alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 219.117 Documentation of informed consent. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, informed consent shall be documented by the use of a written informed consent form approved by the IRB and signed (including in an electronic format) by the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. A written copy shall be given to the person signing the informed consent form.
( b ) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, the informed consent form may be either of the following: ( 1 ) A written informed consent form that meets the requirements of § 219.116. The investigator shall give either the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative adequate opportunity to read the informed consent form before it is signed; alternatively, this form may be read to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative.
( 2 ) A short form written informed consent form stating that the elements of informed consent required by § 219.116 have been presented orally to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative, and that the key information required by § 219.116(a)(5)(i) was presented first to the subject, before other information, if any, was provided. The IRB shall approve a written summary of what is to be said to the subject or the legally authorized representative. When this method is used, there shall be a witness to the oral presentation. Only the short form itself is to be signed by the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. However, the witness shall sign both the short form and a copy of the summary, and the person actually obtaining consent shall sign a copy of the summary. A copy of the summary shall be given to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative, in addition to a copy of the short form.
( c ) ( 1 ) An IRB may waive the requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed informed consent form for some or all subjects if it finds any of the following: ( i ) That the only record linking the subject and the research would be the informed consent form and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality. Each subject (or legally authorized representative) will be asked whether the subject wants documentation linking the subject with the research, and the subject's wishes will govern;
( ii ) That the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context; or
( iii ) If the subjects or legally authorized representatives are members of a distinct cultural group or community in which signing forms is not the norm, that the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and provided there is an appropriate alternative mechanism for documenting that informed consent was obtained.
( 2 ) In cases in which the documentation requirement is waived, the IRB may require the investigator to provide subjects or legally authorized representatives with a written statement regarding the research.
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under Control Number 0990-0260)
<PAGE>

Exhibit 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Christopher J. Dyball, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of LaserCard Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

        (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

        (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

        (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors:

        (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

        (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.

Date: November 8, 2004

/s/ Christopher J. Dyball
-------------------------
Christopher J. Dyball
Co-Chief Executive Officer


                                       37
#### § 1660.5 Responsibilities—the Selective Service System General Counsel.

The SSS GC has overall responsibility for the policy in this part, oversees the implementation of its procedures throughout the SSS, and provides supplemental guidance as appropriate.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6810

GREGORY ROLAND PRUESS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (CR-97-300; CA-01-59-5)

Submitted: December 16, 2004 Decided: December 21, 2004

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gregory Roland Pruess, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer Marie Hoefling,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Gregory Roland Pruess seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration of its order

denying Pruess’ motion for relief filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a

§ 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent a “substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,

683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and

conclude that Pruess has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny Pruess’ motion for remand, deny a certificate

of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 249 (Tuesday, December 29, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Page 85656]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-28741]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4559-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2020-0001]


Louisiana; Amendment No. 10 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Louisiana (FEMA-4559-DR), dated August 28, 2020, and 
related determinations.

DATES: This amendment was issued September 16, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dean Webster, Office of Response and 
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW, 
Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Louisiana is hereby amended to include the following 
areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by 
the event declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration 
of August 28, 2020.

    Claiborne Parish for debris removal [Category A] (already 
designated for emergency protective measures [Category B], including 
direct federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program).
    La Salle and Ouachita Parishes for debris removal [Category A] 
(already designated for Individual Assistance and assistance for 
emergency protective measures [Category B], including direct federal 
assistance, under the Public Assistance program).

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community 
Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 
97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment 
Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, 
Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In 
Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially 
Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing Operations for 
Individuals and Households; 97.050 Presidentially Declared Disaster 
Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other Needs; 97.036, 
Disaster Grants--Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared 
Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Pete Gaynor,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2020-28741 Filed 12-28-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 20-1664

___________________________ 

United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Antonio Escobar

 Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

____________ 

Submitted: November 30, 2020

 Filed: December 3, 2020

[Unpublished]

____________ 

Before BENTON, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Antonio Escobar appeals after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of 

a firearm. The district court1 sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(ACCA) to 180 months in prison. 

1

The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Arkansas.
- 2 -

Counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and filed a brief under Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Escobar’s prior drug convictions do 

not qualify as predicate offenses for purposes of the ACCA, and that the sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. This court concludes that the district court did not 

plainly err in sentencing Escobar as an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e) (felon in possession who has three previous convictions for “serious drug 

offense” shall be imprisoned not less than 15 years); United States v. Coleman, 918 

F.3d 592, 593 (8th Cir. 2019) (standard of review); United States v. Winston, 850 

F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 2017) (to demonstrate plain error defendant must show (1) 

error, (2) that is clear or obvious under current law, (3) which affected his substantial 

rights, and (4) seriously affects fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings). The sentence is not substantively unreasonable because the record 

reflects that the district court properly considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a), and imposed the statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. 

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (abuse of discretion occurs 

when court fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight to improper or 

irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factor);

United States v. St. Claire, 831 F.3d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 2016) (within-Guidelines 

sentence is accorded presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal); United 

States v. Woods, 717 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2013) (statutory minimum sentence was 

not substantively unreasonable). This court has independently reviewed the record 

under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and found no other nonfrivolous issues 

for appeal. 

The judgment is affirmed. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. 

______________________________
1 The legislative history discussed in Judge Hill's

dissenting opinion does not cast such doubt. Although a Senate

conference report does state, "It is the intent of the conferees

that any State law regulating the political activities of State and

local officers and employees is not preempted or superseded by the

amendments to [the FECA]," S. Conf. Rep. No. 1237, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5618, 5669, it is

clear that this statement was aimed at preserving the so-called

"little Hatch acts" of the states, not at permitting direct

regulation of the activities of federal candidates. See Weber v.

Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 876-77 (8th Cir. 1993) (overturning state law

creating monetary incentives for federal candidates to limit

campaign expenditures); Reeder v. Kansas City Bd. of Police

Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 543, 545-46 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding a "little

Hatch act").

CARNES, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the Court's holding that O.C.G.A. § 21-5-35, which

has the effect of limiting the time for making contributions to

some candidates for federal office, is preempted by the Federal

Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. ("FECA"). However,

I would base that conclusion upon the express language of the

preemption clause in the act, 2 U.S.C. § 453, which states

unambiguously that the provisions of the act and rules prescribed

under it, "supersede and preempt any provision of State law with

respect to election to Federal office." (emphasis added) A state

law regulating the time in which a category of citizens can accept

contributions to run for election to federal office is a "State law

with respect to election to Federal office." It is as simple as

that. Moreover, nothing in either the legislative history of the

act or in the rules and regulations adopted by the Federal Election

Commission casts any doubt upon the clear and manifest preemptive

purpose of Congress as plainly stated in the act itself.1

 

The discussion in Judge Kravitch's opinion about the deference

that might be due the Commission's regulations and advisory
2

opinions if there were any ambiguity in FECA's preemption language

is, in my view, unnecessary to proper decision of this appeal,

because there is no ambiguity in the statutory language.

Accordingly, while I agree that FECA preempts O.C.G.A. § 21-5-35,

I do not join the part of Judge Kravitch's opinion that discusses

the effect of the Federal Election Commission's regulations and

advisory opinions.
### New Peer Review Record Comment for Entry **New Peer Review Record Comment for Entry 245551**  **, Document PEER** 

**Document PEER Document PEER**  **REVIEW PLAN REVIEW PLAN** 

**245551 .**  **PDF Sci-**  **Inv -**  **HISA -**  **ISI -**  **Public -**  **Comments Comments**  **Comments 08/19/2012 05:35 PM**  **To: Stan Barone, Sci-Inv-HISA-ISI-Public-Comments**  A new comment has been added to record number 24555 1, document title PEER REVIEW PLAN 245551.PDF. Name: Tom Neltner Email Address: tneltner@pewtrusts.org Affiliation: Pew Health Group Comment: Please include in the risk assessment for Trichloroethylene that it is allowed to be used in food packaging at 21 CFR 172.560, 173.290, 175.105, 177.1960, and 73.345.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.1*


Section 1350 Certification


        We, Christopher J. Dyball and Richard M. Haddock, the co-chief executive
officers of LaserCard Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Company"),
certify pursuant to section 1350 of chapter 63 of title 18 of the United States
Code that, to our knowledge:

        (i)     the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period
ending September 30, 2004 (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements
of section 13(a) or 15(d), whichever is applicable, of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and

        (ii)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date: November 8, 2004


/s/ Christopher J. Dyball          /s/ Richard M. Haddock
-------------------------------    ----------------------
Christopher J. Dyball              Richard M. Haddock


-----------------------

*       The material contained in this Exhibit 32.2 is not deemed "filed" with
the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the
Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
whether made before or after the date hereof and irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.


                                       40
#### STIASNY v. METROPOLITAN ST. R. CO.

(Supreme. Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

January 16, 1903.)

Action by Caroline Stiasny against the Metropolitan Street Railroad Company.

No opinion. Motion denied, with $10 costs.
IV 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 1023 

Requiring Members of the House of Representatives to serve one shift in 

a passenger seat of a law enforcement vehicle observing the work day 

of a local law enforcement officer once during each term as a Member 

of the House, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 20, 2024 

Ms. CRAIG submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on House Administration 

RESOLUTION 

Requiring Members of the House of Representatives to serve 

one shift in a passenger seat of a law enforcement vehicle 

observing the work day of a local law enforcement officer 

once during each term as a Member of the House, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

3 This resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Ride-Along Res4 olution’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HRES 1023 IH 

1 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF 

2 REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN ONE 

3 RIDE-ALONG DURING EACH TERM OF CON4 GRESS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Each Member of the House of 

6 Representatives shall participate in one ride-along in the 

7 respective congressional district of the Member once dur8 ing each term as a Member of the House. 

9 (b) REGULATIONS.—The Committee on House Ad10 ministration shall promulgate regulations to carry out this 

11 resolution. 

12 (c) VIOLATION.—If the Committee on Ethics deter13 mines that a Member has not satisfied the requirement 

14 under subsection (a) by the deadline described in such 

15 subsection, the Committee shall— 

16 (1) publish the name of the Member on a read17 ily available, public list on the website of the Com18 mittee that identifies Members who have not satis19 fied such requirement; and 

20 (2) cause to be published in the Congressional 

21 Record information with respect to the failure of the 

22 Member to satisfy such requirement. 

23 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

24 (1) RIDE-ALONG.—The term ‘‘ride-along’’ 

25 means an arrangement for a Member of the House 

26 of Representatives to serve one shift in a passenger 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HRES 1023 IH 

1 seat of a law enforcement vehicle observing the work 

2 day of a local law enforcement officer in the respec3 tive congressional district of such Member. 

4 (2) MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA5 TIVES.—The term ‘‘Member of the House of Rep6 resentatives’’ includes a Delegate or Resident Com7 missioner to the Congress. 

8 (e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall apply with 

9 respect to the One Hundred Eighteenth Congress and 

10 each succeeding Congress. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### § 2400.41 Office Review Committee.

The Office of Science and Technology Policy Review Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Office Review Committee) is hereby established and will be responsible for the continuing review of the administration of this Regulation with respect to the classification and declassification of information or material originated or held by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Office Review Committee shall be composed of the Executive Director who shall serve as chairperson, the Assistant Director for National Security & Space, and the Security Officer.
#### In the Matter of Louis A. Bezio, Appellant, v. Lester W. Berglund, as Judge of the City Court of the City of Jamestown, et al., Respondents.

Order unanimously reversed, without costs of this appeal to any party, and motion granted. Memorandum: Petitioner seeks an order directing respondents to remove from the records of the City Court of Jamestown every entry which shows or supports a purported conviction of petitioner, on August 1, 1957, of the crime of driving while intoxicated. The petition alleges that no written information under oath charging petitioner with such crime “was made to or was before said City Court” at the time of the purported conviction. This allegation is not denied by answer or otherwise and thus stands admitted. Nor does the “ Traffic Docket ” of the court, on its face, refute that allegation. That *992being so the City Court had no jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment of conviction and. the record of such conviction is a nullity and must be expunged. *(People*v. *Hamm,*9 N Y 2d 5; *People*v. *Scott,*3 N Y 2d 148; *People*v. *Jacoby,*304 N. Y. 33; *People ex rel. Farley*v. *Crane,*94 App. Div. 397; *People ex rel. Davis*v. *Sheriff,*3 Misc 2d 231; *People*v. *Halling,*203 Misc. 428.) (Appeal from order of Chautauqua Supreme Court resettling a previous order denying petitioner’s application to correct Jamestown City Court records by removing therefrom a conviction for driving while intoxicated entered on a plea of guilty.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.