The U.S. Army in Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freed

May 2005–January 2009

by 

Brian F. Neumann and Colin J. Williams

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 2020 
Cover: Tailgating Over the Valley, M. Sgt. Martin Cervantez, 2009

(Army Art Collection)

CMH Pub 70-131-1
Introduction 

Nearly two decades have passed since the terrorist attacks on 

11 September 2001 shocked the United States and the world. Over 

three thousand Americans and several hundred foreign nationals 

from some ninety countries died that day at the hands of al-Qaeda. 

A united nation mourned its losses and vowed to punish the 

perpetrators. Afghanistan, a known training ground and safe haven 

for the terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden, became the initial 

focus of military efforts to strike back. That distant, land-locked, 

mountainous country presented great challenges to planners and 

operators. The U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy 

overcame those obstacles to project power halfway across the globe 

and conduct an offensive, in concert with Afghan allies, which 

drove al-Qaeda into retreat and quickly toppled the Taliban regime 

that supported the terrorists. 

Having achieved that basic goal, national leaders remained 

concerned that the Taliban would reassert its influence in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda might emerge from the shadows yet again. That 

apprehension led to a deepening commitment to establish a stable 

democratic nation that would never again serve as a launching 

pad for global terrorism. That larger and open-ended strategic objective ran headlong into the additional complications of a nation 

cobbled together from disparate ethnic and tribal groupings with 

a long history of mutual discord and limited economic opportunities. The United States Army, which was trained and equipped 

primarily for conventional combat, had to reorient its forces and 

its thinking for a complex, irregular war—just as it would in Iraq 

after 2003. The conflict evolved into the longest-running war in 

our nation’s history, and is ongoing today.

With this series of commemorative pamphlets, the U.S. Army 

Center of Military History aims to provide soldiers and civilians 

with an overview of operations in Afghanistan and to remember 

the hundreds of thousands of U.S. Army personnel who served 

there on behalf of their nation. These publications are dedicated 

to them.

JON T. HOFFMAN

Chief Historian

5

The U.S. Army in Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freed

May 2005–January 2009

Between mid-2005 and the beginning of 2009, the United States 

Army balanced its ongoing commitment to combating terrorist 

and insurgent activity in post-Taliban Afghanistan—termed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)—with the expanding American war in Iraq. As the latter conflict demanded an increasin

share of military resources, the George W. Bush administration 

relegated Afghanistan to an economy-of-force effort and sought 

to transition responsibility for supporting the fledgling Afghan 

government to an international coalition. A growing insurgency 

against coalition forces and the Afghan government threatened to 

derail these efforts. What resulted was a three-year period defined 

by the American goal of minimizing its commitment and the difficulty of achieving unity of effort among the coalition partners. 

In the process, the United States and coalition forces ceded the 

operational initiative to the insurgents, enabling them to steadily 

increase their activities across the country. Consequently, despite 

successes at the tactical level, the United States and the coalition 

proved unable to maintain momentum at the operational or strategic levels as they worked to support Afghanistan’s government, 

security, and economic development.

Strategic Setting

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 

States, by mid-2002 coalition forces had soundly defeated—but 

had not eliminated—Afghanistan’s Taliban government and the 

al-Qaeda terrorists it had helped to shelter. In order to prevent 

Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for international 

terrorists, the Bush administration expanded its commitment to 

help establish a secure, stable, and democratic Afghan government 

that would be an ally in the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. 

Establishing a government and implementing fundamental reforms 

was no small task. Decades of civil war; religious, ethnic, and 

tribal divisions; and economic dysfunction had left Afghanistan in 

disarray. Without a stable system of authority or a functioning rule 

of law, corruption had become endemic to Afghan society. Rampant 

criminal elements controlled narcotics production and trafficking, 
6 

and semiautonomous warlords operated in regions with limited 

government presence. Finally, Afghanistan’s location—bordering 

Pakistan to the east and south, Iran to the west, China to the 

northeast, and the former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 

and Turkmenistan to the north—contributed to its instability.

The process of rebuilding Afghanistan began with an international 

conference in December 2001 in Bonn, Germany. Prominent 

Afghans, with the support of the international community, approved 

a plan to establish a six-month Interim Authority, followed by a 

two-year Transitional Administration. A loya jirga (grand assembly) 

of Afghan political and tribal leaders would meet during the latter 

period to adopt a new constitution and arrange for national elections. 

The United Nations also authorized an International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) that December to provide security in the 

capital of Kabul—eventually transferring command of that force to 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2003. By early 

2005, this plan, commonly referred to as the Bonn Process, was in its 

final stages. Afghan leaders approved a constitution in January 2004, 

and on 9 October the Afghan people elected Hamid Karzai—scion 

of a prominent Pashtun family, leader of a small group of militia 

fighters during the Taliban’s overthrow, and head of the transitional 

government—as the president of Afghanistan. The remaining step, 

elections for the National Assembly and provincial councils, would 

take place in September 2005.

In conjunction with the Bonn Process, the international 

community undertook a comprehensive effort to implement 

security sector reforms in Afghanistan. The core goal was to 

create capable Afghan security forces that were loyal to the central 

government rather than to the warlords or militia groups who 

had controlled parts of the country since the 1980s. A meeting 

of potential donor nations in Geneva, Switzerland, in early April 

2002 established the “lead nations” approach to security reforms. 

The United States would build the Afghan National Army (ANA). 

Germany assumed responsibility for the Afghan National Police. 

The United Kingdom took on counternarcotics efforts and Italy 

agreed to oversee judicial reform. Lastly, the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan would administer a program of 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration for armed militia 

groups not aligned with the Afghan government (Japan took over 

this effort in 2003). The lead nations approach thus defined the 

international community’s efforts in Afghanistan over the next 

three years.
7

Afghanistan’s geography and population contributed to the 

nation’s lack of unity. Roughly the size of Texas, Afghanistan 

is dominated by the Hindu Kush mountain range, which runs 

from the northeast to the southwest. The country’s eastern and 

northern sections are mountainous and contain long, thin river 

valleys and relatively arid terrain. Fertile lowlands border Iran 

to the west, whereas the southern provinces between the Hindu 

Kush and Pakistan consist of scrublands and desert. This diverse terrain, combined with a lack of good roads, kept Afghans 

divided. Afghanistan’s demographics echo the diversity of its geography. Although its population of twenty-five million is nearly 

99 percent Islamic—predominantly Sunni—with small numbers 

of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Christians making up the remainder, its people are divided ethnically and linguistically. The 

Pashtuns (42 percent), the largest group, dominate the southern 

and eastern provinces and have strong ethnic and cultural ties to 

Pakistan’s Balochistan Province. The next largest ethnic group, 

the Tajiks (27 percent), opposed the Taliban from their power 

base in the northeastern Afghan provinces. The Hazaras (9 percent), followers of Shia Islam, and the nomadic Aimaks (4 percent) inhabit the country’s central provinces. Finally, the Uzbeks 

(9 percent) and Turkmens (3 percent) live in the northern provinces. The majority of the population resides in rural communities, with a minority occupying a few urban centers. The population is divided further among an array of tribes that provide an 

extended level of familial and communal organization. One of 

the greatest challenges for Afghan leaders and the international 

community was building a sense of national identity where none 

had existed.

Afghanistan’s distinct geography dictated the division of the 

country into five regional commands (Map 1). Regional Command 

(RC) Capital, around the city of Kabul, sat along the southern rim of 

the Hindu Kush. RCs North and West, ethnically and economically 

diverse, produced the Afghan forces that overthrew the Pashtundominated Taliban in 2001. RCs South and East bordered Pakistan, 

a country that provided critical support to the Taliban before the 

American-led invasion and sanctuary after its fall from power. 

Although American forces operated in each regional command, 

they focused mainly on the provinces surrounding Kabul and along 

the Pakistan border. By early 2005, NATO had expanded ISAF’s 

footprint beyond RC Capital and assumed control over RC North. 

It announced in February that it would move into RC West, where 
Map 1

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Helmand River

Helmand River

Farah River

Harī River

Arghandāb River

Lwarah River

Amu River

Karshi Khanabad Airbase

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKI

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Shibirghān

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H I N D U K U S H

Panj River

INDIA

PAKISTAN

STAN

TAJIKISTAN

CHINA

Abbottabad

Islamabad

Mehtar Lām

Mahmūd-e Rāqī Chārīkār

Asadabad

Pārūn

Faizābād

Bazarak

Tāluqān Kunduz

Pul-e Khumrī

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Pul-e  ́Alam

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WARDAK NANGARHĀR

PANJSHIR

LAGHMĀN

PAKTIYĀ

KĀPĪSĀ

KUNAR

NŪRISTĀN

KHŌST

LŌGAR

KĀBUL PARWĀN

BADAKHSHĀN

TAKHĀR

BALKH KUNDUZ

BAGHLĀN

PAKTĪKĀ

GHAZNĪ

SAMANGĀN

ZĀBUL

0

0

200

200 Kilometers

Miles

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 and above

ELEVATION IN METERS

AFGHANISTAN

2005–2014
10 

few coalition forces operated, in May as part of a larger effort to 

replace American forces across the country.

The American military presence in Afghanistan had evolved 

considerably since Special Forces entered the country in 2001. 

By early 2005, American forces operated under the Combined 

Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A) commanded by Lt. Gen. 

David W. Barno. Created in 2003, CFC-A operated under the U.S. 

Central Command to provide strategic direction and coordination 

for the OEF mission in Afghanistan. Although initially focused on 

counterterrorism operations, mainly directed against al-Qaeda, the 

effort in Afghanistan had broadened over the ensuing two years. 

General Barno directed American efforts along five pillars: deny 

sanctuary to the enemy, hold the ground seized from the enemy, build 

Afghan security forces, extend the reach of Afghan governance and 

development to the provinces, and engage Afghanistan’s regional 

neighbors. With just under 20,000 American personnel operating 

in Afghanistan in April 2005, Barno sought to employ American 

forces in the most efficient manner possible.

His maneuver forces consisted of Maj. Gen. Jason K. Kamiya’s Southern European Task Force, which came from U.S. Army, 

Europe, and began operating as Combined Joint Task Force–76 

(CJTF-76) in March 2005. Kamiya employed two brigade-sized 

task forces: Col. Kevin C. Owens’ 173d Airborne Brigade, which 

rotated into the theater in March and operated as Task Force Bayonet, and Col. Patrick J. Donahue II’s 1st Brigade Combat Team,

82d Airborne Division, which arrived in May. Donahue’s brigade, operating as Task Force Devil, assumed responsibility fo

RC East, and Owens’ Task Force Bayonet conducted operations

in RC South. Col. Mark J. McKearn’s Task Force Griffin—bui

around the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 12th 

Combat Aviation Brigade—provided air support for both American maneuver task forces (Chart 1).

The second element of the OEF mission, training the ANA, 

fell to the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan (OMC-A) 

under U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. John T. Brennan. With a staff of 

more than two hundred, Brennan oversaw a $7 billion program to 

train, equip, and sustain the ANA, which stood at just over 20,000 

soldiers at the beginning of 2005. To accomplish this mission, 

Brennan utilized a dedicated training unit known as Task Force 

Phoenix. Initially filled by rotating Special Operations Forces

(SOF) or active Army units, by April 2005 Task Force Phoeni

consisted of the 53d Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Florida Army 
11

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

[NATO]

Afghan National 

Security Forces

[ANSF]

Regional 

Commands Capital, 

North, West

Task Force Phoenix

53d Infantry Brigade Combat 

Team, Florida Army National Guard

Brig. Gen. John M. Perryman

Task Force Griffin

12th Combat

Aviation Brigade

Col. Mark J. McKearn

Task Force Bayonet

173d Airborne Brigade

Col. Kevin C. Owens

Task Force Devil

1st Brigade Combat Team, 

82d Airborne Division

Col. Patrick J. Donahue II

Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan/

Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan

[OMC-A/OSC-A]

Maj. Gen. John T. Brennan, USAF

U.S. Central Command

[CENTCOM]

General John P. Abizaid

Government, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

President Hamid Karzai

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan

[CFC-A]

Lt. Gen. David W. Barno

International Security Assistance Force

[ISAF]

General Ethem (Turkey)

General Mauro del Vecchio (Italy) - 5 August 2005

Combined Joint Task Force–76

[CJTF-76]

Southern European Task Force

[SETAF]

Maj. Gen. Jason K. Kamiya

Combined Joint Special Operations 

Task Force–Afghanistan

[CJSOTF-A]

Col. Patrick M. Higgins

Chart 1—International Coalition’s Organizational Structure, Summer 2005

Operational Control

Tactical Control

Coordination
12 

National Guard, under Brig. Gen. John M. Perryman. To build 

up the ANA, Task Force Phoenix assigned groups of American

soldiers, known as embedded training teams, to Afghan units. 

The team members supervised all aspects of Afghan training and 

acted as advisers once the units deployed. They worked to instill 

the ANA with a professional military ethos while standardizing 

its capabilities. They also provided coordination with American 

units once the Afghans had completed their initial training. The 

system worked reasonably well, but it would take time before these 

practices took root with the Afghans and their units would be 

capable of independent operations.

Along with securing territory and training the ANA, the United 

States continued to engage in counterterrorism operations in 

Afghanistan. Primary responsibility for this effort fell to U.S. SOF, 

organized as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–

Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). Consisting of American and coalition 

Special Forces units, CJSOTF-A operated throughout Afghanistan 

and conducted its own missions, generally to capture or kill 

medium- or high-level enemy leaders, in addition to supporting 

larger coalition operations. For command and control, the task 

force fell under CFC-A’s operational control and the tactical control 

of CJTF-76.

Finally, CFC-A utilized provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) 

to engage with Afghans at the local level to build support for the 

fledgling central government. The concept for the reconstruction 

teams originated in 2002 as a means to undertake nation building 

in a targeted manner. Although the PRTs did not have a standard 

organizational makeup, they typically consisted of 80 to 125 

military and civilian personnel commanded by a lieutenant colonel, 

usually a civil affairs officer. Team members included security 

forces, engineers, and representatives from other government 

agencies, such as the Department of State and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development. Assigned to specific provinces, the 

PRTs worked to institute development projects of varying scale, 

relying primarily upon Afghan workers to engender support from 

the local population. By mid-2005, twenty-two PRTs operated in 

Afghanistan. The U.S. Army controlled thirteen of them and ISAF 

operated the remaining nine.

American and NATO forces operated in much the same 

manner under the banners of OEF and ISAF, but the two missions 

remained distinctly separate. Operation Enduring Freedom wa

the American response to the 11 September 2001 attacks and the 
13

means by which it waged the Global War on Terrorism. As such, 

despite their expansion into nation building and counterinsurgency 

operations, the priority for OEF forces remained targeting 

international terrorist groups. ISAF had no such counterterrorism 

mission. It initially totaled roughly 2,300 personnel and was 

responsible for securing Kabul after the fall of the Taliban. By 

2005, it had grown to around 8,000 troops from thirty countries. 

Yet even with its growth, ISAF remained focused on postconflict 

security and stability rather than combat operations. After ISAF 

transferred to NATO, command of the force rotated between 

nations every six months, with Turkish Lt. Gen. Ethem Erdağı 

taking over on 13 February 2005. As a NATO effort, it stood apart 

from the OEF coalition. It used a separate command chain that 

included U.S. European Command as opposed to U.S. Central 

Command. Aligning the ISAF and OEF missions remained a point 

of some contention between American and NATO leaders, but so 

long as the situation in Afghanistan was relatively stable, the two 

organizations were able to work together effectively.

Underlying American and NATO leaders’ strategic views on 

Afghanistan was the belief that the Taliban no longer threatened 

the country’s stability. After its defeat in late 2001 and early 2002, 

policymakers in the Bush administration opposed including the 

remaining Taliban leaders in the formation of a new Afghan 

government. The old regime’s refusal to turn over Osama 

bin Laden and the members of al-Qaeda had not only prompted 

its overthrow, but seemingly disqualified its key leaders from 

having an official role in Afghanistan’s future. Unfortunately, 

the Taliban had no intention of giving up the fight for control of 

Afghanistan.

After his government’s fall from power, Taliban leader Mullah 

Mohammed Omar established a leadership council in Quetta, a 

town in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province. The Taliban found ready 

support among the province’s Pashtun population and protection 

from the Pakistani government. Pakistan’s intelligence services 

had spent considerable resources supporting the Islamic-extremist Taliban in order to provide strategic depth against India and a 

training ground for fighters in their low-grade civil war in Kashmir. Although Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had agreed 

to support the American invasion of Afghanistan and the effort 

to destroy al-Qaeda, members of his government refused to abandon the Taliban. On the contrary, they provided money, logistical support, medical treatment, and political cover to Omar and 
14 

his followers as a hedge against potential Indian involvement in 

Afghanistan. With protection and support from elements within 

the Pakistani government, Omar slowly rebuilt the Taliban ranks 

by recruiting from the same religious schools, or madrassas, that 

originally had spawned his movement

Secure in his sanctuary in Pakistan, Omar declared a holy 

war against American forces in Afghanistan on 1 January 2003. 

Determined to reestablish the Taliban’s position and retake its 

traditional seat of power, the city of Kandahar, Omar began 

recruiting in southern Afghanistan in 2003, inserting cadres into 

eastern Paktika and rural Zabul Provinces. In 2004, he expanded 

into southern Uruzgan and northern Kandahar Provinces. By May 

2005, Mullah Omar’s organization occupied districts west of the 

city of Kandahar as well. With almost 15,000 fighters, a revitalized 

Taliban outnumbered the Americans in RC South and was poised 

to mount a renewed fight against the new government in Kabul and 

its international backers.

Additional groups opposed to the American intervention 

and the Bonn Process established their own bases across the 

border in Pakistan. Relatively weak Pakistani authority in the 

semiautonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the 

North-West Frontier Province allowed these regions to serve as 

safe havens for warlords, terrorists, and criminal organizations, 

many of whom traced their origins to the Soviet-Afghan War in 

the 1980s. (See Map 2.) The most notable of these was the Haqqani 

Network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin. 

Their organization had ideological and financial ties to both the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda. A former mujahid, Jalaluddin espoused a 

form of strict religious nationalism for Afghanistan. He received 

support from Pakistan’s intelligence services and the U.S. Central 

Intelligence Agency during the war against the Soviets and was 

an early ally of Osama bin Laden. From bases in Pakistan’s tribal 

areas, especially North and South Waziristan, the Haqqanis 

opposed the Bonn Process and the establishment of democracy 

in Afghanistan.

Another former mujahid, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, also mounted 

an armed opposition from Pakistan against the formation of a new 

government in Afghanistan. During the war against the Soviets, 

Hekmatyar’s political group, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), 

received considerable financial support from Pakistan and the 

Central Intelligence Agency. During the 1990s, Hekmatyar twice 

served as prime minister of Afghanistan, but his radicalism and 
15

instability prevented him from consolidating power, and in 1994 

Pakistan’s intelligence services abandoned their support for him 

in favor of the Taliban. After the Taliban seized power in 1996, 

Hekmatyar fled to Iran, where he lived in exile for the next six years. 

He opposed the American intervention in 2001 and reportedly 

returned to Pakistan sometime in 2002, where he began a renewed 

insurgency in Afghanistan.

Finally, looming over American strategy was the specter of 

al-Qaeda. By early 2005, Osama bin Laden’s organization was a 

shadow of its former self and had lost whatever momentum it 

had gained with the 11 September 2001 attacks. American and 

Pakistani intelligence operatives maintained constant pressure on 

the organization, capturing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—the lead 

organizer of the September 11th attacks—and dozens of others 

between 2002 and 2005. Though its members had been killed, 

captured, or scattered and its operational infrastructure crippled 

during the American invasion, many senior leaders remained 

free. As the hunt for al-Qaeda terrorists progressed, American 

policymakers continued to view Afghanistan and Pakistan through 

the lens of the Global War on Terrorism, rather than with a regional 

focus. In considering insurgent groups such as the Taliban, Haqqani, 

or HiG, they looked at their connections to al-Qaeda as supporters 

of international terrorism, not as local actors focused on specific 

objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

By 2005, the United States also was engaged in a far larger 

conflict that monopolized American attention. The invasion 

of Iraq in March 2003 fundamentally altered the Global War 

on Terrorism. The United States committed significantly to 

substantial combat operations there, and did not have official 

support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from either NA

or the United Nations. This resulted in fewer American resources 

for Afghanistan. The development of an insurgency in Iraq from 

late 2003 through 2005 only exacerbated this situation. Thus, 

with Iraq continuing to demand the majority of the U.S. Army’s 

resources, and the situation in Afghanistan progressing toward 

the conclusion of the Bonn Process, Secretary of Defense Donald 

H. Rumsfeld believed that the United States could reduce its 

military presence in Central Asia. To that end, he supported 

limiting American involvement in Afghanistan essentially to an 

economy-of-force effort by divesting OEF of most of its nationbuilding programs, concentrating American forces in RC East, 

and shifting overall responsibility for Afghan security to NATO. 
Map 2

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Helmand River

Farah River

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Lwarah River

Islamic M

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Hezb-e Islami

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Movement

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Movement

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Tehrik-i-Nefaz

Shariat Muhammad

Islamic Movement

of Uzbekistan

Mashud/Tehrik-i-Taliban

Pakistan 

TAJIKISTAN

CHINA

N

PAKISTAN

I NDI A

WARDAK NANGARHĀR

PANJSHIR

LAGHMĀN

PAKTIYĀ

KĀPĪSĀ

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KHŌST

LŌGAR

KĀBUL

PARWĀN

BADAKHSHĀN

TAKHĀR

KH KUNDUZ

GHLĀN

PAKTĪKĀ

GHAZNĪ

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Parachinar Peshawar

Kohat

Mehtar Lām

Mahmūd-e

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Asadabad

Pārūn

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Federally

Administered

Tribal

Areas

0

0

200

200 Kilometers

Miles

 Taliban

 Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)

 Haqqani Network

 Other Insurgent Groups

Al-Qaeda Concentration

THE INSURGENCY

2005–2008
18 

Operations

General John P. Abizaid, the head of U.S. Central Command in 

May 2005, was responsible for operations in both Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Considering the disparity between the U.S. Army forces 

committed to each conflict—just under 20,000 in Afghanistan 

compared to roughly 137,000 in Iraq—Abizaid later admitted that 

he could only dedicate “maybe 10 percent” of his time to the OEF 

campaign. As General Barno neared the end of his deployment, 

Abizaid nominated as CFC-A commander a proven officer who 

could coordinate the transition to NATO without much supervision. 

Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, who succeeded Barno on 4 May 2005, 

had served as the senior security sector coordinator for the U.S. 

Embassy in Kabul during his 2002–2003 deployment and had set up 

OMC-A. Upon returning as the CFC-A commander, Eikenberry 

received the same mission as Barno: to help build an Afghan 

government that was:

moderate and democratic, understanding that Afghans will not 

copy U.S.-style institutions; representative of all responsible elements in Afghanistan and formed through the political participation of the Afghan people; capable of effectively controlling and 

governing its territory; capable of implementing policies to stimulate economic development; [and] willing to contribute to a continuing partnership with the U.S.-led coalition in the [Global War on 

Terrorism]

Eikenberry understood that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to 

draw down American forces and turn over stability operations to 

NATO. Setting conditions for that transition, and facilitating the 

continued growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), 

became Eikenberry’s top priorities.

The End of the Bonn Process (May–December 2005)

With the Afghan parliamentary and provincial council elections 

set for September, Eikenberry had a small window of opportunity 

to build public support for the central government. He therefore 

focused on improving the means to connect the Afghan population: 

roads. As the key to strengthening government, bolstering trade, and 

creating employment opportunities, Eikenberry adopted the adage, 

“where the road ends, the Taliban begins” to convey his conceptual 

approach. Growing security concerns had interrupted previous 
19

attempts at improving Afghanistan’s transportation infrastructure. 

Eikenberry sought to rectify this situation by pushing his forces 

into areas that lacked a government presence, thereby expanding 

security and allowing PRTs to oversee road construction.

Responsibility for implementing Eikenberry’s plan fell to 

General Kamiya’s CJTF-76. The majority of American combat 

forces operated in RC East owing to its population density and 

proximity to Pakistan’s tribal areas (Map 3). Colonel Donahue’s 

1st Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, eventually 

controlled five infantry battalions. The 2d Battalion, 504th 

Infantry, under Lt. Col. George T. Donovan, covered Khost and 

parts of Paktiya, Logar, and Paktika Provinces. Lt. Col. Timothy P. 

McGuire’s 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, from Task Force Bayone

occupied the rest of Paktika Province. The 1st Battalion, 325th 

Map 3

76

1

Kunduz River

Kabul River

iver

Arghandāb River

Lwarah River

Helmand R

P A K I S T A N

Qalāt

Pārūn

Khōst

Kābul

Sharan

Ghaznī Gardēz

Bāmyān

Bāzārak

Chārīkār

Asadābād

Jalālābād

Mehtar Lām

Pul-e `Alam

Maīdān Shahr

Pul-e Khumr ī

Mahmūd-e Rāqī

KANDAHĀR

URUZGĀN

ZĀBUL

GHŌR

GHAZNĪ

KHŌST

PAKTIYĀ

LŌGAR

NANGARHĀR

KUNAR

NURISTAN

LAGHMAN

PANJSHIR

KĀPĪSĀ

PARWĀN

WARDAK

SAR-E PUL

BALKH

SAMANGĀN

BĀMYĀN

BAGHLĀN

TAKHĀR

BADAKHSHĀN

DAYKUNDI

PAKTĪKĀ

0 80 Miles

0 80 Kilometers

Command Boundary

Provincial Reconstruction Team

REGIONAL COMMAND EAST FALL 2005

I I

2 3 MAR

I I

1 504

I I

1 508

I I

1 325

I I

2 504 X

1 82

X X X

CFC

I I

SF

X

SF

X X

CJTF 76

X

CA
20 

Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. David P. Anders, spread two 

companies across Wardak, Logar, southern Ghazni, and western 

Paktiya Provinces.

In July, Lt. Col. Orlando Salinas’ 3d Battalion, 141st Infantry 

(Texas Army National Guard), replaced Lt. Col. Blake C. Ortner’s 

3d Battalion, 116th Infantry (Virginia Army National Guard), 

which had been operating in Ghazni Province and providing 

security at Bagram Air Base. Lastly, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

under Lt. Col. James E. Donnellan conducted operations in Kunar 

Province. General Kamiya’s other maneuver brigade, Colonel 

Owens’ 173d Airborne Brigade, deployed to RC South. Owens sent 

Lt. Col. Mark R. Stammer’s 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, to Zabul 

Province, and Lt. Col. Bertrand A. Ges’ 3d Battalion, 319th Field 

Artillery, provided security in the city of Kandahar.

Several incidents between May and the September elections 

cast doubt upon the country’s readiness for a diminished American 

presence. The first took place on 3 May when Capt. Dirk D. 

Ringgenberg, commanding Company C from 2d Battalion, 503d 

Infantry, engaged Taliban forces in northern Zabul. Debriefing 

Ringgenberg personally, General Eikenberry learned that the 

Taliban lost seventy-six fighters but fought on until they could 

no longer continue resistance. During Eikenberry’s previous 

deployment, the Taliban had not constituted a persistent threat 

to the burgeoning Afghan government. The battle thus signaled 

the possibility that the Taliban had been reconstituting its 

military forces while allied troops focused on governance and 

development.

An engagement the following month reinforced concerns over 

the strengthening insurgency. Beginning in late June, members 

of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, launched Operation Red Win

in Kunar Province to clear antigovernment forces from one of 

the region’s remote river valleys. Red Wings turned tragic whe

local herders compromised U.S. Navy Lt. Michael P. Murphy’s 

four-member Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) team, which was 

attempting to locate a HiG-affiliated insurgent named Ahmad 

Shah. Engaged by the enemy and out of radio contact with higher 

headquarters, the team soon found itself in a life-and-death situation. After Murphy sacrificed himself to transmit a satellite call for 

support, insurgents downed a helicopter bearing reinforcements, 

killing all sixteen on board. Only one member of the original SEAL 

team, HM1 Marcus Luttrell, survived the encounter. Murphy received the Medal of Honor posthumously for his actions.
21

Eikenberry faced a different challenge in July as relations 

between the United States and Uzbekistan plummeted after the 

Bush administration offered support to victims of the country’s 

human rights abuses. Unwilling to continue its participation in the 

Global War on Terrorism, Uzbekistan terminated the American 

lease for the Karshi Khanabad Air Base. The base had served as 

a critical staging point for operations in 2001 and continued to 

provide American forces with easy access to fuel, allowing the 

twelve C–130 transport aircraft stationed there to fly forces in and 

out of Afghanistan. To compensate for the loss, CFC-A built a 

5.6-million-gallon fuel storage facility at Bagram Air Base.

Finally, in August, Donnellan’s marines mounted a follow-on 

operation to Red Wings, Operation Whalers, targeting Ahm

Shah’s growing power base. The marines intended to clear 

insurgents from central Kunar Province, driving them against 

a blocking position in the Chowkay Valley. Although the 

operation’s plan worked well, the Army’s 105-mm. howitzers at 

Asadabad were not in range of the entire valley. Calling in air 

support would take time, so Donnellan had his marines carry two 

81-mm. mortars and ammunition along the valley’s eastern ridge. 

With the help of these mortars, the marines decimated Shah’s 

fighters, killing an estimated forty insurgents and preventing 

Shah from disrupting the coming election. Though successful, 

the need for the operation illustrated that the insurgent threat in 

RC East remained a concern.

Given the importance of the September elections, General 

Abizaid deployed his strategic reserve to assist in their 

implementation. The 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) out 

of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, injected a combined-armscapable force with much-needed artillery and aviation support 

into Afghanistan. Eikenberry directed the expeditionary unit to 

Uruzgan Province, a hotbed of Taliban activity that housed only 

a twelve-member Special Forces team and a PRT. The 22d MEU 

oversaw voter registration, provided security during voting, and 

safeguarded ballot boxes. Although Mullah Omar and his associates 

launched thirty-two attacks the day before the election and fortyone attacks on election day itself, the insurgents failed to kill or 

wound any civilians. The Afghans cast fewer votes than in the 2004 

presidential election, but Afghan and coalition leaders deemed 

the September 2005 elections a success, marking an important 

milestone in the nation’s development. The new Afghan parliament 

met for the first time on 18 December 2005.
22 

Even with the successful elections, the ANSF’s slow rate of 

improvement proved a continuing concern for Eikenberry. A 

critical feature for the anticipated drawdown of American forces 

in Afghanistan was the ability of indigenous units to take on an 

increased role in security operations. Abizaid hoped to withdraw 

a combat battalion for every second or third Afghan kandak—

nominally a battalion, but more comparable to an American 

company—that graduated from initial training. However, 

Eikenberry soon learned that existing ANA kandaks were losing 

strength through attrition and desertions. To address the issue, 

he had OMC-A push recruitment, pay, discipline, and leadership 

reforms through the Afghan Ministry of Defense.

Regretfully, although necessary, the reforms did not correct 

the most pressing problems within the American training mission. 

The main issue was a lack of resources for Task Force Phoenix. It

trained new kandaks and provided adviser teams for three ANA 

corps: the 201st, headquartered in Kabul Province; the 203d, 

headquartered in Paktiya Province; and the 205th, headquartered 

in Kandahar Province. As of March 2005, the ANA had an 

estimated strength of 43,000, with 58 percent of its forces either still 

in training or deployed around Kabul. As the ANA grew, however, 

the American and coalition training missions did not keep pace. 

An Afghan celebrates voting. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
23

By July, embedded training teams could cover only 60 percent of 

Afghan units. As the ANA approached its planned end strength of 

70,000, this problem would only get worse. The arrival of General 

Perryman and the 53d Infantry Brigade, which took over the Task 

Force Phoenix mission in July, did not solve the problem. It fielded

about 1,500 personnel—out of a total of only 1,900 soldiers in the 

task force—for duty as embedded trainers.

The situation with the Afghan National Police was even more 

concerning. Under the lead-nations approach, the Germans 

were responsible for training the police. However, by 2005, 

German efforts to operate a police academy and train officials 

in the Ministry of Interior, the higher police headquarters, were 

not meeting the country’s needs. The German approach focused 

on slowly building a modern police force, capable of engaging 

in highly technical aspects of law enforcement and of working 

with a functioning judicial system upholding the rule of law 

throughout the country. Regrettably, the high rate of Afghan 

illiteracy, limited resources for or understanding of technology, 

and a virtually nonexistent judicial system undermined this 

approach. Moreover, armed insurgents increasingly targeted 

police as the most visible representatives of the central 

government. In reality, Afghanistan did not need the modern, 

technically proficient police force the Germans sought to create, 

but one more capable of functioning as an armed constabulary 

and engaging in paramilitary operations to establish local 

security. Consequently, the Germans produced a police force 

neither sufficient in number nor with appropriate training to 

address Afghanistan’s security needs.

With the Germans proving either unwilling to or incapable 

of significantly increasing the rate of police training, the United 

States stepped in to fill the gap. American law dictated that the 

Department of State, not the Department of Defense (DoD), had 

oversight of Afghan National Police funding, regardless of which 

agency oversaw the training effort. Initially the DoD left police 

training to State Department officials, but by early 2005, increasing 

Afghan security needs—especially the forthcoming elections—

required the American military to take a more active role in police 

training. After negotiating an agreement with the State Department, 

Secretary Rumsfeld turned over responsibility for part of the police 

training mission to CFC-A. On 12 July, Eikenberry formalized 

this expanded mission by renaming OMC-A the Office of Security 

Cooperation–Afghanistan (OSC-A). 
24 

Although these decisions appeared to provide a clear mandate 

for American security assistance units, the situation on the ground 

was more convoluted. Germany maintained its lead nation status for 

the Afghan police owing to its continued oversight of Afghanistan’s 

National Police Academy. Training of rank-and-file patrolmen took 

place at the Central Training Center in Kabul and seven regional 

training centers, which theoretically were under OSC-A. However, 

although the Army’s training mission increased, its personnel did 

not. Responsibility for staffing the training centers thus fell to 

the State Department, which contracted DynCorp International 

for trainers. Unfortunately, as American Ambassador Ronald E. 

Neumann noted, “Our contractual arrangements were distant, 

rigid, bureaucratic, and terribly ill suited to fighting a war.” Though 

DynCorp provided several hundred trainers and mentors for the 

Afghan police, the company’s contract also included training 

efforts in Iraq and Jordan. This arrangement made it difficult to 

develop and implement a training program tailored to Afghan 

needs. The problems with the ANSF training effort would continue 

throughout Eikenberry’s time in Afghanistan.

As the ANSF training mission evolved, American maneuver 

forces built upon momentum gained by the September elections. 

General Kamiya’s CJTF-76 termed the postelection effort Operation 

Secure Prosperity. Intended to accelerate business growth

ANSF development, the plan withdrew Special Forces from the 

border, where they had been conducting counterterrorism missions 

against targets crossing into Afghanistan. With the elections over, 

they returned to working with local forces. Some detachments 

took over for the departing 22d MEU in Uruzgan Province. Others 

returned to the Pech River Valley along the border between Kunar 

and Nuristan Provinces where they secured an area north of 

coalition forces.

After the Special Forces redeployed, Eikenberry looked to coordinate with the Pakistani military to prevent insurgents from crossing the border. Cooperation with the Pakistanis intensified after a 

devastating earthquake struck Pakistan on 8 October, affecting a 

quarter of the country, killing 80,000, and leaving 4 million homeless. As the crisis overwhelmed the Pakistani government, General 

Abizaid ordered a humanitarian assistance effort and appointed 

Eikenberry its interim commander. Earthquake relief interrupted 

Secure Prosperity, redirecting some of Eikenberry’s troops to s

an operations center and establish a life-support area, and detailing five of the theater’s twenty-eight CH–47 cargo helicopters to 
25

Pakistan. With altitude restricting the amount of troops and equipment the helicopters could carry, and with the other twenty-three 

CH–47s in theater committed to supply routes—the only method 

to support a third of the American outposts—few rotary-wing aircraft could engage in air assaults for a month. Once returned, the 

CH–47s permitted Secure Prosperity to res

Operation Secure Prosperity extended into December, 

Taliban, Haqqani, and HiG fighters ceased operating due to snow 

in the mountains and rain in the lowlands. This weather-induced lull 

gave Eikenberry time to assess the situation. The slow development 

of ANSF units contributed to the CFC-A commander’s increasing 

concerns regarding the drawdown of American forces. The 

American push into areas previously devoid of coalition patrols 

over the preceding eighteen months revealed that the Taliban and 

HiG had developed sanctuaries within Afghanistan. Whatever 

benefits the United States incurred by helping Pakistan with the 

October earthquake would have limited value if insurgents could 

find refuge in Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s continued 

inability to adequately secure its population meant that someone 

else would have to take action to prevent the insurgents’ return. 

It remained to be seen whether the United States or NATO would 

fulfill this mission.

Regretfully for Eikenberry, only Ambassador Neumann shared 

his concerns. Confident of continuing progress in Afghanistan, 

U.S. Central Command hoped to begin reassigning personnel to 

OIF as soon as the transition to NATO was complete. As 2005 drew 

to a close, Secretary Rumsfeld also began to question the number of 

combat troops allocated to Afghanistan for the coming year. With 

NATO taking control of the security effort, the secretary eventually 

decided that Eikenberry would retain OSC-A and theater logistics 

but would lose one of his two maneuver brigades.

Coalition Deployments (January–May 2006)

After the Bonn Process drew to a close with the Afghan National 

Assembly’s first meeting in December 2005, President Karzai’s 

government and the international community made new plans for 

Afghanistan’s future. At a January 2006 conference in London, all 

parties agreed on a framework to guide development for the next 

five years. The resultant Afghanistan Compact formalized the 

international community’s commitment to “build lasting Afghan 

capacity” and the Afghans promised to “combat corruption and 

ensure public transparency and accountability.” For the U.S. 
26 

Army, the most important elements were the compact’s provisions 

regarding the ANSF and initiatives for reconstructing Afghanistan’s 

infrastructure. The plan called for an ethnically diverse, fully 

operational Afghan Army with 70,000 soldiers and a combined 

62,000-member Afghan police force by 2010. It also stipulated the 

creation of a “fully upgraded and maintained” Ring Road—the 

main highway that circumnavigated the country—by 2008 and an 

electrical system that could reach 65 percent of Afghan households 

by 2010. The compact charged the U.S. Army, ISAF, and partner 

nations with continuing to “provide strong support to the Afghan 

Government in establishing and sustaining security and stability in 

Afghanistan.” NATO forces eventually would assume responsibility 

for stability operations throughout the country, whereas the OEF 

counterterrorism mission would remain a separate American effort.

In anticipation of expanding the ISAF mission, the U.S. Army 

began rotating its combat forces in Afghanistan in early 2006. Maj. 

Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley’s 10th Mountain Division took over 

CJTF-76 from General Kamiya’s Southern European Task Force 

on 21 February. Freakley would rely upon Col. Michael S. Rose’s 

Combat Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Task Force 

Falcon), and Col. Larry D. Wyche’s 10th Sustainment Brigade 

(Task Force Muleskinner) for air and logistical support. Initi

plans called for the 10th Mountain Division’s 3d and 4th Brigade 

Combat Teams to deploy as maneuver units to Afghanistan for 

service in RC East and RC South, respectively. However, because 

of Rumsfeld’s concerns over having enough combat troops for 

Iraq, and fears that sending two American brigades to Afghanistan 

would delay NATO’s deployment of forces, U.S. Central Command 

chose to send only the full 3d Brigade. 

Col. John W. “Mick” Nicholson’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, 

10th Mountain Division (Task Force Spartan), started rotating in

theater in early 2006 for duty in RC East. From his brigade headquarters at Forward Operating Base Salerno in Khost Province

Nicholson eventually dispersed his maneuver battalions throughout the regional command. He sent Lt. Col. Christopher R. Toner’s 

2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, to Paktika Province. He kept 

the 3d Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, in Ghazni Province until 

replaced by Lt. Col. Steven Gilbert’s 1st Battalion, 102d Infantry 

Regiment, from the Connecticut Army National Guard. Lt. Col. 

Joseph M. Fenty’s 3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, took up 

positions in northern Kunar Province and Lt. Col. Christopher G. 

Cavoli’s 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, assumed positions 
27

along the Pech River and its tributaries. Lt. Col. David A. Bushey’s 

4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment, would provide fire 

support for Nicholson’s units throughout the regional command. 

The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, under Lt. Col. James W. Bierman 

continued in its area of operations at the junctions of Nangarhar, 

Kunar, and Laghman Provinces.

Before the DoD decided to send only one combat brigade from 

the 10th Mountain Division, the newly formed 4th Brigade Combat 

Team, 10th Mountain Division, had been preparing to deploy to 

RC South. U.S. Central Command ended up sending the brigade 

commander, Col. A. Kent Schweikert, along with members of his 

brigade staff, 200 logisticians from Lt. Col. Michael C. Howitz’s 

94th Brigade Support Battalion, and Lt. Col. Frank Sturek’s 

2d Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, to southern Afghanistan. 

Schweikert would serve as the senior commander in RC South 

until NATO forces arrived, at which time he became the region’s 

deputy commander. Sturek’s team deployed to Zabul Province 

before moving to Ghazni and Wardak Provinces in RC East. Lt. 

Col. Ronald Metternich’s 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 

replaced Sturek’s battalion in November 2006.

The reduction of American forces for RC South was contingent 

on sufficient NATO units arriving in the spring of 2006 to cover 

the regional command until the planned transfer to ISAF control 

during the summer. In February, Canadian General David W. 

Fraser established a brigade-sized command, Task Force Aegis

in Kandahar. In addition to Schweikert’s team, Aegis included th

Canadian PRT, a battalion-sized logistical element, and Col. Ian 

Hope’s 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 

(PPCLI). Additionally, elements from the 341st Romanian Infantry 

reinforced Sturek’s battalion in Zabul Province. The Netherlands 

also planned to send a maneuver battalion, but internal Dutch 

politics delayed authorizing the deployment until February 2006. 

This delay affected Great Britain’s contribution of forces to 

RC South. Heavily engaged in Iraq, Britain’s Parliament would 

not commit forces to Afghanistan until the Dutch agreed to deploy 

forces. This condition resulted in British Lt. Col. Stuart Tootal’s 3d 

Battalion, Parachute Regiment, rotating into the theater in midMay, several months behind NATO’s planned schedule.

Before ISAF formally assumed responsibility over RC South, 

international forces nominally fell under CJTF-76’s control as a part 

of the OEF mission. However, each national contingent continued 

to report directly to its home government, and they put various 
28 

caveats on what their forces could do. As a result, although General 

Freakley ultimately had 20,000 American and NATO troops 

under his command in RC South during the first half of 2006, the 

staggered nature of the NATO deployments and restrictive national 

guidelines limited their operational capabilities.

Operation Mountain Lion (April–June 2006)

As NATO forces rotated into RC South during the early months of 

2006, the United States focused its efforts on RC East. In designing 

his campaign plan, General Freakley built upon Eikenberry’s 

emphasis on security, governance, and reconstruction as well as 

ISAF’s goal to extend the areas in which the Afghan government 

could operate. He intended to use a four-step “clear, hold, build, 

and engage” approach. American forces would conduct combat 

operations against enemy fighters, reducing the insurgents’ strength 

to the point that Afghan troops could establish a permanent 

security presence in an area. The resulting stability would allow 

reconstruction projects to proceed while the Afghan government 

established firm ties with local communities.

In addition to the maneuver units assigned to CJTF-76, 

Freakley utilized Special Forces units to carry out his campaign. 

In early 2006, CJSOTF-A was placed under the operational control 

of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–

Afghanistan and the tactical control of CFC-A. The new Special 

Forces task force commander, Col. Edward M. Reeder Jr., controlled 

twenty-five Operational Detachment Alpha teams, six civil affairs 

teams, six psychological operations teams, and SOF units from five 

partnering nations. All were integrated into CJTF-76’s upcoming 

campaigns.

General Freakley intended to conduct four major operations 

in 2006. In the first, Operation Mountain Lion, American comba

forces would extend the Afghan government’s reach into the 

northeastern provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman and 

create space for development projects in Nangarhar Province. 

The Americans specifically designed the operation to target HiG, 

which they believed to be the weakest of the major insurgent groups 

operating in Afghanistan. The second operation, Mountai

Thrust, scheduled to begin in mid-May, shifted American forces

into RC South to assist the transition to ISAF. Upon its completion, 

Freakley’s units would return to RC East and conduct Operation 

Mountain Fury against insurgents linked to the Haqqani Network

in Paktika, Paktiya, Khost, and Ghazni Provinces. The fourth 
29

major operation would commence in the fall, when rain and snow in 

the mountains began to inhibit insurgent operations, and continue 

until the 82d Airborne Division’s scheduled takeover of CJTF-76 in 

early 2007.

Preparations for Operation Mountain Lion started in Marc

with the insertion of a reconnaissance and surveillance unit in 

Asadabad to monitor Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. The DoD’s 

intent to withdraw the Marine contribution to OEF—consisting of 

successive battalions that had patrolled Nangarhar and Laghman 

Provinces since 2003—affected Freakley’s plan. The 10th Mountain 

Division commander wanted to insert two battalion-sized task 

forces into the river valleys straddling the border between Kunar 

and Nuristan Provinces before the marines left. Operating out of 

small bases and even smaller outposts, these units would conduct 

combat operations while demonstrating the benefits of aligning 

with the Kabul government. 

One of these task forces, Colonel Fenty’s 3d Squadron, 71st 

Cavalry Regiment, started its deployment at Forward Operating 

Base Asadabad in Kunar Province. Helicopters then transporte

the squadron up the Kunar River Valley to Naray District. The 

mountains made this move particularly dangerous. On 5 May 2006, 

a CH–47 carrying Fenty and nine other soldiers struck a tree while 

unloading personnel and equipment on a mountainside outcropping. 

With its rear rotor blades disabled, the helicopter pitched forward 

and plummeted over 300 meters to the ground, killing all aboard. 

After the tragedy, Lt. Col. Michael L. Howard replaced Fenty 

as commander of 3d Squadron. Under Howard, the squadron 

established a PRT in Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province, and 

built an outpost to protect it from attack. The outpost provided 

an obstacle for HiG movements through Nuristan and screened 

units to the south, permitting them to focus on development. More 

importantly, the outpost showed President Karzai that America 

still was willing to expand its presence after the Bonn Process.

The second portion of Mountain Lion involved insertin

Colonel Cavoli’s 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, into the 

Pech River Valley. Four rivers fed the Pech between Asadabad 

and Camp Blessing—the site of 1st Battalion’s headquarters—and 

Cavoli had responsibility for all of them. Supported by elements 

from the 201st and 203d ANA Corps, the United States established 

a presence in the Waygal and Watapur Valleys to the north and the 

Shor’yak and Korangal Valleys to the south. Although Cavoli’s 

troops interacted with the communities, their primary mission 
30 

was to interdict insurgents infiltrating from Pakistan. The move 

into the Korangal valley proved especially significant, as its 

residents had a long tradition of hostility toward outsiders, which 

they defined as anyone from beyond the valley. On 7 May, the 

ANA chief of staff, General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, raised 

the Afghan national flag over a new outpost in the middle of the 

valley, illustrating Freakley’s intent “to go where we hadn’t been 

before with strength, establish a presence with combat outposts 

and partner with the Afghan military, and stay there . . . [to] do 

reconstruction.” The event marked the beginning of a difficult 

struggle for control of the valley. 

NATO Takeover of RC South (May–July 2006)

As American forces pushed into the northern provinces of 

RC East, NATO units continued preparations for ISAF’s takeover 

of RC South. British General David J. Richards assumed command 

of ISAF on 4 May, beginning a six-month rotation during which 

the international task force would become the lead effort in 

Afghanistan. He initially struggled to create a robust headquarters 

capable of overseeing the expanding NATO effort. Richards 

ultimately used elements of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 

as his headquarters, but it did not have the mandate or personnel to 

A convoy through the mountains (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
31

deploy for extended periods or to exercise control over international 

forces. The unit did the best it could until NATO created a 

permanent ISAF headquarters in early 2007.

Richards occupied a unique position as the ISAF commander. 

Although a British general, he did not fall within the British military chain of command. Instead, he operated within the NATO 

command chain, reporting to superiors in The Hague and Brussels. 

Additionally, although he commanded NATO forces in Afghanistan, the ability of each national contingent to appeal to its home 

government limited Richards’ authority. Finally, though the American contribution to NATO functioned as a part of U.S. European 

Command, CFC-A operated under U.S. Central Command. Thus, 

Richards had to coordinate with Eikenberry—and Freakley as the 

CJTF-76 commander—who fell under a separate American combatant command. This convoluted mix of national and international command chains made it difficult to establish a clear unity of 

effort within the NATO coalition and between the ISAF and OEF 

missions. Without clarifying guidance from Washington or Brussels, the commanders in Afghanistan had to make do with an informal command structure.

Richards looked to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe’s Operations Plan 10302, finalized in late 2005, for guidance. 

It stipulated that after the transfer of the regional commands in 

Afghanistan to ISAF control, NATO forces would oversee a 

period of “stabilization” in which they were to “assist the Afghan 

government to extend and exercise its authority and influence” 

until enough “stability is achieved to allow the handover of ISAF 

military tasks to Afghan authorities.” The PRTs would comprise the 

leading edge in this effort, with NATO forces providing support. In 

theory, the reconstruction teams would synchronize their efforts 

across their respective Afghan provinces. Richards had to sort out 

and implement this synchronization with the national contingents 

under his command.

Richards focused his efforts on three areas. First, ISAF identified 

highly populated regions for security, development, and governance 

efforts. Called Afghan Development Zones, they resembled a similar 

initiative begun under General Barno in 2004. The second part of 

Richards’ approach involved the creation of a Policy Action Group 

in Kabul under President Karzai and composed of key members 

of the Afghan government and international representatives. The 

group would monitor the development zones, allocate resources, 

and attempt to align Afghan and ISAF efforts. Finally, Richards 
32

would push ISAF forces outside the development zones to engage 

with the local population. Where necessary, they would conduct 

combat operations, but their emphasis was on stability operations 

in support of the Afghan central government.

Upon his arrival, Richards discovered that the NATO effort 

in RC South had little cohesion, largely owing to the staggered 

deployment of international units. Canadian forces arrived in 

January and February, followed by Colonel Schweikert’s American units in March and British forces in April. Romanian and 

Dutch forces were scheduled to arrive over the summer, after the 

transfer of RC South from OEF to ISAF control. Additionally, 

the disjointed nature of NATO’s command structure meant that 

each national battle group arrived with its own perception of their 

respective missions and vastly different capabilities. Some were 

prohibited by their respective governments from engaging in combat operations. Others had more operational flexibility, but did 

not have the personnel or combat support elements to conduct offensive operations. Finally, none were on a unified rotation schedule. In effect, each national contingent engaged in its own mission 

within the boundaries of its province, without coordinating with 

neighboring NATO forces. 

Despite the jumbled nature of NATO’s arrival in RC South, the 

transfer to ISAF control remained set for July. General Richards 

had to closely coordinate with General Freakley, as CJTF-76 maintained operational control over NATO forces in RC South before 

the official transfer of authority. Both officers sought the smooth 

execution of Operation Mountain Thrust, which differed fro

Operation Mountain Lion in several ways. Not only did it includ

international forces operating under the Canadian Task Force A

gis, but CJTF-76 utilized SOF as the decisive effort. Special Forces 

from five nations began operations in May, working with the Afghan 

205th Corps to project force into the junction of Uruzgan, northern 

Helmand, northwest Zabul, and northern Kandahar Provinces. The 

objective was to relieve pressure on British forces in Helmand, support Canadian forces in Kandahar, and protect the Dutch movement 

into Uruzgan (Map 4).

Although SOF units took the operational lead, American maneuver 

forces also contributed to Mountain Thrust. Colonel Toner withdre

most of his 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, from Paktika 

Province for operations in northern Helmand. Colonel Sturek’s 2d 

Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, conducted operations in northern 

Zabul Province, and a company from 3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry 
Map 4

1

1

Khā

Har

sh River

ī River

Farah R vi er

A ghand r āb River

Lwarah River

Helmand River

TF White Shark (-)

I I

Poland

II

TF Orion

Canada

X

3 205 ANA

X

1 205 ANA

I I

2 87TF Catamount

I

A 3/71 CAV

I I

Netherlands

TF Uruzgan

X

205 ANA 2

I I

2 4TF Warrior

I I

Romania

TF Calugenari X TF Aegis

(MNB-South)

Canada

I I

UnitedKingdom

3 Para

X

TF Helmand

UnitedKingdom

9

8

7

6

4

3

5

2

1

CampBastion

GHŌR

GHAZNĪ

PAKTIYĀ

LŌGAR

WARDAK

BĀMYĀN

PAKTĪKĀ

HERĀT

HELMAND KANDAHĀR

NĪMRŌZ

URUZGĀN

ZĀBUL

DĀYKUNDĪ

Nīlī

Qalāt

Zaranj

Sharan

Ghaznī

Kandahār

Tarīn Kōt

Pul-e'Alam

Maīdān Shahr

Lashkar

Gāh

I R A N

P A K I S T A N

0 80 40 Miles0 80 40 Kilometers

1. Multiple engagements, with sustained 

incident on 17 May (TF ORION)

2. Disruption eorts by U.S. SOF, Romanian 

SOF, 207th ANA Corps kandaks

3. Combat reconnaissance by U.S. SOF, Czech 

SOF, 207th ANA Corps kandaks

4. Multiple engagements, TF CATAMOUNT

5. Blocking operations, U.S. and Dutch SOF6. Blocking operations, U.S. SOF and 3-205 ANA7. Patrols, Canadian SOF8. Clearing operations, U.S. SOF and 2-205 ANA9. Multiple engagements, TF WARRIOR

Regional Command South Boundary

Battle

Anticipated Areaof Operations

OPERATION MOUNTAIN THRUST

May–July 2006
34 

Regiment, moved into Kandahar Province to support the Canadians. 

Shifting American forces into RC South proved exceedingly difficult. 

Toner’s battalion had to move across four provinces, which would 

require route clearance, maintenance, and unmanned aerial vehicles. 

To sustain the battalion in the desert for three months, the U.S. Air 

Force dropped food, water, and ammunition on pallets. Planes also 

dropped humanitarian supplies, reducing the likelihood of an uprising 

and keeping Toner’s supply lines open.

Early reports during Mountain Thrust indicated stiffe

than anticipated resistance. RC South contained only 10 percent of Afghanistan’s total population, but as the birthplace of 

the Taliban movement, Kandahar and Uruzgun Provinces had 

many committed fighters. Helmand also had numerous Taliban 

supporters, and accounted for more than 85 percent of Afghanistan’s opium and heroin production, which the Taliban taxed 

to fund the insurgency. The coalition operation continued until 

late July and consisted of company-sized missions in multiple 

valleys. Despite unexpected difficulties, Mountain Thrust succeeded in creating time and space for the transition from Unite

States to NATO ISAF control over RC South on 31 July. Toner’s 

battalion returned to Paktika Province after the operation, but 

the U.S. Army did not abandon RC South after the transfer of 

authority. To support ISAF operations, the Army kept a maneuver battalion, logisticians, an aviation battalion, more than 350 

embedded training team members, and about 350 Special Forces 

personnel in the region.

Continuing Operations in RC East (August 2006–February 2007)

With several American units shifting to RC South to support the 

transition to ISAF, OEF forces in RC East worked to consolidate 

gains made during Mountain Lion. CJTF-76 did not conduc

another major operation in the regional command until August. 

Once Freakley recovered most of his maneuver forces used for 

Mountain Thrust, he initiated Operation Mountain Fury, targeti

Paktika, Paktiya, Khost, and Ghazni Provinces. Elements from 2d 

Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, and 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry 

Regiment, partnered with units from the Afghan 203d Corps to 

clear out insurgents along the border between Paktika and Ghazni 

Provinces. Various conventional units and SOF elements partnered 

with the ANA to conduct small-scale operations across the region. 

The Pakistani Army contributed by establishing blocking positions 

along the border.
35

Whereas in previous operations, American maneuver units tried 

to connect their efforts in an overarching framework, Mountai

Fury consisted of small unit actions across large areas. The sixweek operation ultimately involved 7,000 soldiers spread across 

four provinces. American forces completed one major road project, 

built thirty-eight district centers, and provided medical assistance 

to more than 6,000 Afghans. Soldiers also killed hundreds of 

insurgents and captured numerous weapons caches at the cost of 

sixteen American deaths and eighty-four other casualties. Despite 

its accomplishments, the operation did not cripple the insurgency 

in the region. Insurgent forces reacted aggressively, attempting to 

wipe out an American platoon-sized force. Although unsuccessful, 

the retaliation illustrated that the region remained far from stable.

On 5 October, American conventional forces completed the 

final shift to ISAF as CJTF-76 formally became the ISAF RC East 

headquarters. General Freakley maintained his authority over 

American maneuver forces as part of the OEF mission, but took 

on the role of ISAF deputy commander for security operations. 

Although the new position ostensibly made Freakley responsible 

for ISAF operations across the entire country, General Richards 

allowed him to continue to direct American operations in RC East. 

The CJTF-76 commander was committed particularly to setting 

conditions for the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain 

Division’s upcoming relief by the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82d 

Airborne Division. He therefore launched his fourth and final 

operation, Mountain Eagle, in early Novembe

Unlike the two previous operations in RC East where American 

units focused on specific provinces, Mountain Eagle spanne

almost the entire regional command. Soldiers continued to push 

into remote valleys in the northeastern provinces and tried to 

cut infiltration routes in the southern provinces. Coalition and 

Afghan forces also established twelve new combat outposts. The 

overall goal was to block insurgent lines of communications 

to Pakistan and disrupt coordination between the Taliban and 

the Haqqani Network before winter set in. More importantly, 

Mountain Eagle included humanitarian and medical assistanc

using international and Afghan government resources. CJTF-76

allocated millions of dollars in assistance and the United Arab 

Emirates funded new infrastructure projects. The Afghan 

government publicized these efforts using radio broadcasts, leaflets, 

and a coordinated shura (decision-making councils) campaign to 

refute Taliban misinformation and build popular support. General 
36 

Eikenberry thought the operation a success and a model for future 

counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.

NATO’s Difficulties in RC South (July 2006–February 2007)

With American forces refocusing their efforts in RC East, ISAF began independent operations in RC South. The coalition encountered 

immediate problems as the Taliban proved considerably stronger 

than anticipated. The British experience in Helmand Province illustrates these difficulties. The delayed deployment of British forces meant that they arrived in Afghanistan in April and May, when 

the warmer weather prompted an increase in insurgent activity. The 

British also staggered their deployment, inserting companies over the 

course of two months. This deployment strategy limited their ability 

to conduct operations until all of their units arrived in theater. Aside 

from these self-imposed restrictions, the British faced an operating 

environment rife with internal problems and defined by political and 

economic factors at odds with what the coalition hoped to achieve in 

the province.

Helmand Province accounted for 42 percent of poppy 

production in Afghanistan in 2006, and 30 percent of the global 

supply of opium. British Prime Minister Tony Blair had campaigned 

for reelection promising to tackle his country’s narcotics problem. 

A 10th Mountain Division soldier on watch (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
37

Blair used the prospect of reducing the drug supply in Afghanistan to 

gain support from Parliament for deploying troops. Unfortunately 

for the British, the fact that many Afghans in Helmand depended 

on poppy cultivation for their livelihood meant that any attempt 

to target poppy production would spark resistance. Reportedly, 

various Afghan politicians in Helmand were deeply involved in 

opiate production and sought to undermine British antinarcotics 

initiatives.

The British intended their counternarcotics operations in 

Helmand to be part of a larger peacekeeping mission. Before 

the deployment of British troops, Defence Secretary John Reid 

announced that they “would not be the aggressors,” and that, “If 

we came for three years . . . and had not fired one shot at the end 

of it, we would be very happy indeed.” The emphasis on stability 

efforts rather than combat operations was not unique to the 

British. Planning by NATO members often reflected an incongruity 

between their anticipated mission, the operating environment in 

Afghanistan, and the circumstances they encountered during their 

deployments.

The British approach to Helmand Province centered on 

securing an area encompassing the provincial capital of Lashkar 

Gar, the province’s largest town of Gereshk, and the British 

headquarters at Camp Bastion. Task Force Helmand, compose

of the British PRT and Tootal’s paratroopers, would sponsor 

economic activity in this area, converting it into an Afghan 

Development Zone. They would only advance outside the zone 

after conditions within it improved. These plans soon went awry, 

however, when the Taliban seized several district centers in 

northern Helmand over the course of the summer.

In response to the Taliban actions, President Karzai and 

provincial governor Mohammed Daoud insisted that the British 

send troops to reclaim and protect the towns. Although the British 

argued that they were trading space for time and would retake the 

district centers once they had secured central Helmand, the Afghans 

insisted on action. Determined that the “‘black flag’ of Mullah Omar 

should never be allowed to fly over the district centers,” Daoud 

complained that if the British did not send troops north then they 

“might as well go home.” Facing the choice of abandoning their 

operational plan or ignoring the desires of Afghan government 

officials, the British chose the first option and sent units north to 

garrison five district centers. In so doing, they sacrificed their ability 

to conduct offensive combat operations because they were left with 
38 

insufficient maneuver forces, and effectively locked themselves into 

defensive operations based around these district centers.

The deteriorating security situation in Helmand Province 

was part of a larger Taliban effort to oppose NATO forces across 

RC South. The Taliban increased attacks in Zabul and Uruzgan 

Provinces and concentrated insurgents around the city of Kandahar. 

Three days after the American forces transferred RC South to ISAF 

control at the end of July, the Taliban ambushed Canadian forces 

southwest of the provincial capital, killing four and wounding ten 

soldiers. The Taliban, growing increasingly bold, abandoned lowlevel guerrilla tactics and utilized battalion-sized elements against 

coalition forces. They infiltrated the Panjwa’i and Zharey Districts 

west of Kandahar, putting them in a position to launch an offensive 

against the provincial capital.

In August, ISAF commander General Richards and Task Force 

Aegis commander General Fraser agreed to address the situatio

in Panjwa’i. A Taliban attack on 19 August, in which between 300 

and 500 insurgents struck an Afghan police position near Bazar-e 

Panjwa’i, escalated the situation. The insurgents forced police and 

an undersized Canadian company to withdraw under cover of 

night. As the Taliban threat to the city of Kandahar potentially 

could undermine the entire ISAF position in RC South, Richards 

Canadian soldiers during Operation Medusa (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
39

and Fraser began to gather forces for a major offensive in Panjwa’i 

in September.

They designated the offensive Operation Medusa. Fraser buil

his assault force around Lt. Col. Omer H. Lavoie’s 1st Battalion, 

Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), which began rotating into the 

theater in August. Fraser asked for and received a company from 

Colonel Sturek’s 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, along with 

American air and artillery assets for the operation. Fraser could 

also rely upon two Operational Detachment Alpha teams from Lt. 

Col. Donald C. Bolduc’s Special Operations Task Force 31, which 

partnered with comparably sized Afghan units. General Freakley 

also sent a company from the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 

to support the SOF units. Finally, the Afghans provided a company 

from the 205th ANA Corps for the operation and the 1st Kandak, 

3d Brigade, 201st ANA Corps, to serve as a reserve. British forces 

supported Medusa by keeping the enemy engaged in Helman

and the Dutch moved forces south to interdict possible enemy 

reinforcements from Uruzgan. The combined force made Medu

the largest NATO operation in Afghanistan to date, and the largest 

offensive operation for American forces since 2002. 

Initial plans for Operation Medusa called for a river crossin

followed by a calculated attack toward the villages of Bayanzi and 

Pashmul. First, Company A, 2d PPCLI, would seize the town of 

Bazar-e Panjwa’i on the south bank of the Arghandab River. Next, 

Company C from 1st RCR would pass through Company A, cross 

the river, and advance on the village of Pashmul. As the primary 

attack advanced across the river, Company A from 2d Battalion, 

4th Infantry Regiment; Company B from 1st RCR; and a kandak 

from the 205th ANA Corps would launch a diversionary attack 

north of the town. Three Special Forces teams and an American 

infantry company would attempt to cut off any Taliban escaping 

south (Map 5).

On 2 September, the Canadian Company A established its position in Bazar-e Panjwa’i while the diversionary assault to the north 

began creeping forward. The next day, Company C from 1st RCR 

began its attack across the Arghandab, encountering well-placed fire 

that killed four Canadian soldiers, wounded twelve, and destroyed the 

attack’s lead vehicles. Taliban resistance proved significantly greater 

than anticipated—initial intelligence predicted less than 1,000 Taliban fighters in the area, but later estimates placed the number closer to 2,000 to 3,000. Immobilized and running low on ammunition, 

the company pulled back to Bazar-e Panjwa’i to refit. A second push 
40 

along the same route made even less progress before disaster struck. 

Early on 4 September, a U.S. Air Force A–10 Thunderbolt II ground 

attack aircraft, flying runs against targets east of Pashmul, accidently strafed the Canadian position, killing one and wounding thirty. 

The friendly-fire incident rendered Company C combat ineffective, 

forcing Fraser and Lavoie to adjust their attack plan. With an American and Canadian company and an Afghan kandak already north 

of Pashmul, Fraser designated them the new main effort. While the 

remnants of Company C secured Bazar-e Panjwa’i, American helicopters flew the 2d PPCLI’s Company A to join the northern assault. 

With Company A, 2d PPCLI, on its left; Company A, 2d Battalion, 

4th Infantry Regiment, on its right; and an ANA kandak in reserve, 

Map 5

1

LZ

II

TF 3-06

Canada

I

A 2 PPCLI

Canada

B 1 RCR

Canada

I

I

205 ANA

I

A 2/4 IN

I

SF TF-31

(-)TF Grizzly

X

C 2/87 IN

I

Spērwān

Ghundēy

Objective

RUGBY

Objective

LACROSSE

Objective

CRICKET

Objective

TENNIS

Arghandāb River

Zangābād

Bāzār-e Panjwā'ī

Dabak

Pāshmūl

Bayānzī

Siyāh

Choy

0 2 Miles

0 2 Kilometers

0 1000 1100 1200 1300 and above

ELEVATION IN METERS

Blocking

Position Friendly Fire Incident

Air

Assault Assault

OPERATION MEDUSA

2–17 September 2006 
41

Company B, 1st RCR, launched a deliberate attack with breaching 

equipment and armored bulldozers on 6 September.

To the south, American Special Forces seized a hilltop east 

of the Arghandab River called Sperwan Ghundey. There, close 

air support repelled repeated enemy counterattacks. Company 

C from 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, positioned itself 

where it could support the Special Forces units and the maneuver 

forces to the north. Meanwhile, General Fraser formed an ad 

hoc command for an attack across the Arghandab. Led by Col. 

R. Steven Williams, the assault force—designated Task Force 

Grizzly—contained elements of Company C, 1st RCR, as well

as the 297th Support Battalion and the headquarters of the 

Alaska Army National Guard’s 207th Infantry Group. With 

orders to make his unit “look like a thousand man organization,” 

Williams’ force advanced across the Arghandab on 6 September 

while the Taliban attempted to repel the coalition attack from 

the north. Using artillery fire and psychological operations to 

mask his unit’s true size, Williams advanced on Pashmul from 

the southeast. The two coalition assaults linked up at Pashmul 

by 13 September. Meanwhile, the Special Forces units crossed 

the Arghandab to the south on 12 September in an effort to mop 

up any Taliban fighters retreating through the area but found 

most of the enemy gone.

Operation Medusa ended on 17 September after coalition unit

seized all objectives, killing more than a thousand Taliban fighters 

in the process. In mounting a staunch defense, insurgents expended 400,000 rounds of small-caliber ammunition, 2,000 rocket-propelled grenades, and 1,000 mortar shells against the coalition attacks. His forces’ failure to hold onto the area compelled Mullah 

Omar to abandon his hopes for a direct assault on Kandahar city 

and return to a more indirect campaign. Marine Corps General 

James L. Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander–Europe, noted 

that the Taliban “believed that the newly arrived NATO forces 

wouldn’t fight. They were wrong, and they suffered a major tactical 

defeat.” Operation Medusa showed that ISAF units could moun

offensive operations and would continue fighting even after taking 

casualties. Unfortunately for the coalition, the operation also dispelled any myth regarding conducting peacekeeping versus combat operations and the serious nature of the Taliban threat. ISAF 

did not have sufficient forces to hold the Panjwa’i District after 

clearing it. Although defeated in Medusa, the Taliban was sure t

return with rebuilt forces. 
42 

The War Ebbs and Flows (September 2006–March 2007)

Despite the short-term tactical gains achieved during Operation 

Medusa, events over the following months provided the Taliba

with renewed momentum. In October, the British acted upon 

an agreement with the Taliban for both sides to pull out of the 

district center at Musa Qal’ah. To General Eikenberry’s dismay, 

the accord led to similar withdrawals from Sangin and Now Zad. 

Not surprisingly, the Taliban portrayed the British departures as 

victories. That same month, the Pakistani Army began withdrawing 

from North Waziristan under a truce signed on 5 September. 

Insurgents could now stage attacks into Afghanistan free of 

interference, and enemy crossings rose by a third. By the following 

spring, insurgent crossings had multiplied threefold.

After the Pakistani truce, insurgents increased their attacks 

in Paktika, one of two Afghan provinces sharing a border with 

North Waziristan. American forces responded by launching a 

major operation in the province as part of the ongoing Operation 

Mountain Fury. After the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment,

retrieved its units from RC South, it gathered air and intelligence 

assets to conduct Operation Catamount Blitz in November. Despite

eliminating pockets of Haqqani Network fighters, Catamoun

Blitz was not large enough to seal the province’s entire border, 

ensuring that the fighting would continue after the winter lull.

Although neither American nor NATO forces were able 

defeat the insurgency in 2006, operations such as Medusa an

Catamount Blitz provided opportunities to develop the ANSF.

After the United States absorbed the police training mission in 

2005, Eikenberry made ANSF development a central element of his 

planning. As preparations continued for transferring responsibility 

for Afghan security to ISAF by the end of 2006, Eikenberry sought 

to expand the American training effort. One of his motivations 

was U.S. Central Command’s plan to inactivate CFC-A after the 

transition, as the United States would ostensibly no longer need a 

three-star headquarters in Afghanistan. However, with the United 

States maintaining primary responsibility for ANSF development 

as a part of the OEF mission, Eikenberry encouraged Maj. Gen. 

Robert E. Durbin, who took command of OSC-A in January 2006, 

to request a massive increase in developmental money and to think 

broadly about how to spend it. In April, General Abizaid authorized 

an expansion for the advisory effort, adding an administrative 

element to OSC-A, and redesignating it as the Combined Security 

Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A).
43

With the expansion of his command, Durbin implemented several new initiatives. The most significant of these were the Afghanistan National Air Corps, commando kandaks, and the Afghan 

National Civil Order Police. Although the National Air Corps—a 

small helicopter fleet centered in Kabul—would be expensive for the 

Afghan government to maintain, it was essential that the president 

travel to all the rugged and remote parts of the country in order 

to exercise influence beyond the capital. The effort to create commando kandaks came in response to President Karzai’s complaints 

regarding American SOF night missions. Although carefully done, 

these missions involved foreign troops forcing their way into Afghan homes. Durbin wanted to recruit talented individuals from 

ANA units and have Special Forces train them to lead these raids. 

Although this arrangement deprived regular ANA units of some of 

their most capable soldiers, Durbin needed to put an Afghan face 

on these vital, and politically sensitive, military operations. The 

Afghan National Civil Order Police was to be an elite police force 

capable of handling dangerous constabulary tasks.

General Eikenberry hoped that increasing Durbin’s authority 

would enable his command to work more effectively with 

American maneuver units in training Afghan security forces. For 

Americans training Afghan soldiers. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
44 

General Freakley’s CJTF-76, training meant partnered operations. 

Impossible just a few years earlier, partnering became more 

feasible by 2006 as three ANA corps fielded units in the American 

operational area. Freakley successfully incorporated ANA units 

into Mountain Fury and Mountain Eagle, and ISAF utilized A

units in Medusa. These operations represented important progres

for ANSF development, but the effort was far from complete and 

significant problems remained within all the Afghan security forces.

In addition to the expanding ANSF training mission, the 

transition to ISAF primacy in Afghanistan accompanied further 

changes in the American effort. The most significant was the 

inactivation of CFC-A in January 2007. With the transfer of RC East 

to ISAF, American maneuver forces became part of the new mission. 

On 4 February 2007, General Dan K. McNeill officially succeeded 

General Richards, becoming the first American ISAF commander. 

McNeill had previous experience in Afghanistan, having served as 

the Combined Joint Task Force–180 commander from May 2002 

to May 2003, but his second deployment was markedly different 

from his first. Instead of commanding an American force of less 

than 10,000 personnel, McNeill would now lead an international 

coalition of more than 35,000 service members from 37 countries. 

The mission had also changed. Instead of hunting al-Qaeda and 

Taliban holdouts in Afghanistan, he had to combat a growing 

insurgency based in Pakistan while strengthening the new Afghan 

government.

McNeill’s assumption of ISAF command did not resolve the 

convoluted and bifurcated American command structure. His 

position put him in the NATO chain of command, reporting to Joint 

Forces Command–Brunssum (Netherlands)—one of two NATO 

operational headquarters. Above the Joint Forces Command was 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO’s strategiclevel headquarters typically led by an American four-star general 

(who concurrently served as the Supreme Allied Commander–

Europe and the head of U.S. European Command).

The two subordinate American commands in Afghanistan, 

however, reported directly or partially to U.S. Central Command. 

The American training mission, led by General Durbin’s CSTC-A, 

remained an OEF mission and did not fall under ISAF. The 

American CJTF-76 operated under a dual command chain 

depending on the mission. When conducting counterterrorism 

operations, it functioned under U.S. Central Command as a part of 

OEF. When it engaged in counterinsurgency or security operations 
45

within its regional command, it did so as a part of ISAF and U.S. 

European Command.

On 2 February, Maj. Gen. David M. Rodriguez’s 82d Airborne 

Division took over CJTF-76 from the 10th Mountain Division. As 

the senior American two-star general in theater, Rodriguez fell 

under both the OEF and ISAF command chains. As the RC East 

commander, he reported to McNeill. He also was designated 

as commander of the U.S. National Support Element—which 

included the OEF mission—and reported directly to U.S. Central 

Command. In this capacity, Rodriguez maintained authority over 

all American personnel in Afghanistan, including tactical control 

of CJSOTF-A. Following the inactivation of CFC-A, operational 

control over American Special Forces in Afghanistan shifted back 

to the special operations element of U.S. Central Command. This 

divided American command arrangement was far from ideal, but in 

the absence of clarifying guidance from either American combatant 

command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Bush administration, 

Generals McNeill, Rodriguez, and Durbin had to work out a system 

of cooperation on the ground (Chart 2).

The complicated chain of command in Afghanistan grew out 

of the United States’ strategic shift away from the conflict as the 

situation in Iraq deteriorated. Drastically escalating sectarian 

violence over the course of 2006 compelled the Bush administration 

to announce a surge of five combat brigades to Iraq in January 2007. 

The expansion of OIF meant that Afghanistan would remain an 

economy-of-force mission for the United States for the foreseeable 

future. General McNeill accepted this reality, recalling later, “I 

didn’t delude myself, I got it. It was all about Iraq. I understood 

that.” In practical terms, this priority meant further constraints on 

resources, as evidenced by the replacement of Colonel Nicholson’s 

3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Task Force 

Spartan), with Col. Martin P. Schweitzer’s 4th Brigade Comba

Team, 82d Airborne Division (Task Force Fury). Although the 

organic brigades were similar in size, Nicholson had used three 

additional maneuver battalions—either from the National Guard 

or the Marine Corps—during his deployment. Schweitzer would 

not have access to comparable reinforcements and thus would 

need to undertake the same mission as Nicholson but with fewer 

resources.

At first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to offset this threebattalion decrease by giving Task Force Phoenix an additional

3,500 soldiers to support the police training mission. Unfortunately 
46 

for General McNeill, the Bush administration instead chose to 

deploy these soldiers to Iraq, leaving Task Force Phoenix to meet

new requirements from its 2,700 troops, which the National Guard 

struggled to fill consistently throughout 2007. The command could 

cover only 69 percent of ANA units and 32 percent of Afghan 

National Police units by the end of the year.

Chart 2–International Coalition’s Organizational Structure, 

Summer 2007

U.S. Central Command

[CENTCOM]

General John P. Abizaid

U.S. Special Operations Command–Central [SOCCENT]

National Governments

Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan [CSTC-A]

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Durbin

Task Force Phoenix

218th (Heavy) Brigade Combat Team, 

South Carolina Army National Guard

Brig. Gen. Robert E. Livingston Jr.

Task Force Pegasu

82d Combat Aviation Brigade

Col. Kelly J. Thomas

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan [CJSOTF-A]

Col. Edward M. Reeder Jr.

Task Force Bayonet

173d Airborne Brigade

Col. Charles Preysler

Coordination Operational Control Tactical Control
47

Anticipating a dearth of resources, American commanders 

received welcome news in January 2007 when the DoD announced 

it would be extending the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain 

Division’s tour an additional 120 days. The decision came directly 

from the new secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates, who replaced 

Secretary Rumsfeld in December. In the fall of 2006, Eikenberry and 

U.S. European Command/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe [EUCOM]/[SHAPE]

General Bantz J. Craddock

Government, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

President Hamid Karzai

Joint Forces Command–Brunssum

[JFC-Brunssum]

General Egon Ramms (Germany)

Regional Commands (RCs)

Afghan National 

Security Forces [ANSF]

National Command Elements

Task Force Cincinnatu

Col. Jonathan G. Ives

Task Force Fur

4th Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division

Col. Martin P. Schweitzer

International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]

General Dan K. McNeill

Combined Joint Task Force–82

[CJTF-82]

RC East Headquarters

Maj. Gen. David M. Rodriguez Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division
48 

his staff had briefed Rumsfeld on their overextended forces, with 

little effect. Gates, however, took over the DoD intent on putting 

more focus on Afghanistan. After receiving a similar briefing on 

the diminishing capabilities of American ground forces, the new 

secretary concluded that the Army needed an additional combat 

brigade for Afghanistan simply to maintain its ongoing missions. 

With the decision to surge forces into Iraq limiting the availability 

of brigades for service in Afghanistan, Gates chose to extend the 

10th Mountain soldiers to provide time to prepare an additional 

brigade for deployment. Gates also secured more troops for Task 

Force Phoenix. Even with these additional forces, though, Gates

acknowledged that “in terms of major units, that was all we could 

do, frankly, until we began drawing down the [planned] surge in 

Iraq.” General Abizaid echoed this assessment, noting that “there 

weren’t enough American forces to be able to do the things that we 

wanted ultimately to do with combat power.”

Task Force Fury in the Lead (February–June 2007)

The decision to extend Task Force Spartan compelled Genera

Rodriguez to readjust where to deploy his forces. He decided to split 

RC East in half, committing Task Force Spartan to the norther

provinces of Nuristan, Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman, and 

assigning the incoming Task Force Fury to cover Paktiya, Paktika, 

Khost, Ghazni, and Logar Provinces. Colonel Schweitzer, the 

Task Force Fury commander, sent Lt. Col. Timothy J. McAteer’s 

2d Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, to Ghazni Province. He 

split Paktika Province in two, sending Lt. Col. David J. Wood’s 

4th Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, to its western districts and 

keeping Colonel Toner’s 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 

from Task Force Spartan, in the eastern districts. Schweitzer’s thir

maneuver battalion, Lt. Col. Brian J. Mennes’ 1st Battalion, 508th 

Infantry Regiment, became Rodriguez’s tactical theater reserve. 

Losing one of his maneuver battalions forced Schweitzer to use 

elements of Lt. Col. Steven A. Baker’s Special Troops Battalion, 4th 

Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, as a combat force 

patrolling Logar Province. The remaining portions of Baker’s unit 

provided combat support and combat service support along with 

Lt. Col. Michael P. Peterman’s 782d Support Battalion. The lack 

of combat power in the brigade also required Schweitzer to convert 

parts of Lt. Col. Scott D. Custer’s 2d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery 

Regiment, into provisional infantry for duty in Khost Province. All 

of these units received airlift, aerial fires, and medical evacuation 
49

support from Col. Kelly J. Thomas’ Combat Aviation Brigade, 82d 

Airborne Division (Task Force Pegasus)

Although extending Task Force Spartan provided Rodriguez’

command—renamed CJTF-82 in early March—more combat 

power, it did create certain logistical problems. The regional 

command needed additional infrastructure to accommodate two 

combat brigades. Most of Task Force Spartan’s major equipmen

had already been shipped back to Fort Drum, New York, before 

Gates’ decision. In order to continue operations, it would have to 

borrow vehicles and combat systems from Task Force Fury. This 

resulted in a slower operating tempo because, as Colonel Peterman 

noted, “you can’t really split a wrecker two ways.” Task Force 

Fury’s logisticians spent months securing additional material and 

equipment to adapt to these increased requirements.

General Freakley’s push into remote parts of Afghanistan 

and the increasing number of ANSF units taking the field sparked 

insurgent attacks. The escalating violence created an additional 

need for sufficient ground units to provide American combat 

support over a larger area. Freakley’s intent was to draw the enemy 

away from the Afghan population, which meant establishing 

additional forward operating bases and combat outposts. By May 

2007, RC East contained forty-three such positions, roughly twice 

the number that existed at the beginning of 2006. These bases 

quickly became targets for insurgent attacks, requiring soldiers to 

spend more time on force protection than on patrolling. Even with 

the additional combat brigade, CJTF-82 required more ground 

troops to fulfill its security mission. The solution, as seen with 

combat support and artillery units, was converting auxiliaries into 

infantry units.

With two combat brigades committed to the provinces along 

the Pakistan border, CJTF-82 found that it needed an additional 

maneuver force to protect the provinces north and west of Kabul. The 

Army utilized Lt. Col. James E. Bonner’s 23d Chemical Battalion 

as the base of an ad hoc task force to fill this role. The battalion 

originally deployed to Afghanistan after the Army diverted the 

43d Support Group—tasked with providing support and base 

management for CJTF-82—to Iraq. U.S. Army Forces Command 

decided to combine parts of Bonner’s battalion with other assorted 

personnel to create Task Force Cincinnatus under the command

of Col. Jonathan G. Ives from the U.S. Army Reserve. The new 

task force was to take on the 43d Support Group’s support mission. 

Fifteen days before the unit began operations, however, Colonel Ives 
50 

learned that he would instead have security responsibility for five 

provinces. He also would oversee New Zealand’s PRT in Bamyan 

Province, a Turkish team in Wardak Province, and American teams 

located at Bagram and in Panjshir Province. Ives pulled the security 

element out of the Bagram reconstruction team, the military police 

from the 82d Airborne Division’s special troops battalion, and any 

other personnel he could find to provide sufficient maneuver units 

for his operational area.

The CJTF-82 campaign plan maintained the American 

strategic objective of creating a stable Afghanistan that could 

support America’s Global War on Terrorism and deny safe haven to 

al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. In practice, this meant 

using PRTs and maneuver forces to support provincial governments 

and build ANSF capabilities. Rodriguez’s CJTF-82 would embrace 

the clear, hold, and build approach with the understanding that 

“the decisive operation will fall within the build portion.” The 

initial effort would focus on creating Afghan Development Zones 

around the cities of Ghazni, Sharan, and Gardez that eventually 

would connect to create a single zone in the center of Task Force 

Fury’s operational area.

CJTF-82’s main effort in RC East over the first half of 2007 involved three major operations to create these Afghan Development 

Zones. Colonel Mennes’ 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, 

commenced Operation Oqab Hamkari (Eagle Teamwork) arou

Ghazni in late February before transitioning to other operations 

as the theater tactical reserve. At the same time, Colonel McAteer’s 2d Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, conducted Operation 

Oqab Etehab (Eagle Unity) around Sharan while Colonel Woo

4th Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, conducted Operation Eagl

Strength around Gardez. The operations received additional support from a Polish battalion-sized battle group and elements fro

the 1st Battalion, 102d Infantry Regiment. Designed as “a little bit 

of an ‘ink blot’ approach,” drawing on established counterinsurgency methods used in conflicts like the Vietnam War, the operations 

involved company-grade officers and reconstruction team members engaging with the local populations while field-grade officers 

developed connections with provincial governors and members of 

the provincial councils. The intent was to create a network where 

Afghan government officials could establish contact with their superiors and subordinates and reach out to other leaders for advice 

and support. These connections also could help identify areas for 

economic development and partnering efforts with the ANSF. Once 
51

the coalition forces and local leaders had built these relationships, 

maneuver units working with Afghan security forces would engage 

and defeat insurgent groups or drive them out of the area. As the 

military cleared new areas, the Afghan police could establish their 

presence and link communities to the central government. With security in place, development projects could then commence.

The operations involved countless patrols, small-scale 

engagements, and shuras with local leaders. The coalition forces 

particularly focused on securing portions of Afghan National 

Highway 1, which connected Kabul and the main population 

centers in RC East to RC South. Keeping the transportation 

infrastructure open was essential to the economic development 

plans at the heart of the operation. By the summer, the 203d ANA 

Corps was ready to launch its own operation—called Maiwa

in reference to a nineteenth-century Afghan victory over British 

forces—in Ghazni Province near its border with Paktika. Carried 

out in June, the operational goal, again, was to separate insurgents 

from the population by providing humanitarian assistance and 

reconstruction. While ANA units conducted most of Maiwand’

engagements with the populace, Colonel McAteer’s battalion 

carried out supporting operations. The 4th Squadron, 73d Cavalry 

Regiment, and the Polish battle group also contributed by established 

Conducting a shura over tea. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
52 

blocking positions while Task Force Fury handled logistics. In 

terms of cooperation and ANSF development, Operation Maiwa

represented a high point in southern RC East. Although Task Force 

Fury continued to conduct operations in the area for the remainder 

of its deployment, none matched Maiwand’s size or degree o

Afghan involvement.

New Development and Training Approaches (2007–2008)

In addition to combat operations, CJTF-82’s approach included new 

ideas about improving soldiers’ understanding of and engagement 

with the Afghans. Early in its deployment, Task Force Fury

employed anthropologists recruited by the U.S. Army to provide 

insight into Afghan thinking. Although these Human Terrain 

Teams were controversial, especially among anthropologists who 

claimed that the military’s use of their expertise jeopardized 

their professional ethics, Colonel Schweitzer credited them with 

improving his brigade’s mission planning and command function. 

Regardless of Schweitzer’s support, only six teams made it to 

Afghanistan before the DoD discontinued the program. 

A more helpful concept percolated up from the field in 

April and May. After observing the outdated nature of Afghan 

agricultural methods, units advocated modernization efforts to 

help farmers improve their livelihoods. Officials at U.S. Central 

Command supported the idea and requested National Guard 

soldiers who could teach modern farming techniques. The 

Pentagon approved the initiative and helped create Agribusiness 

Development Teams for service in Afghanistan. Numbering 

almost fifty members with the addition of security personnel, 

the teams took on a more instructional role than Department 

of Agriculture planners serving with the PRTs. The first of the 

agribusiness teams deployed in early 2008 and found a ready 

audience among the Afghans.

The most significant development effort in RC East, however, 

was the culmination of repeated attempts to create functioning 

economic zones. Although General Rodriguez centered his 

campaign on establishing Afghan Development Zones in Ghazni, 

Paktiya, and Paktika Provinces, the greatest success came in 

Nangarhar Province. Task Force Spartan’s push into the province

to Nangarhar’s north during Mountain Lion and Mountain E

had created an effective security perimeter for internal economic 

development. Planners in Col. Charles “Chip” Preysler’s 173d 

Airborne Brigade Combat Team, Task Force Spartan’s eventua
53

replacement, saw an opportunity to create an Afghan Development 

Zone they called “Nangarhar, Inc.” Begun in the latter half of 

2007, the zone utilized $3.2 billion in infrastructure improvements 

designed to sustain economic growth. The program worked not only 

because it had financial backing but also because it incorporated 

nationally approved goals, aligning itself with other economic 

strategies outlined in the Afghanistan Compact, most notably the 

Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

Developed by the Afghan central government and the 

international community, the National Development Strategy 

represented an attempt to consolidate and coordinate various 

ongoing economic development efforts. It integrated the Afghan 

Development Zones into its approach to Afghan economic 

improvement. It also introduced two new institutions—coordination 

centers and development councils—which tied local governance to 

the government in Kabul. The Afghan constitution had created a rigid 

system in which various security forces reported directly to Kabul, 

but did not communicate effectively with each other. Coordination 

centers provided a method for the military, police, border police, 

and intelligence agencies to share information, respond to incidents, 

and plan operations. The centers brought representatives from the 

different organizations into the same buildings along with American 

advisers who promoted amicable interactions while also reporting 

back to their brigade commanders. The strategy also designated 

the development councils to increase Afghan agency by directing 

reconstruction money toward projects nominated by Afghans. At 

the communal, district, and provincial levels, the councils included 

leading figures who identified development projects and forwarded 

them to Kabul for review and prioritization. The program used 

Afghanistan’s complex social hierarchy to create broad support for 

development projects. The concept proved extremely popular, with 

more than 16,000 council meetings taking place across the country 

in the first eighteen months of the program.

Finally, in addition to new efforts to promote Afghan economic 

development, CJTF-82 and the U.S. State Department intensified 

attempts to influence Pakistan to secure its northern border. Still 

suffering the aftereffects of the 2005 earthquake and the failed 

war against rebels in the tribal areas, the Pakistani government 

struggled to counter the spread of Islamic radicalism within its 

borders. Frustrated by an increasing number of insurgent attacks 

emanating from Pakistan, General McNeill met with senior Afghan 

and Pakistani military leaders to improve coordination across the 
54 

border. The CJTF-82 deputy commander for operations, Brig. 

Gen. Joseph L. Votel, tried to expand this effort by coordinating a 

series of meetings between Afghan, Pakistani, and coalition general 

officers and senior colonels. Regrettably, the program made little 

progress owing to long-standing border disputes and Pakistan’s 

prior support of the Taliban. The murder of Maj. Larry J. Bauguess 

Jr. by a Pakistani soldier at a border engagement meeting on 14 

May 2007 further strained relations.

The situation in Pakistan exploded in July when armed Islamic 

radicals seized the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) complex in Islamabad. 

Although government forces retook the mosque, attacks against 

President Musharraf’s administration increased dramatically. By 

December, radical Islamists formed the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan—

or Pakistani Taliban—as a direct challenge to Musharraf’s regime. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development worked to counter 

Pakistan’s growing instability with a $300 million development 

program for Pakistani territories bordering Afghanistan. The 

United States also contributed nearly $1 billion in aid to the 

Pakistani military in 2007. At the same time, President Bush 

authorized unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against insurgents in 

Pakistan. Despite these efforts, Pakistan plunged further into crisis 

that December when Islamic fundamentalists assassinated former 

prime minister Benazir Bhutto, a powerful politician who was 

one of Musharraf’s leading rivals. With its political and military 

leadership consumed with internal threats, the Pakistanis could 

not effectively support operations against the Taliban and other 

Afghan insurgent groups based in Pakistan.

Despite the increasingly chaotic situation in Pakistan, American 

development efforts in RC East continued unimpeded. The 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team focused on Nangarhar Province’s development potential because of its waterways, extensive farmland, and 

long growing season, as well as its strong governor, Gul Agha Sherzai. While the brigade staff exploited these conditions in Nangarhar, 

Inc., its special troops battalion established six coordination centers, 

each with call-in lines that enabled security forces to respond to local problems. Nangarhar’s PRT supported the coordination centers 

and helped implement Nangarhar, Inc. As they had since 2004, reconstruction teams answered to ground-force commanders. The 

two American combat brigades each supervised four teams, while 

Task Force Cincinnatus supervised two American teams as well as

the New Zealand team in Bamyan Province. Similarly, the PRT in 

Farah Province fell under the American commander for RC West. 
55

Finally, Col. Richard L. Stevens, who replaced Colonel Williams as 

commander of American forces in RC South, supervised the reconstruction team in Zabul Province.

As central as the reconstruction teams were to American and 

coalition efforts in Afghanistan, some felt they did not go far enough. 

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Cone, CSTC-A commander during the latter 

half of 2007, believed that development needed an even more local 

focus. Most district governments were ineffective, consisting only 

of a governor appointed by President Karzai, a small staff, and a 

police squad controlled by the Ministry of Interior. With support 

from U.S. Central Command and General McNeill, Cone devised 

a plan to improve law and order at this level. Labeled Focused 

District Development, the plan began with selecting communities 

for development, a difficult task given the number needing attention. 

Next, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, originally a highly 

trained crisis response force, replaced the police within a district so 

they could train as a unit. After weeks of intense instruction, the 

units returned to their districts for a period of continued mentoring 

to ensure that they employed their new skills. Once mentors were 

satisfied, the units could start operating independently as the 

program moved on to another district.

An Afghan National Police pickup truck (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
56 

Unfortunately, although Focused District Development increased the proficiency of local police, its coverage was too uneven 

to have a measurable effect on Afghanistan’s overall security. A limited number of trainers meant that only six districts could be developed during the first iteration. Brig. Gen. Robert A. Livingston Jr., 

the Task Force Phoenix commander from April 2007 through May

2008, did not have sufficient resources to support Focused District 

Development while mentoring ANSF units en masse. In addition 

to a paucity of American or coalition trainers, too many districts 

needed attention for the existing Afghan National Civil Order Police crews. Moreover, the time required to reintegrate local police 

once their training ended consumed valuable coalition resources. 

After spending eight weeks learning about evidence-based prosecution, squads had to be accompanied by American forces upon 

their return so judges and governors would not negate the reforms. 

In practice, it would take years for Focused District Development 

to improve the country’s security, but lacking a viable alternative 

American forces pressed on with the concept.

Task Force Bayonet in Northern RC East (May–October 2007)

Colonel Preysler’s 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team had been 

slated to deploy to Iraq until Secretary Gates selected it to replace 

Task Force Spartan. Known as Task Force Bayonet, the briga

retained a number of veterans from its 2005–2006 deployment to 

Afghanistan. Despite their wealth of experience, the 173d Airborne 

Brigade Combat Team faced more than a few challenges. Their 

previous familiarity with the country proved of limited benefit; they 

had operated in RC South on their first tour, but would now occupy 

bases in RC East. The shift in the brigade’s assignment meant that 

the airborne units could not prepare as they normally would for 

deployment or gather intelligence regarding their intended areas of 

operation. The paratroopers also learned that only one battalion 

from Task Force Spartan had spent its entire deployment in norther

RC East, which limited the amount of intelligence they could provide 

their replacements. Colonel Preysler later commented that his unit’s 

deployment was a “pretty tough way to come into combat.”

General Rodriguez stationed Colonel Preysler’s brigade in 

RC East’s northern provinces. Preysler deployed his three maneuver battalions along a line straddling the southern border of 

Nuristan Province, bisecting the brigade’s area of operations (Map 

6). Lt. Col. Christopher D. Kolenda’s 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry 

Regiment, replaced 3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, in north-
57

ern Kunar Province. Lt. Col. William B. Ostlund’s 2d Battalion, 

503d Infantry Regiment, took over for the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, in the Pech River Valley. Finally, Lt. Col. Stephen J. 

Maranian’s 4th Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, converted some of its soldiers into light infantry and established its headquarters at Forward Operating Base Kalagush in central Nuristan

Province. The Special Troops Battalion, 173d Airborne Brigade 

Combat Team, commanded by Lt. Col. Jeffrey L. Milhorn, and Lt. 

Col. James R. Ryan’s 173d Support Battalion established positions 

at Forward Operating Base Fenty near Jalalabad. Task Force Bayonet also included an Arizona Army National Guard formation

Lt. Col. Alberto C. Gonzalez’s 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry Regiment, which moved into Forward Operating Base Mehtar Lam 

Laghman Province. The unit had the dual mission of securing the 

Map 6

FOB Bostick

Camp Blessing FOB Kalagush

FOB Mehtar

Lam

FOB Fenty

I I

1 91

TF Saber

I I

4 319 (-)

TF King

L

I I

1 158 (AZ NG) TF Diamondback

I I

3 103 (PA NG) TF Pacesetter

I I

2 503

TF Rock

I I

2 17

TF Out Front

I I

BTSB 173

TF Raptor

I I

BSB 173

X 173

TF Bayonet

Landi Kotal

Peshawar

Parachinar

Pārūn

Bāzārak

Asadābād

Jalālābād

Mehtar Lām

BADAKHSHĀN

NŪRISTĀN

KUNAR

PANJSHIR

PAKTIYĀ

NANGARHAR

KĀPĪSĀ

LAGHMĀN

KĀBUL

PAKISTAN

0 40

0 40

Kilometers

Miles

National Guard units rotated in March 2008

NANGARHĀR, NŪRISTAN,

KUNAR, AND LAGHM ĀN

PROVINCES

AREA OF OPERATION

May 2007–June 2008
58 

province alongside their ANSF counterparts and providing security forces for eleven PRTs.

The brigade’s mission was to disrupt the insurgent infiltration 

routes running from Pakistan to Nangarhar and the area 

surrounding Kabul. Nuristan and Kunar Provinces were also safe 

havens for antigovernment militant groups who could operate 

out of the region’s isolated river valleys. Each battalion occupied 

a forward operating base and sent smaller contingents to combat 

outposts and firebases in remote positions. Although some of these 

could be supplied over land routes, many could be reached only via 

helicopter. The deployment arrangement enabled the Americans to 

cover a large geographic area, but limited the combat power they 

had at any one location. Some of the outposts held only a platoon, 

with squads distributed in support positions. The battalions 

protected these isolated units with artillery and aerial support. 

Even so, reminiscent of the British experience in Helmand Province 

during 2006, the paratroopers in northern RC East occupied 

isolated positions and had limited offensive capabilities, making 

them vulnerable to enemy attack. Both General Rodriguez and 

Colonel Preysler accepted the risk as necessary to protect Kabul 

and support economic development in Nangarhar Province.

In Kunar Province, Colonel Kolenda’s 1st Squadron, 91st 

Cavalry Regiment, worked to secure the northernmost limit of 

American forces. After taking losses early in their deployment, 

Kolenda had his soldiers meet the elders of nearby towns. The 

squadron commander’s outreach resulted in a large shura, in which 

more than a hundred local representatives accepted development 

initiatives and allowed troops to inspect projects. Shura participants 

spoke out against the insurgents who entered their villages—most 

of whom were associated with HiG—and reported their activities to 

American commanders. While operating from Forward Operating 

Base Naray, Kolenda and his subordinates met these leaders

outside either Combat Outpost (COP) Lybert along the Pakista

border or COP Keating, the squadron’s outpost in Kamdes

District, Nuristan Province.

COP Keating exemplified the difficulty the Army faced i

establishing and maintaining isolated positions. Named for 

1st Lt. Benjamin D. Keating, a troop executive officer from 3d 

Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, who died traversing the only 

road to the outpost, COP Keating was situated at the base o

three mountains. It had been established in 2006 to support a PRT. 

Although Colonel Kolenda understood the outpost’s importance, 
59

he closed its ground supply route after one of his soldiers almost 

died driving along it. In doing so, he accepted that the soldiers at 

the outpost were more vulnerable because of their lack of ground 

support, but the likelihood of a major attack remained low so long 

as locals resisted HiG and kept the Americans informed of what 

they were doing. Kolenda’s approach reflected the difficult choices 

required by the operational environment. The gamble seemingly 

paid off with a decline in insurgent activity during the beginning 

of the squadron’s tour, although attacks increased in frequency 

and ferocity in early 2008.

To the west, Colonel Ostlund’s 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry 

Regiment, faced a far more aggressive enemy from the beginning 

of its deployment (Map 7). Ostlund’s soldiers were responsible for 

the valleys of the Pech River and its tributaries. The Waygal and 

Watapur Valleys extended to the north and the Korangal Valley 

ran to the south. Ostlund deployed a company into each of the 

three valleys, intending them to maintain a sustained presence and 

support the ANSF. The battalion commander recalled:

Each platoon went out on two patrols a day, every day, and the intent of nearly every patrol was a non-lethal engagement, checking 

on a project, meeting with the business people of a village, meeting 

with the farmers of a village, meeting with the teachers of a village, 

or meeting with political leaders. It was just shura after shura after 

shura after shura and with that constant interaction you get it [i.e., 

understand the population and the environment].

The enemy, meanwhile, regularly attacked the American positions, 

especially the two northernmost outposts in the battalion’s 

operational area. COP Bella, located along the Waygal River, and

COP Aranas (otherwise known as Ranch House), in the town

Arahnas, were roughly twenty kilometers from Ostlund’s battalion 

headquarters at Camp Blessing. Half of an infantry platoon held 

each outpost and they could only be supplied by air. On 22 August 

2007, insurgents led by Hazrat Omar, a HiG affiliate and native 

of Arahnas, attacked Ranch House. Situated on the side of

mountain, the outpost could not be reinforced quickly, nor could 

it be easily supported by indirect artillery fire. After Omar’s forces 

got close enough to the outpost to render artillery fire ineffective, 

the Americans called in air support. The battle ended when A–10 

Thunderbolt aircraft, whose 30-mm. cannon could fire closer to 

friendly troops than artillery, killed the remaining insurgents. 
60 

Map 7 ASADĀBĀD Watapūr Kōrangal Nangalām

Wānat

Arahnas

NŪRISTĀNPROVINCE

KUNAR

PROVINCE

Wāygal River

Kōrangal River

Tregami River Kunar River Pēch River ryak River ō Sh

COP Bella

VPBKahler

CampBlessing

FirebaseMichigan

FirebaseVegas

KōrangalOutpost

COP

Honaker-Miracle

FOB Wright

COP Aranas

(Ranch House)

Watapūr

Valley

KōrangalValley

WāygalValley

ShōryakValley

I

B 2-503

I

A 2-503

I

C 2-503 II 2 503

Kilometers 6 0

Miles 6 0

50 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 and above

ELEVATION IN METERS

Unit Location

PECH RIVER VALLEY

2d BATTALION, 503d INFANTRY REGIMENT

KĀBUL

PAKISTAN
61

Because the enemy routinely carried off their dead, it was difficult 

to determine the number of insurgents killed in the Ranch Ho

incident. Although the defenders withstood the assault, Ostlund 

believed the outpost too exposed and in October decided to close it.

In November, a foot patrol out of COP Bella traveled to Arahnas

to convey the central government’s peaceful intent toward the region’s 

villages. Insurgents ambushed the patrol, led by 1st Lt. Matthew C. 

Ferrara, during its return to the outpost. The mountainous terrain 

again made it difficult to support the soldiers with indirect fire. 

Mortar and howitzer crews could not fire accurately at their targets 

until Spec. Kyle J. White, knocked unconscious in the initial attack, 

awoke, found a radio, and relayed friendly locations back to the 

battalion. The battle ended after six hours with the enemy failing to 

overrun the patrol despite killing six soldiers, including Lieutenant 

Ferrara. Enemy casualties were unknown.

As much concern as Ostlund had for his northern outposts, his 

forces in the Korangal Valley faced the most determined enemy in 

the region. The battalion’s Company B endured daily attacks almost 

from the beginning of its deployment, prompting Ostlund to try to 

clear the area south of the Pech River in October. Operation Roc

Avalanche was a sequence of search-and-attack missions alon

known infiltration routes. It proved a difficult fight, as every family 

compound the Americans faced could become a hardened fort 

that could be cleared only with artillery support. Regrettably, such 

methods resulted in civilian casualties, which naturally intensified 

hostility from local villagers. Ground forces soon became targets, 

as on 25 October when enemy fighters from the Korangal valley 

ambushed an American column and started carrying off a wounded 

soldier. Observing the abduction, Spec. Salvatore A. Giunta chased 

after the captors, killing one and wounding another. Giunta saved 

the soldier, averting a rescue attempt that would have shut down 

combat operations in the region. He later received the Medal of 

Honor for his actions.

Although Colonel Ostlund contended that Rock Avalan

resulted in an abrupt drop in enemy attacks in the Korangal 

Valley, he could only accomplish so much given the resources 

available. His battalion comprised roughly 1,000 soldiers. Added 

to this were 400 marines serving as embedded trainers with 2,500 

Afghan security forces. These 3,900 soldiers had to secure an area 

with a population of 525,000 Afghans. With only six security 

personnel—American and Afghan—per 1,000 residents, Ostlund’s 

battalion could not achieve the troop density recommended by 
62 

American counterinsurgency doctrine. The colonel later contended 

that he “didn’t have enough forces to ‘clear, hold, and build’ in one 

of my valleys, much less the 10 or 15 that we were responsible for.”

The Deteriorating Situation in RC South (2007–2008)

General McNeill intended RC East to be ISAF’s main effort in 2007. 

However, he routinely had to send his theater’s tactical reserve, 

Colonel Mennes’ 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, south to 

assist coalition forces. In March, the battalion flew to Helmand 

Province to support the British and then returned to the province 

a month later for an assault on Sangin. The operation went as 

planned, enabling the British to reestablish their control over the 

village, but the next effort would not be as easy.

After being battered by coalition forces in 2006, the Taliban 

adjusted its operational approach in RC South. It ceased gathering 

in areas that could be targeted by large-scale coalition operations 

such as Medusa. Instead, it built up its presence in northern Helman

Province while preparing for a more determined effort to capture 

the city of Kandahar. The Taliban began by seizing control of Musa 

Qal’ah in early 2007. From there it waged a guerrilla campaign 

against coalition and Afghan forces, increasingly using improvised 

explosive devices. In doing so, the Taliban kept the Karzai 

government off balance and presented itself as a viable alternative 

within remote districts. The Taliban did not design these efforts to 

defeat ISAF or the central government’s forces in open battle, but 

rather to increase its political and economic influence with local 

Afghans. The British responded by increasing their forces in the 

province to 7,700—double what they had in 2006. In April, they 

launched Operation Achilles to clear the Taliban from norther

Helmand. Even with their additional forces and support from the 

Canadians and Mennes’ battalion, the fight proved difficult. The 

British did not recapture Musa Qal’ah until December, and did not 

have sufficient forces to prevent the Taliban from returning to the 

province the following spring.

To the east, in Kandahar Province, the Taliban started using 

the heavily vegetated Arghandab District as an operational base in 

late 2007. From there, its fighters could spread to adjoining districts, 

eventually making their way into the suburban areas around the 

city of Kandahar. The Canadians routinely cleared Zharey and 

Panjwa’i Districts but could not hold the terrain. Insurgents easily 

fled into Pakistan or disappeared among the local population. They 

also began to use the border between Helmand and Kandahar 
63

to their advantage, recognizing that the coalition did not wage a 

comprehensive campaign across the provinces. As soon as coalition 

forces withdrew, the Taliban returned and reinstituted a shadow 

government in the area, effectively marginalizing the central 

government’s position in the region.

General McNeill’s ability to influence events in RC South proved 

limited, illustrating the inherent difficulties in the ISAF coalition. 

General Rodriguez had more tools to shape the battlefield as the 

American OEF commander in RC East. In addition to his combat 

brigades, he could issue orders to aviation, military police, engineers, 

military intelligence, and logistics brigades. More important was 

Rodriguez’s ability to direct Special Forces. Even though ISAF 

limited his area of responsibility to RC East, Rodriguez oversaw 

twenty-five Special Forces teams, seventeen of which operated in 

RC South. In comparison, McNeill could only set priorities and 

deploy his theater reserve. With each national contingent maintaining 

the right to appeal any operational mission to its home government, 

McNeill had difficulty organizing a concerted effort against the 

Taliban forces. He was limited further by the various national 

caveats that determined what each force contingent was authorized 

to do. This included the various PRTs, which reported to the nation 

that had responsibility for their operational area. McNeill could 

not coordinate these efforts, nor could he link them to development 

projects because ISAF did not control any engineer units. Without 

them, McNeill could not direct reconstruction, roadbuilding, or 

improvised explosive device clearance. The overall coalition effort—

including American operations—could not gain momentum so long 

as its component elements pursued independent objectives.

Operation Pamir Hamkari (October 2007–March 200

As the Taliban expanded its presence in RC South, CJTF-82’s focus 

remained in the southern parts of RC East. Although it had made 

progress during Oqab Hamkari—especially in Khost Provin

where insurgent activity declined significantly—eastern Paktika 

and western Ghazni Provinces remained a concern. Less than a 

month after Operation Maiwand concluded, Taliban fighter

captured twenty-three South Korean missionaries traveling near 

Ghazni. The Korean government chose to negotiate directly with 

the Taliban, securing the hostages’ release in exchange for Seoul’s 

promise to withdraw its remaining 200 soldiers by the end of 

the year. Even though American special operators managed to 

dismantle the kidnappers’ network within six weeks, the insurgents 
64 

had shown that they could force coalition members to withdraw 

their forces from Afghanistan.

General McNeill found the incident reflective of an overall 

decline in the security of the region and confirmed his desire for 

a more aggressive operational approach to the Taliban. The ISAF 

commander was displeased particularly with linking operations to 

Afghan Development Zones. Determining that, “We’re not where 

we need to be in security for those things to have a fair chance to 

succeed,” McNeill decided by the summer of 2007 to largely abandon 

the zones. He instead sought to target insurgent strongholds, such 

as Haqqani infiltration into the Tora Bora cave complexes in 

southern Nangarhar Province. McNeill recalled Mennes’ battalion 

from RC South in August and sent it to Nangarhar. It would remain 

there until November, at which point it returned to RC South.

The shift away from development zones required CJTF-82 to 

craft a new campaign plan. Intelligence showed that the insurgents 

were adapting to the presence of two American combat brigades in 

RC East and improving cooperation between various local groups. 

The insurgents waged a two-pronged campaign, targeting ANSF 

border units to draw American forces away from interior districts 

and infiltrating into the provinces surrounding Kabul to wage an 

intimidation campaign against Afghan citizens and to conduct 

terror attacks against the government.

In response to General McNeill’s shift away from development 

zones and the increase in insurgent activity, General Rodriguez’s 

CJTF-82 planners developed a new campaign, Operation Pamir

Hamkari (Mountain Teamwork). It commenced in October and ran

through March 2008. Rodriguez sought to “concentrate CJTF-82’s 

finite resources into prioritized districts to reinforce success from 

Operation Oqab Hamkari and adjust to changes in the operation

environment.” American units would retain the standard lines of 

operation—security, governance, and development—but shift 

away from districts within the development zones and instead 

focus on those containing commercial centers and critical lines of 

communications.

Pamir Hamkari consisted of two phases. (See Map 8.) During th

first phase, Task Force Fury sent forces into Sperah District in 

Khost Province as the main effort while continuing border interdiction in Paktika. Additional maneuver units secured districts 

in Paktiya and Logar Provinces, creating a security zone around 

the commercial center of Gardez. CJTF-82 also targeted the area 

around Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province, another key commercial 
65

center. These efforts set the stage for the second phase, scheduled 

to begin in December, when American forces moved into districts 

in Ghazni, Wardak, and Laghman Provinces. American planners 

hoped to take advantage of the anticipated winter lull in insurgent activity and increase the Afghan and ISAF security presence 

enough that the districts would prove hostile to insurgents upon 

their return in the spring.

Although Pamir Hamkari reflected a change for CJTF-82 at the

operational level, American activities at the tactical level remained 

largely the same. Maneuver forces still separated the enemy from 

the local population, established or maintained the central government’s presence in an area, and improved local security and economic opportunity. In one example, Lt. Col. Michael R. Fenzel’s 1st 

Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment—from Task Force Bayonet

worked to influence populations in Paktika’s eastern districts. Initially, his units conducted air assaults against suspected enemy positions, cleared them, captured anticoalition forces, and flew back 

to their base. When that tactic proved ineffective, they began conducting sweeps. Although longer than raids, the sweeps moved in 

a set direction and did not allow troops to stay in any one location 

long enough to establish relationships with local communities. Fenzel again adjusted his approach by concentrating his battalion in 

ten districts, placing companies next to Haqqani-controlled villages for as long as it took the soldiers to earn hospitality status under 

Pashtun codes of honor. Once attained, Fenzel had the battalion’s 

engineers build bases so the ANSF could “hold” locations while 

his maneuver units moved to new communities. Fenzel’s efforts reflected the campaign’s larger goal of developing ANSF capabilities. 

Unless the Afghans could provide for their own security and build 

trust among the local population, any progress made during the 

American operation would prove unsustainable. Considering the 

majority of the operation took place, by design, during a period of 

decreased insurgent activity, CJTF-82 could not evaluate its success 

until the campaign season began anew in 2008.

CJTF-101 in Afghanistan (March–June 2008)

In addition to extending the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th 

Mountain Division’s deployment in 2006 and committing two 

combat brigades to Afghanistan, Secretary Gates had extended 

the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division’s tour in 

Afghanistan to fifteen months. Thus the unit began preparations 

for its relief in March 2008, just as insurgent activity began to 
Map 8

76

1

1

Border Interdiction

Spērah

Giyān

Shwāk

Bihsūd

Jalālābād Batī Kōt

Mehtar Lām

Qarghah’ī

Bêrmal

Nêrkh

BarakīBarak

Maīdān

Shahr

Jaghatu

Sayyidābād

Zanakhān

Ghaznī Deh Yak

Sharan

Charkh

Kharwār

Zurmat

Dzadrān

Tagāb

Pul-e ‘Alam

Maīdān Shahr

Jalālābād

Bāmyān

Kābul

Khōst

Gardēz

Ghaznī

Asadābād

Mehtar Lām

Sharan

LŌGAR

KHŌST

PAKTIYĀ

PAKTĪKĀ

GHAZNĪ

WARDAK

BĀMYĀN PARWĀN

KĀBUL

KAPISA

LAGHMĀN

KUNAR

NANGARHĀR

NŪRISTĀN

PAKISTAN

Kilometers

Miles 40

40

00

Phase I

Phase II

Security Force Presence

OPERATION PAMIR HAMKARI

October 2007–March 2008
67

increase in the spring. Its replacement, Col. John P. “Pete” Johnson’s 

4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Task Force 

Currahee), replaced the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airbor

Division, in southern RC East. Lt. Col. Anthony G. DeMartino’s 

1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, moved into Ghazni. The 2d 

Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. John 

C. Allred, assumed control of eastern Paktika Province. Lt. Col. 

Thomas W. O’Steen’s 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, took 

over Paktiya Province and Lt. Col. David J. Ell’s 4th Battalion, 320th 

Field Artillery Regiment, operated in Khost Province. The brigade’s 

operational area also contained an enlarged Polish battle group, 

which controlled eastern Ghazni and western Paktika Provinces. 

Lt. Col. Anthony K. “Kirk” Whitson’s 801st Support Battalion 

and Lt. Col. Charles C. Bradley’s Special Troops Battalion, 101st 

Division, supported the brigade. Colonel Johnson also received 

help from Lt. Col. Daniel J. Fuhr’s 1st Battalion, 178th Infantry 

Regiment, Illinois Army National Guard, which was serving with 

Task Force Phoenix

In April, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey J. Schloesser’s 101st Airborne 

Division took over for General Rodriguez’s 82d Airborne Division. 

Schloesser designated his command CJTF-101. Joining CJTF-101 

were Col. James M. Richardson’s Combat Aviation Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division (Task Force Destiny); Col. Jeffrey P. Kelley’

headquarters from the 101st Sustainment Brigade, and Lt. Col. 

David L. Dellinger’s Special Troops Battalion, 101st Airborne 

Division. Schloesser’s command also managed the arrival of 

the 2,500-strong 24th MEU, commanded by Marine Col. Peter 

Petronzo, which deployed to RC South in early March for service 

with the British.

The second wave of force rotations started in June, with Col. 

John M. Spiszer’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division 

(Task Force Duke), replacing the 173d Airborne Brigade Comba

Team in northern RC East. Spiszer placed Lt. Col. Brett Jenkinson’s 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, and Lt. Col. James C. 

Markert’s 6th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, in Nuristan and 

Kunar Provinces. Lt. Col. Salvatore J. Petrovia’s 1st Battalion, 6th 

Field Artillery Regiment, took up position in Laghman Province 

and Lt. Col. Daniel S. Hurlbut’s 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, went to RC South. Lt. Col. Patrick Daniel’s Special Troops 

Battalion, 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and Lt. Col. Bradley 

A. White’s 201st Support Battalion filled out the brigade. Colonel 

Spiszer made up for sending a maneuver battalion to RC South with 
68 

the addition of Lt. Col. Stephen M. Radulski’s 3d Battalion, 103d 

Armored Regiment, from the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. 

Finally, General Schloesser gained a third maneuver force when 

Col. Scott A. Spellmon’s 1st Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver 

Enhancement)—a new unit activated at Fort Polk, Louisiana, on 16 

September 2007—replaced Task Force Cincinnatus. Unfortunately, Spellmon brought only two of his battalions to Afghanistan; the

other two were sent to Iraq.

Although the security situation in RC South continued to 

decline, General Schloesser kept his attention on RC East. Soon after 

his arrival in April 2008, the 101st Airborne Division commander 

started withdrawing units from the region’s more isolated posts. He 

found the process painfully slow because he had to negotiate every 

closure with an Afghan government that wanted the United States 

to cover more, not less, territory. Despite Afghan concerns, with 

insurgents increasingly threatening the more isolated American 

outposts, Schloesser wanted units positioned so that they could 

reinforce each other. 

Schloesser’s revised campaign plan also emphasized developing 

the ANSF over holding territory or maintaining freedom of movement. Although previous American operational approaches included building up Afghan capabilities, Schloesser put the ANSF at the 

center of CJTF-101’s plans. He expanded the definition of combat 

operations to include those conducted with the ANSF and in conjunction with Pakistani forces that targeted enemy support areas 

and lines of communications. In response to Schloesser’s focus, 

CJTF-101 planners designed a three-phase campaign plan, forgoing the emphasis on named operations used in previous rotations. 

The first phase—beginning with the transfer of authority from the 

82d Airborne Division and running into the fall—sought to exploit 

CJTF-82’s successes with multiple partnering operations. Planners 

considered any efforts not specifically designed to improve ANSF 

capabilities as shaping operations. The campaign’s second phase, to 

begin in the fall, would focus on building governance at the district 

and provincial levels. The intent was to take advantage of security gains made over the summer to improve governance in targeted 

districts. If things went well, the selected districts could transfer to 

ANSF control over the winter, allowing coalition units to shift to 

phase three by moving to adjacent districts and beginning anew.

The effort would be the culmination of years of work by 

American and ISAF troops to develop ANSF capabilities. Even 

so, at its core, the campaign suffered from the same deficiencies 
69

that plagued previous American efforts: lack of resources. Without 

the ability to provide security throughout the regional command, 

insurgents could simply move to another district and begin sowing 

instability. The Americans tried to expand their coverage by 

continuing to convert auxiliary troops into infantry units, but this 

was only a stopgap solution. As one CJTF-101 staff member said, 

“In terms of executing the full spectrum operations mission, it 

was barely sufficient in some places and completely insufficient in 

others. The fact that a company out of the division special troops 

battalion was being employed as foot soldiers in lieu of infantry was 

an indicator of that.”

McKiernan Assumes ISAF Command

In late spring 2008, General McNeill departed as ISAF commander. 

His replacement, General David D. McKiernan, took command on 

3 June. McKiernan had commanded American land forces during 

the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but had yet to serve in Afghanistan. 

Despite this, he had developed an appreciation for the situation in 

Kabul and RC East during his time as commander of U.S. Army, 

Europe. He had a more limited understanding of the situation 

in the other regional commands, and upon taking command of 

ISAF he initiated a comprehensive examination of the theater. He 

quickly discovered that, “in reality, the regional campaigns were all 

operating to different drumbeats, and a lot of those dictated by the 

drum being played back in national capitals.” This was particularly 

apparent in RC South, where “there were really four different 

campaigns going on.” The situation in RC East was also troubling. 

As the American national command element under OEF, CJTF-101 

had responsibility for all American forces in theater. It provided 

policy and strategic recommendations to higher headquarters, 

assigned American forces to subordinate operations, and served 

as the final authority on the allocation of resources. Considering 

CJTF-101 also had operational duties as the headquarters for 

RC East, McKiernan thought it was too much responsibility for 

one headquarters.

One of McKiernan’s first initiatives was to align the American 

and ISAF command chains. He wanted to bring together the 

various national campaigns under a single commander who could 

provide a unified strategic vision. The effort came to fruition in 

October with the establishment of a new headquarters, United 

States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The organization would 

serve as a coordinating headquarters instead of as an operational 
70

command. General McKiernan would provide strategic guidance 

and intended USFOR-A to “coordinate the funding, resourcing, 

and activities on the U.S. side to meet and support that one intent, 

that one command and one strategy.” As commander of both ISAF 

and USFOR-A, McKiernan would control all American forces in 

theater, except for special operators who targeted high-level threats 

to the United States and the internment personnel who worked for 

them (Chart 3). 

The new headquarters enabled U.S. Central Command to 

oversee all American operations in Afghanistan for the first time 

since CFC-A disbanded in January 2007. As such, it presented 

the combatant command with an opportunity to influence the 

United States’ strategic objectives. However, its goals did not 

differ substantially from those given to General Eikenberry in 

2005. U.S. Central Command directed McKiernan to seek an 

Afghanistan that was “moderate and stable, representative of its 

populace, capable of self-governance, and willing to contribute to 

a continuing partnership in the global war on terrorism.” The one 

significant change was the substitution of “stable” for “democratic” 

with regard to the Afghan government.

McKiernan spent the last half of 2008 working to establish 

his new headquarters and trying to align the various American 

and ISAF efforts. Although McNeill had focused on RC East in 

early 2008, McKiernan was more concerned with the situation 

in RC South. Ten days after he took command, insurgents broke 

into Sarposa Prison in western Kandahar city and released all 

of its inmates, many of whom were mid-level Taliban operators. 

The audacious attack was a propaganda coup for the Taliban, 

embarrassing the Karzai government and ISAF and signaling the 

Taliban’s increasing power in the districts surrounding the city.

To counter the Taliban’s advances in RC South, McKiernan 

wanted ISAF to push into the more remote districts, where 80 percent of Afghans lived. Such a campaign would require NATO 

members to commit additional forces. However, this was unlikely. In fact, Canada conditioned its continued involvement in Afghanistan on the addition of a non-Canadian combat element to 

Kandahar Province. The United States had already dispatched 

Lt. Col. Richard D. Hall’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced), 

to Helmand Province to serve as police trainers and mentors and 

the 24th MEU to provide additional security. Even so, McKiernan 

could not risk either the provincial capital falling to the Taliban or 

the Canadian forces withdrawing from the province. With no other 
Chart 3—International Coalition’s Organizational Structure, December 2008

U.S. Central Command

[CENTCOM]

General David H. Petraeus

Government, 

Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan

President Hamid Karzai

Joint Forces Command–

Brunssum

[JFC-Brunssum]

General Egon Ramms (Germany)

Regional Commands Capital, 

North, West, South

Combined Security Transition

Command–Afghanistan

[CSTC-A]

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Cone

Maj. Gen. Richard Formica (18 Dec 2008)

Afghan National 

Security Forces

[ANSF]

Task Force 

Warrior

1st Combat Support 

Brigade (Maneuver 

Enhancement)

Col. Scott A. Spellmon

Task Force 

Duke

3d Brigade Combat Team, 

1st Infantry Division

Col. John M. Spiszer

Task Force 

Destiny

101st Combat

Aviation Brigade

Col. James M. Richardson

Task Force Currahee

4th Brigade Combat Team, 

101st Airborne Division

Col. John P. Johnson

Task Force Phoenix

27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team 

(New York Army National Guard) 

Brig. Gen. Brian K. Balfe

33d Infantry Brigade Combat Team

(Illinois Army National Guard)

Brig. Gen. Steven P. Huber (19 Dec 2008)

Combined Joint Task 

Force–101

[CJTF-101]

RC East Headquarters

HQ, 101st Airborne Division

Maj. Gen. Jeffrey J. Schloesser

Combined Joint Special Operations 

Task Force–Afghanistan

[CJSOTF-A]

Col. Sean P. Mulholland

U.S. European Command/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europoe

[EUCOM]/[SHAPE]

General Bantz J. Craddock

Tactical Control

Operational Control

Coordination

NATO

General David D. McKiernan

International Security Assistance Force

[ISAF]

U.S. Forces–Afghanistan

[USFOR–A]
72 

NATO member offering a contribution, McKiernan sent the 2d 

Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, from Task Force Duke to support the Canadian

McKiernan quickly saw that unifying the command chains 

would be only a partial solution to the problems afflicting the 

ISAF and American campaigns. He understood that, “whatever 

the strategy had been, was, and might be in the future, whatever 

azimuth changes, it was an under-resourced strategy.” What he 

needed were more troops to shore up coalition efforts and gain 

momentum against the insurgency. To that end, within two weeks 

of assuming command of ISAF he sent a request to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff for a Marine expeditionary brigade, a Stryker brigade, a 

second combat aviation brigade, another brigade for CSTC-A, a 

division headquarters for RC South, and more route clearance 

companies: 30,000 troops in all. A decline in troop commitments 

in Iraq enabled the Bush administration to approve most of these 

requests, but the additional forces would not start arriving until 

2009. For the remainder of 2008, American forces in Afghanistan 

would have to make the most of what resources they had.

The Constraints of a Limited Campaign (June 2008–January 2009)

A major attack against American forces in Kunar Province over 

the summer illustrated the continuing threat to American forces. 

As its tour drew to a close, Colonel Ostlund’s 2d Battalion, 503d 

Infantry Regiment, worked to consolidate its positions in the 

valleys adjacent to the Pech River. Having already closed COP 

Ranch House, Ostlund’s soldiers sought to also close COP Bella

the Waygal Valley. Negotiations with locals to establish an outpost 

in Wanat delayed these efforts. The position in Wanat was closer 

to the battalion’s headquarters at Camp Blessing and could be 

reinforced by road—unlike either Bella or Ranch House. By 

summer of 2008, Ostlund’s battalion was ready to execute the move 

as part of its preparations to turn over the battlespace to Colonel 

Spiszer’s incoming 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

The move from COP Bella to Wanat began on 8 July.

Helicopters airlifted supplies out of Bella to the new outpost while

members of Ostlund’s Company C moved to Wanat via ground 

convoy. The new position—initially named Vehicle Patrol Base 

Kahler for one of the unit’s platoon sergeants killed earlier in th

deployment—consisted of a central compound in the village and 

a preliminary observation post roughly 100 meters to the east. 

Despite delays getting heavy equipment to the site, the soldiers 
73

established a basic perimeter and defensive positions within a few 

days. Based upon experience gained over the previous year, the 

soldiers did not expect an attack as insurgents generally engaged 

in an extended surveillance period of any new coalition position. In 

this instance, however, circumstances within the insurgent forces 

broke with precedent.

As the Americans planned to close the outpost at Bella, they did

not realize that insurgents had been organizing a major attack on 

the position. Several hundred fighters had gathered in the area when 

the paratroopers began moving to Wanat. Instead of abandoning 

the operation, the insurgents converged on the new American 

position, launching a coordinated assault with between 120 and 300 

fighters on 13 July. The initial volley of rocket-propelled grenades 

disabled the base’s heavy weapons systems, forcing the defenders to 

hold their ground with small arms and squad automatic weapons 

before air support helped drive off the attackers. Nine Americans 

were killed and twenty-four were wounded defending the outpost 

(Map 9).

From a campaign perspective, the Battle of Wanat served as 

a harsh validation of General Schloesser’s desire to consolidate 

American positions. Schloesser and Colonel Ostlund intended the 

position in Wanat, which could be supported by ground, to replace 

Looking southward over Wanat village (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Map 9

(-)

...

(-)

...

(-)

...

(-)

...

(-)

...

...

...

...

...

...

Enemy movement

spotted at 0400,

1,800 meters

to the west

2 C/2-503

...

I

C 2-503

(-)

...

OP

LZ

VPB Kahler

Mosque Hotel

Bazaar

0 100 Yards

0 100 Meters

0 1160 1180 1200 1220 and above

ELEVATION IN METERS

CONTOUR INTERVAL 2 m

Mortar, greater then 60 mm but less than 107 mm

LZ Landing Zone

Mortar, 60 mm or less Antitank missile launcher

OP Observation Point

BATTLE OF W Ā NAT

13 July 2008

Asadābād

Camp Blessing

Wānat

NŪRISTĀN

PROVINCE KUNAR

PROVINCE

Pēch River
75

remote outposts that could only receive support by air. However, 

after subsequent investigations showed several members of the local 

population, including the district governor and police chief, had been 

complicit in the attack, the CJTF-101 commander determined that 

maintaining forces in the Waygal Valley did not justify the risks.

An attack on another American base in August supported the 

argument to locate American forces in stronger positions. On 18 and 

19 August, multiple suicide bombers hired by the Haqqani Network 

attempted to breach the fully established defenses of Forward 

Operating Base Salerno in Khost Province. Neither attack prove

successful, though the casualties included several Afghan civilians 

who had queued up for work outside one of the base’s gates. One 

suicide blast on 19 August injured American and Afghan Special 

Forces personnel, but it did not prevent them from repulsing the 

attack that followed.

The attacks in Kunar and Khost Provinces proved atypical 

for most American units in RC East. During the latter half of 

2008, they worked to implement General Schloesser’s initiative to 

increase partnering operations and improve ANSF capabilities. In 

Paktika Province, Colonel Allred’s 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry 

Regiment, supported a program started in 2006 to use American 

law enforcement professionals as advisers for Afghan police units. 

Initially deployed to help Afghans counter improvised explosive 

devices, the advisers quickly became mentors to Afghan police, 

teaching them evidence-based operations and other forensic 

techniques. In one instance, the program helped provincial leaders 

apprehend a border police commander who had been selling the 

equipment he was supposed to issue to his officers.

In neighboring Paktiya Province, the 1st Squadron, 61st 

Cavalry Regiment, established a more robust American presence 

than seen in previous American rotations. Based out of Forward 

Operating Bases Gardez and Wilderness and COPs Zurmat

Herrera, Colonel O’Steen’s soldiers pursued a broad mission. I

key responsibility was to secure the road leading to the KhostGardez Pass, one of the country’s most important thoroughfares 

and a frequent target of the Haqqani Network. Working with U.S. 

Air Force Lt. Col. Brett D. Sharp, the Gardez PRT commander, 

O’Steen built roadside rest stops that grew into centers of 

commerce. Like in Paktika, these small efforts could be highlighted 

as examples of successful American efforts, but it was difficult to 

connect them in a way that could build momentum throughout the 

regional command.
76 

One of the main challenges for American forces was the result 

of seemingly positive developments across the border in Pakistan. 

Encouraged by General McKiernan, the Pakistani army undertook 

a new effort to stabilize the North-West Frontier Province. Pakistani 

ground troops increased their activities and the Americans used 

unmanned aerial vehicles to strike at key insurgent positions in the 

area. As a result, many enemy fighters sought refuge in Afghanistan. 

They took advantage of an unusually mild winter in late 2008 to 

continue attacking the Americans. Colonel Markert’s 6th Squadron, 

4th Cavalry Regiment, absorbed much of this increased activity. 

Operating along the Pakistan border in Nuristan and Kunar 

Provinces, Markert coordinated with Pakistan’s Frontier Corps as 

it cleared insurgents from the local administrative districts, known 

as tribal agencies, along the border in November. His soldiers also 

worked to secure the squadron’s line of communications through 

Ghaziabad District in northern Kunar Province. Even after all of 

these efforts, carried out with fewer soldiers than his predecessor 

but the same number of bases to occupy, Markert generally had to 

pursue a defensive campaign in the province.

To the west of Markert’s unit, Colonel Jenkinson’s 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, screened Task Force Duke’s norther

flank. While still interdicting routes used by HiG and its affiliates, 

the battalion concentrated on protecting friendly lines of communications. In evaluating his deployment, Jenkinson stated that, 

“Logistics defined the realm of the possible for me.” Poor weather 

in the mountain valleys could prevent helicopters from performing medical evacuation, forcing Jenkinson to reduce his patrols or 

curtail their movements to within foot-evacuation distance. In the 

summer, high heat kept roads dry but reduced the loads aircraft 

could carry, limiting resupply capabilities. When it rained, the battalion lost vehicles off cliffs and soldiers to injuries suffered trying 

to recover them. The arrival of newer Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles in place of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicles added new challenges, as “a 50-ton vehicle or a 30-ton vehicle is not good for rock crawling on the side of a mountain.” In 

some cases, Jenkinson resorted to contracting locals using donkey 

trains to supply some of his soldiers. However, rains could make 

observation posts in the Korangal Valley so inaccessible that even 

these rudimentary approaches proved impossible. Thus, with logistics limiting how his unit could operate, Jenkinson struggled to 

generate the type of momentum called for by General Schloesser’s 

campaign plan.
77

Colonel Jenkinson’s logistical difficulties were part of the larger reality facing American forces throughout Afghanistan, namely 

that they were reaching the limits of what they could achieve with 

the resources available. By the end of 2008, the United States had 

30,000 troops in Afghanistan, compared to less than 20,000 in mid2005. Even with these additional forces, countering the insurgency 

proved exceedingly difficult. The Taliban, the Haqqani Network, 

and even HiG were exceptionally resilient, adapting to each new 

coalition initiative while steadily increasing their attacks against 

Afghan and ISAF personnel. Coalition casualties had increased 

since the Taliban launched their reinvigorated insurgency in 2006. 

In 2007, American forces sustained 771 battle casualties, including 

78 killed in action. American casualties dropped to 663 in 2008, but 

the number killed in action rose to 97. Both years represented a dramatic increase from 2006, during which the United States suffered 

373 total casualties and 62 killed in action. A comparison to the 

totals from 2001 to 2005—555 casualties and 97 killed in action—is 

even more alarming. This trend showed no sign of abating, as more 

small-arms and improvised explosive device attacks occurred in 

Afghanistan than in Iraq by late 2008. Even after the United States 

and NATO increased the resources committed to Afghanistan, the 

security situation continued to decline.

Soldiers patrolling in Kunar Province. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
78 

General McKiernan’s progress in reconciling the ISAF and 

OEF command chains and achieving unity of effort within and 

between the regional commands were positive steps, yet they did 

not make up for the fact that neither the coalition nor the Afghan 

government had sufficient boots on the ground to break the 

insurgency. Colonel Johnson’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st 

Airborne Division, achieved some success in RC East’s southern 

provinces, but McKiernan’s decision to send the 2d Battalion, 

2d Infantry Regiment, from northern RC East to support the 

Canadians in Kandahar Province continued the trend of shifting 

resources to shore up a particular region. The move reduced the 3d 

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division’s combat power in northern RC East 

even as the enemy ramped up their attacks. Colonel Spiszer had little 

recourse but to make do in an under-resourced area of operations 

in the secondary effort of the secondary theater of the Global War 

on Terrorism.

With American ground forces partnering with the Afghans 

to implement General Schloesser’s multiphase campaign plan, 

General McKiernan pushed Washington for additional resources. 

In the fall of 2008, President Bush approved an additional brigade 

for RC East and some additional forces for RC South, but the DoD 

continued to base troop availability on circumstances in Iraq. 

McKiernan seemingly received support from Lt. Gen. Douglas E. 

Lute’s National Security Council study that recommended pursuing 

counterinsurgency over counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan. 

However, such a modification—if it was resourced fully—would 

entail a significant expansion of the American war effort. With Bush 

approaching the end of his time in office, he did not want to commit 

the incoming president, Barack H. Obama, to a new strategy. As 

a consequence, American forces in Afghanistan continued as they 

had been doing, and waited to see what changes, if any, the new 

administration would bring.

Analysis

In 2005, with a new elected Afghan government established under 

President Hamid Karzai and al-Qaeda reduced to a fraction of its 

former fighting strength, OEF appeared on track to accomplish 

its strategic objectives. However, the reconstitution of the Taliban 

across the border in Pakistan threatened to undermine the 

American-led coalition’s achievements. As the Taliban waged a 

growing insurgency in Afghanistan—alongside allied groups such 
79

as the Haqqani Network and HiG—the Karzai government and 

coalition forces were slow to recognize and adapt to the emerging 

threat. Between 2005 and 2008, American and international 

efforts in Afghanistan progressed in a disjointed manner. This 

lack of cohesion, combined with the difficulties of establishing 

a representative government in a country that did not possess 

the civil and cultural foundations for a Western-style national 

administration, continually plagued coalition efforts. As it faced an 

enemy that only needed to perpetuate instability and erode public 

support for the new government to achieve success, the coalition 

struggled to maintain the operational initiative even with the help 

of additional resources.

The complex nature of the international coalition increased 

the challenge of confronting these resurgent threats. The United 

States remained the largest contributor to the international effort 

in Afghanistan, with just under 20,000 troops in 2005. With its 

military resources increasingly engaged in Iraq, however, the Bush 

administration restricted OEF to an economy-of-force effort and

supported transferring responsibility for Afghan security and 

development to NATO. Although the alliance slowly expanded its 

authority in Afghanistan after its assumption of the ISAF mission 

in 2003, fundamental differences between member states over 

their commitments and operating environments prevented the 

coalition from developing a cohesive operational approach. The 

NATO deployments to RC South in 2006—in which Canadian, 

British, Dutch, and Romanian units arrived at different times, with 

varied capabilities, and pursuing their own objectives within their 

respective operational areas—epitomized these challenges.

The coalition’s byzantine command structure was also a 

source of friction. The expansion of ISAF in 2005 and 2006 and 

the inactivation of CFC-A in early 2007 resulted in the United 

States employing a bifurcated command structure split between 

combatant commands. U.S. European Command was nested 

within NATO and had responsibility for the ISAF mission that 

included national contingents from member states. The American 

CJTF operated within this command structure as the RC East 

Headquarters and the CJTF commander served as the ISAF deputy 

commander for operations. ISAF oversaw counterinsurgency and 

nation-building operations, with the latter carried out primarily by 

PRTs. Meanwhile, from January 2007 through October 2008, U.S. 

Central Command was responsible for American forces engaged 

in counterterrorist operations, such as certain Special Forces 
80 

units, and the training mission for the ANSF. Army leaders in 

Afghanistan managed to operate within this complicated command 

structure thanks to effective interpersonal relationships. Although 

functional, it did not adhere to the principle of unity of command 

and created the potential for discord between the command chains. 

How the system would have worked during a crisis is unknown, but 

the creation of USFOR-A in October 2008—which brought some 

clarity to the American and coalition command chains—showed 

that commanders found the existing structure problematic.

In addition to the difficulties American forces had aligning 

their initiatives with various coalition efforts, the Army continually 

ran up against resource limitations even as its mission expanded 

and the insurgency grew in strength. Over the course of 2006, 

General Freakley—the CJTF-76 commander—sought to extend the 

American operational perimeter by sending his units into remote 

areas of RC East. The intent was to create stable zones around the 

major Afghan population centers, enabling reconstruction projects 

and economic development to progress without disruption from 

insurgents. Doing so meant creating more forward operating bases 

and COPs. Without additional soldiers to hold these positions, 

however, their commanders had to reduce their garrisons and 

diminish their combat power, which left them more vulnerable to 

attacks. Yet, if the Americans did not push into the less accessible 

areas and instead concentrated their forces in more easily 

defendable positions, they would have ceded vast portions of the 

nation to enemy groups, providing them freedom of movement and 

the ability to target the Afghan government, the coalition, and the 

Afghan population with impunity. As with the British in Helmand 

Province, the U.S. Army had to strike a balance between providing 

sufficient local security to achieve its strategic objectives without 

overextending its forces. The decision in early 2007 to maintain 

two American infantry brigades in Afghanistan did not alter this 

balancing act. So long as the insurgent groups maintained secure 

bases in Pakistan, they could continue to oppose the coalition and 

the Karzai government, fostering instability across Afghanistan.

The slow development of the ANSF exacerbated this problem 

by requiring American and coalition troops to provide local 

security rather than seeking out and engaging the enemy. The 

effort to build an Afghan army proved arduous and slow given 

the country’s security needs. Afghanistan had no conventional 

military between the fall of the communist government in 1992 and 

the beginning of the American training effort in 2002. During the 
81

civil wars that ravaged the country between 1992 and 1996, and 

even during the years of Taliban control, Afghanistan experienced 

fighting between armed groups loyal to warlords or competing 

religious, ethnic, and tribal factions. Many of these militias dated 

back to the Soviet-Afghan War nearly a generation before. Building 

a functional Afghan army loyal to a central government required 

a fundamental change to Afghan concepts of national identity and 

civic duty. Moreover, not only was the Afghan population ethnically 

and linguistically divided, but the Afghan government lacked 

functioning civil service and bureaucratic structures, and Afghan 

society as a whole did not maintain the necessary educational levels 

to support a Western-style military. Consequently, widespread 

illiteracy, corruption, and sectarianism undermined American 

training efforts. These problems continued after the U.S. Army took 

over the police training mission in 2006, and the lack of additional 

personnel commensurate with the expanded mission compounded 

them. Creating capable and self-sufficient Afghan security forces 

would require many years and considerable support, with no 

certainty of success. Although theoretically possible, neither the 

United States nor NATO was willing to make such an open-ended 

commitment.

Honoring two soldiers killed by an improvised explosive device 

(U.S. Army Center of Military History)
82 

In the absence of ANSF units in sufficient numbers and 

capabilities to secure the population, American and NATO forces 

filled the vacuum but struggled to maintain momentum on the 

ground as their units continually rotated in and out of Afghanistan. 

Between mid-2005 and the end of 2008, the U.S. Army in 

Afghanistan utilized three divisional headquarters, the Southern 

European Task Force, five maneuver brigades, the 1st Combat 

Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement), the brigade-sized Task 

Force Cincinnatus, and myriad support units at various times. The

ANSF training element averaged roughly a brigade, and American 

Marine, Air Force, and Naval units and personnel rounded out 

American forces. Beginning with just under 20,000 troops in 2005, 

the American presence in Afghanistan rose to roughly 30,000 by the 

end of 2008. Even so, the rotational nature of Army deployments 

meant that each year brought new commanders and new units, 

creating a cyclical nature to the Army’s operations. Arriving units 

and personnel spent months gaining situational awareness of their 

operational areas, months executing their campaigns, and then 

months preparing for redeployment to their home stations. The 

turnover from General Eikenberry to General McNeill to General 

McKiernan added another layer of discontinuity, making it difficult 

to achieve operational consistency. NATO deployments further 

compounded the problem. Taken together, the continual rotations 

contributed to the disjointed nature of the war.

In spite of these strategic and operational challenges, soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines worked to accomplish their given tasks 

to the best of their abilities. The vast majority served as professionals 

in a challenging environment and under difficult circumstances. 

Such is the nature of nation building and counterinsurgency. Whether 

the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government succeeded 

against the insurgents would fall to the incoming American president 

and his administration. In the meantime, soldiers on the ground 

carried on as they had in a conflict that looked no closer to ending 

after seven long years of fighting.
83

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANA Afghan National Army 

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 

CFC-A Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan

CJSOTF-A Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–

 Afghanistan

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

COP Combat Outpost

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command–

 Afghanistan 

DoD Department of Defense

HiG Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin

ISAF International Security Assistance Force 

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OEF Operation Enduring Freed

OIF Operation Iraqi Free

OMC-A Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan

OSC-A Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan

PPCLI Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 

PRT provincial reconstruction team

RC Regional Command 

RCR Royal Canadian Regiment 

SEAL Sea, Air, and Land

SOF Special Operations Forces 

USFOR-A United States Forces–Afghanistan
84 

Unit Reference Guide

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A); 

disbanded February 2007

Lt. Gen. David W. Barno (October 2003–May 2005)

Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry (May 2005–February 2007)

Combined Joint Task Force–76 (CJTF-76)

Southern European Task Force (SETAF) (May 2005–

February 2006)

• 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division (Task 

Force Devi

• 173d Airborne Brigade (Task Force Bayonet

• 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (Task Force Griff

10th Mountain Division (February 2006–February 2007)

• 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Task 

Force Sparta

• Headquarters, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th 

Mountain Division 

• Combat Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Task 

Force Falcon)

• 10th Sustainment Brigade (Task Force Muleskinn

Combined Joint Task Force–82 (CJTF-82)

82d Airborne Division (February 2007–April 2008)

• 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division (Task 

Force Fury)

• 173d Airborne Brigade (Task Force Bayonet

• Combat Aviation Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (Task 

Force Pegasus

• Task Force Cincinnatu

23d Chemical Battalion

Combined Joint Task Force–101 (CJTF-101)

101st Airborne Division (April 2008–June 2009)

• 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Task 

Force Currah

• 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division (Task 

Force Duk

• Combat Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Task 

Force Destin

• 1st Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)
85

• 101st Sustainment Brigade

• 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan 

(CJSOTF-A)

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)–North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

General Ethem Erdağı (Turkey) (February–August 2005)

General Mauro del Vecchio (Italy) (August 2005–May 2006)

General David J. Richards (United Kingdom) (May 2006–

February 2007)

General Dan K. McNeill (United States) (February 2007–

June 2008)

General David D. McKiernan (United States) (June 2008–

June 2009)

United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) (established 

October 2008)

General David D. McKiernan

Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan (OMC-A)

Redesignated Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan 

(OSC-A), July 2005

Reorganized as Combined Security Transition Command–

Afghanistan (CSTC-A), April 2006
86 

About the Authors

Dr. Brian F. Neumann is a historian at the U.S. Army Center 

of Military History (CMH). He earned his B.A. in history from the 

University of Southern California in 1998 and his M.A. and Ph.D. in 

history from Texas A&M University in 2001 and 2006, respectively. 

His academic field is twentieth-century U.S. military history with 

a focus on World War I. After teaching for four years, he joined 

CMH in 2010 and began working in the Contemporary Studies 

Branch, Histories Division, with a focus on Operation Enduring

Freedom. He cowrote and edited the center’s campaign brochure o

Operation Enduring Freedom 2002–2005. After working with th

Chief of Staff of the Army’s Operation Enduring Freedom St ud

Group for two years, Dr. Neumann became the editor of the “U.S. 

Army Campaigns of World War I” commemorative pamphlet series 

in November 2016. He also serves as a member of the CMH World 

War I Commemoration Committee and as the Center’s World War 

I subject matter expert.

Dr. Colin J. Williams is a historian with the Defense Logistics 

Agency. A retired Army officer, he has combat experience in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, and taught military history at the United 

States Military Academy, and served as a historian with the 

Contemporary Histories Division of CMH. He studied the political 

effects of social mobilization in revolutionary New York at the 

University of Alabama, from which he received a Ph.D. in history in 

2013. Dr. Williams has contributed to Key to the Northern Country: 

The Hudson River Valley in the American Revolution (Albany: State 

University of New York Press, 2013) and to New York History (vol. 

99, no. 1).
87

Further Readings

Bradley, Rusty, and Kevin Maurer. Lions of Kandahar: The Story of 

a Fight Against All Odds. New York: Bantam, 2011.

Degen, Edmund J., and Mark R. Reardon, eds. Modern War in 

an Ancient Land: The United States Army in Afghanistan, 

2001–2014, 2 vols. Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group. 

Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army/U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, forthcoming.

Horn, Bernd. No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan. 

Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010.

Parnell, Sean, and John R. Bruning. Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, 

Renegades, Infidels, and the Brotherhood of War in Afghanistan. 

New York: William Morrow, 2013.

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster 

in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking 

Press, 2008.

Richards, David. Taking Command. London: Headline, 2014.

Tapper, Jake. The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor. New 

York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014.

Tomsen, Peter. The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, 

Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers. New York: 

PublicAffairs, 2011.

U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. Wanat: Combat Action in 

Afghanistan, 2008. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2010.