CADRE/PC 2005-009 

SCHOOL 

AIR UNIVERSITY 

INFORMATION WARFARE ARMS CONTROL: 

RISKS AND COSTS 

by 

Maxie C. Thom, Lt Col, USAF 

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty 

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 

Advisor: Dr. Paul A. Kowert, Florida International University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

April 2005 
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do

not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of

Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is 

the property of the United States government. 

ii
Contents 

Page 

DISCLAIMER....................................................................................................................II 

ILLUSTRATIONS .............................................................................................................V 

TABLES ........................................................................................................................... VI 

PREFACE........................................................................................................................VII 

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................VIII 

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 

Background....................................................................................................................1

Raising the Alarm..........................................................................................................2 

Defining Terms..............................................................................................................3 

Organization ..................................................................................................................4

SECURITY..........................................................................................................................6 

Military Sector...............................................................................................................9

Economic Sector............................................................................................................9 

Political Sector.............................................................................................................12

Security Dilemma ........................................................................................................13 

ARMS CONTROL ............................................................................................................17 

Definitions...................................................................................................................18 

Outlook ........................................................................................................................19 

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAWS OF WAR..................................................23 

Intangible Damage.......................................................................................................24 

Challenge to Sovereignty.............................................................................................24 

Ambiguous Definition in Existing International Law .................................................26 

Prospects for a Regime ................................................................................................27 

COSTS FOR INFORMATION WARFARE ARMS CONTROL.....................................29 

Generic Costs...............................................................................................................31 

Types of Costs.............................................................................................................33 

Pre-Signature Costs ...............................................................................................33 

Ratification Costs ..................................................................................................36 

Post-EIF Costs.......................................................................................................38 

iii
Administrative Costs ...................................................................................................38 

Industry Costs..............................................................................................................40 

Hidden or Overhead Costs...........................................................................................41 

Summary......................................................................................................................41

RISKS FOR INFORMATION WARFARE ARMS CONTROL......................................45 

International Legal System..........................................................................................45 

Sovereignty in the Information Realm ........................................................................47 

Verification and Compliance Risks.............................................................................49 

Undetected Cheating..............................................................................................49 

Intelligence Losses ................................................................................................51 

Proliferation Risks.................................................................................................52 

False Sense of Security..........................................................................................52 

Defensive Risk.............................................................................................................54 

Increased Kinetic Targeting.........................................................................................56 

Psychological Operations......................................................................................56 

Infrastructure .........................................................................................................57 

Political Risks..............................................................................................................59

CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................65 

BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................68 

iv
Illustrations 

Page 

Figure 1 The Third Wave..................................................................................................11 

Figure 2 Generic Costs Curve...........................................................................................31 

Figure 3 GII, NII and DII Relationship ............................................................................35 

Figure 4 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Leaflet (IZD-070)..............................................57 

v
Tables 

Page 

Table 1 1999 Program Acquisition Costs for Selected Weapon Systems..........................7 

Table 2 Arms Control Variants.........................................................................................19 

Table 3 Cost Estimates for Weapons Destruction under the CWC ..................................32 

Table 4 Entry into Force ...................................................................................................36 

vi
Preface 

Over the past four years, I have planned and employed information warfare (IW)

at the tactical and operational levels of war and I have engaged in numerous operational 

exercises to help develop IW tactics, techniques, and procedures. I began this research to 

gain an understanding of how an arms control regime would impact IW execution and to 

specifically address the risks and costs for such a regime, which have not been addressed 

in previous research efforts. In addition, given the dual-use nature of information 

technology, an important issue for the security community is the feasibility of an IW

arms control regime. This paper only addresses one aspect of this larger issue. 

I would like to thank the entire Florida International University Department of 

International Relations (IR) who made my stay at this recognized institution of higher 

learning an enjoyable one. This research effort would not have been possible without the 

support from the Department Chair, Professor John Clark, and the intellectual leadership 

of Professors Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Elizabeth Prügl, and Félix Martín. A special thanks to

my advisor, Professor Paul Kowert, for his intellectual challenge that set me on the right 

path and for his generous gift of time. A heartfelt thanks to Kathy Hasselbach, Mary

Cossio, and Martha Linares-the phenomenal IR staff-for their support and friendship. 

Most of all I would like to thank my wife, Sheryl, and daughters, Rashida, Kamili, 

and Niara, for their patience, understanding, sacrifice, and support during my deployment

to Miami throughout the course of this effort. 

vii
AU/SCHOOL/NNN/2005-04 

Abstract 

Since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, information warfare has taken a prominent role

in transforming the military as envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. However, due to the 

rapid changes in information technologies and the low cost, wide availability and high 

payoff of information warfare weapons, some have seen it as a destabilizing influence 

and have called for international arms control agreements to govern its use. Although the

international legal system and the modern concept of arms control were able to provide 

for national and international collective security during the Cold War, information 

warfare presents many challenges that question their viability. The most significant 

challenges are to the international legal system, which include undermining the ordering 

principle of the post-Westphalian international system. Despite these challenges, an

information warfare arms control regime is still achievable; however, at potentially 

significant costs and risks. Although some of these costs would be similar to previous 

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons arms control agreements, the lack of available 

data makes it difficult to determine the expected costs with any degree of accuracy. In

addition, some of these costs cannot be expressed in budgetary terms; therefore, they are 

presented as risks and include increased proliferation, intelligence loss, cheating, and a 

false sense of security. Since there are also political risks by not becoming a signatory to 

international agreements on this issue, the U.S. would be best served by staying engaged 

in the discourse to shape the norm for information warfare in the international arena. 

viii
Introduction 

Background 

For many strategic studies scholars and Department of Defense strategic analysts, 

the successful integration of emerging technologies and innovative ideas in the 1991Gulf 

War was a precursor for a revolution in military affairs (RMA);1

 which dominated the 

discourse on U.S. national security for the remainder of the 1990’s. This modern RMA 

was characterized by the development of precision guided munitions; improved 

Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities; information warfare; and nonlethal weapons.2

 

DOD strategists were enthralled with the concept of a modern RMA because it could 

allow a smaller but more advanced and lethal military to protect U.S. national interests 

with unprecedented efficiency.3

 More importantly, it could help to solve many of the 

strategic dilemmas for the U.S. in the post-Cold War international environment. In order

to capitalize on the new technologies and realize the promise from the RMA, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) to serve as 

the framework for transforming the military. In addition, JV2010 provided conceptual 

clarity for the key to this transformation, information superiority. Specifically it stated: 

We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process,

and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 

denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. 

1
Information superiority will require both offensive and defensive 

information warfare (IW). Offensive information warfare will degrade or

exploit an adversary’s collection or use of information. It will include both 

traditional methods, such as a precision attack to destroy an adversary’s 

command and control capability, as well as nontraditional methods such as 

electronic intrusion into an information and control network to convince, 

confuse, or deceive enemy military decision makers. 

There should be no misunderstanding that our effort to achieve and 

maintain information superiority will also invite resourceful enemy attacks 

on our information systems. Defensive information warfare to protect our 

ability to conduct information operations will be one of our biggest 

challenges in the period ahead.4

However, while DOD sought to achieve the vision depicted in JV2010 and operationalize 

the concept of information warfare, by developing the doctrine and fielding units and 

organizations to specialize in this new type of warfare, security scholars were analyzing 

the evolving concept and warning of its inherent danger. 

Raising the Alarm 

As early as 1995, theorists and strategists argued that due to its relatively low

cost, wide availability, and relatively high payoff, information warfare will have a 

destabilizing effect on international relations. The central point of the debate was the 

notion that potential adversaries didn’t need an industrial database nor were they required 

to invest a substantial portion of their GNP to achieve the effects that are usually

associated with medium-to large-scale interstate warfare. As a result of these concerns, 

some have called for international agreements to govern the use of information warfare. 

The first draft treaty for information warfare circulated on the internet in 1995 and simply 

stated, “The parties to this Convention agree not to engage in information warfare against 

each other”; however, it wasn’t taken too seriously.5

 The first serious attempt came from 

2
Russia in 1998 and called on the First Committee of the U.N. to explore the need for an 

international agreement to address arms control for information warfare weapons.6

 

However, the U.S. did not officially express an interest in pursuing an information

warfare arms control regime until 2004. 

In July 2002, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 16 

(classified), which clarified circumstances under which the United States would be

justified to launch computer network attacks against foreign adversary computer 

systems.7

 This development rekindled the discussions on the use of international 

agreements to regulate this potentially devastating weapon. More importantly, it may 

have motivated U.S. policy makers to take action because the 19 July 2004 Congressional 

Research Service Report for Congress titled Information Warfare and Cyberwar:

Capabilities and Related Policy Issues contains “possible effects of international arms

control for cyberweapons” as a potential policy issue for Congress.8

 As with any other 

international agreement, an information warfare arms control agreement will present risks

and costs for the United States. This report will explore these potential risks and costs. 

Defining Terms 

One of the first challenges to overcome in any discussion on information warfare is 

the definition, since information warfare mean different things to different people. In 

addition, some have used the term interchangeably with “netwar,” “cyberwar,” and 

“infowar.” To arrive at a definition for use in this paper, I started with the stated 

definition in the Congressional report that questioned the need for an information warfare 

arms control regime, which is: 

3
Information itself is now a realm, a weapon, and a target. An informationbased attack includes any unauthorized attempt to copy data, or directly 

alter data or instructions. Information warfare involves much more than 

computers and computer networks. It is comprised of operations directed 

against information in any form, transmitted over any media, including 

operations against information content, its supporting systems and 

software, the physical hardware device that stores the data or instructions, 

and also human practices and perceptions.9

However, for the purpose of this research, this definition is too broad. While certain 

information warfare capabilities primarily fall within the purview of state actors, such as 

deception and psychological operations, others, such as computer network attack, may 

also be executed by criminals and terrorists who won’t abide by an arms control regime.10

Therefore, for this paper, information warfare activities are only executed by state actors

during interstate conflict or warfare.

11

Organization 

The paper consists of five parts. The first chapter will focus on how information 

warfare is securitized, since some have argued that although it is a concern, it is not a 

significant threat that warrants attention in the international arena. Chapter 2 briefly looks 

at the usefulness of arms control in the post-Cold War international environment. The 

concern is that arms control may have lost some of its luster since the end of the Cold 

War and may not be a viable institution to mitigate threats to the international order.

Therefore, if information warfare is indeed a threat, it will be risky to rely on an outdated 

institution to provide for collective international security. Since an arms control regime

is an international legal agreement, chapter 3 will look at the current international legal 

issues in information warfare and the implications they will have for an arms control 

4
regime. Chapter 4 explores the potential costs and will take a qualitative approach, since 

cost data are traditionally hard to generate and they are also hard to glean from previous 

arms control regimes. The fifth chapter will explore the risk incurred by entering or not

entering an agreement. 

Notes 

1

 According to the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, A Revolution in Military Affairs is a major change in the nature of warfare

brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with 

dramatic changes in military doctrine and operations and organizational concepts

fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations. 

2

 Previous RMAs included: the railway, telegraph, steam powered ships, the machine 

gun, the submarine, armored fighting vehicles, radio and radar. See Sharjeel Rizwan, 

“Revolution in Military Affairs,” September 2000, n.p., on-line. Internet. Available from 

http.www.defence journal.com/2000/sept/military.htm. 3

 Steven Metz and James Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: 

From Theory to Policy,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Army War College, 1995), iii. 

4

 Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of 

Staff), 16. 

5

 Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information 

Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of General Counsel, 1999), 47. 

6

 Department of Defense, Assessment of Legal Issues, 48 and UN General Assembly 

Resolution A/RES/53/70, “Developments in the Field of Information and 

Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” 4 December 1998. 

7

 Clay Wilson, Information Warfare and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy

Issues, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004), CRS-10. 

8

 Ibid, CRS-10. 

9

 Ibid, CRS-2. 

10 These malicious activities consist of “cyberterror”, “cybercrime”, and 

“cyberactivism”. See Gregory Rattray, “Security in Cyberspace.” In Arms Control: 

Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment, ed. Jeffrey Larsen. (Boulder, Colo.: 

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 312-313. 

11 This definition is intentionally restrictive to limit the discussion to address only

those activities that may fall under the purview of the Department of Defense, the State 

Department, or their equivalent in other states. Under normal circumstances neither the

Armed Forces nor the State Department will be called to remove a crowd that was 

preventing customers from entering a bookstore. Similarly, they should not be expected 

to respond to computer hackers that were conducting denial of service attacks against ecommerce websites. In both cases, these activities are the responsibility of local law 

enforcement officials, such as campus police or the FBI. 

5
Chapter 1

Security

The difference between normal challenges and threats to national security 

necessarily occurs on a spectrum of threats that ranges from trivial and 

routine, through serious but routine, to drastic and unprecedented. Quite 

where on this spectrum issues begin to get legitimately classified as

national security problems is a matter of political choice rather than 

objective fact. Setting the security trigger too low on the scale risks 

paranoia, waste of resources, aggressive policies and serious distortions 

of domestic political life. Setting it too high risks failure to prepare for

major assaults until too late.1

 

Is information warfare a threat to national security that warrants attention in the 

international arena? According to some experts, information warfare can be considered 

“war on the cheap” because one million dollars and twenty individuals, employing 

computer network attack, can “bring the U.S. to its knees;”2

 $10, 000 and ten individuals 

can disrupt the defense information infrastructure (DII) for weeks;3

 and for $30 million, 

one hundred individuals could corrupt the national information infrastructure (NII) in 

such a manner that would take years to rectify.4

 Even if these experts were overly 

optimistic and the costs were actually 10 times what they asserted, it would still be 

significantly cheaper that many of the U.S. major weapon systems during the same time 

frame, as shown in table 1. 

6
Table 1 1999 Program Acquisition Costs for Selected Weapon Systems 

Weapon System Program

Acquisition 

Costs5

 ($ M) 

Quantity Unit Costs 

($ M) 

F/A-18E/F Hornet6 3178.2 30 105.9

C-17 Airlift Aircraft

7 3192.2 13 245.6

E-8C Joint Stars8 663.2 2 331.6

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)9 152.1 24 6.3

Abrams (M1) Tank Upgrade Program10 702.2 120 5.9

LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Dock11 638.2 1 638.2

Source: Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System: 

Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years 2000/2001, (Washington, D.C.: 

1999), on-line., Internet, 2 April 2005, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/ 

comptroller/ defbudget/fy2000/FY2000_weabook.pdf. 

However, others have also looked at information warfare and concluded that while it is a 

concern it is not a serious threat to national or international security. In fact one author 

suggests that there isn’t a significant threat and “hoaxes and myths about information 

warfare contaminate everything from official reports to newspaper stories.”12 He further 

adds, it is difficult to get the “ground truth” because “most of the people who are 

knowledgeable are on the government’s payroll or in the business of selling computer 

security devices and in no position to serve as objective sources.”13 It would appear that 

the U.N. may subscribe to this latter view in light of the absence of information warfare 

from its latest assessment of current and future threats to international peace and security. 

Following a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2003, the 

Secretary General, Kofi Annan, convened a high-level panel that was charged with 

assessing the current threats to international peace and security, evaluating how existing 

policies and institutions have addressed those threats, and making recommendations to 

strengthening the U.N. in order to provide collective security for all in the twenty-first

7
century.14 In December 2004, the High-Level Panel reported its findings and defined 

“six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades 

ahead” to include: economic and social threats; inter-state conflict; internal conflict; 

nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons; terrorism, and transnational 

organized crime.”15 In addition to suggesting that information warfare was not a serious 

threat to the international order, the inclusion of non military threats also served to fuel a 

larger debate that has raged amongst security scholars for the past fifteen years. The 

significance of this ongoing debate is that unlike the U.N., both sides of the issue can 

agree that information warfare is a threat that warrants attention in the international arena. 

Since the end of the Cold War, strategic studies scholars have questioned the 

primacy of the military element as the quintessential defining threat to national security.

16

Those who have raised this question have pointed to existing challenges from other 

sectors of society that should supplement the military sector in this defining role. As a 

result, within the field of strategic studies, there are primarily two views as to what 

constitutes a threat to national security, the military-centric traditionalist view and the 

new one presented by the wideners.17 While the traditionalists maintain a focus on the

military and political sectors to define the threat, the wideners would also embrace 

environmental, economic and other societal challenges as well. Although this debate has 

continued for the past 15 years, without a resolution in sight, both traditionalist and 

wideners can agree that information warfare is a threat to national security, since it can

threaten the military, economic, and political sectors both independently and 

simultaneously. 

8
Within the discourse of security in the international arena, Barry Buzan states, "security 

is a self-referential practice in that the issue becomes a security issue not necessarily

because an existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat."18

A closer look at the deliberations on information warfare will show that those who are 

charged with securitizing issues for the state have securitized information warfare within 

the military, political, and economic sectors; and in doing so have made information

warfare a security issue within the international arena. 

Military Sector 

Within the military sector, the ruling elites generally define the security threats and the 

state is the referent object that is being threatened. In addition, intergovernmental 

organizations and their responsible officials, such as the UN and its Secretary General, 

also have a limited authority to invoke abstract and collective principles as referent 

objects within this sector.

19 The following is a partial list of responsible actors who have 

securitized information warfare within the military sector over the last decade: 

1994 - Joint Security Commission – IW is "the major security challenge of this 

decade and possibly the next century”

20 

1996 - John M. Deutch, DCI – Testimony Senate Select Committee on Intel21 

1998 - Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protect Prgm22 

1999 - Chinese Army’s Political Newspaper – Liberation Army Daily23

2000 - Russian National Security Concept and Military Doctrine24

2002 - SECDEF – Annual Report to the President and Congress25 

2004 - Director DIA - Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intel26 

Economic Sector 

While both the referent objects and the securitizing actors are relatively easy to

identify in the military sector, the same doesn’t hold true for the economic sector because 

there are “different views about whether states and societies or markets should have 

9
priority and whether private economic actors have security claims of their own that must 

be weighed against the verdict of the market.”27 Moreover, while mercantilists and

neomercantilists put politics first and would give the state primacy as the securitizing 

actor, liberal economic theorists would disagree, since in their view the market should 

operate freely; hence the market and not the state should decide what constitutes a threat 

to economic security.28 These and a variety of other issues, to include the “nature of 

economic relations under liberalism,” will complicate any discussion on economic

security.29 However this debate also has larger implications in the post-Westphalian

international order, where the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 

Identifying an issue as a threat to national security implies that drastic measures, 

to include the use of force, might be required to negate the threat. Therefore, if a nonstate actor or private authority has the responsibility to securitize an issue; this may imply

that they may also have the authority to determine the legitimate use of force; which 

usurps the state’s monopoly. To add clarity to the issue at hand, Buzan points out that 

most of what is assessed to constitute a threat in the economic security is actually a

byproduct or “overspill” of threats in the other sectors.30 Moreover, although national 

economies have a greater claim to the right of survival, rarely will a threat to that survival 

(national bankruptcy or an ability to provide for the basic needs of the population) 

actually arise apart from wider security context, such as war or a large-scale natural 

disaster as seen in the recent tsunami in the Indian Ocean.31 However, in regards to

information warfare, the economic sector can be threatened without necessarily affecting 

the other sectors. Why? 

10
Some strategic studies scholars and international relations theorists have argued 

that we have moved from an agrarian, to an industrial, and now to an information age. 

This concept can be summarized as, “markets are migrating from geographic space to 

cyberspace as electronic commerce grows in both the business-to-business and the 

business-to consumer spheres. Finally, physical products are becoming digital services, 

data transmitted electronically over the internet.”32 This migration is depicted in the

works of future-theorists Alvin Toffler who coined the concept of the “third wave.”33

Moreover, since the early 1990’s, many authors have equated the image of the third wave 

with information technology, which is summarized in figure 1.34

Figure 1 The Third Wave35

In this context, the economy is not dominated by money or trade but by symbols. 

Various scholars have written on this subject and share this point of view. Peter Drucker 

writes “The basic economic resource - "the means of production," to use the economist's 

11
term - is no longer capital, nor natural resources, nor labor. It is and will be 

knowledge.”36 Daniel Bell adds, "The crucial point about a post-industrial society is that 

knowledge and information become the strategic and transforming resources of the 

society, just as capital and labor have been the strategic and transforming resources of the 

industrial society."37 And, "Finance no longer has anything to do with money, but with 

information.”38 Hence, within the economic sector, the referent object is the banking and 

finance system that utilizes symbols, or bytes of information, that represents intra and 

interstate economic transactions. The following is a partial list of securitizing actors who

have securitized information warfare within the economic sector: 

1996 - John Deutch, DCI - Testimony before the Intelligence Subcommittee39 

1998 - Presidential Decision Directive 63 – Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Program40 

2000 – Russian President Putin – Russian Information Security Doctrine41

2001 – George Tenet (DCI) – Congressional Hearings on Worldwide Threats42 

2004 – Director DIA – Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intel43 

2005 – French Economic school for information warfare44

Political Sector 

In the post-Westphalian international order, sovereignty is the central ordering 

principle; and in the political sector, it can be existentially threatened by anything that 

questions the recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority of the state.45 Additionally, 

states establish international regimes to help provide for their collective security; and

situations that undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute these regimes

can also threaten them politically.46 Therefore, the primary referent object within the 

political sector is sovereignty, and the securitizing actor is the government of the state. As 

in the military sector, the U.N. also has a role in this sector and is also a referent object 

12
“because of its central role as the repository of the basic principles of international 

society and international law.”47 The following list represents securitization of

information warfare within the political sector: 

1998 – Russia tabled a resolution on IW in the UN’s First Committee48 

1999 – UN passed Resolution 53/7049 

2001 - Russian President adopted Russian Information Security Doctrine 

2003/04 - Director DIA - Testimony before Senate Select Committee on Intel50 

Security Dilemma

Information warfare is a threat to national security not only because of the selfreferential practice of security, but also because it exacerbates the security dilemma; a 

key aspect of the dominant theory in international relations, realism. Realists posit that 

the international order is anarchical and security is a self-help system, where each state is 

responsible for providing for its own security. In this self-help system, the security 

dilemma occurs because as one state tries to increase its security, its actions may decrease

the security in others.51 In this context, a 1996 National Security Agency report that 

indicated over 120 states either possessed or were actively developing information 

warfare technology could cause angst among their neighbors and motivate others to seek 

like capabilities; thereby heightening the threat.

52 In addition, statements such as China’s 

declaration that it was “committed to becoming the world’s foremost information warfare

power” could lead to an information warfare arms race.53 Can the centerpiece of U.S. 

national security policy during the Cold War mitigate the threat posed by information 

warfare? This question is the focus of the next chapter. 

13
Notes 

1

 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security 

Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 115. 

2

 Cited in Michael N. Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in

International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework,” (United States Air Force 

Academy, Colo.: Institute of Information Technology Applications), June 1999, on-line, 

Internet, 2 April 2005, available from http://atlas.usafa.af.mil/iita/Documents/Schmitt1. 

pdf, 10. 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 These figures only represent the cost of the weapon system during 1999 since many 

of the program costs are amortized over the life cycle of the weapon system. See 

Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System.

6

 The F/A-18E/F is a twin-engine, high-performance, multi-mission, tactical aircraft

for deployment in Navy and Marine Corps fighter and attack squadrons. It can perform 

strike, interdiction, close air support, fighter escort, and fleet air defense missions. See 

Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System. 8. 

7

 The C-17 is a wide body, four engine, turbofan aircraft that meets the nation’s 

strategic aircraft requirement for a new core to modernize the U.S. strategic aircraft

capability. The C-17 provides outsize intratheater airland/airdrop capability. See 

Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, 12. 8

 The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System is a modified Boeing 707 

class aircraft that is modified to operate a target attack radar system to detect and track

both moving and fixed enemy ground targets. JSTARS can provide battlefield 

surveillance, attack planning, and post attack damage assessments. See Department of 

Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, 14. 

9

 The MLRS consists of a tracked, self-propelled launcher loader, disposable rocket 

pods, and fire control equipment firing 227 mm ballistic rockets loaded with antipersonnel/anti-material bomblets. The mission of MLRS is to neutralize or suppress 

enemy field artillery and air defense systems and supplement common artillery systems. 

See Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, 26. 

10 The SAN ANTONIO Class Amphibious Transport Dock ships embark, transport, 

and land elements of Marine landing forces in an amphibious assault by helicopters, 

landing craft, and amphibious vehicles. See Department of Defense, Program Acquisition 

Costs by Weapon System, 40. 

11 The mission of the M1 Upgrade program is to provide a main battle tank with

increased survivability, mobility, firepower, and lethality for U.S. armor forces. See 

Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System. 42. 

12 George Smith, “An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely.” Issue in Science and 

Technology Online, Fall 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 March 2005, available from 

http://205.130.85.236/issues/15.1/smith.htm. 13 Ibid. 

14 UN General Assembly Document A59/565, Follow-up to the Outcome of the 

Millennium Summit, 2 December 2004, 3. 

15 Ibid, p 25. 

14
Notes 

16 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for

Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 4. 

17 Ibid, 1. 

18 Ibid. 24. 

19 Ibid. 49-55. 

20 Douglas Waller, “Onward Cyber Soldiers,” TIME, 1995, 39. 

21 Senate, Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearings before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1996. 

22 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection”, 1998. 

23 Although a newspaper is not a securitizing actor, in this instance the Liberation 

Army Daily is the official newspaper for the Chinese Army and given the government’ 

control of information, the contents of the paper can be taken as the official government

position. See US Embassy Beijing: PLA Colonels on “Unrestricted Warfare: Part 1”.” 

November 1999, n.p., on-line., Internet, 12 November 2004, available from http:// 

http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/china/doctrine/uresw1.htm. 24 Stephen J. Main, “Russia’s Military Doctrine.” April 2000, n.p., on-line., Internet, 

29 January 2004, available from http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Russian/OB77. 

Stated that one of the main threats to military security included “hostile information 

(information-technical, information-psychological) operations that damage the military

security of the Russian Federation and its allies.” 

25 Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2002), 72. 

26 Senate, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: 

Hearings before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 2004, 10-

11. 

27 Buzan et al., 95. 

28 Ibid. 95-96. 

29 Ibid. 

30 Ibid. 

31 Ibid. 

32 Stephen J. Korbin, “Economic Governance in an Electronically Networked Global 

Economy,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Rodney 

Hall and Thomas Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 50. 

33 The Agricultural Revolution was the “first wave” and the Industrial Revolution 

was the “second wave.” 

34 See Robert K. Elliott, “Information Technology: The Third Wave,” The CPA 

Journal, November 1992, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 March 2005, available from 

http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/13856813.htm, Michael J. Robbat, "Resolving the 

Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Information Warfare in the International Forum: The 

Reach of the Existing Legal Framework, and the Creation of a New Paradigm." ." 

Journal of Science and Technology Law, 1 June 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 13 October

2004. Available from http://jstl.law .miami.edu/vol6/Volume%206/6jstl10.pdf. 

15
Notes 

35 “Information Warfare,” 19 April 2004, n.p., on-line, Internet, 23 November 2004, 

available from http://www.nvcc.edu/home/joney/IST%20246%20Lecture%209%20-

%20Information%20Warfare.ppt. 

36 Peter Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society, (New York: Harper Business, 1993), 8. 

37 David Ronfeldt, “Cyberocracy is Coming,” The Information Society Journal 8, no. 

4 (1992): 243-296. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Senate, Worldwide Threat Assessment, 1996.

40 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, 1998. 

41 Main. 

42 Senate, Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World:

Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 

2001. 

43 Senate, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, 

2004. 

44 Steven A. Hildreth, Cyberwarfare, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 

Service, 2001), CRS-14. 

45 Buzan et al., 141-145. 

46 Ibid. 

47 Ibid. 148. 

48 Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in 

Information Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of General Counsel, 1999), 48. 

49 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/70, “Developments in the Field of

Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” 4 

December 1998; William Church, “Information Warfare,” International Review of the

Red Cross, no. 837, 31 March 2000, on-line., Internet, 29 January 2005, available from 

http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQCZ, 205-216. and Gregory Rattray, 

“Security in Cyberspace.” In Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing 

Environment, ed. Jeffrey Larsen. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 315. 

50 Senate, Current and Projected National Security Threats, 2004, 10-11 and Senate, 

Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearings before 

the Senate Committee on Intelligence, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, 15. 

51 Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” in Conflict After the

Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard Betts (New York: 

Pearson Longman, 2004), 382-384. and Buzan, 121. 

52 James T. McKenna, “Tighter Security Urged for Defense Computers.” Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, 20 January 1997, 60. 

53 Michael J. Robbat, "Resolving the Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Information 

Warfare in the International Forum: The Reach of the Existing Legal Framework, and the 

Creation of a New Paradigm." Journal of Science and Technology Law, 1 June 2000, online. Internet, 13 October 2004, available from http://jstl.law .miami.edu/vol6/Volume

%206/6jstl10.pdf. 

16
Chapter 2

Arms Control 

For strategic studies scholars, 1962 is a landmark year for two reasons. First, it

brought the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the U.S. and the Soviet Union were closest to 

the brink of a nuclear exchange and second, it marked the start of the modern theory of 

arms control as we know it today, which served as the centerpiece of U.S. national

security policy for over four decades.1

 However, since the end of the Cold War, security 

scholars have debated the ability of arms control to adequately address the diverse threats 

that we now face. This chapter will briefly look at the institution of arms control for two 

reasons. The first reason is to define arms control and the second reason is to ascertain if 

arms control is still a viable institution to create and maintain stability in the post-Cold 

War, since it would be foolhardy to rely on an outdated concept to mitigate the

burgeoning information warfare threat. 

Although the U.S. primarily depended on deterrence and defense to provide for its 

national security, after World War II it also turned to disarmament to help address the

nuclear arms race and ever-present threat of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

2

 

However, by the mid 1950’s the U.S was getting increasingly disappointed with the slow

pace of disarmament efforts and eventually turned to the modern concept of arms control 

as an “adjunct” to national security.3

 The three main objectives of this new arms control 

17
concept were to reduce the risk of war, reduce the cost of preparing for war, and reduce 

the damage should war occur.4

 However, due to the devastating effects that would result 

from a nuclear exchange, the first objective received most of the focus and became the 

centerpiece of arms control negotiations for the remainder of the Cold War. This narrow 

focus is also one of the points of contention for those who question the viability of arms

control in the post-Cold War era. They argue that since we now face formidable 

technological and other non-nuclear threats, and not the nuclear threat from a peer 

competitor, the second and third objectives should play a greater role in new arms control 

regimes. 

Definitions 

Although there isn’t a universally accepted definition of arms control, over the 

past two decades different types of international agreements have been developed and are 

often addressed under the rubric of “arms control” to include: nonproliferation, 

disarmament, confidence-building measures, and laws of war.5

 Therefore, for this paper, 

the general concept of arms control is defined as an “agreement among states to regulate 

some aspect of their military capability or potential.”6

 These different varieties are 

represented in Table 2 along with their potential to serve as an information warfare arms

control regime. 

There is a general agreement that arms control played a major part in addressing

and successfully managing the proliferation and employment of nuclear weapons, and 

other weapons of mass destruction during the Cold War. Moreover, arms control was also 

a great success in addressing the threats from conventional arms through such regimes as 

the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe, the Stockholm Vienna Confidence and 

18
Table 2 Arms Control Variants 

Type Definition Applicable for

IW7

Arms Control, Convention Agreements that are negotiated, signed, 

and ratified between sovereign states that

possesses the weapon or capability in 

question on a basis of equality and 

reciprocity 

High 

Nonproliferation Agreements that are signed to prevent the 

development of a capability or to prevent 

acquisition by new states 

Low 

Disarmament Agreements that eliminate and further 

prohibit particular classes of weapons 

universally and without discrimination 

Low 

Confidence-Building 

Measures 

Agreement that serve to make military

activities and armaments in question

more transparent in an attempt to ally the

fears of neighbors and the international 

community 

Medium

Laws of War International laws that guide the use of

weapons and techniques in armed 

conflict 

High 

Source: Allan S. Krass, The United States and Arms Control: The Challenge of 

Leadership (Westport, Conn.: Prager Publishers, 1997), 5-7 

Security Building regime and the Open Skies Treaty. However, there isn’t a general 

agreement on the effectiveness of arms control in the post-Cold War era, due in part to 

the lack of any meaningful arms control agreements since the end of the Cold War. 

Outlook

From 1986 to 1993, ten major arms control agreements were signed along with 

numerous confidence and transparency enhancing regimes. By contrast, in the four years 

after the signing of the CWC in 1993, there were only two significant achievements in 

arms control: the renewal and indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

in 1995 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996; which the US 

Congress failed to ratify in 1999. Although partisan politics played a significant role in 

19
preventing ratification of the CTBT, for some, this failure signaled a decline in the U.S. 

commitment and reliance on arms control as a mechanism to maintain national security.8

 

To put this into context, failure to ratify the CTBT was the first time that a securityrelated treaty was defeated in the U.S. Senate since the Treaty of Versailles.9

 

The prospects for major arms control talks and agreements have not improved 

since the death of the CTBT in the U.S. Congress. As one author stated “although 

[President] Bush professes deep concern about the spread of weapons of mass destruction 

in the wake of September 11, he shows little faith in the efficacy of treaty law as a means 

of thwarting it.”10 Other scholars of strategic studies also share this lack of confidence in 

arms control. One author wrote "the traditional arms-control process of negotiating 

legally binding treaties that both codify numerical parity and inexpensive verification 

measures has reached an impasse an outlived its utility."

11 While another has looked into 

the future and concluded that the bipolar nature of the Cold War and the clear and 

unmistakable threat of nuclear weapons provided the catalyst for the US and the Soviet 

Union to forge meaningful arms control agreements; therefore, since none of these facts

remain true today “arms control as it has been traditionally been understood will be much 

less useful.”12 

Other scholars disagree and still see a viable role for arms control now and in the 

future. One author views arms control as part of a broad regime of security arrangements 

to improve global stability.13 A second concedes that although arms control isn’t the 

centerpiece of US foreign policy like it was during the Cold War, its “decline in visibility

should not be confused with a decline in importance.”14 And finally, a third stated, “The 

20
mere act of negotiating arms-control also may lead to better communication, deepened 

understanding, and reduce hostility among adversaries.”15 

During the Cold War, the preeminent objective of arms control was to reduce the 

risk or war. This was primarily achieved through the use of the INF, START I/II, and the 

ABM treaties that served to address the clearly defined threat presented by nuclear 

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In the case of information warfare, the 

threat still isn’t clearly defined. Therefore, there is a greater need for dialogue to

understand how other states perceive information warfare especially since the technology 

and vulnerabilities are rapidly changing. It would be unfortunate to inadvertently escalate 

an international crisis by executing information warfare actions that is deemed 

threatening to the sovereignty or survival of another state. As a case in point, it is

reported that many senior Russian military officers view cyberwarfare as a trigger for 

nuclear war in that: 

From a military point of view, the use of Information Warfare against 

Russia or its armed forces will categorically not be considered a nonmilitary phase of a conflict whether there were casualties or not . . . 

considering the possible catastrophic use of strategic information warfare 

means by an enemy, whether on economic or state command and control 

systems, or on the combat potential of the armed forces . . . Russia retains

the right to use nuclear weapons first against the means and forces of 

information warfare, and then against the aggressor state itself

[Emphasis Added].16 

Only by engaging in discussions to establish a clear understanding can we begin to 

advance towards a commonality of understanding of this still yet to be clearly defined 

concept of information warfare. In fulfilling this role, arms control can serve as a legal 

agreement that binds the signatories to continue or discontinue specific activities or 

standards of practice. However, information warfare presents unique challenges to the

21
existing international legal system; which must be fully understood and resolved before 

forging an arms control regime. 

Notes 

1

 Michael Sheehan, Arms Control: Theory and Practice (New York: Basil Blackwell 

Inc., 1988), 22. 

2

 Allan S. Krass, The United States and Arms Control: The Challenge of Leadership

(Westport, Conn.: Prager Publishers, 1997), 2. 

3

 Jeffrey Larsen, in Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment

(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 6. 

4

 Larsen, 8. and Sheehan, 6. 

5

 Krass, 5-7. 

6

 Larsen, 1. 

7

 This is an assessment that is based on the characteristics of information warfare.

The two items are assessed as “low” due to the dual-use nature of information warfare

and the realization that most of the advancements in IT are made in the private sector and 

not the military. Therefore, attempts to disarm or prevent proliferation might be difficult 

since there are legitimate requirements for the technology in the private sector. 

8

 See Larsen; Terry L. Deibel “The Death of a Treaty,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5

(2002) 141-161; Daryl G. Kimball, “Trust but Don’t Verify,” Arms Control Today, 

September 2004, n.p. On-line, Internet, 7 Feb 2005, available from http://www.arms

control.org/act/2004_09/Focus.asp; and Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Chemical Weapons 

Convention: Has It Enhanced U.S. Security." Arms Control Today, April 2001, n.p. online. Internet, 7 Feb 2005, available from http:// www.armscontrol.org/act/2001 _04/ tuck 

er.asp. 

9

 Center for Arms Control And Non-Proliferation, “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

Fact Sheet.” September 2002, on-line. Internet. 10 November 2004, available from

http://www.clw.org/control/ctbt.pdf. 

10 Deibel, 141-161. 

11 Larsen, 1. 

12John A. Nagl, “Arms Control in the year 2025,” in Arms Control: Cooperative 

Security in a Changing Environment, ed. Jeffrey Larsen (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 2002), 335. 

13 Andrew H. Cordesman, “Concepts of Arms Control – IV: Shaping the Future,” 

May 2000, on-line. Internet, 17 September 2004, available from http://www.csis.org/strat 

assessment/reports/armescontrol4.pdf. 

14 Krass, 3. 

15 Larsen, 3. 

16 Steven A. Hildreth, Cyberwarfare, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 

Service, 2001), CRS-11. 

22
Chapter 3

International Law and the Laws of War 

If the international laws of war are to persist as meaningful constraints, 

they must be adapted when confronted with changes in technology or

other external forces that would render them inefficient.1

 

The laws of war are comprised of two types of laws, conventional law and customary 

law. Conventional laws are made by treaties or other explicit agreement among nations, 

under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, or "agreements are to be observed,” and 

customary laws are derived from case-by-case development in the same manner as 

American common law.2

 One of the touted successes of international law is its ability to 

address the many technical changes in warfare that have occurred over the centuries.

Most often, applying existing laws or creating new ones to address the new weaponry

helped to manage these changes. Unfortunately, the changes presented by information 

warfare challenges both approaches and other significant aspects of the international legal 

system. This chapter will discuss three of the most significant challenges because how 

they are resolved will present risks, and greatly influence the realization of an 

information warfare arms control regime. 

23
Intangible Damage 

The introduction of Allied strategic bombing illustrates how existing laws can be

interpreted to address a new technology. When the Allies first conducted strategic 

bombing against German and Japanese cities in World War II, the laws of war did not

prevent the use of the airplane in this manner. On the contrary, due to the similarity in

their effects, the existing laws of war for naval bombardment were used to justify 

strategic bombing. Specifically, the existing rules governing naval bombardment 

“permitted the legal bombardment of workshops or plants useful to the enemy war effort, 

allowed the bombardment of defended locations, and even permitted the bombardment of 

undefended locations if the local authorities did not agree to remove all facilities of 

military usefulness.”3

 Therefore, under this ruling the laws of war for naval 

bombardment were applicable to strategic bombing because the effects of both actions

were deemed to be the same; unguided munitions raining down to destroy the enemy’s 

war production facilities. One of the challenges presented by information warfare is this 

lack of similarity with other weapons that are currently addressed by arms control 

agreements. Specifically, since many of the intangible effects from information warfare 

do not have a commonality with weapons that operate outside of cyberspace, existing

laws of war may prove difficult to adapt to address information warfare. 

Challenge to Sovereignty 

From the U.S. perspective, information is a domain.4 This is echoed in Joint Vision 

2020 which states, “The label full spectrum dominance implies that US forces are able to

conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces 

tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains – 

24
space, sea, land, air, and information [emphasis added]”5

 One of the more threatening 

characteristics of information warfare in this domain is its ability to propogate across 

international networks, or through the atmosphere, as electronic signals to achieve the 

desired effects; all while invisible to the naked eye. Moreover, these signals can

inadvertently affect other states that are geographically seperated from the intended 

target. This capability undermines the concept of national territorial sovereignty, which 

holds that each nation has exclusive authority over events within its borders and is a

fundamental principle of international law since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.6

 The 

challenge is how to apply the concept of sovereignty in the information realm.

Fortunately, the international legal system has experience with this type of challenge 

because it isn’t the first time that technology has questioned the ordering principle of the 

international environment. 

Until the advent of satellites, a state’s sovereignty extended to the airspace over

its borders. However, when the question of sovereignty was raised in respect to space 

travel, the international community did not extend the traditional understanding of 

sovereignty despite the request of several nations.7

 The 1963 U.N. resolution on this 

issue stated, “Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by 

claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”8

 This

statement was also incorporated as Article II in the Treaty On Principles Governing The 

Activities Of States In The Exploration And Use Of Outer Space, Including The Moon 

And Other Celestial Bodies, commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty. The 

substance of this arms control provision is contained in Article IV, which prohibited 

signatories from placing “in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other 

25
celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass 

destruction.”9

 In addition, it also limited “the use of the moon and other celestial bodies

exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing 

military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting

military maneuvers.”10 

Without a doubt, the ruling on space sovereignty significantly influenced the 

Outer Space Treaty and paved the way for the inclusion of these prohibited activities. 

Similarly, a ruling on sovereignty in the information realm will significantly influence the

type of activities that are prohibited under an information warfare arms control regime;

therefore, this issue must be resolved beforehand. 

Ambiguous Definition in Existing International Law 

One of the key legal documents that govern the use of force in the international

system is the U.N. Charter. However, its ability to address information warfare is limited 

due to a lack of specificity of key terminology that forms the basis for the legitimate use 

of force by an individual nation state, or the international community at large. The

problem largely stems from the ability of information warfare to achieve its intended 

effects without the “traditional” use of force. One of the most egregious examples is

contained in Article 51, which recognizes a state’s right to use force in self-defense 

against an “armed attack”; and where “armed attack” is not defined.11 Other key 

omissions include “aggression”, “force”, and “intervention”. Without a clear 

understanding of how these basic elements of international law applies to information 

warfare, any attempt to establish an arms control regime will be fruitless and frustrating. 

26
Prospects for a Regime 

Despite these legal issues, the outlook is not all grim for developing an 

information warfare arms control regime. This discussion indicates that there are several 

hurdles that must be conquered before proceeding with developing a regime. In response 

to Russia’s request in 1998, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/53/70, 

which “invited members to exchange views on information security issues and ways to 

fight information terrorism and crime.”12 In 1999 the US concluded that it was premature 

to undergo negotiations for an international agreement on information warfare.13 Based

on the unsettled legal challenges discussed in this chapter, this assessment may still be 

true today. Nevertheless, in light of the actions taken by President Bush and the response 

by the U.S. Congress, a current review of the risks and costs of an information warfare 

arms control regime is a prudent course of action. 

Notes 

1

 Gary M. Anderson and Adam Gifford, “Order out of Anarchy: The International 

Law of War,” 8 August 2004, n.p. on-line. Internet, 24 February 2005, available from 

http://www.cato.org/cgi-bin/scripts/printtech.cgi/dailys/08-08-04-2.html. 2

 Lawrence T. Greenberg, Seymour E. Goodman, and Kevin J. Soo Hoo,

"Information Warfare and International Law." n.p. on-line. Internet, available from http:// 

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/iwil/iwilindex.htm. 3

 Anderson. 

4

 A domain is a unique dimension in which to conduct military operations. Land, sea,

air, and space are the pre-existing dimensions and information warfare is often referred to 

as the fifth dimension. See Maj Gen John P. Casciano, address, “Air Force Association 

National Symposia, Los Angeles, Ca., 18 October 1996, n.p. on-line. Internet, 11 March 

2005, available from http://www.aef.org/pub/la9.asp. 

5

 Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

2000), 6. 

6

 Greenberg et al. 

7

 Ibid. 

27
Notes 

8

 UN General Assembly Declaration 1962, “Legal Principles Governing the 

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” 13 December 1963. 

9

 “Treaty On Principles Governing The Activities Of States In The Exploration And 

Use Of Outer Space, Including The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies.” Arms Control 

Today, 10 October 1967, n.p. on-line. Internet, 25 January 2005, available from

http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/outerspace.asp. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Greenberg et al. 

12 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/70, “Developments in the Field of

Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” 4 

December 1998. 

13 Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in 

Information Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of General Counsel, 1999), 48. 

28
Chapter 4

Costs for Information Warfare Arms Control 

One of the factors that contributed to the high-water mark of arms control was the 

“quantitative and qualitative leap forward in verification,” and the keynote 

accomplishment was the Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC) that was signed in 1993.1

The CWC “broke the arms control mold” by establishing intrusive multilateral 

verification provisions that had an aggressive international inspectorate and required 

cooperation among governments and private industry.2

 President Reagan started this new 

standard of verification by insisting that verification must be “effective” and not just 

“adequate,” which was the standard during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.3

However, the “effective” standard was soon replaced by the new standard of “costeffectiveness,” which was not surprising in light of the ongoing debate regarding the 

viability of arms control agreements in the post-Cold War, as previously discussed in 

chapter 2. What is surprising is the speed in which the concern over cost became a major 

factor in arms control negotiations. 

Although the 1993 CWC did not have any language to address the cost issue, by 

1994 “financial implications” was one of the explicit criteria for evaluating the Biological 

Weapons Convention (BWC) verification measures.

4

 Further evidence of the concern 

29
over cost and budgetary constraints in the arms control arena is seen in the 1995 Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency’s Inspector General Report that stated: 

The United States will not be able to meet the funding obligations implicit 

in all arms control agreements currently contemplated.... Budgetary 

constraints, including the political momentum to achieve a balanced 

budget early in the next century, require persuasive evidence that 

expenditures to implement current and proposed international 

understandings serve priority U.S. interests.5

 

The effects of current budgetary pressures is seen in the level of funding for 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which was lauded as “the 

Marshall Plan of nuclear nonproliferation,” by the National Defense University’s (NDU)

Center for Technology and National Security Policy.6

 The significance of this program is 

that it allows the U.S. Department of Defense to assist the former Soviet Union with "safe

and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and other 

weapons in order to prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of the wrong 

parties."7

 Although the President expressed a strong level of support for these programs

during a 2004 address on nonproliferation, the 2005 funding request for the Defense 

Department and the Energy Department portions of the program were reduced by 9 

percent and 1 percent respectively compared to the FY 2004 appropriated funding levels.8

 

Therefore, given the existing level of fiscal support for long recognized and already 

agreed on threats to our national security and the focus on cost of verification provisions 

over the last decade, an information warfare arms control regime must be fiscal 

responsible in order to successfully compete for funding from an already stressed arms

control budget. This chapter will explore the types of cost that would be expected to 

support an information warfare arms control regime. 

30
Generic Costs 

The evolution of costs for a generic arms control agreement is depicted in figure 2 

and is based on data for nuclear and conventional treaties, represented by the solid line.

9

A slight modification was made to better represent the projected cost for the CWC since 

it is expected to maintain a high implementation cost well beyond the point where the 

cost for the nuclear and conventional treaties traditionally start to decline.10 

Figure 2 Generic Costs Curve11

One of the significant factors influencing this shift, and the resultant high cost, is the 

dual-use characteristic of chemical weapons technology that required very intrusive 

verification provisions to ensure compliance. The cost for this aggressive intrusive 

verification provision is substantial and is the primary reason that the BWC does not have 

any verification provisions. As one expert stated: 

31
Weight-for weight, BTW [biological and toxin weapon] agents are 

hundreds of times more potent than the most lethal chemical warfare 

agents, making them true weapons of mass destruction with a potential for 

mayhem that can exceed that of nuclear weapons. This makes their 

elimination by an international treaty with effective verification highly 

desirable. But “effective verification” of such a treaty is at best 

problematic and at worst an oxymoron. Because of the small scale of the 

facilities required and the widespread availability of necessary materials

and technology, the monitoring and inspection effort required would be 

enormous, intrusive, and expensive. In addition...even if activities

involving BW agents were discovered, there would usually be no way to 

tell if they were offensive (prohibited) or defensive (permitted).12

Since information warfare share many of these same factors that mandated the

CWC’s expensive verification provisions, such as dual-use technology and small scale 

production facilities, the cost curve for an information warfare arms control regime

should approximate the CWC costs curve. Nevertheless, even with the best available data 

from previous agreements, accurate costs data for a new arms control agreement are still 

difficult to project. This point is emphasized by the CWC where over the past decade the 

projected cost to destroy weapons prohibited by the convention have increased almost 

200 percent, see table 3. 

Table 3 Cost Estimates for Weapons Destruction under the CWC 

Year of Projection Agency Projected Completion Cost ($B) Projected Year of 

Completion

1994 DOD 8.6 2007

1998 DOD 14.6 2007

2000 GAO 14.9 2007

2001 DOD 23.7 2012 

2004 GAO > 25 2012 

Source: General Accounting Office, “Arms control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements

and the chemical Weapons Convention,” (Washington, D.C.: 15 March 1994), n.p., 

on-line, Internet, 17 November 2004, available from 222.fas.org/spp/starwars/gao/ 

nsi94136.htm, 10-14 and Michael Mguyen, “GAO: U.S. May Miss Chemical 

Destruction Deadline,” Arms Control Today, May 2004, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 Feb

2005, available from http://www.armsco ntrol.org/act/2004_05/GAO.asp. 

32
Types of Costs 

Although figure 2 depicts five phases in the evolution of a generic arms control 

agreement, for this paper these phases will be addressed by three types of cost that 

includes: pre-signature costs (pre-negotiation and negotiation phases); ratification costs,

and post entry into force (EIF) costs (implementation and long-term compliance phases). 

Pre-Signature Costs 

One of the key aspects of any arms control regime is a precise definition of what 

material or activity is prohibited under the agreement in question. In the case of the 

CWC, key terms such as chemical weapons”, “toxic chemicals and “precursor” are 

defined.13 For the Ottawa Landmine Treaty terms such as “antipersonnel mine,” “mine,” 

and “anti shaking” are clearly defined.14 And finally for the Missile Test Control Regime

(MTCR) terminology such as “development,” “production,” as well as the parameters of 

systems that are restricted for transfer, for example “...unmanned air vehicle systems

(including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of 

delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 as well as the specially 

designed “production facilities for these systems” are specified.15 This requirement for

specificity is critical because it helps to ensure signatories meet both the intent and the 

spirit of the agreement, thereby making breakout more difficult. Moreover, it helps to 

ensure only the necessary activities and facilities are included in a verification provision 

and the BWC illustrates this point. 

In contrast to the CWC, MTCR, and Ottawa Landmine Treaty, the BWC does not 

define its key terminology. As a result, the lack of clearly defined terminology in the 

BWC, such as “microbial,” “other biological agents,” or “toxins” would result in the 

33
inspection of facilities such as breweries, yogurt manufactures, and agricultural ethanol 

plants if a verification provision was adopted.16 Since there would be more facilities to 

inspect, this could significant increase the cost, decrease the probability to detect 

cheating, and eventually undermine the verification provision. Similarly, as already 

discussed in chapter 3, key definitions that are required for an information warfare arms 

control regime are lacking and must be resolved during the pre-signature phase to avoid 

the aforementioned consequences that may result from ambiguity. This might not be an 

easy undertaking given that over the past decade, neither security scholars nor state actors 

have been able to propagate a common understanding of information warfare. Therefore, 

an inordinate amount of time might be required to arrive at a specific concept of 

information warfare for an arms control regime, which will be costly. 

Another key cost in the pre-signature phase is due to research and development 

(R&D) of verification technologies that will help to ensure compliance with the regime in 

question. In the case of an information warfare arms control regime, the initial cost 

should be less than nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) agreements due to investments 

in this technology by the private sector. While NBC weapons were primarily developed 

for military use, many of the current information warfare tools were developed in the

private sector for peaceful purposes, which were subsequently modified to conduct 

malicious activities. Therefore, given the significance of information technology (IT) in 

fueling our economy and social behavior, private companies have invested in defensive 

technologies to counter these destructive or disruptive capabilities. 

If verifications provisions are required in an information warfare arms control 

regime, some of these defensive capabilities can be readily applied to verify compliance. 

34
Nevertheless, the cost can be significant due to the sheer abundance of network 

configurations and operating systems that must be addressed. Additionally, 

implementation may also require the destruction of existing arsenals, such as in the CWC 

and BWC, and R&D is often conducted to determine how to accomplish this in a safe and 

cost-effective manner. In regard to information warfare, this cost should be minimal due 

to the non-physical nature of most information warfare weapons. 

One final cost to consider in this phase is derived from an equivalent to the 

environmental impact statement that is an integral part of previous NBC agreements.

Although an environmental impact study may not be required, a comparable study or

analysis might be required for the National Information Infrastructure (NII) or the Global 

Information Infrastructure (GII) if intrusive verification provisions or constant 

monitoring of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) is adopted. This might be a 

requirement because, “The DII is embedded within and deeply integrated into the NII. 

Their seamless relationship makes seamless relationship makes distinguishing between 

them difficult, see figure 3.17 

Figure 3 GII, NII and DII Relationship18

35
Ratification Costs 

Once an agreement is signed, it may still be some time before it is ratified and enter

into force, see table 4, which can significantly increase the cost of ratification for an 

information warfare arms control regime. Moreover, the potential for significant costs

increase will be greater the longer it takes for entry into force due to the rapid changes in 

the technology that has fueled the proliferation of information warfare weapons, the 

microchip. 

Table 4 Entry into Force 

Treaty Signed Entered into Force 

Outer Space Jan 1967 Oct 1967 

BWC Apr 1972 Mar 1975 

Conventional Forces Europe 1990 1992 

Open Skies Mar 1992 Jan 2002 

CWC Jan 1993 Apr 1997 

Source: “Treaties,” Arms Control Today, n.p. on-line, Internet, 15 January 2005, 

available from http://www.armscontrol.org/treaties/. 

During the late 1990’s, microchip technology changed rapidly; where processor 

power and chip density doubled every 24 months, memory size tripled every 18 months, 

and the resulting cost for this new technology was halved every 18 months.19 However, 

within the past few years this has changed in that processor power and chip density now 

doubles every six months, memory size triples every 6 months, and cost is now halved 

every 12 months.20 This trend is further evidenced by the changes in U.S. export controls 

for high performance computers (HPC). 

In July 1999, the Clinton Administration announced that the policy for the export 

of high performance computers (HPC) will be reviewed and updated every six months in 

order to reflect rapid advancements in computer hardware.21 Moreover, in October 2000, 

36
the upper limit for export HPC composite theoretical performance (CTP), measured in 

millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS), was changed for Computer Tier 

3 countries, such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Vietnam, from 20,000 to 28,000 MTOPS. 

This was subsequently changed to 85,000 MTOPS in March 2001 and later to 190,000 

MTOPS in December 2001.22 The overall impact is that these faster and more powerful 

microprocessors can create new vulnerabilities or can lead to new information warfare 

capabilities or weapons. 

Previous treaties have addressed this issue by including statements that prohibit all 

aspects of technological advancements. The ABM Treaty adopted this approach and 

stated, 

Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its 

unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit 

development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or spacebased ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based 

ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems 

"based on other physical principles" than those employed in current 

systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in 

accordance with the Treaty’s provisions for consultation and 

amendment.23 

This approach may not work for an information warfare arms control regime for two 

reasons. First, since many of these new capabilities are developed in the private sector for 

peaceful purposes are then modified by those who want to inflict harm, it may be difficult 

for an arms control agreement to inhibit these malicious activities. Second, given the 

rapid change in technology and with it new capabilities, there is a potential that the new 

capabilities may exceed the scope of the signed agreement since “no one can ban what is 

not yet discovered... It is impossible to put the unknown into chains.”24 In most cases

treaties and conventions automatically enter into force only after they are ratified by a

37
predetermined number of signatories. If technology creates new security concerns that are 

outside the scope of the signed, but not yet ratified, arms control regime, signatories 

might be hesitant to ratify it and may call for more negotiations to address the impact of 

these changes, resulting in higher cost for the regime. 

Post-EIF Costs 

The cost for the implementation and compliance of an information warfare arms

control regime can vary significantly and will depend on the verification provisions. The 

significant difference in costs between the CWC and the BWC illustrates this point. If 

verification provisions similar to the CWC are selected, this might entail the inspection of 

small IT firms and could be just as overwhelming as the inspection of breweries, yogurt 

manufactures, and agricultural ethanol plants would be for the BWC.25 However, a 

significant portion of these costs are hard to quantify; therefore, they will be discussed in 

the next chapter as risks. Other costs in this phase include administrative costs, industry

costs, and hidden or overhead costs. Although they are presented as post-EIF costs, in 

reality they occur throughout the evolution of an arms control regime. Nevertheless, they 

are presented in this section since this is where they are most costly. 

Administrative Costs 

One of the often overlooked costs for an arms control regime is the cost for the 

agency that is created to implement the verification provision, such as the Organization

for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), for the CWC, and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for treaties that address nuclear weapons. Although not 

all regimes require such an agency, if one is needed, its cost must be considered since it is 

38
funded by the parties to the agreement. In most cases, it is underfunded. A case in point is 

the IAEA, which only received in 2003 its first significant funding increase since 1988, 

despite the dramatic increase in the number of facilities and materials that require

safeguarding. Upon receiving this funding, the Director General, Mohamed El Baradei,

said most of the increase will to go toward the IAEA’s verification program because it 

“has been experiencing the greatest demand for additional resources and has for years 

been the most chronically underfunded.” 26 

The level of funding for these organizations is roughly based on the same

proportion of the state’s contribution to the United Nation’s operations, which for the 

United States would be approximately 25 percent. However, the actual cost could be 

significantly higher based on non payment by other parties to the regime. The OPCW 

faced this situation before the CWC entry into force in 1997, and it has continued through 

2001. In this time period a significant number of member states did not pay their assessed 

contributions to the budget.27 A significant portion of the projected and approved inspections could not be carried out; this was as high as 60 percent in 2001.28 And 20 percent 

of the CWC state parties lost their right to vote in the OPCW due to non payment.29 

In response to this financial crisis the OPCW Director-General, José Bustani, warned 

that continued underfunding would result in a reduction in verification activities at 

weapon destruction facilities in the United States, India, and South Korea, and a 

reduction of over 80 percent of industry inspections, as compared to the previous year.30 

In 2004 the IAEA faced another financial crisis when the U.S. and Europe threatened to

cut their funding if the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) maintained its stance to respect 

39
Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology in accordance with the 1970 Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.31

Regardless of the cause, the lack of funding can undermine the verification 

provision and the other states must often make contributions well beyond their fair share 

to maintain the sanctity of the arms control regime. Given the funding experiences of the

OPCW and the IAEA, a similar agency for an information warfare arms control regime

may not fair much better. 

Industry Costs 

As previously noted, the CWC was the keynote agreement that was signed during 

the high-water mark of arms control. The significant feature was the intrusive verification

provisions that included the inspection of private companies in the chemical industry. 

Although only a portion of the inspection cost are borne by the industry, if these cost 

become excessive, industry and special interest groups may lobby government officials 

for relief or ask for rejection of the treaty. The Department of Commerce direct costs 

associated with these inspections was estimated at $1M annualized and consisted of the 

cost for personnel to process the data and fulfill the reporting requirements stipulated in 

the CWC.32 As of May 2004 the, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security (BIS) reported the costs for Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 inspections 

under the CWC averaged $41,000 and the cost for schedule 3 and "unscheduled discrete 

organic chemicals" (UDOC) inspections averaged $24,000.33 Similar cost for an

information warfare arms control regime could cripple an already stressed U.S. IT 

industry that is facing stiff competition from offshore competitors such as China, Taiwan, 

and South Korea. 

40
Hidden or Overhead Costs 

Although these costs are not truly hidden, in most cases they are hard to obtain, 

estimate, or categorize. Nevertheless, they represent additional cost that must be

considered to get a true estimation of how “cost-effective” an information warfare arms

control regime is. This would include the salaries of military personnel serving with the 

On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), FBI counterintelligence activities, temporary duty 

personnel from other agencies that accompany on-site inspections, personnel costs for the 

interagency committees and consultative bodies that analyze compliance and engage in 

negotiations.34 One author summarized the significance of these cost by stating:

The lack of detailed accounting for many of these costs is not surprising;

they are often difficult to apportion accurately to different agreements, and 

in some cases it would not be worth the extra effort and cost to keep track

of them. Such hidden costs are an unavoidable aspect of the 

implementation of any arms control agreement. They constitute a kind of 

“overhead” that will typically add a few percent to estimates of explicit 

costs.35

Summary 

The intent of this chapter was not to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of an 

information warfare arms control regime. The purpose was to clearly what type of cost 

should be expected in the process of forging such a regime. Although cost-effectiveness 

is an important criterion it is not always the final arbiter in deciding issues of national 

security. The lesson from these pages for those involved in negotiating an information 

warfare arms control is an awareness of the cost that are involved in the evolution of such 

a regime. 

41
Notes 

1

 Allan S. Krass, The United States and Arms Control: The Challenge of Leadership

(Westport, Conn.: Prager Publishers, 1997), 29. 

2

 Marie I. Chevrier, “Chemical and Biological Weapons.” In Arms Control: 

Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment, ed. Jeffrey Larsen. (Boulder, Colo.: 

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 143. 

3

 Krass, 101. 

4

 Ibid. 102. 

5

 Ibid. 102. 

6

 Goodby, James, et al., “Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era,” Center for

Technology and National Security Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

University, September 2004), 1. 

7

 John Spratt, “The Bush Administration's Nuclear Weapons Plans: A Critical 

Assessment,” Arms Control Today, May 2004, n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 February 2005, 

available from http://www.armscontrol.org/events/May_2004Press Conference.asp. 

8

 Miles A. Pomper, "Bush Stresses Importance of Nunn-Lugar Programs but Cuts 

Funds in 2005 Budget Request," Arms Control Today, March 2004, n.p., on-line. 

Internet, 7 February 2005, available from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_03/ 

NunnLugarFunding.asp. 

9

 Krass, 105. 

10 Ibid, 105. 

11 Adapted and updated from Krass, 105. 

12 Ibid, 60. 

13 Department of State Chemical Weapons Convention –Article II: Definitions and 

Criteria (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Industry and Security), n.p., on-line. Internet, 17 

January 2005, available from http://www.cwc.gov/treaty/articles/art-02_html. 14 “The Ottawa Landmine Treaty,” Arms Control Today, September 1997, n.p., online. Internet, 25 January 2005, available from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/

1997_09/apltreat.asp. 

15 “Missile Technology Control Regime,” Arms Control Today, 7 January 1993, n.p., 

on-line. Internet, 25 January 2005, available from http://www.armscontrol.org/document 

s/mtcr.asp. 

16 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 

of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.” Arms 

Control Today, 26 March 1975, n.p., on-line. Internet, 25 January 2005, available from 

http://www.armscontrol.org/treaties/bwc.asp. and Krass, 60. 

17 Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, JP3-13,

(Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1998), available 

from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf, I-14. 

18 Ibid. 

19 Capt Jason Brooks, “Information Operations,” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: College of

Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Visual Education, 2004), Slides, 7. 

20 Ibid. 

42
Notes 

21 Department of Commerce, Archive of HPC News Item, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau 

of Industry and Security, 19 January 2001), n.p., on-line. Internet, 12 February 2005, 

available from http://www.bis.doc.gov/hpcs/ArchivedNewsItems.html. 22 Department of Commerce, Archive of HPC News Item, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau 

of Industry and Security, 2 January 2002), n.p., on-line. Internet, 12 February 2005, 

available from http://www.bis.doc.gov/hpcs/ArchivedNewsItems.html. and Department

of Commerce, High Performance Computer Export Controls, (Washington, D.C.:

Bureau of Industry and Security, 10 December 2003), n.p., on-line. Internet, 12 February

2005, available from http://www.bis.doc.gov/hpcs/ default.htm. 23 Department of State, “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.” 

(Washington, D.C.: October 1972) n.p., on-line., Internet, 26 January 2005, available 

from http:// www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html. 24 Michael Sheehan, Arms Control: Theory and Practice (New York: Basil 

Blackwell Inc., 1988), 60. 

25 Krass. 60. 

26 Staff Reporting, “International Response: IAEA Board Approves Budget 

Increase.” Global Security Newswire, 21 July 2003. n.p., on-line. Internet, available from 

http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/7/21/7s.html. 27 Chevrier, 150. 

28 Ibid. 

29 Ibid. 

30 Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Chemical Weapons Convention: Has It Enhanced U.S. 

Security." Arms Control Today, April 2001, n.p. on-line. Internet, 7 Feb 2005, available 

from http:// www.armscontrol.org/act/2001 _04/ tuck er.asp. 

31 “Western States Threaten to Cut IAEA Funding over Iran Row.” 18 September

2004, n.p., on-line, Internet, 27 February 2005, available from http://www.globalsecurity. 

org/wmd/library/news/iran/2004/iran-040918-irna04.htm. 32 Department of Commerce, Assessments of the Costs and Benefits of BXA 

Regulation: Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and Declarations Forms, 

(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Industry and Security, 29 November 1999), n.p., on-line. 

Internet, 12 February 2005, available from http://www.cwc.gov/ Regulations/cba/ 

cost_benefit_analysis_html. 33 Department of State, Industry Issues, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Arms

Control, 18 May 2004), n.p., on-line. Internet, 12 February 2005, available from http:// 

www.cwc.gov/Industry_Outreach/Publications/004/cwc_intro_to_imp/industry _issues. 

See Jack L. Brock, Arms Control - Experience of U.S. Industry with Chemical Weapons

Convention Inspections. (Washington D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 

2000).; Schedule 1 chemicals are toxic chemicals that have little or no commercial use 

and were primarily developed for military use. Schedule 2 chemicals can be used to 

produce chemical weapons, but have commercial uses and are not produced in large 

quantities. Schedule 3 chemicals can be used to make chemical weapons, but also have 

significant commercial uses. 

34 Krass. 109. 

43
Notes 

35 Ibid. 

44
Chapter 5

Risks for Information Warfare Arms Control 

In addition to the fiscal cost explored in chapter 4, arms control agreements incur 

costs that cannot be expressed in budgetary terms. As one author stated, “No purely 

quantitative cost-benefit analysis of arms control is possible because benefits and risk are 

qualitative and depends on subjective values and assumptions.”1

 This chapter will look at 

these non-quantifiable costs and risk that can be expected from an information warfare 

arms control regime. 

International Legal System 

Although information warfare is securitized and often referred to as an “electronic 

Pearl Harbor” threat, this characterization is not based on empirical data from an 

information warfare exchange in the context of interstate warfare.

2

 On the contrary, most 

of the data was derived from simulations and wargames, such as Eligible Receiver.3

 This 

lack of empirical data is a challenge for the international legal system because as Oliver 

Wendel Holmes, a former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, stated, “The life of 

the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”4

 Within U.S. domestic law, this 

means that the courts seldom foresee a problem then legislate laws and put a legislative

solution in place before the problem actually occurs. Instead, legislators create laws after 

the problem develops. 

45
This also holds true for international law in that the international community does 

not normally negotiate treaties to deal with a problem until the results of that problem 

manifest themselves.5

 Therefore, until an interstate information warfare event occurs, that 

is clearly evident to the international community at large, there is a risk in relying on the

international legal system to provide a timely “stamp of approval” to respond to an 

information warfare attack. Based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a state can take

action to respond in self-defense to a perceived threat or attack. However, a response 

might be limited to unilateral actions since other states may want to wait for a U.N. 

resolution, or other international sanctioned response, before supporting efforts that might

be deemed illegal or classified as war crimes. 

In obtaining a resolution, the threatened party may have to show an attack is 

imminent or the adversary is demonstrating hostile intent. With large conventional forces, 

high resolution imagery can be used to convince the U.N. Security Council and the

General Assembly that a threat does exist. This approach was used by the U.S. in 1990 to 

show Saudi Arabia the presence of Iraqi forces along the Saudi Arabian border, which 

resulted in access to Saudi Arabian bases and airspace for the impending military conflict 

with Sadaam Hussein. Since the direct effects from many information warfare weapons 

are short-lived and may not leave behind any physical evidence to serve as the “smoking 

gun,” it might be difficult to garner international support for a response to an attack. 

Moreover, given the level of skepticism, from the international community, over the 

photo imagery evidence presented by the U.S. to justify offensive actions against Iraq 

2003, it is doubtful that a picture of a network diagram or high energy radio frequency 

(HERF) detonation will galvanize support for a resolution. Even if cyber forensics can 

46
provide the smoking gun, this presents an additional risk in that it may reveal sensitive 

information and provide insight into one’s capabilities, which will be discussed later in

this chapter.

The international legal system also presents another risk in that it may expose 

citizens to crimes that are not illegal in their own state. This type of risk is highlighted in 

the wording of the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime treaty which banned “hate speech” 

from the internet. While this type of prohibition is common in European nations, it 

violates the First Amendment of the U.S Constitution, the right to free speech.6

 

Sovereignty in the Information Realm 

As discussed in chapter 3, a ruling on sovereignty in the information realm must be

decided before forging an information warfare arms control regime. However, if the

Westphalian concept of sovereignty is upheld, U.S. public diplomacy programs, a polite 

term for what many would regard as propaganda, that fall under the purview of the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) will be put at risk.7

 

The BBG was formed under the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 

and is an independent autonomous entity that is responsible for all U.S. government and 

government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting.

8

 Additionally, the BBG 

supervises the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) which provides the 

administrative and engineering support for these broadcast operations that includes Radio 

Free Asia (RFA); Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Sawa, and Radio 

and TV Martí. 

Radio Free Asia – RFA is the principal BBG sponsored broadcaster in Asia. It 

broadcasts news and information in nine languages to its Asian audience, where 

47
accurate and complete news might be otherwise unavailable.9

 In addition, it also

broadcasts works of literature and nonfiction that have been banned in its target 

countries that include China, Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North 

Korea.10 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) – The mission of RFE/RL is to 

promote democratic values and institutions by disseminating factual information 

and ideas to its audience that is located in Central, Southeastern and Eastern 

Europe; the Caucasus; and Central and Southwestern Asia.11 RFE/RL reportedly 

played a role in the downfall of communism.

12 

Radio Sawa – Radio Sawa seeks to provide timely mews, information, and 

entertainment to the youthful population of Arabic-speakers in the Middle East. It 

began broadcasting in 2002, and originates its broadcasts from various locations, 

to include Washington D.C.13

Radio and TV Marti – The Office of Cuba Broadcasting directs the operations 

of Radio and TV Marti. The purpose of the broadcast is to provide commentary 

and information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the free flow of 

ideas in Cuba and to foster democracy.

14

The information content of these broadcasts is viewed as a political threat by several 

of the target countries because in their estimation, it undermines their political system and 

their rule of law. As a result, some target countries are actively conducting jamming 

operations to prevent their populations from receiving these broadcasts. These countries 

include China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam.15 Therefore, if an information warfare 

arms control regime affirmed a state’s sovereignty in the information realm, these states 

48
can claim they have the exclusive right and absolute power to determine what type of

information is received by their citizens, thereby making a legitimate claim that these 

types of U.S. public diplomacy programs are a violation of international law. Although 

this might ordinarily be difficult to enforce, because radio waves don’t recognize 

territorial borders, if a state is overtly broadcasting information to deliberately challenge 

and undermine the lawful government of another state, the new ruling on sovereignty 

may help to cease these broadcasts. 

Verification and Compliance Risks 

The CWC is often viewed as a success in arms control because of the depth and 

breadth of its verification provisions, which include national declarations, routine on-site 

inspections, consultation and clarification mechanisms, challenge inspections, and close 

scrutiny of dual-use facilities in the private sector.16 While establishing these intrusive 

verification provisions, the drafters of the convention realized that they also presented 

risks to include loss of proprietary information, release of non-treaty-related trade secrets, 

industrial espionage, and a higher risk of proliferation.17 If similar verification provisions 

are adopted for an information warfare arms control regime, these risks may also be 

applicable to the IT industry along with the risk of undetected cheating and intelligence 

losses. This section will examine the risk to the CWC to provide an understanding of how 

they may be applicable to the IT industry. 

Undetected Cheating 

To help counter the risks to the chemical industry, the drafters of the CWC developed 

an annex to the CWC titled “Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information”. This

49
aspect of the verification provision was often referred to as “managed access” and its

overall purpose was to prevent inspectors from seeing or sampling anything that the 

inspected party did not deem relevant to the convention.18 However, in practice,

managed access has also served to undermine the sanctity of the verification provisions

and promotes undetected cheating. 

While the purpose of managed access was to strike a balance between a state’s 

genuine concern to protect proprietary or national security information and the OPCW

inspector’s ability to access plant sites and facility records to fulfill the inspection 

mandate, state-parties have overly emphasized the former concerns which have led to the 

ineffectiveness of the latter. In addition, 

CWC members have approved procedures giving host governments the 

right to confiscate and retain any piece of recording equipment that host 

officials claim has not been satisfactorily cleared of data unrelated to 

treaty compliance. Even more egregious, OPCW inspectors are currently

required to allow host officials to copy all of the information in their 

notebooks, laptop computers, electronic cameras, and video recorders 

before they depart from an inspected industry site.19

This practice may also provide the inspected countries with access to new tools and 

techniques that can detect cheating; thereby allowing them to exploit weaknesses to 

further mask any prohibited activity or capability. Overall these actions by state-parties

negate the provisions of the CWC that guarantees “the inviolability of inspection records 

so that the inspectors can perform their duties without undue interference from hostile 

government officials or plant managers.” 20 Even without these duplicitous practices, the 

verification provision presents other risks such as intelligence losses. 

50
Intelligence Losses 

In December 1995, US satellites obtained photographic images that clearly showed

that India was preparing to conduct a nuclear test at the Pokharan Test Site. The U.S 

ambassador to India, Frank Wisner Jr, showed the photographs to the appropriate Indian 

officials and succeeded in persuading India not to conduct the test.21 The photographs

revealed how the United States obtained the information and more importantly, what 

indicators it used to determine that a test was pending. The key indicator was the 

presence of cables and wires running into the shaft where the test was to be conducted.22

Consequently, when India conducted its first nuclear test on 11 May 1998, U.S. 

intelligence was caught off guard because the reliable indicator was not present as before. 

The revelation of U.S. methods and capabilities had provided India with all the required 

information to defeat the U.S. intelligence system. In preparing for the 1998 test, they 

simply buried the cables and wires that were previously exposed and served as the tipoff 

for the pending testing activity.23 An information warfare arms control regime might also

present similar intelligence losses since a suspected violator of the regime may want

proof that its activities were indeed discovered. 

This example also illustrates a dilemma in verification provisions, especially those 

that rely heavily on national technical means or advanced scientific methods to detect

violations. In exposing the violation they also risk revealing sensitive sources and 

methods, which may negate their usefulness in the future. However, there is also a risk of

proliferation of the prohibited activity or capability, if the knowledge of the prohibited

activity is not revealed in order to protect these sources and methods. 

51
Proliferation Risks 

Although an arms control regime might be established to help stem the proliferation 

of destabilizing information warfare capabilities. There is also a risk that the process of 

negotiating this regime might also result in proliferation due to the declarations that 

might be required in similar fashion to the declarations in the CWC. Article III of the 

CWC, Declarations, required each State Party to declare and specify, among other things, 

the location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons it owns or 

possesses; any chemical production facility it has or has had under its ownership or 

possession; and the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility

or establishment under its ownership or possession, to include laboratories and test and 

evaluation sites.24 The risk is that in fulfilling this declaration, the identity of advanced 

weapons and their associated facilities must be revealed, which otherwise might have 

remained undiscovered, Moreover, this revelation could motivate others to seek to obtain 

parity in this capability before the regime is ratified and enter into force. Proliferation is 

also a risk during inspections since inspectors could get to see the insides of advanced 

technology facilities and return to their home state with this knowledge.25

False Sense of Security

One of the purposes of verification provisions is to allow for the timely detection of 

prohibited activities to warn if breakout is about to occur, and intrusive verification 

provisions can help to further minimize this risk. However, despite the adaptation of 

intrusive verification provisions in an information warfare arms control regime, breakout 

can still occur due to two factors: the dual-use nature of information technology and its 

52
rapid changes. Consequently, an information warfare arms control regime may only 

provide a false sense of security. 

As discussed in chapter 4, the rapid changes in IT produces faster and more powerful 

microprocessors; which can create new vulnerabilities or lead to new information warfare 

capabilities that are beyond the scope of an established arms control regime. Even if

these technological advances are prohibited by a treaty or convention, in the same manner

the ABM Treaty addressed new technologies for missile defense, it is unlikely that an 

arms control regime can prohibit the development of similar advances to fight cybercrime

in the private sector. Once developed, these new technologies can be adopted for military 

use, which can then lead to a breakout, as witnessed in one of the earliest arms control 

agreements, the Washington Naval Treaty. 

The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty limited battleships (the major naval weapon of 

World War I), aircraft carriers (the future major naval weapon system), and the number 

and size of guns each could carry.26 At the time the treaty was signed, naval aviation

consisted of wooden aircrafts that were relegated for use as scout vehicles. Therefore, the 

treaty did not address the airplane, which in reality was the weapon that made aircraft 

carriers especially dangerous. Within the private sector, the all-metal airplane was 

developed for mail and passenger service. This technology was then adopted by the 

military to develop the torpedo and dive bombers, which subsequently allowed the 

aircraft carrier to vastly exceed the limits on offensive power imposed by the treaty.27

The rapid changes in IT and its dual-use nature can also produce similar results for an

information warfare arms control regime. 

53
Defensive Risk

The CWC is hailed as a landmark in arms control because it banned an entire class of

weapons. However, from a defensive point of view it is permissive since it did not

prohibit activities “directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection 

against chemical weapons.”28 In contrast, the ABM Treaty was restrictive for defense 

since it was all encompassing and purposefully set out to prohibited the deployment of 

antiballistic missiles (ABM), to include the testing and development of systems based on 

current technology, future technology, and the use of non-ABM systems in an ABM

role.29 These two examples illustrate the two extremes of how the defensive aspects of an

information warfare arms control regime can be addressed. However, either of these

approaches presents risk since they can undermine the viability of an agreement. 

The drafters of the ABM purposefully set out to prohibit the development of any 

defensive capabilities against nuclear missiles in order to deny any advantage that could 

be gained by conducting a first strike. The thinking was that if a potential aggressor was 

not able to defend against retaliation, it would be unlikely to initiate a nuclear exchange 

in the first place. This line of reasoning formed the basis of the mutual assured 

destruction (MAD) nuclear strategy. However, on 13 December 2001, President Bush

announced his intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty because he concluded that the 

“ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from 

future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.”30

The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is a stark reminder that although treaties 

and other arms control regimes can help solve the security dilemma; a state is unlikely to 

remain bounded by an arms control regime if it cannot evolve to address new threats. 

54
Therefore, an information warfare arms control regime must contain provisions that allow 

state-parties to develop new defensive capabilities to counter an evolving threat or risk 

abandonment. However, granting these defensive provisions can also undermine the 

viability of the regime since defensive information warfare weapons can be used

offensively and vice versa. 

In September 9 1998, a group of hackers, Electronic Disruption Theater, coordinated 

attempts to launch an attack against DOD’s primary public information Internet site, 

Defenselink.31 This was a denial of service attack that used a mini-application, called 

Floodnet, to direct participant’s computers to dial and redial the Defenselink site.32 The

purpose of the attack was to flood the Defenselink server with request to cause it to 

shutdown or go offline. However, the Pentagon had advanced warning of the impending 

attack and placed its own mini-application, named Hostile Applet on the Defenselink

site.33 Consequently, when the attack was launched and Hostile Applet detected the 

presence of Floodnet on a new connection to Defenselink, it directed the shutdown of the 

browser for the new connection; thereby preventing the redial and saturation of the 

server.34 Although some have called the Pentagon’s actions an “active defense” and 

questioned its legality, this example shows how a cyber weapon, the mini-application, 

can be use for offensive and defensive purposes simultaneously. Therefore, an 

information warfare arms control regime must strike a balance between a restrictive and 

permissive approach to defensive concerns since either can undermine the viability of the 

regime. In addition, the actions by the Pentagon highlight one of the advantages of 

information warfare that might be put at risk by an information warfare arms control 

regime. 

55
Increased Kinetic Targeting 

Based on the reported destabilizing aspects of information warfare, there is a

strong possibility that an information warfare arms control regime will restrict the 

employment of information warfare against certain classes of targets, such as critical 

infrastructure, restrict specific types of activities, such as psychological operations, or

restrict specific weapons, such as computer network attack. However, for either of these 

outcomes, there is a risk that future interstate conflicts might be more destructive due to a

reliance on traditional kinetic weapons that could otherwise be replaced by less lethal 

non-kinetic information warfare assets. 

Psychological Operations 

During the 2003 Gulf War, Iraqi soldiers experienced less attrition on the battlefield 

due to increased desertion rates by the enlisted and officer corps; where in some cases

units experienced desertion rates as high as 90 percent.35 Based on interviews with Iraqi 

military personnel, one of the significant factors that led to their desertion was the U.S. 

psychological warfare efforts that consisted primarily of radio broadcasts and leaflet

drops.36 In addition, the psychological warfare campaign included “sending thousands of 

e-mail messages to commanders, promising protection for those who comply with the 

order to not use weapons of mass destruction against allied forces.”

37 The coalition 

psychological warfare campaign, specifically leaflets, was also credited with saving the 

Iraqi oil fields from destruction. Although many of the oil wells were booby-trapped with 

explosives, the valves were switched off to minimize damage to the oil fields because as 

one Iraqi oil official explained, “We read your leaflets. We heard your broadcasts. We

understand that keeping the oil infrastructure was important for our future. And so while 

56
we complied for our own protection with the regime, we ensured that true damage to the 

oil fields would not occur.”38 As these examples show, information warfare, specifically

psychological operations, had a significant impact on the conduct and outcome of this 

interstate conflict. Without the use of information warfare there could have been a greater 

attrition of Iraqi forces and an ecological disaster if the oil officials carried out Sadaam

Hussain’s orders to destroy the oil fields. However, the salient point is that these

psychological operations efforts began well before the start of armed conflict and could 

be made illegal by an information warfare arms control regime. In fact, coalition aircraft

scattered the first of 43 million leaflets well before the shooting war started on 20 March.

The leaflet that the Iraqi oil official referred to, IZD-070, was first dropped on 10 March, 

(see figure 4). 

Figure 4 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Leaflet (IZD-070) 

Infrastructure 

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, coalition Tomahawk missiles dispensed 

ribbons of carbon fiber over Iraqi electrical power switching systems to shutdown the 

57
significant portions of the Iraqi power system.”39 In addition, an F-117 Stealth fighter 

directed precision-guided munitions through the air-conditioning shaft of the Iraqi 

telephone system in downtown Baghdad, taking out the entire underground coaxial cable 

system, which tied the Iraqi high command to their subordinates in the field.40 These

attacks on the power and telecommunications infrastructures played a critical role in

rendering a significant portion of the Iraqi integrated air defense system (IADS) both deaf 

and blind; thereby denying their ability to engage coalition air assets who were then able 

to achieve air superiority with relative ease and set the conditions for the ground war. 

However, besides achieving their military objectives, these attacks also affected a 

significant segment of the Iraqi population, who were without electrical power and 

telephone service through the end of the conflict. Similar kinetic attacks on the 

infrastructure also served as scapegoats for the dismal conditions in Iraq for many years 

after the end of Desert Storm in March 1991. In contrast to these destructive attacks, 

there is a report that the U.S. was able to achieve similar results on other aspects of the 

IADS through the use of less destructive information warfare weapons. 

According to news reports, several weeks before the start of the 1991 Gulf War, 

U.S. intelligence agents replaced a microchip in a printer that was destined for Iraq as

part of its air defense system. This new microchip contained a virus, which infected the 

air defense network once it was connected, and caused information on the computer 

screens to vanish; thereby rendering the network ineffective.

41 More importantly, the 

effects of the virus can be reversed by replacing the affected components in the network; 

which should take considerably less time than rebuilding a power and telecommunication 

system for the country. As this vignette illustrates, information warfare can help to

58
minimize collateral damage; therefore, if an information warfare arms control regime

categorically restricts certain targets, such as infrastructure, or specific weapons there is a 

risk of increased destruction due to the preponderance of targeting by kinetic weapons. 

Political Risks 

Coalitions and alliances play an important part in providing for U.S. security because

they can help to deter aggression, set conditions for success in combat if deterrence fails, 

enhance our expeditionary capabilities by providing access to local resources, and 

provide access to regional intelligence to allow for the precise application of military

power.

42 In addition, the 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States clearly

stated that, “There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish 

in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and 

Europe.”43 However, if the U.S. does not sign and ratify an information warfare arms

control regime, this can negatively impact our ability to form coalitions and result in non 

support for U.S. information warfare activities during coalition operations. In this 

context, an information warfare arms control regime can become a political risk that is

reminiscent of the Ottawa Landmine Treaty. 

The 1997 Ottawa Landmine Treaty requires each state party to discontinue the use of 

antipersonnel mines; not develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer 

to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti personnel mines; and not to assist, encourage or 

induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 

Convention. Within NATO, all countries are party to the treaty except the U.S and 

Turkey. During Operation Allied Force (OAF), 24 March to 10 June 1999, the U.S. 

reportedly did not conduct any mining missions against Yugoslavia. However, if it did, it 

59
would have put its NATO allies at legal risk and further complicate an already complex 

operation, since in accordance to the treaty our NATO allies could not provide any 

assistance to any facet of the mining missions. Although the U.S. and NATO were not 

faced with this situation in OAF, its potential for complicating coalition operations is real 

and was voiced by Robert Bell, special assistant to the president for national security and 

counselor to the assistant to the president for national security affairs, in 1998. 

When he was asked the question “Given the fact that most U.S. allies have signed the

Ottawa landmine treaty, what effect will that have on the ability of the United States to 

conduct coalition operations using landmines?

44 His reply was: 

What we're discovering is that our allies, particularly in NATO but also in 

Asia, in most cases had simply not thought this through. You had a case

where the negotiating position was being driven principally out of foreign 

affairs ministries, and the defense ministries had not cranked in 

analytically and in terms of their own view on this. So, we're in a situation 

now where these countries have signed the treaty and are clearly going to 

ratify, at least eventually, and their own defense ministries are saying, 

"What does this mean for coalition operations?45 

However, if the U.S. did attempt to conduct mining missions during OAF, the NATO 

allies could have protested by “playing the red card.”46 

In the game of soccer, the official holds up the red card to tell a player he/she is 

out of the game. In multinational operations such as OAF, a NATO ally could "play the

red card" to tell the other coalition members to accept that nation's objection to a mining

mission or that nation will withdraw from the game or the coalition. For air operations, 

coalition members can express their objections in many ways to include: limiting the use

of their aircrafts to certain missions (airlift, air defense, etc.), preventing certain types of 

aircraft from operating in their sovereign territory, and not approving objectionable 

60
targets on a target nomination list. For OAF, “playing the red card” could also entail 

denying support from the NATO E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). 

Therefore, if an information warfare arms control regime contains similar 

language that prohibits party to the regime to aid in any aspect of an information warfare 

mission that is prohibited, the U.S. may face political risk if it is not a party to the 

agreement and must request support from a country that has played the red card. This 

risk is further heightened if the adversary is using the computer or telecommunication 

resources of a coalition member to attack U.S interest that are outside the geographic area 

of the coalition’s operations. 

61
Notes 

1

 Allan S. Krass, The United States and Arms Control: The Challenge of Leadership

(Westport, Conn.: Prager Publishers, 1997), 103. 

2

 “Electronic Pearl Harbor,” was coined by Richard Clarke, President Clinton's 

national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counter-terrorism, to 

represent a surprise IW attack against the country’s critical infrastructures, such as 

transportation, power, and telecommunications. 

3

 Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare and Security (Reading, Mass.:AddisonWesley, 1999), 75. and George Smith, “An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely.” Issue 

in Science and Technology Online, Fall 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 March 2005, 

available from http://205.130.85.236/issues/15.1/smith.htm. 4

 Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information 

Operations ,(Washington, D.C.: Office of General Counsel, 1999), 1. 

5

.Ibid. 1-2. 

6

 Declan McCullagh, “Bush Pushes for Cybercrime Treaty.” CNET, 18 November 

2003, news.com, n.p., on-line, Internet, 24 September 2004, available from 

http://news.com.com /Bush+ pushes+for+cybercrime+treaty/2100-1028_3-5108854.html. 7

 “About the BBG: An Organization of U.S. International Broadcasters.” 

International Broadcasting Bureau, n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 February 2005, available 

from http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_aboutus.cfm. 8

 Ibid. 

9

 “RFE/RL Mission Statement,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 February 2005, available 

from http:// www.rferl.org/about/organization/mission-statement.asp. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Ibid. 

13 “About Us,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 February 2005, available from http://www. 

radiosawa.com/english.aspx. 

14 About the BBG. 

15 “No End to Jamming,” International Broadcasting Bureau Editorial, 6 July 2002. 

n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 February 2005. Available from http://www.ibb.gov/editorials/ 

09989.htm. 16 Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Chemical Weapons Convention: Has It Enhanced U.S. 

Security." Arms Control Today, April 2001, n.p. on-line. Internet, 7 Feb 2005, available 

from http:// www.armscontrol.org/act/2001 _04/ tuck er.asp. 

17 Krass, 127. 

18 Ibid, 57. 

19 Tucker, 3. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Thomas Evan, John Barry, and Melinda Liu, “Ground Zero: India’s Blasts 

Dramatize the New Nuclear Age. How Did the CIA Miss Them? And What’s to Do 

Now?” Newsweek, 25 May 1998, 29-32A. 

22 James Risen and Tim Weiner, “U.S. May Have Helped India Hide Its Nuclear 

Activity,” New York Times, 25 May 1998, A3 

23Ibid. 

62
Notes 

24 Department of State Chemical Weapons Convention –Article III: Declarations

(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Industry and Security), n.p., on-line. Internet, 17 January 

2005, available from http://www.cwc.gov/treaty/articles/art-03_html. 25 Krass, 127. 

26 Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. and Abram N. Schulsky, “Arms Control: The Historical 

Experience,” in Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, 

ed. Richard Betts (New York: Pearson Longman, 2004), 428-432. 

27 Hans Mark, transcript of interview by Harry Kreisler for Technology, Universities, 

and the Changing International Environment, 15 March 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet. 11 

February 2005, available from http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations /Mark/markcon6.html. 28 Department of State Chemical Weapons Convention –Article II: Definitions and 

Criteria (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Industry and Security), n.p., on-line. Internet, 17 

January 2005, available from http://www.cwc.gov/treaty/articles/art-02_html. 29 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, “Treaties, Agreements, and

Organizations of Particular Interest.” In Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a 

Changing Environment ed. Jeffrey Larsen (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

2002), 372. 

30 George W. Bush, “President Discusses National Missile Defense," (Washington, 

D.C.: The White House, 2001), n.p., on-line, Internet. 20 January 2005, available from

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/print/30011213-4.html. 31 George I. Seffers, "Hackers Take Offense at Pentagon Defense." Defense News,

1998. and William Jackson, DOD fires back at hackers preying on its Web servers,” 

GCN.com, Vol. 17, no. 25, 21 September 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 24 January 2005, 

available from http://www.gcn.com/17_25/news/33020-1.html. 32 Seffers. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Seffers and Jackson. 

35 Carl Conetta, "Catastrophic Interdiction: Air Power and the Collapse of the Iraqi 

Field Army in the 2003 War," 26 September 2003, on-line. Internet, 19 February 2005, 

available from http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0309bm30.pdf. 

36 Ibid. 

37 Matthew French, “DoD aims psy-ops at Iraqi officers,” FCW.COM, 24 March 

2003. n.p., on-line, Internet, 19 February 2005, available from

http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles /2003/0317/web-psyops-03-21-03.asp. 

38 Kevin Coughlin, "War --It's Not Just Firing Guns." The Star-Ledger, 11 April 

2003. 

39 Denning, 5. 

40 Ibid. 

41 “Iraq Computers Reportedly Got American Bug: NSA Virus Aimed at Air 

Defense." The Washington Post, 12 Jan 1992, 13. and Computer Virus Use Cited in Gulf 

War." Boston Globe, 12 Jan 1992, 12. 

42 Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2004), 22. 

63
Notes 

43 The White House Office, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), 25. 

44 Robert Bell, "Strategic Agreements and the CTB Treaty: Striking the Right 

Balance." Arms Control Today, January/February 1998, n.p. On-line. Internet, 18 

February 2005. Available from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_01-02/belljf.asp. 

45 Ibid. 

46 Notes, Command and Control Warfare Advanced Course, May 2002. 

64
Chapter 6

Conclusions 

Although the scholarly debate is far from over, traditionalists, who only see 

threats in the military sector as the quintessential defining threat to national security, and 

wideners, who also see threats in the others sectors as worthy contenders, can both agree 

that information warfare is a threat to national security. However, this agreement does not 

extend to a common definition of information warfare or what aspects should be 

addressed in international agreements to solve the security dilemma. In this regard arms

control can play a decisive role because it “is about establishing norms agreed by the 

international community at large to attain co-operative international security and states 

that do not adhere to such norms are rogue to the consensus of the international 

community.”1

 

When faced with the first efforts to negotiate an information warfare arms control 

agreement in 1999, the U.S. assessed that it was premature to do so at the time. Since 

many of the factors that influenced this decision are still unresolved, this assessment

might still be true today. The most consequential of these factors are the legal issues of 

sovereignty in the information realm and the clear definitions of key terminology within 

the current laws of war. Besides their legal implications, these are also important because

65
the manner in which they are resolved will greatly impact the risk and cost of any ensuing

arms control regime that must now be cost-effective in the post-Cold War. 

Although cost has become a prime concern in arms control over the past decade,

the lack of available data made it difficult to determine the expected cost with any degree 

of fidelity. However, previous nuclear, biological and chemical weapons agreements did 

shed some light on the types of cost to be incurred during the evolution of a generic arms

control regime and it was adopted for this research effort, with slight modifications to 

account for the unique challenges presented by information warfare. One of most

significant factors for costs and risk will be the type of verification provision that is 

adopted to ensure compliance. 

An intrusive verification provision like the CWC will provide a degree of

transparency to ensure compliance but it also introduces additional cost to industry and 

risks of proliferation, intelligence loss, and cheating. In addition, the cost to conduct 

inspections under these verification provisions may lead to the absence of verification 

provisions as in the BWC, which minimizes cost but significantly increases the risk. 

In examining the risk for an arms control regime I also discovered several factors 

that should be considered while forging an agreement. First, it may be impossible to 

prevent vertical proliferation due to the dual-use nature of the technology and the 

realization that the driving force behind IT innovation is the private sector and not the 

military. Moreover, given that the DII is inextricably linked to the NII, threats to the 

private sector will migrate to the military sector along with the solutions to these new 

threats. This leads to the second factor, an arms control regime must allow for the 

adaptation of new defenses to face evolving offensive threats. To do otherwise may lead

66
to the same results recently experienced in the CTBT and ABM Treaty. Despite U.S. 

unpreparedness to sign and ratify an information warfare arms control agreement, the 

U.S. must stay engaged and participate in the process to help guide the discourse in the 

international community. In the end we may not become a party to the agreement; 

however, by staying engaged during deliberations we would help to define the norms for 

information warfare within the international community. 

Final Thoughts

Although the purpose of this research was to examine the costs and risk of an 

information warfare arms control regime, and not a cost-benefit analysis or a feasibility

assessment, these latter topics are important and must be accomplished before 

undertaking negotiations for a regime. However, in working through these issues it is 

important to keep in mind one of the tenets of traditional arms control, which states “arms 

control and military strategy should work together to promote national security.”2

 

Therefore, if one of the principles of our current national security strategy is to rely on 

coalitions and allies to counter threats to our security, it would be prudent to keep this in 

mind while deciding on issues, such as an information warfare arms control regime. If 

we do otherwise, we may find ourselves isolated and unable to garner the required

support from others during times of conflict. 

Notes 

1

 Glen Segell, “Arms Control and Nuclear Proliferation,” Paper presented at the 44th

International Studies Association Conference. Portland Oregon, 25 February – 1 March 

2003. 

2

 Jeffrey Larsen, In Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment

(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 7. 

67
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