Taking Down Telecommunications 

by 

Gerald R. Hust, Major, USAF 

Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the 

School Of Advanced Airpower Studies, 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, For Completion 

of Graduation Requirements, Academic Year 1992-93. 

28 May 1993 
Disclaimer 

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the 

interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the 

official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government. 

ii
Contents 

Chapter Page 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

The Modern Communications System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 

Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

Quantification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 

3 DISABLING WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

History And Legal Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

Conventional And Disabling Kill Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 

Advantages/Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

4 GUIDANCE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 

Planning Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 

APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

iii
Abstract 

Information is one of the most, if not the most, essential elements of combat capability. 

Because telecommunications affects every aspect of a society, and is probably the most 

important medium which military information is exchanged, this thesis provides an 

understanding of the telecommunications system and how best to exploit it across the 

spectrum of conflict. I examine the system's vulnerabilities to both lethal and nonlethal 

attack mechanisms. While the ability to employ nonlethal technologies are currently 

limited, I recommend pursuing a strong research and development program to acquire 

this capability. The reason is that they provide additional policy options to deal with 

conflict, they are cheap, and because research may not only discover unanticipated 

capabilities for the US, but also identify countermeasures to protect our own systems. 

This thesis concludes by offering guidelines to help determine whether to exploit 

telecommunications with either lethal or nonlethal attack strategies. 

iv
About the Author 

Major Gerald R. Hust was commissioned from the United States Air Force Academy in 

1977. After completing Undergraduate Navigator Training, he accumulated 2300 hours 

in the F-111A, E, and F. In 1986, he completed a staff tour as a team member in the HQ 

USAFE Standardization and Evaluation Division. While on temporary duty at Taif Saudi 

Arabia, he flew 34 combat missions in support of Desert Storm. He graduated from Air 

Command and Staff College in 1992 and from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies 

in 1993. Currently, he is serving as an action officer in the J-5 Directorate at EUCOM, 

Stuttgart Germany. 

v
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

Of what use is any ultra-advanced weapon, or superbly armed combat unit without a means of communications 

to bring it into play at the right time and with the right objective.1

 

It is easy to find quotations that emphasize the importance and decisiveness of 

command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I). Although not a panacea 

target, communications is a target to be attacked or exploited, regardless of the type 

conflict. Our libraries contain abundant data on C3I and the structures supporting them. 

However, I challenge any reader to find information on how to target communications. 

There is simply little available, much less a single source document on the subject.2 It is

ironic that what allows a military to perform its mission is not seriously analyzed as a 

target set other than to categorically restate the obvious and say it is important and should 

be attacked.3 Also ironic is the fact that "the relationship between [communications and] 

military effectiveness is neither widely understood nor widely appreciated."4 

This thesis provides the campaign planner with an understanding of 

telecommunications and how best to attack them. I chose to examine 

telecommunications because it is the only form of communications that has the capacity 

to process the quantity of diverse information necessary to fight successfully against the 

US at the operational level of war. It permeates every face of society, thus allowing 

exploitation of information throughout the conflict spectrum at the tactical, operational, 

and strategic levels. Because of its data transfer capacity and its mobility, 

telecommunications continues to increase in importance as a medium to direct our 

national instruments of power. Conversely, we must strive to deny the enemy the use of 

their telecommunications. 

A complete analysis would separate communications into its two subsets, supply 

and demand. Demand investigates "why" we should attack communications. It defines 

1
the impact of attacking the information which passes within and between a nation's 

political elites, economic sectors, social groups, and military forces. Analyzing demand 

reveals the effects that exploiting information has on the above mentioned organizations, 

and ultimately measures the enemy's ability to wage war. This cause and effect 

relationship should answer questions such as: what political effects on government, 

psychological effects on population, or military effects on fielded forces occur from

exploiting communication systems. 

While understanding both supply and demand subsets is essential to fully exploit 

a communications system, this thesis will focus only on supply.5 Supply determines 

"how" to attack communications. It defines the medium in which information flows and 

the associated supporting hardware and software necessary to transmit and communicate 

on that particular medium. Generally, attacks on communications conjure up visions of 

destruction of a system with conventional weapons. In fact, much more is involved. One 

must analyze the system to determine its vulnerability to an attacker wishing to collect, 

disrupt, delay, deny, or distort information through the use of either lethal or nonlethal 

methods. It is this physical medium which contains the clues and provides the 

opportunities for us to achieve desired effects. 

I intend to provide a methodology which analyzes the telecommunications system

and then describe both conventional and nonlethal kill mechanisms available to attack it. 

I will then establish guidelines to which the planner may refer when analyzing system

vulnerabilities for the purpose of designing an attack plan against telecommunications. 

These guidelines will help select the appropriate weapon(s) to exploit each vulnerability. 

Chapter two provides an overview of telecommunication systems, vulnerabilities, 

and targeting options. By understanding the design of a generic telecommunication 

system, one develops a capability to analyze any system. The chapter offers one method 

to analyze a system's vulnerabilities and suggests several measures of effectiveness to 

2
quantify degradation. Once vulnerabilities are identified, targeting becomes a function of 

marrying objectives to weapons technologies to achieve those objectives. 

Chapter three will describe both conventional and nonlethal weapons 

technologies and their kill mechanisms. If one wants to fully exploit 

telecommunications, he must consider both lethal and nonlethal attacks. With an 

understanding of what nonlethal weapons actually are, their legal and technological 

roadblocks, and some of their advantages and disadvantages, the planner can better 

understand how to incorporate these mission-enhancing technologies into the guidelines 

presented in chapter four. 

Chapter four examines when a campaign planner should use nonlethal 

technologies. It also defines fourteen factors one must consider when deciding between 

using lethal or nonlethal weapons to attack telecommunications. Some of these factors 

include the quantity, quality, and type of intelligence available about a network, and what 

type delivery vehicle is available. These issues are valuable not only to war fighters and 

campaign planner, but also to those responsible for writing doctrine, procuring C3I 

systems, and developing force structure. 

Inherent in all force structures is the communications necessary to control them. 

Many consider communications the "most vital of all combat commodities."6 According 

to Soviet doctrine, loss of command and control at a critical moment has historically been 

one of the primary factors resulting in defeat.7 Therefore, we must first understand what 

a telecommunications system consists of and exploit its vulnerabilities. 

NOTES 1

Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York: McGraw Hill Book 

Company, 1982), 214. 

2The Air University Library has 926 references to either C3I or telecommunications. None outline a 

systematic approach to targeting telecommunications. Some studies and reports address survivability 

3
 issues such as vulnerability to EMP or lack of system redundancy, but none address the subject of 

targeting. 3Colonel John A. Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington D.C.: National Defense 

University Press, 1988), 56. In his book, Colonel Warden stated he found that ìno really good examples 

exist of successful theater attacks on just the communications part of the command system.î He reiterated 

this point in relation to Desert Storm in an interview I conducted with him in October 1992. 

4Paul B. Stares, Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security (Washington 

D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1991), 18. A recent War College research report helps describe the 

relationship between communications and military power. The report describes COGs as elements of

power which consist of three components: sources, linkages, and forces. Sources are singular substances 

which make up a society. They include elements such as technology, natural resources, social values, and 

the military. Force is the manifestation of these resources into instruments of power. Linkage is the 

conduit which metamorphizes the sources into force. Communications, therefore, is a link, not a center of 

gravity. While linkages possess no force in and of themselves, they ìcan possess either strength or 

vulnerability which can be exploited to disrupt a center of gravity.î Lt Col Pat A. Pentland, ìCenter of

Gravity Analysis and Chaos Theoryî (Unpublished Research Report, Air War College, Air University, 

Maxwell AFB Al, April 1993), 24. 

5Just as information on how to attack communications is sparse, so is that available for why to attack them. 

Page restrictions set on this thesis force deferment of a study of demand. However, the following 

describes what a full study of demand would entail: case studies should describe what effects can be 

achieved from exploiting communications between five categories. The categories include 

communications between governments, national political elites, political elites and the population, political 

elites and the military, military organizations, or a combination thereof. Each case should answer three 

questions. What were the desired effects, how were they achieved, and what were the results. The study

would conclude with an analysis of how, and under what conditions, attacking communications within 

categories degrade enemy military capability. 

6As quoted in Stares, 19. 

7Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union: Military Affairs, Tactics, 29 June 1988, JPRSUMA-88-008-L-1, 39. 

4
CHAPTER 2 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

Remove the communication links, and one is left with a collection of unconnected and therefore relatively 

useless items of equipment.

1

This chapter describes what a modern communications system consists of (to 

include future trends), identifies its vulnerabilities, outlines various methods to attack it, 

and provides measures of effectiveness for post attack analysis. This in-depth analysis is 

important because as force size, spatial dispersion, force complexity, combat tempo, and 

the need for continuous twenty-four hour operations increase, electro-mechanical devices 

"become virtually indispensable to the collection, processing, and dissemination of 

information."2 Late information, if only by seconds, can force an opponent into a reactive 

rather than proactive mode. Information dominance can act as a force equalizer for a 

weaker power, or enhance the capabilities of a stronger power. But, more importantly, it 

is critical when adversaries are closely matched, where just a slight differential of 

information between opponents may determine victory or defeat.3 In order to achieve 

information dominance, the military relies on technology. 

While technology is greatly expanding the sophistication and service level of 

telecommunications, it is also creating more vulnerabilities than ever before. To take 

advantage of these new vulnerabilities, intelligence organizations must collect 

information about a system's enabling software and provide feedback on the effects of 

attacks which leave no visible damage. It is obvious that absolute measurement of 

system degradation will be virtually impossible, but measurements of degradation "is too 

important to be ignored or classified as just another intangible factor, like morale."4 A

commander can at least estimate the impact of his efforts against the enemy if he knows 

how the overall communications system has been affected--especially at the operational 

level where coordination of forces occur.5 In order to better understand the result 

5
targeting a system has on the overall network, one must first understand how that system

functions. 

a. THE MODERN COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 

Many describe the telephone system as "the most complicated machine ever 

constructed by human beings...."6

 It combines physics, natural resources, and ingenuity 

into an unbelievably complex discipline called telephony. It should be no surprise that 

the average subscriber knows little about how telephony works. This lack of knowledge 

is not so much due to the subscriber's ignorance as it is to the telephone company's 

strategy to simplify the use of its service. Unfortunately, this strategy also affects those 

responsible for campaign planning. The following explanation of the modern 

communications system, although simplified, provides the planner the knowledge he 

needs to attack telecommunications. The best way to approach this task is to start with 

how a telephone call is routed to its destination. 

When telephones were first used, each subscriber had a direct line to another. 

However, as the number of subscribers increased, this method became costly and 

unmanageable. As Figure 1 shows, for everyone to have direct contact with every other 

user would require an enormous amount of wiring and switching capability. This type of 

system architecture provides a high degree of redundancy and survivability against 

physical attack, but is cost prohibitive and impossible to manage for large networks.7 For 

example, to connect the 600 million telephones of the world in this manner would require 

180,000,000,000,000,000 interconnections.8 To solve this dilemma, telecommunication 

companies began to route subscribers through switching stations. 

6
FIGURE 1 

Figure 2 illustrates how all subscribers can be connected to a central switching 

station.9

 This approach is an improvement over the direct line system, but several 

problems still exist. First, destruction of one central node could render the entire system

inoperative. Second, it requires a wire from each phone location to run the distance to 

the switching center. Third, the infrastructure necessary to connect 600 million wires 

converging from around the world would be unmanageable not to mention impossible to 

repair. 

FIGURE 2 

The most effective solution was a compromise between the two approaches. The 

solution incorporates both a series of switching facilities ranging from local, sector, 

7
regional, and international levels and amplifying stations to boost signal strength which 

attenuates between these switching facilities. With the exception of some future fiber 

optic systems, long distance calls require numerous remote or manned repeater or 

amplifying stations. The medium determines the distance between these stations. A 

metallic landline may require one every five miles while a fiber optic line may only 

require one every 40 miles. Generally, switching facilities are "the most critical elements 

in a telecommunications system. They are often highly automated, unmanned [or lightly 

manned], and remotely monitored."10 They also house a certain percentage of the 

amplifying capability and the multiplexing equipment which will be discussed later. 

The compromise thus works as follows: Connected to each subscriber phone box 

is a set of wires carrying the electricity, transmitting, and receiving capabilities necessary 

to communicate. The wires travel to a remote switching unit (RSU) which connects a 

small number of users in a local area (for example, telephone numbers assigned a 272- 

prefix). If a caller's destination is not within his RSU, his call is routed to a central office 

(or end office) where his call is transferred to any RSU within the central office's domain 

(usually within a city or perhaps a military base).11 If the destination is outside the 

central office's domain, the central office will transfer the call to a toll office where the 

call will then be switched to another central office, an RSU and then to an individual 

phone or data receiving device. For short distances, a call could be routed from the first 

toll office directly to another central office. For longer distances, the toll office may 

transfer the call through a sector, regional, or international switch and then reverse the 

process until the call reaches another central office. Figure 3 shows one routing option a 

call may take from San Francisco to England. 

8
FIGURE 3 

Cellular phones work in a similar fashion. When a subscriber makes a call, he 

sends out a radio signal to a remote receiver located in various regions. The receiver 

closest to the transmitting phone picks up the conversation and relays it, usually by 

landline, to the nearest central office. From there it follows the normal routing described 

above. Naturally, cellular phones , just as all mediums except for fiber optics, transmit 

signals vulnerable to SIGINT collection. 

Figure 4 illustrates the complex maze of a switching hierarchy.12 If one studies 

the connectivity in this figure, it becomes obvious how difficult it is to significantly 

degrade a system without a proper nodal analysis. There are an infinite number of ways a 

call can be routed when the preferred path is not available. With the advent of 

computerized switching technology, rerouting is almost instantaneous and is very 

9
effective at locating linkage between users. However, if access into the system is 

possible, a computer virus attack executed prior to, and in conjunction with, lethal attacks 

may provide a more uniform effect and a greater degree of total degradation. If a nodal 

analysis is not possible (as in a crisis situation requiring immediate action), virus attacks 

may be able to seek and then disrupt critical nodes not struck by conventional weapons. 

Beyond understanding communications nodes, one must also know how information is 

transmitted from one node to another. 

A telecommunication system passes information over three types of mediums. 

They include landlines, satellites, and radio/microwave relays. Currently all but 

landlines are very susceptible to signal intelligence collection. Recent developments in 

each of these mediums provide vast communicating capability. For example, in 1983 one 

coaxial cable provided a maximum capacity of 10,500 voice channels. In 1988, one fiber 

optic strand, ten times smaller in diameter than a human hair, could accommodate over 

40,000 channels simultaneously.13 The ability to achieve such tremendous 

communications capacity is a result of multiplexing--changing the frequency or 

alternating the timing of a signal transmission so that many signals can be transmitted on 

the same channel without interfering with each other. Without the ability to multiplex, 

even with extensive switching systems, "we would still require a large number of wires, 

one for each potential simultaneous conversation between two points."14 Multiplexing 

normally occurs at the switching office and is one of the most critical subcomponents of a 

telecommunications system. To continue the review of a telecommunications system, I 

now turn to the configuration of landlines, satellites, and radio/micro wave relays. 

 

10
FIGURE 4 

The diversity of mediums complicates the task of defining a system's architecture. 

The various mediums can be used in any combination between switching stations 

depending on a myriad of variables such as user's needs, terrain, security, and cost. 

Satellites and microwave/radio relays have the capability to bypass one or all switching 

stations. At one extreme, if a user is willing to pay the price, he can lease satellite 

channels and transmit and receive directly from desired locations, bypassing all stations 

or connecting to just the ones he specifies. The planner must also realize that adversaries 

have the ability to reconfigure their communications structure rapidly in response to 

destroyed nodes.15 This is especially true at the tactical level. At the operational or 

strategic levels, repairs of main switching stations become much more difficult, and 

therefore depend more on redundancy than repairability. 

The variables influencing the medium or combination of mediums in use also 

complicates target attack planning. Most phone calls within a country are normally 

routed via its civilian landline system because of the high channel capacity of fiber 

optics. However, a user may choose any medium he desires if he can afford it. For 

security reasons, someone like Saddam Hussein may wish to have an unswitched direct 

line, microwave, or satellite link from his bunker to various military headquarters, even 

within a local calling area. Mobile satellite, radio, or microwave systems further 

complicate the planning process. To insure a system of this complexity functions 

reliably, it must be resilient against attack. 

The entire telecommunications system incorporates self-protection and security 

devices such as surge inhibitors and encryption algorithms, and all have back-up power 

sources that continue to keep the system operating for indefinite time periods, even after 

destruction of the national power grid.16 Designers also ensure survivability in additional 

ways. They build in redundancy by laying back-up cables, duplicating management and 

control functions, hardening critical switching nodes, and providing alternate 

11
communication systems at critical nodes. Apart from physical protection, these back-up 

measures also enhance routing adaptability and provide excess capacity.17 As witnessed

in Dessert Storm, Iraqi command posts were buried 25 feet underground and many of the 

telephone and fiber optic cables were also buried, making them very difficult to attack.18 

Not only do these initiatives increase survivability against attack, they also complicate an 

intelligence unit's ability to locate them and analyze system capabilities. 

A lack of self-protection measures can jeopardize an entire operation. The 

primary maintenance and logistics network used in Desert Storm provides a good 

example of how US forces broke many of the rules of telecommunications survivability. 

Fortunately, we did not have to pay the consequences for these violations because the 

enemy was unable to attack Thumraite Oman located in the southern Arabian Peninsula. 

The US logistics system used in Desert Storm relied on a very fragile network dependent 

on two key nodes--one being centralized switching at Thumraite and the other being the 

satellite relay between Thumraite and the United States. A well placed bomb would have 

significantly disrupted the requisition and distribution of spare parts and other war 

material essential for maintaining high aircraft sortie rates. Figure 5 depicts how 

excessive centralization increases network vulnerability.19

12
FIGURE 5 

The Thumraite example, however, does not show the total vulnerability of

modern information systems, which are increasingly dependent on computerization and 

satellites. The trend to simplify information management combined with the desire to 

save money helps insure future telecommunication systems become even more dependent 

on computerization. This exposes communications software and electronic components 

to nonlethal technologies as though it were a crab striped of its shell. Four trends in 

particular already verify these new vulnerabilities. 

First, it is no longer necessary to depend on the slow mechanical switches used in 

analog systems. Computerization provides an exponential increase in capability through 

the use of digital technology. However, this increase in capability comes at the cost of 

network software vulnerabilities. Virtually every aspect of the telecommunications 

system depends on software--a vulnerability which future nonlethal technologies may 

easily exploit. Any nation wishing to compete on the modern battlefield must rely on 

digital communications software and hardware to achieve the data rates necessary to 

integrate complex war fighting systems. 

Computerization does enables one to disperse critical functions, but this entails 

higher costs due to the increased requirement for high-tech systems operators at different 

facilities. However, computerization also provides attractive cost savings through more 

efficient centralization. This is especially true of more sophisticated networks. Due to 

the complexity and expense of today's networks, management of the entire network 

becomes more critical, and more difficult. Ability to oversee the entire network in order 

to monitor and repair network functions becomes very costly. Figure 6 illustrates the 

most cost effective organization of the command and control function, but also the most 

vulnerable. If the regional management and control facilities cannot take over the central 

facility's duties after an attack, huge effects become possible from limited and insidious 

13
lethal and nonlethal attacks at lower levels. Any type attack then becomes more difficult 

to counteract. While centralization increases vulnerability to both lethal and nonlethal 

attacks, decentralization favors a nonlethal approach--a fact I will later demonstrate. 

FIGURE 6 

The second trend is that computerization may change the current organization of 

command and control: 

The rapid distribution of information and its effectiveness display will 

allow greater dispersion of the command and control function, which 

should increase their chances of survival. It will also allow a greater 

degree of flexibility in the composition of headquarters, so that they may 

be more responsive to changes in tasking.20

A recent paper distributed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense concluded 

that failures in "realizing the great increase in military effectiveness was not so much a 

case of the political and military leadership of a state ignoring technological change, as it 

14
was a failure to see and initiate new operational concepts and organizational 

innovation."21 The present military command system is centralized and vertical. As 

computerization provides the ability to maintain global data bases, command can become

decentralized and horizontal. As each headquarters acquires the ability to maintain 

similar data bases, redundancy of command and control increases and coordination 

requirements decrease. "Modern telecommunications and microcomputer technologies 

make possible distributed information processing which reduces dependence on a 

centralized capability."22 

One of the main benefits of decentralization appears in the composite wing 

concept. All headquarters has to do is give one order to the wing such as degrade X 

airfield by Y percent for Z days. Theoretically, the wing would have all the information 

available to achieve mission type orders rather than depend on a centralized headquarters 

to produce an Air Tasking Order, as in previous conflicts. A command structure such as 

this reduces mission complexity by saving time and minimizing coordination 

requirements. Figure 7 illustrates the current as well as future command structures.23 

Note in the figure on the right, each of the nine nodes maintains the global data base 

represented by "D". 

15
FIGURE 7 

However, while the redundancy of a global data base decreases vulnerabilities from

conventional attack, it alternatively subjects the entire global data base to nonlethal 

attacks. As more information is shared, connectivity between all nodes increases, thus 

providing an opportunity to exploit or degrade the entire system in a short period of time. 

The third trend is that modern militaries are becoming increasingly mobile and 

more dependent on information to operate their high-tech equipment. During Desert 

Storm, virtually every soldier had access to a GPS receiver. Satellite communications are 

becoming almost personalized, limited only by channel availability. As this trend 

continues, nonlethal technologies capable of exploiting satellites will become a valuable 

addition to anyone's arsenal. A current USAF initiative called "Reach Back" serves to 

illustrate future dependency on satellite systems. The purpose of Reach Back is to 

provide all the computing capability necessary to support a rapidly deployed Air Force 

without forward deploying the hardware. The intention is to maintain computers and 

data bases in one or two Stateside locations to perform computations. Then each 

deployed unit requiring access to the data base will "reach back" to the States via satellite 

communications.24

This program illustrates the trend towards dependency on satellite 

communications. Ironically, as the US military ties itself to the satellite tether, it also 

recognizes the inherent vulnerabilities of space assets. After the Gulf War, a DoD report 

to congress acknowledged that "most SATCOM was vulnerable to jamming, intercept, 

monitoring, and spoofing, had the enemy been able or chosen to do so."25 Additionally, 

policy makers are starting to take space campaigning more seriously. The new draft of 

the Air Force's space operations doctrine manual states: 

16
The space campaign will employ air, ground, naval, and space assets to 

delay, disrupt, deny or destroy threatening space systems, including up 

and down links; and TT&C nodes. These targets will be coordinated with 

all elements of the joint campaign plan to ensure space superiority. In 

many cases, the space campaign will precede air, land and naval 

campaigns since it makes our adversary 'deaf and blind' to other terrestrial 

operations. No precedents have yet been set concerning attacking an 

adversary's space capabilities...."26

Fourth, there is a significant trend towards the military depending on civilian 

systems for a greater percentage of their overall capability.27 This is due mostly to cost, 

and as perceived threats dissipate, the Congress is less likely to fund separate military 

communications projects such as MILSTAR. The US is not the only country faced with 

this potential problem. 

Even totalitarian countries depend heavily on civil systems. During the Gulf War, 

40 percent of the total Iraqi civil system was dedicated to military use.28 During the same

war, the US depended on civil systems for 24 percent of its satellite communications in 

and out of the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations.29 The move towards shared civil and 

military systems also increases potential vulnerabilities. Civil systems typically are less 

hardened and currently contain fewer encryption and self-protection capabilities than 

military systems. Whichever direction technologies take the development of 

communication systems, the potential for exploiting vulnerabilities will most likely 

increase. 

b. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 

The complexity of modern communication systems necessitates a thorough 

analysis to effectively attack it. This analysis requires a great deal of intelligence 

collection, therefore, it is critical to gather information on an enemy's communication 

systems well before hostilities. This will provide the time necessary to apply that 

information to an attack methodology. 

 The method this thesis uses is a modified open systems interconnection (OSI) 

framework. I chose this for two reasons. First, it separates a computerized 

17
telecommunications system into its component parts in order to isolate and identify 

vulnerabilities as they apply across the spectrum of the system's enabling software and 

hardware. Because of network computerization, exploiting telecommunications through 

its software will provide a valuable targeting option for the future. Besides voice 

transmissions, a telephone network must also transmit instructions for operating.30 The

OSI layers are where these instructions reside. The second reason for selecting the open 

systems interconnection methodology is that the International Standards Organization 

(ISO) recognizes the OSI architecture as the world's standard for development of future 

telecommunication systems. 

The OSI infrastructure currently consists of seven layers, each providing a 

specific service within the total system. As technologies improve, or additional services 

are desired, layers can be added to accommodate. The various layers and their functions 

follow:31

 

 1) Physical layer--the underlying information exchange medium and modulation 

technique. This layer deals mainly with voltage requirements, uni- or bi-directional 

capabilities, number of pins per connector, and purpose for each pin. 

 2) Data link layer--the software/hardware that insures access and acceptable error rate 

transmission of data bits across a single link in the network. This layer regulates the flow 

of information bits. In doing so, it insures the number of bits transmitted are also 

received. 

 3) Network layer--the algorithms resident in the network nodes which provide 

transport of data packets (A single unit of information, including data and control 

elements, that is passed between adjacent nodes) across the network, from originator to 

destination.32 This layer knows the topology of the system thereby chooses the most 

efficient routing of information to its destination. In doing so, it also controls congestion 

and connects multiple networks (inter networking). 

4) Transport layer--the algorithms responsible for establishment, maintenance, and 

detection of connections between users of the network. This layer in essence provides 

quality improvements in the network layer and enables error free transmissions between 

two different type systems. 

18
 5) Session layer--the algorithms which establish, maintain, and disconnect the user 

from the network. It also keeps track of whose turn it is to speak and provides 

synchronization to correct non-communication type errors. 

 6) Presentation layer--the algorithms related to information syntax (the resolution of 

syntax differences between users). This layer especially concerns itself with providing 

compatibility between various computer languages. It is also the easiest layer to induce 

encryption. 

 7) Application layer--the algorithms specific to the system being served, dealing with 

the semantic content of the information. It provides information to the user in a 

recognizable form, such as voice, E-Mail, text, etc. 

Ability to access the application level in order to manipulate information is the 

most difficult because it requires knowledge of all previous layers. Since the application 

layer contains the actual information the user receives, it is an ideal target for a 

misinformation campaign. By injecting false traffic into a system, an attacker can "dilute 

or destroy mission effectiveness."33 These types of attacks were successful in 

misvectoring attack aircraft during the Vietnam conflict.34 Ability to issue false orders or 

situation updates could be more serious. Fortitude, the Allied code name for the 

deception plan associated with Operation Overlord, documents the detrimental effects of 

false information can have on an enemy's ability to fight.35 The other six OSI layers 

control system functions. In other words, they specify the system protocols (rules which 

define how information is exchanged throughout the network). 

Falsifying information sent to the application layer can be diabolical and 

rewarding, while disruption of any of the other six layers can be fatal to the network. For 

example, if an enemy is able to gain access to the "network layer", he would be able to 

misroute information throughout the entire system. This tactic could serve several 

purposes. First, because the intended user never receives the information needed, it is as 

though the system was inoperable. Second, because numerous network subscribers will 

receive superfluous information, they waste time sorting out what they received and 

potentially enter a state of confusion as to what to do with the information. Third, 

continuous routing commands could lock up the system resulting in busy tones for all 

19
users or a crash of the entire system. The synergy of these type effects can devastate 

command and control. 

To complete the system analysis, three additional categories which address the 

actual physical properties of the system are added to the OSI layers. While the OSI 

layers define how the system operates and what services it provides, these additional 

categories define the physical properties of the system.

36 Together, the OSI layers and 

these three categories, provide the analyst the information he needs to decide whether to 

use lethal or non-lethal attacks on the system. The three categories include: 

 

 1) Network topology--physical layout of network nodes and links

 2) Physical placement of assets--location of all equipment and facilities in the network 

 3) Choice of equipment--digital verses analog, landline verses other mediums, etc. 

It is necessary to examine these three perspectives for they help identify system

vulnerabilities to physical attack.37 For example, "the placement of assets and back-up 

assets all within a single small vicinity could result in a physical attack removing all 

capability at a node."38

We can now visualize where the system's vulnerabilities may reside in each layer 

or category by comparing them to five perspectives common to telecommunication 

networks. The perspectives include:39

 

 1) Network configuration--physical properties of a network 

 2) Access--susceptibility to enemy access into the system

3) Protocols--once access is gained, how susceptible are the system's data transfer 

service, routing, flow control, etc. 

 4) Management and control--information concerning network ability to adapt to 

congestion, adaptive routing, etc. 

 5) Information--mission related information actually received by a user/decision 

maker

20
Figure 8 graphically depicts this complex relationship. For example, six of the OSI 

layers have protocols associated with them which may be vulnerable. It also shows that 

to affect the information perspective, one would have to successfully penetrate either the 

presentation or application layer. 

FIGURE 8 

To complete the vulnerability analysis, figure 9 indicates the analyst must ask 

four questions about each perspective to determine its vulnerabilities.40 First, how 

susceptible is a system architecture to interference. Second, to what extent can one 

intercept network information flow describing how the system works thereby gain the 

knowledge necessary to disrupt the network. Third, is it possible to gain access to the 

network to interfere with its functions. Fourth, is it feasible to attack the system (e.g. do 

the objectives of attacking or penetrating the system, or parts of it, justify dedicating the 

resources required to obtain those objectives). 

21
FIGURE 9 

The answer to each of these questions must be yes in order for a layer or category 

to be vulnerable to attack. In other words, if a layer is susceptible to an attack, but access 

cannot be gained, then that layer is theoretically not vulnerable. For example, to analyze 

the "network layer's" protocols, one would ask if they were susceptible, interceptible, 

accessible, and feasible to attack. The same four questions would be asked of each 

perspective. The following provides an example of what type question an analyst would 

ask relative to each perspective. (see appendix A for a complete list of questions):41 

 1) Configuration--Are there critical nodes the loss of which would inordinately 

degrade network performance?

2) Access--Can an adversary with adequate communications resources enter the 

network as though he were a friendly network node?

 3) Protocols--Can protocol parameters be altered resulting in network performance 

degradation?

 4) Management and control--Can an adversary induce deadlock by exhausting 

message buffer space at a node?

 5) Information-- can fictitious or corrupted user data be delivered over the network by 

a spoofer who has joined the network 

The above analysis, however, only addresses the systems owned by an adversary. 

There are some vulnerabilities which may require the cooperation of another 

nation in order to deny information to an adversary. For example, the satellite providing 

information to an enemy may belong to a neutral third party. This in fact occurs 

routinely in both civilian and military information systems. Russia openly advertises its 

satellite intelligence capabilities for the right price.42 These information sanctuaries were 

22
of a major concern to coalition forces during Desert Storm, and will present a greater 

problem in the future as information systems become more internationally dependent. 

At another extreme, the attacker himself may depend on the same satellite for the 

same information he wishes to deny to his enemy. Even US forces depended on other 

nations for information support during the Gulf War. Besides acquiring additional 

communications capabilities from coalition systems, the French SPOT satellite was 

critical in remapping Iraq and Kuwait. It should now be apparent that communication 

systems can be vulnerable in numerous ways. Once the campaign planner identifies 

these vulnerabilities, it is then time for him to target them. 

c. TARGETING 

When exploiting a telecommunications system, the campaign planner must 

choose one of three attack methods--physical, jamming, or spoofing. Figure 10 relates 

the OSI vulnerability analysis from the previous section to these type attacks. The figure 

shows that each perspective should be reviewed for vulnerabilities to each type attack.43 

For example, after completing the vulnerability analysis as explained in Figure 9, one 

would then proceed up the vertical scale to determine best/ alternative attack 

mechanisms. As one climbs the scale, the more sophisticated the information necessary 

to attack the brcomes. 

 

23
FIGURE 10 

Physical attack of the configuration is achieved by either conventional, nuclear, or 

non-lethal weapons (destructive non-lethal attacks may include EMP, high voltage surge 

weapons, etc.). The main consideration in physical attack is "the extent of damage which 

can be done to remote portions of the network from a localized attack."44 System

redundancy, centralization of key nodes, and hardness and location of those nodes will 

determine the resources required to obtain the desired system degradation from physical 

attack. Dispersal, hardening of key facilities, and rules of engagement all act to limit the 

effectiveness of conventional attack. For example: 

The fiber optic network Saddam Hussein used to communicate with his 

field commanders also included many switching stations (one of which 

was at the basement of the Ar-Rashid Hotel) and dozens of relay sites 

along the oil pipeline from Baghdad through Al-Basrah to the south of 

Iraq. However, hitting some of these targets was not desirable despite 

their military significance, because of possible collateral damage. 

Deciding to use physical force does not relinquish the requirements for detailed 

intelligence. If a system is quite sophisticated, it is important to know the location of key 

nodes and their back-ups. Even if the attacker has the necessary intelligence, he must be 

willing and able to expend the effort to attack the system, at the expense of other 

potential targets. A half hearted attempt may do little to degrade combat operations. If

the attacker: 

has (and is willing to expend) enough ordinance, he can destroy all of the 

network communications assets (provided he can find and target them, and 

render the communications network inoperable. Short of this extreme, 

however, there are two key questions which the topological susceptibility 

assessment must address relative to the threat of physical attack: 

24
 1) Are there any nodes that control the entire network. One must also look beyond 

the immediate network to see if there is a key node providing vital information to another 

network such as a weapon system. 

 

2) Is it possible to locate and prioritize these key nodes to insure maximum results 

from each bomb dropped.45

If the answer to these questions are uncertain or physical attack is not desirable, jamming 

or spoofing provide alternative attack options. 

Jamming "focuses resources on particular links, messages, or time periods in 

order to have increased effectiveness in disrupting the network as a whole."46 For

example, jamming of satellite downlink receptions may effect an isolated area of the 

battlefield, but jamming uplink reception at the satellite will uniformly effect the entire 

theater.47 If uplink jamming is not possible, jamming will be most effective when 

selecting a particular time and location to jam in order to achieve a specific objective. 

While jamming is usually understood to be the use of electronic interference projected at 

an electronic instrument such as a radio or radar dish, it can also be internal to the system

effecting each of the OSI levels by introducing failure mechanisms such as harmonic 

disturbances. For a more sophisticated and uniform effect, an attacker can turn to 

spoofing. 

Spoofing allows for "actual participation in the network by a sophisticated 

adversary, so as to disrupt communications by injecting false information into network 

control algorithms and protocols."48 Spoofing can either attack one of the OSI layers, or 

the software within a system dependent digital information. It can create significant 

defects in a system, some serious enough to collapse the entire system. If the attacker has 

an in-depth understanding of and access to the system, "full participation in the network 

activity" is possible.49 "With the ability to participate, he can accomplish such evils as 

withholding information, loading the network, [controlling satellite functions], or simply 

monitoring and controlling network traffic."50 Monitoring network traffic has the 

25
additional benefit of identifying the location of key enemy C3I nodes. One example of 

spoofing is infecting a network with a virus or a worm such as that which attacked the 

INTERNET system in 1988. 

 The INTERNET is an international network of 60,000 subscribers who share 

information for the purpose of research. The system consists of over one million host 

computers and at least 13 million E-Mail accounts. Although the virus did not attack 

network protocols, it did attempt to disrupt services and overload systems to cause lockup. And, while the virus did not spread outside of the INTERNET system, there were 

gateways to other networks. The military network (MILNET) and Defense Advanced 

Research Project Agency (DARPA) both shut down their access to INTERNET prior to 

being infected. Others not so lucky, such as MIT's Lincoln Laboratories were brought 

"to their knees" within twenty-four hours.51

 The virus spread via three different attack profiles so that if users discovered one, 

the other two could continue their mission. One profile had a very insidious side effect. 

It used the E-Mail service to enter the system. When discovered, the initial response to 

kill the virus was to cut off mail service, but this in fact allowed the virus to spread more 

rapidly because instructions could not be sent to users on how to destroy the virus. This 

allowed the other two attack profiles to continue throughout the system. The only fix 

was to shut down all computers until a team of America's brightest computer minds 

isolated and destroyed the virus. 

There are some valuable lessons from this incident. First, this virus was 

somewhat clumsy and unsophisticated but still took two days for some of the world's best 

computer analysts to recognize, then another two days to fix. Regardless of how wellspecified or reliable a system may be, software failures "can be extremely difficult to 

diagnose...."52 It is relatively easy to identify and repair an isolated node after physical 

damage. However, "when a software-based system is modified, the effect of the 

26
modification on the whole system must be considered," and even then, comprehending all 

possible effects may not be possible.53

The friction of war makes the situation even more detrimental. In the midst of

combat, identifying that a subtle software problem exists, then actually locating someone 

capable of repairing the malfunction could be a real challenge. This would especially 

affect a third-world country not having technically skilled indigenous personnel. 

Repairs requiring system shut-down would further complicate enemy military 

operations rendering the system de facto inoperative and temporarily accomplish the 

same objective as if 100 percent of the system was physically destroyed. Additionally, 

the effort spent trying to work with an unreliable system can create even more confusion. 

It is unlikely most militaries have the procedures to cope with an attack of this 

sophistication, and if they do, it is doubtful they have validated them through exercises. 

This is because exercises are costly and by practicing degraded communications 

procedures, commanders sacrifice combat operational training.54 A degraded system

dependent on inadequate reconstitution procedures would severely effect a commander's 

capability to function. 

Attacks become very insidious when one mixes lethal and nonlethal attacks. The 

synergistic effect of mixing lethal attacks and jamming (a form of nonlethal technology) 

have been well documented in attacks against air defense systems during the 1981 Israeli 

attack on the Bekaa Valley and the coalition attack on Iraq. An ability to employ 

nonlethal attacks could make lethal attacks even more effective and efficient--if not 

unnecessary in some circumstances. One example of employing both type weapons 

would be to initiate an attack with nonlethal technology in order to disrupt 

communications and associated functions dependent on the system attacked (such as an 

air defense system). Then, after verifying the desired degree of degradation, a lethal 

attack could commence. In any case, lethal attacks should accompany nonlethal attacks 

in order to mask a main attack on the OSI layers. By doing so, repairs are focused on the 

27
physical damage thereby delaying repairs to the real problem. This leads to further 

confusion and immanently, command paralysis. 

It is possible for the command and control to enter an infinitely increasing 

destructive loop as shown in figure 11 (the trinity of communications targeting). As 

chaos theory predicts "small changes in the definition of a system design may result in a 

very large and unpredictable change in the system vulnerability."55 In addition, changes 

in the network may transform initial susceptibilities into other types.56 As this occurs we

penetrate an adversary's command and control loop and ultimately his ability to 

comprehend or react to problems. One author calls this getting inside the adversary's "OO-D-A Loop" which is his "observation-orientation-decision-action" process.57 If one is

able to operate just ahead of an opponent's O-O-D-A Loop, he can void the enemy's 

strategy. The opponent becomes reactionary and unable to coordinate coherent 

operations. 

FIGURE 11 

At this point, I would like to reemphasize that the information necessary to spoof 

a system is complex, requiring a well developed intelligence port folio long before a 

28
conflict begins. An understanding of the system's authentication procedures, access 

control, data confidentiality, and data integrity is necessary to fully participate, especially 

at the application level.58 However, once a system is infiltrated, the potential damage 

may far exceed that possible by physical attack. An entire system can now be effected 

and provide little to no indication of damage until it is to late to react. The following 

warning serves to illustrate the inherent vulnerability of future communication systems: 

The more complex the automated system becomes, and the more the users 

come to depend on it, the more difficult will it be for them to do without 

it. It also goes without saying that any fallback mode, whether partially 

automated or fully manual will represent a considerable reduction in 

capacity.59

Ability to measure this reduction is an essential element of the targeting process, 

therefore is discussed in the following section. 

d. QUANTIFICATION 

 Quantification of network degradation is necessary if the commander is to make 

an intelligent estimate of a resultant degradation in combat effectiveness. To begin, one 

must first determine what percent of a particular system an adversary needs to effectively 

operate. For example, even at peak usage rates, a military may require only a small 

percent of the civil system it is sharing. This being the case, it becomes apparent massive 

damage is necessary to degrade a system to this level. In addition, as degradation occurs, 

the government can begin controlling access to the system and prioritize calls in order of 

military importance. It is true that while the system is operating at a reduced level, little 

additional degradation is needed to effect military capability. On the other hand, 

operating at this reduced rate also reduces the quantity of repairs required. 

The quantity of information a military needs depends on many variables. The US 

intelligence agencies, integrating an enormous amount of information from many 

sources, would require a much larger communications capacity than most any other 

national intelligence agency. The same can be said for functions such as logistics support 

29
and operational control--especially for deployed forces. This demand analysis can be 

applied to all military functions taking into account variables such as size and complexity 

of forces, command and control philosophies, and tempo of battle. If these 

communication requirements are known, the analyst can use the following measures of 

effectiveness (MOE) to help assess system performance before and after attack. 

 The first MOE is grade of service (GOS) which determines the loss of system

capability in a static (non-mobile) system. To determine GOS, divide the traffic 

available after attack by the traffic offered by the original system capability. However, 

for GOS to be a valid indicator of combat effectiveness, it is necessary to know what 

percent of system capability is actually needed for military operations. All systems have 

a certain amount of slack and can provide some surge capacity. Therefore, a 30 percent 

reduction in system capability may not significantly effect military communications. 

Rerouting, prioritization of transmitted information, and cutting off civilian use could 

nullify even a large reduction in system capability. Also, to make a valid assessment of

degradation in combat effectiveness, knowledge of what level of leadership an attack will 

effect is necessary. Although situation dependent, in most cases degradation at the 

operation level would effect an enemy's ability to coordinate forces and ultimately his 

combat capability the most. 

 The second MOE is the range that information can be heard. For example, 

jamming may overpower a radio's ability to receive if beyond 1000 feet. While at the 

OSI levels, jamming of information may attack the quality of information before it is 

picked up by the receiver.60

 The third measure of merit is throughput and delay. Throughput is the "amount 

of successful data transmissions over a unit of time."61 Delay is the time between data 

transmission and reception. These two parameters are the most used MOEs in civil 

systems to measure performance. The relationship between these two are that if 

throughput increases, then so does delay and vice versa. One becomes keenly aware of 

30
this relationship when trying to place a call on Mother's day. These MOEs are 

susceptible to attack on both the topology and OSI layers. By decreasing nodes through 

destruction, other nodes compensate by taking on a greater load, thereby reducing 

throughput and creating information delay. Attack on the OSI levels can overload 

throughput or intentionally create delays in the system by manipulating network 

protocols or transmitting excessive information packets. 

 The fourth MOE is utilization which defines how much surge capability is 

available. This is the difference between normal usage and peak capable usage.62 

Knowledge of this measure of merit gives the planner an idea of system degradation 

necessary before an enemy is forced to compensate for additional damage to his system. 

The fifth and final MOE is availability. In effect, this is the goal of attacking 

communication systems, for the system must be available and functioning to have merit. 

Two categories under this MOE are reliability and survivability.63 Reliability is the 

capability of a system to provide information to the user. For example, if the system

becomes congested causing rejection of a percentage of the information, it becomes 

unreliable.64

 Survivability is the network's ability to continue to operate after attack from either 

physical damage, jamming, or spoofing. After physical attack, a measure of survivability 

is the "percent users still communicating versus the number of node sites destroyed."65 

This is one area battle damage assessment (BDA) is typically misrepresented. Normally, 

an analysis would look at 50 percent of the nodes destroyed and equate that to a 50 

percent degradation in system capability. In reality; however, this relationship is 

nonlinear and is a function of demand on the system and how it compensates for 

degradation. Up to a certain amount of damage a system will experience little 

depreciation in system performance. However, past that point any additional damage 

will most likely cause a disproportionately larger degradation in combat effectiveness, 

unless demand is controlled or reduced (see Figure 12).66

31
FIGURE 12 

Battle damage assessment must be sensitive to total system effects , not just percent 

damage. This will be a difficult challenge when analyzing effects of attacks on the OSI 

levels, but it is important the intelligence community start thinking in this paradigm. 

Desert storm has already demonstrated that conventional BDA methods are inadequate 

for smart, penetrating weapons, they are even less adequate for nonlethal attacks. 

e. CONCLUSION 

 The targeting of communication systems must emanate from an understanding of 

how communication and information systems work, the capability of the particular 

system targeted, and how the enemy plans to use that system. Without this knowledge, 

the targeter has little hope in designing a successful campaign against an adversary's 

information network. 

32
This chapter presented a methodology to aid in the procurement of this 

knowledge. This method analyzes both the topology and OSI layers to identify system

vulnerabilities to either lethal or nonlethal attacks. It guides targeters, vendors, 

contractors, HUMINT sources, academia and government agencies to answer questions 

such as: is the system centralized, do the number of nodes make physical attack 

impracticable, what are the back-ups, are there key nodes not accessible by conventional 

weapons, and what vulnerabilities do the system OSI layers present. 

I also describe five primary targets within a telecommunications system. They 

were switching centers, management and control facilities, multiplexing facilities, 

transmission mediums, and repeaters or amplifiers. Some nodes house all the above 

transmission components making that particular node critical, hence a high priority 

target. For uniform effects, I recommend attacking these critical nodes at the most 

centrally controlled level as possible. For a more local effect, one should target similar 

facilities at the central office or lower. In each case, deciding on which component to 

take out, and whether or not to use lethal or nonlethal weapons, is a responsibility of the 

planner. He should base his decision on information such as mission objectives, desired 

effects, attack assets, weapons capabilities, available intelligence, ROE (constraints and 

restraints), and the ability to assess battle damage. 

The potential reward for pursuing the ability to attack communication and 

information systems with nonlethal technologies is worthwhile. However, to shift to this 

paradigm will require a revamping of intelligence gathering and damage assessment 

techniques. In the past, battle damage assessment of system topology after lethal attacks 

was fairly simple. However, ability to determine overall system degradation was very 

limited. Battle damage assessment of nonlethal attacks is even more difficult to quantify, 

but if this capability is achieved, the ability to assess lethal attacks will also improve. 

To coordinate pre and post strike analysis, there needs to be an organization 

designated to collect information on national telecommunication systems from a holistic 

33
approach well before a conflict begins. The organization needs to incorporate lethal and 

nonlethal attack options and viable BDA procedures for each option. Some measures of 

effectiveness BDA should answer are grade of service, range of information, throughput 

and delay, utilization and reliability. In addition, a cadre of personnel able to speak the 

language and understand the culture of the enemy will benefit the BDA process. The 

organization also needs to know where to find information on certain countries and if 

necessary maintain HUMINT within the country to track new system developments and 

anomalies or to gain physical presence to enable access to closed systems. The goals of 

the organization would be to know all communications capability within the country, 

determine what percent of the system the military requires to operate effectively, make 

recommendations about attack options (physical attack, jam, or spoof), and quantify 

system degradation after attack. To accomplish this latter objective requires a close 

intelligence/operations relationship. The more the intelligence support knows about the 

overall objective, the better able they are to assist. Accomplishment of these goals are 

necessary requisites to estimating degradation of enemy combat effectiveness. 

Based on the scenario and enemy capability, the targeter has two targeting 

options--lethal or non-lethal. In both cases, attacking key nodes, such as central 

communications management and control centers and critical switching/multiplexing 

stations, will achieve the most effect for a given effort. Lethal attacks may limit effects 

to areas attacked if enough assets are not available or rules of engagement prohibit 

casualties or collateral damage. Non-lethal attacks may expose a larger percentage of the 

system to degradation while keeping the infrastructure in place for post war recovery. 

Regardless of the type attack selected, effectiveness of the attack and political 

ramifications of the methods used are essential to determine how to attack the system. 

 Because of the ability to more fully exploit a network, this study concludes that 

the ability to attack computerized telecommunications at the OSI levels would make a 

valuable contribution to information warfare. Simultaneous lethal and nonlethal attacks 

34
on a network would result in a synergy, magnifying the effects of the attack.67 To delay 

research towards the ability to execute nonlethal type attacks will stagnate the US in the 

old paradigm of the American way of war--physically destroy everything to ensure 

success. Over sixty years ago, Guilio Douhet presented a similar warning. In his book 

The Command of the Air, he said "victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes 

in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adopt themselves after a change 

occurs."68 The ability to manipulate digital information is not a problem of the future, 

but one of the present. Computer hackers, some using unsophisticated methods, "can 

potentially shut down our high-tech society."69 Based on US military strength, it is 

feasible nonlethal attacks on information systems will be an adversary's only effective 

capability to cripple the US. Therefore, I recommend research and development of

nonlethal attack technologies for telecommunications if for no other reason than to learn 

how to protect our own system from these type enemy attacks. The next chapter explores 

the characteristics of both lethal and nonlethal weapons technologies that offer this 

expanded attack capability. 

NOTES 1

M.A. Rice and A.J. Sammes, Communications and Information Systems for Battlefield Command and 

Control (London: Brassey's UK, 1989), 105. 2

Stares, 48-49. 3

Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851-1945

(NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), 8. 4

Stares, 45. The number of ways an opponent may compensate for system degradation are infinite and 

limited only by the imagination. For example, during Desert Storm, the coalition communications

architecture was designed from scratch with modifications made as needs evolved. Also, one cannot

underestimate the value of the courier. Although this method is not effective for rapidly changing 

conditions, it does serve a useful purpose. Highly classified information can be sent this way to prevent 

interception or, as the US did in the Gulf War, large volume information packets sent by courier can free 

overcrowded telecommunications lines. The courier system was the method the US adopted to send the 

daily Air Tasking Orders to each of its bases. It was the only way to get the information to the navy's

carriers. 

5

Stares, 152 and 167. 6

John R. Pierce and A. Michael Noll, Signals: The Science of Telecommunications (New York: Scientific 

American Library, 1990), 4 7

David J. Morris, Communication, Command, and Control Systems (New York: Per Gamon Press, 1977), 

115, and Martin, Telecommunications and the Computer, 443. 8

Martin, Telecommunications and the Computer, 441. 9

Morris, 115 and James Martin, Telecommunications and the Computer (Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: 

Printice Hall, 1990), 443. 

35
 10DCSINT, USA Special Operations Command, Special Operations Targeting Handbook, October 1991, 

101. 

11Often times, a military base will have at least one central office, making an excellent target if isolated

effects are desired. However, one must also consider the possibility of additional civilian capability such

as pay phones or other devices leased by the government from a civilian company. These systems do not 

normally route through the base switching office. 12Martin, Telecommunications and the Computer, 444. 13Pierce, 132. 14Herbert S. Dordick, Understanding Modern Telecommunications (New York: McGraw Hill Book 

Company, 1986), 47. 15Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 48. 16Dawn Bushaus, ìHugo No Match for So. Bell,î Telephony, 25 September 1989, 3. 17Rome Air Development Center, Network Vulnerabilities Study, Final Technical Report RADC-TR-89-

341 (Griffiss AFB,NY: AF Systems Command, 1990). 18Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress (Washington D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1992), 73. 19Interview with Captain Burch and Master Sergeant Raphael, Standard Systems Division (SSC), USAF 

Communications Command, Gunter AFB, AL, 26 Feb 1993. 20Rice and Sammes, 238. 21Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Military-Technical Revolution, A Preliminary Assessment (Washington 

D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Net Assessment), 6. 22Lt Col Mark C. Lewonowski, USAF, Information War, An Essay Presented To the Faculty of Air War 

College in Fulfillment of the Curriculum Requirement, Air University, Maxwell AFB AL, 1991, 29. 23Rice and Sammes, 152-153. 24This system was explained to me by Major Dean Irving, SSC/SSF, USAF Communications Command, 

Gunter AFB Al, in a discussion about the future of C3I systems, 15 April 1993. 25Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 574. 26Air Force Manual 2-25, April 1993 (Initial Draft), Air Force Operational Doctrine, Space Operations, 

Department of the Air Force, HQ USAF, Washington D.C., 23. 27Stares, 163. 28Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 151. 29United States Space Command Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm Assessment, January 1992, 

US Space Command, Peterson AFB, CO (SECRET/NOFORN) Title unclassified, information used 

unclassified, 4. 30Pierce, 192. 31John R. Doner et al, Distributed Network Vulnerability Assessment (DNVA), Harris Corporation, Final

Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, (Griffiss AFB New York: Rome Air Development Center, Air 

Force Systems Command, January 1990), 12-13 and Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Computer Networks 

(Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Printice Hall, 1989), 15, 196, 271, 371, 472, 528. 32Report RADC-TR-89-341, G-7. 33Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 28. 34Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 28. 35Anthony C. Brown, Body Guard of Lies (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1975). Brown 

describes in detail how the use of ULTRA to send false force size and intentions to Germany convinced 

Hitler that the main allied Cross Channel invasion would land at the Pas de Calais. This resulted in the 

Germans keeping their forces dispersed and out of position to meet the amphibious assault at Normandy. 

Brown estimates that due to the success of the misinformation campaign, the Allies saved 60,000 lives. 36Report RADC-TR-89-213, Vol 1 of 2, 65. 37Physical attack causing equipment damage may be accomplished with either high explosive weapons or 

damaging nonlethal weapons such as EMP or microwave bursts which can destroy electronic wiring and 

circuits. 38Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 15. 39Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 17. 40Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 32. 

36
 41Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, A-1 through A-13. 42William J. Broad, ìRussia Is Now Selling Spy Photos From Space,î New York Times, 4 October 1992, 

10. 

43Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 65. 44Report RADC-TR-89-341, 16. 45Report RADC-TR-89-341, 16. 46Report RADC-TR-89-341, 18. 47A Defense Sand T Intelligence Study, Electronic Warfare Threat to the U.S. Satellite Communication

Links--USSR, Report DST-26105-111-91, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, 20 March 

1991, 72. 

48Report RADC-TR-89-341, 16. 49Report RADC-TR-89-341, 19. 50Report RADC-TR-89-341, 19. 51Mark W. Eichin and Jon A. Rochlis, With Microscope and Tweezers: An Analysis of the INTERNET 

Virus of November 1988 (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989), 10. 52Rice and Sammes, 235. 53Rice and Sammes, 236. 54Stares, 204. 55Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 43 and also James Gleick, Chaos, Making a New Science New 

York: Panguin Books, 1987). 56Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 43. 57John R. Boyd, Organic Design for Command and Control, Document M-U 43947-2, Air University

Library, May 1987, 26. Also, Soviet doctrine states that a two-thirds degradation of communications 

would allow them to operate ahead of their enemy's decision loop. 58Secure Solutions, Inc., Placement of Network Security Services for Secure Data Exchange, SBIR Topic 

Number N91-061 (La Jolla, CA: Secure Solutions, Inc., 1992), 2-5 through 2-9. 59M. A. Rice and A. J. Sammes, 233. 60Report TADC-TR-89-341, 8. 61Report TADC-TR-89-341, 8-9. 62Report RADC-TR-89-341, 11. 63Report RADC-TR-89-341, 11-12. 64Report RADC-TR-89-341, 11. 65Report RADC-TR-89-341, 12. 66Tanenbaum, 287. 67Lt Colonel Pat A. Pentland, 17. In his COG analysis, Pentland describes the robustness of modern 

systems. He states that ìthe effect of a single type of power is rarely persuasive if used independent of 

other type power, and influence is magnified when the various elements of power are used in combination 

rather than in isolation.î This concept also applies to attacking a system with a mix of weapons and 

strategies. 

68Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 30. 69Dateline, Are Your Secrets Safe, NBC Television News program, Transcript produced by Burrelle's

Information Service, Box 7, Livingston New Jersey 07039, 27 October 1992, 12. 

37
CHAPTER 3 

DISABLING WEAPONS 

Cleary's aerospace plane was ninety seconds into a correctional rocket burn when all his cockpit electronics 

went dead....He didn't have a single working computer on deck. And then he admitted it: they had been 

pulsed....A pulse beam could have destroyed every piece of working or connected electronics on the X-NASP, if 

the pulse was quick enough and strong enough to get past the suicide switches.1

The above scenario may sounds as if it was from an incredulous "sci-fi" novel, 

however, to others it is reality. The weapon which Cleary describes is within the grasp 

of today's disabling technologies. America's national science laboratories are among 

those who recognize this reality and are currently theorizing, developing, and testing 

these next generation of weapons, thereby transcending the precision guided munitions 

(PGMs) used in the Gulf War.2 Nonlethal technologies are the only way to fully exploit 

telecommunications, and depending on campaign objectives, they may be cheaper, more 

effective, and less destructive. In extreme cases, when conventional weapons are 

prohibited, nonlethal technologies may be the only alternative. 

These technologies have recently gained great appeal in the domestic and 

international political arena. Editorials and other strategic publications routinely specify 

disabling weapons (DWs) as a mechanism to solve political problems requiring military 

force.3 Much of their popularity emanates from a potential to influence problems across 

the spectrum of conflict range while promising effective but less lethal force. Defusing 

the illegal drug trade, slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 

stopping the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia are just some of the crisis in which the use of 

nonlethal technologies are being considered. 

In 1970, Joseph F. Coates conducted research on the application of nonlethal 

weapons during conflict for the Institute for Defense Analysis, Science and Technology. 

His findings are appropriate for the world order of today. He concluded the requirement 

for less lethal military capabilities are needed to: 

38
enable US. forces to act effectively in various political-military roles and 

missions. The general increase in insurgency, increased with the 

anticipated increase in benign and quasi-military missions, suggest the 

requirement for less destructive, less deadly tactics and devices than are 

now conventional.4

While somewhat prophetic in his findings, today's use of NLWs can be a force multiplier 

throughout the spectrum of conflict. This is especially true when employed against 

digital telecommunication systems. It provides the planner with the tools to fully exploit 

the high-tech information systems used on the modern battlefield. And, because of the 

rapid proliferation of high-tech systems, development of disabling technologies can help 

maintain the US's dominance over the information wars of the future. 

In a narrow sense, this chapter will identify what type of nonlethal technologies 

apply specifically to the exploitation of communication and information systems. This is 

especially important because one of the greatest potential applications of NLWs is 

against these two target sets. However, in a broader perspective, this chapter will also 

familiarize the reader with the overall concept of nonlethal technologies so that he 

understands the factors affecting their development and use. 

I will begin by defining nonlethal technologies. An accurate definition is 

important because a misperception of the principles behind nonlethal weapons may bias 

the way one thinks about, and hence employs these weapons. After defining nonlethal 

technologies, I will provide a brief history of their use followed by some of the legal 

considerations affecting their development and employment. The Legal aspect of 

employment may prove to be a road block for the use of some of the technologies. I will 

then differentiate between the kill mechanisms of conventional and nonlethal weapons. 

This area will also list some of the current technologies being explored. The final section 

will identify when to use these technologies against communications and list some of 

their advantages and disadvantages. 

39
a. DEFINITION

In many respects the term "nonlethal" as it applies to weapons is somewhat of a 

contradiction in terms. It is difficult for many to agree to a common definition because 

the term "nonlethal weapon" conjures up the image of attacking someone or something 

without causing death or destruction. While this is the intent of using these weapons, 

they do have the capacity to kill and destroy either directly or indirectly. Therefore, it 

would be more accurate to say they have potential to reduce the death and destruction 

which more conventional methods of blast, fragmentation, and fire usually cause. They 

can also create conditions which to facilitate death and destruction, or they can cause 

long term disruption as a result of their indirect effects. For example, an electromagnetic pulse fired at a nation's telecommunications system may provide an advantage 

for follow on lethal attacks. But, it may also result in large scale death due to indirect 

effects on a society's electrical grid. Therefore, some choose to replace the term

nonlethal with other monikers more reflective of the weapons effects. These include 

"disabling weapons", "low lethality weapons", and "low collateral damage munitions". 

In May 1991, an Under Secretary of Defense policy planning group described 

nonlethal weapons as "an instrument designated to achieve the same tactical or strategic 

ends as lethal weapons, but which are not intended to kill personnel or inflict catastrophic 

damage to equipment."5 This definition captures the essence of nonlethality, but it is 

somewhat limiting. Los Alamos National Laboratories, who are currently developing 

nonlethal technologies, expanded on the above definition. They site three goals for the 

application of these technologies:6

1) no unintentional loss of human life 

2) controlled levels of physical damage 

3) expanded options for commanders 

After reviewing much of the literature written on nonlethal technologies, I arrived 

at the following definition: nonlethal weapons include nonconventional weapons 

40
technologies which disrupt, degrade, or destroy (or enhance the ability of other weapons 

to do so) enemy capabilities throughout the conflict spectrum, and whose intent is to 

prevent or reduce loss of life or catastrophic destruction of equipment. However, 

depending on the situation and type of technology used, direct or indirect loss of life and 

damage to equipment may result from their employment. 

Assigning a name to this definition is more difficult than developing the 

definition itself. The terms "nonlethal" and other monikers are clearly inaccurate and 

may present undesirable public and international sentiment when nonlethal attacks result 

in even one death. While the term "disabling" describes a desirable effect of all type 

weapons , it best describes the attributes and intentions of nonlethal technologies. It also 

connotes an image which differs from conventional, unconventional, or nuclear weapons. 

Therefore, I will use the term "disabling weapons" (DWs) throughout the remainder of 

this thesis. 

b. HISTORY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The concept of disabling technologies is not a new phenomena. In ancient times, 

adversaries had little variety in how to employ their forces. Limited technology generally 

required direct force on force battles and greatly reduced the number of ways one could 

even do that. There were no telephone lines to exploit, electricity to deny, or fuel to 

contaminate. However, nonlethal methods were devised to aid a commander in either his 

attack or retreat. One such method was the use of smoke to deceive the opponent to the 

where abouts of his enemy. If successful, the smoke would surprise the enemy and 

provide a positional advantage. In addition, the enemy would use smoke as an 

asphyxiating agent to aid in siege warfare.7

During World War II and the Vietnam conflict, disabling technologies began to 

come of age. During the Battle of Britain, the British discovered that the Germans were 

using electronic directional beams to guide their bombers to the target. To disrupt the 

targeting solution, the British used electronic countermeasures to override the German 

41
navigation signals causing the Luftwaffe to "completely miss the city of London with 

their bombs."8 In Vietnam, false targets were inserted into air defense radars creating 

confusion among the controllers and causing them to misvector attack aircraft.9 During 

the same conflict American forces resorted to the use of what they thought to be 

nonlethal chemicals such as "Agent Orange" to defoliate the dense jungle canopy in order 

to expose enemy forces and lines of communications. 

 More recently, Aviation and Space Technology, reported that during the Gulf War 

coalition forces used numerous disabling technologies. One most highly publicized for 

its effectiveness and consideration for minimizing long term damage was the Tomahawk 

cruise missiles filled with carbon-fiber threads used to attack electrical generation plants. 

The attacks were successful and resulted in massive short circuits causing "immediate 

shutdown of the huge, hard-to-replace generators but [caused] no damage."10 As a result

of the success of both DWs technologies and precision guided munitions in reducing loss 

of life on both sides (especially civilians), the public and politicians demand even fewer 

casualties in future conflict. Ironically, however, some of the technologies that measure 

up to these demands have come under close legal scrutiny. 

While there is no indication that disabling weapons would violate the concept of 

jus in bello (justification for war), there is concern over their implications to jus ad 

bellum (actual conduct of the war). Specifically, for jus ad bellum, there are numerous 

protocols, agreements, and common law beliefs which some types of DWs may be 

interpreted as violating. The majority of these restrictions however, apply to the use of 

chemical or biological agents. 

Some of the restricting guidelines come from the 1925 Geneva Protocol 

prohibiting the use of chemical (CW) or bacteriological (biological) weapons (BW), the 

1969 US unilateral denouncement of the use of BW and first use of CW, the 10 April 

1972 convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of 

Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons on Their Destruction, and the 1977 convention on 

42
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 

Techniques. Even if a particular technology is not specifically prohibited by one of the 

above protocols, many are concerned that their use will cause escalation towards more 

deadly chemicals or bacterial warfare. One of America's foremost strategist makes the 

statement "there is a simplicity to "no gas" that makes it almost uniquely a focus for 

agreement when each side can only conjecture at what alternative rules the other side 

would propose and when failure at coordination on the first try may spoil the chances for 

acquiescence in any limits at all."11

One renowned international lawyer states that problems exist as to the legitimacy 

of nonlethal chemical weapons and in "recent negotiations great attention has been 

attached to the degree of lethal effects of chemical weapons. There has been little 

agreement on the...types of nonlethal chemical weapons which many states consider 

essential to warfare."12

However, some biological and chemical agents are beginning to receive favorable 

attention in the international legal community. As these agents prove their safety to 

people and the environment, they will be more readily accepted. For example, some

agents currently under development to dissipate oil spills could also be acceptable in 

warfare. Some agents have already been used in the commercial market for years in 

products such as household carpeting.13 

Also jeopardizing the development of DWs are the efforts of special interest 

groups. Some in the international legal community have attempted to restrict the 

development and use of "questionable" or "dubious" weapons. They claim some DWs 

fall into these categories14 However, their interpretations are not legally substantiated. 

As long as weapons comply with the concepts of discrimination (laws of non-combatant 

immunity) and proportionality (degree of destruction compared to objective obtained), 

the US needs to refrain from the pressure from these groups and develop whatever legal 

weapons best protect our national interests.15 

43
Overall, the major dilemma concerning the use over DWs is that technology has 

outpaced the laws of war and is acting as an inhibitor to their development and use while 

at the same time the public demands less lethal means be used to settle conflicts. A 

closer look at what differentiates conventional and nonlethal kill mechanisms may 

illustrate why some nonlethal technologies generate legal concern. 

c. CONVENTIONAL AND DISABLING KILL MECHANISMS 

When using conventional weapons, a typical problem is how to effect just the 

equipment inside a particular facility. Attacks normally result in destruction of both the 

equipment and the building. The conventional Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals 

(JMEMs) clearly identifies the likelihood of undesirable collateral damage and that the 

"development of reversible nondestructive measures for neutralizing facilities could, in 

many situations, be of value."16 With nonlethal technologies, it is no longer necessary to 

"blow up" a particular target. This is especially true now that the equipment necessary to 

compete on the modern battlefield have working tolerances which "are much tighter, they 

are more dependent on timely accurate intelligence as well as command and control, and 

there are simply more things that can be caused to malfunction."17 Therefore, this section 

will provide a framework for the planner to consider when selecting which type weapon 

to use to achieve campaign objectives against communication systems. 

The section begins with an explanation of kill mechanisms and damage criteria. 

It then presents a model that helps analyze which weapon to select based on various 

factors affecting the campaign. In this process, I will list some of the kill mechanisms of 

both conventional and nonlethal weapons. 

Damage criteria is "related to the function of the target and is the level of damage 

that renders the target incapable of performing a specific function."18 An example of 

damage criteria can be related to a communications network. The level of damage 

desired may be to achieve a 90 percent degradation in all telecommunications for the 

duration of the conflict, or to render them inoperative for only one hour. In the case of 

44
the former, one may need to attack the system with conventional weapons turning it into 

rubble. For the latter requirement, jamming key nodes, firing microwave blasts at 

transmission or reception antennas, manipulating system information, or inducing a virus 

into the software may suffice. In either case, the planner should consider the synergistic 

effect of using both conventional and disabling weapons. 

The damage or kill mechanism of the weapon is defined as the "phenomena by 

which the weapon inflict[s] damage on the target...."19 In the case of conventional 

weapons the mechanism may be fire which changes the composition of the target. For a 

particular nonlethal mechanism, it may be a chemical which crystallizes rubber tires or 

shorts out circuits. Selecting the most appropriate mechanism depends on the judgment 

of the planner. Figure 13 provides a framework to aid planers in determining the 

appropriate weapon(s):20 

FIGURE 13 

45
Figure 13, while not all inclusive, does emphasize that the overall attack plan is a 

function of numerous variables in which weapons selection is only one. However, before 

making that selection, systems must first be analyzed for vulnerabilities. 

When determining vulnerabilities on a macro scale, the analyst should account for 

the damage caused by an attack to "all systems, not just combat systems and not just the 

primary objective of the fire."21 It may be that centralized control of an air defense 

system, as with the Iraqi system used in Desert Storm, is totally dependent on 

telecommunications, thereby, an attack on telecommunications may also disrupt the 

defense system. However, when analyzing just a particular system, the same principle 

reapplies in that every system is made of many parts or subsystems. To determine 

vulnerabilities JMEMs recommends three steps:22

 

1) functional analysis--identify the function of each part of the target and 

establish relative importance, and then "designate those vital to its operation and those 

whose destruction would achieve the objective of the attack." For example, identifying 

the air-conditioning unit of a computer complex as a critical component or the 

multiplexing unit of a telecommunications switching station. 

 

2) physical vulnerability analysis--this "includes construction types and overall 

dimensions of structures and equipment, material of construction...and other pertinent 

factors." Of particular interest for the use of DWs would include factors such as the 

computer network layout or hardening of electrical equipment to EMP. 

 

3) sources of information--"information for both the functional and physical 

vulnerabilities analysis may be derived from such sources as aerial photos, reports of 

espionage agents, insurance contracts, business prospectuses, and POW interrogations." 

Publications and industrial experts can also provide valuable intelligence. 

It should be apparent that these considerations closely resemble the process I developed 

for communication systems and applied in chapter two. Once the analysis is completed 

and the objectives are clear, the planner can then select the method of attack based on the 

available weapons technology and the imposed constraints. The following five steps 

assist the planner in this selection:23

1) define vital components 

46
2) identify vulnerabilities and determine damage criteria 

3) select weapons capable of achieving damage 

4) evaluate method and accuracy of delivery 

5) determine capability to measure effects of attack (battle damage assessment)24

Now that the foundation for thinking about how to select a weapon has been laid, I will 

provide a list of the four primary kill mechanisms for conventional weapons and some of 

the mechanisms now available or being considered for disabling weapons. 

Although the objective of an attack against communications may not be its 

destruction, it is the normal result, desired or not, of using conventional mechanisms. 

There are four primary kill mechanisms associated with conventional weapons. A single 

bomb may contain all four, or be designed to take advantage of one or a combination of 

mechanisms, depending on target vulnerabilities and damage criteria. The mechanisms

include:25

 

1) blast--high over pressure creating shock such as that found in a fuel air 

explosive weapon. 

 

2) penetration--a bomb or fragments of jagged steel produced from the bomb 

casing exploding or special devices inside the casing that penetrate the target breaking 

the system or its subsystems. 

 

3) crater--violent earth shock breaking up smooth surfaces or damaging them

such that the surface becomes unusable (e.g. a runway). This is the result of penetration 

and blast. 

 

4) fire--fire damage caused by the weapon and then fires fueled by target material 

itself with radiant heat igniting combustibles to melt and damage components/things. 

As alluded to earlier, for a kill mechanism to be effective, it might not have to 

destroy the target if it can eliminate or reduce performance "of one or more of the critical 

functions of the target system."26 With the use of DWs destruction is not always 

necessary. For example, at the strategic level if one's intent is to deny the enemy 

intelligible communications, a disabling weapon may be able to misroute all information 

47
rendering a system useless while still providing the attacker a source of SIGINT. The 

following is a list of just some of the disabling technologies and their kill mechanisms

either available or currently being considered.27 This list should illustrate to the reader 

that imagination is a key factor in developing and employing these technologies. 

MECHANISM EFFECT

Combustion chemistry - shut off/overspeed engines 

 - contaminate fuel 

Polymer chemistry agents - damage vital components (e.g. air 

 filters) 

- polymerize fuel system

- depolymerize plastics and electrical 

 components 

- runway and roadway slippery/stick 

- damage power grid (colloidal dust) 

Anti-materiel biological agents - thicken fuels 

- dissolve electronics, plastics, 

adhesives, metals, solder, and other 

 substances 

Superagents, acids, oxidizers, and solving - damage tires 

agents - disable mines 

- blind optical ports/sensors 

Computer viruses or worms - subvert communications, radar, 

 satellite, and computer signals 

and fire control operations 

Electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) - damage communication systems 

- explode ammo dumps 

Blinding lasers - blind optics, dazzle operators, 

overload tracking and targeting 

 sensors 

Neural inhibitors - short circuit human synoptic 

 pathways 

Calmative agents - tranquilize personnel 

48
Infrasound - sound projection to disorient, sicken, 

or frighten people from designated 

 areas 

Holographs - pshyops to convince adversaries to 

act in desired manner 

While this list reveals a number of interesting concepts with which to attack enemy 

communications, there are both advantages and disadvantages to their use. 

d. ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES 

The US. Global Strategy Council states that "nonlethality is an essential 

strategy for the future" and that "the opportunity for the US. is incalculable."28

While the word "essential" may overstate the Council's case, under certain conditions 

nonlethal/disabling technologies do provide advantages over conventional weapons. 

These advantages fall within three categories. 

First, they expand US. ability to act throughout the spectrum of conflict (see 

Figure 14). 

FIGURE 14 

Therefore, a major advantage of a disabling strategy is that it will increase "the number of

options for decision makers at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, while increasing 

military effectiveness at the higher levels of the operational continuum."29 

At the lower end of the spectrum, one could manipulate information controlling 

the economic resources of a country prior to hostilities, or intercept communications to 

49
assist in locating and interdicting illegal drugs. At the higher end, a full exploitation of 

command, control, and communications, to include destruction of the national 

telecommunications network, may be desirable. For example, during Desert Storm "the 

use of disabling weapons could have denied Saddam his biggest propaganda victory of 

the Gulf War--the Feb 13, 1991 bombing by an F-117 fighter of Al Firdus Bunker, which 

killed scores of civilians."30 As in this case, disabling technologies may allow you to act 

where as before inaction may have been chosen due to response options.31

Second, the use of disabling technologies can enhance American political 

reputation and thereby permit prosecution of the war to attain original political and 

military objectives. This reputation is primarily realized by reducing military and 

civilian casualties and limiting property destruction. The primary driver behind this is 

the public opinion influenced by the media. 

In a School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) 1992 thesis, the author 

convincingly points out that the extraordinary power of the media to shape and 

orchestrate "not only public opinion, but also public policy."32 The change in targeting 

policy resulting from television coverage of the Al Firdus Bunker bombing during Desert 

Storm is evidence of this power. However, if an adversary decides to put civilians in a 

critical command, control, and communications facility, then it is he who must take the 

blame for their deaths. The point is that until a disabling weapon can effectively take out 

a critical target such as that mentioned above, the US should not refrain from using 

conventional weapons, especially if the adversary is closely matched. In many cases, the 

US would be justified morally and legally to take such action, however, past conflicts 

show we normally do not. The reason for inaction is often fear of the media. 

Some argue that reducing the calamities of war will also reduce the deterrent 

effect that visual, violent death and destruction may have on an aggressor nation's 

decision to initiate war. A professor at SAAS, stated in a point paper that as a result of

50
the media and politics, the Third World may attempt to negate US technological 

superiority. 

There evolves a specious division between public and private morality and 

accountability. As a result, "the people" are "victims" in every respect--

they are "victims" of their own government and they are "victims" of 

errant American Bombs. Legal and moral accountability is thrust back on 

the attacker who remains on the defensive in the eyes of international 

opinion.33

This professor continues by saying that although reeducation of the public about 

the realities of war would help, international pressure will continue to demand less lethal 

warfare, limiting acceptable legal and moral military options. While absolved to the fact 

that the US. will eventually succumb to these pressures, he offers one method of meeting 

the demands of this new paradigm--develop disabling weapons technologies.34

The third advantage is that in certain conditions or against some target sets, 

disabling technologies may prove more effective than conventional weapons. For 

example, if during Desert Storm it was necessary to attack the numerous Iraqi 

telecommunication nodes protected by their location in hotels and along the oil pipeline, 

disabling weapons may have provided the ability to more fully exploit the system. 

In short, there are numerous advantages DWs offer to both the strategist and 

tactician throughout the spectrum of conflict. If employed imaginatively, and in the 

appropriate situation, they can maintain the deterrence value of US military capability 

and help prevent the premature curtailment of military operations prior to the attainment 

of political objectives. Although advantages of using NLWs abound, there are some

disadvantages associated with their use. 

There are two major categories that disadvantages fall into. The first is that 

technology has not yet caught up to the expectations of what disabling weapons promise. 

Many of the technologies are at the stage where further research and development is 

necessary to prove their value. The second category deals with the negative 

51
consequences of their use--for instance, would their existence unnecessarily result in US 

involvement. Lets first discuss the technology issue. 

One of the major concerns of most commanders is the effectiveness of disabling 

weapons. It is one thing to say we will insert a virus into the telecommunications system

and expect to see the air defense system disrupted. It is another to actually achieve those 

results within the desired time frame. This question leads to the biggest concern. 

How do we measure the effects of their use. Current ability to measure 

conventional battle damage assessment is marginal. Ability to measure nonlethal damage 

is unknown. How will we determine if the virus has sufficiently affected the air defense 

system so that the lethal attack on it can be initiated with minimal threat to the attacking 

aircraft? Or even more optimistically, can we determine if the system needs to be 

attacked with lethal weapons at all? If we misjudge our effectiveness, a disabled soldier 

or system may more readily reappear. In addition, an impaired system can sometimes 

continue to operate at some level and, therefore, contribute to enemy combat 

effectiveness.35 There is no doubt that existing BDA capability is insufficient. 

On the other hand, some disabling weapons currently may be too devastating. A 

"large footprint may create unwanted area denials, and may affect large numbers of 

targets, including some outside the immediate battle area."36 The inability to contain a 

computer virus to just a particular system or prevent it from spreading to friendly systems 

is a significant problem which will limit its use. Another example of collateral damage is 

the use of an EMP blast which affects the entire electrical system of a city instead of just 

the electrical components inside a telephone exchange. 

A problem exacerbating all the above disadvantages is how to deliver disabling 

weapons. It is this area in particular that has had the least amount of thought. More than 

anything, this illustrates a certain lack of doctrinal thought towards the whole subject of 

DWs. Also important to doctrine is the consequences of using disabling weapons. 

52
Topping the list in this second category is the potential for escalation. Two areas 

of concern present themselves here. First, the attractiveness of DWs may encourage 

increased US intervention into international conflict.37 Because they promise to be 

precise, nonlethal, and potentially covert, many may misuse them as a panacea to solve 

any problem where lethal means are not desirable. The second area of concern is that the 

use of disabling weapons, even in their most benign form, will most likely be considered 

as an act of war or sabotage, thereby causing the opponent to escalate. A possible result 

of the combination of these two concerns is that the US may become involved in a lethal 

conflict it originally had no intentions of entering.38

There is also a legal issue. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, many believe that 

"nonlethality could pry open a Pandora's box of chemical, biological, and nuclear 

weaponry that diplomats have spent much of the 20th century trying to keep closed."39 

Not only will these type weapons meet resistance within the international legal 

community, but they may also lead to the enemy propagandizing the "autarchy" of their 

use. 

Finally, highly technical societies are very vulnerable to disabling technologies, 

therefore, developing such weapons could provide Third world countries a cheap means 

with which to attack the US. In the near future, one may see the computer as the 

terrorist's weapon of choice. 

While some of these disadvantages seem significant, one must remember that 

DWs do not replace conventional methods, but provide commanders additional and 

complimentary options throughout the spectrum of conflict. The above disadvantages are 

not impossible to overcome, however, expanded research and development is necessary. 

In addition, policy makers must understand that the use of disabling weapons is an act of 

war just as surely as using lethal weapons. Ultimately the decision to employ disabling 

weapons must reside with the policy maker and the campaign planner based on the 

current technologies and the situations they face. 

53
e. CONCLUSION

Disabling technologies have great potential for future conflict, especially against 

command, control, and communication systems. However, a coherent, joint doctrine to 

guide their development and employment is lacking. Many politicians and military 

policy makers have little understanding of the potential capabilities, limitations, and 

employment strategies of disabling weapons. For example, do we employ them before, 

during, or after hostilities; do we employ them in conjunction with lethal weapons or use 

them separately; which technologies show more promise for the future; how will we 

deliver them? The military services most likely to play a leading role in future conflicts 

will be those who have thought about how to use these new technologies and 

incorporated them into their acquisition and training programs. 

I described how disabling technologies can help exploit telecommunications, and 

laid a foundation for the development of a coherent doctrine incorporating the use of 

disabling weapons. I emphasized educating potential users to the capabilities of 

disabling technologies. In doing so several areas were discussed. First, a working 

definition was developed to better understand the purpose of DWs and to generate 

mission needs and strategies. Second, a brief history of DWs pointed out that their use 

dates back to wars of antiquity and illustrated some of the legal problems associated with 

their use. Third, this chapter differentiated between lethal and nonlethal kill mechanisms

in order to stimulate discussion on how to use both for a more effective military strategy. 

Finally, it highlighted some of the primary advantages and disadvantages of disabling 

technologies. 

However, the overall message this chapter sends is that disabling technologies can 

make a significant contribution to US strategy and our capability to control information 

warfare. Disabling weapons should be persuade with greater enthusiasm, especially by 

the Air Force. A recent DARPA report agreed with this recommendation. It stated the 

US pays to much attention to lethal munitions, and that in some cases, nonlethal 

54
technologies may be more effective. Ignoring nonlethal munitions programs will limit 

US capability to respond to future conflict and to deter potential opponents.40 This is 

particularly relevant to C3I control in war. 

I close this chapter by offering a warning that Alexander De Seversky gave to the 

Air University in 1948: "Unless you plan your strategy and tactics far ahead, unless you 

implement them in terms of the weapons of tomorrow, you find yourself in the field of 

battle with weapons of yesterday."41 

NOTES 

1Daniel Stryker, Cobra (New York: Jove Publications, Inc., 1991), 1-6. 

2Alvin Toffler stated that the precision weapons of the Gulf War represented the 'third wave' of warfare, 

while others look at the future potential of nonlethal weapons (NLWs) and describe them as the 'fourth

wave.' (As quoted from a briefing given to SAAS by John Alexander from Las Alamos National

Laboratories in September 1992. Some go further and cogitate nonlethality as advancing warfare to the 

point where war can be conducted against an adversary without his knowledge of it. 3Michael J. Dugan and George Kenny, ìOperation Balkan Storm: Here's a Plan,î The New York Times, 29 

November 1992, E-11. 

4Joseph F. Coates, Nonlethal and Nondestructive Combat in Cities Overseas, Paper P-569, DAHC 1567 C 

0011, Task T-62 (Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, Sciences and Technology Division, 

May 1970), 105. 

5Captain Mark D. Martin, USN, Non-lethal Weapons: A Policy Planning Paper, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Policy Planning Division, 29 May 1991, 1. 

6Alexander Briefing. 

7Martin van Creveld, The Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and the Future of Morally constrained War, 

Parameters, Volume XXII No. 2, Summer 1992, 27. 

8Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Assessment of Mission Kill Concept, 

Requirements, and Technologies, Final Report SPC 1361, SPC Log No. 90-1987, September 1990, 6. 

9Report RADC-TR-89-273, Vol 1 of 2, 28. 

10David A. Fulghum, ìSecret Carbon-Fiber Warheads Blinded Iraqi Air Defenses,î Aviation and Space 

Technology, 27 April 1992, 18. 

11Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966), 131. 

His statement here is specifically speaking about use of lethal gas. However, the concept he raises is that

once a weapon is allowed, the limits of its use are both difficult to agree upon and have potential for 

escalating to more lethal means. As he says in the same paragraph, ìsome gas raises complicated questions 

of how much, where, under what circumstances; no gas is simple and unambiguous.î 

12Shelton M. Cohen, Arms and Judgement (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1989), 224-225. 

13Telephone discussion with Dr. John B. Alexander, Chief of Los Alamos National Laboratory's Nonlethal

Weapons division, 21 April 1993. 

14Miguel D.Walsh, New Technology, War and International Law, Unpublished Paper, June 1991, 20. 

15For further explanation of these two rules see W. Hays Park, ìAir War and the Law of War,î The Air 

Force Law Review 32, no. 1, (1990): pages 4 and 168 respectively. 16Coates, 33. 

17DARPA Report SPC1361, 7. 

18Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs), USAF Fighter Weapons School Instructional Text, 

Courses F4000IOAN, A1000IDOPN, F1600IDOPN, F1500IDOPN, Part1, June 1982, 4-3. 

55
 19JMEMs, 4-3. 

20The model was developed during a brainstorming session which I attended at Los Alamos National

Laboratories, 15 October 1992. 

21DARPA Report SPC 1361, 31. 

22JMEMs, 4-2. 

23JMEMs, 1-3. 

24This is my own addition to the list of JMEMs recommendations. This is an especially important factor

when considering the employment of NLWs since their effects are not always visible. Not being able to

measure effects would be one of the primary reasons to dismiss a DW as the primary attack weapon. 

25JMEMs, 3-1. 

26DARPA Report SPC1361, 8. 

27This list was derived from Captain Martin's policy planning letter and Janet Morris, Nonlethality Briefing

(Washington D.C.: US. Global Strategy Council, 1991). 

28Janet Morris, Nonlethality Briefing, no page number.

29Memorandum, John C. Hopkins, Los Alamos National Laboratories, subject: Nonlethal Strategy Group 

Meeting with the USN, 20 September 1991, 2. 

30Andrew Weinschenk, ìArmy Gives a Boost to Exotic, Non-Lethal Weapons,î Defense Week 13, no. 41, 

(October 19, 1992): 1 and 9. 

31Lt Col Alan W. Debban, HQ USAF, ìDisabling Systems: War fighting Options for the Future,î 

Airpower Journal, Spring 1993, Vol. VII, No 1, 46. 

32Lt. Col Marc D. Felman, ìThe Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War: Media Spinî 

(Master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1992), 5. 

33Peter R. Faber, Professor of SAAS, ìOur Quarrel is With the Regime, Not the People Argument,î (Point

paper written in response to a briefing given by Colonel John Warden, Commandant of Air Command and 

Staff College, about how future war must be less lethal to both civilian and military personnel, 15 

September 1992), 1-2. Faber goes on to say that in fact, the people must share the guilt of war with their 

leader. He states that ìeven police states require the active cooperation of hundreds of thousands, if not

millions, of individuals who do not qualify as passive ìvictims,î' 1-2. 34Faber, 3. 

35DARPA Report SPC 1361, 9. 

36DARPA Report SPC 1361, 7. 

37Ricks, 1. 38Coates, 101. 

39Janet Morris, Nonlethality Briefing. 40DARPA Report SPC 1361, 11. 

41Alexander De Seversky, Air Power, a speech delivered before the Air University, 28 May 1948, 5. 

56
CHAPTER 4 

GUIDANCE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Many may think that just because we possess disabling technologies we should 

use them. Contrary to this view, I suggest a more cautious employment strategy when 

using them to attack telecommunications. Assuming the technology is available to 

employ DWs effectively (which it currently is not), one must consider that the US is a 

nation extremely vulnerable to disabling attacks because of its dependency on 

information. Any use of these technologies may divulge critical national capabilities that 

many adversaries could then use against the US. Therefore, they should never be used in 

a fashion which tips off the enemy to how they were attacked, unless there is an 

overriding political, economic, or military necessity, . This means that the employment 

of disabling technologies should be masked by deception and combined with the use of 

lethal attacks when possible. The next section integrates the information from chapters 

two and three to provide planning factors to consider when matching weapons to the 

telecommunications target set. Hopefully this produces the optimum strategy. 

a. PLANNING FACTORS 

In my research, I found only one document (see Appendix B) that addresses 

factors influencing the selection of one weapon over the other.1 However, that document 

is very limited in scope and discusses a broad taxonomy of factors without listing specific 

conditions to help select the appropriate weapons. Therefore, the following list of 14 

guidelines is a synthesis of my own conclusions based on that document and on the 

information presented in previous chapters. The list does not claim to be inclusive nor 

recommend strict adherence in all situations. However the planner should consider this 

list as generic and use it as a catalyst to evaluate the concepts presented by his own 

circumstances. 

1) Knowing the enemy--In other words, do not mirror image. Know how an 

enemy uses his communications infrastructure. This will provide clues as to which 

57
systems he depends on for the various command and control functions and what capacity 

he possesses to compensate for degradation. The planner should understand that 

communications form a linkage between an adversary's entire social, economic, political, 

and military system. Armed with this knowledge, the planner can build his information 

campaign, and then study each system to determine which systems are prone to lethal or 

disabling attack/exploitation mechanisms. 

2) Objective--Both lethal and disabling weapons have the capability to destroy 

electronic and communications equipment. However, as chapter two points out, there are 

numerous ways to exploit communications. Manipulating national economic assets, 

eavesdropping to gain intelligence, misrouting information, or enhancing a deception 

plan are just a few. The only way to achieve some of these objectives is through the use 

of disabling technologies. 

3) Intelligence--Intelligence is an issue of kind and quality. With conventional 

weapons, knowing the location of key nodes, routes, and repair capability is essential to 

be able to attack with the necessary force to yield the desired effects. Destructive 

nonlethal attacks such as EMP or microwave blasts would require this same intelligence. 

On the other hand, disabling attacks using viruses would require additional information 

about network protocols, command and control of network functions, and how to gain 

access into the system. Questions such as do different switching stations use different 

software, and if they do, will the selected DWs achieve the desired effects must be 

answered. Appendix A gives insight into the type of intelligence necessary to exploit a 

telecommunications system with disabling weapons. Important to both types attack, 

however, is an understanding of the systems network dynamics and interaction with other 

networks. 

4) Uniformity--If enough conventional resources can initially be applied to a 

system and persistently reattacked afterwards, uniformity of effect may be possible. 

However, because of the quantity and quality of intelligence, offensive resources 

58
available, or political constraints one may not always be able to achieve uniformity 

through lethal means. Therefore, disabling weapons may provide degradation throughout 

an entire network. Centralization or dispersion of the system is a key function. The more 

centralized a system, the more vulnerable it is to both lethal and disabling weapons. 

However, if a system is widely dispersed or decentralized (containing numerous nodes), 

then selecting disabling weapons to capitalize on their cascading effects may be more 

cost effective while also achieving a more uniform effect. 

5) Restoration--Post crisis restoration can be expensive for the recovering nation, 

or for the attacking nation if he chooses to share the cost burden. Precision guided 

conventional weapons can limit collateral damage, however, when attacking something 

like a nation's main telecommunication node with high explosives the cost might be 

prohibitive in dollars and repair time. However, the planner might elect to use 

conventional weapons if he finds alternative and less expensive nodes or components 

which still achieve the desired effects. If cost of repair or indirect effects of long term

system outages remain a factor, DWs should be considered. 

6) Accessibility--As with intelligence, accessibility is also a function of kind. 

There may be many reasons one could not attack a system with conventional weapons. 

Political factors, information sanctuaries, location of key nodes in civilian buildings such 

as a hotel, excessive redundancy, hardening, or target defenses all reduce the 

effectiveness of a conventional attack. For DWs these factors are less critical. Access 

for disabling weapons apply more to the ability of the attacker to infiltrate encryption and 

other self protection devices. They also consider system "life-cycle" issues. For 

example, did the contractor install a fault capability into the system at time of

manufacturing which can be activated on demand. 

7) Confidence in weapons effectiveness--Conventional weapons have been 

proven in combat and can be tested and retested. One can reasonably predict not only 

what will happen to a target when it is hit by a bomb, but also how many bombs it will 

59
require to achieve a desired effect. In addition, battle damage assessment is more 

apparent and better quantified, although, PGMs have muddied this issue significantly. 

On the other hand, the documented success of DWs has a limited sample size, especially 

in areas typically targeted by conventional weapons. Currently, as target value and threat 

to friendly lives increase, confidence in the success of DWs decreases. 

8) Duration of effects--Once again, the situation dictates the type weapon used. 

For example, if enough resources can be applied and reapplied to a target set or the 

system is not very robust to begin with, then conventional weapons could have a long 

term effect. However, if for various reasons key nodes cannot be attacked or the enemy 

is able to quickly repair or work around damaged nodes, DWs should be considered. It 

may be possible for a sophisticated virus to render a system inoperative until reversed by 

the attacker. In addition, a combination of both type weapons may have a synergistic 

effect. When considering either type weapon, the speed in which effects occur may be an 

essential factor. 

9) Reversibility--Reversibility of destruction for conventional weapons is 

usually expensive reconstruction. However, for DWs it may be as simple as pressing a 

button or as complicated as rewiring an entire national electrical system. It is essential 

that disabling technologies not be used without knowing the anecdote. To do so could 

result in spreading collateral damage far outside the target area. 

10) Countermeasures--This fits closely with accessibility and duration of effects, 

and applies to both conventional and disabling weapons. The real challenge is to 

determine whether or not a countermeasure is effective and if so, to what degree and on 

what time line. 

11) Political effects--These include ability to act overtly, to legally justify a 

weapon's use, to prevent collateral damage, to accomplish the mission while complying 

with rules of engagement, or to control environmental damage. Using environmental 

damage as an example, blowing up an oil pipeline with lethal weapons or changing 

60
weather patterns with disabling technologies may be prohibited by international law or 

self-imposed restraints. 

12) Classification of technology--Certain weapons may be too classified to use in 

a particular situation. The benefit in keeping their existence close-holed may be greater 

than the ramification of not using them. 

13) Delivery vehicle--For conventional weapons it is a function of determining 

what aircraft or army unit can get to and return from the target. With DWs, its more a 

concern of once access is gained, does the expertise or vehicle exist in order to employ 

the technology. This is one area requiring greater civil and military cooperation. 

14) Escalation control--If the US is determined to respond to a crisis, 

conventional weapons may more readily prompt an increase in hostilities, whether it be 

terrorist action or reprisal in kind. Whereas, the ability to act in a disabling fashion with 

significant enough effects, may coerce a behavioral change without escalating to more 

deadly and destructive force. 

b. CONCLUSION 

I list fourteen factors and conditions that a campaign planner should consider 

throughout the spectrum of conflict. Although the above factors address many of the 

correct questions to ask when faced with selecting weapons type and employment 

strategies, the answers to the conditions are less helpful. I accredit the latter phenomena 

primarily to the limited use of disabling technologies in the past and a lack of enthusiasm

towards pursuing their future use. When the research into the "demand" for 

communications is integrated with the "supply" subset, my recommendation becomes 

more evident. The resistance to pursuing a strong disabling technologies program is 

somewhat predictable viewed in light of budget constraints which threaten the existence 

of major weapons systems and force structure. Ironically, budgetary constraint provides 

one of the strongest arguments for incorporating disabling technologies into our forces. 

61
My research suggests that information is one of the most, if not the most, vital 

elements of combat capability. While still vulnerable to lethal attacks, the modern 

telecommunications system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to disabling attacks. 

Because of these vulnerabilities, and the additional options disabling technologies offer 

throughout the spectrum of conflict, I recommend a strategy to pursue research, 

development, and use of these technologies. Since the US is also vulnerable to 

information warfare, development of a strong disabling technologies program will 

provide at a minimum a countermeasures capability. It may also result in unanticipated 

capabilities no one foresees at the moment. However, until disabling technologies 

improve, it is imperative we employ them in such a way that, if they fail to achieve the 

desired effects, they do not fail catastrophically. In other words, sufficient lethal force 

should still be applied to achieve objectives. 

NOTES 

1Letter from Dr. John Alexander, Director of Disabling Technologies Program, Los Alamos National

Laboratories, 6 January 1992, addressed to Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff referencing a target matrix to aid in weapons selection relative to conditions applicable to varying 

scenarios. This matrix identifies targeting factors and lists considerations for each. However, it does not 

suggest which weapon to select based on that condition. For example, when analyzing the factor of 

ìintelligence,î the condition given is ìpoor-excellent,î not ìif you have this type of intelligence, one type 

technology would be more suited than another.î 

62
APPENDIX A 

 a. CONFIGURATION PERSPECTIVE 

1. Are there critical nodes the loss of which should inordinately degrade network 

 performance?

 2. Are there critical geographic areas where a limited amount of ordinance could 

 destroy a large number of nodes?

 3. How do pertinent performance parameters change with the loss of increasing 

 numbers of nodes?

 4. How do pertinent performance parameters change with the loss of increasing 

 numbers of links?

5. Are there critical links the loss of which would inordinately degrade network 

 performance?

6. Can an adversary jam physical communication links so as to prevent a user from

entering traffic when he desires?

7. Do nuclear effects degrade performance on any communication links or 

communication equipment in the network? Is salvage fusing an effective threat?

 8. Is the network dependent on a single or a few links or nodes for message 

 transmission?

 9. Can link capacities maintain adequate network performance under heavy load 

 conditions?

10. Which interceptible parameters are essential for effective use of physical 

 destruction?

11. Can critical nodes be identified, located or prioritized for targeting through analysis 

 of emissions?

12. Can critical geographic areas be identified, located or prioritized for targeting 

 through analysis of emissions?

13. Can traffic levels at each node be determined by observation of the link data stream?

63
14. Under any circumstances, are nodes which otherwise must keep a low spectral 

 profile (LPI) required to provide program uploads to other nodes?

15. Can the network's data link signal transmitters be detected, identified and located?

16. Can an adversary identify communication links or equipment in the network which 

 are most susceptible to nuclear effects?

17. Can emissions be exploited to identify critical links, geographic areas, or time 

 periods for jamming attack?

18. Are any critical links distinguishable by the type or volume of traffic they carry?

19. Which interceptible parameters are essential for effective use of link spoofing?

20. Which interceptible parameters are essential for effective use of network spoofing?

21. At what point in the mission is physical destruction effective for any identified 

 susceptibilities? 

22. At what point in the mission is jamming effective for any identified susceptibilities?

23. At what point in the mission is link spoofing effective for any identified 

 susceptibilities? 

24. At what point in the mission is network spoofing effective for any identified 

 susceptibilities? 

 b. ACCESS PERSPECTIVE 

 1. What is the relation between link errors (signal distortion), interference power level, 

 and modulation?

 2. What are the optimum interference waveform, power levels, and modulation 

 parameters?

 3. Can an adversary jam critical communication links?

 4. Are frequency division multiplexing techniques used anywhere in the network? 

 5. Do the frequency division multiplexing techniques allow an adversary to selectively 

 jam portions of the network of interest to him?

 6. Are code division multiplexing (CDMA) techniques used anywhere in the network? 

64
 7. Is there any way in which an adversary can increase the difficulty of using CDMA 

 under all network conditions, including simple jamming?

 8. Are multiple access techniques employed anywhere in the network? 

 9. Can an adversary enter information into the multiplexed time assess of TDMA links 

 or is the central multiplexing location a jamming target? 

10. Can network emissions be intercepted?

11. What signal parameters can be determined through intercept?

12. Is the generation rate of network entry requests (or invitations) great enough to 

jeopardize crypto variables, degrade throughput or create a susceptibility to replay?

13. Can user data be interpreted or subtly corrupted by spoofer who has successfully 

joined the network? 

14. Will the link receivers accept spoofing signals in either sync or information mode?

15. Can an adversary with adequate communication resources enter the network as 

 though he were a friendly network node?

 c. PROTOCOLS PERSPECTIVE 

 1. What type of ARQ (automatic repeat request) mechanism is used in the network?

 2. If Stop-and-Wait ARQ is used, can an adversary lengthen round trip delay by 

 eliminating nodes in order to decrease throughput?

 3. Has formal specification and verification been performed on all protocols?

 4. Is circuit service provided on any mission critical data?

5. Can segments of mission critical data be delayed or prevented from delivery by 

jamming one link along a circuit?

 6. Can pulse jamming produce inordinate degradation in protocol performance?

 7. Can the receiver lose frame alignment and be prevented from recognizing valid 

 frames?

8. What type of link flow control algorithm is used? (e.g. Stop and Go, Static Rate, 

Credit Windowing, Class, Stop and Wait)?

65
9. Where "Stop and Go" flow control is used, can an adversary inhibit "stop" control, 

causing sender to overrun receiver? 

10. Where "Stop and Go" flow control is used, can an adversary inhibit "go" control, 

blocking data from the sender?

11. Where "Stop and Go" flow control is used, can an adversary cause control frames to 

be delivered out of sequence causing overrun or blockage?

12. Where "Static Rate" flow control is used, can the receiver be caused to change state 

such that the static rate limitation results in overrun or under utilization?

13. Where "Credit/Windowing" flow control is used, can an adversary block receipt of 

credits and stop transmission by causing the sender to believe that the window is 

 exhausted?

14. If Go-Back-N ARQ is used, are the transmit and receive window sizes so large as to 

cause retransmission of an exorbitant number of packets is a single or Nak (negative 

acknowledgments) is lost?

15. What services are provided on message traffic at each OSI layer in the network? (e.g. 

circuit service, virtual circuit, datagram, sequenced, reliable...) 

16. Can the protocol acknowledgment, retransmission, error detection, or abnormal 

condition recovery procedures be manipulated to degrade network performance?

17. Where "Credit/Windowing" flow control is used, can an adversary introduce 

erroneous credits, causing the sender to overrun the receiver?

18. If Go-Back-N or Selective-Reject ARQ is used, can an adversary alter the sequence 

 of received frames in order to cause excessive? 

19. If Naks are used in the ARQ scheme (especially in Go-Back-N), can an adversary 

introduce or replay Naks to induce excessive retransmissions?

20. Is an alternate set of protocols used for program uploads which are simpler and more 

susceptible to attack? 

21. Do countermeasures targeted against higher level forms of attack degrade 

 performance sufficiently to render the network more susceptible to lower level forms 

 of attack? (i.e. dummy traffic injection or fixed length frames) 

22. Can the communication service types (reliable vs. unreliable, datagram vs. 

 connection oriented, sequenced vs. non-sequenced..) provided to traffic through a 

 particular node be determined by an adversary in order to infer the node types?

66
23. Can an adversary determine which protocols have not undergone formal verification 

and exploit this fact to degrade network performance?

24. Can individual messages be identified and distinguished by type, source, destination 

 or priority in the link data stream for the purpose of selective jamming? 

25. Can the spanning trees used in broadcast routing be determined from emissions, and 

used to suppress message delivery to large portions of the network by jamming 

relatively few links? 

26. Can the network layer services provided to host nodes be determined by an 

 adversary?

27. Can any encrypted control data be retrieved at the TRANSEC or COMSEC levels?

28. Can header and control information be identified and interpreted by an adversary? Is 

header and control data encrypted?

29. Can a knowledge of the protocol services provided at each layer be used to degrade 

 network performance?

30. Can false acknowledgments be introduced to inhibit reliable link service?

31. Can traffic be introduced to upset sequence numbering and acknowledgments?

32. Can an adversary spoof link or physical layer protocols so as to prevent a user from

entering traffic when he desires?

33. Can the protocols be induced to enter the initialization or disconnect procedures 

 inappropriately? 

34. Can the protocols be prevented from entering the connect procedure under certain 

 conditions?

35. Can protocol parameters be altered resulting in network performance degradation?

36. Where "Message Class" oriented congestion control is used, can a spoofer introduce 

fictitious high priority traffic, locking out access to other traffic types? 

 d. MANAGEMENT & CONTROL PERSPECTIVE 

 1. Can an adversary induce deadlock by exhausting message buffer space at a node?

67
2. Can fictitious data be introduced into routing tables to interrupt data paths, prevent 

delivery of certain messages, or increase congestion?

 3. How dependent is the network on a centralized control facility? 

4. Are there direct attack scenarios on communication network assets which can 

overwhelm computational capacity of network management algorithms? (e.g. 

Adaptive routing, Adaptive Link Assignment) 

5. Are there specific node failure rates at which direct attack could undermine network 

 management algorithms?

 6. What specific node failure rates cause inordinate degradation of network 

 management algorithms?

7. What is the maximum number of near simultaneous node failures accommodated by 

the network management algorithms?

8. Can the management and control facility maintain adequate network performance 

when outages occur? 

9. Can the distributed network management coordination technique be undermined by 

direct attack on network nodes?

10. How are links assigned in the network? Can link assignment be prevented from

adjusting to network failures? 

11. Can the network congestion control mechanism be disrupted leaving the network or 

portions of the network locked up?

12. Are any special message transmissions used to establish routing or topology 

 databases or network management functions? (e.g. adaptive routing, adaptive link 

 assignments) 

13. Can selective jamming of special messages used to establish routing or topology 

databases disrupt network management functions?

14. Are there jamming attack scenarios which can overwhelm computational capacity of 

network management algorithms? (e.g. Adaptive Routing, Adaptive Link 

 Assignment) 

15. Can pulse jamming induce oscillations in adaptive routing and delay or prevent 

message delivery on critical data paths?

16. Are there specific link failure rates at which pulse jamming could undermine 

 network management algorithms?

68
17. What specific link failure rates cause inordinate degradation of network management 

 algorithms?

18. What is the maximum number of near simultaneous link failures accommodated by 

 the network management algorithms?

19. Can link and node outage reporting be prevented from reaching the management and 

 control facility? 

20. Is distributed network management coordination explicit or implicit?

21. Can the distributed network management coordination technique be undermined by 

increasing bit error rate? 

22. At what bit error rate does the distributed network management coordination 

technique become unsatisfactory? (e.g. with respect to adaptive routing and link 

 assignment) 

23. How is message routing determined in the network? Can it be prevented from

adjusting to network failures? 

24. Are topology or routing updates required at some regular interval, such that jammers 

could synchronize with this update rate and prevent a node from receiving any 

 topology information?

25. What type of congestion control mechanism is used in the network?

26. Can an adversary provide incorrect network loading information to the congestion 

control mechanism, decreasing throughput through overloading or underutilization?

(e.g. can he induce false queue length indications) 

27. Can the network management and control facility detect and respond to abnormal 

conditions and unauthorized accesses to the network? 

28. What information must a node have in order to enter the network?

29. What sequence of events must a node carry out in order to enter the network?

30. Is the active role in network entry ascribed to nodes which are trying to join the 

network or nodes which are already in the network, or both?

31. Could a node be made to malfunction and overload the network by repeatedly 

requesting program uploads?

69
32. Is there any way an adversary can spoof or affect the central network controller in 

such a way as to degrade the capacity of the network?

33. If the congestion control mechanism uses permits to limit traffic in the network, can 

 an adversary obtain permits, thereby reducing capacity offered to authentic network 

 users?

34. Can the distributed network management coordination technique be undermined by a 

spoofer entering false control or status information, or by altering or delaying such 

 information? 

35. Does the network management and control design have the potential for an external 

influence to cause disruption of normal network operation through the inappropriate 

application of controls?

36. Does the network management and control and switching software: - Enforce safe 

operating limits on parameters and thresholds? - Log and report out-of-range 

 requests?

37. Are operator ID's included in all network management and control commands?

38. Are operator ID's verified prior to network management and control command 

 execution? 

39. Does network management and control and switching verify that each command is 

"reasonable" prior to execution?

40. Are directory updates controlled from a central location?

41. Can the directory update procedure be defeated?

42. Are the directory contents verified frequently?

43. Does the network management and control design include provisions for security 

 monitoring?

44. Does the network management and control design have the potential for an external 

influence to cause degradation of network performance through the consumption of 

excessive resources in valid but inappropriate management and control activities? 

45. Does the network management and control enforce safe limits on: periodic report 

rate, performance measurement intervals? 

46. Does the network management and control design include provision for switching to 

a backup control element? Can the switch over algorithm be defeated?

70
47. Do network reconstitution mechanisms adequately adapt to rapidly changing stresses 

of the network (i.e. jamming, physical destruction, EMP, nuclear propagation 

 effects)? Are these mechanisms susceptible to efforts to prevent the network 

 configuration from stabilizing? 

48. Is the network management distributed or centralized? How dependent is network 

operation on a centralized management and control facility? 

49. What network management and control information is maintained at the network 

management and control facility? 

50. What is the effect of delayed, altered, or inhibited network management and control 

status reports on network performance?

51. What is the effect of delayed, altered, or inhibited control messages sent to network 

 nodes?

52. Are consistent software versions intended to operate concurrently at each node in the 

 network?

53. Can software updates be interrupted?

54. Does the network send out periodic connectivity updates, such that a captured node 

could be connected and disconnected from the network at some rate, to induce 

 routing or link assignment oscillations? 

55. Is ETE encryption employed? Are messages decrypted and re-encrypted at 

 gateways?

56. Can power control software be reprogrammed to periodically throttle transmitted 

power down and up again at a rate matched to adaptive routing or link assignment 

reaction times, or at inappropriate times?

57. Can traffic be introduced to undermine link status estimators, making heavily loaded 

links appear lightly loaded or lightly loaded links appear heavily loaded? (e.g. early 

or late acknowledgments) 

58. Can a spoofer compromise the authentication process in order to request a software 

upload? (spoofer gains complete copy of network software and has potential for 

overloading the network with software upload request.) 

59. Can a spoofer compromise authentication process in order to provide a compromised 

software upload to other network nodes? (Could make network totally inoperable or 

supply subtle access to information in the network.) 

71
60. Can status reports to the management and control facility be delayed, altered, or 

prevented from reaching the facility? 

61. Can control messages sent to network nodes be delayed, altered, or prevented from

reaching the nodes?

62. Can the encryption keys and synchronization be tampered with, causing network 

 performance degradation?

63. Can fictitious data be introduced into topology databases, or link status databases to 

undermine adaptive routing or link assignment?

64. How are software uploads initiated?

65. How is a software upload disseminated through the network?

 e. INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE 

 1. Are there critical network users who would seriously degrade mission performance if 

 prevented from accessing the network? 

 2. Can critical users of the network be identified by an adversary?

 3. Can fictitious or corrupted user data be delivered over the network by a spoofer who 

 has joined the network?

 

72
APPENDIX B 

TARGETING FACTORS: 

FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS

- Target Value Low - High, 

 - Military 

 - Economic 

 - Social 

 - Political 

 - Psychological 

- Accessibility Easy - Difficult 

American Troops/Agent Foreign Agent, 

Weapon System (Manned, Remote, Space- 

 Based) 

Time of Accessibility (Life Cycle) 

- Design & Engineering 

 - Manufacturing 

 - Installation 

 - Pre-hostilities 

- Post onset of hostilities 

- During operation of system

- During dormant periods 

 Strength/Quality of Defense 

- Deniability Required, Desirable, Not Necessary 

 - Non-attributable 

- Attributed to others 

- Damage Required to Little - Major 

 Disrupt System - Few key nodes 

- Major damage to primary system

- Must take down primary & secondary 

 systems to be effective 

- Hardware vs software damage 

- Damage Detection/ Easy - Difficult 

 Battle Damage Assessment - No detectable damage (System just 

 doesn't work) 

- No visible damage 

- Hard to detect without special instruments 

- Physically destroyed (Cinder OK) 

73
- Time to Reaction Short - Long 

 - Immediate 

- Relatively short (Minutes/Hours) 

- Relatively long (Days/Months) 

 - Delayed 

- Delayed Reaction Time or Event Triggered 

 - Time

- Remote trigger, EM, Acoustic, Shock 

- Event - Parameter change (Temperature, 

 humidity, movement, pressure) 

- Policy Implications None - Extremely Adverse 

- To US interests in target area 

- To US interests in other area 

- To host nation 

- To target country 

- To other country/area 

- Legal issues 

- Short term vs long term results 

- Intelligence Poor - Excellent 

- Availability to planners/operators 

 - Current/accurate 

- Target specific 

- Ease of obtainability 

 - Timeliness 

- Restoration Easy - Difficult 

- For the US 

- For target country 

- For others 

 - Cost 

 - Time

- Material/parts availability 

- Effects reversibility 

- Countermeasures Easy - Difficult 

- For US 

- For others 

- Ease of detection 

 - Availability 

- Technology Sensitivity Low - High 

- Initiative lost once used 

74
- Not detectable when used 

 (Delivery system destroys evidence) 

- Masked by other system

- Cannot be duplicated 

- Control of Effects Tight - None 

- Only target location affected 

- May spread in environment 

 (Air, water, ground, plants, animals, etc.) 

 - Duration 

 (Short to persistent) 

- Non-targeted substances/items

- Effects Measurement Easy - Difficult 

- Externally observable 

 (Human, electro-optics, space-based) 

- Instrumentation required 

 (EM, IR, acoustic, other sensors) 

- Sensor system availability 

- Requirement for confirmation 

- Confidence Low - High 

- Degree of confidence weapon will produce 

 desired effect 

- Confidence in operation 

 (Weapon, intelligence, delivery) 

- Precision of effects 

- Delivery Requirements Easy - Difficult 

 - Accuracy 

 (Small CEP vs general area) 

 - Amount 

 (Size, weight, solid, liquid, gas) 

 - Distance 

- Weapons system availability 

- Special requirements 

 (Handling, shielding, etc.) 

- Collateral Damage/ Zero - High 

 Casualty Acceptability - Degree of target isolation 

- Occupancy of target 

 (Military, government, civilian, third 

 country, hostages, 

number/demographics) 

- Time at risk 

- Cultural factors 

75
 (Religious, political, social, etc.) 

- Environment/Health/ Mandatory - Waverable 

 & Safety Requirements (No inherently dangerous weapons) 

 

76
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