Science and Technology

The Making of the

Air Force Research Laboratory

ROBERT W. DUFFNER

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

2000
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of th

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release

distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Catloging-in-Publication Data

Duffner, Robert W.

Science and technology : the making of the Air Force Research Laboratory / Robe

W. Duffner.

 p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN 1-58566-085-X

1. Air Force Research Laboratory (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio) I. Title.

UG644.W75 D84 2000

358.4’0072073—dc21 00-06430

ii
For Carol, Kelly, Susanne, and Tyler,

Who make life more interesting and worthwhile
Contents

Chapter Pag

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Part 1

The Decision

 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . . . 

 3 The Catalyst: National Defense

Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . . . 2

 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . . . 7

 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . . . . . 9

 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the

Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Part 2

The Transition

 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . . . . . . 16

 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

v
Chapter Pag

 12 Other Perspectives: Independent

Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . . . . . . 22

 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Appendix

 A Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 B Laboratory Consolidations prior to

Formation of a Single Laboratory . . . . . . . . . 28

 C Orders Activating the Air Force

Research Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Illustrations

 Figure

 1 Infrastructure Requirements for

Defense Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

 2 Air Force S&T Manpower Reductions,

Program 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 3 Manpower Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 4 Air Force Battlelab Locations . . . . . . . . . . . 8

 5 Single-Laboratory Organization . . . . . . . . . . 11

 6 Vision 21 Background Infrastructure . . . . . . . 12

 7 S&T Strategy—Single-Laboratory

Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 8 Old versus New Laboratory Structure:

AFMC Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

vi
 Figure Pag

 9 Merging Vision and Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 10 Issues Influencing the Creation

of a Single Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 11 General Viccellio’s Initial Vision of Single-Lab

Organization, 26 November 1996 . . . . . . . . . 13

 12 Phased Implementation Approach

for a Single Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 13 Second Stage of the Implementation Plan . . . . . 14

 14 Evolution of the Single Lab . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 15 Single-Lab Transition Structure . . . . . . . . . . 15

 16 AFRL Technology Directorates . . . . . . . . . . 17

 17 AFRL Directorate Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

 18 AFRL Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

 19 AFRL Emblem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 20 Proposed Organization—AFRL, Phase II . . . . . . 25

 21 Pre-AFRL S&T Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 22 Air Force Research Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . 26

Photo

Maj Gen Richard R. Paul . . . . . . . . . . . . . frontispiec

Maj Gen Richard R. Paul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Dr. Donald C. Daniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Tim Dues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Dr. Vince Russo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Col Dennis Markisello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Dr. George R. Abrahamson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

vii
Photo Pag

Dr. Sheila E. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Dr. Gene McCall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Lt Gen Lawrence P. Farrell Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Blaise Durante . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Ms. Wendy Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Dr. Robert “Bart” Barthelemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

AFRL’s First Technology Directors

as of October 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Col Richard W. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Dr. Brendan B. Godfrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Col John Rogacki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Tables

 1 Consolidation of 13 Air Force Laboratories . . . . 1

 2 Air Force “Laboratories” Identified

for Vision 21 Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

 3 Total Laboratory Manpower

(Fiscal Years 1989–2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 4 End State No. 3: Single Air Force

Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

 5 Bergamo Meeting Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 6 Air Force Single-Lab Transition Staff

(January 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 7 Task Groups and Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 8 Technology Directorate Task-Group

Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

viii
Table Pag

 9 Decision Options, AFRL Directorates . . . . . . . 17

 10 First Directors, Deputies,

and Chief Scientists of AFRL . . . . . . . . . . . 18

 11 Air Force Research Laboratory:

Before and After . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 12 Road-Show Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 13 Independent Assessment Board . . . . . . . . . . 21

 14 Grassroots Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

 15 XP Task Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 16 Colonel Rogacki’s Integration

and Operations Task Group . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 17 Colonel Markisello’s Support Task Group . . . . . 24

 18 AFRL Research-Site Detachments . . . . . . . . . 26

 19 AFRL Technology-Directorate Detachments . . . . 26

ix
Foreword

History is the study of change. It is an important—but ofte

neglected—resource and tool that allows each of us to analyz

and extract the most relevant experiences from the past an

apply that knowledge to today’s decision-making process

What has happened in the past affects the way we live in th

future. Therefore, to ignore history is a mistake. Likewise, t

capture the history associated with contemporary events ca

have huge payoffs for future leaders and is an extremely wis

investment of time and energy.

Early in my career, I served on the history faculty at the Ai

Force Academy, where I challenged cadets to gain a bette

appreciation for the past. As part of that educational process, 

encouraged students to consider history a basic buildin

block in their development as professionals. My goal was t

make them more aware of a time-tested database that they, a

future leaders, could draw upon in shaping policies and strat

egy to best accomplish the mission. Later, as chief of staff, 

initiated a reading program of selected historical works t

promote the professional growth of all Air Force personnel.

This history documents a watershed event within the United

States Air Force during my tenure as chief of staff—the crea 

tion of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). As the “high

technology” service, the Air Force has always searched fo

ways to improve continuously its science and technology en 

terprise. In that context, the making of AFRL was not 

bureaucratic accident. Rather, it was the product of a comple

mixture of historical forces and pressures at work that con 

vinced people at all levels that the time was ripe to brin

about fundamental reform in how the Air Force conducts it

business of science and technology.

In terms of significance, a wealth of past studies has fo 

cused on almost every aspect of the “operational” side of th

Air Force. But there has been a scarcity of available scholarl

studies that address the far-reaching implications of scienc

and technology. Bob Duffner’s insightful and comprehensiv

account of the evolution of events leading to the genesis of 

xi
single Air Force laboratory is a major contribution that help

fill that gap. Organization and infrastructure are critically im 

portant components of the total science and technolog

picture. Thus, the manner in which our laboratory system i

organized is a critical factor in the Air Force’s ability to assur

that we are investing in and delivering the most relevant tech 

nologies possible.

Duffner is an accomplished historian who weaves an engag

ing and cogent story of how the Air Force moved from 1

separate labs to one consolidated lab. Thoroughly researched

and documented, this balanced and highly readable narrativ

is divided into two parts. Part one addresses the reasons wh

the Air Force decided to consolidate its far-flung science an

technology enterprise into one lab. How the new lab was im 

plemented is the focus of part two. This study is especiall

revealing because the reader is given access to the inner work

ings and struggles of a major Air Force organizationa

restructuring through interviews with key individuals wh

participated directly in the decision-making process to estab

lish a single lab.

People—collectively and individually—make history. Th

creation of the Air Force Research Laboratory represents on

of the most sweeping reforms in the history of the Air Forc

and is testimony to the principle that change is inevitable

Understanding why and how a single lab happened is criti

cally important in assessing where Air Force science an

technology has been in the past and where it is going in th

future. This book offers a unique perspective on how and wh

the Air Force altered its organizational approach to scienc

and technology. I strongly recommend that it be added t

every serious Air Force professional’s reading list.

RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

General, USAF, Retired

Chief of Staff, 1994–97

xii
About the Author

Robert W. Duffner is chief of the Air

Force Research Laboratory’s history

office at the Space Vehicles and Directed Energy directorates (Phillips

Research Site) located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. A graduate of Lafayette College, he received his PhD in

history from the University of Missouri. He served as an infantry rifleplatoon leader with the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam and later

as a colonel in the Army Reserve

while serving as a consulting faculty

member at the Army Command and

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Dr. Duffner’s

earlier book, Airborne Laser: Bullets of Light (Plenum Press

1997), is a history of the world’s first successful demonstra 

tion of an Air Force laser on board an aircraft that engaged

and disabled tactical missiles.

Robert W. Duffner

xiii
Preface

Vision is often an elusive concept because organization

often package it in terms of an appealing aphorism intended

to symbolize efficiency and productivity. But a well-define

vision is useful only if leaders and workers at all levels persist

ently promote and practice it to bring about fundamenta

change in how an organization operates. This book is abou

the creation and implementation of the Air Force’s vision t

reinvigorate its science and technology infrastructure durin

the mid-1990s in an effort to keep pace with changing times

This vision, which manifested itself from an organizationa

perspective in the creation of a single Air Force laboratory

was the latest initiative in an evolutionary chain of activitie

stemming from the World War II era designed to create

strengthen, and refine the Air Force’s research and technolog

enterprise.

Perhaps no early scientific visionary stood taller than Van

nevar Bush, the tough-minded pragmatist who headed th

Office of Scientific Research and Development during World

War II. Bush’s vision was simple but far-reaching. On mor

than one occasion, he urged President Franklin Roosevelt t

ensure the nation’s defense by insisting that the governmen

take the lead in funding, promoting, and sustaining scientifi

research and development after the war. In making his poin

Bush reminded the president, “If we had been on our toes in

war technology 10 years ago, we would probably not have ha

this damn war.”

Gen Hap Arnold and the eminent aerodynamicist Dr. Theo 

dore von Kármán embraced Bush’s vision to make science an

technology the centerpiece of the nation’s airpower strategy

The first step toward implementing this vision involved a

in-depth study led by von Kármán that resulted in the publi 

cation of Toward New Horizons in December 1945. Thi

multivolume report, considered the first comprehensive blue

print for future aerospace development, forecasted thos

budding technologies that offered the greatest potential fo

influencing the future of airpower over the next 20 to 3

xv
years. The predominant message was that the United State

would have to be willing to take “high risks” and make a

unwavering commitment to invest in ongoing research an

development programs so the nation would have the mos

advanced technical weapon systems to fight the next war.

Toward New Horizons and the influence of Arnold and von

Kármán helped to spur on a new culture in the military tha

depended more and more on the contributions of scientist

and engineers. This movement toward science and technolog

gained more momentum in 1947 with the establishment of th

Air Force, which almost immediately earned the reputation a

the “technically oriented” service. The Air Force’s vision of sci

ence and technology began to take root quickly with th

formation of a permanent Air Force Scientific Advisory Boar

(1947) and the creation of the Air Research and Developmen

Command (1950), the first command exclusively devoted t

advancing science and technology. From this foundatio

emerged the Air Force Systems Command (1961) and a net

work of 13 laboratories that remained in existence, first a

independent Air Force laboratories and later as a federation o

technology centers under which the various laboratories wer

grouped, until they merged into four major laboratories in

1990. Throughout its first 50 years, the Air Force remained

firmly committed to the idea that its research and developmen

infrastructure served as the vehicle for transporting scientifi

and technological advances to the modern-day battlefront.

By the mid-1990s, the vision of how the Air Force intended

to reorganize its science and technology enterprise rested on

the shoulders of two men: Gen Henry Viccellio Jr., com 

mander of Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), and Maj Ge

Richard R. Paul, director of Science and Technology at Head

quarters AFMC. Working closely together, they initiated a new

vision that represented a radical departure from the old way o

doing business by establishing a single Air Force Researc

Laboratory (AFRL) in October 1997. Although the infrastruc

ture changed, AFRL remained true to Toward New Horizons

legacy of conducting “high risk” science to produce “revolu 

tionary” technologies.

Six months after the stand-up of the new laboratory, Gen 

eral Paul recognized the importance of capturing the history o

xvi
the evolution of the single laboratory. I first met General Pau

over a scheduled working lunch in his office to discuss wha

writing a history of this type would involve. After several inter 

ruptions by members of his staff, it soon became abundantl

clear that every minute of this commander’s day was occu 

pied. He reassured me that we would meet again because h

considered the history of the lab a worthwhile project. True t

his word, we met several weeks later—at a site undisclosed t

his staff—during which time I conducted an uninterrupted

three-hour interview with him.

That was the start of a one-on-one association which proved

invaluable in writing this book. Because of his position a

head of Science and Technology at AFMC, General Paul was 

central figure in the laboratory story, and I needed to hear hi

thoughts directly. Fortunately, he was extremely generous in

putting aside time to meet and correspond, encouraging me t

E-mail or phone him anytime I reached an impasse in th

research or writing. I took him up on that offer by frequentl

pestering him to clarify a variety of minor and major lab is 

sues. I was pleasantly surprised that he thoroughly an

completely answered all my E-mails, usually within a few

hours and never longer than a day. If he didn’t know th

answer, he told me he would talk to others to get the informa

tion and get back to me—and he always did so. In addition, 

greatly appreciated his positive attitude and constant encour

agement to move forward with this project. In short, withou

General Paul’s interest and support, I could not have com 

pleted this book.

Like General Paul, numerous other AFRL employees gav

freely of their time, consenting to interviews and providin

information on the evolution of AFRL. Especially willing t

help were Col Dennis Markisello, vice commander of AFRL

and Capt Chuck Helwig of AFRL’s command section, who fur

nished over 40 notebooks containing an extensive collection o

primary source documents covering various aspects of th

lab’s development. Dr. Don Daniel, executive director of AFRL

offered an insightful “top-down” look at the lab-reorganization

process. Through several interviews, Mr. Tim Dues, wit

AFRL/ Plans and Programs, patiently explained all the inne

workings of a complicated laboratory operation. Dr. Brenda

xvii
Godfrey, Col Mike Pepin, and Lt Pat Nutz, also in Plans an

Programs, furnished useful information on the lab reorganiza 

tion. Without the assistance of Ms. Bridgett Parsons

AFRL/ Human Resources, I never would have been able t

locate all the pertinent personnel charts and briefings that ad

dressed the ever-changing personnel picture. Bridgett prove

extremely helpful in interpreting a maze of personnel numbers

statistics, and trends. Dr. Hendrick Ruck, AFRL/Human Effec 

tiveness, also supplied excellent input covering the manpower

downsizing plan as the four labs merged into one.

All the AFRL tech directors I consulted were very forthrigh

in providing candid comments on the lab reorganization

Many offered information not readily found in documents: Ms

Christine Anderson (Space Vehicles), Dr. Earl Good (Directed

Energy), Dr. Joseph Janni (Air Force Office of Scientific Re

search), Dr. Vince Russo (Materials and Manufacturing), Mr

Terry Neighbor (Air Vehicles), Dr. Tom Curran and Col Joh

Rogacki (Propulsion), Mr. Les McFawn (Sensors), and Mr. Jim

Brinkley (Human Effectiveness). Dr. Robert Barthelemy, wh

headed the tech directorate team, imparted a wealth of knowl

edge. Also, Col Mike Heil and Dr. Keith Richey provided uniqu

perspectives on Phillips Lab and Wright Lab, respectively.

Dr. Russo, who directed the lab-transition team, and Ms

Wendy Campbell, his deputy, detailed all aspects of the vari

ous task groups that implemented the lab-reorganizatio

plan. They were particularly helpful in explaining the role o

the three independent review teams. Dr. Harro Ackerman

from Phillips Lab offered sensible information on the day-to

day workings of the lab-transition staff.

Outside AFRL, General Viccellio spoke openly about his mo

tives for reorganizing the laboratory system. His vic

commander, Lt Gen Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., provided informa

tion about the presentation of the single-lab concept to th

Corona meeting in the fall of 1996. As the Air Force’s highest

ranking civilian, Dr. Sheila Widnall, secretary of the Air Force

gave her perspective on the single lab. Also, Mr. Blaise Du rante

who briefed Secretary Widnall on the final single-lab proposa

offered important insights on how that process worked. Hi

assistant, Lt Col Walt Fred, took the time to locate briefin

charts on the series of events that led to the secretary’

xviii
a pproval of the new lab. Dr. Gene McCall, who headed th

New World Vistas study, helpfully explained how outsider

viewed the future of laboratories. Dr. Edwin Dorn, former un

dersecretary of defense for Personnel and Readiness

furnished his account of the “Dorn cuts” and the way the

affected the overall manpower-downsizing plan.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to those steady and consis 

tently productive workers I encounter every day in the histor

office at the Phillips Research Site at Kirtland AFB, New Mex 

ico. Two reservists were very helpful. Maj Laurel Burnet

carefully proofread the entire manuscript and finalized th

chronology. Maj Rhonda Toba did an excellent job of organiz

ing and abstracting over 40 lab-management report

stretching back to the 1960s. Ms. Sylvia Pierce put together 

detailed time-line chart to illustrate the series of events lead

ing up to the single lab. Our archivist, Mr. Steve Watson

relentlessly contacted a number of government agencies t

locate and collect an assortment of critical documents on th

single-lab reorganization that were absolutely essential to th

narrative. Dr. Barron Oder offered his ideas on content issue

and, as our resident computer expert, smoothed out all th

pesky computer glitches to ensure that all photos, charts, an

so forth appeared in the proper place throughout the text. 

also thank Ms. Jessica Gomez, our highly competent stay-in

school employee, who diligently checked the accuracy of al

the endnotes.

Finally, Air University Press has been a very supportiv

partner in this venture. I especially want to thank Dr. Marvin

Bassett for his meticulous attention to detail in reading an

editing the manuscript. My only gripe with Marvin is that h

truly believes the Atlanta Braves are better than the New York

Yankees!

ROBERT W. DUFFNER

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

July 2000

xix
Part 1

The Decision
Chapter 1

Introduction

The first essential of airpower is preeminence in research.

—Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold 

It was a perfect night for baseball on 9 October 1996. Th

power-laden Baltimore Orioles had come to do battle with th

hometown-favorite New York Yankees in game one of th

American League Championship Series. Although playing in

the unfriendly confines of the “Bronx Bombers’” ballpark in

front of thousands of loyal and screaming New York fans, th

Orioles found themselves leading four to three as the Yank

came to bat in the bottom of the eighth. But a dramatic an

controversial change of events would wipe out the fragile one

run margin the Orioles had managed to cling to with only on

inning left to play.

The rowdy New York crowd was getting restless and loude

as Derek Jeter, the rookie Yankee shortstop, stepped to th

plate and drilled the first pitch to deep right field—it looked t

be a long out. Baltimore right fielder Tony Tarasco backed u

to occupy the last two feet of territory on the warning track in

front of the wall and reached up to ease the routine fly bal

securely into his glove. As it turned out, it was anything bu

routine. At that same instant, Jeff Maier, an avid 12-year-old

Yankee fan, leaned over the outfield wall with his right arm

stretched to the limit and managed to “snatch” the ball just a

it was about to land in the right fielder’s glove. Instinctively

within the blink of an eye, an incredulous Maier jerked hi

glove and prized souvenir back into the stands. The frenzie

stadium crowd went wild with delirium as the umpire signale

“home run” and a bewildered Jeter circled the bases.

The outraged Orioles screamed interference, but the um

pire’s call stood, and the boy from Old Tappan, New Jersey

suddenly became an instant celebrity in the New York metro

politan area. Jeff Maier’s heroic action tied the score and pro

vided just the lift to inspire Bernie Williams to hit the game

winning homer in the bottom of the 11th for a dramati

3
come-from-behind five-to-four victory for the Yankees in gam

one. The stunned and tormented Baltimore team never recov

ered from the unlikely episode of that first game and went on

to lose the play-offs, while the Yankees advanced to meet th

Atlanta Braves in the World Series.

At the same time the Yankees were in the midst of deter

mining their baseball destiny with the Baltimore Orioles, half

way across the country in Colorado Springs, Air Force leader

were engaged in a series of top-level meetings to map out th

nation’s aerospace future. There were no Derek Jeters or Jef

Maiers to make the dramatic play in Colorado. Nor was ther

anything comparable to Bernie Williams’s extra-inning heroic

at the five-day Air Force Corona conference taking place at th

Air Force Academy during the second week of October 1996

Instead, the outcome of the Air Force’s game plan and futur

depended primarily on the decisions made by the Corona at

tendees. Those seasoned players included Dr. Sheila E. Wid 

nall, secretary of the Air Force; Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chie

of staff of the Air Force; and a select group of other four-sta

generals who commanded the nine major commands through 

out the Air Force. Unlike the Yankees team that could see th

fruits of its baseball labors almost immediately, the Air Forc

squad did not have the luxury of instantaneous feedback an

reinforcement. Decisions made by the heady Air Force lineu

at Corona ’96 focused on long-term global issues affecting th

nation’s defense that would not be realized for several year

down the road.

Although Corona addressed a wide range of topics, one o

the most important issues had to do with charting the futur

course of research and development (R&D) activities within

the Air Force. This was of utmost concern to two men: Gen

Henry Viccellio Jr., who on 30 June 1995 had assumed com 

mand of Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), headquartere

at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB) in Dayton, Ohio, an

Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, who served as the director of sci

ence and technology (S&T) under General Viccellio. Although

General Paul did not attend Corona ’96, General Viccellio did

attend and was a major participant because of his position a

commander of AFMC. Both men had worked extremely hard

for five months prior to Corona, developing and fine-tuning 

4
radically new plan for conducting S&T business. Faced with

shrinking budgets and the need to eliminate duplication o

effort and similar technological work among multiple labs a

different locations, they proposed to consolidate four existin

laboratories into one Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL

designed to lead to a more efficient and streamlined operation

Viccellio and Paul anxiously awaited the secretary’s an

chief of staff’s reaction to the “single laboratory” proposal

Acceptance of this new plan would have a profound effect on

the S&T acquisition process and would mean a complete dis

mantling of four laboratories to make one. After a short brief

ing with minimal discussion on the single-lab proposal a

Corona , Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman gave thei

endorsement of the single-lab concept. Final approval would

come later, after General Paul prepared a more detailed follow

on briefing scheduled for presentation to Secretary Widnall in

her office in November 1996.

Upon hearing of the Corona decision, General Paul realize

that this was a tremendously significant turning point for th

Air Force’s S&T community. But he also realized that thi

landmark decision was the result of much soul-searching an

hard work by him and others to reform the laboratory system

by moving off in a totally new direction. He welcomed what h

judged to be good news from the Corona meeting, but he wa

also very much aware that the idea for a single laboratory did

not have its origins at Corona . The roots of what would be

come the Air Force Research Laboratory stretched back to 

series of events, requirements, and opportunities that oc

curred several years prior to Corona ’s “Gathering of Eagles.”

5
Chapter 2

Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation

The thought of consolidating laboratories was not new. Ove

the last decade, this idea had grown out of the Packard Com

mission ’s blue-ribbon study (begun in 1985) that looked a

ways to operate the Department of Defense (DOD) in a mor

efficient and economical manner. David Packard , a forme

undersecretary of defense, headed a high-level team of investi

gators that focused on four core areas that were candidate

for change: national security planning and budgeting, militar

organization and command, acquisition organization and pro

cedures, and government-industry accountability. Packard ’

final report, A Quest for Excellence (released in June 1986)

proposed sweeping reforms, including substantial personne

reductions, to improve efficiency and save money in DOD

President Ronald Reagan directed implementation of th

Packard Commission ’s recommendations in National Securit

Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, issued on 1 April 1986. Th

model acquisition-reform plan called for the establishment o

“strong centralized policies through highly decentralized man

agement structures.”1

The 1980s: A Move for Change

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza 

tion Act, also signed into law by President Reagan in 1986 an

considered the most significant defense-reform effort sinc

1947, was enacted to carry out the reforms proposed in th

Packard Commission ’s report. First and foremost was th

creation of a new undersecretary of defense for acquisition

(implemented by NSDD 219), whose job was to set overal

procurement and R&D policy for DOD. This “acquisition czar

(comparable to the chief executive officer of a major corpora

tion) was the one point of contact who exercised centralize

control over all DOD acquisition programs. He exerted influenc

by establishing a three-tiered program-management system

7
made up of three new service acquisition executives (SAE), on

for each military service. Each SAE appointed product execu 

tive officers (PEO) to manage a select number of major acqu

sition programs on a full-time basis. In turn, the PEOs de

pended on program managers to work individual programs

All this served to establish a more streamlined managemen

system that would trim overhead, eliminate waste, and pro

vide for improved efficiency in directing and monitoring DOD

programs.2

Initially, the Air Force laboratories were not inclined to show

much enthusiasm for supporting the Packard Commission ’

reforms and the new acquisition-management system enacted

by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Simply put, the labs were reluc

tant to relinquish control over their R&D programs to the SAEs

By 1989 President George Bush was hearing complaints from

congressmen who were not pleased that the services seemed t

be dragging their feet in getting behind the manage ment re

forms initiated by the Packard Commission and Goldwater

Nichols Act. In February 1989, in response to congressiona

pressure and budget reductions proposed for defense in th

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, President Bush directed Secre

tary of Defense Dick Cheney to draft a plan to look at ways t

improve management (with fewer employees) and organiza 

tional efficiency in DOD. One of Cheney’s major challenge

entailed devising a strategy to fully implement the sweepin

DOD reforms proposed in the Packard Commission ’s report.3

On 12 June 1989, Cheney completed a major reorganization

plan known as the Defense Management Review (DMR), which

addressed ways to improve the defense procurement proces

and urged the military services to borrow and implemen

streamlined business practices used in the private sector. Th

benefits of applying the most acceptable, time-tested busines

methods to defense activities included more effective and effi

cient operations, reduced costs, and a higher level of job satis

faction by military and civilian employees, whose rating

would depend upon performance rather than longevity

Cheney reported to the president that, with appropriate con

gressional legislation, the DMR would be able to fully imple

ment the Packard Commission ’s recommendations. Perhaps thi

thinking was optimistic, but it represented a major com mitmen

8
by the secretary, signaling that he and the Bush administra

tion were serious about implementing substantial changes in

the way DOD conducted its daily business.4

Why did DMR recommend such drastic changes? Secretary o

the Air Force Donald B. Rice believed that the answers wer

simple—DOD could not continue to conduct “business as usual

because budgets would clearly get smaller in the out years

Congress and taxpayers demanded this change as the cold wa

wound down and external threats appeared to diminish. But a

the same time lower budgets were becoming a fact of life, Con 

gress knew it still had to produce the maximum amount o

military capacity possible to deal with any impending regiona

crisis. One way to meet declining future budgets was to begin t

reduce the number of military personnel and civilians workin

for DOD. More specifically, Rice and others in the highest lead

ership positions took an aggressive stance to mount an “attack

on overhead. According to Rice, “It’s simply imperative that w

resize support and overhead to suit the reduced military capa

bility rather than continue to do business as usual.”5

Overhead appeared in many shapes and forms. Some jobs

simply less essential than others in both the support an

technical areas, could be eliminated to help reduce costs. Re

ducing bureaucratic layering by doing away with two head

quarters could also produce savings (e.g., DMR’s recommen

dation to consolidate Air Force Systems Command with Ai

Force Logistics Command). Although the Air Force at firs

strongly resisted this type of action, such a merger would

result in lowering overall personnel numbers as well as mov

ing toward a more efficient organization by pushing more re

sponsibilities down the chain of command to subordinat

units. DMR’s recommendation to consolidate the two com

mands was not idle talk. In anticipation of a possible merger

Secretary Rice remarked that “it’s always better to do it your

self” rather than have congressional action force the decision

To underscore the idea that fundamental changes had to b

made to get away from doing business as usual, the Air Forc

took the initiative and made a bold move to implement DMR

thinking in a relatively short time. On 1 July 1992, System

and Logistics Commands merged to form the newly activate

Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).

6

9
As part of the continual defense-management review pro

cess that followed his DMR report of June 1989, Cheney ap

pointed groups to investigate ways of consolidating defens

functions, including laboratories. Defense Management Repor

Decision (DMRD) 922, issued on 30 October 1989, include

one of the findings of these special study groups. This decision

strongly advised that the Pentagon give serious consideration

to merging all military labs directly under DOD. Some people

envisioned that a single DOD laboratory was not out of th

question since such a lab would become the institutional foca

point for all of DOD’s future S&T matters. Advocates als

reasoned that establishing a single laboratory was the bes

way to proceed because too much overlap and duplication

existed among the service labs; consolidation would cut over

head and operating costs, strengthen DOD ’s technology bas

with fewer and larger laboratories, and boost productivity an

efficiency. Other possibilities included intraservice and inter

service consolidations, providing for “lead laboratories,

headed by the Army, Navy, or Air Force, that would focus on

technology common to all three military services. 7

DMRD 922 directed John A. Betti, undersecretary of de

fense for acquisition, to conduct an extensive study that fo 

cused on the advantages and disadvantages of interservic

and intraservice consolidation of laboratories. Betti called on

Dr. George P. Millburn , deputy director of defense research

and engineering in the Pentagon, to work with the three serv

ices to explore the entire range of laboratory options. On 3

April 1990, Millburn reported his findings to Betti, recom

mending a number of possible solutions, including reducin

the number of labs and combining all service labs into on

DOD laboratory. Betti still did not have a definitive answer on

how to proceed in the future structuring of labs, preferring t

postpone his decision until he had more facts. Consequently

he instructed each service to come up with its best recommen

dation on what to do with the labs. 8

The Air Force and Systems Command knew they had to com

up with a realistic plan of action or be at the mercy of DOD. 

they did not present their own internal plan, then Betti would

likely make the decision for them and support the idea of com

bining all service labs into a single, centralized DOD lab. Tha

10
was too much of a gamble for the Air Force to take. Becaus

Systems Command did not want to get caught in a winner-take

all game, the Air Force decided to compromise. By proposing 

consolidation of its 13 labs (as well as the Rome Air Develop 

ment Center) into four labs, Systems Command hoped it could

duck DOD’s single-lab bullet—at least temporarily.

Hopefully, the creation of four superlaboratories would silenc

proponents of the single DOD lab for the short term. Critic

argued that 13 separate labs were too small to perform “world

class” science because they lacked the synergy and interdiscipli

nary expertise that made America’s large national laboratorie

so successful. These model labs—Sandia , Los Alamos, an

Lawrence Livermore—had established enviable internationa

reputations over the years because of their consistently high

level of performance. Further, some DOD leaders thought tha

the Air Force maintained too many labs that were too geograph

cally dispersed; this kind of poor management resulted in 

wasteful duplication of technical efforts that cost the govern 

ment more money than necessary. Systems Command, however

hoped that its proposed consolidation would satisfy the critic

by establishing a more centralized span of control that would

weed out unproductive technical efforts.

Also, fewer labs meant fewer people, which translated t

additional savings. For years the military services were notori

ous for representing most staff functions at each level of th

organizational structure. Thus, the military resembled a gian

octopus with its staff-function tentacles reaching out an

strangling every organizational level, regardless of the size o

the operation. Private business, driven almost exclusively b

profits, considered such excessive support detrimental to cost

effectiveness. DOD and the Air Force, both committed to mir

roring the organizational techniques of successful businesses

realized they had to mount and sustain an assault on over

head if they expected to effect any meaningful change. Theo

retically, four labs would require only four support staffs in 

stead of 13 and, obviously, fewer people. The standing up o

four Air Force laboratories on 13 December 1990, along with

the combining of Logistics and Systems Commands in July

1992, attested to the Air Force’s resolve to take steps to show

DOD leaders that it was serious about reducing personne

11
numbers and eliminating the duplication of technology effort

(table 1). 9

Air Force Space Technology Center

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

 1. Weapons Lab, Kirtland AFB

 2. Geophysics Lab, Hanscom AFB, Phillips Laboratory,

 Massachusetts Kirtland AFB

 3. Astronautics Lab, Edwards AFB,

 California

Wright Research and Development Center

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

 4. Avionics Lab, Wright-Patterson AFB

 5. Electronics Technology Lab, Wright Laboratory,

 Wright-Patterson AFB Wright-Patterson AFB

 6. Flight Dynamics Lab,

 Wright-Patterson AFB

 7. Material Lab, Wright-Patterson AFB

 8. Aero Propulsion and Power Lab,

 Wright-Patterson AFB

 9. Air Force Armament Lab,

 Eglin AFB, Florida

Rome Air Development Center Rome Laboratory,

Griffiss AFB, New York Griffis AFB

Human Systems Division

Brooks AFB, Texas

10. Air Force Human Resources Lab,

 Brooks AFB

11. Harry G. Armstrong Aerospace Armstrong Laboratory

 Medical Research Lab, Brooks AFB

 Wright-Patterson AFB

12. Air Force Drug Testing Lab,

 Brooks AFB

13. Air Force Occupational and

 Environmental Health Lab,

 Brooks AFB

Table 1

Consolidation of 13 Air Force Laboratories

12
Although this consolidation process satisfied the Air Force

short-term interests, the service did not fully realize the long

term consequences of this dramatic event. Air Force leader

had unwittingly planted seeds that would grow into a singl

Air Force laboratory in 1997. Many people perceived the labo

ratory reform movement of the mid-1990s as a logical exten

sion of the DMR process that had led to the formation of th

Air Force’s four superlabs in 1990. Beyond that, events gener

ated by the Clinton administration and Congress would be

come constant reminders that set the mood and kept th

pressure on in the 1990s for moving one step closer to wha

many top-ranking officials predicted would be the formation o

a single DOD laboratory after the turn of the century.

President Clinton and Laboratory Reform

Consistent with his campaign promises, President William

Jefferson Clinton pledged to work to ensure that the nation

sustained its position of world leadership in science and tech

nology. On 23 November 1993, he established the Nationa

Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and announced an

ambitious plan to undertake an across-the-board review of al

federal laboratories. His basic goal was to streamline labora

tory operations in view of the projected decrease in federa

R&D dollars. Although he recognized that less money would

be available, President Clinton refused to sacrifice the qualit

of S&T programs. He believed that, by reorganizing and con

solidating selected parts of the laboratory system, peopl

would work smarter and S&T would not suffer. 1 0

Over the next six months, the executive branch becam

more and more active in working toward turning the presi

dent’s ideas into reality by sponsoring a major effort to re

evaluate the operation of the government’s laboratories. Clin 

ton ’s interest and desire to have his administration take th

lead in examining how the nation conducted its S&T busines

were only one part of a two-pronged, pressure-driven strateg

to reform DOD laboratories. Although no one foresaw such 

development, the president’s initiative for laboratory reform

would merge two years later with Congress’s own aggressiv

13
plan to revitalize and reduce the number of labs. Congres

sional language describing this plan was spelled out in th

National Defense Authorization Act passed in February 1996

which served to “kick-start” DOD to move out on the laboratory

reform issue. Out of this legislation evolved Vision 21, DOD’

long-range plan for making fundamental changes to the mili

tary labs (see chap. 3 for a more detailed treatment of Visio

21 and the National Defense Authorization Act).

On 5 May 1994, President Clinton issued a directive estab

lishing the Interagency Federal Laboratory Review. To get thi

process under way, he instructed NSTC to review the nation’

three largest laboratory systems operating within DOD, th

Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics an

Space Administration . These three laboratory systems ac

counted for roughly one-fifth of the federal government’s tota

investment ($15 billion out of $70 billion) in R&D. With th

end of the cold war, the president and Congress realized tha

the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the laboratorie

had to change rapidly to meet a new set of global threats an

requirements.1 1

A reassessment of the continuing value of laboratories in

serving vital public interests was a logical extension of th

reform-minded National Performance Review (renamed the Na 

tional Partnership for Reinventing Government) of 1993

headed by Vice President Al Gore and designed to create 

smaller and more cost-effective government. Clinton consid 

ered this program one of the top priorities of his first admin

stration and made a special effort to publicly support an

praise Gore for his determination to eliminate waste and inef

ficiency throughout the government. As part of this overal

commitment, the president wanted to find out what specifi

“options for change” within the laboratories might be availabl

to cut costs and at the same time improve R&D productivity

In other words, in this era of making government smaller an

more efficient, the president and his team strongly urged tha

all federal agencies “do more with less.” Although many peopl

considered this a legitimate goal, others had doubts and won

dered in private about the reality of doing more with less

When it came down to day-to-day working conditions, peopl

14
at the working levels oftentimes sarcastically interpreted thi

to mean “doing less with less.”1 2

The president was quick to point out that, over the years

the laboratories had maintained an extraordinary an

highly talented workforce that had established a stron

track record of providing the nation essential services in

fundamental sciences. Not only had the labs “contribute

greatly” in the past, but the nation counted on them t

make even more significant contributions of “tremendou

importance” in the future. Certainly, Clinton did not advo

cate shutting down the laboratories. His main objective wa

to make them run as efficiently as possible. Although h

gave no specifics as to what changes would have to b

made, he hinted at taking steps to streamline managemen

before sacrificing R&D programs. Most people interprete

this to mean that the number of people working at the vari

ous labs would have to be reduced in order to achiev

budget savings projected over the next few years.1 3

After a year of investigating how the laboratories operated

on 15 May 1995 NSTC submitted to the president its fina

report, confirming what most people associated with the lab

had already known. DOD labs were specialized institution

that zeroed in on S&T programs designed solely to enhanc

the war-fighting capability of the nation. What they re

searched, developed, and transitioned in terms of hardware t

the operational fighting forces became one of the most endur

ing pillars of the country’s national security policy. NSTC rec

ognized that the overriding mission of the DOD laboratorie

was to strengthen national security by advancing technology

which in itself was a compelling argument to retain a qualit

laboratory system that could effectively serve the changin

security needs of the nation. The legitimacy of laborator

functions enjoyed unanimous support, but NSTC also con

cluded that ample room existed to improve management an

cut redundancy throughout the laboratory system. 1 4

The NSTC report’s fundamental recommendation emphasized

that, to achieve greater efficiency in government, DOD had t

come up with a realistic laboratory-restructuring plan to im 

plement cross-service integration and maximum use of com

mon support assets. This meant eliminating the duplication o

15
effort by consolidating lab resources. Although the Defens

Base Realignment and Closure Commission of 1995 (BRAC

95) had also advocated combining similar R&D programs un

der one laboratory, only limited progress had occurred in

meeting the specific goal of cross-service integration. BRAC

did not produce a major laboratory consolidation move, but in

1995 NSTC and the president remained confident that simila

lab functions needed to be combined because of basic change

taking place in DOD . First and foremost, the downsizing o

DOD labs would definitely occur. Declining budgets and 

shift in missions—the result of the changing threat brough

about by the end of the cold war—meant less demand for new

acquisitions systems for advanced weapons traditionally devel

oped by military labs. In fact, prior to the NSTC report, th

president and Congress had already mandated, as part o

across-the-board downsizing in government, the phasing in of 

35 percent reduction in laboratory personnel from 1994 t hrough

2001. Cross-service integration of lab functions, the NSTC rea 

soned, would help accomplish the goals of reducing staff an

budgets and at the same time retain a quality lab infrastructur

to continue meeting future mission requirements. 1 5

After reviewing the NSTC final report, President Clinton is

sued further direction and guidance to DOD to continue pur

suing alternatives that would achieve consolidation of th

labs. Specifically, he instructed the secretary of defense t

submit a report to him by 15 February 1996 “detailing plan

and schedules for downsizing the DoD laboratories. This re

port was to identify opportunities for greater efficiency throu gh

measures such as cross-service integration and service la

consolidations.” The president intentionally did not get bogge

down in outlining the exact details of specific changes neede

in reforming the labs. However, he did present four genera

guidelines and principles for DOD to follow in preparation o

this final report. 1 6

One fundamental area requiring immediate attention calle

for DOD to develop a workable game plan to reduce the exces

sive amount of paperwork—internal management instruc

tions, regulations, policy procedures, and so forth—that ab

sorbed an enormous amount of time and impeded laborator

performance. A second pressing issue entailed a reexamination

16
and clarification of each laboratory

s mission to eliminate re

dundancy and thus help restructure the entire lab system. 

third topic worthy of close scrutiny involved reducing or elim

nating low-priority R&D programs as another way to improv

efficiency. Finally, DOD had a responsibility to explore potentia

opportunities to “coordinate and integrate laboratory resource

and facilities on an interagency and inter-service basis, eliminat

ing unnecessary duplication and establishing joint manage

m ent where appropriate.” In other words, to achieve more cost

effectiveness, would it be better to combine parts or all of th

military labs under one consolidated DOD laboratory?

1 7

The Setting: Changing the Laboratory Image

No single event or landmark decision was responsible fo

the establishment of the Air Force Research Laboratory on 3

October 1997. Rather, a combination of events, decisions, an

other forces spread over several years led to the creation of th

new laboratory. Much of the apprehension, uneasiness, an

unknown aspects that attended the process of completely re

structuring the Air Force’s four-laboratory system came abou

because of a continual stream of mandated guidance an

pressures imposed on the Air Force by President Clinton, Con

gress, and DOD . By the mid-1990s, the time for planning

studying, and assessing the laboratory structure was clearly

over, for the most part. The Clinton administration, Congress

and DOD wanted the Air Force to take action and start recon

figuring the labs to cut more fat and produce an even leane

and more cost-effective R&D operation.1 8

The critical issues driving the move to reorganize the fou

Air Force laboratories scattered across the country include

addressing matters of money and personnel, as well as findin

a more efficient way to advance the type of S&T that produce

superior products for the war fighter. The image and reputa

tion of the labs had become somewhat tarnished in the 1990s

Many people, both inside and outside the Air Force, perceive

each of the four labs as a powerful and independent institu 

tion in its own right that relentlessly protected its technolog

turf. They noted the ever-present and seemingly unresolvabl

17
issue of 

stovepipes and seams (i.e., duplicating research

and technology efforts among several labs at different loca

tions rather than concentrating in one centralized organiza 

tion at one location). Eliminating these stovepipes and seam

proved difficult because each lab lobbied vigorously to defen

its portion of the technological pie. Moreover, the four-lab organ

izational structure did not lend itself to cross-communication

among labs—that is, crossing the organizational seams an

communicating from one stovepipe to another. 1 9

In an effort to formulate a nonduplicative, integrated S&

investment across all four labs, the Air Force created the Ai

Force technology executive officer (TEO). While each lab re

ported to a parent product center (i.e., Wright Lab to Aeronau 

tical Systems Center , Phillips Lab to Space and Missile Sys

tems Center, Rome Lab to Electronics Systems Center, an

Armstrong Lab to Human Systems Center), the TEO worke

directly with the four lab commanders on S&T investment

strategy issues to ensure a cohesive, integrated budget tha

addressed the needs of a broad customer base. The TEO, in

turn, reported to the secretary of the Air Force for acquisition

(SAF/AQ), who also served as the Air Force’s acquisition ex

ecutive. Thus, the arrangement somewhat resembled the PEO

arrangement mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

wherein program managers reported to PEOs, who in turn

reported to a service acquisition executive .

2 0

Under this framework, General Paul was “dual hatted” a

Headquarters AFMC’s director of S&T (reporting to the AFMC

commander) and as the Air Force’s TEO (reporting t

SAF/ AQ). Likewise, each of the four lab commanders had tw

bosses: (1) the TEO (a two-star) for investment and budge

issues and (2) his or her respective product-center commande

(a three-star) for manpower, facility, and other infrastructur

issues (with the product-center commander writing the la

commander’s annual performance rating). The TEO arrange

ment had definite advantages in promoting an integrated S&T

investment strategy, but some people questioned whether i

was optimal in light of the four lab commanders’ dual-reportin 

channels and the fact that no single authority had account

ability for the full set of S&T resources (money, people, an

facilities).2 1

18
Many people also had the impression that the labs were over

stocked with staff and support people. The tooth-to-tail ratio wa

out of balance in terms of the proportion of scientists and engi

neers (the tooth) versus staff and support personnel (the tail

assigned to the labs. For every two scientists assigned, ther

was one support staff person in place, a ratio that needed ad

justing more in favor of the number of scientists. Despite th

legitimacy of this concern, in fairness, all the labs since 199

had gradually reduced the number of people assigned. From

1990 through 1996, total laboratory manpower decreased from

8,480 to 7,226—a 15 percent reduction, largely from the sup

port staff. This gradual drawdown of the laboratory workforc

since 1990 occurred because of various mandated personne

reductions levied on the labs each year by DOD and the Ai

Force. However, one common complaint was that the proces

cut too much muscle from the labs, since a portion of thes

reductions involved the elimination of scientist and engineerin

positions. A second criticism was that, even though each of th

four labs’ manpower numbers ha d declined since 1990, DOD

officials were convinced that in the long run—based on pro

jected budget reductions for the future—they would have t

remove a larger number of positions from the labs’ mannin

documents and at a much quicker pace.2 2

Thus, when Headquarters Air Force and DOD looked at th

labs, they saw four fully staffed and fiercely independent or

ganizations determined to retain their separate identities

Over the years, each lab had worked hard to establish 

unique and, in many cases, narrow customer base within th

Air Force. Further, each lab nurtured this relationship, know

ing that it could offer its customers scientific and technica

services that no other lab could provide. In essence, becaus

of its specialized expertise, each lab had cornered and monop 

olized a portion of the R&D market and wanted to make sur

that relationship continued to grow and prosper. 2 3

Under the organizational structure from 13 December 199

until 31 October 1997, each lab, to a large degree, remaine

autonomous. Its future depended on how it developed an

marketed its own technology products, with little regard t

what the other labs were doing and no incentive for workin

closely with them. Additionally, the fact that the labs wer

19
geographically separated by hundreds of miles made it diffi

cult to work closely together on a day-to-day basis. Each la

focused on building existing programs, attracting new pro

grams, enhancing its own reputation, and conveying to the Ai

Force leadership that it could transition significant advance

in technology to the operational commands. Yet, some high

level officials responsible for managing the laboratory system

especially in this new era of downsizing, began to question

and reevaluate what some people perceived to be the inflate

contributions of the laboratories across the board. Decision

makers, who now began to step back and rethink the labora

tories’ role, perhaps could take to heart the advice Theodor

Roosevelt offered nearly a century ago: “I did not care a rap fo

the mere form and show of power; I cared immensely for th

use that could be made of the substance.”2 4 Substance wa

what the Air Force leadership was looking for as it began

taking steps to reshape its four separate laboratories into 

more coherent, focused, and synergic organization.

Notes

1. President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 

Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: Pres

dent’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 30 June 1986)

xii, 55; and Lawrence R. Benson, Acquisition Management in the Unite

States Air Force and its Predecessors (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Histor

and Museums Program, 1997), 40–41.

2. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

Public Law 99-433, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 1 October 1986; John T. Correll

“Streamlining with a Splash,” Air Force Magazine, March 1990, 12–13; Of

fice of the Secretary of the Air Force, “Seamless Life-Cycle Process: A Visio

for Air Force Acquisition in 2050,” draft, 14 June 1996; and Benson, 41–42

The new acquisition plan called for military acquisition staffs at servic

h eadquarters to be eliminated and consolidated as part of the servic

secretari ats.

3. Dick Cheney, Defense Management: Report to the President (Washing

ton, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 1989); and The Balanced Budge

and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Public Law 100-119, 100t

Cong., 1st sess., 29 September 1987. This act, better known as the Gramm

Rudman-Hollings Act, provided for automatic spending cuts if Congres

failed to reach established budget targets. After automatic cuts were de

clared unconstitutional, a revision of the act in 1990 changed the focu

from deficit reduction to spending control.

20
4. Cheney; and The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Ac

of 1985.

5. Donald B. Rice, memorandum to Maj Gen C. P. Skipton, subjec

Defense Management Review, 21 August 1989.

6. Ibid.; Larry Grossman, “Re-Winging the Air Force: Streamlining fo

Leaner Times,” Government Executive Magazine, December 1991, 11–14

and Benson, 42–50.

7. Briefing, Maj Gen Robert R. Rankine Jr., Air Force Systems Comman

(AFSC)/XT, subject: Horizons South 90: Science and Technology, 7 Jun

1990; Gen Ronald W. Yates, AFSC/CC to Aeronautical Systems Divisio

(ASD)/CC et al., letter, subject: Laboratory Consolidation, 1 June 1990; an

message, 142130Z DEC 89, AFSC/ST to Air Force Office of Scientific Re

search (AFOSR)/CC et al., subject: OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense

Laboratory Consolidation Study, December 1989.

8. Rankine; Yates; and AFST/ST message.

9. Rice.

10. Executive Order 12881, Establishment of the National Science an

Technology Council, 23 November 1993; and White House Press Release

Office of Media Affairs, “Statement of the President” [National Science an

Technology Council], 23 November 1993.

11. White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statemen

by the President: Future of Major Federal Laboratories,” 25 Septembe

1995. The official name of the president’s directive was Presidential Revie

Directive/National Science and Technology Council (PRD-NSTC-1).

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Report, “Future of Major Federal Laboratories: Findings,” The Whit

House, Office of the Press Secretary, 25 September 1995; on-line, Internet, 2

April 1996, available from http://www.dtic.mil/labman/fedlabs/toc.html.

15. Report, “Future of Major Federal Laboratories: Recommendations,” Th

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 25 September 1995; on-line, In 

ternet, 28 April 1996, available from http://www.dtic.mil/labman/fedlabs

toc.html.

16. White House Fact Sheet, “Federal Laboratory Reform,” 25 Septembe

1995.

17. Ibid.

18. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, commander, Air Force Research Labora 

tory, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998; and Dr. Don Daniel, executiv

director, Air Force Research Laboratory, interviewed by author, 27 Jul

1998.

19. Paul interview.

20. Notes, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, 7 January 2000.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.; and fax with attached briefing chart, “Laboratory Manpowe

(FY 89–01),” Bridgett Parsons, AFRL/HR, to author, 7 April 1998.

21
23. Tim Dues, associate director, Plans and Programs Directorate, Ai

Force Research Laboratory, interviewed by author, 2 and 12 March 199

and 6 April 1998.

24. Theodore Roosevelt, Selected Works of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 5

Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 357.

22
Chapter 3

The Catalyst: National Defense

Authorization Act and Vision 21

One of the most demanding and persistent challenges with

which General Paul and others in the Air Force R&D commu 

nity continually had to contend was the steady pressur

brought on by numerous studies recommending that the labo

ratories reorganize. For years, senior leaders in the Air Forc

and DOD recognized that these studies collectively advocate

and hammered home the point that laboratories had to reduc

personnel and budgets, as well as eliminate waste and dupli

cation of technical efforts, if they expected to survive into th

twenty-first century. In essence, the upper echelons of govern

ment said that the Air Force would have to make dramati

changes in the way its laboratories operated. 1

The problem was that most of these studies offered conclu 

sions and recommendations that were often broad in scope o

focused on only a few specific aspects of laboratory opera

tions. No single, all-encompassing blueprint outlining the de

tails of how the laboratories should reorganize existed. However

everyone generally agreed that the labs would have to discard

some of their personnel overhead and at the same time be

come more proficient in implementing better business prac

tices for conducting and managing their S&T programs. In

other words, change was inevitable. 2

General Paul knew better than anyone else that somethin

had to be done soon to revive the labs. By the mid-1990s, th

time had come to make some hard decisions and move for

ward. For several years, Paul had wrestled with the problem

assessing numerous schemes for restructuring the laborator

system. Part of his preliminary mental gymnastics involve

conceiving different consolidation strategies that included go

ing from four labs to three, to two, and even to one lab

Although he deliberated long and hard about coming up with

better ways for restructuring the laboratory system, he basi

cally kept these ideas to himself during the early stages of hi

thinking. He knew that something would have to be done in

23
the long run to respond to th

nagging message that laborato

ries would have to change. Bu

no compelling or immediate ur

gency to do this presented itsel

just yet. In his mind, some re

form was already taking plac

since each lab had annually con

tributed its fair share of person

nel reductions, the main portion

of which became known as th

“Dorn cuts” (after Edwin Dorn

undersecretary of defense fo

personnel and readiness, wh

had levied these reductions on

the Air Force labs in June 1994)

However, many people believe

that the Dorn cuts were only 

Band-Aid solution to a much deeper laboratory problem. 3

By February 1996, circumstances had changed dramati

cally to force Generals Paul and Viccellio to revisit the labora

tory options and make some tough decisions. The single mos

important event was passage of the National Defense Authori

zation Act for Fiscal Year 1996 on 10 February 1996. Section

277 of this legislation (Public Law 104-106) contained un

equivocal language directing the secretary of defense to de

velop a five-year plan to consolidate and restructure laborato

ries and test and evaluation (T&E) centers assigned to DOD 

Congress directed that “the plan set forth the specific action

needed to consolidate the laboratories and test and evaluation

centers into as few laboratories and centers as is practical an

possible, in the judgment of the Secretary, by 1 October 2005.”4

To get this process under way, the National Defens

Authorization Act instructed the secretary of defense to sub

mit an initial plan outlining strategy for accomplishing th

consolidation and restructuring of the labs and test centers t

the congressional defense committees for their review no late

than 1 May 1996. Delivered to Congress on 30 April 1996, thi

first plan—Vision 21—became the catalyst for the Air Force’s

complete revamping of its laboratory system.5

Maj Gen Richard R. Paul

proposed the single-lab concept.

24
As a first step to develop a timely response to the laborator

portion (as opposed to T&E centers) of section 277, Dr. Lanc

Davis, who headed the Laboratory Management Section o

DOD’s Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineer

ing, convened a working group to collect information to clarify

congressional expectations. General Paul served as a membe

of this group, which made a visit on 6 February 1996 t

congressional staffers responsible for the language that ap

peared in section 277. The purpose of the visit was to get th

staffers’ candid interpretation of the legislation in terms o

plans for the laboratories. Led by Dr. Davis, the group me

separately with Bill Andehazy, senior staffer on the Hous

National Security Committee, and John Etherton , senior staf

fer on the Senate Armed Services Committee .

6

Much of the information that came out of the meetings with

the two staffers focused on rather lofty goals. For instance

they believed that too many facilities (labs) remained open an

that laboratory infrastructure (defined as bricks and mortar

could be reduced by 50 percent. This number seemed unrea

istic to members of the working group, especially since DOD’

BRAC exercise in 1995 had had only modest success in clos

ing bases. Although both staffers said their intent was not t

“purple-ize the labs” by putting them all under direct contro

of DOD, they did believe it would be possible to achieve physi

cal consolidation of two geographically diverse facilities. Re

minded that BRAC 95 did not seem to work in terms of con

solidating activities and organizations, the staffers bluntly

replied, “Go back and try again.”7

General Paul walked away from these meetings convince

that radical changes would have to take place within the Ai

Force labs in order to meet the expectations of Congress. Afte

returning to Wright-Patterson AFB, he began weighing all th

possible implications of the National Defense Authorization

Act, revisiting in his own mind the assets and liabilities o

creating a single Air Force laboratory. 8

With the emergence of the National Defense Authorization

Act, the spring of 1996 was a tense time, requiring cool head

for making decisions of substantial consequence on the futur

of laboratories. If changes were to come, then General Pau

who had spent almost his entire career working in the Ai

25
Force R&D area from the ground up, was the right man at th

right time to lead this conversion process. He understood how

the system worked by virtue of his assignments at two Ai

Force laboratories (Weapons Lab and Wright Lab), a produc

center (Electronic Systems Division ), two command headquar

ters (Strategic Air Command and Air Force Materiel Com

mand), and Headquarters Air Force , as well as a Joint Staf

assignment. Not only did he have an enviable operational re

cord that helped him build his lab savviness, but also he ha

impressive academic credentials, having graduated from th

University of Missouri at Rolla with a degree in electrical engi

neering and from the Air Force Institute of Technology with 

master’s in electrical engineering. Taking his professional mili

tary education studies seriously, he excelled in the classroom

and was named a distinguished graduate of Squadron Office

School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Naval Wa

College—a feat few officers could match. 9

His two most recent assignments at Wright-Patterson gav

him an opportunity to observe and participate in the decision

making process at the top of the S&T pyramid in the Ai

Force. As commander of Wright Laboratory from July 1988 t

July 1992, he gained invaluable, practical, day-to-day experi

ence in directing major technology programs that advance

aerospace systems. Selected to serve as director of S&T at Ai

Force Materiel Command in July 1992, he was responsible fo

leading and devising investment strategy covering the ful

spectrum of Air Force technology activities. These last tw

assignments, more than any others, allowed him to see first

hand the fundamental problems of the laboratories. Above all

this specialized on-the-job experience gave him some lastin

insights that he used to formulate basic, commonsense prin

ciples that he would apply to improve the day-to-day opera

tions of laboratories. 1 0

But it took more than formal education and the right on

the-job experience to make a difference in convincing others t

move the laboratory system in an entirely new direction. Per

sonality entered the equation as well. As with any respecte

leader, the one personal quality that stood out above all other

was General Paul’s tenacious work ethic. People who worke

with him and knew him well were amazed by his stamina. H

26
often set a frantic pace to complete complicated taskings but

never demanded more from those

who worked for him than he was

willing to shoulder himself. As

many of his staff members

pointed out, General Paul remained intensely focused and

worked long hours. Very detail

oriented, he left his office at the

end of the day with a briefcase—sometimes two—full of papers to review well into the late

evening hours to ensure he was

fully prepared to deal with all the

anticipated exigencies of the next

day. As one associate put it, “You

just couldn’t give him a glossy

overview briefing—he wanted the

specific facts and details to later help him make an informe

decision.”1 1

The general did not shy away from making decisions. B

nature, he was more analytical than emotional in surveyin

problems and coming up with solutions. Neither impulsive no

the type to jump to conclusions quickly, he invested an enor

mous amount of time, effort, and energy collecting and siftin

through all possible options—perhaps too much time in th

eyes of some people. Moreover, he was most comfortable an

confident developing “incremental steps” in breaking down

and assessing all the available data when trying to devise an

settle on final solutions. Generally, he liked to sort things ou

in his own mind before consulting with others. Although h

was not averse to working alone, when he needed advice, h

turned first to his closest and most trusted advisor, Dr. Don

Daniel. Under General Paul, Daniel served as both deput

director of S&T and as AFMC’s chief scientist. 1 2

A first-rate scientist who over the years had earned th

reputation of being a no-nonsense and extremely effectiv

manager of R&D programs, Daniel was hard nosed, highly

disciplined, and result oriented. He was driven to excel, prou

Dr. Donald C. Daniel, General

Paul's right-hand man.

27
of his accomplishments, and not a man to cross. Daniel hone

his scientific and management skills through 16 years of work

at the Air Force Armament Center, leading a number of pro

grams, mainly in the areas of aeromechanics and aerodynam

ics. In 1988 he moved up to become chief scientist of th

Arnold Engineering Development Center. Four years later, h

joined General Paul’s team. Clearly, Paul ran the organization

but Daniel’s value was that he never hesitated to present hi

candid and often opposing opinions to General Paul. Withou

a doubt, Daniel was Paul’s “right-hand man” whom the gen

eral used as a sounding board and an honest broker to pro

vide his perspective on major and minor decisions. Paul va

ued Daniel’s judgment and wealth of experience; together the

formed a formidable team. 1 3

When all was said and done, Paul made the final decision

Once he formulated his new laboratory plan and made up hi

mind to implement it, there was no turning back. This re

vealed the dual side of his personality. On the one hand, h

was the visionary who thoroughly thought out and devised th

big game plan, but his involvement did not end there. Equally

important to him was the implementation and successfu

completion of his vision. In effect, he operated as both th

coach and quarterback to accomplish the goals he set. In th

case of moving to a single lab, once the decision was made

Paul became a remarkably active participant in making sur

the new laboratory stayed on schedule. To Paul, vision and 

well-thought-out game plan were the essential first steps t

bring about fundamental changes. But he also realized tha

the best vision and game plan meant nothing unless the team

could push the ball across the goal line.

Although making changes of this magnitude proved stress

ful, Paul worked smartly to be sensitive to the needs of 

diversity of people at all levels. Leadership by intimidation wa

not his style. Instead, he relied on logic and persuasion to ge

things done. He never abused the power of his rank or of

fice—his two stars did not interfere with his ability and desir

to connect with people at all levels to gain additional perspec

tive and knowledge. A man who confronted enormous job

pressures with remarkable composure, Paul understood th

virtue of patience. In spite of an unrelenting schedule, h

28
made every effort to listen and respond directly and honestly

to the concerns of individuals and special-interest groups a

all levels throughout the organization. His optimism, unforce

smile, and friendly personality contributed immensely to put

ting people at ease; thus, in the long run he gained thei

support and confidence as the laboratory marched into a new

era fraught with uncertainty.

General Paul recalled that the first step in motivating him t

think seriously about proposing a single lab came about be

cause of the congressional language in section 277 of th

National Defense Authorization Act , passed in February 1996

The second major event that substantially influenced his deci

sion to form one laboratory was the submission of Vision 2

by the secretary of defense to Congress on 30 April 1996. Pau

used the critical three months between these two very closely

related events to clarify in his mind that proposing to consoli

date all laboratory assets in one organization was the mos

logical way to proceed. Paul’s plan staked out only the Ai

Force’s internal strategy as a way to respond to reducing in 

frastructure costs at the labs. An important part of this radi

cal plan was that Paul and others realized from the start tha

infrastructure included not only real estate and facilities bu

also people. 1 4

The genesis of Paul’s proposal for a single lab took place on

an airplane on which he and General Viccellio were returnin

from a temporary-duty trip in the late spring of 1996. At thi

time, Paul first approached Viccellio about a single laboratory

In light of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 an

Vision 21, Viccellio, as AFMC commander, realized he eventu 

ally had to come up with a substantive game plan to addres

the laboratory problem. During this one-on-one discussion

that began to explore potential options, Paul explained th

many advantages of going to a single lab. Concentrating all Ai

Force lab resources under one organization made sense be

cause this approach would streamline R&D programs, make i

easier to reduce overhead personnel, eliminate fragmentation

of similar technologies currently distributed among multipl

technology directorates at various locations, and become mor

cost-effective. In addition, they had to consider political ramifi

cations. Forming one laboratory would elevate the Air Force t

29
the same level and force-structur

configuration as the Army an

Navy, each of which had alread

consolidated its resources an

political clout into one majo

laboratory. 1 5

For a number of reasons, Vic

cellio immediately was very re

ceptive to Paul’s initial comment

and explanations about the pros

pects of a single lab. During hi

first two years as commander o

AFMC, Viccellio had formed som

very definite opinions about th

laboratories—not all of them

positive. Firstly, he believed tha

the labs carried too much over

head—specifically, excess sup

port people. Secondly, he fel

very strongly that each of the labs was operating too inde

pendently. “The evidence that most drove me to that conclu 

sion,” according to Viccellio, “was the fact that when I wen

around on my initial visits to the labs, each of them spen

quite a bit of time describing their marketing functions. In

other words, rather than have a planning function, they wer

out drumming up business. So in the back of my mind 

always had the feeling our lab structure wasn’t well integrate

and coordinated.”1 6

Viccellio had other problems with the labs. It had come t

his attention on numerous occasions that customers often

had a difficult time identifying the right person or group o

people in the laboratory structure to conduct the research th

customer wanted. In many cases, customers became ex

tremely frustrated because of the lack of a central subject

matter expert to go to for information and advice. Customer

found it difficult to coordinate with two, three, or four labora

tories responsible for performing bits and pieces of “very clos

to identical work.” This duplication of effort and lack of syn 

ergy was of grave concern to Viccellio, and he wanted to fix

that problem. He believed that one could cut out technica

Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. approved

the single-lab concept.

30
redundancy by creating a central plans-and-programs offic

located at the single lab’s headquarters at Wright-Patterson 

This new office would replace each laboratory’s independen

planning-and-programming shop that tended to serve its or

ganization’s narrow and most immediate interests. Instead o

four separate labs going in four different directions, Viccellio

wanted all four labs to work as one affiliated unit under on

centralized plans-and-programs office to develop and move

critical technologies needed to help operational command

meet their missions.1 7

Forced to reorganize the laboratory system because of th

National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21, Viccelli

was not surprised when General Paul spoke to him on th

airplane, suggesting the integration of all four labs under on

central control. As Viccellio put it, “I was kind of in the mood

for some initiatives along that line [consolidation].” After lis

tening intently to what Paul had to say, he told Paul to “flesh

it out” and give him some specifics as to what a new labora

tory structure would look like. Viccellio also wanted Paul t

begin identifying functions at each of the four labs that could

be transferred into a consolidated lab headquarters as a wa

to reduce manpower slots across-the-board.1 8

Unlike Paul, General Viccellio had not grown up in the S&T

community. A graduate of the Air Force Academy, Viccelli

was a command pilot who had amassed over thirty-three hun

dred hours in fighter aircraft. First and foremost, he was op 

erations oriented, having spent a large part of his career flyin

and maintaining a variety of aircraft. Over the years, he ha

developed a strong understanding of and appreciation for th

role of logistics in the Air Force. When he moved from hi

position as commander of Air Education and Training Com

mand to head up AFMC on 30 June 1995, he came with 

healthy attitude that questioned what S&T could do for opera

tional units. To him, the acquisition process was a comple

and cumbersome experience, slow in transitioning the prod 

ucts of S&T to operators in the field. In short, deep down h

wasn’t sure how much all the investments in technology pro

grams run by the labs were worth.1 9

Viccellio certainly recognized the value of research, but h

also sensed that the current configuration of the labs was no

31
the most efficient way to conduct business. In fact, he ha

been in favor of “closing one or two labs” as part of the BRAC

95 exercise. However, the BRAC commission rejected thi

plan, mainly because of political pressures exerted by con

gressional delegations to protect their local constituents from

losing their jobs. So when all was said and done, Viccellio, a

AFMC commander, was primed to offer some fundamenta

changes on running the labs more efficiently. Timing was th

key. The appearance of the National Defense Authorization Ac

of 1996 and Vision 21 in the spring of that year gave Viccellio

and Paul the perfect opportunity and rationale to put thei

plan into operation to dramatically reform the organizationa

structure of Air Force laboratories. Furthermore, in the pro

cess they would be able to avoid and distance themselves from

the politically sensitive issues of BRAC . More importantly

they would be able to accomplish the goal of laboratory reform

in a low-keyed manner without the highly emotional publi

attention and political firestorm that BRAC had fueled. 20

During the very early stages of their discussion in the lat

spring and early summer of 1996, Viccellio and Paul were ver

careful to keep their plans for the laboratory reorganization

private. Neither was inclined to share his ideas with others a

this point. They believed that if too many people became in 

volved early on in the process of mapping out radical change

in the laboratory organization, their initial reaction might b

to “kill the idea before it even had the chance to start.” Fur

ther, both men realized that the Air Force did not want a lot o

publicity on proposed lab reorganization until the secretary o

the Air Force gave her final approval for a specific plan

Speculation about doing away with the four laboratorie

would have done more harm than good. Paul and Viccelli

were extremely cautious at this juncture because if peopl

began hearing about a single-lab proposal, they might prema

turely and inaccurately jump to conclusions about the near

and long-term effects of closing down four labs. Naturally

people would be concerned about their jobs, careers, and fu 

ture. In addition, politics was definitely a factor that could

easily trigger congressional reaction in districts where the fou

current labs were located. 2 1

32
Both Viccellio and Paul worried about possible interferenc

from Congress that might impede any plans for establishing 

single lab. If Congress became informed of even a tentativ

lab-reorganization plan, then the chances of moving forward

quickly would most likely be slowed down. It seemed reason

able that congressional delegations would want to take a hard

look at the specifics of any new laboratory plan that could

affect the livelihoods of their constituents. Further, the con

gressional delegations would be out to actively lobby for thei

state to retain the new laboratory components in their geo

graphic areas. Overall, Viccellio and Paul may have overesti

mated the resistance that Congress might use to prevent th

formation of the single lab. After all, Congress had been th

driving force for and a strong advocate of laboratory reform, a

demonstrated by the passage of the National Defense Authori

zation Act of 1996. It was Congress that directed the labs t

look at ways to consolidate and operate more efficiently. Con 

gress also supported the downsizing of the military services, s

it made little sense for Congress to go against its own policy

As it turned out, Congress, through its actions and desire fo

change, offered steady support rather than opposition to th

Air Force’s efforts to form one consolidated laboratory. 2 2

Both Viccellio and Paul realized the potential repercussion

and dangers associated with the premature release of informa

tion about proposing a single laboratory. Viccellio insisted tha

he and General Paul not discuss the plan for a consolidate

lab with others during the very early conceptual phases. How

ever, Viccellio made one important exception. Rather than

springing such a radical proposal on Headquarters Air Forc

at some later date, Viccellio believed that from the very begin 

ning, it was politically astute and absolutely essential tha

Darleen Druyun, the principal deputy assistant secretary o

the Air Force for acquisition and management, be advised o

the overall game plan. By bringing Druyun into the fold dur

ing the early concept phase of a single laboratory, Viccellio

created an opportunity to test the waters at the higher level

of command. He wanted to elicit a reaction to the single-la

idea and get some kind of assurance that he would be backe

up later. Viccellio made a special effort to keep in touch with

Druyun on a regular basis and to keep her apprised of th

33
initial plans for establishing a single lab and the thinkin

behind those plans. According to Viccellio, he and Paul “wen

up and briefed her on our concepts and again we kept it ver

close hold until we were ready to announce a steady plan an

possible transition.” The results of these contacts were posi

tive. After listening to the pros and cons of moving toward 

single lab, Druyun proved receptive to Viccellio ’s long-rang

plan and encouraged him to proceed. With her support, Gen

eral Viccellio knew he was now in a better position to move

ahead quickly with plans to consolidate four labs into one. 2 3

At the same time Viccellio and Paul were weighing the po

tential options for the future of the laboratory system in re

sponse to the enactment of the National Defense Authorization

Act of 1996, DOD was working on finalizing its report on la

reform due to the president by February 1996. As a result o

NSTC’s recommendations to the president in May 1995, Clin 

ton directed DOD to furnish him a detailed plan and realistic

schedule for downsizing the laboratories. Asking DOD to pro

vide the specifics for reforming lab operations clearly demon

strated the executive branch’s unyielding commitment to kee

attention focused on the critical issue of lab management fo

the future. The message was that something had to b

done—and fairly soon. This was an important step, but th

report covering the details of laboratory reform that the presi

dent directed DOD to prepare for him by February 1996 neve

materialized. 2 4

Circumstances overtook events. Congress became a secon

major player in lab reform with the passage of the Nationa

Defense Authorization Act of 1996 . Ironically, this meant tha

there were now two studies under way at the same time ad

dressing the same topic of laboratory reform—just the type o

duplicative effort and waste of resources the president an

Congress were trying to eliminate in DOD operations. To re

solve this problem, the deputy secretary of defense sough

clarification from the president and Congress. The outcome o

all this was that the two studies already simultaneously unde

way—the DOD report to be put together as a result of NSTC’

recommendations on laboratory restructuring (due to th

president in February 1996) and the Vision 21 DOD plan

being prepared in response to the National Defense Authoriza tio

34
Act of 1996—were to be combined into one Vision 21 fina

report.

2 5

Publication and delivery of the Vision 21 report to Congres

on 30 April 1996 did occur on schedule. As its name implied

the report proposed a vision or blueprint to create a new

laboratory infrastructure that would reduce cost, eliminat

unnecessary duplication of technical efforts, and maximize th

efficiency and effectiveness of R&D programs leading to th

production of reliable operational systems. For the vision t

become a reality, the report identified three integrating “pil

lars” (fig. 1) that described what DOD had to do to success

fully design and build a responsive laboratory infrastructur

that would serve the nation’s S&T needs for the future:

1. Reduction of current infrastructure costs with particula

emphasis on the elimination of old, high-maintenance

and inefficient facilities while retaining critical capabilitie

for the future. Options would inclu de reducing infrastruc

ture costs of both laboratories and the T&E centers. On

option would reflect reductions in both laboratory an

T&E center infrastructure by at least 20 percent beyon

BRAC 1995 by the year 2005.

2. Restructuring, to begin with intraservice restructuring

including business-process reengineering, with an em

phasis on cross-service reliance.

3. Revitalization to modernize aged critical laboratories an

T&E centers, with emphasis on technologies of th

twenty-first century, cross-service sharing, improved effi

ciencies, and reduced cost of operation and maintenance

According to DOD guidance, all three pillars were to be pur

sued simultaneously and with equal emphasis.2 6

Since each military service organized differently to meet it

R&D responsibilities, DOD wanted to make sure that none o

the S&T organizations were left out of the Vision 21 evaluation

process. Consequently, for the purposes of the Vision 21 study

DOD defined a laboratory as any DOD activity conducting all o

one of the following functions: S&T, engineering developmen

systems engineering, and engineering support of deployed mate

riel and its modernization. Moreover, if an organization receive

S&T funding in its budget for basic research, applied research

35
and advanced technology development (known as S&T budge

activities), then that agency qualified as a laboratory. An organ

zation did not have to be “named” a laboratory to fit the DOD

definition. The term applied to research institutes as well as an

other defense agencies performing research, development, engi

neering, and technical activities. The intent was to capture an

investigate all DOD units that performed S&T so all could b

integrated into whatever new laboratory system emerged from

the Vision 21 study. 2 7

Based on this definition, the Office of the Secretary of De

fense developed a list identifying 86 military organization

that qualified as laboratories for consideration under the V

sion 21 study. Twenty-nine belonged to the Army, 38 to th

Navy, and 19 to the Air Force (table 2).

With Secretary of Defense William J. Perry naming the spe

cific Air Force facilities engaged in S&T in the Vision 21 report

it became absolutely clear that the Air Force had no choic

other than devising its own internal laboratory-restructurin

plan. To make the process work, the secretary laid out 

timetable to ensure the accomplishment of specific milestones

Figure 1. Infrastructure Requirements for Defense Laboratories (From

Vision 21: The Plan for 21st Century Laboratories and Test and Evaluatio

Centers of the Department of Defense [Washington, D.C.: Department o

Defense, 30 April 1996], 1)

36
The game plan called for developing by 1 April 1998 a detaile

five-year plan covering how the DOD laboratories would re

structure. Secretary Perry would review and approve the plan

and then submit it to the president on 1 July 1998 for hi

review and endorsement. The next step in October 2000 wa

to begin execution of the five-year plan. The mechanics o

implementing the plan would take five years, with the comple

tion date set for 1 October 2005. With this schedule on th

table, each service now had only one option—to come up with

a very precise plan on how it planned to reorganize. 2 8

This came as no surprise to Viccellio and Paul, who alread

had been acutely aware of and heavily influenced by the ve r

direct language of the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act

stating that labs would reorganize. Since their first encounte

Table 2

Air Force "Laboratories" Identified for Vision 21 Study

 1. Armstrong Lab, Brooks AFB, Texas

 2. Armstrong Lab, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

 3. Armstrong Lab, Mesa, Arizona

 4. Human Systems Center, Brooks AFB (engineering functions)

 5. Wright Lab, Wright-Patterson AFB

 6. Wright Lab, Eglin AFB, Florida

 7. Wright Lab, Tyndall AFB, Florida

 8. Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB (engineering functions)

 9. Aeronautical Systems Center, Eglin AFB (engineering functions)

10. Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (non-depot-related engineering functions)

11. Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, Utah (non-depot-related engineering functions)

12. Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, Georgia (non-depot-related

engineering functions)

13. Phillips Lab, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

14. Phillips Lab, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts

15. Phillips Lab, Edwards AFB, California

16. Space and Missile Center, Los Angeles, California (engineering functions)

17. Rome Lab, Griffiss AFB, Rome, New York

18. Rome Lab, Hanscom AFB

19. Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB

 Source: Vision 21 Report, appendix E, 30 April 1996.

37
on the airplane, the two generals had engaged in severa

brainstorming sessions to discuss the lab issue. Their goa

was not to work out the exact details of how the changes in

laboratory structure would take place—there would be tim

for that later. Rather, these initial discussions were broad in

scope and primarily looked at ways to make fundamenta

changes in lab operations across-the-board. The outcome o

all this was swift and decisive. Both men had made up thei

minds in the June time frame—shortly after the release of th

Vision 21 report—that the best and most realistic course o

action for the Air Force called for laying out plans to consoli

date all of its S&T activities under a single laboratory. 2 9

The meetings between Generals Viccellio and Paul that began

in the spring and extended into the summer of 1996 were es

sentia lly informal but very productive sessions in Viccellio ’s of

fice to exchange information and ponder various lab-reorgan

zation options. For the first one-on-one meeting, Paul himsel

sketched out eight or 10 charts proposing a single lab. Rathe

than convening a group of his staff, instructing them to pu

some charts together on a single lab, and demanding tha

they adhere to those principles, Paul explained that thing

were moving quickly and that he just did not want a lot o

people working on such a controversial and potentially explo 

sive issue—at least not during these very early, speculativ

stages. “There wasn’t time,” according to General Paul, “so i

was more of me proposing to General Viccellio , General Viccelli

saying, ‘Yeah, let’s pursue this,’ fleshing it out some more,

until Paul and Viccellio reached a consensus.3 0

The consensus came quickly. One could argue that the ear

lier discussion on the airplane returning to Wright-Patterson

really was the turning point, when both men first became sold

on the idea of a consolidated lab. But that was not the case

They made no snap judgments on the plane. Instead, the

prudently took additional time in the weeks that followed t

think about the pros and cons involved in setting up one larg

laboratory. Only after presenting his charts proposing a singl

lab at their first meeting, Paul recalled, did General Viccelli

officially give “the thumbs up.”3 1

So the two generals had worked effectively together to reach

a decision, but Paul fully realized that his role in this proces

38
was strictly that of an advisor deeply concerned about th

future of Air Force S&T. Nevertheless, Paul’s contribution wa

extremely significant because he had planted the seed an

made the recommendation for a single lab. However, he did

not make the final decision. Only General Viccellio had th

authority to make the command-level decision to move toward

a single lab. As Paul put it, “It was his [Viccellio’s] call,” an

he made it. But even Viccellio did not have absolute authority

At some time in the future, he still had to go to the chief o

staff of the Air Force and the secretary of the Air Force fo

their approval before he could begin to set the wheels in mo

tion to establish a single lab. All this would take time and 

great deal of preparation to spell out the reasons why a singl

lab would make sense.3 2

Viccellio realized that time was critical in making a decision

on the single lab. He knew he had only a relatively short tim

to react to the National Defense Authorization Act and Visio

21 and to come up with a sound plan by November 1996 fo

realigning the organizational structure of the four large labo

ratories under his command. He didn’t waste time but face

this problem head-on, placing a great deal of faith in Genera

Paul’s input to help him make his final decision. Paul serve

as a steady influence by providing answers to Viccellio ’s initia

questions, ranging from the size of a single-lab headquarter

to the role of mission coordinators. Paul brought to Viccellio “

kind of conceptual schematic of how a single lab would look,

including rough manpower numbers. Paul’s proposal favore

a centralized approach to lab management that would lead t

a highly efficient operation with fewer people. This made sens

to Viccellio, who believed that this strategy would best mee

the consolidation goals of Vision 21.

3 3

So all these factors operating together at the same time—th

National Defense Authorization Act , Vision 21, and Genera

Paul’s input—combined to lead Viccellio to make his final deci

sion to go with the single lab. Viccellio put it in perspective when

he commented, “As soon as Vision 21 began to take shape, ther 

was no doubt in my mind that on the S&T side, lab consolida

tion to a single Air Force lab was going to be one of ou

m ajor initiatives that we were going to propose to the Office o

the Secretary of Defense.” General Paul clearly recognize

39
the im plications of Viccellio

s decision. Paul recalled that i

was a big step when General Viccellio said, ‘Let’s take thi

forward’—that was a very big step.”3 4

Although Paul purposely did not consult with or advise hi

staff on the single-lab proposal during his initial rounds o

private talks with Viccellio , he eventually did confide in an

sought the advice of three of his closest associates. After th

first couple of meetings with Viccellio , Paul shared his an

Viccellio’s commitment and enthusiasm for a single lab with

Dr. Daniel, his deputy director, and Tim Dues, who ran th

Plans and Programs Office (XP) at the Science and Technolog

Directorate. A third confidant drawn into the fold was Dr

Vince Russo, director of the Materials Lab, located at Wright

Patterson AFB. Russo, who had anchored the University o

Rochester’s offensive line in the early 1960s, would become 

leading figure responsible for spearheading the drive to mov

the new single laboratory down the field. Paul personally se

lected Russo to be his S&T representative on the Vision 2

committee chartered to develop the Air Force’s plan for estab

lishing its single lab. Paul, who had a great deal of confidenc

and respect for Russo’s management style and abilities, late

handpicked him to head the single-lab transition team in De

cember 1996. In sum, Paul realized that the formation of on

lab was simply much too big and complex an undertaking fo

any one person to handle. After Viccellio made the decision t

pursue the single-lab option, even though it had not been

officially announced yet in the spring of 1996, Paul quickly

brought Daniel, Dues , and Russo in on the ground floor o

this extremely important exercise. 3 5

Paul viewed these men as the nucleus of his team tha

would make the single lab happen. More specifically, Pau

counted on their expertise to make a smooth transition from

the existing multilab configuration to one consolidated Ai

Force lab. They, more than any others who worked for him

thoroughly understood the big picture of how the labs oper

ated on a day-to-day basis. Daniel, Dues, and Russo wer

the equiva lent of the modern backroom politicians who could

put the deals together, run interference for their boss, and influ 

ence and pressure competing factions throughout the laborator

system to compromise on the critical issues of restructuring

40
Moreover, he trusted them. They had been around the block

in the S&T business, and they were readily attuned to potentia

warning signs and obstacles at all levels that would have to b

overcome before any single lab could be set u p.3 6

In short, Paul depended more and more on Daniel, Dues

and Russo for their input on various aspects of lab restructur

ing during the formative stages, beginning in the early sum

mer of 1996 and ending with the stand-up of the lab in Octobe

1997. Even before that, Paul had had numerous conversa tion

with all three to solicit their overall philosophy on lab reor

ganization. Daniel recalled, for example, that he and Paul ha

conducted many informal meetings in the small, private hall

way between their adjoining offices. These discussions, which

covered laboratory options, including a consolidated lab, peri

odically “came up from time to time” during the two year

prior to Vision 21, usually prompted by projected budget an

personnel cuts. As Daniel described it, these five- or 10-minu t

hallway discussions were part of an overall philosophy tha

“had been going on for some time . . . in little sound bites, bu

nevertheless inching along continuously between the two o

us, but not discussed broadly with other folks.” As Danie

interpreted events, it was clear to him that the thought of 

Tim Dues, a key member of

General Paul's inner circle, headed

the Plans and Programs Office.

Dr. Vince Russo was a stron

proponent of the plan for 

consolidated laboratory.

41
single lab did not entail a singular event or one landmark

decision when the light suddenly came on. Rather, th

“thought evolved over a period of perhaps two years” prior t

the commotion brought on by Vision 21.

3 7

If Daniel, Dues , and Russo were to provide effective input

General Paul had to inform them as soon as possible abou

how the specifics of the proposed lab reorganization were un

folding at the highest levels of the Air Force. They needed t

know the complete long- and short-range game plans if the

were to play an active and convincing role in leading th

charge for mustering support throughout the organization onc

the decision to set up one laboratory had been publicized.3 8

Publicizing the plan to move to a single lab would not tak

place for another five and one-half months. Formal an

nouncement of the single-lab plan to all of General Paul’s staf

did not occur until after the Corona conference completed it

work in October 1996 because, between May and October

General Paul, Dr. Daniel, Tim Dues, Dr. Russo, and a small

select group of other staff members needed time to help build

a strong case outlining the rationale and transition to a singl

laboratory. They had to develop and support in more precis

terms the advantages Paul and Viccellio had discussed on 

global level. Doing so required expanding General Paul’s inne

circle by reaching down into the organization to get help from

selected personnel to study and report on different aspects o

the plan for establishing a consolidated lab. They undertook

this time-consuming work solely to meet the immediate goal o

developing input for presentation by General Viccellio at Co

rona so that he could obtain approval from the chief an

secretary to proceed with the new laboratory plan.3 9

Notes

1. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998.

2. Ibid.; Tim Dues, director, Plans and Programs Office, Science an

Technology Directorate, interviewed by author, 2 and 12 March and 6 Apri

1998; and Dr. Vincent J. Russo, director, Materials and Manufacturin

Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, interviewed by author, 4 Febru 

ary 1998.

3. Paul interview.

42
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, sec. 277

Public Law 104-106, 10 February 1996.

5. Ibid.

6. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, director, Science and Technology, to Mr

Money, SAF/AQ, letter, subject: Defense Laboratory Consolidation, 12 Feb

ruary 1996.

7. Ibid. Air Force recommendations to BRAC 95 for closures/consolida 

tions included moving Rome Lab to Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts; movin

Armstrong Lab to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; and cantoning Phillips La

at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, as a way to save money. BRAC, mainl

because of political and fiscal considerations, rejected these Air Force pro

posals.

8. Paul interview.

9. United States Air Force Biography: Major General Richard R. Pau

on-line, Internet, January 1998, available from http://www.af.mil/news/b

ographies/paul_rr.html.

10. Ibid.

11. Dr. Robert Barthelemy, former director of the Training Systems Pro

gram Office, Air Force Materiel Command, interviewed by author, 6 Febru 

ary 1998; and Dr. Don Daniel, interviewed by author, 27 July 1998.

12. Barthelemy interview; and Daniel interview.

13. United States Air Force Biography: Dr. Donald C. Daniel; on-line

Internet, June 1997, available from http://www.af.mil/news/biogra 

phies/daniel_dc.html; Paul interview; and Col Dennis F. Markisello, vic

commander, Air Force Research Laboratory, interviewed by author, 6 Feb

ruary 1998.

14. Markisello interview; Paul interview; and Daniel interview.

15. Paul interview; Gen Henry Viccellio Jr., USAF, Retired, former com 

mander, Air Force Materiel Command, interviewed by author, 24 Jun

1998; and Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. to commander, Aeronautical System

Center et al., letter, subject: Single Air Force Laboratory, 26 Novembe

1996.

16. Viccellio interview.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. United States Air Force Biography: General Henry Viccellio Jr.; on

line, Internet, August 1995, available from http://www.af.mil/news/biogra 

phies/viccelli_h.html; Lt Col Pat Nutz, AFRL/XPZ, interviewed by author, 

February 1998; and Paul interview.

20. Nutz interview; and Paul interview.

21. Viccellio interview; and Paul interview.

22. Viccellio interview; and Paul interview.

23. Viccellio interview; Paul interview; and Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, forme

secretary of the Air Force, interviewed by author, 7 July 1999.

43
24. Vision 21: The Plan for 21st Century Laboratories and Test and Evalu

ation Centers of the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Departmen

of Defense, 30 April 1996); and Markisello interview.

25. Vision 21; and Markisello interview.

26. Vision 21.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Paul interview; and Viccellio interview.

30. Paul interview; and Viccellio interview.

31. Paul interview.

32. Ibid.

33. Viccellio interview.

34. Ibid.; and Paul interview.

35. Viccellio interview; Paul interview; and Russo interview.

36. Viccellio interview; Paul interview; Russo interview; Daniel interview

and Dues interviews.

37. Paul interview; and Daniel interview.

38. Paul interview; Daniel interview; and Dues interviews.

39. Paul interview.

44
Chapter 4

Overhauling Infrastructure

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 199

and Vision 21 were the two main actions initiated by Congres

and DOD that caused the Air Force to commit fully to over

haul its laboratory infrastructure, which meant people as wel

as facilities. A day after the release of the Vision 21 report

Undersecretary of Defense John White clarified the intent o

the National Defense Authorization Act in a letter to all th

military services: “The essential core work required of ou

laboratories and test centers to field the weapons systems o

the future must be done without over-taxing the defens

budget with unnecessary infrastructure.” To achieve this ob 

jective, White directed that the plan to reorganize the laborato

ries had to consider options by which lab infrastructure could

be “reduced by at least 20% by 2005.”1

Manpower Reductions

Congress had not imposed a specific percentage in terms o

how many personnel slots would be reduced from the Air Forc

rolls as part of the lab-restructuring effort. The legislation wa

very broad in its guidance to the military departments to con 

solidate into “as few laboratories . . . as is practical and pos

sible.” DOD wanted to include more precision in its guidanc

and therefore cited 20 percent. But even this percentage wa

not hard and fast. It was simply a starting point that DOD

believed each military service and DOD collectively should

strive to meet. Over the next few years, circumstances such a

increases or decreases in annual budgets could cause thi

figure to fluctuate. Regardless of future budget changes or an

other factors, Viccellio and Paul understood that the immediat

task at hand entailed making significant personnel cuts.

2

“One major reason for creating the new AFRL structure,

according to General Paul, “was to streamline support an

management, to maximize retention of scientists and engineer

45
as we continue to downsize.

 From the very beginning, Pau

realized that the definition of streamlining meant “a way t

operate leaner [and] more efficiently with less overhead.

Fashioning a leaner organization did not solely apply to reduc

tion of the bricks-and-mortar infrastructure consisting o

buildings, hardware, and lab facilities. To make progress

much of the downsizing would obviously come about by elim

nating a substantial number of personnel slots. Unlike pre

vious personnel exercises that targeted both scientists an

staff, this time the lab reductions would come strictly out o

the staff, where most of the overhead resided.3

Overhead would not go away voluntarily and thus becam

the driving issue at the highest levels. Since the inception o

Vision 21, Vince Russo had been attending meetings at AFMC

and Headquarters Air Force to keep abreast of the most up-to

date guidance for downsizing the labs. Most of the time, h

worked closely with Alan Goldstayn , deputy director of th

AFMC Plans and Programs Directorate , which reported di

rectly to General Viccellio. Russo also routinely interacte

with Blaise Durante , deputy assistant secretary for manage

ment policy and program integration, who served as the Visio

21 lead point of contact for Secretary of the Air Force Sheil

Widnall. Durante, Goldstayn , and Russo formed the core o

the Air Force team responsible for planning and implementin

Vision 21—the Army and Navy formed similar teams. All thre

service teams worked under the direction of Dr. Lance Davis

who worked for Secretary of Defense William Perry and coordi

nated the entire Vision 21 effort out of DOD’s Defense Re

search and Engineering Office in the Pentagon. Davis, 

strong supporter of lab consolidation across the three militar

services, even favored closing some lab facilities. He envi

sioned the Army, Navy, and Air Force combining their re

sources and expertise to support specific technology program

at one geographic site.4

In many respects, Lance Davis was the key figure in th

Vision 21 process. He was the point man at the Director

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) who orches

trated, monitored, and gave direction and guidance to Russ

and others swept up by Vision 21 . In turn, Russo’s main job

was to keep General Paul informed of all aspects and th

46
current status of the Vision 21 process. A strong supporter o

the single-lab concept from the very start, Russo believed i

was feasible to downsize the laboratories. In his mind, th

laboratory system was broken, especially the composition o

the personnel force. As director of Wright Laboratory’s Materi

als Directorate, Russo had become dismayed over the years a

he witnessed firsthand how the lab staff had grown out o

proportion. He was convinced that the organization had be

come top-heavy at the expense of the technical workforce: “

hadn ’t hired a scientist or engineer in this damn place fo

seven years—seven years!” However, Russo was also a realis

who, for better or worse, understood how slowly the wheels o

the government personnel system turned. Consequently, h

told General Paul that he “could not just whack off 20 per

cent” of the current assigned personnel. To reach 20 percen

savings in personnel would take BRAC -like authority. Bu

chances for another BRAC in the near future, according t

Russo, were extremely remote. 5

A better plan involved achieving personnel savings by com

bining existing functions into fewer and larger organizationa

elements as a means to help get rid of the overhead. Eliminat

ing four separate lab commanders and their front-office staffs

combining support functions such as the four lab-plans-and

operations shops into one centralized office, and reducing th

number of tech directorates would all add up to lower over

head. To make this happen, however, required reorganizin

the entire laboratory structure. Russo insisted that no specifi

number of personnel savings be given at the front end of th

Air Force Vision 21 process. As he put it, “None of us knew.

One could arrive at those precise numbers only after reviewin

every position on each lab’s unit-manning document to deter

mine what jobs would remain under the new organization

Russo also reasoned that it was not prudent for General Pau

to promise exactly how many personnel savings could b

made because those exact figures would remain unknown un

til they defined the new technology directorates . In genera

terms, Russo advised Paul that “we can make a big step to

wards that goal [20 percent reductions].” But several year

would pass before the emergence of more exact data showin

the extent of personnel savings.6

47
Col Dennis Markisello, militar

deputy for the Science and Tech

nology Directorate , joined Danie

Dues , and Russo in the spring o

1996 as the fourth key figur

brought into General Paul’s inne

planning cell to assist him in

making the new lab a reality

Markisello had daily contact with

Paul, and many of their discus

sions focused on cost savings de

rived from reducing personne

overhead. Markisello recalle

that Paul’s basic plan was t

eliminate a good portion of th

support layer of management a

a cost-savings measure. Reduc

tion of personnel was not some

thing new to Paul and his staff. As Markisello put it, befor

Vision 21 appeared on the scene, DOD continually pressure

Paul’s organization to downsize . Three important long-rang

personnel exercises designed to reduce the number of peopl

assigned to the labs had already been under way for severa

years. One was the Dorn cuts. Another was the reduction

imposed by the defense planning guidance (DPG). The thir

involved A-76 studies that systematically evaluated whethe

private-sector contractors could perform laboratory function

more efficiently and cheaply than civil servants. 7

Dorn Cuts

The Dorn cuts were one of several critical personnel action

that significantly influenced the Air Force’s decision to mov

to a single laboratory. Edwin Dorn , who served as the under

secretary of defense for personnel and readiness in the mid

1990s, played a prominent role in leading a determined effor

to reduce DOD’s civilian-manpower pool. Prior to coming t

the Pentagon, Dorn had earned a PhD in political science from

Yale and had held a variety of high-level positions at th

Col Dennis Markisello was one of

General Paul’s trusted advisors

on the new lab.

48
Brookings Institution and the US Department of Education

Because of his position and leadership role in directing majo

civilian-personnel reductions for the secretary of defense

these personnel actions that began in 1994 were dubbed th

“Dorn cuts” throughout the military services.8

The origins of the Dorn cuts go back to the Bush admin

stration’s decision after Operation Desert Storm to reduce th

active military forces by 30 percent. The goal was to gradually

complete this drawdown by 1998. At the same time the activ

forces were moving ahead to implement hefty reductions in

the military ranks, the Clinton administration in 1993 ap

pointed John Deutch and Adm David E. Jeremiah , vice chair

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to cochair the Infrastructur

Review Panel. This group would take a thorough look at re

ducing DOD’s infrastructure and the effect that would have on

the permanent workforce. One of the key aspects of this pro

cess was that DOD wanted the services to come up with solu 

tions that would allow them to implement “voluntary” meas

ures to cut back on the number of their civilian employees

Not surprisingly, all the services reported to DOD that the

could not justify voluntarily downsizing their civilian work 

force without seriously jeopardizing their missions.9

Also under way in 1993 was DOD ’s “Bottom-Up Review

(BUR), which examined the most prudent options for reducin

the DOD labor force as the nation shifted away from a strateg

designed to meet the Soviet global threat to one based o

preventing aggression by regional powers. Emerging from BUR

was a new strategy of engagement and enlargement that called

for US forces working in concert with regional allies to figh

and win two major regional conflicts occurring nearly simulta

neously. In view of this changing mission profile, the repor

stated that one of its goals was to reduce the number of mili

tary personnel from a peak end-strength of 2.2 million in fisca

year (FY) 1987 to 1.4 million by FY 1999. The report recognize

that a civilian drawdown would also occur but gave no specifi

numbers to indicate how extensive that reduction would be

However, the report mentioned that, like the plans for militar

and reserve separations, “plans for civilian separations wil

minimize involuntary departures. DoD intends to reach th

civilian reduction level first by attrition, then by using th

49
authorized buyout provisions recently passed by the Congress

and last, by involuntary separations.” The report went on t

point out that DOD would continue to adhere to its curren

restricted-hiring policy, replacing two civilian employees fo

every five employees who left civil service. This policy had begu

in March 1991 and ended in the spring of FY 1994.1 0

Since the military services showed no inclination to volun

tarily reduce civilians, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin con

vened a meeting with his deputy, William J. Perry, and Edwin

Dorn to discuss alternatives. This meeting took place shortly

before Aspin left his post on 3 February 1994. A turning poin

in the meeting came when Dorn presented a chart depictin

the ebb and flow of the number of active duty force personne

and civilians assigned each year to DOD from 1950 to th

present. Perry expressed particular interest and concern

about this chart because it clearly verified dramatic reduc

tions in the military forces during times of relative peace. Bu

the dilemma, as Perry saw it, was that although the militar

took substantial reductions, the DOD civilian workforce—in

some cases over the same time period—had not taken a pro

portional share of personnel reductions. If civilian jobs existe

to support the military, then it seemed only logical that 

proportional number of civilian cuts should follow militar

cuts. This was axiomatic to Perry’s thinking, especially in ligh

of the planned 30 percent military reduction through 1998. 1 1

Perry was somewhat baffled. The military cut almost one

third of its active duty force from 1994 through 1998, bu

initially no plans existed to make proportional reductions in

the civilian workforce. DOD projected that the civilian work 

force would be “straight-lined” for the remainder of the 1990s

meaning that civilian authorizations would neither go up no

down. Perry did not like that scheme because it violated th

historical pattern of corresponding cuts for both military an

civilians during periods of downsizing. Consequently, h

asked Dorn to go back and work the math to determine how

many civilian positions would have to be eliminated so tha

reductions in the civilian force structure would be propor

tional to those planned for the military. 1 2

Dorn came up with a plan that proposed spreading th

reduction of civilian personnel numbers from 1994 through

50
2001. His blueprint for the future called for a 30 percen

reduction over that eight-year period. If DOD adopted thi

prescription, he claimed that the projected DOD civilian fig

ures for 2001 would strike the right balance with the reduce

military personnel numbers scheduled for the end of 1998. H

presented his blueprint in the spring of 1994 to Perry, wh

had replaced Aspin as secretary of defense. Perry liked th

plan and told Dorn to issue instructions to get the proces

under way. On 2 June 1994, Dorn sent a letter to all th

secretaries of the military departments specifying year-by-yea

projections of how many civilian positions each service had t

remove. This became known as the infamous “Dorn memo

that directed each service to reduce 4 percent of its civilian

workforce each year from 1994 through 1999. The year 200

would see the imposition of a 3 percent civilian reduction

followed by a 2 percent reduction in 2001. Following thi

schedule and taking the prescribed cuts each year meant tha

by the end of 2001, DOD would diminish civilian positions b

almost 30 percent.1 3

The percentages of four, three, and two were selected pri

marily because any number higher than 4 percent per yea

would trigger a major reduction in force (RIF)—somethin

DOD wanted to avoid because of its extreme expense an

political unpopularity. In addition, RIFs of all types demora

ized the entire workforce. DOD realized that it had to manag

the downsizing as efficiently as possible without sacrificin

the mission in the process. As an integral part of this process

DOD also wanted to dispel the notion that it was a large an

insensitive institution. If DOD truly believed that people wer

its most important resource, then the Pentagon had to prac

tice what it preached and convey to its civilian workforce tha

it would reach the reduced numbers humanely as well a

efficiently. Distributing the civilian cuts over eight years would

lessen the stress and negative impact on both the overal

workforce and specific individuals affected by the drawdown

With relatively small reductions (2 to 4 percent) each year, th

workforce could absorb a significant portion of the personne

losses by normal attrition. DOD could further diminish part o

the balance through special personnel initiatives such as in 

centive bonuses to encourage early outs, job transfers, volun tar

51
early retirement, and removal of vacant positions from th

books. Hopefully, all this would minimize the number of posi

t ions identified for a RIF.

14

The Dorn cuts had an immediate impact on the operation

of the four laboratories. First of all, there was to be no furthe

debate over whether or not DOD would make substantia

civilian cuts from 1994 through 2001. The secretary of de

fense had made that decision, and the Dorn cuts would im 

plement it. The Dorn procedure had put civilian-reduction

percentages in place for each year, and the AFMC com 

mander now had to ensure that all his subordinate units

including the four laboratories, complied with Dorn guidanc

and took their fair share of the cuts. However, the laborato

ries would experience complications. 1 5

In 1994 each of the four laboratories reported to a differen

system product center because each laboratory had a particu 

lar R&D area of expertise best suited to support a specifi

operational requirement of the Air Force. For example, Phillip

Lab in Albuquerque worked with and reported directly to th

Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles. One of th

lab’s primary responsibilities was to advance new technologie

that could be moved and applied to space systems develope

and prepared for launch by the product center in Los Angeles

As part of this arrangement, the center’s commander ha

complete control over all personnel resources, affording him 

great deal of leverage in terms of determining which organiza 

tions would take the bulk of the cuts.16

General Paul found himself boxed in a corner when it cam

to dealing with personnel issues. As the Air Force’s executiv

officer of technology, he had authority and control over all fou

lab budgets. But he had almost no say in the deletion of person 

nel slots. Each product center commander decided, unde

the umbrella of his center’s unit-manning document, which

positions would remain and which would go. General Pau

could shift dollars between labs and program areas, but h

could not move even one person from one lab to another or t

his directorate without negotiating with one or more product

center commanders. This system did not make much sense t

him. People were indeed an important resource, and Paul rea

soned that basic “Management 101” and good business practice

52
made it obvious that a single manager should remain ac

countable for all the organization’s resources, including fund

ing and personnel. Without that authority and control, com

manders of organizations would operate with one hand tied

behind their backs, while at the same time they were expected

to accomplish the mission in the most expeditious and profi

cient manner possible. Establishing a single lab with one com

mander would go a long way toward solving that problem.

1 7

Defense Planning Guidance:

More Personnel Reductions

The decision to begin implementing the Dorn cuts in th

summer of 1994 was one of the first indicators of what would

follow over the long term in the area of eliminating positions in

DOD and the Air Force. A severer blow delivered to the overal

declining personnel picture came in the form of May 1995’

DPG, a planning document prepared by the Office of the Sec

retary of Defense and released before each budget cycle. Thi

document focused on identifying what programs and how

many people each DOD organization would need to run thes

programs to meet the department’s requirements in FY 1997

Budget officials used the information in the 1995 DPG a

building blocks to prepare the Program Objective Memoran

dum for FY 1997, which included budget recommendations t

ensure that moneys for programs and salaries would be in

place so that each military unit would have adequate re

sources to complete its missions.1 8

The DPG’s “overarching plan” for S&T programs focused on

developing superior technology for creating and maintainin

an effective and affordable military capability. More specifically

this strategy embraced the idea that future military system

introduced into the inventory needed to be designed and buil

to achieve lower acquisition and life-cycle-ownership costs. Re

duced costs applied not only to new hardware. One could als

realize savings by reducing the number of people required t

operate, maintain, and support these weapon systems. Like

wise, the guidance directed DOD’s S&T organizations to spen

their money more wisely by exploiting commercially availabl

53
technology, subsystems, and components for developing state

of-the-art systems tailored to meet very specialized militar

missio ns.1 9

Under the “Downsizing and Re-engineering Initiatives” sec

tion of the DPG , instructions described the quantitative na

ture of the drawdown for the three military services. At th

heart of the matter was the proclamation that “the service

should continue to reduce the aggregate number of full-tim

equivalents [jobs] RDT&E [research, development, test, an

evaluation ] activities.” To add teeth to this broad policy state

ment, the DPG laid out very precise number goals. For the Ai

Force as well as the other two services, the DPG clearly out

lined DOD plans that called for “reductions by FY 2001 of a

least 35 percent from the aggregate peak personnel levels o

each Military Department.” The Air Force and other service

had to cut their forces by over one-third in less than fiv

years—a staggering number. 2 0

However, the burden of the 35 percent figure was somewha

tempered because the 30 percent Dorn cuts already under wa

would count as part of the larger DPG reduction. In effect, th

DPG added another 5 percent reduction to the Dorn cuts. Al

though on the surface, 5 percent did not appear extraordinarily

large, in the real world it amounted to a big increase, consider

ing the fact that as of May 1995 the Air Force had reduced b

only 11 percent, leaving a balance of 19 percent to reach th

level established by the Dorn cuts. Because of the extra 5 per

cent imposed by the DPG, the Air Force now had to take a 2

percent reduction (instead of the 19 percent) to meet DPG ’s goa

of a 35 percent reduction. The extra 5 percent was substantia

because it targeted an additional 1,140 jobs for elimination.2 1

The “peak personnel levels” referred to in the DPG wer

defined as the number of people assigned to each service as o

1991. In that year, the Air Force had 22,800 assigned to it

RDT&E workforce, so it had to lose eight thousand people t

meet its 35 percent reduction quota—something that would

not happen overnight but would gradually occur over the nex

few years. As pointed out before, by May 1995 the Air Force—

through the Dorn cuts and other personnel exercises—ha

already whittled its labor force by 11 percent, based on th

FY 1991 personnel numbers. This translated to twenty-fou

54
hundred R&D slots that the Air Force had removed from th

personnel rolls, leaving a balance of fifty-six hundred posi

tions that still had to come off the books over the next six

years to ensure compliance with the DPG . Based on thes

figures, the Air Force would have to eliminate almost a thou 

sand jobs a year over the next six years—an unpleasant cha

lenge for General Paul because it meant that large numbers o

laboratory people would likely lose jobs that they had held fo

10 or 20 years.2 2

Paul had always intended to make the drawdown of person

nel as painless as possible, taking the position that a RIF

would be his last choice as a means of trimming the work 

force. He preferred to lose people through the normal attrition

process, whereby employees voluntarily left the workforc

through retiring or by moving on to new jobs in other govern

ment agencies or private industry. He also planned to offe

monetary incentives to entice people to consider early retire

ment or to separate from civil service outright. Deep down

General Paul knew that normal attrition would not take car

of the entire problem. A realist, he recognized that he eventu 

ally would have to invoke a RIF to accomplish the personne

reductions mandated by DOD. What bothered Paul the mos

was the prospect of dismissing people who were high-qualit

workers. Under RIF guidelines, no matter how well individual

might perform their duties, they remained targets for removal

especially if they were junior in rank or new to the organiza 

tion (last in, first out). Financial resources simply no longe

existed to support a large laboratory workforce in view of per

ceived global conditions that focused on regional conflict

rather than the traditional, massive Soviet threat. 2 3

In the grand scheme of planning for the future of S&T t

meet declining personnel requirements associated with the Ai

Force’s changing mission, the DPG was the straw that brok

the camel’s back. It was a turning point that convinced Gen

eral Paul of the inevitability of combining the various pieces o

the Air Force’s R&D organizations into a single lab. Harborin

no doubt that the 35 percent DPG reduction represented “a

huge cut,” Paul made it one of the primary reasons for decid 

ing that a single lab made the best sense. 2 4

55
Looking back on the events of 1995, General Paul reflecte

on the importance and sway that the DPG had had on hi

thinking: “Like I said, that [DPG] is the dynamic more than

anything to me that said we just can’t continue to keep th

old—the current organization—and downsize in place.” H

pointed out that because the four labs—including their divi

sions, branches, and staffs—numbered too many people, h

had to find a way, as he described it, to “flatten” the curren

organization. In the process, Paul believed he had an opportu 

nity to simultaneously accomplish other objectives, “like con

solidating resources [staff and support functions] and reducin

fragmentation [similar technology efforts taking place at differ

ent locations]. Those were kind of secondary goals—as long a

we were going to streamline, why not try to take care of thos

at the same time?” The Air Force had to create a single labora

tory to “see if we could get enough organizational efficiency s

we could keep doing our missions but deal with a smalle

organization.” If reorganization did not occur, Paul predicte

that he would have to reduce some missions. Because of per

sonnel reductions that would definitely occur—and in som

cases, would target scientists and engineers as technical pro

grams were eliminated—some missions would have inadequat

manpower. Consequently, those missions were strong candi

dates for removal. That was the dilemma Paul faced. 2 5

A-76 Process: Contracts and Privatization

General Paul constantly felt the pressure on two fronts with

the Dorn and DPG requirements. At the same time, he als

had to contend with the BUR finding that included a section

on infrastructure which affected the future of DOD laborato

ries. Although the discussion of this topic was rather brief, th

message was clear: DOD would actively pursue a long-term

process to reduce and streamline its infrastructure to achiev

cost savings by increased use of privatization to take ove

selected government functions. Other recommendations in 

cluded “consolidation of functions” and the “implementation o

better business practices” to DOD operations. In essence

DOD had begun issuing strongly worded guidance encouragin

56
military organizations—including the laboratories—to take 

hard look at hiring contractors to replace certain civil servant

and military personnel who would be let go as part of th

overall downsizing process.2 6

With more and more pressure on government to downsiz

the workforce, the question of whether it was more economica

to hire contractors to replace government workers in selecte

areas became a much bigger issue in 1996. The “A-76 pro

cess ” was the method used to determine whether governmenta 

work activities should be performed under contract, usin

commercial sources, or in-house, using government facilitie

and personnel. One can trace the origins of this process to th

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which supported the pol

icy that the government can rely on products and service

from the commercial sector. A-76 guidance first appeared in

Bureau of the Budget bulletins in 1955. In 1966 the Office o

Management and Budget (OMB) published Circular A-76, re

vised in 1967 and again in 1979. In March 1996, OMB pub

lished a new version of Circular A-76’s Revised Supplementa

Handbook that provided updated guidance and spelled ou

point-by-point procedures for determining if it was more eco

nomical to hire commercial businesses to “supply the prod 

ucts and services the Government needs.”2 7

The government’s policy did not call for automatically turn

ing over government workers’ jobs to the private sector

Rather, the heart of the A-76 process involved fostering com

petition between the government organization and any privat

company that claimed it could do the job cheaper. Before an

final decision, each party had to prepare a comprehensiv

cost-comparison estimate reflecting the expense of performin

jobs classified as “not inherently governmental functions.

These cost calculations depended upon a variety of vari

ables—number of workers required to perform the function

total salaries and benefits, condition of facilities and equip 

ment needed, maintenance and repair, and more. 2 8

If a private agency underbid the government organization

then it could receive a contract to perform that job. The obvi

ous benefit was that the government could then remove th

government workers who previously performed that duty from

the books, thereby contributing to the reduction of governmen

57
workers on the payroll. Another option was that after review

ing the performance of a particular job function, the govern

ment could recommend reducing the percentage of govern

ment workers performing that job and thereby calculate 

lower cost than the one bid by the contractor. In that case, th

government would profit by keeping costs down and retainin

a portion of its original workforce. At the same time, the govern 

ment would comply with the downsizing goals by eliminating 

certain percentage of government workers no longer requir ed. 29

Although A-76 appeared to provide some very tangible bene

fits in terms of costs and personnel reductions, one could

easily overlook some fundamental drawbacks to this process

To many people, A-76 was a tortuous ordeal. Firstly, govern

ment preparation of a lengthy and detailed cost analysi

proved extremely time-consuming and very costly in terms o

total man-hours and dollars. Employees’ efforts to devise de

tailed work-performance statements, collect and interpret 

maze of financial data, and meet other convoluted A-76 re

quirements took up large portions of time normally devoted t

their daily jobs. Consequently, in many cases the work the

were hired to do suffered. This situation was exacerbated b

the fact that the A-76 process often took more than a year t

complete. Secondly, a lower contractor bid did not alway

guarantee the performance of quality work since A-76 focuse

mainly on reducing costs and government personnel. How

ever, no accurate measuring stick existed for reliably deter

mining ahead of time the level of quality work that a contrac

tor would perform. If quality went down, then one could

persuasively argue that keeping the original government work 

ers might have been more cost-effective and efficient. More

over, once contractors were on board, what would preven

them from significantly increasing the price of their contrac

two or three years down the road? Thirdly, A-76 was extremely

demoralizing, appearing to be an insensitive and clinical pro

cess that produced a tremendous amount of stress on worker

who prepared cost-analysis data that could very likely cos

them their jobs.

General Paul and his staff planned to use the A-76 proces

as one means of achieving the personnel drawdown that ap

plied to all four laboratories. In February 1996, a total of 54

58
positions across the four labs were identified as eligible t

undergo A-76 evaluation. Paul realized that not all position

eligible for A-76 would convert to contractor work, but, base

on projected personnel needs over the next few years, he esti

mated that A-76 might eliminate 359 of the 540 position

identified. In reality, however, one could not hope for quic

results or large reductions in laboratory personnel—at least in

1996—because of the snail’s pace of the start-to-finish A-7

assessment. From his vantage point, Dr. Daniel believed tha

“A-76 was not that big of a deal,” especially when compared t

the impact of the Dorn cuts.

3 0

DOD’s personnel figures confirmed Daniel’s intuitions abou

the contribution of A-76 . In a briefing to the Defense Scienc

Board , Diane Disney, who tracked personnel trends for DOD 

admitted that in the mid-1990s, “privatization has not been 

major part of downsizing.” Although the highest levels of govern 

ment had addressed ideas about the benefits of privatization fo

some time, they had little to show in terms of meaningful per

sonnel reductions. For example, in all of DOD from FY 1993 t

FY 1996, a total of 19 A-76 studies had resulted in the separa

tion of only 192 civilian employees. In spite of this relatively poo

showing, DOD continued to take the position that A-76 would

become “the dominant factor for the future.” Although the de

partment had not vigorously pursued contracting out, whic

had not resulted in dramatic personnel reductions in the past, i

recognized that it would have to endorse a policy of privatization

to meet future personnel and budget goals. DOD ’s turnaroun

made sense if one believed that future budgets would be slashed

and that fewer employees would be needed to perform the new

missions of the twenty-first century. Only time would tell if thi

would become a realistic approach for making significant cuts in

the overall personnel picture.3 1

Laboratory Personnel Profile:

A Downward Trend

The years immediately preceding the stand-up of the Ai

Force Research Laboratory in 1997 significantly affected th

personnel profile of the new lab. Even to the most casua

59
observer, the first half of the 1990s portended fundamenta

change for the future. In keeping with the Clinton administra

tion’s policy of downsizing the military, manpower trend

within each of the four Air Force laboratories revealed a con

tinual decline in personnel numbers throughout the 1990s

DOD reform measures embodied in the Dorn cuts and th

DPG convinced General Paul that consolidating civilian an

military jobs under one laboratory was the best way to reach

personnel-reduction goals.3 2

Looking back at the history of laboratory manpower showe

that the laboratory organization—consisting of the four lab

plus the Science and Technology Directorate (AFMC/ST), th

Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the Tech

nical Transition Office (TTO)—had been consistent from yea

to year in complying with DOD’s downsizing policy. From

1990 through 1996, total laboratory-authorized manpower po

sitions decreased from 8,480 to 7,226—a loss of 1,254 slots

representing a reduction of 15 percent (table 3). By the end o

FY 1997, the total manpower number had dropped to 7,091. 3 3

However, this figure from FY 1997 was misleading becaus

511 Program 8 positions assigned to Armstrong Laboratory a

Brooks AFB in San Antonio were transferred out of the labora

tory and assigned to the Human Systems Center. Program 

jobs included veterinarians, drug testers, medical technicians

and so forth, assigned to Armstrong Lab. These jobs were im

portant, but in times of downsizing when reductions had to b

made, Program 8 positions received a lower retention priority

General Paul and others did not believe that these 511 jobs fi

the strict definition of pure S&T positions needed to carry ou

the laboratory’s main mission of R&D. Consequently, the 51

Program 8 positions were moved off Armstrong Laboratory’

unit-manning document and transferred to the Human Sys

tems Center, also located at Brooks AFB. The problem, how

ever, was that these positions were “moved” from one organiza 

tion to another rather than deleted from the personnel books

Although these jobs no longer remained laboratory assets, th

Air Force still had to pay the salaries and provide suppor

services to the 511 people who now appeared on the Huma

Systems Center’s unit-manning document.

3 4

60
61
All this meant that General Paul

s organization did not re

ceive credit for moving the 511 positions to another Air Forc

organization because the jobs did not go away. To receiv

credit for personnel reductions under Dorn and DPG, posi

tions had to be “eliminated” from the Air Force. That had no

happened. Consequently, when the single lab stood up in Oc

tober 1997, the manpower numbers showed 6,580 authorize

positions (see table 3). In reality, the 511 positions had to b

added to the 6,580 number, resulting in a new total of 7,091

of which 73 percent were civilians and 27 percent were military

Although counting the 511 positions in this way might seem

unfair, it was the accepted accounting method used by DOD

to calculate personnel-reduction credits. 3 5

In the midst of this somewhat confusing and changing per

s onnel picture, one could argue that the 6,580 number cited

for 1997 was more accurate than the 7,091 figure. Realisti

cally, the single lab had only 6,580 assigned positions upon it

official establishment in 1997. Calculating personnel losse

using the 6,580 number meant that a reduction of ninetee

hundred positions (8,480 minus 6,580) occurred from FY 199

through FY 1997—a 22 percent decline. As mentioned above

the decline amounted to 15 percent if one counted the 51

Program 8 positions. Either way, since 1990 the emerging gen

eral pattern showed a steady loss of manpower at the lab. Al

signs indicated that this trend would accelerate in the future.3 

Implementation of the Dorn cuts and DPG had both an

immediate and a long-term effect on downsizing the laborator

workforce. But trying to gauge precise personnel numbers wa

not always an easy task for a couple of reasons. Firstly, col

lecting accurate numbers on total authorized positions from

1989 forward proved difficult simply because all the data wa

not available or had to be pieced together by combining infor

mation from a variety of source documents. Secondly, identify 

ing vacant positions (likely candidates for elimination) on th

unit-manning document was also difficult because those posi

tions underwent constant change—at least for the curren

year. Although some vacant positions might be filled, othe

positions might become vacant through retirements, change

of jobs, resignations, and so forth. Furthermore, the fact tha

individuals stated they would retire, change jobs, or resign did

62
not prevent them from changing their minds at the las

minute, reducing the certainty in calculating an accurate lis

of projected vacancies. So the number of vacancies through 

out the laboratory system changed almost daily, making i

tougher to get a firm grip on the exact number of vacant slot

near the top of the list to consider for elimination as part o

the long-term game plan to downsize. 3 7

General Paul knew that once the 35 percent reduction plan

for laboratory personnel was finalized in May 1995 with th

release of the DPG, he had to begin developing a strategy t

meet that goal. One of the first steps was to establish a cred 

ible personnel baseline number to calculate what the la

would have to get down to in terms of authorized personne

positions by 2001. In a reduction-strategy briefing in Februar

1996, General Paul used FY 91 with a baseline of 8,015 t

project future personnel losses. Subtracting 35 percent from

the baseline left a remainder of 5,210 positions by the yea

2001. This was a first cut at trying to determine where th

laboratory would have to be in 2001 to comply with DPG’s 3

percent directive (fig. 2).

Defining reliable personnel numbers to meet goals five year

in the future was no easy task. Manpower numbers alway

seemed a moving target because changes and inputs to th

Figure 2. Air Force S&T Manpower Reductions, Program 6 (From

briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, director, Science and Technology

Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, subject: S&T Manpowe

Reduction Strategy [FY 97–01], 16 February 1996)

63
system occurred daily—even hour to hour. Accordingly, th

number of assigned positions underwent continual revision t

answer the most immediate question at hand. For example

the laboratory goal of 5,210 authorized slots for 2001 (see fig

2) changed as plans to reorganize began to unfold throughou

1996. As more and more historical personnel data was col

lected and used, General Paul’s staff built an accurate set o

manpower numbers for FY 1989 in lieu of FY 1991. By usin

1989 as the starting point—the year DPG originally designate

as the “peak year”—to base manpower reductions, one could

change the final manpower goal from 5,210 to 5,507 author

ized positions. This new number came from taking away 3

percent of the FY 1989 baseline of 8,493 (fig. 3).

Fine-tuning manpower numbers with exacting precision fo

several years in the future was not the most pressing concer

for reorganizing the laboratory. The important issue involve

taking action to implement the spirit and law of the DPG tha

would lead to a smaller and more efficient workforce. Plannin

Figure 3. Manpower Trends (From briefing, Col Mike Pepin, AFRL deput

director, Plans and Programs, subject: AFRL Manpower Report, FY

89–FY01, 20 March 1998; and fax, Jan Moore, AFRL/SP, to author, subjec

S&T Manpower, 17 March 1998, with attached briefing chart, “S&

Manpower and Budget Trend,” 23 January 1998)

64
and moving in the right direction, along with starting to iden

tify and remove authorized positions from the unit-mannin

document, comprised a critical first step that DOD leader

wanted to see happen. However, they realized that projected

personnel-reduction numbers varied, depending on the lates

available manpower data for past years. Manpower was certainly

a core issue that the reorganizers had to deal with, but Genera

Viccellio sensed the urgency of the bigger picture. Primarily, h

wished to avoid delay in initiating the process of establishing 

single lab. He expected and depended upon General Paul t

carry out this exercise in the most expeditious manner possible

Consequently, during the early stages of planning for the new

lab, he did not overly concern himself with defining and defend

ing a specific 35 percent reduction number.3 8

Viccellio served as the decision maker who articulated th

general guidance that armed General Paul with the authorit

to make the single lab happen. Viccellio did not want to ge

bogged down in the details of personnel numbers. Although

the final 35 percent manpower number initially varied from

5,209 to 5,507 and then settled somewhere between fifty-fiv

hundred and six thousand by the beginning of FY 1997, Vic

cellio showed no inclination to name a specific number. Gen

eral Paul knew this, noting that Viccellio “never put a goal in

writing” as regards long-term manpower numbers. However

in his numerous meetings and interactions with Viccellio in

the spring of 1996, Paul had come to believe that Viccelli

thought “we would even go down below the 5,500 point. Hi

[Viccellio’s] hope was that with the single lab that it would b

efficient enough that maybe there were another couple of hun

dred people beyond that.”3 9

Many reasons led them to avoid devoting an excessiv

amount of time and energy to perfecting the goal of achievin

a 35 percent reduction in manpower for 2001. Firstly, it wa

up to Air Force Materiel Command to show it was on th

correct heading for achieving the 35 percent reduction. AFMC

had the responsibility of keeping track of laboratory personne

cuts, but no outside office or agency was involved in the de

tails of keeping an account of the exact number of cuts. Even

tually, the command would have to report its progress peri

odically up the chain. Any heading checks, realignments, o

65
accelerated personnel cuts would occur and be negotiated a

that time. In addition, Congress might enact legislation in

1997 that would later cancel, revise, or increase or decreas

the cuts imposed by the 1995 DPG. In that situation, the 3

percent manpower number for 2001 would change.4 0

One of General Paul’s major concerns in setting up th

single lab was the selection process for determining the type

of positions to give up as part of the overall downsizing effort

Higher authorities provided no guidance about the types o

positions to eliminate during any of the personnel-reduction

exercises. Higher headquarters simply passed on specifyin

how many reductions each organization had to make annu 

ally. Identification of specific job categories was left up to th

leadership of the organization affected by the personnel cuts

During the first few years with the Dorn cuts, for example

laboratory cuts came from a variety of positions, includin

support staff and middle management as well as S&T job

series. All of these work sectors contributed to the mandator

personnel drawdown.4 1

General Paul especially wished to do something to revers

the trend of cutting so deeply into science and engineerin

positions. After all, the heart and soul of the laboratory organ

zation were the scientists and engineers who performed R&D

From 1994 to 1996, the Dorn cuts had consumed too man

science and engineering positions. As Paul explained the me

chanics of the reduction process, “We were taking support an

researchers almost in an equal proportional number.” At tha

point, one accounted for most of the personnel losses by givin

up vacancies or through retirements and job transfers. Even

tually, however, vacancies would run out. Although from 199

to 1996, no one had to face a reduction in force , Paul antici

pated the inevitability of RIFs in the future. But after expend

ing all the vacancies, he would have to have a new system in

place to ensure the protection of scientific and engineerin

jobs. Simply put, the erosion of the scientific and technica

workforce could not continue if one expected the laboratory t

accomplish its mission. General Paul summed it up best whe

he commented, “Without reorganizing, we were going to hav

to take a lot of our cuts from scientists and engineers.”4 2

66
When Vision 21 came along in 1996 advocating laborator

consolidation, it proved a timely and favorable opportunit

and mechanism for preserving scientific and engineering posi

tions within the laboratory system. General Paul believed tha

the decision to reduce the four labs to one would satisfy th

consolidation intent of Vision 21. But it also would have othe

important benefits. Reorganizing into one lab would provid

solid justification for removing overhead positions that pre

viously existed in four separate laboratories. The thinking wa

that, instead of maintaining four separate command section

and their staffs, a single lab would require only one comman

section and a consolidated staff consisting of fewer peopl

than the four collective staffs. Reorganizing in this manne

meant that future personnel cuts would come exclusively from

overhead positions because one lab would not need as man

support and management people. Thus, scientific and engi

neering positions would be protected to ensure that R&D mis

sion performance did not suffer. The only exception to thi

policy would occur if the Air Force decided to do away with 

specific technology program of lesser relevance to users that i

could not fund because of budget cuts. In that case, scienc

and engineering positions would be dropped from the unit

manning document because the technical program these posi

tions supported would no longer exist. 4 3

Predictions of budget cuts influenced the speed of removin

personnel positions under the new laboratory realignment

For example, from 1997 through projections for 2001, th

lab’s balance of 453 positions had to be eliminated as part o

its remaining Dorn allocations. In 1997 the lab gave up 28

positions, leaving only 173 to be abolished over the next fou

years. Why was the laboratory in such a rush to get rid o

personnel slots so much in advance of the 2001 deadline?4 4

The answer is that the lab wanted to act quickly because o

projected budget cuts. If budgets decreased, then it would hav

less money available to pay civilian salaries. As Paul explained

“It is in our interest, as long as we are going to lose them [civilia

positions] anyway, to lose them earlier; we don’t need as man

support people. The longer they are on the payroll, the longer w

have to pay them; when we have to pay them, that is less mone

to do technology.” So the desire to get civilian positions off th

67
books quickly was in step with the idea that the single labora

tory had to create a “flatter” civilian workforce and prepare a

early as possible to deal with future budget cuts that would

prevent the paying of all civilian salaries.45

Pressures brought on by personnel reductions, especially

the requirements imposed by DPG and the Dorn cuts, contrib 

uted significantly to the decision to go with a single lab. Vic

cellio, Paul, and others in the Air Force hierarchy conclude

that formation of a single laboratory represented the best wa

to reduce the number of civilians. As the consolidated la

came together, it would need only a relatively small staff an

management force. Hence, creation of the single lab offere

the rationale to reduce civilian positions and at the same tim

make the organization leaner and more efficient by centraliz 

ing its operations. A single lab would be more efficient be

cause it would no longer need the “integrating function” of th

AFMC/ST staff. The single lab commander and his staff now

would perform that function.

Notes

1. John P. White, undersecretary of defense, to secretaries of the mil

tary departments, letter, subject: Plan for Consolidation of Defense Labora 

tories and Test and Evaluation Centers, 1 May 1996.

2. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, sec. 277

Public Law 104-106, 10 February 1996. Dr. Daniel believed that Pau

Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, pro

posed the 20 percent figure.

3. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998.

4. Dr. Vincent J. Russo, interviewed by author, 4 February 1998; an

Brig Gen Michael C. Kostelnik, director of plans, to ALHQCTR/CC et al

letter, subject: Vision 21 Laboratory and Test and Evaluation Consolidatio

Study, 7 August 1996.

5. Russo interview.

6. Ibid.; and Col Dennis F. Markisello, interviewed by author, 6 Februar

1998.

7. Markisello interview.

8. Dr. Edwin Dorn, dean, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs

University of Texas at Austin, interviewed by author, 22 December 1998

and biography, Edwin Dorn, University of Texas, December 1998.

9. Dorn interview.

10. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: De

p artment of Defense, October 1993), 81–84; and idem, The Bottom-Up Review

68
Forces for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,1 Septem 

ber 1993).

11. Dorn interview.

12. Ibid.; and Linda Gileau, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense fo

Personnel and Readiness, Requirements Directorate, interviewed by author

6 January 1999.

13. Edwin Dorn, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness

to secretaries of the military departments, letter, subject: DOD Civilia

Resource Guidance—FY 1994–2001, 2 June 1994; and Gileau interview.

14. Dorn interview; and Gileau interview.

15. Tim Dues, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998.

16. Ibid. The other three labs had similar ties with their product centers

Armstrong Lab reported to the Human Resource Center at Brooks AFB

Tex.; Rome Lab reported to the Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom AFB

Mass.; and Wright Lab reported to the Aeronautical Systems Center a

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

17. Paul interview.

18. Tim Dues, interviewed by author, 6 April 1998.

19. Dan McDermott, AFRL/XPP, to author, fax (with attached excerp

from FY 1997 DPG, 9 May 1995), subject: DPG, 23 June 1998.

20. Dan McDermott, AFRL/XPP, to author, fax (with attached excerp

from FY 1997 DPG, 9 May 1995, 64), subject: DPG, 25 June 1998.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.; and Paul interview.

23. McDermott, 25 June 1998; and Paul interview.

24. McDermott, 25 June 1998; and Paul interview.

25. McDermott, 25 June 1998; and Paul interview.

26. Aspin, 97–98.

27. David R. Stockman, director, OMB, to the heads of executive depar

ments and establishments, letter, subject: Performance of Commercial Ac 

tivities, 4 August 1983; and Executive Office of the President, Office o

Management and Budget, Circular no. A-76, Revised Supplemental Hand

book: Performance of Commercial Activities, March 1996.

28. Stockman; and Revised Supplemental Handbook.

29. Stockman; and Revised Supplemental Handbook.

30. Briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, director, Science and Technology

Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, subject: S&T Manpower Reduc

tion Strategy (FY 1997–2001), 16 February 1996; and Dr. Don Daniel

interviewed by author, 27 July 1998.

31. Briefing, Diane M. Disney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fo

Civilian Personnel Policy (DASD/CPP), subject: Civilian Workforce Issue

Briefing to the Defense Science Board’s Human Resources Strategy Tas

Force, 21 December 1998.

32. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 6 February and 

March 1998.

69
33. Briefing, Col Mike Pepin, AFRL deputy director, Plans and Programs

subject: AFRL Manpower Report, FY 89–FY 01, 20 March 1998.

34. Bridgett Parsons, AFRL/Human Resources Office, interviewed b

author, 27 July 1998; and Headquarters AFMC/XPMR, memorandum t

Headquarters AFMC/XPMO, subject: Manpower Program Adjustment—Ai

Force Research Laboratory Phase I Authorization Transfer, with attache

Air Mobility Command Manpower Program Subcommand Sequence, 30 Ma

1997.

35. Parsons interview.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Gen Henry Viccellio Jr., interviewed by author, 24 June 1998.

39. Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

40. Parsons interview.

41. Paul interviews, 6 February and 2 March 1998.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.; and Viccellio interview.

44. Pepin briefing.

45. Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

70
Chapter 5

Laboratory Studies and Strategy

Besides the inevitable reduction of civilians in the labs, an

other important issue facing the Air Force was organizational

management alternatives available to labs. Numerous studie

on this subject had taken place over the years. Most recently

in 1993 Dr. George R. Abrahamson, chief scientist of the Ai

Force, led a study that had a particular bearing on the futur

of the four laboratories. Known as the Blue Ribbon Panel on

Management Options for Air Force Laboratories, this investi

gation fulfilled a requirement levied on the Air Force b

DDR&E to explore the feasibility of transforming the labs to 

government-owned, contractor-operated management system

However, Abrahamson and the other eight distinguished pane

members—three of whom had served as chief scientist of th

Air Force—examined a broad range of management topics. 1

Abrahamson’s Blue-Ribbon Panel:

Assessing Laboratory Management Structure

The blue-ribbon panel’s findings strongly endorsed th

value and contributions of Air Force labs. The members de

fined the role of the labs as providing critical leadership t

ensure the development of the most advanced technologie

and their integration into operational Air Force systems. The

went on to explain that one of the “success factors” that con

tributed to the world-renowned reputation of the nationa

laboratories—Los Alamos , Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia —

was the deliberate design of a direct-reporting channel to 

single point of contact at a high level. For example, Lo

Alamos reported to the president of the California Institute o

Technology, and Lawrence Livermore had direct access to th

provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2

On the other hand, the blue-ribbon panel faulted the out-of

step, multiple-reporting procedures followed by the Air Forc

labs. Rather than reporting to one powerful person in charg

71
who had authority to make deci

sions in all areas, the labs di

vided their management respon

sibilities among several people a

various levels of command. In t h

panel’s opinion, these multip le 

reporting lines weakened th

overall operational effectivenes

of Air Force labs: “Lab command

ers report to the product cente

commanders for people, and t

the TEO and SAF/AQ for pro

gram and budget. This leads t

confusion and a lack of flexibilit

to manage the technical enter

prize [sic], and greatly increase

the difficulty of managing th

drawdown in a rational way.” According to the panel, splittin

the key management aspects of the labs rather than reportin

to a single person at the highest level of command fostered 

perception in some quarters that Air Force senior leadership

did not value its laboratories.3

Centralization of authority to control lab operations across

the-board was “urgently needed” to improve the overall opera

tions of the lab system. One persuasive and strong-wille

leader, whether a military commander or high-level civilian

armed with the flexibility to “move slots, redirect programs

and move funds without fighting organizational barriers

would be in a position to take action to cure a number of ill

endemic to the labs. The panel bluntly stated that it wanted “a

person for whom S&T stewardship is a full time responsibil

ity.” Doing that required prying the labs away from the prod 

uct centers.

4

Not everyone thought it was a good idea to separate the lab

from the product centers. Gen Ronald W. Yates, AFMC com 

mander, was not persuaded by the blue-ribbon panel’s argu 

ment that laboratory operations would improve by having th

labs report to the TEO (who ensured that labs operated as 

single enterprise with a balanced investment strategy) instea

of to the product centers. On 7 December 1993, Yates expresse

Dr. George R. Abrahamson led a

blue-ribbon panel study.

72
his reservations after listening to Dr. Abrahamson brief the find

ings of the blue-ribbon study in the general’s office. On 1

December, Abrahamson followed up with a letter to Yates “am

plifying on the reasons” why the labs should operate as Ai

Force “corporate” assets as opposed to product-center assets .5

Abrahamson’s letter did not change the general’s mind

Yates wrote back, reiterating his “fundamental concerns” with

the panel’s recommendations. Because the general though

the labs were not broken, he saw no valid need for an interna

reorganization: “With respect to changing the current linkag

of the laboratories to the product centers, I remain convince

that, in the aggregate, the current reporting relationship i

working well and should not be changed.” In fact, Yate

pointed out that the lab/product-center association “has un

questionably improved our track record in transitioning ma

ture technology out of the laboratories to their customers.

One of the things he especially liked about the current ar

rangement was the “frequent involvement of our product cen

ter commanders with their assigned laboratories,” which ac

counted for the laboratories’ high quality of work an

responsiveness. 6

Yates also pointed out that he relied on his director of S&T

who chaired the Science and Technology Mission Elemen

Board , to work out all lab-related resource issues, includin

people and dollars. If people issues, such as personnel reduc

tions, spilled over into the product centers, then one should

use AFMC’s Resource Allocation Integrated Product Team t

resolve differing views. Failure to reach an agreement between

the labs and centers would result in elevating the issue t

General Yates for a final decision. Although the process wa

new, he wanted to give it a chance to work before changin

the reporting relationship between the labs and centers.7

Yates did agree that the labs should serve a wide array o

customers—not just their parent product centers. Accordingly

six months after writing to Abrahamson , General Yates issue

a policy letter titled “Air Force Laboratories—Corporate Assets

but did not back off from the current lab-reporting arrange

ment. In the letter, he plainly stated that “our laboratories wil

continue to operate as organizational elements of our produc

centers.” He firmly believed that this arrangement was th

73
best way to 

transition mature technologies to our weapon

systems developers.” After the general made his decision on

this issue, no one could persuade him to change his mind

The policy remained in place until General Yates retired an

departed the command on 30 June 1995. A year after Genera

Viccellio took over as AFMC commander in July 1995, th

pressures brought on by the National Defense Authorization

Act and Vision 21 reopened the issue of the labs’ relationship

to the product centers. It became increasingly clear that in th

near future, labs would have to consolidate. As part of thi

restructuring process, labs would break away from their or

ganizational alignment with product centers.

8

New World Vistas:

Building on Toward New Horizons

In November 1994, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff o

the Air Force, and Sheila E. Widnall , secretary of the Ai

Force, sent a letter to Gene McCall, chairman of the Air Forc

Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). The underlying message o

the letter was to remind McCall of the enormously significan

role played by Gen Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore von Kármán

after World War II in establishing and promoting the impor

tance of S&T in developing the Air Force of the future. Toward

New Horizons was the vision von Kármán formulated to serv

as the blueprint for conducting R&D programs that would

lead to superior aerospace systems. The foresight embodied in

Toward New Horizons laid the intellectual framework largely

responsible for shaping the number-one Air Force in th

world. Building on this legacy and recognizing the blisterin

pace of technological change in recent years, Fogleman an

Widnall stressed that “only a constant inquisitive attitude to

ward science and a ceaseless and swift adaptation to new

developments can maintain the security of this nation.” Wid 

nall strongly believed that the swift adaptation of technolog

preached by General Arnold was even more valid today than 

h alf century ago. Widnall and Fogleman recognized this u n swerv

ing and time-tested principle of quickly applying tec hnology a

74
the underpinning of the global

reach, global power policy of today’s Air Force.9

Fogleman and Widnall sought

to rekindle the spirit and attitude

toward science that were so prominent during the von Kárm á nArnold era. Spirit, attitude, and

preparation for the future were

not empty concepts but important ideas of substance that the

Air Force had to practice. If history served as any measure of

truth, then Arnold ’s advice to the

first meeting of the Scientific Ad -

visory Group (forerunner of the

SAB) in January 1945 held special significance. Appealing to the

collective wisdom of the elite assembly of scientists, Arnold

chose his words carefully and deliberately to make a majo

point in simple terms: “I don’t think we dare muddle through

the next 20 years the way we have the last 20.” As a first ste

to applying Arnold ’s lessons learned to new possibilities in

S&T, the chief and secretary challenged the SAB to devise 

new vision for the next 30 years that focused on the mos

advanced air and space ideas which would transform th

twenty-first century. This futuristic assessment of S&T would

be detailed in a report called New World Vistas, scheduled fo

publication in December 1995, to coincide with and com

memorate the 50th annivers ary of the publication of von Kár

mán ’s Toward New Horizon s.

1 0

Essentially, Fogleman and Widnall charged McCall, stud

director of New World Vistas, and 150 eminent scientists from

academia, industry, and government serving on the SAB team

to develop their technology forecast in one year. The heart o

the evaluation process focused on technology that most likely

would “revolutionize the 21st century Air Force.” Although th

future of S&T remained the primary concern, Fogleman an

Widnall also tasked the SAB to take a good look at how th

laboratory system was organized to handle the management o

Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, secretary o

the Air Force, favored a majo

reorganization of the laboratories.

75
R&D programs. More specifically

they wanted the SAB to deter

mine whether the laborator

structure was “consistent with th

new vistas” findings. The funda

mental question became, Should

the Air Force make changes in

the current laboratory organiza 

tional structure to better dea

with projected technologies on

the horizon?1 1

The answer to that crucia

question was “yes.” McCall an

the SAB had no doubt that th

demands of future technolog

would force changes in how th

Air Force leadership approache

structuring its organization t

support R&D . Addressing the laboratory organization issue

the SAB offered constructive recommendations to best mee

future contingencies. Like Abrahamson ’s blue-ribbon panel

the SAB wanted to remove the labs from the control of AFMC’

product centers. Under the current organizational alignment

Rome Lab reported to the Electronic Systems Center, Phillip

Lab to the Space and Missile Systems Center, Armstrong La

to the Human Systems Center , and Wright Lab to the Aero

nautical Systems Center . This organizational structure had it

origins in 1982, when Air Force Systems Command place

laboratories under centers that reported to “product divi

sions.” Later, with the establishment of four Air Force labora

tories in 1990—and the elimination of centers such as the Ai

Force Space Technology Center, which managed the Weapons

Geophysics, and Astronautics labs—each lab now reporte

directly to a product center . By reducing the number of labs

the Air Force reasoned it could more effectively apply state-of

the-art S&T to better achieve mission success, streamline th

acquisition process, reduce overhead, and eliminate duplica

tion of technical efforts.1 2

Systems Command argued that it made a great deal o

sense to place the labs under the product centers becaus

Dr. Gene McCall served as the

study director of New World

Vistas.

76
doing so would force the labs to concentrate more on tech

nologies that held the highest potential for transition to th

operational Air Force. This setup had served its purpose well

according to the SAB . However, the board pointed out tha

each laboratory had “important programs which are not di

rectly associated with its Product Center.” Consequently

these types of programs would suffer because they were con

sidered “outsiders.” Looking to the future, the SAB reporte

that “the impact of new technologies is to demand closer inte

gration and ‘flattening’ of organizations to provide better inte

gration of the technologies themselves.” Every senior Air Forc

leader, including Generals Viccellio and Paul, interprete

“closer integration and flattening of organizations” to mean 

smaller and more centralized laboratory organization.1 3

From a philosophical and practical point of view, many peopl

believed the time was right to shift labs away from the produc

centers. In the past, the Soviet bloc clearly represented th

most dangerous threat facing the United States. During thi

time, it was realistic to assume that this near-term threat ha

the potential of erupting into a worldwide conflict. Because o

this situation, emphasizing near-term S&T made sense. Unde

this arrangement, the labs would develop and pass on ad

vanced technology as quickly as possible to the product cen

ters to integrate with their systems and thus support th

operational Air Force. The effort focused primarily on improv

ing and evolving the next generation of existing war-fightin

systems rather than developing revolutionary systems. Thi

approach was analogous to car manufacturers turning out 

new model every year to meet the near-term demands of cus

tomers, relegating long-term goals to secondary concern. Gen

eral Motors and other car makers were not investing heavily in

research to develop a radically new system, such as the elec

tric car, to meet anticipated customer needs 30 years in th

future. Instead, they sought to turn out new cars each yea

and get them into the hands of eager customers—the operat

ing inventory—as quickly as possible. 1 4

In the late 1980s, the political/military pendulum began t

swing in a different direction. With the fall of the Berlin Wal

in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, th

monolithic communist threat disappeared and was replace

77
by potentially more dangerous regional conflicts that the na

tion would have to deal with on a case-by-case basis. Thi

change in strategy also affected how the Air Force though

about investing its S&T dollars during this new period of rela 

tive peace. Many believed the time was ripe to begin to dedi

cate an increased portion of the budget to promote higher-ris

technology programs that would lead to revolutionary sys

tems. The labs would still support the product divisions, bu

they did not need to be aligned with them organizationally

Centralized management of the labs, which seemed a mor

logical choice for achieving future short- and long-term goals

was the second major recommendation of the SAB .

1 5

This recommendation involved placing the laboratories un

der an S&T executive who would have control over all labora

tory personnel, funding, and programs. General Paul use

this argument as one of the reasons to promote the singl

laboratory. As mentioned earlier, as the Air Force TEO, Gen

eral Paul controlled funding and programs but had limite

power over personnel decisions in the lab. Usually, when per

sonnel cuts came down the line, the product-center com

manders, rather than General Paul, wielded the final authorit

as to what positions would go or stay. This meant that, mor

often than not, the highest proportion of personnel cuts cam

out of the labs rather than the product centers. Paul an

others believed that for the laboratory system to operate at th

highest level of proficiency and productivity, the person direct

ing the labs had to have total control over all funding, pro

grams, and personnel issues. Paul consistently backed th

SAB on this key issue, at every opportunity advocating that “i

makes sense for one person to be accountable and work to

gether in harmony with the manpower and budget aspects o

the labs.”16

The SAB believed that either a civilian or military person

should hold this critical position. A civilian offered continuit

over time, but a military executive could provide a closer connec

tion to the operational Air Force. Although avoiding a com mit

ment to either a military person or civilian, the SAB did take th 

stand that, wherever the executive came from, he should be a

least the equivalent of a product-center commander. In managin 

programs, the S&T executive’s most importa nt responsibilit

78
was to better integrate technologies across-the-board an

pressure his lab organization to pursue and increase transi

tion opportunities. In other words, his most productive contri

butions would entail managing and developing those technolo 

gies that would lead to improved systems for supporting th

war fighter—the bottom line for the existence of any Air Forc

laboratory organization. Equally important was the fact tha

the labs had an obligation to investigate and develop innova 

tive technology to anticipate and meet the long-term demand

of the Air Force over the next 30 years. 1 7

Although everyone agreed that the labs should no longe

remain a part of the product centers’ organizational structure

the SAB made no specific recommendations suggesting how

many labs should exist in the future. The board members did

not believe they had the responsibility to tell the Air Force how

to reorganize its laboratory structure. Consequently, the SAB

issued no blueprint proposing a reduction of the existing fou

labs to three or two labs and made no official mention o

establishing a single lab. Simply put, there was no opposition

to either retaining four labs or establishing a single lab. Gen

McCall remembered that the issue for reorganization empha

sized the need to break the labs out from under the produc

centers and appoint an S&T executive who would provide cen

tralized control over programs, people, and funding. The SAB

wanted to flatten the organization and take steps to integrat

similar technologies so the labs would become more respon

sive to the needs of the operational Air Force. The Air Forc

would decide how that happened.1 8

Providing better integration of technologies proved a some

what elusive concept. In theory, most people agreed that in

times of downsizing and restructuring the laboratory organiza 

tion, it was a good idea to streamline operations by unifyin

technology efforts. As an example, both the Phillips an

Wright labs conducted laser research. Portions of the work on

sensors took place at the Wright, Rome, and Phillips labs. Bu

the basic problem was that no one person, lab, division, o

branch consolidated and directed all the various laser an

sensors work taking place at the different geographic loca

tions. Rather, both small and large groups of people worke

independently, for the most part, on their portion of the lase

79
or sensors pie with little or only minimal interaction with thei

colleagues at other sites.1 9

This complicated situation, which involved bits and piece

of the same technology discipline spread out among variou

labs, had been entrenched in the laboratory system for de

cades. Each lab built walls around the technology pieces i

dealt with to prevent other labs from invading and takin

away its prized work. Except to declare that this state of a

fairs needed to change, the New World Vistas study made n

specific recommendations for breaking down the walls. How

ever, McCall commented that restructuring the laboratory or

ganization did not absolutely require the consolidation of sim

lar technology work at one geographic site.2 0

Far more important to McCall in solving the problem wa

that scientists performing similar work at various location

make a much stronger effort to get to know one another an

“work better together.” To make that happen, one highly com

petent leader, appointed by the lab commander, had to as

sume responsibility for directing and managing all aspects o

a particular technology discipline. That person would be th

point of contact to answer any questions about specific tech

nology posed by the Air Force, lab management, other govern

ment agencies, contractors, or any other customers. O

course, all this was easier said than done. Almost anothe

year and a half would pass after the release of New World

Vistas before General Paul and his staff agreed on a new

single lab structured along the lines of specific technolog

directorates. Part of the reason for organizing in this fashion

was to “better integrate technologies,” as suggested by th

New World Vistas study. 2 1

Secretary Widnall remained extremely enthusiastic an

supportive of the New World Vistas approach to S&T. Upon

reviewing the study’s findings, she definitely recognized th

need to reorganize the lab structure so the Air Force would b

better prepared to manage a diversity of emerging technologie

over the next 30 years. She especially liked the idea of remov

ing the labs from the product centers and making them mor

independent and productive. Faced with the prospects of de

clining budgets and fewer people in the workforce, she t hough

that the Air Force could achieve savings by consolidating al

80
laboratory resources into one organization. Further, she be

lieved that doing so would reduce the size of the administra

tive workforce and eliminate “non-value added administration

functions spread over all four laboratories. 2 2

As Paul and Viccellio pressed to present their case in 199

for a consolidated lab with a single person in charge, they won

Widnall over without much convincing. Part of the reason ha

to do with her concerns about the technical duplication o

effort among the various labs. She believed that one lab an

one commander could correct this problem by making corpo

rate decisions that would eliminate duplication of effort . At th

same time, a single commander would have the authority an

resources to promote an attitude of “greater technology shar

ing across Air Force missions” among scientists, who would

respond better to a single lab’s direction. Looking back, Wid 

nall considered New World Vistas a very important and usefu

exercise that greatly influenced the decision to establish 

consolidated laboratory in the Air Force.2 3

Global Engagement:

A New Strategy for the Next Century

Dr. Abrahamson ’s blue-ribbon panel and New World Vista

recognized that the Air Force laboratories would need t

change their management structure and long-range vision t

meet new challenges posed by political and military realities o

the international arena. In response to the findings of thes

influential studies, the Air Force began taking steps to analyz

its state of readiness for future combat contingencies. One o

the most important actions taken by the Air Force was th

decision to make a major shift in its long-range thinking b

devising a new strategic plan called Global Engagement: A

Vision for the 21st Century Air Force .

The two highest-level leaders in the Air Force, Secretar

Widnall and General Fogleman, initiated a movement in Ma

1995 to produce a new Air Force vision for the twenty-firs

century. They assembled a study group consisting of senio

military and civilian leaders and chaired by Gen Thomas S

Moorman Jr., Air Force vice chief of staff, to come up with 

81
more realistic vision that would respond to changing politica

conditions around the world. Widnall, Fogleman , and other

realized that they needed an updated strategic blueprint t

better define the Air Force’s role in DOD’s “big picture” fo

fighting radically different future wars. 2 4

To a large degree, Joint Vision 2010, issued by the Army’s

Gen John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs o

Staff, drove the urgency to develop a more modern Air Forc

vision. This publication provided overall direction for each

service’s responsibility in conducting future military opera

tions. In other words, each service was an integral part of 

joint team whose mission was to fight. Moreover, each servic

had to begin taking steps now to ensure that it would b

prepared and able to fight to accomplish any mission assigne

by the theater commander. 2 5

Joint Vision 2010 appeared in the summer of 1996—th

same time General Paul and his staff were preparing to pre

sent the single-lab concept to Corona —and demanded tha

the services use their collective capabilities to dominate th

enemy in every aspect of the battlefield. This core concept

known as full-spectrum dominance, served as the foundation

for planning and executing all future US military operations

Successful execution of this military doctrine depended on th

four basic tenets of dominant maneuver, precision engage

ment, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics—critica

areas that each service had to strengthen by investing suffi

cient resources to become ready and capable of meeting an

military contingency, anywhere in the world, in the first quar

ter of the twenty-first century. 2 6

Since the end of the cold war, the Air Force had relied on it

strategic policy of global reach, global power , which require

execution of the four core competencies set out in Toward th

Future: Global Reach, Global Power: air (eventually space) su 

periority, global mobility, precision employment, and informa

tion dominance. All of these had to be developed, sustained

and implemented when the call came. Secretary Widnall note

that this policy “has served us well” during a time when th

Air Force maintained a high state of readiness, even though

faced with significant downsizing of the force and reduce

budgets over the first six years of the 1990s. But that polic

82
could not go on forever. 

Extraordinary developments in th

post–Cold War era,” Widnall stressed, “have made it essentia

t hat we design a new strategic vision for the Air Force.” Rapidl

changing geopolitical conditions worldwide dangerously a

fected the security environment and future missions of the Ai

Force. Perhaps most disturbing was the fact that the US mili

tary would not always be able to identify its enemy ahead o

time, as it could during the cold war.

2 7

Other challenges existed. Terrorist groups, whose action

were impossible to predict, clearly posed a major threat both

at home and abroad. The proliferation and availability (for th

right price) of advanced technology made it more likely tha

third world countries could acquire and use sophisticate

weapon systems against a number of opponents, including th

United States. As Secretary Widnall put it, “New technologie

are erupting around us every day.” Clearly, nuclear, biological

and chemical weapons were entering the arsenals of more an

more nations around the world at an alarming rate. Addition 

ally, DOD was gradually dismantling the once extensive for

ward -basing structure used by the United States and its a

lies; consequently, the United States would have to projec

military power from the homeland rather than strategic base

located around the world.2 8

After months of study and evaluation, General Moorman’

vision team issued its new strategic blueprint—Global Engage

ment—in the fall of 1996. Widnall and Fogleman did not inter

pret that study as just another lofty statement of intent

Rather, this “action oriented” new strategic plan specifie

pathways for the Air Force to follow into the next century

Global Engagement, the culmination of the natural evolution

of events, replaced Global Reach, Global Power, established in

the summer of 1990.2 9

Six straightforward principles that the Air Force had to de

velop and put into practice over the next 30 years lay at th

heart of the Global Engagement document. Four of the six cor

competencies that underlay the Global Engagement vision—ai

and space superiority, rapid global mobility, precision engage

ment, and information superiority—were modifications of th

four Global Reach, Global Power core competencies. To mak

t he strategic plan more robust, Global Engagement adde

83
two other core competencies—global attack and agile comba

support—to round out a total vision plan designed to dete

aggression and to fight and win wars. In his explanation of th

new vision to the Air Force Association in January 1997, Gen

eral Moorman stated that “the context of the long-range plan

is built around sustaining our core competencies and reinforc

ing the central themes found in the strategic vision.”3 0

What effect did Global Engagement and the fundamenta

policy changes it brought about have on the Air Force labora

tories? As it turned out, quite a bit. Global Engagement wa

one of many things that forced the laboratories to reevaluat

how they could best support the six core competencies spelle

out in the new strategic vision.

The Air Force leadership agreed that the six core competen

cies embodied in Global Engagement’s strategic vision cor

rectly identified the service’s goals and pathways. However

they represented only half the answer for solving future prob 

lems. To meet the future demands of airpower and spac

power, the Air Force knew it had to change the way it did

business, which meant changing its culture and organization

Undoubtedly, change would come as DOD and Congress con

tinued to pressure the Air Force to become more efficient with

fewer resources and still successfully prepare for and figh

future wars. Fewer resources translated to reduced budget

and fewer people—both military and civilian employees—as

signed to all organizations across the Air Force, including th

laboratories.3 1

Global Engagement was just one more example that drov

home the point to Air Force leaders that the labs would hav

to reorganize. Over time, the Air Force had no choice othe

than committing to an aggressive reduction of infrastructur

costs. Generals Viccellio and Paul certainly realized this fact o

life and knew that they would no longer have the levels o

money and people to support and sustain the current four

laboratory system. In terms of making the personnel work 

force more efficient, the Air Force’s position as stated in th

new strategic vision called for changing the composition of th

workforce. One change involved converting military position

in a variety of combat-support functions to civilian positions

thereby freeing military members to serve in the more critica

84
operational jobs. This did not necessarily make for fewer posi

tions on the unit-manning document, but contracting out t

the private sector to perform combat-support jobs currently

performed by military and civilians would have the effect o

reducing the number of personnel—which would cut th

number of positions on the unit-manning document. In addi

tion, the Air Force believed that, in the long run, outsourcin

and privatization of the civilian support positions could de

crease a portion of overhead dollars. The intent of all thes

measures was to maximize efficiency by using the best-proven

practices in the business world to run Air Force support func

tions. If the Air Force accepted the current business world’

model of a modern corporation, then it would have to signifi

cantly reduce the size of its civilian support force.3 2

Secretary Widnall was very much aware and in favor o

“getting rid of some administrative overhead structure. . . 

That was an issue that was being looked at very carefully b

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . . We were very wel

aware that in the view of many people, services [overhead], in

general, had gotten bloated.” Overhead was the abhorrent or

ganizational fat that could not avoid drawing attention to it

self. Overhead also ran counter to the military concept of 

lean, mean, fighting machine. To illustrate the point, Widnal

recalled, “You get this famous quote from one of those mem

bers of Congress from California who said there were mor

members of the acquisition force than the Marine Corps

When people say things like that, you know that has th

potential to create the political pressure for major reduction in

administrative overhead. There is no question about that.

And there was no question in Widnall’s mind that in view o

the intense downsizing under way, the labs “needed basically

to be looked at.” The clear goal involved devising a bette

organizational strategy to keep the S&T arm of the Air Force in

step with the vision and six core competencies to meet an

demands on the battlefield during the next century. 3 3

Too, projected budget and personnel reductions meant tha

the laboratories would have to operate as a leaner organiza 

tion. Air Force Materiel Command simply could not afford t

operate the labs as it did in the past because the reduce

number of future dollars and people would not allow this to g

85
on. Consequently, consolidation of laboratory assets into on

central laboratory gained more and more favor at all levels o

government. Global Engagement confirmed what Viccellio an

Paul had already known and accepted. Looking to the ou

years, one could see that a single, consolidated lab made mor

sense in terms of economics and personnel than four separat

laboratories operating independently; further, it would com

pete more and more for less money and fewer personnel ove

the next 30 years. Also, a centralized lab commander would

have the authority to organize his agency by clearly define

scientific disciplines to help eliminate the overlap or duplicatio

of technical efforts embedded for years in the four-laborator

setup. A single lab commander, with control over the tota

spectrum of S&T, would also be in a highly influential position

to explore teaming alternatives with the other military service

in an effort to increase efficiency by forming joint centers o

excellence for R&D. These proposed centers of excellence would

be established to directly support the core competencies articu

lated in Global Engagement and save money in the process .3 4

The goal of Global Engagement was not to destroy the labo

ratories—just the opposite. Perhaps the most important an

revealing result emerging from Global Engagement was th

declaration of change to the basic Air Force mission, which

directly affected the laboratory missions. No longer was air

power exclusively the focus of attention. The new plan pointe

to air and space superiority as the essential ingredient allow

ing all US forces freedom from attack and freedom to attack

The Air Force exists for the purpose of controlling what move

through air and space. As General Fogleman put it, “We have n

other tasks. That is our only job. It is not a diversion for us. W

do it full time—all the time.” He was also extremely confiden

about S&T ’s future ability to adapt to new ch allenges an

mis sions: “The reality is that in the first quarter of the twenty

first century it will become possible to find, fix, or track an

target anything that moves on the surface of the earth .”3 5

The starting point for sustaining air and space superiorit

unequivocally begins with the laboratory system that ad

vances S&T through a diversity of strong R&D programs. La

scientists and engineers serve as the eyes of the Air Force

looking into the future. These people draw upon their scientifi

86
expertise to build 

combat capability by coming up with inven

tive ways to improve existing systems, as well as introducin

revolutionary systems to give the Air Force the technologica

edge to defeat any adversary. The absence of labs to keep th

Air Force in the forefront of advancing and developing new

technology for the war fighter would compromise success in

combat. Today’s modern arsenal of technology furnishes th

military capability to achieve national objectives and, in th

process, acts as the military silver bullet that saves lives. 3 6

Secretary Widnall affirmed the implications of the Air Forc

change in mission. Knowing it was counterproductive to try t

separate air and space operations, she realized that the focu

had to remain on integrating air and space to maximize th

unique assets of both to defeat the enemy. But for the future

she believed that the Air Force would find itself more depend

ent on space than air operations: “All this is just the begin 

ning. We see, over time, our Air Force transitioning from an

air force to an air and space force, and in the future, we fully

expect to become a space and air force.” With their technica

know-how, the laboratories would lead the way by accelerat

ing the development of innovative technologies to ensure th

Air Force’s capability to dominate space.3 7

Emerging from Global Engagement, the formation of six new

battlelabs —small organizations designed to work closely wit

command customers to better define the operator’s battlefield

needs—helped with the development of innovative technologie

to support air and space operations (fig. 4). General Moorma

noted that each battlelab “is not a technology place” but a plac

where people with experience operating equipment and system

in the field generate new ideas. Focusing on “identifying innova 

tive operational concepts that exploit mature technologies,” th

battlelabs work closely with the existing Air Force laborator

system to rapidly develop and test technical capabilities in th

core-competency areas to demonstrate the pluses and minuse

of the most promising operational concepts. Giving the wa

fighter in the field an opportunity to test a particular technology

in its early development stage represented a new approach de

signed to eliminate all kinds of bureaucratic milestones an

reviews in moving new technology through the start-up phases

If the war fighter tries it and likes it, then the lab can proceed

87
with a more rigorous acquisition process. The idea is that thi

team approach will foster more realistic input from the use

since the user of the equipment becomes an active participan

in the process. The desired result entails taking the operator

level information, developing the technology, and modifyin

existing systems that will provide the person in the field wit

the most reliable and effective weapon and support system

For example, the Space Battlelab at Falcon (now Schriever) AF B

Colorado, working with other laboratories, might be engaged in

applying cutting-edge research from the labs on the geo-electro

optical deep-space surveillance system to keep better track o

the number of satellites in orbit. Besides surveillance, othe

projects might evaluate innovative techniques for bolstering ou

space capability for the future, including weapons guidance

warning, communications, and environmental monitoring. 3 8

According to Secretary Widnall, Global Engagement was a wa 

tershed event because it set a new course of action for the Ai

Force to follow. As part of this new vision, S&T would become a

indispensable tool for shaping systems that the operational com

mands would use to fight wars in the next century. Moreover, i

became absolutely essential that the laboratory infrastructur

“seize these new technologies” that would “create combat capa

bility from the metal and plastic of our equipment.”3 9

Figure 4. Air Force Battlelab Locations

88
Certainly, at the highest level of the Air Force, Widnall wa

out front proclaiming the virtues of S&T as one of the mos

important instruments for achieving victory in any future con

flict. But she also realized—mainly because of significan

budget cuts (estimated at about 40 percent), personnel reduc

tions, and a much greater emphasis on the integration of ai

and space—that the laboratory system would have to change

A firm believer that “change is good,” she favored Paul an

Viccellio’s reorganization plan “to put the research labs mor

directly into a single organization.” She also thought that 

single lab structure would be beneficial since it would stimu 

late more competition for funds—a healthy trend. In the past

the four labs knew that they would get their fair share of th

budget. But by consolidating into one lab, budgets would

probably go down, resulting in fewer lab dollars available. Thi

was an effective way to ensure the highest quality work at th

R&D level because only the most productive S&T program

would rise to the top for funding. The least productive pro

grams would fall by the wayside, leaving the remaining limite

funding that would go to support the more successful pro

grams. Widnall liked this approach because “it is the only

responsible way to manage the taxpayers’ money to creat

basically internal competition for scarce resources.”4 0

Secretary Widnall had no doubt that the time was ripe t

pursue a fresh organizational approach to restructure th

labs. Although she promoted the vision for the labs and th

Air Force, her hectic schedule covering the entire spectrum o

Air Force issues did not permit her to devote the time to work

out the details to implement that vision—a job left primarily t

General Paul. Starting in the summer of 1996, he began in

earnest to muster his staff to build the rationale for estab

lishing a single lab. This intensive effort would provide th

basis of the proposal for a consolidated laboratory that would

be presented at the Corona conference in the fall of 1996. 4 1

Notes

1. Gen Ronald W. Yates, AFMC commander, asked Abrahamson to con 

duct the blue-ribbon study. Briefing, Dr. George R. Abrahamson, chie

scientist, US Air Force, subject: Blue Ribbon Panel on Management Option

for Air Force Laboratories, 10 January 1994.

89
2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Gen Ronald W. Yates, AFMC commander, to Dr. George Abrahamson

Air Force chief scientist, letter, subject: Blue Ribbon Panel, 4 January 1994

Dr. George R. Abrahamson to Col Richard W. Davis, commander, Phillip

Laboratory, letter, subject: Blue Ribbon Study, 27 January 1994, with a

tachments (General Paul’s charts, Mr. Jim Mattice’s [deputy assistant sec

retary of the Air Force for research and engineering] chart, and Gen Merril

McPeak’s speech). Yates served as AFMC commander from July 199

through June 1995.

6. Yates letter.

7. Ibid.

8. Gen Ronald W. Yates, AFMC commander, policy letter, subject: Com 

mander’s Policy: Air Force Laboratories—Corporate Assets, 18 July 1994.

9. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force chief of staff, and Sheila E. Wid

nall, secretary of the Air Force, to Dr. Gene McCall, chairman, Air Forc

Scientific Advisory Board, letter, subject: New World Vistas Challenge fo

Scientific Advisory Board, 29 November 1994; video, New World Vistas

prepared by Mr. Jim Slade and Maj Dik Daso, December 1995; and Dr

Sheila E. Widnall, “The Challenge,” in New World Vistas: Air and Spac

Power for the 21st Century, ancillary volume (Washington, D.C.: Air Forc

Scientific Advisory Board, December 1995), 6–8.

10. Fogleman and Widnall letter; and Dr. Ivan A. Getting, “The SAB i

Its Infancy,” in New World Vistas, ancillary volume, 24–27.

11. The SAB consisted of 12 panels charged with evaluating future tech 

nologies: Aircraft and Propulsion, Attack, Directed Energy, Human System

and Biotechnology, Information Applications, Information Technology, Ma 

terials, Mobility, Munitions, Sensors, Space Applications, and Space Tech 

nology. Fogleman and Widnall letter.

12. See Maj Dik Daso’s interview with Dr. Gene H. McCall, chairman, Ai

Force Scientific Advisory Board, in New World Vistas, ancillary volume

143–48.

13. New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, sum

mary volume (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, De

cember 1995), 68.

14. Maj Gen Donald L. Lamberson, USAF, Retired, chair, Directed En 

ergy Panel, New World Vistas, interviewed by author, 30 January 1998.

15. Ibid.

16. New World Vistas, summary volume, 68; Maj Gen Richard R. Paul

interviewed by author, 2 March 1998; and minutes of the Air Force Associa 

tion Science and Technology Committee meeting, Crown Plaza Hotel, Day

ton, Ohio, 17 July 1997.

17. New World Vistas, summary volume, 68.

18. McCall noted that a few SAB members with Air Force connection

lea ned toward supporting the current four-lab setup rather than establishin

90
a single lab. But the vast majority of SAB members did not advocate 

specific reorganization plan. Dr. Gene H. McCall, study director, New Worl

Vistas, interviewed by author, 13 May 1999; Lamberson interview; and Dr

Sheila E. Widnall, former secretary of the Air Force, interviewed by autho

7 July 1999.

19. Dr. Gene H. McCall, study director, New World Vistas, interviewe

by author, 25 May 1999.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Dr. Sheila Widnall, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, t

author, E-mail, subject: Single Lab, 28 June 1999; and Widnall interview.

23. Widnall E-mail; and Widnall interview.

24. Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, and Gen Ronald R

Fogleman, Air Force chief of staff, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21

Century Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, Novem 

ber 1996), 1; and Sheila E. Widnall, “Adapting to an Altered Strategi

Environment,” speech delivered at the Center for Strategic and Internationa

Studies, Washington, D.C., 25 November 1996.

25. Air Force news release, “Air Force Secretary, Chief of Staff Unvei

New Strategic Vision,” 21 November 1996; on-line, Internet, 10 June 1999

available from http://www.af.mil/news/Nov1996/n19961122_961185

html; “Special Report: Global Engagement,” Airman Magazine, Februar

1997; on-line, Internet, 7 June 1999, available from http://www.af.mil/lib

globalon/index.html; and Gen John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Join

Chiefs of Staff, report, “Joint Vision 2010”; on-line, Internet, 18 June 1999

available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs.

26. Toward the Future: Global Reach, Global Power, US Air Force Whit

Papers, 1989–1992 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1993)

Widnall and Fogleman, 5; and Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force chief o

staff, “Global Engagement,” speech delivered at the Smithsonian Institution

Washington, D.C., 21 November 1996.

27. Widnall and Fogleman, 1; “Air Force Secretary, Chief of Staff Unvei

New Strategic Vision”; and “Special Report: Global Engagement.”

28. Projecting firepower from the United States became a reality in th

spring of 1999 with B-2s taking off from Whiteman AFB, Missouri, t

perform bombing missions over Kosovo and then returning home after 

32-hour flight. Widnall and Fogleman, 1; and Widnall speech.

29. Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., Air Force vice chief of staff, “Imple

menting the Air Force’s Strategic Vision,” speech delivered to the Air Forc

Association Symposium, Orlando, Florida, 31 January 1997; and Ge

Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force chief of staff, “A Vision for the 21st Centur

Air Force,” speech delivered at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C

13 December 1996.

30. Moorman speech.

31. Widnall interview; Widnall and Fogleman, 23; and “Special Repor

Global Engagement.”

91
32. Widnall and Fogleman, 19, 23.

33. Widnall interview.

34. Ibid.; Widnall and Fogleman, 23; and Widnall speech.

35. Widnall and Fogleman, 10; Fogleman speech, 21 November 1996

Fogleman speech, 13 December 1996; and “Special Report: Global Engage 

ment.”

36. Widnall and Fogleman, 10; Fogleman speech, 21 November 1996

Fogleman speech, 13 December 1996; and “Special Report: Global Engage 

ment.”

37. Widnall interview; and Widnall speech.

38. The other five battlelabs included Air Expeditionary Force Battlelab

Mountain Home AFB, Idaho; Command and Control Battlelab, Hurlbu

Field, Fla.; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battlelab, Eglin AFB, Fla.; Informatio

Warfare Battlelab, Kelly AFB, Tex.; and Force Protection Battlelab, Lacklan

AFB, Tex. “Battlelabs Created to Advance Air Force’s Core Competencies

Leading Edge, February 1997, 11; and “Vice Chief of Staff Highlights Inno

vative Battlelabs,” Air Force News Service (AFNS electronic bulletin board)

20 February 1997.

39. Widnall interview; and Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the Air Force

“Beyond the Edge of the Map,” speech delivered at the Smithsonian Institu 

tion, Washington, D.C., 21 November 1996.

40. Widnall interview; and Widnall speech, 21 November 1996. Althoug

Widnall supported a consolidated lab for many reasons, she never fe

pressured to form a single lab so the Air Force could compete at the sam

organizational level with one Army and one Navy lab. She did not discoun

the political importance of one Air Force lab but suspected that leaders o

the Air Force S&T community worked this issue.

41. Widnall interview; and Widnall speech, 21 November 1996.

92
Chapter 6

Corona 1996:

Leadership and Decisions

To recap, by the summer of 1996, a series of events ha

transpired that, in one way or another, contributed to the Ai

Force’s decision to move toward establishing a single labora

tory. The most immediate circumstance affecting the single

lab decision was the passage of the National Defense Authoriza 

tion Act of 1996, which subsequently led to the start of th

Vision 21 process in May 1996. However, prior to 1996, numer

ous independent studies and actions were percolating at differ

ent rates of speed throughout the Air Force’s entire acquisition

management system. Starting in the mid-1980s, the Packard

Commission recommended sweeping reforms in the acquisition

management process that resulted in creating an institutiona

mind-set which caused many high-ranking officials to reevalu 

ate the role of laboratories. The Clinton administration also wa

determined to exert its influence since the president considered

the laboratories a critical reform issue in his campaign to reduc

big government. In 1993 he took steps to establish the Nationa

Science and Technology Council to devise new ways to injec

more organizational efficiency into the management of laborato

ries. As it turned out, this was a slow and tedious process tha

did not lead quickly to tangible results.

Instead of making premature and radical changes to the la

structure and management principles, the Air Force turned t

a number of studies conducted in the 1990s to assist in chart

ing a realistic laboratory course for the future. These lab stud

ies included George Abrahamson ’s blue-ribbon panel (1993–9 4)

New World Vistas (1994–95), and Global Engagemen

(1995–96). Although each study put its own particular spin on

lab management, all of them agreed that laboratories defi

nitely would have to restructure their management system t

meet and survive the demands placed on them in the twenty

first century.

In the meantime, while studies and debates wore on, tryin

to map out the best course for the future of S&T, the lab

93
struggled under the weight of a number of mandates impose

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to reduce personne

Implementation of the Dorn cuts, the A-76 process, and th

defense planning guidance steadily chipped away at the lab

personnel infrastructure. This went on for several years, bu

the lab leadership knew that the existing system could no

withstand this constant assault, which weakened the way th

labs conducted their day-to-day business. Midway through

1996, the laboratory system reached a crossroads.

General Viccellio , convinced that the timing was right with

the appearance of Vision 21, set into motion two importan

actions designed to radically change the lab-management sys

tem. He did this first by presenting a new laboratory organiza 

tional setup to the Air Force’s top leaders gathered at Coron

1996, held at the Air Force Academy in October. A month afte

Corona , he laid out the specifics of his plan to reform the lab

to the secretary of the Air Force. This second presentation o

his lab vision was a response to the Vision 21 requiremen

that asked how the Air Force planned to consolidate its lab

for the future. Viccellio knew that if his lab plan were t

succeed, he had to rely primarily on General Paul and his staf

to provide the substance and rationale for drastically alterin

the lab-management structure. Paul and his staff immediately

set to work, spending the entire summer assessing various la

options. The outcome of all this was a persuasive strategy tha

proposed forming a single lab, accepted by the secretary an

chief of staff in November. This intensive summer of work laid

the foundation for the eventual stand-up of the Air Forc

Research Laboratory.

Before consolidation received approval, however, a grea

deal of work and planning had to take place at the comman

level. Because of Vision 21, General Viccellio had to give th

Office of the Secretary of Defense the specifics of the Ai

Force’s plan for restructuring its labs by November 1996. Gen

eral Paul certainly realized the importance and implications o

Vision 21: “There was a stake in the sand that said we, the Ai

Force, had to go back to the Office of the Secretary of Defens

and tell them what we would do within the Air Force with

things under our control—not cross-service control.” With thi

clear tasking at hand, General Paul and his office became th

94
operations center for developing a lab master plan that Viccel

lio could brief to any audience. To get this vitally importan

process under way, Paul selected Tim Dues in June to head 

team to determine what the ideal laboratory structure should

look like during the first quarter of the twenty-first century

Each of the four laboratory commanders appointed repre

sentatives to serve on this “white paper” study group chaired b

Dues. Besides the chairman, participants included Christin

Anderson , Norm Sorenson , Pat Nutz, Glenn Harsberger, Ke

Boff, Chuck Helwig, B. F. Gould , and Igor Plon isch .

1

In July, this study group met at Wright-Patterson AFB t

brainstorm and discuss ideas for incorporation into the whit

paper. Lieutenant Colonel Nutz, representing Wright Labora

tory and its XP shop, stressed that, over the past year, he ha

led a Wright Lab team that had visited and listened to 1

executives explain how they ran their companies. Nutz sough

to gain better insight into how these successful managers in

the private sector structured their workforce to attain maxi

mum organizational efficiency. 2

Nutz found a deliberate move by companies over the pas

few years to consolidate their resources internally and buy ou

competitors when the opportunity presented itself. In 1993

for instance, Martin Marietta acquired GE Aerospace. Shortly

thereafter, one of the largest mergers of all time occurre

when Lockheed and Martin Marietta combined to form Lock 

heed Martin on 15 March 1995. A year later, Lockheed Martin

acquired Loral. Boeing, the world’s largest aircraft company

followed a similar consolidation pattern, purchasing North

American Rockwell in 1996. Two years later, Boeing mad

another major reorganizational move by purchasing McDon

nell Douglas. Consolidating assets then led to the downsizin

of overhead, especially in the middle-management ranks. Thi

reorganization pattern was a fact of life that businesses ha

put into practice in order to scale back and survive in a highly

competitive environment with scarce funds. After assessing al

the information he had collected from the private sector, Nut

strongly advocated that the Air Force laboratory system take 

page from the playbook of industry by pursuing a policy o

consolidation. This fundamental change in thinking, accord in

95
to Nutz, would lead to improved organizational efficiency a

the laboratory level.3

Most members of the study group shared Nutz’s reasonin

that consolidation was the course the laboratories should se

for the future. However, consolidation remained a somewha

elusive term not yet completely defined. The fact that it did no

necessarily equate to a single lab stimulated plenty of discus

sion covering a wide range of options for laboratory reorgan

zation. Possibilities included moving to two labs (one each fo

air and space), three labs, or one lab. Another alternativ

suggested leaving the four labs in place and reducing th

number of personnel assigned to each. Some even flirted with

the idea of doing away with the entire Air Force laborator

system and combining elements from all service labs into on

“purple” lab centrally controlled by the secretary of defense.4

The study group’s white paper concluded that the best op 

tion for the Air Force entailed creating a single laboratory t

centralize technology unique to military applications. A singl

lab would require less overhead than would several laborato

ries, and in the long-run, it would cost less. The Air Forc

would gain organizational efficiency, the study group argued

by operating the single lab more along the lines of a larg

private corporation. As a start, a board of directors in Wash

ington, D.C., would run the lab and establish the appropriat

political connections. The board’s president would have re

sponsibility for all funding, personnel, and programs an

would head a small long-range planning group that would

work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Othe

board members would serve as “directors” responsible for 

specific technology program.5

The white-paper team also insisted that the labs divorc

themselves from the four existing product centers, which sys

tematically avoided high-risk technology programs to solv

short-term technology problems. On the other hand, a labora

tory by definition engaged in high-risk, high-payoff R&D t

push the militarily relevant technology edge. A single lab with

a military commander or civilian director (each similar to 

company’s board president) would have the authority to re

duce manpower and budgets as well as get rid of noncor

technologies in quick fashion. The lab could achieve othe

96
savings by directing more investments to modeling and simu 

lation research, which equated to nonphysical means of re

search—and thus reduce the physical infrastructure (build 

ings, equipment, test devices, etc.) it needed to conduc

research. Also, a single-lab commander or director would b

in a much better position to coordinate and strengthen la

ties with both industry and academia. 6

The participants who put the white paper together pre

sented arguments for a single lab in very broad terms. Driven

by Vision 21, the white paper represented only a first step t

start people thinking about the makeup of the current la

structure and what needed changing. As noted in the whit

paper’s appendix, no one had sufficient time to address all th

details of a new lab organization. Essentially, the white pape

was one of the first attempts by General Paul’s staff to system

atically put together a collection of ideas for building an Ai

Force response to Vision 21’s tasking to consolidate laborato

ries. The heart of that response—as proposed in the whit

paper—was the Air Force’s need to establish a single lab

General Viccellio quickly agreed. As he explained, he and Gen

eral Paul had discussed the possibility of a single lab as soon

as Vision 21 had come out. They had repeatedly weighed 

number of options for the future of S&T but kept coming bac

to the single lab as the best solution for reducing personne

centralizing control with one commander, and producing qua

ity technology. 7

Another very important event paralleled the development o

the white-paper project. General Fogleman had identified 1

major topics distributed among five panels for discussion at th

fall Corona meeting. He appointed General Moorman, the vic

chief, to chair a long-range-planning board of directors respon

sible for assuring preparation of all the issue papers in th

s ame format for presentation at Corona. Moorman selected L

Gen Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., Air Force Materiel Command’s vic

commander, to head panel three to develop AFMC’s Coron

papers nine through 12 on key acquisition and infrastructur

issues facing the Air Force in the future. Corona Issue Paper 

specifically addressed laboratory reorganization. These paper

would serve as the basis for genera ting discussions among th

97
attendees at the Corona confer

ence, scheduled to take place a

the Air Force Academy 8–12 Oc

tober 1996.8

Vision 21 and Corona wer

separate but interrelated events

They were separate in the sens

that Corona was strictly an inter

nal Air Force forum to give top

commanders an opportunity t

brief the chief of staff and secre

tary of the Air Force on topic

that would affect current and fu 

ture missions. Corona addresse

a number of complex questions

including the matter of decidin

how the Air Force intended t

streamline its entire acquisition

process. Management of labora

tories represented only one subset of this larger acquisition

question open for discussion at Corona. Vision 21, however

was a top-down tasking from Congress and DOD that require

AFMC to focus exclusively on what the Air Force planned to d

to consolidate its laboratory system. The service had to com

plete and brief that plan to the secretary of the Air Force in

November 1996. So, both Corona and AFMC’s response t

Vision 21 tried to solve the lab-consolidation issue, but con

solidating the labs was only a small part of many Coron

meeting topics that needed resolution, while developing a re

sponse to Vision 21 was the sole issue that AFMC needed t

resolve. 9

Corona Issue Paper 9, “Weapon Systems Acquisition, Sci

ence & Technology & Associated Infrastructure,” was just on

of many topics on the agenda scheduled for discussion at th

upcoming meeting at the Air Force Academy in October. Ma

Gen Robert E. Linhard, special assistant to the chief of staff o

the Air Force for long-range planning, had the responsibilit

for coordinating with all the commands to provide 17 issu

papers that answered very specific questions covering a rang

of Air Force concerns. As mentioned earlier, to make thi

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of

staff of the Air Force, backed the

lab-reform movement.

98
process more manageable, General Moorman had set up fiv

panels: Core Competencies/Air, Space/Information Warfare

Acquisition and Infrastructure, People Values and Career, an

Organization and Force Mix. Panel three, Acquisition and In 

frastructure, focused on reengineering the acquisition an

sustainment processes to meet required capabilities efficiency

This panel gave General Viccellio an excellent opportunity t

present his views on restructuring the laboratories to the mos

influential Air Force leaders.1 0

As chairman of panel three, General Farrell received assis

tance from Lt Gen George K. Muellner , principal deputy, Offic

of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); Rober

F. Hale , assistant secretary of the Air Force for financial man

agement and comptroller; Maj Gen Eugene A. Lupia , civil engi

neer, Headquarters US Air Force; and Brig Gen Daniel P. Lea

deputy assistant chief of staff, US Forces Korea. Maj Gen

Richard N. Roellig , who headed AFMC’s procurement shop

acted as General Farrell’s principal action officer for gettin

Issue Paper 9 in its final format, which consisted of seven

sections: issue statement, scope, desired/potential objectives

key factors affecting decision, decision options, summary o

options analyzed (pros and cons, etc.), and relationship t

other issues.1 1

One of the main objectives the Air Force set forth to reform

its acquisition system was creation of a leaner S&T infrastruc

ture that would result in flattening the existing organizationa

hierarchy to the greatest extent possible. This had specia

implications for the labs because they were an integral part o

the acquisition process. General Paul knew that, to a large

degree, the future of the labs depended on the issues pre

sented and decided at Corona. With that in mind, he again

assembled his most trusted and experienced advisors—Tim

Dues , Dr. Daniel, Dr. Russo, and Colonel Markisello—to lea

the exercise to make sure that realistic options on the lab

future found their way into Issue Paper 9.1 2

They considered numerous lab-consolidation options tha

covered the entire spectrum of possibilities—from having th

Air Force turn over partial control of the labs to contractors t

getting out of the laboratory business completely. Under thi

move toward privatization , three options appeared. The firs

99
entailed establishing a government-owned, contractor-assiste

agreement whereby the contractor would manage all lab-suppor

activities. Also, the contractor would assume a larger role in

supporting technical programs and would gradually make u

a larger percentage of the contractor/government workforc

ratio. However, the government would continue to make al

decisions on the management of the laboratory. A secon

optio n involved a government-owned, contractor-operated in 

frastructure. Under this scheme, contractors would take ove

as sole technical program managers and would operate al

government facilities. For the government to retain overal

control, the contractor would have to report directly to th

government’s consolidated weapon-systems managemen

staff. The third option entailed divesting almost complete con

trol of the labs to the contractor, who, in this case, would

assume responsibility for the total system program, includin

development and delivery of required weapon products. In effe ct

the government would become a customer with only minima

influence over the contractor.1 3

Another set of consolidation options rejected any movemen

toward contractor control of labs and endorsed a plan

whereby the Air Force would continue to retain ownership o

the weapons-management process but would reorganize t

form a more centralized system for managing its laboratories

One proposal called for the establishment of three laborator

centers of excellence to manage weapon systems from “cradl

to grave” (concept phase through retirement). This schem

would include space; air; and command, control, communica

tions, computers, and intelligence (C4I) centers and would as

sign every weapon system to one of these centers. This plan

also envisioned that all organizations assigned to support 

particular center, such as a system program office, would

geographically consolidate at a single location to support it

center for the entire life cycle of the weapon systems. A secon

consolidation option—a modification of the first—called for es

tablishing two lab centers of excellence: one for space and on

for air systems. This too would be a cradle-to-grave operation

as would the third option—triservice management of the labo

ratory centers of excellence. One service (Army, Navy, or Ai

Force) would act as the lead executive responsible for a join

100
center of excellence comprising air vehicles/engines/human

systems/avionics/applicable technology areas; satellites/

spacelift/missiles/directed-energy weapons/applicable tech

nology areas; C4I; electronic warfare; and munitions. Person

nel from all three services would work at each laboratory cen

ter, but the lead executive service would own the infrastru ctur

(buildings, people, money, and programs). Still another option

had DOD creating one laboratory, managed by the deput

director for defense research and engineering, that would ac

commodate all service needs.1 4

For a number of reasons, none of these options appealed t

General Viccellio. Regardless of whether contractors or th

government ran the labs, he and others believed that an awk 

ward and cumbersome management structure would evolve

On the positive side, some options could produce gains in

terms of reduced staffs and overhead, less duplication, an

better cooperation among the three services on S&T matters

But the negatives seemed to predominate. Allowing contrac

tors to take over the labs involved huge political hurdles. Tha

is, increases in the contractors’ authority would likely lead t

more layoffs of government workers, which, in turn, would

instigate political opposition. In addition, putting mor

weapon-systems management authority in the hands of con

tractors would tend to weaken the Air Force’s link to the wa

fighter. In short, unlike contractors, the military had the bes

interest of the war fighter at heart. 1 5

Setting up two or three lab centers of excellence would als

be politically painful—not to mention expensive—because mov

ing people to one of the centers would set into motion RIF

actions and base-closure procedures. Furthermore, many peop l

worried that creating a triservice lab center of excellence—

thereby becoming partners with the other two services, wh

would naturally promote their agendas—would weaken the Ai

Force’s institutional interests. In other words, the Air Forc

ethos would be lost. Finally, moving control of S&T up th

chain of command to the DOD level would not be pruden

because it would further remove military users from th

weapon-systems management staff. 1 6

Viccellio and Paul were convinced that no good reason ex

isted for turning the laboratory system over to contractors o

101
fixing the problem by moving lab management up the chain o

command or outside the Air Force. Both believed that the thre

lab options they put on the table were more realistic. Tab 9-12 o

Corona Issue Paper 9 clearly spelled out the three options ad

dressing laboratory structures and reporting arrangements

Early drafts of the issue paper incorporated the first two option

while the third did not appear until the end of July. 1 7

All three options aimed to create an infrastructure tha

capitalized on applying best practices to ensure best value fo

the Air Force. The first option favored keeping multiple labs in

place under the current system. Each of the four labs would

maintain alignment with its acquisition center of excellence

Wright Lab with the Aeronautical Systems Center , Phillips La

with the Space and Missile Systems Center, and so forth

There would be no change in the lab commanders reporting t

the TEO—in this case, General Paul—on all issues dealin

with the management of S&T programs. Likewise, lab com 

manders would continue to report to the center commanders

who would attend to the care and feeding of the laborator

workforce, which included personnel and facility matters

Overall, the first option amounted to keeping the current labo

ratory organization in place. But maintaining the status qu

did not mean that the labs would continue to conduct busi

ness as usual. Although the same lab framework would re

main, everyone realized the inevitability of a significant declin

in the current lab workforce over the next few years. 1 8

Good reasons existed for keeping the current lab structur

in place. One could implement consolidation of support an

overhead functions with relative ease. By having the labs re

port to and work closely with existing centers, one could argu

that the Air Force was on the right track by advancing near

term technology that could turn into useful products for us

by customers—the operating commands—now rather than 2

years in the future. Near-term weapon systems appealed to mili

ta ry commanders and congressmen, who seemed more willin

to allocate funding that would lead to improved systems capa

ble of providing better protection of our troops in the field. Th

current lab system also came in for praise because of th 

mutually beneficial relationship it had fostered with industr

and academia over the past 20 years. Air Force–sponsore

102
science programs at private companies and universities ha

resulted in the return of advances in technology to the Ai

Force to enhance system development, which, in turn, led t

improved products.1 9

Despite the obvious advantages of keeping the current la

system intact, one could not ignore some major drawbacks—

particularly the fact that organizational seams among lab

would not go away. Work on the same groups of technologie

(lasers, electronics, signal processing, materials, etc.—identifie

as crosscutting technologies) occurred in multiple labs. Peopl

often perceived this fragmented approach as a duplication o

effort and resources. Moreover, it made it difficult for Genera

Paul as TEO to plan and control technology efforts sprea

across several labs since no one person could tell him about al

aspects and progress of one particular technology disciplin e. 20

Further, lab commanders found themselves in the awkward

position of working for two bosses—the TEO and the cente

commander—which also meant a splitting of S&T resources

The TEO controlled dollars and program management, but peo

ple and facilities fell under the purview of the center com

mander. “This situation,” as the Corona paper pointed out, “com

plicates and prolongs people/position/facility/dollar/allocation

decisions leading to suboptimized decision making.” Viccellio

and Paul wanted to correct this divided control of lab re

sources. They believed that splitting responsibilities violate

the goal of “best practices,” which the Air Force strove t

achieve as part of its overall acquisition-reform movement.2 1

Besides the drawback of working for two bosses and split

ting management responsibilities, under the multiple la

setup, each lab employed its own support staff. The plan

organizations, located at each lab, consisted of a decentralize

setup that, according to many people, should be consolidate

into one centralized office. In a time of diminishing resources

the clear trend in government called for reduction of excessiv

overhead and consolidation of like functions. Keeping fou

laboratory staffs appeared excessive, inconsistent, and out o

step with the basic lab-reform policy that the president, Con

gress, and DOD advocated across the Air Force. In addition

option one ignored recommendations from two important stud

ies of the future of the laboratories: Abrahamson ’s blue-ribbon

103
panel and the SAB 

s New World Vistas (both discussed ear

lier). Neither study favored having lab commanders report t

two bosses; rather, each commander should report directly t

a single S&T executive. Although option one did not endors

the single-reporting concept, it found it viable because tha

approach would cause the least disruption to the existin

laboratory system.2 2

Option two, the next step up in the evolutionary plan of la

consolidation, did incorporate the advice of the blue-ribbon

panel and the SAB by supporting the idea that each lab com

mander would report to a single S&T director who would serve

as both the TEO and the S&T executive at Headquarter

AFMC/ST. Thus, the TEO remained in charge of both pro

grams and people. Positions on the center’s manpower listin

would become part of the laboratory’s unit-manning docu 

ment—a big change because now the S&T executive (Genera

Paul) not only would control programs but also would “own

the people (scientists, engineers, and support personnel) a

well as all the labs’ facilities. However, option two retained 

portion of option one—alignment of each lab with its acquisi

tion center of excellence. Thus, one could expect a minimum

of organizational changes under option two because multipl

laboratories would remain in place.2 3

Giving all resources—people, dollars, and facilities—to 

single executive-in-charge would result in a centrally con

trolled operation that could provide much better integrate

planning and decision making across the entire S&T organiza 

tion. Option two emphasized that “more integration acros

Divisions, Directorates, and Laboratories is needed” as well a

a “better capacity for addressing multidisciplinary problems.

This would not happen, the argument went, as long as lab

reported to a number of center commanders. A single S&T

person could alter the decentralized, integrated planning ap

proach followed by center commanders who pursued thei

own R&D agenda—primarily focused on meeting short-term

technology goals.2 4

Given the right amount of authority and accountability, 

single S&T leader would be in a position to objectively balanc

all S&T resources to support users in the near term. Tha

leader could also set direction for the long term to identify an

104
sustain technology

s push requirements that would lead t

revolutionary technical systems. Furthermore, this arrange

ment would enhance “the S&T Executive’s influence by raisin

his visibility and that of S&T to the same level as the product

test and logistics centers.” Although all this seemed a move in

the right direction, a single S&T executive would not solve al

the laboratory problems under option two, as pointed out b

the Corona paper’s summary: “Multiple labs, even with a sin gl

S&T Executive, provide a suboptimal organizational structur

for optimizing [Air Force] crosscutting technologies.”2 5

Option three became part of Corona Issue Paper 9 at th

end of July. As Vision 21 and Corona progressed simultane

ously, General Paul wrote General Viccellio, suggesting that i

would be beneficial to add the single-lab consolidation option

to the Corona paper. To help build the Corona issue papers

General Farrell had asked for inputs from all offices that had 

stake in the labs’ future. However, the first draft did not in 

clude the single-lab option. After reviewing the initial draft o

the issue paper, General Paul noticed that it made no refer

ence to the single lab. He wanted to correct that omission

because he saw Corona as the perfect opportunity to test th

waters on the single-lab proposal. In his letter to Viccellio 

Paul urged that the single-lab plan be one of the main option

included in the issue paper:

Specifically, we could create a single Air Force laboratory (which subsumes our existing 4-lab structure) reporting to a single laboratory

commander who reported to AFMC /CC or the Service Acquisition Executive. The Army has a single lab: Army Research Lab; the Navy has

a single lab: Naval Research Laboratory. Thus the Air Force analogy

would be the “Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).” . . . A single

laboratory would not only show parallelism with the other two services, but would also maximize the synergy of “corporate” technologies

that support both air and space, e.g. materials, electronics, photonics,

geophysics, C4I, human systems and manufacturing. . . . I simply offer

it [the single-lab option] for completeness, and because periodically

the question has been asked “Why doesn’t the Air Force have a single

lab like the other two Services?”2 6

General Paul wanted the single-lab option included in th

Corona papers for two main reasons. Firstly, he deeply believe

that establishing a single lab was the best option fo r restructur

ing the laboratory system in terms of reducing personnel an

105
improving organizational efficiency. But Paul also viewed th

Corona process and meeting as a golden opportunity and 

timely mechanism to give the single-lab concept exposure in

front of the four-star leadership, as well as the Air Force chie

of staff and the secretary. Paul and Viccellio certainly realize

the advantage of raising the single-lab concept at Corona be

cause of its tie-in with Vision 21. Essentially, Corona becam

a dress rehearsal for finalizing the Vision 21 briefing tha

General Viccellio was scheduled to have ready for the secre

tary in November. With the single lab briefed at Corona, Wid 

nall and Fogleman for the first time would have a chance t

think about the single-lab option. Their reaction at Corona t

this radical proposal would be critical. If they agreed with th

concept, General Viccellio would know that he was on th

right course for restructuring the lab organization. Introduc

ing the single-lab option at Corona also would preclude an

surprises for the secretary when she received a briefing in

November on the Air Force’s internal strategy for Vision 21.

2 7

Option one advocated keeping multiple labs, and option tw

endorsed a similar plan; but with a single-lab commander, th

most dramatic change in laboratory organization appeared in

option three. Unlike the others, it proposed establishing on

corporate Air Force laboratory headed by a single commander

Generals Viccellio and Paul considered option three “the mos

consolidated lab configuration” that would best meet th

needs of an Air Force facing declining budgets and personne

resources. This plan called for merging the existing four labo

ratories and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research int

one laboratory. Organizationally, “major directorates of lik

technologies” would replace the four labs. The new single-la

commander would be elevated to an organizational leve

equivalent to that of product-center commanders and would

report directly to the AFMC commander. No longer would

AFMC’s Science and Technology Directorate be a staff agenc

but would convert to the “command section” of the single lab

Finally, the laboratory commander would control all resource

(program funding, people, technology programs, and facilities

in order to achieve maximum flexibility and consistency of deci

sion making in the day-to-day running of the new organization.2 

106
One of the most potent arguments for a single lab wa

that it would “eliminate organizational seams (and duplica 

tion ) between cross-cutting technologies now worked in mul

tiple labs.” For example, various aspects of advancing signal

processing technology took place simultaneously at differen

labs to support different missions. Phillips Lab engaged in

signal-processing work to support satellites; Rome Lab used i

to improve C4I systems; and Wright Lab depended on it t

develop better aircraft avionics. Setting up a single lab with

technology directorates authorized to manage similar tech

nologies—previously scattered among many labs—would help

eliminate these technology seams. As stated in the analysi

section of the Corona paper, getting rid of the seams would

“result in an optimum use of limited funds by eliminatin

duplication and the cost/delays in trying to pass technolog

across the artificial seams.” In other words, a single technol

ogy director in the lab who managed all aspects of a particula

technology across-the-board would be in the best position t

make decisions affecting program priorities and funding o

various components of one particular technology discipline

However, the downside of forming a number of technolog

directorates, which would surely outnumber the four labs

was that the single-lab commander would have an increase

span of control in managing all the technology directorates. A

it turned out, after formation of the single lab, the commande

had to deal with 10 technology directors instead of four labo

ratory commanders.2 9

Option three used the same reasoning as option two in

promoting the value and advantages of putting a single com

mander in control. Detached from the control of the product

center commander, a single-lab commander would have th

authority to make decisions on all S&T resources—programs

funding, people, and facilities. This arrangement positione

the lab commander to capitalize on the best managemen

practices, which in turn would result in ensuring “best value

in the procurement of advanced-technology weapon systems

In addition, a single-lab commander would speak as one voic

for the organization in establishing timely responses to “th

needs of the marketplace, [major commands], industry an

academia, and make [Air Force] labs more competitive with

107
the other services to obtain work supportive of [Air Force

objectives.” By clarifying and strengthening the lines of com

munications, the single lab would stand to gain a better repu 

tation in the academic and industrial communities. Thi

would allow the commander to exert greater leverage to draw

upon these two labor pools of scientific knowledge to benefi

the Air Force. On the negative side, industry and academi

might view a large single lab as a monolith that would prov

difficult to approach. But the counterargument held that th

lab commander could cut through the bureaucratic red tap

by directing industry and academia to a specific technolog

directorate , thereby removing the perception of the lab as an

unwieldy government bureaucratic institution that took a lon

time to make decisions.3 0

Making decisions to establish better relationships and sup

port with private corporations and universities was only on

part of the communications picture. A new lab, removed from

the oversight of the product centers, could “better support a

AFMC organizations” (emphasis in original). The single-la

commander would be able to “objectively balance” programs

funds, and personnel, thus supporting users at all levels

Transition of technology from the lab to all the product cen

ters would continue to meet their real-time requirements fo

integrating it into new systems. But at the same time, th

single lab would move off in new directions, becoming mor

actively engaged in investing heavily in technology program

designed to produce midterm and long-term breakthroughs t

revolutionize the development of futuristic weapon systems

By following this approach, one Air Force lab would operat

similarly to the Army Research Lab and the Naval Research

Lab. The Air Force feared, however, that DOD would see it

lab as an inviting target to take over and merge with the Arm

and Navy labs, creating one DOD lab. Such an assimilation

into what, in effect, would be a single triservice laborator

would weaken the Air Force ethos. 3 1

Formation of a DOD lab might have loomed on the distan

horizon as a major long-term problem, but no immediate prob 

lem existed in terms of increasing funding to form a sin gle Ai

Force lab. Since forming a consolidated lab constituted an “or

ganizational realignment,” the service would incur no additiona

108
costs to implement option three. Minor additional costs migh

arise in the physical consolidation of some planned technolog

directorates, but savings gained from reduced overhead cost

during the consolidation would most likely offset them.3 2

In many ways, presenting a convincing case for a singl

laboratory at the upcoming Corona conference was very sim

lar to a trial lawyer’s making his closing argument before 

jury. In this case, General Viccellio had to make a convincin

summation of his position to the Air Force jury consisting o

Secretary Widnall and the undersecretaries who accompanie

her; General Fogleman; and the nine commanders of the ma

jor commands. By September, Viccellio began shaping his own

unequivocally clear and persuasive closing argument advocat

ing the value of creating a single lab: 

One corporate Air Force laboratory with a single commander would

serve the needs of multiple [chief executive officers] and all S&T customers. It satisfies all of the objectives and factors identified as necessary for the acquisition community. Primarily, it brings single ownership of all S&T related resources (i.e., funds, people, and facilities) to

the single lab commander for fully integrated planning. It eliminates

organizational seams between cross-cutting technologies now worked

in multiple labs while reducing overhead and improving efficiency by

eliminating separate lab command sections and planning staffs and

the TEO planning staff. Further, it raises the visibility and stature of

S&T within AFMC to the level of the other centers supporting all

AFMC organizations. The negatives are the potential for de-emphasiz -

ing technology transition to the SPOs [system program offices] residing

in the lab’s current parent product center (although strong corporate

technology transition processes have been institutionalized by the

TEO for all labs over the past five years) and DMR; that is, the com -

mander as TEO is accountable for programmatics and training, organizing and equipping responsibilities. This option is the ultimate lab

consolidation possible while maintaining [Air Force] ethos.3 3

Although General Viccellio had clearly articulated his position

on the single lab, he did not brief this issue at the Coron

meeting in Colorado Springs. Since laboratory restructuring—

along with other acquisition and infrastructure issues—fell un

der panel three, General Moorman directed General Farrell, a

chairman of that panel, to present the panel’s briefings. Farrell

area of responsibility included briefing four issue papers cover

ing a complexity of Air Force acquisition and sustainment proc

esses: (1) processes and systems that will bes t support powe

109
projection in 2025; (2) future bas

ing structure; (3) core technolog

and evaluation capabilities (infra

structure) needed to continue ac

quisition of superior weapon sys

tems; and (4) management of th

acquisition infrastructure at al

levels, including reorganization o

the laboratory system. A few week

prior to Corona, each of the four

stars received a stack of notebook

containing all the issue papers tha

would be discussed at the meeting

The idea was that all the general

would study the key issue

ahead of time and be prepared t

comment on topics with whic

they had the most concern.3 4

Farrell and Viccellio , the only two people representing Ai

Force Materiel Command at Corona , sat together at the sam

table. When it came his turn to brief, Farrell spent the nex

four hours going over the four issue papers assigned to pane

three. Most of this time focused on presenting a diversity o

acquisition options that had nothing to do with laborator

restructuring. Farrell recalled that he spent only about thre

minutes briefing how the laboratory system should b

changed to better meet Air Force missions of the future, bu

those three minutes represented the first time the single-la

concept was officially presented to the highest-level assembly

of Air Force decision makers.3 5

At Corona, the heart of the argument for consolidating al

Air Force laboratories into one lab appeared on a single slid

that succinctly summarized General Viccellio ’s reasons fo

proposing a single lab (table 4). One of the most importan

benefits of creating one laboratory was that it would stream

line the current lab structure by reducing overhead. Moreover

appointing a single commander to lead the new organization

meant that this person could exert more effective leadership

and control over all lab resources: people, dollars, programs

and facilities. Finally, under this more centralized managemen

Lt Gen Lawrence P. Farrell Jr.

briefed laboratory options at

Corona.

110
approach, the commander could reduce fragmentation of sim

lar technologies spread out among several geographic sites.3 6

Putting up the single-lab slide in full view of all the Coron

attendees was the first real test in determining how the high

command would react to the radical proposal of doing awa

with four labs and combining them into one. Whether or no

the attendees supported the new lab, their input would prov

very influential in determining the future organization of th

laboratory system. Naturally, General Viccellio was intently

interested in the group’s collective response—particularly Secre

tary Widnall’s and General Fogleman’s reaction to the single-la 

proposal. 3 7

The anticipated lengthy debate on the single-lab proposal a

Corona never materialized. Farrell and Viccellio were prepare

to vigorously defend the laboratory consolidation plan, but n

one opposed the proposal laid out on the single slide. A

Farrell described the scene, the proposal to establish one labo

ratory “got very little discussion,” and everyone in the room

agreed that “it sounds like a pretty good idea.” “Everyone

included Widnall and Fogleman , who liked the idea of consoli

dating diverse lab resources into a single lab. Farrell recalle

that “they gave us a head nod on the spot.” Viccellio didn’

have to make a big speech to sell the single lab—it sold itself

According to Farrell , Viccellio “could see the water flowing in

that direction [one lab], so he just let it flow.” Viccellio had n

doubt that General Fogleman and Secretary Widnall certainly

supported the single lab, noting that “everyone thought that i

Table 4

End State No. 3:

Single Air Froce Laboratory

• Combines AFOSR and four Air Force labs into a single Air Force lab

• Provides a streamlined structure—reduced management overhead

— Single commander

— Single staff

• Consolidates full resource ownership and accountability

• Reduces fragmentation of similar technologies

111
was the right thing to do because it [consolidation] was simila

in concept to so much else that was going on in the Air Force.”3 8

Actually, the makeup of the Corona audience served to limi

the discussion of the single lab. The majority of general offi

cers there were interested primarily in war-fighting doctrin

that affected the operation of their commands. They wer

more comfortable dealing with operational aspects such a

missile defense, communications, space, airpower tactics an

strategy, maintenance, information management, and simila

issues. The operational commanders acknowledged the impor

tance of science, technology, and the complicated acquisition

process, but they simply were not conversant with all of th

details and perplexities. To them, acquisition appeared on

step removed from the operations side of the Air Force. Secre

tary Widnall certainly understood the position of the opera

tional commanders and the reason for the lack of discussion

of or objection to the single lab proposal: “You wouldn’t expec

it. You don’t expect the PACAF [Pacific Air Forces] Commande

to object to this [one lab]. On what basis is the PACAF Com

mander going to object to the Air Force Materiel Commande

proposal to consolidate the Air Force labs, which in fact repor

directly to him? That’s not going to happen!” 3 9

General Viccellio was very pleased with the outcome of th

Corona briefing on the single lab. He had accomplished what h

had set out to do by presenting the single-lab proposal to th

most influential leaders in the Air Force and getting their initia

reaction to the plan. Although the response was positive, Viccel

lio knew this was only the first step toward creating one lab

Secretary Widnall interpreted what went on at Corona not as a

official approval of the single lab but as a “general consensu

Nobody saw any serious flaws in what was being proposed.”4 0

General Viccellio now needed General Paul and his staff t

develop a comprehensive plan providing the details of how

four laboratories would transition to one. That laborator

plan, which would also form the basis for the Air Force’

response to Vision 21 on laboratory reform, was scheduled fo

presentation to Secretary Widnall in November. Everyone rea

ized that this would be an extremely important meeting. Th

secretary would have to make a decision, either allowing th

Air Force to move forward with the creation of a single lab o

112
rejecting the proposal and directing the service to proceed on

a different course. However, because of the favorable reaction

to the single lab at Corona, most people were convinced tha

Widnall would have no choice other than to officially sanction

the new lab in November. 4 1

Notes

1. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998; Tim

Dues, interviewed by author, 6 April 1998; Lt Col Pat Nutz, interviewed b

author, 4 February 1998; and “The Air Force Laboratories in 2025,” whit

paper [August 1996].

2. Nutz interview.

3. Ibid.; George Williams, Lockheed-Martin (Albuquerque office), tele

phone conversation with author, 12 August 1999; Paul Toth, Boeing Air

craft (Albuquerque office), telephone conversation with author, 12 Augu

1999; and “Aviation Industry Evolution,” briefing chart provided by Pau

Toth, 16 August 1999.

4. Nutz interview; and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author

6 February 1998.

5. Dues interview; and “The Air Force Laboratories in 2025.”

6. Dues interview; and “The Air Force Laboratories in 2025.”

7. Gen Henry Viccellio Jr., interviewed by author, 24 June 1998.

8. Ibid.; Lt Gen Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., USAF, Retired, interviewed b

author, 24 August 1999; and Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, Retired

interviewed by author, 14 January 2000.

9. Paul interview, 6 February 1998; and Fogleman interview.

10. Maj Gen Robert E. Linhard, special assistant to the chief of staff o

the Air Force (CSAF) for long-range planning, to board of directors (BOD)

letter, subject: Corona Issue Paper Update, 11 July 1996; “CSAF CORON

Decision Papers,” Air Force internal working paper [June 1996]; and brie

ing, General Moorman, Air Force vice chief of staff, subject: Air Force Long

Range Planning Corona Top Update to BOD, 20 June 1996.

11. Moorman briefing; and Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

12. Tim Dues, interviewed by author, 12 March 1998.

13. Ibid.; and Corona Issue Paper 9, “Weapon Systems Acquisition, Sc

ence & Technology & Associated Infrastructure,” draft, Air Force interna

working paper, 26 July 1996.

14. Dues interview, 12 March 1998; Corona Issue Paper 9; and Co

Dennis F. Markisello, interviewed by author, 6 February 1998.

15. Corona Issue Paper 9.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

113
18. Tab 9-12 of Corona Issue Paper 9, 

Weapon Systems Acquisition

Science & Technology & Associated Infrastructure,” draft, Air Force interna

working paper, 28 August 1996.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.; Viccellio interview; and Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

22. Tab 9-12 of Corona Issue Paper 9, 28 August 1996.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to AFMC (General Viccellio), letter, subjec

Another Laboratory Option for the AF/LR Initiative, 29 July 1996.

27. Paul interview, 6 February 1998.

28. Tab 9-12 of Corona Issue Paper 9, 28 August 1996.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Farrell interview; and “CSAF CORONA Decision Papers,” Air Forc

internal working paper, July 1996.

35. Farrell interview.

36. Ibid.; briefing slide, “Single [Air Force] Laboratory,” presented b

General Farrell at Corona Conference, 8–12 October 1996; and Viccelli

interview.

37. Viccellio interview.

38. Ibid.; Farrell interview; Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, interviewed by autho

7 July 1999; and Fogleman interview.

39. Widnall interview; Farrell interview; and Markisello interview.

40. Widnall interview; and Viccellio interview.

41. Viccellio interview; and Paul interviews, 6 February and 2 March 1998

114
Chapter 7

The Last Dance:

Meeting in the Secretary’s Office

No sooner had the Corona conference ended than General

Viccellio and Paul turned their attention to preparing for th

meeting with Secretary Widnall on 20 November, when the

hoped to secure her approval to move forward with the single

lab option. Paul and his staff had only four weeks or so t

finalize their Vision 21 working paper that would provide valu 

able input in designing the briefing for the secretary.

In the summer of 1996, General Paul and his staff were in

the process of conceptualizing and developing the initial draf

of a plan that would lay out how the Air Force intended t

respond to the Vision 21 tasking to consolidate into as few

labs as practicable. Vince Russo—who led General Paul’s Visio

21 team—and his group had the responsibility for putting th

working paper together. However, development of the Visio

21 plan did not occur in isolation. Numerous coordination

meetings took place in order to share ideas with the othe

Vision 21 points of contact throughout the Air Force. Alan

Goldstayn , deputy director of Plans and Programs at AFMC

served as General Viccellio’s Vision 21 action officer. At th

secretary of the Air Force level, Arthur Money, assistant secre

tary of the Air Force for acquisition, appointed Blaise Durante

deputy assistant secretary for management policy and pro

gram integration, as the Air Force lead on Vision 21. Durant

relied on Lt Col Walt Fred as his primary assistant for workin

Vision 21 taskings. 1

Although a great deal of interaction occurred at all levels o

the Air Force with regard to Vision 21, General Paul and Vinc

Russo’s team played a pivotal role in preparing the initia

working paper, which went through several revisions. Durin

October, the paper carried the title “The Air Force Theodor

von Kármán Laboratory: A Strawman Overview,” but by No

vember it had changed to “The Air Force Laboratory: An Over

view.” However, the basic content of all versions of the work 

ing paper remained the same in terms of subjects addressed

115
the first of which was the organization of the four existin

laboratories, followed by the proposed single-lab organizationa

structure headed by one lab commander and consisting of 1

technology directorates : Air Force Office of Scientific Research

Human Health; Space; Command, Control, Communications

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissanc

(C4ISR); Materials/Processes; Electronics; Optics; Flight Dy

namics; Propulsion and Power; and Weapons (fig. 5). A com

parison of the existing lab structure to that of the new singl

laboratory showed the Air Force’s seriousness about radicall

changing the way it would do business in the future. 2

The core of the Vision 21 working paper focused on a plan fo

setting up the new technology directorates in the single labora

tory. Defining a realistic vision for the entire lab represented on

of the most important responsibilities of the lab com mander

who also had the job of managing technical programs, dollars

people, and facilities, as well as ensuring that the headqu arter

Figure 5. Single-Laboratory Organization (From slide on single laborator

organization, “The Air Force Laboratory: An Overview,” Air Force Vision 2

working paper, [November 1996])

116
staff functioned effectively. Under the commander, 10 technol

ogy directorates would replace 26 directorates, the “model

technology directorate consisting of anywhere from three hun

dred to seven hundred people and supported by two to fiv

technical divisions (one hundred to three hundred people) a

well as an integration and operations division. A Senior Ex

ecutive Service (SES) employee would lead each tech directorate

assisted by a full colonel as deputy director. A similar person

nel arrangement held true for the technical divisions, each o

which would have two or more branches (25 to 50 people)

depending upon its mission. General Paul and other high-leve

Air Force officials believed that during the initial stages o

consolidating into one laboratory, the Air Force could achiev

a savings of up to seven hundred personnel positions. Afte

the new lab had operated for several years, projections put it

total workforce at five thousand people. 3

Although details about the single lab began taking shape in

the Vision 21 working paper, two key issues still needed re

solving. The first concerned the future of AFOSR: should i

function as a separate directorate, or should its current re

sources be distributed among the technology directorates

One argument maintained that the new lab’s chief scientis

should oversee the basic research program currently manage

by AFOSR. Each technology directorate could effectively man

age contracts to universities for providing basic research sup

port to the laboratory. On the one hand, dismantling AFOS

as a separate organization would likely result in manpowe

reductions. On the other hand, breaking it up would mean

that AFOSR most likely would lose its strong presence an

influence in Washington, D.C.’s basic research community. 4

Dr. Joe Janni, director of AFOSR, appealed to General Pau

that it made more sense for his office to function as a director

ate within the new laboratory. Janni pointed out that each

technology directorate under the single lab would have to re

duce its staff as part of the laboratory-consolidation proces

and that each directorate would have only a small staff or

ganization to execute its mission. Because he already had 

“very flat” organization due to downsizing at the end of 1995

AFOSR seemed a prime candidate to fit the definition of th

model technology directorate envisioned in the single lab

117
Later, during the implementation phase of the lab, Janni

position prevailed, and AFOSR became the equivalent of 

technology directorate.

5

A similar fate occurred with munitions technology. Ther

was some talk of integrating munitions work (performed a

Eglin AFB, Florida, and controlled by Wright Laboratory) int

the appropriate technology directorates of the new lab. Th

advantage of this approach was that it would streamline op 

erations by combining like technologies for sensors, guidance

structures, and so forth, as well as producing manpower sav

ings. The downside of spreading munitions technologie

among the various technology directorates was that it would

weaken their optimal integration. As with AFOSR, Weapon

(later Munitions) did not become one of the 10 projected tech

nology directorates that would make up the Air Force Re

search Laboratory until the spring of 1997. 6

The future of AFOSR and Weapons remained undecided in

the final version of the Vision 21 working paper released in

November. However, General Paul was convinced that the new

lab model presented in that paper met the intent of what ha

transpired at Corona in October. His next step called for as

sisting in preparing and finalizing the briefing for Secretar

Widnall on 20 November in order to obtain her approval of th

single-lab proposal. But the job of briefing the secretary fell t

Blaise Durante rather than General Paul. In putting the brief

ing together, Durante relied heavily on input from Paul an

information contained in the Vision 21 working paper. As Du 

rante explained it, the briefing sought to answer the question

What did the Air Force plan to do to reduce, restructure, an

revitalize an apparently bloated R&D infrastructure? 7

With only a few weeks available to assemble the briefing

Durante’s approach entailed hitting the “high points, not th

minutiae” in trying to convey to the secretary the prudenc

and timeliness of endorsing the idea of combining four labora

tories into one. As Durante bluntly put it, “When you are a

the secretary level, you have 30 minutes—get your poin

across, give it to the secretary, and get the hell out!” After all

Secretary Widnall had already heard the single-lab pitch a

Corona and offered no opposition to the plan at that time

Consequently, Durante and others anticipated that the brie fin

118
would be just a formality they had to go through before proceed 

ing with the implementation of the consolidated laboratory. 8

Even though expectations were high that the secretar

would approve the new lab, Durante still put a lot of work int

the briefing to make it as persuasive as possible. A few week

before the briefing, Paul met with Durante in his office in th

Pentagon to review the Vision 21 working paper and put to

gether the briefing slides. Durante knew that General Pau

was the most knowledgeable person on all aspects of the singl 

lab—both the big ideas and details—and wanted to tap hi

expertise to sort out the most cogent points to present t

Secretary Widnall.

9

The slides that Durante and Paul developed went right t

the point. The first couple of charts covered background on

the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Vision 21, an

the president’s directive to develop a plan and schedule fo

downsizing DOD’s labs. One of the fundamental points tha

Durante had to underscore as the centerpiece of his presenta

tion was that as a result of Vision 21, DOD had directed th

Air Force to consolidate its labs into “as few installations as i

practicable and possible.” This process had to start now an

reach completion by 1 October 2005. Durante also intended t

remind the secretary that laboratory downsizing was alread

under way with the 35 percent R&D personnel reduction im

posed by the defense planning guidance. Looking to the fu 

ture, a 20 percent reduction (DOD ’s first Vision 21 estimate t

reduce positions) with the right mixture of personnel would

have significant consequences for laboratory operations. I

would mean that customer support in technology product

and services would jump from 45 percent of the laboratory’

infrastructure to 56 percent, which placed more emphasis on

S&T. By reducing infrastructure 20 percent, lab overhea

would drop from 45 percent to 36 percent of the lab’s tota

operation (fig. 6). 1 0

Durante also made full use of historical perspective to driv

some key points home. For instance, he borrowed a slide tha

General Paul had often used to show that, because the lab

had taken significant manpower reductions since 1989, insti

tutional reform had been under way for years. The lab work 

force of 8,493 dropped to sixty-three hundred in 1996, an

119
projections indicated it would reach 5,507 by 2001. Anothe

historical chart clearly illustrated how the laboratory system

had evolved over the years (fig. 7). Faced with growing pres

sure from Congress, the Clinton administration, and DOD, th

Air Force thought that going to one lab seemed consisten

with the natural evolution of the laboratory system. 1 1

Once Durante was satisfied with the initial set of briefin

slides, he wanted to do a test run of the briefing to obtain

feedback from top Air Force leaders. A few days before th

meeting on 20 November, he briefed General Moorman, the Ai

Force vice chief of staff, to get his reaction to the single-la

proposal. Durante went through the entire briefing, emphasiz 

ing that the Air Force had to commit to reducing, restructur

ing, and revitalizing its R&D infrastructure functions, activi

ties, and facilities to meet the Air Force’s vision and mission

of the future. The most effective way to accomplish this, Du 

rante pointed out, was to reorganize and consolidate resource

by establishing a single laboratory. Such a facility, controlle

by one commander, would be in a better position to brin

Figure 6. Vision 21 Background Infrastructure (From briefing, Blais

Durante to Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman, subject: Air Forc

Strategy Meeting, 20 November 1996)

120
about meaningful change. The commander would have to pur

sue a policy of divestiture whereby the lab leadership would

continually evaluate technology thrusts and programs an

eliminate those that offered little potential for leading to new

systems for directly supporting the war fighter. Further, th

lab would have to establish an aggressive outsourcing pro

gram to draw upon the technical expertise of private contrac

tors to make the lab as productive as possible. Finally, in 

drive to increase efficiency, the lab would have to tailor it

organization to apply better business practices that had been

tested and proven in the private sector. 1 2

General Moorman ’s reaction was predictable. Listening t

Durante and fully aware of what had transpired at Corona, h

endorsed the briefing and did not believe the secretary would

have a problem with it. He knew that the Air Force was unde

substantial pressure to do something about the labs. Afte

months of assessing various options, a single lab seemed 

workable and timely solution to the tasking imposed by Visio

Figure 7. S&T Strategy—Single-Laboratory Reorganization (From

briefing, Blaise Durante to Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman

subject: Air Force Strategy Meeting, 20 November 1996)

121
21. The notion of centralizin

control of the labs through a singl 

commander seemed especially

appealing. In short, Moorman did

not anticipate any opposition

from the chief or secretary an

thought the single lab was 

done deal.1 3

On Wednesday morning, 2

November 1996, General Pau

and others gathered in Secretar

Widnall’s office in the Pentagon

to hear Durante ’s briefing on th

single-lab proposal. The atmo

sphere was cordial and all busi

ness as the small but influentia

group took their seats. Mr. Mone

and General Muellner were pre

sent to answer any questions tha

Secretary Widnall or General Fogleman might ask on what ef

fect a consolidated laboratory might have on the acquisition

process. The secretary’s aide—Colonel Fred—and a few othe

administrators were also present.1 4

Showing the slides that he and General Paul had prepared

Durante hit the high points, stressing to the secretary that th

Air Force had to come up with a solid position in response t

the requirements of Vision 21. Durante’s main point was tha

creating a single lab would improve the management of Ai

Force R&D across-the-board and at the same time reduce th

number of people in the lab workforce by as many as seven

hundred during the first phase of reorganization. In addition

the single lab would gain more prominence by being elevate

to the same level of authority as product centers, test centers

air logistics centers, and specialty centers (fig. 8). The briefin

went smoothly and was over in less than 45 minutes. Widnal

had a question on what reaction “the Hill” might have to th

formation of a consolidated Air Force laboratory. General Pau

assured her that the likelihood of members of Congress oppos

ing a new lab was remote, especially since the Army and Navy

each had a single lab. In short, there was very little discussion

Blaise Durante briefed Secretary

Widnall on the single lab on 20

November 1996.

122
on any of the key issues in Durante ’s presentation, signifyin

everyone’s satisfaction with the proposed single-lab concept.1 5

This meeting represented a major turning point in terms o

how Air Force laboratories would conduct business in th

future. General Paul remarked that they undoubtedly ha

Secretary Widnall’s official approval of the single laboratory

“The Secretary did ask a couple of clarifying questions at th

20 November meeting. It was apparent to me from her hea

nods and verbal acknowledgments during the briefing tha

she was very supportive. She did approve the single lab con

cept.” Durante confirmed Paul’s recollections, rememberin

the secretary’s nodding her head in agreement and statin

that the single lab concept “looked good” and was “a workabl

plan.” She then informed Durante that the single lab was th

official Air Force position in response to Vision 21 and told

him he had her approval to brief Dr. Anita Jones , director o

defense research and engineering at DOD , on how the Ai

Force intended to restructure its laboratory system.1 6

Five days after the meeting with Secretary Widnall, Durant

did just that. Since this briefing was at DOD level, he wante

to make sure he tied the consolidated lab proposal to th

larger issues of vision and mission (fig. 9). Thus, one of th

main points he emphasized was that the Air Force mission

Figure 8. Old versus New Laboratory Structure: AFMC Organizatio

(From briefing, Blaise Durante to Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman

subject: Air Force Strategy Meeting, 20 November 1996)

123
driven by Global Engagement and its core competencies, fitte

extremely well with DOD’s Vision 21 mandate directing each o

the military services to reorganize its laboratory system. A

single lab, Durante explained, would be consistent with th

newly evolved strategy of Global Engagement and at the sam

time would meet the consolidation demands of Vision 21.

1 7

Dr. Jones expressed some skepticism about the consoli

dated laboratory plan, especially the Air Force’s optimistic pro

jection of a workforce reduction of seven hundred people soon

after the laboratory stood up. Durante sensed that Jones an

her staff had doubts that the Air Force would really take step

to remove that many positions from the unit-manning docu 

ment. She thought that the Air Force would eventually end u

fixing the books rather than getting rid of seven hundred peopl

who filled real jobs. In short, she found herself on the horns o

a dilemma. On the one hand, because she wanted the lab’

personnel numbers to come down to comply with Vision 21’

strategy, she should enthusiastically support the single-la

concept. On the other hand, she knew that large personne

reductions could produce political repercussions, as ha

Figure 9. Merging Vision and Mission (From briefing, Blaise Durante t

Dr. Anita Jones, director of defense research and engineering, subject: A

Force Strategy: Vision 21, 25 November 1996)

124
BRAC 95. Thus, she compromised, giving a 

tentative OK t

proceed with the single lab. Durante interpreted her decision

as DOD’s approval for the Air Force to move forward with it

intraservice plan—its response to Vision 21—to create a con

solidated laboratory. Jones had the option at any time of re

viewing the Air Force’s lab-implementation plan and recom

mending that it be stopped. However, over the next few

months, as the idea of the single lab began to unfold an

show more merit, she chose not to interfere with the plan. 1 8

After the meeting with Secretary Widnall , General Paul felt 

great deal of relief and accomplishment. Months of hard work

by Paul, his key staff members, and others had come to 

successful conclusion with the secretary’s decision to mov

forward with the single lab. Elated with Secretary Widnall’

approval, Paul returned to Wright-Patterson and immediately

wrote a letter to his staff and four laboratory commanders

informing them that the secretary and chief had “approved

organizational consolidation of the 4 labs and AFOSR into 

single laboratory as part of the Air Force’s Vision 21 strategy.

General Viccellio sent out a similar letter on 26 November

announcing that the secretary and chief had “approved th

single laboratory concept as an element of the Air Force’s V

sion 21 strategy.” The top-level goals of the new single lab

Viccellio pointed out, were to streamline the laboratory struc

ture by reducing overhead, decrease the fragmentation of sim

lar technology work at multiple geographical locations, and pu

dollars and people under the control of a single commander. 1 9

Viccellio also identified single-lab tenets for use as essentia

guidelines in setting up the new lab. These included eliminat

ing the four existing labs and their command sections, ap

pointing a single-lab commander, replacing the four lab

plans organizations with a single plans office, reorganizing th

current 25 technology directorates into 10–12 large director

ates, and moving all S&T personnel to a new single-lab man

power document.2 0

General Viccellio counted on his director of S&T to imple

ment the secretary’s decision. Paul did not waste any tim

laying the groundwork for the formation of the single lab

insisting that it be set up as soon as possible. Accordingly, h

directed his staff and lab commanders to meet with him “t

125
initiate the detailed planning process

 for setting up the new

laboratory. Scheduling the meeting for 5 and 6 December a

the Bergamo Center , several miles from Wright-Patterson 

Paul told the invitees of the importance and “great opportunit

ahead” for making significant changes to the S&T infrastruc

ture. Looking to the future, he envisioned that dismantling th

old organization and creating a new one would be a “corpo

rate” S&T effort. Since the secretary had made her decision

no one should debate the wisdom of moving to a single lab—

there was no turning back. Everyone had an obligation t

support the decision and utilize his or her talents to make th

new lab happen. No one person could do all this alone. I

would take a steady team effort, with groups at all organiza 

tional levels pulling together to effect the transformation. Pau

who knew this better than anyone else, was anxious to ge

started because he and his staff had to identify, discuss, an

resolve a variety of issues before they could put together 

workable lab-implementation plan. 2 1

Notes

1. Blaise Durante, deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for man

agement policy and program integration, Office of the Assistant Secretary o

the Air Force for Acquisition, interviewed by author, 3 September 1999; an

Lt Col Walt Fred, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force fo

Acquisition, interviewed by author, 3 September 1999.

2. “The Air Force Theodore von Kármán Laboratory: A Strawman Over

view,” Air Force Vision 21 working paper, 30 October 1996.

3. “The Air Force Laboratory: An Overview,” Air Force Vision 21 workin

paper, [November 1996]; and Durante interview.

4. “The Air Force Laboratory: An Overview.”

5. Joseph F. Janni to Headquarters AFMC/ST (Maj Gen Richard R

Paul), letter, subject: Laboratory Consolidation, 9 December 1996.

6. “The Air Force Laboratory: An Overview.”

7. Durante interview; and Fred interview.

8. Durante interview.

9. Ibid.; and Vision 21, Air Force internal working paper, 8 Novembe

1996.

10. Durante interview; and Vision 21, Air Force internal working paper, 

November 1996.

11. Durante interview; and Vision 21, Air Force internal working paper, 

November 1996.

126
12. Durante interview; and Vision 21, Air Force internal working pape

8 November 1996.

13. Durante interview.

14. Ibid.; Fred interview; and Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, interviewed b

author, 7 July 1999.

15. Durante interview; Fred interview; Widnall interview; Gen Richard R

Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998; and briefing, Blaise Durante t

Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman, subject: Air Force Strategy Mee

ing, 20 November 1996.

16. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to author, E-mail, subject: More Answers

30 March 1998; Durante interview; and Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, inter

viewed by author, 14 January 2000.

17. Briefing, Blaise Durante to Dr. Anita Jones, director of defense re

search and engineering, subject: Air Force Strategy: Vision 21, 25 Novembe

1996.

18. Durante interview; and Fred interview.

19. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, director of Science and Technology, to [se

distribution], letter, subject: Single Lab Planning Offsite, 22 Novembe

1996; and Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. to [see distribution], letter, subject: Sing

Air Force Laboratory, 26 November 1996.

20. Viccellio letter.

21. Paul interview; and Paul letter.

127
Chapter 8

Conclusion

The decision to create the Air Force Research Laborator

resulted from a series of events and judgments that began in

the mid-1980s and ended in November 1996 with the secre

tary of the Air Force’s approval of the single-lab proposal. N

one dramatic event was responsible for the formation of th

AFRL. Instead, over the years a number of studies, legislativ

matters, reports to the president, and DOD directives—all o

which penetrated various levels of government—in one way o

another affected the eventual birthing of the single laboratory

Changing the S&T culture in the Air Force was a slow an

tedious process. One can trace the beginnings of laborator

reform to the Packard Commission ’s report, released 10 year

prior to the formation of the AFRL. Packard ’s message wa

clear: to keep pace with better business practices used by th

private sector, DOD ’s antiquated acquisition system needed t

undergo substantial changes in the way it conducted busines

to become a more cost-effective and productive organization

In an effort to reform the acquisition system, Congress passe

the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act in October 1986, requiring DOD to comply with th

Packard Commission ’s recommendations. In February 1989

Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which gav

President Bush authority to direct the secretary of defense t

devise a strategy to make sweeping reforms in DOD. The secre

tary completed a major reorganization plan, known as the De

fense Management Review, that committed to making across

the-board changes, including implementation of the Packard

findings. DMRD 922 (October 1989) advised the Pentagon t

give serious consideration to merging all military labs directly

under DOD—all in the name of good economics. Projections o

declining budgets over the next decade demanded fundamenta

changes in order to improve organizational efficiency by reduc

ing the number of assigned personnel.

One of the first indicators of meaningful laboratory reform

occurred on 13 December 1990, when 13 Air Force laboratorie

129
merged into four. Less than two years later, in July 1992

another major reorganization took place when Air Force Logis

tics Command combined with Systems Command to form Ai

Force Materiel Command. Both of these actions signified tha

the constant pressures of Congress, the president, and DOD

were forcing the Air Force to make some hard decisions on th

best way to manage S&T for the future.

The establishment of four labs certainly amounted to a ste

in the right direction to show the Air Force’s commitment t

making progress in changing the organizational structure o

its labs. But the Clinton administration, Congress, and DOD

continued to pressure the Air Force to implement even mor

lab changes. In November 1993, President Clinton created th

National Science and Technology Council, one of whose job

entailed making a comprehensive study of military labs. A

part of his plan to make big government smaller, Clinton

sought to trim the size of the laboratory workforce and en

couraged remaining employees to do more with less. Th

president also strongly favored a laboratory-restructuring plan

that would lead to cross-service integration of resources—

partnering with other DOD research agencies—to save mone

and boost organizational efficiency. Reaching this goal would

require even deeper personnel cuts.

Passage of the National Defense Authorization Act in Febru 

ary 1996 prevented the Air Force from turning its back on

making even more radical reforms to its laboratory infrastruc

ture. This legislation directed DOD to develop a long-rang

strategic plan, known as Vision 21, that would spell out in

very precise terms how the Air Force intended to consolidat

into as few labs as practicable. The Air Force had to respon

to the Vision 21 tasking by coming up with a blueprint t

revitalize its laboratory organizational structure—now beset b

shrinking financial and personnel resources.

Two prominent individuals, Gen Henry Viccellio and Gen

Richard Paul, were inextricably tied to the effort to reshap

the laboratories. After assessing all the factors, they affirme

the inevitability, desirability, and timeliness of making funda

mental changes to the lab infrastructure. General Paul, direc

tor of Science and Technology at Headquarters AF MC, emerge

as one of the most influential players in the laboratory-reform

130
movement, mainly because his organization had the most a

stake in terms of alterations to lab infrastructure. Over th

years, he had witnessed and could not ignore the disturbin

and persistent pattern of decline in the number of peopl

assigned to the labs. Pressures imposed by the Dorn cuts

defense planning guidance , and A-76 studies all contribute

to significant personnel reductions. Paul realized that the cur

rent laboratory organization could not continue to absorb

more and more personnel cuts without negatively affecting it

mission. The handwriting was on the wall. Fewer people an

fewer dollars convinced General Paul that maintaining one labo

ratory rather than four labs made more sense economically.

Paul’s decision to propose a single lab was not a knee-jerk

reaction. He was influenced over time by a number of strategi

policy issues and high-level studies that consistently pushed fo

laboratory reform (fig. 10). George Abrahamson ’s blue-ribbo

panel, New World Vistas, and the Air Force’s Global En gagemen

Figure 10. Issues Influencing the Creation of a Single Laboratory

131
vision all addressed lab issues that had an important impac

on reorganization. The main thrust of these studies was tha

top Air Force leaders needed to look at rearranging the serv

ice’s lab infrastructure to perform the missions of the twenty

first century. Everyone agreed that technology would remain 

key ingredient in the success of future mission accomplish

ment, which meant fighting and winning wars. Consequently

the Air Force had to rebuild its lab infrastructure to develop

and deliver the most advanced technology for supporting an

protecting the war fighter.

With this in mind, General Paul proposed and General Vic

cellio approved the concept of one corporate laboratory as th

optimum solution for changing the S&T infrastructure. Both

men were convinced that one laboratory under the leadership

of a single commander would result in more efficient contro

and integration of personnel, dollars, facilities, and technica

programs. In addition, one lab would go a long way toward

eliminating technology seams and reducing overhead by doin

away with separate command sections and planning staffs.

By the summer of 1996, Paul and his staff were spearhead

ing an intensive effort to sell the single-lab concept to th

highest Air Force leaders. This involved preparing an acquisi

tion issue paper for presentation at the Corona conference a

the Air Force Academy in October. After several revisions, th

Corona issue paper laid out the pros and cons of variou

options for reorganizing the labs. General Viccellio maintaine

that one corporate lab was by far the best option to meet th

Air Force’s future needs, and Secretary Widnall and Genera

Fogleman agreed. Final approval to move forward with th

implementation of the corporate lab occurred in the secre

tary’s office on 20 November 1996.

The decision to create a single laboratory marked a pivota

turning point destined to have far-reaching consequences fo

the future of Air Force S&T. But future success for the Ai

Force depended to a large degree on its past performance in

building a solid foundation for S&T. After World War II, Gen

Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore von Kármán had the foresigh

and wisdom to convince the military to take an active role in

making S&T an integral part of the nation’s long-range de

fense strategy. Over the past 50 years, Air Force laboratorie

132
have woven a rich legacy of lasting contributions to the na

tion’s defense in such areas as nuclear and aerospace tech

nology, development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, an

revolutionary new weapon systems such as airborne laser

and high-power microwaves. In other areas, the labs hav

made tremendous progress with the modernization of bombe

and tactical aircraft, the emergence of new and more durabl

materials, and the advancement of next-generation sensor

and information systems. This extraordinary record continue

to grow rapidly as S&T turns its attention to exploration be

yond the atmosphere by developing more cost-effective an

higher-performance space systems.

Looking back, one can easily tell that the Air Force laborator

system unquestionably has demonstrated its worth in sustain 

ing the nation’s defense. In the natural evolution of events, 1

labs in 1990 merged to four—six years later, they became one

This new Air Force Research Laboratory clearly represented th

start of an exciting new era. It offered unlimited opportunity t

make a lasting difference with the development of the world’

most advanced technology that would provide the winning edg

to the American war fighter. To make this happen, General Pau

and his staff undertook the challenge of setting up the new

consolidated lab as quickly as possible.

133
Part 2

The Transition
Chapter 9

Early Strategic Planning

General Paul’s letter of 22 November 1996 to his four la

commanders, the director of the Air Force Office of Scientifi

Research , and his staff officially announced the secretary o

the Air Force’s approval of the proposal to create a singl

laboratory. This bold decision represented a major turnin

point in the Air Force’s organizational structure and affecte

how the daily business of military science and technolog

would take place in the future. However, this grand schem

meant nothing unless plans and actions could be set in mo

tion soon to transform four laboratories into one.

Bergamo

General Paul sensed the urgency and challenge of movin

ahead promptly with the planning and implementation of th

new lab. Above all, he knew it would take a total team com

mitment to succeed with the formidable undertaking tha

lay ahead: “We need to meet ASAP to begin the planning pro

cess for a single lab.” As a first step toward getting this labor

intensive process under way, he directed his lab commanders

along with his key staff, to attend an off-site meeting sched 

uled for 5 and 6 December 1996 at the Bergamo conferenc

center , located a few miles from Wright-Patterson AFB. Ber

gamo (formerly a monastery) offered the advantage of an infor

mal atmosphere free from interruptions, which would allow

everyone to furnish input to “corporately” build a phased tran

sition plan leading to the stand-up of the single laboratory. 1

From the vantage point of Air Force Materiel Command

General Viccellio also was very anxious to get the lab-plannin

process under way. From the start, his overall guidance t

General Paul emphasized ensuring the achievement of certain

single-lab “tenets” prior to the stand-up of the new organiza 

tion. He reminded Paul that his first responsibility was t

combine the four laboratories and AFOSR into a single la

137
under the direction of one commander and staff. In addition

Viccellio wanted Paul to reorganize the existing 22 technolog

directorates into roughly 10 to 12 large directorates. To inte

grate technologies across multiple directorates, he propose

establishing positions for three product directors—one each

for Air Vehicles, C4I, and Space—who would report directly t

the lab commander. In terms of personnel, Viccellio instructe

Paul to begin planning to move all S&T employees to a new

single-lab manpower document. Paul felt comfortable with th

basic lab tenets laid out by Viccellio but wondered how h

would develop an effective transition system to work out th

“tons of details and decisions” that went along with setting u

a single lab. 2

Even though at this point, none of the technology director

ates had been precisely defined, Viccellio, in an attempt to ge

the planning process off the ground, offered his vision of how

the new organization should look (fig. 11). Viccellio’s notiona

organizational chart mainly served as a compass to point every

one who was working on the lab’s strategic planning proces

Figure 11. General Viccellio’s Initial Vision of Single-Lab Organization

26 November 1996 (From Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. to Distribution, lette

subject: Single Air Force Laboratory, 26 November 1996)

138
in the right direction. Not wanting to delay the formation o

the single lab, he insisted that this priority project show pro

gress quickly. Determined to see events move forward at 

steady pace, Viccellio asked Paul to report back to him b

mid-December. 3

Knowing General Viccellio’s expectations, Paul had les

than two weeks to educate and organize his staff to begin

addressing a number of complex issues that they would hav

to resolve before any new organization could stand up. Prior t

the scheduled Bergamo meeting, Paul had met on several oc

casions with a small group of his closest advisors—Dr. Danie

Mr. Dues, Dr. Russo, and Colonel Markisello—to brainstorm

the best approach for molding a single lab from four divers

laboratories. What became painfully clear to Paul after only 

few meetings was that it would take much more than th

expertise and experience of this select group to assure that al

the pieces would fall in place in a timely fashion. Paul knew

almost immediately that he would have to depend on a much

larger and heterogeneous group to make the lab happen. Tha

was the first lesson learned in the entire lab-planning process

Actually, when this very small group got together, that’s when I realized we needed a broader approach. We said, “Let’s get three or four

people, and we’ll spend three or four days and map this out.” What

really became apparent to me was that was not the right way to do it.

We needed much broader involvement, and we needed more time. We

needed to bring more expertise in. That was invaluable in starting to

lay out a [lab] structure. What hit me was we could not do this with a

few people in a room. It is too complex—we wouldn’t get the buy in.

We just needed the diversity of more views and expertise on it. That’s

when we decided to bring a bigger group in.4

Paul’s decision to bring a bigger group together was th

main reason he arranged the Bergamo meeting for the firs

week of December. In the meantime, Paul and Dr. Russo ha

a very important meeting with Dr. John W. Lyons, director o

the Army Research Laboratory, headquartered at Adelphi

Maryland, to find out firsthand how Lyons and his staff wen

about setting up their consolidated lab, formed in Octobe

1992. They found out that the Army had taken 18 months t

organizationally structure its single lab. But the critical lesson

learned from Lyons was that the Army completed 90 percen

of the solution for implementing its lab in approximately six

139
months. With the benefit of hindsight, Lyons pointed out tha

he and his staff ended up spending the last 12 of the 18 month 

trying to solve the final 10 percent of their lab-consolidation

problems.5

Lyons’s perspective and comments made a strong impres

sion on Paul, who left the meeting knowing he definitely did

not want his transition team investing the majority of its tim

trying to solve the last 10 percent of lab-consolidation prob 

lems. He did not want to drag the process out because n

matter the solution, it would not be perfect. Consequently

Paul’s philosophy was to pursue the “90 percent solution,

knowing full well ahead of time that they would make mis

takes along the way—true of any new organization. Genera

Paul believed it much more important to configure the la

quickly and make adjustments later, rather than waste tim

agonizing over making every piece of the lab puzzle fit exactly

the first time around. In the end, this turned out to be 

reasonable approach, since within 11 months of Secretar

Widnall’s approval, the four laboratories were inactivated an

replaced by the Air Force Research Laboratory. 6

Considering the geographic separation of the existing fou

laboratories and the magnitude of the operation required t

establish a new lab, 11 months turned out to be a relatively

short time to complete such an ambitious undertaking. Faced

with a number of complex restructuring issues, the group tha

met at Bergamo ultimately had to take the lead in first identify

ing and then solving all the problems connected with the forma

tion of a single lab. General Paul personally invited each person

he had selected to attend the Bergamo meeting. He wanted hi

four commanders and AFOSR director present, as well as hi

experienced senior staff members, who he believed were stron

corporate players. And since the secretary had already made th

decision to go to a single lab, he was not interested in peopl

debating the wisdom of that decision. It would be a waste o

valuable time to fill the ranks of this all-important plannin

board with people not totally dedicated to the one-lab concep

Paul needed and sought out positive thinkers to discuss an

develop a lab structure that would work. As it turned out, h

had carefully assembled a highly motivated and qualified grou

determined to put together a smooth-working implementatio

140
plan. Those who attended this first critical planning meetin

(table 5) represented a cross section of the existing organiza 

tion and would play an extremely influential role in shapin

the structure of the new laboratory. 7

At the start of the Bergamo meeting, General Paul made 

short but forceful presentation, explaining the impact of Visio

21 on the evolution of the single lab. Although Vision 21 calle

for fundamental changes in the organizational structure of th

Air Force laboratory, he stressed that the mission of the la

would not change. The primary goal of the new organization

was to continue to produce technology that would make th

Air Force the world leader in the development of advance

weapon systems. Because that remained a constant, any or

ganizational change had to conform to that goal. But he als

pointed out that the mission would have to be accomplishe

with far fewer people, predicting that the number of worker

assigned to the new lab would shrink to 5,507 by FY 200

(down from over eighty-five hundred in FY 1989). He furthe

acknowledged that the number of technology directorate

would diminish and that a major focus in creating the new

directorates entailed getting rid of technology seams by con

solidating like technologies.8

In addition, developing and adhering to a strict schedul

would be essential to complying with General Viccellio’s over

all guidance. Paul stated that they would have to put togethe

a program plan to serve as a checklist of things to do befor

Table 5

Bergamo Meeting Team

Maj Gen Dick Paul Dr. Don Daniel Col Ron Hill

Dr. Helmut Hellwig Col Rich Davis Capt Deanna Won

Col Mike Heil Col Ted Bowlds Dr. Robert Selden

Mr. Terry Neighbor Col Dennis Markisello Dr. Joe Janni

Dr. Vince Russo Dr. Earl Good Mr. Ray Urtz

Capt Chuck Helwig Ms. Wendy Campbell Maj Mark Sabota

Mr. Tim Dues Dr. Brendan Godfrey

141
the lab could stand up. This would require a great deal o

coordination and cooperation among the current lab com

manders and their division, branch, and staff office chiefs, a

well as Paul’s immediate staff. For all this to succeed, Pau

emphasized that he intended to implement a productive pro

cess for opening the lines of communications and fostering 

free and healthy exchange of ideas and debate. As a start, h

declared he would establish an AFMC Science and Technolog

Directorate web page to promote the sharing of information u

and down the chain of command to “help quell the rumo

mill.” He felt very strongly about getting the word out an

pledged to write the messages for the web site himself, rathe

than delegate this responsibility to his staff. 9

During his closing remarks, General Paul offered a word o

sober caution for the future. Although the single lab, he as

serted, was the Air Force’s answer to solving the very specifi

issue of intraservice lab reform, the new lab did not signal th

end of the reform process. Rather, he realized that leaders a

the highest levels of government were closely watching th

outcome of the intraservice lab to determine if it made bette

sense to consolidate all service labs (of the Army, Navy, an

Air Force) under an interservice plan some time in the future

That option always seemed to lurk in the background as 

constant reminder of proponents at various levels of govern

ment who insisted that the combination of all service labs int

one centralized DOD laboratory would be more beneficial eco

nomically over the long haul.1 0

The press also kept a watchful eye on the laboratory

reorganization effort. During the time of the Bergamo meet

ing, several highly charged articles appeared in the media

stressing that Congress was still considering legislation t

strip the military labs of additional manpower and dollars

Excessive overhead at the labs remained a key issue tha

triggered civilian and government officials to reexamine th

pros and cons of turning the labs over to the private sector o

even closing them. Paul knew that, even though the Air Forc

had made its decision to form one lab, the press would con

tinue to raise the issue of laboratory reform . To the Air Forc

leadership, the fact that the topic attracted such attention

142
underscored the importance of making sure the transition

plan was well thought out and executed in a timely fashion. 1 1

Two days of meetings at the Bergamo center proved an impor

tant first step and a rewarding experience for the select grou

that brainstormed major laboratory-implementation issues

However, Paul made no final decisions. Instead, the meetin

simply focused on starting an initial dialogue on a number o

topics that would affect the stand-up and operation of the new

lab. Everyone wondered how each of the technology directorate

and the command section would be put together. After som

debate, most agreed that AFOSR should remain a separate di

rectorate rather than break up and distribute its basic researc

work among the various technology directorates. Beyond tha

the exact organizational structure remained unclear.1 2

Obviously, identifying and structuring the tech directorate

represented the most critical determinant of the success o

failure of the lab. Someone had to decide how many tech direc

torates were needed, who would head them up, what technolo 

gies would be located where, whether some technology pro

grams would have to move, and how many personnel would b

in each directorate. These were complicated and sensitive is

sues, especially since the tech directors would undeniably be

come the highest-level leaders in the new organization. Conse

quently, General Paul asked Dr. Daniel to head a team t

develop a concept for organizing the technology directorates

Its members included Mr. Urtz, Colonel Markisello , Mr. Dues

Captain Helwig, Dr. Russo, Mr. Neighbor, Dr. Good , Colone

Hill, and Ms. Campbell.

1 3

Although formation of the tech directorates was a majo

concern, several other issues arose at the Bergamo meeting

For example, many believed that they should locate the new

laboratory headquarters in Washington, D.C. Col Mike Heil

commander of Phillips Lab, and Dr. Brendan Godfrey, directo

of Armstrong Lab, led a spirited charge that strongly advocated

the location of laboratory leaders in the nation’s capital. There

they would be in a much better bargaining position to directly

influence Congress and DOD officials on laws and policy affect

ing the laboratory. After all, the Naval Research Lab attributed

much of its success over the years to its location in D.C

which allowed its leaders ready access to political and militar

143
decision makers. Paul felt that the new lab definitely needed 

stronger presence in D.C., but he did not favor moving th

headquarters there. Firstly, he did not want to isolate the head

quarters from the largest component of the lab, located in Day

ton, Ohio. Secondly, uprooting and moving east would entai

tremendous physical and logistical problems, not to mention th

enormous amount of lead time required to make a move of thi

magnitude. Thirdly, with D.C. real estate at a premium, wher

exactly would the headquarters locate? Setting up shop too fa

from the Pentagon and Capitol Hill (e.g., several miles outsid

the beltway) would defeat the whole purpose of colocation. A

with the formation of the tech directorates, General Paul prom

ised to commission a team to thoroughly assess the advantage

of moving the headquarters to Washington, D.C. 1 4

The Bergamo group also discussed possible names for th

new lab. No one really wanted to commit to one name so early

in the planning process. Nevertheless, it did not take long fo

the group to come up with a list: Air Force Research Labora

tory, Air Force Air and Space Laboratory, Air Force von Kár

mán Laboratory, Aerospace Laboratory, Air and Space Labora

tory, Air Force Research and Development Laboratory, Ai

Force Laboratory, and National Air and Space Laboratory. 1 5

After the Bergamo meeting was over, General Paul contin 

ued to meet with his key staff regularly. Sometimes these wer

just one-on-one encounters so he could bounce ideas off hi

most trusted aides. Other times, he would meet with two t

five people on his staff to get their input on specific aspects o

the lab-planning process. These turned out to be useful meet

ings because they helped him prioritize strategic-planning is

sues. One of the first things he had to do was develop th

briefing that Viccellio had requested by mid-December. Al

though it came two weeks late, on 31 December General Pau

presented to General Viccellio the overall long-range plan fo

establishing the single lab.1 6

Phased Implementation

Paul’s briefing to General Viccellio proposed a four-phase

implementation approach that would start immediately an

144
culminate nine months later with the stand-up of the Ai

Force single laboratory. Phase I, a three-month operation to b

completed by the end of March 1997, called for the stand-u

of the “interim” laboratory organization (fig. 12). Two majo

organizational changes would occur during this stage. Firstly

a single-lab command section and headquarters staff carve

out of the existing 93-person AFMC/ST staff would increase t

approximately 150 people who would serve as the nerve cente

to formulate and distribute overall lab policy and guidance. A

that point, the command section would include the com

mander, executive director, chief scientist, and four produc

directors—for Air Vehicles , C4I, Space, and Human Systems

(Human Systems was added to General Viccellio’s origina

suggestion of three product executives to provide parallelism

with and identifiable linkages to the four existing product cen

ters.) Most people assigned to the new single-lab staff would

work either for XP or Operational Support (DS), where th

support offices resided. The XP workers in each of the fou

Figure 12. Phased Implementation Approach for a Single Laborator

(From briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, Headquarters AFMC/ST, subjec

Single Laboratory Phased Implementation Approach, 31 December 1996)

145
labs and AFOSR would report to the single-lab XP to help

formulate an integrated planning strategy. General Paul would

direct the command section. 1 7

A second major component of the phase I interim lab or

ganization entailed a change in reporting procedures for th

four lab commanders. No longer would they report to thei

respective product-center commanders but would report di

rectly to the new AFRL commander, with the four labs’ inter

nal organizational structure remaining intact. This was a sig 

nificant step forward because now the single-lab commande

would have total control over personnel and the four com

manders. One of the most notable benefits of this arrange

ment was that each lab commander no longer had to worr

about serving two bosses—the TEO and the applicable product

center commander.1 8

Another important aspect of the role of the four command

ers was that they would also become product directors in th

single-lab command section. For example, Colonel Heil , th

Phillips Lab commander, would become product director fo

Space; Col Rich Davis, who headed Wright Laboratory, would

become product director for Air Vehicles; Col Ted Bowlds

head of Rome Lab, would become product director for C4I; an

Dr. Godfrey, director of Armstrong Lab, would become produc

director for Human Systems. The product directors would help

eliminate technology seams in the new lab by working to bet

ter integrate cross-directorate technologies for their assigne

product or mission areas. Further, after the AFRL stood up

the lab-commander positions would no longer exist, and th

product-director positions would become full-time. Genera

Paul thought it important that the lab commanders occup

high positions of authority in the new lab structure to tak

advantage of their experience and expertise. As product direc

tors, the four lab commanders not only would influence th

success of the new organization, but also would be able t

move into jobs that would not damage their careers after thei

old jobs went away. 1 9

This new reporting system would allow General Paul t

make maximum use of his four lab commanders during th

critical implementation process. He thought it “essential tha

the four lab commanders work for [him] during phase I to help

146
shape what the final phase should look like.

 Because peopl

could have broken ranks during this critical time, it was im 

perative that the lab commanders work together to mitigat

any of their employees’ apprehensions about the new lab

Moreover, from a practical point of view, an element of uncer

tainty existed over the product commanders’ somehow inter

fering with the lab-building process. General Paul also rea

ized that the product-center commanders naturally did no

relish the thought of losing control of either their laborator

commanders or their labs. Knowing he was about to lose hi

laboratory, a product-center commander conceivably could di

rect his lab commanders to move people out of the lab an

assign them to the product center before formation of th

single lab. To avoid that temptation, Paul campaigned aggres

sively to make sure that the four lab commanders came unde

his control as quickly as possible during phase I. 2 0

Besides the four lab commanders, the director of AFOS

also would report directly to the single-lab commander as par

of the phase I plan. Prior to approval of the single lab, AFOS

was classified as a field operating agency that reported to th

Science and Technology Directorate at AFMC. However, a

part of phase I, AFOSR would become a direct reportin

unit—like the four labs. Moreover, the phase I organizationa

scheme called for the four labs and AFOSR to start a compre

hensive review of every position assigned to their organiza 

tions—a necessary step in preparing to transfer all position

from the four labs and AFOSR to a newly created single-la

unit-manning document. Starting to build such a documen

was an extremely important exercise because it would consoli

date lab personnel from the four product-center mannin

documents to one manning document, thus assuring that th

single lab “owned” and controlled all government position

assigned to it. Other actions requiring resolution during phas

I included choosing a name for the single lab, requesting an

organization-change package (Air Force Instruction [AFI] 38

101, Air Force Organization, called for establishing the “in 

terim” lab by the end of March), and appointing a transition

team responsible for the entire implementation process.2 1

The value of phase I was that it would expeditiously establis

a new interim laboratory with minimum disruption of the statu

147
quo. It would also pave the way for three subsequent phases

Paul explained to General Viccellio that the next step, phase IIA

would last about six months, ending in October 1997 (fig. 13)

This would constitute a major milestone because by that tim

the single lab would have stood up with all current personne

positions from the four labs and AFOSR assigned to one unit

manning document. At that point, the four labs and AFOS

would cease to exist. Roughly 10 to 12 large technology director

ates would replace the four labs and AFOSR.

2 2

Phase IIB, scheduled to take place from October 1997 t

approximately FY 2001, would complete the “end-state” lab

This meant that the lab leadership would push hard to reduc

the manning of the laboratory to conform to personnel number

congressionally mandated by Vision 21 and the DPG —a 3

percent reduction of lab personnel based on total authorized

positions in 1989. Most of these reductions would occur in th

Figure 13. Second Stage of the Implementation Plan (From briefing, Ma

Gen Richard R. Paul, Headquarters AFMC/ST, subject: Single Laborator

Phased Implementation Approach, 31 December 1996)

148
areas of support and overhead. Phase III, the final stage in th

implementation process, looked to the lab environment nearly

eight years into the future. The Air Force envisioned that by FY

2005, any lab closures and consolidations would be completed

and organizational adjustments would be made to comply wit

any interservice decisions resulting from Vision 21.

2 3

Thus, phases I and IIA were the most immediate and impor

tant stages of the phased-implementation approach becaus

those steps had to be completed before the lab stood up. Afte

the lab was up and running, its leadership would be able t

fine-tune and make more adjustments to the organization b

reducing the number of personnel and closing or consolidatin

facilities, if necessary (and if permitted by subsequent BRACs

during phases IIB and III. This four-phased approach reflected

General Paul’s policy that called for implementation of the 9

percent solution by the end of phase IIA. The other “10 percen

adjustment” could occur during phases IIB and III (fig. 14)

Clearly, the most important priority was establishing the new

lab and preparing it to operate on a day-to-day basis.2 4

Figure 14. Evolution of the Single Lab (From briefing, Maj Gen Richard R

Paul, Headquarters AFMC/ST, subject: Single Laboratory Phase

Implementation Approach, 31 December 1996)

149
After listening to all parts of General Paul

s milestone brief

ing on 31 December, General Viccellio told him that he fully

endorsed the phased approach for implementing the single Ai

Force laboratory. A week later, on 6 January 1997, Viccellio

made it official by announcing that he, with the concurrence o

the secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, had approved th

phased approach and had directed Headquarters AFMC/ST t

proceed with the implementation. Viccellio stressed that h

wanted to move forward without delay and appealed to every

one in the organization to give complete support to this high

priority project. The next step called for General Paul to recon 

vene his staff in early January to begin hammering out th

details of how to complete phases I and IIA. 2 5

Transition Office

After General Viccellio gave the green light to move ahea

with the implementation of the single lab, General Paul imme

diately formed a transition office to direct and monitor al

activities related to the establishment of the new organization

During the weeks prior to Viccellio ’s approval of the phase

approach, Dr. Daniel had already led a number of brainstorm

ing sessions with Colonel Markisello, Vince Russo, Tim Dues

and others to begin to explore what procedures and processe

would have to be put in place to get the new lab under way

especially the question of how to set up the technology direc

torates. These initial meetings took place in the conferenc

room next to Dr. Russo’s office at the Materials Directorate a

Wright Lab. (After the lab stood up, Russo took a great deal o

pride in referring to these early meetings in his conferenc

room as the “birthplace” of AFRL.) However, not all the meet

ings occurred there. Earlier, over the Christmas holidays

Daniel had come in on a Saturday to meet with General Pau

in his office, where they spent several hours discussing th

importance of setting up a transition office as quickly as pos

sible to resolve two key questions: how would the office be se

up and who would run it? 26

It became very apparent to Paul that Daniel could not realisti

cally devote the time required to head the transition team

150
Daniel already had a heavy workload and a very demandin

schedule in his position as deputy director for S&T. One of hi

most important duties entailed dealing with internal, day-to-da

S&T programs that still required managing, despite the exist

ence of plans to radically change the laboratory’s organizationa

structure. The business of the Science and Technology Director

ate could not come to a halt. Consequently, Paul had to find 

reliable person able to lead the transition team full-time. Fortu

nately, the general knew exactly the right person.2 7

On 13 January 1997, he selected Dr. Vince Russo to serv

as the transition director. So that Russo could fulfill all th

duties associated with his new position, Paul temporarily re

lieved him of his job as director of the Materials Directorate a

Wright Laboratory, detailing him for 120 days to Headquarter

AFMC/ST and assigning him an office just down the hall from

the command section. This arrangement gave Paul ready ac

cess to Russo when he needed to consult with him on an

aspect of the lab reorganization. 2 8

General Paul was extremely impressed with Russo’s experi

ence and proven abilities. From the beginning, Paul believed i

important to have a person in the Senior Executive Service t

lead the transition office, a requirement that Russo met. More

over, Paul had known Russo personally and had worked wit

him over the years on a number of lab projects: “I highly re

spected his opinion very, very much. He is a strong leader an

team builder, and I also felt he had credibility with the other la

commanders. And he knew how to build teams. I watched him

do it over and over within his own organization.” After tw

months on the job, Russo earned Paul’s praise as a man wh

“ha[d] ‘lab blood’ running through his veins” and who completely

understood the workings of the Air Force laboratories.2 9

Paul particularly liked Russo’s management style. He nei

ther constantly criticized nor worked in isolation. Rather, h

actively sought the opinions of others, urged people to ge

involved, and made them feel that their ideas were importan

and made a difference—exactly the sort of leader Paul wanted

He was certain that Dr. Russo would tackle the transition

problem head-on by using a large cross section of the la

workforce to come up with workable solutions. Up until thi

point, only a handful of people—by design—had participate

151
in the transition planning, but Paul wanted to change tha

because too many questions remained unanswered under tha

system. In his mind, no consensus existed on even the mos

basic issues. Russo offered a refreshing new approach tha

relied on a more “participatory” methodology to ensure th

success of the lab-transition plan. Because of Russo’s person

ality, experience, interpersonal skills, and leadership abilities

Paul had supreme confidence in his ability to serve as th

transition director.3 0

Paul was equally certain that Russo could not single-handedl

make the new laboratory happen. It was far too big a project

So he made sure Russo had adequate full-time help by assign 

ing about half a dozen people to the transition office. To un

derscore the importance of the enormous task ahead, Genera

Paul approved the lab-transition structure on the same day h

appointed Russo director (fig. 15). 3 1

General Paul firmly believed that the transition office would

serve as the backbone of a successful implementation program

and he depended on the transition team to develop a single

lab planning process that eschewed quick solutions. He in 

sisted on an open process that carefully considered “all th

Figure 15. Single-Lab Transition Structure (From Maj Gen Richard R. Paul t

AL/CC et al., letter, subject: Transition Director for Single Laboratory, 13 Januar

1997, with attached chart “Single Lab Transition Ortganization”)

152
alternatives and document[ed]

our rationale for why we rejected

some options and pursued others.”

He wanted the team to encourage

a wide spectrum of the current

lab workforce to participate in

developing the lab-implementation plan: “Without such a transition organization populated by

a cross-section of our workforce,

we would tend to have a ‘closed

process.’ That’s the antithesis of

what we want.” The appointment

of Ms. Wendy Campbell as deputy transition director exemplified Paul’s policy of recruiting people from different back 

grounds to serve on the transition team.3 2

A research psychologist rather than a scientist, Wend

Campbell had worked in the Human Resources office at Arm 

strong Laboratory in San Antonio, where she developed he

skills as a highly proficient manager in working “people” issue

General Paul had selected her to come to Wright-Patterson t

plan and implement the Lab Demo program in 1996. An inno

vative civilian-appraisal system, Lab Demo evaluated each sci

entist and engineer’s (S&E ) contribution, commensurate with

his or her grade level, and then tied salary increases to th

S&E’s contribution score. Outsiders immediately embrace

this radical approach for appraising civil servants as visionar

and bold. Campbell had done an exceptional job with La

Demo, exceeding everyone’s expectations. In the process, sh

had earned a reputation as a self-starter with a tremendou

amount of energy, drive, and stamina to get things done on

time. As a result, General Paul asked her to become Vinc

Russo’s deputy and attend to all the day-to-day details o

running the lab-transition office. 3 3

Paul often referred to Russo and Campbell as the “one-tw

punch” of the transition office. Although probably the tw

most visible individuals in that office, they depended heavily

on the other staff members, who made invaluable contribu 

tions. These tenacious workers in the trenches interacte

Ms. Wendy Campbell served as 

key member of the lab-transitio

team.

153
daily with the various task groups charged with organizing th

major components of the new lab. Consistent with Genera

Paul’s policy of drawing people from throughout the organiza 

tion, these staffers came from Headquarters AFMC/ST an

each of the four laboratories for a four-month assignment t

the transition team (table 6). 3 4

After naming the transition staff, General Paul and Dr

Russo then selected 13 task-group leaders and the areas the

were to address. Paul had some very definite ideas about th

composition of the task groups’ working membership. Her

too, he wanted a mixture of senior people, each of whom had 

great deal of experience and expertise in one of several broa

areas of lab operations. But he also insisted that some mem

bers represent a cross section of the workforce at large, thu

giving less experienced people an opportunity to inject new

ideas into the strategic-planning process. Although there wer

no hard-and-fast selection rules, Dr. Russo met with each

task-group leader to identify group membership. To make thi

Table 6

Air Force Single-Lab Transition Staff (January 1997)

Name Organization Task Group Affiliation

Dr. Vince Russo Materials Directorate (ST/SL) All

Ms. Wendy Campbell Materials Directorate (ST/SL) All

Dr. Harro Ackermann Phillips Laboratory Product Executives and

Financial Management

Maj Jack Donnelly Plans and Programs (ST/XP) Contracting and Corporate

Information

Mr. Don Elefante Rome Laboratory Personnel and Washington

Presence

Capt Charles Helwig Plans and Programs (ST/XP) Technology Directorates

and Plans and Programs

Mr. Thomas Hummel Wright Laboratory Headquarters Locations

and Operational Support

Capt Scott Jones Armstrong Laboratory Integration and Operations

Division

Source: Lab transition team, chart, “Air Force Single Lab Transition Staff,” 11 February 1997; and idem, chart, “Single Lab

Transition Team Points of Contact,” 26 March 1997.

154
work, he gave each leader the authority to write each of th

four lab commanders and the AFOSR director requesting tha

they provide a capable and interested person—who could

think corporately—to serve on the various task groups. (Th

commanders and director were not allowed to prevent peopl

from serving.) Once selected, that person would work directly

with the task-group leader and other members of the group

who would meet periodically at the discretion of the grou

leader (table 7). 3 5

The most important responsibilities of the transition office’

staff included providing overall leadership and oversight b

identifying, scheduling, coordinating, and monitoring the ac

tivities of a number of task groups and focus teams, the latte

addressing specialized concerns outside the purview of th

task groups. Each focus group would consist of “experts from

the field” who would resolve very specific issues affecting th

stand-up of the new laboratory. Phase I included six focu

Table 7

Task Groups and Leaders

Task Group Leader Task Group Organization

Mr. Tim Dues (SES) Plans and Programs (XP) Wright Lab/XP

Col Dennis Markisello Support (DS) AFMC/ST

Mr. Rich Eckhardt (SES) Financial Management (FM) AFMC/FM

Maj Gen Rich Roellig Contracting (PK) AFMC/PK

Mr. Lief Peterson (GM-15) Peronnel AFMC/DP

Brig Gen (sel) Rich Davis Product Executive Officers Wright Lab/CC

Mr. Garry Barringer (SES) Corporate Information Rome Lab/XP

Dr. Brendan Godfrey Washington Presence ARmstrong Lab/CC

Col Walk Avila Classified Programs AFMC/DR

Col John Rogacki Integration and Operation Phillips Lab/RK

Divisions

Dr. Vince Russo (SES) Headquarters Location AFMC/ST-SL

Dr. Bart Barthelemy (SES) Technology Directorates Retired

Brig Gen Charles King Reserves Reservist AFMC/ST

155
teams dealing with the following areas: enlisted-personnel is

sues, laboratory-heritage preservation, administrative pro

cesses, chief-scientist functions, command issues, and AFRL

regulations/policies/instructions/operating instructions.3 6

Each task-group leader would act as the facilitator an

spokesman for his group, each of which sought to furnish

information on how the new lab should organize and function

Group members were to brainstorm a wide range of option

for their assigned “broad” area in an attempt to come up with

a few logical choices and document the rationale for thei

selections. After making an objective list of pros and cons fo

each option, the group would recommend the best option t

help complete the overall implementation process. Thus, each

group would come up with one of many pieces for integration

into the total lab puzzle. 3 7

Each task group would present its findings in an issue pape

to the Science and Technology Corporate Board, consisting o

General Paul; his executive director, Dr. Daniel; the four la

commanders; the AFOSR director; and selected members o

Paul’s senior staff. Traditionally, this board had addressed long

term technology processes/products and investment strategie

that required corporate-level decisions. After the board’s review

two other specially constituted review boards would then evalu 

ate each task group’s recommendations and offer their opinion

on the soundness of each option. The external Independen

Assessment Board (IAB) consisted of senior people from indus

try, academia, and government, while members of the interna

Grassroots Review Board represented a cross section of the cur

rent laboratory system’s S&T workforce. As part of this proces

each board would identify flaws in the logic of each task group’

recommendation, raise other issues that might have been over

looked, and call the Corporate Board ’s attention to potentia

political implications. After listening to and evaluating all th

facts presented by the task group and the two boards, Pau

would solicit final advice from the Corporate Board and the

either approve or disapprove each recommendation. Once Pau

accepted a recommendation as the best solution, it then becam

part of the transition plan for people to follow during phase IIA. 3 

All of the task groups—which General Paul referred to a

“the heart of the transition structure”—faced a formidabl

156
challenge, considering the very short time they had. Indeed

not until mid-February were all members of the task group

selected. Group leaders then acted quickly to set up a meetin

in which all members could participate—a seemingly simpl

task that often took a great deal of coordination because mem

bers were literally spread out from coast to coast. As a result

most of the groups’ kickoff meetings did not occur until th

end of February or early March, leaving little time to formulat

recommendations to brief to the Corporate Board by the third

week of March. By the end of March/early April, the schedul

called for the IAB and Grassroots Review Board to start col

lecting input to pass on to lab leaders for better refining thei

strategic game plan.3 9

Stand-up of the interim laboratory at the end of March

would complete phase I but did not mean that General Pau

and the Corporate Board could finalize the recommendation

of the task groups. That ongoing process would continue unti

early July. Paul and others expected that the initial input

from the task groups would most likely require changes an

fine-tuning in order to establish agreed-upon procedures fo

the final push in the summer of 1997, prior to October’

stand-up. So the strategy called for each task group to rework

its initial input and develop a revised plan that considere

suggestions from the first meeting of the Corporate Board 

Each group would present its final product to one of severa

Corporate Board meetings held between the end of April an

early June. During the first two weeks of July, Paul intende

to make a final decision on the groups’ recommendations

Although the general acknowledged the aggressiveness of thi

timetable, especially considering the scope and complexity o

the work involved, he insisted on following his “90 percen

rule” to set up the lab as quickly as possible. Paul repeatedly

reminded group leaders and members of their jobs’ “highes

priority” and encouraged them to complete their work on

schedule. They did not disappoint the general. 4 0

Notes

1. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, director, Science and Technology, to Distr

bution, letter, subject: Single Lab Planning Offsite, 22 November 1996.

157
2. Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. to Distribution, letter, subject: Single A

Force Laboratory, 26 November 1996; and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, inter

viewed by author, 2 March 1998.

3. Viccellio letter.

4. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 22 November 1999.

5. Ibid.; and Capt Chuck Helwig, AFMC/ST (advanced technology inte

gration manager), interviewed by author, 3 February 1998.

6. Paul interview, 22 November 1999; and Helwig interview.

7. Wendy B. Campbell, Single Laboratory Secretariat, “Summary of th

Single Laboratory Confidante Review,” report [December 1996]; and Pau

letter.

8. Col Dennis Markisello, “Single Lab Offsite,” notes prepared at th

Bergamo meeting, 5–6 December 1996.

9. The web site was not operational until 11 March 1997. Since anyon

could access the original site, Public Affairs had to approve it—a proces

that took time and created delays. As an interim measure, the web site wa

restricted to “.mil” users so General Paul could get the word out quickly

Ibid.; and Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

10. Markisello; and Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

11. Jeff Erlich, “Pentagon Drafts Lab-Cutting Legislation,” Defens

News, 2–8 December 1996, 1, 34; and John Pulley, “Labs May Be Nex

Closure Prospect,” Federal Times, 9 December 1996, 6.

12. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to all Headquarters AFMC/ST, Laboratory

and AFOSR employees, letter, subject: Update on Single Air Force Labora 

tory, 17 December 1996; and idem, “Single Lab Offsite,” notes prepare

after the Bergamo meeting, 5–6 December 1996.

13. Markisello; and Ms. Wendy Campbell, interviewed by author, 1

June 1998.

14. Campbell, “Summary of the Single Laboratory Confidante Review.”

15. Ibid.

16. Briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, Headquarters AFMC/ST, subjec

Single Laboratory Phased Implementation Approach, 31 December 1996.

17. Ibid.; Dr. Vince Russo, interviewed by author, 4 February 1998; an

Dr. Vince Russo, “Functional Support in AFRL,” report, 5 June 1997.

18. Paul briefing.

19. Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. to Distribution, letter, subject: Single Ai

Force Laboratory, 6 January 1997; and Paul interview, 22 November 1999.

20. Paul interview, 22 November 1999; and Helwig interview.

21. In terms of the personnel system, the organizational-change reques

permitted the four labs to report to another laboratory—a temporary ar

rangement because in October 1997 the four labs would go away and onl

the single lab (AFRL) would remain. Paul briefing.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.; Viccellio letter, 6 January 1997; and briefing, Maj Gen Richar

R. Paul, subject: Air Force Research Laboratory: Heading Check, 29 Apri

1997.

158
24. Paul briefing, 31 December 1996; Viccellio letter, 6 January 1997

Paul briefing, 29 April 1997; and Paul interview, 22 November 1999.

25. Viccellio letter, 6 January 1997.

26. Dr. Don Daniel, interviewed by author, 27 July 1998; Paul interview

2 March 1998; and Russo interview.

27. Daniel interview; Paul interview, 2 March 1998; and Russo interview.

28. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to AL/CC et al., letter, subject: Transitio

Director for Single Laboratory, 13 January 1997.

29. Paul interview, 2 March 1998; and message, General Paul’s web site

subject: Single Laboratory Transition Organization; on-line, Internet, 1

March 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single

lab/updates.htm. 

30. Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

31. Paul letter, 13 January 1997.

32. Paul message.

33. Ibid.; Paul interview, 2 March 1998; and Campbell interview.

34. Lab transition team, chart, “Air Force Single Lab Transition Staff

11 February 1997; idem, chart, “Single Lab Transition Team Points o

Contact,” 26 March 1997; Paul interview, 2 March 1998; and Dr. Harr

Ackermann, AFRL/DEL, interviewed by author, 10 January 2000.

35. Ackermann interview; and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, to AFMC/FM e

al., letter, subject: Task Group Leaders for the Single Laboratory Transitio

Activities, 14 February 1997.

36. Paul letter, 14 February 1997; briefing, Dr. Vince Russo, subjec

Kickoff Meeting: Single Laboratory Contracting Task Group, 19 Februar

1997; message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Single Lab Task Group

and Focus Groups; on-line, Internet, 23 March 1997, available from

http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; an

Campbell interview.

37. Paul letter, 14 February 1997; and Russo briefing.

38. Paul letter, 14 February 1997; message, General Paul’s web site, sub

ject: 20–22 March Corporate Board Meeting; on-line, Internet, 20 March 1997

available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/up

dates.htm; and briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Singl

Laboratory, 13 February 1997.

39. Russo briefing; and Paul message, 18 March 1997.

40. Russo briefing; Paul message, 18 March 1997; Paul interview, 

March 1998; and message, General Paul’s web site, subject: AFRL Phase II

A Decision Process Flowchart; on-line, Internet, 25 April 1997, availabl

from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

159
Chapter 10

Shaping the Technology Directorates

One issue, more than any other, drove the implementation

plan leading to the stand-up of the lab: reorganizing and con

solidating the large number of existing technology directorate

into a smaller number of new directorates. Science and tech

nology work, the center of the laboratory operation, took plac

in the technology directorates. The tech directorates affecte

almost every aspect of the laboratory, including contracting

support staff, command guidance, personnel numbers, fund

ing, and more. Thus, General Paul was acutely aware of th

importance of selecting a highly competent tech-group leade

who could work effectively with the existing tech directors an

other senior leaders. He would have to be a savvy person with

sufficient street smarts to guide his task group down a rock

path and then determine how many new tech directorate

would be needed, what technologies they should represent

and where they would be physically located within the single

lab structure. In other words, the basic question became, How

do you transform 22 tech directorates into some smalle

number that would exhibit both “technology purity” and criti

cal mass? Paul did not know the exact answer to that ques

tion. That is why he was anxious to hire someone soon t

solve what he described as the “hardest piece by far” of th

entire lab-reorganization puzzle.1

As it turned out, Vince Russo played a very influential role i

the selection of Dr. Robert R. Barthelemy to lead the Technolog

Directorate Task Group. Earlier, Russo had met with Genera

Paul to discuss the qualifications a person would need to hea

such an important undertaking. After lengthy discussion, Pau

and Russo agreed that whomever they chose had to be a good

facilitator above everything else: “We were looking for a guy wh

would be dealing with controversial subjects. Number one, w

needed a facilitator—someone who is easy, someone who can ge

along with lots of people . . . someone who is able to get others t

get along and work together toward a common goal.” The idea

role of the facilita tor was not to make the final decisions but t

161
persuade others, through a give-and-take process, to reach 

consensus on the best way to organize the tech directorates 

Russo had known Barthelemy for over 25 years and had worked

with him on various lab projects. Over that time, Russo con 

cluded that Barthelemy was one of the most competent labora

tory professionals he had ever encountered in his 35-year gov

ernment career.2

General Paul concurred enthusiastically with Russo’s as

sessment of Dr. Barthelemy. Although Paul did not know

Barthelemy as well as Russo did, Paul had worked with

Barthelemy on several occasions during his days at Wrigh

Laboratory and was impressed by his aptitude for getting peop l

to work together and accomplishing tasks quickly. He neede

a person who could charge ahead in an orderly fashion an

meet deadlines. In addition, the tech-group leader would hav

to deal with a diversified group of current tech directors wh

held very strong and different opinions on the way the la

should reorganize. After Barthelemy retired in January 1996

he went to work for Universal Technology Corporation in Day

ton, Ohio, where he became involved in consulting a numbe

of private companies. In that role, he developed managemen

and leadership skills by conducting numerous workshops an

seminars and earned a reputation as an excellent facilitato

who worked with company officials and employees to mak

improvements in their daily operations.3

Furthermore, Barthelemy knew how the laboratory system

functioned at Wright-Patterson , having worked as an Air Forc

officer and civilian at the various labs there since 1963. H

had held high-level positions over the years and had gained 

great deal of experience working a variety of S&T programs

Most importantly, he had worked his way up through th

laboratory system over the years. Early on, he served as an

engineer in the Aero Propulsion Lab’s Plans Office. In th

1970s, he had assignments in the areas of high-power laser

and the basic mechanics involved in heat pipes. In 1982 h

became the chief of XP at the newly formed Air Force Wrigh

Aeronautical Laboratories. The next year, he became a mem

ber of the SES and assumed the position of deputy director o

the Aero Propulsion Laboratory. Before he retired from federa

service in January 1996, he spent seven years running th

162
National Aerospace Plane program and three years as director

of the Training System Program

Office at AFMC’s Aeronautical

Systems Center in Dayton.4

Knowing that Barthelemy had

a strong lab background made a

big difference to General Paul.

Having worked in the labs made

Barthelemy an ideal candidate

because he could speak “lab ta lk,”

thereby catching subtle nuances

that could easily escape a less

experienced person. Moreover,

the current tech directors could

not easily dismiss him, given his

credibility and understanding of

how the labs operated. Moreover,

the fact that Barthelemy was now

a “lab outsider” since he had retired and brought no agenda t

the table made him even more appealing to Paul because h

could now objectively assess how the labs should be restruc

tured in terms of technology disciplines. Paul had no appre

hensions at all about putting Barthelemy in charge of th

all-important Technology Directorate Task Group.

5

Barthelemy confirmed that Russo had approached him in

late December and again in early January to tell him tha

General Paul was looking for someone on the outside who did

not have a stake in the outcome of the reorganization of th

directorates. Russo and Paul anticipated some knotty prob 

lems because the current directors would most likely have 

narrow perspective and an unyielding attitude about protect

ing their technology turf. Consequently, Paul preferred t

bring in someone who could open everyone’s eyes to the tota

corporate picture and convince the group members to compro

mise on key issues as they sought to effectively organize th

new laboratory. 6

Barthelemy was in California working on a consulting job

when he received a phone call from General Paul in the middl

of January asking him to help out with the restructuring o

General Paul selected Dr. Robert

“Bart” Barthelemy to lead the

all-important Technology

Directorate Task Group.

163
the technology directorates. He told Paul he was interested in

the position and flew back to meet with him during the las

week of January to discuss his duties and responsibilities

Paul told Barthelemy he wanted him to focus on reducing th

22 technology directorates at the Phillips, Wright, Rome, an

Armstrong labs to eight to 12 new directorates. Barthelemy an

his group were to study the issue and come up with a recom 

mendation for the number and kinds of tech directorates.

7

Secondly, Paul directed Barthelemy to regroup the technol

ogy directorates in a way that would minimize technolog

seams that permeated the existing laboratory organization. In

electronics, for example, bits and pieces of work took place in

seven or eight different directorates—a practice that man

people, including Paul, considered redundant and a duplica 

tion of effort. The general asked Barthelemy to look for realis

tic ways of consolidating the majority of electronics work un

der one or two tech directorates. 8

Reducing the number of technology directorates and con

solidating similar work efforts into a single directorate would

also reduce the number of subordinate units, which include

division and branch levels. Fewer tech directorates automat

ically translated to fewer division and branch chiefs. As a third

goal for Barthelemy, Paul favored reducing the number o

these middle-management positions in accordance with th

overall plan of setting up the new lab as a flatter organization

with fewer management and support positions. However, thi

did not mean that middle managers would lose their jobs

Instead, the plan called for them to move back into the variou

tech divisions and branches as program managers or bench

scientists. Paul considered this a strength of the new labora

tory because more scientists and engineers would become di

rectly engaged in working the core S&T issues destined t

advance systems that would best support the war fighter. 9

Paul allowed Barthelemy to pick whomever he wanted t

serve on the group, specifying only that the members should

represent all four labs and AFOSR. To launch the process

Paul assigned Col Ron Hill from the Human Resources Direc

torate at Wright Lab to serve as Barthelemy’s deputy, as wel

as Capt Chuck Helwig from the general’s command section

Capt Jeff Witco from AFMC’s Requirements Directorate, an

164
Ms. Elona Beans from Armstrong Lab at Wright-Patterson t

provide administrative support. By early February, Barthelemy

who wanted to keep his group relatively small, had identified 1

people to serve on the task group (table 8). 1 0

Barthelemy went to work right away, calling the first meet

ing for 25–26 February at the Hope Hotel across the stree

from Headquarters AFMC at Wright-Patterson . In preparation

for this kickoff meeting, he pointed out to all the team mem

bers that “there is no approved solution coming into thi

meeting.” Instead, he wanted people to come with open mind

and a willingness to brainstorm a number of options for shap

ing the new tech directorates in ways most beneficial to th

entire organization. Although Barthelemy explained that h

would not follow a hard agenda because he wanted the grou

to collectively make its decisions, he did identify a number o

concepts to be addressed at the meeting: discussion of goals

criteria, and ground rules; General Paul’s guidance; posturin

AFRL for the future; and process definition and development. 1 

Barthelemy realized that his group, which he referred to a

“The Twelve,” represented only half of the four labs’ 22 tech

directorates. However, the 12 members did represent all fou

labs, as General Paul had requested, and seemed a mor

manageable number than 22 for getting things done and fo

engaging in “team building” activities within the specified tim

constraints. His group had less than one month to brain 

storm, develop, and analyze various options; decide on the tw

best options for each directorate; and prepare its findings fo

presentation to General Paul and the Corporate Board meet

ing scheduled for 20–22 March. 1 2

Table 8

Technology Directorate Task-Group Membership

Wright Lab Rome Lab Armstrong Lab Phillips Lab

Dr. Alan Garscadden Dr. Donal Bodnar Dr. Russell Burton Ms. Christine Anderson

Dr. G. Keith Richey Mr. Igor Plonisch Dr. David Erwin Col William Heckathorn

Mr. Steve Korn Dr. John Granier Dr. Lee Task Mr. Joe Sciabica

165
During General Paul

s opening remarks to the task grou

members on 25 February, he made it very clear that he de

pended on them to develop the best possible plan for organiz 

ing the tech directorates under one laboratory. He told them

he had no doubt that they would lay the foundation for th

new laboratory and that almost every other lab-reorganization

activity would hinge on their plan for setting up the new tech

directorates.

1 3

Explaining his preference for eight to 12 new directorates

Paul noted that a greater number would continue the problem

of having technologies “fragmented” over too many director

ates and that a lesser number would create very large direc

torates that would be difficult to manage and control. How

ever, he pointed out that if the group came up with a differen

number that made sense, he would support it. Paul was als

enthusiastic about the caliber of people assigned to the group

reminding them that they had a rare opportunity to develop 

meaningful plan that would ultimately change the future o

the laboratory system in the Air Force. Before he departed

Paul expressed his complete confidence in their ability to pro

vide an extremely valuable and lasting service to the new la

and to the Air Force. He also assured them that he would

make himself available and provide whatever support he could

to ensure the success of their mission.1 4

Although extremely pleased with Paul’s comments and th

urgency he attached to the group’s challenging job

Barthelemy realized that getting all 12 members to think cor

porately would be no easy job. He characterized them as ex

tremely bright and capable individuals who were very competi

tive, aggressive, independent, and strong-willed with big egos

His principal chore involved harnessing and channeling al

their talents and energy in the same direction to allow them t

determine the optimum grouping of technologies in the new

lab’s directorates. To facilitate their understanding of the job

they faced, Barthelemy borrowed a management technique h

had used in consulting work for some of the largest privat

companies in the defense industry:

All 12 of them came in ready to fight for what they wanted. It turns out

that there were about 24 [22] directorates and about a hundred divisions [115] within those tech directorates. So I went to the store and

166
bought jelly beans. I got 24 different kinds, different colors . . . four or

five of each color representing the hundred divisions and the 24 tech

directorates. On the first day, I threw the jelly beans on the main

table, and I said, “This is our problem. We’ve got to arrange these jelly

beans.” And I said we can spend the next six months putting together

the yellows and reds and all that. Or we can just eat these jelly beans

and start talking about what’s right for the organization.1 5

This little icebreaker not only reduced tensions but als

emphasized that the group should not think in parochia

terms. For the good of the lab, the members had to expan

their perspectives. As the group became more immersed in th

problem-solving process, everyone realized that no one would

get exactly what he or she wanted and that their first priorit

was the welfare of the new laboratory. In time, all of the grou

members saw the wisdom in that corporate approach an

rallied to put into practice the Air Force core value of “servic

before self.”1 6

The most important point considered at this first meetin

was the aforementioned goal of reducing the number of exist

ing tech directorates and providing the Corporate Board sev

eral organizational options that would meet the objectives an

constraints of the new Air Force Research Laboratory. In de

veloping options, Barthelemy instructed his group to take int

account a number of pertinent objectives: minimizing technol

ogy seams, enhancing core competencies, streamlining the di

rectorates, maintaining best practices, enhancing custome

orientation, establishing directorates of three hundred t

seven hundred personnel and divisions of one hundred t

three hundred personnel, and considering AFOSR as a direc

torate. In terms of constraints, the group could not move an

of the directorate components and could use only curren

laboratory resources—nothing from outside organization

(e.g., people, funding, facilities, etc.). In other words, the fou

laboratories + AFOSR + ST = AFRL.1 7

Once the 12 task-group members understood these groun

rules, selection of the tech directorates progressed smoothly

a nd more rapidly than expected. During the first round of dis

cussions, the group quickly saw that certain existing technolog

directorates easily lent themselves to integration into a new

and larger directorate under the single lab. In addition, th

members realized that many of those existing directorate

167
(Barthelemy estimated 80 percent) could logically merge with

a minimum of debate. Accordingly, the members agreed tha

t hey could group existing technologies under separate director

ates for work conducted in materials, space, directed energy

air vehicles, information, and human effectiveness (includin

health, safety and environment, and crew effectiveness). 1 8

Although these new directorates essentially accounted fo

the same technologies as in the past, the difference was tha

bits and pieces of similar technologies—previously scattere

among several directorates—would now be consolidated int

one larger tech directorate. For example, under the four-la

system, the Geophysics Directorate studied and defined th

effects of the upper atmosphere and space environment on

aerospace systems. Since geophysics work focused on space

the task group reasoned that it made sense to eliminate th

existing Geophysics Directorate and move its work into th

new space directorate. Also, General Paul thought that, de

spite its importance as a scientific discipline, geophysic

would not grow substantially in terms of attracting additiona

resources in the future. For these reasons, the group found i

difficult to justify geophysics as a separate directorate an

chose to merge it with the Space Vehicles Directorate.

1 9

Other cases were just as easily resolved. For example, no on

questioned that AFOSR, which managed basic research pro

grams across the laboratory system, would become a separat

directorate. Essentially, this office would retain its identity an

continue to operate as it had in the past. Barthelemy’s grou

also proposed formation of a single munitions directorat

responsible for air-launched weapons designed to defea

ground/fixed, mobile/relocatable air and space targets. Al

thou gh this seemed the right approach for keeping all work on

conventional weapons together, the group also considered in 

tegrating certain parts of munitions work for inclusion in th

Directed Energy Directorate . However, after concluding tha

the technologies of directed energy and conventional weapon

were distinctly different, the group favored keeping munition

work intact under a separate directorate. By quickly identify 

ing most of the new tech directorates that would become an

integral part of the new laboratory, the group gave itself mor

time to consider the more difficult organizational restructurin

168
that focused on establishing roughly 20 percent of the remain 

ing new tech directorates.

2 0

Less certainty and more controversy attended the remainin

technology directorates. Everyone knew that Air Vehicles an

Space Vehicles would be important directorates in the new la

but wondered whether each should have a propulsion compo

nent. Col John Rogacki, who headed Phillips Lab’s Propulsion

Directorate at Edwards AFB, California, and Dr. Tom Curran

his counterpart at the Aero Propulsion and Power Directorat

at Wright-Patterson , strongly advocated the establishment of 

separate Propulsion Directorate under the new lab. Because o

the natural synergy among air, rocket, and space propulsion

as well as the prominence of propulsion as an area of technol

ogy, they argued against moving air-breathing propulsion t

Air Vehicles and rocket propulsion to Space Vehicles . T

them, assigning propulsion to two different directorates would

only create more technology seams in the organization, which

violated General Paul’s policy of eliminating such seams.2 1

In addition, over the past few years, Rogacki had conclude

that his Propulsion Directorate had become a stepchild o

Phillips Lab, mainly because of the geographical separation

between Kirtland AFB and Edwards AFB. The impression

whether right or wrong, was that the Phillips hierarchy tende

to take better care of its local directorates at Kirtland (espe

cially when it came to personnel and funding cuts) than it

Propulsion Directorate , located several hundred miles awa

from the Phillips Lab headquarters in Albuquerque. On man

occasions, Rogacki and his rocket-propulsion proponents fel

they received less than a fair shake from Kirtland. As a result

the propulsion people decided they would rather take thei

chances operating as a separate directorate at Wright-Patterson 

where they would be in a better position to take control o

their destiny. 2 2

On the other hand, Christine Anderson , who led the Spac

Technology Directorate at Phillips Lab, and Dr. Keith Richey

director of the Flight Dynamics Directorate at Wright Lab, fe

quite the opposite. They led a subgroup to collect input from

people in their respective divisions and branches on the ad

vantages and disadvantages of establishing a separate Propu

sion Directorate . Not surprisingly, they disputed the notion o

169
limiting all propulsion work to one directorate. Anderson

stated that because the launch-propulsion element of liftin

missiles off the ground would become increasingly dominate

by the commercial sector, it was not her primary concern fo

the future of space technology. She had more interest in de

veloping advanced technology dealing with onboard propu

sion systems for spacecraft. Although a less mature technol

ogy than propulsion for launch vehicles, onboard propulsion

had far more potential in the near future for influencin

higher performance levels in terms of the on-orbit precision

movement of spacecraft.2 3

Barthelemy’s group found itself unable to choose between

establishing a stand-alone Propulsion Directorate or combin 

ing parts of propulsion into the Space Vehicles and Air Vehicle

directorates. Neither was it able to choose after hearing th

subsequent findings of Anderson and Richey’s subgroup. A

that point, the group simply decided to provide a set of pos

sible alternatives to General Paul and the Corporate Board i

March. Since the group had reached a stalemate, Barthelemy

as group leader, decided to break the tie and recommend 

separate Propulsion Directorate at the Corporate Board meet

ing in April. Barthelemy’s view prevailed—by June, Genera

Paul had elected to establish a separate Propulsion Director

ate rather than split that work between space and air vehicles

Despite their disappointment, Anderson and Richey, as team

players, accepted the decision. Anderson remarked, “We wil

make it work.”2 4

Later in the summer, concerning a related restructurin

issue, Anderson objected to the name given the propose

Space Directorate she would lead. In her mind, Space Vehicle

Directorate was far too limiting and did not clearly convey th

fact that it would cover a full spectrum of space activities—no

just the space vehicle or bus. The integrated payload and it

various technical components (electronics, sensors, materials

etc.), for example, represented other critical space technologies

in addition to the space vehicle, that required advancement an

development. Anderson fully realized that other directorate

conducted space work connected to their technical specialty

She also suspected that other directorates were reluctant t

give up their space work for fear of weakening their operation

170
and position within the new lab. Since space was destined t

become the predominant element in the Air Force’s future mis

sion, no director would willingly give up funding and resource

that would prevent him or her from participating in such a

important movement. If every aspect of space work transferre

to one directorate, then that directorate might easily gain dom

nance in terms of funding, people, programs, and facilitie s . 2 5

Even though Anderson preferred naming the new director

ate Space or Space Technology instead of Space Vehicles, in

the end she would lose this battle. Many of her colleagues in

the task group believed that air and space would become th

two flagship directorates in the new lab, supported by othe

directorates. This situation demanded a certain degree of or

ganizational consistency and parallelism (i.e., air vehicles an

space vehicles). General Paul agreed, deciding to keep th

name Space Vehicles Directorate. In the spirit of corporat

cooperation and in order to press on with the bigger and mor

immediate issue of getting the new lab up and running as soon

as possible, Anderson accepted the decision. As Barthelem 

pointed out, she was a prime example of the team player wh

put her personal agenda aside in favor of doing what th

group thought best for the new laboratory. 2 6

An even more controversial issue at the tech-directorat

level focused on what to do with sensors/electronics under th

single-lab organization. The old lab system scattered sensors/

electronics work over three different sites—Rome, Hanscom, an

Wright-Patterson. At Rome, this work came under the overal

category of surveillance (various ground radars, such as phase

array, laser, electro-optical, over-the-horizon, etc.) and took

place in three directorates: Electronics and Reliability, Intelli

gence and Reconnaissance, and Surveillance and Photonics

Rome also had a contingent of scientists, permanently sta

tioned at Hanscom and carried on Rome’s unit-manning docu 

ment, who worked in electromagnetics, particularly antenn

and optoelectronic technologies as well as electromagneti

scattering and materials. The third major com ponent of sen

sors/electronics work resided at Wright Lab’s Avionics Direc

torate, which emphasized the integration of advanced electronic

and sensors into air vehicles for the purpose of conducting aeria

surveillance and detection missions. With three organization

171
working on similar technologies, the ta sk group had to addres

the best way to realign all these core technologies into a mor

streamlined and synergetic organization . 2 7

Of the three geographically separated organizations, the Avi

onics Laboratory at Wright-Patterson garnered the biggest shar

of sensors/electronics work. At Rome, a large segment of work

concentrated on information technologies associated with com

mand, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) issues

The task group initially proposed combining all sensors/elec

tronics work with the information work at Rome. The problem

with this solution, according to Barthelemy, was that “you

would create a gigantic directorate . . . and no one wanted on

that big.” He and the others estimated that a sensors/informa

tion directorate could include as many as fourteen hundred

people—a size contrary to General Paul’s guidance of keepin

the directorates roughly the same size or somewhere in th

neighborhood of three hundred to seven hundred people.2 8

Since sensors/electronics involved so many complex tech

nologies and integrated concepts, selecting a directorate to hous

them became very difficult. Barthelemy personally headed a sub

gr oup consisting of three representatives from Rome (led b

Dr. Don Bodnar) and three people from Avionics a t Wright

Patterson whose job was to discuss and assess sensors/electron

ics work and then make a recommendation on how to organiz

it in the new lab. After numerous meetings, telephone calls

and E-mails, members of the subgroup presented two option

to the task group. While retaining the option of merging al

sensors/electronics work with information at Rome, they pre

ferred to form two new directorates. One would deal exclu 

sively with sensors/electronics, and the other with informa

tion technologies. A final decision on which way to go with

sensors and information would not take place until after th

Corporate Board ’s second meeting in late April.2 9

Another major reorganizational issue entailed determinin

what to do with Armstrong Laboratory, much of whose work

dealt with medical community matters such as devising system

to protect and sustain crew members who worked with variou 

weapon systems. Armstrong also assessed and managed healt

risks and ecological hazards to the Air Force war fighter. Co

Ron Hill, Barthelemy’s deputy, took charge of a third subgrou

172
to develop options for reorganizing Armstrong Lab

s medica

responsibilities and duties. After much debate, the subgrou

recommended forming two new directorates: the Crew Effective 

ness Directorate and the Environment, Safety, and Health Di

rectorate. As was the case with the propulsion and sensors/elec

tronics subgroups, General Paul would not announce his fina

decision on this recommendation until after the Corporat

Board ’s second meeting in April. 30

The two Corporate Board meetings—the first one on 20–2

March and the second on 24 April—to assess the task group’s

options were very important in terms of helping General Pau

and his senior leadership determine the right mixture of new

technology directorates . In preparation for each meeting

Barthelemy and his group put together an issue paper tha

described their best options and recommendations for formin

new directorates. Everyone realized that the March presentation

did not represent the group’s final recommendation but a pro

gress report that gave the Corporate Board an opportunity t

provide feedback and direction. At the first meeting, Barthelem

told his audience that when he took the job, General Paul an

Vince Russo warned him that defining and establishing the tec

directorates would be the most difficult problem facing the tas

group. He noted, however, that the tasking turned out to b

easier than expected because, as they worked the problem, i

very quickly became apparent that a natural sorting-out proces

made the selection of the majority (80 percent) of tech director

ates fairly straightforward. 3 1

The Corporate Board reacted very favorably to Barthelemy’

briefing, agreeing to proceed with most of the group’s recom

mendations for the tech directorates (table 9). Although n

one questioned the need for the Space Vehicles and Atmos

pheric Vehicles (later renamed Air Vehicles) directorates unde

the single lab, the Corporate Board would have to decid

whether or not propulsion work should become part of thos

directorates. As mentioned above, Barthelemy recommende

keeping propulsion as a separate directorate but also presente

the alternative of merging propulsion with Space Vehicles an

Air Vehicles.

3 2

As regards information and sensors/electronics technolo 

gies, Barthelemy advocated separate Information and Sensor

173
directorates. Although he presented the Corporate Board th

option of combining these two core technologies into one di

rectorate, he advised against this because it would contain to

many personnel, as mentioned previously. Despite some dis

cussion to include electronic devices in the Munitions Direc

torate , that never became a major issue of contention. 3 3

As for the remaining proposals, directed energy and mun

tions work would definitely be set up in separate directorates

Although Barthelemy’s team had considered combining part

of munitions with directed energy, they dismissed that ide

because of the fundamental differences between munition

(conventional weapons) and directed-energy devices such a

high-power lasers and microwaves. Barthelemy also recom 

mended a Crew Effectiveness Directorate and an Environ

ment, Safety, and Health Directorate , to be carved out of Arm 

strong Lab, but General Paul was very reluctant to creat

them, knowing that significant personnel reductions could oc

cur at Brooks AFB over the next few years if the labs had t

deal with more manpower and/or budget cuts.

3 4

The outcome of the Corporate Board ’s first meeting repre

sented an important milestone in creating the new lab. Firstly

it gave both General Paul and the board a hefty dose of confi

dence after listening to the recommendations of Barthelem

Table 9

Decision Options,

AFRL Directorates

• Atmospheric [later Air] Vehicles (A) • Materials (M) two options

• Space Vehicles (S) two options • Directed Energy (D)

• Munitions (N)

• Propulsion (P) • Crew Effectiveness (C)

• Information (I) two options • Environment, Safety, and Health (E)

• Sensors (R)

Source: Dr. Robert R. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group to the Science

and Technology Corporate Board,” 21 March 1997.

174
and his team. Although Paul made no final decisions at th

meeting, he was convinced that the task group was heading in

the right direction and had shown significant progress afte

only a month of assessing the new lab’s organizational struc

ture. Secondly, Paul gave Barthelemy and his team some clea

guidance on what to do next, instructing them to devote al

their time and energy to the unresolved “tough issues” regard 

ing the new directorates. This meant settling on and refining 

final organizational scheme in three primary areas: propu

sion, information and sensors, and health sciences. The grou

would brief these matters, along with recommendations abou

the other proposed directorates, at the next Corporate Board

meeting in April. 3 5

A third outcome of the March meeting was that, for al

practical purposes, Paul and the Corporate Board endorse

the formation of Air Vehicles, Space Vehicles , Munitions, Di

rected Energy, and Materials as stand-alone directorates. Al

though not briefed at the meeting, AFOSR already had been

identified as one of the new directorates, bringing the total t

six. At the second Corporate Board meeting, Barthelemy an

his team would give their best and final recommendation fo

the remaining directorates.3 6

The second meeting proved just as successful as the first

Between the two meetings, Barthelemy’s task group had com

up with its final recommendations for all the tech directorates

In addressing the various options for the three tech areas no

yet fully resolved, they even went as far as drafting a spread

sheet identifying a first cut of the divisions and number o

people assigned that they thought would best fit into each

option. The numbers in their initial draft clearly showed tha

combining information and sensors would result in a larg

directorate consisting of nearly eight hundred people. There

fore, they supported covering these technologies by formin

two more manageable directorates of approximately four hun

dred people each.3 7

Their numbers also revealed that Air Vehicles with propu

sion would total 704 employees and Space Vehicles with pro

pulsion would total 635. Without propulsion, the totals wer

434 and 460, respectively. So to maintain an equitable ba

ance in terms of the size of the directorates, it made mor

175
sense to Barthelemy

s team to recommend an independen

Propulsion Directorate of 445 people. Of course, numbers wer 

not the only reason for establishing a Propulsion Directorate

Barthelemy had not changed his mind since his tiebreake

vote prior to the first Corporate Board meeting. He remaine

firm in his stance that propulsion was a self-contained an

distinctive technology that deserved its own directorate. A stron

“technical synergy” existed among aeropropulsion, rocket pro

pulsion, and advanced propulsion (e.g., ramjets, scramjets

and combined-cycle engines) that a Propulsion Directorat

could exploit. Barthelemy also favored a Human Effectivenes

Directorate acting as an umbrella organization to take care o

all the health sciences/crew-effectiveness requirements. 3 8

As regards Barthelemy’s recommendation of separate direc

torates for human effectiveness and health sciences activities

the former (e.g., man-machine interface, cockpit design, crew

protection, etc.) was funded by the Air Force’s S&T budge

(referred to as “Program 6” funds by the budgeteers). But man

of the health sciences activities (drug testing, occupational

health risk assessments, administration of environmenta

safety standards, clinical consulting services, etc.) wer

funded by the Air Force’s surgeon general, using non-S&

funds (referred to as “Program 8” funds). To Paul and others

these Program 8–funded functions, although important to th

Air Force, were not true S&T activities. Yet, over years o

organizational restructuring, they had become gradually fuse

and collectively folded into the Armstrong Lab when it wa

formed in 1990. 3 9

Paul saw the creation of AFRL as an opportunity to restric

the lab’s mission solely to S&T activities. Accordingly, he pro

posed that the Program 8–funded activities (along with th

approximately five hundred lab positions supporting tha

work) be transferred out of the lab structure to the Human

Systems Center (HSC) at Brooks AFB. Such a transfer would

require no physical movement of people. Thus, the technica

synergy between Program 6 and Program 8 activities at Brook

AFB could be maintained, but HSC would now be accountabl

for the planning and execution of the Program 8 (non-S&T

work. After a trip by Paul to visit Lt Gen Chip Roadman, th

Air Force’s surgeon general, at his Bolling AFB headquarter

176
in Washington, D.C., and after extensive discussions with th

surgeon general’s staff, Roadman agreed with Paul’s proposal

The two generals also decided to transfer Dr. David Erwin , an

SES at Armstrong Lab who was very familiar with the Program

8 work, to HSC to ensure continuity. Thus, General Pau

solved the dilemma of two human-related tech directorates in

AFRL—only a single Human Effectiveness Directorate would

become part of the new lab.4 0

In evaluating all the pros and cons concerning the new tec

directorates, General Paul kept uppermost in his thoughts on

guiding principle that he wanted to implement. In his mind, on

of the most important justifications for creating a single lab wa

to eliminate the technology seams scattered among a number o

different organizations within the existing lab structure. To

many organizational boundaries fenced off similar technologie

and prevented them from coming under the central control o

one person who could efficiently manage and coordinate all th

pieces of similar technologies as a whole. Paul had always bee

firmly committed to changing that situation.4 1

For example, he questioned the logic of splitting propulsion

work between Edwards and Wright-Patterson : “They weren’

duplicating—they weren’t doing the same work—but they wer

both doing work related to propulsion. To really have a mor

coherent program, all that work ought to be under one direc

tor. That will allow one person to plan where we are going t

invest our resources for all propulsion technology, no matte

where it is performed.” He felt the same way about sensors

information, and human effectiveness, as well as other Ai

Force technologies. So it made very good sense to him, in

terms of effectiveness and efficiency, to support the tas

group’s recommendations to consolidate similar technologie

under one directorate whenever possible. Thus, he favored th

option to create single directorates for propulsion, sensors

information, and human effectiveness. 4 2

After weighing all the recommendations presented at th

meeting of 24 April and after consulting with his senior staff

General Paul made the final decision, identifying the tech di

rectorates that would make up the new laboratory. As it turned

out, his task did not prove too difficult because of the com

pleteness and high quality of the work done in Barthelemy’

177
task group. Ten new directorates appealed to Paul becaus

that number confirmed his initial “gut feeling” that eight to 1

new directorates seemed about right. In short, Paul accepte

and approved the recommendations of the task group. Pau

then made one of his top priorities the dissemination of thi

critical information to everyone in the organization as a way o

dispelling any rumors and sharing the steady progress toward

the stand-up of the single lab. During the second week o

May, he posted a message on his web site, naming the new

tech directorates (fig. 16).4 3 On 31 July, Paul posted anothe

message that explained his decision:

By consolidating our current 22 technology directorates to nine, our

new technology directorates will be large enough to have critical mass

and to exercise the flexibility needed to realign themselves internally to

meet the technical challenges of the time. These directorates are the

“engine” of AFRL and represent the Air Force’s core technology areas

for the future. Additionally, our hope is that nine “boxes” with their

attendant smaller number of divisions and branches will have less

overhead manpower than 22 “boxes,” thus contributing to a more

efficient overall organization as we continue to take manpower reductions

Figure 16. AFRL Technology Directorates (From message, General Paul

web site, subject: AFRL Progress Report—Directorates and More; on-lline

Internet, 14 May 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS

labs/single-lab/updates.htm)

178
in compliance with previous mandates. Grouped with our nine tech -

nology directorates is AFOSR, which has remained largely intact and

will continue to manage our basic research program.4 4

With the establishment of the new tech directorates , it becam

clear that similar technologies, formerly dispersed throughou

many directorates in the four labs, now became consolidated

under one of the nine new directorates. This change represented

a major step forward because it conformed to the long-held

premise that the Air Force laboratory system needed to do 

better job of eliminating “fragmented techn ologies.” Paul de

scribed this state of affairs as “‘islands of technology’—island

with rickety or nonexistent bridges between them.” The new

organizational structure went a long way toward solving thi

problem by organizing along well-defined technology disci

plines (fig. 17). For example, under the old lab system, senso

Figure 17. AFRL Directorate Matrix (From Maj Gen Richard R. Paul t

author, E-mail, subject: Conversion Matrix of Four Lab Directorates to AFR

Directorates, 2 February 2000, with attached chart “AFRL Directorate Matrix”)

179
work took place at two labs (Rome and Wright) and was sprea

a mong four different directorates (Avionics , Electromagnetic

and Reliability, Intelligence and Reconnaissan ce, and Surveil

lance and Photonics ). Now, under the single-lab concept o

operation, all sensors work transferred to the new Sensors Di

rectorate . Similarly, aerospace medicine and occupational hea lt

studies, previously assigned to six directorates at the Wright an

Armstrong labs , became centralized under one new Human Ef

fectiveness Directorate, set up at Wright-Patterson . Viccellio an

Paul had wanted to accomplish these kinds of efficiency reform

since the earliest planning stages of the laboratory-restructurin

effort.4 5

Consolidating similar technologies into a smaller number o

new tech directorates altered the geographic profile of AFRL

which extended from coast to coast. Half of the new tech

directorates resided at Wright-Patterson with the new la

headquarters, and the other five were located in New York

Washington, D.C., Florida, and New Mexico (fig. 18). 4 6

Nailing down the tech directorates cleared the way for re

moving many obstacles and uncertainties standing in the wa

of planning for the stand-up of the laboratory. The next ste

entailed making sure the AFRL strategic plan under develop 

ment spelled out what the tech directorates were expected t

Figure 18. AFRL Locations (From briefing chart, “AFRL Locations,” n.d.)

180
accomplish. General Paul, Vince Russo, and other senior staf

members attended an off-site meeting 12–13 May to begin 

dialogue for building a single-lab strategic plan. The first ver

sion of the strategic plan , prepared at the end of May, laid ou

the vision and mission for the new lab and served as the basi

for all the work conducted by the tech directorates. Looking t

the future, the plan publicized the new lab’s vision as “th

best people providing the best technologies for the world’s bes

Air Force.” To make this happen, the tech directorates had t

accomplish the lab’s mission: “to lead the discovery, develop 

ment, and timely transition of affordable, integrated technolo 

gies that keep our Air Force the best in the world.”4 7

The strategic plan informed all the tech directorates of thei

responsibility for assuring the timely development of cor

technologies for the operational Air Force to enhance its futur

war-fighting capabilities. Specifically, according to the AFRL

strategic plan, the technology directorates

will be accountable for the overall health and welfare of their assigned

resources. They will be the stewards of the 6.1 [Basic Research], 6.2

[Applied Research], 6.3 [Advanced Technology Development], and external funds assigned to and executed by them. Additionally, they will

be the advocates and strategists for the technology disciplines within

their respective areas of responsibility. Their leaders will be national

and international spokespersons for their areas of expertise. . . . The

TDs [Technical Directors] will develop integrated and balanced full

spectrum budgets and programs that are responsive to the needs of

the Air Force. . . . A major responsibility of the TDs will be the

development, training, appraisal and recognition of their people. 4 8

Paul also pointed out that the products of the tech director

ates, especially in the 6.3 program areas, would require th

“integration of technologies of multiple AFRL directorates.” In

other words, many different tech directorates would contribut

their specialized technical component to an integrated produc

or system. Because today’s highly complex systems consist o

a wide spectrum of scientific disciplines contributing to th

development of advanced hardware (i.e., sensors, electronics

materials, avionics, power sources, etc.), rarely would case

arise in which one tech directorate would have responsibilit

for the totality of any new product. So emphasis would be on

exploiting technology “synergies” among directorates as th

most effective and cost-effective way of doing business. All thi

181
meant that the new tech directors inherited a huge challeng

and responsibility to meet these ambitious goals. But thei

actions would ultimately determine, to a great degree, th

success or failure of the new laboratory in the years to come. 4 

Disclosure of the new tech directorates by General Paul ha

two very immediate and important effects. Firstly, it sent an

unequivocal signal to everyone that a major organizationa

shake-up would definitely happen, once and for all erasin

any lingering doubts about preserving the old four-lab system

or stopping the reorganization with phase I. There was n

turning back. Secondly, the workload for forming the singl

lab would not diminish. One of the most pressing tasks ahea

involved determining what specific divisions and branche

would become organizational components of each of the new

tech directorates. That inescapable assignment had to be ac

complished before the lab could stand up in October.

General Paul’s announcement officially ended the work o

the Technology Directorate Task Group. However, he electe

to keep Dr. Barthelemy and Colonel Hill on board for severa

more months because of the great amount of unfinished busi

ness, particularly in the area of personnel. Someone needed t

identify and review all civilian and military positions in the old

lab to determine slot assignments in each of the new tech

directorates on AFRL’s new unit-manning document. Pau

counted on Barthelemy and Hill to tackle this extremely de

tailed and labor-intensive process of looking at over six thou 

sand positions; he had to make sure that every slot trans

ferred to the right directorate, division, or branch to ensur

that no organization lost positions in the process and tha

everyone kept his or her job. Although everyone would stil

have a job in October, review of the current unit-mannin

documents included the identification of vacancies and fille

positions tagged for possible elimination as part of phase IIB’

downsizing plan. Barthelemy and Hill were well suited for thi

huge job, having gained valuable hands-on experience an

having developed personal contacts labwide while working on

the task group. They would depend on those contacts to help

them work the difficult unit-manning-document issues.5 0

Before the assignment of specific positions, new divisions an

branches had to be defined and established in each of th e new

182
directorates. Some of the initial proposals for the organization

of divisions and branches had already emerged as part of th

options briefed at the second Corporate Board meeting. T

keep this process moving forward, Barthelemy and Hil

worked closely with the current lab commanders and thei

staffs, tech directors, division and branch chiefs, personne

officials, and others. They would continue this work with th

new tech directors, selected in the summer of 1997.5 1

Selection of the tech directors was extremely important be

cause those individuals would lead an untested laborator

organization into the next century. This called for a fair

minded selection process to ensure that only the most quali

fied people ended up in the most influential and powerfu

positions in the lab. A strong proponent of shared leadership

General Paul wanted the proportion of military and civilian

tech directors to reflect the composition of the lab’s workforce

The current leadership consisted of three military command

ers and one civilian director, despite the fact that civilian

employees outnumbered military by roughly three to one. Pau

realized that with the movement to a single lab, he had 

once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to readjust the ratio of militar

and civilians occupying key leadership positions.5 2

Placing more civilians in positions of high authority tradi

tionally reserved for senior-grade officers seemed a radica

departure from the current lab-management system. In fact, 

number of colonels in the four labs viewed this change as th

first round of reducing the military presence in the labs. The

worried that this would reduce the chances of senior officer

in the science and engineering career fields to realistically

compete for promotion to general officer. But General Paul did

not see it that way, believing that the new lab would suppor

about the same number of full colonels (and other militar

grades) as the old lab structure. Although the overall number o

military and civilians had declined as a result of recent person 

nel cutbacks, the proportion of the military/civilian mix ha

remained the same. Therefore, he favored moving in a new direc

tion, anticipating a gradual policy shift toward placing a highe

percentage of civilians in key leadership positions. For example

AFMC had implemented a plan to replace one of the thre

existing lab military commanders with a civilian SES , which

183
would change the ratio to 50/50. Although the new ratio stil

would not reflect the true workforce population, at least i

would be a step in the right direction.5 3

Paul had to wrestle with another problem associated with

placing military members in positions of high authority in th

lab. If he appointed a colonel as a tech director, then hi

long-term plan called for appointing an SES as the deputy o

that directorate. However, the Air Force Executive Resource

Board (ERB), the authority for approving all SES assignments

had a policy stating that an SES could not work for a colone

because it considered an SES the equivalent of a general offi

cer. The only way around this prohibition entailed requestin

an exception from the board. Indeed, when Paul commande

Wright Laboratory as a colonel from July 1988 to July 1992

he had several SESes reporting to him. General Paul planne

to request exceptions to ERB’s policy on a case-by-case basis

but until then, he had to proceed with the assignment of ke

leadership positions. Thus, until otherwise notified, he would

have to appoint a GS-15 rather than an SES to serve as th

deputy of any tech directorate led by a colonel.5 4

Another factor complicating the filling of the new position

was the availability of only 10 director slots. If three wer

reser ved for senior military officers, then only seven were open

to civilians. Since 22 individuals had SES jobs—mostly tech

directors and a few senior staff slots—what would become o

the ones not selected to fill the director vacancies? Some o

them might need to move down a step in the organizationa

chain to become division chiefs while retaining their SES

ranking—with an attendant loss of prestige and authority

The long-range plan envisioned that over the next few year

some SESes would retire or move to other jobs in other or

ganizations, after which their positions wou ld be droppe

from the unit-manning document. Eventually, under the new

lab, SES jobs would be assigned only to tech directors, th

AFRL executive director, and about five other key staff posi

tions, including the director of XP and the chief scientist.

5 5

As a first step, General Paul instructed Dr. Daniel and Dr

Barthelemy to prepare separate lists of possible candidate

for the tech director positions. Paul solicited Barthelemy’s in

put beca use, as leader of the task group, he had worked with

184
observed, and judged most of the tech leaders in the lab al

most daily over the last three months. In developing his list

Barthelemy could not consult with any member of the tas

group. The process—a sensitive matter involving personali

ties and career progression—would remain private and no

subject to democratic vote, with input restricted to only a few

senior people designated by General Paul. The general knew

that the final decisio n would be his—and his alone—as com 

mander of the new lab. Although Barthelemy received no com

ment on his nominations, 90 percent of Paul’s final selection

were names on his list.

5 6

Despite Barthelemy’s contribution, Dr. Daniel, deputy d

rector of AFMC/ST, played a more active and influential role

in terms of working directly with General Paul on the selec 

tion process. Because of the sensitive political nature of thi

exercise, for the most part, Daniel worked alone and sough

little advice in preparing his list. He did, however, consul

with Colonel Markisello from time to time and talked with 

few prospective candidates one-on-one, as needed. Although

purposely treating the list as a private, close-hold item

Daniel remained open-minded in evaluating candidates: “

took all the SESes and said I am going to go through thi

with an unconstrained attitude. I would write down ever

position where I thought Sally, Joe, or Larry could go. And i

I had to write Sally down 14 times, I would write down 1

times every place where I thought Sally, Joe, or Larry could

be placed. Then I went back, looked at the jobs, and made 

list of the top three who could do that job.” 5 7

After making a first cut, Daniel met with General Paul on

numerous occasions to discuss the technical and leadership

qualifications of each candidate, investing a significan

amount of time going over the top three candidates for each

position. To get a better feel for a particular SES’s futur

plans, Daniel would meet with that person. If, for instance

he learned that the candidate planned to retire in the nea

future, then he plugged that piece of information into th

final selection process. If some were leading candidates fo

more than one tech director job, Daniel and Paul discusse

their qualifications at length, wanting to make sure the

185
selected the right person who would best serve the entir

laboratory. 5 8

Finalizing the selection of the new tech directors turne

out to be a very time-consuming procedure, primarily be

cause the appointment of each SES tech director require

approval from the AFMC commander and the ERB. Accord

ing to Dr. Daniel, “SES assignments have to go all the wa

to the undersecretary of the Air Force. It is a very forma

process. We don’t have the authority. Gen [George T.] Bab

bitt [AFMC commander] doesn’t have the authority to reas

sign SESes. He can propose . . . but can’t give the fina

approval. So we put a list together, briefed it to General Pau

and got his buy-in—briefed it to General Babbitt and got hi

buy-in. Then I personally took it to the Air Force Executive

Administration Board, briefed Darleen Druyu n—got her buy

in, and the undersecretary approved it.”5 9

During the second week of June, General Paul posted 

message on his web site informing people of the progress o

the selection of the new lab leaders and explaining that h

was in the “final phases of proposing a set of provisiona

leaders to AFMC/ CC.” The list consisted of his choices fo

tech directors and the two key staff directors (i.e., XP and th

DS directorates). Paul planned to release the names of all th

“provisional” directors once General Babbitt approved the list

Final approval would not come until after the ERB gave it

blessing concerning assignment locations. In the meantime

Paul became somewhat impatient, not wanting to prolon

passing on to everyone the identity of the new directors

which he considered vital information. The sooner the better wa 

Paul’s philosophy because of the number of practical consid era

tions at stake. Most importantly, he wanted the new leader

identified so they could “begin working the details of the or

ganizations, which they will end up leading.” Paul also wa

anxious to get things moving since the scheduled AFRL stand

up was less than four months away. During that time, h

wanted the new directors working vigorously with people at al

levels to solve some very difficult and labor-intensive organiza 

tional prob lems—particularly, determining the number of divi

sions and branches and the assignments of each individual in

the new laboratory. 6 0

186
Although Paul had hoped to name all the new tech director

in one announcement, that never transpired because of th 

inevitable tangle of rigid procedural rules and regulation

im posed by a government system that seemed to move an

personnel action at a snail’s pace. However, timeliness was an

extremely valuable commodity to Paul and the more than five

hundred other individuals working the formation of the new

lab. Consequently, in August (by that time, General Babbit

had given his approval, but ERB had not issued final ap

proval of all the nominees) he cou ld not wait any longer an

decided to share the names of all the “approved” tech direc

tors. He would announce the other directors—the ones he la 

belled “to be determined” (TBD)—after the personnel system

had approved them.6 1

In the third week of August, less than two months befor

the planned stand-up, Paul announced the names of th

eight SESes and two colonels he had selected as new tech

directors (table 10). Although this proportion did not reflec

Table 10

First Directors, Deputies, and Chief Scientists of AFRL

Directorate/Symbol Director Deputy Director Chief Scientist

Air Vehicles/VA TBD (colonel) Mr. Terry Neighbor Dr. Don Paul (ST)

(DR-4)

Space Vehicles/VS Ms. Christine Col Bruce Thieman Dr. Janet Fender (ST)

Anderson (SES)

Information/IF Mr. Ray Urtz (SES) TBD (colonel) Mr. John Granier (ST)

Munitioins/MN Col Bob Wood Mr. Steve Korn Dr. Bob Sierakowski

(DR-4) (ST-IPA)

Directed Energy/DE Dr. Earl Good (SES) TBD (colonel) Dr. Barry Hogge (ST)

Materials and Dr. Vince Russo Col Don Kitchen Dr. Wade Adams (ST)

Manufacturing/ML (SES)

Sensors/SN Mr. Les McFawn Col Gerry O'Conner Dr. Don Bodnar

(SES) (ST-IPA)

Propulsion/PR Dr. Tom Curran Col John Rogacki Dr. Alan Garscadden

(SES) (ST)

Human Effectiveness/HE Mr. Jim Brinkley TBD (colonel) Dr. Ken Boff (ST)

(SES)

AFOSR Dr. Joe Janni (SES) Col Bob Herklotz N/A

Source: Message, General Paul's web site, subject: Key Leaders for the AFRL Phase II Organization;

on-lline, Internet, 22 August 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

187
Mr. Terry Neighbor

(Air Vehicles [acting])

Ms. Christine Anderson

(Space Vehicles)

Col Bob Wood

(Munitions)

Dr. Vince Russo

(Materials and

Manufacturing)

Dr. Earl Good

(Directed Energy)

Mr. Les McFawn

(Sensors)

Dr. Tom Curran

(Propulsion)

Dr. Joseph Janni

(AFOSR)

Mr. Jim Brinkley

(Human Effectiveness)

Mr. Ray Urtz

(Information)

188
the desired 70/30 percent civilian/military mix, Paul intende

to achieve that ratio shortly after stand-up (this occurred in

the spring of 1998, when Dr. Tom Curran retired and Colone

Rogacki took over as the new Propulsion director and when

Col Bob Wood moved from director of Munitions to director o

Air Vehicles, Col Gerry Daugherty replacing him as Munition

director). 6 2

Since General Paul’s announcement placed only eight SESe 

in key jobs as tech directors, he released the names of 1

other SESes he had assigned to top-level positions, three o

whom became associate directors to Space Vehicles , Material

and Manufacturing, and Sensors. His long-range plan calle

for keeping these slots until a person went to another job o

retired, at which time the SES position would go away. Fo

instance, when Dr. Hal Roth, associate director of Space Ve

hicles, retired a year after the stand-up of the lab, Genera

Paul did not hire a new SES to take his place. Four othe

SESes who headed up four basic research-science discipline

at AFOSR brought the total to 15 SESes working in the 1

tech directorates.

6 3

The remaining six SESes belonged to Paul’s comman

section and central staff. Appointed as the new lab’s execu 

tive director, Dr. Daniel retained his SES position in th

command section. The lab’s chief scientist slot was als

reserved for an SES. At the senior-staff level, the directors o

XP; Corporate Information; and the Washington, D.C., of

fice, as well as the associate director for investment strateg

all became SES positions. So by August, General Paul ha

succeeded in justifying and placing 21 of 22 SESes in per

manent positions in the new laboratory structure. Thes

strong-minded and experienced individuals would assum

responsibility for leading a major thrust over the next tw

months to prepare for the stand-up of the new lab. In th

end, their efforts resulted in radically changing the cumber

some organizational configuration of the old four-lab struc

ture to a more streamlined and efficient single laboratory

They did so by consolidating similar or related technologie

into fewer labs, directorates, divisions, branches, and plan 

ning staffs (table 11). 6 4

189
Notes

1. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998 an

22 November 1999; and Dr. Robert R. Barthelemy, interviewed by author

28 January 2000.

2. Dr. Vince Russo, interviewed by author, 4 February 1998.

3. Ibid.; and Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

4. Paul interview, 2 March 1998; and USAF biography, “Dr. Robert R. Bar

thelemy,” Aeronautical Systems Center Public Affairs Office, Wright-Patterso

AFB, Ohio, March 1993.

5. Paul interview, 2 March 1998; and Russo interview.

6. Dr. Robert R. Barthelemy, interviewed by author, 6 February 1998; an

message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Midcourse Heading Check; on-line

Internet, 24 March 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS

labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

7. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; and Paul message, 24 Marc

1997.

8. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; Paul message 24 March 1997

and Ms. Christine Anderson, director, Space Vehicles Directorate, interviewe

by author, 18 March 1998.

9. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; Paul message, 24 March 1997

Anderson interview; and Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

10. Dr. Robert R. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Tas

Group to the Science and Technology Corporate Board,” 21 March 1997.

11. Dr. Robert R. Barthelemy to Technology Directorate Committe

members, letter, subject: Technology Group Meeting, 20 February 1997

and Col Ron Hill to Technology Group members, E-mail, subject: Techno

ogy Directorate Committee Members, 19 February 1997.

Table 11

Air Force Research Laboratory: Before and After

Before Organization Element After

4 Labs 1

22 Directorates 9

115 Divisions 50

351 Branches 192

5 Planning Staffs 1

AFRL is more efficient and more focused.

Source: Briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Research Laboratory: Overview Briefing to

Industry, February 1998.

190
12. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; and message, General Paul

web site, subject: 20–22 March Corporate Board Meeting; on-line, Internet, 2

March 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single

lab/updates.htm. 

13. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998.

14. Ibid.; and Paul interview, 22 November 1999.

15. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; and Anderson interview.

16. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; and Anderson interview.

17. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to SMC/CC, letter, subject: Single Air Forc

Laboratory, 12 February 1997.

18. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Paul letter; Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000

and briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Research Labora 

tory: Heading Check, 29 April 1997.

19. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Paul letter; Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000

and Paul briefing.

20. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Paul letter; Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000

and Paul briefing

21. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Paul letter; Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000

Paul briefing; Col John Rogacki, interviewed by author, 9 June 1998; Dr

Tom Curran, interviewed by author, 4 March 1998; Anderson interview

Edward T. Curran, director, Aero Propulsion and Power Directorate, mem

randum to Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: A Status Report, 5 Jun

1997; and Fred Oliver, WL/POM, memorandum to Dr. Garscadden, WL/CA

subject: Your Friday Briefing, 3 April 1997, with attached briefing, “AFRL’

Aerospace Propulsion and Power Directorate.”

22. Anderson interview; Dr. Keith Richey, interviewed by author, 5 Feb

ruary 1998; and Rogacki interview.

23. Anderson interview; Barthelemy interview, 28 January 2000; an

Joe Sciabica, memorandum to Col Ron Hill, subject: Space Flight Director

ate, 17 March 1997.

24. Anderson interview; Barthelemy interview, 28 January 2000; an

Sciabica memorandum.

25. Anderson interview.

26. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; and Maj Gen Richard R

Paul to author, E-mail, subject: Answers to Your Questions, 23 Marc

1998.

27. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; Paul E-mail; Les McFawn

interviewed by author, 30 July 1998; and Les McFawn, briefing char

“Sensors Directorate,” 15 July 1998.

28. Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000

Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”; message

191
General Paul

s web site, subject: AFRL Progress Report—Directorates an

More; on-line, Internet, 14 May 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af

mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; and Paul briefing.

29. Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000; Pau

messages, 20 and 24 March 1997; message, General Paul’s web site, subjec

AFRL Phase II: A Decision Process Flowchart; on-line, Internet, 25 April 1997

available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/up

dates.htm; and Don Bodnar, RL/CA, “Report of the Subcommittee on Reducin

Overlaps between Rome Laboratory and Wright Laboratory/Avionics Director

ate,” 13 March 1997.

30. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

and Barthelemy interview, 28 January 2000.

31. Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000; Pau

messages, 20 March and 25 April 1997.

32. Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000; Pau

messages, 20 March and 25 April 1997; and Barthelemy, “Report of th

Technology Directorates Task Group.”

33. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000; Russo inter

view; and Paul briefing.

34. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000; Russo inter

view; and Paul briefing.

35. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000; Russo inter

view; Paul briefing; Paul message, 24 March 1997; and Maj Gen Richard R

Paul to author, E-mail, subject: AFRL History Project, 16 March 1998.

36. Barthelemy, “Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”

Barthelemy interviews, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000; Russo inter

view; Paul briefing; Paul messages, 24 March and 25 April 1997; and Pau

E-mail, 16 March 1998.

37. Dr. Robert R. Barthelemy, spreadsheet, “AFRL Structure,” 23 Apri

1997; Barthelemy interview, 28 January 2000; and McFawn interview.

38. Barthelemy spreadsheet; and Barthelemy interviews, 6 Februar

1998 and 28 January 2000.

39. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, notes, subject: Lab Reorganization, 2

April 2000.

40. Ibid.

41. Paul interview.

42. Ibid.

43. Paul message, 14 May 1997; message, General Paul’s web site, subjec

AFRL Phase II Status; on-line, Internet, 31 July 1997, available from

http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; Barthelemy

“Report of the Technology Directorates Task Group”; Paul interviews, 2 Marc

1998 and 22 November 1999; and Paul briefing.

44. Paul message, 31 July 1997.

192
45. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to author, E-mail, subject: Conversion Matri

of Four Lab Directorates to AFRL Directorates, 2 February 2000; message

General Paul’s web site, subject: The AFRL Corporate Information Office; on

line, Internet, 7 May 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS

labs/single-lab/updates.htm; and Paul briefing.

46. Briefing chart, “AFRL Locations,” n.d.

47. Dr. Vince Russo, memorandum to AFRL Corporate Board, subjec

Charts from 12–13 May Off-Site, 27 May 1997, with attached Air Forc

Research Laboratory Strategic Plan, May 1997.

48. Dr. Vince Russo, working paper, “Air Force Research Laboratory

Strategic Objectives” [May 1997].

49. Russo memorandum; and Paul message, 14 May 1997.

50. Barthelemy interview, 28 January 2000.

51. Ibid.; and message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Key Leaders fo

the AFRL Phase II Organization; on-line, Internet, 22 August 1997, avai

able from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

52. Vannevar Bush, science advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt dur

ing World War II, was a strong proponent of the shared-leadership concep

Over 50 years ago, he advocated assigning civilians to key leadership pos

tions in the military services as one of the most efficient ways to advanc

S&T. See G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer o

the American Century (New York: Free Press, 1997); Paul interview, 2 Marc

1998; and Dr. Don Daniel, interviewed by author, 27 July 1998.

53. Colonel Rogacki, a senior military leader in the lab system, agree

with General Paul that promotion opportunities under the new lab woul

not be diminished. Other colonels assigned to the lab, such as Robert A

Duryea and William G. Heckathorn, disagreed. Paul interview, 2 Marc

1998; Rogacki interview; and Russo interview.

54. Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

55. Ibid.; Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; and Daniel interview.

56. Barthelemy interview, 6 February 1998; and Daniel interview.

57. Daniel interview; Col Dennis Markisello, interviewed by author, 6 Feb

ruary 1998; and Ms. Wendy Campbell, interviewed by author, 11 June 1998.

58. Daniel interview.

59. Ibid.

60. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Status Report; on-line, In 

ternet, 12 June 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs

single-lab/updates.htm; and Dr. Don Daniel to Dr. Earl Good et al., E-mai

subject: AFRL Senior Executive Assignments, 23 June 1997.

61. Paul message, 12 June 1997; and Daniel E-mail.

62. Paul messages, 12 June and 22 August 1997; and Daniel E-mail.

63. Paul message, 22 August 1997; Capt Chuck Helwig, interviewed b

author, 3 February 1997; and Campbell interview.

64. Paul interview, 2 March 1998; Daniel interview; and briefing, Ma

Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Research Laboratory: Overvie

Briefing to Industry, February 1998.

193
Chapter 11

Getting the Message Out

In the third week of January 1997, in compliance with AF

38-101, Air Force Organization, General Paul sent an organiza 

tion change request (OCR) proposing the creation of a singl

Air Force laboratory to Maj Gen Michael C. Kostelnik , directo

of plans at Headquarters AFMC. In turn, Kostelnik submitte

the OCR package to the Air Staff at Headquarters Air Force on

3 February, explaining in his cover letter that the OCR repre

sented AFMC’s response to “the goals of the congressionally

mandated Vision 21 initiative” and section 277 of the Nationa

Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 to reduce infrastruc

ture costs. The benefits of moving to a single lab, he pointe

out, included a more streamlined operation with less over

head, a reduction in duplication of similar technologies a

multiple laboratory sites, and one commander accountable fo

all facets of the consolidated laboratory. To keep the phase 

implementation on schedule, he requested that Headquarter

Air Force approve the OCR by 15 March. If all went accordin

to plan, he intended the lab to stand up by the end of March. 1

Phase I Stand-Up of the Laboratory

A number of salient points in the OCR very specificall

identified the changes necessary to establish the singl

lab—most obviously, the consolidation of the four current lab

and AFOSR into a single lab. The name of the new lab would

be the Air Force Research Laboratory, which accurately an

concisely reflected the mission of the organization and fit in

with the names of its counterparts in the Army and Navy—th

Army Research Laboratory and the Naval Research Labora

tory. The term Research differentiated it from the Air Forc

battle labs, which focused on tactics and technology insertion

as opposed to AFRL’s mission of developing and demonstratin

new technologies. The name Air Force Research and Develop

ment Laboratory, favored earlier by some parties, was discarde

195
because AFMC

s product centers—not the labs—performe

the development function for weapon systems.2

According to the OCR, the mission of the new lab entaile

providing “the science and technology required to enable th

US Air Force to defend the United States through control an

exploitation of air and space.” This new mission statemen

replacing the statements of the four labs and AFOSR, would

become effective at the stand-up of the interim lab in April

which would mark the end of the phase I implementation

process. Each of the 10 new tech directorates would formulat

its own mission statement.

3

At the end of March, AFMC received an approval letter from

the Directorate of Manpower, Organization, and Quality a

Headquarters Air Force, stating that AFRL “is constitute

[and] assigned [to AFMC] effective 31 March.” As an approve

organization and recognized as a legitimate Air Force unit b

the secretary of the Air Force, AFRL would activate “on o

about” 16 April. However, General Viccellio, in keeping with

his policy of pressing on with the lab consolidation, had n

intention of waiting until then to set up the new lab. The da

after he received notification of approval, Viccellio directed Co

Jacob Kessel, chief of manpower and organization at AFMC, t

issue Special Order GA-9 , activating AFRL effective 8 Apr

1997. This occurred without delay, marking the official end o

the first phase of the implementation.4

Very little fanfare accompanied the establishment of th

new lab on 8 April because of the temporary nature of thi

measure, designed to keep the process on track. Over the nex

six months, many lab-implementation issues would requir

study, work, and resolution before the “end state” single la

would stand up in October. By that time, all the new tech

directorates would have been identified and assigned as spe

cific detachments to AFRL. Nevertheless, the interim stand-u

remained important because it represented the first tangibl

evidence that the new lab would become a reality. To com

memorate this event, a short, modest ceremony took place on

8 April at the AFMC Spring Commander’s Conference held a

Wright-Patterson , with General Viccellio reading the order

activating the single lab and unveiling the proposed new AFRL

emblem (see below). General Paul then gave a short briefing t

196
all the AFMC commanders, recounting the events leading u

to the stand-up and promising a much bigger ceremony fo

phase II in the fall. At that time, more people would have an

opportunity to participate and recognize the rich heritage o

the four labs as AFRL leaders ushered in the dawn of a new

S&T era anchored by the newly established laboratory. 5

The April stand-up produced some very immediate an

practical changes. Firstly, although the four labs would stil

exist as named units until the completion of phase II in Octo

ber, the lab commanders would now report to the commande

of AFRL—General Paul—instead of the commanders of th

AFMC product centers (Aeronautical Systems Center, Elec

tronic Systems Center, Human Systems Center, and Spac

and Missile Systems Center ). The four lab commander

wou ld continue to perform their duties as commanders an

would simultaneously serve as AFRL product executives. A

for General Paul, not only would he serve as AFRL com 

mander, he would also become the Air Force’s technology ex

ecutive officer reporting to the service acquisition executive on

investment and programmatic matters, as well as become di

rector of Science and Technology at Headquarters AFMC. A

of these leadership changes served to centralize the span o

control of the new laboratory under one commander, makin

for a more effective and efficient organization. This was espe

cially true as regards personnel matters, since the lab’s lead

ership could now speak in one voice to determine the bes

course of action for reaching the mandatory personnel reduc

tions planned for the next few years.6

Secondly, as of 8 April, the OCR approval letter instructe

AFRL to transfer all personnel (a total of 7,075 military an

civilian positions) from the four labs and AFOSR to a new

AFRL unit-manning document. No longer would the laborato

ries’ manpower be assigned to the product centers’ mannin

documents. Ninety-three positions would transfer to the new

document from General Paul’s Science and Technology Direc

torate ; 144 from AFOSR; 1,739 from Phillips Lab; 1,505 from

Armstrong Lab; 2,547 from Wright Lab; and 1,047 from Rom

Lab. Every one of these positions had to be matched against 

position authorized on the new unit-manning document prio

to the stand-up in October, an extremely time-consuming an

197
taxing exercise that resembled trying to put together a 7,075

piece jigsaw puzzle. Moreover, the change in the new lab’

organizational structure would prevent a one-to-one corre

spondence in the shifting of jobs from the old unit-mannin

document to the new one. Some jobs would assume more o

fewer duties, entailing changes in job descriptions and placin

them in appropriate slots on the new document.7

Thirdly, the OCR approval also involved restructuring th

staff of the new lab headquarters, with the new comman

section consisting of the commander and executive director

Key components of the commander’s staff would include th

chief scientist, the four product executives , and the director

of Plans and Programs (AFRL/XP) and Operations and Sup

port (AFRL/DS). Under this arrangement to centralize overal

planning activities and establish an immediate integrate

planning function to facilitate the transition to phase II, th

four labs’ XP offices were directed to report to AFRL/XP. Th

new staff organization would have to submit the phase II OCR

to Headquarters Air Force at least 60 days prior to the imple

mentation date of October 1997. As it turned out, building th

phase II OCR became an all-consuming effort that did not se

completion until early August.8

Looking back, it is rather remarkable that what started as 

fragmentary strategic concept in the minds of a few people in

January 1997 turned into reality a short three months late

with the interim stand-up of the single laboratory. This majo

event symbolized a radical and fundamental change within

the Air Force in terms of how it planned to conduct its S&

business in the future. To bolster its S&T mission, Genera

Paul thought it very important to craft a distinctive emblem

that would promote and identify what the laboratory stood for

Just as the “swoosh” check gives instant recognition to Nik

products, a creative AFRL emblem would convey a comparabl

message to any audience, underscoring the importance of th

S&T mission throughout the Air Force and DOD.

9

Since the unit emblem would represent the totality of th

new laboratory, Paul decided to “go to the troops” to solici

their ideas. In February 1997, he sent a letter to the workforc

encouraging everyone to submit a heraldry design that would

best exemplify the new lab. In a pleasantly surprising response

198
workers from the four labs, AFOSR, and AFMC/ST turned in

45 full-color entries. General Paul, Dr. Daniel, and Dr. Russ

reviewed and evaluated each entry, narrowing the field t

eight emblem designs. Paul declared that the “very good” sub

missions made it quite difficult for him to select a winner. Bu

on 24 March, he opted for a synthesis of two different design

proposed by the team of Mr. Rogelio Burgos and 1st Lt William

Sabol from Phillips Lab’s Propulsion Directorate and Maj Dav

Swinney from Headquarters AFMC/ST (fig. 19). The combina

tion of these two designs received high marks because th

final emblem took into account three fundamental concepts

the origins of the unified lab, a broad range of missions, an

the clear implication of the new lab’s focus on the future. 1 0

The simplicity of the new

emblem made it very attractive and appealing. On the

left side, five stars arranged

vertically serve as a prominent reminder of AFRL’s

origins. Four of these stars

honor the heritage of the

four former laboratories—

Phillips, Rome, Wright, and

Armstrong—and the fifth represents AFOSR. The bright,

guiding star in the upper

right signifies the lab’s constant striving to achieve greatness. At the center of the

shie ld, a three-dimensional

triangle traveling to new

heights “represents a marriage of aircraft, missile, and space

craft.” The Institute of Heraldry officially described the three

dimensional craft as “silver and white in color to give th

impression of quick flight and straightforward in design t

highlight the constant and steady advances enabled by ou

research and development. The craft is pointing to the heav

ens as it rolls back the night. Thus, through research an

development, the light of understanding replaces the darknes

of ignorance.”1 1

Figure 19. AFRL Emblem

199
Pleased that the new emblem dignified the heritage, spirit

and mission of AFRL, General Paul on 23 April sent a lette

requesting approval to General Viccellio, who quickly con

curred. Two weeks later, the Air Force Historical Research

Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, advised General Paul tha

the emblem met the requirements of AFI 84-101, Historica

Products, Services, and Requirements, which governs heritag

guidelines and requirements for all Air Force units. After th

chief of staff of the Air Force gave his approval, an artist at th

Institute of Heraldry at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, completed th

design and artwork of the official AFRL emblem in fiv

months. The original drawing and a final letter of approva

authenticating the emblem was then sent to the Air Forc

Historical Research Agency for permanent retention and safe

keeping. AFRL received a copy of the original drawing to serv

as the template for making unit flags and any other reproduc

tions of the emblem (i.e., unit patches, decals, signs, an

other emblem facsimiles). Prior to approval, no one could offi

cially use the emblem because of the possibility that som

minor changes might have to be made during the final design

process. As it turned out, that never became a problem. Th

final, official emblem released in the fall of 1997 was an exac

replica of the one submitted by AFRL in the spring. 1 2

Road Shows

After General Paul received approval from the secretary o

the Air Force in November 1996 to proceed with the formation

of the single lab, one of his top priorities was to devise an

effective and timely way to keep the troops informed abou

progress toward that goal. Such a dramatic change in th

organization would certainly bring with it a reasonable degre

of anxiety and trauma to the lab’s large workforce. On the on

hand, Paul wanted to reassure people that the creation of th

new lab did not pose a threat to their jobs, at least in the nea

term. On the other hand, he did not try to hide the fact tha

over the next few years as part of phase IIB, personnel cut

would occur in the support areas (but not for line re

searchers). He was up front about this, realizing that cut

200
would come as part of DOD

s overall downsizing, regardless o

whether the new lab stood up or not. However, he also rea

ized that he could give up vacant positions from the four lab

unit-manning documents and not transfer them to the new

AFRL document. Retirements, offers of early outs, and individ 

ual job changes to other organizations would also help reach

the reduction quota by FY 2001.1 3

Paul also strongly believed in keeping workers informed a

events unfolded rather than confirming an event after it hap

pened. Consequently, he wanted to put together some sort o

matter-of-fact communications system to give everyone an op 

portunity to ask questions and receive accurate and up-to

date information on all aspects of the lab reorganization

Above all, employees needed to hear these progress report

directly from the commander—the one person who could bes

convey a high degree of credibility on a wide variety of la

topics. One of the fundamental principles of command en

tailed communicating up and down the chain in an honest

timely, and effective manner. Furthermore, because sharin

information on a regular basis greatly affected unit morale, i

was one of the most important jobs of any leader who de

pended on his line troops to accomplish the mission. 1 4

General Paul took a two-pronged approach to sharing wh

and how events evolved as they did during the implementation

of the laboratory. As mentioned earlier, one of his first meth

ods involved the use of modern technology—setting up a we

site—to get the word out quickly and effectively. For the mos

part, the web site proved very useful because (1) the com

mander himself wrote messages furnishing timely and truthfu

information to lab employees spread out from one end of th

country to the other and (2) every worker who accessed th

site could send questions electronically to the commander

who promised to answer via E-mail. 1 5

Certainly, the web site was a valuable source of factua

information, but it had one unavoidable drawback, typical o

the age of computers—impersonality. Rather than abandon

his electronic information center, Paul decided to complemen

it with what he referred to as road shows—personal visits t

each lab, where he would tell people face-to-face exactly wha

was going on with the lab reorganization. Determined to kee

201
the lab-restructuring process open, he placed a message on

his web site explaining the purpose of the road-show brief

ings: “I believe it is important that you hear the words that g

with these charts [on lab restructuring] from me. Addition 

ally, I want to hear from you.” Indeed, many lab employee

had never seen the commander and would not have recog

nized him in a crowd of three. Geographic separation and 

horrendous work schedule that tied him to Wright-Patterson

and Washington, D.C., denied Paul sufficient opportunity t

interact regularly with the troops at all levels. Even when h

did visit lab sites around the country, he spent most of hi

time with lab commanders, directors, and other high-leve

officials who always had the most pressing issues to discus

with him. This left little time, if any, to meet with middle

management, junior officers, and enlisted troops—a situation

he wanted to correct. Paul therefore made a New Year’s reso

lution to use his road shows to visit all lab sites during th

first few months of 1997. 1 6

The general made good on his promise, and the road show

paid big dividends to him as well as to lab workers. In Febru 

ary he went to Armstrong Laboratory in San Antonio, followin

that visit with eight other stops, the last of which took him t

Phillips Laboratory at the end of March (table 12). Despite th

similarity of the road-show presentations, Paul tailored hi

briefings to address issues pertaining only to particular sites

Before he left Dayton, he instructed members of his transition

staff to solicit questions from employees at the upcoming site

which gave them time to research and obtain answers before

hand. Thus, Paul could provide the most complete information

possible and avoid the usual military school response of “I’l

get back to you on that.”1 7

Consisting of four major parts, a typical road-show briefin

provided what Paul referred to as “big-picture highlights” o

the status of the new lab. He usually led off with severa

charts that explained the reasons for establishing a single la

by pointing out the combination of influences at work—princi

pally, the congressionally driven Authorization Act of FY 199

and Vision 21, which called for consolidating labs as much a

possible to reduce overhead and infrastructure. This back 

ground information also addressed defense planning guidanc

202
that required a 35 percent manpower reduction over the nex

few years, all done to reduce costs, streamline the laborator

acquisition system, and eliminate technology seams. Pau

pointed out to all employees at each site the inefficiency o

this loose distribution of technologies and the need to estab

lish a more centralized organization that could better contro

and focus all technology efforts. 1 8

Secondly, General Paul talked about the phased implemen

tation schedule, emphasizing phase I events (approving th

OCR, reassigning the four labs from the product centers t

AFRL, etc.) leading to the interim stand-up of the lab in April

He also described that phase’s game plan of weighing recom

mendations from 13 task groups and then using that informa

tion to make decisions on the final structural setup of the new

lab. That also played an important role in phase IIA (alon

with creating a new unit-manning document, selecting tech

directors, etc.), requiring implementation before the fina

stand-up in October. Thirdly, Paul focused on the transition

process, which identified the transition team and variou

tech-group leaders, as well as their responsibilities to an

Table 12

Road-Show Schedule

Date (1997) Research Site

13 February Armstrong Laboratory

3 March Wright Laboratory/Armstrong

Laboratory (local)

7 March AFOSR

13 March Hanscom (RL/ER and PL/GP)

14 March Rome Laboratory

21 March Wright Laboratory/Munitions

(Eglin AFB)

21 March Armstrong Laboratory/EQ

(Tyndall AFB)

27–28 March Phillips Laboratory (Kirtland AFB)

and PL/RK (Edwards AFB)

203
interactions with the Corporate Board .

1 9 Fourthly, Genera

Paul then looked several months ahead, detailing the overal

plan for phase IIA (the first set of road-show briefings took

place over two months and prior to the start of phase IIA).

At these road shows, Paul always passed on new informa

tion as it became available and always set aside sufficient tim

to answer questions—the latter representing, in many ways

the most satisfying part of the entire briefing. This face-to-fac

forum gave all employees an opportunity to ask the one per

son at the top some very pointed questions and allowed them

to vent frustrations brought on by the uncertainty of the new

lab’s future. But after seeing and hearing General Paul explain

firsthand all the positive attributes of the new lab and giv

straightforward answers to their questions, workers at all lev

els gained a renewed sense of optimism about the system. Th

general’s calm demeanor, as well as his sincere, candid an

swers to tough questions, relieved a great deal of stress an

tension that existed prior to his visit. Although some employ

ees continued to complain and resist change, most of them

appreciated the commander’s determined effort to bring th

story to them. 2 0

As an additional benefit of the road shows , Vince Russo

who accompanied General Paul, drew on his expertise as lab

transition director to pass on detailed planning information t

the senior leadership at each site. These very productive meet

ings also allowed the site leadership to tell Paul about specifi

lab-restructuring issues that affected their directorate. Pau

treated these encounters as good listening sessions in which

he could obtain a different slant from the field on a wide rang

of issues and suggestions for possible integration into phas

IIA. Most such conversations concerned options pursued b

the various task groups, which would play a key role in deter

mining the precise structure of the new lab. 2 1

Generally, these get-togethers followed an informal, no

holds-barred format to encourage participants to say exactly

what they thought. For the most part, Paul valued the objec

tivity of the feedback he received from employees at the vari

ous research sites and acknowledged that it positively affecte

his thinking on how the new lab organization should proceed

For example, members of Phillips Lab’s Propulsion Directorat

204
at Edwards AFB passed on to him some 

very, very stron

feelings” about propulsion becoming a separate directorat

under the new lab. Paul took this type of information bac

with him to Wright-Patterson to think about and share with

the Technology Task Group and Corporate Board before mak

ing final decisions. In this case, after weighing all the pros an

cons, he agreed with the propulsion people at Edwards, usin

their information, along with other data, to help him decide t

set up a separate Propulsion Directorate as an integral part o

the new laboratory organization.2 2

Most observers credited the success of the road shows t

the free exchange of information that took place between th

commander and the workforce at each research site. Pau

promised that a second round of road shows would

start—probably in the summer (although this did not occu

until after the October stand-up)—as soon as he and his staf

had “hammered out the details of the Phase II AFRL organiza 

tion.” But these briefings represented only one of many impor

tant sources of suggestions for putting the new lab together

For example, the 13 internal task groups set up by Russo’

transition team as well as the Grassroots Review Board als

flooded him with opinions. Additionally, the IAB and yet an

other review body, the Lab Alumni group (referred to as th

Graybeards), furnished Paul with an outsider’s view on how

the lab should change its ways.2 3

Notes

1. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to Headquarters AFMC/XP, letter, subjec

Organization Change Request Package, 19 January 1997, with attache

OCR; and Maj Gen Michael C. Kostelnik, AFMC/director of plans, lette

subject: Single Air Force Laboratory Organization Change Request, 3 Febru 

ary 1997.

2. Paul letter; and briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Forc

Single Laboratory, 13 February 1997.

3. Paul letter; and Paul briefing.

4. Special Order GA-9 incorrectly relieved Phillips Lab from the 377t

Air Base Wing at Kirtland rather than from its assignment to the Space an

Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles. An amended Special Order GA-12

issued on 8 April 1997, incorporated that correction. Paul W. Smith, actin

chief, Organization Division, Directorate of Manpower, Organization, an

Quality, Headquarters Air Force, to Headquarters AFMC/XPM, letter, subjec

205
Single Air Force Laboratory Organization Change Request (Headquarter

AFMC/XP memo, 3 February 1997), 31 March 1997; idem to AFMC/CC

letter, subject: Organization Actions Affecting Certain Air Force Materie

Command Units, 31 March 1997; and Special Order GA-9, issued by Head

quarters Air Force Materiel Command, 1 April 1997.

5. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Approval and Activation o

the Air Force Research Laboratory; on-line, Internet, 10 April 1997, avai

able from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

6. Ibid.; and Paul letter.

7. Paul message; Paul letter; and Ms. Wendy Campbell, interviewed b

author, 11 June 1998.

8. Paul message; Paul letter; Col Allan R. Nelson, chief, Organizatio

Division, AFMC, to AF/XPM et al., staff summary sheet, subject: Singl

Laboratory Organization Change Request, 11 February 1997; and Campbel

interview.

9. Capt Chuck Helwig, interviewed by author, 3 February 1998; and Ma

Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998.

10. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to AL/CC et al., letter, subject: Single Labora

tory Heraldry Contest, 10 February 1997; idem, staff summary sheet, subjec

Proposed Heraldry for Air Force Research Laboratory, 24 March 1997; mes

sage, General Paul’s web site, subject: Air Force Research Laboratory Heraldry

on-line, Internet, 1 April 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil

STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; and Helwig interview.

11. Paul staff summary sheet; and Paul message, 1 April 1997.

12. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to AFRL/CC, letter, subject: Request Ap 

proval of Organizational Emblem—Air Force Research Laboratory, 23 Apri

1997; and Julian C. Godwin, Headquarters AFHRA/RSO to AFRL/CC, le

ter, subject: Acknowledgement of Organizational Heraldry, 8 May 1997.

13. Dr. Vince Russo, interviewed by author, 4 February 1998; Campbe

interview; and message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Single Laborator

Road Shows; on-line, Internet, 19 March 1997, available from http://stbbs

wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

14. Russo interview; and Paul message, 19 March 1997.

15. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Getting Under Way; on-line

Internet, 11 March 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS

labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

16. Paul interview; Russo interview; and Paul message, 19 March 1997.

17. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to AFMC/CC et al., letter, subject: Informa

tion Briefing on the Single Air Force Laboratory, 10 February 1997; an

Paul message, 19 March 1997.

18. Briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Single Labora 

tory (Road Show I), 13 February 1997.

19. Ibid.; and briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Forc

Single Laboratory (Road Show I), 27–28 March 1997.

206
20. Russo interview; and message, General Paul

s web site, subject: Roa

Show I; on-line, Internet, 17 April 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af

mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

21. Russo interview; and Paul message, 17 April 1997.

22. Russo interview; and Paul message, 17 April 1997.

23. Paul message, 17 April 1997.

207
Chapter 12

Other Perspectives:

Independent Review Teams

Perhaps Vince Russo explained it best when he asserte

that there was “no absolute[ly] perfect answer to the [lab

reorganization.” Everyone seemed to have his or her spin on

the most efficient way of dismantling the four labs and then

building a completely new consolidated laboratory. As part o

the rebuilding process, the leaders at the top needed to attrac

and consider a diversity of opinions on how to proceed. Cast

ing a wide net to catch as many ideas as possible force

decision makers to look and relook at issues that they inten

tionally or unintentionally neglected to include in their pre

liminary planning strategy. 1

Recognizing that different opinions and perspective

strengthened the planning and implementation process, Pau

commissioned a number of review teams for the express pur

pose of critiquing the formulation of the single-lab structur

and offering some time-tested ideas on organizational restruc

turing. The handpicked members of one such group—the In 

dependent Assessment Board —on which he depended for up

front feedback consisted of some very senior and experience

individuals in S&T who had worked, or still worked, in govern

ment, industry, and academia. The mixed background of thi

prominent group’s members, none of whom could be dis

missed out of hand because of their collective experience an

expertise, provided a beneficial “outsiders’ ” perspective on th

new lab. Involved in major organizational restructuring durin

their careers, they could offer sound, practical lessons learne

from their experiences and could identify potential pitfalls t

avoid during the forming of the new lab. Gen Robert T. Marsh

commander of Air Force Systems Command from Februar

1981 to August 1984, chaired the IAB (table 13). 2

General Marsh convened the first meeting of the IAB at th

Hope Hotel at Wright-Patterson on 8 April. Paul, Russo, an

Barthelemy also attended to fill in the group on the overal

lab-implementation strategy and progress to date. Paul told

209
the members that he solicited their input as detached an

objective observers of the entire lab-restructuring process. H

also addressed the overall concept of operation for the la

reorganization and explained the phased approach that would

lead to the stand-up of the lab in October. Next, Russo fur

nished details about the transition office and identified th

various task groups and task forces assigned to projects tha

required resolution before the stand-up. Barthelemy then

briefed the board members on the Technology Task Group an

the initial recommendations it presented to the Corporat

Board concerning the new tech directorates . After the presen

tations, the members made comments and asked some ver

specific and difficult questions, some of which Paul, Russo

and Barthelemy could not answer completely. But they took

copious notes on all those key points for the appropriate tas

group to further investigate and find answers. 3

The tenor of the IAB meeting was very positive. Although

some members questioned the benefits of going to one lab

they did not belabor the point, realizing the decision was irre

versible. They wanted to help out as much as they could in

terms of providing solid practical and political advice on la

restructuring that Paul and his staff could apply to the imple

mentation process. Marsh and the others brought with them 

genuine spirit of cooperation, but they also made clear that th

greatest contribution they could offer entailed raising tough

uncomfortable questions that other people might avoid. 4

Table 13

Independent Assessment Board

Gen Robert R. Marsh, USAF, Retired (chair)

Lt Gen Thomas Ferguson Dr. Gene McCall Dr. Arden Bennett

Dr. Robert Selden Dr. Gary Rapmund Mr. Jim Sennett

Dr. William Welch Dr. George Abrahamson Dr. Natalie Crawford

Dr. Anthony Hyder Dr. Jim Mattice Mr. Kirt Lewis

210
At this meeting, the board members raised issues an

asked questions that generally affected the long-term implica

tions of the laboratory, as opposed to the more immediat

steps required to establish the lab. For example, they ha

strong concerns about how the lab expected to perform world

class research in an environment of declining resources, in 

cluding people, funding, and facilities. They did not buy int

the slogan of doing more with less. If the lab faced hirin

restrictions, what kind of plan did it have to inject new blood

into the organization so it could survive and thrive? How

would the lab consistently, over the next decade, attract th

highly qualified scientists it needed to meet the challenges o

the Air Force in an era of rapidly changing technology? 5

Everyone on the IAB agreed that laboratory leaders neede

to pay more attention to a well-thought-out investment strat

egy that supported long-term S&T programs. They had n

doubt that AFRL’s mission had to satisfy the development o

short-term technology that could transition as quickly as pos

sible to sustain and upgrade operating systems already de

ployed in the field. However, they argued against a myopi

vision that stressed only the near-term benefits of advancin

technology. By definition, a laboratory had an obligation t

invest in high-risk technologies and allow scientists to pursu

far-out ideas that could lead to revolutionary systems for win 

ning future wars decisively. Anything less would shortchang

war fighters ordered into battle 10 to 20 years hence. 6

The day after the meeting, General Marsh sent General Pau

a letter summarizing the issues and concerns of the assess

ment team. Questions posed in the letter addressed broad

long-term lab issues: What is the Air Force vision for the new

laboratory? What are the rationale and statement for how thi

organization will positively affect scientific work and provid

timely support to its customers? Can the lab achieve “real

savings and not just cost avoidance? How will AFRL becom

more valuable to the Air Force, contractors, and academia

Marsh requested that Paul and his staff discuss these ques

tions at the next IAB meeting scheduled for 4–5 June. 7

Marsh’s letter also commented on more immediate issue

that affected the lab’s implementation plan over the next six

months. For example, with regard to the projected decline in

211
manpower, the IAB felt that the lab leadership needed t

mount “an assault on the hiring freeze and to better articulat

the results of the 35% downsizing already taken.” Overhea

cost and ways of dealing with it to reduce expenses repre

sented another personnel problem that needed resolution

early on in the restructuring effort. Marsh’s group also advo 

cated shutting down areas “no longer relevant” in both th

technical and support areas. As the lab developed its concep

of operation, which would rely on a centralized span of con

trol, the IAB cautioned against giving “full autonomy” to th

tech directorates . Doing so would leave AFRL open to criticism

for creating 10 to 12 minilabs from four big labs, suggestin

that the transformation to a single lab was a more superficia

than substantive representation of how the Air Force con

ducted its science and technology.

8

The second meeting of the IAB revisited issues and concern

brought up at the first meeting. At the opening of the session

General Paul brought everyone up-to-date on the lab’s pro

gress since the last meeting and addressed questions raised in

General Marsh’s letter. For the most part, the IAB agreed t

the direction in which AFRL was heading, but each membe

seemed to have specific advice on how to proceed with the la

implementation. For example, most members thought tha

AFRL’s vision, mission, and goals adequately addressed futur

Air Force S&T requirements, although one person declare

that the vision sounded like “a high school cheer.” In addition

some members thought that the vision and mission needed t

stress the synergy required among AFRL, the Air Force battl

labs, the commercial sector, and universities.9

Paul explained that the mission and vision statements wer

intentionally short and clear but agreed that people inside an

outside AFRL needed a better understanding of AFRL’s rela 

tionship with other organizations; otherwise, the single la

could not complete its mission. The general pointed out tha

the just-completed AFRL strategic plan—which describe

AFRL’s vision as “the best people providing the best technolo 

gies for the world’s best Air Force”—contained what the IAB

sought in terms of details about mission and vision. But th

plan also defined in more practical terms what the globa

ideas of the vision really meant. The statement used bes

212
people as an all-inclusive term to refer to the military/civilian

government workforce as well as “our internal and externa

contractors, our colleagues in government, industry, and aca

demia, and our international partners.” Best technologie

meant “those derived through our in-house and contractua

programs, those that our commercial and government col

leagues develop that are adaptable to Air Force requirements

and those developed by national and international defens

and commercial enterprises.” Lt Gen Thomas Ferguson 

USAF, Retired, a past director of Science and Technology in

Air Force Systems Command and an IAB participant, recom

mended that AFRL needed to stress in its vision that the new

lab would do more than develop new technology. In looking t

the future, AFRL’s vision would have to rely more and more on

exploiting and adapting successful commercial technology t

accomplish its mission (a concept included in the strategi

plan ). If the lab took the lead by identifying and investing in

6.1 through 6.3 technology programs, then industry would

follow, investing in those technologies that the Air Forc

wanted. Finally, best Air Force referred to assuring that the US

Air Force maintained “its position of recognized world-wid

preeminence.” In this case, AFRL’s strategic plan provided th

fuller explanation of vision and mission that the IAB wanted.1 

The IAB also thought that the AFRL leadership had done 

good job of structuring the tech directorates so as to take car

of the problem of technology seams. Dr. Anthony Hyder of th

University of Notre Dame’s Aerospace and Mechanical Engi

neering Department praised the work of the Technology Tas

Group: “Aligning the directorates was a tough problem an

overall an excellent job was done.” Another board membe

commented that “the directorates are well thought out an

provide a good basis for the kind of capability based organiza 

tion that is envisioned.” Others were equally complimentary

remarking that “most of the ‘seam’ problems appear to hav

been addressed . . . pretty good resolution of structure—no

sure how better to do it.”1 1

Although IAB’s feedback supported the new tech directorat

organization as described by Paul, Marsh’s group still foun

plenty of room for improvement. Knowing that, at the time of th

meeting, Paul had not made all of his final decisions on th

213
configuration of the tech directorates, the board member

sought to influence his decision and strongly advocated settin

up information, sensors, and conventional weapons technologie

as separate directorates. Indeed, Paul already favored the notion

of three separate directorates, and Sensors, Munitions (conven

tional weapons), and Information did in fact comprise three o

the 10 tech directorates when AFRL stood up in October.1 2

One other IAB issue that drew a great deal of attention an

provoked much debate involved clarification of how AFRL in 

tended to resolve the personnel-support problem. Dr. Hyde

agreed with General Ferguson ’s statement that “support staf

should not be left at present manning levels,” pointing out tha

no clear plan existed to reduce overhead. This left the impres

sion that overhead positions still characterized the status quo

which tended to weaken the argument that fundamenta

changes would occur through personnel reductions with th

establishment of the new lab. In addition, the IAB remained

unconvinced that decentralizing support work at the directorat

level, as opposed to centralizing support operations at head

quarters, was the right way to go. Under a decentralized plan

AFRL ran the risk of increasing its support staff—a position i

did not want to have to defend after the lab stood up. 1 3

Hyder ’s contention that “there was no plan in place to re

duce overhead” was not completely on the mark. AFRL leader

did have a plan—but not for immediate execution. For example

no one doubted that the ongoing 35 percent overhead reduc

tion would eventually drop the lab’s authorized personne

number below six thousand prior to the deadline of FY 2001

However, a large share of those cuts would begin as part o

phase IIB after the stand-up of AFRL in October. Also, a

though manpower savings comprised only a small part o

the total personnel-reduction figures, those savings would oc

cur when the four labs’ command sections disappeared in

October. Other personnel savings would occur afterward

(e.g., 509 non-R&D Armstrong Lab positions would come of

the books as part of phase IIB). Furthermore, under AFRL

General Paul had empowered each tech director to reduc

overhead/support staff by tailoring the size of the suppor

staff for the particular directorate, depending on local need

and requirements. Finally, by centralizing the XP directorat

214
at headquarters, the tech directorates 

 XP support staff

would shrink over time as former XP workers moved back t

fill S&T positions. How all this would play out in terms of th

exact number of support staff assigned to AFRL would no

become clear until the end of phase IIB in FY 2001.

In some ways, IAB functioned as devil’s advocate by cha

lenging the lab leadership to rethink potentially controversia

options before making any final decisions. However, the IAB

was not an enemy but a staunch ally of AFRL, very much

concerned with the future of the new lab and willing to help in

any way possible to endorse the lab’s mission and core compe

tencies. The board members expressed their willingness t

come back at any time to help the AFRL commander sell th

new lab internally and externally after they completed thei

business at the end of June. They also promoted the value o

AFRL by contacting senior Air Force and DOD leaders, con

tractors, the Air Force Association, and members of Congres

to stress the importance of S&T to the nation. 1 4

Furthermore, the IAB provided an independent assessmen

of future AFRL briefings going up the chain of command an

worked with and advised AFRL internal staff members on 

case-by-case basis to resolve special problems. In other words

the team members would always make themselves available t

serve as a sounding board for any laboratory problems tha

might arise in the future. Finally, the IAB unanimously con

curred that lab leaders had to aggressively defend the logic o

moving to a single lab and that AFRL leaders, over time, ha

to demonstrate that utilizing all the advantages of a corporat

organizational structure would result in conducting S&T mor

effectively and efficiently. That had to be a top priority. As on

IAB member warned, “Remember that this may be the las

stand before consolidation across service lines are [sic] openly

discussed.” That is, the lab had to have a solid foundation t

avoid becoming a target of opportunity for intraservice propo

nents who wanted to consolidate AFRL with other service lab

into a single DOD laboratory. 1 5

Thus, the IAB provided a valuable service to General Pau

and his staff by providing a detached perspective on a wid

spectrum of lab-transition issues. Although Marsh and hi

colleagues did succeed in causing a great deal of soul searchin

215
and in forcing lab leaders to think twice before settling on 

policy for completing phase IIA, they did not have a dramati

effect on the outcome of the final decisions. Indeed, Paul, hi

staff, and the various task groups had already identified an

were looking into every issue the IAB raised. Primarily, th

board members contributed by focusing on big-picture issue

affecting the formation of the single lab and its long-term

future rather than detailing how things should be done o

what implementation procedures should be followed at th

workers’ level. Nevertheless, they did note that the success o

AFRL depended to a great degree on the basic managemen

principle that “the devil is in the details.” The daunting re

sponsibility of working out all the specifics fell squarely on

General Paul, his senior staff, tech directors, and over fiv

hundred individuals throughout the organization who dili

gently worked all the issues connected with the phase IIA

implementation .

1 6

While the IAB furnished an outsider’s view of the laboratory

transition process, the Grassroots Review Board provided a

insider’s perspective on the planning of the new lab. Vinc

Russo suggested to General Paul that it would be a good idea t

set up an in-house team to acquire midlevel workers’ input on

how the lab should be structured. Paul agreed, expecting tha

he would “get some of our most ‘unvarnished’ advice from thi

group.” He instructed his four lab commanders and AFOS

director to appoint individuals who represented a “diagona

cross section” (from division level down) of the technical an

support workforce (military and civilian) to serve on the team

On 11 March Paul announced the names of the 22 individual

selected to the Grassroots Review Board (table 14).1 7

At the Grassroots Board meeting on 1–2 April, General Pau

and his staff began by briefing the members on progress mad

on the implementation plan for the new lab and then invited

everyone to ask questions. Other briefings on the first day cov

ered key portions of the reorganization strategy, including tech

nology directorates , plans and programs, support, personnel

and product executives. On the second day, briefings focuse

on financial management; procurement; integration and op 

erations; corporate information; presence in Washington

D.C.; and headquarters location. The board members then

216
gave their initial impressions of the lab-implementation plan

to General Paul and his staff. 1 8

Most board members noted that many of the briefing

focused on broad ideals but often lacked the necessary de 

tails to show how these visions would apply to the work

force. For example, briefers used customer and support re

peatedly but without a clear understanding or exac

definition of these terms. Who, specifically, were AFRL cus

tomers? Who were the support people, and what was thei

function in the new organization? The board considere

such issues important for accomplishing the overall down 

sizing plan that would affect individuals’ jobs and the abilit

of AFRL to meet its mission. 1 9

Downsizing drew a great deal of attention and prompted 

number of questions. For example, the personnel-reduction

plan supported the notion that normal attrition (retirements

would take care of the projected cuts in personnel over th

Table 14

Grassroots Review Board

Armstrong Lab Phillips Lab Wright Lab

Maj Warren Zelenski Dr. Robert Morris Ms. Pat Petty

Maj Keviin Grayson Maj Glenn James Maj T. C. Carter

Ms. Patty Boll Capt Marsha Wierschke Lt Col Pat Nutz

Ms. Cheryl Batchelor Mr. Kevin Slimak Mr. Charles Stevens

Mr. Jim Hurley Lt Col Jim Rooney Dr. Bryan Milligan

Ms. Mary Kinsella

Mr. Steven Karacci

Rome Lab AFOSR

Dr. Heather Dussault Dr. Genevieve Haddad

Mr. Gene Blackburn

Capt Dale Reckley

Ms. Rosanne Loparco

217
next few years. But nothing spoke to the specifics of how tha

would work—in terms of numbers of people who would leave

Because all personnel reductions would come out of the sup

port areas, board members did not believe that retirement

could meet personnel-reduction goals by FY 2001. At that tim

(April), no one had hard numbers representing real people wh

would retire from the support areas. Thus, the Grassroots grou

inquired how anyone knew that attrition would meet the goals o

future personnel cuts. Since no personnel reductions would

come from the core technology areas, the team asserted that n

one could realistically expect that a sufficient number of peopl

in the support areas would retire to meet the 35 percent reduc

tion quota required by FY 2001. General Paul accepted thi

observation and acknowledged that he and his staff needed t

take a much closer look at this issue.

2 0

Another important aspect of downsizing, designed to reduc

support and strengthen core technology positions, focused on

the structuring of the new Plans and Programs Directorate

The overall strategy called for fewer individuals to work in XP

positions at the 10 tech directorates since XP would become 

more centralized function, located at AFRL headquarters

Most XP positions (considered support) required a degree in

science or engineering. As part of the reduction process, man

individuals in XP would move out of XP for “reintegration” int

S&T jobs assigned at the tech-directorate level. Under tha

system, support positions would decline while core technolog

positions would remain unchanged or increase—an unrealisti

approach, according to Grassroots members. They doubte

that a midlevel or senior person—especially in a supervisor

position—who had worked in XP for the past five, 10, or 1

years would care to move down to work S&T at the directorat

level. Not only might such a move interfere with a person’

career-progression plans in XP , but also it would call int

question the effectiveness of a person who had not worked in

his or her scientific or technical specialty in a number of years

Although General Paul did not have a good answer for the board

members, he once again welcomed their feedback, indicating h

would carefully reevaluate his options on this issue. 2 1

One other concern of the Grassroots Review Board had to d

with the support structure at different geographic locations. A

218
the time of the April meeting, the setup of the support office

remained unresolved, some people favoring a system centra

ized at AFRL headquarters and others preferring a decentra

ized arrangement at each of the tech directorates. In eithe

case, the members had concerns about the apparent lack o

effective planning provisions to take into account suppor

functions at locations where a directorate did not exist. Fo

instance, no plan was in place for support functions to resid

at Edwards AFB to assist rocket-propulsion work. Boar

members argued that an isolated location, removed from it

directorate and AFRL headquarters, needed sufficient suppor

personnel working on site and providing day-to-day services t

keep the operation running smoothly. Otherwise, “shadow

organizations would emerge, whereby scientists and engineer

would end up performing all types of support work instead o

concentrating on their S&T mission. The board believed i

fallacious to think that cuts in support personnel would lea

to corresponding reductions in the support workload, predict

ing that the same amount of staff work would exist and that 

large share of it would move to the tech directorates. Thus, th

remaining support people would have a bigger workload, an

some of the support overload would become the responsibilit

of scientists and engineers.2 2

Paul declared the first meeting of the Grassroots Review

Board an “unqualified success” because it brought a fresh

perspective to the planning process. He genuinely appreciate

the team members’ intensity and independence of though

and their willingness to work until midnight to prepare th

outbriefing for the second day’s meeting. He thanked them fo

their “participation, hard work, candor, and dedication” an

told them how pleased he was with “the results [they] ob 

tained and presented . . . since they made [him] aware o

several issues which had not been considered to date—an

which [he and his staff] now [would] factor into [their] delib 

erations.” He informed them that he looked forward to thei

second and final meeting, scheduled for June. 2 3

During the second meeting on 23–24 June, General Pau

and his staff updated the team on the same issues presente

at the first meeting, and the members then prepared thei

responses. Jim Hurley outbriefed Paul and his staff on th

219
second day, providing them with recommendations and con

cerns that amounted to a fine-tuning of issues discussed a

the first meeting. 2 4

Because the proposed structure and function of XP re

mained a significant concern not clearly understood by all o

the Grassroots members, they recommended adding hard de

tails to the implementation plan that would identify the num

bers of people expected to work in each new tech directorate’

streamlined XP area. Tech directors needed to involve them

selves in shaping the functions and authority of the XP or

ganization at headquarters. Without their input and buy-in

they would see XP as a competitor, which in the long ru

would weaken the organizational efficiency of the new lab

Furthermore, board members did not have a clear under

standing of how many and what procedures would eliminat

XP positions at the four labs, of whether the new tech direc

torates would have any XP positions assigned to them, or o

what the projected size of AFRL headquarters XP might be. 2 5

Team members repeated their doubts that individuals re

moved from their XP jobs would automatically move down t

accept division-level science or engineering positions. The

also voiced concerns about the control and tasking authorit

of XP at headquarters, feeling that under the old four-la

system the XP shop at AFMC/ST issued far too many tasking

with short suspenses and far too many repeat taskings. Thes

taskings, which asked for the same information but in a dif

ferent format, continually frustrated the XP offices at the fou

labs. Many of the board members feared that the larger an

more controlling XP component at headquarters would gener

ate an even greater number of taskings—all of this happen in

while the reorganization plan called for assigning fewer people t

the tech directorates working XP taskings. This translated to 

heavier workload for these employees as well as scientists an

engineers, who would increasingly be called on to gather desire

information at the tech directorates—certainly not an efficien

operation for them. The Grassroots team recommended that th

XP shop at headquarters build a corporate-knowledge data

base to which directorates could regularly add information

Each time XP headquarters needed information, it could firs

check its own database before requesting it from the tech

220
directorates and thus cut down on the frequency of routin

and repeat suspenses to the tech directorates.

2 6

The Grassroots team also sought clarification on whom th

people working XP taskings at the directorate worked for—th

local tech director or central XP at AFRL headquarters? Genera 

Paul responded to that question on the spot, stating that all th 

local-directorate XP components would be a part of and sub

ordinate to the main XP at headquarters. He viewed XP as an

organic component of his headquarters, controlled directly b

him. Thus, he could formulate and issue one lab-consolidate

policy on plans and programs. If XP were decentralized at th

directorate level, however, then Paul would have to deal with

10 labs, each going in its own XP direction—something he did

not want to happen under the single-lab concept of opera

tions. In short, one voice would direct XP policy. 2 7

The Grassroots members also suggested that several per

sonnel issues might damage the morale of the new laboratory

If the implementation plan called for gaining efficiency in

AFRL by means of personnel reductions, why did the plan no

provide for an equitable method for reductions at all civilian

grade levels? Clearly, all the cuts would come in the suppor

area, but within that group, the Grassroots team had th

impression that all SES and high-grade positions would re

ceive more protection than would the midlevel and lowe

grades. By definition, support covered all positions not directly

working bench science and engineering, including the com

mander, his staff, XP , finance, personnel, contracting, and s

forth. In his response, Paul pointed out that cuts would occu

at all levels and support functions over time, including thos

in the SES ranks. For example, when three associate director

in SES slots retired over the course of the next few years, Pau

considered their positions cuts because he did not intend t

replace any of them.2 8

Restriction of career opportunities for civilians posed still an

other personnel problem that might adversely affect morale. Th

Grassroots team reasoned that as more personnel red uction

occurred, creating a smaller workforce, civilians would hav

fewer opportunities for career progression. If civilians had t

face the reality of limited promotions because of a shrinkin

workforce, how did AFRL leaders expect to recruit and retain

221
quality workers (or expect younger ones starting out in the job

market to invest in a career with AFRL)? To offer more oppor

tunities for career progression, the board suggested makin

Geophysics a stand-alone directorate under AFRL. For 

number or reasons, however, that did not happen. 2 9

Board members also advised against doing away with dep 

uty branch chiefs as a way of distributing the workload mor

evenly. If a branch averaged 25 to 50 workers, the chief would

need a deputy to help attend to all the administrative dutie

assigned to that branch, freeing the chief to focus on S&

requirements. Dr. Daniel vigorously opposed this proposal

believing it violated the goal of the “objective directorate” plan

that called for organizational consistency to minimize the siz

and staff support of each of the organizational component

(including branches) of the new lab. Ultimately, with the es

tablishment of AFRL, the 351 branches in the old lab struc

ture became 192 new branches. Retaining deputy branch

chiefs would mean a loss of 192 positions dedicated to per

forming core technology work, the heart of the AFRL mission

When the lab stood up in October, it did not include deput

branch chiefs. 3 0

Many of the basic issues raised by the Grassroots Review

Board were the same ones that the IAB and General Paul’

staff had already identified as important topics needing exam

nation. The Grassroots members, however, proved especially

forceful in pushing lab leaders for more precise details an

refinement of policy procedures and processes that lacke

clarity. General Paul reevaluated all this information, eithe

discarding it or applying it in one way or another to his fina

decision on all the lab-implementation issues.

Paul never called the Grassroots Board back into session t

tell its members how he acted on their comments and recom 

mendations, and they did not expect him to do so. As the com

mander, he could consult with any person or group prior to o

after making his final decision. Considering his heavy work 

load—making judgments affecting 13 task groups, six fo cu

groups, and three independent review teams, as well as a hos

of other activities—Paul typically analyzed the data and quickly

made prudent decisions to expedite the transition process. Be

cause of time constraints, feedback from the commander often

222
became a secondary issue in the larger scheme of things. A

one Grassroots participant put it, the most important message

sent by General Paul was that “he included people at th

working level to provide their input on the laboratory restruc

turing through the Grassroots team. That showed he care

about the workforce.”3 1

Besides the IAB and the Grassroots Review Board , a third

review group, known as the Lab Alumni or Graybeards, pro

vided feedback to General Paul on his single-lab implementa

tion plan. Dr. Allan Schell , a former chief scientist at Air Forc

Systems Command, chaired this group, which included 2

people who had held important positions in the Air Forc

scientific and technical community. Brig Gen Philippe O

Bouchard , USAF, Retired—former vice commander of Aero

nautical Systems Division and commander of the Aero Propu

sion Lab, Materials Lab, and Rome Air Development Center in

the 1970s and 1980s—was a typical Graybeard. General Pau

saw Schell , Bouchard , and other team members as extremely

valuable resources whose experience and expertise in Ai

Force S&T he should draw upon.3 2

The Lab Alumni team met just once, from 9 to 10 June a

Wright-Patterson . Of the three independent review groups, th

Graybeards had the most criticism of the single lab, challeng

ing that fundamental concept and even suggesting that AFRL

leaders seriously consider pausing between phases I and II t

reexamine the big issues. But Paul informed them that doin

so was not a viable option: “We simply cannot put things on

hold without significant repercussions.” He and Russo re

minded the group that, for all practical purposes, the topi

was no longer open for discussion. Rather than delaying th

reorganization process, Paul and his staff needed solid sug

gestions that they could use during the implementation phas

to lead to a more efficient day-to-day operation of AFRL. Th

team responded with several specific recommendations.3 3

The Graybeards suggested that if the new lab intended t

compete on the same playing field with the product centers

then its name should give it equal status—hence, Air Forc

Technology Center. Of course, General Paul rejected that sug

gestion because the OCR had already approved Air Force Re

search Laboratory for the interim lab. The team also believe

223
that AFRL leaders should rethink the names of the Air Vehicle 

and Space Vehicles directorates, considering them limitin

and misleading because both directorates engaged in tech 

nology that fell outside the “vehicles” part of the two director

ates’ names. 3 4

Team members also warned against making the headquar

ters staff too large. Although Paul’s policy called for estab

lishing only a modest staff, the Graybeards feared it could ge

out of hand and grow quickly. A large headquarters staff ha

a tendency to become too bureaucratic—a divisive rather than

unifying factor. Further, it would nurture an “us” (tech direc

tors) against “them” (headquarters staff) mentality counterpro

ductive to the effectiveness of the lab. Thus, the Lab Alumn

strongly recommended populating the Corporate Board with

the tech directors, as well as with General Paul and his ke

staff, and intimately involving the directors in XP plannin

activities. Abiding by these rules would show unity of purpos

by giving tech directors an opportunity to influence the decision 

making process on all major policy issues. This would foster 

team approach to solving problems rather than relying on 

strictly dictatorial way of doing business. In addition, team

members viewed the proposal to place product executives in

XP to integrate technologies across multiple tech directorate

as another example of bureaucratic layering. As for the Gray

beards’ suggestions to include tech directors as Corporat

Board members and not use product executives, General Pau

incorporated both of them into the organizational structure o

the lab when it stood up in October. 3 5

As a way to infuse new ideas and sustain a healthy leader

ship atmosphere in AFRL, Dr. Schell stressed the importanc

of rotating personnel between XP and the technology direc

tors. Cross training would build individual depth of experienc

and expertise in the development of strong and effective futur

leaders who would best protect the interests of the laboratory

Moreover, career progression would protect the lab by keepin

up a pool of quality employees. Hence, laboratory leaders ha

an ongoing responsibility to lay out “routes by which high

performers are rewarded with higher pay and increased re

sponsibility.” Finally, the Lab Alumni team believed it essen

tial to establish an AFRL liaison office in Washington, D.C.

224
not only to promote AFRL technical competencies, but also t

stem future personnel and budget cuts.

3 6

General Paul appreciated the Graybeards’ candid feedbac

and thoughtful recommendations, writing all the team mem

bers to thank them for their contributions. He assured them

that he and his staff had reevaluated all the key issues the

had raised and informed them that he had taken steps t

build a stronger and more cooperative process between XP

and all the tech directors.3 7

Notes

1. Dr. Vince Russo, interviewed by author, 4 February 1998; and Co

Dennis Markisello, interviewed by author, 6 February 1997.

2. Russo interview; Markisello interview; and message, General Paul’s we

site, subject: Air Force Research Laboratory Independent Assessment Boar

Review; on-line, Internet, 14 April 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af

mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

3. Russo interview; Markisello interview; Paul message; and Dr. Rober

Barthelemy, interviewed by author, 6 February 1998 and 28 January 2000

4. Russo interview; and Capt Chuck Helwig, interviewed by author, 

February 1998.

5. Russo interview; and Gen Robert T. Marsh, USAF, Retired, to Maj Ge

Richard R. Paul, letter, subject: Concerns/Issues/Comments, 9 April 1997

6. Russo interview; Marsh letter; and Paul message. For a discussion o

the value of long-range R&D, see J. Douglas Beason, DOD Science an

Technology: Strategy for the Post–Cold War Era (Washington, D.C.: Nationa

Defense University Press, 1997).

7. Marsh letter.

8. Ibid.

9. Gen Robert T. Marsh to Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, letter, subjec

Independent Assessment Board Review, 24 June 1997.

10. Ibid.; [Dr. Vince Russo,] “Air Force Research Laboratory Strategi

Plan,” AFRL, May 1997.

11. Marsh letter, 24 June 1997.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.; and message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Status Repor

on-line, Internet, 12 June 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil

STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

15. Marsh letter, 24 June 1997; and Paul messag, 12 June 1997.

16. Russo interview; and Paul message, 12 June 1997.

17. Russo interview; Markisello interview; message, General Paul’s we

site, subject: Single Laboratory Transition Organization; on-line, Interne

18 March 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/sin gle

225
lab/updates.htm; and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to AL/CC et al., letter, subjec

Grassroots Review Board for the Single Laboratory Effort, 11 March 1997.

18. Dr. Robert Morris, interviewed by author, 16 March 1997; and Ma

Gen Richard R. Paul, briefing notebook, “Air Force Single Laboratory

Grassroots Review Board,” 1–2 April 1997.

19. Maj Marsha Wierschke, interviewed by author, 15 and 16 March 2000

briefing slides from Major Wierschke’s Grassroots notebook, 1–2 April 1997

and message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Grassroots Review Panel; on

line, Internet, 14 April 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS

labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

20. Wierschke interviews; and Morris interview.

21. Wierschke interviews; and Morris interview.

22. Wierschke interviews; Dr. Bill Borger, interviewed by author, 27 Jul

1998; Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998; an

Wierschke briefing slides.

23. Morris interview; and Paul message, 14 April 1997.

24. Morris interview; and Mr. Jim Hurley, interviewed by author, 1

March 2000.

25. Paul interview; Morris interview; Hurley interview; Wierschke inter

view, 16 March 2000; and Wierschke briefing slides.

26. Morris interview; Hurley interview; Wierschke interview, 16 Marc

2000; and Wierschke briefing slides.

27. Russo interview; and Wierschke interviews.

28. Hurley interview; Paul interview; and Col Mike Heil, interviewed b

author, 3 March 1998.

29. Wierschke interviews; Morris interview; and Dr. Vince Russo, inter

viewed by author, 3 February 1997.

30. Wierschke interviews; Morris interview; Russo interview, 3 Februar

1997; and briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Singl

Laboratory (Road Show I), 13 February 1997.

31. Hurley interview; and Wierschke interview, 16 March 2000.

32. Russo interview, 3 February 1998; and message, General Paul’s we

site, subject: AFRL Progress Report—Directorates and More; on-line, Interne

14 May 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single

lab/updates.htm. 

33. Russo interview, 4 February 1998; Brig Gen Philippe O. Bouchard

USAF, Retired, interviewed by author, 20 March 2000; Allan C. Schell t

Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, letter, subject: Report of the Laboratory Alumn

Review Team, 23 June 1997, with attached Laboratory Alumni Review Team

Report; and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to Brig Gen Phil Bouchard, letter

subject: Lab Alumni, 17 July 1997.

34. Schell letter.

35. Ibid.; Bouchard interview; and Russo interview, 4 February 1998.

36. Schell letter; Bouchard interview; and Russo interview, 4 Februar

1998.

37. Paul letter, 17 July 1997.

226
Chapter 13

Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates

Establishing the new Plans and Programs Directorate , de

signed to help unite 10 separate tech directorates into on

corporate laboratory, was critical to setting up AFRL. XP ’

mission involved establishing and managing all processes fo

planning, programming, and budgeting AFRL’s S&T resources

The directorate’s long-range corporate investment strateg

and integrated sector planning entailed acquiring, managing

and distributing funding to the 10 directorates in order t

support and sustain integrated technology programs an

thereby satisfy the technology needs of AFRL’s customers

That is, XP had to weave a workable strategy that focused on

building a comprehensive S&T program, drawing from mu

tidisciplines, in order to develop the core technical competen

cies needed to maintain the superiority and cost-effectivenes

of US air and space systems. To accomplish that goal, XP ha

to develop S&T programs responsive to the broad, strategic Ai

Force goals presented in New World Vistas, Global Engage

ment, and Joint Vision 2010.

1

Plans and Programs Directorate

Strategic goals and money drove investment strategy to en

sure that AFRL concentrated on identifying and developin

advanced technologies that would eventually transition to th

Air Force war fighter. A major part of XP’s budgetary responsi

bility involved determining what to invest in, how much t

invest, and where to invest to build the technology base. XP

rolled up the projected dollar amount submitted in its Pro

gram Objective Memorandum each year to higher headquar

ters. Justification for what specific technology program

should receive funding in the memorandum resulted from 

variety of separate planning and assessment processes an

their associated documentation, including the Technolog

Area Review and Assessment, Defense Technology Area Plan

227
Science and Technology Spring Review, Technology Plannin

Integrated Product Teams, Modernization Planning Process

and more. XP also orchestrated AFRL activities to maintain

the lead in technology transfer by managing and coordinatin

Small Business Innovation Research, Independent Research

and Development, and Small Business Technology Transfe

Research . Furthermore, the directorate collected and evalu 

ated recommendations provided by the Office of Research an

Technology Assessment and the Technology Transfer Office ; i

also provided oversight for AFRL’s international activities.2

General Paul appointed Tim Dues to lead the XP task group

instructing him and his group to present all possible option

on how best to set up the XP office in the new lab. Like othe

groups’ members, the XP group’s came from a number o

organizations (table 15). 3 On 24 April, Dues and his team

presented three XP options to the Corporate Board. Option

one called for a centralized XP operation located at Wright

Patterson that, as part of General Paul’s staff, wou ld wield 

great deal of power and authority in terms of defining lab

wide policy on all issues related to planning, programming

and budgeting of S&T activities. The advantages of this ap

proach included a strong corporate perspective; a single poin

of contact, allowing XP to respond quickly to customer re

quests; and increased potential for developing integrated tech

nology programs across all 10 tech directorates. But locatin

Table 15

XP Task Group

Mr. Tim Dues (leader), WL/XP Mr. Garry Barringer, RL/XP

Dr. Richard Miller, AL/XP Col William Byrne, PL/XP

Dr. David Dinwiddie, PL/XP Maj Robert Canfield, AFOSR/XP

Mr. Terry Neighbor, Lt Col James Feine,

Headquarters AFMC/STX Headquarters AFMC/STR

Mr. Bert Cream, AL/STX Mr. Ken Feeser, WL/XPZ, Support

Ms. Jan Moore, Mr. Tom Hummel,

Headquarters AFMC/STX, Headquarters AFMC/ST-SL,

Sedretariat Transition Team POC

228
XP at headquarters would remove it from the tech directorates 

where the base technology work took place. It also meant tha

compared to their influence in the four-laboratory system, th

tech directors would have less say in determining XP policy. 4

Option two, a modification of the first, called for keeping 

centralized XP at headquarters but establishing smaller XP

offices at tech directorate sites (i.e., Kirtland, Wright-Patterson

and Rome), which would allow the central XP to delegate mor

taskings to the site locations and promote more interaction

between the field and headquarters. Option three, the opposit

of option one, proposed a decentralized XP that mirrored th

former four-lab XP structure, whereby each lab largely devel

oped its own XP policy and direction—something not alway

conducive to creating a unified XP policy that best served th

total organization. In the past, each XP assigned to one of th

four labs gave its first allegiance to the lab commander. 

decentralized system allowed XP to interact more closely with

people who had firsthand experience working the technolog

programs at the directorate level. It also meant that the head

quarters XP would require fewer people—a position favored b

the Grassroots and Lab Alumni teams. However, from th

perspective of headquarters, the AFRL commander would hav

more difficulty maintaining a tight span of control over 1

tech directorates , and customers would have 10 XP points o

contact rather than one, thus increasing the time required t

get a definitive response to their questions. 5

General Paul made no decision on the XP structure at th

April meeting, instructing Dues and his team to reevaluate an

refine the three options. He asked them to pay particular at

tention to XP’s responsibilities regarding long-range planning

resource allocation, business-process review, international co

operative efforts, and marketing, with an eye toward determin 

ing under which of the three options these XP functions bes

fit. After rethinking all the XP possibilities, Dues and his team

at the next Corporate Board meeting came out strongly in favo

of a centralized XP as proposed in option one.6

By July, after spending a generous amount of time evaluat

ing all the alternatives for structuring the new XP structure

General Paul made his final decision. His highest priority wa

to make sure the new lab spoke as one voice regarding all XP

229
issues. He did not like the current system, with XP office

located at five different locations—four labs and the Scienc

and Technology Directorate at Wright-Patterson —under fiv

different bosses. This split arrangement proved extremely tim

consuming in terms of gathering accurate data for formulatin

and executing XP policy. The labs wanted to protect thei

interests and tended to drag their feet in responding to th

S&T XP, which had the unenviable task of trying to put to

gether XP guidance, strategic planning, and budgeting tha

would satisfy four independent laboratories and AFMC. There

fore, Paul chose to go with the centralized XP directorate

which would work directly for him as an organic element as

signed to his headquarters and would establish the contro

necessary to meet his one-lab-commander responsibilities t

run an effective XP program.7

By eliminating the XP shops at the directorate level, Genera

Paul not only could gain the control he wanted over the XP

function but also could reduce the support force and build u

the core-technology force, believing that one XP organization

at headquarters would require fewer people than had worke

at the XP offices at the four labs. He planned for the XP

workers at the four labs to do one of two things: (1) apply fo

the vacant positions that would open at XP headquarters an

continue their careers in plans and programs or (2) take 

scientist or engineer position at the tech directorate level. In

either case, it seemed reasonable to believe that the XP sup

port positions would decrease and that the tech directorate

would gain by strengthening their core S&T workforce. How

ever, all this would take time. 8

Although an essential consideration, the XP manpower is

sue was not the most important factor influencing Paul’s deci

sion. He wanted “one central planning shop living togethe

that could do our strategic planning for us and make us mor

into a single integrated organization as opposed to the way i

was done under the old system.” The general believed that th

old system represented a stumbling block to effective opera

tions because “it made it very difficult for us to plan tha

way—planning was fragmented.” Under the new XP, the 1

tech directors would play an important role in the plannin

process, but all final decisions on XP matters would resid

230
with the XP director and commander at headquarters. Al

though definitely less democratic, a powerful, centralized XP

would pay off over the next few years by producing a mor

united and focused laboratory. 9

Originally, Generals Viccellio and Paul, backed by the fou

lab commanders, envisioned four product executive officer

playing a vital role in the corporate technology-planning pro

cess in the areas of air vehicles, space, C4I, and human sys 

tems. By looking across all 10 tech directorates to make sur

the laboratory exploited the right mix of technologies to develop

“specific products,” the PEOs would assist the commander in

making sound budget and investment-strategy decisions. Pau

resolved to fill the PEO jobs with experienced colonels an

GS-15s, giving each position the appropriate grade and pres

tige commensurate with its duties. Doing so would arm eac

PEO with sufficient status and clout to interact effectively wit

product-oriented customers such as major commands, produc

centers, battle labs, DOD agencies, and other government or

ganizations such as the National Aeronautics and Space Ad 

ministration and the Department of Energy. 1 0

In their role as the lab’s principal strategists and advocate

for product-related technologies, the PEOs would constantly

find themselves engaged in a delicate balancing act, assessin

and developing programs that crossed multiple technology di

rectorates. Working with the commander, the XP director, an

tech directors, the PEOs would prove their value by shaping 

corporate investment strategy destined to succeed only with

the combined cooperation and expertise of many groups. Ulti

mately, different groups/customers working cross-technologie 

together in a coordinated fashion would produce the timely

generation of software and hardware products for the Ai

Force’s operational commands, giving them the winning edg

during war. In particular, advanced technology would make 

decisive difference in the Air Force’s six core competencies: ai

and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility

precision engagement, information superiority, and agile com

bat support. 1 1

To make all this happen, each PEO had to work closely with

the tech directors and XP director to coordinate the program

matics of multiple technical disciplines. For example, th

231
Space PEO would consult with the Space Vehicles directo

and all other directors (of Sensors, Materials , Information 

etc.) who had technologies applicable to space systems o

products. That process would help the PEOs and tech director

sort out the most appropriate technologies to support Ai

Force Space Command, Space and Missile Systems Center

Space Battlelab, and other customers as needed. As part o

this collaborative effort, Paul envisioned colocating as many a

30 AFRL individuals on a full-time basis with the major com

mands, battle labs, product/logistics centers, Ballistic Missil

Defense Organization , National Reconnaissance Office, an

other potential customers. They would serve as liaison officer

to best promote what AFRL could do to provide quality tech

nology products to these organizations and assist them in

providing customer feedback to AFRL. Although working with

many agencies outside AFRL, the PEOs in the chain of com

mand would report directly to the AFRL commander. 1 2

As with the XP operation, Paul favored establishing the PEO

offices as a centralized function in the headquarters. Under th

planned command setup, PEOs would directly “task” the tec

directors under certain circumstances—something that did no

particularly sit well with the tech directors, many of whom

viewed the PEOs as competitors and a potential threat. Th

IAB and Grassroots Review Board agreed, seeing the PEOs a

an extra bureaucratic layer with too much authority, which cu

away at the tech directors’ autonomy and increased the size o

the headquarters. According to the review boards, PEO dutie

needed to be more precisely defined to prevent both an overla

of responsibilities and any infringement on the tech director

turf. Furthermore, they considered the name product executiv

confusing because it gave the impression of an AFRL asset in

competition with Air Force product centers—just the opposit

message the laboratory wanted to convey. 1 3

By the middle of April, the issue became more heated an

controversial, with General Paul receiving negative feedbac

challenging the basic concept of PEOs and the role they would

play in the new lab. Admittedly, he too found it difficult t

define the specific concept and roles of the PEOs. Occupying 

separate office in the command section, should PEOs hav

their own staffs, and, if so, how big should they be? Should

232
PEOs have budget authority over

tech programs? Since the XP office and planned PEO offices

both would deal with developing

corporate investment strategy,

Paul suspected that conflicts

would certainly arise over who did

what: “The more I tried to pee l

back the onion and get into the

details of a concept of operation

for how they [XP and PEOs]

would really work, the more convoluted the situation appeared to

be.” Understanding the controversy stirred up by the PEO proposal, on 24 April he directed

Col Rich Davis , the Wright Lab

commander, to put together a

product executives “Red Team”

with the specific tasking to review the entire PEO concept o

operation. 1 4

Senior leadership filled 13 positions on the Red Team

inclu ding all four lab commanders— Colonel Davis, Colone

Heil from Phillips, Dr. Godfrey from Armstrong, and Colone

Bowlds from Rome. Most of the remaining members of th

team served as tech directors in the four labs. After much

debate and analysis, they decided to oppose the estab

lishment of key leadership positions exclusively for produc

executives in the new lab, questioning the value of PEO

operating independently as a staff office at headquarters

Team members strongly believed that future AFRL tech d

rectors, working with appropriate XP personnel, were per

fectly capable of handling all the planning and strate gic

investment duties. This option, which seemed a reasonable

compromise, tended to shift the focus from “independentl

powerful” product executives to less intrusive sector chief

subordinate to the XP director. On 7 May, Colonel Davi

delivered to General Paul and the Corporate Board the Re

Team’s recommendation of eliminating the product execu 

tives and replacing them with sector chiefs assigned to XP .

1 

Col Richard W. Davis chaired th

Red Team.

233
General Paul supported this for several reasons. For one, h

liked the idea of embedding sector-chief functions into XP: “Tha

resulted in a more streamlined organization, avoided a matrix

staff situation, avoided roles and missions confusion betwee

the PEOs and XP staff, and generally seemed to me to be muc

more workable from a practicable standpoint. . . . As we ran

through various scenarios as to how PEOs versus XP staf

would work in response to what-if drills for budget cuts, in

vestment strategy formulation, customer interface, etc., I wa

reinforced that the XP sector chief approach seemed much

more viable. So, that’s the way we went.”1 6

Another critical issue considered whether the XP secto

chiefs should “own resources”—that is, directly control a por

tion of the S&T budget for reallocation to the tech directors fo

multidisciplinary, cross-directorate programs. Although som

people argued that the XP sector chiefs would have limite

power and influence if they didn’t have direct budget control

Paul disagreed. He believed that all execution responsibilit

should reside in the tech directorates and wanted to hold hi

SES and colonel tech directors totally accountable for program

execution; therefore, they needed to own the budget associ

ated with program execution. On the other hand, the genera

believed that the XP sector chiefs ’ influence would derive from

their direct, corporate-level advice to him on S&T investmen

planning. Based on his past experience as a staff member in

the headquarters of two different major commands, Paul fel

that a trusted and competent staff member who worked issue

from a corporate perspective could have significant influenc

on a commander’s decision-making process. In some cases, 

proficient staff member could have even more influence than

line managers who “owned resources”—and Paul thought tha

a set of highly competent and experienced sector chiefs could

have the same kind of influence on the AFRL commander.1 7

With this decision, the die was cast. Sector chiefs would

neither own nor control budgets; nor would they serve a

program managers for cross-directorate programs. Rather

they would facilitate program planning with the applicabl

tech directors and advise the AFRL commander regarding spe

cific programs to support from a corporate perspective. Aft er th

commander had approved a set of multidisciplinary programs

234
then the program managers and the budget they needed t

execute those programs would reside in the tech directorates

Paul would hold his program managers completely account

able for program execution. For multidisciplinary technology

development programs involving more than one tech director

ate , the general planned to appoint a lead tech director wh

would be accountable for execution and who would work with

his tech director peers to ensure adequate support of th

program. To Paul, this overall arrangement seemed straight

forward from a roles-and-missions standpoint and reflected an

appropriate allocation of functions between line and staff. 1 8

General Paul’s decision to place sector chiefs in XP would

not eliminate the tension and conflicts between the line tech

directors and the sector chiefs on the headquarters staff, bu

it would best serve the corporate needs of the new lab. As TEO

for science and technology, Paul sought and relied upon ad

vice on budget and investment-strategy matters from both th

line and staff, expecting differences in their inputs. He consid 

ered both perspectives valuable to his decision-making pro

cess. As regards budget and personnel-reduction issues, h

anticipated that his tech directors would naturally provid

him with in-depth information pushing their respective tech

nology disciplines, while the sector chiefs most likely would

advocate a multidisciplinary perspective: “While the tech di

rectors need to put on corporate hats, it’s hard to expect them

not to defend or advocate their own organizations, manpower

or budgets. If they didn’t do that they wouldn’t be doing thei

jobs.” Thus, the commander had to analyze and use conflict

ing input from his line directorates and headquarters staff t

help him arrive at the best decision. 1 9

The decision to replace PEOs with sector chiefs drew 

mixed reaction. The four lab commanders remained uncon

vinced that sector chiefs buried in the XP organization would

have the equivalent horsepower of product executives. Pau

tried to alleviate that worry by reminding everyone that th

sector chiefs would be handpicked colonels and GS-15s wh

would maintain a high profile in the lab. Because they would

become key participants in corporate budget issues, Pau

added them as regular attendees to all Corporate Board meet

ings. This sent a strong message to both the tech director

235
and sector chiefs that the lab commander highly valued hi

sector chiefs . Although Paul had no desire to increase the siz

of the already large Corporate Board , he thought he needed t

make the sector chiefs an integral part of the corporate AFRL

decision-making process. But some of the tech directors did

not enthusiastically embrace the concept of sector chiefs in

fluencing the AFRL commander to reduce one tech director’

budget in favor of another’s. 2 0

Whether the situation involved money, personnel, or tech

programs, Paul stood by his original position of not allowin

any of the AFRL tech directorates to act independently in

terms of programmatic decisions. On the contrary, AFRL’

success would depend upon their interdependence. In mos

cases, no one tech directorate would own all the technologie

that went into enabling a system or subsystem, most of which

included integrated multiple technologies. For that reason, h

insisted on a strong, centralized XP operation to develop 

comprehensive corporate investment strategy that cut acros

organizational lines to make AFRL a “fully integrated lab.” T

ensure that the integrated part of the lab-planning proces

became a reality, he believed it absolutely essential that secto

chiefs devote all their time and energy exclusively to workin

issues and relating to customers from a product or mission

perspective, as opposed to a technology-discipline perspective

Accordingly, the new sector chiefs would lead five critica

product sectors: aeronautical systems, space and missiles

command and control systems, human systems and logistics

and weapon systems. The first four sectors mirrored the fou

existing AFMC product centers, while the weapons sector cor

responded directly to product-related activities in conventiona

munitions housed at Eglin AFB, Florida. 2 1

Primarily, each sector chief would bring together many tech

nologies at different tech directorates into a single technolog

program for demonstration as an integrated subsystem or sys

tem for transition to the operational Air Force. After the secto

chief and applicable tech directorates had put the technolog

plan together, the sector chief would maintain adequate over

sight to assure the availability of resources (people, money

and facilities) to support the program and see that it pro

gressed on schedule and met customers’ needs. Further, each

236
sector chief had to lead the product cell in XP to develop 

sound investment strategy that would logically build AFRL’

annual budget submission in an integrated way. Because o

the fierce competition for dollars, AFRL would have to submi

a compelling and realistic budget request each year if it expecte

the Air Force to allocate the funding to deliver the most ad

vanced technical products to the war fighter. In other words

the Air Force expected AFRL to deliver an integrated S&

budget linked to the corporate Air Force vision and strategy—no

10 individual budgets for the 10 technology directorates.

2 2

In working an integrated program, the sector chief would ac

as a facilitator with the tech directors and customers to build 

technology road map and program schedule, as well as becom

an advocate to AFRL/XP and General Paul to acquire money t

support that program. The tech directorate would then execut

that program—perform the S&T—according to the approved

road map and schedule. Even after program formulation, th

sector chief would remain an important cog in the process

responsible for monitoring progress as the directorate worke

the program. If the program needed more money as the S&T

moved forward, then the sector chief would advocate additiona

funds during AFRL’s corporate budget-planning process. But a

Tim Dues explained, “If he [the sector chief] sees a directo

pulling funds out of a cross-directorate program or starts to se

the road map unraveling or getting out of phase where you los

synergy, where you lose efficiency, then the sector chief has t

call him on that.” If the tech director and sector chief canno

work out their differences, then the XP director or, if necessary

the commander would resolve the problem.2 3

Using sector chiefs would likely improve efficiency because

under the old four-lab system, too many people became involved

in the integrated-planning process. For example, if technologie

from two different labs contributed to a single integrated pro

gram, then two commanders became involved, who, in turn

would go to their appropriate tech director and XP repre

sentative to help work the problem. Because someone at th

Headquarters AFMC/ST shop at Wright-Patterson also would

become part of the process, as many as seven people might work

the same problem. Under the new AFRL structure, however, th

sector chief—the XP representative at headquarters—would no

237
have to interact with any commanders since the new la

structure eliminated those positions. Instead, th e chief could

coordinate directly with the two tech directors contributing t

the integrated program, thereby reducing the number of peopl

working the problem from seven to three.2 4

Sorting out the new XP and sector chiefs proved a time

consuming and complicated undertaking. However, by th

end of July, General Paul had made up his mind about how

XP and the sector-chief structure would fit into the new lab

Knowing that many people lacked a clear understanding o

how the new XP organization would function, he issued an

unambiguous message on his web site:

Our XP organization is the integrating and facilitating element that will

make AFRL a truly single laboratory. It will be the organizational ele -

ment that will work with our technology directors to define and collaboratively fund 6.3 programs that cut across multiple technology directives. Just as the four lab/XPs facilitated integrated planning within

their respective labs for a set of product-oriented customers (e.g., SPOs,

[major commands], AFMC centers, etc.), our AFRL/XP will house plan -

ning sectors that are also product oriented: an aeronautical planning

cell, a space & missiles planning cell, a [command and control] plan -

ning cell, a human systems planning cell, and a weapons planning cell.

The improvement here is that all five planning cells will be geographically collocated and will work for the same person, as opposed to the

4-lab situation where the 4 lab/XPs are geographically separated and

work for different people—a huge difference! Moreover, within AFRL

Phase II, any given XP planning cell can tap the full spectrum of

technologies in AFRL—not just those traditionally associated with a

given product (e.g., [Wright Laboratory] technologies for aeronautical

systems, [Phillips Laboratory] technologies for space systems, etc.). I’m

confident that this new, centralized AFRL/XP—working in full harmony

with our technology directorates—will help us develop and present a

powerful corporate portfolio for our weapon system–oriented customers

such as product centers, [major commands], and battle labs. We will

roll all of the various XP product-sector planning activities together via

a corporate investment strategy activity within XP. That activity will be

accountable for developing our S&T [Program Objective Memorandum],

working budget cuts with the technology directors, preparing planning

and programming documentation, and assuring our corporate processes for technology investment planning and technology transition

are robust and fully implemented across all of AFRL. Finally, we will

house activities such as [Small Business Innovation Research ], [Independent Research and Development], international cooperative R&D,

and technology transfer within the AFRL/XP organization. As I have

repeatedly said, AFRL/XP is the key to helping us become a truly single

238
laboratory as opposed to 

nine small

labs.” The leaders of the new technology directorates and of the new

AFRL/ XP will be working hard on an

AFRL/ XP concept of operations over

the next few weeks. There is no higher

priority in my mind than assuring that

we establish a cooperative, collaborative working environment among the

AFRL/XP organization and our technology directorates. Success here

means success for AFRL, pure and

simple.25

After he settled on the new XP

organization, General Paul then

appointed a director to lead this

important functional area, so

critical to shaping the corporate

nature of the new lab. In July Dr.

Brendan Godfrey, director of

Armstrong Lab, was in Dayton to attend a memorial service fo

the wife of an Armstrong Lab employee. As they drove togethe

to the service, Paul asked Godfrey if he would take the XP job

After thinking about it a few days, he informed General Paul o

his acceptance, fully realizing that the position would becom

one of the most visible and challenging in the entire AFRL. 2 6

Paul chose Godfrey for several reasons. Firstly, knowin

that the Armstrong director was going away in October, Pau

wanted to make sure that Godfrey moved to a comparable job

in AFRL. Secondly, Paul considered Godfrey, who had a stron

and distinguished track record in the private and militar

sectors, eminently qualified for the position. In the late 1980s

he served as vice president of Mission Research Corporation in

Albuquerque, New Mexico, moving on to become chief scientis

of the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, technology director o

the Advanced Weapons and Survivability Directorate at Phil

lips Lab, and director of Armstrong Lab in San Antonio in

1994. According to Paul, “He will have an unmatched perspec

tive in executing the duties of AFRL/XP.” At the same time h

announced the new XP director, Paul selected Tim Dues a

the associate director of Plans and Programs. As Godfrey’

right-hand man, Dues would devote all his time and energy t

Dr. Brendan B. Godfrey, AFRL’s

first director of Plans and

Programs.

239
working corporate investment strategy and technology transi

tion processes. Dues also would work very closely with the si

sector chiefs to define corporate policy. 2 7

During August and September, when Godfrey began prepar

ing the groundwork to put together the XP organization for th

lab stand-up in October, it became readily apparent tha

Plans and Programs would be a much larger organization in

the headquarters than anticipated. Originally, the single-la

plan called for the headquarters staff to increase from abou

93 to 150 or 160. But according to AFRL’s OCR, submitted in

August, 183 authorized positions (62 officers, four enlisted

and 117 civilians) were to be allocated for the Plans and Pro

grams Directorate—more people than the entire headquarter

staff projected in the spring—to perform all of the XP require

ments of the headquarters and 10 tech directorates.

2 8

Paul pointed out that no one had exact numbers on how big

XP at the headquarters would become during the early plan

ning stages. His approach entailed building XP from th

ground up and sizing it according to the duties attached t

that function. After several months of study and recommenda

tions by the XP task group and others, it became clear that XP

would become the largest element of the headquarters. Tha

seemed reasonable to Paul because after the lab became 

product-center equivalent, the AFRL commander would hav

more responsibilities and duties in the XP area than he ha

under the old ST structure. By the summer, when all XP posi

tions were matched against job descriptions at the XP division

and branch levels, the number 183 did not seem excessive.2 9

The devil was indeed in the details. To handle all the dutie

and responsibilities associated with the XP operation would

take two divisions and six branches. The Technology Transfe

and Corporate Communications Division supervised tw

branches: Technology Transfer and Corporate Communica

tions. Four other branches—Requirements, Planning, Pro

gramming, and International—belonged to the Corporate In 

vestment Strategy Division . So even before the lab stood up

one could see clear signs of a growing headquarters—some

thing the independent review boards had warned the lab lead

ership about several months earlier. 3 0

240
It became clear in the late summer that the tech director

ates would house no more XP offices. Small groups of people

would remain at each tech directorate , working XP issues, bu

the plan called for the majority of the four-lab XP employees t

return to line positions within each of the new tech director

ates. The word also got out that headquarters would urge

volunteers who had worked at one of the four-lab XP shops t

apply for the large number of unfilled positions slated fo

headquarters XP . The moves did not involve promotions—only

lateral reassignments that kept current grades and salaries in

place. The early response was not encouraging. For the mos

part, people in field locations removed from Wright-Patterson

simply did not want to pick up and move, mainly because o

family considerations and career aspirations. Senior lab lead

ership believed that most of these people, over time, would

end up in various tech directorate organizations, such as th

Technology Assessment Division or the Integration and Opera

tions Division .

3 1

Operations and Support Directorate

Although organizing the Plans and Programs Directorat

undoubtedly raised some very tough issues for AFRL, it was no

the only major challenge the lab confronted. Deciding what to d

with the support functions in AFRL generated an equal amoun

of discussion and emotion and, as did XP , produced two basi

perspectives on how to handle the problem. The centralized

approach advocated running support activities from headquar

ters, while the decentralized approach called for the tech direc

tors to select and manage the specific support functions the

needed. The two camps gave the Corporate Board a full spec

trum of support options from which to choose. 3 2

Unlike XP, a self-contained business highly focused on inte

grated strategic planning and budgeting activities, Suppor

consisted of a loose network of numerous smaller offices, each

with its own distinctive responsibilities for supporting AFRL

These functions ran the gamut from safety and security t

weather support, with many others wedged in between. If, b

definition, Support consisted of all activities outside the lin

241
S&T work, then it accounted fo

approximately 40 percent of th

headquarters and four-laborator

infrastructure. This included

communications, facilities man

agement, logistics, human re

sources, contracting, comptrolle

services, computer support serv

ices, small business services

history, intelligence, legal serv

ices, commander’s action group

administrative services (mail

room, travel, printing, publica

tions, etc.), supply, multimedi

services (graphics, photographi

support, displays, etc.), mainte

nance, protocol, and more. 3 3

Two teams examined suppor

options—one led by Colonel Rogacki, director of Phillips La

Propulsion at Edwards AFB, and the other led by Colonel Mark 

isello, vice commander of AFRL. Both agreed that support re

quired a great deal of attention and thought in building the new

AFRL infrastructure, and both recognized the unique opportu

nity they had to streamline it and make it more efficient. Fur

thermore, the final support system—however it turned out—ha

to take into account the mandatory personnel reductions o

AFRL’s phase IIB downsizing plan.3 4

Rogacki charged the members of his group (table 16) with

providing an integrated and efficient support program tha

would optimize each tech directorate’s ability to deliver rele

vant technologies to the war fighter. After reviewing the cur

rent lab-support environment, they would conduct a numbe

of brainstorming sessions that would lead to possible option

and then reevaluate and refine each of the options. As part o

that process, the team had to focus on two key areas: (1

control of support functions (Who would own the support people

Who would prioritize and direct their work? Who would man

age the support offices and be accountable for what they ac

complished or failed to accomplish?) and (2) location of sup

port functions. The group would select the best support op tion

Col John Rogacki led the

Integration and Operations Task

Group.

242
for presentation to the Corporate Board , which would mak

the final decision on how best to organize support.3 5

To better understand the current support organization, Ro

gacki’s team members met with Dues, Russo, and Markisello

to find out how the command section viewed support . The

then used this information to build seven options consisting o

different support configurations. For example, one of the op 

tions—the strategic business-unit model—reflected industry’

view of support. Private companies, which looked very hard a

profits, recommended restricting the support force to approxi

mately 10 percent of the total workforce. But not everyon

agreed with that approach, many expressing skepticism abou

applying the 10 percent ratio to military organizations, which

had a higher calling to fight wars in defense of the nation

Driven by its mission, a fighting unit had to depend on an

extensive support system . (Indeed, to support one infantr

soldier in the field required 14 support troops.) So 10 percen

simply did not seem to fit a military operation, one observe

commenting that it was “just a number,” not factored into th

final support solution. 3 6

After the team narrowed down the seven options to three

Rogacki briefed the Corporate Board on 29 April, recommend

ing a decentralized support operation closely tied in with each

of the tech directorates. This plan called for maintaining only

a skeleton support office at headquarters, consistent with th

Table 16

Colonel Rogacki’s Integration and Operations Task Group

Lt Col Terry Childress, AL/HSC/OET Col Robert Herklotz, AFOSR/CD

Mr. John Mcnamara, RL/OC Mr. Bob Rapson, WL/MLL

Maj Jim Sweeney, RL/XPP Mr. Carl Ousley Jr., OL-AC PL/RKS

Mr. Vince Miller, WL/FIIC 1st Lt Kathy A. Zukor, AL/HRT

Mr. David Ramey, Strategic Leadership Capt Scott Jones, SLTT

Associates

Mrs. Darlene Shifflett, AFFTC/MQQ

243
idea of keeping that staff small, as well as keeping suppor

functions under the control of the tech directors. The director

would have the flexibility to size and tailor the support force t

fit their directorates’ special needs and requirements an

would have to pay for each support-service position carried on

AFRL’s manning document.

3 7

At the same time Rogacki’s group was preparing its recom

mendations, Colonel Markisello’s Support Task Group (tabl

17) was hard at work developing and refining a centralize

support operation controlled and managed by headquarters

Markisello told the Corporate Board that a strong central sit

offered the best chance for maintaining consistency of suppor

services across the laboratory since a director of support a

headquarters could distribute support resources and service

equitably—and with a minimum number of personnel—to al

the tech directorates. Instead of allowing each tech director t

determine the size of his or her support structure, which

could vary greatly from one director to another, the Opera

tions and Support director at headquarters could limit th

number of personnel working support issues at the tech direc

torates—an important aspect since AFRL’s personnel reduc

tions would come only from support positions.3 8

Lt Col Stephen Vining, Headquarters Maj Paul Elmer, Headquarters

AFMC/STDR AFMC/STDR

Bonnie Moutoux, Headquarters Rosemary Andrews, AL/SD

AFMC/STA

Wendell Banks, AL/CFP Scott Marshall, AL

Col Jim Ledbetter, PL/CV/DS Mike Brown, PL/RKD

Louis Michaud, PL/DS-H Dan Bollana, RL/DO

Dick Rapke, RL/CE Jerry Gullo, RL/LG

Col Ronald Channell, WL/DO Ed Candler, WL/DO

Walt Maine, WL/MNP

Scott Jones, Headquarters AFMC/ST-SL

Table 17

Colonel Markisello’s Support Task Group

244
After listening to the presentations by Rogacki and Mark 

isello and after further discussing the two recommended sup

port options with the Corporate Board, General Paul made hi

decision, selecting Rogacki’s decentralized approach to settin

up the support infrastructure. He did so for a number o

reasons. Firstly, he wanted to keep his headquarters as lean

as possible, but a centralized support operation would in 

crease the size of the headquarters and its budget to pay for 

large section of support workers, especially since the XP direc

torate showed signs of growing. The general was determined t

keep a small support directorate at the headquarters tha

would define overall policy and facilitate work on internal sup

port matters.3 9

Secondly, Paul recognized that the majority of support ac

tivities took place at the tech directorate locations. Under th

current organization, support offices of various sizes and func

tions were physically scattered at all AFRL locations. More

over, no two sites configured their support services in exactly

the same way, each site having unique local requirements

partly because of mission demands. Depending on the loca

tion of the tech directorate , the base infrastructure might o

might not be able to furnish some support functions to th

tech directorates. The directors liked the current setup be

cause they could usually obtain direct, timely, and reliabl

service from their own local support people or the base infra

structure. They had no inclination to disrupt this system b

depending on support service from a headquarters located, in

many cases, hundreds of miles away. In short, they wanted t

control their support functions. Furthermore, some expresse

concern that, under a centralized system, directorates next t

the flagpole at Wright-Patterson —because of proximity—would

receive preferential treatment from headquarters for suppor

services. Additionally, many tech directors harbored suspi

cions that a centralized support directorate could easily lea

to micromanagement and dictatorial practices enforced b

headquarters. 4 0

Thirdly, under a centralized approach, AFRL headquarter

would have to build a central support fund by taxing each

tech directorate , whereas a decentralized system would re

quire each tech director to finance his or her own suppor

245
activities. Paul reasoned that, under the latter scheme, mos

tech directors would keep their support costs to a minimum in

order to have more money to conduct research.4 1

General Paul liked the idea that each tech director would

size, own, fund, and control the support offices for his or he

directorate. Further, the fact that decentralization provide

maximum flexibility, allowing the tailoring of support opera

tions to meet specific needs, made sense to Paul, who did no

want to force-fit a support template on every tech directorate

The general was also a realist. The existence of so many differ

ent support offices—many with fewer than five workers—

spread over the entire AFRL landscape would make any kin

of move to headquarters extremely difficult. Additionally, per

sonnel regulations protected civilians from forced geographi

moves unless their job description included a move clause. S

Paul informed his tech directors of his goal of significantly

reducing the size of the current support staffs, urging them t

reevaluate the size of their support operations at least once 

year—preferably more often—as part of an ongoing process t

reach the desired manpower savings. As support people re

tired or changed jobs, tech directors would not backfill thos

positions, which, over time, would help meet the downsizin

requirements.4 2

After Paul made his decision, headquarters and the tech

directors began determining the location of each support of

fice. By the time of the stand-up at the end of October, the

had assigned every support office to one of three organiza 

tions: headquarters, a technology directorate , or a central sit

where two or more tech directorates pooled their resource

and shared support functions. At headquarters, General Pau

made Colonel Markisello director of the Operations and Sup

port Directorate , which included a select group of the large

support activities: communications, safety, security, facilitie

management, logistics, and weather. The 16 people (five offi

cers, one enlisted, and 10 civilians) assigned to DS would

coordinate and issue broad policy throughout AFRL for th

support functions mentioned above. In addition, each of th

support groups in DS had responsibility for ensuring that it

particular functions were carried out within headquarters

However, DS did not contain all of AFRL’s support offices. Th

246
remaining ones were assigned on a case-by-case basis to vari

ous other groups in the command section.4 3

The tech directors had to decide what support offices the

wanted to own separately and what functions they wanted t

include in a common support organization, known as the cen

tral site. All of the directors at Wright-Patterson and Kirtlan

agreed to share a large portion of their support resources a

their respective sites. For example, the five tech directors a

Wright-Patterson formed a site-operations council that as

signed support functions to the Wright central site, with th

tech directors owning and paying for only selected suppor

positions on their books (e.g., each separate computer-suppor

service office, although consolidated under one directorate

would serve all five directorates by working out of the centra

site). Obviously, each tech director would finance roughly 2

percent of the total central-site costs. To sort out what sup

port offices would reside on which directorate’s manning ros

ter, all five tech directors met to conduct something similar t

the NFL draft. One director would run the central site an

coordinate all support activities with the other four directors

which would free them to concentrate on S&T issues withou

worrying about spending too much time attending to suppor

requirements. The two tech directors at Kirtland set up 

similar central-site operation.44

Not all common support functions ended up in a centra

site, however. At Kirtland, some support offices assigned t

Phillips Lab—such as human resources, safety, security, pro

tocol, public affairs, and others—were split. The two Kirtlan

tech directors agreed that the safety office serving Phillips La

should become two separate offices when the lab opened in

October, half assigned to the Integration and Operations Divi

sion to support the Directed Energy Directorate and the othe

half assigned to support the Space Vehicles Directorate. Sim

larly, several months after the AFRL stand-up, Dr. Russo saw

to it that the Materials Directorate at Wright-Patterson had it

own personnel support office. By having his personnel offic

down the hall, he could take care of all personnel matters in 

more effective and timely manner. 4 5

While Paul’s staff worked on finalizing the details of al

command-section staff offices, several very important personne

247
changes occurred in the middle of the summer. At the busies

time of the reorganization process, only three months befor

the phase II stand-up, three of the four lab commanders de

parted for new assignments, prompting many people to ques

tion why the top leaders would leave in the midst of such 

radical change when the organization needed them most

Hundreds of taskings remained incomplete, and personne

uncertainties pushed the anxiety level at the lab to an all-tim

high. Many employees, searching for reassurance and 

steady hand on the helm, felt that the lab commanders ha

abandoned ship to advance their own careers.

General Paul, however, saw things differently. Because o

the decision to replace product executives (the lab command

ers had become product executives during the interim la

stand-up) with sector chiefs, no high-level positions remaine

for the lab commanders to fill. In many ways, they had be

come odd men out. Paul realized in August that the new tech

directors had the deepest involvement in preparing the lab fo 

its October stand-up. They and their staffs worked unit-man

nin g and infrastructure issues to make sure the tech director

ates shaped up as planned. More and more of the burden an

workload passed from the commanders to the tech directors

who would assume control once the stand-up occurred. In

fact, one could argue that, during the few months prior to th

end of phase IIA, the lab commanders had become mere fig 

ureheads. Recognizing their dilemma, Paul encouraged them

to move on and accept jobs of higher responsibility with othe

organizations.4 6

General Paul announced that Col Rich Davis , commander o

Wright Lab and a brigadier general as of 1 August, had to mov

on to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization because no O-7

positions existed in AFRL. Dr. Keith Richey left his job as direc

tor of the Flight Dynamics Lab to take over as director of Wrigh

Lab until the end of phase IIA, and Paul appointed Col Ron

Channell as the Wright Lab commander for the same period.4 7

At Phillips Laboratory in Albuquerque, Dr. Earl Good be

came the new director, replacing Col Mike Heil, who moved on

to become inspector general at Headquarters AFMC. Col Bi

Heckathorn became the new Phillips Lab commander. In up

state New York, Mr. Ray Urtz replaced Col Ted Bowlds, wh

248
left Rome Lab to take a new assignment at SAF/AQ in th

Pentagon. Col Fred Foster became the Rome Lab commander

Dr. Brendan Godfrey, who remained in his position as directo

of Armstrong Lab, would move to his new job as head o

AFRL/ XP in October. 4 8

Faced with the prospect of losing their jobs through reorgan

zation, the lab commanders nevertheless put on corporate hat

and rolled up their sleeves to help formulate the single laborator

during some very challenging times. Paul had generous prais

for them: “I was proud to be associated with these outstandin

leaders. They have my deepest respect and gratitude.”4 9

Notes

1. Dr. Keith Richey, former chief scientist, Wright Laboratory, inter

viewed by author, 5 February 1998; briefing, Mr. Tim Dues, WL/XP, sub

ject: AFRL/ XP Task Force: Status Report, 22 March 1997; Maj Gen Richar

R. Paul, AFRL Corporate Board notebook, meeting materials, tab 14, “Mis

sion Statement: Air Force Research Laboratory Plans and Program Director

ate,” 25–26 August 1997; and Robert Ely, “Air Force Consolidates Researc

under New Lab,” KAFB Focus, 31 October 1997. See also New World Vistas

Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, Summary Volume (Washington

D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1995); Global Engagement: A Visio

for the 21st Century Air Force (Washington, D.C.: United States Air Force

1997); and Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995)

2. Richey interview; Dues briefing; Paul notebook; Ely; and Maj Ge

Richard R. Paul to AL/CC et al., letter, subject: Laboratory Vision State

ment, 21 July 1996 with attached “Vision Statement.”

3. Dues briefing.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Mr. Tim Dues, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998.

7. Ibid.; and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 Marc

1998.

8. Dues interview; Paul interview; and Col Dennis Markisello, inter

viewed by author, 6 February 1998.

9. Paul interview; and Dr. Brendan Godfrey, interviewed by author, 1

June 1998.

10. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, telephone conversation with author, 

April 2000; briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Scienc

and Technology: Product Executives, 2 April 1997; briefing, Maj Gen Rich 

ard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Single Laboratory, 13 February 1997; an

Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to author, E-mail, subject: Update, 2 April 2000.

11. Paul briefings, 13 February and 2 April 1997.

249
12. Paul briefing, 2 April 1997; and briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul

subject: Air Force Research Laboratory: Heading Check, 29 April 1997.

13. Paul briefings, 2 and 29 April 1997.

14. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 22 November 1999

Capt Chuck Helwig, ST-SL, point paper, “Product Executive Red Team,” draf

[April 1997]; Paul E-mail; message, General Paul’s web site, subject: AFR

Phase II: A Decision Process Flowchart; on-line, Internet, 25 April 1997, avai

able from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; an

Paul briefing, 29 April 1997.

15. Briefing chart, “Product Executives Task Force Team,” n.d.; an

briefing, Col Rich Davis, subject: Report of PE [Product Executive] and PE

Red Team Subgroups, 7 May 1997.

16. Paul E-mail.

17. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, notes, subject: Lab Reorganization, 2

April 2000.

18. Ibid.

19. Paul E-mail; and Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, telephone conversatio

with author, 3 April 2000.

20. Paul E-mail; and Paul telephone conversation, 3 April 2000.

21. Paul interview, 22 November 1999; Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, inter

viewed by author, 25 April 2000; message, General Paul’s web site, subjec

AFRL Progress Report—Directorates and More; on-line, Internet, 14 May 1997

available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/up

dates.htm; message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Key Leaders for the AFR

Phase II Organization; on-line, Internet, 22 August 1997, available from

http://stbbs. wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; Dr. Donal

C. Daniel to all AFRL, letter, subject: Request for Volunteers for the Air Forc

Research Laboratory Plans and Programs Directorate, 21 October 1997, wit

attached AFRL/XP mission statements; and Paul notes.

22. Paul interviews, 22 November 1999 and 25 April 2000; Paul mes

sages, 14 May and 22 August 1997; Daniel letter; Paul notes; Dues inter

view; and Dr. Vince Russo, interviewed by author, 4 February 1998.

23. Dues interview.

24. Ibid.

25. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: AFRL Phase II Status; on

line, Internet, 31 July 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS

labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

26. Godfrey interview.

27. Paul message, 22 August 1997.

28. AFRL Organization Change Request Package, appendices A–L, Au 

gust 1997.

29. Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

30. Daniel letter.

31. Godfrey interview; Col Mike Pepin, interviewed by author, 3 Februar

1998; Col John Rogacki, interviewed by author, 9 June 1998; and messag

General Paul’s web site, subject: Personnel Allocation Process; on-line, In terne

250
16 September 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs

single-lab/updates.htm. 

32. Rogacki interview; Markisello interview; and Col Dennis Markisell

to author, E-mail, subject: Single Lab History, 3 April 1998.

33. Briefing, Col Dennis Markisello, subject: Guiding Principles for Sup

port Functions [July 1997]; and briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subjec

Air Force Research Laboratory: Status Update, August 1997.

34. Rogacki interview; Markisello interview; and briefing, Col John Ro

gacki, subject: Integration/Operations Division Team [March/April 1997].

35. Rogacki interview; Markisello interview; and Rogacki briefing.

36. Rogacki interview; and Dr. Robert Barthelemy, interviewed b

author, 6 February 1998.

37. Rogacki interview; Paul briefing, 29 April 1997; and Paul message

25 April 1997.

38. Rogacki interview; AFRL briefing chart, “Support Task Force Team

n.d.; and Paul briefing, 29 April 1997.

39. Paul interview, 2 March 1998; and Paul message, 14 May 1997.

40. Markisello interview; Paul interview, 22 November 1999; Rogack

briefing; and Paul message, 31 July 1997.

41. Paul notes.

42. Paul interview, 2 March 1998; Markisello interview; Markisello brie

ing; and Paul message, 14 May 1997.

43. Paul interview, 2 March 1998; Markisello interview; Markisello brie

ing; Paul messages, 14 May and 22 August 1997; Russo interview; an

AFRL Organization Change Request Package.

44. Dr. Bill Borger, interviewed by author, 27 July 1998; Mr. Le

McFawn, interviewed by author, 30 July 1998; Russo interview; Cap

Chuck Helwig, interviewed by author, 3 February 1998; Paul briefing, 2

April 1997; and Paul message, 14 May 1997.

45. Borger interview; and Russo interview.

46. Paul interview, 2 March 1998.

47. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Transition from AFRL Phas

I to Phase II; on-line, Internet, 4 August 1997, available from http://stbbs

wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

48. Ibid.

49. Paul notes.

251
Chapter 14

The Final Push

In addition to the two functional directorates at headquarters—

Plans and Programs and Operations and Support—a numbe

of staff offices made up other important elements of the AFRL

command section. One of these, the Washington Office

evolved as a result of the work produced by the D.C. Presenc

Task Group, chaired by Dr. Godfrey. This small but very expe

rienced group consisted of Dr. Joe Janni and Mr. Mat

Jaskiewicz from AFOSR, Col Mike Havey from Phillips Lab

Col Brendel Kreighbaum from Rome Lab, Mr. Bill Woody from

Wright Lab, and Lt Col Jim Rader from Armstrong Lab. Thi

group would explore the feasibility of establishing an office t

promote and market AFRL’s capabilities, programs, and prod 

ucts to customers in the nation’s capital. Essentially a liaison

operation, the office aimed to put AFRL on an equal footin

with other federal labs in terms of competing for resources.1

The Bergamo conference of December 1996 had raised th

issue of moving the new laboratory’s headquarters to Wash

ington, D.C., in order to enhance visibility and gain the sup

port of Washington power brokers for the Air Force’s S&T

programs. Generals Viccellio and Paul, however, adamantly

opposed such a plan, arguing that everyone had more than

enough work to complete on a tight schedule without addin

the burden of moving headquarters to a new location hun

dreds of miles away from Dayton. Viccellio firmly intended t

keep AFRL—one of the key elements of his command—close t

Headquarters AFMC at Wright-Patterson so he could interac

with General Paul, daily if necessary. Similarly, Paul intended

to keep his headquarters near the largest technical componen

of his organization (five of nine tech directorates) at Wright

Patterson and close to his AFMC boss.2

Nevertheless, Paul continued to receive inquiries from

“product center commanders and others” about permanently

locating AFRL headquarters in Washington—a good exampl

of taking too much time to solve 10 percent of one’s problems

Wanting to put this matter to rest once and for all so that h

253
and his staff could get on with more pressing lab matters

Paul wrote to General Viccellio in early February, asking him

to verify his intentions concerning the lab’s location. Viccellio

responded in the clearest language possible: “The single lab

HQ will be at WPAFB—final decision.”3

Despite their opposition to moving AFRL’s headquarters

they did favor coming up with a plan that would give the new

lab as much exposure as possible in Washington. That job fel

to Godfrey’s group, which held its first meeting on 18 Febru 

ary. Taking the position “If you’re not there, you don’t play” in

the Washington arena, the members set out to define th

goals and structure for establishing a strong AFRL presenc

there. Other federal labs, such as Sandia, Los Alamos, Liver

more, and Oak Ridge maintained permanent staff offices in

Washington to assure that they received their fair share o

DOD’s economic pie. 4

Godfrey briefed his group’s findings to the Corporate Board

in March, April, and May, reporting that the Washington liai

son office should serve as AFRL’s sole S&T voice in dealings

with the Air Staff, OSD, Congress, and “other Washington-are

stakeholders.” The latter included Washington-based profes

sional technical societies and research institutes, the Arm

and Navy, government agencies, major aerospace companies

and universities. The director of the office would serve as th

AFRL commander’s representative and spokesman for AFRL in

national forums and committees. A successful office would gar

ner a larger fraction of DOD funding for AFRL programs an

pave the way for the lab’s participation in joint-service pro

grams that would leverage Air Force funding for AFRL. 5

During the Corporate Board discussions, General Pau

stressed that the office’s director would not have the authority

to make independent decisions affecting the future of the lab

but would work very closely with him and his staff, as well a

the tech directors and their technology program managers. Only

after proper internal coordination could they develop a coordi

nated and consistent long-range policy for AFRL, allowing th

D.C. director to promote AFRL’s position at high-level meeting

in Washington. This did not restrict the director from takin

the initiative to probe and investigate potential contacts in D.C

that might benefit AFRL, but final commitments to specifi

254
technology programs would take place only after General Pau

had consulted with his senior staff and technology directors.6

After reviewing all the information he received from Godfrey’

team as well as the Lab Alumni group’s comment that “th

Washington D.C. presence of AFRL is critical,” Paul approved

the establishment of a Washington office. In July he an

nounced on his web site that the new office would take th

lead in “promoting AFRL’s interests among our Washington

area partners and customers.” To ensure that the office had

“adequate horsepower,” he assigned Dr. William O. Berry, a

SES and former director of chemistry and life sciences a

AFOSR, as its first director. Paul colocated the new office an

its staff of four people with the Secretary of the Air Force fo

Acquisition (SAF/AQR) organization in the Pentagon to avoid

having two Air Force S&T voices in Washington—whether in

fact or in perception. He and Dr. Helmut Hellwig , head o

SAF/ AQR at the time, were in complete agreement about thi

arrangement and further agreed that to ensure tight linkag

between the two offices, Dr. Berry should also serve a

SAF/ AQR deputy to Dr. Hellwig. Convinced that the Washing

ton presence would have a positive effect on AFRL’s future

General Paul told the AFRL workforce that he was excited

about the “doors to be opened by our D.C. office.”7

Paul then announced that eight other staff offices—mandated

by Air Force organizational policy—would round out the re

maining organizational elements of the headquarters command

section. The largest of these, the Human Resources Office, with

19 employees, combined the traditional functions of manpowe

(spaces) and personnel (faces). The two smallest organiza 

tions—the Corporate Development Office, responsible for cor

porate, organizational, and employee development activities

and the Reserve Affairs Office—each had only two civilian

assigned. A new function, the Corporate Development Office

focused resources and training on organizational skills (e.g

leadership, teamwork, participatory decision making, etc.) fo

AFRL’s workforce. 8

The Corporate Information Office (CIO), consisting of one offi

cer and four civilians, would define and acquire AFRL’s corpo

rate information infrastructure. General Paul wanted a CIO tha

would take the lead in linking modern informatio n-technology

255
systems (computer networking, E-mail, database manage 

ment, standardized software and hardware, etc.) across th

lab: “How we manage information and business communica

tions in our new lab will be crucial to our success.” Despit

CIO’s small size, Paul envisioned a decentralized operation in

which the tech directorates would house and manage most o

the office’s staff. Furthermore, CIO was not just a loca

agency, Congress having passed in 1996 the Information

Technology Management Reform Act (the Clinger-Cohen Act

that established the position of chief information officer for al

government agencies.9

Other offices assigned to the headquarters included th

Commander’s Action Group, which worked special projects fo

the commander on a case-by-case basis; the Executive Serv

ices Office , which managed all command administrative activi

ties, including correspondence tracking, protocol, awards

promotion and retirement ceremonies, supply purchasing

and so forth; the Comptroller Office, responsible for the finan

cial management of AFRL; and the Contracting Office

manned by Headquarters AFMC personnel matrixed to AFRL

The latter office advised the AFRL commander on acquisition

policy; the awarding of contracts, grants, and cooperativ

agreements; and other acquisition transactions. Since AFRL

“outsourced” 75 percent of its budget to private industry an

universities, contracting personnel had to assure the legality

efficiency, and responsiveness of all contracting actions. 1 0

Finally, General Paul announced the establishment of eigh

research site detachments at Brooks, Edwards, Eglin, Han

scom, Kirtland, Rome, Tyndall, and Wright-Patterson Ai

Force Bases, with a colonel designated as site commander fo

each detachment. Their “Series G orders” gave these colonels

who would report directly to General Paul, authority commen

surate with their positions, particularly regarding Uniform

Code of Military Justice authority to deal with military discipli

nary issues promptly and decisively. The site commande

staffed the orderly room, which served the entire AFRL mili

tary population at the installation, in addition to serving a

director, deputy director, or division chief of a tech directorat

at the detachment location. This arrangement would sav

256
manpower and reflected the fact that the site commander

s

duties were not full-time jobs.1 1

None of the offices assigned to headquarters would becom

official until after the stand-up. In order to obtain authoriza 

tion for that event, General Paul and his staff had to submi

an OCR for approval by the AFMC commander and the Ai

Staff—specifically, the chief of staff and the secretary. Tha

document had to respond to seven basic questions. (1) What is

the proposed action? The action entailed inactivating fou

laboratories and consolidating them into one laboratory con

sisting of 10 technology directorates . (2) Why is the action

needed? Congressional action embodied in section 277 of th

National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 required th

Air Force to consolidate and restructure its laboratories. (3

What is the structure of the new organization? Obtaining all th

data to answer this question proved extremely time-consumin 

and arduous (see below). 12 (4) How does the structure compare

with the standard structure and nomenclature? No standard

structure for AFMC laboratory functions existed because th

mission requirements made each current laboratory organiza 

tion different. (5) What are the potential impacts on other or

ganizations? The formation of AFRL would minimize technol

ogy seams that existed in the four-lab organization and, in th

process, would reduce the single lab’s infrastructure operatin

costs. Further, each of the AFMC product centers, previously

serviced by only one of the four labs, would now gain th

support of the entire one-laboratory enterprise. (6) Why is i

better? The new lab would reduce management and suppor

overhead functions, which would eventually decrease th

number of authorized positions assigned to AFRL. (7) Wha

impact does the organization request have on unit history

Each of the four labs would prepare a close-out history, an

historians in the new lab would be responsible for writin

AFRL histories.1 3

As mentioned above, question number three took some tim

to answer. The most tedious undertaking involved assignin

specific authorization numbers for officers, enlisted personnel

and civilians to match each of the newly created staff office

and functional directorates in the command section, as well a

the technology directorates. This process had started back in

257
the spring with Dr. Russo and his transition team reviewin

the four labs’ unit-manning documents to begin the process o

locating each position in the new organization. By July thi

effort had intensified greatly, because they had to include tha

vital information in the OCR (fig. 20). In terms of the organiza 

tional change that took place, one can easily see a flattening o

the AFRL structure, compared to the old four-lab structure, a

well as the elevation of the lab to a “tier one” organization in

the AFMC organizational structure, on par with the product

test, logistic, and specialty centers (figs. 21 and 22). 1 4

By the end of July, General Paul and his staff had docu 

mented all the information required in the phase II OCR and

sent it forward to Headquarters AFMC for coordination. Gen

eral Babbitt approved and signed the OCR on 7 August an

sent it to the Air Staff at the Pentagon on 8 August. Pau

predicted that it would take 60 to 90 days to move the docu 

ment through the staffing process, so he expected to hear tha

AFRL could officially stand up by 1 October.1 5

By the middle of September, Paul had received no word on

the OCR except that it was working its way through the Ai

Staff. At that time, he announced that each of the new tech

directors was hard at work implementing the details for con

figuring the new directorates ’ divisions and branches. Lab

guidance required the directors to build the divisions an

branches in accordance with AFRL’s mission and then assign

individuals who formerly worked for the four labs to the new

slots in the tech directorates . This laborious process, which

tried the patience of everyone involved in the exercise, wa

just one of the growing pains that lab people had to adjust t

and endure. Even though each person had an assigned slo

when the lab stood up, they realized that those assignment

might change over the next few months. All of the personne

offices throughout the lab were closely reviewing each person’s

skill requirements to make sure the right person matched u

with the right job. 1 6

The first of October came and went without any word on th

OCR. On his web site, Paul posted a status message entitled

“What’s the deal?” explaining to the lab workforce that, al

though the Air Staff was taking longer than anticipated, h

knew that the OCR had reached the vice chief of staff’s office

258
259
Figure 21. Pre-AFRL S&T Organization

Figure 22. Air Force Research Laboratory

260
After he signed it, the OCR would then go to the chief

s an

secretary’s offices. Brig Gen Larry W. Northington , wh

headed the AF/XPM shop in the Pentagon, assured Paul tha

it simply took time to push the OCR through the paperwork

process, especially since the Air Force would soon transition

to a new chief of staff. Although Northington saw no problem

with the OCR package that could “derail it,” Paul nevertheles

made a trip to the Pentagon to go over the package with

Northington and ensure that he had no lingering questions.1 7

Two weeks later, Paul wrote, “It’s official!” Secretary of th

Air Force Sheila Widnall, just a few days away from leavin

her post, approved the AFRL reorganization on 22 October

The next step called for the Air Staff to send a letter t

AFMC/XPM to issue the G-series orders inactivating the fou

labs and establishing AFRL and its sites, detachments, an

operating locations. Allowing some time to complete all th

paperwork, Paul and AFMC set the effective stand-up for 3

October, after which all AFRL organizations would start usin

their new office symbols. After nearly 11 months of difficul

work and long hours invested by hundreds of people at al

levels of the laboratory workforce, Paul was jubilant, knowin

that the new lab was a reality. 1 8

Although looking optimistically to the future, General Pau

took the time to remind everyone of the lasting contribution

and rich heritage of the four original laboratories:

In the coming weeks, Armstrong, Phillips, Rome and Wright Laboratories may hold ceremonies or other events commemorating their great

histories. I will leave the decisions as to whether to hold such an

event, and how it should be conducted, to each of our lab sites so they

can tailor it to their own desires. As inactivated units, the labs will

retain their history, honors, and lineage. In order to further preserve

the histories of the laboratories, we have taken the step of naming four

of our Research Sites after them. My hope is that our laboratory

heritage is not lost in the new AFRL. 1 9

Col Jacob Kessel, the same AFMC chief of Manpower an

Organization who cut the AFRL interim orders in April, issued

Special Orders GA-1 and GA-2 on 29 October 1997. The firs

order activated the Air Force Research Laboratory and eigh

research site detachments, effective 31 October 1997 (table 18)

Because of the tech directorates ’ geographical separation from

261
AFRL headquarters at Wright-Patterson , the order also act i

vated four technology directorate detachments (table 19). The sec

ond special order (GA-2) officially inactivated Armstron g, Phillips

Rome, and Wright laboratories, effective 31 October 1997.

2 0

The next day, Colonel Kessel notified General Paul that th

naming of all the command section staff offices, functiona

directorates, and tech directorates identified in the OCR had

received approval. Kessel further noted that the AFRL vic

commander would also serve as the AFRL inspector general

Table 18

AFRL Research-Site Detachments

Table 19

AFRL Technology-Directorate Detachments

Detachment Location

1 Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

2 Tyndall AFB, Florida

3 Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts

4 Rome, New York

5 Brooks AFB, Texas

6 Eglin AFB, Florida

7 Edwards AFB, California

8 Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

Detachment Location

 9 (Space Vehicles) Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

10 (Information) Rome, New York

11 (Munitions) Eglin AFB, Florida

12 (Directed Energy) Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

262
that 509 Program 8 personnel authorizations would transfer from

AFRL to the Human Systems Center, and that the four produc

executive positions originally planned would be eliminated.2 1

An official military ceremony to stand up the Air Force Re

search Laboratory took place on 22 October during an AFMC

commander’s conference at the Dayton Convention Center. As 

small group of senior military and civilians watched, Gen Georg

T. Babbitt, AFMC commander, passed the newly approved AFR

flag to Gen Richard R. Paul, who took command of the Ai

Force’s first unified laboratory. This marked the end of an era o

multiple labs dating back to the 1960s. Now, a single Air Forc

laboratory consolidated all S&T programs under the roof of on

streamlined organization. Transitioning to the new lab was no

easy. It happened because people worked hard to make th

implementation process a success—something General Pau

knew better than anyone else: “I’m proud of the job they did

They really stepped up to the challenge.” Clearly, one challeng

had ended. But lab people had little time to dwell upon thi

watershed event. Air Force Research Laboratory leaders now

had the new challenge of taking the lead in developing technol

ogy that would enable the most capable weapon systems to

support US war fighters in the twenty-first century. 2 2

Notes

1. Briefing, Dr. Brendan B. Godfrey, subject: D.C. Presence Task Group

7 May 1997.

2. Gen Henry Viccellio Jr., interviewed by author, 24 June 1998; an

Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, interviewed by author, 2 March 1998.

3. Maj Gen Richard R. Paul to AFMC/CC (General Viccellio), letter, sub

ject: Single Laboratory Headquarters Location, 7 February 1997.

4. Briefing, Dr. Brendan B. Godfrey, subject: D.C. Presence Task Forc

Kickoff Meeting, 18 February 1997; and briefing, Dr. Brendan B. Godfrey

subject: Status Report: D.C. Presence Task Group, 22 March 1997.

5. Godfrey briefings, 18 February and 22 March 1997; briefing, Maj Ge

Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Research Laboratory: Status Report

June 1997; and message, General Paul’s web site, subject: AFRL Phase II: 

Decision Flowchart; on-line, Internet, 25 April 1997, available from

http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

6. Background paper, “Washington Office Director” [March 1997], in

D.C. Presence Task Group Summary notebook.

7. Allan C. Schell to Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, letter, subject: Report of th

Laboratory Alumni Review Team, 23 June 1997, with attached Laborator

263
Alumni Review Team report; briefing, Dr. Bill Berry, subject: CONOPS [Concep

of Operations]/Staffing for AFRL/D.C., 29–30 September 1997; message, Gen

eral Paul’s web site, subject: AFRL Phase II Status; on-line, Internet, 31 Jul

1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-la b

upda tes.htm; and message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Key Leader

for the AFRL Phase II Organization; on-line, Internet, 22 August 1997, availabl

from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

8. AFRL Organization Change Request Package, appendices A–L, Augu

1997.

9. Ibid.; message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Midcourse Headin

Check; on-line, Internet, 24 March 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af

mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; and message, General Paul’s we

site, subject: AFRL Corporate Information Office; on-line, Internet, 7 May 1997

available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.h tm. 

10. AFRL Organization Change Request Package; and Maj Gen Richar

R. Paul, notes, subject: Lab Reorganization, 20 April 2000.

11. AFRL Organization Change Request Package; and Paul notes.

12. AFRL Organization Change Request Package.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.; briefing, Maj Gen Richard R. Paul, subject: Air Force Researc

Laboratory: Status Report, August 1997; and Paul notes.

15. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Getting Approval of AFR

Phase II; on-line, Internet, 13 August 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb

af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; and briefing charts, subject

AFRL Phase II Organizational Change Request [August 1997], in AFRL note

book no. 29.

16. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Personnel Allocation Process

on-line, Internet, 16 September 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af

mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

17. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: AFRL Status—What’s th

Deal?; on-line, Internet, 10 October 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb

af.mil/STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm; and Paul notes.

18. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: Commander’s Corner; on

line, Internet, 22 October 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/

STBBS/labs/single-lab/updates.htm. 

19. Ibid.

20. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Special Orders GA-

and GA-2, 29 October 1997.

21. Col Jacob Kessel, chief, Manpower and Organization, AFMC Direc

torate of Plans and Programs, to AFRL/XPM, letter, subject: Air Force Re

search Laboratory, Phase II, Reorganization, 30 October 1997.

22. Robert Ely, AFMC Public Affairs, “Air Force Consolidates Researc

under New Lab Organization,” Kirtland AFB Focus, 31 October 1997.

264
Chapter 15

Conclusion

President Lyndon B. Johnson considered himself a pragmatis

who liked to size up people quickly. According to his Texa

yardstick of humanity, people fitted into one of two real-world

categories. There were those, as he put it, who “do”—the hard

individuals of strong convictions who would fling themselve

into the midst of controversy and take a fervent stance on th

difficult problems of the day. Above all, they possessed a passion

and determination to bring about meaningful change. In pursui

of that goal, they were not afraid to take risks. To them, reform

was not some lofty, intellectual vision reserved for some mor

distant and appropriate time. Rather, they had a greater sens

of urgency to get on with things now. Although the “doers

understood and did not discount the importance of vision, the

placed much more emphasis and value on those individual

actively engaged in the hands-on work to transform the curren

inferior state of affairs into a more productive system.

Unfortunately, a large share of the population, in Johnson’

estimation, did not fit into the ranks of the doers when it cam

to making radical changes in government. Others fell into th

second category of “nondoers”—typically the planners, sta

fers, organizers, consultants, managers, visionaries, and fa 

cilitators who created grandiose schemes but depended a

most exclusively on others, the doers, to get the job done righ

and on time. Johnson especially liked to jab the bright Har

vard boys and East Coast intellectuals by educating them on

the realities of politics that they would not necessarily glean

from their classroom studies. He didn’t hesitate to offer hi

observations on the ordering of the universe when he de

clared, “Those who can, do. Those who can’t, write book

about it. For it is far easier to pontificate about defense an

foreign politics than it is to implement them.”1

Raised in the hard-knocks school of the Texas hill country

Johnson measured people more by what they did as oppose

to what they said they would do. He had little respect fo

people who retreated to the comfort of the sidelines and then

265
became the most vocal critics of those who had to make th

tough decisions. These sideline experts always seemed to hav

a more logical and better solution to every problem, but when

it came to the moment of truth, they were unwilling to ente

the arena and put their idea to the test by marshaling th

forces required to implement their superior plan.

Despite Johnson ’s propensity to overuse hyperbole to mak

a point, much of what he believed in could be applied to th

evolution of the Air Force Research Lab. The single laborator

represented a study in microcosm of a major government re

form movement that produced radical change and upheaval in

the military’s S&T community. Consolidation of the Air Force’

four laboratories into one could not have happened without 

legion of doers. Unlike their position in Johnson ’s perspectiv

on the world, the transition to a consolidated laboratory relie

heavily on the talents of many military and civilian “planners.

In truth, creation of the new lab required the combined exper

tise of planners and doers alike.

In this case, the line between planner and doer often wa

blurred. For example, 13 task groups focused on planning func

tions—studying a specific problem and developing various op 

tions for setting up the lab. Although study and analysis led t

several possible “plans,” group members also had to take action

by selecting what they believed was the best plan. Thus, the

became doers by proposing to General Paul and the Corporat

Board the specific actions necessary to expedite the formation o

the laboratory. Paul and the board members then repeated th

process by studying and analyzing, selecting the best option

and then making the decision to move forward with that plan

Incorporating that action into the OCR and securing its approva

gave General Paul the go-ahead to establish the lab.

Action rather than endless planning distinguished the tran

sition effort. From the start, Paul and his senior staff made 

conscious effort to instill an environment of “doing” rathe

than excessive planning and of encouraging people to mov

ahead with confidence. Importantly, the task groups’ recom

mendations, the Corporate Board’s conclusions, and Genera

Paul’s web site and road shows all showed very specific sign

of progress. The transition operation succeeded because Gen

eral Paul realized he could not afford to allow the process t

266
bog down by studying issues to death. Thus, only four shor

months after establishing the task groups, he shifted the focu 

from planning to implementing the consolidated lab—anothe

outward sign of progress.2

Certainly a significant accomplishment—and one too easily

overlooked—is the speed with which this process occurred

After Secretary Widnall gave her approval on 20 Novembe

1996, the new lab found itself up and operating in only 1

months—a monumental achievement, considering all the con

fusion, false starts, geographic separation of the existing labs

and a host of other complexities associated with building 

new unit from scratch. Some of the credit for this must go t

General Paul, who, from the beginning, set his priorities fo

standing up the lab in October. In the face of resistance t

change and some heavy criticism, both inside and outside th

laboratory system, he remained determined—especially afte

consulting with the director of the Army Research Labora

tory—to adhere to his “90 percent rule ” and use his leadership

skills to keep the lab on schedule.

Clearly, General Paul did not have a monopoly on stron

leadership traits. Leadership exhibited by other individu

als—both military and civilian—at all levels throughout the la

also contributed to the project’s success. Tech directors, division

and branch chiefs, support staff, review board members, an

numerous other dedicated workers—some of whom Paul did no

even know—all took on and completed complicated taskings. A

with any military operation of this magnitude, decisions did no

satisfy everyone, some things did not go exactly as planned, an

some people failed to see how their tasks fit into the big picture

More importantly, though, senior leaders made decisions an

took action to overcome inertia rather than engaging in endles

debate that would have delayed creation of the single lab.

In the midst of trying to bring about fundamental change t

the S&T arm of the Air Force, well-meaning critics continued t

try to introduce doubt into Paul’s mind. The independent review

boards wanted him to slow down, reevaluate, and con duct mor

study and analysis before moving forward. Individuals wh

either had strong ties to the old lab system or saw themselve

as prominent players in the new lab asked question afte

question: Does this process simply rearrange the deck chair

267
to create 10 separate labs rather than one? Was AFRL a res

urrection of the old Directorate of Laboratories, which existe

under the former Air Force Systems Command? Did the new

headquarters XP have too much power and add another leve

of unnecessary bureaucratic layering? Wasn’t the notion o

“doing more with less,” although a catchy slogan, unrealistic

Would the new lab infrastructure severely diminish caree

progression for military personnel and civilians? The AFRL

commander responded “no” to all these questions and pro

ceeded with his implementation plan.

Paul’s senior staff, four lab commanders, and tech director

provided substantial support to the AFRL commander durin

these difficult times. Although they did not agree with him on

every issue, they never doubted his sincerity or motives fo

moving to a consolidated laboratory. Paul used his staff an

commanders to develop a logical implementation plan, insist

ing that task groups representing a broad cross section of th

organization study the options and make recommendations

He listened to what the task groups recommended, made him 

self available, and engaged in discussions with them to sup

port or counter their ideas. Not only did he value the opinion

of his Corporate Board and three independent review boards

but he also sought input from the employees who attended hi

road shows , encouraging everyone to comment through hi

web site. Clearly, General Paul did not operate in isolation.

But one thing he could not share. After listening to and weigh

ing all sides of the issues, he alone would make the final deci

sions. By July he had done so, effectively ending further debate

At this point, the senior staff and four commanders closed rank

to support their commander—as would any disciplined militar

unit determined to conduct and complete its mission.

Creation of the single laboratory did in fact bring abou

fundamental changes—and with minimal disruption to per

sonnel. Indeed, most employees retained their positions an

locations, and no organizations physically moved. At the sam

time, everyone knew that personnel and budget cuts would

occur over the next few years—after all, these actions played 

part in creating the lab. There was just no getting aroun

these two issues as the new lab moved on to phase IIB of th

implementation plan.

268
In the final analysis, Air Force leaders accomplished wha

they had set out to do by consolidating four laboratories int

one, thus creating a more streamlined infrastructure designe

to save money and reduce the size of the workforce over th

long haul. People and dollars now came under the control of 

single lab commander who could more effectively and effi

ciently develop an investment strategy more responsive to cus

tomer needs. Moreover, the new lab organization made majo

strides in reducing the fragmentation of similar technologie

previously distributed among multiple directorates. Above all

formation of the Air Force Research Laboratory in Octobe

1997 was a bold and irreversible first step in positioning th

Air Force on the cutting edge of science and technology. N

one should doubt that this new organization will take the lea

in developing enabling technologies to keep our Air Force su 

perior and ensure the nation’s defense as an unsettled world

moves through the new millennium.

As Air Force Research Lab leaders peer into the future to dea

with the enormous challenges and responsibilities ahead, it wil

be useful for them to turn their eyes to the past for guidance on

how best to proceed through unmarked territory. The lesson i

that people facing seemingly insurmountable odds make th

difference in any great endeavor. Although AFRL leaders wil

face daunting and unknown obstacles in the years to come, the

can gain a sense of quiet confidence from the inspirationa

words of Theodore Roosevelt, spoken a hundred years ago:

Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even

though checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor spirits

who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the gray

twilight that knows not victory nor defeat.3

Notes

1. Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman R. Augustine, The Defense Revolu

tion: Strategy for the Brave New World (San Francisco: Institute for Contem 

porary Studies Press, 1990), 197.

2. Message, General Paul’s web site, subject: The AFRL Road Ahead; on

line, Internet, 24 July 1997, available from http://stbbs.wpafb.af.mil/STBBS

labs/single-lab/updates.htm.

3. Theodore Roosevelt, speech before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, 1

April 1899.

269
APPENDIX A

Chronology
1945 First meeting of the Scientific Advisory Group—

forerunner of the Air Force Scientific Advisor

Board (SAB).

1955 A-76 guidance first appears in Bureau of th

Budget bulletins. The A-76 process determine

whether contracting government work woul

be more cost-effective than employing govern 

ment workers to perform the same jobs.

1966 Office of Management and Budget publishe

Circular A-76.

1982 Air Force Systems Command assigns laborato

ries to centers that report to “product divisions.

1986 Packard Commission’s blue-ribbon study look

at ways to operate the Department of Defens

(DOD) in a more efficient and economica

manner. David Packard, former undersecre

tary of defense, heads the study, which fo 

cuses on reform ing four core areas: nationa

security plan ning/ budgeting, military organi

zation/comman d, acquisition organization

procedu res, and government-industry ac

countability.

June 1986 Packard Commission’s blue-ribbon study is 

sues its final report, A Quest for Excellence

proposing sweeping reforms to improve effi 

ciency and save money in DOD.

1986 President Ronald Reagan signs National Se

curity Decision Document 219, directing im 

plementation of the major recommendation

of the Packard Commission.

1986 President Reagan signs into law the Goldwater

Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiz a tio

Act, considered the most significant defense

reform effort since 1947.

273
1986 Position of undersecretary of defense for ac

quisition created as result of the Goldwater

Nichols Act. The new undersecretary set

overall DOD procurement and research an

development (R&D) policy and provides cen 

tralized control over all acquisition programs

Late 1980s The political/military pendulum begins t

swing in the opposite direction. With the fal

of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution

of the Soviet Union in 1991, unpredictabl

regional conflicts replace the monolithic com 

munist threat.

July 1988–

July 1992

Col Richard R. Paul serves as commander o

Wright Lab, gaining invaluable, practical day

to-day experience directing major technolog

programs for advancing aerospace systems.

1989 President George Bush hears complaint

from congressional representatives who fee

that the services are dragging their feet in

supporting management reforms initiated b

the Packard Commission and the Goldwater

Nichols Act.

February

1989

President Bush directs Secretary of Defens

Dick Cheney to draft a plan to look at ways t

improve management (with fewer employees

and organizational efficiency in DOD. Th

goal is to devise a strategy to implemen

sweeping reforms proposed in the Packard

Commission’s report.

12 June

1989

Secretary of Defense Cheney completes a ma

jor reorganization plan known as the Defens

Management Review (DMR) that addresse

ways to improve the defense procuremen

process. It urges military services to borrow

implement streamlined business practice

used in the private sector.

274
July–

September

1989

As part of the continual defense managemen

review process following the DMR report o

June 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney ap 

points special groups to investigate option

for cons olidating DOD functions, includin

laboratorie s.

30 October

1989

As a result of the special study groups, DMR

Decision 922 strongly advises that the Penta 

gon consider merging all military laboratorie

directly under DOD.

October 1989–

April 1990

DMR Decision 922 directs John A. Betti, un

dersecretary of defense for acquisition, to con 

duct an extensive study that focuses on th

advantages/disadvantages of inter- and in 

traservice consolidation of laboratories. Bet

asks Dr. George P. Millburn, deputy director o

defense research and engineering in the Penta 

gon, to work with three services to explore th

entire range of laboratory options.

30 April 1990 Dr. Millburn reports his findings to Betti an

provides various possible solutions, includin

reducing the number of labs and combinin

all service labs into one DOD laboratory.

13 December

1990

Thirteen Air Force laboratories become four.

13 December

1990–31

October 1997

During this period, the organizational struc

ture of each laboratory is, to a large degree

autonomous.

July 1992 Systems and Logistics commands merge t

form Air Force Materiel Command.

July 1992 Gen Richard R. Paul is selected to serve a

director of Science and Technology (S&T) a t Ai

Force Materiel Command. He is responsibl

for leading and devising investment strateg

275
covering the full spectrum of Air Force technol

ogy activities.

October

1992

Consolidated Army Research Laborator

headquartered at Adelphi, Maryland, is formed

FY 1993–

FY 1996

During this time, 19 A-76 studies are com 

pleted in DOD.

1993 Dr. George R. Abrahamson, chief scientist o

the Air Force, leads a study entitled “Th

Blue Ribbon Panel on Management Option

for Air Force Laboratories.”

1993 The Clinton administration appoints Joh

Deutch and Adm David E. Jeremiah, vic

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to co 

chair the Infrastructure Review Panel, whic

will examine the possibility of reducin

DOD’s infrastructure and its effect on th

permanent workforce.

1993 DOD’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) study as

sesses options for reducing DOD’s labor forc

as the nation shifts away from a strategy de

signed to meet the Soviet global threat to 

new one based on preventing aggression b

regional powers. Out of BUR comes a new

strategy of engagement and enlargement tha

calls for US forces to work with regional allie

to fight and win two major regional conflict

that occur nearly simultaneously.

23 November

1993

President William Jefferson Clinton announce

a plan for an across-the-board review of al

federal laboratories to streamline laborator

operations in view of projected decreases in

federal R&D dollars.

17 December

1993

Gen Ronald W. Yates, commander of Ai

Force Materiel Command, verbally expresse

276
his reservations about the findings put forth b

Dr. Abrahamson’s blue-ribbon panel.

February

1994

Since the military services show no inclina

tion to voluntarily reduce civilians, Secretar

of Defense Les Aspin convenes a meeting wit

his deputy, William J. Perry, and Edwin Dor

to discuss alternatives.

3 February

1994

Secretary of Defense Aspin leaves his post.

5 May

1994

President Clinton issues a directive estab

lishing the Interagency Federal Laborator

Review.

May 1994–

May 1995

At the direction of President Clinton, the Na 

tional Science and Technology Counci

(NSTC) reviews the nation’s three larges

laboratory systems operating within DOD

the Department of Energy, and the Nationa

Aeronautics and Space Administration.

2 June

1994

Edwin Dorn, undersecretary of defense fo

personnel and readiness, sends a letter to al

secretaries of the military departments wit

year-by-year projections of how many civilia

positions each service has to remove. Thi

becomes known as the infamous “Dorn

memo” directing each service to reduce 4 per 

cent of its civilian workforce each year from

1994 through 1999. In 2000, a 3 percent ci

vilian reduction will be imposed, followed b

a 2 percent reduction in 2001. The goal is t

reduce civilian positions by almost 30 percen

by the end of 2001.

November

1994

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff of th

Air Force, and Secretary of the Air Force Sheil

E. Widnall send a letter to Dr. Gene McCal

chairman of the Air Force SAB to remind him

277
of the enormously significant role Gen Ha

Arnold and Dr. von Kármán played afte

World War II in establishing and promotin

the importance of S&T in developing the Ai

Force of the future.

Mid-1990s The “planning, studying, and assessing” phas

of the laboratory structure ends. The Clinton

administration, Congress, and DOD want th

Air Force to take action and start reconfigurin

the labs to produce an even leaner and mor

cost-effective R&D operation .

1995 DOD’s Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC

exercise.

May 1995 Air Force Secretary Widnall and General Fogle 

man initiate a movement to produce a new Ai

Force vision for the twenty-first century. Gen

Thomas S. Moorman Jr., Air Force vice chief o

staff, chairs a study group consisting of senio

military and civilian leaders to come up with 

more realistic vision that would be responsive t

changing political conditions around the world.

May 1995 Office of the Secretary of Defense releases it

defense planning guidance. Budget official

use this information as building blocks t

prepare the Program Objectives Memoran

dum for fiscal year 1997.

15 May 1995 After a year of investigating how the thre

laboratories operate, the NSTC submits its fi 

n al report to President Clinton, indica tin

unanimous support for the legitimacy of labo

ratory functions but ample opportunity to im 

prove management and cut redundancy.

June 1995 Gen Henry Viccellio Jr. assumes command o

Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio.

278
December

1995

The Air Force publishes New World Vistas re

port to coincide with and commemorate th

50th anniversary of von Kármán’s Toward

New Horizons.

February

1996

The Air Force identifies 540 positions acros

the four labs as eligible to undergo the A-7

evaluation process.

10 February

1996

Congress passes the National Defense Authori

zation Act for fiscal year 1996. Section 277 o

this legislation (Public Law 104-106) direct

the secretary of defense to develop a five-yea

plan to consolidate and restructure laborato

ries and test and evaluation centers assigne

to DOD.

15 February

1996

President Clinton instructs the secretary o

defense to submit a report to him by thi

deadline, “detailing plans and schedules fo

downsizing the DOD laboratories.”

March 1996 Office of Management and Budget publishe

a new version of Circular A-76’s Revised Sup

plemental Handbook.

Spring 1996 Col Dennis Markisello, military deputy for th

Science and Technology Directorate, join

Don Daniel, Tim Dues, and Vince Russo a

the fourth key figure brought into Genera

Paul’s inner planning cell to assist him in

developing a new lab infrastructure.

30 April

1996

The secretary of defense delivers Vision 2

plan to Congress, which becomes the catalys

for the Air Force to move forward to com 

pletely revamp the laboratory system. The fi 

nal Vision 21 report combines outcomes from

two studies—the DOD report compiled as 

result of NSTC recommendations on labora 

tory restructuring and the Vision 21 DOD

279
plan prepared in response to the Defens

Authorization Act of 1996.

Late Spring

1996

The genesis of General Paul’s idea of proposin

a single lab takes place on an airplane during 

return trip with General Viccellio. General Pau

provides a verbal explanation of the numerou

advantages of going to a single lab. Genera

Viccellio likes the idea and asks General Pau

to give him more specifics about what the new

laboratory structure would look like.

Summer 1996 Joint Chiefs of Staff publish Joint Vision

2010.

Fall 1996 General Moorman’s vision team issues its new

strategic blueprint called Global Engagemen

comprised of six core competencies: air an

space superiority, rapid global mobility, preci

sion engagement, information superiority

global attack, and agile combat support.

8–12 October

1996

Lt Gen Lawrence P. Farrell Jr. presents 

number of laboratory organizational option

to the Air Force’s top leaders gathered at 

five-day Corona conference held at the Ai

Force Academy in 1996. Secretary Widnal

and General Fogleman agree that the single

lab option is the way to go.

20 November

1996

Blaise Durante briefs Secretary Widnall on

the single-laboratory proposal, the Air Force’s

answer to Vision 21. The secretary approve

the single lab.

22 November

1996

General Paul sends a letter to four lab com 

manders, the AFOSR director, and his staff t

officially announce that the secretary of th

Air Force has approved the creation of a singl

laboratory.

280
Late November

1996

General Paul and Dr. Russo meet with Dr

John W. Lyons, director of the Army Researc

Laboratory, to find out first-hand how Lyon

and his staff set up their consolidated lab

General Paul leaves the meeting knowing tha

he definitely does not want his transitio

team investing the majority of its time solvin

“the last” 10 percent of the Air Force lab’s con 

solidation problems. Consequently, Paul de

cides to pursue the “90 percent solution,

knowing ahead of time that mistakes will oc 

cur along the way.

5–6 December

1996

General Paul holds an off-site meeting at th

Bergamo Conference Center near Wrig ht

Patterson AFB.

Mid-December

1996

General Viccellio asks General Paul to pro 

vide a “heading check” on progress in formin

the single lab.

31 December

1996

General Paul presents the overall long-rang

plan (“heading-check briefing”) for establishin 

the single lab to General Viccellio, who full

endorses the phased approach for implement

ing the single lab.

January 1997 General Moorman explains the new vision t

the Air Force Association: “The context of th

long-range plan is built around sustainin

our core competencies and reinforcing th

central themes found in the strategic vision.”

6 January

1997

General Paul forms transition organization

General Viccellio officially announces ap

proval of the phased approach to single-la

implementation and directs Headquarter

AFMC Command/Science and Technology Di

rectorate to proceed.

281
13 January

1997

General Paul selects Dr. Russo to serve a

the single-lab transition director and ap

proves the lab-transition structure.

Early February

1997

Dr. Robert R. “Bart” Barthelemy, Technolog

Directorate Task Group, identifies “The Twelve

people responsible for drafting the first cu

at determining how to form the new tech di

rectorates .

3 February

1997

Maj Gen Michael C. Kostelnik, director o

Plans at AFMC, submits the OCR package t

Headquarters Air Force with a request to ap

prove it by March 15.

Mid-February

1997

By this time, all members of the task group

have been named.

25–26

February

1997

Dr. Barthelemy calls the first meeting of th

technology group at the Hope Hotel near Head

quarters AFMC at Wright-Patterson AFB.

End February–

Early March

1997

Task group kick-off meetings begin.

11 March

1997

General Paul’s web site announces the “Get

ting Under Way” process.

18 March

1997

General Paul’s web site announces the “Single

Lab Transition Orga nization.”

19 March

1997

General Paul’s web site announces “Single

Laboratory Road Shows,” along with his so

licitation of questions prior to his visits to la

locations.

20 March

1997

General Paul’s web site announces “Corpo

rate Board Meeting” for 20–22 March.

20–22 March

1997

Midcourse review of task forces/task group

briefs General Paul and the Corporate Board

282
21 March

1997

Dr. Barthelemy provides the first tech-task

group heading check to General Paul.

23 March

1997

General Paul’s web site announces “Single

Lab Task Groups and Focus Groups.”

24 March

1997

General Paul selects the design for the new

AFRL emblem.

24 March

1997

General Paul’s web site announces “Mid 

course Heading Check” and the decision t

have a corporate information officer.

End of March–

Early April

1997

Independent and Grassroots review board

provide input to the Corporate Board.

End of March

1997

Completion of phase I, a three-month opera 

tion calling for the stand-up of the interim

laboratory organization.

1 April

1997

General Paul’s web site announces the draf

design of AFRL heraldry (emblem for the new

organization).

1 April

1997

Special Order GA-9 announces the activation

of Headquarters AFRL and assigns it t

AFMC. The order also relieves the four labo

ratories and AFOSR from their assignment t

their present organizations and reassign

them to AFRL, effective 8 April 1997.

1–2 April

1997

Grassroots Review Team meets with Genera

Paul and his staff.

4 April

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses “Existin

Four Laboratories’ Name and Heritage” an

responds to concerns people expressed dur

ing the road shows about losing the labs

heritage due to organizational consolidation

Confirms that history and lineage of Air Forc

labs will be memorialized.

283
8 April

1997

By order of the secretary of the Air Force, th

Air Force Research Laboratory is activated

signifying the end of phase I (interim organi

zation). A “short and modest” ceremony i

held at Wright-Patterson honoring this even

General Viccellio reads the orders activatin

the lab and unveils the new AFRL emblem

General Paul briefs the AFMC commanders.

8 April

1997

Independent Assessment Board convenes.

9–10 April

1997

Task groups for Support as well as Integra 

tion and Operations meet.

14 April

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses the “Grass

roots Review Panel,” declaring it an “unquali

fied success!”

14 April

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses the “Ai

Force Research Laboratory Independent As 

sessment Board Review.”

17 April

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses the com 

pletion of “Road Show I,” beginning at Brook

AFB and completing a nine-site briefing cir 

cuit including Wright-Patterson, Hanscom

Rome, Kirtland, Edwards, Bolling, Eglin, an

Tyndall Air Force Bases.

23 April

1997

General Paul sends a letter to General Viccelli

requesting his approval for the new AFRL em 

blem in preparation for the phase II stand-up.

23 April

1997

General Paul forms the product-executive

Red Team.

24 April

1997

Dr. Barthelemy makes second presentation t

the Corporate Board.

25 April

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses “AFR

Phase II: A Decision Process Flowchart

284
Within the flowchart, each decision point i

identified with a Corporate Board and a deci

sion output, which feed into the next critica

decision point.

7 May

1997

General Paul’s web-site memo addresses “Th

AFRL Corporate Information Office.”

7 May

1997

Corporate Board reviews the options of th

product executives and Washington presence

8 May

1997

General Paul briefs concepts (i.e., Technolog

Directorates, Plans and Programs, Operation

and Support, Product Executives, etc.) to th

current 22 technology directors.

12–13 May

1997

General Paul, Vince Russo, and other senio

staff members attend an off-site meeting t

start building a single-lab strategic plan.

14 May

1997

General Paul’s web-site memo provides a

“AFRL Progress Report—Directorates an

More,” announcing the framework for th

technology directorates.

27 May

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses “Organiza 

tional Development in AFRL.”

End of

May 1997

First version of the strategic plan lays out th

vision and mission for the new lab.

2d week of

June 1997

General Paul posts a message on the web sit

informing people of the progress of the selec

tion of the new lab leaders. He explains tha

he is in the “final phases of proposing a set o

provisional leaders.”

12 June

1997

General Paul’s web site provides a “Statu

Report” of phase II.

19 June

1997

In compliance with AFR 38-101, Genera

Paul sends an OCR proposing the creatio

285
of a single Air Force lab to the director o

plans at AFMC.

24 July

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses “The AFR

Road Ahead,” with a preview of coming at

tractions about the reorganization.

31 July

1997

General Paul’s web site announces “AFR

Phase II Status,” including organizationa

structure and consolidation of 22 technolog

directorates to nine.

4 August

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses the “Tran

sition from AFRL Phase I to Phase II,” includ

ing the impact on each laboratory.

7 August

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses the “Offic

Symbols for AFRL Phase II,” including new

office symbols for the technology directorates

7 August

1997

Gen George T. Babbitt, AFMC commander

signs the OCR and submits it to AF/XP late

that day.

13 August

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses “Gettin

Approval of AFRL Phase II.”

22 August

1997

General Paul announces “Key Leaders for th

AFRL Phase II Organization.”

16 September

1997

General Paul’s web site addresses “The Person 

nel Allocation Process,” including his persona

assurances that “my original intention still re

mains to minimize personal disruption an

geographical moves to the extent possible.”

October

1997

Completion of phase IIA, a six-month proces

representing the final organization at full man 

ning, results in the assigning of personnel po

sitions to one lab unit-manning document.

286
10 October

1997

General Pauls web site addresses AFR

Status—What’s the Deal?” The staffing pro

cess at the Pentagon takes longer than antici

pated, and the OCR awaits the vice chief o

staff’s approval. General Paul believes tha

the OCR will be signed by the end of October

22 October

1997

“Commander’s Corner” on General Paul’s web

site announces, “It’s official! The Secretary o

the AF approved the AFRL reorganization to 

day!” Announces that 31 October 1997 wil

be the “official stand-up date.”

31 October

1997

The Air Force activates the Air Force Re

search Laboratory, marking the completion o

phase IIA.

October

1997–1

January

2001

Phase IIB is designed to complete the “end

state” lab—the final organization at reduced

manning.

1 April

1998

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry set

this date as an initial milestone for a five-yea

plan on how DOD laboratories would restruc

ture.

May–June

1998

Secretary Perry and staff review the five-yea

plan on how DOD laboratories would restruc

ture, in preparation for submitting the pla

to President Clinton.

1 July

1998

Secretary Perry establishes target date t

submit five-year plan to President Clinton on

how DOD laboratories would restructure.

October

2000

Target date established by Secretary Perry t

begin implementation of the laboratory five

year restructuring plan.

1 October

2005

Target date established by Secretary Perry fo

completion of the five-year plan.

287
APPENDIX B

Laboratory Consolidations

Prior to Formation of a Single Laboratory
291
APPENDIX C

Orders Activating the

Air Force Research Laboratory
295
296
297
298
299
Glossary

AFB Air Force base

AFI Air Force instruction

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFMC/ST Air Force Materiel Command, Science and

Technology Directorate

AFOSR Air Force Office of Scientific Research

AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory

AFSC Air Force Systems Command

ASD Aeronautical Systems Division

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

[Commission]

BUR Bottom-Up Review

C3I command, control, communications, and

intelligence

C4I command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence

CIO Corporate Information Office

C

4

ISR command, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

CSAF chief of staff of the Air Force

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and

Engineering

DMR Defense Management Review

DMRD Defense Management Report Decision

DOD Department of Defense

DPG defense planning guidance

DS Operational Support

ERB Executive Resources Board

FY fiscal year

HSC Human Systems Center

IAB Independent Assessment Board

301
NSDD National Security Decision Directive

NSTC National Science and Technology Council

OCR organization change request

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PEO product executive officer

R&D research and development

RDT&E research, development, test, and

evaluation

RIF reduction in force

SAB Scientific Advisory Board

SAE service acquisition executive

SAF/ AQ/ AQR Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition

S&E scientist and engineer

SES Senior Executive Service

S&T science and technology

TBD to be determined

T&E test and evaluation

TEO technology executive officer

TTO Technical Transition Office

XP Plans and Programs

302
Index

Abrahamson, George R., 71, 73, 76, 81,

93, 103, 131

Advanced Weapons and Survivability

Directorate, 239

Aeronautical Systems Center, 18, 76,

102, 163, 197

Aeronautical Systems Division, 223

Aero Propulsion Lab, 223

Aero Propulsion and Power Directorate, 169

Air Education and Training Command, 31

Air Force Executive Resources Board

(ERB), 184, 186–87

Air Force Logistics Command, 9, 11, 130

Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), 4,

9, 18, 26–27, 29–32, 46, 52, 65,

72–74, 76, 85, 97–99, 105–6, 108–10,

112, 115, 130, 137, 142, 147,

163–65, 183, 186, 195–97, 230, 236,

238, 248, 253, 256–58, 261, 263

Air Force Materiel Command, Science

and Technology Directorate

(AFMC/ST), 68, 104, 145, 150–51,

154, 185, 199, 220, 237

Air Force Office of Scientific Research

(AFOSR), 60, 106, 116–18, 125, 137,

140, 143, 146–48, 155–56, 164,

167–68, 175, 179, 189, 195–97, 199,

216, 253, 255

Air Force Research Laboratory, Plans

and Programs Directorate (AFRL/XP),

40, 46, 95, 145–46, 162, 184, 186,

189, 198, 214–15, 218, 220–21,

224–25, 227–41, 245, 249, 268

Air Force Space Command, 232

Air Force Systems Command (AFSC),

9–11, 76, 130, 209, 213, 223, 268

Air Force Weapons Laboratory, 239

Air Vehicles Directorate, 138, 145–46,

169–70, 173, 175, 189, 224

Andehazy, Bill, 25

Anderson, Christine, 95, 169–71

Armstrong Laboratory, 18, 60, 76, 143,

146, 153, 164–65, 172–74, 176–77,

180, 197, 199, 202, 214, 233, 239,

249, 253, 261–62

Army Research Laboratory, 105, 108,

139, 195, 267

Arnold, Hap, 74–75, 132

A-76 process, 48, 57–59, 94, 131

Aspin, Les, 50–51

Avionics Directorate, 171, 180

Avionics Laboratory, 172

Babbitt, George T., 186–87, 258, 263

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,

232, 248

Barthelemy, Robert R., 161–68, 170–77,

182–85, 209–10

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC),

16, 25, 32, 35, 47, 125, 149

battlelabs, 87

Beans, Elona, 165

Bergamo conference center, 126, 137,

139–44, 253

Berry, William O., 255

Betti, John A., 10

Blue Ribbon Panel on Management

Options for Air Force Laboratories, 7

Bodnar, Don, 172

Boff, Ken, 95

Bottom-Up Review (BUR), 49, 56

Bouchard, Philippe O., 223

Bowlds, Ted, 146, 233, 248

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 57

budget cuts, 8–9, 16, 23, 41, 67–68, 80,

82, 84–85, 89, 106, 129, 174, 225,

234–35, 238, 268

Burgos, Rogelio, 199

Bush, George, 8–9, 49, 129

business practices, 8, 11, 23, 56, 85, 95

121, 129

Campbell, Wendy, 143, 153

centers of excellence, 100–102, 104

Channell, Ron, 248

Cheney, Dick, 8, 10

Circular A-76, 57

Clinton, William Jefferson, 13–17, 34,

49, 60, 93, 120, 130

cold war, 9, 14, 16, 82–83

command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence (C 4I),

100–101, 105, 107, 138, 145–46, 231

command, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (C 4ISR), 116

command, control, communications,

and intelligence (C 3I), 172

303
Commander

s Action Group, 256

Comptroller Office, 256

Contracting Office, 256

Corona conference, 4–5, 42, 82, 89, 94,

97–99, 102–3, 105–7, 109–13, 115,

118, 121, 132

Corporate Board, 156–57, 165, 167,

170, 172–76, 183, 204–5, 210, 224,

228–29, 233, 235–36, 241, 243–45,

254, 266, 268

Corporate Development Office, 255

Corporate Information Office (CIO),

255–56

Corporate Investment Strategy Division,

240

Crew Effectiveness Directorate, 173–74

Curran, Tom, 169, 189

Daniel, Donald C., 27–28, 40–42, 48, 59,

99, 139, 143, 150–51, 156, 184–86,

189, 199, 222

Daugherty, Gerry, 189

Davis, Lance, 25, 46

Davis, Rich, 146, 233, 248

D.C. Presence Task Group, 253

Defense Management Report Decision

(DMRD) [no.] 922, 10, 129

Defense Management Review (DMR),

8–10, 13, 129

defense planning guidance (DPG), 48,

53–56, 60, 62–64, 66, 68, 94, 119,

131, 148, 202

Defense Science Board, 59

Defense Technology Area Plan, 227

Department of Defense (DOD), 7–11,

13–17, 19, 23–25, 34–36, 45–46,

48–56, 59–60, 62, 65, 82–84, 98,

101, 103, 108, 119–20, 123–25,

129–30, 143, 198, 201, 215, 231, 254

Department of Defense laboratory,

10–11, 13, 15–17, 37, 108, 142

Department of Energy, 14

Deutch, John, 49

Directed Energy Directorate, 168, 175, 247

Director, Defense Research and

Engineering (DDR&E), 25, 46, 71

Disney, Diane, 59

Dorn cuts, 24, 48–49, 51–54, 59–60, 62,

66, 68, 94, 131

Dorn, Edwin, 24, 48, 50–52, 56, 62, 67

downsizing, 16, 20, 33–34, 46–51,

57–60, 62, 66, 79, 82, 85, 117, 119,

201, 212, 217–18, 242, 246

Druyun, Darleen, 33–34, 186

Dues, Tim, 40–42, 48, 95, 99, 139, 143,

150, 228–29, 237, 239–40, 243

duplication of effort, 11–12, 15–18, 23,

30, 34–35, 81, 86, 103, 107, 164

Durante, Blaise, 46, 115, 118–25

Eglin AFB, Florida, 118

Electromagnetics and Reliability

Directorate, 180

Electronics and Reliability Directorate, 171

Electronic Systems Center, 18, 76, 197

Electronic Systems Division, 26

Environment, Safety, and Health

Directorate, 173–74

Erwin, David, 177

Etherton, John, 25

Executive Services Office, 256

Farrell, Lawrence P., Jr., 97, 99, 105,

109–11

Ferguson, Thomas, 213–14

Flight Dynamics Directorate, 169

Flight Dynamics Lab, 248

Fogleman, Ronald R., 4–5, 74–75, 81–83,

86, 97, 106, 109, 111, 122, 132

Foster, Fred, 249

Fred, Walt, 115, 122

Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st

Century Air Force, 81, 83–84, 86–88,

93, 124, 131, 227

global reach, global power, 75, 82–83

Godfrey, Brendan, 143, 146, 233,

239–40, 249, 253–55

Goldstayn, Alan, 46, 115

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act, 7–8, 18, 129

Good, Earl, 143, 248

Gore, Al, 14

Gould, B. B., 95

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 8, 129

Grassroots Review Board, 156–57, 205,

216, 218–23, 229, 232

Hale, Robert F., 99

Harsberger, Glenn, 95

Havey, Mike, 253

Headquarters Air Force, 26, 33, 46

Heckathorn, Bill, 248

Heil, Mike, 143, 146, 233, 248

Hellwig, Helmut, 255

Helwig, Chuck, 95, 143, 164

304
Hill, Ron, 143, 164, 172, 182–83

House National Security Committee, 25

Human Effectiveness Directorate,

176–77, 180

Human Resources Directorate, 164

Human Resources Office, 255

Human Systems Center (HSC), 18, 60,

76, 145–46, 176–77, 197, 263

Hurley, Jim, 219

Hyder, Anthony, 213–14

Independent Assessment Board (IAB),

156–57, 205, 209–16, 222–23, 232

Independent Research and

Development, 228, 238

Information Directorate, 214, 232

Information Technology Management

Reform Act (Clinger-Cohen Act), 256

Infrastructure Review Panel, 49

Integration and Operations Division,

241, 247

Intelligence and Reconnaissance

Directorate, 171, 180

Interagency Federal Laboratory Review, 14

Janni, Joe, 117–18, 253

Jaskiewicz, Matt, 253

Jeremiah, David E., 49

Johnson, Lyndon B., 265–66

joint centers of excellence, 86, 101

Joint Staff, 26

Joint Vision 2010, 82, 227

Jones, Anita, 123–25

Kármán, Theodore von, 74–75, 115, 132

Kessel, Jacob, 196, 261–62

Kostelnik, Michael C., 195

Kreighbaum, Brendel, 253

Lab Alumni (Graybeards), 205, 223–25,

229, 255

Lab Demo program, 153

laboratory reform, 142

Lawrence Livermore, 11, 71

Leaf, Daniel P., 99

Linhard, Robert E., 98

Los Alamos, 11, 71

Lupia, Eugene A., 99

Lyons, John W., 139–40

Markisello, Dennis, 48, 99, 139, 143,

150, 185, 242–46

Marsh, Robert T., 209–13, 215

Materials Lab, 40, 223

Materials and Manufacturing Directorate,

150–51, 175, 189, 232, 247

McCall, Gene, 74–76, 79–80

Millburn, George P., 10

mission statement, 196, 212

Modernization Planning Process, 228

Money, Arthur, 115, 122

Moorman, Thomas S., Jr., 81, 83–84,

87, 97, 99, 109, 120–22

Muellner, George K., 99, 122

Munitions Directorate, 168, 174–75,

189, 214

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, 14

National Defense Authorization Act of

1996, 14, 24–25, 29, 31–35, 37, 39,

45, 74, 93, 119, 130, 195, 202, 257

National Partnership for Reinventing

Government, 14

National Performance Review, 14

National Reconnaissance Office, 232

National Science and Technology

Council (NSTC), 13–16, 34, 93, 130

National Security Decision Directive

(NSDD), 7, 219

Naval Research Laboratory, 105, 108,

143, 195

Neighbor, Terry, 143

New World Vistas, 75, 80–81, 93, 104,

131, 227

90 percent rule, 139–40, 149, 157, 267

Northington, Larry W., 261

Nutz, Pat, 95–96

Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), 57

Office of Research and Technology

Assessment, 228

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 36,

39, 85, 94, 96

Operation Desert Storm, 49

Operations and Support (DS), 145, 186,

198, 244, 246, 253

organization change request (OCR),

195–98, 203, 223, 240, 257–58,

261–62, 266

outsourcing, 85, 121

Packard Commission, 7–8, 93, 129

Packard, David, 7, 129

305
Paul, Richard R., 4–5, 18, 23–34, 37–42,

45–48, 52, 55–56, 58–60, 62–68,

77–78, 80–82, 84, 86, 89, 94–95, 97,

99, 101–6, 112, 115, 117–19,

122–23, 125–26, 130–33, 137–44,

146–54, 156–57, 161–66, 168–87,

189, 195–205, 209–19, 221–25,

228–40, 245–49, 253–58, 261–63,

266–68

Perry, William J., 36–37, 46, 50–51

personnel reductions, 7, 9, 11, 16, 19,

23–24, 29, 41, 45, 48–50, 56, 58–60,

62, 65–68, 73, 78, 85, 89, 94, 97,

106, 119, 124, 129–31, 148–49, 174,

183, 197, 200, 203, 214, 217–18,

221, 225, 235, 242, 244, 268

phased implementation, 144, 149–50,

195–96, 203, 210, 216, 223

Phillips Laboratory, 18, 52, 76, 79, 102,

107, 143, 146, 164, 169, 197, 199,

202, 204, 233, 238–39, 242, 247–48,

253, 261–62

plans and programs, 31, 115, 230,

238–40, 253

Plonisch, Igor, 95

privatization, 59, 85, 99

product centers, 18, 26, 52, 72–74,

76–80, 96, 106–9, 122, 145–47,

196–97, 203, 223, 231–32, 236, 238,

240, 253, 257

product directors, 138, 146

product executive officer (PEO), 8, 18, 145,

197–98, 216, 224, 231–35, 248, 263

product sectors, 236, 238

Program 8, 60, 62, 176–77, 263

Program Objective Memorandum, 53,

227, 238

Program 6, 176

Propulsion Directorate, 169–70, 176,

189, 199, 204–5

Rader, Jim, 253

Reagan, Ronald, 7

reduction in force (RIF), 51–52, 55, 66, 101

research and development (R&D), 4, 7–8,

13–17, 19, 23, 26–27, 29, 35, 52, 55,

60, 66–67, 74, 76, 86, 89, 96, 104,

118–20, 122, 214, 238

research, development, test, and

evaluation (RDT&E), 54

research-site detachments, 256, 261

Reserve Affairs Office, 255

Resource Allocation Integrated Product

Team, 73

Rice, Donald B., 9

Richey, Keith, 169–70, 248

Roadman, Chip, 176–77

road shows, 201–2, 204–5, 266, 268

Roellig, Richard N., 99

Rogacki, John, 169, 189, 242–45

Rome Air Development Center, 11, 223

Rome Laboratory, 18, 76, 79, 107, 146,

164, 180, 197, 199, 233, 249, 253,

261–62

Roosevelt, Theodore, 269

Roth, Hal, 189

Russo, Vince, 40–42, 46–48, 99, 115,

139, 143, 150–54, 161–63, 173, 181,

199, 204–5, 209–10, 216, 223, 243,

247, 258

Sabol, William, 199

Sandia, 11, 71

Schell, Allan, 223–24

science and technology (S&T), 4–5, 10,

13, 15, 17–18, 23, 26–27, 31, 35–36,

38–41, 53, 55, 60, 66, 72–80, 85–86,

88–89, 93, 97, 99, 101–5, 107, 109,

119, 125–26, 129–30, 132–33,

137–38, 151, 156, 161–62, 164, 176,

196–98, 209, 211–12, 215, 218–19,

222–23, 227–28, 230, 234–35,

237–38, 242, 247, 253–55, 263,

266–67, 269

Science and Technology Corporate

Board, 156

Science and Technology Directorate, 40,

48, 60, 106, 142, 147, 151, 197, 230

Science and Technology Mission

Element Board, 73

Science and Technology Spring Review, 22

Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), 74–79, 104

Scientific Advisory Group, 75

scientist and engineer (S&E), 153

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition

(SAF/AQ/AQR), 18, 72, 255

sector chiefs, 233–38, 248

Senate Armed Services Committee, 25

Senior Executive Service (SES), 117,

151, 162, 177, 183–87, 189, 221,

234, 255

Sensors Directorate, 180, 189, 214, 232

service acquisition executive (SAE), 8, 1

Shalikashvili, John M., 82

306
Small Business Innovation Research,

228, 238

Small Business Technology Transfer

Research, 228

Sorenson, Norm, 95

Space Battlelab, 88, 232

Space and Missile Systems Center, 18,

52, 76, 102, 197, 232

Space Technology Directorate, 138,

145–46, 169–70

Space Vehicles Directorate, 168–70, 173,

175, 189, 224, 232, 247

Special Order GA-9, 196

Strategic Air Command, 26

strategic plan, 181, 212–13

support system, 241–43, 245–47

Support Task Group, 244

Surveillance and Photonics Directorate,

171, 180

Swinney, Dave, 199

Technical Transition Office (TTO), 60

Technology Area Review and

Assessment, 227

Technology Assessment Division, 241

technology directorates, 47, 80, 107,

108–9, 116–18, 125, 138, 141,

143–44, 148, 150, 161–62, 164–69,

171, 173, 175, 177–82, 184, 189,

196, 210, 212–16, 218–21, 224,

227–31, 234–37, 239–46, 248, 253,

256–58, 261–62

Technology Directorate Task Group,

161, 163, 182

technology executive officer (TEO), 18,

72, 78, 102–4, 109, 146, 197, 235

Technology Planning Integrated Product

Teams, 228

technology seams, 141, 146, 164, 167,

169, 177, 203, 213, 257

Technology Task Group, 205, 210, 213

Technology Transfer and Corporate

Communications Division, 240

Technology Transfer Office, 228

test and evaluation (T&E) centers,

24–25, 35

Toward the Future: Global Reach, Global

Power, 82

Toward New Horizons, 74–75

United States Army, 10

United States Navy, 10

unit-manning document, 47, 52, 60, 62,

65, 67, 85, 104, 124, 147–48, 171,

182, 184, 197–98, 201, 203, 244, 25

Urtz, Ray, 143, 248

Viccellio, Henry, Jr., 4–5, 24, 29–34,

37–40, 42, 45–46, 65, 68, 74, 77, 81,

84, 86, 89, 94–95, 97, 99, 101, 103,

105–6, 109–12, 115, 125, 130, 132,

137–39, 141, 144–45, 148, 150, 180,

196, 200, 231, 253–54

vision statement, 212

Vision 21, 14, 24, 29, 31–32, 34–36,

38–42, 45–48, 67, 74, 93–94, 97–98,

105–6, 112, 115–19, 122–25, 130,

141, 148–49, 195, 202

Washington Office, 253, 255

Weapons Lab, 26

White, John, 45

Widnall, Sheila E., 4–5, 46, 74–75,

80–83, 85, 87–89, 106, 109, 111–13,

115, 118–19, 122–23, 125, 132, 140,

261, 267

Witco, Jeff, 164

Wood, Bob, 189

Woody, Bill, 253

Wright Laboratory, 18, 26, 47, 76, 79,

95, 102, 107, 118, 146, 150–51, 162,

164, 169, 171, 180, 184, 197, 199,

233, 238, 248, 253, 261–62

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 4, 25–26,

31, 38, 40, 95, 125–26, 137, 153,

162, 165, 169, 172, 177, 180, 196,

202, 205, 209, 223, 228–30, 237,

241, 245, 247, 253, 262

Yates, Ronald W., 72–74

307