The Shootdown of

Trigger 4

Report of the

Project Trigger

Study Team

Todd P. Harmer, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

and

C. R. Anderegg, Colonel, USAF Ret.

Headquarters United States Air Force

Washington, DC

April 2001
ii
Foreword

Of the many axioms that rule the swirling world of aerial combat, none is

truer than “get the first shot.” Fighter pilots will go to almost any length to beat

their adversaries to the draw, because that puts the opponent on the defensive. It

is a very uncomfortable feeling to be defensive, when one is operating a machine

that is by its nature offensive. Granted, the fighter may perform defensive missions, but even the newest fighter pilot learns that the best defense is to attack

before the target knows it is under attack. More than three decades ago, fighter

crews received a weapon system designed to let them throw the first punch—the

AIM-7 Sparrow. The first versions of the AIM-7 seemed impressive; it was a

large missile, 425 pounds, with a devastating warhead of expanding steel rods

propelled outward in an expanding circle by nearly 70 pounds of explosive.

Since the missile was radar-guided, the F-4 Phantom II crews could fire it under

any conditions: at night, through the weather, at targets more than ten miles away.

In fact, they could fire it beyond visual range without ever seeing the target. The

Sparrow seemed to be an ideal weapon to fire from long range at Soviet nuclear

bombers attacking America and her military forces. 

Then came the air war over Vietnam, and the fighter crews there soon realized that AIM-7 shots beyond visual range were often more dangerous to other

Americans than to the enemy, because there was no way to identify the target as

friend or foe. Air Force and Navy crews alike quickly reverted to the eyeball as

the only sure way to discriminate. They abandoned the capability of the AIM-7

to reach beyond visual range, as they came to distrust shots that might lead to a

fratricide—the inadvertent downing of a friendly fighter. 

By 1972 a new system was in place in a handful of Air Force F-4s.

Nicknamed Combat Tree, the system allowed these few fighters to interrogate the

beacons North Vietnamese MiGs carried to show their position to their radar controllers. If an F-4 identified a MiG with Combat Tree, and the crew was certain

that no friendlies were in front of them, the crew could shoot beyond visual range.

Nonetheless, it was risky for several reasons. Navy fighters entered from one

direction as Air Force fighters entered from another. Groups were on different

radio frequencies. Sometimes targets changed at the last minute. The weather

was almost always a factor. It was common for strike packages to become confused as flights got separated. Combat leaders often had to improvise in a thick

fog of war.

On July 29, 1972 Air Force F-4s and North Vietnamese MiG-21s engaged

fifty miles northeast of Hanoi. The F-4s shot down two MiGs, and the MiGs shot

iii
down an F-4 whose callsign was Trigger 4 (the fourth F-4 in a flight of four).

Such is the historical record, but some pilots thought the record was wrong. They

suspected that only one MiG fell, and that the second kill was really Trigger 4, a

victim of fratricide perpetrated by Cadillac 1, the lead F-4 of another flight of four

on a MiG sweep out of Udorn, Thailand. Fortunately, the two-man crew of

Trigger 4 survived the shootdown and several months of imprisonment in Hanoi. 

In the mid-1990’s, an Air Force Reserve colonel conducted research on

Trigger 4’s loss. His skill and persistence permitted him to gather an impressive

body of data on this one engagement. He reached a preliminary conclusion that

it was “highly probable” Trigger 4 had been a victim of fratricide. Yet, he knew

his conclusion was based on circumstantial evidence; he had no smoking gun. In

2000, the pilot of Trigger 4, who was aware of the Air University researcher’s

findings, wrote to the Air Force Chief of Staff and asked that the matter be investigated fully. In response the Chief of Staff directed a team of experts to reconstruct the air battle of July 29, 1972 to determine the facts surrounding Trigger

4’s shootdown. He also appointed a non-partisan senior mentor to monitor the

team’s thoroughness and methodology. 

The Project Trigger team began work in the Checkmate division of the operations directorate. They built upon the foundation provided by the Air University

researcher. Even though this air-to-air battle occurred nearly 29 years ago, the

team found and interviewed 27 participants and other interested observers of the

battle. The team was fortunate to be able to synchronize five cockpit tapes,

including three from the F-4 flight leaders in the battle, and two others from the

flight whose kill was in question. Using the tapes, eyewitness accounts, intelligence records, and the team’s considerable experience, they reconstructed the

engagement, and determined that a MiG-21 shot down Trigger 4.

As the reader sees the story unfold, it becomes clear that there are important

lessons. None of the three aircrews shot down in this engagement realized they

were under attack until it was too late. But firing beyond visual range is also

risky, and the system of rules in place today is the direct result of experiences

from air battles such as this one. A culture of discipline in the Air Force is an

important part of what makes it the best in the world. “Get the first shot” may be

axiomatic, but identifying the target is even more basic.

Richard P. Hallion

The Air Force Historian 

iv
Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

1. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Cockpit Tape Recordings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Research Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Engagement Reconstruction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Shortfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Role of the Senior Mentor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Disposition of Research Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Historical Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Evidence and Analysis 

That Questions the Historical Record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Importance of Synchronizing the Cockpit Tapes . . . . 10

3. Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Evidence Supporting Cadillac’s Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Evidence That a MiG Shot Down Trigger 4 . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Examination of the Thesis

that Cadillac 1 Shot Down Trigger 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix I—Time Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix II—Project Trigger Team Biographies . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

v
The Target Area in North Vietnam on 29 July 1972

vi
1. Methodology

The official record shows that Cadillac, a flight of four F-4s on a MiG sweep

mission over North Vietnam on 29 July 1972, engaged and shot down a MiG-21, a

kill credited to Cadillac 1. Shortly thereafter, Pistol, a flight of four F-4s, escorting

a chaff mission, engaged and shot down a second MiG-21. Almost immediately

thereafter, a third MiG-21 shot down Trigger 4, one of a flight of four that was also

escorting the chaff mission. However, research conducted at Air University over the

past few years challenged the official record by suggesting that Trigger 4 was mistakenly shot down by Cadillac 1, who had misidentified the friendly F-4 as an

enemy MiG-21. The goal of this Air Staff study, nicknamed Project Trigger, was to

reconstruct the events of the air battle and resolve the discrepancy.

Several areas comprise the body of evidence gathered to support Project

Trigger: analysis of cockpit tape recordings; extensive interviews with aircrew that

participated in the mission and others knowledgeable about the mission; review of

archived documents, both classified and unclassified; and reconstruction of the air

battle by means of computer programs designed to display the fight visually. 

Cockpit Tape Recordings

After mini-tape recorders became commercially available in the 1960s, it was

not uncommon for aircrews to carry these devices on combat missions. The

recorders captured everything the aircrew heard, including radio transmissions

made and received, intercom voice, and warning tones. This study was very fortunate to have access to five cockpit tapes (Cadillac 1, Cadillac 3, Cadillac 4, Trigger

1, and Pistol 1) from the mission in question, all of which were in excellent condition despite being nearly three decades old. All the tapes recorded the key portion

of the air battle, and they cover all the major players in the battle. 

The study team gave the tapes to the AF Safety Center where technicians digitized the tapes and then transferred the data to compact disks. Although Cadillac

flight was on one frequency and Pistol and Trigger on another, the technicians synchronized the tapes based on a radio call present on the tapes from Cadillac 3 and

Trigger 1. The call is on the Guard, or emergency frequency, a frequency that only

Cadillac 3 and Trigger 1 monitored. The time matrix at Appendix I shows key radio

calls as they occurred during the engagement. 

Interviews

The Project Trigger team contacted 27 persons, each of whom either had participated in the air battle or had knowledge of it. The team used a comment sheet to

1
document and track communications with the participants. On the initial contact,

the interviewer determined how much recollection the subject had of the mission.

For those who had minimal or no recall of the events, the interview process ended.

For the 15 who could remember more, the team conducted a more comprehensive

interview. Five of these participated in face-to-face interviews at HQ USAF/XOOC

(Checkmate); four participated via video-teleconference (VTC) interview; and the

remaining six interviewed via telephone since it was impractical to conduct either

a face-to-face or VTC session. 

The team conducted comprehensive interviews with Cadillac 1B* (Cadillac 1A

is deceased), Cadillac 2A, Cadillac 3A, Cadillac 4A, Pistol 1A, Pistol 3A, Trigger

1A, Trigger 3A, Trigger 4A and 4B, and the Red Crown controller that directed

Cadillac. The team also interviewed an officer who commanded Teaball, a system

that monitored MiG activity and reported it to US pilots, and they interviewed three

officers who participated in Project Red Baron. During and immediately after the

Vietnam War, Red Baron conducted an extensive analysis of aerial combat over

North Vietnam. 

Audio-visual technicians videotaped the face-to-face and VTC interviews, and

team members audiotaped the telephone interviews. All 15 comprehensive interviews were transcribed. 

To provide interviewees the same information and to start all interviews from

the same baseline, the team provided each the same list of questions and the summaries of the engagements from the Project Red Baron Report. The primary interviewers were Lt Col (then Maj) Todd P. Harmer, Col C. R. Anderegg (USAF Ret),

Dr. Wayne Thompson, and Maj James G. Vick. Biographies of the team members

are at Appendix II.

Research Sources

The team mined several information sources beyond the cockpit tapes and

interviews. The most productive of these was the National Security Agency (NSA)

that provided unredacted intelligence analysis of the air battle. The NSA, at the

team’s request, declassified several documents that shed considerable light on the

results of the air battle. NSA linguists verified translations of original materials, and

their analysts searched archives and open source documentation on the engagement. NSA also located and researched Vietnamese documents. 

The preliminary investigation conducted by the Air University researcher provided a rich source of information for the team. He had already located several of

the participants in the air battle and secured three of the tapes that the team analyzed. Although he was not able to locate some participants in the battle, his interviews helped the team focus its efforts more clearly.

Of course the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama, proved a valuable source for documents such as Project Red Baron

2

* The B callsign suffix refers to weapons system officers (WSO), and the A

suffix refers to pilots.
Reports, interview transcripts, missile firing analysis, and other supporting documentation. The AF Technical Order Repository at Tinker Air Force Base,

Oklahoma, provided F-4 technical orders. 

Engagement Reconstruction

The cockpit tapes, supported by eyewitness accounts, were the primary vehicle the team used to reconstruct the engagement. However, the team was able to

take advantage of sophisticated computer programs to assist the effort. The Theater

Battle Arena section of the Air Staff provided programmers and analysts that were

able to replicate the engagement of 29 July 1972 in a visual display. The display can

be rotated in three axes to give the viewer unlimited views of how the battle progressed. Further, the software afforded the opportunity to “fly” the participants

through different scenarios to determine each scenario’s plausibility. 

The 83 Fighter Weapons Squadron at Tyndall AFB, FL, ran AIM7-E-2 missile

flyout profiles on programs still accessible many years after those missiles left the

AF inventory.

Shortfalls

Perhaps the most significant shortfall was the team’s inability to locate

Cadillac 1’s radarscope camera film. There is no doubt that the film existed;

Cadillac 1B commented on his tape that he was turning the camera on, and three

separate interviewees said they had reviewed the film. Nonetheless, the film is not

at AFHRA, and none of the interviewees have it. The film might have shown exact

firing parameters as well as Combat Tree identifications.

Another shortfall is information concerning the whereabouts and actions of

Chevy flight during the battle. Chevy, like Cadillac, was an ingress CAP, but

Chevy’s territory was west of the battle. In his interview with the team, Chevy 1

could not recall details of his flight and stated that even if he had a tape of the mission it would be impractical to locate it. The team contacted two other officers that

frequently flew with Chevy 1, but neither had a tape and neither could recall who

was on the mission. 

Role of the Senior Mentor

A senior mentor, Maj Gen Larry L. Henry (USAF, Ret.) monitored the team’s

research and analysis. Operating pro bono, his charter was to ensure that the team

thoroughly explored every avenue possible. At the end of the study period he

arrived at his conclusions independent of the Project Trigger team.

Disposition of Research Materials

All materials used in this study were given to the Air Force Historical Research

Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama under the name Project Trigger. These materials

3
include the cockpit tapes, the digitized tapes on compact disks, interview videotapes and transcripts, the contact sheets, Pistol 1’s gun camera film digitized, a copy

of the Air University researcher’s report, and all supporting documents used by

Project Trigger.

2. Analysis

This chapter is in nine sections. The first section briefly reviews the historical

record—what the Air Force has maintained for nearly 30 years as the official results

of the air battle (Linebacker X-Ray III) over North Vietnam on 29 July 1972. The

second section reviews and discusses previous research, not done by the Project

Trigger team, which questions the accuracy of the historical record. The remaining

sections present the Project Trigger team’s analysis of the air battle. 

The Historical Record

Cadillac, four F-4s from Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), was an

ingress CAP in support of a larger package whose mission was to lay chaff into,

over, and out of the target area. The chaff flight, from Ubon RTAFB, callsigns Date

and Palm, were two flights of four F-4s. Another two flights of four F-4s, callsigns

4

Figure 1: Linebacker X-Ray III Enters North Vietnam
Trigger and Pistol from Takhli RTAFB, had the mission of escorting Date and Palm

to protect them from enemy fighters. A flight of four F-105s, callsign Eagle from

Korat RTAFB, was also part of the package to provide Wild Weasel suppression of

surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.1 A US Navy unit, callsign Red Crown on USS

Biddle stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin, provided ground controlled intercept (GCI)

for Cadillac.2

The USAF fighters carried different ordnance and equipment depending on

their mission areas, but only some of the equipment was critical to the fight. Each

Cadillac fighter carried four radar-guided, AIM-7E-2 missiles and four infraredguided, AIM-9E missiles. Cadillac 2, 3, and 4 were F-4Es equipped with a 20-mm

cannon. Although Cadillac 1 was an F-4D with no cannon, it carried Combat Tree,

a system that could distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft by interrogating friendly transponders or enemy beacons. None of the F-4Es in Cadillac, Pistol,

or Trigger had Combat Tree. Also, the F-4D, Cadillac 1, was not equipped with a

gun camera, although it did have a radarscope camera to film the radar picture.3

The battle commenced as Cadillac, on its CAP mission, entered North Vietnam

north of Haiphong, while Date and Palm, the chaff flights escorted by Trigger and

Pistol, entered enemy airspace south of Haiphong. Cadillac swept the airspace

westerly along Phantom Ridge until Red Crown informed them that enemy MiGs

had taken off from Phuc Yen Airfield. (Figure 1) 

Red Crown directed Cadillac southwest to intercept the MiGs. During the

westerly sweep the WSO, Cadillac 1B, used Combat Tree to identify a group* of

enemy aircraft north of Phuc Yen.4 As Cadillac turned southwest under the direction of Red Crown, Cadillac 1B detected two different enemy groups several miles

apart—a south group and a southwest group. Almost immediately, he lost the

southwest group and Cadillac committed to intercept the south group.5 (Figure 2)

During the intercept, Red Crown advised Cadillac of the southern MiGs’ position in relative bearing and range as well as altitude—10,000 feet. Cadillac 1 B

tracked the target using his Combat Tree gear until about 10 miles when he was able

to get a strong enough “skin paint” to lock on with his radar. The MiG was presenting as a left, front-quarter (135-degree) aspect to Cadillac, but the MiG was flying very fast. In order to keep it from drifting off the left side of their scope,

Cadillac performed a series of check-turns to the left that ultimately ended as a constant, hard, left turn. Just as Cadillac reached a firing position, Cadillac 4 called on

the radio that he had been “hit.” In the brief confusion that ensued while Cadillac 1

and 4 conferred, the MiG went off the left side of Cadillac’s scope so they lost radar

contact. (Figure 3) After receiving assurances from Cadillac 4 that his aircraft

instruments indicated no damage, Cadillac 1 continued their turn to the north-north5

* The term “group,” refers to one or more aircraft within 3 miles of each

other. At long distance, radar returns often are inadequate to determine specific

numbers in a group. Project Trigger concluded that at least two groups of

MiG-21s, a south group and a west group, engaged with Cadillac, Pistol and

Trigger flights.
east. Meanwhile another MiG group, whose origin is unknown, entered the fight

from the west, and Red Crown called this west group to Cadillac as “another bandit’s 030 for 7.”6 Trigger 4 B saw the group pass his flight’s six o’clock and twice

called them out on the radio. (Figure 4) Cadillac 1B, trying to find the south group,

6

Figure 2: Cadillac Commits to the South Group

Figure 3: Cadillac Misses the Intercept on the South Group
unknowingly locked on the west group. Cadillac 1A queried Red Crown if the target they were locked on to was an enemy aircraft. Red Crown confirmed it was.

(Figure 5)

Simultaneously, the west group turned right, through south, to west, which

gave Cadillac 1B a momentary head-on indication. However, as the group rolled

out to the west they flew right-to-left across Cadillac’s nose. (Figure 6) Shortly

thereafter Cadillac 4A saw a MiG-21 flying right-to-left in front of the flight.

Nearly simultaneously, Cadillac 2A saw a MiG at the flight’s one o’clock and

called, “...a MiG at one o’clock, Cadillac, one o’clock.” Cadillac 1 launched two

AIM-7E-2s, which tracked to the MiG and destroyed it.7 Cadillac 1 never saw the

MiG. However, both Cadillac 2A and Cadillac 3A witnessed the kill. As they

egressed the area, several members of Cadillac flight saw an F-4, Trigger 4, burning and spinning to the ground.8

Trigger and Pistol had entered North Vietnam at about the same time as

Cadillac and were escorting Date and Palm toward the target. Date and Palm were

flying at about 16,000 feet with all eight aircraft line abreast in order to lay a reliable chaff corridor for bombers about 10 minutes behind them. Trigger and Pistol

escorted the chaffers by flying high and to the rear with Trigger on the east side and

Pistol on the west.9 About two minutes short of the target area, enemy SAM operators launched three missiles toward the 16 F-4s. Pistol took mild evasive action

that put them behind the rest of the formation. As the flight was re-grouping Pistol

1A saw a MiG-21 fly out in front of him. (Figure 6) Pistol 1 locked on to the MiG

and shot a single, AIM-7E-2 that destroyed the MiG.10 Pistol 3A witnessed this kill

and called on the radio, “Nice shot! Nice shot!”11 Meanwhile, Trigger flight was

7

Figure 4: West MiG Group Passes behind Trigger
turning to the east to follow the chaffers, who had expended their chaff bombs over

the targets. During the turn, (Figure 7) Trigger 3A saw the MiG Pistol 1 had shot

going down in flames. At the same moment he saw a MiG attacking his wingman,

Trigger 4, whose WSO also saw the MiG.12 Trigger 3, already in a right turn, called

for a defensive break turn, selected afterburner, jettisoned his external fuel tanks,

and went into a very hard right turn.13 Although Trigger 3 used the wrong callsign,

Trigger 4 recognized his leader’s voice and reached down to jettison his tanks.

However, he was hit by one AA-2 Atoll fired from a MiG-21 flown by Nguyen

Tien Sam.14 The result was catastrophic—Trigger 4 immediately went out of control and burst into flames.15 

Trigger 3 rolled out of his break turn and immediately saw to his left the MiG21 overshooting his flight path. He turned hard behind and below the MiG and fired

an AIM-7E-2 in a back-up mode because his radar was inoperative. The missile

failed to guide, and the MiG escaped.16

Trigger 4A and 4B ejected at 8,000 feet indicated altitude.17 Trigger 1 located

the wreckage and initiated a search and rescue effort. However, the North

Vietnamese captured both Triggers 4A and 4B, who spent the next eight months as

prisoners of war before being repatriated with other prisoners at the end of the war. 

8

Figure 5: Cadillac Locks to West Group
Seventh Air Force credited Cadillac 1 and Pistol 1 each with a MiG kill.18

Project Red Baron and other official sources, including the North Vietnam air force

(NVAF), credited a MiG-21 pilot with shooting down Trigger 4.19

9

Figure 6: Cadillac Attacks West Group as South Group Attacks Trigger

Figure 7: Pistol 1 Shoots South Group Wingman as Leader Attacks Trigger
Evidence and Analysis That Questions the Historical Record

Preliminary investigation by the Air University researcher challenged the

accuracy of the historical record and indicated “a high probability” that Cadillac 1

shot down Trigger 4. NSA documents seemed to suggest that only two MiGs were

airborne at the time of the battle—one was shot down, but the other landed safely

at Phuc Yen. This impression was supported by an interview with the former commander of Teaball, a system that monitored MiG activity. Furthermore, Cadillac 1

never positively identified the target they shot, which occurred remarkably close in

time and position to Trigger 4 being hit. If two MiGs took off and one landed, then

both Cadillac and Pistol could not have each shot down a MiG. Pistol 1’s kill was

irrefutable, because Pistol 3 clearly saw the MiG go down, but Cadillac’s kill was

less certain.20

In addition to the major points just mentioned, other matters have been raised

by critics of the official record. The concluding chapter of this report will address

each of the following nine points:

1. Only two MiGs were airborne, and one landed, yet two were claimed as

shot down.

2. Pistol 1 killed a MiG-21; therefore, Pistol 1 could not have shot down

Trigger 4.

3. The catastrophic damage to Trigger 4’s jet was more typical of the damage caused by a friendly AIM-7 than by an AA-2, Atoll, enemy missile.

4. The pilot of Cadillac 1 was a weak pilot, and his WSO was overly aggressive.

5. Only Cadillac 1 and Pistol 1 expended ordnance in the battle, so no other

friendly aircraft could have shot down Trigger 4.

6. Trigger 4 was not lost to a mid-air collision, SAMs, or anti-aircraft

artillery (AAA) fire.

7. Cadillac 1 had an aspect angle of 0 degrees on its target, the direction from

which Trigger 4 was hit.

8. As they were egressing the fight, Cadillac 1B directed his pilot to shoot at

other aircraft that turned out to be friendly, thereby underscoring 1B’s

excessive aggressiveness.

9. Red Crown was unreliable in its ability to distinguish friend from foe, so

confusion between Cadillac 1 and Red Crown resulted in Trigger 4 being

misidentified as a MiG.

The Importance of Synchronizing the Cockpit Tapes

Clearly, the task of reconstructing an aerial engagement nearly three decades

after the fact is difficult. For a clearer understanding of the complex discussion that

follows, the Project Trigger team constructed a time matrix, or timeline, which

chronologically displays the engagement’s critical events. The time matrix is at

Appendix I. The matrix is comprised of synchronized tapes from the cockpits of

Cadillac 1, Cadillac 3, Cadillac 4, Pistol 1, and Trigger 1. 

10
During the engagements Cadillac was not on the same radio frequency as

Trigger and Pistol. However, the WSOs in Cadillac 3 and Trigger 1 had not turned

off their Guard (emergency channel 243.0) receivers, and both tapes recorded a call

on Guard seconds before Cadillac 1 fired his missiles. The call from Walnut 1 was

“Robin and Goose flights, come up 3 6 6 0, Walnut 1 out,” at 13:18:45 on the time

matrix. Once the team found this common call it was a simple matter for the AF

Safety Center technicians to synchronize Cadillac 3’s tape to Trigger 1’s and then

synchronize the other tapes to establish an exact time line of events. 

The following analysis breaks the mission down into five main areas: the premission situation; Cadillac’s engagement; Pistol’s engagement; Trigger’s engagement; Eagle’s engagement; and events after the mission.

Situation

Seventh Air Force fragged the Linebacker mission for 29 July 1972 as a strike

on the Sudi Co and Nung railroad bridges 50 miles northeast of Hanoi. The mission

included several packages of aircraft: pre-strike MiG CAP; a chaff flight to lay a

chaff corridor and to drop chaff bombs over the target; close escort fighters to protect the chaffers; Wild Weasels to suppress enemy SAM defenses; GCI and air

threat warning from a Navy radar ship; attack aircraft to bomb the bridges with

laser-guided bombs; and post-strike MiG CAP and Wild Weasels to protect the

bombers’ egress from enemy aircraft and SAMs. Cadillac’s mission was to CAP for

MiGs near the targets ahead of the larger packages. Pistol and Trigger flights both

were on missions to provide close escort for Date and Palm flights, the chaffers.

Eagle flight’s job was to suppress enemy SAM systems during the ingress.

Cadillac, from Udorn, flew an F-4D in the lead, and F-4Es comprised the other

three aircraft. Their flight configuration was a bit unusual because the Udorn wing,

the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, preferred to fly with F-4Ds in the element

leads and with F-4Es in the wingman positions. Their preference was based on significantly different equipment on the two F-4 models. About eight of the 432nd’s F4Ds carried the AN/APX-76/80A, nicknamed Combat Tree. Usually referred to

simply as Tree, the equipment was new to Udorn and highly classified. It allowed

the WSO, in the APX-76 mode, to interrogate friendly aircraft transponders. The

APX-80A part of the equipment operated in a similar manner except it could

receive replies from the transponders, or beacons, carried by the MiG-21. The 80A

had both an active and a passive mode. In the passive mode, an F-4D WSO could

simply watch his scope, and if enemy GCI interrogated a MiG’s beacon, the WSO

saw the reply the same as the ground controller. In the active mode, the WSO could

interrogate the MiG’s beacon exactly like a ground controller.21 Of course, the Tree

gave the F-4D an advantage since the WSO could see beacon replies long before

he was close enough to actually lock his radar on to a MiG, a small radar target. In

1972 the F-4E did not carry Tree, but it did have an internal 20mm cannon, or gun.

Thus, Udorn preferred to fly whenever possible with F-4Ds in the lead and element

lead (#3) positions to identify MiGs at long ranges, with the wingmen in F-4Es. On

this particular mission, only Cadillac 1 flew a Tree-equipped F-4D. 

11
Each Cadillac fighter carried four AIM-7E-2, radar-guided missiles. The AIM7E-2 follows a beam of continuous wave (CW) reflections to the target. The CW is

transmitted from the F-4 and the CW transmitter maintains its aim at the target

because it points wherever the radar antenna points. Therefore, to successfully

employ the AIM-7, the WSO must lock the radar on to the target so that it tracks

the target constantly from missile launch to warhead detonation.22 The AIM-7E-2

was a large missile that weighed 425 pounds, and had a relatively large warhead

that weighed 69.4 pounds.23 Each Cadillac also carried four AIM-9E, infraredguided, missiles. Typically called a heat-seeker, the AIM-9E actually tracked a specific infrared spectrum, usually the target aircraft’s exhaust plume. It was possible,

under the right circumstances, for other objects (clouds, bodies of water, and the

earth) to reflect or generate infrared energy in this same spectrum. The AIM-9E was

a launch-and-leave weapon. The pilot pointed his sight at the target and heard a tone

in his headset that indicated the missile seeker sensed the target. The pilot then fired

the missile, it flew to the target, and no further action by the pilot was required.

Both the AIM-7E-2 and the AIM-9E had an influence fuze to command detonation;

therefore, neither missile needed to hit the target to effect a kill. The AIM-9E’s warhead, at 20.8 pounds, was considerably smaller than the AIM-7E-2’s.24 Both Pistol

and Trigger flights were F-4Es with AIM-7s and 9s. 

Two weapons system malfunctions impacted the battle. Trigger 3’s radar was

inoperative; thus he had only an infamously unreliable way to launch AIM-7s missiles called the boresight mode. To shoot an AIM-7E-2 in boresight the WSO

locked the radar antenna straight ahead and set his best estimation of overtake on a

dial switch. The pilot then pointed his sight at the target and fired. He had to keep

the sight on the target throughout the shot for CW energy to illuminate the target.

Boresight AIM-7 shots had an extremely low probability of success.25 The other

malfunction was that Cadillac 1 had a bad AIM-7 on their right, forward missile station. The exact problem is unknown, but the crew knew it was a bad missile and so

stated on their cockpit tape.26

Both Date and Palm were F-4s loaded with chaff dispensers and chaff bombs.

The only noteworthy consideration for their configuration is that they had to fly at

a speed very slow for combat due to limitations of the chaff bombs.27

The Wild Weasel flight, callsign Eagle, were F-105Gs. They carried both the

Shrike anti-radiation missile (ARM) as well as the larger Standard ARM. The usual

employment technique for the Shrike was to loft it at an enemy transmitting station,

usually a SAM radar. The Weasel electronic warfare officer located the site by analyzing radar signals and strengths. The pilot then turned toward the site, pulled his

nose up and launched the Shrike, which then followed the radar signal until an

influence fuze burst it over the antenna. The Shrike was the same size as an AIM7, while the standard ARM was considerably larger. All AIM-7s, AIM-9s, Shrikes,

and standard ARMS were painted white.28

The main enemy aircraft opposing this mission was the MiG-21. Much smaller

than an F-4 and equally as fast and maneuverable, the MiG-21 was a formidable

adversary if flown properly. It usually carried two AA-2, infrared-guided, Atoll

missiles. The Atoll was remarkably similar to an early version of the AIM-9, the

12
AIM-9B—same size, shape, guidance system, speed and warhead. Like the AIM9s carried by the USAF, the Atoll had to be fired from nearly directly behind the

target. Usually the North Vietnam air force GCI closely controlled the MiG pilots

by vectoring them to the target, telling them when to use afterburner and when to

jettison tanks. Typically, they employed very high-speed attacks to hit and run.29

Red Crown, the Navy GCI agency located on USS Biddle in the Gulf of

Tonkin, was a primary factor in this air battle. Red Crown was responsible for the

airspace east of the Hanoi, the airspace for this Linebacker mission. The equipment

used to control Cadillac was a system of displays that gathered radar track, altitude

and intelligence information from other sources and displayed it to the controller as

a battle picture.30

Poor weather in the target area forced a three-hour delay of the mission from

the morning of 29 July until early afternoon. By the time Cadillac and the other

flights arrived over North Vietnam, the weather had broken into the clear and was

not a factor in the mission. All interviewed recalled the weather as either clear or

with scattered-to-broken, low cumulus that may have been a factor to the bombers,

but had no effect on the aerial engagements. The gun camera film of Pistol 1’s

AIM-7 shot confirmed the good weather conditions. 

Cadillac Engagement*

Cadillac entered North Vietnam from the Gulf of Tonkin almost directly over

Haiphong in Fluid Four formation with the element leaders line abreast 6-9,000 feet

apart and their wingmen 1,500-2,500 feet out and slightly back. The element leaders weaved, randomly exchanging sides of the formation in order to avoid flying

straight, predictable flight paths. As they flew northwest toward Phantom ridge,

enroute to their navigation point near the targets, Red Crown transmitted the code

words—x-ray alpha—for MiGs airborne. Almost immediately Cadillac 1B noted

Combat Tree MiG returns on his scope. Shortly thereafter he stated that MiGs were

north of Phuc Yen and only about 10 miles from a friendly flight. 

At 13:14:56 hours, local time, Red Crown advised Cadillac of a bandit bearing

231 degrees from Cadillac at 28 miles. This almost certainly was a second MiG

group since this contact is at least 30 miles south of where Cadillac 1B had seen MiG

beacons two minutes earlier. Cadillac 1 delayed turning southwest to engage the

MiGs until he and his WSO determined that they could intercept the MiGs without

going over Hanoi. They turned to the southwest and pointed at the bandits Red

Crown was tracking, a group Red Crown identified as “two [bandits] on my gadget.”

As they flew southwest, Cadillac 1B momentarily had two Tree contacts, but one

moved off his radarscope to the right (west-northwest), and he lost contact with it.

Cadillac committed to the group Red Crown was tracking, the south group, and

1B continued to track it with his Tree gear. (Figure 2) At 21 miles, Red Crown designated the group as “Green bandit,” the code for an experienced MiG pilot. When

13

* Except where noted the Cadillac engagement is extracted from the tapes of

Cadillac 1, 3, and 4.
they were 10 miles from the group, 1B was able to distinguish the group’s radar

return, and he locked on to it. Red Crown had reported the bandit’s altitude as

10,000 feet only seconds earlier, so it is likely that the bandit was close to that altitude when 1B locked on. It is also likely that Cadillac was slightly below the bandit, since it was a usual tactic for the F-4 to get below its target to optimize radar

performance. The MiG group was flying much faster than Cadillac. The timing of

the range calls indicates a 135-degree aspect, so Cadillac was looking at the left,

front quarter of the contact. In order for Cadillac to keep a very fast, 135-degree

aspect target on their radar they would have to be in a nearly continuous, everincreasing in intensity, left hand turn once they were inside 10 miles. Their cockpit

tape reveals that is indeed what they did; turning from 210, to 204, to 192, to 180,

and then Cadillac1B urged his pilot for a harder turn through the southeast and to

the east. When they were nearly in-range to shoot, the intercept had decreased in

aspect to about 90 degrees so that they were pointing at the bandit’s left wing. They

were below the bandit at this point as the WSO called “he’s 15 degrees high.” This

call came at about 5 miles, so the bandit was 8,000 feet above them. 

Just as Cadillac 1 was preparing to shoot an AIM-7, Cadillac 4 called on the

radio that he had been “hit.” Cadillac probably eased off his turn while he and 4 discussed the situation for the next 30 seconds, and during this delay the MiG “gimbaled”—went off the left side of the scope. (Figure 3) Since Cadillac 4 stated that

his aircraft was okay, Cadillac 1 elected to continue on a course towards the last

known location of the bandit—a heading of 030. (Figure 4) The bandit was off

Cadillac 1’s scope only briefly, eight seconds at the most, and as Cadillac rolled out

on a 030 heading, the WSO’s of both 1 and 3 saw a contact on that bearing; however, neither of their radars would maintain track. Twenty-four seconds later, Red

Crown called, “another bandit 033 at 7.” Cadillac 1B locked on and told his pilot

that they had a contact on the nose for 8 miles that was not squawking. (Figure 5)

At this time, two MiG groups had merged with Trigger, Pistol and the chaffers,

who were about 10 miles in front of Cadillac. One was the south group on which

Cadillac missed its intercept, and the other was a group that had entered from the

west, possibly the group seen earlier near Thud Ridge or a group that had launched

silently from the nearby Kep Airfield. This west group flew from west-to-east

directly behind Trigger flight and in front of Pistol flight, which never saw them.

However, Trigger 4B saw them and called them out as the bandits flew across his

tail, “Trigger 4 has two bogies at our eight o’clock,” and 12 seconds later called,

“Two silver bogies at our seven, going to our six, Trigger 4.” (Figure 4) This second call came five seconds before Red Crown made his call, “another bandit 033

for 7,” to Cadillac. This west group immediately made a hard, descending right turn

back to the west, which was tactically sound because if they had turned 90-degrees

left to attack Trigger or the chaffers they would have turned their six o’clocks

directly toward Pistol. 

Immediately after his WSO locked on to the west group, Cadillac 1A queried

Red Crown, “Roger, we have one on the nose at 8 miles. Is that a bandit?” Red

Crown answered seven seconds later, “Affirmative, that is. Ah, he is 046 for 5 right

now.” The 046/5 corroborates a right turn for the west group as they swung slightly

14
right of Cadillac’s nose, and Cadillac 1B’s comment four seconds later that they had

a “head-on” intercept, an observation he made as he saw a momentary high closure

on his radar as the west group’s nose swung through south on the way to a westerly

heading. However, as Cadillac progressed toward the group it is clear that the headon aspect rapidly changed to a beam aspect since their overtake on the bandit is

much too low for a head-on. In fact it took Cadillac 47 seconds to close from eight

miles to one mile, an average overtake of 537 knots. 

Seven seconds after Red Crown made the 046/5 call, he called, “Looks like an

estimated 3 bandits on your 030-3.” Although the ranges may have been off by two

or three miles, not unusual for GCI equipment, it is clear that Red Crown was looking at the south and the west groups, which were nearly merged in front of Cadillac

and close behind Pistol and Trigger. Six seconds later, Cadillac arrived at firing

parameters on the west group, which was on the beam, a 90-degree aspect, to

Cadillac. Two seconds later, Cadillac 2A saw a MiG-21 moving right-to-left in

front of the flight and called, “We got a MiG at one o’clock, Cadillac, one o’clock.”

His call matched sightings of a MiG in front of the flight by Cadillac 4A and

Cadillac 3B, both of whom observed the MiG moving right-to-left across their

noses. Cadillac 3B was so certain the bogies were bandits that he talked his pilot’s

eyes to the MiGs and encouraged him to fire. 

The instant after Cadillac 2A made his bandit call, Cadillac 1B said to his

pilot, “Okay, cleared to fire.” Cadillac 1A attempted to fire four AIM-7s. Since it

was standard operations to fire the AIM-7s in pairs, it is logical to assume that

Cadillac 1A pulled the trigger, released it, then pulled it a second time and held it—

the common technique to ripple-fire missiles.31 The first missile in the firing

sequence, the left forward, ejected from the missile bay, but the rocket motor did

not fire.32 The missile that should have fired next, the right forward was a bad missile, a fact known by the crew, thus the fire control system “stepped over” it. So, the

first normal missile that came off the jet was the left aft missile at 13:18:51. Six

seconds later the WSO, thinking there were still two AIM-7s left, directed the pilot

to “fire the last two,” and the pilot fired the right aft station a second later.33 The

team estimates that the two missiles were fired between 3.5 and 2.5 miles from the

MiG, with respective flyout times of 13 and 11 seconds.34

Both missiles guided normally by turning hard left to compute a lead-collision

course on the MiG that was crossing right-to-left some three miles in front of

Cadillac. Cadillac 2A, who still had a tally on the MiG that was slightly higher in

altitude, watched the missiles all the way to impact. The first missile detonated at

13:19:04 and the second at 13:19:09. Cadillac 2, during his interview with the team,

was absolutely certain that the missiles destroyed the MiG, saying, “I was positive

then, I’m still positive now.”35 Cadillac 3, who had confirmed the kill just before

post-strike refueling, was not so positive during his interview that the missiles

destroyed the MiG. Cadillac 4A commented on his cockpit tape “that blew up short

of him.”36 However, in his interview he stated that he had seen the MiG prior to the

shots, but he did not have sight of it during the shots, and in retrospect thought he

made the comment based on his estimate of the MiG’s position.37

A second before the second missile exploded, Cadillac 1A made a comment

15
that is unintelligible but could be “Guide...No” or “God...No.”38 The Project

Trigger team speculated that either interpretation might be a result of his surprise or

frustration that the first two missiles failed, or he may have been surprised by the

position of his wingman, Cadillac 2, who was flying line-abreast to forward of lineabreast “a quarter of a mile” immediately to Cadillac 1’s left. Such a position could

have looked to Cadillac 1 like the missiles were a threat to his wingman as they

turned sharply left to achieve the Sparrow’s normal lead-pursuit intercept course.

Or, it is most likely that Cadillac 1A, like Cadillac 2A, thought the missiles had

malfunctioned since they turned so sharply left immediately after launch. 

Five seconds after Cadillac’s missiles timed out, Pistol 1 shot down a MiG-21

from the south group. (Figure 7) Six seconds after that the lead MiG-21 of the

south group shot down Trigger 4. Thirteen seconds later Cadillac 1A transmitted

that he saw a “bird” on fire, and later the WSO commented “there’s a big explosion

in the mountains. Somebody just crashed.” 

During their egress from the engagement, Cadillac 1A misidentified friendly

F-4s for enemy MiGs and tried to position for an AIM-9E shot on them. However,

he realized they were F-4s before he arrived at a shooting position. As Cadillac

raced away from the engagement area, Red Crown made four radio calls as he

tracked a bandit near Kep Airfield. The last three of these indicated the bandit was

low on fuel. These radio calls do not jibe with NSA analysis that only two MiG-21s

were airborne that day, and that the only surviving MiG-21 landed at Phuc Yen. 

After Cadillac flight exited North Vietnam, Red Crown warned them of MiGs

over the water, an unusual occurrence, and reported that Eagle 3 and 4 were

engaged. Unidentified aircraft attacked Eagle 3 and 4, the element from the package’s Wild Weasel support, and fired four missiles at Eagle flight.39

Pistol Engagement*

Pistol entered enemy airspace in a cover position on the chaffers, Date and

Palm. Pistol flew a weave at 22,000 feet behind and on the west side of the chaffers, weaving to keep their speed higher in anticipation of engaging MiGs. They

ended up on a heading of 020 to the target area. About two minutes short of the target, the North Vietnamese launched three SAMs in the general direction of the formation. Pistol saw the missiles and took mild evasive action to the right and down.

This action put them below and further behind the chaffers, almost in trail with

Trigger, the other escort flight that was on the east side protecting the chaffers.

Shortly thereafter Pistol 1 lost sight of the chaffers. At 13:16:58 and 13:18:36 hours,

Date and Palm dropped their chaff bombs over the targets and turned southeast to

exit enemy airspace. In between the chaff drops, at 13:17:55, Trigger 4B called

“bogies at our eight o’clock,” and 12 seconds later called, “Two silver bogeys at our

7 going to our 6, Trigger 4.” (Figure 4) No one acknowledged either bogey call.

Pistol 1, who was still looking for Date and Palm, regained visual on them and

16

* Except where noted the Pistol engagement is extracted from the tapes of

Pistol 1 and Trigger 1.
called for the flight to turn 180 degrees to the right. About 15 seconds later a silver

MiG-21 flew out in front of Pistol 1, who locked on to the MiG and fired one AIM7E-2 at the MiG. The missile knocked a wing off the MiG, which caught fire and

went out of control. Pistol 1 flew within “50 yards” of the burning MiG, and Pistol

3, who witnessed the shot and kill, transmitted on the radio, “Nice shot! Nice shot!”

Twenty-five seconds later Pistol 1 heard Trigger 3 comment that Trigger 4 was shot

down, and a few seconds later Pistol 1 noted Trigger 4’s burning aircraft going

down. Pistol 1 then saw two parachutes and orbited the downed airmen as they

descended. 

Shortly after Pistol 1 killed the MiG, Pistol 3A saw a white missile pass 500

feet below his airplane. He could not identify the type of missile, except he was certain it was not a SAM.40 Since Cadillac and Pistol’s missiles had already detonated,

the team speculated that the missile could have been a Shrike fired by Eagle flight

in response to the SAM launch witnessed by Cadillac 4A moments before. 

Trigger Engagement*

Trigger took little if any evasive action to avoid the three SAMs since the missiles were not guiding toward them. Their formation stayed relatively unchanged

until Date and Palm dropped their chaff bombs over the first target. One minute

later Trigger 4B called the west group of MiGs at his eight o’clock and then a few

seconds later this same group crossing his six o’clock. Twenty seconds later Trigger

3A called for Trigger 1 to “come back to the right. There’s somebody following

me.” However, the bogies turned out to be Pistol flight, so Trigger 3 called 12 seconds later, “Okay, come back left Trigger 1 [to resume course.]” These two turns

allowed the south MiG group to rapidly close to Trigger’s six o’clock. By this time

the west MiG group had disengaged in a right, descending turn, then rolled out to

the southwest, which brought them left-to-right across Cadillac’s nose. It is one of

this west group that Cadillac 1 killed. However, the south group, as yet unseen by

Trigger, merged with Pistol and was pressing toward Trigger’s six o’clock. Just as

Pistol 1 shot down the trailing MiG in the south group, Trigger flight started a fluid

four turn to the east, and several of Trigger flight heard Pistol 3 call “Nice shot!

Nice shot!” (Figure 7) Trigger 3A saw the mortally wounded MiG on fire. At

nearly the same instant Trigger 3A and Trigger 4B saw and called on the radio a

MiG behind Trigger 4. Trigger 3A then called for a break turn, selected afterburner,

and jettisoned his fuel tanks. Trigger 3A used the wrong callsign, but Trigger 4A

recognized his element leader’s voice and saw Trigger 3 pull into a violent break

turn. Trigger 4A added some force to his turn and reached down to jettison his

tanks. Before he could jettison and before he could start a break turn, his aircraft

violently departed controlled flight. It took only a short time to realize the jet was

no longer flyable and both crewmen ejected at 8,000 feet.

The MiG-21 shot Trigger 4 from close range—1,500 to 3,000 feet behind.41

17

* Except where noted the Trigger engagement is extracted from the tapes of

Pistol 1 and Trigger 1
An enemy air defense commander reported almost immediately that MiGs had shot

down an F-4.42 After landing, the MiG pilot claimed an F-4, and NVAF records

credit him with an F-4 kill.43

Trigger 3’s break turn was so violent he pegged the meter on his airplane at 10

G.44 Shortly thereafter he saw the MiG-21 overshooting his flight path to his left.

He called on the radio that he was engaging the MiG and that Trigger 4 was shot

down. Since his radar was inoperative, Trigger 3 tried to employ an AIM-9E, but

the missile seeker would not track the MiG. The MiG continued a descent as

Trigger 3 fired a boresight AIM-7E-2, which not surprisingly failed to guide.

Trigger 3 tried a second shot, but this AIM-7E-2 did not come off the airplane.

Trigger 1, 2, and 3 exited North Vietnam.

Eagle Engagement

Eagle 3 and 4, the element of the Wild Weasel flight, had an unremarkable mission until they exited North Vietnam “feet wet,” or over the Gulf of Tonkin. There

they assumed they were safe because they believed that MiGs hardly, if ever, ventured away from the landmass. As the element cruised toward their tanker, Eagle 3

spotted two aircraft high and to the right of the flight as the bogies turned hard down

and toward Eagle. The F-105s immediately spread their formation in order to see

better behind them and lit their afterburners to accelerate. Both pilots lost sight of

the bogeys, and before they could regain tally, at least two, possibly four, missiles

streaked through their flight missing both of them. As Eagle 3 rolled into a hard

break turn he attempted to jettison his centerline fuel tank, but the tank fouled and

wrapped around one of his wing pylons. Neither pilot ever saw the bogies again,

and neither was able to identify the aircraft. Red Crown, however, at nearly this

same time, was warning Cadillac that MiGs were active over the water. Eagle 3 was

able to fly his aircraft back to South Vietnam, but the fouled tank blocked the landing gear from lowering, so the crew bailed out over the water and were recovered.45

After the Mission

After landing Cadillac debriefed their mission. All seven of the living members of the flight interviewed with the Project Trigger team. None recalled any controversy about their MiG kill in their flight debriefing. However, Cadillac 1B

clearly recalled an “investigation” a few days later by officers from the 7/13th AF

headquarters located at Udorn wherein 1B was asked to describe the mission.46

Cadillac 3B also recalled that he was asked to surrender his radar scope film and

possibly his cockpit tape to an officer from the wing tactics office.47 The wing commander, who had been Cadillac 3A, recalled no investigation. The team located two

officers from the operations office of the 7/13th headquarters, but neither recalled

an investigation, although the officer who was deputy commander of 7/13th recalled

there was some “concern” over the validity of the kill.48 The Project Trigger team

believes that there was an investigation but was unable to find any record of a

report. It is logical to assume that any investigation would have agreed with

18
Cadillac’s claim since Cadillac 1 later received credit for a MiG kill.

Pistol and Trigger were from the same Takhli squadron, and their squadron

commander was Pistol 1. The squadron commander stated in his interview with the

team that he made no complaint about the loss of Trigger 4, and that he was

unaware of an investigation.49 Neither Trigger 1 nor Trigger 3 recalled any bitter

controversy over the possibility that their wingman and squadron mates may have

been the victims of fratricide.

A former Udorn pilot stated in his interview with the team that an officer in

charge of the Red Baron Reports, a personal friend, told him in 1973 that the

Trigger 4 shootdown was a case of fratricide, but his superiors would not let him

say so in the report.50 However, when Project Trigger talked to that officer, he

stated that he did not recall the specific events of the engagement, and he was

unaware of any controversy that indicated it might be a case of fratricide. Two other

officers on the Red Baron project also said they were unaware of any controversy

or investigation. All three Red Baron report participants denied that there was pressure to suppress any such information concerning this engagement or any other

engagement.51

Another forum where it may have been likely for fratricide to be raised as an

issue was during a Linebacker conference held at Udorn the day after the mission.

Such conferences were an effort to hash out improvements to Linebacker operations. Trigger 1A attended the conference to debrief the mission of 29 July; yet he

recalled no suggestion or controversy that Cadillac 1 shot down Trigger 4.52

One of the more difficult issues to explain is the number of MiGs airborne during the battle. NSA analysis clearly states that two MiGs departed Phuc Yen; Pistol

shot down one and the other shot down Trigger 4.53 However, the same analysis

does not account for another MiG flight being airborne. Nonetheless, Red Crown

called more than one group on several occasions, and two US aces both said in their

interviews that it was a known tactic for the NVAF to launch MiGs silently to avoid

radio intercept of their presence and position.

3. Results

Evidence Supporting Cadillac’s Claim

Eyewitness Accounts

1. Cadillac 2A saw a MiG-21 crossing right-to-left in front of the flight just before

Cadillac 1 fired and watched the missiles shoot down the MiG as documented on all

three Cadillac tapes and his interview. Enroute to the post-mission tanker he stated

on the radio that he “thinks [Cadillac 1] had a splash.” This comment carried considerable weight with the team because the radio call came unsolicited. Further, the

19
team believes he must have been very sure since he was risking his credibility in

front of both his squadron commander and wing commander. In his interview with

the team he remained certain that he had seen a MiG-21 moving right-to-left, against

a blue sky. He stated that Cadillac 1’s missiles veered hard left in front of him whereupon he immediately assumed they were bad shots. However, he then realized that

the missiles were performing normally and watched them as they tracked to and shot

down the MiG. When a team interviewer asked him how certain he was that Cadillac

1 had shot down a MiG, he replied, “I was positive then. I’m still positive now.” The

entire team found this interview to be highly credible. Although young, Cadillac 2A

had flown 100 combat missions prior to 29 July, 50 of which were in search of MiGs.

Certainly, the atmosphere of this critical time at Udorn would indicate that both he

and Cadillac 4 were two of the squadron’s better pilots since they were flying as

wingmen to the squadron commander and wing commander. Clearly, Cadillac 2A

was a superior pilot because he had qualified as a combat flight leader and led missions over North Vietnam. Also, he was one of a select group of pilots tapped as the

original cadre of Aggressor pilots at Clark AB, an impressive achievement accorded

only the very top aviators. Further, Cadillac 2A separated from the Air Force early,

and seems to carry a bit of a chip on his shoulder about the institutional Air Force.

The team believes he has no motivation to protect anyone that may have pressured

him to confirm the kill, especially the Air Force. 

2. Cadillac 4A also saw the MiG-21 in front of the flight just before Cadillac 1

fired and so stated as documented on his cockpit tape and in his interview. However,

in his interview with the team, he was less certain, although he stated that because

the sun was behind them conditions for seeing the very small MiG at long range

were ideal.

3. Cadillac 3B saw “two birds” crossing right-to-left in front of Cadillac.

Although he did not use the word MiGs, it is clear that he thought they were MiGs

by the tone of his voice as he urged his pilot to shoot when he was ready.

4. Red Crown confirmed that Cadillac was engaged with a MiG. In his interview

with the team, the controller stated that he did not clearly remember this particular

engagement; however, he was adamant that if he told Cadillac the west group was

a bandit, then it was a bandit. He based this statement on his confidence that when

intelligence sources put a B on his scope he was absolutely certain the contact was

a bandit. An interview with the captain of USS Biddle corroborated the Red Crown

controller’s view. The captain was highly confident in the ability of his “spooks,”

an intelligence center aboard Biddle, to identify MiGs. 

5. Cadillac 3A confirmed the kill over the radio after Cadillac 2 brought it up and

later confirmed the kill in the flight debriefing. However, in his interview, Cadillac

3, stated that he assumed the kill was valid because he thought that the explosion

he witnessed was too large to be only the missile exploding.

Reconstruction of Engagement

1. The radar contact Cadillac engaged was moving right-to-left across their

nose. Analyses of the cockpit tapes as well as three eyewitness accounts of the MiG

20
in front of the flight going right-to-left support this point. Further, eyewitness

accounts from all of Cadillac’s wingmen state that Cadillac 1 was nearly wingslevel during the attack, thus, it is unlikely that Cadillac was in a right turn that

would make the target appear to be moving right-to-left. However, the team’s conclusion of a beam target contradicts what Cadillac 1B, the WSO, reported on his

tape that they were in a head-on attack. It very well may have been a head-on when

he first locked on, during the seconds that the west group, after aborting its attack

on the chaffers turned hard right to escape and then came back to the left to clear

away from Pistol flight. Clearly, the closure rates—a little over 500 knots—indicated on Cadillac’s cockpit tape shows an overtake that indicates a beam attack. For

it to be a head-on attack throughout, the overtake would have had to be twice as

high. The team’s conclusion that the attack was on the beam also contradicts the

missile firing report that states the aspect angle was zero—a tail shot. The timing

of the range calls shows unequivocally that the shots were not taken from the stern

unless the target was stationary. Such geometry would have been possible if

Cadillac inadvertently had locked on to and shot a chaff bundle. In fact, had there

not been credible eyewitness accounts of MiGs in front of Cadillac, the team could

easily draw a scenario wherein Cadillac shot chaff, because the intercept geometry

and overtake, as well as the lack of a visual sighting by either Cadillac 1A or

Cadillac 1B, might be convincing that there was no aircraft at the end of the missiles’ flightpaths. 

2. There is ample evidence that more than one MiG group entered the battle.

Cadillac saw three distinct Combat Tree groups on his radar. Red Crown tracked

two separate groups in the fight. Trigger 4B saw MiGs fly past his six o’clock that

almost certainly were not the same group that Pistol shot. Red Crown warned

Cadillac of MiGs over the water that almost certainly was neither of the two groups

in Cadillac’s battle. Red Crown encouraged both Cadillac and Chevy flights to

reverse course toward bandits, low on fuel, that were at Kep Airfield, even though

it is clear that the surviving MiG from the south group landed at Phuc Yen Airfield.

Archived Documents

1. Intelligence summaries credit Cadillac with the kill of a MiG-21 on 29 July

1972.

2. Seventh Air Force published orders that credit Cadillac with a kill.

3. The Project Red Baron Report credits Cadillac with a MiG-21 kill on 29 July

1972.

Evidence That a MiG Shot Down Trigger 4

Eyewitness Accounts

1. Trigger 3 saw a MiG-21 behind Trigger 4 an instant before Trigger 4 was hit

and called it on the radio. He then went into such a severe break turn that he overstressed his jet. 

21
2. Trigger 3 saw a MiG-21 overshoot his flight path seconds after Trigger 4 was

hit. Further, Trigger 3 has been consistent in this account in his Red Baron debrief

in 1973 and his statements during his interview 28 years later with the Project

Trigger team.

3. Trigger 4B saw MiGs at his six o’clock and called it on the radio just before

they were hit.

Reconstruction of Engagement

1. Cadillac 1 could not have shot down Trigger 4. Trigger 4 was in a right turn

when he was hit—a fact confirmed by Trigger 4A, 4B, and 3A. The MiG that

Cadillac shot was in a constant flight path moving right-to-left across Cadillac’s

nose—confirmed by Cadillac 2A, 4A, 3B, the flight path of Cadillac’s missiles, and

analysis of Cadillac 1’s cockpit tape.

2. Cadillac’s kill happened 11 seconds before Trigger 4 was hit. This is the closest the team could reconstruct the kills. It assumes the maximum flyout time for

Cadillac’s missiles against a beam target, and it assumes Trigger was hit at the

beginning of Trigger 3’s break call. 

3. Cadillac was too far away from Trigger to have shot him down. Even if

Cadillac had locked on to Trigger at the “8 miles” call, Cadillac could not have run

Trigger down in 47 seconds. In corroboration, all the Cadillac flight members

recalled Trigger’s burning F-4 as being well away from their engagement. 

Archived Documents

1. NVAF air defenses claimed an F-4 was killed “by MiGs.”

2. The NVAF credited the pilot with an F-4 kill on 29 July 1972. 

3. The MiG pilot reconstructed his shot and kill in a drawing on display in a

Hanoi museum.

Examination of the Thesis that Cadillac 1 Shot Down Trigger 4

In this section, Project Trigger examines nine points that have been used to

argue for the probability of fratricide. Each point is summarized in italics followed

by Project Trigger’s conclusion about the truth or falsehood of that point. 

1. Only two MiGs were airborne and one landed safely, yet two were claimed as

shot down. Although NSA documents state that sources reported two MiGs airborne, they also leave the door open for the possibility that others were airborne.

Cadillac’s cockpit tape clearly identifies two, if not three, MiG groups airborne.

Red Crown’s transmissions clearly identify two, if not three, MiG groups airborne.

Three eyewitnesses reported that MiGs fired four missiles at their flight over the

Gulf. Further, Red Crown reported MiGs low on fuel at Kep Airfield. 

2. Pistol 1 killed a MiG-21; therefore, Pistol 1 could not have shot down Trigger

4. This statement is almost certainly true. Both Pistols 1A and 3A, as well as other

flight members, identified the target as a MiG. However, Pistol 1’s gun camera film

22
is inconclusive because the film ran out before the missile got to the target, and the

target is never in the camera’s field of view. 

3. The catastrophic damage to Trigger 4’s jet was more typical of the effects of

the AIM-7 than the small AA-2 Atoll. This assessment is an anecdotal comparison

to an occasion when an AIM-7 hit a MiG-21 and produced similar damage.

However, another officer, who flew over 300 combat missions, saw an Atoll hit an

F-4 and the damage was just as catastrophic and very similar in that the tail broke

off and the aircraft tumbled forward. 

4. Cadillac 1A was a weak pilot, and 1B was overly aggressive in an attempt to

become the first USAF ace of the war. One interviewee described Cadillac 1A as a

weak pilot. All other interviewees that had flown with Cadillac 1A described him

as a competent pilot and flight leader. In fact, this was Cadillac 1A’s second MiG

kill of the war. His first kill was a high-speed engagement between 50 and 100 feet

above the ground as he pursued and killed a MiG-21. Highly experienced former

F-4 crewmen that listened to the Cadillac tape observed that Cadillac 1A was passive in the cockpit and tended to rely on his WSO, perhaps to a fault. Nonetheless,

the engagement was a radar engagement, wherein the WSO should rightfully be

directive as opposed to informative. 

5. Only Cadillac 1 and Pistol 1 expended ordnance in the battle, so no other

friendly aircraft could have shot down Trigger. Trigger 3 also expended one AIM7. Eagle, the Wild Weasel flight, expended several Shrikes and Standard ARMs,

which in flight resembled a Sparrow missile in shape and color (and size in the

Shrike’s case).

6. Trigger 4 was not lost to a mid-air collision, SAM, or AAA. Probably true.

SAMs were fired at the flight 90 seconds before Trigger 4 was shot down, however,

another SAM was fired only 14 seconds before Trigger 4 was hit, and Cadillac 4A

commented, “There’s a missile. Another SAM.” None of the interviewees recalled

seeing unusual amounts of AAA that day; however, Cadillac 4A commented on his

tape that there was AAA in front of them a minute before they engaged the MiG.

One interviewee recalled AAA being fired at the crewmen in their parachutes, and

Trigger 4A recalled the rounds zipping by him as he came down in his parachute.

It is possible, but unlikely, that AAA gunners could have hit Trigger at the altitude

he was flying.

7. Cadillac 1 had an aspect angle of 0 degrees on its target, the direction from

which Trigger took his hit. Cadillac 1B thought his target was flying head-on, and

his missile firing report stated that their aspect was zero. But the timing and pacing

of Cadillac’s intercept, as well as witnesses to the MiG’s flight path, indicate that

Cadillac 1 was on the beam to the target (90-degrees aspect) when they shot. 

8. As they were egressing from the fight, Cadillac 1B urged his pilot to shoot at

other aircraft that turned out to be friendly. Although the pilot did not fire, the incident demonstrated the WSO’s excessive aggressiveness. The WSO did urge the pilot

to fire, but it was the pilot that initially misidentified the friendly aircraft as MiG21s. The pilot did not fire; once he saw the aircraft were friendly, he said so immediately and discontinued maneuvering.

9. Red Crown was unreliable in its ability to distinguish friend from foe and also

23
misidentified Trigger as a MiG. Every crewman from Udorn was asked in his interview to rate Red Crown’s ability to distinguish between MiGs and friendlies. They

all rated Red Crown as highly reliable. Crewmen from other bases were not nearly

as confident in Red Crown’s abilities. The team believes this discrepancy is a result

of Udorn crews working frequently with Red Crown to hunt MiGs, whereas crews

from other bases had less experience with Red Crown and usually only used Red

Crown as a warning agency. The Red Crown controller was moderately confident

in his system’s ability to track MiGs, but he was “100 percent sure” that those identified as MiGs were actually MiGs. The captain of Biddle was very confident in the

ability of his team to identify aircraft.

Conclusions

Cadillac 1 Did Not Shoot Down Trigger 4.

1. Trigger 4 was in a right turn when he was hit, whereas Cadillac’s target was

flying right-to-left across their nose. 

2. Cadillac 1’s missiles exploded 11 seconds before Trigger 4 was hit, based on

the synchronized cockpit tapes.

3. Trigger 3A and Trigger 4B both sighted MiGs behind their element and

attempted to defend themselves.

4. Trigger 3 attacked the MiG-21 that overshot his flight path seconds after

Trigger 4 was hit. 

A MiG-21 Shot Down Trigger 4

The body of evidence overwhelmingly supports the historical record. Trigger

4 was lost to a MiG-21 on 29 July 1972.

Cadillac 1 Shot Down a MiG-21

Cadillac 2A’s eyewitness account of Cadillac’s shots was very credible to the

team. Further, his eyewitness report confirmed Cadillac’s kill in accordance with

established kill confirmation policy just as Pistol 3’s did for Pistol 1. 

24
Notes

1. Message, 31115Z Jul 72, AFSSO Udorn to AFSSO 7AF, 31 July 1972.

2. William D. Anderson, OS1, USN (Ret), transcript of telephone interview

by the Project Trigger team, 7 March 2001, 2A-5, Air Force Historical Research

Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, AL.

3. Jeffrey S. Feinstein, Lt Col, USAF (Ret), transcript of interview by the

Project Trigger team, 1 February 2001, 2C-10, Air Force Historical Research

Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.

4. Transcript of Cadillac 1 cockpit tape, 29 July 1972, transcribed by C.R.

Anderegg, 1A-5, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

5. Cadillac 1 cockpit tape, 1A-8.

6. Cadillac 1 cockpit tape, 1A-11.

7. Peter A. Kirchner, transcript of telephone interview by the Project Trigger

team, 21 February 2001, 2G-8, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

8. Cadillac 1 tape, 1A-13.

9. Message, 31115Z Jul 72.

10. Gene E. Taft, Col, USAF (Ret), transcript of video-teleconference interview with the Project Trigger team, 2 February 2001, 2N-4, AFHRA, Maxwell

AFB, AL.

11. Transcript of Pistol 1 cockpit tape, 29 July 1972, transcribed by Maj Todd

P. Harmer, 1E-7, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

12. Transcript of Trigger 1 cockpit tape, 29 July 1972, transcribed by C. R.

Anderegg, 1D-8, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

13. Clem B. “Burt” Myers, transcript of telephone interview by the Project

Trigger team, 13 February 2001, 2K-11, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

14. Thuy K. Ngo, email to Frank L. Miller, May 08, 2001, 10:14 AM, Subject:

ERD answer reagrding [sic] 29 Jul 1972 aerial combat, AFHRA, Maxwell

AFB, AL.

15. James D. Kula, Col, USAF (Ret), transcript of video-teleconference interview with the Project Trigger team, 9 February 2001, 2I-6, AFHRA, Maxwell

AFB, AL.

16. 1st Test Squadron, “15 Jan 1972-8 Jan 1973, Air-to-Air Weapons

Employment in SEA,” 78, Corona Harvest, 0.132.779, AU Library, Maxwell

AFB, AL.

17. Kula interview, 2I-9.

18. History of Seventh Air Force, 1 July 1972-29 March 1973, Vol. IV, G

Series Orders, prepared by the Office of PACAF History, Headquarters Pacific

Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, 30 April 1982, Special Orders G1928 and G-2045, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

19. Project Red Baron III, Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia, Vol III,

Analysis, Part 1, Tactics Command and Control Training, undated, 53, AFHRA,

Maxwell AFB, AL. Also, Ngo email.

20. Darrel D. Whitcomb, Col, USAFR (Ret), draft of preliminary research pro25
vided to Project Trigger team, included as part of Project Trigger archive,

AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

21. TO 1F-4C-34-1-1-2, Aircrew Weapons Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear),

Secretary of the Air Force, 15 September 1980, 1-16.

22. TO 1F-4C-34-1-1, Aircrew Weapons Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear),

Secretary of the Air Force, 15 February 1979, 1-22.

23. 1999 Weapons File, Armament Product Support Group, Eglin AFB, FL,

January 1999, 1-1.

24. 1999 Weapons File, 1-4.

25. 1st Test Squadron, 24.

26. Cadillac 1 cockpit tape, 1A-19.

27. Trigger 1 cockpit tape, 1D-2.

28. Tom Coady, notes from telephone conversation with C.R. Anderegg, 2

April 2001, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

29. Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back (Washington and London:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000) 53-55.

30. Anderson interview, 2A-5.

31. TO 1F-4C-34-1-1, 2-54.

32. 1st Test Squadron, 137.

33. 1st Test Squadron, 138.

34. C. R. Anderegg, memorandum for record, subject: information received

from 83 FWS, Raytheon representative, concerning flyout simulations of AIM7E-2 missiles, 27 March 2001.

35. Kirchner interview, 2G-7.

36. Transcript of Cadillac 4 cockpit tape, 29 July 1972, transcribed by C. R.

Anderegg, 1C-7, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

37. Guy Gardner, transcript of interview with Project Trigger team, 13

February 2001, 2E-10, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

38. Cadillac 1 cockpit tape, 1A-12.

39. Project Red Baron, Mission Summaries, undated, event 69, 60, AFHRA,

Maxwell AFB, AL.

40. James D. Kempton, transcript of video-teleconference interview with the

Project Trigger team, 16 February 2001, 2F-5, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

41. From a drawing that is part of the personal collection of Darrel D.

Whitcomb. This and other information collected by Col Whitcomb is archived

with the Project Trigger collection at AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

42. Message, 312030Z Jul 72, Director of NSA to NSA, 31 July 1972. 

43. Ibid.

44. Myers interview, 2K-11.

45. Project Red Baron, Mission Summaries, event 71.

46. Feinstein interview, 2C-22.

47. Allan Becker, notes from telephone conversation with C.R. Anderegg, 14

February 2001, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

48. Robert E. Hall, Col, USAF (Ret), notes from telephone conversation with

26
C. R. Anderegg, 13 February 2001, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. Also, Joseph

Olshevski, Col, USAF, (Ret), notes from telephone conversation with C. R.

Anderegg, 8 February 2001, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. 

49. Taft interview, 2N-8.

50. Richard S. Ritchie, Brig Gen, USAFR (Ret), transcript of interview with

the Project Trigger team, 7 February 2001, 2L-20, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

51. John A. Corder, Maj Gen, USAF (Ret), notes from interview with Project

Trigger team, 2 March 2001, 16F-1, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. Also, Lyle

Beckers, Col, USAF (Ret), notes from telephone conversation with C. R.

Anderegg, 8 February 2001, 16C-1, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. Also, Glenn

Frick, Col, USAF (Ret), notes from telephone conversation with Maj Todd P.

Harmer, 19 March 2001, 16J-1, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. 

52. Sammy C. White, transcript of telephone interview with Project Trigger

team, 13 February 2001, 2O-15, AFHRA, Maxwell 

AFB, AL.

53. Message, 312030Z Jul 72.

27
28
Appendix I

Time Matrix

Cadillac 1: 13:06:36 (Time hack on Cadillac 1 tape serves as the event matrix

master time) 

Trigger 1: 13:06:43 (Start time for Trigger 1 using common call from Cadillac

3)

Cadillac 3: 13:05:02 (Start time for Cadillac 3 using common call from

Cadillac 1) 

Cadillac 4: 13:06:47 (Start time for Cadillac 4 using common call from

Cadillac 1) 

Pistol 1: 13:08:10 (Start time for Pistol 1 using common call from Trigger 1)

Real Time Callsign Voice Significant Event 

13:08:11 Cadillac 1 Baily (I)* Okay, looks to me like we’re right

over Haiphong. 

13:08:15 Pistol 1 Imaye (I) We’re at 2031 and 10641 [N 20 31’

/ E 106 41’] and our heading is

310. 

13:08:42 Date 1 Unknown And Date right turn and start dispensing.

13:09:12 Pistol 1 Taft (I) We’re at 22 thousand [feet]. 

13:09:28 Unknown Unknown Got a Thud [F-105 Wild Weasel], 2

o’clock low. 

13:09:47 Cadillac 4 Petkunas (I) SAM site’s at 9 o’clock 7 miles. 

13:11:24 Pistol 1 Imaye (I) Yeah, we’re maintaining 380.

They’re not doing very

good...we’re moving up on them.

13:11:24 Red Crown Anderson Chevy, Crown, x-ray alpha. X-ray

alpha from Crown, out. [MiG

activity] 

13:12:04 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) 60 miles, got IFF. [Combat Tree]

13:12:49 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) All right, there’s bandits at Phuc

Yen. We’re holdin’ the IFF returns.

13:12:59 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Rog, just north of Phuc Yen.

Between Phuc Yen and Thud

Ridge. 

13:13:15 Trigger 1 White (I) Whoa! What the fuck is that? I

hope that was a Thud! 

29
13:13:31 Trigger 1 White (I) Can’t fuckin’ tell. Hope they’re

Thuds shootin’ here. What are

these airplanes, I hope these are

Thuds shootin’ they look big.

13:13:43 Date 1 Unknown Okay, Date, right turn. 

13:13:44 Trigger 1 White (I) Christ that scared me when I saw

that fuckin’ missile come

off...Date’s comin’ right a little

bit...Those Shrikes just went like

shit. Looked like a big, ol’ missile.

Air to air type I mean. 

13:13:59 Pistol 1 Taft (I) ...and we’ll try to go over the bend

in the river down there. 

13:14:01 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Oh, I got good guys right up there

on Thud Ridge about 10 miles

from the bad guys. 

13:14:01 Cadillac 4 Petkunas (I) 18 miles out of Kep. Now at 10 to

11 o’clock. 

13:14:55 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, we’re at our point at 15

after. 

13:14:56 Red Crown Anderson Cadillac, Crown, you have a bandit

231 at 28. 

13:15:02 Red Crown Anderson Bandit 231-31 

13:15:17 Red Crown Anderson Okay, ah, Cadillac, let’s go get

him, ah, let’s vector 225. He’s 226-

31. 

13:15:28 Unknown Unknown Take it down, take it down. Triple

launch 12 o’clock 

13:15:30 Red Crown Anderson Roger, he’s ah 226-28. Believe I

hold two on my gadget. 

13:15:37 Red Crown Anderson Altitude 10,000 on my gadget.

He’s 223 at 28. 

13:15:41 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) 30 miles...I got two of ‘em.

13:15:49 Red Crown Anderson He’s 224-27 Cadillac 

13:15:50 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Roll out 240 for a moment and let

me get a good paint. I had one off

to our right also, but I lost him.

13:15:57 Red Crown Anderson He’s ah, 219-25. 

13:15:58 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, take this heading. 

13:16:05 Red Crown Anderson He’s 216-23. 

13:16:06 Cadillac 1 Baily Steady on. 

13:16:10 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) And I’m paintin’...paintin’ IFF. 

13:16:12 Red Crown Anderson He’s 215-21...Green bandit, green

bandit. 

13:16:18 Cadillac 4 Gardner (I) There’s Kep off the right.

30
13:16:19 Red Crown Anderson He’s 210-15. 

13:16:24 Cadillac 4 Gardner (I) Okay, I got some SAMs blowing

up way out there at 9. 

13:16:28 Red Crown Anderson He’s 204 at 12. 

13:16:29 Cadillac 1 Baily Rog, you got an altitude? 

13:16:33 Red Crown Anderson 1 0,000. 10,000. 

13:16:36 Pistol 1 Imaye (I) We’re 50 miles due east...northeast. We should be turning back to

the left somewhere. 

13:16:37 Red Crown Anderson Green bandits. 192 at 10. 

13:16:42 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Come on radar. Skin paint. Lock

on. 

13:16:52 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, come port 150...130. 

13:16:57 Red Crown Anderson 162 at 4. 

13:16:58 Date 1 Unknown Date 2 and 3, Palm 2 and 3 ready,

pickle! 

13:16:58 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) He’s one mile from in-range. 

13:17:02 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Harder port. ‘kay. Good,

keep...hold this hard port turn. 

13:17:13 Red Crown Anderson 118 at 4. 

13:17:19 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay he’s 15 degrees high... 

13:17:20 Cadillac 4 Gardner And 4 just took a hit. Cadillac 4

just took a hit 

13:17:32 Cadillac 1 Baily Cadillac 4, you took a hit? Okay,

let’s go. Let’s get outta here. 

13:17:40 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Zero, roll out...030! Yeah 030! 

13:17:42 Walnut Unknown Walnut flight come up 3660.

Walnut on Guard. 

13:17:45 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) Where is he Jeff? 

13:17:46 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) 030 for 6... Fuckin’ broke lock. 

13:17:49 Pistol 1 Imaye (I) 60 miles - 050. 

13:17:50 Pistol 1 Taft (I) Tally-ho. The flight’s 12 o’clock to

us. 

13:17:53 Red Crown Anderson Okay, bandits 300 at 9, Cadillac. 

13:17:54 Cadillac 1 Baily Roger, 300 at 9. 

13:17:55 Trigger 4 Matsui Trigger 4 has 2 bogies at our 8

o’clock 

13:18:02 Trigger 1 Bettine (I) Everybody’s on our right. I’m

watchin’. 

13:18:07 Trigger 4 Matsui Two silver bogies at our 7 going to

our 6, Trigger 4. 

13:18:10 Cadillac 4 Gardner (I) Looks like 57 [mm AAA] up

ahead. 

13:18:12 Red Crown Anderson And you have another bandit 033

at 7. 

31
32

13:18:17 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, I got somebody on the nose

he’s not squawkin’ for... 

13:18:21 Red Crown Anderson Another bandit’s 004 for 3. 

13:18:24 Pistol 1 Taft Pistol flight, a 180 to the right. 

13:18:24 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) On the nose for 8 miles. 

13:18:26 Cadillac 1 Baily Roger, we have one on the nose at

8 miles. Is that a bandit? 

13:18:27 Trigger 3 Myers Okay, Trigger 1 & 2, comeback to

the right. Come back to the right.

There’s somebody following me. 

13:18:33 Red Crown Anderson Affirmative, that is. Ah, he is at

046 for 5 right now. 

13:18:33 Trigger 1 White Trigger’s coming right. 

13:18:36 Date 1 Unknown Okay 1 and 4 start your pickle. 

13:18:37 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, 1 mile from in range, we’ve

got a head-on. 

13:18:39 Trigger 3 Myers Okay, come back left Trigger 1. 

13:18:40 Red Crown Anderson Looks like an estimated 3 bandits

on your 030-3. 

13:18:44 Pistol 1 Taft Okay, we’ve got a MiG up here! 12

o’clock...Pistol. 

13:18:45 Walnut 1 Unknown [Common Guard Call: Trigger 1/

Cadillac 3] Robin and Goose

flight, come up 3-6-6-0, Walnut 1

out. 

13:18:46 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, we’re in range. 

13:18:48 Cadillac 2 Kirchner We got a MiG at one o’clock.

Cadillac, one o’clock. 

13:18:50 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay. Cleared to fire. Fire two. 

13:18:51 Cadillac 1 N/A First AIM 7, the left aft missile, is

fired. 

13:18:52 Cadillac 4 Gardner(I) I got a tally on it. [MiG] 

13:18:54 Pistol 3 Kempton Pistol, you got the MiG at 12

o’clock? 

13:18:57 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay the circle’s about the largest,

fire the last two. 

13:18:57 Cadillac 4 Gardner (I) There go the tanks 

13:18:58 Cadillac 1 N/A Second AIM 7, the right aft, is

fired. 

13:19:01 Cadillac 4 Gardner (I) There goes ours. [tanks] 

13:19:02 Cadillac 3 Becker (I) Two of them [Bogies] at 1 o’clock.

Got ‘em? 

13:19:02 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay fire again. 

13:19:04 N/A N/A Timeout of Cadillac 1’s first AIM 7
13:19:04 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay you should see ‘em just

slightly low, 10 left at... 

13:19:04 Cadillac 3 Smith (I) I got his [Cadillac 1] missiles. 

13:19:06 Cadillac 4 Gardner (I) There goes a missile. Another

SAM. 

13:19:06 Trigger 4 Matsui Trigger 4 has a bogey at 6 o’clock 

13:19:06 Trigger 3 Myers Trigger 3’s got a MiG at our 6

o’clock. 

13:19:08 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) ****[God / Guide] No. 

13:19:08 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) ...one and a half miles. 

13:19:08 Red Crown Anderson Bandit should be 038 for 4 

13:19:09 N/A N/A Timeout of Cadillac 2’s second

AIM 7 

13:19:09 Pistol 3 Kempton Lead, ah...just had a MiG go by

you 

13:19:11 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, 1 mile. 15 left. 

13:19:12 Pistol 1 Taft (I) Okay, there’s a shot (missile away).

13:19:14 Red Crown Anderson Tracker breaking port. 

13:19:14 Cadillac 1 Baily Okay. 

13:19:14 Pistol 3 Kempton Nice Shot! Nice Shot! 

13:19:16 Pistol 1 Taft (I) We got a MiG! 

13:19:18 Pistol 1 Taft (I) Let’s get our tanks off! 

13:19:19 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, who’s that at our right?

Tally. 

13:19:19 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) Okay, those are bad guys. 

13:19:20 Trigger 3 Myers Pistol 3 break!...ah shit that’s a

MiG (Note: Trigger 3 jettisons

tanks and starts a break turn,

Trigger 4 is hit) 

13:19:22 Cadillac 1 Baily All right, Cadillac let’s get it outta

here. 

13:19:26 Red Crown Anderson Looks like he went low to 319 at 2. 

13:19:29 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Is that our element in front of us? 

13:19:33 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) No. That’s another flight. Droppin’

their tanks! 

13:19:43 Cadillac 1 Baily Okay, we got a bird on fire out

here Cadillac 

13:19:43 Trigger 1 White Trigger 3 say position on lead. 

13:19:46 Trigger 3 Myers Trigger 3’s padlocked, 4’s shot

down 

13:19:47 Red Crown Anderson What’s your heading Cadillac? 

13:19:49 Cadillac 1 Baily Cadillac’s coming around to east. 

13:19:55 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay, good guys on the nose for

ah... 

33
13:20:01 Pistol 1 Taft (I) There’s an F-4 going right down,

right there, take a [fix]. What’s our

latitude? 

13:20:01 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) You see anything that looked like a

hit? 

13:20:02 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) No. 

13:20:05 Unknown Unknown ***got a MiG going 9 o’clock. 

13:20:08 Pistol 1 Imaye (I) 2158...10632 [N 21 58’ / E 106

32’] 

13:20:12 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) There’s a bird spinnin’ in. See him

over there. 

13:20:12 Pistol 1 Taft (I) Okay two chutes, two chutes. 

13:20:13 Cadillac 4 Petkunas (I) There’s AAA all around him. [one

of the survivors in his parachute]

Keep it moving. 

13:20:21 Trigger 1 White Trigger, come back left, come back

east 

13:20:23 Red Crown Anderson [Cadillac] bandit at 336 for 7. 

13:20:31 Cadillac 1 Baily Cadillac reverse we got somebody

right behind us. 

13:20:33 Pistol 1 Imaye (I) 150 heading. 

13:20:34 Date 1 Unknown Trigger, Pistol, you still with me? 

13:20:36 Trigger 1 White Negative. We’re disengaged at this

time from you. 

13:20:36 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) There’s a big explosion in the

mountains. Somebody just crashed. 

13:20:43 Date 1 Unknown Okay, Date and Palm, let’s spread

‘em out. 

13:20:45 Red Crown Anderson [Cadillac] one back of ya there,

301 at 9 miles. 

13:20:58 Red Crown Anderson Bandit 279 at 15. 

13:20:58 Trigger 1 White Trigger 3, I have you in sight,

come back east. 

13:21:03 Trigger 1 White I have you in sight come back east.

I have two chutes over Trigger 4. 

13:21:22 Red Crown Anderson You have a bandit 274 at 16,

Cadillac. 

13:21:43 Red Crown Anderson Black bandit. Black bandit. 289-16. 

13:22:08 Red Crown Anderson Bandit’s gone low, estimating 282

at 17. 

13:22:41 Red Crown Anderson Cadillac, Crown, are you coasting

outbound this time now? 

13:22:43 Cadillac 1 Baily That’s affirmative. 

13:22:57 Red Crown Anderson Cadillac we have a Black Bandit

300-21. 

34
13:24:28 Red Crown Anderson Roger, we have Black Bandits at

Kep. 

13:24:35 Red Crown Anderson *****Cadillac, everything looks

clear on my gadget. 

13:25:08 Red Crown Anderson Cadillac, Crown, what was the

result of your engagement? 

13:25:11 Cadillac 1 Baily Roger. Unknown. We got two good

guides. I couldn’t observe an

impact. 

13:25:21 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) I’ll tell you one thing Jeff. The

first one blew up and the second

one went to the same spot and

blew it up. 

13:25:32 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) So all four of them...the bad one

did launch? 

13:25:33 Trigger 1 Bettine (I) Okay, swing that heading around to

170. 

13:25:35 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) No it’s still there. 

13:26:01 Trigger 1 White (I) It [MiG attack on Trigger 4] was in

the bottom of that fuckin’ fluid 4

turn. Jesus. 

13:26:28 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay. Hold, hold ah, 120. We’re

exiting the mine here at 27. 

13:26:51 Red Crown Anderson Cadillac, Crown, everything looks

clear. 

13:27:28 Red Crown Anderson Cadillac, music. 

13:28:07 Cadillac 1 Baily (I) I wanna wait until we’re clear of

all these islands. 

13:28:40 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Okay we can head 180. 

13:29:01 Red Crown Anderson We got a bandit feet wet. 

13:29:06 Trigger 1 White Trigger 1 and 2 are feet wet at this

time. 

13:29:26 Red Crown Anderson? Be advised we got a bandit west of

channel 26 approximately 40

miles. 

13:29:35 Cadillac 1 Feinstein (I) Christ, that’s out over the water. 

13:29:51 Red Crown Anderson? Estimate him at 090 at 55. And

understand Eagle 3 and 4 [Iron

hand] is engage? 

13:30:50 Trigger 1 White (I) Shit no. There were two camouflaged MiGs it looked like to

me...that’s why we didn’t go down

and engage ‘cause there was four

of them chasing them. 

35
13:31:48 Trigger 2 Penney 1 and 3 are 030 for 58 [from

Bullseye-Hanoi] 

13:33:04 Trigger 1 White Okay, let’s turn for a heading of

about 210. 

13:34:06 Trigger 1 White Could you tell what it was? 

13:34:07 Trigger 3 Myers Hell, yeah! It was a bunch of

MiGs. I fired one AIM 7 at him as

he was running away, but, ah, it

didn’t guide. 

13:34:17 Trigger 1 White Okay, I saw a couple of aircraft

being chased by about four. 

13:34:23 Trigger 3 Myers This was a MiG-21. 

13:34:25 Trigger 1 White Nah, these were camouflaged.

13:34:48 Trigger 2 Penney Sam,

did you see that MiG go down? I

think somebody shot the guys

wingman off **** 

* (I) Indicates use of the intercom

36
Appendix II

Project Trigger Team Biographies

Lieutenant Colonel Todd P. Harmer is the leader of Project Trigger. He is an F16 pilot presently serving as the Chief, EUCOM/PACOM Team in Checkmate,

HQ USAF/XOOC. Prior to serving on the Air Staff, Lt Col Harmer accumulated

over 2,300 hours in the F-16 while serving at Osan AB, Korea, Moody AFB, GA,

Pope AFB, NC, and Misawa AB, Japan. He is a graduate of the USAF Weapons

School as well as the School of Advanced Airpower Studies.

Colonel C. R. Anderegg (USAF Ret), IIT Research Institute, is a writer and historian who participated on the team under a contract with AF/XO. A former Air

Force fighter pilot, he flew 4,000 hours in the F-4 and F-15. He served two tours

as an instructor in the F-4 Fighter Weapons School and a Vietnam War combat

tour in the 555 TFS, Udorn RTAFB. His most recent book, Sierra Hotel,

describes the sweeping, post-Vietnam changes the Air Force made in fighter

weapons, training, and tactics. 

Dr. Wayne Thompson is Chief of Analysis, Air Force History Support Office. His

To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973, was published in 2000 by the Smithsonian Institution Press and by the Air Force. During

the Gulf War, he worked in the Checkmate air campaign planning group, and subsequently he was Senior Historical Advisor for the Gulf War Air Power Survey.

Major James G. Vick is currently assigned as Chief, Operations, Air Force

Executive Issues Team (AFPAZ), Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,

Washington, D.C. A navigator with over 2,000 hours in the B-52 and T-43, Major

Vick located interviewees and participated as an interviewer. He also served as

the Project Trigger team interface with the Office of the Secretary of the Air

Force.

Timothy B. Alger develops virtual environments, models, and high-resolution 3D

animations for AF/XOC. He holds a BS in Engineering Design Graphics with a

background in both mechanical and architectural design. An SAIC contractor, he

supports the Theater Battle Arena office of the Air Staff.

Kevin C. Hollingsworth, a former US Navy intelligence analyst, develops scenarios for the Theater Battle Arena’s participation in distributed, interactive war

games, exercises, demonstrations, and event re-creations. He is a graduate of the

Russian Intermediate Course at the Defense Language Institute and is currently a

Russian Studies/International Relations major at George Mason University.

37
Major Cheryl Law is the media operations officer, Secretary of the Air Force

Public Affairs Media (SAF/PAM) Washington, D.C., where she recommends

media relations policy to senior Air Force leaders on critical issues involving

worldwide operational activities. She provided public affairs policy and guidance

advice to the Project Trigger team.

38
Glossary

AA Air-to-Air, reference to Soviet guided missiles

AA-2 Atoll Infrared Guided Air-to-Air Missile

similar to AIM-9

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery

AF Air Force, reference to numbered AF such

as 7 AF in Saigon

AFB Air Force Base

AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency,

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

AFHSO Air Force History Support Office

AFSC Air Force Safety Center

AGM Air Ground Missile

AIM Air Intercept Missile

AIM-7 Sparrow Radar Guided Air Intercept Missile

AIM-9 Sidewinder Infrared Guided Air Intercept

Missile

Alpha Callsign suffix denotes F-4 pilot or front

seat crewmember

ARM Anti-Radiation Missile

Aspect Relative intercept geometry between aircraft

Atoll AA-2 Infrared Guided Missile

AWC Air Weapons Controller

Bandit Known enemy aircraft

Beam Intercept geometry toward either side of

enemy aircraft

Black Bandit Code words indicating enemy aircraft low

on fuel

Bogey Aircraft of unknown identity

Bravo Callsign suffix denotes F-4 back seat

crewmember

Cadillac Callsign of F-4 aircraft based at Udorn

RTAFB

CAP Combat Air Patrol

39
Chaff Material designed to interfere with radar

signal returns

Combat Tree AN/APX-76/80A IFF interrogation equipment

CW Continuous Wave, refers to missile guidance

radar illumination

Date Callsign of F-4 aircraft based at Ubon

RTAFB

DTIC Defense Technical Information Center

Eagle Callsign F-105 aircraft based at Korat

RTAFB

Feet Dry Code words informing others that aircraft

was over land

Feet Wet Code words informing others that aircraft

was over water

G Abbreviation denoting force of gravity or gloading on aircraft

GCI Ground Control Intercept

Gimbal Mechanical limits of radar antenna

Green Bandit Code words indicating an experienced

enemy 

Group One or more aircraft within three miles of

each other

Guard Emergency radio frequency

Head Intercept geometry toward front of enemy

aircraft

IFF Identify Friend or Foe

MiG Mikoyan-Gurevich, Soviet fighter aircraft

company

mm Millimeter, refers to caliber of aircraft gun

nm Nautical Mile

NSA National Security Agency

NVAF North Vietnamese Air Force

PACAF Pacific Air Force

Palm Callsign of F-4 aircraft based at Ubon

RTAFB

40
Pistol Callsign of F-4 aircraft based at Takhli

RTAFB

Red Baron Post-war project to document aerial combat

engagements

Red Crown Callsign of Navy Air Weapons Control in

the Gulf of Tonkin

RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base

SAM Surface to Air Missile

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Shrike AGM-45 Anti-Radiation Missile

Splash Indicates downing of enemy aircraft

Squawk Reference to operating mode of IFF

transponder

Tail Intercept geometry toward rear of enemy

aircraft

Tally Visual contact with enemy aircraft

TBA Theater Battle Arena, used for computer

simulation

Teaball Intelligence collection and reporting agency

in Thailand

TFS Tactical Fighter Squadron

Trigger Callsign of F-4 aircraft based at Takhli

RTAFB

TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

USAF United States Air Force

Visual Visual contact with friendly aircraft

VTC Video-Tele Conference

WSO Weapons System Operator

X-Ray Alpha Code words denoting MiG activity

41
42