DREW

PAPERS

THE

Jonathan E. Burdick

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

20

Instantly Basing

Locust Swarms

New Options for

Future Air Operations
Air University

Steven L. Kwast, Lieutenant General, Commander and President

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Thomas D. McCarthy, Colonel, Commandant and Dean
AIR UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

Instantly Basing Locust Swarms

New Options for Future Air Operations

Jonathan E. Burdick

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Drew Paper No. 20

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Project Editors

Jerry L. Gantt

James S. Howard

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Burdick, Jonathan E., 1972–

Instantly basing locust swarms : new options for future air 

operations / Jonathan E. Burdick, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.

pages cm. — (Drew paper; no. 20)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-252-4

1. Drone aircraft—United States. 2. Swarming (Military 

science) 3. Air warfare —Case studies. 4. Nigeria—Strategic 

aspects. I. Title. II. Title: New options for future air operations.

UG1242.D7B87 2015

358.4’1422—dc23

 2015012394

Published by Air University Press in January 2016

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

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they are associated or the views of the School of Advanced Air 

and Space Studies, Air Force Research Institute, Air University, 

United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other US 

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and unlimited distribution. 

This Drew Paper and others in the series are available electronically 

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The Drew Papers

The Drew Papers are award-winning master’s theses selected for publication by the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama. This series of papers commemorates the distinguished career 

of Col Dennis “Denny” Drew, USAF, retired. In 30 years at Air University, 

Colonel Drew served on the Air Command and Staff College faculty, directed 

the Airpower Research Institute, and served as dean, associate dean, and professor of military strategy at SAASS. Colonel Drew is one of the Air Force’s 

most extensively published authors and an international speaker in high 

demand. He has lectured to over 100,000 students at Air University as well as 

to foreign military audiences. In 1985 he received the Muir S. Fairchild Award 

for outstanding contributions to Air University. In 2003 Queen Beatrix of the 

Netherlands made him a Knight in the Order of Orange-Nassau for his contributions to education in the Royal Netherlands Air Force.

The Drew Papers are dedicated to promoting the understanding of air and 

space power theory and application. These studies are published by the Air 

University Press and broadly distributed throughout the US Air Force, the 

Department of Defense, and other governmental organizations, as well as to 

leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learning, public-policy institutes, and the media.
Please send inquiries or comments to

Commandant and Dean

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iv
v

Contents

Illustrations vii

Foreword ix

About the Author xi

Acknowledgments xiii

Abstract xv

 1 Introduction 1

 2 A Technologically Driven Paradigm of Overwhelming Force 15

 3 Remotely Piloted Aircraft, Swarms, and Instant Basing 39

 4 Locust Swarm’s First Test 71

Abbreviations 93

Bibliography 95

vii

Illustrations

Figure

1 US air bases of the Vietnam War 21

2 Logistics in Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom 24

3 Operation Enduring Freedom supply routes 27

4 Selected Department of Defense RPAs from groups 3–5 43

5 MQ-1 and MQ-9 LOS and BLOS configuration 44

6 RQ-4 Global Hawk system architecture 45

7 INSITU Integrator 49

8 INSITU ScanEagle/Integrator launch and recovery system 50

9 Nigeria 73

10 Cameroon 76

11 Tactical encirclement by multiple Locust Swarms 81

Table

1 Department of Defense remotely piloted aircraft 41

2 The four levels of automony 51

3 Proposed Instant Basing timeline 58

4 Fuel usage of Locust Swarm aircraft and tanker RPAs 84

ix

Foreword

A key element of innovation involves arranging familiar things into new 

combinations. Flying airplanes from ships led to the demise of battleship 

dominance. Integrating tanks, airplanes, and radios in a unique way enabled 

blitzkrieg operations across Europe. Making dumb bombs smart by using satellite guidance provided the modern imagery and allure of pinpoint destruction. Most of the time—and in all of the examples above—such innovations 

involve cultural and organizational changes as well as the insights of forwardthinking people. And so it is with the new concept of airpower presented 

here, Instantly Basing Locust Swarms.

This study by Lt Col Jon Burdick asks a difficult question: Can unmanned 

aircraft launched and sustained from nontraditional sites create a persistent, 

effective projection of airpower? Can they swarm, or sustain convergent and 

coordinated attacks from multiple directions to achieve significant military 

and political effects while minimizing logistical and political capital? Colonel 

Burdick’s thoughtful synthesis of technology, doctrine, institutional culture, 

geopolitics, logistics, economics, and strategic principles suggests it is not 

only possible but compelling. 

Central to the proposal offered herein is the interrelated development of 

new logistical and operational constructs. The idea of “instant basing” slashes 

the traditional forward-based requirements of US airpower and thus influences 

cost, force protection, and the diplomatic calculus. It does so by exploiting the 

increasingly robust commercial lines of communication relevant to economic 

globalization as well as the lighter footprint associated with deploying small, 

remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and their support teams via military airlift 

and sealift. In essence, this concept springs from the merging of global logistics with the growing stable of small, accurate, and lethal RPAs. Colonel 

Burdick describes how these RPAs and their relatively small logistical requirements—serving in a novel combination—can form the vanguard of a new 

airpower paradigm. 

The Air Force’s history of innovation is in many ways a story of creative 

destruction. New concepts of projecting power emerge that subvert traditional doctrine and supplant the status quo. This study presents an example of 

how that could happen in the near future and reminds us how new opportunities and demands of the strategic environment ultimately privilege innovation and change. This study received the Air University Foundation’s award 

for the best School of Advanced Air and Space Studies thesis on the subject of 
x

technology, space, or cyberspace, and I am pleased to recommend it to those 

who value innovative thinking as a catalyst to strategic advantage. 

Timothy P. Shultz

Colonel, USAF, Retired, PhD

Associate Dean of Academic Affairs,

US Naval War College
xi

About the Author

Lt Col Jonathan Burdick is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies. He has operational experience in KC-135R and U-2S/TR-1 

weapons systems, is a former instructor in both aircraft, and holds a master of 

science in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College. 

xiii

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my extreme gratitude to Col Timothy Schultz and 

Dr. Harold Winton for their expert advice and mentoring during this project. 

Their help was fundamental to the success of this paper. I would also like to 

thank Lt Col Jobie Turner, Lt Col Chris Macaulay, Lt Col Eric Murphy, Maj 

David Hood, and Mr. Michael Spehar for providing essential insight and 

references important to this research. 

xv

Abstract

This study explores the effects of airpower technologies and logistics on the 

application of US airpower. It finds that future swarms of small, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) might provide significant force-projection capabilities 

using global military and commercial logistics infrastructures. This conclusion results from an examination of air operations during the Vietnam War, 

Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom, existing RPA research and 

development, and projected Department of Defense developmental milestones 

involving swarms of small RPAs. The study also proposes a concept of operations, designated Locust Swarm, and a new logistics construct, called Instant 

Basing, that exploit the future capabilities of small, unmanned aerial vehicles. 

Such concepts may provide national policy makers relatively low-cost, low-risk 

options for international crises requiring the rapid deployment of airpower.

1

Chapter 1

Introduction 

Developing a swarming force implies, among other things, radical 

changes in current military organizational structures.

—John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt

During the Battle of Britain, British Spitfires and Hurricanes scrambled 

aloft from geographically dispersed air bases to intercept attacking German 

fighters and bombers. Formations of Luftwaffe aircraft had already demonstrated their destructiveness during the opening campaigns of World War II, 

but the British people were unfazed and rallied behind Prime Minister Winston 

Churchill’s famous call for “victory at all costs—victory in spite of all terrors.”1

Beyond national spirit, Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) had another advantage. It had an integrated air defense system (IADS) consisting of Chain Home 

radar stations, centralized command and control centers, and fighter aircraft 

capable of responding to airborne threats on short notice.2

 By the end of this 

campaign, Fighter Command’s effective use of its IADS greatly contributed to 

the destruction of 1,887 Luftwaffe aircraft and Adolf Hitler’s decision to postpone the invasion of the British Isles.3

Great Britain’s victory over Nazi aggression is one of many important 

events of World War II, and the Royal Air Force’s use of swarm tactics to help 

achieve it was particularly significant. According to RAND theorists John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Britain’s Fighter Command used a “deliberately 

structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means 

of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off 

positions.”4

 Great Britain’s ability to gather and disseminate information 

throughout its IADS unified disparate fighting elements, allowing them to 

converge on enemy aircraft from all directions. Furthermore, Great Britain 

employed swarming from a defensive strategic position and used an indirect 

approach so that it could “await a change in the balance of force—a change 

often sought and achieved by draining the enemy’s force, weakening him by 

pricks instead of risking blows . . . by local attacks which annihilate or inflict 

disproportionate loss on parts of his force; by luring him into unprofitable 

attacks; by causing an excessively wide distribution of his force; and, no least, 

by exhausting his moral and physical energy.”5

 Britain’s strategic defensive position enhanced its chances of survival.6

 Airpower history lacks, however, successful examples of swarming conducted from a strategically offensive position.7
INTRODUCTION

2

Military forces employed within a strategically offensive strategy have often been 

unable to translate tactical-level swarming engagements into strategic victory 

because logistical constraints frequently prevented sustained operations. 

At the tactical level, “the realm of the actual employment of armed forces,” 

swarming is not a new phenomenon.8

 Germany used multidirectional hitand-run tactics by irregular swarms of “shock troops” to exploit gaps and 

weaknesses in enemy lines of operation during World War I.9

 The Japanese 

navy also used swarms of kamikazes in an effort to overwhelm individual 

carrier groups during the Second World War.10 In these examples, the conduct and arrangement of forces were intended to provide local advantage 

that aimed to destroy enemy forces through a series of tactical engagements.11

Tactical victories could then potentially lead to operational results that might 

produce strategic effects. For example, the German army and Japanese navy 

hoped that local victories achieved by swarm tactics as part of their offensive 

strategy could then increase the likelihood of a “better state of peace” recognized by favorable terms at the cessation of hostilities.12 When employed 

within their strategically offensive strategy, swarming methods were tactical 

means that had the potential to create operational momentum leading to strategic results. 

According to military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, “Strategy is the use of 

the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance 

with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim 

will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.”13 Given the politician’s purpose for military operations, commonly called grand strategy, the 

military commander determines how to use available forces as part of an 

overall plan.14 As a result, military effects are referred to as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their intent to affect a conflict’s overall purpose, 

military aim, or specific battlefield events. Colin Gray argues that the employment of any weapon could shape decisions made by political leaders and operational military leaders. He wrote, “All weapons and forces should be called 

strategic, which is precisely why no weapons or forces should be so designated.”15 Nevertheless, Gray’s argument seems to miss the importance of intent and planning. Intent and planning are important because they provide 

objectives that serve as measures of effectiveness.

As noted, swarming attacks conducted by World War I storm troopers and 

World War II kamikazes were tactical means intended to provide operational 

effects by destroying enemy forces and controlling geographic territory or sea 

space. Each military force had the capacity to swarm only at the local level unless it received logistical support from external sources. German and Japanese 
INTRODUCTION

3

swarms of attackers were limited by their range of motion, their ability to 

continue operations, and the size of their operating forces. For example, during the First World War, German Stosstruppen (storm troopers) were often 

dependent on exterior lines of communication for resupply, reinforcements, 

and artillery support. In cases where storm troopers made significant gains 

into enemy territory, they were often unable to continue fighting because the 

German army lacked sufficient rail lines and support forces to transport artillery and supplies to forward positions.16 Furthermore, Stosstruppen gains 

could not generate operational momentum because their forward positions 

were often overrun or they were forced to retreat by reserve British, French, 

and/or US troops.17 Consequently, German field marshal Erich Ludendorff ’s 

“Peace Offensive” failed primarily because of its inability to provide sustained 

logistical support.18 Similarly, the effect of kamikaze forces was limited by aircraft range, their aircraft carrier’s inventory of fuel and weapons, and the 

availability of qualified pilots.19 Each of these fighting units’ limitations relegated their episodic use to the tactical level. More importantly, the original 

intent behind Germany’s and Japan’s use of swarm tactics was to win local 

battles to gain operational momentum and potentially earn favorable terms in 

victory. In their strategic offensive, Stosstruppen and kamikazes intended to 

expand control of their region but only had the means to generate modest 

tactical forces.

In contrast to the previous examples, swarming operations during the Battle 

of Britain relied on a strategically defensive position because their grand-strategic aim was the protection of Britain’s national sovereignty and survival.20

Great Britain intended to prevent a German invasion so it could subsequently 

shift its grand-strategic aim toward the ultimate defeat of Germany. Undoubtedly, each air battle between RAF and Luftwaffe aircraft involved the tactical 

employment of force, yet each British fighter swarm that intercepted Luftwaffe aircraft did so for the strategic aim of mitigating damage to the British 

homeland and therefore supported the goal of national survival. Fighter 

Command’s command-and-control (C2) organizational structure was designed to synchronize the capabilities of British fighter swarms, air defense 

artillery, early warning radar, and domestic logistical systems.21 Furthermore, 

Great Britain relied on interior lines of communication and supply located 

throughout the British Isles. Unlike their opponent, the British could effect 

communication and resupply with relative ease because secure domestic logistics networks were within close proximity to airfields. National purpose, 

geography, military capabilities, technological advances, and logistics aligned 

such that swarming operations were realistic, were included within the strategic planning process, and contributed to strategic victory.
INTRODUCTION

4

Contemporary operations such as Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring 

Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom may have included brief instances of swarming; 

however, they did not demonstrate sustained swarming operations. Arquilla 

and Ronfeldt’s basic characteristics of maneuver warfare better define the latest 

US examples of air warfare. For example, modern operational concepts involve 

“complex, synchronized, fast-tempo, multi-linear operations to surprise, penetrate, and flank” the enemy and aim to apply mass at decisive points.22 They do 

not, however, embody swarming characteristics involving small, dispersed, 

autonomous, or semiautonomous forces that use interconnected surveillance 

sensors in sustainable convergent attacks against the enemy.23 This is not to say 

that strategic swarming has not been possible in the modern era; it simply suggests that US airpower has not been deliberately structured for sustained 

swarming operations. Specific examples of tactical swarming may have occurred, yet they were usually brief, discrete, and/or unintended. 

This research proposes a concept of operations (CONOPS) and logistics 

for swarming. In doing so, it integrates ideas concerning scientific thought, 

military theory and doctrine, the current state of technological affairs, developments in logistics, expanding commercial infrastructures inherent to the globalized economy, and recent events pertaining to international politics. It also 

advocates a new concept of airpower in which individual and potentially expendable aircraft are launched as part of an overwhelming, persistent, and 

flexible constellation of vehicles.24 Moreover, just as locusts emerge unexpectedly 

and devastate agricultural heartlands, this concept of operations provides a 

method to conceal the rapid buildup of air forces so their launch generates 

strategic surprise. It also describes a potent force capability that may reveal a 

new power-projection paradigm.

Problem Background and Significance

As previously noted, Arquilla and Ronfeldt defined swarming as the “deliberately structured, coordinated way to strike from all directions, by means 

of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off 

positions.”25 Early airpower advocate William “Billy” Mitchell alluded to the 

concept of swarming in his 1925 statement that “every air attack on other 

aircraft is based on the theory of surrounding the enemy in the middle of a 

sphere with all our own airplanes around the whole periphery shooting at 

it.”26 Although Mitchell intended to describe the three-dimensional characteristics of air combat at the tactical level of warfare, his ideas apply to modern 

concepts of operations involving swarming. 
INTRODUCTION

5

Swarming has three primary requirements: aircraft with sufficient range, a 

C2 system, and a logistics system capable of continuously supplying air operations. First, airpower capabilities must be positioned within range of targets 

to ensure continuous operations without capability lapses. The RAF could 

successfully employ swarming during the Battle of Britain because sufficient 

numbers of airfields were located within interception range of invading Luftwaffe aircraft.27 Furthermore, the RAF enjoyed the huge benefit of interior 

lines. This advantage shortened response times and simplified the transportation, C2, and supply requirements of its air operations. Simply stated, Great 

Britain’s wartime infrastructure was in place and close at hand during the 

Battle of Britain. In post–World War II conflicts such as the Korean War, Vietnam, and Operation Desert Storm (ODS), aircraft were based at distant locations within range of their targets. In those cases where aircraft range was not 

sufficient, air-refueling capabilities provided greater basing options since aircraft ranges were extended with in-flight refueling.28 Although air operations 

supporting Operation Enduring Freedom include the use of bases located 

within Afghanistan, airpower capabilities employed in the Middle East are similarly transient in nature. These operations seem to rely on many exterior lines 

of communication and complex supply systems. Many C2, reconnaissance, 

air-refueling, and strike aircraft base their operations from locations geographically removed from Afghanistan and require long transit times.29 As a 

result, the US Air Force has not demonstrated the ability to maintain constant 

levels of airpower capability in hostile theaters. Periodic lapses of capability 

may occur, for example, during aircraft changeovers, air refueling, maintenance aborts, and otherwise in a force stretched too thinly over a wide geographic expanse. 

Second, strategic swarms must have robust command-and-control systems 

organized to use information effectively. As recognized by Department of Defense (DOD) joint doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 6-0, 

Command and Control, defines the concept as

the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 

and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. . . . This definition acknowledges three central themes. The first theme, personnel, covers the human 

aspects of C2. . . . The second, the technology element, covers the equipment, communications, and facilities needed to overcome the warfighting problems of integrating 

actions and effects across space and time. . . . The third theme, labeled in this document 

as “processes,” encompasses “procedures.”30
INTRODUCTION

6

Further explanation by AFDD 6-0 reveals that command involves a military leader’s authority to conduct operations, and the term control involves 

the way in which the leader may “plan and guide operations.”31 Moreover, free 

exchange of information is a vital component to C2 systems. A commander 

must be able to communicate with all levels within the chain of command.32

In those cases in which timely information exchange has not been possible, 

decentralized execution of mission orders has been effective during air operations. During the Battle of Britain, for example, RAF fighter pilots were expected to accomplish general orders involving the intercept of Luftwaffe aircraft but had freedom to apply tactics and flight maneuvers according to their 

own interpretation of their flight environment.33 Moreover, the British IADS 

balanced tactical necessity and strategic reporting requirements. Pilots had 

the responsibility to destroy enemy aircraft, and British commanders accepted the fact that they would not have timely visibility into the tactical 

events of each battle.34 As a result, Great Britain’s C2 system represented a felicitous marriage of human input and technological capability.

Although modern air operations still rely on decentralized execution of 

mission orders, technological advances in information systems and computer 

equipment have increased commanders’ access to timely information 

throughout many aspects of operations. For example, full-motion video feeds 

and up-to-the-second electronic maps of air assets are prominently displayed 

in air operations centers (AOC).35 Access to timely information is important, 

and military historian Martin van Creveld contends that commanders must 

have the ability to “telescope” selectively to specific issues of interest but 

should carefully avoid micromanagement.36 As information systems and 

communication technologies eliminate the need for delayed reporting, the 

importance of C2 infrastructures will increase.37 Furthermore, the use of unmanned remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and the future possibility that formations of RPAs may operate autonomously, may require more robust realtime information flow between the battlefield and the commander.38

RPAs and/or formations of RPAs may possess the capability to deliver 

more destructive effects than current generations of manned aircraft, and 

their increasingly autonomous capabilities will not relieve commanders of 

their responsibility to command and control airpower assets. Commanders 

may require “telescoped” information relating to the swarm and/or individual 

aircraft. Such situations might increase information flow requirements between aircraft and C2 elements.39 Consequently, C2 systems serve as a critical 

component of strategic swarming; however, they must also be capable of processing and disseminating the immense volume of information involved with 

modern networked weapon systems. 
INTRODUCTION

7

Just as C2 systems magnify military organizations’ ability to process and 

disseminate information during operations, logistics systems ensure that supplies are delivered to war fighters as quickly as possible. Thus, swarming’s 

third requirement involves logistics systems capable of timely delivery of 

equipment and personnel for sustained operations. During the Battle of Britain, the RAF possessed the advantage of interior lines of communication and 

an indigenous supply of personnel and equipment.40 In modern operations, 

the United States has not enjoyed the same luxury. For example, during Operation Desert Storm a typical Air Force combat wing required the initial delivery 

of 1,000 to 2,000 tons of air- and ground-support equipment; once operations 

began, it required the daily delivery of 100 to 200 tons of ammunition and 

500,000 to 1,000,000 gallons of fuel.41 Moreover, complex global operations 

require capable information processing systems. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, 

Joint Logistics, states, “The global dispersion of the joint force and the rapidity 

with which threats arise have made real-time or near real-time information 

critical to support military operations.”42 The ability to identify maintenance 

problems, coordinate the immediate replacement of equipment, and calculate 

fuel requirements for each vehicle and/or operating base in a timely manner 

will be essential to achieving seamless operations. Continuous operations 

without capability lapses may also prevent the enemy from detecting changes 

in force strength because real-time identification of supply or maintenance 

problems could allow one-for-one aircraft exchanges over the target area. 

Massed air attacks such as Brig Gen Billy Mitchell’s 1,400-aircraft raid against 

Saint-Mihiel and bombing formations of thousands of aircraft in World War 

II were not continuous, but enemies had to deal with never-ending peril.43

Given swarming’s three primary requirements of geographic positioning 

of air assets, effective C2, and robust, timely logistics, the central research 

question of this paper seeks to determine if remotely piloted aircraft can provide sustainable, effective swarm capability from nontraditional bases of operation. As in the Second World War, the Korean conflict, the Vietnam War, and 

Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Enduring Freedom, large air 

bases were vital logistical nodes necessary for the sustenance of air operations, personnel, and equipment. RPAs based with manned aircraft played 

significant roles in every major operation since Allied Force.44 In a general 

sense, manned aircraft and RPA basing decisions are similar because they 

both require extensive logistics, security, and geopolitical planning. However, 

RPAs may provide a more flexible and inexpensive airpower option if they 

require less logistical and security support and mitigate political challenges 

that often complicate the US use of foreign air bases. Furthermore, if RPAs 

demonstrate a capability to overwhelm, deter, dissuade, and/or punish adver-
INTRODUCTION

8

saries via swarms launched from nontraditional locations, their concept of 

employment may spur doctrinal changes.

Weapon systems such as Predator B and Reaper RPAs currently possess the 

ability to find, fix, target, and kill the enemy with persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and air-to-ground weapons.45 According to 

senior Air Force leaders and authors such as P. W. Singer, RPAs are nearing the 

combat capability of manned aircraft in some circumstances and potentially 

offer capabilities yet unseen in the realm of military affairs.46 However, RPAs 

have not demonstrated their ability to project force in denied airspace, and their 

complex operational infrastructures require theater launch bases, stateside pilot and sensor operator facilities, and distributed command-and-control centers.47 Nonetheless, are they the missing link that will permit the maturation of 

flexible and persistent swarming operations?

Methodology and Categories of Analysis

Both primary and secondary sources form the foundation of this paper. 

Primary sources include joint and Air Force doctrinal publications, official 

correspondence, interview transcripts, and official briefings obtained from 

the Air University library, Air Force Historical Research Agency, and operational units. Secondary sources such as scholarly monographs, popular books, 

journal articles, and news articles provide background and contextual information. However, within the plethora of available literature regarding airpower, 

swarming, logistics, security, politics, and remotely piloted aircraft, there has 

not been an attempt to synthesize the available information into a novel, consolidated concept of operations and logistics for air operations involving small 

RPAs. Because the swarming concepts in this paper involve complex interrelationships of operational capabilities, geographic positioning, logistics, security, 

and geopolitics, they serve as the primary categories of analysis.

Assuming that future swarms of small RPAs and their associated C2 structures demonstrate a new means of projecting force, they will require adequate 

logistical support, force protection, access to geographic positions within 

range of their target, and political acceptance by host nations. Although RPA 

swarms will consume a modest amount of fuel, equipment, and weapons 

compared to manned aircraft, their ability to project persistent airpower will 

depend on resilient logistics networks capable of sustaining operations. This 

nontraditional concept of operations, moreover, confounds enemy actions 

that may ordinarily influence operations and logistical infrastructure and is 

less beholden to host-nation leaders who might otherwise seek to exert sig-
INTRODUCTION

9

nificant leverage on US air operations by limiting access to state facilities and 

territories. 

Doctrine and contemporary events support the use of these categories of 

analysis. According to JP 3-0, Joint Operations,

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain 

and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the 

force. Sustainment provides the JFC [joint force commander] with the means to enable 

freedom of action and endurance and the ability to extend operational reach. Effective 

sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The ultimate goal is for 

logistics planners to develop a feasible, supportable, and efficient concept of logistic support and to be able to identify risks to the execution of the CONOPS.48

As described in JP 3-0, sustainment is a matter of logistics and supply. Moreover, just as the second law of thermodynamics dictates that “within a closed 

system the amount of useable energy decreases as it is employed,” air operations require steady streams of supplies to maintain the status quo.49 Without 

a continuous flow of supplies, the swarm dissipates.

In addition to internal force sustainment issues involving logistics and supply, two external constraints threaten continued operations. First, air bases 

and lines of communication are vulnerable to enemy attack, sabotage, and/or 

disruption. Thus, security is a vital consideration for sustained swarming operations. JP 3-0 describes security as a “protection function” and requires active 

and passive measures to preserve the “joint force’s fighting potential.”50 Moreover, it specifically emphasizes “securing and protecting forces, bases, JSAs 

[joint storage areas], and LOCs [lines of communication].”51 Joint Operations

goes on to highlight numerous defensive measures that may thwart enemy actions.52 Nonetheless, attacks against swarm bases and lines of logistics and communication could significantly affect their ability to generate airpower and 

demonstrate a sustained swarm effect over the target area.

Politics serves as the second external constraint to sustained swarming operations. Host-nation governments have the right to determine how the United 

States uses their territories and facilities. Foreign states hold sovereign authority over air bases and LOCs within their national borders. Moreover, they 

may use the basing of US forces for political and economic leverage, as the 

government of Kyrgyzstan demonstrated in 2009.53 Fortunately, a shutdown 

of air operations from Kyrgyzstan’s Manas Air Base was averted following 

diplomatic negotiations. Ultimately in 2010, the Kyrgyzstan government 

agreed to extend the US lease.54

Because host nations wield significant influence over airpower operations 

originating from and transiting their territory, US doctrine emphasizes host-
INTRODUCTION

10

nation relations. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, recognizes diplomacy as an instrument of national power for “engaging with other 

states and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives.”55 JP 

3-0 states, “Establishing, maintaining, and enhancing security cooperation 

among our alliances and partners is important to strengthen the global security 

framework of the United States and its partners.”56 Furthermore, Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2300.02F, Coordination of Overseas 

Force Structure Changes and Host-Nation Notification, and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-504, Overseas Force Structure Changes and Host Nation Notification, emphasize communication and healthy relations between theater 

commanders and host-nation representatives.57 Even with continued diplomacy and doctrinal and regulatory emphasis on host-nation relations, foreign 

leaders hold as much power to stop air operations as do enemy weapons to 

destroy US forward-deployed tools of war.

Limitations and Assumptions

This analysis does not include or rely on classified information and draws all 

of its conclusions from publicly available data. All open-source information 

regarding aircraft specifications, operational events, and military capabilities 

is assumed to be valid. Furthermore, because small RPA swarming has not 

been operationally demonstrated, the argument assumes that the current 

technological trajectory accurately portends the future utility of the Locust Swarm 

concept of operations and its associated Instant Basing concept of logistics. 

Overview

The intent of this study is to develop a swarming concept of operations and 

logistics for the US Air Force and describe how it may apply to a variety of 

airpower scenarios. It assumes initial development by the Air Force but acknowledges that it will require coordination and cooperation with the other 

military services. Following successful demonstration, this concept may set 

the framework for a standard operational architecture that may be used within 

joint and coalition operations. This project considers existing airpower capabilities and doctrine and the potential implications of emerging technologies. 

To some degree, it extrapolates future technological capabilities based on the 

state of existing research and development. Regardless, the future will include 

difficult budgetary limitations, so another intent of this project is to examine 

how strategic swarming can be accomplished with modest resources.
INTRODUCTION

11

Following this introduction, chapter 2 explores how the United States evaluates 

geographic positioning, command and control, and logistics to decide which 

foreign air bases are suitable for operations involving manned aircraft by providing examples of global and theater-level airpower operations. It explains 

how and why the United States used foreign airfields during the Vietnam War, 

Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This 

chapter also briefly describes how the Air Force organized and based airpower assets to provide broad capabilities against enemy targets and concludes by explaining the reasons swarming has not been successful with 

manned aircraft and why future swarms of small RPAs may provide unique 

capabilities that might challenge the existing paradigm regarding the use of 

overwhelming force.

Chapter 3 focuses on operations involving remotely piloted aircraft. It explores the possibility that swarms of small, inexpensive RPAs might serve as a 

vanguard for a new airpower paradigm by surveying three subject areas. First, 

the chapter provides an overview of presently employed RPAs and their 

CONOPS. Second, it explores developmental RPA technologies necessary for 

swarming operations. Third, it describes an Instant Basing concept of logistics 

and examines the impact on the geographic positioning of forces, logistics, 

force protection, and politics and how such capabilities may inform policy at 

the grand-strategy level. 

Chapter 4 notionally demonstrates the Locust Swarm concept of operations and Instant Basing concept of logistics. In a future scenario designed to 

test the findings of the previous two chapters, Locust Swarms help Nigerian 

constabulary forces regain security following crippling terrorist attacks. In the 

notional scenario, US policy makers fear a potential Nigerian genocide and 

oil supply disruptions that could damage the global economy. Because swarms 

of small RPAs are uniquely suited for low-cost, low-intensity conflicts requiring fast response to emerging crises, Locust Swarms are deployed throughout 

Nigeria. This chapter is notable for two reasons. First, it provides a glimpse of 

a Locust Swarm concept of operations. Second, it demonstrates the Instant 

Basing concept of logistics in action.

A concluding chapter provides a concise summary of findings, considerations, 

and shortfalls pertaining to swarming. It further assesses the potential implications of Locust Swarm and Instant Basing on US airpower and international politics. Finally, it examines whether or not the capabilities inherent 

within Locust Swarm and Instant Basing hold the potential to change the US 

paradigm involving the use of overwhelming force.
INTRODUCTION

12

Notes

1. Winston Churchill, “Blood, Sweat, and Tears,” in World’s Great Speeches, 3rd ed., ed. 

Lewis Copeland and Lawrence W. Lamm (New York: Dover Publications, 1973), 431–33; and 

James S. Corum, Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 1997), 182–223.

2. Stephen Bungay, Most Dangerous Enemy:The Definitive History of the Battle of Britain 

(London: Aurum Press, 2000), 61, 64–69.

3. Ibid., 368, 386, 388.

4. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corp., 2000), vii, 9.

5. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Meridian, 1967), 321.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, ed. and trans. by Hans W. Gatzke (Mineola, NY: 

Dover, 2003), 53; and Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 357, 370. A strategic defensive war is one “in 

which we limit ourselves to fighting the enemy in a theatre of war which we have prepared for 

this purpose.” As written in On War, the object of a strategic defensive position is preservation 

and/or maintenance of the status quo. 

7. Clausewitz, Principles of War, 58; and Clausewitz, On War, 357, 370. A strategic offensive 

war “pursues the aim of the war directly, aiming straight at the destruction of the enemy’s forces.” 

8. Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 61.

9. Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: Strategic Theory of John Boyd (London: 

Routledge, 2007), 149.

10. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 34.

11. Clausewitz, Principles of War, 58.

12. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 338; and G. C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: Battle in Depth in the 

West (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 148.

13. Clausewitz, On War, 177.

14. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 322.

15. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 61–62.

16. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–

1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 178; and Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 320.

17. Wynn, If Germany Attacks, 156–57.

18. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, 155–68, 177–78; and Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 320.

19. Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 (Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 75, 189.

20. Bungay, Most Dangerous Enemy, 23–25.

21. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 32–33.

22. Ibid., 17.

23. Ibid., 21.

24. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century 

(New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 126.

25. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, vii, 46. According to Arquilla 

and Ronfeldt, “sustainable pulsing” attacks are those “that repeatedly strike the adversary—with 

fire or force—from all directions, then to dissever from the attack, redisperse, and repeat the 

cycle as battle conditions require.”
INTRODUCTION

13

26. William “Billy” Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern 

Air Power—Economic and Military (1925; repr., Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 

2010), 8–9.

27. Richard J. Overy, “Air War in Europe, 1939–1945,” in A History of Air Warfare, ed. John 

Andreas Olsen (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 30–32; and Bungay, Most Dangerous 

Enemy, 492. For a graphical depiction of the British main battle area, see the map provided at 

the end of Most Dangerous Enemy.

28. Dwayne A. Day, “Aerial Refueling,” Centennialofflight.net, http://www.centennialofflight.

net/essay/Evolution_of_Technology/refueling/Tech22.htm (accessed 27 January 2012).

29. US Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), “Factsheets: 380th Air Expeditionary 

Wing History,” http://www.380aew.afcent.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12246; and 

AFCENT, “Units: 379th Air Expeditionary Wing,” http://www.379aew.afcent.af.mil/units/index.asp (both accessed 20 February 2012); and Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Operation Enduring 

Freedom, 2001,” in History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington, DC: Potomac 

Books, 2010), 258–59.

30. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 6-0, Command and Control, 28 July 2011, 2.

31. Ibid., 4–5.

32. Ibid., 19.

33. Bungay, Most Dangerous Enemy, 63.

34. Ibid.

35. AFCENT, “Factsheets: Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC),” 6 February 

2001, http://www.afcent.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/140/Article/217803/combined-air-and-space-operations-center-caoc.aspx.

36. Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 

1985), 272.

37. Antoine Bousquet, Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of 

Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 233–34.

38. Singer, Wired for War, 126.

39. Information technologies built into aircraft communications systems may allow commanders to gain real-time information on any group or single aircraft based on the design of 

networked airpower. 

40. Richard J. Overy, Air War: 1939–1945 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 31, 

162–63, 165, 170. 

41. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and 

Combat Outcomes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 147.

42. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Joint Logistics, 18 July 2008.

43. John H. Morrow Jr., “First World War, 1914–1919,” in History of Air Warfare, ed. John 

Andreas Olsen (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 21; and Jeremy Black, World War 

Two: A Military History (London: Routledge, 2003), 184.

44. John Andreas Olsen, History of Air Warfare, 249, 270, 347.

45. Orville F. Desjarlais Jr., “Unmanned, Unmatched, Unafraid,” Airman 49, no. 6 (Summer 

2005): 38. The MQ-1B Predator has a significant loiter time, cruises at approximately 84 miles 

per hour, has a range up to 770 miles, can provide full-motion video imagery, and can carry 

two Hellfire missiles. The MQ-9 Reaper also “has significant loiter time,” cruises at approximately 230 miles per hour, has a range of 1,150 miles, and carries a variety of imagery sensors 

and air-to-ground weapons. Each of these aircraft is controlled via remote split operations 

whereby a forward-located crew launches and recovers the vehicles. After launch and prior to 
INTRODUCTION

14

recovery, pilots and sensor operators—located in the United States—operate the aircraft. 

USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-1B Predator,” 20 July 2010, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/

Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx; and USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-9 Reaper,” 

18 August 2010, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq9-reaper.aspx.

46. David A. Deptula, “Unmanned Future,” Armed Forces Journal 148, no. 10 (June 2011): 

34; and Singer, Wired for War, 115–20, 126.

47. David A. Deptula, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Taking Strategy to Task,” Joint Force 

Quarterly no. 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 49–51.

48. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, III-35.

49. Bousquet, Scientific Way of Warfare, 69.

50. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-29.

51. Ibid., III-30.

52. See ibid., III-31–III-35, for a detailed listing of active and defensive protective measures.

53. “US Kicked Out of Kyrgyzstan Air Base,” Military.com, February 2009, http://www.

military.com/news/article/February-2009/us-kicked-out-of-kyrgyzstan-air-base.html; and “Kyrgyzstan Crisis: What You Need to Know,” Week, 9 April 2010, http://theweek.com/article/index/201745/the-kyrgyzstan-crisis-what-you-need-to-know. Manas Air Base is an important supply base for air cargo and air-refueling aircraft supporting Afghanistan. Competition between 

political elements of the Kyrgyz government caused uncertainty over the US use of Manas. Moreover, the Kyrgyz parliament threatened to expel Russia and the United States from its territory in 

an effort to receive higher lease payments for use of its air bases. Shortly after Kyrgyzstan’s temporary decision to expel US and Russian forces, Russia offered to pay more for its base and the use of 

Manas AB. This crisis was eventually resolved following higher lease payments by both states.

54. “Kyrgyzstan Extends US Lease on Manas Air Base,” BBC News, 16 April 2010, http://

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8624723.stm.

55. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 20 March 2009, I-9.

56. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, I-3.

57. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2300.02F, Coordination of Overseas 

Force Structure Changes and Host-Nation Notification, 30 September 2009; and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-504, Overseas Force Structure Changes and Host Nation Notification, 21 

October 2011.
15

Chapter 2

A Technologically Driven Paradigm of 

Overwhelming Force

Sound logistics forms the foundation for the development of 

strategic flexibility and mobility. If such flexibility is to be exercised and exploited, military command must have adequate 

control of its logistic support. 

—RADM Henry E. Eccles, USN 

For professional military organizations and officers almost everywhere, the decisive incentives accrued to the development of 

bigger institutional hierarchies and weapon systems, in eras when 

information and communications systems were improving but 

still remained quite slow, centralized, and cumbersome—all of 

which favored the continued development of mass and maneuver 

approaches to warfare.

—John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 

As noted, military strategy integrates war objectives, planning, and “series 

of actions” so that wartime operations mesh with politicians’ grand strategy.1

The planning process, however, must consider existing capabilities of fielded 

weapons. Development and production of new weapons and equipment takes 

time, and the constant state of readiness demanded of military forces does not 

support strategies built on unproven technologies. During a 2004 meeting 

with deployed military personnel in Kuwait, then–secretary of defense Donald 

Rumsfeld’s comment “You go to war with the army you have, not the army 

you might want or wish to have at a later time” illustrated this reality.2

 Furthermore, within Colin Gray’s 13 “Principles on Characteristics of Armed 

Forces for Guidance of Defense Planning,” four of the first seven planning 

factors involve the evaluation of existing military forces. According to Gray, 

defense planners should evaluate whether existing military forces are “capable 

of winning,” available in sufficient numbers, “applicable quickly,” and “logistically supportable.”3

 Similarly, airpower has contributed to a US military strategy 

based on its ability to speed victory, employ destructive force rapidly against 

adversaries, and sustain operations with adequate logistical support.4
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

16

These ideas have been central aspects of the US airpower paradigm. 

Thomas Kuhn revealed a groundbreaking way to study institutional thought 

processes when he stated that paradigms are “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a 

community of practitioners.”5

 Scientists committed to a given paradigm engage in “normal science” and conduct “research firmly based upon one or 

more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its 

further practice.” Kuhn adds that “men whose research is based on shared 

paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice.”6

 Although there are many differences between the US Air Force and the 

scientific community, Kuhn’s paradigm concept applies to the service.

In many respects, the Air Force has been committed to the idea that airdelivered kinetic effects prosecute war more rapidly and effectively than surface warfare.7

 Thomas Kane named this paradigm the “bombardment style of 

warfare,” based on its emphasis on an alleged ability to deliver decisive kinetic 

effects from air vehicles.8

 Air Force normal science has focused its efforts toward improved weapon systems and employment methods that provide faster 

means to deploy violence against the enemy so that wars can be ended in the 

shortest amount of time. Even with improved weapons systems and employment, the Air Force has been heavily reliant on robust logistics systems. Similar 

to the scientific community’s use of normal science, the Air Force’s reinforcement of operational norms, rules, and standards within service regulations and 

doctrine has hardened support for the existing airpower paradigm.

US kinetic airpower doctrine has also been inextricably tied to the belief 

that airpower serves as a means of accelerating victory using the maneuver 

capabilities of aircraft. Manned aircraft, large foreign air bases, and robust 

logistical requirements have provided the means to satisfy maneuver warfare 

requirements. US airpower force structures provide “complex, synchronized, 

fast-tempo, multi-linear operations to surprise, penetrate [and] flank with 

mobile mass at [the] decisive point.”9

 Moreover, the ability to maneuver air 

forces on a global scale has characterized US air operations and set the stage 

for how the United States developed and sustained its military force structure. 

According to this line of argument, airpower’s use of the third dimension 

has provided military strategists the ability to deliver reconnaissance and 

force with an incomparable maneuver capability, unlike slower and less maneuverable land and sea forces.10 Although early airpower missions dealt primarily with reconnaissance, aircraft gained the ability to deliver destructive 

force directly against enemy assets.11 Instead of supporting land forces or directing artillery, aircraft acquired the ability to conduct attacks themselves. In 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

17

airpower’s infancy, bombing attacks often took place in parallel with reconnaissance operations. For example, in 1911 the Italian army used reconnaissance aircraft to drop bombs against Libyan positions, and as early as 1912, 

“the offensive use of the dirigible and the airplane had begun to draw some 

interest among military authorities.”12 Moreover, by the end of World War I, 

aviation and weapons technologies advanced to such a degree that there was 

“a spreading conviction that if the airplane had not replaced the foot soldier 

or the artillery piece as the central cog in the military machine of 1918, its role 

could only continue to grow as it continued to evolve.”13

Early airpower advocates Air Marshal Giulio Douhet in Italy and Brig Gen 

Billy Mitchell in the United States realized the potential importance of offensive airpower and focused on the merits of aerial bombing. From Douhet’s 

perspective, aerial bombing had inherent measures of effectiveness that could 

increase strategic planners’ ability to achieve decisive victory. He wrote that 

“the guiding principle of bombing actions should be this: the objective must be 

destroyed completely in one attack, making further attack on the same target unnecessary . . . . The unit of bombardment must have the potentiality to destroy 

any target on a given surface” (emphasis in original).14 General Mitchell also 

believed that airpower could be decisive and argued that aerial bombing 

might be a revolutionary form of warfare:

More than that, aerial torpedoes which are really airplanes kept on their course by gyroscopic instruments and wireless telegraphy, with no pilots on board, can be directed for 

over a hundred miles in a sufficiently accurate way to hit great cities. So that in [the] 

future the mere threat of bombing a town by an air force will cause it to be evacuated, 

and all work in munitions and supply factories to be stopped.

A new set of rules for the conduct of war will have to be devised and a whole new set of 

ideas of strategy learned by those charged with the conduct of war. No longer is the making of war gauged merely by land and naval forces.15

Writings such as these provided added support for the use of aerial bombing 

and helped ensure that bomber aircraft held a central role within the force 

structure of the US Air Force.16

Even with the advent of modern precision-guided weapons, airpower historian Tami Biddle noted that current airpower debates have a “familiar ring,” 

adding that

since 1918 airmen have sought to find and destroy a critical Achilles’ heel in an opposing 

society, polity, or economy so as to win wars without fighting one’s way through the mass 

land armies of previous eras. Through more than eighty years and the experience of 

World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the underlying philosophy and central implementing 

ideas of strategic bombing have changed remarkably little. The tools of air warfare have 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

18

changed dramatically since the canvas and plywood planes of the First World War, but 

it is striking just how little the basic ideas behind the use of those tools have changed 

(emphasis in original).17

Biddle is correct that airpower ideas emphasizing the efficacy of bombing 

have been central and relatively continuous aspects of US airpower. Nonetheless, the airpower paradigm continues to hold that no other tool of warfare 

has the capability to deploy violence against enemy targets with the same degree of mobility and speed. Consequently, the tools of air warfare have improved in their ability to deliver powerful weapons. The community of airpower practitioners has advanced the efficacy of the air weapon but only 

within the regnant paradigm.

Modern aircraft are much more capable than their predecessors. Compared to World War II–era bombers, the B-52, B-1, and B-2 carry a load many 

times that of their propeller-driven ancestors. For example, the B-17 carried 

9,600 pounds (lb.) of bombs, and the B-29 had a 20,000 lb. bomb load.18 The 

B-52 and B-1 carry 70,000 lb. and 75,000 lb. bomb loads, respectively.19 In 

fact, jet-powered attack aircraft flown in the Vietnam War and Operations 

Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom carry payloads often exceeding those of 

World War II bombers.20 Military aircraft have also become larger and faster 

because jet aircraft typically consume more fuel, require large fuel tanks, have 

heavy payloads, and require higher airspeeds or larger wings to deliver their 

weapons to the target. The development of large jet-powered aircraft such as 

Boeing 707 variants also led to the employment of large support aircraft such 

as the E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, and air-refueling tankers.21 Although these aircraft have 

resulted in greatly increased airpower capabilities, their use has increased the 

logistical requirements of theater-level air operations. 

Accordingly, geographic positioning, logistics, security, and politics drive 

the United States toward large air bases and robust logistics bases. During the 

Vietnam War, ODS, and OIF, a wide variety of airpower capabilities involving 

manned combat and combat support aircraft necessitated long runways, vast 

ramp space, and facilities for aircraft maintenance, weapon and fuel storage 

infrastructure, aircraft command and control, and aircrew ready areas. Air 

bases also included facilities capable of feeding and sheltering legions of aircrew, maintenance personnel, and support troops. The logistical aspects of air 

operations also required security from enemy attack and involved significant 

political negotiation with host countries.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

19

Geographic Positioning

Consistent with the basic tenets of airpower outlined in AFDD 1, Air Force 

Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command, theater air bases are important 

components of airpower because they provide geographic combatant commanders (GCC) strategic and operational flexibility and versatility, enhance 

persistence, and facilitate concentration of forces.22 The location and presence of 

air bases in foreign countries provide GCCs options relative to the employment 

of airpower. Theater commanders may “shift from one campaign to another,” 

operate at multiple levels of warfare, hold the ability to revisit targets, and 

“concentrate overwhelming power at the decisive time and place.”23 This process is not automatic. Selecting air bases and determining their suitability involves the careful evaluation of numerous factors, including geographic positioning, aircraft operating restrictions, and the logistical requirements of 

individual aircraft.

Geographic positioning of air bases is an important component of theater 

airpower regardless of the availability of air refueling. Colin Gray contends 

that range and reach are “advantages of airpower,” often extended by air refueling.24 Although air refueling greatly extends the reach of airpower, tanker 

aircraft are not a panacea for sustained long-distance air operations. Even 

during the Cold War, basing plans involving nuclear-armed bombers and 

tanker aircraft relied on a mix of air-refueling and ground-refueling bases.25

Air-refueling aircraft carry a finite amount of fuel and have range limitations 

just as any other aircraft. Furthermore, because only a small proportion of the 

US tanker fleet can be refueled in the air, most tankers rely on ground refueling.26 Regardless of their ability to extend the range of aircraft and increase 

loiter time, even air-refuelable tankers must eventually land for logistical support.27 Similarly, the diverse array of attack, command-and-control, and reconnaissance aircraft requires ground-based logistical support.

Thus, tanker aircraft and air bases must be geographically dispersed 

throughout the theater of operations to enable airpower coverage. Due to the 

limited range of many Air Force offensive aircraft, they are normally based 

within the region where they conduct operations, usually within 500 miles of 

their target.28 Moreover, “fighter aircraft tend to operate at much shorter 

ranges than bombers, and since they must operate in relatively large numbers, 

it is correspondingly more difficult to sustain them with aerial refueling.”29

Without a balanced air refueling and air base architecture, the GCC faces a 

difficult task in ensuring operational flexibility and versatility. This task is 

made even more difficult because each type of military aircraft has particular 

operating requirements.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

20

Air bases do not have the universal capability to support every type of air 

asset in the theater of operations. Challenges involving large support and 

bomber aircraft, as well as smaller attack aircraft, require distinctive support 

infrastructures for continued wartime operations.30 Basing of air-refueling, 

bomber, and cargo aircraft is especially challenging because they require long 

runways and large parking areas as well as immense amounts of fuel. As of 

2002, the global inventory of airfields with runways exceeding 6,000 feet in 

length was only 2,011.31 Consequently, basing options for aircraft such as KC-10 

tankers may be significantly limited because they require runways of at least 

7,000 feet, taxiways at least 75 feet wide, 34,800 square feet of parking area, 

and airfield surfaces capable of supporting their 593,000 lb. maximum takeoff 

weight.32 Large aircraft such as B-1B and B-52 bombers, as well as C-17 cargo 

aircraft, have similar airfield requirements.33 Smaller aircraft like F-16, F-15E, 

and A-10 attack aircraft require less runway and parking space but require 

dedicated weapon storage and loading areas.34 Consequently, selection of individual bases and the theater air order of battle may have more to do with a 

base’s infrastructure compatibility with specific types of aircraft than with its 

geographic location.

In the early days of the Vietnam War, airfields were in short supply. According to aviation historian Bill Yenne, at the beginning of the war “the only 

jet-serviceable air bases available were Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son 

Nhut.”35 Few airfields could support jet operations, and existing ones were 

often geographically removed from target areas (see fig. 1).

The lack of suitable airfields caused US air assets to be spread throughout 

Southeast Asia and often forced war planners to base aircraft in friendly states 

such as Thailand. The dispersal of air assets required extensive use of air-refueling 

tankers to extend the range of all types of combat and support aircraft. According to Wayne Thompson, “One of the characteristics of air warfare introduced during the Vietnam War was the routine use of air-refueling in combat 

operations. By the end of Rolling Thunder in 1968, 90 KC-135 air-refueling 

tankers made possible not only B-52 operations from Guam, but also fighter 

operations from Thailand.”36 Regardless of the range extension that air refueling provided, the limited number of airfields made mixed basing of cargo, 

fighter, tanker, and bomber aircraft a necessity.37 By 1968, efforts to relieve air 

base shortages resulted in the construction of eight major bases with 15 runways, and by the end of the war, “200 additional airfields were also built and at 

least that many heliports.”38 These developments demonstrate the important 

relationship between aircraft range, the location of air bases, and the availability 

of theater air-refueling assets. 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

21

Figure 1. US air bases of the Vietnam War 

(Reprinted from: Wikipedia, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fe/Usaf-vietnammap.jpg.)

A quarter-century later, Operation Desert Storm’s war planners were challenged by the Persian Gulf region’s limited number of airfields. They had to base 

2,430 fixed-wing aircraft at approximately 25 airfields located in multiple 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

22

Middle Eastern countries.39 Although Benjamin Lambeth noted that “the coalition 

enjoyed a basing infrastructure in the Gulf region that left almost nothing to 

be desired, largely owing to the military assistance that the United States had 

provided Saudi Arabia over the preceding four decades,” the scope of operations made airfields a valuable commodity.40 As in the Vietnam War, a relative 

shortage of airfields resulted in additional construction and the mixed basing 

of different types of aircraft at common airfields.41 Air bases were a critical 

enabler for the US-led coalition against Iraq, and the DOD’s Conduct of the 

Persian Gulf War report illustrated the importance of “staging bases and a 

well-developed infrastructure, especially airfields and ports.”42 Similar to the 

US experience in Vietnam, the geographic positioning of air assets during 

ODS was primarily dependent on airfield ramp space, support capabilities, 

and air refueling.

The same trends influenced air operations during Operation Enduring 

Freedom. Afghanistan had few air bases capable of supporting US combat 

aircraft, and neighboring countries such as Pakistan did not allow large-scale 

air operations from their airfields.43 Therefore, the majority of air assets were 

based at geographically distant airfields such as Al-Dhafra and Al-Udeid. Air 

expeditionary wings such as the 380 AEW and 379 AEW were responsible for 

supporting a wide variety of aircraft, including tanker, reconnaissance, and 

strike platforms.44

Geographically displaced airfields and the basing of strike aircraft at multiple locations made air refueling essential for continued operations. Lambeth 

explained the impact of range-extending air refueling support during OEF: 

“Yet another operational trend that continued in Enduring Freedom had to 

do with extended-range operations. In Desert Storm, the proportion of tanker 

sorties among the total number of air sorties flown was 12 percent. . . . In 

Enduring Freedom, it was 27 percent. By the same token, long-range bombers 

have delivered a steadily increasing percentage of the overall numbers of 

weapons expended throughout the succession of U.S. combat engagements 

since 1991. In Desert Storm, it was 32 percent. . . . In Enduring Freedom, it 

was about 70 percent.”45

Ideally, future operations will involve theater basing within range of air 

bases so that the success or failure of air operations will be less dependent on 

air refueling. Nonetheless, air refueling provides an extension of ground logistics bases and mitigates some of the challenges involved with disparate 

geographic basing. But airfields and tankers can only support theater military 

operations as long as they receive the logistics (and protection) they require. 

Consequently, the long-term sustainment of air bases may be just as critical as 

aircraft range or the range-extension capabilities of air-refueling tankers.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

23

According to AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, marrying the logistical needs of 

airpower assets with suitable airfields is an issue of agile combat support 

(ACS) which is defined as “the ability to create, protect, and sustain air and 

space forces across the full range of military operations.”46 The goal of ACS is 

to “generate combat capability by creating, posturing, bedding down, protecting, 

servicing, maintaining, and sustaining support and operational forces.”47

AFDD 2-4 provides a basic framework for assessing logistical support and 

available infrastructure to achieve ACS. For example, theater assessment of 

airfields should include an intelligence review, expeditionary site surveys, 

logistical sustainability evaluations, and crisis action planning. This process 

ensures that theater airfields are suitable for use, sustainable, and provide 

adequate options to the GCC in the case of emergencies or enemy action.48

When airfields have been deemed suitable and sustainable, they can begin to 

accept the myriad of support personnel necessary to sustain theater airpower. 

Thus, the influx of logistics and support personnel quickly expands the force 

footprint of operational bases.

Tooth to Tail

Even Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz lamented the requirements of maintenance and supply. During the revolutionary Napoleonic era, 

armies increased dramatically in size and were becoming both expensive and 

complicated to maintain.49 Thus, nineteenth-century commanders were constantly faced with challenges involving the acquisition of military supplies 

and the need to keep units at a high state of readiness. Today’s air operations 

face the same challenges; however, logistics have become more difficult because modern military operations require an immense variety of equipment, 

supplies, and expertise for each weapon system and mission. Moreover, complex logistics requirements exist throughout the initial deployment and sustainment phases of military operations.

Manpower requirements begin with the initial deployment of forces. According to Christopher Bowie, depending on the “type of aircraft, for a squadron of 24 operational combat aircraft, an average of about 500 personnel and 

350 tons of equipment are needed” to deploy into theater.50 Upon arrival at 

forward operating locations (FOL), they require large numbers of personnel 

for aircraft and vehicle maintenance, base operations, civil engineering, equipment supply, billeting, and food preparation, to name a few tasks.51 Moreover, 

air base personnel are vital for processing the 100–200 tons of ammunition 

and 3,500 tons of fuel typically required by Air Force combat wings.52 Figure 2 

provides perspective relating to the logistics requirements of modern air opera-
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24

tions such as Enduring Freedom. It demonstrates that support elements often 

require more supplies than the combat forces they support. 

OAF

56,000 tons total

OEF

83,000 tons total

Combat support supply:

70,000 tons

6% 7%

9%

84%

Munitions

23%

Communication

gear 4% Fuels

support 3% Other

5%

FOL

support

65%

74% 20%

Aviation/MX

Aerial port

Combat support

Combat Support Dominated in Operation Allied Force (OAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom

Figure 2. Logistics in Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom 

(Adapted from: Mahyar A. Amouzegar et al., Analysis of Combat Support Basing Options

[Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004], 5.)

Supplies processed by support personnel are delivered via lines of communication involving vast interconnected land, sea, and air transportation networks. The essential reliance on transportation of supplies is not a new phenomenon. John Lynn notes that “while logistic needs have changed over the 

centuries, logistics have always exerted tremendous influence on strategy and 

operations.”53 Martin van Creveld reinforced this idea with this observation:

Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the possible; but surely what is possible is 

determined not merely by numerical strengths, doctrine, intelligence, arms and tactics, 

but, in the first place, by the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, supplies 

available and expected, organization and administration, transportation and arteries of 

communication. Before a commander can even start thinking of maneuvering or giving 

battle, of marching this way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling or annihilating or wearing down, in short of putting into practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, he 

has—or ought—to make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with those 3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease to be of any use as soldiers; that roads 

to carry them to the right place at the right time are available, and that movement along 

these roads will not be impeded by either a shortage or a superabundance of transport.54
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

25

US military operations in Vietnam, ODS, and OEF were not exceptions. The 

global LOCs involved in each of these major force deployments required extensive logistical support and intercontinental transportation networks. 

During the early stages of the Vietnam War, the vast majority of supplies 

were pre-positioned at forward support locations (FSL) such as Okinawa, Japan; Subic Bay, Philippines; and Korat and Udorn, Thailand.55 As the conflict 

progressed, Vietnamese seaports were expanded to increase US supply operations. The US supply system in Vietnam relied on a constant stream of transport ships to maintain a 20-day supply of petroleum products and a large arsenal of munitions at coastal ports. It also relied on land vehicles and aircraft 

to transport fuel and other supplies inland to FOLs scattered throughout 

South Vietnam.56 Even after additional supply bases were constructed, “there 

was no front and no rear in the conventional sense. There were no advances 

and withdrawals on linear axes, along which the sinews of war could flow.”57

While disjointed LOCs made operations difficult, ineffective inventory 

control of relatively plentiful means of transportation and war materials 

caused extensive waste. For example, “depot operations in 1968 processed 

about two million tons of materiel, but only about one-third were available for 

issue. The majority was lost and not on existing, usable supply records.”58 Consequently, the disorganized nature of the US logistics system caused periodic 

shortages of munitions and other supplies because of poor logistics policies 

using the World War II–era “push” system that “netted pretty much the same 

results: inadequate support of critical items, far too much of the unnecessary, 

and no means for becoming more sensitive and responsive to combat and 

support needs.”59 Fortunately for the United States, Vietnam offered numerous ports that provided direct access to the war zone, and the steady stream of 

materiel shipments overcame uncoordinated attempts to manage obsolete 

brute force methods of supply.

In many respects, the logistics of ODS bear many similarities to US supply 

operations in the Vietnam War. The majority of supplies were transported by 

sea, offloaded at one of many ports, and then delivered by truck and rail to 

FOLs. In Desert Storm, pre-positioned and contracted supply ships delivered 

four-fifths of initial supplies.60 US forward air bases relied on the constant 

supply of Saudi fuel trucks that transported petroleum products from Saudi 

Arabian refineries to US-operated airfields.61 This effort allowed approximately 300 US air tankers to provide 178 million gallons of fuel to coalition 

aircraft.62 Ground vehicles also transported the vast majority of munitions to 

air bases; however, delivery of aircraft munitions was delayed at times due to 

a shortage of munitions-handling equipment.63 When combat operations 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

26

used munitions faster than expected, airlift aircraft mitigated shortages by 

transporting more than 3,600 tons of bombs to Saudi Arabian airfields.64

Although Desert Storm’s general method of logistics supply was similar to 

that of the Vietnam War, the first Persian Gulf conflict’s extensive use of 

computerized logistics networks dramatically improved the management of 

theater supply inventories.65 According to van Creveld, “What made this war 

unique was the fact that, after it ended, every single item not consumed or expended had to be accounted for, restored to a pristine condition and evacuated. 

The days when American forces leaving a theater of war would leave behind 

vast junkyards for the locals to plunder were over.”66 Without a doubt, logistics 

improvements since Vietnam and increased host-nation cooperation contributed to the operational successes of ODS, yet the conflict represented an 

iterative improvement in the sustainment of maneuver warfare logistics that has 

become an essential part of the USAF’s airpower paradigm. 

Operation Enduring Freedom is the latest example of maneuver-warfare 

logistics. As in Vietnam and ODS, the majority of OEF supplies are delivered 

by seagoing cargo vessels and then transported by ground vehicles or rail 

transport to various bases scattered throughout Afghanistan (see fig. 3).67

Although Enduring Freedom has involved fewer aircraft—approximately 

200—air operations have relied heavily on tanker and bomber support from 

dispersed bases.68 Furthermore, tanker sorties and cargo airlift missions comprised the majority of missions flown to and from Afghanistan. From 2001 to 

2004, “of the 11,000 sorties flown in support of OEF, only approximately 

3,400 were combat, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C2ISR), or Special Operations Forces (SOF)/combat support 

and rescue sorties.”69 The rest were cargo and air-refueling sorties. Nonetheless, 

supply operations were put in place for the long haul rather than being designed for quick victory, as in Desert Storm, and enabled a continued airpower 

presence against enemy forces in Afghanistan.70 Moreover, US Transportation 

Command’s use of information technologies and “data transparency” indicates 

a DOD effort to improve combat logistics and delivery of supplies.71 However, 

information technologies may only provide a method to cope with the increasing 

complexity of ACS operations.

Logistics requirements in Vietnam, ODS, and OEF increased with the 

complexity of operations. More advanced aircraft demanded more complex 

logistics infrastructures and vast amounts of fuel and munitions. Furthermore, complex lines of communication made the supply of geographically 

separated FOLs difficult to sustain. Even with improved information systems 

and logistics management, supply remained dependent on seaports, land transportation, and stopgap airlift operations. As van Creveld sagely noted, “One 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

27

thing seems certain: in the future, logistics will become even more complex 

than they already are. In part, this is because they really are becoming more 

complex, what with the introduction of countless new machines and the vast 

amount of coordination those machines require to keep functioning and 

fighting.”72 Nonetheless, people instead of machines are ultimately responsible 

for the conduct of warfare and provide additional options relative to the 

equipment at hand. Unfortunately, enemy personnel have the option to exploit 

US lines of communication, and foreign heads of state have the power to invite 

or deny access to their facilities and national infrastructure.

Figure 3. Operation Enduring Freedom supply routes 

(Reproduced from Tom Gjelten, “U.S. Now Relies on Alternate Afghan Supply Routes,” 

National Public Radio, http://www.npr.org /2011/09/16/140510790/u-s-now-relies-on-alter

nate-afghan-supply-routes. Used with permission.)

Security

Security of air bases and supply lines is critical to the support of air operations. 

Logistical shortages may halt operations. The destruction of base infrastructure 

and/or aircraft, theft of supply items, or attacks against supply convoys have the 

potential to degrade the sustainment of regional airpower capabilities. 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

28

Security against enemy attacks and theft was a major concern during the Vietnam War. Alan Vick described the adverse effects of enemy attacks on US FOLs:

More ground attacks on air bases were recorded in Vietnam than in any other conflict. 

VC [Viet Cong] and NVA [North Vietnam Army] forces attacked USAF main operating 

bases 475 times between 1964 and 1973. Those attacks destroyed 99 U.S. and Vietnamese aircraft and damaged another 1,170. Additional attacks against other USAF, Army, 

Marine Corps, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) facilities in Vietnam and 

against USAF bases in Thailand raised the total destroyed to 375, roughly 4 percent of 

all aircraft losses. Although this is a relatively small percentage of the total losses, it is 

interesting that more U.S. Air Force fixed-wing aircraft were destroyed by ground action 

than were downed by MiGs (99 versus 62).73

Vick also noted that while enemy attacks caused significant aircraft losses, 

“high-value aircraft, such as KC-135s, B-52s, AC-130s, and F-105Gs were 

based in Thailand and Guam, where the ground threat was lower or nonexistent.”74 Convoys and supply lines were also constantly under threat of enemy 

attack and theft. Truck convoys faced frequent attacks. And by the end of the 

war, former commander of the 1st Logistics Command, LTG Joseph M. 

Heiser Jr., estimated that 250 million gallons of petroleum were lost to pilferage.75 Fortunately for US air operations, the sheer volume of supplies sent to 

Southeast Asia limited the adverse effects of security vulnerabilities.

The most significant security concerns during Operation Desert Storm involved SCUD theater ballistic missile attacks against coalition facilities. According to Lambeth, “base vulnerability was generally not a problem,” the 

threat of terrorism was only a “low-key” threat, and most coalition bases had 

few passive defenses.76 Nonetheless, the danger posed by Iraq’s SCUDs led the 

United States to deploy Patriot batteries throughout the region to protect coalition facilities and dissuade Israel from entering the conflict.77 Most Iraqi 

SCUDs failed due to structural failures or guidance problems or were shot 

down by US-made Patriot missiles.78 Although the coalition feared its forces 

were vulnerable following a SCUD missile hit on a US base in Dhahran, Saudi 

Arabia, in which 27 US personnel were killed, rear area security was not a 

significant problem compared with the Vietnam War and Operation Enduring Freedom.79

Similar to the Vietnam War, US FOLs and supply convoys have been under 

constant threat of attack in OEF. US-operated air bases at Bagram and Kandahar, Afghanistan, deal with elusive threats such as car bombs, mortar fire, and 

“small-team assaults” but must also “be wary of the occasional large strike 

with heavy weapons.”80 Taliban forces recognize the value of US airpower and 

seek to impede air operations.81 Enemy forces have also impacted NATO supply lines throughout Afghanistan. Tim McGirk wrote in 2009 that the Taliban 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

29

widened the “scope of their attacks so that convoys rumbling across twothirds of the country are now prey to attack, usually by roadside bombs or a 

well-laid ambush in which rocket-propelled grenades are fired at the lead vehicle, forcing the convoy to a deadly standstill.” He also noted that “from June 

to September [2009], more than 145 truck drivers and guards were killed in 

attacks on convoys and 123 vehicles were destroyed.”82 Pakistani Taliban 

forces have restricted the flow of fuel supplies into Afghanistan with multiple 

attacks against coalition fuel convoys traveling through Pakistan.83 The Pakistani government has also halted such transfers several times.84 Attacks on 

fuel convoys traversing Pakistan have been one of the major reasons that the 

Department of Defense has opened multiple northern supply routes into Afghanistan. Despite these obstacles, military leaders worked to ensure a constant supply of war materiel to Enduring Freedom’s multiple FOLs. Brig Gen 

Jimmy McMillian’s 2010 statement that “our objective, in all cases, is uninterrupted operations . . . and in some locations, this means uninterrupted aircraft sortie generation, in others, uninterrupted training activity” demonstrates the Air Force leadership’s commitment to US supply operations.85

The US experiences during the Vietnam War, ODS, and OEF indicate that 

the operational environment determines the context of supply-line security. 

Vietnam and the current war in Afghanistan demonstrate that extended 

LOCs through hostile territory invite enemy action against supply convoys. 

Furthermore, FOLs are vulnerable to attacks that can destroy or damage deployed aircraft. Ultimately, large-scale logistics have provided the United 

States the ability to overcome enemy attacks and pilferage; however, these 

methods owe some of their success to their favorable political environment.

Politics

During the Vietnam War, the United States endured few political restrictions to its use of South Vietnamese territory and facilities. The Saigon government was frequently not taken seriously. In 1965, the US ambassador to South 

Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, said: “There is no tradition of a national government in Saigon. . . . I don’t think we should take this government seriously. 

There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought 

to do regardless of what the Saigon government does.”86 The Johnson administration took the position that the local government’s lack of legitimacy meant 

that the United States was primarily responsible for South Vietnam’s security.87 Saigon’s political input was rarely accepted or considered during US 

military planning actions.88 Consequently, the relatively unrestricted access 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

30

and ubiquitous presence of US forces in South Vietnam meant that supply 

operations were not restricted by host-nation political concerns.

Compared with the US experience in Vietnam, more recent political discourse 

with host nations has had a significant impact on supply and air operations. 

During ODS, the US buildup of military forces was initially restricted by King 

Fahd’s reluctance to allow Western military forces into Saudi Arabia.89 But, 

after considerable diplomacy, the monarch approved US use of Saudi facilities.90 Furthermore, the US-led coalition was threatened by the possibility Israel would retaliate against Iraqi SCUD attacks. The George H. W. Bush administration feared if Israel became involved, the Saudis would no longer 

allow the use of their country for ODS.91 Ultimately, Israel did not enter the 

war, the United States was able to use Saudi facilities, and the Saudis supported operations to such a degree that they “provided approximately 4,800 

tents; 1.7 million gallons of packaged petroleum, oil and lubricants; more 

than 300 heavy equipment transporters (HET); about 20 million meals; on 

average more than 20.5 million gallons of fuel a day; and bottled water for the 

entire theater.”92 Nonetheless, throughout the first Persian Gulf War, hostnation states such as Saudi Arabia held significant power to affect air operations to a greater degree than enemy action could have accomplished.

Politics and diplomacy have also played a major role in Operation Enduring 

Freedom. The George W. Bush and Obama administrations have had to acknowledge the demands of Afghan president Hamid Karzai, negotiate safe 

passage of coalition aircraft and supply convoys through Pakistan, and coordinate supply routes with Afghanistan’s northern neighbors.93 Although Afghanistan does not possess the military strength to expel US forces, it could exert its 

national will against the United States if it desired their removal. Pakistan 

holds more political leverage than Afghanistan because it controls major lines 

of communication to and from Afghanistan. Although northern routes provide theater commanders additional supply options, Pakistan controls critical 

air and ground supply routes. Consequently, its political power over the United 

States is significant in that it has the ability to isolate US air operations over 

Afghanistan from tanker, ISR, and cargo aircraft located at Al-Udeid, AlDhafra, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Such actions are unlikely; if they 

did occur, however, they would severely restrict the United States’ ability to 

conduct air operations in Afghanistan.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

31

Conclusions about an Overwhelming Force Paradigm

Secretary Rumsfeld was correct in his assertion that the United States goes to 

war with the equipment it has in its inventory. It also goes to war with the 

prevalent ideas commanders hold in their collective knowledge base. Airpower’s 

ability to provide a relatively fast, massive, and cost-effective destructive force is 

a manifestation of the idea that the “American way of war” involves overwhelming 

the enemy.94 According to Russell Weigley, “Air power is especially suitable for 

a war of destruction, annihilation, elimination” and may answer “the problem 

of how to secure victory in its desired fullness without paying a cost so high 

that the cost would mock the very enterprise of waging war.”95 The US military paradigm has been one of overwhelming military force, and airpower 

has been one of many means to sustain this paradigm. Thus, technological 

innovation and employment concepts have continuously increased the destructive prowess of US airpower in support of overwhelming force. Air 

weapons, and their associated employment methods, often provided the 

means to maneuver in multilinear, fast-tempo, and potentially decisive ways 

so victory could be achieved at minimum cost. Although seemingly contradictory, maneuver warfare concepts have also been compatible with existing 

technologies and have facilitated what Thomas Kane called “the bombardment style of warfare.”96 Aircraft, communications, logistics, and organizational structures made multilinear, high-tempo bombing possible while other 

potentially more-effective means remained unfeasible. Although Kane’s analysis is perhaps overly simplified, it does convey many of the general themes 

Biddle, Richard Overy, and others explored. Each of these authors examined 

how institutional thought, available technology, and industrial means produced a bombardment force that was overwhelming but not necessarily the 

most effective means of force projection.97 Moreover, as airpower technologies 

evolved into larger, faster, and more powerful aircraft, their employment constructs became increasingly complex and often required in-depth assessments 

concerning geographic positioning, logistics, security of LOCs, and politics.

As illustrated by the three case studies in this chapter, shortfalls involving 

geographic positioning and logistics were often overcome by technological 

capabilities such as air refueling and cargo airlift; however, long-term sustainment remained constrained by supply LOCs, security, and politics. Combat 

operations can continue only as long as FOLs retain their access to supplies. 

Such access is dependent upon other factors, such as the location of air bases, 

security, and politics, which may also determine whether an operation is feasible and/or sustainable. 
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

32

The US strategic infrastructure involves weapon systems, bases, and supply 

lines intended to provide decisiveness, speed, and overwhelming force. 

Whether it is bombs, fuel, or supplies, US airpower involves the delivery of 

assets from point A to point B as rapidly as possible. In each of these scenarios, large quantities of firepower and supplies have been important to the 

conduct of operations. Because of restrictions and technological limitations, 

US forces were large and were not organized for continuous convergent attacks 

against the enemy. In their current form, modern military forces still require 

vast quantities of supplies. The enormous volume of supplies required for 

military operations, however, has made it very difficult for global LOCs to 

facilitate fast delivery. Until it becomes technologically feasible for aircraft to 

operate with less infrastructure and logistics support, it is unlikely that the 

effective and efficient sustainment of a persistent, flexible, and overwhelming 

swarming capability will be possible. 

Although forces deployed as part of OEF include improved weapon systems involving advanced computer systems and information technologies, 

they are not organized for strategic swarming operations. Forward operating 

locations require large quantities of daily supplies, and delivery of materiel 

incurs significant security risks. Even if airpower forces were able to sustain 

autonomous or semiautonomous swarming operations, they would quickly 

consume existing inventories and would have to cease operations until supplies were replenished. Moreover, in OEF a large proportion of combat and 

combat support aircraft are geographically distant from Afghanistan. The dispersed nature of air bases and airpower capabilities significantly limits opportunities for concentration of assets over the target area. In many respects, 

the United States is bound to its maneuver warfare construct because of the 

aircraft and associated organization schemes it employs. More importantly, 

technology has not demonstrated alternative airpower capabilities and employment concepts that are capable of comparable force. However, if future 

swarm-capable aircraft and employment concepts provide the means to reshape the existing maneuver warfare construct, they might enable a new form 

of power projection that releases US airpower from the hold of logistics-intensive maneuver warfare concepts.

Notes

1. Clausewitz, On War, 177.

2. Eric Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor,” New York Times, 

8 December 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/08/international/middleeast/08cnd-rumsfeld.

html. Rumsfeld made the comment in response to questions and comments regarding the Army’s 

lack of availability of “up-armored” Humvees and improved body armor.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

33

3. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 124.

4. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command, 14 October 2011, 11. “Airpower is the ability to project military power or influence through the control and exploitation of air, 

space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.” Although the Air 

Force’s definition includes multiple domains, this chapter concentrates solely on the air domain. 

5. Thomas S. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1996), x.

6. Ibid., 10–11.

7. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 289.

8. Thomas M. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (Portland, OR: Frank 

Cass, 2001), 160–63.

9. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 17.

10. J. C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (1936; repr., Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 

2009), 8–9; Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari, (1921; repr., Tuscaloosa: 

University of Alabama Press, 2009), 9; and Mitchell, Winged Defense, 8–9.

11. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 89.

12. Lee Kennett, First Air War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 18, 43.

13. Ibid., 226.

14. Douhet, Command of the Air, 20–21.

15. Mitchell, Winged Defense, 6.

16. Overy, “Air War in Europe, 1939–1945,” 12; and Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality 

in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 107, 132. Douhet’s writings were not available 

outside of Italy until the 1930s. His influence is primarily associated with strategic bombing.

17. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, 300. 

18. Roger Freeman, “B-17 Flying Fortress,” in Great Book of World War II Airplanes, Jeffrey 

Ethell et al. eds. (New York: Bonanza Books, 1983), 129; and Michael S. Neiberg, Warfare in 

World History (New York: Routledge, 2001), 77.

19. USAF, “Factsheets: B-52 Stratofortress,” 20 September 2005, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/

FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104465/b-52-stratofortress.aspx; and USAF, “Factsheets: 

B-1B Lancer,” 15 May 2005, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/

Article/104500/b-1b-lancer.aspx.

20. Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers, American Fighter (New York: Orion Books, 1985), 315; 

and Boeing Company, “F-15E Strike Eagle,” http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/f15/

index.htm (accessed 19 February 2012). For example, the Vietnam-era F-4E Phantom had a 

16,000 lb. payload, and the modern F-15E Strike Eagle has a 23,000 lb. payload.

21. Boeing Company, “Commercial Airplanes: 707 Family,” http://www.boeing.com/

commercial/707family/index.html (accessed 19 February 2012).

22. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command, 37. The “Tenets of Airpower” are centralized control and decentralized execution, flexibility and versatility, synergistic 

effects, persistence, concentration, priority, and balance. See AFDD 1 for a detailed explanation 

of each tenet.

23. Ibid., 39–41.

24. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 67–68.

25. A. J. Wohlstetter et al., Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1954), 10–12.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

34

26. Mahyar A. Amouzegar et al., Evaluation of Options for Overseas Combat Support Basing

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 90.

27. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP)10-1403, Air Mobility Planning Factors, 12 December 2011, 

17–19; and USAF, “Factsheets: KC-135 Stratotanker,” 15 September 2004, http://www.af.mil/

AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104524/kc-135-stratotanker.aspx.

28. O’Hanlon, Science of War, 158.

29. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, 163.

30. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 254. Van Creveld wrote, “Take the First Gulf 

War 1991. At the strategic level, the logisticians of Central Command availed themselves of 

much larger aircraft requiring much larger airports and much larger ships requiring much 

larger docking facilities.”

31. Christopher J. Bowie, Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases (Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002), 20.

32. AFP 10-1403, Air Mobility Planning Factors, 17–19; and Mahyar A. Amouzegar et al., 

Analysis of Combat Support Basing Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 18.

33. USAF, “Factsheets: B-52 Stratofortress”; USAF, “Factsheets: B-1B Lancer”; and AFP 10-

1403, Air Mobility Planning Factors, 17–19.

34. See Air Force Handbook (AFH) 32-1084, Facility Requirements, 1 September 1996, for 

specific facility requirements; and Bowie, Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, 20.

35. Bill Yenne, History of the U.S. Air Force, rev. ed. (Stamford, CT: Longmeadow Press, 

1992), 83.

36. Wayne Thompson, “Operations over North Vietnam, 1965–1973,” in History of Air 

Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010),” 112.

37. Yenne, History of the U.S. Air Force, 69, 83.

38. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, 161; and Beth F. Scott, James C. 

Rainey, and Andrew W. Hunt, eds., Logistics of Waging War: A Historical Perspective (Maxwell 

AFB, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Agency, 2000), 133, 353.

39. Department of Defense (DOD), Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: DOD, 1992), 160, 162.

40. Lambeth, Transformation of American Air Power, 107.

41. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 160, 162, 517, 518. Air Force and Navy Seabee 

teams constructed bare-base airfields at Al-Kharj and Al-Kibrit.

42. Ibid., 138.

43. Ariel Zirulnick, “Obama Admits ‘Worst-Kept Secret’: US Flies Drones over Pakistan,” 

CSMonitor.com, 31 January 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2012/0131/

Obama-admits-worst-kept-secret-US-flies-drones-over-Pakistan. Iran is considered an enemy of the 

United States, and Pakistan has allowed RPA operations from only a select few of its airfields.

44. AFCENT, “Factsheets: 380th Air Expeditionary Wing History”; and AFCENT, “Units: 

379th Air Expeditionary Wing.”

45. Lambeth, “Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001,” 271.

46. AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, 23 March 2005, 1.

47. Ibid., 4.

48. Ibid., 21–25.

49. Clausewitz, On War, 330.

50. Bowie, Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, 15.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

35

51. James C. Rainey et al., eds., Combat Support: Shaping Air Force Logistics for the 21st 

Century (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Agency, 2003), 10. As defined in 

Combat Support, “FOLs [forward operating locations] are sites in a theater, out of which tactical forces operate. FOLs can have differing levels of CS [combat support] resources to support 

a variety of employment time lines. Some FOLs in critical areas under high threat should have 

equipment pre-positioned to enable aerospace packages designed for heavy combat to deploy 

rapidly. These FOLs might be augmented by other, more austere FOLs that would take longer 

to spin up. In parts of the world, where conflict is less likely or humanitarian missions are the 

norm, all FOLs might be austere.”

52. O’Hanlon, Science of War, 147.

53. John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to 

the Present (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), ix.

54. Creveld, Supplying War, 1. See Supplying War for a detailed examination of 17th 

through 21st century logistics.

55. Joel D. Meyerson, “War Plans and Politics: Origins of the American Base of Supply in 

Vietnam,” in Lynn, Feeding Mars, 274; and Rainey et al., Combat Support, 10. As defined in 

Combat Support, “FSLs are sites near or within the theater of operations for storage of heavy 

combat support resources, such as munitions or war reserve materiel, or sites for consolidated 

maintenance and other support activities. The configuration and specific functions of FSLs 

depend on their geographic location, the threat level, steady-state and potential wartime requirements, and costs and benefits associated with using these facilities.”

56. Scott, Rainey, and Hunt, Logistics of Waging War, 348–50.

57. Julian Thompson, Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey’s, 

1991), 193.

58. Scott, Rainey, and Hunt, Logistics of Waging War, 346. 

59. Ibid., 347, 349; and Craig M. Brandt, ed., Fundamentals of Military Logistics: A Primer 

of the Logistics Infrastructure (Dayton, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2005), 175–76. “Push” logistical supply methods involve standard shipments of supplies 

by logistical planners based on preplanned requirements regardless of the real-time supply 

needs of field units. “Pull” logistical supply requires robust communications with logistics C2 

elements and involves supply based on field units’ real-time logistical requirements. Instead of 

headquarters dictating supply requirements and inventory levels, “pulling” field units have decentralized authority to manage their own logistics inventories.

60. Creveld, Supplying War, 255; and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems (Washington, DC: CBO, 2005), 5–6.

61. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 472.

62. Michael Self and Edward Kozlowski, “Air Force Logistics Command Operations in 

Desert Storm,” White Paper (Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Logistics Command, July 

1991), 12.

63. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 476–77.

64. Self and Kozlowski, “Air Force Logistics Command Operations in Desert Storm,” 14.

65. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 466.

66. Creveld, Supplying War, 256.

67. Tom Gjelten, “U.S. Now Relies on Alternate Afghan Supply Routes,” National Public 

Radio, 16 September 2011, http://www.npr.

org/2011/09/16/140510790/u-s-now-relies-on-alternate-afghan-supply-routes.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

36

68. Robert S. Tripp et al., Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary Forces: Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004).

69. Ibid., 13.

70. DOD, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 

DOD, 2011), 5–6.

71. US Transportation Command, USTRANSCOM 2011 Annual Report (Scott AFB, IL: 

USTRANSCOM, 2011), 10, http://www.transcom.mil/documents/annual_reports/FY2011_USTRANSCOM_Annual_Report.pdf.

72. Creveld, Supplying War, 260.

73. Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).

74. Ibid., 72.

75. Scott, Rainey, and Hunt, Logistics of Waging War, 355–56, 362.

76. Lambeth, Transformation of American Air Power, 141.

77. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War 

in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 102–7. According to 

Freedman, Israel’s entrance into military operations against Iraq would have fragmented the 

US-led coalition and threatened use of many Middle Eastern states’ staging areas and bases of 

operation.

78. Ibid., 310.

79. Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the 

Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (New York: Free Press, 1992), 220.

80. Marc V. Schanz, “New Look of Base Defense,” Air Force Magazine, 93, no. 10 (October 

2010): 59.

81. Ibid., 60.

82. Tim McGirk, “Taliban Attacks on NATO Convoys Increase,” Time, 7 October 2009, 

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1928899,00.html.

83. Fred Pleitgen, “Attackers in Pakistan Hit Another Convoy Carrying Fuel for NATO 

Troops,” CNN.com, 4 October 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-04/world/pakistan.supply.

route_1_convoy-nato-supply-pakistani-taliban-spokesman?_s=PM:WORLD; and “Rocket Attack 

on NATO Fuel Supply Convoy in Pakistan,” Guardian, 8 December 2011, http://www.guardian.co.

uk/world/2011/dec/08/rocket-attack-nato-pakistan.

84. Scott Baldauf, “Pakistan Cuts Supply Lines, but US Has Options,” Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/1129/Pakistan-cuts-supply-lines-but-US-has-options.

85. Schanz, New Look of Base Defense, 59. Brigadier General McMillian was the director of 

security forces in the Air Staff ’s logistics, installations, and mission support division at the time 

of his statement.

86. Gordon M. Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in 

Vietnam (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2008), 211.

87. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), 190.

88. Ibid., 180–88.

89. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994), 17.

90. Freedman and Karsh, Gulf Conflict 1990–1991, 86–95.

91. Ibid., 86–95, 102–7; and DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 26, 66. 

92. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 127.
A TECHNOLOGICALLY DRIVEN PARADIGM

37

93. Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 8, 66–67, 147–48, 

284–85; and Gjelten, “U.S. Now Relies on Alternate Afghan Supply Routes.”

94. Russell F. Weigley, American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy 

and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 239.

95. Ibid., 239, xxii.

96. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, 160–61.

97. Idid.; Overy, Air War: 1939–1945; and Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare.

39

Chapter 3

Remotely Piloted Aircraft, Swarms, and Instant Basing

I warn you, tomorrow I will bring locusts into your country.

—Exodus 10:4

There is a long journey to be made between the discoveries of basic science and the appearance of new weaponry in sufficient 

numbers to make a difference. Further, it is also unrecognized 

that the real success of new weapons usually comes in areas that 

were unimagined by the scientists and developers. Rather once the 

device is fielded it very often happens that it is combined with 

other mature technologies and put to purposes altogether different 

from those imagined by the originators. All these things take time.

 —David R. Mets

In the 1990s, Martin Libicki proposed that the future of warfare might include a “mesh” of highly integrated sensors, weapons, and information technologies capable of immediately finding, identifying, and targeting adversaries.1

He argued that the miniaturization of military equipment and weapons and 

their integration with advanced computer technologies would create an environment where “the large, the complex, and the few will have to yield to the 

small and the many.”2

 Beyond his emphasis on information technologies and 

the networked employment of joint military forces, Libicki’s ideas are especially important to the future of airpower because they emphasize the combined capability of small, inexpensive weapon systems. Accordingly, small 

remotely piloted aircraft that do not require airfields or robust logistics may 

foster changes within the existing industrial maneuver warfare paradigm. As 

noted in chapter 2, aerospace technologies have been continuously applied to 

military aircraft and their supporting infrastructures and have enabled modifications to existing concepts of operation. Nonetheless, RPAs may provide an 

important opportunity for the US Air Force and its sister services. Swarm 

technology involving small, inexpensive aircraft might serve as a vanguard for 

a new airpower paradigm. This chapter explores the prospect of an RPAdriven vanguard by surveying three topics: (1) presently employed RPAs and 

their CONOPS, (2) developmental RPA technologies necessary for swarming 

operations, and (3) the Instant Basing construct of logistics; its impact on the 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

40

geographic positioning of forces, logistics, force protection, and politics; and 

how it may provide grand strategic utility.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Their Concepts of Operation

Military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are not a new phenomenon. 

Their origins trace to 1918, but they retained a largely experimental nature in 

subsequent decades.3

 Since the 1950s, RPAs have been employed in covert 

national security missions involving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). In recent decades they have demonstrated their utility in overt 

military operations and have become an important aspect of contemporary 

combat operations.4

 According to airpower scholar Tony Mason, the importance of RPAs was elevated in 1999 during Operation Allied Force. As part of 

the 1999 Balkan conflict, “USAF RQ-1 Predators, USN RQ-2 Pioneers, and 

U.S. Army RQ-5 Hunters . . . provided target information and verification, 

battle damage assessment, and refugee monitoring” for a fraction of the cost 

of manned aircraft.5

The utility of RPAs grew so much that in the five years following Allied 

Force they provided a significant portion of ISR during air and ground operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.6

 Furthermore, theater-level RPAs, such as the 

MQ-1 Predator, were modified to employ air-to-ground weapons. They provided an additional precision-strike capability, and later systems such as the 

MQ-9 Reaper were deployed with ground-strike capabilities.7

 RPAs were 

used extensively during Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, and their effectiveness catalyzed an exponential increase in demand for additional support.8

 The utility of their fused ISR and strike capabilities led the Air Force to 

increase its RPA operational capacity to 65 combat air patrols (CAP).9

 According to one observer, “the Air Force measures its RPA presence in-theater 

with the term ‘CAP,’ which equals a 24-hour presence over a given geographical area. A single combat air patrol translates to about four aircraft: three intheater and one at home base for training.”10 Large and medium theater-level 

remotely piloted aircraft such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, and 

MQ-9 Reaper have been the most acclaimed segment of the Air Force’s RPA 

fleet because of their ability to find, fix, target, and potentially destroy enemy 

targets without risking the lives of pilots.11 However, they are a small segment 

of the DOD arsenal of unmanned aircraft. 

According to the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036, 

the DOD employs a large array of remotely piloted vehicles ranging widely in 

size and capability (see table 1).12
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

41

Table 1. Department of Defense remotely piloted aircraft 

(Adapted from DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036 [Washington, DC: DOD, 2011].)

General

Groupings

Name Vehicles Ground

Control

Stations

Employing Service(s) Capability/Mission

Group 5

>1,320 lbs

>18,000 alt

RQ-4A

Global

Hawk/BAM

S-D Block

10

9 3 USAF/Navy ISR/Maritime Domain

Awareness (Navy)

RQ-4B

Global

Hawk Block

20/30

15 3 USAF ISR

RQ-4B

Global

Hawk Block

40

1 1 USAF ISR/Battle Management

Command and Control

MQ-9

Reaper

54 61a USAF ISR/Reconnaissance,

Surveillance, and Target

Acquisition (RSTA)/electronic

warfare/Precision Strike

(PS)/Force Protection (FP)

Group 4

>1,320 lbs

<18,000 alt

MQ-1A/B

Predator

161 61a USAF ISR/RSTA/PS/FP

MQ-1

Warrior/

MQ-1C

Gray Eagle

26 24 Army ISR/RSTA/PS/FP

UCAS-D 2 0 Navy Demonstration Only

MQ-8B Fire

Scout

9 7 Navy ISR/RSTA/antisubmarine

warfare/antisurface

warfare/mine warfare

Group 3

<1,320 lbs

<18,000 alt

MQ-5

Hunter

25 16 Army ISR/RSTA/Battle Damage

Assessment (BDA)

RQ-7

Shadow

364 262 Army/USMC/SOCOM ISR/RSTA/BDA

A160T

Hummingbi

rd

8 3 SOCOM/DARPA/Army Demonstration

Small

Tactical

Unmanned

Aircraft

Systems

(STUAS)S

0 0 Navy/USMC ISR/Explosive Ordnance

Disposal (EOD)/FP

Group 2

21–55 lbs

<3,500 alt

<250 knts

ScanEagle 122 39 Navy /SOCOM ISR/RSTA/FP

Group 1

0–20 lbs

<1,200 alt

<100 knts

RQ-11

Raven

5,346 3,291 Army/Navy/SOCOM ISR/RSTA

Wasp 916 323 USMC/SOCOM ISR/RSTA

SUAS Puma 39 26 SOCOM ISR/RSTA

gMAV/THawk377 194 Army (gMAV) Navy

(T-Hawk)

ISR/RSTA/EOD
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

42

Remotely piloted aircraft in Groups 1–3 are generally small, deployed by 

field units, and have limited capabilities beyond providing local ISR support 

to tactical forces. Many RPAs in these categories operate autonomously and 

can be recovered by their operators in austere locations.13 Micro-RPAs in 

Group 1 “are used for individual situation awareness, have a range of 1 to 3 

nautical miles (nm), can only be used in daylight with fair weather conditions, and carry payloads weighing less than 0.5 lb.”14 Group 2 RPAs are called 

mini-RPAs because they are “designed to be man-portable, launched and 

flown by either a single soldier, or by a handful of troops.”15

Air vehicles in Group 3 are commonly referred to as small RPAs since their 

operational capabilities and increased size, weight, and logistics requirements 

are greater than mini-RPAs but less than their larger counterparts in Groups 

4 and 5.16 Figure 4 illustrates the size difference between small, medium, and 

large RPAs. Small RPAs are capable of supporting a multitude of missions 

including “operational and intelligence support, psychological operations, resupply, ISR, and sensor deployment; have an endurance of 10 to 12 hours; and 

typically carry payloads weighing 50 to 250 lbs.”17

Aircraft in Group 4 are called medium RPAs, and those in Group 5 are referred to as large remotely piloted aircraft.18 Similar to small RPAs, medium 

and large RPAs can accomplish a range of intelligence-related missions. Those 

missions support theater-level objectives at much greater range than those in 

the first three groups, and when medium and large RPAs are operationally 

deployed, they are dependent on expeditionary air bases due to their size, 

operational requirements, C2 infrastructure, and logistics needs.19 Thus, it is 

important to understand that the theater-level capabilities furnished by the 

current generation of medium and large RPAs come at the expense of operational and logistical simplicity.

From an operational perspective, the Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk 

rely on complex architectures involving US-based ground stations (GS), satellite communications relays, and forward-deployed ground control stations 

(GCS). These RPAs operate under a “remote split” concept of operations that 

reduces each platform’s deployed footprint by keeping the majority of mission 

personnel and equipment in the continental United States (CONUS) rather 

than the war zone.20 Satellite connectivity allows remote split operations in 

any geographic combatant command and thus reduces the logistical support 

and force protection assets inherent to manned aircraft.21 However, unlike 

sorties using traditionally piloted aircraft, the success of Predator, Reaper, and 

Global Hawk missions depends on reliable satellite and line-of-sight communication links. According to an experienced RPA operator, MQ-1/9 pilots rely 

on “a C-band line-of-sight (LOS) link or Ku-band beyond line-of-sight 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

43

(BLOS) satellite link” to maintain control of their aircraft through all phases 

of flight (see fig. 5).22

Figure 4. Selected Department of Defense RPAs from Groups 3–5 

(Reproduced from Congressional Budget Office [CBO], Policy Options for Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems, Publication 4083 [Washington, DC: CBO, June 2011].)
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

44

SATCOM LINK Ku-BAND

SATCOM

LINK

C-BAND

LINE OF SIGHT

ANTENNA

LOS LINK

GROUND CONTROL STATION (GCS)

SATELLITE ANTENNA

Figure 5. MQ-1 and MQ-9 LOS and BLOS configuration

Reproduced from Technical Order 1Q-1[M]b-1, MQ-1B and RQ-1B Flight Manual, Change 

11, 14 January 2008.

Although the Global Hawk’s architecture is similar to the Predator and 

Reaper, it requires two satellites to conduct its mission instead of the single 

satellite required for MQ-1/9 operations. Within the RQ-4 construct, one satellite provides mission control element (MCE) pilots oversight of the aircraft’s 

flight parameters, while a second satellite transfers intelligence and sensor 

control data to intelligence specialists (see fig. 6).23 Although the RQ-4 is 

largely reliant on satellite connectivity, it can continue its mission autonomously if it loses its communication links.

Unlike the MQ-1/9, the RQ-4 is highly automated. Almost all aspects of 

the Global Hawk’s flight profile are preprogrammed. During takeoff and landing, 

the aircraft flies an autonomous sequence in which the launch and recovery
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

45

Wideband Data

S-Band (LOS)

C2

, Data, and Status

and Master Control

(6 Links) Wideband Data

Ku-Band (BLOS)

LOS

BLOS

Iridium Ku SatCom

Figure 6. RQ-4 Global Hawk system architecture

(Reproduced from Herbert J. Kramer, “Global Hawk UAS [Unmanned Aerial System] of 

NASA,” https://directory.eoportal.org Image credit: NASA/DFRC.)

element (LRE) pilot monitors critical phases of flight via LOS equipment but 

has few options to change the profile if an emergency occurs.24 It is important 

to note that most medium and large RPAs cannot perform autonomous takeoffs and landings, and remote operation during critical phases of flight is 

problematic due to multiple-second delays in satellite communications.25 As a 

result, LRE personnel and their LOS communications equipment will likely 

remain essential aspects of medium and large RPA operations.26 Furthermore, 

automation does not alleviate their requirement for relatively long runways.

Due to their weight and dimensions, MQ-1/9s and RQ-4s require airfields 

with 5,000- and 8,000-foot runways, respectively, and are often collocated 

with manned aircraft.27 Similar to the manned aircraft requirements discussed 

in the previous chapter, medium and large RPAs must be positioned at bases 

within range of their target area. MQ-1s and MQ-9s are typically based at 

forward expeditionary bases because their combat radius is only 400 nm.28

The RQ-4 has a maximum combat radius of 5,400 nm and can be based 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

46

farther from the area of operations.29 Its transit time, however, decreases its 

persistence over the target area. In many cases, RPA airfield compatibility and 

range considerations are more critical than those of contemporary manned 

aircraft because they lack the ability to conduct air refueling.30 Because of 

these considerations, Predators, Reapers, and Global Hawks were based with 

manned aircraft at expeditionary bases in Afghanistan and Iraq during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. MQ-1s were positioned with 

C-130s at Ali Air Base, Iraq, in 2004, and MQ-1s and MQ-9s were based with 

a variety of manned combat aircraft at the Kandahar airfield and Bagram Air 

Base, Afghanistan.31 The 380th AEW operated RQ-4s, KC-10 tankers, and 

AWACS aircraft from its location during both operations.32

Given their basing requirements, CONOPS for RPAs in Groups 4 and 5 are 

often similar to the operational concepts of manned aircraft, as discussed in 

the previous chapter. One exception is that RPA control systems are divided 

among LREs, satellite relays, and stateside facilities instead of being resident 

in the aircraft itself. In addition, their operational requirements and their 

likely stationing at airfields operating manned aircraft make them subject to 

the logistical considerations inherent with forward-employed manned aircraft.

Like manned aircraft operating from expeditionary bases, Predator, Reaper, 

and Global Hawk RPAs are dependent on agile combat support.33 Following 

their deployment to a given theater of operations, MQ-1/9s and RQ-4s require 

hangars, maintenance facilities, force protection, food and shelter for their 

associated personnel, munitions (in the case of the MQ-1/9), and a steady 

supply of fuel.

Interruption of theater ACS may affect RPAs more than manned aircraft 

because they are more heavily dependent on airlift. For example, because 

Predators and Reapers have limited range and lack an autonomous landing 

capability, they cannot fly into theater and instead must be disassembled and 

packed into specialized containers for shipment to forward locations.34 The 

same is true when they are redeployed. Consequently, MQ-1/9s are heavily 

dependent on military and commercial airlift for intertheater transport. 

Although continued expeditionary operations require the forward deployment 

of LREs, the RQ-4 does not have the same transport problems as Predator and 

Reaper systems because its intercontinental range allows it to deploy and redeploy without airlift. Nonetheless, because Global Hawks transit civilian airspace 

during such flights, advance coordination and approval are required. Even 

within the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration requires RPAs 

to have a special flight certificate to transit controlled airspace.35 Like all forward-deployed aircraft, RQ-4 and MQ-1/9 support equipment and personnel 

are typically airlifted to and from the theater of operations.36 Although remote 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

47

split operations decrease the number of forward-deployed personnel and the 

scale of ACS for medium and large RPAs, these requirements are not significantly less than those for traditional manned aircraft. 

Host nations also have the authority to regulate the use of RPA airfields. 

Because the operational concepts of medium and large RPAs are tied to robust 

airfields sustained by external lines of supply, host nations hold significant 

political influence over US employment of its largest RPAs.37 Host nations 

may allow near unrestricted access to their facilities, as Saudi Arabia did during 

Desert Storm. Alternatively, nations such as Pakistan may heavily restrict and 

ultimately evict US forces from their air bases. In the first Persian Gulf War, 

Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to use its airfields with few restrictions 

and supplied fuel to all of coalition aircraft operating from Saudi bases.38 More 

recently, Pakistan expelled MQ-1/9 aircraft from its bases following internal 

opposition to US drone strikes against targets within Pakistani territory.39 The 

Pakistani example demonstrates that RPAs may be just as vulnerable to hostnation restrictions as manned aircraft. 

Developmental RPA Technologies Necessary for Swarming

The MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk have served 

important roles in the overall development of RPAs. They demonstrated that 

remote split operations could reduce US airpower’s forward footprint with a 

networked arrangement of ground stations, satellites, and expeditionary 

bases. Their operational and logistical requirements, however, required that 

they be employed much like manned aircraft. Furthermore, the use of foreign 

airfields has meant that medium and large RPAs are subject to host-nation 

oversight. However, swarms of micro, mini, and small RPAs might operate 

free of airfields and thus significantly reduce the logistical footprint of US air 

forces. Command and control of future RPAs, or swarms of RPAs, will also be 

important. The MQ-1/9’s single-satellite remote split architecture may serve as an 

excellent model for the development of future generations of globally deployed 

RPAs. Regardless, RPA technology is still in its larval phase of development.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the demand for ISR support at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war accelerated service-specific 

RPA development and procurement programs so much that each of the armed 

services deployed air vehicles specifically suited to its own battlefield needs.40

During Iraqi Freedom more than 10 different types of remotely piloted aircraft operated independently without the ability to exchange information between military services or other aircraft.41 As a result of this uncoordinated 

development and procurement of RPAs, the Department of Defense released 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

48

the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005–2030 and has since published 

frequent updates.42 The 2005 document was intended “to assist DoD decision 

makers in developing a long-range strategy for UA [unmanned aircraft] development and acquisition in future Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) 

and other planning efforts, as well as to guide industry in developing UA-related technology.”43 The document also alluded to the future utility of swarming RPAs on the battlefield:

Combining sensor products in novel ways using advanced processing systems on board 

the aircraft will help solve the sensor autonomy problem as well. Smaller UA operating 

with minimal data links, or in swarms, need this ability even more. The ability to flood 

a battlespace with unmanned collection systems demands autonomous sensor operation to be feasible. While the carriage of multiple sensors on a single, small UA is problematic, networks of independent sensors on separate platforms that can determine the 

most efficient allocation of targets need to be able to find, provisionally identify, and 

then collect definitive images to alert exploiters when a target has been found with minimal if any human initiative.44

Although this mention of swarming was meant to spur an additional method 

of collecting intelligence during wartime, it paralleled many of Arquilla and 

Ronfeldt’s characteristics of swarming. They claim swarms will involve a high 

degree of autonomy; “small, dispersed, internetted maneuver units”; “integrated surveillance, sensors, and C4I [command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence] for topsight”; and should have “stand-off and 

close-in capabilities.”45 Simplified, future RPA swarms may require micro, 

mini, or small air vehicles with few logistics requirements; a high degree of 

aircraft and swarm autonomy; robust communications capability between 

swarming aircraft; sufficient payload capacity; and C4I [command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 

connectivity.46

Micro, mini, and small RPAs have already been marketed for commercial 

and military missions. Micro and mini RPAs are “optionally expendable, can 

be carried by individual personnel, and generally operate within line-of-sight 

range of the units they support.” According to Defense Update, many fixedwing micro and mini unmanned air vehicles may “represent a new concept of 

an ‘always ready’ UAV carried in a tube, with wings wrapped around the fuselage. When needed, the UAV is pulled out of its tube, the wings automatically 

snapping into position making the UAV ready to launch.”47 Although micro 

and mini RPAs (Groups 1–2) provide small units significant utility with minimal logistics support, small (Group 3) RPAs demonstrate exceptional promise for theater-level applications. Small unmanned aircraft, such as the jointly 

produced INSITU/Boeing ScanEagle and Integrator systems, use autonomous navigation, have a 50-mile range limited only by their communications 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

49

equipment, and stay aloft up to 24 hours.48 The Integrator also has multiple 

payload bays and hard-points, or attachment sites, capable of carrying up to 

37.5 lb. of equipment and, potentially, weapons (see fig. 7).49

Figure 7. INSITU Integrator

(Photograph courtesy of INSITU.)

Furthermore, companies such as INSITU, Boeing, and SAIC developed 

small RPAs that can be inserted into target areas by larger aircraft. Examples 

of air-insertable RPAs include the SAIC Finder and Boeing SECC.50 During 

operational testing, the Finder was carried by MQ-1/9 aircraft and controlled 

using the Predator/Reaper’s satellite relay.51 Each of these aircraft has demonstrated the reality of micro, mini, and small RPAs operating with minimal 

logistics and without the need of airfields.

Beyond micro and mini RPAs that can be launched and recovered by individual personnel, small RPAs such as the ScanEagle, Integrator, and Finder 

are launched and recovered with minimal support equipment and manpower. 

ScanEagles and Integrators are launched with a pneumatic catapult and recovered by a crane-type recovery system (see fig. 8).52

The launch catapult and recovery crane are relatively compact and can be 

transported by a common ground vehicle.53 The Finder can also be catapult 

launched and may be recovered using minimal equipment.54 Furthermore, 

these systems use readily available fuels such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel 

and require as few as four people to launch, operate, and recover their respective vehicle.55 In 2004 the Marine Corps flew early variants of the ScanEagle 

for 456,000 combat hours in OEF and OIF, and in early 2012 the Navy’s Integrator RQ-21 variant achieved early operational capability (EOC) for use in 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

50

land-based and maritime missions.56 Although mini, micro, and small RPAs 

may provide significant utility with minimal logistics, they will require more 

advanced automation and communications technologies to allow them to operate collectively within swarms.

Figure 8. INSITU ScanEagle/Integrator launch and recovery system 

(Photograph courtesy of INSITU.)

Swarming weapon systems will require “complex organizational innovations and more information structuring and processing capabilities” than are 

possible with the current generation of manned and unmanned aircraft.57 Not 

only will swarming aircraft be sharing information with other members of the 

swarm, they will be operating autonomously within a system of autonomous 

aircraft. Their guidance systems must have sufficient processing power to 

maintain position within the dynamic swarm environment and also accomplish their mission objectives. According to the Unmanned Systems Integrated 

Roadmap FY2011–2036, “The special feature of an autonomous system is its 

ability to be goal-directed in unpredictable situations. . . . An autonomous 

system is able to make a decision based on a set of rules and/or limitations. It 

is able to determine what information is important in making a decision.”58

Although decisions by humans are free, a cost is incurred when they are made 

by machines.
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

51

According to Rafael Yanushevsky, “The more autonomous ability a UAV 

has, the more complex its guidance and control system is and, as a result, the 

higher is its size and weight, the less . . . its endurance, combat radius, and/or 

speed. Payload capacity and endurance (fuel capacity) are inversely related.”59

Emerging technology will address a large part of this problem. For example, 

innovations in complementary metal-oxide semiconductors (CMOS), essentially the microchips in computers, have resulted in smaller, more-powerful 

guidance and control systems. Breakthroughs in nanoprocessor technologies, 

like those recently tested at Harvard University, could also decrease size and 

weight while increasing the processing power of electronic guidance equipment 

on board future generations of swarming RPAs.60 Small RPAs such as the ScanEagle, Integrator, and Finder are particularly sensitive to weight and use relatively simple guidance systems. Therefore, fully autonomous guidance equipment on small RPAs will likely involve miniaturized electronic components. 

In situations where full autonomy is not technologically feasible or acceptable to military commanders, operators may adjust a swarm’s level of autonomy. This concept is often called “sliding autonomy” or “flexible autonomy” 

(see table 2).61

Table 2. The four levels of autonomy 

(Reproduced from DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036 [Washington, DC: DOD, 2011].)

Level Name Description

1 Human 

Operated

A human operator makes all decisions. The system has no autonomous 

control of its environment although it may have information-only 

responses to sensed data.

2 Human

Delegated

The vehicle can perform many functions independently of human control when delegated to do so. This level encompasses automatic controls, 

engine controls, and other low-level automation that must be activated 

or deactivated by human input and must act in mutual exclusion of 

human operation.

3 Human 

Supervised

The system can perform a wide variety of activities when given toplevel permissions or directions by a human. Both the human and the 

system can initiate behaviors based on sensed data, but the system can 

do so only if within the scope of its currently directed tasks.

4 Fully 

Autonomous

The system receives goals from humans and translates them into tasks 

to be performed without human interaction. A human could still enter 

the loop in an emergency or changes the goals, although in practice 

there may be significant time delays before human intervention occurs.

For example, if commanders choose not to use fully autonomous swarms, 

they may use hierarchical command and control to achieve human supervised autonomy. According to Yanushevsky, 
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UAVs require human guidance to varying degrees and often through several operators, 

which is what essentially defines an unmanned aerial system (UAS). . . . A hierarchical 

control system, where a local operator controls a group of UAVs and an operator-manager controls the actions of local operators, can provide the best solution of the coordinated control of the fleet of UAVs. Moreover, the use of a manned aerial vehicle with an 

operator as the leader of a local UAV group, instead of using a ground-based operator, 

can significantly reduce the UAV’s payload and increase their performance.62

Regardless of guidance system and performance tradeoffs, the willingness of 

civilian leaders and military commanders to accept the risk of unintended 

effects such as collateral damage will also shape their decisions to allow fully 

autonomous RPA swarms. The DOD notes, “Robust safeties and control measures will be required for commanders to trust that autonomous systems will 

not behave in a manner other than what is intended on the battlefield.”63 Consequently, computer algorithms that define RPA swarm flight parameters, 

mission objectives, and communication protocols will be some of the most 

important factors affecting leaders’ willingness to unleash their swarms.

Algorithms programmed into autonomous RPAs can be thought of as premade decisions. For a given situation, a fully autonomous RPA will fly according 

to the rule structures and parameters programmed into its software. This process will repeat itself as long as the aircraft is in operation, and the fidelity of 

the process will depend on the sampling rate of its guidance system.64 Swarm 

guidance algorithms are exponentially more complex than individual RPA 

algorithms because they must account for the flight dynamics of individual as 

well as neighboring aircraft and essentially make decisions for the swarm.65

These factors explain why major advances in RPA swarming have involved 

algorithm research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). University 

of Pennsylvania researcher Vijay Kumar and his team of scientists gained notoriety for their swarm-enabling algorithms. As demonstrated in a recent video, 

their algorithms enabled formations of quad-rotor helicopters to accomplish 

multiple cooperative tasks, including advanced formation flight maneuvers.66

Other scientists, such as Dong You and David Shim, developed algorithms 

that maximize the fuel capacity of RPAs by flocking vehicles in formation like 

migratory birds.67 Flying in tight formations could save 12–20 percent in fuel 

costs.68 Furthermore, German scientists Alex Bürkle, Florian Segor, and Matthias Kollman created sets of computer rules for collaborative micro RPA 

swarms, ground-based sensors, vehicles, and ground control stations.69 Their 

work also involved a communications infrastructure that may apply to future 

military swarming applications.70 Other scientists and defense firms have also 

developed algorithms for RPA search-and-destroy missions, automated ground 

fueling stations for RPAs, and air refueling.71 Regardless of algorithm success in 

achieving specialized tasks that might contribute additional capabilities to RPA 
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swarms, the defense industry measure of success will be its ability to integrate 

the plethora of disassociated algorithms and technologies into an overall architecture that enables swarming CONOPS.

RPA swarms will rely heavily on the integration of software, aircraft capabilities, computer guidance systems, sensor and weapons payloads, and C2 

networks. Autonomous swarming aircraft will require sufficient flight performance and equipment payload capacity so they can translate their algorithms 

into effects desired by political and military leaders. Furthermore, they will 

require C2 interfaces that allow commanders to use sliding autonomy according 

to political aims or technological limitations. Bandwidth limitations involving 

satellite communications will also impact the remote operation and C2 of 

swarms.72 However, existing C2 aircraft such as the E-3 Sentry and E-2 Hawkeye 

might facilitate theater-level command and control of RPA swarms if they are 

retrofitted with appropriate technologies. According to the Unmanned Systems 

Integrated Roadmap, human-supervised autonomous systems may be possible 

as early as 2018, and swarms of fully autonomous systems may pass RDT&E 

stages between 2020 and 2036.73 Nonetheless, when the DOD finally acquires 

the capability to conduct RPA swarming operations, the Instant Basing concept 

of logistics might increase swarming effects while minimizing the logistical 

footprint of future airpower operations. Moreover, RPA swarms linked to a 

concept of Instant Basing may provide such uniquely capable ways and means 

of power projection that the US military paradigm of overwhelming force 

could be transformed to one of precise proportionality.

Instant Basing

A significant portion of US land-based airpower CONOPS is contingent 

upon access to forward airfields. The deployment of land-based airpower involves the geographic positioning of forces and subsequent sustainment of 

forces by lines of supply, force protection (security), and diplomacy with host 

nations. The basing of manned aircraft and existing theater-level unmanned 

aircraft is dictated by the availability of compatible airfields and their ability to 

provide sustained logistical support for continued operations. Furthermore, 

because combat and support aircraft are often concentrated at large air bases, 

forward airfields serve as lucrative targets for enemy attacks and afford host 

nations significant political leverage. Consequently, the existing airpower 

CONOPS involving manned aircraft and medium/large RPA equivalents 

costs the United States considerable operational and strategic flexibility.

Instant Basing is a proposed logistical concept that increases joint force operational flexibility by significantly reducing the deployment and sustainment 
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requirements of US airpower. Further, Instant Basing generates airpower with 

minimal risk to US personnel because most Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, and 

Marines associated with this concept will deploy, generate their RPA swarms, 

and redeploy to a different location before their presence becomes obvious to 

the enemy. The Instant Basing concept also relies on global commercial lines 

of supply, communications, and commerce to ensure that RPA swarms, their 

support equipment, and associated personnel are available for deployment in 

minimum time. The assumptions of this concept are (1) swarms of small 

RPAs provide satisfactory theater-level effects, (2) the Department of Defense 

works with the Department of State to gain use of swarm launch sites within 

host nations, (3) commercial and military airlift are available, (4) personnel 

responsible for launching and recovering swarming RPAs are positioned in 

the theater shortly before an execution order, (5) force protection is provided 

by small US military elements or by host nations, (6) host nations allow the 

entry and exit of US personnel, and (7) joint forces provide security for Instant Basing personnel during operations in hostile territory. Clausewitz 

wrote that “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult” 

and emphasized that “friction” was the distinguishing factor between “real 

war” and “war on paper.”74 At this stage in its development, the idea of Instant 

Basing is significantly simplified and resides on paper for the purpose of 

sparking new thinking about alternative means of power projection that exploit airpower principles and modern technological developments. The author acknowledges that no plan is easy, even if it involves Instant Basing.

The first stage of Instant Basing is the transportation of equipment and 

personnel into theater. Notionally, teams of six people will be responsible for 

launching 15-aircraft swarms of small RPAs.75 Three probable transportation 

options exist for this ensemble. First, swarm-capable unmanned aircraft and 

support equipment may be pre-positioned within areas of operation. Second, 

swarming air assets and supporting persons may be directly transported to 

their deployment site using commercial cargo carriers, passenger airlines, 

and/or military means. Third, crated RPAs and associated equipment may be 

deliberately kept in a state of transit within commercial carrier shipment systems. Future operations will likely involve a combination of these options and 

may also include RPA swarms dispatched from US Navy warships and submarines.76 Nonetheless, Instant Basing primarily focuses on the rapid and safe 

deployment of land-based airpower.

The first method of positioning swarm-capable RPAs in a theater using 

Instant Basing involves pre-positioned US Military Sealift Command (MSC) 

ships and/or terrestrial storage facilities. The MSC currently manages a fleet 

of 30 pre-positioned maritime vessels loaded with military equipment for 
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rapid response to global conflicts and could provide a flexible response option 

for contingencies requiring swarming operations.77 One drawback, however, 

is time lost moving pre-positioned ships into port, finding and offloading assets, 

and then arranging subsequent transportation to specific launch sites. Furthermore, not all locations will have ports capable of handling large cargo 

ships. If supply ships are able to dock, force protection will be a major concern 

while in port. Additional personnel will be required to handle bulk supplies 

of RPAs and launch/recovery equipment, and during that time, supply ships 

and their personnel will be vulnerable to attack without host-nation force 

protection and/or US military security personnel. 

Another pre-positioning option may involve contracted or US-owned storage facilities within allied countries. Just as stocks of RPAs could be stored on 

MSC ships, the US military might store crates of RPAs and support equipment 

in warehouses throughout geographic combatant commands.78 However, this 

option would also require significant security. Swarming RPAs will likely involve classified and proprietary technology that will require continuous protection and frequent software and hardware upgrades. Furthermore, if they 

serve as a key air asset for regional conflicts, GCCs may demand that they are 

always available for rapid deployment. Unfortunately, even if storage sites are 

secured on host-nation government bases, it may be difficult to maintain secrecy if local military, civilian populations, or enemy elements monitor US 

storage facilities. Whether originating from seaports or terrestrial warehouses, 

air weapons will be concentrated and likely require convoy transportation to 

dispersed sites. Large convoys could introduce operational supply vulnerabilities similar to those encountered by NATO convoys traversing Pakistan during 

OEF.79 Given the drawbacks of pre-positioned forces, commercial and military 

airlift may provide a better means of transportation for swarm assets. 

A second force-delivery method makes extensive use of commercial logistics 

firms, military airlift, and local transportation companies. Once RPA swarmforce personnel are notified that they will be needed in a given theater of operations, their aircraft and equipment will be packaged and palletized for shipment. 

USTRANSCOM will coordinate shipments via commercial logistics firms such 

as FedEx, UPS, or DHL to locations as close as possible to designated launch sites 

in host nations.80 Since commercial shippers require physical addresses, RPA 

swarms and their equipment may be shipped to host-nation-approved soccer 

stadiums, racetracks, or government facilities near optimal launch locations.81 If 

commercial airfreight companies are used, maximum consideration should be 

provided to door-to-door delivery, shipment insurance, 24/7 surveillance of 

shipments, and expedited delivery.82 Furthermore, the impact of stolen shipments could be reduced if physical keys, access codes, or insertable critical 
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components are personally carried by launch and recovery teams. When the 

commercial cargo company provides an estimated arrival date and tracking 

number, local defense travel offices will provide launch teams airline tickets to 

locations closest to their planned launch site.83 RPA launch and recovery team 

leaders should have sufficient authority to use government funds for costs associated with accessing equipment, expediting customs processing, and related expenses.84 Ideally, swarm personnel will arrive at their equipment 

drop-off points shortly before the delivery of their shipment.85

If commercial airlift is not available or if planned launch sites are in hostile 

territory, military airlift should be used to transport RPAs, support equipment, and launch teams to host-nation locations closest to designated swarm 

launch sites or to expeditionary airfields with adequate force protection. This 

option may provide the greatest level of simplicity because swarm teams and 

their equipment remain together. However, large numbers of US military 

cargo aircraft and uniformed personnel may degrade operational surprise 

and increase the need for additional force protection because enemy personnel may become alerted. Nonetheless, the delivery potential of commercial 

and military airlift is finite. Thus, Instant Basing will likely involve a combination of commercial and military airlift. For a given timeline, one type of airlift 

may be better suited to deliver personnel and equipment to their destination 

faster than others. According to USTRANSCOM airlift specialist Michael 

Spehar, “airflow planning” will be a critical consideration for the effective delivery of airpower assets into theater.86 If the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) is 

used for intertheater transport, he recommends planning “CRAF missions 

first and scheduling T-tail missions around them.”87 In any case, commercial 

carriers’ delivery procedures may provide another means of pre-positioning 

RPA swarms for short intervals.

Instant Basing may employ a third method of transporting crated RPAs 

and associated equipment in which the US military deliberately keeps swarm 

systems in a state of transit within commercial carriers’ logistics systems. The 

shipping policies of commercial freight carriers like UPS, FedEx, and DHL 

often provide the ability to reroute, reschedule, or store shipments for short 

time periods in the event of missed deliveries.88 In cases where RPA swarms 

have been shipped but the execution order has been delayed, military shipment coordinators may be able to ensure the security of airpower assets by 

rerouting their items multiple times. Shipments of military items may be 

more secure if they are in constant motion aboard commercial aircraft or at 

interim logistics centers than if they were stored at their destination. Tracking numbers on all items will ensure oversight during transit. This method 

may be the true manifestation of logistical swarming because it involves the 
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deployment of multiple assets/artifacts according to a master plan, yet is dispersed, hard to detect, and apparently harmless until coordinated and concentrated. If so, the coherence of logistical and operational swarming concepts 

may provide commanders unforeseen ways and means of force deployment 

within which supplies and weapons maintain “stealthy ubiquity” without the 

need for visible logistical lines or concentrated military forces.89

This shipping option will also disperse swarm assets throughout the increasingly robust global logistics system instead of concentrating multiple 

swarms at a single destination’s storage facilities. If dispersal within air freight 

companies’ logistical systems is not acceptable to military commanders, shipment coordinators may arrange for RPA assets to be stored at destination 

storage facilities so that launch and recovery personnel can pick up their 

equipment at a later date. Purchasing extra insurance and security services 

may provide an added degree of protection against theft and tampering. Although this option may provide theater commanders additional time, crated 

swarm components could become damaged because of increased handling. 

Nonetheless, the use of airfreight companies’ delivery and storage procedures 

may provide launch and recovery personnel a reserve stock of aircraft and 

support equipment in the event their assigned equipment is damaged during 

delivery and/or may provide replacements if their aircraft have system failures during launch. Regardless, it will be the operational commanders’ decision to use reserve supplies of RPAs. Before such a decision is made, swarm 

teams must initiate the second stage of Instant Basing.

During the second stage of Instant Basing, deployed teams of swarm technicians will proceed to their designated launch sites, deploy their assigned 

aircraft, ensure that each aircraft has an acceptable system status, and then 

relinquish command and control to remote operators.90 Due to force protection and operational security reasons, launch sites should be located in desolate areas with adequate space for the launch and recovery of swarm RPAs. 

However, host nations and threat levels in hostile territories may dictate that 

launch sites are located on foreign government facilities or on coalition bases. 

After the launch catapult, recovery crane, and line-of-sight swarm control 

module are assembled, RPAs will be launched as quickly as possible.91 Once 

multiple aircraft are airborne, they will sequentially establish their position 

within the swarm, and one of six team members will check the status of each 

aircraft and collective swarm. If individual aircraft fail their system check, 

they may either be recovered for immediate repairs and launched again or 

repacked for reshipment to the United States. During this process, a second 

member of the support team will establish contact with the remote C2 element, either an airborne C2 aircraft or a CONUS-based operator using an 
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MQ-1/9 style satellite architecture, and coordinate for the remote operator to 

take control of the swarm.

After remote C2 elements assume control of the recently launched swarm, 

airborne swarms will be sustained by a small number of launch and recovery 

bases located throughout the area of operations. Instant Basing auxiliary 

bases will be highly mobile and will have the responsibility of repairing and 

replacing damaged, lost, or malfunctioning RPAs as required. They will also 

be responsible for recovering RPA swarms once the regional conflict has been 

concluded. However, swarms will remain airborne for as long as possible with 

RPA-to-RPA refueling or air refueling with manned tanker aircraft. After 

launch and recovery teams relinquish control of their swarms to remote C2 

elements, they can begin their redeployment to the United States or to their 

next assigned intratheater location. 

During the third stage of Instant Basing, swarm technicians will disassemble their equipment and deliver it to a commercial or military shipping agent 

for transport back to the CONUS or another location. If launch and recovery 

personnel are not required for further duty, they will fly back to their home 

base via commercial or military airlift. From start to finish, the desired Instant 

Basing timeline provides theater commanders airpower within four days and 

only exposes US launch and recovery teams to potential enemy action during 

three days (see table 3). 

Table 3. Proposed Instant Basing timeline

Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7

Travel

(CONUS 

Start)

Travel Shipment 

Receipt & 

Accountability

Launch Reshipment & 

Redeployment

Travel Travel

(CONUS 

End)

Swarms may be launched in less time if they are delivered by military aircraft or launched from US Navy surface ships and submarines. In scenarios 

involving air-launched swarms, the timeline would be reduced to the time 

required to transport air-deployable RPA swarms to an area where they could 

assemble their formations. Furthermore, a reduced timeline involving air deployment of RPA swarms may provide an increased level of surprise as compared to the timeline proposed in table 3. Nonetheless, the use of air-delivered 

swarms may add complexity and risk to operations relying on RPA swarms 

since aircraft might have less opportunity to fix problems with individual RPAs 

or rectify C2 connectivity problems that might develop once the swarms are 

launched. Thus, if RPA swarms are launched from aircraft, operational planners 

should consider whether faster deployment justifies the risk of failed swarms.
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Regardless of their launch method, RPA swarms require significantly less 

logistics than existing manned aircraft. For example, launching 1,000 swarmcapable RPAs would only require 400 personnel and 6,500 gallons of fuel.92

During military operations, a typical US Air Force combat wing of 72 manned 

combat aircraft consumes 500,000 to 1,000,000 gallons of fuel per day and 

requires the support of 1,500 to 2,000 people.93 By percentage, the projected 

daily fuel requirement of 1,000 small RPAs is 1.3 percent of a typical manned 

aircraft combat wing, and the RPAs’ personnel footprint would be 73 percent 

smaller than a typical manned air wing.94 Furthermore, most swarm teams are 

only needed for their RPAs’ initial launch. Once swarms are airborne and launch 

crews have redeployed, the swarm force’s personnel footprint will decrease to a 

much lower percentage.

On initial observation it may seem as if swarm-capable RPAs might be incapable of delivering sufficient combat effects. Such a conclusion is not necessarily correct, because RPA swarms provide airpower effects differently than 

manned aircraft. Swarms are intended to provide more organically effective 

ISR, electronic warfare effects, and, in some circumstances, kinetic effects and 

may potentially have the ability to collectively change their radar signatures 

such that swarms might mimic larger manned aircraft.95 One of the overarching 

ideas within this swarming concept is that small, dispersed, lightly armed 

forces that are deployed in large numbers may provide commanders and political leaders more options than manned aircraft and their associated weapons. 

Although RPA swarms may not carry bomb loads as large as manned combat 

aircraft, their kinetic payloads may provide sufficient force at much less cost 

than traditional aircraft. Moreover, the small explosive yields of RPA weapons 

may provide more proportional force capability because destructive force begins 

at a much lower level than the smallest bombs carried on the current generation 

of manned aircraft. One must ask, is a 250-, 500-, 750-, 1,000-, or 2,000- lb. 

bomb necessary in every situation? Arguably not, and thus the utility of RPA 

swarms may be best suited for situations involving low-intensity warfare. 

In those situations where more force is necessary, other weapon systems 

capable of carrying large bombs may be required. Nonetheless, the destructive 

power of lightweight bombs carried by swarming aircraft will likely increase 

and may be able to deliver destructive power equivalent to the bombs loaded 

on today’s manned combat aircraft. Nanotechnology involving the chemical 

structures of explosives may greatly increase the destructive yields of bombs 

delivered from RPA swarms.96 Ongoing research has already increased the 

destructive force of some explosives without increasing their weight or volume.97

Regardless, RPA swarms’ most important utility may be their ability to flexibly deliver proportionate airpower effects in conflicts involving significant 
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force limitations. Especially within low-intensity conflicts, weapons with adequate 

destructive power which risk less collateral damage may provide commanders 

more utility than the current generation of air-to-ground bombs. Ultimately, 

the commander’s perception of the context of the environment will determine 

the utility of a given weapon system, and RPA swarms thus provide an important option for the commanders and policy makers of the future. 

Instant Basing and its use of swarming RPAs has the potential to provide 

significant efficiencies and create new power-projection options; however, 

munitions shipment and distribution may be a problem if future generations 

of aircraft require the use of high-explosive bombs and chemical propellants 

for projectile rounds. Because munitions require special handling procedures 

and security measures and cannot be transported on commercial aircraft, 

they will probably have to be pre-positioned or airlifted by military aircraft.98

Once the munitions are in theater, moreover, it may be problematic to deliver 

them to swarm launch teams in accordance with Instant Basing timelines. 

Nevertheless, it may be possible to launch armed RPAs from aircraft or naval 

vessels and have them rendezvous with RPA swarms that lack kinetic capabilities. Once armed RPAs are air-delivered they would then be sustained in 

the same manner as their unarmed swarm counterparts. 

The development and employment of directed-energy weapons and miniaturized railguns may also help alleviate concerns involving the deployment of 

RPA swarm armaments; however, the RDT&E of such weapon systems are in 

their early stages. In 2007, a Defense Science Board report revealed that “at medium power levels, solid state laser systems with improved efficiency and reasonable beam quality could provide manned and unmanned aircraft applications at 

power levels of tens to hundreds of kilowatts for self-defense and, eventually, 

precision ground attack.”99 Railgun technology is also significant because it uses 

electromagnetic coils instead of chemical propellants to fire military projectiles 

farther and faster than traditional gun systems.100 Furthermore, railgun projectiles destroy their targets with their large kinetic energy instead of explosive 

charges and might be universally transportable.101 Regardless of RPA swarms’ 

potential to provide new airpower capabilities with minimal deployment and 

redeployment timelines and relatively miniscule logistical requirements, Instant 

Basing will only be effective if it fits the political context of a given scenario.

According to van Creveld, “Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the 

possible; but surely what is possible is determined not merely by numerical 

strengths, doctrine, intelligence, arms, and tactics, but, in the first place, by 

the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, supplies available and 

expected, organization and administration, transportation and arteries of 

communication.”102 The aim of Instant Basing is to make airpower’s “hardest 
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facts of all” less limiting by dramatically reducing the need for large airfields, 

petroleum convoys, and vast numbers of continuously deployed personnel 

and support equipment.103 Furthermore, as James Huston observed, “logistics 

is the application of time and space factors to war” and “provides the substance 

that physically permits an army to ‘live and move and have its being.’ ”104 His 

statements will be even more prophetic if Instant Basing comes to fruition 

because the logistics concept will allow locust-like swarms of RPAs to emerge 

at any time from nearly any place planners see fit.

Most importantly, Instant Basing may influence the context of US military 

thought. Instead of viewing the world from a Westphalian perspective, one in 

which the globe is divided by territorial boundaries, civilization could be perceived in the context of an overarching complex of interconnected government and commercial logistical firms. Regional crises then become lesions 

underlying the international logistics network. If the United States maintains 

a rapidly deployable airpower force comprised of RPA swarms that are constantly in a state of transit throughout the international logistics network, it 

can maintain a strategic defensive position that simultaneously enables political and military leaders to maintain the initiative in a spectrum of scenarios. According to Clausewitz, the strategically defensive actor seeks to “keep 

his territory inviolate, and hold it for as long as possible.”105 However, in the 

context of Instant Basing’s potential application, territory will not be the aim; 

instead, maintenance of international security and stability will be the overarching goal. 

In this context the US military might also consider Instant Basing as a construct for global guerilla-type operations to gain and maintain continuing advantage with respect to potential or emerging regional problems.106 For example, Mao Tse-tung wrote the following ideas during his fight against Imperial 

Japanese forces:

When the situation is serious, the guerilla must move with the fluidity of water and the 

ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. 

They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, 

and they must then strike him from the west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. . . . Guerilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration, and the 

alert shifting of forces. . . . Skill in conducting guerilla operations, however, lies not in 

merely understanding the things we have discussed but rather in their actual application 

on the field of battle.107

Instant Basing may be used as a type of global guerilla tactic because it intends to provide the United States the capability to employ significant airpower from almost any location in a minimum amount of time and aims to 

exert influence in a region by making the enemy unable to determine the location or future concentration and application of US forces. Similarly to T. E. 
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Lawrence’s World War I guerilla tactics in the Middle East, future conflicts 

will be “wars of detachment” where the global logistics network “contains the 

enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert not disclosing ourselves 

till the moment of attack.”108 During attacks, instantly based swarms of RPAs 

will provide the means for rapid punishment (destructive force); however, the 

implied omnipresence of swarms may also deter enemies from disobeying 

international norms, laws, and customs. Robert Pape contends, however, that 

for airpower to coerce enemies to behave as the international order expects, it 

must be applied in the context of the enemy’s strategy. 

For coercion through denial to succeed, the coercer must exploit the particular vulnerabilities of the opponent’s specific strategy. All military strategies do not share the same 

weaknesses. Modern nation-states employ two main types of strategies in conflicts with 

other states: mechanized (or “conventional”) war and guerilla (or “unconventional”) 

war. In this context “mechanized” refers to the dominance of the types of mechanical 

weapons and transport provided by the industrial revolution, not to battle tactics that 

rely on armored vehicles and rapid mobility, such as the German blitzkrieg. The objective in mechanized war is destruction of the enemy forces, by means of massive, heavily 

armed forces that fight intense, large-scale battles along relatively well-defined fronts. . . 

. Guerilla warfare, in contrast, aims to gain control over population, usually beginning 

with villages located in remote areas, and to use these anchors to control still larger segments of the population and thus undermine support for the government. Guerillas 

fight in small units dispersed over large areas with no well-defined front line. . . . From 

the coercer’s point of view, the most important difference between these two strategies is 

that mechanized war is highly dependent on logistics and communications networks, 

and guerilla war is not (emphasis in original).109

Instant Basing’s capability to generate RPA swarms supported by a small 

logistical footprint may make it particularly suited to providing significant 

coercive utility in low-intensity conflicts if (1) “coercers can obtain concessions only over the specific territory that has been denied to the opponent,” 

(2) “military pressure” can be “maintained continuously until a satisfactory 

settlement is reached,” and (3) “the coercer demonstrates the capacity to control the disputed territory by force.”110 Furthermore, the organic capabilities 

included within RPA swarms could provide surveillance, limited airdrop, kinetic effects, and other missions toward military objectives found within lowintensity conflicts. If successfully employed, instantly based swarms may provide a compelling threat that influences the behavior of the enemy through 

continued punishment in cases of enemy misbehavior, but it may also cause 

the enemy to believe that it will be punished if it disobeys the international 

order.111 According to Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, “Deterrence involves 

setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring 

the obligation—and waiting” (emphasis in original).112 If Instant Basing and 
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RPA swarming capabilities are demonstrated, they may create new ways and 

means to such ends.

Conclusions about an RPA Vanguard

Regardless of Instant Basing’s potential grand-strategic and military-strategic 

implications, the integration of RPA technology with swarming concepts creates the potential for a new paradigm of US airpower. However, before RPAs are 

able to swarm and demonstrate meaningful airpower effects, significant RDT&E 

is required to merge a diverse array of algorithms that control the flight, communications, and weapons employment characteristics of RPA swarms. In the 

meantime, current medium and large unmanned aircraft are essentially employed as manned aircraft controlled from afar. The MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 

Reaper, and RQ-4 Global Hawk command, control, and communications infrastructures will be important models for future remote operations involving 

RPA swarms. Furthermore, US airpower remains oriented toward maneuvertype operations as explained in the previous chapter. This trend will continue 

until technologies involving small RPA swarms mature to such an extent that 

they can demonstrate airpower effects commensurate with those of the US military’s manned aircraft fleet. When that happens, the Instant Basing logistics 

concept might provide the foundation for rapidly deployable swarm airpower.

The premise of Instant Basing is that swarms of small RPAs might provide 

significant airpower effects with minimal logistics support; thus, they can be 

rapidly deployed from CONUS and/or from within the global logistics infrastructure by small teams of launch and recovery personnel. If swarming and 

RPA technologies mature to such an extent that this concept is possible, Instant Basing may have a significant influence on US airpower. Because RPAs 

used in Instant Basing do not require airfields, swarms are launched from a 

variety of locations as determined by the theater strategy. This chapter does 

not specifically provide a future-swarming CONOPS; however, the next chapter does. After the swarms are launched, their launch and recovery teams return to the United States or other deployed locations to minimize their exposure to enemy elements and reduce overall force protection requirements. 

According to the proposed Instant Basing timeline, swarms of RPAs can be 

airborne within four days, and support personnel based in the United States 

will be back at their original CONUS destination in seven days. If RPA swarms 

are launched from aircraft or naval vessels, US personnel will be out of harm’s 

way even sooner. Once RPAs are launched they will provide persistent airpower over their target areas and receive air-refueling support from other 

RPAs until operational commanders order their recovery.
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If Instant Basing is successfully demonstrated in the future, it will multiply 

flexibility in geographic positioning, logistics, security, and politics for operational planners and commanders. Since airfields will not be required, air assets may be placed closer to target areas, providing a range benefit to RPA 

swarms, and will not be limited by airfield availability like manned aircraft. 

Swarms of small RPAs will use miniscule amounts of fuel as compared to 

manned aircraft, and their small size will allow a variety of transportation options. As a result, the logistics requirements of swarm-based airpower could 

be significantly less than today’s manned aircraft.

Force protection will still be a concern; however, the rapid nature of Instant 

Basing swarm deployments will minimize the exposure of support personnel 

when operating in permissive environments. In hostile environments, swarm 

teams will require force protection from joint forces; however, because Instant 

Basing launch and recovery sites will be dispersed and support presence in 

the area of operations is brief, force protection requirements are expected to 

be much less than if swarm assets were statically concentrated on expeditionary 

air bases.

Diplomacy with host nations will remain a significant consideration. Host 

nations will always hold leverage over foreign entry into their country. Nonetheless, because RPA swarms are less conspicuous, involve fewer forwarddeployed personnel, and do not require airfields, foreign nations will have less 

leverage to influence the United States. Moreover, because RPA swarms can 

be formed very quickly and remain airborne, host nations have fewer ways 

they can affect operations once begun. They may also be more reluctant to 

restrict US operations since swarms may not be visible to the local population.

Will RPA swarms become a vanguard for a new airpower paradigm? Current and near-future technologies open the door, yet entering such an era requires that the airpower institution reconsider the traditional employment of 

power and effect the organizational changes necessary to exploit a new concept of operations. Such innovation will likely cohere with and be spurred by 

the demands of the modern security environment, especially considering the 

flexibility and opportunity it supplies to senior political and military leaders. 

They may be well served by the ability of RPA swarms to impose, among other 

things, a sort of guerilla warfare against nation-states and nonstate actors behaving badly. RPA swarms may provide an added measure of deterrence 

against sovereign and nongovernmental actors and could increase international stability if enemies suspect their presence throughout the global logistics structure. Regardless, just as regular forces are often surprised by guerilla 

attacks, it is likely that the military will be surprised by the emergence of new 

technologies relating to RPA swarms. Longtime military affairs scholar David 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

65

Mets is probably correct that “the real success of new weapons usually comes 

in areas that were unimagined by the scientists and developers.”113 In the future, Instant Basing may keep the military version of locusts alive, but their 

technological birth and metamorphosis will require significant commitment 

from the Department of Defense. 

Notes

1. Martin C. Libicki, “Small and the Many,” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the 

Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 195.

2. Ibid., 191.

3. Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed Services: A 

Comparative Study of Weapon System Innovation” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 

2000). Ehrhard’s dissertation offers an excellent survey of RPAs and their development.

4. Thomas P. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs: The Secret History (Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, 2010), 88. Ehrhard’s study provides an excellent overview of the development and employment of unmanned aerial vehicles from their initial use in covert missions to their current 

overt uses within military operations.

5. Tony Mason, “Operation Allied Force, 1999,” in History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas 

Olsen (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 246, 249.

6. David A. Deptula, “Air Force Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Flight Plan 2009–2047,” 

PowerPoint presentation, 2009, slide 34.

7. Lambeth, “Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001,” 275–76; USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-1B 

Predator”; and USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-9 Reaper.”

8. Andrew Callam, “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Affairs 

Review 18, no. 3 (Winter 2009).

9. Marc V. Schanz, “Reaper Harvest,” Air Force Magazine 94, no. 4 (April 2011): 36.

10. John A. Tirpak, “RPA Boom,” Air Force Magazine 93, no. 8 (August 2010), http://www.

airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August2010/0810RPA.aspx.

11. US Air Force, “ Fact Sheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk,” http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/

factsheet.asp?id=13225 (accessed 21 March 2012); Deptula, “Air Force Unmanned Aerial System,” 

slide 4; Defense Science Board (DSB), Defense Science Board Study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of 

Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OSD/ATL], 2004), iii; and Council on Foreign 

Relations (CFR), U.S. Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Strategic 

Vision (Washington, DC: CFR, 2005), 2. The Global Hawk is a large, unarmed RPA capable of 

providing imagery support. Its significant intelligence collection accomplishments were emphasized 

in the DSB study and the Air Force 2005 Strategic Vision.

12. Some of the flight profiles and missions listed in fig. 5 are incorrect as published by the 

DOD. For the most accurate vehicle specifications, refer to service-specific fact sheets and/or 

the manufacturer’s sales literature. 

13. Jeremiah Gertler, U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, 2012), 44–46; and Thomas Withington, “Micro and Mini UAVs,” Military Technology 35, 

no. 8 (August 2011): 73.

14. John G. Drew et al., Unmanned Aerial Vehicle End-to-End Support Considerations

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 13.
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

66

15. Withington, “Micro- and Mini UAVs,” 73–79. The term unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

is synonymous with remotely piloted aircraft (RPA).

16. Ibid. RPAs in Groups 4 and 5 are often called medium- and high-altitude long-endurance 

(MALE and HALE) units.

17. Drew et al., Unmanned Aerial Vehicle End-to-End Support Considerations, 13.

18. Deptula, “Air Force Unmanned Aerial System,” slides 17–18; USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-1B 

Predator”; USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-9 Reaper”; and USAF, “Factsheets: RQ-4 Global Hawk.”

19. Drew et al., Unmanned Aerial Vehicle End-to-End Support Considerations, 57–85; AFI 11-

2MQ-1, MQ-1 Operations Procedures, vol. 3, 29 November 2007, 9; and AFI 11-2RQ-4, RQ-4 Operations Procedures, vol. 3, 14 September 2007, 13. According to US Air Force fact sheets, fixed-wing 

RPAs in Groups 4 and 5 have operational ranges between 770 and 8,700 nautical miles. See http://

www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp for weapon system specifics.

20. Deptula, “Air Force Unmanned Aerial System,” slide 26.

21. Drew et al., Unmanned Aerial Vehicle End-to-End Support Considerations, 61–66, 81–83; 

Gertler, U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, 3; and CFR, U.S. Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Strategic Vision.

22. Lt Col Joseph L. Campo, “When Flexibility and Doctrine Collide: Command and Control of Global RPA Operations” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

2011), 31, 33. Per the Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers, C-band is the portion of 

the electromagnetic spectrum between 4.0 and 8.0 gigahertz. Ku-band resides between 10.95 

and 14.5 gigahertz.

23. “RQ-4A Global Hawk (Tier II+ HAE UAV),” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.

org/intell/systems/global_hawk.htm (accessed 22 March 2012).

24. DSB, Defense Science Board Study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Uninhabited Combat 

Aerial Vehicles, 19; and AFI 11-2RQ-4, RQ-4 Operations Procedures, vol. 3. Takeoff and landing 

are critical phases of flight.

25. Although electromagnetic signals travel at the speed of light, it takes a few seconds for 

signals to travel the intercontinental distances commonly involved with remote split operations.

26. Campo, “When Flexibility and Doctrine Collide,” 31. LOS connectivity provides LRE 

personnel near-instantaneous control of MQ-1/9 aircraft since the distance between the LRE 

and the aircraft is often between 50 and 75 miles.

27. AFI 11-2MQ-1, MQ-1 Operations Procedures, 9; AFI 11-2MQ-9, MQ-9 Operations Procedures, vol. 3, 28 November 2008 (incorporating change 1, 3 September 2010), 10; AFI 11-2RQ-4, 

RQ-4 Operations Procedures, 13; USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-1B Predator”; USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-9 

Reaper”; and USAF, “Factsheets: RQ-4 Global Hawk.”The maximum takeoff weights of the MQ-1, 

MQ-9, and RQ-4 are 2,250 lbs., 10,500 lbs., and 32,250 lbs., respectively.

28. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study

(Washington, DC: OSD, 2003), 6.

29. Ibid., 18.

30. CFR, U.S. Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Strategic 

Vision, 21.

31. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs, 51; and Nick Turse, “America’s Secret Empire of Drone Bases,” 

Asia Times, 26 October 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MJ26Df02.html.

32. AFCENT, “Factsheets: 380th Air Expeditionary Wing.”

33. AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, 1, 4.

34. Drew et al., Unmanned Aerial Vehicle End-to-End Support Considerations, 81–82.
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

67

35. W. J. Hennigan, “Pentagon Working with FAA to Open U.S. Airspace to Combat Drones,” 

Los Angeles Times, 13 February 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/13/business/la-fi-military-drones-20120214.

36. Drew et al., Unmanned Aerial Vehicle End-to-End Support Considerations, 63.

37. See chap. 2 for an extensive discussion on expeditionary logistics and lines of supply.

38. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 26, 66, 127.

39. Turse, “America’s Secret Empire of Drone Bases.”

40. DSB, Defense Science Board Study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Uninhabited Combat 

Aerial Vehicles, 9–12.

41. Ibid., x.

42. DOD, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005–2030 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2005); 

DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2009–2034 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2009); 

and DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036 (Washington, DC: DOD, 

2011).

43. DOD, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005–2030, 1.

44. Ibid., B-8.

45. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 21.

46. C4ISR is command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance.

47. “AUVSI Review—2007,” Defense Update, http://defense-update.com/events/2007/summary/

auvsi07.htm.

48. Insitu Inc., “ScanEagle,” Insitu.com, http://www.insitu.com/scaneagle (accessed 17 March 

2012); and Insitu Inc., “Integrator Systems,” Insitu.com, http://www.insitu.com/integrator (accessed 17 March 2012).

49. Insitu Inc., “Integrator Systems.” 

50. Noam Eshel, “FINDER—Autonomous, Expendable UAV/SAIC,” Defense Update, 1 December 2007, http:// defense-update.com/20071201_finder-uav.html; and Chris Haddox, “Flying 

High: Boeing’s ScanEagle Compressed Carriage Conducts Test Flight,” Boeing.com, 7 June 2010, 

http://www.boeing.com/Features/2010/06/bds_feat_secc_video_06_07_10.html.

51. Eshel, “FINDER.”

52. USAF, “Factsheets: ScanEagle,” 1 November 2007, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104532/scan-eagle.aspx.

53. Ibid.

54. Eshel, “FINDER.”

55. Insitu Inc., “ScanEagle;” Insitu Inc., “Integrator Systems;” USAF “Factsheets: Scaneagle”; 

and Eshel, “FINDER.”

56. USAF, Factsheets: ScanEagle; and Naval Air Systems Command, “Small Tactical Unmanned 

Air System Executes Early Operational Capability,” NAVAIR News, 25 January 2012, http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.NAVAIRNewsStory&id=4887.

57. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 21.

58. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036, 43. It is assumed that “systems” 

referred to both individual aircraft and groups of collaborating aircraft. No distinction was made 

otherwise.

59. Rafael Yanushevsky, Guidance of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 

Press, 2011), 178.
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

68

60. “Researchers Produce World’s First Programmable Nanoprocessor,” PHYSORG.com, 

http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-02-world-programmable-nanoprocessor.html (accessed 17 

March 2012).

61. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036, 46.

62. Yanushevsky, Guidance of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 178.

63. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036, 48.

64. A sample is a snapshot of the environment. More snapshots (samples) provide more 

information and smoother flight characteristics.

65. Matthew Turpin, Nathan Michael, and Vijay Kumar, “Trajectory Design and Control for 

Aggressive Formation Flight with Quadrotors” (paper presented at 15th International Symposium 

of Robotic Research, Flagstaff, AZ, 28 August 2011), http://www.isrr-2011.org/ISRR-2011/Program_

files/Papers/Turpin-ISRR-2011.pdf.

66. Vijay Kumar, “Vijay Kumar: Robots That Fly . . . and Cooperate,” TED.com, February 2012, 

http://www.ted.com/talks/vijay_kumar_robots_that_fly_and_cooperate.html. TED is a nonprofit 

organization with a mission to “spread ideas” by making “the best talks and performances from TED 

and partners available to the world, for free.” The TED website provides a forum where presentations 

by notable experts in the fields of technology, entertainment, and design are simulcast or archived for 

public reference.

67. Dong Il You and David Hyunchul Shim, “Autonomous Formation Flight Test of Multi-Micro 

Aerial Vehicles,” Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems 61, no. 1–4 (January 2011): 321–38.

68. Joint Planning and Development Office, “Are Flocks of Aircraft for the Birds? Think 

Again,” Jpdo.gov, http://www.jpdo.gov/newsArticle.asp?id=42 (accessed 19 March 2012).

69. Axel Bürkle, Florian Segor, and Matthias Kollmann, “Towards Autonomous Micro 

UAV Swarms,” Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems 61, nos. 1–4 (January 2011): 339–53.

70. Ibid., 348–49.

71. Joel George, P. B. Sujit, and J. B. Sousa, “Search Strategies for Multiple UAV Search and 

Destroy Missions,” Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems 61, no. 1–4 (January 2011): 355–67; 

F. Paulo Kemper, Koji A. O. Suzuki, and James R. Morrison, “UAV Consumable Replenishment: 

Design Concepts for Automated Service Stations,” Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems 61, 

no. 1–4 (January 2011): 369–97; “Game-Changer: USA Developing UAV Aerial Refueling,” Defense Industry Daily, 7 January 2012, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/49m-for-boeing-toadvance-uav-aeral-refueling-05168/.; and Bruce V. Bigelow, “Northrop Grumman Planning First 

UAV-to-UAV Aerial Refueling,” Xconomy, 1 July 2010. http://www.xconomy.com/san-diego/2010/07/01/northrop-grumman-planning-first-uav-to-uav-aerial-refueling/.

72. Grace V. Jean, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Fuel Demand for Satellite Bandwidth,” National Defense 96, no. 692 (July 2011): 38; and Keith W. Balts, “Satellites and Remotely Piloted 

Aircraft,” Air and Space Power Journal 24, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 35.

73. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036, 89.

74. Clausewitz, On War, 119.

75. Joe Pappalardo, “Flocking ScanEagles,” Air and Space Magazine, August 2007, http://www.

airspacemag.com/ist/?next=/military-aviation/flocking-scaneagles-20369494/; and Insitu Inc., “Integrator Systems.” As of 2007, one technician successfully controlled three ScanEagles. During the 

same time period, a typical ScanEagle crew required four personnel to launch, control, and recover 

the aircraft. It is assumed that increased aircraft/swarm autonomy will allow one team member to 

control a swarm of 15 aircraft by the time Instant Basing is a realistic option. Fifteen Integrator RPAs 

require 97.5 gallons of diesel, JP-8, or Jet-A fuel. This amount of fuel can be easily transported in two 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT

69

50-gallon drums. Thus, swarm size is dictated by fuel requirements at launch, and two extra crew 

members are provided for extra assistance in aircraft/equipment assembly, launch, and disassembly.

76. Haddox, “Flying High.” INSITU ScanEagles currently operate from US warships, and 

ScanEagle compressed carriage (SECC) variants are in development. SECC aircraft are capable 

of being launched from submarines, aircraft, and other types of vehicles.

77. US Military Sealift Command, “Pre-positioning,” http://www.msc.navy.mil/pm3/ (accessed 

14 March 2012).

78. David Axe, “Scan Eagle in Afghanistan,” YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=hWyk1XudaME; and Insitu Inc., “Launch and Retrieval,” Insitu.com, http://www.insitu.

com/launch_and_retrieval (both accessed 26 March 2012). Current generations of small RPAs are 

shipped in specially designed containers. Launch and recovery equipment, such as those used with 

Insitu aircraft, can be folded for compact shipment and storage.

79. See chap 2. Fred Pleitgen, “Attackers in Pakistan Hit Another Convoy Carrying Fuel for 

NATO Troops,” CNN.com, 10 April 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-04/world/pakistan.supply.route_1_convoy-nato-supply-pakistani-taliban-spokesman?_s=PM:WORLD; and “Rocket Attack on NATO Fuel Supply Convoy in Pakistan,” Guardian (UK) , 8 December 2011, http://

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/08/rocket-attack-nato-pakistan.

80. US Transportation Command, USTRANSCOM 2011 Annual Report, 14 

81. FedEx representative, telephone interview by author, 26 March 2012; UPS representative, 

telephone interview by author, 26 March 2012; and DHL representative, telephone interview by 

author, 26 March 2012.

82. Ibid. Many air cargo companies offer premium services that might decrease the risk of 

items being lost. If they are lost, insurance will provide compensation.

83. Local defense travel offices will make travel arrangements for swarm teams.

84. Local DOD financial managers (comptrollers) will likely be responsible for oversight of 

swarm team deployment expenses. Launch and recovery teams should be provided maximum 

financial flexibility since their deployments will be dynamic and will likely require on-the-spot 

payments, rentals, bribes, and so forth to meet their launch timing. 

85. If the swarm team misses delivery, international freight companies often hold items for 

a number of days before they are returned to sender. Swarm teams may also be able to pick up 

their aircraft and equipment at local distribution centers.

86. Michael Spehar, “Practical Perspective of Airflow Planning” (unpublished article, May 

1999); and US Transportation Command, USTRANSCOM 2011 Annual Report, 14. “Airflow 

planning” is a systematic sequencing of airlift assets to and from theaters of operation. The 

CRAF is a reserve fleet of commercial aircraft that are contractually bound to provide on-demand 

air service to the US military during contingency operations. “T-tail” refers to US intertheater 

airlift aircraft.

87. Spehar, A Practical Perspective of Airflow Planning, 7.

88. See the missed shipment procedures of UPS, FedEx, and DHL at the following websites: 

www.ups.com, www.fedex.com, and www.dhl.com. Commercial freight companies often allow 

up to five business days following a missed delivery.

89. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 45.

90. Accountability of RPAs and support equipment should be conducted prior to arrival at 

designated launch sites. Furthermore, launch crews will have to procure an adequate amount, 

perhaps 100 gallons, of diesel fuel, JP-8, or Jet-A fuel for each group of 15 aircraft from local 

sources. Host nations or local retail gas stations may be able to provide fuel. If military airlift is 

used, fuel may be airlifted with RPA systems.
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91. This assumes that RPAs are launched and recovered by INSITU-type launch and recovery 

equipment. It is possible that future RPAs will not require the same level of support equipment for 

launch and recovery.

92. Each six-person launch and recovery team is responsible for the launch of 15 small 

RPAs. Their aircraft require approximately 97.5 gallons of fuel.

93. O’Hanlon, Science of War, 147.

94. In an effort to keep statistics as conservative as possible, percentages were calculated 

using the lowest consumption and personnel figures.

95. Because individual swarming aircraft are small, they may be able to fly in tight formations such that their radar signature appears similar to larger civilian or military aircraft. Their 

ability to change the shape of the swarm may also provide the ability to change radar signatures 

as desired by mission constraints.

96. Michael Berger, “Military Nanotechnology: High Precision Explosives through Nanoscale 

Structuring,” NanoWerk, 5 June 2008. http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=5956.php.

97. John Gartner, “Military Reloads with Nanotech,” MIT Technology Review, 21 January 

2005, http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/14105/page1/. 

98. James D. Hood (432 EAMXS/CC), interview by author, 12 March 2012.

99. DSB, Defense Science Board Task Force on Directed Energy Weapons (Washington, DC: 

OSD/ATL, December 2007), viii.

100. Geoff S. Fein, “ONR’s Record-Setting Test to Showcase Railgun’s Military Relevance,” Office of Naval Research Media Center, 7 December 2010, http://www.onr.navy.mil/Media-Center/

Press-Releases/2010/Electromagnetic-Railgun-32-Fire.aspx.

101. Ibid.

102. Creveld, Supplying War, 1.

103. Ibid.

104. James A. Huston, Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953, Army Historical Series 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), viii.

105. Clausewitz, On War, 614.

106. Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information 

Age (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), 6.

107. Mao Tse-tung, Collected Writings of Chairman Mao, ed. Shawn Conners, vol. 2, Guerrilla 

Warfare, 1st ed. (El Paso, TX: El Paso Norte Press, 2009), 58.

108. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Blacksburg, VA: Wilder, 2011), 

137.

109. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 1996), 30.

110. Ibid., 31–32.

111. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 70.

112. Ibid., 71.

113. David R. Mets, Airpower and Technology: Smart and Unmanned Weapons (Westport, 

CT: Praeger, 2009), 33.
71

Chapter 4

Locust Swarm’s First Test 

There is evil hiding in my country’s shadows. Please save Nigeria 

before it is too late.

 —Pres. Adisa Martins, 25 December 2019

Locusts came out of the smoke onto the land, and they were given the 

same power as scorpions of the earth. . . . The appearance of the 

locusts was like that of horses ready for battle. . . . Their teeth were 

like lions’ teeth, and they had chests like iron breastplates. The sound 

of their wings was like the sound of many horse-drawn chariots racing 

into battle.

—Revelation 9:3–9

During his limousine ride back to the White House, Pres. Dominic Johnson was thinking how the Washington skyline looked especially beautiful. 

Snow, streetlights, traffic, and a starry sky created a kaleidoscope of colors. 

Christmas Eve services at the National Cathedral had gone well, and he looked 

forward to some sleep and a peaceful Christmas morning with his wife and 

children. The president cherished moments like these because they were free 

of crisis, were shared with his family, and had nothing to do with the upcoming 

2020 election.

Johnson’s mood quickly changed when he spotted Sarah Nguyen, his national security advisor, waiting inside the White House entrance. She was not 

one to intrude on the president’s family time and often took care of problems 

herself. This had to be bad.

Crisis in Nigeria

Hours earlier, the Nigerian terrorist organization Boko Haram (translated 

as “Western education is forbidden”) had begun systematically killing Nigerians attending Christmas Eve services. The attacks were part of Boko Haram’s 

plan to eradicate non-Muslims from Nigeria and create an Islamic state.1

 The 

group initiated its offensive by placing bombs inside Christian churches and 

waiting for the buildings to fill. After the services began and the doors closed, 

Boko Haram strike teams secured the exits and detonated their bombs. Car 
LOCUST SWARM'S FIRST TEST

72

bombs demolished the entrances of 12 foreign-owned oil refineries and triggered panic among Nigeria’s foreign nationals. Boko Haram operatives also 

captured several Christian government officials, beheaded them, and posted 

their heads in prominent places with notes that read “I was an infidel oppressor.” 

Between 8:00 p.m. and midnight, Boko Haram killed thousands of Christians, 

especially Americans, and spread chaos among the remaining population.

Prior to this crisis, the Nigerian government had faced an assortment of domestic maladies yet was able to maintain a tenuous peace. Nigeria is the world’s 

eighth-largest oil producer and Africa’s most populous state.2

 Approximately 

203 million people live in an area roughly twice the size of California (see fig. 

9).3

 Poverty, pollution, corruption, religious conflict, and terrorism are constant concerns. Approximately 70 percent of the population lives in poverty, 

21 percent are unemployed, oil spills pollute much of the coastal region, and 

corruption is rampant.4

 Furthermore, Nigeria is polarized by seemingly incompatible religious beliefs. The northern portion of the state is predominantly 

Muslim and governed in accordance with sharia law, while the southern half is 

predominantly Christian.5

 Nonetheless, despite occasional skirmishes, the 

self-imposed segregation of Nigeria’s Muslim and Christian populations has 

produced an entente between the factions. This environment provides Boko 

Haram an excellent opportunity to recruit additional members and prepare 

assaults against its Christian enemies.

Although Boko Haram has conducted terrorist attacks in the past, many 

believe the group has lost its intent and capability to conduct coordinated 

large-scale attacks. From 2002 to 2012, it was responsible for numerous offensives against Christian government officials, police stations, churches, and 

government-sponsored schools.6

 It also gained extensive international attention following a 2011 car-bomb attack against the United Nations headquarters 

in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja.7

 Many experts worry that Boko Haram’s affiliations 

with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab might increase 

its ability to recruit dissatisfied Muslim youth and conduct complex attacks 

against Nigerian targets.8

 For example, US Army general Carter Ham stated 

in 2011, “What is most worrying at present is, at least in my view, a clearly 

stated intent by Boko Haram and by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate and synchronize their efforts. I’m not so sure they’re able to do that just 

yet, but it’s clear to me they have the desire and intent to do that.”9

 Nonetheless, 

international military aid and training helped the Nigerian government keep 

Boko Haram in check with proactive attacks against its leadership and supporters. In 2009 Nigerian security forces killed Boko Haram’s leader, Muhammad Yusuf, and hundreds of his followers.10 In 2012, its armed forces continued their assaults on the organization and forced it into dormancy by the end 
LOCUST SWARM'S FIRST TEST

73

of 2013.11 In the following years, the terrorist group seemed to disappear with 

little trace. Reporters and Nigerian officials heard occasional rumors of Boko 

Haram activity; however, most people assumed the group had been defeated 

(see fig. 9).12

Figure 9. Nigeria (Reproduced from CIA, "Nigeria," World Factbook, [Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2015], 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html.)

On the contrary, Boko Haram bided its time until a major attack was possible. Following the assassination of Muhammad Yusuf and the losses incurred 
LOCUST SWARM'S FIRST TEST

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from the government’s 2012 counterattacks, its leaders changed their strategy. 

Instead of fighting small battles that brought few benefits, they ordered a halt 

to violent actions and banned any overt reference to Boko Haram. Meanwhile, its members infiltrated Islamic communities throughout Nigeria and 

earned significant positions of authority within those societies. Boko Haram’s 

clandestine members used their positions to gather intelligence and stockpile 

small arms and explosives in secure locations. From 2016 to 2019, Boko Haram, 

AQIM, and al-Shabaab operated training camps in Niger that covertly trained 

hundreds of militants for the 2019 Christmas Eve attacks.

Surveying Response Options

After a preliminary briefing by his national security advisor, President 

Johnson calls for an immediate meeting with the National Security Council 

(NSC).13 Following the advice of the secretary of state, secretary of defense, 

and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the president includes the 

US ambassador to Nigeria and the commander of US Africa Command 

(USAFRICOM) via video teleconference. The president’s primary concerns 

involve the safety of US citizens in Nigeria, impact on the global economy, 

and the possibility that genocide has occurred. In 2019, Nigeria maintains its 

position as the sixth-largest oil exporter and fifth-greatest oil supplier to the 

United States.14 President Johnson fears that any decrease in crude production 

could increase oil prices and slow the global economy. He is also worried that 

the Christmas Eve attacks might be the beginning of a Nigerian genocide.

During the NSC meeting, it becomes obvious that the United States has 

few intelligence resources in position to analyze the conflict. Intelligence assets have been focused elsewhere, and the unexpectedness of the crisis means 

that little information is available. Furthermore, the armed forces have few 

means to respond quickly. Following the 2014 redeployment from Afghanistan, 

the Pentagon allocated the majority of its combat forces to the Pacific in defense against China’s growing military might.15 Africa was not a high priority; 

therefore, few bases exist there. The only US air bases on the African continent 

are in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ghana.16

President Johnson inquires about projecting force from the United States 

and the cost of such a plan. The secretary of defense responds that this option 

is possible but will require time to reallocate ISR, cargo, and combat assets 

from other theaters. She adds that sustained operations will require additional 

air bases in or near Nigeria at significant cost. The president is also worried 

that military operations might cost his administration political capital because he is already under significant scrutiny for his inability to tame the $20 
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trillion US national debt.17 Nonetheless, he feels that because this situation 

threatens US citizens traveling abroad and potentially involves genocide, it is 

the duty of the United States to act as quickly as possible, even before a coalition 

can be created. Moreover, he wants this task accomplished at minimum cost.

At the end of the meeting, President Johnson issues guidance to his staff. 

He asks his ambassador to offer the Nigerian government military assistance 

for humanitarian, intelligence, and security operations. The president also orders the Departments of Defense and State to develop a plan that will bolster 

the Nigerian government’s ability to maintain the security of its population, 

including foreign nationals, and protect its oil refineries. He reiterates that 

such a plan should be conducted in the most cost-effective manner.

Following the meeting, the secretary of state works to gain the support of 

Nigeria’s neighboring countries. Ghana, Benin, and Cameroon offer their 

support as long as ground troops are not deployed to or from their countries. 

However, they approve the use of their airfields as cargo and air-refueling 

bases and permit the presence of US support personnel on these bases. These 

were each former European colonies and thus are sensitive to the presence of 

Western military forces.18 Niger refuses to support US efforts to stop the Boko 

Haram offensive because of its strong ties to Nigeria’s Muslim population.

Shortly thereafter, Nigerian president Adisa Martins calls President Johnson to ask for US help. He states that Boko Haram terrorists roam the streets 

at night and are searching for government officials, policemen, military service members, and Christians. They use stolen church registries to refine their 

hunt. Martins has declared martial law; however, Boko Haram’s numerous 

dispersed attacks prevent Nigerian military and police forces from responding in a timely manner. The Nigerian president emphasizes that his government’s forces hold marginal control of the country and might be defeated in 

the near future. President Johnson assures him that the United States is willing to conduct operations in support of his government. President Martins 

concludes their conversation by saying, “Thank you for your help. There is 

evil hiding in my country’s shadows. Please save Nigeria before it is too late.”

Course-of-Action Development and Selection

In response to the developing crisis, USAFRICOM’s joint planning staff 

begins assessing options. Joint planners determine they will not need to gain 

air superiority. Based on their understanding of Nigerian air defenses, Boko 

Haram poses little threat to airborne assets. They additionally assume that this 

conflict is low intensity, involving only personnel and lightly armed vehicles. 

The planners determine that Cameroon’s airfield in Garoua might serve as an 
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important expeditionary base because of its proximity to Abuja and its 

10,000-foot-long runway (fig. 10).19 They assess that Garoua has a high 

probability of supporting refueling operations because Cameroon possesses a 

significant oil refining capability.20 They also decide that Ghana’s airfield in 

Accra might be suitable for tanker and cargo aircraft because of its long runway 

and existing US presence.21

Figure 10. Cameroon

(Reproduced from CIA, "Camaroon," World Factbook, [Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2015], 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html.)
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In accordance with the president’s guidance, USAFRICOM planners develop six operational requirements. First, US air assets have to be deployed 

rapidly. Second, the crisis requires the commitment of multiple ISR capabilities to assess the environment and develop targeting information. Third, US 

forces need points of contact from the Nigerian government to help coordinate air operations against Boko Haram militants. Fourth, US air assets require 

adequate force capability to secure key locations so that Nigerian military and 

police elements can operate with improved freedom of action and mobility. 

Fifth, there is the need for persistent airpower. And finally, a significant emphasis 

is placed on cost-effectiveness.

After the USAFRICOM planning staff conducts operational design and 

mission analysis, they develop multiple courses of action (COA) involving 

manned and unmanned aircraft. The combatant commander chooses a COA 

involving swarms of small RPAs, called Locust Swarms, because he thinks 

they best satisfy the president’s intent and the operational requirements of 

Nigeria’s crisis.22 Armed Locust Swarms are rapidly deployable and can be airdropped over key Nigerian locations including government and police headquarters, oil refineries, airfields, and military bases. Locust Swarms possess 

persistent ISR and kinetic-attack capabilities, are cheaper to operate than 

manned aircraft, and have a C2 structure that enhances coordination with 

host-nation officials during operations. They can also be kept airborne indefinitely with air-refueling support. USAFRICOM also intends to operate manned 

and unmanned tanker aircraft from naval vessels patrolling the coast of Nigeria 

and from land bases at Accra, Ghana, and Garoua in Cameroon. The Locust 

Swarms will be remotely piloted from CONUS and European locations.23

Planners estimate that an initial deployment of 100 swarms will require 

tanker support and 25 RPA combat air patrols (CAP).24 As the security situation improves, small tanker RPAs launched from Instant Basing locations in 

southern Nigeria will gradually reduce the need for tankers based outside the 

state.25 Ideally, Instant Basing teams will be deployed within 16 hours of Locust Swarm deployment. The establishment of Instant Basing locations will 

also reduce the demand for RPA CAPs, because local RPA bases can control 

swarms via line-of-sight (LOS) communications. If conditions deteriorate 

and Martins’s government loses its ability to maintain order, the United States 

can escalate its use of force via intercontinental bombers or carrier-based jet 

aircraft. If the situation becomes irredeemable, it can recover its Locust 

Swarms to US naval vessels or regional land bases such as Garoua.
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Command and Control

Locust Swarms can conduct autonomous operations, according to the 

2011 DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap: “They received goals 

from their human controllers and translated them into tasks to be performed 

without human interaction.”26 Their algorithms and software allow them to 

survey their environment autonomously until they detect potential threats. 

Swarms are programmed to alert their controller and command-and-control 

element if threats are detected so they can either collect additional information or employ kinetic weapons. The process minimizes the workload of controllers and C2 elements and facilitates the management of large numbers of 

Locust Swarms. The standard autonomous alerting capability is available regardless of the communication means used to link human controllers with 

their swarms.

Planners intend to command and control Locust Swarms through satellite, 

LOS, and Internet connectivity.27 Satellite connectivity will be the primary 

means of C2 until Instant Basing teams can provide LOS connectivity. As 

protected launch and recovery locations become available, swarming operations will use Nigerian government and commercial Internet service providers (ISP) serving urban and industrial areas.28 Thus, the Internet will provide 

Instant Basing LOS elements connectivity with theater and CONUS C2 elements without satellite links, airborne C2 aircraft, or in-country C2 facilities.

The Internet also provides an important means of ensuring that the Nigerian government can communicate with US forces, observe operations, and 

authorize the use of force if necessary. With the help of the US ambassador to 

Nigeria and other State Department officials, special operations forces (SOF) 

personnel will deliver coded common access cards (CAC) to designated Nigerian officials.29 SOF members will also provide a discrete, 128-bit encrypted 

website address affording designated Nigerian representatives current video 

feeds and the ability to communicate with US forces via an included chat capability.30 If individual CACs are lost, stolen, or compromised, their access can 

be disabled. Thus, Nigerian officials have a secure capability to positively identify targets and authorize US use of force before an attack. This line of communications gives the United States a degree of deniability should collateral 

damage occur, and it also bolsters the legitimacy of the Nigerian government 

because it holds the ultimate authority for attacks against local targets.
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Executing the Plan

In the period leading up to air operations, the US ambassador to Nigeria 

maintains contact with President Martins and gives him a document outlining 

USAFRICOM’s plan to guard government facilities, airports, and oil refineries. 

The outline lists specific locations that would be protected by Locust Swarms 

and explains that their sensors have a modest ability to detect armed personnel 

entering cordoned areas.31 Furthermore, it requests that Nigerian police and 

military units secure 11 major airports in the southern portion of Nigeria so 

that cargo aircraft can deliver Instant Basing equipment and begin sustainment operations.32 The document also states that Locust Swarms carry small 

bombs capable of destroying lightly armored vehicles and personnel.33

On 26 December, US special forces establish Internet connectivity between 

Nigerian officials and the AFRICOM air operations center (AOC) and provide 

elementary training on the website features. During subsequent collaboration, 

representatives from the Nigerian armed forces report that Nigeria’s airfields 

remain in operation. They also confirm that Boko Haram’s attacks are directed 

at Nigeria’s Christian population, government officials, and oil refineries. 

Moreover, local officials notice that the intensity and frequency of Boko Haram’s 

assaults have decreased. News reports confirm these observations. For example, CNN correspondent Jenny James reported that “the Nigerian people 

remain fearful that more attacks are coming . . . and an uneasy calm prevails 

throughout Nigeria’s capital city.” Nonetheless, the AOC validates information provided by the Nigerian government with available intelligence and decides that Nigeria’s airfields would allow the deployment of Instant Basing 

teams following an initial air delivery of Locust Swarms. Based on staff intelligence assessments, the USAFRICOM commander orders that air operations 

commence immediately.

On 27 December, strategic-airlift planes deploy 100 Locust Swarms into 

Nigerian airspace.34 As planned, they are delivered over major cities and industrial areas in the southern half of Nigeria. Although the vast majority of 

swarms deploy successfully, 5 percent of RPAs are destroyed or lost because 

they fail to assimilate with their swarm. The remaining RPAs assemble into 

fuel-saving formations, similar to flocks of migratory birds, until they arrive 

over their respective areas of interest.35 Meanwhile, supporting vessels from 

the Navy’s Sixth Fleet are en route, and approximately 400 Instant Basing personnel are positioned at Accra, Ghana, and Garoua for eventual deployment 

to airfields throughout southern Nigeria.36 Tanker MQ-9 RPAs with autonomous takeoff and landing capability are also based at Garoua. When the 

swarming RPAs are employed, they will require refueling within 24 hours.37
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Consequently, it is important for Instant Basing teams to begin refueling operations within the next 16 hours.38

As Locust Swarms arrive over their observation areas, most do not detect any 

irregularities. However, a Locust Swarm over a refinery near Port Harcourt detects a group of 10 suspicious individuals huddled near its perimeter fence. They 

appear to be holding rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The swarm 

alerts its controller and C2 element and initiates coordination with the Nigerian 

government. After viewing the group from multiple RPA sensors, USAFRICOM 

and Nigerian representatives agree that they are not Nigerian military or police 

personnel on patrol and determine the potential attackers are hostile. Because 

the suspected terrorists threaten the refinery and Nigerian forces are too far away 

to respond in adequate time, the Nigerian government approves the use of force 

via its Internet link. Therefore, USAFRICOM’s joint force commander (JFC) orders the observing Locust Swarm to attack. The swarm immediately centers itself 

over the militants and uses two of its nanotechnology-boosted, precision-guided 

munitions to destroy the enemy element.

In Abuja, multiple Locust Swarms detect suspicious personnel approaching Nigeria’s national police headquarters. Members of the Nigerian police 

force confirm that large groups of armed individuals are converging on its 

headquarters and request reinforcements. Shortly thereafter, a firefight breaks 

out between Boko Haram militants and police forces barricaded inside the 

compound. Nigerian authorities have been watching video feeds of the situation and authorize use of force. The USAFRICOM JFC subsequently orders 

nearby Locust Swarms to engage the enemy elements.

The Nigerian police headquarters is a large building centered within one of 

Abuja’s largest city blocks. Due to its considerable size, the significant area 

surrounding the building, and numerous approach paths of converging Boko 

Haram assailants, a single Locust Swarm is incapable of providing 360-degree 

surveillance and multidirectional kinetic attacks. Therefore, five responding 

Locust Swarm controllers relinquish control of their swarms to a single controller at the USAFRICOM AOC. The USAFRICOM controller then assumes 

control of the swarms and initiates a multiple-swarm encirclement of the police headquarters (see fig. 11). The five swarms involved in this maneuver 

maintain a constant clockwise track around the city block so that all the militants can be observed, isolated, and attacked via sustained multidirectional 

pulsing strikes. Locust Swarms begin directing their bombs against Boko Haram elements farthest from the police headquarters first so they will drive 

attacking forces toward the building. As enemy elements are forced closer to 

the facility, they become more vulnerable to police gunfire and increasingly 

concentrated Locust Swarm attacks.
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PROTECTED

ZONE

Locust

Swarm

1

Locust

Swarm

2

Locust

Swarm

3

Locust

Swarm

4

Locust

Swarm

5

Figure 11. Tactical encirclement by multiple Locust Swarms 

Shortly after the Locust Swarm tactical encirclement begins, the majority 

of Boko Haram’s attackers are killed and the rest surrender. As soon as the 

Nigerian police clear the area, USAFRICOM’s unified swarm controller returns control to the individual Locust Swarm controllers so they can resume 

other missions. Through this victory, US forces save the lives of a significant 

number of Nigerian policemen. The tactical success also allows Nigerian military and police officials to gather valuable intelligence from captured Boko 

Haram personnel. Thus, Locust Swarms demonstrate their ability to protect 

specific constabulary elements and vital infrastructure so Nigerian police and 

military forces can better focus on regaining a monopoly of force throughout 

their territories.39 Locust Swarms, however, require logistics support to provide the Nigerian government time.
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Sustaining Locust Swarms

By noon on 28 December, Instant Basing personnel have assembled their 

launch and recovery equipment in Nigeria, launched approximately 50 

swarms of small tanker-configured RPAs, rearmed Locust Swarm aircraft as 

required, and begun to establish Internet connectivity with the USAFRICOM 

AOC. Instant Basing personnel cycle fuel to airborne Locust Swarms via their 

tanker RPAs, which are augmented by 10 tanker-configured MQ-9 RPAs 

based in Garoua, Cameroon.40 MQ-9 tanker RPAs refuel swarms that are too 

far from Instant Basing locations and augment swarms of small RPA tankers 

when they are unable to provide sufficient air-refueling support.41

The AOC also uses multiple methods to ensure that operations have a sustained kinetic-force capability. First, Instant Basing teams replenish individual 

RPAs needing rearmament.42 Also, in cases where Locust Swarms operate beyond the range of Instant Basing teams, military aircraft air-drop supplemental 

RPAs into Locust Swarms needing additional force capability.43 A third option 

allows missions to be exchanged so that when one swarm’s munitions have 

been expended, another can take its place. This option is used until Instant 

Basing teams and airlift can replenish Locust Swarms’ force capability.

Instant Basing teams also have the significant task of establishing Internet 

C2 links. In some cases Internet connectivity is not available as planned. Swarm 

technicians then use their LOS equipment to connect to Locust Swarms, which 

provide a link to distant swarm operators and the USAFRICOM AOC. By 29 

December, 38 of 50 Instant Basing locations have Internet connectivity with 

C2 elements, and only four daily MQ-9 tanker sorties are required. Thus, the 

initial requirement for 25 RPA CAPs is reduced to four CAPs within two days 

of the initial deployment.

As operations continue, various elements of the Locust Swarm and Instant 

Basing infrastructure require replacement or maintenance. As swarms selfidentify mechanical difficulties within individual aircraft USAFRICOM is 

alerted. Logistics personnel within the AOC order the delivery of replacement vehicles; some of these are available via commercial airlift, while others 

have remained in constant motion within commercial logistics company 

global networks.44 Replacement launch and recovery equipment is delivered 

in the same manner. However, because Instant Basing support equipment 

lacks an automatic reporting capability, technicians are required to order replacement equipment via communications links with their respective C2 elements. Commercial logistics carriers are prohibited from carrying munitions, 

so Instant Basing crews transfer munitions from recovered RPAs to replacement vehicles prior to their launch. Failed swarm aircraft are then sent back 
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to CONUS repair facilities via commercial logistics firms. The combination of 

Locust Swarms’ self-alerting capability and Instant Basing crews’ ability to 

order and receive replacement components in a timely manner greatly enhances the US propensity to sustain a force presence over Nigeria.

Improved Stability in Nigeria and the US Force Drawdown

Security significantly improves in the days following the initial introduction of Locust Swarms. Although Boko Haram continues to execute sporadic 

attacks, indigenous military and police forces regain their ability to protect 

the population and infrastructure. Locust Swarms provide important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and, in some cases, increase the firepower of Nigerian forces; however, unlike early battles in Port Harcourt and 

Abuja, Nigerian constabularies are winning victories on their own. As a result, Pres. Adisa Martins rescinds martial law on 30 December. Nevertheless, 

he requests that US forces remain overhead for an indefinite period to ward 

against future Boko Haram offensives.

President Johnson does not want to commit US military forces to a prolonged presence in Nigeria. He judges that they have sufficiently bolstered the 

Nigerian government so that it can maintain order and begin to solve domestic problems without outside involvement. Furthermore, the US ambassador 

reports that some Nigerian officials desire an offensive into Muslim-dominated 

regions of the state as punishment for their assumed support of Boko Haram. 

President Johnson does not want any US involvement in such actions. Consequently, he orders redeployment of forces from Nigeria.

On 31 December, Instant Basing teams begin recovering Locust Swarms 

and associated tanker RPAs. They disarm, package, and send aircraft and 

equipment back to US locations via authorized commercial carriers. In some 

cases, US Navy ships operating off the coast of Nigeria recover Locust Swarms. 

MQ-9 tanker RPAs based at Garoua are also shipped back to the United States. 

US military cargo aircraft then transport remaining munitions and personnel 

back to their primary duty stations.

At the request of the Nigerian government, approximately 20 Locust 

Swarms and Instant Basing teams remain behind to ensure the security of key 

locations such as government facilities in Abuja and coastal refineries. President Martins’s government provides them full accommodation on military 

bases near Locust Swarm observation areas. Nonetheless, at the behest of 

President Johnson, the USAFRICOM commander drafts a letter to President 

Martins that details US plans to remove all forces within the following two 

weeks.45 It also states that the United States is committed to Nigeria’s security 
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and will come to its aid if Boko Haram, or any other terrorist organization, 

threatens it again.

Findings

The purpose of this scenario is to provide a glimpse of future military air 

operations involving swarming RPAs and to demonstrate the potential utility of 

an Instant Basing concept of logistics. It is intentionally vague in some areas 

because it is impossible to predict the exact specifications of future weapons, 

equipment, or capabilities. Nonetheless, the scenario revealed five key findings.

First, Locust Swarms provided US leaders a relatively low-cost, low-risk 

option. Using fuel consumption as a measure of operational cost, and excluding the cost of weapon-system procurement, air operations in Nigeria were 

remarkably cost-effective compared to traditional air operations. In six days 

of air operations, 2,175 Locust Swarm and supporting tanker RPAs consumed 

approximately 73,000 gallons of fuel (see table 4). In comparison, daily air 

and ground operations at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, consume an average of 205,175 gallons.46 Because Locust Swarm operations required only 400 

forward-deployed ground support personnel, the risk of significant US combat casualties was negligible. This risk was reduced further because hostnation forces provided security for Instant Basing personnel. Furthermore, 

the permissive air environment in Nigeria facilitated sustainment of Locust 

Swarms and allowed US air assets to operate without the threat of losses from 

air defense systems.

Table 4. Fuel usage of Locust Swarm aircraft and tanker RPAs

27 Dec 28 Dec 29 Dec 30 Dec 31 Dec 1 Jan

#of Locust Swarms 95 95 95 95 45 20

Total Locust Swarm Aircraft1,425 1,425 1,425 1,425 675 300

# of Tanker Swarms 50 50 50 25 0

Total Small Tanker RPAs 0 750 750 750 375 0

Deployed Instant Bases 50 50 50 50 20

Instant Basing Personnel 0 400 400 400 400 160

Fuel Usage (gallons) 9,262.5 14,137.5 19,012.5 19,012.5 9,262.5 1,950

Total Fuel Used (gallons) 72,637.5

Second, the success of Locust Swarm operations hinged on the ability to 

receive air-refueling support from Instant Basing teams and tankers originating from outside of Nigeria. Locust Swarms require refueling every 24 hours. 
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Consequently, USAFRICOM’s ability to immediately deploy Instant Basing 

teams and provide additional air-refueling support from the airfield in Garoua 

allowed air operations to continue. If Instant Basing refueling operations were 

not possible due to insufficient force protection at Nigerian locations, significant numbers of Locust Swarm aircraft might have been lost. Cargo aircraft 

necessary for the air deployment of expendable RPA tankers may not have 

been available in sufficient numbers to supply all Locust Swarms. Furthermore, MQ-9 tankers based at Garoua had insufficient range and fuel capacity 

to service all of the airborne swarms. Consequently, if Locust Swarms come to 

fruition, an intermediary tanker should be developed that can conduct air 

refueling with slow Locust Swarm aircraft and KC-130 equivalent aircraft.47

An intermediary tanker with such capability would eliminate the need for 

small tanker RPAs and would reduce the need for the immediate deployment 

of Instant Basing teams.

Third, the operation required the extensive use of large cargo and air-refueling 

aircraft for the initial force deployment. The security situation in Nigeria was too 

uncertain for Locust Swarms to be employed by Instant Basing teams. As a result, 

large strategic-airlift aircraft were required to deliver sufficient numbers of Locust 

Swarms without risking the safety of ground support personnel.48 Large airrefueling aircraft were also required to extend the range of the strategic-airlift 

aircraft.49 During redeployment of forces, a reduced but significant number of 

airlift and air-refueling aircraft were required to transport cargo, personnel, 

and RPAs out of Nigeria.50 In situations where Instant Basing equipment could 

not be pre-positioned or placed into constant motion within global commercial logistics networks, military airlift was the only sustainment option.

Fourth, the Internet was a critical enabler of US operations in Nigeria because it provided timely connectivity with the Nigerian government and reduced US satellite bandwidth requirements. In the future, global access to the 

Internet will likely increase as information and communication services become standard features of cellular telephones and computer systems.51 Provided sufficient information security measures, the US military should leverage the global information grid to the maximum extent possible to enhance 

its ability to command and control its forces, communicate with coalition 

partners, and reduce logistics inventories of stand-alone military communications systems. USTRANSCOM already uses the Internet to control its vast 

logistics network and to communicate with civilian logistics firms. Although 

the command has endured a significant number of cyber attacks, it is employing encryption technologies to decrease the risk of future information security breaches.52 Nonetheless, USTRANSCOM may serve as an important 

model during the development of future C2 networks capable of exploiting 
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foreign information grids. Exploiting the ubiquity of the Internet, moreover, 

may increase the agility and flexibility of operations in environments that allow US forces to connect with host-nation public information networks.

Fifth, inadequate force protection of Instant Basing personnel and equipment may limit the feasibility of Locust Swarm sustainment in future air operations. In the above scenario, the Nigerian government was able to protect 

Instant Basing teams. Operations in denied environments involving the significant presence of enemy ground forces and air defenses might prevent the 

deployment of sustainment teams. Consequently, US forces must gain access 

to secure areas by suppressing air defenses and clearing enemy territories of 

ground threats. Radar-absorbent materials, swarm techniques involving radar 

cross-section mimicry and rapid dispersion, and electronic warfare capabilities 

may enhance Locust Swarms’ ability to operate in hostile environments.53 If 

future Locust Swarms hold such capabilities, their use may increase the likelihood that Instant Basing teams can quickly sustain Locust Swarm operations. If 

not, other air and ground assets may be required until the logistics requirements of Locust Swarms can be guaranteed.

Conclusions

This scenario is intended to demonstrate a plausible conceptual framework 

for future air operations involving swarming RPAs, information technologies, 

and global logistics networks. Like current manned and unmanned weapons 

systems, future air vehicles will require the ability to communicate with C2 

elements and will be dependent on sustainment. The Locust Swarm concept, 

however, may provide significant force capability with a greatly reduced logistics and C2 footprint. In the Nigeria scenario, swarms provided proportional 

force against Boko Haram militants by using forward-deployed Instant Basing 

teams and Internet connections with USAFRICOM’s air operations center.

The integration of Locust Swarm and Instant Basing concepts may provide 

the joint force a simplified means of sustaining airpower capability. Individual 

Locust Swarms may provide many of the same capabilities that now require a 

diverse array of specialized manned and unmanned weapon systems, thus 

simplifying logistics support.54 The Instant Basing logistics system may also 

allow Locust Swarms to operate as self-sustained combat elements far from 

airfields. Consequently, a force structure comprised of Locust Swarms may 

greatly reduce the need for numerous combat air force wings. Regardless, the 

availability of airfields will remain an important consideration because Locust 

Swarms and Instant Basing equipment are dependent on military and commercial airlift.55 Even if Locust Swarm and Instant Basing do not precipitate 
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force structure changes and provide opportunities for budgetary savings, 

these concepts are valuable because they can provide additional options to the 

US national leadership.

Military operations often require significant economic, military, and political capital. Military campaigns are expensive, frequently result in the destruction of US equipment, and may cost the lives of US service members. For 

example, military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other global war on 

terrorism operations since 9/11 have cost the United States approximately 

$1.3 trillion and the lives of more than 6,400 US military service members.56

Although Robert Kagan wrote that the American public “still sees war as an 

unfortunate but unavoidable fact of international life,” recent polls indicate 

that a majority of Americans oppose the use of force in crises that do not 

threaten the security of the United States.57 In 2011, 63 percent of US citizens 

polled opposed military operations in Libya, and in March 2012, 64 percent 

opposed potential actions in Syria.58 Given these findings, it may be difficult 

for US policy makers to deploy US forces if the public believes that the effects 

of military operations fail to justify the cost.

If relatively low-cost Locust Swarms come to fruition, they may provide 

future administrations additional force employment options that may be 

more acceptable to the American public. Because Locust Swarm and Instant 

Basing concepts may allow rapid deployment/redeployment of airpower with 

minimal threat to US personnel, policy makers may have a more acceptable 

option to respond to emerging crises before they become politically untenable. 

Nonetheless, future forces of swarming RPAs will require significant institutional 

commitment from the Department of Defense.

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow observed, “A program, once undertaken, is not dropped at the point where objective costs outweigh benefits.”59

However, before the perceived benefits of Locust Swarms and Instant Basing 

can be realized, such concepts must gain sufficient technological momentum 

to ensure that institutional resistance does not prevent their success.60 As with 

other new technologies, swarming RPAs will require that defense personnel 

acquire “skill and knowledge, special purpose machines and processes, enormous 

physical structures, and organizational bureaucracy.”61 Furthermore, the development of Locust Swarm and Instant Basing concepts will require leaders capable of 

integrating emerging swarming technologies with heterogeneous elements such as 

existing weapon programs, doctrine, and institutional politics.62 Thus, the success 

or failure of low-cost swarms of RPAs will depend on a combination of DOD 

RDT&E dollars and committed military leaders who can shape institutional acceptance and convince the defense establishment that Locust Swarms and Instant 
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Basing concepts are worthy endeavors. Such endeavors may be necessary to keep 

evil in the shadows.

Notes

1. Rep. Patrick Meehan and Rep Jackie Speier, BOKO HARAM: Emerging Threat to the U.S. 

Homeland (Washington, DC: House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 30 November 2011), 6–7.

2. Elizabeth Leahy et al., Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, 

More Equitable World, Population Action International, 2012, http://populationaction.org/reports/the-shape-of-things-to-come-why-age-structure-matters-to-a-safer-more-equitableworld/.

3. James M. Ward, “Human Population Calculator,” Metamorphosisalpha.com, http://www.

metamorphosisalpha.com/ias/population.php (accessed 24 April 2012) and CIA, “Nigeria,” 

World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed 18 April 2011). Nigeria’s projected population is based on CIA World Factbook figures 

from 2012.

4. CIA, “Nigeria,” World Factbook; and Caroline Duffield, “Nigeria: ‘World Oil Pollution 

Capital,’” BBC News, 15 June 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/10313107.

5. John Pike, “Nigeria Christian/Muslim Conflict,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.

org/military/world/war/nigeria-1.htm (accessed 24 April 2012).

6. David Blair, “Nigeria Army Claims Retaliation as 11 Boko Haram Members Killed,” 

Telegraph (UK), 29 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/9047512/Nigeria-army-claims-retaliation-as-11-Boko-Haram-memberskilled.html; Andrew Harding, “Nigeria Attacks: What Boko Haram Assault Means,” BBC News, 

22 January 2012; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16672760; “Sectarian Attacks Kill 15 

in Nigeria,” New York Times, 7 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/world/africa/

boko-haram-attacks-in-nigeria-kill-at-least-13.html; Karen Leigh, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: AlQaeda’s New Friend in Africa?,” Time, 31 August 2011; David Cook, “Rise of Boko Haram in 

Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 9 (September 2011): 3–5; and “Nigeria Boko Haram Attack ‘Kills 

63’ in Damaturu,” BBC News, 5 November 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15605041.

7. Robyn Dixon, “Nigeria Militant Group Boko Haram’s Attacks Attract Speculation,” Los Angeles Times, 13 September 2011.

8. Leigh, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram”; and Meehan and Speier, BOKO HARAM, 15–16. AQIM and 

al-Shabaab are regional al-Qaeda–affiliated terrorist organizations that operate in Africa. AQIM’s 

primary base of operations is Algeria and northern Mali; al-Shabaab operates from Somalia.

9. Leigh, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram.”

10. Cook, “Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” 4.

11. Blair, “Nigeria Army Claims Retaliation”; and Ibrahim Garba, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s 

Army Kills Nine Suspects after Attack,” Christian Science Monitor, 21 March 2012.

12. Robert Dale, “Where Did Boko Haram Go?,” Economist, 21 April 2017, 12–15.

13. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, II-2.

14. CIA, “Nigeria,” World Factbook; and Department of Energy (DOE), Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries (Washington, DC: DOE, 2011).
LOCUST SWARM'S FIRST TEST

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15. Kevin Sieff, “Afghanistan, U.S. Reach Pact on Post-2014 American Support,” Washington 

Post, 22 April 2012; and Jonathan Masters, “Pentagon Pivots to Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6 January 2012.

16. Zachary Fillingham, “U.S. Military Bases: A Global Footprint,” Geopolitical Monitor, 14 

April 2012. 

17. “CBO Report: Debt Will Rise to 90% of GDP,” Washington Times, 26 March 2010.

18. Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), “Background Note: Ghana,” US Department of State 

(DOS), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm; BAA, “Background Note: Benin,” DOS, http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6761; and BAA, “Background Note: Cameroon,” DOS, http://www.state.

gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26431.htm (all accessed 24 April 2012).

19. “CAMEROON Airports with Runways at Least 10,000 Feet,” Acukwik.com, http://

www.acukwik.com/airports/CAMEROON/-R-/10000 (accessed 25 April 2012).

20. CIA, “Camaroon”, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/cm.html (accessed 18 April 2011).

21. “GHANA Airports with Runways at Least 10,000 Feet,” AC-U-KWIKAcukwik.com, 

http://www.acukwik.com/airports/GHANA/-R-/10000 (accessed 24 April 2012).

22. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. See JP 5-0 for an in-depth explanation of the joint 

operations planning process.

23. Tirpak, “RPA Boom.”

24. Locust Swarms used bandwidth comparable to MQ-1/9 aircraft. Each CAP supports 

four MQ-1/9 RPAs. Consequently the initial deployment of 100 Locust Swarms required 25 

CAPs. Swarms operate as networks and use parallel processing to collectively prioritize tasks 

and targets. Locust Swarm algorithms dictate that swarms continually designate one aircraft to 

link with satellites or line-of-sight (LOS) equipment to ensure that swarm operators maintain 

control. Any aircraft has the capability to serve as a router between the swarm and control 

links. Bandwidth requirements were kept to a minimum since only one RPA within each 

swarm required satellite or LOS connectivity.

25. In case the security situation in Nigeria precluded deployment of Instant Basing teams, 

planners developed a contingency plan that used air-deployable tanker RPAs to provide an additional 24 hours of fuel to Locust Swarms. This contingency option would add significant cost 

to operations because air-deployable tanker RPAs are expendable, and their delivery requires 

military airlift and tanker support.

26. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, 46.

27. Command and control of tanker and cargo aircraft was maintained in accordance with 

Air Mobility Command instructions.

28. CIA, “Nigeria,” World Factbook; and Jaco Maritz, “Broadband in Nigeria: The Revolution Is Coming,” TradeInvestNigeria, 16 March 2008, http://www.tradeinvestnigeria.com/

news/276815.htm. In 2011, Nigeria had approximately 10,000 Internet service providers (ISP) 

and almost 1,000,000 subscribers. The majority of Nigeria’s ISPs are located in its largest cities 

and industrial areas. ISPs used in this scenario would be vetted based on their commercial 

reputation, security practices, and reliability of service. Instant Basing teams would be provided a list of approved ISPs prior to operations.

29. Information Assurance Training Center, “Information Assurance Fundamentals Training,” 

Lesson 15: Encryption and Common Access Cards (CAC),” US Army Signals Center, https://ia.signal.army.mil/IAF/IASOLesson15.asp (accessed 24 April 2012). CACs increase computer security by 

authenticating specific users.
LOCUST SWARM'S FIRST TEST

90

30. Ibid. Use of 128-bit encryption significantly decreases the likelihood that nonapproved 

actors can gain access to operational information. 

31. Insitu Inc., “Integrator Systems;” J. Scott Goldstein et al., Detection of Dismounts Using 

Synthetic Aperture Radar (Hanscom AFB, MA: Air Force Research Laboratory, May 2010); and 

“Electronic Weapons: New Foliage Penetration Radar,” Strategy Page, 2 March 2012, http://www.

strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/20120302.aspx. Synthetic aperture radars have demonstrated a modest capability to penetrate foliage and detect dismounted armed personnel.

32. “Airports in Nigeria,” MapsofWorld.com, http://www.mapsofworld.com/international-airports/africa/nigeria.html (accessed 25 April 2012). Eleven airfields were identified in the outline provided to President Martins. They included Abuja, Jos, Yola, Makurdi, Calabar, Enugu, Port Harcourt, 

Benin City, Akure, Ibadan, and Ilorin.

33. Insitu Inc., “Integrator Systems;” Goldstein et al., Detection of Dismounts Using Synthetic 

Aperture Radar; “Electronic Weapons,” Strategy Page; Berger, “Military Nanotechnology”; and 

Gartner, “Military Reloads with Nanotech.” Locust Swarm RPAs were equipped with an electrooptical visible light and infrared sensor, synthetic aperture radar, and one nanotechnologyboosted precision-guided bomb.

34. Air-refueling tankers extended the range of strategic air-lift aircraft.

35. Dong Il You and David Hyunchul Shim, "Autonomous Formation Flight Test of MultiMicro Aerial Vehicles," Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems 61, no. 1–4 (January 2011): 

321–38.

36. “Area of Responsibility,” Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe–U.S. Naval Forces Africa, US Sixth Fleet website, http://www.c6f.navy.mil/AORPAGE.html (accessed 23 April 

2012). Each Instant Basing team consisted of six swarm technicians and two security forces 

personnel. When deployed, each team had a seven-day supply of MREs.

37. Each Locust Swarm aircraft could operate for approximately 24 hours before refueling 

was required.

38. Instant Basing teams procured fuel from civilian fueling stations at their arrival airfields. Teams and equipment were delivered to each of their respective launch locations, deployed small tanker RPAs to Locust Swarms, and conducted air refueling within 16 hours. An 

additional eight hours was allotted for operational delays.

39. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2006), 18; and John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 182. A significant measure of state legitimacy is its 

ability to monopolize the use of violence within its borders. A government is best able to provide security when it can use overwhelming force against foreign and domestic enemies.

40. Small tanker-configured RPAs are similar to INSITU Integrator-type aircraft except they 

carry only sensors and equipment necessary for navigation, communication, and air refueling. Their 

remaining payload capacity is used for fuel storage.

41. USAF, “Factsheets: MQ-9 Reaper”; “Funds to Boeing, NGC to Advance UAV Aerial Refueling,” Defense Industry Daily; and Bigelow, “Northrop Grumman Planning First UAV-to-UAV 

Aerial Refueling.” MQ-9 tanker aircraft are converted MQ-9 Reaper RPAs. They hold 4,000 lbs. of 

fuel within internal fuel tanks and carry 3,750 lbs. of fuel in external wing-mounted tanks. MQ-9 

tanker RPAs cruise at more than twice the speed of Locust Swarm RPAs. MQ-9 Reapers were 

gradually replaced by swarming RPAs because swarms involved more sensors and could observe 

more area using the same bandwidth as a single MQ-9 aircraft.

42. Instant Basing teams arriving by military airlift carried replacement munitions. Munitions required positive control by military personnel and transport by military means.
LOCUST SWARM'S FIRST TEST

91

43. As an interim force management method, the AOC also considered the use of swarm 

exchanges. Locust Swarms operating in close proximity could be exchanged such that swarms 

with the greatest number of munitions provide cover.

44. See chapter 3 for a more detailed overview of how Instant Basing uses commercial logistics firms.

45. Remaining Locust Swarms and Instant Basing teams would be redeployed in the same 

manner as the main force.

46. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Management: DOD Needs to 

Increase Attention on Fuel Demand Management at Forward-Deployed Locations (Washington, 

DC: GAO, February 2009), 41. The cited figure was from June 2008.

47. US Navy, “Fact File: C-130 Hercules Logistics Aircraft,” http://www.navy.mil/navydata/

fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=500&ct=1 (accessed 29 April 2012); US Marine Corps, “KC-130J 

Marine Super Hercules,” http://www.marines.com/operating-forces/equipment/aircraft/kc-130j-super-hercules (accessed 30 April 2012).

48. USAF, “Factsheets: C-17 Globemaster III,” 27 October 2004; http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/

FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104523/c-17-globemaster-iii.aspx; and USAF, “Factsheets: 

C-5 A/B/C Galaxy and C-5M Super Galaxy,” 15 May 2006. http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104492/c-5-abc-galaxy-c-5m-super-galaxy.aspx. In the scenario, large strategic airlift aircraft such as C-5 and C-17 cargo planes dropped the initial deployment of Locust Swarms.

49. USAF, “Factsheets: KC-10 Extender,” 1 October 2003; http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/

FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104520/kc-10-extender.aspx; USAF, “Factsheets: KC-135 

Stratotanker,” 15 September 2004; http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/

Article/104524/kc-135-stratotanker.aspx; and USAF, “Factsheets: KC-46A Pegasus,” 4 May 2011. 

http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104537/kc-46a-pegasus.

aspx. Large tanker aircraft such as KC-10, KC-135, and KC-46 aircraft were used to air-refuel 

cargo aircraft used in the operation.

50. More military airlift assets would have been required if global logistics companies were 

not available.

51. Carolyn Duffy Marsan, “10 Fool-Proof Predictions for the Internet in 2020,” Network 

World, 4 January 2010, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2238913/wireless/10-fool-proofpredictions-for-the-internet-in-2020.html.

52. Carlo Munoz, “TRANSCOM Pegged as Prime Target for Cyberattacks,” BreakingDefense.

com, 28 February 2012, http://breakingdefense.com/2012/02/transcom-pegged-as-prime-target-forcyberattacks/.

53. Cihangir Kemal Yuzcelik, “Radar Absorbing Material Design” (master’s thesis, Naval 

Postgraduate School, 2003); and JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 January 2007. Because individual swarming aircraft are small, they may be able to fly in tight formations that mimic the 

radar signatures of larger civilian or military aircraft. If air defenses engage tightly formed 

swarms, they can rapidly disperse such that they overwhelm the tracking capability of enemy 

guidance systems. Furthermore, because airpower capabilities are distributed throughout the 

swarm, loss of a single aircraft will not significantly degrade the holistic effects that swarms 

may deliver.

54. See chaps. 2 and 3.

55. Large air-refueling tankers also require long runways. See chap. 2.
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92

56. Amy Belasco, Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations 

since 9/11 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1; and DOD, “Casualty 

Reports,” Defense.gov, http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf (accessed 28 April 2012).

57. Robert Kagan, “Need for Power,” Wall Street Journal, 20 January 2010; and “Little Support for 

U.S. Intervention in Syrian Conflict,” Pew Research Center, 15 March 2012, http://www.people-press

.org/2012/03/15/little-support-for-u-s-intervention-in-syrian-conflict/1/.

58. “Little Support for U.S. Intervention in Syrian Conflict,” Pew Research Center. 

59. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 

1999), 180.

60. Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Does Technology Drive History?, ed. 

Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 101–13.

61. Ibid., 108.

62. John Law, “Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion,” in Social Construction of Technological Systems, eds. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and 

Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 113. Law named such individuals “heterogeneous engineers.”
93

Abbreviations

ACS agile combat support

AEW air expeditionary wing

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFI Air Force Instruction

AOC air operations center

AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

AWACS airborne warning and control system

BLOS beyond line-of-sight

C2 command-and-control

C2ISR command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CAC common access card

CAP combat air patrol

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CJCS chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CMOS complementary metal-oxide semiconductors

COA course(s) of action

CONOPS concept of operations

CONUS continental United States

CRAF civil reserve air fleet

DOD Department of Defense

EOC early operational capability

FOL forward operating location

FSL forward support location

GCC geographic combatant commander

GCS ground control station

GS ground stations

HET heavy equipment transporter

IADS integrated air defense system

ISP Internet service provider

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JFC joint force commander
ABBREVIATIONS

94

JOPP joint operations planning process

JP Joint Publication

JSA joint storage area

LOC lines of communication

LOS line-of-sight

LRE launch and recovery element

MCE mission control element

MSC Military Sealift Command

nm nautical mile

NSC National Security Council

ODS Operation Desert Storm

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RAF Royal Air Force

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Air Force

SAAS School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

TO technical Order

SOF special operations forces

UA unmanned aircraft

UAS unmanned aerial system

USAFRICOM US Africa Command

USTRANSCOM US Transportation Command
95

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ISBN: 978-1-58566-252-4 

ISSN: 1941-3785

AFRI

Air Force Research Institute