CENTRAL COUNT 

OPTICAL SCAN 

BALLOTS

May 2008

Quick Start M a n a g e

m e n t

G u i d e

www.eac.gov

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
2

Quick Start Management Guide

The Quick Start Management Guide for 

Central County Optical Scan Ballots is part 

of a series of brochures designed to highlight 

and summarize the information contained 

in the chapters of the U.S. Election 

Assistance Commission’s (EAC) Election 

Management Guidelines (EMG). The goal of 

the EMG is to provide a collection of election 

management guidelines, consolidated into 

one document, to assist State and local 

election officials effectively manage and 

administer elections. These guidelines 

are solely designed to serve as a source of 

information for election officials and not 

as requirements by which they must abide. 

The EAC expects the EMG to be completed 

in 2008. However, due to the urgent need 

for election management resources, EMG 

chapters and Quick Starts are released as 

they are completed.

The content of the EMG and the Quick Start 

Management Guides has been developed in 

collaboration with State and local election 

officials and other election professionals 

who have first-hand experience managing 

elections. The EAC is grateful for their 

participation and ensuring the guidelines 

are practical and applicable for jurisdictions 

regardless of their size and resources. The 

EMG and the Quick Starts are available 

online at www.eac.gov.

Central

Count

Optical Scan Ballot

s
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Central Count Optical Scan Ballots

www.eac.gov

Introduction

In general, an optical scan voting system is a system 

by which votes are recorded by means of marks 

made in voting response fields designated on one 

or both faces of a ballot card or series of cards. An 

optical scan system then reads and tabulates ballots, 

usually paper ballots, by scanning the ballot and 

interpreting the contents, also known as marksense 

(2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Volume 

1, Version 1.0).When a jurisdiction makes the 

decision to use an optical scan system, their next 

step is to consider whether they will implement a 

central count or precinct count scanners to review 

and tabulate the optical scan ballots. 

In a central count system, ballots are tabulated 

at a central location with the use of a high speed 

ballot scanner. At the polling place, cast ballots 

are deposited by voters into secure ballot boxes, 

which at the close of the polls are transported to the 

central count location. In precinct count systems, 

ballots are tabulated in the same precinct in which 

those ballots were cast. Polling place procedures for 

precinct scanners differ from central count in that 

they can be programmed to immediately return 

blank, overvoted, and undervoted ballots to a voter 

for inspection prior to it being tabulated. Therefore, 

polling place procedures for processing voters and 

ballots will have to be taken into account when 

deciding between central and precinct scanners. 

This guide will highlight considerations and 

administrative practices election officials should 

consider when implementing a central count optical 

scan ballot system; precinct-based optical scan ballot 

systems are addressed in the chapters of the Election 

Management Guidelines available at www.eac.gov. 
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Quick Start Management Guide

Making the Decision

Deciding whether to change to a central count 

optical scan ballot system requires careful 

consideration of a jurisdiction’s internal and external 

environments. This kind of transition must be 

managed in a way that prevents or minimizes the 

impact of the change on election processes, while 

preserving the integrity of the electoral system 

(see Quick Start Management Guide for Managing 

Change in an Election Office, www.eac.gov . As 

such, election officials should identify and assess 

the impact that a central count optical scan ballot 

system will have on their various office and election 

functions. Some key factors that should be taken 

into account are: 

•	 Voter’s Intent Determination: Since a voter is not 

present during the review and tabulation of his/

her ballot, the use of central count ballot scanners 

requires the development of procedures for 

ensuring a voter’s cast ballot is counted as he/she 

intended for it to be counted (voter’s 

intent). The definition 

and process for 

determining a 

voter’s intent 

varies by state; 

local election 

officials should 

consult with 

their state’s 

officials and 

election code 

for state-specific 

guidance. Some 
5

jurisdictions 

considering 

central 

count 

ballot 

scanners 

already 

have such 

procedures 

for their absentee 

ballots. 

•	 Voter Education: Election officials will need to 

establish a voter education program that notifies 

each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes 

for an office, and provide voters with instructions 

on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and 

counted (including instructions on how to correct 

the error through the issuance of a replacement 

ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change 

the ballot or correct any error).1

•	 Blank Ballots, Overvotes, and Undervotes:

Election officials will need to determine 

whether the central count ballot scanner will be 

programmed to stop at ballots that are blank, 

over-voted, and/or under-voted. Note: Stopping 

1 Section 301 (a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Help America Vote 

Act (HAVA) of 2002 requires voting systems used in an election 

for Federal office to: “(I) notify the voter that the voter has selected 

more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot; (II) notify 

the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting 

multiple votes for the office; and (III) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.” 

A State or jurisdiction that uses a central count voting system 

may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by “(i) establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system 

that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an 

office; and (ii) providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions 

on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement 

ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error)” [HAVA Section 301 (a)(1)(B)].

Central Count Optical Scan Ballots

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Quick Start Management Guide

the scanner for every over-voted ballot significantly 

slows the scanning of the ballots. 

•	 Rate of Ballot Scanning: The effective rate of 

ballot scanning that can be achieved on election 

night is approximately 25% of the maximum rated 

speed of the scanner. A central ballot scanner 

that is rated at a maximum speed of 300 ballots 

per minute will effectively scan about 75 ballots 

per minute or 4500 ballots per hour on election 

night. For example, if you have 100,000 ballots 
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Central Count Optical Scan Ballots

www.eac.gov

and you want to finish scanning them in five 

hours you will need about 5 scanners. The rate of 

the scanner is impacted by stoppages caused by 

rejected ballots and whether or not the scanner 

was programmed to stop at every over-voted 

ballot. Note: Depending upon the anticipated 

number of voted ballots in each jurisdiction, 

election officials should communicate to all 

stakeholders (media, candidates, etc.) that the use 

of central count scanners will impact the release of 

unofficial election results. 

•	 Staffing: Central count operations require 

additional staff at the main election office. The 

staff are responsible for accountability and receipt 

of all ballot boxes containing voted ballots, 

including documentation of chain of custody 

as the voted ballots are removed from each box, 

counted and balanced to the signed voter roster, 

reviewed for voter intent, bundled into batches, 

scanned, and re-boxed and sealed for storage. 

•	 Cost: A high-speed central ballot scanner is more 

expensive than precinct-based ballot scanners. 

Polling Place Considerations

Once the decision has been made to purchase 

and implement a central count optical scan ballot 

system, election officials should review their current 

polling place processes to identify areas that will 

require revision or new policies and procedures. 

Addressing these needs in advance will help the 

office and poll workers to prepare accordingly for the 

new system and effectively manage the system on 

Election Day. Polling place considerations include, 

but are not limited to: 

● Jurisdictions that are changing from DRE’s to 

optical scan central count will need to allow 
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Quick Start Management Guide

sufficient time to revise poll worker manuals, 

checklists, supplies, and training procedures. 

● In jurisdictions where there is more than one than 

precinct and/or ballot style in each polling place, 

poll workers must be trained to work in teams of 

two when issuing ballots to voters. In a primary 

election, this issue is compounded further when 

each precinct and/or ballot style is also available 

by party affiliation and/or non-partisan ballot. 

This issue is compounded again even further in 

jurisdictions where ballots are also available in 

various languages. 

● Poll place supplies should, if needed, include a 

tool(s) for enabling voters to magnify their ballot. 

● Policies and procedures must be developed to 

track spoiled and/or replacement ballots issued to 

voters. 

● Ballot boxes must be secured to ensure the safety 

and integrity of the ballots at all times. For 

example, have poll workers inspect the ballot box 

prior to the opening of the polls to confirm that 

the ballot box is empty; then have them apply a 

seal and/or lock to the box to ensure no tampering 

occurs throughout the day. The lock on the ballot 

box would be removed at the end of the night, 

once the poll workers are ready to conduct closing 

procedures. 

● Ballot boxes must be monitored 

at all times to prevent 

tampering and to 

guide voters on how 

to properly deposit 

their ballots in 

the box. Note: Be 

aware that some 
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Central Count Optical Scan Ballots

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central count ballot scanners will only scan ballots 

in a certain orientation, i.e. face up, top edge first. 

Poll workers must keep this in mind as voters drop 

their ballots into the ballot box. 

● Procedures should be developed to provide poll 

workers the ability to balance throughout the day 

the number of voters processed to the number 

of voted ballots deposited in the ballot box. 

Recommendation: This can be accomplished by 

issuing a receipt to each voter to deposit in an 

envelope attached to the outside of each ballot box. 

● After the polls close, poll workers will have to open 

the ballot box and manually count the ballots. 

This count should be balanced against the voter 

list and registration lists. Recommendation: Any 

time the ballot box is opened and voted ballots are 

handled there should be at least two poll workers 

to ensure the security and integrity of the content 

of the ballot boxes are not compromised at any 

point. Some states may require this process be 

overseen by poll workers from different parties; 

this will vary according to a state’s election code 

and administrative procedures. 

● At this time, and if required, the ballots can be 

oriented face up, top edge first, to expedite the 

review and tabulation process. They may also be 

examined at this point to determine voter’s intent 

(if required). 

● It is recommended that the ballots be bundled 

in batches of 25 to 50 ballots. Note: Do not put 

rubber bands around the batches; they can crimp 

the edges of the ballots and cause the central 

scanner to misread the ballot. 

● The audit sheet containing the ballot count should 

be placed in the ballot box with the ballots and the 

ballot box re-sealed and/or locked. 
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Quick Start Management Guide

● Once all end-of-night processes have been 

completed and election supplies are ready to be 

transported back to the election office, procedures 

must be developed to ensure the security and 

integrity of the content of the ballot boxes are 

not compromised at any point in the delivery. 

Recommendation: Incorporate two-person 

integrity security measures at all times during the 

delivery process. 

Central Count Location

Considerations

Similar to the polling place consideration listed 

above, election officials will have to review their 

current facilities to effectively implement a central 

count location. The level of activity in a central count 

location may be significantly more intense than 

in systems that do not use central count. As such, 

the size and layout of the facility will play a critical 

role in how procedures are designed to maintain 

a smooth workflow throughout Election Day, in 

particular the delivery of the ballot boxes at the end 

of the night. Ideally, there should be enough space, 

both inside and outside the facility, to accommodate 

the level of office staff, poll workers, media, public, 

and security expected to be present at that time. 

However, due to the significant variation in size and 

resources across jurisdictions space can be limited 

and central count locations and procedures will vary 

from place to place. 

● A large number of vehicles, at least one for each 

polling place, will arrive at the central counting 

location in a short period of time. There must be 

sufficient space on the street or in parking lots for 

these vehicles to queue up to wait for their turn 

to unload their ballot boxes. Recommendation: 
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Central Count Optical Scan Ballots

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As ballot boxes are delivered to the central 

counting location, election officials should develop 

a drop-off process that ensures the security and 

integrity of the content of the ballot boxes are 

not compromised at any point in the delivery. 

For example, assign election staff to meet the poll 

workers at the parking/drop-off area and escort 

them to the check-in point; the staff may also 

be accompanied by security or law enforcement 

officials as an additional layer of protection. 

● The receiving operation at election central will 

resemble an assembly line, where each ballot 

box is accepted, logged as being received, and 
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Quick Start Management Guide

transferred to the next station for processing. It is 

recommended that each ballot box be numbered 

by polling place to enable receiving staff to quickly 

receive the ballot boxes and at all times be alert to 

any ballot boxes that have not been returned. 

● At the next receiving station, each ballot box 

is opened and the polling place paper work is 

examined for completeness and accuracy. The 

ballots are again manually counted and the 

count compared with the polling place totals. 

If these totals agree, the ballot box may move to 
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Central Count Optical Scan Ballots

the 

next 

station. This 

activity must be 

conducted or monitored by at least two 

election staff; some jurisdictions may require a 

review committee to monitor this activity. 

● At the next station, the ballots are prepared for 

counting. If the ballots have not been oriented face 

up, top edge first, and organized in batches this 

needs to be done at this time. Examine the ballots 

for anything that may cause them to mis-read: 

crimped edges, folds, etc. If the ballots were not 

reviewed for voter intent at each polling place, this 

activity must take place now prior to scanning the 

ballots. 

● Depending upon state law, ballots that are torn 

and/or crimped will need to be duplicated. The 

duplication will have to be conducted according 

to state or administrative practices; however, it 

is recommended that these include two-person 

integrity security measures. This same duplication 

process will be required for any ballots that fall 

into the category of “voter’s intent”. 

● As the ballots pass through the scanner there are a 

number of incidents that may possibly occur that 

can interrupt the scanning. For example: jammed 

ballots, multiple feeds, a worn belt, etc. Note: In 

addition, be aware that central count scanners will 

sometimes stop for no apparent reason. 

www.eac.gov
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Quick Start Management Guide

● The ballots should be managed at the central 

count scanners in batches. Each batch should 

represent a specified number of ballots. As each 

batch is scanned, it is important that the number 

on the scanner’s public counter be balanced to the 

total number of ballots that have been scanned. 

This is important because if a jam does occur it 

may be difficult to determine which ballots were 

in fact scanned or not scanned. After scanning 

each batch, if the numbers do not balance, it will 

be necessary to delete that batch and re-scan the 

entire batch. For this reason it is recommended 

that the batches be relatively small (25 is 

recommended). 

● If the scanner rejects a ballot due to a write-in 

do not rescan the ballot. The voted races on this 

ballot have been counted correctly. Note: Ballots 

with hand written write-in candidate names will 

need to be processed by a write-in team who will 

have the responsibility of hand tallying the votes by 

race by candidate name. 

● After scanning, the ballots are returned to the 

ballot boxes and sealed pending validation of the 

election. 

● The overall balance sheet should include all 

ballots returned from all polling places. That 

number should equal the total number of ballots 

scanned. 

● After the election is validated the ballot boxes can 

be opened and the ballots prepared for archival 

storage. 
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www.eac.gov

Central Count Optical Scan Ballots
For information regarding this publication or to request 

additional copies, please, contact: 

Address

U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100 

Washington, DC 20005

Attn: Election Management Guidelines

Telephone

(202) 566-3100 

(866) 747-1471 (toll free)

Fax

(202) 566-3127

E-mail Address

HAVA info@eac.gov

Website

www.eac.gov

The EAC is an independent bipartisan commission 

created by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). 

It is charged with administering payments to states 

and developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, 

implementing election administration improvements, 

adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, 

accrediting voting system test laboratories and 

certifying voting equipment and serving as a national 

clearinghouse and resource of information regarding 

election administration.