3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 5

CHAPTER 1

Naval Strategy and Missions 7

CHAPTER 2

PLA(N) Equipment—Building a Modern Navy 13

CHAPTER 3

Training, Exercises, and Joint Operations 27

CHAPTER 4

PLA(N) Structure and Leadership 33

CHAPTER 5

Maritime Claims—Securing China’s “Blue Territory” 41

Outlook 49

Additional resources:

Posters of China Equipment, Leadership Structure, and PLA(N) and MLE Recognition 

Guide enclosed in inside back pocket.

Multimedia vignette links of China’s Defensive Layers and South China Sea Maritime 

Claims can be found on pages 8 and 43 respectively.

5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since our last publication in 2009, 

the People’s Liberation Army Navy 

(PLA(N)) has made significant strides in 

operationalizing as well as modernizing 

its force. Although the PLA(N)’s primary focus 

remains in the East Asia region, where China 

faces multiple disputes over the sovereignty 

of various maritime features and associated 

maritime rights, in recent years, the PLA(N) has 

increased its focus on developing blue-water naval 

capabilities. Over the long term, Beijing aspires to 

sustain naval missions far from China’s shores. 

When we wrote the 2009 publication, China had just 

embarked on its first counterpiracy missions in the 

Gulf of Aden, but most PLA(N) operations remained 

close to home. Nearly six years later, these missions 

have continued without pause, and China’s greater 

fleet has begun to stretch its legs. The PLA(N) has 

begun regular combat training in the Philippine Sea, 

participated in multinational exercises including 

Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014, operated in the 

Mediterranean, increased intelligence collection 

deployments in the western Pacific, and for the first 

time deployed a submarine to the Indian Ocean. 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continued 

to modernize its military, providing the PLA(N) with 

increasingly modern multipurpose platforms such as 

the LUYANG III-class destroyers and the JIANGDAOclass corvettes. The Chinese military also continues 

to evolve its doctrine, organization, and training to 

ensure its personnel are able to effectively fight modern wars with modern equipment. Sustained leadership emphasis on “realistic” and “complex” training 

has influenced training patterns and improved 

operational proficiency during the past five years. In 

late 2012, Xi Jinping extolled the continued importance of cultivating “real combat” awareness throughout the military. Today, the PLA(N) conducts complex 

multidiscipline warfare training throughout the year.

China’s force modernization has concentrated on 

improving the quality of its force, rather than its 

size. Quantities of major combatants have stayed 

relatively constant, but their combat capability 

has greatly increased as older combatants are 

replaced by larger, multi-mission ships. With a 

greater percentage of the force consisting of 

these modern combatants capable of blue water 

operations, the PLA(N) will have an increasing 

capability to undertake missions far from China.

In addition to improving the traditional destroyer and 

frigate backbone of its fleet, the PLA(N) is on the 

verge of incorporating very different platforms that will 

greatly influence the operations of its future fleet. The 

JIN-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 

is poised to begin strategic patrols in the near future, 

for the first time, putting Chinese intercontinental 

range ballistic missiles to sea. At the same time, 

with the commissioning of the KUZNETSOVclass air craft carrier “LIAONING,” China has 

taken the first step as a carrier-capable navy.

Against this back drop of increasing military capability, 

China’s leaders appear increasingly willing to assert 

China’s maritime claims, even when such actions 

risk exacerbating tension with China’s neighbors. 

Since 2009, friction in the South China and East 

China Seas has become commonplace. With its 

expanding Coast Guard, China has been able to 

quickly respond to incidents it feels violated its 

claimed sovereignty in disputed areas. This trend 

has been highlighted by sustained China Coast 

Guard operations at a number of disputed features, 

including Scarborough Reef, Second Thomas 

Shoal, and the Senkaku Islands. More recently, 

China has begun strengthening its position in the 

Spratly Islands. Throughout 2014, China reclaimed 

hundreds of acres of land at the seven features 

that it occupies and appears to be building much 

larger facilities that could eventually support both 

maritime law enforcement and naval operations. 

7

CHAPTER 1

NAVAL STRATEGY AND MISSIONS

The Evolution of a Naval Strategy

On September 25, 2012, China’s senior leadership officially 

commissioned the KUZNETSOV-class LIAONING, the 

country’s first aircraft carrier. Although LIAONING remains 

several years from becoming fully operational, and even 

then will offer relatively limited combat capability, this 

milestone signals a trend in Chinese naval strategy that 

has long-term implications for the region and the United 

States. China’s leaders have embraced the idea that maritime power is essential to achieving great power status. 

Since the 1980s, China’s naval strategy has evolved from a 

limited, coastal orientation, to one that is mission-focused 

and becoming increasingly unconstrained by geography. 

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) primarily 

focuses on developing its modern naval combat capability 

to execute a range of contingency operations. Many of 

those operations include the expectation of U.S. military 

intervention. Additionally, China is becoming more involved 

in a range of “diversified missions” throughout Asia and 

beyond. China will invest in the Navy, Coast Guard, and 

maritime industries to more actively and effectively assert 

its security and economic interests in the coming decades. 

Over the past two years, China’s top leadership has emphasized the need for China to become a maritime power. 

In his final report as chairman of the Communist Party of 

China at the 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao declared, 

“We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources...resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and 

interests, and build China into a maritime power.” President Xi Jinping further championed efforts to comprehensively advance China’s maritime development, declaring 

at a high-profile study session in July 2013 that “[w]e need 

to do more to take interest in the sea, understand the sea, 

and strategically manage the sea, and continually do more 

to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power.” 

The public emphasis on maritime power and the need to 

“resolutely safeguard” China’s maritime rights and interests reflects a growing consensus in China that maritime 

power is essential to advancing China’s overall national 

development.

From its founding in 1949 until the mid-1980s, China’s 

strategic concept of naval operations was limited to 

“coastal defense.” This strategy emphasized defending 

China’s coast from amphibious invasion, presumably by 

Taiwan and U.S. forces, in what would primarily be a land 

war. Since the 1980s, China’s shifting threat perceptions 

and growing economic interests have catalyzed a major 

shift in strategic orientation and the perceived utility of 

naval forces. In particular, Chinese naval strategists 

have sought to expand the bounds of China’s maritime 

capabilities and defenses beyond coastal waters. By 

1987, PLA(N) Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing had 

established a strategy referred to as “offshore defense.”

Offshore defense focuses on regional goals and deterring a modern adversary from intervening in a regional 

conflict. Admiral Liu characterized “offshore” areas as 

those east of Taiwan and the northern part of the Pacific 

Ocean, stretching beyond the First Island Chain. 

Offshore defense is often associated with operations 

in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China 

Sea—China’s “near seas.” In the late 1980s, the development of offshore defense paralleled the Central Military 

Commission (CMC)’s adoption of a new military strategy 

that focused on local wars on China’s periphery rather 

than a major confrontation with the Soviet Union. 

Events of the 1990s, including U.S.-led operations against 

Iraq and Serbia, U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait crisis 

of 1995–96, and the ongoing modernization of Japan’s 

and Taiwan’s navies, highlighted for Chinese strategists 

China’s continued vulnerability to threats from the sea and 

long-range precision strike weapons. These trends made 

it clear to Beijing that China was ill-prepared for modern 

warfare. The CMC charged the PLA with developing the 

ability to fight “local wars under modern, high-tech conditions.” To do so, the PLA has advocated two key concepts 

to guide its modernization: “informationization” and “noncontact warfare.” The PLA(N) has subsequently sought to 

develop a force with integrated, highly technical systems 

capable of long-range strikes for regional deterrence. 
8

“Informationization” describes China’s effort to incorporate modern information technology into all aspects of 

military operations, such as command and control (C2), 

logistics, and targeting. China’s leaders recognize that the 

information advantage is vital on the modern battlefield. 

“Non-contact warfare” involves employing platforms 

and weapons in long-range, precision strikes from outside 

an enemy’s “defended zone.” The PLA(N)’s commitment 

to non-contact warfare is demonstrated by its continued 

acquisition of long-range weapons to be launched from 

ships, submarines, aircraft, or shore-based platforms as 

well as the associated detection and targeting capabilities 

required to employ these weapons to their fullest capacity.

Although the PLA(N)’s primary focus remains in the “near 

seas,” where China faces multiple disputes over the 

sovereignty of various islands and associated maritime 

rights, in recent years the PLA(N) has increased focus 

on developing “far seas” naval capabilities. Over the long 

term, Beijing aspires to be able to sustain some naval 

missions far from China’s shores. China has already 

conducted initial far seas missions, which have included 

intelligence collection, humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations, 

and protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in 

the form of counterpiracy escort missions in the Gulf of 

Aden. Future missions could include support to combat 

operations. The expansion of Chinese naval operations 

into the western Pacific and Indian Oceans during the past 

five years will help facilitate these growing mission sets. 

Additionally, Chinese acquisition patterns demonstrate a 

growing emphasis on ships that are both multi-mission 

capable and large enough to sustain far seas operations.

PLA(N) Roles and Missions

Like many other rising powers throughout history, China’s 

interest in maritime power has grown in concert with its 

economic and security agenda. With a heavy reliance on 

maritime commerce, Beijing now has a vested interest 

in ensuring the security of international trade. Beijing 

also faces growing pressure to contribute to world peace 

and international security missions. Finally, the PLA(N) 

is at the forefront of addressing a number of enduring 

PRC security challenges, from being prepared to force 

Taiwan reunification with the mainland to providing the 

military expedient for asserting Chinese maritime claims 

in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Although 

Figure 1-1. China’s Defensive Layers

Multimedia Vignette available 

at oni.navy.mil
9

nontraditional missions are a significant influence and 

drive the PLA(N) to operate in the far seas, traditional 

naval missions to safeguard maritime security and maintain the sovereignty of territorial waters will remain a 

priority for naval operations, training, and planning. 

The Cross-Strait Problem 

The PRC views reunification with Taiwan as an immutable, 

long-term goal and hopes to prevent any third party from 

intervening in what China asserts is an internal matter. 

China’s leaders have long emphasized their preference for 

peaceful reunification; however, they also note that China 

is not prepared to wait indefinitely for a political resolution. 

For several decades, China’s naval investments have 

focused heavily on capabilities to deter Taiwan’s moves 

toward independence, to successfully reverse Taiwan’s 

actions should deterrence fail, and if necessary, to forcibly 

reunify Taiwan with the mainland even if the United States 

were to become militarily involved. As a military strategist 

at Beijing’s Academy of Military Sciences stated, “We 

can resolve a crisis if we are in a position to deter.” 

For these reasons, China’s modernization efforts during the 

1990s and early 2000s focused on preparing for a Taiwan 

conflict and developing capabilities to deter, delay, and, 

if necessary, degrade potential U.S. military intervention. 

China has built or acquired a wide array of advanced 

platforms including submarines, major surface combatants, 

missile patrol craft, maritime strike aircraft, and land-based 

systems employing new and sophisticated antiship cruise 

missiles (ASCMs) and surface-to-air missiles. China also 

developed the world’s first antiship ballistic missile (ASBM), 

a system specifically designed to attack enemy aircraft 

carriers. Chinese leaders hope that simply possessing 

these military capabilities will deter pro-independence 

moves or—should deterrence fail—permit a range of 

military options that can be tailored to the specific situation. 

Given the pace of PLA(N) modernization, the gap in 

military capability between the mainland and Taiwan will 

continue to widen in China’s favor over the coming years. 

During the 1995-96 cross-strait crisis, Beijing engaged in 

large-scale exercises and missile demonstrations; however, 

its options for dealing with Taiwan directly were limited. 

China was ill-prepared to execute a major reunification 

campaign and even less capable of countering U.S. forces 

intervening on Taiwan’s behalf. Nearly two decades later, 

China has closed some of the capability gaps—including 

air defense and long-range maritime strikes—that would 

support a number of Taiwan-related campaigns. 

Following Taiwan’s 2008 election, cross-strait relations 

enjoyed a sustained warming trend. The ensuing 

stability assuaged PRC concerns over the possibility 

of a near-term crisis and enabled the PLA(N) to focus 

attention on other mission areas; however, it has not 

affected the underlying political challenge. From the 

perspective of the PLA, and the PLA(N) in particular, 

developing the capabilities to compel reunification 

will remain a central priority in the years ahead. 

Beyond Taiwan 

China’s nontraditional security interests in the far seas, 

as well as island sovereignty disputes and resource 

competition in the near seas, increasingly influence 

modernization and planning priorities. Former President 

Hu Jintao’s 2004 assertion of the PLA’s “new historic 

missions” highlighted new expectations for the navy. Two 

of the articulated missions—providing a security guarantee 

to safeguard China’s national development and playing 

an important role in ensuring world peace—significantly 

adjusted China’s national defense strategy and broadened 

its definition of security to include new geographic and 

functional areas beyond the PLA’s traditional territorial 

security missions. Missions such as naval escort in the 

Gulf of Aden support China’s economic interests while 

simultaneously advancing China’s international image. 

China’s Defense White Papers have chronicled the shift to 

a wider range of military missions, highlighting pressure 

from economic globalization and strategic competition, 

as well as the requirement for “diversified military tasks,” 

such as disaster relief, counterterrorism, and counterpiracy. 

The 2008 Defense White Paper specifically articulated 

a requirement for military operations other than war 

(MOOTW), noting China’s intent to gradually develop 

the capabilities to operate cooperatively in the open 

ocean and contend with nontraditional security threats. 

China’s 2013 Defense White Paper noted that the PLA(N) 

“endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its forces 

for comprehensive offshore operations...[and] develop blue 

water capabilities.” It asserted that China’s armed forces 

must adapt to meet new challenges, including nontraditional missions, and charged the PLA with strengthening 
10

overseas operational capabilities such as emergency 

response, escort, and noncombatant evacuation missions. 

During the past decade, requirements for diversified 

missions and far seas operations have stimulated an 

operational shift and have catalyzed the acquisition of 

multi-mission platforms capable of improved sustainability 

and self-defense in blue water. Most of the PLA(N)’s new 

acquisitions are suited for both near seas and far seas 

missions. The LUYANG III-class DDG (Type 052D), which 

entered service in 2014, embodies the trend toward a more 

flexible force with advanced air defenses and long-range 

strike capability. The large YUZHAO-class LPD (Type 

071) is capable of amphibious and logistical operations 

in the near seas, although it is also equipped to support 

expeditionary operations and nontraditional security 

missions, such as counterpiracy patrols, around the world.

The PLA(N) has also begun nearly annual humanitarian 

assistance missions with ANWEI-class (Type 920) hospital 

ship “PEACE ARK.” PEACE ARK has deployed to South 

Asia and Africa in 2010 and 2013, Latin America in 2011, 

and Oceania and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise 

in 2014. It also conducted its first disaster relief mission 

to the Philippines in late 2013 following Typhoon Haiyan. 

Protecting Maritime Sovereignty 

In the East China and South China Seas, Beijing faces 

longstanding disputes with its neighbors about maritime 

boundaries, economic rights, and sovereignty over 

various geographic features. During the past few years, 

maritime disputes have intensified between China and 

rival claimants such as Japan, the Philippines, and 

Vietnam. China’s Navy, Coast Guard, and Chinese 

economic actors are increasingly visible throughout 

the region and are increasingly proactive in asserting 

Beijing’s maritime claims, even when directly challenged 

by other claimants’ naval and Coast Guard assets. 

Historically, Beijing has preferred to use diplomacy, 

economic influence, and Coast Guard patrols to assert 

maritime sovereignty; however, the Navy provides 

an important security guarantee with the means to 

intimidate smaller claimants and deter larger ones. 

Beijing’s growing confidence in its capabilities and 

various tools of influence has likely contributed to 

Atlantic

Ocean

Indian

Ocean

Mediterranean Sea

Strait of 

Malacca

Philippine

Sea

Pacific

Ocean

SAUDIA

ARABIA

IRAN

YEMEN

INDIA

JAPAN

INDONESIA

PHILLIPPINES

AUSTRALIA

RUSSIA

Bab al Mendeb

Strait of 

Hormuz

MALAYSIA

Figure 1-2. Sea Lane Protection

Taiwan Strait

South China

 Sea
11

its decision to adopt more assertive tactics when it 

feels that its maritime interests are challenged. 

In a conflict or crisis, the PLA(N) has a variety of options 

to assert its maritime interests through military force. 

The PLA(N) could lead an amphibious campaign to 

seize key disputed island features or conduct blockade 

or sea line of communication (SLOC) interdiction 

campaigns to secure strategic operating areas. 

Sea Lane Protection 

China’s leaders view sustained economic growth as the 

central requirement for transforming China into a powerful 

nation. Since any disruption of critical international chokepoints would undermine China’s export-driven economy, 

the PLA(N) is expected to defend major SLOCs. It is along 

these maritime routes that the overwhelming majority of 

China’s foreign trade—more than 90 percent by volume 

and more than 65 percent by value—is transported. The 

SLOCs are essential to China for the export of finished 

goods and the import of raw materials, including crude oil.

SLOC protection is not simply a matter of deploying 

ships to chokepoints. It requires the capability to sustain 

a maritime presence in strategic locations, in hostile 

conditions, and for extended periods. When President 

Hu initially called for this type of capability in his 2004 

expansion of China’s historic missions, concerns 

over the Malacca Strait dominated discussion of 

SLOC security. Today, as China’s economic interests 

expand, China’s SLOC concerns extend to even more 

distant waters. This appears to have generated greater 

discussion on the potential of overseas naval bases. 

The PLA(N)’s sustained counterpiracy operations in the 

Gulf of Aden demonstrate Beijing’s intention to protect 

important SLOCs. China’s participation serves several 

purposes: first, it is in line with the PLA(N)’s mission 

requirements to protect the PRC’s strategic maritime interests; second, it provides the PLA(N) with the opportunity 

to develop and refine the operational capabilities it needs 

for “far seas” operations; and third, it enhances China’s 

image as a responsible member of the global community.

Looking Ahead

In contrast to its narrow focus just a decade ago, the 

PLA(N) is evolving to meet a wide range of missions 

including conflict with Taiwan, enforcement of maritime 

claims, protection of economic interests, as well as 

counterpiracy and humanitarian missions. The PLA(N) 

will also soon assume a central role in China’s nuclear 

deterrent with the first ballistic missile submarine patrols 

with an intercontinental-range missile. In the next decade, 

China will complete its transition from a coastal navy to 

a navy capable of multiple missions around the world. 

China’s leaders see the evolution of naval strategy 

as necessary to preserve China’s interests and commensurate with its role as an emerging major power. 

Although being prepared to forcibly reunify Taiwan with 

the mainland will remain a driving force behind China’s 

naval modernization, the PLA(N) is simultaneously 

focusing resources on a growing array of other challenges, particularly competition over regional territory 

and rights. Friction between China and its neighbors 

appears increasingly likely as Beijing seeks to deter rival 

activities and assert its own claimed rights and interests.

Aside from these challenges, the PLA(N)’s growing 

capabilities and broad strategic focus also creates 

new opportunities for cooperation with other countries, 

including the United States. China’s sustained presence 

in the Gulf of Aden underscores the potential to achieve 

mutually beneficial objectives, such as countering piracy. 

Similarly, China’s new hospital ships, amphibious ships, 

and even the new aircraft carrier create opportunities 

for China to contribute to the delivery of humanitarian 

assistance, disaster relief, and other positive services.

13

CHAPTER 2

PLA(N) EQUIPMENT–

BUILDING A MODERN NAVY

During the past 15 years, China’s ambitious naval modernization has produced a more technologically advanced 

and flexible force. The PLA(N) currently possesses more 

than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious 

ships, and missile-armed patrol craft. Although the overall 

order-of-battle has remained relatively constant in recent 

years, the PLA(N) is rapidly retiring legacy combatants 

in favor of larger, multi-mission ships, equipped with 

advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons 

and sensors. Since 2000, the PLA(N) has been on track to 

dramatically increase its combat capability by 2020 through 

rapid acquisition and improved operational proficiency.

During 2014 alone, more than 60 naval ships and 

craft were laid down, launched, or commissioned, 

with a similar number expected through the end of 

2015. Major qualitative improvements are occurring 

within naval aviation and the submarine force, which 

are increasingly capable of striking targets hundreds 

of miles from the Chinese mainland. Although the 

PLA(N) faces capability gaps in some key areas, it is 

emerging as a well equipped and competent force. 

From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, China often 

built small numbers of a large variety of ships, changing classes rapidly as advancements were made. 

In the period between 1995 and 2005 alone, China 

constructed or purchased major surface combatants 

and submarines in at least 15 different classes. Using 

imported technology, reverse engineering, and indigenous 

development, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

rapidly narrowed the technology and capability gap 

with modern navies during the 1990s and 2000s. 

As the PLA(N) narrowed the technological gap, procurement became more indigenous and more efficient. The last 

delivery of a major naval platform from a foreign country 

was the SOVREMENNYY II-class DDGs in 2006. China is 

implementing much longer production runs of its domestically produced surface combatants and conventional 

submarines, suggesting greater satisfaction with recent 

designs. The JIANGKAI-class (Type 054A) frigate series, 

LUYANG-class (Type 052B/C/D) destroyer series, and the 

upcoming new cruiser (Type 055) class are considered to 

be modern and capable designs that are comparable in 

many respects to the most modern Western warships. 

Likewise, the PLA-Navy Air Force continues improving 

its capabilities. It is better equipped to project air power 

from shore and has begun the difficult journey towards 

carrier aviation. Two months after the carrier LIAONING 

was commissioned in 2012, J-15 aircraft successfully 

conducted their first-ever carrier-based take-off and 

landings. Full integration of a carrier air regiment remains 

several years in the future, but remarkable progress 

has been made already. Chinese officials acknowledge 

plans to build additional carriers but they have not 

publicly indicated whether the next carrier will incorporate 

catapults or which aircraft they plan to embark. 

With a greater percentage of the force consisting of large, 

multi-mission combatants capable of blue water operations, the PLA(N) will have an increasing capability to 

undertake missions in far seas, and is assuming its place 

among the most powerful navies in Asia. Additionally, the 

introduction of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), 

non-PLA(N) weapons such as the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic 

missile (ASBM), and the requisite Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture to provide 

targeting data will allow China to expand its combat 

capability further into the Philippine and South China Seas.

Multi-Mission Platforms

In the initial stages of China’s modernization drive, 

the PLA(N) successfully concentrated resources on 
14

CHINA

Figure 2-1. PLA(N) Fleet Composition

North Sea Fleet

 3 Nuclear Attack Submarines

25 Diesel Attack Submarines

 8 Destroyers

10 Frigates

11 Amphibious Ships

18 Missile Patrol Craft

 6 Corvettes

East Sea Fleet Ningbo

18 Diesel Attack Submarines

 9 Destroyers

22 Frigates

20 Amphibious Ships

30 Missile Patrol Craft

 6 Corvettes

Qingdao

South Sea Fleet

 2 Nuclear Attack Submarines

 4 Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines

16 Diesel Attack Submarines

 9 Destroyers

20 Frigates

25 Amphibious Ships

38 Missile Patrol Craft

 8 Corvettes

Zhanjiang

North Sea Fleet HQ

East Sea Fleet HQ

South Sea Fleet HQ

PLA(N) HQs

improving its antisurface warfare (ASUW) capabilities, 

both in surface and submarine development. Subsequent 

efforts to improve antiair warfare (AAW) capabilities 

were evident with the surface force, along with modest improvements in antisubmarine capability. 

Every major PLA(N) surface combatant currently under 

construction is capable of embarking a helicopter, 

an addition that supports over-the-horizon targeting 

(OTH-T), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and search 

and rescue. Meanwhile, the submarine force remains 

largely concentrated on ASUW, with the JIN-class SSBN 

poised to strengthen China’s nuclear deterrent once the 

vessel begins strategic patrols in the near future. Naval 

aviation is widening its mission set by incorporating 

more diverse aircraft and capabilities, including airborne 

early warning, carrier aviation, and unmanned aerial 

vehicles. As a whole, although some older platforms 

remain in the inventory, the PLA(N) is clearly shifting 

to a force employing assets that are able to execute a 

wide variety of missions both near and far from home.

PLA(N) Surface Force

Less than a decade ago China’s naval surface force was 

an eclectic mix of vintage, modern, converted, imported, 

and domestic platforms, which utilized a variety of 

weapons and sensors with wide-ranging capabilities. In 

the late 1990s to early 2000s, the PLA(N) transitioned 

from a “green water” force to one capable of operating 

offshore. During this period China imported several major 

combatants, weapon systems, and sensors from Russia 

while concurrently producing and developing its own 
15

YUAN SSP

SONG SS

LUYANG II DDG J-10

PLA(N) has concentrated on precision warfare against a modern adversary. LUYANG I DDG J-8 SONG SS LUDA I DD J-7E MING SS

Figure 2-2. PLA(N) Rapid Modernization

designs. By the second decade of the 2000s, the PLA(N)’s 

surface production shifted to platforms using wholly 

Chinese designs and that were primarily equipped with 

Chinese weapons and sensors (though some engineering 

components and subsystems remain imported or licenseproduced in country). Furthermore, the era of small class 

design runs has given way to series production of multiple 

new destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as China’s 

rapid technological advancement in naval design begins to 

approach a level commensurate with other modern navies.

As of this publishing, the PLA(N) consists of approximately 

26 destroyers (21 of which are considered modern), 52 

frigates (35 modern), 20 new corvettes, 85 modern missilearmed patrol craft, 56 amphibious ships, 42 mine warfare 

ships (30 modern), more than 50 major auxiliary ships, and 

more than 400 minor auxiliary ships and service/support 

craft. During 2013, more than 60 total naval ships and craft 

were laid down, launched, or commissioned; we expect 

a similar number by the end of 2015. In 2013 and 2014, 

China launched more naval ships than any other country 

and is expected to continue this trend through 2015-16. 

In recent years, shipboard air defense is arguably the 

most notable area of improvement on PLA(N) surface 

ships. China has retired several legacy destroyers and 

frigates that had at most a point air defense capability, 

with a range of just several miles. Newer ships entering 

the force are equipped with medium-to-long range area 

air defense missiles. The PLA(N) produced a total of six 

LUYANG II-class (Type 052C) destroyers with the HHQ-9 

surface-to-air missile (~55 nm), and is now receiving 

the new LUYANG III-class (Type 052D) destroyer, 

which carries an extended-range variant of the HHQ-9. 

Additionally, at least 20 JIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A) 

frigates are now operational with the vertically-launched 

HHQ-16 (~20-40 nm), with more under construction. 

These newer platforms use modern combat management systems and air-surveillance sensors, such as the 
16

Chinese SEA EAGLE and DRAGON EYE phased-array 

radar. While some older platforms with little or no air 

defense capability remain in the PLA(N) inventory, the 

addition of these new units allows the PLA(N) surface 

force to operate with increased confidence outside of 

shore-based air defense systems, as one or two ships are 

equipped to provide air defense for the entire task group.

The PLA(N) continues to emphasize ASUW as a core 

strength, with continued development of advanced ASCMs 

and OTH-T systems. Most combatants still carry variants 

of the YJ-83 ASCM, while the LUYANG destroyer is 

fitted with the YJ-62, and the newest class, the LUYANG 

III destroyer is fitted with the new vertically-launched 

YJ-18 ASCM. While the maximum effective ranges of the 

export variants of the YJ-83 family (C802, C802A) and 

YJ-62 family (C602) are advertised as 65nm, 100nm, and 

650nm respectively, it is likely the domestic versions of 

these systems have much longer ranges. A new cruiser 

to be built in China in the latter half of the decade will 

carry a variety of antisurface weapons, some of which 

will be newly developed. The PLA(N) recognizes that 

these extended-range weapons require OTH-T capability 

to realize their full potential and has invested in maritime 

reconnaissance systems at the national and tactical levels, 

as well as communication systems such as datalinks, 

to provide targeting information to launch platforms.

Historically, ASW has lagged behind ASUW and AAW 

as a priority for the PLA(N). Although ASW remains 

a relative capability gap, recent new-construction 

classes are equipped with a variety of new sonar systems, 

including towed arrays and variable-depth sonars, as 

well as hangars to support embarked helicopters. 

LUYANG II DDG Type 052C LUYANG III DDG Type 052D JIANGKAI II FFG Type 054A

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90nm

HHQ-9 Extended Range

HHQ-9

HHQ-7

Range (Nautical Miles)

Figure 2-3. Naval Surface-to-Air Missile Ranges
17

During the past two decades, 

China phased out hundreds of Cold 

War-era OSA and HOUKU-class 

missile patrol boats and gun-armed 

SHANGHAI and HAINAN-class 

patrol craft (among others) as 

the PLA(N) transitioned from 

coastal defense missions towards 

offshore and far seas operations. 

However, China retains a modern 

coastal-defense and area-denial 

capability with 60 HOUBEI (Type 

022) class missile patrol craft (PTG) 

built in the mid-2000s to supplement 25 1990s-vintage HOUJIAN 

and HOUXIN-class missile patrol 

combatants. The HOUBEI design 

integrates a high-speed wavepiercing catamaran hull, waterjet 

propulsion, signature-reduction 

features, and the YJ-83 family 

ASCM. Although poorly equipped for 

offshore patrol duties, the HOUBEI 

is valuable for reacting to specific 

threats in China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and slightly beyond. 

In 2012, China began producing 

the new JIANGDAO-class (Type 

056) corvette (FFL), which offers 

precisely the flexibility that the 

HOUBEI lacks. The JIANGDAO is 

equipped to patrol China’s claimed 

EEZ and assert Beijing’s interests 

in the South China and East China 

Seas. The 1500-ton JIANGDAO 

is equipped with 76mm, 30mm, 

and 12.7mm guns, four YJ-83 

family ASCMs, torpedo tubes, 

and a helicopter landing area. 

The JIANGDAO is ideally-suited 

for general medium-endurance 

patrols, counterpiracy missions, 

and other littoral duties in regional 

waters, but is not sufficiently armed 

or equipped for major combat 

operations in blue-water areas. At 

least 20 JIANGDAOs are already 

operational and 30 to 60 total units 

may be built, replacing both older 

small patrol craft as well as some 

of the PLA(N)’s aging JIANGHU 

I-class (Type 053H) frigates (FF).

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Range (Nautical Miles)

C602

C802

100 110 120 130 140 150 160nm

Figure 2-4. Surface Antiship Cruise Missile Ranges

JIANGDAO FFL Type 056

HOUBEI PTG Type 022

JIANGHU I FF Type 053H

C802A
18

China’s amphibious 

ship force has 

remained steady in 

recent years after 

a modernization 

program in the 

early 2000s. China 

has built four large 

YUZHAO (Type 071) 

class amphibious 

transport docks (LPD), which provide a considerably 

greater and more flexible capability than the older landing 

ships, signaling China’s development of an expeditionary 

warfare and OTH amphibious assault capability, as well as 

inherent humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) 

and counterpiracy capabilities. The YUZHAO can carry 

up to four of the new air cushion landing craft YUYI LCUA 

(similar to LCAC), as well as four or more helicopters, 

armored vehicles, and troops on long-distance deployments. Additional YUZHAO construction is expected in 

the near-term, as is a follow-on amphibious assault ship 

(LHA) that is not only larger, but incorporates a full-deck 

flight deck for helicopters. Low numbers of YUTING II 

LSTs are currently being built to replace older YUKAN 

units that are reaching the ends of their service lives.

An expanded set of missions further into the western 

Pacific and Indian Ocean, such as counterpiracy deployments, HA/DR missions, survey voyages, and goodwill 

port visits have increased demands on the PLA(N)’s fleet 

of ocean-going replenishment and service vessels. In 

2013 China added two new FUCHI-class replenishment 

oilers (AORs), bringing the total AOR force to seven 

ships; two more were launched in 2014. These ships 

constantly rotate deployments in support of China’s 

Gulf of Aden (GOA) counterpiracy deployments. 

The PLA(N) also recently added three state-of-the-art 

DALAO-class submarine rescue ships (ASR), which 

use the LR-7 submersible, and three DASAN-class fastresponse rescue ships (ARS), which have a tri-maran hull 

form. Other recent additions include the ANWEI-class 

hospital ship (AH), the DANYAO I/II-class AF (island 

resupply ships), YUAN WANG-class 5 and 6 (satellite 

and rocket launch telemetry), five KANHAI-class AG 

(SWATH-hull survey ships), two YUAN WANG 21 missile tenders (AEM), and the large DAGUAN-class AG, 

which provides berthing and logistical support to the 

KUZNETSOV-class aircraft carrier LIAONING. In addition, 

several new DONGDIAO-class intelligence collection 

ships (AGI) have been launched since early 2013 and 

have begun to join the fleet, bringing China’s fleet of 

DONGDIAOs to four at present. Several additional large, 

specialized auxiliary ship construction programs are 

currently underway as well, including new icebreakers and 

logistical support ships for South China Sea operations.

PLA(N) Submarine Force

Similar to the surface force, China’s submarine force 

appears to be concentrating on a smaller mix of units when 

compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s, suggesting 

the PLA(N) is more satisfied with current designs. For 

its diesel-electric force alone, between 2000 and 2005, 

China constructed MING-class SS, SONG-class SS, the 

first YUAN-class SSP, and purchased an additional eight 

KILO-class SS from Russia. While all of these classes 

remain in the force, only the YUAN SSP is currently in 

production. Reducing the number of different classes 

in service helps streamline maintenance, training, and 

interoperability. Currently, the submarine force consists 

YUZHAO LPD Type 071

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0

2005 2014 2020

Diesel Nuclear

51

8 9 11

59

63

Figure 2-5. PLA(N) Ratio of Diesel 

to Nuclear Submarines 

number of submarines
19

of five nuclear attack submarines, four nuclear 

ballistic missile submarines, and 57 diesel attack 

submarines. By 2020 the submarine force will 

likely grow to more than 70 submarines.

China’s submarine force is very different from that 

of the U.S. Navy, but has characteristics that are 

well suited for its more limited mission set. Most of 

China’s submarine force is conventionally powered, 

with ASCMs, but without towed arrays. These 

submarines are optimized for regional missions that 

concentrate on ASUW near major SLOCs. China’s 

small nuclear attack submarine force is more capable of operating further from the Chinese mainland, 

conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and ASUW missions. China’s submarines are not currently optimized for two missions at 

the core of U.S. submarines—ASW and land attack.

The YUAN SSP is China’s most modern conventionally powered submarine. Twelve are currently in 

service, with as many as eight more slated for 

production. Its combat capability is comparable to 

the SONG SS, as both are capable of launching 

Chinese-built ASCMs, but the YUAN SSP has 

the added benefit of an air independent power 

(AIP) system and may have incorporated quieting 

technology from the Russian-designed KILO SS. The 

AIP system provides a submarine a source of power 

other than battery or diesel engines while the vessel 

still submerged, increasing its underwater endurance, 

and therefore reducing its vulnerability to detection.

The remainder of the conventional submarine force is a 

mix of SONG SS, MING SS, and Russian-built KILO SS. 

Of these, only the MING SS and four of the older KILO 

SS lack an ability to launch ASCMs. Eight of China’s 

12 KILO SS are equipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM, 

which provides a long-range antisurface capability out 

to approximately 120 nm. China’s newest indigenous 

submarine-launched ASCM, the YJ-18, extends a similar 

capability to the SONG, YUAN, and SHANG classes. 

Previously, China’s only indigenous sub-launched ASCM 

was the YJ-82, which has a much shorter range.

China also continues to modernize its nuclear-powered 

attack submarine force, although it continues to be 

a relatively small percentage of the total number of 

submarines. The SHANG-class SSN’s initial production 

run stopped after only two hulls that were launched in 

2002 and 2003. After nearly 10 years, China is continuing production with four additional hulls of an improved 

variant, the first of which was launched in 2012. These 

six total submarines will replace the aging HAN class 

SSN on nearly a one-for-one basis in the next several 

years. Following the completion of the improved SHANG 

SSN, the PLA(N) will progress to the Type 095 SSN, 

which may provide a generational improvement in 

many areas such as quieting and weapon capacity.

Perhaps the most anticipated development in China’s 

submarine force is the expected operational deployment 

of the JIN-class SSBN, which will mark China’s first 

credible at-sea second-strike nuclear capability. The 

JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), has 

nearly three times the range of the XIA-class SSBN’s 

JL-1 SLBM, which was only able to range targets in the 

immediate vicinity of China. The JL-2 SLBM underwent 

successful testing in 2012 and is likely ready to enter 

the force. Once deployed, the JIN/JL-2 weapon system 

20 40 60 80 0

2005

2014

2020

66%

41%

36%

34%

59%

64%

Figure 2-6. PLA(N) Ratio of Antiship 

Cruise Missile Equipped Submarines

Submarines
20

will provide China with a capability to strike targets on 

the continental United States. To maintain a continuous 

peacetime presence, the PLA(N) would likely require a 

minimum of five JIN SSBNs; four are currently in service.

PLA(N) Air Forces

The role of the PLA(N) Air Force (PLANAF) has been 

steadily evolving for the past decade as navy combatants 

range farther from shore and are more capable of providing 

their own air defense. This has allowed the PLANAF to 

concentrate on an expanded array of missions, particularly 

maritime strike, but also including maritime patrols, ASW, 

airborne early warning, and logistics. The advent of 

the LIAONING aircraft carrier signals a new age for the 

PLANAF, which will now evolve from an almost exclusively 

land-based force to possessing a sea-based component.

Helicopters

The PLA(N) operates three main helicopter variants: 

the Z-9, the Z-8, and the HELIX. The first helicopter 

and the primary helicopter operated by the PLA(N) is 

the Z-9C. In the early 1980s, China obtained a license 

to produce the AS 365N Dauphin II helicopters and 

its engines from Aerospatiale (now Eurocopter). The 

AS 365s produced in China were labeled as the Z-9, 

and the naval variant was designated “Z-9C.” 

Known to be flying by 2000, the Z-9C is capable of operating from any helicopter-capable PLA(N) combatant. The 

Z-9C can be fitted with the KLC-1 search radar, dipping 

sonar, and is usually observed with a single, lightweight 

torpedo. A new roof-mounted electro-optical (EO) turret, unguided rockets, and 12.7mm machine gun pods 

have been seen on several Z-9Cs during counterpiracy 

deployments. The PLA(N) has approximately 20 operational Z-9Cs in its inventory. An upgraded naval version, 

designated the Z-9D, has been observed carrying ASCMs. 

The Z-8 is also a Chinese-produced helicopter based on a 

French design. In the late 1970s, the PLA(N) took delivery 

of the SA 321 Super Frelon, which was reverse engineered 

and designated the Z-8. The Z-8 made its maiden flight in 

1985 and reached initial operational capability by 1989. 

Low-rate production continued through the 1990s and into 

the early 2000s; however, production has recently accelerated because of the development of upgraded versions. 

The Z-8 is a 

medium lift-helicopter. 

Although capable of 

a wide variety of missions, it is generally 

employed for search 

and rescue, troop 

transport, and logistical support roles. 

The Z-8 is usually 

seen with a rescue 

hoist and a nose 

radome and usually 

operates unarmed. 

Other equipment may 

include an EO turret 

and a search light; 

during counterpiracy 

deployments, several 

Z-8s were seen with 

weapons pylons that 

are capable of carrying up to four armament pods—the same 

rocket and 12.7 mm 

machine gun pods 

seen on the Z-9Cs. 

Although the Z-8’s size provides a greater cargo capacity 

compared to other PLA(N) helicopters, it also limits its 

ability to deploy from most PLA(N) combatants. The Z-8 

and a Z-8 variant, possibly called the Z-18, have been 

observed operating with LIAONING. The Z-18 is an 

AEW variant that has been observed since 2009. A large 

cylindrical radar antenna is stowed aft of the main cabin’s 

rear-loading ramp or door and is lowered during operations allowing the antenna to rotate 360 degrees. Another 

version of the Z-8 that has been operating in the maritime 

environment is a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) variant, 

designated the Z-8JH. It is similar to other Z-8s, except 

for the large red-cross insignia on the tail and fuselage. 

The Z-8JH has been seen deployed on the ANWEI AH.

Variants of the HELIX are the only imported helicopters 

operated by the PLA(N). In 1999, the PLA(N) took delivery 

of an initial batch of eight Russian-built HELIX helicopters. 

Five were reportedly Ka-28 HELIX A and three were 

Ka-27PS HELIX D helicopters. The PLA(N) ordered nine 

Z-9C

Ka-28 Helix

Z-8
21

more aircraft in October 2009, and it is likely that all 17 

HELIX helicopters are operational. Like the Russian Ka-27, 

the exported Ka-28s can be used for several mission 

sets but are usually used for ASW, while the Ka-27PS are 

optimized for search and rescue and logistical support 

missions. The Ka-28 is fitted with a search radar and 

dipping sonar and can also employ sonobuoys, torpedoes, 

depth charges, or mines. In 2010, China purchased nine 

Ka-31 AEW helicopters and the E-801 radar system. The 

radar antenna is mounted underneath the main body of 

the aircraft, and 

when the antenna is 

deployed in flight, the 

helicopter’s landing 

gears retract to allow 

the antenna to rotate 

360 degrees. To keep 

pace with the rest of 

the PLA(N) and meet 

growing demand for 

embarked helicopters, the helicopter 

fleet will probably 

experience continued 

growth in the 

foreseeable future.

Fixed-wing 

Aircraft

During the past 

two decades, the 

PLANAF has made 

great strides in moving beyond its humble 

origins. Antiquated 

fixed-wing aircraft such as the Nanchang Q-5 Fantan and 

the Harbin H-5 Beagle have given way to an array of relatively high-quality aircraft. This force is equipped for a wide 

range of missions including offshore air defense, maritime 

strike, maritime patrol, antisubmarine warfare, and, in the 

not too distant future, carrier-based operations. Just a 

decade ago, this air modernization relied very heavily on 

Russian imports. Following in the footsteps of the People’s 

Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA(N) has recently 

begun benefitting from domestic combat aircraft production. 

Historically, the PLA(N) relied on older Chengdu J-7 

variants and Shenyang J-8B/D Finback fighters for offshore 

air defense. These aircraft offered limited range, avionics, 

and armament. The J-8 is perhaps best known in the 

West as the aircraft that collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 

reconnaissance aircraft in 2001. The PLA(N)’s first major 

air capability upgrade came with the Su-30MK2 FLANKER. 

While the PLAAF had received numerous FLANKER variants from Russia between 1992 and 2002, the PLA(N) did 

not acquire its initial aircraft until very late in that process. 

In 2002, China 

purchased 24 

Su-30MK2, making 

it the first 4thgeneration fighter 

aircraft fielded with 

the PLA(N). These 

aircraft feature both 

an extended range 

and maritime radar 

systems. This allows 

the Su-30MK2 to 

strike enemy ships 

at long distances, 

while maintaining a robust air-to-air capability. Several 

years later, the PLA(N) began replacing its older J-8B/D 

with the newer J-8F variant. The J-8F featured improved 

armament such as the PL-12 radar-guided air-to-air missile, 

upgraded avionics, and an improved engine with higher 

thrust. Today, the PLA(N) is taking deliveries of modern 

domestically produced 4th-generation fighter aircraft such 

as the J-10A Firebird and the J-11B FLANKER. Equipped 

with modern radars, glass cockpits, and armed with PL-8 

and PL-12 air-to-air missiles, PLA(N) J-10A and J-11B are 

among the most modern aircraft in China’s inventory.

For maritime strike, the PLA(N) has relied on the H-6 

BADGER bomber for decades. The H-6 is a licensed 

copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 BADGER medium jet 

bomber, maritime versions of which can employ 

advanced ASCMs against surface targets. Despite the 

age of the design, the Chinese H-6 continues to receive 

electronics and payload upgrades, which keep the 

aircraft viable. We think as many as 30 of these aircraft 

remain in service. Noted improvements for the upgraded 

BADGER include the ability to carry a maximum of four 

ASCMs, rather than the two previously seen on earlier 

H-6D variants. Some H-6 have also been modified as 

tankers, increasing the PLA(N)’s flexibility and range. 

Su-30MK2 Flanker G

J-10A Firebird A

J-11B Flanker L

H-6

JH-7 FLOUNDER
22

With at least five regiments fielded across the three fleets, 

the JH-7 FLOUNDER augments the H-6 for maritime 

strike. The JH-7 is a domestically produced tandem-seat 

fighter/bomber, developed as a replacement for obsolete 

Q-5 Fantan light attack aircraft and H-5 Beagle bombers. 

Updated versions of the JH-7 feature a more capable radar 

and additional weapons capacity, enhancing its maritime 

strike capabilities. The JH-7 can carry up to four ASCMs 

and two PL-5 or PL-8 short-range air-to-air missiles, providing considerable payload for maritime strike missions.

In addition to combat aircraft, the PLA(N) is expanding its 

inventory of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), airborne early warning (AEW), and surveillance aircraft. China 

has achieved significant new capabilities by modifying 

several existing airframes. The Y-8, a Chinese license-produced version of the ex-Soviet An-12 Cub, forms the basic 

airframe for several PLA(N) special mission variants. All 

of these aircraft play a key role in providing a clear picture 

of surface and air contacts in the maritime environment. 

As the PLA(N) pushes farther from the coast, long-range 

aircraft capable of extended on-station times to act as the 

eyes and ears of the fleet become increasingly important. 

Internet photos from 2012 indicated the development of a 

Y-9 naval variant that is equipped with a MAD (magnetic 

anomaly detector) boom, typical of ASW aircraft. This 

Y-9 ASW variant features a large surface search radar 

mounted under the nose as well as multiple blade antennae on the fuselage for probable electronic surveillance. 

Also present is a small EO/IR turret just aft of the nose 

wheel and an internal weapons bay forward of the main 

landing gear. The fact that this aircraft appeared in a 

primer yellow paint scheme indicates that it was under 

development and probably has not yet entered service. 

Finally, and perhaps most notably, with the landing of 

the first J-15 carrier-based fighter aboard LIAONING 

in November 2012, the PLA(N) took its first major 

step toward a carrier-based aviation capability. The 

development of LIAONING and the first J-15 aircraft are 

covered in a dedicated section later in this chapter.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

China continues developing multi-mission unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the maritime environment and 

may have begun integrating UAVs into its operations to 

enhance situational 

awareness. For well 

over a decade, China 

has actively pursued 

UAV technology and 

now ranks among a 

handful of countries 

involved in UAV technology and development. China recently 

unveiled its first 

prototype unmanned 

combat aerial 

vehicle (UCAV), Lijan, 

which features a 

blended-wing design 

and low observable 

technologies. 

The PLA(N) will probably emerge as one of China’s 

most prolific UAV users, employing UAVs to supplement 

manned ISR aircraft as well as to aid targeting for land-, 

ship-, and other air-launched weapons systems. UAVs 

will probably become one of the PLA(N)’s most valuable 

ISR assets. They are ideally suited for this mission set 

because of their long loiter time, slow cruising speed, 

and ability to provide near real-time information through 

the use of a variety of onboard sensors. In the near 

term, the PLA(N) may use strategic UAVs such as the 

BZK-005 or the Soaring Dragon to monitor the surrounding maritime environment. In addition to land-based 

KJ-200 MOTH Y-8 MASK Y-9 ASW

BZK-005

S-100
23

systems, the PLA(N) is also pursuing ship-based UAVs 

as a supplement to manned helicopters. To date, we 

have observed the PLA(N) operating the Austrian 

Camcopter S-100 rotary-wing UAV from several surface 

combatants. Following initial evaluation and deployment 

of the Camcopter S-100, the PLA(N) will likely adopt a 

domestically produced UAV into ship-based operations.

China’s Aircraft Carrier Program

With spectacular ceremony in September 2012, China 

commissioned LIAONING, joining the small group of 

countries that possess an aircraft carrier. Since that time, 

the PLA(N) has continued the long and dangerous path of 

learning to operate fixed-wing aircraft from a carrier. The 

first launches and recoveries of the J-15 aircraft occurred 

in November 2012, with additional testing and training in 

early July 2013. With the first landing complete, China 

became only the fifth country in the world to possess 

conventional takeoff and landing fighters aboard an aircraft 

carrier. Nonetheless, it will take several years before 

Chinese carrier-based air regiments are operational.

LIAONING is quite different from the U.S. Navy’s 

NIMITZ-class carriers. First, since LIAONING is smaller, 

it will carry far fewer aircraft in comparison to a U.S.-

style carrier air wing. Additionally, the LIAONING’s 

ski-jump configuration significantly restricts aircraft 

fuel and ordnance loads. Consequently, the aircraft it 

launches have more a limited flight radius and combat 

power. Finally, China does not yet possess specialized 

supporting aircraft such as the E-2C Hawkeye. 

Unlike a U.S. carrier, LIAONING is not well equipped to 

conduct long-range power projection. It is better suited to 

fleet air defense missions, where it could extend a protective envelope over a fleet operating in blue water. Although 

it possesses a full suite of weapons and combat systems, 

LIAONING will likely offer its greatest value as a long-term 

training investment. This “starter carrier” will enable the 

PLA(N) to train its first groups of pilots and deck crews 

in areas critical to conducting carrier aviation. China’s 

follow-on carriers will inevitably offer platform improvements, eventually including a catapult launching system.

China’s first carrier air regiment will consist of the 

Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, as it is known in China, which 

is externally similar to the Russian Su-33 FLANKER D. 

However, in a pattern typical of Chinese military systems 

indigenization, the aircraft is thought to possess many 

of the domestic avionics and armament capabilities of 

the Chinese J-11B FLANKER. Notable external differences between the J-15 and J-11B include folding wings, 

strengthened landing gear, a tailhook under a shortened 

tail stinger, two-piece slotted flaps, canards, and a retractable in-flight refueling probe on the left side of the nose. 

Likely armament 

for the J-15 will 

include PL-8 and 

PL-12 air-to-air 

missiles similar to the 

J-11B and modern 

ASCMs similar to 

those carried by 

the JH-7. Six J-15 

prototypes are currently involved in testing, and at least one two-seat 

J-15S operational trainer had begun flight testing as of 

November 2012. The first landings aboard LIAONING 

came three years after the J-15’s maiden flight in summer 

2009. In the months preceding the landings, the PLA(N) 

conducted multiple J-15 approaches. Production J-15 

aircraft are now rolling off the assembly line as China 

begins training its first regiment of carrier pilots.

Naval Mines

China has a robust mining capability and currently 

maintains a varied inventory estimated at more than 50,000 

mines. China has developed a robust infrastructure for 

naval mine-related research, development, testing, evaluation, and production. During the past few years, China has 

gone from an obsolete mine inventory, consisting primarily 

J-15 Flying Shark

LIAONING CV-16 KUZNETSOV-class
24

of pre-WWII vintage moored contact and basic bottom 

influence mines, to a vast mine inventory consisting of a 

large variety of mine types such as moored, bottom, drifting, rocket-propelled, and intelligent mines. The mines can 

be laid by submarines (primarily for covert mining of enemy 

ports), surface ships, aircraft, and by fishing and merchant 

vessels. China will continue to develop more advanced 

mines in the future such as extended-range propelledwarhead mines, antihelicopter mines, and bottom influence 

mines more able to counter minesweeping efforts. 

China has also invested heavily in improving its mine 

countermeasure (MCM) capabilities. A number of 

advanced, dedicated MCM vessels have joined the fleet 

in recent years, including the capable WOCHI-class 

minehunting ships (MHS) and new WOZANG-class 

minehunters acting as mother-ships to the remotecontrollable WONANG-class inshore minesweepers 

(MSI). China is improving its minehunting capabilities 

with improved SONARs and mine neutralization vehicles. 

Chinese warfare exercises have routinely included 

both mining and mine countermeasure events.

Maritime C4ISR

To effectively employ sophisticated naval platforms and 

long-range weaponry, any modern navy requires an 

advanced maritime command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) capability. The ranges of modern ASCMs extend 

well beyond the range of a ship’s own sensors. Emerging 

land-based weapons, such as the DF-21D ASBM with a 

range of more than 810 nm, are even more dependent on 

remote targeting. Modern navies must be able to effectively 

build a picture of all activities occurring in the air and sea. 

For China, this provides a formidable challenge. Just to 

characterize activities in the “near seas,” China must build 

a picture covering nearly 875,000 square nautical miles 

(sqnm) of water- and air-space. The Philippine Sea—a 

key interdiction area in the event of a conflict over Taiwan 

or in the South China Sea—expands the battlespace by 

another 1.5 million sqnm. In this vast space, navies and 

coast guards from seven regional countries as well as 

several globally deploying nations combine with tens of 

Chinese Cyber Warfare Development

Cyber capabilities represent one of the 

most revolutionary changes to warfare 

in modern history. Many security 

experts have debated how and to what 

extent cyber will be employed during 

the next major conflict. Regardless 

of cyber’s limitations or potential, we 

know that China is one of a handful of 

countries on the forefront of developing military cyber capabilities. China’s 

2010 Defense White Paper highlighted 

the importance of cybersecurity in 

China’s national defense. Publicly, 

China has maintained that it is a 

victim rather than an originator of 

cyber actions, but documents such as 

the 2013 Mandiant Report highlight 

the PLA’s large cyber effort.

During peacetime, cyber espionage 

enables data collection for intelligence 

purposes and lays the groundwork for 

future cyber network attacks. During 

war, cyber attacks can constrain an 

adversary’s actions, or act as a force 

multiplier when coupled with kinetic 

attacks. Strategic Chinese military 

writings do not specifically deal with 

how China would employ cyber 

operations in a maritime environment, 

although they do make clear the 

importance of cyber operations. 

The PLA highlights network warfare 

as one of the “basic modes of sea 

battle” alongside air, surface, and 

underwater long-range precision 

strikes.” As the PLA’s larger military 

investment in emerging domains 

such as cyber matures, the application of cyber operations in the 

maritime realm will consequently 

bolster the PLA(N)’s capability.
25

thousands of fishing 

boats, cargo ships, 

oil tankers, and other 

commercial vessels.

China is developing 

a wide array of 

sensors to sort 

through this complex 

environment and 

contribute to its 

maritime picture. 

The most direct method is reporting from the ships and 

aircraft that China operates at sea. These provide the 

most detailed and reliable information, but can only cover 

a fraction of the needed space. A number of ground-based 

coastal radars provide overlapping coverage of the area 

immediately off the coast, but their range is similarly limited. 

To gain a broader view of the activity in its near and far 

seas, China has turned to more sophisticated sensors. 

The skywave OTH radar provides awareness of a much 

larger area than conventional radars by bouncing signals 

off the ionosphere. At the same time, China operates a 

growing array of reconnaissance satellites, which allow 

it to observe maritime activity anywhere on the earth. 

Two civilian systems also contribute to China’s maritime 

awareness. The first is a coastal monitoring network for 

the Automatic Identification System (AIS)—an automated 

system required on most commercial vessels by the 

International Maritime Organization. China’s Beidou 

system, installed on several thousand of its fishing boats, 

provides GPS-like navigation to the boats as well as 

automatic position reporting back to a ground station 

in China, allowing the location of the fishing fleet to be 

constantly monitored by fishing enforcement authorities.

DF-21
26
27

CHAPTER 3

TRAINING, EXERCISES, 

AND JOINT OPERATIONS 

Overview

Much like the acquisition of advanced weapons, platforms, 

and sensors, the professionalization and training of 

PLA(N) personnel is an essential component of China’s 

naval modernization. Sustained leadership emphasis 

on “realistic” and “complex” training has influenced 

training patterns and improved operational proficiency 

during the past decade. In late 2012, shortly after 

becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party 

of China (CPC) and Chairman of CPC Central Military 

Commission (CMC), Xi Jinping extolled the continued 

importance of cultivating “real combat” awareness 

throughout the military. Since the early 2000s, the PLA(N) 

has steadily increased the complexity of its training and 

exercises to meet the challenge of modern warfare. 

Just over a decade ago, PLA(N) training was heavily 

dependent on an annual conscription cycle and focused 

almost exclusively on anti-surface warfare (ASUW). 

Recent exercises suggest the PLA(N) has strengthened 

its training cycle, has become relatively proficient in 

ASUW, is making notable gains in area air defense, and 

has seen some progress in deep water anti-submarine 

warfare (ASW). In addition to becoming more sustained 

and complex, training has expanded from China’s littoral 

to areas within and beyond the First Island Chain. “Far 

seas” operations, particularly to the South China and 

Philippine Seas, have become routine in recent years. The 

PLA(N) has also improved coordination between its various 

branches. Finally, it has demonstrated a desire to operate 

in more realistic conditions featuring electronic warfare. 

Before China’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy operations 

commenced in 2009, the PLA(N) was largely a training 

fleet, with very little operational experience. Since 

that time, the PLA(N) has conducted more than 19 

counterpiracy missions, expanded its participation in 

multi-national exercises, and frequently patrolled near 

disputed areas such as the Senkaku Islands, Scarborough 

Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal to promote China’s 

claimed maritime rights and territorial sovereignty. This 

latter mission is one of increasing importance for the 

PLA(N), according to China’s 2012 Defense White Paper. 

These operations provide the PLA(N) with valuable 

operational experience and increase confidence in 

its ability to assert PRC’s interests within the region. 

The operations have also attracted the attention and, 

in some cases, concern of China’s neighbors. 

Evolution of the Training Cycle

Until the early 2000s, PLA(N) training and proficiency 

levels were heavily contingent on the annual conscription 

cycle, and focused primarily on ASUW. Major training 

standdowns would occur in late November and last 

through the early part of the next year as new conscripts 

entered the force. Initial training consisted primarily of 

independent or unit-level basic warfare training. As the 

year progressed, more complex unit or flotilla-level training 

occurred. By mid-year, basic warfare drills transitioned to 

more advanced, coordinated warfare training, culminating 

in a series of year-end exercises. Following these 

exercises, units would stand down as new conscripts 

entered into the force, only to begin the cycle anew.

Today, however, the PLA(N) conducts complex 

multi-discipline warfare training throughout the year, 

and the scope of naval training has broadened to 

include more robust ASW and anti-air warfare (AAW) 

training, all of which are integrated using advanced 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers 

and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) systems. Under the new model, general unit 

readiness is maintained at a higher level throughout 

the year, and the impact of new conscripts entering the 

force is less evident, particularly with the increasing 

maturity of China’s noncommissioned officer corps. 
28

The PLA(N) has replaced basic-level independent 

training with robust flotilla-level or combined arms 

training that includes coordinated air, surface, and 

submarine operations. Today’s training cycle is defined 

by three levels of combat readiness, rather than a 

conscription cycle. “Level one” indicates that ships are 

fully operational and combat certified, “level two” indicates 

that ships have recently completed maintenance but 

are not combat certified, and “level three” indicates 

ships in a maintenance status. Under this model, 

individual unit proficiency and progression through the 

training cycle vary according to readiness levels.

The addition of more effective classroom training and 

shore-based simulation systems likely plays an important 

role in maintaining a high level of personnel readiness. 

These initiatives provide crews with basic and advanced 

hands-on training throughout the year, irrespective of ship 

availability or readiness level. This improves the overall 

quality of training and shortens the training cycle. In 

addition to shore-based simulators, vessel training centers 

(VTCs) help maintain year-round readiness levels. Located 

in each of the three fleets and subordinate to the fleet 

headquarters, VTCs provide crews with a variety of basic 

and advanced-level training by supplying technical and 

tactical foundation training, transition training for vessels 

recently outfitted with new weapons or equipment, and 

training instruction for new or returning ship commanders.

The PLA reportedly intends to further reform the 

training cycle during 2015. The PLA’s training 

transformation will likely have the most significant 

impact on joint service integration, an area where 

progress has remained relatively slow. Anticipated 

changes include improved multi-service training, 

intended to increase integration among the services. 

Training Guidelines and Reforms

During the past several years, annual General Staff 

Department (GSD) training guidelines have directed the 

PLA to improve overall combat readiness by conducting 

training representative of actual wartime operations. 

Specific guidelines call for rigorous training based on 

“realistic” combat scenarios, “far seas” training, and 

an emphasis on information-based systems. China’s 

most recent Defense White Paper noted efforts to 

intensify training for blue water deployments and 

operations in complex battlefield environments.

In 2015, the Navy Headquarters Military Training 

Department directed the PLA(N) to advance 

the complexity of training and exercises by 

emphasizing scenarios that emulate war-realistic 

settings. According to these guidelines, PLA(N) 

training and exercises should do the following:

• Increase training in accordance 

with real-war requirements.

• Strengthen command authority and relationships 

through realistic opposing force training.

• Deepen tactical innovation.

• Improve training in the actual use of weapons 

in an electromagnetic environment.

• Continue “far seas” training.

• Rectify training methods by avoiding 

formalism and scripting in exercises.

• Improve joint campaign-level training.

In addition to annual training guidelines, senior 

military leadership has outlined overarching 

goals for the PLA during the 12th Five-Year 

Plan (2011–15). These objectives include:

• Organize and improve multi-branch training.

• Strengthen integration of units and 

information-based systems.

• Focus training for “far seas” operations.

• Modernize management of training and standardize 

training evaluation and assessment process.

• Develop a strong base for simulation 

and network-based training.

“Far Seas” Training

China’s senior naval leadership characterizes “far seas” 

training and deployments (that is, those conducted 

at extended distances beyond routine Chinese local 

operating areas) as the new norm for China’s Navy. While 

the PLA(N) has conducted the occasional long-range 

naval surface and submarine patrols since at least the 

early 1980s, trends over the last few years reflect an 

unambiguous shift in the frequency, complexity, and 

distance of Chinese naval operations. The PLA(N) now 

conducts routine surface deployments to the South 

China and Philippine Seas, including an unprecedented 

seven deployments to the Philippine Sea in 2012 and 

nine deployments in 2013. In 2014, a PLA(N) South Sea 

Fleet surface task group consisting of the amphibious 

dock landing ship “CHANGBAISHAN” and the missile 

destroyers “HAIKOU” and “WUHAN” conducted a 
29

first-time training deployment to the Eastern Indian 

Ocean. Future surface deployments to the central and 

eastern Pacific are likely within the next five years. 

“Far seas” training deployments serve multiple objectives. 

At the strategic level, they display the PLA(N)’s 

conventional deterrence capability and underscore 

Beijing’s desire to assert and defend its maritime rights and 

interests. Operationally, the deployments demonstrate the 

PLA(N)’s ability to conduct tasks associated with military 

operations other than war; they also emphasize “aroundthe-clock” 24-hour training, and they simulate situations 

closer to actual combat conditions. At the tactical level, 

far sea deployments enhance the PLA(N)’s core warfare 

proficiencies in ASUW, ASW, and AAW. They enable crews 

to practice various capabilities, including maritime escort, 

ship boarding, counterpiracy, counterterrorism, at-sea 

replenishment and sustainment, and opposing force drills. 

In late-October 2013, the PLA(N) conducted a 15-day 

at-sea confrontation exercise in the Philippine Sea 

under the umbrella of MANEUVER-5. Accord to media 

reporting, MANEUVER-5 was supported by air and naval 

forces from the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea 

Fleets. This was the first time the PLA(N) organized all 

three fleets for simultaneous open-ocean training and 

marked the largest PLA(N) exercise conducted in the 

western Pacific Ocean. PLA(N) Commander Admiral Wu 

Shengli emphasized that MANEUVER-5 was intended 

to be “combat-realistic.” Additionally, in December 

2014, participants from all three of the PLA(N)’s fleets 

conducted a large-scale naval exercise in the western 

Pacific. During this exercise, PLA(N) participants focused 

on improving command decisionmaking, long-distance 

maneuver, and dynamic opposing force training. 

In addition to “far seas” deployments beyond the First 

Island Chain, the PLA(N) has maintained two combatants 

and a naval auxiliary in the Gulf of Aden supporting 

counterpiracy operations since early 2009. Since those 

operations began, the PLA(N) has conducted more than 19 

counterpiracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden, conducted 

escort operations for more than 6,000 China- and nonChina-flagged ships and responded to numerous pirate 

attacks. In 2011, a PLA(N) vessel played a symbolic role 

in escorting civilian ferries carrying Chinese civilians who 

were evacuated from Libya. Marking another historic 

first, in 2014, the PLA(N) conducted naval operations in 

the Mediterranean Sea in support of a UN-sponsored 

operation to remove chemical weapons from Syria. 

Opposing Force Training

As part the effort to enhance realism in training, the 

PLA(N) and PLANAF regularly incorporate “opposing 

forces play” into their exercises. The PLA(N) uses 

these confrontation drills to simulate combat scenarios 

and emphasize command and control and tactical 

decisionmaking. Accordingly, these interactions have 

become less scripted in recent years. This type of 

training is employed to evaluate a commander’s ability 

to develop and execute operational plans according 

to loosely defined objectives. These dynamic training 

events, which stress tactical flexibility, are occurring 

on a regular basis and at greater distances from the 

Chinese coast. The recent large-scale exercises 

conducted in the western Pacific in 2013 and 2014 

are the best examples of this type of training, as 

they feature elements from all three fleets and nearcontinuous red-versus-blue training evolutions.

Combat Support Operations

The PLA(N) has also begun employing operational 

support exercises, which feature various types of 

logistics support, as would likely be required in wartime. 

Logistics support is now featured prominently in most 

fleet-level and “far seas” deployments. This type of 

training usually consists of general fuel and stores 

replenishment, rescue and salvage operations of 

damaged ships, and emergency response and at-sea 

medical support. This training shift reflects recent 

directives to improve the capabilities of shore-based 

infrastructure and naval auxiliary units to support ships, 

submarines, and helicopters in wartime operations. 

Use of Advanced Training Aids

The PLA(N)’s increasing use of advanced training 

aids, including simulators and mobile targets, has also 

contributed to proficiency and year-round readiness. 

Employed on land, at sea, and in the air, these training 

aids simulate enemy combatants or incoming threats 

to improve tactical proficiency. The PLA(N) frequently 

employs advanced mobile targets equipped with passive 

and active jamming equipment to simulate a variety of 

threat scenarios. These advanced training aids can be 

easily reconfigured to simulate various targets, providing 

crews with highly dynamic training environments. 
30

Civil-Military Integration

During the past five years, tension over disputed land 

features and maritime rights in the East China and South 

China Seas have catalyzed PRC efforts to improve civilmaritime integration and effectively assert China’s interests. 

Typically, Beijing prefers to employ its Coast Guard in the 

forefront of maritime sovereignty operations, with PLA(N) 

ships providing a less overt security guarantee. China 

has also utilized civilian fishing vessels to advance its 

maritime objectives. Coordinating the activities of these 

distinct organizations is an ongoing challenge that has 

important implications for China and for the region. 

Recent PLA(N) exercises, training, and operational 

deployments have incorporated greater civil-military 

integration. In 2012, elements of the PLA(N)’s East Sea 

Fleet and Chinese maritime law enforcement conducted 

the exercise EAST CHINA SEA COOPERATION, 

which remains the largest combined civil-military 

exercise to date. The exercise focused on civilmilitary command integration, search and rescue 

operations, and emergency medical support. 

In May 2013, the PLA(N) also participated in a six-day 

maritime medical and rescue exercise, HEALTH SERVICE 

MISSION 2013. According to PRC media, the exercise 

included the hospital ship PEACE ARK and mobilized 

civilian health services across multiple provinces. The 

exercise was intended to simulate combat-oriented medical 

support to forces involved in maritime defensive operations. 

Exercise serials consisted of maritime medical command 

and coordination and the timely at-sea triage of injured 

and sick personnel. Civil-military integration exercises 

will likely continue to expand in scope and frequency.

In May 2014, China’s unilateral deployment of a deepwater oil rig in an area disputed with Vietnam touched 

off a diplomatic crisis between Beijing and Hanoi, and 

both sides deployed large numbers of coast guard 

ships, fishing vessels, and some naval combatants 

to the area. Ships rammed one another and China’s 

Coast Guard deployed water cannons in the tense 

months to follow. The tense situation could have easily 

escalated into a military conflict. Beijing likely regards 

civil-military integration as essential in these types of 

disputes, both as a means to pressure rival claimants 

and as an instrument of retaining centralized control. 

Training in a Complex Electromagnetic 

Environment (CEME)

In accordance with PLA General Staff Department 

(GSD) training guidelines, the PLA(N) places heavy 

emphasis on training and exercising in a “complex 

electromagnetic environment” (CEME). In 2006, 

military training guidelines shifted from “training under 

mechanized conditions” to “training under informatized 

conditions.” Since that time, complex electronic warfare 

training has remained a top priority for the PLA(N). To 

improve the realism and complexity of training, PLA(N) 

exercises have included greater numbers of “live” or 

“hostile” electronic environments. The PLA(N) has even 

developed an Electronic Countermeasures Simulation 

Training Center in the North Sea Fleet to assist with 

CEME training. In addition, PLA(N) ships, submarines, 

and occasionally aviation units exercise and train in 

simulated nuclear, biological, and chemical environments.

Joint Training with Foreign Navies

During the last decade, the PLA(N) has actively promoted 

naval diplomacy through goodwill cruises and low-level 

joint exercises. Between September and December 

2013, a three-ship task group from the North Sea Fleet 

conducted a historic deployment to South America, by 

way of a first-time transit through the Strait of Magellan, 

with stops in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. The PLA(N) and 

the Russian Navy (RFN) also conducted two joint naval 

exercises, one in Russia in 2013 and the second in China 

in 2014. These exercises highlighted growing mutual 

security concerns within the region and paved the way 

for greater cooperation between the PLA(N) and RFN. 

Marking another historic first and a milestone in U.S. 

Navy-PLA(N) relations, PLA(N) ships joined the 2014 Rim 

of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in Hawaii. The PLA(N) 

dispatched a four-ship flotilla to RIMPAC, the largest 

surface contingent of any RIMPAC participant outside of 

the United States. This contingent included two advanced 

surface combatants, an auxiliary oiler, and a hospital 

ship. The PLA(N) ships participated in various gunnery, 

rescue and assist (R&A), boarding, and medical exercises 

in a multi-national task force, and PLA(N) performance 

was on par with many other participating navies. 

China’s successful participation in RIMPAC highlighted 

its emergence as a capable navy in the Pacific and its 

increasing confidence in showcasing its own abilities. 
31

Developing Integrated Joint Operations

The ability of individual military services to work as a 

cohesive team in pursuit of common objectives, often at 

the tactical level, is essential in modern warfare. That is 

why PLA leaders have emphasized the development of 

“Integrated Joint Operations.” Despite its considerable 

rhetorical emphasis on achieving this goal, the PLA’s record 

of achievement appears mixed during the past decade. 

In practice, the PLA has approached the concept of 

jointness as different services operating toward a common 

goal in a joint or combined campaign, but often with 

operations separated by time and space. More recently, 

China’s analysis of U.S. military operations and other 

observations of modern warfare have convinced the PLA’s 

leadership to expand integration between the services to 

include enhanced joint operations at the tactical level. 

Important doctrinal publications, such as the PLA National 

Defense University Press Science of Campaigns, place a 

high priority on joint warfare. The 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 

and 2012 Defense White Papers highlight the importance 

of Integrated Joint Operations, stating joint operations are 

the basic form of modern warfare and bring the operational 

strengths of different services into full play. The PLA’s 

General Staff Department promoted the 2009 Outline 

for Military Training and Evaluation as the new starting 

point for the adoption of Integrated Joint Operations.

In addition to doctrine, a number of the PLA professional 

military education (PME) institutions are increasing 

the level of joint PME within the Chinese military. On 

28 November 2006, the command 

academies of the Army, Air Force, Navy, 

Second Artillery, and Nanjing Military 

Region signed a cooperative agreement 

to accelerate the development and 

education of joint commanders. 

According to official PLA press, at least 

a few senior military officers and a 

small number of mid-grade officers in 

China have attended the academies of 

sister services, although this practice 

is nowhere near as widespread as 

it is in the U.S. military. Additionally, 

it is not clear if accomplishing the 

appropriate levels of the PLA’s version 

of “Joint PME” is required for promotion, 

the way it is in the U.S. military. 

Despite a rhetorical, doctrinal, and academic commitment 

to the development of Integrated Joint Operations, the 

PLA appears to have made sporadic progress at the 

operational level. In terms of tactical training, PLA media 

have published a number of articles on joint training 

exercises that include photographs of Army attack 

helicopters flying air cover for Navy ships in support of 

amphibious landing exercises, as well as discussion of 

Army, Air Force, and militia elements operating in the same 

command post during air defense training. According to one 

article, Air Force and Navy personnel operated together to 

provide logistics, air traffic control, and targeting support 

during an air force overwater strike training exercise. 

Due in part to linguistic nuance, many reported instances 

of “joint” training might be characterized more accurately 

as “opposing force training.” For example, PLAAF aircraft 

attacking PLA(N) surface vessels or PLAAF aircraft acting 

as targets for PLA air defense forces are sometimes 

reported as “joint training.” Such opposing force play does 

not require the level of tactical and operational coordination 

that would be necessary for multiple services operating 

in concert toward a common goal. China characterizes 

exercises of any type with a foreign military as “joint” 

even though many of these training evolutions involve 

only small numbers of personnel from one service. 

Exercise patterns reflect the desire to address gaps in 

joint capabilities. Every year since 2007, the Jinan Military 

Region of the PLA has conducted the LIANHE “joint” 

exercise in which all services of the PLA participate along 

Joint command post exercise
32

with units from the People’s Armed Police. According 

to PLA media, the LIANHE exercises are used to test 

and develop joint concepts for the whole of the PLA.

In non-tactical areas such as logistics, the PLA is 

successfully increasing operating efficiency through 

greater joint operations. Under an order issued by 

President Hu Jintao, the Jinan Military Region (MR) was 

chosen to lead the development of a theater-level joint 

logistics system. The “Great Joint Logistics” scheme 

was initially announced in April 2007 with the Jinan MR 

serving as a test case for the other six military regions 

in the PLA. Joint logistics concepts have since been 

promulgated to the remaining six military regions with 

significant success, according to official PLA media. 

Although the PLA appears committed to pursuing 

Integrated Joint Operations, the Army’s historic dominance 

over other services may complicate these efforts. Some 

officers have complained that the ongoing dominance 

of the “great infantry” concept across the military has 

affected the development of joint operations and training. 

To achieve true Integrated Joint Operations, the PLA will 

likely need to create a spirit of teamwork throughout the 

services by developing the training, doctrine, procedures, 

and equipment needed to foster such cooperation.

To become a modern, combat-capable navy, the PLA(N) has 

steadily implemented more realistic training during the past 

decade, as demonstrated by the normalization of “far seas” 

operations, dynamic opposing force training, and longdistance combat support exercises. Although some gaps 

remain, these training reforms have catalyzed sustained 

increases in the PLA(N)’s tactical warfighting proficiency. 

In particular, adjustments to the training cycle, personnel 

reform, and the push for greater levels of training complexity 

have improved the PLA(N)’s operational readiness. 

PLA leaders and planners are committed to developing 

systems for conduct of joint operations, but they recognize 

the complexity of that task and are conscious of the fact 

that the PLA lacks real world experience. These factors 

likely moderate leadership expectations of what can be 

achieved and compel military leaders to take an iterative 

approach, relying heavily on top-down supervision by the 

GSD and frequent formal evaluations to ensure steady and 

measurable progress in a controlled environment before 

promulgating joint operations directives across the force. 
33

CHAPTER 4

PLA(N) 

STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP

Organization 

The PLA(N) operates three fleets and controls all of 

China’s Naval and Naval Air (PLANAF) forces as well 

as two marine brigades. The 13-member Navy Party 

Standing Committee is the Navy’s senior-most decisionmaking organ and is responsible for the day-to-day 

administration of the PLA(N). Like the PLA’s seven 

military regions (MRs), Air Force (PLAAF), and Second 

Artillery Corps (SAC), the PLA(N)’s organizational 

structure mirrors the PLA’s four General Departments. 

The Central Military Commission (CMC) sits at the top of 

China’s national command structure. Chaired by Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and PRC 

President Xi Jinping, this group oversees and sets policy 

for China’s armed forces. The CMC currently consists of 

Chairman Xi Jinping, two uniformed vice chairmen, the 

heads of each of the General Departments of the PLA, 

and the Minister of National Defense (MND), as well as the 

commanders of the PLA(N), PLAAF, and Second Artillery.

The four General Departments of the PLA 

immediately beneath the CMC are:

• General Staff Department (GSD)

• General Political Department (GPD)

• General Logistics Department (GLD)

• General Armament Department (GAD)

PLA(N) Headquarters in Beijing is subordinate to 

the four General Departments, equal in grade to 

the PLA’s seven MRs and to the other services. It 

consists of four first-level departments that perform 

leadership and administrative functions for the Navy 

and provide support to the operational fleets:

•	 Headquarters Department: Oversees PLA(N) 

administrative and functional departments including operations, training, communications, and 

intelligence. The PLA(N) Chief of Staff is concurrently 

the Director of the Headquarters Department.

•	 Political Department: Responsible for all 

political work including discipline, officer 

assignments, propaganda, and security.

•	 Logistics Department: Handles construction of facilities, technical support to naval 

vessels, fuel, health care, finance, transportation, and other areas related to supply. 

•	 Armament Department: Provides technical 

support to all PLA(N) equipment and weapons 

systems from concept development to retirement.

The PLA(N) has three geographically oriented fleets which 

direct day-to-day operations. The deputy commanders 

of each fleet command the respective aviation force.

•	 North Sea Fleet: Headquartered in Qingdao, the 

North Sea Fleet is responsible for the Bo Hai, Yellow 

Sea, and the northern portion of the East China Sea

•	 East Sea Fleet: Headquartered in Ningbo, 

the East Sea Fleet covers the majority of the 

East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait

•	 South Sea Fleet: Headquartered in Zhanjiang, the 

South Sea Fleet is responsible for the South China 

Sea, as well as the PLA(N)’s two marine brigades.

Party Control

The PLA is a party (rather than a state) army, and the 

CCP exercises military control through the PLA’s dual 

leadership system in which the commander and political 

commissar share responsibility and are usually equal in 

grade. Decisionmaking in the PLA(N), as in the rest of the 

PLA, is intended to be a consensus-based process. Party 

committees, which also exist at every echelon, are the decisionmaking organs in peacetime. Political commissars are 

usually Secretary or Chair of their unit’s party committee, 

with the unit commander serving as Deputy Secretary. For 
34

example, since Wu Shengli became PLA(N) Commander 

in August 2006, the PLA(N) has had three political commissars (ADM Hu Yanlin, ADM Liu Xiaojiang, and LTGEN 

Miao Hua), all of whom served as Secretary of the Navy 

Party Committee while Wu serves as Deputy Secretary. 

At Navy Headquarters, the Party Committee convenes to 

address service-wide issues including operations, political 

work, logistics, armament, and a host of other issues. 

At the lower echelons of the service, such as the flotilla 

(zhidui) or vessel level, party committees convene to 

Figure 4-1. Leadership Structure as of Feb 2015
35

discuss specific operational objectives, such as reviewing navigation plans or improving the unit’s emergency 

readiness. PLA(N) vessel leaders can convene party 

committee meetings while underway, but such meetings 

are intended to complement the unit’s particular objectives.

PLA writings assert that political work should not interfere 

with or degrade military operations. Rather, PLA commentators and political officers often argue that political 

work—such as ensuring sailors understand the training 

plan, ensuring operational security, or even looking into 

a sailor’s physical and mental health—is an enabler of 

military operations. Although there are likely to be exceptions, most political officers throughout the PLA(N) serve 

in the same warfare area or fleet for decades, giving 

them as much familiarity with the unit as their commander 

counterpart and the personnel under their charge. 

Shenyang

Beijing

Lanzhou

Chengdu

Guangzhou

KAZAKHSTAN

RUSSIA

KYRGYSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA

BANGLADESH

MONGOLIA

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

VIETNAM

PHILIPPINES

JAPAN

N. KOREA

S. KOREA

Nanjing

Jinan

Qingdao

Ningbo

Zhanjiang

Figure 4-2. China Military Regions and Fleet Headquarters

North Sea Fleet HQ

East Sea Fleet HQ

South Sea Fleet HQ

PLA(N) HQs
36

The Navy Party Standing Committee

The Navy Party Standing Committee (NPSC) is the 

Navy’s senior-most decisionmaking organ, responsible 

for the day-to-day (peacetime) administration of the 

PLA(N), as well as dissemination and implementation 

of CMC directives. In this sense the NPSC is akin to 

a “Navy Politburo,” whose members include the most 

senior and influential officers in the service. The NPSC 

should not be confused with the larger Navy Party 

Committee, which numbers in the hundreds and comprises 

“elected” representatives from lower grade units; the 

NPSC currently consists of just 13 officers, including the 

PLA(N) Political Commissar and Commander. The size 

of the NPSC fluctuates depending on how many Deputy 

Commanders the PLA(N) has; currently there are five.

Admiral Wu Shengli

Commander, PLA(N)

The Chinese government’s April 

2013 Defense White Paper, The 

Diversified Employment of China’s 

Armed Forces, prominently called for 

the safeguarding of China’s maritime 

rights and interests, protection of 

China’s overseas interests, and 

securing international SLOCs. PLA(N) 

Commander, ADM Wu Shengli is 

responsible for building the force and 

preparing the navy to contend with this 

ever-expanding set of naval missions. 

He has led a major shift in naval 

operations, including naval operations 

at greater distances from China.

Admiral Wu Shengli was born 

in Zhejiang Province in August 

1945. His father, a high-ranking 

official in the Zhejiang provincial 

government, gave him the name 

Shengli (“victory”) in celebration 

of Japan’s very recent defeat. Wu 

entered the PLA in 1964, shortly 

before China’s Cultural Revolution. 

Wu’s princeling status (as the son of a 

high-ranking official) may have assisted him early in his military career, 

but it appears that his capabilities, 

not his lineage, were essential to his 

subsequent advancements. ADM Wu 

is a career surface-warfare officer who 

has commanded a destroyer flotilla, a 

naval support base, and held several 

shore-based positions including East 

Sea Fleet Deputy Commander and 

South Sea Fleet Commander. 

In 2004, ADM Wu was promoted to 

Deputy Chief of the General Staff 

Department (GSD). While at GSD, 

he was probably responsible for 

national defense mobilization issues. 

ADM Wu was appointed PLA(N) 

Commander in August 2006 and 

elected to the CMC in October 2007 

and again at the 18th Party Congress 

in 2012. He is eligible to remain 

PLA(N) Commander until 2017. 
LTGEN

Miao Hua (1955)

PLA(N) Political 

Commissar (PC),

Secretary, Navy 

Party Standing 

Committee (NPSC),

Grade 3

VADM Jiang 

Weilie (1955)

PLA(N) DCDR, 

Member, NPSC, 

Grade 4

VADM Ding 

Haichun (1954/5)

PLA(N) Deputy 

PC, Member, 

NPSC, Grade 4

RADM 

Xu Weibing

DIR, PLA(N) 

Logistics Dept,

Member, NPSC,

Grade 5

ADM 

Wu Shengli (1945)

CMC Member, 

PLA(N) 

Commander, 

Deputy Secretary, 

NPSC, Grade 2

VADM Liu Yi 

(1955) PLA(N) 

DCDR, Member, 

NPSC, Grade 4

VADM Tian 

Zhong (1956)

PLA(N) Deputy 

Commander 

(DCDR), Member, 

NPSC, Grade 4

RADM Ding Yi 

(1959), PLA(N) 

DCDR, Member, 

NPSC, Grade 4

RADM Qiu 

Yanpeng (1956)

PLA(N) Chief of 

Staff, Director, 

PLA(N) HQ Dept, 

Member, NPSC, 

Grade 4

VADM Du 

Jingchen (1952) 

PLA(N) DCDR, 

Member, NPSC,

Grade 4

VADM Wang 

Dengping (1952) 

PLA(N) Deputy 

PC, Member, 

NPSC, Grade 4

RADM Yang 

Shiguang

DIR, PLA(N) 

Political Dept,

Member, NPSC, 

Grade 4

NAVY PARTY 

STANDING COMMITTEE 

Figure 4-2.

RADM 

Wang Jianguo

DIR, PLA(N) 

Armament Dept,

Member, NPSC,

Grade 5

37
38

In addition to Admiral Wu Shengli, the following are 

members of the NPSC.

LTGEN Miao Hua (b. 1955) was transferred from the position of Political 

Commissar (PC) of the Lanzhou Military 

Region to PLA(N) PC in late December 

2014. His appointment continues a 

precedent of non-navy officers serving in 

PLA(N) political officer billets, such as former PLA(N) PC 

Liu Xiaojiang and former South Sea Fleet PC Huang 

Jiaxiang. Miao was selected onto the 18th CCP Discipline 

Inspection Committee in 2012. He is eligible to remain 

PLA(N) PC through 2020, three years after ADM Wu is 

expected to retire.

VADM Tian Zhong (b.1956) is the most 

senior of the five PLA(N) Deputy 

Commanders. He has had a distinguished career as a PLA(N) surface 

warfare officer and previously commanded the North Sea Fleet. Tian 

became a flag officer at the age of 45 and took command of 

the fleet at 51. Tian has also served in leadership positions 

in the North and South Sea Fleets. He has written articles 

on the navy’s role in military operations other than war 

(MOOTW) and the importance of joint training in the PLA. 

Of note, since he was its commander, the North Sea Fleet 

has participated in the Jinan MR’s “joint training pilot” 

program. In 2011, Tian participated in an international panel 

of naval officers in London, addressing the impact of piracy. 

Tian’s strong foreign engagement experience also includes 

leading task groups and delegations to Russia and North 

Korea. In 2012, Tian was selected to the 18th CCP’s 

Central Committee. He is eligible to remain a PLA(N) 

Deputy Commander until 2019, but it is likely he will 

promote to a higher grade assignment before then.

VADM Du Jingchen (b.1952) was 

laterally transferred from PLA(N) Chief of 

Staff to PLA(N) Deputy Commander in 

July 2014. A career surface warfare 

officer, Du has several notable achievements, including his selection to serve as 

the first task group commander of the PLA(N)’s counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden in 2009. His rapid 

promotion from South Sea Fleet Chief of Staff to East Sea 

Fleet Commander in December 2009 and subsequent 

transfer to PLA(N) Chief of Staff in late 2010 reflects the 

confidence CMC leaders appear to have in Du’s abilities. 

He is eligible to remain in his current positional grade 

through 2015.

VADM Jiang Weilie (b.1955) joins VADM 

Tian Zhong as a strong contender for 

promotion to a higher-grade assignment, 

including PLA(N) Commander. A surface 

warfare officer, Jiang has served in all 

three fleets, including Commander of the 

South Sea Fleet. Like Tian, Jiang was selected to the CCP 

Central Committee at the CCP’s 18th Party Congress in 

2012. The two former fleet commanders also led separate, 

extended-area surface deployments in early 2013. During 

Jiang’s April 2013 deployment to the western Pacific, he 

was quoted in PLA media as saying that the PLA(N) will 

begin to normalize open-sea training in areas farther from 

China. During his brief time as Director of the PLA(N) 

Armament Department, Jiang oversaw reforms to the 

PLA(N)’s weapons acquisition system, reportedly a key 

objective set forth by the CMC. Jiang is eligible to remain in 

position until 2018, but he is likely to promote to a higher 

grade.

VADM Liu Yi (b.1955) has often been 

characterized by “first” and “youngest,” 

while serving in positions of distinction in 

the PLA(N)’s submarine force. After 

reportedly joining the PLA(N) at age 14, 

Liu became commanding officer (CO) of 

a conventional submarine by age 26 and CO of an SSN by 

age 38. As a PLA(N) Deputy Chief of Staff, Liu commanded 

a midshipman training cruise to Japan and Republic of 

Korea in October 2009. He was promoted to his current 

assignment of PLA(N) Deputy Commander in July 2011. Liu 

is eligible to remain in this position through 2018.

VADM Ding Yi (b.1959) is the most junior 

PLA(N) Deputy Commander and the only 

Deputy Commander with an aviation 

background. While serving in the East 

Sea Fleet’s Aviation Force, Ding was 

instrumental in showcasing the PLA(N)’s 

“Flying Leopard” fighter/bombers during the PLA’s military 

review in Tiananmen Square during the PRC’s 50th anniversary celebration. He took command of the North Sea 

Fleet’s Aviation Force in 2010, where he served until his 
39

July 2013 promotion to PLA(N) Deputy Commander. Ding’s 

relative youth means he could remain in this position or a 

position of similar grade until 2022. He was promoted to 

Vice Admiral in July 2014.

VADM Wang Dengping (b.1952) is one 

of two PLA(N) Deputy Political 

Commissars (DPC). He was embarked 

during the PLA(N)’s first global circumnavigation cruise in 2002, commanded by 

former PLA(N) Deputy Commander Ding 

Yiping. Wang is one of the most vocal PLA political work 

officers in recent memory. While serving as a delegate to 

the annual National People’s Congress, Wang often made 

strongly worded pronouncements calling for defense of 

China’s sovereignty in disputed territories in the South 

China Sea. Wang will probably retire in 2015.

VADM Ding Haichun (b.1954 or 1955) is 

a PLA(N) Deputy Political Commissar 

(DPC) Ding ran the political department 

at Nanjing Naval Command College 

before becoming PC of the PLA(N)’s 

naval support base in Lushun and then 

PC of the PLA(N) Logistics Department. In late 2011 he 

was promoted to East Sea Fleet PC, where he remained 

until transferring to the position of PLA(N) Political 

Department Director in July 2013. He was once again 

laterally transferred to his current assignment in late 

December 2014. Ding is eligible to remain a PLA(N) DPC 

until 2017 or 2018.

RADM Qiu Yanpeng (b.1956) is dualhatted as PLA(N) Chief of Staff and 

Director of the PLA(N) Headquarters 

Department. Qiu rose through the ranks 

of the PLA(N)’s surface fleet, going on to 

command the prominent 6th Destroyer 

Flotilla in the East Sea Fleet. Although the flotilla is not 

necessarily equipped with the PLA(N)’s most modern 

surface combatants, prominent leaders including PLA(N) 

Commander Wu Shengli and former Deputy Commander 

Ding Yiping also commanded the 6th, suggesting it is an 

important assignment that augurs well for future promotions. In 2007, Qiu gained valuable international engagement experience while serving as a flotilla commander 

during the Pakistani-hosted multilateral military exercise 

AMAN-07. Qiu later became an East Sea Fleet Deputy 

Chief of Staff. During that assignment he commanded the 

PLA(N)’s fourth counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of 

Aden. Qiu briefly served as Commander of the North Sea 

Fleet until he was laterally transferred to his current position 

in July 2014. He is eligible to remain at his current grade 

until 2019.

RADM Yang Shiguang (date of birth 

unknown) is Director of the PLA(N)’s 

Political Department, which reports to the 

PLA(N) PC and is responsible for propaganda, security, counterintelligence, and 

officer management. Yang’s prior assignments include Political Commissar of the Naval 

Aeronautical Engineering Academy and Director of the East 

Sea Fleet Political Department. His promotion to PLA(N) 

Political Department Director in late December 2014 was 

likely due to a shuffle of PLA(N) political work officers 

triggered by the unexpected death of PLA(N) DPC VADM 

Ma Faxiang and the retirements of PLA(N) PC ADM Liu 

Xiaojiang and DPC LTGEN Wang Sentai. 

RADM Xu Weibing (date of birth 

unknown) has been Director of the 

PLA(N) Logistics Department since 2011, 

when he relieved Lin Yongqing who died 

of illness. Little is known about RADM Xu 

other than his prior service as 

Commander of the PLA(N)’s former naval support base in 

Shanghai, which likely provided him with a skill set not 

often used by PLA(N) Logistics Department leaders: 

hosting and entertaining foreigners. 

RADM Wang Jianguo (date of birth 

unknown) is Director of the PLA(N) 

Armament Department. He has served in 

the Armament Department since at least 

2009, including as the department’s 

senior engineer. In 2009 he co-authored 

a book of more than 500 pages on the theory of equipment 

acquisition. In 2012, he accompanied then-PLA(N) Deputy 

Commander VADM Zhang Yongyi on a delegation to the 

United States.

Fleet Leaders

The commanders and political commissars of the PLA(N)’s 

three fleets direct the PLA(N)’s day-to-day operations. 

They are also strong contenders for promotion to higher 
40

grade assignments in the four general departments or 

the NPSC. All three fleet commanders are dual-hatted 

as deputy commanders of their parent MR. Most, if not 

all three, fleet political commissars are concurrently 

deputy PC of the respective MR. (The North Sea Fleet 

belongs to Jinan MR, East Sea Fleet to Nanjing MR, 

and the South Sea Fleet to Guangzhou MR). 

North Sea Fleet (NSF) Commander 

RADM Yuan Yubai (b.1956) is a nuclear 

submariner who appears to have spent 

his entire career in the North. After 

studying at the Qingdao Submarine 

Academy, he likely commanded HANclass submarines, allegedly spending more than three 

months on patrol at one early point in his career. In 2007 he 

was appointed Commander of the PLA(N)’s 1st Submarine 

Base, where he remained until he was appointed North Sea 

Fleet Chief of Staff in 2010. In 2013, Yuan led China’s 14th 

counterpiracy task group to the Gulf of Aden. He was 

promoted to NSF Commander in July 2014.

North Sea Fleet Political Commissar 

VADM Bai Wenqi (b.1956) previously 

served in North Sea Fleet Aviation with 

current PLA(N) Deputy Commander Ding 

Yi. He has served in political work tracks 

in the South Sea Fleet as well. Per 

convention, VADM Bai should be Secretary of the North 

Sea Fleet Party Committee. Bai is eligible to remain in this 

assignment until 2019.

East Sea Fleet Commander VADM Su 

Zhiqian (b.1955) joins PLA(N) Deputy 

Commander Su Shiliang as one of the 

few—and perhaps the only—PLA(N) 

officers to have commanded two fleets. 

VADM Su previously commanded the 

South Sea Fleet. While serving in surface warfare assignments, Su studied in Russia, suggesting he may possess 

some Russian language skills. In 2007, he commanded a 

PLA(N) task group deployment to Russia, the United 

Kingdom, France and Spain. As a fleet commander, Su is a 

contender for assignments in Beijing, but likely faces tough 

competition from the other two fleet commanders who were 

selected to the CPC Central Committee at the 18th Party 

Congress in 2012, whereas he was not.

East Sea Fleet Political Commissar 

VADM Wang Huayong (b.1955) is one of 

the few officers at his level with prior 

experience in the Marines. In the early 

2000s, Wang served as PC of a Marine 

Brigade, before promoting to assignments in the South Sea Fleet including PC of a destroyer 

flotilla and Yulin Naval Support Base. Wang was promoted 

to East Sea Fleet PC in July 2013, where he is eligible to 

remain until 2018. Wang was promoted to Vice Admiral in 

July 2014.

South Sea Fleet Commander RADM 

Shen Jinlong (b. 1956) has a strong 

background in the oversight of naval 

training and education, going back to his 

time as Director of a Vessel Training 

Center in the North Sea Fleet in 2003. 

After commanding a North Sea Fleet destroyer flotilla for 

several years, Shen took command of Lushun Naval 

Support Base. He authored an article on naval operations 

other than war in 2009 and was then appointed 

Commandant of the Dalian Naval Academy, where he 

oversaw the professional military education of midshipmen 

and junior officers. Shen was later appointed Commandant 

of the PLA(N)’s most senior educational institution, the 

Naval Command College in Nanjing. He was promoted to 

South Sea Fleet Commander in late 2014 after briefly 

serving as a Deputy Commander. Shen is eligible to serve 

in this position through 2019.

South Sea Fleet Political Commissar 

RADM Liu Mingli (b. 1956) was promoted to this position in late 2014 after 

serving as Political Commissar of South 

Sea Fleet Aviation (and concurrently a 

Fleet DPC). Little is known of Liu’s early 

career other than his service as PC of the Naval Armament 

Research Academy and Director of the East Sea Fleet 

Political Department. While serving as South Sea Fleet PC, 

he is likely responsible for ensuring that sailors operating in 

or near disputed waters understand and carry out China’s 

legal and diplomatic claims. Like South Sea Fleet 

Commander Shen Jinlong, Liu is eligible to remain South 

Sea Fleet PC through 2019.
41

MARITIME CLAIMS—SECURING 

CHINA’S “BLUE TERRITORY”

Relationships among Asian states have long been plagued 

by disputes over the sovereignty of various maritime 

features, associated maritime rights, and overlapping 

and excessive jurisdictional claims. Since World War II, 

tensions have oscillated from naval skirmishes and island 

grabs to protracted periods of calm and stability. The 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 

China achieved some progress in assuaging tensions 

with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 

the South China Sea, which effectively halted the seizure 

of additional maritime features by all claimants. Since 

2009, however, friction between China and its neighbors 

in the South China and East China Seas has grown 

significantly. China’s leaders appear increasingly willing 

to pursue China’s maritime interests, even when such 

actions risk exacerbating tension with China’s neighbors. 

In his first publicized policy speech as Chairman of the 

Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping told China’s Politburo 

in January 2013 that, “No foreign country should ever nurse 

hopes that we will bargain over our core national interests.” 

Beijing likely calculates that an assertive approach to 

rival claimants will deter challenges to China’s interests. 

Beijing was frustrated in 2009 when Vietnam and Malaysia 

jointly submitted an extended continental shelf claim to 

the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 

that overlapped areas also claimed by China. Beijing also 

reacted sharply in 2012 when the Japanese Government 

purchased from private owners several of the islands 

known in Japan as the Senkakus and in China as the 

Diaoyu. Also in 2012, the Philippines filed an arbitration 

case against some of China’s claims in the South China 

Sea following a standoff at Scarborough Reef that ultimately resulted in China seizing de facto control of the reef. 

Chinese commentators frequently refer to China’s “threemillion-square kilometers of blue territory,” which would 

incorporate nearly 90 percent of the area within the major 

bodies of water within the First Island Chain, including the 

Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South 

China Sea. To the frustration of international legal experts, 

Beijing maintains a policy of ambiguity over what specific 

rights it actually claims in this vast area, with the nature of 

its Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea being a prime 

example. In many instances, China’s efforts to exercise 

jurisdiction in this “blue territory” are inconsistent with 

accepted international standards as outlined in the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

More than a decade of sustained investment in its Navy 

and Coast Guard has given the Chinese leadership 

additional tools to pressure or deter rival claimants. Until 

recently, China lacked the enforcement capability and 

situational awareness to effectively exercise a jurisdictional 

presence throughout these disputed waters. As China has 

closed these gaps, it has been able to quickly respond 

to incidents it feels violate its claimed sovereignty in 

disputed areas. This trend was evidenced in April 2012, 

when Chinese maritime law enforcement (MLE) ships 

effectively blocked the Philippine Navy from detaining 

Chinese fishermen at Scarborough Reef, a feature 

claimed by both countries. China also responded rapidly 

with a Coast Guard presence at the Senkaku Islands 

in September 2012 following the Japanese governments’ aforementioned purchase of several islands. 

More recently, China has begun strengthening its 

position in the Spratly Islands. Throughout 2014, China 

reclaimed hundreds of acres of land at the seven 

features that it occupies and appears to be building 

much larger facilities that could eventually support both 

MLE and naval operations. Although other countries 

have upgraded their own outposts in previous years, 

the sheer scale of China’s activity is unprecedented.

Basis for Claims

China cites language in UNCLOS and historic rights 

pre-dating UNCLOS as the foundation for its expansive 

regional claims. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 

CHAPTER 5
42

asserted to then-U.S. Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton in 2012 that there is “plenty 

of historical and jurisprudence evidence” 

to demonstrate China’s sovereignty over 

the islands in the South China Sea and 

adjacent waters. China’s Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs asserts that the Senkaku Islands in 

the East China Sea “have been the inherent 

territory of China since ancient times.” 

Regional states including Japan, Vietnam, 

and the Philippines offer differing historical 

narratives in support of their own respective 

claims. Controversy over maritime boundaries 

arises from the geography of the area and its 

tumultuous history during the latter half of the 

19th century and the first half of the 20th century. The Sino-Japanese War, World War II, 

the Chinese Civil War, and the transition from 

colonial states to independent countries in 

Southeast Asia all complicated the establishment of clear maritime boundaries. China’s 

maritime claims remain the largest, and 

Beijing has proven reluctant to clearly articulate the basis and limitations of its claims.

East China Sea

China and Japan face both a resource 

dispute in the East China Sea and dispute 

over title to the Senkaku Islands, called the “Diaoyu” 

Islands in Chinese. On the question of resource rights, 

China claims that UNCLOS and related legal precedent 

entitle it to seabed rights throughout most of the East China 

Sea, based on the prolongation of its continental shelf. 

Tokyo, also citing UNCLOS, counters that the principle of 

equidistance should be employed to delineate all resource 

rights. Although UNCLOS states that international law 

should be the basis for resolving such conflicts, it does 

not explicitly indicate which method should be used to 

resolve this type of dispute. Furthermore, third-party 

arbitration appears highly unlikely. At stake for both Beijing 

and Tokyo is the right to exploit oil and gas deposits 

throughout a large portion of the East China Sea. 

China has developed natural gas infrastructure in 

several areas bordering Japan’s claimed equidistant 

line. Japan objects to PRC exploitation so close to 

this line, claiming that China would effectively extract 

resources that span the border. In 2008, China and 

Japan reached an agreement to jointly develop the East 

China Sea, but that agreement was never implemented 

and its prospects have grown increasingly bleak as 

tensions increased over the disputed Senkaku Islands. 

The Senkaku Island group consists of just five 

small, uninhabited islands between 90 and 150 nm 

east-northeast of Taiwan. The islands are important 

both as a matter of national pride and identity and 

because their title could convey associated fishing 

and mineral rights. While China, Taiwan, and Japan all 

claim sovereignty of the islands, Japan has maintained 

administrative control of the islands since the reversion of the Ryukyus to Japanese control in 1972.

The Senkaku dispute dates back to 1895, when both 

sides agree that Japan took control of the islands. 

The disagreement arises from the question of their 

status before Japan’s seizure. Beijing contends that, like 

Figure 5-1. East China Sea Maritime Claims

Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

*Administered by Japan;

claimed by China and Taiwan
43

Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, the Senkaku Islands 

were wrested from a weak Qing government. China 

contends that under the 1943 Cairo Declaration and 

1945 Potsdam Proclamation, the Senkakus, like other 

territory Japan seized from China, must be relinquished. 

Japan rejects the argument that the Senkaku Islands 

were part of China prior to 1895 and argues they were 

“terra nullius” (that is, not owned by any country) at the 

time they were occupied. Thus, the Senkakus would not 

be subject to the post-World War II requirements to return 

land to China. The Japanese government does not formally 

recognize that a dispute over the islands even exists.

For much of the past 40 years, China and Japan have 

essentially ignored the dispute. Japan maintained Coast 

Guard patrols of the area, but did not attempt to enforce 

exclusive fishing rights outside of the immediate 12nm 

territorial waters around the islands. However, two recent 

incidents—the 2010 ramming of a Japanese coast guard 

ship by a Chinese fishing boat and the subsequent 

detention of its captain and the 2012 purchase of three 

of the islands by the Japanese government 

from its private owners—have raised the issue 

to the forefront of Sino-Japanese relations. 

China, once content to maintain its claim 

without actively contesting the Japanese 

Coast Guard presence at the islands, has 

begun conducting routine patrols in the area.

South China Sea

China has long claimed sovereignty over 

islands in the South China Sea, particularly 

those in the Spratly and Paracel Island groups. 

Vietnam also claims the Paracel Islands 

while Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, 

Taiwan, and Vietnam claim and occupy at 

least portions of the Spratly Islands. There 

are also additional bilateral disputes over 

other features such as Scarborough Reef. 

Chinese officials frequently state that China 

holds “indisputable sovereignty over the 

islands in the South China Sea and adjacent 

waters.” Beijing affirmed sovereignty over the 

Pratas, Spratly, and Paracel Islands, as well 

as Macclesfield Bank in its 1992 territorial sea 

law. However, the exact nature and extent of 

its claims on those “adjacent waters” remains ambiguous. 

Chinese maps show a Nine-Dash Line encompassing the 

vast majority of the South China Sea, but Beijing has never 

published the coordinates of this line, nor has it declared 

what rights it purports to enjoy in this area. Despite 

repeated calls to clarify its claims in the Nine-Dash Line, 

China has yet to offer a clear, legal rationale of this expansive claim. In December 2014, the U.S. Department of 

State published an analysis of the Nine-Dash Line, stating 

that “unless China clarifies that the dashed-line reflects 

only a claim to islands within that line and any maritime 

zones that are generated from those land features...its 

dashed line claim does not accord with the international 

law of the sea.” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs Danny Russel has also expressed 

particular concern over China’s Nine-Dash Line and 

stated that the international community “would welcome 

China to clarify or adjust its Nine-Dash Line claim to bring 

it in accordance with the international law of the sea.”

Contentious disputes in the South China Sea have occasionally turned violent. China, which occupied the eastern 

Figure 5-2. South China Sea Maritime Claims

Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

Note: Nothing in this map 

reflects the United States 

Government acceptance of 

any maritime claim.

Multimedia Vignette available at oni.navy.mil
44

Paracel Islands and objected to Vietnam’s presence in the 

western portion of the island group, successfully ousted 

Vietnamese from the Paracels in 1974. China and Vietnam 

again clashed in 1988 at Johnson Reef in the Spratly 

Islands. During that brief conflict, the PLA(N) sank three 

Vietnamese supply ships, killing dozens of Vietnamese 

sailors. Since 1988, South China Sea claimants have 

refrained from any direct military confrontation, but tensions 

periodically flare over resource exploration, construction 

of structures on the disputed reefs, and fishing activity. 

The non-binding 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of 

Parties in the South China Sea,” signed by China and the 

Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) successfully ended the seizure of additional territory, but it has 

not moved parties towards a permanent understanding. 

Tensions began to rise again in 2009 in conjunction with 

a deadline for the UNCLOS-commissioned Commission 

on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). As various 

countries made submissions to the commission and 

passed associated domestic legislation, those with overlapping claims filed counterstatements and public protests. 

Simultaneously, China’s increasing capacity to patrol the 

South China Sea allowed its MLE ships to be available to 

quickly respond to various actions it deemed as infringing 

on its claimed sovereignty or jurisdictional authority.

These incidents included blocking the USNS 

IMPECCABLE in 2009, severing survey cables of the 

Vietnamese seismic survey ship BINH MINH 02 in 

2011 and 2012, and instituting a long-term presence at 

Scarborough Reef following the Philippine Navy’s attempt 

to arrest Chinese fishermen for poaching. During the 

summer of 2014, tensions between China and Vietnam 

again spiked when China deployed a new deep-water 

oil rig for exploratory drilling in a disputed area near 

the Paracel Islands. Although both sides refrained from 

employing military force, the tense area was awash with 

dozens of civilian and military ships from both sides, 

frequently and deliberately colliding with one another 

and creating the conditions for a rapid escalation. 

Over the past year, China has embarked on a large-scale 

effort to reclaim land at all seven of the features that it 

occupies. Prior to this project, China occupied only small 

outposts with a land area of less than five acres, and 

was the only claimant except Brunei that did not have an 

airfield in the archipelago. It has since added hundreds of 

acres of land, allowing for a large expansion of facilities 

at its outposts. Once complete, these facilities will enable 

an even greater Chinese presence in the disputed area.

Yellow Sea

Although not as contentious as the maritime disputes in the 

East and South China Seas, China also has disputes with 

North and South Korea in the Yellow Sea, primarily over 

unresolved Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) demarcation. 

Even though these disputes do not receive the global 

attention that the East China and South China Seas attract, 

they occasionally turn violent and create political friction. 

These disputes have resulted in the loss of life of South 

Korean Coast Guard personnel and Chinese fishermen. 

Rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone 

While China has no maritime territorial disputes with 

the United States, Beijing is consistently critical of U.S. 

activities in and above China’s EEZ. China and a small 

number of other states seek to prohibit at least some 

military activities in their EEZ. Beijing is particularly critical 

of U.S. military surveys and reconnaissance activities. 

Beijing argues that such activities adversely impact 

Chinese security and effectively require China’s 

consent. The United States maintains that militaries 

enjoy high seas freedoms in an EEZ, with the exception of a small set of explicitly prohibited activities. 

This point of contention is the basis for Chinese monitoring and occasional harassment of U.S. reconnaissance 

activities near China. These tense interactions have 

occasionally resulted in high-profile incidents, such as 

the 2001 collision between an EP-3 and a Chinese fighter 

and the 2009 harassment of the USNS IMPECCABLE. 

China cites U.S. reconnaissance in its EEZ along with 

arms sales to Taiwan and the restrictions of the 2000 

National Defense Authorization Act as “three obstacles” 

to better cooperation between the two militaries. 

This position has not inhibited China from beginning 

its own intelligence collection in the EEZs of other 

foreign countries in recent years, including inside the 

undisputed U.S. EEZs surrounding Hawaii and Guam.

China Coast Guard in the Lead

At the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013, 

China announced that four of the five MLE agencies would 

be combined to form a new China Coast Guard (CCG) 
45

under administrative control of the State Oceanographic 

Administration (SOA) and operational control of the Public 

Security Bureau (PSB). Beijing presumably hopes that the 

consolidation will alleviate coordination difficulties between 

the various maritime actors, create efficiencies, and centralize control of maritime issues. The consolidation allows the 

CCG to more flexibly deploy patrol ships in response to 

sovereignty challenges and more easily maintain presence 

in regional hotspots. When deployed, the CCG sometimes 

coordinates with the PLA(N), which, when necessary, will 

deploy destroyers and frigates several dozen miles from 

the incident to provide a nearby, but indirect presence. 

In recent years the PLA(N) has reduced its overt participation in coastal patrols, law enforcement, EEZ enforcement, 

and territorial claim issues as the CCG assumed these 

China 

Japan

Vietnam

Philippines

95 X Large

110 X Small

205

* A number of older WAGORs (non-naval 

oceanographic research ships) used as 

patrol ships were included

*Navy AFT (stores ship) and AF (combat stores ship) vessels are 

not included

*This includes WPCs (non-naval patrol craft) and WAITs nonnaval intelligence trawler

5 X Large

50 X Small

55

0 X Large

4 X Small

4

53 X Large

25 X Small

78

Malaysia

2 X Large

0 X Small

2

*For the purposes of this graphic, Large vessels are greater than 1,000 tons; Small vessels 

are between 500–1,000 tons.

Indonesia

3 X Large

5 X Small

8

Figure 5-3. Regional Maritime Law Enforcement Comparison
46

operations. China prefers using its Coast Guard as the 

primary enforcer of its maritime claims. This approach limits 

the potential for confrontational incidents to escalate since 

most CCG ships are unarmed, and those that are have 

relatively light weapons. This approach also helps Beijing 

manage the public optic of any enforcement actions. 

Prior to the CCG’s establishment, two of the MLE 

agencies—the State Oceanic Administration’s China 

Marine Surveillance (CMS), and the Bureau of Fisheries 

Law Enforcement Command (FLEC)—were the entities 

responsible for enforcing China’s rights in its claimed 

waters. The FLEC managed Chinese fishing and attempted 

to prevent fishing by other countries in China’s claimed 

waters. CMS was responsible for other economic and 

environmental enforcement. This included protection of 

Chinese oil and gas survey ships operating in contested 

waters and preventing other countries’ exploration of 

similar areas. In 2011, CMS ships severed the cable towing 

sensors of a survey ship contracted by PetroVietnam. 

Both CMS and the FLEC, along with the PLA(N), were 

involved in the 2009 harassment of USNS IMPECCABLE 

as it conducted operations southeast of Hainan Island.

China’s effective use of “white hull” ships as front line 

forces was demonstrated in a series of incidents in 

2012, 2013, and 2014. In April 2012, CMS and FLEC 

ships responded to an attempt by the Philippine Navy 

to detain Chinese fishermen that they claimed were 

illegally harvesting giant clams at Scarborough Reef—a 

feature claimed by both countries. The ensuing standoff 

between CMS and the Philippine Coast Guard lasted 

several weeks. While the Philippines removed its patrol 

craft in June, China maintains its presence, effectively 

gaining de facto control of the disputed feature.

The CCG also featured prominently as tensions rose 

over the Senkaku Islands. Following the Japanese 

purchase of three of the islands from private owners, 

China established a regular Coast Guard presence 

in the vicinity of the islands. This response marked 

the first time China sustained a presence to directly 

challenge Japanese administrative control.

In May 2013 China established a persistent Coast Guard 

presence near Second Thomas Shoal in the eastern 

Spratly Islands. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally 

grounded a tank landing ship (LST) there to establish an 

outpost after China occupied nearby Mischief Reef in 1995. 

The Philippine Navy has continuously maintained a detachment of marines on the LST since its 1999 grounding.

During the last decade, China’s MLE force has undergone a major modernization, which increased both the 

sizes of its ships and their overall capability. These 

civilian maritime forces have added approximately 

100 new large patrol ships (WPS), patrol combatants/

craft (WPG/WPC), and auxiliary/support ships, not 

including small harbor and riverine patrol boats. 

The current phase of the construction program, which 

began in 2012, will add over 30 large patrol ships and 

over 20 patrol combatants to the force by 2015. This 

will increase by 25 percent the overall CCG force level 

in a fleet that is also improving rapidly in quality. Most 

MLE ships are either unarmed or armed only with light 

deck weapons (12.7mm, 14.5mm, and 30mm guns) and 

generally use commercial radars and communications 

equipment. Several of the largest ships are equipped 

with helicopter landing and hangar facilities as well. 
47

OUTLOOK

President Xi Jinping continues to 

emphasize the importance of maritime 

power to enable China’s continued rise. 

Taiwan reunification remains the main 

driver for military modernization; however, other requirements such as “new 

historic missions” are pushing development of mission sets such as military 

operations other than war (MOOTW) 

and sea lines of communication (SLOC) 

protection. These new missions, 

combined with Beijing’s long standing 

interest in developing a “powerful 

navy,” are together driving the People’s 

Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) into new, 

increasingly distant operating areas. 

Nontraditional missions and maritime 

security cooperation provides the PLA(N) 

with real-world operational experience in 

new areas and enhances coordination 

with foreign navies. China’s maritime 

power is an important facet of its national 

power, expanding from its traditional role 

of addressing regional security challenges, such as maritime disputes and 

reunification with Taiwan, to enhancing 

its strategic deterrence and increasingly 

protecting Chinese interests abroad. 

The PLA(N) has solidified its ability 

to conduct “offshore defense” and is 

transitioning to developing a credible 

capability outside the First Island Chain. 

China’s new strategy will combine its 

historical interest in “offshore defense” 

with an added emphasis on “blue-water 

defense.” We see evidence of the shifting strategic focus in the PLA(N)’s rapid 

retiring of legacy combatants in favor 

of larger, multimission ships equipped 

with advanced antiship, antiair, and 

antisubmarine weapons and sensors. 

Highlighting this transition is the fact that 

every major PLA(N) surface combatant 

under construction is capable of embarking a helicopter, an addition that supports 

over the horizon targeting (OTH-T), 

antisubmarine warfare, and search and 

rescue. The OTH-T capability of the 

force is increasingly important as the 

PLA(N) continues to add advanced, 

long-range weapons to its arsenal. 

As evidenced by recent exercises, 

the PLA(N) has embraced training 

under more realistic conditions. We 

expect that this trend will continue. 

Furthermore, the Chinese media has 

recently announced that in 2105, the 

military will “conduct several large-scale 

transregional exercises”; this emphasis 

should help China improve joint operations, a capability consistently identified 

as an area of concern. The PLA(N)’s 

commitment and ability to sustain its 

counterpiracy operations in the Gulf 

of Aden indicates Beijing’s dedication 

to pursuing diversified military tasks 

around the world. We expect this trend 

will continue or even expand as new 

security challenges provide opportunities for international operations. 

China’s growing global interest will place 

pressure on the military to respond to 

crises where Chinese interests are at 

risk. Choosing when and how to employ 

its increasingly capable military will be a 

challenge for China’s current and future 

leaders. China has used the PLA(N) 

to assist in the evacuation of citizens 

from Libya and Yemen, participate in 

the removal of chemical weapons from 

Syria, and respond to emergencies 

and disasters. All of these operations 

have been done in cooperation with 

international bodies and the countries 

concerned, but they also highlight a 

gradual loosening of China’s historic 

reticence for sending its military abroad.

Predicting the composition of China’s 

naval force in the next 10–15 years is 

difficult because of the opaque nature of 

China’s military requirements and acquisition process. Another factor that will 

play an important part in the PLA(N)’s 

continued growth and modernization 

is China’s economic health. Despite its 

slowing economy, China has continued 

double-digit increases to its defense 

budget. In March, China announced a 

military budget of $141.5 billion, a rise 

of 10 percent. Should China’s economy 

slow further, leadership could be faced 

with difficult decisions concerning 

continued military modernization. 

Regardless of these economic pressures, it is evident that the PLA(N) is a 

navy in transition. We must remember 

that China is only in the middle of its 

military modernization, with continued 

improvements planned over the following 

decades. As we view the past 20 years 

of PLA(N) modernization, the results 

have been impressive, but at its core 

the force has remained essentially the 

same—a force built around destroyers, 

frigates and conventional submarines. 

As we look ahead to the coming 

decade, the introduction of aircraft 

carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and 

potentially a large-deck amphibious ship 

will fundamentally alter how the PLA(N) 

operates and is viewed by the world. 
48