Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 

on 15 December 1917. He took flying training 

at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned 

to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 

with a subsequent assignment in December 

1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. 

Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the 

strategic thinkers at the school and coined the 

revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: 

“A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown 

air force attack will constitute an offensive that 

cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three 

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, 

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States 

in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the 

Air Corps in Washington, DC.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 

1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy 

known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, 

deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan 

should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed 

this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen 

George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this 

capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing 

missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat 

conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a 

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. 

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face 

of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy 

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against 

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy 

vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the 

attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and 

intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of 

the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.

00-Inside frontcover.indd 1 11/8/06 9:58:1
After you have read this research report, please 

give us your frank opinion on the contents. All 

comments––large or small, complimentary or 

caustic––will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them 

to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6428.

The Future of NATO-Russian Hendrickson

Relations

or How to Dance with a Bear and

Not Get Mauled

Thank you for your assistance.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cut along dotted line

01-Tearout sheet.indd 1 11/8/06 9:58:4
AIR FORCE FELLOWS

COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Future of 

NATO-Russian Relations

or How to Dance with a Bear 

and Not Get Mauled

GORDON B. HENDRICKSON

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 6

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

July 2006

02-frontmatter.indd 1 11/8/06 9:58:5
ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Hendrickson, Gordon B.

The future of NATO-Russian relations, or How to dance with a bear and not get 

mauled / Gordon B. Hendrickson.

 p. ; cm. – (Walker paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 6)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-155-4

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Russia (Federation). 2. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations. 3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Membership. I. 

Title. II. Series.

355.031091821—dc22

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

This Walker Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web 

site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

02-frontmatter.indd 2 11/8/06 9:58:5
iii

Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of 

carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours at 

distinguished civilian institutions studying national security 

policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, 

these programs were accorded in-residence credit as part of 

professional military education at senior service schools. In 

2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force-development credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their 

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level 

fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well 

as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, 

and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, 

foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force 

Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of 

ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected 

to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and 

foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for 

research and writing on important national security issues. 

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, 

the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force 

Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

On the level of intermediate developmental education, the 

chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on 

career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force LegislaAir Force Fellows

02-frontmatter.indd 3 11/8/06 9:58:5
iv

tive Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the 

Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows 

program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed 

responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.

AIR FORCE FELLOWS

02-frontmatter.indd 4 11/8/06 9:58:5
v

Contents

Chapter Page

 DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

 FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

 ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

 PREFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

 ABSTRACT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 2 BACKGROUND—THE LONG 

ROAD TO ROME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 3 RUSSIAN RESPONSES AND 

PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

 4 CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 5 AREAS OF COOPERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

 6 RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Illustration

 Timeline of NATO Enlargement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

02-frontmatter.indd 5 11/8/06 9:58:5
vii

Foreword

Throughout the Cold War, the NATO allies and the Soviet 

Union faced each other as adversaries, constantly preparing for 

and investing enormous resources against the real possibility 

of a major armed conflict in Europe and the North Atlantic 

region. Thankfully, the end of the Cold War changed all that. 

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the 

Soviet Union almost 15 years ago, NATO subsequently opened 

its doors to any member of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact willing to join the alliance and able to meet its entry 

criteria. Since that time, 10 countries—all former Soviet satellites—have joined NATO’s ranks through two rounds of expansion. During this time, and despite palpable Russian discomfort with the prospect of the alliance drawing ever closer to its 

borders, NATO-Russian relations have been marked by unprecedented and increasing cooperation in a number of different fields and venues.

There is, however, a good chance the alliance may undertake 

yet another round of expansion in the future, to include the 

possibility of offering membership to countries that share significant borders as well as long-standing historic and cultural 

ties with Russia. In addition, an increasingly self-confident 

Russia is now attempting to exert greater political and economic influence in the Eurasian region and to once again 

be seen as a world power. How can NATO effectively deal 

with these dynamics and continue to work cooperatively 

with Russia?

In this paper, Lt Col Gordy Hendrickson offers some answers. 

He examines the recent history of the relationship and the Russian perspectives on that history and addresses many of the 

potentially contentious issues still facing NATO and Russia. He 

then outlines a useful framework for interaction between the 

two sides—a framework which can form the foundation for 

concrete actions and programs to continue down the path of 

mutual cooperation. Colonel Hendrickson concludes by proposing several practical steps the alliance can take to continue 

to effectively work with Russia and keep the relationship moving forward.

02-frontmatter.indd 7 11/8/06 9:58:5
viii

It is absolutely vital that NATO and Russia get this right. 

Despite areas of potential disagreement, there is still much 

room for cooperation between the two parties. However, they 

must both seek to avoid old patterns of distrust and zero-sum 

competition—certainly a task easier said than done. But with a 

joint commitment to cooperation in working through the inevitable challenges, NATO and Russia can, and must, navigate 

the path ahead together. This thought-provoking and timely 

paper offers valuable insight into how to do just that.

FRANK G. KLOTZ

Lieutenant General, USAF

FOREWORD

02-frontmatter.indd 8 11/8/06 9:58:5
ix

Lt Col Gordon B. Hendrickson currently serves as Special 

Advisor to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, where 

he provides recommendations and guidance on a broad range 

of European and Eurasian matters. He is experienced in every 

intelligence discipline across a wide variety of duties at the national, theater, and unit levels.

Colonel Hendrickson was commissioned with military distinction in 1985 from the US Air Force Academy, Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, where he earned a bachelor of science degree in Russian history. He also holds a master of arts degree 

in international relations from Creighton University, Omaha, 

Nebraska; a master of arts degree in national security affairs, 

Soviet/East European Studies, from the Naval Postgraduate 

School, Monterey, California; and a master of military operational art and science degree from the Air Command and Staff 

College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Colonel Hendrickson’s career includes duties as an intelligence analyst, weaponeer and target developer, command 

briefer, foreign area officer, telecommunications and computer 

security chief, and wing executive officer. He served a joint 

tour as assistant air attaché and air attaché to the US Embassy 

in Moscow, Russia, and commanded the 381st Intelligence 

Squadron at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. Most recently, he was a 

Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States in 

Washington, DC. His personal awards include the Defense 

About the 

Author

Lt Col Gordon B. Hendrickson

02-frontmatter.indd 9 11/8/06 9:58:5
x

Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with 

three oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal with 

oak leaf cluster, and Air Force Achievement Medal.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

02-frontmatter.indd 10 11/8/06 9:58:5
xi

Preface

The genesis of this paper began several years ago while I was 

living in Europe and NATO began considering its most recent 

rounds of enlargement. During four years of extensive travel 

throughout Western Europe and two years of working in the US 

Embassy in Moscow, I could clearly see the impact that relations between NATO and the Russian Federation have, not only 

on their foreign and defense policies, but also the very real and 

personal impact they have on me as a US military officer. As a 

result, when the opportunity for additional research arose, I 

wanted to understand better the issues and stakes involved in 

such an important relationship.

I found most of my material for this project from local sources 

in the Washington, DC, area; from NATO printed publications 

and materials; and from Internet sources. I used materials from 

all sides of the problem and from all significant parties involved. 

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my 

Senior Fellowship institution, the Atlantic Council of the United 

States (ACUS). Lyn Soudien and Matt Schumann were terrific 

in helping to facilitate what was a rich and rewarding year of 

“broadening my horizons.” I also thank Fran Burwell and Sara 

Tesorieri for the opportunity to see and experience Europe’s 

leadership institutions firsthand, as well as my colleagues and 

other Senior Fellows at ACUS for their comments and discussions during the writing and presentation of this paper. Their 

perspectives and insights helped me to understand better the 

wide range of views represented in this important area and to 

form my own views on this relationship. Finally and most importantly, I thank my wife, Kim, for her patience and support 

during my seemingly endless research, and for once again tolerating the stacks of source materials that invaded our home 

these past months. 

GORDON B. HENDRICKSON

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

02-frontmatter.indd 11 11/8/06 9:59:0
xiii

Abstract

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 

Pact, NATO has enlarged its membership twice with countries 

formerly under Soviet influence and control and, as of this writing, is preparing to begin the process for a third expansion. 

Russia has watched the borders of NATO creep ever closer to 

its own but has generally been powerless to prevent it. Although 

NATO has taken pains to include and consult with Russia 

regarding its actions and future plans, former air attaché to the 

US Embassy in Moscow Gordon Hendrickson contends the 

Kremlin cannot reasonably be expected to continue to watch 

NATO’s eastward expansion without eventually pushing back 

hard. Without question, many significant issues and challenges must still be solved before enlarging the alliance once 

again. In light of this, the author says NATO must work rigorously to continue to keep Russia engaged in a productive and 

mutually beneficial relationship as both sides work through 

the future obstacles that inevitably will arise in the NATORussian relationship. 

Although the relationship is continuing to evolve, Hendrickson’s research led him to the conclusion that, in order to keep 

Russia reassured and working productively with NATO, there 

are a number of concrete actions the alliance can and must 

take to avoid squandering the historic opportunity before it.

02-frontmatter.indd 13 11/8/06 9:59:0
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

We need to be Russia’s toughest critic, but we also need to be 

Russia’s best friend. 

—Cong. Curt Weldon

Over the past decade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) has undergone the most significant changes of its more 

than 50-year life. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has 

expanded twice, in 1999 and 2004, and has added 10 new 

members in the past six years. The alliance has also undergone 

a fundamental shift in focus, from a purely collective defense 

alliance designed to counter the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat 

during the Cold War to a collective security organization 

designed to bolster and fortify the overall security posture of 

the Euro-Atlantic area. This shift has also significantly included 

a new NATO mission of out-of-area operations, most notably in 

Afghanistan and Iraq.

NATO leaders continue to stress that the “door remains open” 

to even more new members, provided they are willing and able 

to meet NATO’s entrance requirements. As NATO prepares for 

another likely round of enlargement within the next few years, 

its leaders must seriously consider the impact yet another 

growth eastward will have on the Russian Federation. Moscow 

has thus far accepted with relatively little protest NATO’s last 

two expansion rounds, which encompassed countries formerly 

under Soviet influence. This was partly due to Russia’s inability 

to effectively prevent the alliance from expanding, as well as 

the effort alliance leaders made to keep Russia engaged with 

and included in NATO affairs. However, in considering another 

round of new members, which undoubtedly will include countries directly bordering the Russian Federation, NATO leaders 

will have to redouble their efforts and creativity to allay Russian fears of Western encirclement or encroachment. This paper looks at several concrete actions the alliance can take in an 

effort to reach that goal.

03-chap01.indd 1 11/8/06 10:00:
2

Chapters 2 and 3 provide a history and overview of the development of NATO-Russian relations over the past 15 years since 

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, along with a survey of Russian attitudes and responses. Chapter 4 examines some of the 

major contentious issues now facing the two sides, with a particular focus on the underlying sources of those problems that 

will continue to affect future NATO-Russian dealings. Chapter 

5 focuses on many of the cooperative programs and successes 

the alliance and Russia have achieved in the past few years, 

and chapter 6 deals with the previously mentioned sources of 

conflict between NATO and Russia and then outlines several 

concrete actions NATO can take to continue engaging Russia 

productively and positively, even in light of another probable 

round of enlargement.

The NATO-Russian relationship is without question one of 

the most important and pressing issues that affects overall 

Euro-Atlantic security. It is a relationship that can, and must, 

survive future tests of differences in policies, actions, and even 

sometimes values. However, it is a relationship worth fighting 

for, and leaders from both sides must find a way to work constructively through their differences. The future of Euro-Atlantic 

security depends on it.

INTRODUCTION

03-chap01.indd 2 11/8/06 10:00:
3

Chapter 2

Background—The Long Road to Rome

We have come a long way from opposition to dialogue, and 

from confrontation to cooperation.

—Russian president Vladimir Putin

The Early Years

The relationship between NATO and Russia began informally 

in December 1991 with the inaugural session of the North 

Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), later renamed the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NATO leaders created the 

council after the end of the Cold War as a forum for political 

dialogue, consultation, and cooperation in an attempt to foster 

a new relationship with Central and Eastern European countries.1 Although it stopped short of establishing a formal relationship between NATO and Russia, it did at least create the 

initial conditions for the two to begin consultations and dialogue and set the stage for future developments. This was particularly important due to the rapid pace of political change in 

Europe. In fact, while the NACC was meeting at NATO headquarters for this inaugural session, the Soviet Union actually 

disintegrated. As a result, the Soviet ambassador present was 

only able to speak on behalf of the Russian Federation by the 

time the meeting ended.2

The relationship continued after the creation of the EAPC 

when US president Bill Clinton introduced the Partnership for 

Peace (PfP), an initiative to reach out to the countries of the 

former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, along with others that 

also had been under Soviet influence. The PfP was designed to 

be a major program of practical security and defense cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries and was 

created to be the operational wing of the EAPC. In particular, 

the PfP focused, and still does, on activities to help partners 

build forces capable of participating in peacekeeping operations alongside NATO troops.3

04-chap02.indd 3 11/8/06 10:00:3
BACKGROUND—THE LONG ROAD TO ROME

4

By 1994 Russia decided to join the PfP and gradually began 

to join in a greater degree of cooperation and participation with 

NATO activities.4 In 1996 Russian peacekeepers even deployed 

to Bosnia and Herzegovina to serve alongside their allied counterparts in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and later 

in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to oversee implementation of 

the Dayton Peace Accord ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Notably, the Russian contribution was the largest nonNATO contingent in these forces.5 Although politically contentious issues surrounding this deployment arose in later months, 

especially by the end of the 1990s, the fact that Russian forces 

deployed at all and had regular interaction with NATO forces 

was significant in itself.

The Founding Act and 

Permanent Joint Council

President Clinton made the initial decision in the fall of 1996 

to push for expansion of NATO’s membership ranks. NATO’s 

leaders eventually endorsed Clinton’s proposal at the Madrid 

Summit in July 1997, and NATO subsequently invited Poland, 

the Czech Republic, and Hungary to start accession talks. In 

March 1999, these three countries were admitted into the alliance on the eve of its 50th anniversary celebration.6 The allies 

also made clear to all that the door was open for the eventual 

admission of other candidates, according to Article 10 of the 

Washington Treaty. At the 50th anniversary summit, the alliance specified in its Strategic Concept that “no European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of 

the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.”7

NATO leaders realized that this particular round of expansion—the alliance’s fourth since its inception in 1949 but the 

first after the end of the Cold War—would be particularly sensitive since it would bring former Soviet satellites into the Western alliance. Knowing Russia’s perception of NATO as a military 

bloc hostile to its interests, this was a key issue throughout 

deliberations for this enlargement. However, Russia had to 

respect the right of each independent European state to seek 

its own security arrangements and to belong to international 

04-chap02.indd 4 11/8/06 10:00:3
BACKGROUND—THE LONG ROAD TO ROME

5

organizations, as well as the right of the members of the alliance to make their own decisions.8 Although alliance leaders 

invited several former Warsaw Pact members to join NATO, 

they also decided a more formal structure should be developed 

in NATO’s relationship with Russia. Their answer was to create 

a permanent joint council (PJC) for NATO and Russia, giving 

Russia the capability to sit at the same table with the members 

of the alliance. 

The original purpose of the PJC was to demonstrate in a real 

and tangible way the shared resolve of NATO member states 

and Russia to work together more closely towards the common 

goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic 

area.9 Thus, formal relations between NATO and Russia began 

with the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual 

Relations, Cooperation, and Security in May 1997. The 1999 

50th Anniversary Summit reiterated this important relationship by declaring that “a strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting 

stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”10

With the Founding Act, regular consultations between NATO 

and Russia began to take place on common security issues. 

Moscow followed by establishing a Russian mission to NATO, 

although its personnel were simply taken from, and remained 

primarily accredited to, Russia’s diplomatic mission to Brussels. 

Under the PJC, the 16 (later 19) NATO allies and Russia sat at 

the table in a basically consultative format of “16 + 1” (later “19 

+ 1”). However, one of the biggest drawbacks to this arrangement was that the allies would meet separately beforehand to 

coordinate all positions on the issues facing the council and 

then sit down together across from their Russian counterparts 

with a unified front. Needless to say, open and transparent discussion was not one of the hallmarks of this arrangement.

Although the Founding Act took a good additional step forward in NATO-Russian relations, it unfortunately did not fully 

close the still-yawning gap between the alliance and Russia. As 

the ensuing years would reveal, the deep mistrust of the Cold 

War years proved difficult to overcome, and each side’s suspicions of each other’s motives persisted. Amb. Nicholas Burns, 

former US permanent representative to NATO, explained that 

“one abiding legacy of the Cold War has been a deeply entrenched 

04-chap02.indd 5 11/8/06 10:00:3
BACKGROUND—THE LONG ROAD TO ROME

6

suspicion of NATO’s intentions, especially as the alliance has 

expanded eastward and struggled to redefine its mission in the 

post-Soviet world. This feeling of distrust might be best 

summed up by the idea that, if it is good for NATO, it must 

be bad for Russia.”11

As NATO carried out its expansion efforts, coinciding with the 

European Union’s separate efforts to enlarge, Russia remained 

mostly on the outside. The Kremlin was very much struggling 

with its own democratic reforms, looking toward the West with 

both Euro-Atlantic aspirations and some lingering imperial 

ambitions and wondering where its new place was in the world. 

Despite increased cooperation through growing shared interests, such as the previously mentioned joint deployment to the 

Balkans, NATO and Russia still had trouble overcoming the 

long legacy of Cold War hostility and suspicion.12 Furthermore, 

and unfortunately for NATO-Russian relations, the accession 

of three former Soviet satellites to NATO on the eve of its 50th 

anniversary also coincided with the eve of the conflict in Kosovo. 

By this time, rivalry and mutual suspicion had overtly crept 

into the relationship, culminating in a rupture in relations during the early 1999 Kosovo crisis and Russia’s withdrawal from 

the PJC. According to Paul Fritch, head of the Russia and 

Ukraine relations section in NATO’s Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, when Russia walked out of the PJC, “many 

on both sides honestly believed that nothing of great value had 

been lost.”13

Rome and the NATO-Russia Council

Toward the end of 1999, however, hope once again started to 

creep back into NATO-Russian relations. When Lord Robertson 

became NATO secretary general in October of that year, he 

committed himself to break the stalemate that followed the 

Kosovo rupture in the relationship. Furthermore, Vladimir 

Putin announced, following his election as president of Russia 

in the spring of 2000, that he would work to rebuild relations 

with NATO in a spirit of pragmatism.14

Then came the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and 

the first-ever invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.15

The security challenges now facing the alliance—terrorism, 

04-chap02.indd 6 11/8/06 10:00:3
BACKGROUND—THE LONG ROAD TO ROME

7

weapons of mass destruction proliferation, regional instability, 

and trafficking in drugs, arms, and even human beings—clearly 

showed the West that any lasting solution to these problems 

would have to include Russia. What was lacking in the PJC, as 

former NATO secretary general Lord Robertson described it, 

was “a true sense of shared purpose and urgency.” However, 

the events of 9/11 provided that impetus—“a stark reminder of 

the need for comprehensive and coordinated action to respond 

to common threats.”16

As a result NATO leaders decided a new forum was necessary. After discussions at the Rome Summit in May 2002, they 

agreed that, despite a joint commitment to peacekeeping in the 

Balkans and the development of a substantial program of practical security and defense-related cooperation, underlying “inhibitions” remained on both sides and should be dealt with in a 

new organization. The May 2002 Rome Declaration on “NATORussia Relations: A New Quality” thus established the NATORussia Council (NRC), which met for the first time in May 2003 

in Moscow. 

The timing of the NRC’s establishment was none too soon, as 

it coincided with several other significant events in US, European, and Russian relations, including welcoming seven new 

members into the alliance in 2004 and creating a partnership 

with the European Union (EU) under Berlin Plus.17 The NRC 

reinforced the need for coordinated action against common 

threats faced by both NATO and Russia and was set up to serve 

as the main forum for advancing NATO-Russian relations. It 

was designed to give the NATO-Russia partnership new impetus and substance over the previous PJC. Within the NRC, the 

allies and Russia work together as equal partners to identify 

and pursue opportunities for joint action, regularly consulting 

on current security issues and developing practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest.18

Specifically, the council works on the basis of continuous 

political dialogue on security issues to identify early on any 

emerging problems, determine common approaches, and conduct joint operations as appropriate.19 The NRC laid out an 

ambitious plan. According to the Rome Declaration,

the NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, 

consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the 

04-chap02.indd 7 11/8/06 10:00:3
BACKGROUND—THE LONG ROAD TO ROME

8

member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues 

in the Euro-Atlantic region. The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the 

principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between 

NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. . . . NATO 

member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation 

in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, 

non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater 

missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.20

Comprising three committees, seven standing working 

groups, and a number of other ad hoc expert groups designed 

to develop further cooperation in key areas, the NRC goes far 

beyond the previous PJC by seating Russia equally “at 27” with 

the 26 allies for open, transparent discussions, rather than 

having the allies first arrive at consensus and then face Russia 

later with a consolidated front. This arrangement has allowed 

Russia to take part in discussions as much more of a partnerin-fact, and has been far more satisfactory to Moscow than the 

previous “NATO + 1” format under the PJC.21 Furthermore, as 

with the North Atlantic Council, decisions taken by the NATORussia Council are made on the basis of consensus.22

One of the biggest advantages for Russia of the NRC over the 

previous PJC is that Russia can now see firsthand frank discussion and even disagreements among NATO allies. Although 

that raises the prospect of Russia potentially taking advantage 

of these differences to try to drive a wedge between NATO members, it also gives Russia the benefit of participating in actual, 

genuine debate and discussion with alliance members over policies and actions, which it clearly did not have under the previous structure. 

The NRC also now involves far more areas and organizations 

than did the PJC. The council involves a wide variety of professionals, including intelligence officers, border guards, interior 

ministry troops, and civil-emergency planning experts. In addition, Russian scientists have made regular and substantial 

contributions to the NRC and, significantly, the Russian mission to NATO is now no longer just an adjunct of the Russian 

Embassy to Belgium. After years of formalities and stiff coordination, the alliance and Russia finally feel much more like 

partners.23

04-chap02.indd 8 11/8/06 10:00:3
BACKGROUND—THE LONG ROAD TO ROME

9

Notes

(Most of the notes in this and the following chapters appear in shortened 

form. For full details, see the appropriate entries in the bibliography.)

1. “NATO-Russia Relations,” NATO Issues.

2. Bennett, “Building Effective Partnerships,” 22. 

3. “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership,” NATO Topics.

4. The policies NATO established through the PfP have resulted in one of 

the alliance’s great post–Cold War successes, as the policies have been steadily 

extended in order to build more effective relationships with a wide variety of 

countries and international institutions. See “Expanding Operations.” 

5. “Growing NATO-Russian Cooperation,” 125–26. 

6. Mroziewicz, “Enlargement and the Capabilities Gap,” 79. 

7. “Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” 12. 

8. NATO Transformed, 20. 

9. “NATO-Russia Relations,” NATO Issues.

10. “Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” 11.

11. Burns, “NATO-Russia Council.” 

12. Fritch, “NATO’s Strategic Partnerships.” 

13. Ibid. 

14. NATO-Russia: Forging Deeper Relations, 7. 

15. Article V is the core clause of NATO’s founding charter, which states 

that an armed attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against 

them all. In response to an invocation of Article V, each ally determines, in 

consultation with other allies, how it can best contribute to any action deemed 

necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, 

including the use of armed force. See NATO Transformed, 5. 

16. Robertson, “Introduction,” 5. 

17. Powell, “Powell Sees Bright Future.” 

18. “NATO-Russia Relations,” NATO Issues.

19. Meetings of the NRC are chaired by NATO’s secretary general and are 

held at least monthly at the level of ambassadors and military representatives, twice yearly at the level of foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of 

staff, and occasionally at summit level. Another important innovation under 

the NRC is the Preparatory Committee, which meets at least twice monthly to 

prepare ambassadorial discussions and to oversee all experts’ activities under 

the auspices of the NRC. See “NATO-Russia Council.” 

20. “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality,” 6–7. See also “NATO-Russia 

Council.” 

21. The NRC working groups and committees focus on cooperation on terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, theater missile defense, airspace management, civil emergencies, defense reform, logistics, scientific cooperation, 

and challenges of modern society. See “NATO-Russia Council” and also 

“NATO-Russia Relations.” 

22. “NATO in the 21st Century,” 13.

23. Fritch, “NATO’s Strategic Partnerships.”

04-chap02.indd 9 11/8/06 10:00:3
11

Chapter 3

Russian Responses and Perspectives

A nation has neither permanent enemies nor friends, only 

permanent interests.

—Charles de Gaulle

While Russia has accepted NATO’s expansion thus far and is 

consulting with the allies in the NRC, the Kremlin nonetheless 

has continued to express its view that enlargement of the alliance is both unnecessary and unhelpful in furthering EuroAtlantic security. In its view, other international bodies and 

organizations are perfectly suited to take on the role of collective security that NATO has grown into over the past few years. 

President Putin, in his remarks at the Rome Summit, made 

clear the Russian position that other international agreements 

and bodies will also play a critical role in supporting the new 

NATO-Russian relationship under the NRC, stating,

Russia is primarily interested in it as a working instrument. It is of fundamental importance that cooperation at twenty should be based on a 

firm foundation of international law—the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final 

Act and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] 

Charter on European Security. . . . For Russia, with its geopolitical position, the enhancement of cooperation with NATO as equal partners is 

one of the real embodiments of the multiple approach, to which there is 

no alternative and which we intend to pursue resolutely. We do not 

think of ourselves as outside Europe, but it is also unthinkable for us 

that the role of approved cooperation mechanisms in Asia and in the 

Commonwealth of Independent States should be underestimated. Only 

by harmoniously combining our actions in all these areas will we open 

up wide-ranging possibilities for building a single security region—from 

Vancouver to Vladivostok.1

Thus, the Russian government acknowledges publicly that 

working with NATO is useful and beneficial for both Russia and 

the alliance in the interest of overall security. The Russian mission to NATO has certainly “toed the party line” and acknowledged 

this as well. Gen Konstantin Totskiy, Russia’s first ambassador 

to NATO, elaborated in an interview that “the days of confrontation are past and Russians no longer associate NATO with 

the enemy. Quite the reverse. In recent years, people have come 

05-chap03.indd 11 11/8/06 10:00:5
RUSSIAN RESPONSES AND PERSPECTIVES

12

to understand that the common threats and challenges of the 

modern world call for ever-closer cooperation.”2

Popular Misconceptions of NATO Intent

Privately, however, Russian suspicion still runs deep when 

considering its former foe from beyond the Fulda Gap. NATO is 

by far the least popular of all international organizations among 

the general Russian population. Polls conducted after the latest round of NATO enlargement in 2004 suggest that approximately 52 percent of Russians believe NATO enlargement 

threatens Russia’s national interests, while 58 percent believe 

that NATO is an aggressive military bloc.3 Most Russians believe 

the United Nations is the best international body for global 

cooperation, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) for nonmilitary crisis management in Eastern 

European crisis regions, the EU for economic matters, and the 

United States for strategic partnership, despite recent challenges to that relationship.4

Russians still generally dislike NATO and almost anything it 

stands for. In the words of Rolf Welberts, director of NATO’s 

information office in Moscow, many Russians still consider 

NATO “an illegitimate, US-dominated remnant of the Cold War, 

a potentially aggressive military bloc the world would be better 

off without.”5 Many Russians still mirror-image NATO with the 

previous Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and remain highly 

skeptical of the idea that the United States does not dominate 

NATO, despite the recent, very public disagreements among 

the allies over the war in Iraq. 

NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has tried valiantly to dispel those perceptions. In Moscow in April 2004, he 

reiterated that the recent addition of seven new NATO members was not aimed against Russia and that the alliance wants 

to cooperate with Russia to address global threats. He stated in 

a Moscow radio interview, “I consider it my job, my responsibility, 

to convince (Russians) that NATO has no ulterior motives. 

NATO wants to cooperate. NATO needs Russia and Russia 

needs NATO. We live in a dangerous world and we can only 

solve these problems together.”6

05-chap03.indd 12 11/8/06 10:00:5
RUSSIAN RESPONSES AND PERSPECTIVES

13

The United States has also continued to try to reassure Russia that it has nothing to fear from further enlargement of the 

alliance. Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated in April 2004 

that President George W. Bush has given repeated assurances 

that “you’re not our enemies anymore,” and any concerns about 

NATO enlargement near Russia’s borders are groundless.7

Although perceptions are slow to change, there is still room 

for hope and progress following the opening of the NATO Information Office in 2001. One of its many successes has been the 

creation of a NATO column in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda

(Red Star), the official newspaper of the Russian armed forces 

and one that is traditionally very critical of the alliance.8 The 

fact that this newspaper allows a commentary by an “adversary” such as NATO does indeed point to no small progress, no 

matter how far there is still to go in the relationship. 

Economic Conditions and Realities

Russia is definitely struggling with its own economy, particularly since the fall of 1998, and the state of disrepair throughout the Russian armed forces is shocking. The author noted 

this sad state of affairs shortly after arriving at the US Embassy 

in Moscow in the summer of 2000, when the Kursk submarine 

tragedy occurred.9 Although this particular mishap highlighted 

the condition of the Russian navy, it was also indicative of the 

state of the other services in Russia’s forces. President Putin 

has taken several tangible steps to try to correct the problem, 

but it will be a long time before Russia’s forces regain very 

much of their former strength and pride. Russia simply does 

not have the money or ready resources that the former Soviet 

Union once had. 

Russia is looking hard for whatever resources it does still 

own to help rebuild its flagging economy. In particular, Russia’s 

natural resources and its arms sales to other countries, especially China and India, are major sources of continuing revenue. Moscow is also putting on a “full-court press” to try to 

integrate further into European and international economic 

structures, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 

the EU. Conventional wisdom currently holds that Russia’s 

prospects for EU membership are slim to none, at least in the 

05-chap03.indd 13 11/8/06 10:00:5
RUSSIAN RESPONSES AND PERSPECTIVES

14

near future. As a senior US administration official stated at a 

press conference just prior to the February 2004 NATO Summit in Brussels, “The question of Russia’s membership in the 

European Union is not only hypothetical, it is more than that—

it is somewhat beyond hypothetical at the present time. And 

that really isn’t on anyone’s agenda, including Russia’s.”10

Russia’s prospects for entry into the WTO rate somewhat 

higher. President Bush recently expressed support for closer 

integration of the Russian Federation into European and Western organizations. During his February 2005 address to the EU 

at Concert Noble in Brussels, he stated that he believes “Russia’s 

future lies within the family of Europe and the transatlantic 

community. America supports WTO membership for Russia, 

because meeting WTO standards will strengthen the gains of 

freedom and prosperity in that country.”11

However, this strong support comes with a price. For the 

United States, continued progress toward greater democratization and reform is paramount to show genuine commitment on 

Russia’s part to join the international family of democratic 

nations. President Bush also pointed out in Brussels that “for 

Russia to make progress as a European nation, the Russian 

government must renew a commitment to democracy and the 

rule of law. We recognize that reform will not happen overnight. 

We must always remind Russia, however, that our alliance 

stands for a free press, a vital opposition, the sharing of power, 

and the rule of law—and the United States and all European 

countries should place democratic reform at the heart of their 

dialogue with Russia.”12

Philosophical Internal Debate—

To Westernize or Not?

The Russian people have struggled for centuries to define 

their identity and place in the world. As an enormous empire 

and still the world’s geographically largest country by far—even 

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union—Russia straddles the 

European and Asian continents in more than just a physical 

sense. Throughout Russia’s incredibly rich history, outside 

influences have had profound impacts on its development as a 

05-chap03.indd 14 11/8/06 10:00:5
RUSSIAN RESPONSES AND PERSPECTIVES

15

society, culture, and nation—sometimes violently and sometimes 

gradually. One of the biggest internal debates Russians themselves have had over the centuries has centered on whether to 

“Westernize” or to “remain true to Mother Russia,” pure and 

undefiled by outside influences. This is a question Russia has 

struggled with almost from its very beginnings and more so during the past 300 years, especially as Europe modernized and 

progressed. Peter the Great was one of the earliest “Westernizers,” 

and strongly pushed his country toward Europe, to the point of 

founding St. Petersburg as his “window on the West.”13

The empire eventually spread to the Pacific Ocean, and Russia’s crest shows a double-headed eagle for a very good reason—it symbolizes the czar’s (and now the president’s) watchful eye over both continents of the Russian Empire, Europe and 

Asia. Russia was and is both European and Asian, and will 

not fall completely into either camp, nor forsake either continent’s legacy. As much as Russia feels itself to be a part of a 

larger Europe, it also considers itself to be a global and Eurasian power. Ivan Ivanov, a former deputy Russian foreign minister, very well summed up the Russian view that, “While stressing our European identity we prefer to have a free hand in our 

policy towards and cooperation with all regions, including Asia, 

the United States, and above all, the CIS [Commonwealth of 

Independent States].”14

The double-headed eagle on the Russian crest not only signifies the czar’s watchful eye over both directions of his vast 

empire, it may also symbolize the Russian soul, torn between 

East and West. The result is that in many ways, Russians feel 

that they do not belong fully to East or West, and thus have 

their own special history and calling in the world. Though many 

in the West view this as simply a philosophical or even spiritual 

outlook having little to do with tangible realities, it actually 

resonates at the heart of the Russian soul and colors the way 

Russians look at the rest of the world. NATO is now seeing the 

results of this outlook as it seeks to grow eastward and must 

now find more and more creative ways to assuage Russian fears 

and distrust. 

At present Russia is still interested in pursuing continuing 

closer ties with NATO and Europe in general. Andrei Kelin, 

deputy director of the Department of General European Coop05-chap03.indd 15 11/8/06 10:00:5
RUSSIAN RESPONSES AND PERSPECTIVES

16

eration in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently shed 

some light on Moscow’s thinking in this regard. He described 

NATO as “one of the main European community institutions, 

and if we want to steer a course for normal relations with each 

community state, which, properly speaking, we have sought to 

do lately, it will be logical to form civilized working ties with all 

key European organizations, NATO included.”15 The importance 

of NATO capitalizing on this sentiment through continued close 

cooperation with Russia cannot be overstated. 

Notes

1. Putin, “Address,” 18. 

2. Totskiy, “Interview.”

3. Kuznetsova, “NATO,” 22. 

4. Welberts, “Explaining NATO.” 

5. Ibid. 

6. de Hoop Scheffer, “NATO, Russia Enhance Military Cooperation.” 

7. Powell, “Russia Need Not Worry.” 

8. Welberts, “Explaining NATO.” 

9. The author served as assistant air attaché and air attaché at the US 

Embassy in Moscow from June 2000 to June 2002.

10. “NATO Lauded as ‘Centerpiece’,” United States Mission to NATO.

11. Bush, “President Discusses American and European Alliance.” 

12. Ibid. 

13. MacKenzie and Curran, History of Russia, 197–98. 

14. Twain Shall Meet, 37. 

15. Kelin, “Attitude to NATO Expansion,” 17.

05-chap03.indd 16 11/8/06 10:00:5
17

Chapter 4

Contentious Issues

Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.

—Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 1990

In light of these issues, NATO and Russia still face significant 

challenges to their relationship. This chapter examines a number of these contentious issues and highlights their root causes, 

for it is these causes that continue to plague the alliance in its 

relations with Russia. These issues are highlighted due to their 

underlying sources of friction and disagreements, problems 

that both sides can expect to continue into future years and 

that must be dealt with to make it possible for NATO and Russia 

to continue working together productively. Chapter 6 addresses 

several recommendations for the alliance leadership as it strives 

first to understand, and second, to work effectively with Russia 

in its decision-making process. 

NATO Expansion

Russian leaders publicly maintain they have no official objection to NATO’s recent expansions (NATO has now had five 

enlargements since its inception in 1949—see figure below for 

a timeline of all expansions to date). In May 2002, at the opening of the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow, then-first 

deputy chief of the General Staff (now chief), Col-Gen Yuri 

Baluyevsky, stated that Russia “does not fear NATO’s expansion if its new members do not threaten its national security 

and use their infrastructure to deploy strategic arms.” He went 

on to explain that Russia’s policy has become more predictable 

and that Russia does not threaten any other nation, but he 

also added significantly that it has defended and will defend its 

national sovereignty.1

However, the true underlying Russian position on NATO 

expansion is clear and not surprising—Russia does not support 

it. Russian concerns center around the prospect of facing potential new military bases, military units, and the infrastructure of 

06-chap04.indd 17 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

18

a powerful military alliance right on its borders. Russian opinion holds this to be an “echo of the past, a relic of the Cold 

War,” and Moscow clearly favors more universal security mechanisms for the Euro-Atlantic area, such as the United Nations 

and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Despite NATO’s many assurances to Russia, Moscow continues 

automatically to view with suspicion any expansion farther 

eastward. There also remains a persistent belief that one of the 

main reasons for NATO’s expansion was to contribute to the 

weakening of Russia, which began in the early 1990s with the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union.2 As General Totskiy understated it, “We do not consider NATO’s further enlargement to be 

a cause for celebration.”3

Russian concerns over NATO expansion only deepened after 

the most recent round brought the Baltic republics, which 

physically border Russia, into the NATO fold. It is true that 

Russia lodged no strenuous, lasting objections to either of the 

two most recent rounds of NATO expansion. However, this was 

undoubtedly more due to Russian preoccupation with pressing 

 1949 1952 1955 1982 1999 2004

Belgium Greece Federal Republic Spain Czech Republic Bulgaria

Canada Turkey of Germany Hungary Estonia

Denmark Poland Latvia

France Lithuania

Iceland Romania

Italy Slovakia

Luxembourg Slovenia

Netherlands

Norway

Portugal

United Kingdom

United States

Timeline of NATO Enlargement. Adapted from Istanbul Summit Reader’s 

Guide (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2004), 120–21.

06-chap04.indd 18 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

19

domestic and internal issues—such as their economy and challenges with their own version of terrorism originating in their 

southern regions—as well as the fact that most of the new 

NATO members did not physically border Russia (with the 

exception of the small Baltic republics). As US ambassador to 

Russia Alexander Vershbow pointed out recently at Princeton 

University, the Russian reaction, while “not enthusiastic, was 

not negative as some had expected.”4

Future Enlargement

That reaction, however, undoubtedly will not continue to be 

the case when NATO prepares to offer future membership to 

more former Soviet satellite countries in another round of 

enlargement, which is expected to occur within the next few 

years. At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders made 

it clear that they intended to “leave the door wide open” to any 

country wishing to join and able to meet its entry requirements, 

and that the seven countries that had just joined would not be 

the last. To that end, they welcomed progress toward membership made by Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the framework of the Membership Action 

Plan (MAP).5 Secretary of State Powell reiterated this view a few 

months later following his last North Atlantic Council meeting 

in December 2004, stating,

to become a member of NATO is to coordinate and connect yourself to 

all of Europe. But not just Europe. You connect yourself in a very important way to North America, to the United States and Canada. That’s why 

the Alliance is thriving. That’s why more and more nations want to become

part of this great Alliance. So, I see a bright future for NATO. . . . There 

are more nations out there waiting for their turn to join the Alliance: 

an Alliance that continues to grow, that continues to have the complete commitment of its original members and the new energy of its 

new members and aspiring members as an Alliance that will continue to be valuable, continue to be vital, as part of the transatlantic 

family partnership.6

In addition to the three candidates mentioned above, the alliance will also very likely consider Georgia, Moldova, and even 

Ukraine, a country to which Russia has far stronger strategic 

and historical ties. According to former US ambassador to 

NATO Nicholas Burns, the alliance is reaching out to the region 

as it establishes, “for the very first time, liaison offices in the 

06-chap04.indd 19 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

20

Caucasus and Central Asian region, and that reflects the 

increased cooperation with the countries of those regions.” He 

also reiterated NATO’s desire to engage Ukraine, particularly 

following that country’s December 2004 presidential election 

(more on this below). Keeping in mind Russian sensitivities, he 

spoke of making an attempt to give more attention to NATORussian relations and to strengthen those relations, adding 

that “there’s reason to think that we have a lot more that we 

can do with Russia in terms of our partnership.”7 However, if 

membership expands to several more countries bordering Russia, that partnership will surely be sorely tested.

Of course, the Central and Eastern European countries being 

considered for membership are eagerly anticipating that possibility. They still have a tendency to view NATO as a sort of US 

tool for protecting its European partners against military aggression from third parties, mainly Russia. This view is understandable, given the role the former Soviet Union played in dominating the Warsaw Pact. However, it does not accurately reflect 

today’s reality, and NATO’s challenge is to help Central and 

Eastern European countries realize there is much more to 

NATO membership than developing relations with just one or 

even a few new partners, rather than with the entire alliance.8

NATO continues, however, to lay the groundwork for potential 

new aspirants in the next probable round of expansion. According to the Georgian Foreign Ministry, the secretary general’s 

newly appointed special representative for Caucasus and Central Asian countries, Robert Simmons, visited Georgia in early 

February 2005 to hold talks with the Georgian president, prime 

minister, state minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration issues, 

foreign minister, and other top-level Georgian officials. Significantly, the North Atlantic Council in October 2004 approved 

Georgia’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which 

establishes specific defense and political reform goals for Georgia. The next month, NATO secretary general de Hoop Scheffer 

paid a one-day visit to Georgia, saying that “Georgia matters for 

the [sic] NATO,” and calling on the Georgian authorities to 

implement the IPAP.9

Georgia has responded by raising the stakes recently in its 

overtures toward NATO by insisting in ever-stronger terms that 

Russian forces vacate their bases in Georgia. On 10 March 

06-chap04.indd 20 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

21

2005, the Georgian Parliament voted 159 to 0 to urge the Georgian government to set a deadline for Moscow to close two Russian military bases, again highlighting the long-standing dispute between the two countries. This is only one of several 

issues that have been sore spots between the two governments 

since Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in November 2003, and will 

not likely disappear until Russian forces leave and the question 

of South Ossetia is finally resolved.10

In light of this likely third round of enlargement into what 

Moscow considers its immediate sphere of influence, Russian 

mistrust will surely only deepen, and their protests (and 

response) will undoubtedly grow more strident. The Kremlin 

already has a hard time accepting that former Warsaw Pact 

members it once dominated are now members of NATO and 

enjoy the privilege of NATO Article 5 protection. Any expansion 

that includes the Caucasus and especially Ukraine will, in 

Moscow’s view, directly threaten its influence over an area that 

it perceives to be its own and that borders the Russian Federation. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the Russian Empire had its beginnings in Kievan Rus (current-day 

Ukraine) as far back as the ninth century.11

The Special Case of Ukraine

NATO-Ukrainian relations were formally launched in 1991, 

when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 

immediately after achieving independence following the breakup 

of the Soviet Union. In 1994 Ukraine became the first of the 

Commonwealth of Independent States to join the Partnership 

for Peace program and subsequently demonstrated its commitment to contribute to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the 

Balkans.12 By 1997 the two sides had signed the NATO-Ukraine 

Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in Madrid, which recognized the importance of an independent, stable, and democratic

Ukraine to European stability. That same year, the alliance 

established a NATO Information and Documentation Center in 

Kyiv to facilitate wider access to information on NATO, particularly in the post–Cold War era and concerning Ukrainian benefits

from their distinctive partnership. Two years later, in 1999, NATO

06-chap04.indd 21 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

22

opened a liaison office in Kyiv to help Ukraine’s participation in 

the PfP and to support Ukrainian defense reform efforts.13

Ukrainian leadership has made several overtures toward 

NATO. On the eve of the 1999 50th anniversary NATO celebration, then-Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma spoke in glowing terms of this new relationship, saying, “The Ukraine-NATO 

distinctive partnership is important and indispensable to the 

new European security architecture,” and that “there is no 

doubt that these events will not only open a new page in the 

50-year history of the Alliance, but [also will] foreshadow a new 

stage in the dynamic development of the Ukraine-NATO distinctive partnership, all on behalf of Euro-Atlantic security and 

stability.”14 Kuchma later declared boldly in May 2002, just 

before the fifth anniversary of the Distinctive Partnership, that 

Ukraine now had the goal of eventual NATO membership.15 The 

alliance responded later that same month, agreeing to explore 

ways to take the NATO-Ukrainian relationship to a qualitatively 

new level beyond their previous support, where they had already 

cited the importance of Ukrainian “sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic 

prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as 

key factors of stability and security in central and eastern 

Europe and in Europe as a whole.”16

Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko also has made clear 

his plans to integrate further into Europe’s various structures 

and organizations. At the Brussels Summit, he thanked the 

alliance for its support during his election ordeal, saying, 

our declarations, which correspond to our actions, a course of integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, from now on will 

determine the strategy and tactics of our policy. We believe that Ukraine’s 

participation and engagement in the North Atlantic community of democratic peoples will strengthen peace and security on the European continent. We are ready to make all necessary efforts to achieve this noble 

goal. We have already created a strong foundation for our mutual relations and can extend it. . . . The European future of Ukraine is inseparably linked with the deepening of its relationship with the Alliance.17

From the alliance’s perspective, there is now renewed interest in Ukraine’s prospects for drawing closer to NATO. US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice stated at a February 2005 

press conference in Brussels, “We look very much forward to 

continuing to work with Ukraine as it develops its democratic 

06-chap04.indd 22 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

23

future.” She reminded her audience that “Ukraine has an action 

plan with NATO that we can be more active on now, and we 

should do exactly that so that we begin to take the practical 

steps that can support Ukraine’s democratic process and can 

support Ukraine’s coming toward Europe and toward mainstream Europe.”18

At a press background briefing in Brussels just prior to the 

February NATO-Ukraine Summit, a senior US administration 

official candidly acknowledged that “the general attitude within 

NATO . . . is that NATO ought to be open to a new relationship 

with Ukraine. That is going to be focused, at this point, on fulfilling a partnership plan that we developed with the Ukrainians a couple of years ago. We didn’t make much progress on 

that, for obvious reason, given the politics in Ukraine over the 

last year. But there’s strong hope that in 2005 we might deepen 

our partnership with Ukraine.”19

Other NATO leaders also reaffirmed this commitment to 

Ukraine during the summit, saying the alliance leadership 

“pledged continued support and welcomed their aspirations for 

building a democratic and prosperous Ukraine and strengthening their integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.”20

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer elaborated even further 

during the summit when he mentioned the PfP trust fund project that was about to be launched to help Ukraine deal with old 

ammunition, small arms, and light-weapons stockpiles—the 

largest initiative of its kind ever undertaken. He addressed 

President Yushchenko directly and declared, “NATO is ready to 

work with you, to support you, and to help you build a better 

future. All Allies are committed—are fully committed, to a rich 

and progressively stronger partnership with Ukraine.”21

Ukraine, however, still faces some difficult decisions balancing its potential membership in NATO with the necessity of 

maintaining its relationship with Russia. Due to geopolitics 

and centuries of intertwined economics, culture, and history, 

Ukraine and Russia have been and will continue to be inextricably linked into the future. This point was brought home 

shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union during a visit to 

Ukraine by the then head of the US Information Agency, Amb. 

Henry Catto. While Catto was meeting with Ukrainian Minister 

of Culture Larysa Khorolets and Foreign Minister Anatoliy 

06-chap04.indd 23 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

24

Zlenko, Khorolets stated clearly that “Russia is our partner—

our equal partner. We may differ, but they are our neighbors 

and we are linked economically.”22

Even with EU and NATO aspirations, this view from the windows of Kyiv toward their northern neighbor has not changed 

substantially. President Yushchenko most recently addressed 

Ukraine’s relationship to Russia, even as he pushed further for 

NATO membership. Despite Russia’s recent blatant and distasteful meddling in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, Yushchenko was still able to say, “I would like to clearly state once 

again that Russia is our strategic partner and Ukraine’s policy 

towards NATO by any means will be against [viewed in consideration of] the interests of other countries, including Russia.”23

NATO’s Changing Roles and Missions

NATO’s own roles and missions also are evolving with the 

ever-changing strategic world environment. In a recent speech 

to the Atlantic Treaty Association’s (ATA) 50th General Assembly in Rome, Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer emphasized 

that this new environment needs the broadest possible international cooperation. He pointed out that this cooperation is 

“the heart of the ‘wide web’ of international security, including 

NATO’s dialogue with Ukraine and Russia.” He went on to also 

clarify that NATO’s responsibility is no longer simply Euro-centric

territorial defense. In his view, NATO will continue to have outof-area operations, such as those now going on in Afghanistan 

and, to a limited extent, Iraq.24

Gen James Jones, supreme allied commander Europe 

(SACEUR), also discussed the changing NATO focus at the ATA 

General Assembly when he stated that NATO is undergoing the 

“most fundamental transformation in its history.” The goal of 

NATO, he said, is to be “as relevant in the 21st century as it 

was in the 20th century.”25 Certainly, Russian leaders who 

hear these statements come to the only logical conclusion that 

NATO has no intention of disbanding, or even of merging with 

another international security body, such as the OSCE, which 

Russia would much prefer. The message is that NATO is here 

to stay and will continue to adapt and change to the world 

around it, much to the chagrin of Kremlin leadership.

06-chap04.indd 24 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

25

NATO also will continue to maintain a presence in former 

Yugoslav territories in the Balkans, primarily in Kosovo. Alliance leaders reiterated this intent in a joint statement during 

the February 2005 NATO Summit in Brussels. According to the 

statement, “We remain firm in our commitment to stability in 

the Balkans and see the future of this region firmly anchored 

in the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO will maintain its strong 

presence in Kosovo and contribute to the UN-led political process 

of building a multiethnic, peaceful and prosperous society.”26

As it is a historically Slav-dominated region (“Yugoslav” means 

“southern Slav” in Russian and Serbo-Croatian), Russia is 

undoubtedly less than thrilled with this continuing alliance 

presence in this contentious area. 

Air Policing

When the 10 most recent aspirants became full NATO members in 1999 and 2004, they immediately fell under NATO’s 

formal collective security and defense umbrella, which still 

happens to include routine policing of all NATO airspace as required. Historically, all alliance members have either performed 

their own air-policing functions or fulfilled the mission in cooperation with neighboring NATO nations. Of the most recent 

seven adherents, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have their 

own defense capabilities, and Slovenian airspace will be covered by a combination of its own early warning system and airpolicing support provided by the Italian air force. However, the 

Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the only ones 

physically bordering Russia—called on NATO to provide initial 

air policing over the extended NATO skies. As a result, in March 

2004, four NATO F-16 aircraft began a rotating deployment to 

Estonia to provide the same level of routine security as for all 

alliance members, sparking vigorous protests from the Russian 

government.27

Although the alliance’s new air-policing operation over the 

Baltic states initially caused bitter complaints from Moscow, 

especially from the Duma (the Russian parliament), these concerns were eventually assuaged. The new policy was justified to 

Russia as a deterrent to would-be terrorists and other “renegades” who might try to enter the European continent’s air06-chap04.indd 25 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

26

space illegally through the Baltics. Furthermore, Moscow could 

not realistically argue that four NATO F-16s were a threat to 

the entire Russian armed forces or to Russia’s well-being or 

sovereignty. Secretary of State Powell gave strong assurances 

that the deployment of these fighters was in no way directed 

against Russia, asserting that NATO would “adjust to the new 

threats that are out there. We’re not worried about the old 

threat of the Soviet Union.” He also noted the Russian government still has an obligation to make sure its armed forces are 

defending the Russian Federation, stating “they are passionate 

about that and they have to reflect the public opinion and the 

intellectual opinion that exists within Russia.” The Russians 

now seem to have accepted the deployment and, in the words 

of Secretary Powell, are “taking it in stride.”28

Future East European Basing Options

In conjunction with Russian fears about NATO’s eastward 

growth, the Kremlin is particularly concerned about the future 

possibility that NATO will base its soldiers on the territory of 

the newest NATO members. Admittedly, it is problematic when 

Russia sees active plans for NATO forces to be stationed on 

former Warsaw Pact soil. For example, plans are already under 

way to create a Joint Force Training Center in Poland. NATO is 

using this facility, along with other arrangements, to initiate a 

complete overhaul of alliance training under the direction of 

the Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk, Virginia.29

NATO, on the other hand, has downplayed the plans and 

tried to convince Russia those plans are not directed against 

the Russian Federation. NATO leaders insist the planned troop 

deployment does not mean NATO is trying to surround Russia 

with more troops. The United States in particular is doing just 

the opposite and is leading the Western effort to “downsize” 

through its own defense transformation. Secretary Powell put 

it succinctly when he stated that the United States is “not putting more troops in to surround Russia” but rather “moving 

troops out of Europe even more than we’ve moved over the last 

10 or 12 years,” which has been significant in itself.30 However, 

the general Russian public remains unconvinced. 

06-chap04.indd 26 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

27

Other Political Challenges

NATO (particularly the United States) and Russia still have 

fundamental disagreements over the Conventional Forces in 

Europe (CFE) Treaty, which has not yet been ratified years after 

the end of the Cold War. The Western position is that the treaty 

will not be submitted for ratification until Russia complies with 

stipulations to remove its armed forces from Georgia and Moldova.

Russia now is using recent NATO accessions to argue that the 

spirit of the CFE Treaty has the potential to be violated, particularly considering the new status of the Baltic republics as 

NATO members. As General Totskiy pointedly stated, 

Russia’s legitimate security interests must be taken into account. We 

realize that the seven states invited to join NATO will not increase the 

alliance’s overall military capabilities by much. But in terms of infrastructure and geography, the potential for NATO deployments is increasing. Moreover, NATO membership for the Baltic countries, which border 

Russia, brings with it a host of unresolved issues that directly affect our 

interests. At present, for example, there are no force-deployment limitations in the Baltic Republics under the Treaty on Conventional Forces 

in Europe. In effect, this means that this territory could become an 

“arms-control-free zone.” I think that the way Russians view NATO will 

largely depend on how this issue is resolved.31

Furthermore, Russia is taking an opportunity to counter 

NATO moves by expanding its own influence and presence with 

countries near its borders, particularly in Central Asia. In October 2003, President Putin and Kyrgyzstan president Askar 

Akayev signed an agreement within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization regarding the stationing of 

a Russian air base in Kant. According to Col-Gen Yevgeny 

Yuryev, the commander of the Ural Air Force and Air Defense 

Combined Formation, the declared purpose of the agreement 

with Kyrgyzstan was to reinforce the “unified security system” 

in Central Asia with SU-25 attack aircraft and military transport helicopters. Currently, 250 personnel are stationed at the 

base, with plans for a considerable increase and assignment of 

more-modern SU-27 fighter aircraft. This action also corresponds to the reorganization of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, already stationed in Tajikistan, as a full military base.32

Finally, the eventual status of Kosovo remains a challenging 

thorn in the sides of both Russia and the West, and the Kremlin 

is keeping a keen eye on events in the Balkans. While Kosovo is 

06-chap04.indd 27 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

28

still formally a part of Serbia, the long-standing battle over its 

self-determination versus Belgrade’s sovereignty has strong 

implications for numerous semi-autonomous regions throughout the Russian Federation. In particular, Moscow is concerned 

about “rebel” separatist actions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 

especially Chechnya. Growing NATO (or other Western) involvement in these and other areas has already drawn Kremlin criticism of the West’s intentions and will likely continue until the 

issue is satisfactorily resolved for all interested parties.

Notes

1. Baluyevsky, “General Baluyevsky.” 

2. Troitski, Transatlantic Union, 146. 

3. Totskiy, “Interview.” 

4. Vershbow, “United States and Russia.” 

5. “NATO’s Open Door,” 119. The MAP offers aspiring members practical 

advice and targeted assistance. In turn aspiring members are expected to 

meet certain political goals, including the peaceful resolution of territorial 

disputes, respect for democratic procedures and the rule of law, and the 

democratic control of their armed forces. Participation in the plan does not 

offer any guarantee of future membership, but it does help countries to adapt 

their armed forces and to prepare for the obligations and responsibilities alliance membership would bring. See “NATO in the 21st Century,” 14. 

6. Powell, “Powell Sees Bright Future.” 

7. Burns, “Pre-Ministerial Briefing.” 

8. Mroziewicz, “Enlargement and the Capabilities Gap,” 91. 

9. de Hoop Scheffer, “NATO Envoy to Visit Georgia.” 

10. “Vote in Parliament,” 6. 

11. MacKenzie and Curran, History of Russia, 24. 

12. “Further Developing NATO-Ukraine Relations,” 130–31. 

13. “New Relationships,” 44. 

14. Kuchma, “Message from Leonid Kuchma,” 49. 

15. NATO-Ukraine, 2. 

16. “Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” 12. 

17. Yushchenko, “Opening Statement at the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine 

Council.” 

18. Rice, “Remarks at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters.”

19. “NATO Lauded as ‘Centerpiece’,” United States Mission to NATO.

20. “Statement Issued by the Heads of State,” NATO On-Line Library.

21. de Hoop Scheffer, “Opening Statement at the Press Conference.” See 

also de Hoop Scheffer, “Opening Remarks.” 

22. Catto, Ambassadors at Sea, 333. 

23. Yushchenko, “Opening Statement.” 

24. de Hoop Scheffer, address.

06-chap04.indd 28 11/8/06 10:01:
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

29

25. Jones, address. 

26. “Statement Issued by the Heads of State.” 

27. “Air Policing over the Baltics.” 

28. Powell, “Russia Need Not Worry.” 

29. Stanhope, address. 

30. Powell, “Russia Need Not Worry.” 

31. Totskiy, “Interview.” 

32. Yuryev, “Kant Air Base.” 

06-chap04.indd 29 11/8/06 10:01:
31

Chapter 5

Areas of Cooperation

A second marriage is a triumph of hope over experience, all 

the more so when the partners are the same.

—Anonymous

Closer Political Integration

Despite the significant challenges and obstacles still facing 

the alliance and Russia, both sides have seen the need to cooperate more fully in areas of mutual security concern and have 

dedicated themselves to working more closely together, particularly over the past two years. Although President Putin has 

repeatedly made clear that he has no intention of joining NATO, 

he has made good relations with NATO a personal priority.1

General Totskiy related that before he left for Brussels, President Putin summoned him and instructed him that “NATO is 

now a serious and important organization with a visible role to 

play in international affairs,” and with which Russia needs to 

have “effective working relations.”2 Sergey Rogov, director of the 

Institute for US and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy 

of Sciences, has elaborated further on the distinction drawn by 

Putin—the key issue is Russia’s relationship with NATO, not 

Russia’s role in NATO.3

The United States has also emphasized that close relations 

with Russia are important, within the alliance as well as on a 

bilateral basis. During Secretary of State Rice’s February 2005 

trip to Europe, she stated that “we are in complete agreement 

that there are trends in Russia that need to be watched, that 

we are concerned that Russia’s isolation would be a terrible 

thing for the international community, and that we intend to 

continue to work with our Russian colleagues for a better

future.”4 Ambassador Burns has also pointed out the value of 

Russian relations with NATO, an organization he calls the 

“most effective vehicle for multilateral action available to 

Europe, the U.S., and Canada,” and that “brings together the 

07-chap05.indd 31 11/8/06 10:01:4
AREAS OF COOPERATION

32

NATO Allies and the Partnership nations—Russia, Ukraine, and

our friends in Central Asia and the Caucasus—in a way that 

reinforces the common values we share.”5 He further asserted 

that “the U.S. certainly recognizes that a healthy, democratic 

Russia is in its long-term strategic interest. . . . The logic behind

NATO’s partnership with Russia is, therefore, not ‘zero-sum.’ It 

is ‘win-win.’ We realize we can accomplish much more together 

than we can apart.” The key will be to “overcome our differences, and to recognize the strength of our collective bond.”6

Improved Consultation—NATO-Russia Council 

(NRC) and Military Liaison Missions

Despite the two most recent rounds of expansion, Russia 

nonetheless has drawn closer to NATO through the NRC, and 

the council is continuing to make noticeable strides toward 

better NATO-Russian cooperation. Ambassador Burns reinforced

this view when he noted, “The Council is only just beginning to 

hit its stride as an effective security partnership—it will grow in 

stature and influence as NATO and Russia eventually overcome 

remaining Cold War stereotypes and strengthen their developing military and political ties.”7 General Totskiy also asserted that

NATO-Russian cooperation was a priority for Russia. He has 

said Russia is convinced that by further enhancing cooperation 

with NATO across the entire range of areas set out in the Rome 

Declaration, Russia will be able to make a major contribution 

to the evolution of a new security architecture in the EuroAtlantic area (a major Russian goal, to be sure) and that the NRC

will be one of the leading elements of such an architecture.8

The aftermath of the December 2004 Ukrainian presidential 

elections also yielded a significant joint statement from Russia 

(albeit reluctantly) and NATO referencing a free and fair electoral process and the rule of law in Ukraine. Secretary of State 

Powell expressed his encouragement over this joint statement 

after his December 2004 trip to Brussels when he said he was 

“pleased that Russia was able to join with NATO in agreeing to 

the statement.” He continued, “I think what we ought to do is 

accept what we see today in the NATO-Russia Council statement as an expression of the Russian position, and I’m pleased 

07-chap05.indd 32 11/8/06 10:01:4
AREAS OF COOPERATION

33

that we leave here today with this union of views with respect 

to what happens next in Ukraine.”9

Russia has also been more amenable to cooperation with 

NATO following the 9/11 attacks and now uses the NRC more 

and more for this effort. For example, Colonel-General Baluyevsky, 

chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces since 

June 2004, has met several times with senior NATO personnel. 

In November 2004 in Mons, Belgium, he met with Gen James 

Jones, NATO’s supreme allied commander. Their consultations 

centered on expanding the current NATO-Russian military-tomilitary cooperation plan, which the NRC was discussing. 

Among the topics covered was the future supply of Russian 

weapons to the Iraqi army, along with an offer of Russian military training to the new Iraqi army in using these weapons. 

This is particularly important to Russia, as Iraq has long been 

a customer of Soviet and Russian weapons systems.10

In addition to the NRC, the formal military liaison missions 

established by both sides have been particularly useful in helping to carry out programs of practical cooperation. Following 

the installation of a NATO military liaison mission in Moscow in 

May 2002, NATO and Russia signed additional agreements in 

April 2004 to create a Russian military liaison office at the 

NATO Operational Command in Mons and the NATO Transformation Command in Norfolk. The agreements came during NATO 

secretary general de Hoop Scheffer’s visit to Moscow where it 

was further agreed that the Moscow mission would be strengthened with additional personnel. During his two-day visit, de 

Hoop Scheffer held talks with President Putin, Foreign Minister 

Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of 

State of the Security Council Igor Ivanov, and members of the 

Duma. Key issues they discussed included NATO-Russian relations and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among others.11

Better Practical Cooperation and 

Confidence-Building Measures

NATO-Russian military-to-military cooperation had noticeably blossomed by the last quarter of 2003. That year 68 events 

07-chap05.indd 33 11/8/06 10:01:4
AREAS OF COOPERATION

34

were scheduled in the areas of interoperability communications events; NATO Defense College events; and other events 

such as theater missile defense, procedural exercises, defense 

reform and industries, NRC meetings, transport aircraft and 

the Cooperative Airspace Agreement, nonlethal weapons, and 

secure communications. All but three of the 68 events took 

place with almost 450 Russian and NATO military and civilian 

officials interacting. More than 186 events were planned 

through the fall of 2004 in the same general categories, and 

that number was still rising toward the end of the year. More 

significantly, approximately 800 Russian and NATO officials 

were scheduled to work together in these events.12

In other practical terms, NATO and Russian foreign ministers at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 reaffirmed their commitment to continue the military-to-military cooperation the 

two sides had increased during the previous two years. They 

also reiterated their adherence to the goals, principles, and 

commitments contained in the Founding Act, the Rome Declaration, and past NRC decisions, and their determination to 

stand together against shared threats. They expressed their 

mutual desire to broaden NRC political dialogue and to promote common approaches and possible future joint actions. 

They welcomed the concrete, practical contributions the NRC 

made to Euro-Atlantic security, specifically noting

• their solidarity in their stand against terrorism,

• the success of the March 2004 Theater Missile Defense 

Command Post Exercise in Colorado,

• the results of the civil emergency planning and response 

exercise Kaliningrad 2004 hosted by Russia,

• the progress achieved in enhancing military-to-military cooperation and the interoperability of NATO and Russian forces,

• the anticipated completion of the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative Feasibility Study by the end of 2004,

• the ongoing work of the NATO-Russian nuclear experts’ consultations and the Russian offer to attend a field demonstration on nuclear weapons incident response procedures,

07-chap05.indd 34 11/8/06 10:01:4
AREAS OF COOPERATION

35

• the Ad Hoc Working Group on Defense Reform to continue 

ongoing work on interoperability and ongoing efforts to enhance practical work on military-technical cooperation, 

and

• their resolve to strengthen cooperation in crisis management.

Finally, the ministers again welcomed Russia’s offer to provide 

practical support to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and reaffirmed their commitment to further practical cooperation in this regard.13

Russia also agreed in Istanbul to join Operation Active 

Endeavor, NATO’s antiterrorist naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea begun in October 2001.14 Russia followed up by 

formally signing an agreement during a December 2004 meeting of the NRC in Brussels. Although NATO and Russian forces 

have worked together in the Balkans, this operation is significant in that it is carried out under Article 5 of the Washington 

Treaty and therefore is a formal NATO collective-defense operation. It is noteworthy that plans call for the Russian forces, following training and certification, to operate under NATO command. There will also be a certification process for two Russian 

ships to participate. This is the first time for Russia to contribute to such a NATO operation.15

The Russian navy took part in 10 exercises in 2004—three in 

the North Atlantic, three in the Baltic, and four in the Mediterranean. A Russian Northern Fleet nuclear submarine also 

made a port visit to the French port of Brest in a historic, though 

largely symbolic, event. However, General Baluyevsky indicated 

the visit signaled a genuine intent to develop further the levels 

of military cooperation with the alliance, stating, “I am certain 

that today there are objective conditions to allow Russia to finetune a new mode of coordination with NATO.”16

In addition to the areas mentioned above, the NATO-Russian 

partnership has had successes in joint intelligence assessments on terrorist threats, future NATO-Russian peacekeeping 

operations, emergency response exercises in Russia in conjunction with the US Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), and submarine crew escape and rescue. Further highlights include a successful NATO-Russian retraining center for 

military personnel leaving the Russian armed forces and rein07-chap05.indd 35 11/8/06 10:01:4
AREAS OF COOPERATION

36

tegrating into Russian civilian society, a Russian aircrew survival training program, and experts nearing agreement on a 

comprehensive common assessment of proliferation dangers.17

NATO-Russian operational cooperation continues to grow and 

strengthen as well. For example, Russia has offered to support 

the NATO mission in Afghanistan—the International Security 

Assistance Force—with overflights, transit, and airlift; NATO is 

now seriously studying this offer.18 Other programs such as the 

Cooperative Airspace Agreement and the Airlift Implementing 

Agreement also were on track for implementation. 

Finally, ongoing NATO operations in the Balkans following 

the allied intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided a 

good proving ground for burgeoning joint operations with Russia, along with other non-NATO countries. Russian and NATO 

soldiers have generally worked together effectively since 1996, 

both within the Implementation Force and later the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reflecting the shared 

goals and joint political responsibility for the implementation of 

the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Although both sides had significant political disagreements over NATO actions in Kosovo 

during the subsequent low point in their relations, Russia eventually played a vital diplomatic role in securing an end to that 

conflict. This came about after Russia signed an agreement 

with NATO in Helsinki following the conclusion of the Military 

Technical Agreement between NATO and Yugoslav military 

commanders in June 1999 and the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of that same month, which established the basis 

for an international security presence in Kosovo.19 While this 

type of cooperation between West and East was certainly 

unprecedented, it showed the potential for how the two sides 

could work together, especially in the field. Although NATO and 

Russian leaders did not always agree on issues, in the field their 

commanders and forces achieved a remarkable level of cooperation, especially considering their recent past as adversaries.20

Cooperation on Russian Defense Reform

Reform of the Russian armed forces is a high priority for both

the Russian Federation and NATO and is one of the highest 

priorities of the NRC. Russia believes the NRC Ad Hoc Working 

07-chap05.indd 36 11/8/06 10:01:4
AREAS OF COOPERATION

37

Group on Defense Reform, set up at the end of 2002, is doing 

a good job of coordinating cooperation in this area and that the 

cooperation program is being implemented according to schedule. The expert working groups on manning in the armed forces 

and on macroeconomic and social aspects of military reform 

also received high praise from Russian leaders, and two Russian military researchers even began working in September 

2004 at the NATO Defense College in Rome.21

The need for defense reform in Russia has recently been 

highlighted in several areas. One of the most problematic is the 

status of thousands of people who possess unique, potentially 

dangerous knowledge and skills. Should these skills and knowledge spread uncontrolled, the security of many countries around 

the world could be jeopardized. Additionally, the Russian defense 

industry, a major contributor to the Russian economy and GDP 

(gross domestic product), is in desperate condition. As of 2004, 

defense-related enterprises are on average operated at less than 

22 percent capacity. The physical depreciation of fixed assets is 

50 percent, and that of machinery and equipment is up to 70 

percent. Furthermore, as much as 95 percent of this machinery and equipment has not been renovated for a decade.22

The July 2004 sacking of Gen Anatoly Kvashnin, the controversial and pugnacious chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, and his replacement by Colonel-General 

Baluyevsky also appear to have helped Russian military cooperation with NATO. Baluyevsky has widespread support 

throughout Moscow, will work more closely with the civilianized Ministry of Defense, and is considered by many to be one 

of the finest Russian generals on the General Staff. He has 

already appeared much more likely to pursue serious military 

reform than his predecessor, who instead actively pursued only 

his personal ambitions. Baluyevsky has played a significant 

part in arms reduction negotiations and was also involved in 

setting up the NRC.23 Although Russia has no real national 

military strategy yet, and no real consensus on one, there is at 

least now some hope that situation will improve under the leadership of Colonel-General Baluyevsky. 

07-chap05.indd 37 11/8/06 10:01:4
AREAS OF COOPERATION

38

Notes

1. Putin, “Putin Determined to Argue with Bush.” Just prior to his February 

2005 summit with President Bush in Bratislava, Slovakia, Putin once again 

emphasized that Russia would not join NATO, as this would mean a partial 

loss of Russian national sovereignty and certain restrictions in political 

decision making. 

2. Totskiy, “Interview.” 

3. Rogov, “Window of Opportunity,” 72. 

4. Rice, “U.S., Europe Looking Beyond.” 

5. Burns, “NATO and the Transatlantic Relation.”

6. Burns, “NATO-Russia Council.”

7. Ibid. 

8. Totskiy, “Interview.” 

9. Powell, “Powell Sees Bright Future.” 

10. McDermott, “General Baluyevsky Building Trust.” 

11. de Hoop Scheffer, “NATO and Russia Enhance Military.” 

12. Briefing, NATO Military Liaison.

13. “Chairman’s Statement of the Meeting,” 90–91. 

14. “NATO, Russia Review Cooperative Activities,” United States Mission to 

NATO.

15. “Russia to Support NATO’s Anti-Terror Effort.” 

16. McDermott, “General Baluyevsky Building Trust.”

17. Fritch, “NATO’s Strategic Partnerships.”

18. Burns, “NATO-Russia Council.” 

19. “New Relationships,” 39. 

20. Kaplan, “NATO’s First Fifty Years,” 17–19. 

21. Totskiy, “Interview.” 

22. Rubanov, “On the Cooperation with NATO,” 68. 

23. McDermott, “Baluyevsky.”

07-chap05.indd 38 11/8/06 10:01:4
39

Chapter 6

Recommendations—The Way Ahead

And above all, don’t tell us what to do.

—Mikhail S. Gorbachev

Underlying Issues

In light of the previously mentioned underlying issues that 

have either caused contention or contributed to better cooperation between NATO and Russia, NATO can and should take a 

number of recommended actions and policies to foster better 

relations with Russia. Although there will always be disagreements and contentious issues between NATO and Russia, these 

recommendations are based on actions that will minimize those 

contentious issues in the future, along with accentuating the 

policies that are more likely to contribute to continuing success 

between the two. This chapter examines specific underlying 

Russian causes for concern and then describes concrete actions 

the alliance can take to work together more productively with 

its Russian partner. 

Fear of Encirclement and Need for Security 

Throughout the past several centuries, Russians have feared 

threats to their borders and security from outside powers and 

forces. Sometimes these fears have been well-founded and 

sometimes not. However, the Russian perception is that there 

is always that danger and possibility and that they have to be 

constantly on guard to do whatever is necessary to prevent it. 

This is one of the main reasons NATO expansion is such a perceived threat to Russia. After several centuries of invasions 

from the west (from the Poles, French, and Germans—all of 

whom are now NATO allies) as well as from the east and south 

(e.g., the Mongol hordes and the Cossacks), Russians are understandably sensitive to that possibility and very often see 

Western actions from that viewpoint. As a result, NATO expan08-chap06.indd 39 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

40

sion has in many ways alarmed Russians, leading many there 

to believe NATO’s designs on Central and Eastern Europe are 

to weaken Russia and surround it with the Western alliance. 

Russian leaders have also voiced concerns that enlargement 

would only serve to marginalize Russia, hamper and undermine its efforts to reform, and create unnecessary new divisions throughout Europe. They insisted NATO’s eastward 

expansion would not actually deal effectively with the real security issues facing Europe, but would rather force Russia to 

react to NATO’s moves and would undermine, rather than 

enhance, European security.1 Therefore, NATO must proceed 

carefully in considering its future enlargement. It is clear that 

the alliance plans to continue its expansion and has left the 

door open to any country willing and able to meet its entrance 

requirements. However, as NATO’s borders draw closer to Russia’s, NATO leaders can expect Russian protests to grow stronger and more resistant. 

Some potential NATO members will not raise strong protests 

from Moscow due to their distance from Russia’s borders or clear 

lack of strong military capability (e.g., Albania or Croatia). However, vehement protests undoubtedly will arise when countries 

belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States or directly 

bordering Russia join NATO, such as Georgia and especially 

Ukraine, due to its very strong historical, cultural, and economic 

ties to Russia. If the alliance eventually accepts Ukraine, NATO 

leaders will have to deal with how to keep Russia on their side 

and proactively engaged with the alliance without feeling threatened by the presence of the Western alliance on its immediate 

southwestern flank. NATO must think not only twice, but three 

times, before finally extending membership to Ukraine and 

should have a clear understanding of the benefits and drawbacks to this relationship for all parties involved. NATO leaders 

must also keep in mind Ukraine’s necessity to maintain its relationship with Russia and act accordingly. 

Alliance leaders also should turn to new NATO members to 

gain an even better understanding of Russia. The 10 most recent adherents all came out of the shadow and domination of 

the former Soviet Union and can give the alliance a unique perspective on not only their historic relationship with Moscow, 

but also the Kremlin’s general views and thoughts. To date this 

08-chap06.indd 40 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

41

perspective has not yet been significantly aired in Brussels. 

Tomáš Valášek, director of the Brussels office of the Center for 

Defense Information, asserts this more finely tuned Russian 

“radar” could definitely benefit NATO, since it would bring to 

light the knowledge and experience of some of those countries 

that know Moscow best. NATO’s challenge will be to allay any of 

the irrational fears of these newer members, while tapping into 

the energy and focus they offer. This is all the more important 

due to the attention Russia has given to NATO enlargement.2

Russia still tends to see current global relationships in more 

of a nineteenth century “great power” context and mirror that 

view onto the West, particularly the United States. Russian 

leaders automatically assume that a great power and geopolitical 

framework drive Western policy, so they see the net of Western 

relationships in Eurasia as a form of neo-containment meant 

to restrict Russian power and influence. It will be vitally important for NATO to continue to pursue economic trade, investment, and engagement, while holding firm to principled policies upholding international law, respect for sovereignty, 

democracy, and human rights. As Celeste Wallander, director 

of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, recently testified at a House hearing 

on US-Russian relations, “Like the Europeans, the United 

States needs to more consistently see Russia as a work in progress in which we continue to have a very large stake.”3 NATO 

must also continue to see the very large stake it has in Russia’s 

success and security. 

One insight into how to proceed may come from the Russian 

perspective itself. Russia has been clear and firm regarding its 

own prospects of future membership in NATO. President Putin 

has said many times that Russia has no aspirations to join 

NATO. General Totskiy explained further that the issue of membership is not especially relevant to Moscow. 

What is more important is the way in which relations between nations, 

or alliances of nations, are built, and on what basis; the aims they pursue in their cooperation; and the benefit this cooperation brings to others. We believe that NATO-Russia relations form a natural part of 

Europe’s evolving security architecture and that the NRC is becoming a 

pillar of international relations. NATO and Russia have taken on a serious commitment for the future of Europe. And as far as this Mission is 

08-chap06.indd 41 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

42

concerned, it makes no difference whether we join the Alliance or cooperate on a different basis.4

NATO leaders must, above all else, ensure that Russia continues 

to understand that NATO has and will always have a serious 

commitment to Russia for the future security of Europe. 

The key for NATO leaders during any future expansion will 

be to ensure that Russia still believes it is in Europe’s overall 

best interest for more countries, such as Ukraine, to join 

NATO—a tall order indeed. While doing this, they must also 

keep uppermost in mind the inescapable fact that geography 

matters to Russia and must continue to find ways to make the 

benefits to Russia of NATO expansion outweigh the perceived 

losses of geographic security. This also applies to NATO’s future 

deployments of troops on the soil of new members from Central 

and Eastern Europe. The purpose of these deployments must 

be clearly portrayed to Russia, and more importantly understood by them, as not posing any threat to Russian security. 

NATO must continue to engage and include Russia in the planning and execution of alliance exercises and even operations, 

so that Russian leaders understand the value NATO leaders 

place on their participation, while at the same time encouraging Russian responsibility and active participation. 

The Need to Be Respected

Another critical component to the Russian mind is the need 

to be respected by the world. More than almost anything, Russia wants to be respected and treated as an equal to other 

countries and to be considered the great power Russians feel 

she is. In a revealing episode in 1992, shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Catto, then head of the 

US Information Agency (USIA), had the opportunity to interview former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev 

passed on a message through Ambassador Catto for US decision makers that still applies today: “Make up your mind what 

you want Russia to be. Is she a great power to be worked with 

or a candidate for breaking into even smaller pieces? And above 

all, don’t tell us what to do.”5

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing challenges to its economy and society, Russians have strug08-chap06.indd 42 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

43

gled to regain not only the foundations of their society and 

national strength, but also the respect of the world they feel 

they have lost over the past 15 years. The author saw firsthand 

this desire for respect during one of the many Russian delegations he took to the United States during his time at the US 

Embassy in Moscow. During this trip, the delegation visited 

Fort Carson in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and toured the 

state-of-the-art tank simulators at the base. The author was 

quite impressed—even as a US military officer accustomed to 

high-tech equipment—and later asked some of the delegation 

members for their impressions. “Normal’no (normal),” they 

casually shrugged, as if to say it was exactly like what they 

have in Russia. However, having lived and worked in Russia, 

the author knew far better. But it was clear they wanted very 

much to be respected and to have other countries not think 

poorly of them or of their capabilities. 

At a recent US House of Representatives hearing on developments in US-Russian relations, Cong. Curt Weldon gave a summary of how the West should treat Russia. In his testimony, he 

asserted that “they don’t want our money—they want our 

respect! If we are going to call them partners, we need to treat 

them like partners. For us to have the respect of Russia, we 

have to give them our respect.”6 To Russians, this means listening to them, not “telling them what to do,” and not prying 

into their internal affairs. On this latter issue, NATO will have 

to continue to walk its tightrope of insisting on conformity to 

international law and norms of behavior, especially in areas 

such as Chechnya, while at the same time not being seen as 

meddling in the otherwise legitimate internal politics of a sovereign nation.

Desire for Economic Prosperity

One of the strongest driving forces in Russian foreign and 

economic policy is its desperate need to rebuild its economic 

foundation. Russia’s foreign policy is greatly influenced by its 

economic interests for the sake of power, autonomy, and global 

position. Although economic interests do not solely drive Russian foreign policy, they are extremely important to it.7 NATO 

should continue to find a way to engage Russia economically, 

08-chap06.indd 43 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

44

realizing the current limitations to Russia’s finances. Economic 

incentives go far in this regard, and NATO must find ways to 

continue to develop trade with Russia, perhaps through its 

energy sector or even through its military-industrial complex 

and arms capabilities. 

Russia has made clear its desire to join the World Trade 

Organization, a move that would be in NATO’s best interest, 

provided Russia can meet the entry requirements. The United 

States supports this endeavor. President Bush reaffirmed this 

when he and President Putin held a joint press conference in 

Bratislava after their February 2005 summit, saying the two 

leaders had “agreed to accelerate negotiations for Russia’s entry 

into the WTO.”8 It is also worth noting that President Putin 

made a special effort to thank President Bush for the “serious 

message” that Russian negotiators noticed in the course of the 

WTO negotiations during the summit. Putin said it was “a message aimed at resolving all the problems that stand in the way 

of Russia’s accession to the WTO” and opined that “not only the 

Russian economy, but also the US economy are interested in 

the positive outcome.”9

Leading intelligence experts also highlight the importance of 

a strong Russian economy to the security of Europe and of the 

role Europe can play in drawing Russia closer. In their view, if 

Russia knows Western Europe wants to forge a “special relationship” with a Russia that is economically stronger, Moscow 

is more likely to be tolerant of former Soviet states moving 

closer to Europe.10 Such a closer relationship to European 

institutions and structures would also provide Russia a vital 

counterweight to the strong economic lure of weapons of mass 

destruction and other weapons proliferation, as well as reducing its perceived need for growing ties with other regions and 

countries, such as China, India, and Iran. President Putin has 

made clear this Russian need and desire for further development, stating shortly after his reelection in March 2004,

the main goal of our policy is not to demonstrate some or other imperial 

ambitions, but rather to secure favorable external conditions for the 

development of Russia. There is nothing unusual in that. And we will be 

building a multi-vector foreign policy; we will work together with the 

United States, the European Union, and with individual countries of 

Europe. We will work together with our Asian partners, with China, 

India, and with countries of the Asia-Pacific region.11

08-chap06.indd 44 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

45

As a result, the support of NATO and other Western institutions takes on vital importance in keeping Russia positively 

engaged in and cooperating with the rest of Europe.

Need for a Strong Euro-Atlantic Security Framework and 

Dialogue

Russia is now more readily acknowledging, at least publicly, 

the value of NATO and of closer relations with the alliance. 

Amb. Anatoly Adamishin, president of the Russian Association 

for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, recently affirmed this view when 

he opined that NATO-Russian relations are currently exemplary,

despite some disagreements. As he pointed out, Russia must 

“have an alliance with the Alliance,” and any quarrels between 

the two must be settled without taking sides. He put it plainly 

when he said, “NATO is necessary.” The challenge, he said, is 

to avoid tackling new problems with old, obsolete methods.12

It is vital for the alliance to encourage this view and to keep 

Russia engaged with the West. Without a continuation of strong, 

active, and regular engagement from NATO and other important Western institutions (e.g., the EU), Russia naturally will 

look for support, security, and prosperity from other sources 

(e.g., China, India, and even Iran) if they offer much-needed 

economic capital for Russia. NATO’s European members will 

be particularly key players in this regard, both multilaterally 

and even bilaterally, as Moscow looks more and more toward 

integration into European institutions and seeks to regain what 

it considers its rightful, prominent role on the continent. 

Without such continued active engagement, NATO could face 

a hardening of Russian attitudes toward the West. The likely 

result would be for Russia to close more of its society and 

become even more secretive than it already is, clearly a step 

backward from the alliance’s goal of transparency. NATO has 

to avoid these pitfalls, insofar as it can possibly influence them. 

Above all, NATO should avoid marginalizing Russia, which will 

take creativity as NATO’s borders expand further eastward. The 

alliance could encourage a more active Russian role in the PfP, 

include more Russian officers in technical ventures such as 

joint exercises and force planning, and even possibly integrate 

Russia into its own efforts at military reform.13 One thing NATO 

08-chap06.indd 45 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

46

leaders can count on is that as NATO expands its membership, 

especially to the east, Russia will continue to look more to other 

nations to establish or strengthen other alliances and partnerships in response. 

NATO’s leaders also must keep in mind that words matter to 

the Russians. The details and exact wording of international 

treaties, agreements, and even simple diplomatic notes matter. 

The author saw this repeatedly during his time in Moscow, 

when reaching agreement on the seemingly smallest details 

sometimes took excruciating lengths of time. In the Russian 

view, the spirit and intent of an agreement cannot necessarily 

be proven—only that which is written can be proven. Accurate 

words also prevent a subsequent administration or government 

from changing the intent of an agreement without resorting to 

formal channels. Russian leaders believe they can avoid being 

cheated or taken advantage of by correctly spelling out everything. Conversely, they do not see a problem in taking advantage of loopholes in treaties and agreements, if the letter of the 

law is not violated. In their view, it is perfectly fair, even if it 

might violate the intent of the law. Otherwise, their treaty partner should have seen this possibility and guarded against it. 

The moral: Whenever alliance leaders can join formally with 

Russia in an activity or partnership, they should do it.

Close, honest, and transparent dialogue is critical to NATO 

success in continuing to engage Russia, and the NRC definitely 

has been a step in the right direction. Fortunately, the alliance 

has recognized this and should do everything it possibly can to 

encourage dialogue. Amb. Maurizio Moreno, Italian permanent 

representative to the North Atlantic Council, recently commented on the importance of dialogue regarding NATO’s new 

history in its relations with Russia. In his view, Russia is now 

an equal partner, and the process within the NRC is working 

well, even on sensitive issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, and the controversial Ukrainian presidential election. 

Although there are natural differences of opinions, and even 

some differences between NATO and Russian values, he believes 

the two sides can work successfully through these challenges. 

According to Moreno, “There are values we can share,” and he 

stated that we have done so recently through the NRC. Although 

Russia has not joined NATO, and most likely will not, in his 

08-chap06.indd 46 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

47

view there is still the definite possibility for beneficial and productive dialogue.14

Former NATO secretary general Lord Robertson captured the 

essence of NATO’s success in the NRC when he presciently stated 

in 2002, “The real difference between ‘19 + 1’ and ‘20’ is not a 

question of mathematics, but one of chemistry: the success of 

the NATO-Russia Council will depend on the political will of the 

participants.” Based on the apparent willingness of both sides 

to make it work, he believed that “the prospects for a genuinely 

new quality in NATO-Russia relations appear bright.”15

Thus far, his belief in the NRC’s prospects has proven well 

founded. Now, it is up to NATO and Russian leaders to ensure 

that the chemistry remains strong and positive. This will 

undoubtedly require a skillful mix of patient dialogue combined 

at times with more forceful pressure, without resorting to confrontation. As history has shown, confrontation, demands, and 

ultimatums will accomplish very little with Russia (as indeed, 

these tactics accomplish little with any country). The best prospects for NATO-Russian relations will result from NATO leaders honestly listening to and considering Russian views, even if 

in the end Moscow does not like the answer. To the extent possible, NATO must avoid marginalizing Russia. 

Need for Conflict Resolution, Crisis Management, and 

Greater Interoperability

In today’s challenging world security environment, it is more 

important than ever that NATO and Russia find ways to cooperate effectively in conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and crisismanagement operations. Much is already being done, and 

NATO leaders should continue this positive trend toward greater 

cooperation and interoperability of NATO and Russian armed 

forces. For example, NATO and Russia are preparing the 

groundwork for cooperation in peacekeeping in several areas

for possible future joint operations. The NRC Working Group 

on Peacekeeping has prepared a joint document titled “Political 

Aspects of the Generic Concept of NATO-Russia Joint Peacekeeping Operations,” which is being tested in procedural exercises. In addition, a program for improving interoperability 

08-chap06.indd 47 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

48

between NATO and Russian peacekeeping units has been 

approved and is being implemented.16

In considering whether Russia would join NATO in crisismanagement operations, the Russian view is that the United 

Nations should play the lead role. This view is understandable, 

since Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council 

and holds veto power. Still, Russia recently has shown much 

more willingness to operate together with the alliance and has 

agreed to help out in current hot spots such as Afghanistan 

and Iraq to a limited extent. As to whether Russia is prepared 

in principle to conduct further joint operations with NATO—

even outside NATO’s traditional area of responsibility, as it 

already has done in Afghanistan and the Balkans—Russian 

leaders don’t “rule out this possibility.”17

A useful example of good cooperation, for the most part, is 

the joint operations NATO and Russian forces have conducted 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Balkans, NATO and Russian 

forces showed that they have the capability to work together 

effectively, given the right circumstances and the will to succeed. From the Russian viewpoint, when joint forces have clear 

tasking and are working under a UN Security Council mandate, they are perfectly capable of operating effectively together 

in the most difficult conditions. General Totskiy proudly related 

that “Russian soldiers and commanders, who worked shoulder 

to shoulder with their NATO colleagues, have fond memories of 

the spirit of camaraderie and cooperation, which frequently 

provided a source of support during the difficult days of the 

Balkan operations.”18

Despite goodwill and national resolve, NATO and Russian 

forces remain a long way apart from anything close to true military interoperability. However, the encouraging cooperation 

within the NRC also is yielding broader cooperation within the 

EAPC and the PfP. Both NATO and Russia now have the opportunity to take that cooperation and bring greater technical 

interoperability to their military forces, communications equipment, aircraft, naval vessels, and other fields. This will require 

money, something Russia and some NATO member nations lack. 

However, one productive way to accomplish the goal is through 

deeper Russian engagement in existing practical cooperative 

08-chap06.indd 48 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

49

projects in the PfP framework, with the final goal of developing 

true joint capabilities between both parties’ armed forces.19

The Bottom Line

Much of the NATO-Russian relationship can be determined 

by the attitude of cooperation from the alliance. Martin van 

Heuven, former US deputy permanent representative to the 

European Office of the UN and International Organizations in 

Geneva and former member of the US National Intelligence 

Council, summarized the benefits of this cooperation, pointing 

out that, 

a purposeful Western policy of cooperation will remain important to 

help Russia reform and to meet the sensitive issue of Russia’s perception of itself as a world power. But Western cooperation will be validated 

only to the degree reform will create some form of dependency on the 

West, creating mutual incentives for cooperation. . . . An unstable Russia would make for an unstable Europe. On the other hand, a Russia 

that is focused forward on reform rather than backward on lost empire, 

and that cooperates with NATO will be an indispensable and positive 

factor in European security. This should be the continuing objective of 

NATO policy.20

Western institutions in general and NATO in particular 

should continue their strong focus on giving Russia a genuine 

voice in international decision making. Otherwise, Russia will 

not perceive itself to have the same stake in these institutions 

as its Western members and will continue to look to other partners, such as China and India, for support and security. Russia will undoubtedly not become a member of all Western institutions, but it can still play a vital role and, more importantly, 

remain more closely integrated with these institutions. Granted, 

Russia must still show significant reform in several different 

areas in order to be taken seriously by Western institutions 

and integrated more closely into their structures. However, 

without weakening its own position or influence, the West can 

also still ensure that Moscow has a legitimate international 

voice commensurate with its perceived “great power” role, reasonable and competitive economic possibilities compatible with 

its own goals, and the opportunity to agree on many international foreign policy goals, even if some disagreements still exist 

over the means to those goals.21

08-chap06.indd 49 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

50

In the end, NATO must decide what kind of relationship it 

can and should have with Russia, keeping the long term in 

view. NATO should be a constructive partner and be able to 

understand the complexities of the situation the Kremlin leadership is facing. Alliance leaders should give a clear and consistent message of support and engagement to Russia and should 

stand firm on those issues that involve its core interests and 

principles.22 Above all, NATO must convince Russia that it honestly has Russia’s best interests at heart and that Moscow faces 

no threat from the alliance. 

Conclusion

In considering the future of NATO-Russian relations, there 

are reasons to be hopeful. There have been many accomplishments, and the road ahead, while filled with certain challenges, 

still looks passable. However, both sides will have to continue 

their current course of cooperation and keep their focus on the 

will to work productively together. When the inevitable challenges and disagreements arise, both sides must remain committed to work through them, just as in any successful marriage. The most successful cooperation will undoubtedly arise 

from a framework of stability, confidence, predictability, and 

transparency in the NATO-Russian relationship. Such a relationship can lead to even more shared responsibility for joint 

decision making and consensus building, as well as continuing 

to encourage a practical agenda for Euro-Atlantic security.23

Geopolitics will continue to play a significant role. As mentioned above, Russia straddles two continents—Europe and 

Asia—and the double-headed eagle on the Russian crest continues to watch over both directions of the empire. NATO’s challenge will be to ensure that the western view from the Kremlin 

looks much closer and reassuring than it has in the past and to 

ensure that Russia’s leaders know without doubt that they are a 

vital, integral part of the European security structure. 

What the future holds for Russian democratic reforms and 

closer integration into the West remains clouded. Some of the 

initial steps toward real progress and openness Russia showed 

over the past 15 years seem to be regressing under various 

reforms implemented by President Putin. While the final desti08-chap06.indd 50 11/8/06 10:02:0
RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD

51

nation of Russia’s current path remains unknown, it is certain 

that, regardless of where it leads, NATO and Russian leaders 

will have their commitment to the relationship tested again and 

again. The future of the NATO-Russian relationship hangs predominantly on their will to make it work. 

Notes

1. Clark et al., Permanent Alliance? 20. 

2. Valášek, “The Meaning of Enlargement,” 10. 

3. House, Developments in U.S.-Russia Relations. See testimony of Celeste A. 

Wallander, 6–7.

4. Totskiy, “Interview.” 

5. Catto, Ambassadors at Sea, 335–36. 

6. House, Developments in U.S.-Russia Relations. See testimony of Cong. 

Curt Weldon. 

7. Ibid., 4. 

8. “Bush, Putin Address Concerns.” 

9. Ibid. 

10. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, 74. 

11. Torkunov, “Russia and the West,” 3–4. 

12. Adamishin, address. 

13. Twain Shall Meet, 13. 

14. Moreno, address. 

15. Robertson, “Introduction,” 5. 

16. Totskiy, “Interview.” 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Fritch, “NATO’s Strategic Partnerships.”

20. van Heuven, NATO in 2010, 3, 6. 

21. Twain Shall Meet, 5. 

22. House, Developments in U.S.-Russia Relations. See Prepared Statement by Eugene B. Rumer, 4. 

23. For a more detailed analysis, see Rogov, “Window of Opportunity.”

08-chap06.indd 51 11/8/06 10:02:0
53

Bibliography

Adamishin, Anatoly, president of the Russian Association for 

Euro-Atlantic Cooperation. Address. “New NATO and Its 

Partnerships.” Atlantic Treaty Association 50th General 

Assembly Convention, Rome, Italy, 1 December 2004. 

“Air Policing over the Baltics.” NATO Supreme Headquarters 

Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) News, 31 March 2004. 

http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2004/03/i040331 

.htm (accessed 18 November 2004). 

“Alliance’s Strategic Concept.” NATO Press Release, 23 April 

1999. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.

Baluyevsky, Yuri. “General Baluyevsky: Russia Does Not Fear 

NATO Expansion.” On-Line Pravda, 27 May 2002. http://

english.pravda.ru/politics/2002/05/27/29320.html.

Bennett, Christopher. “Building Effective Partnerships.” NATO 

Review-Istanbul Summit Special, June 2004. 

Burns, R. Nicholas. “NATO and the Transatlantic Relation.” 

United States Mission to NATO, 8 November 2004. http://

nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08_Burns 

_Berlin.htm (accessed 18 November 2004). 

———. “NATO-Russia Council: A Vital Partnership in the War 

on Terror.” United States Mission to NATO, 4 November 

2004. http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004 

Nov04_Burns_Moscow.htm (accessed 18 November 2004).

———. “Pre-Ministerial Briefing with Journalists.” United States 

Mission to NATO, 6 December 2004. http://nato.usmission 

.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Dec06_Burns_Brussels.htm.

Bush, George. “President Discusses American and European 

Alliance in Belgium.” United States Mission to NATO, 21 February 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 

2005/02/20050221.html. 

“Bush, Putin Address Concerns about Russian Democracy.” 

United States Mission to NATO, 24 February 2005. http://

nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=235C74C6-32D7-48B7 

-8667-3AC52F69161C. 

Catto, Henry E., Jr. Ambassadors at Sea: The High and Low 

Adventures of a Diplomat. Austin, TX: University of Texas 

Press, 1998. 

09-bibliography.indd 53 11/8/06 10:02:2
BIBLIOGRAPHY

54

Clark, Wesley K., Charles W. Freeman Jr., Max Cleland, and 

Gordon Smith. Permanent Alliance? NATO’s Prague Summit and Beyond. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the 

United States, April 2001. 

“The Euro-Atlantic Partnership.” NATO Topics, 31 March 2004. 

http://www.nato.int/issues/eap/index.html (accessed 7 

September 2004).

Fritch, Paul. “NATO’s Strategic Partnerships: Building Hope on 

Experience.” NATO Review, Autumn 2003. http://www 

.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/art3.html.

Heuven, Martin H. A. van. NATO in 2020. Washington, DC: 

Atlantic Council of the United States, August 1999. http://

acus.org/docs/9908-NATO_2010.pdf.

Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General Jaap de. Address. 

Atlantic Treaty Association 50th General Assembly Convention, Rome, Italy, 1 December 2004.

———. “NATO and Russia Enhance Military Cooperation.” 

NATO Update, 7–8 April 2004. http://www.nato.int/docu/

update/2004/04-april/e0407c.htm (accessed 16 April 2004).

———. “NATO, Russia Enhance Military Cooperation.” United 

States Mission to NATO, 14 April 2004. http://nato.us 

mission.gov/Article.asp?ID=70E14E9A-4D76-4469-8344 

-278F2E8D0042 (accessed 15 April 2005).

———. “Opening Remarks.” NATO Speeches—NATO Summit, 

22 February 2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/ 

2005/s050222a.htm.

———. “Opening Statement at the Press Conference Following 

the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the Level of 

Heads of State and Government.” NATO Speeches—NATO 

Summit, 22 February 2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/

speech/2005/s050222f.htm.

House. Developments in U.S.-Russia Relations: Hearing before 

the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats of the 

Committee on International Relations. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 

9 March 2005. http://wwwa.house.gov/international 

_relation/109/99821.pdf. 

Jones, Gen James L., supreme allied commander Europe, 

NATO. Address. Atlantic Treaty Association 50th General 

Assembly Convention, Rome, Italy, 1 December 2004.

09-bibliography.indd 54 11/8/06 10:02:2
BIBLIOGRAPHY

55

Kaplan, Lawrence S. Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty 

Years. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. 

Kelin, Andrei. “Attitude to NATO Expansion: Calmly Negative.” 

International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, 

Diplomacy and International Relations 50, no. 1 (2004): 

17–25.

Kuchma, Leonid. “Message from Leonid Kuchma, President of 

Ukraine.” NATO Review: 50th Anniversary Commemorative 

Edition, 1999. 

Kuznetsova, Ekaterina. “NATO: New Anti-Terrorist Organization?” 

International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, 

Diplomacy and International Relations 50, no. 3 (2004): 

22–26. 

MacKenzie, David, and Michael W. Curran. A History of Russia 

and the Soviet Union. Rev. ed. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey 

Press, 1982. 

McDermott, Roger. “Baluyevsky: New Chief of the Russian General 

Staff.” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 

56, 21 July 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/publications 

_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3022&article_id 

=2368275.

———. “General Baluyevsky Building Trust with NATO.” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 128, 16 November 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details 

.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3142&article_id=2368858. 

Moreno, Maurizio, Italian permanent representative to the 

North Atlantic Council. Address. Atlantic Treaty Association 50th General Assembly Convention, Rome, Italy, 1 

December 2004. 

Mroziewicz, Robert. “Enlargement and the Capabilities Gap.” In 

Transforming NATO Forces: European Perspectives. Edited 

by C. Richard Nelson and Jason S. Purcell. Washington, DC: 

The Atlantic Council of the United States, January 2003. 

National Intelligence Council. Mapping the Global Future: Report

of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Based on 

Consultations with Nongovernmental Experts around the 

World. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

December 2004. 

NATO. “Chairman’s Statement: Meeting of the NATO-Russia 

Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul.” 

09-bibliography.indd 55 11/8/06 10:02:2
BIBLIOGRAPHY

56

Brussels: NATO Press Release, 28 June 2004. http://www 

.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p040628e.htm.

———. “Further Developing NATO-Ukraine Relations.” NATOIstanbul Summit Reader’s Guide, 2004, 128–32. http://

www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-ist/rdr-gde-ist-e.pdf.

———. “Growing NATO-Russian Cooperation.” NATO-Istanbul 

Summit Reader’s Guide, 2004, 122–27. http://www.nato.int/

docu/rdr-gde-ist/rdr-gde-ist-e.pdf.

———. “NATO after Istanbul: Expanding Operations, Improving Capabilities, Enhancing Cooperation.” NATO On-line 

Library, 14 July 2004. http://www.nato.int/docu/nato 

_after_istanbul/nato_after_instanbul_en.pdf (accessed 7 

September 2004).

———. “NATO in the 21st Century.” Brussels: NATO On-line 

Library, 13 April 2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/

html_en/21st01.html.

———. “NATO Lauded as ‘Centerpiece’ of U.S. Efforts in Europe.” 

United States Mission to NATO, 21 February 2005. http://

nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=7A10F6CE-5894-431 

E-9372-B38896E62FEA. 

———. NATO-Russia: Forging Deeper Relations. Brussels: NATO 

Public Diplomacy Division, 2004. 

———. “NATO-Russia Council.” NATO Issues, 30 August 2004. 

http://www.nato.int/issues/nrc/index.html (accessed 7 

September 2004). 

———. “NATO-Russia Relations.” NATO Issues, 30 August 

2004. http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html 

(accessed 7 September 2004).

———. “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality. Declaration by 

Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States 

and the Russian Federation.” NATO-Russia Council: Rome 

Summit 2002. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and 

Press, 2002. 

———. “NATO, Russia Review Cooperative Activities.” United 

States Mission to NATO, 28 June 2004. http://nato.us 

mission.gov/Article.asp?ID=783FB225-A31D-4CB4-9EA 

4-01277CB9DE25. 

———. NATO Transformed. Brussels: NATO On-line Library, 

June 2004. http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/

nato_trans01.html.

09-bibliography.indd 56 11/8/06 10:02:2
BIBLIOGRAPHY

57

———. “NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership.” Brussels: 

NATO On-line Library, June 2004. http://www.nato.int/

docu/nato-ukraine/html_en/nato_ukraine01.html. 

———. “New Relationships: Practical Cooperation and Dialogue.” The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation: A 

Reader’s Guide. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2003. 

“NATO Envoy to Visit Georgia.” Online Magazine–Civil Georgia, 

1 February 2005. http://www.una.org.ge/publicat.html. 

Powell, Colin. “Powell Sees Bright Future for NATO.” United 

States Mission to NATO, 9 December 2004. http://www 

.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/39635.htm.

———. “Russia Need Not Worry over NATO Enlargement, Powell 

Says.” United States Mission to NATO, 4 April 2004. http://

nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=86EB170C-9938-4898 

-B7C5-4D5A0E98289A (accessed 13 September 2004). 

Putin, Vladimir. Address. NATO-Russia Council: Rome Summit 

2002. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002. 

———. “Putin Determined to Argue with Bush during RussiaUSA Summit in Bratislava.” On-Line Pravda, 24 February 

2005. http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/15010 

_summit.html. 

Rice, Condoleezza. “Remarks at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters.” U.S. Department of State, 9 February 

2005. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/42047.htm.

———. “U.S., Europe Looking Beyond Past Disagreements, Rice 

Says.” United States Mission to NATO, 10 February 2005. 

http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=C3C71785-2D 

58-4F74-952D-AFF87A086846.htm. 

Robertson, Lord George. “Introduction.” In NATO-Russia Council:

Rome Summit 2002. Brussels: NATO Office of Information 

and Press, 2002. 

Rogov, Sergey. “The Window of Opportunity in Russian-Western 

Relations.” In The Twain Shall Meet: The Prospects for RussiaWest Relations. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the 

United States, September 2002. 

Rubanov, Vladimir. “On the Cooperation with NATO in Defense 

Industry.” In International Affairs: A Russian Journal of 

World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 50, 

no. 6 (2004): 68–78.

09-bibliography.indd 57 11/8/06 10:02:2
BIBLIOGRAPHY

58

“Russia to Support NATO’s Anti-Terror Effort in Mediterranean.” United States Mission to NATO, 10 December 2004. 

http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=6F07739A-AE 

27-47D8-AB7E-3A6D604FB7B8. 

Stanhope, Adm Sir Mark, deputy supreme allied commander 

Transformation (DSACT), NATO. Address. Atlantic Treaty 

Association 50th General Assembly Convention, Rome, 

Italy, 1 December 2004. 

“Statement Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 

Brussels.” NATO On-Line Library: NATO Press Release, 22 

February 2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/

p05-022e.htm. 

Torkunov, Anatolii. “Russia and the West: Common Security 

Interests.” International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World 

Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 50, no. 4 

(2004): 1–6. 

Totskiy, Konstantin V. “Interview—General Totskiy: Russian 

Ambassador to NATO.” NATO Review, Autumn 2003. 

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/

art3.html.

Troitski, Mikhail. Transatlantic Union 1991–2004: Transformation of the U.S.-European Partnership in the Post-Bipolar 

World (in Russian). Moscow: Institute for the U.S. and 

Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004. 

Valášek, Tomáš. “Meaning of Enlargement.” NATO ReviewIstanbul Summit Special, June 2004. 

Vershbow, Alexander. “United States and Russia: The Next 

Four Years.” Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson School of 

Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. In 

“Vershbow Sees ‘Strong, Positive’ U.S. Relationship with 

Russia.” United States Mission to NATO, 17 November 2004. 

http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=786EAE89 

-D432-4795-93EA-E0F33FA782C9 (accessed 18 November 2004).

“Vote in Parliament Raises Stakes in Row With Moscow.” Washington Post Metro Express, 11 March 2005. 

Welberts, Rolf. “Explaining NATO in Russia.” NATO Review, 

Autumn 2003. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/

issue3/english/art3.html.

09-bibliography.indd 58 11/8/06 10:02:2
BIBLIOGRAPHY

59

Yuryev, Col-Gen Yevgeniy. “Kant Air Base: The First Year Has 

Passed.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, 22 October 

2004. http://www.redstar.ru/2004/10/22_10/index.shtml.

Yushchenko, Viktor. “Opening Statement at the Meeting of the 

NATO-Ukraine Council at the Level of Heads of State and 

Government.” NATO Speeches—NATO Summit, 22 February 

2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050222e 

.htm.

———. “Opening Statement at the Press Conference following 

the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the Level of 

Heads of State and Government.” NATO Speeches—NATO 

Summit, 22 February 2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/

speech/2005/s050222g.htm.

09-bibliography.indd 59 11/8/06 10:02:2
The Future of NATO-Russian Relations

or How to Dance with a Bear

and Not Get Mauled

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Jerry L. Gantt

Copy Editor

Sherry C. Terrell

Book Design and Cover Art

Steven C. Garst

Composition and

Prepress Production

Ann Bailey

Quality Review

Mary J. Moore

Print Preparation

Joan Hickey

Distribution

Diane Clark

10-back.indd 1 11/8/06 10:02:4