Transcendental Terrorism And Dirty Bombs: 

Radiological Weapons Threat Revisited 

by 

Chad Brown, CDR, USN 

February 2006 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for Strategy 

and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term 

strategic thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national 

security. Copies of No. 54 in this series are available from the Center for 

Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the CSAT web site at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awccsat.htm. The fax number is 

(334) 953-6158; phone (334) 953-6150. 

Occasional Paper No. 54 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
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ii
Disclaimer

 The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the 

author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States 

Government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force 

Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United 

States Government. 

iii
Acknowledgments 

 The author would like to thank Jason P. Meyer from Science Applications 

International Corporation, Colonel Michael J. Ainscough and Major Tasha 

L. Pravecek from the Head Quarters of the United States Air Force 

Counterproliferation Center, and Dr. Grant T. Hammond from the Center 

for Strategy and Technology at the United States Air Force Air War 

College for their advice, inspiration, and critical assessment of the content 

and context of this paper which facilitated the maturation of its key 

conceptual core. Additionally, special thanks to Dr. Marsha Kwolek of 

the Air War College for providing an expert editorial review that truly 

transformed this paper into a publishable product. 

iv
Contents 

 

ABSTRACT....................................................................VII 

INTRODUCTION.............................................................. 1 

Attack of al-Ameen.........................................................2 

Khalid al-Khalil.............................................................2 

Al-Ameen....................................................................3 

Getting Connected..........................................................4 

Cementing Plans............................................................7 

Attack on the Washington State Ferry System..........................8 

Attack on the Acela Express...............................................8 

Attack on the Hartsfeld-Jackson Atlanta International 

Airport......................................................................8 

Attack on Browns Stadium................................................9 

Attack on Orlando School Systems.....................................10 

Capture of Yazid al-Tayyib..............................................10 

Casualty Estimate.........................................................11 

SCENARIO ANALYSIS......................................................12 

The Will to Kil...............l.............................................12 

Capability of the Terrorist.................................................14 

Availability of Radioactive Sources.....................................16 

Bring Out Your Dead......................................................19 

Where's the Beef?.............................................................................19 

THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION....................................23 

Detecting Radioactive Sources..........................................23 

A Systems Based Approach.............................................24 

Overt Versus Covert Threats.............................................25 

Intercepting Illegal International Shipments...........................25 

Intercepting Illegal Internal Movements...............................26 

Intercepting Radiological Weapons at the Target.....................27 

Collecting the Data........................................................28 

Role of Internet............................................................29 

Interdiction..................................................................30 

Technological Solutions Bring Technological Problems............30 

Order of Magnitude Cost Analysis......................................32 

Cost Deference Strategies................................................35 

CONCLUSION..................................................................38 

v
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................43 

ENDNOTES......................................................................49 

vi
ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the potential for terrorists to employ radiological 

weapons against the United States and makes recommendations for 

countering the gaps in security that terrorists will exploit while embarking 

on such an endeavor. The paper’s primary hypothesis is that radiological 

dispersion devices, contrary to popular contemporary analysis, possess 

extreme lethal potential. When combined with the prevalent trend for 

terrorists to maximize the death and destruction associated with their 

attacks, radiological dispersion devices, unlike other weapons of mass 

destruction, offer a unique opportunity as radioactive material is readily 

available and requires unsophisticated technology and knowledge to 

weaponize. 

 A fictional scenario backed by calculations is used to demonstrate the 

lethal potential of a series of covert attacks employing radiological 

weapons. The paper analyzes the motivations for why terrorists are 

willing to use weapons of mass destruction and why radiological weapons 

are a more likely candidate for employment over nuclear, biological, and 

chemical weapons. Additionally, the relative ease with which radiological 

weapons of this nature can be fabricated and the ready availability of 

appropriate radioactive sources is explained. 

 Finally, the paper concludes that securing the life cycle of radioactive 

sources through legislation, regulation, and international agreements is the 

best method for preventing terrorists access to those radioactive sources 

which are most dangerous and capable of weaponization. However, the 

paper also concludes that any legislative, regulatory, or agreement based 

solution will not protect the public in the near term and a nationwide 

system of radiation detectors is proposed as a possible solution for 

interdicting radiological weapons before they reach their targeted 

destination. 

vii
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viii 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

 Radiological weapons provide a low cost and low technology 

alternative for terrorist organizations seeking to inflict damage 

beyond the current capabilities and limitations of conventional 

explosives but who lack the resources to fabricate or obtain a true 

weapon of mass destruction. Radioactive sources are readily 

available and do not require sophisticated or expensive delivery 

vehicles to achieve effectiveness. Even a poorly planned and 

executed radiological attack could achieve devastating economic1

and psychological impact,2

 and a great deal of literature addresses 

these issues. However, radiological weapons are typically 

misrepresented as lacking a lethal component3 due to the 

unimaginative assumption that radiological weapons must take the 

form of a dirty bomb, or radioactive material spread through the 

use of conventional explosives. 

 While there is relevance in speculating terrorists may employ a 

dirty bomb primarily to inspire terror and inflict economic damage 

to disrupt the United State’s economy,4 there is a competing and 

growing trend among terrorist organizations to maximize the 

carnage and bloodshed associated with their attacks.5 These 

terrorists have transcended the need to connect their acts of terror 

directly with a political demand. Resultantly, their acts of terror 

are more commonly brought to a violent conclusion without an 

offer for negotiation. 

1
 This paper will demonstrate that properly employed, 

radiological weapons can posses an awful potential for lethality 

which can certainly achieve death tolls on a par with those 

observed during the 9/11 attacks. Employing such weapons will 

enable terrorists to achieve both devastating economic as well as 

human destruction. Following this demonstration, 

recommendations for countering such radiological weapons are 

offered. 

 In order to provide an understanding for the lethal potential of 

radiological weapons, the following fictional scenario is presented. 

Attack of al-Ameen6

 We present this narrative to the President of the United States, 

the United States Congress, and the American people for their 

consideration. The attacks that occurred between 8 September and 

18 September 2006, now commonly known as the Attack of 

al-Ameen (the faithful), produced shock and suffering on a scale 

never before witnessed on United States soil. The primary 

question posed to this commission was, ‘How, in a post 9/11 

world, with all the advancements in intelligence collection and 

dissemination, was our nation so unprepared to meet and defeat 

this challenge?’ In order to answer this question, we begin with 

providing the fullest possible account of the events surrounding the 

attacks. 

Khalid al-Khalil 

 Egyptian born Khalid al-Khalil, the ring leader for al-Ameen, 

emigrated from Egypt to Algeria with his family in 1989. Shortly 

after his arrival in Algeria, political and social turmoil sponsored 

by the Armed Islamic Group engulfed Algeria and polarized the 

nation along secular Islamic versus radical Islamic lines.7

 

Unemployment and other socioeconomic factors caused many 

young disenfranchised men to join the Armed Islamic Group, 

which sought the violent overthrow of the Algerian Government. 

Khalid al-Khalil was recruited into the Armed Islamic Group in his 

early adolescence by his two older brothers and quickly gained an 

education in extremism and in perpetuating violence to achieve 

political ends. However, the son of an intellectual and perhaps the 

smartest of his fellow siblings, he quickly became disenchanted 

with the limited goals and the uncoordinated efforts of the Armed 

Islamic Group. 

2
 In 1996 he traveled to Afghanistan to meet his ideological hero, 

al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri, recognizing Khalid al-Khalil’s 

intellectual and charismatic potential, encouraged him to both 

remain connected to the Armed Islamic Group while 

simultaneously seeking a western education. Al-Zawahiri 

emphasized that Khalid al-Khalil’s present and future affiliation 

with the Armed Islamic Group did not necessarily need to be a 

limiting or constricting factor for his future connections and 

endeavors. 

Al-Ameen 

 Khalid al-Khalil returned to Algeria in 1997, reconnected with 

the Armed Islamic Group, and quickly applied to several western 

universities. He was accepted to the University of Texas and 

received a full academic scholarship under a foreign student 

program. A gifted and dedicated student, he completed his 

undergraduate studies in physics in just three years and was 

admitted into a graduate level program in 2001 and received 

funding through the university’s student loan, financial aid, and 

teacher’s assistant programs. 

 In his first year at university, Khalid al-Khalil founded a study 

group for foreign Muslim students. Initially drawn to the study 

group by the need for tutored assistance and language translation, 

most members eventually found Khalid al-Khalil’s charisma 

undeniable and continued attending the study group well beyond 

their academic needs. Khalid al-Khalil, appealing to a common 

Muslim identity, subtlety transformed the group meetings from 

strictly academic in nature to a mixture of academics combined 

with fundamentalist Islamic teachings. Through open discourse, 

he was able to identify those Muslims who were more predisposed 

to radical Islam either by their religious or cultural background. 

These Muslims he recruited into an inner circle he called his 

al-Ameen where the teachings of radical Islam were openly 

discussed. 

 Throughout this time period, Khalid al-Khalil maintained 

sporadic contact via courier, letter, and email with both 

al-Zawahiri and his Armed Islamic Group leadership. Inspired by 

messages from al-Zawahiri and the actions of al-Qaeda, Khalid 

al-Khalil began to formulate his own plans for terrorist attacks 

originating on United States soil using radiological weapons. 

Al-Zawahiri provided support, guidance, and inspirational 

3
leadership to both Khalid al-Khalil as well as the Armed Islamic 

Group and approved of Khalid al-Khalil’s plan in principle. 

 In June of 2001, al-Zawahiri, anticipating the logical second 

order effects of al-Qaeda’s future planned operations against the 

World Trade Center, diversified al-Qaeda’s financial holdings in 

order to prevent them from being completely frozen or seized. Part 

of this diversification plan involved distributing significant 

portions of al-Qaeda funds to other radical Islamic organizations.8 

Among these, the Armed Islamic Group received significant 

funding with the stipulation that Khalid al-Khalil’s plans in the 

United States reach fruition. 

Getting Connected 

 With financial backing secured, Khalid al-Khalil began his 

planning in earnest. Over the summer of 2001 he utilized his links 

with al-Qaeda to make contact with radical Chechen Islamic 

leaders9 and described his desires to obtain radioactive sources10

from former Soviet Union defense installations or from corrupt 

Russian or Commonwealth Independent State officials. 

Concurrently in July of 2001, Khalid al-Khalil started monthly 

trips to Los Angeles, where he repeatedly attempted to make 

contact with influential gang or organized crime leadership in an 

effort to obtain radioactive sources from within United States 

borders. On his second trip to Los Angeles in August of 2001, he 

successfully made contact with street level representatives of the 

Mara Salvatrucha gang and began negotiations for meetings with 

the gang’s local leadership. 

 Not part of al-Qaeda’s inner circle, the attacks of 9/11 caught 

Khalid al-Khalil by surprise. Fearing that raised security 

awareness and new security measures would soon make it 

impossible to obtain the materials he needed for his radiological 

weapons, Khalid al-Khalil redoubled his efforts for procurement. 

In October of 2001, Khalid al-Khalil traveled to Grozny, where he 

met with leaders of the radical Chechen Islamic rebels. Following 

two weeks of negotiation and a $100,000 initial outlay to defray 

Chechen expenses, he was able to convey his exact needs and 

obtain a commitment. Khalid al-Khalil returned to the United 

States on 8 November and immediately began semi-monthly trips 

to Los Angeles. In February of 2002, on his ninth trip to Los 

Angeles, he finally worked through lower level functionaries of the 

Mara Salvatrucha gang and, for a confidence payment of $50,000, 

4
achieved an audience with Mara Salvatrucha gang leaders. During 

this meeting, Khalid al-Khalil agreed to pay all expenses necessary 

to locate and obtain a radioactive source meeting his specifications 

and detailed several locations where such a source might be found. 

 With regular progress reports now flowing in from Chechen and 

Mara Salvatrucha contacts, Khalid al-Khalil turned his attention to 

recruitment. Calling on his closest friends from his al-Ameen, he 

appealed to their religious zeal and recruited Mu’ammar al-Nadir, 

Yazid al-Tayyib, and Aban al-Abbas. Directing them to specific 

cities around the United States, he instructed his recruits to seek 

employment at public facilities and stressed the importance of 

infiltrating large entertainment industrial complexes such as 

stadiums and concert halls. To offset expenses, Khalid al-Khalil 

paid each recruit $20,000 annually and required they keep him 

informed of all job offers. However, Khalid al-Khalil kept his 

specific plans a secret and only told his recruits their day of jihad 

would soon come. 

 By May of 2002, Khalid al-Khalil was increasingly concerned 

with the slow progress of the Chechen and Mara Salvatrucha 

networks in locating appropriate radioactive sources. Utilizing 

information gleaned from university physics department 

documents, he initiated efforts to obtain radioactive source 

material legally. In June of 2002, he applied for and obtained a 

small business license under the company name of Steris Isomedix 

Inc. In August of 2002, using this business license, he applied for 

and received a General License to hold and use radioactive 

material directly from the state of Texas, an Agreement State with 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 

 Although a General License legally allowed Khalid al-Khalil 

access to only minor amounts of radioactive material, current 

international agreements allow foreign distributors to ship 

radioactive sources, regardless of their size and strength, direct to 

General License holders and do not require notification of host 

nation officials or host nation regulatory agencies.11 In September 

of 2003, Khalid al-Khalil purchased 50 grams, or 55,000 curies, of 

cobalt-60 from the Canadian firm MDS Nordion. Although it is 

their normal practice to verify the legitimacy of new customers, 

and despite the fact that they had never shipped to a Texas address 

before, MDS Nordion was unconcerned with this particular 

transaction, as they assumed they were doing business with Steris 

Isomedix Services Inc., a medical firm with which they regularly 

5
conducted business.12 On 22 September 2003, MDS Nordion 

shipped the cobalt-60 material to Khalid al-Khalil by rail. Khalid 

al-Khalil took custody of the shipment on 28 September. 

 After several failed attempts to obtain powerful gamma 

emitting radioactive sources, the Chechen rebels contacted Khalid 

al-Khalil and informed him they had instead located a 300,000 

curie source of strontium-90 at an abandoned nuclear powered 

lighthouse along the Russian northern coastline. Khalid al-Khalil 

considered the strontium-90 source acceptable and subsidized the 

Chechen rebels an additional $100,000 to obtain and ship the 

radioactive source. Concurrently, the Mara Salvatrucha reported 

they had located an abandoned food irradiator at a recently 

bankrupt and deserted private contracting firm located in Mexico 

City. 

 On 15 October 2003, the Chechen Islamic rebels shipped the 

radioactive source through an international commercial shipping 

currier. On 15 November 2003, the shipping container passed 

through customs at Charleston Port Authority, Charleston South 

Carolina and was shipped by rail to Austin, Texas, where Khalid 

al-Khalil took possession on 11 December 2003. 

 In October of 2003, the Mara Salvatrucha located an 

unemployed technician who had formerly worked at the now 

bankrupt food irradiation complex and offered $1,000 for his 

assistance in removing the radioactive source material from the 

abandoned building. On 23 October, the Mara Salvatrucha broke 

into the complex and, with the aid of the technician, removed the 

source material along with its intrinsic shielding. The source 

material was placed in the trunk of a car and driven across the 

Mexico-Texas border. The 200,000 curies of cesium-137 were 

delivered to Khalid al-Khalil on 26 October 2003. 

 Throughout 2004, the recruits of al-Ameen applied for 

numerous jobs in their respective cities. However, only one of the 

recruits was successful in obtaining work at an entertainment 

complex. Eager to proceed, Khalid al-Khalil directed his 

remaining recruits to take positions that had been offered within 

the transportation and food preparation industries. 

 With the employment situation stabilized, Khalid al-Khalil 

finalized his attack plans, based on the opportunities generated by 

the special access afforded to each recruit. By June of 2005 the 

planning was complete, and Khalid al-Khalil spent the remainder 

of the year moving the required radioactive material by car to or 

6
near each of the target cities and storing it in rented self storage 

units. Only Khalid al-Khalil knew the location of each radioactive 

source. In fact, at this time, none of his recruits knew the planned 

attacks would involve radioactive material or even that the 

radioactive material had been pre-positioned to support the attack. 

With all the elements in place, Khalid al-Khalil sat back and 

waited for events to align. 

Cementing Plans 

 The 2006 football season provided the perfect nexus of 

opportunity for Khalid al-Khalil and his al-Ameen. Following a 

dismal 4-12 season in 2005, the Green Bay Packers sought to 

lower their salary cap burden by releasing veteran quarterback 

Brett Favre to free agency. In contrast, the Cleveland Browns 

spent considerable money in the 2005 to 2006 off season recruiting 

an all star offensive line and, in a shrewd round of negotiations, 

traded first, second, and third round draft picks to the Houston 

Texans in order to obtain the number one first round draft position. 

For their first pick, they planned to select Heismann Trophy 

winner and former USC running back Reggie Bush, who 

announced he was leaving college football one year early and was 

eligible for the draft.13 Cleveland determined they needed a 

veteran quarterback to cement a solid running game and jumped at 

the opportunity to sign Brett Favre. With Favre closing out the 

2005 football season at 53,615 yards in passing, he had quietly 

surpassed John Elway to become the all time second ranked 

quarterback for total yards passing behind Dan Marino.14 Proud of 

their off season acquisitions, confident they would make a bid for 

the AFC North Division Championship, eager to fuel the recent 

resurgence of fan support sparked by local radio and television 

programming, and with Favre’s historic achievement left 

uncelebrated by the Green Bay Packer organization during the 

2005 regular season, the Cleveland Browns organization planned a 

gala celebration during game two of the 2006 regular season in 

honor of Favre’s career achievements. 

 It was this event around which Khalid al-Khalil planned his 

attacks. In June of 2006, he left the University of Texas and spent 

the next several months traveling to each of the target cities. He 

used this time to spiritually prepare his recruits, reconnoiter the 

target sites, and prepare the radioactive sources as weapons. 

7
Attack on the Washington State Ferry System 

 In early September of 2006, Khalid al-Khalil traveled to 

Boston, where his close friend and recruit, Mu’ammar al-Nadir, 

was living and now worked for Amtrack’s Acela Express. On 8 

September 2006, Khalid al-Khalil and Mu’ammar al-Nadir 

traveled together from Boston to Seattle, where Khalid al-Khalil 

revealed to Mu’ammar al-Nadir for the first time the full scope of 

his plans. Mu’ammar al-Nadir would travel with Khalid al-Khalil 

and provide assistance and security throughout the campaign of 

planned attacks. Together they collected the cobalt-60 sources 

Khalid al-Khalil had prepared and stored in the self storage unit 

and transported them by rented van to the downtown Seattle ferry 

terminal. Riding the ferry system several times over the next few 

days, the two men carried the sources from the van to the 

passenger sections of the ferry in a shielded apparatus. Finding an 

empty section of the ferry, the two men secretly attached the 

radioactive sources to the underside of chairs. 

 Khalid al-Khalil and Mu’ammar al-Nadir placed 250 sources on 

each of Seattle’s largest ferries, the Tacoma, Puyallup, and 

Wenatchee. In order to delay discovery of the harmful radioactive 

sources, the cobalt-60 source strength was chosen such that an 

individual would receive a lethal dose only after riding the ferry 

twice and in one of the affected chairs. 

Attack on the Acela Express 

 On 10 September, Khalid al-Khalil and Mu’ammar al-Nadir 

returned to Boston. On 11 September the two men retrieved the 

cobalt-60 sources Khalid al-Khalil had pre-positioned in Boston. 

Using Mu’ammar al-Nadir’s access to secured areas of Amtrack, 

the two men boarded an Acela Express train in the early morning 

hours prior to the train’s first commute from Boston to New York 

City. Making a small incision in the fabric, the two men placed 

radioactive sources inside 75 of the business class chairs. Each 

source was designed to deliver a lethal dose of radiation to the 

occupant during the 31⁄2 hour commute to New York City. 

Attack on Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport 

 On 12 September, Khalid al-Khalil and Mu’ammar al-Nadir 

flew from Boston to Atlanta. Here the two men picked up a 

suitcase containing two fifty foot long strips of 1⁄4 inch wide vinyl 

veneer molding with an adhesive backing. Along the adhesive 

8
strip, Khalid al-Khalil had placed particulate cesium-137. The two 

vinyl strips were rolled up and stored inside of a single 8 mm film 

canister. This film canister was placed underneath eight other film 

canisters filled with lead for shielding. Six more film canisters 

containing actual film were placed on top of these canisters as a 

diversion for security personnel. The two men smuggled the 

radioactive material through Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 

International Airport security without incident. Posing as 

maintenance technicians, the two men attached the adhesive strips 

into the overhead, on opposing sides, and along the length of a 

single train car servicing the four terminals. The two strips 

contained sufficient cesium-137 to deliver a lethal dose to 

passengers who rode the train for approximately seven minutes or 

the equivalent of traveling at least three of the four terminals. 

Attack on Browns Stadium 

 From Atlanta Khalid al-Khalil and Mu’ammar al-Nadir traveled 

to Cleveland, where they met with Yazid al-Tayyib, who had been 

working on the maintenance staff for Cleveland Browns Stadium. 

The three men rested until Saturday, 16 September. By this time 

several thousand victims had been unknowingly exposed to lethal 

amounts of radiation either in Seattle, Boston, or Atlanta. Most 

had suffered violent nausea for two to three days but had assumed 

they were symptomatic of the flu or food poisoning. Few sought 

medical attention, and those who did were prescribed medications 

for their flu-like symptoms and were released. 

 With Brett Favre appearing in his first home game at Cleveland 

Browns Stadium, the Browns organization had organized a fiveminute ceremony to take place during the game two halftime show. 

Brett Favre would be personally congratulated by John Elway, a 

short film documenting Favre’s achievements would be played on 

the stadiums two video screens, and a short pyrotechnics display 

designed to shower the entire stadium with shooting flares, 

streamers, and confetti would conclude the ceremony. 

 On the evening of 16 September, Khalid al-Khalil, Mu’ammar 

al-Nadir, and Yazid al-Tayyib gained access to Browns Stadium 

and packed particulate cesium-137 into 16 of the 40 pyrotechnics 

packages designed to distribute confetti and streamers throughout 

the stadium. On the morning of 17 September, the three men 

traveled to Orlando. Here they met with Aban al-Abbas, who had 

been working for the Orange County Public School District at a 

9
centralized kitchen responsible for preparing approximately 3,400 

meals daily and distributing them to 20 of Orlando’s 196 

elementary, middle, and high schools. 

 On 17 September, the halftime show was executed as planned. 

Cesium-137 showered down over a packed stadium. Thousands of 

victims began showing symptoms of radiation sickness shortly 

after the completion of the football game, and local health officials 

were overwhelmed. On 18 September, representatives from the 

Center for Disease Control in Atlanta traveled to Cleveland and 

diagnosed the symptoms as radiation sickness. The Federal 

Bureau of Investigation was notified. Believing only a single 

attack had occurred, a 48-hour moratorium was placed on notifying 

the press to facilitate the initial portions of the investigation. 

Attack on Orlando School Systems 

 In Orlando, Khalid al-Khalil obtained the strontium-90 he had 

stored in the city. The strontium-90 had been ground into a fine 

powder. Khalid al-Khalil gave the strontium-90 to Aban al-Abbas, 

instructing him to mix 0.15 grams per serving into the dessert item 

for the next day. On 18 September, Aban al-Abbas placed 486 

grams of strontium-90 into the 3,400 servings of chocolate pudding 

destined for distribution throughout the Orlando School District. 

Students consumed an estimated 3,300 of the 3,400 servings. 

Capture of Yazid al-Tayyib 

 With the dose rate of the strontium-90 laced pudding selected to 

deliver a lethal dose over a ten-day period, Khalid al-Khalil and his 

co-conspirators were primed to leave the country. The four men 

checked in individually to four separate flights destined for 

different locations in Europe. Only Yazid al-Tayyib was flagged 

in the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

(CAPPS), as he was wanted for questioning by the FBI when he 

did not appear for work at Browns Stadium on 17 September. 

Khalid al-Khalil, Mu’ammar al-Nadir, and Aban al-Abbas all made 

it safely to their European destinations before the FBI had a chance 

to secure detailed information from Yazid al-Tayyib. 

 By 19 September, federal authorities had learned enough 

information from Yazid al-Tayyib and from Khalid al-Khalil’s 

confiscated computer to commence investigations for unsecured 

radioactive sources in Orlando, Atlanta, Boston, and Seattle. A 

press release revealed what federal authorities knew about the 

10
attacks, and the transportation, entertainment, and food industries 

came to a screeching halt as routes and events were cancelled and 

consumers refused to purchase or consume food from sources they 

did not trust. 

Casualty Estimate 

 Estimates for the total economic impact of these terrorist attacks 

is still underway but is already approximated to be in the hundreds 

of billions of dollars. Estimates for the total number of people 

potentially exposed to harmful doses of radiation based on 

statistical analysis, observed mortality rates, and total validated 

cases presented to health care providers suggest some 24,000 

people were exposed to harmful doses of radiation. Quick 

mobilization of medical resources prevented local health care 

providers in Cleveland, Atlanta, Boston, New York City, 

Washington D.C., and Seattle from being completely overwhelmed 

by the massive amount of “worried well” citizens who presented 

themselves to health officials. However, the hysteria these attacks 

spawned greatly increased the difficulty of public health officials 

who were trying to properly triage victims. Some victims who 

required medical attention were dismissed, as they were 

asymptomatic at the time of observation and lacked a credible 

coherent connection to one of the distributed radioactive sources. 

Of the estimated 24,000 victims irradiated with lethal doses of 

radiation, initial figures suggest 50% achieved mortality. 

11
Chapter 2 

Scenario Analysis 

 The scenario presented in the previous section paints a grim 

picture for what a committed group of terrorists might accomplish. 

However, the scenario does not answer the key and critical 

question: is such an attack plausible? To answer this question we 

must examine four fundamental aspects: 1) Do terrorists posses 

the will to attack the United States with the intent of producing 

mass casualties? 2) Do terrorists posses the organizational 

capacity and technical knowledge required to plan and execute 

such an attack? 3) Do radioactive materials exist in sufficient 

quantities to produce the desired results, and what is the likelihood 

of terrorists obtaining these materials? 4) And lastly, are the 

casualty figures presented in the scenario realistic and achievable? 

This section will answer these questions. 

The Will to Kill 

 Do terrorists posses the will to attack the United States with the 

intent of producing mass casualties? The simple answer to this 

question is yes, and to look no further than al-Qaeda for supporting 

evidence. However, this is an unsatisfying answer, as not all 

terrorist organizations are al-Qaeda and therefore may have 

different motives and objectives. To answer this question more 

fully, we must understand the origins and trends of modern 

terrorism, the motives for terrorist acts, and their desired 

objectives. 

 Acts of terror are rife throughout history, and this paper does 

not suggest that terrorism is a new invention. However, the roots 

of modern terrorism can be traced back to the 6 September 1970 

hijacking of four jet airliners by the Popular Front for the 

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).15 Prior to this event, acts of 

terrorism were sporadic, sparse, unorganized, and were relatively 

non-lethal.16 After 1970, terrorist attacks took on a new flavor. 

Increasingly dominated by Palestinians or Islamic groups inspired 

by or identifying with the Palestinian cause, terrorist attacks 

steadily became more regular, organized, and lethal.17 

 Examining how this change in terrorism occurred reveals 

insight into the motivation and political objectives of terrorists. 

12
The 6 September hijacking was designed from the beginning to be 

a media spectacle.18 The PFLP hoped to interrupt peace 

negotiations between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel and draw 

international attention to the plight of Palestinians.19 Journalists 

from across the globe were invited to a deserted airstrip in Zerqa, 

Jordan, where the hijacked jets were forced to land. Recognizing 

that bloodshed would not garner international support for their 

cause, the PFLP ensured none of their hostages were harmed while 

they awaited Western nations to meet their meager demands. The 

images spread on the nightly news and on the front covers of news 

magazines captivated the world20 and, for a short period of time, 

earned the PFLP recognition for their struggle. 

 However, the hijacking escalated tensions between Jordan and 

the Palestinians encamped on Jordanian soil.21 Open fighting 

between the Jordanian military and the Palestinians eventually 

erupted and resulted in the death of thousands of Palestinians and 

the expulsion of their political and militant leadership from 

Jordan.22 Known as Black September, this bloody expulsion from 

Jordan hardened the resolve of militant Palestinians, who were 

now forced to fight further for their security and national identity 

in Lebanon.23 Hardened, bloodied, and jaded by conflict, 

Palestinians were no longer willing to take hostages and leave 

them unharmed. Subsequently, Palestinian terrorist attacks 

inspired by Black September steadily became more lethal.24 Over 

the intervening decades between Black September and the present, 

terrorist demands steadily became less specific, more far reaching, 

and in some cases non-existent, indicating their true goal was no 

longer to garner international support but instead to inspire a level 

of fear and public outcry that would enable them to engage 

successfully in power politics.25 

 Additionally, as their political demands became more far 

reaching, terrorists grew to expect less immediate results from their 

actions. With the lack of a direct cause and effect connection 

between terrorist acts and any tangible results, the act of terrorism 

itself began to take on its own meaning and purpose.26 Termed 

“Transcendental Terrorism,” this newly evolved brand of terrorism 

values the act of terrorism itself for its religious and political 

significance.27 With this transformation, the only motive terrorists 

require is the desire to create an event of religious or political 

significance. The only direct, immediate or tangible objective, 

political or otherwise, that terrorists expect to achieve is 

13
recognition. 

 This change in terrorist philosophy created a number of second 

and third order effects. First, no longer restrained in preventing 

bloodshed in order to garner international support for their cause or 

immediate demands, terrorists are now free to commit horrific 

acts.28 Second, shifting the objective of terrorist acts from direct 

political outcomes to one of recognition requires terrorists to tailor 

their attacks to ensure the greatest amount of media coverage for 

the longest period of time.29 Third, the struggle for mass media 

recognition places terrorist organizations in direct competition with 

one another. The convergence of these three effects creates an 

environment where terrorists must produce bigger and bloodier 

spectacles in order to assure they achieve the media recognition 

they desire30. While opponents may rightfully point to recent 

evidence that massive terrorist attacks are in fact designed to 

disrupt or damage the economy or to achieve a specific and 

immediate political objective, the historical evidence is clear and 

more telling. The means to achieve these ends have steadily 

become more lethal, bloody, and gruesome. This trend is expected 

to continue into the future.31

Capability of the Terrorist 

 Do terrorists posses the organizational capacity and technical 

knowledge required to plan and execute such an attack? 

Information necessary to understand the propagation of radiation 

and the physiological effects on the human body can all be easily 

found on the internet, and, while a background in math or physics 

is helpful, it is not necessary. A first year science or engineering 

major of any discipline could easily put together the required 

calculations contained in Appendix A in order to plan a deadly 

attack. This, then, leaves the question of organization. 

 The scenario only required four terrorists to execute their 

attacks. In the wake of 9/11, where 19 terrorists were required,32 a 

cell of four is obviously a small requirement which many terrorist 

organizations could easily meet. However, these four terrorists did 

require funding as well as contacts with organized crime and other 

terrorist organizations in order to obtain the required radioactive 

material. Is this likely? While there is only anecdotal evidence to 

suggest Mara Salvatrucha has active contacts with terrorist 

organizations,33 there is a good deal of evidence to suggest 

organized crime is willing to assist terrorist organizations in 

14
trafficking people and goods, even radioactive material, as long as 

the price is right.34 

 Are other terrorist organizations likely to support decentralized 

planning and control structures such as al-Qaeda’s? Do terrorist 

organizations really share resources, information, and money? Is 

al-Qaeda a one of a kind terrorist organization whose influence 

will die with the organization? The answers to these remaining 

questions are best answered by an analysis of al-Qaeda’s effect on 

world terrorism. 

 Al-Qaeda gained center stage in the world of terrorism with 

their attacks on the World Trade Center. In so doing they became 

a significant source of inspiration and a model for other terrorist 

organizations to emulate. Their decentralized structure provides 

al-Qaeda great resiliency and may even prevent al-Qaeda from 

fracturing if Osama Bin Laden is eventually captured or killed.35 

This decentralized structure is likely to become the model for 

many terrorist organizations in the future and is the fundamental 

characteristic supporting independently planned and organized 

terrorist attacks such as the one presented in the scenario.36 

 Al-Qaeda’s method of using the internet to communicate and to 

raise and transfer funds has already been adopted by other terrorist 

organizations.37 The coalition of supporting terrorist organizations 

al-Qaeda has formed under its influence provides a network for the 

passage of information, money, and goods between individual 

terrorist organizations that otherwise would not be connected.38 

This ability to move ideas, money, and goods throughout an illicit 

but only loosely allied organization is a strength to all participating 

terrorist organizations and is a key enabler for the type of scenario 

described above. 

 Al-Qaeda does not need to survive into the future for their 

brand of terrorism to flourish. They have already provided the 

inspiration and leadership necessary to transform the future of 

terrorism.39 The genie is out of the bottle. Destroying al-Qaeda, 

while a noble goal, may fracture the current coalition of terrorists 

but will ultimately only make room for decentralized but allied 

terrorist organizations on the ascendancy. 

15
Availability of Radioactive Sources 

 Do radioactive materials exist in sufficient quantities to produce 

the desired results and what is the likelihood of terrorists obtaining 

these materials? The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

estimates there are over a million radioactive sources worldwide.40 

Of these, experts estimate only 10,000 are present in sufficient 

quantities or provide a source strength powerful enough for 

weaponization as a radiological weapon.41 However, the real 

problem isn’t the number of candidate radioactive sources 

available for weaponization but rather the inadequate level of 

control exercised over radioactive materials over the past fifty 

years.

42 This inadequacy, combined with other political factors, 

generated an environment where radioactive sources are not only 

readily targeted for theft but are also frequently lost or stolen by 

accident.43 

 Naturally occurring radioactive sources are rare and generally 

characterized by low energy and radioactivity levels. By contrast, 

manmade radioactive sources are generally more powerful and 

more radioactive. These manmade radioactive sources, produced 

in the second half of the twentieth century, became more abundant 

as their usefulness to the medical, commercial, industrial, and 

research industries became apparent.44 Recognizing radiation is 

harmful if used improperly, most nations, the United States 

included, established regulations for the possession and handling 

of radioactive materials to ensure public safety. However, these 

regulations were typically aimed at providing guidance for how to 

inventory and store the materials to protect the public from 

accidental exposure.45 

 Under this system, all licensees were viewed as rational actors 

with the public interest in mind. As a result, the focus for licensing 

merely became the exercise of tabulating a list of businesses and 

organizations who would require regulation and inspection after 

the license was granted instead of an exercise in determining who 

should be allowed, from a national security perspective, to hold 

radioactive sources in the first place. Even today, in a post 9/11 

world, there is very little in the NRC’s code discussing the 

credentials potential subscribers must meet before granting a 

General or Special License.46 Similar holes exist in the NRC’s 

memorandum of agreement with Agreement States who issue 

General Licenses.47 And while the NRC currently recognizes the 

need to modify their code and policy, they have yet to take action 

16
to change the code or to conduct a review of all current General 

and Special License holders within the United States.48 To make 

matters worse, this same thought process, which assumes all 

licensees will be rational actors, creates a number of gaps in the 

regulation process that present serious security concerns. 

 One such gap is that international trade agreements allow sellers 

to distribute any amount and type of radioactive source to holders 

of a General License and do not require the seller to notify or 

register the radioactive source with the nation state where the 

buyer resides.49 This effectively undercuts the purpose of the 

General and Special License system, which was intended to limit 

the type and quantity of radioactive material General License 

holders could legally possess. It also allows buyers to keep their 

purchases undisclosed and, therefore, not subject to regulation. 

When considering rational actors, this system is acceptable, as 

General License holders would not be expected to overstep their 

bounds and attempt to purchase radioactive sources for which they 

are not licensed and presumably would inform the licensor of any 

purchases made from overseas suppliers. However, this gap does 

allow irrational actors to purchase and conceal radioactive 

materials for malevolent purposes. 

 Another gap exists in the regulations and infrastructure 

designed to accept disposal of radioactive sources. Specifically, 

the failure of the Yucca Flats initiative to reach fruition and 

provide a place for the disposal of radioactive material has created 

a system encouraging licensees to store obsolete but still very 

dangerous radioactive sources on site.50 Typically, the security 

arrangements for these obsolete radioactive sources are minimal,51

as they are designed to be cost effective and also assume the 

general public as a whole are rational actors who do not desire to 

steal highly radioactive sources. This gap sets the stage for a 

Goiania-type disaster, where thieves in Brazil searching for scrap 

metal broke into an abandoned cancer clinic and stole an 

abandoned teletherapy machine containing 1,375 curies of 

cesium-137.52 Scrap yard workers who received the stolen 

equipment unknowingly and unwittingly spread the contamination 

throughout Goiania.53 The results were five deaths, 151 people 

who suffered internal contamination and who required monitoring 

and medical assistance,54 decontamination efforts requiring the 

demolition of 85 buildings and homes, and 140,000 people who 

were “worried well” and, although probably never exposed to the 

17
radioactive source, sought medical attention due to panic and 

perception.55 The total economic impact from this disaster is 

difficult to measure but is estimated to have been in the hundreds 

of millions of dollars.56 While these are disturbing facts for 

Brazilians, similar events where lost or stolen radioactive sources 

have reappeared in the public domain inside the United States 

should give us pause to consider the potential consequences of 

failing to take proper action to provide a national repository for 

obsolete radioactive materials. While the distribution of 

cesium-137 in Goiania was not the result of deliberate terrorist 

action, it certainly provides insight into where terrorists might 

expect to obtain their radioactive materials, the level of security 

they might encounter, as well as the potential for death, destruction 

and disruption. 

 Lastly, the NRC has been ineffective in creating a meaningful 

regulatory climate. No national57 or international58 register exists 

to provide inspectors and regulators with a list of all the 

radioactive materials held by General and Special License holders. 

Under funded and understaffed, the NRC all but ignores General 

License holders.59 Special License holders are only infrequently 

inspected or monitored.60 Companies and institutions who are 

occasionally found negligent in their inventory and security 

practices are even less occasionally fined or punished in some 

meaningful manner.61 These problems with regulating radioactive 

sources are not unique to the United States. The IAEA estimates 

that globally there are thousands of orphaned radioactive sources - 

meaning lost, stolen or discarded - which are no longer under any 

inventory or security control, with several hundred more added to 

this total annually.62 

 This problem is amplified by the some 46 failing or failed 

states,63 most of whom possess some radioactive source material. 

States which belonged to the Former Soviet Union are key 

concerns, as they were technologically advanced and had industrial 

and military facilities that contained hundreds of highly radioactive 

sources.64 With the collapse of the state institutions responsible 

for managing these radioactive sources came a great deal of source 

orphaning.65 With this wide availability in unmonitored and 

uncontrolled access to radioactive sources, the key question is not 

‘Can terrorists obtain radioactive materials?’ but rather, ‘Which 

terrorists already have radioactive materials?’ 

18
Bring Out Your Dead 

 Are the casualty figures presented in the scenario realistic and 

achievable? Appendix A details the calculations used to generate 

the casualty figures presented in the scenario. While many 

assumptions were made regarding each attack, each assumption 

was chosen for its conservative nature in limiting the total number 

of casualties achieved. Equally as important, Appendix A shows 

that delivery of the radioactive material to the target is possible 

without causing injury to those involved. 

 Although the success of the terrorist attack scenario requires 

three terrorists to achieve access to relatively secured areas of 

Amtrack, Browns Stadium, and a centralized kitchen facility, these 

are not strictly required elements. Any of several thousand 

entertainment facilities, concert halls, theaters, etc. nationwide 

would provide similar opportunities for terrorists as Browns 

Stadium provided in the scenario. Many of these venues would 

also supply their own pyrotechnic show that would handily provide 

terrorists a covert method for distributing their radioactive material 

over an unsuspecting crowd. Similarly, there are thousands of 

centralized food production facilities nationwide which process 

pre-packaged ready to eat meals such as TV dinners and frozen 

pizzas. Access to a centralized kitchen is not strictly necessary. 

Additionally, if gaining undisturbed access to such facilities proves 

to be too difficult, terrorists could always produce radioactively 

contaminated chili or clam chowder in their own kitchens for entry 

into any one of a number of annual contests or festivals with the 

hopes of achieving similar casualty results. Nationwide, the 

transportation industry provides an equivalent number of 

opportunities for radiological attacks and, as the scenario attacks 

on Seattle and Atlanta demonstrate, secured access to these 

facilities is not always required to achieve effectiveness. 

 The bottom line is this: wherever people congregate in 

sufficient numbers, terrorists are afforded the opportunity they 

need to conduct an effective radiological attack and only a 

minimum of imagination is required to design an attack to ensure it 

is covert as well as lethal. 

Where’s the Beef? 

 Critics of this analysis will undoubtedly point out there has yet 

to occur a radiological attack, and there has never been an arrest or 

uncovering of a credible plot to use a radiological weapon. The 

19
arrest of Jose Padilla66 and the 2005 dirty bomb scare in Boston67

seem testament to this fact and support the argument that 

radiological weapons do not constitute a significant threat. If 

radioactive sources are so readily available and if they can cause 

such destruction, then why have they not been used already and 

why do we need to fear their use in the future? To answer this 

question and refute the argument, there is existing evidence that 

shows terrorists do seek weapons of mass destruction in order to 

further their aims as transcendental terrorists. 

 Terrorists are seeking methods to obtain and disperse weapons 

of mass destruction. Osama Bin Laden, one of the most influential 

terrorist leaders, has made it a religious imperative to obtain and 

use a weapon of mass destruction on Western civilizations.68 And 

in fact, even if he were not advocating such methods, the trend of 

terrorist organizations toward transcendental terrorism requires 

terrorists to plan and execute attacks with ever escalating body 

counts.69 With death tolls already in the thousands from a single 

attack based on conventional materials and explosives, it will not 

be long before terrorists are forced to seek a weapon of mass 

destruction capability. 

 While a nuclear attack with a fission or fusion bomb probably 

remains at the top of most terrorist organizations wish list, these 

devices are beyond the capability of terrorist organizations to 

manufacture organically.70 This requires terrorists to obtain a 

ready made nuclear weapon. State actors within even the most 

irresponsible states are unlikely to provide terrorists with a nuclear 

weapon. This leaves theft, most likely from Russia, as the only 

credible source for a nuclear weapon. For the moment, however, it 

would appear that intense international efforts to secure and 

decrease Russia’s nuclear stockpile, combined with intense 

intelligence efforts in this area, have significantly reduced the 

hopes and prospects for potential terrorists.71 

 Biological and chemical weapons are the next logical choice for 

terrorists. However, manufacturing, purifying, and weaponizing 

biological and chemical agents is incredibly difficult and is again 

beyond the reasonable scope for most terrorist organizations. The 

Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo is in part proof of this. From 1990 

through 1995 the cult conducted approximately a dozen attacks 

using biological and chemical agents.72 Only two of these attacks 

achieved casualties which were limited by the ineffectiveness of 

the agents and weapon design.73 More importantly, these poor 

20
results were achieved by an organization with 300 scientists on the 

payroll who had access to superior laboratories and resources.74 

 This leaves radiological weapons as the logical choice for 

terrorists. They are abundant and can be obtained from many 

unsuspecting sources. They do not require sophisticated delivery 

platforms. In this way, radiological weapons are unlike nuclear, 

biological, and chemical weapons and are, therefore, uniquely 

attractive to terrorists. 

 Terrorist organizations recognize this and have attempted thefts 

of powerful radioactive sources.75 While all known endeavors to 

obtain such a powerful radioactive source have apparently resulted 

in failure, terrorists have placed crude bombs with small amounts 

of radioactive materials in public parks to inspire fear.76 These 

acts show terrorists do recognize the potential radiological 

weapons posses for destruction and disruption and also show the 

intent to use radiological weapons. Statements by Osama Bin 

Laden designed to motivate al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda inspired 

terrorists direct radical Islamic organizations to seek and employ 

radiological weapons. And even though Jose Padilla at the time of 

his arrest was no longer conspiring to build a dirty bomb, he was 

initially seeking this information when he first left for Pakistan.77 

Perhaps if al-Qaeda’s organizational structure hadn’t suffered so 

many setbacks following the invasion of Afghanistan, he would 

have been supplied with the requisite materials and knowledge. 

 If anything, the most convincing argument for why radiological 

weapons have not and will not be employed is that such attacks, 

like the one in the scenario, lack sufficient media coverage of 

bloody bodies and smoking ruins which is the current trademark of 

terrorist organizations. However, conventional explosives are 

reaching the limits for the amount of death and carnage they can 

create in a single attack. To achieve the higher casualty rates 

transcendental terrorists now desire, they will need to employ 

weapons of mass destruction. As previously argued, terrorists will 

have to overcome a great deal of logistical and technological 

problems to successfully employ nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons. These combined forces may cause terrorists to shift their 

reasoning to accept weapons that deliver less visible carnage and 

destruction in favor of less immediately gratifying, but ultimately 

more long term destructive, radiological weapons. In fact, 

biological and chemical weapons will require a similar shift in 

thinking before they can be truly accepted by terrorists, yet we 

21
have no difficulty in imagining terrorists currently desire to use 

these types of weapons. Powerful radioactive sources are out 

there, they are available through theft or the abuse of current trade 

agreements and regulations, and terrorists want them. It is only a 

matter of time before terrorists successfully employ a radiological 

weapon. 

22
Chapter 3 

The Technological Solution 

 It is not the proposal of this paper that a wholly technological 

solution to the problem of defeating radiological weapons exists. 

It, in fact, does not. There is far more ground to be gained by 

improving domestic legislation and regulation, strengthening 

international institutions, and through State Department initiatives. 

The Nunn-Lugar act provided the necessary funding to locate and 

secure hundreds if not thousands of potentially harmful orphaned 

radioactive sources within the Former Soviet Union states.78 

Similarly, the IAEA has taken an aggressive role in securing 

orphaned sources worldwide.79 The IAEA is also seeking to 

strengthen international controls over radioactive sources by 

obtaining more member states under the IAEA umbrella and 

through strengthening import and export controls of those member 

states.80 The Dirty Bomb bill,81 the Yucca Flats proposal,82 and 

NRC initiatives83 promise to shore up a number of the gaps in our 

current policies and procedures regarding the handling and 

disposing of radioactive sources within the United States. This 

regulatory, legislative, and international agreement focus is most 

important, as it will provide the greatest security for and protection 

from radioactive materials and their potential misuse. 

 However, there is plenty of guiding literature discussing these 

initiatives and their potential for success in the future.84 What is 

conspicuously absent from these discussions is the proposal of a 

technological approach to detecting and preventing the use of 

radiological weapons.85 While this approach may not be as 

effective as those described above, it nevertheless can play an 

important role in successfully detecting and preventing the use of 

radiological weapons and is relatively inexpensive when compared 

to other programs designed to defeat radiological weapons. Most 

importantly, while improving regulations, legislation, and 

agreements is a worthwhile pursuit, it ultimately will not protect 

the citizenry from any radiological weapons that slip through the 

cracks. This section of the paper provides a framework for the role 

of technology in defeating radiological dispersion devices.86 

Detecting Radioactive Sources 

 Weapons relying on radioactive sources have a unique Achilles 

23
heel: they all, by definition, emit energy. Additionally, the 

spectrum and intensity of the energy released is unique to each 

radioactive element, occurs on a predictable schedule, and cannot 

be altered under the currently understood laws of physics. 

 Shielding will exponentially reduce the amount of observed 

radiation from gamma emitters; however, no amount of shielding 

will bring this observable to zero. Radiation detectors relying on 

analysis of the spectrum of observed energy are effective in 

rejecting the vast amounts of background radiation, thus raising the 

recognition differential and allowing the observation of very low 

levels of radiation to be accurately categorized.87 

 While shielding can effectively reduce the observable radiation 

from alpha and beta emitters to zero, sources that exclusively emit 

alpha and beta radiation are rare, and the decay chain of these 

elements most often includes gamma emitters. The net result of 

current state of the art technology is that radioactive sources are 

very difficult to conceal, regardless of the amount of shielding 

employed, if the correct technology is applied. It is upon this 

technology, the detection of radiated energy, that any technological 

solution to the problem of identifying and preventing radiological 

weapons must reside. 

 

A Systems Based Approach88

 Although radiation detection technology is relatively mature, 

advanced, and inexpensive, it would be foolish to think that simply 

providing this technology to local law enforcement agencies would 

provide an effective system to detect and prevent the use of 

radiological weapons. A system is required to alert and queue law 

enforcement officers, and a concept of operations must be 

developed detailing how this system should be employed. 

Additionally, any technological system of this nature will be 

subject to false detections, which must be minimized to prevent 

overtaxing law enforcement agencies. Several technologies are 

available today that could be implemented in relatively short order 

to create the necessary system. Of these technologies, mesh 

networks, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), and iridium 

phone technologies, combined with current state of the art 

radiation detection technology, provide a promising solution to the 

problem. 

24
Overt Versus Covert Threats 

 This paper is in agreement with articles and analyses showing 

dirty bombs are little more lethal than the initial explosive event. 

Even the massive amounts of cesium-137 used in the scenario 

against Browns Stadium would cause few deaths if it were 

distributed by an overt explosion that serves to alert officials to the 

presence of the radiation hazard. Proper employment of time, 

distance, and shielding concepts, along with prompt 

decontamination efforts, would greatly reduce the absorbed 

radiation and the number of personnel who are internally 

contaminated, thus preventing high mortality rates. 

 It is the explosive event itself that acts as a warning sign and 

indicator that a radiological attack may be occurring. With this in 

mind, agencies tasked as initial responders who include in their 

concept of operations a survey for radiation when responding to 

explosions will provide adequate safety for the general public from 

most scenarios involving radiological weapons. This reduces the 

act of properly detecting and classifying an overt attack to the 

simple employment of detection equipment by initial responders. 

However, such overt attacks using explosive devices are not the 

focus of this paper and a more complicated system is required to 

detect and defeat a covert threat. 

 Preventing the employment of a covert radiological weapon 

through such a system of detection and interdiction can be broken 

down into three fundamental areas. First, detection systems and 

accompanying procedures must be deployed to monitor and 

prevent illegal shipments of radioactive materials from entering the 

United States. Second, detection systems and accompanying 

procedures must be developed to monitor and prevent illegal 

movements of radioactive materials within the United States. 

Failing to detect illegal shipments or movements, population 

centers must employ systems and procedures to detect and interdict 

harmful radiation as it is entering the targeted public facility. 

Intercepting Illegal International Shipments 

 Detecting illegal radiological shipments as they enter the United 

States requires deploying detection equipment at the major points 

of entry into the United States: seaports, international airports, 

international mail distribution centers, and border crossings. 

Detection systems and their accompanying concept of operations at 

these locations can remain relatively simple as these facilities are 

25
continuously manned with personnel who are trained to look for 

and interdict contraband. Systems such as Radiation Assessment 

and Identification (RAID)89 and Sensor for Measurement and 

Analysis of Radiation Transients (SMART),90 developed by 

Sandia National Laboratories, are examples of ready to deploy 

systems that can accurately detect radiation as personnel and goods 

are moved in bulk, such as in a vehicle, past the detector at 

moderate speeds. 

 The most significant implication of this strategy is that the term 

“Illegal Shipment” will need to be defined in legal terms. This will 

require legislation, regulations, and international agreements to 

reach consensus on the required elements and characteristics of 

legal shipments. Finally, to prevent legal radiological shipments 

from being unnecessarily delayed as they enter the United States, 

some system of documentation or advance notification will have to 

be developed which will allow customs and clearing officials to 

expeditiously pass the legal radiological shipment. 

Intercepting Illegal Internal Movements 

 Detecting and interdicting illegal movements of material 

throughout the United States is a much more complex matter due 

to the vast number of available highways, interstates, railways, 

domestic seaports, and regional airports that exist for terrorists to 

exploit. Regional airports and domestic seaports could be 

eliminated from those areas requiring monitoring, based on the 

argument that roads or railways will ultimately be used to bring the 

radiological weapon to a population center. However, this 

reduction of the problem amounts to little gain, as road and railway 

systems throughout the United States are so vast and complex. 

Additionally, such globally applied strategies risk opening avenues 

for exploitation in cities such as Seattle, Charleston, and 

Pittsburgh, which are built on or near extensive waterways or in 

regions such as Alaska, where regional air travel is more prevalent. 

 Instead, each state must produce a plan, based on their specific 

geography and the defining characteristics of their transportation 

systems, which details the best locations for radiation detectors. 

These specific plans should seek to locate key nodes where traffic 

patterns converge. Sophisticated detectors that break down the 

radiation energy spectrum, such as the RAID and SMART 

detectors, will certainly be a necessary component of this system. 

However, these detectors are expensive and it is not economically 

26
feasible to deploy a system of detectors of this quality to monitor 

our nation’s entire transportation systems. Smaller, cheaper 

detectors that are equally as sensitive to radiation91 but are less 

capable in breaking down the energy spectrum to determine the 

exact radioisotope involved should be employed side by side with 

the more capable radiation detectors in order to keep the total 

systems cost reasonable while maximizing the coverage of the 

transportation system. 

 Similar to the problem of interdicting illegal shipments, 

interdicting illegal movements will require a legal definition and a 

method for identifying legal movements from illegal movements. 

Systems based on proper documentation would likely be bogged 

down by excessive paperwork and bureaucracy and would 

ultimately be flawed. This would result in wasted resources, as 

local law enforcement agencies track down unregistered detections 

of radioactive material in order to determine their legality. Instead, 

a system that utilizes RFID technology provides a simple 

technological solution to the problem. Under this system, all legal 

radioactive sources would be tagged with a unique RFID. 

Radiation detectors, upon sensing a radioactive source, would scan 

for a federally registered RFID. Law enforcement agencies would 

only need to respond to those movements of radioactive materials 

that could not be associated with a properly registered RFID. 

Heavy fines for moving registered radioactive sources without its 

associated RFID tag would ensure responsible source holders 

comply with requirements. 

Intercepting Radiological Weapons at the Target 

 Even the best conceived and implemented system of detectors 

along our nation’s highways, railways, waterways, etc. will do 

little to detect and allow authorities to interdict radiological 

weapons that terrorists acquire in the same city they intend to 

target or who devise a method of delivery which does not rely on 

current transportation systems. To defeat this threat there is no 

substitute for a vast system of radiation detectors located anywhere 

terrorists would otherwise have access to vast segments of the 

population from a single key nodal point. Such locations for 

monitoring would include any public venue where significant 

numbers might congregate such as a concert hall or sports arena, 

corral points that direct and regulate a heavy flow of regular foot 

traffic such as the entryways to large buildings, all public 

27
transportation systems, private food processing facilities, and 

central kitchens. 

 It is worth emphasizing that such a proposed system would not 

require small businesses like the local Starbucks to install a 

radiation detection system. The relatively low throughput of 

customers makes this type of venue an unattractive and unlikely 

target for terrorists. Instead, radiation detectors would be deployed 

in those locations where, if left unprotected, would allow terrorists 

access to vast segments of the populace. Similarly, the type, 

capability, and cost of detection systems deployed would also 

depend in part on the volume of people who patronize the venue. 

These cost benefit decisions would be made by local 

representatives to balance the threat versus the potential costs of 

the system and would presumably be codified as part of local 

building codes. 

 Like the networks deployed to monitor the nation’s roadways, 

the radiation networks deployed to protect facilities would also 

need to rely on RFID technology in order to reduce false detection 

rates from legal movements. Upon the detection of a radioactive 

source unaccompanied by a valid RFID, local authorities would be 

alerted to intercept to determine the legality of the movement. 

Collecting the Data 

 Detecting radioactive sources with a system of detectors as 

described above certainly gives law enforcement officials a more 

than reasonable chance to interdict radiological weapons and 

prevent their use against the general public. However, it would be 

cost prohibitive for each detector to have an associated law 

enforcement officer poised to capture suspected terrorists should 

the detector, in fact, detect a radioactive source. To be cost 

effective, individual detectors need to be networked in order to 

allow the monitoring of many detectors by a small number of 

specially trained people. While networked infrastructures could be 

developed that place the monitoring burden upon each state, this 

would be an inefficient use of resources as it would require each 

state to establish a monitoring station, train their own personnel, 

and all to prevent an illegal activity which will most likely occur 

on only rare occasions at best. This would not only be an 

enormous duplication in effort, it would also establish natural 

barriers that could prevent the flow of lessons learned, best 

practices for organization and implementation, and possibly even 

28
prevent the timely flow of real time detection information from one 

state to another. 

 Instead, a nationwide network administered by a federal agency 

should be established. Many agencies such as the Department of 

Transportation, the Department of Energy, or the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation are good potential candidates to operate this 

system; however, the Department of Homeland Security, who by 

the National Response Plan92 would be in charge of consequence 

management for any radiological incident of national significance, 

is perhaps the best choice. Each state, under the supervision of the 

governing federal authority, would be responsible for determining 

the necessary infrastructure of fielded radiation detectors required 

to adequately monitor the states transportation systems. States 

would also be responsible for developing the communications plan 

for how federal authorities would disseminate information quickly 

to local law enforcement authorities. The federal authorities would 

in turn provide a central monitoring station alleviating the states of 

a significant hardware, personnel, and training burden. The 

centralized facility would also allow for quicker implementation of 

lessons learned, new database or analysis algorithms, and any other 

advancement. 

Role of Internet 

 In order to provide a central monitoring facility with the data 

collected from literally thousands of detectors distributed 

throughout the nation requires each detector have a link with the 

central monitoring system. The natural solution to this problem is 

to exploit the internet. Exploiting the internet prevents having to 

build a complete data network infrastructure from the ground up 

and has the added advantage that the internet is largely maintained 

and updated by the public sector. For the highway and interstate 

system detectors, the overwhelming majority of detectors, even if 

not located directly adjacent to the large population centers they 

are intended to protect, would likely be located near a population 

center with sufficient phone line or cable connections to allow 

direct connection to the internet. For those detectors located away 

from cable or phone connections, data could be transmitted to the 

internet using embedded iridium phone technology. For detectors 

within large population centers, mesh networks should be utilized 

to transmit required data to nearby internet servers to reduce costs 

associated with iridium phone technology. 

29
Interdiction 

 Still, detection of the event and transmission of that data to a 

central monitoring facility does not equate to interdiction. Local 

law enforcement officials must receive relevant and reliable 

information vectoring them to the terrorists and their radioactive 

source. This requires some method of identifying the terrorists 

from the rest of the crowd and their relative direction of motion. 

Cameras collocated with each detector and designed to capture 

critical information such as vehicular description, license plate 

information, or physical characteristics of individuals will pass the 

most pertinent data to law enforcement officials and relies on 

cheap and dependable technology. The central monitoring agency, 

through established communication plans and using preexisting 

communication networks, would alert state and local law 

enforcement officials of the potential threat and vector them in for 

interdiction. Local authorities would use hand held detectors to 

search out and confirm the presence of a radioactive source, 

apprehend the perpetrators, and preserve any required forensic 

evidence. 

Technological Solutions Bring Technological Problems 

 Any technologically based system designed to detect and record 

an event will be subject to false detections. The false detection 

rate observed by the system will depend upon many factors. 

However, the false detection rate for a system designed to detect 

radiation will be dominated primarily by two factors: 1) the total 

number of detectors included in the system and 2) the sensitivity of 

those detectors. As the size of a detection system increases, the 

total number of false detections the system experiences will 

increase proportionally with the number of detectors connected to 

the system. Similarly, the more sensitive a detector is designed to 

be, the more false detections that detector will observe. 

Additionally, detectors designed to detect events near naturally 

occurring background levels of radiation experience false 

detections at a rate increasing in a non-linear fashion with 

sensitivity. 

 The shear number of detectors required and the necessary 

sensitivity these detectors must posses to provide adequate security 

against radiological weapons could potentially create a system 

overburdened with false detection rates. Large false detection rates 

30
would overwhelm law enforcement officials, who would 

eventually become jaded to the process. Even modest or small 

false detection rates would risk public panic when law enforcement 

officials fail to apprehend terrorists that do not exist. For these 

reasons, the false detection rate for any employed system must be 

maintained as close to zero as technically possible. 

 Researchers and designers of the overall system will need to 

rely on several methods to reduce the number of false detections 

the system observes. Collimating the detector window using 

shielding, increasing detector dwell time by positioning detectors 

in areas where traffic patterns are slower, reducing the sample size 

by isolating or limiting the number of objects observed, and 

spectrum analysis are all methods that effectively reduce the ratio 

of background radiation to target radiation observed and are 

industry standards for reducing false detection rates. Computer 

algorithms designed to analyze the observed energy spectrum 

could potentially eliminate some false detections by identifying 

those events where parent nuclides are detected in the absence of 

their decay daughters, by requiring coincident detections of two or 

more collocated detectors, or by employing filtering algorithms 

similar to those used by commercial and military RADAR and 

SONAR systems. Radiation detectors working in conjunction with 

optical, motion, or weight detectors could eliminate some false 

detections based on a lack of corroborating evidence. Similarly, 

radiation detectors separated in space but located on a common 

route could be required to display detections within a specified 

time interval in order for the detection to be considered valid. 

Finally, watchdog diagnostic systems designed to monitor detector 

health could identify failing or failed detectors, allowing 

technicians to remove these detectors from the system before they 

contribute to false detections. 

 The significance of reducing the false detection rate to an 

acceptable value cannot be overstated and is perhaps the most 

significant technological problem any proposed system will have 

to overcome. With this as a given, there are many methods readily 

available for reducing the number of false detections and field 

operations, tests, and evaluations of SMART and RAID systems 

have yielded remarkable fidelity in their ability to detect and locate 

radioactive sources and have yet to encounter a false detection.93 

These results are promising evidence that a massive system 

comprised of many such detectors could be successfully designed 

31
and employed. 

Order of Magnitude Cost Analysis 

 It is difficult to determine the exact cost of a networked system 

without first performing the required nodal analysis to determine 

where and how many detectors will be required, how many people 

will be required to man the system, etc. A detailed analysis of the 

needs to support just one state is beyond the scope of this paper. 

However, an analysis that only concerns itself with determining the 

order of magnitude instead of the exact numbers can provide 

insight into the relative cost of the proposed program. Under this 

methodology, the goal is not to determine whether we need 120 or 

180 people to run the program, the goal is to determine whether we 

need 100 or 1,000 people. This is the level of analysis that will be 

applied to determine a rough estimate of the expected cost of a 

technologically based program to support interdiction of illegal 

radiological shipments and movements. 

 Within this cost analysis, it is assumed mesh networks 

supporting wireless connectivity will be developed and fielded by 

private industry, by local government civic improvement projects, 

or by some combination of the two. Federal and state governments 

may choose to accelerate the creation of wireless networks through 

economic and tax incentives; however, it is maintained the rewards 

of creating such systems will far outweigh the costs. As the next 

natural extension of the internet, many cities have already 

undertaken projects to provide their citizens complete wireless 

coverage.94 It is likely that market economy and political pressure 

will force most major metropolitan areas to follow suit. 

Consequently, this paper assumes zero cost for establishing mesh 

or wireless networks. Where this assumption proves to be false, 

the cost of connecting individual detectors directly into existing 

cable or telephone lines or through iridium phones is already 

factored into the cost calculations for detectors discussed below. 

 Similarly, it is assumed the cost of radiation detection systems 

designed to protect critical access points to the public will be 

absorbed by the private and public facilities. Most facilities will 

only require a few detectors located at key choke points such as 

entrances and exits and will not need detectors throughout the 

entire structure. The cost of implementing such a system would be 

small and on the order of paying for a fire safety system or a 

physical security system.95 While the total cost to business will be 

32
large, the cost to any single firm will be small and quickly 

recapitalized by passing the cost on to customers, who will only 

recognize a fraction of a penny difference. 

 Finally, it is assumed that local and state law enforcement 

officers, customs officials, United States Postal Service personnel 

and all other professional organizations who will operate the 

fielded detector systems are already part of a regular training 

program, and that this training program is capable of absorbing the 

costs of the required training for their personnel to ensure they 

understand and can adequately operate the systems fielded. 

 This leaves the cost analysis of fielding a comprehensive 

system of radiation detectors as the sum of essentially four separate 

but integral parts. One, the cost of radiation detectors designed to 

detect illegal shipment of radiation sources into the United States 

through mail, rail, shipping, airport, or border control stations. 

Two, the cost of radiation detectors designed to detect radioactive 

sources as they are illegally transported throughout the United 

States. Three, the cost of placing hand held radiation detectors into 

the hands of local law enforcement officials. Four, the cost of 

establishing a centralized monitoring facility. 

 Before we can begin the cost analysis, we must have an 

understanding of the cost of individual detectors. The cost of a 

single RAID or SMART type detector is well documented and can 

be expected to run $25,000 to $30,000.96 Smaller detectors that 

have less capability to perform spectral analysis can be as cheap as 

a few hundred dollars.97 Embedded hardware and software 

required to recognize an event, take required pictures, and transmit 

data also rely on technology available in the hundred dollar range. 

The exact cost of each type of detector would of course depend on 

the quantity ordered and other details of the procurement process 

and contractual agreement. However, a reasonable cost estimate 

can be calculated assuming the larger detectors capable of more 

granular spectral analysis will cost $30,000 while the smaller less 

capable detectors can be purchased for $1,000. Reasonable 

handheld detectors that will allow local law enforcement to 

localize and confirm the presence of radiation sources can be 

purchased for approximately $500.98

 There are 317 ports of entry for personnel and goods to enter 

the United States.99 These ports of entry supervise the nation’s 

shipping ports, international airports, and border crossing stations. 

Some ports of entry service multiple facilities, making the exact 

33
number of locations where radiation detectors are required difficult 

to determine. However, the assumption of 500 such facilities is a 

reasonable figure for an order of magnitude cost analysis. Also 

assumed in this figure are the 21 major mail distribution centers, 

which are not monitored by the ports of entry but are a potential 

avenue of transportation for terrorists to exploit.100 All of these 

facilities would require the larger, more expensive, and more 

accurate radiation detectors in order to allow bulk movements of 

material past the detector for screening. Additionally, some 

facilities will require more than one detector to efficiently process 

the goods and personnel moving through the facility. In keeping 

with the order of magnitude analysis, the figure of 1,000 detectors 

fielded to these locations is assumed. At $30,000 per detector, the 

total cost of this portion of the system is $30,000,000. 

 There are approximately 43,000 miles of Interstate System 

roadways.101 Clearly, placing a radiation detector each mile would 

be overkill, while placing a detector every 100 miles would 

probably not create a sufficiently robust system. In keeping with 

the order of magnitude analysis, we will assume a detector is 

required for every 10 miles of interstate in order to provide 

adequate monitoring. Assuming the number of other 

transportation nodes within a given state which also require 

monitoring do not increase the total system requirements by more 

than a factor of 10, then some 43,000 detectors are required. In 

keeping with our order of magnitude analysis, we will assume a 

total number of 100,000 detectors distributed nationwide in order 

to provide adequate monitoring of the nation’s transportation 

systems. With the additional assumption that strategic detector 

placement will allow for a roughly equivalent amount of money to 

be spent on expensive and inexpensive detectors, then these 

100,000 detectors can be purchased for a total of $200,000,000. 

Assuming the cost of installation for a detector will be roughly 

equivalent to the cost of that detector, the total cost of purchasing 

and positioning the 100,000 detectors becomes $400,000,000. 

 While there is a real threat that radiological weapons may be 

used against us in the near future, it is unlikely the United States 

will be struck with such a number of concurrent attacks as to 

require a handheld detector in every patrol car. A few such hand 

held detectors positioned strategically throughout any given state, 

combined with a process designed to keep these detectors in the 

hands of trained officers throughout daily shift turnovers, will 

34
provide sufficient response time statewide to radiological threats. 

The exact number of detectors each individual state needs will 

depend on the size of the state, the quality and quantity of their 

highway system, and any other factors affecting the speed and 

mobility of detectors from one location to another. However, in 

keeping with the order of magnitude analysis, it is assumed that 

100 such detectors will give states sufficient coverage of their 

territory to ensure timely response of qualified and equipped 

officers to the scene of radiological threats. With 50 states and at 

$500 a copy, this brings the total cost of hand held radiation 

detectors to $2,500,000. 

 Establishing a central monitoring facility will require sufficient 

personnel to man and monitor the network 24 hours a day, to 

maintain the detectors and the network hardware, to program 

upgrades and improve algorithms to reduce false detection rates, 

and to act as liaisons between the central monitoring facility and 

local/state officials. An order of magnitude analysis would suggest 

such an undertaking would require in the neighborhood of 1000 

personnel. The cost of salary to support these personnel is an 

annual cost and is considered later. However, it is reasonable to 

assume the cost of initial training for these people as well as the 

cost of equipment and infrastructure that these people will operate 

will be on an order of magnitude equivalent with their annual 

salary. Sources documenting the per capita income in the United 

States vary from $33,000 to $40,000 per individual. In keeping 

with our order of magnitude analysis, an annual salary of $50,000 

is assumed. Multiplying this value by 1,000 personnel and then by 

a factor of two to account for initial training and infrastructure 

required gives a figure of $100,000,000 for initial setup costs. 

 This brings the total cost for the initial outlay of the program to 

approximately $533,000,000. Assuming annual maintenance, 

repair, and training costs run at approximately 10% of this figure, 

and adding in the annual wages for employees, the program will 

require an additional $100,000,000 annually to maintain efficiency. 

 

Cost Deference Strategies

 Measuring in at only .02% of our annual federal budget102 and 

only .1% of our current defense budget,103 $500 million hardly 

seems like a figure requiring strategies to help defer the costs. 

However, in an era where radiological weapons have yet to be used 

against us, it is reasonable to expect citizens and their elected 

35
representatives to baulk at such a figure. The following cost 

deferral strategies are recommended to reduce the perceived cost. 

 The obvious source of funding for any new program is taxation. 

While unpopular, and perhaps a political landmine, there are 

lucrative areas of private enterprise which have successfully 

resisted new taxes. One such area is internet sales. Frequently 

crossing state boundaries, these transactions are left untaxed by 

either state. With annual internet sales approaching $20 billion,104

each 1% federal tax aimed at interstate internet transactions would 

realize $200 million. Similarly, our nation’s ports receive over six 

million containers annually.105 A simple flat tax per container 

could raise tens to hundreds of millions of dollars to help offset 

costs. 

 Another option is to kill competing programs. Programs such 

as the Office for Domestic Preparedness’ Homeland Security Grant 

Program funneled over four billion dollars in 2004 to local law 

enforcement and first response agencies in an effort to better 

prepare them for the threat posed by terrorists.106 Removing or 

reducing the size of these programs in favor of more detailed and 

purposed programs is a potential source of funding. 

 Another option is to combine the initiative for detecting 

radiological weapons with other WMD programs. Adding the 

potential to these detectors to monitor for high explosives, 

chemical, and biological agents is within our capability. While this 

strategy will certainly raise the total cost of the fielded detectors, it 

may achieve economies if it reduces the total cost of similar 

weapon of mass destruction initiatives through the utilization of a 

common monitoring and maintenance infrastructure. 

 Similarly, the radiological detection initiative could be 

combined with other programs such as Weigh in Motion (WIM). 

WIM is a system that most State Departments of Transportation 

are funding in order to automate the weigh station process by 

measuring the weight of trucks as they pass over weight detection 

systems at normal highway speeds.107 Combining state and federal 

funds and the project objectives of WIM and the radiological 

detection initiative may allow state and federal governments to 

realize true cost savings in investment for initial installation and 

infrastructure. 

 The cost of providing security along our nation’s highways and 

interstates could be funded by current highway and interstate 

maintenance and improvement programs. The federal government 

36
alone expends approximately $100 billion annually108 to maintain 

and expand the nation’s interstate. A simple redirection of only 

.1% of these funds would be enough to fund the proposed system 

and would arguably contribute to the safety of the interstate 

system. 

 Finally, the most satisfying answer may be to make those 

industries and institutions responsible for creating and fueling the 

problem to pay for the solution. The IAEA estimates that radiation 

technologies contribute nearly $300 billion to the United States 

economy annually.109 Tapping this portion of the market with 

even modest levees of less than 1% would pay for the proposed 

program outlined above. Furthermore, this extra regulation and the 

fees and additional bureaucracy it would entail might encourage 

businesses to seek alternative technologies that do not rely on 

radioactive sources thus reducing the threat overall by reducing the 

existence of radioactive sources in the United States

37
Chapter 4

Conclusion 

 For terrorists seeking an asymmetric advantage against the 

United States, radiological weapons offer unique opportunities; 

discrete, lethal, requiring only limited technology to employ, and 

with radioactive material readily available they contain an 

awesome potential for psychological disruption. Radiation is 

energy in one of its purest and most elemental forms. As such, 

radioactive sources can possess incredible energy density that is in 

every respect as lethal as traditional kinetic weapons. Invisible to 

all five senses, radiation is also an insidious weapon that can wreak 

tremendous damage on the citizenry long after the initial 

employment of the parent weapon and long before health and law 

enforcement authorities identify that an attack has occurred. 

Furthermore, radiation’s discrete and lethal nature, combined with 

the low level of technology required for its employment, will 

create a sense of psychological dread in the average American that 

his health and well being is held at risk at almost any time and any 

location without warning or indication. It is logical to assume such 

a profound psychological impact will exist following the first 

successful use of a radiological weapon so as to cause tremendous 

economic and social disruption. 

 To illustrate the potential for powerful psychological disruption, 

consider the events which occurred in Goiania, Brazil in 1987. 

Victims of the accidental spread of radioactive cesium suffered 

from Acute Radiation Syndrome for 15 days before medical 

authorities properly diagnosed the symptoms and then only after 

the diagnosing doctor was provided a sample of the cesium-137.110 

Out of a total population of 800,000,111 only 249 people were ever 

discovered to have been exposed internally or externally to the 

radioactive cesium.112 Of these, only five people were exposed 

sufficiently to cause death, and only 49 were considered 

sufficiently exposed to warrant admission to a hospital.113 From a 

psychological perspective, this should be no scarier than the crash 

of a jet airliner. 

 However, the psychological impact of these events was far 

more significant. Fearful of unidentified exposure during the 15 

day delay it took authorities to establish the accidental release of 

radioactive contamination, an estimated 140,000 residents of 

38
Goiania sought medical attention to determine their relative health 

risk.114 The psychological impact on Brazil as a whole was 

profound enough to inspire general fear of Goiania, resulting in a 

reversal of the previously observed growth in the region and a 

waning demand for Goiania products, which translated into a 40% 

reduction in the prices they could demand at market, costing the 

local economy hundreds of millions of dollars.115 The strong 

psychological fears associated with radioactive contamination 

necessitated elaborate investigation and contamination surveys of 

Goiania, time consuming cleanup efforts by highly trained 

individuals, the destruction of 85 contaminated buildings and 

facilities, and the generation of 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive 

waste.116 The sum total of cleanup efforts is estimated to have cost 

the Brazilian Government over $20 million. To make matters 

worse, experts who have studied the Goiania tragedy have 

concluded that during a terrorist attack some health professionals 

may abandon their patients due to their own fears and concerns.117 

All of these effects resulted from the accidental release of 

approximately 1200 curies of radioactive material.118 Imagine the 

psychological and economic impact following the release of ten to 

a hundred times this level of contamination in a fashion more 

purposeful in its intent to inflict death and cause disruption. 

 The threat of terrorists employing a radiological weapon is 

further exacerbated by the widespread use of radioactive sources in 

industry today under poorly constructed national and international 

regulations that fail to adequately control their creation, 

transportation, distribution, handling, and disposal. The resultant 

system is devoid of any meaningful custodial controls and is easily 

bypassed or corrupted. Terrorists who desire radioactive sources 

will have no difficulty finding or obtaining them. Consider, again, 

the example of Goiania. While the criminals in question were not 

specifically targeting the radioactive cesium for theft, the events 

clearly demonstrate that controls over radioactive sources are 

insufficient in their ability to prevent such targeted theft, should 

determined terrorists make obtaining radioactive sources a priority. 

What’s more, the removal of radioactive sources from custodial 

controls is not unique to Goiania and is, instead, a pattern repeated 

hundreds of times per year in almost every nation employing 

radioactive sources in industry.119

 Beyond the example and lessons of Goiania, it is important to 

view radiological weapons as more than merely possessing 

39
powerful psychological effects and representing an economic 

threat. These weapons can produce massive casualties. It is true 

that to achieve truly massive casualty figures similar to those 

described in Appendix A, multiple parallel and/or serial attacks 

must be executed. However, the invisible and enduring nature of 

radiation presents the potential for persistent covert attacks which 

are capable of generating hundreds of casualties per day over 

several days of operations and also provides the necessary stealth 

to allow the execution of such attacks without detection. 

 Given the trend toward transcendental terrorism, it is only a 

matter of time before terrorists move from creating carnage 

exclusively through the use of high explosives to creating 

destruction through the use of biological, chemical, or radiological 

agents. There is a real need to protect the public from this type of 

terrorist and the weapon of mass destruction threat. With 

significant scientific and technological hurdles separating terrorists 

from the successful use of biological and chemical weapons, it is 

likely that enterprising terrorists will default to employing 

radiological weapons. 

 With all of the above as a given, there are some serious 

disadvantages terrorists will have to overcome before they can 

successfully employ a radiological weapon. As Appendix A 

identifies, employing radiological weapons will be greatly 

complicated by the amount of shielding required. Terrorists will 

need to design and develop their own tools to allow the effective 

handling of radioactive materials at a distance. These tools are 

likely to be bulky and heavy due to the intrinsic shielding required. 

Bulky, heavy tools designed to maintain radioactive materials at a 

distance will be cumbersome to employ and will present further 

challenges to terrorists who are trying to maintain their operations 

covert. Even suicidal terrorists who forgo shielded tools during 

placement operations will need extensive shielding while 

transporting the radioactive material to ensure they live long 

enough to get the radioactive material to the target. The opposing 

constraints for sufficient shielding and adequate mobility is a 

sobering drawback that will push many terrorists to their creative 

edge all while providing well trained authorities the necessary 

clues to initiate further investigation. After all, a carry-on bag 

containing eight film canisters full of lead shielding may be a 

clever way of transporting radioactive material but will most 

certainly weigh far more than its contents would imply. 

40
 This is not meant to suggest that radiological weapons can be 

effectively countered by well trained and inquisitive authorities. 

Clever terrorists will devise methods to overcome and defeat any 

system so overly dependent upon a human in the loop. Instead, 

maintaining a focus on improving regulations, legislation, and 

international agreements designed to improve the controls over 

radioactive materials will yield the most significant gains in any 

effort to prevent terrorists from employing radiological weapons. 

Regulatory controls must be meaningful, must contain teeth, and 

must adequately regulate the entire life cycle of radioactive sources 

from their creation through their sale, distribution, transportation, 

employment and to their ultimate disposal.120 Real security and 

safeguards must be present at each phase in a sources lifecycle, 

with special measures in place during the transition periods 

between phases, where the risk of loss from custodial controls is 

arguably the greatest. Denying terrorists access to radioactive 

material is the greatest means to the end of countering radiological 

weapons. 

 While improving regulatory controls is an absolute necessity, 

this is a long term solution to a real threat that exists today. No 

future regulation, law, or agreement can provide the general public 

the security they deserve today from the literally thousands of 

radioactive sources that have already slipped through bureaucratic 

and administrative cracks. A stopgap measure independent from 

these future regulations must be put in place to provide public 

security for the short term interim period. This stop gap measure 

must, therefore, rely more on physical controls than administrative 

and regulatory controls. Whereas many other physical security 

plans less dependant upon a system of interconnected radiation 

detectors could be postulated, they would likely be more man labor 

intensive, sluggish in their ability to process checks, and ultimately 

more expensive. 

 Even as the cost of fielding a network of detectors is in the 

neighborhood of $500 million, experts estimate the cost of 

decontaminating an area following the dispersal of even a small 

non-lethal amount of radioactive material could easily approach 

hundreds of billions if not trillions of dollars.121 Combine this 

economic cost with the potential for further economic and social 

disruption based on psychological fears, and the potential for real 

human destruction from a more successful radiological attack, and 

the question is not ‘How much will such a program cost?’ but 

41
rather, ‘What is the cost of not funding such a program?’

42
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46
Nichelson, Maj Scott M. (USAF) and Maj Darren D. Medlin (USAF). 

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48
Endnotes

 

1

 Multiple sources document the potential economic impact of radiological 

weapons: 

Peter D. Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb, “Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited”, 

Defense Horizon, no. 38 (January 2004): 9-10, 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH38/DH38.pdf. 

John Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat, British American Security 

Information Council Basic Papers, no. 47 (February 2005), 

http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP47.htm. 

Peter Chalk et al., Trends in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the 

Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, RAND Center for Terrorism Risk 

Management Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 11-38. 

2

 Multiple sources document the potential psychological impact of radiological 

weapons: 

Phyllis Skorga et al., “Caring for Victims of Nuclear and Radiological 

Terrorism”, The Nurse Practitioner 28, no. 2 (February 2003): 33-37, 

http://www.tnpj.com/pt/re/nursepract/pdfhandler.00006205-200302000-

00005.pdf;jsessionid=DA0MNntPfqPBWY1JFPsmfWD9T15Q8likEwsSbYINh

d2sD1IsrgCX!250931426!-949856145!9001!-1. 

Department of Homeland Security, Working Group on Radiological Dispersal 

Device (RDD) Preparedness, Medical Preparedness and Response Subgroup, 

(May 2003), 33-39, 

http://www1.va.gov/emshg/docs/Radiologic_Medical_Countermeasures_051403

.pdf. 

Gwyneth Cravens, “Terrorism and Nuclear Energy: Understanding the Risks,” 

The Brookings Review 20, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 40-44, 

http://www.brookings.edu/press/review/spring2002/cravens.htm. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

Maj Scott M. Nichelson (USAF) and Maj Darren D. Medlin (USAF), 

“Radiological Weapons of Terror,“ Research Report no. 1999-04 (Masters 

Thesis, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1999), 26. 

3

 Multiple sources state that radiological weapons lack lethality: 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 1-8. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

Chalk et al., Trends in Terrorism, 11-38. 

Richard A. Miller, “Dirty Bombs Dont Kill,” 

http://www.possibility.com/epowiki/Wiki.jsp?page=DirtyBombsDontKill. 

4

 James Gordon Meek, “Osama goal: Drain U.S.”, New York Daily News, 5 

November 2004, 

http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=inthenews5904&Category=inthenews

&Subcategory=0. 

5

 Multiple sources document the expected future trend for terrorism: 

49
 

Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorist CBRN: 

Materials and Effects (U), (May 2003), 34-37, 

http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN.htm. 

Steve Bowman and Helit Barel, Weapons of Mass Destruction – the Terrorist 

Threat, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (December 1999), 

1-2, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS20412.pdf. 

Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Future Course of International Terrorism,” World 

Future Society Home Page, www.wfs.org/jenkins.htm. 

Jeffrey S. Helmreich, “Beyond Political Terrorism: The New Challenge of 

Transcendent Terror”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, no. 466, (November 

2001), www.jcpa.org/jl/vp466.htm. 

Chalk et al., Trends in Terrorism, 11-38. 

National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, Report of the 

National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, (Pittsburgh PA: Government 

Printing Office, December 2004), 15-16, 25, 55 93, 95, 111, 

http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf. 

 

6

 Contextual format taken from: 

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, The 9/11 Commission Report (U.S. Govt. Printing Office), http://www.9-

11commission.gov/report/index.htm. 

7

 Naval Post Graduate School, “Terrorist Group Profiles: Armed Islamic 

Group,” http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/gia.htm. 

8

 Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden acts to inspire and financially support other 

militant Islamic groups is documented at: Anti-Defamation League, “Osama 

Bin Laden”, http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp. 

9

 Al-Qaeda’s connection with Chechen Islamic rebels is notional; however, AlQaeda maintains inspirational leadership over and acts as the connecting thread 

for a coalition of militant Islamic organizations. Al-Qaeda is seeking to expand 

this coalition and it is conceivable that militant Chechen Muslims could become 

part of this coalition. Al-Qaeda’s coalition is documented at: 

Kenneth Katzman, Al-Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, Congressional 

Research Service Report for Congress (August, 2005), 7-9, 

http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RS22049.pdf. 

10 Throughout the rest of the fictional scenario, analysis, and calculations the 

radioactive elements of cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90 will be referred 

to often. Cobalt-60 and cesium-137 are strong gamma ray emitters and only 

relatively small masses of these elements are required to deliver a lethal dose of 

radiation to an intended victim. Additionally, as gamma rays penetrate the air 

and human tissue with relative ease, they only need to be in the general 

proximity to the victim in order for adequate exposure to occur. Strontium-90, 

on the other hand, is a beta emitter. Beta radiation is only capable of penetrating 

a few inches of air and is easily stopped by a thick layer of clothing or the skin. 

Resultantly, strontium-90 poses little threat when maintained external to the 

50
 

body. However, strontium-90 that is ingested can cause significant damage as 

the more sensitive internal tissues and organs are now exposed directly to the 

harmful radiation without the protection of the intervening shielding effects of 

air, clothing, and skin. These three radioactive sources are among those that 

experts believe terrorists will find most appealing when designing a radiological 

dispersion device. Other potential radioactive sources that terrorists might 

employ can be located in: 

Charles D. Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the 

Security Risks, Occasional Paper No. 11, (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of 

International Studies: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2003), 36, 

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op11/. 

11 Charles D. Ferguson and Joel O. Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive 

Sources,” Issues in Science and Technology Online (Fall 2003), 

www.issues.org/issues/20.1/ferguson.html. 

12 MDS Nordion is a Canadian firm that sells radiological materials to a United 

States company Steris Isomedix Services: 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 36. 

13 CBC Sports, “Heisman Winner Declares for NFL Draft,” 

http://www.cbc.ca/story/sports/national/2006/01/12/Sports/reggie_bush060112.h

tml. 

14 Packers.com, “Favre Watch”, 

http://www.packers.com/history/record_book/favre_watch. 

15 Statement formulated from evidence presented in: 

Mitchell Bard, “The Birth of Terrorism,” Jewish World (March 2002), 

http://www.aish.com/jewishissues/middleeast/ArabIsraeli_Conflict_4_The_Birth_of_Terrorism.asp. 

Rapture Ready, “History of Terrorism”, www.raptureready.com/rap31e.html. 

16 Statement compiled from review of multiple sources: 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “List of Terrorist Incidents,” 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents (accessed 2 February 

2006). 

Rapture Ready, “History of Terrorism.” 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Black September in Jordan,” 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_September_in_Jordan. (accessed 2 February 

2006). 

Robert O’Block, “Timeline of Terrorism: A Historical Overview of Events 

Related to Middle East-Based Terror,” American College of Forensic Examiners 

Institute, 

http://www.acfei.com/images/PDF/Final%20Timline%20of%20T.%20color.pdf. 

17 Statement compiled from review of multiple sources: 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “List of Terrorist Incidents.” 

51
 

Rapture Ready, “History of Terrorism.” 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Black September in Jordan,” 

O’Block, “Timeline of Terrorism.” 

18 Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Black September in Jordan.” 

19 Onwar.com, “Black September in Jordan 1970-1971,” 

www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm. 

20 Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Black September in Jordan.” 

21 Onwar.com, “Black September in Jordan 1970-1971.” 

22 Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Black September in Jordan.” 

23 Mitchell Bard, “The Birth of Terrorism.” 

24 Statement compiled from review of multiple sources: 

Rapture Ready, “History of Terrorism.” 

Onwar.com, “Black September in Jordan 1970-1971.” 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Black September in Jordan.” 

Mitchell Bard, “The Birth of Terrorism.” 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Dawson’s Field Hijackings,” 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawson%27s_Field_hijackings. (accessed 2 

February 2006). 

O’Block, “Timeline of Terrorism.” 

CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorist CBRN, 34-37. 

Bowman and Barel, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1-2. 

Jenkins, “Future Course of International Terrorism.” 

Helmreich, “Beyond Political Terrorism.” 

Chalk et al., Trends in Terrorism, 11-38. 

National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, 1-119. 

25 Statement compiled from review of multiple sources: 

Rapture Ready, “History of Terrorism.” 

Onwar.com, “Black September in Jordan 1970-1971.” 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Black September in Jordan.” 

Mitchell Bard, “The Birth of Terrorism.” 

Wikipedia Online, s.v. “Dawson’s Field Hijackings.” 

O’Block, “Timeline of Terrorism.” 

CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorist CBRN, 34-37. 

Bowman and Barel, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1-2. 

Jenkins, “The Future Course of International Terrorism.” 

Helmreich, “Beyond Political Terrorism.” 

Chalk et al., Trends in Terrorism, 11-38. 

National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, 1-119. 

26 Helmreich, “Beyond Political Terrorism.” 

52
 

27 Ibid. 

28 Jenkins, “The Future Course of International Terrorism.” 

29 Ibid. 

30 Ibid. 

31 Ibid. 

32 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report, 4. 

33 Jerry Springer, “Al-Qaeda Seeks Tie to Local Gangs,” The Washington Times, 

28 September 2004, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040928-123346-

3928r.htm. 

 

34 Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: 

Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism, RAND 

Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 22-67. 

35 Michel Moutot, “Why al-Qaeda Will Live On,” Middle East Online, 9 

November 2005, www.middle-east-online.com/english/features/?id=14979. 

36 Anwar Iqbal, “Other Groups Pick Up al-Qaeda Ideology,” Dawn the Internet 

Edition, 3 May 2005, http://www.dawn.com/2005/05/03/int3.htm. 

37 Katzman, Al-Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, 1-2. 

38 Ibid., 7-9. 

39 Iqbal, “Other Groups Pick Up al-Qaeda Ideology.” 

40 Statement derived from multiple sources: 

International Atomic Energy Agency, “Inadequate Control of World’s 

Radioactive Sources,” 1-4, 

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/rads_factsheet.pdf. 

International Atomic Energy Agency, “Features: Radioactive Sources,” 

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/radsrc_faq.html. 

41 Statement derived from multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Inadequate Control of World’s Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

42 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

53
 

International Atomic Energy Agency, Controlling Radioactive Sources, IAEA 

Bulletin 44/1/2002, 

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull441/article1.pdf. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 1-2,17,22-26,42-48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Bryan Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, National Nuclear 

Security Administration: United States Department of Energy (October 2005), 

1-2, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2005/PR_2005-10-05_NA-05-

23.pdf. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges 

During Field Operations, Information Notice 2002-30 (30 October 2002), 1-3, 

http://www.ndsu.nodak.edu/ndsu/physical_plant/oseh/NDSU%20Safety%20Offi

cer%20Homepage_files/in200230.pdf. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure that 

Power Plants Are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel, Report to 

Congressional Requesters, Report No. GAO-05-339, (April 2005), 1-38, 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05339.pdf. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

43 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 1-2,17,22-26,42-48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, 1-2. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges,

1-3. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

44 IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

45 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 1-2,17,22-26,42-48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, 1-2. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges,

1-3. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

46 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

54
 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 1-2,17,22-26,42-48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, 1-2. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges,

1-3. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

47 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 1-2,17,22-26,42-48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, 1-2. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges,

1-3. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

48 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 1-2,17,22-26,42-48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, 1-2. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges,

1-3. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

49 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, 1-2. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges,

1-3. 

55
 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

50 Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 41-42. 

51 Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

52 Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 22-23. 

53 Ibid. 

54 Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 3-4. 

55 Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 22-23. 

56 Ibid. 

57 Ibid., 51. 

58 Ibid., 57. 

59 Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

60 Ibid. 

61 Ibid. 

62 IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

63 Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Failed State Index,” 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098. 

64 Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 16-18. 

65 IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

66 Tony Karon, “Person of the Week: Jose Padilla,” Time Online Edition, 14 

June 2002, http://www.time.com/time/pow/article/0,8599,262269,00.html. 

67 Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

68 Central Intelligence Agency, “The War On Terrorism: Public Statements on 

Potential Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Agents since July 1997,” 

http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/pub_statements_cbrn.html. 

69 Helmreich, “Beyond Political Terrorism.” 

56
 

70 Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, 1-53. 

71 Ibid., ix, 69. 

72 Sidney D. Drell et al., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and 

Chemical Weapons (Stanford CA: Hoover institution Press, 1999), 79, 86-87, 

91-93, 101, 1129-113, 207-208. 

 

73 Ibid., 79, 86-87, 91-93, 101, 1129-113, 207-208. 

74 Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, 1-21. 

75 The following sources document the attempts of terrorists to steal or otherwise 

illegally obtain radiological materials: 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, 22-43. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 23-24. 

76 Miller, “Dirty Bombs Dont Kill.” 

77 Karon, “Person of the Week: Jose Padilla.” 

78 Thomas Nilsen, “Nuclear Lighthouses to be Replaced”, Bellona, 2 February 

2003, http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nukeweapons/nonproliferation/28067.html. 

79 IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

80 IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

81 The Library of Congress, “Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress,” 

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SN02684:@@@T. 

82 Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, “Yucca Mountain: Latest News, 

Information and Resources, and Action,” 

http://www.nuclearactive.org/docs/YuccaNews.html. 

83 The following articles contain current Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

initiatives: 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, viii, 46-54. 

84 The following articles all contain recommendations or outline current 

initiatives to improve regulations, legislation, and international agreements but 

lack discussion on solutions that involve employing technology: 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, viii-x, 48, 50-51, 56-66. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Miller, “Dirty Bombs Dont Kill.” 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

57
 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 10-11. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

85 The following articles all contain recommendations or outline current 

initiatives to improve regulations, legislation, and international agreements but 

lack discussion on solutions that involve employing technology: 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, viii-x, 48, 50-51, 56-66. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Miller, “Dirty Bombs Dont Kill.” 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 10-11. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

86 Some efforts to deploy radiation detection technologies have been 

implemented; however, the exact nature and extent of such efforts is categorized 

For Official Use Only. 

87 Gary W. Philips et al., A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological 

Weapons, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National 

Defense University (May 2005), 29-30. 

88 There are of course many security concerns with fielding an infrastructure of 

personnel and detectors designed to interdict radiological weapons. Personnel 

must be screened. Locations of detectors must be kept as confidential as 

possible. Data must be properly encrypted. These are but a few of the security 

concerns that will have to be addressed while establishing such a system. While 

the author recognizes that these are valid concerns, it is beyond the scope of this 

paper to discuss all of the security requirements necessary to make such a 

system viable. 

89 Sandia National Laboratory, “RAID System,” Sandia Technology vol 5, no. 2, 

21. 

90 Sandia National Laboratory, “Sensor for Measurement and Analysis of 

Radiation Transients,” Homeland Security Pamphlet (October 2004). 

91 The following sources document that successful experiments have been 

conducted where small commercially available radiation detectors have been 

used to accurately track the movements of radiological sources: 

Jeff J. Fogarty, “Evaluating Strategies to Counter Nuclear-Armed Terrorist 

Groups,” (Masters Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 

December 2000), 56-58. 

Nichelson and Medlin, “Radiological Weapons of Terror,” 34-35. 

58
 

92 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004, 

Nuc-1 – Nuc-28, 

http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml. 

93 Gene A. Kallenbach, “RE: Questions on SMART System for Air War College 

Student” (email, 2 November 2005). 

94 The following articles document cities that are expanding wireless coverage: 

Verne Kopytoff and Ryan Kim, “Google Offers S.F. Wi-Fi – for Free: 

Company’s Bid is One of Many in Response to Mayor’s Call for Universal 

Online Access,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1 October 2005, 

http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/10/01/MNGG9F16KG1.DTL. 

Jodi Slezak, “Wireless Internet in Boston’s Future,” The Daily Free Press 

Online Edition, 28 October 2005, 

http://www.dailyfreepress.com/media/paper87/news/2005/10/28/News/Wireless.

Internet.In.Bostons.Future-1037911.shtml. 

Wireless Philadelphia Executive Committee, “Mission Statement,” 

http://www.phila.gov/wireless/. 

Jonathan Krim, “New Orlean’s New Connection,” Washingtonpost.com, 29 

November 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/28/AR2005112801773.html. 

95 Fire sprinkler systems cost approximately $1.00 per square foot. For large 

public facilities capable of hosting large portions of the public, the cost of a fire 

sprinkler system will clearly cost tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars. This 

amount of funding would supply a significant number of radiation detectors 

throughout the building: 

Mark Bromann, The Design and Layout of Fire Sprinkler Systems, 2nd ed. (CRC 

Press), 2-3, http://books.google.com/books?ie=UTF-8&hl=en&id=7rXshjWrXYC&dq=Mark+Bromann,+The+Design+and+Layout+of+Fire+Sprinkler+S

ystems&prev=http://books.google.com/books%3Fq%3DMark%2BBromann,%2

BThe%2BDesign%2Band%2BLayout%2Bof%2BFire%2BSprinkler%2BSyste

ms&lpg=PA1&pg=PA2&sig=0-NGMRrOvITbN6uhE4Wn7mTKing. 

96 Philips et al., A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological 

Weapons, 36-49. 

97 Ibid., 36-49. 

98 Ibid., 36-49. 

99 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Ports of Entry,” 

http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/ports/. 

100 United States Postal Service, “Discount Mailing Services,” 

http://pe.usps.com/text/dmm200/discount6.htm. 

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101 United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway 

Administration, “Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and 

Defense Highways,” http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.html. 

102 Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal 

Year 2006 Mid-Session Review: Budget of the U.S. Government, 36, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/06msr.pdf. 

103 Ibid., 38. 

104 DoT Federal Highway Administration, “National System of Interstate and 

Defense Highways.” 

105 House of Representatives, “The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 

Transportation Hearing on Port Security: Shipping Containers,” 

http://www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/03-13-02/03-13-02memo.html. 

106 Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 

Preparedness, 1-4, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/slgcpfactsheet.pdf. 

107 Montana’s Official State Website, “Truck Clearance Process at Weigh 

Stations,” 

http://www.mdt.mt.gov/publications/manuals/handbook/frame6.shtml. 

108 DoT Federal Highway Administration, “National System of Interstate and 

Defense Highways.” 

109 IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

110 Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 3-4. 

111 Mongabay.com, “Population Estimates for Goiania, Brazil, 1925-2015,” 

http://books.mongabay.com/population_estimates/full/Goiania-Brazil.html. 

112 Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 3-4. 

113 Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 3-4. 

114 DHS, Working Group on RDD Preparedness, 28. 

115 Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 23. 

116 Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 3-4. 

117 DHS, Working Group on RDD Preparedness, 34. 

118 Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 22-23. 

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119 Statement compiled from facts presented in multiple sources: 

IAEA, “Features: Radioactive Sources.” 

Zimmerman and Loeb, “Dirty Bombs,” 2-3, 10. 

Ferguson and Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources.” 

IAEA, Controlling Radioactive Sources. 

Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, 1-2,17,22-26,42-48. 

Sara Daly et al., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor, vii-ix, 69. 

Wilkes, NNSA Recovers Unique Radiological Devices, 1-2. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Control and Surveillance of Portable Gauges,

1-3. 

Government Accountability Office, NRC Needs to Do More, 1-38. 

Gleeson, Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat. 

120 Ferguson et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources, vi-x, 1-2, 24-66. 

121 Zackary Kershaw, “Benchmark II, Section I:Historical Incidents and 

Potential Misuses: Terrorist Uses of Radiological Sources,” 

http://www.zianet.com/sadobbyn/bm2sc1.htm. 

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