## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Heritsch , 2012 IL App (2d) 090719

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. KENNET H HERI TSCH, Defe ndant-Appe llant.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-09-0719

Filed J une 28, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Where defe ndant’s driver’ s license was revoke d in 1991 for his use of a

car to c ommit a drug -re lated felony and he “neve r g ot his license back,” but his license was revoke d ag ain in 2001 beca use of a DUI
, he was imp ro p er l y convicted in 2008 of ag gravated driving with a revoke d license, since the statute provid es for only one revoc ation of a driver’ s license, de fenda

nt’s 1991 revoc ation was not base d on a DUI violation, he was on l y gu i l t y of driving with a revoke d license, and the 2001

re vocation had no eff

ect wher e defe ndant had not been issued a n ew license; there fore
, the cause was rema nded for re s en tencing on the reduc ed convic tion of driving w ith a revoke d license.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l f rom the Circuit Court of Winnebag o County
, No. 08-CF- 4179; the Hon. Richar d A. Lucas, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med as modified; ca

use re manded.Counsel on

Appea l Thomas A. L ilien and Dar ren E. Miller, b o t h of State Appellate Def ender ’s Off

ice, of Elg in, for appe llant.

J oseph P

. Br

uscato, S tate’s Attorney
, of R ockfor d (L awr ence M. Ba uer and Ba rry W. J aco b s , b o th of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of c ounsel), for

the People.

Panel J USTI CE HUTCH I NS ON delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustice McL are n concur

red in the judg ment and opinion.
J ustice B irkett dissented, with opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 After a stipulated bench trial, defe ndant, Kenne th Her itsch, was convicted of ag g ravated driving with a revoke d or suspended license (DWL R) (625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-5) (West 2008)). He was sentenc ed as a Class X offe nder (see 730 I L CS 5/5-5-3(c )(8) (West 2008)) to s i x y ear s’ imprisonment. Def endant was also convicted of operating an uninsured motor vehicle (625 I L CS 5/3-707 (West 2008)) but was not separ ately sentenc ed for t h at o ff en se. Def endant appea ls, arguing that his conviction of ag g ravated DWL R cannot stand, beca use the State did not prove the ag g ravating fac tor, that defe ndant’s license had been revoke d for

a violation of section 11-501 of the I llinois Vehicl e C o d e (the Code) (625 I L CS 5/11-501 (West 2008)). We agre e with defe ndant, aff irm his conviction of operating an uninsured
motor vehicle, reduc e his conviction of ag g ravated DWL R to DWL R (625 I L CS 5/6-303(a) (West 2008)), and r emand f or sentenc ing on both c onvictions. ¶ 2 T h e indictment ag ainst defe ndant alleg ed that, on October 18, 2008, he dro v e o n a highw ay while his license was revoke d (625 I L CS 5/6-303(a) (West 2008)) and that, beca use “said revoc ation [was] for a violation of 625 I L CS 5/11-501,” that is, driving u n d er the influence of alcohol (DUI ), and defe ndant had at least 14 prior convictions of DWL R, he had violated sec tion 6-303(d-5) of the Code. Section 6-303( d-5) r eads: “Any person convicted of a fiftee nth or subsequent violation of this Section is guilty of

a Class 2 felony
, and is not elig ible for probation or conditional discharg e, if the

revoc ation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code,

or a simil ar out-of-state offe nse, or a simil ar provision of a local ordinanc e, or a statutory summary suspension under Section 11-501.1 of this C o d e. ” 625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-5) (West 2008). ¶ 3 At defe ndant’s trial, the parties stipulated t h at a p o l i ce office r would testify that, on

-2-October 18, 2008, he stopped defe ndant’s car and defe ndant admitted that he was driving

with a revoke d license and did not produce proof of insurance

. The trial court admitted a copy of defe ndant’s driving abst ra ct

. Def endant arg

ued that the abstrac t did not prove his
guilt of ag g ra v at ed DW L R
, as it did not show that the revoc ation was for DUI ; rathe r, it showed that his license had been revoke d in 1991 for a controlled-substanc e offe nse and had

never been r einstated. The trial court he ld that the issue was for sentenc ing, not the tr ial. It found def endant guilty

of the two off

enses. ¶ 4 At sentenc ing, the State argued in part that defe ndant’s driving abstrac t showed that the

revoc ation of his lice nse had been for DUI

. Def endant counter ed that the a bstract r efle cted that, in 1 9 9 1
, his license was revoke d beca use he had used a car to commit a drug -re lated felony and that, since then, he “neve r go t h i s license back.” Def endant conce ded that the abstrac t also ref

lected that, on October 11, 2001, his license was re v o k ed beca use he had

rec ently committed DUI

. The basis for eac h listed revoc ation was section 6-205(a ) of the Code, which, a s pertinent her e, re ads: “Except as provided in this Section, the Secre tary of State shall immediately revoke the license, permit, or driving privileg es of any driver upon rec eiving a repor t of the driver’ s conviction of ***:

***
2. Violation of Section 11-501 of this Code or a s i m i l ar p rovi sion of a local ordinanc e relating to the offe nse of operating or being in phy sical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drug s, intox icating compound or compounds, or any

combination there of;
3. Any felony u n d er the laws of any State or the fede ral g overnme nt in the commission of which a mot or vehicle was used[ .]” 625 I L CS 5/6-205 (a )( 2 ), (a)(3) (West 2008). ¶ 5 Def

endant rea soned that, beca use his license had been revoke d continuously since 1991, it could not have been “re -re voked” for the DUI 10 y ear s later. Thus, the revoc ation in eff ect

as of October 18, 2008, was not for DUI but for th e d ru g o ffe nse, so that defe ndant was guilty only of C lass A m isdemeanor DWL R. The trial c ourt, without ex planation, rejected
t h i s ar gument, held t hat defendant was guilty of aggravated DW L R, and sentenced him t o six y ear s’ imprisonment. Def endant moved to rec onsider the sentenc e, ag ain arguing that he could not be convicted of ag gravated DWL R as charg ed. The trial court denied the motion, and def endant timely

appea led. ¶ 6 On appea l, defe ndant contends that the State proved only that he committed DWL R, not that he committed ag g ravated DWL R. Def endant relies on what he sees as the plain languag e of section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code, as applied to the undisputed fa ct s

. He observe s that, to obtain a conviction of ag g ravated DWL R as char g ed, the St at e h ad t o prove that he had d ri v en with a revoke d license and that the revoc ation was for DUI

. He notes t h at t h e evidenc e i s undisputed that, as of October 18, 2008, his license had been revoke d continuous l y s i n ce 1 9 9 1 and that “the revoc ation” that made this so was based on a drug offe nse, not DUI . We agree with defe ndant. ¶ 7 The issue on appea l is primarily one of statutory construction, which raises questions of

-3-l aw that we review de novo

. See In re Detention of Hardin
, 238 I ll. 2d 33, 40 (2010 ). Ou r

g oal is to asce rtain and eff ectuate the leg islature’s int en t , wh i ch i s best indicated by the languag e of the statute itself. Id. Howeve r, if a statute’s languag e is unc lear
, we may resor t to simil ar statutes or other sources to aid our inquiry

. See People v

. Masterson
, 207 I ll. 2d 305, 329 (2003) (citing Mow en v. Ho l l and
, 336 I ll. App. 3d 368, 374 (2003))

. One such

source includes the maxi m of in pari materia
, under which two statutes, or two parts of one statute, conce rning the same subject must be considere d toge ther to produce a “ ‘har monious whole.’ ” People v. Rinehart
, 2012 I L 111719, ¶ 26 (quoting Sulser v. Co u n t r y Mutual InsuranceCo. , 147 I ll. 2d 548, 555 (1992)). ¶ 8 Both parties agree that section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code is not ambiguous, and we find no ambiguity

. Howeve r, section 6-303(d- 5) is silent as it perta ins to mul t i ple revoc ations. There fore
, we m u s t look to other statutes in the Code to aid our inquiry

. On October 18, 2008, defe ndant was cited for DWL R. The Code define s “re vocation of driver’ s license” as “[ t] he termination by formal action of the Secre tary of a person’ s license or privileg e to operate a motor vehicle on the public highw ay s, which termination s h al l not be subject to

rene wal or restoration except that an application for a new license may be prese nted and
acte d upon by the Secre tary af t er t h e expiration of at least one y ear afte r the date of

revoc ation.” 625 I L CS 5/1-176 (West 2008); see also People v. Suddoth
, 52 I ll. App. 2d 355, 359 (1964) (def

ining “re vocation”)

. A revoke d l i ce n s e i s terminated from the date of its

revoc ation. Suddoth
, 52 I ll. App. 2d at 358. In the prese nt case , defe ndant’s driver’ s license had bee n revoke d, or terminate d, since 1991. ¶ 9 Def

endant’ s driving abstrac t ref lect s an o t h er re v o cation of the same license in 2001, based on his rec ent commission of DUI

. Howeve r, a revoked d ri v er’s license rema ins revoke d until a new license is issued. People v. Morrison
, 149 I ll. App. 3d 282, 284 (1986). The Code does not provide any guidance or rules in circ umstances, such as here
, wher e the Secre tary has imposed additional r e v o c a ti o n s o f a n in d iv id u a l’ s driver’ s license for additional offe nses committed a fter the orig inal revoc ation but where the driver has never applied for

a new license or wher e the Secre tary has never is sued t he d ri v er a new license. Therefor e,

as applied to the fac ts of this case , the Secre tary ’s 2001 formal admi n i s t ra t i v e sanction of

revoc ation had no ef

fec t beca use the Sec reta

ry had neve r issued def

endant a new lice nse. ¶ 10 Reading section 1-176 in conjunction with sections 6-205(a )( 3 ) an d 6-303(d- 5) of the Code, the leg islative intent becomes c lear . Section 1-176 provides for only one re vocation of an individual’s driver’ s license. The rea son for defenda nt’s 1991 revoc ation was a drug offe nse, which trig g ere d subsection (3) of section 6-205(a ) of the Code, not subsection (2). S ec t i o n 6-303(d- 5) speaks of “ the revoc ation or sus pension” (emphasis added) (625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-5) (West 2008)), implyi n g t h at there is only one pertinent trig g ering event. There fore
, the 1991 revoc ation of defe ndant’s license to which section 6-303(d- 5) ref ers was not based on a trig g ering event in section 6-303(d- 5). Acc ording ly
, t h e State proved that defe ndant committed only the offe nse of DWL R and not the offe nse of ag g ravated DWL R. ¶ 11 Our holding appea rs to place defe ndant in a better position than he would have been ha d his license not been revoke d until 2001, afte r he committed DUI

. Howeve r, we cannot esca pe the plain languag e and meaning of section 6-303(d- 5), and, even if we could i gnore the leg islature’s una

mbiguous command, it is far fr om clear that we c ould construe the statute

-4-liberally so as to rea ch a differ ent conclusion. See People ex rel. Birkett v. Dock ery , 235 I ll. 2d 73, 81 (2009) (stating that a car dinal rule of statutory construction prohibits courts from

rewriting a statute and depar ting from its plain languag e by rea ding in t o i t ex ceptions, limit ations, or conditions not expressed by the l eg islature (citing In re Miche lle J. , 209 I ll. 2d 428, 437 (2004)) ). The State might have been in a better position had the leg islature used inclusive languag e in draf ting section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code, e.g. , “any revoc ation,” “if the violation was for,” or words to that eff ect, but it appar ently declined to do so, and we decline
to rewrite the statute or rea d beyond the statute’s plain languag e. To the extent that the plain meaning of section 6-303(d- 5) cre ates a result that seems unsatisfac tory or anomalous, it is up to the leg islature to cor rec t that problem. ¶ 12 We note that the trial court ruled that the State neede d to prove the enhanc ing fac tor not at trial, but only at sentenc ing. Despite the trial court’s ruling
, section 6-303(d- 5) cre ates an essential element of a distinct offe nse, aggr av ated DWL R. Our resolution of this appea l, howeve r, obviates the need to addre ss the propriety of that ruling

. See People v. Campa
, 217 I ll. 2d 243, 269-70 (2005) (re viewing court will no t rende r an advisory opinion when it
cannot result in appropriate re l ief to the preva iling party ). Acc ording ly
, we aff

irm defe ndant’s conviction of operating an uninsured motor vehicle; reduc e his co n viction of
ag g ravated DW L R t o simple DWL R; and remand t he cause for sentenc ing on the reduced conviction and on the insurance conviction (see People v. Frantz
, 150 I ll. App. 3d 296, 300 (1986))

.

¶ 13 Affir

med as modified; ca

use re manded.

¶ 14 J USTI CE BI RKETT, dissenting. ¶ 15 I respe ctfully dissent. The initial filing by the Offic e of the State Appellate Def ender in this case wa s a motion to withdraw as counsel on appea l pursuant to Anders v. California
, 3 8 6 U.S. 738 (1967). In his memorandum of law in support of his motion to wi t h d ra w, counsel argued that it would be frivolous to argue on appea l that defe ndant was not revoke d for DUI in 2001 beca

use, when he was convicted of DUI
, he was alre ady revoke d for a nonDUI offe nse. I believe that the motion to wit hdraw should have be en grante d beca use, as I explain below, defe ndant’s ar gument has no merit. ¶ 16 My colleag

ues po i n t o u t t h at the trial court denied without comment defe ndant’s ora l motion to be sentenc ed for a misdemeanor. In fac t, the trial court said that it had considere d the motion. What my colleagues fail to acknow ledg e is that, in the trial court, defe n s e counsel did not cite a single case for the proposition that someone whose privileg e to drive has been revoke d for one re ason ca nnot have it rer evoked for another rea son. He could not cite a case beca

use there is no case any

wher e in the country that supports this position. The indictment in this case alleg ed that defe ndant drove a motor vehicle upon a highw ay of this
state “at a time when his dr iving privileg es wer e revoke d in violation of 625 I L CS 5/6-303 said revoc ation being for a violation of 625 I L CS 5/11-501.” The trial court said at trial that it was a sentenc ing issue. During the sentenc ing hear in g t h e court found defe ndant to be Class X elig ible. Def

ense counsel filed a motion to rec onside r o n M ay 14, 2009. In the

-5-motion, defe ndant mere ly rea sserted that he was “not revoke d due t o d ri ving under the

influence .” Ag ain, there was no a uthority cited. ¶ 17 The majority fails to d i s t i n gu i s h case s cited in the State’s brief, which I will address. Also, the majority claims that the Code does not provide any guidance or rules for a situation involving a pe rson, like def endant, with multiple revoc ations who has never applied for or had issued to him a new license. I will demonstrate that just the opposite is true. Finally
, the majority fails t o apply t h e first rule of statutory construction, which is to g ive effec t to the intent of the leg islature. People v . Smith , 345 I ll. App. 3d 179, 184 (2004). ¶ 18 The majority

appea rs to be stuck on the t erm “the revoc ation” in section 6-303(d-5) of the Code (625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-5) (West 2008)) and then applies section 1-176 of the Code (625 I L CS 5/1-176 (West 2008)), concluding that until a new license is issued there can be only one revoc ation. That narr ow interpre tation ignor es the clea r intent of the leg islature and it is at odds with numerous provisions of the Code, only some of which I will discuss. It must be reme mbere d that section 6-303(d- 5) is a sentenc ing enhanc ement. People v. Nunez
, 236 I ll. 2d 488, 499 (2010). The State was require d to identify “the revoc ation” in the indictment, along with the requisite number of convictions. The cer tif i ed ab s trac t introduced into evidenc e established the DUI revoc ation and the con v i cti ons. Def endant never challeng ed the abstrac t’s acc urac y

. In the absenc e of such a challeng e, the abstrac t’s contents are deeme d

acc urate

. People v . Meadows , 371 I ll. App. 3d 259, 263 (2007). ¶ 19 The majority acknow ledg es that the I llinois Secre tary of State enter ed a mandatory order of revoc ation on his driving rec ord on October 11, 2001 as a result of his August 22, 2001, conviction of DUI (625 I L CS 5/6-205(a) (2) (West 2000)). T h e abst rac t ref lects that this revocation rema ined in eff ect at the time of the instant offe nses. Def endant ar gu es t h at , despite these fac ts, the unambiguous language o f the enhanc ed sentenc ing provision of section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code (625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-5) (West 2008)) does not apply to him, beca use the term “the revoc ation” as used in the provision ref ers to a single revoc ation, and, since defe ndant’s driver’ s license had been revoke d for a non-DUI offe nse at the time of his October 11, 2001, DUI revoc ation, “t h er e was no driver’ s license to revoke .” Def endant

rea sons that the s tatute cannot ref er to multipl e revocations, beca use t hat i s “only possible if a revoke d driver’ s license can subsequently be revoke d.” Alterna tively
, defe ndant argues that, if the term “the revoc ation” as used in section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code is ambiguous, the rule of lenit y m andate s a finding t hat t he enhance d sentenc ing provision does not apply to him and that his conviction should be modified to misdemeanor DWL R and that he should be sente nced a ccor dingly

. Id. ¶ 20 The State agree s with defe ndant’s contention that the languag e of section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code i s unambiguous. Id. Howeve r, the State contends that the plain languag e of subsection (d-5) does not support defe ndant’s view. The State, rely ing on People v. Kennedy
, 372 I ll. App. 3d 306 (2007), arg ues that “the construction of section 6-303(d- 5) urg ed by the defe ndant revises the pl ain l anguag e of the s tatute to include a limitation not expressed by
t h e leg islature and would defe at the leg islative intent, which is to punish those who
repe atedly

violate sec tion 6-303 more seve rely .” ¶ 21 Def

endant’ s n o v el ar gu m en t fa i l s up o n revie w of the overa ll statutory scheme and

-6-rele vant case law. When interpre ting a statute, our primary objective is to asce rtain and g ive

eff ect to the leg islature’s intent. People v. Zimmerman
, 239 I ll. 2d 491, 497 (2010). Our first step is to examine the languag e of the statute, which is “the surest and most reliable indicator of leg islative intent.” People v. Pullen
, 192 I ll. 2d 36, 42 (2000). I f a statute does not provide

a definition indicating a contra ry leg islative intent, words in t h e s t atute are interpre ted

acc ording to their pl ain and ordinary meaning s. P eo ple v. Liberman
, 228 I ll. App. 3d 639, 648 (1992 ). When the languag e of a statute is clea r, it may not be revised to include exceptions, limit ations, or c o n d i t i o n s that wer e not expressed by the l eg islature. People v. Goins
, 119 I ll. 2d 259, 265 (1988). The majority ignor es our responsibility to construe the
statute as a whol e s o t hat no part is rende red meaning less or superf luous. See People v. McClure
, 218 I ll. 2d 375, 382 (2006). We are require d to construe the statute by interpre ting words and phrase s in light of other re l ev an t p ro visions in the statute. The majority completely fails to co n sider the law’s purpose, the evils sought to be reme died, and the
conseque nces that would result from construing the statute one way or another

. Zimmerman
, 239 I ll. 2d at 497. “[W ]hen the literal construction of a statute would lead to c onsequenc es which the leg islature could not have contemplated, the courts are not bound to that construction.” People v . Hanna , 207 I ll. 2d 486, 498 (2003). ¶ 22 “When deter

mining the leg islative intent of the c rim in a l penalties associate d with driving offe nses as they relate to driver’ s license status, our courts have rea d the licensing provisions toge ther with the penalty provisions.” People v. Rosenbalm
, 2011 I L App (2d) 100243, ¶ 8;

see People v. Sass
, 144 I ll. App. 3d 163, 169 (1986); People v. Ma n i ka s , 1 06 I ll. App. 2d 315, 319-20 (1969). Where a statute is amende d
, s t ri k i ng words, it is to be concluded that the leg islature deliberately intended to cha

ng e the law

. People v . Bradley M

. , 352 I ll. App. 3d 291, 296 (2004). It should also be p re s u m ed t hat an amendment is made for some purpose, and eff

ect must be g iven to the amendment i n a manner consistent with that
purpose. Id. We also consider t h e re gu l ations that guide the return of driving privileg es following revoc ation. These regulations are promulg ated by the Secre tary of State and have the forc e and e ffe ct of law

. Y oule v. Edgar , 172 I ll. App. 3d 498, 503-04 (1988). ¶ 23 It is abundantly clea r that when he was arr ested for DWL R defe ndant’s privileg e to dr ive a motor vehic le was r evoked f or havingbeen c onvicted of DUI

. The analy sis should beg in with the languag e of section 6-303(a ) of the Code (t h e offe nse languag e) and section 6- 303(d-5) of the Code (the felony enhanc ement fac tor). 6 2 5 I L CS 5/6-303(a)
, (d-5) (West 2008). Those se ctions provide, in per tinent part: “§ 6-303. Driving while dri v er ’s l icense
, permit or privileg e to operate a motor vehicle is suspende d or re voked. (a) Ex cept as otherwise provided in subsection (a- 5), any person who drives or is in
actua l phy sical control of a motor vehicle on any highw ay of t his S t at e at a time when such person’s driver’ s license, permit or privil eg e to do so or t h e p r i vi l ege to obtain a driver’s lice nse or permit is revok ed or suspende d by

this Code ***[ .]
* * * (d-5) Any person convicted of a fiftee nth or subs equent violation of this Section is
guilty of a Class 2 felony
, and is not elig ible for probation or conditional discharg e, if the

-7-revoc ation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code, or ***[.] ” (Empha ses adde d.) 625 I L CS 5/ 6-303(a ), (d- 5) (West 2008). ¶ 24 Throughout his brief, defe ndant maintains t h at he was charg ed with and convicted of
ag g ravated DWL R and that, beca use his li ce n s e had alre ady been revoke d for a non-DUI offe nse, “it could n o t b e s ub s eq uently re- revoke d for DUI .” The bill of indictment in this

case char g ed defe ndant with “Ag gravated Driving After Revocation in that he drove a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state at a ti me when his driving privileges w er e r ev o ked in violation of 625 I L CS 5/6-303 said revoc ation being for a violation of 625 I L CS 5/11-501.” (Emphasis added.) The indictment g oes on to list defe ndant’s 14 prior convictions of DWL R, in violation of section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code. 625 I L CS 5 / 6 -303(d- 5) (West 2008). Def endant is corr ect that he did not have a license to revoke

. Howeve r, “the term ‘license to drive’ encompa sses two distinct meaning s: (1) t h e p h y sical document itself, and (2) the abstrac t or i ntang ible privileg e of driving .” People v. Odumuyiwa
, 1 8 8 I l l

. App. 3d 40, 44 (1989). ¶ 25 As section 6-303(a) of the C ode pro v i d es , i t is unlawful to drive when your “pr ivilege
t o do so or the privilege to obtain a driver’s license or permit is revok ed or sus p en ded

. ” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/6-303(a) (West 2008). The Secre tary of State is mandated to keep rec ords of “all licenses and permits ref used, canc elled, disqualified, revoke d
, or suspended and of the revoc ation, suspension, and disqualification of driving p ri vileg es of
persons not licensed under this Chapter, and such rec ords s h al l note the rea sons for such action.” 625 I L CS 5/6-117(b) (Wes t 2 0 0 8 ). The Secre tary also maintains rec ords of convictions repor

ted by the courts. 625 I L CS 5/6-117(c) (West 2008). The courts provide the Secre tary with rec ords of convictions beca use these rec ords are essential to the perf ormanc e of the Secre tary ’s duties “to ca ncel, r evoke or

suspend the drive r’s lice nse and privilegeto drive motor vehicles” (empha sis a dded) ( 625 I L CS 5/ 6-204(a ) (West 2008)) and “[f]or the
purpose of providing the Secre tary of State with rec ords nece ssary to pr operly monitor a nd

assess driver perf

ormanc e and assist the courts in the proper dispositi on of repeat traffi c law offenders ” (e mphasis added) (625 I L CS 5/ 6-204(d) (West 2008)). ¶ 26 When a defendant is convicte d of DUI , which ca rries w ith it t he mandatory revoc ation of the priv i l ege to drive or the privileg e to obtain a driver’ s license, the judge hearing the

case require s the surre nder to the cler k of any license or permit then held by the defe ndant, and, within fi v e d ay s there afte r, the cler k forwa rds the license or permit toge ther with a repor t of conviction to the Secre tary of State. See 625 I L CS 5/6-204(a) (1) (West 2008). Upon

rec eiving a repor

t of conviction of DUI
, the Secre tary enter s a mandatory revoc ation of the “license
, p er m i t , or driving privileg es” of the defe ndant. See 625 I L CS 5/6-205(a) (2), 11- 501.1(d) (West 2008). These provisions contain no exceptions or limit ations for drivers who

are alre ady revoke d when the convi ct i o n s are repor ted, and we may not depar t, as the majority does in this case , from the plain languag e of these provisions by rea ding into them “exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) People v . Cardamone , 232 I ll. 2d 504, 516 (2009). ¶ 27 Contrary to the majority ’s analy sis, the term “the revoc ation” in section 6-303(d- 5) of the Code (625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-5) (West 2008)) ref ers not just to the phy sical license to drive but also to the “abstra ct o r i n t an gi b le privileg e of driving ” ( Odumuyiwa
, 188 I ll. 2d at 44), as

-8-well as to the “privileg e to obtain a driver’ s license or permit” (625 I L CS 5/6-303(a) (West

2008)). Whil e defe ndant’s driver’ s license and privileg e to drive wer e alre ady revoke d when he was convicted of and revoke d ag ain for DUI in 2001, the entry of an order of revoc ation for DU Ion defe ndant’s driving record resulted in additional obstacles f or him in the event that he eve r applied for a new license. Every applicant for a license must state whethe r his or her license ha s “eve r bee n canc elled, suspende d, revoke d or refused, and, if so, the date and reason for such cance llation, suspension, revoc ation or refusal.” 625 I L CS 5 / 6 -106(b) (West 2008). As our supreme court explained in People v. Turner
, 64 I ll. 2 d 1 8 3
, 186-87 (1976): “The leg islature has established through section 6-208 the proce dure to have driving privileg es restore d. It calls for the disclo s u re o f t he revoc ation or other action taken
ag ainst the applicant and then provide s that the Secre tary shall not issue a license until he has investigated the applicant and deter mined that to g rant the privileg e of driving on the hig hway s will not endang er the public safe ty or we lfare .”
See also 92 I ll. Adm. Code 1001.430 (2012). When a person, like defe ndant, has lost his or her driving privileg es for an alcohol-r elated rea son, he or she “must prove he does not have

a curr ent problem with a lcohol, he is a low or minimal risk to r epeat pa st a busive behavior and oper ate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alc ohol, he has c omplied with all other standards as specifie d in the regulations, and the g ranting of driving privileg es will not endang er public safe ty or welfa re.” Grams v. Ryan
, 263 I ll. App. 3d 390, 396 (1994); see 92 I ll. Adm. Code 1001.420(e), 1001.430( c), 1001.440(b) (2012)

. ¶ 28 T h e “P ro v i s i o n s fo r Al co h o l an d Dru g Related Revocations, Suspension s an d Cance llations” contained in the I llinois Administrative Code require “[a]n alcohol and drug evaluation and the evidenc e of succe ssful completion of treatment.” 92 I ll. Adm. Code 1001.440 (2012). Be fore any driving relief will be g rante d by the Secre tary , an administrative hear ing must be held wher e the burden is on the petitioner to prove by clea r and convincing evidenc e that he or she does not have a curr ent problem with alcohol or other drug s and that he or she is at a low or minimal risk to repe at his or her past abusive behavior

. 92 I ll. Adm. Code 1001.440(b) (2012). Acc ording to defe ndant’s argument and the majority ’s interpre tation
, h e co uld avoid these require ments beca use his license was not revoke d for DUI

. This interpre tation would justify a perso n in defe ndant’s position omitti ng a DUI

revoc ation from his or her application for a new license. The law provides that an applicant
must disclose “whe ther any such license has eve r been *** revoke d *** and, if so, the date and rea son for s u ch *** revoc ation.” (Emphasis added.) See 625 I L CS 5/6-106(b) (West 2008). The majority observe s that its holding “appe ars to place defe ndant in a better position than he would have been had his license not been revoke d until 2001” and that “it is up to the leg islature to corre ct that problem.” Supra ¶ 11. This r easoning is inc onsistent with the principle that in c onstruing a statute we not only consider the “the rea son and nec essity for the law, the evils sought to be reme died, and the purpose t o b e ac h i eved,” but “we also
presume that the Gene ral Assembly
, in its enac tment of leg islation, did not intend absurdity
, inconvenienc e or injusti ce.” People v. Botruff
, 212 I ll. 2d 166, 175 (2004) (citing Pullen
, 192 I l l

. 2d at 42, and Michigan Avenue Nat ional Bank v. County of Cook
, 191 I ll. 2d 4 9 3
, 5 0 4 (2000))

.

-9-¶ 29 The Criminal Code of 1961, article 36, provides that a vehicle used with the knowledg e

and consent of the owner in violation of an offe nse descr ibed in subsection (g ) of section 6- 303 of the Code is subjec t to seizure and forf eiture. 720 I L CS 5/36-1 (West 2008)

. Section 6-303(g ) of the Code provides: “The motor vehicle used in a violation of this Section is subject to seizure and forf eiture

as provided in Sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the Criminal Code of 1 9 6 1 i f t h e p erson’ s driving privileg e was revoke d or suspended as a result of a violation listed in para g raph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (c) of this Section or as a result of a summary suspension as provided in para g raph (4) of subsection (c) of this Section.” 625 I L CS 5/6-303(g ) (West 2008). ¶ 30 These examples illust rate that the majority ’s interpre tation would undermine many of the State’s eff

orts to stop drunk drivers from driving while their driver’ s licenses are suspended

or revoke d. Persons like defe ndant not only would be able to e scape the penalties intended for scoff laws like him, bu t they could also esca pe the provisions allowing for seizure and forf eiture of motor vehicles owne d by and drive n by

such per sons. ¶ 31 Def

endant’ s argument is simil ar to the argument made by the defe n d an t i n P eo p l e v. Bloo m b e r g , 3 7 8 I ll. App. 3d 686 (2008), which addre ssed an issue involving section 6-303(d) of the Code. See 625 I L CS 5/6-303(d) (West 2006). Section 6 -3 0 3 (d ) is the sentenc ing enhanc ement provision that eleva tes driving on a suspended or revoke d license or privileg e from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony for a person convicted of a second violation of sec tion 6-303 ( id. ). At the time of B loomberg ’s offe nse, subsec tion (d) re ad as f ollows: “Any person convicted of a second violation of this S ection shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony and shall serve a minimum ter m of imprisonment of 30 day s or 300 hours of community service
, as deter mined by the court, if the revoc ation or suspension was for a viol at i o n o f S ection 11-401 or 11-501 of t his Code, or a simil ar out-of-state offense
, or a simil ar provision of a local ordinanc e, a violation of Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, relating to the offe nse of rec kless homicide, or a simil ar out-of-state offe nse, or a

statutory summary suspension under Sec tion 11-501.1 of this Code.” Id. ¶ 32 At the time of his arr est, Bloomberg was serving a statutory summary suspension under section 11-501.1 of the Code ( 6 2 5 IL CS 5 /11- 501.1 (West 2006)). Bloomber g had previously b ee n s en t enced t o a term of court supervision for driving while his license was s uspended (DWL S) in 1998. Bloomber g argued that he should not be sentenc ed pursuant to section 6- 3 0 3(d), but the t rial court disagree d and sentenced him pursuant to that section (625 I L C S 5/6-303(d) ( West 2006)). On appeal, Bloomberg pointed to the prior version of the statute “as suppor

t for his contention t hat t he trial court’s interpretation improperly allows him to be sentenc ed for a felony for his first DWL S conviction following an enhanc ed suspension if he had any past DWL S violation, reg ardle ss of its ba sis.” Bloomberg
, 378 I ll. App. 3d at 688. The prior version of section 6-303(d) under which Bloomber g had rec eived a sentenc e of court supervision require d proof that the “orig inal re v o ca t i o n or suspension” was for,
among other things, “a violation of S ec t i o n *** 11-501 of this Code *** or a statutory summary suspension under section 11-5 01.1 of this Code.” 625 I L CS 5/6-303(d) (West 1998). The appellate court agree d with the trial court and found that Bloomberg was proper ly

-10-sentenc ed under the provisions of subsection (d) . In doing so, the court said:
“All parties agree that under that version of the statute, Bloomber g would not be elig ible
to be sentenc ed as a felon beca use h i s o ri gi n al suspension was not for an enhanc ed violation. Amendment of the statute included, in part, deletion of ‘orig inal’ (suspension). By amending the statute in that manner , the leg islature intended to broade n the scope of felony sentenc ing to individuals wh ose second DWL S occur red while they wer e suspended for o n e of the enumer ated enhanc ements, including statutory summary suspension. Be cause Bloomber g was convicted of DWL S i n De ce mber 2006, and his license had been suspended, pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code, the felony
sentenc ing provisions apply to h i m u n der a plain rea ding of the statute. Had the leg islature not intended to focus on a party ’s curr ent suspension to deter mine if it was for

an enumer ated enhanc ement, it would not have deleted ‘orig inal’ when am ending the statute.” Bloomberg , 378 I ll. App. 3d at 689.
The appellate court in Bloomberg also cited our opinion in People v. Smith
, 345 I ll. App. 3d 179, 185 (2004), wher e we stated that the purpose of section 6-303(d) was to punish repe at offe nders more sever ely

than first-time off

ender s. Bloomberg , 378 I ll. App. 3d at 688. ¶ 33 After Bloomberg was decide d, in 2008 the leg islature reinsert ed t h e qu alifying te rm “orig inal” into subsection (d), but it did not amend the provision at issue in this case , subsection (d-5)

. When interpre ting the languag e of subsection (d-5)
, we view the statute as

a whole, construing words and phrase s in light of other rele vant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Eac h word, clause
, an d sentenc e of a statute must be g iven a rea sonable meaning
, if possible, and should not be rende red superf l u o u s

. P eo

ple v. Gutman
, 2011 I L 110338, ¶ 12. ¶ 34 An amendment to a statu t e i s p re s u m ed to have a purpose and it is construed tog ether with the orig inal act t o wh i ch i t relates. People v. W oodard
, 175 I ll. 2d 435, 444 (1997). When the leg islature en acts an amendment, it is presumed to act with knowledg e of
preva iling ca se law, a

nd it c an ame nd a statute if it intends a c onstruction that is “diffe rent from that g iven by a court.” Corwi n v. Abbott Laboratori es , 353 I ll. App. 3d 848, 851 (2005). Clearly
, the leg islature rec og nized that, when it omitted the word “orig inal” from subsection (d), a defe ndant like Bloomberg with only one prior DWL S violation, no matter the rea son for the suspe nsion, would be subject to felony sentenc ing for only his second violation, an admittedly harsh result. Howeve r, s ub s ection (d-5)
, which does not contain the word “orig inal,” is consistent with the clea r intent of the leg islature to p u nish repe at offe nders

more sever ely
, espec ially in a case wher e the offe nder has a revoc ation for DUI in e ffe ct at the time of the off

ense, a s was the c ase he re. ¶ 35 In the instant case , the majority refu s es t o l o o k at the Code as a whole to determine leg islative intent. Specifica lly
, the majorit y s t at es that “[t] he Code does not provide any guidance or rules in circ umstances, such as here
, wher e the Secre tary has imposed additional

revoc ati o n s o f an individual’s driver’ s license for additional offe nses committed afte r the orig inal revoc ation but wher e the driver has never applied for a new license or where t he Secre tary has never issued the driver a new license. There fore
, as applied to the fac ts of this

case , the Secre tary ’s 2001 formal adminis tr ative sanction of revoc ation had no eff ect beca use

-11-the Secre tary had never issue d a new license.” Supra ¶ 9. The revoc ation of defe ndant’s

lic en s e o r p r i vil ege to obtain a license was extended 11 times due to convictions that the majority say s “had no eff

ect.” These extensions wer e the result of the subsequent convictions and new order s of revoc ation, which wer e all in eff ect at the time of defe ndant’s arr est in this

case

. See 625 I L CS 5/6-303(b) (West 2006). I would also point out that defe ndant did in fac t attempt to g et a new license in 1996. He did so by providing false information on the application. The Secre tary of State then re voked def endant’ s driving pr ivilege s by entry of

an order of revoc at i o n p u rs u ant to section 6-206(a )(9) of the Code, which, like his other

revoc ations, remained in eff ect on October 8, 2008, as ref lected in defe ndant’s driving abstrac t. 625 I L CS 5/6-206(a )(9) (West 1996). The abstrac t also reve als that on September 3, 1996, the Secre tary of State canc elled defe ndant’s drivingprivileg es pursua nt to section 6-201(a )(5) of the Code. 625 I L CS 5/ 6-201(a )(5) (West 1996). ¶ 36 Under the majority ’s view, an o ff en d er ca n n o t be revoke d for DUI if he is alrea dy revoke d for some other rea son. There fore
, he could not be require d to have an ignition interlock device and could then avoid prosec ution for violating section 303(c- 4) of the Code. See 625 I L CS 5/6-206(A)
, 6-303(c -4) (West 2008). Such a rea ding is clea rly at odds with the leg islative intent, which is to keep drunk drivers off the road. See 625 I L CS 5/1-129 (West 2008) (an ignition interl ock device preve nts a vehicle from starting until analy sis of the driver’ s brea

th shows that his or her blood alc ohol level is below a c erta in level). ¶ 37 The Appellate Court for the Four th District explained in Kennedy
, 372 I ll. App. 3d 306, that the leg islature cre ated in section 6-303 two sets of penalty scheme s for persons convicted

o f DWL S or DW L R. The first set of penalties applies t o persons who are convicte d wh i l e their li cense s are suspended or revoke d but not for leaving the scene of a persona l injury

acc ident (625 I L CS 5/11-401 (West 20 0 6 ))
, DUI (625 I L CS 5/11-501 (West 2006)), a statutory summary susp en s i o n (625 I L CS 5/11-501.1 (West 2006)), or rec kless homicide (720 I L CS 5/9-3 (West 2006) ). See Kennedy
, 372 I ll. App. 3d at 308-09. The second set of
p en al t i es applies to persons who have been convicted of DWL S or DWL R and t h e suspensions or revoc ations were the result of violations o f section 11-401, 11-501, or 11- 501.1 of the Code, or of section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961. 625 I L CS 5/11-401, 11- 501, 11-501.1 (West 2006); 720 I L CS 5/9-3 (West 2006); Kennedy
, 372 I ll. App. 3d at 309. ¶ 38 In Kennedy
, the appellate court reje cted the defe ndant’s argument that, to be elig ible for

a Class 4 sentenc e under subsection (d-3)
, a d ef en d an t must be convicted of “a fourth or subsequent violation” of subsection (d-3)
, whic h r e quires proof of a revoc ation or suspension for a violation of section “11- 401 or 11-501 of this Code, or a similar out-of -state of fense
, or a simil ar provision of a local ordinanc e, a violation *** of the Criminal Code of 1961, relating t o t h e offense of rec kless homicide, *** or a statutory summary suspension under Section 11-501.1 of this Code.” 625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-3) (West 2004). T h e court held that

s ub s ec tion (d-3) was not ambiguous, ref err ing to section 6-303 of the Code. The co u rt explained that, “if the leg is l at u re had intended to condition a Class 4 felony on the commission of four or more violations of subsection (d-3)
, it could have so stated.” Kennedy
, 372 I ll. App. 3d at 308. ¶ 39 Applying the rea soning in Kennedy to subsection (d-5)
, if the leg islature had intended to limit the application of Class 2 nonprobationa b l e fe l ony sentenc ing to those individuals

-12-whose “origin al ” re v o cations wer e for one of the enumer ated violations, it could have so

stated. ¶ 40 The majority ’s interpre tation of the term “re voked” or “re vocation” and its definition of “drive r’s licen s e” ar e i n conflict with numerous provisions of the Code and with repor ted decisions of our appellate and supreme courts. For example, section 6 -2 0 8 (b )(1.5) of the Code deals with pe rsons revoke d for r eckle ss homicide who then ar e convicted of DWL R. 625 I L CS 5/ 6-208(b) (1.5) ( West 2008). That section provide s as follows:
“I f the person is convicted of a violation of Section 6-303 of this Code committed while his or her driver’ s license, permit, or p ri v i l ege was revoke d beca use of a violation of Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, relating to the of fense of rec kless homicide,

or a simil ar provision of a law of another state, the person may not make application for

a license or permit until the expiration of 3 y ea rs fr o m the effective date of the most

rece nt revoc ation .” (Empha sis added.) Id. The majority ’s interpre tation would rende r section 6-205(c )(2) meaning less for repe at DUI offe nders who are revoke d and then convicted of DUI ag ain afte r the initial revoc ation. That section provides, in re levant par t: “I f a person’ s license or permit is revoke d or suspended due to 2 or more convictions of violating Section 11-501 of this Code or a simil ar provision o f a l o ca l o rdi nance or a simil ar out-of-state offe nse, or Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, wher e the use of alcohol or other drug s is rec ited as an element of the offe nse, or a simil ar out-of-state offe nse, *** that person, if issued a restric ting driving permit, may not operate a vehicle unless it has been eq u i p p ed with an ignition interlock device as define d in Section 1- 129.1.” 625 I L CS 5/ 6-205(c )(2) (West 2008). ¶ 41 The mandatory repor ting requireme nts for the courts (625 I L C S 5 /6-204 (West 2008)) and the mandatory revoc ation of licenses by the Secre tary of State (625 I L CS 5/6-205 (West 2008)) apply reg ardle ss of whether a person is alre ady under a suspension or revoc ation. See Stewart v. Ryan
, 229 I ll. App. 3d 912, 914 (1992) (an alre ady revoke d driver was “a gai n mandatorily

revoke d” for

DUI ). ¶ 42 The plain and ordinary meaning of t h e t er m “r ev o cation” as used in subsection (d-5) ref ers to the status of the offe nder’ s “driv er ’s l i cense, permit or privileg e to do so or the privileg e to obtain a driver’ s license or permit

. ” 625 I L CS 5/6-303(a) (West 2008). Def endant’ s driving abstrac t clea rly stated that, at t h e t i m e o f his arr est in this case , defe ndant’s driving privileg e to obtain a license was revoke d for DUI and he had been convicted of violating section 6-303(a ) of the Code on at least 1 4 p ri o r occa sions. The languag e of sec tion 6-303(a) is in accor d with the Code’s definition of “L icense to D rive,” which states:
“L icense to drive. Any driver’ s license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued unde r the law s of this St ate including : 1. Any temporar y license or

instruction permit;
2. The privilege of any person to dri ve a m otor vehiclewhether or not such person holds a valid license or permit

.

-13-3. Any nonreside n t ’s d riving privileg e as define d here in.” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/ 1-138 (West 2008). ¶ 43 Def

endant ha d multipl e re vocations and suspe nsions in eff ect at the time of the instant offe nses. In Gruchow v. W hite
, 375 I ll. App. 3d 480 (2007), the Four th District explained that construing the term “license ” to include driving privileg es “complies with I llinois ’s ‘strong public policy *** to keep repe at drunk drivers off the roads.’ ” Id. at 485-86 (quoting Girard v. W hite , 356 I ll. App. 3d 11, 19 (2005)). ¶ 44 Nunez
, 2 3 6 I l l

. 2d 488, involved a defe ndant who was convicted of both DWL R and
ag g ravated DUI

. Our supreme court hel d t h at DWL R was not a lesser-included offense of
ag g ravat ed DU I an d that convictions of both offe nses did not violate the “one- act, onecrime” principle. Nota

bly , the cour

t said: “[D]rivi ng privileg es wer e revoke d, and the revoc ation was for two previous violations of section 11-501, one violation occur ring on November 20, 1999, an d the other violation occur

ring on J anuary 26, 2002. This elevated the offe nse to a Class 3 felony

. This DWL R charge was based on the fact that defe ndant drove his vehicle at a time when his dri v er’ s license was revoke d for a previous violation of 11-501of the Vehicle C o d e and he had been previously convicted of a viol ation of S ection 6-303 of the Vehic le Code on May 10, 2000.” (Empha sis added.) Id. at 492. Alt h o ug h the issues wer e differ ent, the fac ts in Nunez clea rly ref lect multipl e entries of order s of re vocation notwithstandingthat the def endant wa s alrea dy

revoke d. ¶ 45 In Odumuyiwa
, 188 I ll. App. 3d 40, this court addre ssed an argument very simil ar to the

one advanc ed by defe ndant here

. Odumuyiwa was convicted of b o th unlawful use of a driver’ s license (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951⁄2, ¶ 6-301) and DWL S (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951⁄2, ¶ 6-303). Odumuyiwa arg ued that, when the Secre tary of State suspended his license, his driver’ s license had alre ady been cancelled. Odumuyiwa argued that the “purpor ted suspension must be reg arde d as a null act, the license having alre ady been canc elled.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Odumuyiwa
, 188 I ll. App. 3d at 42. We agree d with the State that the Secre tary “ may suspend a driver’ s curr ent driving privileg e even afte r a driver’ s license has been previously canc elled, noting that there is no case law or statutory authority
preve nting him from doing so.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 43. We also said, “we see no rea son why the Secre tary , in addition t o ca n celling a license, may not also suspend a person’ s driving privileg e there by preve nting a driver from apply ing for or reinstating a license during
a spec ific per iod of time.” Id. ¶ 46 The languag e in Odumuyiwa applies with even greater forc e to persons, like defe ndant, who ar e convicted of DUI even though they are alre ady revoke d. Such revoc ations, unlike the ca ncellation/suspension situation in Odumuyiwa , are mandatory for a rea son. As in the

case with all battles to reduce drunk driving, complete and accur ate recor ds are cruc ial for both the administrative functions of the Secre tary of State and, more importantly
, for
appropr iate sente ncing

. ¶ 47 De fe n d an t ’s ar gu m ent, which the majority acc epts, is also simil ar to the ar gu m en t advanc ed by the defendant in People v. Masten
, 219 I ll. App. 3d 172 (1991). O n Marc h 7, 1990, Masten was arr ested for and char g ed with felony DWL R in violation of section 6-303

-14-(I ll. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951⁄2, ¶ 6-303) and with felony DUI in violation of sections 11-

501(a) (2) and (d)( 2) (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951⁄2, ¶ 11-501(a )(2)
, (d)( 2)). Masten had been convicted of DUI and revoke d for that offe nse i n 1 9 7 6

. He was later convicted of DWL R three times, the latest beingin 1983. On April 7, 1989, Masten pled guilty in Montgome ry County
, I llinois
, to DUI
, b u t h e was never sentenc ed on that charg e. Masten’s driving abstrac t reve aled that he was under a statutory summary susp ension from May 13, 1989, throug h November 13, 1989. Masten obtained a Virginia driver’s license on J une 9, 1989. The trial court dismiss ed the char g es beca use Masten had a Virg inia driver’ s license, and it found that since no sentenc e was imposed on the 1989 DUI he was not elig ible for a felony
sentenc e. The Fifth District Appellate Court reve rsed the trial court’s dism i s s al of both char g es. The f

elony enhanc ement provision for DWL R under subsection (d) at the t ime of Masten’s arre st provided that “[a]ny person c o nvicted of a second or subs equent violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony if the orig inal revoc ation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code.” I ll. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951⁄2, ¶ 6- 303(d). The court r eiterated that, “[w]hen a defendant’s driver’s license has been revoke d, he is not permitted to drive in I ll i n o i s u n t i l h e obtains a license in compliance with the I llinois Vehicle Code.” Masten , 219 I ll. App. 3d at 174. ¶ 48 The Mast en court explained that the Driver ’s L icense Compact, to which both I llinois and Virg inia are parties, was incorporated in the Code and that under the compac t a “par ty

State may not gr ant a license t o a person who has a party -State’s lice nse cur

rently revoke d unless one y ear has p as sed from the date of revocation and the application is permitted by law.” Id. ; see I ll. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951⁄2, ¶ 6 -7 0 4 (2 ). Unfortunately for Masten, even though well ov er a y ea r h ad passed from the date of the revoc ation, the compac t also provided that “a party -State may not g rant a driver’ s license to a person who has a party

State’s license suspended until the suspension period has ended.” Masten
, 219 I ll. App. 3d at 174; see I ll. Rev. St at. 1989, ch. 951⁄2, ¶ 6-704(1)

. ¶ 49 Be cause Masten was u n d er a s t at u t o ry s u m m ary suspension when he obtained the Virg inia license, the appellate court held that the Virg in i a license was invalid under the
compac t and Masten rema ined revoke d for the 1976 DUI when he was arr ested on Marc h 7, 1990. The court observe d that, “[w]ere we to hol d otherwise, it would lead to the absurd result that one whose license had been previously re v o k ed could avoid the eff ect of the
summary suspension by obtaining a license in a fore ign State as defe ndant did in this case .” Masten , 219 I ll. App. 3d at 175. ¶ 50 T h e co u rt i n Masten understood what is obvious from the Code and the case l aw

. A revoke d driver can be suspende d; a suspended driver can be revoke d; a nd a revoke d driver

can be revoke d ag ain and ag ain, as defe ndant was in the instant case

. As the Four th District Appellate Court e x plained in Sass , 144 I ll. App. 3d 163:
“F inally
, we note in passing the defe ndant’s misguided contention that beca use only his license or permit was revoke d under section 6–205(a) (2), and not his privilege to drive in the State of I llinois
, he was there fore leg ally permitted to drive within this State b y v i rtue of a valid fore ign license. It is a matter of common knowledg e that t h e operation of a motor vehicle is a privileg e, and not a rig ht. A driver’ s license, though, is issued in rec og nition of that p ri v i l ege. The privileg e to drive, and the license which is

-15-g iven so that the privileg e may be exercised, are by no means separ ate and divisibl e.” (Emphase s in origina l.) Id. at 170. Def endant’ s argument and the majority ’s ana ly sis in thi s case suffe r fr om the same ty pe of flawe d logic as the de fenda nts in Masten and Sass

. ¶ 51 Although the majority and defe ndant put a new twist on an old theme, it is obvious from

a review o f the case law in our state that we rec ognize and g ive eff ect to suspension and

revoc ation order s enter ed ag ainst persons who are alre ady suspended or revoke d. In People

v. Y aworski
, 2011 I L App (2d) 09 0 7 8 5
, t he defe ndant was convicted of felony DUI (625 I L CS 5/11-501(a) (2) (West 2004)). The trial c ourt imposed a Class 2 felony sentenc e. 625 I L CS 5/11-501(c- 1)(3) (West 2004). Yawor ski was found to be eligi ble for Class 2 nonprobationable felony sentenc ing beca use he committed his fourth DUI when he was revoke d for a violation of section 11-501(a ) of the C ode. On appea l, Yawor ski challeng ed the evidenc e offe red to enhanc e his sentenc e. Yawor ski argued that the State had not proven the “c ause of

the re vocation.” We he ld:
“Howe ver, the ful l ab s t ra ct plainly shows that on August 6, 2005, and again on August 12, 2005, defe ndant’s license was revoke d pursuant to section 6-205(a )(2) of the Code, which provides that, upon rec eipt of a repor t of a driver’ s DUI conviction, the Secre tary of State shall immediately revoke the driver’ s license. 625 I L CS 5/6-205(a) (2) (West 2004). The abstrac t also indicates that the r ev o ca tions rema ined in eff ect. Acc ording ly
, the arg

ument is without merit.” (Emphase s added.) Y aworski
, 2011 I L App (2d) 090785, ¶

8. The majority makes no attempt to acknow ledg e Y aworski
, a rec ent case from our district, or to explain th e fa ct that in that case we specific ally ref err ed to the conce pt of multipl e

revoc ations. ¶ 52 In People v. DiP a ce , 3 5 4 I l l

. App. 3d 104 (2004), our court upheld the def endant’ s convictions of felony DUI and felony DWL R. One of DiPace’ s arguments on appea l was that the State “f

ailed to e stablish at se ntencing that at the time of his a rre st his license ha d been

revo k ed fo r d ri ving under the influence
, as require d under the ag g rava ted version of both statutes.” Id. at 115. In reje ctingDiPace’ s argument, we state d:
“Howe ver, t h e prese ntencing repor t in this case reve als not only defe ndant’s prior driving -under -the-inf

luence convictions, but also the fac t that at the time of his arr est his license was revok

ed due t o t h ose prior driving-under-the -influence convic tions .” (Emphasis adde d.) Id. ¶ 53 This court rec ently add re s s ed an ar gu m ent that is somewhat simil ar to defe ndant’s
argument. In Rosenbalm
, 2011 I L App (2d) 100 2 4 3
, t he defe ndant was char g ed with two counts of ag g ravated DUI in that when he committed the offe nse of DUI he did not possess

a valid driver’ s license. 625 I L CS 5/11-501(d)( 1)(H) (West 2008). At the time of his arr est, Rosen b alm’s license was being held as bond in another case and it had expired. He was unable to rene w his license b ec au s e he had outstanding traff ic fines in other case s. Rosenbalm’s motion to dismiss was denied. Af t er a s t ipulated bench trial, the trial court imposed a C lass 4 felony sentenc e. R osenbalm m aintained t h at h e was not elig ible for the felony enhanc ement beca

use the statute rea ds, “the person committed the violation while he

-16-or she did not possess a driver’ s license or permit or a restric ted driving permit or a judicial

drivingpermit” (625 I L CS 5/ 11-501(d) (1)( H) (West 2008) ) and at the time of his arre st he had a driver’ s license but it just was invalid beca use it had expired. Rosenbalm
, 2011 I L App (2d) 100243, ¶ 9. We reje cted this a rgument and upheld Rosenbalm’s conviction. We said, “[a]lt houg h, as defe ndant contends, the sta t u t e does not expressly ref er to a valid driver’ s license, to rea d the statu te to avoid application of the ag g ravating fac tor wher e a person possesses a revoke d, suspended, or expired license would lead to absurd results.” Id. ¶ 9. We noted that, contra

ry to Rosenbalm’s argument (and defe ndant’s arguments in this case ), “the phy sical driver’ s license car d mere ly repr esents the permission, i.e.
, license, that the state has
g rante d a person to drive on the state’s roadw ay s, and it is this permission
, not the car d, that
a per son must possess to l eg ally drive on the r oads of I llinois .” Id. ¶ 10. ¶ 54 In Rosenbalm , we recognized that “the leg islature has taken great effor t to establish an elabor ate scheme under which the Secre tary of State is char g ed with maintaining rec ords of who possesses valid driver’ s licenses in I llinois

. See 625 I L CS 5/6-117 (West 2008) (re cords
to be kept by the Secre tary of State); 625 I L CS 5/6 -204 (West 2008) (whe n courts are to forwa rd license and repor

ts to the Secre tary o f S t at e).” Id. ¶ 11. We also said that the “ela borate scheme would be unnecessar y if the l eg islature were not focuse d o n p enaliz ing those who operate vehicles wit hout valid licenses.” Id. ¶ 11. L i k ew i s e, this scheme would be unnece ssary if the leg islature wer e not fo cu s ed o n penalizing repe at offe nders more

sever ely than first-time offe nders. Under the majority ’s analy sis, the courts, the circ uit court cler ks, and the Secre tary of State wer e eng ag ed in a colossal waste of time and eff ort car rying
out their mandated responsibility to rec ord defe ndant’s convictio n s o f DUI and DWL R, beca use those convictions have no bear ing on his punishment. He will, for all time, be a firsttime offende r. Such a r eadingis clear ly inconsistent with the leg islative intent. ¶ 55 In People v . Smith
, 162 I ll. App. 3d 739 (1987), the de fenda nt was convic ted of fe lony DWL R. The appe llate cour t, in affirmingSmith’s conviction, observe d that, “[a]t t rial, the State introduced as evidenc e thre e sepa rate order s of revocation, certified by the S ecr etar y of S tate, all of which wer e for driving under the influence of i ntox icating liquor and a ll of which were in effec t

on Februar

y 3, 1986.” Id. at 741. ¶ 56 Consist ent with the rea soning in Smith
, Senator Dan Cron i n , the sponsor of the law at issue in this case, explained the policy behind its creation on the Senate floor:
“This bill simply say s that–it simply provides for a penalty enhanc ement. Penalty enhanc ement afte r a cer

tai n n u m b er o f convictions for the offe nse of driving on a revoke d driver’ s license is curr ently a Class 4. In this case , if the offe nder is guilty of–if the offe nder is guilty of driving on a revoke d license, a person convicted of a fifth, six th, seventh, eig hth or ninth offe nse of driving on a revoke d or–driver ’s license or permit is
guilty of a Class 4. It provides that a person convicted of a tenth, eleve nth, twelft h,
t h i rtee nth, fourtee nth offe nse–sounds a littl e g oofy
, but it happens ever y day in our courts, unfortunate ly

–is guilty of a Class 3 felony
, and a p erson that’s convicted of a fiftee nth or subsequent off ense–sixteenth, seventee nth and so forth–would be guilty of

a Class 2 felony

. These are the very serious, most dang erous drivers, who we just are–are

so frustrated and all of us have tried very hard here to figure out a way to g et them off the roads. They are–they are just driving time bombs just waiting and–to–to wr ec k [ sic ]

-17-havoc and to ruin people’ s lives. We g ot to g et ’em off the road, these repe at offe nders, and the only thing we ca

n do in this bill is to make the penalties more sever e and keep ’em locked up.” 94th I ll. Gen. As s em., Senate Procee dings, May 11, 2005, at 96 (statements of Senator Cronin). ¶ 57 In this c ase, defe ndant’s “per mission” wa s revoke d in 1991, but he continued to ignor e the law and rac ked up an amazing number of convictions, including DUI
, which was added to the “ca use” for his r evoca

tion in 2001. He should not be allowed to esca pe the plain and ordinary meaning of section 6-303(a ) of the C ode; hi s “privileg e” to drive or “p ri vileg e to obtain a driver’s li cense ” was revoke d for DU Ias we ll as for the other viol ations ref lected in the order s of re vocation ente red on his drivingabstrac t by the Secr etar

y of State. ¶ 58 My rese arc h of other states h as l o cate d only one case in which a defe ndant argued, as defe n d an t here does, that an “orde r purporting to revoke his driver’ s license was invalid beca use he had no license to revoke when the order was issued.” Fielding v. State
, 733 P.2d 271 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). The S tate of A laska is a member of the Nonresident Violator Compact. See 625 I L CS 5/6-700 et seq. (West 2008). I agree with the analy sis by the appellate court in Fielding and wo u l d ad o pt it here

. In Fielding
, the defe ndant was first revoke d in 1981, wit h t h e re v o ca tion set to terminate in 1984. L ess t han a month afte r t he

revoc ation beg an, Fielding was convicted of DUI

. Pursuant to statute, his licen s e was revoke d for another y ear

. L ike the defe ndant in this case , Fielding con t i nued to rac k up DWL R convictions, eac h of which extended the revoc ation. Simi larly
, in this case defe ndant’s revoc ation was automatically extended by the Secre tary of State upon rec eipt of

eac h notice of conviction for a period of one y ear “fr om the date of s u ch co n v i ction.” 625 I L CS 5/ 6-303(b- 3) (West 2008). ¶ 59 In the instant case , defe ndant’s abstrac t reve als 11 extensions of revoc ation. The abstrac t also reve als that defe ndant was revoke d for DUI on October 11, 2001, and that the order of

revoc ation rema ined in eff ect at the time of his arr est in t h is case

. The leg islature clea rly intended that an order of revoc ation for DUI would be g iven eff ect by our courts even though the offe nder has alre ady been revoke d for other rea sons at the time of the DUI

. In Fielding
, the appellate court reje cted the defe ndant’s argument and held that the revoc ation was valid, “eve n though, when it is order ed, the defe ndant technica lly no longe r has a license to revoke .” Fielding
, 733 P.2d at 272. L ikewise, here defe ndant’s DUI revoc ation was valid and
must be g iven eff

ect, even though technica l l y h e h ad no valid license to revoke

. This is beca use it is the abstrac t privileg e to d ri v e that was revoke d and not mere ly the phy sical license. Def

endant should not be allowed to avoid the statutorily presc ribed punishments for
ag g ravated DWL R, or the steps for reissuanc e of a driver’ s license as i t relates to a DUI

revoc ation
, m ere ly beca

use he was initially revoke d for a non-DUI offe nse. I believe that such a r esult makes a moc kery of the lawand is an improper interpre tation of the statute. ¶ 60 It is a matter of common knowledg e that entry of sus pension an d revoc ation order s on

a driving rec ord depend upon previous misconduct in the operation of a motor vehicle. See People v. Archibald
, 3 I ll. App. 3d 591, 594 (1972). Also, the majority and defe ndant do not dispute the acc uracy o f t h e information contained in his driving abstrac t. The abstrac t is “prima fac ie evidenc e of fac ts there in stated,” including “proof of prior conviction or proof of rec ords, notices, or order s rec o rd ed on individual driving rec ords maintained by the

-18-Secre tary of State.” 625 I L CS 5/2-123(g )(6) (West 2008); see Meadows
, 371 I ll. App. 3d at

261. ¶ 61 I maintain, as the defe ndant in People v. Lucas
, 231 I ll. 2d 169, 177 (2008), argued, that “the only differ ence among leg al driving
, misdemeanor driving while license revoke d, and driving while l icense revoke d, subsequent offense, is the s tate of the driver’s record.” The I l linois Supreme Court agree d with Lucas. It held that a subsequent DWL R offe nse (62 5 I L CS 5/6-303(d) (West 2004)) could not serve as a predic ate for arme d violence. Howeve r, the court aff

irmed Lucas’ s DWL R conviction wit h a sentencing enha n ce ment due to prior convictions. Lucas , 231 I ll. 2d at 183. ¶ 62 T h e m aj o ri t y ci t es t wo case s, which wer e not cited by either party , to support i t s interpre tation of the term “ revoc ation.” See People v

. Suddoth
, 52 I ll. App. 2d 355 (1964); People v. Morrison
, 149 I ll. App. 3d 282 (1986). I agree with the analy sis in both of t hese

ca ses. These case s mere ly demonstrate that a revoke d license rema ins revoke d until an application for a new license is made and it is acte d upon by the Secre tary of State. Howeve r, these c ases do not in any

way support the majority ’s conc lusion that “the Secre tary ’s 2001 formal a dminist rative sa

nction of re vocation had no e ffe ct.” Supra ¶ 9. ¶ 63 The majority misses the point of Suddoth and Morrison
, which is that the restora tion of one’s driving pri v i l ege s is not automatic. Unlike a suspension, wher e privileg es can be reinstated after the suspension period ha s expi red a nd upon pay

ment of a fee
, a revocation require s a person to demonstrate to the Secre tary that “af ter a revie w or investigation of such
person, *** to g rant the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the h i g hway s will not end a n g e r the public safe ty or welfa re.” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/6-208(b) (West 2008). A p er s o n , like defe ndant in this case , who has been revoke d for DUI must prove that “h e does not have a curr ent problem with a lcohol, he is a low or minimal risk.” Grams
, 263 I ll. App. 3d at 396. The burden is on the applicant for a new lic en s e t o prove “by clea r and convincing evidenc e” that he is entitled to be g rante d driving privileg es. Id. The applicant’ s total driving rec ord may be considered in deter mining an application for reinstateme nt. Grams
, 263 I ll. App. 3d at 398; Caracci v. Edgar
, 160 I ll. App. 3d 8 9 2
, 897 (1987). The majority ’s analy sis is inconsistent with deca des of prec edent holding that the proper method of showing a revoc ation of a defe ndant’s driver’ s license (privileg e to drive) and the rea sons for such action is b y i n t roducing a cer tified copy of the defe ndant’s driving abstrac t. See People v

. Prano
, 44 I ll. App. 2d 273 (1963); People v . W allace , 9 I ll. App. 3d 129 (1973); Smith , 162 I ll. App. 3d at 742; 625 I L CS 5/ 2-108, 3-303( f), 6- 117(b) ( West 2008). ¶ 64 In this case, the r evocation for DUI in 2001, acc ording to defe ndant’s driving abstra ct, clea rly shows the entry of a DUI conviction and a mandatory revoc atio n fo r t h at offe nse, which rema ined in eff

ect on the date of the offe nses in this case

. In People v. Morrison
, 149 I ll. App. 3d 282, 284 (1986), the court obser ved that, “[f]rom the above statutory and case law, it is appar ent that the revoc ation period is the time period when a person may not apply for a new lic en s e. ” (Emphasis added.) Her e, defenda nt was originally revoke d in 1991 for using a motor vehicle in the commission of a felony

. The orig inal order of revoc ation, which would have expired one y ear from the date of revoc ation (625 I L CS 5/1-176, 6-208(a ) (West 2008)), never expired beca use defe ndant continued t o co m m it offe nse afte r offe nse, including his 2001 DUI
, which is ref lected in h i s driving abstrac t by “Ty pe of Action 94

-19-(i mmediate action conviction)” on August 22, 2001, and “Ty pe of Action 01 (manda

tory

revoc ation)” for that offe nse on October 11, 2001. Morrison then clea rly supports the

common and ordinarily unders t ood meaning of the term “re vocation.” Contrary to the majority ’s conclusion, defe ndant’s 2001 DUI conviction and revoc ation clea rly had an eff

ect

on the period during which defe ndant could not apply for a new lic en s e. I n other words, defe ndant’s privileg e to obtain a license was now terminated for DUI as well as the other

rea sons noted on his abstrac t. ¶ 65 Neither the majori t y n o r d ef en dant cites any case s or any other authority that would entitle this court to disreg ard the information contained in his driving abstrac t, namely
, that he was convicted of and revoke d for DUI in 2001 and that said revoc ation rema ined in eff ect at the time of the instant off enses. ¶ 66 At his sentencinghear ing, de fenda nt offer ed, as a rea son for drivingin violation of the law, that he had to g et to work. The court succinc tly summarized the rationale behind the penalty scheme for r ecidivist revoke d drivers:
“THE DEFEN DANT: I arr ang ed my self a ride to work every day
, sir, up until that day

. THE C OURT: L ook, you know, there ’s this theory about what’ s the bigdeal I was only driving a car , I am not hurting any body
, I am g oing to work, I am s up p o rt ing my children. Tha

t’s a lot of bolog na [ sic ], absolute bologna [ sic ].
THE DEF ENDAN T: Iunderstand that, sir.
THE COURT: It’s a conti n u i n g flagrant violation of the law. People are of the opinion what are you g etting excited about people driving revoke d and suspended. You

are a potential predator on the roadw ay

. You cra ck up your car , you cra ck up people. They are totally

innocent.
THE DEF ENDAN T: Iunderstand that, sir.
THE COURT: But you, you s h o u l dn’t even be behind the whee l, but you are

. The potential is there for great bodily harm, death, substantial damag e, persona lly and
proper ty -wise. So it’s not a poo-poo ty pe of offe nse. Are you running around with a gun

or a knife? Absolutely not. No one is sug g esting that for one moment. But you have the potential, and we see it day in and day out here. P eo p l e t rul y being hurt on acc ount of offe nders such as yourself, and it’s a blight o n this community
, a plague on this community .” ¶ 67 For the fore g oing rea sons, I believe that defe ndant was proper ly revoke d for DUI in 2001, notwithstanding that his license or privileg e to drive was previously revoke d for a non-DUI offe nse, and the State proper ly relied upon “the revoc ation” in order to enhanc e defe ndant’s
sentenc e wher e his dri ving abstrac t reve aled at least 14 prior convictions of violations of section 6-303 of t he C ode. 625 I L CS 5/ 6-303(d- 5) (West 2008). I respe ctfully believe that the majority

is in error in holdingotherwise.

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