US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE 

BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DE FACTO PARTITION 

Evelyn N. Farkas 

and 

IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 

THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

Beth L. Makros 

Jeremy C. Saunders 

INSS Occasional Paper 40 

Regional Security Series 

June 2001 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this volume are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air 

Force or Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. The papers are approved for public release by the Marine Corps 

Staff College (Farkas) and SAF/PA (Makros/Saunders); distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss

ISBN: 0-9710900-3-3 
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Forward vii 

Executive Summary- Farkas xi 

Executive Summary- Makros/Saunders xiii 

US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND 

EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

Introduction 3 

Bosnia 5 

 -Security 6 

 -Political Institutions and Processes 11 

Kosovo 17 

 -Security 18 

 -Political Institutions and Processes 24 

Conclusion and Recommendations 27 

Endnotes 31 

IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

Introduction 41 

 -Significance of US-Russian Relationship 42 

 -Improving the US-Russian Relationship Through Peacekeeping 44 

Assessment of Russian Peacekeeping 46 

 -Russian Political Environment 46 

 -Russian Peacekeeping Forces 49 

 -Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine 51 

Case Studies of Russian Peacekeeping 54 

 -Case Study of Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) 55 

 -Lessons Learned in Bosnia 62 

 -Case Study of Abkhazia (UNOMIG) 64 
v

 -Lessons Learned in Abkhazia 70 

The Future of Russian Peacekeeping 72 

Recommendations 73 

 -Recommendations for Bosnia and Combined Operations 73 

 -Recommendations for US Support in Abkhazia 76 

 -Overall Recommendations 78 

Summary 81 

Endnotes 81 
vi
vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this fortieth volume in the Occasional 

Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies 

(INSS). The decade following the Cold War has seen a rise in ethnic conflict, 

and the United States military has found itself involved in a range of 

humanitarian intervention situations. The US Commission on National 

Security Strategy/21st Century—the Hart-Rudman Commission—has forecast 

a continuation in this type of conflict and in concomitant calls for United 

States military intervention at some level. While the US military has 

expressed mixed attitudes toward this type of political-military mission, and 

while they have had to climb a relatively steep learning curve gaining 

experience and expertise in the range of “peacekeeping” operations, several 

issues have been identified as important to the success of current operations 

and to planning for future situations. These two papers identify, explain, and 

analyze two very important sets of those issues. They are presented here not 

as endorsements of US military intervention or as a “cookbook” of keys to 

successful peace operations, but as solid and sobering examinations of the 

complexity of this operational realm and of the unique military requirements 

and opportunities it presents. 

In the first paper, US Policy Towards Secession In The Balkans And 

Effectiveness Of De Facto Partition, Evelyn Farkas addresses inherently nonmilitary contextual challenges encountered by military forces during NATO 

efforts to make or enforce peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. She highlights 

significant problems that have emerged in both former Yugoslavian states; 

namely, that the initial progress towards establishing stable multiethnic states 

has been stalled by criminal networks and the lack of functioning central 

governments. She concludes that civil and military peace implementers must 

be more aggressive in administering the protectorates NATO has established 

in order to advance the political and economic reforms that are needed to 
viii

achieve a lasting peace. Her efforts help to detail the struggle of institutionbuilding that accompanies peace enforcement and peacekeeping efforts. 

In the second paper, Improving US-Russian Relations Through 

Peacekeeping Operations, Beth Makros and Jeremy Saunders use Bosnia and 

Abkkhazia peacekeeping interventions as case studies to show the need for, 

and possible strategic benefits from, improving cooperation during combined 

or multinational peacekeeping operations. Not only do they outline the major 

weaknesses of Russian peacekeeping efforts and spell-out the differences 

between Russian and American peacekeeping doctrine, but they identify a 

major US weakness in combined settings: the lack of US peacekeepers’ 

knowledge of the Russian language and culture and how such knowledge 

would improve the ability of US troops to effectively function in the field with 

their Russian counterparts within these combined settings. Their paper 

highlights both the wider potential benefits that can be gained from 

multinational operations and the further complexity and requirements they 

generate in order to ensure such broad success. 

It is hoped that the issues and lessons highlighted by the authors of 

both papers will enable US policy makers and military commanders to identify 

means to more effectively lead or participate in such interventions for as long 

as the international situation and United States policy dictate a need for 

military intervention. 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air 

Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Our 

other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th and 23rd 

Information Operations Squadrons; the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net 

Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Army 

Environmental Policy Institute; and the Air Force long-range plans directorate 
ix

(XPXP). The mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research 

for the Department of Defense within the military academic community, and 

to support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research 

focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms 

control, proliferation, aerospace planning and policy, information operations, 

and regional and emerging issues in national security. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines 

and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy 

making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects researchers from 

within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. 

It also hosts conferences and workshops and facilitates the dissemination of 

information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS 

provides valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. 

We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
x
xi

US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND 

EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

During the decade of the 1990s, as ethnic conflicts obtained greater salience 

and demonstrated renewed ability to destabilize the international order, 

successive US administrations fostered cautious multilateral policies. 

Washington advocated interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo that were designed 

to end conflict and restore order in the short-run while firmly denying the right 

to partition the original state. Partition—the creation of one or more new 

independent states from an existing one—was normatively and practically 

rejected. Instead, the US and its NATO allies opted for de facto partition as 

the “best of the worst” policy choices. 

 The de facto partitions in Bosnia and Kosovo are short-term military 

and political expedients involving the use of non-sovereign boundaries to 

divide states ethnically, geographically and politically. Simultaneously, the 

regimes imposed by the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and the UN protectorate in 

Kosovo emphasize the use of political and economic incentives to bridge 

military and territorial boundaries. The following study examines the two 

major ongoing civil-military attempts to manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans 

via de facto partition. The analysis focuses on the extent to which policy 

implementation bolsters the underlying objective—to maintain a multiethnic 

sovereign state and prevent secession or partition. The study assesses the de 

facto partition regimes in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of their short-term 

effectiveness containing conflict and the long-term prospects for state 

preservation. In each case, the analysis begins with a brief review of the 

objectives of the intervenors. Subsequent sections focus on the military and 

political aspects of the intervention, and the extent to which they are 

reinforcing partition or integration. The conclusion offers a blunt final 

assessment of international efforts in the Balkans and policy recommendations 

addressing current shortcomings. 
xii

 The evidence demonstrates that some progress has been made 

towards achieving the underlying objective in both cases—to establish 

multiethnic democracy and prevent secession or partition. De facto partition 

has brought short-term gains to Bosnia and Kosovo. It has proven to be an 

effective post-conflict mechanism to separate formerly warring parties. The 

international forces have restored peace to Bosnia and Kosovo. However, 

progress towards establishing a stable multiethnic state and territory in Bosnia 

and Kosovo, respectively, has been slowed and is in danger of stalling. The 

continued presence of war criminals and associated mafias in both states 

provides a sustained threat to internal security. The criminal networks prevent 

true freedom of movement of peoples, goods and capital, affecting long-term 

economic prospects as well. Finally, in Bosnia the lack of a functioning 

central government leaves the state out of the European integration process 

and continues to prevent compromise and a power shift from nationalists to 

more moderate politicians. 

 The study recommends that the implementers in Bosnia and Kosovo 

move quickly and assertively to: 1) remove internal security threats, 2) begin 

to reform the economic system and 3) in Bosnia, rewrite the constitution to 

strengthen the central government. The author asserts that de facto partition 

cannot become the basis for policy, if civilian and military peace implementers 

are unwilling to aggressively administer the protectorates that result. Firm 

international administration is required to implement the political and 

economic reforms that will bridge the de facto partition. Imposing reform 

upon these ethnically divided societies is the only “shock-therapy” that will 

allow for relatively quick political change and conditions conducive to a 

removal of the international forces that enforce the de facto partitions. 
xiii

IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The post-Cold War era has seen a rise in the number of international 

peacekeeping operations undertaken by the world community. While these 

missions have often consumed the world’s attention, the US-Russian 

relationship still plays a crucial role in world affairs. This paper seeks to answer 

three main questions: 

1. Can relations between the US and Russia be improved through combined 

peacekeeping operations and support for Russian peacekeeping in the near 

abroad? 

2. In what areas can the US most effectively use resources to enhance 

cooperation in peacekeeping? 

3. What actions should the US take to initiate or improve relations in these 

areas?

Cooperation in Peacekeeping 

The US has several vital and important interests involved in 

maintaining a cooperative relationship with Russia. While the current 

relationship is somewhat tense, one of the most promising ways to improve 

the overall strategic relationship is through cooperation in peacekeeping 

efforts. These efforts provide an opportunity for higher level political figures 

to interact and allow the US and Russia to promote their mutual interests. 

Assessment of Russian Peacekeeping 

To find the areas where the US can most effectively use its resources 

to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping, this paper assesses: 1) where Russia 

is most likely to participate, 2) Russian peacekeeping training and equipment, 

3) Russian peacekeeping doctrine, 4) a case of participation in an international 

operation, Bosnia, and 5) a case of involvement in the near abroad with a low 

level of UN supervision, Abkhazia. 
xiv

Participation: Russia’s economic and political situations limit them to 

participation in peacekeeping missions in the near abroad, the Balkans, and, to 

a limited extent, UN operations. 

Training and Equipment: The training Russian forces receive for these 

missions is adequate, but their equipment is outdated and poorly maintained. 

Doctrine: Russian peacekeeping doctrine, at least in practice, differs from US 

doctrine in three areas: 1) a greater propensity to use force, 2) an often-times 

partial approach to promote Russian interests, and 3) the inclusion of 

combatants in the peacekeeping force. 

Performance in Bosnia: As an example of Russian participation in combined 

operations with the US under NATO auspices, Bosnia shows that Russian 

troops perform adequately. The major issues in Russian performance include 

setting up a mutually agreeable command and control structure, questions of 

Russian partiality and lack of professionalism, equipment and maintenance 

problems, and language and cultural barriers.

Performance in Abkhazia: In Abkhazia, Russian forces act under CIS auspices 

with UN supervision. They perform the minimum task of maintaining 

stability reasonably well, partly because of their heavy-handed approach. 

Russian troops have frequently acted with partiality towards the Abkhaz, and 

have been unable or unwilling to completely fulfill their mandate to provide a 

secure environment and to facilitate the return of refugees. 

The US has an opportunity to improve the overall strategic relationship with 

Russia by improving cooperation in the Balkans and finding areas to support 

Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad. 

Bosnia 

The US should seek to improve cooperation and communication in Bosnia by: 

increasing the number of LNO’s (liaison officers) to the Russian Brigade, 

including a Russian Representative in PfP command post exercises, and 

restarting the combined patrolling missions that the Russian and US troops 

perform. To reduce cultural misunderstandings and break down language 
xv

barriers, the US should set aside more time to brief incoming American 

commanders (down through platoon leaders and NCO’s) and develop phrase 

books on various differences in military culture, terminology, and procedures. 

Abkhazia 

The US can support Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad by allowing 

American UN observers more freedom to travel in the conflict region and 

increasing their interactions with CIS peacekeeping forces. The US should 

also encourage and support other CIS nations, such as the Ukraine, 

Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia, to take a more active role in CIS 

peacekeeping missions, bolstering the CIS and improving its peacekeeping 

capabilities and legitimacy.

Overall Recommendations 

These recommendations can improve the US-Russian relationship in the 

context of any type of peacekeeping operation: 

1) Define each nation’s participation in the operational planning of 

multinational peacekeeping operations by the level or amount of their 

participation in the operation. 

2) Restart educational exchanges between US and Russian military personnel. 

3) Perform combined exercises of staff level officers under the established PfP 

program. 

4) Improve Russian language and cultural expertise among US officers. 

5) Increase cultural training for officers and NCOs assigned to work with 

Russian units. 

6) Give more credit to Russia for its peacekeeping operations in recognition of 

improved performance in desired areas. 
xvi