AIR WAR COLLEGE 

AIR UNIVERSITY 

China in Space 

Civilian and Military Developments 

Colonel David J. Thompson, USAF 

and 

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Morris, USAF 

Air War College 

Maxwell Paper No. 24

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 

AUGUST 2001 
Air University 

Donald A. Lamontagne, Lt Gen, Commander 

Air War College 

David F. McGhee, Jr., Maj Gen. Commandant 

Stephen O. Fought, PhD, Dean 

Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Series Editor 

Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Essays Advisor 

College of Aerospace Research, Education and Doctrine

Bobby J. Wilkes, Colonel, Commander 

Air Power Research Institute 

James W.R. Titus, PhD, Dean of Research, Air University

Allan W. Howey, Colonel, Director 

Harry N. Newton, Chief, Research Support 

This Maxwell Paper, and others in the series, is available electronically at

the Air University Research web site http://research.au.af.mil under

“Papers” then “Special Collections.” Email comments on this paper to:

lawrence.grinter@maxwell.af.mil. 

The Air War College is pleased to acknowledge the assistance of the

Research Support Division of the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) in the technical preparation and publication of this paper.

Disclaimer 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied

within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the 

Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

 ii
Foreword 

In October 1956, Mao Tse-tung ordered the start of China’s space 

program. Four years later, on 5 November 1960, China launched its

first rocket, becoming the fourth country, behind Germany, the United 

States, and the Soviet Union, to enter space. Today China routinely 

launches space satellites for Western companies, including US corporations, and is increasing its share of the global space launch market. But

the Chinese also use the technology and assistance gained in foreign 

ventures for PRC military applications. And a principal organization in

China’s space effort, the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, has 

been identified by the US State Department as engaging in missile 

technology proliferation activities. 

How does China’s space effort fit into its overall development strategy? What is China doing in military space applications? These are 

the two principal questions addressed, in order, by Lt Col William R.

Morris and Col David J. Thompson, both of whom traveled to the PRC

in the spring of 2001. 

Lt Col Morris examines the relationship between China’s evolving

space effort and its national development goals. He shows how the

Chinese have used their space launches both for fund raising and employment activities, and as a foreign policy tool: Beijing now has 

space-related technical and economic cooperation with over 70 countries. But the Chinese also use spin-offs and pirated technologies from

space operations to enhance their imagery, signals, and communications intelligence. The author also speculates that the Chinese may be

developing electronic pulse weapons and lazer dazzlers that could degrade an adversary’s satellites. 

Col Thompson, in his concentrated focus on China’s military space 

applications, examines PRC ground, space, counterspace, and space

policy aspects. His principal findings: China has plans to construct a

new launch site in the deep south; PRC telemetry, tracking and command capacities are improving; China has the ability to conduct limited

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions from space; the 

PRC is pursuing a counterspace capability most likely using satellite 

jammers and anti-satellites (possibly parasitic or nano-satellites). Col 

Thompson concludes that while China’s space program does not now

constitute a global threat, the PRC is pursuing space capabilities that 

will increase its regional influence, and deny an adversary certain uses 

of space. 

 iii
As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the spirit of 

academic freedom, open debate and serious consideration of the issues. 

We encourage your responses. 

 DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR. 

 Major General, USAF 

 Commandant, Air War College 

 iv
About the Authors 

Colonel David J. Thompson, USAF, graduated from the University

of Northern Colorado in 1978 and earned Masters Degrees at Central

Michigan University and the Naval War College. A Navigator and 

Specialist in Space Operations, Colonel Thompson’s experience includes C-130 and T-43 aircraft, and Spacelift Range Operations. Previous assignments include Director of Operations, 3rd Space Ops

Squadron, Schreiver AFB, Commander, Detachment 4, Ascension Island, Commander, 45th Range Squadron, Patrick AFB, and Military 

Staff Assistant, OSD/Operational Test and Evaluation, Pentagon.

Colonel Thompson is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 2001.

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Morris, Air National Guard, graduated from Auburn University in 1982, and earned an MBA from

Golden Gate University. He is a pilot with experience in F-16, F-15,

and F-5 aircraft. Lt Col Colonel Morris’s previous assignments include 

F-15/F-16 Instructor Pilot, Chief, Wing Weapons and Tactics, F-16, 

Assistance Director for Operations, 512th Fighter Squadron, Ramstein

AB, Chief, F-22 Avionics Requirements, ACC, Langley AFB, and

Chief of F-16 Weapon and Tactics, Tyndall AFB. Lieutenant Colonel

Morris is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 2001.

 v
Air War College 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama 

THE ROLE OF CHINA’S 

SPACE PROGRAM IN ITS 

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

STRATEGY

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Morris, USAF 
2 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

On 8 October 1956, the Central Committee of the Communist Party 

of China, presided over by Mao Tse-tung, established the Fifth Research Academy of the Ministry of National Defense to develop a space

effort.1 This was the official beginning of the People’s Republic of

China (PRC) space program. Just four years later, on 5 November 

1960, China launched its first rocket becoming the fourth country behind Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union, to enter space.2

The Chinese space program has survived periods of traumatic upheaval during its 44-year history. Today, space is the cornerstone of 

China’s national science and technology development effort.3 Beijing

is advancing China’s space program on a number of fronts hoping to 

become a recognized international space power. 

The Chinese leadership under Jiang Zemin wants China to become a 

strong, modern, and ultimately wealthy nation, in short a “great 

power.” Given its natural resources, manpower, nuclear forces, seat on

the UN Security Council, and growing economy, China wants “parity”

with other great powers. To do this Beijing has crafted a national development strategy led by certain sectors. The purpose of this paper is

to discuss how China’s space program aids the government in reaching

for great power status. 

China’s National Development Strategy 

In the 1970s and 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s advisers, picking up where 

Zhou Enlai had left off, developed a method of calculating China’s

national strength based on four subsystems of national power. Put into

practice, the strategy was termed the “Four Modernizations.”4

A RAND Corporation study terms the Chinese approach a “calculative” security strategy. It is pragmatic, emphasizing the primacy of

internal economic growth and stability, international relations, relative 

restraint in the use of force, while increasing efforts to modernize 

China’s military forces.5 The element of greatest importance remains

economic power. Beijing continues to place priority on efforts to promote rapid and sustained economic growth, to raise technological levels in sciences and industry, while developing and gaining access to 

national and global resources. As CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin

said in his closing speech to the Central Committee of the 14th Party

Congress in October 1992, “National defense construction and the construction of the military must rely on economic construction, and be

subordinate to the overall situation in the construction of the national

economy. Only when the national economy has developed can we provide the necessary material and technical basis for national defense 

modernization.”6
 MORRIS 3

While defense modernization, on the other hand, is lower on the official priority hierarchy, in the aftermath of Operation ALLIED 

FORCE in Kosovo numerous Chinese officials pushed for upgrading

the PRC’s national defense. Nevertheless, at the August 1999 leadership retreat at Beidaihe, the senior leadership elite reaffirmed its customary priorities.7

The Gulf War also had been a revelation to the Chinese – an introduction to 21st century tactics and weaponry that pointed out, in the

most graphic way, the limits of China’s massive but antiquated military.8

 Then came Operation ALLIED FORCE, clearly reemphasizing 

the need to improve the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in precisionguided weapons, advanced information technologies, and hightechnology weapons. Beijing is reforming China’s defense industries 

to gain a self-sufficient defense technology and production capability in

keeping with the emerging “revolution in military affairs.” 

In March 2001, during the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC),

President Jiang Zemin again emphasized China’s goals of development,

economic restructuring, reform, opening-up, and technological progress.

9

 So, at least rhetorically, China is reiterating the primary tenets 

of its 20-year-old national development strategy. 

But at the Ninth NPC it also was announced that defense spending

would increase by 17.7%. Talking to senior PLA officers at the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) in Beijing in March, they stated that a 

majority of that increase would be dedicated to salaries and personnel

retention.

10 But we also know that substantial areas of China’s actual 

defense spending are “off budget.” This lack of transparency into PRC 

defense spending (and space is related to defense) makes detailed PRC 

space spending hard to estimate. 

China’s Space Program 

The RAND Corporation defines spacepower as the pursuit of national objectives through the medium of space and the use of space 

capabilities. Developing a strategy for spacepower must include consideration of economic and political security interests as well as military goals and objectives.11 Space-related functions include commercial, civil, international, scientific, intelligence, and other military specific matters. 

China’s November 2000 White Paper on space activities states, “The 

Chinese government attaches great importance to the significant role of 

space activities in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country

with science and education and that of sustainable development, as well

as in economic construction, national security, science and technology

development and social progress.”12 Thus development of a viable
4 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

space force is seen as integral part of China’s national development 

strategy. 

The Beginnings 

The recognized father of the Chinese space program is Tsien Hsueshen, born in 1911. Tsien moved from China at the age of 24 to study

aeronautical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(MIT) and later at the California Institute of Technology (CalTech).

Shortly after receiving his Doctorate in 1939, Tsien Hsue-shen’s interest in rocketry began.13 He was deeply involved in US rocket and jet 

propulsion programs during the 1940s. In May 1945, with the fall of

Germany, Tsien was given the rank of temporary colonel in the US

Army to evaluate the German rocket programs.

14

But Tsien was subsequently caught up in the post-World War II

fears of communism and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s witch-hunts. In

August 1955 Tsien was deported to China.15 A year later Mao Tsetung formally established China’s space development program. Tsien 

Hsue-shen’s return to China may have been a serious factor in Mao’s

decision and timing.

Dr. Yanping Chen, in the May 1991 issue of Space Policy, divides

China’s space program into four distinct periods.

16 The first period, 

1956-1966, saw the Chinese establish a space program in spite of the 

trauma from Mao Tse-tung’s “Great Leap Forward” and withdrawal of

Soviet support. Loss of Soviet access was a real setback for China’s

science and technology efforts.

The second period, 1966-1976, witnessed China’s space program 

maintain a progressive course even though sectors of Chinese society 

were being torn apart by Mao’s “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” A notable accomplishment occurred on 24 April 1970 with the

successful launch of China’s first Earth satellite on the Long March-1 

rocket. However, the Cultural Revolution profoundly diminished the 

number of students in China’s technical schools and universities; again,

China’s space program was set back for years. 

The third period, 1976-1986, was an ambivalent period for the space 

program as China’s recovery from the Cultural Revolution slowly proceeded under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. As recently as August 

1978, Deng had stated, “As far as space technology is concerned, we

are not taking part in the space race. There is no need for us to go to

the Moon and we should concentrate our resources on urgently needed 

and functional practical satellites.”17 So China’s space budget was

trimmed to meet more modest ambitions. 

With the reductions in space spending (and budgeted defense spending) in the early 1980s, came Beijing’s authorization for China’s space 

agencies to generate income from external sources. On 29 January
 MORRIS 5

1984, the newest Long March-3 launcher vehicle inaugurated the 

Xichang facility in south-central China.18 Following a successful 

launch, China began offering Long March launchers to the West. In

effect, China’s space program was shifting orientation from the defense

sector to the civilian and commercial sector. 

According to Yanping Chen, the final period of China’s space development, beginning in 1986, has become the “heyday” of the space 

program. China had received little response to the offered launch services until a series of events occurred in 1986. They began with the 

disastrous loss of the United States space shuttle Challenger. Then two 

of America’s other leading rocket launchers, a Titan and a Delta, spectacularly exploded. Compounding these problems, Europe’s Ariane

also went down. Western companies in a hurry to launch satellites and 

facing increasing delays turned to Russia and China, about whose capabilities they knew little. 

The China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) has been actively marketing PRC launch services since those unfortunate events. 

The world’s space failures in 1986 made the versatile and flexible Long 

March family of launch vehicles attractive to the international market. 

The first launches for paying customers involved experimental payloads using the Long March-2, first for a French company (Matra) in

1987 and then for a German consortium (Intospace) in 1988.19 China’s 

Space Leading Group (SLG), under the State Council, was established 

in 1991. The SLG’s primary purpose has been to oversee and coordinate all space activities in a broad policy-making role.20 The Space 

Leading Group also has the responsibility for attracting foreign contracts. The Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA), established in 1993, is the executive agency for space functions responsible

to the Premier who also sits on the Space Leading Group.21

Revenues earned by China’s commercial launches are shared between two government organizations, the Commission of Science,

Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and the

China Aerospace Corporation (CASC). Within CASC, profits are 

shared between the Chinese Academy of Launcher Technology

(CALT) entities involved in manufacturing the launch vehicle; 

CGWIC, as the marketing and contracting agent; and CASC headquarters. 

Economic Impacts 

China’s first 10 space launches grossed approximately $500 million, 

or an average of $50 million per launch. With the cost of each Chinese 

launch vehicle estimated at $5 million to $10 million, the commercial 

launch business is extremely profitable.22 In November 2000 Beijing

reported that China had launched 27 foreign-made satellites into space, 
6 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

thus acquiring a significant share of the international commercial market.

23 There are a number of contracts either signed or under negotiation. By 1999, China had launched 7% of the total satellites put up in

the world. With demand for satellite launch services booming, China is 

continuing to increase its share of the global market in the 21st century.24

With relatively lower labor costs, and propped up with government 

subsidies, the CGWIC offers very attractive launch fees to the international market. China’s economy gets a financial boost, an influx of 

technology, and world recognition. By agreement with the US in 1994, 

however, Beijing is only allowed to price launches 15% below the

market to protect US launch companies from unfair pricing.25 US

manufactured products on satellites launched by any other country also 

require an export license that must be granted by Washington. These 

two factors have limited China’s ability to seize a larger share of the 

world’s space launch market. 

China’s space industry has benefited economically from its reinvigorated space program in several ways. Conducting research and development on space systems, building varying missile and guidance systems, building satellite systems, building space launch complexes, and 

operating and maintaining the space launch and control systems are all

vital to a space program and involve high-technology workers. So not

only are jobs created, but also the “pull” from the space program fosters

better educational institutions and more graduates. Marketing this capability brings income into government agencies, which feeds further 

space development. 

Specifically, CASC and its sub-contracted industries have an estimated 270,000 employees. By 1986, the Chinese were able to identify

1800 spin off-items generated by the space industry.26 The space program has accelerated the pace in a wide range of Chinese industrial 

technologies and products. For example, it has driven development of

computers, modern electronics, precision engineering, chemicals, and 

high-strength materials. 

Until recently, communication and broadcasting capabilities in

China were very poor. The great expanse of China is characterized by 

many remote districts and varied terrain making it difficult to connect

ground-based systems. However the use of operational satellites is

resulting in rapid development of telecommunications, television, and 

radio broadcasting in China. Traditional ground-based systems are 

being skipped for satellite systems. One analysis shows traditional

systems would cost twice as much and provide only 80% coverage as

opposed to 100% coverage for a satellite system.

27 Launched satellites

for civilian and government use today include telecommunications, 
 MORRIS 7

television broadcasting, meteorology, natural resources, earth observation, and scientific experiment. 

The Chinese are attempting to overcome their huge technology lag 

by uniting with other countries in joint ventures. Beijing has promoted

technical and economic cooperation and exchanges to jointly develop

satellites and other space related articles with more than 70 countries 

and regions.

28 Commercial collaboration in other industries such as 

aviation also has helped the PRC achieve significant improvements in

process and quality control standards.29 For example, China gained 

experience from the bi-national effort to produce and launch the ChinaBrazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). 

Technical Challenges

During the mid-1990s, China experienced a rash of mishaps and 

failures in its space program. Several of these incidents involved USbuilt satellites being destroyed or damaged. The loss of confidence by

commercial contractors, and by the Chinese themselves, forced a rigorous program overhaul dealing with quality control and launch safety. 

The program was put under international quality standards, additional 

quality checks, and a redesign of the guidance systems. These steps

have improved China’s space program in both quality and success. 

Several incidents involved the US firms of Loral Space & Communications Company and Hughes Space & Communications Company. 

After a 1995 accident, Hughes engineers determined that the Chinese 

had been using an “oversimplified” model to predict the effect of wind

shear and other forces on their rocket launches.30 Following a second 

failure in 1996 of their Intelsat 708 satellite launch, Loral formed a

review committee of representatives from several aerospace companies

to evaluate China’s investigation of the launch. The Loral report gave

feedback to the Chinese regarding other suspected causes of failure. 

With Loral and Hughes having vested interests in the future success of 

China’s space launch program, the Chinese in effect got outside technical assistance from two prominent US companies. 

But a variety of technical problems continue. For example, “kick

motors” are designed to boost satellites from geosynchronous transfer 

orbit (~600 miles high) up to geosynchronous orbit (~22,300 miles 

high) using solid rocket propellant. These motors need to have the correct grain structure and shape to produce exactly the right amount of

thrust for the right amount of time. Chinese “kick motors” are considerably behind US-designed motors in accuracy and detail. A lack of 

confidence has had foreign firms wanting to first validate the propellant

and witness test firings of the Chinese motors. These certifications

have resulted in more reliable, efficient kick motors as well as other 

solid-rocket motor designs for the Chinese.31 Whether that improve-
8 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

ment is due to export of technology, espionage, or national scientific 

advancement (or some combination), the results indicate the Chinese 

are progressing. 

The US House of Representatives felt it necessary to look into how 

far Loral and Hughes had gone in identifying problems and assisting

the Chinese in rectifying their rocket launch failures. The Final Report

of the Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, more 

commonly referred to as the “Cox Report,” made a number of charges 

against both China and several US organizations. The Cox Report

dealt with technology acquisition related to China’s nuclear weapons,

missile, and satellite development. “To acquire US technology the 

PRC uses a variety of techniques, including espionage, controlled

commercial entities, and a network of individuals and organizations

that engage in a vast array of contacts with scientists, business people, 

and academics.”32 Although most of the Cox Report’s allegations were

not proven, and remain disputed within US government and business 

circles, one thing is clear – the Chinese are advancing their space capabilities by whatever means possible. 

International Impacts 

China’s international space activities in government-to-government 

agreements and business joint-ventures now include Australia, Brazil, 

Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 

Russia, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States. These relationships have earned China a level of respect and esteem they clearly desire in the modern high-technology world. 

Nevertheless, the US State Department identified CGWIC as one of

two Chinese entities engaged in missile technology proliferation activities.33 With China selling missile systems and missile technology to 

countries the US considers “rogue states,” such as Iraq, Iran, and North 

Korea, Washington was forced to impose trade sanctions on the PRC in

accordance with the Arms Export Control Act. These sanctions included denial of license applications for export items of US-made satellites to be launched on Chinese launch vehicles covered by the Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Ultimately Beijing made concessions, agreeing to abide by the MTCR, “on principle.” 

In 1997 it was reported that China put its first satellite monitoring

station abroad in the South Pacific. The ground station, located on 

South Tarawa Island belonging to the Republic of Kiribati, has commercial and military strategic significance. The station conducts a variety of missions to include satellite control, data downlinks, and data 

intercepts for the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General 

(CLTC).34 This government agency has the responsibility to track and
 MORRIS 9

control China’s domestic satellites through a network of locations. The 

South Pacific location is also ideal to track and monitor US satellite and

rocket launches from Vandenberg AFB, California, and other US Navy

communications. It is unconfirmed as to the existence of any related

Chinese intelligence collection, but the site has raised suspicion.

CLTC recently reached a cooperation agreement with the Swedish 

Space Corporation (SSC).35 This agreement allows each organization 

to purchase services from the other’s network of control centers and

ground stations. This expands China’s network potential and serves to

enhance their international reputation. 

Technology Gains 

With the end of the Cold War, the US economy underwent a major 

transformation. To stay alive and relevant, defense firms had to increase their sales in the commercial and overseas markets. Former Secretary of Defense Perry realized it would be necessary to compromise 

and open up to a greater flow of dual-use technologies abroad to maintain the US defense industry base.36

China obviously has benefited from this greater US openness. A

great deal of technology being applied to commercial space systems

can be carried over to military systems. An imagery satellite, for example, whether it is being used for military or civilian purposes, requires the same basic technical capabilities for gathering data. A rocket

launch vehicle delivering a civilian satellite to space or a ballistic missile delivering a nuclear warhead also are largely identical in forms of 

rocket science, guidance technology, environmental stresses, etc. 

The United States is rightfully concerned with Chinese dual-use and 

pirated technologies being garnered in commercial space programs as 

demonstrated by events leading up to the Cox Report. Dual-use technologies have accelerated China’s technological advancements. It is,

however, strongly believed that the Chinese still lag behind. A Nixon 

Center report released in 2000 concluded that, “The reality is that the 

technological gap between the Chinese and the US is most likely growing,” particularly in such areas as computers, satellite communications, 

and precision-guided munitions.37

Military Significance and Space Capabilities 

American forces in Operation DESERT STORM clearly demonstrated the significant contribution and value of space assets to military 

forces. US satellites served as valuable force multipliers to operational

commanders and personnel. Space forces provided time critical data

and information related to ballistic missile attacks, worldwide communications, up-to-date weather information, pinpoint navigation and positioning, and vital intelligence and reconnaissance information about
10 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

Iraqi forces and assets. The Chinese clearly understand this. Moreover, Chinese strategists appear to have grasped the concept of space

dominance. PLA leadership acknowledges space as an essential dimension of regional warfare. 

For example, in 2000 the PRC Defense Minister said that spacepower is viewed as the key to China’s planning to supplant the United 

States.38 PLA doctrine would deny the advantages of space to the US, 

seeking to leverage space for China’s own advantage. This is in direct 

confrontation with the recently released Rumsfeld Commission report

characterizing space as a “vital national interest” for the United 

States.39 As the Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tao Daily reported in

January 2001, “to ensure winning in a future high-tech war, China’s 

military has been quietly working hard to develop asymmetrical combat

capability [sic] so that it will become capable of completely paralyzing

the enemy’s fighting system when necessary by ‘attacking selected

vital points’ in the enemy’s key areas.”40 This correlates to CIA Director George J. Tenet’s February 2001 testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee that weaker foreign militaries view US space systems as a key vulnerability during potential conflicts.41

The Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST) is responsible 

for spacecraft production including satellites. China has launched three 

basic types of satellites: imagery intelligence (IMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and communications. The imagery intelligence satellites are the Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) recoverable satellite series. By

mid-1999 a total of 17 FSW-class launches had occurred with 15 successful recoveries.42 These photo reconnaissance satellites orbited the

earth for up to 16 days before recovering to have their recorded images 

developed. Resolution quality and the recovery requirement are signs

of the lagging capabilities. 

China also is pursuing higher resolution imaging capabilities with

remote sensing to expand their usefulness. Another IMINT area being

pursued is synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability. A radar satellite 

will not only provide imagery in a different spectrum, but will have allweather, round-the-clock capabilities. 

The Shi Jian (SJ) series of spacecraft are considered to be a SIGINT 

category of satellites. China’s SJ-2 satellite was first launched on 20 

September 1981 in an orbit characteristic of an electronic intelligence 

(ELINT) mission. The SJ-2 is China’s first suspected SIGINT satellite.43 Beijing has not pursued space-based SIGINT systems as they

have ground, air, and sea platforms, but efforts are believed to be underway. 

The Feng Huo-1 (FH-1) satellite is the first space-based communication platform for China. This satellite was launched in January 2000 as 

the first of several military communication satellites being part of the 
 MORRIS 11

Qu Dian command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) system.

44 Qu Dian will provide commanders a capability

to communicate and share information with their theater forces in nearreal time. This system may afford a huge advancement in the communication field to the PLA. 

China is emphasizing dual-use systems, which provide benefits today and potential benefits to future PLA operations. For example, the

PRC has deployed advanced imagery reconnaissance and earth resource systems. These can be used to advance their economy, agriculture, and environment management today, but they also have potential

military applications tomorrow. The CBERS system, mentioned earlier, also can provide militarily useful data although it was developed 

under the premise of bi-national cooperation and non-military use. 

China’s aerospace industry is seeking to integrate global positioning 

system (GPS) and Russian Global Navigation Satellite System

(GLONASS) guidance technology into their jet fighters and helicopters. Loath to be dependent on foreign systems, China is developing its 

own navigation satellite constellations. The Twinstar Rapid Positioning System, or Beidou Navigation System (BNS), consists of just two 

satellites in geosynchronous orbits. The first satellite of the Twinstar 

system, the Beidou Navigation Test Satellite-1 (BNTS-1), was successfully launched on 31 October 2000.

45 China’s first satellite navigation 

system was completed with the BNTS-1B launch and successful deployment was on 21 December 2000.46

With just two satellites, the BNS is a very rudimentary satellite navigation system. Li Hairu, Deputy Chief Designer, states the system’s

primary purpose is for highway and railway transportation within China 

and seafaring in the Pacific Ocean.47 The positioning accuracy is very

coarse, but it does provide all-weather, round-the-clock operation. 

Most importantly, however, it is the first indigenous Chinese system. 

For greater accuracy, a follow-on system consisting of four satellites 

in geosynchronous orbit is already planned.48 Lessons learned from the 

BNS will surely be applied for any follow-on system. Both of these

systems will only provide regional navigation services, rather than

worldwide navigation capability. Of course Chinese plans could change

and a more robust system be deployed, but several possible factors affect the decision of the Chinese to deploy these limited systems. The 

US and Russian global navigation satellite systems could continue to be

utilized to support worldwide needs. There are additional technical 

requirements and tremendous associated costs with deploying a global

system that simply may not be justifiable. Perhaps most importantly, 

China’s military has shown no explicit expeditionary ambitions, and

thus its worldwide navigational needs are minimal.
12 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

The counterspace arena also is receiving PRC emphasis. For several 

years it has been reported that China has been acquiring a variety of 

foreign technologies which could be used to develop an anti-satellite

capability. Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, reported in February 2000 to the Senate Intelligence

Committee that China had “across-the-board programs” underway to

develop weapons and systems to attack and counter US satellites and 

space sensors.49 CIA Director George Tenet and Admiral Wilson believe that by 2015 adversaries will be able to employ a wide variety of

means to disrupt, degrade, or defeat portions of US space support systems. 

China is suspected of developing ground-based laser weapons and 

electronic pulse weapons that could blind or destroy satellites.50 A

weapon does not need to destroy a satellite to render it useless, just

damage the susceptible optical sensors. The closer Sino-Russian relationship also is contributing to China’s advancement, as Russia turns

the former Soviet Union’s tremendous Cold War research and development budgets and technological advancements into economic gains. 

It is also accepted that China possesses laser dazzlers capable of degrading or defeating the ability of adversary satellites to gather intelligence. The Sing Tao Daily reported in January 2001 that China had 

ground tested a potentially very potent satellite weapon called a “parasite satellite.” This micro-satellite could attach itself to a targeted satellite with the intent of jamming or destroying it under command.

51 

These types of systems tend to confirm US intelligence suspicions that 

space will be a new theater of warfare. 

Some senior PLA officers, evidently, prefer the US to believe otherwise. Chinese officers recently refuted any counterspace goals of the

PRC and challenged Americans not to believe everything we read from

their press.52 This obvious propaganda directly contradicts what the

PRC government and national press have reported numerous times in

the recent past, as well as American intelligence reporting.

So China is addressing the demands of 21st century warfare. Such

things as small booster systems that will be available on short notice for 

contingency support are being developed. Protective measures for satellites such as small size thermal shielding, and EMP protection, are 

being implemented.53 Recently there were reports that “radiationhardened” integrated circuits were shipped to China through Singapore 

from a US company.54 Beijing can be expected to aggressively continue acquiring modern weapons-related goods from the US and others

for its space and military modernization programs. 
 MORRIS 13

Future Plans 

The Chinese people’s dream of space flight may be characterized as 

originating with the famous legend of Goddess Chang’e flying to the 

Moon.

55 On 20 November 1999, China began that journey with the 

launch of its unmanned spacecraft named Shenzou, or “Vessel of the

Gods.” The spacecraft is designed to carry China’s first astronauts, or 

“taikonauts,” to the Moon in the near future. The Project 921 spacecraft has obvious Soyuz-like design characteristics, thus hinting at a 

substantial amount of Russian assistance. This first unmanned flight

from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in northwest Gansu province

orbited the Earth 14 times before landing 21 hours later.56 Although

unmanned, it has major military and commercial implications. 

After much delay and anticipation the Shenzou-2 (SZ-2) launch occurred on 10 January 2001, the second unmanned launch.

57 During the

nearly 7 day voyage, various subsystems for manned flight were tested. 

Chinese press reports indicate mice, plants, and other organisms were

along for the ride. While the Chinese media insist it was a perfect mission, no pictures of the re-entry capsule have been released. 

The global applause that Communist Party officials in Beijing were

hoping for did not materialize. Despite Beijing’s public optimism,

technical problems, funding shortages, and political interference are 

expected to continue hampering China’s man into space program.

58

The first two Chinese taikonauts are active-duty PLAAF fighter pilots trained in Russia. China has initiated its own training center with a

group of other candidates for the future manned spacecraft program.

Russian technical and cooperative assistance is evident. 

China also has mentioned becoming involved in the international

space station, exploring deep space, and even setting up a permanent 

lunar base by 2015 to mine Helium-3 from the Moon’s soil, an excellent fuel source for nuclear fusion plants, producing virtually no radioactive by-product.59 A space shuttle load of Helium 3 could supply US 

energy needs for a year, according to Apollo17 astronaut Harrison 

Schmitt.60 

Conclusion 

The People’s Republic of China’s space program has come a long

way since its birth in 1956. From humble beginnings, periods of meager budgets, political chaos, and shortages of well-educated engineers 

and scientists, the space program has somehow managed to continue, 

and today it thrives. The Soviet Union and the United States developed

their large space programs around national security needs. Moscow

and Washington, as of late, have carried over that technology into

commercial sectors of their economies. Beijing, on the other hand, has
14 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

its space program focused around China’s national development strategy, prioritizing the economy first. 

The economic benefits of space to China have come in a variety of

ways – from commercial services, to jobs programs, to improving educational programs, to industry spin-offs and more. Joint ventures and 

international agreements have improved China’s stature and global

respect. These features combined with other ongoing Chinese efforts to 

acquire information, whether it be in the form of technical assistance, 

scientific advancement, technology transfer, or even espionage, are

enabling China to further advance its military space assets and capabilities. 

In the United States, the National Reconnaissance Office has pursued space-based capabilities for 40 years because President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower and his successors clearly understood the significance of 

space reconnaissance to our national security. Today, China also 

shares a doctrine that views space as vitally important to its national 

security, and as an arena for competition. China’s space industry will 

remain an integral part of the nation’s comprehensive development

strategy. 

Notes 

1

 Brian Harvey, The Chinese Space Programme: From Conception to Future Capabilities

(New York, N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 4-5. 2

 Ibid., 11-12. 3

 Marcia S. Smith, China’s Space Program: A Brief Overview Including Commercial 

Launches of U.S.-Built Satellites, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: The 

Library of Congress, 23 June 1998), CRS-3. 4

 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Defense 

Link, 22 June 2000, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 28 November 2000, available from

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm. 5

 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, RAND

Report MR-1121-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), 113. 6

 Quoted from Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Cox Report on Governance and Policy in 

China: Problems of Fact, Evidence, and Inference,” in The Cox Committee Report: An 

Assessment, ed. by M. M. May (Stanford, Calif.: The Center for International Security

and Cooperation, 1999), 28. 7

 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.” 8

 Douglas Waller, “China’s Arms Race,” Time 153, no. 4 (1 February 1999): 32. 9

 “Top State Leaders Join Group Discussions,” China Daily, 7 March 2001, 1. 10 Discussions at Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing, China, 9 March 2001. 11 Dana J. Johnson, Scott Pace, and C. Bryan Gabbard, SPACE: Emerging Options for 

National Power (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998), xi. 12 “China’s Space Activities, a White Paper,” SpaceRef.com, 22 November 2000, n.p.; 

on-line, Internet, 28 November 2000, available from

http://www.spaceref.com/china/china.white.paper.nov.22.2000.html. 
 MORRIS 15

13 Harvey, 1-2. 

14 Ibid., 3. 

15 Lewis R. Franklin, “A Critique of the Cox Report Allegations of PRC Acquisition of 

Sensitive U.S. Missile and Space Technology,” in The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment, ed. by M. M. May (Stanford, Calif.: The Center for International Security and 

Cooperation, 1999), 84. 

16 Smith, CRS-2. 

17 Harvey, 36. 

18 Ibid., 63. 

19 Smith, CRS-4. 

20 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, 

SSI (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 1999), 173. 

21 Harvey, 100. 

22 Stokes, 176. 

23 “China’s Space Activities, a White Paper,” SpaceRef.com, 22 November 2000, n.p.; 

on-line, Internet, 28 November 2000, available from 

http://www.spaceref.com/china/china.white.paper.nov.22.2000.html. 24 Kenneth G. Weiss, “Space Dragon: Long March, Missile Proliferation, and Sanctions,” 

Comparative Strategy 18, no. 4 (October-December 1999): 347. 25 Ibid. Also see the appraisal by Kathryn L.Gauthier,”China as a Peer Competitor ? 

Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare”, in Lawrence E. 

Grinter(ed.), The Dragon Awakes: China’s Military Modernization Trends and Implications( Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 1999), p.21 26 Harvey, 111. 

27 Lt Col J. Barry Patterson, “China’s Space Program and Its Implications for the United 

States,” Research Report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 19 April 1995), 13. 28 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.” 29 John Pike, “China: Dual-Use Space Technology,” Prepared Testimony before the 

House Science Committee, 25 June 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 28 November 2000, 

available from http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/h980625-pike.htm. 30 Brian Duffy and Warren P. Strobel, “When Rocket Science Turns Troublesome,” U.S. 

News & World Report 125, no. 24 (21 December 1998): 32. 31 Patterson, 21. 

32 House, Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, 105th Cong., 1999, H.R. 

851,xxxiii. 

33 Smith, CRS-5. 

34 “China Eyes US Military in S. Pacific,” Christian Science Monitor 89, no. 235 (30 

October 1997): 7. 

35 Solina Strand, “Chinese and Swedish Satellite Operators Sign Long Term Access 

Agreement,” SpaceDaily, 24 January 2001, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 26 January 2001, 

available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-01p.html. 36 In what came to be known as “the Last Supper,” Deputy Defense Secretary William 

Perry announced in 1993 to a gathering of senior executive defense contractors that half 

of them would soon disappear from Pentagon payrolls as victims of dramatically falling 

procurement budgets in the post-Cold War environment. Michael Hirsh, “The Great 

Technology Giveaway?,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 8. 37 Quoted in Paul Mann, “Chinese ‘Hegemony’ Called Decades Away,” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology 153, no.1 (3 July 2000): 33. 38 James H. Hughes, “Chinese Space Power,” Journal of Social Political & Economic 

Studies 25, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 231. 39 Editorial, “Rumsfeld II,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 January 2001, A.18. 
16 SPACE AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT 

40 Quoted in editorial, “Rumsfeld II.” 

41 Bill Gertz, “Space Seen as Battlefield of Future,” The Washington Times, 8 February 

2001, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 8 February 2001. Available from 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/default-20012823833.htm. 42 “China and Military Space Projects,” Federation of American Scientists, 23 June 2000, 

n.p.; on-line, Internet, 30 January 2001, available from 

http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/military/index.html. 43 Ibid. 

44 Ibid. 

45 “First China Navsat in Operation,” SpaceDaily, 22 November 2000, n.p.; on-line, 

Internet, 28 November 2000, available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china00zzr.html. 

46 Wei Long, “China Completes First Satellite Navigation System,” SpaceDaily, 8 January 2001, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 February 2001, available from 

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-01b.html. 

47 Ibid. 

48 Stokes, 181-182. 

49 Gertz, “Space Seen as Battlefield of Future.” 

50 Ibid. 

51 “Rumsfeld II.” 

52 Author’s discussions at the Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing, China, 9 March 

2001. 

53 Stokes, 173-174. 

54 Bill Gertz, “Beijing Using Front Companies to Grab U.S. Arms Technology,” The 

Washington Times, 26 January 2001: A1 55 Lou Ge, “Comments by Luo Ge, Director General, Department of Foreign Affairs, 

China National Space Administration,” SpaceRef.com, 3 November 1999, n.p.; on-line, 

Internet, 28 November 2000, available from 

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=2943. 

56 “China Claims Military ‘Trump Card’ With Space Launch,” CNN.com, 22 November 

1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 28 November 2000, available from 

http://www.cnn.com/TECH/space/9911/22/china.space.folo/. 57 Wei Long, “China Opens 21st Century With Shenzhou-2 Launch,” Space Daily, 12 

January 2001, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 26 January 2001, available from 

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-01f.html. 58 Wei Long, “China Prepares Plan For Space Station As China Eyes Manned Mission,” 

SpaceDaily, 12 June 2000, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 26 January 2001, available from 

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-00zg.html. 

59 Marc Boucher, “Shenzou 2 Launch Imminent, Chinese Manned Space Program Targets 

the Moon,” SpaceRef.com, 30 October 2000, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 28 November 2000, 

available from http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=239. 60 Julie Wakefield, “Moon's Helium-3 Could Power Earth,” Special to SPACE.com, 

30 June 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 July 2001, available from 

http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/helium3_000630.html. 
Air War College 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama 

CHINA'S MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM 

Strategic Threat, Regional Power, or National 

Defense? 

Colonel David J. Thompson, USAF 
18 CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is attempting to emerge as a

major world player in a number of commercial and military arenas. Of

special concern to the United States is China’s potential as a peer or

near-peer competitor in military space operations. This paper reviews 

the basic elements of China's space and counterspace programs in order 

to assess current and near-term capabilities. Also outlined is China's 

national space policy to discern the leadership’s likely intent for future 

military use of the space medium. Discussion concludes with an overall assessment of China’s probable future as a potential peer-competitor 

to the United States in military space operations. 

Not discussed are information operations, computer network attack

or defense, or intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although these missions are assigned to space forces in the United States, they are not inherently space operations and are not included in this review of China’s

space program.

Much of the information presented here is speculative due to the

closed nature of the Chinese government. This is further complicated

by the particularly guarded nature of PRC military activities and developments. However, the available information does allow one to make a 

basic assessment of China's current and near-future status in military

space operations. 

Ground Segment 

The Chinese space program’s ground segment consists of three elements: launch sites, launch vehicles, and telemetry, tracking, and 

commanding (TT&C) and space surveillance sites. We discuss each 

segment followed by an assessment of current and likely future status. 

Launch sites 

China currently has three primary satellite launch centers, each designed to handle specific types of missions. The Xichang Launch Center, located in Sichuan Province in southern China, supports all

launches into geostationary orbit. The two launch pads at Xichang recently underwent extensive modernization and expansion in order to

handle new rocket variations as well as support commercial customer

needs.1

 The Chinese put Xichang off limits to foreigners during this 

period. 

The Jiuquan Space Facility, located in Kansu Province near the 

southern edge of the Gobi Desert, was first designed to support surfaceto-surface and surface-to-air missile test and operational launches. In

April 1970 China launched its first satellite, a DFH-1 communications

satellite, into orbit from Jiuquan. The facility now has three pads used 
 THOMPSON 19

to launch satellites into low altitude, posigrade orbit with inclinations

greater than 40 degrees.

2

The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Shanxi Province 

250 miles southwest of Beijing, has a single pad from which satellites

are launched into sun-synchronous orbit

3

 and polar orbits.4 The site is

also used for Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tests. 

There are indications that China may soon undertake construction of

a new, fourth, launch facility in the southern coastal province of

Hainan.

5

 This location would help alleviate logistical and safety problems associated with the existing sites. Current sites are all inland and

can be difficult to reach. Additionally, their inland locations create 

safety hazards for people living beneath the launch vehicle flight path. 

A launch failure in 1996 resulted in the death of several, possibly dozens of civilians.

6

China’s existing three launch sites are capable of placing satellites

into every type of militarily useful orbit. However, the sites do not

provide a great deal of launch redundancy for each type of orbit. Additionally, problems noted with accessibility and safety may limit China’s 

ability to create a launch “surge” in time of need. Launches take place 

on a long term planning basis as China does not currently have a

“launch on need” capability.7

 As with all static, above ground launch

facilities, China's launch facilities are highly vulnerable to attack from

both conventional and unconventional forces. 

Launch vehicles 

China has developed a relatively impressive inventory of launch 

rockets for its military and commercial satellites. Although the overall

launch success rate is only between 80%-90%, and recent launch rates 

have been even worse, China has sought in recent years to improve its

launch capabilities. This is especially true in the areas of low-earth

(LEO) and geosynchronous (GEO) orbits. Domestic launch rates are

historically in the low single-digits each year. China currently can 

launch the following maximum payloads:

LEO 25,000 kg* 

Polar Orbit 2,500 kg* 

GEO-Transfer 4,000 kg

*The large difference between LEO and polar-orbit payloads is a 

launch site limitation and not a launch vehicle limitation.
20 CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM

China has the capability to launch major payloads into all militarily

useful orbits, giving them the potential to provide all their launch needs 

domestically. However, their low launch rate and relatively poor 

launch success rate, coupled with their lack of launch surge capabilities, indicate China would fight wars in the near term with assets already in place or planned for launch in the immediate future. 

TT&C and Space Surveillance 

A major but little discussed element of all space programs is the

TT&C and space surveillance element. This capability allows personnel on the ground to track rockets and payloads in flight, assess conditions during launch, and take corrective actions. The TT&C sites enable ground controllers to communicate with satellites in orbit, assess 

satellite health, command orbit and payload adjustments, as well as 

other activities. The space surveillance portion of this ground element

provides position and orbit data to assist authorities in keeping track of 

their own, as well as other nations’, satellites. China currently employs

approximately 20,000 personnel within its TT&C and space surveillance system.

8

 The primary facility is the Xian Satellite Monitor and 

Control Center. Additional sites are located at each launch facility as

well as numerous sites dispersed across China, including some mobile 

and ship based systems.9 Recent upgrades include the addition of Sband tracking radars and the addition of new tracking stations.

10 Also,

China recently completed an agreement with Sweden for a mutual 

ground station support program.

11 This is in addition to space-related

cooperation agreements already worked with other nations.

12

The Chinese TT&C and space surveillance system is a generally capable distributed system. The system not only gives China the ability 

to control its own satellite constellations; it allows the Chinese insight

into the on-orbit activities of other nations. One use of such information might be to track and target foreign military satellites in the event 

China develops a capable anti-satellite program. Forging ties to other 

countries like Sweden may be part of a major effort to increase China’s

ability to observe satellites worldwide, as well as provide TT&C and 

space surveillance system redundancy in the event her domestic systems are targeted by enemy forces. 

Space Segment 

The term “space segment” refers to the on-orbit satellite portion of 

the space program. For simplification, satellites have been grouped 

into four general categories: 1) communication, 2) navigation, 3) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and, 4) weather. 
 THOMPSON 21

Communications Satellites 

China has successfully launched at least 11 different variants of Chinese built communications satellites. Although the majority of the 

PRC’s efforts have been commercial ventures, several have been either

primarily or solely for military use. The satellites with the greatest

military utility include two-way communications satellites, data relay 

satellites, and direct broadcast satellites. Recent improvements include 

use of the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band, a band that provides the 

military with some increased protection against signal intercept and

jamming.

13 There is evidence that China is seeking to procure satellitehardening technology illegally through Hong Kong in order to further 

improve its space communications security.14 This technology will be

necessary for the satellites to operate under high electromagnetic pulse 

conditions that might be expected in future wars. 

China has not developed the reliance on communications satellites to

the same degree as the United States. Perhaps partly as a result, current 

Chinese communications satellites lack much of the design and technical performance capability of western satellites.15 While this leaves 

Chinese communications satellites somewhat vulnerable to jamming, 

interference, and interception efforts, China’s lesser dependence on 

space communication systems also means they would be less impacted 

by an adversary’s hostile space activities. Additionally, China’s security involves mostly internal lines of communications where fiber optics and other reasonably robust legacy forms of communications links

are very viable. 

Navigation Satellites 

China launched its first navigation satellite, the BNTS-1, on October 

31, 2000. A second satellite, launched on December 21, completed the

twin-satellite, geostationary navigation and timing system.

16 The system will provide 24-hour coverage over a limited geographic region in

the Chinese mainland and some surrounding waters. Although the 

Chinese system does not provide the global coverage and degree of

accuracy gained by the US GPS system, deployment of this Chinese

built system indicates China has both the intent and capability of deploying an indigenous satellite navigation system. Neither the full capability of the system, nor its schedule for deploying further navigation

satellites is known.

Two observations occur regarding the Chinese navigation satellite 

system. First, it is clear that China wishes to develop its own spacebased navigation capability so as not to be vulnerable to a US decision 

to employ GPS selective availability during times of crisis. China, like

most countries of the world, is rapidly becoming more dependent on
22 CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM

the position and timing information provided by GPS. Secondly, the 

choice of a geostationary system with limited geographic reach is a 

clear indication that for now and the foreseeable future China is content

to restrict military activities to within or close to its own borders. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

Satellites

Although public sources are meager about the technical specifics of 

China’s ISR programs, it is known that China is working on developing

several ISR satellites systems. Although we cannot determine the truth 

of this statement, an unnamed “Chinese military expert” went so far as

to state to the Sichuan Youth Daily newspaper in late 1999, “If the US

seeks to intervene militarily into the internal affairs of China and Taiwan, they will find that the entirety of their global movements are seen 

by Chinese satellites.”17 

China began retrieving imagery intelligence from low-earth-orbiting 

satellites in 1975. In all, 17 photoreconnaissance satellites have been 

launched and 15 successfully recovered. The last recovery occurred in

1999.

18 China is currently thought to be working on a next generation

imagery satellite, but details are limited to supposition that it will be

based on small satellite technology and have 5-meter resolution. Although this resolution may not match other military or even some

commercial endeavors, it is sufficient for a large number of military

applications. There is some evidence that China may be working on the 

technology to produce 1-meter resolution. This would place the PRC 

among the world elite in this category. China does not currently possess real-time satellite photoreconnaissance capability.19 In addition,

there is speculation that China is seeking Russian assistance to develop 

a high-resolution radar satellite capable of supplementing optical sensors on existing imaging satellites, thus enabling China to take ground 

images during nighttime or overcast conditions.

20

Little is publicly reported of China’s space-based signals intelligence 

(SIGINT) or electronic intelligence (ELINT) capability. There is some

speculation in open literature, and the Secretary of Defense alluded to

such capability in his FY2000 Report to Congress, but nothing of supportable substance is currently available. This is not surprising considering the highly classified nature of these capabilities. 

Although the unnamed “Chinese military expert” almost certainly 

was overstating the situation, China has the capability to conduct limited ISR missions from space, perhaps even on a limited global basis. 

But without a more extensive network of satellites, real-time photoreconnaissance, or sophisticated SIGINT or ELINT satellites, they remain well behind the US in locating, tracking and targeting the enemy 

under fluid conditions. 
 THOMPSON 23

Weather Satellites 

Although not designed primarily for military uses, earth observation 

and weather satellites do support military activities. As of 1999, China 

had launched five domestic weather satellites capable of operating in

the visible and infrared wavelengths.

21 All weather satellites are listed

as part of the Feng Yun (Wind and Cloud) series. Feng Yun-2B (FY2B), the latest weather satellite, was successfully launched into geostationary orbit on June 25, 2000. FY-2B is the second geostationary

weather satellite, replacing FY-2A that was launched on June 10, 1997. 

The reported design life for FY-2B is three years. During this time,

FY-2B will collect and transmit weather images and meteorological, 

oceanographic and hydrologic information as well as monitor solar

activities.22 In addition to the geostationary satellite, China operates a 

number of polar orbiting weather satellites which are capable of providing more detailed information on such events as sand storms, fire, and 

flood.23 China is also working with Brazil on a cooperative ChinaBrazil Earth Remote-Sensing Satellite (CBERS) program. Two satellites have been launched.

24

China has a reasonably sophisticated weather satellite capability not

totally unlike that of the US. Designed primarily for civil users, the 

satellites provide weather and other related data that are vital to military

forces when determining useable ground maneuver routes, aircraft

flight paths and visible target areas, among other things. Such information is equally valuable in determining the enemy’s probable courses of

maneuver. 

Counterspace Capabilities 

As the US becomes ever more reliant on space systems, there will be

more concern about China’s ability to impact US operations in space. 

Although China does not appear to currently possess major counterspace capabilities, there is no reason to doubt that such capabilities are 

within its technical grasp. Although he did not provide details, Vice 

Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in

February 2001 testimony before Congress on counterspace programs, 

noted: “China and Russia have across-the-board programs under way,

and other smaller states and non-state entities are pursuing more limited, though potentially effective, approaches.”25 Some of the most

likely areas of development are now discussed. 

Satellite Jammers 

Interestingly, none of the articles researched discussed the specifics 

of GPS, communications, or other forms of counterspace jammers. 
24 CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM

Even the China portion of the FY2000 Secretary of Defense report to

Congress failed to provide any illumination in this area.26

My assessment is that despite the lack of available information, this 

is a very likely key area for future Chinese activities. GPS jammers are 

available on the world market at low prices and have proved to be

highly effective when properly employed. GPS jamming is a major

threat as GPS signals are used by most if not all segments of US weapons systems. US military satellite communications systems have some

anti-jam protection. The Defense Satellite Communications System

(DSCS), Milstar, and other military systems were designed to be jam

resistant up to various levels. However, the commercial satellites used

by the US and other countries to augment military systems contain no

such resistance. It is highly likely that China would seek to prevent the 

US from using these systems in the event of hostilities. 

Anti-satellites (ASAT) 

Although not verified through other sources, the Hong Kong Sing

Tao Daily newspaper quoted unnamed Chinese resources in reporting

that China is developing a space-based anti-satellite system. According 

to the report, the concept is to deploy very small “parasitic” satellites

called nano-satellites that would attach themselves to satellites and remain inactive during normal times. Upon activation, these parasitic 

satellites would destroy the satellite or disrupt its operations.

27 Although the existence of a Chinese parasitic satellite program is uncertain, the existence of micro-satellite programs for data transmission,

earth sensing and other programs is well documented.28 Whether the

technology will translate into Chinese ASAT capabilities is not known.

The Secretary of Defense is also concerned that China already may 

have, or is acquiring, the technology for developing laser radars to track 

and image satellites. This technology would be of great assistance in 

targeting orbiting satellites. China also already may have the capability

to damage the optical sensors on US systems as they pass over China

29, 

and may be developing high-power microwave (HPM) technology to

be used against satellites. Additionally, there is speculation China may

be researching the use of steel balls to kill a satellite or the use of powder, paint and dust to render a space-based laser ineffective.30 If developed, these applications also could have an effect on other satellite sensors or solar panels. An additional possibility not mentioned in the

literature is use of a nuclear ASAT. China already has such a capability within its ICBM force. 

Some ASAT technology, such as ground-based lasers and nuclear

ASAT, exists or is well within the reach of China’s science community. 

Other technology, such as applying paint or powder to space-based 

lasers, seems more challenging. Use of a nuclear ASAT seems unlikely
 THOMPSON 25

except as a last resort since its use would be as damaging to Chinese 

satellites as to an adversary’s. Other options requiring short-notice 

launches are not practical due to current limited launch capability. Another drawback to a “launch to kill” scenario is the ease of determining 

China’s role in such an action as the launch would be seen by one or 

more US space systems. China is far more likely to develop groundbased lasers and other non-space-based weapons that are cheaper to 

deploy, easier to control, and leave a less obvious trail back to the perpetrator. 

Space Policy and Strategy 

China’s space strategy can be expected to reflect its national strategy. According to the FY2000 Secretary of Defense Report to Congress, the Chinese government’s national security strategy is focused 

on becoming the preeminent power in East Asia. The report states the

Chinese military strategy includes “fielding forces capable of rapidly

deploying to fight and win a future regional war under high-technology

conditions along China’s periphery.”31 On 22 November 2000, China’s 

State Council published a report entitled “China’s Space Activities.” It 

conveys a more benign picture. The report speaks in terms of space

education and exploration, and specifically outlines the principle that: 

“The aim of international space cooperation is to peacefully develop 

and use space resources for the benefit of all mankind.” The report also 

argues for a fundamental principle of “Persisting in the independence

and self-reliance policy, carrying out pragmatic international space

cooperation to meet the needs of the national modernization drive and 

the demands of the domestic and international markets for space science and technology.”32

China’s space strategy and policy appear to be remarkably like that 

of the US. Since the days of Sputnik, US policy on space has been

grounded on the principles of peaceful use of space and right of free

passage for satellites. Within that framework, however, the US has

prepared for the possibility of war against assets in space by developing

and testing aircraft-launched ASATs and ground-based lasers. Other 

options are almost certainly being explored. In effect, Washington has

advocated and hoped for the best while gradually developing the capabilities to cope with space warfare should it became a reality. Like

China, the US also shares some of our technology with the world, but

takes actions like hardening satellites and imbedding selective availability into GPS to ensure we retain a good measure of independence 

and control under all conditions. So China’s space strategy and policy

are not unlike that of the US; Beijing seems to hope for the best, but is 

gradually preparing for hostilities in space. 
26 CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM

Conclusion 

Today China’s space program does not constitute a global threat, nor 

is it likely to become such a threat in the foreseeable future. The PRC

has a moderately strong space program that will improve as part of 

China’s overall economic development. Beijing is looking into technologies that will increase the PRC’s space capabilities as well as put 

adversaries’ use of space at risk. Some day, China may be able to create major global problems for the US and others. However, without

global land, sea, or air capabilities, the military impact of China’s space 

programs is likely to be limited to defense of China’s homeland and 

support of regional activities undoubtedly pointed at Taiwan, the 

Spratly Islands, Tibet, and other areas of similar proximity and sensitivity to China. In a conflict, China also could assist nations allied against

the US by providing launch support, ASAT activities, ISR data, and

similar services. 

Based on current space and associated military capabilities, PRC 

policies and historical tendencies, the Chinese space program is likely

to increase its regional influence by assuring more freedom of action

within Asia while also seeking to deny foreign powers’ freedom of

action in space, air, land and sea activities. China’s drive may not be so

much to ensure they become Asia’s regional hegemon as to ensure that 

the United States does not. 

Discussions with Chinese and American officials during visits to 

China and Hong Kong in mid-March 2001 served to reinforce my assessments in this paper. The Chinese space program, like other elements of China’s military and economic development, has a very long

way to go before it can be considered a true peer competitor of the 

United States. Nothing learned in the visit indicated China has the air, 

land, or sea capabilities to support activities outside their immediate

region even if they possessed the space capabilities to support such

activities. Additionally, Chinese officials repeatedly stated that their 

national policy has been and will continue to be one of internal vigilance and noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. 

That said, the issue of Taiwan remains of great concern. Taiwan’s

proximity to mainland China, China’s insistence on a “one China” policy that it defines, and the limited expeditionary forces required to cross 

the Tiawan straits or to blackmail Taiwan constitute East Asia’s major 

flashpoint. These realities require that the US continue to closely

watch the progress of China’s space and other military programs to 

ensure Taiwan’s security. 
 THOMPSON 27

Notes 

1

 “Base 27 Xichang Satellite Launch Center”, Federation of American Scientists, World

Space Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/facility/xichang.htm 2

 “Base 20 Jiuquan Space Facility”, Federation of American Scientists, World Space 

Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/facility/jiuquan.htm 3

 “Base 25 Taiyuan Space Facility”, Federation of American Scientists, World Space 

Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/facility/taiyuan.htm 4

 “Launch and Research Facilities”, Go Taikonauts, Internet 7 February 2001, available 

from http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Launchpad/1921/facilities.htm 5

 “China Eyes New Spaceport and Bigger Rockets”, SpaceDaily, Internet 7 February

2001, available from http://www.spacer.com/news/china-01t.htm 6

 Conversations with Captain Steve Prichard, 45th Range Squadron, Patrick AFB, FL,

Spring 1996 after his return from observing a Longmarch launch failure. 7

 “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act”,

Secretary of Defense, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://www.defenselink.mil/Jun2000/china06222000.htm 8

 “China Satellite Launch and Tracking General (CLTC)”, Federation of American Scientists, World Space Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/contractor/cltc.htm 9

 “Base 26 Xian Satellite Monitor and Control Center (XSCC)”, Federation of American 

Scientists, World Space Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/facility/xscc.htm 10 Wei Long, “China Builds Advance Spacecraft Tracking and Command Network”, 

Space Daily, May 29, 2000, Internet 9 February 2001, available from

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-00za.html 11 “China and Swedish Satellite Operators Sign Long Term Access Agreement”, Space 

Daily, Internet 7 February 2001, available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china01p.html 12 “China Satellite Launch and Tracking General (CLTC),” Federation of American Scientists, World Space Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/contractor/cltc.htm 13 “China and Communications Systems”, Federation of American Scientists, World

Space Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/comm/index.html 14 Bill Gertz, “Beijing Using Front Companies To Grab U.S. Arms Technology”, The 

Washington Times, January 26, 2001: A1 15 “China’s Satellite Industry Faces Crisis Due to Lack of Funds”, SpaceDaily, Internet 9

February 2001, available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-00zzi.html 16 Wei Long, “China Completes First Satellite Navigation System”, Space Daily, January

8, 2001, Internet 9 February 2001, available from

http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-01b.html 17 “Chinese Satellites Watching US Military”, Space Daily, Internet 9 February 2001,

available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-99i.html 18 “China and Imagery Intelligence”, Federation of American Scientists, World Space 

Guide, Internet 7 February 2001, available from

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/military/imint/index.html
28 CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM 

19 “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act”, 

Secretary of Defense, Internet 7 February 2001, available from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/Jun2000/china06222000.htm 20 “Radar Satellite”, Federation of American Scientists, World Space Guide, Internet 7 

February 2001, available from http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/military/imint/radar.htm 21 “Overview of Chinese Satellites”, Go Taikonauts, Internet 7 February 2001, available 

from http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Launchpad/1921/satellite.htm 22 Wei Long, “China Meteorological Bird Fengyun-2B on Station”, Space Daily, July 4, 

2000, Internet 9 February 2001, available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china00zm.html

23 “Chinese Weather Bird Happy In Orbit”, Space Daily, Internet 9 February 2001, available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-00zd.html 24 “China’s Space Activities”, Peoples Republic of China, The Information Office of the 

State Council, 22 November 22, 2000, Internet 7 February 2001, available from 

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp112200.html 25 Bill Gertz, “Space seen as battlefield of the future”, The Washington Times, February 

8, 2001, Internet 9 February 2001, available from 

http://www.washtimes.com/national/default-20012823833.htm 26 “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act”, 

Secretary of Defense, Internet 7 February 2001, available from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/Jun2000/china06222000.htm 27 Cheng Ho, “China Eyes Anti-Satellite System”, SpaceDaily, January 8, 2000, Internet 

7 February 2001, available from http://www.spacer.com/news/china-01c.html 28 Wei Long, “China to Launch Micro Imaging Birds”, SpaceDaily, November 20, 2000, 

Internet 7 February 2001, available from http://www.spacer.com/news/china-00zzq.html 29 “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act”, 

Secretary of Defense, Internet 7 February 2001, available from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/Jun2000/china06222000.htm 30 Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States”, 

September 1999, Internet 7 February 2001, available from 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/chinamod.htm 31 “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act”, 

Secretary of Defense, Internet 7 February 2001, available from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/Jun2000/china06222000.htm 32 “China’s Space Activities”, Peoples Republic of China, The Information Office of the 

State Council, 22 November 2000, Internet 7 February 2001, available from 

http://fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp112200.html