GRADUAL FAILURE

THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM

1965–1966

JACOB VAN STAAVEREN

Air Force History and Museums Program

United States Air Force

Washington, D.C. 2002
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

Van Staaveren, Jacob.

Gradual failure : the air war over North Vietnam, 1965-1966 / Jacob Van

Staaveren.

p. cm. -- (The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia)

Includes bibliographical reference and index.

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Aerial operations, American. 2. United

States. Air Force--History--Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. I. Title. II. Series

DS558.8 .V359 2002

959.704 ́348 ́0973--dc21 2002003229 
iii

Foreword

The United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years

of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force

operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful

but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power.

Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the

University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995.

He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began

to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on

the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume

on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes

that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after

the war.

Readers of this volume will also want to read the sequel, Wayne Thompson's

To Hanoi and Back: The U. S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973, which

tells the more encouraging story of how the Air Force employed airpower to far

greater effect using a combination of better doctrine, tactics, technology, and

training.

RICHARD P. HALLION

Air Force Historian
iv

The Author

Jacob Van Staaveren (1917–1999) served as a historian for over twenty years

with the Air Force history program, both in Washington and in the field. He

earned a B.A. degree from Linfield College, Oregon, and an M.A. in history

from the University of Chicago. From 1946 to 1950, Mr. Van Staaveren served

with the Allied occupation forces in Japan, initially as an adviser on civil

reforms, then as a historian preparing studies on Japanese economic reforms.

The University of Washington Press published his account of this period, An

American in Japan, 1945–1948: A Civilian View of the Occupation, in 1994.

During his long career with Air Force history, he wrote numerous studies,

including several on the war in Southeast Asia. He was co-author of The United

States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973: An Illustrated Account (1977)

and the author of Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968 (1993).
v

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 1

Flaming Dart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The United States Considers a Reprisal Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Flaming Dart I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Flaming Dart II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Chapter 2

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Paramilitary Activities and Bombing Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Rising Pressure from the Services to Bomb the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Selecting Major North Vietnamese Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Washington Forbids Follow-on Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

The Bien Hoa Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Beginning of a Limited, Two-Phase Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Washington’s Resistance to a Bombing Program Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Chapter 3

Rolling Thunder Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The Air Challenge in North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Command and Control of Air Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Preparations for a Rolling Thunder Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

The First Two Rolling Thunder Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Initial Analysis of Aircraft Losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

An Air Strategy Emerges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Beginning of Weekly Rolling Thunder Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Supporting Operations for Rolling Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Contingency Planning for a Larger Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Chapter 4

Gradual Expansion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Further Decisions on Prosecuting the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Initial Bridge-Busting Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Countering the North’s Air Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

The Honolulu Conference of April 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Rolling Thunder’s Moderate Pace Continues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Expansion of the Leaflet Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Cautious Optimism on Bombing Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Chapter 5

Pause and Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

The First Bombing Halt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Rolling Thunder Resumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Hanoi Expands its Air and Ground Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

The Air Force Organizes for Extended Combat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Washington Rejects a More Air-Oriented Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Beginning of Two-Week Bombing Cycles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Chapter 6

The SAM Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Initial anti-SAM Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

The First Iron Hand Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Improving Detection of SAM Sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

Continued Air Strikes on non-SAM Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Establishment of a Target Intelligence Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Deepening Service Concern about Strike Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

The First SAM “Kill” and the anti-SAM Campaign in Late 1965 . . . . . . 192

The Air Force Increases its anti-SAM Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Chapter 7

Toward the Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Additional Interdiction Changes and Planning for Negotiation . . . . . . . . 202

Continuation of the Leaflet Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Beginning of a Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
vii

CONTENTS

Chapter 8

Diplomacy Fails. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Hanoi Rejects American Peace Overtures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Debate on Resuming the Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Rolling Thunder 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

More Deployment Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Rolling Thunder 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Chapter 9

Rolling Thunder 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Westmoreland’s “Extended Battlefield” Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Selecting Rolling Thunder 50 Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Rolling Thunder 50 Begins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

The Air Munitions Shortage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Circumventing Bad Weather With MSQ–77 Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Countering the North’s Air Defense System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Improving MiG Watch and Border Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

Chapter 10

The Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

The POL Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Approval of a Few POL Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Gradual Expansion of POL Strikes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

Strikes on Major POL Sites Begin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

The Honolulu Conference, July 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

The POL Strangulation Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

Chapter 11

Summary and Reappraisal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Illustrations

Maps

Southeast Asia, Principal U.S. Airbases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

Armed Reconnaissance Route Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

Figures

1. Rolling Thunder Sorties, Ordnance, and Targets 

March–June 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2. Redeployment of Aircraft 

August 5–9, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

3. Redeployment of Aircraft by CINCSTRIKE 

August 8–21, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4. Location of USAF Combat Squadrons 

February 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

5. RollingThunder Sorties, Ordnance Delivered, and Principal Targets

March 2–June 24, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

6. Troops and Equipment in South Vietnam and Thailand 

February and June 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

7. Targets and Air Strikes 

As of June 24, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

8. Increase in Conventional Antiaircraft Weaponry 

July 5–September 30, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

9. Personnel Shortfalls

February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

10. Air Force Deployments 

1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

11. Sortie Effectiveness 

April, May, and June 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

12. Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged 

April, May and June 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

13. Storage Capacity of Major North Vietnamese POL Installations 

1964–1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
ix

CONTENTS

14. Prestrike and Poststrike Storage Capacity of POL Targets, 

Route Package 1

August 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

15. Prestrike and Poststrike Storage Capacity of POL Targets, 

Route Package 6A 

August 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Photographs 

F–105 Thunderchief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Infiltration route in Laos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

EC–121s at Tan Son Nhut Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

North Vietnamese military barracks area under attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

U.S. dependents leaving South Vietnam in 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

President Lyndon B. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

President Johnson and advisers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

USS Ticonderoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

A–4 launching from USS Hancock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

F–102s at Tan Son Nhut Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Da Nang Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Gen. William C. Westmoreland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Farm Gate aircraft at Bien Hoa Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

F–105s at Da Nang Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Secretary of State Dean Rusk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

South Vietnamese A–1s and T–28s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Laotian General Vang Pao. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

President John F. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, 1964 . . . . . . . 36

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

B–57 in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

B–57s at Da Nang Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Shipping in Haiphong Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Burning North Vietnamese Swatow boat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Gen. Hunter Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

B–57 destroyed in Viet Cong mortar attack at Bien Hoa, November 1964 . . . 58
x

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Laotian T–28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Saigon hotel bombing, December 1964. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Air attack on North Vietnamese barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

F–105s at Takhli Royal Thai Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

MiG–17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay and Gen. Paul D. Harkins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

F–105s at Korat Royal Thai Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Gen. John P. McConnell arriving at Tan Son Nhut Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Tan Son Nhut Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Secretary of Defense McNamara at a Pentagon press conference . . . . . . . . . 84

Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Antiaircraft fire at night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

F–100 attacking enemy target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Damaged bridge, Laos, 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

U.S. ground troops unloading C–130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Kim Cuong bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Dong Phuong Thuong bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

F–105 with Bullpup missiles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

F–105 refueling receptacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Qui Vinh bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

RF–101 landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

RF–101 nose camera. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Xom Ca Trang bridge, North Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Bullpup missile in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

U–2 at Bien Hoa Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

F–8 launching from USS Hancock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

F–4 in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

F–104s at Da Nang Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Phu Dien Chau bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

My Duc bridge, North Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

DC–130 and drones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Damage at Tan Son Nhut Air Base after attack on April 14, 1966 . . . . 126–127

KC–135 refueling F–105s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

KC–135 refueling an F–4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Dien Bien Phu airfield, North Vietnam, after attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

North Vietnamese supply area under attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Il–28 aircraft in revetments at Gia Lam airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

President Lyndon Johnson, Gen. William Westmoreland, Vietnamese 
xi

CONTENTS

Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu, and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. . . . . . . . 150

Trai Hoi bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

F–4 attacking enemy position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Air Force crews credited with downing first MiGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

SA–2 surface-to-air missile in flight and detonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

SA–2 missile on launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

EC–121 in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

SA–2 site, empty and with missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166–167

Lang Met bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Navy ordnancemen moving 500-pound bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Lt. Col. Robinson Risner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

EB–66 in flight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Air Force photo interpreters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

North Vietnamese SA–2 site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Destroyed bridge on Route 6, North Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

B–52 releasing bombs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Air Force crew members loading bombs on B–52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

F–105 with 750-pound bombs on fuselage centerline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

North Vietnamese antiaircraft gun site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

North Vietnamese 57-mm antiaircraft gun and crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

F–105 bombing North Vietnamese bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Rocket attack on a North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile site . . . . . . . . . 190

North Vietnamese train after attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

F–100F in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Bac Can bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

A–6 launching from USS Kitty Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

North Vietnamese patrol boat repair area under attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

North Vietnamese bridge repairs and bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Ground crew removing film from RF–4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

Crew members attach a 500-pound bomb to an F–4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Destroyed bridge on Route 19, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Southeast Asia Conference in Manila, the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu greets U.S. airmen at Da Nang Air Base . . . . . 217

Pontoon bridge bypass around destroyed bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Destroyed bridge bypassed with a ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

MiG–17s at Phuc Yen airfield, North Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
xii

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

F–4 launching from USS Franklin Roosevelt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

KC–135s at Takhli Royal Thai Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

HU–16 rescue seaplane at Tan Son Nhut Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

HU–16 rescuing downed pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Air Force Secretary Brown and Premier Ky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Runway construction at Cam Ranh Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

F–105 fires rockets at a North Vietnamese target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

North Vietnamese camp near Mu Gia Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

MiG–21 in flight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

North Vietnamese truck park after attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Air Force Secretary Brown and General Westmoreland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

Phu Ly bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi and Nguyen Van Thieu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

O–1 forward air control aircraft and pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Yen Bai railyard, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

Thai Nguyen railyard, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Capt. C. Glen Nix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Bac Giang bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Than Hoa bridge, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

North Vietnamese bridge with three bypass routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Mu Gia Pass after bombing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Bomb rack for B–52s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

Modified B–52 releases load of 108 bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

EB–66 leads F–105s on bombing mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

MSQ–77 facility at Dong Ha, South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

North Vietnamese 37-mm antiaircraft gun and crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

F–105 with Shrike air-to-surface missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Air-to-surface missile launched at missile site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

North Vietnamese gunners running to man their positions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

MiG–17 hit by cannon fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

Kep airfield, North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Underground petroleum storage area burning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Underground petroleum storage area under construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

Petroleum supplies in drums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Hanoi petroleum storage facility after attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290–292

Dong Hoi petroleum storage area after attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

Soviet tanker Buguruslan outside Haiphong Harbor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

Badon petroleum storage area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296–297

Hanoi railyard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
xiii

CONTENTS

A–4 launching from carrier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp and Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Surface-to-air missile contrail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Chieu Ung railroad bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304–305

F–105 bombing a rail line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

F–105s refueling en route to North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
xiv

PRINCIPAL U.S. AIR BASES

 Udorn

Nakhon Phanom

 Takhli

 Korat

 Don Muang

 U-Tapao

 Ubon

 Binh Thuy

	 Tan Son Nhut


 Bien Hoa

 Phan Rang

Cam Ranh Bay

 Nha Trang

 Tuy Hoa

 Qui Nhon

 Pleiku

 Phu Cat

 Chu Lai

	 Da Nang

















GRADUAL FAILURE

THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM

1965–1966
Introduction

Of the many facets of the American war in Southeast Asia debated by U.S.

authorities in Washington, by the military services and the public, none has

proved more controversial than the air war against North Vietnam. The air war’s

inauguration with the nickname Rolling Thunder followed an eleven-year

American effort to induce communist North Vietnam to sign a peace treaty

without openly attacking its territory. Thus, Rolling Thunder was a new military program in what had been a relatively low-key attempt by the United

States to “win” the war within South Vietnam against insurgent communist Viet

Cong forces, aided and abetted by the north.

The present volume covers the first phase of the Rolling Thunder campaign

from March 1965 to late 1966. It begins with a description of the planning and

execution of two initial limited air strikes, nicknamed Flaming Dart I and II.

The Flaming Dart strikes were carried out against North Vietnam in February

1965 as the precursors to a regular, albeit limited, Rolling Thunder air program

launched the following month. Before proceeding with an account of Rolling

Thunder, its roots are traced in the events that compelled the United States to

adopt an anti-communist containment policy in Southeast Asia after the defeat

of French forces by the communist Vietnamese in May 1954.

The Geneva Agreements of July 1954 formally ended the first Indochina war,

but led to a Vietnam divided into a communist north and a noncommunist south,

with the United States committed to ensuring that the latter had the political and

military strength to defend itself. The United States encountered intractable difficulties in establishing a viable new nation in a South Vietnam wracked by

chronic social, political, and military instability and poor leadership, all aggravated by an incipient Viet Cong insurgency within its borders. Despite these

problems, Washington authorities believed that this policy of communist containment had to be won first in South Vietnam, whose defense required everincreasing numbers of American forces for training, counterinsurgency and regular military operations from all branches of the armed services. Many in

Washington feared possible intervention by communist China or the Soviet

Union, the main military suppliers of the north, if the war was extended to North

Vietnam proper. It was a fear not shared by Air Force and Navy leaders, who

believed that the conflict could be won only by vigorously striking the north and

who were confident that the risk of intervention by the two large communist

powers was minimal.

American policy included attempts to stabilize Laos, one of the former

Indochina states, by very limited air and covert ground actions, while sending

Air Force and Navy air strikes to stem the flow of North Vietnamese troops and

3
4

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

supplies through southern Laos and into South Vietnam to bolster the Viet

Cong insurgency there. These limited air actions, with nicknames like Barrel

Roll and Steel Tiger, also represented attempts to “signal” the North Vietnamese

government of stronger U.S. military action unless it desisted from its efforts to

destabilize South Vietnam with its continued support for the Viet Cong.

Meanwhile, an emboldened communist north began instigating major hostile “incidents,” which forced Washington to modify its military strategy of

confining the war largely to South Vietnam. Most important was an attack on

a U.S. Navy patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, resulting in the first

air strike on the north, and the enactment by the U.S. Congress of a “Tonkin

Gulf Resolution” empowering the U.S. President to take whatever action he

deemed necessary to prevent further communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

Then in late 1964 and early 1965, three more attacks on American and

Vietnamese military installations in South Vietnam led to the retaliatory

Flaming Dart air attacks on the north. 

In March 1965, Washington inaugurated a highly restricted and carefully

controlled series of numbered Rolling Thunder air programs against the north.

Conducted by U.S. Air Force and Navy carrier aircraft with the small

Vietnamese Air Force making “token” air strikes, Washington dictated the number of combat sorties that could be flown and the number, type and location of

targets that could be struck. Avoiding civilian casualties was emphasized repeatedly. Sometimes alone, and frequently with the Navy, Air Force leaders

attempted—without success—to persuade Washington authorities that the

regime would only be brought to the negotiating table by a more robust attack

on all of the north’s industrial sites, logistic centers, road and rail network, port

The Republic F–105 Thunderchief was the Air Force aircraft used most often

in bombing missions over North Vietnam. Originally designed as a tactical

nuclear bomber, it was big, tough, and carried a large load of munitions.
5

INTRODUCTION

facilities, and by mining the harbors. When they failed to convince Washington,

Air Force and Navy units nonetheless carried out their Rolling Thunder mission

within the tight constraints imposed from home. This included an adjustment to

a highly complex air command and control system in the Southeast Asia theater.

The system consisted of an Army-controlled Military Assistance Command in

Saigon, and a Navy-controlled Pacific Command in Honolulu, with the commanders of each having considerable air authority, in contrast to a single air

commander having overall control of all air operations in a war theater as Air

Force doctrine specified. 

As the air campaign against the north gradually expanded and the permissible targeting area moved northward incrementally towards Hanoi-Haiphong and

the Chinese border, the Air Force used a variety of specially equipped aircraft—

such as F–100Fs, RB–66Bs, RB–66Cs, and EC–121Ds—to locate and/or neutralize the hundreds of enemy radar-controlled antiaircraft guns and Soviet-built

SA–2 surface-to-air missile sites that appeared in the spring of 1965 around the

north’s industrial areas, key logistic centers, and road and rail routes. Air Force

fighters had to engage in aerial battles with MiGs as the Soviet-built fighters

began to challenge strike aircraft. The Air Force and the Navy adjusted their aerial tactics as a consequence of Washington’s tight combat constraints while

devising navigational safeguards after occasional violations of Chinese air

space.

Even as they approved the Rolling Thunder program, many in Washington

believed “air power” could never win the war in the north. Still, they expected

the air strikes, in conjunction with ongoing American military action against

the Viet Cong in South Vietnam and southern Laos, to inflict sufficient “pain”

on the Hanoi regime to force it to negotiate. When this goal was not immediately realized, Washington embarked upon—over the objections of military

commanders—a vigorous “negotiating strategy” to convince the Hanoi regime

A destroyed bridge on an

infiltration route in Laos.
6

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

it could not win the war. To persuade Hanoi to begin “talks”, Washington

declared bombing halts. One, lasting five days in May 1965, was part of a

diplomatic initiative code-named Mayflower; the second, lasting thirty-seven

days in late 1965 and early 1966, was part of a diplomatic initiative codenamed Marigold. Both efforts failed to persuade Hanoi to begin discussions to

end the war.

With Washington’s negotiating strategy in recess—although “peace feelers”

continued with the help of other nations—Rolling Thunder resumed, initially

with more restrictions than before, but these restrictions were slowly relaxed in

the first half of 1966 to permit the Air Force and Navy to strike more northerly

targets. However, most air combat and combat support sortie constraints

remained. All the while, losses of aircraft, pilots and other aircrew mounted

because of the ferocity of the north’s growing arsenal of antiaircraft guns, automatic weapons and SA–2 missiles, many of which could not be struck because

of their proximity to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the Chinese border. In

permitted bombing areas, the Air Force and Navy deployed more sophisticated

armament, such as the Air Force’s newest Wild Weasel F–105Fs with the

Navy’s improved Shrike AGM–45 air-to-surface missiles, to attack or neutralize Soviet-built SA–2 SAM sites whose numbers continued to increase.

Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders in the field succeeded in

obtaining Washington’s approval to strike the principal petroleum, oil and

lubrication (POL) storage sites in North Vietnam. These operations, beginning

on June 29 and ending in October with many sites destroyed or damaged, raised

hopes briefly they would measurably reduce the flow of North Vietnamese

troops and supplies into South Vietnam. The impact of the POL attacks was

Lockheed EC–121 Constellations at Tan Son

Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam, in 1965.
7

INTRODUCTION

diminished, however, by the long delay in authorizing them, which gave the

Hanoi regime time to disperse its POL supplies in barrels throughout towns and

villages that Washington had exempted from bombing to avoid civilian casualties. In addition, Soviet ships had begun offloading POL onto barges lest the

Navy mine Haiphong harbor and other ports.

After the failure of POL strikes to slow to any appreciable degree the

movement of the north’s supplies—logistic and road and rail repair personnel

by now numbered several hundred thousand—or to bring the Hanoi regime to

the negotiating table, Washington approved a new “barrier strategy” for reducing communist infiltration through southern Laos and the demilitarized zone.

This would include air support and the use of special mines and sensors. Concurrently, Washington asked the military services to study ways to make the

Rolling Thunder program more effective and to reduce aircraft attrition. The

substance of the Air Force and the Joint Staff replies was that while bad

weather, antiaircraft fire, and other factors hindered Rolling Thunder operations,

only by striking all remaining significant targets in the north and by mining

its harbors could aircraft losses be reduced and victory be assured in the conflict. Washington remained unswayed in its belief, however, that an all-out air

campaign against the north and the mining of its harbors not only could not win

the war, but threatened a serious military confrontation with communist China,

the Soviet Union, or both.

A North Vietnamese military

barracks area after an Air

Force F–105 attack with

750-pound bombs.
Dependents leaving South Vietnam in February 1965.
9

CHAPTER 1

Flaming Dart

At approximately two in the morning of February 7, 1965, a small band of

Viet Cong (VC) insurgents, numbering between six and ten men, breached the

last strands of barbed wire protecting the small U.S. Advisory Detachment of

II Corps, popularly known as the MACV compound, about 4.5 kilometers north

of Pleiku in the central highlands of South Vietnam. Entering the compound,

they placed several small demolition charges with delay fuses of four to five

seconds along the north wall of the main building and against the entrance gate.

A U.S. sentry, Jesse Pyle, who was on duty in a sandbagged area near a billet,

moved to investigate. Suddenly a charge four feet away exploded prematurely,

mortally wounding Pyle. Proceeding with their stealthy attack, the Viet Cong

quickly detonated three more charges, which blasted off the entrance gate, hit

a mess office, and tore a hole through the roof of the main building. They threw

sixteen more charges through the damaged wall and windows of the building,

then sprayed it with fire from 7.62-mm automatic weapons. In the attack,

which lasted from ten to fifteen minutes, the Viet Cong killed Pyle and

wounded twenty-four other Americans and destroyed five rooms and damaged

twelve more. There were no Vietnamese casualties.

Almost simultaneously, about 6.5 kilometers distant but still close to Pleiku,

two small assault teams consisting of five to six Viet Cong and each armed

with demolition charges and 81-mm mortars, entered the runway and aircraft

parking area at Camp Holloway, the headquarters of the U.S. Army’s 52d

Aviation Battalion. One team placed demolition charges on the landing gear

and under the fuselages of several aircraft while the other broke through a

barbed wire fence near the helicopter ramp and placed charges on helicopter

skis. As the charges exploded, the Viet Cong fired their mortars at nearby billets, engulfing them in flame and mortar fragments. This assault, which also

lasted between ten and fifteen minutes, caused much greater carnage than the

one at the MACV compound: 7 American soldiers were killed and 104 were

wounded. Again, there were no Vietnamese casualties. On or near the airfield,

five Army UH–1B helicopters had been reduced to smoldering ruins. The toll

of major or minor damage further included eleven UH–1B helicopters, two

CV–2 transports, three O–1F forward air control (FAC) aircraft, and one

Vietnamese air force (VNAF) O–1F stationed temporarily at the airfield.

At about the same time, near the coastal town of Tuy Hoa, the Viet Cong fired

81-mm mortars into villages and two gas storage tanks near a VNAF airstrip,

destroying the tanks. A fourth attack was carried out on a village about fifteen

miles northeast of Nha Trang. No Americans were injured in the last two incidents.

At the MACV compound and Camp Holloway, the scenes of the major

assaults, the Americans responded immediately with firearms and search but

they were not able to capture any of the infiltrators. A postaction report attributed
10

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

the surprising and successful onslaught chiefly to lack of vigilance on the

part of security units of the South Vietnamese Army (popularly known as

ARVN, for the Army of Vietnam) in the Pleiku area. While officially the chief

guarantor of safety for American installations, the ARVN’s habitual state of

undermanning and low level of alertness were further diminished by the weeklong Lunar New Year Tet celebrations that had ended the previous day. Another

factor was the attitude of the populace of Pleiku Province. Consisting largely

of Montagnard tribal groups whose loyalties were to family and tribe rather

than to the Saigon government or to the Viet Cong, they were not inclined to

sound an alarm.1

The United States Considers a Reprisal Attack

It was the afternoon of February 6, 1965, in Washington when news of the

Viet Cong depredations at the MACV compound and Camp Holloway reached

the White House. Faced with this last and most serious in a chain of “significant” Viet Cong “incidents,” President Lyndon B. Johnson braced for renewed

pressure from some of his advisers to conduct an air strike on North Vietnam

in reprisal. When he learned of the extent of devastation at Pleiku, he ordered

a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) for 7:45 that evening.2

Meanwhile, the President awaited further reports from American officials in

Saigon. By coincidence, his special adviser on National Security Affairs,

McGeorge Bundy, was in the South Vietnamese capital assessing the faltering

military and political fortunes of the Saigon government with Ambassador

Maxwell D. Taylor, Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, and Gen. William

C. Westmoreland, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command,

President Lyndon B. Johnson.
11

FLAMING DART

* De Soto patrols had been conducted infrequently by the Seventh Fleet off the North

Vietnamese coast since April 1962.

† Gen. John P. McConnell succeeded Gen. LeMay on February 1, 1965.

Vietnam (COMUSMACV). Bundy’s recommendation, endorsed by Taylor,

Johnson, and Westmoreland, was that the two attacks at Pleiku called for an

immediate air riposte on North Vietnam.3

Despite the unanimity of views in Saigon, the President and some of his

advisers were apprehensive. On February 4, a few days before the assault at

Pleiku, Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin, arrived in Hanoi accompanied by

military and economic advisers. It was assumed, and soon confirmed, that the

Soviets would offer more aid to North Vietnam. Their presence in the capital

prompted American officials to delay and then cancel a special patrol by the

U.S. Seventh Fleet, planned earlier and nicknamed De Soto, off the coast of

North Vietnam, and to order the Coral Sea and the Hancock, two of three

Seventh Fleet carriers, to “stand down” from a “fully alert” status and head for

the American naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Only the carrier

Ranger was instructed to remain “on alert” at the Yankee Station area in the

Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnamese coast. The main purpose of the De

Soto patrol, normally a one-destroyer type of operation to collect electronic

intelligence and harass the North Vietnamese,* was to make a “show of force”

and elicit a military response that might justify a retaliatory air strike by the

United States. In preparation for this eventuality, at the request of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC)

had compiled a list of North Vietnamese targets. It contained three strike

options for Seventh Fleet carrier aircraft and for Pacific Air Force (PACAF)

aircraft based in South Vietnam and Thailand.4

The NSC members and attendees who assembled with the President on

February 6 to review the attack on American installations at Pleiku included

Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS; George Ball, Under Secretary of State (sitting in for the absent

Secretary, Dean Rusk); senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield; and house

speaker John McCormack. General Wheeler unequivocally urged a quick

reprisal air strike on the north. His recommendation was supported by and had

been made repeatedly in previous months by all of the service chiefs, especially

by Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff who had just retired.† The

service chiefs were convinced that air strikes against the Hanoi regime were the

quickest way to arrest the political and military decline of the Saigon government. Other advisers, particularly McNamara and Rusk, had insisted that

Saigon’s military and political problems should be ameliorated before an air

program was begun against the northern adversaries. The magnitude of the Viet

Cong’s attack at Pleiku forcibly changed opinions.
12

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

With the strongly supportive views of Bundy, Taylor, and Westmoreland

before them, the NSC members and attendees now agreed that a reprisal air

strike was mandatory. Senator Mansfield alone was not persuaded. He feared

that an air strike on the north might trigger a war with China or heal SinoSoviet disputes. In the President’s opinion, the senator offered no alternative

American response to the attack at Pleiku. The NSC conferees were heartened

by the latest U.S. intelligence assessment that China would not intervene in the

war unless the United States invaded the north or the Hanoi regime was in danger of being overthrown. Encouraged by the call for action by his principal

officials in Saigon and Washington, the President concurred. For the chief

executive, the hour was a dramatic one for intelligence assurances could not

completely dispel lingering uncertainties concerning the way in which the

communist countries would respond to the proposed air strike. The President

later recalled:5

As we talked, there was an electric tension in the air. Everyone in the

room was deadly serious as he considered the possible consequence of

this decision. Each man around the table knew how crucial such action

could be. How would Hanoi react? Would the Chinese Communists use

it as a pretext for involving themselves? What about Kosygin and the

Russians in Hanoi?

From the original three-option target list compiled by CINCPAC, the President

selected four targets in southern North Vietnam associated with communist infiltration into the south, and directed U.S. aircraft to hit three and the Vietnamese air

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay,

Air Force Chief of Staff,

1961–1965.
13

FLAMING DART

* Redesignated Flaming Dart I soon thereafter.

force (VNAF) to strike one. The importance of VNAF participation in action

against the north to demonstrate U.S.-Vietnamese solidarity of purpose had been

stressed by Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland in earlier planning.

In addition to strike options, the target list prepared for the Air Force and

Navy contained the approximate number of aircraft required for “strike” and

“cover” for each of seven targets (figure 1).6 

Figure 1

Rolling Thunder Sorties, Ordnance, and Targets, March–June 1965

a To include Option I targets

b To include Option I and II targets

The target list was easily adjusted to include Vietnamese aircraft.

CINCPAC’s operational order accompanying the list for a possible reprisal air

attack triggered by the De Soto patrol was nicknamed Flaming Dart.* The

name was retained to meet the crisis occasioned by the Viet Cong’s attack at

Pleiku.7 Notwithstanding the weeks and months of planning to prepare for an


  

  
  
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14

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Regular U–2 missions in Southeast Asia began in February 1964 (see Chapter 2).

air attack, as the hour grew near, Air Force, Navy, and VNAF commanders possessed an inadequate picture of the assigned targets. There had been no tactical

reconnaissance of North Vietnam thus far and, to ensure maximum surprise,

none was ordered prior to the impending strike. The only photos available were

those taken by high altitude SAC Trojan Horse U–2 aircraft.*8

Flaming Dart I

It was nearly midday on February 7 when the President’s order, sent by the

JCS to Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, CINCPAC in Honolulu, reached the principal Air

Force and Navy commanders in Southeast Asia. Sharp’s command chain for the

Navy consisted of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Commander, Pacific Fleet

(CINCPACFLT) who was also in Honolulu, and Rear Admiral Joseph W.

Williams, Commander, Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) who was located in

the coastal waters off South and North Vietnam. The command chain for the Air

Force began with Gen. Hunter Harris, Jr., Commander, Pacific Air Forces

(CINCPACAF) in Honolulu. Under General Harris was Maj. Gen. Sam Maddux,

Jr., Commander, Thirteenth Air Force at Clark AB, Philippines. Subordinate to

General Maddux was Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, Jr., Commander, 2d Air

President Johnson meets with advisers, (from left) Maxwell D. Taylor, 

Ambassador to South Vietnam; Secretary of State Dean Rusk;

Johnson; and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
15

FLAMING DART

Division at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon. The 2d Air Division, which was also

a component command of General Westmoreland’s MACV headquarters, was

removed temporarily from COMUSMACV by Admiral Sharp, who had command and control authority for U.S. air operations in North Vietnam and Laos, so

that Sharp would be able to notify U.S. and VNAF aircraft of the impending

Flaming Dart strike through his subordinate PACAF and PACFLT commanders.

Sharp assigned coordinating authority to General Harris, a task that was soon

further delegated to General Moore in Saigon. The carriers Coral Sea and

Hancock reversed course to take up their positions at Yankee Station, the nickname for the area in the Gulf of Tonkin where the carriers prepared for a strike

on the north.9

Sharp’s operational order called for Air Force F–105s based in Thailand to

hit the Chap Le barracks, and the Navy’s carrier aircraft to strike the Vit Thu

Lu and Dong Hoi barracks.10 As a precautionary measure, the JCS directed certain commanders in the United States and Asia to alert their air and ground

units for possible deployment to Southeast Asia or nearby Pacific bases: ten

tactical fighter squadrons from the Commander in Chief, Strike Command

(CINCSTRIKE); thirty B–52s for conventional bombing from the Commander

in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC); and the Marine airbase defense

battalions based in Okinawa, two Marine amphibious groups, and the Army’s

173d Airborne Brigade from CINCPAC.11

The first U.S. aircraft were scheduled to hit their targets at about three in the

afternoon Saigon time. However, with the onset of the northeast monsoon,

which each year from mid-October to mid-March battered the coastal and delta

regions from about 12 degrees north in South Vietnam northward into North

USS Ticonderoga
16

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Farm Gate was the name for the Air Force personnel and aircraft that deployed to South

Vietnam in 1961. Based at Bien Hoa AB, the original purpose was training of South

Vietnamese, but Farm Gate began to conduct combat missions more frequently as the war

intensified. Flown by U.S. Air Force pilots, the aircraft carried South Vietnamese insignia

and had a South Vietnamese crew member on each flight.

Vietnam and made for poor flying weather, General Moore was forced to cancel the scheduled Farm Gate* air strikes by the Air Force and VNAF on Chap

Le and Vu Con respectively. The Vit Thu Lu barracks, one of two Navy targets,

was also scrubbed due to bad weather after a fleet of thirty-four aircraft had

been launched from the attack carrier Ranger. The second Navy target at Dong

Hoi was struck, however. Lying slightly north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ)

that divided North and South Vietnam, the target area consisted of 275 barracks

and administrative buildings and housed 12,500 troops of North Vietnam’s

352d Division as well as four other battalions.

Supported by twenty other aircraft, twenty-nine A–4s were launched from

the carriers Coral Sea and Hancock and briefly blasted the barracks with 250-

pound bombs, 2.75-inch rockets, and a few Zunis. The JCS had prohibited the

use of napalm. Subsequent bomb damage assessment (BDA) showed sixteen

buildings destroyed and six damaged. The Flaming Dart strike was not without

penalty: apparently on the alert for air strike, the North Vietnamese downed

one A–4E with pilot and damaged seven other aircraft with antiaircraft and

small arms fire.12

Although the JCS and the service commanders in Honolulu and Saigon

wished to continue the air strikes, the President held his decision in abeyance.

At eight o’clock on the morning of February 8, he again conferred with the

NSC to determine whether the three targets that had not been struck should be

An A–4 on the

deck of the

USS Hancock.
17

FLAMING DART

attacked. The NSC consensus was “no” and he agreed. “We all felt,” the

President recalls, “that a second daytime strike by U.S. planes might give Hanoi

and Moscow the impression that we had begun a sustained air offensive.” But

mindful of the importance Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland

attached to VNAF participation in attacks on the north, he authorized the

VNAF to strike its originally scheduled target, the Vu Con barracks. The

Vietnamese government concurred.13

Bad weather once more foreclosed an attack at Vu Con, so a weather alternate was chosen, the Chap Le barracks near Vinh Linh, which had initially been

earmarked for the Air Force. The area was a suspected enemy center for radio

communications, coding, training, and liaison activities, and consisted of about

140 barracks and administration structures for North Vietnam’s 270th

Regiment with approximately 6,500 troops. The JCS order emphasized the

importance of a successful first strike by the VNAF. To ensure its success, the

service chiefs directed Farm Gate and other aircraft to provide navigational

assistance, flak suppression, combat air patrol (CAP), reconnaissance, and rescue.

Farm Gate pilots were directed to replace the VNAF markings on their aircraft,

which had signified their combat training role in South Vietnam, with USAF

insignia. They would carry no Vietnamese “student” pilots.

In preparation for the strike on Chap Le, an armada consisting of fifty-five

aircraft from the VNAF, Farm Gate, and the U.S. Air Force assembled at Da

Nang in northern South Vietnam. It included F–100 Super Sabres of the 90th

Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) of the 3d Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) which

arrived on February 8 from Clark Air Base, the Philippines. The twenty-six A–1Hs

from the VNAF were led by Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the VNAF commander. Upon reaching the target area at 1530 Saigon time, the Skyraiders

dropped 260 500-pound general-purpose bombs on the barracks. Air Force aircraft provided support in the form of six Farm Gate A–1Es, three RF–101s, six

F–102s, and twenty F–100s, principally to provide BDA, cover for rescue, and

flak suppression. Although JCS guidance directed only the VNAF to attack the

target, the Farm Gate A–1Es of the 34th Tactical Group, led by Lt. Col. Andrew

F–102s at

Tan Son Nhut

Air Base, 1966.
18

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

H. Chapman, flew an unscheduled strike to ensure the success of the VNAF mission. Behind the VNAF aircraft, Farm Gate pilots hit portions of the Chap Le

barracks, while supporting F–100s flying in an antiflak role dumped about

30,000 pounds of ordnance on enemy antiaircraft sites. This was the first Air

Force strike on North Vietnam and the only time when A–1E Skyraiders were

used against the north.

Although visibility was good, the first VNAF-Farm Gate effort inflicted relatively little damage on the Chap Le barracks, destroying nine buildings and

damaging thirteen. This was roughly 16 percent of the 140 buildings in the

area, well below the 68 percent destruction and damage figure that was hoped

for considering the size of the ordnance loads. In a poststrike assessment,

Colonel Chapman said the VNAF erred by splitting its forces so that it became

impossible to achieve total target destruction.

For their part, North Vietnamese gunners penalized the VNAF by shooting

down one A–1H with pilot, who was quickly rescued, and damaging sixteen

other Skyraiders, chiefly with 30- and 50-caliber small arms fire. Only one of

Colonel Chapman’s A–1Es suffered damage, a hole in the right wing flap

caused by a 30-caliber shot.14

The announcement by Washington of the U.S. and Vietnamese reprisal air

strikes elicited reaction from abroad and at home. As the strikes began, a White

House statement charged Hanoi with the Viet Cong attacks at Pleiku and elsewhere, because it had taken “a more aggressive course of action against South

Vietnam and American installations,” and Americans assisting the South

Vietnamese people to defend their freedoms. “We have no choice now,” ran the

statement, “but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued

determination to back South Vietnam in its fight to maintain its independence.”

Simultaneously, the President announced that all American dependents (numbering about 1,800) would be withdrawn from South Vietnam and that a Marine

Hawk air defense battalion would reinforce the air defense of the important Da

Nang Air Base.15

In an emotionally charged televised news conference on February 7,

Secretary McNamara characterized the Viet Cong attacks as “a test and challenge to which the United States could not fail to respond without misleading

the North Vietnamese of the American strength and purpose.” He charged that

captured documents and prisoner of war reports showed how Hanoi stepped up

infiltration. Twice the number of infiltrators entered the south in 1964 compared with 1963, he said, and intelligence sources indicated that the attacks at

Pleiku, Tuy Hoa, and Nha Trang were “ordered and directed, and masterminded

directly from Hanoi.”16

The next day, before a Boy Scout delegation in the Capitol, the President

stressed the dangers of miscalculating the character and strength of young

Americans, adding: “We shall take up any challenge...answer any threat...pay

any price...to make certain freedom shall not perish from this earth.”17
19

FLAMING DART

Communist reaction to the Flaming Dart strikes was defiant. The Hanoi

government denounced the air attacks as “a new and utterly grave act of war,”

for which the United States “must bear full responsibility for all consequences

arising from its aggressive and war-seeking policy in this area.”18 In Peking,

one million Chinese reportedly demonstrated against the United States.19 In

Moscow, a mob of about 2,000, led by Asian and Russian students, attacked the

American Embassy;20 and in separate statements the Chinese and Soviet governments vowed that they would not fail to aid North Vietnam.21 A few days

later, U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, attempted to dampen

the fire of escalated warfare. He called on all parties in the conflict “to move

from the field of battle to the conference table,” inside or outside the United

Nations, and to refrain from any new acts that could lead to further expansion

of the conflict.22

In Washington on the morning of February 8, the President met with NSC

members to assess domestic and foreign reaction to Flaming Dart, and to

review a report prepared by McGeorge Bundy and his group following their conferences with Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland. Bundy’s report

provided a rationale for continuing the air strikes. It characterized the internal

situation in South Vietnam as “grim” and “deteriorating,” and warned that

without new U.S. measures defeat appeared “inevitable” within a year or so. To

halt the military and political decline, the report proposed a “graduated and

continuing reprisal” against North Vietnam:

Da Nang Air Base, 1965.
20

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of sustained

reprisal against North Vietnam policy in which air and naval action

against the north is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the south. 

The report stopped short of recommending an all-out air campaign:

[The] reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level of force and

pressure should be increased only gradually and as indicated above it

should be decreased if VC terror visibly decreases. The object would not

be to “win” an air war against Hanoi but rather to influence the course of

struggle in the south. 

The NSC endorsed the report unanimously. However, Bundy and some of

the President’s other advisers remained sharply divided regarding the pace and

purpose of the initial air strikes. While he agreed with Bundy that the strikes

should begin gradually, Ambassador Taylor believed that their ultimate objective should be to force North Vietnam to “cease its intervention” in South

Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs, particularly General McConnell, the Air Force

Chief of Staff, favored a series of air strikes that would begin vigorously and

would knock the Hanoi regime out of the war.23

President Johnson adopted the gradual approach favored by Taylor and

Bundy. On the same day, February 7, he informed the Ambassador that he

planned to begin a program of “continuing action” against the north “with

Gen. William C. Westmoreland,

Commander, U.S. Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam.
21

FLAMING DART

modifications up and down in tempo and scale in light of your recommendations...and our own continuing review of the situation.” He asked the

Ambassador to inform key South Vietnamese leaders of his thinking and his

hope that the United States could work out its plans and actions with a unified

and operating government.24

The President did not specify when the graduated strike program would

begin, but on February 10, the tenacious Viet Cong again forced his hand. That

evening (Saigon time), they bombed an American Army enlisted men’s barracks at Qui Nhon, about 80 miles east of Pleiku, killing twenty-three

Americans and wounding twenty-one, and killing seven Vietnamese. President

Johnson again summoned the NSC. After reviewing the details of the attack,

McNamara, the JCS, and General Westmoreland (from Saigon) all urged

another prompt retaliatory air strike. However, some NSC attendees, notably

Under Secretary of State George Ball and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson,

suggested that it be postponed until after Soviet Premier Kosygin had left

Hanoi. Vice President Hubert Humphrey expressed “mixed emotions” about a

fast response. After weighing the arguments, the President determined that

another air strike was necessary. In deference to Kosygin’s presence in Hanoi,

the President deleted a bridge target only seventy-five miles south of the North

Vietnamese capital.25

The strike order, again relayed by an execute message from the JCS to

CINCPAC, contained two primary targets, the Chanh Hoi and the Vu Con barracks, and two alternate targets to allow for bad weather, the Dong Hoi and Chap

Le barracks areas. All were in the southernmost part of North Vietnam. In the

operational order to his subordinate commanders, CINCPAC nicknamed the

Farm Gate aircraft at Bien Hoa Air Base in 1962: on the right,

a T–28; next to it, a B–26; and in the background, a row of T–6s.
22

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* The deployments consisted of one squadron each of F–100 Super Sabres and F–105

Thunderchiefs from Japan and Okinawa respectively to Da Nang AB, South Vietnam; two

similar squadrons to the Thai airbases at Takhli and Korat; eight B–57s from Clark AB in

the Philippines to Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam. Less than 24 hours later, the JCS ordered

the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to deploy thirty B–52s of the 2d and 320th Bomb Wings

at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and Mather AFB, California, all modified for conventional

warfare, to Andersen AFB, Guam, and to deploy thirty KC–135 refueling tankers of the

913th and 904th Refueling Squadrons to Kadena AB, Okinawa. Nicknamed Arc Light, the

SAC Bombers were prepared to conduct high altitude, all-weather strikes against the north.

SAC airmen arrived in Guam with twenty high priority targets in their folders and complete plans for attacking two of them: Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi and a petroleum, oil,

and lubricant (POL) facility near Haiphong. However, the SAC bombers were eventually

used mainly in South Vietnam, beginning on June 18, 1965. They did not make an initial

strike on Laos until December 10, 1965, and did not strike North Vietnam until September

16, 1966

upcoming assault Flaming Dart II and designated Navy air to strike the barracks

at Chanh Hoi and the VNAF to attack Vu Con. As in the first strike, the Air

Force’s Farm Gate unit was directed to fly cover for the VNAF. Last-minute

changes in the target selection process, mostly in Washington, created havoc

with planning at PACOM, PACAF, Thirteenth Air Force, MACV, and 2d Air

Division headquarters. The 2d Air Division was again responsible for coordinating joint operations by the Navy, the Air Force, and the VNAF. At the same

time, the JCS directed four and one half Air Force tactical squadrons to deploy

to Southeast Asia on February 10.*26

Flaming Dart II

The Flaming Dart II strike was not launched until late on February 11

Saigon time and, as noted, it was again principally a U.S. Navy and VNAF operation. Ninety-seven Navy aircraft, of which seventy-one had a strike role, left

the carriers Coral Sea, Hancock, and Ranger for Chanh Hoi. They hit the area

at two forty in the afternoon. About two hours later, twenty-eight VNAF A–1H

Skyraiders carried out a second strike on Chap Le barracks, supported by

thirty-two USAF aircraft, mostly F–100s flying flak suppression and combat

air patrol and RF–101s. The attack at Vu Con had again been postponed due to

poor weather. The Skyraiders dropped about 168 260-pound fragmentation

bombs, an equal number of 250-pound fragmentation bombs, and an equal

number of 250-pound general-purpose bombs on the target area. In their supporting role, the Air Force F–100s struck several enemy antiaircraft sites containing 37-mm and 57-mm guns.27

As with Flaming Dart I, the task of coordinating the strike was immensely

complex for General Moore’s 2d Air Division headquarters. MACV exercised

operational control of Air Force activities in South Vietnam but, as noted ear-
23

FLAMING DART

lier, CINCPAC possessed authority for operations in North Vietnam and Laos.

Thus, in both Flaming Dart I and II, control was transferred briefly from

MACV to CINCPAC, and back to MACV upon completion of each mission.28

The air strikes required that Navy and VNAF strikes be coordinated with Air

Force support aircraft, with the latter flying flak suppression and cover for the

A–1Es. The decision by CINCPAC to limit Air Force participation in Flaming

Dart II to support for the VNAF and not to use the newly arrived F–105

Thunderchiefs at Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, perturbed the Air Force. The

omission prompted protest from PACAF headquarters, but to no avail.29

While the decision by CINCPAC not to use USAF aircraft based in South

Vietnam could be explained as an air commander’s prerogative, it was political

considerations that compelled the JCS to order the PACOM commander not to

use USAF aircraft based in Thailand. It was disclosed later that Ambassador

Graham A. Martin in Bangkok did not request the approval of the Thai government to employ the aircraft for a direct strike on North Vietnam. Since on

August 7, 1964, the government had agreed to allow combat missions from its

bases if they could be “plausibly denied,” for diplomatic reasons Martin was

reluctant to approach the Thai authorities for permission. In Vientiane, Laos,

Ambassador William H. Sullivan needed the approval of the Lao government

for overflights of its territory by U.S. aircraft flying from Thai bases to strike

the north, but he was also reluctant to seek concurrence unless a specific U.S.

request to do so was received and he could explain to Lao officials the “larger

plan” of which air action would be a part.30

F–105s on the ramp at Da Nang Air Base in 1966.
24

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

The Navy attack on the Chanh Hoi barracks destroyed approximately twenty

buildings and damaged three while the VNAF destroyed approximately eleven

buildings and damaged thirteen at Chap Le. The results were based largely on

pilot reports rather than BDA, which was poor because of smoke, haze, dust,

and low clouds in the target areas.31

Both attacks were costly. The Navy lost three aircraft (two A–4s and one

F–8). While no VNAF aircraft were lost, eighteen were damaged, and not all by

enemy groundfire: in several instances, VNAF pilots bruised their aircraft by

flying into their own bomb blasts. The Air Force experienced no losses and only

slight damage to two F–100s. As in Flaming Dart I, North Vietnamese casualties were judged to be light or negligible.32

Unlike Flaming Dart I, the administration indicated that Flaming Dart II

took place in retaliation not for a single enemy attack, but for a series of Viet

Cong depredations since February 8, such as the attack at Qui Nhon, the mining of and attacks on the South Vietnamese rail system, the overrunning of a

district town in Phuoc Long Province, and ambushes and assassinations of

American and South Vietnamese civilian and military officials.33

Two days after Flaming Dart II, Ambassador Taylor in Saigon asserted that

the aim of the air attacks was political rather than military. Thus, rather than trying to achieve “great military effect,” the strikes were conducted to suggest the

possibility of other and “bigger forms of reaction.” American limits on air action

against North Vietnam, he said, could be “set by the behavior of the Hanoi government.” The objective was limited, namely “to oblige Hanoi, to persuade

Hanoi to desist in its efforts to maintain the insurgency in South Vietnam.”34

Dean Rusk,

Secretary of State,

1961–1969.
25

FLAMING DART

In Washington, President Johnson had already determined that there should

be “bigger forms of reaction.” He had so informed Ambassador Taylor on the

8th, and on the 13th he issued a memorandum outlining a plan to begin regular and measured bombing of North Vietnam in the near future.35

To reassure himself that he was making the right decision, the President met

with most of his senior advisers on February 17, to listen to the views of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower who had been invited to attend the meeting. Eisenhower stressed the need to contain communism in Southeast Asia and

said that, while bombing the north would not end infiltration into South

Vietnam, it would help to achieve the goal and “weaken Hanoi’s will to continue the war.” Thus American policy should shift from conducting retaliatory

strikes to a “campaign of pressure.” The former President supported all U.S.

measures to prevail, from using as many as eight U.S. divisions if necessary, to

warning the Chinese and Soviets of “dire results” (such as nuclear bombing) if

they openly intervened in the war. Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly supported Eisenhower’s position.

On February 19, the President finally decided to begin a campaign of regular bombing of the north, though he chose not to announce it publicly for the

time being, apparently to protect his domestic programs, and to shield himself

from criticism from military “hawks” in Congress and among the public, and

an immediate sharp response from China, the Soviet Union, or both.36
South Vietnamese A–1s and T–28s.
27

CHAPTER 2

Planning

The two Flaming Dart strikes in February 1965 ended a protracted debate

within the Johnson administration concerning the political and military risks of

bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Although air strikes had

not been considered seriously until Premier Ngo Dinh Diem’s Saigon government was overthrown on November 1, 1963, their desirability had been under

discussion since the late 1950s.

The discussions arose from several American concerns regarding activities

of the DRV. Initially, they focused on the materiel and moral support provided

by Hanoi to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, and later on its support for the

communist-led Pathet Lao (PL) insurgents in Laos, who threatened the

Neutralist government in Vientiane. Hanoi’s close relationship with the Peking

and Moscow governments also gave cause for concern. Desirous of neighbors

having political policies congruent with its own, China provided a continuing

flow of military and economic aid to the DRV during the latter’s successful war

against the French in 1954, which ended with the Geneva Agreements on

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia the same year. The Soviet Union was seeking a

foothold in Southeast Asia and was accordingly increasing its military and economic assistance to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese.

Meanwhile, the United States had replaced the French as the dominant foreign influence in Southeast Asia after 1954, and provided South Vietnam, Laos,

and Cambodia with most of their military and economic needs. Its stake in preserving the independence of the new countries was growing.

The first serious American confrontation with communists in the region

occurred in Laos in the early 1960s. To settle the internal political rivalry

between the Neutralist and the Pathet Lao factions, the United States led an

effort to stabilize Laos by means of another Geneva Agreement, eventually

signed on July 23, 1962, by fourteen nations including the United States, the

People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, as the agreement was called officially,

recognized the existence of a coalition government of rightists, neutralists, and

communists under Premier Souvanna Phouma; it also called for the withdrawal

of all foreign troops, and forbade a neutral Laos from joining a foreign military

alliance, granting military bases, or taking other actions that could directly or

indirectly “impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial

integrity” of the country. The new Laotian Agreement would be enforced by the

International Control Commission, which had been established in 1954 to

enforce the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina and consisted

of representatives from India, Canada, and Poland.1

Unfortunately, mutual suspicions and the actions of the foreign antagonists

in Laos could not be overcome. The United States withdrew its military mission
from Vientiane but quietly continued to support a Laotian guerrilla army commanded by Meo Gen. Vang Pao and a small neutralist military group headed by

a Capt. Kong Le. The Hanoi regime withdrew only some of the 9,000 to 10,000

men deployed in Laos. By September of 1962, an estimated 6,000 North

Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops were still encamped throughout the country

and continued to exert considerable influence over the Pathet Lao faction

headed by Prince Souphanouvong, a half-brother of Neutralist Premier

Souvanna Phouma. Although the Pathet Lao maintained a liaison mission in

Vientiane after 1962, it refused to cooperate with Souvanna’s government and,

indeed, attempted to undermine it with forays against government ground units.

As a consequence, the United States resumed its military assistance to

Vientiane, but to prevent an open breach of the 1962 agreement, the aid was

limited and unannounced.2

Paramilitary Activities and Bombing Plans

Besides the assaults of the PL-NVA on the Vientiane government,

Washington was also perturbed that Hanoi was funneling manpower and supplies through southern Laos to insurgents in South Vietnam. To discourage this

activity, and to collect intelligence and harass the new communist government

in Hanoi, in 1954 the United States, in concert with the British, the French, and

other allies, began to carry out small paramilitary activities against the north.

American activities were conducted by a Saigon Military Mission, which was

supported by the CIA and headed by Edward G. Lansdale, an Air Force

28

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Gen. Vang Pao,

Laotian Meo commander.
29

PLANNING

colonel.3 However, the activities in the ensuing months and years did not appreciably deter the leaders in Hanoi from strengthening their position in the north

and providing assistance to Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam.

By 1960, as the military and political travails of the Saigon government

worsened, the United States had decided to step up paramilitary operations “to

do to the north what it was doing to the south.” From June 1960 until the early

summer of 1962, the CIA office in Saigon, headed by William E. Colby, trained

more South Vietnamese paramilitary personnel for limited assaults on the north.

To perform this task, Colby’s office was augmented by former members of the

U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army Special Forces who were variously skilled in

night flying, coastal landings, and “living off the land” in enemy territory. Two

air organizations were enlisted for the operations: the South Vietnamese Air

Force, trained by the USAF and commanded by Nguyen Cao Ky, and a newly

organized CIA proprietor called the Vietnamese Air Transport, Inc., or “VIET,”

which recruited aircrews from among Chinese pilots who had been trained by

the USAF and were living in Taiwan.4

By early 1961, the VNAF and VIET aircrews were occasionally dropping

specially trained and equipped South Vietnamese personnel into isolated North

Vietnamese areas. The personnel expanded intelligence-collecting activities

where possible and engaged in small-scale sabotage of industrial and transportation facilities, as did South Vietnamese “frogmen” who landed in coastal

areas. The frequency of missions flown to drop leaflets containing anticommunist and anti-infiltration propaganda increased, as did “black” radio broadcasts

President Ngo Dinh

Diem, shown (at left)

during official

ceremonies in Saigon,

was overthrown in 1963.

South Vietnam’s

continued political

instability was a critical

factor affecting U.S.

policy in the region.
30

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* At the request of President Kennedy, Taylor had conducted the official postmortem of the

Bay of Pigs operation [see Taylor’s Swords and Plowshares (New York, 1972), Chap 13].

Colby observes that the CIA planned and supported rather sizeable and successful

operations in Laos on behalf of Meo Gen. Vang Pao’s troops and guerrillas and also aided

in recruiting, training, and supervising tribal teams for intelligence collection and air

targeting, which disproved Taylor’s conclusion about the CIA’s capabilities [William E.

Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York, 1978), pp 174

and 200–201].

from South Vietnam. There was one aerial mishap when a plane was downed in

the north and some members of the aircrews and paramilitary personnel were

captured. Hanoi managed to obtain highly publicized confessions from them all.5

The small but slowly expanding CIA operations against the north were

accompanied by deepening U.S. concern about the military and political viability of the Diem government. There was also high-level debate in the administration concerning harsher measures against the north, possibly the threat of

bombing. Some officials believed that such a threat might persuade Hanoi’s

leaders to cease and desist from their support of insurgent factions in South

Vietnam and Laos. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, President Kennedy’s Special

Military Representative, and Walt W. Rostow, Deputy Assistant for National

Security Affairs, led a presidential mission to Saigon in October 1961. The

mission studied Diem’s requirements and concluded that American ground

commitment could be held to a maximum of six divisions or 205,000 men,

because the north was “extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing.” The

mission also informed Mr. Colby, the CIA chief in Saigon, that the CIA’s

recently expanded air, sea, and ground forays against the north should be transferred gradually to Defense Department agencies, with CIA operatives limited

to a supporting role. According to General Taylor, this decision flowed from an

important “lesson” of the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs operation organized by the

CIA in April 1961 against the regime of Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba. The lesson was that the CIA possessed neither the staff nor the logistic backup to

undertake large and difficult military-style operations.*6

Taylor’s decision was not immediately implemented, however, and interagency

debate over the merits of the transition continued for many months. MACV did

not assume control of the covert operations until the beginning of 1964.

Other important recommendations of the Taylor mission called for the dispatch of additional U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine advisory units and

more assistance for the economic and pacification programs to bolster the

embattled Diem regime in Saigon. Secretary McNamara generally endorsed the

mission’s recommendations and sent them to President Kennedy on November

8, 1961. As the military deployments began, the Defense Secretary advised the

President that Hanoi should be informed that “we mean business” and warned

“that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation.”7
31

PLANNING

* These were missions flown by North Korean pilots in a flimsy Po–2 propeller aircraft

over the Seoul area, usually after midnight. By flying at very low altitude, the aircraft usually escaped detection on antiaircraft radar scopes. Although they dropped bombs, the

pilots accomplished little, yet were considered “a small but very agonizing thorn in the

side of the United Nations force.” Air Force and Marine pilots succeeded in shooting a few

of them down. See Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953

(Ofc AF Hist, 1983), pp 310–11 and 662–66.

Other officials and analysts were less sanguine about altering Hanoi’s

behavior by more visible American support for the Diem regime or a bombing

threat. Some in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) believed that the

dispatch of additional U.S. military units to the south would prompt Hanoi’s

leaders to increase their assistance to the Viet Cong, to which the United States

would react, in turn, by deploying three or more divisions to South Vietnam.

The authors of a special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) of November 5

viewed a U.S. threat or decision to bomb the north as a mistake. This, they said,

would not only fail to end Hanoi’s support for the insurgency, but would also

probably strengthen determination on the part of Peking and Moscow to defend

their ally.8

Despite uncertainty over how the DRV and its two principal communist

allies would view increased American military pressure on the north, at an

early date administration leaders had compiled a series of possible actions. A

conference in Honolulu in December 1961 attended by McNamara and other

ranking officials reviewed these actions, including aerial photoreconnaissance

to detect any significant DRV military buildup, harassing strikes patterned

after North Korea’s Bedcheck Charlie flights of the Korean War,* interdiction

of logistics routes between Techepone and South Vietnam used to resupply the

Viet Cong, airdropping of “booby trap” and other ordnance in selected areas,

and airlifting more South Vietnamese or Chinese nationalist special forces

teams into and out of the north for intelligence gathering and more intensive

sabotage and harassing operations. Apparently, small-scale air activity could be

conducted safely as Hanoi appeared to have no air force or ground-controlled

intercept capability, and its thin air defense radar system could be avoided by

flying below 5,000 feet.9

A decision on these options was deferred pending a more concerted American effort to deal with the Viet Cong within South Vietnam. In December

1961, in accordance with the recommendations of General Taylor, Mr. Rostow,

and Mr. McNamara, President Kennedy directed the deployment of the first

U.S. air, ground, and naval combat advisory units to South Vietnam to bolster

the Diem government’s military and internal security forces. One of the first

units was an Air Force special air warfare detachment nicknamed “Farm Gate.”

On February 8, 1962, the Kennedy administration displayed further determination to deal forcefully with the Viet Cong insurgency by establishing the
32

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam with Army Lt. Gen. Paul D. Harkins

as commander and Air Force Brig. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis as commander of

the 2d ADVON (advanced echelon), soon thereafter renamed 2d Air Division,

as the Air Force component in General Harkins’ command. For a brief period

in the ensuing months, the increased advisory training for South Vietnam’s

armed forces and other internal security organizations appeared to augur eventual success.10

Of course, prudence dictated the preparation of contingency plans in the

event that North Vietnam or China or both attempted to overrun South Vietnam

and other parts of the region. As was customary, the Joint Chiefs assigned this

task to Adm. Harry D. Felt’s Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters which

prepared a series of plans. Operations Plan 33-62 called for direct and progressively heavier Air Force and Navy operations against the north but was sufficiently flexible to permit a wide range of covert activities. To stabilize the

military situation in Laos should the need arise, in 1963 PACOM prepared

Operations Plan 99-64, which required selective air and naval assaults against

Hanoi. A more comprehensive Operations Plan 32-64 provided for air, naval,

and ground defense against a combined Chinese and North Vietnamese thrust

against mainland Southeast Asia, defined as the countries of South Vietnam,

Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The manpower, aircraft,

and materiel needed by CINCPAC to execute the plans were spelled out in considerable detail in supporting plans prepared by PACOM’s service components,

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), and U.S. Army, Pacific

(USARPAC).11

Throughout 1962, American officials believed the outlook for containing the

Viet Cong was promising, despite occasional military setbacks. However, the

weakness of the Diem government’s armed forces contrasted sharply with the

energy and perseverance of the insurgents, backed by the Hanoi regime’s political and limited materiel support. As a consequence, in January 1963 the JCS

sent an investigative team to South Vietnam to review the military situation.

The teams were led by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, and Lt.

Gen. David A. Burchinal, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations,

Headquarters USAF.

After its return to Washington, the JCS team warned that Hanoi possessed

the resources and “latitude of choice,” in aiding the Viet Cong, and could readily

increase its supporting role. The disquieting circumstances in the south warranted more American actions against the northerners “...it is not realistic,” the

team said, “to ignore the fact we have given Ho Chi Minh [no] evidence...we

are prepared to call him to account for helping to keep the insurgency in South

Vietnam alive.” The North Vietnamese should be made to “bleed.” What should

be done? The CIA’s small intelligence-gathering and sabotage forays were too

minor, but a precipitous air attack would be “too grave” a step. The alternative

was for MACV to develop a South Vietnamese unconventional warfare capabil-
33

PLANNING

* In April 1961, the Air Force began flying intermittent RF–101 reconnaissance missions

along the border between Laos and North Vietnam to determine the extent of communist

movements into Laos and South Vietnam. (See Jacob Van Staaveren, Interdiction in

Southern Laos, 1960–1968, (Center AF Hist, 1994), p 5.

ity for launching “a coordinated program of sabotage, destruction, propaganda,

and subversive missions against the north. This would “consume communist

resources” and prevent the north from giving its undivided attention to the

southern insurgency. In short, it was a restatement of Taylor’s recommendation

in late 1961 to transfer CIA’s expanding paramilitary operations to the services.

The JCS team chafed over existing U.S. political restrictions that barred

unilateral activities in the theater. The Viet Cong and its supporters enjoyed a

“privileged sanctuary” in Laos and Cambodia, it observed, and in December

1962 Washington halted RF–101 photoreconnaissance missions over Laos and

along the North Vietnamese border.*12

As no immediate action was taken on the JCS team’s recommendations, the

services continued to examine ways to combat the Viet Cong insurgency more

effectively. An Army study, completed in April 1963, proposed airborne and

amphibious “hit and run” raids under the cover of a “National Liberation Army of

the North,” which the United States would help organize. The purpose of the raids

would be more psychological than political. Admiral Felt noted, however, that the

study complemented part of his Operations Plan 33-62, providing for American

and South Vietnamese personnel to conduct limited overt operations. Under the

Navy plan, specially trained Navy units would harass the North Vietnamese

President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
34

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

coastal installations by mining or possibly sinking a ship in Haiphong channel,

and the Air Force would use its Farm Gate or other aircraft for airdropping personnel into North Vietnam and subsequently retrieving them. A few important

North Vietnamese targets might also be struck by VNAF or U.S. aircraft.13

In the same month, in conjunction with a review of the military situation in

Laos, where PL-DRV units had recently made gains against Laotian government

forces, the Joint Chiefs urged President Kennedy to convey a sharp warning to

Hanoi by bombing eight key targets in the north: Dong Hoi and Vinh airfields,

a Haiphong thermal power plant, a steel rolling mill, separate chemical and

POL storage facilities, and two highway bridges. The attacks would be conducted by USAF aircraft based in Thailand and some carrier-based aircraft.

However, the President withheld his assent.14

Nonetheless, the bombing proposal remained alive and was discussed again,

along with plans to step up covert activities against the Hanoi regime, on May

6, 1963, during another conference in Honolulu, which was attended by

Secretaries McNamara and Rusk, JCS Chairman Taylor, General Wheeler,

Admiral Felt, General Harkins, Frederick C. Nolting (U.S. Ambassador to

Saigon), and other officials. Felt and Nolting strongly believed that circumstances warranted a series of air strikes, possibly against more than the initial

eight targets. The Ambassador predicted that the air assault might hinder activities by the north in Laos. McNamara indicated that the President still believed

such action was untimely, but asked Felt to include the targets in his contingency planning documents.

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler,

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

1964-1970.
35

PLANNING

* Taylor left his post as military representative of the president to become Chairman of the

JCS on October 1, 1962.

In a review of the ongoing covert air, ground, and sea operations against the

north, it was evident that the CIA’s involvement had not been phased out, as

ordered by General Taylor in late 1961.* In fact, the issue was still being

debated. General Wheeler believed MACV (i.e., the Army) should control such

activities using non-U.S. personnel, and he clearly stated the difficulty of establishing any South Vietnamese support movement in the north such as the Viet

Cong had in the south. On the other hand, Admiral Felt believed the CIA

station in Saigon should continue to have chief responsibility for applying

covert pressure on the Hanoi regime, noting that it had placed nine speciallytrained teams in the DRV and had trained twenty-five teams for airdropping.

The agency accomplished this, he noted, while complying with Washington’s

injunction not to use Laotian territory as a “back door” for attacking the north.

If MACV were to take over these activities, he averred, this would contravene

present American policy, which stated that U.S. commanders and forces were

assisting South Vietnam solely in an advisory role. McNamara indicated that

the existing policy might be changed and directed another review of the restrictions imposed on special military activities against the north.15

Two days after the conclusion of the conference, long simmering internal

dissent against the Diem government flared into Buddhist protest marches in

Saigon, and then in other cities, and disorder spread to the universities and high

schools. Numerous monks and students were killed and wounded, and others

were arrested in clashes with police. American officials in Saigon and

Washington were divided over the best way to suppress the Viet Cong insurgency. Some believed that the United States could no longer “win with Diem”

whose powers were being increasingly preempted by his brother Nhu.16

In the ensuing weeks, as South Vietnam’s instability increased and U.S. concern grew over a resurgence of PL-DRV activities in neighboring Laos, the JCS

cooperated with CINCPAC and his component commanders to step up planning against North Vietnam. On May 22, the Joint Chiefs approved a concept

for “hit and run” raids, although Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force Chief of

Staff, believed considerably stronger measures were required. Admiral Felt

updated his Operations Plan 33-62 against the north, now renumbered Plan 33-63,

and at the request of McNamara and the JCS he prepared a new Operations

Plan 99-64.17

Operations Plan 99-64 called for another series of actions to strengthen the

combat capabilities of the Laotian and South Vietnamese governments in the

face of enemy infiltration and to penalize the north with threatening or punitive

action. The last envisaged air and naval gunfire strikes, aerial mining of certain

harbors, airborne and amphibious raids, and at its most severe, a maritime
36

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

blockade of North Vietnamese ports. As usual, PACAF, PACFLT, and

USARPAC prepared supporting plans.18

To the relief of administration officials, the Laotian crisis subsided quickly,

the annual monsoon rains helping to dampen military operations. South Vietnam’s

tribulations continued, however, although McNamara, JCS chairman Taylor,

and others still believed that most “war progress” indicators augured eventual

success for the U.S. combat advisory, economic, and other measures introduced

over the past 18 months. To underscore their optimism, they announced plans

to reduce the advisory force by 1,000 men by the end of 1963. Against the

north, South Vietnamese and Chinese Nationalists, trained and supported by

the U.S. continued their low-level intelligence collecting, sabotage, leaflet

dropping, and harassment activities in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force and

Navy. Admiral Felt and his component commanders made sure their contingency plans for an overt attack on the country remained current.19

Unhappily, South Vietnam’s internal problems after mid-1963 only intensified, peaking on November 1 when a group of South Vietnamese officers, led

by Maj. Gen. Duong “Big” Minh overthrew the Diem regime. President Diem

and his brother Nhu were killed, leaving General Minh and a collegium of fellow officers to take over the government. Washington underwent its own

trauma twenty-two days later when President Kennedy was assassinated and

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded to the presidency. On November

26, after a quick review of the situation in South Vietnam, Mr. Johnson issued

National Security Memorandum (NSAM) 273, which presaged further actions

against the communists in Laos as well as in North Vietnam.20

NSAM 273 demonstrated the continuity of American policy in Southeast

Asia and authorized more military and economic assistance for the new Minh

Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara speaking during a

visit to Tan Son Nhut Air Base in

1964. Gen. Maxwell Taylor,

chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S.

Ambassador to Vietnam,

are to his left.
37

PLANNING

government. It also solicited plans from the JCS for stepping up clandestine

activity against the north, and for launching ground incursions up to 50 kilometers across infiltration routes in southern Laos.21

In mid-December, President Johnson sent McNamara and John McCone, the

CIA director, to Saigon to meet with General Harkins, the MACV commander,

and Henry Cabot Lodge, who had succeeded Nolting as ambassador in August,

to assess the new government’s ability to combat the insurgency, and then to

determine what additional pressures could be applied to North Vietnam. On his

return to Washington on December 21, the Defense Secretary warned Mr.

Johnson that unless the United States immediately reduced the infiltration of

men and weapons through Laos, there was real danger of neutralization or

communist control of the country. He recommended measures that exceeded

those mandated by NSAM 273, such as bolstering the new Minh regime with

more advisory assistance, mapping the Laotian and Cambodian borders using

SAC U–2 reconnaissance aircraft, and launching a twelve-month program of

increased intelligence collection, sabotage, and psychological warfare activities against North Vietnam, to be carried out chiefly by MACV rather than

CIA. In preparation for this responsibility, MACV, with CIA assistance, had

prepared an Operations Plan 34A, dated December 15, 1963, which described

four major categories of activities: harassing, attritional, punitive, and aerial.

As before, the operations would be conducted by specially trained South

Vietnamese tribesmen, South Vietnamese special forces, Chinese Nationalists,

and other personnel. The military assets of the 2d Air Division, MACV, and

the Vietnamese Air Force, Army, and Navy would all be enlisted directly to

execute the plan.22

President Johnson approved most of Secretary McNamara’s recommendations. To oversee the implementation of the measures outlined in the plan 34A,

Mr. Johnson created an interdepartmental committee, composed of representatives of the Defense and State Departments and the CIA and chaired by Marine

Maj. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and

Special Activities in the JCS. He instructed the new organization to select

activities that promised the greatest return with the least risk.

In January 1964, the committee proposed an initial four-month program

against North Vietnam consisting of eighteen sabotage missions by teams that

would enter either by airdrop or on foot, special naval operations, nineteen U–2

reconnaissance and four aerial communications electronic missions performed

by SAC, and more intensive leaflet distribution and radio propaganda broadcasts. The President quickly approved these measures. The U.S. National Board

of Estimates predicted that Peking’s reaction to these activities would be slight

as long as they avoided Haiphong and China. Some Washington analysts speculated (wrongly in retrospect) that the Hanoi regime might construe the measures as a threat, and perhaps agree to convene an international conference to

settle the conflict before it grew any further.23
38

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* De Soto patrols had been conducted off the North Vietnamese coast periodically since

April 1962 (see Chapter 1).

To carry out its new mandate for covert operations, on January 24, 1964,

MACV established a Special Operations Group (MACSOG) with CIA in a supporting role. MACSOG was accorded the status of a special staff section under

the oversight of MACV J-5. The new section quickly divided its activities into

five categories: air and airborne, maritime, psychological, intelligence, and

logistic. As already noted, manpower, aircraft, and other resources for the special organization would be drawn from all of the services.24

With the approval of the Minh government and its successor, headed by Maj.

Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who replaced Minh in a bloodless coup on January 30,

1964, on February 1, the United States with its South Vietnamese and other

allies began to apply further, low-level military and psychological pressure on

the north. Starting on the 13th, two SAC U–2 aircraft, nicknamed Lucky

Dragon, were used to fly two sorties a day over parts of Laos, Cambodia, and

South Vietnam. The aircraft belonged to the 4080th Strategic Wing, and had

deployed from the United States to Clark AB in the Philippines. Their purpose

was to map more accurately the boundaries of these countries and to pick up

intelligence on communist activity in the photographed areas. On March 5, the

U–2 unit moved to Bien Hoa AB in South Vietnam. Photography quickly provided new evidence of DRV military activities close to the Plain of Jars in

northern Laos, and confirmed the inaccuracy of recent government statements

that 8,000 strategic hamlets had been established in the pacification program.25

In another action, starting on February 28 and continuing into March, the

Seventh Fleet resumed De Soto* patrols, using the destroyer USS Craig. The

patrol was intended to provide “a show of force,” and to collect visual, electronic, and photographic data on infiltration by sea from the north into South

Vietnam. The ship was authorized to approach within four nautical miles (n.m.)

of the North Vietnamese mainland, but instructed to remain fifteen n.m. from

the Chinese mainland and twelve n.m. from Chinese-held islands.26

By March and April of 1964, with Washington watching closely, the lowlevel activities of Plan 34A were conducted as regularly as weather conditions

permitted. SAC U–2s continued mapping and intelligence-gathering missions.

VNAF RT–28s and RC–47s flew photo and electronic reconnaissance missions

respectively, and its C–47s, T–28s, A–1Hs, and H–34s airdropped and supplied

small intelligence and harassing teams and distributed propaganda leaflets and

gift kits. During one night operation in early April, for example, the aircraft

dropped 1,350,000 leaflets and 2,000 gift kits. Farm Gate T–28s, B–26s,

C–47s, and C–123s occasionally participated in these activities, though pilots

were very careful not to venture too deeply into North Vietnamese airspace.

Supported by Seventh Fleet personnel and resources, the Vietnamese Navy
39

PLANNING

stepped up its maritime operations. These consisted of commando raids by

PT boats to blow up rail and highway bridges and bombardment of coastal

installations.27

Operation Hardnose was also intensified. This was a program of attacks by

specially trained South Vietnamese on DRV men and supplies as they moved

down the Ho Chi Minh Trail toward South Vietnam. U.S. officials briefly encouraged the South Vietnamese and Laotian governments to cooperate more in these

intelligence-gathering and harassing activities, but the political and military

weaknesses of both, as well as Laos’ traditional distrust of the Vietnamese,

brought an early end to such joint operations. American officials were further

disquieted by the considerable publicity that accompanied the planning of the

anti-infiltration program. Although sporadic air and ground attacks along the

Trail increased, they were the result of separate programs backed by the United

States, rather than joint operations by the Vientiane and Saigon governments.28

Rising Pressure from the Services to Bomb the North

However, the expansion of MACV Plan 34A against the Hanoi regime failed

to reduce pressure for more aggressive measures against the communists,

inside and outside of South Vietnam. On January 22, 1964, in a delayed

response to the President’s NSAM 273 of November 26, 1963, the Joint Chiefs

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 1962–1964, and

Ambassador to South

Vietnam, 1964–1965.
outlined a ten-point program of “bolder actions.” The program required that the

United States virtually take over the war in South Vietnam, that it commit whatever forces were necessary for this purpose, and that it increase air, ground, and

sea training for the South Vietnamese. Against North Vietnam, the service

chiefs called for the bombing of key military targets, larger commando raids,

and the mining of sea approaches. They believed these measures could be carried out under South Vietnamese “cover,” while the MACV commander

assumed complete responsibility. In Laos, they recommended that South

Vietnamese ground operations be of sufficient size to impede the movement of

men and supplies southward, and that the United States carry out tactical

reconnaissance of Laos and Cambodia to obtain whatever “operational intelligence” was needed.29

The ten-point program was too drastic for the administration, particularly

after Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, the I Corps commander, and a new group of

rebel officers overthrew the Minh regime in a bloodless coup on January 30,

1966. Khanh charged that Minh and his associates were contemplating the neutralization of South Vietnam in accordance with a plan outlined by President

De Gaulle of France several months earlier. The coup underscored again South

Vietnam’s political and military weaknesses. A U.S. special national intelligence estimate of February 12 quickly warned that, unless the new government

demonstrated “marked improvement,” it had, at best, only a 50 percent chance

of surviving the Viet Cong insurgency for the next few weeks or months.30

President Johnson wanted more moderate measures against the enemy and

solicited the views of the JCS on revitalizing the counterinsurgency program

and possible alternative military actions against North Vietnam. As McNamara

explained to the service chiefs, the President wanted to examine a range of

overt and covert air and sea actions that would be most likely to end Hanoi’s

support for the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos, but unlikely to escalate the conflict and draw adverse “third country” reaction.31

The JCS pondered the options separately and jointly. General LeMay still

advocated immediate U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese targets. In the preceding month, he had made a similar proposal in more colorful and blunter

language before a committee of the House of Representatives: “We are swatting flies,” he said, “instead of going after the manure pile.” But in their formal,

joint reply on March 2, the Joint Chiefs recommended that U.S. cooperation

with the South Vietnamese in military activities against the north become

more direct, but remain limited. They said the Air Force’s Farm Gate or regular Air Force and Navy aircraft should fly low-level reconnaissance missions

over the north and Laos and armed reconnaissance missions against bridges,

airfields, POL installations, and other targets along North Vietnamese supply

routes leading to Laos. Work began on a combined Air Force and Navy plan

to stop the aggression of Hanoi and Peking (in the event the Chinese entered

the war).32

40

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966
41

PLANNING

The joint reply had obviously muted the views of individual service chiefs.

General LeMay, for example, considered the recommendations weaker than he

desired, and Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, would have

preferred to delay further military action against the north until the Saigon

government’s most recent efforts, with American assistance, had been given a

trial. Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., who succeeded Gen. David M. Shoup as

Commandant of the Marine Corps at the beginning of the year, agreed with

LeMay. The views of the Air Force and the Navy were not identical but the differences between them were less significant than between the Air Force and

the Army.33

Secretary McNamara “noted” the reply and promised to consider its contents in higher level deliberations. Then, at President Johnson’s request, he

again traveled to Saigon in early March and conferred with General Harkins

and Ambassador Lodge and their staffs concerning the U.S. advisory effort.

McNamara’s report to the President, made on March 16, was a detailed and

doleful account of the Khanh government’s military, political, and economic

woes and warned that the military situation had worsened considerably since

September 1963. The decline contrasted with Viet Cong territorial gains in a

context of growing public apathy, increased military desertions, waning

morale, and setbacks in the pacification program.

As for remedial action, the Defense Secretary said that he and his associates

in Washington and Saigon “have given serious thought to all the implications

and ways of carrying out directly military action against North Vietnam in

order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam.” Three

categories of action were reviewed: additional border control, retaliation, and

graduated overt military pressure. As the severity of the respective responses

increased, each would entail more direct Air Force, Navy, and Army operations

and the indirect support of the South Vietnamese military forces. The most

Martin B–57 over

South Vietnam,

1966.
42

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

important transition would be from the retaliatory or “tit for tat” air attacks on

important industrial and other targets in North Vietnam. These would be conducted by combined VNAF, USAF Farm Gate, and three USAF squadrons of

B–57s based in Japan. In advance of the last actions, which risked an escalation of the war, the United States should strengthen its military presence in the

Pacific and improve air defense in South Vietnam.

When weighing alternative measures, McNamara believed the Khanh government was too weak to risk a higher level of conflict. Accordingly, he proposed a twelve-point program to arrest the government’s decline. The first ten

measures would improve Saigon’s civil and military structure and personnel

training, provide the South Vietnamese with guerrilla and paramilitary forces,

and equip the VNAF with twenty-five A–1H Skyraider aircraft instead of the

present force of T–28s. The last two measures provided for cautious “outcountry” actions. Under point 11, the United States would continue to fly high-altitude reconnaissance flights, using U–2s to map South Vietnam’s borders. “Hot

pursuit” activities by South Vietnamese forces, which followed the enemy into

Laos for the purpose of border control, would be expanded, but still limited.

Under point 12, military commanders were authorized to plan numerous border control actions inside Laos and Cambodia and a program of “graduated

overt military pressure against North Vietnam” on thirty-days’ notice. President

Johnson quickly approved McNamara’s recommendations that were issued on

March 17 as NSAM 288. The JCS directed Admiral Felt to prepare contingency

plans for conducting operations.34

The Defense Secretary’s recommendations reflected a pervasive administration

fear of an untimely escalation of the war. Secretary Rusk foresaw the possibility of Soviet diversionary moves in Berlin, the Middle East, or elsewhere if the

United States applied too much pressure on the Hanoi government. The

President later explained: “We did not know what secret agreements Hanoi

might have worked out with Peking and Moscow.” On the other hand, the

President saw another justification for exercising restraint against North

Vietnam in the difficult relations between the Chinese and the Soviets. The

expectation of an imminent confrontation between the two communist countries, he informed Ambassador Lodge, meant that action against the north

would be more “practicable” after such an event had played out.

American domestic politics also stayed the President’s hand. Barry

Goldwater, the Republican nominee in the presidential race, favored a considerably more aggressive policy for U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, Mr. Johnson had made numerous promises not to involve

the United States in a larger war. This commitment could not be breached easily

without damaging consequences for the President and his political party.35

There were other high officials who were more willing to risk escalation. In

Saigon, Ambassador Lodge wanted to take strong punitive measures against

the North Vietnamese, especially for instigating terrorist acts in South Vietnam,
43

PLANNING

and make them “cease and desist from their murderous intrusion” into the

country. John A. McCone, Director of CIA, was a staunch advocate of heavy

air and naval strikes against the north now rather than later. The Joint Chiefs,

especially General LeMay, believed the twelve-point program was inadequate

and called for more vigorous air action against the communists in both North

Vietnam and Laos.36

During mid-April, however, the consensus among the Joint Chiefs lost

strength, and another paper to McNamara bore witness to the divided opinion.

Generals LeMay and Greene still recommended air strikes against the north,

attributing them to the VNAF if necessary, and that low-level photoreconnaissance continue. But in a shift of opinion toward that of the White House,

General Taylor, the JCS Chairman, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of

Staff, and Adm. David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval operations (CNO), now

believed heavy pressure on the north was not warranted for the time being.37

Selecting Major North Vietnamese Targets

As the Saigon government grew weaker, still riven with political factions

and the malaise of its fighting forces, General LeMay’s concern grew. In late

May, in a meeting with his service colleagues, he warned that the war was

being lost. He called for an end to the policy of sending “messages” in the form

of the low-level military actions, in the hope that Hanoi would change its policy,

and insisted on action that would destroy the regime’s capability to aid the Viet

Cong. In spite of more than two years of effort to convince the communists of

America’s will, he observed, the VC-DRV had clearly improved their military

position. It was time to convey a “message” sharply and directly, and he

proposed striking two targets supporting the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao. One

A line of B–57s at Da Nang start their engines with black powder cartridges.
44

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

was the city of Vinh, just north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and the other

was Dien Bien Phu in northeastern North Vietnam, famous as the site of the

last stand of the French army in the spring of 1954. The Army, Navy, and

Marine Corps chiefs agreed with the proposal and, as the acting JCS chairman

(General Taylor was not in Washington at the time), LeMay sent the recommendation to Secretary McNamara on May 30.38

Upon his return to the Pentagon, Taylor disagreed with the JCS views submitted in his absence and prepared his own. He said the two targets, Vinh and

Dien Bien Phu, were too large, required too many sorties, and hitting them

would be fraught with too many risks. There were three ways, he said, to strike

the north: by massive attack on all significant targets, rendering them unusable

for the Viet Cong or the Pathet Lao, by smaller attacks on some significant

parts of the north’s target system to persuade Hanoi to cease its support for the

Viet Cong and Pathet Lao or to obtain its cooperation in calling off the insurgency, and by limited attacks on smaller installations to impress upon Hanoi

U.S. willingness to move to the first and second alternatives.

Taylor rejected the first alternative as unnecessarily destructive if the purpose

was to change the will of the adversary as it reduced the likelihood of winning

Hanoi’s cooperation and “could challenge the Communist bloc and raise considerable possibility of escalation.” He favored the second alternative, but sensed that

political considerations would incline the President’s civilian advisers to opt for

the third. Thus, the JCS should prepare a plan for its possible execution.

Shipping in Haiphong harbor.
45

PLANNING

McNamara agreed generally with Taylor’s views, and on June 10 asked the JCS to

prepare a three-phase strike plan ranging from “demonstrative” attacks showing

U.S. readiness and intent to attacks on all significant targets within the country.39

The first two days of June 1964 found all of the principal U.S. military and

civilian officials conferring again in Honolulu, with Secretary Rusk serving as

chairman. There was more lengthy and agonizing debate over Saigon’s internal

problems and how to resolve them. Aside from the three service chiefs, who

were not present and whose chairman, General Taylor, did not share their view,

one of the loudest voices in favor of an attack on North Vietnam was

Ambassador Lodge. At the plenary session of the conference, the Ambassador

expressed the belief that most support for the VC would fade as soon as

counter-terror measures were begun against the Hanoi regime. He called for a

selective bombing campaign against military targets in the country and also in

Laos, citing Techepone as an example, predicting this would bolster the morale

and a feeling of unity among the South Vietnamese people and reduce quarreling among its leaders. On the other hand, Westmoreland and Taylor believed

that the deterioration in the south had been arrested, obviating the need to

launch a bombing campaign. McNamara and CIA Director McCone were considerably less sanguine about Saigon’s future stability.40

The conferees discussed the possibility of Chinese intervention in the event

that the United States began bombing the north. McNamara surmised that tactical

air strikes might reduce the effectiveness of invading Chinese troops by

50 percent, but this would not stop a large Chinese force of up to eighteen divisions. Another participant estimated that it would take five to seven U.S. and

allied divisions to hold mainland Southeast Asia, but Admiral Felt said these divisions were out of “practical reach” and, in any event, the United States would

deplete its bomb supply before it could defeat the Chinese. U.S. commanders

would then have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Rusk countered that the

use of nuclear bombs would be “a most serious matter,” and could induce the

Soviets to take diversionary military action. The discussion produced a consensus that it would be too risky to escalate air and naval action against the

communists in the north and Laos for the time being, and that measures to

ensure the survival of the Khanh government should have first priority. Two

immediate goals were imperative: the government must be made more politically secure and the armed forces must be made more effective. Until these

goals were attained, probably not before the end of 1964, U.S. military and economic programs should be strengthened. In the interim, Admiral Felt should

continue to review his contingency plans for dealing with an unexpected

Chinese entry into the war.41

In the ensuing weeks, however, planning activities for more drastic action

against Hanoi and Peking were not diminished by the administration’s decision

to concentrate on bolstering the Saigon government. At McNamara’s request,

in early June the Joint Chiefs prepared data on shipping entering Haiphong har-
46

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* A final version of the list of ninety-four targets identified by the JCS was sent to

McNamara on August 24. The list also contained several hundred less important targets.

† Gen. Hunter Harris, Jr., succeeded Gen. Smart as PACAF commander on August 1, 1964.

bor, plans to mine the harbor, alternate ports if Haiphong were closed, military

requirements to sustain “escalation phases” of CINCPAC’s Operations Plans

32-64 and 37-64, a U.S.-Thai military plan for the defense of the Mekong

Delta, and plans for conducting more punitive attacks on the communists in

Laos. The service chiefs also sent General Taylor a study on the ability of U.S.

and allied air power to blunt a possible force of eighteen North Vietnamese and

Chinese divisions advancing towards the Mekong River. At the request of both

the Defense Secretary and the JCS chairman, the Joint Chiefs collaborated with

CINCPAC in the preparation of a three-phase air attack plan against the north,

ranging from a massive air strike on all significant military targets to limited

“demonstrative” air strikes on a few targets. To carry out the latter option,

Taylor asked for the number of sorties that would be needed per target if bombing was conducted solely by the VNAF; jointly by the VNAF, Farm Gate, and

B–57 units; and by a combined effort of the VNAF, Farm Gate, B–57s, and

other USAF and Navy aircraft.42

On June 15, in response to a request by McNamara, an ad hoc study group

within the JCS and composed of representatives of the services and the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA), completed an initial list of ninety-one of the most

important “JCS designated” targets, and another three-phase attack scenario for use

against North Vietnam. The scenario was suffused with details of types of ordnance,

ordnance delivery tactics, prestrike reconnaissance needs, and anticipated aircraft

attrition. Following further revisions requested by McNamara, on July 11, the study

group issued a list of ninety-four targets and a four-phase attack scenario.*43

While supporting the list of ninety-four targets, the Air Force was nonetheless highly disenchanted with the administration’s air planning.44 Observing

that some of the alternate attack plans provided for the covert use of USAF’s

Farm Gate aircraft and B–57s based in South Vietnam, PACAF planners argued

strongly for overt attacks on the north, citing some salutary results in Laos

where armed escorts of Yankee Team aircraft were now permitted to return

enemy fire. PACAF was also concerned about the status of pilots captured in

covert strikes, whose fate could cost the United States considerable international political capital. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, who was retiring as commander

of PACAF,† believed Washington was injecting itself too deeply into the details

of military activity. In a report on the worldwide military problems of the

United States, but with Vietnam specifically in mind, he averred there was too

much “dedicated and misguided” effort over detailed operations from too high

and remote a level to permit “adequate judgment of dynamic events....”45 For

his part, General LeMay insisted that the military problems in South Vietnam
47

PLANNING

* On May 9, the JCS approved B–57 training for six VNAF pilots. The first two pilots

completed their training on June 27, 1964.

† Taylor was succeeded as JCS chairman by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the former Army Chief

of Staff. Taylor’s broad authority and prestige in the White House inevitably made his voice

one of the most influential on every aspect of the war, including the scope and tempo of

the Rolling Thunder program once it began.

and Laos could not be solved satisfactorily without striking the north and

ensuring a “credible impact” on the Hanoi regime.46

As the debate continued, U.S. officials suddenly faced the possibility that

Saigon’s generals might make a unilateral attack on the north. On July 18,

speaking before 100,000 Vietnamese in Saigon on the tenth anniversary of the

division of their country (known as National Shame Day), General Khanh led

the call to “Bac Tien” or “Go North.” He declared that a million refugees,

Buddhists, Catholics, and students wished to liberate their compatriots in the

north and unite the country. The next day, the government formally made an

identical threat. On July 22, Vice President Ky committed a diplomatic faux

pas, stating publicly that South Vietnam had sent sabotage teams into North

Vietnam and that Vietnamese pilots were receiving training on jet bombers in

preparation for large-scale attacks.*47

General Taylor, who resigned as JCS chairman on July 2, 1964 to replace

Henry Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to Saigon—and arrived there with an

unusually broad presidential writ of authority for conducting the war in the

south†—sought to forestall the Saigon government’s “go-it-alone” policy by

promising joint U.S.-South Vietnamese military planning against the Hanoi

regime. A worried State Department thought South Vietnam’s morale might be

raised and Khanh’s attention diverted if the VNAF struck communist supply

lines in the Laos panhandle. But Ambassador Leonard Unger in Vientiane

vetoed that proposal. He doubted whether Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma

would approve participation by the Vietnamese and, if he did consent, Unger

feared the air strikes would have only a marginal effect, would deepen

U.S. involvement in Laos, and complicate Laos’ overall political problems.

The Soviet Union, Unger noted, had threatened to resign its cochairmanship

(with Great Britain) of the Geneva Agreement on Laos, signed on July 23, 1962.

To the relief of U.S. officialdom, the danger that Khanh’s government might

conduct a strike on the north soon subsided.48

Even as military planning continued in June and July 1964, the administration

tried to strengthen its political and diplomatic hand. In speeches and news conferences, President Johnson, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and others sought

to allay public and congressional doubts about U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

They discussed the need for a Congressional Resolution to support U.S. policy, and

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, prepared
48

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

drafts of such a resolution. On June 18, through J. Blair Seaborn, Canadian

Representative to the International Control Commission, the administration conveyed to Hanoi its determination to maintain a noncommunist regime in Saigon

and the threat of “greater devastation” to the north. Hanoi’s rejoinder, also made

through Mr. Seaborn, was that the government would continue its support of the

Viet Cong, and the United States should withdraw from South Vietnam and permit the installation of a “neutral” regime. Between June 1964 and June 1965 Mr.

Seaborn would serve as intermediary between Washington and Hanoi on five

occasions, but none of his efforts to initiate discussions or negotiations to end the

war proved successful.49

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident

The preoccupation of the United States to make the Khanh government

more effective militarily and politically was interrupted briefly by a new crisis,

triggered by intelligence gathering and covert actions. On July 14, 1964, to

gather more North Vietnamese and Chinese communication data in the area of

the Gulf of Tonkin, a detachment of specially equipped Air Force C–130Bs of

the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadron deployed from Japan to Don Muang

Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). Under the nickname Queen Bee, the aircraft began flying communications intercept missions. Following this, on the

night of July 30–31 and under the aegis of Oplan 34A, four South Vietnamese

patrol boats shelled a North Vietnamese radar station on Hon Me Island and a

communication transmitter on Hon Ngu Island. Both islands lay off the coastal

town of Vinh and were considered waypoints for men and supplies en route to

South Vietnam.

Also on July 31, the Seventh Fleet’s destroyer Maddox began sailing close

to the North Vietnamese coast in another De Soto patrol, last conducted

between February 28 and March 10. The destroyer’s mission was to make a

“show of force” and to collect visual and electronic intelligence. The probings

of the Maddox were uneventful until August 2. Evidently provoked by the

South Vietnamese attacks on Hon Me and Hon Ngu islands or by the intelligence collection activities of the Maddox—or both—the North Vietnamese

sent three high-speed, armed Swatow boats to meet the American ship. They

were beaten off by the Maddox’s guns and F–8E aircraft from the carrier

Ticonderoga. At the time of the attack, the Maddox claimed it was 28 n.m. offshore and moving away from the North Vietnamese coast line.

In Washington, after discussing the attack with his advisers, the President

dispatched a protest to Hanoi and ordered reinforcements for the De Soto

destroyer patrol, with the C. Turner Joy joining the Maddox. On the night of

August 3–4, South Vietnamese patrol boats attacked a radar station on Cape

Vinh Son and a security station near Cuo Ron. Twenty-two hours later, on the

night of August 4, the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy, which were then about
49

PLANNING

* For Adm. Sharp’s account of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and his role as CINCPAC during the war, see his Strategy For Defeat (San Rafael, Calif., 1978).

† Many students of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are convinced that the United States provoked the attack on U.S. Navy ships on August 2 and 5, 1964, through its clandestine support

for the operation by the South Vietnamese Navy and its own intelligence collection activity.

In any event, the incident prompted both houses of Congress to pass the fateful Southeast

Asia Resolution (popularly known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) by overwhelming

votes. The resolution voiced strong congressional support for the President should he deem

it necessary to take more forceful military action against aggression in Southeast Asia. The

incident has been studied intensively by Congress, newsmen, and scholars. Two congressional studies are: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Gulf

of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents, 90th Cong, 2d Sess, with the Hon. Robert S. McNamara on

February 20, 1968, and Part II (with supplementary documents to the study of February

20, 1968), February 16, 1968. The subject is also addressed in the following six books:

Joseph C. Goulden, Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair—Illusion and

Reality, (Chicago, 1969); John Galloway, The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Rutherford, N.J.,

1970); Eugene G. Windcy, Tonkin Gulf (New York, 1971); Anthony Austin, The President’s

War (New York, 1971); Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, 1983), pp

369–76; and Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Lessons

and Tragedy of Vietnam (New York, 1995), pp 132–36.

seventy miles to the northeast, were thought to have come under fire again

from North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boats. Although subsequent analyses

indicated the attack probably did not occur, at the time Admiral Ulysses S. G.

Sharp, who had succeeded Admiral Felt as CINCPAC on July 1, 1964,* and

General Harris recommended an immediate retaliatory air strike on the north.

After reviewing the details of the incident and intercepted North Vietnamese

messages, the NSC and other presidential advisers were unanimous in their recommendation, and the President agreed, Hanoi must be punished with air

strikes on several military targets. At the same time, the President asked

Congress to pass a resolution supporting his policy in Southeast Asia.†

On August 5 (Saigon time), under code name Pierce Arrow, Navy A–1

Skyraiders, A–4 Skyhawks, and F–8 Crusaders from the Ticonderoga and

Constellation, flying sixty-four sorties, struck four torpedo bases at Hon Gay,

Loc Chao, Phuc Loi, and Quang Khe and an oil storage facility at Vinh. The

bombs destroyed eight boats, damaged twenty-one, and wiped out about 90

percent of the oil facility, which held about 10 percent of the north’s oil storage capacity. One A–1 and one A–4 were shot down over Hon Gay, resulting

in the death of one Navy pilot and the capture of the other, Lt. Everett Alverez,

Jr., the first U.S. airman to become a prisoner of war in North Vietnam. Two

other aircraft were hit, but returned safely to their carriers. No Air Force aircraft were employed as Ambassador Martin had not secured the approval of

the Thai government to use USAF aircraft based in Thailand for strikes on

North Vietnam.
50

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

As the air assault began, President Johnson publicly warned the communist

nations not to support or widen aggression in Southeast Asia and, with his

approval, the JCS ordered the immediate deployment of additional air, sea, and

ground units to Pacific bases. Between August 5 and 9, more than eighty Air

Force fighter, reconnaissance, and refueling aircraft were redeployed from

the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan to bases in South Vietnam and Thailand

(figure 2).

Figure 2

Redeployment of Aircraft, August 5–9, 1964

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Swatow boat, August 1964.
51

PLANNING

(+
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a Because of rain and a slick runway at Clark AB, one B–57 was destroyed and two damaged.

In addition, the JCS directed the Commander in Chief, Strike Command

(CINCSTRIKE) to send the following TAC (Tactical Air Command) composite strike force and supporting SAC refueling tankers from the United States to

Pacific bases (figure 3).

Figure 3

Redeployment of Aircraft by CINCSTRIKE, August 8–21, 1964

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These deployments were carried out between August 8 and 21. In preparation for additional attacks, on August 6 General Moore created a command post

for the 2d Air Division at Tan Son Nhut, separate from the Vietnamese-USAF

operations center to assure a tighter command link between all USAF units in

South Vietnam and Thailand.

From its First Fleet on the Pacific Coast, the U.S. Navy sent the carrier

Ranger, twelve destroyers, an antisubmarine task force, and selected Marine

units to the Asian Pacific area. The Army sent additional aviation and ground

units to South Vietnam. Tours of duty for personnel assigned to theater tactical

forces were extended indefinitely, and the total U.S. manpower authorization in

South Vietnam was raised to 23,308.50

On August 7, at President Johnson’s request, the Congress overwhelmingly

approved a resolution of support calling for him “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to

prevent further aggression.” Popularly named the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
52

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Interestingly, circumstances would prompt the United States to begin “heavier” military

pressure on North Vietnam in February 1965, only a month later than had been envisaged

in August 1964.

and signed by the President on August 10, it was similar to resolutions passed

by the Congress during the crises in the Formosa Strait in 1955, in the Middle

East in 1958, and in Cuba in 1962.51

Washington Forbids Follow-On Strikes

Predictably, the principal communist countries reacted strongly to the retaliatory

air strike of August 5. China and the Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the

war and promised more aid for Hanoi.52 Flexing its air muscle, North Vietnam flew

about thirty of its MiG–15s and MiG–17s from bases in South China to Phuc Yen

airfield near the capital. General Harris urged quick destruction of the aircraft to

eliminate their threat to Air Force bases in South Vietnam, and to teach China a

“sharp lesson” lest it send more MiGs to the north and continue its “aggression.”53

To the dismay of General Harris, Admiral Sharp, and other military commanders, the President failed to order a follow-up strike. In fact, the actions that were

approved by the administration represented a short step backward. Seventh Fleet

patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and all Oplan 34A operations against the north were

suspended temporarily and support for Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) T–28

attacks on the Pathet Lao forces and their North Vietnamese allies was reduced.

In consonance with decisions taken at a high-level conference in Honolulu in early

June, Ambassador Taylor informed the President and other Washington officials

this was no time to escalate the war. Although the air strikes on August 5 had left

General Khanh, Saigon’s military chief, in a “euphoric” state, Taylor warned that

Khanh had “at best” only a 50-50 chance of surviving until the end of the year.

His government was ineffective, and the populace confused and apathetic. Taylor

wanted the energies of the United States mission in Saigon devoted principally to

shoring up Khanh’s government both politically and militarily, improving the

pacification program, and, with CINCPAC, preparing contingency plans for

operations against the north which probably could not begin until January 1965.54

The President’s principal advisers accepted Taylor’s views, which were formalized in a new and pivotal policy paper prepared by William P. Bundy,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The document, endorsed by

the NSC on August 14, outlined a three-phase program for pursuing American

objectives in Vietnam over the next few months. Phase I called for the suspension of further U.S. action against the communists in Laos or North Vietnam

until the end of August 1964, to avoid providing them with a pretext for escalating the war. In phase II, from September through December 1964, military

pressure was to be used in the two countries sufficient only to maintain the
53

PLANNING

morale of the Saigon government. This might consist of new cross-border

incursions into Laos by land (to determine the extent of infiltration and detect

targets), renewed U.S. Navy De Soto patrols off the North Vietnamese coast,

and “tit for tat” military reprisal attacks. Beginning in January 1965, phase III

consisted of heavier air and naval pressure on North Vietnam.*55

Within the JCS, Generals LeMay and Greene were highly distressed by the

NSC’s languid provisions for the remainder of the year. They believed that it

did not send clear, recurring signals of U.S. determination to remain in Asia.

Nonetheless, the principal thrust of the NSC paper, which postponed any major

air pressure on the north until early 1965, was destined to prevail.56

Further details were added to the cautious military policy, however, including

more planning for changing circumstances that warranted strikes on the north or

against the event that Hanoi and Peking declared open war. On August 7, after conferring with the Deputy Defense Minister of Thailand, U.S. Ambassador Graham

A. Martin, persuaded the Thai government to allow USAF combat aircraft based

in Thailand to be used against North Vietnam should this become necessary. “All

concerned must recognize this as a major departure from previous Thai policy,”

Martin said, “and authority is granted with considerable reluctance.” While authority to use the aircraft was unlimited, the degree of restraint the U.S. demonstrated

in their use would probably affect future decisions by the Thai government. The

ambassador also declared that no further deployments to Thailand for contingency

purposes should take place until he personally had obtained Bangkok’s consent.57

On August 9, the Departments of State and Defense approved “in principle”

limited air and ground operations against the North Vietnamese in the Laos

corridor as soon as they were politically and militarily feasible.58 In regional

defense planning, on August 17, the JCS informed McNamara that CINCPAC

was readying Oplan 37-64 for the defense of South Vietnam, and Oplan 99-64

for the defense of Laos. On the 24th, the service chiefs sent the Defense

Secretary a contingency planning facilities list (CPFL) of about 650 targets in

North Vietnam that included the earlier ninety-four JCS targets. The list divided

targets into five categories: airfields, lines of communication (LOCs), military

installations, industrial sites, and targets suitable for armed reconnaissance. In

submitting the document, the JCS affirmed that from a military viewpoint, the

most effective application of military force would result from a sudden “sharp

blow” to convey to Hanoi the penalty for violating international agreements

and the resolve of the United States to end the north’s support of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos.59 When he received the list, McNamara asked

for more information on the likely impact of the proposed air strikes, the sufficiency of POL and stocks, and other possible measures if the destruction of

the initial ninety-four targets failed to undermine the capability and will of the

North Vietnamese to continue the war.60

On August 26 the Joint Chiefs, with General LeMay as acting chairman,

sent McNamara another paper based on a review of the document prepared by
54

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Bundy and recent analyses of the conflict by Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland, Ambassadors Taylor and Unger, and the DIA. Its overall and gloomy

conclusion was that “accelerated and forceful action with respect to North

Vietnam is essential to prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in

Southeast Asia.” With recommendations obviously tailored to what might be

acceptable, the paper urged the immediate resumption of De Soto patrols off

the coast, covert Oplan 34A, sea and air operations against selected targets, and

retaliatory air strikes in response to the increased activity by Viet Cong or

Pathet Lao actions in South Vietnam and Laos. In the Laotian panhandle, the

paper recommended that the RLAF and South Vietnamese ground forces (with

U.S. support) attack enemy LOCs, and U.S. armed reconnaissance strike infiltration targets. For the campaign in South Vietnam they favored “hot pursuit”

of Viet Cong insurgents into Cambodia; strict controls of traffic on the Mekong

and Bassac Rivers; continuation of the pacification program, especially around

Saigon; “direct action” against the Viet Cong leadership; and additional “forward deployments” of U.S. combat units. Should this prescription fail to end

Hanoi’s support for the insurgencies—and the Joint Chiefs were convinced it

would—more American forces should be sent to Southeast Asia in accordance

with CINCPAC’s Oplan 37-64 (for the defense of South Vietnam), and air

strikes on the north in accordance with “current planning (i.e., the list of

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1965. Seated, left to right: Adm. David L.

McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA,

chairman; Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, USA. Standing,

left to right: Gen. John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, USAF,

and Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Commandant, USMC.
55

PLANNING

ninety-four targets).”61

As usual, the Joint Chiefs’ views were considered only in conjunction with

higher White House deliberations on the war. In view of the continued disarray

in Saigon in early September 1965, the President began another reassessment

of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, with the persuasive and influential

Ambassador Taylor briefing the President and his principal advisers. The advisers accepted with little debate Taylor’s pessimistic evaluation of the situation

in South Vietnam, which had deteriorated since August. In essence, the ambassador reported that for the next two to three months the Khanh government

would be unable to strike the north or face the communist response to U.S. air

attacks. Believing that some punitive military pressure should be continued, the

advisers agreed upon, and the President approved, a number of low key measures that were spelled out in NSAM 314 on September 10. The measures were

more limited than those advocated by the JCS on August 26: prompt resumption of U.S. Navy De Soto patrols off the coast of North Vietnam with naval air

cover initially outside the international limit of twelve nautical miles; resumption of Oplan 34A; maritime, airdrop, and leaflet operations, to be conducted

separately and covertly by South Vietnamese forces; and preparations to

“respond as appropriate” to a NVA or VC attack on U.S. or South Vietnamese

units or facilities. In Laos, U.S. and Lao officials should quickly arrange for the

beginning of limited South Vietnamese air and ground operations, RLAF air

strikes, and U.S. armed reconnaissance in the southern corridor. In South

Vietnam, U.S. policy should concentrate on providing economic and political

programs having an “immediate impact” without resource restrictions. These

decisions, NSAM 314 stated, were based on “a prevailing judgment that the

first order of business...is to take actions which will help strengthen the fabric of the Government of South Vietnam....” 62

General Wheeler immediately informed McNamara that the Joint Chiefs

considered the NSAM 314 measures inadequate. Going beyond the JCS proposals of August 26, he personally advocated more extensive air and ground

operations against infiltration in the Laos corridor and U.S. air strikes to

respond to any attack on U.S. units and units of the government of South

Vietnam (GVN). The other service chiefs, Wheeler reported, were not of one

mind about what to do. There was a congruence of views between himself, the

Army Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations with Taylor’s recommendation not to create an incident that would trigger military escalation but

to respond only and “appropriately” if the communists attacked a U.S. unit.

Moreover, the Air Force and Marine chiefs (i.e., LeMay and Greene) believed

otherwise. According to Wheeler, both had concluded:

time is against us and military action against the DRV should be taken

now. They concur that the American public should support any action

taken by the United States government against the DRV. They consider
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* The next De Soto patrol was not scheduled until early February 1965. This patrol was

also suspended in deference to the arrival in Hanoi of Soviet Premier Kosygin and his military and economic aides on February 4. 

† Typical covert operations in October consisted of two coastal South Vietnamese probes

of enemy defenses near Vinh, an unsuccessful effort to capture a junk, and bombardment

of a radar site and an observation post at Vinh and Mui Dai, respectively [Robert F. Futrell,

The Advisory Years to 1965 (Ofc AF Hist, 1981), p 460].

that, linked to the next significant incident, we should commence a retaliatory GVN and U.S. air strike program against the DRV in accordance

with the 94 target plan. In this regard, they consider that a battalion-size

VC attack on South Vietnam should be construed as significant.63

LeMay’s disenchantment with administration policy in prosecuting the war

in Southeast Asia was already total. He concluded earlier that the “message”

delivered to Hanoi by the air strike on August 5 in response to the north’s

attacks on U.S ships in the Gulf of Tonkin had been nullified by subsequent

American actions. For example, a CIA study indicating that the United States

wanted to negotiate had been leaked to the press, and he perceived a cutback in

RLAF T–28 strikes on communist targets in Laos. He believed Washington’s

highest officials were overly concerned about escalating the war and unrealistic in their efforts to strengthen Saigon politically before hitting the north. As

LeMay saw it, air strikes would help strengthen Saigon’s political base and he

urged that the JCS’ recommendations of August 26 be implemented soon, that

these strikes be carried out, and that more U.S. ground troops be deployed to

Thailand (where most Air Force aircraft would be based for strikes on the

north) to bolster that country’s defenses.64

The upshot of the latest presidential review was a decision not to exceed the

measures outlined in NSAM 314. The administration’s apprehension over

Saigon’s instability increased on September 13 when two Vietnamese brigadier

generals and 2,000 followers tried unsuccessfully to topple the Khanh government in a “minicoup.”65 There was reluctance to risk provocative operations. On

the night of September 17 (Saigon time), a U.S. Navy De Soto patrol consisting of two destroyers flashed it had made enemy contact. (The patrols had

resumed two days earlier.) With JCS authority, Admiral Sharp alerted his Air

Force and Navy commanders for a possible retaliatory air strike on the north.

Probably mindful of the difficulty in collecting and assessing the facts surrounding Hanoi’s attack on a similar patrol early in August, which had led to

just such an air strike, Washington demanded “positive evidence” that enemy

craft had again fired on the destroyers. However, the U.S. Navy was unable to

provide the evidence and a strike was not conducted. To avoid another incident,

on Ambassador Taylor’s recommendation, Washington’s highest authorities
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PLANNING

again suspended the patrols in the Gulf* and covert operations in the north.

The latter would be resumed under tighter control on October 4.† Several

USAF RB–47s were permitted to continue collecting electronic intelligence,

however, and they were shortly flying weekly missions off the North

Vietnamese coast.66

Saigon’s political and military travails did not ease in October. Both Taylor

and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 53264 reported that the

morale and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces continued to decline.

In mid-October, the ambassador said that the north was sending more men into

South Vietnam, including regulars from the Peoples Army, Vietnam (PAVN).

Before the end of October, Saigon’s leadership again reorganized, culminating

on the 30th in the designation of a civilian premier, Tran Van Huong, who

replaced General Khanh, although Khanh retained control of the armed forces.

Events would soon reveal that the new premier was also unable to ameliorate

the government’s intractable internal difficulties.67

Unable to take forceful action against the DRV, the services busied themselves with more contingency planning. Apprehensive lest the United States

find in Saigon an unfriendly government or no government at all, on September

25, Admiral Sharp asked General Harris and Admiral Moorer, his Air Force and

Navy component commanders, to provide him with plans ranging from possible American disengagement to taking a “stronger hold” of the government and

conducting joint U.S. and South Vietnamese strikes on the north. Sharp also

completed, and the JCS approved, his Oplan 39-64 (redesignated Oplan 39-65)

to counter an attack on South Vietnam, South Korea, and other parts of

Gen. Hunter Harris,

Commander in Chief,

Pacific Air Forces
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Southeast Asia by China alone or with North Vietnam and North Korea. In the

Air Force’s view, it was PACOM’s first truly offensive plan providing for the

proper use of air power to destroy China’s main economic, military, and logistic targets. Previously, the Army and Marine chiefs had raised objections on the

grounds that air power could not entirely replace ground forces.68

On October 14, the services derived some satisfaction from the inauguration

of limited air operations by the T–28s of the fledgling Royal Laotian Air Force

against an initial list of thirteen enemy targets on the Laotian side of Mu Gia

Pass, a key infiltration point from North Vietnam into Laos, and along several

routes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In compliance with NSAM 310, which had

been issued on September 10, the attacks were aimed at bridges, supply sites,

and barracks. The purpose of the strikes was to inflict military and psychological pain on the North Vietnamese and thereby boost the morale of Laotian and

South Vietnamese armed forces. Air Force F–100 combat aircraft normally

assigned as escorts for RF–101 Yankee Team reconnaissance missions accompanied the South Vietnamese strike aircraft.

Although the initial interdiction plan called for the USAF combat escorts to

fire back at enemy antiaircraft sites and to supplement the attacks on heavily

defended targets, Washington’s nervous planners decided at the last moment

not to hazard such U.S. participation except for USAF search and rescue missions. Between October 14 and November 2, the RLAF struck all thirteen targets plus three others, then continued to hit new targets along the Trail. While

there was evidence that the attacks “seriously damaged” some of the targets,

Airmen of the 13th Bomb Squadron at Bien Hoa Air Base

clean up the remains of a B–57 aircraft destroyed in the

Viet Cong mortar attack on November 1, 1964.
59

PLANNING

there was no immediately discernible impact on Hanoi’s leaders.69

The Joint Chiefs were still exasperated and dismayed by the reluctance of

Washington’s civilian leadership to sanction more forceful military pressure. In

late October, they dispatched additional memoranda to McNamara, one document warning that the United States was “fast running out of time,” and another

expressing apprehension about a possible “collapse of the American position in

Southeast Asia.” The memoranda again urged stronger measures to curb the

infiltration of enemy manpower and supplies into South Vietnam and for

stronger action against the Hanoi regime. As before, Generals LeMay and

Greene argued for heavier air strikes than the other service chiefs in response

to communist depredations in South Vietnam.

On November 1, McNamara met with General Wheeler, who said that the

service chiefs felt so strongly that, “if the President decided against additional

military action, most of them believed the United States should withdraw from

South Vietnam.” On the other hand, Ambassador Taylor believed that the JCS

proposals constituted an effective departure from the longstanding principle of

the Kennedy and Johnson administrations that the South Vietnamese must fight

their own war. Westmoreland was of like mind and, in fact, he had recently

predicted that without a fairly effective government in South Vietnam, no

amount of U.S. offensive action in or outside of South Vietnam could “reverse

the deterioration now under way.”70

The Bien Hoa Incident

The administration’s forbearance, in the face of extreme “provocation,” was

remarkable. On November 1, 1964, a Viet Cong mortar squad audaciously entered

the perimeter of Bien Hoa Air Base and, in a twenty-minute barrage, left enormous

carnage. Four Americans were killed and seventy-two wounded. On the airfield,

seven Air Force aircraft were destroyed (six B–57s, one H–43 helicopter) and sixteen were damaged (thirteen B–57s, three H–43s). South Vietnamese losses

totaled two personnel killed, five wounded, and three aircraft destroyed (all

A–1Hs) and five damaged (three A–1Hs, two C–47s). Three houses, a mess hall,

vehicles, and fuel tanks were also destroyed or badly damaged.71

The attack on Bien Hoa ended disagreement among the services regarding

the magnitude of retaliatory air strikes. The Joint Chiefs, now backed by

General Westmoreland, Admiral Sharp, and Ambassador Taylor—who had

counseled for months against precipitous action until the Saigon government

displayed more stability—unanimously urged a rapid tactical riposte against

the Hanoi regime. The service chiefs also proposed using SAC’s B–52s based

in Guam to bomb Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi, where most of the North

Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) aircraft were based. But President Johnson,

finding that most of his civilian advisers, particularly McNamara and Rusk,

were still opposed to such action, withheld his approval. The administration
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* See Chapter 1.

† For a discussion of airbase defense during the Southeast Asia war, see Roger P. Fox, Air

Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam (Ofc AF Hist, 1979).

consensus was that the “concerns of September” over Saigon’s unsteadiness and

military weaknesses were still valid and the United States should avoid provoking a Viet Cong attack on U.S. civilian and military dependents still in

Saigon. The officials were also reluctant to retaliate for an enemy attack directed

chiefly against U.S. rather than South Vietnamese aircraft and installations.72

These were the official reasons for not responding in kind to the Bien Hoa

“incident.” There was another obvious reason. The attack came two days before

the U.S. national elections, and in the 1964 presidential campaign President

Johnson had frequently vowed that he would not enlarge the war by going

“north” and “dropping bombs.”73 The only exception to this policy had been his

approval on August 5 of U.S. Navy air strikes on North Vietnamese targets in

retaliation for attacks on two destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Thus, presidential restraint was undoubtedly dictated by political necessity, and it was so

understood by General Westmoreland and particularly by Ambassador Taylor,

who had pressed frequently for “immediate retaliation of the kind we...often

discussed in Washington....”74

The attack on Bien Hoa also inflamed a smoldering dispute between the Air

Force and Army over the inadequate base protection provided by South

Vietnamese security units. Generals LeMay and Harris and other Air Force

leaders urged immediate action to ensure more protection. LeMay went so far

as to recommend that the United States-South Vietnamese military agreement

be revised to permit special U.S. Army or Marine security forces to establish an

8,000-meter security perimeter around the most important airbases, particularly Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang.75 But Westmoreland and Taylor

opposed such a deployment on the grounds that the troops would lack language

and area knowledge to search local dwellings, and create political problems

and encourage the South Vietnamese to relax their security activities. The

MACV commander and Admiral Sharp recommended the addition of 300 and

502, respectively, Air Force, Army, and Marine police personnel to bolster airbase defense, but these appeals likewise failed to win administration approval.76

In fact, OSD was unwilling to admit officially the shortcomings of South

Vietnamese defensive duties. Not until Viet Cong attacks on Army facilities in

February 1965, which triggered the first two Flaming Dart air strikes on the

north, and the onset of Rolling Thunder operations in March,* which in turn

increased the likelihood of larger Viet Cong assaults on airbases, did MACV

recommend and Washington approve the dispatch of the first contingent of U.S.

combat-ready Marines to protect Da Nang and the “beefing up” of American

security personnel around other Air Force bases.†77
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PLANNING

In the meantime, in Laos a lesser “provocation” also resulted in no retaliatory action. On November 19, a USAF F–100 was shot down and the pilot

killed. The aircraft was escorting RLAF T–28s as they attacked infiltration targets on roads leading to the Mu Gia Pass on the Laotian-North Vietnamese border. This very limited air program began on October 14. Two days later, a

USAF RF–101 on a Yankee Team reconnaissance mission was also downed by

groundfire, but in this case the pilot was rescued.

Within the JCS, General LeMay urged rapid retribution for the aircraft losses

by air strikes on five infiltration targets in the Laotian panhandle, but had to settle for a more moderate JCS consensus. The Joint Chiefs asked McNamara to

approve flak suppression missions along and in the vicinity of Routes 12 and 23

from the North Vietnamese border to the junctions of Routes 8 and 121 in Laos.

The Defense Secretary, preparing for another NSC review of the war, did not

reply formally. To reduce the risk of additional shootdowns, he issued new operational guidance requiring all U.S. medium-altitude missions in Laos to fly no

lower than 10,000 feet, well out of range of most communist antiaircraft guns.78

Beginning of a Limited, Two-Phase Program

Thus, once again, contrary to JCS recommendations, communist attacks in

South Vietnam and Laos failed to elicit high-level support for “tit for tat” or

any other type of retaliatory action. The main reason was the deepening administration anxieties concerning Saigon’s military and political insolvency.

Each new internal crisis appeared to reinforce Washington’s military paralysis.

Marking time, the President asked for another review of the war by the

National Security Council.79

The new review was conducted by an “NSC Working Group” on South

Vietnam and Southeast Asia established by the President at the beginning of

November with William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern

Affairs, as chairman. Over the next three weeks, the working group, staffed

with personnel from key State and Defense agencies, painstakingly assessed

and reassessed the situation in South Vietnam, the American stake in Southeast

Asia, military options, and negotiating possibilities. A working group paper,

dated November 21, summarized, with some modifications, the principal

courses of action previously considered to induce Hanoi to call off the insurgency in South Vietnam and to accept the reality of a noncommunist South

Vietnamese nation. The first option was for the U.S. to conduct reprisal air

strikes on North Vietnam (not necessarily just for the spectacular Viet Cong

“provocations” as had occurred at Bien Hoa), intensify coastal raids as provided in covert Oplan 34A, resume destroyer (De Soto) patrols in the Gulf, step

up air strikes by RLAF T–28s against infiltration targets in Laos, and seek

reforms in South Vietnam. The second option was “a fast/full squeeze” bombing of the north at a fairly rapid pace without interruption with early air raids
62

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

on Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi and key bridges on road and rail links with

China until American demands were met (supported by the JCS but regarded

by Bundy as virtually a reckless invitation to the Chinese to intervene). The

final option was a “slow squeeze” series of air strikes on infiltration targets,

first in Laos, then in North Vietnam, to convey the impression of a steady,

deliberate approach, but allowing the United States the alternatives of proceeding at this pace, increasing the pace, or escalating in other areas.

Although the Joint Chiefs were represented on the NSC working group,

their voice was only one of many. In response to direct questions from the

group or from McNamara, the service chiefs boldly expressed their disagreement with administration policy. Having studied the group’s military-political

options, they replied that there were five, not three, ranging from terminating

the American commitment to South Vietnam and Laos and withdrawing as

gracefully as possible, to a controlled program of intense military pressures

accompanied by appropriate diplomatic pressure. The last, they insisted,

entailed the least risk, the fewest casualties, and the lowest costs; entailed less

danger of enemy miscalculation or intervention; and would most probably

achieve American objectives. In another contingency plan, they expressed confidence that the United States could deal with any direct military response from

Hanoi and Peking. They proclaimed Southeast Asia an area of major U.S.

strategic importance, the loss of which would lead to “grave” political and military consequences, not only in the Pacific, but worldwide.80

An exhaustive, high-level review of the working group’s assessment began

in late November. The principal attendees, McNamara, Rusk, Wheeler, Taylor,

George Ball (Under Secretary of State), and John P. McCone (Director of the

CIA) were divided. On this occasion, Ambassador Taylor, who normally played

a highly influential role in such proceedings, found that he and Wheeler, who

represented JCS views, were alone in arguing for air strikes on North Vietnam

and infiltration routes in southern Laos. The others, Taylor found, were not

ready to abandon the dictum that “stable government in the south must precede

military action in the north despite the improbability of ever getting stable government without the lift to the national spirit which military action against the

homeland of the enemy could provide.” In essence, Taylor’s position was that

while conducting air strikes on the north, in Laos, or in both areas, he would

try harder to persuade Saigon’s leaders to institute political and administrative

reforms leading to more effective and stable government. The attendees fully

agreed, on the other hand, that in the event the administration approved some

type of air program outside of South Vietnam, no negotiating opportunity

should be overlooked.81

As the high-level review of military options neared an end, Taylor suggested,

and the conferees agreed, to lay before President Johnson a limited two-phase

military program for South Vietnam, Laos, and North Vietnam for the ensuing

weeks. The program’s concept, pulled from several working papers, consisted
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PLANNING

of revised and somewhat softened provisions contained in the three options

drawn up by the NSC working group. The NSC principals then presented the

concept to the President on December 13, 1964.

The President accepted the concept. Phase I, lasting for thirty days, would

consist of heavier air strikes against infiltration in the Laotian panhandle and

intensified covert Oplan 34A operations against North Vietnam, principally by

U.S.-trained South Vietnamese personnel. The air strikes would be conducted

by RLAF T–28s and U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft flying armed reconnaissance missions. The objective was psychological rather than military, to warn

Hanoi of American strength. After a period of thirty days, U.S. commanders

could continue flying armed reconnaissance or take other measures to “signal”

Hanoi. For example, they could withdraw American dependents from South

Vietnam or, for the first time, conduct air strikes on North Vietnamese targets

a short distance above the DMZ.

If the Hanoi regime failed to heed these warnings, the United States would

launch phase II operations, with the President’s approval. These would be USVNAF coordinated air strikes on North Vietnam beginning in the southernmost

sector of the country. The strikes would increase in number and intensity for

two to six months until all significant targets had been hit. Meanwhile, the

United States might exert other pressure such as mining or blockading North

Vietnam’s seaports, all the while seeking opportunities to negotiate an end to

the conflict. Despite his approval of the two-phase concept, the President’s

position had not changed fundamentally since September 1964, when he had

concluded that the United States could do little until Saigon’s leaders pulled

together. Before Johnson approved the two-phase program, a draft NSAM 319

was prepared, but never issued, apparently because the concept differed little

from the provisions in NSAM 314 of September 10, 1964.82

Ambassador Taylor returned to Saigon on December 6 with authority to

implement the phase I military actions and to discuss with Saigon’s leadership

joint U.S.-South Vietnamese bombing plans against North Vietnam, along

with more economic and other assistance. On December 10, in Vientiane,

Ambassador William H. Sullivan, who had replaced Unger the previous

month, secured Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s consent to limited U.S.

armed reconnaissance along certain Laotian routes, provided there was no

publicity. In Washington, the Joint Chiefs completed a scenario for conducting missions, and on the 12th, Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus R. Vance

briefed the President’s principal Southeast Asia advisers on the air objectives.

U.S. aircraft, he explained, would strike targets of opportunity along segments

of Routes 8, 121, and 12, or strike secondary targets, such as barracks areas

and military strongpoints. If an aircraft was downed in Laos, the United States

would adhere to its official position that the loss occurred while the plane

was escorting Yankee Team reconnaissance flights requested by the Laotian

government.83
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

On December 14, six Air Force F–105s, eight F–100s, two RF–101s, all from

Da Nang, plus two refueling KC–135 tankers, flew their first mission in the

Laotian panhandle. Nicknamed Barrel Roll, the aerial program was directed

against infiltration targets along Route 8 from the border of North Vietnam

southward in Laos toward South Vietnam. Navy F–4Bs and A–1Hs launched

their initial missions on the 17th. Because the bombing tempo was intentionally

low, only six Barrel Roll missions had been flown by January 2, 1965, three

each by the Air Force and Navy. As part of phase I, on behalf of Secretaries Rusk

and McNamara, Ambassador Sullivan asked the Laotian government to intensify the bombing of routes and targets in the Laos corridor near the DRV. RLAF

T–28s, with USAF F–100s flying combat air patrol, had been bombing infiltration targets in Laos since October 14.

With only a handful of T–28s available, the RLAF could do little to increase

its sortie rate. By the end of 1964 it had flown seventy-seven sorties and the

Hanoi government was complaining about the strikes to the International

Control Commission, the three-nation supervisory body established to oversee

compliance with the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos’ neutrality. Hanoi alleged

that the RLAF attacks sponsored by the United States were also hitting North

Vietnamese territory.

Not included in the phase I operations were Air Force and Navy Yankee

Team reconnaissance missions, which began on May 18, 1964, to photograph

Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese dispositions and movements in Laos. Including escort, weather, and electronic intelligence operations, the United States

flew a total of 1,500 missions over Laos in 1964, a not inconsiderable number,

warning the Hanoi regime of a gradual increase in aerial surveillance.84

Washington’s Resistance to a Bombing Program Ends

Before the end of 1964, another “significant” incident, presumably conducted by the Viet Cong, increased pressure for a retaliatory strike on North

Vietnam. On Christmas Eve, a 300-pound explosive charge detonated in the

Brink Hotel, a billet for U.S. personnel in Saigon, killing two and wounding

sixty-four Americans and wounding forty-eight South Vietnamese.

Ambassador Taylor, Deputy Ambassador Johnson, and General Westmoreland

in Saigon; Admiral Sharp in Honolulu; and the JCS in Washington all urged an

air strike. Admiral Sharp alerted PACFLT air (but not PACAF) to make the

riposte. But President Johnson refused, advancing the familiar arguments that

Saigon’s political base was too shaky to withstand a possible communist reaction, and he did not wish to provoke an attack on American dependents in

Saigon. There was also uncertainty as to whether the Brink Hotel bombing was

instigated by the Viet Cong. The President was willing to dispatch more U.S.

troops to South Vietnam, but Ambassador Taylor believed that increasing their

presence at this time would only slacken the government’s military efforts.
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PLANNING

* In his memoir of the war, Gen. Westmoreland describes his position on the issue at this

time as follows: “To a Joint Chiefs’ proposal that the U.S. military’s dependents go home

and a U.S. Marine force land at Da Nang, I replied that either or both would reflect lack of

confidence in the Vietnamese and would seriously affect their morale.” A Soldier Reports

(New York, 1976), p 112.

Following a severe defeat of the South Vietnamese by the Viet Cong at Binh

Gia during the last few days of December 1964, Taylor, Deputy Ambassador

Johnson, and Westmoreland again warned Washington of the worsening military situation, increasing anti-Americanism, and possible civil disorder. Concerned lest these developments spawn a new Saigon government hostile to the

United States, they again urged an immediate air attack on the north. But the

President refused to alter his no-strike stance, or to implement those parts of

the phase I and phase II programs approved in late November 1964 that provided for air strikes on North Vietnamese targets lying above the DMZ.85

The political disarray in Saigon only served to exacerbate the military problems. Throughout December 1964 and January 1965, Taylor and his embassy

staff were confronted with a three-cornered, largely public conflict, between

Premier Tran Van Huong’s government and South Vietnam’s generals, the generals versus Taylor, and the Buddhists versus the Huong government and the

Ambassador. It seemed the United States was “playing a losing game.”86

Within the JCS, no service chief was more anguished than General LeMay. In

mid-January 1965, he asserted: “I don’t understand how we can go on as we

have....” He feared for American lives in South Vietnam, but observed that when

the JCS recommended moving dependents from the country, Headquarters

Laotian Air Force T–28.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

MACV objected because of “serious defeatist” implications.* LeMay continued:

For a long time I’ve said we should go north. Our present strategies

aren’t working. The coups are getting worse. Dissatisfaction with the

government in South Vietnam is growing. The military is the only viable

and cohesive force. It is possible to do things with them. But these things

smolder. Who knows when rioting will spread to the Army? Everything

else would then go up. We would lose our people who are dispersed and

not... able to get to an airfield. 

In advocating an attack on North Vietnam, the “source” of the aggression,

LeMay did not fear Chinese intervention.87

CIA Director McCone was also very pessimistic. In conversations with the

President he predicted that General Khanh was heading for another crisis. On

the international scene, he believed an impending trip by Soviet Premier Alexei

N. Kosygin to Hanoi only presaged more trouble. He added that, after removing

Nikita Khrushchev from power on October 14, 1964, Kosygin and the new chief

of the Communist Party, Leonid I. Brezhnev, appeared ready to reverse the policy of relative inaction in Southeast Asia. McCone conjectured they had concluded Hanoi would win the war and wished to share credit for the anticipated

victory. The CIA Director joined the JCS and Taylor in advocating the bombing

of selected targets in North Vietnam, beginning with initial strikes above the

17th parallel, and intensifying them as the attack program moved northward.88

On January 27, 1965, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security

Interior of the Brink Hotel after the attack in December 1964.
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PLANNING

Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, informed the President that he and Secretary

McNamara agreed that present U.S. policy would lead to a disastrous defeat.

They saw two alternatives: employ military power to force a change in Hanoi’s

policy or deploy more manpower and other resources in concert with a “negotiation track” and salvage what little was possible without significant risk.

Bundy added that Secretary Rusk knew things were going badly but did not

think the deterioration could be stopped. Rusk believed that the consequences

of both escalation and withdrawal were so bad that we simply must find a way

of making our present policy work. In contrast, Bundy and McNamara were

convinced present policy could no longer work.89

In the light of Bundy’s memo and further discussions with his advisers,

President Johnson asked Mr. Rusk to consider again all ways for finding a

peaceful solution to the war. At the same time, he asked Bundy to fly to Saigon

immediately with a team of military and civilian experts “for a hard look at the

situation on the ground.”

Bundy and his experts departed Washington quickly for Saigon. Before they

completed their review of South Vietnam’s military and political crisis, the Viet

Cong attacked the MACV compound and Camp Holloway at Pleiku in the

central highlands. Within twenty-four hours, President Johnson approved a

retaliatory air strike, Flaming Dart I, that was conducted on February 7. On

February 11, after a second attack on an American Army barracks at Qui Nhon,

Flaming Dart II was launched against several North Vietnamese targets, ushering in a new phase of the war.
An attack on a North Vietnamese barracks area, 1965.
69

CHAPTER 3

Rolling Thunder Begins

The Flaming Dart air strikes in February and the President’s decision to continue

them represented a significant milestone in America’s containment policy

in Southeast Asia. Having led the other services in pressing home the need to

deter the Hanoi regime with air power, initially the Air Force felt vindicated. But

disenchantment quickly followed as the service chiefs found administration

officials intent on controlling the scope and tempo of the bombing to an

unprecedented degree. The strictures on air operations by civilian rather than

military men violated basic Air Force doctrine and created severely frustrating

problems for professional airmen.

The Air Challenge in North Vietnam

The tight oversight of the bombing program stemmed from an administration fear that an overwhelming aerial assault on the north, an assault that could

quickly turn the major industrial and population targets to ashes, could impel

the Chinese and the Soviets to engage in diversionary activities or enter the

conflict openly, thus opening the door to the possible use of nuclear weapons.

The fear was underscored by the stark disparity in aerial strength between the

United States and the small, Soviet-trained and -equipped North Vietnamese

Air Force. 

At the beginning of February 1965, USAF’s combat force in South Vietnam

consisted of 200 aircraft. The largest single units were the 1st and 602d Air

Commando Squadrons and their 48 A–1Es. About 7,000 of 24,000 U.S. personnel

assisting the Saigon government’s military effort were Air Force. Although the

force was geared for advisory operations in the south, many aircraft could and

were used against the north. Eighty-three aircraft, mostly jets, were based in

Thailand, as well as 1,000 Air Force personnel.1 Three aircraft carriers of the

U.S. Seventh Fleet with about 200 aircraft lay in the Gulf of Tonkin off the

South Vietnamese coast, and all were available for operations in North or South

Vietnam or Laos. In fact Navy and Air Force aircraft had been flying very limited tactical aerial reconnaissance missions over Laos since late 1961.2 

As has been noted, on the eve of the Flaming Dart II strike on the north, the

Air Force’s aircraft inventory in Southeast Asia was reinforced by the deployment of four and a half tactical squadrons that were moved quickly to airbases

in South Vietnam and Thailand.3 In addition, two B–52 squadrons and two

KC–135 squadrons were ordered to bases in Guam and Okinawa, respectively.4

The small Vietnamese Air Force was ready to fly a limited number of strikes in

North Vietnam over and above daily missions in South Vietnam. In early 1965,

the VNAF’s combat arm consisted of fifty-three A–1E Skyraiders. Five were

based at Tan Son Nhut, thirty-two at Bien Hoa, eleven at Da Nang, and five
70

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

were on other bases. The Skyraiders that were used in Flaming Dart I and II5

flew from Da Nang, the northernmost base, and subsequent VNAF strikes on

the north would also start from there.

Although many U.S. tactical air squadrons at airbases in Southeast and East

Asia were on four-month temporary duty (TDY) tours, which obviously

degraded their potential effectiveness, their aggregate number gave the United

States overwhelming air superiority. In contrast, North Vietnam possessed a

minuscule force of 117 to 128 Soviet aircraft, of which only thirty-five were

MiG–15 or MiG–17 fighters. The rest were transports, trainers, liaison aircraft,

and helicopters. The MiGs were based at Phuc Yen airfield near the capital. Of

the twenty-one airfields in the north, only Phuc Yen was suitable for jet aircraft

operations although several other airfields were being readied for jets.6

More formidable was the Hanoi regime’s antiaircraft defense system, which

was expanding rapidly. One of several American intelligence estimates in early

1965 indicated that the regime possessed 1,039 antiaircraft guns: 322 14.5-mm

and 37-mm, 709 57-mm, and eight 85-mm. There were 298 antiaircraft sites, of

which 161 were considered active. The sites were located mainly around the

Hanoi-Haiphong area and along important rail lines, roads, and bridges north

and south of the two cities.7

The threat from China’s air force was more ominous. In February 1965, the

Chinese possessed about 310 MiG fighters and twenty light bombers on airfields in the Kunming and Canton Military Regions adjacent to North

Vietnam. From there they could easily redeploy to Phuc Yen and the other jet

bases nearing completion.8

The communists had two other valuable allies against U.S. air power: tropical

vegetation and weather. As a consequence of the counterinsurgency operations

from 1961 to 1965, many U.S. airmen were familiar with the aerial problems

F–105s at Takhli Royal Thai Air Base.
71

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

associated with jungle growth in various sectors of the country. In Laos, jungle

growth and forested, mountainous terrain covered most of the country. SAC U–2

pilots and those who undertook reconnaissance as part of Yankee Team operations, or strike operations in Barrel Roll, were aware of the considerably greater

obstacles such terrain posed for interdiction and armed reconnaissance. U.S. aerial experience over North Vietnam had been limited to a single air strike in

August 1964 and the two Flaming Dart strikes.

North Vietnam’s terrain was somewhat less forbidding for airmen than that of

South Vietnam and Laos. Nonetheless, roughly 50 percent of the country’s 61,300

square miles was forested, 37.5 percent was wasteland, and only 12.7 percent was

under cultivation to feed a population of about 17,800,000. The transportation system, meager by western standards, included slightly more than 6,000 miles of roads

suitable for motor vehicles, about 44,000 miles of poorer secondary roads, 3,380

miles of navigable waterways (the Red River the principal artery) and a rail system

stretching 561 miles. The forested and tropical areas provided cover for the small

roads and waterways. On the other hand, the rail system, which was rebuilt after it

had been largely destroyed during the French-Viet Minh war, was highly visible. It

consisted of four main lines. Two ran between Hanoi and China, one to the northwest and the other to the northeast, to Lao Cai and Dong Dang respectively. At the

border, the two lines connected directly with China’s rail system. A third line,

reopened in 1964, ran southward for 156 miles to Thanh Hao, and a fourth spanned

the 65 miles between Hanoi and Haiphong, the north’s principal seaport.

The effect of the weather on air operations was considerable. It was responsible

for thousands of canceled or aborted missions, it delayed takeoffs or lengthened

takeoff intervals, which in turn delayed formation after takeoff, and it prevented

aerial refueling or created difficulties for aircraft attempting to rendezvous for

aerial refueling. Poor weather forced aircraft to deviate from planned routes or

planned targets, leaving pilots with the option of hitting targets by radar, striking a

secondary target, or aborting the mission. Bad weather often precluded the release

of ordnance at the preferred 30- to 45-degree angle to minimize aircraft exposure

The MiG–17.
72

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

to flak, forcing release at a lesser angle—or even a level release—allowing

maximum exposure to enemy gunners; it made spotting small, transitory targets

impossible; and as the war progressed, the weather was a factor in the determination

of ordnance used. Finally, all pilots knew that bombing through cloud cover at low

altitudes created hazards, such as “low blows” (self-inflicted damage to aircraft),

“short rounds” (strikes on friendly or wrong targets), or flying into the ground.

Another impediment to visibility throughout Southeast Asia was the effect

of vegetation burned by natives to clear land. Smoke, dust, and haze accompanying such burnings, often aggravated by weather and the effects of American

bombing, seriously hampered attempts to locate small targets by visual or photoreconnaissance, keep them in view for an air strike, and photograph them for

bomb damage assessment. Darkness also hampered air operations and, when

combined with weather and the effects of burning, made night operations in

Southeast Asia exceedingly difficult.9

As the scope of the war expanded, American technicians introduced improved airborne and ground radar, infrared (IR), side-looking radar (SLAR),

forward air controllers (FACs) and other devices and techniques to overcome

the difficulties in conducting air operations in North Vietnam and Laos. Their

use by the Air Force will be described in later chapters.

Command and Control of Air Resources

Another vexing problem, especially for the Air Force, was the command and

control structure for aircraft engaged in the Rolling Thunder program. The

structure that had evolved, first for operations in South Vietnam, then in Laos,

and finally in North Vietnam, conflicted sharply with the Air Force’s roles and

missions doctrine. Briefly, this doctrine required that a single air commander,

preferably Air Force, control and coordinate all service aircraft in a combat theater. Such an arrangement appeared most appropriate for Southeast and East

Asia where China was perceived to be the main threat to U.S. interests.10

From the Air Force’s viewpoint, however, the command and control arrangements in South Vietnam had been unduly complex and inefficient since the

United States’ combat advisory involvement began in that country in the early

1960s. The problem was compounded by the establishment on February 8,

1962 of Headquarters MACV in Saigon as a sub-unified command of PACOM.

MACV’s first commander, Lt. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, exercised overall command and control authority for all military operations in the south. Air Force

control over its own air assets, let alone those of other services, was diluted

first by the initial assignment of the principal air units to the 2d ADVON, a

component of MACV, and then because MACV was staffed predominantly

with Army personnel. Not only were most of the staff drawn from the Army,

they also held most of the key positions. In the Air Force’s chain of command,

2d ADVON/2d Air Division was also a component of Thirteenth Air Force in
73

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

the Philippines, which in turn, was a component of PACAF in Honolulu, which,

along with PACFLT and USARPAC, was a component of PACOM.11

However, as South Vietnam had been the principal theater of military operations since the early 1960s and had first claim on available air assets, the

MACV commander would also have considerable influence on air operations in

Laos and North Vietnam when they began in those countries, in 1964 and 1965,

respectively. With the establishment of MACV, the Air Force attempted to

obtain greater representation in the unified command structure. Initially,

General LeMay attempted to place an Air Force general officer in the post of

MACV Chief of Staff and then in the post of MACV Deputy Commander when

it was created for the first time in January 1964. Despite support from the Navy

and Marine chiefs, LeMay’s efforts were unsuccessful because McNamara supported the Army. Air Force frustration over its subordinate role in South

Vietnam was exacerbated by the PACOM’s refusal to permit a Navy component

to be assigned to MACV.

Thus, from the beginning MACV leadership reflected Army ideas concerning the role of air and ground forces in combating the Viet Cong and the North

Vietnamese insurgency. Whereas the Air Force stressed the importance of air

power in counterinsurgency activities, the Army insisted that only ground

forces, with appropriate air support, could fashion a victory against the enemy.

In fact, Army leaders claimed counterinsurgency was an Army mission. In June

1964, when General Westmoreland, then MACV Deputy Commander, succeeded the retiring General Harkins and debate about who was to take over as

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, and Gen. Paul D.

Harkins, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
74

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Gen. Harris succeeded Gen. Smart on Aug. 1, 1964.

Deputy Commander was revived, General Taylor, still JCS chairman, averred

that it was “hardly conceivable” a member from any service other than the

Army could fill the post. General LeMay strongly believed otherwise and was

again supported by the Navy and Marine chiefs, especially since the Army’s

decision two months earlier to replace the outgoing Chief of Staff, who had

been a Marine general officer, with an Army general officer. The disagreement

among the JCS about who should occupy this post was resolved once more by

McNamara who supported the Army’s position, as did many other high administration officials. Thus, in mid-1964, the Army held the top three MACV posts.12

The question of who should have overall command and control authority

over “outcountry” combat operations, namely in Laos and North Vietnam, was

largely avoided until May 1964 when the United States began regular tactical

reconnaissance of Laos, using Air Force and Navy Yankee Team resources.

Then, the principal contenders were the commanders of the two unified commands, Admiral Felt and General Harkins. Felt claimed that he had operational

control of Laotian operations and intended to exercise his authority through his

PACAF component commanders, bypassing MACV. The commanders of

PACAF, the Thirteenth Air Force, and the 2d Air Division supported Felt’s position,

convinced that Harkins’authority should be strictly limited to military operations

in South Vietnam.

Harkins disagreed. Because he controlled the aircraft of the 2d Air Division,

based in South Vietnam, some of which would be diverted to Laos (and soon

to North Vietnam), he claimed the right to issue operational orders “solely” to

General Moore, the 2d Air Division commander. The disagreement was ameliorated when Gen. Jacob Smart,* then PACAF commander, suggested that Felt

pass “execute” orders for Yankee Team reconnaissance in Laos through MACV

to General Moore. This was done in the ensuing months for Laotian missions

and for the initial air strikes against the north in August 1964 and early 1965.

Under this arrangement, the PACOM commander remained the principal

authority for allocating Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft for operations

in Laos and North Vietnam, taking into account the daily needs of the MACV

commander. He delegated air coordinating authority through MACV to General

Moore and his 2d Air Division. Mission coordination was facilitated by

exchanges of Air Force and Navy liaison officers between Moore’s headquarters at Tan Son Nhut AB in South Vietnam and the Seventh Fleet in the

Gulf of Tonkin.13

Meanwhile, command and control arrangements for air operations outside

of South Vietnam were further modified in July 1964. To meet Thailand’s

desire to avoid being perceived as directly belligerent in the war in the south,

General Moore established the office of Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division,
75

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

at Udorn Air Base in Thailand. Moore appointed Brig. Gen. John H. McCreery

as Deputy Commander and at the same time established an Air Operations

Center (AOC), and a Command Reporting Post (CRP) at Udorn. With secure

communication links to the 2d Air Division’s AOC in Saigon, to USAF tenants

at Thai bases, and to the Royal Laotian Air Force AOC in Vientiane, Laos,

McCreery was technically capable of maintaining operational control of Air

Force operations in Laos, and if necessary in North Vietnam, by USAF aircraft

based in Thailand. Administrative and logistic support for USAF units was provided by Detachment 2, 35th Tactical Group, established at Udorn in June.

Although the arrangement ended the appearance that an Air Force commander

based in South Vietnam controlled USAF aircraft in Thailand, it increased the

complexity of the command and control system in the Southeast Asia theater.

In practice, no substantive change was made, since McCreery normally

deferred judgment on all Air Force operational matters to Moore, who coordinated (but did not control) air operations of the other services. However,

McCreery served actively as Moore’s point of contact with the U.S. Embassy

in Vientiane, which exercised oversight of Yankee Team reconnaissance and

several small covert air and air-ground activities in Laos and with the U.S.

Embassy in Bangkok, which obtained permission for all Air Force deployments

to or within Thailand, as well as operations in Laos and, beginning in 1965, in

North Vietnam of aircraft based in Thailand.14

Air Force commanders chafed over the diffused nature of authority in the

Southeast Asia command and control system as it existed at the start of Rolling

Thunder, believing that many of the systemic mistakes made in World War II

and the Korean War were being repeated.15 Although they accepted PACOM’s

overall authority for air operations in Laos and North Vietnam, they objected

Two F–105s at Korat are readied for a mission over North Vietnam.
76

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

to the stream of detailed operational guidance issued by the headquarters. The

best operational expertise, they believed, resided in the PACAF and PACFLT

component commands and their subordinate organizations, and in the geographically compact Southeast Asia war theater, the preferred command and

control arrangement was to have one local theater commander in charge,

preferably an Air Force officer.16 In General Moore’s opinion, the PACOM

commander was

a little too far away from the scene of action...to [conduct air operations]

effectively. You just can’t have more than one commander controlling the

air in a geographical area even a...bit larger than Vietnam.... Aircraft

move mighty fast. You’ve got great flexibility. You can go anywhere. And

to get the most efficient, most effective use of it, it should be under the

control of one man, one commander.17

Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers, who would serve as the 2d Air Division’s first

Deputy Air Commander from July 1, 1965 to August 31, 1966, agreed that efficient air control could not be exercised from Hawaii, let alone from

Washington.18

General Harris, the PACAF commander, believed that the Air Force was

uniquely equipped to exercise overall command and control and coordinating

authority in the war theater. The principal Air Force organizations, beginning

with PACAF in Hawaii, the subordinate Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines,

and the 2d Air Division in South Vietnam, he observed, possessed adequate

tactical air control center facilities and aircraft, control, and warning systems.

The 2d Air Division also possessed a command post and an air operations center to control strike, air defense, airlift, and other operations.19

However, these resources could not overcome the desire of each service to

maintain as much control as possible over its own aircraft. In fact, as Rolling

Thunder operations expanded, the jerrybuilt command and control system would

undergo yet more changes in 1965 and would become even more complex.

Preparations for a Rolling Thunder Program

There was no immediate follow-up to the Flaming Dart I and II strikes in

early February 1965. In Washington, administration officials waited for Hanoi,

Peking, and Moscow to react while service planners in the major commands

worked on new air deployment and strike plans. On February 11, as Flaming

Dart II was under way, the JCS urged OSD to immediately dispatch nine more

Air Force squadrons to bases in the western Pacific and solicited Admiral

Sharp’s views on deploying six more at a later date. The most definitive planning document was prepared by General Harris’ staff at Headquarters PACAF.

This showed the location of the Air Force’s thirteen combat squadrons in South
77

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, and Korea and proposals

for the addition of fifteen more (figure 4).

Figure 4

Location of USAF Combat Squadrons, February 1965

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As Harris explained to higher authorities, PACAF’s deployment plan generally

followed the force structure of CINCPAC’s plan 39-65, with U.S. air power to be

deployed along the Chinese border to deter that government from intervening in the

war.20 As events unfolded, all new deployment proposals were weighed carefully by

Washington’s highest officials and approved incrementally based on theater-wide

need, base saturation, and plans to enlarge existing bases or construct new ones.

Meanwhile, in Saigon, General Moore warned Harris that Hanoi might send its


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78

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Gen. Westmoreland briefly summarized his views in late 1964 and early 1965 on bombing North Vietnam in his memoir, A Soldier Reports (New York, 1978), pp 142–46 and 152–

57.

small fleet of MiGs to challenge further Flaming Dart missions over the north or

to challenge the Yankee Team reconnaissance and Barrel Roll interdiction operations in Laos. To thwart such an eventuality, he advocated a prompt “overwhelming blow” against North Vietnam’s MiG bases.21 From Honolulu, Admiral Sharp

sent the JCS a new list of targets below the 20th parallel and bombing options for

a Flaming Dart III strike.22 He also proposed an attack by the Air Force on the Mu

Gia Pass, a key infiltration point between Laos and North Vietnam border. A force

of twelve B–57s, twelve F–100s, and twenty F–105s, he said, would assure a 90-

percent damage level to military facilities in the area, permit “seeding” the pass

with delayed-action bombs, and “clearly imply America’s interest in preventing

subversion in Laos as well as in South Vietnam.”23

General Moore, Admiral Sharp, and the JCS pressed for a more rapid escalation of the air program against the north, but Westmoreland was more

inclined to a program of “graduated reprisal” that would be a “most powerful

persuader.” He believed that the intensity of reprisal air strikes should be determined by the level of Viet Cong atrocities, outrages, and incidents committed

against U.S. or South Vietnamese personnel or facilities. A special MACV project nicknamed Fish Net would compile a daily summary of provocative Viet

Cong actions justifying U.S.-GVN air strikes on the north. The U.S. Embassy

in Saigon would transmit the data to Washington and coordinate the project

with the Saigon government. The MACV commander said graduated air

reprisals would complement the other four military programs (Yankee Team

reconnaissance and Barrel Roll interdiction in Laos, covert 34A operations,

and U.S. Navy De Soto patrols) exerting pressure on the DRV.*24

On February 8, immediately following the first Flaming Dart strike,

McNamara asked the JCS to submit a tentative eight-week bombing program.

The request implied that a short period of air assaults would convince Hanoi to

end its support of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. McGeorge

Bundy, the President’s Special Adviser on National Security Affairs, believed

Hanoi would come to terms within three months after bombing began.25

Three days later, the JCS submitted an eight-week program, deliberately

mild since it was apparent that the administration would not accept more

aggressive recommendations. The program called for a series of U.S. and

Vietnamese air strikes ascending in intensity and risk, initially on targets lying

along Route 7 and south of the 19th parallel. They would begin at a rate of two

to four per week in coordination with Barrel Roll operations in Laos, U–2

reconnaissance coverage of the north, ground cross-border incursions into Laos

(still awaiting approval), U.S. Navy De Soto patrols off the North Vietnamese
79

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

* Gen. McConnell succeeded Gen. LeMay as Air Force Chief of Staff on February 1, 1965.

† Hastily put together, Gen. Wheeler’s plan was not staffed through the JCS.

coast, heavier coastal bombardment by the Navy, and covert 34A activities.

There would be no air strikes on MiG airfields unless North Vietnamese and

Chinese pilots interfered with the U.S.-VNAF assault, an eventuality that would

obviously signal an escalation of the war and alter the eight-week bombing scenario. On balance, however, the Joint Chiefs foresaw that only Hanoi would

enter the war openly, at least for the time being. They urged the immediate

adoption of the program and cited examples of Viet Cong “provocations” that

could trigger its implementation.26

The program remained under study, however, and although soon overtaken

by events, many of the proposed targets were struck soon after Rolling Thunder

operations began on March 2, 1965. The preferred tactic of the JCS, enunciated

several times in 1964, was to launch a sudden blow against the north. Gen. John

P. McConnell, the new Air Force Chief of Staff,* was convinced that this would

be the most appropriate military response to the situation facing the United

States in South Vietnam.27

With the endorsements of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Taylor,

on February 11 General Wheeler also sent an air attack plan to McNamara.†

The plan was designed to impede movements of materiel and personnel from

North to South Vietnam with at least 201 air strike sorties against five rail

bridges and “classification yards” at Vinh, all well below the 20th parallel. This

Air Force Chief of Staff

Gen. John P. McConnell

arriving at Tan Son Nhut

Air Base, October 1965.
80

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

would make it easier to trap and destroy rolling stock. Wheeler argued that the

attacks by the Viet Cong on the south’s rail system throughout 1963 and 1964

justified such a program. McNamara was interested in Wheeler’s plan and

asked for more details, but after they were provided, he continued to consider

the plan in conjunction with others submitted to him.28

Disregarding service views on how to proceed with the bombing, the White

House wrote its own scenario. On February 13, President Johnson issued a

three-point military and political proposal that was cautious and suffused with

political considerations, in contrast with the views of the JCS and the air commanders who wanted no more delay in launching a major air program. It recommended intensifying attempts at pacification in South Vietnam “by all available means,” conducting only “measured and limited” action in the north using

U.S. and GVN aircraft against targets south of the 19th parallel (at a rate of one

or two attacks per week and against two or three targets on each day of operation), and “proving” Hanoi’s “aggression” before the United Nations Security

Council, while leaving no doubt that the United States was ready for “talks” to

terminate it. The President asked Ambassador Taylor to obtain approval from

Saigon on these three points. He failed to specify precisely when the bombing

would continue.

Taylor, who with Bundy was a persuasive advocate of gradual bombing of North

Vietnam, received the President’s directive “with enthusiasm,” but warned of the

difficulty in obtaining Saigon’s concurrence while it remained in a state of “virtual

nongovernment.” Nevertheless, Taylor promised to inform authorities in Saigon

Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
81

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

that a “dramatic change” was occurring in U.S. policy, one highly favorable to their

interests but demanding a parallel “dramatic change” on the part of the government.29 Between February 13 and 18, President Johnson continued to review the

hazards and difficulties of conducting a regular bombing campaign against the

north. Seeking advice that supported his policy, he consulted with former President

Dwight D. Eisenhower, who endorsed a “campaign of pressure” against the DRV

to make it pay a price and backed the use of six to eight divisions in South Vietnam

if circumstances dictated. Eisenhower’s overall support of the war undoubtedly

gave Mr. Johnson confidence that his tentative policy was on the right track.30

The President was also reluctant to quickly follow the two Flaming Dart air

strikes with more action for another reason. Always hopeful of a negotiating

“breakthrough,” he wished to await the outcome of the Soviet Union approach

to the British government on February 7, on possibly reactivating the BritishSoviet cochairmanship of the 1954 Geneva Conference established to deal with

the Vietnam crisis. After mid-February, however, it became apparent that the

“peace feeler” was without substance.31

Events revealed that the most compelling reason for not proceeding rapidly

with further bombing was the governmental disarray in Saigon. “My advisers

had long argued,” the President later recalled, “that a weak government in

Saigon would have difficulty surviving the pressures that might be exerted

against the south if we bombed the north.” There was also apprehension that

South Vietnam’s restless generals might impulsively act on their own.

Westmoreland and Taylor alerted Washington that General Khanh (who

resigned on February 26) might order a VNAF strike against the north rather

than wait to coordinate it with U.S. aircraft as had been agreed.32

The fears were not realized. On February 18, persuaded that a modicum of

political stability had been restored to the south, the President made his fateful

decision to resume bombing. On his order, the JCS quickly issued an execute

directive to Admiral Sharp to launch Rolling Thunder 1 on the north from

“dawn to dusk” on February 20. Sharp dispatched instructions to the commanders of PACAF, PACFLT, and MACV and assigned Navy carrier aircraft to strike

a naval base at Quang Khe and the VNAF to hit the Vu Con barracks, both of

which were in the southernmost part of North Vietnam. If weathered out, pilots

were authorized alternate targets. As in the two Flaming Dart strikes, the Air

Force was restricted to flying support for the VNAF. As Sharp’s coordinating

authority for the U.S.-VNAF strike, General Harris again redelegated the

responsibility to General Moore. To the commander, Thirteenth Air Force, at

Clark AB in the Philippines, he assigned responsibility for coordinating Air

Force aircraft based in Thailand should they be needed.33

No sooner had the JCS flashed the President’s strike decision to Sharp than

a new political crisis erupted in Saigon. At one in the afternoon February 18,

Saigon time, Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, a participant in a previous coup attempt,

tried to oust General Khanh, though not the ruling Armed Forces Council. He
82

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

was aided by Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat, a former interior minister. The troops

under Thao and Phat occupied the military headquarters of the army, the radio

station, and several other buildings. To prevent intervention by Gen. Nguyen

Cao Ky and his air force, they rolled tanks onto the runway at Tan Son Nhut

airfield on the outskirts of the capital and occupied Ky’s headquarters and air

communications center.34

Eluding the coup leaders, General Ky flew to nearby Bien Hoa Air Base and

there joined forces with ARVN general Nguyen Chanh Thi. At this juncture,

Brig. Gen. Robert R. Rowland, chief of the Air Force’s advisory group in

Saigon, contacted the VNAF commander and, in a “man to man” conversation,

urged Ky to avoid bloodshed. His plea was successful, as Ky and Thi, without

any killings, managed to regain control of the situation in Saigon the next day.35

Washington, at Ambassador Taylor’s urgent request, canceled the proposed

Rolling Thunder 1 strike.36 A reshuffle of the political structure in Saigon

brought to the fore a new power factor: General Ky and the Vietnamese Air

Force. Ky remained on the alert for further internal struggle, despite General

Westmoreland’s efforts to get him to end it and direct the VNAF’s energies

toward the war against the communists.37

Meanwhile, preparations resumed for another air strike on the north, with

the Air Force and Navy on alert to do so. Rolling Thunder 2 was scheduled,

then Rolling Thunder 3, but each was canceled as Saigon worked toward a

political resolution. It was achieved on February 26 when General Khanh

resigned to assume a hastily arranged and nebulous post of Ambassador-atLarge. He was replaced by Maj. Gen. Tran Van Minh, popularly known as

“Little Minh.” At the same time, a civilian premier, Phan Huy Quat, whose

appointment was announced on the 16th, was installed by the junta, and Taylor

informed Washington it should proceed with the air strikes. Rolling Thunder

program 4 was readied for execution, but bad weather blanketed most of North

Vietnam for the next four days, again postponing a launch of U.S. and

Vietnamese aircraft. The first Rolling Thunder strike did not get off the ground

until March 2.38

While Saigon’s politics and bad weather frustrated efforts to bomb the north,

the administration attempted to strengthen its domestic and foreign support and

signal Hanoi that more military pressure was imminent. In a news conference

on February 25, Secretary Rusk averred that the United States would not negotiate an end to the war unless Hanoi agreed to terminate its aggression and

“leave its neighbors alone.”39 Other high U.S. and South Vietnamese officials in

Washington and Saigon alerted the news media to the “virtual certainty” of a

limited air war against the north to assure an honorable negotiated settlement.40

On the 27th, the State Department issued a paper summarizing “massive” evidence of Hanoi’s aggression. It alleged that since 1959, more than 20,000 Viet

Cong officers, soldiers, and technicians had entered South Vietnam on orders

from Hanoi, and that their numbers had been swelled by a further 17,000 sup-
83

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

* Washington’s control of the first Rolling Thunder strikes early in 1965 was virtually total.

Gen. Moore, the 2d Air Division commander recalls: “...I was never allowed in the early

days to send a single airplane North [without being] told how many bombs I would have on

it, how many airplanes were in the flight, and what time it would be over the target. And if

we couldn’t get there at that time for some reason (weather or what not) we couldn’t put the

strike on later. We had to...cancel it and start over again (Intvw, Maj. Samuel E.

Riddlebarger and Lt. Col. Valentino Castellina with Gen. Moore, Nov 22, 1969, p 12).

porters. It declared that Hanoi’s military high command was responsible for

training these personnel and for their infiltration.41 The intensive public information campaign, led by Rusk, continued into the first week of March.42

The Hanoi government was under no illusions about what to expect. Near

the end of February, the Central Committee of the ruling Lao Dong (Labor)

Party publicly declared that the primary task of the party and the people would

be to maintain communications and transportation and to expect the complete

destruction of the entire country, including Hanoi and Haiphong. On the 28th,

the government issued its first nationwide order to citizens in the larger cities

to disperse. All those not engaged in production of combat materiel (meaning,

apparently, the very young and the very old) should leave the cities. Although

not enforced vigorously at first, the government’s action established evacuation

criteria and procedures that were soon applied to other North Vietnamese areas

bearing the heaviest American air attacks. By autumn 1965, an estimated

50,000 residents of Hanoi had departed, assisting American airmen in complying with their directives to minimize civilian casualties as far as possible.43

The First Two Rolling Thunder Strikes

After nineteen turbulent days of false starts, on March 1 the JCS ordered

Admiral Sharp to proceed with the first Rolling Thunder strike, designated

program 5. Once again, the air commanders were constrained by the execute

and other implementing directives, since these specified both the strike day and

the number of sorties to be flown; they required participation by the VNAF

prior to or concurrent with U.S. air strikes; they limited strikes to targets

approved by Washington; they directed pilots to dump unused ordnance in the

China Sea; and they prohibited the use of napalm. In addition, reconnaissance

aircraft were barred from flying over a target area immediately before an attack

and, if sent on a bomb assessment mission, they had to fly unescorted and at

medium altitude. There were other operational restrictions: pilots were

instructed to exercise “extreme caution” in attacking North Vietnamese vessels

to avoid hitting nonmilitary personnel and to inflict the “maximum feasible

damage level” on authorized targets, but not to conduct restrikes without

Washington’s consent.*44

Initially, four targets designated by the JCS were earmarked for the attack,
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

but by aircraft takeoff time on March 2, the number was reduced to two: JCS

target 64 at Xom Bang, an ammunition depot about ten miles above the DMZ,

covering roughly thirty-five acres and containing forty-nine barracks, administration, and support structures and JCS target 74A, the north’s southernmost

naval base at Quang Khe, sixty-five miles above the 17th parallel and possessing

berthing, repair, dry-dock, and logistic facilities.45

Thus, the attack on Xom Bang was the first Rolling Thunder strike and,

except for the six Farm Gate A–1Es used during the VNAF-Farm Gate strikes

on February 8, it was also the first conducted solely by Air Force tactical aircraft. The assault force consisted of twenty-five F–105s and twenty B–57s with

a “mix” of supporting aircraft: sixteen F–105s and eight F–100s for flak suppression; F–100s for MiG and rescue combat air patrol (CAP); two RF–101s

for reconnaissance, and six SAC KC–135s for refueling. Most of the F–105s

and some of the F–100s came from Korat and Takhli in Thailand. Strike aircraft

carried 250-pound and 500-pound general-purpose bombs and CBU–2A fragmentation bomblets. No MiGs were encountered and the attacks destroyed or

damaged an estimated 75 to 80 percent of the target area, with thirty-six to

forty-nine structures completely demolished. Personnel casualties were undetermined.46 B–52 bombers on Guam were alerted, this time for a night strike on

the ammunition depot, but were not used.47

Almost simultaneously, twenty South Vietnamese A–1Hs, supported by about

sixty F–105s, F–100s and RF–101s from the 2d Air Division hit the naval base at

Quang Khe. VNAF pilots dropped 250-pound fragmentation and 500-pound

general-purpose bombs and CBU–2A ordnance. As with the air strike on Xom

Bang, bomb damage assessment disclosed that about 75 to 80 percent of the target

area, consisting mainly of buildings, was destroyed or damaged. Again, there was

no information on personnel casualties. The cost of the air strikes was high: the Air

Force lost three F–105s in the assault on Xom Bang and two F–100s over Quang

Khe. With the exception of one Thunderchief pilot, all airmen were rescued.48

Unlike the Flaming Dart sorties I and II in February, the double air strike

Secretary of Defense 

Robert S. McNamara

conducting a press

briefing at the Pentagon,

February 7, 1965.
85

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

was not launched in retaliation for a specific attack on U.S. installations in the

south. In fact, communist activity in the preceding week had been at a very low

level. According to officials in Saigon, the purpose of the strike was “to make

clear to Hanoi that North Vietnam will be held fully responsible for continuing

aggression against South Vietnam.”49 Secretary McNamara explained the new

bombing policy before a House appropriations subcommittee: “We will not

limit our bombing to respond to their attacks on U.S. personnel or property. We

will attack the north when it seems necessary to respond properly to their level

of infiltration or support of aggression in the South.” The principal military

effort, he added, would remain in South Vietnam.50

On March 9, the President approved a second Rolling Thunder strike, designated program 6. The execute message from the Joint Chiefs to Admiral

Sharp directed two separate daylight strikes on the 11th, Saigon time. On the

same day, administration officials allowed the Air Force and the Navy to make

daily photo and weather reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam south of the

19th parallel. Nicknamed Blue Tree, the new program would follow the targeting and reporting procedures employed in the Air Force-Navy Yankee Team

reconnaissance operations. The initial photo missions over the north were also

tightly controlled by Washington officials. After program 6, reconnaissance

pilots would be restricted to a “single pass” mission at low level to assess

target damage.51

However, it would be five days before Rolling Thunder program 6 was

flown, mainly because VNAF pilots were not on alert at Da Nang, although bad

weather also contributed to the standdown. Air rules still required that the

VNAF participate with U.S. (specifically Air Force) missions. General Ky

claimed that his A–1H Skyraiders were not ready and needed inspection,

although American officials in Saigon were inclined to attribute the VNAF’s

hesitation to the danger of another coup. Ambassador Taylor expressed the

frustration of the services: “We are failing to give the mounting crescendo to

Rolling Thunder,” he said, “which is necessary to get the desired result.”

On the 14th, with improved but still marginal weather and the VNAF again

on alert, Rolling Thunder program 6 was launched. General Ky led the attack

against a barracks area containing seven buildings that housed an estimated

250 to 300 troops on Hon Gio (Tiger) Island, about twenty miles off the North

Vietnamese coast and slightly above the 17th parallel. Ky’s strike force consisted of twenty A–1Hs loaded with 250-pound, 500-pound, and 750-pound

bombs and 2.75-inch rockets. The VNAF commander’s force was supported by

twenty-three Air Force F–100s and F–105s to suppress flak and guard against

possible MiG interception. As a result of the strikes, two buildings were

destroyed by fire and five were damaged. Neither the VNAF or the USAF aircraft sustained damages or losses from groundfire.52

The next day (March 15) a joint Air Force-Navy force struck the Phu Qui

ammunition depot that covered about forty acres some one hundred miles
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

southwest of Hanoi. Of 137 aircraft dispatched, 84 flew a strike profile (20 Air

Force F–105s and 64 Navy A–1Hs, A–4Cs, and A–4Es). Air Force ordnance

consisted of 250-pound and 750-pound general-purpose bombs, 2.75-inch

rockets, and napalm, which was authorized for the first time. As on the previous day, the missions were flown in marginal weather. About 33 percent of the

target area was hit and bomb damage assessment photos confirming that at

least three ammunition structures and one support building were destroyed and

seventeen damaged. Bombs also inflicted damage outside of the target zone.

The only loss was a Navy aircraft that crashed short of a carrier on its return

flight, apparently as a result of a mechanical problem rather than from enemy

groundfire.53

Initial Analysis of Aircraft Losses

Although gratified by the results of the Flaming Dart-Rolling Thunder strikes,

the services and administration authorities, especially McNamara, were deeply

concerned about the aircraft attrition inflicted by enemy groundfire. By March 2,

eleven aircraft had been shot down (five Air Force, four Navy, and two VNAF) and

forty-one damaged (seven Navy and thirty-four VNAF) during the strikes. The

Defense Secretary asked the Joint Staff to analyze the loss rates quickly, compare them with those of World War II and the Korean War, and to submit recommendations for reducing losses.54 At the same time, with McNamara’s

approval, General McConnell quickly established a USAF Analysis Team, headed

by Maj. Gen. Gordon M. Graham, Vice Commander, Tactical Air Command

(TAC), to undertake a second and more comprehensive study of aircraft attrition.55

Air Force concern about the north’s antiaircraft defenses was pervasive.

Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert foresaw a “credibility” problem

arising from the loss of tactical aircraft to “unsophisticated” weapons. Combat

crews of USAF’s 18th and 469th TFSs attested to the effectiveness of the

enemy’s small arms and automatic weapons. To some aircrews, it seemed that

nearly every foot soldier had an automatic weapon “so barrage capability of

small arms fire is a threat up to 1,000 feet in or near target complexes.” In fact,

most of the aircraft destroyed or damaged were hit by small arms fire under this

altitude. A change in tactics was imperative: fewer aircraft—no more than sixteen—should be sent against a defended target complex in a single attack and

cluster bombs, dropped from no lower than 1,000 feet whenever possible. In

another study, Admiral Sharp’s analysts noted that bad weather seldom permitted dive bombing. They observed that pilots could expect cloud layers at 3,500

feet more than 50 percent of the time and usually did not have good strike

weather until the middle of the afternoon, a circumstance not lost on the North

Vietnamese who knew when to be on the alert for most of the attacks. The analysts also noted the complaint of air commanders, who believed higher authorities did not allow them sufficient operational “flexibility” to conduct the air
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strikes, which contributed to the high aircraft losses.56

The Joint Chiefs’ initial findings were compiled with the studies by the Air

Force and Navy analysts and sent to McNamara by General Wheeler on March

10. They were based on 505 missions totaling 2,565 Air Force and Navy sorties (Farm Gate and VNAF sorties were excluded) flown in 1964 and 1965 over

Laos and North Vietnam. Loss rates (based on 1,000 sorties) compared favorably with those sustained in previous wars: World War II; 0.9 percent; Korea,

0.3 percent; and Southeast Asia, 0.6 percent. Wheeler believed improved tactics and equipment would eventually reduce the loss rate, as in previous wars.

The report listed several items to lower the loss rate: the recommendations

by Air Force and Navy air commanders for reducing aircraft attrition in North

Vietnam and Laos; lifting the ban on napalm and other types of improved ordnance; random reconnaissance and more prestrike reconnaissance at medium

and low altitudes to preclude “signaling” air missions; better security, cover,

and deception activities at Vietnamese and American-occupied airbases; and

greater operational “flexibility” for air commanders on the timing of air strikes

and in the selection of alternate targets. The last recommendation was crucial

to compensate for poor weather and enemy antiaircraft defenses.57

A few days after Wheeler submitted his report, Dr. Harold Brown, OSD’s

Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) ordered the Weapons

System Evaluation Group within the JCS to establish a study unit to conduct

further analyses of aircraft destruction. Dr. Brown believed this would aid

research and development efforts to reduce combat aircraft losses.58

Meanwhile, General Graham’s analysis team was completing its study of

aircraft attrition in Southeast Asia. For statistical purposes, the team’s database

Eugene M. Zuckert,

Secretary of the Air Force,

1961–1965.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Initially, Air Force personnel did not differentiate carefully between RB–66 reconnaissance aircraft equipped with cameras and infrared detectors and those equipped to detect

and jam enemy radars in electronic countermeasures (ECM) operations. Eventually a distinction was made between RB–66Bs and RB–66Cs, although the B models might engage

in reconnaissance rather than ECM. In the spring of 1966, the Air Force began to designate

was limited to one Barrel Roll mission and one Rolling Thunder mission in

which Air Force and Navy aircraft sustained considerable damage. In a preliminary report to Secretary McNamara, sent through Air Force Secretary Zuckert

in April, Graham endorsed virtually all of the changes recommended by

Wheeler and added others: fewer “flash” precedence messages from

Washington, especially those containing last-minute changes to missions; more

uniform rules of engagement in the war theater (the rules for the air programs

in North Vietnam and Laos varied widely); deployment of Air Force reconnaissance RB–66s equipped with electronic countermeasures (ECM) gear* to

conduct missions against radar-controlled antiaircraft guns; use of delayed-fuse

bombs; better night interdiction capability; modifications in the dive bombing

training programs in the United States paralleling the development of new

types of ordnance nicknamed Snake Eye, Dragon Tooth, and Gravel.

In separate briefings and reports for the Air Force, General Graham stressed

the need for pilots to receive more realistic training before their assignment to

combat duty. Their training, he said, should go beyond gunnery school patterns,

and airmen flying in squadron formation should relearn the technique of flying

and fighting as a squadron. A follow-on study by TAC operations analysts who

interviewed officers of the 2d Air Division in May 1965 further emphasized the

need for more practice in gunnery and weapons delivery. The analysts concluded that combat preparation should require the use of bombing ranges containing camouflaged real targets such as vehicles, bridges, and gun emplacements; practice with 750-pound bombs, napalm, CBUs, and newer types of

ordnance such as Snake Eye and Lazy Dog, but without the use of run-in headings and ordnance release altitudes; and using tactics, dive angles, and release

altitudes that minimized aircraft exposure to groundfire. These findings would

change TAC’s training program over the coming months.59

General Graham’s final report, which was processed through the Joint Staff,

was submitted to the Defense Secretary on May 22. The Joint Staff addressed the

operational restrictions imposed by Washington that prevented air commanders

from engaging in “optimum” tactics to reduce aircraft attrition, including restrictions on bombing target areas, restrikes, use of advanced ordnance, and selection

of secondary targets. Further, the injunction to achieve “maximum feasible damage” in single strikes encouraged air commanders to dispatch more strike aircraft

than was prudent given the strength of enemy antiaircraft positions. Frequent

detailed guidance on air routes and entry into a target area often eliminated

the element of surprise. The command and control system was cumbersome,
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ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

all RB–66s engaged in ECM as EB–66s. For the sake of consistency, the latter designation

will be used as applicable throughout this narrative (See Bernard C. Nalty, Tactics and

Techniques of Electronic Warfare: Electronic Countermeasures in the Air War Against

North Vietnam, 1965–1973 (Ofc AF Hist, 1977), p 19.

complex, and unrealistic. In brief, aircraft attrition could be reduced most readily

in the same manner that operational effectiveness could be enhanced: by allowing

Air Force and Navy air commanders greater flexibility in planning and executing

air strikes.60

Although Mr. McNamara did not reply formally to the JCS report, the services

were already revising some of their aerial tactics. However, air commanders still

did not have the operational flexibility they considered essential that, in their

view, would shorten the war and save many aircraft and American lives. 

An Air Strategy Emerges

As had happened with the Flaming Dart strikes, the first Rolling Thunder

strikes on March 2 reverberated in world capitals. In Paris there was renewed

anxiety, in Tokyo criticism, and in Moscow communist leaders attending a conclave predictably condemned the attacks.61 Domestic and worldwide concern

increased when, four days after Rolling Thunder 5, the Defense Department

announced that 3,500 Marines of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade were

on their way to Da Nang to provide additional security for the military center serving as the springboard for most Air Force attacks on the north, for Barrel Roll

operations in northern Laos, and for many Air Force-Marine operations against

the Viet Cong in the south. After the first contingent of “leathernecks” reached

Da Nang on March 8 (by mid-April, 8,000 would be stationed there), Hanoi

charged that their arrival was “an open declaration of war on the entire

Vietnamese people,” and vowed to defend itself, and Peking saw “a grave move

to further expand the war in Indochina.”62

Against these events, the Secretary General of the United Nations appealed

to the principal nations involved in the conflict (the United States, the Soviet

Union, Great Britain, France, China, and South and North Vietnam) to convene

a preliminary conference to discuss the issues. The United States’ response

was a rejection of U Thant’s offer until North Vietnam stopped its aggression

against South Vietnam.63 In support of this stance, the State Department circulated a memorandum proclaiming that U.S. and South Vietnamese air attacks

on the north were “fully justified” under international law, and consonant with

the United Nations charter and the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.64

As Washington officials saw it, the bombing policy could not be suspended,

at least for the time being, in light of the continued military and political

reports of deterioration in South Vietnam. Before more strikes were carried out,
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

the first strikes were examined closely, but Admiral Sharp and his analysts

could not determine the total impact. Nonetheless, the PACOM commander

conjectured that Hanoi was playing a “waiting game” until American intentions

toward the north were clearer. His confidence in the potential of air power was

complete:

The damage inflicted by these attacks on LOCs and military installations

in North Vietnam will cause a diminution of the support being rendered to

the Viet Cong. Successful strikes on bridges will degrade the transportation

system and an attendant reduction in its capability to transport food and

materials from production to storage areas. Manpower and supplies will

undoubtedly be diverted toward the recovery and rebuilding process. While

the effect may not be felt immediately by the VC, this increased pressure will

demonstrate our strength of purpose and at the same time make support of

the VC as onerous as possible.

Sharp’s latest “optimum” air program called for attacks initially below the

20th parallel on eleven targets designated by the JCS, wider ranging reconnaissance, harassment of rolling stock and truck shuttling, and then more

bombing of other primary and secondary LOC targets. He proposed sending

two to four aircraft on each daylight mission and beginning night operations.

This tactic would be followed by “maximum intensity” air strikes on ten JCS

targets above the 20th parallel (not in the Hanoi-Haiphong area) and by armed

reconnaissance on five North Vietnamese supply routes.65

While high administration officials moved slowly toward a decision on the

scope and tempo of Rolling Thunder, Ambassador Taylor, increasingly appreAppearing to curve as they

streak skyward, these tracers

from small and medium

antiaircraft guns were filmed

during a reconnaissance flight

over a staging area ten miles

south of Dong Hoi.
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ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

* Since June 18, 1964, Mr. Seaborn visited Hanoi periodically to convey the American

view of the war and on negotiations.

hensive about the declining fortunes of the Saigon government, strongly urged

that air operations be intensified. He believed Hanoi had construed the initial

strikes merely as “a few isolated thunderclaps” whereas their objective was to

convince the DRV of “progressively severe punishment.” The ambassador

declared there was “an urgent need” for a consensus on “measured and limited

air action” lasting several weeks, with one or two air attacks per week on two

or three targets, and retaining the option of heavier strikes in more northern

areas. Taylor thought that the eight weeks of bombing proposed tentatively by

the JCS, while very useful, was limited to targets too far south of the 19th parallel. But to avoid giving Hanoi a misleading signal, U.S. aircraft should also

hit targets immediately north of the 19th parallel in “a slow but steadily ascending movement.” He foresaw no difficulty in coping with the north’s MiGs.

The ambassador decried international pressure on the United States to negotiate with Hanoi without “clear evidence” that Hanoi (and Peking) were “prepared

to leave their neighbors alone.” He cited a recent observation by Blair Seaborn,

Canada’s representative to the International Control Commission* who found

in Hanoi an air of confidence and an impression that the bombing was limited

to improving the United States’ bargaining position and “hence of no great

cause for immediate concern.” Significantly, Taylor’s views on the scope and

intensity of an air program and on negotiations had the explicit endorsement of

General Westmoreland.66

Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, made further recommendations. General Johnson had been sent to Saigon at the personal request of

President Johnson and Secretary McNamara to make a comprehensive evaluation of Saigon’s sagging military and political situation, and on March 15, he

presented the President with a pivotal 21-point program for alleviating South

Vietnam’s internal difficulties and improving the limited bombing programs in

North Vietnam and Laos. The air war thus far against North Vietnam, he said,

was inadequate “to convey a clear sense of U.S. purpose to Hanoi.” He recommended increasing the scope and tempo of operations, canceling the requirement for Washington’s approval for each alternate target, selecting targets from

a narrow geographical area, flying U.S. and VNAF strike missions concurrently,

and using only unclassified or older types of munitions. He also called for more

covert (i.e., plan 34A attacks) air, ground, and seaborne activities against the

north. In Laos, he proposed limiting the Barrel Roll program to the northern

part of the country and inaugurating a new, anti-infiltration attack program

along infiltration routes in the Laotian panhandle. The Army Chief of Staff conceded that these stronger military measures, especially against the north, could

escalate the war, but they also promised to induce Hanoi to cease and desist in
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

its support of the Viet Cong.67

Beginning of Weekly Rolling Thunder Strikes

The President immediately approved most of General Johnson’s recommendations for the north. However, he and most of his advisers, including Secretary

McNamara, agreed that a regular bombing program should proceed very cautiously and with continued tight controls from Washington. This was made

clear in the Joint Chiefs’ directive to Admiral Sharp on March 16 that informed

him the next series of Rolling Thunder strikes, scheduled to begin on March 19,

would be planned on a weekly basis. South Vietnamese and VNAF aircraft,

USAF units based in Thailand, and Navy carrier aircraft would all be involved

in the missions. All operations by USAF aircraft from Thai bases would continue to be cleared through the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. In addition to strikes

on fixed targets, one U.S. and two VNAF armed reconnaissance missions

would be permitted weekly, although concurrent USAF-VNAF missions were

no longer mandatory. USAF advisors could accompany Vietnamese airmen,

but only in aircraft marked with USAF insignia, USAF combat pilots could

“fill out” VNAF sortie requirements beyond the capability of the Vietnamese.68

On the same day, the service chiefs raised the northernmost limit of Air

Force and Navy Blue Tree reconnaissance missions from the 19th to the 20th

parallel and allowed them to be accompanied by fighters for combat air patrol.

Pilots were ordered not to pick a fight with the North Vietnamese Air Force

MiGs, and if any were sighted, should withdraw. The fighters were authorized

to engage in combat only to protect reconnaissance aircraft from an attack. Two

days later, as an additional precaution, air commanders were directed to fly

photo, visual, infrared, radar, and other sensor-equipped aircraft at or above

10,000 feet and to remain south of the 20th parallel. Although General Harris,

the PACAF commander, insisted that the need for low-level reconnaissance missions was “imperative,” Sharp, who fully agreed, noted that the political

“climate” in Washington was “not right” to press the issue. He counseled

patience and expressed confidence that approval would be obtained eventually.69

General McConnell, the new Air Force Chief of Staff, viewed the administration’s bombing policy with considerable disquiet. Convinced it was far too

restrictive, on March 17 he sought JCS endorsement of an air and naval offensive

plan that had been devised to allow the Air Force to strike the ninety-four JCSdesignated targets over a period of twenty-eight days. Like General LeMay, and

other Air Force commanders, and General Greene, the Marine Commandant, he

believed air power should be applied more quickly against the north’s vital targets. Otherwise the United States might find itself in a prolonged ground war in

South Vietnam or forced to invade North Vietnam.70

The Joint Staff quickly expanded McConnell’s proposal into a tentative fourphase plan. In phase I, air commanders would reduce the flow of manpower and
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materiel moving southward with an intensive, three-week bombing campaign

against the north’s transportation network below the 20th parallel. The campaign

would also send a “signal” to Hanoi concerning the United States’ ability to

widen the scope and intensity of the bombing. Phase II would be a six-week

campaign to cut the northeast and northwest rail lines into China, bringing the

war closer to the regime’s government and people. Phase III, lasting two weeks,

would introduce the mining of the north’s seaward approaches, all of its ports,

and the ammunition and supply centers in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This

would complete the attacks on most of the ninety-four targets, and hopefully

convince Hanoi that the takeover of South Vietnam was no longer worth the

price. Finally, phase IV would last two weeks and would be directed against

whatever industrial targets remained outside of the populated areas and any targets that had not been fully destroyed or had been repaired.71

Three days after McConnell sent his plan forward, the Joint Staff prepared a

twelve-week bombing proposal requested by McNamara. Other proposals from

the field were also examined by the Joint Staff. All required comments by

Admiral Sharp’s PACOM headquarters, his PACAF and PACFLT component

commands, and MACV. The short-range and long-range planning exercises

revealed that recent JCS agreements on the need for a more intensive Rolling

Thunder program had glossed over long-standing differences among the services. As in the previous year, Generals McConnell and Greene still championed

a series of rapid attacks on all of the north’s major industrial and transportation

targets while the Army’s position, articulated by General Westmoreland, called

for gradually escalating strikes, initially below the 20th parallel, until their

impact could be assessed carefully. This approach would also reduce the danger of Chinese intervention in the war, and the Administration had already

aligned itself with this view.72

Meanwhile, as plans were being laid for the bombing scheduled to begin on

March 19 as Rolling Thunder program 7, Admiral Sharp proposed a massive

“radar busting” day in southern North Vietnam. He said that this would dramatize the United States’ ability to destroy the north’s air defense command

and control network at will. However, McNamara decided only three radar sites

should be struck initially. A JCS directive, based on McNamara’s guidance,

spelled out in considerable detail how the services should proceed. Three radar

sites at Vinh Son, Vinh Linh, and Dong Hoi should be struck in conjunction

with three armed reconnaissance missions over segments of the coastal northsouth Route 1, with all targets well below the 20th parallel. U.S. aircraft should

strike the first two JCS targets and one radar site and the VNAF the third target and two radar sites. All Air Force aircraft in Thailand scheduled for operations in North Vietnam and Laos still had to be “cleared” by the U.S. Embassy

in Bangkok.73

Nonetheless, the restrictions were somewhat less confining than for the first

two Rolling Thunder attacks. PACAF pilots were no longer limited to flying mis-
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

sions only in conjunction with the VNAF and could “fill out” VNAF operations

as necessary against military vehicles and rolling stock, and air commanders had

seven days in which to complete their strikes on authorized targets. As in the initial attacks, pilots were ordered to achieve the “maximum feasible damage”

against their objectives.74

Navy carrier aircraft flew the first Rolling Thunder 7 mission on the 19th,

striking the Phu Van ammunition depot and the Vinh Son army supply depot.

The Phu Van target, about 20.5 n.m. northwest of Vinh, consisted of eighty-two

buildings. The Navy launched eighty-six aircraft, fifty-seven in a strike role,

with damage estimated at 50 percent. Only six Air Force strike aircraft were

used for an attack on twelve buildings in the Vinh Son area, but they damaged

an estimated 70 percent of them.

There were no attacks on the 20th, but on the 21st, twenty-four VNAF

A–1Es hit the Vu Con army barracks one mile north of the DMZ. The supporting Air Force planes included Farm Gate “pathfinders,” which led VNAF pilots

to the target areas, and aircraft providing reconnaissance, flak suppression,

combat air patrol, bomb damage assessment, and rescue. As in previous attacks

on the north, the Farm Gate aircraft bore USAF insignia.75

On March 22, flying the first of three armed reconnaissance missions, the

Air Force hit a radar site seven miles north of Vinh Son, the first mission not

flown in conjunction with the VNAF. Eighteen aircraft were dispatched, with

eight F–105 Thunderchiefs in a strike profile. One Thunderchief was lost when

the squadron flight commander’s aircraft was hit. The flight commander bailed

out and was rescued in fifteen minutes.76

Over the next two days, with Air Force support, the VNAF twice attacked

radar sites. In the first mission, seventeen aircraft (eight VNAF and nine Air

Force) struck a coastal early warning site near Vinh, about three miles above

the DMZ. In the second, eighteen aircraft (eight VNAF, ten Air Force) flew

against an early warning site near Dong Hoi. Enjoying clear visibility at Vinh,

VNAF pilots claimed “100 percent” site damage, but the second mission

encountered bad weather and was unable to reach the target. Pilots dropped

their ordnance on an antiaircraft position a mile west of the radar site. No aircraft were lost or damaged in the twin attacks. In accordance with McNamara’s

guidance,77 Rolling Thunder program 8 (March 26–April 1) authorized strikes

or restrikes on eight radar sites and on the Vit Thu Lu barracks. CINCPAC allocated four sites each to the Air Force and Navy and scheduled three armed

reconnaissance missions, two to be flown by U.S. and one by VNAF aircraft.

The rules for program 7 applied except that pilots were granted slightly more

authority. When attacking the radar sites, they could hit ancillary military

installations, support facilities, targets of opportunity, vehicles and DRV water

patrol craft. The armed reconnaissance area was extended slightly northward

toward the 20th parallel.78

Last minute changes altered strike plans. Because of weather, missions were
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flown only on March 26, 30, and 31, and six of eight radar sites were struck.

These were at or in the vicinity of Cap Mui Ron, Ha Tinh, Cua Lo, and on the

coastal islands of Bach Long, Hon Ngu, and Hon Matt. The Navy flew seven

missions, the Air Force two, and the VNAF one, with Air Force support. The

VNAF was scheduled to hit the Vit Thu Lu barracks, but selected the Dong Hoi

airfield as an alternate target. In the first strike on an airfield, the VNAF

destroyed four of fifteen buildings and cratered the runway and parking area.

Results of Rolling Thunder 8 were based largely on pilot estimates. Navy

claims ranged from 43 to 100 percent destruction or damage to target areas while

the Air Force reported damage to 50 percent of its targets at Hon Matt. No damage was inflicted on Hon Ngu, as all bombs missed the target. The VNAF-Air

Force assault on Dong Hoi airfield was judged to have been 81 percent effective.

Intelligence analysts found some evidence that the North Vietnamese had moved

radar equipment at several sites just prior to or immediately after the air strikes.79

The North Vietnamese exacted a severe penalty for program 8, especially

from the Navy, which lost nine aircraft: four A–1Hs, two A–4Es, and three F–8Ds.

The Air Force lost one F–105 and the VNAF none.80 There was some consolation

in the valuable experience gained over the north. By the end of March, they had

struck eighteen of the targets designated by the JCS south of the 20th parallel,

as well as many smaller ones. Several lessons on the usefulness of different

types of ordnance had been learned. Napalm was most effective against barracks and supply buildings, general-purpose bombs against revetted and concrete structures, and rockets against manned antiaircraft sites and watercraft.81

In his assessment of the initial Rolling Thunder operations, Ambassador Taylor

believed they had brought about “a clear lift in morale” in South Vietnam.82

Supporting Operations for Rolling Thunder

Washington’s insistence on restricting Air Force and Navy reconnaissance

aircrews to medium-altitude missions impeded Rolling Thunder operations

throughout March. As noted, General Harris, had emphasized the need for lowlevel pre- and poststrike reconnaissance, and Admiral Sharp had heartily

agreed. On the 21st, in outlining a two-phase program to cut lines of communication, Sharp informed the JCS that weather over the north in April would

probably render 40 to 60 percent of medium-level reconnaissance missions

nonproductive. When he visited Washington late in the month, Ambassador

Taylor sided with the air commanders in their requests to remove the altitude

restriction. On March 30, the authorities at last permitted photoreconnaissance

at lower altitude and simultaneously extended the authorized reconnaissance

area from the 20th to the 21st parallel. For the first time, Sharp could also

schedule photo missions at his discretion.83

The removal of the altitude limitation was not without strings. The PACOM

commander could schedule no more than ten two-aircraft missions per week or
96

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

a total of twenty sorties, aircraft were forbidden to intrude within forty n.m. of

Phuc Yen airfield and Haiphong, and the JCS would decide on a case-by-case

basis whether to approve requests for supporting flak suppression.84

These restrictions notwithstanding, Washington authorized more reconnaissance for North Vietnam and Laos, speeding plans by General Moore and his

staff to redeploy and augment the 2d Air Division’s RF–101 force. On March

6, several personnel of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) at

Tan Son Nhut flew to Udorn, Thailand, to arrange for the redeployment of some

of the Voodoos at that base, and on the 31st the first four RF–101 units of the

15th TRS arrived there. Nicknamed Green Python, the unit flew its first Yankee

Team mission over Laos the next day, and in April they began Blue Tree missions over the north. A month later, the Thai government authorized eight more

RF–101s at Udorn, bringing the total to twelve, providing regular reconnaissance for Rolling Thunder. The 2d Air Division was soon flying about twothirds of the tactical reconnaissance missions over the north while the Navy

flew the remainder.85

The Air Force took other actions in support of the Rolling Thunder program.

Thirty-four MiG–15s and MiG–17s were based at Phuc Yen airfield near

Hanoi, and the Air Force requested a squadron of F–4s to provide cover for

reconnaissance and strike missions over the north. On April 1, McNamara

approved the JCS recommendation to move this squadron to Udorn. The twoseat Phantoms were the newest and most sophisticated fighters in the Air

Force’s inventory. Responding quickly, Tactical Air Command dispatched the

45th TFS of the 15th TFW from the United States to Udorn, where it arrived

on April 7. Aircrews immediately began flying combat air patrol.86 Also at the

Air Force’s request, the JCS authorized TAC to begin modifying several RB–66

reconnaissance aircraft to provide an electronic intelligence (ELINT) and

countermeasures capability against Hanoi’s expanding ground communication

F–100 flying flak suppression fires rockets at an enemy gun position.
97

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

* For a discussion of the origins and initial operations of the Steel Tiger program, see Jacob

Van Staaveren, Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968 (Washington, 1993), p 147.

intercept (GCI) system and possibly Soviet-built SA–2 surface-to-air missiles

(SAMs).87 In Honolulu and Saigon, military and civilian psychological warfare

specialists prepared for a major overt leaflet dropping program against the

north’s populace and leadership. Specially equipped Air Force and Vietnamese

fighters would distribute the leaflets.88

On the night of April 3, in an effort to reduce the infiltration of manpower

and supplies through southern Laos, General Moore launched two missions

against enemy truck traffic on segments of three truck routes. Each mission

consisted of a navigation and flare-carrying C–130 Blindbat and two strike

B–57s. Recommended by General Johnson in mid-March and approved by the

President shortly thereafter, these missions began a new Air Force and Navy

anti-infiltration interdiction program nicknamed Steel Tiger,* that was

intended to supplement the Rolling Thunder program against the north.89

Contingency Planning for a Larger Conflict

The beginning of Rolling Thunder triggered more JCS planning to counter

any strong military reactions by Hanoi, Peking, or Moscow. In their eight-week

bombing scenario, drafted at McNamara’s request early in February 1965, the

Joint Chiefs speculated that:

the DRV, communist China, and the Soviet Union will make every effort

through propaganda and diplomatic moves to halt the U.S. attacks. The

DRV will defend itself, and open, overt aggression in South Vietnam and

Laos by the DRV might occur.... Hanoi would probably elect to maintain

the very intense levels of activity of the past few days. 

As the bombing intensified, however, the Joint Chiefs foresaw that the

Chinese and Soviets might take additional measures. The Chinese might send

“volunteers” into North Vietnam and northern Laos, thereby raising “the

specter of further escalation to underline their commitment to assist the North

Vietnamese, and to challenge the Soviets to extend corresponding support.”

The Soviets would probably intensify their diplomatic and propaganda effort

“to bring the United States to the conference table,” and step up their shipments

of antiaircraft artillery, radars, and perhaps SA–2 missiles to Hanoi.90

The most likely threat was open intervention by the Hanoi and Peking governments rather than the Soviets, but the Joint Chiefs were confident the United

States and its allies could deal with such an eventuality.91 On hand were

CINCPAC’s Operations Plan 32-64 or CINCPAC’s Operations Plan 39-64. The
98

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* The plans were updated frequently and soon renumbered 32-65 and 39-65.

first was basically defensive, requiring large numbers of American and allied

ground forces to prevent a Chinese takeover of mainland Southeast Asia; the

second was an Air Force and Naval plan to deter, or if necessary, halt a major

Chinese thrust into Southeast Asia or into South Korea, Taiwan, or Burma. Not

surprisingly, the services were divided on the merits of the two plans. The

Army, always ground-oriented, favored the first, while the Air Force and Navy,

opposing large-scale use of American troops on the Asian mainland, supported

the second.92

General Wheeler considered both plans inadequate, plan 32-64 because it

was not logistically sustainable in the short term, and plan 39-64* because it

was not politically feasible. He doubted that the authorities in Washington were

capable of making a quick decision to use the Air Force and Navy to prevent

Chinese troops from moving into South Vietnam, Thailand, or Burma or from

making diversionary actions against South Korea or Taiwan. He directed the

Joint Staff to determine the minimum number of ground and air units needed

in Southeast Asia and the Pacific to keep the Chinese from taking over the

countries defended by or allied to the United States.93

General McConnell disagreed strongly with Wheeler’s assertion that plan

39-64 was not politically viable, and lent his planning support for a possible

land war in Asia. He was convinced that the most prudent action was to deploy

the fifteen Air Force squadrons to bases in Southeast Asia and the Pacific as

envisaged in plan 39-64. This was not only possible logistically, but was the

best strategy to meet the twin threats of Hanoi and Peking.94 General Harris

articulated the Air Force’s strategic view more precisely:

While we are hurting both VC and Hanoi by increased air strikes in

SVN and DRV, it would be prudent to convey a concurrent message to

Peking. This can be done quickly by significant deployments of air power

around the periphery of China rather than large-scale ground deployments to SEA. I see...major ground deployments as inconsistent with

sound strategy which could take advantage of our superiority in air and

naval strength. We’ve already noted a buildup of Soviet strength in

Vladivostok area and see [a] continuing shift of China air strength to the

south. If we place the principal emphasis in Southeast Asia, we may mislead Peking and, in fact, encourage concentration of their support for

Hanoi rather than forcing a China posture to cope with other possible

actions on China’s periphery. We should make it unmistakably clear to

Peking that the United States will not restrict action as we did in Korea.

Harris cited the Berlin and Cuban missile crises as precedents where signif-
99

ROLLING THUNDER BEGINS

* Signed on September 8, 1954, by eight Asian and western nations, including the United

States, to prevent the further spread of communism in Southeast Asia, the SEATO Pact

came into force on February 20, 1955.

icant Air Force deployments provided deterrence and made all but a few other

combat forces unnecessary. Within the JCS, General McConnell reminded his

colleagues that they had previously approved CINCPACs air-oriented Air Force

and Navy plan 39-64 and considered it feasible, as it would allow the U.S. government to engage or disengage its forces in the Pacific as necessary. Preparing

still another concept as desired by General Wheeler, he said, would take time.95

Of course, it was not possible to override the request of the JCS Chairman for

the Joint Staff to also examine about ten alternate U.S. and allied deployment

proposals for South Vietnam and Thailand that had surfaced in recent days with

sizeable ground forces. The principal concepts called for the deployment of one

or two U.S. Army divisions in northeast Thailand or one Army division around

Saigon or near Pleiku in the central highlands, a U.S. or multinational force

under the aegis of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)* in South

Vietnam below the DMZ, a South Korean division near Saigon, and U.S. ground

units for beach enclaves along South Vietnam’s coastal areas.96 Except for the

coastal ground enclave concept, the Air Force strongly opposed the dispatch of

division-level forces to Thailand and South Vietnam and, with the Navy,

believed that the United States should rely principally on air and naval power for

either defensive or offensive operations against China and North Vietnam. The

Army, on the other hand, staunchly believed neither major defensive nor offensive operations were possible without sizeable ground forces. The Marine Corps

shared the Army’s view regarding South Vietnam because of the instability of

the government and the unreliability of its leaders.97

As China would not enter the war, contingency planning for the “worst case”

military threat remained only an exercise, but high-level debate on strategy and

planning continued over the size of U.S. and allied forces that would be

required to stop the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam.
Bridge damaged by bombing in 1965.
101

* For more discussion of the various views on the planning and implementation of Rolling

Thunder strikes, see Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of

North Vietnam (New York, 1989), chap 2; Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force’s

Setup in Vietnam (Texas, 1993), chap 3; and Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark,

In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), pp 171–77.

CHAPTER 4

Gradual Expansion

Washington’s decision to inaugurate the Rolling Thunder and Steel Tiger

programs in North Vietnam and Laos, respectively, did not end debate on how

to prosecute the war. In late March and the first two days of April, when the

National Security Council addressed the subject, high officials expressed conflicting views. The Joint Chiefs believed that direct action was “imperative” to

halt the decline in South Vietnam. They recommended the deployment of three

ground divisions (two American, one Korean) to bolster Saigon’s military

effort and four more Air Force squadrons to apply “more forceful...pressure on

the north.”1 John P. McCone, the Director of the CIA, conceded that more U.S.

troops were needed but believed that the major emphasis should be on bombing.2 Conversely, General Westmoreland proposed sending more troops to

South Vietnam and then waiting until June 1965 to determine whether the

Rolling Thunder program was successful. If not, the United States should send

additional combat manpower, but not substantially more aircraft.*3

Ambassador Taylor was also pessimistic about the potential effect of the

Rolling Thunder program, and he insisted that it could not win the war. He

played down the threat of the North Vietnamese MiGs based at Phuc Yen airfield. On the other hand, he was in favor of the mining of Haiphong harbor by

the VNAF and credited the bombing with having raised the morale of the South

Vietnamese people. With John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs, he opposed a major increase in U.S. troops

in the south.4

McNaughton hoped that the military situation in the south had “bottomed

out” and would not propel the United States into using “extreme measures”

against Hanoi. He suggested redefining America’s Southeast Asia objectives,

which he said were to avoid a humiliating defeat (70 percent), to keep South

Vietnam and adjacent territory out of Chinese hands (20 percent), and to permit

the South Vietnamese people to enjoy a better and freer way of life (10 percent).5 George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, was in favor of cutting

American losses with no further commitment to the war.6 But William P.

Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who supported the

bombing, believed that after two or three months of Rolling Thunder, Hanoi

might begin “making noises” about negotiations. By then, there should be

“clear evidence” the United States had the means to win in South Vietnam.7
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Further Decisions on Prosecuting the War

After examining these views and numerous studies and memoranda on the

bombing, the NSC, after its meetings of April 1 and 2, sent new recommendations to President Johnson. These sought to accommodate three diverse views

on the war: those who wished to move more rapidly against the communists in

both South and North Vietnam; those who would proceed more prudently,

chiefly in the south, without significantly increasing the bombing in the north;

and those who opposed any increase in the American commitment.8

The President’s decision, embodied in NSAM 328 and issued on April 6, was

the most fateful of his administration. He sanctioned a modest increase in U.S.

ground troops in South Vietnam—two Marine battalions and one Air Force

squadron plus support—and altered the mission of the U.S. Marines from defense

to “more active use” or offense. In short, the change signaled the beginning of

open U.S. ground warfare, a strategy strongly opposed by the Air Force. The

President also authorized 18,000 to 20,000 more support personnel, stepped up

nonmilitary assistance and USIA programs, and more bombing of North Vietnam. 

The air assault on the north, however, continued very cautiously:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of

Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to

a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the

unlikely event [the] VC slackened off sharply for what appeared to be

more than a temporary operational lull.

In April 1965, President Johnson increased the number of ground troops

deployed to South Vietnam. Here, arriving troops unload gear from a C–130.
103

GRADUAL EXPANSION

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of

MiGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks

on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a

few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population. Proposals to blockade or

mine North Vietnamese ports from the air, while offering many advantages,

required further study as such action augured major political complications

“especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries.” To reduce infiltration through southern Laos, Mr. Johnson repeated his endorsement of “aerial route

blocking” at the “maximum remunerative rate” in Steel Tiger. At the President’s

request, officials publicly downplayed the decisions in NSAM 328 to avoid any

suggestion there had been a sudden change in American policy on the war.9

NSAM 328 emerged against a background of separate, harsh warnings in late

March voiced by China’s newspaper, People’s Daily, and by Premier Chou EnLai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi. They affirmed support for the National

Liberation Front’s demand for the withdrawal of American troops from South

Vietnam; promised the insurgents more arms, materiel, and if asked, Chinese

troops; and predicted that the Chinese and Soviet peoples would close ranks and

fight side by side if the United States precipitated a major war in Southeast

Asia.10 In a television interview in early April, McGeorge Bundy, the President’s

Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, replied that if China intervened in Southeast

Asia, it would not enjoy a “privileged sanctuary” as it did in the Korean War.11

The administration’s effort to minimize public fears of a larger conflict

failed to quiet the crescendo of dissent. India, France, Sweden, and other noncommunist countries and large segments of the American public, Congress,

and the press expressed apprehension over the conflict or outright disapproval

of the bombing. Meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia on 1 April, an assembly of

nonaligned nations appealed for negotiations without preconditions among

interested parties as soon as possible.12

President Johnson had considered making another major public statement

on U.S. policy in the war. He seized this statement, signed by seventeen

nations, as an opportunity to answer these nations and other foreign and

domestic critics. With the approval of the NSC, the President selected as his

forum Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where he delivered an address

on April 7. There, he reaffirmed the United States’ determination to halt

Hanoi’s attacks on the south, but offered to begin “unconditional discussions”

for peace and asked the U.S. Congress for one billion dollars for investment in

a vast Southeast Asia regional development program that might eventually

include North Vietnam. This was the administration’s first significant effort to

negotiate with Hanoi, and the President subsequently considered his offer to do

so without preconditions as his fourth major decision on Vietnam.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Various dates have been given for the four-point peace plan. It is believed to have been

announced initially by Premier Pham Van Dong during an internal government meeting in

Hanoi on April 8, but was not distributed officially until April 13, 1965 (see New York

Times, Apr 14, 1965, p 1).

The address was applauded generally in the Congress and the country, but the

reaction in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow was negative. After an initial tirade

against the President’s offer, Premier Pham Van Dong quickly announced a fourpoint peace plan which demanded the basic rights of the Vietnamese people.*

The rights were defined as independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial

integrity; withdrawal of all foreign military personnel in accordance with the

1954 Geneva Agreement; settlement of South Vietnam’s internal affairs with the

program of the National Liberation Front; and peaceful reunification of the two

Vietnam zones without foreign interference.13 Subsequently, Hanoi also rejected

the appeal by the seventeen nonaligned nations, asserting that the Premier’s four

points could be the only basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem, a position supported by Peking.14

Initial Bridge-Busting Attacks

With the administration’s peace initiative firmly rejected by the three communist capitals, the Rolling Thunder campaign continued as envisaged in NSAM 328.

Air strikes remained well below the 20th parallel, to minimize the risk of a wider

war with Hanoi and Peking. Under the aegis of Rolling Thunder program 9, which

Kim Cuong highway bridge

after attack.
105

GRADUAL EXPANSION

* For a detailed account of the bombing of Thanh Hoa (and later the Paul Doumer bridge)

in North Vietnam, see Maj. A. J. C. Lavalle, ed., The Tale of Two Bridges and The Battle for

the Skies Over North Vietnam, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Vol I (Air University, 1976).

lasted from April 2 to 8, attacks were made on four fixed targets, of which, for the

first time, three were highway and rail bridges. The bridges at Thanh Hoa, Dong

Phuong Thuong, and Dong Hoi each carried rail and vehicle traffic and were considered vital for the transportation of materiel for guerrilla operations in South

Vietnam. The Thanh Hoa bridge was the most prestigious, having been destroyed

during the French-Viet Minh war, rebuilt, and dedicated by Ho Chi Minh in 1964.

CINCPAC assigned one bridge each to the Air Force, the Navy, and the VNAF. The

bombing directive authorized a limited number of armed reconnaissance missions

and once again eased operational restrictions somewhat by allowing Air Force and

Navy aircraft to drop unexpended ordnance on rolling stock in the permissible

bombing areas or on military targets on Hon Gio (Tiger) Island off the North

Vietnamese coast rather than dumping it at sea. At the same time, the new Steel

Tiger program was launched against troops and supplies in Laos heading toward

South Vietnam.

Admiral Sharp directed the Air Force to attack the Thanh Hoa bridge, also

known by the Vietnamese as the Hong Rong (the Dragon’s Jaw). Spanning the

Song Ma River about seventy-six miles south of Hanoi, it was 540 feet long,

54 feet wide, and 50 feet above the water, the longest bridge below the 20th

parallel. It would prove to be one of the toughest targets in North Vietnam.

Bombed repeatedly in subsequent years, the bridge’s two spans were not

dropped until May 14, 1972.*

Dong Phuong Thuong

railroad and highway

bridge after attack. 
106

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

The initial assault on April 3 was planned and coordinated by the 67th TFS,

which was commanded by Lt. Col. Robinson Risner. Seventy-nine aircraft were

assembled, with forty-six F–105 Thunderchiefs forming the principal strike

force. Sixteen were loaded with a pair of AGM–12B Bullpup missiles with 250-

pound warheads, and the remaining thirty carried eight 750-pound bombs each.

Support aircraft consisted of twenty-one F–100 Super Sabres for flak suppression, weather reconnaissance, MiG and rescue CAP; two RF–101s for photoreconnaissance; and ten KC–135 tankers. The F–105s were based in Thailand, the

other tactical aircraft in South Vietnam, and the SAC tankers in Okinawa.

Launched in the afternoon, the strike aircraft hit the bridge with 254 750-pound

bombs and 266 2.75-inch rockets, inflicting considerable damage on the

bridge’s roadways and structure. However, they failed to drop the spans. Heavy

enemy groundfire exacted a penalty, downing one reconnaissance aircraft and

a Super Sabre flying flak suppression, and damaging other aircraft, including

Colonel Risner’s F–105. Despite crippled aircraft and smoke in the cockpit,

Risner continued to direct the attack and landed safely at Da Nang.15

At about the same time, Navy carrier aircraft attacked the Dong Phuong

Thuong bridge twice in three hours. Fifty-seven aircraft flew in the first attack,

thirty-eight in a strike role, and sixty-eight flew in the second, with thirty-five

in a strike role. Using general-purpose bombs and 2.75-inch rockets, the aircraft dropped the center span and inflicted other damage at the cost of one A–4

that was shot down. The strike was enlivened when, for the first time since

Rolling Thunder began, three North Vietnamese MiGs rose to challenge the

attackers. In a brief encounter, one MiG scored four or five hits on the tail and

two hits on the wing of a Navy F–8E. The MiGs escaped before fighters could

engage them. The F–8E pilot made an emergency landing at Da Nang.16

Deeply perturbed over the failure of the first strike to disable the Thanh Hoa

bridge, General McConnell personally directed General Moore to put adequate

sorties on the target. The next day, Moore dispatched sixty-eight aircraft, of

A F–105 carrying Bullpup

missiles on a mission to

North Vietnam refuels

from a KC–135.
107

GRADUAL EXPANSION

* In recognition of the award and his exploits in both the Korean and Vietnamese wars,

Colonel Risner was the subject of Time magazine’s cover story on April 23, 1965.

which forty-eight were F–105s, again loaded with 750-pound general-purpose

bombs, the remainder were F–100s for MiG and rescue CAP and weather

reconnaissance. No flak suppression strikes were ordered, reflecting the previous day’s unsuccessful attempt to silence enemy gunners. Colonel Risner again

led the mission, and for his “extraordinary heroism” in both strikes, in May he

received the first Air Force Cross awarded in the war, from Gen. John P.

McConnell, the Air Force Chief of Staff.* The Thunderchiefs attacked the stubborn target with 384 750-pound bombs and Bullpups. This attack cratered both

approaches to the bridge, blasted out large chunks of concrete, holed the rail

trestle, and caused one span to sag. North Vietnamese traffic was halted, but

only temporarily. Some aircraft struck nearby secondary targets, destroying an

estimated 74 percent of the Thanh Hoa power station facilities, thirteen pieces

of rolling stock, and some trucks.

The State Department immediately flashed Taylor that the attack on the

plant was unauthorized, but the charge was denied by PACAF and 2d Air

Division. General Wheeler soon cleared up the mystery by confessing, much to

the President’s displeasure, that he had personally authorized the attack. Also

beyond dispute was the cost of the strikes on the bridge and secondary targets:

three F–105s and their pilots downed, one by antiaircraft fire and two others by

The F–105 had a probe

for probe-and-drogue

refueling and a

receptacle for boom

refueling, one of only a

few Air Force aircraft

to be equipped for both

modes of refueling.
108

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

four North Vietnamese MiG–17s that appeared suddenly for the second time in

two days to challenge Air Force and Navy fighter-bombers.17

A MiG attack was not totally unexpected, but as General Moore explained

later, preparations to meet one were not entirely adequate. Flying at about 500

knots, the MiG–17s struck in two waves against four F–105 Thunderchiefs that

were circling at 14,000 to 17,000 feet and 375 knots about ten miles south

of the target area, waiting to strike the bridge. Pilots of the two lead

Thunderchiefs, laden with ordnance and surprised by the attack, could not

maneuver swiftly enough to shake off the attackers. They were shot down and

lost with their aircraft. Other Air Force and Navy fighters flying cover were too

far away to assist. Poststrike debriefings indicated that the MiG pilots demonstrated good training and were probably guided by the north’s GCI system. One

PACAF pilot believed he scored a hit. As the air-to-air incident appeared to be

unduly inflammatory, President Johnson informed the service chiefs he did not

want any more MiGs shot down, although circumstances would soon dictate

otherwise.18

The next day, VNAF and PACAF aircraft struck the 400-foot bridge at Dong

Hoi, the third bridge on the authorized target list. Twenty VNAF A–1Hs flew

strike and the PACAF aircraft flew support. General-purpose bombs collapsed

the center span and heavily damaged other parts of the bridge. The Defense

Department declared that the bombings had made all three bridges impassable.

Qui Vinh railroad bridge after an attack in April 1965.
109

GRADUAL EXPANSION

The fourth fixed target in program 9 was a repeat strike against a coastal early

warning radar station near Vinh Linh, the southernmost radar site in North

Vietnam. The strike was carried out on April 15 by forty-four Navy aircraft,

twenty-six in a strike profile, but only a few buildings were damaged. Reports

on the type and manner of enemy antiaircraft fire in these early strikes suggested to General Moore that some of it was controlled by radar.19

In armed reconnaissance, Navy aircraft flew two missions on April 4 over the

coastal railroad and national highway 1, the main artery from Thanh Hoa southward to Vinh. Pilot reports, unconfirmed by BDA, claimed twenty-one vehicles

destroyed, four probably destroyed, eight vehicles damaged, and eight rail cars

and one locomotive damaged. The next day, PACAF flew an armed reconnaissance foray with sixteen aircraft from the coast north of Vinh to the Laos border,

then up to the Plain of Jars and over Route 8 from Vinh to the Laotian border at

Nape Pass. The aircraft hit a truck convoy and two trains. In the first attack,

results were undetermined, and in the second, pilots claimed the destruction of

two locomotives and two nearby trucks. One F–105 was shot down. Program 9

armed reconnaissance missions were completed on April 7 when Navy aircraft

flew along the coastal railroad and highway 1 from Dong Phuong Thuong to

Vinh. Pilots reported three vehicles destroyed and eight damaged, along with one

antiaircraft and one aircraft warning site probably damaged.20

As the second weekly Rolling Thunder program neared its end, McNamara

verbally requested and Wheeler submitted an evaluation of the bombing

through April 4. Except for “damaging blows” against three major rail and

highway bridges, which slowed traffic and destroyed some enemy ammunition

and other supplies stores, Wheeler said, the air strikes “have not reduced in any

major way the capabilities of the NVN,” and the impact on Hanoi’s economy

was minimal. While the country’s military leaders were “keenly aware” of

American power, they were prepared to use their ground defenses to make the

United States “pay a good price,” and he noted, the North Vietnamese Air Force

MiGs “showed daring” in their first two attacks on U.S. Navy and Air Force

planes. The North Vietnamese navy had dispersed and its crews had been

ordered not to fire on U.S. aircraft unless attacked. Although the Hanoi regime

acted as if it were not influenced by the air strikes, intercepted messages indicated that it was adopting a range of counterbombing measures. It had partially

evacuated some population centers, launched air raid exercises and the construction of air raid shelters, and expanded its air defenses. Wheeler avoided

recommending a faster paced Rolling Thunder program, although he implied

he favored it, apparently so as not to place himself at variance with the

President who, that day, issued NSAM 328, enjoining the services to continue

operations in the north at “roughly the present slowly ascending tempo.”21

Air Staff officials objected to the tenor of Wheeler’s singular evaluation of

Rolling Thunder, observing he had not coordinated it with the other service

chiefs. The JCS chairman, they noted, particularly failed to address “the political
110

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

restraints and limited scope of air operations by type, location, and the number

of targets” in the bombing program.22

Rolling Thunder 10 (from April 9 to 15) authorized strikes on five more

bridges and two radar sites. CINCPAC assigned three bridges and the radar sites

to the Air Force, two bridges to the Navy, and authorized more armed reconnaissance. Of ten armed reconnaissance missions flown, the Air Force flew five,

the Navy three, VNAF-Air Force one, and VNAF one. On April 10, the JCS

increased to twenty-four the number of armed reconnaissance sorties allowed in

a 24-hour period. All air missions remained well below the 20th parallel.

Still relying on the F–105 Thunderchiefs as the principal strike aircraft, the Air

Force completely destroyed the Khe Kiem highway bridge and dropped one span

of each of the other bridges, the Phuong Can highway bridge and the Qui Vinh

bridge. The Navy, using A–1Hs and A–4s in a double strike, dropped the north and

center span of the Tamada rail bridge and, in a single attack, one span of the Kim

Cuong highway bridge. Approaches to the latter were cratered and nearby buildings left burning. During the first strike on the Tamada bridge, an engagement

with MiGs off of Hainan Island cost the Navy an F–4B and the North Vietnamese

a MiG. Groundfire claimed an A–4C in the second strike. A single Air Force strike

The McDonnell RF–101 Voodoo

was the mainstay of the Air Force’s

reconnaissance effort in 1965 and

1966. Above, a RF–101 lands at a

Thailand base. Left, the nose

camera of the RF–101.
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on radar sites at Hon Matt Island and Cuo Lao caused moderate damage to eleven

buildings on the island, but results at Cuo Lao were uncertain.23

The clash between the Navy and the MiGs, occurring almost simultaneously

with the Navy’s attack on the Tamada bridge on April 9, was the third aerial battle since Rolling Thunder began, but the first with a Chinese aircraft. It began

when four MiG–17s based on Hainan Island pounced on four Navy F–4B

Phantom IIs on “barrier combat patrol” in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the ensuing

battle, the MiGs, armed only with cannons, failed to score a hit, but the

Phantom crew downed one of the Chinese aircraft with a Sidewinder air-to-air

missile. This was the first aerial “kill” of the war. Unfortunately, on the return

flight to the carrier Ranger, the four Phantoms became separated, and the aircraft and the two-man crew responsible for the shootdown were lost. The

responsibility for the aerial engagement and the circumstance of the Navy’s

loss were immediately the subject of conflicting American and Chinese claims.

Peking said the Navy aircraft intruded into Chinese air space, but Navy pilots

reported that the MiG–17 attack occurred about thirty-five miles southeast of

Hainan Island; Peking further asserted that an American missile, fired at a

MiG, downed a Navy plane. The Navy initially attributed the loss of its

Phantom to insufficient fuel while it was returning to the carrier. Later, however, the Navy conceded that its air loss was apparently caused by another

Sidewinder, as the Chinese had claimed.24

The State Department received news of the aerial engagement near or over

Hainan Island—the facts were not clear—with considerable unease, as the rules of

engagement explicitly stated that “no [aerial] pursuit is authorized at this time into

the territorial waters or airspace of Communist China.” Acting Secretary of State

George Ball sought renewed assurances from Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus R.

Vance and General Wheeler that the rules would be “precisely followed.”25

Results of program 10 armed reconnaissance missions were meager. On a

double mission on April 10, Air Force pilots claimed two trucks destroyed and

three damaged. On the 15th, the Air Force hit a ferry landing and damaged a

boat, while the Navy attacked two small bridges and set ancillary buildings

ablaze, but the results of several joint Air Force-Navy strikes on gun positions,

radar sites, and trucks were unknown. On several missions, no targets were

sighted. With support from the Air Force, VNAF A–1Hs, flew one night armed

reconnaissance mission between the DMZ and Vinh, but made no target sightings, dropping their bombs on a road with unknown results.26

Program 11 (from April 16 to 22) targeted five more bridges. Three were

assigned to the Air Force (one a restrike), one to the VNAF-Air Force, and one to

the Navy. Armed reconnaissance missions were again increased: twenty-three

were flown over part or all of Routes 1, 15, 101, 102, 111, 113, and 117. As before,

targets were principally military vehicles, infiltration points or sites, and highways. The latter were cut by ordnance where possible. A special air strike was

directed for the first time against the Mu Gia Pass staging area, a vital border point
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

for infiltrating men and supplies into Laos. The maximum authorized number of

armed reconnaissance sorties for any one day remained at twenty-four.27

On April 16, the services launched their largest one-day effort against the

north in a series of strikes against bridges. Air Force F–105 Thunderchiefs hit

the heretofore unscathed Dien Chau railroad bridge and the Thai Hai highway

bridge with 296 750-pound bombs. The bombs dropped the center span and

forty feet of a second span on the first bridge and the single span of the second. A restrike on the Kim Cuong highway bridge also destroyed a span. On

the same day, twin air strikes by the Navy against the Bai Duc bridge, recently

completed and used for sending supplies into Laos, dropped one span and left

a forty-foot gap in the other. In another Navy attack, an AGM–12B Bullpup

missile dropped the span of the Xom Ca Trang highway bridge. On the 20th,

eight VNAF A–1Hs were joined for the first time by eight Air Force F–100

Super Sabres in an attack on the My Duc highway bridge. The bridge was

destroyed, but groundfire claimed one of the Vietnamese Skyraiders.28

Twenty-six armed reconnaissance missions were flown during program 11,

and a small number of trucks, buildings, boats, and boxcars were destroyed or

damaged. The most lucrative target, spotted by Navy pilots, was a convoy of 80

to 100 trucks that stretched over eight to ten miles. A smaller convoy of 16 to

20 trucks was also spotted. Results of many of the armed reconnaissance

strikes were unknown. Losses during the week of 16–22 April consisted of an

Air Force F–105 on the 17th and one VNAF A–1H on the 19th.29

Measuring 350 feet in length, the four-span Xom Ca Trang highway

bridge was situated between the convoy staging areas along Route

12 and the Mu Gia Pass. The bridge was struck on April 16,

1965, with one span completely destroyed.
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* Two high-flying U–2s of SAC’s 4080th Strategic Wing arrived at Bien Hoa AB, South

Vietnam, on February 13, 1964, to begin reconnaissance missions over Cambodia, Laos,

and North Vietnam. Over North Vietnam, except when haze, clouds, and bad weather interfered, the U–2s could acquire usable, oblique coverage of SAM sites and other targets from

a distance of about seventeen n.m.

As usual, Hanoi continued to make extravagant claims, stating that seven U.S.

aircraft were shot down and many others damaged during the large-scale raids on

bridges on the 16th. In fact, North Vietnamese newspapers and journals, which

were almost totally propagandistic and engaged in domestic morale building,

provided little substantive information on the impact of Rolling Thunder operations. American “air pirates” reportedly struck mostly homes, schools, hospitals,

dikes, and other civilian targets, and casualties invariably were only women, children, the elderly, and the wounded. If roads, bridges, factories, and other military

installations were hit occasionally, civilian workers repaired them in record time,

thus minimizing any traffic or production slowdowns.30

Countering the North’s Air Defenses

However, Hanoi’s actions belied much of its propaganda: in late March and

early April, its air defense forces were attempting to blunt the impact of the bombing. In addition to augmenting their automatic weapons and artillery units, the

forces deployed a new weapon. Photos taken by a U–2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft on April 5, 1965 disclosed for the first time an SA–2 surface-to-air

missile site under construction about fifteen miles southeast of Hanoi.*31 The JCS

A Bullpup missile launched from an F–105 over North Vietnam.
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unanimously urged the destruction of the site and others that might be detected

before they became operable.32 McNamara deferred a decision pending discussions with the State Department and the White House, but authorized the services

to maintain a 48-hour alert for a strike on the site.33 A strike order was not forthcoming. Washington’s civilian authorities were still committed to limiting the

bombing well below the Hanoi-Haiphong area and were inclined to discount the

seriousness of the SA–2 threat. One high-ranking civilian, John T. McNaughton,

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, believed that the

sole purpose of the Soviet Union in placing missiles around Hanoi was to bolster

the sagging morale of the North Vietnamese, not to fire them against aircraft, an

assumption that was proved incorrect on July 23, 1965, when the first missiles

downed a PACAF F–4C Phantom.34 Only then were Air Force and Navy pilots

authorized to attack missile sites.

In the interval between initial detection and the first air strike against the

SA–2 sites, the services undertook a series of measures to increase the protection

of their aircraft from a possible SAM attack. On April 8, SAC was instructed

to install “System 12” electronic countermeasures equipment in its U–2s in

Southeast Asia. This equipment was designed to warn pilots if they were being

tracked by the SAM’s Fan Song radar, but it had very limited jamming capability. Pending the installation of improved “System 15” ECM equipment, U–2

pilots were directed not to fly within thirty n.m. of known SA–2 sites.35

However, SAC was permitted to launch some of its unmanned reconnaissance drones over the Hanoi area for the first time. First known as the model

147B Lightening Bug, and produced by the Ryan Corporation, the early drones

were improved by lengthening their fuselage and extending their wing span

until they achieved a speed of Mach .74, an altitude of 60,000 feet, and a range

of 1,200 n.m. These models, redesignated 147D and assigned to SAC’s 4080th

Strategic Wing, were first tested in early 1962 and sent to Southeast Asia in

A U–2 at Bien Hoa Air Base in 1965.
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GRADUAL EXPANSION

1964, where they began operational reconnaissance missions. Launched from a

DC–130A based at Bien Hoa AB in South Vietnam, at first the drones did not

penetrate deeply into North Vietnam.36

Blue Spring operations consisted of four elements: an Air Force DC–130A

“mother ship” for launch and control, the drone itself with reconnaissance gear,

a ground control station for drone recovery, and a helicopter for drone retrieval.

By the end of 1964, SAC had launched nineteen drones, of which thirteen were

considered very successful in terms of launch, photography, and retrieval, while

six failed to return. By the spring of 1965, Blue Spring photography had added

significantly to the gathering of targeting and other data in North Vietnam.37

However, the drones were not used to assist in locating SAM sites by electronic means until mid-1965. This task, and the related task of locating a growing array of other North Vietnamese air defense radars was conducted almost

entirely by tactical aircraft. The Navy led off on April 16 when several of its

carrier-based EA–1Fs flew their first ECM mission over the north. The Air

Force followed on April 29, using three RF–101 Voodoos, hastily refitted with

QRC–160-1 ECM pods designed to jam the SA–2 Fan Song radar. The retrofit

began in the middle of April, with the pods drawn hastily from Fifth Air Force

bases at Misawa, Japan, and Kadena, Okinawa. After May 5, PACAF’s ECM

effort was augmented by five EF–10B ECM aircraft of the Marine Composite

Reconnaissance Squadron based at Da Nang, and Air Force, Marine, and Navy

ECM operations were normally coordinated by the 2d Air Division.

An F–8 launching from the USS Hancock.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* For further discussion of the antiaircraft radar and SA–2 threat and Air Force electronic

countermeasures, see Lt. Col. Robert M. Burch, Tactical Electronic Warfare Operations in

Southeast Asia, 1962–1968 (Proj CHECO, 1969); Bernard C. Nalty, Tactics and Techniques in Electronic Countermeasures in the Air War Against North Vietnam, 1965–1973,

(Ofc AF Hist, 1977); and Earl E. Tilford, Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam

(College Station, Tex: 1993), pp 81–84.

PACAF’s use of the QRC–160-1 pods was brief. The pods were not built to

endure in-flight vibrations, which loosened internal parts and caused the

RF–101 wing tips to tuck, creating a safety hazard. They were soon removed and

sent to the United States. Meanwhile, in April, a first group of four Douglas

Destroyer RB–66Bs and two EB–66Cs of the 9th Tactical Reconnaissance

Squadron at Shaw AFB, South Carolina arrived at Tan Son Nhut AB. Three of

the RB–66Bs with night photo and infrared sensor equipment were put to work

immediately on reconnaissance missions over South Vietnam. The EB–66Cs

began flying missions against the north’s air defense radars on May 7. Before

the end of May, two more EB–66Cs arrived from Shaw AFB, and all of the

Douglas Destroyers then redeployed from Tan Son Nhut to Takhli in Thailand.

Normally carrying a pilot, a navigator, and four electronic warfare officers, the

EB–66Cs alerted strike pilots to the approximate location of enemy radars, analyzed the signals, and frequently attempted to jam them with chaff. 

The EB–66s were most effective in reducing the ability of North Vietnamese

antiaircraft gun crews to direct fire by radar. ECM operators reported frequent

successes in breaking Fire Can radar lock-ons, but disrupting SA–2 missile

radar was another matter. Although the EB–66C crews—and aircrews of Navy

and Marine ECM aircraft—later developed the ability to warn other aircraft of

some SAM areas when conducting a strike, aircrews generally found the ECM

equipment only marginally effective or, in some instances, obsolescent. After

a SAM destroyed an Air Force F–105 Thunderchief on July 23, heralding the

enemy’s intent to use them, the services separately embarked on crash programs

to correct many of the deficiencies of the airborne ECM equipment in use in

Southeast Asia.*38

Meanwhile, the overall air defense threat became more formidable. At least

twenty different types of “radar threats” were soon identified and included radars

for early warning, height finding, SA–2 target acquisition, tracking and guidance, gun laying, and airborne intercept. The most difficult to defeat were the

north’s early warning and GCI radars with their frequent signal diversity, good

overlapping coverage, and cross-tell communications net. The frequency diversities required U.S. ECM aircraft to carry a wide variety of jammers to provide

full spectrum capability against all of the frequency bands. However, the north’s

principal EW/GCI radars were equipped with antijam features and were not very

vulnerable to the equipment on a single ECM aircraft. As a result, several
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EB–66Cs were launched against a single target or group of targets employing a

combination of electronic jamming, chaff, and crossing tracks. They could

degrade EW/GCI in a given area, but could not render it entirely ineffective.39

The north’s air defense system included its small force of Soviet-built MiGs

that had been based at Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi since the U.S. Tonkin Gulf

air strike of August 5, 1964. As noted earlier, a squadron of F–4C Phantoms

was based at Udorn to challenge the Phuc Yen MiGs if necessary.40 For more

defense against the MiGs, on March 18, General Harris, the PACAF commander, asked Admiral Sharp to approve the deployment of five Air Force Lockheed

EC–121D Big Eye aircraft to provide a “MiG watch,” while American aircraft

flew missions over the north. Admiral Sharp’s initial response was to claim there

was insufficient logistic and unit “beddown” information about the EC–121Ds

to warrant soliciting JCS support for the deployment of the aircraft.41 However,

the MiG attack on a Navy F–8E on April 3 and the loss of two Air Force

F–105D Thunderchiefs the next day during a strike on the Thanh Hoa bridge

sparked the decision-making process. Washington immediately authorized the

deployment of Big Eye aircraft.42

The F–4C Phantoms of the 45th Tactical Fighter Squadron of the 8th

Tactical Fighter Wing, from George AFB, California, arrived at Udorn RTAFB

on April 7. Like most air units, they were assigned for a 120-day TDY. The

Phantoms flew their first MiG combat air patrol for the workhorse F–105s on

the 9th (they did not fly a primary strike mission until May 30).43 On April 4,

five Big Eye EC–121 aircraft with 153 aircrew and supporting personnel of the

552d Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWC) Wing began to deploy to

Southeast Asia from McClellan AFB, California. The first two aircraft, each

A McDonnell Douglas Phantom II armed with air-to-air Sparrow missiles.
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* Several special studies have described in considerable detail the procedures employed by

Big Eye (redesignated College Eye on March 9, 1967) aircraft in airborne control of fighters in Southeast Asia. See especially Capt. Carl W. Reddell, College Eye, Special Report

(Proj CHECO, 1968), and Grover C. Jarret, History of College Eye, Apr 1965–Jun 1969

(ADC, Ofc of Command and Hist, 1969).

with a normal seven-man crew and eleven radar operators, analysts, and maintenance personnel, arrived at Tainan Air Station, Taiwan on April 16, then

redeployed quickly to Tan Son Nhut AB, South Vietnam, their forward operating base, and began flying missions during the week of April 16–22. Employing

a water-reflecting AN/APS–95 search radar, the EC–121Ds initially flew in a

racetrack pattern at an altitude of only 50 to 300 feet about fifty miles off the

North Vietnamese coast. Soon afterwards, they adopted the tactic of flying in

groups of two, one at high altitude, the other low, although single missions were

sometimes flown at either high or low altitude. Although the radar equipment in

the aircraft was designed principally for operations over water, it also permitted

surveillance over land areas. Besides providing early warning of hostile aircraft,

the EC–121Ds served as airborne communications relay centers and assisted in

the search for targets and rescue of downed pilots. If necessary, they could provide on-station support twenty-four hours per day. Later, as Rolling Thunder

strikes were conducted closer to the Chinese border, the Big Eye aircraft

provided border warning for Air Force and Navy combat pilots.*44

About fourteen F–104 Starfighters of the 476th Tactical Fighter Squadron of

the 479th Tactical Fighter Wing from George AFB were deployed with the Big

Eye aircraft. Earmarked to fly cover for the EC–121Ds, they began to arrive at

Kung Kuan AB, Taiwan, on April 7. From there, many were sent to Da Nang

AB as their forward operating base. Most of the squadron’s Starfighters were

normally stationed there.45

Although the F–4Cs and EC–121s reduced the MiG threat somewhat, the

most effective countermeasure, namely the bombing of the principal North

Vietnamese airfields, was still prohibited by Washington authorities. Phuc Yen,

which sheltered most of the MiGs, lay well above the current bomb line at the

20th parallel. It was further protected by the zone of forty nautical miles around

Hanoi and Haiphong established by Washington authorities near the end

of March to prevent intrusion into this sensitive area. Since authorization to

bomb the MiG airfields appeared highly remote for the time being, air commanders fashioned a plan to conduct ostensibly separate Air Force and Navy

air strikes on two North Vietnamese targets as a ruse to “flush” the MiGs into

the air where they could be destroyed. Prepared by CINCPAC in coordination

with PACAF, PACFLT, and the JCS, the plan went to McNamara on April 22,

but elicited no immediate response. Frequently revised, it was not used for

many months.46
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Washington’s prohibition against MiG base attacks lasted until April 1967

when the North Vietnamese Air Force began large-scale attacks on Air Force and

Navy Rolling Thunder aircraft and could no longer be ignored. Until then, the

services were frustrated that they were not allowed to strike more important

military targets. The Washington-imposed strictures highlighted the widely

divergent viewpoints of high civilian officials and military commanders, with the

former clearly reluctant to permit air strikes that might be considered unduly

provocative.47

The Honolulu Conference of April 1965

Another divisive issue affecting bombing strategy was whether more U.S.

and allied troops were needed immediately in South Vietnam. Ambassador

Taylor had left Washington for Saigon late on April 2 after the NSC deliberations that produced NSAM 328. The basic U.S. objectives of the NSAM were

the continuation of “the slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations,” more military and nonmilitary assistance for the Saigon government,

and, most significantly, “a change in mission” for the U.S. Marines guarding

Da Nang Air Base. This meant that for the first time the Marines were permitted to engage in offensive as well as defensive operations.

Between April 8 and 18, however, numerous JCS and Department of Defense

dispatches to Taylor and Westmoreland indicated that President Johnson and his

advisers were increasingly alarmed about the deteriorating situation in the

south. Convinced that “something new” had to be added to achieve victory,

the President believed the South Vietnamese Army could be revitalized by the

Lockheed F-104 Starfighters at Da Nang Air Base, December 1965.
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insertion of U.S. troops into its ranks, and by the participation of more U.S. and

allied battalion-size units. He specifically cited the possible deployments of the

U.S. Army’s 173d Brigade and combat units from Australia and Korea. Although

Taylor and NSC members had discussed these and other options at the NSC

meetings on April 1 and 2, none were approved at that time. Now, Taylor

was asked to obtain immediate approval of the additional deployments from

Premier Phan Huy Quat, who assumed leadership of a new Saigon government

on February 16. The ambassador subsequently characterized the switch in

administration policy as “the product of Washington’s initiative, flogged to a

new level of creativity by a President determined to get prompt results.”48

Asking for clarification, Taylor noted the Quat government was still digesting a mountain of military and nonmilitary programs imposed by the United

States. He expressed alarm over the administration’s “far greater willingness to

get into [a] ground war,” than he discerned during his recent trip to the capital

to participate in the NSC deliberations. Believing Vietnam’s internal situation

still did not warrant a large infusion of U.S. and allied troops, he urged that the

proposed deployments be discussed at a conference scheduled for April 20–21

in Honolulu.49

The two-day conclave met as scheduled. In attendance were Secretary

McNamara; General Wheeler; John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of

Defense for International Security Affairs; William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary

of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Ambassador Taylor; General Westmoreland; and

Admiral Sharp. Other ranking officials, including General Harris, were present,

but they were excluded from the principal meeting held on April 20.

The conference’s minutes and McNamara’s summary of the decisions

reached and sent to the President on April 21 indicated that South Vietnam’s

problems remained paramount. The seven principal conferees agreed that the

DRV-VC could not be expected to capitulate or provide acceptable terms for

ending the war in less than six months and that a war settlement would come

as much or more from VC failure in the south as DRV “pain” in the north.

Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp, and Westmoreland agreed that the strategy should be

“to break the will of the DRV by denying it victory. It was thus vital to hold on

in the south and avoid a “spectacular defeat” of the Saigon government or U.S

forces. The recent lull in the war was the quiet before the storm.

The majority view called for the addition of 100,000 to 160,000 to South

Vietnam’s existing armed forces, then at 450,000 men. Also, overriding Taylor’s

position, the U.S. military presence in the south should be increased from

33,500 to 82,000, with the further addition of 7,250 troops from Korean,

Australian, and New Zealand contingents. A U.S. Army airmobile division of

about 15,800 men, Korean troops equal to a full division, and a U.S. Marine

expeditionary force totaling 24,800 men were also planned for later deployment.

In addressing the Rolling Thunder program, the conferees assigned it a role

subordinate to air and ground operations in South Vietnam. According to the
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record, no one argued for a more aggressive program, at least for the time

being. According to the Defense Secretary:

They all think...the present tempo is about right, that sufficient pressure is provided by repetition and continuation. All of them envision a

strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more,

avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. There

might be fewer fixed targets or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. 

Taylor expressed a shared view that it was important “not to kill the

hostage” by destroying the North Vietnam’s “assets” inside the “Hanoi donut”

or sanctuary area. While all believed that the strike program was essential psychologically and physically, “it cannot be expected to do the job alone.” The

seven principals also agreed that strikes against the north should continue during

any “talks” between Washington and Hanoi with a view to finding a solution to

the conflict. However, with regard to the allocation of air power in the war theater, Rolling Thunder should be accorded only second priority; first priority

was assigned to South Vietnam. If there were insufficient aircraft to perform all

tasks, then more air units should be deployed.50

Admiral Sharp quickly dispatched the air priority decision to his Air Force

and Navy commanders, adding that Rolling Thunder requirements, in turn,

would take precedence over the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger interdiction and the

Yankee Team reconnaissance air programs in Laos.51

Needless to say, the Air Force would have given Rolling Thunder first priority in the war and opposed a ground-oriented strategy in the south. Reviewing

the implications of the Honolulu decision for General McConnell, General

Harris warned that there might not be sufficient airbases in South Vietnam to

permit the Air Force to quickly increase air support for ground operations. He

solicited the assistance of the Air Force Chief of Staff in securing fast approval

of a PACAF request for the emergency construction of a new jet base. The use

of USAF jets based in Thailand was not very practical because of their distance

from the battlefield and, in any event, their use in South Vietnam was still prohibited by the Thai government. Service interest, said Harris, also dictated

rapid expansion of South Vietnam’s bases for USAF aircraft. Unless this was

done “we will find both [the] Marine Corps and carrier based aircraft taking

over a portion of USAF responsibilities and missions.” In fact, the current

shortage of airbases prompted the Navy to stress the “political flexibility” of

the carrier.52

Approving the decisions taken at the Honolulu conference, President Johnson directed the deployment of more U.S. Army, Marine, and allied units to

South Vietnam. In a news conference on April 27, he restated America’s commitment to stand firm against the communists, condemned the provocations of
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the Viet Cong, and said only military targets in the north would be hit until

aggression ceased. He reaffirmed a willingness to “talk to any government, anywhere, anytime, without conditions,” to achieve a settlement of the war.53

In news conferences in Honolulu and Washington, Secretary McNamara also

discussed the communist threat and the administration’s strategy for defeating

it. He stressed the “very high level” of infiltration of men and materiel by land

through Laos, by sea across the beaches of South Vietnam, and the delivery of

weapons to the Viet Cong by China and other communist countries. Justifying

the “South Vietnamese first” strategy, he said that the south’s military, paramilitary, and police forces needed to be enlarged because it was in the south where

the “war against the guerrilla is being fought and it’s there we must direct our

primary attention.”

The Defense Secretary defended the limited nature of Rolling Thunder operations being conducted largely below the 20th parallel. The air strikes, he said,

had already reduced the movement of men and materiel “significantly” and

“adversely” affected the morale of the Viet Cong. Strikes against bridges in the

DRV had proved successful and of twenty-seven highway and rail bridges struck

The Phu Dien Chau railroad bridge after it was attacked

on April 17, 1965, and the main span destroyed.
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thus far by American and South Vietnamese aircraft, twenty-four were destroyed

or so severely damaged as to render them unusable. Targets were restricted to

bridges, transit points, barracks, supply and ammunition depots, and lines of

communication. The aerial objective was “to force [the North Vietnamese] off the

rails onto the highways and off the highways onto their feet.” If the Soviets introduced antiaircraft SAMs into the north as anticipated, “we have ways and means

of taking care of them.” The Defense Secretary said that he and Secretary of State

Rusk agreed on the danger of halting the bombing as some foreign governments

desired lest it be interpreted as a major American military defeat and bring about

the collapse of the Saigon government.54

Rolling Thunder’s Moderate Pace Continues

The administration’s commitment to a gradually escalating bombing program was manifested in Rolling Thunder program 12 for April 23–29. The JCS

approved attacks on eight bridges and seven ferries along major road and rail

lines. The directive also relaxed operating rules somewhat by approving a few

My Duc highway bridge photographed by an RF–101 that

also recorded the shadow of its passing, April 1965.
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A DC–130 releases a reconnaissance drone (top), and reconnaissance

drones with the DC–130 carrier behind them (above). 
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* For an account of Blindbat and other Air Force night operations in Southeast Asia, see

Maj. Victor B. Anthony, The Air Force in Southeast Asia, Tactics and Techniques of Night

Operations, 1961–1970 (Ofc AF Hist, 1972).

more night missions and lifting a ban on flying more than twenty-four armed

reconnaissance sorties in a 24-hour period, enabling pilots to hit trucks and

rolling stock that had been missed during preplanned missions. Also, for the

first time, the JCS permitted pilots to fly in “successive waves” of aircraft

(rather than to conduct single strike missions) against primary targets, and to

use any unexpended ordnance on targets of opportunity along specified routes

in addition to dropping it on the North Vietnamese-held Hon Gio (Tiger) Island

off the North Vietnamese coast.55

At the end of the week, Air Force, Navy, and VNAF pilots reported they had

destroyed or seriously damaged all of the authorized bridges and had hit hard several ferries and ferry ramps. They also claimed to have destroyed or damaged an

estimated 150 buildings, dozens of railroad cars and trucks, a number of enemy

antiaircraft sites, and to have made numerous road cuts. F–105 Thunderchiefs

remained the Air Force’s principal “workhorse” for these operations.

Meanwhile, on April 22, two Air Force B–57s of the 3d Bombardment Wing

at Clark AB, the Philippines, attached to the 34th Tactical Group at Bien Hoa,

South Vietnam, flew their first night armed reconnaissance missions over

North Vietnam, damaging an estimated six trucks and six buildings. In the last

week of April, six B–57s were dispatched on four different nights to search for

trucks and other targets of opportunity and to cut enemy roads with bombs and

“seed” them with mines. On the night of May 4/5, the Air Force made its first

use over the north of Blindbat C–130 flare and navigation aircraft. They were

used as pathfinders for B–57s that normally carried 500-pound and 750-pound

general-purpose bombs and 2.75-inch rockets.* Since most C–130/B–57 night

operations produced uncertain or unknown results, not many were flown in the

ensuing weeks and months. Not until the arrival of the better equipped F–4C

Phantom jets of the 68th TFS in September 1965 did the Air Force launch Night

Owl operations and significantly step up its night activities over the north. In

the interim, the Navy flew most night missions.56

The cost of the week’s strike effort was fairly heavy. Enemy gunners damaged seven Air Force aircraft—five F–105s and two F–100s—the VNAF lost

one A–1H and suffered damage to another, and the Navy sustained damage to

ten aircraft.57 Rolling Thunder 12 ended the initial air campaign against the

north’s major road and rail targets, especially bridges, south of the 20th parallel that began with program 9 on April 2.58

The next two Rolling Thunder programs, 13 (from April 30–May 6) and 14

(May 7–13) singled out fewer primary fixed targets and placed greater emphasis on day and night armed reconnaissance missions. Pilots were directed to
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

concentrate on rail and road traffic, ferries, lighters, radar sites, secondary

bridges, road repair equipment, and staging areas. Beginning with program 13,

the number of preplanned armed reconnaissance aircraft authorized for a single day was raised from 24 to 40, with a maximum of 200 during the week. The

total authorized sorties could be exceeded by six sorties per day to hit trucks,

rolling stock, and naval craft that were discovered late. To exceed the maximum

authorized numbers, Air Force and Navy air commanders had to obtain permission from CINCPAC.59

Program 14 concentrated more armed reconnaissance against the north’s coastal

regions to destroy more enemy naval boats and other types of watercraft in estuaries, at moorings, and in the vicinity of coastal islands. Return fire was authorized

on any air mission, and henceforth, pilots could jettison their loads on Tiger Island,

radar sites on Hon Nieu and Hon Matt Islands, and on the Dong Hoi barracks.

About twenty Rolling Thunder missions were flown in program 13 and twentytwo in program 14. Attacks on significant fixed targets included a restrike on the

enduring Thanh Hoa bridge, an initial strike on Vinh airfield, and a restrike on the

Xom Trung Hoa barracks. Again, numerous smaller bridges were targeted.

For the restrike on Thanh Hoa bridge, whose defenses had been increased,

on May 7 General Moore dispatched a composite strike force of sixty-four aircraft coordinated by Maj. Charles A. Watry of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing

based at Korat. The force included twenty-eight F–105s that pounded the

bridge and the surrounding area with 356 750-pound bombs and 304 2.75-inch

rockets. While Major Watry was leading the first attack element, groundfire hit

a Thunderchief whose pilot was able to reach the Tonkin Gulf, where he bailed

out and was quickly rescued. Several other aircraft were also damaged, including Watry’s. Hit in the wing by flak, Watry’s plane began leaking fuel. Despite

On April 14, 1966, the Viet Cong mounted a surprise mortar

attack against Tan Son Nhut Air Base. A firetruck sprays

foam on a burning storage tank (left), and flames

engulf another tank hit by mortar fire (right). 
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GRADUAL EXPANSION

* Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers subsequently underscored the general lack of Air Force training in fusing bombs properly. “I am amazed...how few people know weapons and effects

...It’s understandable if you think about it. The average pilot never drops a...live bomb

until he goes to war. There are a few expended in the United States for demonstration purposes...that’s the only time we...expend live munitions....The fusing is so critical as far as

the damage that [the] bomb is going to do vis-à-vis a given target.” (Intvw, Maj. Richard B.

Clement and Capt. Ralph G. Swentson with Gen. Meyers, May 27, 1970, pp 73–74).

uncertainty about his own aircraft’s chances of survival, he continued to direct

other strike aircraft to the target area, radioing all the while to other aircrews

the location of antiaircraft guns, intensity of fire, and other bombing information. For his heroism and leadership, he won the Silver Star.

The attack severely cratered the eastern approach to the bridge and railroad, and

moderately damaged the eastern end of the truss and abutment, but the two spans

remained standing. Later that day, General Moore dispatched two more strike aircraft against the bridge, but their ordnance caused no further visible damage.

Nonetheless, the attacks again halted all traffic across the bridge temporarily.60

General Moore and his fellow commanders were chagrined over the losses

sustained in bombing the Thanh Hoa bridge and the failure to drop the spans

completely. A poststrike assessment offered several lessons. First, much ordnance was wasted on the bridge, chiefly because the 750-pound general-purpose

bombs normally exploded into fragments and had little penetration capability.

Second, pilots and operations personnel generally had little knowledge about

fusing bombs.* Third, large numbers of aircraft attacking the bridge at the same

time led to excessive bombing errors with some circular error probabilities

(CEPs) reaching 700 feet. Skip bombing, which required pilots to drop their

bombs at low altitude, was considered too risky. In view of these problems,

Moore and his aides decided not to bomb Thanh Hoa bridge again until the Air

Force obtained an improved AGM–12C Bullpup missile with a 1,000-pound

The remains of a C–47

destroyed in the April 14

attack at Tan Son Nhut.
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warhead (delivery was expected by about July 1, 1965), and to limit future

attack missions to only four to eight aircraft.61

On May 8, an Air Force restrike on the Xom Trung Hoa barracks and supply area produced better results. Sixty-two planes, led by twenty-eight F–105s,

destroyed between thirty-four and forty buildings, leaving most of the barracks

area in ruins. On the same day, the Navy hit a North Vietnamese airfield at

Vinh, which contained radar equipment and warehouses. This was a double

strike, with about eighty-four aircraft dispatched for each mission, and fortysix and forty-eight in strike profiles. Dropping about 160 tons of bombs in the

two raids, the assaults cratered the runway in fourteen places, damaged six of

seventeen buildings in the area, inflicted further damage on the nearby Vinh

radar site, and destroyed eight buildings in a warehouse area. Two aircraft were

lost and two damaged in the attacks. Both the Air Force and the Navy attacks

also struck numerous secondary bridges.62

Rolling Thunder program 14 completed about eight weeks of bombing that

began on March 2, 1965 with program 5. By now, all of the north’s primary and

principal secondary roads south of the 20th parallel had sustained the loss of

one or more bridges. Most of the sorties were scheduled for armed reconnaissance, as relatively few were needed against fixed targets. Every day, armed

reconnaissance pilots looked for trucks, rail cars, locomotives, boats, small

bridges, and hidden radar and antiaircraft sites. State Department officials carefully scrutinized each Rolling Thunder program, often deleting certain targets and

modifying early drafts of proposed strike execute orders to CINCPAC, to avoid

any precipitous increase in the bombing tempo. The President continued to

make the final decisions on the intensity of the aerial assault on the north in

coordination with Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and other advisers.

BDA results were most easily obtained from fixed targets. However, for the

hundreds of armed reconnaissance missions flown, destruction and damage results

were based principally on pilot “eyeball” observation or surmise. Secondary explosions, for example, suggested a successful strike on fuel or ammunition stores.

North Vietnamese gunners continued to exact a heavy price for the Rolling

Thunder attacks. In programs 13 and 14 combined (April 30–May 13), the Air

Force lost one RF–101, one F–105, and sustained damage to six aircraft. The

Navy lost three aircraft and nine were damaged.63

Although generally gratified by the authorizations to strike more targets in

the north, the Joint Chiefs—and especially Air Force and Navy commanders—

chafed over the restrictions against bombing more important targets in the

Hanoi-Haiphong area, well above the 20th parallel. Two highly desirable objectives still off limits to pilots were the first SA–2 site near Hanoi, photographed

by a U–2 aircraft on April 5, and Haiphong harbor. In late April, the State

Department denied permission for overt attacks on both. Hitting the SA–2

sites, it said, would be “a big step up the escalation ladder” and increase the

hazard of a direct confrontation with Hanoi and Peking.64
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GRADUAL EXPANSION

Haiphong harbor, now hosting many more Soviet and other communist ships

laden with supplies, was obviously a more sensitive target. Seeking an indirect

way to reduce shipping, McNamara queried the services about the feasibility of

using air strikes to sink the dredges that maintained harbor depths. Admiral

Sharp opposed sinking the dredges from the air. He feared the numerous antiaircraft guns in the area would take a high toll and believed the harbor could be

closed more easily by mining.65 However, the JCS considered an air strike feasible, noting that of seven known dredges in the area, only one, a large SC–8

suction dredge, was used to keep the channel clear. If this dredge were eliminated, the harbor channel would silt up in about six months, effectively closing

Haiphong harbor to shipping. The service chiefs estimated that six aircraft, plus

antiflak and other air support, could sink the dredge and ordered Admiral Sharp

to prepare a plan to do so.66 When the plan was completed, however, McNamara

made no further decision on the proposal. In fact, except for a few targets,

Haiphong and its harbor would remain untouched by U.S. fighter-bombers until

May 1972.67 Only then, in the wake of a large-scale North Vietnamese invasion

of South Vietnam, would President Richard M. Nixon impose an air and naval

blockade on all of the north’s major seaports and order its harbors mined.

Expansion of the Leaflet Program

With the gradual expansion northward of Rolling Thunder strikes during

April and early May, American planners decided to expand leaflet dropping

operations in the north. Although millions of leaflets had already been scattered under the aegis of MACV’s covert Operations Plan 34A, their impact on

the North Vietnamese was not yet perceptible. The new and expanded program,

authorized by NSAM 328 of April 6, 1965, would be overt with no attempt to

disguise the nationality of the aircraft employed for the missions.68

Officials placed great store in the new leaflet program, which was assigned

the nickname Fact Sheet. With the concurrence of MACV and the United States

Information Service (USIS) representatives in Saigon, Ambassador Taylor advised Washington that the leaflets, together with the air strikes, promised to have

a “dramatic psychological impact” on the Hanoi regime. The messages, he said,

would make credible U.S. policy not to destroy the DRV, warn Hanoi’s leaders of

the ability to drop bombs as easily as leaflets, and demonstrate the United States’

willingness to intensify the bombing until Hanoi ceased its support of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos.

The first major leaflet mission, flown on April 14, was conducted by four

F–100 Super Sabres over the cities of Dong Hoi, Ha Tinh, Vinh, and Thanh

Hoa, all well below the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Leaflet messages underscored

China’s role in the war, the slavish relationship of the north’s leadership with

the Chinese, and the necessity for air strikes to blunt China’s aggression and

VC-NVA killing of South Vietnamese people.
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They warned the populace to avoid military installations, industrial plants,

and communication centers. The F–100s also dropped translations of President

Johnson’s Johns Hopkins University address of April 7, in which he proposed

“unconditional discussions” to terminate hostilities.

The second and third leaflet missions were conducted on April 17 and 19

over the same four cities, plus Bai Thuong, Ha Trung, Phu Qui, and Phu Diem

Chau. The fourth leaflet drop, on April 28, again carried out by four F–100s,

scattered about one million leaflets on Cua Rao, Khe Bo, Muong Seng, and

Cong Cuong. These told the populace to stay away from military targets and

promised that strike aircraft would try to avoid harming North Vietnamese

civilians. In the following weeks the leaflet drops increased in volume and frequency and extended over larger areas of North Vietnam.69

Cautious Optimism on Bombing Results

In early May, as authorities in Washington prepared to test Hanoi’s willingness to begin peace negotiations, American civilian and military officials

expressed varying degrees of optimism about the war. McNamara believed that

the U.S. and VNAF strikes on the north, the new Steel Tiger program, and the

recent arrival of four battalions of U.S. Marines had halted the military and

political deterioration of the previous eighteen months in South Vietnam and

had improved military and civilian morale. However, he considered it premature to assess the impact of all military actions on the Hanoi regime’s morale

and capability.70

Commanders and analysts at PACOM and PACAF were likewise guardedly

“upbeat” in their assessments. Admiral Sharp saw progress in both North

Vietnam and Laos and urged Washington to approve more targets and speed up

the pace of the bombing. Air strikes, he said, had disrupted road and rail movements in the north and had completely changed the pattern of logistic support

to Laos as the Pathet Lao were more dependent than the Viet Cong on DRV

support. PACAF intelligence analysts were quite optimistic, observing that in

addition to destroying bridges, trucks, rail cars, and other targets in the north, the

air program had forced the Hanoi government to relocate some of its agencies,

divert manpower to road and rail repair work, caused food shortages, and

eroded morale. In Laos, bombing had disrupted supply shipments to South

Vietnam, and in both Laos and North Vietnam, the DRV had been forced to

deploy more antiaircraft weapons and institute other air defense measures. In

the next few months, it appeared likely that Hanoi would have to choose

between accepting Soviet and Chinese domination, because of its excessive

dependency of their supplies, or the possibility of defeat in South Vietnam.71

PACAF’s operations analysts took a more sober view of Rolling Thunder’s

achievements thus far, noting that “bridge busting” and armed reconnaissance

operations below the 20th parallel had not damaged Hanoi’s logistic system too
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severely. Poststrike reconnaissance of bridge bombings, they said, revealed the

DRV’s skill at adapting. Of twenty-three bridges struck between April 4 and

May 10, five were bypassed within one to five days and eight between one and

thirty days, chiefly by repairing the bridges, using ferries, and fording streams.

The DRV also made frequent use of floating spans at water crossings, of men

and animals to carry supplies, and they built many points for staging, rest, and

refueling on key routes located within one day’s walking distance from each

other. Nine such points were spotted on Routes 12 and 101. Although aerial

attacks had apparently reduced supply movements, the DRV could still readily

transport the estimated 101 tons of supplies required daily by VC-NVA forces

in southern North Vietnam, southern Laos, and South Vietnam. Indeed, the

DRV’s supply capability considerably exceeded its current rate of supply movements and was sufficient to transport up to 300 tons of supplies per day to the

DMZ and 175 tons daily into Laos. To thwart interdiction, the Hanoi regime

recruited thousands of laborers—the number would eventually reach an estimated 500,000—to repair its rail lines, roads, and bridges.72

Although there was sufficient poststrike photography for PACAF to make early

assessments of the impact of Rolling Thunder operations, its BDA interpreters very

soon faced increasing difficulty in determining what all of the Air Force, Navy, and

VNAF air strikes were accomplishing. A growing profusion of BDA photos and

insufficient numbers of adequately trained photo interpreters quickly led to a glut

of unanalyzed photos. This problem would be exacerbated as more strike and

armed reconnaissance missions were approved by Washington in the coming

months. Another problem, especially for the Air Force, was that the JCS relied principally on analysts with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington,

who represented all four services in assessing strike results and their impact on the

Hanoi regime in moving troops and supplies towards South Vietnam.73
A KC–135 refuels a flight of F–105s during a mission to North Vietnam.
133

* For a discussion of events leading to the brief bombing halt in May 1965, see George C.

Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, 1994), pp 96–97 and 125; and

Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of

Vietnam (New York, 1995), pp 184–86.

CHAPTER 5

Pause and Escalation

In May 1965, President Johnson took a new approach in the air war against

North Vietnam. He temporarily halted the bombing to induce Hanoi’s leaders

to negotiate for peace. A second but more compelling consideration was to

mollify, if possible, domestic and foreign critics of the war and particularly of

the Rolling Thunder program.

Hanoi’s Premier Phan Van Dong, supported by Peking and Moscow, demanded

the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing as a precondition to ending hostilities, so Mr. Johnson doubted that a suspension would lead to meaningful

bargaining. But he reasoned that a demonstration of Washington’s willingness

to parley might “correct” the wishful thinking of some critics who believed that

a reduction or even the complete termination of bombing would bring Hanoi to

the negotiating table.*

Mr. Johnson made his decision on May 10 after receiving assurances from

General Wheeler and other military advisers that a short bombing halt would

not seriously harm the United States or the allied cause. He quickly received

the assent of Premier Quat in Saigon, and privately informed the Peking and

Moscow governments of his intentions. Administration officials assigned the

code word Mayflower to this military and diplomatic ploy.1

On the 11th, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk jointly advised Admiral

Sharp, General Westmoreland, and Ambassador Taylor that armed reconnaissance and other strikes against the north would cease for several days beginning

midnight, May 12, Saigon time. To conceal the fact that Washington planned to

conduct secret negotiations with Hanoi during the period, the two secretaries

asked the ranking officials in Southeast Asia to state that the main purpose of

the halt to bombing was to permit aerial reconnaissance of the DRV’s rail and

road transportation activity.2

Sharp quickly informed General Harris and Adm. Roy L. Johnson, who had succeeded Admiral Moorer as PACFLT commander on March 30, 1965, to intensify

Air Force and Navy “eyeball” and photoreconnaissance of the north. However, the

air commanders should schedule no more than two aircraft at a time, and pilots

should fly only at medium or high altitude below the 20th parallel, and conduct as

little flak suppression as possible. He said that aircrews and photoanalysts should

look for evidence of enemy truck movements, shuttling and transshipment points,

portering, ferrying and fording by vehicles, repair activities on bridges and ferries,
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

coastal traffic, camouflaging and dispersion actions, alternate routes, shifting air

defenses, and POL, bivouac, and other fixed targets. Sharp singled out about forty

separate routes and route segments below the 20th parallel for concentrated Air

Force and Navy visual and photosurveillance. Strike sorties normally scheduled

for the north should be diverted temporarily to targets in South Vietnam to the

extent practicable, and Yankee Team reconnaissance operations in Laos should be

reduced to allow concentrated reconnaissance of the north.3

To comply with Sharp’s directive, PACAF diverted some of its RF–101s normally reserved for Laotian missions to the Blue Tree program over the north,

and raised the strength of the reconnaissance unit in Udorn from eight to twelve

aircraft, the maximum permitted by the Thai government.4

The First Bombing Halt

The bombing pause began as scheduled, without public announcement from

Washington or Saigon. Launching his negotiation effort, President Johnson

asked the Soviet Union to relay a message to the Hanoi government. When they

refused, the message was dispatched to Hanoi through the U.S. Embassy in

Moscow and the British Consul in Hong Kong. The message called for a reduction of armed action against South Vietnam, asserted that peace could be

achieved only by a complete end to armed acts, and warned of American determination to demonstrate clearly, after the bombing pause, that it would not

accept further aggression. The message expressed hope that Hanoi would not

misunderstand the purpose of the pause, and would respond in a manner that

would allow its extension. In a public address on May 13, the President, avoiding

any reference to his diplomatic gambit, said that there was no purely military

solution to the war, reiterated America’s willingness to come to the conference

Ambassador to Vietnam

Maxwell D. Taylor

consults with General

William C. Westmoreland,

Commanding General,

U.S. Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam, at

Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
135

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

table, and accused China of wishing to continue the war at whatever cost to its

allies: “It’s target is not merely South Vietnam: It is Asia.”5

Meanwhile, the Air Force and the Navy had launched the special reconnaissance effort, and in the ensuing five days flew about eighty-five photo missions.

Unfortunately, much of the photography was wasted as the volume quickly

exceeded the capability of personnel to process and interpret the film. Air Force

F–105 pilots flew 175 additional visual reconnaissance sorties and the Navy

about 36. On May 16, Sharp advised the Joint Chiefs that while much of the data

was valuable, it was becoming repetitive. He urged a quick resumption of the

bombing to prevent Hanoi from gaining further advantage from the halt.6

Initial photo and visual reconnaissance disclosed little rail or road traffic

from Thanh Hoa to the junction of Routes 1 and 17, but yielded substantial

indications that the North Vietnamese were taking advantage of the strike-free

period to increase daylight road and river movements from the Vinh area southward. Approximately 329 vehicles, 263 railroad cars, 221 barges, 387 boats of

all types, and 24 ferries were sighted below the 20th parallel. Except for 55

trucks spotted in one convoy, most vehicles appeared to travel in small groups.

Traffic on highways 1, 8, and 12 crossed rivers at fords where the bridges had

been destroyed, and there appeared to be no traffic obstacles along Route 7.

Most of the daylight air sightings were obtained in the first three days, then—

presumably in anticipation of renewed bombing or to minimize aerial detection—the North Vietnamese reverted to moving most of their vehicles and

watercraft at night.7

As the President expected, Hanoi’s reaction to the bombing halt and negotiating initiative was negative. The notes sent to the government were returned

unopened.8 The DRV’s news media characterized the American offer as “an old

trick of deceit and a threat” and charged the President with imposing “arrogant

conditions.” The Foreign Ministry insisted that its four-point peace program,

made public on April 13, 1965, was the only sound basis for a settlement of the

Vietnam problem. Peking likewise denounced the offer and alleged that there had

been no bombing pause.9 In Washington, a State Department spokesman decried

Hanoi’s lack of proper response to the bombing halt,10 and President Johnson

concluded that he had opened the door to negotiations, only to have Hanoi slam

it shut. After just five days, the Rolling Thunder strikes were resumed.11

Rolling Thunder Resumes

Before bombing resumed, the future scope and tempo of Rolling Thunder

was debated intensely in Saigon, Honolulu, and Washington. In mid-May, Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland sent Washington a flexible bombing

proposal. Still believing that Rolling Thunder strikes could be used as a coercive instrument, they suggested that they be linked to the level of Viet Cong

activity in the south. For example, a downward trend in Viet Cong incidents
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

would be rewarded by reduced bombing and an upward trend would signal

more. The United States worked out a number of such quid pro quo arrangements in response to any peace initiative from Hanoi. These included offers to

reduce the level of air strikes, stop them altogether, or reduce the U.S. military

presence in South Vietnam. If there was another pause in the bombing, for

example, Hanoi could take some form of action leading to the termination of

hostilities on U.S. terms without formally engaging in negotiations.12

Both Sharp and the JCS opposed the Taylor-Westmoreland prescription on

the grounds that the United States needed a stronger military position in South

Vietnam before it could undertake any negotiations. They felt that discussions

should take cognizance of America’s future posture in Southeast Asia and the

western Pacific. Transmitting their views to Secretary McNamara, the service

chiefs cited their memorandum of March 15, 1965, which stressed the same

point and added: “We must maintain a position of strength to thwart communist aggression and expansion in these areas.”13 They reaffirmed the need for

heavy bombing throughout North Vietnam. A rationale for more bombing was

also proffered by Walt W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department’s Policy

Planning Council, who said that an historical analysis of recent guerrilla wars

in Greece, China, North Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines suggested that

Hanoi’s military and political progress would recede in the face of more bombing of the north and military successes in the south. Mr. Rostow believed that

Hanoi’s hopes of winning the war in February had changed to the prospect of

“clear-cut” defeat, higher military costs, increasing U.S. strength, and

improved morale in South Vietnam.14

The President adopted none of the competing proposals. Instead, he decided

not to alter significantly the pace of either reconnaissance or strike activity.

This decision translated into a JCS directive to CINCPAC for program 15

(May 18–24). Yankee Team and Blue Tree reconnaissance missions would

resume in Laos and North Vietnam, and Rolling Thunder attacks would resume

in North Vietnam. One of the nine targets identified was Quang Soui barracks,

the first target authorized above the 20th parallel (notwithstanding State

Department objections), which was assigned to the Air Force. The State

Department feared that a strike above the 20th might be interpreted negatively:

Hanoi would conclude that the United States had made a “change in signal”

and planned to bring the war closer to MiG bases, and the American press

would see “the opening of a new phase” of the war. Program 15 also permitted

more armed reconnaissance of coastal areas, harassment of offshore shipping,

and more night reconnaissance. However, reconnaissance was restricted to 40

sorties a day and no more than 200 sorties in a week. Twelve more sorties could

be flown to destroy suddenly discovered trucks, rolling stock, and naval craft

not hit within the week’s sortie allocation. Finally, the directive enjoined the

services once again to exercise “utmost caution” and avoid populated areas in

close proximity to the targets.15
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PAUSE AND ESCALATION

The Navy led off the week’s strikes with three missions on May 18 and one

on the 20th. An attack on Hoan Lao barracks by thirty-two strike aircraft

destroyed or damaged an estimated 79 percent of seventy-eight major buildings

in the area. The Chanh Hoi military radio station, which was hit by six aircraft,

suffered an estimated 86 percent level of damage or destruction. Twenty-two

aircraft hit the Phu Qui POL storage area again, with damage estimated at 73

percent, and eighty-six carrier strike and support aircraft hit the Phuc Lao naval

base near Vinh, inflicting an estimated 84 percent destruction level.

The Air Force’s first strike mission for the week beginning May 20 (the

Quang Soui barracks, above the 20th parallel) was canceled because of bad

weather. As a result, it selected a secondary target, several military installations

on Hon Matt Island, but an attack by twenty-four aircraft produced unknown

results. On the same day, four F–105 Thunderchiefs dropped leaflets on Ninh

Binh, only fifty miles south of Hanoi, the deepest penetration into the north

since the Flaming Dart I strike on February 7, 1965. The F–105s dispensed

eight canisters containing half a million leaflets that appealed to the North

Vietnamese people not to let their leaders or the Chinese communists use them

in the fratricidal war against South Vietnam and said that the purpose of the air

strikes was to compel the Viet Cong to cease their sabotage and other aggressive acts in the south.

On May 22, improved weather finally permitted forty F–105s to fly against

the Quang Soui barracks, a few miles south of Ninh Binh and fifty-five to sixty

miles from Hanoi. The attack achieved moderate results, hitting about twenty

of seventy-one buildings in the target complex, with three destroyed and the

rest damaged to varying degrees. Simultaneously, some aircraft also attacked

the Phu Qui ammunition depot, destroying six buildings and damaging three.

The rest of the target area containing barracks buildings was attacked on May

22. Twenty-seven buildings were demolished and forty-eight were damaged.

On the same day, VNAF A–1Es distributed about 400,000 leaflets over Ron and

Ba Den in conjunction with the armed reconnaissance missions over four separate routes. The leaflets urged DRV soldiers to end their support for the war in

South Vietnam. Joint VNAF A–1E and USAF F–105 strikes were conducted on

May 21 and 22 against NVA barracks at Phu Le and Vu San, with destruction

and damage at the two sites estimated at 48 and 83 percent, respectively.16

The next series of Rolling Thunder programs, numbers 16 to 21 and encompassing the period from May 25 to July 8, continued the gradual northward

trend of Air Force and Navy strikes and included restrikes against fixed targets

and armed reconnaissance missions. The VNAF was now flying about twentyfour sorties against fixed targets and four armed reconnaissance sorties in

southern North Vietnam every week, although aircraft aborts and weather

sometimes caused variation in this figure. The weekly cycle of Washington’s

authorization for U.S. attacks on the north’s targets was uninterrupted except

for program 16, which lasted ten days, from May 25 to June 3.
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Still under orders to achieve “maximum feasible damage,” air commanders

often scheduled large armadas of thirty, forty, or more aircraft against a single

target area. Operational rules for aircrews continued to be relaxed gradually,

but OSD, the State Department, and frequently the President still dictated target

selection and the overall sortie rate. Administration authorities also maintained

a ban on strikes in populated areas, MiG bases, and SA–2 missile sites.17

Among the important targets struck in this six-week period was the Hoai

An ammunition depot on May 30, 31, and June 1, with the Air Force’s F–4C

Phantoms first used over the north in a strike role. Assigned to the 45th TFS, the

Phantoms joined a number of F–105s in blasting the depot. In a series of separate strikes during the same three days, the Thunderchiefs again hit the Thanh

Hoa bridge, reversing an earlier Air Force decision not to strike the bridge again

until AGM–12C Bullpup missiles with 1,000-pound warheads became available

in the theater. One mission consisted of five aircraft, the others were four-aircraft

missions. As before, the bridge’s spans remained standing although traffic was

halted temporarily.18 Beginning with Rolling Thunder programs 20 and 21 (from

June 25 to July 8), Washington approved a series of targets west and northwest

of Hanoi, all of which were struck by Air Force Thunderchiefs and Phantoms.

The three most important targets were the Ban Nuoc Chieu depot, the Son La

army barracks, and the Dien Bien Phu airfield and barracks area. The targets

were about 70, 110, and 170 miles respectively west or northwest of Hanoi. The

Son La area straddled Route 6, which ran south from China and connected with

Route 7 at Sam Neua in Laos. This route was used for much of the infiltration

traffic in support of the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese in Laos, and the

area was blasted several times in the last week of June. Dien Bien Phu, the site

of the last major resistance by the French before they capitulated to the Viet

An F–4 en route to North Vietnam refuels from a KC–135.
139

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

Minh on May 27, 1954, was both a military and psychological target. Near the

airfield was a barracks area containing several hundred structures with an estimated troop capacity of 10,000 and the headquarters of the NVA’s 316th

Infantry Brigade. The complex was believed to be a staging area for NVA units

assigned to support the Pathet Lao in Laos. In an initial attack on July 2, twentyeight Air Force F–105s and F–4Cs struck the airfield and barracks twice,

destroying twenty-three buildings and damaging seven. The planes also hit an

antiaircraft site and cratered the airfield. On July 8, thirteen Thunderchiefs and

Phantoms conducted a second strike, but because of marginal weather, the

attack achieved only further cratering of the airfield.19

However, the majority of Air Force and Navy missions were for armed

reconnaissance over the growing area of authorized road and rail routes. Pilots

searched constantly for a variety of targets: bridges, structures, ferries, trucks,

rolling stock, watercraft, barracks, supply areas, and antiaircraft sites, and they

made hundreds of road and rail cuts. The standard armament for an F–105 on an

armed reconnaissance mission at this time consisted of six 750-pound generalpurpose bombs on the centerline rack, two outboard rocket pods, and 20-mm

high explosive incendiary ammunition.20

From the beginning of Rolling Thunder, air commanders considered North

Vietnam’s road and rail bridges to be primary targets, whose destruction, they

hoped, would significantly slow the movement of men and supplies into Laos

and South Vietnam. By early June, PACAF analysts had studied strike results

on twenty-seven of the most important bridges. Their data showed that the Air

Force had hit twelve, the Navy eleven, and the VNAF four. Destruction

(defined as dropping at least one bridge span) was achieved on all but the

Thanh Hoa bridge. Although comparison of service performance against the

bridges was admittedly imprecise because of the different types of ordnance carried by strike aircraft, the analysts nonetheless offered the following statistics: the

Air Force used 22.7 aircraft per bridge, the Navy 40, and the VNAF 21.5. The

Dien Bien Phu

airfield after an

Air Force attack.
140

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Navy’s larger total was attributed to the relatively light ordnance loading requirement for carrier aircraft. Air Force F–105s carried an average ordnance load of 3

tons, the VNAF’s A–1Hs about 2.5 tons, and Navy A–4Cs and A–4Es less than

either the Air Force or the VNAF, while Navy A–1Hs carried about the same load

as the VNAF’s Skyraiders. The analysts concluded that the 750-pound generalpurpose bombs were better against bridges than had been expected and the

AGM–12B Bullpup missile, with its 250-pound warhead, was less than satisfactory except against small bridges.21

Another statistical finding, as of June 24, was that the Air Force’s larger

F–105s and F–4Cs were dropping about 55 percent of all conventional bomb

tonnage in the north, while the Navy dropped about 32 percent and the VNAF

13 percent.22 However, the PACAF analysts did not address the impact of bridge

and other bombing on the north’s manpower and supply movements.

At the same time, Air Force and VNAF pilots were escalating their delivery

of psychological warfare leaflets to undermine the morale of the populace and

government leaders. On June 28, for example, the two services scattered

leaflets on five towns: Phat Diem, only fifty-six miles south of Hanoi, and the

more distant towns of Pai Thuong, Thanh Hoa, Dong Phuong Thuong, and

Minh Binh. The leaflets charged Hanoi’s leaders with taking rice from the people to purchase arms in China and continuing the oppression of South Vietnam.

Bombs from Air Force

F–105s explode in a

North Vietnamese

supply area southwest

of Hanoi.
141

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

They urged the people to demand that their leaders end the war. On July 2, a

new type of leaflet was dropped on Mac Chou, about eighty miles southwest

of Hanoi, warning the populace that the air strikes would continue “violently”

and “unceasingly” until the leaders in North Vietnam and China stopped

their invasion of South Vietnam.23

By mid-1965, the Rolling Thunder program was still expanding in scope and

intensity. From a combined total of 585 attack sorties by the Air Force, Navy,

and VNAF in March 1965, the level of effort had reached 5,901 attack sorties

in June. The Navy and Air Force each flew about half the sorties, with the

VNAF contributing only a small percentage. Several thousand additional sorties were flown for MiG combat air patrol, rescue patrol, escort, bomb damage

assessment, and other types of support. Although the damage inflicted on

enemy manpower, trucks, and supplies in both the north and in southern Laos

was steady, even if difficult to quantify, and the north’s transportation system

was suffering, the Hanoi regime had failed to signal a willingness to negotiate

on American terms. In fact, the regime was rapidly augmenting its air defense

system and downing more U.S. and VNAF aircraft with a consequent rising

loss of airmen killed or captured.24

Hanoi Expands its Air and Ground Defenses

By June 24, 1965, Hanoi’s air defense system had been responsible for the

loss of fifty-seven U.S. and VNAF aircraft: the Navy lost twenty-six, the Air

Force twenty-four, and the VNAF seven. Except for two Air Force and one

Navy aircraft downed by MiGs, they were victims of groundfire. In addition,

enemy gunners had inflicted damage on 161 aircraft: the Navy eighty-two, the

Air Force seventy-two, and the VNAF eight.

Intelligence analysts at PACOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

maintained a close watch on the north’s antiaircraft arsenal. In February 1965, they

counted about 943 guns of various caliber and in May raised the estimated total to

978: 327 light 14.5-mm and 37-mm guns, 635 light 57-mm and 85-mm guns, 8

ZSU self-propelled 57-mm guns, and 8 guns of medium but unspecified caliber.

There were a total of 180 active and 319 inactive sites. Additionally, there were

undetermined numbers of air defense personnel with automatic hand weapons

capable of inflicting loss or damage on low-flying aircraft. There was also a sharp

upswing in air defense radar strength. In February 1965, forty-four radars had been

confirmed and sixteen were suspected. In early May, the figures were sixty-six and

eleven respectively, grouped in the following categories: early warning, forty-one;

height finders, five; GCI, one; fire control, seventeen; and surface search, two.25

The extent to which the estimated numbers of larger guns, sites, and radars represented true increases or were simply the result of a more intense reconnaissance

effort was unknown. Whatever the size of the air defense system, ground gunners

were becoming more proficient in damaging and downing aircraft.
142

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Figure 5

Rolling Thunder Sorties, Ordnance Delivered, and Principal Targets

March 2–June 24, 1965 


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143

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

To pilots who flew over the north daily, the MiG–15s and MiG–17s on bases

protected by Washington’s self-imposed restraint were understandably a threat.

In May, several Soviet-built Il–28 bombers arrived at Phuc Yen airfield near

Hanoi, creating apprehension about their possible use against airbases in South

Vietnam. On May 25, 2d Air Division hosted an air defense conference in

Saigon, and PACOM held another in Honolulu three days later, both for the

purpose of examining the state of air defense readiness or deficiencies in the

south. The consensus was to upgrade the air defense capabilities of the 2d Air

Division and the 1st Marine Air Wing around , which was heavily populated

with Air Force and Marine aircraft, and to adopt a variety of other defensive

measures.26

In Washington, the Joint Chiefs considered the MiGs, the Il–28 bombers,

and the SA–2 sites highly disquieting. They warned McNamara that the

bombers added a “new dimension” to the north’s threat to South Vietnam and

raised the specter of a combined MiG and Il–28 strike on Da Nang that could

destroy or damage 100 to 150 aircraft and inflict 500 to 600 casualties. This

would enhance the communist cause, reduce American prestige, and hinder the

achievement of U.S. objectives in the war. The SA–2 sites, numbering two by

June with evidence that others were under construction, augured a more serious problem. A protective ring of missiles around Hanoi would endanger all air

operations within 80 to 125 miles of the capital, jeopardize SAC U–2 reconnaissance flights, and restrict tactical reconnaissance for gathering data on the

north’s troop and logistic movements. General Moore’s staff briefed

Westmoreland on an attack plan against the missile sites that the MACV commander considered “feasible and sound.” All Southeast Asia commanders and

the JCS regarded the elimination of the three threats—the MiGs, the Il–28s, and

the SA–2 sites—as “a matter of military urgency.”

A JCS plan to destroy the enemy aircraft, backed by Admiral Sharp and

General Harris, envisaged the use of low-level night strikes by B–52s on Phuc

Yen airfield, followed by early morning armed reconnaissance of all airfields

in the Hanoi-Haiphong area to finish off Phuc Yen and any dispersed MiGs.

Just prior to or concurrent with the Phuc Yen attack there should be air strikes

Gia Lam airfield

with Il–28s in

revetments.
144

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Pilots and radar intercept officers of the two Navy aircraft were Cmdr. Louis C. Page and

Lt. John C. Smith, Jr., and Lt. (JG) E.D. Batson and Lt. Cmdr. Robert B. Dormus.

on all known SA–2 sites. According to the planners, anticipated aircraft loss

rates would not be higher than those for Rolling Thunder interdiction, but

would increase the longer the administration procrastinated.

The Joint Chiefs conceded that an attack was not without risks. It could intensify domestic and foreign controversy over the war, provoke the Soviet Union and

China to step up support for Hanoi, and increase U.S. commitment to Southeast

Asia. Nevertheless, they advocated destroying as many aircraft and missiles as possible before the Soviet Union embarked on a policy of more generous assistance

to Hanoi and the political obstacles to a Washington decision to destroy Phuc Yen

airfield and the SA–2 sites became insurmountable.27 In early June, at the instigation of General McConnell, the service chiefs reaffirmed their recommendations.28

The administration remained unpersuaded. In mid-June, McNamara

informed the service chiefs that Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and

General Westmoreland in Saigon opposed a strike on the Il–28s on the grounds

that Hanoi was unlikely to use them for offensive purposes. The Defense

Secretary also refused to lift the ban on striking SA–2 sites or MiG airfields,

observing that neither enemy missiles nor planes had interfered with Rolling

Thunder operations.29

Although the Il–28s would never attack the south, thus confirming the

administration’s benign view of their purpose, the MiG threat was another matter. On June 17 and 20, MiG pilots again challenged U.S. aircraft. The first clash

occurred when two Navy F–4B Phantoms on “high barrier” patrol between MiG

bases near Hanoi and Thanh Hoa encountered a flight of four MiG–17s.* As

the rival aircraft closed, pilots of the Phantoms fired their Sparrow III missiles.

Each struck a MiG and both aircraft, enveloped in orange flame and smoke,

plummeted to the ground. Only one enemy pilot was observed descending by

parachute. These were the first two “kills” of North Vietnamese aircraft in aerial combat and followed the downing, also by a Navy Phantom, of the first

Chinese MiG off of Hainan Island on April 9.30

On the 20th, in a unique engagement, a flight of four Navy A–1H Skyraiders

led by Lt. Cmdr. Edwin A. Greathouse, was flying at about 11,000 feet searching

for an Air Force pilot downed during an attack on the Son La barracks when

two MiGs suddenly appeared and fired missiles that failed to score. The

Skyraider pilots immediately dropped to treetop level to evade the faster

MiGs but were pursued. After circling for about five minutes the Americans

separated the enemy aircraft. Two A–1H pilots, coming out of a 90-degree

bank, saw a MiG on the tail of Commander Greathouse’s aircraft. One of them

fired his 85-mm gun at the MiG which plunged into the forest as the other

enemy aircraft fled. Lt. (JG) Charles W. Hartman and Lt. Clinton B. Johnson
145

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

* In the same period, U.S. Navy carrier aircraft strength rose from about 200 to 463 aircraft with two of three carriers positioned at Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin for

strikes on North Vietnam and Laos.

were credited with half a MiG each. It was the only instance in the war in which

a propeller aircraft downed a jet.31

The MiGs made a third challenge on June 24, during the Air Force’s fourth

strike on the Ban Nuoc Chieu ammunition depot. A flight of four F–105s, with

one element flying at 17,000 feet and another at 22,000 feet, were approached

from a six o’clock position by two MiG–15s. As the lower Thunderchiefs broke

right and up to engage the MiGs, one of the enemy aircraft broke off. The second MiG was pursued by the topside Thunderchief pilots, who fired their guns

but failed to score. After a 270-degree turn, the second MiG also disengaged.

All Air Force aircraft returned safely to base without damage.32 Thus, as the

first four months of Rolling Thunder operations ended, the North Vietnamese

Air Force had clearly signaled its intent not to let the daily Air Force and Navy

attacks go unchallenged.

The Air Force Organizes for Extended Combat

As the tempo of Rolling Thunder attacks and North Vietnamese reaction to

them increased in the first half of 1965, the Air Force made more changes in

personnel, air units, and the administration of those units to facilitate the prosecution of the air war largely from airbases in Thailand. In May, Brig. Gen.

John R. Murphy succeeded Brig. Gen. John H. McCreery as the deputy commander of 2d Air Division at Udorn. From Udorn, the 2d Air Division deputy

commander maintained close contact with the American Embassy staffs in

Bangkok and Vientiane on all Air Force combat operations affecting the Thai

and Laotian governments. Since July 1964 the 2d Air Division deputy commander administered the units through the 35th Tactical Control Group, which

by early 1965, was located at Don Muang RTAFB near Bangkok. However, the

arrival of four F–105 squadrons, an F–4C squadron, and additional RF–101,

EB–66, and other aircraft in Thailand in the spring of 1965 demanded wingsize organizations. Consequently, on April 5, 1965, the Air Force activated the

6234th TFW (Provisional) at Korat. The wing exercised operational and administrative control over all Air Force units based in Thailand until permanent

wings were established later in the year. The 35th Tactical Group was then converted to a purely support organization. On May 8, in a further reorganization,

the 6234th and 6235th Combat Support Groups were organized at Korat and

Takhli, respectively.33

The rapid increase in Air Force and other service personnel and aircraft in South

Vietnam and Thailand created other administrative and operational problems. The

extent of the buildup in the first half of 1965 can be seen in figure 6.*34
146

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Figure 6

Troops and Equipment in South Vietnam and Thailand 

February and June 1965

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The Air Force experienced major difficulties because of the short 120-day

temporary duty (TDY) tours of many recently arrived Air Force combat and

combat support units. They were most severe in Thailand where, at the end of

June 1965, about 59 percent of all Air Force personnel were on TDY, compared

with 30 percent in South Vietnam. An Air Force officer assigned on a one-year permanent change of station (PCS) tour in Southeast Asia underscored the shortcomings of the TDY assignments:35

Generally, the four month TDY personnel cannot be considered efficient enough to justify their being sent to Vietnam. Both TDY and PCS

personnel require similar periods of orientation...the PCS man is useful

for 11 months whereas the TDY person is only useful for 75 percent of his

tour.... Millions of extra dollars are spent creating a vast decrease in efficiency. We could endure the situation if it applied only to airmen, but we

of the PCS variety had to endure many TDY staff policy makers, each

with new ideas, procedures, policies, and regulations. Just as they

grasped the situation they were ready to go home and another man, with

other desires and different methods of winning the war rolled in. If any

single factor contributed to lack of continuity and bad morale, this was it.
147

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

All four F–105 squadrons in Thailand, for example, were on TDY status, and

in mid-1965 the rapid turnovers continued: on June 12, the 357th TFS replaced

the 354th TFS, and three days later the 12th TFS replaced the 44th TFS. On

June 26, at Takhli the 80th TFS replaced the 35th TFS. The 563d TFS arrived

at Takhli on April 7, 1965 and was replaced by the 47th TFS, another Phantom

unit, on July 26. RF–101 and EB–66 reconnaissance and ECM units suffered

from the same administrative, personnel, and operational turbulence.36

The Air Staff in Washington and Generals Harris, Maddux, and Moore were,

of course, fully aware of this problem. Throughout the spring of 1965, they prepared plans to deal with it. The sheer size of the 2d Air Division, approaching

that of a numbered Air Force, and the probability that more Air Force units would

deploy to Southeast Asia, prompted attempts to establish a structure geared to

longer operations. In July, Moore established the first permanent tactical fighter

wing, the 6234th at Korat, which replaced the 6234th (Provisional). The replacement of TDY with PCS units received impetus in late July when President

Johnson ordered a sharp increase in U.S air, ground, and Navy units to Southeast

Asia to prevent the collapse of the Saigon government’s military efforts. A special CINCPAC deployment conference, hastily convened in Honolulu from

August 2 to 6, made plans to dispatch the first PCS Air Force F–105 and F–4C

tactical fighter squadrons to South Vietnam and Thailand by late 1965.37

There were other changes in the Southeast Asia command and control structure. The staff of Headquarters 2d Air Division needed to expand to meet its

growing responsibilities for waging war in three countries and for managing

the Air Force’s expansion program in South Vietnam. On July 8 General

McConnell ended the 2d’s status as a component of the Thirteenth Air Force

and placed it directly under PACAF. Air Force units on six principal Thai bases

were assigned to the Thirteenth for administrative and logistic purposes

only, while operational control was retained by the 2d Air Division. General

Murphy assumed a second responsibility as Deputy Commander, Thirteenth

Air Force, and his office was redesignated Deputy Commander, 2d Air

Division/Thirteenth Air Force. The leadership of the Thirteenth Air Force also

underwent change when Maj. Gen. James Wilson succeeded Maj. Gen. Sam

Maddux as commander on July 15.38

In Saigon, General Moore’s position also underwent a change. On June 25,

with JCS and McNamara’s approval, General Westmoreland appointed Moore

MACV Deputy Commander for Air Operations in addition to his post as

commander of the 2d Air Division. On the same day, in recognition of the

change, Moore was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned a deputy

commander. The latter post was filled on July 1 by Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers,

formerly commander of the Air Force’s Tactical Air Warfare Center at Eglin

AFB, Florida.39

Although Westmoreland claimed General Moore’s new status as MACV

Deputy Commander for Air Operations enlarged his authority and would promote
148

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Gen. Easterbrook was succeeded by Army Maj. Gen. Richard G. Stillwell on August 14,

1965. Gen. Whitehouse was promoted to the rank of major general in August, and assumed

his post on September 2, 1965.

interservice harmony, the Air Staff saw little practical significance in the new

title. In fact, it regarded the change as unwise organizationally as it divided

Moore’s energies between the two headquarters, his own at Tan Son Nhut and that

of MACV in downtown Saigon. In addition, he remained outside of the MACV

headquarters staff structure.40 Nonetheless, Moore and his successors retained the

new position for several years.

Another organizational adjustment occurred on July 10 when General

Westmoreland, Commander, MACV since June 1964, relinquished his second

“hat” as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam/Thailand

(COMUSMACVTHAI) to an Army commander in Bangkok. The COMUSMACVTHAI post was initially created as a vehicle for U.S. participation in

military planning by the eight-nation SEATO countries, of which Thailand was

a member. Once again, political rather than military considerations dictated the

reorganization: to allay the concern of the Thai government that it may be identified too closely with American military activities in support of South Vietnam.

The new post, designated U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand

(COMUSMACTHAI) would be the focal point for U.S. military participation

in SEATO planning. The creation of the post triggered another debate with

General McConnell, supported by the Navy and Marine Corps chiefs, advocating the appointment of an Air Force general officer. But the new JCS chairman,

Army Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, who had replaced Taylor in June, favored an

Army incumbent. McNamara selected Brig. Gen. Ernest F. Easterbrook,

already in Bangkok as Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory

Group, Thailand, who would assume the duties of COMUSMACTHAI as an

additional duty. Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Whitehouse was appointed

Deputy Commander, COMUSMACTHAI.* As a result of this change, theater

command and control relationships became more complex as General Murphy,

now Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force, at Udorn, dealt

directly with General Easterbrook and with the staffs of the American

Embassies in Bangkok and Vientiane regarding Air Force and other service

matters associated with the U.S. military presence in Thailand.41

Thus, in mid-1965, changes in the Southeast Asia command and control system

failed to strengthen the Air Force’s role in planning and conducting air operations in North Vietnam as well as in Laos and South Vietnam. In truth, the

system was more elaborate than ever and, in the Air Force’s view, augured less

efficient use of available air power in the theater. In July 1965, General Harris

wistfully sent a proposed command and control arrangement to the Air Staff,

which he believed would be simpler, more effective, and more in consonance
149

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

with Air Force doctrine. According to this arrangement, control of all service air

operations in South Vietnam would be transferred from the MACV to the 2d Air

Division commander which would assure the PACOM commander of undisputed control of air operations in Laos and North Vietnam (unencumbered by

operational directives and requests from Washington, MACV, and the U.S.

Embassies in Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok). The PACOM commander would

exercise his authority solely through his PACAF and PACFLT component

commanders, relying principally on USAF aircraft in Thailand and with Navy

carrier aircraft playing only a minimal role.42 Of course, if submitted officially,

Harris’ proposal would have been totally unacceptable to the Army-oriented

MACV commander, who was about to assume responsibility for a greatly

expanded air and ground war in South Vietnam, and to the Navy-oriented

PACOM commander, who would never seriously countenance a subordinate role

for Navy air operations.

Washington Rejects a More Air-Oriented Strategy

By mid-1965, it was clear that the earlier expectations of some high administration officials that Rolling Thunder would bring Hanoi quickly to the negotiating table would not be realized. Military and political developments in South

Vietnam continued to favor the insurgents. A Viet Cong “monsoon offensive”

forced Saigon’s army to abandon six district capitals, and there were many military reverses offset by only occasional successes.43 Communist destruction and

disruption of the road and rail system in South Vietnam was widespread. Prime

Minister Quat was embroiled in a dispute with President Phan Khac Suii over cabinet appointments and was caught in the struggle between Catholic and Buddhist

factions. On June 11, Quat resigned. Political power returned to an all-military

National Leadership Council, with Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu as acting chief

of state and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky as de facto prime minister. With the collapse of the fourth government and the fourth constitution in twenty months, a

new regime emerged on June 19 with General Ky, the colorful chief of the

Vietnamese Air Force, as prime minister. Thus did the Thieu-Ky team come into

being. Together, they would give Saigon a semblance of political stability in the

coming months. But they could not halt the deterioration of the ground forces.44

Meanwhile, on June 6, General Westmoreland and Ambassador Taylor

agreed that more troops were needed to contain the VC-NVA in South Vietnam.

However, in Westmoreland’s opinion, the South Vietnamese Army’s excessively

high desertion rates, casualties, and occasional heavy losses, made further

enlargement of the Army impossible until November 1965. With the ratio of

military manpower tilting progressively in favor of the communists, he doubted

that the Saigon government would be able to withstand a VC-NVA military and

political offensive for more than six months. To rectify the imbalance, he proposed the addition of 45,000 more U.S. troops to the 50,000 already in the
150

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

south and four more Air Force tactical squadrons. The Army’s additional

manpower, he believed, should include the 1st Cavalry Division (Air

Mobile) plus support for the emplacement near Pleiku in the central highlands.

Concurrently, the JCS made plans to send the equivalent of twenty-three U.S

and nine Korean battalions to the south, and for “more intense” air operations

against the north to underscore U.S. perseverance in the war.45

During the high-level deliberations on Westmoreland’s proposals in Saigon,

Honolulu, and Washington, the Air Force opposed the evolving strategy requiring more ground troops rather than air power to halt enemy advances in South

Vietnam. On June 8, General Harris again emphasized to the Air Staff—which

needed no persuading—the need for raising the tempo of the air war against the

north and striking more key targets above the 20th parallel. This, he said, would

be a simpler, more easily controllable, and less risky course of action than “the

introduction of...U.S. troops into the jungles and mountain areas of RVN.” The

PACAF commander conceded that additional troops should be deployed to protect

military bases and to establish enclaves to assure the effective use of air power,

but he strongly opposed their engagement principally to defeat the Viet Cong.

Placing a force of 20,000 to 30,000 men in the highlands near Pleiku, he

warned, invited another Dien Bien Phu or a “retreat from the Yalu [River]” and

would generate major logistic problems.46

Contrary to the Air Force’s view, on June 16, Secretary McNamara

announced the dispatch of 20,000 more U.S. troops to the south, bringing the

number of men there to between 70,000 and 75,000. He said that this was dictated by the growth in Viet Cong strength, now totaling about 165,000 guerrillas,

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Gen. William C. Westmoreland,

Vietnamese Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu, and Premier

Nguyen Cao Ky salute the colors during the President's

visit to Cam Ranh Bay Air Base, South Vietnam, 1965.
151

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

which threatened Saigon’s regular and pararegular forces of about 500,000 men

and created an unsatisfactory ratio of roughly one to three between the guerrillas

and the south’s regular forces. He had little to say about the Rolling Thunder

campaign in the north, but indicated it had been effective in reducing the flow

of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam. Aircraft were striking barracks, supply and POL depots, and rail and highway bridges, he noted, and

efforts were under way to keep twenty-two of twenty-three bridges struck thus

far impassable to traffic.47

Events would show that McNamara’s decision of June 16 was merely the initial

increment of still larger ground reinforcements for the embattled South Vietnamese

government. Within the JCS, during interminable debate on the declining fortunes

of Saigon and nature of additional U.S. assistance, General McConnell expressed

his discontent with the administration’s slow pace in approving strikes for important targets. Of the ninety-four fixed targets in the north designated by the JCS, he

informed his colleagues, only twenty-two had been struck, and many targets subsequently added to the master list (which totaled 235 targets by June 17) were

unimportant. Thus it would be wasteful to hit them. Many targets approved by the

administration, he observed, had not been endorsed by the Joint Chiefs. In view of

recent DIA bombing assessments indicating that air strikes in South Vietnam were

not hurting the VC-NVA sufficiently, he characterized as incongruous the stringent

bombing restraints that kept planes out of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the buffer

zone near China. For McConnell, there was an inherent contradiction in the United

States’ objective of destroying the will and capability of the Hanoi regime and the

refusal to employ enough air power to do so.48

Poststrike photo shows results of an F–105 strike against the Trai

Hoi highway bridge in April 1965. One span of the bridge was

dropped and the ferry docks were destroyed by direct hits.
152

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

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To underscore his argument, the Air Force Chief of Staff gave the other

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of important changes as of June 24, 1965.49

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153

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

* Lodge would officially succeed Taylor as ambassador to South Vietnam in August 1965.

This was Lodge’s second tour as ambassador, having served previously from mid-1963 to

mid-1964.

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In another memorandum, McConnell said he was “more convinced than ever,”

that air strikes on the north were essential to the defeat of the Viet Cong in the

south. Rather than destroying the insurgents’ will and capability, the current attack

level provided them with an opportunity to strengthen themselves. A JCS recommendation sent to McNamara in November 1964 urging strikes on all key military

and industrial targets, he noted, had yet to be adopted.50 In another meeting with

the service chiefs on June 25, McConnell said that if the United States sent fighting troops to the south without first “completely knocking out the North

Vietnamese with air power,” the Joint Chiefs would be “criminally responsible.”51

The fact that not all of the service chiefs agreed fully with these fervent arguments was evident two days later when they provided McNamara with another

memorandum reflecting a compromise of service positions. The document retained

the thrust of McConnell’s views, calling for increased activity against the north:

more armed reconnaissance missions; strikes on POL installations, the major rail

and highway bridges between Hanoi and China, airfields, and newly constructed

missile sites; and the mining of the major seaports. To accomplish these objectives,

the number of Rolling Thunder sorties should rise from the current 2,000 to 5,000

per month. However, the document also supported the dispatch of more U.S.

ground troops to the south as desired by the Army and Marine Corps.52

Nonetheless, persuaded by Westmoreland, the administration again refused

to accelerate drastically the strike tempo against the north. Convinced that the

war had to be won in the south, its sole concern at the moment was the number

of additional U.S. and allied air, ground, and sea units necessary to assist South

Vietnamese forces and when they should be sent. At the President’ s request,

Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, and Ambassador-designate, Henry

Cabot Lodge* and their staffs arrived in Saigon on July 16 to confer with

MACV and embassy authorities concerning the problems of the war, and to
154

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* See Leon Goure and C.A.H. Thompson, Some Impressions of Viet Cong Vulnerabilities:

An Interim Report, memo RM-4699-ISA/ARPA. After interviewing 215 Viet Cong military and civilian cadres and rank and file, the authors concluded tentatively that the Viet

Cong had military, political, and psychological vulnerabilities that could be exploited further by intensified interdiction and psychological warfare programs. This promised to

generate more Viet Cong deserters and defectors and add to the discontent of the populace

who would be encouraged to withhold men and supplies from the insurgents.

determine more precisely the scope of Saigon’s additional needs. General

Moore would serve as the senior Air Force representative at the meetings.

In briefings for the high-ranking visitors, MACV officials said the Viet Cong had

increased its strength from forty-two to sixty-eight battalions in the eighteen months

from January 1964 to July 1965 (McNamara thought the total was higher), possessed a manpower pool of one million, and could expand its strength by 100,000

men per year. In comparison, infiltration from the north (consisting of southern

returnees and DRV personnel) into South Vietnam was small, totaling about 5,000

since February 1965. Travel time varied from a few months to two years.

Viet Cong supply needs from outside South Vietnam were estimated at fourteen

tons per day (a figure used by the JCS), based on the Viet Cong strength and combat level. Ambassador Taylor conjectured that it would take about 12,000 personnel to support a daily requirement of fourteen tons per day. The Viet Cong did not

appear to be suffering from an ammunition shortage and had probably fired fortyone tons during a recent two-day battle at Dong Xoai. There was general surprise

over the ability of the communists to get along with so few materiel resources.

McNamara did not expect the present Rolling Thunder program to reduce

the requirement, and noted that the Viet Cong were taking over the country

with that level of support, and could acquire even more territory if they

received twenty-eight tons per day of supplies from sources outside the country. Because the insurgents had needed so few supplies in the past, at present,

and probably in the future, the Defense Secretary doubted if the bombing could

seriously degrade communist logistics, although he did not advocate stopping

the attacks. The military situation dictated more manpower in the south, and

because the Viet Cong could readily obtain more recruits locally, the U.S. and

South Vietnamese governments should be prepared to increase their own troop

strengths accordingly.

McNamara evinced considerable interest in obtaining more information

from communist prisoners of war on the effect of bombing on Viet Cong

recruitment, infiltration from the north, and the movement of the South Vietnamese populace from one area to another. He characterized a recent RAND

study that provided a rationale for stepping up the bombing* as an “initial

meek effort,” although it threw some light on air strike results.

In reviewing additional U.S. and allied needs for the war, the conferees considered two basic plans. One, prepared by the JCS, would raise the overall level
155

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

* Msg, CINCPAC to AmEmb Vientiane, COMUSMACV, 260330Z Jun 65.

of U.S. and allied troops in the south to 176,000 personnel by the end of 1965,

providing thirty-four infantry-type “maneuver” battalions, and six to nine more

USAF squadrons, contingent on the completion of more airfields. A second

plan prepared by MACV would raise troop levels in the south to 196,000 men

by the end of 1965 and provide forty-four “maneuver battalions.” A second

phase of the plan, extending into 1966, would raise the number of U.S. and

allied forces in-country to 270,927.

In further discussion of the Rolling Thunder program, Ambassador Taylor,

whose views were highly influential, now argued for maintaining the current

bombing tempo rather than increasing it as he had earlier in the program.

Amplifying his position later in response to specific questions from

McNamara, Taylor averred that vigorous air attacks would not bring Hanoi to

terms immediately, but promised to have a greater “climactic” effect later. He

cautioned that the United States should avoid bringing China into the war and

avoid alienating its friends. The best way to apply maximum pressure on Hanoi,

he said, was to achieve military success in the south coupled with air pressure

on the north.

Taylor observed that in Laos the limited data from aerial reconnaissance and

road watch teams made it difficult to assess the effect of the bombing. Thus far, it

did not appear to be great. He said that there was data showing that from April 26

to May 24, 1965 it took an average of six sorties to destroy one truck, and studies of

eight choke points revealed that they were closed less than one third of the time.*

The principal result of strikes on choke points was to delay and harass

communist traffic. Taylor favored no major change in the level of armed reconnaissance or choke point missions but recommended more attacks on river traffic

and fixed targets. These would increase air needs from about forty to sixty-eight

sorties per day. He also urged that ground-based incursions into the Laotian

border regions, supported from the air, be organized by MACV and launched as

soon as possible to provide more intelligence on infiltration and the impact of

air strikes.

The upshot of the conference was that Secretary McNamara, whose views were

essentially congruent with Taylor’s, decided to maintain a tight rein on out-country

bombing while concentrating on winning the war in the south. He reiterated

the standing policy giving military operations in South Vietnam first claim on

available air power:53

I want to make clear...that I do not want one plane dropping bombs on

North Vietnam if it can be used advantageously for air operations in South

Vietnam....There is to be no bombing in Laos or in North Vietnam if we

can use that sortie effectively in South Vietnam. Now this is clearly estab-
156

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

lished U.S. policy. I want to make sure that is understood and followed.

On his return to Washington, McNamara immediately sent his recommendations to President Johnson. Declaring that the situation in South Vietnam was

worse than a year previously (which, in turn, was worse than a year before that)

he considered the odds “less than even,” that the Saigon government could last out

the year. Pacification was making little progress, and the communists believed

South Vietnam was on the run and near collapse and were determined to try for

“a complete takeover.” The Defense Secretary posed three alternate courses of

action: cutting U.S. losses and withdrawing in as orderly a fashion as possible

but under conditions humiliating to the United States and damaging to U.S.

effectiveness throughout the world; continuing at the present level while limiting U.S. forces to about 75,000 in the south, holding on and playing for the

breaks, a policy that would almost certainly force a choice between withdrawal

or emergency expansion of forces when it might be too late to do any good; or

expanding “promptly and substantially” U.S. pressure on the Viet Cong in the

south, maintaining pressure against the north, and launching a vigorous political

effort to lay the groundwork for “a favorable outcome by clarifying our objectives

and establishing channels of communication.” Amplifying the third alternative,

which he favored, he noted Ambassador Lodge’s view that an American effort

to negotiate an end to the war before South Vietnam was strong militarily

would simply harden communist resolve to fight. He said that Ambassador

Taylor and Deputy Ambassador Johnson agreed with this position but also

believed that the United States should maintain discreet contacts with the

Soviet Union. The Defense Secretary continued:

[The third] alternative would stave off defeat in the short run and offer

a good chance of producing a favorable settlement in the longer run; at

the same time, it would imply a commitment to see a fighting war clear

through at considerable cost in casualties and materiel and would make any

later decision to withdraw even more difficult and even more costly than

would be the case today. 

The most propitious time for launching another diplomatic effort for peace,

he counseled, was after the United States and third countries had deployed

forty-four more battalions (as proposed by MACV) to the south and subjected

the north to heavier bombing—such as destroying key bridges north of Hanoi.

The United States might then consider a six- to eight-week bombing pause as

part of that initiative. He thought five considerations should guide future

bombing: to capitalize on Hanoi’s fear of destruction that could be avoided if it

agreed to negotiate or agreed to some type of settlement; to make it politically

easy for Hanoi to enter into negotiations and make concessions—as when no

bombing was taking place on its territory; to maximize bombing effectiveness and
157

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

minimize political repercussions arising from methods used; to coordinate with

whatever factors that might induce Hanoi to consider a settlement with the

United States as preferable to continuing the war; and to avoid a program of air

attacks with a high risk of war with the Soviet Union or China or which would

alienate America’s friends and allies.54

On July 21, to review McNamara’s recommendations, the President began a

series of meetings with his principal advisers, with General Wheeler the sole

representative of the armed forces. The sessions continued intermittently until

the 27th when the President briefed the congressional leaders on his tentative

decisions, which were announced the next day at a news conference.55

Accepting most of McNamara’s views, he said that U.S. troop strength in South

Vietnam would rise almost immediately from 75,000 to 125,000 men and

include the Army’s 1st Air Mobile Division. He promised to send more men

later as needed. Military draft calls would rise gradually from about 17,000 to

35,000 men per month, but there would be no call-up of reserve units. He said

that Ambassador Lodge would initiate reform programs in South Vietnam, and

Ambassador Arthur Goldberg at the United Nations would launch new efforts

to bring peace. Denying that the substantial new deployments constituted a

change in U.S. policy in the war, the President strongly reaffirmed America’s

support for the Saigon government and its determination to prevent the communist domination of Asia.56

Thus, three years and nine months after the first American counterinsurgency units entered South Vietnam, the U.S. government, faced with the possible loss of its Saigon ally, embarked on a conventional air and ground war.

During this period, despite support from Admiral Sharp, CIA Director

McCone, Walt W. Rostow, the State Department’s Policy Planning Chief, and a

few other officials, the Air Force had failed to persuade higher authorities to

pursue an air-oriented rather than a ground-oriented strategy to bring the Hanoi

regime more quickly to the negotiating table. However, it would carry out the

administration’s directives.

Beginning of Two-Week Bombing Cycles

The President’s July decisions did not significantly alter the current tempo

of air attacks on North Vietnam, and left any further gradual changes hostage

to a variety of political and military developments. However, the administration

supported one important change desired by air commanders for planning and

executing Rolling Thunder programs. This was the extension of the bombing

cycle from one to two weeks. Generals Moore and Westmoreland and Admiral

Sharp had all called for this adjustment in June to ease the problems inherent

in aircraft scheduling and weather aborts and to assure greater flexibility in the

separate air programs in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. The twoweek cycle was adopted beginning with Rolling Thunder programs 22/23 (July
158

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

9–22). Air commanders were instructed to apportion the level of air effort for

each seven-day period as equally as possible.57

Several other tactical changes promised to enhance somewhat the effectiveness of Rolling Thunder operations. Pilots were granted authority to strike

more targets above the 20th parallel, to fly upwards of 550 armed reconnaissance sorties for a fourteen-day period, and to hit designated road segments in

Laos with ordnance not expended in North Vietnam while returning to bases in

Thailand. As before, Admiral Sharp assigned about half of the allocated sorties

to the Air Force and VNAF, and half to Navy carrier air.58

Of seven targets above the 20th parallel designated by the JCS and authorized for programs 22/23, several had been attacked previously. Air Force

F–105s and F–4Cs hit four of the northernmost targets between July 9 and 14,

leading off with air strikes on the Yen Son and Yen Bai ordnance depots, about

sixty-five and seventy miles northwest of Hanoi respectively. The larger of the

two, Yen Son, encompassed about sixty acres, contained twenty-five buildings

believed to hold ammunition, and represented about 10 percent of national capacity. As the major depot in the northwest, it supported military activities in the

Red River Delta area above Hanoi and was assumed to be an important supply

depot for the Pathet Lao via Dien Bien Phu and for the Viet Cong in South

Vietnam via Moc Chau. Both Yen Son and Yen Bai depots were also suspected

storage areas for supplies from China. Five Air Force missions against Yen Son

and seven against Yen Bai wrought destruction estimated at 54 and 60 percent

of capacity of the two targets. Several restrikes were also conducted by Air

Force aircraft against the Dien Bien Phu and Son La military areas.59

On July 11, during restrikes on Dien Bien Phu and the Yen Bai and Yen Son

ordnance depots, for the first time F–105 Thunderchief pilots of the 12th TFS

dropped MLU–10 time-delay fused land mines along the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail

line. On the same day, Hanoi and Peking charged that two formations of U.S.

aircraft also struck Lao Cai, 160 miles northwest of Hanoi and near the Chinese

border, several nearby populated areas, and entered Chinese air space over

Hakow in Yunnan Province opposite Lao Cai. Hanoi protested to the

International Control Commission and Peking denounced the alleged air intrusion short of threatening outright intervention. American officials denied the

allegations.60 On July 14, four F–105s severely damaged two trucks thirtyseven miles north of Dien Bien Phu, the furthest penetration yet into North

Vietnam.61

The Navy’s initial strikes on the Tri Dong highway bridge dropped one span

and damaged three others. Navy aircraft also hit the Hamp Rong port facility

for the first time and conducted a restrike on the Ban Xom Lam barracks area.

Air Force and Navy aircraft carried out restrikes on several targets below the

20th parallel, the most notable consisting of four separate Navy missions

against the hardy Thanh Hoa bridge. Radar-directed bombs scored hits near the

bridge and its approaches, but the spans remained intact. No clear-cut BDA
159

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

was achieved.62

An Air Force mission above the 20th parallel on July 10 was enlivened by

an aerial engagement with North Vietnamese MiGs in which the Air Force

made their first two MiG kills of the war. The engagement occurred about

twenty-five to thirty-five miles northwest of Hanoi, where F–105s were pounding enemy targets in the Yen Bai area. A flight of four Phantom F–4Cs of the

45th TFS of the 8th TFW at Ubon, commanded by Maj. Richard Hall, were flying cover for the Thunderchiefs. Hoping not to alert the MiG pilots, they maintained complete radio silence during their flight and rendezvous with KC–135

refueling tankers and flew at Mach .85 at about 20,000 feet, a flight profile

similar to that of the strike aircraft. A radar officer in an EC–121 Big Eye early

warning and control aircraft sighted two MiG–17s and alerted the USAF crews.

Shortly after entering orbit near Yen Bai, the lead Phantom established initial

radar contact with a MiG and the number three Phantom locked on a few seconds later. In the ensuing maneuver and evasion by the contestants, in which all

jettisoned their fuel tanks, the MiG pilots fired their cannons and missed, but

two Phantom aircrews released eight Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, two of

which found their mark, destroying both aircraft. All four Phantoms returned

safely to Ubon.

The first MiG kill was credited to Capts. Thomas S. Roberts and Ronald C.

Anderson, the pilot and radar intercept officer respectively, and the second to

Capts. Kenneth E. Holcombe and Arthur C. Clark, who held the same assignAn F–4 fires 2.75-inch rockets at a North Vietnamese target.
160

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* For further discussion of Air Force SAR deployments and operations, see Capt. Earl H.

Tilford, The Development of Search and Rescue Operations in the United States Air Force

in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975 (Ofc AF Hist, 1980).

ments in the second Phantom. Soon afterwards, General Moore awarded Silver

Stars to the four men and the Distinguished Flying Cross to the other two

Phantom aircrews, who had assisted by visually identifying the enemy aircraft.

The aerial battle brought to five the number of North Vietnamese MiGs

destroyed in the war, the first three by Navy pilots on June 17 and 20.63

During the fourteen-day period of Rolling Thunder 22/23, the Air Force flew

233 sorties, the VNAF 28, and the Navy 471.64 Antiaircraft fire continued to

take a toll, downing two Navy planes and damaging three Air Force F–105s and

six Navy planes.65 Hanoi’s news media claimed 370 America aircraft shot down

from August 5, 1964 (the date of the first attack on the north during the Gulf

of Tonkin crisis) to July 10, 1965.66

The real U.S. aircraft and pilot losses, while considerably more modest,

nonetheless strained the Air Force’s search and rescue resources, now thinly

spread to save as many U.S. and Vietnamese aircrews as possible in the threetheater air war. As a result, the Air Force’s Military Air Transport Service, the

operating agency for rescue activities, established the 38th Air Rescue

Squadron, with Lt. Col. Edward Krafka as commander at Tan Son Nhut AB,

Members of the first USAF flight to down MiGs over North Vietnam celebrate after receiving their medals. Capts. Thomas S. Roberts and Ronald C.

Anderson, credited with the first MiG kill, are among the flight crew members raising the flight commander, Maj. Richard Hall, on their shoulders.
161

PAUSE AND ESCALATION

South Vietnam, on July 1. The new unit, which would soon receive additional

manpower, helicopters, and aircraft, replaced temporary units of the Pacific Air

Rescue Center that had performed SAR in Southeast Asia since early 1962. A

total of seven detachments were established under the 38th—five in Thailand

at Nakhon Phanom, Takhli, Ubon, Korat, and Udorn and two in South Vietnam

at Bien Hoa and Da Nang.*67

The slowly increasing strike tempo in the north in July was accompanied by

more widespread leaflet distribution by the Air Force and VNAF. About

9,888,000 leaflets were scattered from the DMZ to Dien Bien Phu in the first

fourteen days of the month. In the last half of July, about 6,450,000 leaflets were

released over nineteen separate areas, with the largest single leaflet distribution

of the war on July 22, the eleventh anniversary of the partition of South and

North Vietnam as a consequence of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. Fourteen Air

Force aircraft were employed to dispense the messages for Hanoi, Haiphong,

Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Thanh, Phat Diem, Vinh, and Phu Dien Chau. Because

of the forty n.m. restricted zone around Hanoi and Haiphong, pilots relied on

wind drift to scatter leaflets on the two cities. VNAF A–1Hs dropped leaflets

on towns in southern North Vietnam on the same day.68

Although air commanders obtained satisfaction in striking a few more

important targets in the north, however piecemeal the authorization to do so,

they remained highly frustrated over Washington’s ban on knocking out the

north’s SA–2 missile sites. Since U–2 photography had detected the first site

near Hanoi on April 5, 1965, three more had been pinpointed by the end of

June, all in the sensitive Hanoi-Haiphong area. Washington permitted only

occasional reconnaissance of the sites by reconnaissance drones and U–2

pilots, although the latter, instructed to remain thirty n.m. miles away from the

sites until their planes received better missile radar warning devices, took only

oblique photographs.69

On July 4, 1965, photography disclosed work on a fifth site about twelve

miles southwest of Hanoi. Secretary McNamara, again pressed by the services

to strike the sites before they became operational, asked the JCS to compare the

anticipated aircraft attrition rate if the sites were hit quickly with the rate after

the sites became an integral part of the north’s air defense system. The service

chiefs replied quickly that the price of postponing an attack would be a significant rise in aircraft attrition. On July 7, McConnell informed the administration through the JCS that three of the five SA–2 sites might be ready to receive

the necessary operational equipment within any 48-hour period. But the administration still refused to issue a strike order. In a news conference on the 11th,

Secretary Rusk announced that there were no plans “at this time” to attack the

sites, justifying the administration’s stance, as McNamara had earlier, on the

grounds the missiles were not interfering with Rolling Thunder operations.

Thirteen days later, however, Hanoi would dramatically change the administration’s no-strike policy by firing its first missiles, and with devastating effect.70
SA–2 surface-to-air missile in

flight (left). SA–2 missile

explodes underneath RF–4,

downing it (above).
163

CHAPTER 6

The SAM Threat

On July 24, to the apparent surprise of some administration officials, the North

Vietnamese fired their first SA–2 surface-to-air missiles from near the Hanoi sanctuary, downing an Air Force F–4C Phantom and its two-man crew. Thus the SAMs

were allowed to draw “first blood” despite earlier appeals by the JCS, Admiral

Sharp, General Harris, and other military commanders to Washington’s highest

authorities for permission to destroy the sites before they became operational.

Defense Secretary McNamara initially opposed striking suspected or known SA–2

sites while Rolling Thunder was confined largely below the 20th parallel because

he feared killing Chinese or Soviet technicians working at the sites.

A U–2 aircraft spotted the first SA–2 missile site under construction on

April 5, 1965, and by late July, five were in place roughly in a circle within

twenty n.m. of Hanoi. Each consisted of six firing, one guidance control, and

one missile-holding revetments plus associated roadways. The diameter of the

firing revetments and sites averaged about 75 and 750 feet respectively. The

configuration was similar to that employed by the Soviet Union.1

However, no SA–2 missile had been demonstrably operational until 0805

Saigon time on July 24 when an Air Force EB–66 Destroyer intercepted for the

second time in as many days a Fan Song radar signal from a missile site twentythree n.m. west of Hanoi. A crew member flashed a warning to four F–4C

Phantoms that were flying cover at about 20,000 feet for several F–105

Thunderchiefs en route to strike the Lang Tai explosive plant. Lt. Col. William

A. Alden, aboard one of the Phantoms, suddenly saw two, perhaps three, missiles rising towards the flight. One exploded directly beneath the Phantom

opposite Alden’s. Flames erupted from the wing, then the plane rolled over and

spiraled into the clouds. The pilot of the stricken plane, Capt. Richard P. Keirn,

parachuted safely, but was to spend nearly eight years as a prisoner of war in

North Vietnam. His radar intercept officer, Capt. Roscoe H. Fobair, apparently

SA–2 on launcher.
164

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

died in the crash. The other one or two missiles detonated near the flight and

peppered the remaining Phantoms with shrapnel, damaging them severely. The

surviving aircrews likened each SAM to “a telephone pole with fins,” judged

they had been set with proximity fuses, and were fired from two previously

undetected sites quickly numbered sites 6 and 7. Admiral Sharp flashed the

JCS that the initial enemy SAM attack from outside of Hanoi’s strike-free

perimeter demanded the abandonment of all political considerations heretofore

precluding attacks on missile targets.2 Ambassador Taylor in Saigon likewise

backed a prompt response and urged simultaneous attacks against all of the

north’s known SAM sites.3 The lethality of the SA–2s was punctuated the next

day when another downed a SAC reconnaissance drone flying at 59,000 feet.4

Initial anti-SAM Operations

For several days, high administration and military officials pondered what

the American response to these missile firings should be. In a JCS meeting on

the 26th, General McConnell proposed attacking all known SA–2 sites in the

north, including those in the sanctuary area around Hanoi, and bombing Phuc

Yen airfield. As civilian officials were unlikely to approve such action, the service chiefs recommended a less drastic measure.5 After weighing the missile

threat to the Rolling Thunder program, President Johnson approved a retaliatory air strike against the offending site or sites outside the Hanoi-Haiphong

sanctuary. The JCS quickly sent the order to Admiral Sharp who assigned the

task to the Air Force. On July 27, under the code name Spring High, General

Moore sent forty-six F–105s, carrying napalm and CBUs, supported by fiftyeight other aircraft (three EB–66s, six Marine EF–10Bs, two EC–121s, eight

F–105s, eight F–104s, four RF–101s, twelve F–4Cs, and fifteen KC–135s) to

the offending missile installations. Eleven Thunderchiefs struck site 6 and

Lockheed EC-121 Constellation.
165

THE SAM THREAT

* For additional details of the initial SAM firings and Air Force and Navy tactics to counter

them, see Capt. Melvin Potter, Air Tactics Against NVN/Air Ground Defenses (Project

CHECO, 1967), p 114; Bernard C. Nalty, Tactics and Techniques of Electronic Warfare:

Electronic Countermeasures in the Air War Against North Vietnam, 1965–1973 (Ofc AF

Hist, 1977); and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam (College

Station, Texas, 1993), pp 81–83.

twelve struck site 7. At the same time, twenty-three aircraft hit barracks areas

suspected of housing SAM air defense personnel at nearby Cam Doi and Phu

Nieu. In their bombing runs, pilots flew 50 to 100 feet above the terrain, four

abreast, to deliver their napalm and CBU ordnance.* The attack was very costly.

The North Vietnamese had ringed the sites with 37-mm, 57-mm, and 85-mm

antiaircraft guns, and aircraft flying into and out of the target areas faced

intense groundfire for seven and a half minutes. Enemy gunners damaged one

F–105 striking site 6. During the approach to Udorn with an escort, the damaged aircraft rammed its escort and both planes and pilots were lost. Two more

Thunderchiefs were shot down with their pilots while attacking site 7. A fifth

F–105 and pilot were lost in an associated strike on the Cam Doi barracks. A

sixth was downed after hitting the barracks at Phu Nieu, but the pilot was rescued, the sole survivor of the antiaircraft barrage. The heavy attrition was even

more distressing in light of electronic evidence that Fan Song radars were emitting before, during, and after the air strikes and that bomb damage assessment

photos disclosed that there was a dummy missile in site 6, placed there as a

trap, and that site 7 was empty.6

There were also diplomatic repercussions. A United Press International

news story, based on information provided by a USAF spokesman in Saigon,

stated that the two USAF aircraft that had collided had been on a Rolling

Thunder mission. The disclosure greatly agitated Ambassador Martin in

Bangkok who was honor-bound to enforce the Thai government’s request not

to acknowledge that USAF aircraft based in Thailand were bombing North

Vietnam. Such “unthinking utterances,” he informed U.S. officials in Saigon

and elsewhere, could cost the United States the use of Thai airbases, lead to

Soviet accusations against Thailand for allowing Americans to operate from

their territory, and possibly have other serious consequences. He said that the

embassy had planned to treat the plane collision as an unfortunate accident

without relating it to Rolling Thunder operations. Martin personally asked

General Harris to prevent any future untimely security leaks.7

A poststrike study of the first anti-SAM attack that cost six aircraft and five

lives was launched immediately. PACAF analysts quickly ascertained that a

more careful readout of U–2 photography taken on July 20 could have pinpointed the sites. Other factors militating against success were insufficient

low-level prestrike photography of the target area, an inadequate antiaircraft
166

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Estimates of North Vietnamese antiaircraft weapons varied widely. In early July, PACAF

believed that the DRV possessed about 2,306 light and medium guns and 639 smaller-caliber automatic weapons (PACAF DI rprt, Effects of Air Ops, SEA, 6th ed, 5 Jul 65, p 9).

order of battle, pilot difficulties in finding the targets at low altitude from

fast-flying jets, and the likelihood that North Vietnamese air defense personnel

anticipated the air strike. This last factor, plus the time lag in responding to the

SA–2 attack, enabled the defenders to place more antiaircraft weapons near the

sites.8 These included light- and medium-caliber guns, automatic weapons, and

an antiaircraft installation, confirmed by photoreconnaissance on July 29, consisting of eight 100-mm guns, each with an altitude range of about 39,000 feet.*9

Although all but one of the aircraft losses were caused directly or indirectly

by conventional antiaircraft fire, air commanders were most concerned about

the proliferating SAM sites. On July 29, Admiral Sharp directed his Air Force

and Navy components to conduct at least one electronic intelligence flight

every three hours against SAM-associated radars until further notice. The sorties could be flown separately or in conjunction with other reconnaissance or

strike missions over the north. To expedite the electronic coverage, the Air Force

should conduct missions from midnight to noon and the Navy from noon to midnight Saigon time.10 Five known SAM sites within the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary

area were exempt from surveillance to avoid possible strong counteraction by

North Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union.11

Sharp also directed a more careful study of aerial photos of the north by target

analysts, believing that the extra effort would reveal more sites and wider distribution among the services of information about the installations. For its part,

Washington took some steps to relax the air rules.12

Unoccupied SA–2

missile site near

Hanoi. 
167

THE SAM THREAT

Not surprisingly, SAM installations were first priority targets in the next

series of Rolling Thunder strikes, program 26/27 for August 6–19. The sudden

detection of another site, number 8 northwest of Hanoi, again outside the sanctuary area, was cleared for a strike. On August 9, a force of twelve F–105

Thunderchiefs with Maj. William J. Hosmer of the 12th Tactical Fighter

Squadron as mission commander, headed for the installation accompanied by

many supporting aircraft flying MiG and rescue CAP, ECM, and ELINT. Because

the area was heavily defended by 37-mm, 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm guns,

Hosmer split his force into three flights of four aircraft each. The lead flight, led

by Hosmer, winging at minimum altitude and high speed from divergent directions, dropped 173 CBUs on radar-directed and other antiaircraft guns. Behind

them, flying in train, came the remaining Thunderchiefs, dropping their 750-

pound general-purpose bombs in a series of low-altitude, pop-up strikes. The

tactic of targeting the gun emplacements first, of which several were hit, and of

drawing away fire allowed the follow-on aircraft to strike the missile area more

accurately. No aircraft were lost and only one Thunderchief was damaged. For

his leadership, Major Hosmer won the Silver Star. Unfortunately, as in the

assault on July 27, bomb damage assessment disclosed that the missile revetments were unoccupied, indicating that the DRV was able to anticipate an attack

and to disperse missiles and associated equipment quickly.13

The First Iron Hand Missions

On August 11, with administration approval, the JCS directed Admiral Sharp

to step up attacks and extend the boundary for armed reconnaissance slightly

northward to 20°30'N . Strikes on selected targets above this line, such as SAM

Same SA–2 site as

page 166, with

missiles.
168

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* In the ensuing months, other aircraft would be assigned to fly Iron Hand missions. For

example, in November 1965, four F–100F Wild Weasel aircraft, capable of detecting SA–2

radar emissions, arrived in Southeast Asia to fly test “hunter-killer” missions with strike

F–105s against SAM targets. In 1966, the F–100s would be replaced by F–105s with improved electronics for the hunter-killer missions.

site numbers 6, 7, and 8 and bridges northwest of Hanoi were permitted.

However, armed reconnaissance pilots could not fly within an extended radius of

Hanoi, within 10 n.m. of Haiphong, nor within the twenty-five to thirty n.m.

buffer zone between North Vietnam and China (strikes close to the buffer zone

would begin later in 1965). The service chiefs exempted sorties flown by specialized aircraft earmarked for anti-SAM missions—nicknamed Iron Hand by

PACOM—from the sortie limitations imposed on the biweekly Rolling Thunder

program.14

General Harris quickly selected a number of F–105Ds as Iron Hand aircraft

and PACFLT designated a few A–6A Intruders and A–4E Skyhawks for the

same purpose.* The Air Force Thunderchiefs, loaded with ordnance, would rely

initially on photos or ELINT data gathered by reconnaissance planes in searching

for known or suspected SAM installations. If weather or operational problems

canceled an anti-SAM mission, they could strike other targets.15

Meanwhile, Hanoi’s air defense units were far from intimidated. On August 12,

within hours of Sharp’s receipt of the Joint Chiefs’ latest strike authorization,

The Lang Met highway bridge

on Route 1A north of Hanoi,

October 1965.
169

THE SAM THREAT

another SA–2 missile downed a Navy A–4E Skyhawk and damaged a second

about fifty-five miles southwest of Hanoi. As no parachute was observed, the

pilot of the first Skyhawk was presumed killed. Both aircraft were part of a

flight engaged in armed reconnaissance along Route 119 at about 9,000 feet,

outside the range of known SAM sites. The other Skyhawk pilots believed they

saw a second missile fired.

Sharp immediately dispatched his first Iron Hand search and destroy directive to PACAF and PACFLT commanders. But in selecting Navy aircraft for the

initial missions, he ordered PACAF to “stand down” its Rolling Thunder operations for the remainder of the day while aircraft from the Coral Sea and

Midway undertook a massive hunt for the offending SAM site or sites. During

the next two days, the Navy flew 124 missions, with an outcome not unlike the

Air Force’s first anti-SAM effort on July 27: high cost and no verifiable results.

Intense groundfire downed five Navy aircraft and damaged seven. Two pilots

were lost. Once again, North Vietnam’s air defense cadres had camouflaged the

sites, positioned many antiaircraft weapons in the surrounding area, and dispersed their missile equipment prior to the Navy’s search.16

The downing of a second U.S. aircraft by a SA–2 missile and the Navy’s five

losses during its retaliatory search sent shock waves throughout the JCS and

the services. In Washington, the Joint Staff, the Air Force, and the Navy quickly

established separate committees to examine the missile threat and propose

ways to counter it.17 As the in-depth studies began, the anti-SAM campaign

continued. On August 16, the Air Force flew its first Iron Hand mission while

attacking the Binh Linh barracks, the Bai Du Thon highway, and Kbu Mai

staging areas. To assure quick reaction to ELINT or other data pinpointing a

SAM site, it established an Iron Hand F–105 ground alert force. But the tactic

proved ineffective. As a consequence, Iron Hand planes were henceforth dispatched with regular daily missions against fixed or armed reconnaissance targets.

By August 19, there was more evidence to indicate that the DRV had embarked

on an expansive SAM emplacement program: nine sites were confirmed and

ten suspected.18

Like the Air Force, the Navy quickly compiled its own study of the costly

anti-SAM operation on August 12–13. One clear lesson was that the Navy had

overreacted, as had the Air Force on July 27 when it lost its first aircraft to an

SA–2. A second lesson showed that JCS and Navy intermediate command

directives on conducting the eye-for-an-eye response, while intending to be

helpful, unfortunately drew an excessive number of Navy aircraft at low altitude

(about 800 feet) over a relatively small area that was heavily defended by the

North Vietnamese. A wiser riposte would have been a retaliatory strike on the

Haiphong POL storage area with tactics left to the local air commander. As a

result of the study and other analyses, shortly thereafter the JCS rescinded an

earlier directive requiring Air Force and Navy strike aircraft to remain below

the effective range of the SAMs.19
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Rolling Thunder program 28/29 (August 20–September 2) was the first to

include Iron Hand missions. In another significant change, the biweekly JCS

operational directive increased the level of preplanned armed reconnaissance

from 500 to 1,000 sorties. As usual, Sharp allocated the sorties evenly between

the Navy and the Air Force-VNAF. However, pilots were allowed to fly additional

sorties to destroy trucks, rolling stock, and naval craft that were detected accidentally. Non-Iron Hand aircraft were instructed to fly outside of the effective

range of installations containing SA–2 missiles.20

In the following weeks, search and attack missions against SAM installations continued without success. When Air Force Iron Hand searches on August

23 and 24 uncovered no missile sites, the aircraft struck the barracks areas at

Xom Ban and Ban Na Pew as secondary targets.21 On the 23d, the Navy

attacked a suspected site about thirty-five miles northeast of Hanoi. Sixteen

A–4Es, escorted by six F–8s, zoomed in at low level to drop Snake Eye ordnance. Once more, poststrike photos disclosed an empty site and the cost was

considerable. DRV gunners damaged six aircraft, filling two with so many

holes in their wing tanks they had to fly back to their carrier plugged into refueling tankers.22

The next day, one of two PACFLT F–4B Phantoms flying at 12,000 feet on

barrier combat air patrol (BARCAP) was lost to a salvo of about seven SAMs

from a site about fifty miles southeast of Hanoi and ten miles north of the

Thanh Hoa bridge. One missile detonated directly behind the doomed aircraft

and a second narrowly missed a wingman. Of the two-man crew in the downed

Phantom, one was believed killed and the second, who parachuted safely from

his aircraft, was apparently captured. It was the fourth U.S. loss to SAMs.23

Very upset, Admiral Sharp informed the JCS that the chances of finding the

mobile SAM equipment and concealed site were remote, and that the DRV gunners were probably waiting for a special U.S. air effort to find the offending

weapon. Sharp said that the continued missile firings indicated that the present

Rolling Thunder targets were not of great value to the Hanoi regime. He

strongly urged hitting a more vital target, such as Haiphong’s principal POL

installation, as soon as possible. However, administration officials were not

prepared to endorse such provocative action.24

Because of the aircraft destroyed and damaged by SAMs, Air Force and

Navy commanders understandably considered the missiles a grave threat.25 The

rapid proliferation of the sites was also a matter of serious concern. The number of known sites rose from seven at the end of July to eighteen confirmed and a

further eighteen suspected by September 2. Furthermore, DRV air defense personnel demonstrated an ability to construct missile installations quickly. One

appeared to have been built in forty-eight hours. In consonance with a mobility concept, the sites considerably outnumbered available missiles and missile

launchers. Air defense crews demonstrated that they could move missiles,

launchers, and associated equipment in or out of a site in a few hours.26
171

THE SAM THREAT

Throughout September, pilots witnessed more missile firings. On the 9th, an

SA–2 was fired against four F–105 Thunderchiefs returning from a strike mission

about twelve miles from the Laotian border and sixty-two miles west of Hanoi. The

missile passed between the flight leader and the wingman, but caused no damage.

A pilot believed he saw square fins on the missile, raising considerable speculation

at the time, later discounted, that the Soviet Union had introduced an advanced

SA–3 SAM into North Vietnam. Reports of at least a dozen firings in the first half

of the month alone attested to the increasing activity of the SAM crews.

The Navy was flying most of the SAM search and destroy missions. On

September 4, a Navy aircraft detected an enemy Fan Song radar emission and

struck a suspected site, which was believed to be camouflaged within buildings

near a canal. However, poststrike reconnaissance failed to verify its existence.

Frustrated in their search, from September 12 to 14 Navy pilots launched

another intensive effort to locate and destroy sites, flying 338 Iron Hand sorties

without success.27 On the morning of September 16, the Air Force attacked a

site near Thanh Hoa, resulting in the downing of two Thunderchiefs and their

pilots, one of whom was captured. He was Lt. Col. Robinson Risner, who had

won the Air Force Cross for his exploits in April. After his release in February

1973, he wrote a book about his experiences that included a graphic account of

his fateful anti-SAM mission on September 16:

We had four two-ship flights going out. For maneuverability, we

wanted only two-ship flights because we were looking for SAM sites. The

lead aircraft in each of the two-ship flights was loaded with napalm and

the other with 750-pound bombs. As lead, when we found the SAM sites,

Navy ordnancemen roll 500-pound

bombs across a carrier deck.
172

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

I would go in and drop napalm on the control trailer from where they

launched the missiles. Then the other man would go to afterburner

(which gave him half again as much power), climb to the proper altitude

and dive-bomb the SAM missiles with those 750-pound bombs.

This morning, our mission was to hit a SAM site about ten miles north

of the provincial capital of Thanh Hoa. Just as we came in over Highway 1,

I heard one of my flight commanders, leading another flight about fifteen

miles to my left to say: ‘Heads up, they’re shooting!’ I knew we were

going to get groundfire.

As we approached we turned left to go right up the highway. It was cut

through a little hill perhaps a hundred feet high. We were right down on

the deck. I had to lift to go over the hill, and as I topped it, the first thing

I saw were tracers. I was hit immediately. My engine shuddered, followed

by several quick explosions in the cockpit, which immediately filled with

smoke. Fire was coming in behind me from the right side, and I couldn’t

see anything else.

As soon as I was hit, I said, ‘Oak Lead—I’m hit,’ Within a second or

two my wing man was shouting ‘Get Out, Lead, Get Out, Lead, You’re

burning. You’re burning all over.’ He kept hollering but I didn’t intend to

get out....

I was already in a right pull up and only two or three miles from the

ocean. The nose was coming up when the engine quit, but I had about 550

knots by then because I had gone to afterburner. Suddenly my stick came

Lt. Col. Robinson Risner
173

THE SAM THREAT

right back into my lap and the aircraft pitched forward, throwing me up

against my shoulder straps toward the canopy. My options were gone—I

was out of control. I reached for the handle to eject the canopy. After it

went, I squeezed the trigger and ejected...before I realized it, I was

almost ready to hit the ground. I frantically shoved the radio back in the

pocket. I was headed for a rice field between two hamlets. I could see

people running toward me.

The man who had said he would never be captured was down in enemy

territory. And I had just dropped a load of napalm on them.28

On the same day, Navy pilots flying A–4Es equipped with ALQ–51 radar

deceptive devices claimed a “first” in “breaking” a Fan Song radar “lock-on” on

an aircraft. Another first was achieved on the 20th when pilots of similarly

equipped Navy A–4Es believed they diverted the aim of six SAMs fired at them

and other aircraft in the vicinity. Elsewhere that day, a non-Iron Hand mission

along the Northeast Hanoi-Lang San rail line elicited a barrage of ten SAMs and

heavy antiaircraft fire, but no aircraft were hit or sustained damage. The Navy’s

SAM detection capability was enhanced on September 5 when it began flying

its own EC–121 airborne command and control aircraft—nicknamed Big

Look—over the Tonkin Gulf to coordinate air strikes in North Vietnam. Similar

in purpose to the Air Force’s Big Eye EC–121s, the Navy plane also carried an

APS–20 radar for detecting the DRV’s SA–2 Fan Song radar.29

On September 23, while attacking an ammunition depot at Tai Xouan northwest of Hanoi, Air Force Thunderchief pilots observed two SAMs heading

towards them. As one missile soared toward an aircraft, the pilot made a “SAM

Break” maneuver that allowed him to elude it.30

Meanwhile, the Air Force’s loss of two planes and the capture of a pilot on

September 16 led McNamara to inquire if the mission was worth the risk. He

also asked for the rationale of the strike and if the planning and the tactics were

sound. General Moore, the commander of the 2d Air Division, defended the

mission vigorously. He warned higher authorities of the operational hazard

posed by the SA–2 missiles, cited the Air Force’s “severely limited” capability

to locate, photograph, and attack the sites and insisted that the risk was no

greater than for other types of missions. Observing that eighty-seven U.S. aircraft had been lost over the north since January 1, 1965, the majority to

groundfire while flying below 5,000 feet, he said that SA–2 missiles precluded

medium-altitude air operations. Thus, aircraft losses at low altitude would

probably rise. “We must accept the risks or losses involved in the SA–2 campaign,” he emphasized, “if we are to take the initiative away from the enemy.”31

On September 30, the Air Force lost its second F–105 to a SAM during a

Rolling Thunder strike near a bridge at Ninh Binh. It was the lead aircraft of a

flight and was destroyed at 18,000 feet. Another SAM was also observed in the

area, and an F–4C on the same mission was shot down by antiaircraft fire.32
174

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Improving Detection of SAM Sites

Meanwhile, neither conventional aerial photography nor the intensive electronic intelligence effort directed by Admiral Sharp on July 29 had produced

much data to help in pinpointing SAM locations. The new threat to the Rolling

Thunder program did have one salutary impact on air operations, at least from

the viewpoint of air commanders and aircrews. It forced administration officials to relax some of the more stringent air rules in the north which enabled

the services to become more innovative in searching for SAM sites.

On August 3, for the first time, the Joint Chiefs authorized Air Force and Navy

air commanders to conduct low-altitude photoreconnaissance, except over the

sanctuary areas, to confirm SAM site locations and to strike them immediately.

Another welcome change was an end to the inclusion of anti-SAM operations in

the established bimonthly Rolling Thunder sortie ceilings.33 In mid-August,

Admiral Sharp, saying that better dissemination of electronic intelligence was

needed, directed the Air Force and Marine Corps to collaborate more closely in

employing one or more of the Marine EA–3B Skywarriors with Air Force tactical reconnaissance and strike missions. He urged the use of several Marine

aircraft at one time to obtain “optimum flight tracks” for intercepting Fan Song

and other SAM-associated radars. Sharp also asked the Air Force to undertake

periodic joint strike and SAC reconnaissance drone operations to determine if

they would activate SAM radars, leading to their more precise location.34

The use of SAC Ryan 147D drones for photographic or electronic reconnaissance, begun in April 1965, was still very much in the experimental stage,

however. Launched from DC–130 mother ships, the drones, flying at low or high

altitude, emitted signals that were picked up by RB–47s, whose aircrews then

recorded and studied the signals. Of twenty-five drones launched between July

and September 1965, only eleven returned to the recovery areas. Nonetheless,

some drone launches and recoveries were successful, even if the mission objective was not attained. On August 21, for example, a drone was sent to a target

area accompanied by a Marine EA–3B electronic and Air Force photo and strike

aircraft. The Marine aircraft twice succeeded in “exciting” Fan Song radars, but

the signals ceased before the aircrew could flash their location to the photo and

strike aircraft. As a result, alternate targets were struck. The operation underscored a basic problem in locating missile radar sites: the short duration of Fan

Song transmissions.35

On August 31, another drone operation was somewhat more successful. This

witnessed the use of two drones escorted part of the way by twelve F–105

Thunderchiefs. Sixty other Air Force aircraft, including EC–121s, EB–66s,

F–105s, F–4Cs, and KC–135s along with Marine EF–10Bs were launched separately. As the drone began its “coast in” period, an RB–47 began recording the

anticipated Fan Song radar signal. After an eleven-minute break, Fan Song signals

were received continuously for one hour and twenty minutes. This data permitted three fixes on SAM site installations within a five-mile circle. An SA–2
175

THE SAM THREAT

missile destroyed the drone, but a flight of F–105 Thunderchiefs was dispatched quickly to the area. The strike pilots were unable to find the sites and

finished their mission by striking a bridge as an alternate target. Antiaircraft

guns downed one of the planes, but the pilot was rescued.36

The use of drones to find SAM sites diminished in the ensuing weeks. On

October 16, a drone was unable to elicit the desired SAM radar signals, two

drones launched on October 20 and November 5 fell victim to the north’s antiaircraft guns, and three low-altitude drones launched in October never returned

to the recovery area. SAC then halted the operations temporarily until the reliability and survivability of the drones could be improved.37

Other measures were instituted to facilitate the search for new SAM sites.

At the end of August, the JCS authorized the first low-altitude armed reconnaissance of sites detected by electronic intelligence or U–2 photography.38

They also approved an Air Force proposal to deploy a specially equipped

RB–57F reconnaissance aircraft, with six supporting officers and twelve airmen, for intensive photo coverage of suspected sites. The 2d Air Division

had emphasized that weather conditions made repeat photography mandatory.

Assigned to the 6250th Combat Group at Tan Son Nhut in South Vietnam, the

aircraft and personnel deployed quickly to Udorn. Because of the aircraft’s vulnerability to missile and conventional antiaircraft fire, however, the JCS limited missions to authorized reconnaissance areas, prohibited direct overflights

of known or suspected sites, and permitted the use of fighter escorts. However,

an initial series of fifteen missions in September to mid-October, provided little

useful data. A second effort from December 1965 to February 1966 was no more

successful. After this, the project was discontinued.39

A Douglas EB–66.
176

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

In August, the Navy began testing a new air-to-surface, stand-off, antielectronic

radiation weapon, the AGM–45 Shrike, with a 141-pound warhead and a maximum

range of twenty-five miles. Later used by the Air Force as well, the weapon was

designed principally to home in on S-band and C-band guidance radars for the

SA–2s, but they could also be adapted to counter radar-controlled antiaircraft guns

and early warning and GCI radars.

During a few weeks of testing, the Shrike generally failed to perform as

expected, although aircrews quickly gained firing experience, but the north’s

SAM crews learned how to neutralize the weapon’s homing capability. When an

aircraft performed a maneuver commonly employed just prior to the Shrike’s

release, they turned off the radar which the weapon used to home to its target. In

addition, aircrews found it difficult to judge the Shrike’s performance because of

the long release distance, the need for aircraft to take quick evasive action after

firing it, and the possibility that the missile would err and follow a wrong signal.

By September 25, the results of twenty-five Shrikes fired at radiating targets

were as follows: seven probable and two possible hits, two probable misses, and

fourteen unknown results. Because of the limited number of missiles, testing

ceased in September and the remaining weapons were set aside as a reserve.40

After further development, an improved Shrike became combat ready early in

1966 and Air Force and Navy aircrews began using it on a regular basis.

Continued Air Strikes on non-SAM Targets

Although air commanders were largely concerned about the evolving SAM

threat—and still awaiting solid confirmation of a first SAM kill—most air missions were still scheduled for non-SAM targets. For Rolling Thunder program

24/25 (July 23–August 3), for example, the JCS authorized 13 fixed targets and

500 armed reconnaissance sorties.41

Air Force photo interpreters

at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
177

THE SAM THREAT

The Air Force’s most important targets during this period were the Ban

Pham Lat and Phu Huong bridges above Hanoi on the northwest Hanoi to Lao

Cao rail line. The strikes destroyed both bridges and such ancillary objectives

as boxcars and river barges and cut segments of the rail line. In armed reconnaissance, Air Force operations were highlighted by the first use (on July 28)

of 3,000-pound general-purpose blockbusters by F–105 pilots of the 12th TFS

against the durable Thanh Hoa bridge. The spans did not collapse, but pedestrian traffic across the bridge again came to a temporary halt. With Air Force

support, the VNAF flew a restrike on the DRV army barracks at Vinh and the

ammunition depot at Xom Rung.

Many of the Navy’s missions were against several earlier targets in the Nam

Dinh area. These included a POL site, a railyard, six nearby antiaircraft sites,

and the Nam Dinh thermal power plant. Additional attacks were mounted

against the Thanh Hoa power plant (a restrike); radars on Hon Matt Island; the

barracks areas at Dong Hoi, Quang Suoi, and Bai Thuong; and the Roa Leky

bridges. The power plants at Nam Dinh and Thanh Hoa, now judged destroyed,

were believed to have reduced the DRV’s electrical capacity by 7 percent.

During a night attack on the Thanh Hoa power plant, Navy pilots reported tracking by twelve to twenty-four searchlights, the first known instance of the north’s

use of air defense illumination. About forty-eight hours later in another target

area, two Navy aircraft on ECM missions were also tracked with searchlights.

Pilots were unable to determine if the searchlights were controlled by radar.42

For Rolling Thunder program 26/27 (August 6–9), the Joint Chiefs proposed

striking a number of new and more significant targets, but administration

authorities again overruled their selection in favor of targets deemed less

provocative. These included the barracks and SAM installations around Dien

Bien Phu, warehouses at Long Giem Da and Dang Thanh, two bridges, and the

Long Chi explosives plant. The Air Force made seven separate assaults on the

North Vietnamese surfaceto-air missile site with four

missiles in place.
178

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* This meant that SAM sites 6 and 7, having been attacked once, could not be attacked

again.

targets around Dien Bien Phu, and on August 10 Thunderchiefs destroyed the

Vinh Tuy bridge employing a 3,000-pound bomb and, for the first time, an

AGM–12C Bullpup missile with a 1,000-pound warhead. Until the latter

weapon became available, the Air Force had used the AGM–12B Bullpup with

a 250-pound warhead.

The Navy’s principal fixed targets in this period were the frequently bombed

Vinh army barracks, railyards, and a supply depot that endured eight separate

strikes. The Navy also struck the barracks areas at Son La and Than Chai and

the Ban Nuoc Chieu ammunition depot.43

For program number 28/29 (August 20–September 2), the JCS authorized

strikes and restrikes on nine fixed targets and slightly expanded the boundaries

for armed reconnaissance. SAM sites 1 and 9 and airfields used by attacking

MiGs remained off limits to Air Force and Navy commanders because of their

proximity to Hanoi.*44 Air Force pilots hit the Bai Thuong barracks area, the

Xom Truong Hoa barracks and ammunition complex, and the Long Ban rail

bridge. The bridge was a vital link on the northwest Hanoi to Lao Cao rail line

and was located on a segment northwest of Yen Bai that had been hit numerous

times since July 11. By August 25, six bridges on the line had been destroyed

and five damaged. Nevertheless, in a sustained repair effort, DRV work crews

restored the bridges sufficiently to keep traffic moving over them. U.S. analysts

observed that repair time averaged two to six weeks per bridge. The railyard at

Yen Ba, heavily damaged on July 17, was also serviceable again by late August,

permitting rail traffic to pass through the city.45

The Air Force’s most important targets were the Ban Thach dam and hydroelectric plant and the associated Bic Thuong locks located about eighty miles

Bridge on Route 6

southeast of Dien Bien

Phu destroyed by Air

Force F–105s.
179

THE SAM THREAT

* For a discussion of the sharpening munitions shortage in 1965 and measures to overcome

it, see Herman S. Wolk, USAF Logistic Plans and Policies in Southeast Asia, 1965 (USAF

Hist Div Liaison Off, June 1967), chapter III.

southwest of Hanoi. These targets were struck five times between August 21

and 23. On the 23d, Air Force aircraft dropped eight 3,000-pound bombs on the

generator building and the dam. The attacks created news headlines and speculation there would be more bombing of dams, dikes, and locks in the floodvulnerable Red River Delta. Although the two targets were not part of the

DRV’s river irrigation system, their bombing alarmed the State Department.

Taking seriously Hanoi’s allegations that such targets had been hit before, State

directed OSD to desist from targeting dams and locks. The assault on the Ban

Thach power plant, the fifth DRV power plant struck thus far, and on other targets on August 22, made it the largest one-day Air Force effort of the war. A

total of eighty-seven strike sorties dropped 228 tons of bombs.

On August 2, the Air Force scheduled its F–4C Phantoms for armed reconnaissance missions for the first time. Newer and more sophisticated than the

F–105 Thunderchiefs, the Phantoms of the 47th TFS (which replaced the 45th

TFS at Ubon RTAFB in July) had been used for combat air patrol since April

and for strikes on fixed targets since the end of May. During their initial armed

reconnaissance mission, the F–4Cs hit bridges, trucks, a radar site, and the

Kim Cuong barracks area. The beginning of August also coincided roughly

with a transition point in the Rolling Thunder program when air commanders

began scheduling more sorties for armed reconnaissance than for fixed targets. There were two principal reasons for the change: the intensive search for

SA–2 SAM sites and deteriorating flying weather. In the period from August

6 to 19, for example, eighty-eight scheduled Air Force sorties were canceled

because of weather before takeoff and ten were aborted after launch due to

poor weather. Flying under somewhat better weather conditions in coastal

areas, the Navy claimed a lower cancellation rate and reported no weather

aborts during the same period. In late August, an anticipated shortage of 750-

pound bombs, used largely by the Air Force, resulted in reduced bomb loads.

Bomb stockpiles were depleted much more rapidly after June 18, 1965, when

SAC began B–52 Arc Light bombing in South Vietnam. The bombers were

voracious consumers of ordnance, capable of carrying more than fifty-one of

the 750-pound bombs. When studies showed that both 500-pound and 750-pound

bombs would be in critically short supply by February 1966, Washington

authorities ordered the production lines to be reopened, but predicted no new

bomb supplies before August 1966. The Air Force adjusted to the impending

munitions shortfall by relying more on CBUs and napalm. When a safety

problem arose with the CBUs, PACAF used more 2.75-inch rockets and other

types of ordnance.*46
180

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Rolling Thunder’s tempo increased only moderately, despite the increase in

air activity in August against SA–2 sites and the escalation of U.S. air and

ground operations in South Vietnam to save that country from collapse. Air

Force, Navy, and VNAF combat sorties in August totaled 1,263 compared with

1,001 in July, while ordnance expenditures decreased somewhat from 2,540 to

2,357 tons during the two months. Although the permissible bombing line had

been extended northward, Air Force and Navy pilots still flew most of their

missions below the 20th parallel. After six months of the Rolling Thunder program, they had struck or restruck 82 of the 91 targets designated by the JCS

below the 20th parallel, but only 28 of 121 designated targets above it. The

VNAF, usually supported by the Air Force, still limited its operations to below

the 19th parallel and flew relatively few missions. In the four-week period from

August 6 to September 2, for example, it completed twenty-eight armed reconnaissance and eight leaflet sorties.47

For Rolling Thunder program 30/31 (September 2–17), the JCS again selected

more important targets, but administration authorities vetoed seven, added two of

their own, and again permitted only a modest increase in the bombing level. They

raised the biweekly sortie rate for armed reconnaissance from 1,000 to 1,200 to

allow more attacks on SA–2 sites, trucks, rolling stock, naval craft, and other targets of opportunity. They also approved a slight extension westward of the armed

reconnaissance area, from the coast at latitude 20°30'N to longitude 105°20'E,

then north to a point 30 n.m. from the Chinese border, then southwest to the

Laotian border, retaining a 25 n.m. distance from China.

Administration authorities also eased strike operations by making an exception to the rule prohibiting aircraft from entering the 25 n.m. to 30 n.m. buffer

zone between North Vietnam and China. In the future, strike aircraft maneuvering

to hit a target close to the northern edge of the zone could penetrate as far as

15 n.m. from the Chinese border.48 As an indication of the gradually increasing

B–52 releasing bombs over South Vietnam.
181

THE SAM THREAT

pace of Rolling Thunder, during the week ending September 17, the Air Force

flew 524 combat sorties and dropped 1,105 tons of bombs. In the following

week the totals were 638 combat sorties and 1,105 tons of bombs.49

The most intensive missions of the month were against the Yen Khaoi army

base and ammunition supply area about 40 n.m. west of Hanoi. Three strikes

were conducted on September 9, 11, and 12. The mission leader in each instance

was the redoubtable Lt. Col. Robinson Risner, commander of the 67th TFS at

Korat RTAFB, and winner of the Air Force Cross for his exploits in April. To

assure a surprise attack against a heavily defended target, Colonel Risner led his

F–105 flights toward the area at low altitude and high speed each time. Attacks

were conducted with aircraft approaching from different directions and angles,

tactics particularly hazardous because of bad weather.

On the 9th, after leading his flights to the barracks and ammunition area and

expending his own bomb load, Colonel Risner took on fuel from an SAC KC–135

tanker, then finished his mission by flying combat air patrol for a downed

Thunderchief pilot. On the 12th, with the target area more heavily defended than

before, he again completed a bomb run but as he pulled away the canopy of his

Thunderchief was shattered by automatic weapons fire. Nevertheless, he managed

an aerial refueling and landed at his home base. The three-day effort left about

100 barracks and other buildings destroyed or damaged. For his courage and professionalism, Colonel Risner was awarded the Silver Star. Unfortunately, he

received his second award in absentia. On the 16th, as noted earlier, he was shot

down and captured after completing an assault on a suspected SAM site near

Thanh Hoa.50

Because the Air Force was suffering from a lack of aircraft with good night

capability, it flew relatively few nocturnal sorties, leaving most of the task to the

Navy. But in September it began launching more night operations, nicknamed

Night Wind, using, as it had earlier in 1965, C–130 Blindbat navigation and flare

Ground crew

loading bombs

on underwing

pylon of B–52.
182

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

*For an in-depth study of Air Force night operations see Maj. Victor B. Anthony, The Air

Force in Southeast Asia, Tactics and Techniques of Night Operations, 1961–1970, (Ofc AF

Hist, 1972).

ships in conjunction with two B–57 Canberra light bombers. Under flare illumination, the B–57s searched principally for trucks, attacking them when possible

with 260-pound fragmentation ordnance.* During the period September 3–30, Air

Force crews flew twelve night missions, compared with nineteen by the Navy.51

Beginning with Rolling Thunder program 33 in late September, the Air Force

augmented its night interdiction effort by introducing specially equipped F–4C

Phantoms of the 68th TFS whose two-man aircrews were trained in nighttime flying techniques. The squadron deployed to Korat RTAFB from George AFB,

California on August 27. Nicknamed Night Owl, the missions consisted of two

Phantoms flying in tandem with the lead aircraft carrying MK–24 flares and the

second, about five miles behind, loaded with 750-pound bombs. Initially six missions, then eight, were scheduled nightly, but after mid-October monsoon weather

began to curb operations drastically. In the period from October 29–November 11,

for example, only 90 of 260 scheduled sorties were completed. Weather and darkness also obscured strike results, and the enemy was very elusive. At the first drop

of a flare, truckers pulled off the roads. However, the night missions were believed

to have a harassing effect.52

Given the frequently poor flying weather and the large areas of jungle in the

north, occasional bombing accidents were inevitable. On September 16, an Air

Force F–100 Super Sabre from Korat erroneously hit the northern end of a bridge

spanning the Ben Hai River, the demarcation line between the northern and southern sectors of the DMZ. The strike destroyed the bridge and killed three Vietnamese

civilians. The next day, a flight of four F–105 Thunderchiefs struck a hamlet in the

southern sector of the DMZ, killing twenty-one Vietnamese, including eight policemen, and wounding many others. Because the 1954 Geneva Agreement prohibited

military activity in the DMZ, the International Control Commission, made up of

Canadian, Indian, and Polish representatives, conducted an investigation. Both incidents were attributed to pilot error in identifying targets. PACAF quickly tightened

operational procedures, stipulating that in future all aircraft should confirm their

positions by radar when flying within 20 n.m. of the DMZ and conduct no air strikes

within five n.m. of the northern portion of the zone.53

On September 20, the Chinese shot down an Air Force F–104 Starfighter

over Hainan Island, capturing its pilot, Capt. Philip E. Smith.54 Captain Smith

had been flying escort for four Silver Dawn C–130Bs that had arrived recently

at Da Nang AB. Assigned to the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadron in Japan, the

C–130Bs flew electronic and communications intercept missions off the North

Vietnamese and Chinese coasts. Following midair refueling for his mission,

Captain Smith reported navigational difficulty and drifted over Hainan Island.
183

THE SAM THREAT

* The first U.S. loss to a Chinese MiG occurred on April 9, 1965, during a PACFLTChinese aerial engagement near the Chinese-held Hainan Island in the eastern part of the

Gulf of Tonkin. 

His Starfighter was the second American aircraft lost to the Chinese since the

beginning of the war.* Exploiting the propaganda value of their captive, the

Chinese trumpeted that Captain Smith was given a bath and a hearty meal of

Chinese noodles, then alleged that he had stated: “I hate this war. But I was

made to come.” Captain Smith’s sudden disappearance led to another costly

near tragedy. After completing a quick search for him, two Starfighters collided

in mid-air over Da Nang and were destroyed, but both pilots bailed out and

were rescued.55

Because dams and locks associated with North Vietnam’s irrigation system were

exempt from attack, Hanoi’s claims in late August and early September that U.S.

aircraft had struck four dams and a lock prompted a State Department inquiry.

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, pressed the

Defense Department to amend JCS Rolling Thunder guidance. He asked that dams,

canal locks, flood-control levees, and hydroelectric plants be excluded from air

attack, except as approved in Washington on a case-by-case basis.56

Responding for the JCS, General Wheeler believed that, except for floodcontrol levees and dams, waterway dams and locks were fair game for bombing,

as were power plants. Of five plants struck thus far, he observed, all but one had

prior interagency concurrence. He vigorously opposed the imposition of yet

more restraints on the Rolling Thunder program. Nonetheless, Mr. Bundy’s

concerns were soon translated into a new bombing guideline. Starting in late

October and early November (programs 38/39), locks and dams were specifically

excluded from attack (certain exceptions were made shortly thereafter).57

750-pound bombs on

a centerline pylon of

an F–105.
184

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Worried lest further violations of bombing rules lead to more restrictions

and the establishment of additional sanctuary areas, Air Force leaders ordered

their subordinates to comply fully with the bombing rules. At the end of

September, General Harris directed his subordinates to make the “strongest

effort” to tighten flight discipline and “insure that all crews are imbued with the

seriousness of violations of restricted zones.” He also ordered the establishment

and monitoring of standard flight procedures to reduce the possibility of bombing infractions.58 Several weeks later, addressing an Air Force commanders’

conference, Air Force Brig. Gen. John W. Vogt, Director, Policy Planning Staff,

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs,

who in April 1972 would become Commander of the Seventh Air Force, further

urged air commanders to observe Washington’s operational restraints. He cited

the most important “don’ts” for strike aircraft:

Don’t attack MiG airfields, even if you see MiG airplanes coming...to

attack you. Don’t go within thirty miles of Hanoi unless you are directed

to do so. We have been directed twice, I think, not to go within the thirtymile border. Don’t go within ten miles of Haiphong unless you are

directed. Don’t hit SAMs in the thirty and ten-mile restricted areas unless

you have specific authorization in advance, even if the SAMs are firing at

you while you are in there. Don’t hit SAMs elsewhere in the northeast

restricted area outside the thirty-mile limit or ten-mile limit unless you

have positive evidence that they are occupied beforehand...if you attack

an empty SAM site, you are subject to criticism. Don’t go closer than

thirty miles to the Chinese border in the northwest. Don’t go closer than

twenty-five miles to the Chinese border in the northeast. We can go as

close to twenty miles in both areas only if you are a strike airplane and

positioning yourself for attack, and then you must drop your bombs

twenty-five miles...and not twenty miles away [from China’s border].

Don’t hit dams and locks unless you are sure they are associated with

nonirrigational purposes. You can attack them if they are involved with

navigation. Don’t hit barges unless you think they are engaged in carrying supplies and equipment to support the war effort.

I could go on and on, but the point is that the restrictions apply and

we have to get them to the pilots. They change almost weekly. New

restrictions are imposed, others are lifted. We are engaged in a constant

discussion with CINCPAC and Joint Chiefs of Staff trying to get these

things changed, and it is amazing to me that General Moore and his people are able to fight the war as effectively as they do under the rules and

restrictions that apply.

In addition, we have to provide constant justification for the manner

we are fighting the war...to justify our Rolling Thunder operations to

prove that they are doing some good. We have countless commissions and

groups out here to investigate these things.59
185

THE SAM THREAT

* Col. Triantafellu was promoted to brigadier general on November 1, 1965.

Establishment of a Target Intelligence Center

By the summer of 1965, the need for more targets for Air Force and Navy

aircrews, especially for armed reconnaissance missions, obliged the 2d Air

Division to expand its targeting capability in the Directorate of Intelligence. On

September 15, Col. Rockly Triantafellu,* Deputy for Intelligence, established a

target intelligence center (TIC) with Lt. Col. James C. Enney as its chief.

Staffed by personnel from the 13th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 2d’s

Intelligence Directorate, the TIC was divided into separate photo support, target

recording, and target development branches. To improve targeting, the target

development branch bisected the north at about the 19th parallel and divided

Laos between the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger sectors. Photoreconnaissance

remained the basic source for enlarging the target base, but intelligence personnel made a concerted effort to use data from other sources.

The TIC began to pinpoint more targets, both short-term and long-term,

for operational units on September 20. As before, when targets had been plotted and developed, the data was sent to all strike, reconnaissance, and other

using units. Liaison among the TIC and aircrews, debriefing officers, and

other personnel involved in operations improved markedly. In the ensuing

months, the continuing search for all kinds of enemy targets resulted in further expansion of the TIC. Of course, most targets recommended for strikes

were sent to the JCS, which forwarded them to McNamara and his staff for

final approval.60

Deepening Service Concern about Strike Restrictions

Despite the gradual increase in strike sorties against more targets in North

Vietnam throughout August and September 1965, Hanoi’s press and radio and

VC-NVA battlefield performance in the south showed no loss of determination

to fight on. Intelligence assessments of Rolling Thunder also raised questions

about its impact. A DIA-CIA report covering the period through the end of

August 1965 concluded that the DRV’s capability to defend its homeland, train

its forces, and infiltrate men and supplies to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam

and the Pathet Lao in Laos had “not diminished to any appreciable degree.”

The economic impact of the bombing thus far, the study showed, caused some

disruption and strain within the country, but overall it did not “amount to much.”61

PACAF’s intelligence analysts arrived at a similar conclusion. Bombing had

caused some morale erosion, limited food shortages, evacuation of populated

areas, and transportation problems, the latter because of destroyed roads and

bridges, but the DRV showed no sign of giving up. Rather, its press and radio

expressed a desire for revenge and maintained a confident attitude.62
186

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* The antiaircraft estimating task was extremely difficult and depended on a number of

variables: whether estimates were based solely on air reconnaissance or air reconnaissance

plus data from POW and other sources, inclusion or exclusion of automatic weapons, the

extent to which air search of antiaircraft sites had been stepped up and the extent to which

more and better trained photoanalysts were being used for readouts, and the time lag

between the acquisition and reporting of antiaircraft data.

There was mounting concern among air commanders over the cost of the constricted Rolling Thunder program. In the last three weeks of August the DRV’s

air defense shot down 19 aircraft (9 Air Force, 10 Navy), and damaged many

more. In the following twenty-eight days (September 3–30), they downed 21

more aircraft (Air Force 11, Navy 8, VNAF 2) and damaged 66 (Air Force 31 and

Navy 35). As of September 26, U.S. losses over the north totaled 114, the Air

Force and Navy having lost 57 each. On the same day, Hanoi climaxed its propaganda effort by “celebrating” its “600th” shoot-down of American aircraft.63

The DRV’s conventional antiaircraft capability was increasing, though how

rapidly was uncertain. PACAF intelligence saw a fairly fast expansion of the

DRV’s antiaircraft weapons (figure 8).

Figure 8

Increase in Conventional Antiaircraft Weaponry

July 5–September 30, 1965

6:8*%( /0*8*%( *"=$%( 

*9 "% +& " +"'


$
9 +& +// +" +'"

The DIA’s estimates of the DRV’s antiaircraft strength was considerably more

conservative, although it too noted an increase. On November 3, 1965, it credited

the North Vietnamese with 700 light and 900 medium guns, but made no estimate

of the number of smaller automatic weapons.* Most antiaircraft guns were concentrated around important towns and cities, industrial sites, rail and road bridges,

and transportation points. Intelligence analysts agreed that the DRV placed great

emphasis on the mobility of their air defenses, sometimes constructing as many as

four alternate antiaircraft battery sites around a vital target area.64

A Joint Staff aircraft attrition study, using data through mid-September

1965, confirmed previous estimates that the majority of hits and nearly 50 percent of all U.S. air losses over the north were inflicted by automatic weapons
187

THE SAM THREAT

14.5-mm or smaller. The study noted that DRV gunners were trained to use

small arms against all aircraft within range and regardless of speed. There were

“firing cells” that aimed at an aircraft until it was out of sight. A trained platoon, it was judged, could shoot up to 1,000 rounds at a high-speed jet in three

to five seconds. Other tactics included barrage-firing of automatic weapons

and the larger 37-mm and 57-mm guns at a particular azimuth and altitude and

setting up tempting targets as bait and surrounding them with a heavy concentration of guns (as was demonstrated in the initial Air Force and Navy strikes

against SAM sites in July and August). An estimated 60 percent of the 57-mm

and 85-mm guns were located within a 30 n.m. radius of Hanoi and Haiphong

and many others encircled the towns of Vinh, Thai Nguyen, Thanh Hoa, Yen

Bai, and elsewhere. The lethal air defenses generally forced pilots to remain

above 4,500 feet and to limit the size of their missions to two, three, or four aircraft. Wingmen often flew one-half to one mile behind the lead aircraft and all

were weaving constantly.65

There was evidence that many aircrews were disquieted about their daily

missions and believed they were taking unwarranted risks in hitting targets of

little value. Except for armed reconnaissance, they faulted Rolling Thunder

guidelines requiring largely repetitive biweekly air programs that seemed more

than anything else to benefit the enemy gunners. Following meetings with Air

Force and Navy commanders in Southeast Asia, Adm. David L. McDonald,

Chief of Naval Operations, documented these opinions in a report issued in

September 1965. General Westmoreland agreed with his criticism of Rolling

Thunder, but Admiral Sharp was reluctant to admit to any serious misuse of air

resources, although he conceded that aircraft could be used more efficiently

against more profitable targets in northeastern North Vietnam.66

North Vietnamese antiaircraft artillery site with

seven 57-mm weapons in

place.
188

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Illustrative of service discontent was the planning for Rolling Thunder program 26/27 (August 6–19). The JCS sent Secretary McNamara proposals for

attacking twelve new “significant” non-SAM targets (including Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi, now harboring sixty-three MiG–15s and MiG–17s and eight

Il–28 bombers), an accelerated and systematic campaign against all SAM

installations regardless of location (i.e., including SAM sites within the HanoiHaiphong sanctuary area), and more sustained interdiction of LOCs supporting

the SAM system. However, Mr. McNamara and State Department and White

House officials drastically pruned the Joint Chiefs’ requests, deleted all twelve

targets, substituted nine others of lesser importance, and reduced the planned

sortie rate accordingly.67 They approved an increase only in attacks on SAM

sites that were outside of the sanctuary area.

Such decisions deepened the disenchantment of many service leaders, especially in the Air Force. To a man, Air Force commanders remained convinced

that the full weight of available air power should be brought to bear on all of

the SAM sites and MiG bases in the north, the entire DRV air defense net, and

those storage facilities and power stations that had not yet been bombed. The

Air Staff was convinced that effective strikes against the last two target categories could “shut down the highways and turn off the lights throughout the

DRV.” Expounding on the air problems, Maj. Gen. Seth J. McKee, Chief of Plans

for the Air Staff, conveyed to General Harris the shortcomings of the current

war strategy:

North Vietnamese 57-mm antiaircraft weapon and crew.
189

THE SAM THREAT

Since the role of the U.S. ground forces was changed in SVN, the

overall trend of U.S. actions has been toward greater imbalance of effort.

The continuing emphasis on efforts within...SVN while refusing to

destroy the source and direction and support of...NVN must be changed

before we find ourselves unwillingly involved in an interminable and

indecisive ground war on the Asian land mass.

McKee concluded that if the United States was disinclined to adopt a more

balanced military program that included wider and more intense air operations

against the north, “then we should not commit more U.S. troops to a war in the

jungles of Vietnam from which we cannot extricate ourselves and...may have

no chance of winning.”68

Interestingly, Admiral Sharp took a more sanguine view of the Rolling

Thunder program. Accepting the program’s limited objectives, in late August

he informed the Joint Chiefs that he considered the air campaign “successful,”

and predicted “we are on the threshold of realizing the full impact of a cumulative effect.” “It is a campaign of pressure,” he said. “Immediate and spectacular

effects were not intended.” He proposed two alternative bombing programs for

the weeks ahead. The first, and the one preferred by all the services, was to

strike targets designated by the JCS in the prohibited north and northeast sectors of North Vietnam to isolate Hanoi-Haiphong from China. If this was not

politically feasible, he urged greatly increased armed reconnaissance with pilots

assigned many “pre-briefed” targets. Whatever course Washington decided on,

he believed it could be attained by flying a maximum of 5,500 sorties per month,

a level to be attained by November 1965. About 70 percent of the sorties would

be for target strikes and 30 percent for support.69

An F–105 bombs a bridge

in North Vietnam, 112

miles northwest of Vinh,

November 1965.
190

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Not surprisingly, for the next Rolling Thunder program 30/31 (September

2–17), the Joint Chiefs recommended immediate strikes on rail, highway, and

waterway routes, traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong, and between the two

cities and southern China; on POL storage facilities at Haiphong (holding

about one-half of the remaining DRV POL stores); and four more thermal

power plants (generating about half of the DRV’s thermal power). They again

asked for authority to strike all SAM sites regardless of location, and Phuc Yen

airfield near Hanoi. The MiGs and Il–28 bombers at Phuc Yen, they warned,

were within range of Da Nang AB and other South Vietnamese installations. If

these were attacked, estimates predicted upwards of 2,000 casualties and 200

aircraft damaged or destroyed. The service chiefs asked that their views be

placed before the President “without delay.”70

As usual, the President and his civilian advisers refused to sanction a precipitous air assault on the north and approved a series of targets of lesser importance.71

They relaxed the air rules again, however, approving a maximum of 1,200

armed reconnaissance missions (although this number could be exceeded if

necessary), the highest number thus far for a two-week period, unrestricted

strikes on JCS targets that had been struck previously, and strikes on secondary

targets in the north by pilots flying Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger missions in Laos

who might be carrying unspent ordnance.72 Pilots on Rolling Thunder missions

had previously been permitted to drop unexpended ordnance on secondary targets in Laos while returning to their bases in Thailand. The two-week strike

A salvo of rockets fired at a North

Vietnamese missile site thirteen

miles northwest of Dong Hoi. 
191

THE SAM THREAT

effort was highlighted by a “flap” over public reports that Air Force planes had

bombed a rail bridge only seventeen n.m. from the Chinese border. As the

buffer zone extended from twenty-five to thirty n.m. from China, this was in

clear violation of the air rules. An investigation quickly revealed that the

bridge’s coordinates had been misread and that the bridge was located within

the authorized bombing area. Nevertheless, General Moore took steps to

tighten the strike reporting system and avoid a similar incident in the future.73

McNamara shortly explained to the Joint Chiefs why some of their targeting

proposals had been vetoed. There was “other” intelligence, he said, indicating that

MiG or Il–28 bomber attacks on South Vietnamese installations were “unlikely”

as Hanoi had reasons to fear strong American retaliatory action. Further, he

doubted that heavier air strikes would persuade Hanoi that the price for assisting

the Viet Cong was too high, or forestall the insurgents in the south. In fact, Hanoi’s

reaction might be the reverse and lead to actions more supportive of the Viet

Cong. The Defense Secretary also disagreed with a DIA evaluation, made in May

1965 and accepted by the JCS, that predicted Chinese reaction to a U.S. air strike

on Phuc Yen airfield was “unlikely,” and a response by the Soviet Union would

probably be “limited.” On the contrary, he said, such a bombing might lead to a

confrontation between the United Sates and China, but he left the door open for

further discussion.74

Mr. McNamara’s reasons for regarding a more aggressive Rolling Thunder

program as neither wise nor feasible at this time were already a matter of public

record. In the aggregate, they reflected a conviction that heavier strikes would

prove counterproductive and provoke a stronger military reaction by Hanoi, or

Chinese intervention in the war, or both. Nor did the Defense Secretary conceal

his view of the efficacy of air power. “We never believed and we don’t believe

today,” he averred in an interview in August, “that bombing in the north will drive

the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table or force them to cease their terror

tactics and harassment and subversion of political institutions....” The only way

to stop this was “to prove they can’t win in the south,” and the strategy was

directed to that end. It was the antithesis of the Air Force’s view.75

A further reason for the administration’s refusal to expand Rolling Thunder

rapidly in the summer of 1965 was not articulated. As events soon disclosed,

the President, Mr. McNamara, and other officials were considering another

serious negotiating effort with Hanoi to terminate hostilities. For bargaining

“chips,” they planned to use the carrot of a prolonged bombing pause and the

stick of heavier air attacks on more vital targets if negotiations failed. By fall,

debate within the administration over another bombing halt had increased

markedly. By the end of the year, the halt would become a reality.76

Political constraints and the arrival of the monsoons in October thus led to

a reduction in Rolling Thunder operations. The only increase in air activity was

against the growing number of SA–2 missile sites outside of the HanoiHaiphong sanctuary.
192

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

The First SAM “Kill” and the anti-SAM Campaign in Late 1965

On October 17, five Navy Iron Hand aircraft, accompanying a joint Air Force

and Navy Rolling Thunder mission against the Bac Can and Thai Nguyen

bridges on the northeast rail line, prepared to strike a missile site near Kep airfield, not far from the rail line. The missile installation, assigned number 32, had

been detected two days earlier by a drone. As the Rolling Thunder mission

neared the target, the Iron Hand aircraft, consisting of one A–6A Intruder and

four A–4E Skyhawks, all from the carrier Independence, broke off, popped up

to 8,000 feet, and attacked the missile and associated equipment from two directions. As the lead aircraft, the A–6A strung eighteen Mark V 500-pound bombs

across a missile transporter park, each of the A–4Es dropped 500-pound and

1,000-pound bombs from about 4,500 feet on the revetments. One missile was

destroyed by a bomb, and the second missile, after snaking on the ground,

burned itself out. The attack also destroyed ten missile transporter vehicles,

damaged four others, and left three vans in flames. All five aircraft returned

safely to the Independence.

77

This was the first confirmed destruction of missiles and related equipment

since the Air Force conducted an initial authorized strike on a missile site on

July 27, 1965. Although the two services had only marginally effective equipment for detecting and pinpointing SAM installations, tactics were improving.

Another collaborative Air Force and Navy effort followed. On October 31, in a

“hunter-killer” experiment, a Navy pilot, Cmdr. Richard Powers, flying one of

several specially equipped A–4E Skyhawks, flew as a pathfinder for USAF

F–105 Thunderchiefs in an attack on missile sites. On the day preceding the

mission, Commander Powers flew his Skyhawk from the carrier Oriskany to

the 355th TFW at Takhli RTAFB to make coordinating arrangements. The next

day, during another regular Rolling Thunder mission on the Kep highway

bridge about thirty-five miles northeast of Hanoi, Powers guided two flights

of Air Force F–105s to the target area. While Navy jets hit the Kep bridge,

destroying it, Powers picked up a Fan Song radar from one SAM site and then

observed two SAMs fired from a second site about two miles away. He quickly

directed the Thunderchiefs to the latter target, then headed back to the first,

dropping MK–82 high-drag Snake Eye bombs on it. Powers’ Skyhawk was hit

by groundfire, forcing him to bail out. He was observed descending and landed

apparently unhurt. Rescue efforts followed immediately, but as these proved

unsuccessful, Powers was presumably captured (officially listed as missing in

action). Meanwhile, four USAF F–105s ascended to about 8,000 feet and

expended their ordnance on the second missile site. Then one Thunderchief

pilot spotted a third site and attacked it.

Next, Navy “pouncer” aircraft went into action, dropping their Snake Eye

bombs on all three SAM sites. They used both low-level and dive-bombing

techniques and experienced withering groundfire including about thirteen

SAMs. After the attacks, pilots of the two services believed they had destroyed
193

THE SAM THREAT

radar and control vans in two and possibly in all three sites. This was widely

reported in the press, although lingering smoke and haze precluded any conclusive BDA. Losses were minimal, and consisted of Commander Powers and

his Skyhawk and one F–105 Thunderchief gun which blew up while firing.

Pilots credited the low attrition to timely warnings from ELINT and other aircraft of approaching SAMs, which enabled them to take speedy evasive action.

One USAF pilot reported that he was tracked by a SAM at 700 to 800 feet

while executing a 90-degree turn and finally eluded the missile by flying

behind a hill. Because the Navy had insufficient numbers of the specially

equipped A–4E Skyhawks such as the one flown by Powers, no further Air

Force/Navy hunter-killer experiments were conducted in the ensuing months.78

In one instance, search and rescue proved more costly than a strike operation. On November 5, an armada of fifty-six Air Force aircraft en route to a SAM

support facility at Guoi Bo and the Phu Ly bridge were diverted to armed reconnaissance because of bad weather. Near Thanh Hoa, a SAM missile downed an

F–105, and this single loss led to several more. An A–1E Skyraider, searching

for the pilot the next day, was shot down by groundfire, as was a USAF CH–3

helicopter with a crew of four, which was launched to rescue the Skyraider

pilot. Another rescue effort succeeded in saving one of the four helicopter

crewmen. On the 6th, another A–1E searching for the downed pilots and crews

was hit by antiaircraft fire and crashed. The pilot could not be rescued.

In another anti-SAM mission, also on November 6, twenty Navy aircraft

first conducted a restrike on the Hai Duong bridge located in a restricted area

between Hanoi and Haiphong (although outside the prohibited radius of both

cities). Intercepting a SAM radar signal, three Iron Hand A–4Es found the site

and scored a direct hit on a missile launcher causing a secondary explosion, but

poor weather prevented most visual and photo assessment. Three SAM missiles

were fired against the attackers but all missed. However, heavy flak from 37-mm

and 57-mm guns damaged one of the aircraft, which then silenced one of the

antiaircraft emplacements.

November 7, 1965, witnessed the largest one-day Air Force-Navy Rolling

Thunder assault of the war. While twenty Navy aircraft, including accompanying

Iron Hand A–4E’s, were attacking the Me Xa highway bridge on the morning

of the 7th, pilots spotted an SA–2 missile ascending north of Thanh. Two firing installations were quickly found and attacked. Five Skyhawks damaged a

missile van and left two missiles burning in a revetment of the first installation.

Another flight of five Skyhawks hit the second installation, destroying one or

more missile control vans. However, poststrike photos disclosed that eighteen

missiles on launchers or movers had escaped detection. Groundfire downed

one Skyhawk, but the pilot was saved, as was the crew of a rescue helicopter

that was forced down on a nearby mountaintop.

On the afternoon of the 7th, while fifteen Air Force F–4C Phantoms attacked

the Phu Ly bridge and a nearby antiaircraft site, twenty more jets headed for two
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

SAM sites near the Guoi Bo bridge. Four aircraft destroyed a radar van at one site

and hit two nearby antiaircraft emplacements. The attack on the second site

destroyed ten buildings, damaged two, and caused secondary explosions, however,

clouds prevented good bomb damage assessment. The Air Force incurred no

losses on the last strike, but the aggregate three-day effort proved costly. The

North Vietnamese downed five fixed-wing aircraft and two helicopters, damaged

numerous others, and seven crewmen were missing. Although a good part of the

SAM installations near Guoi Bo bridge were found to have escaped destruction,

Admiral Sharp was unable to obtain immediate Washington authorization to

conduct a restrike.79

Air Force F–105s struck four SAM sites on November 16 and 22, bringing

to seventeen the number of sites attacked by U.S. aircraft since July 27. As

usual, pilots reported some destruction and damage, but weather again precluded satisfactory photo verification. The attack on the 16th cost the Air Force

one Thunderchief, which was downed by a SAM. It was the eighth U.S. loss to

the SAMs and the 160th U.S. aircraft lost over North Vietnam since August

1964. On the 22d, four Thunderchiefs, employing terrain masking at minimum

altitude and flying in a line-abreast formation, popped up ten miles from the

target and released rockets from 5,500 feet while flying at 450 knots. The

absence of flak suggested that the strike surprised enemy gunners. In a similar

In November 1965, A–4s from the carrier USS Oriskany struck

this railroad siding located about 40 miles south of Thanh Hoa,

destroying five railroad cars with 500-pound bombs.
195

THE SAM THREAT

attack on the second site, despite SAM and MiG warnings, the Thunderchiefs

encountered only flak leaving the target area while flying at 6,600 feet.

On November 27 at Dong Em, about twenty-two miles from Hanoi, USAF

aircraft first hit a suspected SAM assembly and maintenance facility that was

believed to support three nearby SAM sites. Pilots reportedly destroyed at least

eight buildings and damaged eight others. An SA–2 missile, although struck by

2.75-inch rockets, became airborne and exploded at about 1,000 feet. The aircraft also dropped several 3,000-pound bombs on two cave entrances, but with

unknown results.80

Air Force and Navy pilots conducted no major SAM strikes in December,

although pilots reported numerous SAM firings and the North Vietnamese

crews scored three times.

On December 19, during an Air Force raid on the Bag Can highway bridge,

a JCS target, the communists fired two SAMs at the aircraft. One exploded

near an F–4C Phantom, disabling it, but the crewmen ejected and were rescued.

On the 22d, during a Navy strike on the Uong Bi thermal power plant, SAMs

downed a combat A–5A and a reconnaissance RA–5A.81

The Air Force Increases its anti-SAM Capability

According to a Joint Staff review of the adequacy of ECM and ELINT

equipment, the most “serious deficiency” was the inability of Iron Hand and

other specialized aircraft to provide timely warning of SAM firings to aircrews.

Issued in mid-October 1965, the study was prepared in cooperation with the

scientific and industrial community and itemized the improvements needed in

electronic intelligence, electronic countermeasures, all-weather navigation,

reconnaissance, attack capability, and cameras, the last to insure more effective

immediate poststrike assessment capability. The Air Force’s Big Eye EC–121s,

EB–66s, F–100s, and F–105s especially needed more sophisticated electronic

equipment.

A separate Air Force study, conducted by a group headed by Brig. Gen. K.C.

Dempster, Deputy Director for Operational Requirements, DCS/R&D, listed

the requirements for countering SA–2 missiles: a warning system to alert air

crews when they were under enemy radar surveillance, better pinpointing of

enemy radar locations, timely processing of intelligence data, prompt air strike

decisions, adequate ECM for all fighter aircraft, precise navigation for aircraft

flying at high speed and low altitude into a target area, and suitable tactics for

strikes in areas defended by antiaircraft weapons. The Dempster group divided

remedial measures between those to be completed in the short term (6 months)

and the long term (6 to 18 months). A Navy task force compiled a similar list of

technical changes needed by Navy and Marine aircraft.82

By October, many of the recommended improvements were under development, some on a crash basis, but months would elapse before most of the new
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

equipment became available. As a consequence, the Air Force and Navy continued

to employ existing systems and experimented further with tactics against the

SAM installations with existing aircraft. The Air Force augmented its EB–66

force variously equipped with radar detection, jamming, and infrared equipment and cameras. Three more of the aircraft were sent from Shaw AFB in

North Carolina TDY to Takhli, where they arrived on September 8 to join six

similar planes already there and assigned to the 9th TRS. Then on October 7,

the JCS directed that five EB–66s with aircrews and equipment of the 25th

TRS at Chambley Air Base in France—part of the United States Air Force,

Europe (USAFE)—likewise deploy to Takhli. They arrived on October 21, providing General Moore with fourteen EB–66s. In late November 1965, the 41st

TRS moved to Takhli from Shaw, taking over all aircraft and personnel from the

9th TRS, which was discontinued.83

More specialized than the first EB–66s, each of the five USAFE aircraft carried

a crew of three. Although not equipped for gathering electronic intelligence, all

were very well suited for performing passive ECM. They possessed twentythree jammers configured to counter all known North Vietnamese air defense

radar emitters. The 2d Air Division developed anti-SAM radar tactics that

called for the use of destroyers and jammers within 15 n.m. of an installation.

A minimum of two aircraft were assigned to each ingress route. While one

EB–66C (for active ECM) was placed in an orbit outside of the SAM ring,

another penetrated the target’s air space. The tactic proved quite successful.84

As a result of the Joint Staff and Air Force crash efforts instituted in August

1965 to equip special aircraft with advanced electronic gear, the Air Force

deployed a detachment of four Wild Weasel two-seat F–100Fs from Eglin AFB,

Florida, to Korat, Thailand, on November 25. Commanded by Maj. Garry A.

Willard, Jr., the detachment was assigned to the 6234th TFS at the same airbase.

Each aircraft had a radar homing and warning (RHAW) system, a panoramic

A two-seat F–100F approaching a KC–135 for refueling.
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THE SAM THREAT

SCA Receiver (IR–133), and a missile guidance warning receiver (WR–300)

that were controlled by an electronic warfare officer in the rear cockpit. The

front cockpit had a duplicate scope of the RHAW for the pilot.85

From November 28 to 30, the detachment flew orientation missions with

F–105 Thunderchiefs in preparation for operational tests. Bad weather delayed

the initial flight tests, but on December 19, two Wild Weasel aircraft piloted by

Major Willard and Capt. Leslie J. Lindemuth, accompanied by their respective

electronic warfare officers, Capts. Truman “Walt” Lifsey and Robert D. Trier,

ventured into SAM territory in North Vietnam. The two aircraft picked up no

Fan Song missile radar signals, but the next day was fateful. After locating and

then leading a strike attack on a SAM site about five nautical miles southeast

of Kep airfield, a Wild Weasel piloted by Capt. John J. Pitchford was shot down

by antiaircraft fire. Pitchford parachuted to safety, but was captured and

remained a prisoner of war until February 1973. His electronic warfare officer,

Captain Trier, died in the crash, a loss magnified by the unsuccessful attack.

Three days later, electronic instruments in another Wild Weasel plane carrying

Capts. Allen T. Lamb and John E. Donovan, pilot and electronic warfare officer respectively, picked up a Fan Song signal in the vicinity of Yen Bai. Captain

Lamb quickly verified the location visually, sighting a radar van and three missiles partially concealed under a thatched hut. He marked the area with a smoke

bomb and called in a flight of four Iron Hand F–105Ds. The Thunderchiefs

struck the target area with seventy-six 2.75-inch rockets, creating numerous

explosions and sending smoke and dust 300 to 400 feet into the air. Although

not immediately confirmed, the missile site was presumed destroyed, demonstrating the potential of the specially equipped Wild Weasels.

By year’s end, the operational tests had provided several useful tactical

lessons. The aircrews learned that in the heavily defended sectors of North

Vietnam, hunter-killer tactics worked best when one F–100F led three strike

Thunderchiefs into a suspected SAM target area at 8,000 feet with five miles

visibility. Maneuvering required a minimum of 4,000 feet. The tests also

showed how operations could be improved considerably by employing special frequencies for inflight Iron Hand communications and assigning two rather than

one KC–135 tankers to Wild Weasel missions, to expedite refueling and extend

loiter time. In a separate but related action, Wild Weasel pilots were authorized

at year’s end to use BLU–27B finned napalm to mark targets.86

Although still engaged in testing at the end of 1965, and despite their vulnerability to groundfire, the F–100F Wild Weasels led the way in the Air Force’s

effort to improve its anti-SAM capability, hitherto borne solely by the Destroyer

EB–66s. However, the F–100Fs would be replaced in the spring of 1966 by several two-seat F–105Fs, currently undergoing modification at Eglin AFB, with

improved radar detection and suppression equipment.87
Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base
199

CHAPTER 7

Toward the Thirty-seven-Day Bombing Halt

The air commanders’ preoccupation with finding, neutralizing or destroying

SA–2 missiles and their sites tended to obscure the fact that most sorties were

still being flown against non-SAM targets. At the beginning of October 1965, the

authorities in Washington permitted bombing of the northeast quadrant in the

north, which included a large segment of the rail line from Hanoi to Ping Hsiang,

China. Approved targets for the first half of the month were listed in JCS Rolling

Thunder program 34/35 (October 1–14). The most important were bridges at

Long Het, Xom Phuong, and Vu Chua and an ammunition depot near Long Het.

In program 37/38 for the last half of the month (October 15–28), the key targets

were bridges at Bac Can, Choi Moi, Thai Nguyen, and Lang Luang. Restrikes on

bridges on the northwest line between Hanoi and Cai Cao were also authorized,

but JCS directives limited the services to “a single coordinated attack” on each

bridge during a seven-day period. Unhappily for aircrews, this rule would enable

repair crews to nullify much of the bombing impact.

Other rules for striking fixed or armed reconnaissance targets remained

largely unchanged for the remainder of 1965. Directives authorized a maximum

of 1,200 armed reconnaissance sorties for each biweekly period: six hundred

sorties were allocated to the Air Force and VNAF-Air Force operations, and the

other 600 were allocated to the Navy. These figures could be exceeded if necessary. As indicated earlier, beginning with Rolling Thunder programs 38/39

(October 29–November 11), locks and dams were exempt from attack unless

they were related solely to navigation.1

On October 5, in a major effort against the highway bridge at Long Het, eighteen

PACAF F–105s dropped one end of the structure, damaged the other, and cratered

the southern approach and a nearby road, leaving the bridge unserviceable.

Groundfire downed one Thunderchief and damaged three, while an accompanying reconnaissance RF–101 was destroyed attempting to land at Da Nang Air

Base. In a separate mission, eight F–4C Phantoms hit the Long Het ammunition

depot with seventy-five 750-pound bombs with undetermined results. This too

cost an aircraft and two airmen, although both were observed ejecting safely. Ten

Phantoms, immediately diverted to rescue CAP, were unable to locate the pilots.

During the Long Het mission on October 5, five MiGs intercepted an

EB–66C flying ECM support about fifteen miles east of the bridge, deep in the

north’s northeast sector. Two enemy aircraft made firing passes at the aircraft,

but missed. The EB–66C pilot believed he saw Chinese markings on the planes,

which flew due north after the attack. Speculation that the planes were Chinese

increased when Peking publicly charged that an American aircraft had violated

Chinese air space over Kwangsi Province, and in a dogfight that ensued, a

Chinese fighter pilot shot it down. Peking also alleged that in a separate incident, U.S. aircraft strafed Chinese fishing boats in the South China Sea.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

American officials denied both allegations, and the Chinese failed to produce either aircraft parts or the pilot of the supposedly destroyed plane.

However, an Air Force investigation of the incident indicated that the EB–66C

had intruded to within 15 nautical miles of the Chinese border. The pilot and

other Air Force officials believed it was permissible to make a nonbombing

penetration this close to China, but Admiral Sharp responded that the 15 n.m.

limit, authorized in September, was only for strike pilots who might have to

maneuver to hit a target on the edge of the buffer zone established by

Washington earlier in the year.

On October 5, Air Force planes struck the Kep highway bridge and hit the

Vu Chua railroad bridge on the 7th. Bombs missed the Kep bridge, but cratered

its southern end, while the Vu Chua bridge was destroyed. During the Kep

bridge attack, pilots observed numerous bursts of fire, apparently SAMs. One

flash was seen in the target area and others appeared about fifteen miles east

and southeast of Haiphong. A Navy F–8E was hit by a SAM and disabled. The

pilot was forced to eject offshore and was rescued.

On October 17, sixteen F–105s hit the Bac Can bridge, dropping thirty-two

3,000-pound bombs that cratered the south approach and left two holes in the

bridge’s deck. No aircraft were lost. The attack was coordinated with the Navy’s

strike on the heavily defended Thai Nguyen bridge that, in turn, served as a

cover for the first successful air strike on an SA–2 site near Kep airfield,

The Bac Can highway bridge, located about seventy-five miles

north of Hanoi, after an F–105 strike in December 1965. 
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TOWARD THE THIRTY-SEVEN DAY BOMBING HALT

roughly adjacent to the northeast rail line some distance from Hanoi. For the

bridge assault, the Navy used about thirty-two strike and support aircraft with

the attackers dropping forty 500-pound bombs, thirty-one 1,000-pound bombs,

and twenty-six 2,000-pound bombs. These damaged the bridge severely, left a

large traverse crack on the deck, damaged the southern pier, and cratered the

abutments and approaches. However, the mission was costly, with three aircraft

downed and three damaged.2

The air campaign against the northeast rail and some road targets continued

until the end of 1965, although its effectiveness was diminished by the monsoon season, a prodigious repair effort, and bombing rules that allowed only

intermittent attacks. In the last two weeks of October, for example, weather

forced the Air Force to cancel about 30 percent of its planned sorties. By early

November, repairs on six rail bridges, two railyards, and rail cuts were sufficient to permit limited traffic on the rail line. Consequently, on November 6

Admiral Sharp directed his Air Force and Navy commanders to conduct more

armed reconnaissance strikes on selected track segments. This was a difficult

assignment: in the four-week period from October 28 to November 25, 354 Air

Force sorties were aborted due to the thickening monsoon weather.3

Nonetheless, the missions were of sufficient frequency to draw the North

Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF)—quiescent since July 10—into action to

counter U.S. attacks near and above Hanoi. On November 15, two MiGs

pounced on two Air Force RF–101s near Yen Bai, but the Voodoos eluded them.

The next day, two other RF–101s spotted two MiGs northeast of Hanoi and

made their escape. There were no further incidents until November 25 when

four to six MiGs were observed about sixty-seven nautical miles northwest of

Hanoi. The enemy pilots fired their guns at the reconnaissance aircraft which

evaded the MiGs by flying at high speed and low altitude and returned safely

to their base at Udorn.

On the same day, three or four MiGs twice engaged the second wave of

Navy aircraft conducting a strike on the Me Xa bridge. One fired an air-to-air

rocket and its cannons, but without effect. In a second attack, two MiGs made

firing passes at two A–4Es, damaging one, possibly with 23-mm cannon fire.

The second MiG engaged in low-altitude air-to-air combat for about five minutes before withdrawing. These attacks, made at about 2,000 feet, suggested a

new enemy tactic to evade Air Force Big Eye EC–121s circling over the Gulf

of Tonkin. Despite the NVAF’s resurgence, analysts conjectured that Hanoi

gave highest air defense priority to the installation of SAM sites and would rely

on its MiGs only when the odds appeared favorable.4

Additional Interdiction Changes and Planning for Negotiation

In late November, with Washington’s approval, Admiral Sharp again asked

his Air Force and Navy commanders to shift their interdiction emphasis.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Judging that armed reconnaissance of rail and road LOCs in the north had

increased communist dependence on inland and coastal waterways to transport

their supplies, he directed more attacks at watercraft. To enable pilots to distinguish more readily between military and nonmilitary cargoes, the PACOM

commander said that watercraft were suspect if they were motorized (as the

DRV owned most of the north’s motorized vessels), carried large cargoes,

engaged in night traffic, were camouflaged, and moved between points connecting different modes of transportation. Along coastal waterways, all vessels

were suspect, including small groups of junks if they moved point-to-point in

contrast with seaward movements for fishing. As usual, air crews were warned

to minimize civilian casualties.5

November also witnessed a renewed JCS effort to get administration backing for a harder hitting campaign in both North Vietnam and Laos. On the 10th,

in a “Concept for Vietnam” paper, the service chiefs sent Secretary McNamara

a proposal calling for 7,000 combat and combat support sorties per month with

5,500 sorties allocated to Rolling Thunder and 1,500 to Laos, chiefly against

infiltration routes. These sortie levels, they said, could be carried out by the Air

Force aircraft already based in Thailand and two Navy aircraft carriers at

Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin. They believed it would take only “three

to four” months to destroy most of the significant fixed targets. Thereafter, the

services would need only 400 combat sorties per month to assure interdiction

of the western and southern LOCs in North Vietnam and Laos respectively.

The Joint Chiefs’ priority targets included POL facilities with an estimated

storage capacity of 216,000 metric tons. Of thirteen storage sites, only four had

been struck thus far. Further delay in striking the remainder, they warned Mr.

McNamara, would permit Hanoi to continue its logistic support of Viet CongDRV forces in South Vietnam and to establish additional antiaircraft weapons

around the POL sites. The alleged danger of retaliatory attacks by communist

An A–6 launches from the deck of the USS Kitty Hawk.
203

TOWARD THE THIRTY-SEVEN DAY BOMBING HALT

ground forces on POL installations in South Vietnam should not stand in the

way of granting strike approval. The Joint Chiefs also backed “phase II” manpower and unit deployment schedules for South Vietnam in 1966, a callup of

reserves, and extension of tours of duty.6

Nearly a month elapsed before OSD advised the service chiefs officially

that their latest recommendations were being considered in conjunction with

other views. As events disclosed, OSD’s delayed reply was linked to high-level

discussions in November on another political-military gambit to end the war.

The President deferred a decision until Secretary McNamara, accompanied by

General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp, and other officials had visited Saigon on

November 28–29, again to assess the military situation and to determine what

additional U.S. and allied manpower and other aid was needed to counter the

growing strength of the VC-NVA.7

In the weeks preceding McNamara’s trip to Saigon, a series of discreet activities by high-level U.S. and foreign diplomats and amateur peacemakers were

under way to find a basis for Hanoi and Washington to begin talks or negotiations. The most prominent officials engaged in this effort were Secretary of

State Rusk, Arthur Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and

Amitore Fanfani, the Italian Foreign Minister. In May 1965, the President had

encouraged Fanfani to help the United States seek a negotiated settlement.8

Presumably, the President and McNamara discounted the importance of these

diplomatic maneuverings, for early in December, as part of Rolling Thunder

program 44/45 (December 10–23), they approved the bombing of two sensitive

targets hardly calculated to make Hanoi more amenable to negotiations. One

was the Uong Bi power plant, only sixteen miles from Haiphong, and the other

a highway bridge in the vicinity of Haiphong and thus within the sanctuary area.

The power plant, which had a capacity of 24,000 kilowatts, supplied about 15

percent of the north’s electricity, much of it consumed in Hanoi and Haiphong.

It was the sixth electrical utility earmarked for attack and considered the DRV’s

most important industrial target.9

The strike on the Uong Bi plant was initially scheduled for December 10, but

monsoon weather delayed several attacks, only part of many canceled missions.

The Air Force and Navy would schedule more than 160 missions of which scores

were canceled. The Air Force scratched completely all missions on seven days, the

Navy on four. Many aircraft became weather aborts after launch or struck secondary targets in the north or Laos while returning to their bases in Thailand.10

After several weather cancellations, the Uong Bi attack finally began on

December 15 with ninety Air Force aircraft. Twenty-three F–105s flew a strike

profile, while sixty-seven other Thunderchiefs, F–4Cs, EB–66s, RF–101s, and

KC–135s flew support. Poor weather forced all but seven of the strike F–105s to

jettison their 750-pound, 1,000-pound, and 3,000-pound bombs. The other fighterbombers dropped fourteen 3,000-pound bombs in a corner of the target area and

expended 304 2.75-inch rockets on a nearby antiaircraft site. Enemy gunners shot
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

down one Thunderchief, although the pilot was rescued, and damaged five others.

Secretary McNamara publicly called the attack “representative of the type we

have carried out and will continue to carry out. I would not characterize it as retaliatory, but I think it is appropriate to the increased terror activity.”

After poststrike data disclosed that, in fact, most of the power plant had not

been hit, the Navy, with JCS permission, conducted a second strike on the night

of December 19, while simultaneously attacking the Haiphong highway bridge.

The Navy used six A–6A Intruders equipped with some of the latest night radar

bombing systems. They dropped 2,000-pound bombs, but these too missed the

power plant with one aircraft shot down by a SAM. After the JCS sanctioned a

third strike on the 22d, the Navy dispatched thirty-five aircraft including several Intruders. These first hit the Haiphong bridge, then the Uong Bi plant. The

bridge’s deck was damaged, temporarily closing it. The pilots then dropped

about twenty-five tons of bombs on the plant and fired three Bullpups with

1,000-pound warheads, finally destroying most of it. This brought the north’s

cumulative electricity generating loss to about 47,000 kilowatts, about 27 percent

of national capacity. Antiaircraft fire brought down two A–4s and one RA–5.

The aggregate Air Force-Navy loss in attacking the target thus totaled five

aircraft destroyed and many others damaged. Another A–6A and an RA–5 were

downed by SAMs in the strike on the Haiphong bridge. Struck once more by

the Navy on the 23d, the bridge was left unserviceable.11

Highly disturbed by the excessive aircraft attrition in bombing a relatively

small utility, Air Force analysts attributed the losses to Washington’s over-control

of operational matters. Admiral Sharp, they observed, had to obtain JCS assent

A riverside naval patrol

boat repair area in

North Vietnam, during

an F–105 attack,

October 8, 1965.
205

TOWARD THE THIRTY-SEVEN DAY BOMBING HALT

for each restrike and for the types of aircraft to be used. In addition, too much

time elapsed between the restrikes, enabling the North Vietnamese to deploy

many more antiaircraft weapons around the power plant. In the Air Staff’s view,

the Uong Bi operation underscored dramatically the need to let Navy and Air

Force commanders rather than Washington control the strikes.12 In the ensuing

months, however, high administration officials showed no inclination to transfer

significant authority for prosecuting the war, particularly for bombing North

Vietnam, to general officers of the Air Force and Navy.

In late 1965, the Air Force deployed its first RF–4C all-weather and night

reconnaissance unit to Southeast Asia. The specially equipped aircraft would

augment the Blue Tree and Yankee Team reconnaissance programs over North Vietnam and Laos, respectively. Flying from Shaw AFB, South Carolina, nine

RF–4Cs arrived at Tan Son Nhut AB on October 30 and were assigned to the

16th TRS. They flew an initial mission over Laos on November 16, and over

North Vietnam the next day. Manned by a two-man crew, the aircraft were packed

with sophisticated gear: infrared, side-looking, and forward-looking radars;

cameras for day and night photography; high frequency and single sideband

communications; a pinpoint inertial navigation system; and in-flight photographic film processing and film cassette ejection systems to ensure fast delivery

of finished photos to field commanders. They also possessed an in-flight refueling capability.13

Initial reconnaissance results indicated a number of technical problems

remained to be resolved. To assure good resolution of imagery from the

infrared AN/AAS–18 system, the RF–4Cs had to fly at low altitude. There was

difficulty in translating multisensor reconnaissance imagery rapidly to combat

aircrews and inadequate target display in the cockpits. Downward-looking

Dr. Harold

Brown is sworn

in as Secretary of

the Air Force, 

October 1, 1965.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

radar quickly proved more rewarding than side-looking. Highly specialized

photointerpreters were needed to discriminate between good and poor data in

reconnaissance film. Both Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown (who

replaced Eugene M. Zuckert on October 1), and General McConnell noted

these shortcomings. Between mid-November and December 30, six RF–4C

missions were flown in the north, thirty in Laos, and some in South Vietnam.14

In November, in conjunction with reconnaissance operations over the north,

an RB–57E with infrared capability searched for enemy targets revealed by

campfires, cooking fires, sentry fires, small manufacturing, and camouflage.

Several EB–66Bs with infrared capability were also employed, but most of the

RB–57E and EB–66B missions were flown over South Vietnam.

Despite the additional reconnaissance resources, it was evident that aerial

detection of enemy infiltration from North Vietnam into Laos and southward

into South Vietnam would have to be drastically improved if Air Force and

Navy pilots were to be able to conduct more rewarding air strikes. The terrain,

the darkness, and enemy concealment tactics made the interdiction task formidable. In December 1965, James Cameron, a British correspondent and the first

westerner allowed by the Hanoi government to travel through southern North

Vietnam, authored a graphic account of the way the DRV managed to avoid

serious losses from road bombings:

Through the hours of daylight practically nothing whatever moved on

four wheels on the roads of North Vietnam; hardly a car or a truck; from

the air, in the sunlight, it must have looked as though the country had no

wheeled transport at all. That, of course, was the idea. It was the roads

and the bridges that were being bombed; it was held to be no longer safe,

after sunrise, to be near either.

In the paddy fields in the sunlight the farmers were reaping their third

harvest of the year, which had been especially abundant....They moved

among the rice bowed under a shawl of foliage, the camouflage that gave

everyone kind of a carnival air, like so many Jack O’ The Greens. At the

corners of every field stood what looked like sheaves of iron corn, and

which were stacks of rifles. The roads stretched long and empty, leading

from nowhere to nowhere. One could have taken it for a charade; in this

land does nothing travel from place to place?

At dusk the roads became alive. From a thousand arbors and copses

and the shelter of trees the traffic materialized; the engines were started

and the convoys emerged from invisibility, began to grind away through

the darkness behind the pinpoints of masked headlights. There were

miles of them—heavy Russian-built lorries, antiaircraft batteries of guns,

all deeply buried under layers of branches and leaves; processions of

huge green haystacks. By day North Vietnam is abandoned; by night it

thuds and groans with movement. It was an excessively fatiguing routine
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TOWARD THE THIRTY-SEVEN DAY BOMBING HALT

These reconnaissance photos show the ability of the North Vietnamese

to recover and reconstruct destroyed bridges and roads, sometimes in

a matter of days after an airstrike. The top photo shows two destroyed

bridges. A bypass system is under construction, complete with a river

ford, around the bridge in the upper part of the photo. The dark spot

near the fork in the road is a road grader. Below, an emergency span

has been built to repair a railroad bridge 135 miles south of Hanoi.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

for those of us who were trying to capture this peculiar picture: moving

always by night, and working always by day.

...by the time we inched through the darkness to the bombed area it

seemed it was already passable, though only with difficulty. It was hard

to see in the darkness what was happening though later, after many such

experiences, I came to know: great multitudes of women had somehow

been recruited or accumulated from the neighborhood and were filling in

the holes and reconstituting some sort of a surface for the road, out of the

piles of stones and gravel....It was impossible to count the number of

women, but there were several hundred. This, they said, happened frequently; almost every major road in the country was a semi-permanent

condition of running repair.

Two main bridges on the road head were gone long since; they had

been destroyed in the early raids; they had been replaced with pontoons

of bamboo rafts. Usually the replacement was a ferry; North Vietnam is

a wilderness of ferries in the delta region; they take up a tremendous proportion of travelling time....Sometimes a pontoon bridge was alternated

with a ferry, to cause confusion among the American reconnaissance aircraft. Frequently with makeshift bridges, when daylight came and traffic

stopped, one end of the floating bridge was detached, so that the whole

structure could drift down and lie parallel with the bank and become

invisible. There never was a place where such importance was attached to

invisibility.15

To tighten their loosely coordinated reconnaissance and bombing efforts

over North Vietnam and Laos, in November the Air Force and Navy established

the Rolling Thunder Armed Reconnaissance Coordination Committee. Like its

As the pilot gets out of the

cockpit after a mission, the

ground crew removes the film

from this RF–4.
209

TOWARD THE THIRTY-SEVEN DAY BOMBING HALT

predecessor, the 2d Air Division-Task Force 77 coordinating committee established earlier in the bombing program, it was chaired by the Air Force. The rising

number of armed reconnaissance sorties over the north, constituting about

86 percent of all combat sorties by late December, necessitated the change. The

new committee tried to reduce overlapping and duplication of service missions

by designating suitable LOCs and targets for armed reconnaissance, establishing

special target and photo ELINT panels, developing route packages for each service over the north, and preparing common armed reconnaissance terminology.

Plans called for the committee to meet once every two weeks, about five days

prior to each biweekly Rolling Thunder period.

Although the new committee ironed out numerous problems, Admiral Sharp’s

desire to maintain command and control of operations over the north—with Navy

air in a dominant role—soon made coordination of Air Force and Navy activities

more nominal than real. The committee was reduced to a discussion forum, limited

to exchanging information and ideas for essentially independent Air Force and Navy

air activities in North Vietnam and Laos. Although the Air Force chairman strove to

develop closer coordination for Rolling Thunder, he was unable to achieve it.

Admiral Sharp’s insistence on maintaining Navy air independence was dramatized on December 10 when he unilaterally divided North Vietnam into six

major geographical route packages for armed reconnaissance operations. He

gave route packages 2, 4, and 5 to the Air Force, and route packages 1 and 3 to

the Navy. The initial operational arrangement called for the two services to exchange their route packages every two weeks. In the event of poor weather, they

could fly into each other’s primary operating area after requesting and receiving permission from the other service. Missions flown in route package 6 in the

northeast area of North Vietnam (divided into route packages 6A and 6B)

Crewmen attach a

500-pound bomb 

to an underwing

rack on an F–4.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

would be authorized and assigned on a mission-by-mission basis. However, the

Navy increasingly confined its strikes to the coastal route packages. The Navy’s

predilection for flying short-range sorties from its carriers was understandable, but

the practice left the Air Force with responsibility for bombing the more distant and

often more strongly defended inland targets. This highly hazardous task,

General Moore believed, should have been shared by the Navy.16

In late 1965, the arrival of the first F–4C and F–105 tactical fighter squadrons on one-year permanent change of station (PCS) rather than 120-day TDY

tours held the promise of improved combat capability for the Air Force. The

390th TFS arrived at Da Nang AB in November with F–4C Phantoms and was

assigned to the 6252d TFW, while the 333d TFS with F–105 Thunderchiefs

arrived at Takhli RTAFB on December 8, where it was assigned to the 355th

TFW. In accordance with a decision by General McConnell in November, pilot

tours were established at one hundred missions over North Vietnam or Laos or

for one year, whichever was the lesser. Unless pilots completing one hundred

missions could be used in a noncombat rated position in Southeast Asia to complete a year’s tour, they would be returned to the United States. The change to

PCS tours of duty, decided at a PACOM conference at Honolulu in August,

promised to reduce the turmoil caused by continuing personnel turnover, lower

orientation requirements, and to mitigate the reduced performance normally

associated with 120-day TDY tours.17

Continuation of the Leaflet Program

The aerial distribution of psychological warfare leaflets over North Vietnam

continued unabated in late 1965. Designed to undermine popular support for

the war, most leaflets were dropped by Air Force F–105 Thunderchiefs. VNAF

pilots made occasional drops in areas just above the DMZ. In a departure from

normal delivery, on the night of September 10 an Air Force C–130 scattered

about 9,000 packets of toys over the north in honor of the annual Vietnamese

children’s day. It was hoped that the populace would consider the toys a “goodwill” gesture from South Vietnam and its ally.18

By mid-October, approximately forty-four million leaflets had been spread over

ninety areas and along major LOCs leading to population centers. Most were

dropped between mid-July and mid-October under a program devised and carried

out by the principal U.S. military, diplomatic, and information offices in Saigon.

Although a MACV analysis of the six-month propaganda effort sent to Washington

conceded that the operations did not threaten the Hanoi regime, they were nevertheless considered “successful” as measured by the DRV’s press and radio reaction

to the leaflets, newspapers, and gift packages. The reaction indicated that some citizens, believing what they read, had spread the propaganda and therefore needed

more political indoctrination. A similar, but more expansive, leaflet program in

South Vietnam to strengthen the south’s morale and weaken that of the Viet Cong
211

TOWARD THE THIRTY-SEVEN DAY BOMBING HALT

was likewise judged “successful,” although it failed to slow the rush of U.S. manpower and arms to the south to stop a possible communist takeover.19

Psychological warfare leaflet drops over the north continued at a steady pace

throughout November and December. At Admiral Sharp’s request, Washington

relaxed somewhat the rules governing leaflet operations but continued to prohibit overflights of the Hanoi and Haiphong area and the buffer zone adjacent to

China. On December 1, in a record-breaking mission, Air Force pilots released

one million propaganda leaflets over cities and towns in the Red River Delta.

They depended on wind drift to scatter the leaflets over the Hanoi-Haiphong

sanctuary area. By December 24, seventy-seven million leaflets and fifteen

thousand gift kits had been distributed. Based on reports that “in some

instances” leaflet messages had forced Hanoi’s authorities to take counter-propaganda actions, the leaflet program was considered worthwhile.20

Beginning of Thirty-Seven-Day Bombing Halt

The last Rolling Thunder missions in 1965 were flown on December 24. At

1800 Saigon time, with the approval of the Saigon government, President

Johnson ordered a thirty-hour Christmas truce in the air and ground wars in

South and North Vietnam and Laos.21

The end of the thirty-hour truce period, midnight on December 25, passed

without a resumption of bombing over the north, although the tactical Barrel

The remains of a bridge and the ford built to bypass it on

Route 19 northeast of Dien Bien Phu, October 1965.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Launched on December 5, 1965, Tiger Hound was another U.S. aerial anti-infiltration

program and was confined to the extreme southeastern sector of Laos adjacent to the South

Vietnamese border. For a discussion of the beginning of the Tiger Hound program, see

Jacob Van Staaveren, Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968, (Center AF Hist, 1994),

pp 80, 85, and 96–105.

Roll, Steel Tiger, and Tiger Hound* operations in Laos were quickly resumed,

at the insistence of Ambassador Sullivan, but not from South Vietnamese bases.

But all B–52 operations in South Vietnam and Laos ceased.22 The truce continued into the 26th. On the 27th, Admiral Sharp informed his Air Force and Navy

component commanders to be ready “on short notice” to resume Rolling

Thunder armed reconnaissance missions on the 28th, weather permitting.23 But

before the day was out, President Johnson decided to extend the bombing halt

indefinitely and to launch a major diplomatic effort to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table.24

The President’s decision was the culmination of months of internal debate

on how to force Hanoi to talk. In mid-July 1965, after the United States had

deployed more ground forces to South Vietnam and subjected the north to heavier

bombing, Secretary McNamara had suggested calling a halt to the bombing for

six to eight weeks as part of a new peace initiative.25 Westmoreland,

Ambassador Lodge, Admiral Sharp, and the Joint Chiefs strongly opposed a

cessation. In fact, the Joint Chiefs had objected to the Christmas truce and

insisted that its continuance would only aid the North Vietnamese in their military buildup, regrouping, and road and rail repair activities and would expose

the United States’ determination and intentions in the war to criticism.26

In truth, domestic more than diplomatic considerations compelled the

President to extend the Christmas truce. This became evident on the 28th when

McNamara informed the Joint Chiefs of the reasons for the President’s actions.

One factor, he said, was the “thin” domestic support for the war. A high percentage

of the public believed that the administration had failed to devise “a diplomatic

equivalent to its military program” with half to three-fourths of the public

desiring the United States to propose either a ceasefire or a complete cessation

of bombing. Furthermore, in two to three weeks, the administration would ask

the new Congress for an additional twenty-five billion dollars to support operations in Vietnam over the next eighteen months and to extend the bombing to

POL depots and other targets that were important but as yet unscathed. Support

for these proposals, “will be less than required unless we can show that an honest attempt has been made to test the effect of a bombing cessation on Hanoi’s

willingness to enter into negotiations.” 

For the Defense Secretary, there were other important reasons for stopping

the bombing and trying to negotiate an end to the conflict. During his meetings

with Ambassador Lodge, General Westmoreland, and their aides in Saigon on

November 28–29, the MACV commander said that the Saigon government’s
213

TOWARD THE THIRTY-SEVEN DAY BOMBING HALT

instability had increased, pacification was stalled, and South Vietnamese army

desertions had skyrocketed. He said he would need a total of 400,000 troops by

the end of 1966 and possibly 200,000 more by the end of 1967. As a result of

this somber assessment, when he returned to Washington, McNamara led a

number of key presidential advisers who were convinced that, because military

victory was not certain in South Vietnam, more vigorous diplomatic effort was

necessary. Only Secretary of State Rusk strongly opposed the bombing halt.

McNamara also believed that a lengthy bombing pause would provide the

Soviet Union with an opportunity to exert pressure on Hanoi to begin talks, test

the “remote” possibility that its leaders would attend a negotiation conference, and

possibly widen the breach between China and the Soviet Union. In the event that

the pause was followed by more intensive military operations in South and North

Vietnam, it would reduce the likelihood of a Soviet military response. McNamara

and the principal presidential advisers marshaled all the foregoing arguments

during the first three weeks of December 1965 to convince an initially reluctant

President Johnson to approve a longer cessation of Rolling Thunder operations.27

As long as the Rolling Thunder pause continued, the Defense Secretary

would receive daily photoreconnaissance findings of DRV movements from

USAF Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the DIA Director. If Hanoi took advantage of

the pause, McNamara said he was “prepared to recommend [an] immediate

bombing resumption.” He also directed the services to transfer strike sorties

normally scheduled for the north to the Laotian infiltration routes and asked for

a plan for accomplishing this.28

As December 1965 ended and the north remained bomb-free for the first

time since the five-day suspension in May, the President’s diplomatic offensive

to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table moved into high gear. 

President Johnson

and Secretary of

State Rusk.
The leaders of seven nations met in 1966 for a conference on Southeast Asia.

Gathered on the steps of the Congress of the Philippines are: (left to right)

Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of Vietnam; Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of

New Zealand; President Park Chung Hee of Korea; President Ferdinand E.

Marcos of the Philippines; Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia; Prime

Minister Thanon Kittikachorn of Thailand; and President Lyndon B. Johnson of

the United States.
215

* For brief summaries of different perspectives on the diplomatic initiative, see Lyndon B.

Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1965 (New York, 1971),

pp 233–40; George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, 1994),

pp 99–111; and Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect, The Tragedy

and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), pp 227–31.

† Because the Hungarian government was serving as an intermediary between Washington

and Hanoi in late 1965, Rusk’s “fourteen points” were initially sent to Hanoi secretly

through the Hungarian ambassador to the United States. They were summarized publicly

in a White House statement on January 2, 1966 entitled: “The Heart of the Matter in Vietnam.” See Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality Gambits: Hoaxes, and Diplomatic OneUpmanship in Vietnam (South Bend, 1978), pp 101–12.

CHAPTER 8

Diplomacy Fails

New Year’s Day 1966 dawned and North Vietnam was still free of American

fighter-bombers as the administration’s diplomatic initiative continued. Washington officials were unconvinced that the gambit would succeed, so they continued

to develop plans to renew the bombing and to deploy large numbers of U.S. and

allied air, ground, and naval units to the war theater. There was no surcease of

lively debate on these two crucial subjects between Secretary McNamara and his

aides on one side, and the JCS and top military commanders on the other. On the

bombing issue, the services—especially the Air Force—still urged the immediate

resumption of Rolling Thunder operations with fewer restrictions than in 1965.

Hanoi Rejects American Peace Overtures

The U.S. peace initiative, championed by McNamara and code-named Marigold, was orchestrated by President Johnson personally. It was a highly

publicized effort, which entailed some of the nation’s most distinguished officials

winging their way around the world to consult with foreign statesmen and to

solicit their understanding and support for America’s military and political objectives. The most active traveler was Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman,

while others were Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice President of the United States,

Arthur Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and McGeorge Bundy,

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In total, thirtyfour capitals in friendly, neutral, and communist countries were visited.* At the

State Department, American officials met with numerous ambassadors to the

United States. The President sent personal letters to several heads of state and to

the chiefs of all 115 delegations to the United Nations, in which he emphasized

the United States was prepared to negotiate with Hanoi “without prior conditions.” In amplification of the American position for beginning negotiations,

on December 23, 1965, Secretary of State Rusk proposed “twelve points”—

enlarged to “fourteen points” on January 2, 1966—for transmittal to Hanoi.†1
216

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* On February 1, a DRV representative in Rangoon, Burma, would inform the United

States that Radio Hanoi’s statement of January 4, 1966, was his government’s official

response to the American peace initiative. Allen G. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America’s

Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the War (Stanford, 1978), p 35.

The fourteen points cited past U.S. statements on the Southeast Asia war that

could be the basis for negotiations. In summary, the United States’ position was

that the peace could be based on provisions of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva

Agreements or in the context of a Southeast Asia conference: unconditional

discussions or negotiations would be possible, and a ceasefire arrangement

would be the first order of business; Hanoi’s four points could be discussed and

the Viet Cong could be represented in discussions and meetings; and free elections could be held in South Vietnam to enable the people to choose their own

government. In addition, the countries of Southeast Asia could choose to be

nonaligned or neutral; there was no U. S. desire to maintain bases in Southeast

Asia or troops in South Vietnam; the United States could make a minimum

contribution of one billion dollars to a Southeast Asia regional reconstruction

program; and there could be a permanent bombing halt if Hanoi took appropriate reciprocal action towards peace.2

Although the initiative was applauded at home and in many foreign countries, North Vietnam’s truculent reaction offered no hope of success. On January

2, 1966, the newspaper Nhan Dan denounced the Goldberg and Humphrey

diplomatic missions as “a noisy propaganda campaign.” On the 4th, Radio

Hanoi charged that the American peace effort was “a mere attempt to appease

public opinion at home and abroad” and insisted peace could come only with an

unconditional end to the bombing and acceptance of Hanoi’s “four points”

(made public on April 13, 1965).* On the 7th, a five-man Soviet mission, led by

Alexander S. Shelepin, Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee,

arrived in Hanoi to arrange for more military and economic aid for the Hanoi

regime. On the 24th, in a message to world communist leaders, President Ho

Chi Minh reiterated his government’s position requiring U.S. acceptance of the

“four points,” and also of the Viet Cong National Liberation Front as the sole

representative of the South Vietnamese people as the basis for ending the war.

Meanwhile, the Air Force and Navy, conducting special reconnaissance missions over the north, likewise found no evidence along roads and rail lines to

suggest that Hanoi’s leaders were amenable to “talks” or “negotiations.”3

The special reconnaissance missions were launched immediately after bombing was halted on December 24, 1965. Air Force and Navy pilots concentrated

on route packages 1 and 2 in the southernmost part of the country, although

other areas were not wholly neglected. By February 3, four days after Rolling

Thunder resumed and despite frequently poor weather, Air Force RF–101s and

RF–4Cs had flown 498 sorties from their bases at Tan Son Nhut and Udorn; the
217

DIPLOMACY FAILS

Navy had flown 283 sorties. A number of RB–57Es and EB–66s also flew missions, the first to obtain photo and infrared data, the second to gather electronic

intelligence and to conduct electronic countermeasures, chiefly against SA–2

SAMs. North Vietnamese air defenders, who considered U.S. reconnaissance to

be as intolerable as combat aircraft, shot down one RF–101 on 26 January. The

pilot ejected safely and was presumed captured.4

Although reconnaissance data was fragmentary, it confirmed that the North

Vietnamese were taking full advantage of the bombing suspension and clearly

expected air attacks to resume. On January 20, General McConnell informed a

joint session of the House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees that

the enemy was rebuilding routes and freely moving supplies and troops southward in daytime. He disclosed later that ten more SA–2 sites were detected during

the suspension, bringing the total to at least sixty. Admiral Sharp’s analysts

found forty more air defense positions along or in the vicinity of the northwest

rail line and twenty-six more antiaircraft guns to protect routes south of Vinh.

Despite all of this reconnaissance data, McNamara remained committed to a

lengthy pause to facilitate negotiations. On February 3, four days after bombing resumed, General Wheeler informed a House committee that the North

Vietnamese “worked around the clock rebuilding bridges, building fords, and

otherwise improving LOCs, and they were moving things...in daylight.” The

magnitude of the infiltration (during the thirty-seven-day period) was not yet

clear, he noted, but the effect would show up in South Vietnam in the next sixty

or ninety days. Asked to evaluate the consequences of the bombing halt, the

JCS chairman opined, diplomatically, that the halt’s adverse military impact

had to be weighed against the President’s effort to find peace and against the

domestic and foreign relations gains that flowed therefrom.5

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu,

Vietnamese Chief of State, meets

members of Detachment 4, 4th

Air Commando Squadron, at 

Da Nang Air Base, January 1966.
218

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Debate on Resuming the Bombing

Concurrently with the peace initiative and reconnaissance operations, the

JCS, Air Force, Navy, and administration officials debated the scope of Rolling

Thunder operations if the President ordered their resumption. Throughout

1965, as noted, the services—except the Army—had been at sword’s point with

the administration over the weight of bombing, insisting on a harder-hitting

program with fewer restraints. Except for an occasional JCS consensus, however, service disagreement over the war’s strategy remained unresolved. The

Air Force and Navy particularly desired to force the Hanoi regime to cease its

support for the Viet Cong insurgency in the south by an air and sea campaign,

in contrast with the administration, backed by the Army, which was inclined to

defeat the VC-NVA in a ground-oriented war.

As the bombing halt entered its second week, the Air Staff launched another

major effort to alter the thinking of the Army and the administration. General

McConnell asked Air Force specialists at the Air University at Maxwell AFB,

Alabama, for an “historical study” on opposition to a strategy envisaging the

use of large U.S. ground forces in Southeast Asia and elsewhere on the Asian

mainland. He also solicited the views of Lt. Gen. Glen W. Martin, the Inspector

General of the Air Force, on ways to persuade the Johnson administration to

alter its ground-oriented outlook.6

Trucks cross a pontoon bridge, bypassing downed Dong

Lac highway bridge in North Vietnam, February 1966.
219

DIPLOMACY FAILS

Responding quickly, General Martin observed:

it is clear that both our strategy related to Southeast Asia and our tactics in

South Vietnam have failed to achieve the desired results. In summary, we

should consider the possibility we have committed a tactical blunder in the

north through our piecemeal [bombing] approach and [committed] a major

strategic error in the south by designing our plan fundamentally around

ground operation concepts which reflect the enemy’s greatest strength.

The Inspector General was not optimistic about the chances of change in the

course of the war soon, as the President and his key advisers, he said, were convinced they had a “delicate problem” in dealing with American public support for

the war. Nonetheless, he made five air-oriented proposals, which if judiciously

worded and “not too radical and sweeping in nature,” could conceivably influence the administration’s position: encourage U.S. military discussions with the

Thai government on making Thailand a stronger bulwark against communism;

deploy or redeploy selected strategic and tactical units, including air defense,

to Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to reassure those allies and deter Chinese air deployments south; interdict a minimum number of significant air, land, and sea

transportation targets that could have a major, possibly decisive, impact on the

north’s access to supplies; request security for air units and airbases in South

Vietnam in a manner that would emphasize the importance of air, rather than

ground, operations; and underscore the opinions of most U.S. intelligence agencies that Chinese entry into the war was unlikely. The Air Force should also point

out, he added, that if China entered the war, the services could initiate “highly

selective” air attacks against the country in consonance with CINCPAC’s

Operations Plan 39-65 and demonstrate to Mao Tse-tung that he had far more to

lose than to gain. The Air Force’s position on the Soviet Union should be that, as

they had a vested interest in keeping China out of the war, their reactions to a

more assertive U.S. air policy would be political rather than military.

7

Meanwhile, on January 6, McConnell informed Air Force Secretary Harold

Brown that it would be very difficult for the Air Force to support the large

ground forces in South Vietnam envisaged in deployment plans prepared by

MACV and PACOM and sent to the JCS by Admiral Sharp in December 1965.

These plans projected an escalation in movements of U.S. personnel to

Southeast Asia, mostly to South Vietnam, in 1966. By the end of the year there

would be 486,500 American air, ground, and navy personnel (of which 55,000

would be Air Force) in the south and 169,000 additional personnel in Thailand

and other PACOM areas, notably Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Air

Force would have to provide sixteen more tactical fighter squadrons (in addition

to those already in the war theater) with four squadrons scheduled to arrive by

the end of March. McConnell said this would require the withdrawal of some

Air Force units from Europe, and transform most tactical fighter squadrons in
220

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* JCSM-652-65, 27 Aug 65.

the United States into training and rotation organizations. He feared a weakening of the visible U.S. deterrent around the periphery of China and elsewhere in

the world. He called for the federalization of national guard units, as had the

JCS. He continued:

In my evaluation of additional force requirements, I’m concerned not

enough consideration is being given to the problem of greatest importance: the maintenance of a viable, flexible, and credible military posture

measured against the worldwide communist threat. The real threat to U.S.

objectives and interest still remains China in the Western Pacific, and the

USSR in Europe and against the continental United States. Therefore,

while recognizing the immediacy and seriousness of the conflict in

Southeast Asia, I believe we should view it in the perspective of the overall threat and examine alternate solutions and strategies to achieve our

overall objectives.

He urged adoption of a strategy based on the concept of a Vietnam paper

initially approved by the JCS on August 27, 1965.* The paper postulated three

major objectives of equal priority in the war: force Hanoi to end its support for

the Viet Cong; defeat the Viet Cong and extend the control of the Saigon government over all of South Vietnam; finally, deter the Chinese and, if necessary,

defeat them. There should be continuous evaluation of progress toward these

goals as a guide to future deployments.

The way to implement this strategy, McConnell continued, was to end the

bombing pause over North Vietnam “dramatically” and “forcefully,” relying on

A ford, far left, bypasses

this destroyed bridge.
221

DIPLOMACY FAILS

American technical superiority—air power—for striking at the heart of the

DRV-supported insurgency in the south rather than fighting a war of attrition.

This could shorten the conflict by months, or possibly years, and arrest the decline

of the U.S. military posture. He cited recent national intelligence estimates indicating that neither Hanoi nor Peking were likely to introduce substantially more

combat troops into the war as a result of intensified air strikes. “I am...

convinced,” he concluded, “that before additional forces are deployed to

Southeast Asia, serious consideration...be given to this proposal.”8

In transmitting McConnell’s views to McNamara on January 10, Secretary

Brown characterized them as “revealing” and “challenging” and meriting “serious consideration” before a final decision was made to increase U.S. strength

in Southeast Asia as Admiral Sharp had recommended. He also provided

McNamara with an initial analysis of the Air Force’s manpower, aircraft, and

ammunition resources and of its training and field requirements to support

Sharp’s 1966 deployment proposals, noting the “lead time” and foreign government clearances needed for some units.

9

The Air Force continued its challenge of the current strategy in late January.

General William H. Blanchard, the Vice Commander of the Air Force, informed

Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance that the Air Force had not yet

approved the Westmoreland-Sharp deployment proposals and that, without an

evaluation of the effectiveness of forces in South Vietnam and until an intensified air campaign was conducted against the north, “the deployment of more

American forces to Southeast Asia could not be justified.” In his testimony

before the House Armed Services and Appropriations Committee, McConnell

urged a quick resumption of the Rolling Thunder program. The longer the

bombing halt, the more costly it would be in American lives. “...a decisive military victory cannot be achieved,” he emphasized, “unless military targets in

both South...and North Vietnam are bombed....” McConnell also said that

upwards of 600,000 U.S. and allied troops could not drive the enemy out of the

south and keep them out.

10

Meanwhile, McConnell joined the other service chiefs in advising McNamara

on January 8 that the protracted bombing halt could prove costly in lives, as was

learned in the Korean War. The intensified air campaign in South Vietnam and

Laos could not compensate for no air attacks on the north. Thus, early resumption

of Rolling Thunder was imperative to avoid any misinterpretation of America’s

resolve in Southeast Asia, to redress the military disadvantages, and to permit

negotiations from a position of strength. A five-man delegation from the Soviet

Union was in Hanoi to discuss more economic and military assistance for North

Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs recommended that Rolling Thunder operations begin

shortly after the delegation, headed by Alexander S. Shelepin, returned to

Moscow and the results of its visit were communicated to Washington. In Saigon,

Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland strongly supported JCS efforts to

end the bombing halt and resume air strikes on the north.11
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* JCSM-982-64, 23 Nov 64.

† A DIA study of North Vietnam’s imports in January 1966 indicated that about 67 percent

arrived by sea and 33 percent by rail from China, while roads from China carried only a

negligible amount (JCSM-41-66, 18 Jan 66).

‡ This would approximate the attack sorties flown in September 1965, the highest monthly

total flown in that year.

On the 18th, the Joint Chiefs suggested to McNamara four ways to resume the

bombing and quickly exert more pressure on the Hanoi regime: by a “sharp blow,”

as recommended initially on November 23, 1964;* by closing Haiphong and other

cities through which most of the “identifiable” imports reached North Vietnam in

1965, despite the sensitivity of mining operations;† by reducing the bombing

sanctuary areas to a radius of ten nautical miles around Hanoi and Phuc Yen airfield, four nautical miles around Haiphong and twenty nautical miles along the

border between North Vietnam and China, with exceptions permitted only by the

JCS; and by the removal of armed reconnaissance sortie limits and air strike

restrictions. Continued U.S. restraint, they said, probably increased rather than

decreased the risk of Chinese intervention in the war and signaled American military vacillation to both communist and free world leaders.12

Other administration officials were more apprehensive about unleashing a

heavy bombing program on the north. The most ominous view was expressed by

George Ball, Under Secretary of State, who warned the President on January 25

“that sustained bombing of North Vietnam will more than likely lead us into a

war with Red China—possibly in six to nine months.” Further, it could trigger a

possible limited war with the Soviet Union.

McNamara’s position was less apocalyptic. He strongly recommended continued restraint with regard to bombing. Summarizing the war’s progress for

the President on the 24th, he urged that air attacks be confined largely to the

north’s routes, as in 1965. He cited the various ways in which limited bombing

had diminished Hanoi’s military capability and raised its war costs: the quantity

of enemy supplies, delivered mostly in trucks, had dropped from 400 to 200 tons

per day; between 50,000 and 100,000 personnel had been diverted to air defense

and repair work; the mobility of the populace had been hampered; government

activities had been decentralized, creating inefficiency and political risk; and

military operations in Laos had been reduced. Continued (limited) bombing of

the north and Laos would also weaken the VC-NVA’s capability to launch frequent offensives against U.S., allied, and South Vietnamese troops and boost

the latter’s morale. If Rolling Thunder was resumed, the Defense Secretary suggested flying about 4,000 day and night armed reconnaissance sorties per

month‡ in the north, more intense bombing of Laos, and better surveillance of

the sea approaches to South Vietnam. In the latter country, there should be

more harassment of the enemy’s LOCs and destruction of its bases. He listed
223

DIPLOMACY FAILS

several objectives for the south during 1966 that were quickly approved by the

President and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky at a meeting in Honolulu early

in February.

13

Before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations on the 26th, McNamara

restated the administration’s previous arguments against an all-out bombing

offensive in the north: bombing alone could not force Hanoi to negotiate unless

it was accompanied by military action in the south sufficient to prove it could

not win there; Hanoi, Haiphong, and other ports and certain POL installations

had not been and could not be bombed lest such action trigger a wider war

(with China, the Soviet Union, or both); and targets would continue to be carefully controlled. Air Force Secretary Brown held essentially the same views.

These views contrasted sharply with those held by the Air Force.

14

The likelihood that the President would resume Rolling Thunder was signaled by Secretary Rusk on January 21 in a news conference where he expressed

regret at his inability to report “any positive and encouraging response” from

North Vietnam to end the war. The prospect of a less intense bombing campaign

than prior to late 1965 was portended by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary

of State for Far Eastern Affairs. He believed that for two or three weeks after

bombing began, while the world was still “digesting” the impact of the bombing

pause, the United States should do as little as possible to fuel likely communist

charges that the pause was a prelude to a more volatile air campaign. John T.

McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,

agreed that the situation did not argue for a “noisy” resumption of bombing. He

recommended bombing initially at the same level as before the pause, followed

by an escalation in the tempo perhaps two weeks later.15

Two MiG–17 jet

fighters at Phuc Yen

airfield, twenty miles

northwest of Hanoi.
224

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

As for the precise geographical limits for the next Rolling Thunder program,

Bundy recommended keeping Air Force and Navy aircraft below the 20th parallel.

The State Department’s intelligence office more precisely suggested confining

the bombing to the region south and southeast of the Song Ca River in southern North Vietnam, a river which flowed into the Gulf of Tonkin just below

Vinh. The smaller area, the office claimed, would assure more interdiction

effectiveness and minimize the risk of Chinese intervention in the war. State’s

views would shortly prove generally congruent with President Johnson’s thinking on where to reinstate the bombing program.16

The Joint Chiefs, painfully aware that their hard-hitting recommendations for

renewing Rolling Thunder were unpalatable to the administration, sent three

new bombing proposals to McNamara on January 25, all restrictive or escalating

slowly. The first called for a “maximum” armed reconnaissance program throughout the north except for the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area. All available USAF

aircraft based in Thailand as well as planes from three Navy carriers would maintain a level of 450 strike sorties per day for twenty-four to seventy-two hours

against major land and water LOCs, ferries, vehicles, pontoons, bridges, and similar types of targets. A second proposal envisaged an initial armed reconnaissance

campaign of only 600 attack sorties per week in southern North Vietnam, then a

gradually rising tempo until bombing attained the level recommended by the JCS

on January 18. The third proposal provided for the use of only Navy aircraft from

three carriers against the north’s POL system for twenty-four to seventy-two hours

and USAF and Navy armed reconnaissance against all LOCs. The least effective

proposal, the Joint Chiefs said, would be the second one, as southern North

Vietnam contained few important targets and the geographical restriction could be

misconstrued by Hanoi as evidence that the United States had established a new

sanctuary area above the permitted bombing area. Each proposal, they added,

should begin without prior warning to the Hanoi regime. That McNamara leaned

towards the adoption of some variation of proposal one was indicated the same

day when General Wheeler requested, and Admiral Sharp quickly sent, a more

detailed armed reconnaissance scenario in which POL targets associated only with

rest stops, dispersal areas, and sites generally related to LOCs would be among the

primary targets. The PACOM commander suggested apportioning the 450 strikes

per day in the lower four route packages. General Westmoreland “sweetened” the

proposal by flashing his willingness to give up fifty sorties in South Vietnam to

assure a first-day level of 500 strike sorties.17

Rolling Thunder 48

As January neared its end and Hanoi’s leaders remained totally unresponsive to Washington’s peace overtures, President Johnson, after consulting with

Congressional leaders and the National Security Council, ordered the resumption

of Rolling Thunder. He approved a bombing scenario roughly in consonance
225

DIPLOMACY FAILS

with Admiral Sharp’s hastily revised proposal and agreed to a little more flexibility for air commanders. Sharp’s implementing directive to Admiral Johnson

and Generals Harris and Westmoreland ordered the resumption of Rolling

Thunder 48 on January 31, Saigon time. The precise moment was left to the Air

Force and Navy commanders, except for the proviso that the first strike should

be made before daylight and achieve surprise. However, the directive’s guidelines

were disheartening to the air commanders: both the tempo and permissible

bombing area were more constricted than before the bombing halt had begun on

December 24, 1965.

18

Bombing for Rolling Thunder 48 was to be south and west of a line due west

from the coast at latitude 20°31'N to longitude 105°20'E, then due north to

21°N, then due west to the Laos border. A maximum daily strike level of only

300 sorties—rather than 450 or 500—was established, Sharp allocating 120

sorties to the Air Force and 180 for the Navy’s two carriers assigned to Rolling

Thunder. Sorties would be apportioned, with route packages 2 and 3 receiving

the majority of the sorties. Strike aircraft should concentrate on moving targets

along infiltration routes leading into Laos and the principal north-south rail,

highway, and waterway routes, with second priority for pontoon bridges, truck

parks, and transshipment and dispersed storage areas. Targets designated by the

JCS within the authorized area could be struck again if necessary. Iron Hand

operations against SA–2 SAM sites would be limited to the authorized geographical area and collateral damage, as usual, kept to a minimum.

No VNAF strikes should be scheduled for the first day. Thereafter they

could fly armed reconnaissance missions between the DMZ and the 19th parallel, as previously. Until further notice, all VNAF sorties should be included

within the authorized ceiling of 300 sorties per day. Rolling Thunder 48 was

unique in that it had no termination date, thus ending the one-week and twoweek planning cycles that had existed throughout 1965.

19

However, poor flying weather and the lack of good targets combined to yield

an inauspicious beginning on the morning of January 31. The first five Air

Force F–105 missions were weathered out, and the pilots returned to their bases

with their ordnance.

A sixth Thunderchief mission finally broke through overcast skies to strike

at targets along Route 1A in route package 1, expending 152 2.75-inch rockets

with undetermined results. Four Navy A–4s and a single F–4 mission followed

a few hours later, making two road cuts with 250-pound bombs while attacking

a small bridge. Throughout the first day, only fifty-eight Air Force strike aircraft became airborne, but finding only ten targets, many diverted to Laos to

hit secondary targets in the Steel Tiger area. A total of fifty-eight scheduled

sorties were canceled because of weather. Navy pilots fared somewhat better.

They flew sixty-six sorties and declared fifty “effective,” while the rest, finding no suitable targets, jettisoned their ordnance over Tiger Island just off the

North Vietnamese coast. By day’s end, aircrews of the two services had struck
226

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

a number of small bridges, vehicles, and cut and cratered many roads. Enemy

air defense units, still vigilant, shot down an Air Force F–105, a Navy A–4, and

a Navy F–4B. Operations personnel adjudged the first day’s bombings as

achieving little surprise and inflicting undetermined losses on the enemy.

20

President Johnson made no public announcement regarding Rolling

Thunder’s resumption until February 1. “Our strikes...from the beginning have

been aimed at military targets and controlled with great care. Those who direct

and supply the aggression have no claim to immunity from military reply.”

Other administration officials informed the news media that, while bombing the

north would be limited, military operations in South Vietnam against the VC and

NVA would intensify. For example, they predicted heavier use of B–52s and

ground artillery.

21

The following days found no basic change in the low tempo and restricted

bombing operations over the north. The 300 sorties per day rule remained in effect

throughout February, although weather usually prevented pilots from achieving

this total. To surmount the weather problem, the Seventh Air Force began employing a synchronous radar bombing procedure in which B–66Bs led F–105 and

F–4C fighter-bombers on their bombing runs.

22

Known as the “radar pathfinder buddy bombing technique,” this tactic consisted of a B–66B pathfinder leading a formation of four, eight, or twelve aircraft

across a target at an altitude above 15,000 feet. The B–66B navigator, using a K–5

bombing navigation system, determined the bomb release point for the formation.

Throughout the bombing run, the pathfinder employed its S-band jammers to suppress radar-controlled antiaircraft (Fire Can) guns. After the formation released its

bombs, the pathfinder continued its Fire Can jamming while circling over the target area. Meanwhile, the fighter-bombers broke away and, with unspent ordnance and weather permitting, completed their missions at a lower altitude,

striking targets of opportunity. During the month, aircrews flew eighty-two of

An F–4B launches from the

USS Franklin Roosevelt.
227

DIPLOMACY FAILS

these radar-guided strike missions, and they accounted for about 95 percent of

all bombs dropped on the north. In addition to assuring more accurate bombing

under adverse weather conditions, the B–66Bs obtained valuable radar coverage

of the north, with the data sent to Headquarters USAF and SAC for inclusion in

their respective radar film libraries. In late February, three SAC officers were sent

to General Moore’s headquarters to assist target planners in refining the technique

for finding and bombing targets developed by radar. The Navy relied chiefly on

its A–6As for bad weather and night operations.23

The only significant variation from routine armed reconnaissance missions

in February was a series of strikes against Dien Bien Phu airfield and associated buildings, as well as installations in route packages. Ambassador Sullivan

in Vientiane believed the airfield complex, a target designated by the JCS, was

a major staging base for infiltrating men and supplies into Laos and should be

struck. Air Force photo reconnaissance disclosed that the southern end of the

runway had been graded and extended, and high-priority cargo, possibly airdropped, was stacked adjacent to the runway. After Sullivan’s request was

approved at the highest levels in Washington, General Wheeler directed

Admiral Sharp to “neutralize the military activity there.” Sharp gave the

assignment to General Harris (who relayed it to General Moore) with instructions to await good weather to assure a successful strike and to ask Navy for

strike support in the event that the Air Force could not attack both Dien Bien

Phu and infiltration routes in route packages 2 and 4 within its daily allocation

of 120 sorties.

24

On February 6, the weather over northwest North Vietnam cleared sufficiently to permit General Moore to dispatch four morning and one afternoon

strike missions against the Dien Bien Phu complex, employing a total of seventeen

KC–135 tankers at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, January 1966. 
228

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

F–105s, four F–4Cs, and several KC–135s. Pilots initially believed their

750-pound bombs severely cratered the runway and destroyed twelve or more

structures. However, subsequent reconnaissance showed that the target area was

only marginally damaged and the runway had not been cratered. As a result,

Wheeler persuaded McNamara to include Dien Bien Phu henceforth in the

authorized armed reconnaissance area and to continue the strikes. Accordingly,

on February 15 General Moore sent eight more F–105s against the target area,

and there were two more missions the next day, one consisting of four

Thunderchiefs and another consisting of four Thunderchiefs and two Navy A–1

Skyraiders. The attacks destroyed some additional structures.

25

In the latter part of February, General Moore made a concerted attempt to

obtain approval for armed reconnaissance along the vital Hanoi to Lao Cai rail

line, also in route package 5. Because of the extended bombing halt, he said,

the North Vietnamese had been able to make this vital transportation artery

from China operational again. He proposed beginning with strikes against the

Yen Bai and the Phu Tho railyards, then cutting the rail line between Yen Bai and

Lao Cai, but higher authorities insisted on keeping these targets “off limits.”26

As in 1965, most estimates of attrition visited upon the North Vietnamese

by air attacks were based on pilot reports, although little of it was verifiable by

bomb damage assessment missions because of the poor flying conditions. For

example, for one fourteen-day period (February 4–17), pilots claimed to have

destroyed and damaged, respectively, the following targets: vehicles, 21 and 11;

rivercraft, 29 and 37; bridges, 16 and 60; structures, 47 and 56; antiaircraft

sites, 2 and 2. In addition, 4 radar sites were damaged, the Dien Bien Phu runway

was hit twice, and 215 road cuts were made. As Admiral Sharp allocated the

largest share of the authorized daily 300 strike sorties to the Navy (180 versus

An HU–16 at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in 1965, with a Navy A–3 and several

F–8s behind it to the left and an Air Force F–4 and C–124 to the right.
229

DIPLOMACY FAILS

120 to the Air Force), Navy reports of destroyed and damaged targets were

larger than those of the Air Force.27

Both the relatively low level of air operations in February—2,809 Air Force

and Navy attack sorties—and the confinement of most sorties to the lower four

route packages, meant that aircraft attrition was low. The Air Force lost only

two aircraft during the month, an F–105 to unknown causes and an EB–66E to

an SA–2 SAM, fired from the vicinity of Vinh, the southernmost firing of a

SAM yet. Although few SA–2 firings were observed, one missile scored on the

25th when it exploded behind the EB–66E flying an electronic countermeasures mission at about 28,000 feet. The weapon disabled the aircraft’s control

system, forcing the crew of six to bail out over the Tonkin Gulf. An Air Force

HU–16 and several Navy helicopters reached the area of the downed men

quickly and rescued all but one from the rough waters of the Gulf. North

Vietnamese Air Force MiGs offered no challenges, although American pilots

saw a number of them.28

More Deployment Planning

The debate leading to the resumption of Rolling Thunder in no way

detracted from the administration’s plans to send more air, ground, and sea

units to the war theater. At the end of 1965, 184,346 American personnel were

stationed in South Vietnam and 14,107 in Thailand, with the Air Force accounting for 20,620 and 9,117 respectively in the two countries. The Air Force had

A downed pilot swims to an Air Force HU–16.
230

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

536 aircraft on eight bases in South Vietnam, principally to prosecute the incountry war, although many missions were also directed against North

Vietnamese and Laotian targets, and 205 aircraft on six bases in Thailand. For

strike and strike support operations throughout the war theater, the Air Force

had a variety of air commando, fighter-interceptor, tactical fighter-bomber, and

tactical fighter squadrons. Until the bombing halt in December 1965, the

Air Force relied principally on eleven tactical fighter squadrons for the air

programs in North Vietnam and Laos: six F–4C Phantom squadrons (of which

four were based in South Vietnam and two in Thailand), and five F–105

Thunderchief squadrons based in Thailand.29

A prerequisite for any rapid deployment of additional Air Force, Army,

and Marine Corps units was airbase accommodation. In early 1966, airbase

congestion was becoming severe, as slippage affected the improvement or new

construction of four major bases in South Vietnam and two in Thailand. Work

began on three of the six bases in 1965: Cam Ranh Bay (which possessed only

an emergency air strip) and Phan Rang in South Vietnam and Sattahip in

Thailand. Work had not begun at Tuy Hoa in South Vietnam, and two new

major airbase sites, one each in South Vietnam and Thailand, remained to be

designated.30

To some extent, especially in South Vietnam, expansion of airbases was temporarily hostage to a roles and mission conflict between the Air Force and the

Navy. General McConnell believed that Admiral Sharp and other Navy leaders in

PACOM were dragging their feet over construction decisions until they had

decided whether to add a fourth aircraft carrier to the Pacific Fleet’s force in the

Tonkin Gulf. Air Force dependence on Army and Navy construction units for its

major engineering needs represented a further problem. These two services were

inclined to give higher priority to building ports and supply depots than to airfields. In May 1966, to overcome this obstacle, the Air Staff, with Secretary

Brown’s support, obtained OSD approval to hire a private U.S. construction

firm to build one of the badly needed airbases at Tuy Hoa.31

However, the airbase problem did nothing to alter the administration’s tentative

plans, drafted in late 1965, to deploy upwards of 300,000 more U.S. and allied

troops, plus supporting Air Force and other service air units, over the next twelve

months. To determine more precisely how this should be accomplished, on

January 17 Admiral Sharp convened an interservice deployment conference in

Honolulu. To the dismay of the Air Force, the three-week proceedings again confirmed the administration’s intent to pursue a ground-oriented strategy in the war.32

In early February, Admiral Sharp and other briefers summarized planning

results for McNamara and his aides, who attended the closing sessions of the

conference. The PACOM commander observed how estimates of future

American air, ground, and naval strength in South Vietnam had evolved in 1965

through four planning phases: phase I, 220,000; phase II, 112,400; phase IIA,

57,500; and phase IIA (revised), 68,900. This would place nearly 459,000 U.S.
231

DIPLOMACY FAILS

military personnel in the south by the end of 1966. A need for about 45,000

additional allied troops would boost the combined U.S. and allied total to

504,000. Subtracting those already in the country, a total of 274,700 U.S. and

23,900 allied (Korean, Australian, and New Zealand) personnel would have to

be deployed during the year. U.S. forces in Thailand and other PACOM areas

such as South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, would rise to

172,000 personnel.

33

On the basis of 459,000 U.S. personnel, Sharp calculated the possible contribution from each service to satisfy three “cases,” each based on different

“assumptions” of what the administration would approve to achieve three different

manpower levels, and the likely “shortfalls” in each case (figure 9).

Figure 9

Personnel Shortfalls

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Case I assumed that manpower would come from the current force structure

in the United States, new unit activations, some withdrawals from overseas,

callups of selected reserve units, and extensions of terms of service. Case II

was based on the same assumptions as case I, except that there would be no

callups of selected reserve units or extension of terms of service. Case III was

the same as case II and also assumed that there would be no withdrawals from

overseas.

As the figures indicate, even case I would have a shortfall of 30,000 men

compared with the 459,000 that MACV considered essential for prosecuting

the war in South Vietnam by the end of 1966. MACV analysts believed only

this number could assure a total of 122 U.S. “maneuver” battalions, of which

102 would be in South Vietnam and 20 in the PACOM reserve. Air Force, Navy,
232

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

and Marine manpower totals could be attained, at least on paper, although rapid

deployments of supporting units, particularly aircraft, would create serious

problems. One was insufficient airbase space; another was a growing shortage

of air munitions.

Addressing theaterwide air planning, the PACOM commander said that

about 648,000 tons of air munitions would be available, with 700,000 tons

needed during the year. Taking this limitation into account, air planners would

allocate air sorties as follows: 150 per month for each U.S. and allied maneuver battalion, 7,800 per month for South Vietnamese forces, 7,100 per month

for North Vietnam, and 3,000 per month for Laos. To support this schedule and

to maintain the desired American air posture, planners estimated that, in addition to the Navy’s three aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, tactical fighter

strength at the end of 1966 should consist of eighteen USAF and ten Marine

Corps squadrons in South Vietnam, and eleven USAF squadrons in Thailand.

To reach this goal, the Air Force would have to deploy sixteen more tactical

fighter squadrons during the year, four of them by the end of March. The SAC

B–52 force would have to be enlarged so that the sortie rate could increase

from 400 sorties per month in February to 600 per month for the last six

months of 1966. Thus far, all B–52 sorties had been flown in South Vietnam,

except for one in Laos in December 1965. The first B–52 attack in North

Vietnam would not take place until 1966.

34

McNamara expressed few opinions during the briefings, but raised several

Air Force Secretary Harold Brown (right) talks with South

Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky during Secretary

Brown's visit to South Vietnam in January 1966.
233

DIPLOMACY FAILS

questions about the air program in North Vietnam. In the course of a colloquy,

the PACOM briefers informed the Defense Secretary that a Rolling Thunder

campaign limited only to LOCs in the two countries would probably not significantly degrade the Hanoi regime’s capability to support the war in 1966, but

would reduce it somewhat by mid-1967; striking the north’s harbors, rail lines,

thermal power plants, POL, and other “high value” targets in addition to the

LOCs would have little effect on the enemy in the first half of 1966, but would

have a significant impact in 1967; and it was not necessary to strike the north’s

airbases until the MiGs began to interfere seriously with U.S. air operations.

Then, striking them would not draw the Chinese into the war.35

Admiral Sharp’s closing observation was that the proposed increases and

ground deployments would not vitiate predictions of a long war. There was

uncertainty, he said, about the services’ ability to meet the deployment goals,

and major difficulties loomed in establishing adequate port facilities for handling the accelerated troop and unit buildups. He sent the official results of the

three-week planning conference to Washington on February 12.36

On his return to Washington, McNamara discussed the options with the service secretaries, the JCS, and members of his OSD staff. He directed them to

proceed with the planning and deployments in accordance with case I objectives, but with the proviso that there would be no callup of the reserves or

extensions of duty tours, although he did not preclude further study of these

two issues.37 His order triggered a major service planning and data assembling

effort. To guide it, the Defense Secretary established an OSD Southeast Asia

Program Team, chaired by Dr. Victor K. Heyman, thus bypassing the JCS and

assuring that he retained personal control over planning activities. The team

immediately began preparing new deployment tables containing all essential

information on available manpower, aircraft, logistic, and construction

Runway construction at Cam Ranh Bay.
234

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* After its expansion on July 15, 1966, this group was renamed the Operations Review

Group within the Directorate of Operations.

resources. McNamara also directed each service to establish counterpart teams

to that of Dr. Heyman’s. General McConnell quickly appointed Maj. Gen. John

D. Lavalle, Headquarters USAF’s Director of Aerospace Programs, to head the

Air Force team, which was composed of representatives from all key Air Staff

offices. At the request of Secretary Brown and General McConnell, the Air

Staff also created an ad hoc study group* under Col. Leroy J. Manor of the

Operations Directorate. Manor’s group was assigned the task of scrutinizing

Sharp’s tactical air proposals for Southeast Asia. At the same time, the

Directorate undertook an analysis of the Air Force’s tactical fighter resources.

38

In short order, the Air Staff’s plans and operations analysts designated additional Air Force squadrons, supporting aircraft, and special units for deployment

by the end of 1966 (figure 10).39

Figure 10

Air Force Deployments, 1966

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a Consisting of 122 personnel.

The foregoing deployment actions, in which the Air Force played only a

minimal role, heightened Air Staff vexation, already irritated by the adminis-
235

DIPLOMACY FAILS

* The Mace was an improved version of the Matador missile.

tration’s decision to restrict the Rolling Thunder operations that resumed on

January 31. PACAF representatives at the Honolulu conference criticized the

proceedings harshly in a report sent to the Air Staff by Maj. Gen. John W. Vogt,

PACAF’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. According to Vogt’s

report, the three proposals were prepared almost solely by Westmoreland’s

staff, with little participation by the component services. Similarly, evaluations

of past and future air operations in North Vietnam were readied principally by

PACOM’s staff. The report characterized the deployment data as “a purely

mathematical development of the effectiveness of U.S.-Free World forces

against the VC-NVA.” PACAF attendees had only a day and a half to comment

on the data and evaluations presented to McNamara and his aides, and no

opportunity to change the ground rules for developing the three proposals.

PACAF’s comments were limited to injecting a more optimistic assessment of

the air campaigns in North Vietnam and Laos and stressing the interrelationship of three separate air campaigns in the theater.

40

General McConnell considered “unrealistic” the administration’s refusal to

call up reservists and extend terms of service and “insufficient” a proposed

$1.2 billion allocation to support the air buildup. The Air Staff’s view of the

evolving deployment scenario was predictably in consonance with its strategic

outlook: the trend towards U.S. and allied “matching” of enemy manpower was

wrong, and proper use of air and naval power would make the sizeable troop

deployments unnecessary. There were also practical considerations. The air munitions shortage (if exacerbated by a larger ground war in South Vietnam) would

not be surmounted until the January–March 1967 period, and there would be

slippages in the airbase construction and expansion program. If the case I

deployment scenario was followed, the Air Force could meet its commitments

only by withdrawing most of its reconnaissance aircraft from Europe (i.e.,

USAFE) and weakening the Air Force’s posture there, by employing more

Tactical Air Command squadrons in Southeast Asia, and by diverting many

USAF personnel from around the globe.

41

Air Force Secretary Brown, whose views on the prosecution of the war were

generally supportive of McNamara’s, nonetheless agreed with the Air Staff’s

position that case I deployments would require important adjustments in the

Air Force’s overseas posture. He said that this would mean replacing three

F–100 squadrons with two PCS squadrons from the United States, in Turkey,

retention for the duration of the Southeast Asia war of a Mace missile wing* in

USAFE that had been scheduled for withdrawal, converting an F–5 Skoshi Tiger

unit (engaged in combat testing in South Vietnam) to a full eighteen-aircraft

squadron, converting an F–102 squadron on Okinawa from TDY to PCS, and

sending two more F–102 squadrons to the war theater on PCS. Early in March,
236

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Brown warned the Defense Secretary that the Air Staff’s analysis of the impact

of the case I objectives showed that even if all sixteen tactical fighter squadrons

were sent in 1966, assuming “beyond all optimistic hope” there would be

sufficient airfields for them, some Air Force reservists would have to assist in

maintaining an adequate training base in the United States. The JCS was

blunter, advising the Defense Secretary at the beginning of March that even

with a “maximum effort” all military units envisaged in Admiral Sharp’s proposal could not be sent in 1966. They urged that deployments be stretched out

over a sixteen-month period (i.e. to be completed by June 1967, rather than

compressing them into South Vietnam and Thailand in the remaining ten

months of the year).42

The warnings were partly effective. On March 10, McNamara informed the

JCS and the service secretaries that their recent recommendations needed more

study. Nonetheless, pending further notice, he insisted that they continue

deploying men and units in accordance with case I guidelines without calling

up reservists or extending terms of service. He said that OSD’s Southeast Asia

Program Division would continue to develop deployment data, expedite

deployments, and indicate reasons for slippages in the deployment schedule.

The Defense Secretary’s next major deployment decision, on March 26,would

consist of revised case I tactical aircraft requirements and combat sortie levels

for South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Laos.43

Rolling Thunder 49

Meanwhile, there was further sparring between the Joint Chiefs and

McNamara over the intensity of the next Rolling Thunder program, tentatively

scheduled to begin in March. During a meeting with General Wheeler on

February 12, the Defense Secretary indicated that if there were sufficient aircraft

and weather conditions permitted, he might be willing to approve more attack

sorties and invest air commanders with more bombing flexibility. He asked about

Admiral Sharp’s recommendation.44

Wheeler queried the PACOM commander, and his reply was incorporated in a

JCS paper, supported by the Air Staff, to McNamara on the 19th. Sharp advocated

a minimum authorized level of 10,000 to 11,000 strike sorties per month for North

Vietnam and Laos, with upwards of 7,500 sorties allocated to Rolling Thunder.

He arrived at the latter figure after recent intelligence disclosed construction of

more SA–2 SAM sites and the apparent deployment of more antiaircraft

artillery and other air defense weapons provided by the Chinese. The high number of sorties was needed, he said, against many small targets now being struck

in compensation for the administration’s ban on attacking more important ones.

He fully agreed that air commanders needed more latitude to hit targets without

regard to sortie ceilings.

In the event that the northeast quadrant (packages 6A and 6B) remained
237

DIPLOMACY FAILS

immune from attack (as in Rolling Thunder 48), it would be desirable either to

extend armed reconnaissance over the same areas in the north as existed before

the thirty-seven-day bombing halt, or to reduce the size of the sanctuary areas

of Hanoi and Phuc Yen airfields, Haiphong, and the buffer zone between North

Vietnam and China (as recommended by the JCS on January 18, 1966). The

problem with the first alternative, however, was that the most important targets

in earlier approved armed reconnaissance areas had been struck, and more

bombing of small targets was unlikely to induce Hanoi to cease its support of

the insurgency in South Vietnam. A third option was to make available to Air

Force and Navy pilots about 5,000 square miles of territory just outside the

northeast quadrant containing 650 miles of major rail, highway, and water

routes and eighteen targets designated by the JCS. Sharp and the JCS strongly

preferred the “balanced strategy” in the JCS paper of January 18, 1966 paper,

which promised the greatest military return.45

On February 25, the administration approved a new bombing directive for

Rolling Thunder 49. It had less weight than Sharp and the Joint Chiefs desired,

but it provided for more bombing over a wider geographical area than was permitted under Rolling Thunder 48. It enlarged the armed reconnaissance area,

including parts of route package 5, to the size existing on December 24,

1965—one of the options suggested by Admiral Sharp—and permitted the

Navy to resume coastal armed reconnaissance north of 20°31'N to within

twenty-five nautical miles of the Chinese border and to within three nautical

miles of North Vietnamese territory. Air commanders were authorized to fly

8,100 strike sorties per month in North Vietnam and Laos, with a recommended allocation of about 5,100 and 3,000 sorties, respectively, between the

two countries. Supporting MiG combat air patrol, reconnaissance, and electronic intelligence and countermeasures were exempt from the total. And, with

McNamara’s approbation, there was a marked improvement in operational flexibility for air commanders. For the first time they could vary the sortie level

each day as weather and other factors dictated. Admiral Sharp quickly delegated his sortie allocation authority to General Harris and Admiral Johnson or

their representatives. For the time being, the PACAF and PACFLT commanders

would determine jointly the overall sortie level in North Vietnam on any one

day and the sortie level in each of the five route packages. Sharp similarly delegated to General Westmoreland—and to his Air Force Deputy Commander,

General Moore—and to Admiral Johnson the authority to determine service

sortie allocations in Laos.46

Numerous irritating strictures remained. DRV naval craft outside of the

authorized coastal area could not be attacked until they fired on American

planes; Iron Hand missions could hit only SA–2 SAM sites located within the

permitted armed reconnaissance areas, no new JCS-designated targets were

approved, no North Vietnamese airfields, even those used by MiGs to attack

American aircraft, could be struck, and route packages 6A and 6B, with their
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

vital rail and road links between China and the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary,

remained off limits. General Wheeler assured Admiral Sharp that the Joint

Chiefs would keep up the pressure to relax further strike rules and gain permission to hit more significant targets.47

There was no operational break or public announcement as Rolling Thunder

48 ended in February and Air Force and Navy commanders inaugurated Rolling

Thunder 49 on March 1. Nor did the heavy monsoon weather over the north

relent in the next few weeks. Commanders were forced to cancel scores of

scheduled missions, which made it very difficult to assess the results of many

airborne missions.48 On many days, pilots were confronted with a low cloud

ceiling or light rain and drizzle that limited flying altitudes from 1,500 to 3,000

feet and visibility to two to four miles. Clouds and fog enveloped the inland

river valleys, particularly the Red River valley to Lao Cai, and often persisted

throughout the day. Thunderstorms sometimes blocked out the mountain

regions. The most suitable flying weather was in the mountainous region of the

northwest, east of 104 degrees longitude.49

Despite the monsoon weather, Air Force, Navy, and VNAF pilots succeeded

in flying 4,551 strike sorties or about 87.5 percent of the total authorized for

the month. The VNAF, almost totally preoccupied with the war in South

Vietnam, contributed a token 12 sorties on two missions. Flying 57.5 percent

of the sortie total, the Air Force concentrated on targets in route packages 1, 3,

and 5, while the Navy hit route packages 2 and 4. More than 500 of the Air

Force sorties were flown at night: fighters were accompanied by flare-dropping

aircraft or B–66Bs with special radar bombing equipment to conduct buddyDiving on a target in North Vietnam, an F–105

Thunderchief fires a volley of 2.75-inch rockets.
239

DIPLOMACY FAILS

bombing strikes. The Navy carried out somewhat fewer night sorties.50 As in

February, pilots searched for vehicles, rolling stock, rivercraft, coastal junks;

such fixed targets as small bridges, military structures, and logistic and antiaircraft sites; and they cut scores of roads. In route package 1 the Air Force frequently struck routes leading to and in the area around Mu Gia Pass, the major

entry point from North Vietnam into southern Laos. In route package 5, the

favorite targets were segments of the northwest Hanoi to Lao Cai rail line, fully

repaired and carrying rolling stock again. In route package 2, Navy pilots concentrated on segments of Routes 4, 8, 14, and 15; and in route package 4, they

hit routes leading to Barthelemy Pass, another important entry point into Laos.

They also continued their assault on coastal junks. In the absence of good flying weather and targets, Air Force and Navy pilots attacked vehicles and logistic sites and cut roads along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.51

Iron Hand missions, exempt from the authorized sortie ceiling, continued to

search for and, when possible, hit SA–2 SAM radar sites. Air Force EB–66s

performed some of the electronic detection and countermeasures tasks, but

most were conducted by Marine EF–10Bs. From March 4 to 31, the Marines

flew eighty-five of these sorties, escorted by their own or by Air Force fighters. When Iron Hand missions were canceled because of poor weather, accompanying strike aircraft were diverted to flying armed reconnaissance.52

Despite the weather and bombing restrictions, the services believed they

took a considerably higher toll of enemy resources than in February. For the

four-week period of March 4–31, the services claimed to have destroyed and

damaged the following: vehicles, 103 and 103; rivercraft, 63 and 177; small

bridges, 46 and 90; structures, 96 and 95; and antiaircraft sites, 18 and 5. In addition, they counted 28 damaged rail cars and made at least 145 road cuts.53

In inflicting this damage, the two services relied on existing ordnance. The Air

Force continued to use chiefly 250-pound, 500-pound, and 750-pound generalpurpose bombs, especially the latter, but frequently dropped 1,000-pound,

2,000-pound, and 3,000-pound bombs on more difficult targets, and fired thousands of 2.75-inch rockets. In route package 5, pilots tried to slow traffic on

segments of the Hanoi to Lao Cai rail line and some key routes by dropping

MLU–10 land mines. The Navy employed chiefly 250-pound and 500-pound

bombs, but also substantial numbers of 1,000-pound bombs, and they used

Zuni rockets heavily. Beginning in February and continuing into March, Navy

pilots tested an improved AGM–45 Shrike air-to-surface missile against SA–2

SAM and other antiaircraft radar sites; but weather, combined with the mobility of the SAM and other air defense equipment, made damage assessment very

difficult. General Moore’s Seventh Air Force pilots would begin using the

Shrike in April.54

More strikes over a larger geographical area resulted in greater aircraft attrition than in February. The Air Force’s losses in March totaled thirteen aircraft

(six F–105s, two F–4Cs, one F–100, three RF–101s, and one HU–16). Four air-
240

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Armed Reconnaissance Route Packages
241

DIPLOMACY FAILS

craft were damaged, but four planes (three F–105s and one RF–101) disappeared while flying Rolling Thunder missions, the cause of their loss unknown.

The Navy lost at least five aircraft, and many others were damaged.

55

The high level of aircraft attrition was easily attributed to the lethality of the

north’s air defense units along important routes. The heaviest concentrations

were along rail lines and routes south of the 20th parallel. More SA–2 sites

were also detected during the month, the total reaching in excess of one hundred throughout the country. With the mobility of the north’s gun and missile

units, however, the number of missiles and missile launchers was uncertain.56

Although there were no losses to enemy MiGs, air commanders anticipated

more trouble from them if the authorized bomb line moved further northward

and exposed more sensitive targets. MiGs were becoming increasingly aggressive, as was demonstrated on several occasions. On March 4, while circling at

13,000 feet on a combat air patrol mission for a strike on the Hanoi-Lao Cai

rail line, four USAF F–4C Phantoms were challenged by a MiG pilot.

Appearing from a 6 o’clock position, he made several firing passes. In several

other instances, MiG pilots vectored near U.S. escort and strike aircraft, made

visual passes, and threatened a number of RF–101s. The number of MiG warnings from Air Force Big Eye/Airborne Battlefield Command and Control

Centers (ABCCCs) in March was substantially higher than in February.57

In late March, intelligence data indicated that there were about sixty-three

MiG–15s and MiG–17s, plus fifteen MiG–21s, at Phuc Yen airfield. More

MiG–21s, which had made their first appearance over North Vietnam in late

1965, were expected after photoreconnaissance indicated the presence of about

fifty-three aircraft crates at Phuc Yen. Thirty crates were believed to contain aircraft

fuselages, twenty-five of them MiG–21s and five MiG–15s, while twenty-three

crates appeared to contain wings. The Air Staff believed that the recently

arrived wings, frames, and parts, which could be assembled into operational

aircraft in about six weeks, promised a significant increase in the air threat. The

airfields were being improved and lengthened, and there were still a number of

Il–28 bombers on the north’s airfields that were capable of striking vital

American and Vietnamese installations in South Vietnam. The Air Staff—in

fact, all Air Force and Navy commanders—were still very frustrated by the

administration’s ban on attacking the crated MiGs and the airfields, especially

the latter, as failure to do so now presaged higher American air losses later.

From November 14, 1964 to March 1, 1966, the JCS, with occasional Army

dissent, officially asked McNamara on eleven occasions for authority to strike

all of the north’s important airbases, convinced that this would not substantially

increase the risk of Chinese intervention in the war, but Washington’s refusal to

allow such attacks would endure for many more months.

58
Military camp near Mu Gia pass.
243

CHAPTER 9

Rolling Thunder 50

As Rolling Thunder 49 continued in March 1966, most Southeast Asia commanders and the JCS searched for new ways to convince the administration to

step up the air and sea war against North Vietnam. Air Force and Navy leaders

remained steadfast in their advocacy of “taking the wraps” off the bombing

program. In Saigon, however, General Westmoreland made a counterproposal,

which was quickly approved, to divert some air power from the upper regions

of the north to areas closer to South Vietnam’s battlefields and to adjust service

responsibility accordingly from PACOM to MACV.

Westmoreland’s Extended Battlefield Area

The MACV commander sent his proposal to Admiral Sharp and General

Wheeler on March 17. He explained that a recent MACV study of VC-NVA

activities in South Vietnam showed that manpower and supplies were being

infiltrated on a “decidedly larger scale than experienced to date.” Between

October 1965 and February 1966, “at least” 11,280 infiltrators entered the

south, and in the last two months “collateral reports and intelligence” indicated

“possibly in excess of 15,000” NVA personnel had moved into Laos. 

Westmoreland saw the Laotian panhandle as the “connecting link” between

Hanoi’s strategic base and the southern battlefields and expected the high troop

and supply infiltration movements to continue until the monsoon weather in

Laos, beginning in late May and June, made routes impassable. Thus, the

United States and its allies had only a month and a half to improve air effectiveness against the north’s routes leading to and adjacent to Laos’s border.1

To deal with the increased infiltration, Westmoreland asked higher authorities to approve five related measures: a new, “national intelligence analysis” of

the vulnerability of the north’s transportation net from the Chinese border to

South Vietnam; more armed reconnaissance in an “extended battlefield area”

consisting of route packages 1 and 2, the Tiger Hound sector of Laos, and the

demilitarized zone area west of 107°E; the transfer of command and control of

the extended battlefield area from PACOM to MACV (and indirectly to the

Seventh Air Force commander); the use of napalm in Laos (still banned except

when authorized by the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane) when directed by forward air controllers; more B–52 strikes along the eastern edge of the Laotian

border with cover strikes in South Vietnam (as currently practiced); and the

destruction of POL storage facilities, power plants, and other important targets

in North Vietnam’s “strategic rear” that had not yet been bombed. The Rolling

Thunder Armed Reconnaissance Coordinating Committee would continue to

provide the requisite field intelligence analysis and service coordination.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Westmoreland predicted that, if adopted, his proposals would enhance

Sharp’s operations against the north’s “strategic resource base” because they

would “relieve you of the day-to-day tactical concern related to those operations impacting directly on the battlefield in SVN.” They would also insure

optimum employment of available air resources. “General Moore concurs in

the plan,” he concluded, “and I request to put it into effect as a matter of operational urgency.”2

Sharp agreed that NVA infiltration was growing and commended

Westmoreland for his efforts to improve air operations in the north but rejected

most of the proposals. The PACOM commander was skeptical of the recent

estimate of 15,000 NVA entering Laos, reluctant to change command responsibility for the route packages, and disagreed that Hanoi’s “strategic rear” was

in North Vietnam; rather, he said, it was outside of the north. Further, he

opposed allocating more air sorties in the panhandle at the expense of larger

strikes further north and employing more B–52s against Laotian routes to create

“choke points” since this tactic had previously proved unsuccessful. The

Rolling Thunder Armed Reconnaissance Coordinating Committee, he continued,

appeared to be allocating sorties satisfactorily, and any sortie shortages were

the result of bad weather, which forced air commanders to cancel missions or

divert aircraft to other areas. With better weather, the bombing tempo against

the north would increase. Sharp had no quarrel with Westmoreland’s desire to

hit the remaining significant targets and sent him his own list of targets in order

of importance: ports, POL storage facilities, supply storage sites along key

routes from China, airfields, power plants, and locks and dams, the last two

“relatively insignificant.”3

The Air Force followed the Westmoreland-Sharp exchange with considerable

interest, but its reaction was ambivalent. General Moore supported

Westmoreland’s proposals because MACV delegated much of its authority over

MiG–21 in flight over

North Vietnam.
245

ROLLING THUNDER 50

* First proposed by the Army in 1964, the concept of a new Southeast Asia Command that

would replace MACV and bypass PACOM in the command chain between Saigon (or at

some other Southeast Asia location) and Washington was still being discussed in 1966. The

proposed command was never established. See McConnell Notebook, Item 113, 27 Apr

65; Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt, Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950–1969

(Dept of Army, 1974), pp 40–41.

air operations in South Vietnam to the 2d Air Division, and the extension of

MACV’s control into route packages 1 and 2 thus could lead to greater Air

Force interdiction responsibility over this area.4

On the other hand, General Harris noted that the transfer from PACOM to

MACV of command and control over the extended battlefield area would still

leave all major policy decisions firmly in the hands of the Army. In the event

that Sharp later transferred more authority to MACV, the PACAF commander

foresaw that Rolling Thunder’s tempo might be reduced, and worse, should

PACOM headquarters receive a new Army “Commander, Southeast Asia,” the

Army would have complete control of all air operations in the war theater.* The

last eventuality would leave the Air Force with little leverage to influence the

use of air power generally in Southeast Asia, and specifically near China’s borders,

should that become necessary. Other Air Force officers were inclined to agree

with Harris, believing that, on balance, the existing Rolling Thunder command

and control arrangements were in the best interests of the Air Force. In

Washington, a Joint Staff study likewise concluded that CINCPAC should

retain operational control of bombing North Vietnam and that MACV should

not be assigned any of the route packages.5

Truck park in North Vietnam

after bombing by fighters.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

*The Tiger Hound program began on December 5, 1965.

In discussions with General Wheeler on March 21 and 23, however, Secretary

McNamara made it clear that he was highly supportive of Westmoreland’s proposals, especially since Rolling Thunder was having “relatively little effect” on the

enemy. He expressed “concern and wonderment” that the northwest Hanoi-Lao

Cai rail line remained open after repeated bombings. Wheeler succeeded in allaying somewhat the Defense Secretary’s skepticism about the bombing, at least to

the extent that McNamara indicated that the northeast quadrant (i.e., route packages 6A and 6B) might shortly be reopened to air strikes.6 Told of McNamara’s

desire to give first priority to whatever bombing Westmoreland requested, Admiral

Sharp shifted primary responsibility for armed reconnaissance in route package

1—but not route package 2—to the MACV commander for his “extended battlefield area” (which already included the Tiger Hound section of Laos),* beginning

with the next Rolling Thunder program on April 1, 1966. As before, General

Moore’s 2d Air Division, augmented occasionally by the VNAF, would conduct

most of the route package 1 combat sorties, with the Navy assisting if weather or

other circumstances precluded operations elsewhere in the north. The PACOM

commander did not consider Westmoreland’s request valid. He believed that there

was ample in-theater air power to satisfy all of MACV’s legitimate needs and that

PACOM’s existing command and control system checked the propensity of the

MACV staff to inflate sortie requirements in and near South Vietnam and fritter

away bombs on unjustified targets. However, the Defense Secretary had the last

word, and Westmoreland received his new authority.7

Secretary of the Air Force 

Brown (left) and General

Westmoreland during the

Secretary’s tour of Air Force

installations in Vietnam in

January 1966.
247

ROLLING THUNDER 50

At the same time, Sharp decided to make other changes to Rolling Thunder

operations. He reassigned the route packages, giving 5 and 6A to the Air Force

and 2, 3, 4, and 6B to the Navy. He directed the Rolling Thunder Armed Reconnaissance Coordinating Committee, under the chairmanship of General Moore,

to continue compiling data on armed reconnaissance of the north; MACV to

recommend targets every two weeks in route package 1 and the authorized

interdiction areas of Laos; and PACAF and PACFLT to submit a comprehensive status and analysis report of their respective bombing areas every two

weeks. The PACAF-PACFLT report should describe the status of the main

LOCs, traffic military support facilities, and list new targets. The Rolling

Thunder Planning group, consisting of senior PACOM, PACAF, and PACFLT

operations and intelligence officers would analyze fixed targets and, every

Thursday, would recommend the targets that should be struck. Finally, the

PACOM commander directed the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) in Honolulu

to perform a “detailed analysis” of all of North Vietnam’s LOCs.8

Air Force leaders were highly disconcerted by Sharp’s assignment of four

route packages to the Navy and only two to the Air Force. Although the latter’s

assignment covered a sizeable geographical area, General Harris viewed the

disparity as indicative of a diminished PACAF role in Rolling Thunder, and he

particularly objected to the restrictions on PACAF with regard to attacking the

The Phu Ly railroad bridge, thirty-three miles southeast of Hanoi,

immediately after an F–105 strike on April 17, 1966, that collapsed

the south span and cratered the approaches to the bridge.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

north’s coastal and inland waterways. Gen. George B. Simler, the Seventh Air

Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, observed that the Navy

could fly “neither the number nor the quality of reconnaissance missions needed

in four route packages” and forecast a degradation in Rolling Thunder intelligence-gathering and tactical operations. Nor did he see any benefit to the Air

Force from the adjusted functions of the Rolling Thunder Armed Reconnaissance

Coordinating Committee, which at best practiced “nominal coordination of independent [service] efforts” in the bombing program. He believed that a better

solution would be to transform the committee into a Southeast Asia Air Board,

chaired by Moore, with authority to review all MACV and PACOM air planning

and requirements in the Southeast Asia war theater. However, if the objections of

the Air Force reached Admiral Sharp, they did nothing to deter him. Meanwhile,

the JCS and McNamara were completing work on the target list for “Rolling

Thunder 50,” as the next bombing program would be called.9

Selecting Rolling Thunder 50 Targets

In late March, General Wheeler had attempted to assuage McNamara’s skepticism about the Rolling Thunder program and to stress the need for more

strikes on important targets even as more air power was shifted to Westmoreland’s extended battlefield area. The JCS chairman described the difficulties

Air Force and Navy pilots normally experienced over the north: poor flying

weather (the monsoon did not usually abate until May), the heavy concentrations of antiaircraft weaponry along important segments of the Hanoi-Lao Cai

and other rail lines, and the enemy’s fast repair capability. In response, the

Secretary indicated that, for the next Rolling Thunder program, he would be

willing to approve 600 to 700 sorties per month for a “controlled armed reconnaissance program” in route packages 6A and 6B and for such JCS-designated

targets as the Haiphong cement plant, the bridges at Viet Tri and Phu Ly, and a

radar facility at Kep. On March 23, he informed Wheeler that he would allow

attacks on POL storage facilities within the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area,

but would not sanction the mining of waters leading to Haiphong and other

ports. He asked for specific Joint Staff bombing recommendations roughly

within the foregoing guidelines.10

On March 26, the service chiefs sent McNamara a “bombing package” for

execution beginning on April 1. They proposed 700 armed reconnaissance sorties

against rail and highway routes in the northeast and strikes on nine important

POL sites, six bridges (three would be restrikes), and four other important targets.

For the twelfth time since November 1964, they also called for strikes on the

north’s jet-capable airfields. Their recommendation stated that from “a strictly

military point of view,” the sixty to seventy MiGs based near Hanoi posed a constant threat, and the airfields should take precedence over other proposed targets

despite the risks of losing men and aircraft during such an air assault. Although
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ROLLING THUNDER 50

the airfield recommendation had not been discussed with McNamara, the Joint

Chiefs noted that overall, the bombing package was less escalatory than their

“preferred” Rolling Thunder program outlined on January 18, 1966.11

Surprisingly, in the closing days of March, McNamara sent—with some

modifications—an endorsement of the Joint Chief’s bombing proposals to the

President. Apparently influenced by a new CIA study that for the first time

advocated heavier bombing in the north, the Defense Secretary said that Hanoi’s

loss of its only cement plant and most of its POL stores would harm its bridge

and road repair activities and logistic movements. He minimized communist

reaction to such strikes. Virtually paraphrasing earlier JCS assertions, he said

that the Soviet Union would probably do nothing more than adopt “a somewhat

harsher diplomatic and propaganda line” and that the Chinese “would not react

to these attacks by active entry by ground or air” unless the United States took

additional military steps. Such decisions “at each point would be largely within

our ... control.” The Defense Secretary did not abandon his long-held view, however, that Hanoi would not alter its policy until it concluded that its chances of

winning the war in the south were so slim as to “no longer justify the damage

being inflicted on the north.” In the longer term, he said:

The recommended bombing program...can be expected to create a

substantial added burden on North Vietnam’s manpower supply for

defense and logistics tasks and to engender popular alienation from the

regions should shortages became widespread. While we do not predict

the regime’s control would be appreciably weakened, there might eventually be an aggravation of differences within the regime as [to] the policies

to be followed.12

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi,

I Corps Commander (left), and

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu,

Vietnamese Chief of State,

(center) at Da Nang Air Base,

South Vietnam, January 1966.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Whether President Johnson was prepared to endorse McNamara’s recommendations is uncertain. What is clear is that he felt constrained to withhold an

endorsement at the moment because of another political upheaval in South

Vietnam.13 The latest crisis came on March 10 when Prime Minister Ky dismissed General Nguyen Chanh Thi, the rebellious commander of the South

Vietnamese Army forces in the northernmost I Corps, which included five of

the most strategic provinces. Ky and his ruling military collegium in Saigon

charged Thi with insubordination. The I Corps commander was popular in the

region, a hero because of his role in overthrowing the Diem regime in 1963, and

he had the loyalty of his military and civilian appointees, most of whom resigned

their posts in protest. Local Buddhist monks led anti-Ky demonstrations in Hue

and Da Nang and were joined quickly by many other dissenters to Saigon’s rule.

Some condemned the presence of the United States in South Vietnam and called

for negotiations with the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the

Viet Cong. The disorder spread southward to Saigon where, on March 31, 10,000

Buddhists demonstrated against the Ky government. On April 5, Ky flew to Da

Nang to quell the rebellion, threatening to use troops if necessary.14

In Washington, the unrest prompted renewed concerns about the war by critics within the administration, Congress, and the public about aiding an ally that

appeared unwilling or unable to set aside domestic quarrels while fighting for

its very survival. As a consequence, the President was obliged to defer his

approval of the escalatory parts of the Rolling Thunder 50 package, namely the

seven POL and two industrial targets. As a further precaution, he somewhat

enlarged the principal sanctuary area by prohibiting any bombing within a

thirty nautical miles of Hanoi and ten nautical miles of Haiphong. He made no

change to the Chinese buffer zone, but he did shorten the maneuvering area for

strike pilots flying over the zone: pilots were directed to remain at least twenty

nautical miles from the border, not fifteen nautical miles, as before.

Nonetheless, the directive still gave Air Force and Navy commanders more

targets and operational flexibility than they had enjoyed in the February and

March operations. It permitted 900 (rather than 700) attack sorties (of 8,100

authorized per month for North Vietnam and Laos) in the reopened route packages 6A and 6B and retained in the target list four important rail and highway

bridges and eight key rail and highway segments. Commanders were instructed

to make a special effort to block train traffic along the northeast Hanoi-Dong

Dang rail line.15

On April 1, Admiral Sharp, dispatched implementing orders to Generals

Harris and Westmoreland and Admiral Johnson, allocating monthly armed

reconnaissance sorties as follows: MACV, 3,500 for route package 1 and the

Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs in Laos (most of which would be flown by

the Air Force); Air Force, 1,100 sorties for route packages 5 and 6A; and Navy,

3,500 sorties for route packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B. He divided evenly between the

two services the 900 sorties permitted for route packages 6A and 6B, allocating
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ROLLING THUNDER 50

450 sorties to each in their respective bombing areas. Each service was also

assigned segments of four armed reconnaissance routes. The Air Force’s segments totaled 134 miles, and the Navy’s totaled 186. In addition, Sharp directed

the Navy to continue flying armed reconnaissance of coastal areas in accordance

with guidelines issued earlier by Washington. JCS targets in the north that had

already been struck, he added, could be attacked at any time at the discretion of

air commanders, but Iron Hand SA–2 SAM strikes in route packages 6A and 6B

could be conducted only after photography confirmed the location of the sites.

Attacks on fixed SAM sites, on the other hand, were permissible to protect aircraft and their aircrews.16

On the same day, Sharp issued a revised Rolling Thunder, Iron Hand antiSAM, and Blue Tree reconnaissance operations order that assigned service

responsibility for intelligence analysis for each of the route packages in a manner identical to service responsibility for attack sorties: MACV was assigned

route package 1, the Air Force received route packages 5 and 6A, and the Navy

route packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B. The PACOM commander insisted on retaining

final control of these activities on the grounds that it was essential to have

undivided authority over reconnaissance in North Vietnam.17

The foregoing attack and reconnaissance directives were issued only a week

prior to the completion of a JCS study team report, requested by McNamara in

February, on the results of Rolling Thunder’s first year of operations (i.e., March

2, 1965 to March 2, 1966). Headed by USAF Brig. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott,

the team concluded that the bombing program had achieved “a degree of success within the parameters of imposed restrictions.” The team also determined

that Hanoi was willing to absorb the present level of air-inflicted damage and

would not cease its support of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. 

The report also described Rolling Thunder’s “unfinished business.” Of 236

targets designated by the JCS in North Vietnam in early 1966, 134 had been

struck, including 42 important bridges, but 102 remained untouched. Of these,

90 were in the northwest, including 70 in the sanctuary areas of Hanoi and

Haiphong and within the Chinese border buffer zone. The team strongly recommended that the remainder of these top priority targets should be destroyed

as a matter of urgency, in three attack phases. For each phase, Admiral Sharp

would decide which targets should be struck, the weight of air effort, and the

tactics. To assure maximum effectiveness, the operations should be conducted

in concert with the air campaigns in South Vietnam and Laos.18

The team’s conclusions had no discernible impact on the President’s decision to permit only a moderate expansion of bombing under Rolling Thunder

50. A major shortcoming of the report was that it lacked Joint Staff endorsement, despite General McConnell’s efforts to obtain it. When the report was

sent to McNamara on March 9, the service chiefs merely “noted” it, stating that

it was in consonance with their bombing recommendations of January 18,

1966, and would be useful in future Rolling Thunder planning.19
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* A Canadian emissary first visited Hanoi in March 1966.

† See Chapter 11.

‡ Because Headquarters, 2d Air Division, was now larger than that of a standard Air

Force, on March 25, Gen. McConnell directed Gen. Harris to reestablish the division as

Headquarters, Seventh Air Force, effective April 8, 1966. Headquarters, 2d Air Division,

was discontinued. At the same time, the Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division/Thirteenth

Air Force, at Udorn, Thailand, was redesignated Deputy Commander, Seventh Air Force/

Thirteenth Air Force (msg, CSAF to CINCPACAF, 252211Z Mar 66).

More important than the Philpott report were other events that obliged the

President to withhold his approval of a major escalation of the bombing in late

March and for the ensuing weeks. The internal strife in South Vietnam, precipitated

by Prime Minister Ky’s dismissal of General Thi, was not resolved in April, but

would simmer throughout May and into June. On the diplomatic front, on April 28,

General Taylor warned the President that heavier bombing and other possible U.S.

military actions against the Hanoi regime were “blue chips” to be bargained away

only at the negotiating table, not relinquished beforehand. More significantly, in

May, United Nations General Secretary U Thant and the British government began

separate peace initiatives, and in June, with Washington’s concurrence, the Canadian

government sent an emissary to Hanoi for the second time* to determine whether

its leaders were prepared to scale down the fighting and begin discussions.20

Publicly, administration spokesmen would give oft-repeated reasons for the

caution of the bombing program. On May 22, during an interview on NBC’s

“Meet the Press”, Air Force Secretary Brown said that the use of additional air

power against an expanded target list in North Vietnam might decrease infiltration, but would not “cut it off.” Furthermore, it might well lead to a wider

war, “and no responsible government can lightly step into such a situation.”

There was no significant change in bombing policy until late June, when the

President finally approved strikes on several important POL targets.†21

Rolling Thunder 50 Begins

After receiving Admiral Sharp’s “execute” message on April 1, Seventh Air

Force‡ and Navy commanders quickly dispatched their fighter-bombers and

support aircraft over the enlarged bombing area. Substantial numbers of strikes,

in accordance with bombing guidelines, were flown in route package 1 and

the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger sectors of Laos. Targets in route package 1 alone

absorbed 2,406 sorties in April, of which most were flown by the Air Force

with the VNAF contributing a few. In mid-April, Secretary McNamara

declared his interest in concentrating the air effort near South Vietnam’s borders. “I want it clearly understood,” he informed General Westmoreland, SAC

Commander Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, General McConnell, and Admirals Sharp
and McDonald, “that all commanders are to give first priority...to fulfilling

requirements...against targets in the extended battlefield.” Operations in route

packages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6A and 6B “are not to be carried out unless they can be performed without penalty” in the first priority area. The policy would remain in

effect, he added, until a major field commander or a JCS member proposed a

change, and he (McNamara) or Deputy Defense Secretary Vance agreed that a

shift in air emphasis was warranted.22

In May, largely because of poor weather, strike sorties in route package 1 fell

to 1,675 with the Air Force flying 1,391, the Navy 181, and the VNAF 103. In

June, with monsoon weather easing, the three services recorded 4,070 strike sorties, with all but 243 flown by the Air Force. Targets consisted principally of small

bridges, vehicles, structures, watercraft, ferries, supply and POL storage sites, and

rolling stock along the rail line between Vinh and the DMZ. In addition, pilots cut

and cratered hundreds of roads, especially along Routes 1A, 15, 101, and 137.23

Beginning on May 1 and continuing in June, some of the strikes in route

package 1 were flown under the aegis of a new program. Patterned after the

Tiger Hound operations inaugurated in December 1965 in southeastern Laos

and controlled by an interservice Tiger Hound Task Force headed by Air Force

Col. John F. Groom, Gate Guard was an “integrated interdiction” concept. As

weather worsened in southern Laos but improved in North Vietnam, Air Force,

253

ROLLING THUNDER 50

An O–1 forward air

control aircraft.

This forward air

controller notes

target coordinates

on the side window 

of his aircraft.
254

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* For a detailed discussion of the Gate Guard and Tally-Ho programs, see Jacob Van

Staaveren, Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968 (Center AF Hist, 1994), pp 118–19,

152–58, and 181–84.

Navy, and Marine pilots shifted most of the their operations to the southern

sector of route package 1. Attack sorties were supported by special aircraft:

O–1 Bird Dog forward air controllers to direct strike pilots to their targets,

C–130 ABCCCs, C–130 flare aircraft, EB–66Cs and EB–66Bs for electronic

intelligence and countermeasures, and RF–101s for photoreconnaissance.

Strike pilots concentrated on attacking “selected interdiction points” or “gates”

in daytime and “fleeting targets,” mostly vehicles, at night.24

Although the Gate Guard program initially promised to inflict more casualties

on the enemy, especially at night, pilots found the operations in route package 1

more difficult and hazardous than in southeastern Laos. The low-flying O–1s

were very vulnerable to the heavier antiaircraft fire in the area, the interdiction

points on flatter terrain were easily bypassed, and there were more villages

where the enemy could rest and service vehicles, secure in the knowledge that

American airmen would not attack largely civilian targets. As a consequence,

Gate Guard operations were soon terminated and were succeeded, on July 20,

1966, by Tally-Ho, a program designed to stem the increasing flow of manpower and supplies into South Vietnam through the demilitarized zone.*25

F–105 strikes on November 3, 1966, severely damaged the

railyards at Yen Bai, seventy-six miles northwest of Hanoi. 
255

ROLLING THUNDER 50

In route packages 2, 3, and 4, assigned to the Navy, a total of 2,081 strike sorties were flown in April, with the Air Force contributing about 200. In May, sortie

totals for the two services in these areas were 2,325 and 42, and in June 2,902 and

61 (the VNAF did not venture beyond route package 1). Most of the targets were

similar to those in route package 1, with some special areas singled out for repeated attacks, including routes leading to the Barthelemy Pass, an infiltration entry point from North Vietnam into Laos; five important “logistic hubs” at Thanh

Hoa, Vinh, Phi Din, Vinh Son, Phu Qui, and Bai Thuong; the Hai Yen and Phuc

Loi naval bases; and the Son Chau POL storage area. In late April and May, following an air strike that blocked a canal, Navy pilots enjoyed a field day against

an estimated 1,100 junks and sampans, with about 850 reported damaged or

destroyed. In late June, Washington authorized additional strikes against dispersed

and major POL storage areas located in these and more northern route packages.26

In route packages 5 and 6A, where only the larger and longer range Air Force

planes ventured, numerous attacks were made against rail and highway bridges,

rail tracks, and rolling stock along the Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen rail

lines; the Yen Bai and Thai Nguyen railyards; logistic sites at Yen Bai, Son La, and

Thai Nguyen; and, near the end of June, three major POL storage areas. Strike sorties in April, May, and June totaled 342, 237, and 98 respectively.27

The assault on the Thai Nguyen railyard was made in response to insistent

requests by General Harris to Admiral Sharp to obtain the necessary strike authority.

After administration officials assented, on April 29, thirteen F–105s conducted the

attack, tearing up the tracks, cratering the yard, and destroying an estimated twelve

railroad cars. Groundfire cost the attackers one plane and pilot. Air Force analysts

The Thai Nguyen railyard after strikes in May 1966.
256

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* See Chapter 10.

believed that the destruction of the yard would hamper shipments from the north’s

only nearby steel mill—which remained off limits to the fighter-bombers. As usual,

the North Vietnamese quickly began to repair the damage, assisted by a period of

poor flying weather that prevented immediate restrikes.28

Air commanders were especially frustrated by Washington’s refusal to approve

an attack on 132 SA–2 SAM canisters, associated equipment, and a SAM maintenance installation at the Hanoi barracks northeast of Gia Thong Boe. Detected

by a SAC Blue Spring reconnaissance drone at the beginning of May, analysts

determined that the SAM assemblies could equip eleven North Vietnamese SA–2

battalions and contained missiles equal to the number fired at Air Force and Navy

aircraft since December 1965. Admiral Sharp informed the JCS that an air attack

on the target would constitute “a severe blow” to Hanoi’s SA–2 capability.

General Wheeler was sympathetic to the PACOM commander’s request, but

advised him that it was not expedient “at this time” to ask higher authorities for

the strike authority. The Joint Chiefs, he explained, were reluctant to jeopardize

ongoing discussions with the authorities on bombing the important POL storage sites in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and reluctant to recommend a single

strike on the missiles and equipment that would inevitably alert the north’s air

defenders to exercise greater vigilance in the vicinity of the POL targets.29

The fewest sorties in the three-month period were flown in route package 6B,

an area assigned to the Navy, but shared with the Air Force. April sortie totals

are unavailable, but in May, the Navy flew 116 and the Air Force 9, with the

June totals 78 and 22 respectively. Both services concentrated on interdiction of

bridges along the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line, and in late June, Navy pilots struck

four of seven major POL storage areas belatedly authorized by the President.*30

On May 5, 1966, F–105 pilot

Capt. C. Glen Nix hit the center

span of the Bac Giang railroad

and highway bridge with a full

bomb load, destroying that key

bridge linking Hanoi with China.
257

ROLLING THUNDER 50

Air Force and Navy commanders expended considerable effort to knock out

four rail and highway bridges designated by the JCS in the northern route packages

authorized under Rolling Thunder 50. The largest bridge stood on the northeast

Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line at Bac Giang. It possessed four steel trusses resting on

three concrete piers and abutments, two center swing spans, each thirty-nine feet in

length and two road lanes and one rail line.

After Admiral Sharp directed the Air Force to attack the Bac Giang bridge,

General Moore dispatched four separate missions against the sturdy target. A total

of twenty-three F–105 Thunderchiefs dropped 107 250-pound bombs on or near

the bridge, but succeeded in damaging only one span and cratering the southwest

approach. After numerous weather cancellations, a fifth strike was conducted on

May 5 by two flights of four F–105s, all carrying 3,000-pound bombs, and these

destroyed the two northern spans, closing the bridge to traffic. Twelve Air Force

F–105s knocked out, for the second time, the Phu Ly railroad bridge on the same

rail line (previously hit in 1965). Navy pilots likewise needed only single-mission

attacks on two JCS bridges at Hai Duong and Haiphong on April 17 and 19 respectively, to make them unusable. All four bridges were struck again in May and June

to keep them out of operation. Nonetheless, the indefatigable North Vietnamese did

not cease their repair activity. In May, photoreconnaissance detected construction

units building a rail bypass 2,300 feet north of the Hai Duong bridge.31

Bac Giang bridge after the May 5 attack. A pontoon

bridge and a ferry are above the destroyed bridge. 
258

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

The most creative bridge assault during the three-month period was against

the Thanh Hoa rail and road bridge in route package 3. Bombed repeatedly in

1965, the structure withstood Air Force and Navy bombs while groundfire

inflicted considerable losses. To destroy its two heavy spans, the Air Force

devised a special attack program nicknamed Carolina Moon. This called for

dropping five huge 5,000-pound bombs from a Hercules C–130 cargo plane into

the Song Ma River upstream from the bridge. The bombs would float towards

the bridge and explode when they struck the superstructure. General Moore

believed an upstream bomb drop was the only feasible method of attack, given

the heavy air defenses in the vicinity of the bridge.32

Preparations for Carolina Moon began in late 1965 at the Air Force’s Tactical

Air Warfare Center at Eglin AFB, Florida. At the Center’s Armament Development

Laboratory, personnel constructed a number of high-explosive bombs, 96 inches

wide and 31 1/2 inches high, with affixed sensors. The bomb weighed about 3,750

pounds, but the attachments increased the weight to about 5,000 pounds. During

the extensive test and training period that followed, aircrews made about 80 test

drops of the huge bombs from C–123 and C–130 aircraft, while two aircrews

underwent special training in two C–130 Hercules planes that would conduct the

mission in the war theater. One seven-man aircrew was headed by Maj. Richard T.

Remers, the other by Maj. Thomas F. Case. Early in May, the two aircraft and their

aircrews departed from Eglin and arrived at Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, on the

15th. They immediately began flying orientation missions and acquainting themselves with a Carolina Moon operational plan prepared by General Moore’s staff

and approved by Admiral Sharp in mid-April.33

Because of the weather, aircrews had to wait until late May to begin their

mission. Finally, shortly after midnight on the 30th, Major Remer’s aircrew of

navigators, radio operators, and bombardiers took off from Da Nang. They flew

a circuitous route towards Thanh Hoa that took them over the Gulf of Tonkin,

Thanh Hoa highway and

railroad bridge under attack.
259

ROLLING THUNDER 50

then to a drop area about one mile upstream from the bridge. As the time

neared to unload their five bombs, ten Air Force F–4C Phantoms made a diversionary strike on a highway ten miles north of Thanh Hoa while electronically

equipped EB–66s engaged in jamming operations against antiaircraft radars in

the vicinity of the bridge. Major Remer’s bomb run was made at about 150 knots,

400 feet above the ground. After maneuvering safely through groundfire, his

aircrew dropped the 5,000-pound blockbusters in the river. The mission was executed flawlessly. However, the results were nil. Photoreconnaissance the next

day disclosed no new damage to the bridge or any trace of the bombs.34

Disappointed but undaunted, General Moore ordered Major Case’s seven-man

aircrew to fly an identical mission in the second Hercules the next night, with

no changes in procedure. To provide additional navigational expertise for the

mission, 1st Lt. William “Rocky” Edmundson, one of two navigators who had

flown with Major Remer the night before, signed on with Major Case’s C–130.

The plane left Da Nang without incident, then, presumably while flying over

the Gulf of Tonkin towards the target area, Case’s plane vanished. Also lost

without trace was one of two F–4C Phantoms and its two-man crew which, as

on the preceding night, made a diversionary attack just before the scheduled

bomb drop above the bridge. After an extensive search failed to locate the plane

and the eight-man aircrew, the Air Force decided to abandon the Carolina

Moon project. Major Remer and his fellow airmen, plus support personnel,

returned to Eglin AFB in June 1966.35

Repeated bombings led

to the construction of

three bypass routes around

this destroyed bridge in

North Vietnam.
260

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* Considerable controversy surrounded the planning and implementation of the first two

strikes on the Mu Gia Pass. See Jacob Van Staaveren, Interdiction in Southern Laos,

1960–1968 (Center AF Hist. 1994), pp 135–37.

What happened to Major Remer’s five bombs and Major Case’s mission?

Later, North Vietnamese sources provided conflicting accounts of Remer’s

bomb delivery. The first, in late 1966, indicated that four of the bombs

exploded but caused little damage. According to the second account, obtained

by the New York Times in 1972, the North Vietnamese “guards” who witnessed

the drop leaped into the river and held the five bombs until they were defused

by technicians. The main source of information about Major Case’s mission

came from a communist film obtained by the Japanese that was seen by Major

Remer. This suggests that the plane was shot down about twenty miles west of

the river, and that there were no survivors. However, U.S. authorities have never

obtained conclusive evidence concerning the fate of Major Remer’s five bombs

or Major Case’s mission.36

Another highlight of Rolling Thunder 50 was the first two strikes in North

Vietnam by SAC’s B–52s. The target was Mu Gia Pass, the north’s principal entry

point for troops and supplies into southern Laos. General Westmoreland had been

pressing for an SAC attack on the area for many weeks and solicited the backing

of Admiral Sharp and Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane for the operation. Administration authorities reviewed the proposal intensively before concurring in early

April 1966. On the 8th, the JCS sent an “execute” message to Sharp and General

Nazzaro, the SAC commander. Unlike B–52 strikes in the eastern border regions

of Laos, which were conducted under a veil of secrecy (despite occasional leaks

to the press), there would be no effort to conceal Arc Light attacks in the north

as Hanoi obviously would publicize them immediately.*37

On April 12, under the nickname Rock Kick II, the SAC commander ordered

the bombers to strike the pass. Thirty B–52s and thirty KC–135s—the latter had

been forced out of their home base on Okinawa by weather—consumed one hour

and four minutes for take-off from Andersen AFB, Guam. Each bomber carried

twenty-four 1,000-pound bombs internally and twenty-four 750-pound bombs

externally. All of the 750-pound bombs were preset for subsurface burst while

the thirty 1,000-pound bombs were fitted with long delay fuses. At the target

area, twenty-nine bombers (one aborted because of a radar malfunction)

released their ordnance from 35,000 to 37,000 feet. On the North Vietnamese

side, the B–52s carpet bombed a three-mile segment of Route 15.38

Based on official briefings in Saigon, American newsmen characterized the

attack as the largest single bombing mission of the war, and also the largest since

World War II. Quoting “usually reliable sources,” they said that the bombers also

struck the Laotian side of the pass. The sources, on this occasion, were unreliable,

as the final decision was to bomb only on the North Vietnamese side of the pass.39
261

ROLLING THUNDER 50

U.S. spokesmen in Saigon hailed the raid as a “marked” success, as it created

huge landslides leading to the pass. Within 24 hours, however, visual and photoreconnaissance confirmed that the communists were again shuttling traffic

through the gateway into Laos. Westmoreland urged a second attack and, noting

recent increased traffic sightings toward and through the pass, recommended

Air Force and Navy follow-up tactical assaults, with the Air Force employing

its B–66/F–105 buddy bombing pathfinder technique to assure accuracy. On

Guam, Maj. Gen. William J. Crum, commander of the SAC’s 3d Air Division,

also desired to hit Mu Gia Pass again because several bomb drops during the

first strike were marred because of a blurred radar image induced by the terrain. As usual, the MACV commander had to obtain the approval of Admiral

Sharp and Ambassador Sullivan before the White House authorized another

SAC strike on the Mu Gia area for April 17.40

The second SAC strike, nicknamed Big Kite was executed more smoothly

than the first. SAC aircrews possessed better targeting data, the operational

aiming points were more easily identified, and all of the aircraft delivered their

ordnance as planned. The only untoward incident occurred when two SA–2

SAMs, launched from a site not far from Mu Gia Pass, scored a hit on an Air

Force tactical escort, although the plane was not downed.41

Poststrike photography showed thirty-two craters along North Vietnam’s

Route 15 running towards the pass, but after eighteen hours, all of the craters were

Cratering on Route 15 near Mu Gia Pass from B–52 bombing in April 1966.
262

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

filled and enemy trucks were again rumbling into southern Laos. In Westmoreland’s

view, the rapidity with which the North Vietnamese had reopened the route signaled

the importance they attached to the traffic artery and justified more B–52 saturation

bombing to keep it closed. And, with the annual monsoon weather approaching, he

believed the pass should be struck frequently while weather permitted. Many bomb

craters, filled with rain, would then frustrate enemy truck travel.42

However, Sullivan and Sharp now raised objections to further SAC bombing

of the Mu Gia area. The Ambassador wished to avoid publicity about strikes on

the Laotian side of the pass (Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma officially remained in the dark about SAC operations in his country), questioned the effectiveness of the bombing, considered wasteful the use of scarce munitions on

Laotian targets that could be struck more easily and accurately by tactical

aircraft, and worried about the safety of tribal road watch teams gathering intelligence in the targeted area. He also found control over strike aircraft to be

inadequate, observing that on the night of April 25/26, several B–52s had

“bombed through” a Navy mission apparently “working over” the SAM target

along the Laos-South Vietnam border assigned to the Arc Lighters.43

Admiral Sharp’s opposition to further B–52 strikes against Mu Gia Pass was

based on their high cost, their excessive use of scarce ordnance, their ineffectiveness in cratering roads and blocking traffic, and the vulnerability of the

bombers, which were ill-equipped to evade the SA–2 missiles sited not far from

Mu Gia. He believed that SAC’s primary mission should be to destroy war-making

material, not to block routes.44

Westmoreland was unconvinced by these arguments, but in the ensuing weeks

he was unable to persuade Sharp and Sullivan to renew the bombing using B–52s.

Administration officials sided with the PACOM commander and the Ambassador,

thus ending the operations for the time being. The bombers would not be employed against the Mu Gia area again until December 1966.45

A concept developed

early in 1966 allowed

loading of three racks of

twenty-eight 500- and

750-pound bombs

internally into B–52s, an

increase of over 50 per

cent.
263

The Air Munitions Shortage

With more targets available over a larger authorized bombing area, Rolling

Thunder 50 operations inflicted more losses on the north’s transportation, supply,

and air defense systems than in February and March. Service tabulations showed

hundreds of enemy vehicles, railroad cars, rivercraft, small bridges, antiaircraft

sites, and structures damaged or destroyed. In addition, pilots continued to cut

and crater hundreds of rail and road segments throughout the country.46

Operations were conducted in the face of a relatively new problem in the

war theater: a growing shortage of air munitions. The likelihood that air munitions expenditures would eventually outpace production and deliveries became

apparent in late 1965, and the trend became increasingly obvious in the first

three months of 1966.47

In April, as the tempo of air operations gradually rose, Generals Moore and

Westmoreland reported that the munitions shortfall had created “an emergency

situation,” forcing them to cancel many planned strike sorties. Shortfalls applied

particularly to CBU–2s, 2.75-inch rockets, and 500-pound and 750-pound bombs.

The supply of 750-pound bombs was diminishing most rapidly because of

intensified B–52 operations in South Vietnam and the border areas of Laos.

By mid-1966, there were inadequate inventories of thirteen types of air munitions, as well as components such as fuses. In addition to increased theater-wide

consumption, munitions production in the United States was not keeping pace

with demand, and there were unloading and delivery delays in South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the Air Force and Navy took separate actions to redistribute some

of the munitions stocks at airbases throughout Southeast Asia.48

ROLLING THUNDER 50

A modified B–52 releases an internal load of 84 bombs during a test at Eglin

Air Force Base, Florida. Increased use of B–52s intensified the bomb shortage.
264

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Seeking a solution to the munitions problem, Secretary McNamara sent Paul R.

Ignatius, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, to

Honolulu to meet with Admiral Sharp and other Navy and Air Force representatives. Two major actions resulted from the meetings. In Washington, President

Johnson assigned “the highest national priority” to the production of 250-pound,

500-pound, and 750-pound bombs; 2.75-inch rockets; and 20-mm, 81-mm, and

105-mm cartridges and in Honolulu, with JCS approval, Admiral Sharp made

tentative sortie allocations for all of the services for the remainder of 1966.

Contingent on such factors as aircraft size and targets, each service was given

temporary munitions loading limits. For example, the Air Force would carry 2.40

tons of munitions per sortie in North Vietnam and 1.65 tons per sortie in South

Vietnam and Laos. For the Navy, the figures were 1.80 and 1.30 tons respectively.

The Marine Corps and the VNAF were assigned 1.65 and 1.30 tons respectively.49

The April decisions on future service sortie allocations represented only the

first step to deal with the problem. On May 24, Secretary McNamara again

approved adjusted monthly sortie allocations for the remainder of 1966, based

on estimates of available ordnance and the number of aircraft expected to be in

the war theater by then. The Defense Secretary doubted if the services could

use “effectively” more than 60,000 tons of air munitions per month. At bottom,

he believed the munitions problem was partly a matter of insufficient production, but chiefly caused by inadequate distribution of available supplies.50

In a continuing debate on the munitions shortage, General McConnell and

other JCS members consistently argued for a policy allowing full munitions loading of aircraft to assure successful missions. McNamara took a contrary position,

asserting that large munitions loads were not warranted simply because aircraft

could carry them. In June, he acquiesced temporarily when he directed a reduction in sortie rates rather than reduced aircraft loading. Then, following another

high-level munitions conference in Honolulu in July, the Defense Secretary

Twelve F–105s, led by an EB–66, bombing the Mu Gia Pass area, May 1966.
265

ROLLING THUNDER 50

redefined “optimum” ordnance loads for aircraft as meaning loads based solely

on mission and target requirements. On the basis of this and other guidance,

planners worked out another revised ordnance and air sortie rate formula for the

remainder of 1966, subject to further adjustment as circumstances dictated.51

The need to reduce the number of planned strike sorties and the unavailability of

sufficient optimum munitions for Rolling Thunder and other air programs was a

matter of considerable concern to air commanders and combat pilots. In their view,

the twin deficiencies not only increased the danger of missions, but accounted for

higher aircraft losses. The acute shortage of a variety of bomb fuses, frequently compounded by their unreliability, was deemed a particularly important factor. Although

the losses were not easily documented, the airmen believed that their connection

with an inadequate munitions supply was direct and real.52 Surprisingly, General

McConnell downplayed the importance of the munitions shortage, informing a

Senate Committee on May 9 that the problem was overblown and could be rectified

with better munitions management. His was a minority view, however.53

Circumventing Bad Weather with MSQ–77 Radar

More measurable was the impact of bad flying weather on bombing, especially during April and May. Normally, the monsoon over North Vietnam began

to abate in the spring, but in 1966 the rain, drizzle, and overcast conditions lingered for many weeks. In fact, May proved to be the worst month, illustrated

by sorties scheduled, canceled, and adjudged ineffective (figure 11).

Figure 11

Sortie Effectiveness

April, May, and June 1966

($($.*$. $$
$*$. $BB$=$

'
 '
 '
 '
 '
 '


#* '+& +/ A/ /A & 
A

1
! +/' + "A& A' &" 
A

2$ +%& '+%% A' A' +%"' 
A

In April, poor weather led to canceled operations for the following numbers

of Air Force aircraft: 247 F–4Cs, 397 F–105s, and 1 F–100; in May, 743 F–4Cs,

1,060 F–105s, 18 A–1Es, and 30 B–57s; and in June, 196 F–4Cs, 130 F–105s,

14 A–1Es, 8 B–57s, and 12 F–104s. There are no comparable Navy figures.
266

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

* A total of six MSQ–77 radar ground installations were activated on the following dates:

Bien Hoa and Pleiku, South Vietnam, in April and May 1966, respectively; Nakhon

Phanom, Thailand, and Dong Ha, South Vietnam, on June 3 and 12, 1966; and Da Lat and

Binh Thuy, South Vietnam, on September 26, 1966 and April 3, 1967. See Van Staaveren,

USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966 (USAF Hist

Div Liaison Ofc, Jan 68), p 28.

The Navy flew fewer sorties over the north during the period mainly because,

beginning in April, 30 or more sorties per day were diverted from route packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B to General Westmoreland’s extended battlefield areas in

route package 1 and in Laos.54

To reduce the impact of poor flying weather, the services continued to introduce new bombing methods and equipment. In March 1966, Seventh Air Force

pilots began employing the radar pathfinder buddy bombing technique

described earlier, in which a formation of B–57, F–105, or F–4C strike aircraft,

flying at 15,000 feet or higher was led by a B–66B pathfinder, and the

pathfinder’s navigator determined the bomb release point for the formation

using a K–5 bombing navigation system.

Early in June, combat pilots flying in route package 1 began relying on a

new MSQ–77 radar system nicknamed Combat Skyspot, using special radar

instruments in the aircraft and at ground installations at Nakhon Phanom,

Thailand, and Dong Ha, South Vietnam. The same system had been introduced

two months earlier in South Vietnam to assure more accurate close air support

and B–52 strikes.*55

Adapted from MSQ–35, a radar bomb scoring system developed by the SAC

which assured more accurate bomb dropping, the MSQ–77 was a pencil beam

X-band radar and operated most effectively in conjunction with an

SST–181 X-band beacon in an aircraft. Measuring about four inches on each

side, the beacon received, amplified, and returned the signal from the MSQ–77.

This greatly improved the navigation of both tactical and B–52 aircraft, assuring more accurate bombing. Without an SST–181 beacon aboard, the MSQ–77

radar could track an aircraft 40 to 50 miles using a “skin paint” technique; with

the beacon, tracking could be extended upwards of 196 nautical miles. This

would permit Skyspot bombing in the first three route packages, but left route

packages 4, 5, 6A and 6B and northern Laos beyond the radar’s range.56

Although an advance over other navigation and bombing systems, the MSQ–77

system was not without its limitations. Both the radar and associated UHF communications, on which MSQ–77 operations largely depended, were based on the

line-of-sight principal. For the radar, this meant that operations were affected by

the curvature of the Earth, or any obstacles between the radar site and airborne aircraft. For UHF communications, reliability generally did not exceed 140 nautical

miles. The MSQ–77 system could control only one flight at a time against a single

target. A five minute lapse was necessary before another flight could be con-
267

ROLLING THUNDER 50

trolled, and if the radar operator switched to another target, another five minutes

were required in order to return to the original flight. Finally, an aircraft had to fly

straight and level to ensure precision bombing using the radar system.57 The results

of the first month’s use of MSQ–77 radar bombing in route package 1, totaling

fifty-six strikes, could not be determined readily as cloud cover or darkness frustrated efforts to obtain good bomb damage assessment photography.

However, more than two month’s experience with the Skyspot system in

South Vietnam was encouraging. There, combat aircraft dropped ordnance

safely within 1,000 yards of friendly troops, and tests showed that this figure

could be reduced considerably. Skyspot promised to replace flareships and the

B–66B pathfinders. By the beginning of July, 1966, General Westmoreland was

sufficiently confident of the new radar bombing system to report that the

pathfinders were no longer needed in southern North Vietnam.58

Countering the North’s Air Defense System

While bad weather hindered or made bombing impossible, the north’s growing antiaircraft defense capabilities continued to take a high toll of aircraft and

aircrews. Figure 12 shows the numbers of Air Force, Navy, and VNAF aircraft

destroyed or damaged for the period April to June 1966.59

Figure 12

Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged

April, May, and June 1966

#* 1
! 2$

7( 7 7( 7 7( 7

6( '   /  

6(  "  ' & &

6(1 % % % % % %

 % %  % % 

With few exceptions, automatic weapons and antiaircraft artillery accounted

for all of the enemy-inflicted aircraft attrition. Route 6A was a particularly hazardous area where the Air Force, flying relatively few sorties, lost five F–105s.

The firing intensity was measurable. Prior to the bombing halt that began on

December 24, 1965, one mission in twelve received enemy fire; in April the ratio
268

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

was one mission in four. The Air Force’s monthly rate of aircraft loss (for every

1,000 combat sorties flown) was also rising. In February 1966, the rate was .0004,

in March, .0034, and in April, .0037. The Navy began to experience a rate increase

in April when it rose to .0035, almost matching that suffered by the Air Force.60

The north’s inventory of conventional antiaircraft weapons also continued

to grow. At the end of April, Air Force analysts made the following estimate

of the active antiaircraft order of battle: automatic weapons, 672; 37-mm and

57-mm guns, 1,425; and 85-mm guns, 555. At the end of April, analysts plotted about 13,891 antiaircraft sites in the north, of which 4,047 were considered

to be occupied.61

Conversely, the direct SA–2 SAM threat to Air Force and Navy pilots continued to fall. By mid-1966, of 376 U.S. aircraft lost in the north since the air

war began, no more than 15 to 18 were shot down by SAMs. On March 31,

General McConnell testified before a House Armed Services Committee that

anti-SAM techniques had “reduced the effectiveness of the [SA–2 SAMs] and

are expected to reduce it further.” He added that the SAMs had not prevented

any strikes against authorized targets in the north.62

The Hanoi regime’s effort to construct more SAM sites and import more

SAM equipment and missiles had by no means peaked. By July 5, 1966 (the

last day of Rolling Thunder 50), about 115 sites had been detected and SA–2

firing battalions were believed to number between 20 and 25. This compared

with 99 confirmed and suspected sites and 12 to 15 firing battalions at the end

of 1965. U.S. pilots reported at least 24 single firings in May and 31 in June,

but all missiles failed to score. The last confirmed SAM downing of an Air

Force plane had occurred on April 24.63

MSQ–77 Combat Skyspot facilities at Dong Ha, South Vietnam.
269

ROLLING THUNDER 50

* An experimental F-105F Wild Weasel II model, with homing and warning equipment

mounted in the wing tips rather than in the fuselage, proved unsatisfactory. 

The relative ineffectiveness of the SAMs could be attributed to a series of

evolving countermeasures. These consisted of Iron Hand missions (with

accompanying Air Force EB–66Cs, EB–66Bs, and F–100Fs as well as Navy

EA–3s and Marine EF–10Bs, all variously equipped to detect or jam SAM

radar emissions); pilots alerted to SAM firings (and MiG approaches) by Air

Force EC–121Ds and Navy EC–121Ms, all heavily laden with communications

and electronic gear; and pilot evasion tactics.64

The services were constantly improving their countermeasures by adding

aircraft, better equipment, and refining tactics. In May, the Seventh Air Force’s

inventory of EB–66Bs was increased when five more arrived from the European

theater. This gave the Seventh a total of eight EB–66Bs, in addition to twelve

EB–66Cs. Also in May, the Seventh Air Force received an initial delivery of

two-seat F–105F Wild Weasels from Eglin AFB, Florida. Carrying more sophisticated electronic equipment, these aircraft, known as Wild Weasel IIIs,* began

anti-SAM operations immediately. Six more arrived in June, and all were

assigned to the 388th TFW at Korat airbase in Thailand. The Wild Weasel Is

returned to Eglin soon thereafter, after a change in their mission. Used primarily

North Vietnamese 37-mm antiaircraft artillery gun and crew.
270

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

as SAM hunter-killers in late 1965, by the spring of 1966 their role had changed

to that of SAM and gun radar suppressors flying with the main strike force.65

In April 1966, Wild Weasel aircraft were equipped for the first time with the

Navy’s Shrike AGM–45 air-to-surface missile. The Navy had tested the weapon

in the north in 1965, and in the spring of 1966 improved models arrived in the

war theater. On the 18th, an F–100F Wild Weasel launched the first Shrike

against a SAM site with undetermined results. More firings followed, and near

the end of the month General Moore directed the first Shrike night attack

against a SAM target as a riposte to several SAM night salvoes.66

Although the radars of known or suspected SAM sites were the principal targets for the Shrikes, they were also aimed at radars that controlled conventional

antiaircraft positions. In May, in conjunction with Iron Hand missions, Wild

Weasel aircraft fired fifty-five Shrikes, and in June there were thirty-two

Shrike launches. In May, pilots reported at least one SAM radar and eighteen

gun radars silenced by Shrikes, and in June they reported fifteen radars similarly silenced. Pilots assumed some of the radars and associated equipment

were destroyed or damaged in these attacks, but assumptions were not facts.

Between April 18 and July 15, 1966, the Wild Weasel Is and IIIs launched 107

missiles with only one hit confirmed as against 38 “probables.”67

Although more Wild Weasel IIIs equipped with Shrikes would be deployed

in the ensuing months—plans in April had called for up to 25 percent of

Phantoms and six to eight Thunderchiefs in each F–105 wing to be equipped

with the missile—the problems inherent in Shrike missions were quite apparent

by mid-1966. The missile’s ability to hold SAM and gun radar signals for homAn F–105 carrying a Shrike air-to-surface antiradiation missile.
271

ROLLING THUNDER 50

ing invariably ended when the air defenders, anticipating an air strike, turned off

the signals; and with few exceptions, because of weather or terrain, aircrews

could not visually locate enemy missiles and supporting equipment when a site

had been located electronically. The Shrikes were also in short supply: on May 26,

Shrike allocations to the Air Force were reduced and General Moore was

instructed to conduct launches only against SAM radars.68

Meanwhile, the Air Force was planning to deploy additional EC–121Ds and,

for the first time, KC–135 radio-relay aircraft. These two actions, completed in

the latter half of 1966, promised to enhance further the Air Force’s capability to

alert pilots to SAM firings and MiG approaches.

The best and most frequently used measure against SAM firings, however,

was simple evasion. The most common maneuver was the split-S while descending to a lower altitude or, in airman parlance, hitting the deck. “Our success in

avoiding SAMs,” Admiral Sharp reported at the end of April 1966, “has been

almost entirely due to the fact [tactical aircraft pilots] have been able to take rapid

evasive action...after receiving electronic intelligence warnings or seeing a missile approaching....This prevented a SAM Fan Song radar lock-on to aircraft and

the missiles usually detonated above them causing little or no damage. B–52

bombers, conversely, lacked maneuverability and this was why they should not

be sent deeply into North Vietnam and risk being shot down by a SAM.”69

An air-to-surface missile launched by an F–105 at a missile site.
272

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

The diminishing direct threat of the SAMs was underlined on July 5, the last

day of Rolling Thunder 50, when launching units fired at least twenty-six of the

weapons against attacking aircraft northwest of Hanoi and failed to score a hit.

Nonetheless, the SAMs continued to have a disruptive effect on operations and

indirectly increased aircraft attrition. Col. William H. Holt, commander of the

355th Wing observed in mid-1966:70

Although the loss rate to SAMs is relatively low compared to missiles

fired, the SAMs are foiling the...strike plan and forcing the fighters

down into range of other defenses. Strike aircraft are then susceptible to

fire by all caliber guns; the attack plan is disrupted and additional fuel is

consumed in reforming the attack.

Hanoi’s third arm of air defense, its MiG fighters, had caused few problems

before March 1966. Anticipating another surge of MiG activity, Admiral Sharp

and his PACAF and Navy component commanders and the SAC commander

had prepared a two-option strike plan against the major MiG airfields.

According to option one, if administration authorities approved, the Air Force

and Navy would strike the Phuc Yen and Kep airfields, where most MiGs were

based. Under option two, twenty-five or thirty B–52s loaded with 750-pound

Surprised by an RF–101 reconnaissance aircraft, North

Vietnamese gunners run to man their gun positions. 
273

ROLLING THUNDER 50

bombs and BLU–3s would hit the airfields in a single low-level night attack.

The bomber strikes would be followed by Air Force and Navy tactical “mopping

up” sorties to destroy any MiGs remaining on any airfields.71

Because the airfields were within the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area,

administration authorities refused to approve either strike option despite a

series of strong MiG challenges that began in late April. From the 23d until the

end of the month, thirty-nine to forty MiGs periodically tried to break up

Rolling Thunder missions. In each instance, they were intercepted by F–4C

Phantoms and, in several air-to-air battles, Air Force aircrews downed six MiGs

without a loss.72

The encounter on the 23d was triggered while four Phantoms of the 555th

TFS of the 8th TFW were flying cover for F–105 Thunderchief flights en route

to bomb the Bac Giang highway and rail bridge about twenty-five miles northeast

of Hanoi. Phantom aircrews suddenly detected by radar four MiG–17s fifteen

miles away. The planes met nearly head-on, then quickly engaged each other in

a series of left-turning maneuvers at 10,000 to 18,000 feet. At first, neither side

scored a hit. Then, Capt. Max F. Cameron and 1st Lt. Robert E. Evans shot

down a MiG and Capt. Robert E. Blake and 1st Lt. S. W. George in a second

Phantom scored on another. Throughout the battle, the MiG pilots fired several

times but were unable to hit the Phantoms.73

Three days later, a flight of three Phantoms, flying cover for an EB–66 on

an electronic countermeasures mission, were attacked by three MiG–21s. In the

engagement that ensued—the first in the war with the more advanced Sovietbuilt aircraft—Maj. Paul J. Gilmore and 1st Lt. William T. Smith downed one

of the enemy fighters with a Sidewinder. The two men had to disengage when

A MiG–17 shortly after

being hit by cannon fire

from an F–105, with

flames starting to emerge

at the left wing root.
274

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

low fuel forced them to return to their base. Aircrew reports that the enemy

aircraft possibly had Chinese markings were quickly discounted by high administration officials.74

Two MiG–17s were destroyed on April 29 when Phantom aircrews of the

555th TFW, again flying MiG combat air patrol for a strike on the Bac Giang

railroad and highway bridge, engaged the attackers north of the target area.

Capt. William B. P. Dowell and 1st Lt. Hulbert Cossard downed one of the aircraft with a Sidewinder, while a second aircrew, Capt. Larry R. Keith and 1st

Lt. Robert A. Bleakley, outmaneuvered another MiG, forcing its pilot to crash

from about 2,500 feet. The enemy pilot, they conjectured, either lost control of

his aircraft or attempted a split-S maneuver at insufficient altitude.75

The third battle occurred on April 30. A flight of four Phantoms was flying

combat air patrol for an air rescue mission about 100 miles west and northwest

of Hanoi. Two of the Phantoms had just completed midflight refueling while

the other two were about to begin. At that moment, four MiG–17s, flying out

of the sun and obviously hoping to catch the two Phantoms with low fuel, dove

in for the attack. But Capt. Lawrence H. Goldberg and 1st Lt. Gerald D.

Hargrove spotted the MiGs at about five miles. Calculating that they had

enough fuel for a quick fight, they fired one Sidewinder that shot up a MiG

tailpipe and exploded, destroying the aircraft. Goldberg and Hargrove then

quickly returned to their base at Udorn, landing with only 400 pounds of fuel.76

For the next eleven days, the North Vietnamese Air Force was fairly quiet.

Then, on May 12, an engagement took place that erupted into controversy.

According to Air Force aircrews, the incident began when four MiG–17s

jumped an electronic countermeasures mission, consisting of an EB–66 and

three escorting F–4Cs, in the northern sector of North Vietnam. The aerial battle

was precipitated when one of the MiGs headed for the EB–66 but was intercepted by an F–4 flown by Maj. William B. Dudley and 1st Lt. Imants

Kringelis. As the MiG maneuvered towards the aircraft, the Dudley-Kringelis

team unleashed a Sidewinder that missed as the MiG descended in what

appeared to be a split-S maneuver for the purpose of regaining an offensive

position. The Phantom aircrew fired a second Sidewinder as the MiG rolled out

from behind the Destroyer. This time the missile flew into the MiG’s tailpipe,

destroying the plane. The pilot was not seen ejecting or parachuting and was

presumed killed. The other Phantoms and MiGs continued the aerial duel a

while longer, then both sides withdrew without further losses.77

The Peking government immediately claimed that five American fighters

had penetrated its air space and fired guided missiles at several Chinese aircraft

flying a training mission, with one missile downing an aircraft. The battle

reportedly took place northeast of Makwan (about twenty miles north of North

Vietnam’s border) in Yunnan Province at 1617 local time. A Peking spokesman

warned: “This is an extremely grave incident, a deliberate systematic act of provocation by the Johnson administration.” Before the month was out, the Chinese
275

ROLLING THUNDER 50

published photographs showing fragments of a Sidewinder missile and auxiliary

fuel tanks. The tanks were marked Mfg by Argent Fletcher Company, El Monte,

California. Meanwhile, the Air Force and administration officials launched

separate investigations that led to tightened Air Force “MiG Watch” and border

warning and control.78

June witnessed three more MiG engagements, two involving the Navy, one

involving the Air Force. The first occurred on June 12, when four MiG–17s jumped

a Navy strike force. One MiG pilot, allowing himself to be attacked from the classic 6 o’clock position, was pursued immediately by a Navy pilot armed with

Sidewinders. The first missile failed to connect, but the second struck and disabled

the aircraft. The enemy pilot lost control and crashed with the plane. A second MiG

was damaged, but not downed when hit by 20-mm fire. On June 21, several

MiG–17s attacked two Navy F–8 Crusaders on combat air patrol for a downed

Crusader pilot, and a dogfight ensued. One of the Navy pilots fired a Sidewinder

that detonated near the tail of a MiG causing it to spiral downward, trailing black

smoke, presumably crashing. The victor, flying with barely 200 pounds of fuel,

then rendezvoused quickly with an aerial tanker and returned to a carrier.79

On June 29, a flight of four F–105s, completing an Iron Hand SAM suppression mission northwest of Hanoi, was attacked by four MiG–17s. After one

MiG fired, the Thunderchief pilots took evasive action, pursued by all four

enemy aircraft. As the American pilots jettisoned their ordnance and went to

afterburners, one of the MiGs fired again, this time scoring several hits on the

Kep airfield, North Vietnam, with an RF–101 above it.
276

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

plane piloted by Maj. Fred L. Tracy. One 23-mm slug entered Tracy’s cockpit,

knocking his hand off the throttle, putting him out of afterburner, and damaging his gunsight, oxygen equipment, and other instruments. The attacking pilot

overshot his American adversary and appeared suddenly at Tracy’s 12 o’clock

position. Tracy fired two hundred rounds from his 20-mm cannon and observed

about ten hits. The MiG rolled over, flew a split-S at about two thousand feet,

and crashed. Although Tracy left the battle area immediately, the fight was not

over. A second MiG and two Thunderchiefs now engaged. The enemy plane

scored once, and one Thunderchief pilot responded with two bursts of cannonfire but made no hits. This ended the dogfights. Tracy was credited with downing a MiG, the first F–105 pilot to do so.80

Despite the North Vietnamese Air Force’s lack of success, it possessed

ample aircraft at the end of June 1966. There were still fifty MiG–15s and

MiG–17s and thirteen MiG–21s poised for action at Kep and Phuc Yen airfields. In South Vietnam, commanders continued to wonder if Hanoi intended

to attack with the six Il–28 bombers at Phuc Yen.81

Improving MiG Watch and Border Patrol

The Peking government’s allegation that its air space was violated by American fighters on May 12 prompted General Harris to order a thorough review

of the incident. When questioned, aircrews associated with the mission insisted

that there had been no border violation. At no time, they said, did they receive a

warning of a SAM firing, approaching MiGs, or an alert that they were crossing

China’s border. Nor did the aircrews consider their navigation maps deficient.82

Unconvinced, Defense Secretary McNamara directed the Joint Chiefs to dispatch a special JCS team to South Vietnam and Thailand to conduct another

investigation. The Joint Chiefs quickly appointed USAF Brig. Gen. Robert G.

Owens of the JCS J-3 Operations Staff to head a team that included representatives of the Air Staff and the National Security Agency. As the team’s preliminary

findings pointed to a likely border violation, General Moore in Saigon took

actions to assure closer Air Force and Navy coordination of their airborne control systems, tightened rules for fighter escorts of reconnaissance aircraft, issued

new instructions for maintaining radio discipline, and explored the possibility

of providing combat pilots with additional radios.83

The Owens report was completed in late May 1966 and concluded that “in

all probability,” because of a navigation error, an Air Force EB–66 and accompanying Phantom fighters had indeed entered China’s air space on May 12. On

June 9, General McConnell sent a special Air Force team, headed by Col.

Charles E. Williams Jr., to Southeast Asia to conduct a thorough study of the

reliability of the Air Force’s command and control system for aircraft over

North Vietnam. Before the Williams group had completed its study in South

Vietnam and Thailand, the Peking government alleged that its border had again
277

ROLLING THUNDER 50

been violated by American aircraft, on June 29. As on May 12, the offenders

were an EB–66 with three accompanying F–4C Phantoms. This time, the border crossing was verified by the EB–66’s own photography, again causing

alarm within the administration. Vice Adm. Lloyd M. Mustin, the JCS’s

Director of Operations, informed USAF Lt. Gen. Paul S. Emerick, PACOM’s

Chief of Staff, that the second incident created “extraordinary sensitivity” at

high Washington levels and would impair service efforts to obtain future

approval for attacks on important targets and for armed reconnaissance closer

to China’s border.84

The Williams team returned to Washington on July 6 and submitted its findings

to General McConnell, the JCS, and the Air Staff. The team’s major recommendation called for the establishment of an improved communications radio

relay center in South Vietnam for receiving and correlating all aerial combat

data, such as possible border violations, MiG approaches, and SA–2 firings.

Because “lead time” was needed to procure all these items, the center, consisting of three interlocking installations, would be established in three phases: an

improved central reporting system and relay center at Na Tra (or Monkey

Mountain) about six miles northeast of Da Nang by July 15; a new manual

Tactical Air Control Center at Na Tra by September 15; and a semiautomatic

data processing and display facility at both Monkey Mountain and Udorn by

September 1967. Other improvements would be added as warranted.85

The team also took three supporting actions. The first called for two more

EC–121D airborne battlefield command and control center aircraft to augment

the SAM firing and MiG surveillance and warning system. Two new high orbits

would be maintained over the Gulf of Tonkin and Laos to supplement the low

EC–121D orbits instituted in 1965. Second, specially-equipped KC–135s

should be used over the north for radio relay operations at 35,000 feet. The converted SAC tankers would be equipped with ARC–89, 250-Watt UHF automatic

relay equipment with a minimum of four communications channels. Two aircraft would be needed to ensure twelve-hour coverage and, if necessary, five

could provide twenty-four-hour coverage. Finally, there would be procedural

changes in flashing warnings to combat aircraft of possible violations within

the border buffer zone.86

Following the second border violation on June 29, the JCS requested that the

Air Force implement the recommendations made by the Williams team. The Air

Force complied, assigning the nickname Combat Lighting to the project. Two

KC–135s were equipped with communications gear and, on September 10, 1966,

the JCS directed their deployment with aircrews and support personnel to

U-Tapao whenever the Thai government agreed. As an interim measure, they

were based at Kadena AB, Okinawa, from where they flew their first missions

over the north in September.87
An underground petroleum storage area burning

after strikes by F–105s in June 1966.
279

* See Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 10

The POL Strikes

On June 29, 1966, Air Force and Navy commanders began attacking a number of the north’s major petroleum, oil, and lubricant storage areas. President

Johnson’s decision authorizing the attacks ended more than two years of intense

debate between the services and high civilian officials over the value of these targets to the north’s war effort and the possible political consequences at home and

abroad of their destruction. The most important POL storage sites were located

within the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area, making them highly sensitive.

The POL Debate

The significance of POL targets in the north had been discussed by services

and administration officials since the early 1960s, but a concerted effort to win

authorization to destroy them did not begin until May 1964. At that time,

General LeMay fashioned a JCS recommendation that called for attacks on all

POL and other significant targets as soon as possible and was quickly sent to

Secretary McNamara. The Defense Secretary’s response was to ask the Joint

Chiefs to prepare a list of key targets in the north. In June 1964, the JCS completed the list, which included thirteen important POL storage and facility

installations.* Administration officials did not permit strikes on any targets on

the list until March 1965, when they authorized Rolling Thunder operations. To

avoid escalating the bombing too rapidly, officials ordered Air Force and Navy

commanders to limit interdiction to southernmost North Vietnam and to move

the bomb line northward gradually.

In subsequent months, a limited number of the JCS-designated targets were

struck, but none within or above the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area or near

China. By the end of October 1965, only four of thirteen key POL targets had

been attacked.1

Convinced that all of the POL sites could be destroyed without undue political risk, in November 1965, the JCS made clear to Secretary McNamara

Hanoi’s growing dependency on fuel supplies. The country’s POL imports to

date totaled about 170,000 tons, valued at $4.8 million, almost all of it shipped

from the Black Sea area in the Soviet Union. After delivery to Haiphong, the

only port with facilities for handling large oil tankers, the fuel was stored at

that port in large tank farms, then transported by road, rail, and waterway to

Hanoi and other areas of the country. The regime’s reliance on POL revealed

itself in increasing use of motorized watercraft and vehicles on an expanding

network of small roads in North Vietnam and Laos. Thus, the destruction of
280

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

storage areas would more seriously damage North Vietnam’s capability to move

resources within the country and along infiltration routes than any other single

large system.2

Figure 13

Storage Capacity of Major North Vietnamese POL Installations 

1964–1966 

&%(% #%$")

2%"%(4


# '+%%


 +'%


 +%%%

5$ +%%%

!$3$ +%%%


  +%%%

F %+%%%

 %+%%%

	
7
 +%%%

( +%%%

$ +%%%


 +%%%

3$# &%%

 9


Source: Msg, ADMINO CINCPAC TO JCS, 310121Z Jul 66.

Of the nine remaining key storage areas, the Joint Chiefs recommended

attacking the one at Haiphong first. This would require about 336 strike and 80 flak

suppression sorties. The cost would be about ten aircraft, some light collateral

damage to the surrounding area, and fewer than fifty casualties. The operations

should not be delayed, as Hanoi was strengthening its air defenses around the

areas and dispersing supplies. Recent aerial photography of the Hanoi vicinity,

they said, showed that the North Vietnamese were working around the clock

burying groups of sixteen to twenty storage tanks with only vents and filling

apparatus protruding above ground. Photography also disclosed considerable

drum storage activity.3
281

THE POL STRIKES

However, U.S. intelligence offices and agencies did not share the services’

conviction of the importance of the POL storage areas and the need to attack

them quickly. In late 1965, the U.S. Board of National Estimates did not anticipate that VC-NVA activities in South Vietnam would be crippled if Hanoi lost

its principal POL storage and distribution centers. The Board predicted that if

the centers were bombed the Hanoi government would become more firmly

entrenched, both in military terms and with respect to negotiations, and the

bombing would be interpreted by the government and its communist allies as

“a conspicuous change in the ground rules” for waging the war. A Special

National Intelligence Estimate and a CIA intelligence analysis in December

1965 were inclined to favor more bombing of POL and other targets, but concluded the military impact would not last long. Individually, both reports stated

that, at worst, Hanoi might find it more difficult to carry on the war and be

forced to limit its support to the VC-NVA fighting in the south. The CIA

doubted that the destruction of the major POL installations would readily

undermine the determination of Hanoi’s leaders to continue the war:

Although there presumably is a point at which one or more turns of the

screw would crack the enemy resistance to negotiations, past experience

indicates that we are unlikely to have clear evidence when that point has

been reached.4

Some petroleum was dispersed by storing it underground. Here, an

underground petroleum storage facility is under construction.
282

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Asked by McNamara to comment on the CIA’s conclusion, in January 1966

General Wheeler reiterated the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs in

November 1965. He said that the destruction of the major POL centers would

have a “substantial impact” on the Hanoi regime’s present and future military

operations in the south, and compel it to rely largely on animals, porters, and

motorless watercraft to move supplies. Wheeler went on to assert that the

regime’s dependency on POL was particularly evident in its inventory of

10,000 to 12,000 trucks and its request for 3,700 more from its Soviet allies.

Although the U.S. services had destroyed about 800 trucks in the north in 1965,

the losses were offset by imports of about 2,000.5

President Johnson’s decision to suspend Rolling Thunder operations on

December 24, 1965, to observe a thirty-hour Christmas truce stretched into an

unsuccessful thirty-seven-day diplomatic initiative to convince Hanoi to begin

negotiations. During the hiatus, the POL discussions were subsumed into

the wider issue of the scope and tempo of future Rolling Thunder attacks.

On January 8 and 18, 1966, the Joint Chiefs, strongly backed by all Southeast

Asia commanders, urged McNamara to resume bombing with a “sharp blow”

against the major POL, industrial, and other such targets if negotiations failed.

However, when the President reinstituted the Rolling Thunder campaign on

January 31, he sanctioned only armed reconnaissance missions below the 20th

parallel for both political and military reasons.6

The President’s decision to constrict Rolling Thunder operations brought

no surcease in the debate over the major POL sites. On February 4, a special

National Intelligence Estimate reaffirmed its earlier assessment that the destruction of the fuel facilities, as well as power plants and port targets, would not

bring the country to its knees. According to the estimate, the loss of POL storage facilities could be readily offset by POL tankers unloading at Chan Ching

in South China, from where the fuel could be transported by rail to North

Vietnam’s border, and from there by truck to Hanoi and elsewhere.

Alternatively, POL supplies could also be moved by rail from the Soviet Union

to Chan Ching and then shipped down the coast in shallow-draft boats.7

The highly restricted Rolling Thunder campaign continued through February and March 1966. During this two-month period, Generals Harris and

Westmoreland, Admiral Sharp, other Southeast Asia commanders, and the Joint

Chiefs again requested approval from the administration for strikes on important

targets that had hitherto escaped bombing. The Joint Chiefs addressed the subject frequently in memoranda to Secretary McNamara. On March 1, they

observed that striking POL sites remained “the highest priority action not yet

approved.” On the 10th, they appealed for authority to strike all important POL

installations and the principal road and rail routes from China and to close

Haiphong port by mining its waters.8

McNamara and other high officials rejected the military services’ requests until

late March, although there were indications that they soon planned to approve
283

THE POL STRIKES

somewhat expanded bombing operations. The Defense Secretary’s position appears

to have been influenced by a change in the CIA’s assessment of the progress of the

war. In a new report, issued the same month, the agency—surprisingly—advocated

intensified air attacks on the north, including the destruction of eight major POL

storage facilities that had “a direct bearing” on Hanoi’s ability to support the war in

the south. In conversations with General Wheeler on March 21 and 23 concerning

more air power for General Westmoreland’s extended battlefield area, the Defense

Secretary signaled that he was now inclined to allow striking important POL and

other targets during the next bombing program, tentatively designated Rolling

Thunder 50 and scheduled to begin on April 1.9

Gratified by the Defense Secretary’s sudden support of heavier bombing—

on condition that General Westmoreland’s air needs would have first air priority—Wheeler requested, and Sharp quickly submitted, a new bombing scenario

for destroying the key POL storage and distribution facilities. The PACOM

commander challenged earlier intelligence analyses that played down the

importance of POL to the north’s warmaking capability:10

I believe some influential views recently put forward understate [the]

difficulty [the] enemy would have in mitigating [the] effects of [a] determined POL campaign. For example, [the] view that storage facilities at

Haiphong are not required in order to pump POL to users on shore simply

cannot be substantiated. Recently, [the] CIA estimated that bulk POL

supplies could be lightened ashore as required, but we know from experience that offloading of public POL to lighters and then to shore is quite

an operation. Storage facilities of some kind are required. Drumming

operations take time and effort at each facility. Points where POL transfer

must take place are more easily found by photoreconnaissance than many

other types of activity. Even if POL is brought in already drummed, the

offloading process would be tedious and time-consuming, and susceptible

to disruption by armed reconnaissance.

Using Sharp’s scenario, the Joint Chiefs assembled their recommended “bombing package” for the north. McNamara quickly endorsed it, and urged the President

to do likewise, observing that the package included nine new JCS-designated

targets, of which seven were key POL storage and distribution facilities, representing 70 to 80 percent of such facilities in the country. The Defense Secretary still

believed that the destruction of the major POL sites would have less military

impact than the service chiefs assumed. The losses, he said, would not cripple the

regime as it possessed other POL stores, and it had recently doubled its POL orders

with the Soviet Union. Still, Hanoi’s overall military effort was bound to suffer.11

By late March, President Johnson appears to have concluded that attacks on

the key POL and other targets near Hanoi and Haiphong could now be undertaken with minimum risk of expanding the war. However, renewed political
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strife in South Vietnam, triggered by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky’s removal of

General Nguyen Chanh Thi, Commander of South Vietnam’s I Corps, and new

diplomatic efforts in the ensuing weeks by the United Nations, Great Britain,

and Canada to end the war delayed the President’s decision until late June. In

the intervening weeks, pressure to strike the POL sites continued to mount.12

Approval of a few POL Strikes

On April 1, 1966, Walt W. Rostow succeeded McGeorge Bundy as the President’s Special Adviser on National Security Affairs. A noted student of international economic and political affairs, Mr. Rostow agreed with the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that the destruction of the north’s major POL sites could seriously cripple the communists’ war effort. On May 6, he personally urged

Secretaries McNamara and Rusk to back a quick assault on the targets, citing

the impact of POL bombing in Germany in World War II:

From the moment that serious and systematic oil attacks started, front

line single fighter strength and tank ability was affected. The reason was

this: it proved more difficult, in the face of general oil shortage, to allocate

from less important to more important uses than the simple arithmetic of

the problem would suggest. Oil moves in various logistic channels from

central sources. When the central sources began to dry up, the effects

proved fairly prompt and widespread. What look like reserves statistically are rather inflexible commitments to logistic pipelines.

With an understanding that simple analogies are dangerous, I nevertheless feel it is quite possible the military effects of a systematic and sustained

bombing of POL in North Vietnam may be more prompt and direct than

conventional intelligence analysis would suggest. I would underline, however, the adjectives “systematic” and “sustained.” If we take this step, we

must cut clean through the POL system—and hold the cut—if we are looking for decisive results. 

Earlier, he added, the United States calculated that 60 percent of the north’s

POL supplies were used for military purposes and 40 percent for the civilian

sector, but that had grown to an estimated 80 percent of POL supplies for military use. Thus, Hanoi possessed only a small POL supply “cushion.” Three days

after Rostow dispatched his letter, General McConnell, a vigorous advocate of

knocking out all POL sites, told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee that

hitting the sites would have a “substantial” effect on the amount of supplies that

the North Vietnamese could send to their forces in South Vietnam.13

President Johnson apparently believed that attacks on the north’s entire POL

system could not be delayed much longer, yet he was hesitant to flash the order

to do so. The internal strife in South Vietnam still simmered and several foreign
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diplomatic initiatives to slow or halt the war were under way. Near the end of

May, he decided he could risk a series of strikes on six less important storage

areas south of Hanoi. At about the same time, he informed his closest European

ally, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, of his intent to bomb all of the major

POL sites. But a new series of events—often marked by high drama—would

delay the first attack on several major POL sites for another month.14

The usually supportive British Prime Minister quickly asked the President

not to proceed with the POL assault. He warned that it would be construed

abroad as further escalation of the war. The political disadvantages would far

outweigh the military benefits and intensify the criticism by, and the disquiet

among the United States’ European allies. If the attacks were undertaken, he

said, Britain would have to dissociate itself from the operations. The President

tried (but failed) to change the Prime Minister’s position.15

On May 31, Air Force and Navy fighter-bombers rained bombs on six dispersed

sites in and around Vinh, Phuc Loi, Da Loc, Yen Duong, and Phu Qui, all located

below Hanoi. These strikes and others on non-POL targets accounted for 313 sorties

over North Vietnam, the largest number in one day since Rolling Thunder operations began in March 1965. Five days later, General Westmoreland asked Admiral

Sharp and General Wheeler to maintain the air pressure. Citing an improved political situation in South Vietnam, he said the time was “ripe” for a “telling blow”

against eight key POL storage sites at Haiphong, Hanoi, Nguyen Khe, Phuc Yen,

Bac Giang, Don Son, Viet Tri, and Duong Nham. Further delay would reduce the

bombing impact because of Hanoi’s continuing dispersal activities.16

Admiral Sharp quickly endorsed Westmoreland’s plea and, in a second cable

to the Joint Chiefs, stressed the vital importance of destroying all of the major

targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The attacks, he averred, would have a “critical impact” on Hanoi at the moment its forces were about to launch another

campaign in the south from their Laotian and Cambodian bases. Ambassador

Lodge in Saigon also dispatched a cable to Washington, asserting that the present level of bombing was having an adverse effect on Hanoi and that heavier

air strikes might force its leaders to come to the negotiating table. At the same

time, Air Force intelligence analysts speculated that the destruction of the

major POL targets would have a most profound impact on Hanoi’s infiltration

capability and could be conducted without severe civilian losses.17

By June 10, President Johnson was ready to give air commanders the goahead for strikes against the key POL sites and a few other JCS-designated

targets. In the Pentagon, John McNaughton, the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Internal Security Affairs, had drafted a series of papers for release on the

day of the operations, the JCS sent an “execute” message to CINCPAC, State

Department sent cables to U.S . allies and “third countries” explaining the reasons for the strikes, and a public announcement of the bombings and “talking”

papers were prepared for the use of high officials. However, a new political

development again delayed the attacks.18
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The Canadian Foreign Office informed the State Department that it had asked

Chester Ronning, a retired Canadian ambassador, to make a second visit to Hanoi

from June 14 to 18 to explore again the possibility of persuading Hanoi’s leaders

to negotiate with the United States. Secretary Rusk, who happened to be in Europe

and approved of the Canadian initiative, immediately advised President Johnson

to hold the POL strikes in abeyance. The President agreed. Both wished to avoid

accusations by domestic and foreign critics of the war that the administration had

struck sensitive targets deliberately to sabotage the Ronning mission.19

The strike postponement did not halt the frantic planning for the attacks. On

June 13, McNamara informed Admiral Sharp that the initial strikes would be

limited to four new targets: the two POL sites at Hanoi and Haiphong and a

thermal power plant and a cement plant in Haiphong. However, final approval

was contingent on the ability of American pilots to keep civilian casualties low.

How many casualties would there be? What could be done to limit them?20

Vice Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin, Chief of the Joint Staff’s operations section

responsible for working out the tactical details of the proposed attack, made sure

that Sharp had no doubt about the administration’s profound concern over civilian

losses. For example, a Joint Staff study projected about 48 casualties in bombing

eleven POL targets, but CIA analysts concluded there might be up to 300. General

Wheeler had already informed White House and State Department officials

through McNamara that the services would minimize losses by employing only

the most experienced pilots, by briefing those pilots extensively, by attacking only

when the weather permitted visual targeting, and by using precision weapons

consistent with mission objectives. “We know these [instructions]...are completely nauseous and tell you how to blow your nose,” said Mustin, “but they

were prepared as a ‘sacrifice’ to obtain strike authority.”21

In response to McNamara’s queries about casualties, Sharp indicated that Air

Force and Navy pilots would adhere to the precise tactical guidelines already

conveyed by Wheeler to higher officials and that they would select only the optimum axis of attack and use electronic countermeasures against radar-controlled

SA–2 SAM and antiaircraft guns. Furthermore, air commanders would make

certain that pilots were not distracted by communications not associated with

their mission. Hanoi’s excellent air alert system, the PACOM commander noted,

would assist by giving the populace time to seek cover. All of these measures

should minimize human deaths, which, he believed, would total less than fifty.

McNamara was pleased with Sharp’s response, but asked for, and quickly

received, one additional assurance: that pilots would be extremely cautious while

conducting flak and missile suppression missions.22

On June 15, while Canadian Ambassador Ronning was conferring with Hanoi’s

leaders, President Johnson approved for immediate execution attacks on a different series of targets, all outside of the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area and the

buffer zone bordering China. The three most sensitive targets were two POL sites

at Don Son and Duong Nham, barely ten nautical miles outside of Haiphong, and
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THE POL STRIKES

a radar installation in the vicinity of Kep airfield, northeast of Hanoi. Slightly more

than forty-eight hours later, the President ordered the three targets deleted from

the approved list, although bad weather now delayed the planned air assaults. The

deletion of the POL sites dismayed the service chiefs. General McConnell

believed that the Joint Chiefs should seek another meeting with McNamara in

order to underline the compelling need to attack “all segments of the POL system”

in view of Hanoi’s dispersal activities and the inevitably higher cost in aircraft and

men if there was further delay in destroying the system.23

Meanwhile, Ronning had returned to Ottawa. North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s “negotiating” position, as relayed by Ronning to

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was contradictory. The Prime Minister said his government would come to the conference

table “unconditionally” and not insist, as previously, on U.S. acceptance of his

government’s Four Points, enunciated in April 1965, if the United States

“unconditionally” stopped the bombing, a position in consonance with the Foreign Ministry’s statement of January 4, 1966. Ronning realized that the Foreign

Ministry’s statement, which called upon the United States to halt the bombing

“unconditionally” and to recognize the Four Points as the only basis for peace,

could not be reconciled with the assurances he had just received from Bundy.

He thus concluded, as did administration officials to whom he relayed his conversations with Ronning, that Prime Minister Dong had shown no new flexibility

in his attitude towards peace. Thus, a change in Rolling Thunder planning and

operations was not warranted.24

Dispersed petroleum supplies stored in drums alongside a stream.
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* Pierce Arrow was the code name for the first U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam in

August 1964 in retaliation for patrol boat attacks on two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of

Tonkin. See Chapter 2.

Gradual Expansion of POL Strikes

Thus it was that in a press conference on June 18, President Johnson signaled that heavier bombing in the north was likely. “We must continue to raise

the cost of aggression at its source,” he said, “and this is the sole purpose for

striking selected targets.” Three days later, as weather cleared, Air Force and

Navy commanders again received the go-ahead to attack the dispersed POL

sites and other targets authorized on June 15, minus the sites at Don Son and

Duong Nham, and the radar installation at Kep. Attacks continued daily against

POL sites near Vinh, Yen, Yen Hau, Bai Thuong, Thang Ha, and along routes

1A and 116. Eager to maintain the momentum, Air Force targeters plotted

scores of “truck park/POL sites” for the fighter-bombers, assuming—with considerable justification—that every truck park harbored drums of POL. By now,

the news media was rife with speculation that the major unharmed POL sites

would be next.25

The speculation was well-founded. On June 22, White House and Pentagon

officials were engaged in preparations to bomb the key POL sites and a few other

sensitive targets. Admiral Mustin informed Sharp that the President and

McNamara, were on the phone repeatedly and “have not seen the likes [of this]

since [the] hours preceding, during, and after [the] Pierce Arrow strikes of August

1964.”* The Joint Chiefs operations director attributed the frenetic activity to the

“expected storm of reaction worldwide” and the fear of adverse reactions that

had been “carefully implanted, nurtured, and amplified by those here who oppose

more effective actions against the north.” The latter group, he said, posed “the

greatest danger to hope for future effective action against the north.” Thus, future

bombing approvals would be contingent on the manner in which the decisions of

the President and Defense Secretary were fulfilled. He asked Sharp for “complete, exhaustive, minute details” of the strike operations before, during, and

after their completion and for the data “any hour of the day or night.” No effort

should be spared in keeping McNamara and the President fully informed.26

The President’s decision to proceed with the major bombing strikes was dispatched earlier in the day in a JCS execute directive to Admiral Sharp. The

directive ordered air attacks “at first light” on the 24th against POL storage

sites at Hanoi, Haiphong, Nguyen Khe, Bac Giang, Don Son, Viet Tri, and

Duong Nham, plus the radar station at Kep. There were two pages of detailed

operations guidance. The main instructions called for a surprise attack, no strikes

in marginal weather, no strikes on Sunday, June 26, if weather delayed the

fighter-bombers that long, no attacks on merchant shipping in Haiphong port

(the Russian tanker Komsomol had been discharging its cargo near a POL facility), no attacks on other ships or watercraft unless they fired first and were
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THE POL STRIKES

unmistakably of North Vietnamese registry, and strict adherence to the tactical

guidelines developed in mid-June to minimize civilian casualties.27

As Air Force and Navy commanders and hundreds of their aircrews and supporting airmen remained on alert, the Joint Chiefs flashed another bombing

postponement. This time, a news leak on June 24—the date set for the

attacks—aborted the planned take-offs. Philip Geyelin, a reporter for the Wall

Street Journal, confirmed that the President intended to bomb the POL site at

Haiphong. That evening the essential details of the decision appeared on a Dow

Jones news wire. The Joint Chiefs considered the strike plan “thoroughly

blown.” However, bad weather had descended over the principal targets and, in

all likelihood, would have canceled the attack. The postponed operation left

administration spokesmen highly discomfited. In reply to press inquiries, they

felt compelled to deny the President had made a decision to bomb the fuel

dump at Haiphong. They found it easier to refute a highly erroneous CBS

report that the installation would be struck by B–52 bombers.28

On June 28, Sharp informed Wheeler that favorable flying weather would

permit the POL strikes, that his Air Force and Navy units were ready, and

requested permission to conduct them beginning on the 29th. Wheeler flashed

the President’s approval, reinstating the directive of June 22 and asked that all

messages pertaining to the strikes be sent “Special Category, Exclusive” to

himself and Secretary McNamara.29

Strikes on Major POL Sites Begin

Thus, after several weeks of on-again, off-again decisions, on June 29

Admiral Sharp issued an execute order to his Air Force and Navy commanders.

He instructed the Navy to hit the POL installations at Haiphong, Bac Giang,

Don Son, and Duong Nham and a radar site near Kep airfield and assigned the

Air Force the POL installations at Hanoi, Nguyen Khe, and Viet Tri and a highway and railroad bridge at Viet Tri.30

The Navy led off, not at “first light” as planned, but at 1350 Saigon time on

the 29th because of weather. Sixteen A–6s and twelve support aircraft from the

carriers Constellation and Ranger attacked the Haiphong site where they

dropped one hundred nineteen 250-pound and twenty-four 1,000-pound bombs.

Smaller missions hit the Don Son site, where pilots dropped eighteen 500-pound

and six 250-pound bombs. Both sites escaped extensive destruction as many

bombs fell off target, and the two sites were subsequently targeted for restrikes.31

Twenty-five minutes later, General Moore sent his Seventh Air Force planes

against a POL tank farm three and a half miles from the center of Hanoi. The farm

had a storage capacity estimated at 31,250 metric tons, or roughly 17 percent of

the north’s total POL reserves. Moore dispatched twenty-five strike F–105s,

four EB–66s for electronic countermeasures, eight Iron Hand F–105s to attack

radar-controlled SAMs and antiaircraft guns, and twenty-four F–4Cs and two
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F–104s for combat air patrol and escort. The Thunderchief pilots dropped a total

of 188 750-pound bombs on the storage tanks, triggered many explosions and sent

smoke billowing 35,000 feet above the North Vietnamese capital. When the fires,

smoke, and haze dissipated, only two of thirty-two tanks were left standing,

although all appeared to have burned. The bombing was quite accurate, with about

90 percent of the target area destroyed. Poststrike photography showed only

twenty-two bombs off target, and these fell mostly in rice fields. A few bombs

accidentally destroyed five farming huts located within 300 feet of the storage

area. As a “bonus,” several bombs fell in the southwest corner of the Hanoi army

barracks and supply depot, destroying and damaging four buildings.32

North Vietnam’s air defenders, lying in wait, responded with a heavy barrage of SA–2 SAMs and conventional antiaircraft fire. The SAMs, none of

which scored a hit, were less of a problem than the antiaircraft fire. Air Force

Maj. Hallet F. Marsten, a veteran of 101 missions in Korea and more than 75

missions over North Vietnam, characterized the flak over Hanoi as very severe.

One burst jolted his plane to a 90-degree angle. “It was worse than anything
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THE POL STRIKES

I’ve experienced,” he later told newsmen. By constant “jinking,” or evasive

action, all pilots except Capt. Murphy Neal and his Thunderchief made it back

to their airbases. A group of four MiG–17s also challenged the attackers,

zooming in against several Iron Hand F–105Ds. They paid a price. In a quick

engagement, a plane piloted by Maj. Fred L. Tracy shot down one of the enemy

aircraft, the first MiG “kill” of the war by a Thunderchief pilot.33

Captain Neal successfully ejected from his stricken plane, but he was captured and, according to the Soviet news agency Tass, paraded through the streets

of Hanoi the same night with crowds shouting “down with the imperialists.” He

was then put on display before North Vietnamese and foreign newsmen and

forced to express “contrition” for his “action against the Vietnamese people.”

Predictably, Radio Hanoi charged that the planes bombed indiscriminately and

strafed residential and economic areas, causing human and material losses, but

did not admit the destruction of the POL facilities. A Hanoi spokesman boasted

that the air defenders shot down four planes and captured a number of Americans, but except for Captain Neal, failed to produce evidence that more than

one plane was downed and one pilot captured.34

In Saigon, Maj. Gen. Gilbert Meyers, the deputy commander of the Seventh

Air Force, characterized the strikes at Hanoi and Haiphong as “the most significant, most important of the war.” In Washington, in a turbulent news conference, McNamara justified the POL attacks on the grounds that the Hanoi regime

had increased its reliance on POL, a development clearly manifested by its

expanding use of vehicles and powered junks. Truck movements in the first five

The Hanoi petroleum storage facility shortly after the June 29,

1966, attack, opposite page and above. Strike pilots reported that

flames were12,000 feet high and that smoke rose to 35,000 feet.
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

months of 1966, he said, were double those for the same period in the previous

year and, with continuing truck imports and the construction of more and better

roads, would probably double again by the end of 1966. As a consequence, over

the past year, daily overland supply tonnages increased 150 percent, the infiltration rate increased 120 percent (averaging 4,500 men per month), and the

number of NVA units in South Vietnam increased 100 percent.35

Over the next two days, U.S. pilots returned to hit the remaining key POL

installations. General Moore dispatched two separate missions, each consisting

of twelve F–105 strike and support aircraft, against the POL storage areas at

Nguyen Khe and Viet Tri, seven miles north and twenty-eight miles northwest

of Hanoi. The pilots rained sixty-two 750-pound bombs on the first and thirtytwo on the second, with supporting aircraft plastering antiaircraft positions in

each area with CBU–24 cluster bombs. Only one Thunderchief was damaged

and the pilot, who ejected, was recovered safely. The dual mission proved only

marginally successful, however, destroying only 20 percent of the target area at

Nguyen Khe and 15 percent at Viet Tri.36

On the same day, Navy pilots from the carrier Hancock hit the Bac Giang POL

facility twenty-five miles northeast of Hanoi, and the radar facility at Kep eleven

miles northeast of Bac Giang. Forty-eight 500-pound bombs dropped from eighteen

aircraft largely demolished the POL facility, while twelve aircraft inflicted heavy

damage at Kep. Three radar vans and sixteen support buildings were destroyed.37

Air Force and Navy commanders continued the attacks into July. The Navy

conducted restrikes at the Don Son and Haiphong POL sites, which had escaped

heavy damage in the first attacks, and the Air Force bombed POL facilities

twenty-eight and thirty-three miles north and northeast of Hanoi. By July 11, a

total of twenty-five large and small sites had been struck, with Air Force and Navy

planes dropping ordnance every day but one. Pentagon officials announced that

Damage to the Hanoi petroleum storage facility after the June 29 attack.

Approximately 80 percent of the facility’s capacity was destroyed.
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THE POL STRIKES

80 to 90 percent of the north’s fuel storage areas and facilities had been attacked

and 55 percent of all facilities had been destroyed.38

American officials made no estimate of the civilian casualties caused by the

raids, but considered them small. Hanoi published no figures. But the strikes

hastened the exodus of residents from the two cities, especially Hanoi. Foreign

news sources reported 10,000 residents were leaving the city every day in addition

to an estimated 700,000 residents who had left the capital in previous months.39

As expected, the POL bombings produced major domestic and foreign repercussions. In the United States some congressional supporters of the administration expressed unease about the danger of expanding the conflict, while

well-known critics sharpened their attacks. Senator J. William Fulbright,

Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations, who was holding special hearings on

the war, cited a study prepared by academicians allegedly “proving” that peace

hopes were dashed by U.S. military escalation on seven separate occasions

since the beginning of the war. Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana charged that

the bombings torpedoed Canadian Ambassador Ronning’s mid-June mission to

Hanoi. The United Kingdom, France, India, and other countries disapproved of

the bombings, and there were violent anti-American demonstrations in several

Indian cities, especially in Calcutta, where rioters attacked the U.S. information

building. Peking, Moscow, and all East European countries predictably condemned the POL attacks and issued dark warnings about providing more overt

assistance in the war, vowing unstinting aid to the Hanoi regime.40

Administration spokesmen vigorously defended the military operations. Under

Secretary of State Ball denied that the strikes had frustrated the Canadian peace

initiative, and the State Department observed that twenty-six Free World

nations approved or indicated “understanding” of the action, while only twelve

openly disapproved. State also emphasized that the attacks carefully avoided

populated areas and that the United States did not intend to widen the war.

In contrast, Hanoi was sending more men and supplies to South Vietnam and

refusing to negotiate for peace.

In Des Moines, Iowa on June 30, President Johnson renewed his call for negotiations with Hanoi as “one way to end the killing in the south and the bombing of

the north.” “As long as [Hanoi’s leaders] carry on the war” he warned, “we will persevere. They cannot wear us down and they cannot escape paying a very high price

for their aggression.” Walt W. Rostow, the President’s Special Adviser for National

Security Affairs, sought to allay domestic and foreign concern during a CBS “Face

the Nation” broadcast. He stated that the POL strikes were “wholly consistent”

with past U.S. military efforts to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam,

they were not an attempt “to force North Vietnam to its knees, and they would not

lead to a war with China.” Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of congressional members supported the POL attacks. So did the American public. A

Harris public opinion poll taken on July 11 showed that 62 percent backed the

bombings, 11 percent opposed them, and 27 percent were undecided.41
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The Honolulu Conference, July 1966

With the POL strikes in full swing, Secretary McNamara and his aides flew

to Honolulu where, on July 8, they conferred with Admiral Sharp and other

Southeast Asia commanders. The purpose of the conference was to review the

POL campaign, the pace of enemy infiltration into South Vietnam, future air,

ground, and sea deployments to the war theater, and the progress of the war.

After initial briefings by Sharp and his staff, McNamara said it was now

President Johnson’s desire that the services give “first priority” to complete the

“strangulation” of the north’s POL system. He went on to say that Admiral

Sharp should not feel constrained by sortie limitations to accomplish this goal,

which should be preceded by a thorough study of the north’s land and sea POL

system, the categorization of the targets, then their destruction. Concurrently

and contributory, the services should step up air strikes on the main rail lines

and selected bridges. He asked the PACOM commander to submit a POL strangulation plan in accordance with these guidelines.42

Current intelligence on the eve of the conference was sobering. Despite an

estimated 137,800 killed from 1959 to mid-1966, mostly in South Vietnam,

North Vietnam appeared as determined and resilient as ever. Its strength in

South Vietnam was believed to total between 260,000 and 280,000. This contrasted with about 165,000 men a year earlier, and Viet Cong recruitment inside

the south and infiltration from the north was unremitting. Further, the Hanoi

regime was adjudged capable of training 75,000 to 100,000 troops annually to

serve as combat replacements in the south and of fielding upwards of 500,000

Smoke rises from a

petroleum storage area

northwest of Dong Hoi

after an attack in July

1966.
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THE POL STRIKES

troops without serious strain. Air Force and Navy bombing operations, which

totaled about 3,000 combat sorties in December 1965, reached a monthly high

of 7,500 in June 1966. In Laos, a yearly high of 3,000 combat sorties (including those of the Laotian Air Force) in December 1965 was eclipsed by monthly

combat sortie totals of 6,000 to 8,000 during the driest months in the first half

of 1966.43

In his briefing for McNamara, Sharp emphasized the burden of bombing

restraints and requested permission to strike thirty-three significant North

Vietnamese port and logistic sites used by the Soviets and Chinese for funneling

supplies and enemy forces to the south and for other air attacks to reduce the

southward movement of supplies and troops. He observed that about 28,000 North

Vietnamese had entered South Vietnam in the first five months of 1966, and the

infiltration rate of 4,500 per month at the beginning of the year threatened to reach

6,900 per month by the end of December. The VC-NVA were fielding more

maneuver battalions, occasionally employed division-size forces, had increased

their supply stockpiles, and had strengthened their support organizations.

Despite the many restrictions on Rolling Thunder, Sharp did not consider

the program a failure. This was evident, he thought, by the rapidity with which

the Hanoi regime built up its antiaircraft defenses. From March 1965, when

Rolling Thunder operations began, Hanoi’s antiaircraft gun inventory had risen

from about 849 to 4,200, or an average of about 205 guns per month. In addition, there were now about 20 to 25 SA–2 SAM firing battalions, a respectable

MiG force, and good early warning and GCI systems. Bombing had forced the

north to divert upwards of 500,000 military and civilian personnel to its air

The Soviet tanker Buguruslan anchored in Vung Ha Bay

outside Haiphong Harbor, transferring petroleum to

barges for transport to mainland North Vietnam.
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defenses and its repair and construction units stationed along roads, trails and

rail lines. In addition, more than 2,000 watercraft had been destroyed by mid1966. The PACOM commander did not expect air power to cut off sufficient

supplies to “isolate the battlefield,” but said he was convinced that air attacks

against more significant targets would eventually undermine Hanoi’s strength.44

Concerning future American deployments to Southeast Asia, Sharp proposed a

force of 524,800 U. S. and allied personnel (50,000 Air Force) in South Vietnam

and 147,800 personnel (20,000 Air Force) in Thailand and other PACOM areas by

the end of 1966. For 1967, he proposed sending 121,000 more U. S. and allied personnel (18,300 Air Force) to South Vietnam and other PACOM areas. As future

strategy promised to remain more ground than air oriented, Sharp proposed

assembling a 136,800-man contingency corps for Southeast Asia for direct and

indirect support of the war effort. This would raise U.S. and allied commitment to

the war to 930,000 personnel (90,300 Air Force). Air combat sorties for North and

South Vietnam would be increased to support the expanded military effort.45

Responding to the briefing by Sharp and others, McNamara said it was now

President Johnson’s desire that the services give “first priority” to complete the

strangulation of the north’s POL system. Accordingly, he wanted the PACOM

commander to submit a POL strangulation plan. Second priority should be given

Trenches and craters from earlier attacks were used to store petroleum drums at

the Ba Don storage area (above). A subsequent attack in August 1966 destroyed

many of the drums and caused secondary explosions and fires (opposite page).
297

THE POL STRIKES

to striking a few new bridges and rail line segments within the sanctuary area of

Hanoi and Haiphong. He quashed any service expectations that he would

approve a major change in other bombing restrictions within the buffer zone

next to China and stressed the administration’s “extreme sensitivity” to any further violations of China’s air space, as occurred on May 12 and June 29.46

The POL Strangulation Campaign

The day following the end of the Honolulu conference, the JCS sent a new

Rolling Thunder Program 51 to Admiral Sharp. This would become effective on

July 9 and contained many of the guidelines indicated by McNamara just before or

during the Honolulu conference. The program authorized additional strikes on

selected targets within the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area, principally on dispersed POL sites if identified positively with advance notice to the JCS of intent to

strike. Also approved were armed reconnaissance strikes on seven segments of the

two rail lines, ranging from 4 n.m. to 18 n.m. in length between Hanoi and China

and Hanoi and Vinh, and five bridges. To support these modestly expanded operations of Rolling Thunder Program 51, McNamara authorized an increase in

monthly armed reconnaissance sorties in North Vietnam and southeastern Laos

from 8,100 (established in April 1966) to 10,100, an increase of about 25 percent.47

Because more armed reconnaissance operations were now authorized, Sharp

quickly revised service sortie allocations. He assigned 4,500 sorties by Thailandbased aircraft to Westmoreland for his extended battlefield area of route
298

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

package 1 and the Tiger Hound sector of Laos; 4,100 sorties to the Navy for route

packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B; and 1,500 sorties to the Air Force for route packages 5

and 6A.48

Meanwhile, Admiral Sharp’s staff completed a POL strangulation plan in

late July. Briefly, it called for the destruction of several types of remaining POL

targets: port facilities; offshore lighterage; key road and rail routes from China,

especially from the northeast; small sea craft moving POL from China or from

point to point along the North Vietnamese coast; single and multiple POL

tank complexes; dispersed drum storage areas; and vehicles and watercraft

transporting POL along inland roads and waterways. The plan also called for

special reconnaissance activities to detect POL and POL-associated targets to

determine the amount of remaining POL, if any, after they were attacked. A

new target list contained 225 POL sites, of which 100 had been photographed

recently. Data indicated that about 90,000 metric tons of POL remained in the

largest storage installations and 5,000 to 10,000 metric tons were in semipermanent drum storage areas. There was no estimate of the total amount of POL

already dispersed in unknown sites throughout the country.49 To carry out the

plan, Admiral Sharp directed Air Force and Navy commanders to concentrate

their POL operations against nine installations with the following estimated

residual capacities in metric tons: Haiphong, 23,000; Nguyen Khe, 10,530;

Duong Nam, 8,000; Viet Tri, 4,000; Don Son, 3,600; Phui Qui, 2,000; Vinh,

1,980; Hanoi, 1,700; and, Bac Giang, 1,380.50

North Vietnam’s railroads were used to disperse petroleum.

This railyard at Hanoi contains tank cars, rail cars carrying

petroleum tanks, and rail cars loaded with drums.
299

THE POL STRIKES

To meet the higher sortie requirements for the POL strangulation campaign and

armed reconnaissance, the PACOM commander directed the PACFLT commander

to transfer, on August 4, one aircraft carrier from the Dixie Station in the Gulf of

Tonkin to the Yankee Station further north. This would permit the Navy to assign

all three of its carriers to Rolling Thunder operations and to relieve the Seventh

Air Force of its responsibility for bombing the Nape and Barthelemy Passes, both

key infiltration points from North Vietnam into southern Laos. Additional Air

Force sorties would thus be available for the POL campaign and, with newly

arrived Air Force squadrons, for General Westmoreland’s extended battlefield area

in route package 1. Of the additional 1,000 authorized armed reconnaissance sorties

for Rolling Thunder, the Navy would fly 900. Sharp’s unilateral actions in

realigning route package responsibilities and the unequal distribution of the additional armed reconnaissance sorties highly displeased the Air Force.51

Not surprisingly, Washington authorized far fewer POL targets than envisaged in Sharp’s plan. By the end of July, the Air Force had attacked only sixteen

dispersed POL sites holding an estimated 55,000 metric tons of fuel in route

packages 1, 5, and 6A. Phantom and Thunderchief aircrews had concentrated

their attacks on sites at or near Hanoi (Nguyen Khe, Dao Quan (west), Viet Tri,

La Danh, Van Lung, and Duc Thang), all in route package 6A, destroying an

estimated 42,600 metric tons of fuel. The fighter-bombers had also demolished

a tank production plant at Thai Nguyen. Navy fliers had struck numerous sites

with an estimated capacity of 114,800 metric tons of fuel in route packages 2,

3, 4, and 6B. They reported the destruction of many tons of fuel supplies at

Haiphong, Don Son, Bac Giang, and Duong Nham, all of which had been

attacked previously.52

In reality, the POL strangulation campaign was not a new program, but a

continuation—with operational refinements and many restrictions—of the air

An A–4 launches from

the starboard catapult

of a Navy carrier.
300

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

effort against POL installations that began on June 29. Poststrike reports made

no attempt to differentiate between the strikes conducted before or after the

CINCPAC directive of July 24 that launched the program.53

Because the Defense Secretary quickly concluded that the POL strikes were

not very effective—he refused to allow all POL sites to be struck—in August,

Admiral Sharp sought Washington’s approval to strike more “POL-associated”

targets. These would include two lock and dam sites to render unusable about

200 miles of waterways for POL-carrying watercraft; new POL and LOC targets

at the north’s three main ports at Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha; and harbor

dredges at Haiphong used to keep the channel from silting up. Destruction of

the dredges, initially and strongly urged in 1965, would make it impossible for

Soviet and other foreign tankers to enter Haiphong harbor as soon as the harbor

silted up. Again with service support, the PACOM commander also urged the

destruction of the entire Thai Nguyen steel plant as it was producing, inter alia,

barges used for the storage or movement of POL products.54

Except for the tank production facility, Washington refused to approve

attacks on these large targets and on the POL sites at Phuc Yen and Kep, both

of which were near the north’s most important and politically sensitive MiG

airfields. The State Department provided Washington’s rationale for restraint:

further bombing escalation might be construed by Peking as an American

attempt to capitalize on confusion in China, which was in the initial throes of

a “Cultural Revolution” led by the Red Guards, and trigger an “irrational”

response. Also, Hanoi appeared “resolved” to stay the course in the war, at least

until the next South Vietnamese elections, which were scheduled for November

1966. Thus, more bombing pressure would be hazardous in the first instance,

wasteful in the second.55

Because of Washington’s refusal to further expand the bombings, air commanders believed that the POL campaign had reached the point of diminishing

returns. Lt. Gen. William Momyer, who succeeded General Moore as Commander, Seventh Air Force on July 1, 1966, informed Generals Harris and McConnell

on August 12 that virtually all of the known POL caches in route package 1 had

been bombed and he questioned the value of more attacks on small targets, especially those in heavily defended areas. 

Despite the concentrated air attacks on small, dispersed POL sites, the North

Vietnamese still seemed capable of moving their supplies from the HanoiHaiphong area through the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. General

Momyer characterized the POL strangulation campaign “as another piecemeal

application of air power which left important targets unstruck.” He recommended to Admiral Sharp that Air Force planes could be used more profitably

against small POL and other targets in the Navy’s route packages 2, 3, and 4,

which contained about 1,480 miles of roads.56

Sharp agreed and permitted Seventh Air Force to fly an average of 50 sorties per day with peaks of 100 sorties per day, or 1,500 sorties per month, in the
301

THE POL STRIKES

western sectors of the three route packages. The PACOM commander then

readjusted the services’ armed reconnaissance responsibilities—still limited to

10,100 per month for North Vietnam and Laos—as follows: COMUSMACV,

2,500 sorties in North Vietnam (i.e., in route package 1) and Laos; CINCPACAF, 2,600 sorties in route packages 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6A; and CINCPACFLT,

5,000 sorties in route packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B.57

Inexplicably, as confidence in the restricted POL campaign waned among air

commanders, Washington’s interest grew. On August 11, McNamara, strangely,

asked the service chiefs for additional briefings each Monday on the number of

POL facilities destroyed, the residual capacity, the impact of bombing on the

transport of POL into and within North Vietnam, and future POL bombing

plans. Admiral Sharp and his PACAF and PACFLT commanders provided the

available data as quickly as possible.58

In another report in late August, Admiral Sharp informed McNamara that air

commanders had made little progress in reducing the size of the north’s remaining

POL capacity, now estimated at about 66,000 metric tons. Of this total, 17,000 metric tons were at sites not yet authorized for attack. Admiral Sharp had instructed his

component commanders, to step up their aerial search for more POL sites, and to

fly more reconnaissance missions against thirty-six small POL sites whose known

or suspected locations had been plotted by DIA analysts in Washington. Some of

these sites had been bombed previously. He added that it was not easy to obtain

good BDA photography of these relatively small sites, which made it difficult to

determine how much fuel remained after they had been struck.59

Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (left),

and Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, Commander, Seventh Air Force

(center), during a visit to Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam.
302

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Operational data for August confirmed that dispatching large numbers of aircraft against small, dispersed POL sites was not very rewarding. In Westmoreland’s

extended battlefield area or route package 1, for example, the estimated capacity of

five targets just before and just after air strikes is shown in figure 14:60 Strikes

against seven POL targets in route package 6A yielded similarly modest results

(figure 15).

Figure 14

Prestrike and Poststrike Storage Capacity of POL Targets, Route Package 1

August 1966 

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Figure 15

Prestrike and Poststrike Storage Capacity of POL Targets, Route Package 6A

August 1966 

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Included in the 17,000 metric tons of POL still not authorized for strikes

were the supplies at the Phuc Yen and Kep airfields. Meanwhile, reconnaissance photos were pinpointing numerous new, small sites, but many were in
303

THE POL STRIKES

populated areas. It was not unusual for photos to show streets in towns lined

with POL drums, but fearful of causing civilian casualties, Washington officials forbade air commanders to attack the drums.61

Throughout September, service interest in the POL strangulation campaign

continued to dwindle. “There are relatively few significant POL installations,”

General Harris observed, “that warrant a strike on a priority basis.” Bombing a

few important non-POL targets in conjunction with the POL campaign was

perceived as a major shortcoming by the PACAF commander. “Until additional

target complexes are authorized,” he said, “no dramatic impact of a strategically

persuasive nature seems likely.”62

In contrast, Washington officials—especially McNamara—still viewed the

campaign as important. They compelled the services to maintain a strenuous

reconnaissance effort to find new POL sites within authorized areas and to continue submitting weekly reports on POL interdiction and the size of the residual

POL capacity. During September, the Air Force and Navy reported striking

thirty-five and eighty-two POL sites, respectively, in their assigned areas.63

Meanwhile, other ongoing assessments indicated that the restricted POL

campaign was not seriously reducing Hanoi’s ability to continue the war.

Although the Air Force and Navy were not permitted to bomb or mine

Haiphong and other harbors to cut off all POL and other shipping into North

Vietnam, the tankers from the Soviet Union and other foreign suppliers took

the precaution of offshore loading onto barges, usually at night. Strikes were

authorized and a few were made against the barges, but with insignificant

results. In September, an estimated 20,000 or more metric tons were unloaded

successfully from two offshore tankers. There were also more oil shipments by

The strike camera of an F–105 Thunderchief recorded this contrail

of a surface-to-air missile passing another Thunderchief

(lower center) in the skies over North Vietnam.
304

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

rail from China. In late August and early September, DIA and CIA analysts

agreed that the country did not appear to be pinched for supplies and, with

stocks on hand and a steady flow of imports, had enough to sustain military

operations.64

A similar conclusion was reached by a group of forty-seven top U.S. scientists and engineers who had convened at McNamara’s request to study enemy

infiltration and bombing effectiveness. In a series of reports issued at the end

of August 1966 through the JASON Division of the Institute for Defense

Analyses, the study group foresaw no curtailment of infiltration into South

Vietnam. They calculated that only 5 percent of Hanoi’s fuel supply was used

for truck operations through Laos, and they discerned no reduction in VC-NVA

combat capability in the south, as enemy troops did not rely on fuel shipped

from the north. Instead of heavier bombing, the JASON group recommended

an innovative anti-infiltration system employing physical barriers and acoustic

and seismic sensors. The JCS, Admiral Sharp, and other Air Force and Navy

commanders opposed the barrier concept strongly on the grounds that it

smacked of “Maginot Line thinking” and that its cost in terms of money and

The 700-foot Chieu Ung railroad bridge is on the single-track line between

Hanoi and China through the Red River valley, a major route for supplies to

North Vietnam. Air Force F–105s destroyed the bridge on June 16, 1966,

but the North Vietnamese repaired the bridge within a month (above).

On July 22, F–105 pilots again destroyed the bridge (opposite page).
305

THE POL STRIKES

* For a detailed discussion of the background of the Igloo White barrier concept and its

initial implementation, see Jacob Van Staaveren, Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968

(Center AF Hist, 1994), chap XI. The concept is also discussed briefly in Gravel Pentagon

Papers, Vol IV, pp 115–24.

manpower would be enormous. However, Secretary McNamara quickly

endorsed and the President approved the creation of the system. On September

15, McNamara appointed Army Lt. Gen. Alfred D. Starboard to head a task

force to expedite the barrier’s implementation. Nicknamed Igloo White, the

sensors associated with the barrier became operational in late 1967.*65

Meanwhile, the POL campaign was not completely over. In October 1966,

the Air Force struck an undetermined number of sites and the Navy twenty-nine.

Occasionally, a restrike was conducted on one of the major POL installations,

as at Bac Giang. Then, with the JASON reports in hand, McNamara and many

aides made a three-day visit to Saigon during the second week of October 1966

to meet with Westmoreland, military and embassy officials, and several members of the South Vietnamese Government. Highlighting a seventeen-item

agenda of briefings was the progress of Rolling Thunder program 51 and

specifically the POL campaign. His report to President Johnson revealed his

pessimism concerning the air campaign.66

Briefly, McNamara informed the President that the bombing of the north

had neither reduced infiltration significantly nor diminished Hanoi’s will to

fight, a conclusion shared, he said, by the intelligence community. The North
306

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Vietnamese-Laotian road network for military supplies was still capable of

meeting communist needs in South Vietnam and attacks on the POL system had

not seriously stanched the flow of essential supplies. He faulted the services for

their over-optimistic estimates of what concentrated POL attacks could accomplish, although he praised close air support operations in South Vietnam. (Later,

before Senate committees in January 1967, he would make much of the “failure” of the “unrestricted” POL campaign.) “It is clear,” he said, that to bomb the

north sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoi’s political, economic,

and social structure “would require an effort we could make, but which would

not be stomached either by our own people or by world opinion, and it would

involve a serious risk of drawing us into open war with China.”67

McNamara went on to say that the North Vietnamese had been forced to pay

a price and assign about 300,000 personnel to their lines of communication to

maintain the necessary flow of personnel and materiel to South Vietnam. He

said that a large increase or decrease in the interdiction sortie level “would not

substantially change the cost to the enemy of maintaining the roads, railroads,

and waterways....” At the proper time, he believed, the United States should

consider terminating the bombing of all of North Vietnam, or at least in the

northeast zones “for an indefinite period in connection with covert moves

toward peace.” As an alternative to further bombing escalation, the Defense

F–105 coming out of a bomb run against a rail line north of Hanoi.
307

THE POL STRIKES

Secretary recommended proceeding with the anti-infiltration barrier (the Igloo

White project) across the DMZ and Laos that he had already endorsed and the

President had approved.68

With regard to future increases in U.S. and allied forces in South Vietnam,

McNamara said he would approve the deployment of only 40,000 more troops

for an eventual end strength of 470,000. (This total would rise to 469,300 after

the U.S. elections in November 1966.) This contrasted with Admiral Sharp’s

proposal in Honolulu on July 8 of 524,800 U.S. and allied troops by the end of

1966 (a figure that Sharp had recently raised to 570,000 for the end of 1967).69

In his strong criticism of the POL campaign, McNamara, of course, erred

grossly in characterizing it as “unrestricted.” Virtually all of the north’s POL

supplies delivered by Soviet and other foreign tankers were unloaded freely in

Haiphong and other ports, exempt—except for a few storage sites—from mining

or air attacks. Also, only minimum civilian casualties were tolerated. Despite

the restrictions, Admiral Sharp believed that the POL campaign had exacted a

price causing “destruction, greatly reduced capacity, or the abandonment of all

major POL installations.” The net effect, he averred, undoubtedly caused some

temporary POL shortages, considerable inconvenience, and diverted more

manpower and resources to POL dispersal activity.70
A flight of F–105s on their way to North Vietnam takes on fuel from a KC–135.
309

CHAPTER 11

Summary and Reappraisal

President Johnson’s principal advisers, headed by Defense Secretary Robert

S. McNamara, considered that the failure of the POL strikes to make obvious

progress toward winning the war (even when combined with limited attacks

against other targets) represented proof that bombing could not bring the Hanoi

government to the negotiating table. They believed that the war first had to be

won in South Vietnam, thus validating the administration’s initial strategy. Top

Army leaders in Washington and in Saigon generally supported this view.

Air Force and Navy leaders in Washington and tactical air commanders at

PACOM in Honolulu, Saigon, and in Thailand saw the shortcomings of bombing POL sites and other targets differently. They believed strongly that, from

the start of the American military buildup in South Vietnam in 1961, the new

Kennedy administration should have begun attacking North Vietnam’s most

important targets and mining its harbors. They also objected strongly to

Washington’s tight control over targeting and the initial limited scope and

tempo of air operations against the north.

The foregoing disparity in views on how the war in Southeast Asia should be

fought had a long history. Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May

1954 and the signing of the Geneva agreements in July of that year, which led to

the division of Vietnam into a communist north and a noncommunist south, the

United States gradually assumed full responsibility for assuring the independence

of South Vietnam and the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. This responsibility

was dictated by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union and

by the fall of China to a communist regime at the end of 1949. American policy

was based on the premise that the fall of South Vietnam to communist rule would

have a domino effect and lead to the communization of much of Southeast Asia,

with serious consequences for the West, especially for the United States. This view

received considerable impetus in June 1950 when communist North Korea suddenly attacked noncommunist South Korea, triggering a three-year war, during

which China openly supported the North Koreans. An armistice finally ended the

war in July 1953—less than a year before at Dien Bien Phu.

For eleven years after the official end of hostilities in the Indochina theater

in 1954, the United States attempted to shore up the political and military infrastructure of the new South Vietnamese nation. It was a difficult task as the

communist north, although a signatory to the Geneva agreement that divided

Vietnam, nonetheless sought to destabilize South Vietnam by organizing and

supporting communist Viet Cong insurgents within the new nation.

Despite the north’s support of the Viet Cong insurgents, the U.S. Government

refrained from overtly attacking North Vietnamese territory. Fearful of a wider war

in Southeast Asia, which might involve the Chinese government and the Soviet

Union, including possible nuclear confrontation with the Soviets, Washington
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GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

opted to win the war in the south. Nonetheless, to make the Hanoi regime pay a

price for its aggression, beginning in 1954 the United States tried mounting smallscale paramilitary activities to force the regime to cease and desist in its efforts to

undermine the stability of South Vietnam. When these efforts failed, in 1960 the

U.S. government approved in increase in paramilitary activities. Initially, the CIA,

supported by the Air Force, Army, and Navy, was in charge of training South

Vietnamese personnel for hit-and-run assaults on the north. However, these limited

assaults proved unsuccessful in deterring the north’s support for a small, but growing, Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam.

Primarily, but not solely, because of the growing insurgency, President Ngo

Dinh Diem’s government in South Vietnam remained unstable and the morale

of its armed forces low. In 1961, a new administration under President John F.

Kennedy undertook a series of more concerted actions. These consisted of an

expansion of paramilitary activities against the north and the transfer of these

activities to Defense Department agencies, with the CIA in a supporting role.

Limited Air Force reconnaissance flights over the borders of Laos and North

and South Vietnam were also begun to better determine the magnitude of the

movement of troops and supplies into South Vietnam. In December 1961,

President Kennedy ordered the deployment of the first combat advisory units

to South Vietnam, which included an Air Force special air warfare unit named

Farm Gate to provide combat training for the fledgling Vietnamese Air Force.

In February 1962, the Kennedy administration expanded its military training efforts by establishing the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Saigon,

headed by (Army) General Harkins. Service components included an Air Force

2d ADVON with General Anthis as commander. The JCS also directed Admiral

Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific, to develop operational plans for either

graduated air attacks on the north or for thwarting a Chinese and North

Vietnamese military thrust against other Southeast Asia countries. All the

while, the chiefs of the military services, the Army excepted, urged President

Kennedy and his key advisers, headed by McNamara, to begin air strikes

against the north. General LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, was in the forefront

of those arguing for an air-oriented campaign against the Hanoi regime, rather

than a ground-oriented strategy within South Vietnam, to force Hanoi to desist

in its support of the Viet Cong and to come to the negotiating table.

Nonetheless, President Kennedy and his principal advisers in Washington, and

at MACV headquarters in Saigon, continued to believe firmly that the war had

to be won in the south. Only then would Hanoi sue for peace. Direct air strikes

on the north were still ruled out lest they lead to a conflict with China, the

Soviet Union, or both.

Throughout most of 1963, the Saigon government’s chronic political instability and the poor performance of its ever growing army frustrated American

combat advisory units in their efforts to defeat the Viet Cong. The culmination

of the political instability came on November 1, 1963, when President Diem was
311

SUMMARY AND REAPPRAISAL

overthrown and, with the approval of the United States, a military junta, led by

Maj. Gen. Duong Minh, assumed control of the government. On November 22,

President Kennedy was assassinated and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson

became President. One of his first important actions was to send Defense

Secretary McNamara to Saigon to assess the political situation in the country.

McNamara’s assessment was somber. Stressing the chronic weakness of the

south’s government and military forces, he recommended bolder covert air, sea,

and ground attacks against the north. These soon found expression in an

Operation Plan 34A prepared by MACV. In addition, SAC U–2 and Yankee

Team tactical reconnaissance aircraft had already begun mapping more thoroughly the borders of North and South Vietnam and Laos, and the Royal Lao

Air Force, with the U. S. Air Force flying support, had begun limited strikes on

North Vietnamese infiltration targets in northern Laos. The Navy began De

Soto patrols as its larger covert actions to harass the north. Meanwhile, most

members of the JCS, especially General LeMay and other Air Force leaders and

tactical commanders, continued to urge a series of quick, overt attacks on the

north. They warned that the war was in danger of being lost.

The first seven months of 1964 witnessed more political instability in

Saigon. In January 1964, the Minh government was overthrown in a bloodless

coup by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. The new government soon demonstrated

that it was also incapable of curing South Vietnam’s chronic political instability.

This fact, plus the constant infiltration of troops and supplies to support the

Viet Cong in South Vietnam finally forced the Johnson administration to contemplate reversing its long-held policy of not openly attacking North Vietnam.

On June 15, 1964, at the request of Secretary McNamara, the JCS completed a

list of ninety-four of the most important targets in the north. The same month

also saw the appointment of General Westmoreland as MACV’s new commander

in Saigon, replacing General Harkins.

Less than two months after the JCS completed its 94-target list, the Johnson

administration used a naval incident as a pretext for attacking the Hanoi regime

openly for the first time. On the night of August 3, North Vietnamese gunboats

attacked a Navy De Soto patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack was presumed to have occurred the following night, although it was never verified. The

two incidents prompted President Johnson to authorize naval air strikes on several North Vietnamese targets in southern North Vietnam. At the President’s

request, on August 7, the U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

that authorized the President to take all necessary measures to repel an attack

on U.S. military forces and to prevent further aggression by the Hanoi regime.

To the distress of most service chiefs, especially the Air Force, now headed by

General McConnell (who replaced General LeMay in February 1965), there were

no immediate follow-up strikes, except in Laos, where in December 1964

Washington approved for the first time limited Air Force and Navy reconnaissance

strikes. Nicknamed Barrel Roll, the strikes were intended to supplement ongoing
312

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Royal Lao Air Force attacks on Laotian infiltration targets. (With limited strikes

in Laos, the United States also sought—unsuccessfully—to signal Hanoi of the

threat of more pain unless it agreed to negotiate an end to the war.) In fact, after

the Tonkin Gulf air attacks, the President withheld approval of air strikes in the

north for six months because of the weakness of the South Vietnamese government and the coming national election in the United States, scheduled for early

November 1964. Not until Viet Cong attacks against an American airbase at Bien

Hoa on November 2, a bombing at the American Brink Hotel on December 24,

and an assault on a U.S. military compound in South Vietnam’s II Corps on

January 7, 1966—all causing death or injury to numerous Americans and South

Vietnamese and considerable physical damage—did President Johnson, Secretary

McNamara, and his other advisers in Washington and Saigon agree that Hanoi

should be punished more severely for its provocations.

Another month of high-level agonizing in Washington elapsed, however,

before the President decided to strike a series of North Vietnamese targets,

albeit well below the 20th parallel. Called Flaming Dart I and Flaming Dart II,

the air strikes were conducted on February 7 and 11 primarily by Air Force and

Navy aircraft, with the VNAF making a few token strikes. Then, as the political

and military viability of the south remained steadfastly unimproved, McNamara

and other advisers called for, and the President authorized, a Rolling Thunder

program against the north. The program began on March 2, 1966 in the form of

numbered weekly packages of targets and sortie levels. Contrary to the recommendations of the service chiefs—the Army excepted—the targets were carefully

selected and the number of combat and combat support sorties controlled by

McNamara and his staff, although final approval rested with the President.

Also frustrating to the Air Force were the complex command and control

arrangements for conducting the Rolling Thunder program. The JCS sent

approved weekly strikes to CINCPAC, who determined the number of sorties

to be flown jointly by the Air Force and the VNAF and by the Seventh Fleet

from its three aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Commander, Pacific

Air Force, General Harris, also in Hawaii, would relay strike and target authorization to General Moore, the Commander, 2d Air Division, in Saigon.

General Moore had earlier replaced General Anthis, and it was he who would

then schedule aircraft based in South Vietnam. For aircraft based in Thailand,

Moore’s orders were relayed through the Thirteenth Air Force. Washington

authorities also restricted air attacks on the north by creating a strike-free zone

around the Hanoi-Haiphong area and another along the Chinese border and by

mandating that civilian casualties be kept to a minimum.

The tight control over the initial air strikes against North Vietnam masked the

overwhelming American air superiority in Southeast Asia. In February 1965, the

Air Force possessed about 200 combat aircraft in South Vietnam and 83 aircraft

of all types in Thailand. Offshore were three Navy aircraft carriers with more than

200 combat aircraft. In addition, the VNAF had about 53 aircraft. Ranged against
313

SUMMARY AND REAPPRAISAL

them, the North Vietnamese Air Force possessed 35 MiG–15s and MiG–17s (and

soon, a few MiG–21s), plus 20 light jet bombers. Above North Vietnam, however,

loomed another potential threat: about 310 Chinese MiG fighters.

With the beginning of the constricted Rolling Thunder operations, the Air

Force began to deploy many more aircraft and personnel to bases in South

Vietnam and Thailand. Its principal combat aircraft were the F–100 Super Sabres

and F–105 Thunderchiefs; but the higher performance F–4C Phantoms soon

arrived in Thailand, although they would not be used immediately for striking the

north. Air Force aircraft were already employed in an even more tightly controlled

program against the movement of troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail

in southern Laos and into South Vietnam. In Laos, an American ambassador, the

de facto military commander in that country, made the final decisions on the limited

air strikes in coordination with Laotian government officials.

Taking advantage of long delay, by February 1965, the north had deployed

nearly 1,000 antiaircraft guns of various sizes along many roads, railroads, logistic centers, bridges, power plants, and other likely targets, especially in the HanoiHaiphong area. As a consequence, enemy gunners immediately took a heavy toll

during the two Flaming Dart and the initial Rolling Thunder strikes. A total of

eleven aircraft were lost (five Air Force, four Navy, two VNAF) and forty-one

were damaged, and one Air Force pilot was also lost. These losses would mount.

Poor weather over the north, haze from slash burning, jungle terrain, and other

factors usually forced combat and armed reconnaissance pilots to fly low and

within range of antiaircraft guns. Frequent poor weather also frustrated efforts to

obtain accurate bomb damage assessment of the targets struck.

Another major problem for Air Force and Navy pilots was Washington’s decision to approve only a few of the ninety-four JCS targets in North Vietnam. In fact,

most of the Rolling Thunder strikes in the ensuing weeks were confined to relatively unimportant targets below the 20th parallel—again to signal Hanoi of

American determination to persevere in South Vietnam and force a negotiated end

to the conflict. In early April 1965, a new Air Force and Navy strike program,

nicknamed Steel Tiger, against more infiltration targets in southern Laos, likewise

failed to motivate the Hanoi regime to negotiate. In the same month, the regime

publicized its own four-point peace plan for ending the war that required inter alia

the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Johnson administration did not achieve

any success with a new major propaganda campaign consisting of dropping

leaflets over the north. A five-day bombing halt in mid-May 1965, codenamed

Mayflower, to allow U.S. diplomats and other intermediaries to convince the Hanoi

government to begin talks was likewise ineffective. Meanwhile, the Johnson administration decided to bolster internal security in South Vietnam against the Viet

Cong insurgents. It approved funds for adding 100,000 more men to the south’s

military force of 450,000 men, increasing from 33,000 to 82,000 the number of

American combat training and other types of forces in the country, plus the dispatch of 7,500 combat troops from South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia.
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All the while, the Air Force, Navy, and VNAF aircraft—with the latter flying only limited sorties above the demilitarized zone separating the two

Vietnams—continued to strike and restrike a large assortment of targets: rail

and road lines, trucks, railroad rolling stock, bridges, watercraft, military barracks, ammunition depots, and antiaircraft sites. At the end of May, the Air

Force’s most modern fighter-bombers, the F–4Cs, also began bombing—to signal Hanoi of heavier bombings to come unless it was willing to negotiate. The

air attacks destroyed or damaged hundreds of structures, trucks, railroad rolling

stock, watercraft, and cut road and rail lines. Aircraft losses were high. By June

24, the Air Force had lost twenty-four, the Navy twenty-six, and the VNAF

seven to North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns along with two Air Force and one

Navy aircraft shot down by enemy MiGs that had first begun to challenge

American pilots in April.

During June 1965 the Air Force, Navy, and VNAF flew about 2,300 strike,

armed reconnaissance, and flak suppression sorties, compared with 585 flown

in March, the first month of the Rolling Thunder program. Several thousand

other sorties were flown for MiG combat patrol, rescue patrol, escort, bomb

damage assessment, reconnaissance, and for other purposes. In July, at the

request of the JCS, Washington authorized two-week Rolling Thunder targeting and sortie packages. Tight controls over targeting remained, but the pace of

air operations increased slightly. The modest increase in the rate of bombings

came in June of 1965, following another crisis in the South Vietnamese government and the emergence of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu as Chief of State

and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the VNAF commander, as Prime Minister. Thieu

and Ky, as Chief of State and Prime Minister, then as President and Vice

President, gave South Vietnam political stability until the mid-1970s.

Meanwhile, General Westmoreland obtained Washington’s approval for substantially larger U.S. ground forces to deal with the still expanding insurgency.

General McConnell, the Air Force chief, and other tactical commanders

such as General Harris, the PACAF commander, and General Moore, the 2d Air

Division commander, continued to deplore Washington’s policy of trying to

win the war in South Vietnam rather than by bombing the north into submission. But McNamara and other key presidential advisers remained unwavering

in their conviction that any precipitous bombing escalation could lead to open

conflict with China and the Soviet Union or to some military diversionary

action. China’s angry reaction to an accidental intrusion of its airspace over

Hainan Island in April, when a U.S. Navy aircraft clashed briefly with a

Chinese MiG, fed Washington’s enormous fear that Peking might openly enter

the conflict. In addition, McNamara, most civilian presidential advisers, and

Army leaders remained convinced that air power alone could not win the war

in the north.

In addition to a daily toll of Air Force, Navy, and VNAF aircraft, two other

threats to bombing appeared in the spring and summer of 1965. In April, North
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Vietnamese MiGs began to challenge American pilots, first during separate

Navy and Air Force attacks on the large Thanh Hoa bridge. The number of aerial engagements soon increased, with American pilots usually the victors.

Because of the proximity of MiG airbases to Hanoi and Haiphong, and fearful

of escalating the air war, Washington continued to withhold its approval for

attacking the airfields. Another threat was posed by Soviet-built SA–2 missiles,

which scored their first kill by downing an Air Force Phantom in July 1965.

Although some newly built SA–2 sites outside of the sanctuaries near Hanoi,

Haiphong, and China could be attacked, the sites inside could not.

For more precise targeting, to deal with the MiG threat, and particularly to

lessen the threat from the north’s deadly antiaircraft guns, in the spring and

summer of 1965 the Air Force and Navy deployed increasing numbers of specially equipped aircraft: photo-equipped drones launched from C–130A aircraft; Wild Weasel F–100Fs, EB–66Bs and EB–66Cs with night photo or infrared

equipment; and EC–121D airborne and early warning aircraft. After the first SA–2

missile site was discovered early in April, the Air Force deployed RF–101

reconnaissance aircraft equipped with QRC–160–1 ECM pods to neutralize

the radar that controlled the guns and the missiles.

With the increase in confirmed SA–2 sites—five by the end of July and

eighteen by the end of September—the Air Force and Navy also began to

employ specially equipped Iron Hand aircraft: Air Force F–105 Thunderchiefs

and Navy A–6A Intruders and A–4E Skyhawks. Both services also began testing the Navy’s Shrike AGM–45 antiradar missiles, launching twenty-five

against SA–2 sites. Withdrawn briefly for improvements, the Shrike AGM–45s

entered into regular use in 1966. Washington authorities facilitated the antiSAM campaign by allowing a slight northward extension of the authorized

Rolling Thunder bombing area. Because of the danger from constantly heavier

antiaircraft fire, as well as from light and medium guns and automatic

weapons, the first confirmed SA–2 destruction was not achieved until October

17, by Navy aircraft. Other successful strikes followed in swift succession.

With the northward adjustment of the area open to bombing under Rolling

Thunder in the last half of 1965, the Air Force and Navy were also able to strike

and destroy or damage a few other targets heretofore off limits, such as small

power plants, ammunition complexes, barracks, segments of new road and rail

lines, and the like. However, the majority were still located below the 20th parallel, well south of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the Chinese border. The

beginning of the northwest monsoon weather in October often delayed or cancelled operations. The JCS periodically complained bitterly to McNamara and

other presidential advisers for withholding approval of more important targets,

such as the Phuc Yen airfield—where most North Vietnamese MiGs were

based—and canal locks, flood control levees, and four thermal hydroelectric

plants, all of which were within the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area. The

Defense Secretary asserted that the Hanoi government might view striking
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such targets as provocative and thus strengthen its resolve to fight and provide

more support to the Viet Cong.

The latter months of 1965 witnessed only small increases in permitted

monthly strike sorties. The period also saw two Air Force bombing errors. The

first, due to pilot error, occurred when an F–105 Thunderchief struck the off

limits demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam, killing twentyone Vietnamese and injuring others. The second, due to navigational error,

occurred when another F–105 Thunderchief, flying escort for four C–130Bs,

drifted over Hainan Island where it was shot down by a Chinese MiG and the

pilot captured. This was the second time an American plane had been shot

down by a Chinese MiG. Concerned lest both incidents lead to even tighter

bombing restrictions, Air Force tactical commanders redoubled their efforts to

prevent further mistakes. In November, the JCS sent to McNamara a paper

titled Concept for Vietnam, which again stressed the importance of permission

to hit more significant targets, including POL sites. Of thirteen of the most

important, only four of the smaller targets had been struck.

The administration made no immediate reply as it contemplated another

bombing halt to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. In December, to consolidate his authority as Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the control over air

operations over the north, Admiral Sharp unilaterally divided North Vietnam

into six—and soon thereafter seven—geographical route package areas. He

assigned route packages 2, 5, and 6A to the Air Force and route packages 1, 3,

4, and 6B to the Navy. The change displeased the Air Force, but it had no

recourse but to accept the assignments.

Because of the highly restrictive Rolling Thunder rules of engagement, until

December 24, 1965, when Washington halted all bombing of the north, combat

pilots took many risks and often suffered high losses by striking and restriking

a large number of relatively unimportant targets. Statistically, the number of

sorties flown against the north during the year were impressive. Combat and

combat support sorties totaled 54,791 (Air Force, 25,971; Navy, 28,168; VNAF,

652). Actual strike sorties totaled 23,194 (Air Force, 10,975; Navy, 11,656;

VNAF, 563). The Air Force dropped 32,063 tons of explosives, the Navy, with

smaller aircraft, 11,144 tons, while the total for VNAF was undetermined.

Assessing strike results was far more difficult. Sharp’s analysts reported that

by December 24, 1965, Rolling Thunder operations had destroyed or damaged

an estimated 4,700 huts and buildings, 808 motor vehicles, 658 pieces of railroad rolling stock, 1,563 watercraft, 1,200 bridges, 115 antiaircraft installations, 51 radar facilities, 4 SA–2 missile sites, 6 POL storage tanks, and 5 electric power plants. Also hit were miscellaneous targets such as ferries and ferry

slips, small airfield runways, and a few small locks and dams. Finally, the aerial assaults created about 846 significant road and 92 rail cuts along important

traffic arteries. There were no reliable figures regarding civilian casualties, but

they were relatively small. PACAF’s computations were larger and credited
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SUMMARY AND REAPPRAISAL

Rolling Thunder attacks with destroying or damaging an additional 2,700

buildings, 500 bridges, and 1,140 vehicles, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft. With photographic bomb damage assessment uncertain, many reports of

destruction or damage were pilot estimates.

The cost in terms of aircraft was high. By December 24, Hanoi’s air defense

system had downed 171 aircraft (80 Air Force, 83 Navy, 8 VNAF) and damaged

450 (189 Air Force, 250 Navy, 11 VNAF). Losses were largely due to the

north’s large inventory of antiaircraft guns: by December 24, 1965, they numbered approximately 2,236, more than twice the number in February of that

year, plus several thousand automatic weapons. Although few aircraft were lost

to enemy aircraft and SA–2 missiles, they had a significant harassing effect on

combat and reconnaissance missions.

On December 24, 1965, the Johnson administration announced that the

Rolling Thunder program would cease temporarily for the express purpose of

trying to persuade the Hanoi government to begin talks to end the war. The

decision to halt the bombing arose primarily from McNamara’s belief, born in

July 1965 and belatedly shared by President Johnson, that the war could only

be ended by negotiating with Hanoi. This constituted another major shift with

regard to the Johnson administration’s earlier strategies. The first was that the

war had to be won within South Vietnam. When this strategy failed to move

Hanoi, primarily because of South Vietnam’s continuing political instability

and the many desertions and poor morale of its army, the administration reluctantly approved a highly restrictive Rolling Thunder air program against the

north. This strategy had also failed by late 1965. Thus, the Defense Secretary

now counseled the President that only negotiations could end the war. The first

step towards this objective required a lengthy bombing pause, coupled with a

highly energetic diplomatic offensive.

This time, however, all of the service chiefs—Air Force and Navy tactical

commanders, Admiral Sharp, and General Westmoreland—strongly opposed

the halt, believing it to be a mistake. It would nullify whatever success the

Rolling Thunder program had achieved thus far, and reduce pressure on the

Hanoi government to parley. But their views were overruled. The bombing halt

was to last thirty-seven days and witness frenetic activity on the part of the

United States to entice Hanoi to the bargaining table. President Johnson’s emissaries visited 35 foreign capitals and contacted 115 foreign governments to

convey America’s peaceful intentions if the Hanoi regime would cease and

desist from its support of the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. The

peace overture included a fourteen-point plan, which was relayed to Hanoi and

provided for unconditional discussions and the promise of a contribution of at

least one billion dollars to a Southeast Asia regional reconstruction program.

The Hanoi government rejected the plan out of hand and countered that the

United States must first end all bombing of the north and accept the four-point

peace plan of April 13, 1965, which required the withdrawal of all foreign
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troops. Washington’s hopes that negotiations might end the war were struck still

lower when a mission from Moscow arrived in Hanoi early in January 1966 to

arrange more Soviet military and economic aid for its embattled ally. In addition, Air Force and Navy reconnaissance during the bombing pause showed that

Hanoi was rebuilding its logistic routes, freely moving supplies and troops

southward, and improving its antiaircraft defenses, which now included about

sixty SA–2 sites.

The bombing hiatus also witnessed a concerted effort by top Air Force and Navy

commanders to convince the Johnson administration to alter its ground-oriented

strategy of first defeating Hanoi in South Vietnam. For the Air Force, this effort was

led by General McConnell who was especially perturbed by tentative plans to boost

American manpower in South Vietnam to 486,500 (of which 55,000 would be Air

Force), and 169,000 military personnel (mostly Air Force) in Thailand by the end

of 1966 (Admiral Sharp in Honolulu rapidly convened a three-week conference

that prepared three manpower deployment options for McNamara, including an

optimum of 459,000 military personnel in South Vietnam).

Objecting to this scenario, the Air Force Chief of Staff described the enormous problems that would arise. These would include an immense base construction effort, and the relocation of Air Force tactical units from around the

world to provide sufficient air support for an ever-growing land army in South

Vietnam. Despite their differences on military strategy, all of the services

nonetheless strongly believed that Rolling Thunder operations should resume

quickly with an unannounced sharp blow. More new targets should be authorized closer to China and within the Hanoi-Haiphong area, Haiphong’s harbor

should be mined to eliminate military imports, and restrictions on flying combat and armed reconnaissance missions should be reduced.

McNamara vetoed the recommendations, invoking again the danger of a war

with China or the Soviet Union if the United States did not demonstrate

restraint. Accepting the Defense Secretary’s arguments, President Johnson did

not authorize the resumption of bombing until January 31, 1966. With Rolling

Thunder program 48, combat pilots found themselves more restricted than

before. Only 300 strike sorties per day were permitted against targets located

principally below the 21st parallel. Most strikes took place in route packages 1

through 4 and attacks were directed against vehicles, watercraft, rail and road

lines, small bridges, structures, and a few antiaircraft and ground radar sites.

Groundfire was intense, as Hanoi had taken full advantage of the bombing halt

to move more troops and supplies to the south and to strengthen its antiaircraft

defenses.

A total of 2,809 strike sorties were flown in February 1966 by the Air Force,

Navy, and VNAF. Beginning with Rolling Thunder program 49 on March 1,

McNamara relaxed bombing restrictions somewhat, authorizing 5,100 strike sorties for the north and 3,100 for Laos, the latter mostly against troops and supplies

moving towards South Vietnam. Combat air patrol, reconnaissance, electronic
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SUMMARY AND REAPPRAISAL

countermeasures, and other sorties were not included in the authorized sortie

totals. Despite the onset of monsoon weather, Air Force and Navy combat

pilots flew about 87 percent of the permitted sorties. During March, the Air

Force and Navy claimed to have destroyed or damaged respectively the following: vehicles, 103 and 103; rivercraft, 63 and 177; small bridges, 46 and 90;

structures, 96 and 95; and antiaircraft sites, 18 and 5. In addition, they damaged

28 rail cars and made about 145 road cuts. Meanwhile, a growing munitions

shortage of 250-pound, 500-pound, and 750-pound general-purpose bombs

forced greater use of 1,000-pound, 2,000-pound, and 3,000-pound bombs.

In March, route package 1 was assigned to General Westmoreland in Saigon

to serve as his extended battlefield to provide more air power against infiltration

of North Vietnamese Army personnel from Laos into South Vietnam that was

estimated at more than 11,000 and increasing between October 1965 and the end

of February 1966. General Moore had some reservations, but still supported the

change. Admiral Sharp did not, on the premise that South Vietnam’s strategic

rear was not within the country as Westmoreland claimed, but outside of North

Vietnam (i.e., in China and the Soviet Union). McNamara sided with the MACV

commander on the grounds that Rolling Thunder operations appeared to be having

little effect on the Hanoi government. The change went into effect on April 1, 1966

(the start of Rolling Thunder program 50). At the same time, Sharp reshuffled

service assignments over the north, giving route packages 5 and 6A to the Air

Force and route packages 2,3,4, and 6B to the Navy. In the Air Force view, this

change was not warranted as it gave Navy pilots a larger but less hazardous geographical area for their shorter range aircraft.

Rolling Thunder 50 began on April 1 and would continue through April,

May, and June and end in early July 1966. In this program the scope of the air

war in the north was modestly increased. Before it started, the JCS had proposed

a new bombing package of targets, including nine POL sites, six bridges (three

would be restrikes), one cement plant, and several other important targets not

yet bombed. For the twelfth time since November 1964, they also made an

urgent request to be allowed to strike the north’s MiG airfields. They stressed

that the sixty to seventy MiGs—among which there were now a number of

MiG–21s—posed a constant military threat. McNamara surprisingly sent the

recommendations with some modifications to the President, apparently influenced by a new CIA report advocating more severe bombing of the north. He

also minimized the prospect of any Chinese ground or air action if Hanoi’s only

cement plant and some new POL sites were struck and said that the Soviet

Union would do no more than adopt a harsher diplomatic line. Thus did the

Defense Secretary suddenly modify his earlier thinking about strong Chinese

and Soviet reaction to a more escalatory bombing policy.

The JCS recommendations, as approved by the Defense Secretary, sanctioned 700 monthly armed reconnaissance sorties, including strikes for the first

time against rail and highway routes in the more northeastern sector of North
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Vietnam. The recommendation also sanctioned strikes on nine new POL storage sites, six new bridges, and four other important targets. Program 50 would

also provide for more strikes in route package 1, because of an upsurge in infiltration in that area, and which received first strike priority. To implement the

last change, Westmoreland appointed General Moore as MACV Deputy

Commander for Air Operations, but Moore’s new title did little to increase his

authority in conducting air operations. Almost at the same time, the 2d Air

Division was redesignated the Seventh Air Force because of its huge size, and

the Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force in Thailand,

became Deputy Commander, Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force.

The President briefly withheld approval of the new recommendations, however, following another political crisis in South Vietnam in early March triggered by President Ky’s dismissal of a rebellious commanding general of South

Vietnamese Army Forces in I Corps. The crisis would simmer until June. When

he finally approved Rolling Thunder program 50, he imposed more restrictions

than McNamara had recommended, although some earlier ones were dropped.

Authorized were the first two B–52 strikes on Mu Gia Pass (the main point of

entry into Laos for the north’s troops and supplies en route to South Vietnam), and

an air program in Laos aimed at reducing infiltration into South Vietnam through

the ten-mile demilitarized zone. Other highlights of program 50 were an initial

strike on the Thai Nguyen railyard, the Bac Giang bridge, and the plan to attack

the much-bombed Thanh Hoa bridge with five 5,000-pound bombs dropped from

a C–130 that floated down the river to the bridge. Inexplicably, the bombs failed

to explode. In a second attack, the C–130 and its eight-man crew were lost. The

bridge would not be attacked again and destroyed until many months later.

Because radar-controlled antiaircraft guns and SA–2 missiles continued to

proliferate, the Air Force again deployed more sophisticated aircraft in the

spring and early summer of 1966 to detect and neutralize or destroy these

weapons. Wild Weasel F–105Fs, equipped with Shrike AGM–45 antiradar missiles, replaced the earlier Wild Weasel F–100Fs. By mid-1966, of a total 376

Air Force, Navy, and VNAF aircraft lost in the north, only 15 to 18 were attributed to SA–2s, thus attesting to the efficacy of the anti-SAM measures. In addition, MSQ–77 Skyspot radar systems were installed in tactical and B–52

bombers and on ground sites to assure more accurate bombing. By mid-1967,

six MSQ–77 ground installations had been activated in South Vietnam and

Thailand, thus assuring more accurate bombing than theretofore.

In April 1966 the North Vietnamese MiG–15s, MiG–17s, and MiG–21s on

airfields near Hanoi became more aggressive. In six aerial battles, however, Air

Force F–4Cs downed six MiGs without loss. Once in May and again in June,

China claimed that American aircraft had violated its air space. Because of

Washington’s extraordinary sensitivity, both PACAF and Joint Staff teams, the

latter ordered by McNamara, conducted separate investigations of the violations. Both border intrusions were attributed to navigation errors. Air Force and
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SUMMARY AND REAPPRAISAL

Navy commanders took immediate measures to improve communication and

navigation control when flying near the Chinese border. Another problem

affecting Rolling Thunder operations in the spring of 1966 was the increasing

shortage of rockets, general-purpose bombs, and other ammunition for air

operations in North and South Vietnam and Laos. President Johnson quickly

gave highest priority to increasing production of certain types of ammunition.

Meanwhile, McNamara and the JCS continued to spar over the effects of

bombing POL storage sites and associated targets. In recent months, the CIA’s conflicting estimates of the possible impact had muddled the problem. On April 1,

1966 Walt W. Rostow succeeded McGeorge Bundy as the President’s National

Security Adviser. On May 6 he informed McNamara and Dean Rusk, the Secretary

of State, that systematic and sustained attacks on Hanoi’s POL supplies could seriously cripple its war effort, noting how attacks on Germany’s petroleum resources

compromised Germany’s war operations in World War II. In the same month

General McConnell informed a Senate committee that knocking out all of Hanoi’s

POL sites would have a substantial effect on the amount of supplies it could send

to its forces in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland generally agreed, and soon

called for the bombing of eight POL sites, warning that delay would allow Hanoi

to continue its POL dispersal activities. Underlying these recommendations was a

rising congressional and public concern about the course of the war.

Gradually, McNamara and the President were persuaded to approve more

concentrated, albeit still limited, strikes on POL targets. The Defense Secretary

justified attacking them because enemy truck movements in the first five months

of 1966 were double those of 1965. Also compared with the previous year, daily

enemy supply tonnage had increased 150 percent, the troop infiltration rate along

the Ho Chi Minh Trail had increased by 120 percent (averaging 4,500 men per

month), and the number of North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam had

risen by 100 percent. Meanwhile, the usually inordinate fear of McNamara and

most other presidential advisers in the face of excessive Chinese or Soviet reaction

was again minimized. The President agreed, and in early June prepared to approve

attacks on new POL and other targets. However, the President’s final approval was

delayed by a series of events, including a new Canadian diplomatic initiative to persuade Hanoi to negotiate (which proved unsuccessful), weather conditions, and a

news leak about the impending bombings.

When the President made his final decision in late June, it was another compromise: some, but not all of the recommended POL sites and other new targets could be attacked. Finally, on June 29, Air Force and Navy aircraft struck

the first authorized POL sites near Hanoi, Haiphong, and other areas previously off limits to combat pilots. Some radar sites in formerly restricted areas

were also hit. By July 11, twenty-five large and small POL facilities had been

attacked. Adding a few bombed previously, an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the

north’s POL inventory had been bombed and an estimated 55 percent destroyed.

There was no estimate of civilian casualties, but analysts considered them
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small. As expected, the POL campaign triggered more domestic and foreign

debate and concern that the war might expand. China, the Soviet Union, and

other communist countries vowed to send more aid to the Hanoi regime.

On July 8, McNamara and his aides arrived in Honolulu to attend another

series of briefings and discussions with military commanders. Current intelligence was sobering. Despite an estimated 137,000 enemy killed, the Hanoi

regime had an estimated 260,000 to 280,000 insurgents in South Vietnam,

compared with about 165,000 a year earlier. Although Admiral Sharp, who

gave the principal briefing, believed that attacks on more significant targets

would eventually undermine Hanoi’s strength, he emphasized the frustration of

the bombing restraints and noted that infiltration into South Vietnam, running

at an estimated 4,500 men per month early in 1966, would continue to increase

and that there were more antiaircraft guns and SA–2 battalions than ever

before. Following earlier guidelines from McNamara, he also proposed sending more American troops to South Vietnam for an eventual force of 524,800

U.S. and allied personnel.

In response, McNamara asked the PACOM Commander for a POL strangulation plan as a first priority, plus plans to hit new road and rail targets within

the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area. In addition, he said more sorties would

produce only marginal results, declared that the proposed new manpower totals

for South Vietnam were too high and would create more economic inflation,

considered the base construction programs in South Vietnam and Thailand too

costly, and demanded that there be no more violations of Chinese air space.

Immediately after the Honolulu conference, Admiral Sharp’s PACOM staff

began preparing the strangulation plan. The next day, July 9, the JCS sent

Rolling Thunder program 51 to Sharp, effective immediately. Program 51 would

increase the number of authorized armed reconnaissance sorties in North

Vietnam and Laos from 8,100 to 10,100 per month.

In late July, Air Force and Navy pilots began attacking the remaining POL targets approved by Washington in conformance with the new PACOM strangulation

plan, as well as associated targets such as vehicles and watercraft. By the end of

the month, the Air Force had attacked sixteen dispersed sites and destroyed an

estimated 42,800 metric tons of fuel. Navy fliers also destroyed many thousands of tons of fuel in its areas of operation. However, Washington withheld

permission to strike other POL sites and associated targets near Hanoi and

Haiphong, such as two lock and dam sites, sites at the north’s three major seaports, and a large steel plant. Nor did Washington approve the mining of the

north’s three main harbors to close them to shipping, as had long been advocated by both the Air Force and the Navy.

Although the tempo of air strikes against POL sites and associated targets had

passed their apogee by early August, McNamara continued to ask for weekly

reports on the campaign. Washington’s rationale for not striking additional POL

and other targets was that China, in the initial throes of a Cultural Revolution led
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by the Red Guard, might take irrational action (i.e., enter the war openly). In addition, Hanoi appeared resolved to continue the war until the next South Vietnamese

election in November 1966. General William W. Momyer, who succeeded General

Moore as Commander, Seventh Air Force on July 1, 1966, characterized the POL

strangulation campaign as another piecemeal application of air power.

In late August, Admiral Sharp informed McNamara that little progress had

been made in reducing further the north’s POL storage capacity—much of it

dispersed—estimated at 66,000 metric tons with sites containing 17,000 metric tons not yet authorized for bombing. The PACOM commander said weather

and groundfire made it difficult to obtain good photos of strike results. He also

informed the Defense Secretary that it was not worthwhile to send aircraft

against small, dispersed POL sites as in MACV’s route package 1 and, to avoid

civilian casualties, pilots were prohibited from attacking POL drums on many

streets in towns. PACAF concluded separately that few of the remaining authorized POL sites merited strikes on a priority basis. Still, McNamara considered

the POL campaign important, and throughout September, he continued to ask

for weekly reports.

By October, it was apparent that the highly restricted POL strangulation

campaign had not reduced infiltration into South Vietnam. In fact, in late July

and in subsequent weeks, U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese forces were battling elements of the north’s 324th Division that had crossed the buffer zone

into the I Corps area of South Vietnam. Other Viet Cong and North Vietnamese

Army activity had also increased throughout the country. Uncertain if

American POL bombing strictures would continue, Soviet and other foreign oil

tankers, while still immune from a U.S. naval blockade and air strikes on port

facilities, took the precaution of unloading onto barges. In Washington, the

DIA and CIA had jointly concluded that the north’s POL supplies remained

adequate for transporting troops and supplies into South Vietnam, a conclusion

that the JASON Division of the Institute of Defense Analyses had reached by

the end of August.

Thus ended another unsuccessful special Rolling Thunder program intended

to force Hanoi to the negotiating table. In a congressional hearing, McNamara

faulted the services for their over-optimistic estimates of what unrestricted

POL strikes could accomplish—not mentioning that the strikes were never

unrestricted. And with no surcease in the political instability within South

Vietnam, the lackluster performance of its Army, and the presence of several

hundred thousand American troops, plus some allied units, the close of 1966

brought no sign that the war would end soon. All of the strategies tried thus far

by the Johnson administration, devised and directed largely by McNamara and

his principal associates in Washington, had proved to no avail. Despite the frequent warnings of the JCS and other tactical commanders, the Army excepted,

that a ground-oriented strategy within South Vietnam could never win the war

and that an incremental and highly restricted Rolling Thunder program on the
324

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

north also could not bring Hanoi to heel, the Defense Secretary refused to

acknowledge defeat. He never seriously considered unleashing the full might

of Air Force and Navy aircraft against important targets in the north, including

its seaports, since the specter of open conflict with China, the Soviet Union, or

both was ever present.

Still believing that the war was winnable with more technology, McNamara

now turned to a plan received at the end of August from the JASON Division

of the Institute for Defense Analyses to establish a new anti-infiltration system.

At his request, in the summer of 1966 forty-seven scientists and engineers

under the aegis of the JASON Division had studied enemy infiltration and the

impact of more bombing to reduce it. Rather than more bombing, the JASON

group proposed, and McNamara quickly approved, the construction of a system

of physical barriers and acoustic and seismic sensors in southern Laos and the

demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams. Although the JCS, Admiral

Sharp, and all other Air Force and Navy leaders and tactical air commanders

strongly opposed the barrier concept as it reflected World War II Maginot Line

thinking, sensor placement began early in 1967.

The end of the restricted POL strangulation campaign in October 1966 closed

the first phase of Rolling Thunder operations that had begun on March 2, 1965.

Although these air attacks had caused considerable pain to the Hanoi government,

the gradualness of the air program had enabled the government to absorb its daily

losses of military manpower, trucks, watercraft, and other materiel. It had marshaled an estimated 300,00 to 500,000 military and civilian personnel to maintain

its logistic network and to man its antiaircraft guns and automatic weapons.

Despite the Johnson administration’s efforts to win the war using the carrot of

diplomacy and eventual foreign aid, and the stick of limited military pressure,

Hanoi clearly had not felt sufficient pain to begin talks on ending the war. 
325

NOTES TO PAGES 9–18

1. Report of Investigation, Pleiku

Incident, by Board of Officers to

Investigate Incident at MACV Compound

and Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, Maj

Gen Milton B. Adams, USAF, President,

16 Feb 65; Transcript of News Conference

by McNamara and (Under Secy of State)

Ball on Air Strike in VN, Wash Post, 8 Feb

65.

2. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The

Vantage Point: Perspectives of the

Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp 124–25.

3. Ibid., p 124; Maxwell D. Taylor,

Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W.

Norton & Co., Inc., 1972), p 335; Robert

S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In

Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of

Vietnam (New York: Times

Books/Random House, 1995), pp 172–74.

4. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp

317–18; CINCPACFLT rpt, The United

States Navy in the Pacific, 1965, pp

13–14; The Pentagon Papers: The Defense

Department History of United States

Decisionmaking on Vietnam. The Senator

Gravel edition, 12 vols. (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1971), Vol III, pp 298–301; New

York Times, 11 Feb 65; Adm. U.S. Grant

Sharp, Strategy for Defeat Vietnam in

Retrospect (San Rafael: Presidio Press,

San Rafael, 1978) p 39; McNamara and

VanDeMask, In Retrospect, pp 172–74.

5. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp

317–18; CINCPACFLT rpt, The United

States Navy in the Pacific, 1965, pp

13–14; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 298–301; New York Times, Feb 11, 65;

U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat:

Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael:

Presidio Press, 1978) p 39; McNamara

and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, pp

172–74.

6. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp 121,

124–25.

7. Ibid., p 124; hist, CINCPAC, 1965,

Vol II pp 317–18; ltr, Harris to

McConnell, 3 Jan 65.

8. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp

317–18.

9. Hq USAF rpt, Analysis of Air

Operations, Southeast Asia (hereafter

cited as Analysis of Air Ops), 26 Mar 65,

Vol I, pp 3–9.

10. Ibid., Vol I, pp 3-1 to 3-2; Hist,

CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp 319–20;

CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy in the

Pacific, 1965, pp 14, 57, and 191–92.

11. Analysis of Air Ops, 26 Mar 65,

Vol I, pp 3-1 to 3-2; msg, CINCPACAF to

CSAF, 070535Z Feb 65.

12. Project CHECO Team, Rolling

Thunder (Proj CHECO, 1966) (hereafter

cited as Rolling Thunder), pp 8–9.

13. Rolling Thunder; hist CINCPAC,

1965, Vol II, pp 319–20; Analysis Of Air

Ops, 26 Mar 65, Vol I, Mar 26 65, pp 3-1

to 3-10; Adm U.S.G. Sharp, CINCPAC,

and Gen William C. Westmoreland,

COMUSMACV, Report on the War in

Vietnam (as of 30 June 1968)

(Washington: GPO, 1969), pp 14–15.

14. Sharp and Westmoreland, Rpt on

the War in VN, p 15; Johnson, The Vantage

Point, p 126; hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II,

p 321.

15. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 071459Z Feb 65; Analysis of Air

Ops, Vol I, pp 3-1 to 3-10; Rolling

Thunder, pp 6–7; hist, CINCPAC, 1965,

Vol II, p 321; Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF

Plans and Operations in SEA, 1965

(USAF Hist Div Liaison Ofc, 1966), p 7;

intvw, with Lt Col Andrew H. Chapman,

Hqs 2d AD, Feb 13 65; hist, 509th Ftr Int

Sq; Jan–30 Jun 65, pp 9–10; Robert F.

Futrell, Chronology of Significant Air

Power Events in Southeast Asia,

1954–1967, (Maxwell AFB, Ala:

Aerospace Studies Institute, 1968), p 54.

Notes

Chapter 1
326

NOTES TO PAGES 18–28

16. Public Papers of the Presidents of

the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,

1965 (Washington: Office of the Federal

Register, National Archives & Records

Service, 1966), Vol I, pp 153–54.

17. Transcript of News Conference by

McNamara and Ball on Air Strikes in

Vietnam, New York Times, Feb 8 65, p 15.

18. Public Papers of the President,

Johnson, 1965, Vol I, p 166. 

19. New York Times, Feb 9 65, p 1.

20. Washington Post, Feb 10 65.

21. Ibid.

22. New York Times, Feb 9 65.

23. Ibid., Feb 13 65.

24. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

128–30; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 271; 308–18; McNamara and

VanDeMark, In Retrospect, pp 170–72.

25. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 129.

26. Ibid., pp 129–30; Rolling Thunder,

pp 9–11.

27. Rolling Thunder, pp 9–12; hist,

CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p 322.

28. Msg, PACAF to 13th AF, 5th AF, et

al, 101934Z Feb 65; hist, PACAF, 1 Jul

64–30 Jun 65, Vol I, Pt 2, p 96, hist, SAC,

Jan–Jun 65, Vol II, pp 238–39.

29. Analysis of Air Ops, May 64–65,

Vol I, pp 3-1 to 3-16; Rolling Thunder, pp

9–12; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Ops, SEA 1965, pp 7–8; Hist, CINCPAC,

1965, Vol II, p 322; Baltimore Sun, Feb 12

65; Washington Post, Feb 12 65, p 1.

30. Fact Sheet, Subj: Operation

Flaming Dart-Rolling Thunder, 16 Apr 65,

Tab M in File, CINCPAC Agenda Fact

Sheet for SECDEF Conference, 19–20

Apr 65; Futrell, Chron of Significant Air

Power Events, 1954–1967, p 455.

31. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 062350Z

Feb 65; msg, PACAF to CSAF 122330Z

Feb 65; Gen Moore: Speech for Comdrs

Conference, Gaguio, Phila, 22–25 Feb 65;

PACAF rpt, Out-Country Strike

Operations in Southeast Asia, Subtask 1A,

Strike Operations in NVN, Jan 1964–11

Feb 1965, 30 Sep 70, (hereafter cited as

PACAF rpt, Strike Ops in NVN, Vol I), pp

76–77; 2d AD rpt, Sequence of Events

(Flaming Dart I and II), 6–17 Feb 65.

32. PACAF rpt, Strike Ops in NVN,

Vol I, pp 76–77; msgs, Amembassy

Bangkok to SECSTATE 133, 5 Aug 64

and 137, 7 Aug 64.

33. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol I, pp 3-1

to 3-10; Wash Post, Feb 12, 65, p 1.

34. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol I, pp 3-1

to 3-10 PACAF rpt, Strike Ops in NVN, pp

76–77; 2d AD rpt, Sequence of Events,

6–17 Feb 65.

35. Documents on American Foreign

Relations, 1965, pp 130–31; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p 306; New York

Times, Feb 12, 65

36. Deadline Data on World Affairs,

Feb 14, 65, p 44.

37. The Pentagon Papers as Published

by The New York Times (New York:

Bantam, 1971) (hereafter cited as the New

York Times Pentagon Papers), pp 428–29.

38. McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 172–73.

Chapter 2

1. Hearings before the Senate

Subcommittee on United States Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad of

the Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Security Agreements and

Commitments Abroad, The Kingdom of

Laos, 91st Cong, 1st sess, pt 2, pp 20–22,

and Oct 28, 68, pp 367–74.

2. Ibid.; Senate Foreign Relations

Committee Print, Background Information

Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam

(hereafter cited as Background Info on

SEA and VN), 7th Rev Ed, 93d Cong, 2d

sess (GPO, Dec 1974), pp 242–50; D.

Gareth Porter, After Geneva, Subverting

Laotian Neutrality, in Laos: War and

Revolution, ed by Nina S. Adams and

Alfred W. McCoy (New York, 1970), pp
327

NOTES TO PAGES 28–38

183–95; Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in

Laos: The Politics of Neutralization, Rev

ed, (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp 224–26

and 245–56; Maj Victor B. Anthony, Draft

Study, A Military History of the War in

Northern Laos, 1945–1968, chap IV.

3. House Cmte on Armed Services,

Cmte Print, United States-Vietnam

Relations, 1945–1967, Study Prepared by

the Department of Defense, 12 vols,

(GPO, 1971), (hereafter cited as DOD

Pentagon Papers), Bk 2, IV.A.5. Tab 3, pp

60–64; New York Times Pentagon Papers,

(New York, 1971), pp 53–56; Final Report

of the Select Committee Study on

Governmental Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities, US Senate,

Together with Additional Supplemental

and Separate Views, Apr 26, 76, Report

No. 94-755, 94th Cong, 2d Sess, Foreign

Military Intelligence (hereafter cited as

Senate Select Cmte on Intel Activities),

Bk 1, p 147.

4. William E. Colby and Peter Forbath,

Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp

162–71.

5. Ibid., pp 170–73.

6. DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2, IV, B

1, pp 117–18; Taylor, Swords and

Plowshares, pp 216–44; Colby and

Forbath, Honorable Men, pp 174–75.

7. DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2, IV, B

1. pp 122–23.

8. Ibid., pp 120–21.

9. SECDEF Briefing Bk (for mtg in

Jan 62), 16 Dec 61.

10. Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Plans

and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961–1963

(USAF Hist Div Liaison Ofc, 1965), pp

14–18, 76–78.

11. Hist, CINCPAC, 1963, pp 38–43.

12. Rpt of Visit by JCS Team to SVN,

Jan 63; Jacob Van Staaveren, Interdiction

in Southern Laos, 1960–1968 (Center for

Air Force History, 1993), p 5.

13. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS (Exclusive

for SACSA, Gen Harkins, Gen Collins,

Adm Needham, Gen O’Donnell from

Adm Felt), 300421Z Apr 63; msg, CSAF

to PACAF (Personal, Gen Carpenter to

Gen Martin), 222211Z Apr 63; memo,

subj: GVN Ops in DRV-US Army Plan, in

Summary of Defense Conference Bk (for

May 1963 mtg), Blue Tab 5a.

14. Memo, 8 May 63, subj: Agenda

Item 5 in Record of SECDEF Conference

Held on 6 May 1963 at HQ CINCPAC.

15. Ibid., msg, CINCPAC to JCS,

020048Z May 63.

16. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

60–61.

17. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN, 1961–1963, pp 69–72;

hist, CINCPAC, 1963, pp 42–43 and

197–200.

18. Ibid.

19. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN, 1961–1963, pp 72–74;

msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 312100Z Jun 63;

msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 070232Z Aug 63;

PACAF Ops Plan 32-65 (as of Aug 63);

memo, 4 Nov 63, Col L. W. Bray, Ofc of

Dep Dir of Plans for War Plans to CSAF,

subj: Consideration of CINCPAC Oplan

99-64; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol II, p

752; McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 70–80.

20. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN, 1961–1963, pp 72–74;

McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 81–87.

21. New York Times Pentagon Papers,

pp 232–33; Johnson, The Vantage Point, p

45.

22. New York Times Pentagon Papers,

pp 271–74; Johnson, The Vantage Point,

pp 63–64; Jt COMUSMACV Oplan 34A

and Saigon Oplan Tiger, 15 Dec 63, subj:

Operations in NVN; msg, CIA to State

Dept (Jt State-DOD-CIA msg), 162215Z

Jan 64.

23. Msg, McNamara to SECSTATE

and Director CIA, no subj, Jan 3, 64, with

attached copy of draft memo to Pres, subj:

Covert Ops Against NVN; msg, CIA to

State Dept, White House, JCS (personal

for Lodge, Harkins, and CIA Chief,

Saigon), 162215Z Jan 64.

24. Hist, MACV, Annex A, 14 Jan 66.

25. Msg, Saigon 3943 to Washington,
328

NOTES TO PAGES 38–46

Honolulu (from Lodge to SECSTATE,

JCS, CINCPAC Pol Adviser (POL AD),

21 Jan 64; msg, CIA Wash to SECSTATE,

OSD, JCS, White House, 250250Z Jan 64;

hist, SAC, Jan–Jun 64, Vol III, p 417;

Kenneth Sams, Escalation of the War in

SEA, Jul–Dec 64 (Proj CHECO, 1965), pp

92–93; William R. Greenhalgh, Jr., ms,

US Air Force Reconnaissance in Southeast

Asia, 1960–1975, (AF Hist Research

Cent, 1977), pp 118–21; Van Staaveren,

Interdiction in Southern Laos, p 22.

26. Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, p 367; DOD

Pentagon Papers, Bk 4, IV, C. 2, pp 2–3.

27. COMUSMACV Oplan 34A, 15

Dec 63; msg, Saigon to SECSTATE, OSD,

JCS, White House, 14 Mar 64; msg,

COMUSMACV to SECSTATE, OSD,

White House, CIA, JCS, 060515Z Apr 65;

New York Times Pentagon Papers, pp

234–40.

28. Msg, State-Def to Amembassy

Saigon, Paris, et al, Feb 23, 64; msg, CIA

to SECSTATE, OSD, JCS, ISA, White

House, Mar 16, 64; msgs, State Dept to

Amembassy Saigon 155, 1581, and 1587,

Mar 28, Apr 1 and 2, 64; msg, Vientiane

to SECSTATE 1083, Apr 64.

29. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 496–99.

30. Facts on File, SVN 1961–1965,

Vol I, pp 88–89; Gravel Pentagon Papers,

Vol III, p 42; Taylor, Swords and

Plowshares, p 308.

31. Msg AFCVC, USAF to PACAF

(personal Gen McKee to Gen Smart), 1

Mar 64; memo, SECDEF to Chmn JCS,

21 Feb 64, subj: Vietnam.

32. Book of Actions in SEA, 1961–74,

Dir/Ops, HQ USAF (hereafter cited as Bk

of Actions, SEA, 1961–1974), Tab K.

33. Ibid.

34. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol II, pp

121 and 499–510; memo, SECDEF to SA,

SAF, SN, et al, 17 Mar 65, subj:

Implementation of SVN Program; hist,

Dir/Plans, Hqs USAF, Jan–Jun 64, pp

17–18; Robert F. Futrell, ms, The Advisory

Years to 1965, Ofc AF Hist, 1979, pp

406–07; Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of

Air Power: The Bombing of North Vietnam

(New York: Free Press, 1989), pp 45–46;

McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, p 274.

35. Msg, State Dept to Amembassy

Saigon 1484 (from the President to Amb

Lodge), Mar 20, 64; Gravel Pentagon

Papers, Vol IV, p 511; Futrell, The

Advisory Years, pp 406–07; Johnson, The

Vantage Point, pp 65–67, and 189.

36. Msg, Saigon to SECSTATE 1594

(from Lodge to Pres), Feb 20, 64; Futrell,

The Advisory Years, pp 406–07; Johnson,

The Vantage Point, pp 66–67.

37. Memo, Chmn JCS to SECDEF,

subj: Alternative Courses of Action, 14

Apr 65.

38. CSAFM-549-64, 28 May 64;

JCSM-471-64, 2 Jun 64; Bk of Actions in

SEA, 1961–74, pt IV, tabs O and P;

Futrell, The Advisory Years, p 409.

39. CM-451-64, 5 Jun 64; Futrell, The

Advisory Years, p 418.

40. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p

316; Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Plans

and Policies in South Vietnam and Laos,

1964 (USA Hist Div Liaison Ofc, 1965),

pp 19–21; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol II,

pp 172–76; New York Times, May 31, 64. 

41. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

172–78; MR, by Brig Gen Richard A.

Yudkin, Dep Dir of Plans for Policy,

DCS/P&C, Hq USAF (based on Gen

Smart’s notes), subj: Honolulu

Conference, 1–2 Jun 64; MR, Gen Yudkin,

subj: SECDEF Conf, 1–2 Jun 64, with

attached MR by Lt Col Walter M. Pickard,

Ofc of Dir/Plans, 24 Jun 64, no subj; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in

SVN and Laos, 1964, pp 19–21; New York

Times, May 31 and Jun 3, 64; Taylor,

Swords and Plowshares, pp 312–13.

42. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 162144Z

Jun 64, and 21 Jun 64; hist, CINCPAC,

1964, pp 61–62; Futrell, The Advisory

Years, p 410; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol

III, p 177; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans

and Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

19–21; New York Times, May 31, and Jun

3, 64.

43. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 180800Z Jun 64; msg, JCS to
329

NOTES TO PAGES 46–56

CINCPAC, 02211 5Z and 081414Z Jul 64;

JCS 2343/423, 11 Jul 64, with atchd

memo, Col R.E. Phelan, Asst Dep Dir of

Plans for Policy to CSAF, 9 Mar 65, subj:

Proposal for a Settlement of SEA, with

atchd list of key 1964 JCS Papers; study,

Outcountry Strike Operations in Southeast

Asia, 1 Jan 65–31 Mar 68, Plans,

Concepts, Doctrine, Vol V, pt 1, 30 Sep

70, pp 11–12; msg, JCS to CINCPAC,

0211 Jul 64.

44. Msg, PACAF to CINCPAC,

042151Z Jul 64.

45. Ltr, Gen Smart to Dep SECDEF

Vance, 18 Jul 64, no subj.

46. Memo, Phelan to CSAF, 9 Mar 65,

subj: Proposals for a Settlement of the

SEA Conflict with atchd key 1964 JCS

Papers.

47. Futrell, The Advisory Years, p 452;

hist, CINCPAC, 1964, p 354; New York

Times, Jul 20, 23, and 24, 64 (all p 1).

48. Futrell, The Advisory Years, p 452;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

512–17; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p

316.

49. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 177–80; DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 4,

p 42ff; Washington Post, Jun 27, 72, p A13; New York Times, Jun 28, 72.

50. Futrell, The Advisory Years, pp

451–56; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

24–27; hearing before the Committee on

Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 90th

Cong, 2d sess, subj: The Gulf of Tonkin:

The 1964 Incidents (GPO, 20 Feb 1968),

pp 9–19; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

p 575; msg, Bangkok to SECSTATE, 157

to DoD, JCS, White House, CIA, Saigon

(Westmoreland) 7 Aug 64.

51. Futrell, The Advisory Years, pp

451–57; Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

112–119; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

24–27; Public Papers of the Presidents,

Johnson, Vol II, 1963–64, pp 927–41;

Joint Hearing before the Committee on

Foreign Relations and the Committee on

Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 88th Cong,

2d sess, subj: Southeast Asia Resolution

(GPO), 6 Aug 64; Supplementary

Documents to February 20, 1968 Hearing

with SECDEF Robert S. McNamara,

Cmte on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong, 2d

sess, subj: The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964

Incident, part II, Dec 16, 1968, pp 2–3.

52. New York Times, Aug 7, 8, 9, 10,

11, 64.

53. Futrell, The Advisory Years, p 456.

54. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 530–33; Futrell, The Advisory Years, p

45; msg, Saigon to SECSTATE 132, 7

Aug 64.

55. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 524–37; Futrell, The Advisory Years, pp

456–67.

56. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

34–35.

57. Msgs, Amembassy Bangkok to

SECSTATE 133, Aug 5, 64 and 157, Aug

7, 64; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 1122272

Aug 64.

58. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 524–39.

59. Ibid., pp 539–42 and 537–55;

JCSM-729-64, 24 Aug 64; JCS Armed

Reconnaissance Study Group Report,

Analysis of the Armed Reconnaissance

Program in NVN, 15 Nov 65, Tab A to app

1 to annex C, p 2.

60. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 555–56; JCSM-729-64, 24 Aug 64.

61. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 542–45, 550–52; msg, CINCPACAF to

CSAF, 29 Aug 64.

62. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 192–93, 560–66; Johnson, The Vantage

Point, pp 120–21; Taylor, Swords and

Plowshares, pp 320–21; New York Times,

Sep 8, 64.

63. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 565–66.

64. JCS 2343/450, 31 Aug 64; hist,

Dir/Plans, Hq USAF, Jul–Dec 64, pp

50–51, 58–59; New York Times, Aug 25,

64; Baltimore Sun, Aug 25, 64; Chicago

Tribune Sep 1, 64.

65. New York Times, Sep 13–16, 64;
330

NOTES TO PAGES 56–67

Facts on File, South Vietnam, 1961–65,

Vol I, p 104; Taylor, Swords and

Plowshares, p 321.

66. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

194–95; Futrell, The Advisory Years, p 460.

67. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 133–34; Facts on File, South Vietnam,

1961–65, Vol I, p 107.

68. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 569–70; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans

and Policies in SVN and Laos, 1965, p 32.

69. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 133–34; New York Times Pentagon

Papers, p 319; Van Staaveren, Interdiction

in Southern Laos, chap. III.

70. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p

134; JCSM-893-64, 21 Oct 64; JCSM902-64, 27 Oct 64: Book of Actions in

SEA, pt II tab W; DOD Pentagon Papers,

4, pp 2–3; McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, p 159.

71. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp

323–25; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

36–38.

72. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 121;

Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies

in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp 36–37; Taylor,

Swords and Plowshares, p 323–25.

73. William C. Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports, (New York: Dell, 1976),

p 111; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp

48–49; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p

324.

74. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p

324; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p

111; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp 40–45.

75. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Ops in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp 39–41.

76. Lt Col Roger P. Fox, draft study,

Air Base Defense in the Republic of

Vietnam (Ofc AF Hist, undated), pp

20–36; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

39–41.

77. CSAFM-K-73-74, 23 Nov 64;

JCSM-997-64, 28 Nov 64; Bk of Actions

in SEA, 1961–74, pt V, Tab H; USAF Mgt

Sum SEA, 16 Jul 65.

78. Futrell, The Advisory Years, pp

493–95; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

42–43.

79. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 210–36; Van Staaveren, USAF Plans

and Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

42–43; Clodfelter, The Limits of Air

Power, pp 52–56; McNamara and

VanDeMark, In Retrospect, pp 159–61.

80. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

42–43; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp

326–27; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 236–51.

81. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN and Laos, 1964, pp

43–44; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 248–55, 677–83; Futrell, The Advisory

Years, pp 495–96.

82. Futrell, The Advisory Years, pp

495–96; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 258–263; Taylor, Swords and

Plowshares, pp 329–32.

83. Futrell, The Advisory Years, pp

495–96; Sams, Escalation of the War in

SEA, Jul–Dec 64, pp 79–80, 201–06; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in

SVN and Laos, 1964, pp 44, 79; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp 251–57;

memo, SAF to SECDEF, Use of Infra-Red

Equipped Acft for Locating Targets in

Laos at Night, 11 Jan 65; 1st Lt Robert L.

MacNaughton, Yankee Team, May 64–Jun

65, (Proj CHECO, 1966), p 34. 

84. Futrell, The Advisory Years, pp

502–5; Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 121;

Kenneth Sams, The Battle for Binh Gia

(Proj CHECO, 1965), p 1; Taylor, Swords

and Plowshares, pp 322–34.

85. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp

326, 329–32.

86. Intvw, Dr. Alfred E. Goldberg and

Arthur M. Marmor, AF Hist Liaison Ofc,

with Gen LeMay, 12 Jan 65.

87. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

123–24.

88. Ibid., pp 122–23.

89. Ibid., p 123.
331

NOTES TO PAGES 69–80

1. Hist, MACV, 1965, pp 46 and 269;

hist, CINCPAC, 1965, An B, p 22.

2. CINCPACFLT rpt, U.S. Navy in the

Pacific, 1965, p 214–15; Van Staaveren,

Interdiction in Southern Laos, p 5.

3. Msg, PACAF to Thirteenth AF, Fifth

AF, 2d AD, 313th AD, 109334Z, Feb 65.

4. Msg, JCS to SAC, 111440Z Feb 65.

5. Hist, 2d AD, Jan–Jun 65, Vol II, p 2.

6. Ibid.

7. DIA Bull-6-65, 3 Feb 65.

8. PACOM WID No 9-65, 26 Feb 65.

9. Harrison, pp 11, 27–28, 53, 73, and

78; PACAF rpt, Climatology in Southeast

Asia, p 5; hist, 355th TFW, Jan–Jun 66, p 12.

10. Robert F. Futrell and Martin

Blumenson, The Advisory Years to 1965

(Ofc AF Hist, 1978), chap IX; William W.

Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (WW II,

Korea, Vietnam) (GPO, 1978), pp 70–71.

11. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Policies in SVN, 1961–1963, pp 14–19;

Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, pp 70–71.

12. Hist, 2d AD, Jan–Jun 64, p 12; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in

SVN, 1961–1963, pp 14–19; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in

SVN and Laos, 1964, pp 65–68; Momyer,

Air Power in Three Wars, pp 70–71;

Futrell and Blumenson, Air Force Ops In

SEA, Chap IX.

13. PACAF rpt, Plans, Concepts, and

Doctrine, pt 1, pp 102 and 114–17;

Kenneth Sams, Command and Control,

1965 (Proj CHECO, 1966), pp 1–2; msg,

CINCPACAF to CSAF 110645Z Feb 65;

hist, MACV, 1965, p 101; hist, CINCPAC,

1965, Vol II, p 393.

14. Ibid.; MSgt Robert T. Helmka and

TSgt Beverly Hale, USAF Operations

from Thailand, 1964–65 (Proj CHECO,

1966), pp 10–11.

15. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Ops in SEA, 1965, pp 65–68; Momyer, Air

Power in Three Wars, Chap III.

16. Hist, MACV, 1964, p 9; McConnell

notebook, Item 75, 5 Apr 65; intvw, Maj

Samuel E. Riddlebarger and Lt Col

Valentino Castillina with Gen Moore, 22

Nov 69, p 27; Sharp and Westmoreland,

Report on the War, pp 83 and 279.

17. Intvw, Maj Samuel E. Riddlebarger

and Lt Col Valentino Castillina with Gen

Moore, 22 Nov 69, p 27.

18. Intvw, Maj Richard B. Clement and

Capt Ralph G. Swentson with Maj Gen

Gilbert L. Meyers, 20 May 70, pp 36–38.

19. Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF,

110645Z Feb 65; intvws, Maj

Riddlebarger and Lt Col Castillina with

Gen Moore, 29 Nov 69, p 29, and Maj

Clement and Capt Swentson with Gen

Meyers, 27 May 70, pp 46–48.

20. Msg, CINCPACAF to Fifth AF,

Thirteenth AF, 315th AD, PACAFBASECOM, 140340Z Feb 65.

21. Msg, 2d AD to PACAF, 110748Z

Feb 65.

22. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 110942Z

Feb 65.

23. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 132220Z

Feb 65.

24. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 131250Z Feb 65.

25. David Kraslow and Stuart H.

Loory, The Secret Search for Peace, (New

York: Random House, 1968) pp 114–15.

JCSM-100-65, 11 Feb 65; James C.

Thompson, “How Could Vietnam

Happen?” Atlantic Monthly Apr 68, p 51.

26. JCSM-100-65, 11 Feb 65; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp 318–21;

PACAF Corona Harvest Rpt, Strike Operations in NVN, 12 Feb–23 Dec 65, pp

16–17.

27. Memo, Maj Gen J. W. Carpenter

III, Asst DCS/Plans and Ops for NCS

Matters to CSAF, 28 Mar 65, subj: Recent

Actions by JCS and Recommendations to

Higher Authority Re SEA; JCS Rpt, Night

Song Study Gp Rpt, prepared by Jt Staff,

30 Mar 65, Vol III, p C-27; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp 320–21.

28. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 340–41; DOD Pentagon Papers, Vol

IV, p 75; CM-438-65, 19 Feb 65; memo,

Carpenter to CSAF, 1 Mar 65, subj: Air

Chapter 3
332

NOTES TO PAGES 80–87

Strikes Against NVN Transportation

System.

29. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 310;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

308–18; Senate Rpt, Background

Information Relating to SEA and VN, p

19; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p 336.

30. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

130–31.

31. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 325–30.

32. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 162215Z

Feb 65; msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 180045Z

Feb 65; Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 132.

33. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 182327Z

Feb 65.

34. Msg, Hq PACAF to CINCPACFLT

et al, 190835Z Feb 65; msg, CINCPACAF

to Comdr Thirteenth AF, 19001Z Feb 65;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p 325;

Kenneth Sams, Nguyen Cao Ky (Proj

CHECO, 1965), pp 13–15.

35. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p

325; Sams, Nguyen Cao Ky, pp 13–15.

36. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 190754Z

Feb 65; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p

325.

37. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 240220Z Feb 65; Sams, Nguyen Cao

Ky, pp 13–14; Analysis of Air Ops, 26 Mar

65, Vol I, pp 4-1 to 4-2.

38. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 325–40.

39. New York Times, Feb 26, 65, p 1.

40. Ibid., Mar 1, 65.

41. Rpt, Aggression from the North:

The Record of North Vietnam’s Campaign

to Conquer South Vietnam (Dept of State

Publ 7839 of Media Services, Bureau of

Public Affairs, Feb 64) pp 133.

42. New York Times, Mar 17, 65.

43. Jon M. Van Dyke, North Vietnam’s

Strategy for Survival (Palo Alto, Pacific

Books, 1972), pp 30 and 126–27.

44. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 011840Z

Mar 65.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.; Analysis of Air Ops, May

64–5 Apr 65, Vol I, , pp 4-1 to 4-2;

Rolling Thunder, 26 Mar 65, p 22.

47. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 011840Z

Mar 65; hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol I, p 326. 

48. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC,

JCS, 041120Z Mar 65; Analysis of Air

Ops, 26 Mar 65, Vol I, pp 4-1 to 4-2;

Rolling Thunder. Personal Notebook on

Significant Events, by Gen John P.

McConnell, CSAF (hereafter cited as

McConnell Notebook), item 33.

49. Baltimore Sun, Mar 3, 65.

50. Stmt, by Secy McNamara on Mar

2, 65, Hearings before the House Subcmte

on Appns, 89th Cong, 1st sess, DOD

Approps for 1966, pp 3 and 80.

51. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, 092251Z

Mar 65, and 111624Z Mar 65.

52. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC,

NMCC, 120825Z Mar 65; msgs,

Amembassy Saigon to SECSTATE,

130245Z Mar 65; MACV J-3 to CINCPAC, NMCC, 130050Z Mar 65; MACV to

CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, 130310Z Mar

65; JCS to CINCPAC, 131548Z Mar 65.

53. PACAF Working Paper, subj:

Sequence of Events (Feb 65–Jan 67),

undtd; msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 131548Z

Mar 65; Analysis of Air Ops, May 64–Apr

65, Vol I, pp 4-4 to 4-6; New York Times,

Mar 15, 65; Washington Post, May 15 and

16, 65.

54. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol I, pp 4-1

to 4-3; Rolling Thunder, pp 22–23.

55. Memo, Gen W.H. Blanchard, Vice

CSAF to TAC (Maj Gen Graham), 4 Mar

65, subj: Ltr of Instruction; msg, CSAF to

PACAF (Personal Gen Blanchard to Gen

Harris), 040034Z Mar 65; hist, TAC,

Jan–Jun 65, pp 794–95.

56. Msg, 313th AD, Kadena AB,

Okinawa to CINCPACAF, 060927Z; msg,

CINCPAC to JCS, 040710Z Mar 65; hist,

TAC, Jan–Jun 65, pp 794–95; msg,

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 041120Z

Mar 65.

57. Memo, Vice Adm L. Mustin,

Dir/Ops J-3, Joint Staff to Vice Dir/Ops, J3 Jt Staff, 3 Mar 65, subj: Analysis of Acft

Losses in SEA; CM-469-65, 10 Mar 65.

58. Memo, H. Brown to SAF, SN, et

al, 15 Mar 65, subj: Acft Combat Losses

in VN.
333

NOTES TO PAGES 88–96

59. Msgs AFIN 40725 and 40735, 2d

AD to CSAF, 15 Mar 65; msg, 2d AD to

CSAF 160535Z Mar 65; memo, Brig Gen

R.A. Yudkin, to AFXOPL, 25 Mar 65,

subj: USAF Analysis Team; memo, SAF

to SECDEF, 15 Mar 65, no subj; rpt,

Advanced Flying Training in TAC in

Support Southeast Asia Operations,

1965–1969 (Ofc TAC Hist, Jun 71), pp

22–26.

60. Memo, SAF to SECDEF, 22 May

65, subj: Rpt of USAF Combat Ops in

SEA.

61. New York Times, Mar 4 and 5, 65;

Washington Post, Mar 4, 65.

62. Washington Post, Mar 8, 65, p 1;

CINCPACFLT rpt, The United States

Navy in the Pacific, 1965, pp 58–59;

Communist Policy Towards Southeast

Asia, 1954–1969, A Chronological

Compendium (Aerospace Studies

Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1970), pp

228–29.

63. Senate rpt, Background Info

Relating to SEA and VN, p 20.

64. Memo, Legal Basis for United

States Actions Against North Vietnam:

Department of State Memorandum, March

8, 1965; Senate rpt, Background Info

Relating to SEA and VN, Jun 70, pp

220–24.

65. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 040304Z

Mar 65.

66. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 334–36; JCS-180-65, 15 Mar 65.

67. Rpt, Gen Harold K. Johnson, CSA

to SECDEF, et al, 14 Mar 65, subj: VN

Trip from 5–12 Mar 65; Gravel Pentagon

Papers, Vol III pp 337–40; JCSM-197-65,

17 Mar 65.

68. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 160119Z

Mar 65; msg, State Dept to Amembassy

Saigon, 2000, Mar 16, 65.

69. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 162346Z;

msg, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC,

140315Z Mar 65; msg, CINCPAC to

CINCPACAF, 162259Z Mar 65;

Greenhalgh, USAF Reconnaissance in

SEA, 1960–1975, p 171.

70. CSAF-J-78-65, 17 Mar 65;

Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, p 19.

71. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars,

p 19.

72. Hist, JCS Historical Office, The

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in

Vietnam, 1960–1968 (JCS Hist Ofc, 1970)

(hereafter cited as The JCS and the War in

VN), p II, pp 18-21 to 18-24; msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 210525Z Mar 65.

73. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 162142Z

Mar 65; msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 172219Z

Mar 65; msg, CSAF to CINCPACAF,

181322Z Mar 65; hist, CINCPAC, 1965,

Vol II, p 332.

74. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 162143Z

Mar 65; Analysis of Air Ops, Vol I, pp 4-7

and 4-9; Vol III, pp 3–28.

75. Analysis of Air Ops, SEA, Vol I, 26

Mar 65, pp 4-8 to 4-11; memo, Col H. L.

Price, Ofc Dir/Ops 2d AD to AFB GP

(ODC), subj: Rolling Thunder VII, 18

Mar 65.

76. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol 1, 26 Mar

65, pp 4-11 to 4-12.

77. Ibid., pp 4-12 to 4-14.

78. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, CINCSAC, 240057Z Mar 65; msg, CINPAC to

CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 24084Z Mar 65; msg, CINCPACAF to Thirteenth AF, 2d AD, 241054Z

Mar 65.

79. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol I, 26 Mar

65, pp 4-14A to 4-14M; hist, CINCPAC,

1965, Vol II, p 332.

80. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol I, 6 Mar

65, pp 4-14A to 4-14M.

81. DIA Bull, 5 Apr 65, pp F-3 and F-4.

82. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Ops in SEA, 1965, p 24. 

83. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 210515Z

Mar 65; msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 300059Z

Mar 65; The JCS and the War in VN, pt II,

pp 18–25.

84. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 300059Z

Mar 65.

85. Greenhalgh, USAF Reconnaissance

in SEA, 1960–1975, pp 181–82; Helmka

and Hale, USAF Operations from

Thailand, 1964–1965, pp 112–13;

Analysis of Air Ops, 6–12 Apr 65, Vol II, p

1-1.
334

NOTES TO PAGES 96–106

86. JCSM-202-65, 20 Mar 65; msg,

CSAF to PACAF, TAC, 312215Z Mar 65;

memo, SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 1 Apr 65,

subj: Immediate Deployment of an F–4C

Squadron to Thailand; hist, CINCPAC,

1965, Vol I, p 285; hist, 8th TFW, Jul–Dec

65, pp 5 and 11; Robert F. Futrell, Chron

of Significant Air Power Events in

Southeast Asia, 1950–1968 (Maxwell

AFB, Ala: Aerospace Studies Institute,

1969) p 91.

87. Msg, CSAF to PACAF, 312215Z

Mar 65; Helmka and Hale, USAF

Operations from Thailand 1964–1965,

p 114.

88. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF et al, 060127Z, Mar

65; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC,

150645Z Mar 65; memo, McKee to

DCS/P&O, 31 Mar 65, subj: Interagency

Psywar Ops Subcmte; hist, MACV, 1965,

p 458.

89. Analysis of Air Ops, May 64–5 Apr

65, Vol I, pp 2-15a to 2-20a.

90. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 319–20.

91. Ibid.

92. CM-481-65, 11 Mar 65.

93. Memo, Germeraad to CSAF, 12

Mar 65, subj: Contingency Planning for

SEA/WESTPAC; CM-481-65, 11 Mar 65.

94. CSAFM-J-67-65, 12 Mar 65;

Germeraad to CSAF, 12 Mar 65.

95. Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 2d

AD, 090117 Mar 65 (Personnel for Gens

Carpenter, Preston, Moore, Maddux, and

Ellis from Moorman); 2d AD (personal) to

Gen Compton (from Harris), 12 Mar 65.

96. Memo, McKee to CSAF, 18 Mar

65, subj: Briefing on Views of Amb

Taylor, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV

on Certain Proposals made by Chmn JCS.

97. CMCN-27-65, subj: U.S.

Deployments to SEA, 18 Mar 65; McKee

to CSAF, 19 Mar 65, subj: VSMC Plan for

U.S. Deployments into SEA; memo,

McKee to CSAF, 18 Mar 65, subj:

Briefing on Views of Amb Taylor, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on Certain

Proposals Made by Chmn JCS; memo,

McKee to CSAF, 19 Mar 65, subj: USMC

Plan for U.S. Deployments into SEA.

Chapter 4

1. JCSM-204-65, 20 Mar 65.

2. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 140;

New York Times Pentagon Papers, pp

440–43.

3. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC,

271338Z Mar 65; New York Times

Pentagon Papers, pp 398–400.

4. New York Times Pentagon Papers, pp

394–400; New York Times, Mar 29, 65; The

JCS and the War in VN, pt II, pp 18–25.

5. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

695–702; and New York Times Pentagon

Papers, pp 432– 440.

6. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 147.

7. McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 171–77.

8. Ibid., pp 139–40 and 147; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p 407.

9. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

702–03; Public Papers of the President,

Johnson, 1965, Vol I, p 370; New York

Times, Apr 2 and 3, 65; McNamara and

VanDeMark, In Retrospect, pp 185–87;

Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, pp

66–67; Van Staaveren, Interdiction in

Southern Laos, pp 56–61.

10. Facts on File, South Vietnam

1961–65, p 170.

11. New York Herald Tribune, Apr 5, 65.

12. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

132–33.

13. Chester L. Cooper, The Lost

Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York:

Dodd, Mead, 1970), pp 272–75.

14. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p

356.

15. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 311717Z

Mar 65; Analysis of Air Ops, 26 Mar 65,

Vol I, pp 4-14N to 4-14W; Vol II, 6–12

Apr 65, p 3-3; and Vol II, tab 3; Asst

SECDEF (PA) News Release 206–65, 4

Apr 65; Maj A.J.C. Lavalle, ed, The Tale
335

NOTES TO PAGES 106–116

of Two Bridges and The Battle for the

Skies Over North Vietnam (Air University,

1976), pp 31–38; Ofc Asst SECDEF (PA)

News Release No 206-65, 4 Apr 65.

16. Analysis of Air Ops, 26 Mar 65,

Vol I, pp 4-14N to 4-14Q; Hq PACAF

Working Paper, Sequence of Events, 4 Feb

65–24 Feb 67; CINCPACFLT rpt, The

U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1965, p 49;

Washington Post, May 15, 72; hist, 313th

AD, Jul–Dec 65, p 187.

17. Analysis of Air Ops, 26 Mar 65, Vol

I, pp 4-14N to 4-14R; Rolling Thunder, pp

31–35; Asst SECDEF (PA), News Release

206-65, 4 Apr 65; hist, 313th AD, Jul–Dec

65, p 187; hist, 67th TFS, 1 Jan–30 Jun 65,

chap IV; Lt Charles H. Heffron, Air to Air

Encounters Over NVN (Proj CHECO,

1967), p 1; New York Times, Apr 5, 65;

Washington Post, Apr 5, 65; memo, L.

Unger, Dep Asst SECSTATE for Far

Eastern Affairs and Chmn of VN

Coordinating Cmte to George Ball, Acting

SECSTATE, subj: Recent U.S. Mil

Engagements in NVN and Vicinity; msg,

Wheeler to Sharp, 061616Z Apr 65;

McConnell Notebook, Item 68, 3 Apr 65,

and Item 93, 13 Apr 65; Lavalle, Tale of

Two Bridges, pp 38–40.

18. Msg, 18th TFW to 2d AD,

051740Z Apr 65; Rolling Thunder, pp

32–35; McConnell Notebook, Items 70, 4

Apr 65, and 84, 9 Apr 65; New York Times,

Apr 4, 65; Washington Post, Apr 5, 65.

19. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol I, p 4-14S,

Vol II, p 3-3.

20. Ibid., Vol I, pp 4-14S to 4-14U, Vol

II, p 3-3.

21. CM-534-65, 6 Apr 65.

22. Memo, Maj Gen J.W. Carpenter III,

Asst DCS/Plans, and Ops for JCS to

CSAF, 15 Apr 65, subj: Overall Appraisal

of Air Strikes in NVN, 7 Feb–4 Apr 65.

23. Analysis of Air Ops, 6–12 Apr 65,

Vol II, pp 3-4 to 3-9, and Vol III, 13-19

Apr 65, pp 3-3 to 3-10.

24. CINCPACFLT rpt, The United

States Navy in the Pacific, 1965, pp

49–50; Aviation Week and Space

Technology, Apr 26 65, p 30; New York

Times, Apr 10, 65.

25. Memo, L. Unger, Dep Asst SECSTATE for Far Eastern Affairs to Acting

SECSTATE, Apr 9, 65.

26. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol II, pp 3-8

to 3-9 and Vol IV, pp 3-3 to 3-10.

27. Msg, CINCPACAF to 13th AF, 2d

AD, 161012Z Apr 65; Analysis of Air Ops,

Vol III, p 3-28, Vol IV, pp 3-1 to 3-20.

28. Ibid.

29. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol III, p 3-

28; and Vol IV, pp 3-1 to 3-20.

30. New York Times, Apr 17, 65; David

A. McCormack, Summary of Source

Materiel on the Indochina War

1965–1973, in the Joint Publications

Research Series (Special Report prepared

for Ofc AF Hist, 3 Aug 76).

31. CSAFM-R-40-65, 12 Feb 65.

32. CM-519-65, 2 Mar 65; JCSM-275-

65, 14 Apr 65.

33. Memo, SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 19

Apr 65, subj: SA–2 Sites.

34. Ltr, Lt Gen Joseph H. Moore, Jr.,

Comdr, 2d AD to Maj Gen Robert N.

Ginsburgh, Chief, Ofc AF Hist, 15 Apr 65.

35. Memo, by the J-3 for the JCS on

Air Attack of SA–2 SAM Installations,

annex A to App B (JCS 2343/599-5), 26

Jul 65.

36. Hist, SAC, Jul–Dec 64, Vol II, p

124.

37. Maj Paul W. Elder, Buffalo Hunter,

1970–1972 (Proj CHECO, 1970), p 1. 

38. Msg, 2d AD to all R/T addressees,

050840Z May 65; msg, PACAF to 2d AD,

120208Z Oct 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 2d

AD, et al, 150201Z Apr 65; Capt Mark E.

Smith, USAF Reconnaissance in SEA,

1961–1966, (Proj CHECO, 1967), p 37;

Rpt, Jt Study of Theater ELINT ECM Ops,

JCS 2031/376-17, 18 Oct 65; hist, 363d

Tac Reconnaissance Wing, Jul–Dec 65, pp

31–32 and 38–40; hist, 355th TFW,

Jul–Dec 65, p 28; ltr, CG, Marine

Composite Reconnaissance Sq 1, Marine

Acft Gp 11, 1st Marine Acft Wing (adv),

III Marine Amphibious Force to CMS via

Marine Acft Gp 11, 1st Marine Acft Wing

and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, subj:

Electronic Warfare Special Action Rpt,
336

NOTES TO PAGES 117–127

period 29 Apr 65 to 31 Aug 65; Futrell,

Chron of Significant Air Power Events in

SEA, 1954–1967, p 63; rpt, JCS Prong

Tong Study Report, Surface-to-Air Missile

Problems in North Vietnam, 15 Oct 65

(hereafter cited as JCS Prong Tong Study

Rpt), Vol I, Foreword; Lt Col Robert M.

Burch, Tactical Electronic Warfare

Operations in SEA, 1962– 1968 (Proj

CHECO, 1969), pp 18–19.

39. Capt Melvin F. Porter, Air Tactics

Against NVN Air-Ground Defenses (Proj

CHECO, 1967), pp 14–15.

40. CSAFM-J-77-65, 17 Mar 65;

JCSM-202-65, 20 Mar 65; memo,

SECDEF Chmn JCS, 1 Apr 65, subj:

Immediate Deployment of an F–86 Sq to

Thailand.

41. Msg, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC,

(Personal, Harris to Sharp), 18 Mar 65;

msg, CSAF to PACAF, 232009Z Mar 65;

msg, CINCPACAF to 13 AF, 2d AD, 23

Mar 65.

42. Msg, JCS to CINCONAD, CINCPAC, CSAF, et al, 4 Apr 65.

43. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p

285; Analysis of Air Ops, 6–12 Apr 65,

Vol II, p 3-6, 14 May–3 Jun 65, Vol VI, p

3-55; hist, 8th TFW, Jul–Dec 65, pp 5 and

11.

44. Hist rcrd, Big Eye Task Force MOB

and FOB for period ending 10 Jul 65, in

hist, 552d AEW&C Wing (ADC), 1 Apr

65–30 Jun 65; msg, CINCPACAF to

CINCPAC, 18 Mar 65; Porter, Air Tactics

Against NVN Air-Ground Defenses, pp

21–11; msg, CINCPACAF to 13th AF, 2d

AD, 161012Z Apr 65; memo, Background

Info, Project 5-52/5111, 10 Jun 65 and

Oct 65.

45. Futrell, Chron of Significant Air

Power Events in SEA, 1954–1967, p 62.

46. CSAFM-R-65, 12 Apr 65; msg,

CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 170018Z Apr

65; JCSM-300-65, 22 Apr 65; msg, JCS to

CINCPAC, 130049Z May 65.

47. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars,

p 140.

48. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 411, 436–37, 704–05; Taylor, Swords

and Plowshares, pp 341–42.

49. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 367–58, 411, 436–37, 704–05.

50. Ibid., pp 705–6; minutes of 20 Apr

65 Honolulu Mtg by John T. McNaughton,

Asst SECDEF (ISA), 20 Apr 65;

McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 184–87; Clodfelter, The

Limits of Air Power, pp 66–67.

51. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 230412Z Apr 65.

52. Ltr, Gen Harris to Gen McConnell,

13 May 65, no subj.

53. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 142;

Public Papers of the President, Johnson,

1965, Vol I, pp 448–49, and 454; New

York Times, Apr 28, 65.

54. Transcripts of McNamara’s News

Conferences in Honolulu, Apr 20, 65, and

Andrews AFB, Wash, Apr 22, 65, and at

the White House, Apr 22, 65; News

Release 261–65 by Ofc Asst SECDEF

(PA), Apr 26, 65, Washington Post, Apr

22, 65, New York Times, Apr 27, 65, pp 1

and 12.

55. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 212339Z

Apr 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 13th AF, 2d

AD 221031Z Apr 65; msg, PACAF to

13th CC and 2d AD CC, 210340Z Apr 65;

Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp 86–87.

56. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol IV, 20-29

Apr 65, pp 3-10 and 3-57 to 3-61, Vol V,

30 Apr30–May 65, p 3-20, Vol VI, 14

May–3 Jun 65, p 3-82, Vol VII, 4-10 Jun

65, pp 3-38, 3-44; hist rpt, Chief, Ops

Plans Div, PACAF, Apr 65, in hist,

PACAF, Vol II, 1 Jul 64–30 Jun 65; hist,

34th Tac Gp, 1 Jan–8 Jul 65, pp 10–11.

57. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol IV, pp 3-

21 to 3-95.

58. Msg, PACAF to 13th AF, 2d AD,

210340Z Apr 65; Lavalle, Tale of Two

Bridges, p 42.

59. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 290056Z

Apr 65 and 051832Z May 65; msg,

CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, et al, 29081Z Apr 65; msg,

CINCPACAF to 13th AF, 2d AD 291940Z

Apr 65.

60. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol V, 30

Apr–13 May 65, pp 3-7, 3-8, 3-31 to 3-36,
337

NOTES TO PAGES 127–135

3-64 to 3-69; hist, 313th AD, Jul–Dec 65,

pp 162–64; New York Times May 9, 65.

61. Msgs, PACAF to 13th AF, 2d AD,

140505Z May 65 and 13th AF to CINCPACAF, 150500Z May 65.

62. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol V, 30

Apr–13 May 65, pp 3-7, 3-8, 3-31 to 3-36,

3-64 to 3-69.

63. Ibid., 3-76 to 3-77; memos, Wm P.

Bundy, Asst SECSTATE for Far Eastern

Affairs to SECSTATE, Apr 19, 65, subj:

Planning for R/T 12, Action Memo, Apr

26, 65.

64. Memos, Seymour Weiss, Director

for Combined Policy, Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson,

Jr., Amb-at-Large, Ofc, SECSTATE, Apr

23, 65, subj: VN Mil Actions, and Weiss

to Lewis Hoffacker, Dep Executive Secy,

Director, Ops Center, State Dept, Apr 27,

65, subj: Tuesday Luncheon Item.

65. Msg, PACAF to 13th AF, 2d AD,

140505Z May 65; msg, 13th AF to CINCPACAF, 150500Z May 65.

66. Memo, SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 26

Apr 65, subj: Interdiction of Dredging

Ops in Haiphong Harbor; msg, CINCPAC

to CNO, 290743Z Apr 65; JCSM-350-65,

12 May 65.

67. Memo, SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 18

May 65, subj: Dredging Ops in NVN.

68. NSAM-328, 6 Apr 65.

69. Msg, Jt MACV-USIS-Embassy

Saigon (Taylor) to Secy State 260930Z

Mar 65; Rolling Thunder, p 74; New York

Times Apr 18 and 20 65; msg, 2d AD to

All Rolling Thunder Addressees 110950Z

Apr 65; New York Times, Apr 15, 65, p 1;

Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr 29, 65.

70. Intvw, Hearst Papers Newspaper

Panel with McNamara, New York Journal

American, May 9, 65.

71. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 120314Z

May 65; msg, PACAF to 2d AD, 162355Z

May 65; PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air

Ops, SEA (as of 12 May 65), 1965, pp

1–6.

72. Analysis of Air Ops, Vol V, 30

Apr–13 May 65, pp 3-7, 3-8; Clodfelter,

The Limits of Air Power, p 132.

73. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air

Power, pp 130–31.

Chapter 5

1. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

362–68; McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Restrospect, pp 184–86; Sharp, Strategy

for Defeat, pp 81–84.

2. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

366–68.

3. Msgs, OSD (State-Def msg) to

CINCPAC, Amb Taylor, 112359Z May 65

and CINCPAC to CINCARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF, 122318Z May

65.

4. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 162031Z

May 65; hist, 313th AD, 1 Jan–30 Jun 65,

p 311; Greenhalgh, USAF Reconnaissance

in SEA, 1960–1975, p 182.

5. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol II, pp

369–74; Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

136–37; New York Times Jun 28, 72, p 19;

Public Papers of the Presidents, Johnson,

Vol I, p 522; msg, OSD-State-Def to Amb

Taylor, CINCPAC, 112359Z May 65.

6. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 162031Z

May 65; hist, 313th AD, 1 Jan–30 Jun 65,

p 311.

7. Msg, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC,

180141Z May 65; Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum

of Air Ops, SEA, Vol VI, 14 May–3 Jun

65, pp 1-1 to 1-2; DIA Bull, 18 May 65, p

F-2.

8. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp

371–74.

9. Ibid.; Washington Post, May 17, 65,

p 1; and May 19, 65, p 1, New York Times,

May 19, 65, p 1; Johnson, The Vantage

Point, p 137.

10. New York Times, May 19, 65, p 1.

11. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 137;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, pp 375,

378; memo, Maj Gen J.W. Carpenter III,

Asst DCS/Plans & Ops for JCS Letters to

CSAF, subj: Modification of Rolling

Thunder Program; 19 May 65; Clodfelter,
338

NOTES TO PAGES 135–145

The Limits of Air Power, p 67.

12. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p

375; memo, Carpenter to CSAF,

Modification of Rolling Thunder

Program, 19 May 65.

13. Memo, Carpenter to CSAF, subj:

Modification of Rolling Thunder

Program, 19 May 65; JCSM-394-65, 20

May 65; JCSM-404-65, 22 May 65;

Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp 77–80.

14. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III,

pp 381–82

15. Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol VI, 14 May–3 Jun 65, pp 1-1;

msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 171201Z May 65;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol III, p 378;

memo, W.P. Bundy to SECSTATE, May

10, 65, subj: FE/INR Comments on R/T

15.

16. Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol VI, 14 May–3 Jun 65, pp 3-1 to

3-11, 3-14 to 3-47; New York Times, May

21, 22, and 23, 65.

17. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 222235Z

May 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 13th AF,

2d AD, 231517Z May 65; msg, PACAF to

13th AF and 2d AD, 282345Z May 65;

msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 272233Z May 65;

memo, W.P. Bundy to SECSTATE, May

25, 65, subj: FE/INR Comments on R/T:

msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC,

240105Z Jun 65.

18. Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum Or Air

Ops, SEA, Vol VI, 14 May–3 Jun 65, pp 3-

10 to 3-13, 3-49 to 3-74.

19. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 111659Z

and 152030Z Jun 65; msg, CINCPAC TO

CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 161814Z Jun 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 13th AF, 2d AD, 240755Z and

240331Z Jun 65; msg, CINCPACAF to

CINCPAC, 120235Z Jun 65; msg, JCS to

CINCPAC, 292236Z Jun 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 13th AF, 2d AD, 301700Z Jun

65; hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p 333;

Hq USAF rpts, Stat Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol VIII, 11–24 Jun 65, pp 3-5 to 3-8, Vol

IX, 25 Jun–8 Jul 65, pp 3-1 to 3-11;

Baltimore Sun, Jun 24, 65.

20. Hist, 12th TFS, 1 Jul–31 Dec 65,

pp 3–4.

21. Abstract from Ops Analysis

Working Paper 27, subj: An Analysis of

Air Strikes Against Bridges in NVN, prepared by Ops Analysis Ofc, Hqs PACAF, 6

Aug 65.

22. Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol VIII, 11–24 Jun 65, pp 3-123 to

3-128, tab 3B.

23. Ibid., Vol IX, 25 Jun–8 Jul 65, pp

3-1 to 3-11; New York Times, Jun 29, 65.

24. Stat Sum of Air Ops, Vol VIII,

11–24 Jun 65, pp 3-123 to 3-128, and tab

3B; Hearings before Senate Committee on

Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1974

Authorization for Military Procurement,

Research, and Development ... and Active

Duty and Selected Reserve Strengths.

25. DIA Bull, 24 May 65; PACOM

WID No 9-65, 26 Feb 65 and No 20-65,

14 May 65.

26. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, et

al, 292320Z May 65; msgs, 2d AD to 13th

AF, 011259Z, 011300Z, 011000Z,

011006Z Jun 65; msg, CINCPACAF to

CINCPAC, 030235Z Jun 65; msg, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC 040027Z Jun 65;

Rolling Thunder, pp 55–56.

27. Msg, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC,

030235Z Jun 65; msg, CINCPACFLT to

CINCPAC, 040027Z Jun 65; msg,

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 101024z

Jun 65; JCSM-415-65, 27 May 65; USAF

Mgt Digest, SEA, 7 Jun 65, p 39.

28. JCSM-442-65, 7 Jun 65.

29. Memo, SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 15

Jun 65; memo, Col Frank F. Kaufman,

Ofc Dir/Plans to CSAF, 28 Aug 65, subj:

Ops Against NVN.

30. CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy

in the Pacific, 1965, pp 90–92; hist, 313th

AD, Jul 64–Jun 65, Vol I, p xi; New York

Times, Jun 18, 65, p 2.

31. CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy

in the Pacific, 1965, pp 92–96; New York

Times, Jun 22, 65.

32. Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol VII, 11–24 Jun 65, p 3-6.

33. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, An B,

USMACTHAI, pp 22–24; EOT rpt by
339

NOTES TO PAGES 145–156

Brig Gen John R. Murphy, 15 Jun 66;

EOT rpt, by Brig Gen Murphy, 15 Jun 66;

Helmka and Hale, USAF Ops from

Thailand, 1964–1965, pp 7–9; hist, CINCPAC, An B, USMACTHAI, pp 22–24;

Futrell, Chron of Significant Air Power

Events in SEA, 1954–1967, pp 35 and 60.

34. USAF Mgt Digest, SEA, 16 Jul 65,

p 14 and 3 Sep 65, pp 8 and 9.

35. Ibid., 16 Jul 65, pp 4–5; EOT rpt

by Capt George W. Baker, 13th Recon

Tech Sq, 1 Dec 65.

36. Futrell, Chron of Significant Air

Power Events, pp 59–69.

37. Helmka and Hale, USAF Ops from

Thailand, 1964–1965, pp 8–9; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Ops in SEA,

1965, p 49; memo, SECDEF to Pres, Sep

22 65, no subj.

38. Helmka and Hale, USAF Ops from

Thailand, 1964–1965, pp 9–13; msg,

CINCPACAF TO 5th AF, 13th AF, et al,

250216Z Jun 665; hist, 2d AD, Jan–Jun

65, Vol I, pp 12–14; hist, MACV, 1965, p

50; Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, pp

82–83; Records of Regular and Reserve

Officer Matters, Ofc of Asst Dep COFS

For Manpower and Personnel, Hqs USAF.

39. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p

313; hist, MACV, 1965, pp 92–93; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in

SVN, 1961–1963, pp 14–17.

40. Hist, MACV, 1965, pp 92–93; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Ops in SEA,

1965, pp 43–44.

41. Memo, Ofc, Combined Plans Div,

Dir/Plans, Dir/Plans, Hqs USAF to CSAF,

27 Apr 65; JCS 2448/3, 26 May 65;

JCSM-319-65, 28 Apr 65; hist,

MACV,1965, pp 102–3; hist, CINCPAC,

1965, Vol II, p 313, An B; hist, USMACTHAI, 1965, apps F3 and F4; Momyer,

Air Power in Three Wars, p 82; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Ops in SEA,

1965, p 44.

42. Memo, Maj Gen S.J. McKee,

Dir/Plans, Hq USAF to CSAF, 19 Jul 65,

subj: Issue Raised by SECDEF As a

Result of Trip to VN.

43. Msg, Amembassy Saigon to State

No 108, Jul 11 65; CIA Weekly Sum, Jun

11 65, p 1.

44. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p

345; Baltimore Sun, Jun 8, 65; John

Schlight, The War In South Vietnam: The

Years of the Offensive (Ofc AF Hist,

1988), pp 58–60; Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, p 178.

45. Hist, MACV, 1965, p 35; Sharp

and Westmoreland, Report on the War, p

98; msgs 17988 and 19995, CINCPACAF

to CSAF, 8 Jun 65; msg, CINCPAC to

COMUSMACV, 130083Z Jun 65; memo,

Germeraad to CSAF, 24 Jun 65, subj:

Additional Deployments to SVN; JCSM457-65, 11 Jun 65; Taylor, Swords and

Plowshares, pp 344; Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports, pp 180–81; McNamara

and VanDemark, In Retrospect, pp

186–90.

46. Msgs 17988 and 17995, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 8 Jun 65.

47. New York Times, Jun 17, 65.

48. Memo, Carpenter to CSAF, 20 Jun

65, subj: Targeting in NVN; CSAFM-86-

65, 21 Jun 65.

49. Col F. L. Kaufman, Asst Dep Dir,

DCS/Plans to CSAF, 27 Jun 65, subj: Air

Strikes Against NVN, with atch

Background Paper on Air strikes in NVN.

50. CSAFM-M-105-65, 30 Jun 65.

51. McConnell Notebook, Item 186,

26 Jun 65.

52. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

1 and 24.

53. Record of Questions and Answers

at Mtg between Secy McNamara and His

Party, Ambassador Taylor and His Staff,

and COMUSMACV and his Staff, Jul 16,

65; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p 288;

Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 144; Van

Staaveren, USAF Plans and Ops in SEA,

1965, pp 45–47; hist, MACV, 1965, pp

42–43; DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 4, p

110; transcript of SECDEF questions and

Taylor’s Replies in JCS 2343/637, 22 Jul

65; msg, CINCPAC to Amembassy

Vientiane, COMUSMACV, 260330Z Jun

65; McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 200–03.

54. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

26–32, 619–22; McNamara and
340

NOTES TO PAGES 156–165

VanDeMark, In Retrospect, pp 203– 05.

55. Jack Valenti, A Very Human

President (New York: W. W. Norton,

1975), pp 319–56.

56. Public Papers of the Presidents,

Johnson, 1965, Vol II, pp 794–803;

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp

182–85; McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 201–06.

57. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 050300Z

Jun 65; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 201207Z Jun 65; msg, JCS to

CINCPAC et al, 062224Z Jul 65; msg,

CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and COMUSMACV, 070320Z Jul

65; hist, CINCPAC, Vol II, 1965, p 333.

58. Msgs JCS to CINCPAC et al,

062224Z Jul 65; msg, CINCPAC to

CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and

COMUSMACV, 070320Z Jul 65; Hq

USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol

IX, 9–22 Jul 65, pp 3–6; Hq PACAF rpt,

Summary of Air Ops, SEA, Vol II, 9–22 Jul

65, p 3-1; msg, JCS to CINCPAC,

082113Z Jul 65.

59. Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol X, 9–22 Jul 65, pp 3-1 to 3-8 and

p 3-38; Washington Post, Jul 13, 65, p 1.

60. New York Times, Jul 13, 65, and Jul

14, 65, p 5; hist, 12th TFS, 1 Jul–31 Dec

65, pp 4–5.

61. Washington Post, Jul 15, 65, p A8.

62. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol II, 9–22 Jul 65, pp 3-A-3, to 3-

A-16.

63. Hist, Dir/Ops, Jan–Jun 65, pp

63–64; hist, 8th TFW, 1 Jul–31 Dec 65, p

5; New York Times, Jul 11, 65, p 1; R.

Frank Futrell, ed, Aces and Aerial

Victories (The Albert F. Simpson Hist

Research Center and Ofc AF Hist, 1976),

pp 22–26, 118.

64. Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol X, 9–22 Jul 65, pp 3–132.

65. Ibid., pp 3-126 to 3-131.

66. New York Times, Jul 11, 65, p 3.

67. Hqs MATS S. O. G-81, 25 Jun 65;

hist, 38th Air Rescue Sq 1 Jul–30 Sep 65;

USAF Fact Sheet on USAF in SEA, Nov

1965, p 27.

68. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 271315Z Oct 65; msg, CINCPAC to

DIA 312209Z Oct 65; NMCC OPSUM169-65, 22 Jul 65; Rolling Thunder, pp

74–75.

69. Memo by J-3 for the JCS on Air

Attack on SA–2 SAM Installations, An A

to App B (JCS 2343/599-5), 26 Jul 65.

70. DIA Bull, 6 Jul 65, p F-4;

CSAFM-F-34-65, 2 Jul 65; JCSM-529-65,

3 Jul 65; CSAFM-F-40-65, 7 Jul 65; New

York Herald Tribune, Jul 12, 65.

Chapter 6

1. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, 377-

78; Burch, Tactical Electronic Warfare

Operations in SEA, 1962–1968, p 28;

msg, CINCPAC to AIG 830, 280210Z Jul

65; Hq USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, 23 Jul–5 Aug 65, Vol XI, pp 3-25, 3-

26, 3-29; USAF Mgt Digest, SEA, 13 Aug

65, p 16; New York Times, Jul 28, 65, p 1;

Washington Post, Aug 7, 65, pp 1, A-13;

NMCC OPSUM-174-65, 28 Jul 65; msg,

Wheeler to Sharp and Westmoreland,

301641Z Jul 65; Earl H. Tilford,

Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in

Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M

University, Press, 1993), p 82.

2. Msg, Amembassy Bangkok to

Amembassy Saigon, 290529Z Jul 65.

3. Msg AFIN 40776, CINCPACAF to

CSAF, 30 Jul 65.

4. PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air Ops,

SEA, 6th ed, 5 Jul 65, p 9; CIA Weekly

Sum, Aug 13, 65, p 5; msg, CINCPAC to

CINCPACAF, 292344Z Jul 65.

5. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, 292125Z Jul 65.

6. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p 378;

JCS Prong Tong Study Rpt, Vol II, App 1;

Tilford, Crosswinds, pp 81–83.

7. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p 378;

Greenhalgh, USAF Reconnaissance in

SEA, 1960–1975, p 194.
341

NOTES TO PAGES 166–173

8. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol IV, pp 3-1 and 3-10 and 3-11;

CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy in the

Pacific, 1965, p 128; hist, 313th AD,

Jul–Dec 65, pp 168–70.

9. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp

378–79.

10. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol IV, 6–19 Aug 65, pp 3-1, 3-A-2,

3-A-10.

11. Ibid., p 3-2, 3-11, 3-A-10; CINCPACFLT rpt, U.S. Navy in the Pacific,

1965, pp 129–31; New York Times, Aug

13, 65; DIA Bull 156-65, 12 Aug 65; hist,

CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp 379–80;

Aviation Week and Space Digest, Aug 16,

65, p 43.

12. DJSM-964-65, 20 Aug 65; ltr, Gen

W. H. Blanchard, Vice CSAF to Deputies,

Dirs, and Chiefs Of Comparable Ofcs, 13

Aug 65, subj: Acft Attrition; hist, Dir/Ops,

Jul–Dec 65, p 146.

13. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p

379; PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air Ops,

SEA, 8th ed, 19 Aug 65, p 5 and 9th ed, 2

Sep 65, p 8; Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air

Ops, SEA, Vol IV, 6–19 Aug 65, pp 3-A-2

to 3-A-3.

14. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p

379; memo, Rear Adm John J. Hyland,

Ofc CNO to SN, 26 Aug 65, subj: Navy

Air Ops, SEA, in JCS Prong Tong Study

Rpt, App 2.

15. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol IV, 6–19 Aug 65, pp 3-1, 3-A-2,

3-A-10.

16. Ibid., p 3-2, 3-11, and 3-A-10;

CINCPACFLT rpt, U.S. Navy in the

Pacific, 1965, pp 129–31; New York Times,

Aug 13, 65; DIA Bull 156-65, 12 Aug 65;

hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp 379–80;

Aviation Week and Space Digest, Aug 16,

65, p 43.

17. DJSM-964-65, 20 Aug 65; ltr, Gen

W. H. Blanchard, Vice CSAF to Deputies,

Dirs, and Chiefs Of Comparable Ofcs, 13

Aug 65, subj: Acft Attrition; hist, Dir/Ops,

Jul–Dec 65, p 146.

18. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p

379; PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air Ops,

SEA, 8th ed, 19 Aug 65, p 5 and 9th ed, 2

Sep 65, p 8; Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air

Ops, SEA, Vol IV, 6–19 Aug 65, pp 3-A-2

to 3-A-3.

19. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p

379; memo, Rear Adm John J. Hyland,

Ofc, CNO to SN, 26 Aug, 65, subj: Navy

Air Ops, SEA, in JCS Prong Tong Study

Rpt, App 2.

20. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 172220Z

Aug 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 2d AD,

181637Z Aug 65. 

21. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol V, 20 Aug–2 Sep 65, pp 3-1, 3-A-5.

22. CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy

in the Pacific, 1965, p 132; DIA Bull 163-

65, 23 Aug 65; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air

Ops, SEA, Vol V, 20 Aug–2 Sep 65, pp 3-1

to 3-A-5; New York Times, Aug 26, 65.

23. CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy

in the Pacific, 1965, p 132; CIA Weekly

Sum, Aug 27, 65, p 5.

24. PACOM WID No 47-65, 19 Nov

65, p 7.

25. Ibid.

26. PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air OPS,

SEA, 9th ed, 2 Sep 65, pp 1, 8, and 19;

PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol IV,

pp 3-1 thru 3-6, Vol V, 20 Aug–2 Sep 65,

pp 3-1 to 3-7; Wesley R.C. Melyan and

Lee Bonetti, Rolling Thunder, Jul 65–Dec

66 (Project CHECO, 1967), p 6; New York

Times, Sep 1, 65, p 4; DIA Bull 187-65,

17 Sep 65, p F-3.

27. Msg, NMCC-216-65, 16 Sep 65;

and NMCC 217-65, 17 Sep 65; JCS

Prong Tong Study Rpt, Vol II, App 3, Tab

A, App 5 to Annex B; PACAF DI rpt,

Effects of Air Ops, SEA, 10th ed, 16 Sep

65, p 7, 11th ed, 30 Sep 65, pp 11–12;

PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, 3–16

Sep 65, Vol VI, pp 3-A-12 to 3-A-19, 17

30 Sep 65, Vol XI, pp 3-A-1 to 3-A-12.

28. Robinson Risner, The Passing of

the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner

of the North Vietnamese (New York:

Random House, 1973), pp 7–10.

29. JCS Prong Tong Study Rpt, Vol II,

App 3, Tab A, App 5 to Annex B; PACAF

DI rpt, Effects of Air Ops, SEA, 10th ed,

16 Sep 65, p 7, 11th ed, 30 Sep 65, pp

11–12.
342

NOTES TO PAGES 173–182

30. PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air Ops,

SEA, 11th ed, 30 Sep 65, pp 11–12.

31. Msg, 2d AD to PACAF, 191276Z

Sep 65; PACAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol VI, 3–16 Sep 65, p 3-2.

32. PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air Ops,

SEA, 11th ed, 30 Sep 65, p 12.

33. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 032148Z

Aug 65; and msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, 040315Z Aug 65.

34. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, 2d AD, FMFPAC,

et al, 151942Z Aug 65.

35. JCS Prong Tong Study Rpt, Vol II,

Tab A to App 3 to An B; JCS Armed

Reconnaissance Study Group Rpt, subj:

An Analysis of Armed Reconnaissance

Program in NVN, 15 Nov 65, App 3 to

Annex A, p 1; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air

Ops, SEA, Vol V, 20 Aug–2 Sep 65; msg,

PACAF to CINCPAC, 221054Z Aug 65.

36. JCS Prong Tong Study Rpt, Vol II,

Tab A to App B to Annex B; Greenhalgh,

USAF Reconnaissance in SEA,

1960–1975, pp 194–95.

37. Greenhalgh, USAF Reconnaissance

in SEA, 1960–1975, p 195.

38. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 312141Z

Aug 65.

39. Msgs, 2d AD to CINCPACAF,

291323Z Jul 65, Amembassy Bangkok to

13th AF, 200847Z Aug 65, and JCS to

CINCPAC, 302142Z Aug 65.

40. Futrell, Chron of Significant Air

Power Events in SEA, 1954–1967, p 75;

CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy in the

Pacific, 1965, pp 129, 160–61, and 208;

Hq USAF DCS/P&O rpt, Southeast Asia

Counter Air Alternatives, 20 Apr 66, p B29.

41. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 212259Z

Jul 65; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 220100Z

Jul 65.

42. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, 23 Jul–5 Aug 65, Vol III, pp 3-A-1

to 3-A-13; PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air

Ops, SEA, 7th ed, 5 Aug 65, p 23; Hq

USAF rpt, Stat Sum of Air Ops, SEA, 23

Jul–5 Aug 65, Vol XI, p 3-8; PACAF rpt,

Out-Country Strike Operations in SEA, 12

Feb 65–23 Dec 65, Subtask 1b, 23 Oct 70,

pp 128–29 (hereafter cited as Out-Country

Strike Ops, SEA, 12 Feb 65–23 Dec 65);

hist, 12th TFS, 1 Jul– 31 Dec 65, p 6;

msg, NMCC OPSUM 176-65, 30 Jul 65;

msg, NMCC OPSUM-177-65, 31 Jul 65.

43. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA; Vol IV, 6–19 Aug 65, pp 3-1 to 3-5,

3-A-1 to 3-A-12; CM-863-65, 25 Sep 65.

44. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 172200Z

Aug 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 2d AD,

181637Z Aug 65.

45. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol V, 19 Aug–2 Sep 65, pp 3-1 to 3-13;

New York Times, Aug 24, 65; Baltimore

Sun, Aug 24, 65.

46. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol IV, 6–19 Aug 65, pp 3-2 to 3-6, Vol V,

20 Aug–2 Sep 65, pp 3-1 to 3-5; Futrell,

Chron of Significant Air Power Events in

SEA, 1954–1967, p 72; Herman S. Wolk,

USAF Logistic Plans and Policies in SEA,

1965 (USAF Hist Div Liaison Ofc, 1967),

pp 38–45.

47. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol IV, 6–19 Aug 65, pp 3-1 to 3-6, Vol V,

20 Aug–2 Sep 65, pp 3-1 to 3-5.

48. Memo, Col J. C. Berger, Asst for Jt

Matters, Dir of Ops, DCS/Plans and Ops

Hqs USAF to CSAF, 2 Sept 65, subj:

Second Supplemental Brief; msg, CINCPACAF to 2d AD, 040214Z Sep 65.

49. New York Herald Tribune, Sep 27,

65.

50. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol VI, 3–16 Sep 65, pp 3-A-1 and 3-A-2;

hist, 313th AD, Jul–Dec 65, Vol I, pp

182–87.

51. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol VI, 3–16 Sep 65, pp 3-2, 3-B-1, Vol

VII, 17–30 Sep 65, pp 3-3, 3-B-1; msg,

CSAF to AFSC, TAC, AFLC, 13 Sep 65.

52. Maj Victor B. Anthony, Tactics and

Techniques of Night Operations,

1961–1970, (Ofc AF Hist, 1976), p 114ff;

2AD Study, A Preliminary Comparison of

Night Operations.

53. Washington Post, Sep 18, 65, p 1

and Sep 20, 65, p 8; Baltimore Sun, Sep

20, 65; Chicago Tribune, Sep 20, 65; hist,
343

NOTES TO PAGES 182–192

MACV, 1965, p 204; PACAF DI rpt,

Effects of Air Ops, SEA, 30 Sep 65, p 4;

msg, 2d Ad to PACAF.

54. Washington Post, Sep 21, 65, p 1

and Sep 22, 65, p A16.

55. Msg, PACAF to CINCPAC,

201223Z Sep 65; msg, 2d AD to CINCPAC, 200511Z Sep 65; msg, PACAF to

CINCPAC, 200626; msg, PACAF to

CINCPAC, 201340Z Sep 65 (in CINCPAC

microfilm collection for Sep 65);

Washington Post, Sep 21, 65, p 1, Sep 22,

65, p A16; Smith, USAF Reconnaissance

in SEA, 1961–1966, pp 55–56.

56. Memo, William P. Bundy to John T.

McNaughton, Asst SECDEF (ISA), 16

Sep 65, subj: Rolling Thunder; memo,

McNaughton to Chmn JCS, 22 Sep 65,

subj: Rolling Thunder.

57. CM-876-65, 24 Sep 65; msg, JCS

to CINCPAC, 281858Z Oct 65.

58. Msg, CINCPACAF to 2d AD and

CSAF (Personal, Harris to Gens Moore

and McConnell), 300546Z Sep 65.

59. Minutes of Air Force Commanders

Conference (Edited Excerpts), Nov 65.

60. Intvw, Col Franklin D. Lown, Jr.,

Dir/Intel, Hqs 2d AD, Apr 65–May 66, by

Capt Robert M. Snakenberg and Lt Col

James C. Enney (Proj Corona Harvest

Oral Hist Intvw No 319), 4 Nov 69.

61. CM-863, 23 Sep 65 (JCS

2343/598-4), 27 Sep 65.

62. PACAF DI rpts, Effects of Air Ops,

SEA, 16 Sep 65, pp 4–11, 30 Sep 65, pp

1–14.

63. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol VI, 3–16 Sep 65, pp 3-2, 3-B-1, Vol

VI, 17–30 Sep 65, pp 3-3, 3-B-1, Vol X,

29 Oct–11 Nov 65, p 9-C-1; msg, CSAF

to AFSC, TAC, AFLC, 13 Sep 65; hist,

MACV, 1965, p 203.

64. PACAF DI rpts, Effects Of Air Ops,

SEA, 6 Jul 65, p 9, 30 Sep 65, p 12; DIA

Bull-214-65, 3 Nov 65; U.S. ARPAC Bull,

Apr 65; PACOM WID-32-65, 6 Aug 65;

PACOM WID 24-66, 24 Jun 66; JCS

Study Gp rpt, An Analysis of the Armed

Reconnaissance Program in NVN, 15 Nov

65, Annex F, p 8.

65. JCS Study Gp rpt, An Analysis of

the Armed Reconnaissance Program in

NVN, 15 Nov 65; App 1 to Annex F; Tab

D to Annex D to App A to Sec II.

66. Memo, Adm David L. McDonald,

CNO to Chmn JCS, 20 Sep 65, subj: Air

Strikes on NVN; memo, Col Heath

Bottomley, Asst Secy JCS, 20 Sep 65,

subj: Note to Control Div on CNO’s Trip

Rpt; msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV,

240855Z Sep 65.

67. Memo, McKee to CSAF, 3 Aug 65,

subj: R/T 26/27; USAF Mgt Sum, SEA,

27 Aug 65, p 7.

68. Msg 90300, CSAF to CINCPACAF

(Personal, McKee to Harris), 31 Jul 65.

69. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 220043Z

Aug 65.

70. JCSM-670-65, 2 Sep 65; PACAF

rpt, Out-Country Strike Ops in SEA, 12

Feb 65–23 Dec 65, Vol I, Subtask 1b, pp

134–35.

71. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol VI, 3–16 Sep 65, pp 3-0 through 3-16.

72. Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, p

334.

73. Baltimore Sun, Sep 10, 65; msgs,

Sharp to Wheeler, 100004Z Sep 65, Sharp

to Westmoreland, 100002Z Sep 65, and

Westmoreland to Sharp, 110115Z Sep 65.

74. Talking Paper for Chmn JCS on an

Item to be Discussed at JCS Mtg, 10 Sep

65, subj: Air Strikes on NVN; JCSM-686-

65, 11 Sep 65; memo, SECDEF to Chmn

JCS, 15 Sep 65, subj: Air Strikes Against

NVN; memo, SECDEF to DIA, 15 Sep

65, no subj.

75. Intvw, Secys McNamara and Rusk

on CBS Face the Nation, Aug 9, 65.

76. Hq PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol VII, 1–14 Oct 65, pp 3-1 to 3-5,

Vol IX, 15–28 Oct 65, pp 1-1 to 1-2;

CINCPACFLT rpt, 5 Oct 65; NMCC

OPSUM-232-65, 6 Oct 65; hist, CINCPAC 1965, Vol II, pp 380–81; Washington

Post, Oct 6, 65, p A10; New York Herald

Tribune, Oct 6, 65; New York Times, Oct

18, 65, p 1.

77. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol X, 29 Oct–11 Nov 65, pp 2-A-3 thru
344

NOTES TO PAGES 193–201

2-A-11; CINCPACFLT rpt, The U.S. Navy

in the Pacific, 1965, p 160; hist, 355th

TFW, 1 Jul 65–31 Dec 65, pp 31–33;

Burch, Tactical Electronic Warfare

Operations in SEA, 1962–1968, pp 28–29;

Washington Post, Nov 2, 65.

78. Msgs, NMCC OPSUMS-259-65,

5 Nov 65, 260-65, 6 Nov 65, and 261-

65, 8 Nov 65; msg, CINCPAC to

NMCC (Lt Gen Emerick to Vice Adm

Mustin), 10 Nov 65; msg, NMCC to

CINCPAC (Vice Adm Mustin to Lt Gen

Emerick), 102119Z Nov 65; Aviation

Week and Space Technology, Nov 22,

65, New York Times, Nov 7, 65, p 1, and

Nov 8, 65; Baltimore Sun, Nov 9, 65,

p 2.

79. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XI, 12–25 Nov 65, 2-2 to 2-4, 2-A-2

and 2-A-8; Weekly Sum, 19 Nov 65, p 4;

Washington Post, Nov 17, 65; New York

Times, Nov 18, 65; Baltimore Sun, Nov

23, 65.

80. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XII, 26 Nov–9 Dec 65, pp 2-2 and 2-

A-1; msg, NMCC Ops Sum-277-65, 29

Nov 65; New York Times, Nov 28, 65.

81. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol VII, 10–23 Dec 65, pp 2-4, 2-A-2.

82. Report of Air Staff Task Force on

Surface-to-Surface Missiles, 23 Sep 65;

JCS Prong Tong Study Rpt, Vol I, pp 28–3,

Vol II, App 1, Vol III, Tab 1; memo, Maj

L.G. Sorrell, Electronic Warfare Div,

Dir/Ops, Hq USAF to CSAF, 9 Oct 65,

subj: Jamming Capability.

83. McConnell Notebook, Item 302, 5

Oct 66; Greenhalgh, USAF

Reconnaissance in SEA, 1960–1975, pp

195–96.

84. PACAF rpt, In-Country and OutCountry Strike Ops in SEA, Vol IV,

Support: Electronic Warfare, 30 Sep 70,

pp 38–39; USAF Mgt Sum, SEA, 1 Oct 65,

p 9, 5 Nov 65, p 43; hist, 355th TFW,

Jul–Dec 65, p 33, doc 22.

85. Briefing Bk on SEA, subj: Trip

Brochure for Secy Brown’s Visit to SEA

(prepared by Dir/Plans and Ops, Hq

USAF), 29 Dec 65, Bk I, p 74; Hq 2d

AD OPORD 525-65, 4 Nov 65; Porter,

Air Tactics Against NVN Air-Ground

Defenses, pp 18–21; Col Gordon E.

Danforth, Iron Hand/Wild Weasel

(Special Proj Corona Harvest Rpt, 1970),

p 5.

86. Msg, 6234th TFW, Korat RTAFB

to 2d AD, 21 Dec 65; msg, 2d AD to

6234th TFW, 300645Z Dec 65; PACAF

rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol XII, 10–23

Dec 65, p 2-A-8; trip rpt, Air Staff AntiSAM Task Force Field Trip to SEA, 5–14

Dec 65 (undated).

87. Bernard C. Nalty, Tactics and

Techniques in Electronic Warfare:

Electronic Countermeasures in the Air

War Against North Vietnam (Ofc AF Hist,

1967), pp 40–41; Momyer, Air Power in

Three Wars, pp 130–31.

Chapter 7

1. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF,

CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 300347Z

Sep 65; msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 131846Z

and 132345Z Oct 65; msg, CINCPAC to

CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, et al,

140015Z Oct 65; msg, CINCPACAF to 2d

AD, 1400945Z Oct 65; msg, JCS to

CINCPAC, 281858Z Oct 65; msg, JCS to

CINCPAC, 232227Z Nov 65; msg, JCS to

CINCPAC, 090002Z Dec 65; PACAF DI

rpt, Effects of Air Ops, SEA, 25 Nov 65, p

22; hist, CINCPAC, 1965, Vol II, pp

364–376.

2. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol VII, 1–14 Oct 65, pp 3-1 to 3-5, Vol

IX, 15–28 Oct 65, pp 1-1 to 1-2; CINCPACFLT rpt, U.S. Navy in the Pacific,

1965, pp 133–35, 210; hist, CINCPAC,

1965, Vol II, pp 380–81; msgs, NMCC

OPSUM-232-54, 5 Oct 65 and OPSUM233-65, 6 Oct 65; Washington Post, Oct

6, 65, p A-10; New York Herald Tribune,

Oct 6, 65; and New York Times, Oct 18,

65, p 1; msg, CINCPACAF to 2d AD, 5

Oct 68; msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 1222151

Jul 65.
345

NOTES TO PAGES 201–212

3. DIA Bull-277-65, 8 Nov 65; PACAF

rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol VIII, 1–14

Oct 65, p 3-28, Vol IX, 15–28 Oct 65, pp

1-2 to 1-5; Vol X, 29 Oct–11 Nov 65, p 2-

9, and Vol XI, 12–15 Nov 65, p 2-9.

4. Msgs, NMCC OPSUM 267-65, 16

Nov 65 and 276-65, 27 Nov 65; PACAF

rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol XI, 12–25

Nov 65, pp 2-3, 2-4, 2-A-13, 6-6; Weekly

WID Sum, 19 Nov 65; Porter, Air Tactics

Against NVN Air-Ground Defenses, pp

22–24.

5. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT

and CINCPACAF, 201945Z Nov 65.

6. Memo, McKee, Dir/Plans to CSAF,

10 Nov 65, subj: Air Ops Against NVN

POL System; JCSM-910-65; JCSM-811-

65, 10 Nov 65; PACAF rpt, Out-Country

Ops in SEA, 12 Feb–23 Dec 65, Subtask

1b, pp 40–42.

7. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

622–23.

8. Kraslow and Loory, The Secret

Search for Peace in Vietnam, pp 129–35.

9. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 090002 Dec

65; memo, Lt Gen F. Carroll, Dir DIA to

SECDEF, 21 Jan 66, subj: An Appraisal of

Bombing in NVN; Facts on File, South

Vietnam, 1961–65, pp 141–42; New York

Times, Dec 16, 65.

10. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XIII, 10–23 Dec 65, pp 2-A-1 thru 2-

A-27.

11. PACAF DI rpt, Effects of Air Ops,

SEA, 23 Dec 65, p 13; PACAF rpt, Sum of

Air Ops, SEA, Vol XIII, pp 2-2 and 2-4 and

2-A-1, 2-A-21, and 2-A-22; msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 140147Z Dec 65; msg, JCS to

CINCPAC, 16 Dec 65; New York Times,

Dec 16, 65, p 11, Dec 21, 65, p 1, Dec 24,

65, p 3; Washington Post, Dec 17, 65;

memo, Carroll to SECDEF, 21 Jan 66, subj:

An Appraisal of the Bombing of NVN.

12. Memo, Col J. C. Berger, Asst Dir

for Jt Matters, Dir/Ops to CSAF, 21 Dec

65, subj: Jt Staff Actions Concerning

Restrike of Target 82.

13. Hist, 363d Tac Reconnaissance

Wing, Jul–Dec 65, pp 31–41; PACAF rpt,

Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol XI, 12–25 Nov

65, pp 6-4 to 6-6; Statement by Gen

McConnell in Hearings before House

Cmte on Armed Services: Military

Posture, Executive Session, Mar 31, 66, p

1079; hist, TAC, Jan–Dec 65, pp 562–64;

memo, Brown to CSAF 30 Nov 65, subj:

Improved Intelligence Handling in SEA;

USAF Mgt Digest, SEA, 7 Jan 66, pp 23,

24, and 36.

14. Smith, USAF Reconnaissance in

SEA, 1961–66, pp 31–56, 70–71, 77–78;

PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol XII,

26 Nov–9 Dec 65, p 6-3, Vol XIII, 10–23

Dec 65, pp 6-5 to 6-6, Vol XIII, 24 Dec

65–6 Jan 66, pp 6-4 to 6-6.

15. James Cameron, Here is Your

Enemy (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and

Winston, 1966), pp 53–57.

16. JCS Rolling Thunder Study Group

rpt, Air Ops Against NVN, 6 Apr 66,

Annex D to App A to Section II, pp 8–10,

19; msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 062135Z

Sep 66; EOT rpt by Brig Gen G.B. Simler,

DCS/Plans and Ops, 2d AD/7th AF, 13 Jul

66; intvw, Riddlebarger and Castellina

with Gen Moore, 22 Nov 69, pp 17–18.

17. Futrell, Chron of Significant Air

Power Events in SEA, 1954–1967, p 85;

hist, 355th TFW, 1 Jul–31 Dec 65, p 36;

Personnel Support, Phase I (DCS/P, Hqs

USAF, Proj Corona Harvest), 1 Feb 68, p

59.

18. Sharp and Westmoreland, Rpt on

the War in VN, pp 20–21.

19. Msg, CINCPAC to DIA, 312209Z

Oct 65.

20. Sharp and Westmoreland, Rpt on

the War in VN, p 21; New York Times, Dec

2, 65.

21. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 230038Z

Dec 65; Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

233–38.

22. Msg, Amembassy Vientiane to

SECDEF, 230525Z Dec 65; msg,

COMUSMACV to 2d AD, 250807Z Dec

65; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC,

JCS (Exclusive from Westmoreland to

McConnell and Sharp), 260936Z Dec 65;

msg, SECDEF to Principal Defense

Agencies, 230013Z Dec 65; Capt Melvin

F. Porter, Tiger Hound (Project CHECO,

1966), pp 17–18; Van Staaveren,
346

NOTES TO PAGES 212–221

Interdiction in Southern Laos, pp

102–03.

23. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, 272158Z Dec 65.

24. McConnell Notebook, Item 372,

27 Dec 67; Johnson, The Vantage Point,

pp 237–239; Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, p 256; Van Staaveren,

Interdiction in Southern Laos, pp 80, 85,

96–105.

25. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

32–39.

26. Ibid., Vol IV, pp 32–39, 623; talking paper for Chmn JCS on an item to be

discussed at JCS mtg, subj: Resumption

of R/T 46/47, 26 Dec 65; Sharp, Strategy

for Defeat, pp 105–8; Clodfelter, The

Limits of Air Power, pp 91–92; George C.

Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different

Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas

Press, 1994), pp 99–100.

27. Msg, SECDEF to Westmoreland,

Wheeler, Sharp, McConnell; McNamara

and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, pp

222–226; Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp

233–23, Gravel Pentagon Papers, pp

32–36.

28. Msg, McNamara to Westmoreland,

Wheeler, Sharp, McConnell, Abrams,

Greene, 28 Dec 65; msg, McNamara to

Westmoreland, 282350Z.

Chapter 8

1. Kraslow and Loory, The Secret

Search for Peace, Chap 9; Janos

Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits,

Hoaxes, and Diplomatic One-upmanship

in Vietnam (South Bend: Gateway

Editions, 1978), pp 101–112; Cooper, The

Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam, pp

292–94; Allen E. Goodman, The Lost

Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated

Settlement of the War (Stanford: Hoover

Institution Press, 1978), pp 34–35;

Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different

Kind of War, p 100.

2. Cooper, The Lost Crusade, pp

293–94.

3. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Print, Background Information Relating to

Southeast Asia and Vietnam (7th Rev ed,

93d Cong, 2d Sess, GPO, Dec 74), pp

24–26; Goodman, The Lost Peace, p 35;

Ranvanyi, Delusion and Reality, p 42.

4. PACAF reports, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vols XIV, XV, XVI, (24 Dec 65

through 3 Feb 66), section 6 of each

report and p 7–C-1 in Vol XVI.

5. Ibid.; hearings of Jt Session of

Senate Armed Services and

Appropriations Cmtes in FY 1966

Supplemental, Background Paper on

Pertinent Testimony by SECDEF and

JCS, 20 Jan 66; intvw, McConnell with

Hearst Panel, 21 Mar 66; Test of Gen

Wheeler before House Cmte on Armed

Services, 3 Feb 66, pp 135–66; hist,

CINCPAC, 1966, Vol II, pp 490–91;

McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 227–229.

6. Msg, CSAF to AU, 5 Jan 66; memo,

Lt Gen Glen W. Martin, IG Hq USAF to

CSAF, 10 Jan 66.

7. Memo, Martin to CSAF, 10 Jan 66.

8. Memo, CSAF to SAF, 6 Jan 66,

subj: Reprogrammed Rqmts for CY 1966;

McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 218–22.

9. Memos, SAF to SECDEF, 10 Jan

66, subj: Reprogrammed Rqmts for CY

1966, and 17 Jan 66, subj: AF Capability

to meet CINCPAC’s Rqmts.

10. Memo, Col J.H. Germeraad, Asst

Dep Dir/Plans for War Plans to CSAF, 25

Jan 66, subj: Deployments to SVN w/atch

Background Paper on SEA Strategy

Against Deployments; hearings of Jt session of Senate Armed Services and

Approps Cmtes on FY 1966

Supplemental, Background Paper on

Pertinent Testimony by SECDEF and JCS,

20 Jan 66.

11. JCSM-16-66, subj: Air Ops

Against NVN, 8 Jan 66; Sharp, Strategy

for Defeat, pp 107–110.
347

NOTES TO PAGES 222–231

12. CASFM-Y-32-66, 12 Jan 66, subj:

Future Air Ops Against NVN; msg,

CINCPAC to JCS, 120205Z Jan 66;

JCSM-41-66, 18 Jan 66, and CM-1134-

66, 25 Jan 66.

13. Memo, SECDEF to Pres, 24 Jan

66, subj: The Mil Outlook in SVN; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p 51.

14. Test of Secy McNamara on 26 Jan

66 before the House Subcmte on Appns,

89th Cong, 2d sess, Supplemental Def

Appns for 1966, p 31; Jacob Van

Staaveren, The Air Campaign Against

NVN (Ofc AF Hist, 1966), p 13.

15. Senate Foreign Relations Cmte

Print, Background Info Relating to SEA

and VN, 7th Rev Ed, Dec 74, p 25;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

67–68.

16. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p

67; memo, George C. Denney, Jr.,

Intelligence and Research Ofc, State Dept

to SECSTATE, 26 Jan 66, subj:

Infiltration-Oriented Bombing: The Song

Ca River Line.

17. JCS-56-66, subj: Air Ops Against

NVN, 25 Jan 66; msgs, JCS to CINCPAC,

250209Z Jan 66; and ADMINO CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF,

COMUSMACTHAI, 260037Z Jan 66;

msg, CINCPAC to NMCC (Lt Gen

Emerick to Maj Gen McPherson),

272153Z Jan 66; Tilford, Crosswinds, pp

77–78.

18. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF,

CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 300305Z,

Jan 66; Johnson, The Vantage Point,

p 240; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, p 111.

19. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF,

CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 300305Z

Jan 66.

20. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol XVII, 21 Jan–3 Feb 66, 11 Jul

65–31 Dec 65, pp 2-1 and 2-2, and sections 2-B-5 and 2-B-14; Melyan and

Bonetti, Rolling Thunder Jul 65–Dec 66,

p 33.

21. Msg, JCS to CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 300305Z Jan

66; New York Times, Feb 1, 66;

Washington Post, Feb 1, 66.

22. Melyan and Bonetti, Rolling

Thunder, Jul 65–Dec 66, pp 33–34;

PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol

XVI, 21 Jan–3 Feb 66, pp 2-2 and 2-3,

and section 2B.

23. Melyan and Bonetti, Rolling

Thunder, Jul 65–Dec 66, pp 33–34;

PACAF report, Sum of Air Ops SEA, Vol

XVI, 21 Jan–3 Feb 66, pp 2-2, 2-3, and

section 2B; Vol XIX, 4–17 Mar 66, pp 6-3

and 6-4.

24. Msgs, CINCPAC to Amembassy

Vientiane, 010405Z Feb 66, and JCS to

CINCPAC, 030125Z Feb 66; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT,

030522Z Feb 66.

25. Msgs, CJCS to ACJCS (Personal,

Wheeler to Adm McDonald), 090021Z

Feb 66; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XVII, 4–17 Feb 66, pp 2-B-8, 2-B-9,

2-B-22, and 2-B-23.

26. Telecon, 2d AD to PACAF Comd

Center, 21 Feb 66.

27. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XVII 4–17 Feb 66, p 2-B-1.

28. Hearings before Senate Cmte on

Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1974

Authorization for Military Procurement,

Research and Development, p 427;

William R. Greenhalgh, Jr, ms, USAF in

Southeast Asia, Feb 1965–Nov 68 (AF

Hist Research Cent, 1969), Chap VII, pp

7–5 and 7–6; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vols XVI, XVII, XVIII, from 21

Jan–3 Mar 66, section 2 of each rpt;

USAF Mgt Sum, SEA, 11 Mar 66, pp 35,

and 37.

29. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Ops in SEA, 1965, p 74.

30. Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF

Deployment Planning in Southeast Asia,

1966, (USAF Hist Div Liaison Ofc,

1967), pp 17–18.

31. Ibid.; McConnell Notebook Item

399, 3 Feb 66, and Item 400, 5 Feb 66;

Wolk, USAF Logistic Plans and Policies

in Southeast Asia, 1965, chap IV.

32. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and

Ops in SEA, 1965, pp 64–70.

33. Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment

Planning for SEA, 1966, pp 10–12.
348

NOTES TO PAGES 232–245

34. Ibid.; memo, CSAF to SAF, 6 Jan

66; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

309–15.

35. Ltr, Maj Gen John W. Vogt,

DCS/P&O, Hq PACAF to Hq USAF, 12

Feb 66, subj: Phase IIA Evaluations.

36. Ibid., p 14; ltr, CINCPAC 310 Ser

00055, CINCPAC to JCS, 12 Feb 66, subj:

CY 66 Capabilities Program.

37. JCS 2343/772, 18 Feb 66, subj:

Ops and Force Deployments with Respect

to the War in VN.

38. Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment

Planning for SEA, 1966, pp 15–16.

39. Memo, MacDonald to CSAF, 25

Feb 66.

40. Ltr, Vogt to Hqs USAF, 12 Feb 66.

41. McConnell Notebook, Item 402, 8

Feb 66; Col. E.F. MacDonald, Asst Chief,

Combined Plans Div, DCS/P&O to

CSAF, 25 Feb 66, subj: Deployment

Schedule for SEA and other PACOM

areas.

42. Memo, Secy Brown to SECDEF,

19 Feb 66, subj: Decisions Required

Associated with SEA Deployment

Planning Assumptions; memo, Secy

Brown to SECDEF, 3 Mar 66, subj: SEA

Deployment Planning; JCSM-130-66 with

Apps A and B, 1 Mar 66.

43. Memo, SECDEF to Secys of Mil

Depts and JCS, 10 Mar 66 subj:

Deployments to SEA; memo, SECDEF to

Chmn JCS, 26 Mar 66, subj: Tac acft

Rqmts for SEA.

44. JCSM-113-55, 19 Feb 66.

45. Ibid.; memo, McKee to CSAF, 18

Feb 66, subj: Air Ops Against NVN.

46. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 260025Z

Feb 66.

47. Ibid.; msg, Wheeler to Sharp,

262219Z Feb 66; unsigned memo for JCS

chmn, 25 Feb 66, in JCS folder R/T 51,

sec 12; PACAF rpt, Out-Country Strike

Operations in SEA, 24 Dec 65–21 Jul 67,

Vol I, Subtask 1C, subj: Air Operations

Against North Vietnam, pp 24–25.

48. Ibid.

49. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XIX, 4–17 Mar 66, pp 2–9, 2–10, Vol

XX, 18–31 Mar 66, p 2–8.

50. Ibid., Vols XVIII, XIX, XXX, 18

Feb–31 Mar 66, section 2 of each rpt.

51. Ibid.

52. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol IX, 4–17 Mar 66, p 2–8, Vol XX,

18–31 Mar 66, p 2–3.

53. Ibid., Vol IX, 4–17 Mar 66, p 2-B1, Vol XX, 18–31 Mar 66, p 2-B-0.

54. Ibid., Vol XIX, 4–17 Mar 66, pp 2-

2, 2-3, 2-B-1, Vol XX, 18–31 Mar 66, p 2-

B-0; Annual Report, CINCPACFLT, FY

1966, 19 Sep 66, pp 1 and 32.

55. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol IX, 4–17 Mar 66, pp 2–5, 2–8, Vol

XX, 18–31 Mar 66, pp 2-9 to 2-12; USAF

Mgt Sum, SEA, 1 Apr 66, pp 35–39.

56. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol IX, 4–17 Mar, pp 2-5 to 2-8, Vol XX,

18–31 Mar 66, pp 2-9 to 2-12.

57. Ibid., Vol XIX, 4–17 Mar 66, p 2-

8, and Vol XX, 18–31 Mar 66, p 29.

58. Memo, McKee to Blanchard, 23

Mar 66, subj: Air Ops Against Aflds in

NVN; draft memo, SAF to SECDEF, Mar

66, subj: Buildup of Ftr Acft in NVN;

Dir/Plans Talking Paper on the Growing

MiG Threat in NVN, 28 Mar 66; PACAF

rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol XX, 18–31

Mar 66, pp 2-9 to 1-12.

Chapter 9

1. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 170652Z Nar 66, and COMUSMACV to CINCPAC and JCS

(Westmoreland to Sharp and Wheeler),

1710372 Mar 66.

2. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 170652Z Mar 66, and Westmoreland

to Sharp, 171210Z Mar 66, and 220220Z

Mar 66.

3. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV,

190452Z Mar 66; Sharp, Strategy for

Defeat, pp 114–15.

4. 4. Msg, CINCPAC TO 2d AD

(Exclusive Harris to Moore), 252132Z
349

NOTES TO PAGES 245–256

Mar 66.

5. Msg, CINCPACAF to 2d AD,

252132 (Exclusive Harris to Moore),

252032Z Mar 66; msg, 2d AD AFSSO to

PACAFAFSSO (Exclusive Gen Simler to

Gen Vogt), 28103OZ Mar 66; Gen

Westmoreland’s Hist Briefing, 3 Apr 66. 

6. Msgs, Wheeler to Sharp, 222345Z

Mar 66 and SECDEF to CINCPAC,

CINCSAC, COMUSMACV, CNO, AND

CSAF, 162229Z Apr 66; The JCS and the

War in VN, Vol II, p 31–13.

7. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV,

CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, 262337Z

Mar 66; msgs, Wheeler to Sharp,

222345Z Mar 66, and SECDEF to CINCPAC, CINCSAC, COMUSMACV, CNO,

CSPF, 162229Z Apr 66; Sharp, Strategy

for Defeat, pp 114–15.

8. 8. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, 280003Z MAR 66. 

9. Msg, 2d PD AFSSO to PACAF

AFSSO (Exclusive Gen Simler to Gen

Vogt), 28103OZ Mar 66; end of tour rpt,

Brig Gen G.B. Simler, DCS/P&O Hqs 7th

AF, 13 Jul 66; PACAF rpt, Air Ops

Against NVN, 24 Dec 65–21 Jul 67, p 51.

10. Msg, Wheeler to Sharp, 222345Z

Mar 66; Air Staff rpt, Analysis of Actions

by JCS: Air Ops Against NVN, 25 Mar 66;

JCS 2343/799, 24 Mar 66; The JCS and

the War in VN, Vol II, p 31-13.

11. JCSM 189-66; memo, McKee to

William H. Blanchard, Vice COFS, 23 Mar

66, subj: Air Ops Against Airfields in NVN.

12. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

77–78.

13. Ibid., pp 78–79.

14. Ibid.; Goodman, The Lost Peace, p

37; Cooper, The Lost Crusade, p 304;

Johnson, The Vantage Point, 246–47;

Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, p 95;

Washington Post, Mar 31, 65; New York

Times, Apr 3, 66.

15. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 010112Z

Mar 66.

16. Msgs, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 010835Z

Apr 66, and 01020OZ Apr 66.

17. Msgs, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 01020OZ

Apr 66, and CINCPAC to COMUSMACV,

302305Z Apr 66.

18. PACAF rpt, Air Ops Against NVN,

24 Dec 65–21 Jul 67, pp 25–26; Van

Staaveren, The Air Campaign Against

NVN, 1966, pp 23–25.

19. Van Staaveren, The Air Campaign

Against NVN, 1966, pp 22–25.

20. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

95–98; Senate rpt, Committee on Foreign

Relations, Background Info Relating to

SEA and VN (7th ed, 1974), pp 29–30;

Goodman, The Lost Peace, p 38.

21. New York Times, May 23, 66.

22. Msgs, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 010835Z

Apr 66, and SECDEF to CINCPAC,

COMUSMACV, CNO, CSPF, 162229Z

Apr 66; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXI, Apr 66, section 1.

23. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vols XXII and XXIII, May and Jun 66,

section 1 of each rpt.

24. Van Staaveren, The Air Campaign

Against NVN, 1966, pp 24–28; and Van

Staaveren, Interdiction in Southern Laos,

pp 107, and 118–20.

25. Van Staaveren, The Air Campaign

Against NVN, 1966, pp 25–28.

26. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vols XXI, XXII, and XXIII, Apr, May,

Jun 66, section 1 of each rpt.

27. Ibid.

28. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC,

050155Z and 130255Z Apr 66, and

032046Z Jun 66, and CINCPAC to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, 15041Z Apr

66; PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Vol

XXI, Apr 66, p 1-15; and Data

Addendum, Vol XXI Apr 66, pp 1-A-78

and 1-A-79.

29. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 052329Z

May 66, and CINCPACAF to 7th AF,

072255Z May 66; memo, Adm L.M.

Mustin, Dir for Ops, Jt Staff to Dir for Jt

Staff, 12 May 66, subj: CINCPAC’s

Request for Strike of SAM Support

Facilities; msg, Wheeler to Sharp,
350

NOTES TO PAGES 256–267

162306Z May 66.

30. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vols XXII and XXIII, May and Jun 66,

Section 1 of each rpt.

31. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 04044722

May 66; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops,

SEA, Vol XXI, Apr 66, pp 1-5 to 1-17, Vol

XXIII, Jun 66, p 1-31.

32. Lavalle, Tale of Two Bridges.

33. Ibid.; memo, Brig Gen Woodrow P.

Swancutt, Dep Dir for Forces, Dir Ops to

Dep COFS, Plans and Ops, Hqs USAF,

subj: Recapitulation of Carolina Noon

Activities, 6 Jun 66.

34. Lavalle, Tale of Two Bridges, pp

52–56; Hqs 7th AF Folder on Carolina

Moon, 29–30 May 66.

35. Lavalle, Tale of Two Bridges, pp

52–56.

36. Ibid.; msg, PACAF to TAC, TAWC,

Eglin 11015OZ Jun 66; memo, Swancutt

to Dep COFS Plans and Ops, 6 Jun 66;

New York Times, Mar 25, 72.

37. Gen Westmoreland’s Hist Briefing;

Wesley R. C. Melyan, Arc Light,

1965–1966 (Proj CHECO, 1967), pp

127–32.

38. Hist, SAC, Jan–Jun 66, Vol I, p

126.

39. New York Times, Apr 13, 66.

40. Gen Westmoreland’s Hist Briefing,

26 Apr 66; Melyan, Arc Light,

1965–1966, pp 137–41.

41. Hist, SAC, Jan–Jun 66, Vol I, pp

128–29; Melyan, Arc Light, 1965–1966, p

141.

42. Msg, COMUSMACV to AIG

7241, Amembassy Vientiane, 290745Z

Apr 66; hist, SAC, Jan–Jun 66 Vol I, p

129.

43. Msg, Amembassy Vientiane 1121

to SECSTATE 26 Apr 66; msg, CINCPAC

to JCS, COMUSMACV, 300405Z Apr 66.

44. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, COMUSMACV, CINCSAC, 30 Apr 66.

45. Msg, SAC to CINCPAC, 07165OZ

May 66; msgs, PDMINO CINCPAC to

CINCPAC, 11 May and 130925Z May 66;

msg, Amembassy Vientiane to SECSTATE, 02833OZ May 66; msg,

Amembassy Vientiane to SECSTATE,

30302Z May 66; msg, CINCPAC to

COMUSMACV, CINCSAC, 310110Z

May 66; Melyan, Arc Light, 1965–1966,

pp 145–46.

46. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vols, XXI, XXII, and XXIII, Apr, May,

and Jun 66, section 1 of each report.

47. Wolk, USAF Logistic Plans and

Policies in Southeast Asia, 1966, Chap II.

48. Hist, MACV, 1966, pp 259–66;

Wolk, USAF Logistic Plans and Policies

in SEA, 1966, Chap II.

49. Wolk, USAF Logistic Plans and

Policies in SEA, 1966, pp 15–17.

50. Memo, SECDEF to JCS Chmn,

subj: Air Munitions and Sortie Plan, 24

May 66; Van Staaveren, Interdiction in

Southern Laos, pp 140–43.

51. Wolk, USAF Logistic Plans and

Policies in SVN, 1966, pp 15–17; hist,

CINCPAC, Vol II, pp 761–63; msg,

SECDEF to COMUSMACV, 081853Z

Apr 66; Van Staaveren, Interdiction in

Southern Laos, pp 140–43.

52. Greenhalgh, USAF in SEA, Feb

65–Nov 68, pp 457–58.

53. Stmt by Gen McConnell on 9 May

in hearings before the Senate

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

of the Committee on Armed Services,

89th Cong. 2d sess, Tactical Air

Operations and Readiness, 9 May 66, pp

62–63.

54. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXI, Apr 66, pp 4 and 1-16 and 1-17,

Vol XXII May, 66, pp 1-12 and 1-13, and

Vol XXII, Jun 66, pp 1-14 and 1-15; msg,

CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV, 290225Z

Apr 66; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

COMUSHACVL 150419Z Apr 66.

55. Maj Richard A. D. Durkee, Combat

Skyspot (Proj. CHECO, 1967), p 4; and

Van Staaveren, The Air Campaign Against

NVN, 1966, p 28.

56. Durkee, Combat Skyspot, pp 4 and

25.

57. Ibid., pp 10–11.

58. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,
351

NOTES TO PAGES 267–277

Vol XXIV, Jun 66, p 1-8 and Vol XII Jul

66, pp 7-B-2 and 7-B-3; MACV Monthly

Eval Rpt, Jul 66, p 4.

59. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXI, Apr 66, pp 1-31 and 1-32, Vol

XXII, May 66, pp 1-18 and 1-19, Vol

XXIII, Jun 66, pp 1-19 and 1-20.

60. Ibid., Vol XXI, Apr 66, p 54;

Greenhalgh, USAF in SEA, Feb 65–Nov

68, p 467.

61. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXI, Apr 66, p 1-28.

62. Ibid., Vol XXIII, Jun 66, pp 1–9;

stmt by Gen McConnell on 31 Mar 66 in

hearings before the House Armed

Services Cmte, p 1,053.

63. USAF Mgt Sum, SEA, 15 Jul 66, pp

45 and 78; CINCPAC briefing for

SECDEF, 8 Jul 66; PACAF rpts, Sum of

Air Ops, SEA, Vols XXII, May 66, p 1-15

and Vol XXIII, Jun 66, p 1-17.

64. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXI, Apr 66, pp 1-24 to 1-28.

65. Hist, 355th TFW, 1 Jul–31 Dec 66,

p 32; msgs, 355th Takhli to 13th AF,

030730 Jul 66; and TAC to CINCPACAF,

12th AF Waco, Tex. et al, 171548Z Jun

66; USAF Mgt Sum, SEA, 10 Jun 66, p 22;

Nalty, Electronic Countermeasures, pp

40–42.

66. Intvw, Capt Snakenberg with Lt

Col David P. Blackbird, 9 Nov 69; PACAF

rpt, Sum of Air Ops SEA, Vol XXI, Apr

66, pp 1-19 and 1-24 to 1-26, Vol XXI,

Apr 66, Data Addendum, p 1-A-36, Vol

XXII, May 66, p 1-16; Nalty, Electronic

Countermeasures, pp 40–42.

67. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXII, May 66 and Vol XXIII, Jun 66,

pt 1, subsection 3 of each rpt; memo, Col

Richard E, Gaspard, Ops Intel Div, Hqs

7th AFI to Brig Gen G.B. Simler, DCS

Plans and Ops, 7th AF, with atchd rpt, 23

Jun 66, subj: SA–2 Deployment and

Tactics in NVN; Nalty, Electronic

Countermeasures, p 43.

68. Fact sheet, subj: Wild Weasel, 22

Apr 66, in Notebook on CINCPACAF and

Vice COFS USAF Conference, 25–26 Apr

66 at Hickam AFB, Hawaii; msg, 7th AF

to PACAF, 280856Z May 66.

69. Msg, Sharp to Westmoreland,

302239Z Apr 66; PACAF rpts, Sum of Air

Ops SEA, Vol XXI, Apr 66, pp 1-24 and

1-25 and Vol XXII, May 66, p 1-16.

70. Melyan and Bonetti, Rolling

Thunder, Jul 65–Dec 66, pp 105–06; hist,

355th TFW, Jul–Dec 66, p 30.

71. Msgs, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, CINCSAC, 090505Z Apr

66; 7th AF to PACAF, 1113457, Apr 66.

and SAC to JCS, CINCPAC, 122335Z Apr

66.

72. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXI, Apr 66, pp 1-20, 1-23.

73. Futrell, et al, Aces and Aerial

Victories, pp 27–29.

74. Ibid., pp 27–29; New York Times,

Apr 25, 66, and Apr 28, 66.

75. Futrell, et al, Aces and Aerial

Victories, pp 27–29.

76. Ibid., pp 29–30.

77. Ibid., p 30.

78. New York Times, May 13 and 27, 66.

79. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXIII, Jun 66, pp 1–16.

80. Futrell, et al, Aces and Aerial

Victories, pp 30–31; hist, TACC-NS, Oct

67, p 7.

81. USAF Mgt Sum, SEA, 8 Jul 66, p

79.

82. Hist, TACC-NS, p 30; msg,

ADMINO CINCPAC to COMUSMACV,

CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, 180412Z

May 66; msg, SSO MACV to AFSSO 7th

AF, 18013OZ May 66.

83. Msg, AFSSO MACV to 7th AF,

18013OZ May 66; msg, 7th AF to Hq

USAF, PACAF 180715Z Jun 66; hist, 7th

AF Tactical Air Control Center, North

Sector (TACC-NS), Oct 67, p 4; Melyan

and Bonetti, The War in VN, 1966, pp

25–27.

84. Hist, 7th AF TACC-NS, Oct 67, pp

4 and 7; msg, AFSSO MACV to AFSSO

7th AF, 180130Z May 66; Air Force rpt,

SEA Items, Item No. 37A; msg, NMCC

to CINCPAC (Adm Mustin to Gen

Everick), 070040Z Jul 66.

85. Hist, 7th AF TACC-NS, pp 4–5.

86. Ibid.; Air Force rpt, SEA Items No.
1. Msgs USAF Dir/Plan memo, Background Paper on CSAF Recommendations

Regarding Attacks on NVN POL, Jun 66;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

60–63; Clodfelter, The Limits of Air

Power, pp 92–95.

2. JCSM-910-65, 10 Nov 65; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol VI, pp 59–62.

3. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p 61.

4. Ibid., pp 62–66.

5. Ibid., pp 66–67; The JCS and the

War in VN, pt II, 31-4 and 31-5.

6. JCSM-16-66, 8 Jan 66; JCSM-41-

66, 18 Jan 66; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 300305 Jan 66.

Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp 108–111;

Tilford, Crosswinds, p 78.

7. JCSM-15-66, 8 Jan 66; JCSM-41-

66, 18 Jan 66; Gravel Pentagon Papers,

Vol IV, pp 68–70.

8. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

74–76.

9. Msg, Wheeler to Sharp, 222345Z

Mar 66; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV,

p 77; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp

116–17; Clodfelter, The Limits of Air

Power, pp 94–95.

10. Msg, Wheeler to Sharp, 222345Z

Mar 66; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV,

p 77.

11. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

77–78.

12. Goodman, The Lost Peace, pp

36–38; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV,

pp 94–95.

13. Memo, Walt W. Rostow, Special

Asst to President for National Security

Affairs to Secys State and Def, 6 May 66;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

100–101; Van Staaveren, The Air

Campaign Against NVN, 1966, p 31.

14. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p

102.

15. Ibid., pp 102–3.

16. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 051201Z Jun 66; PACAF rpt, Sum of

Air Ops, SEA, Vol XXII, May 66, pp 1-7

to 1-10, Data Addendum, pp 1-A-78 to 1-

A-83, 1-A-175 to 1-A-181; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol IV pp 102–3; New

York Times, Jun 1, 66.

17. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 060805Z

Jun 66; memo, Maj Gen Robert N. Smith,

Dir/Plans, DCS P&O to CSAF, subj: NVN

Air Strike Program, 16 Jun 66; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p 102.

18. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

103–05.

19. Ibid.; Kraslow and Loory, The

Secret Search for Peace, pp 155–57.

20. Msg, SECDEF to CINCPAC (Adm

Mustin to Gens Hutchins, Hutchinson, and

Brown), 130384Z Jun 66.

21. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC (Adm

Mustin to Gens Hutchins, Hutchinson, and

Brown), 130384Z Jun 66.

22. Msg, CINCPAC to SECDEF

(Exclusive Sharp to McNamara), 140659Z

Jun 66; msg, SECDEF to CINCPAC (personal SECDEF to Sharp), 152000Z Jun

66; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p

105.

23. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 1522552

Jun 66; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 160922Z

Jun 66; msg, CINCPACFLT to COMSEVENTHFLT, 162227Z Jun 66; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 180006Z; msg,

CSAFM-W-53-66, 20 Jun 66, subj: NVN

Strike Program.

24. Goodman, The Lost Peace, p 38;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

104–05.

25. Public Papers of the Presidents,

Johnson, Vol I, p 629; Baltimore Sun, Jun

19, 66; New York Times, Jun 19 and 24,

352

NOTES TO PAGES 277–288

37A, Jul 66; memo, Lt Gen K.K.

Compton, DCS/Plans and Ops to Lt Gen

James Furgeson, DCS/R&D, 9 Jun 66,

subj: Enhanced Control Capability SEA;

msg, CSAF to PACAF, 2914327 Jun 66.

87. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 040206Z

Sep 66; JCS to CSAF, 102244Z Sep 66;

hist, 7th IF TACC, p 7.

Chapter 10
353

NOTES TO PAGES 288–298

66; Chicago Tribune, Jun 24, 66; New

York Post, Jun 24, 66; intvw, Capt

Snakenberg with Lt Col David P.

Blackbird, 9 Nov 69; PACAF rpt, Sum of

Air Ops, SEA, Vol XIII, Jun 66, pp 1-9 to

1-13.

26. Msg, NMCC to CINCPAC,

231747Z Jun 66.

27. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 222044Z

Jun 66; msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, 222044Z Jun 66; Melyan

and Bonetti, Rolling Thunder, Jul 65–Dec

66, p 60; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, 

p 117.

28. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 251859Z

Jun 66; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p

105; The JCS and the War in VN, Pt II, p

31-30; Washington Post, Jun 26, 66.

29. Msg, CJCS to CINCPAC, 281254Z

Jun 66; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p

106.

30. Msgs, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF

and CINCPACFLT, 230943Z Jun 66 and

281932Z Jun 66; UPI dispatch (in Current

News, Early Bird ed), Jun 29, 66, p 6;

Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, p 98.

31. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXIII, Jun 66, p 1-4; UPI dispatch, Jun

29, 66 (in Current News, Jun 29, 66); msgs,

JCS to CINCPAC 052249Z and 052249Z

Jul 66 and CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, et al, 060845Z Jul 66.

32. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXIII, Jun 66, pp 1-3 and 1-4; Facts

on File, SVN, 1966–67, p 90; Washington

Post, Jun 30, 66; Melyan and Bonetti,

Rolling Thunder Jul 65–Dec 66, p 64.

33. Futrell, et al, Aces and Aerial

Victories, pp 30–31; PACAF rpt, Sum of

Air Ops, SEA, Vol XXIII, Jun 66, pp 1–3;

Aviation Week, Jul 4, 66, pp 22–23;

Baltimore Sun, Jun 30, 66; Washington

Post, Jul 2, 66. 

34. Text of McNamara’s Stmt and

Questions and Answers on the Bombing

of Hanoi and Haiphong Depots, in the

New York Times Jun 30 66; Baltimore Sun,

Jun 30, 66.

35. Text of McNamara’s Stmt and

Questions and Answers, Jun 29, 66;

Baltimore Sun, Jul 1, 66.

36. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Vol XXIII, Jun 66, pp 1-4 and 1-5;

Washington Post, Jul 1, 66.

37. Ibid.

38. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC 052249Z

Jul 66 and CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF et al, 060845Z Jul 66; Van

Staaveren, The Air Campaign Against

NVN, 1966, p 33; Facts on File, SVN,

1966–67, pp 102–03; Philadelphia

Inquirer, Jun 12, 66.

39. Facts on File, SVN, 1966–67, pp

90–91; Oleg Hoeffding, The Bombing of

North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic

and Military Effects (RM-5213, Dec 66),

p 25.

40. Baltimore Sun, Jul 1, 66; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p 108; Facts on

File, SVN, 1966–67, pp 90–100. 

41. Baltimore Sun, Jul 1, 66;

Philadelphia Inquirer, Jul 4, 66; Gravel

Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp 107–08;

Facts on File, SVN, 1966–67, pp

99–101.

42. MR by Maj Gen George Brown,

Spec Asst to Chmn JCS, 8 Jul 66, subj:

Highlights of SECDEF Conf; Van

Staaveren, USAF Deployment Planning

for SEA, 1966, pp 39–45.

43. NIE 14-3-66, 7 Jul 66; USAF Mgt

Sum, SEA rpts, 1 and 8, Jul 66.

44. Van Staaveren, The Air Campaign

Against NVN, 1966, pp 33–35; Van

Staaveren, USAF Deployment Planning

for SEA, 1966, p 39.

45. Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment

Planning for SEA, 1966, p 41. 

46. MR, Maj Gen George Brown, Spec

Asst to Chmn JCS, 8 July 66, subj:

Highlights of SECDEF Conference; msgs,

AFIN 10036OZ and 100625Z, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 10 Jul 66.

47. Hist, CINCPAC, 1966, pp 500–01;

msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 061949Z; Sum of

Air Ops, SEA, 1966, Vol XXIV, pp 1-4

and 1-8.

48. Msg, PACAF to 7th AF, 070323Z

Jul 66; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

1966, Vol XXIV, p 1-4.

49. Msgs, CINCPAC to Chmn JCS (to
354

NOTES TO PAGES 298–307

Gen Wheeler) 230909Z Jul 66; CINCPAC

to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 242059Z Jul 66; hist, CINCPAC,

1966, Vol II, pp 500–01.

50. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 242059Z

Jul 66.

51. CM-1638, 23 Jul 66; msg,

COMUSMACV to 7th AF, 300222Z Jul

66; PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA, Aug

66, Vol XXV, p 1-B-4.

52. PACAF rpt, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

1966, Vol XXIV, p 1-40 and 1-43.

53. Ibid., Jul 66, Vol XXI, section 1. 

54. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 081937Z

Aug 66; Melyan and Bonetti, Rolling

Thunder, Jul 65–Dec 66, p 82; McNamara

and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, pp 245–46.

55. Memo, VN Task Force, State Dept

to William P. Bundy, Asst Secy, Far

Eastern Affairs, 25 Aug 66, subj:

Proposed Rolling Thunder Program and

Escalation Generally: Melyan and Bonetti,

Rolling Thunder, Jul 65–Dec 66, pp

84–87.

56. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPACAF,

CSAF (Personal, Gen Momyer to Gens

Harris and McConnell), 12043OZ Aug 66;

msgs, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 120430Z

Aug 66.

57. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, 150135Z, Aug 66.

58. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 111813Z

Aug 66; msg, CINCPAC to DIA, 110015Z

Aug 66; msgs, 7th AF to CINCPAC,

130845Z Aug 66 and to PACAF, 300940Z

Aug 66.

59. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 260412Z

Aug 66; The JCS and the War in VN, pt II,

pp 36-2 and 36-3.

60. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Aug 66, Vol XXV, pp 1-B-4 and 1-B-19.

61. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT,

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 260412Z,

Aug 66; The JCS and the War in VN, pp

36-2 and 36-3; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat,

pp 118–19.

62. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPACAF,

231143Z Sep 66; PACAF rpts, Sum of Air

Ops, SEA, 1966, Vol XXV, Sep 66, pp 3,

1-B-11, 1-B-17 and 1-B-18, Vol XXVII,

pp 1-A-l and 1-A-12.

63. Msgs, 7th AF to CINCPACAF,

231143Z Sep 66; CINCPAC to JCS,

282258Z, Sep 66; undated memo for

Chmn, JCS, subj: R/T 52 Strike

Objectives.

64. Hist, CINCPAC, 1966, Vol II p

502; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol II, pp

110–12; McNamara and VanDeMark, In

Retrospect, pp 245–46. 

65. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV,

110–16 and 123; Clodfelter, The Limits of

Air Power, p 99.

66. PACAF rpts, Sum of Air Ops, SEA,

Oct 1966, VoL XXVII, pp 1-1 and 1-A-2;

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

110–12 and 124–26.

67. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

110–12 and 125–26; memo, Col Fred W.

Vetter, Jr., Mil Asst to SAF, 9–14 Oct 66,

subj: Air Staff Activities as a Result of

SECDEF trip to SEA; test of SECDEF

McNamara on January 23, 1967 before

Senate Armed Services Cmte and the

Subcmte on DOD Approps, 90th Cong.,

1st Sess, Supplemental Military

Procurement and Construction

Authorizations, FY 1967, pp 70–72.

68. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, pp

125–26; Tilford, Crosswinds, p 80.

69. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol I, pp

125–26; Clodfelter, The Limits of Air

Power, pp 99–100.

70. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 26192OZ

Oct 66.
355

Glossary

AB Air Base

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

Acft Aircraft

AD Air Division

AFI Air Force Intelligence

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command

AFSC Air Force Systems Command

AFSSO Air Force Security Service Office

AFTAC Air Force Tactical Air Command

AGM Air-Ground Missile

AOC Air Operations Center

ARPAC Army Pacific

AU Air University

BDA Bomb Damage Assessment

CAP Combat Air Patrol

CEP Circular Error Probable

CHECO Comparative Historical Evaluation of

Counterinsurgency Operations (later

Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat

Operations)

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

CINCSAC Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

COMUSMACTHAI Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command,

Thailand

COMUSMACV Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam

COMUSSEVENTHFLT Commander, U. S. Seventh Fleet

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CSAF Chief of Staff, Air Force

CSAFM Chief of Staff, Air Force Memo

DI Director of Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

EOTR End of Tour Report

FAC Forward Air Controller

Flak Antiaircraft artillery
356

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

Iron Hand Code name for specially equipped aircraft engaged

in attacking SA–2 surface-to-air missiles

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM Joint Chiefs of Staff Memo

Jt Joint

LIMDIS Limited Distribution

LOC Line of Communication

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

NASM National Action Security Memo

n.m. Nautical Mile

NMCC National Military Command Center

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

NSC National Security Council

NVA North Vietnamese Army

NVAF North Vietnamese Air Force

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PACAF Pacific Air Force

PACFLT Pacific Fleet

PACOM Pacific Command

PCS Permanent Change of Station

PL Pathet Lao

POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

RAND Research and development (the RAND

Corporation, Santa Monica, California)

RLAF Royal Laotian Air Force

RM Research Memo

RTAF Royal Thai Air Force

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Air Force

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAF Secretary of the Air Force

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SEA Southeast Asia

SEACORD Southeast Asia Coordination (Committee)

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SLAR Side-Looking Airborne Radar

SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate

Sortie A single aircraft mission

SVG South Vietnamese government

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACC Tactical Air Control Center
357

GLOSSARY

TDY Temporary Duty

TFS Tactical Fighter Squadron

TFW Tactical Fighter Wing

TIC Tactical Intelligence Center

TRS Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

UHF Ultra High Frequency

USA United States Army

USAFE United States Air Force, Europe

USIA United States Information Agency

USMACTHAI United States Military Assistance Command,

Thailand

USMACV United States Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam

VNAF Vietnamese Air Force

WID Weekly Intelligence Digest
359

Bibliography

The Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, held many

of the Air Force’s records used in this study, pending their eventual transfer to

the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. These included records of

Air Staff directorates (e.g. plans, operations, and intelligence), the Chief of

Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force, and Pacific Air Forces.

During the Vietnam war, the Air Force’s Project CHECO (Contemporary

Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations) microfilmed records in Southeast

Asia. More than a thousand rolls of this microfilm are held by the Air Force

Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, together

with thousands of relevant rolls filmed in the United States under the auspices

of the Air Force’s Project Corona Harvest. Unfortunately, these microfilming

projects did not get fully underway until 1968, and the researcher must look

elsewhere for much of the documentation of early operations over North

Vietnam.

A rich collection of documents on the early months of air operations over

North Vietnam was maintained by the Naval Historical Center in Washington,

D.C. These included records of the Commanders in Chief Pacific, Pacific

Fleet, and Seventh Fleet.

Statistical data on the war can be found in the following multivolume

Headquarters USAF Reports: Analysis of Air Operations, Southeast Asia; Statistical Summaries of Air Operations, Southeast Asia; and USAF Management

Digests. Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces issued its own monthly Summary of

Air Operations.

The National Archives facility at College Park now holds the voluminous

records of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon. Most of these documents deal with the air-ground war in South Vietnam. Many duplicate those

found in the records of the Pacific Command and Pacific Air Forces.

The Pentagon Papers (leaked to the press in 1972) are available in three separate editions (Department of Defense, Gravel, and New York Times), no one

of which is complete; they contain a lode of high-level planning for the air war

in North Vietnam and air-ground operations in South Vietnam. The Public

Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy (1961–1963)

and Lyndon Baines Johnson (1963–1969) also contain material on how the

Southeast Asian war unfolded and expanded, including the air war in North

Vietnam. 

Separate House and Senate hearings, especially by their respective armed services committees and subcommittees, contain large amounts of material on the air

war in North Vietnam, particularly periodic testimony by the Secretary of Defense

and by other ranking defense officials. Also very useful are the House and Senate

hearings and reports of their foreign relations committees and subcommittees. 
360

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

The most important contemporary official studies of Air Force operations

in North Vietnam were written by civilian historians and a few military officers assigned to the United States Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office

in Washington and in Southeast Asia by military and civilian historians of

Project CHECO. Other chronologies, special studies, and evaluations of the air

war in North Vietnam were written by military and civilian personnel at various Air Force commands (especially Pacific Air Forces) under the aegis of

Project Corona Harvest. All of these reports can be consulted at the Air Force

Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, together with periodic

histories of the commands and units involved. Although of varying quality,

many command and unit histories contain details on the progress and problems

of air operations in North Vietnam as well as supporting documents. 

In no previous war have newspapers played so prominent a role as in

Southeast Asia. By far the most useful for this book has been the New York

Times. Also helpful have been memoirs penned by former military officers and

civilians who played prominent roles early in the period under study: two volumes by General Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet and Swords and

Plowshares; General Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinley Kantor, Mission With

LeMay; William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (World War II, Korean

War, and Vietnam); Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat; General

William W. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Robert S. McNamara and Brian

VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Lessons and Tragedy of Vietnam; and Lyndon

Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency.

Published accounts of the air war in North Vietnam include Mark

Clodfelter’s The Limits of Air Power and Earl H. Tilford’s Crosswinds: The Air

Force’s Setup in Vietnam. The most comprehensive single volume on the

Southeast Asia War is Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam: The First Complete Account

of Vietnam at War; while his book lacks footnotes, Karnow obviously consulted

a wide array of sources, Vietnamese as well as American.

BOOKS

Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973: An

Illustrated Account. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Rev.,

1984.

Cameron, James. Here Is Your Enemy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

1966.

Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North

Vietnam. New York: The Free Press, 1989.

Colby, William E. and Peter Forbath. My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1978.

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd,

Mead, 1970.
361

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dommen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization. Rev. ed.,

New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1971.

Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and

its Aftermath. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Facts on File. South Vietnam: U. S.-Communist Confrontation in Southeast

Asia, 1961–1965. 

———. South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia,

1966–1967.

Futrell, Robert F. with the Assistance of Martin Blumenson. The United States

Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965. Washington:

Office of Air Force History, 1981.

Goodman, Allen E. The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the War. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994.

Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency,

1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War. New

York: The Viking Press, 1983.

Kraslow, David and Stuart H. Loory. The Secret Search for Peace. New York:

Random House, 1968.

LeMay, Curtis E. with MacKinlay Kantor. Mission With LeMay: My Story.

New York: Doubleday, 1965.

McNamara, Robert S. and Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and

Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books/Random House, 1995.

Momyer, William W. Air Power in Three Wars. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978.

The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam

Books, 1971.

The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition. 4 vols. Boston: Beacon

Press, 1971.

Radvanyi, Janos. Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, and Diplomatic

One-upmanship in Vietnam. South Bend: Gateway Editions, 1978.

Risner, Robinson. The Passing of the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner of

the North Vietnamese. New York: Random House, 1973.

Schlight, John. The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–

1968. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1988.

Sharp, U. S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. San Rafael:

Presidio Press, 1978.

Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W. W. Norton and

Company, 1972.
362

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

———. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959.

Thompson, James Clay. Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program

Failure. University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 

Tilford, Earl H. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station:

Texas A&M University Press, 1993.

Valenti, Jack. A Very Human President. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975.

Van Dyke, Jon M. North Vietnam’s Strategy for Survival. Palo Alto, Calif.:

Pacific Books, 1972.

Van Staaveren, Jacob. Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968. Washington:

Center for Air Force History, 1993.

Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Dell, 1976.

AIR FORCE STUDIES AND REPORTS

In addition to periodic historical reports submitted by Air Force units (major

commands, numbered air forces, wings and squadrons), the author consulted

the following:

Analysis of Air Operations, Southeast Asia. 5 vols. Washington, 1965.

Analysis of the War in Southeast Asia. HQ USAF, 1965 and 1966.

Anthony, Maj. Victor B. Tactics and Techniques of Night Operations, 1961–

1966. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1976.

Book of Actions in Southeast Asia, 1961–1974. Directorate of Operations, Headquarters, USAF, n.d.

Burch, Lt. Col. Robert M. Tactical Electronic Warfare Operations in Southeast

Asia, 1962–1968. Project CHECO, 1969.

Danforth, Col Gordon. Iron Hand/Wild Weasel. Project Corona Harvest, 1970.

Durkee, Maj. Richard A. Combat Skyspot. Project CHECO, 1968.

Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia. PACAF, Directorate of Intelligence,

quarterly.

Elder, Maj. Paul W. Buffalo Hunter, 1970–1972. Project CHECO, 1973.

Futrell, Robert F. A Chronology of Significant Air Power Events in Southeast Asia, 1950–1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala: Aerospace Studies Institute,

1969.

———. A Chronology of Significant Air Power Events in Southeast Asia,

1954–1967. Maxwell AFB, Ala: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1968.

Futrell, R. Frank, et al. Aces and Aerial Victories. Washington: Office of Air

Force History, 1976.

Greenhalgh, William H., Jr. U. S. Air Force Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia,

1960–1975. Manuscript. Albert Simpson Historical Research Center:

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1977.

———. USAF in Southeast Asia, February 1965–November 1968. Manuscript.

Albert Simpson Historical Research Center: Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969.
363

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hefron, Lt Charles H. Air to Air Encounters Over North Vietnam. Project

CHECO, 1967.

Helmka, MSgt Robert T. and TSgt Beverly Hale. USAF Operations from Thailand, 1964–1965. Project CHECO, 1966.

In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia. Project

Corona Harvest: Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, n.d.

Lavalle, Maj. A. J. C. The Tale of Two Bridges and the Battle for the Skies Over

North Vietnam. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air University, 1976.

McCormack, David A. Summary of Source Material on the Indochina War,

1965–1973. Joint Publication Research Series. A Special Report for the

Office of Air Force History, 1976.

MacNaughton, 1st Lt. Robert L. Yankee Team, May 1964–June 1965. Project

CHECO, 1966.

Management Digest, Southeast Asia. HQ USAF, 1965 and 1966.

Melyan, Wesley R.C. Arc Light, 1965–1966. Project CHECO, 1967.

Melyan, Wesley R.C. and Lee Bonetti. Rolling Thunder, 1 July 1965–31

December 1965. Project CHECO, 1966.

———. The War in North Vietnam, 1966. Project CHECO, 1967.

Nalty, Bernard. Tactics and Techniques of Electronic Warfare: Electronic

Countermeasures in the Air War Against North Vietnam, 1956–1973.

Washington: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1977.

Porter, Capt. Melvin. Air Tactics Against North Vietnam’s Air-Ground

Defenses. Project CHECO, 1967.

———. Interdiction in Southeast Asia, 1965–1966. Project CHECO, 1966.

———. Tiger Hound. Project CHECO, 1966.

Rolling Thunder, March–June 1965. Southeast Asia Team, Pacific Air Forces,

1966.

Sams, Kenneth. Command and Control, Project CHECO, 1965. 

———. Escalation of the War in Southeast Asia, July–December 1964. Project

CHECO, 1965. 

Nguyen Cao Ky. Project CHECO, 1965. 

Smith, Capt. Mark E. USAF Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia, 1961–1966.

Project CHECO, 1967.

Statistical Summaries of Air Operations. HQ USAF, 1965 and 1966.

Strike Operations in North Vietnam, 12 February–23 December 1965. Project

Corona Harvest, PACAF, 1966.

Summary of Air Operations. PACAF, monthly.

Van Staaveren, Jacob. The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966. Washington: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967.

———. USAF Deployment Planning for Southeast Asia, 1966. Washington:

USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967.
364

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM: 1965–1966

———. USAF Logistic Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia, 1966. Washington: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967.

———. USAF Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965. Washington:

USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1966.

———. USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961–1963. Washington:

USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1965.

———. USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964.

Washington: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1965.

Wolk, Herman S. USAF Logistic Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia,

1965. Washington: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967.

OTHER DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORTS

Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam’s Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam. Washington: Department of State, 1965.

Air Operations Against North Vietnam. Rolling Thunder Study Group, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 1966.

CINCPAC Histories, 1965, 1966.

CINCPACFLT, The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1965, 1966.

Defense Intelligence Agency Bulletins.

Defense Intelligence Digest. Monthly.

Hoeffding, Oleg. The Bombing of North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic

and Military Effects. RAND RM-5213, December 1966.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968. Washington: JCS

Historical Office, 1970.

MACV Histories, 1965 and 1966.

Sharp, U.S. Grant and William C. Westmoreland. Report on the War in Vietnam.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND REPORTS

House. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Appropriations. Supplemental

Defense Appropriations for 1966. 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1966.

House. Committee on Armed Services. United States-Vietnam Relations,

1945–1967. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

House. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. Military Posture,

Executive Session. 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1966.

Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign

Relations. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad:

The Kingdom of Laos. 91st Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1968.
365

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. Background Information Relating to

Southeast Asia and Vietnam. 7th Rev. ed., 93d Cong., 2d sess.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974.

Senate. Final Report of the Select Committee Study on Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Together with

Additional Supplemental and Separate Views. Foreign Military

Intelligence. Report No. 94-755. Washington: 94th Cong., 2d sess. 1976.

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. The 1964 Gulf of

Tonkin Incidents. 90th Cong., 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1968.

Senate. Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the

Committee on Armed Services. Southeast Asia Resolution. 88th Cong.,

2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Supplementary Documents to

February 20, 1968 Hearing with Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara. The Gulf of Tonkin: The 1964 Incident. 90th Cong., 2d sess.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968.

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. Fiscal Year 1974

Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development,

Construction Authorization for the Safeguard ABM, and Active Duty and

Reserve Strength. 93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1973.

Senate. Hearings before a Joint Session of the Armed Services and

Appropriations Committees on Fiscal Year 1966 Supplemental.

Background Paper on Pertinent Testimony of the Secretary of Defense

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1966.

Senate. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the

Committee on the Armed Services. Tactical Air Operations and

Readiness. 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1966.

Senate. Hearings before the Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee

on Department of Defense Appropriations. Supplemental Military

Procurement and Construction Authorizations, Fiscal Year 1967. 90th

Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967.
367

Index
368

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966
369

ADVON (advanced echelon). See Air

Forces, numbered, Thirteenth, 2d

ADVON.

Aerial engagements: 315, 320–21

with Chinese 111, 183n, 274–75, 314.

See also Airspace violations.

with North Vietnamese: 110–11,

144–45, 158–59, 273–74

Airborne Battlefield Command and

Control Center: 173, 241, 254

Aircraft, China

MiG–17: 111

Aircraft, Laos

T–28: 52, 56, 58, 60, 61, 63, 65

Aircraft, North Korea

PO–2: 31n

Aircraft, North Vietnam

Il–28: 143, 143, 188, 190, 241, 276

MiG–15: 52, 70, 96, 106, 143, 145,

188, 241, 276, 313, 320

MiG–17: 52, 70, 71, 96, 108, 143, 159,

223, 241, 273, 273, 274, 276,

291, 313, 320

attacks on U.S. aircraft: 108, 109,

144, 201, 273, 275–76, 291

MiG–21: 241, 244, 276, 313, 319, 320

attacks on U.S. aircraft: 273

introduction of: 241

Aircraft, South Vietnam

A–1: 17, 18, 22, 26, 38, 42, 69, 84, 85,

108, 110, 112, 113, 125, 137,

140, 161

losses at Bien Hoa: 59

C–47: 38

losses at Bien Hoa: 59

H–34: 38

O–1F: 9

RC–47: 38

RT–28: 38

T–28: 26, 38, 42

Aircraft, U.S.

A–1: 49, 110, 228

A–1: 17, 22, 49, 63–64, 69–70, 86, 95,

110, 140, 193, 228, 265

engagement with North Vietnamese

MiGs: 144–45

A–4: 16, 16, 24, 49, 63, 86, 95, 106,

110, 140, 168, 170, 173, 201,

204, 225, 226, 299, 315

first destruction of SAM: 192

Iron Hand: 193

loss to SAM: 166–69:

loss in Flaming Dart: 16

A–5A: 195

A–6: 168, 202, 227, 289, 315 

Iron Hand: 192

night radar equipment: 204

B–26: 21, 38

B–52: 22n, 59, 69, 84, 143, 180, 181,

226, 232, 243, 244, 262, 262,

263, 263, 266, 272, 289

Arc Light: 179

operations halt: 212

ordnance depletion: 263

Rock Kick II: 260, 320

vulnerability: 271

B–57: 41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 78, 84, 265

buddy bombing: 266

deployments of: 22n, 50, 77

destroyed at Bien Hoa: 58, 59

night armed reconnaissance: 97, 125,

181–82

training for VNAF pilots: 47n

B–66: 5, 234, 238, 261

buddy bombing: 226–27, 266

C–47: 38, 59, 127

C–123: 38, 258

C–130: 48, 102, 182, 210, 265, 315,

316

Blindbat operations: 97, 125, 181–82

Carolina Moon: 258–59, 320

deployments: 51

flare dropping: 254

night reconnaissance: 125

CH–3: 193

DC–130: 115, 124, 174

EA–1F: 115

EA–3: 174, 269

EB–66: 88n, 116, 174, 175, 195, 199,

200, 203, 206, 217, 229, 239,

254, 259, 264, 269, 273, 274,

289, 315. See also RB–66.

Chinese airspace violations: 276, 277

equipment improvements: 196

Iron Hand missions: 269

EC–121: 5, 6, 164, 164, 173

Index

(numbers in bold indicate illustrations)
370

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

Big Eye: 117–18, 159–60, 173, 174,

195, 201, 241

fitted with AN/APS–95 search radar:

118

EC–121M: 269

EF–10: 164, 174, 239, 269

F–4: 96, 114, 117, 117–18, 125, 138,

138, 139, 140, 147, 158, 159,

174, 193, 199, 203, 209, 216,

225, 228, 230, 241, 265, 273,

274, 277, 289, 313, 320 

anti-SAM operations: 163, 164

buddy bombing: 226, 266

deployments: 77, 145, 234

down MiGs: 273–74

first armed reconnaissance: 179

first arrivals on PCS: 210

first bombing missions: 314

losses: 114, 163, 173, 195, 199, 239,

259

Night Owl: 182

F–4B: 63–64, 111, 144, 226

losses: 110, 170, 226

F– 5: 235

F–8: 24, 48, 106, 115, 117, 170, 275

losses: 95, 200

Pierce Arrow: 49

F–100: 5, 17–18, 22, 58, 64, 78, 84, 85,

96, 106, 107, 112, 125, 182,

195, 235, 239, 265, 313

deployments of: 22n, 50, 51, 77

leaflet missions: 129–30

losses: 60, 84

F–100F: 196, 196–97, 269–70, 315, 320

F–102: 17, 17, 50, 235

deployments of: 50 

F–104: 118, 119, 164, 265, 289–90

shootdown by Chinese MiG: 182–83

F–105: 4, 15, 23, 70, 75, 94, 106, 106,

107, 110, 112, 113, 125, 126,

132, 135, 138, 145, 147, 158,

163, 164, 171, 179, 182, 183,

189, 199, 201, 225, 230, 238,

257, 264, 265, 270, 273, 306,

308, 313

accidental civilian strike: 316

deployments: 22–23n, 50, 77–78,

145, 147

Barrel Roll: 63–64

buddy bombing: 226, 261, 266

drone escort: 174–75

first arrivals at Da Nang: 22–23

first landmine drop: 158

first Rolling Thunder strikes: 84–86

hunter-killer missions: 168n, 192,

193, 196, 270

improved rotation arrangements: 210

Iron Hand: 168–69, 197, 275, 291,

315

leaflet missions:137, 210

losses: 95, 107–8, 109, 116, 117,

128, 159, 173, 193, 194,

203–4, 226, 229, 239–40,

267–68

need for improved equipment: 195

POL strikes: 289 

SAM strikes: 165, 194, 303

Thanh Hoa bridge: 106–7

Wild Weasel testing and training:

196–97

F–105F: 6, 197, 269–71, 320

Wild Weasel II: 269n

Wild Weasel III: 269, 270

H–43

losses at Bien Hoa: 59

HU–16: 228, 229, 229, 239

KB–50: 50

KC–135: 63, 84, 106, 107, 132, 138,

158, 164, 174, 181, 197, 203,

227, 228, 308

Combat Lighting: 277

deployments of: 22n, 51, 69

Rock Kick II: 260

O–1: 9, 234, 253, 254

RA–5: 195, 204

RB–47: 56, 174

RB–57E: 176, 206, 217, 

RB–57F: 175

RB–66: 5, 88, 88n, 96, 116, 234. See also

EB–66.

RF–4: 205–6, 208, 216, 234

RF–101: 17, 22, 33n, 58, 61, 63, 84,

106, 110, 115, 116, 145, 147,

164, 201, 216, 217, 241, 254,

315. See also Yankee Team.

Blue Tree: 134:

deployments: 50, 51, 96, 234

losses: 128, 199, 239–40

Ryan 147 reconnaissance drone:

114–15, 124, 174–75, 256, 315

T–6: 21

T–28: 21

U–2: 37, 38, 42, 71, 78, 113, 113n, 114,

128, 143, 311
371

INDEX

deployment: 38

discovery of first SAM sites: 161,

163

Trojan Horse: 14

UH–1B: 9

Aircraft losses, China: 111, 144, 274–75.

Aircraft losses, North Vietnam: 110–11,

144, 159, 273, 274–76, 320–21

Aircraft losses, South Vietnam: 18, 59, 86,

141, 186, 267–68, 314, 317

Aircraft losses, U.S.: 6, 7, 59, 60–61, 107–

8, 109, 110, 111, 113, 116, 117,

141, 159, 160, 165–66, 171, 173,

183n, 186–87, 193, 194, 197, 204,

226, 229, 239, 241, 267–68, 316,

317. See also Air defense, North

Vietnam; Bien Hoa Air Base,

attacks at; Surface-to-air missiles.

to SAMs: 163–64, 169, 194, 195, 272

studies of: 86–89

weather-related: 313–14

Aircraft technology: 315. See also

Electronics technology; Missiles,

U.S.

infrared imaging: 196, 217, 315

AN/AAS–18: 205–6

reconnaissance drones: 114–15, 174–75

weapons systems: 176, 178

Wild Weasels: 6, 196–97, 269, 320

Air defense, North Vietnam: 31, 86,

113–17, 161, 186–87, 196, 201,

217, 222, 236, 241, 263, 272–74,

280, 295–96, 318. See also Radar

improvements, North Vietnam;

Surface-to-air missiles.

antiaircraft artillery: 5, 6, 7, 16, 31n,

61, 86–88, 97, 107, 129, 130,

159, 165–67, 169, 173, 175,

187, 188, 193, 195, 197, 202,

204, 205, 206, 217, 236, 248,

254, 269, 272, 290, 295, 313,

314, 315, 318, 320, 322, 324 

estimates of strength: 70, 141, 166n,

186n

ground controlled intercept: 31, 141,

176, 295

losses to: 141, 186, 226, 317

searchlight use: 177

tactics to counter: 267–68

weaponry: 141

Air Divisions

2d: 22, 37, 76, 84, 88, 96, 107, 173,

175, 314. See also Air Forces,

numbered, Thirteenth.

air defense conferences: 143

air operations centers: 75

anti-SAM radar tactics: 196

command post, Tan Son Nhut: 51

command reporting post, Udorn: 75

coordination of ECM efforts: 115

growth of: 147, 320

Intelligence Directorate: 185. See

also Target Intelligence

Center.

mission coordination: 22, 312

organization and subordination: 15,

72–73, 314

outcountry operations: 74–75, 145

redesignation: 252n, 320 

relationship to MACV: 74, 244–45

Task Force 77 coordinating

committee: 209. See also

Rolling Thunder Armed

Reconnaissance Coordination

Committee.

2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force:

148, 252n, 320

3d Air Division: 261

Airfields, North Vietnamese

Dien Bien Phu: 138–39, 139, 158, 227–

28

Gia Lam: 143

Kep: 192, 197, 272, 275, 276

Phuc Yen: 22n, 52, 59, 61, 70, 95, 96,

101, 117, 118, 121, 143–44,

164, 188, 190, 222, 223, 237,

241, 272, 276, 300, 302, 315

perceived threat from: 77–78, 143–44,

248

protected status: 118–19, 138, 144, 178,

237, 241, 272–73, 300, 315 

Air Force Tactical Air Warfare Center:

147, 258

Air Forces, numbered

Thirteenth: 14, 22, 72, 74, 76, 81, 147,

148, 252n. 312, 320

2d ADVON: 32, 72–73, 310

Air Operations Centers: 75, 76

Airspace violations: 4, 111, 274–75,

182–83, 314, 320–21. See also

Buffer zones; Shootdowns, by

China.

study of: 276–77

Air Staff: 147, 148, 150, 236, 241, 276,
372

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

277. See also Command and

control issues; Personnel

expansion.

airbase construction planning: 218–19,

230, 233–35

defense of Rolling Thunder: 109

deployment planning: 235–36

discontent with administration-led

strategy: 188–90, 205

Air University: 218

Alden, William A.: 163

ALQ–51. See Electronics technology,

electronic countermeasures.

Alverez, Everett, Jr.: 49

AN/AAS–18. See Aircraft technology.

AN/APS–95. See Radar improvements,

U.S.

Andersen AFB, Guam: 22–23, 23n, 51,

260

Anderson, Ronald C.: 159, 160

Anthis, Rollen H.: 32, 310, 312

APS–20. See Radar improvements, U.S.

Arc Light. See Bombing techniques and

procedures.

Argent Fletcher Company: 275

Armament Development Laboratory. See

Eglin AFB, Florida, Tactical Air

Warfare Center.

Armed Forces Council: 81

Assembly of nonaligned nations: 103

Australian troops. See Personnel

expansion, with foreign forces.

Bach Long Island: 94–95

Bai Thuong: 130, 255

Ball, George: 11, 21, 62, 101, 111, 222,

293

Bangkok: 23, 53, 75, 92, 93, 145, 148,

149, 165

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana: 22n

Barrel Roll: 4, 63–64, 87, 89, 91, 190,

311–12. See also Laos, infiltration

routes.

in coordination with other programs:

77–78, 121, 185

division of effort: 63–64, 250, 252

Barrier combat air patrol: 111, 170

Barrier concept: 7, 304–5, 324

Barthelemy Pass: 239, 255, 299

Base congestion: 230

Bassac River: 54

Batson, E.D.: 144n

Bay of Pigs operation: 30, 30n

Bedcheck Charlie flights: 31

Ben Hai river: 182

Berlin: 42, 98

Bien Hoa Air Base: 16n, 21, 22n, 38, 114,

115, 125. See also Farm Gate.

attacks at: 58, 59–60, 312

deployments to: 50, 113, 160

MSQ–77 ground installation: 266n

response options to attacks: 61–62

VNAF presence: 69

Big Eye/College Eye: 117–18, 118n, 158,

173, 195, 201, 241, 275, 276–77

Big Kite: 261

Big Look: 173. See also Big Eye/College

Eye.

Binh Gia: 64. See also Viet Cong, military

engagements.

Binh Thuy: 266n

Black Sea: 279

Blake, Robert E.: 273

Blanchard, William H.: 221

Bleakley, Robert A.: 274

Blue Spring: 115, 256

Blue Tree: 85, 92, 96, 134, 205, 251

Bomb damage assessment: 16, 17, 24,

109, 128, 131, 142, 158, 193, 301,

355

Bombing, international view of: 103, 293

Bombing halts. See also Peace initiatives.

five-day: 133–35, 313

thirty-seven day: 191, 199, 211–13,

215–17, 218, 225, 317–18

opinions of effects: 217, 221, 228

Bombing policy: 13, 46, 92, 128, 135,

141, 179, 224, 225, 238, 256, 299.

See also Command and control

issues.

allocations: 232, 264, 297–98

effectiveness of: 155, 187, 265

gradual relaxation of rules: 123, 138,

166, 174, 190, 211, 237–38, 318

limits: 4, 6, 83, 95–96, 110, 112, 125,

126, 136, 157, 168, 174, 176,

222, 225, 226, 237, 250, 265,

300–301, 316, 318

loss rate analysis: 86–87, 268

Navy-USAF division of effort: 157, 159,

170, 180–81, 199, 216–17, 225,

228, 250, 255, 318

Rolling Thunder statistics: 142, 152,

153, 180, 295, 316
373

INDEX

Bombing techniques and procedures. See

also Aircraft technology;

Targeting; Reconnaissance. 

Arc Light: 23n, 179, 260, 262

buddy bombing: 226–27, 238–39, 261,

266

K–5 bombing navigation system:

226, 266

dive bombing: 86, 88, 172, 192–93

hunter-killer teams: 168n, 192, 193,

197, 269

skip bombing: 127

Brezhnev, Leonid I.: 66, 

Bridge busting: 104–13, 130–31. See also

Targets, bridges, Thanh Hoa.

Brink Hotel bombing: 64, 312

British Consul, Hong Kong: 134

Brown, Harold: 87, 205, 206, 219, 221,

223, 230, 232, 234–36, 246, 252, 

Buddy bombing. 226–27, 238–39, 261,

266

Buffer zones: 151, 168, 211, 237–38, 250,

251, 286, 323, 312, 315, 318, 321,

322. See also Airspace violations.

Chinese border: 38, 111, 180, 200, 237,

277, 297

Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary: 6, 37,

95–96, 114, 118, 121, 128, 151,

164, 166, 168, 170, 184, 188,

191, 193, 203, 222, 224, 248,

250, 273, 279, 283–84, 297, 315

Bundy, McGeorge: 10–11, 12, 80, 103,

284, 321

search for diplomatic solution: 215

position on Vietnamese policy: 19–21,

66–67, 78

Bundy, William P.: 101, 120, 223, 287

NSC working group: 61

influence on Rolling Thunder bombing

policy: 183–84, 224

policy paper following retaliatory air

strike: 52, 53–54

preparation of Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution: 47–48

Burchinal, David A.: 32

Burma: 98, 216n

Cambodia: 27, 32, 33, 38, 40, 42, 54,

113n, 309

Cameron, James: 206

Cameron, Max F.: 273

Camp Holloway: 9–10, 67

Cam Ranh Bay Air Base: 230, 233

Canada: 27, 91, 252, 284, 286. See also

International Control Commission;

Peace initiatives, by foreign

agencies.

Canton Military Region, China: 70

Carroll, Joseph F.: 213

Case, Thomas F.: 258–60

Castro, Fidel: 30

Casualties: 62, 84, 143, 149, 156, 190,

280, 286

CBS: 289, 293

Central Intelligence Agency: 29, 30, 35,

37, 45, 56, 62, 310. See also

Covert operations.

bombing policy position: 43, 66, 101,

249, 319

covert operation support: 38

joint reports with DIA: 185, 304, 323

leaks: 56

POL strikes, position on: 281, 283, 286

Saigon Military Mission: 28–29

Chambley, France: 196

Chan Ching, China: 282

Chapman, Andrew H.: 17–18

Chen Yi: 103

China, People’s Republic of: 19, 27, 52,

66, 72, 89, 97, 101, 103, 129,

134–35, 136, 199, 228, 309. See

also Airspace violations; Buffer

zones.

influence on plans and policy: 3, 7, 12,

25, 32, 37, 40, 45–46, 57, 61,

69, 93, 97–99, 144, 155, 156,

166, 184, 189, 191, 219–20,

222, 223, 224, 233, 241, 249,

293, 300, 306, 310, 314, 315,

318, 321–22, 324

relations with Soviet Union: 42, 213

supplies to Viet Cong: 122, 158, 295

support for North Vietnam: 71, 130,

140, 236, 298, 319

Chinese air force: 70, 313

Chinese nationalists: 36, 37. See also

Covert operations.

Chou En-lai: 103

Civilian casualties: 285–86, 290, 321–22.

Ben Hai River: 182

concerns: 4, 7, 83, 130, 202, 254, 286,

289, 303, 307, 312, 323

Clark, Arthur C.: 159

Clements, Richard: 127n
374

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

Colby, William E.: 29–30, 30n

College Eye/Big Eye: 117–18, 118n, 158,

173, 195, 201, 241, 275, 276–77

Combat Air Patrol: 17, 22, 62, 84, 92, 94,

96, 106–7, 117–18, 141, 167, 170,

179, 181, 199, 237, 241, 274, 275,

290, 318

Combat Lighting: 277

Combat Skyspot. See MSQ–77 radar

bombing guidance.

Command and control issues: 5, 14–15,

72–76, 88–89, 147–49, 312–13.

See also Bombing policy; Joint

Chiefs of Staff; McNamara,

Robert S.; Johnson, Lyndon B.

civilian control of operations: 4, 6, 83,

83n, 137, 138, 188, 199, 236,

248, 286

complex coordination for 2d Air

Division: 22–23

role of MACV: 245–46, 245n

Rolling Thunder: 245

Sharp’s attitude to Navy-Air Force

roles: 209–10

system study of: 276–77 

troop rotation planning: 146–47

Westmoreland’s extended battlefield

area: 243–44

Conferences

1954 Geneva: 81

1965 CINCPAC deployment:147

1965 Honolulu: 52, 119–23

conclusions of: 120–21

1966 deployment: 230–36, 318

1966 Honolulu: 294–97

1966 Manila: 214

Saigon air defense: 143, 210

Cossard, Hulbert: 274

Counterinsurgency operations: 3, 40–41,

70, 73, 157, 355

Covert operations: 29–30, 35, 37–38, 56n.

See also Central Intelligence

Agency; Operations plans.

Crum, William J.: 261

C. Turner Joy, USS: 48–49

Cuban Missile crisis: 98

Cultural Revolution: 300, 322

Da Lat: 266n.

Da Nang Air Base: 17, 18, 19, 23, 23, 43,

69, 119, 143, 183, 190

Barrel Roll missions from: 63–64

deployments to: 22n, 50, 77, 118, 160,

182, 210, 258

Carolina Moon missions from: 258–59

emergency landings at: 106, 199

Flaming Dart missions from: 23, 69–70

Marines at: 65n, 89, 115, 119, 143

MSQ–77 installation: 277

security for: 18, 60, 89

VNAF presence: 69, 85

Decorations

Air Force Cross: 107, 167, 171, 181

Distinguished Flying Cross: 159

Silver Star: 126–27 159, 167, 181

Defense Intelligence Agency: 131, 141,

144, 186, 301. See also Central

Intelligence Agency; Joint Chiefs

of Staff.

bombing effects, assessment of: 151

DIA-CIA reports: 185, 304, 323

import study: 222n

McNamara disputes Chinese

assessment: 191

South Vietnam stabilization

recommendations: 53–54

target list: 46

De Gaulle, Charles: 40

Demilitarized Zone: 7, 16, 44, 243, 314

accidental strike in: 316

barrier to prevent infiltration: 7, 304–5,

307, 324

infiltration through: 254, 300, 320, 324. 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. See

North Vietnamese government.

Dempster, K.C.: 195.

De Soto patrols: 11, 38, 38n, 48, 52, 56,

78–79. See also Flaming Dart;

Seventh Fleet; Ships, U.S. Navy.

Flaming Dart intelligence: 13

suspensions and resumptions: 54, 55,

56n, 61, 311,

Diem, Ngo Dinh. See Ngo Dinh Diem.

Dien Bien Phu: 44, 138–39, 158, 177–78,

309

Dixie Station: 299

Dong Em: 195

Dong Ha: 266, 269

Dong Phuong Thuong: 109, 140

Dong Xoai: 154

Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base:

48, 145

Donovan, John E.: 197

Dowell, William B. P.: 274
375

INDEX

Draft calls: 157

Drones. See Reconnaissance drones.

Dudley, William B.: 274

Duong Minh (Big Minh): 36–37, 38, 40,

310–11

Easterbrook, Ernest F.: 148, 148n

Eckhardt, George S.: 245n

Edmundson, William: 259

Eglin AFB, Florida: 259

Tactical Air Warfare Center: 147, 258

Armament Development

Laboratory: 258.

Wild Weasels: 196, 197, 269

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 25, 81

Electronics technology: 195–96

electronic countermeasures: 88n,

114–16, 195, 217, 229, 239,

273, 286

ALQ–51: 173

QRC–160–1 pods: 115–16

electronic intelligence: 96, 167, 168,

169, 193, 195, 209

radio relay

KC–135: 271–72, 277

SAM detection and jamming: 172,

196–97, 239. See also Aircraft,

U.S, EB–66; EC–121.

Emerick, Paul S.: 277

Enney, James C.: 185

Evans, Robert E.: 273

Extended battlefield area. See

Westmoreland, William C.

Fact Sheet. See Operation Fact Sheet.

Fanfani, Amitore: 203

Farm Gate: 16n, 17–18, 22, 31–32, 34, 38,

40, 42, 46, 84, 87, 94, 310

Fan Song radar. See Surface-to-air

missiles.

Felt, Harry D.: 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 42, 45,

49, 74

Fifth Air Force: 115

Fire Can radar. See Radar improvements,

North Vietnam.

First Fleet: 51

Fish Net: 78

Flaming Dart: 3, 60, 86, 89, 313

Flaming Dart I: 13–19, 67, 70, 312

Flaming Dart II: 22–25, 67, 70, 312

Flaming Dart III: 78

Fobair, Roscoe H.: 163–64

Formosa Strait crisis resolution: 51

Forward Air Controllers: 72, 243, 253,

254

Four-point peace plan. See Peace

initiatives.

France: 28, 89, 103, 293

French-Viet Minh war: 3, 27, 44, 71, 105,

138, 309. See also Dien Bien Phu.

Fulbright, J. William: 293

Gate Guard: 253–54, 254n

Geneva Agreements

1954: 3, 27, 89, 104, 161, 182, 216,

309

1962: 47, 64, 216

Geneva conference, 1954: 81

George AFB, California: 117, 118, 182

George, S. W.: 273

Geyelin, Philip: 289

Gilmore, Paul J.: 273

Goldberg, Arthur: 157, 203, 215, 216

Goldberg, Lawrence H.: 274

Goldwater, Barry: 42. See also Johnson,

Lyndon B., presidential elections.

Goure, Leon: 154n

Graham, Gordon M.: 86, 87–89

Great Britain: 28, 47, 81, 252, 284. See

also Peace initiatives, by foreign

agencies.

position on bombing policy: 285

Greathouse, Edwin A.: 144–45

Greece: 136

Green Python: 96

Greene, Wallace M. Jr.: 41, 43, 53, 54,

55–56, 59, 92, 93

Groom, John F.: 253

Ground controlled intercept. See Air

defense, North Vietnam.

Groups, U.S., Air Force

34th Tactical: 17–18, 125

35th Tactical Control: 75, 145

detachment 2: 75

6234th Combat Support: 145

6235th Combat Support: 145

6250th Combat: 175

Guam: 59, 69, 84. See also Andersen

AFB, Guam.

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: 4, 47–48, 49,

49n, 51, 311

Gulf of Tonkin: 111, 126, 145, 173, 183n,

201, 202, 224, 229, 230, 232, 258,

259, 277, 288n, 299, 311, 312
376

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

Hainan Island: 110–11, 144, 182, 183n,

314, 316. See also Airspace

violations.

Haiphong: 23n, 34, 37, 71, 83, 96, 118,

169, 184, 190, 193, 200, 203, 222,

257, 279, 283, 315. See also

Buffer zones, Hanoi-Haiphong

sanctuary; POL strangulation

campaign; Targets.

Haiphong harbor: 7, 34, 44, 45–46, 101,

223, 282, 288, 300, 303, 307

plans to block: 128–29, 300

Hall, Richard: 158–59, 160

Hancock, USS: 16, 115

Hargrove, Gerald D.: 274

Harkins, Paul D.: 32, 34, 37, 41, 72–74,

73, 310, 311

Harriman, W. Averell: 215

Harris, Hunter, Jr.: 14–15, 46n, 57, 74n,

81, 95, 98, 120, 133, 143, 163,

165, 168, 184, 225, 227, 237. See

also Bien Hoa Air Base, attacks at;

Pacific Air Forces; Tonkin Gulf

Incident.

calls for more vigorous armed

responses: 49, 52, 60, 150, 282

command and control: 148–49, 312,

314. See also Command and

control issues.

extended battlefield area: 245

planning for troops expansion: 77–78,

121, 147

proposal to counter MiG threat: 117

view of POL bombing campaign: 300,

303

views of Air Force role in theater

operations: 76, 247

Harris public opinion poll: 293

Hartke, Vance: 293

Hartman, Charles W.: 144–45

Heavy repair units: 234

Heyman, Victor K.: 233–34

Ho Chi Minh: 32, 105, 216 

Ho Chi Minh Trail: 39, 58, 239, 313, 321

Holcombe, Kenneth E.: 159

Holt, William H.: 272

Hon Gai: 300

Hon Gio (Tiger) Island: 85, 105, 125, 126,

225

Hon Matt Island: 94–95, 110–11, 126,

137, 177

Hon Me Island: 48

Hon Ngu Island: 48, 94–95

Hon Nieu Island: 126

Hong Rong (the Dragon’s Jaw). See

Targets, bridges, Thanh Hoa.

Honolulu: 31, 34–35, 45, 322.

munitions meeting: 264

meeting between U.S. and South

Vietnamese presidents: 222–23

Honolulu Conferences. See Conferences.

Hosmer, William J.: 167

Hue: 250

Huong, Tran Van. See Tran Van Huong.

Humphrey, Hubert H.: 21, 215, 216

Hungary: 215n

Hunter-killer missions:168n, 192, 193,

196, 270. See also Iron Hand.

Igloo White: 305, 307

Ignatius, Paul R.: 264

Infiltration, barrier to prevent: 7, 304–5,

307, 324

Infiltration routes: 5, 37, 62, 91, 202, 213,

225, 227, 280

International Control Commission: 27, 48,

64, 91, 158, 182

Interservice deployment conference. See

Honolulu, deployment conference.

Iron Hand: 166–68, 170. See also Surfaceto-air missiles.

Itazuke Air Base, Japan: 77

Japan: 22n, 42, 48, 50, 77, 115, 182, 219,

231

Jarret, Grover C.: 118n

Johns Hopkins University: 103

Johnson, Clinton B.: 144–45

Johnson, Harold K.: 41, 43, 54, 91, 97

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 10, 10, 14, 36, 37,

50, 80, 81, 92, 150, 155, 213, 214,

215, 283, 286, 294, 311, 313, 323.

See also Command and control

issues; McNamara, Robert S.;

National Security Memoranda.

alarm about South Vietnam instability:

119–20, 250

bombing halts: 133–35, 211–12, 282,

317 

domestic considerations: 42, 47

Eisenhower’s advice: 25, 81

escalation reluctance: 20–21, 25, 27, 40,

59, 60, 62–64, 67, 102, 309

ground war decision: 318
377

INDEX

increased deployments: 147

meeting with South Vietnamese

premier: 222–23

McNamara’s report on Saigon: 37

munitions production priority: 254, 321

negotiation stance: 103, 293

NSAM 288: 42

Oplan 34A approval: 37

POL strike authorization: 288

presidential elections: 42

retaliatory bombing approval: 67, 164

Rolling Thunder approval: 92

Rolling Thunder resumption: 224–25,

318

Steel Tiger approval: 97, 103

Tonkin Gulf Resolution: 51, 311

withdrawal of U.S. dependents: 18

Johnson, Roy L.: 133, 237, 250

Johnson, U. Alexis: 10, 64, 144, 156

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 11, 20, 35, 40, 54,

59, 79, 97, 135, 144, 184, 190,

221, 224, 238, 249, 279

aircraft loss analyses: 86–87

barrier concept opposition: 304

bombing halt views: 212, 221

and bombing rextrictions: 128

border violations investigation: 276–77

differences with administration: 58,

224, 236, 237

eight-week bombing program: 78–79,

97

Iron Hand authorization: 168–67

J–3 operations: 276

low-altitude photoreconnaissance

authorization: 174

McNamara and JCS target requests:

188, 191

and North Vietnamese aircraft threat:

143–44

and NSAM 314: 55

political dilemma alarm: 65

POL strike recommendation: 6, 202–3,

282, 287

retaliation recommended: 39–41

sortie increase recommended: 202–3

sortie limit proposals: 202, 222, 249

three-phase air attack plan: 46

VNAF B–57 training: 47n

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group: 87

Kadena Air Base, Okinawa: 115

deployments to: 23n, 50, 51, 77, 277

Keirn, Richard P.: 163

Keith, Larry R.: 274

Kennedy, John F.: 30, 30n, 31–32, 33, 34,

36, 310–11

Khe Kiem: 110

Kitty Hawk, USS: 202

Kong Le: 28

Korat Royal Thai Air Force base: 75, 84,

126, 145, 147

deployments to: 22n, 50, 77, 160, 182,

196, 269

Korean War: 31, 31n, 221

comparisons with: 86, 103

Kosygin, Alexsei N.: 12, 56n

visits to Hanoi: 11, 21, 66

Krafka, Edward: 160

Kringelis, Imants: 274

Krulak, Victor H.: 37

Khrushchev, Nikita: 66

Kung Kuan Air Base, Taiwan: 77, 118

Kunming Military region, China: 70

Kunsan Air Base, Korea: 77

Kwangsi Province, China: 199

Ky, Nguyen Cao. See Nguyen Cao Ky.

Lam Van Phat: 81–82

Lamb, Allen T.: 197

Lang Luang: 199

Lansdale, Edward G.: 28–29

Lao Cai: 71, 158, 228, 238–39, 241, 246,

248, 255

Lao Dong (Labor) Party: 83. See also

North Vietnamese government.

Laos: 5, 15, 22, 23, 23n, 30, 33n, 36, 38,

40, 45, 55, 60, 71, 72, 78, 91, 96,

113n, 130, 254n, 309. See also

Barrel Roll; Steel Tiger; Tiger

Hound; Yankee Team.

concerns for stability: 3, 27–28, 32, 39

deniability: 63

infiltration routes: 4, 5, 7, 27–28, 30,

33, 34, 35, 37, 42–43, 46–47,

52, 53, 54, 58, 61, 62, 103, 105,

111–12, 122, 129, 206, 227,

243, 260, 261, 299, 313, 320

napalm ban: 243

North Vietnamese influence in: 40, 139,

251

reconnaissance: 310, 311

sensors: 324

strike missions: 73, 74, 87–89, 148,

149, 157, 209, 222, 225, 232,
378

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

236, 295, 311, 322

Lavalle, John D.: 234

Lazy Dog containers. See Munitions and

ordnance, U.S.

Leaflet distribution: 29, 38, 96–97, 129–

30, 137, 140–41, 160–61, 210–11,

313. See also Psychological

warfare, U.S..

LeMay, Curtis E.: 11, 11n, 12, 35, 41, 43,

44, 46–47, 55, 59, 60, 61, 73, 73,

74, 310, 311

speech to House of Representatives: 40

view of NCS’ approach: 53

view of U.S. policy: 56, 65–66

Lifsey, Truman: 197

Lindemuth, Leslie J: 197

Lockheed Corporation: 117

Lodge, Henry Cabot: 36, 37, 41, 42–43,

45, 47, 153, 153n, 156, 157,

212–13, 221, 285

Lucky Dragon: 38

Maddox, USS: 48–49. See also Tonkin

Gulf incident.

Maddux, Sam, Jr.: 14, 147

Malaysia: 32, 136

Manor, Leroy J.: 234

Mansfield, Mike: 11–12

Mao Tse-tung: 219

Marsten, Hallet F.: 290–91

Martin, Glen W.: 218–19

Martin, Graham A.: 23, 49, 53, 165

Mather AFB, California: 22n

McClellan AFB, California: 117

McCone, John: 37, 43, 45, 62, 66, 101,

157

McConnell, John P.: 54, 79, 79, 86, 92,

98, 106, 107, 121, 144, 147, 153,

161, 164, 206, 217, 251, 268, 287,

300, 311, 

Air Force command and control study:

276–77

on bombing policy: 92–93, 151, 153,

314

bombing proposal: 92–93

deployment planning: 219, 233, 235

ground-oriented campaign views: 318

maximum sorties for pilots: 210

munitions shortage: 264, 265

POL strikes: 284, 321

Rolling Thunder resumption: 221

on thirty-seven day bombing halt: 221

McCreery, John H.: 75, 145

McDonald, David L.: 43, 54, 187, 252–53

McKee, Seth J.: 188–89

McNamara, Robert S.: 11, 14, 36, 84,

222, 249, 279, 288, 315–16, 323.

See also Command and control

issues; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

anti-SAM operations extension: 188

barrier concept: 7, 304–5, 307, 324

bombing halts: 191, 212–13, 217

bombing strategy changes: 283

Contingency Planning Facilities List: 53

control of air operations: 236, 248, 249,

264–65, 297, 312, 319

deployment plans: 235–36

escalation: 121, 324

concerns over communist response:

42, 191, 318

extended battlefield area: 242–43, 246,

283

initial recommendations: 37, 41–42

JCS relations: 236

Laos operations approval: 53

munitions shortage: 264–65

negotiations: 317

POL strangulation campaign: 283, 300,

309, 321

Rolling Thunder: 122–23, 191, 246

Saigon visit: 311

Southeast Asia Program Team: 233

South Vietnamese stability: 119–20

strategic options for Johnson: 155–57

McNaughton, John T.: 101, 114, 120, 223,

285

Mekong Delta: 46

Mekong River: 46, 54

Meo forces: 28, 30n

Meyers, Gilbert L.: 147, 291

bomber crew training: 127n

control from Washington: 76

Middle East: 42, 51

Military Assistance Command, Thailand:

148

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam:

15, 35, 37, 40, 60, 81, 93, 310,

319, 320, 323. See also Air

Division, 2d; Command and control issues; Westmoreland, William

C., extended battlefield area.

battlefield command and control

authority: 243
379

INDEX

command and control complexity:

72–74

covert operations: 30, 32–33

Operations Plan 34A: 39, 129, 311

responsibility from CIA: 37

Special Operations Group: 38. See also

Central Intelligence Agency;

Covert operations.

strike coordination complexity: 22

Viet Cong attack on: 9–10, 67

Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam/Thailand: 148

Minh, Ho Chi. See Ho Chi Minh.

Misawa Air Base, Japan: 115

deployments to: 50, 77

Missile guidance warning receiver. See

Radar, improvements, U.S.

Missiles, U.S.:

AGM–45 Shrike: 176, 239, 269–70

use by Air Force: 176, 238, 270–71,

270, 320 

Bullpup–12B: 106, 106, 112, 113, 127,

138, 140, 178

Matador: 235n

Sidewinder: 111, 159, 273, 274–75

Sparrow III: 144

MK–24 flare: 182, 192

Moc Chau: 158

Momyer, William W.: 300, 301, 323

Monkey Mountain: 277

Montagnard tribes: 10

Moore, Joseph H., Jr.: 14, 77, 109, 173,

210, 228, 258–59, 320

bombing policy: 78, 314

coordination with Navy: 276

deputy MACV commander for air

operations: 147

operational authority: 15, 74, 81

Thanh Hoa bridge: 106–7, 126–27

thirty-seven day bombing halt opinion:

228

Moorer, Thomas H.: 14, 57, 133

Moscow: 17, 19, 31, 89, 104, 133, 293, 18

MSQ–77 radar bombing guidance:

265–67, 320. See also radar

improvements, U.S. 

ground installations: 266n, 268

success of: 267

X-band radar: 266

Mu Gia Pass: 58, 60, 78, 111–12, 239,

242, 260–62, 260n, 261, 264, 320

Munitions and ordnance, U.S.

3,000 pound bomb: 177

BLU–3: 273

CBU–2: 263

CBU–24: 292

CBU–2A fragmentation bomblets: 84,

142

Dragon Tooth: 88

Gravel: 88

MLU–10 land mine: 158, 239

safety problems: 179

napalm: 88, 164, 165, 171, 172, 197

effectiveness of: 95

lifting of restrictions: 86, 87

restrictions on use: 16, 83, 243

Zuni rockets: 16, 142, 239

Munitions improvements, U.S. See also

Eglin AFB, Florida, Tactical

Warfare Center.

5,000 pound bomb: 258–60. See also

Operation Carolina Moon.

Bullpup development: 138, 140 178

Lazy Dog: 88

MK–82 Snake Eye: 88, 170, 192

Murphy, John R.: 145, 147, 148

Mustin, Lloyd M.: 277, 286, 288

Naha Air Base, Okinawa: 50, 77

Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force

Base: 160, 266, 266n

Nam Dinh: 161, 280

Nape Pass: 109, 299

National Leadership Council: 149

National Liberation Army of the North:

33. See also Covert operations.

National Liberation Front: 103, 104, 216,

250. See also Viet Cong.

National Security Agency: 276

National Security Council: 10, 101,

224–25

working group recommendations:

61–62

National Security Memoranda:

NSAM 273: 36–37

NSAM 288: 42

NSAM 310: 58

NSAM 314: 55–56, 63

NSAM 319: 63

NSAM 328: 102–5, 109, 119, 129

National Shame Day: 47

Nazzaro, Joseph J.: 252, 260

Neal, Murphy: 291

New Zealand troops: 120, 231, 313. See
380

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

also Personnel expansion, with

foreign forces.

Ngo Dinh Diem: 25, 29, 30, 310–11 

government weakness and U.S. policy:

30–32, 310

internal opposition: 35

overthrow: 27, 36, 250, 310

Nguyen Cao Ky: 17, 29, 81–82, 149, 150,

214, 223, 232, 250, 284, 314

Nguyen Chanh Thi: 82, 249, 250, 283–84

Nguyen Khe: 280, 285, 288–89, 292, 298

Nguyen Van Thieu: 149, 150, 217, 249,

314

Nha Trang: 9, 18

Nhan Dan: 216

Night armed reconnaissance: 111,

125–26, 222–23

Night Owl: 125, 182

Night Wind: 181–82

Ninh Binh: 137, 161, 173

Nix, C. Glen: 256

Nixon, Richard M.: 129

Nolting, Frederick C.: 34, 37

North Korea: 57, 309

North Vietnamese air force: 70, 91, 272

strength of: 70, 241, 276, 295, 313

North Vietnamese army: 38, 39, 

units: 

270th Regiment: 17

316th Infantry Brigade: 139

352d Division: 16

North Vietnamese government: 27, 31, 55,

57, 78, 81, 91, 97, 98. See also

Lao Dong (Labor) Party.

bombing effects: 185

civilian protection measures: 109

communist superpowers relations: 130

four-point plan: 104, 135, 313, 317–18

Pathet Lao/Viet Cong support: 34, 35,

43, 120, 130, 202, 221

peace initiatives, response to: 135

propaganda results: 210

North Vietnamese infrastructure. See also

Bridge busting; POL strangulation

campaign.

night operations: 206–8

repair efforts: 131, 178, 207, 217, 296

Office of the Secretary of Defense: 31,

60, 76, 138, 179, 203, 230

Southeast Asia Program team: 233–34,

236

Operation Carolina Moon: 258–60. See

also Targets, bridges, Thanh Hoa.

Operation Fact Sheet: 129–30. See also

Leaflet distribution; Psychological

warfare, U.S.

Operation Hardnose: 39. See also Covert

operations.

Operation Marigold. See Bombing halts,

thirty-seven day.

Operation Mayflower. See Bombing halts,

five-day.

Operations Plans: 32–36, 97–99

32-64: 32, 45–46, 97–98

32-65: 98n

33-62: 32, 33, 35

34A: 37, 38–40, 48, 52, 54–55, 61,

62–63, 78–79, 129, 311

37-64: 45–46, 53, 54

39-64: 57, 97–99

39-65: 57, 77, 98n, 219

99-64: 32, 35–36, 53

Operations Review Group: 234n. See also

Air Staff.

Osan Air Base, Korea: 77

Owens, Robert G.: 276–77. See also

Airspace violations.

Pacific Air Forces: 11, 14, 15, 22, 23, 32,

36, 46, 76. See also Smart, Jacob E.

Pacific Air Rescue Center: 160

Pacific Command: 57, 72–73, 74, 75–76,

90, 93, 95, 130, 141, 143, 149,

168, 202, 219, 224, 230, 232, 243.

See also Sharp, U.S. Grant.

command and control to MACV: 245

POL strangulation campaign: 294,

322–23

Pacification programs: 30, 38, 41, 52, 54

Page, Louis C.: 144n

Pathet Lao: 27, 28, 43, 44, 52, 54, 64,

130, 138, 139, 158, 185, 256

Pathfinders: 94, 124, 192, 226, 261, 266

replaced by Combat Skyspot: 267

Paul Doumer bridge: 105n

Peace initiatives. See also Bombing halts.

by foreign agencies: 81, 252, 284, 286,

293, 321

by the U.S. See Johnson, Lyndon B.

four-point peace plan: 104, 135, 313,

317–18

Pentagon: 44, 285, 288, 292

Peoples Army, Vietnam: 57
381

INDEX

Personnel expansion: 145–51, 157,

229–36

with foreign forces: 101, 120, 150, 231,

313

Pham Ngoc Thao: 81–82

Pham Van Dong: 104, 104n, 287

Phan Huy Quat: 82, 120

Phan Khac Suii: 149

Phan Rang Air Base: 230

Philpott, Jammie M.: 251

Photoanalysis: 176, 209

Photoreconnaissance: 21, 31, 33, 43, 50,

72, 95, 106, 133, 166, 174, 185,

213, 241, 254, 257, 259, 261, 270,

283. See also Blue Tree.

Pierce Arrow: 49, 288, 288n

Ping Hsiang, China: 199

Pitchford, John J.: 197. See also Prisoners

of war.

Plain of Jars: 38, 109

Pleiku: 9–11, 13, 18, 67, 99, 150, 266n.

POL strangulation campaign: 294, 296,

297–307, 322, 323, 324. See also

Rolling Thunder 50; Targets, POL

facilities.

concerns for civilian casualties: 286,

289, 290, 303, 307, 316, 321

Potter, Melvin: 165n

Powers, Richard: 192–93

Prisoners of war: 49, 154, 163, 171, 192,

197, 291

Propaganda, China: 182–83, 199

Propaganda, North Vietnam: 113, 135,

186

Psychological warfare, U.S.: 137, 140–41.

See also Leaflet distribution.

attempts to exploit Viet Cong

vulnerabilities: 154n

Pyle, Jesse: 9

Queen Bee: 48

Quat, Phan Huy. See Phan Huy Quat.

Radio Hanoi: 216

Radar improvements, North Vietnam: 115,

116–17, 141. See also Air defense,

North Vietnam.

artillery controlled by: 226

Fan Song: 

Fire Can: 116, 226–27

Radar improvements, U.S: 238–39, 277

ALQ–51: 173

AN/APS–95: 118

APS–20: 173

jamming techniques and equipment:

196

night bombing equipment: 204

panoramic SCA Receiver: 196–97

Radar homing and warning system: 196

S-band jammer: 226

Side-Looking Air borne Radar: 205

skin painting: 266

techniques and equipment to neutralize

SAMs: 196

RAND bombing study: 154

Reconnaissance drones: 114–15, 124, 161,

164, 174–75, 192, 256, 315

against SAM locations: 115, 174–75

Ryan 147B: 114

Ryan 147D: 114–15

Reconnaissance programs

Blue Spring: 115, 256

Blue Tree: 85, 92, 96, 134, 205, 251

Yankee Team: 60–61, 96

Red River: 71, 238

Red River Delta: 158, 179, 208, 211

Refueling: 22n, 50–51, 63, 71, 84, 107,

131, 132, 138, 158, 170, 181, 182,

197, 274, 308

Remer, Richard T.: 258–60

Reserve units: 157

Risner, Robinson: 106, 107, 107n, 171,

172, 181. See also Prisoners of

war.

account of capture: 171–73. 

Roberts, Thomas S.: 159, 160

Rock Kick II: 260–61. See also Aircraft,

U.S., B–52; Strategic Air

Command.

Rolling Thunder: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 47n, 60,

69–83, 12. See also Bridge

busting; Iron Hand; Night armed

reconnaissance; Night Owl; POL

strangulation campaign; Route

packages; Steel Tiger; Targets.

first strike: 84

planning for: 188–89

Planning Group: 247

programs 1–4: 81, 82

program 5: 83–84, 128

program 6: 85–86

program 7: 93–94

program 8: 94–95

program 9: 95, 104–9, 125
382

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

program 10: 110–11

program 11: 111–13

program 12: 123–25

program 13/14: 125–29 

program 15: 136–37

program 16: 137–38

program 20: 138–39

program 21: 138–39

program 22/23: 157–58, 159

program 24/25: 176–77

program 26/27: 167, 177–78, 188

program 28/29: 170, 178–79

program 30/31: 180–82, 190–91

program 33: 182

program 34/35: 199

program 37/38: 199

program 38/39: 183, 199

program 44/45: 203

program 48: 224–28, 236, 237, 238, 318

program 49: 236–38, 241, 243, 318–19

program 50: 243–77, 283, 319–20

first use of B–52s in North Vietnam:

319

program 51: 297, 305, 322

Rolling Thunder Armed Reconnaissance

Coordination Committee: 208–9

Ronning, Chester: 286–87, 293

Rostow, Walt W.: 30, 31, 136, 157, 321

POL facilities bombing: 284, 293

Route packages: 209–10, 225, 239, 240,

250, 251, 255, 299, 301, 319

route package 1: 246, 247, 252, 253,

254, 266, 267, 299, 300, 302,

320, 323, 2

route package 2: 246, 266, 300

route package 3: 258, 266, 300

route package 4: 266, 300

route package 5: 228, 237

route package 6a: 302, 267

route package 6b: 256, 266

Rowland, Robert R.: 82

Royal Laotian air force: 52, 56, 58, 60,

61, 63, 64. See also Aircraft, Laos.

Rusk, Dean: 11, 14, 24, 25, 34, 42, 64, 67,

82, 83, 123, 128, 133, 161, 203,

213, 215, 223, 284, 286, 321

Saigon

air defense conference: 143, 210

attack on: 66

2d Air Division Air Operations Center:

75

Sam Neua, Laos: 138

Sattahip Royal Thai Air Force Base: 230

S-band jammer. See Radar improvements,

U.S.

Seaborn, J. Blair: 48, 91n

Security leaks: 56, 165, 260, 286, 289,

321

Seismic sensors: 7, 92, 116, 304–5, 324.

See also Barrier concept.

Seventh Air Force: 184, 226, 239, 243,

252n, 320, 323. See also Air

Divisions, 2d.

Seventh Fleet: 11, 38–39, 48, 52, 69, 74,

312. See also Ships, U.S. Navy.

De Soto patrols: 11n

Sharp, U.S. Grant :14–15, 89, 129, 166,

187, 200, 201–2, 271, 286, 289,

294, 301. See also Pacific

Command.

air base defense resources

recommended: 60

barrier concept opposed: 304, 324

bombing escalation recommended: 78,

90, 93, 130, 136, 189, 236–37

bombing halt opposed: 135, 212, 317

bombing sorties allocated: 157, 169,

170, 209, 225, 228, 250–51,

264, 297, 301

EC–121 request approved: 117

extended battlefield opposed: 244–45,

319

force size increase recommended and

planned: 219–20, 221, 230–33,

296, 307, 318

Mu Gia Pass bombing opposed: 262

Oplan 39–64 completed: 57

POL bombing campaign: 282, 285,

322–23

reconnaissance collaboration directed:

133–34, 174

reconnaissance increase recommended:

92, 95

retaliatory strikes recommended: 49,

52, 53, 59, 64

route packages devised: 209, 316

route packages responsibilities

reassigned: 247–48, 251, 299,

319

SAM strikes recommended: 163–64

strategies for winning the war: 120, 143

on Tonkin Gulf incident: 49n

Shaw AFB, South Carolina: 116, 196, 205
383

INDEX

Shelepin, Alexander S.: 216, 221

Ships, Soviet:

Komsomol: 288

Buguruslan: 295

Ships, U.S. Navy. See also De Soto

patrols; Seventh Fleet.

C. Turner Joy: 48–49. See also Tonkin

Gulf Incident

Constellation: 49, 289

Coral Sea: 11, 15, 16, 22, 169, 

Craig: 38

Franklin Roosevelt: 226

Hancock: 11, 15, 16, 16, 22, 115, 292

Independence: 192

Kitty Hawk: 202

Maddox: 48–49. See also Tonkin Gulf

Incident. 

Midway: 169

Oriskany: 194

Ranger: 11, 16, 22, 51, 111, 289

Ticonderoga: 15, 48–49. See also

Tonkin Gulf Incident.

Shootdowns, by China: 182–83, 316. See

also Airspace violations.

Shootdowns, by North Vietnam: 110–11

Shootdowns, by U.S.: 110–11, 158–59,

273–74, 320–21

by propeller aircraft: 144–45

of Chinese aircraft: 144

of MiG–21: 273–74 

Shoup, David M.: 41

Side-looking Airborne Radar. See Radar

improvements, U.S.

Silver Dawn: 182

Simler, George B.: 248

Singapore: 32

Skoshi Tiger: 235

Smart, Jacob E.: 2, 46, 46n, 74. See also

Pacific Air Forces.

Smith, John C., Jr.: 144n

Smith, Philip E.: 182–83

Smith, William T.: 273–74

Snake Eye. See Munitions and ordnance, U.S.

Song Ca River: 224

Song Ma River: 105, 258. See also

Targets, bridges, Thanh Hoa. 

Southeast Asia Program Division. See

Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Southeast Asia Resolution. See Gulf of

Tonkin Resolution.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: 99

South Korea: 57, 98, 99, 231, 309, 313.

See also Personnel expansion, with

foreign troops.

South Vietnamese army: 10, 82, 149

I Corps: 40, 320, 323

II Corps: 9, 312

special forces: 31, 37

South Vietnamese elections: 216, 300, 323

Souphanouvong: 28

Souvanna Phouma: 27–28, 47, 63, 262

Soviet Union: 7, 47, 76, 191, 309, 321,

323

influence on U.S. policy: 3, 35, 42, 52,

61, 97, 98, 144, 166, 191,

309–10, 314, 318, 319, 324, 

peace moves: 81, 89, 156, 213

relations with China: 42, 213

relations with North Vietnam: 130

support for North Vietnam: 7, 19, 114,

163, 300, 303, 318, 322

support for North Vietnam's air force:

69, 117

Special air warfare unit. See Farm Gate.

Special National Intelligence Estimates:

281, 282

SNIE 53264: 57

Spring High: 164–66

Squadrons, U.S. Air Force:

1st Air Commando: 69

4th Air Commando: 217

8th Bomb: 50

9th Tactical Reconnaissance: 196

12th Tactical Fighter: 147, 167, 177

landmine drops: 158

13th Bomb: 50, 58

13th Reconnaissance: 185

15th Tactical Reconnaissance: 50, 96.

See also Blue Tree; Yankee

Team.

16th Tactical Fighter: 50

16th Tactical Reconnaissance: 205

18th Tactical Fighter: 86

25th Tactical Reconnaissance: 196

35th Tactical Fighter: 147

36th Tactical Fighter: 50

38th Air Rescue: 160

41st Tactical Reconnaissance: 196

44th Tactical Fighter: 147

45th Tactical Fighter: 96, 117, 138,

158–59, 179

47th Tactical Fighter: 147, 179

67th Tactical Fighter: 106, 181

68th Tactical Fighter: 125, 182. See also
384

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

Night Owl.

80th Tactical Fighter: 147

90th Tactical Fighter: 17

333d Tactical Fighter: 210

354th Tactical Fighter: 126, 147

357th Tactical Fighter: 147

390th Tactical Fighter: 210

421st Air Refueling Squadron: 50

469th Tactical Fighter: 86

476th Tactical Fighter: 118

509th Tactical Fighter: 50

522d Tactical Fighter: 51 

555th Tactical Fighter: 273

563d Tactical Fighter: 147

602d Air Commando: 69

614 Tactical Fighter: 51

615 Tactical Fighter: 50

904th Refueling: 23n

913th Refueling: 23n

6091st Reconnaissance: 48, 182–83.

See also Queen Bee.

6234th Tactical Fighter: 196–97

Starboard, Alfred D.: 304–5

State Department: 37, 47, 82, 89, 111,

114, 128, 135, 136, 138, 157, 179,

183, 188, 215, 224, 285, 286, 293,

300

Steel Tiger: 4, 97, 101, 103, 105, 121,

130, 190, 211–12, 225, 250, 252

Strategic Air Command. See also Arc

Light; Reconnaissance programs.

bomber strikes: 119, 243, 260–63, 320

tankers: 49, 84, 106, 180, 181

U–2 flights: 14, 37, 38, 42, 71, 113n,

114, 128, 143, 311

Subic Bay, the Philippines: 11

Suii, Phan Khac. See Phan Khac Suii.

Sullivan, William H.: 23, 63, 64, 211–12,

227, 260, 261–62

Surface-to-air missiles: 113–14, 173, 162,

163, 163–167, 169, 192, 271, 303.

See also Air defense, North

Vietnam.

anti-SAM operations: 164–73, 174,

192–97, 239, 269–71, 320. See

also Electronics technology;

Iron Hand; Radar

improvements, U.S.

Fan Song radar: 163, 165, 171–75, 192,

197

tactics and equipment to defeat: 114,

115, 171–75, 271

SA–2: 162, 163, 318

diminishing threat from: 268, 269,

272

discovery of first sites: 161, 163

estimates of numbers: 241

guidance radar: 176

shootdowns by: 195, 204

sites: 166, 167, 177

skill at hiding and protecting: 167,

170

SA–3: 171

Swatow boats: 48–49, 50

Sweden: 103

Tactical Air Command: 51, 86, 88, 96,

235

Tactical Air Control Center: 277

Tactical Control Party: 234

Tainan Air Base, Taiwan: 77, 117–18

Taiwan: 29, 77, 118, 219

Takhli Royal Thai Air Force base: 70, 84,

145, 160, 192, 227

deployments to: 22n, 50, 77, 116, 147,

196, 210

Tally-Ho: 254, 254n

Tan Son Nhut Air Base: 6, 15, 17, 36, 69,

80, 82, 96, 160, 216, 228

2d Air Division command post: 51, 74,

148

attacks at: 126, 127

deployments to: 50, 116, 118, 175, 205

security for: 7, 60

VNAF presence: 69

Target and photo ELINT panels. See

Rolling Thunder Armed

Reconnaissance Coordination

Committee.

Target Intelligence Center: 185

Targets: 13–14. See also Airfields, North

Vietnamese; Bridge busting; Route

packages; POL strangulation campaign; Weather.

ammunition depots: 45, 123, 181, 280,

294, 314

Ban Nuoc Chieu: 138, 145, 178

Haiphong: 70

Hoai An: 138

Long Het: 199

Phu Qui: 85, 137

Phu Van: 94

Tai Xouan: 173

Xom Bang: 84
385

INDEX

Xom Rung: 177

Yen Bai: 158

Yen Khaoi: 181

Yen Son: 158

barracks: 7, 58, 63, 68, 95, 139, 150,

312, 315

Bai Thuong: 177, 178

Ban Na Pew: 170

Ban Xom Lam: 158

Binh Linh: 169

Cam Doi:165

Chanh Hoi: 21–24

Chap Le: 15, 17–18, 21–24

Dien Bien Phu: 138–39, 177

Dong Hoi: 15, 16, 21, 177, 302

Hanoi: 256, 290

Hoan Lao: 137

Hon Gio: 85

Kim Cuong: 179

Phu Le: 137

Phu Nieu: 165

Quang Soui: 136–37, 177

Son La: 138, 144, 158, 177

Thanh Chai: 178

Vinh: 177, 178

Vit Thu Lu: 15, 16, 94

Vu Con: 16, 17, 21, 22, 81, 94

Vu San: 137

Xom Bang: 84, 170

Xom Trung Hoa: 126, 128, 178

Yen Khaoi: 181

bridges: 5, 21, 34, 39, 40, 58, 61, 70,

100, 110–11, 112, 178, 189,

204, 207, 211, 220, 256, 286,

302. See also Bridge busting.

Bac Can: 192, 199, 200, 201

Bac Giang: 257, 257, 273, 274, 320

Ban Phu Lat: 177

Chieu Ung: 304–5

Choi Moi: 199

Dong Hoi: 105, 108

Dong Lac: 218

Dong Phuong Thuong: 105, 105, 106

Kep: 192, 200

Kim Cuong: 104, 110, 112

Lang Met: 168

Long Ban: 178

Long Het: 197, 199

Me Xa: 193, 201

My Duc: 112, 123

Ninh Binh: 173

Phu Dien Chau: 122

Phu Huong: 177

Phu Ly: 193, 247, 248, 257

Qui Vinh: 108, 110

Roa Leky: 177

Thai Nguyen: 192, 199, 200

Thanh Hoa: 13, 105–7, 117, 126–27,

138, 139, 158, 177, 258, 258,

315, 320

Trai Hoi: 151

Tri Dong: 158

Vu Chua: 199

Xom Ca Trang: 112, 112

Xom Phuong: 199

Yen Bai: 178

cement plants: 248, 286

locks and dams: 178–79

Mu Gia Pass: 58, 60, 78, 111–12, 239,

242, 260–62, 260n, 261, 264,

320

munitions facilities

Lang Tai: 163

Long Chi: 177

ordnance depots

Yen Bai: 158

Yen Son: 158

POL facilities: 6–7, 34, 40, 53, 134,

151, 153, 202, 212, 223, 224,

233, 243, 244, 248, 249, 250,

252, 253, 255, 256, 278, 279–

93, 281, 298–304, 309, 316,

319–20, 321–23, 324. See also

POL strangulation campaign.

Bac Giang: 285, 288, 289, 292, 298,

299, 305

Ba Don: 296–97

Bai Thuong: 288

Da Loc: 285

Dao Quan: 299

Dong Hoi: 294

Don Son: 285, 286, 288, 289, 292,

298, 299

Duong Nham: 285, 286–87, 288,

289, 299

Haiphong: 22n, 169, 170, 190, 279,

285, 286, 288, 289, 292, 298,

299, 321

Hanoi: 285, 286, 288, 289, 290–92,

298, 299, 321

Kep: 300, 302

Nam Dinh: 177

Nguyen Khe: 285, 288, 289, 292,

298, 299
386

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

Phuc Loi: 285

Phuc Yen: 285, 300, 302

Phu Qui: 137, 285, 298

Son Chau: 255

Thang Ha: 288

Viet Tri: 285, 292, 298

Vinh: 285

Yen Duong: 285

Yen Hau: 288

power stations: 178–79, 195, 203–5

Haiphong: 34

Nam Dinh: 177

Thanh Hoa: 107, 177

radar facilities: 48, 93, 94, 109, 110–11,

129, 137, 177, 255

Dong Hoi: 93

Cuo Lao: 111

Kep: 248, 287, 288, 289, 292

Vinh: 56n

railroads and railyards: 71, 140, 178,

194, 199, 228, 250, 273–74,

298, 306

Thai Nguyen: 255, 255–56, 320

Yen Bai: 228, 254, 255

river, marine and naval facilities: 13,

49, 81, 84, 137, 158, 204, 223,

255, 285

Cam Pha: 300

Haiphong: 7, 34, 44, 45–46, 101,

223, 282, 288, 300, 303, 307

Hamp Rong: 158

Hai Yen: 255

Hon Gai: 300

Phuc Loi: 255

roads and highways: 169, 257

supply areas: 230, 237, 239, 295, 313,

314

Bai Thuong: 255

Dang Thanh: 177

Hanoi: 290

Long Giam Da: 177

Phi Din: 255

Phu Qui: 255

Than Hoa: 255

Vinh: 178, 255

Vin Son: 94, 255

Yen Bai: 255

Yen Son: 158

surface-to-air missile launch sites: 6,

113–14, 164–65, 166, 167–69,

170, 171, 177, 190, 192, 193–

95, 224, 239, 251, 269, 201. See

also Wild Weasels.

Kep: 192–93, 197, 200

Than Hoa: 181

missile support areas

Dong Em: 195

trucks/truck parks: 90, 96, 108, 109,

111, 112, 123, 125, 126, 128,

130, 133, 139, 141, 142, 158,

179, 182, 225, 245, 288, 312

Tass: 291

Taylor, Maxwell D.: 10, 14, 17, 19, 25, 36,

39, 56, 60, 63, 82, 85, 89, 90, 101,

119, 120, 134, 135, 149, 153n,

154, 156, 164. See also Command

and control issues; Bombing policy; Joint Chiefs of Staff

ambassador to South Vietnam: 19

Brink Hotel bombing: 64

CIA responsibility transfer: 30, 30n

on Flaming Dart: 24

flexible bombing proposal: 135

gradual approach advocate: 20, 52

change of approach: 53

influence: 47n, 54–55, 62

request to cancel Rolling Thunder 1: 82

on Rolling Thunder: 95, 101, 154

worsening military situation warning:

64–65

Techepone, Laos: 31, 45

Temporary tour of duty: 146–47. See also

Command and control issues.

Tet celebrations: 10

Thai Nguyen: 187, 299, 300

Thailand: 11, 15, 23, 32, 34, 49, 56, 75,

81, 84, 92, 93, 96, 98, 99, 106,

116, 121, 145, 148–49, 157, 165,

190, 196, 202, 219, 236, 260, 276,

297, 309, 312, 318, 320

neutrality: 53, 74

deployments and planning: 50–51,

229–30, 231, 232, 234, 296, 322

troops and equipment in: 77, 146–47

Thanh Hoa: 107, 129, 135, 140, 171–72,

181, 187, 255

Thanon Kittikachorn: 214

Thant, U. See U Thant.

Thao, Pham Ngoc. See Pham Ngoc Thao.

Thi, Nguyen Chanh. See Nguyen Chanh

Thi.

Thieu, Nguyen Van. See Nguyen Van

Thieu.

Thompson, Llewellyn: 21
387

INDEX

Ticonderoga, USS: 15, 48–49. See also

Tonkin Gulf Incident.

Tiger Hound: 212, 212n, 243, 246,

253–54, 298

Tiger Island: 85, 105, 125, 126, 225

Tokyo: 89

Tonkin Gulf Incident: 4, 48–51, 117,

159n, 312

Tracy, Fred: 275–76, 291

Tran Van Huong: 57, 65

Tran Van Minh (Little Minh): 82

Triantafellu, Rockly: 185

Tribal road watch teams: 262

Trier, Robert D.: 197

Tuy Hoa Air Base

attack on: 18

construction: 230

Ubon Royal Thai Air Base: 158, 159

deployments to: 77, 160, 179

Udorn Royal Thai Air Base: 75, 134, 145,

148, 160, 165, 198, 201, 216, 252,

274

2d Air Division Command Reporting

Post: 75

data processing facility: 277

deployments to: 96, 117, 175

Unger, Leonard: 47, 53, 63

United Nations Security Council: 80

United States Air Force, Europe: 196, 235,

239

United States Army Pacific: 32, 36, 73,

247

United States Army units

1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile): 150

52d Aviation Battalion: 9

173d Airborne Brigade: 15, 120

United States Congress: 4, 25, 47, 49n,

51, 103, 104, 156, 212, 224, 250,

293, 311, 321, 323. See also

Johnson, Lyndon B.; McNamara,

Robert S.

United States Embassy, Bangkok: 75, 92,

93, 145

United States Embassy, Moscow: 19, 134

United States Embassy, Saigon: 78, 153

United States Embassy, Vientiane: 75, 145

United States Information Agency: 102

United States Information Service: 129

United States Marine Corps: 41, 44, 99,

121, 148, 153, 174, 264

deployment planning: 230–32

sortie allocation: 239

units

1st Marine Air Wing: 143

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade: 89

Composite Reconnaissance

Squadron: 115

Hawk air defense battalion: 18

United States Military Assistance

Command. See Military Assistance

Command, Thailand; Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam:

Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam/Thailand.

United States National Board of

Estimates: 37

Uong Bi: 195, 203–5

USAF Analysis Team: 86, 87–88

U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Base: 277

U Thant: 19, 252

Vance, Cyrus R.: 63, 111, 221, 253

Vang Pao: 28, 28, 30n

Vientiane, Laos: 23, 27–28, 39, 47, 63,

75, 145, 148, 227, 243, 260

Viet Cong: 9, 20, 43, 45, 55, 90, 98, 102,

120, 129, 131, 149, 151, 185, 203,

218, 222, 226, 235, 243, 281, 295,

304

attacks in South Vietnam: 18, 66, 312.

See also Bien Hoa Air Base;

Camp Holloway; Pleiku;

Saigon; Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

Brink Hotel bombing: 312

military engagements: 64, 154

strength of: 153

supply needs: 153–14

vulnerabilities: 154n

Viet Tri: 248, 280, 285, 288, 

Vietnamese Air Transport, Inc.: 29. See

also Covert operations.

Vietnamese Navy. See Covert operations.

Vit Thu Lu: 13, 15, 16, 94, 95:

Vladivostok, Soviet Union: 98

Vogt, John W.: 235

flying prohibitions: 184

Wall Street Journal: 289

Watry, Charles A.: 126–27

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. See

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Weather: 179, 182, 201, 253, 265

Westmoreland, William C.: 10, 13, 15, 17,
388

GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM, 1965–1966

19, 20, 45, 53, 59, 60, 79, 81, 91,

119, 120, 133, 134, 143, 148, 150,

157, 224, 246, 235, 311, 317, 320.

See also Command and control

issues.

airfield strikes opposition: 144

Brink Hotel bombing: 312

bombing halt: 212

extended battlefield area: 243–46, 248,

266, 283, 297–98, 299, 302, 319

flexible bombing proposal: 135

graduated reprisals: 78, 93, 153

ground war emphasis: 314

JCS differences: 136

McNamara meeting: 305

pacification program: 213

Rolling Thunder pessimisim: 305

sortie allocations in Laos: 237

on troop expansion: 101

on withdrawal of civilians: 65n

Wheeler, Earle G.: 11, 34, 35, 47n, 55, 62,

79, 80, 87, 88, 98, 107, 109, 120,

153, 156, 183, 217, 227, 236, 243,

256, 282, 285, 289 

evaluation of bombing campaign: 109

JCS investigative team: 32

on thirty-seven day bombing halt: 133,

217

Whitehouse, Thomas B.: 148, 148n

Wild Weasel. See Aircraft, U.S., F–100F;

F–105F

Willard, Garry A., Jr.: 196–97

Williams, Charles E. Jr.: 276–77

Wilson, Harold: 285

Wilson, James: 147

Wings, U.S. Air Force

2d Bomber: 22n

3d Bombardment: 125

3d Tactical Fighter: 17

8th Tactical Fighter: 117, 158, 273

15th Tactical Fighter: 96

314th Tactical Combat: 51

320th Bomb: 22n

354th Tactical Fighter: 126

355th Tactical Fighter: 192, 210, 272

363d Composite Reconnaissance Unit:

51

388th Tactical Fighter: 269

405th Tactical Fighter: 50

463d Tactical Combat: 51

479th Tactical Fighter: 118

516th Tactical Combat: 51

552d Airborne Early Warning and

Control: 117–18

555th Tactical Fighter: 274

4080th Strategic: 38, 113n, 114–15

6234th Tactical Fighter: 145, 147

6252d Tactical Fighter: 210

Mace Missile: 235

Withdrawal of U.S. civilians: 18

World War II: 75, 86, 87, 260, 284, 321,

324

Yalu River: 150

Yankee Station: 11, 15, 145n, 202, 299

Yankee Team. See Reconnaissance

programs.

Yen Bai: 159, 187, 197

ZSU self-propelled gun. See Antiaircraft

defense, North Vietnamese,

weapons and tactics.

Zuckert, Eugene M.: 86, 87, 88, 206