“Skin in the game”: Partnership in Establishing 

and Maintaining Global Security and Stability

From the Preface by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN

[This] book . . . provides a detailed analysis of what we need to do to 

effectively build and sustain enduring partnerships, examines our current state, and provides a roadmap with specific, actionable recommendations to strengthen our processes and employ a holistic joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approach to partnerships. Two of the insights that I think we often miss are that our 

partners have a say in the process and that we need to manage the 

process as an integrated portfolio and make investment/reinvestment 

decisions based upon capability objectives that we and our partners 

agree upon. The U.S. military simply cannot engage alone. Partnership must be planned and executed in order to set meaningful objectives as well as to synchronize available resources to achieve them.
Cover: Multinational color guard lines up for Multinational Division 

Central South change of command ceremony, July 2006. 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Air Force/Adrian Cadiz.
Skinin the

game

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C. 

2011

By Brigadier General Jeffery E. Marshall, ARNG (Ret.)

Preface by Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN

Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining 

Global Security and Stability

Skinin the

game
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed 

or implied within are solely those of the author and do not 

necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. 

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without 

permission, provided that a standard source credit line is 

included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of 

reprints or reviews.

First printing, February 2011

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government 

Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512–

1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

For GPO publications on-line access their Web site at: 

http://bookstore.gpo.gov.
v

Contents

List of Illustrations ..............................................................vi

Preface ............................................................................ix

Executive Summary........................................................... xiii

Chapter 1. Capability-building: The Theory ................................ 1

Chapter 2. Capability-building: Current State of the Art ...............21

Chapter 3. Capability-building: A Way Ahead .............................47

Recommendations..............................................................69

About the Author...............................................................73
vi

List of Illustrations

Figures

1. Capability-building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. Setting the Capability Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3. National Will. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

4. Employment of National Will. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

5. Capability Rating Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

6. Capability and Interoperability Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

7. Capacity Investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

8. Capability-building Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

9. Hungarian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team

Building Example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

10. Capability-building Network: Geographic Combatant 

Command Focus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

11. Joint State Department and Defense Department 

Capability- and Capacity-building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

12. Capability and Capacity Investment Process. . . . . . . . . . . 54

13. Capability-building Common Operational Picture. . . . . . . 62

14. Partnership Coordination Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
vii

Tables

1. Capabilities Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2. Investment Rating Sheet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Full-spectrum

Training and/or Equipping of Partner Nation Forces. . . . . . 22

4. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Limited 

Training and/or Equipping of Partner Nation Forces. . . . . . 23

5. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Provision 

of Logistical Support to Coalition Partners. . . . . . . . . . . . 25

6. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Other 

Forms of Support to Coalition Partners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

7. Other Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

8. Title 10 Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

9. Title 22 Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

10. Hungarian Special Operations Forces Example. . . . . . . . . 30

11. Country Rating. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

12. Program Design Worksheet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Skin in the Game

viii

Around the world, even as we pursue a new 

era of engagement with other nations, we’re 

embracing a broader engagement—new partnerships between societies and citizens, community organizations, business, faith-based 

groups. . . . In fact, this spirit of partnership is 

a defining feature of our foreign policy.

—President Barack Obama, September 22, 2009

“

“
ix

Preface

We operate in a complex and dynamic security environment. Planning 

assumptions that held for decades are no longer relevant; assumptions that 

are relevant today may not be next year. Asymmetric threats are exploding, and the level of complexity and the challenges that we face will only 

continue to grow. The United States simply cannot meet every challenge 

unilaterally. Resources are only part of the problem. Even if we had unlimited resources, we would still need the perspectives and skills that our 

partners can bring to bear to address increasingly complex issues. 

Deep, enduring partnerships based on shared values, mutual benefit, and trust are vital to maintain our security. Our partners bring 

critical capabilities that we often cannot duplicate. They also bring a 

multilateral approach to security that is increasingly important for economic, cultural, and political reasons. While the United States will 

maintain its role as the preeminent global power for the foreseeable future, the growth of China and other regional powers, as well as the appearance of new economic powers such as India, will make it difficult 

for any country to consistently act unilaterally. More to the point, however, multilateral action is in the Nation’s best interests. As a global political, economic, and cultural power, U.S. prosperity is increasingly 

linked to global prosperity and strong partnerships.

While we recognize the need for partnerships and say they are vital 

to securing our interests, the truth is that our partnership-building 

methods are locked into Cold War–era systems, processes, and policies. 

While these systems served us well at the time, they do not support the 

requirements in today’s complex environment.
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x

For example, the Army’s training facilities in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, are state-of-the-art facilities. They were built when 

the Army had two corps in Germany in order to provide training similar 

to that offered to troops at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, 

California. With the end of the Cold War, the United States moved many 

of these troops back to the continental United States (CONUS). However, the facilities remain vital to our efforts in Europe. They now form 

the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) and are critical to our 

partnership-building and partner training efforts. Yet the resourcing 

models we use still reflect only the Army’s usage and training requirements. As more forces may move back to CONUS, the Army resourcing 

models show a need for the facilities, and the Army is considering closing them. Yet as our troop footprint shrinks, JMTC’s importance grows. 

It is an important visible sign of our presence in Europe and of our continued commitment to our allies and partners. Our resourcing models 

and systems must change to reflect the requirements of the new environment in which we operate.

There are similar examples throughout our planning and resourcing systems from the Guidance for the Employment of the Forces 

through the synchronization of Department of State and Department 

of Defense programs and resources at the partner country level. We 

need to take a holistic look at these systems and ensure they meet the 

requirements of our new environment.

The following book takes this approach. It provides a detailed 

analysis of what we need to do to effectively build and sustain enduring 

partnerships, examines our current state, and offers a roadmap with 

specific, actionable recommendations to strengthen our processes and 

employ a holistic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approach to partnerships. Two of the insights that I think we often 

miss are that our partners have a say in the process and that we need to 

manage the process as an integrated portfolio and make investment/
Preface

xi

reinvestment decisions based upon capability objectives that we and 

our partners agree upon. The U.S. military simply cannot engage 

alone. Partnership must be planned and executed in order to set 

meaningful objectives as well as to synchronize available resources to 

achieve them.

In the end, as we always say at U.S. European Command, we are 

indeed “Stronger Together.”

—ADM James G. Stavridis, USN

Commander, U.S. European Command

Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Skin in the Game

xii
xiii

Executive Summary

We must recognize building partner capability and capacity as a critical, 

distinct line of effort that contributes greatly to U.S., partner, regional, 

and global security. Global stability and security are core foundational 

requirements for all U.S. vital interests. However, the Nation cannot 

maintain global security and stability by itself. Given the size of the globe, 

the multiplicity of cultures and interests, and the sheer cost of maintaining stability and security, the United States must work with other countries that have the common goals of security and stability and will share 

the costs and burdens of maintaining them. Moreover, the process of 

burden sharing actually helps to promote greater stability and security, as 

more countries are invested in the outcome, or have “skin in the game.” 

At the same time, we must understand that building partner capability is a team sport. Relationships matter. They must be built, sustained, 

and nourished, or they will not work. Both the United States/coalition 

and the partner need to benefit from the relationship. Open, honest dialogue about requirements, capacity, and national will is vital to success.

Partner capability-building is not new. Since its inception, the United 

States has been involved in the process as either a client or a builder. Arguably, the French and the Dutch engaged in building partner capabilities 

during the American Revolutionary War. Both governments provided financing, training, and equipment to help the Americans defeat the British. The Lend-Lease program and others were capability-building 

programs during World War II. Other capability began at least as early as 

the John F. Kennedy administration with the birth of the Special Forces, 

whose primary mission is to build partner capability.
Skin in the Game

xiv

In some ways, the linkage between partner capability-building and 

special operations forces (SOF) is unfortunate. Today, many U.S. partner 

capability-building efforts are included in irregular warfare resourcing 

programs. However, most current U.S. programs are conducted not by 

SOF, but rather by conventional forces. When we include partner capability-building and SOF in the same resourcing program, we do a disservice to both types of operations. Building partner capability and 

special operations are two distinct lines of operations that may overlap 

at times, but one is not a subset of the other. 

Currently, U.S. partner capability- and capacity-building is inefficient. There are too many authorities, funding mechanisms often are too 

inflexible, and planning and execution are fragmented. We need to 

streamline this process and make it much more effective and responsive 

if we want to rapidly adapt to changing situations and requirements. We 

also need to establish capability organizations that can effectively work 

with our partners, develop clear, concise plans, and successfully implement them in a timely manner. 

The logical place for such organizations is at the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) level. These organizations will need to tie into 

capability- and capacity-building activities within other agencies and 

coordinate their activities to ensure they are harmonized and synchronized. The GCC also is the natural integrator for all country plans since 

the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation in each country in a theater 

reports to the GCC. 

Global stability and security are core foundational requirements for 

all U.S. vital interests. With a stable and secure global environment, 

threats against the homeland are reduced, and the United States has far 

better access to global trade. However, security and stability do not 

provide these benefits in and of themselves. There could still be obstacles to trade and governments that block free trade. There could still be 
xv

Executive Summary

hostile nations that seek to undermine U.S. security. But stability and 

security provide the foundation for better commerce, freedom of navigation, and security from attacks against the homeland—conditions necessary for U.S. prosperity and our way of life.

Several countries have the capacity to promote global security and 

stability with little or no direct U.S. assistance. The United Kingdom, 

France, and Germany have well-developed military capabilities and 

strong economies that can support a broad spectrum of global engagement. Other countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have 

proven their desire to contribute to global stability and security in a variety of ways within the scope of their capacity to sustain these efforts. 

Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria have consistently shown the 

desire to contribute and are working to develop improved and interoperable capabilities, but they require assistance. Still other countries clearly 

have niche capabilities that, if properly grown and nurtured, can contribute to an overall framework.

Many potential partners, however, do not have the capability to 

contribute to regional, let alone global, stability and security. They 

might lack the resources to develop capabilities from scratch, have the 

resources but not the technical expertise, or lack the infrastructure and 

processes to develop and sustain capabilities. If the United States and 

other well-developed countries want these potential partners to participate in global security, they will need to invest in them to develop 

their capabilities and capacity. If done properly, the returns on this investment will be large as these countries both increase the security and 

stability within their own regions and become increasingly capable of 

exporting security and stability to other regions.

While the United States recognizes the need to develop partnership 

capability, we still have not developed the systems, policies, and processes required to manage the program effectively. The Guidance for the 
Skin in the Game

xvi

Employment of the Force (GEF) recognizes this paradigm shift but the 

Department of Defense (DOD) is still developing the processes and tools 

needed to implement these concepts. In addition, the GEF does not 

properly recognize or prioritize the resources required. While DOD and 

the Department of State (DOS) recognize the importance of building 

partner capability and have budgeted considerable funds for it, their efforts are hindered by suboptimal and obsolete processes, budgeting, 

authorities, and organizational structures. We still have not recognized 

that we need to change how we do business if we are going to engage 

our partners effectively and work with them to build capacity.

Our business practices must be standardized across all agencies and 

headquarters involved with partnership building to effectively establish 

priorities, allocate resources, and manage program execution. DOD and 

DOS need to develop common business practices and work together far 

more effectively to ensure synchronization of effort. 

To do this, the paper makes the following recommendations:

• Reorganize the Defense Security Cooperation Agency into a joint 

interagency security cooperation agency

• Implement interagency security cooperation program and portfolio management

• Standardize capability- and capacity-building systems 

• Combine phase zero and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) into a seamless approach to SSTR.

xviii
1

Capability-building

The Theory

Our partners need to participate in developing partnership capacity. 

Partner nations that want U.S. investment to develop their capabilities 

need to work in conjunction with U.S. partner-building teams to determine which capabilities to build and which institutional systems and support structures are required to support them. There may also be a 

significant role for collective security organizations, such as the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in capacity-building programs.

Jointly, the United States, the partner, and any collective security 

organizations need to answer several questions before embarking on any 

capability-building program: 

• What capabilities are required? 

• Do any countries currently have capability that can be developed?

• What assistance does the partner need to develop the new capability?

• What countries or organizations are able and willing to provide 

the needed assistance?

• Who has the baseline capacity to create the capability?

• Which countries have the national will to employ the capability?

The resourcing and capacity-building process is just as important. 

Effective capacity-building requires dedicated resources, purpose-built 

processes, and the authorities required to employ them.

Strong, sustained, and nourished relationships that are built upon 

shared values, mutual interest, respect, and trust—not solely on mutual 

necessity—are key to building partner capacity. Such relationships need 

Chapter 1
Skin in the Game

2

time to flourish and grow, and need commitment to build trust and shared 

values. The National Guard State Partnership Program is an excellent 

example of these types of relationships. The states and countries have 

forged strong bonds that have been tested in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many 

of our partners in the program will not deploy without their state partner.

These strong relationships allow the United States and partner 

countries to have the dialogue depicted in the top portion of figure 1 and 

to answer the questions asked above. Since this is a partnership, both the 

United States/coalition and the partner need to benefit from the relationship. Open, honest dialogue about requirements, capacity, and national will is vital to success. 

Figure 1. Capability-building

National

Will

Current

Capacity

U.S./Coalition 

Need

Current

Capability

Doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership, 

personnel, and facilities

Capability

Objective

Authorities

Processes

Joint U.S./Partner Infrastructure

Capability Selection 

Decision

Investment/

Reinvestment

Decisions

Determining Capability Objectives

The United States clearly does not have the resources to build capacity 

for its own sake. We must make prudent investments to build the capac-
3

The Theory

ity needed to both maintain security and stability within a region and 

export to other regions to further global security and stability. This involves a balance between what a partner country needs to satisfy internal requirements, what coalitions require for transnational requirements, 

and what capabilities are already present in the region. As shown in figure 1, it also involves a continual reinvestment decision. At some point, 

a partner needs to sustain the capacity on its own. 

Figure 2. Setting the Capability Objective

e

,

National

Will

Current

Capacity

U.S./Coalition 

Need

Current

Capability

Doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, 

leadership, personnel,

and facilities Capability

Objective

Therefore, the capability investment decision must be a joint one. As 

shown in figure 2, this process requires a dialogue between the United 

States/coalition and the partner to balance all needs. All participants 

need to determine the capability objective. The process must emphasize 

open dialogue, mutual support, and long-term relationships.

Also note that figure 2 references capability and capacity. Most U.S. 

literature references “building partnership capacity” rather than capability. 

The distinction between the two is critical. Capacity refers to the potential 

to do something. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines capacity as “the 

facility or power to produce, perform, or deploy; capability.” Thus, it is 
Skin in the Game

4

institutional infrastructure, processes, and trained people that generate 

capability. Capability is the specific function to be performed, such as 

demining, border security, logistics, training, or combat power. Building 

capability without building capacity is like digging a well in barren rock. 

Building capacity with no capability objective is like running a grocery 

store that has no inventory. Capability and capacity are two sides of the 

same coin and must be looked at concurrently.

Partner will. Partner national will is a critical component in setting 

capability objectives. Building capability that a partner never intends to 

use is pointless. All parties must understand how the partner will employ the capabilities developed. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the will 

to deploy forces and the will to employ forces. Based on these two variables, planners can determine which constraints the national will puts 

on any generated capacity. The combination of variables indicated in the 

upper right quadrant provides the most flexibility; that in the lower left 

provides the least. 

Figure 3. National Will

Internal

Security

Global

Security

Do Nothing Regional

Security

Will to Deploy

Will to Employ
5

The Theory

Figure 4. Employment of National Will

Peace

Operations

Full-spectrum

Combat Operations

Support

Operations Security

Operations

Will to Eliminate Caveats

Will to Fight

Figure 4 breaks employment of national will into two components: 

the will to fight and the will to reduce caveats placed on forces. National 

caveats prescribe rules and constraints on a nation’s forces. They can run 

the gamut from prohibiting troops from participating in combat operations to constraining them geographically. Caveats limit an operational 

commander’s flexibility and potentially reduce a force’s effectiveness. 

The upper right quadrant of figure 4 shows the combination of variables 

that provides the most flexibility, while the combination shown at the 

lower left provides the least flexibility. Capability planners should not 

focus exclusively on full-spectrum combat operations. All four of these 

capability types are required for comprehensive security, and planners 

should identify which capabilities already exist and are accessible and 

should develop the capability shortfalls, optimizing the contributions 

from each country. 
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6

Determining required capabilities. Table 1 provides a summary 

of capabilities that planners could use when looking to develop capabilities for three major types of operations. Planners can add two more 

columns that let them track what they have and note where they may go 

to meet capability shortfalls. The categories of major combat operations, 

irregular warfare, and peace operations are not crisp and distinct. Any 

given operation will likely involve all three categories. 

Table 1. Capabilities Matrix 

Major Combat 

Operations

Irregular 

Warfare

Peace

Operations

Capabilities Combat 

Operations Postcombat

Counterinsurgency PeacemakingPeace 

Enforcement Peacekeeping

Postoperations

Land Combat 

Operations X – X –

Air Combat 

Operations X – X X – –

Special 

Operations X X X X X X

Stability, 

Security, 

Transition, and 

Reconstruction

X X

Peace 

Monitoring

Compliance 

Monitoring X X X X

Construction – X – – X

Demining – – –

Humanitarian 

Assistance – X X – – X X

Consequence 

Management – – – – –

Sustainment X X X X X X X

Deployment X X X X X X X

Medical X X X X X X X

Command 

and Control X X X X X X X
7

The Theory

Based on the capability requirements and the operational priorities, 

planners can then rate capabilities as shown in figure 5. The combination 

of the capabilities matrix in table 1 and the rating matrix in figure 5 

provides a clear way to determine capability requirements and their 

relative importance.

Figure 5. Capability Rating Matrix

Medium Immediate

Low High

Operational Importance

Capability Importance

Determining capacity. The final determinant in capability is the 

partner nation capacity—that is, the country’s ability to build and to 

sustain capabilities. Planners should avoid “one-off ” capability generation wherever possible; the goal should be to jointly invest in sustainable capability that meets both the partner’s and the U.S./coalition’s 

capability requirements. 

Capacity revolves around doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Planners will need to 

evaluate the partner’s institutional capacity in terms of DOTMLPF and 
Skin in the Game

8

then determine how much they will need to invest in building that capacity as well as the desired capability. For example, if the capability goal 

is to build and sustain a deployable infantry company, the planners must 

determine whether the partner nation has the capacity to recruit, train, 

and retain soldiers and leaders. Planners need to assess the partner’s 

training, basing, and support facilities. They will also need to determine 

whether the partner has an interoperable doctrine that will allow the 

company to integrate with U.S./coalition forces as well as the equipment required for integration. Then, planners will need to determine 

the overall organizational structure required to sustain a deployed company. The partner nation may well need to build a battalion to ensure 

that it can continuously deploy an infantry company. Obviously, the 

building of institutional capacity could significantly increase the cost to 

build capability. These costs will encumber the investment decision and 

factor into the overall return on investment. However, depending on the 

partner, investing in capacity-building may be just as important as investing in capability-building. The full spectrum of political-military considerations needs to taken into account, as well as existing capacity 

infrastructure that can be shared.

Interoperability. The ability to work with coalition forces is also 

critical to success in almost any operation. The common NATO interoperable framework outlined by the Standard NATO Agreements is perhaps the best benchmark for most measures of interoperability. As the 

partner’s capabilities increase, the relationship should seek to build 

higher degrees of interoperability not only with doctrine and weapons 

systems, but also in command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Greater degrees of interoperability and capabilities allow the partners to participate in increasingly complex and demanding situations and perform more 

sophisticated tasks. As the levels of interoperability and capabilities con-
9

The Theory

tinue to increase, the partner could graduate into “framework” nations 

that can coordinate with other partners for capability- and capacitybuilding. This relationship is shown in figure 6.

Figure 6. Capability and Interoperability Matrix

Command, Control,

Communications, 

Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Building

Framework Nation

Small Unit

■ All funding streams

■ All programs

Basic Capability Building

Combat Capabilities Building

■ All funding streams

■ All programs

Advanced Capability Building

Interoperability

Capability

Investment Portfolio Approach: A Strategic Mind Shift

■ Diplomatic

■ Foreign Military Sales

■ Exercises

■ MET/GCMC

Full-spectrum combat 

operations

Partnership in Building 

Partner Capacity

Resource Profile

(notional)

More Less

 Personnel

 Financial

■ Diplomatic

■ Foreign military funding

■ Some restricted program funding

■ Traditional Commander’s 

activities, State Partnership 

Program, International Military 

Education and Training (IMET), 

George C. Marshall Center (GCMC)

Integrated combat operations

Capability Builder

Interagency

More democratic • More free market

More capability • More stable

U.S./Framework

Partners

Partners

Partners

Partners

Partners North Atlantic

Treaty Organization 

Standards Framework

Engagement
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10

Investment and Reinvestment Decisions

Investment decisions at their essence are governed by a calculus of risk 

versus reward. Figure 7 provides a matrix to help planners determine 

the relative value/reward for a capability investment. Risk is measured 

as shown in figures 3 and 4. If a country is not willing to build and employ/deploy capability, then risks will be higher. Other risks include 

partner country stability and ability to sustain a capability once it is built. 

The driving factor is to ensure the highest risk-adjusted return on investment possible. Portfolio theory broadens this scope by managing a basket of investments that spread the risk and provide a suitable overall 

return. Portfolio managers constantly rebalance their portfolio to remove underperforming assets and invest in new assets with a higher 

expected risk-adjusted return.

Figure 7. Capacity Investment

Critical

Investment

Invest Where

Required

Low Medium

 Existing Capacity

Political Importance
11

The Theory

Investing in partner capacity is not significantly different than maintaining any other investment portfolio. The capability portfolio manager 

must determine investment priorities, devise ways to rate potential investments, and develop and process methods for managing investments 

and redeploying investments where appropriate.

The foregoing discussion provides the framework to help the capability portfolio manager decide what to invest in and when to redeploy 

an investment. Because investments must compete for limited resources, 

portfolio managers need tools to help them make consistent, rational 

decisions. The spreadsheet in table 2 provides an example of a rating tool 

based on the factors discussed above as well as on the amount and duration of the expected investment. Ideally, the scores for a country will be 

the same regardless of capability, with the potential exception of caveats. 

A country could put different caveats on specific capabilities or within 

specific operations. The scores for a capability will vary depending on 

the operational importance. 

Note that three of the ratings have negative scores. The more caveats 

a country employs, the more of a penalty it is assessed. Likewise, the 

larger the investment required and the longer the duration, the more of 

a penalty is assessed.
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12

Financial scoring will have a standard set of metrics that award scores 

based upon investment amount and duration. 

Table 2. Investment Rating Sheet 

Investment ID

Country

Capability

Description

Operation

Anticipated costs

 Startup

 Ongoing

 Funded years

Weight Scale Score Weighted Score Capability Score

Capability Rating 3

 Operational importance 1–10 0

 Capability importance 1–10 0

0

Country Rating 2

 Will to fight 1–10 0

 National caveats -10–0 0

 Will to deploy 1–10 0

 Capacity status 1–10 0

 Political-military 

considerations 1–10 0

0

Financial Rating 1

 Investment scale -10–0 0

 Investment length -10–0 0

0

Capability Score 0

The capability portfolio manager can use the matrices discussed above 

to create scatter charts based on country, capability, and investment ratings. The capability scores and the investment requirements can then be 

summarized in a portfolio analysis to determine funding priorities.
13

The Theory

Portfolio managers must schedule time to review portfolio performance and determine when to rebalance the portfolio or redeploy investments. Generally, investments are redeployed when:

• the situation changes. The capability, operation, or country dynamics changes and requires a rescoring. The new score could trigger 

an investment decision based upon the total portfolio.

• the partner country is unable to build the capability.

• the partner country becomes able to sustain the capability without 

further outside investment.

Capacity-building Processes and Resources

Capability-building requires a comprehensive system to coordinate and 

synchronize the planning, resources, processes, and infrastructure required to generate and sustain the effort. The entire process must be 

coordinated at all levels to ensure policies, processes, and priorities are 

aligned and complementary. In many cases, this will require coordinating not only U.S. efforts, but also coalition efforts. Planners must develop comprehensive capability-building campaign plans that incorporate 

the entire system and the organizations and plans. 

Strategy and planning. Given the scope of authorities, funding, 

plans, policies, and processes, capability planning must be conducted on 

an integrated, campaign basis. It must be both top down and bottom up. 

The national level must set overarching priorities and coordinate 

integrated resourcing approaches to achieve them. For example, DOD 

should set the capability priorities and operational priorities in the 

sample rating system in table 2. Senior leadership must ensure there is a 

consistent approach to capability-building and planning across the spectrum of all agencies involved in the process. 

At the country level, Ambassadors and Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) officers must understand the country and articulate the “art 
Skin in the Game

14

of the possible” to inform higher plans. Their Mission Strategic Plan 

(MSP) and the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Country 

Campaign Plan (CCP) must be nested. Both plans need to clearly state 

capability-building objectives that are both achievable and defined from 

the process articulated above; a sample goal might be to “develop the 

capability to conduct a sustained deployment, in conjunction with 

NATO, of a light infantry company for full-spectrum combat operations 

to respond to global security crisis within the next two years.” This goal 

clearly states the need for not only a trained, interoperable light infantry 

company, but also the entire DOTMLPF capacity process required to 

sustain it and rotate companies through long-lasting operations such as 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). A similar example of a goal in the 

security sector might be to “develop the capability to operate an incident 

management command and control system that provides integrated 

communications from first responders to a national level operations 

center and provides an integrated Common Operational Picture and 

decision support tools in order to respond to national and regional crises 

within the next two years.” 

As capability managers look at these objectives, they need to ask 

several questions:

• What capacity needs to be in place to achieve the capability 

objective?

• Do any supporting capabilities also need to be in place to achieve 

the capability objective?

• Does this objective nest with the goals and priorities in the 

Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), MSP, and CCP?

• Who is best positioned to help the partner develop this capability?

Higher level guidance from the GCC and cooperation with the partner nation must inform these plans. The GCC’s Theater Campaign Plan 

must contain a coherent framework that lays out priorities, theater and 
15

The Theory

regional objectives, and resourcing and coordinating mechanisms. They 

must work with all parties to develop crisp, concise CCPs that contain 

achievable objectives that support the TCP. The GCC’s component commands then need to develop their implementation plans to accomplish 

the objectives.

Funding. Funding is the critical enabler of all other resources and 

processes. Without a dedicated, steady, multiyear source of funding, the 

United States cannot sustain capability-building efforts. However, we 

need to work with our coalition partners more to spread the costs of 

building capabilities.

In addition to dedicated, steady funding, capability-building requires 

a coordinated and, where possible, centrally managed approach to funds 

management. Investment decisions need to be closely coordinated and 

synchronized into a campaign level approach to capacity-building. Without a single fund approach, managers could potentially reprogram funds 

away from capability efforts or into other funds that do not build capability. If laws prohibit a single fund manager, then country plans must be 

closely coordinated and reflect a common capability generation plan and 

be tightly managed to ensure synchronization and coordination.

Funding sources allow fund managers and congressional activities to 

track spending and ensure it follows the intent of the law. 

Authorities. Authorities govern what we can legally do—both actions and funding. They are law and therefore require congressional action to update and to change. Current authorities such as Title 10 and 

Title 22 govern engagement with partner nations. Other authorities 

such as 1206, 1207, and 1208 govern funding for various partner engagements and capability-building. The multitude of authorities can 

greatly complicate coordinated capability-building as a comprehensive 

campaign plan may span multiple authorities, each with its own unique 

set of permissions, constraints, and authorities.
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16

The theory behind authorities is sound. They ensure that we follow 

the law and provide a way to trace activities back to a legal source. As we 

saw in Iraq, when authorities are loose or nonexistent, bad things can happen. However, if the theory is taken to an extreme, the guidelines become 

handcuffs and impede legal program execution. Well-crafted authorities 

strike a balance between effective control and manageable execution. 

Processes. The entire constellation of capability generation efforts 

from planning to funding to execution must reside in a well-defined system of integrated processes. This system must be seamless from the country team through the combatant command and the interagency process. As 

with policies, each of the organizations shown in figure 8 has its own processes that need to be coordinated and synchronized. As with policies, the 

capability campaign planner must understand who owns the processes and 

how they can be modified if they conflict with one another.

Infrastructure. While policies do not have the force of law, they 

likewise govern what can and cannot be done in capability-building campaigns. Capability campaign planners must understand the governing 

policies and who sets and enforces them. Not only do the planners need 

to work within the bounds of the policies, but they also need to understand how to change those policies if their constraints prevent them from 

building comprehensive campaigns. Each of the organizations shown in 

figure 8 has its own plans and policies that need to be coordinated and 

synchronized. This is especially important in capability-building efforts 

that involve coalitions. The coalition and each of its members may have 

different plans and policies that reflect different priorities. If planners are 

not careful, this can result in conflicting goals or duplicated efforts.
17

The Theory

Figure 8. Capability-building Network

Coalition Country

Embassy

National Guard

Bureau Geographic

Combatant Command

Office of Defense

Cooperation

State Partnership

Program

Congress National Security Council President

Department of

Homeland Security Plans

Theater

Campaign

Plan

Plans

Defense

Department

State Department

Plans

Components

Plans

Other

Departments

Country

Campaign

Plan

Mission

Strategic

Plan

Capability-building requires a dedicated organization to plan and 

execute. Without planners who understand capability-building authorities, funding mechanisms, and processes, we will not generate effective 

plans. Without dedicated leaders and Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen who understand the art of capability-building and can maintain the 

relationships that are its cornerstone, we will not effectively engage our 

partners. Without training facilities and resources, capability programs 

will be continually hamstrung and ad hoc.

At the national level, there must be capability-building organizations 

at DOD, DOS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the 

National Security Council (NSC). These bodies must manage the overall 

process and coordinate with each other. Key functions at the national 

level include:
Skin in the Game

18

• establishing overall priorities

• conducting congressional liaison for authorities and funding

• establishing the cooperation/coordination framework for coalition 

capability-building efforts

• establishing resource policies and allocating resources to the GCCs 

and Embassies

• designating and resourcing national level operations

• coordinating interagency capability-building

• DOD: military

• DOS: nonmilitary security sector

• DHS: engaging partners on cooperative security.

The critical capability-building organization will be at the GCC, 

which is the hub of all capability-building efforts within its region.

Key functions at the GCC level include:

• planning and synchronizing all military capability-building 

efforts in the theater

• coordinating capability-building plans within the TCP, component plans, and the various CCPs

• managing the programming and resourcing for capabilitybuilding efforts

• conducting strategic outreach/communications to partner nations to develop, nurture, and sustain the key relationships required to build capability and capacity and to jointly identify 

capability- and capacity-building objectives

• coordinating capability-building training programs and the operation 

of capability-building centers of excellence and training facilities

• coordinating logistics support (equipping, transportation, 

sustainment) for capability-building programs
19

The Theory

• coordinating capability programs with other programs such as 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 

and International Military Education and Training (IMET)

• coordinating 1206, 1207, 1208 initiatives with the appropriate 

Embassies

• coordinating capability programs with exercises

• coordinating efforts with DOS and DHS

• coordinating efforts with coalition partners in theater

• coordinating capability efforts with DOD and other GCCs and 

DOD agencies

• coordinating stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) 

planning and efforts with DOS and other agencies.

The Embassy team is perhaps the most effective example of the interagency process at work. The Chief of Mission coordinates almost all aspects 

of the interagency process. These efforts are reflected in both the MSP and 

the execution. Some of the capability generation activities include:

• coordinating the development of a comprehensive MSP that 

includes capability objectives

• working with partner nation leadership to jointly determine 

capability objectives and a joint plan to generate them

• coordinating all aspects of planning and execution

• leading and managing the strategic communications within 

the effort

• coordinating all Title 22 funding with the GCC to ensure 

consistent priorities and objectives

• coordinating with the GCC on all 1206, 1207, 1208 initiatives

• managing any required SSTR efforts.
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20
Preface

21

Capability-building

Current State of the Art 

Partner capability-building is not new. Since its inception, the United 

States has been involved in the process as either a client or a builder. Arguably, the French and the Dutch engaged in building partner capabilities 

during the American Revolutionary War. Both governments provided financing, training, and equipment to help the Americans defeat the British. 

The Lend-Lease program and others were capability-building programs 

during World War II. Other capabilities began at least as early as the John 

F. Kennedy administration with the birth of the Special Forces, whose 

primary mission is to build partner capability.

Current Authorities and Funding

Partnership capability-building efforts do not suffer from a lack of authorities. As tables 3 through 7 show, an abundance of authorities span a 

range of different activities. There is an authority for just about any kind 

of capability-building activity one can imagine. While most of the emphasis on these tables is for military capacity-building, there are some, 

such as 1207 (see table 7), that are for nonmilitary requirements. There 

are other authorities for civil security as well that GCCs normally will 

not access.

The problem is not the lack of authorities. Rather, it is the plethora 

of authorities, often with different agencies and approval mechanisms. As 

the case studies in table 10 and figure 9 show, the volume of authorities 

and approval requirements can overly complicate even relatively straightChapter 2
Skin in the Game

22

forward, low-cost projects. The current mix of authorities pushes the 

balance too far to the control side and impedes program execution—

often with little real gain in control.

Table 3. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Full-spectrum Training 

and/or Equipping of Partner Nation Forces 

Name Authority Limitations

Coalition 

Readiness 

Support 

Program 

Provide specialized 

training and loan equipment and supplies on a 

nonreimbursable basis to 

partner nations contributing forces to coalition 

operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan

■ Only loans a limited set of equipment (5–6 common items) to partner nations; insufficient to support entire range of partner nation requirements 

or forces being offered (for example, Special 

Operations Forces)

■ Does not have dedicated funding; as a subset 

of Coalition Support Funds, the availability of 

funds depends on reimbursements to Pakistan 

and Jordan

■ Single-year authority

Section 1206 Provide training and 

equipment to critical 

regional partners to meet 

“urgent and emergent” 

threats or opportunities

■ Congress has indicated that it should go first 

and foremost to projects in countries that face a 

known terrorist threat and lack the resources to 

build their military’s counterterrorism capacity

■ Not intended for North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces (though there is indication that this 

may change)

■ Not intended to support forces deploying to Iraq 

and Afghanistan

■ Funding used for short-term (1-year) projects until 

transition to Foreign Military Sales possible—not 

for a program of record

■ Competitive process and lengthy review/approval

Combatant 

Commander 

Initiative 

Fund 

(10 U.S.C. 

§2010)

$50 million total, of which 

only $5 million may be 

used for training foreign 

military forces

■ One-year initiatives only; not intended for 

multi-year projects and must be fully obligated 

within the fiscal year in which it is received

■ Competitive process with up to 60-day 

processing time

■ Not intended for equipping

■ No funds for any activity that has been denied 

authorization by Congress

■ Funds will not be used to support initiatives that 

have other funding sources
23

Current State of the Art

The authorities in table 3 form the core of effective capability and 

capacity generation programs. Currently, they are centrally managed at 

DOD and DOS (1206 is a “dual-key” program between DOD and DOS 

that will be addressed later, along with 1207 and 1208). These programs 

have been overwhelmingly targeted toward a handful of countries such 

as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan, often at the expense of building capability that will help these countries. The current methods for 

allocating these funds need to be reviewed along with the entire GEF 

process. We will analyze this concept below and address potential 

changes later in this paper.

Table 4. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Limited Training and/or 

Equipping of Partner Nation Forces

Name Authority Limitations

Acquisition 

and Crossservicing 

Agreement 

(ACSA)

Provides for mutual 

exchange of logistics, 

supplies, and services 

(requires consultation 

with Secretary of State)

■ Services include partner nation training but restricted to training services (in practice, familiarization/interoperability activities)

■ Partner must provide reciprocal support via cash, 

equal value exchange, or replacement-in-kind

■ Many partner nations cannot meet the requirements for equal value exchange or replacementin-kind to enable U.S. European Command to 

loan them vehicles under an ACSA

Enhanced 

ACSA

(Section 

1202)

Permits loans of military 

equipment for personnel 

protection and survivability to partner nations 

participating in combined 

operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan

■ Use of equipment for no longer than 1 year

■ ACSA provisions still apply

 (continued)
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24

Table 4 (continued)

Name Authority Limitations

Developing 

Country 

Combined 

Exercise 

Program

(10 U.S.C. 

§2010)

Supports the incremental 

expenses incurred by a 

developing country while 

participating in a multinational exercise 

■ Incremental expenses are the reasonable and 

proper costs of goods and services that are consumed by a developing country as a direct result 

of that country’s participation in a multinational 

exercise with the United States, including rations, 

fuel, training ammunition, and transportation

■ Two criteria for eligibility:

■ The country could not provide the support 

without specialized training, supplies, and/or 

equipment

■ The country’s participation in a multinational 

exercise with the United States, including 

rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation

■ Training limited to familiarization/interoperability

■ Requires Secretary of Defense approval and consultation with Secretary of State

■ Only countries on the Department of State developing country list can qualify 

Warsaw 

Initiative 

Fund 

Supports U.S. and partner 

nation costs for certain 

training activities, such as 

traveling contact teams, 

State Partnership Program, 

military liaisons, personnel exchanges, seminars, 

conferences; selected partner nation participation 

in bilateral or multilateral 

exercises

■ Limited to developing (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Partnership for Peace) countries 

■ Cannot be used to fund exercises and U.S. 

 participation in exercises

■ Nation is ineligible once it joins NATO 

■ Cannot be used to purchase equipment, training,

 or construction

Joint Combined Exchange Training (10 U.S.C. 

§2011)

Supports both U.S. and 

“incremental” partner 

nation training costs for 

training U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF)

■ Training intended for U.S. SOF

■ Does not provide for equipping
25

Current State of the Art

GCCs generally have greater access to the resources controlled by 

these authorities. Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreements are legal 

concepts and do not have prescribed budget limits. The other programs 

tend to be tied to specific programs. Warsaw Initiative Funds funding is 

geographically constrained and may have a limited future, depending on 

the Partnership for Peace.

Table 5. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Provision of Logistical 

Support to Coalition Partners

Name Authority Limitations

Acquisition 

and Crossservicing 

Agreement 

(ACSA) and 

Enhanced 

ACSA

Provides for mutual 

exchange of logistics, 

supplies, and services 

(requires consultation 

with Secretary of State) 

■ Services include partner nation training but 

restricted to training services (in practice, 

familiarization/interoperability activities)

■ Partner must provide reciprocal support via cash, 

equal value exchange, or replacement-in-kind

■ Many partner nations cannot meet the requirements for equal value exchange or replacementin-kind to enable U.S. European Command to 

loan them vehicles under an ACSA 

Lift and 

Sustain

Provision of logistical 

(such as lift) and sustainment support to partner 

nations contributing forces 

to operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan

■ Does not support provision of training or 

 equipment

■ Annual authority (via appropriations)

Global Lift 

and Sustain 

(10 U.S.C. 

§127c)

Provides logistical support, supplies, and services at no cost to allies 

participating in combined 

operations; provides 

equipment covered by Enhanced ACSA (personnel 

protection and survivability) to allies participating 

in combined operations

■ During active hostilities, contingency operation, or 

noncombat operation and Allied forces are essential to success and could not participate without 

logistical support

■ Not for countries participating in operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan (covered by separate Lift and 

Sustain authority)

■ Not to exceed $100 million annually; requires 

Secretary of State concurrence

Lift and Sustain and Global Lift and Sustain are critical programs 

that deploy partner capability. Without the resources managed by these 

authorities, the United States would not be able to support partner 

deployments to operations such as OEF.
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26

Table 6. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Other Forms of Support 

to Coalition Partners 

Name Authority Limitations

Section 1208 $35 million/year to support foreign forces that are 

supporting or facilitating 

military operations by U.S. 

Special Operations Forces 

to combat terrorism

■ Not intended for training and equipping partner 

forces outside of operating areas

■ Requires concurrence of relevant Chief of Mission

Coalition 

Support Funds 

Reimburse countries, 

primarily Pakistan and Jordan, for expenses incurred 

while providing logistical 

and military support to 

U.S. military operations

■ Single-year authority (via appropriations)

Coalition Support Funds is one of the largest funding sources in the 

capacity- and capability-building arsenal. Historically, it was limited to a 

handful of countries. We need to open this funding source to critical 

efforts that build capacity that supports the countries listed in table 6.

Table 7. Other Authorities

Name Authority Limitations

Security and 

Stabilization 

Assistance 

(Section 

1207)

Allows Secretary of 

Defense to transfer funds 

to State to facilitate civilian stabilization missions, 

bringing civilian expertise 

to bear alongside or in 

lieu of U.S. forces

■ Not to be used for training by U.S. military forces

Given the abundance of authorities shown above, one would think 

capability-building would be straightforward and easy. Unfortunately, as 

figure 9 shows, such is not the case.
27

Current State of the Art

Figure 9. Hungarian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team Building Example

2007

Mid Oct 07

Hungary

committed 

OMLT

Apr-Jun 08

Confusion in

CSF process

2009

4 Mar 08

Ambassador

relayed U.S. intent

of funding and

support to Hungary

Ministry of Defense

3 Aug 08

CSF Request sent to 

Office of Secretary 

of Defense (OSD)

from USCENTCOM

5 Aug 08

Letter of Offer and

Acceptance (LOA)

sent to Hungary

from USASAC

9 Oct 08

15-day Congressional

notification

period expires

Hungary

accepts LOA

23 Jan 2009

OMLT deploys

8 Oct 07

Deputy 

Assistant

Secretary of

Defense (DASD)

CS requested 

Hungary Operational

Mentor and 

Liaison Team

(OMLT)

12 Feb 08

DASD confirmed

intent to Ambassador

for $2M+ Coalition

Support Funds (CSF)

21 Mar 08

Letter of Request

submitted to U.S.

Army Security Assistance 

Command (USASAC)

23 Jun 08

CSF Request approved

at U.S. European Command

and sent to U.S. Central

Command (USCENTCOM)

24 Sep 08

OSD approval and

sent to Congress 20 Oct 08

CSF case 

implemented 5-22 Nov 08

Joint Multinational

Training Command

training

Fall 08 Scheduled

Deployment

16 months to

deploy one OMLT

On the surface, the task of building an operational mentor and liaison team (OMLT) would seem to be fairly limited in scope. These are 

small teams that embed with Afghan National Army units to help mentor 

them and provide liaison to coalition forces. Most OMLTs consist of 

fewer than 30 soldiers and require no heavy equipment. However, the 

OMLT shown in figure 9, which is not atypical of the process, took 16 

months to generate and deploy, largely because of the authorities that 

needed to be engaged to obtain training, equipment, and support. Eight 

months elapsed from the decision to use Coalition Support Funds until 

the funds under this authority were granted and available for use.

Any capability- and capacity-building program will require close 

coordination between Title 10 and Title 22 funding sources (see tables 8 

and 9). Because both DOD and DOS control these funding sources, any 

successful capability- and capacity-building program needs to be coordinated between the two departments. By law, DOD does not have funding authorities for any train and equip missions.
Skin in the Game

28

Table 8. Title 10 Authorities

Name Authority Limitations

Operations and 

Maintenance 

Title 10 U.S. military only

Military-to-military Title 10 U.S. military only

State Partnership Program New funding source granted 

after establishment as a program of record

Currently, small funding levels and no 

established mechanisms to manage 

program investments; limited to civil 

security engagement

Counterterrorism 

Fellowship Program

Up to $20 million per year of 

its budget “to pay any costs 

associated with the attendance 

of foreign military officers, 

ministry of defense officials, 

or security officials at United 

States military educational 

institutions, regional centers, 

conferences, seminars, or 

other training programs conducted under the Regional 

Defense Counterterrorism 

Fellowship Program”

Nonlethal training

Exercise-related 

Construction

Must support an approved exercise

Table 9. Title 22 Authorities

Name Authority Limitations

Foreign Military Sales Title 22 Department of State (DOS)–managed as part of 

the overall foreign assistance program

Foreign Military 

Financing

Title 22 DOS-managed as part of the overall foreign 

assistance program

International Military 

Education and Training

Title 22 DOS-managed as part of the overall foreign 

assistance program
29

Current State of the Art

When we look at the critical 1206, 1207, and 1208 programs, the 

need to coordinate and jointly plan is even more important. These programs are “dual-key” programs established by Congress. DOD moves 

Title 10 funds into Title 22 for the purposes shown in tables 3, 6, and 7. 

Both DOD and DOS must jointly approve the expenditures in these 

programs. This provides DOD a little more input into the Title 22 process. Congress watches these programs and has, in the past, threatened 

to curtail them over concern of crossing jurisdictional boundaries.

The Hungarian SOF company deployment shown in table 10 offers 

a second example of the complexities involved in building partner capability and capacity. Note that even though the cost is extremely low, the 

project spanned 14 different authorities for legal permissions and funding. The complexities involved in coordinating these multiple lines of 

authorities can add months to a deployment.
Skin in the Game

30

Table 10. Hungarian Special Operations Forces Example

Function Support Provided Cost 

($thousands) Authorities

Train Psychological Operations 

Qualification Course, 

Joint Terminal Attack Control/Special Operations 

Terminal Attack Control, 

Joint Special Operations 

University Operational 

Planners Course, Aviation 

Training with 6th Special 

Operations Squadron, 

Special Operations Forces 

Mobile Training Team, 

Special Forces Qualification Course Mobile 

Training Team

3,040 International Military Education and 

Training, Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, Joint Combined 

Exchange Training, Combatant 

Commander’s Initiative Fund, Joint 

Contact Team Program, State Partnership Program, Military-to-military, 

Excess Defense Articles Operations 

and Maintenance

Equip Team Equipment for 2d

Special Forces Company, Ground Laser Target 

Designators II, Blue Force 

Trackers, North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization 

Jammers

8,080 Foreign Military Financing, 1206, 

Coalition Support Funds

Transport Strategic airlift to/from 

International Security Assistance Force

640 To be determined

Sustain Medical facility, isolation 

facility, weapons cage, 

support center improvements

450 Exercise-relation Construction, 

Excess Defense Articles, Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civil 

Aid

Total 12,210 14 different authorities
31

Current State of the Art

Planning

The capability-building network depicted in figure 8 shows the nesting 

of the key plans required to build partner capability and capacity. This 

network of plans and programs needs to flow both top down and bottom 

up. The national level controls authorities and resources, as well as setting critical policies that shape capability- and capacity-building plans 

and programs. Down at the country level is where the rubber meets the 

road. This is the level where critical relationships are forged and the 

country and the United States/coalition agree to essential objectives. 

Resourcing guidance and policy need to effectively flow down from the 

national level, and resource requirements need to flow up from the 

country level. At the theater level, the GCC provides the natural place 

where resources and resource requirements meet and plans are fully 

vetted and analyzed. Figure 10 shows this critical planning nexus.

Figure 10. Capability-building Network: Geographic Combatant Command Focus

State Partnership

Program

Coalition Country

Embassy

Mission

Strategic

Plan

Office of Defense

Cooperation

Country

Campaign

Plan

Geographic

Combatant Command

Theater

Campaign

Plan

Components

Plans
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32

Phase Zero

Operations are often planned with five phases, ranging from buildup 

through combat operations through SSTR. Phase zero refers to nonoperational activities in many of our partner countries that include defense 

sector reform and capability- and capacity-building. There is a great deal 

of overlap between these phase zero activities and SSTR activities—so 

much so that the same organizations and processes that do SSTR in an 

operational construct could potentially be used to perform phase zero 

activities. Currently, the United States sources Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other efforts out of hide and ad hoc. These organizations 

currently do not have a table of distribution and allowances that will 

survive the operations they support.

The primary planning document is the GEF. While this is an excellent approach to planning, it is not set up to effectively manage building 

partner capability and capacity. The emphasis—rightly so—is on sustaining combat operations. However, the GEF focuses on sustaining U.S. 

capabilities and does not adequately reflect the priority of effectively 

resourcing key partner capability- and capacity-building efforts. Such 

capabilities, which allow the United States to better manage the strain 

on its forces, are potentially as important as U.S. force structure.

DOS manages much of its capability- and capacity-building through 

the F process, which integrates all of the planning for Title 22 and other 

resources. As shown in table 9, at least three critical military capacitybuilding programs lie within Title 22, as does most of the responsibility 

for the training and equipping of partners. Historically, this process has 

been somewhat opaque to outsiders, especially DOD. In addition, DOS 

can elect to reprogram funding from one Title 22 program to another, 

perhaps without coordination and input from DOD. Therefore, DOD 

may rely upon funding sources and plans for which it has little or no 

control or input in the process.
33

Current State of the Art

NATO, through Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

(SHAPE), conducts OMLT planning and coordinates through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for requirements. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe coordinates most of these planning 

efforts within SHAPE. OMLTs are absolutely critical to making sure the 

Afghan National Army units are capable of assuming security responsibilities and allowing NATO to successfully hand over security responsibilities to the Afghans and reach an endstate. Both troop-contributing 

nations and NATO share OMLT training responsibilities. The United 

States, through the State Partnership Program, provides OMLT augmentation and training to selected partners if required. 

The GCCs conduct partner capability and capacity planning as part 

of their theater campaign plan process. Building partner capability and 

capacity is an integral part of the GCC’s theater security cooperation 

plan. This process is informed by the GEF and in turn informs the CCPs 

for the countries in the GCC area of responsibility (AOR). The TCP 

should establish umbrella goals and coordinate regional efforts. GCCs 

may develop regional campaign plans as appropriate to coordinate regional requirements or when the various regions within the AOR have 

different characteristics and requirements.

The GCC and its components should conduct integrated, parallel 

planning efforts, much as they do in an operational campaign. The same 

core planning functions that the GCC and components use in operational planning translates directly to theater security cooperation planning. Components should dynamically participate in the development of 

the CCPs, just as they do in an operational plan. Therefore, GCCs need 

to establish planning mechanisms and collaborative systems that promote this integrated effort.

The country team is perhaps the best example of a functioning and 

integrated interagency effort. There are two critical planning documents 
Skin in the Game

34

at the country level. The Embassy produces the Mission Strategic Plan 

(MSP), which governs all efforts within the Embassy. The ODC and the 

GCC prepare a country campaign plan that defines the military engagement within the country. Capability- and capacity-building are a critical 

part of the CCP. The MSP and the CCP need to be synchronized and in 

harmony with each other. 

The CCP should support the objectives identified in the security 

sector portion of the MSP. From a capability- and capacity-building perspective, this portion of the MSP is the most critical. This section should 

coordinate all security sector initiatives, both civil and military, into a 

mutually supporting, comprehensive approach. It should also address 

key security sector Title 22 funding issues such as FMF and IMET. Any 

joint 1206 projects should also be addressed in the MSP. If these projects 

are not jointly addressed and coordinated with the GCC, they most 

likely will not get funded and approved. 

The CCP is where the rubber meets the road for the GCC. The CCP 

should clearly express the capability- and capacity-building objectives 

for the country. These objectives should drive funding requirements for 

1206, FMF, and IMET and provide the guidance for the components to 

prepare their engagement plans for the country.

The CCP should be synchronized with the security sector portion of 

the MSP. Ideally, the CCP should be able to function both as a standalone 

document for the GCC to direct planning to its components as well as a 

supporting document to the MSP. The CCP should state capacity- and 

capability-building objectives crisply and cleanly. It should provide the 

requisite level of detail and tasks to enable the components to build effective engagement and capability-/capacity-building plans. As mentioned 

above, 1206 projects and other joint funding and mutually supporting 

requirements should be coordinated in both the MSP and the CCP.
35

Current State of the Art

Where appropriate, the CCP should also address civic engagement 

priorities that help to set the conditions for a strong partner relationship 

and selected capacity enabling functions. 

The Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force components that each GCC 

has are essentially its execution arm. Therefore, the component plans 

are where the details of partner capability- and capacity-building need 

to be specified as well as the particular engagement activities and resource requirements. Component plans should address the specific 

details of how they will meet the objectives laid out in the CCP. These 

plans should address engagements, exercises, and senior visits, as well 

as key civic engagement projects.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan regional planning effort works to provide 

better coordination between NATO operations in Afghanistan and U.S. 

support for Pakistan. Given the flow of fighters back and forth from the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan and the increasingly unstable eastern provinces in Afghanistan, this is a critical effort. The creation 

of a single DOS representative to manage the efforts is a tremendous step 

forward in regional integration and could be a model for other efforts.

Current Programs

State Partnership Program. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is 

perhaps the most economic and effective engagement tool in the GCC 

toolkit. National Guard forces partner with countries in the GCC AOR 

and build strong relationships through traveling contact teams and familiarization exchanges. In addition, the state adjutant general and other 

key leaders regularly conduct senior leader engagements with the partner nations’ military and civilian leadership. Often, these relationships 

are the strongest relationships the GCC has with the partner nation.
Skin in the Game

36

SPP was finally designated a program of record in 2009, after which 

it received dedicated funding. This funding is centrally managed by the 

National Guard Bureau and is designated primarily for civil security 

engagements. These funds will allow the GCC to bring in targeted state 

agencies as well as National Guard troops and Airmen to conduct comprehensive, full-spectrum engagement.

SPP must be tightly integrated into the GCC theater security cooperation plan and all subsidiary planning. In addition, the GCC should 

include the states in the planning teams as their long relationships have 

often produced key insights for planning and helping the GCC to identify objectives and engagement opportunities.

Operation Enduring Freedom. OEF is targeted primarily at the 

defeat of al Qaeda and militant Taliban forces in Afghanistan. As part of 

these efforts, however, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) helps to build Afghan security forces consisting of 

the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police. CSCT–

A’s efforts are absolutely vital to OEF success. The United States and 

ISAF will not be able to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban and maintain 

security and stability without a trained and effective Afghan National 

Security Force (ANSF).

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While U.S. combat operations in 

OIF are winding down, there could be continued requirements for security engagement and capacity-building with the Iraqi military and security forces. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq 

(MNSTC–I) coordinates the training and support for this effort.

OMLT generation. OMLTs are coalition teams designed to embed 

into ANSF units to help train them and to coordinate critical combat 

enabling functions when the ANSF unit is in combat. These teams are the 

coalition analogs to the U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). 
37

Current State of the Art

Each battalion or higher unit in the ANSF should have either an ETT 

or an OMLT embedded within it to engage in both training and operations in order to improve unit effectiveness and ultimately enable the 

ANSF unit to become self-sustaining. Therefore, OMLTs and ETTs are 

absolutely vital to OEF and ISAF success. Afghanistan simply will not be 

able to provide for its own security if these teams are not successful. The 

exit of U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan is dependent upon 

these teams’ success.

U.S. and coalition forces, however, are unable to generate enough 

teams for all ANSF units. With current plans to significantly expand the 

size of the ANA and to create police OMLTs (POMLTs), the problem 

will become even more acute.

Therefore, the United States must engage in robust capabilitybuilding with our coalition partners to help them to generate the required OMLTs and POMLTs. To date, these efforts have been ad hoc and 

poorly resourced. The United States and NATO must work together to 

develop a systematic approach to identify OMLT requirements and to 

generate properly trained and resourced teams that understand the 

ANSF doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and Afghan 

culture. OMLTs, regardless of which country provides them, must understand the ANSF doctrine and TTPs in order to ensure consistency and 

interoperability.

The one bright spot in the OMLT generation process is the joint 

U.S.-partner codeployment OMLTs. These are teams formed jointly 

between National Guard Soldiers and partner soldiers based upon the 

SPP relationship. While the process has been ad hoc to date, it represents 

a critical path forward to developing the required number of teams with 

the necessary capabilities and skill sets.

U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC)–Israel and Palestine. The 

USSC is a military-led effort that works for the State Department to 
Skin in the Game

38

build the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). Since the PASF 

is not a military force, DOD does not have the authorities to do the train 

and equip mission for them. All authorities lie with DOS. In spite of this 

situation, the USSC has been able to train and equip more than two battalions of PASF. These lightly equipped battalions, to which Israel was 

initially opposed, have made a significant difference in the security situation of the West Bank and have earned Israeli acceptance. The PASF is a 

critical component of any solution that envisions a Palestinian state. 

Without an effective PASF, the Palestinian Authority (PA) cannot hope 

to aspire to a two-state solution and a government that can securely 

govern its territory. The formation of two battalions is just a beginning. 

The PASF will need to grow larger and more capable if it is to maintain 

security within a Palestinian state. The problem is even more significant 

if the Palestinian state includes Gaza, where the PA currently is not sovereign and does not maintain any PASF units. The USSC is a critical part 

of any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem and will almost certainly need to increase its capability-building capacity as part of any viable way ahead.

Colombia. The United States has partnered successfully with Colombia to meet the twin threats of an insurgency and narcoterrorism. As 

a result, a lot of analysts wonder whether there are precedents in Colombia that can be employed in Afghanistan, which is also plagued by an insurgency and narcoterrorism. While there may be some applicable 

lessons, there are also clear differences between Afghanistan and Colombia that need to be fully understood. While Colombia is not an ultramodern country and has a sizeable rural populace, it is a modern country 

in many respects with a functioning government and an educated workforce. The differences between Colombia and Afghanistan may be as significant as the similarities.
39

Current State of the Art

The key lesson, however, is pertinent to Afghanistan. The United 

States saw a clear national security interest in helping Colombia and 

made a significant, coordinated effort to help it build its capabilities and 

capacity to fight the insurgents and narcoterrorists. If we want to replicate the success in Afghanistan, we may not be able to follow the Colombia playbook. Rather, we may want to use the framework and coordinated 

approach that developed the playbook and develop a uniquely Afghan 

approach and help our Afghan partners implement and execute it. 

Current Organization 

DOD. Under the George W. Bush administration, DOD established a 

series of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) to manage programming activities for established portfolios. While this idea made a lot of 

sense in theory, the practice was somewhat flawed. The Building Partner 

Capacity (BPC) CPM included not only BPC activities, but also a plethora of other activities such as information operations. In many respects, 

it became the “catch-all” CPM. This greatly diluted its effectiveness and 

sent a negative message about the importance of building capacity and 

capability. The Obama administration has not officially disbanded the 

CPM approach but does not seem to be using them.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA is considered DOD’s premier security cooperation body—except that it really is not. DSCA is far more of a security assistance organization than a 

security cooperation organization. The name of its flagship program, 

Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM), says it 

all. DISAM is far more involved with managing foreign military sales 

programs than security cooperation programs. Most of DSCA’s efforts 

are still weighted toward selling U.S. military hardware than toward 

working with our partners to generate and sustain targeted capabilities. 

The security assistance programs tend to follow after the initial security 
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40

cooperation programs required to jointly establish capability objectives 

and then manifest them. DISAM needs to spend as much time training 

U.S. representatives on working to develop capabilities as it does teaching them to manage complex FMS cases. 

Given the different dynamics between many security assistance and 

capability-building programs, DSCA potentially needs to teach two different courses depending on where the security assistance personnel 

will be deployed. Very few countries require both complex FMS case 

management and the dynamics of joint capability generation. Poland is 

clearly an example where both programs are required. But outside of 

Poland and some other former Warsaw Pact nations, the distinction is 

much sharper.

DSCA’s strategic plan clearly positions the organization to become 

far more involved in capability programs. It is a logical place to build 

much of the connective tissue that we need in partner capability-building. It has the schools, the institutions, and the organizational weight to 

make an enormous contribution. However, it may need to refocus some 

of its efforts to achieve this potential.

NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A). This mission 

will further support the development of capable and self-sustaining Afghan National Security Forces. It will comprise senior-level mentoring 

of the ANA and an expanded role in developing a professional Afghan 

National Police. NTM–A will be collocated with CSTC–A, and one individual will be dual-hatted as the commander of both.

The NATO investment in NTM–A should help to broaden the coalition support for ANSF capability-building and improve OMLT and other 

capability generation.

NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM–I). NTM–I may be getting a 

new lease on life. NATO and Iraq are nearing a new agreement to allow 

NTM–I to remain in Iraq and work with Iraqi security forces. The NATO 
41

Current State of the Art

presence in Iraq will help to ensure a continued coalition approach to 

Iraqi security.

USCENTCOM. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) 

is the supported command for the two critical U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most capability generation in place today is to support USCENTCOM’s efforts. In order to coordinate the generation of 

Afghan and Iraqi capabilities, USCENTCOM has stood up two commands within these operations that report directly to the operational 

commanders. While CSTC–A and MNSTC–I have effectively coordinated the building of Afghan and Iraqi security forces, they are neither 

permanent organizations nor do they have organic capability-building 

forces. Both organizations need to pull personnel—often key leadership—from the operating force. Depending on how these requirements 

are sourced, this process can play havoc with brigade reset and the Army 

Force Generation process.

In conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF, and the international community, and nested with the 

U.S. Forces–Afghanistan commander’s intent, CSTC–A plans, programs, and implements the generation and development of the ANSF in 

order to enable Kabul to achieve security and stability in Afghanistan. As 

noted above, the commander of CSTC–A will be dual-hatted as the 

NTM–A commander. As part of this transformation, CSTC–A’s key 

capability-building execution arm—Task Force (TF) Phoenix—will 

move from CSTC–A to direct operational control of the newly forming 

intermediate headquarters. TF Phoenix runs the ETTs and OMLTs that 

are embedded within the ANSF and is therefore the critical capability 

organization. While this change may improve operational control, it 

could impact the mission and focus of CSTC–A/NTM–A, which may 

assume a more institutional and capacity-building role as a result.
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42

MNSTC–I, in partnership with NTM–I, USM–I, and other organizations, assists the interior and defense ministries and the Counterterrorism Bureau, generates and replenishes Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 

and improves their quality and institutional performance in order to 

increase ISF capability to assume responsibility for population protection and to develop Iraqi security institutions capable of sustaining security with reduced coalition involvement.

With the current plans to wind down combat operations in Iraq, 

MNSTC–I will almost certainly transform as well. It could maintain its 

focus and ensure Iraqi units have embedded military transition teams, or 

it could morph into an organization similar to the U.S. missions in Kuwait, Egypt, and Colombia. The two keys will be the state of the ISF and 

the size of the footprint the United States can—and is willing to—maintain in Iraq.

Department of State. The core mission of the State Coordinator 

for Stability and Reconstruction is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for postconflict situations and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition 

from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward 

peace, democracy, and a market economy. 

The Civilian Police program in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs focuses on meeting the demand for law 

enforcement, criminal justice, and corrections experts and assistance in 

postconflict societies and complex security environments. The Foreign 

Assistance Framework objective for this program is Peace and Security, 

the program area is Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform, and the program elements are Operations Support and Law Enforcement, Reform, Restructuring, and Operations.
43

Current State of the Art

Analysis

Our current system is fractured and reactive to the immediate circumstances rather than taking a systematic, holistic approach to global security requirements. These requirements cannot—and should not—be 

solved by the United States in isolation. At present, we tend to approach 

building partner capability and capacity on a one-off basis. 

The United States has many of the authorities, funding mechanisms, 

institutions, and planning constructs in place to effectively develop partner capacity and capability. However, it lacks an overall integrative approach. But even more important, while U.S. strategy and policy state 

that building partner capability and capacity is critical, U.S. actions do 

not reflect this priority. The Nation has skin in the game in certain 

areas—we are spending enormous sums in Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt, 

for example—but not overall. When a need arises for a specific requirement, we tend to cobble together authorities, funding, programs, and 

organizations. There is little or no systemic approach to building partner 

capabilities and capacity in the global security and stability context, and 

almost no recognition that this effort by itself helps to make the globe a 

safer place and one more conducive to U.S. interests.

If we are serious about the need to build partner capability and 

capacity, we need to conduct a complete review and overhaul of our 

system to include authorities, funding mechanisms, processes, and 

organizational structures.

Funding. An enormous percentage of our security assistance budget each year goes to two countries—Egypt and Israel. The United 

States began this funding nearly 30 years ago as part of the Camp 

David agreements between the two. At the time, the funding made a 

great deal of sense. In the intervening years, however, the situation has 

changed. It may well be time to seriously reevaluate the return that we 
Skin in the Game

44

get on this enormous security assistance investment and whether it is 

time to redeploy it.

In addition, most security assistance funding is provided through 

Title 22, which is controlled by DOS. These funds are part of the overall 

DOS budget for foreign assistance and can be reprogrammed, perhaps 

without any coordination. The DOS F Process greatly complicates security assistance funding and execution. Given the often technical issues 

that span the entire DOTMLPF set of requirements, the F Process may 

not be the best way to manage security assistance funds. We may need to 

establish a process that separates security assistance funding from the 

rest of the foreign assistance funding in order to ensure both DOD and 

DOS have adequate visibility and control.

Arguably, 1206/1207/1208 funding provides this dual-key approach. 

However, these funds do not have the flexibility of normal funding within 

Title 22 security assistance funding. Their application is significantly constrained, leaving many important capability- and capacity-building programs ineligible for funding. In addition, they are capped and the approval 

process is complex and opaque. Congress has also placed significant constraints on the programs and has nearly canceled them several times. They 

live on a year-to-year basis.

Furthermore, we need an effective adjudication system to handle disagreements on security assistance funding between DOD and DOS. The 

phrase “Heads I win, tails you lose,” often captures the current situation. 

Both DOS and DOD have critical insights into partner requirements and 

national strategy. Thus, both departments need to have equal voices in 

establishing priorities and allocating resources for security assistance. 

Authorities. As we have seen, the authorities required to manage 

even small programs are exceedingly complex. While there are many good 

reasons for the existence of authorities such as program control, accountability, and funds management, we need to streamline the complex, often 
45

Current State of the Art

Byzantine maze of authorities and simplify the process for program 

managers. We need to establish the minimum number of authorities that 

provide the required control and accountability. 

Organization. At present, the United States does not have an organization that manages the complete process of building partner capability and capacity. Rather, organizations develop on an ad hoc basis and 

then try to interface with each other where they can. This creates competing demands for which there is little or no mechanism for adjudicating differences, establishing priorities, and rationally allocating resources.

We need a systematic approach and defined organizational structure 

and processes to manage the capability-building network flow shown in 

figure 8, which actually oversimplifies the process as it reflects only one 

geographic combatant command and does not include the multiple DOD 

and DOS agencies that have roles in or influence over capability- and 

capacity-building. In addition, the individual Services often get involved 

in a target country, sometimes without coordinating with the GCC in 

order to push Service-specific programs. Finally, while figure 8 shows 

coalitions as part of the process, it understates how complex the interaction with coalition partners in capability- and capacity-building can be. 

Coalition partners may have competing requirements and hence duplicate or fragment the overall effort within a selected partner country. 

DSCA, at least by name, seems to have a master role in coordinating 

security assistance. However, the organization is focused on FMS and, to 

a lesser extent, FMF and IMET and does not take a comprehensive approach to the entire process of security cooperation. We may need to 

reassess DSCA’s organization and mandate to make it more adaptable to 

meet emerging security cooperation requirements and perhaps provide 

more coordinating processes to ensure the entire DOD capability- and 

capacity-building system is properly coordinated.
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46

These NSF [PASF] troops, who replaced either Israeli 

soldiers or Palestinian gangs, have been warmly received 

by the locals. Recently, NSF forces wiped out a Hamas 

cell in Qalqilya, and took losses themselves. The death 

of the Hamas fighters drew nary a peep, but a memorial 

service for the NSF soldiers killed drew thousands of 

people. For the first time, I’ve heard top Israeli military 

officers say these new Palestinian troops are professional and for real.

—Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, August 8, 2009

“

“
47

Capability-building 

A Way Ahead

As the epigraph and evidence from Colombia and Iraq show, capacity-building programs can be successful. We have had many programmatic successes in building partner capability and capacity. However, 

almost all of them had to be built from scratch and have their funding 

and authorities assembled—in many cases by program-specific legislation. In the case of the PASF, it is almost a skunk works, successful 

largely because of its leadership quietly making things happen and tirelessly searching to find workarounds.

While the ad hoc program approach does provide success, it does 

not create easily replicable success in new programs since it is not a 

systematic approach. It does not provide an effective way to create and 

manage programs and prioritize, allocate, and, just as importantly, 

reallocate investments.

In order to effectively put U.S. skin in the capability- and capacitybuilding game, we need to adopt a far more systematic and holistic approach than the one-off approach we generally take. Even when some of 

those approaches are huge, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are still largely 

ad hoc, with a solution developed to meet specific needs and requirements. Whether the solutions involve authorities, funding, programs, or 

organizations, they are ad hoc. There is practically nothing—other than 

the ideas and concepts—that we have created in MNSTC–I or CSTC–A 

that will survive the end of our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Chapter 3
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48

These ideas and concepts need to be incorporated into an overall approach and the organizations need to be thoroughly reviewed to determine the best way to build similar organizations for other operations.

Our program building tools need to be easy to use and transparent 

and provide the proper accountability and controls. They need to be 

nimble and adjust to changing dynamics. They need to rapidly digest the 

lessons of successful programs and replicate themselves as appropriate 

to other programs. They need to be part of a comprehensive system that 

spans the range of organizations shown in figure 8.

Our investment system needs to be transparent, with well-defined 

rules and an open portfolio approach to ensure we make rational investment decisions in partner capability and capacity—and redeploy the 

investment when either the return on investment drops because of 

changing circumstances or lack of partner participation or will, or because the partner has become capable of sustaining the capability.

We need a central agency or body to manage the processes and to 

coordinate resource flow, program management training, and investment management and to help rapidly create new programs to meet 

emerging requirements. 

We need to ensure the GCCs are intimately involved in the process 

and have the capacity to manage one or multiple programs depending 

upon requirements—and can rapidly stand up and stand down efforts 

and readily redeploy resources. They must have programmatic authority 

over the key resources required to build capability and capacity. To do 

this, the GCCs must have a dedicated organization that can plan, program, and execute partnership capacity-building. They must also have 

strong relationships with DOS and potentially DHS to coordinate security sector capability- and capacity-building programs. 

We should consider a combined, interagency approach to capability- and capacity-building at each GCC. From a combined perspective, 
49

A Way Ahead

the GCC capability- and capacity-building organization should include 

highly interoperable and capable framework allies. DOS and DHS 

should also be key members of this team. Both allies and interagency 

members should hold positions within the organization and not simply 

be liaison officers. This organization should coordinate efforts across the 

range of U.S. and allied interests and requirements.

In addition, a comprehensive approach must include a full spectrum 

of engagement with our partner countries to set capacity-building objectives. This integrated approach is especially important when we work 

with partners to build deployable capability to support out-of-area operations. All allied and U.S. interagency expertise must be brought to 

bear to understand the dynamics of the capability investment decision 

and to both understand and influence the partner. The best capability 

programs to support out-of-area operations will not succeed if the partner does not have the national will to deploy the capability.

Authorities and Funding

One of the key inhibitors to systematic success is the patchwork quilt of 

authorities and one-off legislation that complicates any capability- and 

capacity-building program. Program managers need to invest inordinate 

amounts of time to cobble together the authorities required for each 

program, no matter how large or small. In addition, many of the authorities required span Title 10 and Title 22 or require 1206/1207/1208 

funding, further complicating any program and adding time to the 

startup process.

To correct these problems, we need to streamline partnership capability- and capacity-building authorities into a coherent system that a 

single program manager can readily access and control. 

The place to start is with the military-related components of Title 22: 

IMET, FMF, and FMS. These programs are central to any partnership 
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50

program, but they are controlled by the State Department as part of the 

overall foreign assistance program. The Geographic Combatant Commander, who perhaps best understands the requirements for these programs in their AOR, has no control—and at times little influence—over 

the programming and budgeting of these funds. The United States needs 

a regional and global comprehensive approach to managing these authorities and coordinating their employment. While there are statutory 

limitations on how these funds can be employed, an integrated approach 

will be far more effective.

Practically every capability- and capacity-building program will require the balancing and integration shown in figure 11. At the GCC 

level, a combined interagency capability- and capacity-building organization can work together to manage the balancing and integration process to ensure that all funding and authorities are approached as an 

integrated portfolio that is supported by both DOS and DOD.

Figure 11. Joint State Department and Defense Department Capability- and 

Capacity-building

Capability- and Capacity-building Overlap

STATE

■ Title 22

■ Funding source

■ Chief of Mission

DEFENSE

■ Title 10

■ Large capability

■ Military expertise
51

A Way Ahead

There must be a similar approach at the national level to integrate 

and prioritize programs between GCCs, as well as national programs. 

Potentially, DSCA could form the kernel of a program to perform this 

task. To do this, however, we will need to transform DSCA and make it 

a true interagency body for security cooperation. We might also consider renaming DSCA to reflect the interagency approach. The Partnership Security Cooperation Agency (PSCA) would be a good name that would 

encompass inclusion of other agencies such as DHS in addition to DOS 

and DOD. 

Likewise, the GCC will need to take an interagency approach. It 

needs DOS representatives who have connections throughout DOS 

from the Embassies back to Foggy Bottom embedded in its capabilityand capacity-building organization. They need to be able to link together 

both the GCC and the DOS programs and provide the clear picture required to deconflict efforts and to create synergy.

At both the national and GCC levels, program managers will need 

to integrate the capability- and capacity-building programs with the 

spectrum of other programs that employ Title 22 funding. They must 

understand the scope and impact of mandated Title 22 spending and 

work to leverage these mandates as well as discretionary nonsecurity 

assistance funding.

While there will almost certainly always be a legal separation between Title 10 and Title 22, we can work to create more effective synchronization. The process needs to be far more open and integrated into 

an overall portfolio management process. The Title 22 funds allocated to 

security cooperation need to be set aside and jointly programmed in an 

open manner. When funds need to be reprogrammed, this effort also 

must be open and include not only DOD and DOS programmers at the 

national level, but programmers at the regional and GCC level as well.
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52

One possible solution is to move the security portion of Title 22 

funding into the 1206/1207/1208 funding. These funds would then have 

both DOS and DOD funding and be able to use the existing joint funding and approval mechanisms already in place. To do this, Congress 

would need to strengthen these programs and make them permanent. 

Currently, 1206/1207/1208 operates on a year-to-year basis. Some 

Members of Congress are skeptical of the programs and want to eliminate them. Congress may want to consider joint Armed Services/Foreign Affairs committees that provide oversight to the 1206/1207/1208 

programs and focus on capability- and capacity-building efforts.

In addition to managing the synergies between Title 10 and Title 

22 more effectively, we need to review the spectrum of authorities 

shown in tables 3 through 7. As the Hungarian examples in table 10 

and figure 9 show, the network of authorities required for even small 

efforts is complex. 

The range of authorities exists for good reasons—to provide control, congressional oversight, and accountability. The lack of accountability and control in some of the programs in Afghanistan and Iraq 

clearly reinforces these needs. We have tremendous sums of money we 

cannot properly account for and precious little to show for the efforts in 

some places.

However, a complex basket of authorities that make program development difficult is not the only way to provide the required controls. 

Modern accounting systems provide both the control and the accountability required to effectively manage these programs. A good accounting system can provide the same level of control without as many of the 

complexities. As we reengineer DSCA to make it a more effective security cooperation organization, we should include an accounting system 

that will provide clear controls, reporting, and oversight. DSCA should 

then be required to provide monthly and quarterly reports to the joint 
53

A Way Ahead

Armed Services/Foreign Affairs committee for review and analysis. 

Since DSCA already has a system in place for case management, they 

may have the core capabilities to expand into overall portfolio management and control.

The concept of portfolio management is key to effective decisionmaking and program execution. We currently segregate our capabilityand capacity-building efforts into separate systems and approval 

mechanisms, which degrades our ability to manage the overall effort and 

to make sound investment decisions. Capacity- and capability-building is 

an investment decision that needs to be approached from an integrated 

perspective to make sound decisions that maximize limited resources 

and clearly support U.S. national security objectives. A new PSCA needs 

to be able to effectively manage these investment portfolios at the national level. The GCCs need to be able to create viable investment proposals that can compete for funding based upon a ranking system similar 

to that shown in table 2. PSCA should then include an additional set of 

metrics that reflect national priorities in order to rank the investment 

proposals and to create an overall portfolio of approved and funded programs. A joint investment board from DOD and DOS should make the 

investment decisions.

The process may look something like that depicted in figure 12. It 

envisions two investment board levels. Each GCC will create an interagency joint investment board that includes representatives from DOD, 

DOS, and other agencies as required. Likewise, the national boards will 

also be interagency boards with standing members from DOD and DOS 

and other agencies included as required. The NSC and Congress provide 

oversight to the process. 
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54

Figure 12. Capability and Capacity Investment Process 

Approved

Portfolio

Congressional

Oversight

Joint Investment

Board

National Security

Council

GCC Program

Managers

Partnership Security

Cooperation Agency

Portfolio Managers

Department of Defense

Building Partner

Capacity Capability

Portfolio Manager

GCC Investment

Board

Approved Geographic Combatant Command (GCC)

investment worksheets

GCC investment

worksheets

Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency

investment worksheets

The process should also take into account the existing DOD Capability Portfolio Manager process discussed above. The BPC CPM should 

be reorganized to include only partnership capability- and capacitybuilding initiatives rather than the current broad basket of projects it 

currently manages. As shown in figure 12, it should provide guidance to 

the PSCA portfolio managers and coordinate their review. If DOS has a 

similar body, it should also provide guidance and coordination.

Programs

Programs exist at both the national and the regional level. At the national level, they should either support named operations or seek to 

develop specific partnership capabilities. At the regional level, programs 

should support stated regional or partner country capability-building 
55

A Way Ahead

efforts. Unfortunately, with the exception of a few key large programs, 

such as CSTC–A and MNSTC–I and some large national programs such 

as Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, we do not manage 

most of our efforts as programs. Far too often, we tend to manage each 

project and, in some cases, engagement as a separate event rather than 

linking them to specific objectives and managing them as a program.

Where possible, programs should have well-defined objectives and 

endstates. For example, we previously discussed the example objective, 

“Develop the capability to conduct a sustained deployment, in conjunction with NATO, of a light infantry company for full-spectrum combat 

operations to respond to global security crisis within the next two 

years.” This objective can then be used to build a program that has a 

defined endstate, a measurable outcome, and a defined timeline. Based 

upon the assessment of current capabilities and capacity, the GCC can 

then develop a program engaging the spectrum of DOTMLPF requirements to accomplish the objective. In the example, the program could 

consist of familiarization events, training, equipping, building training 

ranges, defense modernization, and reform engagements and joint exercises to build and to evaluate the capability.

Capability objectives are key to the process. A capability objective 

clearly states what the partner and the United States and framework 

nations want to build and why. Building capacity is an enabling task to 

meet the capability objective. Capacity is a means to an end and not 

the end itself.

Thus, programs have several key components:

• defined capability objective

• program design and budgeting

• program execution

• program assessment with defined metrics

• program completion.
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Determining the capability objective. Our discussion in the 

theory portion of this paper discussed setting a capability objective once 

a need is established. Figure 2 shows the key steps of determining the 

need, conducting assessments, and then ensuring the partner’s national 

will supports the objective. Even when the objective appears to be capacity-oriented, such as in some defense reform and modernization efforts, 

it should be expressed in capability goals. The purpose of reform and 

modernization is not simply to create improved processes and structures. 

These new processes and structures exist to enable capability generation. 

Thus, rather than state an objective as, “build an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) academy within two years,” the objective should be 

an enabling task to create interoperable doctrine, which is an enabling 

task for specific capabilities—such as the full-spectrum light infantry 

company used in the example above. Granted, the NCO academy and 

doctrine development will support multiple capability objectives.

We are left with a circular question. Does the capacity come first, 

or does the capability come first? If we start building capacity before we 

know what capability we want it to support, we could create structure 

the partner does not need. The concept is similar to building a factory 

without knowing the product it will produce. Generally speaking, the 

factory layout is tailored to the product. Factories are often reengineered when a new product is introduced. Thus, while a project may 

develop capacity first, the program should do so with the capability 

objective(s) clearly in mind and support them.

Need can be established in several ways. If the capability is to support ongoing operations, such as ISAF, then the commander validates 

requirements and asks for capabilities. For ISAF, this is then expressed in 

the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. For operational planning, the need is normally expressed as part of the commander’s capability requirements. These could include U.S. planning, coalition planning, 
57

A Way Ahead

or planning for the partner nation’s security. Another example is to develop capabilities for designed regional forces or response forces. Examples include a Baltic battalion or the NATO response force. Civil 

security capability needs may be developed through a comprehensive 

assessment of current capabilities. The capabilities matrix in table 1 may 

also be useful for force planning requirements.

Once the need is expressed, planners must determine whether sufficient capability exists or whether there is a requirement to build the 

capability. This starts the assessment process. In some cases, we may already have a specific partner in mind—either because the partner has 

offered the capability or because we know the partner has a core competency we can build upon. In other cases, we may need to determine 

which partners may be the best candidates for capability development.

Assessments, therefore, can take two forms. If we do not have a 

partner identified, the program team will need to conduct a quick assessment to determine likely partners and then discuss the capabilitybuilding program with likely candidates. Once we have identified a 

partner for the program, a more detailed assessment must be conducted 

to determine the scope of the program.

The qualities shown in figures 3 through 7 are the key data elements 

that GCCs can use to facilitate these assessments. The GCC can develop 

a score sheet such as the one shown in table 11. Program managers can 

then send this sheet out to ODCs, regional education centers such as the 

Marshall Center, GCC country desk officers, Joint Staff desk officers, 

and DOS desk officers, and ask for a rating. Regional education centers 

can assist in developing questionnaires and refining the rating matrix like 

the one shown in table 11. 
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58

Table 11. Country Rating

Country:

Metric

Unknown

(1)

Weak

(2) (3) (4)

Moderate

(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Strong

(10)

Will to employ ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Will to deploy ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Will to fight ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Will to reduce 

caveats ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Political 

importance ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Existing capacity ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Interoperability ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Since the evaluation criteria should be consistent across GCCs and 

PSCA, and other agencies such as the Business Transformation Agency 

may develop standardized ratings that can be used in surveys and assessments, these groups can also help to develop the tools for graphical 

depiction of the data.

While these ratings may be subjective, they will probably be close to 

accurate. The scores can then be updated based on more detailed assessments. Once the scores are averaged, they can be plotted in the matrices 

shown in figures 3 through 7. The matrices provide a powerful visual 

plot of the partners, and the quadrants can be very useful in determining 

potential capabilities that each partner can manifest. For example, the 

matrix in figure 3 can help the programmer to quickly spot likely candidates for global deployment requirements and rule out those that are 

less suitable. When combined with the information in figure 6, the planner can narrow the field down even further. The scores can also be used 

to complete the worksheet shown in table 2. 

Once a partner is selected and agrees to the capability objective, the 

GCC needs to conduct a joint assessment of the partner’s current capability and capacity. During the Georgia crisis in 2009, U.S. European 
59

A Way Ahead

Command developed a modular construct, the Armed Forces Assessment Team (AFAT), to conduct an assessment of the Georgian armed 

forces. This team provided a “plug and play” approach that can be 

adapted for general capability and capability assessment teams. The 

AFAT consisted of a core team that ran the overall assessment and modules that were to be implemented as required to conduct specific portions of the assessment. 

The AFAT’s final report may provide a good template for the report. 

The key is to ensure the report clearly identifies the requirements by 

DOTMLPF element required to build, sustain, and (if needed) deploy 

the capability. Each GCC can develop a standing assessment team and 

execute order template based on this concept. 

While the standing country assessment rates the national will, the 

program manager will need to ensure it is specifically validated for a 

given capability objective. Ideally, the country team should get a memorandum of agreement signed by the partner’s ministry of defense and 

ministry of foreign affairs (and ministry of interior as required) as well 

as the U.S. Ambassador and other framework nation ambassadors that 

states the agreed capability objective and outlines the program.

Program design and budgeting. Once the assessment is complete, the program manager uses the findings in the report to build a 

specific program design to manifest the capacity objective. The design 

includes all aspects of DOTMLPF required to build, sustain, and, where 

appropriate, deploy the capability. The DOTMLPF provides a powerful 

outline for program design and should be used to group the various activities involved in the design and to ensure the design does not leave out 

critical components.

The program design should contain as much detail as possible and 

be jointly developed with the partner and framework partners. It is a 

partnership document that identifies the tasks to be accomplished, who 
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60

will accomplish them, and who will provide the resources. A potential 

format is shown in table 12. This table is ideally the front end of a program management database. 

Table 12. Program Design Worksheet

Country

Program Name

Program Objective

Task Agent Resource Provider Estimated Cost

Doctrine

 Tasks

Organization

 Tasks

Training

 Tasks

Materials

 Tasks

Leadership

 Tasks

Personnel

 Tasks

Facilities

 Tasks

Program execution. Program execution requires continual monitoring and plan updates to effectively manage execution. The GCC 

needs to establish and maintain positive control over the execution and 

ensure the program is moving forward to meet the established capability 

objective and accomplish the designated tasks. Execution agents will 

need to develop detailed plans and then carry them out.

Detailed planning. The program manager should coordinate overall development of the execution plan. As part of this effort, the manager 

should include the capability objective in the CCP and list the primary 

tasks assigned to each component or other execution agent. Components/execution agent detailed plans should be program annexes.
61

A Way Ahead

Once the program is designed, the execution agent for each task 

needs to complete a detailed plan for task execution. This includes refining the task details, setting milestones assigning units/personnel and 

resources, and developing any control measures. Program managers will 

need to work with the execution agents to ensure all plans are up to date 

and support any program changes.

To do this, the GCC will need to maintain a capacity-building Common Operational Picture (COP). The COP should include the matrices 

shown in figures 3 through 7, as well as key metrics that reflect measures 

of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

A potential rough-out of a capability-building COP is shown in figure 13. It includes the three key matrices that look at national will for 

type of forces to build, national will to deploy and employ these forces, 

and capability and interoperability. The countries in the GCC show up 

in the appropriate quadrants, depending upon their scores. The countries are hotlinks. Clicking on a country fills in the Focus Country data 

in the bottom part of the COP. Each of the MOPs and MOEs in this area 

are hotlinks that can be drilled down into to get information about specific events. The Current Efforts section is a scrollable list that shows 

countries with current capability-building programs, hotlinked by country and by program. 
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62

Figure 13. Capability-building Common Operational Picture

Internal Security Global

Security

Do Nothing Regional

Security

Will to Deploy

Will to Employ

Peace

Operations

Full-spectrum

Combat 

Operations

Support

Operations

Security

Operations

Will to Eliminate Caveats

Will to Fight

C4ISR 

Building

Framework

Nation

Small Unit

Combat 

Capabilities

Building

Interoperability

Capacity

Current 

Efforts 

Country 

Program

Military-to-military Engagements ■ Will

Military-to-civilian Engagements ■ Capability

Civil Security Engagements ■ Interoperability

Civic Engagements Deployments

Exercises Regional Engagement

Construction Coalition Engagement

Equipping

Deployments

Current Budget

Measures of Performance Measures of Effectiveness

 

 Planned Executed Cancelled %

Focus Partner

Country: Program:
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A Way Ahead

MOPs measure whether the program has accomplished planned 

tasks. As shown in figure 13, these can include engagements (by type), 

exercises, construction, equipping, deployments, and budget execution. 

These metrics should give a snapshot of the program execution status. 

Each metric should be a hotlink that allows drilldown into individual 

engagements or tasks to provide details.

MOEs measure the effectiveness of the program—in other words, 

are we doing the right things to achieve the Capability Objective? Potential MOEs shown in figure 13 include changes in will, capability, and 

interoperability, as well as the number of operational deployments the 

program produces and the partner’s engagement with other partners in 

the region, and, if appropriate, a coalition or alliance.

Program assessment. Each GCC should develop a Capabilitybuilding Executive Steering Council (CBESC), which should convene 

monthly to assess current programs as well as to approve new programs. 

As part of the assessment process, program managers should brief current MOPs and MOEs for their programs and recommend program 

changes based upon their assessment. They should also be prepared to 

recommend program termination if the capability objective is achieved 

or if the assessment indicates that it is no longer achievable.

Program completion. When a program manager recommends 

program termination, the CBESC will review the assessment and make 

a final determination. 

If the program is terminated before completion, the CBESC will 

need to review the political-military issues involved, the impact on the 

partnership, and potential ways to either change the capability objective 

to make it achievable or to mitigate the impact of program termination.

If the program is terminated because of completion, the CBESC 

should determine whether there are follow-on objectives that can expand 
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64

the existing program or whether resources should be redeployed to 

other programs.

In either case, program termination is a critical portfolio management decision. The CBESC should not continue programs simply for the 

sake of the program or of engagement with a given partner. If the 

CBESC feels additional engagement is required, it should make a deliberate decision to create a new program. 

Program synchronization. With any given partner, there may be 

a multitude of engagement activities across the full range of military 

events and interagency engagements. Since many interagency efforts are 

outside the GCC span of control, the GCC Capability COP should also 

include as many of these efforts as possible to seek ways to synchronize 

them and develop program synergies. This will require a robust interagency cooperative effort. Depending on the GCC, the CBESC may be 

periodically expanded to include interagency partners for the review 

process. In GCCs with a mature interagency process, interagency representatives should be standing members of the CBESC. 

The GCC’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or 

equivalent could be an excellent place to coordinate and synchronize 

programs. This group should have representatives from many of the 

agencies that have programs within the GCC AOR. While it cannot direct efforts, it can provide a useful venue for synchronization.

GCCs may want to take the process a step further and create a 

Partnership Coordination Center (PCC). It would be the center for 

planning and managing all partnering activities, both military and civilian, within the GCC. Properly structured, a PCC would include 

both the GCC’s theater support command planning and management 

personnel as well as the interagency representatives normally associated with a JIACG or equivalent organization. A sample structure for 

a PCC is shown in figure 14.
65

A Way Ahead

Figure 14. Partnership Coordination Center

COE

Defense Threat

Reduction Agency

U.S. Agency 

for International

Development

Department 

of State

■ Office of the Coordinator

 for Reconstruction and

 Stabilization

■ International Narcotics

 and Law Enforcement

 Affairs

■ Regional

■ Programs

■ Nongovernmental/private

 voluntary organization

 liaison officer

■ Intergovernmental

 liaison officer

Department of

Homeland Security

■ Customs and Border 

 Protection

■ Immigration and Customs

 Enforcement

■ Federal Emergency 

 Management Agency

■ U.S. Coast Guard

Department

of Justice

■ Federal Bureau 

 of Investigation

■ Rule of Law

Internal

Security

Global

Security

Do Nothing Regional

Security

Will to Deploy

Will to Employ

Peace

Operations

Full-spectrum

Combat

Operations

Support

Operations

Security

Operations

Will to Eliminate Caveats

Will to Fight

C4ISR 

Building

Framework

Nation

Small Unit Combat

Capabilities

Building

Interoperability

Capacity

Current Efforts 

Country Program

Military-to-military Engagements ■ Will

Military-to-civilian Engagements ■ Capability

Civil Security Engagements ■ Interoperability

Civic Engagements Deployments

Exercises Regional Engagement

Construction Coalition Engagement

Equipping

Deployments

Current Budget

Measures of Performance Measures of Effectiveness

 

 Planned Executed Cancelled %

Focus Partner

Country: Program:

Civil 

Partnering

Military

Partnering

■ Security Cooperation Programs

■ Theater Security Cooperation Plans

■ State Partnership Program

■ Office of Defense Cooperation 

 Management 

■ Civil-military Programs

■ Partnership Programs
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66

Elements in this structure can change as required by the GCC and 

the partners. The military partnering and civil partnering elements are 

permanent structures from the GCC. The other elements are from other 

DOD agencies or other departments. Depending on the situation, there 

may be NGO/private voluntary organization/intergovernmental organization liaisons under the U.S. Agency for International Development 

representative, which builds upon existing relationships. The PCC director should be a military 2-star with a civilian deputy.

This center could administer the portfolio management system 

shown in figure 12 and the program design and budgeting for the GCC. 

Assessments could be part of the PCC or a separate function in order to 

strengthen control measures.

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69

Recommendations

Reorganize DSCA in a joint interagency security 

cooperation agency. 

• Relabel DSCA as Partnership Security Cooperation Agency and 

staff it with DOD and DOS personnel. Currently, DSCA is a DOD 

organization. However, virtually all security cooperation programs 

require a great deal of integration and cooperation between DOD 

and DOS. Recognize these requirements and change DSCA to 

PSCA with integrated DOD and DOS leadership and structure.

• Change the DISAM focus from FMS to integrated security cooperation programs. As noted above, DSCA’s current programs are 

heavily weighted toward FMS cases. DISAM deals almost exclusively with FMS case management. While FMS is critical, it is just 

one part of integrated security cooperation programs. DISAM 

curriculum needs to reflect the spectrum of integrated security 

cooperation programs and how to plan and implement them. 

Core curriculum should emphasize an integrated DOS/DOD 

security cooperation program and portfolio management. Case 

studies should include building mutually supporting MSPs and 

CCPs and the program and portfolio required to execute an objective in these plans. Electives should include more detail on 

FMS case management and other specific activities. Students 

should tailor DISAM electives based upon the requirements of the 

Embassy in which they will work. Country team members should 
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70

be able to take other DISAM electives on line as the requirements 

in their partner nation change.

• Charge the new organization with administering joint security 

cooperation programs. Conduct far more seamless program management between DOS and DOD. Ensure integrated controls are 

in place and develop the systems required to jointly administer 

security cooperation programs and funding. Provide executive 

reports to Congress, DOD, and DOS. Manage authorities and 

provide joint recommendations to Congress on authorities and 

funding requirements.

• Implement interagency security cooperation program and portfolio management. Implement the integrated program and portfolio management process shown in figure 12. Create a Joint Investment Board within PSCA and a group of regionally focused 

portfolio managers who will work with DOD, DOS, and other 

agencies as required to manage broad portfolios and evaluate their 

returns on investments. Portfolio managers will provide investment decisions to the Joint Investment Board, which will determine broad investment decisions between regions and specific 

capability-building programs. It will establish overall investment 

guidance and review portfolios as appropriate.

• Revise the F process to ensure effective DOS/DOD coordination 

over security sector Title 22 funding. Modify the current F process to allow greater DOD involvement in the planning and budgeting of Title 22 security sector funds. Ideally, these funds will 

be planned and budgeted by the Joint Investment Board within a 

PSCA. When changes occur that require reprogramming to meet 

new circumstances or requirements, PSCA should assess the security sector impact and make reprogramming recommendations to 

the Joint Investment Board.
71

Recommendations

• Create a more robust 1206/1207/1208 program to provide an 

integrated approach to security sector funding. Expand the funds 

and authorities available under these programs. Allow DOD to 

contribute more to these funds. The Joint Investment Board in 

PSCA should manage the programming and allocation of these 

funds. Consider placing all security sector Title 22 funds in 

1206/1207/1208 as well as the DOD funds.

• Create a systematic approach to security sector program and portfolio management. Develop a system from the national level to the 

GCC level to manage security cooperation as shown in figure 12. 

Rather than view each program and authority as separate investments, manage countries and GCCs as investment portfolios. Develop the integrated business processes and investment metrics to 

evaluate programs at the GCC and national levels in order to make 

holistic investment decisions that look at all resources required for 

a program and its expected returns. Form the Joint Investment 

Boards and other oversight boards at the GCC and national levels 

to make investment decisions.

Standardize capability- and capacity-building systems. 

• Ensure common business practices across regions. While each 

GCC has unique requirements that will shape their specific engagements, the overall business practices need to be standardized 

to ensure a common approach and to readily make priority and 

resource decisions. Specifically, the program investment worksheets need to be standardized. Other practices, such as assessments and COPs, also are prime candidates for standardization to 

ensure free flow of information with a common format. 
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72

• Ensure common naming and functions across regions. Currently, 

different GCCs have different naming conventions and functions. 

While at times the functions may have a common endstate, their 

processes, names, and organizational design may be quite different. Where possible, common functions and positions should have 

standardized names, processes, and descriptions. This will help to 

reduce informational friction throughout the system and provide 

greater flexibility for mutual support.

Combine phase zero and SSTR into a seamless

approach to SSTR. 

• Develop a common doctrine that supports what is currently called 

phase zero and SSTR. Combine the approach and organizations that 

perform phase zero and SSTR functions into a standardized approach to partner capability-building. Develop a common doctrine 

that combines SSTR and other capability efforts into an integrated 

approach to partnership building. This combined doctrine will 

speed SSTR efforts in postconflict situations as well as provide a 

more standardized approach to all capability-building efforts.

• Create SSTR structures that GCCs can employ during all facets of 

SSTR activity. Review the current organizations and processes developed for OEF and OIF and develop permanent SSTR organizations that GCCs can employ on an ongoing basis. Each GCC should 

have a team that can deploy throughout its AOR to conduct joint 

assessments and manage SSTR and capability-building efforts.
73

About the Author

Brigadier General Jeffery E. Marshall, ARNG (Ret.), was the Deputy 

Director, Plans and Policy, J5, U.S. European Command, as well as the 

command’s executive liaison to the State Partnership Program. Prior to 

this assignment, he commanded the Maryland Army National Guard’s 

29th Joint Task Force Augmentation Team and led the unit’s deployment 

to Afghanistan in 2002–2003. While in Afghanistan, BG Marshall was the 

Director of the Afghan National Army Reconstruction Team that did the 

original design and building of the Afghan National Army and Border 

Police. This team also developed the training and mentoring programs 

and built the initial Afghan National Security Forces barracks, infrastructure, and training facilities. He also commanded the 29th Infantry Division (Light) brigade as part of Stabilization Force 10 in Bosnia (October 

2001–April 2002). BG Marshall is a 1981 graduate of the United States 

Military Academy.

Cover: Multinational color guard lines up for Multinational Division 

Central South change of command ceremony, July 2006. 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Air Force/Adrian Cadiz.
“Skin in the game”: Partnership in Establishing 

and Maintaining Global Security and Stability

From the Preface by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN

[This] book . . . provides a detailed analysis of what we need to do to 

effectively build and sustain enduring partnerships, examines our current state, and provides a roadmap with specific, actionable recommendations to strengthen our processes and employ a holistic joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approach to partnerships. Two of the insights that I think we often miss are that our 

partners have a say in the process and that we need to manage the 

process as an integrated portfolio and make investment/reinvestment 

decisions based upon capability objectives that we and our partners 

agree upon. The U.S. military simply cannot engage alone. Partnership must be planned and executed in order to set meaningful objectives as well as to synchronize available resources to achieve them.