J-S56032-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.R.L., JR., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.T.P., MOTHER

No. 867 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree February 13, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No.: CP-51-AP-0000860-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2017

J.T.P. (Mother), appeals from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Philadelphia County (trial court) entered February 13, 2017, that granted 

the petition to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her son, K.R.L., 

Jr. (Child) (born 9/12). We affirm.1

Child entered foster care pursuant to an order of protective custody 

(OPC) obtained by Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) on 

August 8, 2014. DHS acted after Child’s paternal grandmother sent DHS a 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, N.L. 

(Father). Father did not appeal that termination. 
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picture she received from Mother showing Child with a plastic trash bag around 

his head. (See N.T. Hearing, 2/13/17, at 17-18).

Child was not to have been in Mother’s care because Child’s two siblings 

had been removed from her care. They were removed when she was found 

to be the indicated perpetrator of abuse against Child’s sibling when she 

burned the child’s arm by holding it over a burner on a stove and punching 

him in the eye and leg. (See id. at 20-21, 43; DHS Exhibit 9, Report of 

Forensic Evaluation, 6/08/15, at 1). The trial court ultimately terminated 

Mother’s parental rights to that child and another of Child’s siblings. (See 

N.T. Hearing, 2/13/17, at 21). 

Child had been living with Father, who was aware he was to keep Child 

away from Mother. According to Father, he returned Child to Mother’s care 

because he was unable to provide for Child. (See id. at 20-23).

The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on August 19, 2014, and 

committed him to DHS.

After submitting to a psychiatric evaluation through Behavioral Health 

Services (BHS) and an evaluation at the Clinical Evaluation Unit, Mother was 

to have supervised visits with Child at the discretion of Child’s therapist. (See 

id. at 24; DHS Exhibit 7, at 14-15, Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 

8/19/14). As a result of his experiences while in Mother’s care, Child was 

found to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and required therapy and 

medication management. (See N.T. Hearing, 10/19/16, at 49).
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At a family service plan meeting, Mother’s objectives were determined 

to be: 1) comply with the court-ordered BHS evaluation and participate in 

mental health treatment; 2) participate in parenting training; 3) submit to a 

parenting capacity evaluation (PCE) as court-ordered; and 4) obtain stable 

housing. 

Mother had disclosed a history of mental health issues. That, and the 

fact that she seriously physically abused Child’s siblings as well as her irate 

behavior in her contact with DHS, raised serious concerns about Mother’s 

mental health. (See N.T. Hearing, 2/13/17, at 25-27).

On January 26, 2015, the trial court found aggravated circumstance 

existed as to Mother as a result of her victimization of Child’s siblings. The 

trial court also found that DHS had no requirement to provide reasonable 

efforts to reunify Child with Mother. (See DHS Exhibit 7, at 18, Aggravated 

Circumstances Order, 1/26/15).

The trial court order notwithstanding, DHS continued to provide Mother 

with specific permanency objectives and referrals. Mother, however, failed to 

follow through with a number of those objectives. She failed to go to BHS to 

obtain services specified in her PCE and failed to obtain housing, remaining 

transient and without the financial means to care for Child. Mother also gave 

birth to another child who tested positive for marijuana. (See N.T. Hearing, 

2/13/17, at 27-30, 66-67).
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On June 8, 2015, Dr. Erica Williams, a psychologist, conducted a PCE of 

Mother to assess her ability to provide safety and permanency for Child. Dr. 

Williams found Mother lacked that ability. (See id. at 64-65). Mother denied 

any responsibility for the removal of her children from her care, placing all the 

blame on others. (See id. at 65-67). Dr. Williams found Mother to “present[]

with poor insight and judgment, with thoughts consistent with grandiose 

delusions, and an altered perception of reality.” (DHS Exhibit 9, at 8). 

Mother’s primary diagnosis was unspecific schizophrenia spectrum and other 

psychotic disorder. (See id.). Dr. Williams recommended Mother engage in 

individual therapy focused, inter alia, on reality testing; identification of her 

role in the other children’s removal; addressing her substance abuse; 

developing healthy coping and relationships skills; participating in a 

psychiatric evaluation for medication needs; obtaining and maintaining 

appropriate housing and a sustainable financial plan; and participating in 

parenting classes focused on children with behavioral needs. (See id. at 8-

9).

On September 19, 2016, when it became clear that Mother failed to 

address and resolve her presenting issues, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily 

terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights to Child and to change Child’s 

goal to adoption. The trial court held hearings on the petitions on October 19, 

2016, and February 13, 2017. DHS presented the testimony of DHS social 

worker, Fredina Parker; Children’s Crisis Treatment Center (CCTC) trauma 
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therapist, Alyssa Bruno; Village case manager, Fred Hayward; and 

psychologist, Dr. Erica Williams. Mother was present but did not testify or 

present any evidence on her behalf. (See N.T. Hearing, 2/13/17, at 70).

Dr. Williams testified that Mother did not take responsibility for her role 

in her children’s trauma and removal. (See id. at 66-67). Ms. Parker testified 

that Mother denied abusing Child’s siblings and contended Child’s paternal 

grandmother had a vendetta against her. This vendetta allegedly resulted in 

the disclosure of Child’s picture with a plastic bag wrapped around his head. 

(See id. at 28). Ms. Parker stated that Mother denied and lacked an 

understanding of Child’s documented developmental delays, special needs and 

mental health concerns. (See id. at 30-32). According to Ms. Parker, Child 

is believed to be on the autism spectrum. (See id. at 31). The trial court had 

to intervene when Mother failed to sign authorizations for Child to receive 

needed treatment. (See id. at 32).

In October of 2015, Child was referred to the CCTC trauma treatment 

program as a result of Mother’s securely fastening a plastic bag over Child’s 

head and suspected concerns that Child had witnessed the physical abuse of 

his siblings and was, in general, neglected. (See N.T. Hearing, 10/19/16, at 

11, 18-20, 29). Child presented with symptoms consistent with being subject 

to physical abuse or witnessing violence. (See id. at 20). At three years of 

age, Child was very aggressive, destructive, and defiant. Child was kicking 

his then-foster parent’s cat and escaping from the home. Child was also 
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significantly delayed in his speech, learning, and motor skills requiring services 

at Elwyn Institute. (See id. at 13, 20-21, 49).

According to Ms. Bruno, Mother lacked an understanding of Child’s needs 

and failed to attend caretaker sessions as required by CCTC. (See id. at 42-

43). Mother only attended two caretaker sessions, one in December of 2015 

and one in March of 2016. Caretaker sessions are necessary to receive 

training on childhood trauma, its effects, and how to respond to it. (See id.

at 23, 25, 27). At the sessions, Mother denied that Child had been 

traumatized, and denied any role in or responsibility for his trauma or that of 

his siblings. (See id. at 26-28).

Ms. Bruno related that Mother insisted that Child had placed the plastic 

bag over his own head and that she was so disturbed that she sent the picture 

to Father. (See id. at 26, 29). According to Ms. Bruno, Mother blamed the 

system and other persons for her children’s circumstances and claimed that 

Child was traumatized because he was out of her care. (See id. at 29-31). 

Mother denied that Child was developmentally delayed. (See id. at 26-27). 

Other than one additional phone call, Mother never made contact with Child’s 

therapist, Ms. Bruno, again. (See id. at 31). Ms. Bruno worried about Child’s 

safety if he were in contact with Mother. (See id. at 42). 

Ms. Bruno opined that Child requires a safe and stable environment with 

a supportive caregiver able to validate his trauma and appropriately respond 

to his trauma-related symptoms. (See id. at 21-22, 40). The evidence 
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established Child’s current pre-adoptive foster parent is that person. She 

participates in every trauma session with Child. (See id. at 22). Child has 

improved in her care, is more manageable, has been toilet trained, sleeps 

better and is talking much more since his placement with her. The foster 

parent is very patient with Child, and Child responds well to her. (See id. at 

40; N.T. Hearing, 2/13/17, at 45).

Ms. Parker and Mr. Hayward opined that Mother cannot appropriately 

care for Child and that termination of her parental rights and the goal of 

adoption is in Child’s best interests. (See N.T. Hearing, 2/13/17, at 32-33, 

59). Mother has had no contact with Child since he entered foster care, and 

they do not share a parent-child bond. (See id. at 30). Child shares a bond 

with his pre-adoptive foster mother, whom he refers to as mom. Child has 

made significant behavioral improvement in his foster mother’s home and he 

views her as his primary caregiver. Her home is “the best fit for him.” (Id.

at 41; see id. at 39-42, 57).

The trial court entered its decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and 

changing the Child’s goal to adoption on February 13, 2017. Mother filed her 

notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal to the 

termination of her rights on March 8, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The 

trial court filed an opinion on April 20, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).

Mother raises the following questions on appeal:
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1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in [t]erminating [Mother’s] 

[p]arental [r]ights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. section 2511(a)(1), the 

evidence having been insufficient to establish Mother had 

evidenced a settled purpose of reli[n]quishing [her] parental 

claim, or having refused or failed to perform [her] parental 

duties[?]

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in [t]erminating [Mother’s] 

[p]arental [r]ights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511 (a)(2), 

(a)(5), and (a)(8), the evidence having been not sufficient to 

establish that [Mother] had refused or failed to perform [her] 

parental duties, caused [Child] to be without essential parental 

care, that conditions having led to placement had continued to 

exist, or that any of above could not have been remedied[?]

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in [t]erminating [Mother’s] 

[p]arental [r]ights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. section 2511(b), 

whether the evidence having been sufficient to establish 

termination of parental right would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the Child[?]

(Mother’s Brief, at 5).

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope 

of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court which 

have adequate support in the record so long as the findings 
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do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and 

credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in 

the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions 

only if they involve errors of law or are clearly 

unreasonable in light of the trial court’s sustainable 

findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

We note our standard of review of a change of goal:

When we review a trial court’s order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is 

abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion, we must determine that the court’s 

judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not 

apply the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. . . .

In the Interest of S.G., 922 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

2

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

____________________________________________

2 Mother has waived any challenge to the change of permanency goal to 

adoption by her failure to raise the issue in her concise statement and in the 

statement of questions involved portion of her brief. See Krebs v. United 

Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Notwithstanding her waiver, our review of the record reveals that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in changing the Child’s goals to adoption, as 

adoption is clearly in his interests. See S.G., supra. at 946.
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Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Requests 

to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are governed by 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (b).

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 
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T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the person 

or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and 

convincing evidence “that for a period of at least six months prior to the filing 

of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrates a[] settled purpose to 

relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citation omitted).

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998) 

(citation omitted). Further, 
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the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and 

not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The 

court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and 

consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination 

of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light 

of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the 

involuntary termination. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). 

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific 

reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but our case 

law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 

484 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not 

required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 

2008).

Here, in arguing that DHS did not present sufficient evidence to permit 

the trial court to terminate her parental rights pursuant to subsection (a)(1), 

Mother claims there is “little to confirm [her] having a settled purpose of 

relinquishing her parental claim.” (Mother’s Brief, at 13). Whether this is 

correct is immaterial, because our review of the evidence reveals that it is 

more than sufficient to support the conclusion that Mother has “refused or 
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failed to perform parental duties.” M.E.P., supra at 1272 (citing 23 Pa. C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1)).

For example, Ms. Parker’s testimony demonstrated that Mother denied 

and lacked an understanding of Child’s documented developmental delays, 

special needs and mental health concerns. Further, the trial court had to 

intervene when Mother failed to sign authorizations for Child to receive needed 

treatment. Ms. Bruno’s testimony revealed that Mother lacked an 

understanding of Child’s needs and failed to attend all but two CCTC caretaker 

sessions that would have helped her to address them. At the sessions she did 

attend, Mother denied any responsibility for or role in the trauma Child 

suffered or its effects on him. Dr. Williams testified that Mother did not take 

responsibility for her role in Child’s trauma and his subsequent removal from 

her care. According to Ms. Parker and Mr. Hayward, Mother cannot 

appropriately care for Child and termination of her parental rights and the goal 

of adoption is in Child’s best interests. 

Based on the foregoing, Mother’s claim that there is insufficient evidence 

to terminate her parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) is 

without merit.

Mother’s whole argument regarding subsection (b) is this and no more:

[Mother] would aver section 2511(b) to be a best interest 

standard exclusively. Thus, it is submitted, in the matter at hand, 

if [DHS] has not been been [sic] able to establish grounds for 

termination of parental rights under the provisions contained 

under section 2511(a); then section 2511(b) as a grounds for 

involuntary termination would not come into play. 
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(Mother’s Brief, at 15). 

Mother fails to develop a coherent argument to support her claim that 

there was insufficient evidence to support the termination of her rights 

pursuant to subsection (b) and she has, therefore waived that claim.3 

That being said, our review of the record reveals that there is sufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interest. 

According to Ms. Parker, Mother cannot appropriately care for Child and 

the termination of her parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Mr. Hayward 

also opined that adoption would be in Child’s best interest. In addition, Mother 

has had no contact with Child since he entered foster care and they do not 

share a parent-child bond. Child does share a bond with his pre-adoptive 

foster mother, whom he views as his primary caregiver, and has made 

significant behavioral improvement in her home. Her home is “the best fit for 

him.” (N.T. Hearing, 2/13/17, at 41).

____________________________________________

3

 “The failure to develop an adequate argument in an appellate brief may [] 

result in waiver of the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.” Commonwealth v. 

Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc), appeal denied, 

982 A.2d 509 (Pa. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[A]rguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments 

not appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite

any authority in support of a contention.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 

29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). 
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Mother’s claim that the trial court erred when it terminated her parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) is without merit. 

Accordingly, we affirm the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County, entered February 13, 2017, that involuntarily terminated 

Mother’s parental rights and changed Child’s goal to adoption.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/15/2017