AIR WAR COLLEGE


AIR UNIVERSITY


Iran’s Strategic Culture and 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Implications of US Policy 

Anthony C. Cain 

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

Air War College 

Maxwell Paper No. 26 

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 

April 2002 
Air University 

Donald A. Lamontagne, Lt Gen, Commander 

Air War College 

Bentley B. Rayburn, Maj Gen, Commandant


Stephen O. Fought, PhD, Dean


Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Series Editor


Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Essay Advisor


Air University Press 

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Disclaimer 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

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government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. 

ii 
Foreword 

Since 1979 the relationship between the United States 

and the Islamic Republic of Iran has mirrored aspects of 

the ideological tensions that characterized the Cold War of 

the twentieth century’s latter half. The revolution that 

ejected the shah emerged from a consensus within the 

Iranian community that favored social reform founded 

upon Islamic values. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the 

charismatic imam whose vitriolic sermons helped to polarize relations between Tehran and Washington, established 

a theocracy in which the faithful could prosper. 

In this study, Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, PhD, analyzes the 

relationship between Iran’s strategic culture and weapons 

of mass destruction. Following the Iranian Revolution in 

1979, foreign policy experts in the West had trouble comprehending the cleric’s politicized Shi’i ideology and reacted 

with alarm when Khomeini, energized by the revolution’s 

success, acted to export his ideology to other communities 

in the Middle East—sponsoring terrorism, if necessary, to 

combat regimes that supported US policies and interests. 

Consequently, the United States focused on containing 

Iran until the regime changed enough to allow for less ideologically charged dialogue to occur on the one hand while, 

at times, pursuing active measures to overthrow the revolutionary regime on the other. This range of policies resulted 

in economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Khomeini’s Islamic republic. Moreover, when war broke out between Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United States 

opportunistically backed the Iraqi dictator in the hope that 

a military defeat would usher in moderate leaders in 

Tehran. At times the relationship flared into military confrontation. US forces bombed Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf, and Iranian leaders launched missile attacks 

against shipping in the same waters. Beneath the surface 

of Middle Eastern power politics, Iran became a touchstone for religiously charged revolutionary movements 

across the Middle East. Perhaps the low point for US-Iranian relations occurred on 3 July 1988 when a US Navy 

Aegis cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing all 290 

passengers aboard. 

Colonel Cain describes how, in the aftermath of the 

1991 Gulf War, the United States adopted a one-size-fitsall policy toward Iran and Iraq, the twin rogue states of the 

iii 
Middle East, under the rubric of "dual containment." Since 

the landslide election of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami to 

the presidency in 1997, however, signs emanating from 

Iran point to possibilities for altering the tension that has 

plagued relations between the two states for more than 20 

years. This study concludes by analyzing options available 

to US policy makers should they choose to help Iran’s 

transition from pariah state toward a more moderate role 

in the Persian Gulf. President George W. Bush demanded 

in his January 2002 State of the Union Address that Iran 

abandon proliferation and terrorist-related activities as a 

precondition for easing tensions with the United States. 

Colonel Cain argues that US decision makers must understand the social and economic challenges that confront 

leaders in Tehran as they attempt to guide their nation toward the future. For its part, the Islamic republic must develop a consensus between its citizens and the ruling elite 

regarding Iran’s legitimate role within the region and the 

world. 

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the 

spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious consideration of the issues. We encourage your responses. 

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN


Major General, USAF


Commandant, Air War College


iv 
About the Author 

Lt Col Anthony C. Cain graduated from Georgia State 

University in 1980 and was commissioned upon completing Officer Training School in 1981. After earning his navigator wings at Mather Air Force Base (AFB), California, in 

1982, he served as a B-52G navigator, radar navigator, instructor, and evaluator at Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; Barksdale AFB, Louisiana; and Castle AFB, California. In 1984 

he won the William J. Crumm Linebacker Memorial Trophy for high-altitude bombardment during the Strategic 

Air Command’s (SAC) annual bombing and navigation 

competition. As the senior standardization and evaluation 

radar navigator at Barksdale AFB, he launched several 

missiles and helped draft crew procedures and tactics during the initial operational test and evaluation of the AGM 

142/A precision-guided munition weapon system. In 1991 

he deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield and flew 

26 combat missions in support of coalition objectives during Operation Desert Storm, earning the Distinguished 

Flying Cross and two Air Medals. In 1992 his crew won the 

Bartsch Memorial Trophy for electronic countermeasures 

performance during SAC’s last bombing and navigation 

competition. After graduating as a distinguished graduate 

from the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), he served 

at ACSC as a faculty member and director for the Theater 

Air Campaign Studies Course. In 1995 the commander, Air 

Education and Training Command, selected Colonel Cain 

as the command’s Educator of the Year. He earned his doctorate in military history at Ohio State University and returned to the faculty at ACSC where he served as the director for the Airpower Studies Course before being 

selected to attend Air War College. In May 2002 the Smithsonian Institution will publish The Forgotten Air Force, 

Cain’s study of French airpower doctrine in the interwar 

years. He is a Master Navigator with more than 3,000 

hours in the B-52. He and Mechieal, his wife of 21 years, 

have three children, Jessica, Micah, and Ryan. 

v 
Iran’s Strategic Culture 

and Decision Making 

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent 

hostage crisis, popular perceptions of a society dominated 

by “irrational” Islamic fundamentalists have colored US 

policy toward Iran. Michael Eisenstadt notes: 

Because Shi’ite religious doctrine exalts the suffering and martyrdom 

of the faithful, and because religion plays a central role in the official 

ideology of the Islamic Republic, Iran is sometimes portrayed as a 

“crazy” or “undeterrable” state driven by the absolute imperatives of 

religion, not the pragmatic concerns of statecraft. . . . Experience has 

shown, however, that the perception of Iran as an irrational, undeterrable state is wrong.1 

Conflict will tend to characterize US policy toward Iran, 

in part, in proportion to the degree that US leaders fail to 

comprehend the Islamic republic’s struggle to reconcile 

tensions between the faith and the economic, diplomatic, 

and military functions of state power.

2 Similarly, coping 

with Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, coupled with the potential proliferation of 

those weapons to other “rogue” states and terrorist organizations, requires a sophisticated understanding of Iranian 

decision-making processes.3 The challenge to US policy 

makers will center on modifying the prevailing paradigm 

that emphasizes the irrationality of the Iranian government in favor of one based on understanding the synergies—and the conflicts—between the various segments of 

the Iranian polity that help to shape relations between the 

two states. 

The first step in developing a more sophisticated understanding of Iranian decision-making processes requires 

distinguishing between the Shi’ism espoused by the clerics 

who share power in the Iranian government, the politicized 

Islamism that threatens moderate Muslim regimes and 

their non-Muslim counterparts in the Middle East, and Islamic tenets to which most peaceful Muslims adhere. 

Shi’ism is, by definition, a millenarian sect of Islam that relies on imams, holy men, to mediate between God and the 

Islamic community.4 The basic distinction between Shi’i 

and Sunni branches of Islam derives from a conflict over 

the right to govern the ummah, the community of the faith1 
ful. Sunni Muslims attempted to reconcile religious and 

secular communities within the ummah by creating the 

caliphate to provide political leadership while vesting spiritual leadership in the clergy. Followers of Shi’i Islam believe that political and religious leadership derives from the 

prophet’s bloodline (through his son-in-law Ali ibn Abi 

Talib). This doctrine worked well until the twelfth generation (the Twelfth Imam) when, according to Shi’i doctrine, 

Allah caught up the imam (technically the imam was occulted or hidden from view)—unfortunately before he could 

appoint a successor to govern the ummah. Iranian Shi’ism 

follows the “Twelver’s” sect because of its anticipation of 

the Hidden Imam’s return. 

Iranian religious leaders relied upon this doctrine to justify their political ambitions in Iran as they found themselves pushed to the margins of political authority under 

Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlevi’s regime. The clergy resented 

this marginalization and developed a view that society— 

the ummah—would remain flawed as long as Iran’s leaders 

maintained the separation between secular and religious 

communities. They encouraged opposition groups to adopt 

increasingly militant tactics designed to usher in a utopia 

in which the imamate would govern religious and political 

aspects of the community according to Koranic precepts.5 

Shi’i religious doctrine produced a divided power structure in post-revolutionary Iran. During the years when Ayatollah Khomeini dominated the government (1979–89), 

the combination of his charisma, his religious authority as 

imam, and a brutally efficient internal security apparatus 

discouraged dissent and opposition. Additionally, Khomeini’s 

focus on expanding Islamist influence struck a responsive 

chord spawning radical sects throughout the Middle East, 

North Africa, and elsewhere that came to rely on Iranian 

resources for ideological and logistical support.6 The virulent distrust with which Khomeini viewed the West contributed to the rise of Islamism in Iran and throughout the 

Muslim world as he consolidated his leadership and exported his ideology within the context of the Iranian Revolution.7 Thus, the revolution’s apparent success encouraged disenfranchised, pious, and militant individuals and 

groups to campaign to overturn the status quo in such diverse states as Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and 
the Philippines, often using terrorist tactics, in the name of 

a brand of Islamism that has only existed for a brief time 

in Iran.8 

One final doctrinal point figures significantly in the evolution of Shi’i belief toward radical Islamism—the doctrine 

of jihad. In the early years of the faith, jihad was necessary 

both to protect and to expand the community of the faithful. As long as the imams ruled the community, their authority to declare jihad remained a fundamental symbol of 

their right to rule in Allah’s name. Technically, until the return of the Twelfth Imam, the authority to declare jihad 

has lapsed. However, because the Iranian clerics derive 

their authority based upon the legitimacy of their imamate, 

they assumed the authority to declare jihad. The Iranian 

community’s tacit recognition of this authority harbors 

significant implications for conflict with the Islamic republic and its surrogates. Competitors could face combatants 

motivated by religious fervor that stems from their anticipation of rewards in paradise for their sacrifice (and corresponding torments in the afterlife should they fail) if they 

answer the imam’s call to wage holy war.

9 

It is impossible to separate the Iranian government’s 

policy choices from its religious precepts. Religion governs 

every aspect of social, political, and economic life for citizens of Iran in ways that rarely apply to most Western societies.10 One analyst observes, “Islam also encompasses 

the material and spiritual aspects of the followers’ lives 

from the time of birth, throughout life to death, and even 

after death throughout the spiritual experience.”11 Thus, 

for contemporary Iranian politics, reconciling the demands 

of international statecraft and domestic consensus building with the principles of religious dogma remains difficult 

and, at times, nearly impossible. Western society resolved 

the secular-religious dilemma over the course of several 

centuries of religious wars that culminated with the conflicts that accompanied the Protestant Reformation. Islam 

has yet to undergo a similar reconciliation—and Iran, in 

particular, has erected institutional barriers to prevent 

this development by establishing an Islamic theocracy.12 

Iran’s decision-making process remains clouded in mystery to most Western observers. The Islamic Revolutionary 

Council vested supreme authority in the vali al faqih (a re-
ligious leader who combines political and religious authority in the executive branch of government).13 Between 1979 

and 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini steered the country and 

consolidated the revolution. His nearly unimpeachable religious authority constrained the boundaries of dissent 

and debate over economic and political issues. Economic 

stresses stemmed from Iran’s nearly total dependence on 

the oil industry for foreign exchange. Thus, decisions by 

other petroleum-producing nations to regulate prices and 

supplies severely constrained Iran’s economic potential. 

Moreover, the Iran-Iraq War, coupled with economic and 

political sanctions sponsored by the United States and the 

United Nations, placed severe strains on the Iranian government and population. Khomeini’s regime pushed aside 

moderates like former President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr as 

it reacted to the war with Iraq and perceptions of political 

and economic attacks against the Islamic republic from 

the US-led international community.14 Since Khomeini’s 

death, tensions within a rising middle class and students 

who campaign for democratic reforms aimed at reconciling 

Iran with Western cultures have threatened to shatter the 

fragile unity that governs Iran.15 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, wields 

power as the vali al faqih in the post-Khomeini era. Rather 

than following the archconservative policies of his predecessor, the tensions outlined above forced Khamenei to accommodate popular demands for reform. President Seyyed 

Mohammad Khatami, who rose to office on the wings of a 

landslide victory in 1997, carefully pushed the conservative clerics to implement moderate governmental and economic reforms. As one analyst notes, however, the signals 

emanating from Tehran are often difficult to sort out: 

“Since Khatami’s election, there have been many signs that 

Iran has a complex political structure that is in the midst 

of an uncertain transition. . . . Moderates must talk like 

hard-liners to survive, and this helps explain why one 

day’s new moderate initiative may be followed by the next 

day’s hard-line speech.”16 Consequently, some nations 

have reacted cautiously to Khatami’s influence by easing 

restrictions on trade and diplomatic contacts with Iran. 

Also, Khatami has made public statements of regret to the 

United States for the hostage episode in an apparent at-
tempt to ease tensions between the two countries. Thus, 

those who seek to discern Iran’s propensity to pursue 

moderate foreign and domestic policies must sort through 

the rivalries between Khamenei and the clerics and between Khatami and the political elite. 

The Iranian theocracy filters its interaction with the international community through the lens of Koranic law. 

This constitutional requirement means that the elite clergy 

will formulate moderate policies slowly, if at all. Despite 

the mullahs’ inherently conservative approach, instances 

of policy shifts have occurred that, on the surface, appear 

to contradict religious dogma. Perhaps the most significant, and ominous from a weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) proliferation perspective, was the Ayatollah Khomeini’s reversal of his policy, based upon the Koran’s prohibition against using poison, during the Iran-Iraq War that 

condemned the use of chemical weapons (and by extension, nuclear and biological weapons). This decision came 

after Iranian forces suffered horrific losses from Iraqi 

chemical weapons attacks.17 Significantly, however, the 

decision emerged only after the international community 

failed to take action to condemn or curb Iraq’s use of such 

weapons and after intense debates within Iran between 

Khomeini, the military, and the clerics. Thus, a fundamentally secular decision based upon military effectiveness calculations had to pass through the filter of Islamic 

law to acquire the mantle of legitimacy. With the debate 

settled, however, the republic’s leaders relied upon the new 

religious precedent to justify future nuclear, chemical, and 

biological weapons proliferation. This example illustrates 

the difficulty that moderate leaders will encounter as they 

attempt to reshape Iran’s foreign or domestic policies— 

without a catalyst to prompt clerical review of established 

policies, there will be little rationale for proposing new interpretations merely to justify liberal reforms. 

The characterization of Iran as an “Islamic democracy” 

conceals serious flaws within the functioning and the fabric of the society. In the first place, the clerics jealously 

guard their prerogatives as the interpreters of the revolutionary agenda. In terms of governmental structure, this 

translates into a dual system of government with a weak 

presidency that operates under the close supervision of the 
supreme leader (vali al faqih) and the Assembly of Experts. 

Second, the military operates within a dual chain of command with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps serving 

a praetorian function as the protectors of the revolution 

while the nominally “regular” armed forces act in reserve 

capacities. Finally, great personal risk accompanies dissent and freedom of expression for the average Iranian citizen. The clerics monitor media and press outlets to detect 

instances of nascent counterrevolutionary thought. Even 

with these overarching controls, however, spontaneous 

demonstrations have occurred that have forced the regime 

to act decisively to prevent a replay of the mass uprisings 

of the late 1970s as the public clamors for reform.18 

The twin social upheavals of revolution and interstate 

war exerted harsh effects on Iran’s social infrastructure. 

Presently in Iran, age groups cluster around the less than 

30-year-old and more than 50-year-old sectors as a result 

of the flight of many citizens from the country in the immediate aftermath of the revolution and the tragic casualties sustained in the war with Iraq. This clustering means 

that few of Iran’s nearly 66 million citizens have memories 

of any but the present form of government. Those who remember Shah Pahlevi’s regime likely do so with resentment stemming from the corruption and inequality that 

characterized the regime in its waning days. Thus, the current regime in Tehran enjoys modest popular support that 

draws its strength from the population’s ignorance of viable 

alternatives on one hand and a determination not to return to the monarchy’s flawed structures on the other.

19 

Despite the current regime’s popular revolutionary 

agenda of establishing equality for all members of the society, urban and rural poverty continue to characterize life 

in Iran. This stems in part from a 3 percent annual population growth that will outstrip the nation’s economy if left 

unchecked. The government recently acted to stave off the 

potentially disastrous effects that could occur from unsustainable population growth by relaxing its interpretation of 

the Koran’s encouragement of large families. The large 

urban population has resulted in unequal and inefficient 

food distribution reflected in a 20 percent malnourishment 

rate for children under five years of age.20 These and other 
demographic trends portend a troubling and challenging 

future for Iran’s leaders. 

Iran’s isolation under the mantle of Islamic purity and 

the wasteful 10-year war with Iraq left the nation’s infrastructure in decline. Rural areas remain isolated from government services owing to the lack of serviceable roads. 

The airline and rail industries have also suffered profound 

neglect from insufficient maintenance. Consequently, Iran’s 

leaders now must invest in concentrated infrastructure recapitalization strategies to prevent further decay and its 

negative effects on the economy. 

The economy Iran’s leaders will rely upon to pull their 

nation into the twenty-first century is founded on a single 

commodity—oil. As a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iran’s economic fortunes remain tied to the consensus of its partners. Since 

1997 those fortunes have fluctuated wildly as oil prices 

ranged between $10 and $35 per barrel. For the average 

Iranian, these fluctuations have translated into inflation 

rates that hover around 15 percent, an unreliable currency, and an uncertain standard of living.21 Recent US 

State Department estimates place the Iranian gross domestic product at $413 billion—which translates into a per 

capita income of $1,500.22 One source quotes a disgruntled 

Iranian citizen’s comment on the economy. “There are many 

who remember the corrupt days of the Shah: ‘At least then 

you could get a chicken to put on the family table without 

having to do three different jobs to pay for it.’”23 

Although Western states continue to rely on Middle 

Eastern oil, OPEC does not enjoy the freedom to hold them 

hostage as it did in the early 1970s—nor is there a consensus among member-states that such a policy is consistent with their individual state’s economic and security interests. New oil sources coupled with dramatically altered 

relationships between the West and major Persian Gulf oil 

states (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait) 

have dampened Iranian influence at OPEC price-setting 

councils.24 These developments have combined to cause 

the Iranian economy to stagnate. Debt stands near $12 billion in an economy in which annual imports exceed exports by approximately $1 billion.25 Therefore, the Iranian 

economy’s myopic concentration on vast oil and natural 
gas reserves has placed the country paradoxically in thrall 

to the demands of the global oil economy by preventing diversification and modernization of other such vital sectors 

as computing, banking, attracting foreign investment, and 

communications. 

Iran presents a picture of a state with vast human and 

economic potential—possibly the preeminent leader among 

the Gulf states. The social and economic challenges outlined above, however, dramatically constrain Iran’s leaders. Moreover, the apparent unyielding adherence to the 

tenets of Shi’i doctrine complicates foreign relations while 

simultaneously adding a layer of complexity to domestic 

policy making. The international community, led by the 

United States, has exacerbated some of Iran’s social and 

economic problems by treating the Islamic republic as a 

pariah state. For its part, Iran has thumbed its nose at the 

international community by supporting extremist movements throughout the Muslim world. Perhaps the most serious policy barriers to improved relations between the 

United States and Iran, however, are Iran’s support of terrorism and its pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear 

weapons programs along with associated delivery systems 

technologies. 

Iran’s Chemical and 

Biological Weapons Programs 

As outlined earlier, advancing along the path toward détente between the United States and Iran will require significant cultural accommodation from both parties. Since 

Khatami’s election to the presidency in 1997 and again in 

2001, the message from Tehran has remained ambiguous— 

hard-line rhetoric often has followed conciliatory overtures. Iran’s policies regarding terrorism, WMD, and missile technologies give ample reason for US policy makers to 

remain cautious. But increasing trends toward globalization coupled with a temporary international consensus 

centered on fighting terrorism may provide the levers 

needed to ease tensions between the two countries. While 

the challenges remain great for US policy makers, the initiative and the paths to improving relations remain clear 
for Iran. The mullahs have proven that they can reconcile 

their religious ideology with the needs of international 

statecraft—perhaps their egos and quest for personal 

power present the only barriers to channeling their efforts 

toward improving relations with the West in the future. 

Most observers agree that the Iran-Iraq War was the catalyst for Iran’s ambitions to acquire chemical and biological weapons. One analyst notes, “Iran was never a regional 

leader in the effort to acquire biological and chemical 

weapons until the Iran-Iraq War. . . . Iran only revitalized 

its nuclear program and gave its chemical and biological 

programs high priority after Iraq made extensive use of 

chemical warfare against Iranian troops.”26 More recently, 

Tehran has intensified its efforts to develop an indigenous 

capability to produce and weaponize chemical and biological agents. A 2001 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report 

noted that “Tehran was seeking production technology, 

training, expertise, equipment, and material that could be 

used as precursor agents—the ingredients for chemical 

weapons—from Russia and China.”27 Thus, the Islamic republic’s status with respect to chemical and biological 

weapons has shifted from one of reluctance or indifference 

to active and aggressive pursuit of chemical and biological 

weapons capabilities.28 

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1989, the Iranian 

armed forces have developed capabilities to produce a wide 

range of chemical agents including blood and blister agents. 

Additionally, the Iranian arsenal includes a limited ability to 

produce nerve agents. Beyond this growing chemical stockpile, Iranian scientists pursue research that focuses on developing biological weapons that include mycotoxins, anthrax, hoof-and-mouth disease, and botulinum toxin. 

Although Iran currently has a limited capability to employ 

such weapons, analysts fear that ongoing efforts to acquire 

long-range ballistic missiles could result in the ability to 

threaten Asia, Europe, and most of Africa.29 

Surveillance efforts can give a generally accurate picture 

of the technical outlines of Iran’s chemical and biological 

weapons program, however, determining how and under 

what conditions the government would elect to employ its 

arsenal is less clear. First, in the post-Khomeini era, power 

relationships within the government remain far from 
transparent. Second, interest groups within Iranian society appear to influence the government’s decision-making 

processes, resulting in often contradictory signals that 

complicate US policy formulation toward Iran. Finally, it is 

difficult to distinguish how the Iranian military command 

functions with respect to chemical and biological weapons 

employment doctrine. 

The tension between religious and political leaders apparently does not extend to relations between the government 

and military commanders. One report concludes, “The military remains largely depoliticized since the mid-1990s.”30 

Observers describe the military institutions as more inclined 

to support conservative policies within the Iranian hierarchy, 

thus making the military a loyal servant to the Islamic republic’s evolving revolutionary ideals. The requirement to 

balance decisions to use chemical or biological weapons between the government’s hard-line clerics, who control the 

military in a general sense, and the reform-minded moderates has produced a compartmentalized command structure. 

Conceivably, the government (represented by the vali al faqih 

and the military high command) could decide to launch a 

chemical or biological strike without presidential knowledge 

or approval. 

The military’s operational composition and tactical abilities, however, create a dangerous mix owing to the general 

weakness of its conventional forces. Chemical and biological weapons offer obvious force enhancement options that 

bolster the Islamic republic’s brittle conventional weapons 

infrastructure. As the Iranians discovered in the Iran-Iraq 

War, chemical and biological weapons are remarkable 

equalizers when employed against massed ground 

troops.31 Moreover, chemical and biological arsenals are 

cheaper to procure and maintain than the high-tech 

weapons Iran would require in a confrontation with Western powers. The combination of weak conventional forces, 

hard-line political domination of military decision-making 

processes, and an uncertain knowledge of Iranian chemical-biological weapons doctrine complicates the problem of 

assessing the likelihood of chemical-biological use by the 

Islamic republic. 

Iranian doctrine is, perhaps, less opaque than other aspects of the chemical-biological weapons problem. Two 
likely scenarios suggest conditions in which the Iranian 

government would resort to chemical-biological attack. 

One reflects the defensive posture that has characterized 

most Iranian military operations since the revolution. The 

second is more intimidating and reflects the possibility of 

offensive operations designed to energize a global or, at 

least, a regional Islamist bid for power. 

Although Tehran has not abandoned Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision of becoming the dominant force in the Muslim 

world, domestic economic pressures and a generally inferior posture vis-à-vis regional competitors dictate a defensive strategy. The most likely conditions for Iranian chemical or biological weapons use against regional competitors 

would conform to the pattern established in the Iran-Iraq 

War. In this role, “Iran views Iraq as the primary threat to 

its security, and is a key factor . . . in the development of 

an indigenous WMD and missile capability.”32 The Iranians 

would use chemicals in a tactical role, and probably only 

in retaliation against a first strike by their adversaries, to 

reinforce or stabilize conditions for troops in contact with 

the enemy. This scenario conforms to the general view held 

by Iranian leaders that chemical and biological weapons 

are deterrent weapons with devastating combat potential. 

Viewed this way, chemical and biological weapons arsenals 

become critical national security policy tools that support 

the constitutional mandate to “safeguard the complete independence and integrity of the territory.”33 

Barring state-sponsored threats to Iranian sovereignty, 

however, the revolutionary doctrine offers a rationale for 

Iranian sponsorship and support of chemical or biological 

weapons attacks designed to further the Islamic republic’s 

cause. Anthony Cordesman argues, “The possibility that 

Iran has biological weapons gives it an enhanced capability to deter and intimidate . . . it has incentives to make 

covert use of biological weapons because they are particularly well-suited to unconventional warfare or ‘terrorism.’”34 

The plausible deniability the veil of terrorism offers state 

sponsors affords the Iranians wide latitude in selecting 

methods and targets for chemical or biological attacks of 

this nature. Trends toward moderation, the need to obtain 

economic assistance to bolster the sagging economy, and 

the fear of overwhelming retaliation are likely to cause 
Iranian leaders to weigh their actions carefully before 

choosing this offensive option in the near future. Moreover, 

the overwhelming support for US actions following the 11 

September 2001 terrorist attacks may cause Iran’s leaders 

to shift their emphasis away from chemical and biological 

weapons because of their potential association with terrorist strategies in favor of enhanced nuclear capabilities. 

Iran’s Nuclear Program 

The specter of a nuclear confrontation in the Middle 

East has replaced fears of a Cold War nuclear showdown 

between the United States and the Soviet Union. This view 

has emerged for several reasons. In the first place, deterrence and positive control mechanisms that characterized 

the bipolar world are largely absent in the Middle East. 

Competing interests, weak state structures, a post-colonial 

legacy of deep-seated mistrust of the West, and dramatic 

cultural differences heighten concerns over regional nuclear proliferation. Second, some states pursue nuclear acquisition programs with overt intentions of radically altering the regional balance of power. State-sponsored threats 

against Israel usually reflect this aspect of the Middle 

Eastern security equation. Finally, Islamist movements 

that rely upon terrorism to advance politico-social agendas 

could acquire nuclear or radiological materials to use 

against regional and Western powers in attempts to eradicate unwanted influences, thereby, setting the stage for regional hegemony. 

Iran figures prominently in each of the instances listed 

above. Most assessments of the Iranian nuclear program 

characterize the Islamic republic as relatively far from developing a credible nuclear threat.35 However, the Iranians 

have, haltingly at times, pursued nuclear research and development since before the 1979 revolution that toppled 

the shah’s regime and gave the reins of government to the 

ultraconservative Shi’i clerics.36 One analyst notes Iran’s 

importance to regional stability, “Iran is the largest country in the region and has the potential to play the most important role there, for good or ill.”37 Tehran’s desire to restore Iran to its rightful place within the larger Islamic 
community and as a regional power coupled with its robust intermediate-range missile resources makes Iran a 

potent nuclear “proliferator” that bears careful watching.38 

The roots of the current Iranian nuclear program reach 

back to the shah’s regime. The United States supported 

the monarch’s ambitions to modernize the country by offering education for Iranian students and by supporting 

his efforts to use nuclear power plants to electrify the 

country. With Pahlevi’s support, nuclear power and nuclear research became a conspicuous symbol of modernization while they simultaneously bolstered his bid for regional hegemony. 

The 1979 revolution curbed nuclear research for several 

years owing to the ruling Islamic council’s characterization 

of nuclear (and chemical and biological) weapons as incompatible with Islamic law. However, the war with Iraq 

forced Khomeini and his fellow clerics to alter their assessments of nuclear weapons. As tensions with the Iraqis 

moved from open war toward uneasy truce after the IranIraq War, Iranian leaders concluded that they could ill afford to allow regional competitors to gain again the upper 

hand in the nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons 

arena. Moreover, the ruling council of clerics retained a vision of Iran as the bearer of Islamic purity. Michael Eisenstadt concludes that the clerics “believe that the fate of the 

Islamic community at large depends on Iran’s ability to 

transform itself into a regional military power that can defend and advance the interests of that community.”39 

Ayatollah Khomeini authorized nuclear research to commence in 1985 in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) that the shah’s government had ratified in 

1970. This marked the renewal and acceleration of Iranian 

clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in violation 

of NPT terms.40 In the late 1990s, such events as the arms 

race between Pakistan and India, which came to a head in 

May 1998 with the detonation of Pakistani and Indian nuclear devices, compelled Iran’s leaders to move to balance 

several emerging security challenges.41 

The Iran-Iraq War left a lasting imprint on Iranian foreign policy that provided added impetus to violate the NPT. 

On one hand, Iraq’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear capability coupled with the US-led coalition’s apparent difficulty 
in dismantling the Iraqi program during and after Operation Desert Storm left the Iranians with little confidence in 

international collective security mechanisms. The conspicuous failure of the international community to act against 

Iraq’s overt use of chemical weapons in the war served as 

a catalyst for the Iranian chemical and biological weapons 

program.42 The net result of this unfortunate failure on the 

part of the international community was to convince the 

Iranians that they could not look to others for support or 

defense where weapons of mass destruction were concerned. On the other hand, Iranian leaders do not trust the 

international community to act in accord with their country’s interests. In other words, “The lessons of international sanctions imposed on Iran during the Iran-Iraq War 

suggest that self-reliance must be one of Iran’s long-term 

goals, if only to avoid future humiliations. This objective 

would entail increased domestic production of arms and 

support items and decreased dependency on foreign supplies.”43 Thus, the foreign policy legacy of the tragic war 

with Iraq was a strengthening of the Iranian’s leaders tendency to view themselves as martyrs in a global conflict between Islam and the rest of the world. 

Although the nuclear program’s details are difficult to 

discern, Iranian scientists apparently conduct research 

and weapons development at eight known facilities scattered throughout the country. Agreements signed with 

Russian officials in 1992 to provide two 440 megawatt reactors in 1992 form the foundation for current weapons 

research programs.44 Other countries, such as China, 

North Korea, France, Germany, and Great Britain, have 

contributed specific and dual-use technologies to the burgeoning Iranian nuclear capability.45 For such countries as 

China and North Korea, trade with Iran bolsters domestic 

arms industries and provides much-needed oil while simultaneously equipping an emerging counter to Western 

influence in the Middle East. Western countries acquire 

tangible foreign trade benefits coupled with increased access to Iranian oil and natural gas resources by dealing in 

the shadowy world of nuclear and dual-use technology 

trade. Between 1995 and 1997, the value of total arms deliveries of all types to Iran exceeded $1.5 billion with China 
and Russia leading all other nations at $725 million and 

$480 million respectively.46 

Ballistic missile technologies represent another important facet of the nascent Iranian nuclear weapons program. The inaccurate Scud B presently forms the backbone of Iran’s ballistic missile force. But Iran has made 

incremental improvements in the Scud’s accuracy and 

range while simultaneously moving to equip its forces with 

the Shahab 3, an indigenous variant of the North Korean 

Nodong (1,500 km) intermediate-range ballistic missile. 

The relationship with North Korea appears strong, thus, 

giving rise to fears that Iran could eventually acquire the 

3,000 km Taepo-Dong missile that could be modified to accommodate multistage boosters. Should this occur, the 

Iranians would be able to threaten most of Western Europe 

with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads.47 

Although the above facts certainly provide ample reason 

for US officials to express concern about the Iranian nuclear program, there also are reasons to be somewhat optimistic about US-Iranian relations in the near term. In the 

first place, the list of nuclear-capable suppliers who could 

rapidly accelerate Iran’s progress toward developing a nuclear bomb is relatively short. Such states as China and 

Russia would seriously jeopardize their relationship with 

the United States and its allies if they provided fissile material to the Islamic republic. International monitors have 

recently thwarted illicit attempts to supply Iran with such 

materials.48 

The Iraqi attempt to develop a Hiroshima-type atomic 

device could provide a reasonable yardstick against which 

to measure the likely timelines that would characterize the 

Iranian program. Beginning in the early 1970s, Saddam 

Hussein sponsored an all-out effort to produce a bomb— 

that effort has proved unsuccessful to date. Despite relatively loose controls on technology imports and dual-use 

policies, the Iraqi effort was still 8 to 12 months short of 

fielding its first atomic weapon when the Gulf War began 

in January 1991. The research and development effort behind Iraq’s program occurred with relatively few fiscal restrictions on procurement—a situation that does not prevail in present-day Iran. Moreover, during the Iran-Iraq 

War, the West (particularly the United States) viewed Iraq 
as an acceptable proxy in its efforts to contain the tide of 

Islamic fundamentalism that appeared to originate in the 

Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic republic. This proxy status 

eased many import restrictions, and Hussein’s nuclear scientists clearly turned it to their advantage.49 Iran does not 

enjoy such sponsorship for its research efforts. 

A final reason for optimism regarding Iran’s nuclear 

weapons research program lies within the Islamic republic’s borders. The Iran of the twenty-first century is not the 

Iran of 1979—or of 1989 for that matter. The wave of fundamentalism that swept the mullahs into power has somewhat subsided leaving Iranians yearning for better social 

and economic conditions. The landslide election of Khatami 

and his reelection indicate the degree to which the mullahs 

must pay attention to popular desires for reform. Khatami 

has made hesitant public overtures to the West in general 

and to the United States in particular. He treads a fine line, 

however, between loyalty to revolutionary principles and 

the mandate to ease Iran toward a more moderate form of 

Islamic republicanism. He addressed this issue before the 

Assembly of Experts on 4 February 1998 saying, “I have 

chosen elimination of tension as the core of our foreign 

policy. . . . Elimination of tension, however, does not mean 

giving up our principles . . . and forsaking our integrity and 

independence in return for such things as, for example, 

rapprochement with the United States.”50 Consequently, 

the United States should remain cautious regarding Iran’s 

nuclear weapons research programs. While Iran’s leaders 

will probably continue to pursue nuclear weapons and 

long-range missile programs to complement their robust 

chemical and biological programs, competing factions within 

the Islamic republic will likely delay progress toward developing a fully functioning nuclear device for several years. 

Implications for US Policy 

The hypothesis that describes the Iranian strategic culture as more akin to a rational state actor rather than as 

an irrational and unpredictable religiously fanatic state 

appears valid. This statement does not imply that a peculiar brand of Islamic fundamentalism has no bearing on 
Iranian governmental decisions regarding the utility of 

WMD. On the contrary, the power wielded by the clerics 

and Ayatollah Khamenei, in the proper religious context, 

could make a decision to launch chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attacks more likely. As discussed 

above, however, the Iranians appear to prefer to act 

covertly through surrogates to advance their Islamist 

agenda abroad while simultaneously preserving the territorial integrity of the Iranian state by adopting a strategic 

defensive posture.51 

Economic conditions within Iran appear to be the primary 

vehicle for encouraging or constraining moderate influences 

within the government. The economy’s overwhelming dependence on oil production for growth gives state competitors a significant lever to shape dialogue with the Islamic 

republic. Iran’s leaders are aware of this fundamental 

weakness and tend to resent the Gulf states and their trading partners when they enact policies that constrain the 

Iranian economy. Once again, the clerics tend to view their 

state’s economic weakness as an assault by the West 

against the revolutionary Islamic utopia. Therefore, the 

United States and its allies should use economic sanctions 

carefully with an understanding of the paranoia that 

haunts the powerful clergy—at any time, the imams could 

invoke jihad using covert WMD attacks against competitors to alleviate economic strains brought on by perceived 

Western intervention in the Iranian economy. 

Iran’s deteriorating conventional military capabilities 

tend to encourage WMD proliferation. The expense of creating indigenous conventional weapons industries within 

the context of a faltering economy has forced Iran to look 

to China, the former Soviet states, North Korea, and other 

proliferators to recapitalize its conventional force. Tactical 

and operational effectiveness, coupled with the relative 

ease of producing chemical and biological agents, has encouraged the Iranians to procure large stocks of unconventional weapons along with advanced missile technology 

for delivering them against strategic targets.52 As for nuclear and radiological weapons, the respect India and Pakistan gained after demonstrating their nuclear capabilities 

is unlikely to have escaped notice in Tehran. Although 

Iran’s normal military posture focuses on defense and de-
terrence, analysts do not discount the possibility that the 

Iranians would resort to WMD attacks should they perceive their deterrent posture as weakening. 

US policy makers should concentrate intelligencegathering efforts on emerging democratic movements 

within the Islamic republic. According to several reports, 

“There are growing signs that Iran may evolve a more tolerant approach to defining the Islamic state, one that emphasizes the humanitarian and moral strength of Islam, 

rather than the effort to force other nations into accepting 

its concept of repressive and outdated theological rules 

and social customs.”53 Ill-considered diplomatic initiatives 

based upon general perceptions of Iran as an “irrational 

and unpredictable” actor could reinforce conservative 

power at the expense of emerging moderate trends. This 

type of mistake could encourage Iran’s predilection toward 

WMD proliferation while simultaneously making their use 

more likely. 

While there are compelling reasons for US policy makers 

to look toward Iran with optimism, several realizations 

must take hold before relations between the two countries 

can thaw. In the first place, Iran will continue to pursue its 

revolutionary agenda to its logical conclusion. This pursuit 

will likely mean a continuation of the theocratic governmental model with its inherent conservatism and resistance to accommodation with the larger international community. This trend works at cross-purposes to traditional 

US preferences for rapid, decisive action in international 

affairs, but American policy makers must learn to distinguish between Iranian intransigence and the struggle 

within the governing community to reconcile religious 

principles with the demands of international and domestic 

affairs. For the present, US policy offers an olive branch to 

Tehran—but at arm’s length.54 

While the above mentioned trend may require more accommodation and patience from US policy makers than it 

does from Iranian leaders, Iran’s leaders must decisively 

abandon their historic support of radical Islamist and terrorist groups that threaten governments in the Middle 

East and elsewhere. The events of 11 September 2001 

have greatly stiffened US resolve to combat terrorism, especially state-sponsored terrorism. The State Department 
reported in April 2001, “Iran remained the most active 

state sponsor of terrorism in 2000. It provided increasing 

support to numerous terrorist groups, including the 

Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad (PIJ) which seek to undermine the Middle East peace 

negotiations through the use of terrorism.”55 Since 11 September, Iranian leaders have condemned the al-Qaedasponsored attacks against the United States, but they also 

leveled muted criticism at the US actions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. President Khatami’s policy of 

“eliminating tension without neglecting principles of the 

Revolution” must change substantially to reflect the new 

strategic circumstances of the ongoing war against terrorism if Iran is to realize détente with the United States.56 

US policy makers can encourage Iranian actions with regard to changing policies about terrorism by acknowledging 

the Islamic republic’s legitimate aspirations to regional leadership. Iran has the economic potential, geographic position, 

and a sense of cultural destiny to garner respect as a constructive regional power; however, such a position comes 

with responsibilities. Iranian leaders must acknowledge that 

their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and 

long-range missile technologies work at cross-purposes to 

their visions of regional leadership. International trends 

point to arms limitations as a preferred stabilizing mechanism that paves the way for economic and cultural development. Tehran’s efforts to acquire advanced weaponry while 

its economy declines and its people labor under high inflation rates makes little sense—especially in the context of a 

global economy that is projected to amplify differences between developed and undeveloped nations. 

Finally, Iran must adopt domestic policies that lead to 

social reform. With nearly 440,000 students enrolled in 

higher education, Iranian society is destined to undergo 

dramatic change. While the managers of the revolution in 

the post-Khomeini era are to be commended for promoting 

such high levels of education, they also must realize that 

education will cause their revolution to evolve in unforeseen ways. Rather than suppressing the exchange of ideas 

through surveillance, control of the media, secret police, 

and thinly veiled state-sponsored assassinations, Iran’s 

leaders should recognize the consensus that exists among 
their constituents for the theocratic form of government. 

As that government reconciles itself with the international 

system, the citizens can become a potent engine for social 

development, economic growth, and cultural advancement. 

This, after all, is the vision that President Khatami outlined for Iranian civilization.57 

Despite Khatami’s apparently contradictory call for easing tensions within a context of revolutionary independence, Iran’s leaders must take positive action to ease the 

suffering of their people. Gary Sick notes, “The demonstrations in Iran are not about clerical rule or a return to 

the monarchy or even about democracy and human rights. 

They are about quality of life, drinking water, inflation, 

housing, and jobs. The demonstrations are serious—not 

because they threaten to overturn the government, but because they force the government to confront its failure to 

keep promises and to deal with fundamental economic issues.”58 The emerging schism in Iranian domestic politics 

gives some observers reason to believe that a dialogue 

could evolve that would ultimately reverse Iran’s pursuit of 

nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration’s policy of 

treating Iran and Iraq as essentially twin sides of the same 

rogue-state coin under the rubric of dual containment has 

failed to make Iranian WMD programs more transparent. 

On the contrary, US officials know disturbingly little about 

the scope and progress of chemical, biological, and nuclear 

weapons research in the largest state in the Persian Gulf 

region. 

Even before Khatami’s rise to the presidency, analysts in 

the United States called for easing of the rhetoric and the 

tensions between Iran and the world’s remaining superpower. Kenneth Timmerman wrote as early as 1996, “Containment is no longer enough. Iran has been too successful in procuring nuclear weapons technologies, in spite of 

our entreaties to our allies. When we have been successful 

and have blocked a problematic sale, Iran has simply gone 

shopping in Russia, China, and India.”59 Some observers 

point to the fact that Iran boasts the only democratically 

elected government in the Persian Gulf region and that the 

Islamic republic enjoys broad support among its constituents. Those who adhere to this view suggest that 

using an approach similar to the one used to alter the di-
rection of North Korea’s nuclear program may provide a 

foundation for better US-Iranian relations while reducing 

the nuclear threat.60 Using this model, US leaders would 

no longer characterize Iran as a rogue state, but would recognize the legitimate right of the Iranian people to adopt a 

theocracy as their chosen form of government.61 

There are, however, several obstacles to the conciliatory 

approach. Iranian clerics and the Revolutionary Guards 

who control the WMD and missile programs will probably 

be reluctant to forgo the research and development 

progress achieved to date. In addition, the fiercely independent Iranian leaders will most likely refuse to submit to 

the invasive inspections that would be necessary to verify 

compliance with international demands to rollback nuclear research. Ideologically, the clerics continue to express support for radical Islamist movements throughout 

the Middle East. Western fear that Hizbollah or Hamas operatives could employ an Iranian nuclear or radiological 

device remain a powerful bargaining chip in the Iranian arsenal. The obvious advantage of such a tactic lies in the 

covert advancement of Iranian policies toward Israel or in 

the Persian Gulf. The events of 11 September also complicate matters as long as the United States identifies Iran as 

a state that sponsors global terrorism.62 Finally, US leaders must recognize the fundamental utility that Iran gains 

from possessing WMD—strategic advantage vis-à-vis its 

principal regional rival, Iraq. As long as Saddam Hussein, 

or leaders with his proclivities, rule in Iraq, Iran will pursue a security policy that includes aggressive pursuit of 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their associated delivery systems. 

By all accounts, the Iranian nuclear program is several 

years from producing its first practical weapon. The aggressive research programs that center on chemical, biological, and missile development more than compensate 

for the Islamic republic’s nascent capability in the nuclear 

arena. Iran’s central place, however, in the Persian Gulf 

and within the larger Islamic world will continue to draw 

US attention and efforts to ease the Islamic republic away 

from proliferation. While trust between the two governments remains low, US policy makers will have a difficult 

time gaining enough credible information with which to 
formulate effective strategies to mitigate the Iranian proliferation threat. The longer this process takes, the more difficult it will be to discover common interests upon which to 

thaw the cold war that has characterized US-Iranian relations since 1979. This should motivate US negotiators to 

move quickly and carefully to maintain an acceptable level 

of instability amid the tensions of Middle Eastern politics. 

Notes 

1. Michael Eisenstadt, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence: Iran (Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), 17. 

2. Rouhallah K. Ramazani, “Reflections on Iran’s Foreign Policy: 

Defining the ‘National Interests,’” in Iran at the Crossroads, eds. John L. 

Esposito and Rouhallah K. Ramazani (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 

3. A recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report contained the observation that “Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to 

acquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional 

weapons technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons—chemical, biological, and nuclear—and their delivery systems.” See Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Related to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (CIA, 

2001), n.p., on-line, Internet, 1 October 2001, available from http://www. 

cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm#1. 

4. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 

eds. Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (Albany, N.Y.: State 

University Press of New York, 1984), 2–6; I. P. Petrushevsky, Islam in Iran, 

trans. Hubert Evans (Albany, N.Y.: State University Press of New York, 

1985). 

5. Mehran Tamadonfar observes, “Muslims agree that the establishment of an Islamic state requires the implementation of Islamic principles 

and laws. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters developed doctrinal justifications for uncontested clerical rule to ensure political order 

and social conformity.” Mehran Tamadonfar, “Islam, Law, and Political 

Control in Contemporary Iran,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 

40, no. 2 (2001). 

6. John Esposito writes: “Iran’s export of revolution served as a catalyst in the emergence of Hizballah and Islamic Jihad in Lebanon; support 

for radical organizations and movements across the Muslim world resulted in kidnappings and hostage taking and contributed to uprisings 

and protest demonstrations in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. . . . Iran, in 

fact, proved more effective as a symbol and exemplar of revolution than 

an effective model.” John L. Esposito, “Introduction: From Khomeini to 

Khatami,” in Iran at the Crossroads, 1. 

7. Graham Fuller distinguishes between Islam (the religion) and Islamism (the radical philosophy that turns the tenets of Islam to political 
purposes). Graham E. Fuller, “Islamic Fundamentalism,” in Conflict after 

the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. 

Betts (New York: Macmillan, 1994). 

8. Cyrus Vakili-Zad notes that “the ideology of the revolution, and 

those who carried the heavy burden of often bloody confrontations with 

government troops, were, in general, religiously oriented and linked to 

traditional values from the rural past . . . the blueprint for future society 

was an Islamic Republic modeled on the one created by the Prophet 

Muhammad more that 1,400 years earlier.” Cyrus Vakili-Zad, “Continuity and Change: The Structure of Power in Iran,” in Modern Capitalism 

and Islamic Ideology in Iran, eds. Cyrus Bina and Hamid Zangeneh (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 29. 

9. Some principles of jihad will illustrate how compelling the doctrine 

is for motivating Iranian and militant Islamic soldiers. “People against 

whom jihad should be carried out are three categories: (1) Those who 

rebel against the Imam, (2) protected minorities such as Jews, Christians, 

and Zoroastrians, if they violate the conditions of protection; and (3) whoever is hostile, among the various kinds of unbelievers. The Muslims 

must bring all of these into submission, either by subjecting them or converting them to Islam. . . . It is permissible to fight the enemy by any 

means which will lead to victory.” S. H. Nasr, Dabashi, and S. V. R. Nasr, 

62. 

10. One obvious exception may be the struggles between Catholic and 

Protestant factions in Northern Ireland. If the infusion of leftist political 

ideology in the conflict between the parties had not occurred, the conflict 

in Ulster may have revolved solely around religious differences. 

11. Mehran Tamadonfar, The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership: 

Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Pragmatism, Westview special studies 

on the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 36. 

12. “The intense factional struggle that has come to characterize virtually all aspects of life in contemporary Iran has its roots in the ambitious proposition put forward at the birth of the Islamic Republic two 

decades ago—that it be both an Islamic state run by clerics and a republic ruled by popular consent. Failure to resolve this tension in a lasting 

and profound way had badly weakened the cohesion of the clerical class, 

undermined the legitimacy of the Islamic system, and left the state increasingly paralyzed in the face of mounting internal pressures.” Geneive 

Abdo, “Re-Thinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘Conversation’ with Ayatollah 

Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri’,” The Middle East Journal 55, no. 1 (2001). Olivier 

Roy writes, “What we are witnessing since Khatami’s election is the unfolding of a contradiction which already existed in the text of the Constitution: in a religious revolution such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution, 

the status and role of religion is nevertheless defined by political institutions, not religious ones. Politics rule over religion. The crisis of religious 

legitimacy is leading to the supremacy of politics, and subsequently to a 

de facto secularization. There is a growing tendency . . . to separate religion and politics, this time in order to save Islam from politics, and not, 

as was the case in most of the processes of secularization in Western Europe, to save politics from religion.” Olivier Roy, “The Crisis of Religious 

Legitimacy in Iran,” The Middle East Journal 53, no. 2 (1999). 
13. Iran, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s Information Group, Inc., 2000), 72. 

14. “By late 1987, the United States had some thirteen naval ships in 

the gulf, supported by another twelve to fifteen in the Gulf of Oman and 

a substantial allied force. American forces several times attacked small 

Irani ships. Iranian-laid naval mines posed the gravest threat to gulf shipping. On 18 April 1988, in retaliation for a mine attack on the frigate 

Samuel B. Roberts, the navy fought its largest surface action since World 

War II. Operation Praying Mantis destroyed two oil platforms, a frigate, a 

fast attack craft, and two armed speed boats.” Mark H. Lytle, “US Military Involvement in Iran,” in The Oxford Companion to American Military 

History, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1999). 

15. “In July 2000 amidst a heat wave that has seen water shortages 

and no improvements in living standards, thousands of protesters from 

poorer areas joined with prodemocracy students to demonstrate their 

frustration at the lack of political liberalization and harsh economic conditions. The protesters specifically singled out President Khatami for his 

inability to improve the plight of ordinary Iranians, but directed most of 

their anger at the conservatives who have stalled the president’s reforms. 

. . . Khatami warned his conservative opponents that the growing restlessness of the Iranian people could no longer be contained by force.” 

Iran, 51. 

16. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: 

Praeger, 1999), 3. 

17. Leaders in Tehran transported several casualties to Vienna for examinations by United Nations officials. UN investigators identified conclusive evidence that Iraq used mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun 

against Iranian troops in 1984. Investigators also alluded to evidence that 

some Iranian casualty patients may have suffered exposure to mycotoxins as well as mustard and nerve agents. The Iranian decision to pursue 

chemical and biological arsenals came as a result of the failure of the international community to act decisively on the evidence that stemmed 

from the casualty investigations. Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Goldblat, Chemical Warfare in the Iraq-Iran War, Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute, 1984, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2002, 

available from http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/factsheet-1984. 

html. 

18. “When the Shah relaxed censorship laws in 1977, Iran erupted 

into a series of demonstrations and dissents. There were two distinct revolutionary movements. The first was the religious movement headed by 

the ulama; this movement demanded the return to a society based on the 

Shari’ah and ulama administration. The second movement was a liberal 

movement that wanted Westernization, but also demanded greater 

democracy, economic freedom, and human rights. As the revolution proceeded, these two groups gradually merged to form a united front.” 

Richard Hooker, Shi’a: The Iranian Revolution, 1996, n.p., on-line, Internet, 18 January 2002, available from http://www.wsu.edu:8000/~dee/ 

shia/rev.htm. 
19. President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami observed, “For many centuries, we lived under regimes which drew their power and authority not 

from public support but from other sources and ruled over our people not 

by relying on public will and aspiration but on their own military might . . . 

and since they did not derive their authority from a popular basis, they 

felt no responsibility to people and had no need of their participation in 

running the country. . . . As a result of their revolution, our people managed to regain their highly constructive mood of building a civilization and 

culture.” Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: Religion, Culture, and Civilization, 1998, n.p., on-line, 

Internet, 9 December 2001, available from http://www.gov.ir/outlooks/ 

civiliz.htm. 

20. Iran. 

21. In an address to the Assembly of Experts in 1998, President 

Khatami made this observation: “We must undertake fundamental rebuilding of this country so that there will be neither inflation and high 

prices, nor unemployment and underemployment in the long run, instead 

of merely administering short-term ‘sedatives’ to our economy. We are 

currently examining our state-owned companies to decide which are essential and vital for the economy and should, therefore, remain under 

government control and which can be turned over to the private sector.” 

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mohammad 

Khatami: Economic Problems, 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 December 

2001, available from http://www.gov.ir/outlooks/economic.htm. 

22. Department of State, Background Note: Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2002, available from 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid=5314. 

23. Iran, 142. 

24. Patrick Clawson documents recent efforts to tap the oil reserves 

in the Caucasus region via a pipeline that terminates along the Caspian 

Sea. If such measures prove successful, isolated states like Iran could be 

forced to take drastic action to avoid social and economic catastrophe. 

Patrick L. Clawson, “Oil Resources: Markets, Politics, and Policies,” in The 

Global Century: Globalization and National Security, eds. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 

[NDU] Press, 2001). 

25. Iran. 

26. Cordesman, 269. 

27. Anwar Iqbal, Iran Seeks Weapons of Mass Destruction, United Press 

International (UPI), 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2002, available 

from http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?storyid=09012002-035338-8224r. 

28. Efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities date back to the shah’s 

regime. The Islamic republic has continued and expanded efforts to procure nuclear weapons technology and delivery vehicles. Gregory F. Giles, 

“The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, 

Biological, and Chemical Weapons, eds. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, 

and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); “Proliferation: Threat and Response” (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, 1996), Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 
Technology Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 

29. “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” 17; “Special: A Bigger Punch,” 

The Economist 359, no. 8223 (2001). 

30. Iran, 80. 

31. The first allegation of chemical weapons use by Iraq against Iranian troops occurred in November 1980, approximately two months after 

the war began. By the war’s end—in 1988—an estimated 5 percent of 

Iranian casualties resulted from chemical weapons attacks. Jeffery K. 

Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. 

Frederick R. Siddell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army 

Medical Center, 1997). 

32. Iran, 101. 

33. Ramazani, 223. 

34. Cordesman, 357. 

35. Department of Defense analysts conclude, “Iran is seeking fissile 

material and technology for weapons development through an elaborate 

system of military and civilian organizations. . . . Iran’s success in achieving a nuclear capability will depend, to a large degree, on the supply policies of Russia and China or on Iran’s successful illicit acquisition of adequate quantities of weapons-useable fissile material.” “Proliferation: 

Threat and Response.” Barry Schneider writes, “In the mid-1990s, CIA officials in public testimony estimated Iranian production of a nuclear 

weapon to be ‘unlikely before the end of the decade without foreign assistance.’ ” Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation: US 

Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 

1999), 32. Geoffrey Kemp also reports, “CIA director James Woolsey said 

on 23 September 1994 that ‘Iran is 8–10 years away from building such 

weapons and that help from the outside would be critical in reaching that 

timetable.’ ” Geoffrey Kemp, “Assessing the Iranian Threat,” in Fighting 

Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, ed. Henry Sokolski (Maxwell 

Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 217. See also 

Cordesman; Paula A. DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian 

Use of NBC Weapons (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1997); and Giles. 

36. Gregory Giles writes, “In 1979, Iran had no offensive or defensive 

chemical warfare program to speak of and no biological warfare program. 

As a part of the civilian nuclear program, however, the Shah had undertaken nuclear weapons-related research, including paper and computer 

studies.” Giles, 81. 

37. Shahram Chubin, “The Persian Gulf: Security, Politics, and 

Order,” in The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, eds. 

Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 

2001), 931. 

38. “Given the limitations of Iran’s conventional forces . . . efforts to 

acquire weapons of mass destruction are probably the most threatening 

aspect of Iran’s present and future military capabilities.” Cordesman, 

222. 

39. Eisenstadt, 12. 
40. Iranian leaders take issue with the structure and terms of the 

NPT. “Underlying Iran’s resentment, however, is a simple fact; NPT is a 

discriminatory treaty, with two classes of states. Unlike other multilateral 

arms control conventions such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, 

where all states are prohibited a category of weapons—in NPT—states are 

given different rights and privileges. NPT is an unequal treaty that also is 

selectively enforced and adhered to. Iran, as a revolutionary state, would 

not have adhered to the treaty if it had not inherited membership. A nationalist Iran will find the inequality of the treaty and double standards it 

implies no less chafing.” Chubin, 941. 

41. Iran, 106. 

42. “The weak international response to Iraqi violations of the Geneva 

Protocols greatly disappointed Iran’s leaders and encouraged Tehran to 

consider military responses. . . . The mullahs even reversed themselves 

and began to resurrect Iran’s nuclear program. . . . As the war dragged 

on, Iran increasingly fulfilled realist expectations by developing its own 

nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry capabilities to offset those of 

Iraq.” Giles, 82. 

43. Kemp, 215. 

44. The eight facilities are located at Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Darkhovin, Gorgan, Isfahan, Banab, Qazvin, and Yazd. Disturbingly, Iran has 

indigenous sources of uranium ore thus dramatically simplifying the 

weapon construction equation. Iran, 105. 

45. “Since 1982, Germans have sold on average $2.5 billion worth of 

high technology goods to Iran. What they have gotten in return is a wellfunded Iranian intelligence network implanted on German soil, infiltrating the Muslim immigrant population, assassinating Iranian opposition 

figures in public restaurants, and using private German airports and 

German front companies to purchase technology so sensitive for the Iranian nuclear weapons program that even the German government would 

not authorize its sale to Iran.” Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Opportunities for 

Change in Iran,” in Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, 

ed. Henry Sokolski (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 231. 

46. Iran, 136. 

47. “After over 25 years of rocketry research, Iran has a considerable 

technical endowment. The essential equipment to create long-range missiles of mid- to late 1950s vintage appears to be largely in hand. If Iran 

decides to give the program higher national priority, making the leap from 

dabbler to a determined proliferator, it could have a long-range system 

sufficiently advanced for flight testing to begin within two years, although 

key technologies still would have to be mastered. The pacing technology 

no longer appears to be propulsion or guidance. It is more likely to be 

warheads and re-entry vehicles.” Iqbal, Iran Seeks Weapons of Mass Destruction. Ibqal, see also “Proliferation: Threat and Response.” 

48. The editors of Jane’s Security Sentinel write, on 5 July 2000, “Security forces in Kazakhstan detained three people who were allegedly 

smuggling un-enriched Uranium 235. Moscow’s NTV reported that it was 

believed that the substance was en route to Afghanistan and then to Iran. 

There were previous reports of uranium allegedly bound for Iran being intercepted. It was claimed that such seizures were made in Georgia in 
April 2000 and September 1999. In early April 2000 Uzbek customs officers seized a cargo of radioactive materials in an Iranian truck driven by 

an Iranian citizen.” Iran, 105. See also, “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” 34–36. 

49. For a riveting account of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program see, 

Khidhir Hamza, Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the 

Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner, 2000). 

50. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: International and Regional Issues, 1998, n.p., on-line, 

Internet, 9 December 2001, available from http://www.gov.ir/outlooks/ 

issuse.htm. 

51. “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000. 

Its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MIOS) continued to be involved in the planning and execution of 

terrorist acts and continued to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.” Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2001, n.p., 

on-line, Internet, 18 September 2001 available from http://www.state. 

gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000. 

52. Jane’s Security Sentinel includes this assessment: “The U.S. 

claims that Iran already has stocks of up to 2,000 tons of chemical 

weapons which include choking, blister, and blood agents. . . . What evidence is available suggests that Tehran has taken the decision to concentrate its available resources on WMD rather than conventional military programs.” Iran, 107. 

53. Cordesman, 1. 

54. “The U.S. believes that normal relations are impossible until 

Iran’s behavior changes. However, the United States has offered to enter 

into dialogue with authorized representatives of the Iranian Government 

without preconditions. The Iranian Government has not accepted this 

offer. The United States has made clear that it does not seek to overthrow 

the Iranian Government but will continue to pressure Iran to change its 

behavior.” Department of State, Background Note: Iran. 

55. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000. 

56. Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: International and Regional Issues. 

57. Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: Religion, Culture, and Civilization. 

58. Gary Sick, “The Stalemate in US-Iran Relations,” in Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, ed. Henry Sokolski (Maxwell 

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 243. 

59. Timmerman, 232–33. 

60. “Denial and punishment strategies do not deal with the motives of 

these states. A policy based more on the North Korean model of mixing 

inducements with deterrence might lead to better technology offered with 

the degree of transparency the target state accepted may be more productive. Thus, the United States should consider offering Iran appropriate nuclear technology in exchange for increased transparency.” Chubin, 

945–46. 
61. Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 

2000), 189–92. 

62. The continuing existence of Israel remains the central issue for 

Iranian support of terrorist groups. According to the State Department, 

“Iran’s involvement in terrorist-related activities remained focused on 

support for groups opposed to Israel and peace between Israel and its 

neighbors. Statements by Iran’s leaders demonstrated Iran’s unrelenting 

hostility to Israel. Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to refer to Israel 

as a ‘cancerous tumor’ that must be removed; President Khatami, labeling Israel an ‘illegal entity,’ called for sanctions against Israel during the 

intifadah; and Expediency Council Secretary (MOSEN) Rezai said, ‘Iran 

will continue its campaign against Zionism until Israel is completely eradicated.’ Iran has long provided Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and 

Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC—with varying amounts of funding, safe haven, 

training, and weapons. This activity continued at its already high levels 

following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May and during the intifadah in the fall. Iran continued to encourage Hizballah and 

the Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their 

activities against Israel. Iran also provided a lower level of support—including funding, training, and logistics assistance—to extremist groups 

in the Gulf, Africa, Turkey, and Central Asia.” Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000. 
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