Turbulent Arena: 

Global Effects Against Non-State 

Adversaries 

Troy S. Thomas 

William D. Casebeer 

INSS Occasional Paper 58 

June 2005 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

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******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: 

Troy S. Thomas is an Air Force officer assigned to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. In addition to leading airmen in homeland defense missions and 

combat operations in the Middle East, Troy served as intelligence 

flight commander for the 1st Fighter Wing, a war planner in South 

Korea, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the US Air Force 

Academy, and a Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence 

Research. A distinguished graduate from the Air Force Academy, he 

holds a MA in Government from the University of Texas, Austin, a MA 

in Organizational Management from George Washington University, 

and a MA in Operational Studies from the USMC School of Advanced 

Warfighting. Troy is a term member with the Council on Foreign 

Relations, a member of the Council for Emerging National Security 

Affairs, and Associate with the Institute for National Security Studies. 

Travel to over 38 countries informs his publications on leadership, 

conflict, intelligence, and Islam. 

William D. Casebeer, Major, USAF, has served as an intelligence 

officer and Middle East political and military analyst, and as an 

Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Air Force 

Academy. He is a graduate of the US Air Force Academy, where he 

majored in political science. He completed an M.A. in Philosophy at 

the University of Arizona and taught in the Philosophy Department at 

USAFA for two years prior to returning to graduate school, where he 

completed a Ph.D. in Cognitive Science and Philosophy at the 

University of California at San Diego. His book Natural Ethical Facts: 

Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition was published by MIT 

Press in 2003. Maj Casebeer is currently attending Intermediate 

Developmental Education at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has 

teamed with Troy Thomas and Stephen Kiser for the forthcoming 

Warlords Rising: Coping with Violent Non-State Actors (Lexington, 

2005). 
iv

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Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

Organic Threats 4 

 VNSA as Open Systems 5 

 Contributing Concepts 10 

Slicing the Environment 14 

Battlespace Effects 21 

 Defining Effects 21 

 Net Effects 25 

 Dimensional Effects 37 

Battlespace Shaping 46 

 Battlespace Manipulation 47 

Parting Shots 55 

Notes 57 
vi
vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this fifty-eighth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). This volume continues a seminal 

series of reports by the research team of Troy Thomas, Bill 

Casebeer, and Steve Kiser. The series (Troy Thomas and Stephen 

Kiser’s Lords of the Silk Route, Occasional Paper #43, May 2002; 

and Troy Thomas and William Casebeer’s Violent Systems,

Occasional Paper #52, March 2004) began by establishing a 

systematic framework for the analysis of the broad category of 

violent non-state actors (VNSA), and by applying that framework 

broadly for deterring and combating such groups. The series was 

supplemented by Armed Groups (Occasional Paper 57, September 

2004) in which Dick Shultz, Doug Farah, and Itamara Lochard 

added differentiation and analysis of four distinct categories of 

VNSA. The current work summarizes much of that earlier work in 

establishing a context specifically for planning and conducting 

effects based counter-VNSA activities. This framework has broad 

applicability to much of the current military activity being 

undertaken by the United States around the world, and it is 

developing into a critical foundational framework for military 

intelligence, planning, and operations. We most highly commend 

this work to all who are interested in understanding the current 

security environment facing the United States, and we strongly 

recommend it as must reading to US military analysts, planners, and 

commanders. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the Strategic Security 

Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XOS), and the 

Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors include the 

Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); the Air Force 

Information Warfare Center (AFIWC); The Army Foreign Military 

Studies Office (FMSO); the Army Environmental Policy Institute 

(AEPI); the United States Northern Command/North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORTHCOM/NORAD); and the 

United States Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center 

(CTC). The mission of the Institute is “to promote national security 

research for the Department of Defense within the military 

academic community, to foster the development of strategic 
viii

perspective within the United States Armed Forces, and to support 

national security discourse through outreach and education.” Its 

research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our 

organizational sponsors: arms control and strategic security, 

counterproliferation and force protection, homeland defense and 

combating terrorism, regional and emerging national security 

issues, air and space issues and planning, and information 

operations and warfare. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It reaches out to and partners 

with education and research organizations across and beyond the 

military academic community to bring broad focus to issues of 

national security interest. And it hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. In these ways, INSS 

facilitates valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our 

sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our 

research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Violent non-state actors (VNSA) pose a pressing challenge to 

human and national security across the geo-political landscape. In 

the midst of a global war against terrorism, collective violent action 

thrives as a strategy of groups ranging from the al Qaida network to 

Maoist rebels of Nepal to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC). The dark dynamics of globalization enable 

VNSAs to prosper in a turbulent international environment marked 

by deepening roots of violence, failures in governance, and 

burgeoning illicit trade in guns, drugs and humans. With few 

exceptions, VNSAs play a prominent, often destabilizing role in 

nearly every humanitarian and political crisis faced by the 

international community. Successfully countering VNSAs across 

the geo-political landscape is complicated by a host of factors, 

including the adaptive character of the threat and the difficulty of 

developing and implementing a coherent strategy that engenders 

measurable victories. 

By applying systems analysis to this intensifying problem, we 

first proffer an actionable and universal analytical framework for 

diagnosing the non-state adversary. Building on previous research 

into the operational environment and VNSA properties, we now 

expose the internal workings of the organization in order to 

understand sources of strength and critical vulnerabilities. This sets 

up a counter-VNSA (C-VNSA) strategy that goes beyond coercion 

to the defeat of the enemy. At its core, our C-VNSA strategy 

defeats a VNSA by: 1) denying the negative entropy, or stores of 

energy, required to survive attack; and 2) disrupting congruence, or 

fit, among sub-systems to achieve system failure. By also 

understanding the indicators of organizational change during its 

developmental life-cycle, preemptory defeat before the VNSA 

reaches maturity becomes feasible. Importantly, our approach 

allows for measuring campaign progress by assessing changes in 

VNSA effectiveness. Thus armed, prospects improve for inter- and 

intra-governmental collaboration, on-target intelligence collection 

and analysis, and successful execution of a multi-facetted, effectsbased strategy. 
x
TURBULENT ARENA: 

GLOBAL EFFECTS AGAINST NON-STATE 

ADVERSARIES 

Hidden down a narrow alley in the old quarter, or Parte Vieja, 

of San Sebastian in the Basque province of Spain is one of 

many small bars. It is crammed with young people wearing tshirts championing Basque nationalism and chain smoking 

under a large poster of Che Guevara. The bar, and probably 

most of its crowd, is loosely associated with the recently 

banned Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) political party, which 

was linked in its 1979 origins with the terrorist organization 

ETA (Basque Homeland (Euskadi) and Freedom). Among 

these youth, several if not many, will spend the early hours 

before daybreak spray painting “ETA” and other nationalist 

slogans across the old city—a ritual being simultaneously 

conducted in the province’s other major urban centers of 

Vitoria and Bilbao. From among these rebellious youth, 

several will one day be approached by ETA recruiters, and if 

selected, their participation in vandalism will cease while their 

indoctrination and training in terrorism will begin. According 

to officials of the Basque Nationalist Party, recruitment is 

becoming more difficult for ETA. Improved economic 

conditions as well as the increased societal rejection of 

violence have reduced the pool of potential recruits, forcing 

ETA to consider less than optimal new members or face 

dwindling numbers. For those that make the cut, as members 

of an organization that has killed 800+ since its founding in 

1959, they may be called on to assassinate Spanish officials or 

place improvised explosive devices on trains—attempts to do 

this on up to four trains headed for Madrid in December 2003 

failed. Given the arrests of key ETA leaders over the decades, 

and most recently in France in 2002 with the arrest of ETA’s 

commandos leader, Jon Ibon Fernandez, the rebellious youth 

of the back alley bar may even rise to the rank of senior 

military leader within a matter of years.1

 

Whether ETA survives or dies depends on its ability to adapt to 

increased environmental turbulence. Among the many dimensions of 

turbulence that violent non-state actors (VNSA) encounter, ETA in 

particular confronts increased international law enforcement 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

2

cooperation, political marginalization due to the socio-economic 

prosperity of the Basque region, and a public backlash against terrorist 

methods due to the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 by religious 

extremists. Just as VNSA like ETA attempt to prosper it a turbulent 

environment, the United States (US) and other stakeholders must 

navigate a messy security landscape to successfully engage, prevent, 

and defeat non-state adversaries. The contest between nation-states and 

VNSA takes place in an environment that is marked by an 

unprecedented degree of complexity and diversity. On one hand, the 

revolution in information technology enables a global recruiting 

campaign by religious extremists, while on the other, persistent socioeconomic deprivation and failures in governance expand the recruiting 

pool. Single-country groups access transnational networks, and groups 

with global reach penetrate the dense physical terrain of mega-cities 

where governments fear to tread. It is in this demanding environment, 

buffeted by the forces of globalization and extremism that we seek to 

deter, coerce, and defeat non-state adversaries. 

Typically, we approach this contest in term of a direct relationship 

between the belligerents, each seeking to directly affect the other 

through policies and violent action. In reality, the interaction is filtered 

and modified by the environment. Moreover, the environment 

generates its own effects. For example, the diffusion of technology 

allows a bin Laden speech to shape terrorist targeting strategy in Iraq, 

reconstruction efforts in an Afghanistan village enables access to fresh 

intelligence on the location of weapons stores, and heavy February 

rains complicate monitoring airborne drug trafficking in the Andean 

region.2

 As these examples suggest, the contest with VNSA occurs 

within a dynamic arena that affords constraints and opportunities that 

are irrespective of organizational behaviors. Gaining an advantage in 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

3

this contest requires an understanding of what the environment allows 

and discovering ways to shape the environment in a manger that 

influence VNSA performance and prosperity. When awareness of 

opportunities for environmental leverage is combined with insight to 

adversary vulnerabilities, the result is an asymmetric knowledge and 

capability advantage. 

The intent of this paper is to generate an understanding of the 

environment in order to shape it to the detriment of our non-state 

adversaries and to our operational advantage. We seek to build on 

strategies that target the adversary organization directly by developing 

a framework and associated methods for affecting adversary 

performance indirectly through environmental manipulation. We begin 

with an examination of VNSA as organic threats. As open systems, 

VNSA and all other organizations are influenced by forces outside their 

social boundary. The open systems methodology is a universal 

framework for a global problem set. As a transportable tool, it allows 

for structured analysis across regions, which is increasingly important 

given the transnational character of VNSA. Moreover, we review 

contributing concepts from previous research to show how VNSA 

interact with the environment through boundary-spanning functions and 

change in form and function over the course of their life cycles. Thus 

armed, we debut a framework for defining the environment in terms of 

a contested battlespace. More directly, we elevate the importance of 

the information and social dimensions as critical arenas for analysis and 

action. Next, we define the core concept of effects, distinguishing 

between direct, indirect, cascading, and cumulative effects. Reversing 

the conventional cause-effect arrow, we introduce methods for 

evaluating the overall character of the battlespace to determine how its 

effect—degrees of uncertainty, webs of influence, resource 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

4

dependencies, and affordances—shape organizational behavior. 

Following this examination of net effects, we outline effects that radiate 

from the physical, information, and social dimensions. Among other 

firsts, we attempt to operationalize cultural intelligence and address 

cognitive effects. Equipped with the framework, concepts, and 

methods for thinking about battlespace effects, we close with several 

general guidelines for improving the environmental shaping component 

of a counter-VNSA strategy. 

ORGANIC THREATS 

VNSA are non-state organizations that use collective violence.3

 

VNSA embrace a broad spectrum of political goals, ranging from 

statehood for ethnic separatists to the establishment of a religious 

political order by extremists. They leverage the dark dynamics of 

globalization to move in the shadows of the nation-state, exploiting 

seams to transit the terrain of the physical, information and social 

dimensions. They embrace asymmetric values and methods to erode 

sovereignty, propagate an ideology, and in many cases, annihilate a 

perceived adversary. VNSA propagate a multi-faceted, global 

enterprise where violence is no longer the only product, and in fact, it 

may not be the most important to group survival. In addition to 

upholding the time-honored tradition of blowing things up, VNSA now 

run clinics and schools, produce and ship drugs, operate charities, and 

host game shows. Knowing our adversary is proving increasingly 

difficult. We are in need of a conceptual model with associated 

methods for understanding and, ultimately, influencing the wide range 

of VNSA that populate the modern security landscape. 

There is growing recognition of the value in treating all 

organizations, including VNSA, as open systems, interacting with a 

dynamic environment. Approaching organizations as open systems is 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

5

not new to the social sciences; however, the application of systems 

thinking to violent groups, including terrorists, insurgents, and 

transnational criminal organizations is. The open systems framework 

that we develop and apply here is guided by modern organization 

theory, which is rooted in an interdisciplinary approach to the 

examination of social groups. As a way of thinking about 

organizations of all types, organization theory has evolved beyond a 

rigid emphasis on scientific management and bureaucratic structures, 

which characterize mechanistic organizations, to an organic view based 

on natural and biological systems.4

 That is, structural theory does not 

reveal the inner workings of the organizations to include the complex 

informal interactions that constitute the “real” group. Our analysis 

must go beyond formal structural theory to appreciate these 

complexities as an aspect of the dynamic, even organic character of all 

social organizations. 

VNSA as Open Systems 

Open systems theory serves as the diagnostic framework for our 

inter-disciplinary analysis of VNSA. As applied in modern 

organization theory, diagnosis is the process of employing conceptual 

models and methods to assess a target organization’s condition in order 

to solve problems and increase performance.5

 We diagnose VNSA for 

a different, but related purpose: to assess the capabilities of threatening 

organizations in order to decrease and deny their performance. Our 

diagnosis is framed by open systems theory; meaning it is directed by 

an open systems-informed theoretical framework, which is less 

deterministic than a theory, but still allows for analysis of key concepts 

and the relationships among them.6

The open systems framework springs from the general systems 

theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1940s, but it did not catch hold 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

6

in the social sciences until the 1960s and 1970s. Championed by 

Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn in their seminal work, The Social 

Psychology of Organizations, and many others, open systems theory 

emerged as modern organization theory by the 1980s, replacing the 

more limiting structural approach. Among its many early benefits, the 

“adoption of a systems frame helped researchers in the social sciences 

to discover commonalities with fields such as biology and engineering, 

and it provided a basis for an interdisciplinary approach to 

organizations.”7

 After over sixty years of applied and basic research, 

open systems theory has emerged as the principal approach to 

understanding organizations. 

At its most basic, open systems theory views all organizations as 

systems, interacting with their environment in a dynamic manner. In 

the words of its godfather von Bertalanffy, it conceptualizes a system 

as an “organized cohesive complex of elements standing in 

interaction.”8

 The interaction refers to two generalized patterns of 

behavior that must keep our attention throughout: (1) the relationship 

between the VNSA system and its environment; and (2) the 

relationships among the “complex elements,” or parts of the 

organization (known as subsystems). The latter constitute the 

transformational processes of the VNSA, while the former draws 

attention to the reality that organizations are open systems, continually 

exchanging information and energy with the environment. 

Too often organizations are analyzed in isolation from their 

environment with excess emphasis on internal structures, including 

organization charts, leadership, rules, formal communications and 

process efficiency to name a few. While a useful aspect of 

organizational diagnosis, this closed system approach neglects the 

simple reality that an organization “must interact with the environment 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

7

to survive; it both consumes resources and exports resources to the 

environment.”9

 As put by Katz and Kahn, “living systems, whether 

biological organisms or social organizations, are acutely dependent 

upon their external environment.”10 The VNSA emerges as a response 

to environmental pressures, and it is in turn affected by contextual 

constraints and opportunities—the arena of cause-effect interaction is 

the focus of this paper. Thus, our approach lends itself more to an 

inter-disciplinary application based on ecology, engineering, and social 

science than it does to the Newtonian physics of closed systems. 

It is an understatement to say that open systems are highly 

complex. As put by noted organizational theorist and practitioner, 

Richard Daft, “the organization has to find and obtain needed 

resources, interpret and act on environmental changes, dispose of 

outputs, and control and coordinate internal activities in the face of 

environmental disturbances and uncertainty.”11 To simplify, which is 

essential to ensuring our diagnostic framework is applicable on the 

street, all organizational systems share the following basic components: 

(1) importation of energy and resources; 2) through-put (transformation 

of this energy and these resources); 3) export of product to the 

environment; and 4) dynamic pattern of activities. Organizational 

inputs are many, but generally include the raw materials, money, 

people, equipment, and information.12 Outputs can be objective and 

subjective, but generally include products, services, ideas, and in the 

case of VNSA, collective violence. The transformations—the ways it 

converts inputs into outputs—are often the most difficult to diagnose, 

particularly given the elusive character of VNSA. Finally, all 

relationships inside and outside the system are dynamic; they involve 

feedback based on interactions with the environment. As put by Katz 

and Kahn, “Inputs are also informative in character and furnish signals 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

8

I

N

P

U

T

S

O

U

T

P

U

T

S

SUPPORT

MAINTENANCE

COGNITIVE

VNSA

CONVERSION

to the structure about the environment and about its own functioning in 

relation to the environment.”13

An initial look inside the organization reveals a dizzying array of 

activities and behaviors whose overall contribution to system 

performance seem beyond determination. Systems theory comes to the 

rescue by structuring these activities for us. Patterns of activity in all 

organizations are both formal and informal, and they reflect the most 

basic level of analysis. By examining how people interact with 

information and tools to accomplish tasks we can discern functions. 

Functions are patterns of activity with a purpose that contribute to the 

whole. For example, the function of a flashlight is to shine light. Even 

when the specific patterns of activity remain obscured, we can have 

confidence that most VNSA will perform functions that fall into one of 

Figure 1: VNSA System 

several general categories known as subsystems. Subsystems “perform 

the specific functions required for organizational survival, such as 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

9

production, boundary spanning, maintenance, adaptation, and 

management.”14 

To summarize, the open systems framework asks us to analyze all 

organizations, including VNSA, on three levels: environment, 

organization (system), and internal elements (subsystems). Figure 1 

depicts these three levels by showing a system, consisting of 

subsystems, embedded in an environment with which it exchanges 

energy and information. In addition to stressing the importance of 

conducting analysis on relationships within and across levels, we are 

also left with these key ideas: 

(1) An organization’s effectiveness and success depends 

heavily on its ability to adapt to its environment, shape the 

environment, or find a favorable environment in which to 

operate; 

(2) Organizations will use their products, services and ideas as 

inputs to organizational maintenance and growth; 

(3) An organization’s effectiveness depends substantially on its 

ability to meet internal system need—including tying people to 

their roles in the organization, conducting transformative 

processes and managing operations—as well as on adaptation 

to the environment; and 

(4) Developments in and outside of organization create 

pressures for change as well as forces for inertia and stability.15

With these key attributes in mind, we are left with a view of 

organizations as organic systems. That is, organizations bear more than 

metaphoric similarity to organisms. They grow, adapt, spawn, and in 

some cases, die. An ecological view of VNSA is consistent with open 

systems theory and informs our analysis and strategy throughout. The 

ecological view forces us to look at how the environment shapes the 

organization, which in turn, suggests strategies for affecting the 

environment in a profitable manner. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

10

Contributing Concepts 

This paper’s effort to develop an understanding of the 

environment-organization interface and derive practicable strategies is 

buttressed by previous research. Given the importance of this research 

to the current project, the following paragraphs offer a summary of key 

contributing concepts that were examined in Troy S. Thomas and 

Stephen D. Kiser, Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in 

Central Asia, and Troy S. Thomas and William D. Casebeer, Violent 

Systems: Defeating Terrorists, Insurgents, and Other Non-State 

Adversaries. Respectively, these works looked at the environmental 

conditions that foster VNSA and the functioning of VNSA in that 

environment. They also laid out the basic elements of a counter-VNSA 

strategy extended in this paper with a focus on environmental 

shaping—we seek to change the ecosystem of collective violence. 

Environmental conditions, or roots of violence, ripen communities 

for mobilization into non-state groups. While there are many dynamic 

forces impacting the environment, the roots of violence proffered by us 

have explanatory power regarding the formation of an at-risk 

population, ripe for mobilization along existing identity lines, known as 

cleavages. From among the varied sources of human insecurity, our 

analysis sets forth five conditions for violence: resource scarcity, 

demographic pressures, socio-economic deprivation, organized crime 

and corruption, and pre-existing identity cleavages. Each places 

significant stress on the individual, civil society, and the state. The 

roots of violence are highly interrelated and a greater stress in each has 

a synergistic effect on whole. In regions where the synergistic effect is 

most acute, the environment is more likely to spawn VNSA. Grave 

stresses across the board are a reasonable indicator of impending group 

formation. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

11

The roots of violence create optimal conditions for VNSA 

incubation; however, they are rarely sufficient to convert individual 

deprivation or communal dissatisfaction into organized violence. The 

engines of change that translate passivity into action are failures in 

governance, identity mobilization, and reinforcing behaviors. Current 

research focuses heavily on state failure as the primary catalyst. We 

agree that a weakened state is a key intervening variable; however, we 

amend the traditional view of state failure in terms of weakened 

capacity to include a broader conception of failures in governance to 

include illegitimacy due to ideological incompatibility, impotence in 

the ability to provide basic goods and services, and excessive coercion 

of the population. An often overlooked, but equally important 

transformation process is identity mobilization, where members of the 

disaffected community begin to associate with other identity cleavages. 

The psychological process of identity formation is directly relevant to 

forming or joining a VNSA. A key agent in this conversion is the 

identity entrepreneur, or charismatic leader that leverages the 

conditions of violence and failures in governance to manipulate identity 

cleavages. The process is not linear since VNSA will also take 

reinforcing actions to perpetuate the cycle of violence. Like 

organisms, they seek out, adapt to or expand the ecological niche in 

which they can prosper; it is a type of niche construction that deepens 

the roots of violence. 

Turning from environmental analysis to a diagnosis of the 

organization itself, we must look at VNSA as a whole with properties 

that are separate from the sum of its parts as well as the internal 

workings of a core set of functions. At the organizational-level, the 

most important concepts are life cycle, negative entropy, and 

congruence. First, organizations do not magically appear on the scene. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

12

Rather, they pass through a series of life cycle phases during which they 

change in form and function. When the conditions of violence meet a 

weak state and identity mobilization, incubation occurs and a VNSA 

enters the gestation phase. As the organization takes initial form, the 

VNSA will grow, adapting to its environment and becoming 

increasingly complex and differentiated. If allowed to prosper 

uncontested, or if highly adaptive even in a turbulent environment, the 

VNSA may reach maturity in which growth might plateau, but 

increased efficiencies and the birthing of VNSA progeny may occur. 

The life cycle is not necessarily linear, since even mature organizations 

continue to experience growth in some areas, and in the first of two 

significant divergences from the biological metaphor, organizations can 

reverse course. Maybe as a result of conscious strategy, but more 

likely due to environmental constraints, organizations can revert back 

to a growth phase or even gestation. 

In a major divergence from the biological metaphor, the VNSA can 

flirt with death. Organizations can live forever. Of course, their ability 

to do so is contingent on many factors, not the least of which is its 

ability to avert the natural entropic process. The tendency toward 

disorder and decline – information is lost, people fail to uphold role 

behaviors, conditions worsen – is forestalled by building negative 

entropy. Negative entropy is the “stock of energy,” the “store of fuel,” 

and the “winter fat” on which the VNSA draws during periods of crisis. 

It is common and often appropriate to think of cash reserves, abundant 

recruits and back-up sanctuaries as the forms of negative entropy relied 

upon by the VNSA. Through systems analysis, however, other more 

potent and less appreciated forms emerge, including culture, 

socialization, social services, intelligence gathering, and command and 

control structures. Whatever it is, a counter-VNSA strategy must 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

13

deplete the stores of negative entropy in order to keep the VNSA from 

reemerging down the rode. 

The third key system property, congruence, deals with the “fit” or 

“alignment” among subsystems. A VNSA is most likely to prosper 

when it achieves reinforcing working relationships among its parts, and 

importantly, between the organization and its environment—a fit our 

strategy seeks to disrupt through increased turbulence. Good fit works 

against entropy, optimizes performance, and propels the VNSA along 

its life cycle path. Congruence analysis requires us to determine the 

factors that contribute most to harmonizing the functions of the four 

primary subsystems of all VNSA—support, maintenance, cognitive, 

and conversion. The support subsystem manages boundary relations, 

acquiring resources from the environment, recruiting members and 

attending to stakeholder associations. The maintenance subsystem 

works on the people in the organization by socializing them to a set of 

values (culture)—often derived from the environment—and enforcing 

role behaviors through a schedule of rewards and sanctions. The 

cognitive subsystem is responsible for decisionmaking through 

learning, strategy development and exercising control over the 

organization. The conversion subsystem works on the energy brought 

into the organization, training recruits, producing goods and services, 

and conducting operations, which do not always involve collective 

violence. Each subsystem and associated functions contribute to the 

VNSA as a whole and take leading roles during different phases in its 

life cycle. 

In seeking to counter VNSA, either to prevent their emergence or 

impact performance, four critical concepts emerge. First is the idea of 

ecological deterrence; if we accept expanded notions of both what 

constitutes deterrence, and what aspects of human psychology are 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

14

pertinent to it, then we discover it is possible to deter VNSA 

throughout their life cycles. Second, we revisit the overarching 

counter-VNSA concepts of congruence and negative entropy—by 

focusing on disrupting the "fit" between all the parts of the system that 

constitute VNSA, we can cause organizational breakdown; in addition, 

attacking the "stores of fat" that VNSA accumulate will allow knockout blows with immediate organizational impact. Third is the notion of 

revised principles of war for combating open systems; while we should 

not abandon ideas such as "surprise" and "economy of force," there are 

other general principles that will aid us in our efforts to war-fight with 

VNSA. Finally, for assessing the results of our counter-VNSA efforts, 

we offer the idea of measures of performance for attacking systems: 

we can measure how our efforts are affecting input-related issues 

(resource utilization), conversion-related issues (process efficiency), 

and-output related issues (goal attainment). 

SLICING THE ENVIRONMENT 

The environment consists of everything outside the boundary of the 

organization, but not everything “out there” is relevant to a counterVNSA strategy and the operations that flow from it. Therefore, 

analysis and action in reference to a specific VNSA occurs within the 

context of a battlespace. The concept of battlespace narrows the field 

by focusing on “the environment, factors, and conditions that must be 

understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or 

complete the mission.”16 Thus, the battlespace is what is important 

about everything; determining “what is important” is the hard part. It is 

a conceptual cut at what needs to be weighed when analyzing and 

selecting plans. It is a dynamic view, changing in relation to 

operational requirements, adversary actions, force availability, and 

other factors. It contracts and expands “in relation to the commander’s 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

15

ability to acquire and engage the enemy.”17 Given the complexity of 

countering VNSA, particularly in terms of diverse missions and threat 

adaptability, shifts in battlespace contours are regular occurrences, if 

not a continuous quality. This dynamism demands a rejection of the 

linear thinking associated with the outmoded “battlefield.” Think of 

the battlespace as the non-linear offspring of the battlefield, taking in 

areas of the operating environment beyond the physical surface of the 

planet to include air, space, cyber, and more recently, social 

dimensions. 

The concept of dimension is used to slice up the battlespace into 

manageable chunks. Where terrain and weather features once 

dominated, today’s multi-faceted missions against non-state groups 

demand consideration of surface, air, space, information, and social 

dimensions. Military doctrine carves these up differently; however, the 

core dimensions of physical, information and social come across 

throughout. The physical dimension includes the geography of terrain, 

air, space, and weather. The information dimension consists of 

information, information systems, and information functions; it is “any 

medium adversary or friendly elements could use to transfer, defend or 

attack information.”18 The social dimension is the most diverse and 

difficult to assess, and yet it is the most critical to countering VNSA. 

Joint and Air Force doctrine refer to it as the human dimension, but 

since we are really talking about characteristics of groups of people and 

relationships among people, the term “social” is more apt. Regardless 

of the label, this dimension includes “militarily significant sociological, 

cultural, demographic and psychological characteristics of the friendly 

and adversary populace and leadership.”19 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

16

Figure 2: Dimensional Sectors

The three dimensions provide orientation and balance, but they fall 

short of the fidelity required to ensure we observe and orient on all the 

relevant features. For greater precision and to help get organized, we 

add the idea of “sectors” nested within dimensions.20 Think of 

dimensions as a strategic-level construct and sectors as the operational 

equivalent. Dimensions frame our work. Sectors fill out the frame by 

grouping and relating characteristics in sub-categories that we 

aggregate later to provide a more holistic picture. The reductionist 

process of breaking down the battlespace is ultimately complemented 

Culture

Economics 

Politics 

Geography

Weather

Artifacts

Information 

Technology 

Cognition

PHYSICAL

INFO SOCIAL
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

17

by an inductive process of linking tactical “facts” to strategic 

“theories.” 

Devising sectors and their labels is more art than science. 

Therefore, the sectors identified in Figure 2 are a guide: rules-ofthumb. That said, these sectors do capture the dozens of characteristics 

highlighted throughout force protection, asymmetric conflict, 

information operations, MOOTW, and other appendices found in joint 

and service doctrine. Moreover, they reflect an appreciation for the 

complexity of the problem, including the diversity of missions, VNSA, 

and environmental dynamics. The intent is not to present the universe 

of relevant characteristics, but to ensure we are not neglecting any 

important galaxies. Time allowing, each characteristic is further 

broken down into four core elements: agents, space, information, and 

resources. For example, the transshipment of an illegal commodity 

such as heroin involves specific people, occupying and moving through 

physical space, transferring information and resources. 

The physical dimension is well-developed and includes geography, 

weather, and artifacts. Geography encompasses the land, maritime, air, 

and space domains as well as hazards and diseases originating in the 

natural world. The land domain “concentrates on terrain features such 

as surface materials, ground water, natural obstacles such as bodies of 

water and mountains, the types and distribution of vegetation, and the 

configuration of surface drainage” to name a few.21 The maritime 

domain is the sea and littoral environment, while the air domain 

reaches from the surface to the atmosphere’s edge where space takes 

over. Rarely will VNSA have a space presence; however, it is 

increasingly common for adversaries to rely on commercial imagery 

and the telecommunications systems resident in space. Weather refers 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

18

to conditions in the atmosphere. Finally, artifacts are man-made 

features: buildings, roads, bridges, harbors, tunnels, airfields. 

The information dimension is less developed than the physical, but 

has nonetheless received considerable attention as cyberspace, cyber 

security, cyber attack, information operations, computer network 

attack, information assurance and other “informational” concepts have 

come to the fore in the national security dialogue. Air Force doctrine 

breaks the informational domain into the information itself, the 

technology used to collect, exploit, assess, and disseminate it, and the 

cognitive style of individuals and groups.22 “Information” serves as a 

generic label for a hierarchy of knowledge, beginning with 

measurements and observations known as data.23 When data are placed 

in context, indexed, and organized, they become information, and 

information turns into knowledge when it is understood and explained. 

The effective application of knowledge is wisdom.24 Technology 

includes the tools used to collect, exploit, and create information and 

knowledge. IT ranges from computer chips to satellite dishes to 

cellular phones. In the words of “informational” expert Bruce 

Berkowitz, “information technology has become so important in 

defining military power that it overwhelms almost everything else.”25 

The “brain” sector refers to the ability to observe (collect intelligence), 

orient (develop situational awareness and fix on salient features), and 

decide.26 

The social dimension consists of at least three primary sectors, 

each placing collection, analysis, and operational demands. The 

political sector focuses on the distribution of power in the system and 

the rules that govern political interaction. Relevant characteristics 

might include the role of inter-governmental organizations (IGO), 

international laws and treaties, criminal court jurisdiction, rules of 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

19

engagement, and failures in governance due to incapacity, illegitimacy 

or excessive coercion.27 The form of government, the extent of civil 

society, and on-going conflict resolution measures are just a few 

additional considerations. The economic sector will include the 

availability of goods and services, market tendencies, rules governing 

trade, illegal commodities (drugs, guns, humans), unemployment, bank 

accounts, money laundering schemes, exchange rates, and many more 

factors related to the trade in goods and services. 

The culture sector is the least understood and yet the most 

important as we deal with today’s non-state adversaries. Cultural 

intelligence is gaining prominence, and intelligence professionals are 

increasingly called on to understand the sociology and psychology of 

their opponent. Attempts at “actionable” cultural intelligence often fall 

short, resulting in interesting histories, customs and folklore. Cultural 

intelligence deserves more attention and increased study.28 As 

operationalized here, cultural intelligence looks at the norms and values 

that shape individuals, groups, and communities. Breaking it down, 

“norms make explicit the forms of behavior appropriate for members” 

of the group being evaluated.29 To determine if a norm is a property of 

the group or community in question, the following criteria must be met: 

1) there is evidence of beliefs by individual members that certain 

behaviors are expected; 2) a majority of group members share the 

belief; and 3) there is general awareness that the norm is supported by 

most of the group’s members, not just the leadership.30

Collectively, values constitute the group’s ideology and provide a 

more “elaborate and generalized justification both for appropriate 

behavior and for the activities and functions of the system.”31 Values 

become norms when they are operationalized by the group members in 

terms of specific behaviors. Two value systems tend to dominate: 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

20

transcendental and transactional.32 Religious extremist, single issue, 

and ethnic separatist groups embrace a transcendental value system, 

which places emphasis on morality, sacred duty, the supernatural, and 

symbolism. Transcendental values are difficult to inculcate, but are 

more effective in sustaining loyalty. Transnational criminal 

organizations (TCO) and warlords with private militias epitomize the 

transactional or pragmatic value system with their emphasis on 

amassing wealth or power. The transactional value system can be 

rapidly developed, but it is also more susceptible to disruption and 

defection in the face of a superior threat or more lucrative alternatives 

for members. The most effective groups foster a dual value system, 

manipulating symbols and delivering tangible value. Dual-value 

systems have the added advantage of offering reinforcing sources of 

adaptability; faith can often be sustained even when cash runs short. 

Culture emerges from the evolution and propagation of norms and 

values. Diagnosing culture is exceedingly difficult, but when 

successful, cultural insight provides answers to practical issues, 

including: who matters, where are boundaries, why and how does work 

get accomplished, what are problems, and what is most important to the 

community or terrorist group.33 Cultural strength, or the extent to which 

members share the norms and values, is the community’s glue. It is a 

strong and often overlooked source of cohesion and survivability in 

social organizations—it is negative entropy. A terrorist group with a 

strong culture, such as the IRA or Hezbollah, is more likely to enjoy 

greater member commitment. An organization with an inflexible or 

weak culture will have greater difficulty dealing with environmental 

turbulence. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

21

BATTLESPACE EFFECTS 

The effects emanating from the battlespace are dynamic, and they 

will routinely shift as VNSA seek new advantages to counter our latest 

strategy or due to changes in battlespace conditions. For example, AlQaida relied on the global financial network to rapidly move money 

through wire transfers, credit transactions, and multiple bank accounts; 

however, increased international cooperation to disrupt terrorism 

financing forced a shift in strategy emphasis by al-Qaida financiers to 

an informal banking system known as hawala.

34 The relationships 

between changes in the battlespace and organizational behavior are 

hard to discern and even more difficult to predict. Even when the result 

of a specific policy or action can be readily observed, delayed and 

unexpected outcomes are rarely anticipated in full. Nonetheless, it is 

incumbent upon policy-makers and implementers to at least attempt to 

understand and forecast the range of effects that might spring from 

action or inaction. When trying to develop a counter-VNSA strategy, 

the more specific task is to appreciate how changes in the battlespace 

relate to changes in the organization. To that end, we begin by defining 

effects and then turn attention to the different methods to assessing the 

most relevant battlespace effects across the dimensions. 

Defining Effects 

An effect is “the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, 

event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military 

actions.”35 This line of thinking is the basis for effects-based 

operations (EBO), which is the 

process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or “effect” on 

the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and 

cumulative application of the full range of military and 

nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels.36 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

22

These definitions make sense when we think from the organization 

out. But this is only half the equation—we must reverse the causeeffect directional arrow. In addition to thinking about how we impact 

the battlespace, we are must figure out how the battlespace affects us, 

our adversary, and other players. That is, countering VNSA is not 

simply about one organization (joint military force) acting against 

another (terrorist group). Rather, these actions are distorted by the 

medium of the environment, and the environment can impact all 

organizations party to the contest in a manner that is independent of the 

original action. In reality, the relationship between the organization 

and the environment is open, dynamic, and hard to discern. From a 

systems perspective, the organization is continually exchanging energy 

and information with the environment; organizational behaviors are 

shaped by environmental conditions, and the environment is in turn 

shaped by the organization. The trick is to think in both directions all 

the time. 

Thinking in terms of effects begins with a seemingly simple 

question: Does the action or environmental feature have an impact or 

not? Will persistent sandstorms restrict operating windows, or will 

local opinion allow intelligence gathering? Yes or no? Such simplicity 

is an important start, but it is of limited utility to understanding how the 

feature will impact the VNSA, whether the effect represents a 

constraint or opportunity, and how all the effects interact to create 

comparative advantage or disadvantage relative to the adversary. To 

get beyond binary answers to a laundry list of factors, we begin by 

distinguishing between direct and indirect effects. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

23

Figure 3. Direct and Indirect Effects 

Source: USAF Doctrine Center briefing, “Strategic and Indirect 

Effects: Defining and Modeling,” reprinted in T.W. Beagle, 

“Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise,” (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: Air University Press, December 2001), 6. 

Direct effects have an immediate, usually recognizable impact in 

time and space with no intervening effect or mechanism between act 

and outcome.37 Conversely, indirect effects tend to be delayed in time 

and space, resulting from an intermediate effect or mechanism to 

produce the final outcome; they are much more difficult to recognize 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

24

(Figure 3).38 Indirect effects are less important for tactical level action, 

but become increasingly important as we move through the operational 

level of military action to the strategic level of policy. As an example 

of a direct effect that cannot be discarded during military planning, 

consider the relationship between a group targeted by a psychological 

operations message and the behavior of an influential religious leader 

in the region. In the sectarian cauldron of violence that is Kaduna, 

Nigeria, for example, it would be foolish to ignore the relevance of 

Islamist firebrand, Ibraheem Zakzaky. Located farther north in Zaria, 

Zakzaky recently delcared, “If we want a million people out on the 

streets on any issue we can do that."39 

Effects are a two-way street, impacting friendly forces and the 

adversary. For example, a direct effect against a terrorist group, such 

as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern 

Philippines, might be the disruption of training as a result an attack on 

their jungle camp. The indirect effect of disrupting training is likely to 

be a decrease in attacks down the road, or even a longer training 

program with smaller throughput due to increased concealment 

requirements. According to a MILF field commander, codenamed 

“Congressman,” the destruction of their main camp, Abu Bakr, in 2000 

by the Philippine Army has forced them to break up in to smaller, more 

mobile guerilla units and confine leaders to secret locations, combining 

to make training more difficult.40 

Thus, the first and most basic step in effects-based thinking is to 

distinguish between direct and indirect effects. At a minimum, policy 

and operations must anticipate direct effects and make an initial cut at 

potential indirect effects to avoid being blinded by beyond-the-horizon 

forces. In the sections to follow, we take on the challenges associated 

with understanding, generating, and forecasting indirect effects through 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

25

an examination of net and dimensional effects. We do this wide-eyed 

with the understanding that forecasting effects is difficult, but that we 

can at least develop a framework and identify general types of effects 

with global relevance as a starting point. 

Net Effects 

The inverse of the inductive approach sketched above is a 

deductive method based on a more generalized portrayal of the 

battlespace. Rather than looking from the organization out, we think 

from the battlespace in—can we describe the overall battlespace in a 

way that lends insight to probable impacts on all participants? How 

players respond to these overall dynamics determines who derives the 

most advantage. Political and organizational theory offers some useful 

concepts toward achieving this goal, and here they are applied to assess 

net, or overall effects related to uncertainty, nesting, stakeholders, 

dependencies, and affordances. Net effects help us get a general fix on 

how messy the situation is, who the major players are, and what 

constraints and opportunities are present.

Uncertainty 

The battlespace is turbulent, creating uncertainty for all players.41 

Uncertainty, commonly attributed to the battlespace, is actually 

experienced by decisionmakers. It is akin to the Clausewitzian “fog of 

war.” The denser the fog, the greater the risk to all participants and the 

more likely performance will decline. Uncertainty is a more useful 

concept than its seeming ambiguity suggests. It has specific 

components, complexity and change, that are evaluated to characterize 

the battlespace and suggest implications for the organizations in it. 

Moreover, knowledge of the contributors to battlespace uncertainty can 

lead to strategies for increasing turbulence that hurts VNSA. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

26

The degree of uncertainty is influenced by a simple-complex axis, 

which “refers to the heterogeneity, or the number and dissimilarity of 

external elements relevant to an organization’s properties.”42 More 

directly, how cluttered is the battlespace with things of concern to our 

plans? As the numbers of relevant features and other organizations 

(friendly, neutral, or adversarial) in the battlespace increase, so does the 

complexity. For example, the battlespace in Afghanistan during 

Operation Enduring Freedom gained complexity as relief NGOs; 

outside terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan (IMU); and additional coalition forces poured in. 

Moreover, changes in weather, the influence of the heroin trade, 

refugee flows, and attacks on cultural objects like the Buddhist statutes 

at Bamiyan, and a host of other variables added to the complexity even 

before the operation began. 

Uncertainty is also influenced by a stable-unstable axis, which 

refers to whether elements in the battlespace are dynamic.43 Are things 

changing? In a stable battlespace, the mission-relevant features 

experience little change over time. At the other extreme, the unstable 

battlespace is characterized by abruptly changing and shifting features. 

Instability in Afghanistan was increased by rapidly shifting alliance 

between tribes, a prison revolt in Mazar-i-sharif, unexpected levels of 

resistance in the Tora Bora region, and other dynamic features. Figure 

4 pulls these two axes together in a way that allows us to quickly sizeup the degree of uncertainty faced. The battlespace gains uncertainty 

as timelines, vulnerabilities, hostile interference, stakeholders, and 

other factors increase. The role of US intelligence is to reduce our 

uncertainty relative to the terrorist, while counter-VNSA actions seek 

to increase adversary uncertainty to undercut performance. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

27

The degree of uncertainty in the battlespace has general effects on 

decisionmaking, organization, and planning. Change and complexity 

impact decisionmakers by altering their intelligence demands. Meeting 

shifting requirements consumes resources and energy, and the resulting 

availability of needed intelligence can enable or hinder decisionmaking. 

A complex-stable battlespace, for example, can result in information 

overload. A complex-unstable battlespace generates an “overwhelming 

amount of information, but [decisionmakers] will not know which 

Figure 4. Uncertainty Framework I 

Source: Adapted from Robert B. Duncan, “Characteristics of 

Perceived Environments and Perceived Environmental 

Uncertainty,” Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972), 313-327. 

Simple + Unstable = 

High-Moderate Uncertainty 

Small number of external 

elements, and elements are 

similar 

Elements change frequently and 

unpredictably 

Simple + Stable = 

Low Uncertainty

Small number of external 

elements, and elements are 

similar 

Elements remain the same or 

change slowly 

Complex + Stable = 

Low-Moderate Uncertainty

Large number of external 

elements, and elements are 

dissimilar 

Elements remain the same or 

change slowly 

Complex + Unstable = 

High Uncertainty 

Large number of external 

elements, and elements are 

dissimilar 

Elements change frequently 

and unpredictably 

S 

T 

A

B 

L 

E 

U 

N 

S 

T 

A 

B 

L 

E 

SIMPLE COMPLEX 

B

A

T

T

L

E

S 

P

A

C

E 

C

H

A

N

G

E 

BATTLESPACE COMPLEXITY 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

28

information to attend to due to constantly changing circumstances.”44 

To get a clearer picture of whether uncertainty breeds indecision or 

poor judgment among blue, red or other decisionmakers, this net 

assessment should be integrated with the psychological profiling of 

specific decisionmakers if possible. Some commanders and terrorist 

group leaders are capable of good judgment under uncertainty, but 

many are not. 

Uncertainty also drives organizational structure. Drawing again on 

systems thinking, the law of requisite variety states that 

for one system to deal with another it must be of the same or 

greater complexity. In organizational terms this means that 

organizations map perceived environmental complexity with 

their internal structures and management systems. There is a 

theoretical limit to this, of course, since if the organization 

ever realized the full complexity of its environment, it would 

be that environment.45

This means the battlespace will influence the command and control 

structure and function of us and our adversaries. A failure to fit 

(congruence) one’s organization to the battlespace can result in a lack 

of adaptability, missed intelligence, and ultimately, decreased 

performance. What structures result? A stable-simple battlespace 

fosters a mechanistic organization, marked by formalized rules and 

procedures, clear hierarchy of authority, rigidly defined tasks, 

centralized planning and decisionmaking, and vertical 

communication.46 It is the epitome of the modern bureaucracy. The 

mechanistic organization improves efficiency, but it also reduces the 

ability to adapt and pursue alternative strategies. Mechanistic 

organizations are generally rigid and rational, which makes them 

vulnerable. Where uncertainty reigns, organic organizations prove 

more successful—communication is horizontal, knowledge is diffused, 

control is lessened, hierarchies are flattened, tasks shift to reflect new 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

29

demands, and decisionmaking is decentralized.47 Organic 

organizations are a better fit for VNSA, often resulting in an 

asymmetric command and control advantage until nation states and 

military forces adapt. 

Uncertainty also impacts planning. Planning and forecasting is 

increasingly important as instability and complexity go up. In a placid 

battlespace, organizations are free to focus on current problems and 

operations—the day-to-day efficiency of recruiting or training. 

Turbulence, on the other hand, creates the need for more detailed 

Simple + Unstable = 

High-Moderate 

Uncertainty 

Constant need for new 

information 

Organic structure 

Moderate planning 

Fast response 

Simple + Stable = 

Low Uncertainty 

Needed information is known 

and available 

Mechanistic structure 

Current operations 

Low-speed response 

Complex + Stable = 

Low-Moderate 

Uncertainty 

Information overload 

Mechanistic structure 

Limited planning 

Moderate-speed response 

Complex + Unstable = 

High Uncertainty 

Not known what information 

is needed 

Organic structure 

Extensive planning 

High-speed response 

S 

T 

A 

B 

L 

E 

U

N

S 

T

A

B

L

E

SIMPLE COMPLEX 

B

A

T

T

L

E 

S 

P

A 

C

E 

C

H

A

N

G

E 

BATTLESPACE COMPLEXITY

Figure 5. Uncertainty Framework II 

Source: Adapted from Richard Daft, 152, and Mary Jo Hatch, 91. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

30

planning, more options, improved forecasting of adversary courses of 

action, and the ability to respond quickly. Response speed refers to the 

ability to execute a plan without delay when the battlespace affords 

optimal advantages. The effects of uncertainty on information 

requirements, organizational structure, and planning are summarized as 

rules-of-thumb in Figure 5. In terms of a counter-VNSA strategy, we 

should shape the VNSA’s battlespace toward high uncertainty while 

simultaneously acting to undermine the mechanisms it uses to adapt. 

Nesting 

Effects are often thought of in horizontal terms, flowing across 

organizations—inputting inferior weapons results in decreased combat 

effectiveness later. Effects also flow vertically across level of analysis 

and action. The three levels are the strategic, operational, and tactical. 

The operational level “determines WHAT we will attack, in WHAT 

order, and for WHAT duration.”48 The operational level links tactical 

engagements to strategic objectives. Tactical engagements deal with 

how we fight, while the strategic level addresses “WHY and WITH 

WHAT we will fight and WHY the enemy fights us.”49 Although the 

levels of analysis and action are often treated separately, we must think 

in terms of planning, operations, and effects that transcend levels. That 

is, a tactical-level action can have strategic effects and strategic-level 

planning will shape tactical behaviors. Moreover, “success” or 

“defeat” at one level may not translate to the others—we can win 

battles, but still lose wars. Essentially, the levels provide a theoretical 

scaffolding to frame our work and understand the flow of action and 

effects across the battlespace. 

Effects cascade “when they ripple through an enemy target system, 

often influencing other target systems as well. Typically this can 

influence nodes that are critical to multiple target systems.”50 These 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

31

indirect effects do not just influence targets, but they influence all 

stakeholders and the battlespace itself, usually flowing across levels. 

To help understand the cascading influences of nested effects, consider 

the following brief examples. An operational consideration in targeting 

a terrorist training camp might be insight to the school of Islamic 

thought embraced by the camp’s protectors, which has implications for 

how prisoners of war (POW) might be treated.51 This operational-level 

analysis informs tactical-level evaluation of specific religious and tribal 

leaders who have a stake in protecting or supporting the camp. The 

convictions of a specific Islamic school of thought, such as 

Wahhabism, influences a global trend in the resurgence of a more 

fundamentalist, or even radical approach to Islam, which in turn forges 

a global movement of jihadists that embolden and support the initial 

school of thought at the operational level.52 Globalization offers 

another example of nested effects. Globalization is a strategic-level 

dynamic that impacts communication infrastructures among 

belligerents at the operational level, which shapes the types of specific 

devices—cell phones, email, courier—used at the tactical level. Trends 

in developing world socio-economic development, such as increasing 

disparity between the poor and wealthy or rising infant mortality rates, 

translate into failures in governance at the operational level, which 

enables terrorist groups and other criminals to operate with impunity in 

the state’s hinterlands. The not-so-new “idea” here is that our analysis 

of battlespace effects must move vertically as well as horizontally. 

Stakeholders 

Naming and correctly identifying the adversary, particularly when 

dealing with contemporary Islamist extremist groups, is complicated by 

rapidly shifting, self-proclaimed group titles, multiple memberships by 

individual terrorists, and blurred connections between groups, 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

32

movements, and communities. The transnational nature of threat also 

requires cooperation across nation-states and with inter-governmental 

organizations like the United Nations, European Union, Association of 

South East Asian Nations, and others. To the mix we will also add 

roles for private individuals, NGOs, neighborhood associations, 

religious communities, private security firms, and other VNSA. 

Placing these within a cultural or ideological context, fueled by the 

rapid dissemination of information, leaves a cauldron of complexity. A 

good counter-VNSA strategy starts by getting a fix on this mess, and a 

good place to start is by mapping out the stakeholders. 

Stakeholders are individuals and organizations with an interest in 

the outcome of the contest. The contest with VNSA plays out in a 

multi-centric world, where power and influence is diffused across 

actors. Civil-military affairs and psychological affairs missions, for 

example, are directly influenced by the presence of developmental and 

relief NGOs like NetAid or Refugees International, and the long-term 

influence of local leaders, including tribal chiefs, mayors, clerics, 

priests, shaman, elders, and school teachers. Even direct action 

missions to take down a sanctuary or capture a leader are likely to 

occur in a social context, possibly an urban battlespace, where families, 

businesses, and entire communities become involved. As an example, 

Israel’s targeted assassinations of two Hamas leaders in February and 

April 2004 roused vast street demonstrations, resulted in the deaths of 

civilians, and destroyed infrastructure. Mapping these diverse 

stakeholders is a form of social network analysis that results in a 

picture of the interorganizational network.53 

The resulting stakeholder picture is a useful reminder that our 

policies and operations navigate a complicated terrain of multiple 

actors with shifting loyalties and varying degrees of influence. It 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

33

provides initial insight into the relationships the terrorist may draw on 

to survive in the face of a concentrated counter-VNSA effort. For 

example, it is widely held that the Revolutionary Guard of the Iranian 

armed forces maintains a stakeholder interest in the Hezbollah in 

Lebanon, providing a range of support services to include money, 

sanctuary, and training. Strings are attached, although their strength 

remains a matter of dispute. In its 16 February 1985 foundational 

letter, Hezbollah asserted 

We, the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation, whose vanguard God has 

given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of 

the world’s central Islamic state, abide the orders of a single 

wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme 

Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini, the rightly guided 

imam who combines all the qualities of the total imam.54

With the death of al-Khomeini, the rise of more moderate political 

forces in Iran, and Hezbollah’s growth into a dominant social, political, 

economic, and military organization in Lebanon, it can be reasonably 

argued the Hezbollah no longer takes orders from Tehran. Therefore, 

the character of this important stakeholder relationship has changed. 

In terms of methods for getting at these relationships, we must first 

inventory all possible stakeholders, including, but not limited to state 

sponsors, sanctuary or safe haven providers, individual financiers, 

charismatic leaders, weapons suppliers, diasporas, corrupt officials or 

agencies, sympathetic communities, financial institutions, and other 

terrorist groups. Too often, social network analysis only looks at the 

adversary’s relationships, but the entire network, including friendly and 

neutral actors, should be addressed to get at the overall relational nature 

of the contest. Second, we must develop a basic assessment of their 

influence on participants—three “influences” are useful. First, is the 

stakeholder likely to have a direct or indirect influence? A direct 

influence indicates the stakeholder impacts decisions or actions 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

34

immediately—a religious leader can withhold divine sanction for a 

terrorist act, or an ally can veto an operation. Indirect influence may 

degrade performance in the near-term, but is more likely to impact 

decisions or actions down the road. A regular weapons supplier who 

backs off the sale of black-market shoulder-launched surface-to-air 

missiles will not stop tomorrow’s attack on a civilian airliner, but he 

may be able to undermine future planning. 

Second, is the influence likely to be adversarial, friendly, or 

unknown? Of course, these generic labels can mean many things, 

ranging from active support with intelligence or combat force to 

passive support by acquiescence to a mission in neighboring territory—

Russian tolerance of US-supported operations in the Pankisi Gorge, 

Georgia in 2002. Finally, toward what other stakeholders is the 

influence likely to be exerted? How we label these characteristics is 

less important than understanding who the relevant players are beyond 

the named VNSA and what impact they are likely to have on the 

mission. A simplified, conceptual example of stakeholder mapping to 

reveal the interorganizational network of influences is shown in Figure 

6. Of note, this map only shows a few stakeholders and their 

relationship to the US joint force or the notional terrorist group; a more 

accurate map will also show relationships among the stakeholders. 

Furthermore, mapping external relations is probably one of the most 

difficult tasks for intelligence, so it is important to highlight degree of 

certainty.55 The result is a web of influence that provides insight into 

the effects other players are likely to have in terms of assistance, 

interference, or neutrality. Thus armed, we can seek to exploit 

alliances, flip or disrupt hostile parties, or persuade the uncommitted. 

Moreover, it suggests how the VNSA or another stakeholder might 
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respond to one of these moves based on their direct or indirect 

relationships. 

Dependencies 

A fourth option for thinking about net effects is the concept of 

dependency. Dependency moves us closer to an organizational 

perspective, but still offers a general concept for identifying and 

defining the influences of the battlespace. The idea is that the 

battlespace is the source of scarce resources that are critical to survival, 

Joint 

Force

Influence 

- Direct 

- Indirect 

- Ally 

- Adversary 

- Neutral 

- Unknown 

Terrorist

Group 

Religious 

Organization

Relief 

NGO 

Weapons 

Supplier 

IGO 

Local 

Community 

State 

Sponsor 

Figure 6. Stakeholder Effects 

Source: Author.
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

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or less dramatically, to performance. The concept has its roots in 

resource dependency theory, which argues in its simplest form that the 

battlespace is a powerful constraint on organizations. Thus, resource 

dependencies must be effectively managed to guarantee the 

organization’s survival and “to secure, if possible, more independence 

and freedom from external constraints.”56 For the purposes of a 

counter-VNSA strategy, “resources” is a broad term, encompassing 

information, money, technology, divine sanction, allies, skilled 

operatives, and others. 

Dependency is measured in terms of criticality and scarcity. 

Critical resources are vital to system function. Individuals committed 

to suicide bombing are a critical resource of Hamas and Islamic Jihad 

now and the LTTE (Sri Lanka) in the past. Scarce resources are not 

widely available in the battlespace, causing intense competition for 

them—diamonds and plutonium are scarce, landmines are not.57

Unfortunately, willing suicide bombers are also abundant. Resources 

that are critical and scarce demand the greatest organizational attention 

and may represent an exploitable vulnerability. Critical resources that 

are widely available, or scarce resource that are not critical, create less 

vulnerability, while non-critical, abundant resources do not constrain 

performance. As we analyze the battlespace, we should ask whether 

we or the VNSA are dependent on any resources whose disruption 

could undermine performance. For civil-affairs missions, for example, 

a dependent relationship is likely to exist with community leadership; 

whereas, the capture of a terrorist cell leader may be dependent on an 

unobstructed route in and out of the labyrinthine suburb slum. 

Affordances 

The final “net effect” seeks to capture an overall assessment of 

what the battlespace affords. The goal of affordances is to determine 
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whether the battlespace affords advantages (opportunities) or 

disadvantages (constraints). If, for example, our analysis suggests the 

attitudes of the local population will directly impact an operation, we 

must also determine whether existing attitudes are favorable 

(opportunity) or unfavorable (constraint). Of course, the challenges 

associated with collecting accurate intelligence about attitudes and 

intentions make it difficult to have a high degree of confidence in the 

results; the goal is a general sense of what the battlespace affords as the 

basis for more targeted intelligence collection and analysis. In this net 

assessment of opportunities and constraints we must incorporate an 

appreciation for the inherent limits of human perception. The argument 

that what we perceive about the battlespace is more important than 

what it actually presents is rooted in affordance theory. The perception 

theorist James J. Gibson invented the word “affordances” to refer to 

“the offerings of the environment, roughly the sets of threats (negative 

affordances) and promises (positive affordances) that characterize items 

in the environment relative to organisms.”58 That is, we see 

constraints where none exist, and we fail to recognize opportunity when 

it knocks. What we think we see is more relevant to the actions we 

choose than what is really out there. Essentially, it is another 

cautionary tale against mirror-imaging, reminding us that the VNSA 

and other stakeholders may behave in unexpected ways and charging us 

to creatively turn obstacles into opportunities. 

Dimensional Effects 

In addition to adopting the five general concepts and methods for 

analyzing net effects, we can also derive dimension-specific effects that 

help us understand and influence VNSA. Of the three dimensions, the 

physical is well developed in current military doctrine and frankly, is 

often given attention that is disproportionate to its value in dealing with 
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VNSA. Therefore, this section elevates the importance of 

informational and social effects, which in turn suggests areas for 

improved intelligence work and strategy. 

Information Effects 

Whether dependency and uncertainty exist is a result of the 

interplay among information, technology, and cognition. Information 

effects warranting investigation relate to organization, publicity, and 

decisionmaking. The information dimension affords opportunities and 

constraints as a result of the availability and quality of information, the 

sophistication and reliability of technology, and the limitations of 

human cognition. We are well aware of the information dependencies 

of the US military in particular, but there is also general consensus 

among terrorism experts that among the various trends over the last 

decade, 

[w]hat has been particularly significant has been the logical 

extension of the profound impact of television and satellite 

communication through the rapidly developing and expanding 

use of the Internet and the revolutionary change that 

characterizes all aspects of computer technology. The 

terrorists now have at their disposal the medium to disseminate 

information and increasingly coordinate attacks against a wide 

range of targets from the relative safety of cyberspace. In 

addition they will increasingly be able to conduct terrorism 

against the vulnerable technological infrastructure of industrial 

and post-industrial societies by targeting critical infrastructure, 

particularly in reference to computer facilities and networks. 

Through their actions, they will have the potential to directly 

and indirectly place large numbers of people in harm’s way by 

degrading an air traffic control network, public health care 

system, or other complex systems that can profoundly threaten 

both personal and societal security.59

The information dimension is having profound effects on the shape 

and capabilities of the US, and has enabled NGOs, IGOs, VNSA, and 

other stakeholders to extend their reach and increase their effectiveness. 

Among organizational effects, advances in IT combined with declining 
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costs of processing are impacting command and control structures. 

Increasingly, the old hierarchical, cell-based VNSA is giving way to 

IT-based networked organizations. According to RAND analysts, 

many of the newer Islamist extremist groups, such as Hamas, have 

become more “loosely structured,” with activists using chat rooms and 

email to coordinate activities.60 IT, and the Internet in particular, 

enable several other organizational functions, including collecting and 

sharing information, recruiting, publicizing propaganda, debating 

agendas, coordinating action, and conducting attacks.61 Internet-based 

recruiting is just one powerful example of how IT can dramatically 

change the capabilities of a VNSA. Websites routinely post “be all you 

can be” videos, martyr testimonies, and interviews.62 Our counterVNSA strategy can leverage informational effects by determining the 

availability of IT, what capabilities it affords, what are its 

vulnerabilities, and what are the consequences associated with its 

disruption or failure. At the same time, we must not overestimate the 

role of IT for organizational purposes. Al-Qaida’s famed reliance on 

satellite phones quickly gave way to an old-school courier service—a 

reminder that technology is a double-edged sword. 

The media is the landlord of the information space. Publicity is 

central to the violent theater of VNSA employing terrorism, ensuring 

that media effects are integral to our strategy. For example, there is a 

natural symbiosis between the terrorist and the media. Terrorist groups 

exploit media coverage to extend the psychological impact of the act of 

violence on the target audience. Examples span the history of 

terrorism, but just during the time of this writing, media coverage of the 

bombing in Madrid and Riyadh, suicide attacks in Israel and the 

Palestinian territories, elevated threat levels in US, and a video-taped 

beheading in Iraq have all contributed to increased public anxiety and 
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ensured widest coverage of propaganda by deed. When press coverage 

is absent, terrorists generate their own through faxes, newspapers, and 

increasingly, websites. The idea that media coverage provides the 

terrorist with tactical and operational advantages is supported by 

terrorism expert Walter Laqueur, who argues that “media coverage has 

provided constant grist to the terrorist mill; it has magnified the 

political importance of many terrorist acts out of all proportion.”63 It is 

not clear, however, whether it always has strategic benefits, as put forth 

by Hoffman 

While terrorists certainly crave the attention that the media 

eagerly provides, the publicity that they receive cuts both 

ways. On the one hand, terrorists are indeed assured of the 

notoriety that their actions are designed to achieve; but, on the 

other, the public attitudes and reaction that they hope to shape 

by their violent actions are both less predictable and less 

malleable than either the terrorists or the pundits believe.64

In addition to figuring out the impact of the media on VNSA 

behavior, effects on the US must also be factored. Key issues to 

determine overall media effects include reporter access; the media 

outlet’s capacity to communicate locally, regionally, or internationally; 

the likely spin to be put on our actions; the opportunity to shape the 

story; and other concerns that shade into public affairs or 

psychological operations. To be clear, 

psychological operations use specific techniques to influence 

favorable behavior or beliefs of non-US audiences. In contrast, 

joint PA [public affairs] operations should not focus on 

directing or manipulating public actions or opinion. They 

provide a timely flow of accurate information to both external 

and internal publics. While they reinforce each other and 

involve close cooperation and coordination, by law PA and 

PSYOP [psychological operations] must be separate and 

distinct.65 

Strictly on the public affairs side, the media provide advantages for a 

range of counter-VNSA actions. A civil-affairs mission to the jungles 
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of the southern Philippines, for example, might leverage media effects 

to advertise the public benefits of the mission, keep citizens informed 

of health concerns, and coordinate meetings to increase participation. 

On the flip side, media presence can undermine surprise, expose and 

fuel VNSA behaviors. The type of media effects desired and realized 

will depend on the mission, but as a general rule for the “hearts and 

minds” emphasis of countering VNSA, the advantages outweigh the 

risks. 

The stress thus far on IT is not meant to diminish the criticality of 

the brain piece. In fact, the cognitive styles of individuals and groups 

as well as the attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of other stakeholders, 

including the public, is probably the most important. Why are people 

joining Hamas in droves? Why did she become a suicide bomber for 

Hamas? What are bin Laden and Musab al-Zarqawi planning? Is this 

community sympathetic to us or to Ansar al-Islam? What are public 

attitudes toward our presence in Najaf? These are important questions, 

but very, very difficult to answer. In terms of cognitive effects, we 

should seek answers using HUMINT as we can, but it is more likely 

that such insight will come from the participants themselves, who give 

speeches, make martyrdom tapes, give interviews, and participate in 

public opinion polling. Cognitive inquiry, particularly psychological 

profiling and opinion analysis, are integral to the analysis of the 

adversary. At this point, it is sufficient to note that cognitive effects 

spring from the individual mind, organizational behaviors, and public 

attitudes. Cutting across these cognitive domains are several general 

influences, or factors, that will affect the decisionmaking and 

perceptions of all stakeholders—bounded rationality, the role of affect, 

and the importance of narrative. 
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Cognitive biases are limitations on all decisionmaking. US actions 

must anticipate that other stakeholders will not only suffer from the 

same biases, but that we must be careful in assuming their actions are 

the result of a rational calculus. An old idea remains salient here—

bounded rationality. Decisionmakers “often lack important information 

[uncertainty] on the definition of the problem, the relevant criteria,” the 

range of possible outcomes, and other factors.66 As a result, it is very 

difficult for us or our adversary to always calculate the optimal choice; 

instead, we often forego the “best solution in favor of the one that is 

acceptable or reasonable.”67 Even when we cannot get at the VNSA’s 

calculus, we can appreciate that all stakeholders are affected by limits 

on ability to choose. Organizational decisionmaking suffers from the 

same constraints. There is a lot of room for work on the cognitive 

front, particularly with regard to decisionmaking, and while this 

research unfolds, we must rely on historical precedent, public 

statements, and confidential communications to get at the 

decisionmaking style of the adversary. Getting at public perception is 

equally difficult, but not impossible. Given its integral relationship 

with cultural factors, it is picked up in the next section. 

Social Effects 

The links between violence by sub-state groups and the sectors of 

the social dimension are profound. Modern religious extremism, for 

example, reflects the cultural influence of religion, the power 

imbalances of the international system, and the socio-economic 

conditions of its constituents. US strategy, in turn, reflects Western 

values, the state system, and economic strength among other qualities. 

The health standards in a local village affect the type of clinic that 

should be built. Various factors ranging from religious beliefs 

regarding fasting to norms governing nocturnal habits drive mission 
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timing. Preferences of local leaders impact rules of engagement. 

Kinship ties open doors to new intelligence. Codes of honor prevent 

the surrender of a terror suspect. Social effects flow from the political, 

economic, and culture sectors. Effects stemming from the political 

sector span the levels, from alliances to rules of engagement. The 

economic sector shapes commerce, finances, land use patterns, 

industry, public services, employment and other characteristics that 

may provide opportunities or constrain options. Finally, culture affects 

behavioral norms and worldviews. Collectively demographic analysis 

might reveal the role of ethnicity, age, religion, income, and other 

population qualities in shaping public opinion, socio-economic 

development, or the use of violence. Since it is not possible to address 

every type of effect in this bucket, the following discussion integrates 

the cultural, political, and economic features into an analysis of 

demographic, cultural, and perception effects. 

Demographic analysis offers a picture of how the population looks 

on paper based on a host of defining societal characteristics, including 

religion, ethnicity, language, income levels, type of economic activity, 

or age. We are most familiar with this type of analysis, which gives us 

a static picture of population composition. The utility of these 

snapshots is that they offer a graphic representation of the positioning 

of relevant social features in relation to the physical dimension. 

Similar types of cross-dimensional mapping can be done in cyberspace. 

Among other benefits, they highlight possible lines of contention, areas 

in greatest need of assistance, and a first cut at religious preferences.68 

Of course, this type of analysis must be scalable. Increasingly, 

precision operations require highly localized, or micro-geographic 

insight to specific cities, swamps, jungles, mountains, and coast lines.69
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Grasping demographic effects requires going beyond the static look 

by analyzing changes in population composition over time. Central 

Asia offers a prime example of how such changes can create 

demographic pressures on communities, ripening individuals for 

recruitment and fueling terrorist rhetoric. The compositional factor 

most often associated with demographic pressures in Central Asia is the 

“youth bulges” (where the population is skewed towards a younger 

demographic)—most of the developing world is experiencing a similar 

fate.70 Assuming net migration is zero, persistent fertility rates above 

the replacement value of children per family cause the population to 

expand, while the converse—fertility rates below the replace value—

result in a shrinking population. A rapidly increasing population places 

demands that are beyond the capacity of the local government, 

reinforcing failures in governance. When high fertility rates are 

combined with rapidly declining death rates, the result is a population 

explosion that will persist until the demographic transition is completed 

by a corresponding decline in fertility.71 This population explosion has 

been forestalled in Central Asia due primarily to acute 

underdevelopment and migration which has kept death rates relatively 

high. Nonetheless, the relatively high fertility rates and strong growth 

rates are creating demographic pressures that are destabilizing. These 

trends can be shown on an overlay that links age to employment to 

location. 

Another approach to understanding how the population looks in 

practice is cultural intelligence, which “augments demographic analysis 

by describing how demographic traits and relationships between groups 

can act, or have already acted, to stabilize or destablize conditions.”72 

Cultural effects are a function of deep-seated norms and values. With 

good planning, we should gain familiarity of the local culture through 
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an inquiry of history, language, and other social studies. The USMC’s 

on-going seminars and reports on cultural intelligence are useful in this 

regard. Open source literature is particularly useful for gaining solid 

background information that goes beyond custom and folklore. As we 

dig through these resources, keep an eye for norms—enacted values—

that are likely to characterize interaction with the adversary or another 

stakeholder. To illustrate, Margaret K. Nydell’s book, Understanding 

Arabs: A Guide for Westerners, is a highly regarded study examining 

Arab values: 

(1) A person’s dignity, honor, and reputation are of paramount 

importance and no effort should be spared to protect them, 

especially one’s honor; 

(2) It is important to behave at all times in a way which will 

create a good impression on others; 

(3) Loyalty to one’s family takes precedence over personal 

needs; and 

(4) Social class and family background are the major 

determining factors of personal status, followed by individual 

character and achievement. 

In four bullets, Nydell provides deep insight to the nature of likely 

interaction on the Arab street and with other stakeholders. Community 

leaders, for example, are unlikely to admit failure; they will lie to you 

before compromising their family; and they are unlikely to challenge 

poor-performing high-ranking officials. When background research is 

not possible, boots-on-the-street communication and observation 

should focus on patterns of behavior that suggest underlying norms. 

Culture drives perception, and perception effects determine the 

temperature of the battlespace. A sense of overall attitude proves 

useful in anticipating effects on US policy and operations. Will there 

be protests? Will we be welcomed? Will our presence be betrayed? 

Can we expect to gather street-level intelligence? Doing our cultural 
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homework enables current attitudes to be gauged in relation to a 

historical benchmark. Getting at current conditions requires aggressive 

street-level interaction, and if possible, public opinion polling, either 

formally or informally. Not without precedent, the Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq commissioned a poll by the Gallup 

Organization in early 2004 that revealed that “80 percent of the Iraqis 

questioned reported a lack of confidence in the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, and 82 percent said they disapprove of the US and allied 

militaries in Iraq.”73 No doubt, this affects planning. 

At the end of the day, we pull our analysis together into an 

integrated whole to enable strategy evaluation and prioritization. 

Essentially, we need an assessment of cumulative effects: the 

“aggregate of many direct or indirect effects.”74 Given a specific 

policy or operational plan, we must provide an assessment of what the 

battlespace affords for us, the adversary, and other stakeholders. 

BATTLESPACE SHAPING 

Countering VNSA requires us to leverage battlespace knowledge 

to affect VNSA performance. Confronting violent non-state actors is 

no easy task, but is instead a challenge that must be undertaken with the 

appropriate combination of intellectual determination and cognitive 

humility. Learning to tackle the challenge posed by resurgent VNSA is 

not optional. Globalization and the concomitant erosion of the 

Westphalian status quo have changed the international security 

environment irrevocably, and the growing prevalence of VNSA in 

transnational conflict ensures they will remain a fixture in the world’s 

political ecology for some time to come. In this paper, we have offered 

a framework and associated concepts and methods for understanding 

the battlespace and several of the relevant effects that originate in it. 

This framework implies, in turn, a set of strategies for preventing 
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VNSA development, deterring them when they do gestate, and finally 

for disrupting their integrity across all phases of their life-cycles. The 

following strategy discussion urges new thinking for countering nonstate adversaries and offers broad guidelines that are rooted in systems 

thinking. 

Battlespace Manipulation 

In previous research, we argued that VNSA can be deterred, 

especially if we are willing to broaden our notion of what deterrence 

(and the human psychology that underpins it) consists in. Early in the 

VNSA life-cycle, affective considerations are more likely to hold sway, 

while traditional rational actor considerations can effectively deter later 

in the life cycle. Ecological deterrence couples ideas regarding the 

importance of environmental shaping with affective and rational 

considerations: a more full understanding of deterrence-related 

psychology allows us to see how we can shape VNSA cognition across 

its life-span. Should coercion fail, system disruption through 

battlespace manipulation becomes a necessity. Conquering VNSA 

requires formulation of a comprehensive counter-VNSA strategy. A 

robust C-VNSA strategy requires consideration of all three levels of 

interaction, married to a life cycle account of the VNSA’s 

development. New principles of war (leverage diachronic effects, seek 

“synergy minus one” interventions, disrupt well-connected nodes, 

leverage feedback loops, increase entropy, disrupt environment/system 

interfaces, pay attention to life history analysis, increase uncertainty, 

implement across the system, and disrupt congruence) developed in 

previous research guide our thinking. In the broadest terms, open 

systems theory then encourages us to assess the effectiveness of our CVNSA actions in terms of input metrics (how well is the VSNA using 
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resources?), conversion metrics (how efficient is the conversion 

process?) and output metrics (are VNSA goals being obtained?). 

The VNSA is a dynamic adversary. Hence, our C-VNSA strategy 

will itself need to be dynamic. A mantra we would do well to repeat as 

we formulate grand C-VNSA strategy is “time, location, application.” 

When will the instruments of state power be brought against the 

VNSA? Where in the environment or organization? To what end are 

they applied, and what tool (given the dynamic principles of war) will 

best achieve that end? Essentially, our goal must be to synchronize, or 

orchestrate in time, space, and action, a systems-based diagnosis and 

strategy for VNSA. Keeping these three questions in mind will enable 

us to build something like what the military calls a time-phased force 

deployment diagram. Military strategists use this concept to help guide 

the elaborate and tremendously complex process of staging military 

personnel and equipment during the build-up to a confrontation. A 

time-phased plan for all the resources that will be brought to bear 

across the VNSA life-cycle would be invaluable. Certain instruments 

of state power will be most appropriate to preventing VNSA genesis 

(by addressing root causes and disrupting the connection between the 

international ecology and transformative processes). Others will be 

most effective at slowing or shaping VNSA growth once genesis has 

already occurred. Still others will be most effective at disrupting 

mature VNSA, using the principles of war and the strategy and tactics 

implied by them. Some instruments of state power will be most 

effective at encouraging the transformation of VNSA into non-violent 

actors (be that by co-optation, negotiated settlement, or destruction). 

Understanding the synergetic relationships between actions that 

intervene upon the system earlier and the effects produced later is 

admittedly hard, but not without potential. 
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The importance of leveraging multiple instruments of state power 

(including soft power) should be obvious. A “military only” response 

to the VNSA problem would hamstring our strategy. Numerous 

instruments of state power (ranging from economic aid to transnational 

education reform to conflict resolution to alternate identity cultivation 

to targeted special operations to international police cooperation to 

more traditional military force-on-force confrontations), applied at the 

right time at the right level in the right dimension, will have maximal 

impact. A strategy driven primarily by output considerations, either 

force-on-force or security-style confrontations of existing VNSA, lacks 

balance. To address the system only at the level of output, or by 

confronting only one aspect of the multiple functions, is to 

unnecessarily limit the full range of options we have for confronting 

VNSA. Too often, our strategies focus on direct effects against the 

organization without understanding how environmental shaping can 

indirectly impact performance. To ensure we consider the full range of 

policy options available for confronting VNSA, we offer the following 

list of bullets. None (of course) are “magic” bullets, but taken together, 

we think they provide coherent and workable ideas for US strategy: 

Systems thinking offers a powerful approach to solving 

complex problems. Countering VNSA requires an approach that can 

effectively deal with high levels of uncertainty (rapidly changing 

environment and complex array of ever-changing factors). Systems 

thinking provides the intellectual scaffolding and tools for evaluating 

and acting on two sets of linkages: (1) relations between the 

organization and the battlespace; and (2) relations among the internal 

workings, or functions, of the organization. As an approach, it captures 

the adaptive, evolving character of all social organizations, providing 

insight to the exchange of information and resources with the 
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battlespace, the feedback loops that enable learning, and the leverage 

points that allow us to achieve lasting effects. 

Our adversaries inhabit a niche in a multi-dimensional 

ecosystem. A critical insight for C-VNSA strategy is that webs of 

environments, interactions, and processes both contribute to and 

constitute VNSA growth. Those involved in formulating 

counterterrorism strategy need to be experts in these webs of structured 

interactive relationships. We could do worse than taking our cues from 

those who manage eco-systems such as foresters, farmers, and artificial 

life theorists. Or, as UCLA research fellow Raphael Sagarin maintains, 

The real challenge is to apply evolutionary thinking to 

homeland security in a more structured, broad-based manner. 

Evolutionary biologists, ecologists, and paleontologists 

understand better than anyone the evolutionary successes and 

failures of genes and species and what it takes to survive in the 

natural world. Officials prosecuting the war on terrorism 

should bring experts on evolution into the discussion.75

The members of the military profession involved in combating VNSA 

should, at the end of the day, be part of a transformed cadre of military 

professionals, possessing a very different set of skills not traditionally 

associated with the warrior profession: this is not our grandfather’s 

security environment. Ecology, rather than physics, might be the 

operative structuring metaphor. An ecological approach might include 

actions intended to deny the VNSA access to its niche (physical 

sanctuary, cyber position, or idea space), interrupt resource intake, 

narrow advantages, or even to reposition ourselves into a sector that the 

VNSA previously inhabited without interference. 

Effects-based analysis and operations sharpen focus on 

outcomes. Countering VNSA is an operational process focused on 

achieving specific mission outcomes, or effects. An effects-based 

approach views the adversary as a complex system and time as an 
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essential ingredient to analysis and operations. Direct and indirect 

effects cascade and accumulate to impact organizational capabilities 

and courses of action. Thinking in terms of effects ensures we remain 

centered on our goals while considering that changing circumstances 

and actions can ripple through the battlespace and organizations in it to 

alter conditions, constrain options, and shape capabilities. As opposed 

to a target or capabilities-based approach, which measure success in 

terms of destroying things or denying actions, effects-based operations 

incorporate them both as intermediary stops on the path to achieving a 

desired end-state. 

Levels, dimensions, and time provide a three-dimensional 

skeleton for diagnosing and affecting VNSA. Effects are achieved 

within levels and dimensions over time. The three levels of analysis 

and action—strategic, operational, and tactical—are nested; effects, 

characteristics, and actions have a cascading impact on the adjoining 

level(s). Tactical-level actions are molded by operational constraints, 

but often have strategic consequences. Effects are also achieved and 

experienced across the physical, information, and social dimensions of 

the battlespace. Dimensions carve up the battlespace into mutually 

reinforcing, interrelated arenas, which are reassembled to build holistic 

battlespace awareness. By adding the time component we turn a static 

snap-shot into a dynamic motion picture. 

Counter-VNSA missions are wide-ranging and multi-faceted. 

Confrontation happens in many ways. There are multiple paths 

towards successful confrontation with VNSA and the environments that 

generate them. We should not think of the war on terrorism as 

consisting only in armed struggle. Rather, aspects of this war may be 

more like the “war” on illiteracy—war-like in the sense that we take (or 

ought to take) the root causes of illiteracy very seriously and struggle 
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52

mightily against them, but not war-like in the sense that we shoot 

bullets at people who can’t read. Effective use of the multiple 

instruments of state power is not to shrink from confrontation, nor to 

handle VNSA with kid gloves; rather, it is to boost our ability to 

successfully shape the battlespace in a maximally efficacious manner. 

The military is part of a coordinated interagency process that 

emphasizes public diplomacy, conflict resolution, and good 

governance. It provides lethal and non-lethal options for shaping 

battlespace conditions, strengthening allied CT capabilities, disrupting 

militarily accessible terrorist activities, and defeating organizations 

when and where they can be directly engaged. The great diversity of 

missions, which span the spectrum of conflict from combat to 

humanitarian operations, requires intelligence to address a wider array 

of conditions, threats, and stakeholders. 

Countering VNSA involves non-traditional stakeholders with 

asymmetric capabilities and intentions. Religious leaders, local 

politicians, non-governmental organizations, international 

organizations, multi-national corporations, allied forces, and John Q. 

Public are often part of the mix. Getting a fix on who matters and why 

demands persistent stakeholder analysis, resulting in a crowded web of 

influence that can be leveraged, manipulated, isolated, and 

strengthened. We must account for all the stakeholders with potential 

influence and evaluate their capabilities and intentions as time and 

resources allow. In many cases, such as foreign internal defense or 

civil affairs, other stakeholders may be more important to mission 

success than the VNSA itself. Moreover, contemporary VNSA employ 

asymmetric tools and tactics and in some cases, values, to obtain 

surprise or exploit perceived weaknesses in the joint force. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

53

VNSA are not monolithic, nor do they exist in splendid 

isolation. VNSA do not spring onto the international scene fully 

formed and made of solid granite. They develop over time, and as they 

do so, they articulate parts that have functions. VNSA are (thankfully) 

neither hermetically nor hermeneutically sealed. They exist as part of 

an open system and the parts of a VNSA are constantly exchanging 

matter and energy with the environment; more, the meanings VNSA 

leadership use to reinforce group and role-specific identity are not 

water-tight. Undermine a VNSA’s “story,” and you go a long way 

toward winning the hermeneutic struggle. Stories open the book on 

VNSA group identity and strategy. Stakeholder narratives are echoed in 

rhetoric, publications, recruiting and socialization processes, and 

operational actions. Analyzing narratives answers key questions, 

including issues of identity, cultural roots, ideological influences, sense 

of history, and the meaning of existence. The stories we tell connect 

our actions to a symbolic framework and a narrative thread that arcs 

through history. The more compelling narrative often wins, 

particularly when the struggle is between competing interpretations of 

contemporary events. By analyzing the stories told and enacted by our 

adversaries we answer key questions and gain insight to how it shapes 

the battlespace, other stakeholders, and the terrorist group itself. 

Non-traditional intelligence that emphasizes social and 

cognitive capabilities is critical. Doing this all well is an intelligenceintensive enterprise. Much of our intelligence, especially military 

intelligence, is geared towards conventional warfare. Social 

intelligence is vital to a decision-quality understanding of the 

battlespace and adversary. Terrorist VNSA in particular are generally 

rooted in an ideology that reflects the human perceptions, socioeconomic and political conditions, and culture of at least the group’s 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

54

members if not the community from which it is spawned. Therefore, 

there is a pressing need to build the concepts and competencies that 

allow us to analyze social dynamics in a manner that gets beyond 

folklore. To that end, cultural intelligence as operationalized here 

provides for dealing with our own mirror-imaging and perceptual 

biases as well as for integrating consideration of perception and 

demographic effects, affordance theory (perception drives action), and 

the worldview of adversaries as reflected in their prevailing narratives. 

Much of this intelligence will be open-source, but will be manpower 

intensive and require a rich conceptual infrastructure in order to 

organize effectively. Actionable intelligence needs to be placed in 

boxes that bear a clear connection to policy and strategy; open-systems 

theory does some of this work for us. 

Recurring, critical self-evaluation, if ignored, risks success. It 

is a mistake to think only in terms of the adversary. Understanding the 

decisionmaking process of the enemy is an enduring, yet highly elusive 

intelligence requirement. It is never possible when we fail to think 

through our own strengths and weaknesses; failing to do so ignores an 

essential aspect of the adversary’s decision cycle. Even when we are 

not concerned with the perception of other stakeholders, our 

operational planning, force protection, and other inter-agency activities 

are improved by an understanding of our own critical factors and what 

the battlespace affords. 

We don’t mean to imply that none of these points are factored in to 

our current national security posture; on the contrary, seeds of them can 

be found scattered throughout our national security apparatus. Rather, 

our contention is that (in the main), we have tended toward output 

confrontations, ignored deterrent options, undervalued ecological 

insights, treated VNSA monolithically and without due regard to their 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

55

meaning-laden nature, defaulted to a narrow sense of confrontation 

rather than a broad sense, and not focused effectively on the 

appropriate intelligence tools. Moreover, our expertise is centered on 

specific groups, thus demanding a policy so nuanced that it lacks the 

cohesion required to synchronize the instruments of power. This is 

understandable, given the lack of a comprehensive framework for 

thinking about such organizations. If we are to overcome some of our 

disappointments with the results obtained thus far in our war on terror, 

though, we would do well to embrace the outlook presented here. 

PARTING SHOTS 

Not all the effects are important all of the time, but effects are 

present every time. The concept of effects, originating in the 

environment and shaping stakeholder performance, is peeled back here. 

Direct effects grab our attention with their in-your-face immediacy and 

impact, while indirect effects are often overlooked due to their subtle 

wear-you-down approach. Effects are only important insofar as they 

condition options and organizational performance. Therefore, we 

provided an inter-disciplinary approach to assessing total battlespace 

effects. Degrees of uncertainty, measured by change and complexity, 

shape decisionmaking styles, organizational structures, and planning. 

Nesting highlights the vertical and horizontal axes of effects. Tactical 

effects, like rules of engagement, can have strategic consequences 

when violated. The interrelationships among stakeholders present a 

web of influence that we must navigate. Reversing directions, the view 

from the organization’s window reveals dependencies on critical and 

scarce resources, constraining action and exposing vulnerabilities. The 

battlespace also affords real advantages and disadvantages that may be 

misconstrued due to a lack of creativity or flawed perception. 

Complementing these overall effects are new concepts and methods for 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

56

the information and social dimensions. The information front fosters 

organizational, media, and cognitive effects. On the social front, 

demographics, culture, and perceptions shape options. Taken together, 

total and dimensional effects enable an initial cut at the comparative 

advantages or disadvantages we can expect relative to the VNSA and 

offer insight to entry point for influencing VNSA performance. 

The philosopher and sociologist of science Thomas Kuhn is 

famous for articulating the idea of a paradigm shift.76 Kuhn postulated 

that all science is conducted within the boundaries of a paradigm: 

fundamental assumptions about what we should count as real and how 

we come to possess knowledge about those things. From paradigms 

fall such items as testing procedures, methodological considerations, 

and vocabularies. Eventually, paradigms may enter a crisis stage 

because of their inability to resolve anomalies. For instance, the 

Newtonian paradigm eventually entered crisis because of its inability to 

explain multiple stellar phenomena, including the precession of 

Mercury. When a new paradigm emerges that explains away the 

anomalies that the paradigm in crisis could not, is it oft-times adopted, 

becoming the new and normal way of doing science. Progress occurs 

by the successive replacement of failing paradigms with more 

expansive explanatorily fecund paradigms.77

Current approaches to VNSA understanding have multiple 

anomalies. Defense decision-makers have complained that we have no 

comprehensive understanding of terrorism as a phenomena; we have no 

way of knowing whether or not we are winning the war on it; 

ultimately, critics say, we are on unsure ground as we confront what 

could eventually become an existential challenge to our way of life. 

The way we best solve these anomalies and deal with the complexity 

before us, is by shifting to a more comprehensive framework that gives 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

57

us the tools, methods, and vocabulary we need to be able to make sense 

of them. That new paradigm is the one we have articulated here: the 

open systems framework can unify disparate approaches to VNSA, 

providing us comprehensive insight into how we can both effectively 

confront them across their entire life-cycle and measure whether or not 

our confrontation is effective. There is much at stake. The success of 

our national security posture rides on whether or not we are willing to 

think creatively and “outside of the box” about violent non-state actors. 

Nothing less is acceptable if we are to successfully confront a dynamic 

and growing threat to international security. 

NOTES 

 

1

 For a discussion of the Basque region, which includes insight to ETA’s 

development, we recommend Mark Kurlansky’s The Basque History of the 

World, (New York: Penguin Books, 1999). Insights for this vignette were 

also derived from the author’s visit to the Basque province in December 

2003, which involved informal discussions with members of the ruling 

Basque Nationalist Party as well as leaders of several non-governmental 

social organizations pursuing non-violent solutions to the Basque conflict. 

2

 An audio-tape attributed to Osama bin Laden surfaced in February 2003 

in which the speaker stated, “We have been following anxiously the 

preparations of the crusaders to conquer the former capital of Islam and 

steal their wealth and impose a puppet regime that follows its masters in 

Washington and Tel Aviv.... We also want to clarify that whoever helps 

America...either if they fight next to them or give them support in any 

form or shape, even by words, if they help them to kill the Muslims in Iraq, 

they have to know that they are outside the Islamic nation,” and thus 

subject to punishment. Transcript reprinted in Daniel Benjamin and Steve 

Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America

(New York: Random House, 2003), 459-460. According to Lieutenant 

General David Barno in a February 2004 interview with the BBC, “Where 

our units interact with the same elders, the same leaders on a regular basis, 

our intelligence will improve dramatically, and we've seen indications of 

that in the last two months,” including the seizure of weapons caches or 

stores. Andrew North, “Village Life Benefits US Troops,” BBC News Online, 20 February 2004, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/ 

3507141.stm, accessed on 16 May 2004. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

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3

 Collective violence is an extension of collective action, which is 

coordinated action by the members of the group in pursuit of common 

ends. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York, NY: 

Random House, 1978), 55. See also Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 

4

 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design (Mason, OH: Thomson 

South-western, 2004), 25-27. 

5

 For a primer on diagnosis, refer to Michael I. Harrison, Diagnosing 

Organizations: Methods, Models, and Processes (Thousand Oaks, CA: 

SAGE Publications, Inc., 1994). 

6

 Daft, 10. 

7

 Harrison, 39. 

8

 Thomas G. Cummings, quoting von Bertalanffy in Systems Theory for 

Organization Development (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), 

6. 

9

 Daft, 14. 

10 Daniel Katz and Robert l. Kahn, “Organizations and the System 

Concept,” The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York, NY: John 

Wiley and Sons, 1966). Reprinted in Classics of Organization Theory, Jay 

M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott, eds. (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College 

Publishers, 2001), 259. 

11 Daft, 14. 

12 Michael I. Harrison and Arie Shirom, Organizational Diagnosis and 

Assessment: Bridging Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 

Publications, 1999), 44. 

13 Katz and Kahn, 262. 

14 Daft, 15. 

15 Harrison and Shirom, 47-48. 

16 Joint Pub 1-02, under “Battlespace.” 

17 Quoted from Field Manual 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A, Operational Terms 

and Graphics (Washington, DC: Department of the Army and U.S. Marine 

Corps, 30 September 1997) in Medby, 16. 

18 AFPAM 14-118, 17. 

19 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-37. 

20 Dimensions and sectors have enjoyed prominence in political and 

organizational theory for many years. In organizational theory, the 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

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following sectors are identified: industry, raw materials, human resources, 

financial resources, markets, technology, economic conditions, 

government, socio-cultural, and international. See Daft, 137. 

21 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-10. 

22 AFPAM 14-118, Attachment 4, “Aerospace Intelligence Preparation of 

the Battlespace for Information Operations, “130-146. 

23 Edward Waltz, Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise

(Boston: Artech House, 2003), 62. 

24 Waltz, 62. 

25 Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War will be Fought in the 

21st Century (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 2. 

26 This is a reference to the so-called OODA Loop of former Air Force 

officer John Boyd: Orient, Observe, Decide, Act. See Robert Corum, 

Boyd: The Fighter Pilot who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, 

Brown and Company, 2002). 

27 For a discussion of “failures in governance” as a key to the formation of 

violent non-state actors, see Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser, Lords 

of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia, Occasional 

Paper 43 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, 

May 2002), 45-47. For further insight to state failure, see Chester Cocker, 

“Why Failing States Endanger America,” Foreign Affairs, SeptemberOctober 2003, 32-45, Donald Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security 

and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

1996), and reporting by the State Failure Task Force, University of 

Maryland, URL: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail. 

28 Of note, the USMC has engaged in an on-going cultural intelligence 

effort through its Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the 

Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. More information can be found at 

http://www.ceto.quantico.usmc.mil/projects.asp. 

29 Troy S. Thomas and William D. Casebeer, Violent Systems: Defeating 

Terrorists, Insurgents, and Other Non-State Adversaries, Occasional Paper 

52 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, March 

2004), 32, quoting from Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social 

Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 385. 

30 Katz, 386. 

31 Katz, 385. 

32 Katz, 388. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

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33 Thomas G. Cummings and Christopher G. Worley, Organization 

Development and Change (Cincinnati, OH: South Western College 

Publishing, 1997), 480. 

34 According to terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna, as of 2003 Al-Qaida’s 

“banking network operates feeder and operational accounts, transfers from 

the feeder accounts to the operational accounts usually taking place 

through several bank accounts in order to disguise their true purpose.... AlQaida also siphons funds from legitimate Islamic charities and NGOs that 

it infiltrates, while its extensive web of front, cover and sympathetic 

organizations include businesses ranging from diamond-trading, importexport, manufacturing and transport. Al-Qaida’s clandestine penetration of 

legitimate public and private organizations included one charity that 

became the unwitting target of such activities and whose board at the time 

included President Pervais Musharraf of Pakistan.” Inside Al-Qaida: 

Global Network of Terror (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002), 

62-63; Gunaratna, Associate Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic 

Studies, Nanyang Technological University, interview by author, 24 

February 2004, Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina, and 19 March 2004, 

Montreal, Canada. 

35 JFCOM Glossary, under “Effects,” URL: http://www.jfcom.mil/about/ 

glossary.htm#E, accessed 14 May 2004. 

36 JFCOM Glossary, under “Effects-based Operations.” For an analytical 

approach, see Paul K. Davis, Effects-based Operations: A Grand 

Challenge for the Analytical Community (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2001). 

37 JFCOM Glossary, under “direct effects.” 

38 T.W. Beagle, “Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise,” 

School of Advanced Airpower Studies thesis (Maxwell Air Force Base, 

AL: Air University Press, December 2001), 6. 

39 Dan Isaacs, “Nigeria’s Firebrand Muslim Leaders,” BBC News, 1 

October 2001, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1573491.stm, 

accessed on 27 April 2004. 

40 Orlando de Guzman, “The Philippines’ MILF Rebels,” BBC News, 6 

May 2003, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3003809.stm, 

accessed on 27 April 2004. 

41 The seminal work on the turbulent character of the contemporary 

international system is James N. Rosenau’s, Turbulence in World Politics

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 

42 Daft,141. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

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43 Daft, 142. 

44 Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic and 

Postmodern Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 90. 

45 Hatch, 90. 

46 Daft, 149. 

47 Daft, 149. See also Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, “Mechanistic and 

Organic Systems,” The Management of Innovation (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 1994). Reprinted in Classics of Organization Theory, 

eds. Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College 

Publishers, 2001), 201-205. 

48 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization and Employment 

of Aerospace Power (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center, 17 

February 2000), 3. Cited hereafter as AFDD 2. 

49 AFDD 2, 2. 

50 JFCOM Glossary, under “cascading effects.” 

51 Once captured, the Muslim commander has several options, which differ 

according to the Islamic school of thought (madhab) followed by the 

commander. According to the Shafi'i madhab, the commander is allowed 

four options; execution, enslavement, or release with or without ransom.51 

The Maliki madhab does not allow for gratuitous release; that is, without 

ransom, while the Hanafi madhab forbids release under any condition until 

the war is terminated.51 The controversy surrounding the treatment of 

captives springs from contradictions among Qur’anic verses and 

inconsistent practices by the prophet Mohammad, and points to the need to 

thoroughly understand the prevailing madhab of any potential adversary to 

discern expected actions.51 There is general consensus, however, that the 

commander is not authorized to force the enemy to embrace Islam. Indeed, 

the POW must be kept alive and ultimately released, unless the Muslim 

commander follows the Maliki madhab. See Troy Thomas, “Prisoners of 

War in Islam: A Legal Inquiry,” The Muslim World (January 1997), 47. 

52 Islamic laws regarding international relations, known as siyar, have real 

implications for CT missions against Islamist extremists. There is urgency 

in understanding, for example, what siyar has to say about a POW, given 

the frequency of conflict in which participants invoke jihad, and the 

continued likelihood of American and allied warriors becoming POWs. 

The need is further accentuated by the reality of conflict involving groups 

like al-Qaida, the IMU, or Abu Sayyaf. War with non-state actors exists 

outside the body of contemporary international law—war is traditionally 

the circumstance of states, and international law is the law of states. Even 

if we extended the laws of war to non-state actors like Al-Qaida, they 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

62

 

reject the system on which these very laws are predicated. These groups as 

well as hostile Islamic states, however, are bound by the legal maxims 

associated with jihad, which entitles their adversaries, including the US, to 

certain expectations of conduct. Armed with this understanding, individual 

warriors can assert rights even where the jurisdiction of international law 

ends, and policymakers are better positioned to leverage international 

opinion against those who violate the same laws they claim to enforce. 

53 Hatch, 65. 

54 Cited in Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, by 

Augustus Richard Norton (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987), 

168-169. 

55 A RAND Corporation study stresses the difficulty of collecting 

intelligence on external relations. Bonnie Cordes, Brian M. Jenkins, 

Konrad Kellen, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups, 

(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, June 1985). 

56 I.M. Jawahar and Gary L. McLaughlin, “Toward a Descriptive 

Stakeholder Theory: An Organizational Life Cycle Approach,” The 

Academy of Management Review 26, no. 3 (July 2001). From ProQuest. 

57 Hatch, 79-80. 

58 Andrea Scarantino, “Affordances Explained,” Philosophy of Science 

(December 2003), 950. 

59 Stephen Sloan, “The Changing Nature of Terrorism,” The Terrorism 

Threat and U.S. Government’s Response: Operational and Organizational 

Factors, eds. James Smith and William Thomas. (US Air Force Academy, 

CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, March 2001), 61-62. 

60 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, 

and Information-age Terrorism, Countering the New Terrorism, eds. Ian O. 

Lesser and others (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 65. 

61 For a full discussion of each, I recommend Dorthy E. Denning, 

“Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for 

Influencing Foreign Policy,” Networks and Netwars, eds. John Arquilla 

and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 239-

288. For the overall best discussion of information-age effects, see 

Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: 

MIT Press, 2001). 

62 “Examining the Cyber Capabilities of Islamic Terrorist Groups,” 

presentation by the Technical Analysis Group, Institute for Security 

Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, November 2003, slide 18. A 

good example of a bin Laden recruitment video can be found at the 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

63

 

Columbia International Affairs On-line website (ciao.net). Cited hereafter 

as “Cyber Capabilities.” 

63 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass 

Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 44. 

64 Hoffman, 147. 

65 Joints Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs 

in Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 May 1997), III-18. 

66 Bazerman, 5. 

67 Bazerman, 5. 

68 Medby, 57. 

69 “Irregular warfare exists in highly specific operational environments, 

‘microclimates,’ which need to be understood by intelligence analysts, 

military commanders, and policymakers. This presents several challenges. 

First, these operational environments consist of a number of elements, 

including geography, ecology, history, ethnicity, religion, and politics. 

These are not topics to which the military intelligence community devotes 

much attention. Second, for irregular warfare, these have to be seen in a 

detailed and nuanced context. It is specific local geography, history, and 

politics that are crucial. Arab history is one thing, the history of ChristianDruze conflict in Lebanon is another, and the role of specific families and 

family members yet another. Collecting, analyzing, and assimilating 

information at this level of detail is a formidable challenge for intelligence 

analysts, policymakers, and warfighters alike.” Jeffrey B. White, “A 

Different Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” Studies in 

Intelligence (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996), 

2. 

70 Thomas and Kiser, 24. 

71 Thomas, 24. 

72 Medby, 59. 

73 Thomas E. Ricks, “80% in Iraq Distrust Occupation Authority,” 

Washington Post, 13 May 2004, URL: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A22403-

2004May12?language=printer, accessed 25 May 2004. 

74 JFCOM Glossary, under “Cumulative Effects.” 

75 See his “Adapt or Die: What Charles Darwin can teach Tom Ridge about 

homeland security,” Foreign Policy (September/October 2003): 68-9. 
Thomas and Casebeer—Turbulent Arena

64

 

76 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The 

University of Chicago Press, 1962). 

77 For technical reasons regarding the incommensurability of vocabularies 

between paradigms, Kuhn is sometimes cast as a skeptic regarding the idea 

of scientific progress. We can set aside this concern for present purposes. 

Even if paradigms are problem-driven, and our problems change from 

epoch to epoch, it still remains the case that solving the VNSA problem is 

critical currently.