[Cite as State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1124.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

JEREMIAH ULYSSES JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NOS. 2023-T-0054

 2023-T-0055

Criminal Appeals from the

Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court Nos. 2018 CR 00575

2017 CR 00790

O P I N I O N

Decided: March 25, 2024

Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 

44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Michael A. Partlow, P.O. Box 1562, Stow, OH 44224 (For Defendant-Appellant).

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, (“Appellant”), Jeremiah Ulysses Jones, appeals from 

the trial court’s denial of his post-sentence motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in Trumbull 

County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. 2017 CR 790 and 2018 CR 575, which have 

been consolidated for purposes of appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

{¶2} On January 17, 2018, the Trumbull County Grand Jury indicted appellant,

charging him with aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

2911.01(A)(1) and (C), with a firearm specification, pursuant to R.C. 2941.145 in Case 

No. 2017 CR 790.

1

{¶3} Appellant entered a not guilty plea at arraignment on February 12, 2018. 

The $25,000 cash or surety bond set by the municipal court was continued. On July 9, 

2018, appellant sought a competency evaluation, and a written motion was filed on July 

13, 2018. A competency evaluation pursuant to former R.C. 2945.371(G)(3) was 

ordered.2

{¶4} On July 31, 2018, the Trumbull County Grand Jury indicted appellant in 

Case No. 2018 CR 575 and charged him with aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, 

with a firearm specification, pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (C) and R.C. 2941.145 

(“Count 1”); aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, with a firearm specification 

pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(3)&(C) and R.C. 2941.145 (“Count 2”); felonious assault, a 

second-degree felony, with a firearm specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and 

(D)(1)(a) and R.C. 2941.145 (“Count 3”); felonious assault, a second degree felony, with 

a firearm specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and (D)(1)(a) and R.C. 2941.145 

(“Count 4”); and, having weapons under disability, a third-degree felony, in violation of 

R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) and (B) (“Count 5”).3

{¶5} On August 6, 2018, appellant entered a not guilty plea at arraignment on 

the charges in Case No. 2018 CR 575. Bond was set at $250,000 cash or surety. Seven 

1. This matter was originally filed in the Warren Municipal Court in Case No. 2017CRA002272 and bound 

over to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas on December 8, 2017.

2. The former version was effective from October 12, 2016 to August 2, 2021.

3. This matter was originally filed in the Warren Municipal Court in Case No. 2018CRA001618 and bound 

over to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas on July 6, 2018.
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

days later, on August 13, 2018, appellant’s initial counsel filed a motion to determine 

competency. 

{¶6} On November 5, 2018, appellant’s new trial counsel sought a subsequent 

competency evaluation. The following day, counsel filed a motion for leave to enter a plea 

of not guilty by reason of insanity in both cases. The trial court granted the requests for a 

second evaluation pursuant to former R.C. 2945.371(G)(3) and (4) on December 10, 

2018. 

{¶7} On January 30, 2019, appellant sought to employ a medical expert, Dr. 

Adeyemi Marcus, MD, “for the purposes of conducting a forensic psychiatric evaluation 

to determine [d]efendant’s sanity at the time of the commission of the offense.” The motion 

was granted on February 5, 2019. 

{¶8} On April 10, 2019, appellant filed a motion to sever. On April 19, 2019, the 

State filed a brief in opposition and moved that the cases be joined. The trial court granted 

the State’s motion on April 23, 2019. 

{¶9} On July 22, 2019, appellant appeared with counsel, waived his rights, and 

entered guilty pleas in both cases. In Case No 2017 CR 790, appellant pleaded guilty to 

aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony with a firearm specification as contained in the 

indictment. In Case No. 2018 CR 575, appellant pleaded guilty to an amended indictment 

of Count 1: aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, with a firearm specification, in 

violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (C) and R.C. 2941.145; Count 3: felonious assault, a 

second-degree felony, with a firearm specification, in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1)&(D)(1)(a) and R.C. 2941.145); and Count 5: having weapons while under 
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

disability, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) and (B). The State 

agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. 

{¶10} A presentence investigation was waived in both cases. The trial court 

proceeded directly to sentencing.

{¶11} In Case No. 2017 CR 790, the trial court sentenced appellant to the jointly 

recommended prison sentence of three years for the offense and ordered that sentence 

to be served consecutively to a three-year prison term on the firearm specification for an 

aggregate prison term of six years. The sentence imposed in the 2017 case was ordered 

to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case No. 2018 CR 625.4

{¶12} In Case No. 2018 CR 575, the trial court sentenced appellant to a prison 

term of three years on each Counts 1 and 3, and a term of 24 months on Count 5 to be 

served concurrently to one another. The trial court determined that the firearm 

specification accompanying Counts 1 and 3 would merge for purposes of sentencing and 

imposed a three-year term of imprisonment to be served prior to and consecutively to the 

sentence imposed on the underlying offenses. The trial court also ordered the sentence 

to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed in Trumbull County Common Pleas 

Court Case Nos. 2017 CR 790 and 2018 CR 625. The total term of incarceration imposed 

in each of the three cases amounts to 18 years. 

{¶13} Appellant did not file a direct appeal. 

{¶14} On June 7, 2023, nearly four years after appellant was sentenced, he filed 

his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. The State filed its opposition to the motions on 

4. Appellant made a similar motion to withdraw his guilty plea in Case No. 2018-CR-625 which was also 

denied by the trial court. Appellant also appealed from that entry. State v. Jones, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 

2023-T-0047, 2024-Ohio-898. 
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

July 3, 2023. The State attached the competency evaluation reports of Dr. Ronald 

Yendrek, D.O. and two reports by Dr. Thomas G. Gazley, Ph.D., dated October 3, 2018 

and January 16, 2019. Both Dr. Gazely and Dr. Yendrek concluded that appellant was 

competent to stand trial. Dr. Gazley further concluded “with a reasonable psychological

certainty [appellant] at the time of the offenses charged in both Case No. 17 CR 790 and 

in Case. No. 18 CR 575 knew the wrongfulness of his acts.” The State also attached the 

entry finding appellant competent in Case No. 2018 CR 625. On July 11, 2023, the trial 

court denied appellant’s motions. Appellant now appeals and raises a single assignment 

of error: “[t]he trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 

as a manifest injustice has occurred.”

{¶15} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only 

before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may 

set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” 

Crim.R. 32.1. “A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of 

sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v. 

Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio has defined “manifest injustice” as “a clear or openly unjust act.” 

State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 (1998).

{¶16} It is well-established that a post-sentence withdrawal “is allowable only in 

extraordinary cases.” Smith at 264. Motions made pursuant to Crim. R. 32.1 are 

“addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the good faith, credibility and 

weight of the movant’s assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by 

that court.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

{¶17} As this court has held, “‘a trial court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on 

a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the record indicates the movant is not 

entitled to relief and the movant has failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to 

demonstrate a manifest injustice.’” State v. Caskey, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-014, 

2010-Ohio-4697, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Mays, 174 Ohio App.3d 681, 2008-Ohio-128, 884 

N.E.2d 607, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). See also State v. Pena, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0103, 

2023-Ohio-2354, ¶ 23.

{¶18} Appellant argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made because he was not advised that he could appeal the trial court’s 

decision on competency. Appellant asserts he should be permitted to withdraw his plea.5

We disagree. 

{¶19} As noted above, this Court reviews a trial court’s decision under an abuse 

of discretion standard. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Likewise, a trial court’s decision finding a defendant competent to stand trial is also 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. “[T]he Supreme Court of Ohio has long held that a 

trial court does not abuse its discretion in finding a defendant competent where its findings 

of competency are supported by some reliable, credible evidence.” State v. Spurrier, 11th 

Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-069, 2021-Ohio-1061, ¶ 42, citing State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 

184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 33. “‘An appellate court will affirm a trial court’s 

finding of competency when the record contains some competent, credible evidence 

supporting such a finding.’” State v. Spencer, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2017-T-0117, 2018-

5. This is the same argument raised by appellant in a separate case. Jones, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2023-

T-0047, 2024-Ohio-898.
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

Ohio-4276, ¶ 35, quoting State v. Clemmons, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 95-T-5305, 1996 

WL 760933, *3 (Dec. 20, 1996).

{¶20} An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, 

reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 

2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.2004). This court has 

also noted that, in relation to competency findings, “‘“deference on these issues should 

be given to those ‘who see and hear what goes on in the court room.”’” (citations omitted). 

State v. Peters, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0106, 2023-Ohio-2028, ¶ 20, appeal not 

accepted, 171 Ohio St.3d 1506, 2023-Ohio-3968, 220 N.E.3d 836, quoting Spurrier at ¶ 

42, quoting Vrabel at ¶ 33.

{¶21} While certified copies of the transcripts of proceedings have not been filed 

in this Court, appellant attached the transcripts from two pretrial hearings and the plea 

and sentencing hearings to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The transcripts from 

the pretrial hearing on May 6, 2019, indicate that appellant had retained new trial counsel. 

His newest trial counsel wanted additional time to receive discovery and informed the trial 

court that he believed previous counsel had aborted the competency claim. The trial court 

set a pretrial for the following week. 

{¶22} On May 13, 2019, the parties reconvened and trial counsel for appellant 

formally withdrew the motion to determine competency and the motion for leave to plead 

not guilty by reason of insanity.

{¶23} At the plea and sentencing hearing, the court advised appellant of his limited 

appellate rights. Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides in relevant part:
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

In felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty 

* * * without first addressing the defendant personally * * * and 

doing all of the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 

voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges 

and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that 

the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition 

of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the 

defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no 

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may 

proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the 

defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is 

waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against 

him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to 

prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a 

trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify 

against himself or herself.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) through (c). 

{¶24} “The best way to ensure that pleas are entered knowingly and voluntarily 

is to simply follow the requirements of Crim.R. 11 when deciding whether to accept a plea 

agreement.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 29.

{¶25} The trial court complied with these provisions. Moreover, the written plea of 

guilty, signed and acknowledged by appellant, also informed appellant of his ability to 

appeal, to receive appointed counsel, and to obtain transcripts at the State’s expense. 

Appellant cites to no authority which requires the trial court or counsel to inform a criminal 

defendant of specific items he may be entitled to appeal, such as a competency 

determination, for a plea to be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given. Moreover, 

appellant has failed to argue that had he known of his ability to assign error to the 
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Case Nos. 2023-T-0054 and 2023-T-0055

competency determination, appellant would not have entered a plea. Instead, he 

suggests that had he known of this ability, he would have filed a direct appeal.

{¶26} However, unlike in State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-898, appellant’s trial counsel

withdrew the motion to determine competency in the underlying cases. Because the 

motion was withdrawn, appellant waived any objection to a competency determination. 

See State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 44, 1994-Ohio-492, 630 N.E.2d 339. The trial 

court did not err by failing to advise appellant of the ability to appeal a competency 

determination where appellant waived the argument for purposes of appeal by 

withdrawing his motion. 

{¶27} Further, in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, appellant also alleged that 

he was not guilty of the charges and was not properly represented by counsel. Appellant 

did not appeal his convictions despite being informed at sentencing of his limited appellate 

rights.

{¶28} Upon review of the record, Appellant’s claim does not amount to a manifest 

injustice warranting withdrawal of his plea. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied appellant’s post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Appellant’s 

sole assignment of error is meritless. 

{¶29} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of the Trumbull County 

Court of Common Pleas. 

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

concur.