Filed 8/27/24 Doe v. University of Southern California CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN 

CALIFORNIA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B324253 c/w B325706

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21STCV45745)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Kristin Escalante, Judge. Affirmed.

Jane Doe, pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kjar, McKenna & Stockalper, Patrick E. Stockalper and 

Hannah R. Hogoboom for Defendants and Respondents.

_____________________
2

Plaintiff and appellant Jane Doe appeals from a judgment 

of dismissal pursuant to an order to show cause, and as an 

independent basis for dismissal, an order sustaining the 

demurrer of defendants and respondents University of Southern 

California (USC), Alfred E. Mann Institute for Biomedical 

Engineering (the Institute), and Dr. Gerald Loeb. On appeal Doe 

contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer, 

denying discovery, and denying leave to amend. We conclude the 

demurrer was properly sustained because it is not reasonable to 

infer from the allegations of the complaint that any of the 

defendants was the proximate cause of Doe’s injuries; the 

doctrines of res ipsa loquitor and strict products liability do not 

apply. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

discovery, and Doe has not shown that she could amend the 

complaint to state a cause of action. Therefore, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jane Doe, representing herself, filed her original complaint 

against USC, the Institute, and Loeb in Santa Clara County in 

November 2020. USC and the Institute filed a demurrer, a 

motion to strike portions of the complaint, and a motion to 

transfer venue. The trial court overruled the demurrer as to 

several claims, expressly stating that the allegations of the 

complaint must be taken as true, and therefore a claim had been 

stated, but sustained the demurrer as to other claims with leave 

to amend. The Santa Clara court transferred the case to Los 

Angeles County. 
3

After further proceedings, Jane Doe ultimately filed the 

operative second amended complaint against the same 

defendants in April 2022. She alleged causes of action labeled res 

ipsa loquitor, strict liability, stalking, negligence, intentional and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, battery, assault, sexual 

battery, violation of the California Tom Bane Civil Rights Act 

(Bane Act; Civ. Code, § 52.1), gender violence, and conspiracy 

based on the following allegations: On May 23, 2018, as she was 

walking on the campus of Santa Clara University, she felt a 

sharp pain in her genital area. When she arrived home, she 

found a stiff wire-like object in her vulva that an expert identified 

as a device with semiconductor components. On subsequent 

occasions, she found similar objects in her genital area. The 

objects were found to be consistent with sencil technology, which 

are hair-like sensors that were the subject of patent applications 

filed by or assigned to USC, the Institute, and Loeb in 2005 and 

2006. Doe believes the defendants control the manufacture, 

distribution, storage, and security of sencil technology. The 

sophisticated technology is not readily available in the ordinary 

course of commerce and its dissemination is limited. 

Doe does not allege how the technology was implanted in 

her body. She speculates that it could have been implanted “by 

any number of methods,” such as remotely from a distance. She 

alleged the defendants were in a unique position to identify 

delivery methods for their technology. She noted that the 

Central Intelligence Agency, in 1975, revealed the ability to

deliver technology through nearly undetectable darts. The 

complaint does not allege that Doe was in the vicinity of any 

defendant or received medical treatment from any defendant.
4

The defendants filed a demurrer on several grounds, 

including failure to state a cause of action, which Doe opposed. 

Doe filed two motions to compel discovery responses, which the 

defendants opposed. 

Doe filed a motion for leave to amend the causes of action 

in the second amended complaint for res ipsa loquitor and 

negligence per se, which the defendants opposed. 

The trial court ordered all discovery proceedings stayed 

until after the hearing on the demurrer. 

A hearing was held on July 7, 2022. The hearing on the 

demurrer to the second amended complaint was continued. The 

trial court, on its own motion, issued an order to show cause why 

the second amended complaint should not be dismissed as 

factually frivolous and based on delusional allegations. The court 

stayed the action pending resolution of the order to show cause, 

including staying discovery. The parties filed pleadings in 

response to the order to show cause.

The demurrer and the order to show cause were heard on 

August 17, 2022, and the trial court took the matters under 

submission. 

Later that day, in response to the order to show cause for 

being factually frivolous and based on delusional allegations, the 

trial court dismissed the second amended complaint on that 

ground with prejudice. The trial court summarized the relevant 

allegations and legal authority. The court found the allegations 

of the second amended complaint were based on similar 

delusional allegations that had been dismissed in other cases. 

The court stated, “Even accepting the allegations that Plaintiff 

found hair-like sensors on her person that match the description 

of sensors described in patent applications filed and published by 
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USC professors in 2005 and 2006, Plaintiff’s theory that USC 

professors somehow remotely implanted this technology into 

Plaintiff’s body without access to her person is delusional. The 

action is grounded on the theory that Defendants could implant 

hair-like devices into Plaintiff’s genital area while she was 

walking in a public area, without any access to her body. 

Plaintiff’s purported experts provide no rational explanation for 

how that could happen and no such inference could arise from the 

facts alleged.” 

The court added that it had no doubt that “Plaintiff 

sincerely believes in the truth of her allegations, but the sincerity 

of the belief does not overcome the objectively frivolous basis for 

the claims. Further, the court notes that Plaintiff is highly 

educated and unusually articulate, but that does not change the 

court’s evaluation of the key factual allegations on which the 

claims are based.” Based on the court’s analysis, the court 

ordered the action dismissed.

In addition, as an independent basis for the dismissal 

order, the trial court sustained the demurrer to the second 

amended complaint without leave to amend and ordered the case 

dismissed with prejudice. The court stated that to the extent any 

claim was based on an allegation that the defendants were 

somehow liable for the actions of an unknown person who 

implanted technology, the claims lacked merit. Plaintiff had not 

sufficiently alleged that USC had any duty to Plaintiff regarding 

third parties’ use of USC’s purported technology. There was also 

no allegation that the technology was ever placed in the stream of 

commerce. For these and other reasons not articulated, the court 

sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as an 

independent basis for the court’s dismissal order. 
6

The trial court entered an order of dismissal on August 17, 

2022. Doe filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial 

court denied. Doe filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

First, we review the complaint de novo to determine 

whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under 

any legal theory or to determine whether the trial court 

erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of law. (Cantu v. 

Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879.) Second, 

we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. (Ibid.) Under 

both standards, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating 

that the trial court erred. (Ibid.) An abuse of discretion is 

established when “there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff 

could cure the defect with an amendment.” (Schifando v. City of 

Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) 

In this case, Doe contends the Los Angeles court erred by 

reversing a ruling by the Santa Clara court overruling in part the

demurrer to the original complaint. At this stage, however, we

conduct a de novo review of the complaint to determine whether 

it states a cause of action. We are not bound by the rulings of the 

lower court in our review.
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B. Causation Theories

Doe concedes her complaint fails to allege as to any cause of 

action how the defendants caused her injury because she does not 

know how the sencil device was implanted in her body. Instead, 

she contends the element of causation is satisfied under two legal

doctrines: strict liability and res ipsa loquitor. We conclude 

neither doctrine applies in this case.

1. Strict Liability

Doe contends the defendants are strictly liable for placing a 

defective, dangerous product on the market. This theory, 

however, is not supported by the allegations of the complaint.

“A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he 

places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without 

inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury 

to a human being.” (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.

(1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62.) “The purpose of such liability is to 

insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products 

are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the 

market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to 

protect themselves.” (Id. at p. 63.)

“ ‘The strict liability doctrine derives from judicially 

perceived public policy considerations, i.e., enhancing product 

safety, maximizing protection to the injured plaintiff, and 

apportioning costs among the defendants. [Citations.] Where 

these policy justifications are not applicable, the courts have 

refused to hold the defendant strictly liable even if that 
8

defendant could technically be viewed as a “ ‘link in the chain’ ” 

in getting the product to the consumer market. [Citation.] In 

other words, the facts must establish a sufficient causative 

relationship or connection between the defendant and the product 

so as to satisfy the policies underlying the strict liability 

doctrine.’ [Citation.]” (Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC (2021) 63 

Cal.App.5th 466, 477.)

There are no allegations that the defendants in this case 

placed these devices in the stream of commerce, and Doe does not 

contend that she could amend her complaint to allege that any of 

the defendants manufactured or sold these devices to consumers. 

Strict products liability does not apply.

2. Res Ipsa Loquitor

The other theory that Doe relies on, res ipsa loquitor, is not 

applicable under the circumstances of this case. We conclude 

Doe’s injury, the implantation of technology in her body, is not 

the type of accident that usually occurs only if someone is 

negligent.

The mere fact that a person is injured by a device is not 

enough to raise a presumption that the owner of the device that 

was used at the time of the accident was negligent. (Metz v. 

Southern Pacific Co. (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 260, 268 (Metz).) 

“California cases have frequently stated that the doctrine of res 

ipsa loquitur may apply ‘when a thing which causes injury is 

shown to be under the management of the defendant and the 

accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not 

happen, if those who have the management use proper care, it 

affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the 
9

defendant, that the accident arose from a want of care.’ 

[Citation.] This doctrine prescribes a mere rule of evidence. The 

requirement that the instrumentality must be under the 

management and control of the defendant, in the application of 

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, does not mean, nor is it limited 

to, actual physical control. It has been held to apply to the mere 

right of control of the instrument which causes the injury at the 

time of the accident.” (Ibid.)

“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions: ‘(1) 

the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in 

the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an 

agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the 

defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action 

or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.’ [Citation.]” (Ybarra 

v. Spangard (1944) 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 (Ybarra).) “Generally, [res 

ipsa loquitur] applies ‘where the accident is of such a nature that 

it can be said, in light of past experience, that it probably was the 

result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is 

probably the person who is responsible.’ [Citations.] Conversely, 

where no such weight of probabilities can be found, res ipsa 

loquitur does not apply. [Citations.]” (Fowler v. Seaton (1964) 61 

Cal.2d 681, 686.)

Doe contends the elements of res ipsa loquitur are satisfied

by the allegations in this case. We disagree. The link in the 

causal chain that Doe must explain is how the sencil device was 

implanted in her body. Even though she alleges the defendants 

are the developers and owners of sencil technology, the injury in 

this case is not the type of accident that in the ordinary course of 

things would occur from defendants’ negligence in their role as 

developers and owners of that technology. In the absence of any 
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allegations that defendants ever had access to her person, such as 

for medical treatment or experimentation, it is not reasonable to 

infer that Doe ended up with this unusual, uncommon device 

inside her body on multiple separate occasions because of

defendants’ negligence. It is equally probable, if not more 

probable, that Doe’s injury resulted from someone’s intentional 

conduct. Where no explanation for an injury is inherently more 

probable than others, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not 

apply. (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 

820, 827.) Doe seems to recognize this, by speculating that the 

sencils could have been implanted intentionally by someone using 

other technology that was generally known to exist (i.e., the CIA’s 

undetectable darts). The technology necessary to implant devices 

remotely is not alleged, however, to be defendants’ technology, or 

under their control. It does not follow from the allegation that 

sencils were in Doe’s body that the most likely explanation is the 

defendants acted negligently, rather than the defendants or an 

unknown third party acted intentionally. The doctrine of res ipsa 

loquitor does not apply.

C. Denial of Discovery

Doe contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying her sufficient opportunity for discovery. We disagree. 

Without a viable complaint, the proposed discovery would be an 

unnecessary and burdensome additional expense to the 

defendants; there was no abuse of discretion in staying discovery. 

(See Terminals Equipment Co. v. City and County of San 

Francisco (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 247 [without viable 

complaint stating a triable cause of action, stay of discovery was 
11

not an abuse of discretion]; Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 

245 Cal.App.2d 673, 674–675 [“Once it is recognized that the 

complaint shows that plaintiff has no claim, all concerned should 

be spared the expense of further proceedings”].)

D. Leave to Amend

Finally, Doe argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying leave to amend. However, she does not state how she 

could have amended the complaint to cure its defects. No abuse 

of discretion has been shown, and therefore, the order must be 

affirmed.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondents University of Southern 

California, Alfred E. Mann Institute for Biomedical Engineering, 

and Dr. Gerald Loeb are awarded their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting, P. J.

KIM, J.