CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE 

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Newport, Rhode Island

Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea

www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx

Challenge and Opportunity in China’s 

Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities

Lyle J. Goldstein
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island 

Center for Naval Warfare Studies 

China Maritime Study No. 5 

April 2010

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, U.S. Navy

Provost

Amb. Mary Ann Peters

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Robert C. Rubel

Director of China Maritime Studies Institute

Dr. Lyle J. Goldstein

Naval War College Press

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ISSN 1943-0817

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and not those of the 

U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government. 

Photographs from the China Defense Forum are used with permission. Other photographs are from official U.S. and Chinese publications.

I

n an age of delicate maneuvering among the great powers, coast guards have taken 

new and leading roles on the world stage. When Washington wanted to demonstrate 

conviction and bring supplies to beleaguered Georgia without escalating already simmering tensions around the Black Sea, the USCGC Dallas, a large U.S. Coast Guard 

cutter, was quickly dispatched.1

 The trend has long been visible in Asia. Tokyo’s most 

extensive use of deadly force in the postwar era was an action by the Japanese coast 

guard against a North Korean surveillance vessel.2

 More recently, a Japan Coast Guard 

cutter sank a Taiwanese fishing vessel in a collision near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai 

Islands in the East China Sea, prompting a relatively serious diplomatic incident.3

 These 

most powerful coast guards are spawning imitators. India, for example, announced a 

bold new purchase of long-range patrol aircraft for its coast guard in the fall of 2008.4

South Korea’s improving coast guard, meanwhile, has invited foreign reporters to a tour 

in the vicinity of islands that are administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan, 

accompanying the visit with belligerent rhetoric.5

In light of this background, but also of the wide consensus that the rise of China is one 

of the most important phenomena for international security in the twenty-first century, 

it is especially curious that almost nothing is known about the organization, capabilities, 

service culture, or prospects of China’s coast guard. While the Japan Coast Guard has 

appropriately drawn the recent attention of scholars in the field, China’s developments 

in this regard have been neglected, despite the availability of ample source material in 

Chinese.6

 Notably, a leading expert on China’s “frontier defense” recently observed that 

his own work “examines only China’s approach to securing its land borders. . . . Future 

research should study China’s approach to maritime defense.”7

 Of course, there has been 

considerable scholarly attention to Chinese naval development, and this is wholly appropriate.8

 Nevertheless, studies of Chinese naval development tend to focus on offshore 

and high-intensity combat scenarios, including submarine operations and amphibious 

exercises, as well as the potential future possibilities for extended sea-lane defense, power 

projection, and nuclear deterrence. A widely noted incident in March 2009 involving 

U.S. surveillance vessels and Chinese maritime enforcement vessels (alongside Chinese 

Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea 

Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime 

Enforcement Capabilities
2 china maritime studies

fishing boats) has also increased the salience of understanding China’s nonmilitary 

maritime-enforcement capabilities. 

In general, coastal-defense issues and, especially, questions related to so-called nontraditional security have not been adequately explored in the Chinese maritime context. If 

Chinese perceptions with respect to coastal management and monitoring, port security, 

piracy, narco-trafficking, environmental protection, and search and rescue continue to 

be poorly understood outside of China, cooperation among the maritime powers of East 

Asia may well remain underdeveloped as well.9

 The unprecedented December 2008 deployment of the Chinese navy to join other navies in the Gulf of Aden in counterpiracy 

operations is unquestionably a major step in the right direction. But much more can 

and should be done to find common ground with China in countering nontraditional 

threats.

Today, China remains relatively weak in the crucially important middle domain of 

maritime power, that between commercial prowess and hard military power, which is 

concerned with maritime governance—enforcing a nation’s own laws and ensuring 

“good order” off its coasts.10 Despite major improvements over the last decade, China’s 

maritime enforcement authorities remain balkanized and relatively weak—described in 

a derogatory fashion by many Chinese experts as so many “dragons stirring up the sea.”11

In Northeast Asia, China’s weak maritime enforcement capacities are the exception, 

especially when compared to the coast guard capacities of Japan (or, outside the region, 

of the United States). Indeed, Japan’s coast guard was recently described as almost, if not 

quite, a second navy for Tokyo.12

China’s relative weakness in this area is a mystery, one that forms the central research 

question of the present study. This condition of relative weakness is outlined in the 

paper’s first part. The second part describes and analyzes the current situation of each 

of the five most important bureaucratic agencies responsible for maritime enforcement 

and governance in China today. The third part of this paper raises the question of what 

relationships these entities, and any future unified Chinese coast guard, would have with 

the Chinese navy. Before turning to implications and prospects, the fourth delves into a 

variety of macroexplanations for the weakness of China’s coast guard entities today. Part 

five analyzes the possibilities for future maritime security cooperation, by looking closely 

at U.S.-China civil maritime engagement between coast guard entities over the last 

decade. The final part elaborates on three possible strategic implications of enhanced 

Chinese coast guard capabilities. This study, as a whole, draws on hundreds of Chineselanguage sources, interviews in China, and, especially, a highly detailed and remarkably 

candid 2007 survey by Professor He Zhonglong and three other faculty members at the 

Border Guards Maritime Police Academy in Ningbo.13
five dragons stirring up the sea 3

The continuing evolution of Chinese coast guard entities into more coherent and effective agents of maritime governance presents both a challenge and an opportunity for 

security and stability in East Asia. Enlarged capacities will naturally result in more stringent enforcement of China’s maritime claims vis-à-vis its many neighbors.14 However, 

a more benign potential result is that enhanced Chinese capacities in maritime governance may result in greater willingness by Beijing to support global maritime safety and 

security norms as a full-fledged and vital “maritime stakeholder.” 

Relative Weakness in a Strong Neighborhood

The weaknesses in China’s coast guard capacities are amply evident to Chinese maritime analysts. They view these capacities as disproportionately small, given the scale of 

China’s maritime development. He Zhonglong and his colleagues write: “Our current 

maritime law enforcement forces . . . are not commensurate with our status and image as 

a great power.”15 He and his coauthors elaborate: “Currently, among maritime enforcement ships, the vast majority consists of small patrol boats of less than 500 tons, and the 

number of ship-borne helicopters is such that these forces cannot meet the requirements 

of comprehensive maritime law enforcement.”16 The Ningbo Maritime Police Academy 

faculty assert that the present situation is intolerable: “China is a country with a large 

population, and its land-based resources are insufficient. The oceans can replace and 

supplement for land space and with respect to resources have enormous latent capacity 

and strategic significance.”17

By contrast, other Pacific powers, and especially the United States and Japan, wield 

tremendously strong and effective coast guards. This unfavorable comparison is well 

documented and understood among Chinese maritime analysts.18 Indeed, the level of 

detailed understanding in China of American and Japanese coast guard capacities is 

impressive, suggestive simultaneously of envy and admiration.19 Illustrating the relative weakness of Chinese coast guard capacity, He Zhonglong, for instance, notes that 

the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is equipped with 250 aircraft of different types, while the 

Japanese coast guard has seventy-five. Chinese coast guard entities, with much less developed aviation forces, probably field fewer than three dozen aircraft of all types.20 Aircraft 

are crucial for both long-range patrol, on the one hand, and complicated rescues, on the 

other. Moreover, the professional requirements for a nation’s coast guard to maintain a 

strong aviation component are considerable. Therefore, these numbers are reflective of 

the very large gap that separates China from these other major Pacific coast guard forces, 

a fact duly noted by the Ningbo Academy study.21 Table 1 illustrates that although coast 

guard entities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have relatively many small and 

very small patrol vessels (under 1,500 tons), Beijing is well behind both Washington 

and Tokyo in numbers of medium-sized (1,500–3,000 tons) and large (over 3,500 tons) 
4 china maritime studies

cutters.22 The Ningbo Academy study additionally points out that the Republic of Korea 

(ROK) undertook in 1996 a successful unification of disparate maritime enforcement 

elements into a single, powerful Korea Coast Guard, modeled on the American and 

Japanese paradigms.23

Beijing’s impulse to upgrade its coast guard capabilities is clearly related to its overall 

strategic goal of increasing its maritime capabilities more generally and is thus quite 

consistent with China’s rapid naval development. Indeed, the implications of this initiative for East Asian security are considerable and will be analyzed at the conclusion of 

this study. The tone of the Ningbo Academy analysis certainly does suggest the significance of the national security factor in Chinese thinking about maritime enforcement 

capabilities. Its authors observe, for example, that “today, cold war thinking still exists 

in many countries. . . . [T]here are hostile attitudes.”24 Regarding the delicate issue of 

sovereignty in the South China Sea, the same analysis notes: “On the one hand, China 

and the ten states of ASEAN signed the code of conduct with respect to the South Sea 

in Phnom Penh, [but] to some degree, what has happened is that China’s sovereignty 

and interests continue to be seriously encroached upon.”25 This motive is not surprising 

and is consistent with strong nationalism extant among Chinese intellectuals and policy 

analysts more generally. 

However, another strong current is evident in China’s buildup of coast guard capacities, 

one that is quite cognizant of globalization and the growing interdependence among 

nations. In this current of thinking, also amply evident in the Ningbo Academy analysis, 

can be found the quite sophisticated and encouraging notion that strong coast guards 

might, by their versatile nature, actually serve as cushions between navies, helping to 

mitigate the possibility of interstate conflict in East Asia. Along these lines, it is reassuring that He Zhonglong and his coauthors conclude, “Everyone lives together on one 

planet, and are confronted by common threats, and have common interests.”26 Another 

Table 1. Pacific Coast Guards Compared 

Source: He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, pp. 142–43.

Length of coastline (km) 160,550

Large cutters 8 5 11 12

(3,500 tons+)

Midsize cutters 19 9 37 32

(1,500 tons+)

Small cutters 149 66 82 44

(500 tons+)

Small boats 304 111 107 258

(100 tons+)

Country China South Korea Japan USA

18,000 11,542 30,000
five dragons stirring up the sea 5

analysis likewise notes that international relationships built with other coast guards have 

“many time[s] succeeded in foiling transnational criminal activity.”27 The study by the 

Ningbo Academy faculty ultimately pinpoints the organizational factor in explaining 

weakness in Chinese maritime enforcement capacity. As its coauthors write, 

The organizational set up of China’s maritime governance is not ideal. For a long time, 

there has been the situation of “a group of dragons stirring up the sea”: in every situation 

there are multiple agencies involved, each with their own competence and scope of jurisdiction overlapping, as well as glaring gaps. Internally, this creates problems with respect 

to consistent enforcement, while externally there is no unity of effort. The result is a situation of a passive, weak, and ineffective force.28

While this explanation in itself is quite persuasive, this analysis will evaluate some other 

potential causes of this weakness as well, in addition to evaluating prospects for reform, 

the potential for developing further international cooperation in maritime security, and 

the attendant strategic implications for East Asian security.

China’s Five Maritime Enforcement Dragons

Altogether, China’s “five dragons stirring up the sea”—that is, the five agencies that 

constitute the nation’s maritime enforcement capabilities—amount to roughly forty 

thousand personnel, according to the analysis by Ningbo Academy.29

The following section briefly describes the organization, missions, and capabilities of 

each of the “dragons.” However, it should be noted that while the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) is remarkably transparent, the other, smaller organizations are less 

accessible and therefore less well understood.

The Maritime Police of the Border Control Department (BCD)

The China Maritime Police (公安边防海警部门) is a part of the Border Control 

Department, which is an elite subcomponent of the People’s Armed Police, under the 

Table 2. Planning Requirement for Chinese Maritime Enforcement Vessels 

Source: He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 142.

Large cutters — 4 — — 4 8

(3,500 tons+)

Midsize cutters 2 6 5 1 5 19

(1,500 tons+)

Small cutters 20 30 30 26 43 149

(500 tons+)

Small boats 26 95 80 304

(100 tons+)

Tonkin 

Gulf

East China 

Sea

Yellow 

Sea

Bohai 

Gulf

South China 

Sea

Total

103
6 china maritime studies

Ministry of Public Security. This pattern is likely derived from the Soviet model, which 

also designated border guards as a separate and elite formation. The China Maritime 

Police operate speedboats and small cutters generally. These craft are often armed with 

machine guns or small cannons. It is worth emphasizing that this force is armed, because 

several of the other important dragons are unarmed, raising a host of complications. 

A current workhorse of the Maritime Police fleet is the Seal (海豹) HP1500-2, a highspeed patrol craft. These small vessels are capable of fifty-two knots, have a range of 250 

km, and require a crew of six to eight personnel. Their intended missions include escort, 

on-the-water marine inspections, and search and rescue. The new standard small cutter 

for the Maritime Police is the Type 218. This design is forty-one meters in length; has 

a beam of 6.2 meters; displaces 130 tons; develops a top speed of twenty-nine knots; 

carries a crew of twenty-three; and mounts a single, 14.5 mm machine gun. A large Type 

718 patrol cutter for the Maritime Police was apparently launched in 2006. It displaces 

1,500 tons, and has a length of one hundred meters, a helicopter landing platform, and a 

37 mm cannon. The Maritime Police also recently took possession of two older People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Jianghu frigates, after they had been overhauled and 

renamed Haijing (海警)1002 and Haijing (海警)1003. At this time, the Maritime Police 

has no aviation assets.30

Photo 1. This 1,000-ton Type 718 cutter, Haijing 1001, serves with the China Coast Guard of 

the Ministry of Public Security. This ship, launched in 2006, has a single 37 mm deck gun. This 

is the China Coast Guard’s most modern vessel. (China Defense Forum)
five dragons stirring up the sea 7

The main training academy for the maritime police is in Ningbo. However, not all the 

students at the Ningbo Academy are maritime police; its students receive a generalized 

border-guard curriculum in their first years and apparently can opt into the maritime 

specialty about halfway through the program. Training facilities at the Ningbo Academy are impressive, especially the engineering and shiphandling simulators, which use 

advanced software to create a 

high degree of fidelity comparable to simulators in use in the 

West.

The primary mission of the 

Maritime Police is crime 

fighting, but emergent threats 

of special concern include 

terrorism and piracy. Although 

no cases of maritime terrorism have been reported in or 

against China, fears have been 

heightened by the 9/11 attacks 

against the United States, continued unrest among certain minority populations in 

China that have resorted to terrorist tactics, and a naturally heightened consciousness 

resulting from the Olympic Games in Beijing. During the games the Maritime Police apparently sortied thirty ships each day and stopped or detained over a thousand vessels.31

Photo 2. Haijing 1002 is one of two new China Coast Guard cutters that were transferred to 

the Public Security Ministry from the PLA Navy. They were formerly Jianghu-class missile 

frigates. China Maritime Surveillance is another civil maritime agency that has received ships 

from the PLA Navy. (China Defense Forum)

Photo 3. A small patrol boat in service with the China 

Coast Guard. Chinese civil maritime authorities have 

lacked for an adequate motor surfboat for rescue 

operations and have apparently considered purchases 

from abroad to fill this requirement. (China Defense Forum)
8 china maritime studies

On the theme of vulnerability along the coasts, He Zhonglong and his coauthors write, 

“Our country’s cities of Hong Kong, Macau, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and such important 

cities along the coast . . . could become the major targets of surprise attack by international terrorists.”32 Another China naval affairs analyst observes with similar concern 

that “armed groups from the Middle East are becoming more and more interested in 

maritime, surprise terrorist attacks.”33 Indeed, Chinese military and naval analysts have 

been keen to learn any lessons that have emerged from the November 2008 terrorist attacks against Mumbai, which involved insertions by boat.

China’s maritime history is replete with difficulties arising from piracy, so it is perhaps 

not surprising to see great interest in the subject as reflected in Chinese maritime 

publications.34

Moreover, it is certainly noteworthy that the impetus for the December 2008 counterpiracy deployment of a Chinese naval task force to the Gulf of Aden seems to have 

originated in part within China’s civil maritime sector.35 Indeed, piracy has long been a 

major concern among Chinese maritime analysts. One article on the issue emphasizes 

the proximity of the problem: “Of the 124 incidents of piracy in 2005, 60% occurred in 

Photo 4. Ministry of Public Security forces on a China Coast Guard cutter participate in a drill. 

Most of China’s other civil maritime agencies are unarmed. This has caused some consternation, 

for example, when Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels are lacking deterrence or 

enforcement capabilities. (China Defense Forum)
five dragons stirring up the sea 9

Asia’s South Sea triangle [in approximately the area of the South China Sea].”36 Another 

Chinese analysis of the piracy issue concludes, “The pirates have lots of modern weapons, are equipped with advanced communications equipment, and have secret links with 

international criminal gangs and even terrorist organizations.”37 Yet another source observes that Chinese vessels in distant waters have also been victimized by pirates.38 Thus, 

it would not be surprising to see various Chinese maritime enforcement elements active 

in future operations against pirates, perhaps acting in tandem with the PLA Navy.

As the primary armed element among China’s maritime enforcement dragons, the 

BCD—frequently referred to as the “China Coast Guard”—might well be expected to 

take the lead in confronting such challenges. At present, according to the Ningbo Academy study, the BCD has ten thousand personnel—about a quarter of the total of the five 

dragons.39 It is also noteworthy that the BCD has been designated as the “lead dragon” in 

liaison and exchanges with the U.S. Coast Guard—a relationship discussed at length in 

the fifth part of this study.

The Maritime Safety Administration 

The only dragon that competes in power and prestige with the BCD is the Maritime 

Safety Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Transportation (交通部下属的海

事局及救打捞局). In terms of manpower, the MSA has twice as many personnel as 

the BCD—about twenty thousand—approximately half of the aggregate of the five 

maritime enforcement agencies. MSA missions include inspection and registration of 

Chinese and foreign vessels in Chinese ports, investigation of maritime accidents, the 

training and certifying of seafarers, supervision of marine traffic control, maintenance 

of aids to navigation, implementation of domestic and international maritime laws, 

and maritime search and rescue. There are fourteen regional MSA offices, mainly in 

the coastal provinces but also at some inland river transport centers, such as along the 

Yangtze River. Each MSA regional office has a rescue coordination center, and several in 

coastal provinces have a variety of rescue subcenters.40

The author was fortunate enough to visit the Shanghai Rescue Coordination Center 

(RCC) in November 2007. As befits one of the world’s busiest ports, the Shanghai RCC is 

equipped with modern and fairly well integrated ship-management systems. The Shanghai Port relies on at least eleven major radar stations and two vessel tracking centers in 

addition to the RCC.41 These systems are supplemented by the Automatic Identification 

System (AIS), which, per regulations of the International Maritime Organization, requires vessels of over three hundred tons to report automatically their positions, courses, 

and speeds in real time.42 Such systems have revolutionized ship traffic control and dramatically enhanced maritime domain awareness on all the world’s oceans but especially 

along the Chinese coast; a major push has been made to set up AIS receiver/tracking 
10 china maritime studies

stations along the entire length of that busy shipping route.43 A further vessel tracking method employed by Chinese authorities is the China Ship Reporting (CHISREP) 

system. It requires Chinese-flag vessels to report their positions regularly to a coordination center. Somewhat analogous to the U.S. Coast Guard’s Amver (Automated MutualAssistance Vessel Rescue) system, which serves as a clearinghouse for merchant vessel 

positions on a global scale, CHISREP has most obvious significance in the domain of 

search and rescue, though other applications—for example, pollution control—are quite 

conceivable. Another important technology on display at the Shanghai RCC during the 

author’s visit was extensive closed-circuit-TV coverage of the port area of the Huangpu 

River, no doubt improving port management, safety, and security. 

Despite this wide variety of mutually reinforcing systems, however, some problems 

seemed evident, especially in the realm of coordination. For example, Shanghai RCC 

personnel conceded that while their display screens could easily plot the positions of 

local MSA assets, they could not readily display those of BCD/China Coast Guard vessels 

in the same area.

 The MSA’s important position among China’s maritime enforcement dragons is confirmed by evident investments in capital stock—new ships and aircraft. (It is worth emphasizing here that MSA cutters are unarmed—a clear distinction from the USCG and 

other coast guards around the world.) The launching of the fairly large cutter Haixun 31

(three thousand tons) in 2004 seems to have heralded a turn toward oceangoing rescue 

vessels. Though the ship reportedly had problems, particularly with communications 

equipment, it was noteworthy not only for its size but also as the first MSA vessel to 

carry an embarked helicopter.44 A June 2008 deployment of the vessel to patrol China’s 

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea was covered widely in the Western 

press.45 Two successor ships are Haixun 21 and Haixun 11, the latter of which was commissioned in September 2009 and similarly displaces three thousand tons. It appears that 

Haixun 11 will be homeported at Weihai, in Shandong Province.46

Three additional big, new cutters have been commissioned by the MSA, including 

Nanhaijiu 101, Nanhaijiu 112, and Beijhaijiu 111. These very large vessels—Nanhaijiu 

101 is listed at 6,257 tons, and all are equipped to carry helicopters—feature a dramatic 

departure in design from Haixun 31. With their very prominent forecastles and superstructures and their extremely low aft decks, they resemble massive tugboats more than 

their actual equivalents in, for example, the Japanese coast guard. They appear to be 

equipped with very modern features, including, for example, variable-pitch propellers, 

which greatly enhance the maneuverability of large vessels. Current MSA doctrine keeps 

most ships at sea for two weeks, followed by just one day in port to resupply before 

resuming station. There are apparently two crews per vessel, each crew working two 
five dragons stirring up the sea 11

continuous months on board, then one month ashore. Crew members are thus at sea 

about eight months per year.47

With respect to smaller vessels, another innovative design is featured in the recently 

launched Beihaijiu 201. This small cutter is a high-speed catamaran, modeled on recent 

commercial ferry designs.48 The MSA has 

notably lacked small motor surfboats and 

may have recently purchased some from the 

United Kingdom.49 However, attention to 

smaller cutters is evident in the 2008 launch 

at Wuhan of a new forty-meter design, optimized for Yangtze River rescue operations.50

Progress in airborne rescue assets has been 

slower. Certainly, Chinese maritime analysts 

appreciate the crucial role of helicopters 

for contemporary coast guard duties.51 The 

coauthors of the Ningbo Academy study, for 

example, conclude, “A helicopter operating 

from a mother ship has enormous value 

. . . especially in conducting enforcement 

[operations] in blue water.”52 Nevertheless, 

airborne search and rescue capabilities are 

being built essentially from scratch. Though 

Photo 5. The large cutter Haixun 11 of the MSA was commissioned in September 2009 in 

Qingdao. In terms of resources and personnel, the MSA, which is part of the Transportation 

Ministry, appears to be the most influential among China’s civil maritime agencies. (China 

Defense Forum)

Photo 6. This catamaran, Donghai Jiu 201,

serves with the Rescue and Salvage Bureau 

of the China Maritime Safety Administration. 

Catamarans are in wide use now as ferries 

and also with the PLA Navy. (China Defense 

Forum)
12 china maritime studies

a series of MSA flight bases were established in 2004, the service does not appear to 

currently operate many more than a dozen aircraft.53 Interestingly, the MSA already has 

a number of Sikorsky helicopters. Some helicopter rescues have reportedly occurred, 

but night operations are restricted. According to MSA personnel, the biggest bottleneck 

preventing a major expansion of the MSA flying service is training, of both pilots and 

rescue swimmers. In both these areas, China has made ambitious proposals involving 

assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard, but the USCG has been unable to respond so far. 

To date, PRC coast guard entities have benefited substantially from training assistance by 

Hong Kong’s capable airborne patrol and rescue service. According to an MSA plan announced in early 2003, the goal is to achieve effective search and rescue within fifty miles 

of the coast with a reaction time of 150 minutes; by 2020 this time is to be improved to 

less than ninety minutes. The range for search and rescue operations is also to be gradually expanded to cover China’s entire exclusive economic zone.54

China’s maritime rescue service has come a long way in a short time. In 1999, the MSA 

was faced with a Titanic-like tragedy when the ferry Dashun went down in bad weather 

just a few miles offshore in the Yellow Sea. Out of 304 passengers and crew, there were 

just twenty-two survivors.55 The accident, a major national tragedy, helped to galvanize 

efforts to establish a much more vigorous maritime rescue service. As Captain Bernard 

Photo 7. Search and rescue is a major mission of the MSA and aviation assets are now a 

development priority for MSA and Chinese civil maritime agencies more generally. However, 

deck aviation is still a relatively new concept for Chinese civil maritime authorities. (China 

Defense Forum)
five dragons stirring up the sea 13

Moreland, USCG, as a liaison officer at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, 

wrote in 2007, “Less than 10 years 

after the Dashun tragedy, China 

has a fully operating professional 

maritime search and rescue capacity.”56 Indeed, MSA can point to 

some concrete achievements, such 

as reductions over the course of a 

ten-year plan of maritime accidents 

by a third and maritime accident 

fatalities by a quarter. A new rescue 

network was established along the 

Yangtze River in 2001.57 During 

2002–2003, the MSA conducted 520 

rescue missions, involving 1,303 ship 

sorties and 25 aircraft sorties; of 14,901 persons in danger, 13,997 were saved, including 

787 foreign nationals.58

A key enabler of enhanced professionalism in China’s MSA is its high-quality professional journal, 中国海事 (China Maritime Affairs). Of particular note in this journal is 

the frequent and serious use of the case-study method: accidents are described, dissected, and mined for lessons that can inform future practice.59 Nor do these cases describe 

accidents only in Chinese waters; they examine related incidents around the world, 

such as the recent sinking of an Egyptian ferry in the Red Sea with great loss of life.60

Additionally, a major emphasis in this journal is on learning from the experiences and 

procedures of maritime safety and security in other nations.61

Other common themes in China Maritime Affairs include recently promulgated laws, 

issues related to toxic spills, typhoon emergency response, newly available technologies, and profiles of service practice in foreign countries.62 Regarding typhoon response, 

China has received high marks in recent years for diligent preparedness and execution 

of emergency plans for dangerous coastal storms.63 The MSA has played a leading role 

in establishing Chinese readiness for the cleanup of oil spills. In September 2008 it was 

announced that China was signing an agreement on mutual support for oil-spill cleanup 

with Japan, Russia, and South Korea.64 This agreement followed a December 2007 incident in which the Hong Kong oil tanker Hebei Spirit was involved in a major spill off the 

Korean coastline; Beijing’s Ministry of Transportation dispatched two vessels to assist in 

the cleanup.65

Photo 8. A heliborne rescue undertaken by the 

Maritime Safety Administration. China began to use 

helicopters in civil maritime rescue operations in 

2006. (China Defense Forum)
14 china maritime studies

Unlike the BCD, the Maritime Safety Administration does not have a formal academy. 

The main maritime universities in Dalian, Shanghai, and Xiamen are apparently feeders 

for MSA recruiting. Compared to equivalent American schools, such as King’s Point and 

the Maine Maritime Academy, these Chinese maritime academic centers seem impressive.66

The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC)

As have fisheries all over the globe, the Chinese fishing industry has been plagued in 

the last decade by the environmental devastation wrought by overfishing. While growth 

in aquaculture has mitigated this crisis to some extent, fishermen all along the Chinese 

coast have experienced a difficult transition. As one Chinese study recently opined, “The 

fact is obvious that the development of our nation’s fishing industry has reached an extremely important juncture. Most—if not all—of the fisheries have been fully exploited, 

and many are already exhausted.”67 Another published study further reveals the scope of 

the problem. Since the 1960s, fish species in the Beibu Gulf area of the South China Sea 

have declined from 487 to 238. Stock density reached its lowest level in 1998, at just 16.7 

percent of that of 1962; fish stocks have recovered somewhat since.68

Photo 9. FLEC cutter 44183 on patrol. Compared to other maritime enforcement agencies the 

fisheries enforcement command has not received equivalent resources, at least to this point, and 

may also be significantly undermanned. The large poster on the ship reads, “Protect National 

Fisheries Resources.” As for many countries, fisheries conservation efforts have proved to be an 

extremely challenging task for the Chinese government. (China Defense Forum)
five dragons stirring up the sea 15

Such conditions have increased pressure on fisheries enforcement institutions and personnel, because of the imperative to enforce new regulations strictly in order to replenish fish stocks. A “zero growth” plan for the fishing fleet was initiated in 1999. By 2004, 

eight thousand fishing vessels had been scrapped, and there is an effort to bring China’s 

total fishing fleet down to 192,000 vessels by 2010. Summer moratoriums now exist for 

almost all of China’s coastal areas.69 The task is made even more complicated by the 

extensive overlapping of exclusive economic zones in the western Pacific, not to mention 

the wide-ranging migratory patterns of regional fish stocks. 

With a total haul of seventeen million tons in 2007, China’s fishing take is four times that 

of the nearest competitor.70 Official figures suggest that China currently has approximately eight million fishermen. Among finfish, Chinese are largely catching anchovy, 

Japanese scad, hairtail, and small yellow croaker; nets, line and hooks, and purse seines 

are used. The East China Sea accounts for the largest catch, followed by the South China 

Sea, then the Yellow Sea. Of these, only the South China Sea has seen increasing catches 

of late. China’s marine fisheries and related industries are ranked as the largest sector of 

the nation’s major marine industries. Guangdong and Shandong are the leading provinces, as measured by fishing output; Fujian and Zhejiang are close behind.71

China’s Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (农业部下属的渔政部门), part of the 

Ministry of Agriculture, apparently has just a thousand personnel.72 The strategic implications of the state of China’s fisheries enforcement capabilities were suggested in early 

Photo 10. A Chinese FLEC officer, in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, seized a Chinese 

fishing vessel suspected of illegal large-scale high-seas drift net fishing in the North Pacific, on 

September 12, 2008. (USCG Official Photo)
16 china maritime studies

2009, when Chinese fishing or fisheries vessels were involved in a variety of international 

incidents with regional neighbors and the United States.73 Hints of ineffectiveness and 

inefficiency are revealed by the Ningbo Academy study, which cites fisheries enforcement 

as an example of confusion among the five dragons. There is, Professor He Zhonglong 

and his colleagues assert, 

the “got jurisdiction, but cannot find, or can find, but do not have jurisdiction” phenomenon. . . . The fisheries enforcement department has the function of escorting fishing 

vessels, but because they are unarmed, they lack enforcement deterrence and coercion 

capabilities, and thus have trouble dealing with situations that suddenly arise. . . .

The public security maritime police, though having the police function, and being 

equipped with all types of weaponry, possessing an advantage in any circumstances involving escort of fishing vessels, because of limitations on jurisdiction can only play a supporting role, and are in an awkward position. The country’s maritime rights and interests, as 

well as the national honor, are difficult to protect in such circumstances.74

Also important is that in addition to policies encouraging aquaculture, Beijing has in 

recent years pushed to develop a long-distance fishing fleet. By 2006, this fleet had grown 

to almost two thousand vessels and was operating on the high seas and in the EEZs of 

thirty-five countries.75 The Ningbo Academy study, for example, mentions this development, asserting, “If our country seeks to resolve the food question internally, then it is 

necessary to exploit the sea’s bounty, through . . . developing the deep sea fishing industry.”76 Chinese fishing vessels are now a common sight in the waters of Africa and Latin 

America, for example, a phenomenon that has brought about considerable controversy. 

From the Chinese perspective, there has been some question as to how Chinese fishermen can be protected—against, for example, pirate attack—in such distant locations.77

This question in turn invites maritime analysts to consider whether Chinese maritime 

enforcement capabilities will expand to a global presence commensurate with the nation’s global maritime commercial interests and how, if so, that would mesh with China’s 

emerging naval strategy, which has already embraced the counterpiracy mission. An 

even more sensitive question arises regarding fishing practice proximate to Chinese 

waters. As stocks have declined around the region, a sense of fisheries nationalism has 

grown. Indeed, a recent Chinese fisheries analysis concludes, “Although our country 

has signed one after another fishing agreements with neighboring states, the number of 

fishing industry security incidents involving foreigners has unceasingly increased. . . . 

Some [countries] even send warships to bump and sink our side’s fishing boats.”78 Tensions flared in the summer of 2009 as Chinese maritime enforcement agencies patrolled 

against foreign violators of strict new fishing regulations in the sensitive South China Sea.79

If, as has been suggested recently, a major buildup is under way of large, helicopter-capable 
five dragons stirring up the sea 17

cutters for the South China Sea component of the FLEC, Beijing’s fishing policies in the 

region could well become more assertive.80

General Administration of Customs (GAC)

China’s status as an international trade juggernaut raises commensurately the prestige 

of the General Administration of Customs. Indeed, before the establishment of the PRC, 

China’s customs service (managed to a large extent by foreigners) virtually controlled 

the state’s foreign policy. The vast amount of international commerce taking place in 

China’s ports and on its coastal waters preordains the importance of the role of customs 

in maritime enforcement (海关总署下属的缉私部门). Among the chief missions of 

China customs are compilation of foreign trade statistics, revenue collection, customs 

control (declarations, etc.), countersmuggling, and port control.81 The latter two missions are most relevant to maritime enforcement capabilities. 

According to the China Customs 2007 annual report, the GAC represents “the competent antismuggling authority of the Chinese government, which takes up most, if not 

all, of the responsibility for combating smuggling.”82 The significant smuggling cases 

prosecuted by the GAC in 2007 were reported to number 1,190, involving more than 

US$1 billion, up 4.3 percent from the previous year. Among these cases were some 356 

major drug busts, which netted almost five hundred kilograms of assorted illegal drugs.83 

It is not clear what percentage of these interdiction activities occurred in the maritime 

sphere, but some preliminary evidence suggests that a portion of China’s drug trade 

does take place in seaborne vessels. Thus a 2007 article in the journal of the Fujian Police 

Senior Academy Journal suggested, “In the last few years, criminals with drugs passing 

through the port of Xiamen’s water transport routes have been using fishing vessels to 

smuggle drugs.”84 Similar concerns about maritime drug enforcement have been noted 

Photo 11. China’s Customs Agency operates a fleet of small cutters that focuses on maritime 

anti-smuggling operations. (China Defense Forum)
18 china maritime studies

in Chinese naval publications.85 The Ningbo Academy study also asserts the importance 

of the antidrug mission for the future development of China’s maritime enforcement 

capabilities.86 This is perhaps not surprising, as China customs has been working in 

coordination with the Ministry of Public Security to form “joint anti-smuggling forces” 

since 1998.87

China customs also plays a leading role in Chinese port management. The GAC is 

proud that “ocean going imports and exports can usually be released within 24 hours.”88

China’s ambitious “E-port” initiative, outlined by the State Council in 2006, aims to 

smooth out port operations by harnessing information technology—for example, by 

allowing online payment of taxes and various charges. China customs holds the vice 

chairmanship of the National E-Port Steering Committee, which also has representatives 

from the other maritime enforcement dragons, including the BCD and the MSA. 

According to the Ningbo Academy study, GAC maritime enforcement personnel number 

about two thousand. Thus the GAC constitutes one of the smallest dragons, measured 

by manpower. Interestingly, a June article in a Chinese military newspaper suggested that 

the GAC has up to 212 fast patrol boats to employ against smugglers, but this figure has 

been difficult to verify.89 The 2007 annual report makes note of a recent salary reform, 

new uniforms, and the establishment of a new institute in Shanghai dedicated to customs issues.

The State Oceanographic Administration (SOA)

With an estimated six to eight thousand personnel, the State Oceanographic Administration—specifically, its China Maritime Surveillance (海洋局下属的中国海监), or 

CMS—constitutes a maritime enforcement dragon of medium size, between the large 

MSA and the much smaller customs and fisheries enforcement agencies.90 Major missions for the SOA include environmental protection, scientific research, and enforcement of EEZ rights and interests.

The rising profile of environmental protection in China has increased attention on 

coastal environmental issues. The SOA has played an important role in recognizing the 

extent of current problems. In 2006, a major SOA study concluded that “China faces 

severe ocean pollution.”91 Some limited progress is already evident—for example, in 

efforts to set up a comprehensive coastal environmental monitoring system, an initiative to increase compliance among coastal polluters, and a new network of 149 marine 

protected areas.92 The 2008 Beijing Olympics seem also to have spurred new interest in 

improving coastal water quality—in particular, in conjunction with the sailing events at 

Qingdao; SOA research centers were active in monitoring and forecasting water quality 

for that prestigious event.93 Along with curbing the runoff of pollutants discharged from 
five dragons stirring up the sea 19

factories on land, another major concern is coping with spills of oil and other toxic substances, which are carried in Chinese waters in huge quantities.

Corresponding with its mission to patrol China’s EEZ, the SOA has a relatively extensive 

fleet of ships and aircraft. In 2006, it was reported that the SOA itself had twenty-one 

ships, each displacing between a thousand and four thousand tons.94 A recent report on 

the SOA’s South China Sea flotilla suggested that this division had eleven ships, six of 

which reportedly are over a thousand tons in displacement. This South China Sea division of the SOA is said to be equipped with one helicopter and two fixed-wing aircraft.95

A 2008 report said that the CMS had a total of nine aircraft and more than two hundred 

patrol vessels.96 Of late, the SOA has received at least three large new cutters, including 

Haijian 46, Haijian 51, and Haijian 83. According to a 2009 report, the latter is the SOA’s 

largest cutter, at ninety-eight meters; this 3,400-ton vessel, built at Jiangnan shipyard, is 

said to have cost about US$22 million and is assigned a helicopter.97

Though the MSA operates some aircraft for search and rescue purposes, the SOA’s allotment of aircraft clearly separates it from the other large dragon, the BCD (i.e., the 

China Coast Guard), which has no aircraft. However, like the BCD, the SOA has recently 

taken over some retired Chinese navy vessels.98 Reportedly, Haijian 20 and Haijian 32,

which will patrol in the Bohai Sea, are converted PLA Navy subchasers.99 With respect to 

the SOA’s mission of patrolling China’s EEZ, the Ningbo Academy study states bluntly 

that the agency falls short of requirements: “At this point, maritime enforcement patrol 

ships are only sufficient to patrol territorial and adjoining sea areas with any frequency, 

and cannot be responsible for missions within the EEZs or continental shelf areas.”100

Photo 12. Haijian 83 is the largest and most advanced cutter of the CMS. The launch of several 

new cutters for the CMS over the last decade suggests that the CMS has a certain priority among 

China’s maritime enforcement agencies. (China Defense Forum)
20 china maritime studies

According to another 

report, the SOA was 

directed by China’s 

State Council to initiate patrols of the East 

China Sea in 2006. 

This elevated surveillance activity apparently involved daily 

patrols by four aircraft 

and six ships, operated by the SOA.101 A 

2009 report suggests 

that the CMS initiated 

regular patrols of the southern part of the South China Sea in 2007.102 In aggregate, the 

CMS reported, in the period 2001–2007, fifteen thousand instances of illegal activities 

were detected in China’s EEZ, of which about ten thousand were apparently prosecuted. 

According to one 2006 report, the SOA is already closely collaborating with the China 

BCD in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Wan) area and is looking to do so elsewhere as well.103

SOA sources candidly describe close coordination with the Chinese military.104 Indeed, 

during a public statement in October 2008, CMS deputy director Sun Shuxian declared 

that “the [CMS] force will be upgraded to a reserve unit under the navy, a move which 

will make it better armed during patrols. . . . [T]he current defensive strength of CMS is 

inadequate.”105 A similar message emerges from a September 2009 Chinese report that 

documented multiple interactions between the SOA and American surveillance vessels. 

Photo 13. A helicopter operated by China Maritime Surveillance. 

This is a type Z-9 design that is used widely among China’s armed 

forces. (China Defense Forum)

Photo 14. A Y-12 aircraft of the CMS. It seems China’s civil maritime agencies are generally 

lacking in sufficient numbers of fixed-wing aircraft, inhibiting long-range search and rescue 

operations, for example. That the CMS operates fixed-wing aircraft is again symbolic of the 

priority that the CMS enjoys among the civil maritime authorities. (China Defense Forum) 
five dragons stirring up the sea 21

This report suggested that SOA vessels required better sensors and electronic warfare 

technology to cope with U.S. military surveillance craft.106

In addition, the SOA is leading China’s oceanographic research effort. According to the 

official SOA website, the agency has no fewer than sixteen discrete research centers and 

institutes. The agency is a major funder of research projects at China Ocean University 

in Qingdao and likely many other university centers as well. In 2005, a SOA research 

vessel capable of drilling cores from the sea bottom at depths in excess of three thousand 

meters circumnavigated the globe to advance China’s oceanographic research across the 

world’s oceans. The SOA has also launched a series of maritime observation satellites. 

China’s recent mission to Antarctica to establish its third base there was organized by the 

SOA, demonstrating the ambitious research agenda that the agency pursues.107

The Sixth and Mightiest Dragon? The Chinese Coast Guard and the 

Chinese Navy

Among coast guard–like entities, it is natural and proper to consider how roles and 

missions, not to mention resources, are allocated between coast guard forces, on the one 

hand, and navies, on the other. Sea-power theorist Geoffrey Till explains that although 

overlap is inevitable and logical, there is a spectrum of coast guard models, entailing 

different kinds of relationships with national navies. Till observes, “With the widening 

of the concept of security, accelerated perhaps by the events of 11 September, the extent 

Photo 15. A buoy tender of the MSA operates in close proximity to two PLA Navy vessels. 

Maintaining aids to navigation along China’s busy coasts is a major mission of the MSA. (China 

Defense Forum)
22 china maritime studies

of potential overlap is increasing in ways which raise issues over who should be responsible for what.” As he further explains, some countries have navies and coast guards with 

dramatically separate tasks, while in other countries (often smaller or less developed 

ones) the navies themselves have functioned essentially as coast guards, active principally 

in coastal patrol, management, and search and rescue missions.108

Chinese analysts have duly noted that some coast guards, including the USCG, have been 

critically involved in national security. One Chinese maritime analyst, for example, notes 

that Japan’s powerful coast guard serves as a vital reserve force for the Japanese navy.109

As the authors of the Ningbo Academy study observe, “The United States explicitly calls 

its Coast Guard one of the five armed services, many times employing it for combat missions.”110 The same analysts are quite candid in projecting an important role for China’s 

coast guard entities in any future military conflict: “In wartime, under the command of 

the navy, [China’s coast guard elements] would escort maritime transport, would assist 

in controlling maritime transport and also with amphibious ships, execute antisubmarine missions, protect ports, secure wharves, provide crews for some portion of the 

navy’s fleet and assist in completing national mobilization.”111

An expert analyst from China’s National Defense University argued in June 2009 that 

large Chinese coast guard cutters could be easily converted for use in far-seas combat, 

while small- and medium-sized coast guard vessels could support coastal defense, 

undertaking such missions as laying defensive minefields.112 Captain Moreland likewise suggests, “Both China Coast Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard are maritime armed 

forces that lie outside their countries’ respective defense departments or ministries, but 

are available to them for waging war.”113 It is, accordingly, perhaps not surprising to 

see elements of the Chinese maritime enforcement community taking a hard line on 

sovereignty and maritime claims issues: “Taiwan is in most respects still dominated by 

a few foreign powers. . . . [F]rom this perspective, Taiwan island forms the strategic core 

deciding the future fate of the Chinese nation. . . . On the sea, there are many neighboring countries that have island and ocean territorial disputes with China. These contradictions are relatively extensive, and this has a major impact on room for maneuver in 

Chinese politics, foreign policy and military affairs.”114

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see China’s developing coast guard entities as 

simple adjuncts to the PLA Navy. A cosmopolitan outlook is strongly evident in the 

Ningbo Academy study: “The initiation of armed conflict[,] or even limited war, would 

severely impact the whole region and international system, and does not conform to the 

nation’s circumstances of development.”115 Moreover, the Ningbo Academy is part of 

the BCD, one of a few armed elements among China’s coast guard entities; one might 

logically presume the unarmed elements (e.g., the powerful MSA) to be less inclined to 

quasi-military activities. Also evident in the Ningbo Academy study is a sense that coast 
five dragons stirring up the sea 23

guard entities may actually be in competition with the Chinese navy for resources. These 

scholars, for example, observe with evident frustration that “internally, many scholars 

believe that maritime power means maritime military power, and maritime military 

power means the navy.”116

A crucial question arises as to what the disposition of the Chinese navy, and the PLA 

more generally, will be toward improving maritime enforcement capabilities. Preliminary evidence, in the form of an article in the June 2008 issue of the official and 

prestigious 中国军事科学 (China Military Science), suggests that the PLA will support 

this endeavor; its author, from the Chinese National Defense University, emphatically 

calls for stronger maritime enforcement capabilities as a crucial component of a new 

Chinese maritime strategy.117 In July 2009, a significant search and rescue exercise was 

undertaken in the vicinity of the Pearl River Delta. The co-organizers were the PLAN’s 

South Sea Fleet and the Guangdong provincial government. Thirteen agencies, twentyfive vessels, and two helicopters took part in the exercise, which was termed a “立体军

警民” (three-dimensional—that is, military, coast guard, and civilian) exercise. A Navy 

publication describing the exercise notes that China has set up a new and robust search 

and rescue system but laments that the military regions are not well integrated into that 

structure—a problem suggesting the need for further such exercises.118

Reconsidering Till’s two alternative models—wide bifurcation or extensive overlap—it 

is worth noting that China has clearly emerged from the latter tradition. For much of 

the Cold War, its navy was not much more than an elaborate coast guard. Today, more 

bifurcation is occurring as China’s navy emphasizes technology-intensive warfare. Nonetheless, the PLA is also increasingly interested in issues that have often concerned coast 

guards, including search and rescue, environmental protection, and piracy, suggesting 

that a strict bifurcation of roles is simply not practical for China in the near or medium 

term.119

Photo 16. In July 2009, the first-ever major search and rescue exercise involving significant naval 

units and civil maritime entities (twenty-five vessels and thirteen agencies) reportedly took place 

in the Pearl River Delta of southern China. (Modern Navy)
24 china maritime studies

Explaining the Weakness of China’s Maritime Enforcement Capabilities

This study has given priority to offering an objective and detailed rendering of the 

current statuses of various Chinese coast guard entities, primarily because no such 

rendering yet exists in the English language. Still, it is important to lay a foundation for 

explaining the central phenomenon at issue: China’s relative weakness in coast guard 

capacities. Three related explanations are examined below: modernization processes, 

economic issues, and finally, institutional structural issues. No doubt these different explanations have 

complex linkages; for 

example, economic and 

institutional structural 

issues are clearly results 

of modernization processes. Still, there is value 

in focusing on different 

segments of the various 

causal links.

A recent and extremely 

helpful article by Richard 

Suttmeier titled “China, 

Safety, and the Management of Risks” explains 

that conventional wisdom posits a strong relationship between modernity and safety. 

He writes, “The wealth and power expected from ‘modernization’ have long been seen 

in China—and elsewhere—as risk-reducing, safety-enhancing developments.”120 Wealth 

and education can bring about China’s “sixth modernization”—enabling Beijing “to 

manage environmental and technological risk.”121 Suttmeier’s analysis looks at the 

example of civil aviation in China, suggesting that “China’s performance on safety issues 

. . . attracted and maintained high-level political and managerial attention . . . which 

permitted the introduction of redundancy.”122 The essential argument here, then, is that 

China’s coast guard entities could not function effectively until China became a modern society; until then, it simply lacked the wherewithal. Besides, many other demands 

took precedence, not least economic and political survival—which, at certain points 

during the “Century of Humiliation” and the Cold War, could not be taken for granted. 

Having secured China from existential threats and moved it out of poverty, Beijing can 

now turn to such previously second-order priorities as effective maritime governance 

and even the relatively new concept of valuing individual lives. However, Suttmeier does 

ask the provocative question of whether the “sixth modernization” can proceed without 

Photo 17. China Rescue and Salvage Bureau of the MSA accepted 

two Eurocopter EC225s into service in 2007. Further development 

of aviation forces by China’s civil maritime agencies appears to be 

a priority. (China Defense Forum)
five dragons stirring up the sea 25

further political liberalization that would support “transparency in China’s risk management strategies” by empowering “activist civil organizations that have autonomy and . . . 

resources.”123

An alternative explanation that prioritizes economic factors in particular may be more 

amenable to Beijing’s current mode of thinking. Suttmeier calls for a “science-based 

regulatory regime that is also sensitive to market forces.”124 He explains: “China needs 

multiple mechanisms of risk management and governance that address the incentives 

and disincentives operating on individual economic decision-makers.”125 According to 

this view, order in China’s coastal waters is simply a requirement of the rapidly developing coastal economy. Powerful corporate entities are demanding the orderly management of ports and the safe, reliable passage of ships (and of the goods they carry). 

Maritime disasters like the Dashun ferry tragedy in 1999 injured not only the victims 

and national pride but also business as well, and it reflected poorly on Chinese technical quality and organizational efficiency. The safety-and-security culture in China may 

flow from corporate entities outward. Suttmeier highlights the important contributions 

of increasingly sophisticated Chinese insurance markets;126 coast guard improvements 

may be seen as a new form of insurance for the massive investments made in China’s 

maritime trade.

A final explanation has been a recurrent theme of this paper and is the central theme of 

the important Ningbo Academy study of 2007—that the balkanization of maritime enforcement entities in China has severely inhibited the coherent development of Chinese 

coast guard entities.127 The dragons duplicate one another in certain functions, fail to 

Photo 18. Two small cutters from the MSA (foreground and right), are shown berthed across 

from a cutter from the FLEC. There is some coordination among Chinese civil maritime 

authorities, but it is also clear that Chinese maritime analysts perceive some problems in getting 

the disparate agencies involved to work in concert to serve China’s maritime interests. (China 

Defense Forum)
26 china maritime studies

coordinate effectively in others, and are individually too weak to achieve fundamental 

breakthroughs in maritime governance—for example, in long-range search and rescue. 

Suttmeier addresses this problem, noting that “responsibility for regulation is often 

fragmented with the result that no one agency in the central government has control. 

. . . Effective coordination among central government agencies, and between the central 

government and local governments, has long been recognized as a key problem of governance in a rapidly changing China.”128 Indeed, a considerable problem within China’s 

coast guard entities (for example, the MSA) is that local entities are often more powerful than the center in terms of resources, a situation promoting further balkanization, 

inconsistency, and incoherence.129

In sum, modernization and economic explanations give considerable reason for optimism. Nevertheless, coast guard modernization in China is likely to continue to be 

slowed by failures related to a lack, first, of entities in civil society charged with keeping 

Chinese maritime governance structures honest, and also, more important, of a pervasive disunity of effort.

A Case Study in Cooperative Maritime Security 

Notwithstanding that most coast guards have intricate and special relationships with 

the naval forces of their nations, they are uniquely positioned to spearhead a cooperative maritime security agenda. This is because coast guards confront a panoply 

of challenges of concern to all states with maritime interests. Indeed, many of those 

challenges cannot 

be met without 

robust international 

cooperation. In that 

light, it is instructive to consider the 

cooperation between 

the U.S. Coast 

Guard and Chinese 

coast guard entities 

that has blossomed 

over the last decade, 

while navy-tonavy contacts have 

remained rather 

limited. 

Photo 19. Captain Bernard Moreland, former U.S. Coast Guard 

liaison officer posted to the U.S. embassy in Beijing, participates in a 

professional dialogue with members of the China Coast Guard during 

a visit to their academy in Ningbo. The designation of an O6 level 

billet by the U.S. Coast Guard to the Beijing embassy is a signal of 

Washington’s desire to enhance bilateral maritime cooperation. (USCG 

Official Photo)
five dragons stirring up the sea 27

Search and rescue cooperation has been 

quite successful—an achievement that can 

be measured in lives saved. In 2007, the 

USCG’s Amver reporting system, which 

assists in rescue coordination across the 

globe by exchanging data on participating vessels near ships in distress, proved 

crucial to major rescues of Chinese sailors 

on two occasions. In March, Unicorn Ace,

with a crew of nineteen Chinese citizens, 

sank in the South China Sea. The Hong 

Kong Rescue Service, querying the USCG 

Amver system, identified and vectored in 

a nearby freighter, which rescued eleven of 

the crew. Even more dramatically, in July 

the vessel Haitong 7, crewed by twentytwo Chinese nationals and carrying lumber from New Guinea to Dalian, was caught 

in a typhoon three hundred miles northwest of Guam and sank; the survivors were 

Photo 20. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Charles 

D. Wurster, serving then as Pacific Area 

Commander, presents Director-General Chen 

Aiping of the China MSA with a commemorative 

plaque honoring the U.S. Coast Guard and China 

MSA on 4 April 2008 in Alameda, California. 

The USCG and China MSA have engaged in 

quite extensive exchanges and other forms of 

cooperation. (USCG Official Photo)

Photo 21. The crew from the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell trains with the China 

Coast Guard in Shanghai during August 2007. Boutwell visited China as U.S. Coast Guard 

representatives for the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. This forum was developed to increase 

international maritime safety and security in the North Pacific and has evolved to become the 

most developed international organization focused on maritime security in the vital East Asian 

region. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)
28 china maritime studies

scattered across a thousand miles of ocean. Again, merchant vessels alerted by the Amver 

system were crucial to the rescue, as were two U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft and two USCG 

cutters. American rescuers coordinated closely with Chinese rescue authorities, receiving 

from them information that aided the rescue plan. Thirteen of the Chinese sailors were 

eventually saved. Few aspects of maritime cooperation can be so powerfully symbolic for 

building vital trust and cooperation as mutual aid to sailors in distress.130

Another area of fruitful cooperation has been in the area of high-seas fisheries. In 

particular, the USCG and the Chinese FLEC have developed a major innovation to help 

enforce a United Nations General Assembly resolution prohibiting drift net fishing on 

the high seas. Their approach involves the temporary posting of FLEC officials aboard 

U.S. cutters patrolling the North Pacific. For example, a FLEC “ship rider” boarded 

the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719) in August 2007. In one notable case, a fishing boat 

suspected of using drift nets initially claimed Chinese registry and refused to submit to 

an inspection by a Boutwell boarding team. The FLEC ship rider, however, had both the 

jurisdiction and skills to inspect the vessel and detain the ship. The FLEC then sortied Yu 

Zheng 118 from Yantai on a long journey to rendezvous with Boutwell and take custody 

of the offending vessel and crew. This pattern was repeated six more times in 2007, during which process “international enforcement cooperation resulted as the mechanisms 

finally fell into place for exchanging operational intelligence and plans.”131 One can quite 

easily imagine a wide spectrum of similar environmental initiatives that would benefit 

from creative U.S.-China cooperation, including many in the maritime dimension.

Photo 22. The 378-foot Coast Guard Cutter Rush, homeported in Honolulu, Hawaii, arrives 

in Shanghai on 1 November 2009. The crew of Rush was in China to engage in maritime 

partnerships and cultural exchanges. The U.S. Coast Guard has built significant goodwill 

with Chinese maritime agencies, potentially building the basis for a more extensive maritime 

partnership between the United States and China. (USCG Official Photo)
five dragons stirring up the sea 29

Yet another vital area of maritime cooperation concerns port security and flag-state 

rights. China has been a leading player in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), an effort to ensure that the huge numbers of containers entering U.S. ports each year cannot 

be used to transport terrorists or, in the worst case, a weapon of mass destruction. Teams 

of USCG experts frequently visit Chinese ports to discuss requirements and exchange 

security practices. Reciprocal visits are made to American ports by delegations from 

the Chinese Ministry of Transportation. USCG personnel are also frequent visitors to 

Chinese shipyards, as they must certify repairs made on U.S.-flagged vessels. Similarly, 

the China Classification Society now maintains offices in the United States and visits 

American ports to inspect Chinese-flag vessels.132 Given the huge amount of U.S.-China 

shipborne commerce, it is perhaps not surprising that this form of maritime cooperation is both broad and deep, entailing the regular posting of each country’s officials in 

the major ports of the other. It is well worth considering how this practical, grassroots 

cooperation might serve the larger cause of maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.

While the progress in bilateral coast guard cooperation is impressive, there are nevertheless real constraints and challenges that inhibit further expansion of the relationship. Most obviously, there are the coordination difficulties that result from the fact 

Photo 23. Chinese coast guard cadets drill aboard USCG cutter Eagle in the Atlantic during 

August 2009. Second Lieutenant Dun Mao, from Changsha in Hunan Province, of the Chinese 

Public Security Marine Police Academy, gets help from classmates to don a survival suit. The 

four Chinese cadets and one officer spent three weeks in America, training with different Coast 

Guard units. In 2010, cadets from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy are scheduled to go to China 

to train with its Public Security Marine Police Academy. (USCG Official Photo)
30 china maritime studies

that there there is no single counterpart for the USCG on the Chinese side but rather a 

group of often-competing institutions. An additional major problem concerns USCG 

resources, since the organization is not primarily tasked with conducting international 

engagement. Moreover, the small resources that the USCG does have for international 

activities tend to be absorbed by initiatives related to the global war on terror. A third 

complication is that the two nations have somewhat different priorities when it comes 

to maritime governance: Washington has prioritized the counterterrorism mission since 

the 9/11 attacks, but Beijing continues to give first place to sovereignty issues. Nevertheless, the USCG has led the way in developing U.S.-China maritime cooperation, 

by “look[ing] for areas where China wants what the United States wants. Negotiating 

how to execute a mutual interest takes far less resources than an adversarial negotiation to find a middle ground.”133 Contrary to conventional wisdom, moreover, it is quite 

possible that cooperation between American and Chinese law-enforcement entities 

could actually increase Beijing’s respect for human-rights norms.134 One high-value 

program for the Chinese Maritime Police has arisen from the willingness of the USCG 

to allow Chinese trainees into its Cadet Summer Program. Chinese students are still not 

able to attend the full U.S. Coast Guard Academy course, but such exchanges should 

be expanded further and reciprocated with American students in Chinese maritime 

enforcement institutions. Faculty exchanges could also help in this important area of 

bilateral cooperation. Given the clear priority of international cooperation in the new 

U.S. maritime strategy, the leadership of the U.S. Navy would do well to study the recent 

USCG experience with China to see how enhanced cooperation could serve the larger 

cause of Asia-Pacific maritime security.135

Future Prospects and Strategic Implications

The 2007 Ningbo Academy study, discussed at length in this analysis, forms an important window into the current thinking and evident frustration of those charged with 

contemporary Chinese maritime governance. The authors of that study make a strong 

case that “our current maritime law enforcement forces . . . are not commensurate with 

our status and image as a great power. . . . Unification of maritime enforcement agencies 

would strengthen our flexibility in maritime conflicts[,] . . . exert pressure on Taiwan 

separatists . . . and would not damage the nation’s strategic opportunity at the beginning 

of the twenty-first century.”136

Still, the solution of unifying the various maritime enforcement dragons seems to 

remain largely theoretical at this point. The MSA, largest of the maritime enforcement 

agencies by far, could be a logical leader, but others have promoted the SOA because of 

its broader strategic vision. There is little clarity regarding the way forward.137 Even the 

BCD authors of the Ningbo Academy study ask pointedly, “Who will lead?”138
five dragons stirring up the sea 31

At least three possible strategic implications can be drawn from the foregoing analysis. 

Most obviously, stronger Chinese coast guard entities will no doubt serve to strengthen 

China’s extensive maritime claims. More and better ships and aircraft at Beijing’s 

disposal will likely increase its confidence in maritime disputes with its neighbors. As 

stated clearly in the Ningbo Academy study, China will continue to “build up its military 

maritime power, developing the power to safeguard its national territorial and maritime 

rights and interests.”139 Yet there is also the practical consideration that “relying on the 

navy . . . makes it easier for certain other countries to use the excuse of ‘the China threat 

theory.’”140

A second major implication is that stronger Chinese coast guard entities are likely to 

give further impetus to China’s rapidly growing “soft power” both in the Asia-Pacific 

and around the globe. Thus, in June 2008, the Ningbo Academy hosted a maritime law 

enforcement workshop for forty-two senior maritime officials from Asia and Africa.141

Such activities are likely to grow in size and scope in future decades, ultimately reaching 

a level more in line with China’s major role in international maritime commerce.142 No 

doubt, rescuing sailors from foreign (and often neighboring) nations helps to burnish 

China’s emerging prestige in the arena of maritime safety and security.143

Photo 24. Nanhai Jiu 113 of the Rescue and Salvage Bureau of the MSA will serve off the coast 

of southern China and is one of several new vessels that the MSA has developed in the last 

decade. (China Defense Forum)
32 china maritime studies

A third strategic implication may be even more important—that coast guards represent 

a distinctively different form of power than do navies. As explained by the authors of the 

Ningbo Academy study, “Naturally, in the course of the struggle for national interests, 

contradictions are inevitable. The real question is what means are used to settle these 

disputes. Giving full play to the government’s capabilities, deploying the navy cautiously 

and strenuously trying to limit the conflict’s scope to among the civil maritime authorities, can avoid a resort to escalation of the crisis.” 

Thus, the Ningbo coauthors articulate a vision of coast guards serving as a kind buffer 

between states in crisis, forestalling the intensification of crises that can result from 

rapid naval deployments. Similarly, a Chinese military analyst wrote in June 2008 that 

coast guard involvement would not complicate crises in the same way that direct navy 

involvement might.144 Geoffrey Till also makes this point in his classic treatise on contemporary sea power: “Coastguard ships are often more acceptable politically. . . . [T]he 

involvement of grey-painted warships is often seen as unhelpfully escalatory.”145 To be 

sure, this is an encouraging line of reasoning. The same Chinese analysts also highlight 

Photo 25. Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessel 311 exercises with other FLEC vessels. 

FLEC 311 is China’s largest fisheries management vessel and was dispatched to patrol the South 

China Sea when tensions arose in the area during mid-2009. It is expected that the FLEC will 

receive additional large cutters in the near future. FLEC 311 served formerly with the PLA Navy. 

(China Defense Forum)
five dragons stirring up the sea 33

Deng Xiaoping’s prescription to “maintain sovereignty, but shelve rivalry, and pursue 

joint development.” For them, Deng’s formulation represents a new way for China to act 

as a responsible great power that seeks peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.146 Such 

reasoning and stronger and more coherent Chinese coast guard capabilities generally 

make more feasible the realization of China’s emergence as a “responsible maritime 

stakeholder” in the twenty-first century.

1. Tara Bahrampour and Philip Pan, “U.S. Military 

Ship Delivers Aid to Georgia,” Washington Post,

28 August 2008, p. A14.

2. “Japan Says ‘Spy Ship’ Fired Rockets,” BBC, 25 

December 2001, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia 

-pacific/1727867.stm.

3. “Japan Admits Coast Guard ‘Partially at Fault’ in 

Fishing Boat Sinking,” Weekly Japan Update, 20 

June 2008, www.japanupdate.com/?id=8741.

4. Vivex Raghuvanshi, “Indian Coast Guard to Buy 

Six New Aircraft,” Defense News, 29 September 

2008, p. 30.

5. Choe Sang-hun, “Desolate Dots in the Sea Stir 

Deep Emotions as South Korea Resists a Japanese 

Claim,” New York Times, 31 August 2008. 

6. Richard J. Samuelson, “New Fighting Power: 

Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East 

Asian Security,” International Security 32, no. 3 

(Winter 2007/08), pp. 84–112.

7. M. Taylor Fravel, “Securing Borders: China’s 

Doctrine and Force Structure for Frontier 

Defense,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, nos. 4–5 

(August–October 2007), p. 709.

8. Some of the most important books written 

about Chinese naval development include Bruce 

Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History 

of China’s Quest for Seapower (Annapolis, Md.: 

Naval Institute Press, 1982); John Wilson Lewis 

and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The 

Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994); 

Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s 

Navy Enters the 21st Century (Annapolis, Md.: 

Naval Institute Press, 2001); and Andrew S. 

Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, 

and Andrew R. Wilson, China’s Future Nuclear 

Submarine Force (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 2007). Some government reports are also 

useful, especially Ronald O’Rourke, China’s 

Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy 

Capabilities: Background and Issues for Congress,

Report for Congress, Order Code RL33153 

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 

Service, 18 November 2005) (this report has been 

updated continuously in recent years); and U.S. 

Navy Dept., China’s Navy 2007 (Suitland, Md.: 

Office of Naval Intelligence, 2007).

9. A laudable effort to understand China’s approach 

to nontraditional security issues is Susan L. 

Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and 

Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. 

Army War College, 2007). However, this effort 

does not discuss the Chinese coast guard, or 

maritime security issues generally.

10. This term is employed to describe the major 

function of coast guards in Geoffrey Till, 

Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century

(London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 333.

11. It is worth noting that the problem of competing 

bureaucracies in the maritime domain is not 

unique to China. Even in the United States, Customs and Border Protection, National Marine 

Fisheries Service, and National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration also operate vessels, 

for coastal management and research. However, 

the primary difference is that the U.S. Coast 

Guard clearly functions as the nation’s “center of 

gravity” for maritime policy and enforcement. 

For a detailed discussion of the organizational differences, see Bernard Moreland [Capt., 

USCG], “U.S.-China Civil Maritime Engagement” (draft paper, Third Annual Conference of 

the China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval 

War College, Newport, R.I., 6 December 2007), 

pp. 1–2.

12. Samuelson, “New Fighting Power,” pp. 99–102. 

This analysis reveals the impressive capabilities 

of the Japan Coast Guard but also some of its 

distinct limits (e.g., in antisubmarine warfare 

and the projection of power ashore). 

13. 何忠龙, 任兴平, 冯水利, 罗宪芬, 刘景鸿 [He 

Zhonglong, Ren Xingping, Feng Shuili, Luo Xianfen, and Liu Jinghong], 中国海岸警卫队组建

研究 [Research on the Building of the Chinese 

Coast Guard] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007). The 

importance of this book is reinforced by the 

fact that a large number of articles by the same 

or nearly the same authors have appeared in a 

wide variety of civil and military maritime 

Notes
34 china maritime studies

professional journals on the subject of Chinese 

coast guard development. For example, the 

following articles were published in the journal 

of the State Oceanographic Administration: 何

忠龙, 任兴平, 冯水利 [He Zhonglong, Ren 

Xingping, and Feng Shuili], “我国海上综合执法

的特点及对策” [Our Country’s Comprehensive 

Maritime Enforcement: Characteristics and Solutions], 海洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development 

and Management] 25, no. 1 (2008), pp. 100–102; 

and 何忠龙, 任兴平, 冯永利 [He Zhonglong, 

Ren Xingping, and Feng Yongli], “我国海岸

警卫队组建模式探讨” [Inquiry into Building Our National Coast Guard], 海洋开发与

管理 [Ocean Development and Management] 

(June 2006), pp. 112–13. This is particularly 

significant, insofar as it means that thinkers in 

agencies in the Chinese government are reaching 

outside their organizations and speaking to a 

broader community of maritime policy makers. 

Additional articles by this research team include 

何忠龙, 任兴平, 冯永利 [He Zhonglong, Ren 

Xingping, and Feng Yongli], “组建中国海岸警

卫队初探” [Preliminary Study of the Creation of 

a Chinese Coast Guard], 军事学术 [Military Art] 

(November 2006), pp. 52–53; and 何忠龙, 赵久

利, 任兴平 [He Zhonglong, Zhao Jiuli, and Ren 

Xingping], “中国海岸警卫队兵力部署综合评

定指标体系研究” [Study on the Comprehensive 

Index System for Evaluating the Troop Disposition of Chinese Coast Guard], 装备指挥技术学

院学报 [Journal of the Academy of Equipment 

Command and Technology] (December 2006), 

pp. 1–5.

14. Another symptom of Beijing’s bureaucratic challenge related to China’s maritime frontier was the 

May 2009 announcement that a new Department 

of Boundary and Ocean Affairs was being set up 

within the foreign ministry. This move would 

seem to reflect a broader perception that China 

has lacked for an authoritative, lead agency with 

both the technical capacity and the authority to 

clarify Beijing’s positions regarding maritime 

boundaries. See “New Chinese Government 

Agency to Manage Land, Maritime Disputes,” 

Kyodo World Service, 5 May 2009.

15. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 69.

16. Ibid., p. 145.

17. Ibid., p. 3.

18. See, for example, 白俊丰 [Bai Junfeng], “中国海

洋警察建设构想” [Conception Regarding the 

Building of China’s Maritime Police], 海洋管理

[Maritime Management] (March 2006), p. 35.

19. 李培志 [Li Peizhi], 美国海岸警卫队 [The 

United States Coast Guard] (Beijing: Social 

Science Academic, 2005), is an authoritative 

Chinese study of the U.S. Coast Guard. On the 

Japan Coast Guard, see, for example, 方新洲

[Fang Xinzhou], “日本海上保安厅概览” [An 

Overview of Japan’s Maritime Security Agency], 

海事达观 [Maritime Spectacle] (May 2005), pp. 

33–37; 候建军 [Hou Jianjun], “日本第二支海

上力量: 海上保安厅” [Japan’s Second Maritime 

Force: The Maritime Security Agency], 舰船知识

[Naval and Merchant Ships] (October 2006), pp. 

24–28; and 间舞 [Jian Wu], “专盯钓鱼岛的日

本海上保安厅第11管区” [The Japan Maritime 

Security Agency’s 11th District: Focused on the 

Diaoyu Islands], 环球军事 [Global Military Affairs] (July 2008), pp. 14–17.

20. Discussions with MSA- and SOA-affiliated personnel, Qingdao, April 2008.

21. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 36.

22. Ibid., p. 142. This compilation of statistics shows 

Chinese capacities in a more favorable light when 

calculating ship numbers and tonnage per square 

kilometer of water in the exclusive economic 

zone.

23. Ibid., p. 26.

24. Ibid., p. 14.

25. Ibid., p. 13.

26. Ibid., p. 14.

27. Bai Junfeng, “Conception Regarding the Building 

of China’s Maritime Police,” p. 38.

28. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 4.

29. Ibid., p. 37.

30. This information is mostly derived from 陈光

文 [Chen Guangwen], “中国海上警备力量” 

[China’s Coast Guard Capabilities], 兵器知识

[Ordinance Knowledge] (May 2009), pp. 50–51.

See the “List of China Coast Guard Vessels” on 

the website of China Defense Today, www 

.sinodefense.com/navy/coastguard/ship.asp. A 

total of nine types of patrol boats are listed on 

this website as serving the Maritime Police.

31. Interviews, Beijing, April 2008.

32. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building 

of the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 57. Terrorism is 

also cited as a concern for China’s future coast 

guard in Bai Junfeng, “Conception Regarding the 

Building of China’s Maritime Police,” p. 36. 

33. 烽火 [Feng Huo], “海上保安战: 近海反恐与安

全战术” [The Battle for Maritime Security: Tactics for Littoral Counterterrorism and Security], 

现代舰船 [Modern Ships] (June 2008), p. 20.

34. See, for example, “话说海盗” [About Piracy], 中

国海事 [China Maritime Affairs] (November 
five dragons stirring up the sea 35

2006), pp. 63–65; “海盗: 国际航运的难去之痒” 

[Piracy: A Disruption of International Shipping 

That Is Difficult to Eliminate], 中国船检 [China 

Ship Survey] (May 2006), pp. 48–50; and 刘少才

[Liu Shaocai], “马六甲海峡死抗海盗” [Deadly 

Pirates of the Malacca Strait], 中国海事 [China 

Maritime Affairs] (October 2007), pp. 66–68.

See also Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and 

David Rosenberg, eds., Piracy and Maritime 

Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, Newport Paper 35 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College 

Press), esp. chaps. 3–5.

35. “交通部国际合作司长透露海军护航决策由来” 

[Head of International Cooperation Department of Ministry of Transportation Reveals 

Origins of Decision on Naval Escort], 三联生

活周刊 [Sanlian Life Weekly], 16 January 2009. 

Prof. Nan Li of the U.S. Naval War College 

identified this source and noted the importance 

of this information.

36. 杨翠柏 [Yang Cuibai], “亚洲打击海盗及武装

抢劫船只的地区合作协定评价” [Evaluation 

of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 

Ships in Asia], 南洋问题研究 [South East Asian 

Affairs], no. 4 (2006), p. 29.

37. 吴尉青 [Wu Weiqing], “浅谈知何预防盗劫” 

[A Simple Discussion on Prevention of Pirate 

Attacks], 中国水运 [China Water Transport] 7 

(June 2007), p. 183.

38. 吕贤臣 [Lu Xianchen], “现代海盗的威胁和防

范” [The Threat and Precautions against Modern 

Pirates], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships] (October 

2006), pp. 26–29.

39. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 37.

40. “‘十五’海事成果辉煌和谐发展还看令朝” 

[Great Maritime Achievements during the Time 

of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and Harmonious 

Development Now and in the Future], 中国海事

[China Maritime Affairs] (January 2006), p. 11.

41. Shanghai MSA (Shanghai: 2005), p. 13.

42. For discussion of AIS integration in China, see, 

for example, 陆悦铭, 周懿宗 [Lu Yueming and 

Zhou Yicong], “关于国轮在设置, 使用AIS设备

中存在的问题和一些思考” [Some Issues and 

Considerations Related to the Carrying and Use 

of AIS Equipment aboard Chinese Ships], 中

国海事 [China Maritime Affairs] (July 2006), 

pp. 35–37; 张哲, 卢言朋, 邓霞 [Zhang Zhe, Lu 

Yanpeng, and Deng Xia], “关于我国进行远距离

AIS信息探测的研究” [Study on the Detection 

of Long-Range AIS Message Traffic in China], 

中国海事 [China Maritime Affairs] (December 

2007), pp. 52–55; and 赵海波, 张英俊 [Zhao 

Haibo and Zhang Yingjun], “中国北方海区AIS

应用研究” [Study on the Application of AIS in 

the Northern Sea Region of China], 大连海事大

学学报 [Journal of Dalian Maritime University] 

33 (December 2007), pp. 81–86.

43. Shanghai MSA director, interview, November 

2007.

44. 程彪 [Cheng Biao], “海巡31号船通导设备安

装调试问题的分析及解决方案” [Analysis and 

Resolution of the Equipment Debugging aboard 

the Vessel Haixun 31, a Pathbreaking Project 

for the Communications Ministry], 广船科技

[Guangdong Shipbuilding Science and Technology] (February 2005), p. 88.

45. See “China Sends Patrol Fleet to East China Sea,” 

中国网 [China Net], 1 July 2008, www 

.china.org.cn/china/national/2008-07/01/ 

content_15915452.htm.

46. 林红梅 [Lin Hongmei], “我国最大最先进的

海事巡视船‘海巡11’列编” [Our Country’s 

Largest and Most Advanced Maritime Patrol 

Ship “Haixun 11” Joins the Fleet], Xinhua, 28 

September 2009.

47. Interviews, Beijing, April 2009.

48. Incidentally, the design of this catamaran is very 

similar to that of the PLA Navy’s Type 022 fast 

attack craft—one of the few surface vessels that 

has entered serial production with the Chinese 

navy.

49. Capt. Bernard Moreland, USCG (USCG liaison 

officer, U.S. Embassy, Beijing), discussions with 

author, November 2007.

50. “CSC All-Weather Patrol Rescue Ship Launched,” 

国际船艇 [World Ships and Boats] (May 2008), 

p. 6.

51. The high level of Chinese interest in this subject 

is evident, for example, in 张显库, 尹勇, 金一丞

[Zhang Xianku, Yin Yong, and Ji Yicheng], “海上

搜救模拟器的直升机悬停鲁棒控制” [Robust 

Control for Helicopter Hovering in Marine 

Search and Rescue Simulator], 中国航海 [Navigation of China] 31, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 1–5; 

and 贺欣 [He Xin], “救助直升机救助半径分析

计算” [Analysis and Calculation of the Service 

Range of a Rescue Helicopter], 大连海事大学学

报 [Journal of Dalian Maritime University] (June 

2007), pp. 122–23.

52. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 111.

53. According to the U.S. Coast Guard liaison officer 

at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, the China MSA 

and Rescue and Salvage Bureau currently operate 

eleven helicopters. Moreland, “U.S.-China Civil 

Maritime Engagement,” p. 10.
36 china maritime studies

54. “China to Expand Maritime Administration 

Scope,” Xinhua, 12 February 2003, available at 

www.china.org.cn/english/China/55774.htm.

55. For basic reporting on this tragedy, see, for 

example, “Hopes Fade for Shipwreck Survivors,” 

BBC News, 26 November 1999, available at news 

.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/536540. For Chinese 

reporting, which is relatively extensive, on the 

incident, see, for example, 胡梓 [Hu Zi],“中国的

泰坦尼克的佘音” [The Story of China’s Titanic], 

中国船检 [China Ship Survey] (July 2000), pp. 

37–38. A more technical Chinese analysis that 

provides comparative insights is 张文博, 鲍君忠

[Zhang Wenbo and Bao Junzhong], “渤海湾水

域海事案例分析” [An Analysis of Maritime Incident Cases in the Bohai Sea Area], 大连海事大

学学报 [Journal of Dalian Maritime University] 

33 (December 2007), pp. 98–102.

56. Moreland, “U.S.-China Civil Maritime Engagement,” p. 10.

57. On safety along the Yangtze, see, for example, 

周航, 吴桐 [Zhou Hang and Wu Tong], “浅析

长江干线桥区水域安全管理” [Discussion on 

Safety Management in the Waters adjacent to 

the Bridges on the Upper Section of the Yangtze 

River], 中国海事 [China Maritime Affairs] 

(February 2008), pp. 20–21.

58. “Great Maritime Achievements during the Time 

of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and Harmonious 

Development Now and in the Future,” p. 11. 

59. See, for example, “‘富山海’轮与‘Gdynia’轮碰撞

事故调查” [Investigation in the Collision Involving M/V “Fushanhai” and M/V “Gdynia”], 中国

海事 [China Maritime Affairs] (March 2006), pp. 

18–21; 李爱民 [Li Aimin], “由‘安庆’号油轮爆

炸事故引发的思考” [Analysis of the Oil Tanker 

Explosion Accident aboard the “An Qing”], 中国

海事 [China Maritime Affairs] (August 2008), 

pp. 33–35.

60. 彭宏恺 [Peng Hongkai], “从红海海难看海事

管理中德‘海思发则’”[Discussion of Accident 

Law of Maritime Management in the Context of 

the Disaster in the Red Sea], 中国海事 [China 

Maritime Affairs] (March 2006), pp. 38–39.

61. See, for example, “英国海上搜救” [Maritime 

Search and Rescue in the UK], 中国海事 [China 

Maritime Affairs] (January 2007), pp. 65–67; and 

刘松树 [Liu Songshu], “渤海与欧盟地区客滚

运输安全的比较与启示” [Comparison and Insights from Bohai Bay and EU Ro/Ro Passenger 

Transport Safety], 中国海事 [China Maritime 

Affairs] (September 2007), pp. 40–43.

62. Regarding typhoon preparedness and response, 

see, for example, 王海潮 [Wang Haichao], “台

风: 考验海上灾害预警机制” [Typhoon: A Test 

for the Maritime Disaster Alerting System], 中国

海事 [China Maritime Affairs] (January 2007), 

pp. 14–17; 袁书明, 单福林, 欧阳泰山 [Yuan 

Shuming, Dan Fulin, and Ouyang Taishan], “基

于电子海图的船舶绕避台风系统设计与实

现” [Typhoon Avoidance System Software for 

Vessel-Based ECDIS], 中国航海 [Navigation 

of China] (December 2007), pp. 50–53; and 翟

久刚 [Zhai Jiugang], “中美防抗台风体制之比

较” [A Comparison of the Typhoon Response 

Systems of China and the United States], 中国海

事 [China Maritime Affairs] (February 2006), pp. 

52–56.

63. See, for example, the assessment by Ramsey 

Rayyis, International Red Cross representative 

in China, as quoted in Jaime FlorCruz, “People, 

Politics Ease China’s Disaster Evacuation Efforts,” CNN.com, 9 October 2007. In another 

example from the same period, MSA ships and 

aircraft played primary roles in rescuing nearly 

a thousand fishermen stranded during Typhoon 

Hagibis. Many were Chinese, but Vietnamese and 

Filipinos were also rescued by the China MSA. 

See Xin Dingding, “Aid Dispatched to Fisherman,” China Daily, 28 November 2007, pp. 1, 3.

64. 林红梅 [Lin Hongmei], “中日俄朝立起油事故

互相援助机制” [China, Japan, Russia, and South 

Korea Establish an Oil-Accident Mutual-Support 

Mechanism], 人民网 [People’s Daily Internet], 3 

September 2008, www.people.com.cn.

65. “Two Chinese Ships Sent to Assist in ROK Oil 

Spill,” 中国网 [China Net], 14 December 2008, 

www.ching.org.cn/english/international/235711 

.htm.

66. Chinese maritime universities have much larger 

student bodies and also faculties. Perhaps a more 

telling indicator, however, is that Chinese maritime universities have PhD programs in a variety 

of disciplines, while their American counterparts 

do not have PhD programs.

67. 慕永通 [Mu Yongtong], 渔业管理: 以基于权利

的管理为中心 [Fisheries Management: Focusing 

on a Rights-Based Regime] (Qingdao: China 

Ocean University Press, 2006), p. 292.

68. Yunjun Yu and Yongtong Mu, “The New Institutional Arrangement for Fisheries Management in 

the Beibu Gulf,” Marine Policy 30 (2006), p. 251. 

69. “Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: 

China,” Food and Agriculture Organization of 

the United Nations, p. 3, available at www.fao 

.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP/en. 

70. The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 

2008 (Rome: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009), p. 11, available at www 

.fao.org/docrep/10250e/io250e00.htm.

71. This paragraph draws upon information from 

“Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: 
five dragons stirring up the sea 37

China,” and also from 李德水, 王曙光 [Li 

Deshui and Wang Shugang], 中国海洋统计年鉴

2004 [China Marine Statistical Yearbook 2004] 

(Beijing: Ocean Press, 2005), pp. xi–xvi.

72. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 37.

73. On this subject, see Lyle Goldstein, “Strategic 

Implications of Chinese Fisheries Development,” 

China Brief 9, no. 16 (5 August 2009), available at 

www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/.

74. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 40.

75. Guifang Xue, “China’s Distant Water Fisheries 

and Its Responses to Flag State Responsibilities,” 

Marine Policy 30 (2006), p. 653.

76. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 12.

77. Lu Xianchen, “The Threat and Precautions 

against Modern Pirates,” pp. 26–29.

78. Li Zhujiang, ed., 海洋与渔业: 应急管理 [The 

Ocean and the Fishing Industry: Emergency 

Management] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), p. 

299.

79. 王旭 [Wang Xu], “我南海海警依法驱逐外籍

渔船20余艘” [Our South China Sea Maritime 

Police Acting in Accordance with the Law Expel 

20 Foreign Fishing Boats], CCTV.com, 2 August 

2009.

80. Hai Tao and Qi Fei, “PRC Building Civilian ‘Law 

Enforcement’ Fleet for South China Sea,” Guoji 

Xianqu Dabao, 20 March 2009, Open Source 

Center translation CPP20090324671007.

81. “China Customs Annual Report 2007,” p. 1, 

General Administration of Customs, www.customs 

.gov.cn/publish/portal0/.

82. Ibid., p. 4.

83. “Chinese Customs Uncover 1,190 Smuggling 

Cases in 2007,” Renmin Wang, 10 January 2008.

84. 卢文辉, 叶信鹄 [Lu Wenhui and Ye Xinhu], “夏

门市涉台毒品犯罪问题研究” [Research on the 

Platforms Used in the Xiamen City Illegal Drug 

Problem], 福建公安高等专科学校学报 [Fujian 

Police Senior Academy Journal] (March 2007), p. 

12.

85. 王义生 [Wang Yisheng], “濒海 作战舰载雷达” 

[Shipborne Radar for Inshore Combat], 当代海

军 [Modern Navy] (December 2005), p. 54.

86. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 38.

87. “China Customs Annual Report 2007,” p. 4.

88. Ibid., p. 9.

89. “中国海上警备力量装备” [Equipment of 

China’s Coast Guard], 中国国防报 [China 

National Defense Report], 16 June 2009, p. 22.

90. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 27. A higher 

number of personnel, eight thousand, is given 

in a different source: 孙书贤 [Sun Xuxian], “中

国海监: 护卫国家海洋权益” [China Maritime 

Surveillance: Protecting the Nation’s Oceanic 

Interests], 中国国防报 [China National Defense 

Report], 5 May 2008, p. 21. The latter figure is 

also reported in “Sea Patrol Force to Get More 

Muscle,” China Daily, 20 October 2008, available 

at www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-10/21/

content_7123436.htm.

91. “China Faces Severe Ocean Pollution,” China 

Daily, 11 January 2006.

92. 郝艳沣, 杨凤丽 [Hao Yanfeng and Yang Fengli], 

“中国海洋环境管理现状与对策” [Management 

Situation and Policy Options for China’s Maritime Environment], 海洋开发与管理 [Ocean 

Development and Management] (July 2008), pp. 

75–77. 

93. North China Sea Marine Forecasting Center, 

www.ncsmfc.gov.cn/.

94. Bai Junfeng, “Conception Regarding the Building 

of China’s Maritime Police,” p. 37.

95. Report, 1 July 2008, SOA website, www.soa 

.gov.cn/.

96. “Sea Patrol Force to Get More Muscle.” 

97. Chen Guangwen, “China’s Coast Guard Capabilities,” pp. 51–52. See also China Defense Today, 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/marine-surveillance/

ship.asp.

98. Report, 22 July 2008, SOA website, www.soa 

.gov.cn/.

99. Chen Guangwen, “China’s Coast Guard Capabilities,” p. 52.

100. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 145.

101. Sun Xuxian, “China Maritime Surveillance,” p. 

21.

102. Chen Guangwen, “China’s Coast Guard Capabilities,” p. 57.

103. Bai Junfeng, “Conception Regarding the Building 

of China’s Maritime Police,” p. 38.

104. 孙书贤 [Sun Xuxian], “进一步增强使命感和责

任感奋精神, 开拓进取不断开创海监工作的

新局面” [Further Enhance the Sense of Mission 

and Responsibility and Constantly Foster New 

Work Initiatives for China Sea Surveillance], 海

洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management] (March 2008), pp. 11–16; 苏宸 [Su 
38 china maritime studies

Chen], “雾航: ‘中国海监18’船船长亲历东海维

权” [Foggy Patrol: The Captain of “China Maritime Surveillance Boat 18” Upholds Sovereign 

Rights in the East Sea], 海洋世界 [Ocean World] 

(April 2008), pp. 52–53.

105. “Sea Patrol Force to Get More Muscle.” 

106. “中国海监跟踪美间谍船详情: 美舰无视中方

警告” [Detailed Description of China Maritime 

Surveillance Trailing a U.S. Spy Vessel: The U.S. 

Vessel Defies China’s Warning], 新华网 [Xinhua 

Internet], 15 September 2009.

107. On this recent mission to Antarctica, see, for 

example, 崔晓龙 [Cui Xiaolong], “亲历‘雪龙’号

远征南极” [Intimate Look at the Snow Dragon’s 

Expedition to the South Pole], 舰船知识 [Naval 

and Merchant Ships] (July 2007), pp. 22–25.

108. Till, Seapower, pp. 343–46.

109. Bai Junfeng, “Conception Regarding the Building 

of China’s Maritime Police,” p. 35.

110. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 4.

111. Ibid., p. 221. Bai Junfeng also asserts that a future 

Chinese coast guard would support the Chinese 

navy in wartime. His analysis lists as possible 

wartime missions “supporting and participating 

with the navy in combat operations, escorting 

maritime commerce, protecting ports, securing 

wharves, and supporting the full mobilization of 

citizens.” Bai Junfeng, “Conception Regarding the 

Building of China’s Maritime Police,” p. 38.

112. 田承基 [Tian Chengji], “专家呼唤 ‘中国海岸警

卫队’保海洋权益” [Expert Calls for a “Chinese 

Coast Guard” to Protect Maritime Rights and 

Interests], 人民网 [Peoples’ Daily Internet], 21 

June 2009.

113. Moreland, “U.S.-China Civil Maritime Engagement,” p. 4.

114. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 9.

115. Ibid., p. 14. A similar idea is articulated in Bai 

Junfeng, “Conception Regarding the Building of 

China’s Maritime Police,” p. 38.

116. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 213.

117. 孙景平 [Sun Jingping], “新世纪新阶段海上

安全战略断想” [Notes on Maritime Security 

Strategy in the New Period for the New Century], 

中国军事科学 [China Military Science] (June 

2008), pp. 77–78.

118. 菖学军 [Chang Xuejun], “黄金水道: 上演立

体大搜救” [The Golden Sea Route: Presenting 

Multidimensional Search and Rescue], 当代海军

[Modern Navy] (August 2009), pp. 8–14. 

119. See, for example, 于文献 [Yu Wenxian], “怒

海救援: 107 舰10级风浪中搜寻受困渔民记” 

[Rescue from an Angry Sea: Report of (Navy) 

Ship 107’s Search for a Distressed Fishing 

Vessel in Force 10 Gale], 现代舰船 [Modern 

Ships] (April 2007), pp. 2–3. See also a photo 

of civil-military combined medical-response 

exercise by 章汉亭 [Zhang Hanting] in 当代海

军 [Modern Navy] (November 2007), p. 44. With 

respect to coastal natural disasters, see the article 

by authors from the Nanjing PLA Academy of 

Science and Technology, 郑晶晶, 徐迎, 金丰年

[Zheng Jingjing, Xu Ying, and Jin Fengnian], “‘卡

特里哪’飓风对防灾预案的启示” [Taking Lessons from Disaster Planning before “Hurricane 

Katrina”], 自然灾害学报 [Journal of Natural 

Disasters] 16, no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 12–16. 

It is also worth noting that the PLA Navy retains 

an interest in coastal frigates and cutters: 谭正平

[Tan Zhengping], “近海护卫舰正受各国海军

青睐” [Inshore Frigates Are in the Good Graces 

of Every Navy], 当代海军 [Modern Navy] (April 

2007), pp. 49–52.

120. Richard Suttmeier, “China, Safety, and the Management of Risks,” Asia Policy 6 (July 2008), p. 

133.

121. Ibid., p. 131.

122. Ibid., p. 141.

123. Ibid., p. 143.

124. Ibid., p. 142.

125. Ibid., p. 143.

126. Ibid., p. 144.

127. A similar thesis is put forward in Tian Chengji, 

“Expert Calls for a ‘Chinese Coast Guard’ to 

Protect Maritime Rights and Interests.”

128. Suttmeier, “China, Safety, and the Management 

of Risks,” p. 142. 

129. Moreland, discussions with author, April 2007.

130. This paragraph summarizes the detailed description of these incidents in Moreland, “U.S.-China 

Civil Maritime Engagement,” pp. 8–9.

131. Ibid., p. 6.

132. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

133. Ibid., p. 11.

134. Ibid., pp. 4–5.

135. See U.S. Navy Dept., A Cooperative Strategy 

for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, D.C.: 

17 October 2007), available at www.navy.mil/

maritime/; reprinted in Naval War College Review

61, no. 1 (Winter 2008), available at www 

.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College 

-Review.aspx. 
five dragons stirring up the sea 39

136. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, pp. 69–70.

137. Discussions with MSA- and SOA-affiliated personnel, Qingdao, November 2007.

138. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 212.

139. Ibid., p. 16.

140. Ibid., p. 69.

141. “China Holds Workshop for Asian, African 

Maritime Officials,” Xinhua, 4 June 2008.

142. Regarding other international maritime-security 

initiatives, see, for example, 许艳, 刘政 [Xu 

Yan and Liu Zheng], “中国与东盟加强海事

合作” [Maritime Cooperation between China 

and ASEAN Strengthened], 中国海事 [China 

Maritime Affairs] (September 2007), pp. 60–62; 

章茉军, 王鹤荀, 华文锋 [Zhang Mojun, Wang 

Hexun, and Hua Wenfeng], “第11届中日朝俄四

国搜救合作操作级别会议概况” [General 

Introduction to the 11th China, Japan, Korea, 

and Russia Operative-Level Meeting for Cooperation in Search and Rescue], 中国海事 [China 

Maritime Affairs] (January 2008), pp. 61–62; 

and 王海潮 [Wang Haichao], “澜沧江—湄公河

建设国际航运 ‘大通道’” [The Great LancangMekong International Shipping Corridor], 中国

海事 [China Maritime Affairs] (February 2006), 

pp. 14–15.

143. See, for example, 郝光亮 [Hao Guangliang], “海

事部门成功救助朝鲜籍‘君山’轮上21名遇险

船员” [China Maritime Authorities Successfully 

Rescued 21 Seafarers from the Korean Vessel M/V 

“Jun Shan”], 中国海事 [China Maritime Affairs] 

(November 2007), pp. 18–20.

144. Sun Jingping, “Notes on Maritime Security 

Strategy in the New Period for the New Century,” 

p. 77.

145. Till, Seapower, pp. 343, 347.

146. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of 

the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 14.

Abbreviations and Definitions

A AIS Automatic Identification System

Amver Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue (system)

B BCD Border Control Department

C CSI Container Security Initiative

CMS China Maritime Surveillance 

E EEZ exclusive economic zone

F FLEC Fisheries Law Enforcement Command

G GAC General Administration of Customs

M MSA Maritime Safety Administration

P PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

R RCC Rescue Coordination Center

ROK Republic of Korea

S SOA State Oceanographic Administration

U USCG U.S. Coast Guard
About the Author

Professor Lyle J. Goldstein is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and is also the founding 

director of NWC’s new China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). This institute was 

established in October 2006 to improve mutual understanding and maritime cooperation with China. Proficient in Chinese and Russian, Professor Goldstein has conducted 

extensive field research in both China and Russia. His research on Chinese foreign 

policy, especially concerning maritime development, has been published in Asia Policy, 

China Quarterly, International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, and U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings. Professor Goldstein’s first book, which compared proliferation 

crises and focused particularly on Chinese nuclear strategy, was published by Stanford 

University Press in 2005. He is the co-editor of the U.S. Naval Institute books China’s 

Future Nuclear Submarine Force (2007), China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s 

Maritime Policies (2008), and China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in a Comparative Historical Context (2009). The next book in this series is entitled Defining a 

Maritime Partnership with China (forthcoming 2010). Recently, his research focus has 

been on further development of China’s Coast Guard and related cooperation issues. 

He lectured at the Chinese Coast Guard Academy in Ningbo in 2007 and has published 

research on Chinese maritime enforcement capabilities in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and also in China Brief. In October 2009, Professor Goldstein briefed this research 

to USCG Commandant Admiral Thad Allen. His future work will continue to support 

USCG engagement and cooperation with China. Professor Goldstein earned his PhD 

from Princeton University in 2001, has an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and also a BA from Harvard University. In China, 

he studied at Beijing Normal University.