STREAMLINING DOD ACQUISITION: 

BALANCING SCHEDULE WITH COMPLEXITY 

edited 

 by 

James R. Rothenflue, Lt Col, USAF 

and 

Marsha J. Kwolek 

September 2006 
ii
DISCLAIMER 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States 

government. 

iii 
Contents 

Chapter Page 

Disclaimer.........................................................................iii 

Foreword.............................................................................v 

1 A System as the Enemy: A Doctrinal Approach to Defense Force Modernization............................................................................1 

 Benjamin A. Drew, Jr., Colonel, USAF 

2 Impact of Weapon System Complexity on Systems Acquisition.........55 

 Robert A. Dietrick, Major, USAF 

3 Faster Is Better...Can the USAF Acquisition Process Be SAIV’D?.....81

James L. Chittenden, Major, USAF 

Endnotes....................................................................... 107 

iv
 Foreword 

Since at least the late 1960s, the Department of Defense has been 

trapped in an escalating cycle of cost overruns and schedule delays on 

large acquisition programs. In particular, state-of-the-art aircraft programs have ballooned from one to five year sprints during and immediately after World War II to the 25-year marathons of the present day. An 

aerospace force that once blackened the skies over Europe with tens of 

thousands of aircraft of all shapes and sizes and swelled our nation’s nuclear deterrent with thousands of leading-edge missiles and warheads now 

struggles to purchase a few dozen modern bombers, barely 150 fighters, 

and a few hundred airlifters and tankers despite enormous outlays over the 

last 20 years. Over this time, the average age of operational USAF aircraft 

has grown from just a few to approximately 24 years, and seems inevitably bound to approach 40 years within decades. In response to these 

trends, a parade of commissions and surveys, marching to a seemingly 

perpetual acquisition reform drumbeat, have proposed a dizzying array of 

cures for the gamut of ills effecting the acquisition corps. Yet despite 

these heroic efforts, program schedules and costs continue to grow, confounding even the sharpest minds of American industry. 

 The United States has so far been able to compensate for this 

growing inefficiency by leaning on the massive industrial might of the 

world’s greatest economy. Unfortunately, it appears that the age of defeating our enemies by outspending them is ending. To begin, the American share of the world’s economic output has been steadily shrinking since 

the end of World War II, and some estimate that the United States will be 

replaced by China as the world’s largest economy by the year 2030 and 

may well slide into third place behind India by 2050. If these estimates 

are even approximately correct, we will no longer be able to rely on overwhelming defense outlays to protect our nation within the careers of many 

of the new Airmen entering the service today. Next, and even more compelling, is the fact that the strategic environment itself is changing, and the 

rules of the national defense game with it. 

A growing chorus of academics and theoreticians are raising an 

alarm that the world has already entered an age in which the traditional 

measures of national power are no longer valid. Unfortunately, contemporary military practitioners study a craft which evolved through the agricultural and industrial ages. A common thread through these ages has been 

that a nation’s likelihood to prevail in war is dominated by its ability to 

deploy and employ more men and materiel on the battlefield than its adversaries. Complex theories evolved describing the efficient transport, 

v 
supply and employment of large forces—great nations moving mountains 

of “stuff” with which to crush their enemies. Certainly, military genius, 

terrain, politics, and tricks of fate have often conspired to produce victories for the lesser over the greater, but the material qualities of greatness 

have remained essentially unchanged throughout history. But now, harbingers like Ray Kurzweil, Joel Garreau, Thomas Barnett, Thomas Friedman, and others point to a shift in the equation of national power – a dramatic shift away from quantity to quality. Specifically, they employ the 

concept of “accelerating change” to describe a world in which radical and 

disruptive technological innovations become routine and occur with increasing frequency. In the extreme case of this analysis, the point is eventually reached in which any numerical advantage by a business or army 

can be overcome by even a small adversary with sufficiently up-to-date 

technology. From a military perspective, this future includes hyperempowered individuals and groups, armed with the latest generation of 

cell phones, internet devices, lethal and non-lethal bombs, personal computers, and cheap nano and bio technologies capable of defeating “great” 

nations employing armies, navies, and air forces equipped with legacy 

hardware. In this future, change itself has become the “stuff” of war. 

Even if one doesn’t accept the asymptotic case of Kurzweil’s “singularity,” the growing importance of quality (perhaps “modernity” is a 

better word in this context) was clearly evident in the waning years of the 

Cold War. The United States overtly and successfully relied on modern 

military technologies to overcome significant Soviet numerical advantages. Despite inefficient acquisition practices, the US used its economic 

muscle to ram new technologies into its order of battle 10 to 20 years 

ahead of the even less efficient Soviet Union. This qualitative advantage 

proved to be more than sufficient to compensate for relatively few fielded 

troops, tanks, missiles and aircraft. The importance of this fact is often 

overlooked. Never before has one nation been able to consistently maintain an advantage over a numerically superior adversary over time, primarily by placing technologies in the hands of its warfighters that were only 

20 or so years more up to date. Episodic disruptive technologies notwithstanding (i.e. the iron sword, the longbow, gunpowder, the breech loading 

rifle, etc), 20 year differences in weapon technologies were inconsequential until the 20th century. In principle, according to the theory of accelerating change, the military advantage conferred by 20-years more up-todate hardware in the 20th century is the same as that conferred by, say, 

200-years more advanced technology in the year 1800, 2000 years more 

advanced technology for the early Roman Empire, and will be the same as 

that conferred by only 2-years more advanced technology in the mid 21st

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century. Although these notional timelines can be debated, it stands to 

reason that attempting to defend oneself with the product of a 25 year acquisition cycle in the year 2040 may well be about as effective as attempting to resist the advance of Hitler’s Blitzkrieg with swords, knives and 

spears. It doesn’t matter how many knives and spears your massive economy can produce – you lose. 

Thus the motive for the studies contained in this volume. Among 

its several research thrusts, the Air University Center for Strategy and 

Technology continues to examine the need to transform defense acquisition to prepare for a future of accelerating change. For nations to survive 

in this “Age of Change,” they must shed the inertia built into their industrial age acquisition processes. The three researchers represented herein 

were each given a clean slate and assigned the task of defining a vision for 

transforming today’s pedantic acquisition system into one with the agility 

to outmaneuver even the most technologically savvy 21st century adversary. Three different visions emerged. 

All authors agreed that the DoD acquisition system must become 

more agile in response to a rapidly changing strategic environment. In the 

first paper, Col Alvin Drew argues that Congress must scrap the entire 

slate of overly restrictive and prescriptive acquisition laws and regulations 

in order to allow the DoD to create a doctrinal environment in which program managers can more efficiently respond to changing conditions. In 

effect, his argument describes a contemporary acquisition environment 

analogous to a fighter pilot being forced clear all changes in speed and 

heading with Air Traffic Control during a dogfight. The second paper, 

penned by Maj Robert Dietrick, asserts that increasing weapon system 

complexity is the primary driver behind long acquisition cycles and describes how this complexity might be better managed. Finally, in the third 

paper, Maj James “Judge” Chittenden identifies the “Cost as an Independent Variable” philosophy as the main culprit in recent program cost and 

schedule overruns. Instead, programs should be schedule driven, demoting cost and performance to dependent variables in the process. It is left 

to the reader to dissect these arguments and determine which of these visions are true, or whether these are simply three more anonymous voices 

in the raucous din of acquisition reform. 

 -Lt Col James Rothenflue, USAF 

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viii
Chapter 1 

A System as the Enemy: A Doctrinal Approach to Defense 

Force Modernization 

By 

Colonel Benjamin A. Drew, Jr., USAF 

Force modernization is more like a warfighting campaign than an industrial process. Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity inherent in all its key factors and enablers make modernization as much an operational art as a scientific method. Therefore, modernization, like warfare, would operate more effectively and responsively under an authoritative body of doctrine rather than under layers of detailed prescriptive and 

legally binding regulations. 

At the core of a body of doctrine is a foundational doctrine document 

putting forth broad guidance with fundamental principles to guide planning and execution. This study will consider principles, presented below, 

as candidates for such a document. 

Principles of Modernization

1. Objective 

2. Stable Program Inputs 

3. Risk Management 

4. Simplicity of Command 

5. Economy of Effort 

6. Initiative 

7. Credibility 

8. Synergy 

9. Tempo 

10. Synchronization 

Together, these are the fundamental and underlying doctrinal principles for an effective and efficient force modernization program. These 

principles can guide modernization process improvement efforts as well as 

modernization programs to shorten program timelines and still deliver a 

quality product. 

Force modernization here includes the Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System (JCIDS), formerly the Requirements Generation 

System, and the US Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process. 

With respect to JCIDS, this paper is concerned only with material solu1
tions feeding into the acquisition system. The analysis does not include 

doctrine, operations, training, leadership & education, personnel, and facilities solutions to documented needs. 

The Coming Apoplectics: Shock and Awe for Modernization 

The DoD acquisition process is currently in its fourth decade and 

fourth generation of overhaul. The policy underpinnings, the DoD 5000-

series and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 3710-series instructions, have been completely rewritten. They focus now on a top-town 

modernization process and mission needs (now “capabilities”) spawned 

from mission area Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) for achieving strategic objectives. 

Further, force modernization directives now emphasize evolutionary 

acquisition, system upgrades, development spirals, and incremental deployment of new systems’ capabilities. This purports to bring new capabilities to field and fleet sooner—as soon as they become available as subsystems, rather than after the last capability is integrated into an entire 

end-system. 

This force modernization is parcel to the overall defense transformation. At the heart of this effort is the concept for networking all the levels 

of command and all of the warfighting actors in order to achieve shared 

situational awareness, to overcome barriers to rapid communication, including stovepipes, and to tighten decision (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 

[OODA]) loops to reflex-arc speeds that literally shock an opponent into 

paralysis through lightning-fast responsiveness. This prescription for warfighters, which DoD’s force modernization process is to deliver, is appropriate medicine for the modernization process itself. Force modernization 

itself needs to tighten its own decision cycle to keep itself from being 

shocked into paralysis due to its increasingly glacial responsiveness to 

increasingly dynamic warfighter needs. 

Acquisition Program Timelines: Too Long and Getting Longer 

In 1986, Packard Commission member and future Secretary of Defense William Perry lamented the unacceptably long times, 10 – 15 years, 

required to field major defense systems. (45:8) Since then, F-22 development has spanned 24 years (7:4), and the V-22 should achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 2007, after 27 years of development. (20) The 

RAH-66 Comanche was cancelled in February 2004, due to mission obsolescence, 21 years after program inception. (21) The Joint Strike Fighter 

2
faces a similar timeline of development. With acquisition timelines now 

trending towards 20 – 25 years from identifying mission needs to fielding 

a proper fix, 10-15 years of development seems optimistic. 

 

Dynamic Strategic Environment: Time-to-Need Increasingly Shorter 

At the same time, the security environment is increasingly dynamic. 

Weapons coming to the flightline, field, and fleet in this decade were 

specified to counter threats from the Soviet Union: before the advent of 

humanitarian operations, before the internet, before stabilization operations, before Al Qaeda, homeland security, or even satellite or cable television. How appropriate will solutions to present-day deficiencies be between 2025 and 2030? 

Increasingly, DoD future plans documents have shortened their forecast horizons from 25-year looks-ahead to ones looking out 10 – 15 years. 

Thus, the situation has reversed from the late 1980s, where the forecast 

included the first 10 – 15 years of a developing system’s existence, to one 

in which a new system’s IOC happens 10 – 15 years beyond the forecast 

horizon. Given this, the dominant risk to any program is time itself. 

A review of exemplary successful historical acquisition programs reveals a common key factor among them: they benefited handsomely from 

stable external factors over their development phases. However, requirements, funding, personnel, and technology become increasingly volatile 

influences to programs with developments lasting a quarter-century or 

more. It’s a vicious cycle that starts with planning for a lengthy program 

(ironically to avoid developmental risk). Lengthy programs’ performances 

suffer from unstable influences, and program performance problems cause 

the program to get stretched out further. The answer to this volatility is 

not necessarily to stabilize the process inputs and perturbations (it’s beyond control), but to field solutions faster than the environment can 

change. Short programs require agility—speed and flexibility—only afforded through having actors with unambiguous goals and latitude-inaction in novel circumstances. This latitude is available under doctrinal 

guidance in ways not possible with prescriptive regulations. 

On Modernization: The Case for Doctrinal Principles 

Warfighting doctrine emphasizes centralized control and decentralized 

execution. We seem to operate the acquisition system in direct opposition by implementing decentralized control and centralized execution of 

key macro processes. We manage the requirements and technology 

processes in a decentralized fashion, while exerting tight and central 

controlling on program management and budget (particularly for large 

programs). (11:57) 

3
Can disciplined force modernization replace current and future statutory and regulatory directives with doctrinal principles? For this to be 

true, modernization would have to have characteristics in common with 

warfighting such that a body of doctrine would be similarly useful. 

According to historian Martin Van Creveld, applying the logic of industrial processes to warfare is dangerously myopic. Whereas industrial 

processes are repeatable, that is, the same input yields the same output, 

warfighting strategy is not, so long as it is a contest among two living 

wills. While manufacturing endeavors to achieve optimal production efficiency, combat must entail tremendous waste and slack as hedges against 

overwhelming uncertainty. While industry is the very epitome of determinism, warfare is anything but predictable. (57:311-320) An additional 

consideration is the consequences of failure. Commercial failures end in 

bankruptcy; failures in warfare result in loss of lives and often in the destruction of the losing state. Likewise, any single force modernization 

failure is a loss of taxpayers’ revenues and warrior capability. But the fate 

of the Soviet Union is a cautionary example of how inability to keep modernization apace with a rapidly changing security environment can lead to 

extinction. 

What happens at the interface of industry and warfare, where determinism meets friction and chance? A process that bridges the battlefield 

and the assembly line should be subject to principles from both environments, and the closer the process operates to one environment, the greater 

weight that environment’s principles come to bear. Much of top DoD acquisition management comes from industry, and the language and guidance from them has a distinct industrial flavor: streamlined processes, 

benchmarking, and business models. The requirements generation community led by service generals has a distinctly different lexicon: strategy, 

CONOPS, and campaigns. Bridging the two force modernization communities requires a construct that includes operational art and industrial 

science, production line efficiency, and battlefield chaos. A body of doctrine would function to bridge and encompass these disciplines. It would 

clarify, to modernization’s actors, the context in which they operate. It 

would give them guidance and latitude in interpreting their location along 

the process’ continuum, from the laboratory to the battlespace, and in applying governing guidance with due weight. It would guide the novices 

and liberate the masters of the art to do what’s best to meet their strategic 

goals. 

Knowledge management databases, Defense Acquisition University 

guides, “Best Practices” lists, and statutory and regulatory guidance al4
ready capture much of the enduring lessons of force modernization history. What a doctrine document does is to redact that large body of literature into a concise handbook, as an introduction for novices and a ready 

reference for practitioners. A singular volume of doctrinal guidance is definitive, a source of ground truth, for creating policy, interpreting guidance, resolving dilemmas, and generally giving a sense of coherence to the 

welter of widely disparate simultaneous activities constantly undertaken in 

the name of force modernization. 

The force modernization community and its processes are large and 

complex, facing the same challenges as large military units in the field: 

volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, if to a lesser degree. 

Operational commanders work with the understanding that their influence 

on battlefield events is at best second-order; they cannot control them directly. They give broad guidance (commander’s intent), set boundaries 

(rules of engagement), and do their best to create conditions for those on 

the front echelons to succeed. In de-centralized execution, they support

those peripheral echelons. 

Much of acquisition has worked the other way around. The citation 

below implies that the need for central planning and control (i.e., generating requirements from the top down) was an undesirable aberration. 

Secretary McNamara was hard pressed to get the Services to write requirements for more conventional weapons in lieu of nuclear weapons 

and therefore found himself and his staff in the business of writing requirements for the Services (McNaugher 1989:59). (29:41) 

Except in rare cases, those in the periphery identify the requirements; and 

acquisition executives execute centrally, requiring support from the program offices. Thinking of force modernization in its true dual nature – 

science and art, industrial and martial – would go far to help policymakers 

resist the temptation to “drive” the process. 

[W]e need to return the military service chiefs to the chain of command for acquisition... OSD should not be running things, but overseeing procedures and decisions. (23:74) 

Hon John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense 

By not being prescriptive, doctrinal guidance gives innovative solutions the necessary latitude in novel situations. Innovators would then 

only risk having their judgment questioned – not their lawfulness – should 

they need to break with traditional guidance. And that wiggle room provides just the flexibility and responsiveness necessary to keep decision 

cycles short. Finally, the common sense that legislators and policy-makers 

try to capture in modernization policy and instruction better resides in a 

non-binding doctrine document. This serves to limit the scope of direc5
tives and instructions to only the truly mandatory guidance and to better 

highlight them as legal boundaries. 

Modernization Principles Evolution: A Brief History of 

Acquisition Reform 

A body of doctrinal principles exists – waiting to be explicated. They 

are the critical aspects of modernization, enduring and frequently repeated, 

such that these principles emerge as a pattern over time. The raw data 

containing those enduring fundamentals reside both in program case histories and in government efforts at acquisition reform. This section mines 

results from acquisition reform commissions’ findings and recommendations for a list of candidate principles for force modernization. 

Round One (1969 – 1972): Containing Cost 

While the history of DoD transformation, reorganizations and reengineering date back to the National Defense Act of 1947, initiatives specifically for reforming acquisition start in 1969 with Congress mandating Selected Acquisition Reports from the Secretary of Defense. Straining under 

the costs of the Vietnam War, Great Society social spending, and the 

Apollo moon landing program, Congress began to question Cold War 

weapons procurement practices. The result was a series of commissions to 

investigate inefficiencies in the acquisition process. (29:44) In the first of 

them, in 1970, Undersecretary of Defense David Packard put forth the list 

of initiatives in Table 1. (29:45) 

Table 1: 1970 Packard Initiatives 

Improve the quality of information available from development. 

1) Use more hardware testing. 

2) Establish operational test and evaluation agencies separate from developing commands 

3) Establish the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) within OSD 

to improve the quality of cost estimates during development. 

Enhance program flexibility. 

4) Practice “design-to-cost.” 

5) Account for all “life-cycle costs.” 

6) Strengthen Program Manager (PM) independence and lengthen their 

tenures. 

7) Reduce production concurrency...fly before you buy. 

Restore competition to weapons acquisition. 

8) Reduce risk and stimulate contractor efforts during development. 

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9) Prime-contractor competition through full-scale development to avoid 

developer monopoly at the time the initial production contract is negotiated. 

-- Regulate the OSD’s involvement in acquisition. 

10) Establish a Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). It 

shall meet to approve the start of development (DSARC I), meet again 

to decide on full-scale development (DSARC II), and meets a third 

time to approve the move to production. 

At about the same time, a presidential Blue Ribbon Commission, “The 

Fitzhugh Panel,” released their recommendations and findings from their 

1969 investigation. (29:46) The following recommendations related to the 

acquisition process are in Table 2. (29:47) 

Table 2: 1969 Fitzhugh Commission Recommendations

1) Decentralized Authority: 

Observation: Effective civilian control is impaired by the generally 

excessive centralization of decision-making authority at the level of the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Recommendation: The functions of the Department of Defense should 

be divided into three major groupings: Operations, Resource Management, and Evaluation...Each of these major groups should report to the 

Secretary of Defense through a separate Deputy Secretary. 

2) Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E): 

Observation: OT&E has been too infrequent, poorly designed and executed, and generally inadequate. 

Recommendation: A defense test agency should be created to perform 

the functions of overview of all Defense test and evaluation ... with 

particular emphasis on operational testing, and on systems and equipments which span Service lines. 

3) Career and Professional Development: 

Observation: The promotion and rotation systems of the Military Services do not facilitate career development in the technical and professional activities. 

Recommendation: Specialist career should be established for officers 

in such staff, technical and professional fields as research, development, intelligence, communications, automatic data processing and procurement...the duration of assignments for officers should be increased, and should be as responsive to the requirements of the job as 

to the career plan of the officer. 

4) Research and Development: 

Recommendation: A new development policy for weapons systems and 

other hardware should be formulated and promulgated to cause a reduction of technical risks through demonstrated hardware before full-scale 

7
development, and to provide the needed flexibility in acquisition strategies. 

5) Program and Project Management 

Recommendation: The effectiveness of program or project management should be improved by: 

a) Establishing a career specialty code for program managers in each 

Military Service and developing selection and training criteria 

that will ensure the availability of an adequate number of qualified officers. The criteria should emphasize achieving a reasonable balance between the needs for knowledge of operational requirements and experience in management; 

b) Increasing the use of trained civilian personnel as program managers; 

c) Providing authority commensurate with the assigned responsibility and more direct reporting lines for program managers, particularly those operating in matrix organizational arrangements; and 

d) Giving the program manager directive authority, subject to applicable laws and regulations, over the contracting officer, and clarifying the fact that the contract auditor acts in an advisory role. 

The final installment to the first group of acquisition process investigations was the Commission on Government Procurement. (29:48) Their 

findings, published in 1972, contained the recommendations presented in 

Table 3. (29:49) 

Table 3: 1972 Commission on Government Procurement

1) General Procurement Considerations: 

a. Finding: Void in policy leadership and responsibility and a 

fragmented and outmoded statutory base. 

Recommendation: Create the Office of Federal Procurement 

Policy within the Office of Management and Budget. 

b. Finding: The military procurement is governed by the Armed 

Services Procurement Act of 1947, but civilian procurement 

came under the Federal Property and Administrative Services 

act of 1949. There are inconsistencies between the two statutes. 

Recommendation: Enact legislation to eliminate inconsistencies 

c. Finding: There is a burdensome mass and maze of regulations 

Recommendation: Establish a system of government-wide coordinated and uniform procurement regulations under the direction of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. 

2) Research and Development Acquisition: 

a. Recommendation: Emphasis should be placed on basic, innovative research and the sharing of new ideas among govern8
ment agencies. There should be more cooperative industrygovernment relationship which maximizes the creative energies of U.S. suppliers. 

b. Finding: In cost allowability principles, the independent research and development (IR&D) and bid and proposal (B&P) 

expenditures are in the nation’s best interest to promote competition, to advance technology, and to foster economic 

growth 

Recommendation: Establish a policy recognizing IR&D and 

B&P efforts as necessary costs of doing business. 

3) Acquisition of Major Systems: 

a. Finding: Too often the focus has been on the system product 

and not on its purpose...adequate attention [not given] to why 

and what new level of capability is needed. 

Recommendation: Start new system acquisition programs with 

agency head statements of needs and goals. 

b. Finding: Funds spent on development of alternative systems 

serve as insurance against the possibility of a premature and 

potentially costly choice involving only one system. 

Recommendation:

i) Create alternative system candidates; 

ii) Finance the exploration of alternative systems; and 

iii) Maintain competition between contractors exploring alternative systems. 

c. Finding: The cost to maintain competition throughout rises 

substantially. Thus, systems entering production and deployment normally do so under an evolved monopoly situation, 

with only a single system and contractor to meet the need. 

Recommendation: Procuring agencies and Congress should 

withhold approval for full production and use of new systems 

until the need has been reconfirmed and system performance 

has been tested and evaluated in an environment closely approximating the operational conditions. 

d. Recommendation: Alleviate the problem of management layering and excessive staff reviews. 

e. Recommendation: Strengthen each agency’s cost estimating 

capability 

9
Round Two (1981 – 1982): Avoiding Risk 

It would be another 10 years before the next spate of commissions on 

acquisition reforms. News of overpriced hammers and toilet seats, along 

with a number of difficult and failed major acquisition programs in the late 

1970s, gave cause for further investigations and initiatives. (29:53) The 

first of these were a list of initiatives from Secretary of Defense Frank 

Carlucci in 1981, presented in 

Table 4. (29:54) 

Table 4: The Carlucci Initiatives 

1. Acquisition Management Principles. 

• Long-range planning 

• Delegating responsibility, authority and accountability 

• Low-risk evolutionary technology 

• Economic production rates 

• Budgeting realistically 

• Improving readiness and sustainability 

• Strengthening the industrial base 

• Good relations with industry 

2. Pre-planned Product Improvement (P3I). 

This initiative is designed to ensure an evolutionary, lower-risk 

approach to weapon system design in order to reduce unit costs 

and decrease the time needed to field new equipment. 

3. Multiyear Procurement. 

This initiative is designed to reduce the cost of mature, low-risk 

weapon programs already in production by funding economical lot 

buys instead of small, piecemeal, annual buys. 

4. Program Stability. 

This initiative is designed to increase the stability of weapon system acquisition by adequately funding Research and Development 

(R&D) and procurement in order to maintain the established baseline schedule and reduce cost growth. 

5. Capital Investment. 

10
This initiative encourages, through a variety of mechanisms, capital investment by DoD contractors to increase their productivity. 

6. Budget to Most Likely Cost. 

This initiative is designed to achieve realistic defense acquisition 

budgets, reduce apparent cost growth in weapon systems, and 

achieve greater program stability. 

7. Economic (Stable) Production Rates. 

This initiative involves buying weapon systems at a rate that assures economical production and reduces unit costs. 

8. Appropriate Contract Type. 

This initiative balances program needs and cost savings with a realistic assessment of contractor and government risk by insuring 

the use of the appropriate contract type. 

9. System Support and Readiness. 

This initiative involves establishing readiness objectives for each 

weapons development program and then designing in reliability 

and maintainability. 

10. Reduced Administrative Costs. 

This initiative reduces the administrative cost and time for procuring items by raising the dollar limit on purchase order contracts 

and cutting unneeded paperwork. 

11. Technological Risk Funding. 

This initiative provides for evaluating, quantifying, and budgeting 

for technological risk. 

12. Test Hardware Funding. 

This initiative requires that adequate test hardware be obtained to 

reduce overall schedule time and risks. 

13. Acquisition Legislation. 

This initiative calls for a review of acquisition-related laws and 

regulations to identify and change those which are an unnecessary 

burden on the DoD acquisition process. 

14. Reduced Number of DoD Directives and Eliminate Non CostEffective Contract Requirements. 

This initiative requires a reduction in the number of DoD acquisition directives and the amount of contract documentation, and non 

cost-effective contract requirements. 

15. Funding Flexibility. 

This initiative involves obtaining legislative authority to transfer 

funds from procurement to R&D for an individual weapon system 

without the prior approval of Congress. 

11
16. Contractor Incentives for Reliability and Support. 

This initiative requires that incentives be developed to encourage 

contractors to improve reliability and support. 

17. Decreased Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 

(DSARC) data.This initiative requires that DSARC briefing and data requirements be reduced. 

18. Budgeting for Inflation. 

This initiative requires that weapon system budgets be prepared 

using realistic forecasts of inflation. 

19. Forecasting the Business Base. 

This initiative entails maintaining a data exchange covering business base conditions at major defense plants for use by the Services in planning and budgeting. 

20. Improved Source Selection Process. 

This initiative places added emphasis on contractors' past performance, schedule realism, facilitization plans, and cost credibility. It requires that a system be established for documenting and 

sharing information on contractor performance. 

21. Standardization of Operational and Support Systems. 

This initiative requires the development and use of standard operational and support systems to achieve earlier deployment and better support of weapon systems. The benefits are increased force 

readiness and support. 

22. Design to Cost Contract Incentives. 

This initiative requires that DoD provide appropriate incentives to 

industry by tying award fees to actual costs achieved during early 

production runs. 

23. Implementation of the Acquisition Improvement Program. 

This initiative assigns overall responsibility to the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Research and Engineering) (USDRE) to assure that 

the Acquisition Improvement Program is implemented. 

24. Decision Milestones. 

This initiative requires that Department of Defense Directive 

5000.1 and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 be revised 

to reflect a reduction in the number of DSARC milestones. 

25. Mission Essential Needs Statement (MENS). 

This initiative links the acquisition and Planning, Programming 

and Budgeting System (PPBS) processes by requiring the MENS to 

be submitted with the Service Program Objective Memorandum 

(POM). 

12
26. DSARC Membership. 

This initiative adds the appropriate Service Secretary or Service 

Chief to DSARC membership. 

27. Acquisition Executive. 

This initiative retains USDRE as the Defense Acquisition Executive. 

28. DSARC System Criteria. 

This initiative increases the criterion for DSARC review to ~200M 

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and ~1B 

procurement in FY 1980 dollars. 

29. DSARC/PPBS Integration. 

This initiative links the DSARC and the PPBS processes. 

30. Program Manager Control Over Logistics and Support Funds. 

This initiative requires that logistics and support resources be 

shown in the Service POM by weapon system, and program managers to be given more control of support resources. 

31. Improved Reliability and Support. 

This initiative involves improving reliability and support for shortened acquisition cycle programs. 

32. Competition. 

This initiative is designed to enhance competition in the acquisition process in order to reduce cost. 

The following year, 1982, President Reagan assembled the President’s 

Private Sector Survey on Cost Controls (PPSSCC), “The Grace Commission,” in order to “identify opportunities for increased efficiency and reduced costs achievable by executive action or legislation.” (29:54) The 

commission’s recommendations are presented in Table 5. (29:55) 

Table 5: 1982 Grace Commission Recommendations

1. Improved Organization. 

Observation: Massive duplication of effort among the services and 

OSD 

Recommendation: Total consolidation of day-to-day acquisition 

functions at the OSD level. 

2. Defense Contract Administration Consolidation. 

Observation: Wide variations in the procedures between the Defense Contract Administration Service...and the various related 

components at the service level. 

13
Recommendation: Consolidate all contract administration at the 

OSD-level. 

3. Regulatory Constraints. 

Observation: The Department of Defense acquisition of weapons 

systems operates under a complex regulatory system 

Recommendation: Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) should 

be replaced with general guidelines for DoD procurement actions. 

4. Independent Research and Development Costs. 

Observation: The DoD reimbursement policy for independent research and development (IR&D) costs involves an elaborate and 

time-consuming technical review process. 

Recommendation: Eliminate technical review and group IR&D 

under overhead costs. 

5. Department of Defense Laboratories. 

Recommendation: Improve data exchanges...reduce duplication, 

and DoD laboratories should phase out their involvement in the 

late stages of the development cycle. 

6. Common Parts and Standards. 

Recommendation: Use standardized parts in weapons systems and 

decrease the use of military specifications. 

7. Major Weapons System New Starts. 

Recommendation: Limit the number of new weapons programs 

started each year and impose stricter entry requirements for new 

systems. 

8. Estimating Weapons systems Costs. 

Recommendation: Establish procedures to ensure more accurate 

estimates of weapons cost in order to permit better planning and 

reduce cost overruns. 

9. Instability of the Weapons Acquisition Process. 

Recommendation: The DoD should commit to a stable 5-year 

spending plan for the acquisition of weapons systems at economical production rates. 

10. Transfer of Consumable Inventory Items. 

Observation: DLA has proven its ability to manage successfully 

consumable items with statistically superior results over services. 

Recommendation: Of the 1.2 million inventories being managed by 

the Services, 900,000 should be transferred to DLA. 

11. Implementation of OMB Circular A-76. 

14
Recommendation: Remove various legislative requirements that 

serve to restrict DoD’s implementation of the A-76 program. 

Thereby outsource commercial functions. 

These preceding two lists of recommendations and ensuing reforms 

constituted the second generation of acquisition reforms. Their unifying 

theme was to prevent embarrassing mistakes associated with fraud, waste, 

and abuse. (23:74; 24:14) 

Round Three (1985 – 1997): Acquisition Streamlining 

In 1985, in preparation for the legislation that would become the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, former Secretary of Defense David Packard headed a Blue Ribbon Panel, “The Packard Commission,” whose charter was to review defense management and organizational structure. 

(29:56) The Packard Commission recommendations are presented in 

Table 6. (29:57) 

Table 6: 1985 Packard Commission Recommendations 

Acquisition Organization and Procedures 

1. Create the position of (USD (A)) as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). 

2. Services should have similar executives. They will act as Service 

Acquisition Executives (SAE). 

3. The SAE appoints PEOs, each responsible for a set number of acquisition programs. 

4. PMs are responsible to the respective PEO and report only to him 

on program matters. 

5. All federal statues governing procurement be recoded into a single 

procurement statute. 

6. Business-related education/experience criteria for senior-level acquisition personnel. 

15
7. Establish the Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB) 

co-chaired by the CJCS and the USD(A) to define requirements 

and select programs for development. 

8. Use a greater number of “off the shelf” items. 

9. Increase use of prototypes. 

10. Operational testing should be completed prior to high-rate production. 

11. Increase use of commercial-style competition. 

12. DoD should fully institutionalize “baselining.” 

13. Greater use of multi-year procurement. 

14. Reduce requirements for data rights. 

Government-Industry Accountability 

1. Aggressively enforce federal civil and criminal laws governing defense acquisition. 

2. Defense contractors should promulgate and vigilantly enforce codes 

of ethics and develop internal controls to monitor themselves. 

3. DoD should develop specific ethics guidance on matters of DoD acquisition and train personnel on such matters. 

4. Oversight of defense contractors must be better coordinated among 

the various DoD agencies. 

5. USD(A) should establish audit policies and foster contractor selfgovernance. 

Former Packard Commission member and Secretary of Defense William Perry initiated a “Mandate for Change” in the mid-1990s. His Oversight and Review Process Action Team made the recommendations presented in Table 7 for streamlining the acquisition process. (29:74) 

Table 7: 1994 Oversight and Review Process Action Team

1. Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it. 

1) The quality of the products being fielded 

2) How quickly new capabilities become available 

2. Demand accountability by matching managerial authority with responsibility. 

1) The clarity of such role definition 

2) The ability of personnel to play their role without external interference 

3) Whether decisions are made at the lowest level possible 

3. Promote flexibility and encourage innovation. 

4. Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder. 

5. Actively promote program stability. 

16
6. Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs. 

7. Emulate the best practices of successful commercial companies 

and successful government ventures. 

1) Clear command channels that is a short, unambiguous chainof-command to the decision maker 

2) Stability in performance demanded, schedule and funding 

3) Limited reporting requirements 

4) Small, high-quality staff to manage the program rather than 

sell it or defend it 

5) Greater communication with users throughout the lifecycle of 

the system 

6) Greater use of prototyping and testing 

8. Preserve the public trust. 

In 1996 RAND analyzed a major defense acquisition program from 

each Service based on ten of their own derived criteria for program process health. The study declined to analyze each program individually; 

rather it awarded composite grades in each criterion and noted trends 

across the three programs. The key observations of concern in the study’s 

findings were (8:xxi) 

1. Program funding was unstable. Program managers spent more 

time defending their programs rather than managing them. 

2. Program schedules were budget-driven, a powerful disincentive for attracting talent managers. 

3. Risk management philosophies and practices were disparate, an 

indicator of weak emphasis at top managerial levels. 

RAND’s criteria are presented in Table 8. (8:16) 

Table 8: RAND’s Ten Criteria for Evaluating Acquisition Program Management and Oversight Processes within the Department of 

Defense 

1. Lines of authority have been established and are clear. Defense Management Review issues and/or problems must not cause confusion, 

bickering, or a diminution of Program Manager (PM) responsibility and 

accountability. 

2. Communication is open (no secrets – all information is divulged; using 

all media and avenues, e.g., e-mail, written, verbal) and continuous at 

and between all levels of authority. 

17
3. Cost/Schedule Control System, Cost Performance Measurement, and 

other management reports are used as indicators of trends in program 

progress and for reporting program status. 

4. Risk-management techniques have been implemented. 

5. Program stability has been achieved through control of requirements. 

6. A strong government-industry support team (Program Office, functional support, Defense Plant Representative Offices [DPROs]) is present and has explicit mechanisms for coordinating responsibilities. 

7. Incentives for the Program Manager are adequate and positive. 

8. Funding is stable and adequate. 

9. Selection of best-qualified personnel for key acquisition-management 

positions is objective and regulated 

10. Security requirements do not restrict adequate and sufficient management. 

Round Four (2001 – Present): Transformation 

Finally, in this decade Undersecretary for Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)] Pete Aldridge issued five goals in 

support of “Acquisition Excellence.” (24:17) 

Table 9: Aldridge’s Five Goals in Support of Acquisition Excellence 

1. Achieve credibility and effectiveness in the acquisition and logistics 

support process. 

2. Revitalize the quality and morale of the DoD (AT&L) acquisition 

workforce. 

3. Improve the health of the defense industrial base. 

4. Rationalize the weapon systems and infrastructure with defense strategy. 

5. Initiate high-leverage technologies to create the warfighting capabilities, systems, and strategies of the future. 

And within the Air Force, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Marvin Sambur issued a series of his own initiatives 

in keeping with Air Force transformation. (2:4, 58-108) 

Table 10: SAF/AQ Marvin Sambur’s Air Force Acquisition Transformation Initiatives 

• Challenge Over-Restrictive implementation of the Law and “ZeroBased” perspective. 

All programs start with a “zero-based” perspective. All activities, 

reports, plans, coordination or reviews except those mandated by statute or previously approved by a person in the execution chain, must 

18
buy their way into the program by demonstrating that the benefit 

gained clearly equals or outweighs the resources expended (p. 58) 

• Shift from avoiding risk. 

Success in meeting our objective requires a shift from avoiding risk 

to managing it, and sometimes, simply accepting it. Taking risks will 

sometimes produce failure. That is acceptable as long as those in the 

execution chain understood the risks and we learn from the failure. (p. 

64) 

• Operational urgency. 

The primary mission of our acquisition system is to rapidly deliver 

to the warfighter affordable, sustainable capability... Speed is important. In devising and implementing acquisition approaches, the concept 

of time or schedule as an independent variable is one that must override prior concepts of delivering the ultimate capability at whatever 

cost and schedule is necessary to do so. Every key decision must have 

an operational sense of urgency. (p.74) 

• Credibility. 

Credibility is essential. We must create and maintain realistic expectations. PMs must continually manage expectations so that senior 

acquisition and warfighter leadership are never surprised by sudden 

cost growth or schedule slippages. Each program must have a clear, 

unambiguous set of priorities among cost, schedule, performance and 

supportability. Normally, the senior leadership of the requiring MAJCOM should set these priorities as part of the initial requirement. (p. 

84) 

• Full teaming. 

Teaming among warfighters, developers/acquirers, technologists, 

testers, budgeters and sustainers must begin when the requirements are 

being defined, not after. PMs, through the MDA, are responsible for 

making decisions and leading implementation of programs, and are accountable for results. The PM, as the accountable agent for executing 

the program, has a responsibility to seek resolution if asked to do 

something that goes counter with meeting the Commander’s Intent. (p. 

94) 

• Staffs are advisors. 

Staffs at all levels exist to advise the MDA and PM and assist them 

with their responsibilities. Councils, committees, advisory groups, panels and staffs are advisors at the discretion of the PM, PEO, DAC or 

MDA. The MDA, PEO or DAC, and PM are accountable for the overall program results. Those not accountable for the program outcome 

are expected to provide program inputs to the program decision process, but do not have decision-making authority. (p. 100) 

• Solid systems engineering. 

19
Solid systems engineering is required at the outset of a program to 

ensure a robust foundation and flexible architecture that can accommodate future requirements with minimal redesign. (p. 108) 

To date, the DoD 5000 series instructions for acquisition have been revised and coordinated, with a similarly revised CJCS 3710 series instructions. Together, they are the defense acquisition system and the Joint 

Concept Integration and Development System, and they form the body of 

instruction for defense modernization. DoD Instruction 5000.2-R, a prescriptive and regulatory guide book on acquisition procedures, was rescinded in lieu of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which made the 

procedures only advisory in nature. (2:23) 

Summary of Acquisition Reform Efforts 

Since 1969, DoD Acquisition has gone through four generations of acquisition reform to contain costs, impose quality controls, improve efficiency through streamlining, and maintain responsiveness as DoD undergoes transformation. The reviews and initiatives offer conflicting, but often reinforcing, findings about the acquisition process. On the one hand, 

the repeated findings are evidence of tenaciously insoluble problems with 

the process; on the other hand, they give insight into consistent and enduring themes, fodder for a body of principles. The scope and level of findings varied widely, and the truly profound ones suffered for attention 

amidst the clutter. The warfighting analog offers dividends. Acquisition is 

an extension of policy, and strata for acquisition (strategic, operational, 

and tactical levels) serve to de-confound narrow prescriptive findings from 

broader more general ones. Important themes, repeatedly manifest were 

• More power and autonomy needed for program managers to execute 

the strategy 

• Longer tours/less turnover needed for program office personnel 

• The need for fewer levels of management and fewer audits and reviews 

• The need for stable funding and realistic budgets, properly padded to 

program risk 

• The need for fewer laws and directives, more general guidance 

• The need to return program managers to the job of management instead of program advocacy 

• An emphasis on avoiding risk instead of managing it 

• The importance of the industrial base as a factor affecting force modernization 

• The growing need to meet requirements in a timely manner 

20
Around 1997, former Lockheed-Martin CEO Norman Augustine presented a tongue-in-cheek version of his laws for acquisition program management. They offer a canny view of the process from a contractor’s perspective as well as a good indication of the effectiveness of prescriptive 

efforts of acquisition reform up to then. Augustine’s observations are presented in Table 11. 

Table 11: Augustine’s Checklist for an Acquisition Adventure 

 Settle for less than the best people – Reduce payroll costs 

 Build an adversarial relationship between buyer and seller 

 Change management frequently – Provide opportunities 

 Avoid evolutionary growth to new capabilities – Take grand leaps 

 Continually revise schedule and funding – Generate excitement 

 Include all features anyone wants – Make everybody happy 

 Allow no margins in funding, schedule or technical approach – Nothing 

will go wrong 

 Divide management responsibility among several individuals – Two 

heads are better than one 

 Whenever difficult problems are encountered, start all over with a new 

approach having no (known) problems 

 Promote continued debate over goals throughout the life of the project 

– Variety is the spice of life 

 Give reliability low priority – Especially avoid redundancy 

 Develop underlying technology and end-product concurrently 

 Do not plan intermediate test milestones – Just one glorious display 

 Create as many interfaces as possible – Help people get to know each 

other 

 Focus on the big picture – The details will take care of themselves 

 Disregard seller’s track record – The law of averages will work out 

 Cut costs by reducing testing – Especially environmental and fullsystem testing 

 Ignore the users – They don’t understand high-tech 

 Choose among the sellers based on what they promise – Nobody likes a 

pessimist 

 Get a head-start on work prior to finalizing goals, schedule and cost – 

This is especially true for software – which is easy to change 

 Share authority for project direction with staff advisors 

 Eliminate independent checks and balances – They just create friction 

 Don’t compete potential suppliers at the outset – Pick a friend 

 Once underway, continue to compete selected supplier with outsiders – 

Change as often as possible to assure “Freshness” 

 Minimize managers’ latitude for judgment – Rely on regulations 

 Deal harshly with anyone surfacing problems – One can’t afford troublemakers 

 Never delegate – Hold authority at the top where people really know 

what’s going on 

 Maximize individual incentives – Teamwork is just the sum of the parts 

21
 Make up for schedule slips by overlapping design and build – Especially when test results are disappointing 

 Include at least as many auditors on the project as workers – Reviews 

give everyone a chance to participate 

 Do all possible to minimize profits of participating contractors – Save 

the money 

 Don’t waste time communicating (especially face-to-face) – It just 

takes time; and time is money 

 Eschew strong systems engineering – It complicates decision-making 

 Delay establishing configuration control until the last minute – Reduce 

the cost of management 

 Always pick the low bidder – They must know something special and 

are often courageous 

 Don’t worry about the form of the contract – Just enforce it

22
Principles of Warfare 

[D]octrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs, warfighting 

principles, and terminology that describes and guides the proper use of 

... forces in military operations. (1:ix) 

Doctrine is the best way to do things... all things being equal 

1. All things are NEVER equal 

2. You NEVER know what things aren’t equal 

3. The same things are NEVER equal 

 LtGen Michael Short, JFACC, Operation ALLIED FORCE 

At the core of any basic doctrine document, principles of warfare exist 

to serve as a guide to formulating warfighting strategy. Doctrine contains 

the accumulated lessons from experience in a discipline and puts forth the 

most effective methods for success. It describes how to achieve an objective, but it doesn’t prescribe which objectives to achieve. Doctrine applies 

to disciplines not governed by definitive deterministic laws; they offer the 

70-90% solution. As such, they are not directive or binding in nature. 

Decision-makers should neither blithely ignore doctrine, nor follow its 

dictates by wrote without an understanding of the peculiarities of their 

own situations. Doctrinal proposals originate from observation and experience, and scientific method refines it into theory. Once doctrine is 

published and applied, constant feedback from operational experience 

serves to update it. (1:87) 

Principles are the enduring characteristics of successful combat operations and form the foundation of warfighting doctrine. (41:2-4) They indicate the dimensions of conflict considered universally true and relevant. 

(1:19) The US Army first listed its original nine principles of war in 1921 

and has refined them with the experience of 20th century conflicts. Today, 

all of the service and the joint doctrine documents acknowledge these 

principles. (41:21) The current principles are listed on the following page, 

and definitions of these principles are in 

23
Appendix B 

 Expanded Principles of War 

• Objective

• Unity of Command 

• Offense 

• Mass 

• Maneuver 

• Economy of Force 

• Security 

• Surprise 

• Simplicity 

Candidate Principles for Force Modernization 

This section lists and defines candidate force modernization principles 

in order to vet them against the lessons of hard experience in force modernization. It distills the previous lists of initiatives, findings, and recommendations into a draft list of principles for modernization, intended as a 

keystone for building a basic modernization doctrine. Like the principles 

of war, these principles may or may not work together in congruence; the 

demands of some may constrain or oppose the demands of others. Every 

modernization program is unique; therefore, the appropriate weight to give 

towards pursuit of any one principle will vary from program to program. 

Achieving the right balance requires judgment and mastery, not a rigid 

algorithm. Hence, modernization, like warfighting, is as much an art as a 

science. 

The earlier review of acquisition reform yielded 135 different findings 

and initiatives. Ten major themes emerged as candidate principles. They 

were germane to the findings and initiatives, and they showed up on numerous occasions across the range of panels, commissions, and Secretaries’ initiatives. 

1. Objective: The unifying focus behind any modernization effort. All 

subordinate tasks must be consonant with the overall objective of a 

modernization effort, and any modernization effort’s goals must be 

consonant with the objectives of the concept of operations to which it 

is linked. In this context, Objective refers to system performance, the 

operational effectiveness and suitability of the product system, and its 

linkage to higher strategic objectives. 

2. Simplicity of Command: Modernization’s corollary to the warfighting 

principle of Unity of Command/Effort. Beyond unity, Simplicity of 

24
Command requires as short a chain of command and as short a line of 

communication as possible between program managers and decisionmakers. It also exclusively associates authority and responsibility. As 

in battlefield operations, it enables a more agile tempo and therefore 

mitigates vulnerability to external perturbations such as funding instability. It is a necessary condition for program stability and responsiveness. 

3. Tempo: To remain viable, a program must be more dynamic than the 

events driving it, at the tactical level (contract changes, technical developments), the operational level (budget turbulence, schedule 

changes), and at the strategic level (mission changes, new priorities). 

Tempo includes those items affecting program agility, flexibility and 

responsiveness, the speed and effectiveness of its OODA cycle. 

4. Risk Management: The very objective and the underlying method of 

force modernization. Modernization programs are undertaken in order 

to mitigate an unacceptable risk to warfighters and/or national security, 

and the elements of modernization strategy: analysis, prototyping & 

testing, competition, tracking & reporting are all in place to manage 

(identify, track and mitigate) risks to program objectives of cost, 

schedule and performance. Residual risk inevitably requires insurance 

in the form of a commensurate management reserve. 

5. Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution: Centralized Control is 

traceability and linkage of disparate efforts back to the over-arching 

objective. It includes direction (policy, commands, decisions, approval and funding) as well as feedback (reporting, reviews, audits, 

evaluations and inquiries). Centralized Control is necessary to some 

degree to focus and organize efforts. Decentralized Execution prescribes execution at the point of action, at the lowest level appropriate. 

It gives robustness and agility to execution. 

6. Economy of Effort: Keeping the scope of the organization and process 

for a modernization effort to the minimum sufficient for the objective. 

Economy of Effort has its basis in the KISS (Keep It Simple...) principle. It includes conservation of manpower, man-hours, funds, or any 

critical finite resource. It also recognizes the risk, due to complexity, 

of losing focus on the objective and loss of responsiveness when programs and processes grow unnecessarily large or lengthy. 

7. Stable Program Inputs: The need for requirements, funds, schedule and 

personnel turnover to be stable if a program is to operate efficiently 

25
and effectively. It also recognizes realistic cost estimates, technology 

maturity and a robust industrial base as necessary preconditions. 

8. Initiative: The modernization process’ corollary to the warfighting 

principle of Offense. It dictates being proactive, anticipating and responding in advance of challenges, at all levels, and using creativity 

and innovation where necessary. To maintain an optimum tempo, a 

program requires momentum. Initiative is the means by which program leadership maintains and controls that momentum. 

9. Workforce Quality & Credibility: The lubricant of the entire modernization process and machinery. People, expectations and agreements 

must all have credibility in order to maintain an optimum tempo while 

containing risk. Without trust, processes stall while parties pursue 

bona fides and formal contracts. The most effective programs have all 

run on informal communications and arrangements made possible with 

credibility. 

10. Synergy & Synchronization: Synergy is the tight integration of interdisciplinary and inter-organizational teams toward a unifying objective, the antithesis of stove-piping. It requires rapid communication 

and coordination among all stake-holding communities involved in a 

modernization effort, and in turn enables (i.e. it’s necessary but not 

sufficient for) the remaining principles. Where synergy is coordination 

across disciplines, synchronization is coordination across processes. 

While any modernization process is ideally event-driven, interfaces 

with the modernization process may be calendar-driven (Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting and Execution System) or subject to their 

own event-driven sequence (CONOPS Development). To be most effective, a modernization strategy should plan ahead for times to make 

required inputs or receive necessary outputs of those interfacing systems. 

The frequency of occurrence of these principles across the findings 

and initiatives from the presidential and congressional panels and secretariat initiatives is presented in Table 12. 

26
Table 12: Acquisition Reform Findings/Initiatives and Principles 

Correlation 

ObjectiveSimplicity of CommandTempoRisk ManagementCentralized Control/Decentralized ExecutionEconomy of EffortStable Program InputsInitiativeWorkforce Quality & CredibilitySynergy & Synchronization

Packard Initiatives 1 5223 1

Fitzhugh Commission Recommendations 2 2 1 2 3

Commission on Government Procurement 1 1 2 1 6 1 2 1

Carlucci Initiatives 6 1 4 7 3 13 10 2 4 4

Grace Commission Recommendations 1 2 5 4 3

Packard Commission Recommendations 3 1 1 4 4 4 4 2

Oversight and Review Process Action Team 3 2 2 1 2 4 2 1 2 2

RAND's 10 Criteria 22 2112 22

USD (AT&L) 5 Goals 1 2 1 2

SAF/AQ Initiatives 1 1 2 1 1 1 1

19 9 12 24 14 36 26 6 18 16

Among the candidate principles, Economy of Effort, Stable Program 

Inputs, and Risk Management (Avoidance) received the most attention in 

acquisition reform investigations and initiatives. The candidate principles 

of Objective, Workforce Quality & Credibility, Synergy & Synchronization, and Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution all appeared very 

frequently. The candidate principles of Tempo, Simplicity of Command, 

and Initiative also appeared on occasion. None showed a bias in time in 

that no particular principle’s appearance tapered off or gained in frequency 

with respect to the time of the findings. These results do not guarantee 

sufficiency. A candidate principle, neither visible to senior investigators 

nor overwhelmingly affecting them, would likely escape attention but 

rather manifest at other echelons of management. Just as victors write the 

history books, senior leaders write the findings and initiatives. 

The Candidate Principles Applied to Recent Programs 

These candidate principles should be decisive factors in the success, 

troubled nature, or outright failure of modernization efforts. The scope of 

this section is to look at six major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) 

started within the last 30 years. The first two programs are ones widely 

considered successful if not exemplary. The next two programs are ones 

27
surviving to date but considered troubled in terms of cost and schedule. 

The final two programs were terminated after considerable investment. In 

each case, program circumstances are compared with the list of candidate 

principles to see if they are applicable. Where a candidate principle is a 

factor in a program history narrative, that principle appears in brackets. If 

a program is found to have been deficient in observing that principle, a 

minus sign appears in parentheses next to the principle in brackets. In the 

summary tables, 

• “+” indicates the program was found to have observed a candidate 

principle 

• “-“ indicates the program failed to appropriately observe a candidate 

principle 

• “+/-“ indicates the program both observed and violated the principle at 

different times 

• A blank cell indicates that the program’s observance or violation of a 

principle was not evident from its case history 

The Good: Exemplary Acquisition Programs 

The ones [indicators] we settled on as being most indicative of problems in the program was the acquisition cycle, the length of time from 

the beginning of full scale development, to the fielding of the system, 

to establishment of initial operating capability. On a typical defense 

program, that takes 8, 10, or 12 years, somewhere in that range. On the 

truly well run, most excellent programs we looked at, that was done in 

4 or 5 years.

Dr. William Perry, testimony before Congress, 1985 (55:34-37) 

F-117 Nighthawk. The F-117 Nighthawk is a low-observable light 

bomber/attack airplane. It had its genesis in 1976. Following a successful 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) investigation into radar signature suppression, HAVE BLUE began as a technology demonstration of 

an experimental jet aircraft applying those signature suppression methods. 

[Stable Program Input] Even as testing was underway, the contractor began designing the F-117, based on lessons learned from building the two 

demonstrators. [Risk Management] With the success of HAVE BLUE, 

the F-117 development program initiated with Engineering Manufacturing 

Development (EMD) in 1978, and the first lot was delivered to the Air 

Force in 1982, four years from the establishment of a requirement. (8:8-

10) [Tempo] Development on the F-117 continued after fielding; the efforts centered mainly on reliability and maintenance of the low radar signature [Objective(-)], but the aircraft fielded successfully with a total of 13 

28
months schedule slippage. (8:9) Despite its technological novelty, the F117 acquisition cost was only 3% above initial estimates. (8:41) [Stable 

Program Input] [Economy of Effort] Eleven years from contract award, 

the USAF had successfully employed the F-117 in air combat operations. 

[Objective] 

RAND’s analysis of the F-117 acquisition program derived the following findings: (8:47-43) 

x A narrow mission with a limited number of performance requirements 

[Objective] [Economy of Effort] 

x Flexibility and responsiveness in decision-making [Initiative] 

x Program manager latitude on making cost, schedule and performance 

trades [Simplicity of Command] 

x An exceptionally small, handpicked program staff (36 people) with 

great autonomy [Workforce Quality & Credibility] 

x Stable requirements due to security and limited insight among staffs 

with divergent interests 

x Stable support from DoD and USAF executives [Stable Program Inputs] 

x Delegation of authority to lowest levels practicable [Decentralized 

Execution] 

x Tolerance for risk/ waiver of numerous controls [Risk Management] 

x Significant trust between agencies involved as well as between the 

government and the contractor [Synergy] 

x Inadequate consideration to reliability and maintainability of the radar 

absorbing materials [Objective (-)] 

These findings, related to the success of the F-117 acquisition program, as they related to the candidate principles are summarized in Table 

13: 

Table 13: Candidate Principles as Factors in the F-117 Program 

+/- Objective 

+ Simplicity of Command 

+ Tempo 

+ Risk Management 

+ Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution

+ Economy of Effort 

+ Stable Program Inputs 

+ Initiative 

+ Workforce Quality & Credibility 

+ Synergy & Synchronization 

29
 RQ-1A Predator ACTD. The RQ-1A, a remotely piloted/remotely 

operated reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), had its inception 

in 1993 when the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated 

a requirement for a medium altitude endurance UAV and incorporation it 

into a pilot program for Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

(ACTD). (56:11) The objective of ACTDs is to shorten the time for fielding ripe and useful technologies. [Stable Program Inputs] [Tempo] The 

ACTD concept is to match maturing technologies with warfighter needs 

and to evaluate prototypes in actual operations over a 30-month trial. 

[Synergy] Concepts with operational utility enter the acquisition process 

at the appropriate point and the prototypes are left with the warfighters. 

The prototype first flew in 1994, and the UAVs were operating over Bosnia by 1995. The ACTD completed in 1996, with Predator UAVs flying 

in operations in Bosnia. [Tempo] DoD transitioned the RQ-1A into formal acquisition that year, and the US Air Force began taking deliveries of 

an upgraded RQ-1B in August 1997—less than five years from program 

start. The transition had some issues. The Air Force was designated as 

the lead agency for transition late in the ACTD. Being that it was originally a demonstration, foundational documentation such as an Operational 

Requirements Document, a Logistics Support Analysis, and a Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan had to be developed in parallel with EMD. [Risk 

Management] Nevertheless, the system fielded on schedule, with only a 

6% cost overrun. (56:45) [Stable Program Input] [Economy of Effort] 

A RAND study of the program made the following findings: (56:78) 

x “Flexibility and creativity were key to the success of the Predator 

ACTD.... (1) An emphasis on informal communication and (2) Limited CDRL (Contract Data Requirements List) items.” (56:55) [Economy of Effort] [Decentralized Execution] 

x “Given the necessarily fast pace of the ACTD process, confident, effective, and innovative individuals are critical to the success of a program.” [Workforce Quality & Credibility] 

x Requirements analysis and logistics planning need to start as soon as 

there are inklings that the demonstration will transition to a formal acquisition. [Tempo (-)] 

x ACTDs operate differently due to fast pace, small staffs, and limited 

guidance. [Tempo] 

x The ACTD used a nonbinding CONOPS rather than formal requirements in assessing performance. [Initiative] 

30
x “The small size of the government and contractor teams of the Predator ACTD required an integrated team approach, which is founded on 

mutual trust, limited documentation, and novel management techniques. (56:32) [Synergy] [Credibility] [Economy] [Initiative] 

x Success—in part, due to stability of funding [Stable Program Inputs] 

x The need for reliability and maintainability goals [Objective (-)] 

x The need for a life cycle cost estimate [Economy of Effort (-)] 

These findings, as they related to the candidate principles are summarized 

in Table 14. 

Table 14: Candidate Principles as Factors in the RQ-1Program 

- Objective 

Simplicity of Command 

+/- Tempo 

+ Risk Management 

+ Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution

+/- Economy of Effort 

+ Stable Program Inputs 

+ Initiative 

+ Workforce Quality & Credibility 

+ Synergy & Synchronization 

The Bad: Troubled (but Surviving) Acquisition Programs 

The next programs under review are characterized as troubled—

experiencing cost and/or schedule overruns well in excess of the NunnMcCurdy limits of 25%. The purpose of this analysis is to determine any 

correlation between principles and program troubles and survival. 

F-22 Raptor. The F-22 Raptor is the air superiority fighter currently 

being fielded to succeed the F-15 Eagle. Its beginning was in studies that 

commenced in the late 1970s, culminating with USAF requirements developed for the Advanced Tactical Fighter Program in 1981. (19) The 

demonstration and validation phase stretched out as the Air Force subsequently added stealth requirements. [Stable Program Inputs (-)] Lockheed’s YF-22 prototype won a fly-off competition at the end of demonstration/validation in 1991. [Risk Management] [Economy of Effort] 

The original program goals called for a fleet of 750 F-22s, a 1995 IOC 

date, and a total program cost of $80.7 B ($12.6 B for development). 

(4:238) The program experienced numerous technical difficulties in EMD 

31
throughout the early 1990s; finally, Congress imposed spending caps. The 

dynamic changes in the security environment brought questions about the 

value of a fighter being built to counter would-be Soviet fighter threats. 

[Stable Program Inputs (-)] At IOC in December 2005, 10 years after the 

projected IOC (111% schedule overrun) [Tempo (-)], the Air Force plans 

to field 178 (23.7%) of the original 750 aircraft [Objective (-)]; total program cost is congressionally capped at $63.8 B, but USAF spent $28.7 B 

for development (127% overrun). (54:4-5) [Economy of Effort (-)] A 

RAND study made the following findings: (63:57) 

x The need for realistic cost and schedule estimates up front with minor 

adjustments over time [Stable Program Inputs (-)] 

x Stable team structure, proper team expertise, clear lines of responsibility/authority, and a single lead contractor as critical to success [Stability (-)] [Simplicity of Command (-)] 

x The necessity for experience among government and contractor management teams [Quality Workforce (-)] 

x The added risk of developing technology for a baseline design concurrently with manufacturing development [Risk Management (-)] [Stable 

Program Inputs (-)] 

x The utility of planned technology insertion, as technology stabilizes, as 

a risk management tool [Risk Management (-)] [Stable Program Inputs (-)] 

x The need to carefully monitor key leading indicators of design instability [Centralized Control (-)][Risk Management (-)] 

x The need for an appropriate management reserve for flexibility in containing cost growth [Risk Management (-)] [Stable Program Inputs (-

)] 

These findings, with respect to the F-22 program’s difficulties but continued survival, as they related to the candidate principles are summarized 

in Table 15. 

32
Table 15: Candidate Principles as Factors in the F-22 Program 

- Objective 

- Simplicity of Command 

- Tempo 

+/- Risk Management 

Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution

+/- Economy of Effort 

- Stable Program Inputs 

Initiative 

- Workforce Quality & Credibility 

Synergy & Synchronization 

V-22 Osprey. In 1981, following the success of the XV-15 tilt-rotor 

technology demonstration [Risk Management], DoD began the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift (JVX) program to meet the vertical lift requirements of all the services. In 1983 the US Army withdrew as lead for 

the development program (but still committed to procuring the production 

model), and the Department of the Navy assumed program lead. [Stable 

Program Inputs (-)] By 1984, the program goals included delivery of 913 

V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft to the services, with an IOC in 1992. Bell 

and Boeing partnered to bid on the V-22 development. The Navy obliged 

them to accept a fixed-price development contract and to compete against 

one another for production. [Synergy (-)] [Risk Management (-)] Development began in 1986. (48:18) During development, the Army abandoned 

its procurement commitment and, citing cost overruns, then-Secretary of 

Defense Richard Cheney cancelled funding in 1989. [Stable Program Inputs (-)] Congress restored funding for the V-22 to continue as a test program. In 1993, the Clinton administration restored program funding, and a 

re-designed V-22 entered EMD in 1994. (42:3) The Defense Acquisition 

Board (DAB) permitted the program into Low-Rate Initial Production 

(LRIP) in 1997, based on testing of the original design. [Risk Management (-)] LRIP halted after a number of in-flight incidents; two catastrophic accidents revealed design limits not discovered in testing. In 2003, 

after a new round of development testing, the V-22 re-started LRIP. The 

DAB approved Full Rate Production in 2005. Bell and Boeing will build 

458 V-22s for the Marine Corps and for Air Force Special Operations, 

with an IOC in 2007. Unit cost will be $85 M, up from the $24 M per aircraft estimated in 1986 (42:9) [Economy of Effort (-)] When delivered, 

the V-22 will have had a 15-year (200%) schedule overrun and a $26.7 B 

(354%) cost growth. [Tempo (-)] A survey of V-22 program history literature reveals the following highlights: (42:9-13) 

33
x Program stability was chaotic due to widely varying support across 

Defense Secretaries’ tenures [Stable Program Inputs (-)] 

x The initial contract structure inhibited contractor latitude in development [Initiative (-)] 

x The requirement for competition among partners for manufacturing 

poisoned the teaming relationship [Synergy (-)] 

x The program proceeded into production without adequate developmental/operational testing (44:6) [Risk Management (-)] 

x Marine Corps response to operational test failures was to revise requirements [Objective (-)] 

x The V-22 program benefited from constant congressional support 

[Stable Program Input] 

V-22 program lessons, with respect to its difficulties but continued 

survival, as they related to the candidate principles are summarized in 

Table 16. 

Table 16: Candidate Principles as Factors in the V-22 Program 

- Objective 

Simplicity of Command 

- Tempo 

+/- Risk Management 

Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution

- Economy of Effort 

+/- Stable Program Inputs 

- Initiative 

Workforce Quality & Credibility 

- Synergy & Synchronization 

The Downright Ugly: Cancelled Acquisition Programs 

A-12 Avenger II. The A-12 Avenger II was a low-observable, aircraft 

carrier-based attack aircraft intended to succeed the Navy’s A-6. Planners 

envisioned 1,200 aircraft for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, with 

first flight due in 1990. (14:2) The program began in 1983 with Deputy 

Secretary of Defense direction to the Navy to undertake development. 

The Navy did this reluctantly, absent the spare money or technology necessary for such a major effort. To contain cost risk, the Navy bid the development contract as fixed-price. [Risk Management (-)] [Initiative (-)] 

The two contractors with ongoing stealth aircraft development experience, 

Lockheed and Northrop, declined to bid the contract—citing excess risk—

and the Navy awarded the contract to the McDonnell-Douglass/General 

34
Dynamics team, the only responsive bid. Neither had any experience with 

the composites technology necessary for stealthy airframes. [Workforce 

Quality (-)] Following a major program review in 1989 and Secretary of 

Defense testimony before Congress that program performance was 

healthy, the A-12 program office announced an 18-month slip in the date 

of first flight. [Credibility (-)] The ensuing inquiry from OSD staff revealed a program badly broken. Having spent $3 B of the $4.77 B development budget, the aircraft design was 5,000 lb overweight [Objective (-

)], two years behind schedule [Tempo (-)], and $500 M over budget 

[Economy of Effort (-)]. (14:7) Furthermore, Navy program management 

had been aware of this and had not only withheld the information from the 

Secretary of Defense major review but had successfully quashed a DoD 

comptroller memorandum stating the situation. [Credibility (-)] By this 

time, the advocacy had reversed. Amidst a shrinking post-Cold War force, 

the Air Force and the Navy were in a cutthroat roles competition over 

deep strike, and Naval aviation was now committed to the A-12. [Stable 

Program Inputs (-)] In reaction to the findings, key members of the A-12 

acquisition chain of authority were relieved and/or disciplined, and Secretary Cheney ordered the program terminated for cause in 1991. (14:1-5) 

The ensuing litigation between the contractors and DoD revealed 

further misdoings. In order to force a bid within the Navy’s established budget for the program, the Navy had misled the McDonnellDouglass/General Dynamics team and others into believing that the 

contractors were bidding competitively, when in fact they were the 

sole bidders. [Credibility (-)] Although the Navy bid reviewers had 

uncovered a critical error in the team’s weight estimation, the Navy 

neglected to share this with the contractors, fearing that the revised 

bid would be higher. (35) [Credibility (-)] The Navy had not developed stealth technology, but the program depended on it. OSD had 

directed the Air Force to make its low-observables expertise available 

to the program. The Air Force, having assumed all of the previous 

risk and expense of developing stealth, and in fierce competition with 

the Navy for the deep strike role, was reticent to share its data, and 

the contractors had to develop that knowledge by themselves. (35) 

[Synergy (-)] The events of the A-12 program failure as they related 

to the candidate principles are summarized in 

Table 17. 

RAH-66 Comanche. The RAH-66 Comanche was a ReconnaissanceAttack helicopter designed to replace US Army observation helicopters 

and its AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter. The effort began as the Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX) program in 1983. (21) It specified a 

35
fleet of 5,023 single-seat rotorcraft, with ambitious goals for aircraft 

stealth, flight performance, 

Table 17: Candidate Principles as Factors in the A-12 Program 

- Objective 

Simplicity of Command 

Tempo 

- Risk Management 

Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution

- Economy of Effort 

- Stable Program Inputs 

- Initiative 

- Workforce Quality & Credibility 

- Synergy & Synchronization 

targeting and fire control, and communications. (9:1) In 1985, the Army 

determined that singleseat operation was hazardous, and they subsequently specified a crew of 

two. [Stable Program Input (-)] The contractor team won in a “fly-off” 

solely via modeling and simulation. [Risk Management] [Economy of 

Effort] In 1993, facing financial constraints, the US Army cut the buy to 

1,292 aircraft, extended program technical development until 2000, and 

scheduled EMD from 2000 – 2006, with fleet production through 2028. 

[Stable Program Input (-)] [Tempo (-)] During the 17-year technical development, the program underwent five restructurings. (9:5) The avionics 

mission equipment package underwent continual flux, due to evolving 

communications and interface standards [Stable Program Input (-)], while 

the program struggled unsuccessfully to manage airframe weight [Objective (-)]. In 2000 the DAB sent the program into EMD amidst growing 

concern over the validity of the original requirements for this weapon system. Not only was the helicopter designed for an extinct threat but the 

UAV technology, conceived, developed, and fielded during the span of the 

RAH-66 technical development had supplanted the helicopter for tactical 

reconnaissance. [Stable Program Input (-)] [Tempo (-)] The EMD plan 

came under fire for excessive risk taking: going into full-rate production 

before finalizing configuration, making a full rate-production decision before completing operational testing, and continuing avionics technical development during manufacturing development [Risk Management (-)]. 

(9:8) In February 2003 the Army cancelled the program, claiming it no 

longer needed the aircraft and wished to reprogram the money for more 

urgent issues. (36) The lessons of the case history, in that the RAH-66 

36
program ultimately failed, as they related to the candidate principles are 

summarized in Table 18. 

Table 18: Candidate Principles as Factors in the RAH-66 Program 

- Objective 

Simplicity of Command 

- Tempo 

+/- Risk Management 

- Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution

+ Economy of Effort 

- Stable Program Inputs 

Initiative 

Workforce Quality & Credibility 

Synergy & Synchronization 

Analysis of Candidate Principles across the Six Acquisition Program 

Case Studies 

In the review of acquisition program case histories, some new recurring themes stand out. First, the two exemplary programs developed in 

five to six years, and they both had logistics supportability problems early 

in fielding. This implies that time-to-field and thorough logistics supportability work against one another, and that at some point, a manager must 

deliver with the logistics on hand in order to balance against risk due to 

time (i.e., make schedule). Second, informal communications, trust, and a 

sense of esprit-de-corps were common among the two exemplary programs, weak in the two troubled programs, and notably absent in the A-12 

case. This implies that the proportion of formal communications and 

agreements among members of a development team correlates to the degree of artificial trust needed to compensate for genuine rapport and 

should be a leading indicator for senior decision-makers for potential program troubles. Third, on two occasions the Navy required fixed-price development contracts and imposed onerous conditions upon the contractors; 

in both cases the contractors failed to deliver. This implies that short-term 

risk-avoidance is not the same as prudent risk management. The F-117 

development ran the opposite tack, calculatingly assuming risks and giving contractors wide latitude. Finally, the most successful programs had 

the least number of stakeholders and the narrowest operational objectives. 

This implies that too many interests can spoil the program and that start-up 

programs require a gatekeeper who will prevent too many disparate requirements from attaching themselves to a funded development. The F37
117 program’s classification served this function, and the Predator’s highlevel interest and advocacy did likewise for it. 

 LtGen Trey Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, declared himself program manager for major programs under his agency. He 

felt that he needed the weight of a Lieutenant General to fend off the flock 

of narrow but powerful interests threatening to defocus and derail his programs. Coincidentally, joint task force (JTF) commanders leading campaigns are three-star generals and admirals. Thinking of a major defense 

acquisition program as a campaign for national security suggests that its 

campaign commander, the program manager, ought to carry the rank and 

authority of a JTF commander. Smaller programs can accommodate managers with lesser rank and authority. A summary of correlation between 

the six acquisition program case histories and the candidate principles is 

presented in Table 19. 

The candidate principles of Risk Management, Economy of Effort, and 

Stable Program Inputs were factors across all program experiences. The 

candidate principles of Objective, Tempo Initiative, Workforce Quality & 

Credibility, and Synergy & Synchronization were factors in most of the 

cases examined. The candidate principles of Centralized Control/Decentralized 

Table 19: Acquisition Program Histories and Principles Correlation Objective Simplicity of Command Tempo Risk Management Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution Economy of Effort Stable Program Inputs Initiative Workforce Quality & Credibility Synergy & Synchronization

F-117 XXXXXXXXXX

RQ-1 X XXXXXXXX

F-22 XXXX XX X

V-22 X X X X X X

A-12 X X XXXXX

RAH-66 X XXXXX

5256366444

38
execution and Simplicity of Command were factors in half or fewer of the 

cases reviewed. The results, combined with those relating to acquisition 

reform in Table 12, support the following 

conclusions, in that time after time these principles were causal in the 

studied programs’ successes or lack thereof: 

The data most strongly supported the candidate principles of 

x Economy of Effort 

x Stable Program Inputs 

x Risk Management 

The data strongly supported the candidate principles of 

x Objective 

x Credibility 

x Tempo 

x Initiative 

The data moderately supported the candidate principles of 

x Workforce Quality & Credibility 

x Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution 

x Simplicity of Command 

Therefore, the data support the hypothesis that there is a useful body of 

broad and enduring principles to be reaped from the lessons of DoD’s experience with force modernization, and that those principles have utility in 

current modernization programs and in efforts to transform the modernization process. However, the number of case studies, reviewed to evaluate 

the candidate list of principles, is not statistically compelling; it simply 

gives an indication for further investigation. An analysis with a greater 

number of case studies would help to discern other principles or to definitively eliminate candidates from the proposed list. 

Modernizing Modernization: Applying Doctrinal Principles 

to Current DOD/USAF Directives, Instructions, and Processes 

What do the principles and their degree of support from acquisition reform and acquisition program experience portend for the current concepts 

for transforming the acquisition process? How well do these concepts adhere to the principles? This section examines the current processes with 

respect to the candidate list. The current process is top-down driven [Centralized Control]. Joint and Service staffs develop concepts of operation, 

based on strategic objectives [Objective], with tasks allocated to DoD 

39
Mission Areas. Each Mission Area completes a Mission Area Assessment 

to determine the necessary enabling capabilities, and then conducts a gap 

analysis to compare mission requirements with actual (or projected) capability. Gaps, from the analysis, become needs (identified holes in mission 

capability), and Mission Solution Analysis considers the spectrum of options (DOTMLPF) to close the gaps [Economy of Effort]. Those needs 

requiring a material solution generate an Initial (needed) Capabilities 

Document. A Requirements Oversight Council [Centralized Control] 

[Risk Management] validates or refines the documented need, and an 

Analysis of Alternatives for the material solution gets underway [Economy of Effort] with the acquisition community participating. [Synergy] 

From this analysis of costs, operational effectiveness, and operational suitability criteria comes a preferred solution and a set of performance requirements for that solution. [Credibility] [Objective] (26: A-7ff) 

Evolutionary acquisition has become the DoD-preferred method for 

acquiring new capabilities. It encompasses a variety of techniques, including preplanned product improvement (P3I), spiral development, and incremental acquisition. The concept is to manage (mitigate) risk due to 

time [Risk Management] in a modernization program by fielding required 

technologies as they mature [Tempo], thereby continually improving systems untilthey meet the entire requirement. It requires faith on behalf of 

the warfighter that partially met needs won’t cause cancellation of future 

development funds [Credibility], and it assumes the solution systems will 

be designed such that they facilitate system upgrades after initial product 

delivery. [Objective] 

The Capabilities Review and Assessment (CRRA) is a USAF process 

by which it considers its entire portfolio of programs in one of its roles or 

mission areas. [Centralized Control] The intent is to compare solutions to 

the CONOPS [Objective] and the mission needs to assess them for sufficiency, necessity, and risk. [Economy of Effort] [Risk Management] 

Given funding constraints, it renders a portfolio-wide allocation of resources for the upcoming programming and budget cycle. [Synchronization] 

From these processes, principles not evident are 

• Simplicity of Command 

• Stable Program Inputs 

• Initiative 

• Decentralized Execution 

While the current processes make an effort to mitigate time-to-need 

with incremental deployment of capability, they do nothing to accelerate 

40
the delivery of final capability [Tempo(-)]. Risk management initiatives 

center exclusively around risk avoidance and neglect prudent risk taking. 

[Risk Management (-)] Still notably absent are any efforts to empower 

program managers or any other workers at the tactical level. [Decentralized Execution (-)] The strength of analytical support for the candidate 

principles gives rise to the following conclusions about the current processes for transforming force modernization: 

The new processes will likely fall short in the following areas in that 

they do not observe the corresponding most-strongly supported principles 

x Stable Program Inputs 

x Risk Management (i.e., prudent risk taking) 

x Tempo 

This implies that, at the operational level, future programs will be subject 

to the same vicious cycle of risk avoidance, long acquisitions, and subsequent instabilities. 

The new processes may fall short in the following areas in that they do 

not observe the corresponding strongly supported principles 

x Decentralized Execution 

x Simplicity of Command 

x Initiative 

This implies that tactical responsiveness in future programs will suffer as 

program managers with insufficient empowerment and conflicting guidance will not have the latitude to innovate in anticipation of, or in reaction 

to, incipient crises and fleeting opportunities. It also indicates that the 

very talent needed to take on such challenges will flee or avoid program 

management jobs. 

And the new processes will probably succeed in the following areas in 

that they observe the corresponding principles 

x Workforce Quality & Credibility 

x Synergy & Synchronization 

x Risk Management (i.e. calculated risk avoidance) 

x Objective 

x Centralized Control 

x Economy of Effort 

This portends that strategic level portfolio management should improve as 

senior decision makers approach harmony and integration among overarching modernization themes and that initial legislative and executive 

buy-in will be easier to obtain. However, maintaining that buy-in will 

41
prove difficult when programs fail to execute as planned, due to operational and tactical difficulties not adequately addressed. 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

The analysis of the history of acquisition reform commissions, senior 

Defense executive initiatives for acquisition reform, and case studies of 

selected acquisition programs appear to support (1) The hypothesis that 

there is a useful body of broad and enduring principles to be reaped from 

the lessons of DoD’s experience with force modernization, (2) That those 

principles have utility in current modernization programs and in efforts to 

transform the modernization process, and (3) That those principles form 

the cornerstone of a body of modernization doctrine that is better suited 

for governing the modernization processes than is the current prescriptive 

mass of laws, regulations, and instructions. 

The candidate list yielded a number of principles with moderate to 

strong regularity of occurrence among the historical records. Although the 

small number of program histories considered in this study makes confidence in these candidate principles less than certain, they may be used, 

with caution, to evaluate current force modernization transformation efforts. 

The conclusions from that evaluation reveal a process with strong adherence to principles controlling central direction, risk avoidance, and 

program credibility that does not address the critical problem stated in this 

paper’s introduction—that of program responsiveness in a dynamic environment. The enabling conditions for such an ability—stable program inputs, decentralized execution, simplicity of command (i.e., protection from 

disparate narrow interests), appropriate risk-taking, and initiative—are opportunities being missed. If modernization is to have a chance at outpacing the strategic environment, it must adopt a doctrinal approach and give 

due regard to these neglected principles. Therefore, the following actions 

are recommended: 

1. The force modernization communities should enlist a doctrine development center to formulate a draft force modernization doctrine 

document. 

2. They should conduct an exhaustive analysis of acquisition program 

case histories to develop a definitive list of truly broad and enduring principles for force modernization. 

 3. With a force modernization doctrine document in place, eliminate 

all but the truly oblige tory statutes and policy mandates (i.e., 

treaty obligations, ethics, and environmental constraints) from acquisition and requirements regulations, directives, and instructions. 

42
 4. The force modernization community should evaluate alternative 

concepts for force modernization as well as suggestions for improvement and innovation within the context of its new doctrine. 

This would serve to vet the concepts and to exercise and mature 

the doctrine. 

43
APPENDIX A 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

AFDD – Air Force Doctrine Document 

AIP – Acquisition Improvement Program 

ARPA – Advanced Research Projects Agency (now DARPA) 

CAIG – Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CONOPS – Concept of Operations 

DAB – Defense Acquisition Board 

DAE – Defense Acquisition Executive 

DAR – Defense Acquisition Regulations 

DARPA – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DFAR – Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 

DLA – Defense Logistics Agency 

DoD -- Department of Defense 

DoDD -- Department of Defense Directive 

DoDI - Department of Defense Instruction 

DPRO – Defense Plant Representative Office 

DSARC – Defense System Acquisition Review Council (now DAB) 

EMD – Engineering and Manufacturing Development 

FM – Field Manual 

FSD – Full Scale Development (now EMD) 

JCIDS - Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(JCIDS) 

JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition 

MDAP - Major Defense Acquisition Program 

MENS – Mission Essential Needs Statement 

MNS – Mission Needs Statement 

NSC – National Security Council 

OMB – Office of Management and Budget 

OODA – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 

OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OT&E – Operational Test and Evaluation 

PP

3

I – Preplanned Product Improvement 

PEO – Program Executive Officer 

PM – Program Manager 

POM – Program Objective Memorandum 

44
PPBS – Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 

R&D – Research and Development 

SAE – Service Acquisition Executive 

SAF/AQ – Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 

SecDef – Secretary of Defense 

USD (A) – Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) 

USD (AT&L) – Under Secretary for Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

USDR&E – Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) 

45
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46
Appendix B 

EXPANDED PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Objective Objective is directing military operations toward a defined 

and attainable end state that contributes to strategic, operational, and tactical aims. The purpose of the objective is to achieve a unity of effort, with 

clear and complementary subordinate goals even in the absence of a united 

command. 

Unity of Command Unity of command means that all forces operate 

under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces 

employed in pursuit of a common purpose. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for 

every objective. 

Offense Offensive is to act rather than react and to dictate the time, 

place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The purpose of an 

offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. 

Mass Orchestrating all the elements of combat power where they will 

have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to 

achieve mass. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat 

power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. 

Maneuver Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — 

or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering 

force. 

Economy of Force Economy of force is the judicious employment 

and distribution of forces. The purpose of economy of force is to allocate 

minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. 

Security Security consists of actions taken to protect friendly forces 

-- reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The purpose 

of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. 

Surprise Surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a 

manner for which it cannot prepare. The purpose of surprise is to help the 

commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success 

well out of proportion to the effort expended. 

Simplicity Simplicity is ensuring that guidance, plans, and orders are 

as simple and direct as the objective will allow. The purpose of simplicity 

is to allow subordinate commanders the freedom to operate creatively 

47
within their battle-space, and to allow better understanding and troop leading at all echelons -- permitting branches and sequels to be more easily 

understood and executed. 

48
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28. Kent, Glenn A., and Ochmanek, David A., A Framework for Modernization within the United States Air Force, MR1706, Santa 

Monica, CA, RAND, 2003. 

29. Kruderik, Diane I. K., (Capt), Establishing a Framework for the 

Oversight of Major Defense Acquisition Programs – A Historical 

Analysis, AFIT/GCA/ENV/04M-04, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 

Air Force Institute of Technology, 2004. 

30. Laurenzo, Ron, “New Life for Comanche?” Aerospace America, 

Reston, VA, AIAA, October 2003. 

31. Li, Allen, Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO03-603T, Washington, DC, United States General Accounting Office, April 2, 2003. 

51
32. Li, Allen, Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 and Joint Strike 

Fighter Programs, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives, GAO-04-597T, Washington, DC, United States 

General Accounting Office, March 25, 2004. 

33. Life is Too Short: A Review of the Brief Periods Managers of Major Defense Programs Stay on the Job, Report of the Investigations 

Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Edition, 

Washington, DC, GPO, July 4, 1990. 

34. Little, Terry, Acquisition Reform in Action, PowerPoint Presentation, 1997. 

35. Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 

(MDAPS) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs, DoD 5000.2-R, April 5, 2002.

36. Morris, Jefferson, “Army Cancels RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter 

after 20 years, $8 Billion,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 

New York, McGraw-Hill, February 24, 2004. 

37. Myers, Dominique, “Acquisition Reform – Inside the Silver Bullet: 

A Comparative Analysis: JDAM versus F-22,” Acquisition Review 

Quarterly, Washington, DAU Press, Fall 2002. 

38. Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, US Navy, 28 March 

1994. 

39. Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, May 12, 2003. 

40. Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, 

11 May 2005. 

41. Operations, FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

June 1993. 

42. Pena, Charles V., “V-22: Osprey or Albatross?” CATO Institute 

Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 72, Washington, DC, CATO, January 

8, 2003. 

52
43. Planeaux, James B. (LtCol), Beyond the Task Force CONOPS: The 

Path to a Capabilities-Based Modernization Framework for the 

Air Force, Maxwell AFB, AL, Air War College, February 2003. 

44. Presentation to the V-22 Blue Ribbon Panel, GAO-01-369R Defense Acquisitions, January 12, 2001. 

45. President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, A 

Formula for Action: A Report to the President on Defense Acquisition, April 1986. 

46. Report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, the House of Representatives, Defense Acquisition: Comanche program Objectives Need 

to Be Revised to More Achievable Levels, GAO-01-450 June 2001. 

47. Rich, Michael, and Dews, Edmund, Improving the Military Acquisition Process, R-3373-AF/RC, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1986. 

48. Riegart, Paul M., “A Case Study: Acquisition Reform and the New 

V-22 Osprey Program, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 

March 1998. 

49. Rippere, Richard B., “Acquisition Reform: Lead Into Gold?” Defense AT&L , Fort Belvoir, VA, DAU Press, July-August 2004. 

50. Slate, Alexander R., “The Underlying Keys to Acquisition: Needs, 

Requirements, Prioritization, Asset Allocation,” Program Manager 

Magazine, Fort Belvoir, VA, DAU Press, July-August 2003. 

51. Smith, Giles K., Shulman, Hyman L., and Leonard, Robert S., Application of F-117 Acquisition Strategy to Other Programs in the 

New Acquisition Environment, Santa Monica, RAND, 1996. 

52. Stizza, John G. (LtCol), In the Shadows of Greatness: Can the National Reconnaissance Office Still Innovate?, Maxwell AFB, AL, 

Air War College, 25 February 2005. 

53. Systems Engineering Fundamentals, Fort Belvoir, VA, DAU Press, 

January 2001. 

54. Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support 

F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities, Report to Congres53
sional Committees, GAO-06-304, Washington, DC, United States 

General Accounting Office, March 2005. 

55. The Acquisition Findings in the Report of the President’s Blue 

Ribbon Commission on Defense Management; Hearing before the 

Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on 

Armed Services, US Senate, Ninety Ninth Congress, Second Session on S.2082, S.2151, Washington, DC, GPO, April 8, 1986. 

56. Thirtle, Michael R., Johnson, Robert V., and Birkler, John L., The 

Predator ACTD: A Case Study for Transition Planning to the 

Formal Acquisition Process, MR899, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 

1997. 

57. Van Creveld, Martin L., Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to 

Present, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991. 

58. Waldrop, M. Mitchell, Control Without Control: From Complexity 

to the Management of Innovation, 

http://www.complexityandpolicy.org/images/ControlwithoutContr

ol.ppt, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 

2002. 

59. Waldrop, M. Mitchell, Control Without Control: From Complexity 

to the Management of Innovation, 

http://www.complexityandpolicy.org/waldrop.ram, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 2002. 

60. Walker, Ian L., (Capt), Combat Air Forces Campaign Level Modernization Planning: A Study in Group Decision Making, 

AFIT/GCA/ENV/03-10, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2003. 

61. Warden, John A., III. (Col, ret), “The New American Security 

Force,” Aerospace Power Journal, Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, Fall 1999. 

62. Warfighting, MCDP 1, US Marine Corps, PCN 142 000006 00, 20 

June 1997. 

63. Younossi, Obaid, et al., F/A-22 and F/A-18E/F Development Programs, MG-276, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2005. 

54
Chapter 2 

Impact of Weapon System Complexity on Systems Acquisition 

by 

Robert A. Dietrick, Major, USAF 

The purpose of studying the new sciences is simple... We want to learn to 

understand war through the most powerful means available... to encompass the ideas contained in quantum mechanics, nonlinear systems, and 

chaos and complexity theories. 

 —Lt Gen Paul K. Van Riper 

There seems to be strong consensus that the current “acquisition system” is broken. It takes too long and costs too much to develop and produce the next generation of weapon systems. Programs frequently overrun 

both cost and schedule targets. Focusing on long cycle times the following perspectives have been offered: 

1986: “We believe that it is possible to cut this cycle time 

in half.” -- The Packard Commission 

1986: “The most important way technology could enhance 

our military capability would be to cut the acquisition cycle 

time in half.” -- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

1997: “We need a fast-paced acquisition system.” -- William Cohen, Secretary of Defense 

2002: “We still have an acquisition system that takes 

years, and years, and years, notwithstanding the fact that 

technology is changing in 18, 20, 24 months.” 

-- Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense1

These observations actually go back further than 1986 and have been 

the impetus for a number of studies, research reports, commissions, and 

reform initiatives. As early as 1980 there were nearly 30 studies either 

underway or publishing findings.2

 That trend has largely continued to the 

present day with the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5000.1, “The 

Defense Acquisition System,” being revised in 1996, 2000, and 2003. To 

some extent all of these efforts have followed a “search for the Holy 

55
Grail” type of mentality, that there is a solution out there, it just needs to 

be found. More often than not, the solution seems to be viewed in the singular sense; that a single solution, the adoption of a single process such as 

evolutionary acquisition will result in tremendous improvement. 

The possibility that long acquisition cycle times are a byproduct of 

enormously complex systems has been frequently ignored or rejected. For 

example, Dr. Jacques Gansler noted that development times for defense 

systems have increased as system complexity has increased, but added that 

DoD development times are significantly longer than commercial systems 

of comparable complexity.3

 Unfortunately, Gansler offers little proof and 

never actually defines complexity. This is typical of another problem with 

many of the search for the Holy Grail studies. These studies often make 

extensive use of soothsayers, subject matter experts offering unsubstantiated opinions on problems and solutions. “Regardless of the precise form, 

this approach [expert opinion] relies on the intuition of knowledgeable individuals [emphasis in original].”4

 The obvious problem is that the possibility exists that all or nearly all of the experts are wrong. Consider the 

example of Copernicus who proposed that earth orbited the sun instead of 

the other way around. 

This study seeks to minimize the influence of expert opinion and explore the other possibility for long acquisition cycle times. Despite the 

burden of federal and DoD acquisition regulations and processes, increasing weapon system complexity drives development schedules and is the 

prime acquisition challenge. This paper explores the nature of complexity 

as applied to weapon systems, specifically the exponential growth of aircraft avionics complexity, and develops a suitable definition. It then establishes the link between increasing complexity and increasing development times and the corresponding impact on acquisition programs. Finally, based on a belief that solutions do not exist, suggestions for limiting 

complexity and coping with complexity are offered. 

56
Understanding Weapon System Complexity 

Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating. 

—Carl von Clausewitz 

The term “complexity” has been frequently used with respect to 

weapon systems but establishing a good definition is not easy. Complexity has been defined circularly, used interchangeably with cost, and associated with schedule. For example, one researcher offered this circular 

explanation of complexity, “These systems are inherently ‘complex’ because of the dramatic increase in the complexity of the hardware and software that are used in the development of even ‘simple’ products.”5

 This 

chapter explores the historical associations of complexity with cost and 

schedule as evidence of the lack of precision with which the term has been 

used. Complexity theory is reviewed to develop a more precise definition 

for weapon system complexity. Finally, measures of complexity are 

proposed. 

Previous Cost, Schedule, and Complexity Relationships 

Historically, acquisition researchers have associated complexity with 

cost. With the cost of modern tactical aircraft increasing sharply, studies 

during the 1980s investigated the tradeoff between platform and weapon 

complexity. Bruno Manz and Kenneth Smith compared the alternative 

approaches of improving munitions or improving the delivery platforms 

with procurement cost as the measure of merit.6 The study was hypothetical in nature, concluding that a general answer did not exist but was 

dependent on the parameters of a specific scenario (i.e., actual platform 

and munitions costs, threat level, and sortie rates). Although they never 

specifically defined complexity, they used the terms cost and complexity 

interchangeably and noted that cost and complexity are “inferentially” related; that platform and weapon system performance are enhanced as the 

cost of components increases “and supposedly component complexity.”7

 

Similarly, Robert Lowe investigated the link between technical complexity and production cost for tactical aircraft. Using regression analysis, he 

established a strong link between the level of technology or complexity 

and production cost.8

 

Complexity has also been related to design iterations and development schedules. According to Robert Grady and Deborah Caswell, the 

nongovernmental Software Metrics Council pursued the development of 

57
software difficulty measures based on the belief that complexity is correlated with longer development schedules.9

 Offering a deeper explanation 

for this relationship, Tyson Browning found that the number of design iterations increases as system complexity increases. According to Browning, “Multiple configurations are put up as strawmen, additional details are 

added, and many virtual and sometimes physical prototypes are necessary 

to reveal issues initially overlooked.”10 Browning found this relationship 

applied equally to both the DoD and private sectors, noting that between 

13% and 70% of total semiconductor development time at Intel was the 

result of development iterations and that iteration was the primary cause of 

variability in development schedules.11 Yet, Browning never offered a 

clear definition or objective measures for complexity. 

Another view has been to use complexity as a synonym for technology and in terms of technical performance measures. Lowe offers a typical view: “Technology can be measured using data describing the ‘engineering’ sophistication of a system (an input measure) or using data describing the performance of a system (an output measure).”12 He goes on 

to use the terms technology and complexity interchangeably. In analyzing 

the relationship between performance and cost for tactical aircraft, Lowe 

uses payload, range, maneuverability, and useful speed as measures of 

complexity.13 

But viewing complexity strictly in terms of system performance 

greatly reduces its meaning because performance generally improves over 

time. Therefore, system complexity would merely be a function of time. 

For example, Lowe found the technology level of previously fielded tactical aircraft a “significant predictor” of the production cost for the next 

generation of aircraft.14 By using aircraft performance as the measure of 

technology, Lowe found that performance generally improved from one 

generation of tactical aircraft to the next in a predictable manner based on 

the time interval between the two aircraft. Looking at the explosive 

growth of computer software, Frame notes that “the first word processing 

software packages easily fit onto a 360 KB disk; 10 years later, packages 

occupied 9MB of disk space.”15 Frame attributes this phenomenon to the 

fact that the growth of knowledge is cumulative, implying that increased 

knowledge leads to increased complexity.16 Defining complexity as a 

synonym for cost or technology squanders an important system characteristic. 

Complexity Theory 

Complexity theory offers a different view of complex systems, emphasizing the impact of interactions within the system. According to 

58
Waldrop, one of several leading experts on complexity theory, complexity 

stems from the interactions between entities within a system.17 Offering a 

definition for complex systems, Waldrop states that they are dynamic and 

adaptive, with the ability to self-organize.18 Frame agrees, noting that 

“Consensus is emerging that complexity is closely tied to the adaptive behavior of systems.”19 This leads to the conclusion that static objects or 

systems can be complicated, but they cannot be complex.20 Formally, because weapon systems and weapon system designs lack the ability to selforganize, they are static with respect to complexity theory. Weapon system designs evolve through various stages of maturity only through the 

efforts of the design team. Despite the subtle distinction used in complexity theory, this paper will use the terms complicated and complex interchangeably. In both static and dynamic systems, interactions between system components contribute to complexity. 

Before moving on, there is yet another view of complexity that should 

be addressed. Dr. George Perino, with over 25 years of experience in DoD acquisition, offers the view that complexity is not a characteristic of the system but is in the mind of the observer.21 According to 

Perino, “It is the observer’s inability to grasp the interplay of multiple factors and events that lead to ‘complex’ problems, issues or systems.”22 Although arguably valid, this view transforms complexity into a binary variable. When an observer’s view of a system causes confusion, the system 

is complex; otherwise it is not complex. This would make any comparison of the complexity between multiple systems meaningless. Instead, by 

viewing complexity as a system characteristic linked to the number of interactions within a system, the complexity of multiple systems can be 

compared, which is consistent with the intent of this research. 

In addition to entity interactions within a system, sheer technical difficulty should also be considered in defining system complexity. Frame 

associates system complexity with technical difficulty and notes that multiple alternatives can lead to “paralysis through analysis.”23 In comparing 

the relative complexity of a Minuteman III guidance upgrade to the original intercontinental ballistic missile development, Col Steve Suddarth also 

seems to use complexity in reference to technical difficulty.24 Others, 

however, have used the terminology of technological advance to capture 

this element of technical difficulty.25 This is more precise and enables the 

following program terms to be defined: 

1. Technological Advance: An assessment of the extent to which 

existing technology must be extended or new technology developed to meet required performance. The AFRL Technology 

59
Readiness Levels are an example of one measurement scale for 

this characteristic. 

2. System Complexity: A measure of either actual or potential number of interactions between entities comprising the system. 

3. Technical Difficulty: The aggregate of Technological Advance 

and System Complexity. 

Measures of Complexity 

Although counting the number of interactions between entities within 

a system would be a very good measure of system complexity, this would 

be difficult to accomplish. As Frame identifies, the upper limit for the 

number of interactions within a system is: 

2

)1( max

− = nn nsInteractio EQ

Where n is the number of entities within the system.26

But even this assumes a maximum of one interaction between any two 

entities. In considering subsystem relationships in systems decomposition, 

Thomas Pimmler and Steven Eppinger proposed four categories of interactions: 

1. Spatial: A spatial-type interaction identifies needs for adjacency 

or orientation between two elements. 

2. Energy: An energy-type interaction identifies needs for energy 

transfer between two elements. 

3. Information: An information-type interaction identifies needs 

for information or signal exchange between two elements. 

4. Material: A material-type interaction identifies needs for materials exchange between two elements.27

Additional categories could include thermal (heat transfer) and electromagnetic fields, neither of which is clearly captured under the category 

of energy. Thus, for a system with even 500 entities, there could be as 

many as 748,500 interactions. Clearly, attempting to identify and count 

the exact number of interactions directly for anything more than a trivial 

system would be very difficult and beyond the scope of this research effort. 

Instead, the number of system entities can be used to estimate the 

complexity of a system using EQ-1. The key to applying this approach is 

to translate the term entity into something actual to enable the counting. 

For an electronics hardware system, integrated circuit boards are probably 

a good measure at the system level. However, the complexity of the 

boards also needs to be considered, using circuit components as the meas60
ure. Thus, one highly integrated system design may contain relatively few 

densely populated boards and alternative modular design for the same 

functionality might utilize more boards with lower population densities. 

By merely applying EQ-1 at the system level, the highly integrated system 

may appear less complex than the modular system when in reality the 

more highly integrated system is more complex because of the higher 

complexity of its circuit boards. 

For software intensive systems, complexity can be assessed by using 

the number of software modules or executable source lines of code 

(ESLOC or just SLOC). For measuring software complexity, Walter 

Perry et al identified the three standard methods as SLOC, object points, 

and function points. Object points is basically the number of software 

modules and function points is essentially a more direct measure of system 

inputs, outputs, interfaces, and internal logic.28 Although both object 

points and function points are newer and potentially more meaningful 

measures of complexity, they require more information for support. For 

this paper, the number of software modules will be estimated based on the 

SLOC. 

Summary 

In order to better understand the impact of complexity on weapon systems development, a better definition of complexity is required based on 

the interactions occurring within a system. However, direct and exact 

measure of the number of interactions is difficult, so the number of potential interactions will be used as the quantification of complexity. This 

number is provided by EQ-1. It is important to remember that at this 

stage, complexity is only a characteristic of a system and relationships 

with cost and schedule have not yet been identified. Thus, a system with a 

complexity factor of 500 will not necessarily take 10 times longer to design or cost 10 times as much to develop or build than a system with a 

complexity factor of 50. It is simply 10 times more complex. 

61
Increasing Complexity 

After the year 2015, there will be no more airplane crashes. 

There will be no takeoffs either, because electronics will 

occupy 100 percent of every airplane’s weight. 

—Norman Augustine 

Although it can be safely assumed that Augustine’s above quote was 

made only in jest, it singles out aircraft avionics as an increasingly significant contributor to the overall weight, cost, and problems of modern aircraft.29 Complexity estimates for the avionics of five aircraft from the 

1965 F-111 to the 2005 F-22A, plus complexity estimates for two next 

generation airborne sensors, are presented in this section. These systems 

were chosen based on the availability of data and because of the explosive 

growth of software. As the charts of complexity log10 clearly show, the 

estimated complexity is growing exponentially. 

Aircraft Avionics 

The proliferation of electronics in both performance and quantity is a 

major contributor to increasing weapon system complexity. Norman 

Augustine, former CEO of Lockheed, encapsulated this trend with his Law 

Number XIV, that by 2015 “electronics will occupy 100 percent of every 

airplane's weight.”30 Augustine based this law on the exponential increase 

of electronics as a percentage of tactical aircraft empty weight. The actual 

plot of the data presents a less sensational perspective of electronics 

weight perhaps leveling off at 6-10 percent of empty weight as early as the 

1960s. Still, considering Moore’s law of doubling the number of transistors in a processor about every 24 months, the same amount of electronics 

has vastly more performance capability today than in the 1960s. This 

growth is not just limited to tactical aircraft. The typical communications 

satellite had around 250 circuits in 1965, 4,000 in 1970, and 30,000 by 

1985.31

In addition to increasing in size, weight, and number of processors, 

the amount of software in aircraft avionics has increased dramatically. 

This is unlikely to come as a surprise to anyone familiar with modern jet 

age aircraft, but the scale of the increase and the impact on system complexity may be surprising. According to Alexander Hou, early models of 

the F-4 did not include digital computers and, consequently, did not have 

any software.32 Digital processors and primitive assembly language software for fire control tasks appeared during the 1960s, and the number of 

processors and lines of higher order language code have increased consid62
erably over the last 40 years.33 The data presented in Table 1 show the 

relationship between lines of software and complexity. For the 1960s, it 

should be noted that 0.2 KSLOC (KSLOC = 1000 SLOC) actually refers 

to 4-8 bit words of assembly language. The number of modules is estimated based on 100 SLOC per module, which is a general target for developing easily maintained software.34 For 1960s assembly language, the 

number of modules was set equal to the number of words because the assembly code is inherently more complicated than the higher order languages that followed. Calculating the potential number of interactions between software modules and the log10 is then straightforward. Of course, 

the resulting complexity numbers are only estimates, but assuming that the 

actual number of interactions as a percentage of the maximum possible 

number of interactions has remained relatively constant over time, the 

complexity factors should be reasonable in a relative (but not absolute) 

sense. Ultimately the complexity of aircraft software appears to be increasing exponentially. 

0.000

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

7.000

8.000

9.000

10.000

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Year of Initial Operational Capability

Complexity (Log10)

Figure 1: Increasing Complexity of Aircraft Avionics 

Airborne Sensors 

One of the main distinguishing characteristics of the latest generation 

of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors is 

63
the increased amount of airborne data processing prior to transmitting sensor data to the ground. Previously, airborne sensors on the high altitude 

U-2 collected only relatively raw data and transmitted this information to 

ground stations for processing. In the case of a synthetic aperture radar 

(SAR) imaging sensor, data was transmitted from the air to the ground for 

processing to include image formation. This scheme of operation forces 

trade-offs between image size and resolution based on the available bandwidth of the air-to-ground data link. 

Table 20: Software Size and Corresponding Complexity Numbers 

The advent of significantly more powerful digital processors enabled 

image processing to 

move from the ground to the air. However, this also requires processing 

image data in real-time to avoid the prohibitive additional weight of airborne digital storage of pre-processed data. To process the data in realtime requires many parallel digital signal processors and adds substantially 

to the complexity of the resulting sensor. The result of more powerful 

digital processors is demonstrated in Table 2. The names of the systems 

have been concealed to protect the contractors, but System 1 is a “legacy” 

sensor relying on ground processing for exploitation of sensor data. Systems 2 and 3 are next generation systems with airborne processors and are 

substantially more complex. The year of Initial Operational Capability 

(IOC) has been estimated for Systems 2 and 3. For System 2, it is very 

unlikely to slip because early versions of the sensor have been operating 

effectively since late 2004. System 3 is less mature and has not yet entered flight test. Due to this fact, it is conceivable, but judged unlikely, 

that the actual year of IOC could slip. The resulting complexity log10 for 

64
these systems is plotted in Figure 2. The previously plotted complexity 

numbers for the aircraft avionics are retained for comparison. 

Table 21: Airborne Sensor Complexity 

Source: Sensor contractor program offices (specific names concealed for 

their protection), interview by author, 12 January and 16 February 2006. 

Reasons for Increasing Complexity 

Next generation weapon systems are developed on the premise that they 

deliver enhanced performance over the systems that they will replace. In 

general, development programs fall into three broad categories: new capability programs such as the Airborne Laser program, replacement programs such as the F-22A, and modification programs such as an F-16 

block upgrade. In some respects, programs delivering new capability have 

the most flexible requirements in that they are not competing against an 

already fielded weapon system. For example, the first generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Atlas and Titan I, were fielded 

from 1957-1961 but deactivated by 1965.35 These early systems had been 

rushed into service as a “stop-gap” measure until more capable systems 

such as the Minuteman and Titan II could be developed and 

65
0.000

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

7.000

8.000

9.000

10.000

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Year of IOC

Complexity log(10)

Figure 2: Increasing Complexity of Airborne Sensors 

fielded. The first generation systems simply had to work; the follow-on 

replacement systems had to have equal or better range and accuracy, improved reliability, and increased survivability. 

In general, greater performance can be delivered by either new technology or “larger amounts” of the same technology. Considering ICBMs, 

the relative perfection of solid fuel boosters enabled the Minuteman I to 

easily deliver improvements in operational robustness, maintainability, 

and survivability over its Atlas and Titan I rivals. As for aircraft avionics, 

the technology has been essentially the same for an extended period of 

time. The digital processors of today are not much different from the first 

digital processors decades ago. They simply pack more gates or transistors into vastly smaller sizes producing greater performance in exchange 

for greater complexity. 

66
Complexity as the Prime Challenge 

The last 10 percent performance generates one-third of the 

cost and two-thirds of the problems. 

—Norman Augustine 

Having demonstrated the increasing nature of weapon system complexity, this section will examine its impact. From previous research and 

available data, complexity appears to drive both cost and schedule for development programs. This perspective conflicts with other views that attribute acquisition slowness and expense to funding instability and bureaucracy, but on closer examination, complexity seems to offer the better 

explanation. 

Complexity Drives Cost 

In addition to being used as a pseudonym for cost, complexity is also 

related to production cost when technology is advancing. The level of integration (the number of electronic gates or transistors per chip) and subsystem weight have been used as the independent variables for estimating 

the production cost of various avionics subsystems.36 Combined, the level 

of integration and subsystem weight essentially capture the interaction nature of complexity. As the number of gates involved increases, the expected number of interactions can also be expected to increase. Using 

data from 1959 through 1995, R.W. Hess et al. concluded that “Each time 

the level of integration [number of gates per chip] increases by an order of 

magnitude, [avionics] subsystem costs increase between 10 percent (controls and displays) and 48 percent (fire control radars).”37 Hess attributed 

this to “performance push” which “has driven avionics to higher and 

higher levels of complexity to fully exploit the advances in microelectronics technology.”38 So despite decreasing costs for each electronic gate, the 

overall cost of aircraft avionics has been increasing as a function of the 

level of integration or level of complexity of the components. 

Complexity has also been linked to development costs for electronics. 

A proprietary cost estimating system for development and production 

costs, PRICE, was originally developed by RCA and is now in use by 

multiple defense contractors and government acquisition offices. Due to 

the proprietary nature of PRICE, the exact nature of the cost estimating 

equations is not available, but inferences have been made regarding general relationships. For PRICE-H, the hardware module of the system, cost 

estimates are primarily a function of types of components, weight, component density, power dissipation, testing, types of materials, and manufacturing methods.39 Component density is similar to complexity as defined 

67
here. As component density increases, the number of planned and unplanned interactions between components will likely increase. Unplanned 

interactions could include interactions such as electromagnetic fields and 

heat. In general, development and production cost can be expected to increase as the level of complexity increases. 

Development cost growth has also been linked to development schedule. As a general rule, programs with longer development schedules cost 

more than programs with shorter schedules. Various factors likely contribute to this relationship. Jeffrey Drezner et al. offer one possible cause, 

“Longer programs allow more time for unanticipated events to occur that 

[negatively] affect cost performance.”40 Another possible explanation is 

that programs with longer schedules are pushing beyond the region where 

a linear or nearly linear extrapolation from previous experience is valid for 

cost estimating. This would complicate the cost estimating process and 

would likely result in more discrepancies between estimated and actual 

costs. Regardless of the mechanism, the evidence of a relationship is 

there. Studying 67 development programs, including 15 that either completed under budget or stayed within budget, Drezner noted a strong relationship between cost growth and program duration from acquisition program approval (Milestone I) to first operational delivery. He concluded 

that the longer the actual program duration, the more likely a program was 

to experience a cost overrun and the larger the cost growth as a percentage 

of planned program cost.41 

Cost and Schedule Relationship 

Other researchers have also investigated the potential for a relationship between cost and schedule. At a fundamental level, system development is often a very labor-intensive effort, and longer schedules provide 

the opportunity for more man-hours, increasing cost. Program management and overhead functions are also performed over a longer period of 

time, and indirect costs for facilities and infrastructure accumulate over a 

longer period of time. Although not always recognized, data suggests a 

strong positive correlation between development schedule and development cost. Analyzing the relationship between cost and development 

schedule, McNutt notes that for 154 DoD projects, the best fit line correlating development time with cost (in millions of dollars) is provided by:42

( )

4 DevelopmentCost 03.0 ×= DevelopmentTimemonths + 36.1 EQ

McNutt is quick to point out that a number of factors influence this relationship, including the complexity of requirements, which presumably correlates with the complexity of the resulting weapon system.43 Ultimately, 

however, it should be clear that cost is related to schedule. 

68
Since development cost is proportional to complexity and development 

cost is proportional to development schedule, development schedule must 

also be proportional to complexity. From a mathematical perspective, if 

development cost is a function of complexity and development cost is also 

a function of development schedule, then development schedule must also 

be a function 

0.000

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

7.000

8.000

9.000

10.000

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Com plexity log 1 0

0

12

24

36

48

60

72

84

96

108

120

132

144

Developm ent Tim e (Months)

19 97 P roje ction

1997 P rojectio n

Figure 3: Complexity and Acquisition Cycle Time 

Source: Development Time data from Maj Ross T. McNutt, Reducing 

DoD Product Development Time: The Role of the Schedule Development 

Process, 33 

of complexity. This does not imply that complexity is the only variable 

but merely that it is at 

least one of the variables. Figure 3 overlays the increase in average acquisition cycle time (development schedule) for major defense acquisition 

programs against the previously plotted exponential increase in complex69
ity of aircraft avionics. Assuming the increase in avionics complexity is 

representative of the increase in complexity of major defense acquisition 

programs in general, then there would appear to be a very strong correlation between the exponential growth of complexity and the linear increase 

in acquisition cycle time. 

Funding Instability and Bureaucracy 

Still, not everyone is convinced that increasing weapon system complexity is the prime issue for systems acquisition. One counterargument is 

that increased congressional involvement in the defense budget is a major 

problem for acquisition programs. Dr. Barry M. Blechman, CEO of Defense Forecasts, Inc., International, provides fuel for this belief with the 

data in Tables 3 and 4. The percentage of the defense budget requiring 

authorization rose from a mere two percent in 1961 to a complete 100 percent in 1983. But more to the point, the appropriation for research, development, test, and evaluation, went from zero percent requiring authorization in 1962 to a full 100 percent in 1963. Also, Table 4 highlights the 

increase in the number of requested deliverables and the number of adjustments to authorizations and appropriations by Congress. According to 

Blechman, the participation in this time-consuming congressional review 

process results in a “quite significant” cost to the nation.44 Blechman, 

however, never attempts to quantify this cost nor provide a specific cause 

and effect mechanism. He merely implies that first, DoD personnel spend 

an inordinate amount of time responding to congressional inquiries and 

second, the budget adjustments result in a lack of funding stability. As a 

solution, Blechman argues that “legislative enactment of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] would cause the Pentagon to take the ‘out 

years’ of its programs more seriously,” and that Congress should enact 

two-year defense budgets to enhance budget stability.45

The problem with this argument is that the data lacks sufficient detail 

to determine its effect on development programs. The data does not identify how many of the requested studies and reports should be developed 

anyway in the course of normal business, the cost in dollars and schedule 

of producing these reports, nor the number of programs affected. Also, 

the data does 

70
Table 22: Percentage of Defense Budget Requiring Authorization, 

1961-1983 

Source: Dr. Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security, 31 

Table 23: Congressional Initiatives on the Defense Budget, 1970-

1988 

Type of action 1970 1976 1982 1985 1988 

Requested studies and 

reports 

36 114 221 458 719 

Other mandated actions 18 208 210 202 n/a 

General provisions in 

law 

64 96 158 213 179 

Number of programs adjusted: 

in authorization 180 222 339 1,315 1,184 

in appropriation 650 1,032 1,119 1,848 1,579 

Source: Dr. Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security, 41 

not identify how many funding adjustments are decreases and how many 

are increases. Considering the primacy of local politics and the reluctance 

congressmen have displayed in closing 

military bases in their districts, it is likely that many of the adjustments are 

actually “adds” to improve the funding for programs with local interest. 

Essentially, this argument is the result of a Washington-centric mindset 

that searches for problems and solutions exclusively within the nation’s 

capital while ignoring the fact that systems are actually developed through 

the collaboration of contractors, program offices, and the operational users. 

The issue of funding instability was also raised by the Affordable Acquisition Approach study conducted by Air Force Systems Command in 

1983. Relying on subject matter experts, this study highlighted the growth 

of funding instability as a major program issue (see Table 5). Although 

71
this may be true in some instances, it should be viewed skeptically. First, 

it has been concluded that most of the factors identified in the study are 

interdependent.46 Since the factors are interdependent and cause and effect has not been established, firm conclusions cannot be made regarding 

the impact of funding instability on program performance. For example, 

since the incidence of technical complexity closely parallels the incidence 

of funding instability, it is possible that programs encounter execution 

problems stemming from complexity, which later results in funding instability. Alternatively, if complexity is lengthening the minimum time required to complete a program, then that program is subjected to more 

budget cycles, increasing the cumulative probability of funding instability 

over the length of the program. Although funding instability is a likely 

contributor, there is insufficient information to determine if it is a root 

problem or just another symptom of increasing complexity. 

Table 24: Schedule Impact Factor Percentages 

Factor Pre 

1970 

1970-

1983 

Technical Complexity 52% 61% 

Technical Problems 70% 36% 

Technical Advance Impacts 67% 46% 

Funding Instability 48% 64% 

External Management Impact 41% 68% 

Source: Cited in Eric K. Nelson, Independent Schedule Assessment 

FSD Study, 2-10. 

Technical Complexity - The existence of large numbers of 

technical interfaces, subsystems, or components 

Technical Problems - The occurrence of unanticipated major technical problems 

Technical Advance Impact - Unstable configurations and 

undemonstrated performance of [sub-] systems at the 

start of FSD [Full Scale Development] 

Funding Instability - Large or frequent changes in or restrictions to program funding resulting from budget decisions by HQ USAF, OSD, or Congress 

External Management Impact - The occurrence of program 

decisions at levels above the program office or the oc72
currence of program reviews at HQ USAF or higher 

levels47

On the contrary, Table 3 provides additional evidence that complexity 

is a growing program issue. Note that the definition used by the Affordable Acquisition Approach study for complexity captures the factors that 

lead to interactions, so this definition is congruent with the definition used 

here. The percentage of programs reporting technical complexity issues 

increased moderately from 52% to 61%, despite sharp declines in the percentage of programs reporting technical problems or technical advance 

impacts. This increase reinforces the conclusion that less technically advanced systems relatively free of technical problems can still encounter 

considerable program problems simply due to the size and scope of the 

technical effort. 

In addition to funding instability, another competing claim is that increasing levels of bureaucracy are a prime reason for a slow acquisition 

cycle. In this view, lengthy requirements and funding processes, combined with an inherently slow decision cycle, dramatically reduce the responsiveness of the acquisition cycle.48 Of course, these symptoms of bureaucracy can be overcome with sufficient need. The GBU-28 “Bunker 

Buster” program offers interesting insights. In the week after Desert 

Storm combat operations began, the Air Force asked industry for ideas 

about a weapon to support targeting of the Iraqi hardened command bunkers.49 The resulting GBU-28 “was conceived, developed, tested, and deployed in approximately 28 days.”50 This type of process was repeated 

more recently to support operations in Afghanistan. On October 11, 2001, 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) organized a quickresponse team to pursue the development of enhanced munitions for targeting cave complexes in Afghanistan. “This new thermobaric bomb, designated as BLU-118/B, was developed within 67 days and subsequently 

supported Operation Enduring Freedom.”51 These two munitions programs provide examples of rapid development when overwhelming need 

trumps business as usual mindsets. 

Turning to larger systems, the F-117A is another example of the 

speed possible in weapon systems development. Following the initial development of math models and wooden mockups in 1975-76, development 

of the F-117 flying prototype Have Blue required just 20 months; flight 

test started in December 1977.52 With follow-on contracts for a production configuration and delivery of 59 aircraft, initial operational capability 

was achieved in October 1983,53 about seven years after Have Blue prototype development. On the surface, it appears that the F-117, GBU-28, and 

73
BLU-118/B programs demonstrate the promise of an acquisition system 

free of bureaucracy. 

In reality, however, all three systems are relatively less complex systems. For example the rapid production of the GBU-28 was possible only 

through the reuse of existing systems integrated in an innovative way.54 

Essentially, the same applies to the BLU-118/B. As for the F-117A, 

the Skunk Works made extensive use of existing subsystems and components. In the words of Ben Rich, head of the Lockheed Skunk Works: 

We took our flight control actuators from the F-111 tactical 

bomber, our flight control computer from the F-16 fighter, 

and the inertial navigation system from the B-52 bomber. 

We took the servomechanisms from the F-15 and F-111 

and modified them, and the pilot’s seat from the F-16. The 

heads-up display was designed for the F-18 fighter and 

adapted.55

And enabling the hopeless diamond to fly, the fly-by-wire system was 

adapted from the F-16 with significant reuse of existing software.56 As a 

result, by 2001 the F-117 avionics still had only 500,000 source lines of 

code, compared to over 1.1 million for the Block 50 F-16C, making it far 

less complex by comparison.57 Despite the technological challenge of 

mastering stealth, the extensive use of existing components made the F117A a less complex weapon system, which enabled its rapid development. 

Although many variables, to include funding instability and bureaucracy, combine to influence the duration of development programs, weapon 

system complexity appears to be the dominant factor. Confirming the intuition of early researchers, complexity also drives development and production costs but should not be used as a mere pseudonym for cost. Complexity has been successfully minimized in some development efforts. In 

fact, minimizing complexity appears to be an essential part rapid development. 

74
Recommendations 

Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of 

virtuosity calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. 

If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional 

achievements, their possessor is called a “genius.” 

—Carl von Clausewitz 

One obvious approach to addressing weapon system complexity is to 

attempt to minimize it. As Grady and Caswell observed, there are two 

categories of complexity: inherent complexity, “the basic property of a 

problem that requires its solution to be more complex than that of another,” and unnecessary complexity, “complexity which is built into a solution that is not inherently required.”58 Since even the inherent level of 

complexity in modern weapon systems is extremely high, the other necessary approach is to better cope with complexity. Modular design offers 

one approach for reducing design complexity; embracing acquisition as 

analogous to Clausewitzian warfare offers an approach to better cope with 

inherent complexity. 

Reducing Complexity 

The use of modular design methods provides one approach for reducing the inherent complexity of a system. Modular design standardizes interfaces and seeks to isolate subsystems such that changes to one subsystem do not impact other subsystems.59 Modular design can minimize 

complexity by finding the optimal balance between a system of many 

simple subsystems and a 

system with only a few very complex subsystems. For example, suppose 

100 components are required to provide the necessary level of performance for a system and these components can be arranged in various different ways to form subsystems that then form the overall system. If at the 

system level each subsystem is considered an entity and if at the subsystem level each component is considered an entity, then there is at least one 

optimal design that will use all 100 components and simultaneously minimize the theoretical maximum number of interactions at the system and 

subsystem levels. In this arbitrary example constrained to just three levels 

(the system, subsystems, and components), the optimal system design with 

respect to complexity would be a system of ten subsystems, each comprised of ten components (10 subsystems x 10 components/subsystem = 

100 components). 

Although system development in the real world is never as arbitrary 

as in the above example, the theory is still applicable. In studying avion75
ics programs, Tondreault noted that one of the cost drivers of an approximately ten-pound hardware subsystem was excessive component integration, resulting in very low manufacturing yields.60 The manufacturing 

yield was increased from only 5% to 95% by redesigning the subsystem 

using a more modular architecture to significantly decrease the level of 

component integration.61 In this real world example, the excessive component integration was leading to unmanageable complexity at the circuit 

card level. Dramatic improvement was possible by reducing this level of 

complexity. 

In another similar real world example, Tondreault studied a project 

that was cancelled when the production microwave monolithic integrated 

circuits (MMICs) failed to meet the same performance of the prototypes. 

According to Tondreault, 

[The design] concept centered around a small number of 

highly integrated and complex MMICs (an alternate approach would have been a larger number of less complex 

MMICs). These complex MMICs became the core of the 

new design and were marketed as the team’s technical discriminator.62

It can be inferred that the team was trying to present a system level design 

that had the appearance of being very simplistic, composed of just a few 

MMICs. But the penalty for this seemingly elegant system level design 

was again unmanageable subsystem complexity. The application of 

modular design and efforts to balance the level of system and subsystem 

complexity should always be considered during the development process. 

Coping with Complexity 

Systems development is an inherently nonlinear process similar in nature to Clausewitzian warfare. According to Alan D. Beyerchen, one of 

the more recent interpreters of Clausewitz, “On War is suffused with the 

understanding that every war is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon, the 

conduct of which changes its character in ways that cannot be analytically 

predicted.”63 Clausewitz attributes this unpredictability of war to the very 

nature of the interactive processes as two separate actors each simultaneously seek victory. In some sense, systems development is nothing more 

than an exercise of exerting one’s will upon a lifeless mass. However, its 

essence remains nonlinear because development programs generally involve many thinking individuals, each trying to exert his own will on an 

otherwise lifeless mass giving rise to multiple interactions between individuals and subsystems during the development process. In part, this explains a common rule of thumb--to limit the size of both contractor and 

76
government development teams to the smallest possible size.64 Still, the 

development process will always be nonlinear and, therefore, resistant to 

accurate prediction. 

Resembling Clausewitzian warfare, systems development is characterized by fog and friction. In systems development, cost, schedule, and 

performance estimates roughly correspond to intelligence estimates of opposing forces. Clausewitz warned that many reports are false and most are 

uncertain.65 Similarly, many acquisition researchers have noted that most 

programs overrun cost and schedule, and many fail to achieve expected 

performance.66 For Clausewitz, friction was the accumulation of unforeseeable minor incidents combining to lower the level of performance.67 

The inability to accurately predict the course of development, to perfectly 

analyze system performance prior to test, or to identify and correct every 

design flaw or software bug, also leads to friction. Friction leads to designs that fail to meet performance objectives resulting in iterations. In 

one study of seven different avionics programs, it was noted that all involved an iterative approach whether planned or unplanned.68

Clausewitz noted that friction could be overcome with iron willpower.69 Willpower was one of several necessary elements contributing 

to a “genius” for war. The same applies for acquisition. In the 1950s 

General Bernard Schriever generated a sense of urgency regarding the 

need to develop and deploy ICBMs and produced amazing results. The 

first generation Atlas was developed and deployed in three and one-half 

years, the follow-on Titan I achieved operational status in less than six 

years, and the solid-fueled Minuteman reached initial operational capability in approximately four years.70 In contrast, the B-47 required almost 

eight years, the B-52 about nine and one-half years, and the B-58 over 

eleven years.71 Certainly, some attribute Schriever's accomplishments to 

freedom from bureaucracy and generous funding. These factors, however, 

seem to be overestimated. For example, in 1956 “the ICBM operational 

plan underwent sharp scrutiny by the Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee,” resulting in funding cuts and efforts to stretch the program.72 This 

activity seems indicative of both some level of bureaucracy and funding 

instability. The ICBM acquisition and deployment serves as an example 

of the impact acquisition genius can have by infusing energy into development programs to overcome friction. 

Acquisition genius must be cultivated with experience and independent study. The assertion that acquisition officers and civilians must gain 

experience in their trade seems obvious, yet the current system does not 

seem to recognize it. The current system, based on certification levels for 

different acquisition specialties, encourages “ticket punching,” which in 

77
one instance “allowed an otherwise unqualified officer to replace an experienced physicist as chief technologist simply because the officer had 

APDP [Acquisition Professional Development Program] ‘Level-III’ certification.”73 Certifications can be obtained without any relevant program 

experience.74 As for independent study, current DoD acquisition training 

focuses primarily on learning the processes as dictated by regulation. Acquisition professionals would be better served by studying the research 

reports being produced by students at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lean Aerospace Initiative, as well as the 

RAND reports. These reports serve as a better analogy to the type of history that Clausewitz encouraged military commanders to study. 

In studying research reports, acquisition leaders must remember that 

development is complex and defies simplistic approaches. Because development is nonlinear, it is very sensitive to initial conditions, which will 

never be precisely the same on two separate programs. Differences will 

likely exist in program objectives, government personnel, and contractors. 

Application of the same methods across two different programs is no more 

likely to guarantee success than applying the same strategy to two different wars. If the balance of power is sufficiently great or the program objectives sufficiently easy, nearly any approach will be successful. As the 

balance of power becomes less favorable or program objectives more challenging, great skill will be required to deliver success. 

78
Conclusion 

The trend of increasing development schedules and rising program 

costs has been well documented. Contrary to the beliefs proposed by 

various subject matter experts that funding instability and bureaucracy are 

the main problems confronting acquisition, system complexity appears to 

be a larger factor. This realization is made possible by moving past dated 

inferences that weapon system complexity is merely a synonym for cost or 

technical challenge and establishes a formal definition of complexity 

based on the interactions between the entities comprising a system. Based 

on this definition, analysis of data for aircraft avionics and airborne reconnaissance sensors convincingly suggests that system complexity is indeed 

increasing exponentially. Assuming the increase in avionics complexity is 

representative of the increase in complexity of major defense acquisition 

programs in general, there would appear to be a very strong correlation 

between the exponential growth of complexity and the linear increase in 

acquisition cycle time. 

Systems development is complicated; frustrating efforts to determine 

the cause and effect relationships that drive long schedules and high cost. 

Regarding the complexity of a system, evidence does suggest that exponentially increasing system complexity correlates to linear increases in 

development schedule, which in turn drives costs significantly higher. On 

the other hand, although funding instability may contribute to longer 

schedules, there is no apparent explanation for how funding instability 

would drive system complexity. Therefore, it seems more logical to conclude that system complexity is a root cause and enables funding instability and bureaucracy to play larger roles in the overall schedule and cost of 

defense programs. 

No simple solution exists for addressing this trend of increasing complexity. Attempts can be made to limit the amount of complexity of future 

weapon systems while still providing adequate performance increases 

and/or to better cope with complexity. In regard to the latter, it has been 

suggested that acquisition is analogous to Clausewitzian warfare in some 

key respects and that the cultivation of acquisition genius should be pursued in like manner to the cultivation of war genius. To improve performance, the DoD will need to pursue both approaches in concert with defense 

contractors. 

In the near term, further research should provide additional insight 

into complexity and system development. Recommended research topics 

include collecting and analyzing additional data sets to develop a more 

direct linkage between the complexity of a system and the development 

schedule for that system, in-depth case studies of how high or low com79
plexity impacted the development of a specific system and systems engineering methods to minimize complexity and better enable program managers and systems engineers to cope with higher levels of complexity. 

80
Chapter 3 

Faster Is Better...Can the USAF Acquisition Process Be 

SAIV’D? 

by 

James L. Chittenden, Major, USAF 

... all too often the Air Force has suffered from development costs and schedule overruns which have, in turn, led 

to fielding delays, lower production quantities, and even 

reduced capabilities. 

- Acting SECAF Pete Geren, September 200575

While “transformation” and “responsive agility” have become 

buzzwords of the current administration’s defense policy, particularly in 

fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) acquisition system continues to be mired in schedule and cost 

overruns and unfulfilled promises to the war fighter. There have been at 

least 128 reform studies trying to address the myriad of problems within 

the acquisition system and prevent its perceived culture of fraud, waste, 

and abuse.76 Yet, despite this seemingly endless number of investigations, 

initiatives, and congressional mandates, the DOD’s 26 major acquisition 

programsa

 are currently $43 billion over-budget in research, development, 

test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs.77 Perhaps more alarmingly, these 

programs have also incurred an average schedule overrun of more than 20 

percent and an overall program duration of an amazing 15 years.78 These 

schedule delays directly contribute to cost overruns, create budget instability, and prevent emerging technologies from being fielded to combat 

forces who increasingly require more adaptive weapon systems. In order 

to resolve these enduring concerns, the United States Air Force (USAF) 

should pursue using schedule adherence or “SAIV” (schedule as an 

independent variable) as the first order programmatic driver for the majority of its acquisition programs. SAIV is a comprehensive strategy that re-

 

a

 Major defense acquisition programs are programs identified by the DOD as requiring 

$365 million in eventual RDT&E expenditures or $2.19 billion in procurement expenditures in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 

81
quires disciplined baselining upfront and then balances schedule, cost, and 

operational requirements utilizing schedule incentives and penalties to 

compel program success. 

 This refocusing of acquisition management is particularly crucial now. 

The DOD, and the USAF in particular, is emerging from a period of procurement sluggishness in the 1990s with a renewed investment in defense 

spending, especially in weapon systems offering technologically advanced 

capabilities tailored to fighting the GWOT (Table 1). Not only will responsible management of this enormous investment directly enable future 

combat capability but timely delivery of weaponry has become increasingly important in current asymmetric combat operations. Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are causing accelerated wear on existing 

hardware, thus making the requirement for their replacement systems even 

more urgent.79 On-going combat operations also have severe budget implications for the acquisition community –ever more programs not delivering promised capability to the war fighter on time will simply be cancelled 

or rebaselined to obsolescence. 

 FY96 FY98 FY00 FY02 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07

96-07 increase

Procurement 19.6 18.5 21.5 25.5 33.7 36.1 32.8

 32.2 64% 

RDT&E 15.6 17.3 16.6 15.9 21.1 20.5 21.7

 24.4 56% 

Table 4. USAF RDT&E and Procurement Funding (Billions of constant FY06 dollars)80

The causes of these rampant schedule delays are as far-reaching as 

their unintended consequences. There is a direct relationship between cost 

and schedule overruns, as well as a significant impact on procurement 

funding requirements, when delays in RDT&E extend the start of a program’s production run. The delays often cause increased congressional 

oversight, which induces a death spiral of continued schedule modifications and program extensions. Consequently, DOD and contractor management often myopically focus on program survival and not weapon systems delivery, ultimately resulting in fewer fielded systems. Furthermore, 

in today’s environment of accelerating technological change, not only are 

RDT&E and production delays preventing critical system enhancements 

from being fielded, but often military hardware (particularly computer systems) is technologically obsolete upon delivery. The principle of SAIV 

addresses both budget discipline concerns and technology insertion opportunities while ultimately increasing the number of weapon systems delivered.

82
This emphasis on schedule adherence is not entirely new to acquisition program management. In the past it simply received secondary attention to technical requirements or cost performance or both. Yet, there 

exist historical examples where schedule-driven programs fielded their 

required systems capabilities on time. These examples range from the five 

generations of fighter aircraft developed during World War I to the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) of the late 1950s to the current 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) program.81 These programs suggest using 

schedule as a first order driver can, at a minimum, provide capabilities on 

time while also increasing the likelihood of delivering them on budget. 

Still, some critics have concerns with making schedule a first order 

programmatic driver. Chief among these is the assertion that today’s military weapon systems are more complex than ever and thus too multifaceted to adhere to a disciplined procurement schedule. This argument is 

hollow. While military aircraft have become more complex as technology 

has advanced (today’s C-17 is clearly more complex than the C-47 of the 

1940s), today’s military systems are not significantly more complex than 

their current commercial counterparts. In fact, some of the most technologically advanced military hardware, such as the USAF’s first operational 

jet fighter and the Minuteman missile, were schedule-driven programs. 

Similarly, the assertion that schedule adherence is only realized, or can be 

realized, when defense budgets are robust is unsupported. Historical 

analysis indicates that the ability of the defense industry to deliver systems 

on time has been largely independent of overall RDT&E outlays. 

The bottom line is the US defense industry is interested in its bottom line—making a profit. The USAF must recognize this fact and shape 

its acquisition strategies accordingly. The defense industry must be encouraged to apply SAIV by using properly constructed incentive fee contracts to motivate on time product delivery. Similarly, defense contracts 

must be structured to penalize contractors when programs don’t meet 

schedule, principally by using liquidated damages assessment. To facilitate this, the USAF must ensure technologies are mature enough to guarantee fielding within a specified timeframe before contracting for their development. The benefits of this initiative are substantial, as it focuses contractors on technologies that can be delivered within five years, with riskier or emerging technologies incorporated in future spiral upgrades. This 

combination of positive and negative performance consequences with 

“time and technology assured” development will synergistically drive future schedule success. 

Over 90 years ago the US made a critical decision not to build 

military aircraft in large all-encompassing government arsenals but to in83
stead rely on the private sector to purchase the most advanced technologies available.82 The USAF must now use SAIV to ensure America’s current and future investment in military aviation reaps capability-enhancing, 

cost-effective results. The USAF, its aerospace industrial base, and America’s citizens cannot afford for the acquisition community’s current path of 

waste and inefficiency to continue. 

This research paper is limited to unclassified and previously classified acquisition programs which are now wholly unclassified. It assumes certain 

baseline knowledge of government/contractor relationships as well as an 

introductory understanding of the DOD 5000-series acquisition regulations. It also assumes future conflicts and threats will require the USAF to 

build more adaptive weapon systems. The study primarily focuses on 

USAF air-breathing weapon systems. Many space acquisition programs 

and satellite systems are classified due to their payloads. In addition, 

space acquisition has been historically DOD-centric with minimal commercial development activity available for comparison. However, since 

space acquisition is now dominated by a select number of defense contractors, the fifth section’s concept of incentivizing delivery performance 

through profit-driven competition against the calendar is still relevant. 

84
Problem Refinement and Consequences 

... there is just too much uncertainty in the Air Force’s 

plans. There are some great things planned, but it would 

be nice to know they will show up in the time frame [ the 

Air Force predicts.] 

 - Lt Gen Larry Dodgen, Head of US Army Missile Programs, February 200683

 Ever since the US Army Signal Corps’ Aeronautical Section contracted the Wright Brothers to develop heavier than air machines, there has 

always been an element of risk in the development and production of aerial systems. At times, as the role and predominance of aircraft in military 

doctrine and operational concepts evolved, the government procurement 

of these systems encountered setbacks and delays. Today, it appears 

nearly all major USAF acquisition programs are mired in an unprecedented cycle of schedule and cost overruns. Moreover, the consequences 

of today’s schedule overruns extend beyond their considerable effects on 

the delayed program itself. These schedule delays directly contribute to 

cost increases, increased budget instability, and intensified congressional 

oversight. They also prevent the evolution and fielding of critical emerging technologies and damage the USAF’s ability to contribute in an increasingly joint combat environment. 

Selected analysts on both the government and contractor sides of 

the defense industry contend that schedule delays and cost overruns are an 

inherent by-product of military purchasing and current concerns are 

merely consistent with past developments. Analysis indicates, however, 

that the procurement problems that began in the 1960s and heightened in 

the 1970s and 1980s are more prevalent now than ever. A RAND study of 

major DOD acquisition programs from the mid-1960s to 1993 indicated 

average cost growth fluctuated around 20 percent.84 Since the early 

1990s, despite numerous acquisition reform initiatives by the DOD and 

Congress, the problem has progressed to today’s current debacle of 42 

percent average cost growth.85 Indeed, the problem is getting even worse. 

The top five defense programs (of which the USAF owns four) have seen 

costs skyrocket from $281 billion to $521 billion during the last four 

years. The trend isn’t improving. In the past year alone, estimates of cost 

and time growth on those five programs increased 14 % and 6% respectively.86

85
This connection between development and production delays and 

overall cost growth should be of paramount concern for both USAF 

budget and combat personnel. As shown in Figure 1, there was a 1 to 1.05 

normalized relationship between unit schedule delay and unit cost growth 

in fighter development programs during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.b

This connection continued into the 1990s and 2000s with the development of the USAF and Navy’s premiere fighter programs, the F-22 

and the F-18E/F. While the F-22 has been plagued with schedule and cost 

overruns, the F-18E/F program met its major program milestones on 

schedule and has, as a result, seen negligible cost growth (Figure 2). A 

measurable amount of 

 

DCG = Developmental Cost Growth 

DSG = Developmental Schedule 

Growth 

Figure 1. Relationship of Developmental Cost and Schedule 

Growth87

this schedule-driven cost growth results from inflation factors in the contractor’s pricing, although it is certainly exacerbated by parts obsolescence 

costs, systems engineering inefficiencies, and subcontractor parts availability. These inflation factors affect both labor and material 

costs (e.g., with a mere 3 percent inflation, one hour of labor costing $100 

in 1999 will cost $109.27 in 2002). SAIV endeavors to control them both 

by demanding schedule adherence. 

These past program delays and cost overruns have led to increased 

publicity and, as a result, more congressional scrutiny. Beginning in the 

1960s, Congress began to take a keen interest in defense procurement. In 

1961, zero percent of the defense acquisition budget required specific 

 

b

 The AV-8B was a modification program versus a new development program and was 

treated as a dummy variable. 

86
congressional line authorization. This involvement grew to 70 percent in 

1967 and finally to 100 percent in 1983.88 However, this justifiable “crusade for reform” is obscured by a resultant political peddling of influence, 

as industry and politicians attempt to extract the maximum monetary benefits for their regions. This practice has become even 

more prevalent as the number of Washington DC lobbyists has doubled 

since 1999 to over 34,000, with over $2.4 billion in gifts being dolled 

out.89 As a result, Congress continues to delve deeper into DOD micromanagement. 

 

Program 

Estimate at Milestone 1 

Figure 2. Relationships of Fighter Program Schedule and 

Cost Growth90

 Congressional meddling, combined with the DOD’s inability to 

execute programs on time, has required the DOD to avert program cancellation by rebaselining or stretching out programs. This practice started 

during the late 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s. As a result, the average length of production runs for DOD fighters grew from 9.4 years in the 

1950s to over 18 years in the 1980s.91 Indeed, today 60 percent of the 

DOD’s major programs have had multiple baselines, with the F-22 having 

an astounding 15.92 

This practice of extending programs lengthens production runs and 

causes substantial unit cost growth. It is a symbiotic relationship that reduces buying power and results in fewer combat aircraft. To point, the B2 bomber’s first flight was originally scheduled for late 1987 but did not 

occur until July 1989, due to a wing redesign that cost the program a year 

and caused a major program rebaselining.93 In the end, the USAF bought 

just 21 of a planned 132 B-2s at over $1.1 billion a copy.94 While the B-2 

is a recent example of rebaselining leading to unit cost growth, diminished 

87
buying power, and the fielding of operationally-constrained “low density/high demand” assets, Table 2 indicates that similar concerns exist in 

the near future. 

Schedule delays also cause parts obsolescence issues, particularly 

in computer hardware. According to Moore’s Law, computing power 

doubles approximately every 18 months – a 

Table 2. Examples of USAF Acquisition Programs with Diminished Buying Power95

significant concern for development programs that stretch out for decades. 

As an example, the B-2’s computer architecture dates from 1984 when the 

first Macintosh computer was introduced; it was outmoded well before the 

bomber reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in late 1993. The B2’s microprocessors, used for critical flight management, stores management, and threat locating functions, utilize the military versions of the Intel 286 processor with merely 512KB of RAM. They are now operating at 

90 to 99 percent dynamic memory capacity and simply cannot support 

several of the B-2’s future planned enhancements.96 

Similarly, the F-22 program office is already addressing parts obsolescence issues through massive buys of 10-year old components while 

trying to find new vendors to produce and satisfy out-year spare parts requirements.97 This programmatic and funding concern is compounded by 

the effects of dependent technology, found in the parallel development of 

the F-22 and F-35, where Lockheed is relying on gains in one program to 

be integrated into the other. As a result, F-22 parts obsolescence issues 

have already delayed F-35 development.98 

 Finally, schedule delays are depriving combat forces of fielded 

systems. These delays have the dual effect of reducing immediate threat 

response capability while robbing users of baseline systems on which to 

rapidly insert emergent technologies such as data linked imagery or satellite target cueing. Recently, a fielding delay of the B-1B bomber’s latest 

88
software upgrade deprived US Central Command of a significant capability in the GWOT. Sustainment Block 10, which included the ability to 

carry and employ the 500-pound GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munition (a 

preferred weapon due to its GPS-aided accuracy and low collateral damage radius), was initially scheduled to be released in mid-2004 and utilized 

during Afghanistan and Iraq election support. However, due to development delays, not only was this enhancement not available for either election but it is yet to be fielded.99 This is merely one of an untold number of 

acquisition delays diminishing battlefield capability. USAF operators are 

used to making tradeoffs in employing weapon systems; however, they 

simply can’t do this without possessing the hardware to begin with. 

The USAF can no longer allow schedule delays to devastate its 

budgeting process, force manpower cuts, and shrink the number of fielded 

systems in attempts to pay for weapon systems cost overruns. It leads to a 

perception of low-density/high-demand specialization, which hurts USAF 

credibility in the joint arena. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “lowdensity/high-demand is nothing more than a euphemism for saying, ‘Our 

priorities were wrong, and we didn’t buy enough of what we need.’”100 

Whether schedule delays instigate cost growth or cost growth drives rebaselining and resultant schedule delays, SAIV provides the opportunity to 

control the interrelationship between the two. At a minimum, SAIV will 

drive discipline in delivery schedules—the programmatic element the warfighters in the field really care about. 

A Historical Perspective of Schedule Driven Programs—

They Can Work! 

Primary emphasis on RDT&E completion, production delivery, 

and IOC dates is not an entirely new concept to the USAF acquisition 

community. It has historically, however, usually received secondary attention to other programmatic variables. During the Cold War, operational performance was prime as USAF doctrine relied on technological 

superiority to deter the Soviet Union’s overwhelming numerical advantage. In the 1990s, after the Gulf War victory and the dissolution of the 

Soviet Union, the acquisition community responded to “peace dividend” 

downsized budgets by shifting its focus to cost.101 Program managers began extending schedules and trading off performance in efforts to maintain 

programs within cost. These attempts at using cost as an independent 

variable contributed to many of the massive delays and cost overruns addressed earlier. Yet, during and before these time periods, several schedule-driven programs fielded their systems on time. Analysis of these pro89
grams suggests using SAIV would help provide the USAF timely combat 

capability while assisting delivery within prescribed budgets. 

The initial period of aircraft innovation occurred between 1904, the 

year after the Wright Brothers’ first flight, and 1914. Aviation pioneers in 

the US and Europe produced spectacular advances in performance and, by 

the start of World War I, aircraft had already reached top speeds of nearly 

130 miles per hour. The British, Germans, and French rapidly transferred 

new technology into weapon systems, with companies competing to field 

their products first. As the war progressed, these countries developed the 

first true combat aircraft (both fighters and bombers) in brisk succession.102 This innovation continued at a blistering pace as five generations 

of fighter aircraft were developed while the European combatants struggled to gain and regain air superiority over the trenches.103 WW I was 

merely the first instance of combat spurring rapid aircraft development 

and production. 

After a relatively stagnant period in the interwar years, the mid1930s witnessed a burst of aircraft development and production. Stimulated by nearly $100 million a year in aviation research, the US commercial airline industry rapidly built several new models of high-performance 

passenger aircraft.104 These new technologies were soon applied to military aircraft (principally transports and bombers) as commercial companies competed to deliver the Army Air Corps aircraft in minimum time. 

Highlighting this drive for delivery was Boeing’s development of the B-17 

Flying Fortress, which progressed from concept to first flight in less than 

12 months.105

Dramatic advancements in both technological capability and production determination continued during WW II as developers exploited 

the enormous increases in performance made possible by turboprop and jet 

engines.106 For example, despite its quantum increase in performance, the 

renowned P-51 Mustang was developed in only 120 days.107 Also notable 

was the development and production of the first operational turbojet aircraft, the German Messerschmitt Me-262, which progressed from design 

to first flight in approximately eighteen months.108 Perhaps most remarkable is the design and prototype of the P-80, the first US jet fighter to go 

into service. Lockheed agreed to build the P-80 with a strict requirement 

of delivery 180 days after contract award, and its astonishing delivery in 

only 143 days stands in stark contrast with today’s decades-long aircraft 

development cycles.109

The late 1940s and early 1950s also saw a number of technologically advanced USAF weapon systems produced in minimal time. The B52 bomber, conceived in 1946, was developed, redesigned several times 

90
due changing USAF requirements, prototyped, and flown in less than six 

years. Its nuclear weapon-capable, high-altitude, high-subsonic, intercontinental design was a generational advance in integrated avionics, aircraft 

materials, and propulsion systems.110 The bomber’s development was expedited by its official DOD designation as a BRICKBATc

 category S program, which directed B-52 delivery milestones a “highest national priority.”111 Next, the Korean War was instrumental in promoting intense 

competition in supersonic technology, leading to the development of six 

new aircraft that became known as the “Century Series” fighters. From 

their contractual authorization between mid-1951 and 1953, the complex 

F-100 series fighters achieved numerous aviation firsts, with all reaching 

IOC within five years.112 Ironically, the rapid fielding of these technological advances was accomplished without the benefit of today’s computer-aided design, computational fluid dynamics, and information cybernetworking. 

The 1957 Russian launch of Sputnik created a firestorm in the defense acquisition community. For the first time, America’s perception of 

technological superiority was challenged. The ensuing race to launch satellites and men into space elevated schedule to the primary programmatic 

driver for a number of USAF and NASA programs. Chief among them 

was the development and fielding of ICBMs, with a stated program goal 

of realizing IOC within six years. The Minuteman missile program benefited from this management focus and went from contract award to delivery to Strategic Air Command in four years.113 Similarly impressive, the 

hypersonic SR-71 spy plane, with its 80,000-foot plus service ceiling, radar absorbing material, and revolutionary use of titanium, proceeded from 

contract award to flying operations in less than five years.114 It is evident 

that if provided the right incentives, the defense industry can field technological breakthroughs in a responsive manner. 

Historical analysis, however, yields one notable exception to 

schedule-driven success. The 1960s’ C-5 Galaxy program had specific 

operational constraints, the foremost being total aircraft weight, and a specific schedule milestone of IOC in 1969. The program, utilizing a soon 

 

c BRICKBAT refers to those DOD programs designated by the President as being of the 

highest national priority. BRICKBAT programs are listed in a classified DOD document 

called the Master Urgency List.

91
discarded “total procurement package” strategy,d

 was plagued with delays 

and cost overruns as Lockheed speciously reduced weight by using thinner 

wing boxes.115 These structures proved to be grossly insufficient, leading 

to massive cost overruns, a delayed IOC, and, ultimately, a $250 million 

government bailout.116 Lockheed was never held accountable for its broken contractual requirements, an issue SAIV’s contract provisions would 

fix. 

Although not prevalent in today’s acquisition programs, examples 

of contractually-mandated schedule adherence do exist. The F-22 System 

Program Office is using schedule as the primary driver for its December 

2006 spiral-2 software update. The program is on schedule for delivery to 

Air Combat Command and is one of the few procurement highlights of the 

Raptor program.117 The USAF’s Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) program 

has used schedule adherence even more extensively. The SDB program 

office received direct guidance from former USAF Chief of Staff General 

John Jumper mandating asset availability to the Combat Air Forces in 

2006. The program office developed a “Schedule is #1” rallying cry and 

awarded contracts with incentives for key milestone completions such as 

hardware delivery for operational test. As a direct result, the SDB program has met all of its original baseline cost and schedule estimates.118

 Finally, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs have utilized 

schedule-driven strategies to rapidly insert technology into the GWOT 

battlefield. Responding to a USAF request, Lockheed designed and delivered the Desert Hawk UAV to US Central Command in only 127 days. 

The cost of the six drones, a laptop-based control system, and the support 

equipment totaled a reasonable $400,000.119 Similar rapid technology development and insertion has occurred in the integration of new sensors and 

Hellfire missiles on selected Predator UAVs. The 

acquisition community’s responsiveness to these schedule-compelled programs provides optimism towards the more prevalent use of SAIV in the 

future. 

 Successful examples of schedule-driven programs all share a collective USAF/contractor motivation to rapidly deliver quality weapon systems to the field. Whether this motivation came from wartime demands or 

competition-driven contract incentives, the defense industry has, in the 

past, demonstrated the ability to produce weapon systems of significant 

 

d

 Total Procurement Package required simultaneous bidding for both the development 

and production stages as a means of preventing the winning contractor of the development stage from facing little or no competition during the second stage. It was found to 

be ineffective and the concept was abandoned in 1966. 

92
complexity on strict development and production schedules. To correct 

the USAF’s current troubled acquisition culture, the principle of SAIV 

aims to synergistically couple today’s renewed defense emphasis with 

competitive programmatic incentives, thereby ensuring schedule adherence. 

93
Debunking the Hollow Myths 

... acquisition is not off track ... We’ve got to put things in 

perspective. The Air Force and its contractors are developing complex machines and the environment we put [systems] into is very hostile and unforgiving ... 

- Boeing Vice President George Muellner, September 2005120

Designating schedule as a first order driver requires dispelling 

some myths about past and present USAF acquisition programs. Chief 

among these is the assertion today’s military weapon systems are too 

complex and multifaceted to adhere to disciplined procurement schedules. 

While it’s true military aircraft have become more complex, the argument 

ignores the comparable increases in complexity of commercial systems 

and an analysis of military complexity versus the accelerated state of technology as a whole. Similarly, the assertion that schedule compliance can 

only be achieved when defense budgets are robust is unsupported. History indicates the ability of the defense industry to deliver systems on time 

has been largely independent of overall RDT&E outlays. Finally, some 

acquisition reformers have advocated increasing concurrency in development and production to solve schedule delays. While useful in some areas, concurrency has proven to be a catalyst for programmatic disaster in 

others. 

Today’s Air Force Systems Are Too Complex 

As technological change has accelerated and the global economy 

has exploded in the last decade, the military has become less relevant as a 

driver of technology. In the mid-1980s defense R&D accounted for over 

46 percent of the national investment. By 1997, however, it had diminished to 30 percent and it continues to decline today. Once the dominant 

buyer of microelectronics accounting for almost 70 percent of industry 

sales in the 1960s, the DOD now accounts for less than 1 percent of microelectronic sales and R&D.121 This trend is particularly significant for 

the USAF, which has taken 15 to 20 years to field new systems like the B2 and F-22. Excepting niche elements such as stealth (which, in itself, 

had been previously explored by the fielded F-117 fighter), many cutting 

edge technologies on the B-2 and F-22 at program start were merely 

commercially standard by the time they were delivered. 

Historically, software development has been a problem area for 

military aircraft developers, consuming about 40 percent of the USAF’s 

RDT&E budget. A 1999 study indicated the average software schedule 

94
overrun was 222 percent of the original estimate.122 These overruns are 

commonly justified by stating that performance requirements for weapon 

systems are evermore demanding and thus cause greater reliance on software. As evidence, one could point to the fact software provided about 10 

percent of an F-4’s functionality in the 1960s but provides over 80 percent 

of an F-22’s.123 This evolution of software reliance is valid but neglects 

the reality that technology in the commercial sector has also evolved to 

rely extensively on complex software. While the F-22’s integrated avionics has received publicity both for its touted complexity and its problematic in-flight shutdowns, it is largely comparable with the Eurofighter in 

the size of its flight program software (Table 3). 

 F-22: 2.2 million Eurofighter 2000: 2 million 

C-17: 1.3 million Boeing 777: 4 million 

Table 3. Operational Flight Program Software Lines of Code 

Comparison124

A comparison of the development and manufacture of Boeing’s 

777 and McDonnell Douglas’s C-17, the most prominent outsized commercial and military aircraft of recent production, also reveals the fallacy 

of the military technological superiority argument. While the C-17 was 

certainly the most advanced strategic aircraft the USAF has produced to 

date, the 777 was similarly an order of magnitude increase in technology 

and design methodology. 

The two aircraft, both of which reached IOC in 1995, are remarkably similar in levels of technological innovation. The C-17, the first 

USAF transport to introduce a complete fly-by-wire system, includes 

heads-up displays and a short takeoff and landing capability (STOL).125 

The 777, Boeing’s first fly-by-wire aircraft, used composite materials extensively and was equipped with a two-way digital data bus and advanced 

liquid-crystal displays. The first completely computer-designed aircraft, 

the 777 was also the first US two-engine aircraft to immediately receive 

extended-range twin engine operations (ETOPS) certification.e

 Yet, despite these similarities, the C-17 took six years longer to field than the 777 

and cost over $80 million more per copy.126 A key distinction between 

the programs was Boeing’s profit-driven motivation to develop and deliver aircraft on schedule to fulfill requirements of its first 777 customer, 

United Airlines.127 While McDonnell Douglas received cost payments 

 

e

 Federal Aviation Administration ETOPS certification allowed the twin-engine 777 to 

fly up to three hours from the nearest airport - key to lucrative flights such as from the 

mainland to Hawaii and from Japan to Singapore. The FAA usually restricts aircraft to 

one hour for their first year. 

95
and profit on the C-17 during its development, Boeing recognized no income or profit during the 777’s RDT&E. 

Similar results are revealed when comparing the 53-month development of the $21million per copy Boeing 747 and the 87-month development of the $50 million per copy Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, both of which 

achieved IOC in 1970 (Figure 3).128 Again the distinction is clear. On 

government contracts, most contractors not only receive funding to cover 

their costs during overruns but also continue to receive their contract profit 

percentages. Thus, while USAF contractors tend to stay in RDT&E 

longer and are practically rewarded for doing so, the commercial aircraft 

industry is demonstrably motivated to get out of the RDT&E phases and 

into aircraft production. As a result, one must ask if development “complexity” is just a convenient excuse for the defense industry’s lack of 

urgency and resolve during RDT&E. 

 C-17 Globemaster: 14+ Years (179 months) C-5 Galaxy: 7+ years (87 

months) 

 Figure 3. Comparisons of Military vs. Commercial Aircraft Development129

Schedule Adherence Only Occurs During Defense Funding Surges 

A common myth attempts to tie periods of rapid aircraft development and delivery to surges in defense spending. While military spending 

has fluctuated from year to year, the long-term pattern in “constant” dollars adjusted for inflation has been surprisingly stable, excepting the early 

96
1940s of WW II.130 This is especially true for USAF RDT&E expenditures, as illustrated in Figure 4. 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Billion Dollars

Then Year Dollars Constant 1952 Dollars

Figure 4. USAF RDT&E Budget Authorizations131

 As shown, the successful fielding of the Century Series fighters in 

the early 1950s and the development of the ICBM fleet in the late 1950s 

and 1960s were largely independent of significant development funding 

outlays. In addition, the huge funding increases of the 1980s’ Reagan defense build-up did little to motivate industry performance, as evidenced by 

numerous C-17 program delays and the Navy’s cancelled A-12 program. 

Moreover, while USAF production funding did surge significantly during 

the Korean and Vietnam wars, RDT&E funding did not significantly increase during any of the major post-WW II conflicts. During these periods, it was competition and the possibility of large production contract 

profits, not appreciably larger outlays in development funding, which 

drove aircraft companies to rapidly develop, prototype, and produce new 

designs. 

Increased Concurrency Leads to Faster Schedules 

The defense industry has attempted, at times, to reduce program 

schedules by utilizing concurrent development practices. Here, typically 

serial activities such as development, testing, and production become 

varying degrees of parallel activities. This procedure was used successfully on rocket development in the late 1950s but became problematic in 

the 1960s when applied to large integration projects such as the C-5 and F111.132 It was resurrected in the 1980s when the Soviet threat was paramount and was justified on the basis of getting weapon systems to the 

field quickly to counter the USSR. 

This over-reliance on concurrency, however, led to several major 

program delays and cancellations, such as the A-12, and the fielding of 

hollow weapon systems. For instance, the B-2 program used concurrency throughout its acquisition cycle, but its use systematically intensi97
fied as the program’s engineering, manufacturing, and development 

(EMD) phase increasingly slipped and overlapped into its developmental 

testing phase. Concurrency problems arose again later as setbacks in production caused considerable manufacturing work to be accomplished after 

B-2s were delivered to the Air Force for operational testing. In fact, the 

first B-2 delivered required about 230,000 hours of additional manufacturing work at the test site.133 Unfortunately, the end result of the B-2’s concurrency initiative was that the program concurrently experienced difficulties during development, testing, and production which contributed to its 

rebaselining and, ultimately, a reduced number of fielded aircraft. 

The B-1B bomber program was planned and executed as a 100 

percent concurrent program. After the Reagan administration restarted the 

cancelled B-1A program in 1981, B-1B RDT&E and production were 

launched at the same time.134 It turned out the aircraft was not ready for 

production, however, and the B-1B endured years of costly modifications 

to its flight control software and defensive avionics systems. As these 

post-production integration problems dragged on, the aircraft soon gained 

the reputation as a weapon system not ready for combat. 

After these programs, the Pentagon realized using concurrency to develop 

highly technically integrated systems was too risky; thus, it has been reluctant to use concurrency on the F-22 and F-35 programs. The issue continues to arise, however, as continual F-22 and F-35 development delays 

drive desires to use concurrency as a panacea to get schedules back on 

track. A better method is to apply SAIV to incentivize schedule adherence 

and discipline from the onset and to eliminate the delays that ultimately 

compound across a program’s lifetime. 

98
Schedule as an Independent Variable Implementation 

...The Chief of Staff said he is down on acquisition programs whose costs continue to rise ‘exponentially’ with no 

end in sight and he’s willing to cancel programs if they 

can’t be brought under control ... If a program shows no 

sign that it can be managed, his impulse would be to kill it. 

- General Michael Moseley quoted at the American Enterprise Institute, October 2005135

A fundamental cause of schedule and cost overruns is the USAF’s 

familiar practice of awarding contracts largely on the basis of lowest bid 

cost. As a result, contractors often perceive the need to bid low to obtain 

contracts and underestimate the cost and schedule requirements of a program. This phenomenon is particularly insidious in the defense industry, 

where there are quasi-monopolies and reliance on competition is often 

limited to the initial bidding and contract award process. Additionally, the 

intervals between major orders often cause losing companies to abandon 

specific areas of defense or drive consolidation, especially since the complexity of systems make entry costs high. The 1993 to 1999 reduction of 

major fighter, bomber, and helicopter contractors from twelve to five is 

partial evidence of this effect.136 Reduced competition means less incentive to deliver systems on time, while fewer major programs actually induce contractors to suckle on existing programs for as long as possible. 

SAIV provides the incentives and penalties needed to ensure a new paradigm of competition—competition against the calendar—and consists of 

three main elements. 

1. Incentives for positive contractor performance 

 2. Penalties for poor contractor performance 

 3. “Time and technology assured” development ... the five 

year test 

Incentives for Positive Contractor Performance 

Ensuring schedule adherence begins during contractor selection 

where increased emphasis must be placed on proposals with shorter periods of performance, particularly given the relationship between program 

length and cost growth. Next, the type of contract selected should motivate contractors to optimize performance while ensuring the maximum 

degree of budgetary stability. Fixed price contracts are often appropriate 

where performance standards are well defined; most production contracts 

utilize this pricing methodology. Cost reimbursement contracts are fre99
quently used where goods and services can only be defined in general 

terms or when complex or unique systems require a specific level of performance.137 RDT&E contracts use these “cost-plus” contracts extensively. In both cases, profit is usually based on a set percentage of the 

fixed price or projected cost. Thus, there are few mechanisms in place, 

particularly in cost reimbursement programs where the government habitually pays cost overruns, to reward or penalize contractor performance. 

Incentive contracts, which represent only about four percent of the 

DOD’s contracting, provide one means to reward contractors for on time 

or early delivery.138 Defense contractors are generally not fond of incentive contracts, particularly ones with quantitative requirements such as 

schedule milestones or number of systems delivered, due to their exacting 

standards. They often prefer award fee mechanisms which are largely 

based on more nebulous factors such as “management responsiveness.”139 

SAIV-based incentive contracts, however, will drive discipline into the 

schedule by helping ensure original program timelines are accurate, which 

in turn would enable the budgeting process and production phasing to be 

more accurate as well. 

A critical element of SAIV is making profit incentives high enough 

to compel performance. While typical profit percentages for both cost and 

fixed price contracts range between eight and twelve percent, it is essential 

for SAIV-driven contracts to have incentive fees sufficient to compel on 

time execution—approximately 20 percent for on time performance with 

graduated increases to 25 percent for early delivery. For instance, Lockheed would receive a nominal profit of 2 to 3 percent for a research and 

development contract with an incentive of an additional 18 percent for on 

time prototype delivery and 22 percent for a three-month early delivery. 

This would motivate a margin conscious contractor to focus his resources 

on areas of developing concern, including allocating company funds, if 

necessary, to meet incentive fee schedules. 

The Santa Monica freeway repair following the 1994 Northridge 

earthquake serves as a model for this methodology. Potential bidders projected a completion time for their efforts and were informed that if work 

was completed after the established date, they would be penalized but if it 

was completed early, they would receive a bonus. The penalty/bonus incentive was set at $200,000 per day. The winning contractor, CC Meyers, 

made schedule adherence the key to its construction strategy by hiring extra crews, paying overtime, and chartering transportation for supplies. Although these measures extended CC Meyers $14.9 million cost budget 

slightly, the repairs were completed 74 days early, garnering the company 

a $14.5 million bonus. Because the state of California estimated that the 

100
freeway’s closure cost Los Angeles’ economy $1 million a day, the 

speediness of completion may have saved the state as much as $34 million.140

This freeway repair highlights another key to the incentive fee 

strategy—payments must be based on major milestone completions and 

not time-phased. Additionally, the current policy of allowing provisional 

incentive fee payments based on percentage of work accomplished must 

be eliminated.141 Presently, contractors can receive 75 percent of the incentive fee if a program is on schedule at the 75 percent point, even if the 

program’s highest risk is in the final 25 percent of the development. As 

the latter stages of a program usually focus on system integration, historically an area of delay, this time-phased approach is financially inconsistent with responsible systems engineering, 

To enact these incentive procedures, the USAF will be required to 

budget in anticipation of the contractor meeting program milestones on 

schedule (or early if there is an early delivery consideration). As a result, 

the program office must ensure sufficient funds are available to cover the 

contingent liability created in any specific incentive fee period. However, 

with a change to acquisition law, a potential benefit exists if incentive fees 

are not awarded. It provides the USAF the opportunity to utilize a portion 

of the unused incentive funds as management reserve in other contract areas of the program, if necessary. 

Penalties for Poor Contractor Performance 

Utilizing SAIV methodology, late performance in itself would affect a company through lost incentive fees and profit. However, when incentives are coupled with a penalty instrument for late delivery, the USAF 

is fully equipped to stimulate contractor performance. The USAF should 

employ liquidated damages clauses as tools for this two-fold contractor 

motivation. 

Liquidated damages are a little used provision of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). They may be used for services, research and 

development, and construction when “time of delivery or timely performance is so important the government may reasonably expect to suffer damage if the delivery or performance is not met.” This performance schedule 

may be expressed “in terms of specific calendar dates or specific periods 

from the date of contract award.” While not specifically punitive, liquidated damages compensate the government for “probable damages” in 

cases where an exact damage amount is difficult to prove, such as when 

research and development delays drive extensions or delays in subsequent 

program elements.142

The USAF must first establish the appropriate liquidated damages 

101
rate; two possible approaches are an inflation-based rate and a comparative rate. When utilizing the inflation-based rate, the USAF should adopt 

the higher of the producer price index (PPI) and the employment cost index (ECI)f

 rate.143 This would help ensure the USAF receives consideration for worst case inflationary cost increases caused by contractor delay. 

The comparative rate codifies a relationship between historical cost and 

schedule delays of similar aircraft or products, such as the 1.05 to 1 delay 

relationship previously shown for fighter aircraft, and assesses damages 

based on this rate. (For this 1.05 to 1 relationship, the damage rate would 

be 5%). Table 4 gives an example of these rates applied to a $10 million, 

48-month long fighter development program that is 24 months late, assuming a 2.0% PPI, a 2.2% ECI, and a 1.05 to 1 cost to schedule delay 

relationship. The USAF should utilize either inflation-based or comparative rate liquidated damages for its RDT&E contracts and could, in fact, 

look to recoup RDT&E liquidated damages on follow-on production contracts. Conversely, the inflation-based rate should be used for production 

contracts. Table 5 details a program with $200 million yearly purchases 

that is 24 months late and assumes a 2.2% PPI. 

 Liquidated damages = (Delay Length) * (Program Cost) * (Liquidated Damage Rate) 

 Inflation-based rate damage: (24 months / 12 months) * $10,000,000 * 2.2% = $ 

440,000 

 Comparative rate damage: (24 months / 48 months) * $10,000,000 * 5% = $ 

250,000 

 * Inflation rate uses 12 months as the basis for delay length while the comparative rate 

uses overall program length* 

Table 4. Development Contract Inflation vs. Comparative 

Rate Damage Assessment 

 Liquidated damages = (Delay Length) * (Program Cost) * (Liquidated Damage Rate) 

 Inflation-based rate damage: (24 months / 12 months) * $200,000,000 * 2.2% = 

$ 8.8 million 

 *For production contracts, the yearly production value is the program 

cost variable * 

Table 5. Production Contract Damage Rate Assessment 

While canceling a program experiencing extreme cost and schedule overruns (done recently to the Army’s $8 billion spy-plane program) 

sends an unmistakable message to the defense industry, it ultimately de-

 

f

 PPI measures changes in the wholesale prices of finished goods. ECI measures changes 

in wages, salaries and benefits for civilian workers (private industry plus state and local 

government). 

102
prives the services of needed systems.144 Assessing damages for unsatisfactory performance, even if they are merely credited via post-production 

support equipment or services contracts, provides the USAF its required 

assets, keeps the aerospace industry more viable, and demonstrates USAF 

resolve for better performance in the future.

 “Time and Technology Assured” Development 

To secure SAIV’s success and alleviate concerns over complexity, 

the USAF must ensure a program’s technology is mature enough to realize 

fielding within five years of the program’s Milestone A decision. This 

assessment must occur prior to entering the Milestone B development 

phase. Programs whose technology is found to lack sufficient maturity 

would require further program and concept refinement. It is critical that 

this test be passed before advancing the program any further down the acquisition trail. A realistic fielding assessment would serve as a catalyst for 

SAIV’s success by requiring better defined programs from the outset and 

adding increased fidelity to program schedule baselines. 

This time and technology assured strategy, especially in today’s 

environment of accelerating change, will require mechanisms to ensure 

technology is mature enough for incorporation into USAF weapons programs. The mandated use of open architecture systems will better facilitate computing power advances while the increased use of computer modeling should assist in earlier and more successful component integration. 

Increased funding in science and technology, through the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA), will also be required to accelerate and mature technological 

advances. Overall, this early investment in maturing technology will reduce schedule risk and cost later. 

To be sure, time and technology assured development is a major 

paradigm shift which may require the USAF to relax its “100 percent solution” mindset and accept that riskier technologies be fielded through a 

program’s future spiral upgrades. The USAF recently acknowledged this, 

as Chief of Staff General Mike Moseley froze the design of the F-22 at its 

present configuration to reduce costs and allow for the funding of four additional airplanes.145 The USAF should also expect a certain degree of 

requirements pushback and scrutiny from contractors as they attempt to 

better define what can be technologically assured. The benefits of this initiative are substantial, however, as it incentivizes contractors to focus on 

technologies that will actually be delivered within five years. 

103
Conclusion 

They [the Pentagon budget personnel] can almost live with 

the cost increase since I am guaranteeing the system’s delivery on time. They seem to understand if it’s not on time; 

the cost will increase anyway... 

Major Bill McGuffey, ASC/SDLGSSS, February 2006146

In promoting the use of Schedule as an Independent Variable, the 

USAF will rely on one of the basic principles of capitalism—competition 

engenders enhanced performance. SAIV explicitly links the contractor’s 

schedule performance to profit and motivates it to compete against its sole 

competition ... the government’s timeline and calendar. The benefits of 

this approach are far reaching. It will provide the USAF more immediate 

combat capability, provide discipline and stability to the budgeting process, likely reduce total program costs, and possibly reduce Congress’s vigorous involvement in the acquisition process. 

SAIV is a comprehensive approach to ensuring schedule. It 

merges the incentives of profit with the contractual teeth of unsatisfactory 

performance penalties while stipulating technological maturity. Its fiveyear time and technology assurance strategy, combined with increased science and technology funding, will refine the USAF’s technological fruits 

until they are mature enough to be delivered in a reasonable time period. 

This will help ensure the USAF builds more adaptive systems that are not 

immediately obsolete due to long acquisition timelines. 

 The stakes are high for the Air Force. The DOD currently has 

more than $1 trillion worth of major acquisition programs in development 

and production, with the USAF having the largest share.147 The F-35 

Joint Strike Fighter alone has a lifetime price tag of $240 billion. Of further concern, for the first time a single prime contractor will be involved in 

designing and developing a new aircraft to meet the manned fighter needs 

of three services for decades.148 Looking back, if the F-22’s baseline 

schedule had been measurably adhered to, the USAF would be currently 

receiving its 350th of 750 planned Raptors rather than celebrating a 3-

month old IOC with 20-plus aircraft of a now-planned 183.149 The USAF 

must act now to prevent becoming marginalized as a hollow service without any significant or relevant capabilities. SAIV provides the tools to do 

just that. 

104
Glossary 

AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

ECI Employment Cost Index 

EMD Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development 

ETOPS Extended Range Twin-Engine Operations 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

GPS Global Positioning System 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IOC Initial Operational Capability 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

PPI Producer Price Index 

RAM Random Accessed Memory 

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

SAIV Schedule as an Independent Variable 

SDB Small Diameter Bomb 

STOL Short Takeoff and Landing Capability 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

USAF United States Air Force 

105
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106
Endnotes, Chapters 2 and 3 

 

1. Maj Dan Ward and Maj Chris Quaid, It’s About Time, 14 

2. Norman R. Augustine, Augustine’s Laws, 208 

3. Jacques S. Gansler, Affording Defense, 172 

4. R. W. Hess et al., Estimating the Cost of Advanced Technology, 4 

5. Alexander C. Hou, Toward Lean Hardware/Software System Development: 

Evaluation of Selected Complex Electronic System Development Methodologies, 21 

6. Bruno J. Manz and Kenneth W. Smith, Platform Vs. Weapon Complexity: How 

to Trade Platform Versus Weapon Improvement Budgets, 1 

7. Ibid., 2-3 

8. LCDR Robert E. Lowe, Estimating the Relationships between the State of the Art 

of Technology and Production Cost for U.S. Aircraft, 48-49 

9. Robert B. Grady and Deborah L. Caswell, Software Metrics: Establishing a 

Company-Wide Program, 192 

10. Tyson R. Browning, Modeling and Analyzing Cost, Schedule, and Performance 

in Complex System Product Development, 32 

11. Ibid., 33 

12. Lowe, 31 

13. Ibid., 15-16 

14. Ibid., 48 

15. J. Davidson Frame, The New Project Management: Tools for an Age of Rapid 

Change, Complexity, and other Business Realities, 26 

16. Ibid. 

17. M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order 

and Chaos, 11 

18. Ibid., 12 

19. Frame, 24 

20. Waldrop, 12 

21. George H. Perino Jr., Complexity: A Cognitive Barrier to Defense Systems Acquisition Management, 4 

22. Ibid. 

23. Frame, 28 

24. Col Steve Suddarth, Solving the Great Air Force Systems Irony, 7 

25. R. W. Hess et al., Estimating the Cost of Advanced Technology, 23-24 

26. Frame, 25 

27. Thomas U. Pimmler and Steven D. Eppinger. Integration Analysis of Product 

Decompositions, 4 

28. Walter Perry et al., Network-Based Operations for the Swedish Defense Forces, 

64 

29. Norman R. Augustine, Augustine’s Laws, 92 

30. Ibid. 

31. Ibid., 94 

32. Hou, 21 

33. Ibid., 21-22 

34. Mark Nissen, Post Deployment Software Support and Configuration Management, 22 

40. David K. Stumpf, Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program, 4-5 

107
 

41. R. W. Hess et al., Estimating the Cost of Advanced Technology, 10 

42. Ibid., 11 

43. Ibid., 10 

44. Cited in Hess, 17 

45. Jeffrey A. Drezner et al, An Analysis of Weapon System Cost Growth, 40 

46. Ibid., 40 

47. McNutt, 350 

48. Ibid., 351 

49. Dr. Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security, 42 

50. Ibid., 60 

51. Cited in Eric K. Nelson, Independent Schedule Assessment FSD Study, 2-9 

52. Ibid., 2-8, 2-9 

53. Lt Col Steven C. Suddarth, Solving the Great Air Force Systems Irony, 6-8 

54. Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) BLU-113 Penetrator

55. Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) BLU-113 Penetrator

56. BLU-118/B Thermobaric Weapon

57. Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at 

Lockheed, 57 

58. F-117A Nighthawk

59. Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) BLU-113 Penetrator

60. Rich and Janos, 45 

61. Ibid., 46 

62. Cited in Robert Graybill, High Productivity Computing Systems Program, 5 

63. Robert B. Grady and Deborah L. Caswell, Software Metrics: Establishing a 

Company-Wide Program, 192-194 

64. Hou, 42 

65. Jeffrey T. Tondreault, Improving the Management of System Development to 

Produce More Affordable Military Avionics Systems, 61 

66. Ibid., 62-63 

67. Ibid., 67 

68. Alan D. Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War, 

163 

69. Limiting the size of teams has been a maxim of multiple development leaders 

including Kelly Johnson and Ben Rich. See Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos. Skunk Works: 

A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed, 51 

70. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 117 

71. Drezner is one of the many. See Jeffrey A. Drezner et al., An Analysis of 

Weapon System Cost Growth, 40-44 

72. Clausewitz, 119 

73. Tondreault, 80 

74. Clausewitz, 119 

75. Jacob Neufeld, Bernard A. Schriever: Challenging the Unknown, 19-20 

76. Ibid., 19 

77. Ibid., 17 

78. Lt Col Steven C. Suddarth, Solving the Great Air Force Systems Irony, 11 

108
 

79. APDP requires 4 years of acquisition experience for Level-III certification, but 

from the author's personal experience it can be easily obtained without any experience 

through the use of waivers. 

75. Adam J. Herbert. “The Air Force Sharpens Its Edge.” Air Force Magazine, November 2005, 36. 

76. Department of Defense. Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Executive 

Summary. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2005), 2. 

77. US Government Accountability Office. Report to the Congressional Committees: 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. (Washington 

DC, March 2005), 5. 

78. Donald J. Hoffman. Military Deputy, Office of the Asst Secretary US Air Force. 

Statement before House Armed Services Committee, 2 November 2005. 

79. US Government Accountability Office, Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 

Programs, 5. 

80. Tamar A. Mehuron. “USAF Almanac 2005” Air Force Magazine, (May 2005), 

63-65. and Department of Defense FY 2007 Budget. 

www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/ fy2007 html. (accessed 14 February 2006). 

81. Jacon Neufeld. Research and Development in the United States Air Force. 

(Washington DC: Center for Air Force History, 1993), 59. 

82. John J. Hamre. “Realities of Today Demand a New Defense Acquisition Reform.” Aviation Week and Space Technology. 28 November 2005, 74. 

83. Andy Pasztor. “U.S.’s Lofty Plans for Smart Satellites Fall Back to Earth.” Wall 

Street Journal, 11 February 2006, 1. As printed in DOD Early Bird. 

84. Captain Mark A. Holbrook. “An Analysis of the Implementation of Acquisition 

Reform Initiatives and Contract Cost Variance.” (Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2003), 2. 

85. Jeff Child. “Summer of DOD Acquisition Reform.” COTS Journal. 

http://www.cotsjournaloneline.com/home/article (accessed 16 January 2006). 

86. Ibid. 

87. Karen W. Tyson. “Understanding Cost and Schedule Growth in Acquisition Programs.” (Study prepared for the Institute for Defense Analyses, July 1994), IV-12. 

88. Barry M. Blechman. The Politics of National Security. Congress and U.S. Defense Policy. (New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1990), 31. 

89. “Congress: Does Corruption Have a Cure?” The Week. 3 February 2006, 4. 

90. Obaid Younossi, David Stern, Mark Lorell, and Frances M. Lussier. Lessons 

Learned 

 from the F/A-22 and F/A-18E/F Development Programs. (Rand Study, 2005), 7. 

91. Tyson, “Understanding Cost and Schedule Growth,” III-36. 

92. US Government Accountability Office. Defense Acquisitions: Information for 

Congress on Performance of Major Programs Can Be More Complete, Timely, Accessible. Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. (Washington DC, March 

2005), 8.

93. Bill Sweetman, Northrop B-2 Stealth Bomber. (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1992), 83. 

94. US House of Representatives. Status of the B-2 Stealth Bomber Program. Hearing before the Committee of the Armed Services. 102nd Cong., 1st sesson, 1991, 25. and 

109
 

B-2 Factsheet. http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82/. (accessed 4 March 

2006). 

95. US Government Accountability Office, Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 

Programs, 4. 

96. Barry D. Watts. Moving Forward On Long Range Strike. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 27 September 2004), 17. 

97. C.D. Ebersole (Chief Engineer, F-22 SPO), interview by the author. 10 February 

2006. 

98. Ibid. 

99. Major Michael Miller, Chief of 28 Bomb Squadron Weapons and Tactics. Interview by the author. 21 February 2006. 

100. Robert S. Dudney. “Questions for Rumsfeld’s Pentagon.” Air Force Magazine, 

October 2005, 2.

101. Anthony Potts. “Acquisition Excellence.” Defense AT&L, March/April, 2004. 

102. Mark Lorell. The U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry. (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 6, 13-15. 

103. Dr. Bert Frandsen, “AP 501” (lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB AL, 15 November 2005). 

104. Michael H. Gorn. Vulcan’s Forge: The Making of an Air Force Command for 

Weapons Acquisition. (Andrews AFB, MD: Officer of History, October 1986), xiv. 

105. Jacob Neufeld. Research and Development in the United States Air Force, 23. 

and http://www.boeing.com/history/boeing/b17.html

106. Lorell, U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry, 61. 

107. Ibid., 52. 

108. Jacob Neufeld. Technology and the Air Force: A Retrospective Assessment. 

(Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 8. 

109. William H. Gregory. The Defense Procurement Mess. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 166. 

110. Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: the Politics of the US Strategic Bomber Program. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 108-160. 

111. Lori S. Tagg. Development of the B-52: The Wright Field Story. (WrightPatterson AFB, OH: Aeronautical System Center History Office, 2004), 81. 

112. Lorell, U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry, 71; Lori S. Tagg, On the Front Line of 

R & D: Wright-Patterson AFB in the Korean War: 1950-1953. (Wright-Patterson 

AFB, OH: Aeronautical System Center History Office, 2001). 

113. Neufeld, Research and Development in the United States Air Force, 62; Gorn, 

Vulcan’s Forge, 39. 

114. Colonel Richard H. Graham. SR-71 Revealed: The Inside Story. (Osceola, WI: 

Motorbooks International, 1996), 41-49. 

115. Ronald J. Fox. The Defense Management Challenge. (Boston, MA: Harvard 

Business School Press, 1988), 42-49. 

116. Dina Rasor. More Bang, Less Bucks: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons. (Washington DC: Fund for Constitutional Government, 1983), 318. 

117. Ebersole, interview by the author, 10 February 2006. 

118. William M. Wise (Senior Acquisition Engineer, Small Diameter Bomb), personal 

110
 

email and interview by the author, 1 March 2006. 

119. Jonathan Karp. “One Small Step for Drones.” The Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2006, B1-2. 

120. Adam J. Herbert. “High Anxiety.” Air Force Magazine, January 2006, 37. 

121. Tony Kausal. A Comparison of the Defense Acquisition Systems of the France, 

United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. (Ft Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems 

Management College Press, 1999), 4-60. 

122. US Government Accountability Office. Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices are Needed to Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. US Senate. (Washington DC: March 2004), 1, 8. 

123. Ibid., 4. 

124. Bruce Peet (ASC/YFAA) Personal Email, 21 February 2006. and Introduction 

to Ada Symposium. www.ada-france.org/IMG/sxi/presentation_ada-en.sxi (accessed 2 

March 2006). and C-17 Globemaster III History www.globalsecurity.org/military/ systems/aircraft/c-17-history.htm - 32k (accessed 2 March 2006). and Ron J. Peterson. Software Development for the Boeing 777, Cross Talk, January 1996. 

http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/1996/01/Boeing777. asp (accessed 1 March 2006). 

125. Lee A. Battershell. The DOD C-17 versus the Boeing 777. (Washington DC: 

National Defense University, October 1999), 12. 

126. Ibid., 42, 44. and C-17 Factsheet. 

http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=86 (accessed 11 January 2006). 

127. 777 Family Factsheet. 

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/777family/background/ index.html (accessed 15 

January 2006). 

128. http://www.panamair.org/OLDSITE/Aircraft/boeing747-100.htm and C-5 Factsheet 

http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=84 (accessed 10 January 2006). 

129. C-5 Factsheet. (accessed 10 January2006). and Battershell, DOD C-17 versus 

the 

Boeing 777, 25. 

130. Dina Rasor. More Bang, Less Bucks: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons. (Washington DC: Fund for Constitutional Government, 1983), 291. 

131. Gorn, Vulcan’s Forge, A4-3. 

132. Ibid., 37, 64-65. 

133. US House of Representatives. Status of the B-2 Stealth Bomber Program. Hearing before the Committee of the Armed Services. 102nd Cong., 1st sesson, 1991, 4, 24, 

36. 

134. Ibid., 24, 30. 

135. John A. Tirpak. “Washington Watch.” Air Force Magazine, December 2005, 

10-12. 

136. Kausal, Comparison of the Defense Acquisition Systems of the France, United 

Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, 5-8. 

137. James W. Fuhs. “How the Implementation of Performance Based Contracting 

Has Affected Program Management Within the Department of Defense.” (Masters’ Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998), 22. 

111
 

138. Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes. Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate. (Washington DC: US Government Accountability Office, December 2005), 10. 

139. Michael R. Wagner (HQ AFMC/A9Q Contracting Officer) interview by the author, 10 February 2006. 

140. Peter Phillips. “Lessons for Post-Katrina Reconstruction.” Economic Policy Institute. EPI Paper #166. 6 October 2005. 

141. Thomas S. Wells, AFMC Director of Contracting. Memorandum for Record on 

“Establish Provisional Award Fee Payments as a Result of DFARS Changes, AFMC Policy 

Letter 2004-PK-002.” 8 January 2004. 

142. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Section 11.4, 11.5. 

http://farsite.hill.af.mil/reghtml (accessed 28 February 2006). 

143. Inflation Calculators. http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflate.html (accessed 4 

March 2006). 

144. Jonathan Karp. “Airborne Incident.” The Wall Street Journal, 26 January 2006, 

A1, 6. 

145. John A. Tirpak. “Washington Watch.” Air Force Magazine, February 2006, 14. 

146. Major Bill McGuffey (ASC/SDLGSSS SPO), interview by the author, 10 February 2006. 

147. Defense Acquisitions: Information for Congress on Performance of Major Programs Can Be More Complete, Timely, Accessible. Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate. (Washington DC: US Government Accountability Office, March 

2005), 1. 

148. Jonathan Karp. “Airborne Incident” The Wall Street Journal, 26 January 2006, 

A1, 6. and Lorell, U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry, 117. 

149. “Battle of the F-22.” Air Force Magazine Online. http://www.afa.org/magazine/

Sept1999 / 999f22.asp (accessed 5 March 2006). 

 

112