91. Edward Christie, “Sanctions after Crimea: Have they 

worked?” NATO Review Magazine, 2015, available from www.

nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-theyworked/EN/index.htm, accessed March 18, 2016. 

92. Rebecca M. Nelson, “U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications,” Current Politics and Economics of Russia, Eastern 

and Central Europe, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2015, p. 201, available from 

search.proquest.com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1770385425?account

id=4444, accessed March 16, 2016. 

93. European Parliament briefing, “Economic impact on the 

EU of sanctions over Ukraine conflict,” October 2015, available 

from www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/

EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf, accessed January 18, 2016.

94. Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Why Russia needs to rebuild its military.” Foreign Policy, February 21, 2012, available 

from foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/21/being-strong/, accessed February 

29, 2016. 
39

CHAPTER 2

DETERRENCE STRATEGIES IN AN 

INCREASINGLY COMPLEX EUROPEAN 

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Europe is approaching an inflection point where decisions to follow either the instinct for collective interests or individual interests could transform that region 

into a very dangerous operational theater.

 —General Martin Dempsey1

We cannot be fully certain of what Russia will do next. 

We still cannot fully discern Mr. Putin’s intent. But I 

can observe the capabilities and capacities that Russia is creating across our [area of operations]. And I 

continue [to] believe that we must strengthen our deterrence and that EUCOM and our NATO allies must 

continue to adapt by improving our readiness and 

responsiveness.

 —General Philip M. Breedlove2

How to deter Russia effectively, without provoking conflict, is a subject of prolonged debate, complicated by the challenge of defining what deterrence 

is and how to do it in today’s security context. The 

United States’ and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) primary challenge is deterring both 

a conventional threat and an ambiguous threat as 

Russia works toward achieving its objectives. In his 

2016-posture statement before Congress, the then U.S. 

European Command (EUCOM) Commander, General 

Philip Breedlove, speaking of Operation ATLANTIC 

RESOLVE stated that: 
40

Now that we are nearly two years into this operation, 

our efforts are adding a deterrence component with 

the goal of deterring Russia from any further aggressive actions.3

However, what is not entirely clear is how such efforts, as well as others, are contributing to deterrence. 

It is therefore essential to understand what deterrence 

is, the calculus underlying decisions regarding deterrence options, and the effects that such decisions 

might have on the actors. A baseline theoretical and 

definitional exploration of deterrence and a subsequent assessment of current U.S. efforts to deter Russia will demonstrate that the U.S.’ ability to deter Russian aggression using conventional forces is difficult, 

although not impossible. Solutions to mitigate these 

challenges will follow this brief discussion, focusing 

on ways to deter Russia’s potential use of conventional forces as well as its use of ambiguous warfare.

THEORETICAL AND DEFINITIONAL 

FOUNDATIONS OF DETERRENCE

Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must 

determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude 

and also duration.4

Clausewitz’s calculus applies to deterrence as well 

as war. The bulk of deterrence theory evolved during 

the Cold War when the United States and its NATO 

allies faced the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. 

Cold War deterrence relied heavily on nuclear weapons, but shifted to include conventional deterrence as 

the Soviet Union developed its own strategic nuclear 

deterrent capabilities.5
41

Source: U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jeremy J. Fowler, 

https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope.

Soldiers from Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry 

Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division 

fire rounds from their M1A2 Abrams Tanks at the Adazi 

Training Area, Latvia, on November 6, 2014. These activities 

were part of the U.S. Army Europe-led Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE land force assurance training taking place 

across Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to enhance 

multinational interoperability, strengthen relationships 

among allied militaries, contribute to regional stability, and 

demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO.

Figure 2-1. Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE.

With the end of the Cold War, the focus on deterrence 

diminished as the threats against the United States 

became increasingly impotent.6 Nevertheless, nuclear 

deterrence retains a role, a point that Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter underscored in a recent speech 

at the Reagan National Defense Forum.7 Yet, in the 

context of today’s security environment, the threat of 

large-scale nuclear attack or the use of tactical nuclear 

weapons between the United States/NATO and Russia seems unlikely. Contemporary discussions include 
42

new aspects such as how to deter an ambiguous threat 

where attribution is elusive. The challenge in today’s 

security environment is, therefore, twofold. It includes 

deterrence against a conventional force of another 

state actor, and deterrence against ambiguous threats, 

whether those emanate from state or non-state actors.8

The underlying premise of deterrence is one actor, 

the deterring force, influencing the decision-making 

calculus of another in such a manner that the decisions made are to the benefit of the deterring force. 

Thomas Schelling, one of the fathers of classical deterrence theory, notes that deterrence includes the threat 

of the use of force, and the harm it would inflict, with 

the aim to influence behavior.9 Daniel Byman and 

Matthew Waxman also highlight deterrence’s role in 

influencing behavior.10 John Mearsheimer noted that 

deterrence focuses on the deterring force persuading 

an adversary not to act by getting him to perceive that 

the costs and risks outweigh the benefits.11 Gordon 

Craig and Alexander George arrive at similar conclusions.12 While approaches to deterrence vary, there are 

common elements among them, credibility and capability, as key tenants to effective deterence; and a costbenefit calculus that influences behavior.

Robert A. Pape defines two fundamental types of 

deterrence: by punishment and by denial. Punishment 

focuses primarily on raising the costs or risks associated with the adversary’s potential actions. In line 

with Pape’s definition, Austin Long from the RAND 

Corporation defines deterrence by punishment as the 

threat of inflicting harm on the opponent to the degree 

that he would calculate any provocation as not cost 

beneficial.13 Deterrence by denial, according to Pape, 

prevents the adversary from achieving its political or 

military objectives, thus reducing the benefits.14 Simi-
43

larly, Long defines deterrence by denial as defending 

interests to prevent opponent access to them.15

In order to be effective, a deterring force must be 

credible. Schelling notes that communicating intentions to the adversary is very difficult.16 He states:

we go to great lengths to tell the Russians that they 

will have America to contend with if they. . . attack 

countries associated with us. Saying so does not always make it believed.17

Herein lies an extremely complex challenge for 

the deterring force. Many factors influence credibility, including: political will and resolution; domestic pressures; economic and budget constraints; and 

force capability and disposition, such as size, posture, 

and readiness. According to Craig and George, credibility consists of two elements. The first is the deterring force’s ability to convince its opponent that it has 

the will and resolution to do what it threatens to do, 

and that it will back its commitments to respond to 

attacks on its interests. The second element of credibility requires possessing the capabilities to do what 

one says one is going to do. Thus, the deterring force’s 

threats must be both credible and sufficiently potent 

that the costs and risks to the adversary of attacking 

outweigh the benefits.18 Byman and Waxman note that 

an adversary's perception of the strength of the deterring force will largely influence its decisions.19 Thus, 

the capability of the deterring force, both actual and 

perceived, underpins the deterring force’s credibility. 

Highlighting the significance of a capable force, Craig 

and George note that deterrence fails when the force 

applied is either inappropriate or unusable.20 Therefore, the right capability is critical when attempting to 

deter a threat. 
44

Understanding the threat and the adversary’s intentions are contributing factors in determining the 

right capability. Multiple factors, aside from the adversary’s force size and strength, contribute to the deterring force’s calculus, such as the adversary’s intent 

and political will, among others. 

It is even more difficult to determine what capabilities to apply against an ambiguous threat, particularly when applying conventional forces against those 

threats is not viable. Deterring an ambiguous threat 

may require a set of different capabilities than those 

used to deter a conventional threat. These capabilities 

include a greater reliance on the other instruments of 

national power. Craig and George highlight that actors rarely apply deterrence options in isolation and 

include other diplomatic strategies as part of the deterrence calculus.21 Mearsheimer further highlights 

that policy decisions on deterrence must consider all 

the resources at one’s disposal and consider the second and third order effects.22

The credibility and capability behind a deterrence force influence an adversary’s cost-benefit 

calculus. Byman and Waxman use a cost-benefit 

model in which they identify basic elements that are 

helpful in understanding the cost-benefit relationship 

inherent in deterrence. First, benefits are the value 

the adversary derives from an action, which are ultimately difficult for the deterring force to determine or 

influence. Second, costs define the price an adversary 

anticipates paying in pursuit of a particular action. 

This includes the cost to continue resistance versus 

the cost to comply with the coercer. The final element 

is the probability of achieving the benefits or suffering 

the costs. This is very subjective in nature and a function of the deterring force’s credibility and capability, 

both as he perceives it and as the adversary perceives 
45

it.23 Pape provides further fidelity on the cost-benefit 

relationship by using what he terms “the logic of coercion.”24 Pape defines the logic of coercion, from an 

adversary’s perspective, wherein the adversary calculates the hope of attaining any benefits outweigh 

the potential costs. In such a case, the adversary concedes.25 Pape uses the following equation to define the 

logic of coercion: 

Figure 2-2. Logic of Coercion.26

The cost-benefit model of course has it limits, particularly since much of the decision-making on both 

sides is based on perceptions and probability, not to 

mention the challenges of quantifying deterrence. Nor 

can it account for the human dimension of decisionmaking. Nevertheless, it provides a baseline from 

which to assess options for deterrence.

ASSESSING DETERRENCE

Assessing the effects of deterrence activities, and 

how to make necessary adjustments, is not easy in 

a complex security environment. During the Cold 

War, although force posture fluctuated, the numbers 

and locations of U.S. and NATO forces, as well as the 

 

R = B p(B) – C p(C), 

 

where: R = value of resistance

B = potential benefits of resistance

p(B) = probability of attaining benefits 

 by continued resistance

 C = potential costs of resistance

 p(C) = probability of suffering costs

 
46

robust nuclear capabilities, easily defined what deterrence looked like.27 Arguably, this approach worked 

since the Soviet Union never attacked, and ultimately 

ceded when the costs became too high. The landscape, 

in terms of force size and presence, has completely 

changed since the end of the Cold War for both NATO 

and Russia. There are currently no U.S. Corps or Divisions stationed in Europe, and the viability of NATO 

to provide ready and capable equivalent units is questionable. The United States has drawn down its maneuver forces in Europe to two brigade combat teams 

(one Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and one 

Airborne Infantry Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)), 

and limited enabling capabilities (e.g. no bridging assets capable of supporting an M1 tank, and significant 

reductions in the size of the aviation brigade). Due to 

their force reductions, European NATO allies are limited in their capability to organize and deploy large 

forces and to move them rapidly across borders in the 

event of an emerging crisis. Further, NATO has limited forces along its eastern flank—mostly just national 

forces resident within each NATO member’s territory. 

It would prove challenging for the United States to 

move forces quickly enough to preclude a fait accompli, a point further addressed in an another chapter 

in this monograph. Russia has also reduced its force 

strength from Cold War levels, but it still maintains 27 

motorized brigades, 4 airborne divisions, and 1 tank 

army. In quantitative terms, Russia has numerical 

superiority in tanks and artillery pieces, and roughly 

equivalent numbers of infantry fighting vehicles and 

armored personnel carriers as the United States.28 On 

the other hand, RAND notes that Russia can position 

22 battalions on its western border (roughly 7 brigades),29 and arguably more if the conflict in Ukraine 
47

were to subside or turn cold. Russia also has the advantage of interior lines of communication and the ability 

to muster quickly and move forces, as evidenced by its 

snap exercises. One must, therefore, wonder whether 

the United States and NATO actually pose a credible 

and capable deterrent force in Europe. In order to answer that question, it is first necessary to understand 

two things. What are Russia’s objectives and intentions? What threats are the United States and NATO 

deterring? 

As addressed in Chapter 1 and supported by a 

recent U.S. Army War College analysis of Russian 

strategy in Eastern Europe, Russia seeks to maintain 

its influence over its near abroad, and to discredit 

NATO.30 This is also consistent with the assessment 

of various headquarters within Europe, including 

NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

(SHAPE), EUCOM, and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). NATO’s center of gravity—its most important 

source of strength—is Alliance cohesion; and Russia’s 

actions seek to fracture that cohesion.31 Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work echoed this assessment 

in a recent speech at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London.32 Elbridge Colby and Jonathan 

Solomon similarly refer to Russia’s attempt to recreate 

its sphere of influence and to break the cohesion of 

the Alliance.33 Kaplan refers to this risk to NATO by 

highlighting the fact that NATO does not, “protect its 

members against Russian subversion from within.”34

Fractures already exist as evidenced by the varying 

degrees to which the NATO members perceive Russia 

as a threat.35 Therefore, it is possible to surmise that 

Russia’s objectives include increasing its influence in 

Europe, by stopping NATO and European Union (EU) 

enlargement and influence; and it intends to exploit 
48

fractures in the Alliance. As noted in Chapter 1, in 

pursuit of this objective, Russia has demonstrated its 

willingness to use its conventional land forces (albeit 

not always overtly), as well as other capabilities. For 

example, Russia used cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, 

and again during the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts to 

advance its objectives.36 

Russia’s use of ambiguous warfare, as previously 

referenced in the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ 2016 Global Forecast,

37 coupled with its 

use of conventional forces, demonstrates Moscow’s 

approach to achieving its objectives. The U.S. Army 

War College analysis of Russian strategy in Eastern 

Europe drew three key conclusions about Russia’s approach to achieving its objectives. First, Russia relies 

heavily on landpower, particularly in its near abroad. 

Second, it uses airborne and special operations forces 

(SOF) in both conventional and non-conventional 

roles. Finally, Russia effectively uses information operations (and to this one could add cyber) to influence 

the strategic narrative. Therefore, the United States 

and NATO must be capable of countering all three of 

these elements: Russian land forces; SOF, particularly 

when used in an ambiguous role; and information operations, which are often employed using ambiguous 

warfare. 

Assessing the credibility and capability of the United States and NATO to deter these threats is open to a 

wide range of subjective analysis. Credibility includes 

the will and resolution to defend one’s interests.38 The 

United States has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to defend the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, 

and any other NATO member, against aggression. In 

a September 2014 speech delivered in Estonia, President Barack Obama confirmed the U.S.’ commitment 
49

to defending NATO allies and their territorial integrity.39 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter reinforced the 

President’s comments by noting that NATO remains 

a cornerstone to maintaining international order and 

underscored the significance of the Article 5 commitment.40 NATO has yet to be openly tested in an Article 

5 scenario against Russia, nor should it want to be in a 

position to consider invoking an Article 5. Nevertheless, NATO is making significant strides to enhance its 

credibility via various capabilities agreed at the 2014 

Wales Summit, such as the Very High Readiness Joint 

Task Force (VJTF), which was recently validated in an 

exercise in 2015. NATO is expected to further enhance 

its efforts at the upcoming 2016 Warsaw Summit, with 

a focus on its deterrence and defense posture. Despite 

all these efforts, Russia’s use of ambiguous warfare 

is a way to avoid testing the U.S. or NATO resolve, 

while still progressing toward achieving its objective 

to fracture the Alliance.

That said, the United States is making steps to 

demonstrate its commitment to Article 5. For example, 

the United States announced the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in June 2014 to provide funding 

for, among other things, increased exercises, deployments, and activities focused on building partner capacity.41 Since ERI’s announcement, the United States 

has increased the number of exercises and is vigorously conducting bilateral and multilateral training 

events across NATO, with a focus on the Baltic States 

and Eastern Europe, under the auspices of Operation 

ATLANTIC RESOLVE.42 It also includes a renewed 

emphasis on NATO operationalizing its Readiness 

Action Plan (RAP).43 However, increasing the quantity 

of exercises and training does not necessarily equate 

to credibility. Planners should design exercises and 
50

training to focus on specific capability objectives, and 

to demonstrate critical capabilities that might be used 

in support of Article 5. Further, such efforts should 

include a deliberate supporting public affairs and information operations plan (further explored later in 

this monograph), all of which contributes to increasing credibility, or at least the perception thereof.

Source: www.eucom.mil/media-library/photo/32982/allied-port-opsin-riga-reinforce-operation-atlantic-resolve.

Soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division offload an M1A2 

Abrams Main Battle Tank from the transportation vessel 

“Liberty Promise” March 9, 2015, the Riga Universal Terminal docks. More than 100 pieces of equipment, including 

the tanks, M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and assorted 

military cargo, moved on to sites in other areas of Latvia 

as well as Estonia and Lithuania in support of Operation 

ATLANTIC RESOLVE.

Figure 2-3. Rotational Presense.

Returning to the two elements of credibility (will 

and capability), while the United States and the Alliance are making strides to demonstrate their collective 

will to use force, they must do more to develop the 
51

capabilities that underpin it. As previously noted, 

credibility is validated only when it is tested. While the 

goal is never to need to validate credibility, the United 

States and NATO should not rely solely on the ERI 

and other U.S.-centric activities, or NATO activities as 

part of the RAP, to demonstrate a credible unified Alliance commitment to collective defense. Nor do any 

of these activities readily equate to an Alliance capable 

of defending its borders from outside aggression. For 

credibility to be effective, the United States and the 

Alliance must also continue to develop capable forces 

in Europe in order to effectively deter Russia against 

both conventional and ambiguous threats. The NATO 

Defense Planning Process is a critical tool in developing these capabilities.44 Yet NATO may need to revise 

how it conducts its defense planning, for example by 

better tying the necessary capabilities to the identified 

threats.45

An outdated NATO Strategic Concept, NATO’s 

baseline strategy document, also hinders NATO’s 

credibility. This document clearly sees Russia as a 

cooperative, albeit challenging, partner in European 

security.46 The Alliance is holding on to this dated 

Strategic Concept despite the fact that the security environment, and Russia’s role in it, have clearly changed 

since 2010. The main factor behind not changing the 

Strategic Concept is a reluctance by the United States 

to move forward with any changes in light of an impending change in administration.47 Despite this delay in adopting an updated Alliance strategy, efforts 

to increase capability and capacity through the ERI, 

Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, and RAP activities, 

continue. 

NATO faces other challenges to providing a capable deterrent force in Europe, including reversing 

two decades of declining defense budgets. Defense 
52

spending by European NATO members has declined 

by 28 percent since 1990, which is in part normal given 

the lack of an existential, ideologically driven context 

present during the Cold War.48 These reductions and 

a widespread move toward professionalized militaries have led to a significantly smaller European force 

structure. This coupled with a focus on expeditionary 

operations over the last decade and the economic crisis of the last several years, have led to a European 

force that is less capable across the entire spectrum 

of conflict and that struggles to field a corps, and, in 

many instances, a division.49 The result is a significant 

decrease in military capabilities available to defend 

against threats across an enlarged Alliance flank.50

However, it appears the downward trend in defense 

spending may be reversing. In his annual report, 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that 

European allies defense cuts have essentially stopped. 

He noted, that more needs to be done to increase defense investments in light of emerging security challenges, such as Russia.51 Russia, despite a decade of 

deterioration of its armed forces, has progressively increased its defense budget since 2000, and focused on 

modernization. For example, from the period between 

2007 and 2015, Russia increased its defense spending 

from an estimated $37 billion to just over $53 billion, 

an almost 70 percent increase.52

One way to measure capability is to assess expert 

opinion. According to three-quarters of the National 

Journal’s Security Insiders, NATO does not have the 

capabilities to counter Russia.53 Those who disagreed 

did caveat their opinions with insistence that the Alliance needs to make adjustments.54

Another way of measuring capability is through 

war games and simulations. Two recent studies 
53

indicate that, taking into account the current U.S. 

force posture in Europe as well as European NATO 

members’ capabilities, the Alliance would not be able 

to defend the Baltic States against a Russia invasion, 

regardless of the likelihood of such a scenario. In a 

report prepared for the National Commission on the 

Future of the Army,55 the Burke-Macgregor Group 

LLC, concluded the United States could not defeat a 

Russian ground invasion in the Baltic States. 56 RAND 

similarly concluded that NATO cannot prevent a Russian invasion and occupation of the Baltic States.57

This assessment draws several conclusions. First, 

the United States and NATO backed up their commitment to collective defense with ERI, Operation 

ATLANTIC RESOLVE, NATO’s recent adoption of 

its RAP, and an increased rotational presence of many 

allies in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe.58 While 

these commitments and activities provide a reassuring effect to the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, they 

do not automatically provide a credible deterrence 

strategy. Further, Russia has yet to overtly test that 

credibility against NATO members. It is therefore 

unclear whether the costs to Russia have gone up or 

the ability of Russia to secure its objectives has gone 

down. This may lead Russia to believe it can continue 

its current approach. Finally, based on current force 

structure, NATO lacks the capability to defeat a surprise Russian conventional attack into the Baltic States 

or Eastern Europe, regardless of the likelihood of such 

a scenario. 

Capability is the backbone of credibility, and that is 

something that the United States and NATO together 

can and should address to enhance deterrence against 

Russian aggression. To that end, the United States 

and NATO should address ways to enhance capabilities, and thus their credibility, so that it will provide 
54

a deterrent against Russian aggression and assist in 

addressing other security challenges as they emerge. 

DERIVING STRATEGY OPTIONS

Charles F. Herman once stated that, “Shifts in values, environment, capabilities, or threats may lead 

to the need for altered strategies for minimizing the 

threats posed to our security.”59 Policymakers and 

strategists need to approach deterrence differently today than in the Cold War due to the character of the 

threat from Russia, the change in U.S. force posture in 

Europe, and a decreased Alliance capability to defend 

itself. 

In today’s world, Russia uses aggression in areas 

where its influence is already strong, its interests are 

historical (e.g. Crimea), and where it has the military 

advantage and can therefore achieve its objectives 

(e.g. Georgia and Ukraine). Its invasion of Georgia in 

2008, illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and military involvement in Eastern Ukraine beginning that 

same year are cases where Russia’s actions have created divisions within Europe. Russia continues to try 

to gain influence in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, but it knows that the United States and European states, particularly those that are part of NATO, 

would not tolerate Russian overt use of force against 

a NATO ally. 

Russia, therefore, uses ambiguous warfare to cause 

fissures within the European security institutions and 

increase its influence. Therefore, the United States and 

NATO must be prepared to deter against both conventional and ambiguous threats. Taking these points 

into consideration, it is possible to derive two strategies to achieve deterrence: deterrence by denial and 

deterrence by punishment. 
55

Deterrence by Denial—Denying Access Through 

Presence.

Deterrence by denial focuses on denying the adversary its objectives. It seeks to deny Russia access to the 

Baltic States and Eastern Europe. Unlike during the 

Cold War, positioning multiple divisions with hundreds of thousands of soldiers along NATO’s eastern 

flank is unlikely to be acceptable to the United States 

or most other NATO allies and could lead to a security dilemma with Russia. With that understanding, 

and noting current Alliance force posture and its ability to defend, a Russian advance into the Baltic States 

would likely happen quickly and come with minimal 

military cost to Russia. While the Alliance could not 

prevent a fait accompli, it can enhance its presence in 

the Baltic States and Eastern Europe to demonstrate 

its commitment to common defense. 

A conventional attack would likely lead to NATO’s 

invocation of Article 5, followed by a massive counteroffensive to repel the Russians from Alliance territory. 

Russia would therefore lose its ability to influence Europe, and instead of fracturing the Alliance, it could 

serve to galvanize NATO against Russia and stiffen 

the resolve of the threatened states to resist Russian 

pressure. The benefits derived from such a conventional military incursion into the Baltic States are thus 

reduced by Alliance presence. Second order effects 

could put the Russian regime at risk of collapse, thus 

further decreasing the benefits to the regime. 

By decreasing the probability of Russia achieving 

its objectives to influence Europe and fracture the Alliance, the costs of such an attack would outweigh the 

benefits. The decreasing value of the object therefore 

increases the deterrent effect.
56

There are multiple ways for the United States and 

the Alliance to enhance their presence in the Baltic 

States and Eastern Europe that contribute to deterrence by denial. Deterrence by denial would involve 

continuing the rotational presence in the Baltic States 

and Central and Eastern Europe using ERI, Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, enhanced air policing, 

and RAP activities. Rotational forces would use the 

European Activity Set (EAS) along the Alliance’s eastern flank. The U.S. Congress should also approve the 

President’s 2017 budget proposal that includes funding to establish an ABCT set of Army Prepositioned 

Stock (APS) in Europe.60 Joint and combined training 

and exercises with NATO forces should also continue. 

Deterrence by denial is particularly enhanced as 

other European NATO members, Germany in particular, and possibly other partners, contribute to a regular rotational presence. Germany plans to begin rotations in 2016.61 This would speak volumes in terms of 

Alliance commitment. These are all actions that U.S. 

and NATO allies can take in the immediate and short 

term with the effect of denying Russia its objectives. 

However, more must be done to effectively deter Russian aggression. 

Deterrence by Punishment—A Delayed 

Counterattack.

While a continual presence, rotational forces, air 

policing, and robust training exercises are necessary, and demonstrate U.S. and Alliance commitment 

and will, it is clear that the United States and NATO 

just do not have enough forces to prevent Russia 

from invading and occupying all or part of the Baltic States, however unlikely that scenario might be.
57

Source:https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/2014

5026316/in/album-72157657462727401/.

U.S. Army M1A2 Abrams tanks arrive at the Grafenwoehr 

Training Area, Germany, January 31, 2014. The vehicles 

were part of the European Activity Set designed to support 

the U.S. Army’s European Rotational Force and the NATO 

Response Force during training exercises and real-world 

missions.

Figure 2-4. European Activity Set.

A deterrence by punishment strategy focuses on developing a viable and potent capability for a delayed 

counterattack in the unlikely event of a Russian invasion. An underlying assumption of this approach is 

that the obligation established by Article 3 of the North 

Atlantic Treaty, that members defend themselves 

against an armed attack, has been ineffective or failed 

for one or more allies.62 Therefore, the focus should be 

on building national capability within the Alliance to 

repel a Russian invasion and occupation of Alliance 

territory, if deterrence by denial fails. Not only would 

such a capability serve as a deterrent effect, it would 
58

also underpin the credibility of the United States and 

Alliance commitment to Article 5, and raise the costs 

and risks to Russia. 

European NATO members need to enhance their 

capabilities if the Alliance is to get to the point at 

which it has the ability to deter Russian armed aggression with the threat of a massive counter-offensive. 

Budgets are tight, so this is not an easy task, nor is this 

an immediate solution. Developing the required national capabilities will take years, which underscores 

the necessity of the deterrence by denial approach 

previously addressed. This will serve as the primary 

means of deterrence against Russia while the United 

States and NATO re-focus efforts to develop requisite 

capabilities on the European continent. In developing 

these capabilities, the Alliance will also increase its 

ability to deny Russia its objectives, thus highlighting 

an interconnectedness between deterrence by denial 

and deterrence by punishment.

Developing Alliance Capabilities.

The United States has several mechanisms in place 

as part of its security cooperation activities, as well as 

those associated with ERI and Operation ATLANTIC 

RESOLVE, to focus efforts on enhancing and exercising Alliance capabilities. However, senior USAREUR 

officials admit that while they are indeed doing a 

lot to reassure allies, there is no coordinated effort 

on the intent, other than reassurance, behind these 

activities.63 To remedy this problem, EUCOM and 

USAREUR need to better coordinate and streamline 

their activities to focus on enhancing and exercising 

Alliance capabilities. In particular, EUCOM and USAREUR should more effectively make use of NATO 

capability targets—part of the NATO Defense Plan-
59

ning Process—to define the types of activities that will 

focus on lacking capabilities. 

EUCOM should clearly define the approach in its 

Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and associated Countryspecific Security Cooperation Sections, and provide 

the resources USAREUR needs to achieve its defined 

objectives. This requires a persistent coordinated staff 

effort among EUCOM, USAREUR, SHAPE, NATO, 

and NATO’s Land Component Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir, Turkey. These activities should ultimately support Phase 0 (shape) and Phase 1 (deter)64

operations in support of EUCOM’s TCP. However, it 

is not entirely clear there is a coherent Phase 0 and 

Phase 1 plan, or if they are included as part of draft 

contingency plans.65 All this implies that the commands properly train their staff, particularly those 

involved in security cooperation, to conduct strategic 

and operational planning, and understand the nesting 

of national security objectives with Alliance capability 

targets.66 A subsequent chapter to this monograph further elaborates on the issue of capability development, 

particularly with the use of exercises.

European NATO members must also do their part 

by progressively increasing their defense budgets and 

finding effective ways to increase capabilities. NATO 

has programs in place aimed toward that end, such as 

the Connected Forces Initiative,67 but they are only as 

good as the allies’ commitment to the programs. Some 

allies are also working independently toward increasing capabilities. For example, Germany announced in 

April 2015 that it is buying back 100 Leopard II tanks 

in order to increase its defense capabilities and provide flexible options.68

As the Alliance develops a more capable force—that 

underpins credibility—it will increase the perceived 

costs and the probability of such costs in the event of 
60

a Russian invasion into Alliance territory. These costs, 

as noted above, would come after such an invasion via 

a massive Alliance counterattack against Russia to restore Alliance territory. By raising the probability and 

degree of perceived costs, the perceived net benefits 

of a Russian invasion into Alliance territory go down. 

Therefore, this reduces the value of the object for 

Russia and increases the deterrent effect. 

Deterrence by Denial—Denying the Ability to 

Fracture and Influence.

The capability development efforts associated with 

both of the above deterrence strategies focus purely 

on a conventional threat, and not on an ambiguous 

threat. A Russian conventional attack against the Alliance, while plausible, is unlikely. The more likely 

scenario is that Russia continues to use ambiguous 

warfare to fracture Alliance cohesion, and gain influence in Europe. Russia is opportunistic and is likely to 

leverage other events to further achieve its objectives. 

Case in point is the refugee crisis in Europe. Russia 

could use the crisis to find fracture points and exploit 

them, such as EU members’ differing views on border 

security. One way to counter this ambiguous approach 

is to deter by denial—to deny Russia its objectives of 

increasing its influence in Europe and fracturing the 

Alliance through ambiguous warfare. Activities conducted under the first part of a denial strategy would 

help to deny Russia its objectives by enhancing Alliance cohesion. 

There is also a vital second part to deterrence by 

denial. As previously noted, Russia is using ambiguous warfare to create fissures within Europe. This is a 

particularly challenging problem, since it is difficult to 

identify the activities, attribute the source, and deter-
61

mine what resources to pit against such activities. This 

effort has an important foreign internal defense (FID) 

element to it, and requires a strategy with more than 

just a military element. It should also include information, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, financial, and diplomatic instruments, among potentially 

others. 

In many, if not most nations, the ability to counter 

Russian ambiguous warfare is largely a law enforcement function. It also has an economic and diplomatic element and significant information and intelligence instruments as well, particularly in light of the 

prevalence of cyberwarfare. Hence, the United States 

needs a concerted effort among interagency partners 

to identify those areas where Washington can assist 

European NATO members to develop capabilities to 

deter Russia’s ambiguous warfare. This includes synchronizing the EUCOM Country-specific Security Cooperation Sections of its TCP with the U.S. Embassy 

Integrated Country Strategies, and finding synergies 

where possible. EUCOM has the structure to facilitate 

this process within the J-5 (Strategic Planning and Policy) and J-9 (Interagency Partnering) directorates, but 

it is unclear how much buy-in there is from both the 

Department of Defense (DoD) and interagency partners. This implies the need for EUCOM to work closely with country teams in U.S. embassies across Europe 

to clearly define approaches and synchronize efforts 

to help allies develop capabilities required to counter 

ambiguous threats. The U.S. military could add value 

to this process through the National Guard’s State 

Partnership Program (SPP). This program has the flexibility to bring in state agencies and members of the 

National Guard with capabilities required to create 

synergies, thus, augmenting efforts of the interagency 

country team. Where critical national security objec-
62

tives are at stake, the National Security Council should 

play a critical role in coordinating efforts among the 

interagency to define the risks and potential threats, 

and develop appropriate policies and strategies.

European NATO members also have a responsibility to work together, particularly those who are 

also EU members. Failure to work together could 

lead to fractures between and among states. Franklin 

D. Kramer et al., posit that this requires a fourth core 

task for the Alliance that focuses on national resiliency 

against ambiguous threats. This “stability generation” 

seeks to enhance Alliance capacity to prevent and dissuade threats that seek to attack or influence society.69

Many of the functions required to protect society reside within government agencies outside of the military, and cross over into the purview of the EU. These 

are the functions and associated capabilities (e.g. law 

enforcement, border control) that are essential to 

deter ambiguous threats. Since NATO does not possess or have influence over these types of capabilities, 

it implies the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination between NATO and the EU. In support, the 

U.S. DoD should also reconsider its representation at 

the U.S. Mission to the EU in order to enhance the ability to synchronize efforts with NATO and EUCOM. 

These are all critical activities that will help to 

secure the Alliance’s center of gravity—cohesion 

and unity—and deny Russia the ability to influence 

European security affairs. These efforts, by denying 

objectives, would decrease the probability of Russia 

obtaining the benefits of its action, thus decreasing 

the value of the object and increasing the deterrent effect. A subsequent chapter to this monograph further 

elaborates on this aspect of building partner capacity 

through theater security cooperation (TSC), especially 

including FID.
63

A NOTE REGARDING REASSURANCE

Historically, security assurances applied primarily 

to the use of nuclear weapons, both to prevent nuclear 

states from threatening other states, and to provide assistance to those states who become the victims of nuclear aggression.70 Thus, security assurance includes 

providing a security umbrella with the protection of 

nuclear weapons. This was very much the case during 

the Cold War as well as in nuclear non-proliferation 

activities,71 and which has been the topic of a great 

deal of research.72 However, the security assurances 

sought by the Baltic States and Eastern Europe are 

less about the nuclear umbrella and non-proliferation 

and more about the Alliance’s commitment to collective defense and response to Russian aggression. This 

is why, on June 3, 2014, President Obama announced 

the ERI.73 As previously noted, the ERI, along with 

Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, are critical components of building national capabilities that in the end, 

make allies security contributors. Based on the warm 

welcome from local communities to an increased U.S. 

presence in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe,74 one 

can assume that the level of reassurance has indeed 

increased, despite the call from some allies for more 

presence. Yet, reassurance will only become viable 

and credible as all Alliance members improve and develop capabilities that provide the Alliance with the 

full set of forces and capabilities it requires75 to legitimately deter Russian aggression. 

Ultimately, in the case of Russian aggression, assurances of an Allied and U.S. response will depend 

on, among other things, the strategic context, the attribution of ambiguous threats, the scale of the aggression, and the national interests impacted. It is difficult 

to state definitively how the Alliance, and particularly 
64

the United States, would respond to what the Baltic 

States or Eastern Europe might see as Russian aggression if the methods are ambiguous or attribution 

is difficult. This is where building national resiliency 

capabilities is critical. 

Efforts to arrive at a political decision and efforts 

to deploy forces may indeed take time. Yet two cautions are in order. First, the United States and NATO 

cannot afford to reassure allies to the point where 

they solely rely on the United States or NATO writ 

large, to ensure their security. This could leave the Alliance in a deficit of capabilities (the assured ally being 

a consumer of security and not a producer). It could 

also leave the assured ally vulnerable to adversarial 

actions that fall below the threshold of an Article 5 

incident and against which it can neither defend nor 

respond. Reassurance activities must therefore seek 

to assure allies that the Alliance will respond to its 

collective defense commitments, while at the same 

time assisting that Ally to develop its own capabilities. This is consistent with Kramer et al.’s approach to 

resiliency.76

Second, the United States and NATO must be careful that its reassurance activities do not provoke further Russian aggression, or lead to a new security dilemma. Indicators point to Russian military responses 

to increased U.S. and NATO activities along Russia’s 

western border. For example, at the same time Operation DRAGOON RIDE was taking place, Russia 

doubled its troop levels from 40,000 to 80,000 for mass 

exercises across Russia.77 The challenge, according 

to Arnold Wolfers, is convincing each other that the 

accumulation of power is not intended for offensive 

operations against the other.78 This is, therefore, a 

delicate balancing game. It must take into consideration Russian actions in Georgia and Ukraine, but also 
65

understand Russian intentions and the likelihood of 

a conventional attack—balanced against the reality 

of potential ambiguous activities and Russian influence in Europe. Any strategy toward Russia therefore 

requires continual assessment and adjustment, and a 

well-coordinated and thought-out public affairs and 

information operations plan. 

Source: U.S. Army photo by Capt. Spencer Garrison, https://www.flickr.

com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/.

In the fall of 2015, the U.S. Army’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment 

completed an 800 km military movement across Germany, 

Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Hungary, to demonstrate continued commitment and cooperation between 

NATO allies and to exercise freedom of movement across 

Europe. Along the way, U.S. Soldiers from 4th Squadron, 

2nd Cavalry Regiment received logistical support from their 

allies in the host nations’ militaries.

Figure 2-5. OPERATION DRAGOON RIDE.
66

CONCLUSION

Over the last two decades, as hope ensued that the 

peace dividend would create lasting peace and stability in Europe, the United States and NATO drew 

down their forces and significantly reduced their force 

posture in Europe. At the same time, NATO and the 

EU expanded, adding former Warsaw Pact states and 

former Soviet republics. In the last decade, Russia has 

increased its capability, and boldly employed them to 

pursue its objectives of increasing its influence in Europe, stopping the expansion of NATO and the EU, and 

creating fractures within Europe that enable Russia to 

exert influence on its own terms. This evolution has 

made it clear that based on current capabilities within 

the Alliance and the United States—particularly those 

forces stationed in Europe—the Alliance is not capable 

of preventing a Russian conventional attack into Alliance territory. This diminishes the Alliance’s ability to 

deter Russia from using conventional or ambiguous 

threats to achieve its objectives to fracture the Alliance 

and gain influence in Europe. However, this does not 

preclude the possibility of enhancing conventional 

capabilities and developing other capabilities to counter ambiguous threats, which will in turn underpin a 

credible deterrence against Russian aggression. The 

way forward is to apply both types of deterrence—

by denial and by punishment as described above—in 

order to provide a capable a credible deterrence both 

in the immediate and long-term. The consolidated effect of such efforts—to include forward presence, rotational forces, and combined and joint exercises and 

training—should increase the perceived costs and the 

probability of such costs in response to Russian aggression, and decrease the probability of Russia deriv-
67

ing benefits from its actions. The combined effect is a 

decrease in the value of the object for Russia, and an 

increase in the deterrent effect. 

To develop such capabilities requires a concerted 

effort on the part of the United States, the Alliance, and 

the EU. It includes European NATO members continuing to search for more effective ways to increase 

capabilities and progressively increase their defense 

budgets. It also includes EUCOM and USAREUR to 

more effectively align their security cooperation activities to support capability development and a coordinated whole of government effort to address those 

capabilities that fall beyond the scope of the military, 

such as law enforcement. It is through such activities 

that the Alliance can develop a capable force that underpins the credibility of its commitment to defend 

Alliance territory through deterrence. The subsequent 

chapters of this monograph further elaborate on various aspects of U.S. Army efforts, in coordination with 

NATO and interagency partners, to achieve a credible 

and capable deterrent.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Jim Garamone, “Dempsey Discusses Use of Military Instrument of Power,” DoD News, U.S. Department of Defense website, 

July 2, 2014, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/

Article/602812, accessed December 5, 2015.

2. GEN Philip M. Breedlove, “Department of Defense Press 

Briefing by General Breedlove in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” 

news transcript of a Pentagon briefing, Washington, DC, October 30, 2015, www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/TranscriptView/Article/626787/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-generalbreedlove-in-the-pentagon-brief, accessed November 27,. 2015.

3. Idem., “United States European Command Posture Statement 2016,” Posture Statement presented to the 114th Congress, 
68

2nd Session on February 25, 2016, Stuttgart, Germany: United 

States European Command, 2016, available from www.eucom.

mil/media-library/article/35164/u-s-european-command-posture-state

ment-2016, accessed February 27, 2016.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret eds./trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 

p. 92.

5. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of our Time, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 180-181.

6. Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do 

We Stand?” Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, April 

2011, p. 741, available from search.proquest.com/docreview/87350

0712/fulltextPDF?accountid=4444, accessed September 29, 2015.

7. Honorable Ashton Carter, “Strategic and Operational Innovation at a Time of Transition and Turbulence,” Public speech 

at the Reagan National Defense Forum, Simi Valley, CA, November 7, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/SpeechView/Article/628146/remarks-on-s, accessed on November 23, 2015. 

He stated: “We’re modernizing our nuclear arsenal, so America’s 

nuclear deterrent continues to be effective, safe, and secure, to deter nuclear attacks and reassure our allies.”

8. The emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as 

a non-state actor with conventional capabilities presents a new 

twist on deterrence—that is, how to deter a non-state actor that 

could potentially pose a conventional threat to the United States. 

It is, however, not considered in the context of this monograph.

9. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, CT: 

Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 2-3.

10. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might, New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1, 6.

11. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 14.
69

12. Craig and George, p. 180.

13. Austin Long, Deterrence From the Cold War to the Long War: 

Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2008, p. 10.

14. Robert A. Pape, Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coercion in 

War, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 13.

15. Long, p. 10.

16. Ibid., p. 35.

17. Ibid., pp. 35, 74, and 93.

18. Craig and George, p. 180.

19. Byman and Waxman, pp. 10-12.

20. Craig and George, p.190.

21. Ibid., p. 181.

22. Mearsheimer, p. 14.

23. Byman and Waxman, pp. 10-12.

24. Pape, pp. 1-54. While Pape’s model focuses on coercion, 

he notes it equally applies to deterrence since the only difference 

between coercion and deterrence is that the former seeks to force 

the adversary to change its behavior, while the latter seeks to prevent him from changing his behavior. Based on the applicability 

of Pape’s theories to coercion and deterrence, this monograph refers to Pape’s approach using solely its application to deterrence 

(Ibid., p. 4.).

25. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

26. Ibid., p. 16.

27. For example, as one snapshot in time, in 1989 at the tail 

end of the Cold War along the inter-German border (IGB), North 
70

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces consisted of more 

than 20 Allied divisions. (Refer to David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: 

Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2016, p. 3, available from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf, accessed February 3, 2016.) Including tactical and strategic nuclear weapons 

that underpinned Cold War deterrence, and the second offset 

strategy employing precision guided munitions and the evolution of the air-land battle, one easily concludes the United States 

and NATO posed a credible and capable deterrence force against 

an equally large Soviet force. Applying Pape’s logic of coercion, 

the costs would have been very high for the Soviet Union and 

the benefits minimal by going to war with NATO. The value 

of its objective would have likely been negative.

28. “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia And 

The CIS,” December 18, 2015, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/

Display/1767799, accessed April 28, 2016. 

29. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 4, 

30. Doug Mastriano et al., Project 1704: A United States Army 

War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, and Appropriate U.S. Response and the Implications for U.S. Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2015, p. 9.

31. Research discussions conducted from November 3-6, 2015, 

with the United States Mission to NATO, the United States Military Delegation to NATO, the NATO International Staff, Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), U.S. Army Europe 

(USAREUR), and U.S. European Command (EUCOM).

32. Honorable Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

“Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech—Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),” Whitehall, London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, September 10, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/News/

Speeches/Speech-View/Article/617128/royal-united-services-instituterusi, accessed October 28, 2015.

33. Elbridge Colby and Jonathan Solomon, “Facing Russia: 

Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe,” Survival, Vol. 
71

56, Iss. 6, November 2015, p. 21, www-tandfonline-com.usawc.idm.

oclc.org/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116146, accessed November 30, 2015.

34. Robert D. Kaplan, “Countering Putin’s Grand Strategy,” 

Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2015, search.proquest.com.usawc.

idm.oclc.org/docview/1654552152, accessed January 14, 2016.

35. There is a clear east-west divide: eastern NATO members 

perceive Russia as a significant threat, and the western NATO 

members do not. Other factors are creating divides as well, including the recent refugee crisis and the euro crisis. This refugee crisis is creating a potential north-south divide within the 

Alliance.

36. Rob Pritchard, “West accuses Russia of cyber-warfare,” 

Janes Intelligence Review, December 29, 2014, available from https://

janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1732353, accessed April 25, 2016.

37. Heather A. Conley, “Putin’s Europe,” in Craig Cohan 

and Melissa G. Dalton eds., 2016 Global Forecast, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015, p. 39, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/151116_Cohen_GlobalFore

cast2016_Web.pdf, accessed November 28, 2015. 

38. Craig and George, p. 180.

39. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama 

to the People of Estonia,” public speech, Nordea Concert Hall, 

Tallinn, Estonia, September 3, 2014, available from https://www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obamapeople-estonia, accessed November 27, 2015.

40. Honorable Ashton Carter.

41. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT 

SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other United 

States Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners,” June 

3, 2014, available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-andother-us-efforts-support-, accessed November 27, 2015.
72

42. Operation Atlantic Resolve is a demonstration of continued United States commitment to the collective security of NATO 

and to enduring peace and stability in the region, in light of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine. From the United States Army Europe Atlantic Resolve web page, available from www.eur.army.

mil/atlanticresolve/, accessed January 15, 2016. Additionally, U.S. 

European Command, Communication and Engagement Directorate, Media Operations Division, “OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE (SEPTEMBER 2015),” United States European Command 

Fact Sheet on Operation Atlantic Resolve, September 2015, available from www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0514_atlanticre

solve/docs/Operation_Atlantic_Resolve_Fact_Sheet_22SEP2015.pdf,

accessed 30 November 2015.

43. The NATO website states: 

Due to the changed security environment on NATO’s borders, the RAP includes ‘assurance measures’ for NATO 

member countries in Central and Eastern Europe to reassure 

their populations, reinforce their defence and deter potential 

aggression. Assurance measures comprise a series of land, 

sea and air activities in, on and around the NATO’s eastern 

flank, which are reinforced by exercises focused on collective defence and crisis management. The RAP also includes 

‘adaptation measures’ which are longer-term changes to 

NATO’s forces and command structure so that the Alliance 

will be better able to react swiftly and decisively to sudden 

crises. Adaptation measures include tripling the strength 

of the NATO Response Force (NRF), creating a Very High 

Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that is able to deploy at 

very short notice, and enhancing the Standing Naval Forces. 

To facilitate readiness and the rapid deployment of forces, 

the first six NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) - which 

are small headquarters - were inaugurated in Central and 

Eastern Europe. Headquarters for the Multinational Corps 

Northeast in Szczecin, Poland and the Multinational Division Southeast in Bucharest, Romania will be established 

along with a standing joint logistics support group headquarters.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Readiness Action Plan,” 

available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm, 

accessed January 16, 2016.
73

44. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The NATO Defence 

(sic) Planning Process,” available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49202.htm, accessed December 19, 2015. Through the 

NATO Defence (sic) Planning Process (NDPP), NATO identifies capabilities and promotes their development and acquisition 

by allies so that it can meet its security and defense objectives. 

By participating voluntarily in the NDPP, allies can harmonize 

their national defense plans with those of NATO. The NDPP is 

designed to influence national defense planning efforts and prioritizes NATO’s future capability requirements, apportions those 

requirements to each ally as targets, facilitates their implementation and regularly assesses progress. NATO defense planning 

encompasses different domains; force, resource, armaments, logistics, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency, 

air and missile defense, air traffic management, standardization, 

intelligence, military medical support, science and technology, 

and cyber.

45. One potential flaw of the NATO Defense Planning Process, particularly in light of the evolving security environment, 

is that capability targets are based on those capabilities that the 

Alliance needs in order to achieve its Level of Ambition (LOA). 

The LOA defines how many major and minor joint operations the 

Alliance should be able to simultaneously execute. Capabilities 

are not based on a threat, which has the potential risk of creating 

capability gaps, particularly as the threat continues to evolve at 

an ever-rapid pace.

46. North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium: NATO 

Public Diplomacy Division, November 2010, p. 30, available 

from www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf,

accessed December 19, 2015.

47. Research discussions conducted on November 3, 2015, 

with the United States Mission to NATO, the United States Military Delegation to NATO, and the NATO International Staff.

48. Jan Techau, The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security 

Vacuum in Europe, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Publications Department, September 2015, p. 4.
74

49. Luis Simón, “NATO’s Rebirth: Assessing NATO’s Eastern 

European ‘Flank’,” Parameters, Autumn 2014, p. 73.

50. Techau, p. 4. 

51. Jens Stoltenberg, “Secretary General’s Annual Report 

shows cuts in defence spending have almost stopped,” NATO 

Press Release, January 28, 2016, available from www.nato.int/cps/

en/natohq/news_127503.htm, accessed February 27, 2016.

52. “Russia’s Defence Budget,” Jane’s Defence Procurement 

Budgets, October 5, 2015, available from https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/

Display/1327508#DEFENCE BUDGET TRENDS, accessed January 14, 2016. Note: Caution should be taken in considering the 

amount of Russia’s defense spending increase within the context 

of a corrupt society where not all defense spending actually goes 

toward defense investment.

53. The Security Insiders include: Gordon Adams, Charles 

Allen, Michael Allen, Thad Allen, Graham Allison, James Bamford, David Barno, Milt Bearden, Peter Bergen, Samuel “Sandy” 

Berger, David Berteau, Stephen Biddle, Nancy Birdsall, Marion 

Blakey, Kit Bond, Stuart Bowen, Paula Broadwell, Mike Breen, 

Mark Brunner, Steven Bucci, Nicholas Burns, Dan Byman, James 

Jay Carafano, Phillip Carter, Wendy Chamberlin, Michael Chertoff, Frank Cilluffo, James Clad, Richard Clarke, Steve Clemons, 

Joseph Collins, William Courtney, Lorne Craner, Roger Cressey, 

Gregory Dahlberg, Robert Danin, Richard Danzig, Janine Davidson, Daniel Drezner, Mackenzie Eaglen, Paul Eaton, Andrew 

Exum, William Fallon, Eric Farnsworth, Jacques Gansler, Stephen 

Ganyard, Daniel Goure, Mark Green, Mike Green, Mark Gunzinger, Todd Harrison, John Hamre, Jim Harper, Marty Hauser, 

Michael Hayden, Michael Herson, Pete Hoekstra, Bruce Hoffman, 

Linda Hudson, Paul Hughes, Colin Kahl, Donald Kerrick, Rachel 

Kleinfeld, Lawrence Korb, David Kramer, Andrew Krepinevich, 

Charlie Kupchan, W. Patrick Lang, Cedric Leighton, Michael 

Leiter, James Lindsay, Justin Logan, Trent Lott, Peter Mansoor, 

Ronald Marks, Brian McCaffrey, Steven Metz, Franklin Miller, 

Michael Morell, Philip Mudd, John Nagl, Shuja Nawaz, Kevin 

Nealer, Michael Oates, Thomas Pickering, Paul Pillar, Larry Prior, 

Stephen Rademaker, Marc Raimondi, Celina Realuyo, Bruce Riedel, Barry Rhoads, Marc Rotenberg, Frank Ruggiero, Gary Samo-
75

re, Kori Schake, Mark Schneider, John Scofield, Tammy Schultz, 

Stephen Sestanovich, Sarah Sewall, Matthew Sherman, Jennifer 

Sims, Suzanne Spaulding, James Stavridis, Constanze Stelzenmüller, Ted Stroup, Guy Swan, Frances Townsend, Mick Trainor, 

Richard Wilhelm, Tamara Wittes, Dov Zakheim, and Juan Zarate.

54. Sara Sorcher, “Security Insiders: NATO Unprepared 

to Counter Newly Aggressive Russia,” National Journal Daily A.M., April 28, 2014, available from search.proquest.com/

docview/1520022795, accessed October 6, 2015.

55. The National Commission on the Future of the Army was 

established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2015 (Pub. L. 113-291). The Commission submitted a report 

containing a comprehensive study and recommendations to the 

President and Congress of the United States. The Commission examined the structure of the Army and policy assumptions related 

to the size and force mixture of the Army in order to make an 

assessment of the size and force structure of the Army’s active 

and reserve components. The Commission made recommendations on modifications to the structure of the Army based on current and anticipated mission requirements, acceptable levels of 

national risk, in a manner consistent with available resources, and 

anticipated future resources. In accordance with legislation, the 

Commission specifically examined the transfer of Army National 

Guard AH-64 Apache attack helicopters from the Army National 

Guard to the Regular Army. The Commission consisted of eight 

Commissioners; four appointed by Congress and four appointed 

by the President. The Commissioners used their decades of public 

service and expertise in national and international security policy and strategy, military forces capability, force structure, organization, and employment, and reserve forces policy to provide 

recommendations that seek to strengthen the future Army. See 

National Commission on the Future of the Army website, Background, available from www.ncfa.ncr.gov/content/background, accessed April 28, 2016.

56. They used a Combat Power Builder and Combat Calculator (CBCC) model:

 CBCC is an easy to use “first order” method to compare 

force design and actions at brigade or division levels in 
76

experimental, classroom, or field settings. The CBCC uses 

open source data to compute platform combat values, then, 

groups them into units. Opposing units are placed in 2-4 

sectors where environmental and operational factors modify combat values to produce force ratios. The CBCC computes and displays losses in action (Offense or Defense) for 

5-7 days, letting the user visualize the battle and draw or refine conclusions for more study.5

 Back-up Slides in the RSG 

briefing contain charts with supporting CBCC data.

See Douglas Macgregor, “MEMORANDUM FOR: National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA),” September 7, 2015, 

National Commission of the Future of the Army website, available 

from www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/COL%20%28R%29%20

Douglas%20Macgregor--September%203%2C%202015.pdf, accessed 

November 27, 2015, p. 2. They ran two scenarios using two different force constructs based on the current brigade combat team 

(BCT) structure, one using a single Stryker BCT and two Armored 

BCTs, and another with one Stryker BCT and two Armored BCTs. 

In both scenarios, the Russians defeated the United States forces 

nearly 80 percent of the time.

57. Shlapak and Johnson, pp. 4-6. RAND used a map-based tabletop exercise (TTX) in a series of war games. (Ibid., p. 12). RAND 

further concluded that at least, in order to prevent a fait accompli, 

the United States would need to provide six or seven brigades, to 

include three heavy brigades, with enablers (Ibid., p. 8).

58. John R. Deni, “NATO Force Posture upon Its Return to 

Europe: Too Little, Too Late,” in Rebecca R. Moore and Damon 

Coletta, eds., NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

forthcoming in early 2017.

59. Charles F. Hermann, “Defining National Security,” in John 

F. Reichart, Steven R. Sturm, eds., American Defense Policy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, available from 

www.voxprof.com/cfh/hermann-pubs/Hermann-Defining%20Nat

ional%20Security.pdf, accessed October 22, 2015.

60. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United States 
77

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request, Washington 

DC: Department of Defense, February 2016, table 7-7, available 

from comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/

FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf, accessed February 27, 

2016.

61. Staff Report, “Germany will deploy rotating infantry 

troops to Estonia in 2016,” The Baltic Times, May 19, 2015, available from www.baltictimes.com/germany_will_deploy_rotating_infan

try_troops_to_estonia_in_2016/, accessed February 27, 2016. Note: 

The reason Germany is critical is due to its influence in Europe, to 

include NATO and the European Union, and its close economic 

ties with Russia. Germany’s participation would send a clear message to Russia that any armed aggression into Alliance territory 

would not be tolerated.

62. Under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, members are 

obligated to do all in their power to resist armed attack. It states:

 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this 

Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to 

resist armed attack.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” 

April 4, 1949, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_

texts_17120.htm, accessed February 3, 2016.

63. Research discussions conducted between November 5-6, 

2015, with USAREUR, and EUCOM.

64. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, 

Joint Publication 5-0, Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, August 11, 2011, pp. III-3 – III-42, available from www.

dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf, accessed November 28, 2015.

65. Research discussions conducted between November 5-6, 

2015, with USAREUR and EUCOM staff, and with various staff 

elements in the Pentagon on October 27, 2015.
78

66. The author concluded, following 3 years at EUCOM as a 

political-military affairs desk officer, that the Department of Defense does a poor job of preparing staff officers for such jobs (refer to R. Reed Anderson, “Political-Military Affairs Officers - The 

Art of Strategic Planning,” FAO Journal, Vol. XII, No. 4, October 

2009, pp. 14-20, available from www.faoa.org/resources/Documents/

pub40.pdf, accessed November 28, 2015). Based on discussions 

conducted between November 5-6, 2015 with USAREUR and EUCOM staff, this appears still to be the case and the Department of 

Defense should look at ways of resolving this professional development shortfall.

67. According to NATO’s website: 

CFI is a key enabler in developing the goal of NATO Forces 

2020: a coherent set of deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces equipped, trained, exercised, commanded 

and able to operate together and with partners in any environment. It is essential in ensuring that the Alliance remains 

well prepared to undertake the full range of its missions, 

as well as to address future challenges wherever they may 

arise. In light of the current security environment, it is also 

a means to deliver the training and exercise elements of the 

Alliance’s Readiness Action Plan.

“Connected Forces Initiative,” NATO website topics, available 

from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_98527.htm, accessed January 16, 2016.

68. Deanne Corbett, “Germany To Buy Back Tanks Amid 

Russia Threat,” Defense News, April 18, 2015, available from www.

defensenews.com/story/defense/land/vehicles/2015/04/18/germany-tobuy-back-tanks-amid-russia-threat/25879281/, accessed January 14, 

2016.

69. Franklin D. Kramer et al., NATO’s New Strategy: Stability Generation, Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015, p. 1, 

available from www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/nato-snew-strategy-stability-generation, accessed April 14, 2016.

70. Joseph F. Pilat, “Reassessing Security Assurances in a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, Spring 

2005, p. 159.
79

71. Ibid., p. 159.

72. See, for example, Jeffrey W. Knopf, ed., Security Assurances 

and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Stanford, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 2012.

73. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

74. See for example, “Cavalry ride: American forces in Europe” The Economist (Online), Apr 1, 2015, available from search.

proquest.com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1669491275, accessed November 30, 2015.

75. As defined by its Level of Ambition (LoA) which defines 

the number, scale, and nature of the military operations that 

NATO should be able to conduct simultaneously, North Atlantic 

Council, NATO Handbook, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2006, p. 53, available from www.nato.int/docu/

handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf, accessed December 19, 2015.

76. Kramer et al.

77. Agence France-Presse, “Russia Expands Military Exercises To 80,000 Troops,” March 15, 2015, available from www.

defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/03/

19/russia-expands-military-exercises-troops/25023979/, accessed 30 

November 2015.

78. Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous 

Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4, December 

1952, pp. 481-493, available from www.jstor.org.usawc.idm.oclc.org/

stable/2145138?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, 

accessed October 24, 2015.

81

CHAPTER 3

THE TIME-DISTANCE CHALLENGE 

OF U.S.-BASED FORCES

Presence is important, because presence equals trust. 

You can’t rotate trust. You can’t surge trust. You earn 

trust in long-term relationships. Our ability to use 

these European bases to project on behalf of the alliance or other objectives is about that trust, that relationship, that long-term bond you get from forwardstationed forces.

 —General Philip Breedlove1

 Events similar to the one in this monograph’s opening vignettes are becoming more and more familiar in 

Eastern Europe as tensions increase between Russia 

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 The 

European Leadership Network highlighted 40 events 

in just 8 months in 2014, stating that:

these events add up to a highly disturbing picture of violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea, 

simulated attack runs and other dangerous actions happening on a regular basis over a very wide geographical 

area.3

On March 5, 2014, in a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the Department 

of Defense (DoD) was boosting its NATO presence 

by taking additional steps to reassure its Baltic allies 

in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea.4

This effort included increased U.S. Air Force contributions to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and 

increased U.S. Army contributions to ground exer-
cises in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.5

 These 

new missions would eventually become Operation 

ATLANTIC RESOLVE6 and by October 2015, U.S. 

Army Europe (USAREUR) soldiers had participated 

in multinational events from the Baltic States to the 

Black Sea.7 Lithuania’s land forces commander Major 

General Almantas Leika stated the movement of U.S. 

Army forces into the region “shows that we can rely 

on our ally.”8

In 2015 the Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe 

(USAFE), General Frank Gorenc stated:

When [the crisis in] Crimea broke out, from the word 

go to the time that the F-15 showed [up] in Lithuania was 14 hours. You can’t replicate that without 

forward-based combat power. I still get thank-you’s 

from the Baltic countries with respect to that. They 

were completely assured and very, very happy that 

we did that.9

This deployment was considered a major strategic 

success and the blistering 14-hour response time highlighted a unique capability of the air domain. However, these missions were flown during peacetime 

(between NATO and Russia) and in a permissive environment. If the Russian Army advanced into Baltic 

territory, it would operate under a layered protective 

umbrella of advanced Russian surface-to-air missile 

systems. Additionally, Russia has 27 combat Air Force 

squadrons in its Western Military District alone.10 In 

war game scenarios, NATO airpower appears unable 

to generate enough sorties to stop Russia from taking 

two of the three Baltic capitals in 60 hours.11 Furthermore, any forward-based airpower would be subject 

to continuous SS-26 Iskandar missile attacks which, 

combined with the surface-to-air missile threat, would 

82
force NATO airpower to fly missions from Scandinavia or Western Europe.12 Russia has essentially created an Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) region for 

NATO airpower and seapower in the Baltic region. 

Although Russia’s A2/AD systems appear dormant 

in peacetime, that could change at the flip of a switch. 

As the USAREUR Commander Lieutenant General 

Ben Hodges stated:

Readiness to perform any mission is why we are forward stationed in Europe. Though we make up only 

5% of the Army’s manpower, US Army Europe touches or is involved in most of what the US Army delivers in terms of strategic effect...we guarantee access to 

allies and critical infrastructure. US Army Europe enables early entry so we don’t have to do forced entry.13

Despite the benefits of forward-based military 

power, both USAFE and USAREUR have endured 

similar infrastructure and force structure reductions 

(over 70 percent in the last 25 years).14 USAREUR in 

particular consists of only about 30,000 soldiers and 

maintains only two assigned maneuver forces; the 

173d Airborne Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) 

and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR). There is no armor or attack aviation assigned to USAREUR.15 To 

mitigate a plausible Russian attack, USAREUR relies 

on the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept to better prepare for potential contingencies.16

This chapter argues that continental United States 

(CONUS)-based Regionally Aligned Forces do not 

provide the Army a reliable, enduring mechanism 

to overcome the time/distance challenge inherent in 

a Baltic conflict with Russia. To overcome the time/

distance challenge that Russia could exploit, the DoD 

should assign, allocate, and apportion forces versus 

83
84

aligning them, to include assigning a two-star headquarters (HQ) to USAREUR, and establishing a rotational allocation of an Armored Brigade Combat Team 

(ABCT) that provides a continuous rotational presence 

of armor in Europe.

THE PROBLEM OF A RESURGENT RUSSIA

The previous chapter noted RAND’s findings that 

based on current capabilities of the forces stationed 

in Europe, the United States, and NATO lack the capability to defeat Russian aggression should Russia, 

using both conventional and ambiguous warfare, 

choose to invade the Baltic States. However, this does 

not preclude NATO from developing such capabilities and associated activities (forward presence, rotational forces, combined/joint exercises, and training) 

that will in turn underpin a more credible deterrent 

to Russian aggression. Improving NATO capabilities, activities, and forward-presence force posture are 

likely to change the cost/benefit analysis for Russia to 

increase deterrence. To be effective, a deterring force 

must be credible, capable, and have the will to fight. 

Traditionally, no force fits that description better than 

the U.S. military. However, in the last 20 years USAREUR alone has decreased from about 300,000 soldiers 

to 30,000.17 In addition to this drawdown in American forces (prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine 

and the subsequent Wales Summit), overall defense 

spending of NATO members dropped.18

As discussed in Chapter 1, Russia’s key foreign 

policy goals are the protection of its homeland through 

the creation and maintenance of an external buffer 

zone and the protection of the Russian diaspora that 

live in the so-called near abroad. Russia has proven 

that it is willing to use military force against neighbors 
85

to further these policy goals. Like Ukraine, the three 

Baltic States were republics that gained independence 

after the fall of the Soviet Union and have large Russian minorities.19 While no one can predict whether, 

when, or where Russia might again violate another 

state’s sovereignty, the United States would be wise 

to better posture its military forces to support other 

NATO members against potential Russian aggression. 

General Hodges recognizes that with a much smaller 

forward-based force structure than it had during the 

Cold War, USAREUR has to look to other methods to 

reassure allies and respond to possible Russian aggression.20 One method that the Army has developed 

is the RAF concept.

REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES

General Ray Odierno introduced the RAF concept 

in 2013 to compensate for a strategy to resources mismatch saying “nothing is as important to your long 

term success as understanding the prevailing culture 

and values.”21 General Odierno defined the RAF as: 

Army units and leaders – Brigades, Divisions, Corps, and 

support forces – who focus on a specific region within 

their normal training program by receiving cultural 

training and language familiarization.22

USAREUR’s current aligned forces are the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) as USAREUR’s RAF division HQ 

and the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (1/3ID) as 

the RAF ABCT. Regional alignment is an:

organizing policy that improves the Army’s ability to 

provide responsive, specifically trained, and culturally attuned forces to support Combatant Command 

(CCMD) requirements.23
86

The RAF includes active duty, Army National 

Guard, and Army Reserve personnel of all force pool 

categories (Assigned, Allocated, and Service RetainedCCMD Aligned [SRCA]).24 RAF units essentially fulfill 

requirements outside of the global force management 

process to assist Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) in fulfilling Theater Campaign Plans (TCP). 

RAF forces can also conduct shaping operations like 

those assigned forces typically conduct. This allows 

the Army to keep more SRCA forces in reserve for 

contingencies. Aligned forces regionally train to the 

readiness level required by the CCMD to which they 

are aligned.25 Additionally, baseline training will be 

supplemented by regional skills appropriate for their 

anticipated missions. 

The term “aligned” is not a joint term used in 

global force management. According to the Center for 

Army Lessons Learned, “despite their regional mission and training focus, SRCA forces can be allocated 

by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with global 

force management business rules to meet a higher 

priority requirement.”26 In other words, regionally 

aligned forces are still open to traditional sourcing options anywhere in the world regardless of the region 

to which the Army aligned the forces and regardless 

of the mission for which the forces have trained. This 

has the potential to waste money, time, and effort. For 

example, 4ID is only aligned to USAREUR for 2 years. 

Because 4ID is not assigned or allocated to USAREUR, 

it is open to other possible mission assignments. Moreover, there is no indication that 4ID will continue to 

be aligned to USAREUR after its initial commitment. 

This is not the expectation of partners and allies in the 

field, where many assume that 4ID would be available 

to USAREUR or U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 

in the event of crisis.27
87

Source: Staff Sgt. Caleb Barrieau, www.army.mil/media/370520.

General Raymond Odierno, then Army Chief of Staff, talks 

with multinational soldiers participating in exercise Combined Resolve III at the Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, 

November 4, 2014. The exercise featured the U.S. Army’s 

regionally aligned force for Europe, at the time the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, which supported 

the EUCOM during Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE. The 

current Regionally Aligned Force consists of the 4th Infantry 

Division and the 4th Infantry Division Mission Command 

Element and the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. The shifting of units assigned the RAF mission is not conducive to long-term relationships with local 

partners and allies.

Figure 3-1. Regionally Alligned Forces.

This is not conducive to long-term relationships with 

local partners and allies, such as those that General 

Breedlove spoke of in the epigraph. To reduce confusion and uncertainty as well as to synchronize Army 

concepts with joint partners, EUCOM should work 

with the Joint Staff to have such Army forces assigned, 

allocated or apportioned to EUCOM rather than just 
88

relying on the Army to align them. Such guidance 

should be codified in the Global Force Management 

Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), and specific allocation of forces identified in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). Providing clear 

guidance and identification of forces not only allows 

units to properly prepare for potential and assigned 

missions, but also provides EUCOM continuity in 

force planning in support of shaping operations and 

contingency planning.

TYPES OF FORCES

Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes only three processes to manage U.S. 

forces: assignment, allocation, and apportionment.28

Assigned forces belong to a CCMD and are used to 

perform missions assigned to that command. Allocated forces are either assigned or unassigned (service 

retained) forces that are then transferred by the Secretary of Defense (with the President’s approval) to a 

new commander, generally from one CCMD to another. Allocation comes in two forms; emergent and rotational and while allocation issues are handled by the 

Global Force Management Board (GFMB), the Secretary of Defense decides the final allocation.29 Although 

emergent allocation happens quicker than rotational 

allocation, it still must go through the Pentagon bureaucracy and requires the Joint Staff to modify the 

GFMAP.30 Apportionment is the distribution of forces 

for planning purposes only.31

According to a recent RAND report, Russia maintains approximately 22 maneuver battalions in its 

Western Military District and Kaliningrad Oblast 

with arguably many more battalions available if it 
89

shifts emphasis from Ukraine.32 Through extensive 

wargaming, RAND demonstrated that Russian forces 

would be able to seize two of the three Baltic capitals (Tallinn and Riga) in approximately 36-60 hours 

and assessed the outcome as a “disaster for NATO.”33

RAND concluded, “NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic [S]tates from a plausible 

Russian conventional attack.”34 Of note, the force posture RAND analyzed included the 82nd Airborne Division’s Global Response Force (GRF) that is postured 

to send one battalion-sized element within 18 hours.35

This worst-case surprise attack could present NATO 

with the conquest and occupation of NATO’s Baltic 

members as a fait accompli and suggests that neither 

emergent allocation nor regional alignment is responsive enough to protect the three Baltic States. For more 

effective deterrence, (or for a more plausible posture 

to prevent Russian conquest) NATO forces will need 

to be in the area, ready to fight when hostilities begin.36

From a U.S. perspective, the forces needed would 

most likely be USAREUR’s two assigned brigades and 

any rotational unit that was in place by coincidence 

at the time. However, continuously rotating allocated 

units would mitigate the lack of response time by, and 

potential unavailability of, the U.S. Army’s aligned 

forces. Rotational allocation allows the force provider 

time and flexibility to identify and prepare units, in 

advance, for an operation.37

Although apportioned forces may not be the ones 

actually used during execution of an operation, they 

aid deliberate planning. Generally, apportioned forces 

are tied to an operations plan (OPLAN) and provide 

planners with notional forces to assist the development of planning assumptions and guidance. Now 

that the Pentagon is reportedly updating contingency 
90

plans for an armed conflict with Russia, the Secretary 

of Defense should apportion Army forces to EUCOM 

to aid the development of a future OPLAN.38 Regardless of how forces are assigned, allocated, or apportioned, USAREUR needs to be able to build and maintain regional expertise without losing flexibility.

AN ASSIGNED HEADQUARTERS

The U.S. Army War College’s Project 1704 offered 

four courses of action to counter the Russian approach 

to the Baltic States that covered a wide array of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) 

actions. One consistent theme across all options was 

the need for a two-star HQ.39 Not only does an assigned HQ demonstrate American resolve, it “would 

foster the relationships, trust, expertise, and oversight 

required to integrate U.S. rotational forces with other 

NATO and host nation capabilities.”40 According to 

Stephen Covington, undermining Europe’s political 

cohesion is a key target for Russian President Putin.41 Covington assesses that Russia benefits from a 

distracted Alliance focused on challenges outside the 

Russian sphere of influence.42 In a presentation to the 

School of Advanced Military Studies, General Hodges 

said:

We have non-stop exercises going on from Estonia to 

Bulgaria — the [ATLANTIC RESOLVE] series of exercises. We are doing more than 50 exercises this year 

alone that are battalion or larger. We are also doing 

exercises in Ukraine, Georgia and back in Germany. 

So, you can imagine with our small number of units, in 

order to spread that effect, we have captains in several 

countries that are the senior United States commander 

in that nation.43
91

While giving young U.S. Army officers and noncommissioned officers an opportunity to lead is beneficial, USAREUR is forced to direct an orchestra 

without a conductor.44 In an address to the U.S. Army 

War College, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work 

described a single infantry battalion deployed to Afghanistan that had been disaggregated into 77 different units.45 The Deputy Secretary recognized that 

small units spread out over wide areas have huge 

implications for leadership, especially in today’s 

net-centric environment.46 In a reference to RAF HQ, 

General Hodges noted:

I would be completely unable to do what we’re doing 

now if we did not have the 4th Division headquarters...they are essential to us being able to provide the 

assurance and deterrence that we’re doing.47

USAREUR’s mission statement is to train and lead 

Army Forces in support of EUCOM by: 

• Training and preparing full spectrum capable 

forces for global employment;

• Strengthening alliances and building partner 

capacity and capability;

• Providing Army Service Component Command and Title 10 support; and,48

• Continually seeking to improve the readiness 

and quality of life of Soldiers, Army Families 

and Civilian workforce.49

Despite the U.S. military’s can-do attitude, USAREUR does not have the capacity to effectively handle 

the day-to-day business of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE in addition to its normal organize, train, and 

equip (OT&E) mission. HQs are the often underappre-
92

ciated brains of an operation. Typically, assigned forces, National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) 

and the Army Reserve’s military-to-military training 

program forces are the units that conduct the peacetime shaping operations that assure allies and deter 

potential adversaries. However, this mission is now 

falling on regionally aligned and rotational forces that 

do not maintain an enduring presence. These units cannot be expected to capture lessons learned above the 

tactical level nor establish and maintain key long-term 

relationships among allies and interagency partners. 

This critical component of shaping the environment is 

best accomplished by a two-star Joint Task Force-capable HQ.50 In dealing with Russia, USAREUR should 

seek a strategy that balances ends, ways, and means. 

A two-star HQ is the right size to achieve that balance, 

enabling U.S. forces to more effectively plug into any 

number of corps-level HQs across Europe, including NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast based in 

Poland. 

In order to train for this sort of multinational engagement, NATO created six new command, control, 

and reception entities called NATO Force Integration 

Units (NFIU). These units have been active since September 2015 and are expected to reach full operational 

capability in 2016.51 They are located throughout 

Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Poland, and Romania) to work:

in conjunction with host nations to identify logistical 

networks, transportation nodes and supporting infrastructure to ensure NATO high-readiness forces can 

deploy into an assigned region as quickly as possible.52

NFIUs would work in close coordination with 

the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC 

Brunssum) through NATO’s Allied Land Command 
93

in Izmir, Turkey. It is unclear whether the RAF or 

other rotational forces would integrate into this command and control structure through the USAREUR 

staff, or whether it would accomplish this through a 

small rotational Mission Command Element (MCE). 

With respect to HQs, Conrad Crane suggests that the 

way to provide stability on the ground is through an 

established HQ however, “we are often playing the 

Super Bowl with a pickup team.”53 When crises arise, 

there are many times when there is a scramble to fill the 

void, often with ad hoc, untrained personnel. Crane 

warns, “the complexity of contemporary warfare requires well-trained and coordinated staffs capable of 

providing detailed planning and comprehensive intelligence at every level. That aspect of warfighting must 

be enhanced, not cut.”54

All of these efforts would be even more complicated if EUCOM were to publish an OPLAN in Europe. 

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter alluded to this in a 

recent speech saying, “we are adapting our operational posture and contingency plans as we—on our own 

and with allies—work to deter Russia’s aggression.”55

It is likely that such a plan would initially be classified 

and would require some level of coordination with 

host nation personnel as well as foreign militaries. A 

recent RAND assessment of overseas basing concluded that a sizable reduction in HQ units would affect 

strategic and operational level engagement.56 To preserve the HQ capability and keep command structures 

intact, forces should be returned when operational 

needs merit or if OPLANS determined certain forces 

need to be in place.57 Russia’s recent activity and the 

subsequent response by the United States suggest that 

operational needs merit a return of an assigned HQ. 
94

Currently the 4ID at Fort Carson is controlling Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE efforts in Europe using 

a 90-man MCE. General Hodges commented on the 

MCE:

Fourth division command post arrived just the other 

day. The deputy commander has touched every one 

of the embassies and the defense leadership of all the 

nations of Operation [ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR)], 

and he and the fourth Division Mission Command element are going to be running land operations for OAR 

all year. So getting that level of headquarters is really 

a huge help to us.58

However, it is inefficient to have an HQ develop 

such relations temporarily only to have another HQ 

have to go through the same thing later. Obviously, 

this is better than nothing, but a command post and an 

MCE will not provide the capacity and strategic messaging of an assigned two-star HQ nor the continuity 

of assigned forces. Further, a standing two-star command would be able to establish standard operating 

procedures for coordination and integration with the 

NFIUs. Finally, if Russia made a surprise move into 

the Baltic region, an MCE could not be expected to 

perform as a joint forces land component HQ capable 

of coordinating joint land operations and activities, to 

include joint reception, staging, onward movement, 

and integration (JRSOI) for the joint force, and potentially allied land forces in support of land operations.
95

Source: U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. James Avery, 16th Mobile Public Affairs 

Detachment, www.army.mil/media/400896.

Lithuanian Land Forces Colonel Dalius Polekauskas, Chief 

of Staff, Lithuanian Land Forces, (left) shakes hands with 

U.S. Brigadier General Michael J. Tarsa, deputy commanding general for support, 4th Infantry Division out of Fort 

Carson, CO, after he and the 4th ID’s Mission Command Element arrived at Vilnius International Airport, Vilnius, Lithuania, July 1, 2015. This monograph argues that a two-star, 

Joint Task Force-capable headquarters is needed in Europe.

Figure 3-2. Mission Command Element.

Qualitative efforts matter to Russia and U.S. allies. 

Current Army efforts are ad hoc and quantitative in 

nature. However, in the Spring of 2015, Russia conducted an extensive command and control exercise 

for a multi-theater conventional war stretching from 

the Baltic States to the Arctic.59 Russia has changed the 

security environment in the Baltic States and has set 

a “course to compete over Europe’s future security 
96

arrangement.”60 Although Russia may not want a war 

with the West, an assigned division HQ in Europe is 

an appropriate enduring move to reassure allies, focus 

shaping and deterrence operations, and to fight a war 

if needed. Small, rotational HQs with ad hoc formations cannot deliver the depth of engagements that a 

permanently assigned, appropriately staffed HQ can. 

PROVIDING THE COMMANDER FLEXIBLE 

OPTIONS: A CASE FOR ARMOR

Equipment not in the region at the start of hostilities will face a significant challenge getting there 

in time to affect the outcome. The current balance 

of power in northeastern Europe favors Russia, not 

NATO. The Alliance will need heavy forces able to 

quickly respond in the unlikely, albeit feasible, case 

of a Russian coup de main.

61 If not, under that scenario, 

Russian forces could be in Riga, Latvia; and Tallinn, 

Estonia in no less than 60 hours, leaving NATO with 

only bad options.62

Another complicating factor is that the United 

States and NATO lack sufficient indication and warning capabilities to forecast Russian moves. General 

Breedlove told the Senate Armed Services Committee 

in April 2015 that Ukraine underscored critical gaps 

in collection and that Russian military exercises were 

a continued surprise.63 General Hodges remarked to 

Defense News, “I’ve been watching the Russian exercises . . . what I cared about is they can get 30,000 

people and 1,000 tanks in a place really fast. Damn, 

that was impressive.”64 In one exercise, just before 

Christmas 2014, the Russians massed 250 tanks and 

armored personnel carriers on the Lithuanian border 

inside the Kaliningrad Oblast.65
97

NATO’s response has been the RAP, promulgated 

at the 2014 Wale’s Summit. The plan involved “enhancing the NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it 

more responsive and capable.”66 Essentially, it would 

grow from 13,000 to 40,000 troops. Additionally, it 

created a new lead unit called the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) comprised of a multinational brigade of around 5,000 soldiers supported 

by air, maritime, and Special Forces.67 With the help 

of NFIUs, the VJTF may be able to move within the 

hoped-for timeline of less than 7 days.68 However, activating these new forces would require the consensus 

of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as well as national approval, and could move too slow to counter 

further Russian aggression.69 Therefore, a more realistic timeline is closer to 10 days, and even perhaps as 

many as 28 days. Moreover, the VJTF and NRF remain 

outnumbered by the Russian units in the Western Military District and Kaliningrad Oblast, and would be 

susceptible to advanced Russian A2/AD capabilities 

if, due to late NAC approval, the units arrived after 

the commencement of hostilities.70

In 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission was concerned about resident landpower in Europe, specifically armor, recommending that a heavy brigade combat 

team (BCT) should remain in Europe, fully manned, 

and that another heavy BCT equipment set should be 

prepositioned in the region.71 Despite the warning, 

both of USAREUR’s heavy BCTs were deactivated, removing much of USAREUR's armored force and more 

than 10,000 soldiers.72 Moreover, the United States was 

not the only Alliance member that reduced its armored 

forces in Europe. Twenty years ago, Germany fielded 

three armored corps consisting of 2,200 tanks, but today it has only 250.73 All of Russia’s forces in the Baltic 
98

region, including its eight airborne battalions, are 

motorized, mechanized, or tank units.74 Just 2 years 

after removing armor from Europe, the United States 

is scrambling to return some capability to the region 

by spreading over 200 tanks and Bradley fighting 

vehicles around Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 

Romania, and Bulgaria as part of the European Activity Set (EAS) in support of rotational deployments.75

Commenting on the armor’s arrival, General Hodges 

stated, “of course, our allies, they see tanks, they see 

Bradleys, they see self-propelled howitzers. That significantly increases the sense of assurance, which is 

the primary reason for doing it.”76

Unfortunately, the presence has not been continuous. Armored units are only scheduled to be present 

in Europe for 9 of the next 18 months—that is, only 50 

percent of the time. Some suggest the lack of continuous presence of a rotational armor force is born out 

of the fear of provoking Russia (versus deterring it).77

Russia has overwhelming numerical superiority over 

NATO forces in the Baltic region. U.S. strategic communications efforts should highlight that a returning 

ABCT provides senior leaders with flexibility and assures allies. The final chapter will further explore this 

vital element of the information environment as a way 

to mitigate risk.

In Donbass, eastern Ukraine, Russia effectively 

used ambiguous warfare tactics to paralyze decisionmaking.78 If Moscow employed similar tactics, vis-àvis NATO, and was able to slow down Alliance decision-making, NATO’s response might be too slow 

to thwart Russian aggression. Russia also used its 

modern, layered air defense system to keep Ukrainian 

close air support aircraft and attack aviation out of the 

fight.79 Further, Russian tanks were well protected by 
99

reactive armor and central to land operations in the 

region.80 According to a Center for Naval Analyses 

(CNA) review of the fighting Russia used armored 

raids deep into Ukrainian territory.81 Russian artillery accounted for 85 percent of Ukrainian casualties 

and light infantry fighting vehicles simply could not 

survive.82 The bottom line from the CNA report is 

that “mounted infantry need tank-equivalent protection.”83 Russia learned much from its fight in Georgia 

where Georgian T-72 tanks had better navigation, imaging, and communication than Russian T-72s. Essentially this left Russian tanks blind at night and in poor 

weather, which Russia has since fixed by upgrading 

its tanks.84 The counter to this is resident landpower. 

If the Alliance had three ABCTs in the Baltic region at 

the time of Russian aggression, NATO could delay the 

fait accompli by at least 7 days, the time it would take 

for the VJTF to arrive.85

If the United States is drawn into combat in the Baltic region (most likely in conjunction with invocation 

of a NATO Article 5-based response) it will not be like 

Iraq or Afghanistan. The fighting in eastern Ukraine is 

state-sponsored warfare on a high-tech, high-intensity 

battlefield where Russian armed forces have superiority (or at least parity) in many domains.86 In a recent 

speech in Estonia, President Obama promised to uphold America’s Article 5 treaty obligations to the three 

Baltic States. The President’s words set clear ends but 

the current ways and means to back up that policy 

with military force are not particularly credible in preventing Russian conquest. It is unclear how the United States and the rest of the Alliance could accomplish 

their collective defense objectives after a fait accompli 

by Moscow. 
100

A key step in that defense is to return an ABCT to 

Europe, with a primary focus on rotations in the Baltic 

States and Eastern Europe, in a continuous rotational 

presence. While ambiguous warfare is getting all of 

the attention and understandably, much discussion 

revolves around how to counter it, Russia’s last few 

wars have demonstrated its willingness and ability to 

fight conventionally with a reliance on landpower as 

its primary means of warfare.87 Moreover, combining 

an ABCT with the resident capabilities of the 2CR and 

173d Airborne IBCT will provide commanders with a 

better menu of options to include mil-to-mil training 

with other partner armored-units and shaping operations. The decision by the United States to withdraw 

armor from Europe was based on the idea that Russia was a positive contributor to the security situation 

in Europe—it has proven that is no longer the case. 

A fully manned and equipped ABCT should be rotationally allocated to Europe until the strategic calculus 

changes again.88

Although Secretary of Defense Carter recently 

announced that a portion of the fiscal year 2017 budget will “go toward putting a ‘heel-to-toe’ ABCT in 

Europe,”89 the budget is for 2017, still needs to be approved by Congress and implemented by the Department of the Army. Despite this new budget request 

announcement that occurred at the time of this writing, the recommendation remains valid. Additionally, 

as a new administration arrives in office, it will decide 

how to best handle decisions laid on it by previous 

leadership. One continuous ABCT is the right balance—any more force structure could provoke Russia and exhaust U.S. Army means, yet any less would 

leave the Baltic States unacceptably exposed.
101

Source: U.S. Army photo by Spc. Marcus Floyd, 13th Public Affairs Detachment, https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images.

Soldiers participating in Saber Strike 15 conduct a combined 

live fire exercise June 19, 2015 at the Drawsko Pomorskie 

Training Area in Poland. A heel-to-toe rotation of armor 

units in Europe is needed.

Figure 3-3. A U.S. Armor Presence in Europe.

MULTILATERALIZING THE SOLUTION SET: 

A CASE FOR AN ALLIED APPROACH

There are several steps NATO should consider in 

order to maximize its ability to deter Russia while individual allies such as the United States modify force 

structure in Europe. First, NATO should re-examine 

its Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) 

authority to reposition forces in Europe. Currently, 

SACEUR cannot move forces without a North Atlantic Council Execution Directive. There are several 

reasons for resistance among the allies to grant this 
approval. One reason is that the allies are reluctant 

to grant what would amount to permission to put 

their forces in harm’s way without approval from 

their capitals and discussions at NATO HQ. Another reason is that funding is a national responsibility. 

Costs lie where they fall and very little comes out of 

the commonly funded pool of resources. The bulk of 

NATO’s €3 billion common funding is spent on the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, communications, and the Airborne Warning and 

Control System (AWACS) platform. If SACEUR could 

reposition forces under his own authority, he would 

essentially have the ability to commit funds of the ally 

from which the forces originated. 

Many members of the Alliance have national governments that are very leery or constitutionally prohibited from allowing anyone to commit national funding. 

For this reason, NATO should re-examine how it funds 

contingency operations. SACEUR needs the authority 

to reposition forces at the first indications of a Russian 

threat and if national funding is the prohibitive factor, 

NATO needs to update its funding mechanisms. SACEUR would also have the ability to employ these authorities as a part of the theater security cooperationenabled NATO exercise program. 

102
Source: NATO photo by British Army Sergeant Ian Houlding, https://

www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images.

Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area, Poland—The NATO flag 

is raised during the opening ceremony for Exercise Steadfast 

Jazz November 2013 at the Drawkso Pomorskie Triaining 

Area in Poland. NATO plays a critical role that the United 

States can help facilitate, but should not carry the load for 

the Alliance.

Figure 3-4. NATO’s Role.

Second, NATO should move toward a multinational logistics capability. Collective defense for small 

countries in Europe is a critical piece of their budget 

calculations. In general, it makes more financial sense 

to specialize in a few areas, while allowing others to 

specialize in other areas. The main concern remains 

that the other countries will need to provide the capability when it is required. This was less of a challenge 

for U.S. forces based in Europe during the Cold War, 

103
104

since the United States maintained all the capabilities 

it needed on the continent. Four Divisions and two 

Corps HQs in the Cold War era construct provided 

not only the war fighting capability, but the combat 

service support (CSS) and combat support (CS) capability that U.S. formations would require in the event 

of a conventional conflict with the Soviet Union. In the 

modern era, U.S. forces forward-based in Europe have 

decreased and the CSS and CS units that supported the 

corps and divisions (and their subordinate units) have 

largely disappeared. As a result, the United States will 

need to rely heavily on support to arrive from CONUS 

or on capabilities that are already on the continent. 

When NATO was initially conceived, logistics 

was a national responsibility. In the new construct, it 

will not be possible for the United States to support 

conventional combat operations with national assets. 

In fact, in several recent computer war games, the logistics tail is what brought the United States to a halt 

in the fighting—national assets could simply not get 

enough fuel and ammunition forward fast enough 

to allow the U.S. formations to continue to attack.90

In order to go to a NATO universal logistics capability, it would have to be commonly funded. Of the top 

four contributors to NATO funding (Germany, United 

Kingdom, France, and the United States), the United 

Kingdom and France appear unsupportive of developing a common logistics system because they would 

continue to bear a disproportionate share of the funding burden.

Third, NATO should streamline the timeline for 

approvals of counter-Russia actions. While many 

acknowledge the need to be faster to meet realistic 

timelines to counter or deter Russian action, current 

staff processes are insufficient to allow for this action. 

NATO needs to come to an agreement on a common 
105

assessment and a counter-Russia plan (Baltic-focused). 

Then the Alliance must designate the force that would 

execute the mission, before it is needed. With these 

three areas agreed upon ahead of time, the VJTF may 

be able to meet a 10-day employment timeline, consistent with the 7-day deployment timeline envisioned 

for the VJTF.91 These pre-completed steps along with 

increased authority for SACEUR could greatly reduce 

the employment timelines for forces. When these 

timelines are rehearsed as part of the NATO exercise 

program, they will reinforce the Alliance’s ability to 

assure member states and will show Russia a credible 

and capable deterrent force.

Finally, NATO should reinitiate dialogue with 

Russia. As recently as 10 years ago, there were conversations in NATO about the Russians joining the Alliance. In light of Russian action in Crimea and Ukraine, 

these conversations have stopped. As NATO moves 

toward re-establishing a deterrent capability and 

conducting increased exercises in what may be contentious areas, increased transparency will become 

critical to ensuring there are no misunderstandings or 

accidental escalations.

CONCLUSION

Two NATO capitals are potentially 60 hours from 

being in Russian control.92 Chapter 2 argued that the 

United States and NATO must be capable of deterring 

Russian land forces; Russian special operations forces 

(SOF), particularly when used in an ambiguous role; 

and Russian information operations (IO), which will 

be discussed in Chapter 5. Small, displaced units operating alone in the three Baltic States may not be the 

best way to convey a focused, capable, credible commitment to Russia. 
106

The recommendations in this chapter are intended 

to reassure allies by strengthening capabilities that 

will, in turn, enhance credible conventional deterrence of potential Russian aggression in the Baltic 

region. Specifically, the DoD should assign, allocate, 

and apportion forces versus aligning them, and EUCOM should push to have a two-star HQ assigned to 

USAREUR, and an apportioned continuous rotational 

presence of an ABCT in Europe.

An assigned two-star HQ is key to focusing a broad 

range of efforts, working with allied and interagency 

partners, countering enduring Russian IO, capturing 

lessons learned, and preparing rotational forces. The 

HQ would be the culturally savvy caretakers of key 

relationships. Allocated and apportioned units would 

then be free to focus on readiness until they entered 

a well-set theater. Asking units to do more (outside 

of a surge) in today’s operational tempo is unrealistic. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley issued 

a memorandum to the Army that stated, “readiness 

for combat is our No.1 priority and there is no other 

No. 1.”93

The United States cannot afford to reassure allies 

to the point where they rely entirely on the United 

States to ensure their security. HQ staff is the appropriate level to maintain visibility on this sensitive and 

complex issue. After all, the Alliance is the center of 

gravity, it seems imprudent to rely on a small MCE or 

reach back to an HQ 4,000 miles away.

The United States should increase the amount of 

available armored forces in Europe by instituting continuous presence of one U.S. ABCT. The 2005 Overseas 

Basing Commission recommended leaving American 

armor in Europe to reassure and train allies and to deter potential adversaries. Russia, on the other hand, 
107

has upgraded its armor and effectively used it in its 

wars with Georgia and Ukraine. This leaves the 2CR, 

the 173d Airborne IBCT, and 11 Baltic infantry battalions exposed to a numerically superior armor force.94

Although NATO has made some headway since the 

Wales Summit in developing the VJTF, rotationally allocated armor in Europe is the appropriate move to 

give NATO time to show up. Admittedly, the challenge in Europe is not just a U.S. Army one—instead it 

is a challenge facing all of NATO. 

Indeed the alliance could play an important role 

in helping to mitigate the time-distance challenge presented by the lack of a massive U.S. military presence 

on the continent. The United States must focus less on 

how to “make 30,000 look like 300,000”95 and more 

on how to leverage the over 300,000 NATO soldiers 

who are already in Europe. When there were 300,000 

U.S. troops with the necessary support capability, it 

was certainly easier to accomplish critical tasks. If the 

NATO process was slow or unwieldy, SACEUR could 

put on his EUCOM hat and authorities to accelerate 

the process. The problem in Europe today is that there 

are only so many U.S. forces available to execute tasks 

under those authorities. Until force posture changes, 

the “NATO solution” will remain a critically important element of the broader solution set.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. John Vandiver, “Breedlove: No-fly zone over Syria would 

constitute ‘act of war’,” May 21, 2013, Stars and Stripes, available 

from www.stripes.com/news/breedlove-no-fly-zone-over-syria-wouldconstitute-act-of-war-1.223788, accessed December 1, 2015.
108

2. Thomas Frear, Lukasz, and Ian Kearns, “Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West 

in 2014,” Policy Brief, November 2014, European Leadership Network, available from www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibr

ary/2014/11/09/6375e3da/Dangerous%20Brinkmanship.pdf, accessed 

April 26, 2016.

3. Ibid.

4. “Pentagon sending fighter jets to boost NATO presence 

amid Ukraine crisis 2014,” Fox News, March 5, 2014, available 

from www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/03/05/hagel-says-us-steppingup-support-to-nato-allies-in-europe-amid-ukraine-crisis/, accessed 

August 26, 2015.

5. Association of the United States Army, “The U.S. Army in 

Europe: Strategic Landpower in Action,” Torchbearer Campaign 

Issue Paper, October 2015, p. 4.

6. Ibid., p. 2.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Aaron Mehta, “Interview: USAF Gen. Frank Gorenc,” Defense News, March 10, 2015, available from www.defensenews.com/

story/defense/2015/03/10/interview-usaf-gen-frank-gorenc/24701435/,

accessed December 1, 2015.

10. David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing 

Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the 

Baltics, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016, p. 3, available from www.

rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/

RAND_RR1253.pdf, accessed February 3, 2016.

11. Ibid.

12. Kaarel Kaas, “Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea Region,” Diplomaatia, No. 130/131, June/July 2014, available from 

www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russian-armed-forces-in-the-baltic-searegion/, accessed February 15, 2016.
109

13. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, “Remarks by Lt. Gen. Ben 

Hodges, Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR),” 

Speech at the USAREUR Change of Command ceremony, Wiesbaden, Germany, November 5, 2014.

14. Association of the United States Army, p. 2.

15. United States Army Europe official website, Units and 

Commands, available from www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.

htm, accessed February 21, 2016.

16. Tom Roeder, “General: Army plans to rely more heavily 

on Fort Carson soldiers to counter Russian aggression,” The Gazette, September 20, 2015, available from gazette.com/general-armyplans-to-rely-more-heavily-on-fort-carson-soldiers-to-counter-russianaggression/article/1559637, accessed March 2, 2016.

17. John R. Deni, The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in Europe, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, p. 2.

18. Ibid.

19. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 3.

20. David Vergun, “USAREUR commander: Eastern Europe 

troop rotations likely to continue,” November 24, 2014, available 

from www.army.mil/article/138877/USAREUR_commander__East

ern_Europe_troop_rotations_likely_to_continue/, accessed March 2, 

2016.

21. General Ray Odierno, “Regionally Aligned Forces: A New 

Model for Building Partnerships,” March 22, 2012, available from 

armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/, accessed February 21, 2016.

22. Ibid.

23. Army Capabilities Integration Center website, Regionally 

Aligned Forces (RAF), available from www.arcic.army.mil/Initia

tives/regionally-aligned-forces.aspx, accessed December 1, 2015.
110

24. Ibid., note: Service Retained- Combatant Command 

(CCMD)-Aligned (SRCA) is not a joint doctrinal term. The Army 

uses it to define a pool of forces from which it draws forces to 

support the RAF. The three joint doctrine terms for Global Force 

Management include: assigned, allocated, and apportioned, 

which this monograph goes on to further explain.

25. Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, 

“Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not As Usual,” Parameters, 

Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 60.

26. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Regionally Aligned Forces Brigade Planning, Handbook 16-06, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 2015, p. 77.

27. Throughout the research process, the team encountered 

confusion over the RAF at all levels of the Army, the joint team, 

and NATO. Multiple discussions at U.S. European Command 

(EUCOM) and USAREUR suggests that there is a reasonable expectation that the RAF are the forces that will be brought forward 

during a contingency. While most understand the Global Force 

Management (GFM) process, there is belief that RAF are being 

“held” for the regions they are aligned to. Further discussions at 

US Army G-3 suggest this is not the case.

28. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint 

Publication 5-0, Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, August 11, 2011, p. H-1.

29. Ibid., p. H-2.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. H-1.

32. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 4.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.
111

35. Drew Brooks, “Global Response Force Acts as a 911 for 

the U.S. March 11, 2015, available from www.emergencymgmt.com/

safety/Global-Response-Force-911-for-US.html, accessed February 

21, 2016.

36. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 1.

37. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. H-3.

38. Julie Ioffe, “Exclusive: The Pentagon Is Preparing New 

War Plans for a Baltic Battle Against Russia” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com.usawc.idm.oclc.

org/2015/09/18/exclusive-the-pentagon-is-preparing-new-war-plansfor-a-baltic-battle-against-russia/, accessed January 3, 2016.

39. Doug Mastriano et al., Project 1704: A United States Army 

War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, and Appropriate U.S. Response and the Implications for U.S. Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2015, p. 100.

40. Ibid.

41. S.R. Covington, Putin’s Choice for Russia, Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015, pp. 12-13.

42. Ibid.

43. Stephen P. Kretsinger Sr, “Hodges discusses Army challenges in Europe,” September 24, 2015, available from www.ftleav

enworthlamp.com/article/20150924/NEWS/150929733, accessed February 21, 2016.

44. Quote developed during author’s interview with Dr. Richard A. Lacquement Jr., Dean, United States Army War College 

School of Strategic Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 

22, 2015.

45. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “Army War College Strategy Conference,” Speech at the U.S. Army War College, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 8, 2015.
112

46. Ibid.

47. Michelle Tan, “Army looks to rotating and reserve forces for Europe missions,” Army Times, October 8, 2015, available 

from www.armytimes.com/story/defense/show-daily/ausa/2015/10/08/

army-looks-rotating-and-reserve-forces-europe-missions/73289458/,

accessed October 30, 2015.

48. In other words—organizing, training, and equipping U.S. 

Army Forces for EUCOM.

49. United States Army Europe official website, Mission Statement, available from www.eur.army.mil/organization/mission.htm, 

accessed April 26, 2016. 

50. This headquarters (HQ) should be an operational theater 

Joint Task Force (JTF) capable of coordinating TSC activities, ongoing operations, joint reception, staging, onward movement, 

and integration (JRSOI) for all services and Allied land forces in 

support of NATO operations. This HQ should also be capable of 

commanding unilateral U.S. operations until such time that the 

NATO command structure assumes command and control.

51. NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

(SHAPE) website, “NATO Force Integration Units,” September 

2015, available from https://www.shape.nato.int/operations/natoforce-integration-units, accessed February 21, 2016.

52. NATO (SHAPE) website, “NATO Response Force / 

Very High Readiness Joint Task Force,” Fact Sheet, Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, available from aco.nato.int/

page349011837, accessed October 30, 2015.

53. Conrad Crane, “Observations on the Long War,” September 10, 2014, War on the Rocks website, available from 

warontherocks.com/2014/09/observations-on-the-long-war/, accessed 

December 30, 2015.

54. Ibid.
113

55. Eric Zuesse, “U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter Implies Russia and China Are ‘Enemies’ of America. What 

Next?” Global Research, November 11, 2015, available from www.

globalresearch.ca/u-s-secretary-of-defense-ashton-carter-impliesrussia-and-china-are-enemies-of-america-what-next/5487984, accessed 

November 30, 2015.

56. Michael J. Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military 

Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2013, pp. 292-294.

57. Ibid.

58. “Interview: Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges,” DefenseNews, March 

31, 2015, available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policybudget/leaders/interviews/2015/03/27/lt-gen-ben-hodges/70573420/, 

accessed December 5, 2015.

59. Covington, p. 10.

60. Covington, p. 14.

61. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 1.

62. Ibid.

63. “Senate Armed Services Committee Opening Statement 

by General Phil Breedlove, Commander, U.S. European Command,” April 30, 2015, available from eucom.mil/media-library/

article/33031/senate-armed-services-committee-opening-statement-bygeneral-phil-breedlovecommander-u-s-european, accessed December 

5, 2015.

64. “Interview: Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges,” DefenseNews.

65. Damien Sharkov, “Putin Orders Snap Military Drills on 

NATO Border,” Newsweek, December 16, 2014, available from 

www.newsweek.com/putin-orders-snap-military-drills-russian-troopsnato-border-292308, accessed December 5, 2015.

66. NATO website, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan,” 

Fact Sheet, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 
114

2015, available from www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/

pdf_2015_02/20150205_1502-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf, accessed December 30, 2015.

67. Ibid.

68. NATO (SHAPE) website, “NATO Response Force / Very 

High Readiness Joint Task Force”

69. Interviews with international officers at SHAPE, November 3, 2015.

70. Interviews with international officers at SHAPE, November 3, 2015. Also, Shlapak and Johnson, p. 4.

71. Overseas Basing Commission, Al Cornella et al., Report of 

the Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure 

of the United States, Arlington, VA: United States Congress, May 

2005, p. C&R4.

72. Dakota L. Wood ed., 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: 

Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2015, p. 86.

73. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 8.

74. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 5.

75. John Vandiver and Matt Millham, “Carter: US to Position Armor in Baltics, Poland, Southern Europe,” June 23, 2015, 

available from www.military.com/daily-news/2015/06/23/carter-usto-position-armor-in-baltics-poland-southern-europe.html, accessed 

December 5, 2015.

76. “Interview: Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges,” DefenseNews.

77. Throughout interviews, the team encountered the opinion 

that returning armor to Europe may provoke Russia. While the 

team agrees that Russia will use the information domain to spin 

that message, the balance of power is heavily on Russia’s side 

and that USAREUR could counter Russian propaganda with that 

message.
115

78. Mary Ellen Connell and Ryan Evans, “Russia’s ‘Ambiguous Warfare’ and Implications for the U.S. Marine Corps,” CNA’s 

Occasional Paper, Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis and Solutions,

May 2015, p. 10.

79. Connell and Evans, p. 12.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Mastriano et al., p. 57.

85. Shlapak and Johnson, p. 1.

86. Connell and Evans, p. 19.

87. Mastriano et al., p. 47.

88. Mastriano et al., p. 131.

89. Jen Judson, “Army Budget Boosts European Presence, 

Sacrifices Modernization,” Defense News, February 6, 2016, 

available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-bud

get/2016/02/05/army-budget-boosts-european-presence-sacrifices-mod

ernization/79884226/, accessed March 2, 2016.

90. Information derived from a review of a classified war 

game after action report conducted by the U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership-Strategic Wargaming Division, December 15, 2015.

91. Information derived from research discussions with 

SHAPE staff members conducted by the author on November 4, 

2015.

92. Shlapak and Johnson, p 1.
116

93. Amanda Dolasinski, “Army leaders: Combat readiness is 

No. 1 priority,” Fayetteville Observer, October 14, 2015, available 

from www.fayobserver.com/military/army-leaders-combat-readinessis-no-priority/article_5e35ccb2-f3e5-59e2-a758-aeed7e68876b.html, accessed March 2, 2016.

94. Shlapak and Johnson, p 4.

95. Benjamin Hodges, “Strong Europe” Lecture at the U.S. 

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, September 21, 2015.
117

CHAPTER 4

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN 

EUROPE: KEY TO CONVENTIONAL 

DETERRENCE

EUCOM will...participate in...bilateral and multilateral exercises and engagements to support the mission to assure and defend NATO, enhance Allied and 

partner ability to provide for their own security, and 

counter Russia’s use of conventional, irregular, and 

asymmetric warfare.

—General Philip Breedlove, U.S. European 

 Command (EUCOM) Commander1

As a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

staff officer at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers

Europe (SHAPE) stated, “NATO is like car insurance. 

It is something you continually pay against for a distant, even remote, possibility. It can become very expensive in the long run—even if you never need it.”2 

As the size of forces in Europe has decreased, the ability of NATO to present a credible and capable deterrent to Russian actions has also decreased. In order 

to present a credible deterrent to conventional Russian aggression, NATO members will need to become 

more integrated, agile, and comfortable relying on 

other members’ capabilities. The United States with 

its decreased force structure in Europe can no longer 

bear the lion’s share of the burden alone. As the allies move toward more integrated operations, General 

Philip Breedlove’s excerpt from his theater strategy 

above will drive how this deterrent effect will be possible. The interaction he describes meets the U.S. definition for theater security cooperation (TSC),3

 which, 

as noted in the 2015 Guidance for the Employment of the 

Force (GEF), “is a way to achieve desired ends, not an 
118

end unto itself.”4 Focused, joint, and multinational 

TSC—including foreign internal defense—will remain 

a key pillar of a deterrent strategy for a Russian nonnuclear threat in Europe. TSC, done properly with the 

right focus can ensure that NATO presents a credible, 

capable, and ready force to counter Russian aggression.

The remainder of this chapter will focus on the 

most dangerous course of action; that of a conventional attack, as well as address ways to deter Russian 

use of ambiguous means, considered the most likely 

course of action. The efforts to address the most likely 

and most dangerous courses of action are presumed 

to address the most disruptive course of action as 

defined in Chapter 1.

ACHIEVING A DETERRENT EFFECT

A Russian incursion into the Baltic States may be 

unlikely, but if the threat of a conventional attack is 

possible under certain conditions, the question becomes how to deter the Russian threat adequately 

without becoming provocative or opening up a new 

security dilemma. As seen in war games, the Russians 

have the ability, with very little indications and warnings, to mass forces and seize the Baltic States. As noted in previous chapters, various analyses have shown 

that the lack of permanent U.S. and other NATO forces (other than those of the Baltic NATO members) and 

the geography of the region would enable Moscow to 

seize the Baltic States within 60 hours. No matter how 

the scenario is played, without a significant force already present in the Baltic States, NATO always loses 

(although this does not account for the deterring effect 

of force presence addressed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this 

monograph).5 According to one NATO official:
119

In the end, I have no doubt that NATO will prevail 

and that we will restore the territorial integrity of any 

NATO member [but] I cannot guarantee that it will be 

easy or without great risk.6

The amount of damage and instability such an assault and re-conquest would incur would be tremendous. In essence, the best way for NATO to win a conventional fight in the Baltic States (or Eastern Europe) 

is not to fight one.

Outnumbered and out-positioned, the challenge 

for NATO becomes how to deter Russia from taking 

conventional action. As seen earlier in this monograph, deterrence theory provides two methods of 

deterring an opponent from achieving its goals. Deterrence through threat of punishment postulates that 

the action one side is taking will not be worth the cost 

that will be exacted on it from the other side.7 NATO 

armies, continental United States (CONUS)-based 

U.S. forces, the Global Response Force (GRF), and Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) based in CONUS are 

valid tools for deterrence by punishment. Although 

their arrival would be delayed, and they would have 

to overcome Russian Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/

AD) systems, the follow-on forces would most likely 

have the ability to forcibly eject Russian forces from 

the Baltic States. This deterrence by punishment will 

remain a key portion of any calculus Russian President Vladimir Putin uses before taking conventional 

action. However, as noted in Chapter 1, President Putin is an opportunist and if he saw a window to take 

the Baltic States in a fait accompli manner and then 

negotiate for favorable terms before NATO marshals 

a sufficient force for a counterattack, he might do so. 

The other means of deterring an opponent is 

through denial. At its core, deterrence by denial is 
120

producing an environment, through either physical 

presence or capability that denies the adversary the 

ability to accomplish even short-term goals. At first 

glance, deterrence by denial seems an easy and obvious answer to the deterrent problem with respect 

to Russia. If NATO is able to posture forces in such 

a quantity and array that Russia is unable to accomplish even short-term goals, then the Alliance has won 

without fighting. What makes this a less practical solution is the problem of numbers. Lieutenant General 

Ben Hodges frequently mentions that his struggle is 

to “make 30,000 look like 300,000.”8 His statement is 

a reference to the Cold War force numbers for U.S. 

Army troops permanently based in Europe. The current numbers of 30,000 are nowhere near the levels of 

the height of the Cold War. The armed forces of the 

rest of the allies have shrunk as well. 

While modern forces are much more effective than 

Cold War troops due to advances in technology, air 

support, and training, their numbers preclude them 

from being spread across Europe as they were in the 

1970s and 1980s. The old General Defense Plans that 

had multiple NATO corps headquarters (HQs) and 

numerous NATO divisions are no longer viable; and 

it is impossible to deter by denial through sheer physical occupation of terrain. 

The question quickly becomes, if conventional 

deterrence by punishment will be incredibly costly 

on both sides and deterrence by denial is not very 

practical, how should NATO exert its efforts? As discussed in Chapter 2, in order to deter behavior, the 

deterrence must be credible and capable. Credibility 

comes from the adversary actually believing that the 

opposing side has the will to take action. Capability 

comes from the adversary believing the opposing side 
121

has the means to take effective action should it choose 

to do so. NATO provided a credible and capable deterrent force during the Cold War, but currently this 

is an open question. The NATO Warsaw Summit in 

July 2016 will likely be a key turning point in the discussion of NATO’s force posture on the continent. In 

the meantime, assuming the United States will maintain a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and an 

Airborne Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), that 

Congress will approve the President’s request for a 

rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 

and that current NATO force posture will remain 

generally the same, a key pillar to a deterrent strategy 

against conventional Russian aggression in Europe 

will remain TSC.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION: 

ENABLING DETERRENCE

The GEF defines security cooperation as follows:

Security Cooperation: Security cooperation encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense 

establishments to build defense relationships that 

promote specific US security interests, develop allied 

and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 

multinational operations, and provide US forces with 

peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. It is 

a way to achieve desired ends, not an end unto itself. 9

Unless the U.S. force posture in Europe significantly changes, TSC is the primary means by which 

the United States can contribute to NATO’s improved 

conventional deterrence capability. As the definition 

indicates, TSC is a broad term for any interaction between the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and for-
122

eign security establishments. How the United States 

chooses to spend its time and money as it relates to 

NATO remains of critical importance. As a NATO 

staffer shared, internal to NATO, “budgets and force 

structure have shrunk away from building collective 

defense capacity to capacity-building focused on nonNATO forces.”10 This was a reference to not only the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, but also to the focus among the 

Alliance more on partners in Europe and less on the 

collective defense mindset. 

Currently, the United States employs three lines 

of effort underneath a TSC umbrella: the European 

Reassurance Initiative (ERI); country-specific Security 

Cooperation plans; and bilateral/multilateral NATO 

exercises. The GEF directs: 

In light of resource constraints, whenever possible, 

Country specific cooperation sections [for a Theater 

Campaign Plan] should support regional approaches 

... in order to achieve regional economies of scale.11

The GEF’s direction is especially appropriate with 

respect to Europe. While TSC can focus on specific 

countries, it should also take a regional approach, gaining “regional economies of scale.” The struggle for the 

United States TSC efforts is the balance between U.S. 

Embassy country team focus areas, U.S. European 

Command (EUCOM) focus areas, and NATO capability targets. While the three are not always mutually 

exclusive, they are frequently not mutually supporting either.
123

Source: 112th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment Photograph by First 

Lieutenant Paul Nadolski/Released, www.eucom.mil/media-library.

Dragoons from Iron Troop, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, maneuver through a forest toward a simulated enemy 

stronghold. Their mission was to capture a high value target 

as part of a combined training exercise with Estonian Allies 

in support of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, March 7, 

2015, in Rabassare, Estonia. Theater security cooperation is a 

key pillar to enabling deterrence.

Figure 4-1. Theater Security Cooperation.

When ERI emerged in June of 2014, it was an attempt to quickly reassert the U.S. commitment to 

NATO and to Europe. The additional funding for 

operations and exercises allowed EUCOM to increase 

its activity across the theater, conducting highly visible training events that served to broadcast to European citizens the continued U.S. commitment to the 

Alliance. 
124

At its introduction, ERI was very well received by 

European populations. At this point, however, the 

allies appear to understand the United States is committed to NATO, but they want to see concrete efforts 

to deter Russia. The United States is at a point now 

where the friendly focused reassurance effort needs 

to shift to NATO-based, Russian-focused deterrence.12

The second line of effort, country-specific TSC, is 

focused on a balance of what the U.S. Embassy country 

team and the relevant combatant command (CCMD), 

working together, have determined is important, 

on the capability targets that have been assigned by 

NATO HQ to Alliance members, and on what individual allies and partners are interested in and capable of 

absorbing. As military forces shrink in Europe, these 

capability targets have become increasingly valuable. 

In theory, national specialization, based on NATO assigned goals, ensures countries strive to bring their 

assigned capabilities to the Alliance. In practice, this 

is not always the case, and many nations rely on the 

United States as a safety net for their assigned tasks. 

A U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) staff member likened the current approach of country-specific TSC to 

exercising in a gymnasium. In his analogy, the United 

States was the spotter and the other NATO countries 

were all bench-pressing weights. At the first sign of 

struggle, the United States swoops in and immediately pulls the weight off the chest of the struggling 

ally. While this relief has the short-term impact of reassuring the ally that the United States will always be 

there in their time of need, it has the long-term impact 

of failing to allow the ally to develop the appropriate 

“muscle” and does not actually make them stronger—

instead it creates an enduring attitude of dependence 

on the United States.13
125

The third component to ongoing TSC efforts is 

the numerous exercises and named operations occurring in Europe. Exercise Trident Juncture 15 (a NATO 

Very High Readiness Joint Task Force [VJTF] exercise 

including the U.S. GRF), Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (Baltic defense operation), and Exercise Fearless Guardian (Ukraine advise and assist mission) all 

allow NATO to focus its energy on specific areas. U.S. 

forces in Europe are incredibly busy. Units are quickly 

moving from one exercise to the next, simultaneously 

reassuring allies, training capabilities, and rehearsing for future contingency operations. As the United 

States looks to the future, it will need to apply appropriate thought and focus to its exercise program. 

It remains important to tie exercises to the required 

collective capabilities and to ensure NATO allies are 

integrated based on their capability targets as well as 

what NATO needs them to do for the Alliance. In an 

article in Military Review, two former Army Service 

Component Command staff members advocate for a 

holistic approach to TSC:

A successful security planning process will curtail 

purposeless or episodic activities with limited potential for long-term impact [and answer] [w]hy are we 

doing this activity and how does it support our goals 

and objectives in theater?14

As the United States re-examines its goals for TSC 

and specifically for its exercise program, it must ensure that it answers the previous question, and the 

CCMD must nest all components of its TSC plan within the NATO exercise program. As the United States 

assists with shaping this program, the planners would 

be well served to remember the six theater priorities 

from the EUCOM theater strategy of October 2015 

(listed in priority): 
126

• Deter Russian Aggression; 

• Enable the NATO Alliance; 

• Preserve United States Strategic Partnerships;

• Counter Trans-national Threats; 

• Ensure Postured and Ready Forces; and, 

• Focus on Key Relationships.15

Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Brandon Anderson, 13th Public 

Affairs Detachment/Released https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeu

rope_images.

Soldiers of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry 

Division, and Danish soldiers of Dragoon Regiment, 1st Armored Battalion, 1st Danish Tank Squadron, participated in 

a combined arms live fire exercise at the Drawsko Pomorskie 

Training Area, Poland June 16, 2015 as part of Exercise Saber Strike 15. The exercise sought to facilitate cooperation 

amongst the United States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 

Poland to improve joint operational capability in a range 

of missions as well as preparing the participating nations 

and units to support multinational contingency operations. 

There were more than 6,000 participants from 13 different 

nations. Conducting the right exercises at the right scale is 

a challenge that EUCOM and USAREUR should work together in coordination with NATO allies and partners.

Figure 4-2. Exercise Saber Strike 2015.
127

There are three ways that TSC can continue to support the six priorities. TSC can support the U.S. Embassy country team’s requirements, accomplish EUCOMTSC guidance, and serve as building block events that 

culminate into a major NATO exercise. While the first 

two are important, the maximum gain for the United 

States comes from the integration of TSC building 

blocks into a NATO exercise. In this case, the countries 

get the training they need and a high-end exercise has 

the added benefit of a deterrent effect toward Russian 

activity, especially in the Baltic States. Unfortunately, 

with the mechanics of budgeting within NATO, General Breedlove, in his Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe (SACEUR) role, has extremely limited ability 

to conduct “snap-exercises” to either test readiness or 

to position forces near a potential conflict site in order 

to deter. Moving national forces can incur financial 

cost for the owning ally and many countries within 

the Alliance are hesitant to allow the military leader 

of another ally the right to spend national funds. This 

concern, while understandable, places large limitations on NATO’s ability to use exercises as a deterrent 

tool prior to the onset of actual hostilities.

EXERCISE-BASED DETERRENCE

In response to Russian ambiguous activities and 

its enhanced conventional military power, NATO and 

the United States need to re-examine their deterrent 

posture. In order for deterrence to be effective, it must 

be capable and credible, and that starts with a robust 

NATO exercise-based deterrent strategy. A NATO 

exercise-based deterrent strategy must demonstrate 

several distinct aspects in order to present a capable 

signature. 
128

The NATO exercise program must be highly visible with well-publicized exercises that reflect how and 

where NATO would defend against a real Russian attack. Exercises should replicate as closely as possible 

the conduct of the operational plans and should be 

joint and multinational. The design of the exercises 

must clearly communicate their defensive nature and 

information operations (IO) should reinforce that it is 

a response to unwanted aggression on the part of Russia, a point further explored in Chapter 6.

As they rehearse pieces of the operational plan, 

the exercises should also rehearse “a visible approach 

for flowing reinforcements and materiel to forward 

forces quickly, securely, and assuredly.”16 Logistics 

shortfalls emerge in every iteration of a Baltic defense 

war game and therefore, NATO must show the Russians that it has the capability to ensure its forces can 

continue to fight for the long term. A theoretical example would involve a combined German battalion 

and Stryker Squadron moving by rail from Germany 

to Poland, disembarking in Poland, moving through 

Poland and the Suwalke Gap with NATO air support, 

linking up with Lithuanian forces, and conducting 

several days of defensive exercises. An additional enhancement would be the deployment of U.S. armored 

forces using pre-positioned equipment in Poland with 

a follow-on movement through the Suwalke Gap. 

NATO-controlled resupply operations would support 

the drill. 

Although briefly described here, such an operation 

would be incredibly challenging to execute and would 

also have to be carefully messaged to the Russians 

to ensure that its defensive nature was understood. 

Russian observers would need to be invited to participate in the entire operation to ensure Moscow was 

aware of both the nature and the effectiveness of the 

operation. 
129

USAREUR has begun to take steps in this direction 

with its participation in the Polish National Anakonda 

exercise scheduled for June 2016. From its beginnings 

as a Polish national training event, it has morphed into 

a large, multinational exercise that incorporates multiple types of forces and locations. Unfortunately, after 

the exercise began to take shape, elements within the 

NATO command structure declined to provide command and control for the event. The provided reason 

was that the exercise was too provocative toward the 

Russians from a NATO perspective.17

Source:https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/24539

314710/in/album-72157661903283323/.

Exercise Anakonda 16 is a Polish-led, joint, multinational exercise taking place in Poland from June 7-17, 2016. This exercise involves more than 25,000 participants from 21 nations. 

Anakonda 16 is a capstone event for USAREUR and partner 

nations which will set conditions for success at the NATO 

biannual summit in July 2016 in Warsaw, Poland. Anakonda 

16 validates the requirements set at the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014 in time for members of the alliance to 

reconvene at the Warsaw summit in July.

Figure 4-3. Anakonda Rock Drill.
130

In order to maximize the credibility of NATO’s enhanced deterrence posture, NATO must demonstrate 

that it is willing to rapidly approve and move forces 

from the various staging locations to an area of conflict on a timeline that would keep it competitive with 

a Russian timeline. The centralized nature of decisionmaking on the Russian side, which greatly streamlines 

the decision-making timeline, coupled with their ability to move forces discretely along interior lines, will 

make it a challenge for NATO to beat the deployment 

timeline, but it must do better. 

In the past, NATO relied on having forces close to 

the locations where they would fight to streamline processes. Units would probably already have been in the 

fight before the approvals came out of Brussels. The 

situation has changed and forces are no longer staged 

near the locations where they would fight. NATO recognized that it would need a force that could quickly 

move in reaction to NATO’s needs to reinforce its 

eastern border. The VJTF was built to fill this need. 

For reasons noted in Chapter 3, it is probably unrealistic for the VJTF (NATO’s quickest response force) to 

make it to the Baltic States in less than 28 days, which 

is clearly an unacceptable response time standard.18 A 

large portion of this delay is actually waiting for the 

consultations and approvals from NATO HQs before 

any forces can begin movement. In order for the deterrent to be credible, NATO must reinforce its commitment publically and conduct short notice training deployments of the VJTF that are initiated at the NATO 

HQs level. 

NATO must update its graduated response plans 

and develop an executable defensive plan based on 

the force structure and geographic disposition in Europe. Instead of training solely on what the allies want 

to train on, NATO exercises must instead focus on 
131

integrating the specialized capabilities that allies have 

committed to providing to NATO. If the same capabilities exist in multiple countries, then NATO must 

exercise with all of them in order to ensure it has a 

trained resource at its disposal when needed. Political 

decisions from individual allies may influence what 

forces are available and when, and NATO’s ability as 

an alliance should not hinge on one Alliance member’s forces. A current example is bridging ability. If 

the Alliance operational plan requires the ability to 

bridge a river tactically, there are only a few allies that 

have that capability on the continent. The NATO exercises must work with all of them to ensure that they 

are ready and available in the event they are needed. 

ACHIEVING STABILITY THROUGH 

RESILIENCE

As discussed in Chapter 1, the most likely course 

of action for Russia to pursue includes the technique 

of inciting a Russian minority in a former Warsaw 

Pact or near abroad country as a pretext for Russian 

involvement.19 Russia could employ various ambiguous warfare techniques to generate confusion, spur a 

request for Russian assistance, or deliberately cause a 

state to fail—allowing for a Russian-friendly government to take over. Such ambiguous actions would be 

difficult to attribute to Russia, and would likely capitalize on the struggle within NATO to build a consensus for an immediate response. NATO considers civil 

unrest and most other ambiguous operations, such as 

cyberattacks, as internal security issues, which should 

be dealt with as a national responsibility under Article 

3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.20 If there was clear, factual evidence of Russian sponsorship of an ambiguous attack into a NATO country, the Alliance might 
132

consider action under Article 5 of the North Atlantic 

Treaty, but such clear attribution is unlikely. If Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea are any indicator, 

the ambiguous attacks will remain unattributed until 

Russian actions become a fait accompli and hence significantly more difficult to undo. 

The key to countering this type of action is to ensure the allies in the border states have the ability to 

generate their own stability using internal tools to 

anticipate and react to ambiguous attacks.21 This includes capabilities such as cyber defense, the ability 

to competently deal with civil unrest, and the ability to adequately deal with covert special operations 

disguised as terrorism. In most NATO countries, the 

responsibility to deal with these types of attacks does 

not rest solely with the military. It also resides with 

law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the civil 

sector. Accordingly, any efforts to defend against such 

attacks must account for preparing all the various national entities and not just the militaries. 

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID): 

ENABLING RESILIENCE

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by 

civilian and military agencies of a government in any 

of the action programs taken by another government 

or other designated organization, to free and protect 

its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to their security.22

In addition to strengthening external defense capabilities and capacity, the U.S. military also plays a 

critical security cooperation role in building the internal defense capabilities and capacities of allies and 

partners. Although it is most frequently associated 

with special operations forces (SOF) and is, in fact, 
133

a core SOF mission, FID can actually be a whole of 

government effort toward assisting another country 

to maintain security within its borders. Typically, U.S. 

forces engaged in FID activities have focused on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counterdrug 

objectives. However, given the potential for Russia to 

engage in ambiguous operations, FID can play a critical role in building resilience and other capabilities 

among U.S. allies in Europe. By doctrine, FID is a subtask under the TSC umbrella. Many TSC efforts help 

to develop “dual-use” skills that the countries receiving the training can use in support of NATO operations outside of their borders or during internal strife 

if national laws allow. 

Source: U.S. Army photo by SPC Timothy Clegg, https://www.facebook.

com/SOCEUR/photos/.

U.S. and Estonian SOF conduct route planning for a ground 

infiltration during Exercise Spring Storm 2014. FID plays a 

critical role in theater security cooperation.

Figure 4-4. Foreign Internal Defense.
134

Although the United States TSC efforts are facilitating many of the military-focused assurance and deterrence tasks NATO has recently undertaken, there 

is room for improvement in gaining U.S. interagency 

support for conducting FID training. The goal for this 

type of FID would be to assist with strengthening the 

resilience of a NATO ally to ensure they are less vulnerable to Russian ambiguous actions. The challenge 

for conducting what might be thought of as “interagency FID” would be establishing priority countries, 

identifying focus areas, and getting the appropriate 

trainers in place. The key in every case is for the United States and allied or partner countries to jointly determine the lines of effort necessary to achieve specific 

and attainable objectives while considering NATO 

defense planning process priorities. The United States 

must be cognizant of the strategic end states for each 

Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and associated countryspecific Security Cooperation Sections, which should 

lay out the end states and the ways to achieve them, 

and should be coordinated with the U.S. Embassy 

Integrated Country Strategy and associated foreign 

assistance plans. 

There are several challenges to employing an interagency FID effort to build resilience among NATO 

allies. First, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and 

EUCOM must ensure that the DoS Regional Strategies 

and EUCOM’s TCP are mutually supporting. There is 

no clear chain of command in this process, and it will 

certainly involve intense personal engagement from 

leaders across the interagency. The primary stakeholders, DoS and EUCOM, operate differently with 

respect to generating strategy. The presidentially appointed ambassadors are the lead for developing their 

country plans, which are then forwarded to the DoS in 

Washington for inclusion in the regional strategies. In 
135

the DoD, the policy offices of the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) and EUCOM 

generate the strategy and then push it down to subordinate elements for execution. The common ground 

for decision-makers can be hard to determine since 

the Ambassador is the lead for DoS and is countryfocused and the EUCOM commander is the lead for 

DoD and is regionally focused. Achieving unity of 

effort toward building resilient partners will require 

a constant, integrated engagement from both bureaucracies. Additionally, it would be invaluable to generate some form of interagency resilience strategy that 

would synchronize efforts.23

Another challenge will be getting the right interagency trainers in the right country at the right time. 

With no overall decision-maker across the interagency 

other than the President, organizations will have to 

choose to contribute to the effort versus being compelled to contribute. In a resource-constrained environment, the ability of agencies to surge people forward 

will remain difficult. A potential DoD contribution in 

this area would be to leverage the unique capabilities and relationships that exist in the National Guard 

State Partnership Program (SPP). Although it would 

not be a systemic fix, the National Guard frequently 

has citizen soldiers who have unique skills from their 

civilian life that would transfer over to assisting with 

FID efforts. Stereotypically, there are a high number of 

police officers in the Guard who would have the ability to train in civil disturbance response. Information 

technology professionals would also be invaluable 

assets in assisting the Allies with hardening their networks against Russian cyberattacks. Additional funding and authorities would be required to effectively 

pursue this course of action but, in the short term, the 

National Guard could assist with filling this gap. The 
136

relationships already built through years of the SPP 

would serve to enhance this type of training. 

Source: U.S. Army photo by Kenneth C. Upsall, https://www.flickr.com/

photos/usarmyeurope_images.

Latvian Chief of Defense Lieutenant General Raimonds 

Graube (left) and U.S. Chief of National Guard Bureau, 

and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Frank J. 

Grass discuss tasks associated with Operation ATLANTIC 

RESOLVE with U.S. Army Major Douglas A. Laxson and 

Lieutenant Colonel Felix A. Perez of the 2nd Battalion, 8th 

Calvary Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Calvary 

Division at Adazi Training Area, Latvia on Nov. 7, 2014. The 

National Guard, through its SPP, plays a critical role in helping NATO allies enhance capabilities.

Figure 4-5. The Role of the National Guard.
137

The United States must also take into account 

the nature of the threat and the operational environment facing each ally when it considers training and 

equipping efforts. Each ally will use their forces in a 

manner informed by culture, history, geopolitics, and 

other factors, which ideally should shape the scope 

and breadth of U.S. efforts. For example, FID activities 

could enable the Baltic States in their efforts to counter ambiguous threats ultimately emanating from 

Moscow, but U.S. planners must be cognizant of Baltic State sensitivities toward their Russian-speaking 

populations. A large amount of the recommended FID 

training is already taking place under EUCOM’s TSC 

efforts. What is currently lacking is a synchronized 

interagency effort that is focused on building national resiliency as a component of an overall countryspecific strategy. 

CLOSING THE GAPS

There are also several steps EUCOM can take to 

better focus its TSC efforts. First, EUCOM should reexamine its TSC processes. An efficient process should 

more effectively nest TSC efforts between EUCOM and 

USAREUR to ensure that USAREUR is focused on the 

right allies and capabilities. The United States needs 

to become more effective in Europe with streamlined 

TSC efforts between EUCOM and USAREUR improving the training level of individual allies, while best 

aligning the exercise program to support further development and demonstration of NATO capability.

Second, EUCOM should reduce the number of 

exercises in order to focus on high-quality, fully integrated NATO operations. The current pace and 

volume of exercises in EUCOM is generating a large 
138

amount of activity and has served its purpose in reassuring the allies of the U.S. commitment to NATO. 

This activity is also likely having a deterrent effect 

on Russian intentions. However, a more focused exercise program that actually rehearses likely employment scenarios for NATO forces would have an even 

greater deterrent effect. By doing fewer exercises, 

with more resourcing and participation, EUCOM will 

more efficiently enable the Alliance. EUCOM should 

use the Joint Exercise Program to force multinational 

integration and encourage NATO command structure 

participation. An exercise that does not fully integrate 

the current and upcoming NATO command and control nodes misses the opportunity to rehearse a critical component of possible future operations. By rehearsing them, NATO can generate a deterrent effect 

against the very action they are designed to counter.

Third, EUCOM should improve public affairs 

and IO to ensure the United States is delivering the 

intended message. The current messaging in Europe 

focuses on reassurance and is focused primarily on a 

European audience. This emphasis on how busy the 

United States is in Europe and on how the Alliance 

is training offensive capabilities may be sending an 

unintended message to the Russians. NATO exercises should remain primarily defensive in nature and 

U.S. messaging should reinforce that the purpose of 

all training and exercises is to better prepare the Alliance to defend itself against Russian aggression. Russian IO will likely continue to promote the narrative 

that the Alliance is interested in attacking. However, a 

coherent U.S. public and IO campaign will minimize 

its impacts. Russian observers should be invited to 

attend all exercises to watch the defensive focus and 

leader engagement from senior U.S. officials should 

communicate the defensive message.
139

CONCLUSION

As part of the U.S. Army War College Project 1704—

an in-depth study of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe—the study team recommended that NATO work 

to regain the initiative in Europe. A key pillar of this 

effort to regain the initiative was to, “Maintain credible land forces in theater.”24 The study recommended that to do this, NATO must “build and maintain 

a credible and scalable deterrent.”25 To establish the 

credible minimal deterrence, the study realized that 

landpower capability, both forward staged and rotational, would be critical. 

The Russians must believe that NATO is capable 

of responding with overwhelming force, and indeed 

NATO must be capable of doing so, whether or not 

it is ever actually required. Although focused TSC is 

not a panacea, nor a perfect substitute for large-scale 

forward presence, in the current fiscal and political 

environment, it is a primary mechanism to shape exercises, capabilities, and operations to achieve a credible 

and capable deterrent effect.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. GEN Philip M. Breedlove, United States European Command 

Theater Strategy, United States European Command (EUCOM), 

Headquarters, October 2015, p. 4, available from www.eucom.mil/, 

accessed February 6, 2016.

2. Analogy derived from research discussions with a North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Staff Officer at the Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Headquarters, 

November 4, 2015.
140

3. Joint Publication 3-0 defines theater security cooperation 

(TSC) as: 

Security cooperation involves all [DoD] interactions with 

foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security 

interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense for and 

multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with 

peacetime and contingency access to the host nation. 

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, p. V-9.

4. Chuck Hagel, Guidance for The Employment of the Force 

(GEF), U.S. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, February 2015, 

p. 32. Note: This extract from the GEF comes from an unclassified 

section of the document.

5. David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016, p. 1, available from www.

rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/

RAND_RR1253.pdf, accessed February 3, 2016.

6. Julie Ioffe, “Exclusive: The Pentagon Is Preparing New 

War Plans for a Baltic Battle Against Russia” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com.usawc.idm.oclc.

org/2015/09/18/exclusive-the-pentagon-is-preparing-new-war-plansfor-a-baltic-battle-against-russia/, accessed January 3, 2016.” 

7. Derived from discussions with LTC Reed Anderson, author 

of Chapter 2 of this monograph.

8. Benjamin Hodges, “Strong Europe” Lecture at the U.S. 

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, September 21, 2015.

9. Hagel.

10. Information derived from research discussions with 

NATO International Staff for Policy member on November 3, 

2015.
141

11. Hagel.

12. Information derived from research discussions with 

NATO International Staff for Policy member on November 3, 

2015.

13. Analogy derived from research discussions with U.S. 

Army Europe (USAREUR) Staffers on November 4, 2015.

14. Michael Hartmayer and John Hansen, “Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy,” Military Review, JanuaryFebruary 2013, p. 27.

15. Breedlove, p. 4.

16. Elbridge Colby and Jonathan Solomon, “Facing Russia: 

Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe,” Survival, Vol. 

56, Iss. 6, November 2015, p. 40, www-tandfonline-com.usawc.idm.

oclc.org/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116146, accessed November 30, 2015.

17. Information derived from research discussions with USAREUR staff officers conducted by the author on January 14, 2016. 

18. Information derived from research discussions with senior NATO/SHAPE members conducted by the author on November 3-4, 2015.

19. Colby and Solomon, p. 23.

20. Information derived from research discussions with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) staffers conducted 

by the author on November 4, 2015.

21. Franklin D. Kramer et al., NATO’s New Strategy: Stability 

Generation, Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015, available 

from www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/nato-s-new-strate

gy-stability-generation, accessed April 14, 2016.

22. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, 

Joint Publication 3-22, Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, July 12, 2010, p. ix.
142

23. Information derived from research discussions with Department of State staff members on February 23, 2016.

24. Doug Mastriano et al., Project 1704: A United States Army 

War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, and Appropriate U.S. Response and the Implications for U.S. Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2015, p. 95.

25. Ibid. 
143

CHAPTER 5

THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: 

A CRITICAL ELEMENT OFTEN NEGLECTED

In light of the new strategic environment in Europe, this monograph has addressed several ways to 

improve deterrence, including modifying U.S. Army 

posture in Europe. However, senior leaders should 

also consider the policies and activities required 

to help anticipate and counter Russia’s adversarial 

moves while minimizing potential risks with the proposals laid out in this monograph. Most importantly, 

senior leaders have to consider how they communicate these policies to various audiences and how these 

activities are perceived. 

This chapter will first assess how Russia manipulates information to achieve its goals. Next, the chapter will provide an overview of key Department of 

Defense (DoD) information and influence related resources, highlighting how critical it is for the United 

States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) to gain an advantage in Europe’s highly contested information environment. Finally, any information campaign must also take into account that there 

is always the possibility that miscalculations by either 

side could occur, which could have disastrous consequences, and planners must therefore clearly understand and manage associated risks. 

By dedicating additional resources and improving 

the coordination of efforts to inform and influence, the 

U.S. Army can reinforce its commitment to security in 

Europe and clearly communicate U.S. intentions to all 

audiences. Such a step is key to mitigating risk and 

addressing Russia’s belligerence. 
144

RUSSIA’S MANIPULATION OF THE 

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

It is not unusual for highly centralized or authoritarian regimes to encourage and exploit a degree of 

paranoia, vis-à-vis foreign threats, to justify domestic 

control. Historically, Moscow has proven particularly adept at this, employing a robust and tightly 

controlled domestic information campaign. Russian 

President Vladimir Putin carries on this tradition of 

carefully shaping public perception, using fear of foreign aggression, as well as a call for returning Russia 

to its Cold War-era power status, to support a foreign 

policy that keeps the nation safe while simultaneously maintaining his “strong and stable” control of 

the government. Under Putin’s leadership, Russia’s 

foreign policy conveys the need to defeat aggression 

outside its borders. As stated on the official website of 

the Russian Mission to the European Union (EU):

Russia is well placed to consolidate its role as one of 

the centres of the new multipolar system and actively 

impact the global situation with a view to ameliorating it, strengthening security and stability, putting in 

place favourable external conditions for the country’s 

internal development to ensure sustainable economic 

growth and thus a higher quality of life for Russian 

citizens.1 

Its incursion into Ukraine is an example of this 

policy, as it reflects how Russia said it would ensure 

domestic security for its citizens and affect the international order to obtain or safeguard its interests. 

Not only does Putin’s government shape the domestic perception of security as one that justifies 

military action to the Russian people, he has likewise 
145

manipulated the perception of Russian military action among various Western audiences. Following 

the revolution that occurred on February 22, 2014 that 

ousted then-Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich, 

unidentified ground forces took control of eastern 

parts of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula. These 

troops wore military uniforms with no identifying insignia and balaclavas covering their faces, but were 

equipped with the same weaponry as Russian Special Forces. It is now clear that Russian-backed militant separatists and “other militant forces” in eastern 

Ukraine and Crimea fought to secure territory favorable to Russian interests and its foreign policy. However, Putin publicly denied that Russia had deployed 

troops into Ukraine and the ensuing confusion as to 

who the soldiers were caused a moment of hesitation 

among European leadership. As the former Supreme 

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), retired U.S. 

Army General Wesley Clark observed, “the evidence 

is right in front of your face but we couldn’t bring ourselves to admit it because we didn’t want to admit the 

implications of direct Russian aggression.”2

The Russian narrative, supported by its actions, 

also sent a message to NATO and the EU concerning 

their ambitions for further expansion, or inclusion of 

Russia’s near abroad into what Moscow perceives as a 

European sphere of influence. Russia has historically 

maintained influence over Ukraine. In Russia’s view, 

a pro-Western Ukraine could eventually join NATO, 

much like the Baltic States did. Weakening the Alliance supports Russia’s foreign policy of “putting in 

place favourable external conditions.”3 A fractured 

NATO would also serve to boost Putin’s popularity 

as having stood up to additional NATO expansion, 

reinforced by the negative perception many Russians 
146

have developed toward the Alliance.4 Putin’s government continues to fuel the “fear of encroachment” 

rhetoric among Russians and it has promoted the idea 

of Russian humiliation “based on revisionist history.”5

Vladimir Putin has pointed out NATO’s expansion as 

an affront to Russian honor as NATO granted membership to newly independent nations on Russia’s 

borders.6

Putin’s Internal Control of the Narrative.

With a firm grip on domestic media outlets, Putin’s government has not only used fear of foreign 

encroachment to solidify his government’s position 

and power, but it has also ignited Russian nationalism. With very high public approval ratings, Putin 

has been free to carry out foreign policy as he and his 

military see fit.7 Putin’s interests are very clear in a foreign policy where control of the near abroad is linked 

directly to domestic control and the vertikal vlasti

discussed in the opening chapter of this monograph. 

Through careful manipulation of information to domestic audiences, Putin’s government has influenced 

the national motivations of fear and honor to support 

Russia’s foreign policy goals.

The Russian media has a long history of state control and it only experienced the relaxed environment 

of free and independent journalism immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soon after, 

oligarchs began to influence the media landscape, in 

some cases purchasing favorable coverage. By the end 

of the 1990s, the media was once again under heavy 

state control. Nataliya Rostova, a visiting scholar 

at the University of California Berkeley’s Graduate 

School of Journalism, believes that since free press was 
147

“given from above,” there was little concern when it 

was slowly taken away since the people “didn’t really 

fight for it.”8 Her commentary highlights how there 

was little time for a free media to grow and mature 

and serves as an example of how Russians accept the 

government’s control of media outlets using a methodology that is underhanded and effective. 

One example of such cunning occurred in October 

2015, during the start of Russia’s aerial bombing in 

Syria. A weather forecaster on a state-owned television channel cheerfully told viewers, “Syria’s weather 

was ideal for carrying out operational sorties.” With 

a straight face, she continued with a lengthy analysis 

of weather conditions for bombing.9 Another recent 

example in the online edition of The Moscow Times, an 

unnamed author accused the United States and its allies of waging a “hybrid war (economic, political, andinformational) against Russia for two decades” based 

on an alleged “’top’ Russian investigator’s findings.”10

Thus, in this state-controlled media environment, 

Putin employs news outlets to legitimize Russian action in Syria and the centuries-old method of exploiting fear of subjugation and even invasion. In essence, 

Putin can shape and then leverage a Russian worldview, with historical resonance, where Europeans are 

encroaching from the west, Mongols are conducting 

a cyber-invasion from the east, and extremist Islamic 

terrorists are attacking from the south. As noted above 

though, Putin’s information campaign is not limited 

to the domestic audience. 

Using the same techniques, Russia spins news stories through outlets, including in Western Europe, to 

highlight decadence and corruption in the West as well 

as exploiting European security concerns, for example 

over the immigrant surge from the Middle East.11 As 
148

noted in Chapter 1, the Russian strategy includes buying news outlets in Western Europe. Additionally, 

many parliamentarians in European governments 

have received financial support from bank and business institutions based in Russia or that are Russianowned. These politicians can advance their positions 

and influence using the same Western media outlets 

that provide the Kremlin’s worldview to a wide audience. As one NATO officer pointed out, what good is 

a robust defense of a nation when that nation’s leadership hands over the keys to the kingdom?12

U.S. EFFORTS TO INFORM AND INFLUENCE

To address Putin’s robust information campaign, 

the United States must continue to challenge Russia’s misinformation. The Russian news outlet, RT 

(formerly Russia Today) “has an annual budget comparable in size to the BBC’s World News Service,”13

That amount in 2015 was roughly $361 million.14 In 

comparison, the Department of State (DoS) requested 

$770,000 in the President’s fiscal year 2017 budget for 

Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty programming.15

DoD information-related capabilities are in a position to support these state-led activities, but DoD 

needs to resource and organize its own strategic communication efforts more effectively in theater. The 

President’s fiscal year 2016 budget for the European 

Reassurance Initiative (ERI) references activities to 

counter malignant influence in Central and Eastern 

Europe in the defense-wide spending section and allocates $24 million “to increase partnership activities.” 

This line item funds:
149

[Special Operations Force’s] SOF persistent presence 

[activities] to train, advise, and assist Allies and conduct defense planning with select countries to counter 

malign influence in Central and Eastern Europe.16

The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request 

adds an additional $8 million for the U.S. European 

Command (EUCOM) to monitor the information environment, $5 million for establishment of a U.S. Army 

influence platform, and $43.5 million for SOF presence 

and partnership activities that also include activities 

to counter malignant influence in Central and Eastern 

Europe.17 This budget request amount is an increase 

to previous funding to counter propaganda and misinformation but it also shows disconnect across the 

DoD’s capabilities and effort in Europe to conduct effective information operations. 

The bulk of U.S. Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) military information support operations 

(MISO) or (psychological operations [PSYOPS] in 

NATO) efforts are still focused on and funded to counter violent extremist ideology, predominantly from 

the Middle East. The SOCOM MISO endeavors are increasingly coordinated with the DoS’s new Global Engagement Center, led by a former Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict. However, its official charter is heavily antiIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (also known 

as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS] or Daesh)

focused.18 In fact, funding for MISO programs in Europe is at a level lower than the resources allocated to 

the Middle East and Africa.

In addition to financial resourcing, success in planning and executing these programs requires professionals dedicated to the task. Current Army doctrine 
150

describes, “inform and influence activities” replacing 

information operations (IO), which covered a wider 

scope of activities such as electronic warfare and computer network operations. Over a decade of Army 

operations have seen public affairs professionals 

conduct the informing, while MISO officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) carry out influence and 

military deception tasks. 

Within the U.S. Army, a dedicated officer-only IO 

career field, trained to only integrate but not to conduct MISO or public affairs, is responsible for coordinating EUCOM’s limited resources to counter Putin’s information campaign. Specifically, as of October 

2016 there will be a handful of IO officer authorizations in EUCOM—a colonel and a lieutenant colonel 

at EUCOM headquarters (HQ), a lieutenant colonel 

at Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), 

a lieutenant colonel and two majors at U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), and a lieutenant colonel and major 

at 7th Army. At the same time, the highest-ranking 

MISO planner on the EUCOM staff will be a staff sergeant while a major and captain will be authorized for 

SOCEUR. The USAREUR HQ will have no authorizations for MISO planners. Currently, its chief IO staff 

officer is a civil affairs colonel. Only its subordinate 

7th Army HQ staff is authorized a MISO major and a 

sergeant major.19

While, MISO is a SOF function, the bulk of MISO 

capability dedicated to supporting conventional 

forces resides in the U.S. Army Reserve and is not 

directly connected to or under the command of the 

Army’s SOF training and doctrinal institutions. There 

is only one active component MISO battalion (about 

250 personnel), coordinating its activities through 

SOCEUR, and occasional reserve component sup-
151

port dedicated to the European theater. A dedicated public affairs career branch also coordinates its 

communication activities with both IO planners as 

well as MISO staff sections. However, to operate in 

this highly contested information environment and 

be successful in countering Russian propaganda, 

the U.S. Army requires dedicated inform and influence planners in Europe to match the increased ERI 

funding.

Furthermore, the purpose and structure of the 

Army’s information-related capabilities are decentralized, yet the authorities and approvals for information 

programs and products are highly centralized. The 

decentralized nature of various information-related 

staff structures resulted in the creation of a career field 

of coordinators untrained in the capabilities they are 

charged to integrate—this is akin to creating a combat 

operations coordination career field in which none of 

the personnel in that specialty have previously served 

or received training as combat arms officers. The tendency in the Army over the last decade is for influence 

program and product approvals to reside at a very senior (major general or lieutenant general) officer level. 

It would be far more effective and efficient to push 

approval authority for execution to lower levels of 

command.

Additionally, to inform European audiences, 

Army public affairs efforts must continue to highlight 

bilateral and multilateral events to reassure allies and 

partners that the Alliance is unshakeable and that the 

United States remains committed to European security. Army public affairs officers and their activities 

should also publicize joint exercises that highlight 

distinct capabilities that can deter aggressive behavior 

toward NATO and Europe, and must clearly highlight 

to Russian leaders the defensive nature of these joint 
152

exercises. Most importantly, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, strategic communication in support of reassurance to European audiences must be NATO-centric. European populations may be less concerned with 

the United States’ capability to “come to their rescue” 

and instead, need to know what other NATO member 

militaries are doing to deter Russia.20 Influence activities need to focus on countering Russia’s anti-Europe 

propaganda and developing the same military deception capabilities that are a hallmark of Russia’s ambiguous warfare. The success of U.S. programs requires 

more trained inform and influence professionals who 

can be trusted to approve and execute plans to counter Russian disinformation rapidly. Fundamentally, 

U.S. military inform and influence structures must be 

consolidated in capability and purpose and decentralized in approval and execution.21

Inform and influence activity in Europe should 

be clearly coordinated with other U.S. Government 

strategic communications efforts, particularly those 

coordinated out of U.S. embassies in Europe and 

Eurasia, as well as those of European Allies and partners. In a similar fashion to the DoS’s counter-ISIL 

focused Global Engagement Center, the U.S. Army 

with NATO, along with the DoS public diplomacy 

efforts, should regularly share and coordinate efforts 

to take advantage of flaws in the Russian narrative. 

Non-military media outlets such as Radio Free Europe 

excel at fostering and maintaining relationships with 

free press and media agencies throughout the world. 

A recent survey conducted in the Baltic States on the 

consumption and influence of Russian-language media found that of domestic, Russian-backed, and international news sources, Russian speakers in all three 

Baltic States ranked “Kremlin-backed media as the 

least trustworthy.”22
153

These perceptions represent an opportunity to provide information supporting a Western European and 

NATO narrative. More importantly, fostering relationships helps media outlets to enhance transparency 

and disclose “the identities of [Russian] governmentsponsored backers of European political parties and 

how they are financed.”23 The advantage for U.S. and 

NATO strategic communication endeavors is having 

free and independent media outlets reporting reliable 

information to European audiences. This construct 

provides more than one voice or source of information in order for populations to arrive at a conclusion 

that aligns with the free and democratic values that 

the United States and NATO allies espouse and defend. Exposing Russian-backed media across print, 

television, radio, and the Internet to create transparency and show how all of its information is carefully 

manipulated by one source weakens the effectiveness 

of the Russian Government’s propaganda operations. 

MITIGATING RISK TO AN INFORMATION 

CAMPAIGN

Previous chapters recommend the robust application of inform and influence activities to support 

NATO deterrence. However, there is risk to U.S. and 

NATO credibility if bold rhetoric directed at the Russian Government does not come with the necessary 

military resources that are needed to promote deterrence. Positive steps to reinforce deterrence include 

the requested fourfold increase to the ERI budget 

and the heel-to-toe rotation of an armored brigade in 

Europe.24

Therein lies another risk: NATO and U.S. information efforts could reinforce Putin’s domestic fear mon-
154

gering that NATO’s publicized military maneuvers 

are a sign of preparations for a future invasion of the 

Russian homeland. Mitigating the risk of miscalculating by the Russian military will require very clear 

communication to Russian leaders that all of NATO’s 

activities are defensive in nature, lest both sides fall 

into a misperception leading to a security dilemma, or 

worse, open conflict. 

Another risk of “too much” reassurance to European allies is the development of an over reliance 

on the United States to perform the greater part of 

conventional deterrence in Europe. Therefore, U.S. 

information efforts in Europe need to support the focused security cooperation recommendations made in 

Chapter 4, and these efforts should support U.S. diplomacy to prompt NATO members to develop their 

own military deterrence capabilities.

Additionally, the two deterrence strategies discussed in Chapter 2 require an effective information 

campaign to mitigate the risks associated with them. 

The first strategy, deterrence by denial, has two parts: 

denying an adversary access through presence, and 

denying an adversary the ability to fracture and influence the Alliance. The first part requires the presence 

of NATO member military units in areas that Russia 

seeks to control, such as the Baltic States. There is risk 

associated with NATO units operating in areas with 

large numbers of ethnic Russians, which Moscow 

continues to consider its citizens. However, many of 

these Russian-speaking enclaves already do not trust 

Kremlin-based news sources, as discussed earlier, 

thus presenting an opportunity in winning popular 

support for a NATO presence even among Russianspeaking minorities. 
155

There is further risk associated with having the 

forces either permanently stationed or present on a rotational basis in these areas. The U.S. Army War College’s Project 1704 called for stationing “NATO (especially U.S.) forces in the Baltic countries” as the best 

means of deterring Russia.25 While such an approach 

may present an effective deterrence, it does so at the 

risk of escalating a Russian military response along 

the border and providing propaganda fodder for Russian news media to highlight the “alarming presence” 

of significant NATO forces on those borders. To mitigate this risk requires substantial NATO-member media engagement to communicate the defensive nature 

of Alliance forces, a continued emphasis on rotational 

deployments (vice permanent basing) from across 

NATO, and the use of capability-developing exercises 

for visiting units.

The other part of the deterrence by denial strategy 

is impeding Putin’s ability to fracture and influence 

the Alliance. Chapter 2 focuses on the substantial U.S. 

DoD, interagency, and bilateral interaction necessary 

for NATO members to develop resilient law enforcement and security institutions. Alliance efforts must 

also include coordination with media outlets, especially those throughout North America and Europe 

that foster free and independent journalism. This will 

help to provide the transparency that undermines 

Russia’s media influence and disinformation campaigns in Europe. NATO must also seek to elicit the 

support of nongovernmental organizations dedicated 

to fostering democratic ideals and reducing political 

corruption. Doing too little on these fronts creates opportunities for Russia to move in with large amounts 

of cash to bribe and buy influence in the media and in 

European governments.
156

The second deterrence strategy is deterrence by 

punishment, in which NATO uses military force to 

damage or destroy overt Russian military aggression 

toward a NATO member. As addressed in previous 

chapters, there is much the Alliance needs to do to 

develop the necessary capabilities, and this requires 

a commitment to providing the requisite resources, 

without which the Alliance and the United States risk 

being unable to provide effective deterrence. The request for increased ERI funding should help, but it 

also requires a concerted communications effort by the 

United States to NATO allies, highlighting combined 

exercises and training, designed to show the benefit of 

investing in rapid response forces that demonstrate a 

credible deterrence capability.

Another key capability to mitigate risk in this deterrence strategy is to continue SOF training with NATO 

allies focusing on unconventional warfare as well as 

IO. U.S. Army Special Forces based in Germany still 

coordinate several joint training exercises every year. 

A Russian attack against the three Baltic States may 

occur swiftly but the costs associated with an invasion 

and its subsequent occupation may be prohibitive, especially if Putin realizes he may lose the information 

war. A well-trained and capable force, conventional or 

otherwise, which is capable of IO and military deception as part of a broader, prolonged insurgency may 

actually increase the deterrent effect.

CONCLUSION

Seizing the initiative for the information campaign 

to counter Russian aggression and actions is not simple. Moscow’s vertikal vlasti gives Russia an advantage 

that open and free societies do not have. However, 
157

that does not preclude the United States, NATO, and 

individual European allies from working together 

to develop a well-considered information campaign 

that is capable of countering Russian information. It 

should also serve to mitigate the risks associated with 

U.S. and NATO activities designed to enhance the 

Alliance’s ability to defend itself and deter Russian 

aggression on or aimed at Alliance territory. 

As discussed, in order to effectively develop and 

implement such an effort, the DoD and its interagency 

partners need to make several changes, without which 

Russia will retain the initiative. First, the Joint Staff, 

in coordination with the services, should reconsider 

manning levels of appropriate staff expertise to plan 

and manage information campaigns at EUCOM, 

USAREUR, and within the proposed two-star HQ addressed in Chapter 3. These staff experts at the combatant command (CCMD) level should have all necessary authorities for planning and implementation, 

and should synchronize efforts with the regional desk 

officers within EUCOM’s Planning Directorate, with 

EUCOM exercise planners, and with other relevant 

stakeholders. These stakeholders include subordinate 

units within EUCOM, especially SOCEUR, which retains a critical role in IO, as well as the U.S. Embassy 

country teams and the DoS’s Global Engagement 

Center. 

The DoD should also synchronize its information 

campaign with strategic objectives. While it continues 

efforts to counter extremist terrorist organizations 

in Europe, the DoD must also enhance information 

campaigns focused on Russia. This should not be 

done in a vacuum. Such efforts should include close 

coordination with U.S. country team efforts to ensure 

message synchronization. Further, both the DoD and 
158

DoS should ensure they have effective mechanisms to 

measure the effect of their coordinated information 

campaigns, and make necessary adjustments as the 

information environment evolves. Capturing these 

elements in both the EUCOM Theater Campaign Plan 

(TCP) (to include the country-specific security cooperation sections) and the U.S. Embassy Integrated Country Strategy, is critical for codifying the approaches 

and providing baselines from which to make necessary adjustments.

There is not much the United States or NATO 

can do to change the way Russia uses information to 

achieve its security objectives. However, effectively 

targeting its own operations to counter Russian information activities—and doing so in a timely and 

proactive manner—can mitigate the effect of Russian 

efforts as well as the risks associated with U.S. and Alliance military activity in the Baltic States and Eastern 

Europe.

Sun Tzu stated, “Thus a victorious army wins its 

victories before seeking battle; an army destined to 

defeat fights in the hope of winning.”26 These words 

of the ancient strategist offer sound advice to military 

planners and policymakers in determining how best 

to posture U.S. Army forces in Europe. As noted in 

Chapter 4, the objective to seek victory without resorting to a costly and potentially catastrophic armed conflict should be considered a principal aim of current 

U.S. foreign policy.
159

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5 

1. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Russian Foreign 

Policy,” available from www.russianmission.eu/en/russian-foreignpolicy, accessed December 28, 2015.

2. General (Ret.) Wesley Clark, Interview originally aired February 18, 2015 on BBC News—Europe, The Inquiry, “How strong 

is the NATO military alliance?” available from www.bbc.com/news/

world-europe-31503859, accessed September 30, 2015.

3. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation.

4. Gordon Hahn, “It’s Not ‘Putin’s Russia’ - It’s ‘Russia’s Putin’,” Russia Insider, December 10, 2015, available from russiainsider.com/en/politics/its-not-putins-russia-its-russias-putin/ri11772, 

accessed April 27, 2016. This article refers to several surveys taken 

during the 1990s (by Russian language VTsIOM opinion survey) 

where Russians: 

felt to one degree or another that Russia had something 

to fear in countries joining NATO, only 31 percent did 

not think so. By June 1999, VTsIOM found that 73 percent of Russian citizens had a negative view of NATO, 

27 percent – a positive view. This was particularly true 

regarding NATO expansion to former Soviet republics.

The author notes the change in survey questions regarding 

“fear” and “negative view of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO).” 

5. Anne Applebaum, “The Myth of Russian Humiliation,” 

The Washington Post, October 17, 2014, available from https://www.

washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-nato-pays-a-heavyprice-for-giving-russia-too-much-credita-true-achievement-underthreat/2014/10/17/5b3a6f2a-5617-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.

html, accessed February 10, 2016. 

6. See both Michael Rühle, “NATO enlargement and Russia: 

myths and realities,” NATO Review, 2014, available from www.

nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Nato-enlarge
160

ment-Russia/EN/index.htm, accessed April 27, 2016; and John Pat 

Willerton, “Willerton on Tsygankov, ‘Russia and the West from 

Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations’,” book 

review of Andrei P. Tsygankov’s, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations, East Lansing, 

MI: H-Diplo, Michigan State University, May 2013, available 

from https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/reviews/30483/willertontsygankov-russia-and-west-alexander-putin-honor-international, 

accessed November 30, 2015.

7. Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Rankin, and George Arnette, 

“Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at record levels,” The Guardian—U.S. Edition, July 23, 2015 available from www.theguardian.

com/world/datablog/2015/jul/23/vladimir-putins-approval-rating-atrecord-levels, accessed November 30, 2015.

8. Eline Gordts, “Putin’s Press: How Russia’s President Controls The News,” The World Post, a partnership of The Huffington 

Post and Berggruen Institute, October 24, 2015, available from 

www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/vladimir-putin-russia-news-media_

us_56215944e4b0bce34700b1df, accessed February 10, 2016.

9. Moscow AFP, “Russian TV forecasts ‘good weather for 

bombing’ in Syria,” Yahoo! News, October 5, 2015, available 

from news.yahoo.com/russian-tv-forecasts-good-weather-bombing-syr

ia-131355437.html, accessed February 10, 2016.

10. “Russia’s Top Investigator Sees U.S. Hand in Economic 

Crisis, Litvinenko Probe,” The Moscow Times, February 12, 2016, 

available from www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russias-topinvestigator-sees-us-hand-in-economic-crisis-litvinenko-probe/559315.

html, accessed February 13, 2016.

11. Heather A. Conley, “Putin’s Europe,” in Craig Cohan 

and Melissa G. Dalton eds., 2016 Global Forecast, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015, p. 38, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/151116_Cohen_GlobalFore

cast2016_Web.pdf, accessed November 28, 2015. 

12. Analogy derived from a discussion with a Lithuanian 

Army officer in 2013 and also supported in Conley, p. 40, where 

she highlights how “Putin has perfected the art of ‘managed 
161

democracy’ in Russia—where Russian authorities ‘arrange both 

the elections and the results’—the Kremlin is now attempting to 

‘manage’ several other European democracies.”

13. Conley, p. 38.

14. Ashley Kirk, “BBC Charter Review: How does the BBC 

spend its money?” The Telegraph, July 16, 2015, available from 

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/bbc/11744085/BBC-Charter-Review-Howdoes-the-BBC-spend-its-money.html, accessed March 14, 2016.

15. The Secretary of State, “Congressional Budget Justification 

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,” 

February 9, 2016, available from www.state.gov/documents/organi

zation/252179.pdf, accessed March 14, 2016.

16. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 

“European Reassurance Initiative,” Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2015. p. 12. 

17. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 

“European Reassurance Initiative,” Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2016.

18. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “A 

New Center for Global Engagement,” Fact Sheet, January 8, 2016, 

available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/01/251066.htm, accessed January 18, 2016.

19. Information derived from interviews between the authors 

and members of U.S. Army Human Resources Command, March 

11, 2016.

20. Information derived from interviews between the authors 

and a member of the NATO International Staff for Policy, November 3, 2015.

21. Information derived from discussions with U.S. Army 

Europe (USAREUR), Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and U.S. 
162

European Command (EUCOM) Information Operations (IO), 

Public Affairs Office (PAO), and military information support 

operations (MISO) staff members highlighting the Department 

of Defense’s resourcing priority toward counter violent extremist ideology programs, sluggish program approvals due to high 

level approval authorities, and the disjointed nature of a nonMISO trained IO career field supporting conventional Army staff 

structures while active MISO personnel predominantly support 

Special Operations Force (SOF) unit headquarters (HQ).

22. Broadcasting Board of Governors, “Credibility of Russian 

Media Lacking in Baltic Nations,” Press Release, February 9, 2016, 

Washington, DC, available from www.bbg.gov/blog/2016/02/09/

credibility-of-russian-media-lacking-in-baltic-nations/, accessed February 12, 2016.

23. Conley, p. 39.

24. Jen Judson, “US Army Budget to Build Force Size in Europe,” Defense News, February 12, 2016, available from www.de

fensenews.com/story/defense/land/army/2016/02/09/us-army-budgetbuild-force-size-europe/80063172/, accessed February 14, 2016. 

25. Doug Mastriano et al., Project 1704: A United States Army 

War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, and Appropriate U.S. Response and the Implications for U.S. Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2015, p. 9. 

26. Sun Tzu, trans. by Samuel Griffith, The Art of War, New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 87. 
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the last two decades, as hope ensued that the 

Cold War’s end would create lasting peace and stability in Europe, the United States and North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) drew down their forces 

and significantly reduced their force posture in Europe. In the last decade, Russia has increased its military, economic, and informational capabilities, and 

boldly employed them to pursue its objectives. These 

objectives have included increasing its influence in 

Europe, slowing the expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), and creating fractures within Europe so that Russia could exert influence on its own 

terms. 

Understanding Russian foreign policy aims and, 

more importantly, what drives Russian President 

Vladimir Putin’s decision-making process is critical 

for influencing Russia. Even with increased understanding, tempering Russia’s behavior will continue 

to present challenges. For this reason, the United 

States and its allies must address and be prepared to 

respond to Russian aggression, to include its use of 

both conventional forces and ambiguous warfare. The 

military element of Western power is critical here, but 

it should be used with particular care. 

Given current capabilities, NATO is not able to 

prevent a Russian conventional attack into Alliance 

territory. This diminishes the Alliance’s ability to 

deter Russia from using conventional or ambiguous 

threats to achieve its objectives to fracture the Alliance 

and gain influence in Europe. The military approach 

outlined in this monograph therefore includes the 

163
164

development of capabilities that provide the Alliance 

with the ability to not only respond to Russian aggression, but more importantly serve as a deterrent against 

such possible aggression. The consolidated effect of 

such efforts as outlined in this monograph should increase the perceived costs of Russian aggression and 

the probability of Moscow incurring such costs, and 

it should decrease the probability of Russia deriving 

benefits from its actions. 

To develop such capabilities requires a concerted 

effort on the part of NATO, the EU, and their member states. For instance, European NATO members 

should continue searching for more effective ways to 

increase capabilities and progressively increase their 

defense budgets. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 

and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) must more effectively align their security cooperation activities to 

support capability development, especially as identified through NATO’s defense planning process. The 

United States and its allies must employ a coordinated, whole of government effort to address those capabilities that fall beyond the scope of the military, such 

as law enforcement. It is through such actions that the 

West can develop a capable force that underpins the 

credibility of its commitment to defend Alliance territory through deterrence.

More specifically, this monograph also identifies 

areas where the U.S. Army and NATO allies should 

focus efforts to achieve defined effects in response to 

Russian foreign policy. It does so fully recognizing that 

the United States has tried for many years to encourage its European NATO allies to pull a greater share of 

the burden. This monograph also recognizes that with 

global commitments, the United States can no longer 

afford to lift the bar from the allies when it becomes 
165

too heavy. Winning in a complex world indeed relies 

on allies, and the United States should help the allies 

succeed in pulling their share of the burden. With that 

in mind, and in the context of the entire monograph, 

this monograph identifies the following key considerations for senior leaders and then proposes a series of 

recommendations.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS

• The United States, and NATO, cannot afford to reassure allies to the point where they solely rely on 

the United States to ensure their security. 

• Any policy or strategy toward Russia must understand Russian intentions and the likelihood of 

a conventional attack—balanced against the reality of potential ambiguous activities and Russian 

influence in Europe. 

• The United States and NATO must be careful 

that its reassurance activities do not provoke further Russian aggression, or lead to a new security 

dilemma. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

• The U.S. Army should assign, allocate, and apportion forces versus aligning them, in support of 

EUCOM’s Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and contingency plans.

• The U.S. Army should assign a Joint Task Force 

(JTF)-capable two-star headquarters (HQ) to 

USAREUR.

• The U.S. Army should establish a rotational allocation of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) 

that provides a continuous armor presence in 

Europe.
166

RECOMMENDATIONS CONT.

• The U.S. Army should ensure units receive the 

requisite security cooperation, and/or foreign internal defense (FID)-specific training for conventional units. 

• The National Guard’s State Partnership Program should focus more explicitly on building 

and maintaining allies’ resiliency in the face of 

ambiguous warfare. 

• EUCOM should re-examine its theater security 

cooperation (TSC) process to nest efforts between 

EUCOM and USAREUR more effectively.

○ EUCOM and USAREUR should more effectively make use of NATO capability targets, 

part of the NATO Defense Planning Process, to 

define the types of activities that will focus on 

lacking capabilities. 

○ EUCOM should reduce the number of exercises in order to focus on high-quality, fully 

integrated NATO operations. 

○ EUCOM should synchronize country-specific 

sections of its Theater Campaign Plan with the 

U.S. Embassy Integrated Country Strategies.

• EUCOM and USAREUR should ensure staffs are 

trained, particularly those involved in security 

cooperation, to conduct strategic and operational 

planning, and to understand the nesting of national security objectives with Alliance capability 

targets. 

• The Joint Staff and the U.S. Army should improve 

manning levels of appropriate staff expertise to 

plan and manage the “inform and influence” activities at EUCOM, subordinate units, and within 

the proposed two-star HQ. 

• The Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) should ensure they have effective mechanisms to coordinate information 

campaigns, and make necessary adjustments as 

the information environment evolves. 
167

RECOMMENDATIONS CONT.

• The DoD should reconsider its representation at 

the U.S. Mission to the EU to enhance its ability to 

synchronize efforts with NATO and EUCOM. 

• Washington needs to build a concerted effort 

among interagency partners to identify areas 

where the United States can assist European 

NATO members develop capabilities to deter Russia’s ambiguous warfare. 

• NATO should re-examine The Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) authority to 

reposition forces in Europe. 

• NATO should move toward a NATO multinational logistics capability. 

• NATO should streamline the timeline for approvals of counter-Russia actions. 

• NATO should reinitiate dialogue with Russia. 

By implementing the above recommendations, 

while remaining mindful of the key considerations, 

the West can more effectively and efficiently employ 

the military tools at its disposal to manage a resurgent 

Russia.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Lieutenant Colonel R. Reed Anderson

Colonel Patrick J. Ellis

Lieutenant Colonel Antonio M. Paz

Lieutenant Colonel Kyle A. Reed

Lieutenant Colonel Lendy “Alamo” Renegar

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Vaughan

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

This Publication SSI Website

FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/

USAWC Website