DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE CITY OF FORT PIERCE, FLORIDA, a Florida municipal 

corporation, FORT PIERCE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, a dependent 

special district of the City of Fort Pierce, KEN PRUITT, the ST. LUCIE 

COUNTY TAX APPRAISER, and LISA VICKERS, the EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Appellants,

v.

TREASURE COAST MARINA, LC, a Florida limited liability company,

RIVERFRONT DEVELOPMENT, LC, a Florida limited liability company,

and RAINCROSS HOLDINGS, LC, a Florida limited liability company,

Appellees.

No. 4D14-3064

[April 27, 2016]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; William Roby, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562011CA002968.

Robert V. Schwerer and James T. Walker of Hayskar, Walker, Schwerer, 

Dundas & McCain, P.A., Fort Pierce, for appellants The City of Fort Pierce 

and Fort Pierce Redevelopment Agency.

Loren E. Levy and Jon F. Morris of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for 

appellant Ken Pruitt, St. Lucie County Property Appraiser.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert P. Elson, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellant Department of Revenue.

Brigid F. Cech Samole and Jay A. Yagoda of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., 

Miami, and Jerry Stouck of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

appellees Treasure Coast Marina, LC, Riverfront Developers, LC, and 

Raincross Holdings, LC.

Benjamin K. Phipps of Phipps & Howell, and Harry Morrison, Jr. of 

Kraig Conn, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae Florida League of Cities.

WARNER, J.
2

The City of Fort Pierce and Fort Pierce Redevelopment Agency (referred 

to collectively as “the City”), along with Ken Pruitt, St. Lucie County 

Property Appraiser, appeal from an order granting final summary 

judgment in favor of appellees, Treasure Coast Marina, LC, d/b/a 

Harbortown Marina, Raincross Holdings, LC, and Riverfront Developers, 

LC (referred to collectively as “Riverfront”). The trial court determined that 

the City was not entitled to an exemption from ad valorem taxes on 

marinas owned and operated by the City, concluding that the marinas did 

not serve a “municipal or public purpose” under article VII, section 3(a) of 

the Florida Constitution. It relied on cases finding that Florida Department 

of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2005), had narrowed 

the legal standard for the exemption. We conclude, however, that 

Gainesville did not change the legal standard, and that it used the same 

definition of municipal or public purpose as in prior court opinions. Under 

this definition, municipal marinas are traditionally considered exempt 

from taxation. Thus, the tax exemption was properly applied to the City’s 

marinas, and we reverse the final judgment.

The City owns and operates two marinas—City Marina and Fisherman’s 

Wharf Marina. Riverfront, a privately-owned enterprise, owns and 

operates Harbortown Marina. In tax years 2011-13, the Property 

Appraiser exempted the City’s marinas from ad valorem taxes. 

Harbortown Marina was not exempted. Riverfront thereafter brought suit 

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against application of the 

exemption to the City’s marinas. The complaint alleged that it was 

unconstitutional to exempt the City’s marinas, because they are 

commercial enterprises, indistinguishable from a privately-owned 

enterprise, not used exclusively for a municipal purpose, and not essential 

to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the City’s people.

Riverfront and the City each moved for final summary judgment, with 

the Property Appraiser joining the City’s motion. After a hearing, the court 

granted final summary judgment in favor of Riverfront. In its order, the 

court noted that the parties had conceded there were no issues of material 

fact. The court found that in Gainesville, 918 So. 2d at 256, the Florida 

Supreme Court had modified and narrowed the definition of “municipal or 

public purpose” with regard to ad valorem tax exemptions, and therefore 

cases predating Gainesville did not apply. Under this interpretation of 

Gainesville, the court found that the City’s marinas did not serve a 

municipal or public purpose, because they previously operated as private 

marinas and still competed with private marinas such as Harbortown. 

Additionally, although the court declined to apply Islamorada, Village of 

Islands v. Higgs, 882 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (finding municipal 

marinas traditionally serve a municipal or public purpose), because it 
3

predated Gainesville, the court nonetheless found Islamorada 

distinguishable from the present case under its interpretation of 

Gainesville. The court therefore enjoined application of the ad valorem tax 

exemption to the City’s marinas for the 2014 tax year. The City, joined by 

the Property Appraiser, now appeal from this order.

Under article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, “[a]ll property 

owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public 

purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” This provision, added in the

1968 Constitution, was a change from the 1885 Constitution, which 

required legislative authorization as to whether an activity served a 

municipal or public purpose. Gainesville, 918 So. 2d at 257-58. The 1968 

Constitution eliminated this requirement and made the exemption selfexecuting. Id.

The 1968 Constitution also added the requirement that the 

municipality both own the property as well as use it exclusively. Id. at 

257. This was seen as a response to Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational 

Facilities District v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349, 353 (Fla. 1965), which applied 

the tax exemption to a municipally-owned but privately-operated 

racetrack, finding that it served a public purpose because it contributed 

to the economic well-being of the community. See Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 

at 260. The framers of the 1968 Constitution sought to limit the holding 

of Daytona Beach Racing, not by changing the definition of what 

constituted a “municipal or public purpose,” but by requiring both 

ownership and exclusive use of the property by the municipality. Id. at 

259-60. As such, the meaning of “municipal or public purpose” remained 

the same as in prior decisions:

There is nothing in the language of article VII, section 3(a) that 

evinces an intent to create a more restrictive definition of 

“municipal or public purposes” for property that is owned and 

used exclusively by the municipality than the definition applied 

to “municipal purposes” under the 1885 Constitution in [State 

ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 200 So. 100 (Fla. 1941),] and 

[Saunders v. City of Jacksonville, 25 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1946),]

through the 1968 adoption of the current provision. 

Id. at 263. Gainesville therefore concluded that “the ‘municipal or public 

purposes’ for which municipally owned property must be exclusively used 

in article VII, section 3(a) to qualify for an ad valorem tax exemption 

encompass activities that are essential to the health, morals, safety, and 

general welfare of the people within the municipality.” Id. at 264.
4

In applying this definition, the Gainesville court focused on the word 

“essential,” which it concluded meant “necessity.” Id. The court found 

that prior cases also rested on the necessity of the municipal activity in 

determining tax exemptions. Id. at 264-65. Most apropos to this case, the 

court noted that “the tax-exempt status upheld in [City of Sarasota v. 

Mikos, 374 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979),] for vacant land held by a municipality 

to preserve natural open spaces or for future needs is consistent with the 

traditional municipal function of providing parks for the municipal 

population.” Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); cf. City of 

Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So. 2d 493, 495 (Fla. 1953) (stating that “[i]n all 

heavily populated municipalities the police power should be exercised by 

municipal officials to afford all of the people light, air, [and] an opportunity 

for recreation”) (emphasis added).

Because Gainesville did not recede from older cases defining a 

“municipal or public purpose,” Daytona Beach Racing provides guidance 

on what constitutes a public purpose. “[T]he purpose of the [speedway] 

facility is both to increase trade by attracting tourists and to provide 

recreation for the citizens of the District. We have on numerous cases 

approved as a public purpose the development of recreational facilities.” 

Daytona Beach Racing, 179 So. 2d at 352. Indeed, under the 1885 

Constitution, the courts gave wide latitude to the legislative judgment of 

what constituted a public purpose: “The development of the law in this 

State on this question and particularly a study of the legislative history 

with relation to public projects of a recreational and entertainment nature 

reveals the allowance to the public bodies of an extremely wide latitude in 

this field.” Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608, 613 (Fla. 1957).

The Legislature has defined “municipal or public purpose” in the 

context of determining whether a private lessee of governmental property 

may qualify for a statutory exemption:

Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall 

be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any 

leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the 

state . . . , or any municipality . . . is demonstrated to perform 

a function or serve a governmental purpose which could 

properly be performed or served by an appropriate 

governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a 

function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid 

subject for the allocation of public funds.

§ 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). Under this statute, airports, maritime and 

port activities, convention centers, visitor centers, sports stadiums, parks, 
5

and beaches are all entities or uses deemed to serve a municipal purpose 

“when access to the property is open to the general public with or without 

a charge for admission.” Id. Under this definition, a marina would most 

definitely qualify as a public or municipal purpose.

Additionally, marinas are generally considered a traditional municipal 

function. “Florida courts have long recognized that governmental 

construction or promotion of recreational facilities, including a public 

marina, constitutes a valid public function.” Page v. Fernandina Harbor 

Joint Venture, 608 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), disapproved of on 

other grounds, Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 

1994); see also Islamorada, 882 So. 2d at 1010-11; Panama City, 93 So.

2d at 613.

The present case is similar to Islamorada, which also involved the 

application of the “ad valorem tax exemption when the marina serves both 

residents and nonresidents, despite (1) operating in competition with other 

marinas in the area and (2) generating a profit for the municipality.” 

Islamorada, 882 So. 2d at 1010. The Islamorada court held that that such 

a marina was entitled to the tax exemption because it “is a recreational 

facility that is available to residents and nonresidents and is operated 

without the involvement of a non-governmental lessee or operator.” Id. at 

1010-11. Although the trial court in this case found that Islamorada was 

no longer good law, we disagree. As noted above, we disagree with the trial 

court’s finding that Gainesville mandated a narrower definition of 

municipal or public purpose.

Islamorada actually defined “municipal functions,” characterizing them 

as “functions created for or granted for the benefit and advantage of the 

community included within the corporate boundaries[,] which ‘specifically 

and peculiarly promote the comfort, convenience, safety and happiness of 

the citizens of the municipality rather than the welfare of the general 

public.’” Id. at 1011 (citation omitted) (quoting Greater Orlando Aviation 

Auth. v. Crotty, 775 So. 2d 978, 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). Under this 

definition, “[m]unicipal operation of a marina is a legitimate municipal 

corporate undertaking for the comfort, convenience, safety, and happiness 

of the municipality’s citizens. . . . When a city operates a marina it owns, 

marina property it has not leased to a nongovernmental entity is exempt 

from ad valorem taxation.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Page v. City of 

Fernandina Beach, 714 So. 2d 1070, 1076 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)).

In finding that Islamorada is no longer good law, the trial court relied 

on the applications of Gainesville in CAPFA Capital Corp. 2000A v. 

Donegan, 929 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), and City of Gainesville v. 
6

Crapo, 953 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). This reliance was misplaced, 

as both cases are distinguishable from Islamorada and the present case.

In CAPFA, the Fifth District Court of Appeal found that a student 

housing complex, created and administered by a municipality but 

operated by a non-profit corporation, did not qualify as a municipal or 

public purpose for the following reasons: it was not within the range of 

services historically provided by municipalities; it competed with private 

providers; and it was operated with the intent of making a profit.1 CAPFA, 

929 So. 2d at 574.

In Crapo, the First District Court of Appeal found that a city’s 

communication towers were subject to ad valorem taxation because they 

were partially leased to private providers, who sold telecommunications 

services for profit. Crapo, 953 So. 2d at 565. Although the city also used 

the towers for governmental communications serving a municipal or public 

purpose, the property was not used exclusively by the municipality. Id. A 

property used by the city as a buffer between its generating plant and 

residential development was also not exempt, as a private company

retained timber rights and was conducting a for-profit timber operation. 

Id. at 565-66. Thus, CAPFA did not involve a traditional municipal 

function,2 while Crapo involved concurrent use by private interests. Where 

the municipality leases the property to a private interest, “a separate and 

more restrictive test” applies. Gainesville, 918 So. 2d at 260.

3 This test 

does not apply to property owned and used exclusively by a municipality. 

Gainesville, 918 So. 2d at 261.

Further, Gainesville has been applied in harmony with Islamorada. In 

Zingale v. Crossings at Fleming Island Community Development District, 

960 So. 2d 20, 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), quashed on other grounds by

Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Echeverri, 991 So. 2d 793 

(Fla. 2008), the First District Court of Appeal found that public 

recreational facilities owned and operated by a community development 

1 The municipality was the City of Moore Haven located in Glades County. 

CAPFA, 929 So. 2d at 569. Its non-profit corporation purchased the apartment 

building in the Orlando area. Id.

2 Additionally, CAPFA incorrectly characterized the Gainesville opinion, finding 

that McDavid was no longer applicable because it was decided under the 1885 

Florida Constitution. CAPFA, 929 So. 2d at 573. However, Gainesville stated 

that cases decided under the 1885 Constitution were still applicable, and 

explicitly cited McDavid as an example. Gainesville, 918 So. 2d at 258.

3 See Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d 238, 246-48 (Fla. 2001) 

(allowing exemption only if the private entity’s use could be performed by the 

municipality or would be a valid allocation of public funds).
7

district, including a golf course, pedestrian playground, and swimming 

facility, were exempt from ad valorem taxation. The court found that the 

property “should be treated the same as parks and recreation 

opportunities traditionally provided by municipalities, which are explicitly 

recognized as exempt property by the Court in Gainesville.” Id. (citing Sun 

‘N Lake of Sebring Improvement Dist. v. McIntyre, 800 So. 2d 715, 723 (Fla. 

2d DCA 2001) (holding that golf courses or tennis courts, owned and 

operated by a municipality and held open to the public, may serve a public 

purpose); Page, 714 So. 2d at 1070 (finding that a marina operated by a 

city serves a public purpose)). Zingale, in applying Gainesville, is 

consistent with Islamorada. Both cases support the City’s entitlement to 

the constitutional tax exemption on the marinas it owns and operates.

We conclude that the City’s marinas serve a “municipal or public 

purpose” under Islamorada, Gainesville, and the cases predating 

Gainesville. The marinas are open to public use, are exclusively owned 

and operated by the City, and are part of a larger recreational park 

complex, providing recreation for local residents and supporting the local 

economy by attracting non-local residents. Thus, not only do the City’s 

marinas serve a purpose that has been repeatedly and explicitly recognized 

as a “municipal or public purpose,” see, e.g., Zingale, 960 So. 2d at 25, 

they also operate specifically “for the comfort, convenience, safety, and 

happiness of the municipality’s citizens[,]” Islamorada, 882 So. 2d at 1011

(quoting Page, 714 So. 2d at 981), and serve the public purpose of 

developing recreational facilities in “increas[ing] trade by attracting 

tourists and [providing] recreation for the citizens[,]” Daytona Beach 

Racing, 179 So. 2d at 352. 

We therefore reverse and remand for a declaration in favor of the City, 

holding constitutional the Property Appraiser’s application of the ad 

valorem tax exemption to the City’s marinas.

STEVENSON and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.