COUNTERSEA 

OPERATIONS 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.4 

15 September 2005 

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-30,

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.4 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 15 SEPTEMBER 2005 

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS 

 This document is substantially revised. This revision’s overarching changes are 

new chapter headings and sections, terminology progression to “air and space” from 

“aerospace,” expanded discussion on planning and employment factors, operational 

considerations when conducting countersea operations, and effects-based methodology 

and the emphasis on operations vice capabilities or platforms. 

 Specific changes with this revision are the additions of the naval warfighter’s 

perspective to enhance understanding the environment, doctrine, and operations of the 

maritime forces on page 3; comparison between Air Force and Navy/Marine Corp 

terminology, on page 7, included to ensure Air Force forces are aware of the difference 

in terms or semantics; a terminology matrix added to simplify that awareness on page 9; 

amphibious operations organization, command and control, and planning are also 

included throughout the document. 

 

 

 

Supersedes: AFDD 2-1.4, 4 June 1999 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DS (Lt Col Richard Hughey) 

Certified by: AFDC/DR (Lt Col Eric Schnitzer) 

Pages: 66 

Distribution: F 

Approved by: Bentley B. Rayburn, Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center 
FOREWORD 

Countersea Operations are about the use of Air Force capabilities in the maritime 

environment to accomplish the joint force commander’s objectives. This doctrine 

supports DOD Directive 5100.1 requirements for surface sea surveillance, anti-air 

warfare, anti-surface ship warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. Air Force countersea 

operations are conducted in the maritime environment through counterair; strategic 

attack; air interdiction; close air support; and intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance operations. Air Force forces also provide vital air mobility support to 

maritime forces through air refueling. 

 The objective of countersea operations is to gain and maintain control of the 

maritime environment in order to achieve maritime superiority. Air Force forces, with 

their speed, range, and flexibility, offer the joint force commander the unique ability to 

exploit the air and space dimensions. Air Force forces are inherently capable whether 

achieving effects in the air, on land, or on the sea. Air, space, and information forces of 

the Air Force, working in concert with naval forces, make a significant contribution to US 

dominance of the maritime environment. 

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN 

 Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... v 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ..................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER ONE—Fundamentals Of Countersea Operations............................................... 1 

General ...................................................................................................................................... 1 

Definition of Countersea...................................................................................................... 1

The Maritime Environment...................................................................................................... 2 

Air Force Service Functions and Responsibilities............................................................... 2 

Countersea Operations ........................................................................................................... 3 

Naval Warfighter Perspective................................................................................................. 3 

Sea Control ........................................................................................................................... 4 

Power Projection .................................................................................................................. 4 

Naval Warfare Areas ........................................................................................................... 5 

Air Force Countersea Operations.......................................................................................... 7 

Terminology .............................................................................................................................. 7 

CHAPTER TWO—Organization, Command, And Control (C2) ......................................... 12 

General .................................................................................................................................... 12 

Supporting Versus Supported Relationships..................................................................... 12 

Commander of Air Force Forces ......................................................................................... 13 

The Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander................................................ 13 

Sea-based JFACC ............................................................................................................. 14 

General Considerations for Command and Control of Joint Air Operations............. 15 

Maritime Command and Control.......................................................................................... 16 

Maritime Airspace Sector Commander Coordination Responsibilities ...................... 17 

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander ................................................................. 17 

Navy Composite Warfare Commander............................................................................... 18 

Amphibious Operations......................................................................................................... 19 

Airspace Control During Amphibious Operations ......................................................... 19 

C2 of Amphibious Operations .......................................................................................... 22 

Afloat C2.............................................................................................................................. 22 

Ashore C2............................................................................................................................ 22 

Close Air Support C2 During Amphibious Operations ................................................. 22 

Close Air Support Agencies.............................................................................................. 23 

Multinational Maritime Organization.................................................................................... 27 

Coalition Command Structures ........................................................................................ 27 

CHAPTER THREE—Countersea Planning And Employment............................................ 28 

General .................................................................................................................................... 28 

Supported Commander Responsibilities for Planning...................................................... 28 

Supporting Commander Responsibilities for Planning..................................................... 28 

Apportionment and Allocation .............................................................................................. 29 

Liaison Officers in the Joint Air and Space Operations Center ...................................... 29 

iii
Planning Considerations ....................................................................................................... 30 

Air Force Operations.............................................................................................................. 33 

Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissannce................................................................ 33 

Antisurface Ship Warfare (Surface Warfare)................................................................. 34 

Antisubmarine Warfare...................................................................................................... 36 

Aerial Minelaying Operations ........................................................................................... 37 

Counterair Operations ....................................................................................................... 38 

Air-to-Air Refueling............................................................................................................. 39 

Amphibious Operations..................................................................................................... 39 

Close Air Support ........................................................................................................... 42 

Maritime Air Support...................................................................................................... 42 

Space Capability................................................................................................................. 43 

Stability Operations............................................................................................................ 43 

Homeland Security Operations ........................................................................................ 43 

Other Air Force Countersea Operations......................................................................... 44 

International Law.................................................................................................................... 44 

CHAPTER FOUR—Countersea Training............................................................................... 46 

General .................................................................................................................................... 46 

Training Forces....................................................................................................................... 46 

Summary ................................................................................................................................. 47 

Suggested Readings ................................................................................................................. 48 

Glossary....................................................................................................................................... 50 

iv
INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 This document establishes doctrine guiding the employment of Air Force forces 

in countersea operations. It describes the critical role Air Force functions such as 

counterair and interdiction perform in the maritime environment. Additionally, it 

articulates the conventional wisdom of Airmen and provides guidance for conducting 

independent, joint, and multinational Air Force operations. 

APPLICATION 

 This Air Force Doctrine Document applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, 

Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. The doctrine in this document is 

authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider the contents 

of this AFDD and the particular situation when accomplishing their missions. Airmen 

should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 

 This doctrine primarily focuses on Air Force operations in the maritime 

environment. It emphasizes the roles of commander, Air Force forces, and joint force 

air and space component commander in these operations as the service component or 

functional commander to the joint force commander. 

v
COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force 

prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and 

space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term ”JFACC” refers to the joint component-level 

operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control

administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a 

Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and 

space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the 

air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in 

joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC. 

vi
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

Air Force doctrine documents (AFDDs) are built. Other information in the AFDDs 

expands on or supports these statements. 

 Countersea operations are those operations conducted to attain and maintain a 

desired degree of maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, delay, 

diversion, or other neutralization of threats in the maritime environment (page 1). 

 Air Force forces achieve effects in the maritime environment through the integrated 

employment of air and space operations. (Page 1) 

 Countersea operations are equally relevant to shallow littoral “brown” water as well 

as the deep “blue” water environment. (Page 2) 

 Air Force capabilities can extend the reach and increase the flexibility of naval 

surface, subsurface, and aviation assets, playing a key role in controlling the 

maritime environment. Air Force and Navy capabilities synergistically employed 

enable the joint force to control the maritime environment. (Page 2) 

 US military airpower is particularly suited to dominating the maritime environment by 

virtue of its inherent offensive character, precision, speed, range, and flexibility. 

(Page 7) 

 Air Force forces can provide rapid and large area coverage and often engage the 

adversary long before other forces arrive, transitioning swiftly from defensive to 

offensive roles to dominate the maritime environment. (Page 7) 

 Command relationships should be tailored to account for supported and supporting 

roles in joint or multinational actions. (Page 12) 

 Regardless of the support relationship, Air Force forces are best utilized when 

employed by a single air component commander exercising centralized control and 

decentralized execution of joint air operations. (Page 12) 

 The commander, Air Force forces, whether acting as Service component 

commander or dual-hatted as joint force air and space component commander, 

should be prepared and equipped to perform countersea operations either in support 

of maritime forces or as a supported commander when directed by higher authority. 

(Page 13) 

 Detailed coordination is required when operating Air Force forces in proximity to US 

Navy forces or when Air Force forces are placed under tactical control or in support 

of the navy composite warfare commander. (Page 18) 

 Until the requisite combat power exists ashore, the amphibious operation is quite 

vulnerable. It is during this transition from afloat to ashore that Air Force forces can 

vii
create needed effects and play a pivotal role in the success of the amphibious 

operation. (Page 22) 

 Due to the inherently joint nature of most countersea operations, liaisons serve a 

vital and active role in coordinating and planning effects in the maritime environment. 

(Page 29) 

 Air Force members can be expected to be liaisons to the joint force maritime 

component commander and/or the commander, Naval forces, during joint maritime 

operations. These Air Force liaisons within the staff(s) of the respective maritime 

commander offer tactical expertise, operational guidance, proper doctrinal 

implementation and real-time coordination of operations with Air Force forces. 

(Page 30) 

 Air Force forces provide rapid and large area surveillance and reconnaissance 

coverage, often arriving on station prior to other forces. This coverage can be used 

to observe the maritime environment in a homeland security role or overseas. (Page 

33) 

 One of the most important aspects of countersea preparation is training. Training 

should be realistic, subject to constant review and evaluation, and reflect the range 

of military operations in the maritime environment. (Page 46) 

viii
CHAPTER ONE 

FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERSEA OPERATIONS 

GENERAL 

 Our nation depends on assured access to the world's waterways and coastal 

regions for global economic trade, as well as providing a stabilizing military presence 

abroad. These waterways, along with our maritime fleet, provide the means for 

projecting the bulk of our heavy forces forward, sustaining them over the long term, and 

projecting force ashore from the seas. Where air and space power is the key to rapid 

forward presence and striking power over long distances, sea power is key to extended 

forward presence, power projection, mass force deployment, and sustainment through 

sealift. Protecting sea lanes, littorals, and our maritime assets operating within them are 

vital to US defense posture, economic prosperity, and national security.

Definition of Countersea 

Countersea operations are those operations conducted to attain and 

maintain a desired degree of maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, 

delay, diversion, or other neutralization of threats in the maritime environment. 

The main objective of countersea operations is to secure and dominate the maritime 

environment and prevent opponents from doing the same. 

 

 The countersea function entails Air Force operations in the maritime environment 

to achieve, or aid in the achievement of, superiority in that medium. This function fulfills 

Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for the use of Air Force forces to counter 

adversary air, surface, and subsurface threats, ensuring the security of vital sea and 

coastal areas, and enhancing the maritime scheme of maneuver. More importantly, it 

demonstrates the teamwork required of Service forces working together in a joint 

environment. Air Force forces achieve effects in the maritime environment 

through the integrated employment of air and space operations. The overarching 

effect of countersea operations is maritime superiority—denial of this medium to the 

We must be able to project military

power much more rapidly into areas

where we may not have stationed forces.

The ability to project lethal forces—in the

air, on the sea, or on the land—will be

essential. 

—Transforming Defense: 

National Security in the 21st Century

1
adversary while assuring access and freedom of maneuver for US and allied maritime 

forces. To this end, Air Force operations can make significant contributions to maritime 

components in support of joint force objectives. 

THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT 

We are a maritime nation. Our economic

stability is inextricably tied to the sea. 99% of

our import-export tonnage and 90% of the

world’s trade is transported on the sea 

 

 —Naval Doctrine Publication 1

 From a military perspective, the maritime environment is not limited to the open 

seas. The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication [JP] 1-

02) defines the maritime environment as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, 

coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals.” “Littoral” refers to 

the world’s coastal regions. Countersea operations are equally relevant to shallow 

littoral “brown” water as well as the deep “blue” or open water environment. 

With the potential emergence of a credible naval opponent, maritime operations 

are once again focusing on defeating enemy naval forces while retaining a focus on the 

role of power projection ashore from the littorals. Airpower provides a rapid, 

maneuverable, and flexible element in this environment. Air Force capabilities can 

extend the reach and increase the flexibility of naval surface, subsurface, and 

aviation assets, playing a key role in controlling the maritime environment. Air 

Force and Navy capabilities synergistically employed enable the joint force to 

control the maritime environment. 

AIR FORCE SERVICE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

 In defining the functions of the various military Services, DOD policy directs each 

Service to provide assistance to its sister Services. This mutual support is essential to 

the conduct of joint military operations ensuring combat force is massed and 

concentrated to achieve decisive results over the enemy. 

 DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major 

Components, directs the Air Force to carry out certain functions for protecting and 

enhancing maritime freedom of operations. The Air Force performs the following DOD 

maritime functions through assigned missions designed to achieve effects for the JFC: 

2
Primary function: 

 The Air Force is required to organize, train, equip, and provide forces and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) for joint amphibious, space, and airborne 

operations. 

Collateral functions: 

 Surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare through air and space 

operations. 

 Antisubmarine warfare and anti-air warfare operations to protect sea lines of 

communications. 

 Aerial mine-laying operations. 

 Air-to-air refueling in support of naval air operations. 

COUNTERSEA OPERATIONS 

 Countersea operations can be used in various ways to support the joint force 

commander’s (JFC’s) campaign. Conducted independently, or in conjunction with other 

military operations, countersea operations may be used for the following purposes: 

 At the initial phase of a campaign or major operation where the objective is to 

establish a military lodgment to support subsequent phases. 

 Serve as a supporting operation during a campaign in order to deny use of an 

area or facilities to the enemy, or to fix enemy forces’ attention in support of other 

combat operations. 

 Support stability operations in order to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace 

and stability, or support civil authorities in response to crises that require 

controlling the surrounding maritime environment. 

 Support military operations for homeland defense, by controlling use of the 

maritime environment along US coastal waters to prevent enemies from 

attacking civilian population centers, disrupting sea lines of communication 

(SLOC), or committing terrorism on US sovereign soil. 

 As an independent operation without other Service forces present, to achieve 

operational or strategic objectives in the maritime environment. 

NAVAL WARFIGHTER PERSPECTIVE 

 

 US naval forces offer a specific capability to shape the maritime environment 

through the mobility of their platforms and extended presence. Their ability to project 

timely high-intensity combat power from the sea is critical to meeting JFC objectives 

3
during crisis response as well as during a campaign. In peacetime, the carrier strike 

group (CSG), expeditionary strike group (ESG), and surface action group (SAG) 

possess the credible military might to project power reinforcing our nation’s ability to 

influence events, deter potential aggressors, promote regional stability and provide the 

requisite force to influence multinational collective security. 

 The ability to take the fight to the enemy at a time and place of our choosing is a 

forte enjoyed by naval forces, and has always been one of our nation’s primary 

objectives in war. Sea control and power projection in naval warfare are critical to 

securing the maritime environment and delivering effects against the enemy. Airmen 

can view sea control as a similar concept to air superiority. Additionally, the concept of 

maritime power projection can be viewed in parallel with the Air Force’s functions of 

counterland and strategic attack. Historically, maritime power projection focused on 

creating effects in the maritime environment while Air Force counterland and strategic 

attack operations typically were directed theater-wide. The maritime forces are now 

creating effects throughout the joint operations area (JOA). 

Sea Control 

 Sea control entails control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace affecting 

naval operations in any littoral or open ocean. Naval forces achieve control of the sea 

by destroying enemy forces, deterring enemy actions, disabling or disrupting enemy 

command and control, or seizing critical littoral areas and/or chokepoints. Control of the 

sea ensures operating areas and SLOCs remain open and protected, but it does not 

imply absolute control over all the seas at all times. Rather, control of the sea is 

required in specific regions for particular periods of time, to allow unencumbered 

maritime operations (Naval Doctrine Publication [NDP] 1, Naval Warfare). 

Power Projection 

 

 Power projection takes the battle to the enemy. It means applying high-intensity, 

precise, offensive power at a chosen time and place to create the desired effects and 

achieve JFC objectives. Naval commanders are provided with a full range of power 

projection options that include employment of long range cruise missiles, Marines 

conducting high-speed maneuvers across the shore (and inland) aided by naval surface 

fire support, and a great variety of weapons released from naval strike aircraft (NDP-1, 

Naval Warfare). 

 At the end of the Cold War, the emphasis of maritime warfare changed from 

"blue water" operations against enemy navies to "brown water" force projection ashore. 

The naval perspective similarly changed. To this end, Navy and Marine Corps 

capabilities and operations are currently used increasingly in combination with 

Air Force capabilities and operations to create effects inland. 

 In contrast, the growing naval threats in the 21st century, and the possibility of 

entering into combat with a near-peer adversary, have forced the Navy to readdress its 

4
capabilities in the blue water environment. In order to employ in this fashion, Air Force 

forces should be familiar with and understand the maritime warfare areas and threedimensional battlespace from which maritime forces develop their operations. 

Naval Warfare Areas 

 Navy doctrine identifies six warfare areas, conducted in three dimensions 

(surface, undersea, and air), in which air elements play a prominent role. Each requires 

coordination and integration in the battlespace. These warfare areas can be compared 

to the way Airmen view Air Force operational functions, such as counterair, counterland, 

etc. 

 Undersea Warfare (USW). USW is operations conducted to establish 

battlespace dominance in the underwater environment. It includes offensive and 

defensive submarine operations, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and mine 

warfare (MIW). ASW involves locating, tracking, and engaging enemy 

submarines and often employ airborne assets to locate and destroy those 

platforms. ASW may require airspace deconfliction measures particularly in 

littoral operations. DOD and the Navy also place MIW and sea, air, land (SEAL) 

operations in this category. Air Force forces may be called upon to support 

undersea warfare through the interdiction of enemy submarines or mine 

employment. DOD 5100.1 refers to this action as “antisubmarine warfare.” 

 Surface Warfare (SUW). SUW employs airborne, surface, and subsurface 

assets to locate and destroy maritime surface platforms. As with USW, 

execution of this operation requires airspace deconfliction, particularly in the 

near-land environment. Air Force forces may be called upon to perform surface 

sea surveillance, maritime air support (MAS), or interdiction in the maritime 

environment. DOD 5100.1 refers to this task as “antisurface ship warfare.” 

 Strike Warfare (STW). STW consists of carrier-based strike aircraft, the use of 

missiles such as the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), and naval surface 

artillery to create effects ashore. STW can produce strategic, operational, and 

tactical effects. Integration of TLAM with strike aircraft in the same attack 

requires close coordination between the joint force air and space component 

commander (JFACC) and the joint force maritime component commander 

(JFMCC) (specifically through the air and space operations center [AOC] 

Tomahawk strike coordinator) and possibly the joint force land component 

commander (JFLCC) as well to ensure target and airspace deconfliction. The 

Air Force refers to these operations as “counterland,” “counterair,” or “strategic 

attack” depending on intended effects. Close air support (CAS) is part of STW. 

 Command and Control Warfare (C2W). C2W achieves effects in the realm of 

command and control. It integrates operations security, military deception, 

psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction and is 

driven by intelligence. Its purpose is to deny or influence information used for 

5
C2. This area also includes protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such 

actions. C2W is the offensive and defensive application of information 

operations. Naval C2W involves the direction and control of aircraft, TLAM, 

naval surface fire support (NSFS), and special operations forces (SOF) targeting 

(directing units and localization), counter-targeting, reconnaissance, 

surveillance, counter-surveillance, C2 attack, and C2 protection. The Air Force 

conducts similar “C2W type” operations, depending on the desired level of 

effects and objectives through functions such as strategic attack; counterland, 

counterair, countersea, counterspace operations; information operations; and 

command and control operations. 

 Amphibious Warfare (AMW). Amphibious warfare operations involve naval 

and landing forces launching from the sea against a hostile or potentially hostile 

shore. Major elements of amphibious warfare for Air Force forces are 

counterair, interdiction, and CAS. 

 Air Defense (AD). AD is the protection of all friendly forces in the assigned area 

of operations (AO) against hostile air platforms and weapons, i.e., theater 

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft both manned and unmanned. 

Commander’s Intent and Unity of Effort 

Officers of the maritime forces are given command opportunities very early

in their careers and are expected to take the initiative following the broad intent of

their superiors. Naval warfare is shaped by commander’s intent through unity of

effort by subordinate units—getting all parts of a force to work together. Air Force 

forces are taught and exercise the tenet of centralized control—decentralized 

execution. Maritime forces are offered more latitude in exercising control 

and execution of operations in the maritime environment.

 To reconcile these seemingly contradictory requirements, the naval forces

use their understanding of the main effort, and a tool called the commander’s

intent, which conveys the “end state,” his desired result of action. The

commander’s intent reflects his vision. His thinking is conveyed through missiontype orders, in which subordinates are encouraged to exercise initiative and are

given freedom to act independently to reach the end state. 

 Historically, the isolated nature of the maritime environment coupled with the

need for rapid action, dictate a large degree of decentralization, thereby giving

those closest to the problem the freedom to solve it. While maritime forces have

incorporated technological advances in command and control warfare, the

continued culture of decentralized operations still offers naval warfighters the

flexibility to operate more autonomously than their Air Force brethren, while both

still execute under the superior commander's intent. 

—Edited from NDP-1, Naval Warfare

6
AIR FORCE COUNTERSEA OPERATIONS 

US military airpower is particularly suited to dominating the maritime 

environment by virtue of its inherent offensive character, precision, speed, range, 

and flexibility. Long ago, maritime forces realized the power and flexibility of aircraft 

carrier operations over battleship operations and the distinctive advantage of using 

airpower to dominate the maritime environment. Subsequently, Navy and Marine 

aviation further developed by fielding a formidable array of carrier-based air capability 

enabling the maritime forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical effects 

through airpower. Today, Air Force capabilities protect and complement maritime 

operations. Air Force forces, by design, can augment naval forces by providing 

additional protection; extended reach; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR); and strike capability with air, both manned and unmanned, and space platforms. 

 Due to their inherent flexibility and versatility, Air Force forces can provide 

rapid and large area coverage and often engage the adversary long before other 

forces arrive, transitioning swiftly from defensive to offensive roles to dominate 

the maritime environment. In certain situations Navy and Marine airpower alone is 

insufficient, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are well suited to provide large littoral or 

open ocean area surveillance and reconnaissance over long time periods that would 

normally require several aircraft and air-refueling resources to accomplish. .Air Force 

forces will likely be called upon to counter adversary maritime threats whether those 

threats originate from land, the sea, or from the air. Air Force forces should be 

prepared to conduct warfare in the maritime environment independently or together with 

Navy and Marine aviation. 

 Air Force countersea operations use Air Force strengths in traditional air 

interdiction, close air support, and counterair missions to accomplish effects in the 

maritime environment. From a tactical perspective, these traditional missions can be 

quite different in the maritime environment than missions conducted over land. 

Countersea operations require familiarity with naval air warfare, terminology, and 

command and control. This familiarity will be key in successful countersea operations in 

the maritime environment, and is one reason why joint training is vital. 

TERMINOLOGY 

 Air Force personnel operating in the maritime environment will likely do so in 

conjunction with maritime forces. Understanding Navy and Marine Corps terminology 

will contribute greatly to clear communication while minimizing confusion during 

operations. The following discusses Navy/Marine Corps terms used for comparable Air 

Force functions, missions, or capabilities. For more information regarding Naval or 

Marine Doctrine, see, Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-03.4 (Rev 

A), Naval Strike and Air Warfare and Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-0, 

Marine Corps Operations. 

 

7
Air Warfare vs. Counterair 

Air warfare is a term used by Navy forces to indicate the action required to 

destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. The Marine 

Corps term, anti-air warfare, uses same definition (see below). It includes use of 

fighters, bombers, ship antiaircraft guns, ship surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, 

cruise missiles launched from ships or submarines, as well as electronic attack to 

destroy, disrupt, delay, or deceive the air or missile threat before or after it is launched. 

It also includes measures taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action using cover, 

concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility. 

 Naval and Marine aviators label and define operations such as offensive 

counterair (OCA), defensive counterair (DCA), and suppression of enemy air defenses 

(SEAD) in line with Air Force and joint terminology. What is different is the Navy and 

Marine Corps, outside of the aviation community, identify all or partial employment in 

this operational function as either “air defense” or “anti-air warfare.” Thus, doctrinally 

the terms “air defense/anti-air warfare” and elements of “counterair” are similar. Air 

Force doctrine and joint doctrine identify this function solely as counterair. 

Air Defense/Anti-Air Warfare vs. Defensive Counterair 

Air Defense (AD) is not only a mission performed by the carrier strike group 

(CSG) but a command and control authority (air defense commander) within the CSG 

and is usually located on an AEGIS-equipped surface combatant. The Navy definition 

of air defense is nearly synonymous with defensive counterair (DCA). 

 Further confusion for Air Force forces could come from the Marine Corps 

definition of anti-air warfare (AAW) used to indicate that action required to destroy or 

reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. This definition is more 

in line with Air Force operational function of counterair (and the Navy operational 

function of air warfare). The Marine Corps breaks down AAW to offensive AAW 

(OAAW) and air defense (AD), which parallels the OCA and DCA elements of counterair 

respectively. 

Strike Warfare vs. Counterland and Strategic Attack 

Strike warfare is another potentially confusing and encompassing term 

Navy/Marine Corps forces use to describe what the Air Force typically refers to as 

counterland or strategic attack. It involves Navy and Marine Corps assets (aircraft, 

cruise missiles, naval surface fire support, and special forces) to destroy, disrupt, delay, 

or neutralize enemy targets ashore. Strike warfare includes attacks against targets 

such as manufacturing facilities and operating bases from which an enemy is capable of 

conducting or supporting air, surface, or undersea operations against friendly forces. 

Strike warfare also includes CAS. Therefore the doctrinal term “strike warfare,” 

depending on its intended effect, is similar to either counterland or strategic attack. 

8
Maritime Air Support (MAS) and Dynamic Targeting 

Maritime air support or MAS is a concept that adapts the tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP) of CAS against a dynamic target in the littoral or open ocean 

environment not in close proximity to friendly forces. The Navy and Marine Corps don’t 

think of MAS as a tactic, but more of a standardized method of providing targeting 

information through a maritime air controller (MAC). MAS is defined as those 

operations conducted against enemy forces and their equipment to directly assist in the 

attainment of the surface force objectives by the destruction of enemy resources or the 

isolation of his military force. 

 Any available and suitably loaded aircraft may conduct MAS in order to provide a 

rapid response. A MAC is responsible for the coordination, tactical employment, and 

safety of on-scene action platforms. MAC duties are similar to those of a forward air 

controller (FAC) in CAS. The MAC simply adapts CAS procedures to control aircraft or 

ship-coordinated fires to achieve mission objectives against a dynamic target. As MAS 

is not conducted with friendly forces in close proximity, there is no requirement for 

detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces. 

Detailed integration is simply used as needed to enhance mission success. 

 

 MAS can be preplanned or immediate, depending on the response time and 

urgency required. Preplanned requests are made early enough to be included on the 

air and space tasking order (ATO). Immediate requests arise from situations that 

necessitate an urgent requirement for air support or to exploit a time-sensitive 

opportunity. Primary consideration is rapid response to counter immediate threats and 

attack targets of opportunity. For more on MAS, see NTTP 3-03.4 (Rev A), Naval Strike 

and Air Warfare. 

Battlespace Dominance vs. Battlespace Control 

 Naval forces describe battlespace dominance as a critical operational capability 

they can provide. Navy and Marine Corps operations encompass air, surface, 

undersea, land, space, and time. Dominance of these dimensions continues to be an 

important factor in the survival and combat effectiveness of their forces. Command and 

control integrate ships, submarines, aircraft and ground forces, to effectively extend 

their full range of capabilities throughout the battlespace (NDP 1). 

 Battlespace dominance can be easily mistaken with the Air Force term of 

battlespace control which has a somewhat different meaning. Battlespace control 

means exercising the degree of control necessary in all domains (land, sea, air, and 

space in their physical and informational domains) to employ, maneuver, and engage 

forces while denying the same capability to the adversary. Battlespace control includes 

a number of active measures such as ensuring air, space, and maritime superiority. 

Furthermore, information superiority and control of the use of the electromagnetic 

spectrum also play a critical role in battlespace control. 

9
 Figure 1.1 is a terminology matrix to help Air Force forces understand 

terminology of functions, operations, or missions, and how they relate to their maritime 

force counterparts. These terms are NOT synonymous, but are similar and aid in 

discussion, planning, and execution of countersea operations. 

Figure 1.1. Service and Joint Terminology 

Reference Publications 

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 

DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine 

NTTP 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare

MWDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations 

Air Force Navy/USMC Joint DOD 5100.1

TERMINOLOGY

Counterair

Countersea

Battlespace Control Battlespace Dominance

Air Warfare/Anti-Air

Warfare

Counterair Anti-Air Warfare

Undersea Warfare

Dynamic Targeting

Antisurface-Ship

Warfare

Maritime Air Support

(MAS)

Antisubmarine

Warfare

Countersea Surface Warfare

Counterland/

Strategic Attack

Strike Warfare Interdiction

Offensive Counterair (OCA)

Air Warfare/Offensive

Anti-Air Warfare

Offensive

Counterair

Defensive Counterair (DCA)

Air Defense/Air

Defense

Defensive

Counterair

Close Air Support Joint CAS Joint CAS

Air Force Navy/USMC Joint DOD 5100.1

TERMINOLOGY

Counterair

Countersea

Battlespace Control Battlespace Dominance

Air Warfare/Anti-Air

Warfare

Counterair Anti-Air Warfare

Undersea Warfare

Dynamic Targeting

Antisurface-Ship

Warfare

Maritime Air Support

(MAS)

Antisubmarine

Warfare

Countersea Surface Warfare

Counterland/

Strategic Attack

Strike Warfare Interdiction

Offensive Counterair (OCA)

Air Warfare/Offensive

Anti-Air Warfare

Offensive

Counterair

Defensive Counterair (DCA)

Air Defense/Air

Defense

Defensive

Counterair

Close Air Support Joint CAS Joint CAS

10
BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA (14 MARCH 1943) 

Throughout July and August, Allied

aircraft that had survived the Japanese

invasion of the Philippines were now

operating out of Australia. During the

summer of 1942, Japanese forces landed

on New Guinea's Papuan peninsula and

began a drive toward Port Moresby.

Ground fighting was fierce and, because

of limited numbers operating from far

away, air support sporadic. Allied aircraft

were unsuccessful in their attempts to

counter Japanese shipping because they 

were using high level bombing techniques, which proved to be very inaccurate against

ships at sea. Fifth Air Force was organized in September 1942. Due to the archipelagic

nature of the Southwest Pacific operating area, General George C. Kenney, Fifth Air

Force commander, realized that the means to successfully attack shipping had to be

developed. 

Fifth Air Force began experimenting with different ideas to improve their lethality.

Their A-20s were modified by the addition of four .50-caliber, forward firing machine

guns in the nose and two 450-gallon fuel tanks to extend their range. Parafrag bombs

were acquired. The A-20s then enjoyed remarkable success against targets in the

jungles of New Guinea. Kenney then directed that several B-25Cs be modified in a

similar fashion. Since they were to operate at low altitude, the tail and belly turrets were

removed. Fifth Air Force shifted from the traditional high altitude bombing to low altitude

bombing. American and British tests of skip bombing showed promise. Eventually, the

bombers of Fifth Air Force perfected the technique of two aircraft attacking at masthead

height. One aircraft would strafe to reduce the antiaircraft artillery coming from the ship

under attack, while the other would strafe and bomb at mast height. 

 In January and February 1943, Allied intelligence indicated that the Japanese were

beginning to assemble a convoy in Rabaul for the reinforcement of Japanese forces

fighting in New Guinea. On 28 February, word came that 14 ships were coming down

from Rabaul. On 1 March, a B-24 Liberator spotted the convoy and for the next two

days it was shadowed and harassed by the longer-range heavy bombers. Escorting P38s engaged aircraft from Japan's Eleventh Air Fleet destroying 25 of 30 aircraft. The

convoy came within range of the medium bombers on the third. Coordinated attacks by

long range bombers dropping bombs from 3,000 to 6,000 feet, followed by low-level skip

bombing releases from the Beaufighters and B-25s resulted in the loss of eight

transports and four destroyers, along with all of the Army Division's equipment and

nearly half of the unit's 7,000 men. Japanese ground forces at Lae were not reinforced,

effectively ending any chances of a renewed Japanese offensive. The victory confirmed

General MacArthur's growing confidence in Fifth Air Force and demonstrated the

dominance of air power in the Southwest Pacific. 

—Various sources

11
CHAPTER TWO 

ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL 

The lesson from the last war that stands out 

clearly above all the others is that if you want 

to go anywhere in modern war, in the air, on 

the sea, on the land, you must have command 

of the air. 

 —Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey to 

Congress after World War II 

GENERAL 

 Countersea operations require maximum flexibility in organization, command, 

and control. Since Air Force forces may be directed to accomplish these operations in 

supported or supporting roles in a joint or multinational environment, adaptability is 

paramount. Command relationships should be tailored to account for supported 

and supporting roles in joint or multinational actions. Refer to AFDD 2, Operations 

and Organization, JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), and JP 3-0, Doctrine 

for Joint Operations, for specifics relating to organizational structure and command 

relationships. 

SUPPORTED VS. SUPPORTING RELATIONSHIPS 

 A commander, such as the JFC, establishes support relationships when he 

identifies subordinate command organizations to aid, protect, complement, or sustain 

another force. The designation of support relationships is important as it conveys 

priorities to commanders and staffs planning or executing joint operations. For air 

operations in the maritime environment where airpower is providing the joint force 

commander’s intended effect or is the primary combat arm, the JFACC should be the 

supported commander. While capable of serving as a supporting commander to the 

JFMCC, this command relationship dilutes the disproportionate effects airpower can 

have for the joint force commander. No matter where the AOC location, the JFACC 

may serve in a supporting and/or supported role in the maritime environment. 

Regardless of the support relationship, Air Force forces are best utilized when 

employed by a single air component commander exercising centralized control 

and decentralized execution of joint air operations. 

 An example would be the JFACC providing air and space support to the JFMCC 

in the planning and execution of an amphibious operation. Supporting the landing force 

12
can range from aircraft conducting CAS to an increase in communication satellite 

priority and utilization. The JFMCC would generally provide requirements in terms of 

the effects desired to meet his objectives, and possibly the specific maritime targets or 

target sets. The JFACC should determine how best to achieve those effects to meet 

JFMCC objectives and recommend the necessary apportionment of forces to the JFC. 

Employing those apportioned forces, the JFACC can provide the optimum support to 

JFMCC objectives. 

COMMANDER OF AIR FORCE FORCES 

 Two central ideas—the principle of unity of command and the tenet of centralized 

control and decentralized execution—underpin the way the Air Force organizes for 

operations. In any operation involving Air Force forces, a commander, Air Force forces 

(COMAFFOR), will exercise command over operational and administrative matters of 

the forces assigned and attached. Forces provided to the COMAFFOR will normally 

conduct operations as part of an air and space expeditionary task force (AETF). In this 

manner, COMAFFOR can present the JFC a tailored, task–organized, integrated 

package with the proper balance of force, sustainment, and force protection elements. 

The COMAFFOR, whether acting as Service component commander or dualhatted as JFACC, should be prepared and equipped to perform countersea 

operations either in support of maritime forces or as a supported commander if 

directed by higher authority. 

THE JOINT FORCE AIR AND SPACE COMPONENT COMMANDER 

Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into

compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and

destroy its greatest asset — its flexibility. 

—Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery 

 The COMAFFOR will normally serve as the JFACC, exercising operational 

control (OPCON) over assigned and attached Air Force assets and tactical control 

(TACON) over other component assets made available for tasking. These forces are 

generally centrally controlled and tasked from the AOC. Tasking occurs through 

publication of the ATO. Countersea operations involving the use of air assets should 

likewise fall under a single authority capable of planning and directing such operations. 

There may be cases when, in order to ensure effective integration with carrier-based air, 

the JFC may task the JFACC to support the JFMCC. Still, the JFACC must, by 

definition, control and execute the air assets assigned to the joint force operation, in 

whole or in part, depending on the situation. 

13
 A single air commander should command and control all joint air assets. The JFC 

normally designates a JFACC and apportions joint air assets for the JFACC to control. 

The component commander with the preponderance of air forces and the capability to 

control and direct joint air and space operations should be designated the JFACC. 

Centralized control and decentralized execution serve to focus forces on theater 

objectives and provide commanders flexibility for employment. The JFACC will make 

apportionment recommendations to the JFC. Apportionment can change as the 

campaign progresses and/or as the operational situation changes. The JFACC will 

allocate the JFC’s apportioned air power to best affect the JFC’s intent and priorities. 

 Even though the JFACC and COMAFFOR will normally be the same individual, 

the staffs are separate and have different functions. Furthermore, JFACC staffing 

requires augmentation within the AOC from relevant Service components and coalition 

partners to ensure adequate joint and multinational representation. It is important 

during countersea operations that the naval liaison officer (NALO) and/or Marine liaison 

officer (MARLO) assist the JFACC in having a clear understanding of the JFMCC or 

commander, Naval forces (COMNAVFOR), desired and prioritized effects. 

 The other Services have developed their air arms with different doctrinal and 

operating constructs in mind. Maritime forces have allowed for organic asset 

scheduling, command, and control utilizing their own assets for missions separate from 

the JFACC’s control. For example, the Marine Corps expects that Marine aviation 

assets will be used organically within the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), during 

both amphibious operations and subsequent land operations. COMNAVFOR may have 

other mission priorities, such as USW or AW, constraining asset availability to the 

JFACC. Similar concerns also apply to the aviation arms of our allies. These limitations 

of air assets by their respective entities will normally be limited in time and scope to 

specific missions during certain phases of operations. The JFACC must account for 

these dynamics when developing the joint air operations plan and realize that all aircraft 

flying within the AOR may not be available for tasking. 

Sea-based JFACC 

 In operations where no shore-based AOC facility can initially be accommodated, 

the preponderance of air capability coordination may be located afloat on a US Navy 

command and control ship. This scenario is most likely during the initial stages of a 

campaign, in maritime forced entry operations or prior to shore-based AOC 

arrival/completion. 

 

 The sea-based JFACC positions are jointly manned by officers and enlisted 

personnel from the other Services who may fill key JFACC staff positions while aboard 

the command ship. These ships have the ability to host several hundred augmentees 

and have sufficient connectivity to meet requisite command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence (C4I) requirements for initial operations until the JFACC is 

transitioned ashore. 

14
 In this arrangement, Air Force component and joint air component functions and 

responsibilities remain distinct; both are essential to successful joint air operations. The 

COMAFFOR will maintain OPCON of Air Force forces executed through an A–staff. 

With another Service designated as JFACC, the COMAFFOR will provide Air Force 

forces TACON to the JFACC as directed by the JFC. In addition, the COMAFFOR will 

coordinate with the JFACC through a liaison officer (LNO) teams and fill designated 

billets within the JFACC staff and joint AOC (JAOC). 

Naval Air Command and Control of Air Operations (NC2AO) 

NC2AO is a new and developing construct for naval assets to

manage air operations where no shore based JFACC has been

established. The US Navy has established policy to support this idea, but

is still developing the actual doctrine and yet to practice this in operational

exercises. 

—Commander, Fleet Forces Command, MSG 131456Z JAN04

 When the JFACC transitions to a suitable host shore-based facility (or 

from shore-based to sea-based) and where the preponderance of air assets may be or 

may become Air Force, several concerns need to be addressed. The following is taken 

from JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. 

General Considerations for Command and Control of Joint Air 

Operations 

 Planned Transition. The JFACC should develop a plan for transition of JFACC 

duties to another component or location. Planned JFACC transitions are possible 

as a function of buildup or scale down of joint force operations. During transition 

of JFACC responsibilities, the component passing responsibilities should 

continue monitoring joint air planning, tasking, and control circuits, and remain 

ready to reassume JFACC responsibilities until the gaining component has 

achieved full operational capability. 

 Unplanned Transition. During unplanned shifts of JFACC responsibility, as a 

possible result of battle damage or major C2 equipment failure, a smooth 

transition is unlikely. Therefore, the JFC should pre-designate alternates (both 

inter- and intra-component) and establish preplanned responses/options to the 

temporary or permanent loss of primary JFACC capability. Frequent backup and 

exchange of databases is essential to facilitate a rapid resumption of operations 

should an unplanned transition occur. 

 Transition Events. The following events may cause the JFACC responsibilities 

to shift: 

15
(a) Coordination requirements related to ATO planning and execution exceeds 

the component capability. 

(b) Buildup or relocation of forces shifts preponderance of the air 

capabilities/forces and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air 

operations to another component commander and the JFC decides that the other 

component is in a better position (location, C2 capability, or other considerations) 

to accomplish the JFACC responsibilities. 

(c) C4I capability becomes unresponsive or unreliable. 

 Considerations. Considerations to aid in JFACC transition planning and 

decisions: 

(a) Continuous, uninterrupted, and unambiguous guidance and direction for joint 

air operations must be the primary objective of any JFACC transition. 

(b) Appropriate C4I capabilities to ensure shift of JFACC duties are as 

transparent to the components as possible. 

(c) Specific procedures for coordinating and executing planned and unplanned 

shifts of JFACC should be published in the joint air operations plan (JAOP). 

(d) The relieving component must have adequate communications, connectivity, 

manning, intelligence support, and C2 capability prior to assuming JFACC 

responsibilities. 

MARITIME COMMAND AND CONTROL 

In joint maritime operations, C2 is normally directed either from a command ship, 

a CSG, or the lead ship in an ESG or SAG. The command ships have the most robust 

capabilities for establishing a sea-based JFACC or JFMCC. The mobile air base and 

layered defense system represented by aircraft carriers and their surface screening 

units (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) create a network of control options. Depending 

on the ships capabilities, it can integrate as part of the maritime command and control 

system as well as a part of the maritime layered defense system. The maritime 

command and control structure may differ from those used in a land-based operation 

and may require establishing a regional or sector area air defense commander (AADC) 

in order to integrate and best utilize unique maritime capabilities and operations. 

The Airspace Control Authority (ACA) may designate COMNAVFOR or JFMCC 

as the control authority for a specific airspace control area or sector for the 

accomplishment of a specific mission. The massing of maritime forces into a battle force 

of combined arms (air, surface, and undersea) under a single commander reduces the 

front to be defended, enhances mutual support, and simplifies identification and 

deconfliction of friendly aircraft and other air defense measures. To ensure seamless 

16
integration, unity of effort and minimal interference along adjacent boundaries, the 

commander responsible for the maritime airspace sector should coordinate with the 

ACA on the items from JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 

Maritime Airspace Sector Commander Coordination Responsibilities 

 Procedures for coordination of flight information. 

 Clearance of aircraft to enter and depart the maritime airspace sector. 

 Procedures for assisting and coordinating with airspace control elements that 

respond to adjacent or supporting component commander. 

 Procedures for deconfliction of operations during transitional operations and 

during operations in overlapping airspace areas. 

Where no sector control authority is designated by the ACA and where joint 

operations composed of adjacent maritime and land environments exist, specific control 

and defensive measures may be a composite of those measures normally employed in 

each environment. The JFC for such operations needs to ensure detailed coordination 

of control and defensive measures with the affected air, land, and maritime 

commanders. The exchange of liaison personnel at the joint force level will facilitate 

coordination to ensure: 

 Establishment of procedures for integration and coordination of joint air 

operations along adjacent boundaries. 

 Agreement on procedures for coordination of flight information, clearance of 

aircraft to enter and depart the adjoining airspace, and the coordination of 

airspace control services. 

 These coordination items should be clearly stated in the airspace control plan 

(ACP) and daily special instructions (SPINS) as required. 

JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER 

 Normally, COMNAVFOR will serve as the JFMCC, exercising operational 

authority over assigned and attached maritime assets and forces. The JFMCC role is to 

provide a central authority over all maritime assets operating within a given region. 

These forces are generally centrally controlled and tasked from the command ship 

within a task force. Maritime tasking occurs through publication of the maritime tasking 

order (MTO). Air assets conducting countersea operations could fall under the tasking 

of the JFACC in serving maritime objectives within an AOR (JFACC supporting/JFMCC 

supported). Organic naval and marine air assets will most likely be retained for 

direction by the JFMCC. Detailed coordination with ATO-tasked air assets operating 

within or adjacent to the JFMCC’s AOR is necessary for ensuring safe, effective 

operations. 

17
The JFMCC is also responsible for advising the JFC on the proper employment 

of maritime forces, and in some situations, may plan and direct limited Air Force support 

operations in coordination with the COMAFFOR. For instance, a communications 

support unit operating in the maritime environment may fall under the guidance of the 

JFMCC. 

NAVY COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER 

Naval units are deployed in task group organizations that can be tailored to the 

intended employment of the force. The commander of each task group is responsible 

for all aspects of operations and for carrying out the missions assigned by the JFC. 

(The force is organized according to the composite warfare commander [CWC] 

doctrine). CWC doctrine represents the Navy’s implementation of centralized control 

and decentralized execution. This type of planning, control, and execution allows 

subordinates flexibility and initiative in executing the commander’s intent by telling them 

how their respective warfare areas contribute to overall mission success without 

specifically telling them how their tasks are to be accomplished. Naval doctrine makes 

decentralized execution of battlespace dominance and power projection tasks possible 

through subordinate warfare commanders who are focused on air (air defense 

commander or ADC), strike (strike warfare commander or STWC), sea (sea combat 

commander or SCC), surface information (information warfare commander or IWC) 

environments. Standard procedures for the CWC concept are contained in NWP 3–

56.1, JFACC Organization And Processes. Air Force forces should view this 

organizational construct as similar to how the Air Force organizes an AETF. 

USS Blue Ridge, under escort,

is a US Navy command ship

designed to accommodate

planning staffs and their

associated command and

control of combat operations in

the maritime environment 

Detailed coordination is required when operating Air Force forces in close 

proximity to US Navy forces or when Air Force forces are placed under TACON or 

in support of the navy composite warfare commander (CWC) (i.e. coordinated AD, 

SCC or STW operations with a CSG). 

18
Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating land-based air operations with 

maritime air and sea operations are challenging, but necessary. In a joint context, 

maritime operations are distributed operations that stress communications capabilities. 

The JFACC staff, as well as land-based air units, should establish communication 

channels and points of contact well in advance of integrated joint air operations. For 

example, normal Air Force mission planning timelines may not be adequate for 

operations with strike warfare crew mission planning on an aircraft carrier. 

The criteria for either joint force or Service component application are determined 

by the overall effectiveness and availability of appropriate forces for the task at hand. In 

most instances joint operations will dominate a campaign; however, in selected 

instances, this should not preclude the effectiveness, C2, and economy of force 

considerations of single Service operations. 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

 With increased maritime operations in the vicinity of the shoreline (the littoral), Air 

Force forces conducting countersea operations should be prepared to be part of 

amphibious operations. Airmen need to understand that amphibious operations are 

very intensive and complex in planning, C2, and execution. Operations in the 

amphibious objective area (AOA) are particularly risky due to the high density and close 

proximity of friendly forces attempting to achieve initial lodgment, with their variety of 

supporting fires. Landing forces will generally be supported by ship artillery, land-based 

artillery, organic Navy and Marine airpower, and Air Force airpower, all using the same 

airspace. The risk of fratricide is high in this environment. 

Airspace Control During Amphibious Operations 

 During maritime operations such as amphibious operations, the ACA will 

normally designate the maritime commander as the control authority for a specific 

airspace control area during the conduct of the amphibious operation (see JP 3-52, 

Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone). The complexity and size of an 

amphibious operation directly affects the amount of airspace allocated. The level of air 

control allocated to the amphibious force depends on the air control measures approved 

by the ACA. If only an area of operations (AO) is established, the amphibious force 

may request that the ACA establish a high-density air space control zone (HIDACZ) 

over this geographic area. A HIDACZ is airspace designated in an airspace control plan 

(ACP) or airspace control order (ACO) where there is a concentrated employment of 

numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. Access is normally controlled by 

the maneuver commander who has the requisite capabilities to command and control 

the designated area. The items shown below should be considered when establishing a 

HIDACZ: 

 Airspace control capabilities and limitations of the amphibious force. 

19
 Minimum risk routes into and out of the HIDACZ (and to the target area.). 

 Air traffic advisory requirements. Procedures and systems must also be 

considered for air traffic control service during instrument meteorological 

conditions. 

 Procedures that offer expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the 

HIDACZ while providing aircraft deconfliction as well as awareness to surface 

units. 

 Coordination of fire support, as well as air defense weapons control orders or 

status within and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ. 

 Range and type of naval surface fire support (NSFS) available. 

 Location of enemy forces inside and in close proximity to the HIDACZ. 

 At a minimum, the HIDACZ should cover the amphibious task force sea echelon 

areas and extend inland to the landing force’s (LF’s) fire support coordination 

line. Additionally, the HIDACZ should be large enough to accommodate the flow 

of fixed-wing aircraft into and out of the amphibious airspace. 

20
 

 

 

Figure 2.1. Airspace Control in Amphibious Operations (from JP 3-52 

Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone) 

 When an amphibious objective area (AOA) is established, the items in Figure 2.1 

(see JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations) need to be considered and 

implemented. 

21
C2 OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

 To conduct amphibious operations, an amphibious task force (ATF) is formed as 

a Navy task organization in charge of the initial afloat operations. The LF is formed as a 

Marine Corps or Army task organization in charge of the subsequent shore operations. 

The two commanders are responsible for the planning of the operation. Once initiated, 

the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) is the supported commander until 

enough combat power has been built up on land. The CATF then transitions this 

supported role to the commander, landing force (CLF) ashore who controls operations 

until complete or a withdrawal occurs. When an AOA or AO is initially established, Air 

Force forces could be tasked to support the CATF. Later, during the amphibious 

operation, air forces would transition to support the CLF. Until the requisite combat 

power exists ashore, the amphibious operation is quite vulnerable. It is during 

this transition from afloat to ashore that Air Force forces can create needed 

effects and play a pivotal role in the success of the amphibious operation. 

Afloat C2 

 While the preponderance of forces are sea-based, airspace control in the AOA 

will be performed by the Navy tactical air control center (TACC). The TACC role is to 

provide air planning, direction, and control over all air efforts within the airspace sector 

until such time as a land-based control center is established. Within the TACC, the 

Navy will produce airspace control measures for incorporation into the airspace control 

plan (ACP) and ATO special instructions (ATO SPINS). The TACC is usually collocated 

with the supporting arms coordination center (SACC). The SACC works closely with the 

Navy TACC to integrate both helicopter and fixed wing air operations with naval surface 

fire support (NSFS), land based artillery, and any other supporting arms. The SACC is 

the naval equivalent of the Marine Corps fire support coordination center (FSCC). The 

Marine Corps establishes a tactical air direction center (TADC) on initial build-up ashore 

to effect air operations through the Navy TACC. 

Ashore C2 

 Once sufficient combat power is massed ashore, C2 of the AOA is passed to 

CLF. This transition requires extensive planning and coordination in execution. When 

established ashore, the Marine Corps’s TADC becomes the tactical air command center 

(TACC) and the afloat Navy TACC becomes a TADC supporting the Marine Corps 

TACC. Also, the Marine Corps TACC works in conjunction with the Marine Corps FSCC 

to integrate the different arms (as the SACC performed afloat). 

Close Air Support C2 During Amphibious Operations 

 Close air support C2 in an amphibious operation is significantly different than 

traditional Air Force/Army CAS over land. Planning and coordination require familiarity 

with maritime terminology and C2 arrangements. Additionally, agencies controlling CAS 

operations will transition from afloat operations to landing force operations. 

22
 Both the Navy and the Marine Corps air control systems are capable of 

independent operations. However, in the conduct of an amphibious operation, elements 

of both systems are used to different degrees from the beginning of the operation until 

the C2 of aircraft and missiles are phased ashore. 

 Under the CATF, the Navy TACC, typically onboard the amphibious flagship will 

normally be established as the agency responsible for controlling all air operations 

within the allocated airspace regardless of mission or origin, to include supporting arms. 

As the amphibious operation proceeds, C2 of aviation operations is phased ashore as 

Marine air command and control systems (MACCS) agencies are established on the 

ground. Air C2 functions are traditionally sequenced ashore in five phases: 

 (1) Phase one is characterized by the arrival of various “supporting arms controllers” 

ashore; namely the tactical air control party (TACP), forward observers, air support 

liaison teams, and naval surface fire spot teams. 

 (2) In phase two, the Marine direct air support center (DASC) is normally the first 

principal air control agency ashore during amphibious operations. When control is 

afloat, the Navy TACC supervises DASC operations. 

 (3) The movement of the Marine TADC ashore, although not directly related to CAS, 

is the principal event in phase three. 

 (4) In phase four, the senior organization of the Marine air control group (MACG) is 

established ashore and functions as the Marine TADC under control of the Navy TACC. 

 (5) Phase five is characterized by the passage of command responsibility ashore. 

The Marine Corps TADC assumes the role of the tactical air command center and once 

the Marine Corps tactical air command center receives control of all LF air operations, 

the Navy TACC becomes a TADC supporting the land-based air control agency. 

Close Air Support Agenices 

 Figures 2.2 through 2.4 depict various C2 structures (including Air Force and 

Army for familiarity) for CAS. As aircrew perform CAS in the AOA, knowledge of the 

operating environment and associated C2 is critical to mission accomplishment. It is 

incumbent on planners and operators to be familiar with the synonymous functions but 

different labels for effective employment of CAS in amphibious operations. 

23
Figure 2.2. Component Air Command and Control Agencies for Close Air Support 

(from JP 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support) 

24
Figure 2.3. Army/Air Force Close Air Support Connectivity (from JP 3-09.3 Joint 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support)

25
Figure 2.4. Navy/Marine Corps Close Air Support Connectivity (from JP 3-09.3 

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support)

26
MULTINATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 

Coalition Command Structures 

 Coalition command structures are usually regulated by agreements and reflect 

the composition of the participating nations. The selection of the overall commander 

may be based on the preponderance of a nation’s forces, a rotational basis, expertise, 

or other considerations. There are three basic coalition command structures—parallel, 

lead nation, or a combination of the two. 

 Within a parallel command, each nation retains control of its forces. Though Air 

Force forces will be operating under standardized joint guidance, they will probably be 

participating in maritime operations with other nations using different operating 

procedures. Careful coordination of multinational maritime operations is necessary to 

preclude conflicting operations. 

 

 Under a lead nation command structure, the nation that supplies the 

preponderance of forces generally provides the overall commander of forces. In a 

combination structure, parallel and lead nation arrangements coexist. Regardless of the 

structure, it is imperative that US personnel understand the procedures of other nations 

conducting operations in the maritime environment. 

27
CHAPTER THREE 

COUNTERSEA PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT 

The argument has been advanced that the Air

Force should be concerned with land objectives,

and the Navy with objectives on and over the

water. That distinction is to deny the peculiar

quality of the air medium, the third dimension.

The air is indivisible; it covers land and sea. 

 —General Carl A. Spaatz, 

First Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (1947-1948) 

GENERAL 

 Countersea planning and employment of Air Force forces with maritime forces 

will require close coordination between maritime component planners and AOC and unit 

planners. Ironing out the differences in expectations through liaison officers (LNOs) will 

reduce confusion and distraction while providing synergy, unity of effort, and effective 

air-sea integration. Employment in the maritime environment is enhanced greatly 

through integrated service collaboration, collective planning effort, and synchronized 

coordination in execution. 

SUPPORTED COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PLANNING 

 Supported commanders and their staffs should clearly define commander’s intent 

and objectives, scheme of maneuver, and effects desired. Once enemy capabilities 

have been assessed, supporting forces, timing, tempo, and concept of operations must 

be communicated to allow the supporting forces to understand their roles and objectives 

in the operation. Operational level planning will require integration of members from 

both supporting and supported staffs through various methods of communication. 

SUPPORTING COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PLANNING 

 In order to aid, protect, complement, and sustain the supported commander’s 

operation, supporting commanders and their staffs should expect to coordinate and 

integrate with the supported force, as well as to clearly identify employment strengths, 

shortfalls and limitations, interoperability challenges, and the impact of these factors on 

overall operations. It is also incumbent on the supporting commander and staff to know 

the intent, objectives, scheme of maneuver, and effects desired by the supported 

commander. 

28
APPORTIONMENT AND ALLOCATION 

 JFC priorities and objectives will determine the operational effects and weight of 

effort required. The JFACC, as the senior Airman, should determine the utilization of air 

assets to ensure proper balance, economy of force, and priority. This is particularly 

important to countersea operations where maritime and Air Force airpower need to be 

combined efficiently. 

 JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines 

apportionment and allocation as follows: 

 Apportionment: The determination and assignment of the total expected effort 

by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air 

operations for a given period of time. 

 Allocation: The translation of the air apportionment decision into total numbers 

of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task. 

LIAISON OFFICERS AND THE JOINT AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS 

CENTER 

 Liaisons are an important aspect of joint force planning and employment. Liaison 

teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, 

or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending 

commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the 

commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters and should be 

assigned early in the planning stage of joint operations (JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint 

Operations). 

 Naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Marine liaison officer (MARLO) 

and special operations liaison element (SOLE) provide the necessary face-to-face 

contact between Navy, Marine, and Special Operations planners and the JFACC or 

COMAFFOR and the respective planning staff. Direct communication between these 

individuals will help ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort, reducing friction 

between Services. The Navy, Marine, and special operations liaison officers 

participating in the AOC planning process represent their respective component 

commanders, and are not assigned or attached to the COMAFFOR or JFACC staff. 

 The NALE, MARLO, and SOLE provide the JFACC or COMAFFOR with timely 

information on non-familiar forces, assets, and planning opportunities to further the 

collective coordination and integration between components/Services. Due to the 

inherently joint nature of most countersea operations, liaisons serve a vital and 

active role in coordinating and planning effects in the maritime environment. 

One liaison element offers coordination between the JFACC and other 

component or Service commanders. The air component coordination element (ACCE) 

29
director is the JFACC's primary operational-level conduit to the supported/supporting 

component. The mission of the ACCE is to enable the director to personally and 

effectively represent the JFACC to his counterpart component commander. The ACCE 

works to ensure the director has all requisite knowledge, understanding, and 

background information to facilitate this mission. The ACCE also can provide 

component-to-command level presence in the forward headquarters. It provides 

operational level assessment and coordination of JFACC planning and execution to 

ensure integration with the operations plan and operational intent to meet JFC 

guidance. 

Air Force members can be expected to be liaisons to the JFMCC and/or 

COMNAVFOR during joint maritime operations. These Air Force liaisons within 

the staff(s) of the respective maritime commander offer tactical expertise, 

operational guidance, proper doctrinal implementation, and real-time 

coordination of operations with Air Force forces.

 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

 Planning for operations in the maritime environment presents many challenges. 

The following characteristics, conditions, and challenges found in the maritime 

environment should be considered in the planning process: 

 Command Relationships. Establishing proper relationships of components and 

functions is necessary to achieve unity of effort in employing Air Force forces in 

countersea operations. The following areas and issues need resolution before 

moving forward in the planning process:

 The JFACC normally retains TACON of all common/joint use sorties. 

 All air defense sorties are considered common/joint use sorties. 

 Recognize that the COMNAVFOR and/or the JFMCC are conducting 

maritime superiority operations and will retain sorties/assets for organic 

support. 

 Areas of Responsibility. Clearly understood areas of responsibilities are 

prerequisite for successful joint operations in the maritime environment. 

 The JFACC, land or sea-based, is normally both the AADC, ACA, and 

space coordinating authority (SCA) responsible for overall defense of the 

joint operations area (JOA) and integrating all component requirements for 

space support. 

 The JFMCC or COMNAVFOR is typically assigned regional air defense 

responsibilities over water. 

30
 The JFACC is normally tasked to achieve functional, not regional, 

objectives. Whereas land and naval commanders are normally given 

areas of operations (AO), the JFC normally tasks the JFACC with theaterwide responsibilities such as interdiction or strategic attack. Per joint 

doctrine, areas of operation do not apply to the joint air component. 

 Defensive counterair operations or missions are typically sourced jointly 

for efficient command and control and economy of force whether over land 

or water. 

 Strike Planning. Strike planning should ensure maximum integration of land 

and sea-based air and space operations. Attention should be given to the 

complexity of the operation, as well as communications challenges. 

 Contemplate joint packaging after attainment of air and maritime 

superiority. 

 Use AWACS and E-2 Hawkeyes to assist real-time package coordination 

for joint air operations. 

 TLAM harmonization and launch deconfliction should continue to be 

coordinated through the JFACC and the TLAM strike coordinator to 

ensure deconfliction with strike aircraft. 

 Consideration should be given to flight deck operations and cycle times. 

 Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and air refueling are typically 

operations with the greatest demand. Consider all LIMFACs when 

conducting strike planning. 

 Exchange of Air Force unit representatives with JFMCC, COMNAVFOR, 

and/or carrier air wings (CVWs) is highly effective in facilitating tactical 

planning and operations coordination. 

 Air Refueling Operations. Air Force assets operating near or in the vicinity of 

an aircraft carrier require familiarity with flight deck operations to facilitate 

effective air refueling operations with Navy air assets. Air refueling coordination 

and integration requires constant management by planners, and details need to 

be stated in ATO SPINS. 

 Positive control procedures should be utilized combined with an 

awareness of potential air traffic congestion. 

 Organic maritime aircraft operating at lower altitudes (below 10,000 ft) can 

be a risk factor in the maritime operating environment 

 Planners should ensure Air Force air-to-air refueling procedures are 

clearly communicated to be used in all JFACC-controlled operations. 

31
 Desired effects. Once desired effects are defined, the concept of operations 

(CONOPS) and master air attack plan (MAAP) optimize assets and munitions 

based on the maneuverability, size, shape, and dimensions of surface, undersea, 

and other potential maritime targets.

 Integration with maritime forces. Many variables not encountered in typical Air 

Force training environments are essential to the success of planning integrated 

operations with maritime forces. Integration during the planning process should 

consider and determine issues such as: 

 Maritime superiority vs. air superiority. 

 Joint air operations. 

 Joint packaging. 

 Leveraging component capabilities. 

 Cross component information flow. 

 Areas of responsibility. 

 ADC responsibilities within the maritime AO. 

 Sector and regional air defense functions. 

 DCA for maritime force protection. 

 Strike packaging and considerations. 

 Maritime air support. 

 Dynamic targeting. 

 Surface attacks. 

 EW support. 

 Air mobility and air refueling. 

 Environmental conditions. Maritime environment weather conditions may 

change rapidly. Characteristics such as wave height and sea spray will impact 

visibility and radar/sensor effectiveness for platforms and munitions. Ducting, a 

phenomenon that allows radar energy to travel extended distances within a few 

hundred feet of the sea surface under some conditions, can influence tactical 

planning. Therefore, these conditions require thorough analysis. For example, 

carrier-based aircraft may encounter sea-state constraints for launch and 

recovery. Operations, in turn, may impact joint land- and sea-based strike 

packaging as well as counterair. Advance planning should address the need for 

32
sufficient air power assets to offset the loss of capability and desired effects due 

to environmental factors. 

 Enemy threat, location, and capabilities. Maritime targets tend to be more 

difficult to engage than land-based targets. The maritime environment does not 

provide the protection afforded by terrain. In this medium, the threat can often 

detect and engage aircraft from long distances. Such factors may increase the 

number of aircraft needed to successfully strike targets or meet desired effects 

and objectives. 

 Naval nomenclature and terminology. Integration with maritime forces during 

employment needs to be thoroughly planned for and understood. Command and 

control structure, element/agency call signs, and communication procedures are, 

in most cases, different than those in the Air Force. Aircrew must be able to 

identify, understand, and interface with maritime elements within the CSG, ESG, 

or SAG. For instance, conducting CAS in an AOA requires coordination with the 

DASC as opposed to the air support operations center in traditional CAS. 

AIR FORCE OPERATIONS 

 The following sections cover planning and employment considerations for 

directing Air Force functions related to the protection and enhancement of maritime 

freedom of action. 

Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

 In the maritime environment, control must be achieved in the air, on the surface, 

and under the surface as part of battlespace dominance. Air Force forces help enable 

control of air and surface maritime areas through surveillance and reconnaissance 

coverage and their significant abilities to collect data. Air Force forces provide rapid 

and large area surveillance and reconnaissance coverage, often arriving on 

station prior to other forces. This coverage can be used to observe the maritime 

environment in a homeland security role or overseas. 

Planning and employing this capacity could occur as a single Service or jointly. 

Operations may involve interfacing with multinational forces, Navy forces, the Coast 

Guard, or other agencies responsible for homeland security. Preparation and execution 

of ISR should include coordination through LNOs working in the AOC or with other 

agencies. 

Some of the attributes Air Force air and space assets may offer in surveillance 

and reconnaissance of the maritime environment are: 

 Rapid deployment to the area of interest. 

 Large area coverage in a short time period. 

33
 Ability to loiter with or without air refueling depending on platform. 

 Passive and active detection, classification, and identification. 

 Real time target tracking/reporting. 

 Over the horizon targeting. 

 Ability to transition to weapons employment depending on platform. 

 Real time strike support. 

 Environmental situational awareness through weather data. 

 Indications and warnings. 

 Rapid and accurate battle damage assessment. 

 Planning for ISR operations should address the objectives of area and directed

surveillance/reconnaissance, classification of contacts, prioritization of contacts, and 

rules of engagement relating to contact location, type, and overflight. LNOs may be a 

valuable source of information regarding surveillance/reconnaissance operations and 

associated supported commander’s intent. Awareness of international laws regarding 

vessel type and location, as well as threat capabilities, help avoid unnecessary 

escalation of a surveillance/reconnaissance situation. 

Antisurface Ship Warfare (Surface Warfare) 

Commanders may employ Air Force forces to interdict enemy maritime surface 

forces. These operations are conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface 

forces and merchant vessels. Planning should address and define marshalling areas; 

area of attack; ROE; required coordination and deconfliction with friendly vessels in or 

near the area of operation; fighter, joint, missile, and self-defense engagement zones; 

vessel identification; and other factors that may influence platform choices, weapons 

mix, tactics, and support requirements. 

Air Force assets such as the F-16, F-15E, A-10, B-1, B-2, B-52, and F-117 are 

capable of employing a variety of precision-guided munitions effectively against the 

majority of maritime surface vessels. Most Air Force fighter and bomber aircraft provide 

precision, cluster, and general-purpose munitions capabilities. 

Today’s combatant commanders require the capability to engage mobile 

seaborne targets in all weather conditions. While there exists a capability to engage 

mobile, maritime, surface vessels in clear air conditions using “fighter-centric” shortrange munitions, there is presently no fielded capability to hit this same target set in 

adverse weather conditions such as low ceilings or fog. The Air Force is currently 

developing that capability and PACAF successfully completed tests in 2004 through the 

demonstration of Resultant Fury. 

34
Air Interdiction Demonstration In The Maritime Environment

1921 

US Army Air Service MB-2 bombing of

German capital ship Ostfriesland 

2004 

US Air Force B-52 using AMSTE JDAM 

creating effects on ex-USS Schenectady 

Analogous of the transformation from black and white to color photos, air

interdiction in the maritime environment has progressed since 1921 when the first

employment (83 years ago) of an aircraft against a ship proved to be, yet another

effective use of air power. In November of 2004 the Air Force conducted Resultant

Fury, a two-phased demonstration featuring B-52 bombers and F-15E fighters

meeting, engaging, and sinking multiple moving maritime targets. This is the first time

Air Force aircraft have used the [joint direct attack munition] JDAM to sink a moving

vessel. “The ability for airpower to rapidly respond and sink naval vessels is crucial in

our theater,” said Maj. Gen. David Deptula, Director of [Pacific Air Forces] PACAF air

and space operations. “We can successfully engage and destroy multiple ships in all

weather, day or night.” 

Though maritime interdiction itself is not new, the Air Force has not practiced it a

lot since before Desert Storm. However, the level of command and control and the

ability to use the technology in the Global War on Terrorism is new. “We can use this

technology to sink ships used by enemy combatants, terrorists, or those used for

piracy,” said Maj. Mike Eliason, Resultant Fury demonstration director and Chief of

PACAF weapons and tactics. 

Through real-time, all-weather technology, information was fed from intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to the Pacific air and space operations

center, enabling command and control elements near real-time ability to track multiple

moving sea targets and feed that information to airborne bomber pilots, allowing them

to quickly engage and destroy the vessels. 

–PACAF Public Affairs

NOTE: While Resultant Fury was designed strictly as a demonstration, and as such 

does not reflect current operational capabilities, it, like Brigadier General “Billy" 

Mitchell’s demonstration in 1921, dramatically highlighted the potential effectiveness 

of airpower in the maritime environment. 

35
ATTACK ON THE HMS SHEFFIELD 

The British Task Force that deployed to retake

the Falkland Islands was centered approximately

100 miles south of Port Stanley in the Falkland

Islands on the morning of 4 May 1982. An

Argentine Neptune of the 1st Naval Reconnaissance

Escuadrilla had been shadowing the fleet and

periodically reporting the fleet's position. Later that

morning, two Argentine Super Etendards armed

with Exocet missiles launched from Rio Grande 

Air Base. After a brief refueling from a KC-130 Hercules tanker, the two aircraft continued

eastward toward the Falklands and their target, the British fleet, all the while maintaining

radio silence and listening to broadcasts from the Neptune. 

The Super Etendards descended to low altitude as they approached the target area. In

the reported vicinity of the warships, they climbed to about 120 feet, turned on their radar to

locate the targets, launched the Exocets, descended, and withdrew as fast as they could. 

The HMS Sheffield was on radar picket duty approximately 20 miles west of the main

body. Its radar briefly picked up an incoming aircraft at low altitude, but it disappeared from

their radar shortly afterwards. Two minutes later, officers on the bridge noticed a trail of

smoke followed five seconds later by the missile impacting the ship with a dull bang. Many

believe the warhead never exploded, but the remaining rocket fuel started a fire that

eventually forced the crew to abandon ship. Eventually the ship sank. 

With only four operational Super Etendards and few Exocets, the Argentines flew a total

of 12 sorties that launched five missiles. Of these, two missiles hit their targets. Due to this

threat and lacking an effective early warning capability, the British shifted their aircraft

carriers further to the east, forcing their Harriers and Sea Harriers to operate close to their

maximum combat radius, reducing the amount of support they could provide to British

surface forces in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands. 

—Various sources

Antisubmarine Warfare 

 Air Force forces successfully performed ASW during WW II. Currently, Air Force 

assets could perform ASW in an ISR and interdiction role by monitoring and, if needed, 

attacking enemy submarines under way or in port, as well as the port itself, or locations 

used for refueling or supply. Additionally, currently fielded Air Force assets have 

sensors and weapons required to detect and engage diesel submarines, in support of 

the JFMCC’s undersea warfare efforts. However, extensive planning and training would 

be required for Air Force forces to effectively attack deployed, submerged submarines. 

36
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 

The formation, equipping, and training

Aerial Minelaying Operations 

Mine warfare (MIW) is the strategic, operational, and tactical use of mines and 

mine countermeasures (MCM). Mine warfare is divided into two basic subdivisions–

minelaying for area denial and countering enemy–laid mines. Mine warfare air 

operations support the broad task of establishing and maintaining control of vital sea 

areas. The most expeditious minelaying operations are accomplished by aircraft. Mine 

countermeasures seek to prevent an enemy from laying mines and include actions to 

reduce or eliminate mines already laid by an enemy. 

of effective sea and air antisubmarine

forces against the German offensive on the

East Coast required time. The Navy,

supported by the AAF [Army Air Force],

gradually progressed with various

defensive measures and increasingly

effective air patrols forced the Germans

to greater caution in the waters of the 

Eastern Sea Frontier. By June 1942, German submariners had turned to the less

dangerous waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. 

The shift of the German submarines offensive to the Gulf overwhelmed the

resources of the Navy and the AAF, which were barely adequate to defend

against submarines in the Eastern Sea Frontier. The Navy had created the Gulf

Sea Frontier in February 1942 with minimal surface and air forces, and the AAF

had contributed only fourteen observation aircraft and two worn-out B-18s. To

counter increased submarine attacks, the AAF, between May 8 and 10, sent a

squadron of light bombers (A-29s) to Jacksonville, Florida, and six medium

bombers (B-25s) to Miami and on May 20 - 21 sent a detachment of B-25s to

Havana, Cuba, to patrol the Yucatan Channel. On May 26, the First Air Force

created the Gulf Task Force and stationed it at Miami. This organization, which

continued to operate until November 1942, cooperated with the Commander, Gulf

Sea Frontier, to provide operational control of all AAF aircraft that flew

antisubmarine patrols in the area. At the end of July 1942 the Navy instituted a

convoy system in the Gulf of Mexico, and German submarines faced the same

dangers they had off the East Coast. On September 4, 1942, the United States

lost the last ship sunk by enemy action in the Gulf of Mexico, as Admiral Doenitz

withdrew all submarines from the Gulf. 

—A.Timothy Warnock

The Battle Against the U-Boat in the American Theater

37
EFFECTS OF MINES 

From 1943 through 1945, US land-based

bombers conducted aerial minelaying operations

against Japanese shipping in Burma, the East

Indies, the Solomon Islands, the Bismarck

Archipelago, Thailand, and other locations around

the South China Sea effectively closing the area

or severely restricting barge and ship traffic.

Beginning in the Spring of 1944, B-29s operating

from the Marianas Islands began aerial

minelaying in the waters surrounding Japan. B29s flew 1,529 missions and dropped over 

12,000 mines. This effort complemented the submarine campaign being waged by the US

Navy. According to The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "mines dropped by B-29s in

Japanese harbors and inland waterways accounted for 50 percent of all ships sunk or

damaged. In isolating areas of combat from ship-borne reinforcements land-based aircraft also

sank large numbers of barges and vessels smaller than 500 tons gross weight, not included in

the tabulation provided by the Survey." Mines dropped by B-29s are credited with sinking 287

ships and damaging another 323 from April 1945 until the war ended. Shipping in and around

Japan was either stopped or severely restricted to the point that industry was paralyzed due to

severe shortages of coal, oil, salt, and food. 

—Various sources 

Counterair Operations 

Air Force doctrine and joint doctrine identify the term counterair as the action 

required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. 

“Counterair” and the US Navy/US Marine Corps term, “air warfare” (AW), are virtually 

synonymous. The Navy employs an air defense commander (ADC) as part of its 

composite warfare commander (CWC) structure to enable air and ship platforms to 

engage the enemy in much the same way Air Force assets perform counterair. 

Depending upon the proximity of a forward operating location to an objective 

area and the availability of air–to–air refueling support, commanders may employ Air 

Force fighter aircraft in the maritime environment to gain air superiority. Counterair is 

divided into offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive counterair (DCA). SEAD is a 

component of OCA. 

Air Force forces may perform DCA to thwart enemy air and missile attacks 

against maritime forces. Maritime aviation protects the carrier/expeditionary strike group 

through the action of AW. Surface combatants and aircraft within the strike group to 

protect them from any air threat much the same as DCA is employed. This function is 

controlled by the air warfare commander (AWC). The airborne warning and control 

system (AWACS) and Air Force fighter aircraft are the primary assets to perform DCA 

and augment the AW mission. 

38
Planners, with LNO coordination, should flesh out airspace deconfliction, 

identification procedures and responsibilities, entry and exit procedures, and minimum 

risk routing (MRR) within the strike group AO. More importantly, the defining of fighter 

engagement zones (FEZ), joint engagement zones (JEZ), surface combatant missile 

engagement zones (MEZ), and/or self-defense zones is necessary to preclude 

fratricide. 

Air-to-Air Refueling 

KC-10 refueling F-18 with F-14 in formation 

 Planning air–to–air refueling in 

support of maritime operations should 

ensure refueling compatibility between 

tankers and aircraft receiving fuel. 

Because maritime support aircraft 

missions generally begin from locations 

outside the AO, determination of air 

refueling tracks and offload 

requirements should account for 

operating radius of aircraft, distance to 

and from the AOR, and threat reaction 

requirements. To the maximum extent 

possible, joint air units ordered to 

receive a scheduled ATO offload (e.g., 

specified air refueling control time) 

should take the fully planned onload. 

This helps ensure timely and efficient execution of joint air operations and prevents 

unintentional consequences in the joint air environment. Air Force air mobility planners 

need to recognize the Navy/Marine practice of “opportunity tanking” and accommodate 

it where practicable, without sacrificing planned offloads. Flight operations aboard an 

aircraft carrier are very dynamic and time sensitive requiring carrier-based crews to plan 

their missions with flexibility with regard to fuel and timing. There are instances where 

extra fuel can give these aircraft, or the aircraft carrier, the needed time and flexibility to 

conduct their operations safely and efficiently without having to divert aircraft to landbased facilities. 

Amphibious Operations 

“The doctrine and performance of Marines and Airmen matured in Pacific 

campaigns as the hesitancy and missteps of Guadalcanal, New Guinea, 

and Tarawa were heeded. Coordinated amphibious assault and air warfare 

became irrepressible.” 

—“Struggle for the Marianas,” CAPT Bernard D. Cole, USN

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring ‘95 

39
 Amphibious operations may require Air Force forces to perform functions such as 

counterair to provide air superiority, counterland for interdiction and/or joint close air 

support, airlift for air assault or resupply, and ISR from air and space assets. The 

COMAFFOR or JFACC should plan with the JFMCC, CATF, and CLF to ensure 

functional integration and to accomplish the following in preparation for amphibious 

operations: 

 

 Air superiority must be gained and maintained to protect the amphibious forces 

at sea during transition to land and until amphibious assault is complete. 

 Through air interdiction, enemy forces in the littoral environment will need to be 

reduced or suppressed to an acceptable level prior to an amphibious assault. 

 ISR assets are required to support friendly forces and to monitor enemy forces 

throughout the amphibious operation. 

 High-density airspace control may require the JFACC to designate, along with 

the CATF, a subordinate ADC and ACA within the AOA or HIDACZ depending 

on the area established. 

 Command and control requirements must be clearly established prior to 

employment. JFACC coordination with CATF, CLF, and subordinate agencies 

from initial planning through the different phases of amphibious operations to 

termination are key to mission success. 

40
FAR EAST AIR FORCES (FEAF) AND 

INCHON (AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 1950) 

 As the date for the Inchon landing

approached, FEAF began its part of the

operation. Photographic reconnaissance

units flew across the Inchon-Seoul area to

provide the Navy with desperately needed

high and low tide photos of the sea walls that

would have to be scaled at Inchon. The

photos also provided the Navy with the

information needed to orient the landing

crews. FEAF Bomber Command bombed the

enemy's rail lines north of Seoul beginning 9

September. B-29s bombed bridges,

marshalling yards, tunnels, trestles, and track

leading into the landing area. 

Armed fighters sought out and attacked enemy airfields and aircraft that could threaten

the landings. The X Corps surprised the Communist troops when they went ashore on

15 September. On 17 September, the Marines took Kimpo Airfield with minimal

damage. On 19 September, FEAF Combat Cargo Command landed the first C-54 at

Kimpo, followed by additional C-54s and C-119s loaded with troops, supplies, night

lighting equipment, and cargo handling equipment. A 24-hour operation began with

incoming cargo aircraft bringing troops and supplies and outgoing aircraft providing

aeromedical evacuation of casualties to Japan. 

—Various sources

As an entity, the amphibious operations generally follow following five distinct phases, 

though the sequence may vary: 

 Planning: The period extending from issuance of the initiating directive to 

embarkation. 

 Embarkation: The period during which the forces, with their equipment and 

supplies, are embarked (on board) in the assigned shipping. 

 Rehearsal: The period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for 

the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, 

and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons 

are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications. Rehearsal may consist 

of an actual landing or may be conducted as a command post exercise. 

41
 Movement: The period during which various components of the amphibious task 

force move from points of embarkation or from a forward-deployed position to 

the operational area. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, or rendezvous 

areas. The movement phase is completed when the various elements of the 

amphibious force arrive at their assigned positions in the operational area. 

 Assault: The period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the 

amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the 

amphibious task force mission. 

 When amphibious forces are forward deployed, or when subsequent tasks are 

assigned, the sequence of phases may differ. Generally, forward-deployed amphibious 

forces use the sequence “embarkation,” “planning,” “rehearsal” (to include potential 

reconfiguration of embarked forces), “movement to the operational area,” and “action.” 

However, significant planning is conducted prior to embarkation to anticipate the most 

likely missions and to load assigned shipping accordingly. The same sequence is useful 

for subsequent tasks or follow-on amphibious missions. 

 In short, the five phases of an amphibious operation are always required, but the 

sequence in which they occur may be changed as circumstances dictate. 

Close Air Support (CAS) 

 Amphibious operations may entail CAS in the littoral environment. However, 

there are significant differences that make this type of CAS operation more difficult than 

traditional CAS. Amphibious operations involve many fire support elements creating 

deconfliction challenges and increased potential for fratricide. Air, sea surface and subsurface, and land elements operate and converge in one confined area to support the 

LF. Command and control in an amphibious operation is complex, requiring both 

horizontal and vertical integration bringing fire support coordination agencies under one 

hierarchy. All dimensions become intricately interwoven as the LF transitions to shore. 

 Given the challenges of CAS in a maritime environment, aircrew cannot afford to 

operate as tasked by the ATO without prior planning and coordination. Execution of 

CAS with Air Force forces during amphibious operations requires significant preplanning, rehearsal, and clear understanding of friendly force positions as well as 

movement intentions. Deconfliction of airspace, target areas, and friendly locations is 

essential to safely executing CAS and avoiding fratricide. Aircrew operating in the 

dynamic environment associated with a landing force moving inland requires familiarity 

with geographic reference points, holding points, and entry/exit routes as determined in 

planning. 

Maritime Air Support (MAS) 

Air Force forces may be called upon to prosecute maritime surface targets in a 

time urgent manner. This is a Navy/Marine Corps mission called maritime air support 

(MAS) that is similar to Air Force dynamic targeting. This mission also parallels the 

42
methodology of CAS with detailed integration and terminal control, but not in close 

proximity to friendly forces. Planner and operator coordination with LNOs is critical in 

conducting successful MAS. For more information and MAS procedures, refer to NTTP 

3-03.4 (Rev A), Naval Strike and Air Warfare. 

Space Capability 

The JFACC, as the SCA, will coordinate space operations, integrate space 

capabilities, and have primary responsibility for in-theater joint space operations 

planning. Planning and coordinating as early as possible to utilize joint space 

capabilities greatly enhance maritime operations. Space-based assets may provide a 

significant capability to characterize threats and identify adversary strengths, 

weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Joint space assets provide global communication, 

bandwidth, space-based ISR, environmental monitoring, missile warning, positioning, 

navigation, and timing, which enhance air and maritime maneuver as well as joint fires 

in countersea operations. Also, counterspace operations are conducted to ensure 

friendly forces the ability to exploit space capabilities while negating the adversary’s 

ability to do the same. Defensive counterspace operations are important since space 

capabilities enable distributed operations in the maritime environment. 

Stability Operations 

The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support 

national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. The various discrete 

military tasks associated with small-scale and security operations are not mutually 

exclusive; depending on the scenario, there may be some overlap among the tasks. 

They may also occur within the context of a larger major operation. Air Force stability 

operations in the maritime environment include: 

 Enforcement of sanctions and/or maritime intercept operations. 

 Counterdrug enforcement. 

 Ensuring freedom of navigation and/or protection of shipping. 

 Recovery operations. 

Homeland Security Operations 

 The Air Force defines its role in homeland security operations as all applications 

of air and space power designed to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover 

from the full spectrum of incidents and threats to the homeland, whether man-made or 

natural. This includes traditional combat operations as well as combat support. This 

definition for homeland security operations establishes the Air Force’s responsibilities in 

direct support of homeland security. 

43
 The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works with DOD to 

ensure the sovereignty and security of our nation. DHS provides a comprehensive 

framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations 

whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security. Air Force forces can 

be employed in the role of preserving the security of our homeland by performing 

operations that are conducted to protect our coastal areas from various threats. Air 

Force homeland security operations in the maritime environment include: 

 Indications and warnings. 

 Maritime surveillance and reconnaissance. 

 Anti-surface ship warfare (interdiction in the maritime environment). 

 Counterair. 

There are differences in terminology and definitions between the DHS and the 

DOD. The Air Force construct for homeland security operations attempts to bridge the 

differences. See AFDD 2-10, Homeland Security Operations, for more detailed 

information regarding this matter. 

Other Air Force Countersea Operations 

 Other Air Force operations such as airlift, IO, special operations, C2, personnel 

recovery operations, and weather services may also provide support to countersea 

operations. 

INTERNATIONAL LAW 

To effectively conduct countersea operations, commanders, planners, and 

aircrews must be aware of the legal issues that can impact such operations. National 

policy and legal requirements dictate that countersea operations be conducted in 

compliance with international law. The law relating to countersea operations is 

particularly complex in that much of the law is customary international law developed 

throughout naval history. In addition, commanders, planners, and aircrews must have 

knowledge of the air navigation regimes that dictate where aircraft can lawfully fly. Part 

of the preparation for countersea operations must be a review of the law of armed 

conflict (LOAC) and law of the sea requirements, which affect these operations. 

 The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 has codified customary 

international law on maritime navigation and overflight rights. Air Force members 

involved in countersea operations must be aware of the rights of aircraft over the 

various maritime zones. These zones include the high seas, exclusive economic zones, 

contiguous zones, territorial seas, internal waters, archipelagic waters, international 

straits, and archipelagic sea lanes. These zones are important because they determine 

the amount of control that a coastal state may exercise over foreign aircraft and ships. 

44
All of these zones are measured from national baselines, hence knowledge of where 

these baselines are located is essential if aircraft are to be able to assert and exercise 

their lawful rights in conducting countersea operations. 

 Some nations assert security zones beyond the limits of their territorial sea but 

international law does not recognize any such zone. Military aircraft generally have 

freedom of navigation rights outside of territorial seas. Any nation may declare a 

temporary warning zone including over areas of the high seas. These zones do not 

restrict the right of navigation but advise ships and aircraft of hazardous (but lawful) 

activities. These may include missile testing, gunnery practice, and space vehicle 

recovery operations. In the exercise of their inherent right of self-defense under the 

United Nations Charter, nations may declare various forms of maritime control areas. 

These may include air or maritime exclusion zones, or other types of defensive sea 

areas in which a measure of control is exercised over foreign ships and aircraft. During 

times of conflict, Air Force units must be particularly aware of the rights of neutral 

nations. These rights protect a neutral’s sovereignty, which includes national ships and 

aircraft. 

 The upper limits of airspace have not been authoritatively defined by international 

law. There is a different legal regime that governs outer space, which begins at an 

unidentified point at which artificial satellites can be placed in orbit without freefalling to 

earth. 

In the maritime environment, LOAC, customary international law as recognized 

by the United States, international conventions to which the United States is a party, 

and national policy directives are all relevant. When planning and conducting 

countersea operations, commanders, planners, and aircrew should obtain the legal 

advice of the supporting judge advocate. 

45
CHAPTER FOUR 

COUNTERSEA TRAINING 

Value of Training...Those air units which had anti-shipping attacks as their 

prime mission and employed the required specialized techniques, equipment, 

and training achieved against ships the best results for the effort expended. 

—The United States Strategic Bombing Survey 

GENERAL 

 

 Not since the demise of the Soviet Union has the United States faced a 

formidable adversary on the seas or other maritime environment. Today, a near-peer 

threat to our maritime forces is emerging and will require countering through the use of 

organic maritime forces and Air Force forces. In short, Air Force countersea operations 

can be expected to take place against an enemy’s maritime force, and to project power 

along with the Navy and Marine Corps and protect our domestic shores from would-be 

unconventional attacks. 

 

 To meet the challenges of the maritime environment, the Air Force should be 

prepared to conduct its assigned functions independently, as part of a joint force or as 

part of a coalition. Countersea functions assigned to the Air Force, based on its air, 

space, and information operations capabilities, will be performed most effectively with 

thorough and frequent training in the joint environment. 

TRAINING FORCES 

One of the most important aspects of countersea preparation is training. 

Training should be realistic, subject to constant review and evaluation, and 

reflect the range of military operations in the maritime environment. It should 

balance flexibility and cost, and also emphasize joint and multinational procedures. 

Units must train regularly for their countersea mission to gain experience, develop 

procedures, and streamline integration with maritime forces. For instance, if a unit’s 

designed operational capability (DOC) statement includes a sea surveillance mission, 

then commanders should train crews to successfully fulfill that function. Unit programs, 

weapons schools, exercises, and simulations are sources for this training. Joint 

multinational exercises provide excellent opportunities to gain valuable experience and 

refine procedures for operating together in the maritime environment. Planners should 

design exercises to closely simulate stability and wartime operations in the maritime 

environment. The Air Force should pursue continued or increased participation in 

Service, joint, and multinational maritime exercises. 

46
 Simulation and wargaming, although not a substitute for hands-on training, 

should be utilized when unable to conduct live exercises. Simulations can be made 

more realistic by incorporating stress factors and varied scenarios. Simulation and 

wargaming may best be utilized to work through challenging aspects of an operation, 

such as integration or C2 issues, so as to identify “best practices” and optimize training 

in live exercises. 

 Examples of current training include B-52 and E-2 Hawkeye crews routinely 

performing maritime patrol missions, ISR, and aerial minelaying. The USAF Weapons 

School (USAFWS) provides elements of countersea training and academics to some 

weapon school students. For instance, the 340th Weapons Squadron provides training 

to all B-52 weapons officers in aerial minelaying and jointly coordinates with US Navy 

crews. Other squadrons at the Weapons School, such as the16th Weapons Squadron 

(F-16) are taught maritime operations academics with cross-talk between USAFWS 

instructors and Navy “Top Gun” instructors. 

SUMMARY 

The future success of Air Force maritime operations is based on efforts taken 

now to effectively organize, train, and equip Air Force forces for these operations. 

Through proper preparation and foresight, Air Force forces will be capable of conducting 

countersea to achieve commanders’ objectives in support of national policy for the 

maritime environment. 

Air Force forces in the maritime environment

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine...

47
SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications 

AFDD 1, Basic Air Force Doctrine 

AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power 

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.25, Bomber Maritime operations (BMO) Multiservice Tactics, Techniques 

and Procedures 

(Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air Force Doctrine Center 

web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil; all Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) documents 

are available on the their website https://wwwmil.alsa.mil/index.html) 

Joint Publications 

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support 

JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone 

Other Publications 

Naval Warfare Publication 3–56, Composite Warfare Commander Manual. Naval 

Doctrine Command. 

Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. Naval Doctrine Command. 

Naval Doctrine Publication 1–14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 

Operations. Naval Doctrine Command. 

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Maxwell AFB, AL, reprinted by Air 

University Press, 1987. 

Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral. Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1979. 

Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973: An 

Illustrated Account. Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History, 1984. 

Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U–Boat War. New York: Random House, 1996. 

Doenitz , Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days. New York: World Publishing 

Company, 1958. 

Ethell, Jeffrey and Price, Alfred. Air War: South Atlantic. New York: Macmillan 

Publishing Company, 1983. 

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports. Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997. 

McAulay, Lex. Battle of the Bismarck Sea. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. 

48
Mason, R. A. Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal. London: Brassey’s Publishers, 1994. 

Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two–Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy 

in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963. 

Perry, Charles M., Pfaltzgraff Robert L., Conway Joseph C. Long–Range Bombers and 

the Role of Airpower in the New Century. Cambridge, MA, Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, 1995. 

Perry, Charles M., Rothenberg Laurence E., Davis Jacquelyn K. Airpower Synergies in 

the New Strategic Era: The Complementary Roles of Long–Range Bombers and 

Carrier–Based Aircraft. McLean, VA, Brassey’s, Inc., 1997. 

Potter, E. B. and Nimitz, Chester W., eds. Sea Power: A Naval History. Englewood 

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice–Hall, 1960. 

San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Forces at Sea. 

International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 1994. 

Schoenfeld, Maxwell. Stalking the U–boat: USAAF Offensive Antisubmarine Operations 

in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995. 

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: 

Free Press, 1984. 

Syrett, David. The Defeat of the German U–Boats. Columbia, S.C.: University of South 

Carolina Press, 1994. 

Van der Vat, Dan. The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Great Struggle. New York: 

Harper & Row Publisher. 1988. 

49
GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AAA antiaircraft artillery 

AAF Army Air Forces 

ACC air component commander 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AI air interdiction 

ATP allied tactical publication 

AOR area of responsibility 

AETF air and space expeditionary task force 

AW air warfare (Navy) 

AWC air warfare commander (Navy) 

C2 command and control 

C2WC command and control warfare commander [Navy] 

CAS close air support 

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONUS continental United States 

CSAR combat search and rescue 

CWC composite warfare commander (Navy) 

DCA defensive counterair 

DOC designed operational capability 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

ELINT electronics intelligence 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JA judge advocate 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JDAM joint direct attack munition 

JFACC joint force air and space component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JP joint publication 

JTF joint task force 

LOAC law of armed conflict 

LNO liaison officer 

50
MCM mine countermeasures 

MIW mine warfare 

NDC Naval Doctrine Command 

NDP Naval doctrine publication 

NWP naval warfare publication 

OCA offensive counterair 

OPCON operational control 

OTC officer in tactical command (Navy) 

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses 

SLOC sea lines of communication 

SO special operations 

SUW surface warfare (formerly antisurface air operation—Navy) 

SUWC surface warfare commander (Navy) 

TACON tactical control 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

USW undersea warfare [formerly antisubmarine warfare] [Navy] 

USWC undersea warfare commander [Navy] 

Definitions 

airlift. Operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel through the air in support 

of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. (AFDD 1) 

air refueling. The capability to refuel aircraft in flight, which extends presence, 

increases range, and serves as a force multiplier. (JP 1-02) 

air warfare. A US Navy/US Marine Corps term used to indicate that action required to 

destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. It includes 

such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface–to–air 

and air–to–air missiles, electronic attack, and destruction of the air or missile threat both 

before and after it is launched. Other measures which are taken to minimize the effects 

of hostile air action are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), 

and mobility. Also called AW. (NDC) 

amphibious operation. An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, 

embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. 

As an entity, the amphibious operation includes the following phases: a. planning—The 

period extending from issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation. b. 

embarkation—The period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, 

are embarked in the assigned shipping. c. rehearsal—The period during which the 

51
prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the 

timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) 

ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications. d. 

movement—The period during which various components of the amphibious task force 

move from points of embarkation to the objective area. e. assault—The period between 

the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area 

and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. (JP 1–02) 

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to 

successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This 

includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; 

weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within 

the operational areas and areas of interest. See also electromagnetic spectrum; 

information environment; joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. (JP 1-02) 

[The commander’s conceptual view of the area and factors which he must understand to 

successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It 

encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and land operations that the 

commander must consider in planning and executing military operations. The 

battlespace dimensions can change over time as the mission expands or contracts 

according to operational objectives and force composition. Battlespace provides the 

commander a mental forum for analyzing and selecting courses of action for employing 

military forces in relationship to time, tempo, and depth.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized definition 

in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} 

close air support. Air action by fixed– and rotary–wing aircraft against hostile targets 

which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of 

each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1–

02) 

close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which 

are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or 

coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the 

supported force. (JP 1–02) 

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. 

(JP 1–02) 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority 

established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised 

only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise 

directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command 

authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to 

perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving 

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics 

necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command 

52
(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force 

commanders and the Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant 

command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ 

commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to 

accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command 

(command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1–02) 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 

the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 

the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1–02) 

compatibility. Capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material 

to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. (JP 

1–02) 

counterair. A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and 

maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to 

destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 1–02) 

counterland. Operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of 

superiority over surface operations through the destruction, disruption, delay, diversion, 

or other neutralization of enemy forces. The main objectives of counterland operations 

are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the 

same. (AFDD 1)

countersea. Operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of 

superiority over maritime operations by the destruction, disruption, delay, diversion, or 

other neutralization of threats to maritime capability. The main objectives of countersea 

operations are to dominate the maritime environment and prevent the opponent from 

doing the same. (AFDD 2-1.4)

direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and 

authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance. (JP 1–02) 

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, 

composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established 

across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that 

may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1–02) 

general support. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not 

to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1–02) 

53
interoperability. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and 

accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so 

exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (JP 1–02) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. See 

also joint force commander. (JP 1-02) [The joint air and space component commander 

(JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center to command and control the 

integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force commander’s objectives. This title 

emphasizes the Air Force position that air power and space power together create 

effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power alone.] (AFDD 2) {Italicized 

words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command 

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1–02) 

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of 

maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or 

accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime 

component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and 

tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component 

commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces 

and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1–02) 

littoral. A coastal region (Webster, 10th ed). The term littoral, as it applies to naval 

operations, is not restricted to the limited oceanographic definition encompassing the 

world’s coastal regions. Rather, it includes that portion of the world’s land masses 

adjacent to the oceans within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of 

sea-based forces. (NPD-1) 

maritime environment. The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and 

the airspace above these, including the littorals. (JP 1–02) 

maritime power projection. Power projection in and from the maritime environment, 

including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or 

logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’ 

range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by 

54
amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control 

operations. (JP 1–02) 

mine warfare. The strategic, operational, and tactical use of mines and mine 

countermeasures. Mine warfare is divided into two basic subdivisions: the laying of 

mines to degrade the enemy’s capabilities to wage land, air, and maritime warfare; and 

the countering of enemy–laid mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of selected land 

or sea areas. Also called MIW. (JP 1–02) 

mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, 

because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, 

and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1–02) 

Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS). Fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and 

electronic-warfare systems in support of a unit or units on land. (NDP-1) 

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational 

control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control 

may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over 

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning 

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish 

the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the 

command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint 

force commanders and the Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces 

and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers 

necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of 

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, 

internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1–02) 

power projection. The application of offensive military force against an enemy at a 

chosen time and place. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by amphibious 

assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations. (NDP1) 

sea control operations. The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air 

forces, as appropriate, to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations 

include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, 

protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of 

naval operations. (JP 1–02) 

sea surveillance. The systematic observation of surface and subsurface sea areas by 

all available and practicable means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying and 

55
determining the movements of ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly and 

enemy, proceeding on or under the surface of the world’s seas and oceans. (JP 1–02) 

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component 

commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, 

organizations, and installations under the command including the support forces that 

have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate 

unified command or joint task force. (JP 1–02) 

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the 

closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most 

efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt 

on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, 

administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures 

and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, 

weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with 

corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 1–02) 

strategic attack. Military action carried out against an enemy’s center(s) of gravity or 

other vital target sets including command elements, war production assets, and key 

supporting infrastructure in order to effect a level of destruction and disintegration of the 

enemy’s military capacity to the point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or 

will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity. (AFDD 1) 

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects 

of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation 

planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the 

commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to 

requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1–02) 

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other 

support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the 

designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1–02) 

suppression of enemy air defenses. That activity which neutralizes, destroys, or 

temporarily degrades surface–based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or 

disruptive means. Also called SEAD. (JP 1–02) 

surface warfare. That portion of maritime warfare in which operations are conducted to 

destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels. Also called 

SUW. (NDC)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or 

military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, 

usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to 

accomplish missions or tasks as-signed. Tactical control is inherent in operational 

56
control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the 

level of combatant command. Also called TACON. See also combatant command; 

combatant command (command authority); operational control. (JP 1-02) 

undersea warfare. Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the 

effective use of submarines. Also called USW. (NDC) [This term was formerly known as 

antisubmarine warfare.] 

57