Air University

Stephen R. Lorenz, Lt Gen, Commander

Air War College

Robert J. Elder, Jr., Lt Gen, Commandant

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inside_front.indd 1 9/18/06 1:09:1
AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Offensive Use of Chemical

Technologies by US Special

Operations Forces in the

Global War on Terrorism

The Nonlethal Option

GEORGE N. T. WHITBRED IV

Commander, USN

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 37

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

July 2006

frontmatter.indd 1 9/18/06 1:10:2
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web 

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press 

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

frontmatter.indd 2 9/18/06 1:10:2
iii

Foreword

The possible use of nonlethal chemical technologies in 

counterterrorist operations is drawing much attention in 

the ongoing global war on terrorism. The examination of 

their use comes at a time when the United Nations Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits their application in any 

type of armed conflict. International law governing the 

use of new developments in antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical technologies has recently been the 

subject of intense public debate, resulting in congressional 

hearings questioning the ratification enforcement protocols 

to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Although the exercise of nonlethal chemical technologies 

is not prohibited in domestic law enforcement applications, 

US special operations counterterrorist forces encounter situations where military combat and law enforcement tactics, 

techniques, and procedures amalgamate into an overarching 

methodology. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars sparked controversy as to the possible application of nonlethal riot control and calmative-type agents against insurgents who are 

entrenched physically within the geographical commons. 

The decision to apply nonlethal technologies requires an 

understanding of their overall effects, both tactically and 

strategically. This paper provides background information 

on both antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical 

technologies; their applications within the special operations 

forces (SOF) counterterrorist environment; and their operational applications during armed conflict, combat search 

and rescue, and hostage rescue. Comparisons of technologies are made, their differences highlighted, and recommendations for use offered. While it may appear that nonlethal 

chemical technologies are new, their path to development 

has been navigated with forethought and discretion. 

A fresh look at nonlethal chemical technologies yields 

valuable insights for emerging twenty-first century unconventional approaches to global counterterrorist operations. 

The author identifies specific recommendations that could 

extend the legal range of options for SOF. Some uses are 

intuitive, such as SOF units supporting law enforcement 

counterterrorist operations. Others address the new defrontmatter.indd 3 9/18/06 1:10:2
iv

velopments in pharmaceutical agents used extensively by 

international counterterrorist forces. Finally, Commander 

Whitbred is clearly on mark when he concludes that the 

Chemical Weapons Convention must be reviewed in light of 

the new developments in nonlethal chemical technologies, 

both in the context of conventional armed conflict and unconventional counterterrorist operations. While analyzing 

strategic impacts, this study calls for fundamental change 

to be considered. 

As with all Maxwell Papers, this research is provided in 

the spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious 

consideration of the issues. We encourage your responses.

ROBERT J. ELDER, JR.

Lieutenant General, USAF

Commandant

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v

About the Author

CDR George N. T. Whitbred IV is a naval special operations officer specializing in explosive ordnance disposal 

(EOD) and underwater clearance operations. Prior to his 

assignment to Maxwell AFB, Alabama, he was the maritime homeland defense special operations staff officer, US 

Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. He has served 

in numerous expeditionary assignments including Carrier 

Strike Group EOD officer for commander, Carrier Group 

Eight and Expeditionary Strike Group EOD officer for commander, Amphibious Squadron Six. He served in the US 

Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet Antiterrorist Security Company 

and in the US Sixth Fleet as the EOD staff officer for Operation Joint Endeavor. Commander Whitbred commanded 

an EOD mobile unit, Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, 

Washington. He is presently assigned as commanding officer, Naval Weapons Station, Indian Island, Washington. 

Commander Whitbred is a 2006 graduate of the Air War 

College at Maxwell AFB.

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1

Introduction

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual 

change in the weapons; and with that must come a 

continual change in the manner of fighting.

—Rear Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan

—The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1890

Throughout history the success of special operations 

forces (SOF) has relied on a combination of highly trained 

and exceptionally skilled operators, unique and specialized 

equipment, and unconventional methods of warfare not 

common to standard military forces. This combination has 

proved to be highly successful against unprepared adversaries who countered SOF methods of warfare with conventional means. Today’s SOF face a developed enemy—the 

modern terrorist—an adversary in contrast to the terrorists of the Cold War where political motivations traditionally targeted the local battlefields of government officials, 

soldiers, and law enforcement. Operating within a global 

network of asymmetric and unconventional domains, modern terrorists use a religious banner to advance a focused 

ideology and to justify violent attacks. This ideological advancement neither follows constructs of conventional warfare nor is bound by accepted conventions, protocols, or 

rules of engagement. Anyone, anywhere, anytime is a target. Maneuverability within this domain is by way of advanced technology through nontraditional approaches and 

use of commonly accessible information. Computers and 

wireless communication provide the vehicles of approach 

for the modern terrorist, and global information networks 

provide the common areas for planning, recruiting, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), finance operations, and manipulation of worldwide 

unconventional attacks. This linkage of advanced technology and radical ideology creates a new type of warfare that 

levels the global battlefields in which SOF must tackle these 

modern extremists. 

On 11 September 2001 America was introduced to the 

modern terrorist on a devastating scale. Americans saw 

the wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents in 

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a way never before imagined. This heinous act caused the 

US government to revisit its strategy on combating terrorism. In October 2001 Pres. George W. Bush announced to 

the American people, “The attack took place on American 

soil, but it was an attack on the heart and soul of the civilized world. And the world has to come together to fight 

a new and different war, the first and we hope the only 

one, of the twenty-first century.”1 Shortly after this speech, 

the United States and its allies began forming strategies 

that would bring the war to the terrorists on multiple fronts 

and in multiple ways. President Bush declared a new class 

and strategy of warfare that focused on the diplomatic, economic, informational, military, and traditional law enforcement strategies and tactics of counterterrorism. This strategy evolved into the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The 

GWOT strategy initiated a series of governmental reforms 

aimed at focusing greater attention on defeating terrorist 

networks in close conjunction with partner nations through 

intelligence sharing, staging rights, special operations (SO), 

and law enforcement exchanges. These reforms and initiatives 

continue to be debated among government leaders today. 

While the nature of warfare remains relatively invariable, 

its techniques and environment constantly change. Over 

the course of the last four years, GWOT initiatives dominated the political arenas of the world; however, to what 

extent have they upheld the evolving methods and techniques used in counterterrorism? Is enough lateral flexibility provided for the United States and its partner nations to 

conduct effective counterterrorist operations using unconventional methods? Are the legal dimensions of the existing conventions and treaties too conventional and outdated 

for counterterrorism operations? Most importantly, are the 

counterterrorist operators, specifically SOF, empowered 

with the unconventional means necessary to defeat global 

terrorism? Examining these questions through a specific 

capability focuses the research and provides a thorough 

analysis of the subject. 

This paper examines the applicability of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to the unconventional counterterrorist in the 

arena of the GWOT operations of today. The 1925 protocol restricts the use of nonlethal chemical warfare (CW), 

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while the CWC augments this protocol (which, for instance, 

makes no provision for production, storage, or transfer) to 

include verification measures. The argument herein develops a case that supports the offensive use of nonlethal CW 

technologies as a viable expansion to the existing capabilities of SOF counterterrorist operations. 

Chemical Warfare—A Glance into the Past

Military commanders of the past, envisioning weapons 

able to swiftly stop enemy advancement, have searched for 

weapons of last resort. At the beginning of the twentieth 

century, battlefields were comprised of lineal divides where 

armies would mass frontal attacks of unstoppable momentum. Efforts to counter these attacks led to the development 

of trenches, barriers, and emplacements which eventually 

became insurmountable, resulting in prolonged battles. On 

22 April 1915 near Ypres, Belgium, in a desperate attempt 

to develop a breakthrough, Germany opened the valves of 

6,000 cylinders of compressed chlorine gas.2 With favorable 

winds, a brown cloud enveloped the French and British positions. The French and British troops, never expecting the 

use of poisonous gas, were completely unprotected.3 The 

unopposed German infantry advanced behind the cloud; 

then, as dusk fell, they dug themselves in.4 The next day the 

Germans created a 9-kilometer gap in the French and British lines, inflicted 7,000 casualties, and captured 1,600 Allied prisoners.5 From this point, both the Germans and the 

Allies realized a new dimension of warfare had entered the 

battlefield with tactical effects and strategic significance.

 Necessity introduced CW to the battlefields of World War 

I (WWI). As German military commanders realized the methods and techniques of warfare had to change in order to 

meet the battlefield environment, CW became their method 

of choice. Adaptable to almost any tactical situation and 

superior to explosives and bullets, CW became known, on 

both sides, as an unconventional means of achieving battlefield superiority. Whereas Germany envisioned CW as a 

method for countering trench warfare, Allied powers viewed 

it as a defensive measure that slowed the massive German 

army. In the end, CW enabled military commanders to unArticle.indd 3 9/18/06 1:11:0
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conventionally attack or defend fixed fighting positions on a 

symmetric battlefield. 

Developments from World War I to Vietnam

Although CW had been used prior to 1914, it was not until WWI that developments in science and technology made 

its use significant on the battlefield.6 By the end of WWI, 

research and development (R&D) of CW resulted in classifying chemical agents into two broad categories—casualty 

agents and harassing agents.7 Casualty agents, as the name 

implies, are defined as chemical agents that cause severe 

injury or death.8 Germany’s industrial base capitalized on 

the development of casualty agents and became the leading 

producer of both lethal and nonlethal chemical agents. By 

1917 Germany produced numerous amounts of casualty 

agents that were successfully used against Allied troops. 

Harassing agents, commonly referred to today as nonlethal agents, are defined as chemical agents that produce a 

temporary disablement on an individual.9 While casualty 

agents were designed to incapacitate and kill, harassing 

agents were designed to force the enemy to wear chemical 

protective equipment. This disrupted his ability to fight effectively. The effects of harassing agents on the battlefield 

were of minor importance during WWI.10 In August of 1914, 

early attempts by the French to use tear gas on German 

positions garnered little success due to the agent’s nonpersistent nature and transitory effects on individuals.11 Consequently, the continued development of harassing agents, 

in comparison to the lethal types of chemical agents, became limited. 

Military doctrine evolved as new technologies were introduced into the battlefield environment. The introduction of 

the tank and combat aircraft forced CW into a diminished 

role.12 Troops no longer fixed in trench positions made difficult targets for these slow-acting, area-effect weapons.13

As a result, the unconventional methods of CW could no 

longer meet the evolutionary demands of military methods 

and techniques. CW development would not catch up with 

military tactics for another two decades.14

After World War I, CW development and manufacturing 

did not reach any significance until the years immediately 

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preceding World War II (WWII). Restricting the use of asphyxiating gases as a method of warfare, the 1925 Geneva 

Protocol was an early measure of success in attempts to 

abolish chemical weapons. However, this treaty was only 

a partial triumph since it failed to address the stockpiling 

of chemical weapons for defensive measures. After 1942 

stockpiles of chemical weapons began to increase throughout the war to levels that exceeded the stockpiles of WWI.15

The very threat of chemical war and the large chemical 

stockpiles, produced up to and throughout WWII, became 

viewed as an effective deterrent. Military leaders realized 

that using CW in a first strike scenario would only bring retaliatory measures of the same magnitude or worse. Stockpiles remained unused and were mostly destroyed after the 

war ended.16

Between 1945 and 1955, improvements in technology resulted in the development of new forms of lethal and nonlethal agents. Nerve agents, incapacitating agents, and herbicides became of interest to militaries throughout the world 

due to their persistency and quick effect on the battlefield. 

Because of their impact on humans and potential to cause 

unnecessary suffering, these chemicals were prohibited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, just as the earlier chemical 

agents had been. The offensive uses of both lethal and nonlethal chemical agents remained legally restricted to those 

countries that ratified the 1925 Protocol.17 In contrast, the 

United States, a nonratifying country of the 1925 Protocol, viewed nonlethal chemical agents as a legal, offensive 

warfare capability. New forms of tear gas, or riot control 

agents (RCA), developed primarily for law enforcement began to see increased usage in the 1960s during the Vietnam 

War. Initially, these chemical compounds served as harassing agents for crowd control, but as the war developed their 

use evolved into a much broader application. 

From November 1965 to January 1970, approximately 

13.7 million pounds of RCAs were used in Vietnam in the 

following types of operations: attacking occupied positions, 

defending positions, clearing tunnels, breaking contact 

with the enemy, defending against ambush, and rescuing 

downed Airmen.18 Intricate trails through dense jungle provided avenues for insurgents from the North to penetrate 

deep into South Vietnam. In an effort to counter the inArticle.indd 5 9/18/06 1:11:0
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surgency, powdered RCAs were dusted onto a trail so that 

anyone passing across it stirred the agents up into an irritating cloud.19 Complex tunnel systems and underground 

fortifications used to conceal guerrilla operations from the 

air often proved fatal to US infantrymen attempting to gain 

access.20 RCAs confirmed their effectiveness in countering 

enemy defenses by engulfing these barriers with an irritant cloud, making it impossible for occupants to remain 

inside. 

CW was developed out of innovation and necessity. From 

the trenches of WWI to the jungles of Southeast Asia, CW 

technologies provided military leaders the capability to effectively counter both conventional and unconventional 

methods of warfare using unconventional techniques. 

Chemical Agents and Their Effects

The ability to differentiate between lethal and nonlethal 

chemical agents is essential for several reasons. First, by 

understanding their basic differences, one is able to realize their designed intent. Second, while both lethal and 

nonlethal chemical agents have similar effects, their consequences are vastly dissimilar. Third, nonlethal chemical 

agents expand the capabilities of military commanders to 

shape the courses of action within the battlefield environment. Because of the potential utility of nonlethal agents, 

these are addressed in the most detail.

 Lethal Chemical Agents

The definition of a lethal chemical agent implies a direct toxic effect on man, animal, or plant.21 The effects produced may be short-lived or permanent, depending on the 

amount of exposure. The fundamental intent of employing 

lethal chemical agents is to achieve irreversible injury on 

personnel, ranging from extreme skin irritation to paralysis, asphyxia, and death. Lethal chemical agents fall into 

the categories of blister agents, blood and choking agents, 

and nerve agents.22

Blister agents are primarily used for area denial because 

they are persistent in most environments. The onset of 

their effects is slow in comparison to the other agents. The 

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painful wound, combined with the appalling visual effect of 

vesication, increases the level of fear and promotes hysteria 

among personnel.23 Blister agent effects can also be considered a useful deterrent because of their psychological 

impacts.24

Blood and choking agents are most effective as antipersonnel weaponry; their nonpersistent properties stop the immediate advancement of troops by direct dispersion, usually 

in the form of aerosols applied directly on personnel. They 

can also be used in an offensive mode to disrupt a defender’s 

fighting position as the immediate effect of blood and choking agents is to disrupt the ability to fight. This is accomplished when the agent inhibits the normal transfer of oxygen from the blood to the body tissues, causing death within 

minutes.25 Choking agents utilize the same principles, except they attack the lining of the lungs. This results in dryland drowning, wherein the damaged lung membranes allow 

fluid to enter, precluding the transfer of oxygen to the bloodstream.26 Although blood agents are quick acting, they are 

only effective if delivered in large quantities.27

Nerve agents are the most common chemical agents in 

the world.28 While there are many variations of chemical 

nerve agents, they all perform the same way.29 By blocking 

the balance between the sympathetic and parasympathetic 

nervous systems, which together form the autonomic nervous system, they cause the nervous system to be continually stimulated.30 The effect of this stimulation causes uncontrolled convulsions, eventually leading to death. 

Nerve agents became attractive for several reasons. Their 

widespread toxicity and ease of employment make dispersion more effective.31 Smaller doses of agent became more 

lethal, and delivery options increased. For example, artillery-type ordnance was plentiful and easier to employ compared to aircraft bombs. The time of lethality is another factor for widespread use of nerve agents. The period required 

for a nerve agent to cause death is between one and 10 

minutes, unlike previous chemical agents, such as blister 

agents, which took between four and 24 hours for effects 

(death) to occur.32 The rapidity with which nerve agents 

are absorbed also makes them harder to defend against 

since chemicals absorbed through the skin result in symptoms within an hour.33 Because nerve agents have viscosity 

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characteristics similar to that of fuel oil, they are easier to 

disperse as an aerosol. Additionally, nerve agents have an 

environmental temperature range of effectiveness between 

-50 to 2000 degrees Celsius, meaning they can be used effectively throughout the world.34 The use of nerve agent, as 

with the other lethal chemical agents, is intended for area 

denial and antipersonnel effects. The difference between lethal chemical agents is intent and effectiveness. 

Nonlethal Chemical Agents

Nonlethal chemical agents are a subset of capabilities 

that fall under the broader heading of nonlethal weapons 

(NLW). The term nonlethal has many definitions. A Naval 

Law Review article defines it as “the intent of the user 

‘neither to kill nor to harm permanently.’ ”35 A nonlethal 

weapon, as defined by Department of Defense Directive 

3000.3, Policy for Nonlethal Weapons, 9 July 1996, is one 

that is “explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to 

incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage 

to property and the environment.”36 This directive further 

characterizes NLW as having either relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel, and/or as affecting objects 

differently within their area of influence.37 NLW can cause 

serious injury or death if not used properly. Consequently, 

Department of Defense (DOD) policy advocates that they 

are to be used in a complementary fashion with existing 

lethal weapons systems.38

Nonlethal chemical agents have existed as long as lethal 

chemical agents. Tear gas and other forms of irritants developed during WWI became available on the battlefield but 

were never deemed useful to military commanders. Military 

leaders opted not to use nonlethal chemical agents (commonly referred to as harassing agents) because the agents 

did not achieve the desired effects on the battlefield.39

Antipersonnel and antimaterial are the two main categories of nonlethal chemical agents. Antipersonnel chemical 

agents consist of two subsets—chemical agents that rely on 

toxic effects to humans and those that do not.40 Antimaterial chemical agents are those that are not intended for 

use against humans.41 According to the US Army National 

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Ground Intelligence Center, nonlethal chemical agents that 

depend on the toxic effects to humans are incapacitating chemicals. These chemicals consist of RCAs, vomiting 

agents, psychochemicals, calmatives, and malodorants.42

Since WWI nonlethal chemical technologies have become 

increasingly important because of their ability to disable an 

opponent.43 Today, nonlethal chemical agents have evolved 

in the continuum of incapacitating agents to antimaterial 

agents. Mostly common to law enforcement applications, 

nonlethal chemicals are intended to rapidly disable an opponent or equipment but have only temporary effects. For 

this reason, the application of nonlethal chemical agents 

has become an appealing capability of the twenty-first century military. 

RCAs—used extensively in peacekeeping, public disturbances, area denial, dynamic building clearing, and hostage rescue/barricade situations—produce eye and nose 

irritation, lacrimation (tearing), itching, and burning sensations.44 When exposed to an RCA, personnel remain helpless until removed from the area. Recovery time is minimal 

and without long-term injury.45

Vomiting agents contain the same characteristic as RCAs, 

except they produce tightness in the chest, nausea, and 

vomiting.46 Vomiting agents are used extensively throughout foreign militaries because their symptoms make it difficult to wear a protective mask, thus exposing individuals 

to the effects of other agents.47

Psychochemicals and calmatives are agents that affect 

the central nervous system. The term psychochemical refers 

to the effects of a psychotropic action that will incapacitate 

without causing harm.48 In the early 1950s, the US Army 

became interested in pyschochemicals because of their effect on the human mind. In 1962 it developed an incapacitating agent code-named BZ.49 Having similar effects to the 

drug LSD, BZ research was discontinued because of the 

unpredictable nature of its effects on humans.50 Calmative 

agents are commonly defined as pharmaceutical drugs.51

These drugs usually consist of an opiate-based chemical 

which depresses or inhibits the function of the central nervous system thereby producing a sedative-hypnotic state.52

Calmatives have recently caught the attention of the world 

because of their application in the October 2002 Moscow 

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theater hostage crisis, where Russian special forces used 

the analgesic fentanyl to subdue occupying Chechen terrorists and their hostages. The difficulty of delivering calmatives, as witnessed in this incident, is determining the 

correct dose to achieve incapacitation or unconsciousness 

without causing death. 

Malodorants are chemical compounds that produce an 

odor that is unbearable to the sense of smell. Commonly 

referred to as “stink bombs,” their effect on the olfactory 

nerves causes personnel to leave the particular area.53 Military interest in malodorants is due to their potential to control crowds, clear facilities, and deny areas.54 Because of 

their recent development, toxicological assessments of malodorants have not been completed. The Non-lethal Technology and Academic Research Symposium in late 2001 outlined some possible health effects on the sinus and nasal 

passages that can be caused by odorous chemicals used as 

components in malodorant mixtures.55

The second subset of nonlethal antipersonnel agents 

(those not relying on toxic effects to humans) are chemicals 

employed in such a way that they affect neither the physiological nor central nervous systems in the human body.56

These include adhesive agents which are quick-setting polymer foams. Otherwise known as sticky foams, these agents 

immobilize personnel by sticking them to their surroundings.57 Once immobilized, special solvents dissolve the foam 

to remove the personnel from entrapment. If misused, adhesive polymer foams could cause serious injury or death. 

Chemical marking agents used to identify personnel, either 

through conventional dyes or infrared chemicals for covert 

markings, are some examples of antipersonnel chemicals 

which do not have toxic effects. 

The key issue with these types of chemical technologies is 

with their employment. Since these agents are used directly 

against personnel to incapacitate or cause some other effect, they have the potential of causing harm. As a result, 

strict controls are placed on their intended use and desired 

effects. As with all lethal and nonlethal weapon systems, 

extensive training is required prior to their operational employment. 

The last category of nonlethal chemical agents, antimaterial (those not intended for use against humans), pursues a 

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wider variety of targets such as metals, tires, fuels, engines, 

lubricants, tubing and seals, and other system components.58 Their possible applications are unlimited because 

many of these chemical agents may be exempt from the 

CWC, which means restrictions on their usage would not 

apply. Additionally, they are common in industrial uses, 

an application which makes R&D a cost benefit. Some of 

these chemical agents include combustion modifiers which 

alter the combustion process in an engine without changing the characteristics of the mechanical or electrical systems.59 Rigid foam, commonly used in construction, can be 

applied as a rapidly expanding barricade to isolate an area 

or control an evacuation or escape. Other agents include 

super caustics, an enhanced blend of caustic with other 

additives, stored in binary form, that can be combined and 

applied against weapons, tires, roads, optical systems, and 

even shoes.60 Liquid metal embrittlement (LME) can severely 

weaken metals by chemically breaking down their molecular structures, thereby reducing equipment effectiveness.61

An example of this application is its use against aircraft 

and vehicles, in which the primary surfaces become brittle 

and break apart.

A wide variety of chemical options exist, and grasping 

the differences between lethal and nonlethal chemicals is 

necessary to understand their designed intent, application, 

and effect on the battlefield.

Operational Case Studies—A Reality Check

The following investigates the mission intent and then the 

effects achieved in three events in which nonlethal chemical 

agents were used in SO missions. The first objective of reviewing these case studies is to provide associated implications when using nonlethal chemical weapons in two types 

of settings—guerilla warfare/insurgency and counterterrorism. The second is to acknowledge the impacts imposed 

by the existing treaties when these actions took place. 

Chemical agents, both lethal and nonlethal, have historically been used to counter many types of threats. Since 

CW is easily defended against with protective equipment, 

it eventually came to serve only as a disrupting or delaying 

tactic used against conventional threats from combat forces. 

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Significant battlefield effects could not be achieved. As the 

face of warfare changed over time, more and more asymmetric situations began to develop. The use of chemicals 

in combination with unconventional warfare (UW) tactics 

became popular. Operations involving SOF and nonlethal 

chemical agents, such as RCAs, officially began in Vietnam. 

An example of this is the deployment of RCAs in the Seven 

Mountains area of the Mekong Delta. Special Forces Team 

A-421 deployed powdered orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile 

(CS), a tear-agent-like chemical, along the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail to prevent use of the area by the Vietcong.62

Vietnam: Operation Tailwind

The first military disclosure of the use of nonlethal chemical agents in Vietnam ignited an international uproar.63

Nations from around the world issued notes of complaint to 

the United States for its use of CS in Southeast Asia. Members of the House of Representatives sent letters to Pres. 

Lyndon B. Johnson protesting the use of RCAs.64 Editorials 

in the New York Times published in 1965 highlighted the 

counterproductive nature of CS and its inconsistency with 

the moral views of the United States, stating that “this is 

something that no Asian, Communist or not, will forget. . . . 

Gas is a wretched means to achieve the most valid ends.”65

Extensive use of RCAs in Vietnam prior to 1965 became 

popular against guerilla fighters who were using elaborate 

tunnel systems to move supplies and escape aerial bombardment. US troops sealed the tunnel entrances and filled 

the tunnels with CS gas to flush out enemy forces. This 

method was so successful that other conventional military 

applications of RCA, particularly CS, soon followed. Reliance on CS gas for military operations developed to such 

an extent that the total procurement cost for RCA rose from 

$2.4 million in 1963 to $80.5 million in 1965.66 In 1966 after several civilian fatalities resulted from the improper use 

of CS, and with mounting political pressure on the Johnson 

administration, military operations involving the use of all 

types of gases were unofficially suspended.67

Operation Tailwind commenced on 11 September 1970. 

Two US Marine Corps CH-53 helicopters, escorted by 

three AH-1G Cobra gunships, carried into Laos a team 

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of 16 American soldiers from the Military Advisory Command Studies and Observation Group and a special commando unit consisting of Montagnard troops.68 Their objective was to provide reconnaissance, intelligence collection, 

and diversion for a larger operation to the north.69 During 

the four-day mission, the SOF unit came under enemy attack almost every day. Despite the 56th Special Operations 

Wing’s (SOW) continuous air support to and coverage of 

the unit, increasing enemy pressure created an immediate requirement to extract the SOF team.70 On the 14th of 

September A-1 Skyraider aircraft from the 56th SOW, as 

well as 11 CH-3 helicopters from the 21st Special Operations Squadron, evacuated the SOF unit using CS to suppress enemy fire. Equipped with CBU-30s (cluster bomb 

units) containing 66 pounds of CS-1, the A-1 Skyraiders 

dropped their munitions on key enemy positions downwind 

of the intended landing zone.71 This tactic gave the helicopters enough time to safely pull out the entire team of SOF 

personnel without any losses.72

The Air Force’s and Army’s employment of RCAs in Vietnam created extreme controversy. By the time Operation 

Tailwind occurred, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, issued key authorization for use of CS in Laos for 

combat search and rescue (CSAR) and recovery/extraction 

operations only.73 The US ambassador to Laos held the authority to use CS in that country and controlled its use on 

a case-by-case basis.74

In this situation, it is clear that the intent and effects 

were the same. Both achieved the safe extraction of the SOF 

team while suppressing enemy fire. Implications still existed 

with the use of RCAs in that region. At the time the United 

States had not yet ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of poisonous gases during war and took the 

position that, since RCA did not fall into the category of poison gas, no international protocols were being broken. This 

stance continued to raise questions among other countries 

throughout the war. By 1970 the use of RCAs became so 

closely monitored that their applications began to appear 

only in unconventional operations, causing the controversy 

to fade. Operation Tailwind is an example of a successful 

mission in which military commanders, given the lateral 

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flexibility and combined with the right intent, utilized unconventional methods and techniques to save lives. 

Waco, Texas: Attack on the Davidians

During the spring of 1993, a botched attempt by agents 

from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to seize 

the Branch Davidian ranch near Waco resulted in a 51-day 

standoff between the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 

elite hostage rescue teams (HRT) and 100 well-armed militant followers of David Koresh.75 On 19 April, in an attempt 

to drive out the occupants, the RCA CS was employed. In 

the early morning hours, the FBI’s HRT attempted to deploy CS gas directly into the building. However, because 

there was no entry point to the interior, most of the CS 

agent blew downwind, thereby negating its effectiveness.76

The FBI’s second attempt involved a more drastic measure 

which entailed breaching the exterior of the building and 

injecting the CS. This attempt was successful; however, 

when incendiary munitions were fired into the structure, 

the CS gas ignited and created a massive fire.77 As a result, 

82 lives were lost inside the structure, many of which were 

small children. 

Illustrated in this situation is that the intent and the effects of using CS were not the same. Although the stated intent was a nonlethal intervention, these effects could not be 

achieved. First, the winds were never favorable for the CS 

to take effect. Second, the majority of RCAs are flammable, 

and in this scenario, CS combined with incendiary munitions created a tremendous fire. Finally, intelligence supports claims that most of the occupants, all of whom had 

some form of militia-type training, had protective masks to 

counter CS attacks.78 The FBI’s hostage rescue team failed 

in their planning for the use of RCAs. Unlike Operation Tailwind, where mission intent and desired effects-based operations were clear, the HRT never understood their mission 

intent or effects, resulting not only in the loss of lives but 

also in the loss of trust by the American people in federal 

agency law enforcement SO. The tragic events at Waco exemplify that unconventional methods and techniques must 

be used intelligently to achieve the intended effects.

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Dubrovka Theater, Moscow

On the evening of Wednesday, 23 October 2002, 41 

armed Chechen nationalists seized the Moscow cultural 

center during the performance of Nord-Ost.79 Approximately 

900 attendees and actors were held hostage while the insurgents placed improvised explosive devices throughout 

the theater. Female terrorists strapped explosive suicide 

devices to their bodies and positioned themselves among 

the hostages as a deterrent against any rescue attempt. 

Fifty-seven hours into the standoff, the hostage takers had 

only one demand: “Pull Russian troops from Chechnya.”80

In reply, Russian officials made only one offer: release the 

hostages unharmed, and the Chechen perpetrators would 

be allowed to live.81 On the third day, in the early morning 

hours of 26 October, Russia’s elite counterterrorist force, the 

Federal Security Service (Russian translation Federal’naia 

sluzhba bezopasnosti [FSB], referred to hereafter as FSB) 

Al’fa, pumped fentanyl, a nonlethal incapacitating agent, 

into the theater to subdue the occupying Chechen terrorists 

and their hostages in preparation for a dynamic assault.82

In the aftermath of the assault, 128 of the 900 hostages 

died. All 41 Chechen terrorists received fatal gunshots to 

the head, and the FSB commando unit reported no fatalities. The Moscow public health department announced that 

many of the hostages suffocated as a direct result of the 

fentanyl. Of the 128 hostages reported killed, only one was 

shot by the terrorists—the others died due to the effects 

of the aerosol.83 Immediately following the attack, Russian 

military and police forces placed the suffocating victims on 

the sidewalk while waiting for medical personnel to arrive 

on-scene. Doctors at the hospitals were never informed of 

the chemical agent used and could not properly diagnose 

any of the victims. Finally, four days after the raid, with 

increasing domestic and international pressure, Russian 

health minister Yuri Shevchenko established that the aerosol agent was a form of a fentanyl anesthetic that was used 

extensively for anesthesia and analgesia.84

While the Russian government claimed this incursion 

was a complete success because of its use of a nonlethal 

chemical agent, fentanyl, this analysis instead reveals it as 

a failure with respect to the intent and effects of using this 

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analgesic agent. Irregardless of the large numbers of hostages involved in this situation, FSB Al’fa’s intent of using a 

nonlethal agent was less focused on their rescue and more 

so on killing the Chechen terrorists. This vendetta stemmed 

from past encounters when Chechen fighters defeated the 

elite unit in hostage-taking scenarios, causing the Russian 

government great embarrassment. Chechen guerilla leaders began to exploit the FSB’s shortcomings with refined 

tactics. Russian SOF had to reestablish their reputation because allegations of organized crime links, contract killings, 

and political assassinations forced the disestablishment of 

some FSB units.85 Part of the Al’fa unit was initially dissolved, but it was later built back up specifically to target 

Chechen terrorism.86

The combination of having an unsuccessful record against 

Chechen hostage takers and the pressure to reestablish their 

counterterrorism reputation slanted the Al’fa group’s intent 

within their course of action. Their intent of using a calmative 

agent inside the Dubrovka theater was to incapacitate and 

then kill the Chechen terrorists, verified by the amount of fentanyl agent used in the raid. Urine and blood samples from 

several of the German hostages examined by a German toxicology professor showed an extremely high concentration of 

anesthetics.87 Loss of consciousness from fentanyl occurs at 

the lowest effective dose—for 50 percent of a given population, 

around .011 milligram (mg) per kilogram (kg) of body weight.88

The lethal dose of fentanyl for 50 percent of a given population occurs at 3.1 mg per kg of body weight.89 Although there 

are no facts available showing how much fentanyl was used 

in the raid, it is safe to assume that a high concentration was 

required to effectively render everyone unconscious.90 Additionally, the FSB Al’fa had no prior training in administering 

calmative agents in this type of environment, implying that 

hostage safety was not a high priority. 

The aftermath of the hostage crisis drew attention across 

the globe. Accused of releasing a lethal chemical agent against 

the terrorists, Russian president Vladimir Putin felt the international pressures to admit this atrocity. However, rather 

than admitting fault, he instead viewed this as one of the most 

successful hostage rescue missions ever completed.91 When 

accused of violating the CWC, Putin took a hard stance and 

argued that because fentanyl is considered a pharmaceutical 

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drug, its use was not in violation of the CWC. The negative 

publicity generated from the aftermath and the initial secrecy 

of this incident fueled the adverse publicity. Unlike the tragedy that occurred in Waco, Texas, where nonlethal intervention was the intent, resulting effects of using this unconventional method (fentanyl) killed 50 times more of FSB Al’fa’s 

own people than did the hostage takers. 

The Legal Dimensions of Chemical Warfare

The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use 

of riot control agents as a method of warfare, reaffirms 

the prohibition in international law on the use of 

herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for 

the possibility for protection against and assistance in 

the event of use or threat of use of chemical weapons 

against a State Party. The Administration is reviewing 

the impact of the Convention’s prohibition on the use of 

riot control agents as a method of warfare on Executive 

Order No. 11850, which specifies the current policy of 

the United States with regard to the use of riot control 

agents in war. 

 —Pres. William J. Clinton

 —The White House, 23 November 1993

The CW casualties of WWI will be fixed in the minds of 

policy makers, military leaders, and antiwar advocates for a 

very long time. While both the military and civilians would 

generally place the use of CW into the category of “evil,” international treaties prevent their development. Most policy 

makers agree that any chemical used against personnel 

that may cause unnecessary suffering should be restricted 

from warfare, but there are nonlethal chemical technologies that do not produce injury. Therefore, it is pertinent to 

examine the legal dimensions of their usage in relation to 

the CWC and synthesize these findings with today’s GWOT 

counterterrorist applications. 

Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993

The CWC became the first post–Cold War international 

arms control treaty banning possession and use of chemiArticle.indd 17 9/18/06 1:11:0
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cal weapons. It was ratified in 1997 by the United States, 

symbolizing its increased emphasis on efforts for post–Cold 

War arms reductions with Russia and its nonproliferation 

agenda throughout the world.92 The process began in April 

of 1984 at the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva.93 Recognizing that nonstate actors could much more easily acquire chemical weapons than nuclear weapons, the United 

States decided to take the lead in abolishing them. Vice 

President George H. W. Bush presented to the conference a 

draft treaty that became the basis for negotiations and, ultimately, the foundation of the CWC.94 Negotiations on the 

CWC were completed at the Conference of Disarmament 

in September of 1992, and the convention was opened for 

signature in Paris on 13 January 1993.95 The convention 

entered into force for the United States on 29 April 1997, 

following lengthy ratification proceedings by the US Senate.96 This was largely due to the decision-making processes 

between Washington and Moscow over the implementation 

of treaty commitments and concerns for the preservation of 

Executive Order (EO) 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses 

in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 

which allowed for restricted use of RCAs in war.

Although the CWC is the latest convention restricting the 

use of chemical weapons, it is not the first. CW restrictions 

have been attempted through the years and have always 

become the issue of an irrelative policy, unable to maintain 

pace with changing environments. While attempts to control 

CW began with the 1899 Hague Conference, international 

chemical agreements have always lost their authority. 

This synopsis of key international treaties and protocols 

of CW reveals several explanations for why they are difficult 

to enforce. First, the methods and techniques of warfare 

always evolve in complexity as different forms of warfare 

emerge onto the battlefield. By the start of WWI, several 

treaties existed in which nations agreed to prohibit the use 

of chemical agents. After the war moved towards a stalemate of trench warfare, restraints provided by these CW 

treaties became irrelevant. Secondly, new technological developments in both lethal and nonlethal chemical agents 

evolved from the chemical industries. These developments 

produced new chemical technologies that became more effective, essentially creating treaties that did not apply. The 

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third and final reason is the symmetry of ever-changing 

threats within the battlefield environment. To counter these 

threats, countries relied on unconventional applications of 

lethal and nonlethal forms of CW to effectively stop symmetric and asymmetric threats.

In 1899 the Hague Conference met to decide on how to 

establish peace through the convention of “disarmament 

and pacific settlement of disputes.”97 Although the conference never reached an agreement on disarmament, it did 

agree on certain conventions pertaining to international 

disputes and the rules of war.98 One of the agreements was 

the prohibition of the use of poisonous gas. In this declaration, the conference concurred that poisonous gas was inhumane and prohibited its use in war. However, the United 

States did not support the declaration because it failed to 

adequately define “inhumane” acts.99

After WWI other international treaties, signed in an attempt to restrict the methods of warfare, failed. Many of 

these treaties never went into effect because countries did 

not consent to ratify. Introduced in 1925, the Geneva Protocol recognized the efforts of the previous treaties by declaring that the “use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 

gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices has 

been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world.”100 Additionally, the treaty attempted to make 

this a lasting effect by stating that this “prohibition shall be 

universally accepted as part of International Law, binding 

alike the conscious and the practice of nations.”101 However, the prohibition did not restrict the research, development, and stockpiling of these weapons. The United States 

recognized this and did not initially ratify the protocol. One 

reason for its hesitation was that by the start of WWII, the 

United States clearly realized CW had become an effective 

deterrent against the threat of adversaries who possessed 

the same capabilities.102 In other words, possessing a retaliatory capability was threat enough to keep these weapons out of war. Since the protocol was ineffective against 

stockpiling, it made no sense for the United States to sign 

on. Instead, it viewed the continued research, development, 

and stockpiling of chemical weapons as the best control. 

The United States also recognized the potential in technological development of both lethal and nonlethal chemical 

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agents.103 Nerve agents, RCAs, and chemical herbicides became available, offering greater capabilities on the battlefield against various forms of threats. This was the case in 

the 1960s when the United States, not restricted under the 

1925 Geneva Protocol, decided to use RCAs and chemical 

defoliants in Vietnam. Although drawing controversy and 

adverse world opinion, military leaders realized the importance of the nonlethal chemical agents in guerrilla/insurgency types of UW. 

In November 1969 Pres. Richard M. Nixon announced 

that the United States had decided to join the 1925 Geneva Protocol.104 The United States did not ratify the 1925 

Geneva Protocol until 1975, after settling disagreements 

about the protocol’s application to RCAs and herbicides. 

As the succeeding Ford administration recognized the importance of RCAs and herbicides in asymmetric types of 

environments, it strived to protect their use. However, strict 

conditions that would first have to be met before RCAs or 

herbicides could be used in war were outlined, and then 

only by presidential authorization.105 This authorization became EO 11850.106 Pursuant to this EO, the administration 

reserved the right to use herbicides to control vegetation 

within armed US bases or installations. The administration 

also reserved the right to use RCAs to control rioting POWs, 

to reduce or avoid civilian casualties, to aid in the rescue of 

isolated personnel (e.g., downed pilots), or to protect convoys in rear echelon areas from civil disturbances, paramilitary organizations, and terrorists.107 Executive Order 

11850 also provides the United States with a limited unconventional (nonlethal) method to counter the perceived 

threats of that time.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol served as an important precedent that began talks on a broader CWC. In 1984, in an 

effort to improve superpower relations, the Conference on 

Disarmament agreed that efforts should get underway to 

start a chemical weapons ban.108 The United States and 

Soviet Union began promising Geneva delegates that the 

leadership of the superpowers would exert their influence 

to prohibit chemical weapons. Until this time, talks were 

well underway between the United States and the Soviets 

on nuclear arms control. It became evident that the two 

world superpowers began to focus on unconventional arms 

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reduction. In 1992, after long and painstaking negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to the text of 

the CWC.109 The convention became the first disarmament 

agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that 

provided for the elimination of an entire category of WMD.110

Unlike the nuclear weapons conventions, the CWC prohibits all development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, 

transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It levies the requirement for “each State Party to destroy chemical weapons 

and chemical weapons production facilities it possesses, 

as well as any chemical weapons it may have abandoned 

on the territory of another State Party.”111 The verification 

provisions of the CWC affect not only the military but also 

the civilian chemical industry worldwide through certain 

restrictions and obligations regarding the production, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are considered 

relevant to the objectives of the convention.112

One area drawing strong argument against the CWC is 

the prohibition of nonlethal chemical agents, specifically 

RCAs, used as a method of warfare. The CWC does not 

regard toxic chemicals and their precursors as chemical 

weapons if their intent is not prohibited under the CWC.113

That is, RCAs are not considered a chemical weapon within 

the definition of Article 2 of the CWC if their intended use 

is not a method of warfare.114 RCAs used as a method of 

warfare are prohibited under Article 1 of the CWC.115 RCAs 

or any other toxic chemical used in national law enforcement, including domestic riot control, are not prohibited 

under the CWC.116 The question remains, What are the 

military applications for RCAs? The CWC defines RCAs as 

“any chemical not listed in a Schedule which can produce 

rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following 

termination of exposure.”117 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.07B, Nuclear, Biological, 

and Chemical Defense: Riot Control Agent; and Herbicides 

(U), 16 February 2001, clearly outlines the policy regarding the use of RCAs in war, peacetime military operations, 

and operations other than war (OOTW). The policy of RCAs 

in war continues to support the 8 April 1975 EO 11850. 

During war, use of RCAs outside a war zone is authorized 

as prescribed for peacetime.118 CJCSI 3110.07B states that 

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in peacetime military operations and in OOTW, the United 

States is not restricted by the CWC in its use of RCAs, including against combatants who are party to a conflict in 

any of the following cases:

1. The conduct of peacetime military operations within an area of 

ongoing armed conflict when the United States is not a party to 

the conflict.

2. Consensual peacekeeping operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state, including operations pursuant to 

Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter.

3. Peacekeeping operations when force is authorized under Chapter 

VII of the United Nations Charter.119

While nearly all treaties and conventions have some irrelevancies to today’s applications, the CWC is outdated with 

respect to the use of nonlethal RCAs as a method of warfare 

in the GWOT. As stated earlier, the GWOT is a combination 

of conventional and unconventional methods of warfare to 

counter an unconventional asymmetric threat. It is clear 

from the review of both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 

1993 CWC that both were developed to restrict the uses of 

CW within specific threat environments. For example, the 

1925 Geneva Protocol based its foundation on the events of 

WWI. Overlooking the fact that countries could still produce 

and stockpile these weapons, the protocol became ineffective leading into WWII. The United States, Germany, Russia, Japan, England, and France continued to develop and 

stockpile large quantities of chemical weapons throughout the 1930s despite the protocol’s conditions. When the 

United States announced in 1969 that it had decided to join 

the 1925 Geneva Protocol, President Nixon wanted to show 

the Soviet Union that the United States was serious about 

arms control—which then equated to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.120 While the United States eventually signed 

the treaty on 26 March 1975, the environment under which 

the protocol was intended became irrelevant. This became 

apparent on 8 April 1975, when the United States issued 

EO 11850 to renounce first use of RCAs in war except in 

defensive military modes to save lives.121

This retrospect of the CWC supports its irrelevancy to the 

GWOT in the following three areas:

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1. The warfare environment of the 1980s was conducive 

to symmetric threats. The CWC focused on establishing bilateral arms control while overlooking unconventional and asymmetric threats of nonstate actors 

and terrorist networks. 

2. The use of RCAs in national settings versus international settings became inconsistent with respect to 

enforcement. For instance, if a country deploys RCAs 

against terrorists as a law enforcement action, the 

country is in compliance with the CWC. If the country 

deploys RCAs against terrorists as an unconventional 

method of warfare, it is subject to the prohibition of 

Article 1 of the CWC. This holds true for the GWOT. 

If the country is conducting a GWOT combined federal law enforcement/paramilitary counterterrorism 

operation in conjunction with another country on its 

sovereign territory, nonlethal chemical technologies 

can be used without prohibition from the CWC. 

3. The usefulness of nonlethal chemical agents is highly 

favorable to technological change, and treaties tend 

to lag behind evolving applications. This is exemplified in the Russian FSB Al’fa team’s use of fentanyl 

as an incapacitant to conduct rescue and dynamic 

entry against Chechen terrorists inside the Dubrovka 

theater. Normally considered a pharmaceutical drug 

without treaty restrictions, fentanyl was utilized by 

the FSB Al’fa with the intent of incapacitating, thus 

creating another area of uncertainty within the confines of the CWC. 

In essence, the CWC has no teeth. Countries will always 

obtain ways to meet their intent through necessity. In today’s GWOT, necessity may require the use of unconventional methods and techniques of warfare such as nonlethal chemical technologies to counter a terrorist action. 

Fighting the Global War on Terror 

Since 9/11 the DOD’s strategy for counterterrorism 

operations has undergone major developments.122 United 

States Special Operations Command, designated the DOD’s 

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executive agent for the GWOT, has developed highly successful strategies in counterterrorism operations worldwide. SOF units, both US and coalition, have destroyed 

remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Elements of SOF and the interagency 

have formed units to conduct tracking of high value targets 

like Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.123 New equipment, such as enhanced night vision and communications, 

developed specifically for counterterrorism operations, has 

empowered SOF with greater capabilities on the battlefield. Interoperations with federal law enforcement SO have 

proven effective in achieving dual supporting relationships 

in capturing terrorists. Has the strategy looked at the full 

range of options? Or is the strategy restricted by traditional 

bounds governing conventional forces? The answer to both 

of these questions is no. 

Potential strategies within the GWOT for the offensive 

use of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorism 

operations show that opportunities exist through viable avenues. One of these avenues is the design of the National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism and its applications to law 

enforcement. Another is the definition of war under existing international law versus the definitions of conflict. The 

latest technological developments and applications of nonlethal chemical agents are a final avenue for their offensive 

use in counterterrorism operations. 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:

The Potential

 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, published 

in February 2003, provides possible opportunities for the 

use of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorism 

operations. After describing the United States’ approach to 

defeating terrorism, its strategic intent is to stop terrorist 

attacks by using every instrument of national power on four 

fronts—defeat, deny, diminish, and defend (4D strategy).124

The following discussion will focus on the first tenet of the 

4D strategy—defeat. 

In the context of the national strategy, the United States 

will use its resources to “defeat terrorists and their organizations.” This goal calls for the direct use of economic, 

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financial, information, military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic power.125 These instruments of 

power, specifically the latter four, are the most common approaches when conducting counterterrorist operations.126

Used unilaterally these tactics offer little effectiveness; 

when combined, however, their effects in supporting relationships demonstrate added value. Successful counterterrorist operations of today are a seamless composite of SOF 

and interagency forces. This is illustrated in Presidential 

Decision Directive (PDD) 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, along with classified concept plans (CONPLAN) that 

delineate supporting relationships between SOF and the interagencies.127 This authority codifies counterterrorist measures for coordinated federal responses to terrorist threats 

or acts. The 2003 overseas arrest of top Al-Qaeda leader 

Khalid Shaik Mohammed in Pakistan clearly demonstrates 

this relationship between the Department of Justice (DOJ), 

Department of State (DOS), DOD, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This particular counterterrorist action, 

determined to be a law enforcement mission, placed DOJ 

as the lead federal agency, while the DOS, the CIA, and the 

DOD provided supporting roles in tactical operations and 

host country liaisons. If the United States continues to pursue overseas terrorists under federal law enforcement jurisdiction, then Article 2, paragraph 9(d) of the CWC, which 

states that “purposes not prohibited under this convention: 

law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes,” 

applies.128 Specifically, if the methods used to conduct counterterrorist operations do not relate to methods of warfare, 

then law enforcement applications of nonlethal chemical 

technologies, with SOF in support, would not be in violation 

of Article 1, paragraph 1(b) of the CWC, which prohibits the 

use of any chemical as a method of warfare.129 Essentially, 

the definition of counterterrorist operations changes, but 

the intended effects remain the same. This reinforces the 

fact that the CWC is not relevant with respect to today’s 

GWOT counterterrorist operations. 

The “Nonwar” Definition

The meaning of the term war has evolved from Carl von 

Clausewitz’s definition as “an act of force to compel our enArticle.indd 25 9/18/06 1:11:1
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emy to do our will.”130 War has advanced into subcategories 

of unconventional conflicts where volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous influences shape the battlefields of 

tomorrow. This nonwar atmosphere is typically a SOF environment where less than optimal use of force often necessitates mission completion. Today, the DOD has developed 

new terms to fit the battlefields of the future. These terms 

include peacekeeping, military operations other than war

(MOOTW), and OOTW. The argument among critics is about 

how the DOD defines war. Pentagon planners argue in favor 

of these terms because they do not fit the offensive international war definition and, therefore, are not bound by the 

restrictions of international law.131 These terms would label 

our actions in Mogadishu as MOOTW or OOTW, allowing 

options to military commanders that normally do not exist 

under the title of war. Thus, counterterrorist operations not 

relating to warfare would allow SOF the use of RCAs under 

the purview of CJCSI 3110.07B.132

The Technology Breakthrough

Nonlethal chemicals can serve a variety of purposes, 

depending on the desired effects. Identifying an optimum 

nonlethal chemical depends upon the situation of the crisis 

requiring intervention. Equally important, nonlethal chemical technologies have an effect that may cause a strategic 

impact on the way a war is being fought. With the new developments in technologies, many nonlethal chemicals achieve 

similar effects without the strategic consequences. For example, chemical irritants such as CS or pepper spray, traditionally used in situations requiring crowd control, may 

be replaced by new developments in calmative agents.133

New adhesives (sticky foams) may be used to stop foot-traffic access to protected locations.134 Infrared dye markers 

may be used for clandestine tracking of individuals.135 Metal 

embrittlement, polymer agents, and super caustics may be 

used against equipment and materials for area denial.136

Malodorants may be used to clear structures or tunnels 

in lieu of CS. As with all advanced technology, nonlethal 

chemicals have provided the added flexibility needed to operate on the unconventional battlefield. 

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The GWOT provides an avenue for SOF to capitalize on 

the offensive use of nonlethal chemical technologies, but 

the political burden associated with the term chemical often 

precludes their use. 

The Strategic Implications

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads 

of radicalism and technology. When the spread 

of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, 

along with ballistic missile technology—when that 

occurs, even weak states and small groups could 

attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. 

Our enemies have declared this very intention, 

and have been caught seeking these terrible 

weapons. They want the capability to blackmail 

us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we 

will oppose them with all our power.

 —Pres. George W. Bush

 —West Point, New York, 1 June 2002

Before moving closer to making nonlethal chemical technologies a more significant option for SOF counterterrorist 

operations, a continuous assessment of the implications is 

required at the strategic levels. There are no simple solutions to the operational use of nonlethal chemicals. Many 

restrictions prohibit their use from the operational realities 

of warfare. The highly political nature alone suggests that 

there are many skeptics who question the military’s use 

of these nonlethal technologies. This analysis does not advocate that nonlethal chemical technologies should be the 

only means used in counterterrorist operations, but offers 

that nonlethal chemical options exist to enhance the overall 

effectiveness of these types of operations.

This section assesses the potential advantages and disadvantages of nonlethal chemical technologies and their 

applications within a strategic context. Although nonlethal 

chemical technologies are designed to be employed at the 

tactical level, the results of their effects can and will most 

likely become strategic in nature. Political and military 

leaders must understand both the tactical and strategic effects before applying this method of UW. It is important for 

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senior leaders to understand the uses of these weapons in 

order to make informed decisions. 

The first strategic advantage is nonlethal chemical technology’s ability to provide senior leaders with more options 

in the application of force.137 Joint Vision 2020 illustrates 

that the development of full spectrum dominance in which 

military operations are “persuasive in peace, decisive in 

war, [and] preeminent in any form of conflict” requires a 

wide range of capabilities.138 The application of nonlethal 

chemical technologies greatly enhances these capabilities 

and provides the greatest contribution to counterterrorist 

operations. Nonlethal chemical technologies provide SOF 

with a myriad of options, allowing commanders transitional 

options that before were only to detect and destroy.139 Figure 1 shows the lethal transition, while figure 2 shows the 

nonlethal transition. Nonlethal chemical technologies contribute three additional options for SOF commanders: deny, 

delay, and defeat.140

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Time

Figure 1. Lethal Transition

A second strategic advantage to using nonlethal chemical 

agents in an unconventional counterterrorist environment is 

deterrence. Experts argue that terrorism cannot be deterred, 

and attempts at deterrence add motivation to an ideological 

belief. Many of these ideological beliefs involve suicide while 

committing terrorist acts.141 If terrorists die in the act, either 

Article.indd 28 9/18/06 1:11:1
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from the result of suicide or in direct confrontation with the 

military or law enforcement, the results of their actions become viewed as martyrdom by their followers. This reinforces 

the ideology. Conversely, if the terrorist fails (e.g., is captured, 

tried, and sentenced to prison), then the ideological motivation 

begins to lose effect.142 In some cases, counterterrorist operations make capturing specific terrorists a concern in order to 

prevent the reinforcement of the ideology. Inconsistencies and 

radical behavior exhibited by some terrorists may become an 

impossible task. This is where nonlethal chemical applications benefit the counterterrorist forces. Nonlethal chemical 

technologies, such as calmatives, sticky foams, or even RCAs, 

offer the flexibility to effectively capture terrorists. The option 

to capture instead of kill will not only change terrorists’ techniques, but will also deter their methods, thus creating flaws 

in the ideology. 

 The third strategic advantage that nonlethal chemical 

technologies offer is reduced collateral damage. Terrorists 

capitalize on the advantages of collateral damage resulting from counterterrorist actions. Destruction of homes, 

buildings, schools, and religious buildings resulting from 

lethal effects adds incentive to a terrorist’s recruiting campaign with the local population. Many times counterterrorist operations result in the loss of innocent lives, either 

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Time

Figure 2. Nonlethal Transition

Article.indd 29 9/18/06 1:11:1
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through hostage situations or simply because the terrorists 

purposely place themselves within crowds to maintain anonymity. Nonlethal chemical technologies can lessen collateral damage by creating effects that enable counterterrorist 

forces to discriminate terrorists from civilians. Covert dyes, 

infrared markings, and malodorants are a few examples 

that would assist in this discrimination of terrorists. RCAs, 

irritants, or malodorants could effectively drive terrorists 

from religious buildings, for example, by forcing or channeling them into an area for capture.

The final strategic advantage is that nonlethal chemical 

weapons close the gap between war and peace. As mentioned previously, SOF often find themselves in areas where 

the environment is at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. This typically results in a combination of military and 

federal agency types of counterterrorist operations. Nonlethal chemical agents offer the ability to minimize death 

and destruction.143 They enable counterterrorist forces the 

ability to capture intelligence and materiel that might have 

been destroyed with conventional capabilities.144

The use of nonlethal chemical agents presents many challenges and concerns when their strategic effects may cause 

long-term consequences. There are also four strategic disadvantages of using nonlethal chemical technologies. 

The first strategic disadvantage, and perhaps the most 

damaging, is world perception. In 1953 Peking Radio announced that two US aircraft dropped bombs filled with 

“poison gas of an asphyxiating type” on North Korean positions near the Han River.145 In reality the United States did 

not report any use of chemical weapons during the conflict. In 1965, although the United States only used RCAs in 

Vietnam to clear tunnel systems and herbicides to defoliate 

dense jungles, Hanoi Radio accused the United States of 

dropping “lethal asphyxiating gases” on North Vietnamese 

forces.146 In 1998 CNN claimed that the United States used 

nerve agent on American deserters in Vietnam during Operation Tailwind.147 The report later proved to be false. 

Today’s world is driven by the media and the Internet. 

Unfortunately, the world’s perception of the United States 

is shaped by the media. This spin on perception that these 

information services produce often influences actions. With 

current world opinion constantly condemning the US govArticle.indd 30 9/18/06 1:11:1
31

ernment over its actions, the use of nonlethal chemical 

technologies against terrorists would only add to the negative effect. Media propaganda has the potential to reinforce 

terrorist ideologies around the world, widen the gap in foreign relations, and politically humiliate the United States.

The second disadvantage of using nonlethal chemical technologies is violation of the CWC. Since the United 

States—along with some 150 other countries, including the 

United Kingdom—ratified the CWC treaty and pledged to 

uphold it, breaking with the treaty would undermine its 

effectiveness. Combined with negative world perception, 

this would divide the United States and its closest coalition partners in the GWOT, particularly the United Kingdom, which already publicly opposes the use of nonlethal 

chemical technologies.148 The loss of key coalition partners 

would reduce the overall effectiveness of the United States’ 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

A third strategic disadvantage is that the availability of 

nonlethal chemicals might present unrealistic expectations.149 Senior leaders may make strategic decisions based 

on the expectation that nonlethal chemical technologies can 

produce effects that in reality are impossible to achieve. 

Consequently, their decisions may result in unintended 

death and political fallout. For example, in Waco, Texas, the 

FBI’s hostage rescue team intended to drive out the Branch 

Davidians knowing the wind conditions were unfavorable 

and that the Davidians possibly had masks to counter the 

effects of CS. The FBI’s leadership continued to use CS with 

unrealistic expectations which resulted in catastrophe.

The fourth strategic disadvantage of using nonlethal chemical technologies is that it may encourage countries to develop 

their own lethal chemical weapons.150 This would be a direct 

result of the second strategic disadvantage—the United States 

breaking with the CWC treaty. As a consequence, chemical 

technologies would present an available warfare temptation 

to the militaries of many nonstate actors. The risk of proliferation of these lethal chemical agents to other nonstate actors or 

terrorists would most likely increase. 

The use of nonlethal chemicals in counterterrorist operations presents new challenges and complex issues. These issues cover diverse topics such as psychology, policy, ethics, 

law, and technology. Many of the challenges will continuArticle.indd 31 9/18/06 1:11:1
32

ally evolve, directly affecting the decisions of senior leaders. 

As the United States recognizes that UW and asymmetric 

threats will likely dominate the strategy of war in the future, 

military leaders must cautiously approach nonlethal chemical options, recognizing that solutions will not come easily. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

It is by devising new weapons, and above all by 

scientific leadership, that we shall best cope with 

the enemy’s superior strength.

 —Winston S. Churchill

 —3 September 1940

The success of SOF counterterrorism operations will continue to rely on the combination of highly trained and exceptionally skilled operators, specialized procedures, and the use 

of unconventional methods of warfare to defeat terrorists. 

As recent events have shown, today’s terrorists continue to 

adapt to the methods and strategies of counterterrorism operations. This adaptation poses an ever-increasing threat to 

the United States, its allies, and its friends in defeating terrorism. Countering such actions will require the integration 

of conventional and unconventional approaches, including 

lethal and nonlethal applications. As a result, opposing terrorists’ efforts to reduce counterterror capabilities requires 

the development of new tactics, methods, and technologies 

within SOF and the interagencies. These developments can 

present additional options for decision makers. This paper 

analyzed options supporting the use of nonlethal chemical 

technologies in counterterrorist operations. 

The application of nonlethal chemical technologies offers viable options in today’s counterterrorist environment. 

Although looked upon by many as brutal and inhumane, 

nonlethal chemical agents have proven successful in area 

denial, counterinsurgency, hostage rescue, and CSAR. Advances in technology have not only overcome the drawbacks of nonlethal chemical agents, both in antipersonnel 

and antimaterial applications, but have also evolved, offering new dimensions in the methods of UW. 

Restrictions imposed by the CWC on nonlethal chemical agents are too limiting in nature for unconventional 

Article.indd 32 9/18/06 1:11:1
33

SOF operations in today’s GWOT. The CWC was created 

as an arms control measure but evolved into a chemical 

technology watchdog for the world. All chemicals, including nonlethal, became restricted. However, loopholes in law 

enforcement applications of nonlethal chemicals still allow 

for the use of RCAs. New developments of nonlethal incapacitants, which would normally fall under pharmaceuticals, continue to erode the validity of the CWC. Restrictions 

placed on nonlethal chemical applications by the CWC require amendment. 

The GWOT strategy, defined by the National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism, PDDs, and CONPLANs, clearly delineates counterterrorist tactics that the United States will 

support in its efforts to defeat terrorism. Combined military, diplomatic, and law enforcement planning will enable 

senior leaders new avenues of approach in the application 

and effects of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorist operations. Senior leaders continue to be reluctant 

to use chemical technologies for fear of violating the CWC.

 Although typically used in tactical applications, the effects of nonlethal chemical agents in warfare will always 

have strategic implications. Continuous reassessments of 

these implications must be conducted at the highest levels. 

As with any application of warfare, the use of nonlethal 

chemical technologies will have advantages and disadvantages. It is crucial that senior political leaders carefully analyze each advantage and disadvantage in their decisionmaking processes. 

While their absolute effectiveness in counterterrorist operations is not known, the enormous potential of the application of nonlethal chemical technologies makes their 

investigation worthwhile. The DOD should team with interagency partners to research nonlethal chemical technology 

applications within the counterterrorist environment. Senior leadership within the US government should consider 

the following recommendations, in priority: 

1. Revise EO 11850 to allow for the offensive application 

of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorist operations. The advantage of a revision, by virtue 

of the authority vested in the president of the United 

States, would allow for the offensive use of nonlethal 

Article.indd 33 9/18/06 1:11:1
34

chemicals as first-use weapons against terrorists under US law. As with the current EO, the authorization 

for their use would be prohibited in war unless such 

use has presidential approval. 

2. Submit amendments to Article 2, paragraph 9, of the 

CWC that would propose changes to the use of RCAs 

in warfare. Specifically, amend the article to allow the 

application of nonlethal chemical technologies as a 

method of warfare against terrorists and their actions. 

This would alleviate the law enforcement loophole and 

ambiguous definitions posed by the United States to 

circumvent the CWC. 

3. Continue investing in R&D of nonlethal chemical technologies. Both antipersonnel and antimaterial agents 

offer new applications that do not fall within the traditional restrictions of the CWC. Calmative agents, 

sticky foams, and malodorants continue to provide 

new effects that would benefit SOF counterterrorist 

applications. 

4. Limit the use and application of nonlethal chemical 

technology to highly trained, specialized SOF units. 

For reasons discussed earlier, some chemical agents, 

such as calmatives, fall within the pharmaceutical 

realm of nonlethal chemicals, therefore requiring operators with specialized training to apply these agents 

correctly.

The GWOT has changed the world’s understanding of 

counterterrorism. The United States and its allies continue 

to wage an effective counterterrorism campaign, but the use 

of new technologies in nonlethal chemical agents continues 

to be avoided. It is time for the US government to make the 

necessary investments to add nonlethal chemical technologies to its counterterrorist operations.

Notes

1. Frank Bolz, Jr., Kenneth J. Dudonis, and David P. Schulz, The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, 3rd ed. (Boca 

Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2005), 2.

Article.indd 34 9/18/06 1:11:1
35

2. John Eldridge, ed., Jane’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence 

2004–2005, 17th ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group 

Limited, 2004), 63.

3. Ibid.

4. Julian P. Robinson, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: 

A Study of the Historical, Technical, Military, Legal and Political Aspects of 

CBW, and Possible Disarmament Measures, vol. 1, The Rise of CB Weapons 

(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), 30.

5. Ibid., 31.

6. Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas, eds., The New 

Chemical Weapons Convention–Implementation and Prospects (The Hague: 

Kluwer Law International, 1998), 125. 

7. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 39.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Eldridge, ed., Jane’s Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, 63.

12. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 19.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 153.

16. Ibid.

17. Eldridge, ed., Jane’s Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, 63.

18. House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, ChemicalBiological Warfare: US Policies and International Effect, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 

1970, 29–30.

19. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 108.

20. Maj Paul E. Smith, “Riot Control Agents in Southeast Asia,” Research Report no. 2285-80 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff 

College, 1980), 7.

21. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 25.

22. Eldridge, ed., Jane’s Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, 63.

23. Ibid., 64.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 67.

26. Ibid.

27. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 84.

28. Eldridge, ed., Jane’s Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, 68.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 84.

32. Ibid., 85.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Lt Col James C. Duncan, “A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons,” Naval Law Review 24, no. 10 (1998), 5–6, http://www.au 

.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/nonlet2.pdf (accessed 1 Nov. 2005).

36. DOD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Nonlethal Weapons, 9 July 1996 

(certified current as of 21 Nov. 2003), 2.

Article.indd 35 9/18/06 1:11:1
36

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 39.

40. Lt Col James C. Duncan, Head, Operational Law Branch, Department of the Navy, “Legal Issues for Nonlethal Weapons” (lecture, Air War 

College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 3 Nov. 2005).

41. Ibid.

42. National Ground Intelligence Center, “Nonlethal Weapons” (U), 

http://www/ngic.army.smil.mil.htm (accessed 25 Oct. 2005). (Secret/

NOFORN) Information extracted is unclassified.

43. Larry H. Mabry, USA NGIC-1147-101-98, “Nonlethal Technologies—Worldwide” (U), 17 Feb. 1998, 3, http://www.ngmic.army.smil.mil/ 

products/dird/NGIC-1147-101-98. (Secret/NOFORN) Information extracted is unclassified. 

44. Army Field Manual (FM) 8-9, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations AMedP-6(B), 1 Feb. 1996, 6-1.

45. Ibid., 6-2.

46. Ibid., 6-4.

47. National Ground Intelligence Center, “Nonlethal Weapons.” 

48. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 75.

49. Ibid., 77.

50. Ibid.

51. Neil Davison, Biochemical Weapons: Lethality, Technology, Development, and Policy, BNLWRP Research Report no. 5 (United Kingdom: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2004), 27.

52. Army FM 8-9, NATO Handbook, 6-3.

53. Davison, Biochemical Weapons, 10.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Duncan, “Legal Issues for Nonlethal Weapons.” 

57. Col Lawrence L. Larson, “Legal Implications of Nonlethal Weapons” 

(briefing, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 8 Nov. 2005).

58. Col John B. Alexander, Future War: Nonlethal Weapons in Twentyfirst Century Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 72.

59. Mabry, “Nonlethal Technologies,” 1.

60. Maj Joseph W. Cook, III, Maj David P. Fiely, and Maj Maura T. McGowan, “Nonlethal Weapons: Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies,” Airpower Journal, Special Edition, 1995, 11, http://www.airpower

.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/mcgowan.html (accessed 3 Nov. 2005).

61. Ibid.

62. Alexander, Future War, 48.

63. J. B. Neilands et al., Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Vietnam 

and Cambodia (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 31.

64. Ibid., 33.

65. Ibid., 31.

66. Ibid., 34.

67. Ibid., 32.

68. Air Force History Support Office, Air Force History Report on Operation Tailwind (Pentagon, Washington, DC: Air Force History Support 

Office, 16 July 1998), 7.

Article.indd 36 9/18/06 1:11:1
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69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., 8.

71. Ibid., 10.

72. Ibid., 17.

73. Ibid., 14. 

74. Ibid.

75. Alexander, Future War, 48.

76. House, The Tragedy at Waco: New Evidence Examined, Eleventh 

Report by the Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 

28 Dec. 2000, H. Rept. 106-1037, 71–86.

77. Ibid., 50.

78. Ibid., 5.

79. Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, Counterterrorism Handbook, 309.

80. Ibid., 311.

81. Ibid.

82. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Russian Special Forces: Issues of Loyalty, 

Corruption, and the Fight against Terror, JSOU Pamphlet 05-01 (Hurlburt 

Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2005), 8.

83. Wikipedia, “Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis,” http://en.wikipedia

.org/wiki/Moscow_theater_siege (accessed 15 Oct. 2005).

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, The 

Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare (Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Monterey Institute of International Studies), 4 Nov. 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/02110b.htm (accessed 

21 Nov. 2005).

89. Ibid.

90. Wikipedia, “Moscow Theater.” 

91. Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, Counterterrorism Handbook, 311.

92. Statement of Donald A. Mahley, deputy assistant secretary for arms 

control implementation, in Senate, Chemical Weapons Demilitarization: 

Hearings before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of 

the Committee on Armed Services, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 11 Apr. 2005, 1, 

http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm44633.htm (accessed 3 Oct. 2005). 

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., 2.

96. Ibid. 

97. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 288.

98. Ibid.

99. Maj George R. Clarke, “The United States, Chemical Weapons, and 

Disarmament,” Research Report no. 0520-73 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1973), 26.

100. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 280.

101. Clarke, “United States, Chemical Weapons,” 26.

Article.indd 37 9/18/06 1:11:1
38

102. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 281.

103. Ibid., 21.

104. Ibid., 23.

105. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 

War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods 

of Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 5–7.

106. Executive Order (EO) 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War 

of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 8 Apr. 1975.

107. Ibid.

108. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 26.

109. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention on the Prohibition of 

Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 

Their Destruction, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993, S. Treaty Doc. 103-21, XII.

110. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 26.

111. United Nations, Centre for Disarmament Affairs, The Chemical Weapons Convention with Selective Index (New York: United Nations, 

1994), 3–18.

112. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 37–55.

113. Ibid., 384.

114. Ibid., 280.

115. Ibid.

116. United Nations, Chemical Weapons Convention, 6.

117. Ibid., 5.

118. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

3110.07B, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense: Riot Control Agent; 

and Herbicides (U), Encl. B, Riot Control Agents and Herbicides, 16 Feb. 

2001. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

119. Ibid.

120. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 23.

121. EO 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses. 

122. Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, Counterterrorism Handbook, 34.

123. Ibid.

124. White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: White House, Feb. 2003), 15, http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf.

125. Ibid.

126. Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (Washington, DC, January 

2001), 3–5, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf (accessed 8 Nov. 2005).

127. Ibid., 6.

128. United Nations, Chemical Weapons Convention, 6.

129. Ibid., 3.

Article.indd 38 9/18/06 1:11:1
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130. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard 

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

131. Bill Mesler, “The Pentagon’s ‘Nonlethal’ Gas,” The Nation, 17 Feb. 

2003, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030217&s=mesler (accessed 14 Nov. 2005).

132. CJCSI 3110.07B, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.

133. Joan M. Lakoski, W. Bosseau Murray, and John M. Kenny, The 

Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique (College of Medicine, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania 

State College, 3 Oct. 2000), 10.

134. Dennis B. Herbert, “Non-Lethal Weaponry: From Tactical to Strategic Applications,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1999, 89, http://www.

dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1621.pdf.

135. John M. Collins, “Nonlethal Weapons and Operations: Potential 

Applications and Practical Limitations,” Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress (CRS-4, 14 Sept. 1995), http://www.beyond-the-illusion.com/files/Military/Weapons/weps.txt (accessed 25 Nov. 2005).

136. Ibid.

137. Lt Col Erik L. Nutley, “Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting Our Phasers 

on Stun? Potential Strategic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons 

on the Battlefield,” Occasional Paper no. 34 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for 

Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Aug. 2003), 27.

138. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), 2, http://www.dtic

.mil/jointvision (accessed 15 Nov. 2005).

139. Nutley, “Non-Lethal Weapons,” 28.

140. Ibid.

141. Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, Counterterrorism Handbook, 2–19.

142. Ibid., 21–34.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid., 29.

145. Robinson, Rise of CB Weapons, 205.

146. Ibid.

147. Air Force History Support Office, Air Force History Report on Operation Tailwind, 1.

148. David Isenberg, “US Chemical ‘Nonlethal’ Weapons in Iraq: A Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention?” British American Security 

Information Council (BASIC) Paper no. 44 (BASIC Publications, March 

2003), http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP44.htm (accessed 14 

Nov. 2005).

149. Nutley, “Non-Lethal Weapons,” 29.

150. Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas, eds., New Chemical Weapons Convention, 222.

Article.indd 39 9/18/06 1:11:1
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CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

instruction

CONPLAN concept plan

CS orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile

CSAR combat search and rescue

CW chemical warfare

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

EO executive order

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FSB Federal’naia sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal 

Security Service)

GWOT global war on terrorism

HRT hostage rescue team

LME liquid metal embrittlement 

MOOTW military operations other than war 

NLW nonlethal weapons

OOTW operations other than war 

PDD Presidential decision directive

R&D research and development

RCA riot control agent 

SO special operations

SOF special operations forces

SOW special operations wing

UW unconventional warfare

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WWI World War I

WWII World War II

Abbreviations

Abbreviations.indd 41 9/18/06 1:12:1