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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STANLEY A. SANSONE )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02470 (UNA)

)

UNITED STATES PATENT )

AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, et al., ) 

)

) 

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF 

No. 1, amended complaint, ECF No. 3, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

ECF No. 2. The Court will grant the in forma pauperis application and dismiss the case for the 

reasons explained below. 

Plaintiff, a resident of Houston, Texas, has filed a complaint against the United States 

Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and the USPTO’s Director. He seeks reexamination of 

a final decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) that affirmed the USPTO’s denial 

of Plaintiff’s petition seeking patentability on his invention. He also seeks damages arising from 

that denial.

First, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff has two available 

avenues to challenge a PTAB decision; he may either appeal the decision directly to the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit under 35 U.S.C. § 141, or he may file a civil action 

to obtain a patent in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, under 35 

U.S.C. § 145. Plaintiff has no recourse in this Court. 
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Second, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages, he has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff 

fundamentally predicates his claim for damages on criminal statutes, namely, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–

242, 2387. However, bare federal criminal statutes, such as those, “have no corresponding private 

right of action.” Wiggins v. Philip Morris, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 458, 466 (D.D.C. 1994) (collecting 

cases); see Crosby v. Catret, 308 Fed. Appx. 453, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (no private 

right of action under §§ 241–242); Johnson v. D.C. Crim. Just. Act, 305 Fed. Appx. 662, 662 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (same); Brooks v. Army 1st Operations Comm., No. 23-cv-00189, 2023 

WL 1963891, at 1 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2023) (same) (collecting cases); Mirarchi v. Exec. Branch of 

Gov’t, 2023 WL 5598454, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2023) (no private right of action under § 2387)

(collecting cases including Barrett v. Biden, No. 22-2823, 2022 WL 16528195, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 

25, 2022); Prunte v. Univ. Music Grp., 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007)). Even if those 

statutes provided a cause of action, they bear no relevance to the facts giving rise to this case. 

Finally, Plaintiff broadly alleges that the USPTO violated his due process rights under the 

14th Amendment by repeatedly rejecting his application, which he contends contravenes the

“special status” originally afforded his application by the agency. Put simply, Plaintiff fails to 

articulate adequately the deprivation of a protected right. “Events may not have unfolded as 

Plaintiff wished, but his dissatisfaction . . . [does] not form a basis for a due process violation.”

Melton v. District of Columbia, 85 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015). “[F]ederal court 

jurisdiction must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly. The mere suggestion of a federal 

question is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of federal courts.” Johnson v. Robinson, 576 

F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per 

curiam)). Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to federal government, its 

agencies, or its officials. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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For all of these reasons, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. A separate order 

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: October 25, 2023 ___________________________

 JIA M. COBB 

 United States District Judge