1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s JONES v . FLOWERS ET AL
. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COUR T OF ARKANSAS No. 04–1 47 7. Ar g u ed Janu a r y17, 2006 —D ec ided April 26, 20 06 Pet i t i oner J o nes cont inued t o pa y t h e mor t ga ge on his Arka ns a s home

a f

t e r s e pa rat i ng from his wife a n d mo ving els e where in t h e s a me cit y . Once the mort gage was paid off, th e prope r ty taxes—wh i ch had been paid byth e mor t g a g e c o mpan y
—w e n tu n p aid, an d th e pr oper tyw a s cert ified a s delinq u ent
. Res p ondentCommiss ioner of S t a t e La nds mailed Jon e s a c e r t ified lett erat th e pr oper ty ’s addr ess, stat in gth at u n l ess h e r e deemed th e pr oper ty , it w o u l d be su bjec t to pu blic sale in tw o y e ar s. Nobodyw a s h o me to sig nforth e letteran d n o bodyr e trieved it fro m the post office with in 15 days, so it was returnedto t h e Commis s i oner, ma rked “ uncla i med.” Two yea r s la t e r, t h e Com

mis s ioner pub lis hed a not i ce of pub lic sa le in aloca l news pa per. No bids w e r e su b m itted, so th e Sta t e n e g o tiat ed a pr iv ate s a le to r e spon dent Flowers. Before selling the house, the Commission e r mailed an

ot her cert ifiedlet t e r t o J o n e s , which wa s a l s o ret urned uncla i med. Flowers purch a s ed t h e hous e a n d ha d a n unla w ful det a i ner not i ce de

livered t o t h e propert y . It wa s s e rved onJ o nes ’ da ugh t er, whonot i

fied him of the sale. He file d a st a t e -courts u ita g ains t res p ondent s , alleg i n gth at th e Commi ssi on er ’s failu r e to pr ov ide adequ ate n o tic e resulted in th e taking of his proper t ywit h outdue proces s . Gra nt ing res p ondent s summa ry j u dgment , t h e t r ial courtconclu d ed t h a tAr

kan s as’ t a xs a le st atu te, w h ic hsets ou t th e n o tic e pr oc edu r e u s ed h e r e , c o mplied w i thdu e pr ocess. Th e State Su pr eme Cour t affir m ed. Held: 1

. When ma iled not i ce of ata x s a le is ret urned un cla i med, aS t ate mu st take add i tion al r e ason able ste p s to a ttemp t to pr ovide n o tic e to the property owner before selling his pr o p erty, if it i s practicable to do so. Pp. 4–12. (a) This Courtha s deemed not i ce cons t i t u t i ona lly s u fficientif it wa s rea s onab ly ca lcula t e d t o rea ch t h e int e nded recipien twhen s e nt ,2 JO NES v. FLOWERS Sy llabu s see, e.g. , Mullanev. Cen t ra l Hanover Bank& Trust C o ., 339 U. S. 306, 31 4, bu t h a s n e v e r addr essed w h e th erdu e pr oc ess r e qu ir es fu r ther efforts when thego vernment becomes aware prior to the taking th at its n o tic e attemp t h a s failed. M o st Cou r t s of Appeals an d St at e Su pr eme Cou r t s addr ess i n gth is qu e s tion h a v e dec i ded t h at th e g o v ernmentmus tdo more in such aca s e , a n d ma ny s t ate s t at ut es re qu ir e mor e thanmailed n o ti c e inth e fir s t in stan c e . Pp. 4–6. (b ) The mea n s aS t at e employs t o provide n o t i ce “ m us t b e s uch as on e desir o u s of ac tu allyin for min gth e absen tee m i gh t r e ason abl y adopt to ac c o mplishit.” Mullane, 399 U. S. , at 315. Th e adequ a c yof a par t ic u l arfor m of n o tic e is asse ssed byb a lan c i n gth e State’s in ter

est ag ain s t “t h e in div i du al in ter e st sou gh tto be pr otec ted byth e Fourt eent hAmendment .” Id., at 314. He r e , th e ev alu ationc o n c e rn s th e adequ a c yof n o tic e pr ior to th e State’s ex tin g u i sh ing a pr oper ty owner ’ s int e res tin ahome. Itis unlikely tha tapers on who a c t u a lly des i red t o inform a nowner ab o ut a nimpending t a xs a le of a house would do not h ing whe n acer t ified let t e r a d dres s e d t o t h e owner is re turned unclaimed. The sender wo uld ordinarily atte mpt to resend th e letter , if t h at i s pr ac tic a l, espec i ally g i v e nth at it c o n c e r n s th e import a n t a n d irrevers ib le pros pectof los i ng ahous e. The S t at e ma y ha ve ma de ar e a s onab le ca lc ula t i on of how t o rea ch J o nes , b u titha d good rea s on t o s u s p ectwhen t h e not i ce was ret urned t h a tJ o nes was no better off than if no notice had been s e nt. Thegove rnment must cons ider uniq u e informa t i on ab o uta nin t e nded recipientrega rdles s of w h e th era statu tor ysc h e me is r e a s on a b lyc a lc u l ated to pr ov ide n o t i ce in t h e ordina ry ca s e . S e e Rob i nsonv. Hanrahan, 40 9 U. S. 38, 4 0 (per cu riam), an dCoveyv. Town of Somers , 351 U. S. 1 41, 1 46– 14 7. It does n o t ma tterth at th e S tate ineac hof th ose c a ses w a s aw ar e of the information b efore itca lcula t e d t h e b e stwa y t o s e nd not i ce. Knowledge that notice was ineffective wa s one of the “ p racticalitie s an d pec u liar i t i es of th e c a se ” takenin to a c c o un t, Mulla ne, supra, at 314–3 15, an d it sh ou ld si mi lar l ybe takenin to ac c o u n t inasse ssin g t h e a d eq ua cy of not i ce here. The Commis s ioner a n d S o licit or Gene ra l c o r r e c t lyn o te th e c o n s titu tion alityof th at a par t ic u l arnotic e pr oc e du r e is assess ed ex an te , n o t post ho c. Bu t if a featu r eof th e State’ s pr oc edu r eis th at it pr omptl ypr ov ides addition al in for m ationto th e government about the effectiveness of attempted notice , the ex ante principle is notcont ra vene d b ycons idering wha tt h e gover n ment does w i thth a tin for mation

. Non e of th e Commi ssion e r ’s addition a l c o n t en tion s—th at n o tic e w a s sen t to ana ddr ess th a tJo n e s pr ov ided an d h a d aleg a l ob lig at iont o keep u pdate d, th at a pr op er tyow n e r who fails to re ceive a property tax bill andpay taxes i s o ninquiry no

tic e th at h i s pr oper tyis su bjec t to g o v e r n m en tal taki n g , an d th at J o nes wa s ob liged t o ens u r e t h a tt h os e in whos e ha nds he lefthis3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s pr oper tyw o u l d aler t h i m if it w a s injeop ar dy—r eliev e s th e State of its c o n s titu t i o n al oblig ation to pr ov ide adequ ate n o tic e . Pp. 7–12.

2. Bec a u s e ad dition al r e a s o n able ste p s w e r e av ailable t o th e State, given t h eci rc ums t a nces here, t h eCommis s i oner’s effortt o provide n o tic e to Jon e s w a s in su ffic i en t to sa tisfydu e pr oc ess. Wh at i s r e a son able inr e spon se to n e w in for m ationdepen d s on w h at th at in for

ma t i on revea l s . The ce rt ified let t e r’s ret urn “ u ncla i med” mea n tei

t h er t h a tJ o nes wa s nothome when t h e pos t ma n ca lled a n d did not r e tr iev e th e letterorth at h e n o lon g err e si ded th er e. O n e r e ason abl e step addr es se d to th e for merpossibil i tyw o u l d be forthe State to r e s e nd t h e not i c e b yregula r ma il, which req u ires no s i gna t ure. Cert i

fied ma il m a k e s ac tu aln o tic e mor e likely only if someone is there to sig nfor th e letterortell th e mail c a r r i erthat th e addr ess is in c o rr ec t. Regula r ma il ca n b e leftunt il t h e pers on re t urns home, a n d mightin

crea s e t h e ch a nces of a c t u a lnot i ce. Ot her rea s onab l e follow-up mea s ures would ha ve b een to pos tnot i ce on t h e frontdoor or a ddress ot herwis e undeliverab l e ma il t o “ o ccupa n t
. ” Eit h er a ppr oa ch would increa s e t h e likelihood t h a t a n y occ u pa nt s would a l ertt h e owne r, if only because an ownership change co uld affect their o wn occupancy. Cont ra ry t o J o nes ’ cla i m, t h e Commiss ioner wa s notreq u ired t o s e a rch t h e loc a l phone b ook a n d ot her go v e rnmentreco r d s . S uch a n open-ended search imposes burdens onthe State significantly greater th anth e sev e ral r e lativ e lyeasyoption s ou tlin ed h e r e . Th e Commis

sion er ’s c o mplain t abou t th e bu r d enof ev enth ese additi on al step s i s belied byAr kan s as’ r e qu ir emen t th at n o t i c e to h o meste a d ow n e r s b e a ccomplis hed b ypers ona ls e rvice if cert ifi e d ma il is returned a n d b y th e fac tth at t h e Sta t e tr an s f er s th e c o sto f n o tic e to th e tax pay e ror t a xsa le purc ha s e r. The Solicit or Genera l’s a dditiona la r gument s
— t h a tpos t ed not i ce could b e removed b ychildren or va nda l s , a n d t h a t th e follow

- u p requ ir emen t w ill en c o u r a g eState s to fav o rmodes of de

livery that will not generate addit i onal i n formation—a re rejected. This Court will not prescribe th e form of servi c e t h at Arkansas sh ou ld adopt. Ar kan s as c a ndeter m in e h o wbest to pr oceed, an d th e Sta t es h a v e ta kena v a r i ety of appr oac h e s. Pp. 12–17. 359 Ark. 443, ___ S. W. 3d _ __, re versed and remanded. R OBERTS , C. J

. , delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court , in whi ch S TEVENS , S OUTER , G IN SB U R G , and B REYER , JJ., joined. T HOMAS , J., filed a dis s en t

ing opinion, in which S CALI A an d K ENNEDY , JJ., joined. ALITO , J., took no pa rtin t h e cons idera t i on or decis i on of t h e ca s e ._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 47 7 GARY KE N T JON E S, PETITION ER v. LIN D A K. FLOWE RS ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COUR T OF ARKANS A S [Apr il 26, 20 0 6 ] C HIEF J U S TICE R OBER TS delivered the opinion of the Court. Before a State may ta ke property and sell it for unpai d taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourte enth Amend

ment requires the government to provide th e owner “no

tice and opportunity fo r hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullanev. Cent ral Han o ver Ba nk&Tr ust Co., 339 U. S. 3 06, 31 3 (19 50). We gran te d ce rtio ra ri to de te r mine whe th e r, when n o ti ce o f a tax s ale is mail ed to th e ownerand retu rned undelivered, the go v e rnment must t a ke a d di ti on alre a s on ab l est ep st op r ovi d en o ti c e be f o r etaki ng th e own e r’ s pr op erty. I In 1967, pet i tioner Gary Jones purchased a house at 717 North Br ya n Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. He lived in the house with his wife until they separated in 1993. Jones then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and his wife continued to live in the North Bryan Street house. Jones paid his mortgage each mon t h for 30 years, and the mortgage company paid Jones’ property t a xes. After Jones paid off his mortga g e in 1 997, the property ta xes2 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt went unpaid, and the property was certified as delinquent. In April 20 00, respondent Mark Wilcox, the Commis

sioner of State Lands (Commissio n er), attempted to notify Jones of hi s tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the property, b ymailing a certified letter to Jones at t h e North Bryan Street address. See Ark. Code Ann. §26–3 7 – 301 (1997). The packet of infor m ation stated that unless Jones rede e m ed the property, itwould be subj ect to publi c sale two years later onApril 17, 2 002. See ibid. Nobody was home t o sign for t h e letter, a n d nobody appeared a t the post of fice to ret r ieve the letter withinthe next 15 days. The post office r e turn ed the unopened pack et to the Commissioner marked “ ‘unclaimed.’ ” Pet. forCert. 3. Two years later, and ju st a few we eks before the public sale, the Commissionerpublished a notice of public sale in the Ar kansas Democra t Gazet t e. No bids were submitted, which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of the property. See §26–37–202(b). Se veral months later, respondent Linda Flowers subm itted a pu rchase offer. The Commissioner mailed anothercertified letter to Jones at the Nor t h Br yan S t reet addres s, attempti ng to notif y him that hi s house would be s o ld to Flowers if he did n o t pay his taxes. Like the firs t letter, the second was also returned to the Commi ssioner mar k ed “unclaimed.” Ibid. Flowers purchased the house, whi c h the parties stipulated in the trial court had a fair market value of $80,000, for $21,042.15. Record 2 24. Immediately after the 30-da y period for postsale redemption passed, see §2 6–37–202(e), Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to th e property. The notice was serv ed on Jones’ daughter, who contacted J o nes and notified him of the tax sal e . Id., at 11 (Exh. B). Jones fi led a lawsuit inArkansas state court against the Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commis

sioner’ s fail ure to provide notice of the tax sale and of Jones’ rightto redeem resulted in the taking of his prop

-3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt erty without due proce ss. The Commissionerand Flowers moved for summary ju dgment on the ground that the t w o unclaimed letters sent by the Com m issioner were a consti

tutionally adequate attempt at no tice, and J o nes filed a cross-motion for summary ju d g ment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissio n er and Flowers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a–13a. It concluded that the Arkansas ta x sale stat ute, which set forth the notice proc edure followed bythe Commissioner, complied with constit u tional due process requirements. Jones appealed, and the Arkansa s Supreme Court af

firmed the trial court’s judgment. 359 Ark. 4 43, ___ S. W. 3d ___ (2004). The court noted our precedent stating that due process does not r e quire actual notice, s ee Dusenbe ry v. United Sta t es, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002), and it held that attem p ting to p r ovide notice by certifi ed mail satis

fied due process in the circumstan c es presented, 359 Ark., at ___, _

__ S. W. 3d, at ___. We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), t o resolve a conflict am ong the Ci rcuits and State Supr eme Courts concerning whether th e Due Process Clause requires the government to take additionalrea s onable steps to notify a property ow ner when notice of a tax sale is ret u rned unde

livered. Co mpare, e.g., Akey v. Clinton County , 375 F. 3d 231, 236 (CA2 2004) (“In light of the notice’s return, th e County was required to use ‘r easonably diligent efforts’ to ascertain Ak ey’s correc tadd r ess”), and Kennedy v. Mos

safa , 100 N. Y. 2d 1, 9, 789 N. E. 2d 607, 611 (2003) (“[W]e reject the view thatt h e enforcing officer’s obligation is always satisfied by sen d ing th e notice to the address listed in the tax r o ll, even where the notice is retur n ed as unde

liverable”), with Smith v. Cliffs onthe Bay Co ndominium Assn. , 463 Mich. 420, 429, 617 N. W. 2d 536, 541 (2000) (per curi am ) (“The fact that one of the mailings was re

turned by the post off i ce as undel iv erable does not impos e on the state the obl i gation to un dertak e an investigation4 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt to see if a new address . . . coul d be located”). We hold tha t when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to at

tempt to p r ovide notice to th e pro p erty o w ner before sell

ing his pro p erty, if it is practicab l e to do so. Un der th e circumstan c es presented here, additional reasonable steps were available to the State. W e therefore reverse the judgment of the Ark ansas Supreme Court. II A Due process does notrequire that a property owne r receive act ual notice before the government may take h i s property. Dusenb ery , supr a , at 170. Rath er, we ha ve stated thatdue process requires the government to pro

vide “notice reasonablycalculated, under all the circum

stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency o f the action and afford th em an opportunity to p r esent their objections.” Mullane , 339 U. S., at 314. The Commis

sioner argues that once the State provided notice reasona

bly calculated to appri s e Jones of the impending tax sale by mailing him a certified letter, d u e process was satisfied. The Arkans as statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice, the Co mmissionercontinues, because it provides fornotice by c e rtified mail to an addr ess that the property owner is responsible fork eeping up to date. See Ark. Code Ann. §26–3 5–705 (199 7). The Commission er notes this Court’s am ple precedent condoning notice by mail, see, e.g., Du sen bery, supr a, at 169; Tuls a Profes

sional Collection Servi c es, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missionsv. Adams, 46 2 U. S. 791, 798 (1983); Mullane , su pra , a t318 –319, and a dds that th e Arkansas s c heme exceeds constitutional requirements by requiring t h e Commissioner to use certified mail. Brief for Respondent Commissioner 14–15. It is true t hat this Co urt has deemed notice constitu

-5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt tionally suf f icient if it was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent. See, e. g., Dus e nbery , supra , at 1 68–169; Mullane , 339 U. S., at 31 4. In each of these cases, the government attempted to provide notice and heard nothing back indicati ng that anythi n g had gone awry, an d we stated that “[t]he reasonabl en ess and hence the constit u tional validity of [the ] chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to i n form those affected.” Id., at 3 15; see als o Dusenb ery , supra , at 1 70. But we have nev e r addressed whether du e process entails further responsibility whe n the government becomes aware prior to the taking tha t its attempt at notice has failed. That is a new wrinkle, and we have explained that the “notice required will vary wi th circumstan c es and conditions.” Walker v. City of Hutchin

so n, 352 U. S. 11 2, 11 5 (19 5 6)

. Theq u es tio npre s en te d is whether such k n ow ledge on the go ve r n men t ’s pa rt i s a “c irc u mstanc e and c o ndition”th atv a ries the “notice req u i r e d

. ” The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have addressed this question on frequent occasions, and most have decided that when the government lear ns its attempt at notice has failed, due process requires the government to do something more before re al p r op er t ymaybe soldin a tax sale. 1 See, e.g., Plemons v. Gale , 396 F. 3 d569, 576

——————

1 Mos tC o ur ts of Appeals h ave als o conc lu ded th atth e Due Proc ess Cl aus eof the Fifth Amendmentrequ ire s th e Fe de ral G ove rnmen t to take fur ther r e ason able ste p s in the pr op er ty f o rf eitur e con t e xt. Se e, e.g. , United States v. Ri tchi e , 342 F. 3d 903 , 911 (CA9 2 003); Foeh l v. Un ite d Sta t es , 238F. 3d 474 , 480(CA32001); Sm al l v. Un ited States , 136 F. 3d 1334 , 1337–1338(CAD C1998); Torres v. $36 , 256

. 8 0 U. S. Currenc y , 25 F. 3 d 1154 , 1161 (CA2 1994); Barrera-M o n t enegro v. Un ited States , 74 F. 3 d657 , 660 (CA 51996); United States v. Rod gers , 108F. 3d 1247 , 1252–1 253(CA101 997); s ee als o G a rcia v. Meza , 235 F. 3d 2 87, 291 (CA 7 2000) (dec li n i n g to adopt a per seru le th at on ly ex am i n esn o tice at th e ti me itis s e nt, b u talso d e cli n ing t o impose an af fir m ative duty to seek ou t clai ma n t s in every c a s ewh ere notice isreturn ed un deliv e red). Bu t s e e6 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt (CA4 2005); Akey , 375 F. 3d, at 236; Hamilto n v. Renewe d Hope, Inc. , 277 Ga. 46 5, 468, 589 S. E. 2d 81, 85 (2003); Kennedy , 100 N. Y. 2d, at 9, 789 N. E. 2d, a t611; Malone v. Robinson , 614 A. 2d 33, 38 (D. C. App. 1992 ); St. George Antiochian Or thodox Christi a n Ch urch v. Agga rw a l , 32 6 Md. 90, 103 , 603 A. 2d 484, 490 (1992); Wells Fargo Cr edi t Corp. v. Ziegl e r , 78 0 P. 2d 7 03, 705 (Okla. 198 9); Rosenberg v. Smidt , 72 7 P. 2d 778, 780–783 (Alaska 1986); Giacobbi v. Hall , 109 Idaho 293, 297, 707 P. 2d 404, 408 (1985); Tra c y v. County of Chest e r , Tax Claim Bureau, 5 07 Pa. 288, 29 6, 489 A. 2 d1334, 133 8–1339 (1985). But see Smith , 463 Mich., at 429, 617 N. W. 2d, at 541; Dahn v. Trown sell , 1998 SD 36, ¶23, 576N. W. 2d 535, 541–5 42; Elizondo v. Read , 588 N. E. 2d 50 1, 504 (Ind. 1992); Atlan

tic Ci tyv. Block C–11, Lot 11 , 74 N. J. 34, 39–40, 376 A. 2d 926, 928 (1 977). Man yStates al ready require in their statutes th at the gove rnment do more than simply mail notice to d e linquent owners, either at the outset or as a followup measure if ini t ial mailed notice is ineffective. 2

—————— Madewe ll v. Downs , 68 F. 3d 1030 , 1047 (CA8 19 95); Sar i t v. Uni t e d States Dru g Enforce men tAd min

. , 987 F. 2 d 10 , 14–15(CA1 1993). 2 M a n yState s r e qu ir e th at n o tic e be g i v e nto th e occ u pan t s of th e pr oper tyas a mat t erof c o u r se. See Cal. R e v . & Tax

. Code An n . §3704

. 7 (West Su pp. 2 006); G a . Cod e An n . §48–4– 45(a)( 1 )(B) (S u pp. 2005); Il l

. Comp. St at., c h

. 35, §§200/2 1–7 5(a), 20 0/2 2–1 0, 20 0/22

– 15 (Wes t 20 04 ); M e . Rev

. Stat . An n . , Tit. 36, §107 3 (19 9 0 ); M d . Tax

- Pr op. Code Ann

. §14– 83 6(b)(4)( i)(2) (Lex is 2001); M i c h

. C o mp. Law s An n . §211.78 i(3 ) (West 2 0 0 5 ); M i n n . Stat. §2 81.23( 6) (2 004 ); M o n t . Code An n . §§15–18

– 212( 1)(a), (2)(A) (200 5); N. D

. Cen t . Code An n . §57–28–0 4(3) (Lex is 200 5); O k la. S tat., Tit. 6 8 , § 311 8(A) (We s tSu pp. 20 06); S. D

. Codified Law s §10 –25

– 5 (200 4); Utah Code An n . §59–2 –1 351( 2)(a) (Lex is 2004); Wis. St at. §7 5

. 12(1) (2 00 3–2 004); Wy o. St at. Ann. §39– 13– 10 8(e)(v)(B) (200 5). Some Sta t es r e qu ir e th at n o tic e be posted onth e pr oper tyorat th e pr oper tyow n e r’s lastkn ow naddr ess e i th erat th e o u tset, see D e l. Code An n ., Tit. 9, §§87 24, 8 772 (19 89 an dSu pp. 20 04); G a . Code An n . §48– 4– 78(d) ( S u pp. 200 5); Haw

. Rev

. Stat. §24 6–5 6 ( 200 3); M d . Tax

Pr op. Code An n . §14–83 6 (b)(6) (Lex is 200 1); O k la. Sta t ., Tit. 68 , §311 8(A) (Wes t Su pp. 200 6), oras a follo w u p measu r e w h e nper s on a l7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt In Mullane , we stated that “wh e n notice is a person’s due .

. . [t]he means employed must be such as one desir

ous of actually informing the abs entee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,” 339 U. S., at 315, and that assess

ing the adequacy of a particular form of noti ce requires balancing the “interest of the State” against “the individ

ual interest sought t o be protected byth e Fourteenth Amendment,” id. , at 314. Our leading cases on n o tice have evaluated the adequacy of n o tice given to beneficia r ies of a common trust fund, Mullane , supra;a mortgage e , Mennonite , 462 U. S. 791; owners of seized ca sh and auto

mobiles, Dus e n b er y, 534U

. S

. 16 1; Robinsonv. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 3 8(19 7 2 ) (per cur i am); cre di to r sof an es ta te , Tulsa Profess i o na l , 485 U. S. 4 78; a n d t e nant sl ivi ng in publi chou s i n g, Gree nev. Li ndse y, 456U. S. 4 44 (1 982 ). I n th is ca se, w eev alu a te thea d eq ua c y o f no ti cep rio r to th e St at e exti ngu i sh i n g a pro p erty own e r’ s i n t e r e stina h o m e . We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house h e owns would do noth ing when a certified letter sent to the owner is returnedunclaimed. If the Commis

sioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent

—————— s e rvice ca nnotb e a ccomplished or cert ified ma il is ret urned, s e e Fla

. Sta t . §197.5 2 2 (2)(a) (2 003); M i n n . Stat. §281.2 3 (6) (2 0 04); S. C. Code An n . §12–51

– 40(c ) (Su pp. 2005). An d a fewState s r e qu ir e a dilig en t inq u iry t o find apropert yow ner’s co rre cta ddres s when ma iled notice is returned. Se e Miss. Code Ann. §27–43–3 (2002); N e v. Rev. Stat. §361.5 95( 3)(b) (20 03); P a . Sta t . An n ., Tit. 7 2 , §58 60. 607 a (Pu r d on 199 0); R. I. G e n . Law s §44–9 –25.1 (2 00 5).

S e e al so 26 U. S

. C

. §63 35(a) (requ iri ng th e In t e rn alR ev e n u e Servic e to make areasonabl e attem p t t oper s on allys e rv e noti ce on adeli n qu ent taxpay er before r e lyi n g upon n o tic e b ycer tif i e d mail); 28 U. S

. C. §3203(g)(1 )(A)(i)(IV ) (r equ iri n g writt en notic e t o ten a n t sof realpr oper ty subjec t to sale und er the Fe der al D ebt Co llec tio n Pr actice s Ac t) ; 1 2 U. S

. C

. §3758(2)(A)(iii) (r equiri ng writt e nnoti ce to oc cupa n ts b e for e for eclo sure bytheSecr e t ary of H o u s ing an d UrbanDeve lo p m e nt) ; §3758(2 ) (B)(ii) (requ iring th atnotice be posted on the proper ty if

occ u pa nt sar e unkn o w n)

.8 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt taxpayers, handed them to the postman, and then watch ed as the depa rting postm an acci dentally dropped the letters down a storm drain, on e would certainly expe ct the Com

missioner’ s office to p r epare a n e w stackof letters and send them again. No one “desirous of actually informing” the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters d i s a p p e a r e da n ds a y “ I t r i e d

. ” F a i l u r e t o f o l l o wu p w o u l d be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated to reach th eir intended recipients when delivered to the postman. By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post office, the s e nder will ordinarily attempt to re send it, if it is practicab l e to do so. See Small v. UnitedStates , 13 6 F. 3d 1334, 1337 (CADC 1998). This i s es pecially true when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns such an im portant an dirreversible prospect as the loss of a house. Although the State ma y have made a reasonabl e calculation of how to reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect wh en the notice was retu rned that J o nes was “no better off than if the notice had never been s e nt.” Malone , supra, at 37. Deciding to take no further action is not what someone “desirous of actually informing” Jones would do; such a person would take furthe rreasonabl e steps if any were available. In prior ca ses, we have required the gove rnment to consider unique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case. In Ro b

inson v. Ha nrahan, we held that notice of forfeiture pro

ceedings sent to a vehicle owner’s home address was in

adequate when the State knew that the pro p erty owne r was in prison. 409 U. S., at 40. In Coveyv. Town of So

mers , 351 U. S. 141 (1956), we held that notice of foreclo

sure by mailing, posti n g, and publication was inadequ a te when townofficials knew that t h e property owner w a s incompetent and without a guardian’ s protection. Id. , at9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 146–147. The Commissioner poi n ts out that in these cases, the State was aware of such information before it calculated how best to provide notice. But i tis difficult to explai n why due p r ocess would have settled for something less if the government had l e arned after notice was sent, bu t before the t a king occur r ed, that th e property owner was i n prison or was incompetent. Under Robinson and Covey , the govern ment’s kno w ledge th a tnotice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligati o n on the government’s pa rt to take a dditional steps to effect notice. That knowledg e was one of the “pract icalities and peculiarities of the case,” Mullane , supra, at 314–315, that the Courtt ook into ac count in de termining whether co n stitutional requirements were met

. It should similarly be taken into account in assessing t h e adequac y of notice i n this case. The dissen tdismisses the State’s knowledge that its not i ce was ineffective as “learned long after th e fact,” post , at 7, n. 5 (opinion of T HOMAS , J.), but the noti ce letter was promptly r e turned to the State two to three weeks after it was sent, and the Arkansas s t atutory re

gime precludes the State from taking the property for two years while the property owner may exercise his right to redeem, see Ark. Code Ann. §26–37–301 (Supp. 2005). It is certai n ly true, a s the Com m issioner and Solicitor General contend, thatthe failur e of notice in a speci f ic case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempte d notice; in that sense, the constitutionality of a particul a r procedure for notice i s assess ed ex a n te , rather than post hoc

. But i f a feature of the State’ s chosen procedure is that it pro m ptly provides additional infor m ation to the government about the effective ness of notice, it does no t contravene the ex ante principle to consider what the government does with that inform ation in assessing the adequacy of the chosen procedure. After a ll, the State kne w ex a n tethat it would promptly learn whether its10 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt effort to effect notice t h rough certified mail h a d succeeded. It would not be inconsi s tent with the approach the Court has taken in notice cases to ask, with respect to a proce

dure underwhich telephone calls were placed to owner s , what the State did wh en no one a n swered. Ask i ng what the State d oes when a notice letter is returne dunclaimed is not subst antively different. The Commissioner has three further arguments for why reasonable followup measures were not required in this case. First, notice was sent to an address that Jones provided an d had a legal obligat io n to k eep updated. See Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (199 7). Second, “after faili ng to receive a property tax b ill an d pay property taxes, a property ho lder is on i nquiry -notice that his property i s subject to government al taki ng. ” Brief for Respondent Commissioner 18–19. Third, Jones was obli ged to ensure that those i nwhose ha nds he l e ft his property would alert him if it was in jeopardy. None of these co ntentions re

lieves the State of its constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice. The Commi ssioner does not argue that Jones’ failure to comply with a statu t ory oblig atio n to keep his address updated forfeits his right to co nstitutionally sufficient notice, and we agree. Id. , at 19; s ee al so Brief for United States as Ami c u sC u r i a e16, n. 5 (quoting Mennonite , 462 U. S., at 7 99 (“ ‘[A] party’s ability to ta ke steps to safe

guard its own interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation’ ”)). In R o binson , we noted that Illinois lawrequired each vehi cle owner to register his address wit hthe secretary of state, and that the State’s vehicle forfeiture scheme provid ed for notice by mail to t h e address listed in the secretary’s re cords. See 409 U. S., a t 38, n. 1 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 9 5 1 ⁄ 2 , §3–405 (1971), an d ch. 38, §36– 1 (1969)). But we fou n d that the State had n o t provided constitutionally su fficient notice, despite having followed its reasonably calculated s c heme, because it knew11 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt that Robinson could not be reached at his address of re

cord. 409 U. S., at 31–32. Altho u gh Ark. Code Ann. §26– 35–705 provides strong support for the Commissioner ’s argument that mailing a certified letter to Jones at 71 7 North Br ya n Street w a s reasonably calculated to reac h him, it does not alter the reasonab leness of the Commis

sioner’s position that he must do nothing more when the notice is promptly retu rned “uncla imed.” As for the Commissioner’s inquiry notice argument, the common knowledge th at propert ymay become subject to government taking when taxes are not pa id does not excuse the governmentfrom comp lying withits constitu

tional ob ligation of n o tice befo re taking priva t e property. We have p r eviously s t ated the opposite: Aninterested party’s “kn o wledge of delinquency in the pa yment of taxes is not equivalent to n o tice that a tax sale is pending.” Mennonite , supra, at 800. Itis at least a s wi dely known that arrestees have t h e right to remain sil e nt, and that anything they say may be used against them, see Dick ers onv. U n ite d States, 53 0U. S. 42 8, 443 (20 0 0 ) (“Miranda [v

. Ar izona, 384 U. S. 4 36 (19 6 6) ,] has be com e embedd edin r o utine polic e pr actice to the point where th e warning s have bec o me partof ournati on al cu ltur e”), b u t that k n owledge does n o t excuse a police fail ure to provide Miranda warnings. Arkansas affords even a delinquent taxpayerth e right to s e ttle accounts with th e State and redeem his property, so Jones’ failure to pa y his taxes ina timely manner cannot by itself excuse inadequ a te notice. Finally, the Commissi oner remin d s us of a statement from Mullane that the State can assume an owner leaves his property in the ha nds of on e who will inf o rm him if his interest is in jeopardy. 339 U. S., at 316. But in this passage, Justice Jacks on writes of “libel of a ship, attach

ment of a c hattel[,] or entry u p on real estate in the nam e of law”—su ch “seiz[ures]” of property, he conc luded, “ma y reasonably be expected to come p r omptly to the owner’s12 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt attention.” Ibid. An occupant, h o wever, is not charge d with ac tingas the own e r’s agent i nall respects, and it is quite a l e a p from Jus tice Jackson’s examples to conclu de that it is a nobligation of tenancy to follow up withcerti

fied mail of unk nown content addressed to the owner. I n fact, the S t ate makes it impossible for the occupant to learn why the Commis s ioner is writing the owner, because an occupant cannot call for a ce rt ified letter without firs t obtaining the owner’s signature. For all the occupant k n ows, the Commissio n er of State Lands might write to certain residents about a variety of matters he finds im

portant, such as state parks or highway co nstruction; it would by no means b eobvious to an occupant observing a certified mail slip from the Commissioner that the owner is in danger of losing his prop erty. In any event, there is no record evidence that noti ces of attempted delivery were left at 717 North Brya n Street. Mr. Jones should have been more diligent wi th respect to his property, no question. People must pay their taxes, and the government m a y hold citi zens accountable for ta x delinquency by ta king their prop erty. But before forcing a citizen to satisfy his d e bt by forfe i ting his pr operty, due process requires the government to prov ide adequate notice of the impending takin g . U. S. Const., Amdt. 14 ; Mennonite , supra , at 79 9. B In response to the retu rned form s u ggesting t hat Jones had not received notice that he was about to l o se his prop erty, the St ate did—nothing. Forthe reasons stated, w e conclude th e State sho u ld have ta ken additio nal reason

able steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so. The question remains whether there were any such available steps. Whil e “[i]t is notour responsibility to prescribe the form of s e rvice that the [government] should adopt,” Gree

ne, 45 6 U. S., a t45 5, n

. 9, if the r e were no re aso nab le a d di

-13 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt tio nal steps the go ve rn men tcoul d have ta ke n upo n retu rn of the un cl aim e d no ti ce le tte r , i tcan n ot be fa ul ted fo r doi n g nothi n g. We think there were several reasonable step s the Sta t e could have taken. Wh at steps are reasonable in response to new information depends upon what the new informa

tion reveals. The return of the certified letter marked “unclaimed” meant ei ther that Jones stil llived at 7 1 7 North Br ya n Street, but was not home when the postman called and did not retr ieve the le t t er at the post office, o r that Jones no longer resided at that address. One reason

able step primarily a ddressed to the former possibility would be for the State to resendthe notice by regular mail, so that a si gnature wa s not requi red. The Commission er says that use of certified ma il makes actual notice more likely, because requiri ng the re cipient’ s signature protects against misdelivery. But that is only true, of course, when someone is home to si gn for the letter, or to inform the mail carrier that he has arrived at the wrong addres s. Otherwise, “[c]ertified mail is dis p atched and handled in transit as ordinary mail,” United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual §503.3.2.1 (M ar. 16, 2006), and th e use of certified mail might make a ctual notice less likely in some cases
—the letter cannot be left like regu lar mail t o be examined at the end of the day, and it can only be retrieved from the postoffice for a specified pe riod of time

. Following up with regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice to Jones if—as it tu rned out—h e had moved. Even occupants wh o ignored certified mail notice slips addressed to the owne r (if any ha d been left) might scra wl the owner’s new add r ess on the notice packet and leave i tfor the p o stman to retrieve, or notify Jones directly. Other reas onable f o ll owup measures, directed at the possibility that Jones had moved as well as that he ha d simply not retrieved t h e certified letter, wou l d have been14 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt to post notice on the front door, or to address otherwise undeliverable mai lto “ o ccupant.” Most States that explic

itly outline additional procedur es in their tax sale statutes require just such steps. See n. 2, supr a . Either approach would incr ease the likelihood that the own e r would b e notified that he was about to lose his property, given th e failure of a letter deliverable on ly to the owner in person. That is clear in the case of an owner who s t ill resided at the premises. It is also true in the case of an owner who has moved: Occupan t s who might disregarda certified mail sl ip n o t addressed to them are less lik ely to ignor e posted notice, and a l e tter add r essed to them (even a s “occupant ”) might be opened and read. In either case, there is a s i gnificant chance the occupants will alert the owner, if only because a change i nownership could wel l affect their own occupa ncy. Infact, Jones firs t learned of the State’s effort to sell his house when he was alerted by one of the o ccupants—his daughter—after she was serve d with an unlawful detainer notice. Jones believes that the Commi ssioner sh ould have searched for his new address in th e Little Rock phonebook and other governmentrecords su ch as income tax rolls. W e do not believe the governme ntwas required to go this far. As the Commissioner points out, the return of Jones’ mail marked “unclaimed” did not necessaril ymean that 717 NorthBryan Street was a nincorrect address; i t merely info rmed the Commission e rthat no one appeared to sign for t h e mail before the designated date on which it would be r e turned to the sender. An open-ended search for a new address—especially when the State obligates the taxpayerto keep his a ddress upd a ted witht h e tax collec

tor, see Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997)—imposes burdens on the State significantly greater tha nthe sever a l relatively easy options outlined ab ove. The Commissioner com p lains abou tthe burden of even those additional steps, but his argument is belied by Ar

-15 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt kansas’ cu rrent requi rement tha tnotice to homestead owners be accomplished by pe rsonal service if certified mail is retu rned, §26–3 7–301(e) (Supp. 2005), and the fact that Ar kan s as transfers the cost of notice to the taxpa y e r or the tax sale purchaser, §26–37–104(a). T h e Commis

sioner has offered no estimate of how many notice letters are returne d , and no f a cts to su p p ort the dissent’s asser

tion that t h e Commissioner must now phys ically locate “tens of thousands of properties every year.” Post , at 10. Citing our decision in Green ev. Lindsey, the Solicitor General adds that posted noti ce could be taken down by children or vandals. But in Gr een e , we noted that outsid e the specific facts of that case, posting notice on real prop

erty is “a singularly appropriate and effective way of ensuring that a person .

. . is actually apprised of proceed

ings against him.” 45 6 U. S., a t 452–453. Successfull y providing n o tice is often the mostefficient w a y to collect unpaid taxes, see Menn onite , 462 U. S., at 800, n. 5 (more effective notice may ease bur den on State if recipient arranges to pay delinquent taxe s prior to tax sale); Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 (85 percent of tax delinquent p r operties in Arkansas a r e redeemed upon notice of delin quency), bu t rather tha ntakingr e latively easy additional steps to effect notice, the State undertook the burden and expense of purchasing a newsp a per advert isement, conducting a n auction, and then negotiating a private sal e of the prop

erty to Flow ers. The Solicitor General argues that requiring further effort when the gover n ment le arns that notice was n o t delivered will cause the govern ment to favor modes of providing n o tice that do not gener a te additional informa

tion—for example, starting (andstopping) with regul a r mail instea d of certified mail. We find this u n likely, as we have no doubt that the governme nt repeatedly finds itself being asked to prove that notice was sent and received. Using certified mail provides the Sta t e withdocumenta

-16 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt tion of personal deliv ery and protection against false claims that notice was never received. That added sec u rity, howev e r, comes at a pri c e—the Sta t e also learns when notice has not been received. We conclude that , under the circumsta nces presented, the State cann ot simply ignore that information in proceeding to take and sell the owner’s prope rty—any m o re than it could ignore the information that th e owner in Robinsonwas in jail, or that the owner in Covey was incompetent. Though the Commissioner argues that followup meas

ures are not constituti onally required, he reminds us that the State did make some attemp t to follow up with Jones by publishing notice inthe newspaper a few weeks before the public s a le. Several deca des ago, this Court observed that “[c]ha nce alone” brings a person’s attention to “a n advertisement in small type inserted in the b a ck pages o f a newspaper,” Mullane , 339 U. S., at 315, an d that notice by publicati o n is adequate only wh ere “it is no t reasonably possible orpracti cable to give more adequate warni n g,” id. , at 317. Following up by publication was not constitu

tionally adequate under the circu mstances presented here because, as we have ex plained, it was possibl e and practi

cable to give Jones more adequate warning of the impen d

ing tax sale. The dissentforcefully articulates some basic principles about constitutionally require d notice, principles from which we h a ve no intention to depart. In p a rticular, w e disclaim any “newrule” thatis “co ntraryto D u senbery an d a significant departu re from M u llane .” Pos t , at 6. In Dusenb ery , the Go vernment was aware that someone at the prison had signed for the prisoner’s notice letter, and we determined that th is atte mpt at notice was adequate, despite the fact that the State could have made notice more likelyby requiring the pr isoner to sign for the letter himself. 5 34 U. S., at 171. In t h is case, of course, th e notice letter was retur n ed to the Commissio n er, informing17 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt him that his attempt a tnotice had failed. As for Mullane , it direc t s that “wh en notice is a person’s due .

. . [t]he means employed must be such as one desir

ous of actually informing the abs entee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. ” 339 U. S., at 315. Mindful of the dissent’s concerns, we conclude, at the end of the day, th at someone who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was in danger of losing hi s house would do more when the attempted notice letter was retur n ed unclaimed, and there was more that reasonably could be done. As noted, “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of s e rvice that the [gove r nment] should adopt.” Gre ene , sup r a, at 455, n. 9. In prior cases fi nding notice inadequate, we have n o t attempte d to redraft the State’s notice statute. See, e . g . , T u ls a Professional , 485 U. S., a t 490–4 91 ; R o binson , 40 9 U. S., at 40; Schro e de r v. Cit yof NewYork, 37 1 U. S. 2 0 8 , 21 3–21 4 (19 6 2 ) ; Walker , 35 2 U

. S. , a t11 6; Covey , 351 U. S., at 146– 147. The State can de

termine how to proceed in resp onse to our conclusion tha t notice was inadequate here, and the States h a ve taken a variety of approaches to the present questi o n. See n. 2, supra . Itsuffices for present pur p oses that we are confi

dent that a dditional reasonable st eps were available for Arkansas to employ bef o re taking J o nes’ property. * * * There is no reason to s u ppose that the State will ever be less than fu lly zealous i nits efforts to secure t h e tax reve

nue it needs. The same cannot be said for the Sta t e’s efforts to ensure thatits ci tizens receive proper notice before the State ta kes action against them. In this case, the State is exerting extraor dinary power against a prop

erty owner—taking an d selling a house he owns. It is not too much to insist that the State d o a bit more to attemp t to let him know about i twhenthe notice letter addressed to him is returned uncl a imed.18 JO NES v. FLOWERS Opinion of t h eCourt The Commissioner’ s eff o rt to provide notice to Jones of an impendi n g tax sale of hi s house was in sufficient to satisfy due process given the circumstances of this case. The judgment of the Ark ansas Supreme Court is reversed , and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so orde red. J USTICE ALITO tookno part in the consi d eration or decision of t h is case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 47 7 GARY KE N T JON E S, PETITION ER v. LIN D A K. FLOWE RS ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COUR T OF ARKANS A S [Apr il 26, 20 0 6 ] J USTICE T HOMAS , wi th whom J USTICE S CALIAand J USTICE K E NNEDY join, dissenting. When petitioner failed to pay his property taxes fo r several con s ecuti v e ye ars, re spondent Commissioner of Sta t e La nd s in Ar kan s as, using the re cord add r ess th at petitioner p r ovide dto t h e Sta t e, sent peti tione ra lette r b y certi fied mail, noting his tax deli nquency and explainin g thathis p r opert y wou l d be subj ect to p ublicsale if t h e delinquent taxes a n d p e nalties we re not paid. Afte r pe ti

tioner failed to respon d, the Sta t e also published notice of the delinqu ency and pu blic sale in an Arkansa s newspape r. Soon after respondent Linda K. Fl owers s ubm itteda pur chase offer to the S t ate , it sent peti tioner a sec o nd letter b y certi fied ma il explainin gt h at the sale would proceed if the delinquent taxes an d p e nalties we re not p a id. Petitioner argues that the State violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend

ment because, in his view, the State failed to take suffi

cient steps to contacthim befor e selling his property to Flowers. Petitioner contends that once the State became aware tha the had no t claimed the certified mail, it was constitutionally obligated to employ additional methods to locate him. Ad op ti ng pe ti ti on er’ s argu m e nts , t h e C o u r th o l d s t o d a y that “whenmailed notice of a tax sale is returned un

-2 JO NES v. FLOWERS T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g claimed, the State mu st take additional reas onable step s to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practi cable to do so.” Ante , at 4. The Court concludes that it was practicable for Arkan

sas to take additional steps here—namely, notice by regu

lar mail, posting notice on petitioner’s door, a n d address

ing mail to “occupant.” Ante , at 13. Because, under this Court’s p r ecedents, the State’s notice methods clearly satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, I respectfullydissent. I The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liber ty, or prope rty, without due process of law.” This Court has held that a State mus t provide an individualwith notice and opportunity to be heard before the State may de prive him of his property. Mullanev. Ce ntra l Hanover Bank & Tr ustCo., 33 9 U. S. 306 , 31 3 (1 950 ). Bal a ncin g a Sta t e ’ s i n te res tin effi cien tly ma nagi ng it s ad mi ni s t r a tive sys t em andan i n divi du al ’ s in te res t i na d eq ua te no tice , th is Co urt ha s h e l d tha ta Sta t e mu stpr ovid e “n otic e rea s on ab ly calc u l at ed , un d e ral l the c i rc umstances, t oapprise int e r e ste dpartie s of the pendenc y of the action.” Id ., a t3 1 3–3 14

. As this Co urt h a s e x pla i ne d, “wh e n no ti ce is a pe rs on ’s du e . . . [t]h e mea n s em plo y e d mus tb esu ch as on e des i rous o f actu all y i nfo rmin g th e abse n tee m i gh t re aso n ab l y a d o p t toac co mp lis hit. ” Id ., a t 315

. “[H]eroic e ffo rts , ” ho we ve r, are not re qui red. D u sen beryv. Unite d St ates, 534U. S. 1 61, 1 70 (2 0 02). To th e c o ntrary , we hav eexpressly r e j e cte d“[a] co ns tructi on o f th e Due Pr oc ess Clause whic h wo ul d pl ace i m po ssib l e o ri m pr acti c a lobs t ac l e sin th e way [of the State].” Mulla ne, su p ra, a t3 13– 31 4. Thus , “n one of o u r cas e s . . . has re qui re d a c tu al no ti ce ”; i n s t ea d, “we have al lo wed the Go v ernme n t to defend the ‘reaso nableness and he nce the consti

tu ti o n al v ali di ty of a n y c h os e n m e th od

. . . on th e gr ou nd3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g th a tit is i nits e lf rea s onab l y ce rta i n to info rm tho s e a f

fe cted

. ’ ” Dusenber y, supra, a t16 9–1 70 (quo tin g Mullane , su p ra , a t 31 5). The metho d s of notice employed by Ar kansa s were rea sonably calculated to inform petitioner of procee dings affectin ghi s pro p er tyinteres ta n d t hus sa tisfythe r e quirements of the Due Process Clause. The State mailed a notice by c e rtified let t e r to the a ddress pro v ided by pe t i

tioner. Th e certifie d letter was retu rned to the S t at e mar k ed “un c laimed” aft e r th ree at t e mpts to de liver it. Th e Sta t e thenpublished a notice of public sa le containi ng redemp tion informationin the Ar ka nsas Democ r at Gaze tt e newspa per. After Flow ers submit t e d a pur c ha se offer, the Sta t e sent yet ano t hercer t ified le tter to pe ti tioner athi s recor dad dr ess. That l e tter, too, w a s retu rnedto the S t at e mar k ed “un c laimed” aft e r th ree del iver yat tem p ts. 1 Arkansas’ attempts t o contact petitioner by certified mail at his “recordad dress,” wit h out more, satisfy du e process. Dusenbery, s u pra , at 1 69. See al so Mullane, supra , at 3 18; Tulsa Professional Collection Servi ces, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 (1988) (“We hav e repeatedl y recognized that mail s e rvice is a ninexpensiv e and effi

cient mechanism that is reason ab ly calculated to provide actual notice”); Mennonite Bd. of Missionsv. Adams, 462 U. S. 791, 792, 798 (1983) (holdin gthat “noti c e mailedto [the affected party’s] last knownavailable addres s ” is sufficient where a State seek s to sell “real property o n

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1 Thou gh t h e Courtpos i ts t h a t “ t h ere is no record evidence t h a tno tic e s of attem p ted deliv er y w e r e left at 717 Nor t hBr yanStr e et,” ante , at 12, th e pos tal c a r r i erw a s r e qu ir ed to leav e n o tic e at th e addr ess at eac hdeliv er y atte mpt in dic a tin gth at deliv er yof c e r t ified mail h a d been atte mptedan d th atth e m a il c o u l d be r e t r iev e d at th e l o c a l postoffic e . See Un ited S tate s Post al O p er ation s M a n u a l §813.2 5 (Ju l y2005) , http://www .na l c.org/ depart/c an/pdf/m a nua ls /pom/pomc8 .pdf (a ll Int e r n e t ma ter i als as v i sitedApr

. 21, 20 06, an d av ail able inC l er k of Cou r t ’ s ca s e file) (“ The ca rrier mus tlea v e a not i ce of a rriva l on Form 3 8 4 9 if t h e ca rrierca n n otdeliver t h ecert ifiab l e a r ticle for a n yre a s on” )

.4 JO NES v. FLOWERS T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g which payments of property taxe s have been delinquent” (emphasis added)). Because th e notices were sent to the address provided by petitioner hi mself, the State had an especially s o und basis for de termining that notice would reach him. Moreover , Ark ansas exceeded the constitu

tional min i mum by additionally publishingnotice in a local newspaper. 2 See Mullane , su pra, at 318. Due proc

ess requires nothing more—andcertainly not here, where petitioner had a statutory du ty to pay his taxes and to report any change of address to the state taxing authority. See Ark. Co de Ann. §26–35–705 (1997). My conclusion that Arkansas’ notice methods s a tisfy du e process is reinforced by the well-establishedpresumption that individuals, especially those owning property, act in their own interest. Recognizing that “ ‘[i]t i s the part of common prudence for all those w h o have any interest in [a thing], to guard thatinterest by persons who are in a situation to protect it,’ ” Mullan e , supra , at 3 16 (quoting The M a ry , 9 Cranch1 26, 144 (1815)), this Court has co n cluded that “[t]he wa ys of an owner with tan gible propert y are such th at he usually arranges means to learn of any direct atta c kupon his possessoryor proprietary ri ghts. ” Mullane , 3 39 U. S., a t316. Cons istent with this observa

tion, Ar kan s as was fre e to “indulg e the assumption” th at petitioner had either providedthe State taxi ng authority with a correct and u p -to-date mailing address—as re

quired by s t ate law— “ o r that he

. . . left some caretaker under a duty to let him know that [his property was] being jeopardized.” 3 Ibid.

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2 Th e Cou r tfoun d in adequ ate th e State’s at tempt a tn o tic e bypu bli

c ation , as if t h at w e r e th e Sta t e’s solemet h od for effec t ua t i ng not i ce, see ante , at 16. Bu t th e State pl ain l yu s ed it h e r e as a secon d ary meth od of n o tic e .

3 The is s u e is n o t , a s t h e Courtma inta ins , whet h er t h e c urre ntoccu pan tis “c h a r g ed w i thac tin gas th e ow n e r ’ s ag en t.” Ante , at 12. Rath er , th e i ssu e is w h e th erpetition er disc h a r g ed h i s owndu tyto g u ar d h i s in ter e sts.5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g The Co u rt does no t co nclu de th at ce rtifie d m ail is i nh e r entl y in su ffi c ie n tas a mea n s o f no ti ce , b u t ra the rtha t “t h e government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the nor

mal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on the government’s partto take additional st eps to effect notice.” Ante , at 9. I disagree. First, whet her a method of notice is reasonably calcu

lated to not i fy the inte rested part y is determ ined ex ante, i.e., from the viewpoint of the government agency at the time its not i ce is s e nt. This foll ows from Mul lane , where this Court rested its analysis on the inf o rmation the sender had “at hand” when its n o ti ce was sent
. 339 U. S., at 318. Relatedly, we have refus e d to evalu a te the rea

sonablen ess of a particular method of notice by compari n g it to alternative methods that are identified after the fact

. See Dus e nb ery , 534 U. S., at 171–172. Toda y the Court appears to abandon both of these practices. Its rejection of Arkansas’ selected method of notice—a method this Cour t has repeatedly concluded is co nstitutionally sufficient—is based uponinformation that was unavailable when notice was sent. Indeed, the Court’s p r oposed notice methods— regular mail, posting and addressing mail t o “occupant,” ante , at 12 –14—are entirely the product of post hocco n siderations, including the discovery that members of petitioner’s family con t inued to live in the h o use. Simi

larly, the C o urt’s observation that “[t]he Com m issioner[’s] complain[t] about the burden of .

. . additiona lsteps .
. . i s belied by Arkansas’ current re q u irement that notice to homestead- owners be accomplished by pe rsonal service if certified mail is retur n ed,” ante, at 14–15, i s contrary to Dusenb ery ’s “conclusion thatthe G o vernment ought not b e penalized a n d told to ‘ try harder’ .

. . s i mply because [i t] has since u p graded its policies, ” 5 34 U. S., at 172 (citation omitted). Second, implicit in ourholding that due process does not require “actual notice,” see id. , a t 169–170, i s that whe n6 JO NES v. FLOWERS T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g the “govern m ent becomes aware .

. . that it s attempt at notice has failed,” ante, at 5, it is not requ ired to take additional steps to ensure thatnotice has been received. Petitioner’s challenge to Arkansa s ’ notice methods, and the Court’s acceptance of it, is little more than a thinly veiled attack on Dusen bery. Under the majority’s logic , each time a doubt is raised wi th respect to wh ether notice has reached an interested party, the State will have to consider additional means bett er calculated to achi eve notice. Because this rule turns on speculative, newl y acquired information, it has no na tural end point, and, in effect, requires the States to ach i eve som e thing close to actual notice. The majority’s new rule is contraryto Dusenb ery and a significant departure from Mullane

. The only circumstance s in which this Court has found notice by m a il and pub lication inadequate under the Du e Process Clause involvesituations where the s t ate or loca l government k n ew at the outset that its notice efforts were destined to fail and knew how to r e ctify the p r oblem prior to sending notice. See Robinsonv. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38, 39 (197 2) (per curi am) (intended recipient known to be in jail) ; Coveyv. Town of Somers , 351 U. S. 1 41, 145 (1956) (intended recipient known to be incompetent and witho u t a guardian). In Robinson , the State, having a rrested petitioner and detained him in county jail, immediately ins t ituted forfei

ture procee dings again s t his automobile and mailed noti ce of those proceedings to his resident ial address. 409 U. S., at 38. Robinson, who was incarce rated in th e county jail during the entirety of the forfeiture proceedings, did no t receive notice of the proceedings until afterhe was re leased and the forfeiture order had been entered. Id. , at 38–39. Because the State knew beforehand that Robinson was not at, and had n o access to, the addres s to which it sent the notice, this Court he ld that the State’s efforts were not “reasonably calculated” to notify him of the pe nd

-7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g ing proceedings. Id., a t4 0

. S i m i l a r l y , i n Covey , the Court concluded that the methods of notice used by the town

— mailing, posting, and publishing—were not reasonabl y calculated to inform C o vey of proceedings adverse to he r propertyinterests because local officials knew prior t o sending notice that sh e was “without mental capacity to handle her affairs” and unable to comprehend the mean

ing of the notices. 351 U. S., at 14 4, 146. By contra st , Arkans as did n o t know at the t i me it s e nt n o ti c e to pe t i tio n e rt h a t i t s m e tho dw o ul dfa il ; an dAr kansa s did not know that pet i ti on er no l o ng er lived at t h e record address simply because lett ers w e re r e tur n ed “u n c la im e d .” Pe t. fo r Ce rt. 3. “[U]nclaimed” does not nec e s s ar ilymean th atan addres s is n o long er correct ; i t may indicate that an intendedrec i pient has simp ly failed o rr e f u s e d t o c l a i m m a i l

. S e e U n i t e dS t a t e s P o s t a lS e r vice, D o mestic Mail Manual (DMM), §507, Exh. 1.4. 1, http://pe.usps.gov/text/ dmm300/ 5 07.htm. 4 Given that the State hadbe en us ingthe addr es s prov ided b y pet i ti on e r and that p e tit i on er had a le gal duty to maintain a cur

rent mailing address with the state t a xing author it y, return of t h e mail as “unc la im e d” di d no t arm Arka n s a s with the type of specific kn owl e d g e th at th e govern me n t s h a d a t ha nd i nRo binso n and Covey

. Cf. ant e , at 13

. T h e State ca nn ot b e ch ar ged to corr ect a pr ob l e m of p e t i

tioner’ s ow n creat ion and of whi c h it was not awar e. 5

——————

4 Th e Postal Se r v ic e u s es “M ov ed, Left No Addr ess” to i n dic ate th at the “[A]ddressee moved and filed no change-of-address o r der,” and “No t D e liv er able a s Addr es sed

—Un able to For w a r d” to i n dic ate th at th e mail is “undeliverable at ad dress given; no change-of-address order on file; forwa rdin g orderexpire d.” DMM§5 0 7 , Exh. 1

. 4

. 1

.

5 Th e Cou r t ’s “stor m dr ain” h y poth etic al, ante , at 7–8, pr esen ts th e ha rder q u es t i on of when n o t i ce is s e nt—a tt h e precis e moment t h e Commissionerplaces the ma il in t h e posta lca rrier’s ha nd or t h e s p lit s e cond la t e r w h en heob s e rv es t h e depa rt ing ca rrier d r o p t h e ma il down th e stor m dr a i n . Th at mor e diffic u l t qu e s tionis n o t b efor e u s inth is c a se bec a u s e Ar kan s as le ar n e d lon gafter th e fac tth at it s atte mpt s h a d b een uns uc ces s f ul.8 JO NES v. FLOWERS T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g Even if th e Stat e h a ddivi ned that p e tit i on er was no lo nger at t h e rec o rd a ddres s, it s publ icat i o nof not i c e ina l o ca l ne wspa pe r wo uld h a ve s u ffi c e dbe caus e Mul l ane auth oriz e s the us e of p u bl icat i o n when t h e r e cord addr e ss i s u n k no wn. See 33 9 U. S., a t 316 (“[P]u b l i ca tio n tradi

tio n a lly h a s be en acce ptabl e a s n o ti ficat i on s u ppl em ent a l to oth e r ac tion wh ichinit self may r e as onab ly b e ex pected to convey a war n ing”). II The Court’ s proposed methods, aside from being consti

tutionally unnecessary, are also burdensome, impracti ca l, and no more likely to effect notice than the m e thods actu

ally employed by the State. In Arkansa s , approximately 18,000 parcels of delinquent real estate are certified annually. T s ann Kuen Ente r p r i se s Co. v. Cam p bell , 335 Ark. 110, 119–120, 129 S. W. 3d 822, 828 (2003). Under the Court’s rule, the State will bear the burden of l o cating thousands of d e linquent p r operty own

ers. These administrative burdens are not compelled b y the Due Process Clause. See Mul lane, su pra , at 313–314 ; TulsaProfe ssional Coll ection Servi ces, Inc., 4 85 U. S., a t 489–490 (stating that constitutionally suffi cient notice “need not be inefficientor burdensome”). Here, Arkansas has determined that it s law requiring proper ty owners t o maintain a current add r ess with the state taxing author

ity, in conjunction wit hits authorization to send property notices to t h e record address, is an efficient and fair wa y to administer its taxc o llection system. The Court’s deci

sion today forecloses s u ch a reasonable syst em and bur

dens the S t ate with inefficiencies caused b ydelinquent taxpayers. Moreover, the Court’ s proposed methods are no more reasonably calculated to achieve n o tice than the methods employed by the State here. Regular mail is hardly fool

proof; indeed, it is arguably less effective than certifie d mail. Certified mail is tracked, delivery attempts are9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g recorded, a ctual delivery is logged , and notice s are posted to alert someone at the residence that cert ified mail is being held at a local post o ffice. Bycreati n g a recor d , these features give parties gr oun d s for defending or ch al

lenging notice. By contrast , reg u lar mail is untraceab le; there is no record of either delivery orreceip t. Had the State used regular mail, petitioner would presumably argue that it should have sent notice by certified mail because it creates a paper trail. 6 The Court itself reco gnizes the deficiencies of its pro

posed meth ods. I ta c knowled g es that “[f]ollo wing up wi th regula r ma il might

. . . increase the chan c e s of actu al notice”; “oc c u pants w h o ignore d ce rtifiedmailnotice slip s

. . . mights cra wl the owner ’ s newaddress on the notic e packet, ” an te , a t12; a n d “a letter addresse d to [occupan t] mightbe opened and read,” ante , at 14 (emphasis added). Nevertheles s , the Court justifies i t s redraftin g of Arkans as ’ notice s t at u t e on the gr ound that“ [its] a p p r oa ch[es] woul d increase t h e likelihood that the o w ner wouldbe notified that he wa s about to l o se his property

. . . .” Ibid. T h a t , howeve r, is not t h e tes t ; indeed, we rejec t ed su c hreasonin g in Du senb e ry . See 53 4 U. S., a t 171 (reje cti ng the argu

ment tha t “the F B I’s notice was constitu tio n ally fla w ed

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6 Int e r e s tin gly , th e C o u r t s t o p s sh or t of s a ddl i n g th e St at e w i thth e oth e r s t e p s th atp e ti ti on er ar gu e sa S t at e sh ou ld t ak eany ti me th e i n t e res t ed party failst o clai ml e tt e rsmail e d t o his re cor d a d dr es s , s e e ante , at1 4 , n a me ly se arc h i n g s t at e tax r e c o r d s, th e p h on e - b o o k, th e In t e rn et , departmen t of motor vehic l e records , or v o ting rolls , con t ac tin g his e m p l oyer, or emp l oying d ebt co llec tor s . He re, the Cou rt re ason s th at bec a use of th e con t ext—thefac tth at thele tter w a s re turn ed mer e ly
“unc laimed” and petiti oner h a d a duty to main taina currentaddr ess
—th e Stat e isnotrequ ir ed t ogoasfar aspetitioner urges

. Ib id

. Though th e me th od s pro p ose d by pe ti tioner are seve rely flaw e d (f or in stanc e , th e common ality of hiss urn ame “J on es” c allsin to qu e s ti onth e fru i tf u l n e s s o f In tern e tan d phon e- boo kse arch e s), ther e is no princ ip l e d basis for th e C o u rt’s conclu s i o nth atpetiti on er’sother propos ed methods w o u l d “i m po s[e] bu rd en s on the State sign if ic an tly gr eater th an th e seve ral r e la

tively eas y opti o n so u tli n ed [by th e C o urt] .” Ib i d

.10 JO NES v. FLOWERS T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g because it was ‘subs t antially less likely to brin g ho me notice’ thana feasible substi tu te” ( c ita t ions omitted)). The Court’s suggestion that Arkansas postnotice i s similarly unavailing. The State’s records are organized by legal description, not address, which makes the prospect of physically locating tens of thou sa nds of prop erties every year, and p o sting notice on each, impractical. See Ts a nn Kuen Enter p rise s Co. , supra, a t1 19–120, 129 S. W. 3d, at 828. Also, this Court has previously concluded that post

ing is an i nherently unreliable method of notice. See G re ene v. Li ndsey , 456 U. S. 444, 453–454 (1982). Similarly, addressing t h e mail to “occupant,” s ee ante, at 13, is n o more reasonab ly calcul ated to reach petitioner. It is sheer sp eculation to assume, as the Court does, that although “[o]ccupants . . . might disregard a certified mail slip . . . , a letter addressed to them (even as ‘occupant ’) might be opened and read.” Ante , at 14. It is at least as likely that an occupant who re ceives generically addressed mail will di scard it as junk mail. III If “title to property shouldnot depend on [factual] vaga

ries,” Duse nberry , sup r a, at 171, then certainly it cannot turn on “wrinkle[s],” ante , at 5, caused by a property owner’s own failure to be a prudent ward of his interest s. The meaning of the C o nstitution should not turn on the antics of tax evaders and scofflaw s. Nor is th e self-created conundrum in which petitioner fi nds himself a l e gi ti m a t e grou n dfo r i m po si ng a d di tio nal co n s ti tu tio nal o b li ga ti ons o n th e S t a t e . The State’s attempts to notify petitioner by certified mail at the a ddress that he provided and, addi

tionally, by publishing notice in alocal newspaper satisfy due process. Accordin gly, I would affirm th e judgmentof the Ark ansas Supreme Court.