[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12557

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JAMES LAMAR STRICKLAND, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00002-RH-MAF

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-12557

Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

James Lamar Strickland was convicted of armed robbery in 

Florida state court and sentenced to life in prison. After exhausting 

his state postconviction remedies, Strickland filed a habeas petition. 

The district court denied the petition, and we affirm.

I 

A 

On January 16, 2011, two Florida State University students—Emiloina Pantner and Todd Laycock—were robbed at gunpoint on their way home from a bar in Tallahassee. According to 

their testimony, they were walking to Pantner’s car when an older, 

mustachioed white male wearing a hooded sweatshirt pulled up 

next to them in a green Ford Ranger pick-up truck. They testified 

that when the truck stopped, they were about an arm’s length away

from the passenger-side window and had a good view of the man 

inside the truck. 

The driver turned on the truck’s dome light, told the students that he lived out of his truck, and asked them for gas money. 

The students told him that they didn’t have any money, but the 

driver persisted, offering to sell them pornographic material. The

students again declined. After being turned down twice, the driver 

stated: “[W]ell what if I show you a gun now.” The driver then 

pulled out a gun, which prompted the students to fork over 

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20-12557 Opinion of the Court 3

whatever cash they had on them—a total of $11. The driver took 

their money, told the students to walk away, and drove off. 

As soon as the robber left, the students found a university

police officer, who called the Tallahassee police. Once Tallahassee 

police arrived, the students recounted what had happened and described the robber. One of the students—Laycock—informed police that he had been able to identify the first three letters of the 

license plate: “BJM.” Laycock also told the officer that it was a Florida plate, but later said he hadn’t been sure about that fact. Neither 

student noticed any other distinguishing features of the truck. 

Strickland was a resident of Cairo, Georgia, which is about 

30 miles from Tallahassee near the Florida/Georgia line. He drove 

a green Ford Ranger carrying a Georgia license plate that began 

“BJM” and that had been in an accident that had not been repaired. 

Using the information the students provided and a database containing Georgia and Florida license plates, the investigator identified Strickland as a suspect. Moreover, the investigator was able to 

determine that Strickland had been in Tallahassee when the crime 

occurred. Despite all of that information, the investigator testified 

that he did not go to Strickland’s address or attempt to search his 

truck. The jury heard testimony that—due to a decision not to 

search the truck—the police never found a gun, hooded sweatshirt, 

or pornographic material connected to Strickland. 

About a week after the robbery, police showed the students 

a photographic lineup of four suspects, which was compiled from

the information the students provided and the investigation that 

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followed. Pantner was able to narrow the selection to two people—in positions three and four of the lineup—but couldn’t state 

with absolute certainty which one was the robber. Laycock was 

able to positively identify the suspect in position four as the robber. 

That suspect was Strickland, and Laycock identified him again at 

trial. 

On that information, the jury found Strickland guilty of 

armed robbery with actual possession of a firearm. As a prison releasee reoffender, see Fla. Stat. § 775.082, the state court sentenced 

Strickland to life in prison. 

Here’s what the jury didn’t hear: The day after the Tallahassee robbery, on January 17, 2011, Strickland had been arrested for 

an unrelated theft. When he was arrested, his truck was impounded and searched. An inventory of the search included a 

handful of random items—a Christmas tree, a weed eater, and 

other sundries—but it didn’t include a hooded sweatshirt, gun, or 

pornographic material. For whatever reason, although the officer 

investigating the January 16th robbery in Tallahassee was aware of 

the January 17th arrest and that Strickland’s truck had been impounded as a result, he was under the impression that the truck had 

not been searched. 

Strickland had the same defense counsel for both criminal 

cases. But the attorney took at face value the investigator’s report 

for the January 16th robbery, which stated that the truck was not

searched in relation to the January 17th theft charge—the attorney 

didn’t cross reference the two cases. Instead, because Strickland

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intended to enter a guilty plea on the theft charge, and because he 

was going to trial on the higher stakes robbery charge, the attorney 

focused his attention on the robbery case. In so doing, he ignored 

a material fact—it wasn’t police incompetence that failed to uncover the pornographic material, hooded sweatshirt, or gun from 

Strickland’s truck; instead, police had failed to uncover those items 

because they weren’t in the truck when the police searched it.

So, turning back to the trial for the January 16th robbery, the 

jury received false testimony that the truck had never been 

searched. They were left with the impression that the incriminating items were never found due to a failure to search; not that the 

truck actually was searched but that the search was fruitless.

B 

Strickland appealed his conviction for the January 16th robbery in state court, and it was affirmed without an opinion. Strickland v. State, 128 So.3d 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). He then 

sought postconviction relief in Florida, pursuant to Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.850. He asserted that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecution had committed a Brady violation by withholding exculpatory evidence. See 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The state court denied him 

postconviction relief, which was affirmed on appeal. Strickland v. 

State, 258 So.3d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).

Having exhausted his state postconviction remedies, Strickland brought a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-12557

magistrate judge recommended that his petition be denied and the 

district court adopted that recommendation. But the district court

granted a certificate of appealability on the following question:

[W]hether the petitioner is entitled to relief based on 

his attorney’s ineffective assistance of counsel as to, 

or the state’s failure to disclose, that the petitioner’s 

truck was searched the day after the robbery at issue 

and no hoodie, pornography, or gun was found.

Strickland timely appeals the district court’s habeas denial on those 

grounds.1

II 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996, “an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court shall not be granted by a federal court 

unless the decision is ‘contrary to’ or is an ‘unreasonable application of’ ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent.” Hall v. 

Head, 310 F.3d 683, 690 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)); see also 28 U.S.C. 

1 Strickland also asserts a Brady violation with respect to the investigator’s failure to preserve the list of vehicles created based on Laycock’s partial license 

plate identification. But we don’t consider that argument because our “review 

is limited to the issues specified in the COA.” Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 

1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

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20-12557 Opinion of the Court 7

§ 2254(d).2 That “standard is intentionally difficult to meet.” 

Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam) (quotation 

marks omitted).

Strickland challenges his state conviction on the grounds either that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that the 

prosecution committed a Brady violation—both of which arise 

from the same basic premise: The jury was misinformed as to 

whether police actually searched Strickland’s truck. Instead, the 

jury heard testimony that police never found any of the incriminating items because they didn’t look for them, not because they 

weren’t in his truck when police searched it.

We need not delve into the substance of Brady violations or 

ineffective-assistance claims. Any way we slice it—even if Strickland is right that his state trial was constitutionally defective—he 

wasn’t prejudiced by that defect.3 Put simply, there isn’t a 

2 “The district court’s determination of whether the state court decision was 

reasonable . . . is subject to de novo review.” Hall, 310 F.3d at 690.

3 For both Brady violations and ineffective-assistance claims, a habeas petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by the state court’s error. See 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (ineffective assistance of 

counsel); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999) (Brady violation). And 

the prejudice inquiry is the same for both: Whether there is a reasonable probability—“a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”—

that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the defect. 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681–82 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)

(adopting the Strickland prejudice standard for Brady violations); see also id. 

at 685 (White, J., concurring in the judgment and concurring in part) (same).

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-12557

reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been 

different but for the error that Strickland contends infected his trial. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

The state postconviction court determined that because 

“the defense [was] able to argue . . . lack of evidence as well as police incompetence,” and because the January 17th arrest occurred

“approximately 34 hours” after the January 16th robbery—giving 

Strickland time to “remove[]” the incriminating items before the 

search took place—any error that led to the jury being misinformed 

“ha[d] no effect at all” on the outcome of the case. That determination is a mixed question of fact and law, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

698, subject to AEDPA’s reasonableness standard, Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111–13 (2011). 

Accordingly, we may reverse only if the state court’s prejudice determination was “unreasonable.” Id. (reversing a grant of 

habeas relief in part because “[i]t would not have been unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude [petitioner’s] evidence of prejudice fell short of [Strickland’s] standard”). The district court held that “[u]nder the deferential standard applicable” 

here, the state court’s prejudice “conclusion [was] not ‘contrary to’ 

and did not involve ‘an unreasonable application of’ clearly established federal law.” We agree.

The jury heard ample evidence supporting Strickland’s guilt. 

For example, it heard: (1) eyewitness testimony from one of the 

victims identifying Strickland as the robber; (2) testimony from the 

other victim describing Strickland’s physical appearance, and 

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asserting that he had been able to identify Strickland as one of two 

possible suspects when he viewed a photographic line-up of possible suspects; (3) eyewitness testimony that the robber was driving

a green Ford Ranger with a license plate bearing the same first 

three letters as the license plate on Strickland’s green Ford Ranger; 

and (4) testimony that Strickland, who lived in Georgia, was in Tallahassee on the night of the robbery. 

Moreover, the jury heard testimony that the prosecutors 

had failed to uncover the gun, pornographic material, or hooded 

sweatshirt that were allegedly involved in the robbery—and it convicted Strickland anyway. It’s unlikely that the jury’s determination—in light of all of the facts listed above weighing in favor of 

Strickland’s guilt—would have been different had it been informed 

that, more than simply not finding the incriminating items, the police had searched for and still not found them. And that’s especially 

so given the roughly 34 hours that elapsed between the robbery 

and the search—ample time for Strickland to have moved the incriminating items out of his truck.

At a minimum, the state court’s prejudice determination—

that the search evidence wouldn’t have made a difference—wasn’t 

“an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 404–05 (cleaned up).

AFFIRMED.

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