COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RANDALL A. STRAWBRIDGE and 

 STATE BUILDING CODE TECHNICAL 

 REVIEW BOARD 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record Nos. 2438-95-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 2521-95-2 NOVEMBER 19, 1996 

COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

William R. Shelton, Judge 

 William F. Etherington (Beale, Balfour, 

Davidson, Etherington & Parker, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant Randall A. Strawbridge. 

 John B. Purcell, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief) for appellant State 

Building Code Technical Review Board. 

 Stylian P. Parthemos, Senior Assistant County 

Attorney (Steven L. Micas, County Attorney, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Randall A. Strawbridge, a professional engineer, and the 

State Building Code Technical Review Board appeal a circuit 

judge's decision reversing a ruling of the Review Board and 

referring the case back to the Chesterfield County Board of 

Building Code Appeals for a ruling on the merits. We must 

decide: (1) Whether Chesterfield County had standing to appeal 

the decision of the Review Board to the circuit court; (2) 

whether Strawbridge had standing to appeal the decision of the 

County Board of Appeals to the Review Board; (3) whether the 

Review Board had jurisdiction; and (4) whether the Review Board's 
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ruling was erroneous. For the reasons that follow, we reverse 

the circuit judge's decision. 

 I. 

 Tomac Corporation, a builder, hired Strawbridge to inspect 

concrete pours at a residential construction project in 

Chesterfield County. The inspection was required by the Virginia 

Uniform Statewide Building Code ("USBC") and had to be made 

on-site when concrete was poured for a building's foundation. An 

inspector is required to examine the concrete's strength and 

customarily uses a tool known as a "slump cone" for that 

measurement. Although these inspections are ordinarily conducted 

by Chesterfield County employees, the County also accepts 

inspections by private engineers such as Strawbridge. 

 While traveling to the site, Strawbridge's vehicle became 

disabled. The builder sent a truck to bring Strawbridge to the 

site. When Strawbridge arrived at the site, the trucks were 

ready to pour concrete. However, Strawbridge discovered that he 

had inadvertently left his slump cone in his vehicle. To prevent 

further delay, Strawbridge conducted a visual slump test. During 

the test, William Dupler, a County building official, arrived at 

the site and noticed that Strawbridge was not using a slump cone. 

 He asked Strawbridge to conduct the tests with a slump cone. 

Strawbridge obtained his slump cone from his vehicle and 

continued testing the concrete with the slump cone. 

 Upon receiving Strawbridge's inspection report, Dupler 
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rejected the tests. He informed Strawbridge in writing that he 

would not accept the report and would no longer accept any 

concrete pour inspections from Strawbridge. Dupler also required 

Tomac to obtain further tests using an alternative method. Those 

tests confirmed Strawbridge's report that the concrete met the 

County's requirements. 

 Strawbridge appealed Dupler's decision to the County Board 

of Appeals and requested that the County Board of Appeals reverse 

Dupler's decision to bar him from conducting inspections. Ruling 

that the appeal was not authorized by the USBC, the County Board 

of Appeals dismissed the case. Strawbridge appealed that 

decision to the Review Board. The Review Board directed 

Strawbridge to submit a statement of facts demonstrating that his 

case was governed by the USBC and it also ordered the County to 

submit a reply to Strawbridge's statement. Based upon the 

submissions, the Review Board decided that it had jurisdiction 

and conducted an evidentiary hearing. The Review Board then 

ruled "that the building official acted arbitrarily under Section 

107.1 of the USBC when he rejected the technical data submitted 

by Mr. Strawbridge, and that the building official may not 

summarily reject any future engineering reports made by Mr. 

Strawbridge." 

 Pursuant to the Administrative Process Act ("APA"), Code 

§ 9-6.14:1, the County appealed to the Circuit Court of 

Chesterfield County. The County alleged that (1) the Review 
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Board incorrectly decided that it had jurisdiction to review the 

inspection decision, (2) the Review Board erred in ruling on the 

merits of the appeal and should have remanded the case to the 

County Board of Appeals, and (3) the Review Board incorrectly 

reversed the inspection decision. Strawbridge and the Review 

Board filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the 

County lacked standing to bring the action in the circuit court. 

 The circuit court judge denied the motion to dismiss, heard 

the appeal, and ruled that the Review Board had jurisdiction 

solely to determine whether the County Board of Appeals should 

have dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the 

judge found that the Review Board should not have decided the 

merits of the appeal and remanded the case to the Review Board 

with instructions that the County Board of Appeals should decide 

the merits of the case. Strawbridge and the Review Board 

appealed to this Court from that decision. 

 II. 

 The General Assembly statutorily established the framework 

for the adoption and enforcement of the USBC. The Code directs 

the Board of Housing and Community Development, a state agency, 

"to adopt and promulgate a Uniform Statewide Building Code 

[USBC]." Code § 36-98. Except as provided by the building code 

statutes, the USBC "shall supersede the building codes and 

regulations of the counties, municipalities and other political 

subdivisions and state agencies." Id. Pursuant to this mandate, 
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the Board of Housing and Community Development adopted a set of 

regulations entitled the "Virginia Uniform Statewide Building 

Code" [USBC]. 

 The General Assembly specified that "[e]nforcement of the 

[USBC] shall be the responsibility of the local building 

department" and that each local building department must 

establish a local board of Building Code appeals. Code § 36-105. 

 "Appeals from the local building department concerning 

application of the [USBC] . . . shall first lie to the local 

board of Building Code appeals." Code § 36-105. The General 

Assembly also established the Review Board and gave it "the power 

and duty to hear all appeals from decisions [of the local board 

of Building Code appeals] arising under application of the 

Building Code." Code § 36-114. The USBC contains regulations 

consistent with the building code statutes. See USBC §§ 102, 

103, and 116 (formerly §§ 116 and 117). 

 III. 

 The Review Board and Strawbridge contend that the County did 

not have standing to appeal the Review Board's decision to the 

circuit court. We disagree. 

 Proceedings of the Review Board are governed by the APA. 

Code § 36-114. The APA states that "[a]ny . . . party aggrieved 

by and claiming unlawfulness of a case decision . . . shall have 

a right to the direct review [of the decision] by an appropriate 

and timely court action." Code § 9-6.14:16(A). Thus, the County 
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may appeal if (1) the Review Board's decision constitutes a "case 

decision," (2) the County was a named party in the Review Board 

proceeding, and (3) the County was aggrieved by the agency 

ruling. See id.

 The Review Board's decision was a "case decision" because it 

was an "agency proceeding or determination that . . . a named 

party . . . either is, [or] is not . . . in compliance with any 

existing requirement for obtaining or retaining a . . . right or 

benefit." Code § 9-6.14:4(D) (defining "case decision"). In 

ruling that the "building official acted arbitrarily under 

Section 107.1 of the USBC," the Review Board decided that Dupler, 

the County's building official, was not in compliance with the 

USBC, and, therefore, he did not have the right to reject 

Strawbridge's reports. In addition, this was a case decision 

because it included an application of the law to the facts of 

this particular case. See Kenley v. Newport News Gen. & NonSectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 227 Va. 39, 45, 314 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1984) 

(holding that a letter written by the State Health Commissioner 

was a case decision because the Commissioner "applied the rules 

and regulations to the facts" gathered at a previous meeting). 

 The County was a named party in the Review Board's 

proceeding because the Review Board's decision was styled, 

Randall A. Strawbridge, P.E. v. County of Chesterfield. More 

importantly, the record establishes that the County participated 

throughout the Review Board's proceedings. The Review Board 
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directed the County to respond to Strawbridge's statement of 

facts. The County attorney represented the County in the 

proceeding, presented an opening statement, and had the 

opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Indeed, Strawbridge 

appealed the case to the Review Board because of the action of 

officials acting on behalf of the County. 

 Finally, the County was "aggrieved" by the ruling. "'The 

word "aggrieved" in a statute . . . refers to a substantial 

grievance, a denial of some personal or property right, . . . or 

the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation.'" 

D'Alessio v. Lukhard, 5 Va. App. 404, 408, 363 S.E.2d 715, 718 

(1988) (citations omitted). The Review Board's decision denied 

the County the right to "summarily reject any future engineering 

reports made by . . . Strawbridge." Before this ruling, the 

County, by its appointed official, adopted a policy to reject any 

reports submitted by Strawbridge. Obviously, the Review Board's 

decision forced the County to change its policy. By ordering the 

County to consider Strawbridge's reports, the Review Board 

imposed an obligation on the County and, thus, the County was 

aggrieved. Therefore, we find that the County met the 

requirements to appeal the Review Board's decision. 

 IV. 

 The County argues that Strawbridge did not have standing to 

appeal Dupler's decision. However, the regulations provide as 

follows: 

 The owner of a building, the owner's agent, 
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or any other person, firm or corporation 

directly involved in the design and/or 

construction of a building or structure may 

appeal to the local Building Code Board of 

Appeals within 90 calendar days from a 

decision of the building official when it is 

claimed that: 

 1. The building official has refused 

 to grant a modification which 

 complies with the intent of the 

 provisions of the USBC; or 

 2. The true intent of the USBC has 

 been incorrectly interpreted; or 

 3. The provisions of the USBC do not 

 fully apply; or 

 4. The use of a form of construction 

 that is equal to or better than that 

 specified in the USBC has been denied. 

§ 116.7 (currently § 116.5, as amended). 

 The County claims that Strawbridge cannot be classified as 

an "owner of a building, the owner's agent, or any other person, 

firm or corporation directly involved in the design and/or 

construction of a building or structure." That argument lacks 

merit because the inspections were an integral part of the 

construction process. The evidence proved that the builder 

requested Strawbridge to perform the inspection and paid for his 

services. In addition, Strawbridge's inspection was a critical 

prerequisite to the construction of the home because the USBC 

requires the inspection of concrete pours. Strawbridge directly 

contributed to the construction because without his test the 

building would not have complied with USBC standards. 

 The County also contends that the appeal does not involve 
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the "design and/or construction of a building" because 

Strawbridge appealed the decision to bar him from future projects 

and not the rejection of his inspection report. That contention 

is not supported by the record. As evidenced by the Review 

Board's ruling, Strawbridge appealed both the rejection of the 

specific inspection report and the rejection of any future 

reports. Furthermore, the County ignores the substance of 

Dupler's action. In his letter to Strawbridge, Dupler rejected 

the inspection report and also refused to accept any further 

concrete inspection reports. These decisions were intertwined. 

 Strawbridge's initial letter to the County Board of Appeals 

properly raised the issue and stated as follows: 

 I am writing to request a review and 

reversal of the Building Official's decision 

to stop my firm from making concrete pour 

inspections for house footings in 

Chesterfield County. His decision was based 

on circumstances which occurred in connection 

with [my inspection of a residence on May 11, 

1993]. 

The propriety of Dupler's decision to bar Strawbridge from making 

future inspections turned on the inadequacy of the May 11 report. 

 If Dupler erred in refusing to accept that report, he also erred 

in using that report as grounds to bar Strawbridge from making 

future reports. Obviously, the County Board of Appeals was 

required to examine both of Dupler's decisions together. We 

hold, therefore, that Strawbridge meets the regulation's 

requirement of "any other person . . . directly involved in the 

. . . construction" and had standing to appeal Dupler's decision. 
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 V. 

 Strawbridge and the Review Board claim that the circuit 

court judge erred in ruling that the Review Board lacked 

jurisdiction to decide the merits of Strawbridge's appeal. The 

Code states that "no appeal to the . . . Review Board shall lie 

prior to a final determination by the local board of Building 

Code Appeals." Code § 36-105. 

 At a hearing on July 20, 1993, the County Board of Appeals 

voted "that we do not hear . . . Strawbridge's appeal based upon 

Sec. 116.7 [§ 116.5 as amended] of the Virginia Uniform Statewide 

Building Code." In addition, the letter from the local board to 

Strawbridge contained the following language, now required by 

USBC § 116.8.1: "Upon receipt of this decision, any person who 

was a party to the appeal may appeal to the . . . Review Board by 

submitting an application to the State Board . . . ." The County 

Board of Appeals clearly intended its dismissal to constitute a 

final and appealable determination. Cf. Marchant & Taylor v. 

Mathews Co., 139 Va. 723, 733, 124 S.E. 420, 423 (1924) ("[T]he 

order by its very terms is not final."). 

 Furthermore, the County Board of Appeals determination "that 

[Strawbridge's] appeal was not within the confines of . . . Sec. 

116.0 of the USBC" was the equivalent of a dismissal order and 

was a final determination of the appeal. See Daniels v. Truck & 

Equip. Corp., 205 Va. 579, 585, 139 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1964) ("A 

final order is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all 
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the relief contemplated, . . . and leaves nothing to be done in 

the cause . . . ."). In deciding not to hear the case, the 

County Board of Appeals decided to take no further action 

regarding the case. That ruling was a final determination. 

 The County cites no authority for its argument that, after 

the Review Board determined that the County Board of Appeals 

erred in dismissing Strawbridge's appeal, the Review Board was 

required to remand the case to the County Board of Appeals for a 

ruling on the merits. Neither the Code nor the USBC requires the 

Review Board to remand in such an instance. We hold, therefore, 

that the Review Board did not err in conducting a hearing and 

issuing a ruling on the merits of Strawbridge's appeal. 

 VI. 

 The County argues that the Review Board erred in ruling that 

Dupler acted arbitrarily. The principle is well established, 

however, that in reviewing proceedings governed by the APA, 

"agency action is presumed valid on review, and the burden rests 

'upon the party complaining' to overcome this presumption." 

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control 

Bd., 15 Va. App. 271, 277, 422 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1992) (quoting 

Code § 9-6.14:17). On review of an agency's decision, the sole 

question regarding "factual issues is whether substantial 

evidence exists in the agency record to support the agency's 

decision." Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 242, 

369 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1988). "The court may reject the agency's 
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findings of fact 'only if, considering the record as a whole, a 

reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different 

conclusion.'" Atkinson v. Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control 

Comm'n, 1 Va. App. 172, 176, 336 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1985) (citation 

omitted). 

 The evidence at the Review Board hearing created a question 

of fact -- whether the testing performed by Strawbridge met the 

standards of the USBC -- uniquely suited for the Review Board's 

expertise. Robert A. Hill and Edward C. Drahos, professional 

engineers, attested to the accuracy of visual slump tests. 

Strawbridge testified concerning the events of that day and 

explained that a professional could measure slump accurately 

without a slump cone. Thus, the record contained credible 

testimony that visual inspection by an engineer can be an 

accurate and effective means of testing the slumping of concrete. 

 Furthermore, tests conducted after the concrete pour confirmed 

the accuracy of Strawbridge's visual test. The Review Board 

found that Dupler acted arbitrarily in rejecting Strawbridge's 

report and ruled that the County could not summarily reject any 

future reports filed by Strawbridge. We find no evidence that 

would justify overturning the Review Board's findings. 

 For these reasons, we reverse the trial judge's decision. 

 Reversed.