AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

.

Counterland Operations

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3 

11 September 2006

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publications 3-0, 

Doctrine for Joint Operations; 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations; 3-

09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support; and 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Close Air Support.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.3 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2006

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It 

updates the historical discussion of counterland and describes the functions, joint 

considerations, and elements of effective counterland operations (pages 1-16). It better 

describes how air interdiction can affect an enemy land force (page 21). It updates the 

discussion of the different types of air interdiction and associated missions (page 26). It 

provides a more current description of close air support while explaining types of 

requests and control (page 32). It updates guidance on command and control of 

counterland operations (page 49). It updates the description of the various command 

and control elements of the theater air control system and explains their functions (page 

51). It describes the most current linear fire support coordinating measures used in 

counterland (page 66). It updates discussion on non-linear coordination measures 

including a discussion about common reference systems and kill box operations (page 

72). This document updates basic planning considerations and describes counterland 

aspects in each phase of the air tasking cycle (page 78). It adds new discussion on 

how counterland fits into planning at the joint force commander level and gives 

considerations for planning it within the joint air estimate planning process (page 85). 

Finally, the publication contains lessons learned for counterland operations from recent 

conflicts such as Operations ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI 

FREEDOM (throughout).

Supersedes: AFDD 2-1.3, 27 August 1999 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR 

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DR (Col Robert Nuanes) 

Pages: 113 

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading 

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: Allen G. Peck, Major General, USAF

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center 
FOREWORD 

 In war, defeating an enemy’s force is often a necessary step on the path to 

victory. Defeating enemy armies is a difficult task that often comes with a high price tag 

in terms of blood and treasure. With its inherent speed, range, and flexibility, air and 

space power offers a way to lower that risk by providing commanders a synergistic tool 

that can provide a degree of control over the surface environment and render enemy 

forces ineffective before they meet friendly land forces. Modern air and space power 

directly affects an adversary's ability to initiate, conduct, and sustain ground combat. 

 Counterland operations dominate the surface environment by crushing an 

enemy’s ability to fight on land. Through air interdiction, air and space power can divert, 

disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy military potential before it can be brought to bear 

against friendly ground forces, and achieve joint force commander objectives 

independently. Indeed, the devastation wrought on an enemy by air and space power 

may preclude costly ground combat. When called for, air and space power delivers 

devastating support to assist friendly ground forces in achieving their objectives. 

 Twenty-first century capabilities regarding precision, information technology, 

space, intelligence, and command and control increase counterland effectiveness. 

Modern counterland capabilities can help achieve objectives more efficiently than in the 

past. This provides commanders a flexible capability that makes other applications of 

military power more effective and may drive an early end to conflict. 

When the objective is to destroy an enemy army’s capability to fight, air and 

space power should always be considered as a first option. Air and space power has 

inherent, unique advantages in conducting counterland operations, but commanders 

should recognize they are more effective in conjunction with other forms of military 

action. In fact, other air and space power functions often complement counterland 

operations to produce operational level effects to destroy an enemy’s warfighting 

capability. 

 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland Operations, is doctrine for 

understanding, planning, and executing this crucial air and space power function across 

the full range of military operations. Air Force personnel need to be able to articulate 

the rationale for counterland as a valuable warfighting option for the combatant 

commander. More importantly, Air Force personnel must understand how counterland 

operations can help enhance military strategies as a tool for defeating our nation’s 

adversaries. 

Allen G. Peck 

 Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters 

 Air Force Doctrine Center 
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... vi 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ....................................................................viii 

CHAPTER ONE—Counterland Fundamentals ....................................................................... 1 

Definition and Purpose............................................................................................................ 1 

Counterland Effects ................................................................................................................. 4 

Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support (CAS)............................................................... 5 

AI............................................................................................................................................. 5 

CAS ........................................................................................................................................ 6 

Types of AI and CAS........................................................................................................... 7 

Derivative Missions Associated with Counterland .......................................................... 8 

Joint Considerations ................................................................................................................ 9 

Elements of Effective Counterland Operations ................................................................. 11 

Air Control............................................................................................................................ 11 

Joint Integration and Complementary Operations ........................................................ 12 

Appropriate Munitions, Assets, and Allocation.............................................................. 14 

Favorable Environmental Factors.................................................................................... 15 

Summary ................................................................................................................................. 16 

CHAPTER TWO—Air Interdiction ........................................................................................... 17 

Definition.................................................................................................................................. 18 

Interdiction Objectives ........................................................................................................... 19 

Divert .................................................................................................................................... 19 

Disrupt.................................................................................................................................. 19 

Delay .................................................................................................................................... 20 

Destroy................................................................................................................................. 20 

Effects of AI............................................................................................................................. 21

Channeling Enemy Movements....................................................................................... 23 

Constricting the Enemy’s Logistic System ..................................................................... 23 

Disrupting Enemy Communications ................................................................................ 24 

Forcing Urgent Movement Upon the Enemy ................................................................. 25 

Attrition of the Enemy ........................................................................................................ 25 

Types of AI Requests ............................................................................................................ 26 

Preplanned .......................................................................................................................... 26 

Immediate............................................................................................................................ 27 

Elements of Effective AI Operations ................................................................................... 28 

Integration with Surface Maneuver.................................................................................. 29 

Sustained and Concentrated Pressure on the Enemy................................................. 30 

Accurate Timely and Relevant Intelligence.................................................................... 30 

Summary ................................................................................................................................. 31 

CHAPTER THREE—Close Air Support ................................................................................. 32 

Definition.................................................................................................................................. 32 
iv

Responsibilities....................................................................................................................... 32 

CAS Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 33 

CAS Effects............................................................................................................................. 34

Facilitate Ground Action.................................................................................................... 34 

Induce Shock, Disruption, and Disorder......................................................................... 34 

Air-Ground Integration........................................................................................................... 35 

Terminal Attack Control......................................................................................................... 36 

Types of Terminal Control................................................................................................. 36 

Armed Unmanned Aircraft Considerations..................................................................... 38 

Verification........................................................................................................................... 39 

CAS Execution with Non-Joint Terminal Attack Controller Personnel....................... 40 

Fratricide Avoidance.............................................................................................................. 40 

Types of CAS Requests........................................................................................................ 41 

Preplanned Requests for CAS......................................................................................... 42 

Immediate Requests for CAS........................................................................................... 43 

Conditions for Effective CAS................................................................................................ 44 

Training and Proficiency.................................................................................................... 44 

Planning and Integration ................................................................................................... 44 

Integrated Command and Control (C2) Infrastructure.................................................. 45 

Target Marking.................................................................................................................... 46 

Streamlined and Flexible Procedures ............................................................................. 47 

Summary ................................................................................................................................. 48 

CHAPTER FOUR—C2 of Counterland Operations.............................................................. 49 

Command Relationships....................................................................................................... 49 

C2 Architecture....................................................................................................................... 51 

Theater Air Control System .............................................................................................. 51 

Army Air-Ground System.................................................................................................. 52 

Navy Tactical Air Control System .................................................................................... 53 

Marine Air Command and Control System .................................................................... 53 

Special Operations............................................................................................................. 54 

Theater Air Ground System.............................................................................................. 55 

C2 Elements............................................................................................................................ 55 

Air and Space Operations Center.................................................................................... 55 

Air Support Operations Center......................................................................................... 55 

Control and Reporting Center .......................................................................................... 58 

Expeditionary Operations Center..................................................................................... 58 

Airborne C2 ......................................................................................................................... 59 

Liaison Elements .................................................................................................................... 61 

Battlefield Coordination Detachment............................................................................... 61 

Air Component Coordination Element ............................................................................ 61 

Ground Liaison Officer ...................................................................................................... 62 

Air Liaison Officer............................................................................................................... 62 

Tactical Air Control Party .................................................................................................. 63 

Terminal Attack Control......................................................................................................... 63 

Joint Terminal Attack Controller....................................................................................... 63 
v

Joint Fires Observer .......................................................................................................... 63 

Special Tactics Team ........................................................................................................ 63 

Forward Air Controller (Airborne)..................................................................................... 64 

Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne).................................................................................. 64 

Special Operations Liaison Element ............................................................................... 64 

Battlespace Geometry and Coordination ........................................................................... 64 

Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operations .................................................................. 65 

Linear and NonLinear Operations ................................................................................... 65 

Linear Coordination Measures............................................................................................. 67 

Forward Boundary.............................................................................................................. 67 

Forward Line of Own Troops............................................................................................ 67 

Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM)............................................................... 67 

Fire Support Coordination Line ........................................................................................ 68 

Battlefield Coordination Line............................................................................................. 71 

Nonlinear Coordination Measures....................................................................................... 72 

Area Reference System .................................................................................................... 72 

Kill Box Operations............................................................................................................. 74 

Combined Kill Box and Traditional FSCM Operations ................................................. 77 

Summary ................................................................................................................................. 77 

CHAPTER FIVE—Conducting Counterland Operations...................................................... 78 

Basic Planning Considerations ............................................................................................ 78 

Supporting Counterland Operations................................................................................ 78 

Target Development .......................................................................................................... 80 

Urban Considerations........................................................................................................ 82 

Irregular Warfare ................................................................................................................ 83 

Weaponeering and Allocation .......................................................................................... 84 

Execution Planning and Force Execution........................................................................... 85 

Air-Ground Integration........................................................................................................... 86 

Summary ................................................................................................................................. 89 

Suggested Readings ................................................................................................................. 90 

Glossary....................................................................................................................................... 93 
vi

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 This Air Force doctrine document (AFDD) establishes doctrinal guidance for the 

United States Air Force on counterland. It articulates fundamental Air Force principles 

for the application of combat force and provides commanders operational guidance on 

the employment and integration of Air Force resources to achieve desired objectives. 

APPLICATION 

 This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, 

including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. 

Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 

 This doctrine provides guidance for planning and conducting counterland 

operations in support of US national security and combatant/joint force commander 

objectives. 
vii

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force 

prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and 

space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term “JFACC” refers to the joint component-level 

operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational 

control/administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through 

a Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air 

and space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the 

air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in 

joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC. Since 

nearly every operation the US conducts will involve international partners, this 

publication uses the terms CFACC and CAOC throughout to emphasize the 

doctrine’s applicability to multi-national operations. 
viii

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these 

statements. 

 Counterland operations are air and space operations against enemy land 

force capabilities to create effects that achieve joint force commander (JFC) 

objectives (Page 1) 

 Counterland operations are a form of maneuver warfare that seeks to shatter 

an enemy’s fighting ability through focused attacks against key enemy military 

targets. (Page 2) 

 Counterland operations can serve as the main attack and be the decisive 

means for achieving JFC objectives. (Page 3) 

 Counterland operations can achieve tactical-, operational-, or strategic-level 

effects, and can significantly influence the course of a military operation. 

(Page 4) 

 Counterland operations are supported by two types of air operations for 

engaging enemy land forces: air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS). 

(Page 5) 

 The Air Force defines AI as air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, 

or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear 

against friendly forces or to otherwise achieve JFC objectives. These 

operations are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed 

integration with those forces is not required. (Page 5) 

 The combined force air and space component commander (CFACC) is 

normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall AI effort. When 

designated as the supported commander, the CFACC will conduct theaterwide or joint operations area-wide AI in direct support of the JFC’s overall 

theater objectives. (Page 6) 

 CAS is air action by fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft against hostile targets 

that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed 

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. 

(Page 6) 

 AI can channel movements, constrict logistic systems, disrupt 

communications, force urgent movement, and attrit enemy fielded forces. 

(Page 21) 
ix

 Accurate information about the enemy’s support characteristics, force 

structure, and ability to adapt is imperative to successful AI. (Page 30) 

 The success of both offensive and defensive CAS operations in contiguous, 

linear warfare may depend on massing effects at decisive points—not diluting 

them across the entire battlefield. (Page 33) 

 Missions attacking targets not in close proximity to friendly forces, and 

beyond the range requiring detailed integration with surface fires and 

maneuver, should be conducted using AI procedures vice CAS. (Page 38) 

 Throughout the entire process, CAS operations remain under the control of 

the joint air component while supporting the joint land component. (Page 50) 

 The theater air control system (TACS) provides the CFACC the capability to 

centrally plan and control joint air operations through the combined air 

operations center while facilitating decentralized execution through the 

subordinate elements of the TACS. (Page 51) 

 The preponderance of kinetic effects shifts from landpower to airpower near 

the maximum range of organic field artillery. Therefore, under all but the most 

rapid ground maneuvers, the fire support coordination line (FSCL) is normally 

placed near the maximum range of tube artillery because air and space 

power provides the most expeditious attack of surface targets beyond that 

point. (Page 70) 

 The FSCL is primarily used to establish command and control procedures for 

planning and execution purposes—it does not define mission types. (Page 

71) 
1

CHAPTER ONE 

COUNTERLAND FUNDAMENTALS 

 Military history provides many successful examples where airpower smashed 

enemy land forces in modern warfare, from the breakout of Normandy in World War II to 

the destruction of the Iraqi army in 1991 and 2003. Attacking the capabilities of land 

forces through air and space power—counterland operations—is often a necessary step 

on the path to military victory. As a vital element in joint warfare, air and space power 

continues to demonstrate a unique ability to accurately find, fix, track, target, engage, 

and assess (F2T2EA) enemy land forces. Because of these essential counterland 

capabilities, it is virtually unthinkable to go into combat without air and space power 

today. With a solid comprehension of counterland operations, Airmen increase their 

ability to properly plan and execute air warfare against enemy land forces. This chapter 

provides a basis for understanding counterland operations by giving a fundamental 

explanation of its purpose, functional missions, and capabilities. 

DEFINITION AND PURPOSE 

Counterland operations are air and space operations against enemy land 

force capabilities to create effects that achieve joint force commander (JFC) 

objectives. The aim of counterland operations is to dominate the surface environment 

using air and space power. By dominating the surface environment, counterland 

operations can assist friendly land maneuver while denying the enemy the ability to 

resist. Although most frequently associated with support to friendly surface forces, 

counterland operations may also be conducted independent of friendly surface force 

objectives or in operations where no friendly land forces are present. For example, 

recent conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq illustrate situations where 

counterland operations have been used absent significant friendly land forces or with 

small numbers of special operations forces (SOF) providing target cueing. This 

independent or direct attack of adversary land operations by air and space forces often 

provides the key to success when seizing the initiative, especially in the opening phase 

of an operation. 

 The JFC has two distinct means for engaging enemy land forces that support 

counterland operations. The first is air interdiction (AI), in which airpower supports land 

forces in addition to supporting JFC objectives. The second method is close air support 

(CAS), in which airpower directly supports land maneuver. Whether destroying enemy 

surface forces, interdicting supply routes, or providing CAS to friendly troops, 

counterland operations are a vital air and space power function that applies throughout 

the range of conflict. 

The air force has become the hammer of modern warfare on land... 

aviation gives modern battle a third dimension. 

— Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Otto Miksche, 

Infantry Officer & Military Strategist, writing in 1942
2

Counterland operations achieve JFC objectives. 

In the first week of November 2001; bombers and 

fighters supported by SOF destroyed Taliban forces 

defending the enemy stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif 

during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. These 

actions facilitated the Northern Alliance’s capture of the 

town on 9 November 2001. Soon, counterland airpower 

cued by SOF teams routed Taliban forces throughout 

Afghanistan until Kabul itself fell just days after Mazar-iSharif. Within two weeks, Coalition forces took control 

of Afghanistan by relying on the powerful combination of 

counterland airpower and distributed ground forces 

using small-unit tactics. 

Counterland operations are a form of aerial maneuver that seeks to shatter 

an enemy’s fighting ability through focused attacks against key enemy military 

targets. Air and space forces, with their inherent speed, range, and precision attack 

capabilities, are superior theater-level maneuver forces. Where ground forces must 

seek out weak points in the enemy line to penetrate and exploit, aircraft and missiles 

can maneuver in three dimensions and directly attack key points in the enemy rear. By 

striking enemy military targets such as fielded land forces, command and control (C2) 

nodes, vital logistics, or supporting infrastructure, the destruction of decisive points, 

forces, and capabilities degrades the enemy system and ultimately renders the enemy 

incapable of effective resistance. Persistently applied, airpower can permanently 

disrupt the enemy and crush its ability to fight as a coherent, effective whole, thus 

wresting initiative and dictating tempo. 

Counterland operations can support and facilitate maneuver warfare on land. 

World War I saw the first widespread use of airpower in support of Allied land 

operations when combat aircraft began cutting supply routes, strafing trenches, 

and bombing fielded 

forces. Military leaders 

soon realized that airpower added a synergistic 

element to conventional 

ground forces because of 

its ability to attack behind 

enemy lines and support 

offensive breakthroughs. 

Since then, counterland 

operations have occurred 

in every major war as 

well as numerous smaller 

conflicts characterized by 

protracted, low-intensity 

conflict. In each instance, 

air and space power’s 

ability to maneuver in 

three dimensions has 

proven invaluable in supporting friendly surface 

maneuvers by destroying, 

disrupting, delaying, or 

denying an enemy’s operational military potential. 
3

Two contrasting historical examples of air 

warfare illustrate how technology enhances 

counterland operations. In December 1944, 

adverse weather prevented Allied airpower from 

detecting and attacking German Panzer divisions 

during the initial phases of the Ardennes 

counteroffensive that ultimately culminated in the 

Battle of the Bulge. Today, technological advances 

in air and space power enhance the ability to cope 

with adverse weather conditions during 

counterland operations. When a sandstorm struck 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Iraqi 

leadership perceived an opportunity to attack 

American ground forces advancing to Baghdad 

under the cover of foul weather. However, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) platforms observed the enemy movement 

and relayed the information to the combined air 

and space operations center (CAOC). Using the 

information transmitted from the CAOC and ISR 

assets, counterland aircraft soon picked up and 

identified the moving Republican Guard units. 

Employing advanced on-board sensors and 

inertially aided munitions, fighters and bombers 

interdicted enemy tanks, artillery, and vehicles 

before they could affect coalition ground forces. 

 

Counterland operations can serve as the main attack and be the decisive 

means for achieving JFC objectives. Although often associated with support to 

friendly surface forces, counterland operations also include operations that directly 

support theater strategy rather than exclusively supporting a surface component. In 

some cases, counterland operations can provide the sole effort against the enemy. 

This occurred in the Balkans during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, when the USled coalition contained no 

significant land component. In 

concert with strategic attack 

operations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

(NATO) independent counterland battle against Serbian 

ground forces helped end 

Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic 

cleansing campaign. In other 

campaigns where a “boots on 

the ground” presence is 

required to achieve the desired 

end state, counterland operations can decisively engage 

adversary fielded forces prior 

to occupation by friendly 

ground forces. During Operation DESERT STORM, counterland operations broke the 

back of the Iraqi army and 

achieved JFC objectives aimed 

at weakening enemy forces 

prior to the start of the ground 

campaign—a fight that lasted 

only four days. In the end, the 

devastating effects of counterland operations paved a 

path for Coalition forces to roll 

back a demoralized Iraqi army 

in Kuwait. These recent historical examples illustrate that 

directly attacking adversary 

land forces with air and space 

forces can permit rapid control 

over the battlefield during early 

phases of a conflict. 

 Air and space power offers a critical capability to deliver lethal and nonlethal 

combat power against enemy land forces. Due to its inherent speed, range, flexibility, 
4

 Air and space power offers a critical capability to deliver lethal and nonlethal 

combat power against enemy land forces. Due to its inherent speed, range, flexibility, 

lethality, precision, and ability to mass at a desired time and place, air and space power 

transcends the normal operating limitations imposed on surface forces. Able to strike 

enemy surface forces across the width and depth of the theater, air and space power 

contributes significantly to the counterland effort and can reduce or even eliminate the 

need to engage in potentially costly ground combat. 

Stealth, precision, persistence, information technology, unmanned aircraft 

system (UAS), and modern sensors have revolutionized counterland warfare. The 

impressive successes of air and space power during Operations DESERT STORM, 

ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM prove the viability of 

recent technological advances in modern warfare. Stealth and night capabilities 

increase survivability. Precision weapons enable one sortie to strike several targets 

rather than requiring several sorties for the destruction of one target. Information 

technology increases flexibility, aids decision making, facilitates integration, increases 

tempo, and improves combat assessment during counterland operations. With 

inherently long loiter and weapons carrying capacity, unmanned aircraft (UA) such as 

the MQ-1 Predator can provide a persistent counterland capability to the battlefield. 

Information shared among aircraft, surface forces, command nodes, and space 

platforms provides valuable intelligence, continuous surveillance, and precise targeting 

of an enemy’s military capabilities. A counterland platform using data link, precision 

weapons, optical and infrared sensors, radar, and advanced fire control systems 

provides an all-weather night attack capability that often is equal to, or surpasses, 

daytime operations in terms of target detection, aircraft survivability, and attack 

accuracy. 

Counterland operations are not strictly associated with a particular type of aircraft 

or weapon system. Instead, a variety of combat air assets conducts counterland 

operations to deliver lethal and less than lethal effects against enemy land forces and 

their support structure. Predominant weapons systems used in counterland operations 

include aircraft equipped with cannons, bombs, mines, missiles, rockets, and electronic 

warfare (EW) systems. Air assets, space platforms, and SOF provide intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as target cueing, navigation aids, and 

battle damage assessment (BDA). Each weapon system has unique characteristics 

that should be considered based on the nature of the specific threat, targets to be 

attacked, and environmental conditions. Many of the assets used to interdict forces 

deep in the enemy rear can also be used to support the close fight and vice versa. 

Fighters, bombers, gunships, unmanned aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and Army 

tactical missile systems (ATACMS) are a few examples of joint assets that air 

component commanders can use to execute counterland operations. 

COUNTERLAND EFFECTS 

Counterland operations can achieve tactical-, operational-, or strategiclevel effects, and can significantly influence the course of a military operation. 

Counterland effects focus at the tactical and operational levels of war by targeting 
5

fielded enemy surface forces and their supporting infrastructure. When planned and 

executed successfully, counterland operational effects will indirectly lead to strategic 

effects by denying the enemy’s ability to execute a coherent ground campaign. In 

cases where the enemy places strategic value on a specific portion of their ground 

combat force, counterland operations can produce more immediate effects at the 

strategic level. 

 As witnessed during the recent conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, 

Counterland operations apply across the range of military operations. Although they are 

usually associated with history’s major wars, counterland operations have routinely 

taken place in stability operations characterized by insurgency, guerrilla tactics, and civil 

strife.1 To be effective, however, counterland operations must adapt to the situation. 

Conducting counterland operations against an unconventional enemy with a primitive 

force structure differs from attacking a modern, highly mechanized army with heavy 

logistics requirements. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the nature of the conflict to 

properly apply air and space power during counterland operations. 

AIR INTERDICTION AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 

Counterland operations are supported by two types of air operations for 

engaging enemy land forces: AI and CAS. AI may operate as a supported part of the 

overall theater strategy or it may indirectly support the land component. CAS is 

normally considered direct support to surface components by the air component. AI 

and CAS missions can function under an overall theater posture of offense or defense 

and are typically coordinated with a ground scheme of maneuver to maximize the effect 

on the enemy. This section gives a brief overview of AI and CAS by discussing their 

definitions and purpose to provide a basic understanding of their character. Chapters 2 

and 3 expand the discussion and give a more detailed description of each. 

Air Interdiction

The purpose of interdiction is to attack the enemy’s ability to fight by targeting 

tactical and operational forces and infrastructure with either lethal or non-lethal means 

(See Joint Publication [JP] 3-03, Joint Doctrine for Joint Interdiction). 2 The Air Force 

defines AI as air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the 

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve JFC objectives. AI is conducted at such 

distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the 

fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. AI targets may include fielded 

 

1

 Historical examples include: British air policing in the Middle East during the interwar period, French 

operations during the battle for Algeria, the US in Vietnam, the insurgent war in El Salvador, and recent 

US air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

2

 Not all air interdiction falls under the category of counterland. History has many examples of airpower 

interdicting the enemy’s air or sea lines of communication; these are actually counterair or countersea 

missions even though they may have an interdiction effect at the operational level. Additionally, some 

interdiction missions may be considered a subset of strategic attack as described later in Chapter 1 in the 

section titled “Joint Integration and Complimentary Missions.”
6

enemy forces or supporting components such as operational C2 nodes, 

communications networks, transportation systems, supply depots, military resources, 

and other vital infrastructure. When conducted as part of a joint campaign, interdiction 

needs the direction of a single commander who can exploit and coordinate all the forces 

involved, whether air-, space-, surface-, or information-based.

The combined force air and space component commander (CFACC) is 

normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall AI effort. When 

designated as the supported commander, the CFACC will conduct theater-wide or 

joint operating area (JOA)-wide AI in direct support of the JFC’s overall theater 

objectives. With the preponderance of AI assets and the ability to plan, task, and 

control joint air operations, the CFACC can best plan and execute AI. The CFACC 

recommends theater and/or JOA-wide targeting priorities and, in coordination with other 

component commanders, forwards the air apportionment recommendation to the JFC. 

The CFACC, using the priorities or percentages established by the JFC’s air 

apportionment decision, then plans and executes the theater and/or JOA-wide 

interdiction effort. 

Close Air Support

CAS is air action by fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft against hostile targets 

that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed 

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (see JP 

3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support). CAS 

provides supporting firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, disrupt, 

suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemy targets as an element of joint fire 

support. The speed, range, and maneuverability of airpower allow CAS assets to attack 

targets that other supporting arms may not be able to engage effectively. CAS can be 

conducted at any place and time friendly forces are in close proximity to enemy forces 

and, at times, may be the best means to exploit tactical opportunities. Although in 

isolation it rarely achieves campaign-level objectives, at times it may be the more critical 

mission due to its contribution to campaign objectives. CAS should be planned to 

prepare the conditions for success or reinforce successful attacks of surface forces. 

CAS can halt attacks, help create breakthroughs, destroy targets of opportunity, cover 

retreats, and guard flanks. To be most effective, however, CAS should be used at 

decisive points in a battle and should normally be massed to apply concentrated combat 

power and saturate defenses. Equally important is that the appropriate level of C2, with 

appropriate release authority at a commensurate level, be in place to facilitate the 

expeditious application of airpower in rapidly changing scenarios. In fluid, high-intensity 

warfare, the need for terminal control, the unpredictability of the tactical situation, the 

risk of fratricide, and the proliferation of lethal ground-based air defenses make CAS 

especially challenging. 

CAS requires a significant level of coordination between air and surface forces to 

produce desired effects. CAS employment should be safe, accurate, and timely to 

create effects that support the ground scheme of maneuver. The fluidity of the ground 

situation that exists within this close proximity usually requires real-time direction from a 
7

joint terminal attack controller to ensure that targets of highest priority to the ground 

commander are struck. Additionally, when friendly forces are within close proximity, 

more restrictive control measures may be required to integrate CAS with surface 

maneuver and joint fires. Integrating airpower and surface maneuver is an important 

factor for mitigating fratricide from both air-delivered weapons and surface fires. Thus, 

Airmen should consider two key factors when employing CAS: the need for flexible, 

real-time targeting guidance and the avoidance of hitting friendly ground forces in close 

proximity to the target. 

Types of AI and CAS 

 Counterland missions are either scheduled or on-call. Scheduled missions result 

from preplanned requests during the normal air tasking order (ATO) cycle and allow for 

detailed coordination between the tactical air and ground units involved. Additionally, 

preplanned requests may result in counterland sorties in an on-call status (either 

airborne or ground alert) to cover periods of expected enemy action, respond to 

immediate requests, or attack dynamic targets. Scheduled AI missions use detailed 

intelligence to attack known or anticipated targets in an operational area to generate 

effects that achieve JFC objectives. Scheduled CAS missions are normally dedicated 

to a specific ground unit or operation. Air planners attach a “G” or “X” prefix to the ATO 

mission identifier to designate either ground or airborne alert, respectively. 

 GAI is a mission placed on ground alert to provide responsive AI throughout 

the theater in response to emerging targets. 

 XAI is a mission that pursues a designated area versus a particular target. 

XAI may fly airborne alert or search particular areas to strike at targets of 

opportunity. 

 GCAS is a mission placed on ground alert status to provide responsive air 

support to ground forces that encounter substantial enemy resistance. CAS 

assets located close to the supported ground forces normally provide faster 

response times. GCAS missions may be changed to XCAS as the situation 

dictates. 

 XCAS is a mission on airborne alert status in the vicinity of ground forces that 

expect to encounter enemy resistance. XCAS sorties typically remain in 

established holding patterns to provide responsive air support while awaiting 

tasking from any ground unit that needs CAS. If no tasking evolves during 

the vulnerability period, XCAS missions may swing to an AI role if other 

appropriate targets exist. 

 Some counterland missions may not clearly fall under the traditional definition of 

CAS and AI, but are still examples of airpower used against enemy surface forces or 

supporting infrastructure--the generic term “attack” may be used in such cases. 

Other labels such as strategic attack describe air-to-ground missions that fall under a 

different operational function than counterland. 
8

 

 Scheduled AI missions can be dynamically retasked to provide CAS or attack 

time-sensitive targets if requisites such as aircrew qualifications, weapons load, and 

weapons fusing are compatible. Commanders and planners should carefully consider 

the resultant balance between effectiveness and efficiency caused by keeping a portion 

of air assets in reserve when apportioning ground-based and air alert missions. 

 Immediate requests usually result from situations that develop after the suspense 

for preplanned requests in a particular ATO cycle. Dynamic targeting provides a 

responsive use of on-call or dynamically retasked counterland missions to exploit 

enemy vulnerability that may be of limited duration. However, dynamic targeting may 

lead to an overall reduction in the probability of success because of reduced time for 

mission preparation and target study. Chapters 2 and 3 provide an expanded 

discussion of scheduled and on-call counterland missions. 

Derivative Missions Associated with Counterland 

 Derivative mission-types are frequently tasked to complement and support 

counterland operations. The following discussion briefly describes the two most 

common missions that are associated with, and facilitate the effective accomplishment 

of, CAS and AI. 

 Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). FAC(A) missions provide joint 

terminal attack control for CAS aircraft operating in close proximity to friendly 

ground forces. Because of the risk of fratricide, FAC(A)s are specially trained 

aviation officers qualified to provide delivery clearance to CAS aircraft. The 

FAC(A) is the only person cleared to perform such control from the air, and 

can be especially useful in controlling CAS against targets that are beyond 

the visual range of friendly ground forces. 

 Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR). SCAR missions use 

aircraft to detect targets for dedicated AI missions in a specified geographic 

zone. The area may be defined by a box or grid where worthwhile potential 

targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units 

have relocated because of ground fighting. 

SCAR missions are normally part of the C2 interface to coordinate multiple 

flights, detect targets, kill targets, neutralize enemy air defenses, and provide BDA. 

SCAR aircrew perform a similar function for AI missions that FAC(A) provide for CAS 

 Theater battle management core systems (TBMCS) has a myriad of “mission 

type” descriptors for missions ranging from direct support of surface forces, to the 

independent application of airpower supporting JFC objectives in the absence of 

surface forces. Mission type descriptors and their prefixes should not be confused 

with or tied to supported/supporting relationships. For example, an XAI mission using 

SOF as a sensor could quickly devolve to a CAS mission if the SOF unit were 

compromised. In this case, airpower supported by SOF becomes SOF supported by 

airpower very quickly, and is transparent to the TBMCS mission type planned. 
9

missions. Typical tasks include cycling multiple attacking flights through the target area 

and providing prioritized targeting guidance to maximize the effect of each sortie. 

Although fighter aircraft often accomplish SCAR missions, other platforms such as the 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and MQ-1/MQ-9 Predator 

UAS’ can perform SCAR tasks such as locating, verifying, and cross cueing other 

assets to positively identify moving targets; procedurally controlling and sequencing 

aircraft; and passing target updates. The MQ-1 and MQ-9 can also find, fix, and track 

potential targets for subsequent AI missions. These platforms may also be able to 

engage targets on their own, buddy lase for manned aircraft, and provide BDA for the 

same mission. Optimally, the deconfliction and sequencing of aircraft is best performed 

by an E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) or a ground-based control and 

reporting center (CRC). 

 Even though some SCAR responsibilities are similar to that of a FAC(A), SCAR 

aircrew DO NOT have the authority to provide terminal attack control. FAC(A)s undergo 

specialized training to effectively coordinate and integrate air-ground forces to conduct 

terminal attack control safely during CAS—a SCAR pilot does not have these 

specialized qualifications. 

 The bottom line: a FAC(A) can conduct SCAR but a SCAR aircrew cannot 

conduct FAC(A) duties. Planners and commanders need to understand this important 

nuance when tasking XAI missions or diverting airborne aircraft to an immediate CAS 

request (in addition to the fact that not all AI aircrews are qualified to conduct CAS). 

JOINT CONSIDERATIONS 

 When discussing the use of air and space power in counterland operations, it is 

necessary to recognize the contribution of other components’ aviation arms. Navy, 

Marine Corps, Army, and SOF assets can be used for both AI and CAS. While the 

primary task for Marine aviation is support to their own ground forces, excess Marine 

sorties may execute other elements of the JFC’s plan. Scout and attack helicopters 

may also prove valuable platforms for counterland missions even though they lack the 

speed, range, and survivability of fixed-wing assets. Although the Army does not 

consider their helicopters CAS platforms, they can nevertheless employ CAS tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) when operating in support of land forces. Depending 

on circumstances and threat, SOF AC-130s may be available to support certain 

counterland operations. Air and surface-launched cruise missiles can also be employed 

for interdiction, as can the ATACMS. In multinational coalitions, air forces from allied 

nations will usually be available for counterland employment. 

 Regardless of which component the assets come from, the counterland effort is 

guided by a single air and space component commander and directly supports the 

overall joint campaign. Centralized control is a fundamental tenet that commanders 

must exercise to guarantee the concentration of air and space power where it is needed 

most. The CFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall AI effort. 

When designated as the supported commander, the CFACC will conduct theater-wide 

or JOA-wide AI in direct support of the JFC’s overall theater objectives. This functional 
10

responsibility is executed by engaging the enemy across the theater wherever valuable 

AI targets are found, to include those found inside a surface area of operations (AO). AI 

used in this manner tends to have the greatest overall effect on the enemy, but the 

results may be delayed in comparison with AI employed closer to the ground battle. If 

theater objectives dictate, AI may operate in support of a particular portion of the theater 

where it is more closely integrated with the ground battle. This form of AI may strike 

targets nominated through the joint targeting process by either the air or surface 

component and often produces results visible to the surface commander more quickly 

than a theater-wide AI effort. These results also tend to be smaller in scope and shorter 

in duration. The most detailed integration of air and ground components is found in 

CAS where the air attack and ground battle are essentially a single cohesive operation. 

Proper integration of counterland and surface operations is vital to the success of both, 

and the synergistic effect of integrated operations is often much greater than the sum of 

individual air and surface operations. This will be especially true if a single, integrated 

joint operations plan is employed instead of attempting to synchronize individual plans 

developed by the various components. 

The Airman’s perception of depth differs from that of the Soldier, in that air and 

space power can reach to any depth of the battlespace—from the close battle area back 

to and beyond the enemy’s heartland. As an aerial maneuver force, counterland 

operations forces should not be considered as “flying artillery.” Counterland assets 

have much greater range and targeting options; can adapt to changing situations while 

en route to the target area; can retarget based on onboard or offboard information 

updates; can fight their way through enemy defenses; and can orbit over a given area 

while reconnoitering for targets of opportunity. Depending on the designated strategy, 

air and space power’s reach enables a commander to focus counterland effects in a 

small area or disperse them uniformly across the theater at whatever depth is required. 

While in some instances it may be appropriate for the joint air component to be given 

responsibility for an AO, such as western Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, it 

should not be limited to a single or even multiple independent AOs. Joint doctrine 

confirms this view by stating that AOs are defined by the JFC for land, maritime, and 

special operations forces for use by land, naval, and special operations component 

commanders (See JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations). 

Air and surface maneuver forces share supporting roles during counterland 

operations. CAS represents aerial maneuver in direct support of surface maneuver. Air 

attack of ground-nominated AI targets is aerial maneuver indirectly supporting ground 

maneuver. Air attack against theater-wide AI targets is aerial maneuver that either 

provides general support to the ground force or directly achieves JFC objectives. 

Indeed, in some circumstances ground maneuver may support aerial maneuver by 

forcing the enemy into a position that is more vulnerable to air attack, enabling air and 

space power to deliver a vital blow. Moreover, SOF have proven extremely effective for 

target identification and cueing, as was the case during Operations ENDURING 

FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. In those unusual circumstances in which air and 

space forces conduct AI in the absence of friendly surface forces, enemy forces are 

able to disperse and seek cover in a way that complicates the problem for Airmen. 

However, as was shown in Operation ALLIED FORCE, air and space power can still 
11

create decisive effects and lead to success for the joint force. Whether air, space, or 

surface forces are the decisive element is not what matters. Instead, it is important to 

realize that the proper integration of air, space, and surface forces is required for 

successful joint operations. 

 Fires are “the effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons.” Joint fires are “fires 

produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated 

action toward a common objective” (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms). Counterland itself is not joint fires; rather, it represents a form of aerial 

maneuver, which delivers fires on various targets as required. Those counterland 

missions that are apportioned to support another component, such as CAS and some 

AI, can be defined as meeting the description of “two or more components in 

coordinated action.” Therefore, the application of these missions can be called joint 

fires. Those missions that operate in direct support of theater strategy, such as theaterwide AI, are not operating in “coordinated action” with another component, rather they 

are conducting missions with organic forces in support of a scheme of maneuver. 

Therefore, the fires produced by those missions are not joint fires. 

ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS 

 Effective counterland operations share a number of common elements that lead 

to the attainment of operational objectives, such as destruction of enemy forces or 

infrastructure. To what degree each will contribute to the operation depends on such 

variables as the nature of the conflict, geographic location, weather, and characteristics 

of the enemy. 

Air Control 

 Successful counterland operations require a certain degree of freedom to act 

without enemy interference. Providing both the freedom to attack and freedom from 

attack, air superiority is that degree of air advantage possessed by one force over 

another that permits the conduct of operations in the air domain at a given time and 

place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Air superiority over 

counterland operations allows combat aircraft to focus on target acquisition and 

weapons delivery parameters, thus increasing the chances of achieving desired effects. 

Air supremacy is an additional degree of air control, where the opposing force is 

incapable of effective interference in the air domain. While this level of control is 

desirable in the air domain, it may not be required for successful counterland 

operations, and may be too costly in terms of asset apportionment. Assets dedicated to 

air supremacy may be used more wisely in support of land forces or other JFC 

objectives, if the level of interference by opposing air assets is acceptable or negligible. 

 While air supremacy relates to the air domain, air dominance is the highest 

level of air control that allows us to focus on affecting surface events. Air dominance 

does not require unopposed use of the air domain, but indicates a level or control in the 

air that allows us to apportion assets against surface objectives, reducing the ability of 
12

enemy forces to effectively employ on land or sea. In other words, air control describes 

our level of ascendancy in the air domain, while air dominance goes further to describe 

how we use that level of air control to affect enemy surface forces. 

Although some aircraft are capable of self defense, gaining air superiority before 

conducting counterland operations will increase the chances of mission success without 

excessive losses. Stealth technology offers a means of minimizing much of the enemy 

air threat when air superiority is in dispute and may allow some counterland operations 

even in the face of heavy enemy air defenses. Multi-role fighters have significant air-toair capabilities that can serve as a defense against enemy air threats even while 

carrying a full load of air-to-ground weapons. However, whether stealth or self-escorted 

fighter, attack assets are likely to be prioritized against counterair targets until air 

superiority is achieved. 

 

 The risk of conducting counterland operations prior to achieving air superiority 

must be balanced with the threat posed by the enemy air and surface forces. 

Counterland operations conducted prior to achieving air superiority should normally be 

reserved for those targets that represent immediate and critical danger. 

Joint Integration and Complementary Operations 

Counterland operations are most effective when planned and conducted 

synergistically with other air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces. AI can 

create opportunities for commanders to exploit, and centralized joint planning ensures 

the optimum employment of AI. AI levies requirements on air planners and combined 

air and space operations center (CAOC) personnel to plan, execute, and assess AI in 

coordination with surface components, when appropriate. Air and surface commanders 

need to work together to: 1) identify crucial targets; 2) decide when, where, and how to 

attack them; and 3) determine how surface operations and AI can best complement 

each other to achieve JFC objectives and to create opportunities for other maneuver 

elements to exploit. The integration of several other air and space power functions can 

significantly contribute to the effectiveness of counterland operations. 

 Counterair operations enable the effective execution of counterland 

operations by suppressing or eliminating surface-to-air and air-to-air threats. 

Though it is possible to conduct counterland operations without control of the 

air, such operations would likely be both costly and ineffective. 

 Strategic Attack and counterland operations complement one another 

through their synergistic effects. Strategic attack operations directly target 

enemy centers of gravity such as leadership, conflict-sustaining resources, 

and/or strategy. Targets may include strategic C2 nodes, munitions plants, 

heavy industry, energy production, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

Thus, in one sense, strategic attack disrupts or destroys such targets at the 

source, while counterland operations normally target operational fielded 

forces and their supporting infrastructure in the field. 
13

Strategic interdiction is a label often used for those strategic attack operations that 

seek to cut off the flow of strategic resources or other material vital to the 

adversary’s war effort. This type of interdiction differs from the more familiar 

counterland AI in that enemy fielded forces or their supporting infrastructure are not 

directly involved. A good example of strategic interdiction was the effort by US 

submarines, joined later by US Army Air Force bombers and fighters, against 

Japanese merchant shipping during World War II. 

 Space Force Enhancement multiplies the effectiveness and increases the 

lethality of counterland forces through five force enhancement functions: 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and 

attack assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and 

positioning, navigation, and timing. ISR provides location and disposition of 

adversary assets as well as tactical BDA. Environmental monitoring provides 

meteorological data as well as imagery of surface conditions, vegetation and 

land use. Communications allows counterland forces the means to 

disseminate plans, orders and force status over long distances, and provides 

critical connectivity for maneuver forces operating beyond inherent 

communication networks. Finally, the global positioning system (GPS) 

constellation allows precise, reliable blue force tracking, navigation of forces, 

combat identification, and target weaponeering for precision munitions. 

 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance serves a vital role in the 

planning and prosecution of counterland operations. Persistent, accurate, 

and timely intelligence aids commanders in anticipating environmental factors, 

predicting enemy actions, identifying counterland targets, and combat 

assessment. 

 Information Operations (IO) targeted against enemy information systems 

can have collateral effects on the entire enemy system through the disruption, 

degradation, denial, and destruction of its C2 networks. Effective IO can 

deceive the enemy and assist friendly forces to seize the initiative. 

Additionally, the synergistic effects of psychological operations (PSYOP) 

conducted in parallel with counterland operations combine to give the air 

component a pivotal role in achieving the overall goals of any joint campaign. 

The psychological shock of massed air attack and information operations can 

be overwhelming to the enemy’s fielded forces, especially when those forces 

have already been strained by surface combat. Public affairs (PA) also play a 

role in IO. Effective employment of PA operations keeps global audiences 

aware of the precision and effectiveness of counterland operations via the 

news media. PA operations are the first line of defense against enemy efforts 

to leverage collateral damage or fratricide events for propaganda purposes. 

 Special Operations Forces (SOF) complement and support conventional 

counterland operations by providing intelligence, target cueing, terminal 

attack control, guidance for precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and post 
14

attack assessment. SOF may also employ organic weapons systems such as 

fixed or rotary-winged gunships, and special operations ground teams. 

 Weather Services provide timely, accurate, and relevant environmental 

information essential to the effective planning and execution of air, ground, 

and space operations. Weather information influences the timing of force 

employment as well as the selection of targets, routes, weapon systems and 

delivery tactics. 

Appropriate Munitions, Assets, and Allocation 

 Proper munitions planning and employment are important factors for effective 

counterland operations. Numbers and types of munitions available, as well as those in 

the logistics pipeline, need to support specific requirements for a particular conflict. The 

munitions mix must correspond to the selected targeting strategy. Weapons loads and 

fuse settings should be tailored to the desired level of target destruction, neutralization, 

or suppression. Although precision munitions have become a primary weapon of 

choice, planners should realize that general-purpose bombs and cluster munitions may 

provide better effects in some situations. Planners should also consider the possibility 

of adverse weapons effects against friendly forces, such as the employment of timedelayed munitions against an enemy near advancing friendly forces. Precision 

munitions are uniquely valuable in attacking hardened point targets or for minimizing 

collateral damage. These highly accurate direct attack munitions provide rapid strike 

capability with maximum flexibility, while standoff precision weapons allow delivery 

platforms to remain outside the most heavily defended areas with nearly the same 

accuracies. Precision attack of key infrastructure, transportation, and C2 targets can 

cripple an enemy force’s ability to maneuver, and has usually been the preferred use of 

limited PGM assets rather than attacking the enemy one vehicle at a time. However, 

with increased stockpiles, PGMs and inertially-aided munitions (IAMs) are particularly 

useful against a mechanized enemy force that places most of its combat power in 

various types of vehicles. If the number of precision munitions and aircraft available is 

high enough, counterland operations can inflict devastating losses on a mechanized 

enemy force through the simple expedient of vehicle-by-vehicle destruction. However, 

such a strategy of attrition must be considered in terms of both number of weapons 

required and the possible existence of more lucrative target sets and the time required 

to destroy enough of the enemy force to be operationally effective. 

 The CFACC’s ability to conduct counterland operations successfully depends on 

the available type and quantity of air and space assets. Precision weapons delivery, 

stealth characteristics, and destructive power, combined with the inherent capability of 

the air and space component to mass effects against a given objective, can provide a 

substitute for raw numbers. The principles of mass and economy of force should be 

followed to ensure that adequate force is available to achieve the desired effects. 

Though many platforms can employ in the AI and CAS roles, some are better suited for 

each mission from both a training and equipment standpoint. In addition, it is important 

to understand that some units employing air-to-ground ordnance are not qualified for 

CAS, which has specific training and currency requirements. Commanders should 
15

Night attack capability for

counterland has progressed from the 

flares used in World War II and the 

Korean War to modern infrared

systems such as the low-altitude 

navigation and targeting infrared for

night (LANTIRN) pods on this F-15E

Strike Eagle. Improving technology

has removed some of the 

night/adverse weather interdiction 

sanctuary formerly exploited by enemy

surface forces. 

carefully assess the desired munitions effects, aircrew training, and asset capabilities in 

light of the potential for fratricide. 

 Commanders should also 

understand the impact that AI/CAS 

allocation has on sortie throughput to 

increase counterland efficiency. During 

high-intensity operations, effective 

integration between air and land 

components increases tempo and 

efficiency. Because CAS requires detailed 

integration, the communications and 

procedures are much more involved than 

AI. Therefore, CAS execution tends to 

require more time, resources, and trained 

personnel. Because of these factors, C2 

agencies can control significantly more AI 

sorties than CAS sorties per ATO cycle. 

When possible, air and ground 

commanders should synchronize their 

schemes of maneuver to minimize the area 

of detailed integration. That way, when 

JFC objectives call for the rapid destruction 

of enemy land forces, more airpower can 

be used against counterland targets when 

detailed integration is not necessary. This 

does not imply that the Air Force should 

divert its assets and abandon ground 

forces. It simply means the air and ground components should coordinate their actions 

to maximize combat power throughout the battlefield. 

Favorable Environmental Factors 

 Some argue that recent technologies have eliminated the sanctuaries of adverse 

weather and darkness. In some respects, this is true. The adverse effects of weather 

can be reduced through a combination of IAMs and on-board sensors that do not 

require optical guidance. GPS-assisted joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) and radar 

sensors can aid the weapons delivery process in conditions of poor visibility. During 

night operations, modern air-to-ground infrared (IR) systems often see better in 

darkness than in daylight, and night can make many enemy air defense systems less 

effective against counterland aircraft (especially attack helicopters which are typically 

limited to low altitude operations). 

 Despite technological advancements, poor environmental conditions can still 

negatively affect counterland operations. Some forms of adverse weather can interfere 

with the ability of airpower assets to reach the intended target while often hindering both 

detection and attack geometry. Many precision-guided weapons still rely on line of sight 
16

to the target for employment; conditions such as fog, low clouds, or battlefield 

obscuration can prevent visual contact and disrupt weapons delivery. Target 

identification is a critical factor when employing weapons in close proximity to ground 

forces. 

 Favorable weather is important to effective CAS, perhaps more so than other 

forms of air attack. Since identification of the target through visual or electro-optical 

means is usually required for target confirmation and fratricide avoidance, a low cloud 

deck can often prevent CAS missions from hitting their targets. Non-visual weapons 

deliveries using radar, GPS, or IAMs may allow CAS aircraft to hit stationary targets 

through the weather, but target coordinate accuracy will have to be confirmed to both 

the air and ground component’s satisfaction before this option is used. This is 

especially important when assessing the risk of fratricide. The ground commander 

authorizes the attack and accepts responsibility of risk to friendly forces while the 

CFACC determines the minimum acceptable weather for CAS. In the absence of Air 

Force weather personnel, the air liaison officer (ALO) should advise the ground 

commander on what impact adverse weather will have on CAS. Although advanced 

navigation systems and targeting sensors lessen the consequences of adverse 

environmental conditions, technology will never completely alleviate the risk of fratricide 

or collateral damage. Individual controllers and aircrew must make the final call during 

mission execution if existing weather is above or below their mission minimums. 

 Environmental factors also affect surface forces. The rate and extent of enemy 

surface maneuver influenced by weather conditions may provide increased AI 

opportunities (for example, when enemy maneuver is restricted to a few major routes by 

seasonal conditions, it results in concentrated forces which are more easily destroyed or 

disrupted). Planners should use information from C2 systems or weather personnel to 

help gauge the effect of weather and environmental conditions on counterland 

operations.

SUMMARY 

 Counterland can play a key role in the successful outcome of a campaign or 

major operation across the range of military operations. Counterland operations require 

close integration with the JFC’s overall strategy to be effective and must be tailored to 

the situation. Counterland may achieve tactical, operational, or strategic level effects. 

Counterland can complement, support, be supported by, or act independently of other 

joint force operations. Because air and space assets are a limited resource, joint 

counterland operations require unity of effort to achieve the desired synergy to achieve 

JFC objectives. 

 
17

GENESIS OF COUNTERLAND DOCTRINE 

In theory and in practice, air support aircraft in 1918 had two categories of 

targets: objectives along the enemy’s heavily defended frontal positions, which 

some generals called the “crust,” and a whole range of targets extending twenty 

miles and more behind that crust. By the end of the war, a considerable body of 

opinion held that the chief contribution of aircraft should be against those objectives 

behind that crust. Enemy reinforcements moving up in column were much more 

visible and much more vulnerable than front-line troops in field fortifications, and 

there was less danger of confusing them with friendly ground forces. Then too, 

objectives behind the front lines tended to be less fiercely defended—no minor 

consideration, given the losses suffered by ground attack units. Additionally, 

excellent targets often lay beyond the effective range of friendly artillery, in a zone 

where only the airplane could reach them. Toward the end of the war, targets such 

as dense troop columns and convoys of vehicles appeared in great numbers. 

—Lee Kennett, 

Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support 

World War I pursuits like this SPAD XIII were often used for both “trench 

strafing” and “ground strafing” missions, which would today be categorized as 

close air support and air interdiction. 

CHAPTER TWO 

AIR INTERDICTION 
18

DEFINITION 

 AI is an air operation conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s 

military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to 

otherwise achieve JFC objectives. AI is conducted at such distance from friendly forces 

that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces 

is not required. AI can significantly affect the overall course of a campaign. It 

contributes by disrupting the enemy's ability to command, mass, maneuver, withdraw, 

supply, and reinforce available combat power and by weakening the enemy physically 

and psychologically. AI creates opportunities for friendly commanders to exploit. 

 AI increases air and space power’s efficiency because it does not require 

detailed integration with friendly forces. Detailed integration requires extensive 

communications, comprehensive deconfliction procedures, and meticulous planning. AI 

is inherently simpler to execute in this regard. Therefore, if the enemy surface force 

presents a lucrative target, AI conducted before friendly land forces make contact can 

significantly degrade the enemy’s fighting ability and limit the need for CAS when the 

two forces meet in close combat. 

 The joint air component often conducts theater-wide air attacks against enemy 

land forces and their resources to achieve JFC objectives. This autonomous use of AI 

usually occurs outside of a surface component’s AO. SOF air and ground assets may 

play a significant supporting role during AI with their ability to seamlessly integrate into 

the F2T2EA process. Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and 

IRAQI FREEDOM are just a few modern examples where AI independently achieved 

JFC objectives through the direct attack of enemy land forces. 

 Using JFC priorities and understanding the land component’s scheme of 

maneuver, the CFACC can employ AI to provide effects that facilitate and support the 

maneuver. The CFACC may support a land scheme of maneuver by conducting AI 

within a surface commander’s AO. After coordinating priorities, effects, timing, and 

targets with surface components, the CFACC directs responsive AI across the JOA 

against enemy military capabilities that contribute directly to, or are maneuvering to 

reinforce, the conflict. US surface commanders often consider AI synonymous with 

what they express as “shaping” operations. From an Airman’s perspective, shaping 

The disruption of hostile lines of communication (and at times lines 

of signal communication), the destruction of supply dumps, installations, 

and the attack on hostile troop concentrations in rear areas will cause the 

enemy great damage and may decide the battle. 

 — US Army Field Manual 100-20, 

Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943
19

Air Interdiction vs. Shaping Operations 

From a Soldier's perspective, shaping operations support the decisive 

operation by affecting enemy capabilities and forces, or by influencing enemy 

decisions. Shaping operations use all elements of combat power to neutralize or 

reduce enemy capabilities. (US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations) As a result, 

Soldiers may consider AI as shaping which solely supports their maneuver elements. 

From an Airman's perspective, AI may be conducted either in support of surface 

force objectives or in direct support of JFC objectives; in the latter case, the air 

component commander might be the supported commander. Because of these 

slightly differing views, there is a potential for friction between the air and land 

components regarding supporting/supported roles and responsibility for planning. 

These situations require careful and continuing dialogue between the competing 

senior commanders and their common superior commander. 

may be regarded as preparing the battlefield with AI to assist the land component’s 

scheme of maneuver. 

INTERDICTION OBJECTIVES 

 The desired objectives of AI are to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy. It 

is not necessary for an AI operation to focus solely on a single objective; in fact, AI 

typically inflicts multiple effects on the enemy. The enemy army traveling to the front 

while under air attack will suffer some level of destruction. The remaining force will 

likely be delayed in getting to its destination and will suffer some level of physical and 

psychological disruption. 

Divert 

 AI can divert enemy fielded forces from areas where they are critically needed. It 

may divert enemy ground forces to a location more favorable to the JFC and can also 

divert enemy naval, engineering, and personnel resources to the tasks of repairing and 

recovering damaged equipment and facilities as well as keeping lines of communication 

(LOCs) open. These diversions prevent enemy ground forces and their backup support 

resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can also cause 

circuitous routing along LOCs, resulting in additional delays for the enemy. 

Disrupt 

AI can disrupt the enemy’s C2 systems, intelligence collection capability, 

transportation systems, supply lines, and psychological will. Disruption of enemy 

surface forces can be accomplished in a number of ways. A key part of the interdiction 

planner’s task is to analyze the enemy army for critical vulnerabilities that, if attacked, 

will have a disruptive effect across significant portions of the enemy force. The 

presence of such targets, and the ability to attack them, will often determine whether 
20

disruption or destruction will be the primary effect mechanism planned for AI effort. This 

can include traditional supply targets such as ammunition or petroleum, oil, and 

lubricants (POL); LOCs used to transport the enemy force into combat; C2 systems that 

the enemy army requires to fight effectively; or anything else the enemy force depends 

on for success in combat. In analyzing the enemy, considerations include what 

reserves or workarounds the enemy has available, what time delay can be afforded 

before the effects must affect the enemy, what strategy the enemy is expected to 

employ, and what the actual battlefield situation is. Another way to neutralize the 

enemy surface force is to affect the morale of its troops, which has historically been a 

strongpoint of using airpower. Psychological uncertainty as to whether or not forces, 

materiel, or supplies will arrive can directly affect enemy commanders, their staffs, and 

forces. 

Delay 

AI can delay enemy forces and supplies. If part of the enemy surface force is 

destroyed, the enemy’s efforts to avoid having the rest of its force suffer the same fate 

will often result in long delays or an outright halt to their movement to contact. When AI 

delays the enemy, friendly forces gain time. What JFCs do to improve their situation in 

the time gained is critical to any assessment of interdiction’s contribution. However, an 

AI plan that focuses on delay does not guarantee a major impact on combat operations. 

In order for delay to have a major impact, either the enemy must face urgent movement 

requirements in support of its own operations or to counter friendly maneuver, or the 

delay must enhance the effect of planned friendly maneuver. It is advantageous for 

friendly forces to pressure their opponent to attempt urgent movement. Ideally, if the air 

component maintains the initiative, the opponent is forced to make unplanned urgent 

movements at times and places that maximize their exposure to AI. Delay is critical in 

achieving additional AI payoffs. For example, it can lengthen the time during which 

enemy land or naval forces are at risk of attack. When vehicles amass behind a 

damaged route segment, or ships are trapped in a harbor because of mines, a more 

concentrated set of targets and a longer period of exposure results. This makes the 

enemy easier to destroy or renders it ineffective. 

Destroy 

 Destruction of the enemy surface force, supporting elements, and supplies is the 

most direct of the four objectives of AI. The enemy’s perception of its imminent 

destruction can be as effective in achieving AI objectives as physically destroying target 

systems, if it causes the enemy to react in a way upon which friendly forces can 

capitalize. Destroying transportation systems is usually not an end in itself, but 

contributes to the delay, diversion, and disruption of enemy forces and materiel. The 

demonstrated or perceived ability to destroy may, by itself, achieve substantial delay 

and diversion of enemy resources. It may cause the enemy to move only at night or to 

mass air defense assets (which may be useful elsewhere) around critical transportation 

nodes. The enemy may have to divert engineering resources from other tasks to 

prepare alternate routes in anticipation of possible attacks. This may be true when 
21

transportation systems remain largely undamaged. However, destruction may also 

inhibit friendly freedom of action. For example, destruction of key transportation targets 

could hinder future surface operations that intend to use the same infrastructure. 

Appropriate coordination of AI with other joint force components helps preserve friendly 

freedom of action. 

EFFECTS OF AIR INTERDICTION 

 AI effects differ with every situation and can significantly affect the course of a 

campaign or operation. Results against an enemy with minimal logistics requirements, 

a simple force structure, and primitive logistics systems differ from AI conducted against 

a highly mechanized, modern force possessing intensive logistics requirements. 

Interdiction conducted against enemy forces and logistics, without regard to the overall 

theater situation, may be largely ineffective; thus planning for interdiction should be 

closely integrated in the JFC’s overall planning process. 

The effectiveness of AI is largely dependent on a number of variables. The time 

required for AI to affect the enemy, and the duration and depth of those effects, 

depends on several factors. These factors include, but are not limited to, the distance 

between interdiction operations and the location of intended effects; the means and rate 

of enemy movement (ships, trains, aircraft, trucks); the physical target (forces, supplies, 

fuel, munitions, infrastructure); the level of enemy activity; enemy tactics; and the 

resilience of the targeted force or system. For example, AI will have a more robust 

effect in linear combat against a modern, mobile, conventional force using significant 

resources. Moreover, the timing and magnitude of effects will vary depending on where 

AI is conducted and the nature of the enemy. On one hand, AI deep in the battlespace 

will usually produce extensive, protracted effects that take longer to occur. On the other 

hand, AI close to the front lines typically produces immediate, but geographically limited, 

effects. Thus, during major operations and campaigns, AI effects are typically more 

apparent by influencing an enemy’s ability to command, mass, maneuver, supply, and 

reinforce available conventional combat forces. When conducted during stability 

operations, AI may have negligible effects against an insurrection that employs a 

shadowy force structure, a simple logistics net, and unconventional tactics. However, 

with timely, accurate intelligence and persistent operations, AI can disrupt enemy supply 

operations, destroy weapons caches, or deny sanctuary to insurgents. To maximize 

AI’s potential, commanders must understand how its effects will differ depending on the 

nature of the conflict being fought. 

 Whether the Air Force is involved in major operations and campaigns or smaller 

scale contingencies, AI can channel movements, constrict logistics systems, 

disrupt communications, force urgent movement, and attrit enemy fielded forces.
22

Disruptive Counterland Operations During DESERT STORM 

Even Iraqis who had foreseen heavy air attacks commented that the 

Coalition bombing was more continuous, devastating, and wide-scale than what 

they had expected. The round-the-clock bombing experienced by some units 

during portions of the air campaign proved particularly stressful for both officers 

and enlisted personnel because it deprived them of sleep and allowed them little 

opportunity to perform their duties. One senior officer reported that he could 

rarely sleep more than two hours at a time and that the constant pounding 

shattered the soldiers’ nerves, causing some men, as he put it, nearly to go 

mad. The bombing produced this strong psychological effect even though it 

caused the Iraqi officer’s division relatively light casualties: perhaps 100 men 

killed and another 150 wounded. 

 

The magnitude of the B-52 bomb loads had a tremendous psychological 

effect on the Iraqi troops. Even though few Iraqi POWs or line crossers 

reported that their units were actually hit in B-52 strikes, many had seen B-52s 

attacking other units in the distance and had felt the ground tremors from B-52 

bomb detonations. The sound and vibrations of the B-52 detonations—even 

when the actual strike zone was as far away as 40 kilometers—spawned 

suspense and fear because the soldiers imagined that they would be the next 

target of attack, and they realized that their bunkers were neither sufficiently 

deep nor sufficiently hard to protect them. 

An Iraqi officer told his interrogator that he had surrendered because of 

B-52 strikes. “But your position was never attacked by B-52s,” his interrogator 

exclaimed. “That is true,” the Iraqi officer replied, “but I saw one that had been 

attacked.” 

—Stephen T. Hosmer, 

Psychological Effects of US Air Operations in Four Wars: 1941-1991 
23

Channeling Enemy Movements 

 AI channels the movement of ground forces when conditions force the enemy to 

maneuver through or along predictable avenues. This generally results from the lack of 

transportation routes, manmade and natural obstacles, and other geographic 

constraints. The fewer the routes available to transport enemy supplies and 

reinforcements, the greater the loss or delay caused by severing those routes. Attacks 

on enemy lateral LOCs can channel movement, impair reinforcement, reduce 

operational cohesion, and create conditions for defeating the enemy in detail. 

Geography influences the rate of enemy movement, the size of the force to be moved, 

where it can move, and the means required to move the force. Geography may also 

restrict or channel ground movement, creating chokepoints and concentrated targets. 

In cases where geography favors rapid movement of enemy forces, AI assets can 

create artificial or temporary chokepoints by laying large numbers of scatterable mines, 

dropping bridges, or collapsing tunnels. 

 Air component planners must coordinate the AI effort with the land component’s 

overall scheme of maneuver. LOCs used by the enemy may also facilitate rapid 

advance of our own ground forces, requiring properly coordinated trade-offs between 

interdicting the enemy and preserving key routes for advancing friendly ground units. 

Constricting the Enemy’s Logistics System 

 Heavy ground combat creates demands on enemy fielded forces and speeds 

consumption of vital war materiel. This in turn increases the effects of AI operations by 

straining the enemy support system and reducing stockpiles. For surface combat to 

take place, soldiers and their weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and communications 

must get to the battle. When the enemy consumes large quantities of supplies because 

of heavy combat or extensive movement, interdiction operations have an accelerated 

impact for two reasons. First, when opponents are under heavy pressure, they may be 

forced to use up stockpiles reserved for ongoing or future operations. Inability to 

stockpile supplies makes it more difficult for the enemy to initiate large-scale offensive 

operations. Second, high consumption drives an enemy to use more direct routes, 

making them more vulnerable to interdiction attacks. The nature of ground combat also 

determines which supporting elements are most critical at any given time, as which 

items of supply and infrastructure are critical can vary greatly with the situation. 

Historically, an enemy army fighting under static conditions is more affected by the 

destruction of munitions, while a highly mobile enemy is more disrupted by the loss of 

fuel and transportation. 

 The less surplus capacity the enemy’s logistics system has, the less it can 

compensate for damage. Degrading the mobility of the enemy’s distribution system 

hinders its ability to redistribute assets to effectively counter friendly operations. When 

attacking the enemy’s logistic systems, it is normally prudent to concentrate efforts on a 

small number of limiting factors such as concentrations of supplies; petroleum, oils, and 

lubricants; storage and resupply systems; or soft vehicles. There may not be enough 
24

interdiction assets to attack all of an enemy’s logistic systems, even sequentially over 

time. 

 The enemy transportation system itself must also be broken down into 

components when analyzing for weaknesses to attack. Most transportation systems 

consist of the actual conduit for travel (roads, rail, etc.), vehicles used to transport 

troops or supplies along the conduit, energy required for those vehicles to operate 

(typically POL or electricity), C2 to run the transportation system, and repair facilities to 

keep the system operating. The loading and unloading points in the transportation 

system may prove especially lucrative, as large concentrations of enemy forces or 

supplies are often found there. Examples include rail yards, harbors, and airfields. If 

forces or supplies are critically needed at the front, the enemy may not have the luxury 

of dispersing them during loading or unloading, which increases vulnerability to attack. 

Moreover, environmental impacts on the transportation system can create additional 

chokepoints worth exploiting. In many cases, the enemy will use the same 

transportation system for both forces and supplies. Under such circumstances, 

destroying or degrading the enemy’s LOCs will affect both their force mobility and 

resupply capability. When analyzing an enemy transportation network for importance to 

their overall strategy, all possible uses for such a system must be considered. Before 

making the decision to interdict the enemy’s transportation network, it must be analyzed 

for surplus capacity and reconstitution capability. Failure to do this has sometimes led 

to large-scale AI efforts that had little real chance of success (e.g., the limited 

effectiveness in halting activity on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War). 

Disrupting Enemy Communications 

 The enemy’s combat operations may be disrupted with attacks on their C2 

nodes; the level of C2 disruption must be commensurate with overall objectives. C2 

attacks may seek complete isolation of enemy combat forces from higher headquarters, 

or such attacks may force the enemy to use less capable, less secure backup 

communication systems that can be more easily exploited by friendly forces. When the 

enemy employs a rigid, top-down C2 doctrine, they can be particularly vulnerable to the 

disruptive effects of C2 interdiction. This is especially true when the enemy has not had 

a long preparation period to exercise their plan, or when the conflict has moved beyond 

the initial stages. Conversely, an enemy that practices a high degree of C2 autonomy 

will likely be less affected by attacks on their C2 network. When the ground situation 

has been static for long periods before the campaign, chances are greater that the 

enemy has planned and trained for either offensive or defensive operations. Under 

such circumstances, attacks on enemy C2 are less likely to have significant effects, as 

the enemy is still able to react in a scripted manner. Once enough time has elapsed for 

events to overcome a preplanned enemy response, attacks on C2 will impair their ability 

to respond and pay larger dividends on the battlefield. In some circumstances, such as 

when the operations plan includes forcing the enemy to react to friendly maneuver, 

complete destruction of their C2 architecture would be counterproductive. The 

capability to affect the enemy through nonlethal information operations must also be 

considered, as this approach may lead to better overall results while freeing up 

conventional attack assets for other forms of AI. 
25

Forcing Urgent Movement Upon the Enemy 

 The enemy may execute urgent movement for several reasons: an attempt to 

achieve surprise, the need to attack before reinforcements or supplies arrive, the 

requirement for rapid reinforcement of threatened defensive positions, the attempt to 

exploit offensive operations, or when driven to urgent movement by interdiction effects. 

Under these conditions, the enemy has a strong incentive to attain specific objectives 

within time constraints. Rapid movement of enemy forces and supplies may make them 

more vulnerable to AI. They generally become more concentrated while traversing 

more exposed and predictable avenues, foregoing time-consuming camouflage and 

concealment efforts. However, urgent movements are temporary due to a desire to limit 

exposure. For friendly forces to capitalize on such opportunities, we must deny the 

enemy mobility when they need it most. Close coordination is required among all forces 

to take full advantage of the situation. Additionally, commanders require access to 

information systems able to process real-time and near real-time intelligence in order to 

exploit the capabilities of interdiction and opportunities that AI operations create. 

Friendly forces must take full advantage of all reconnaissance and surveillance assets, 

from air- and space-borne sensors to SOF air and ground elements, to detect when 

these movements occur. Coordination is required among all forces to take full 

advantage of the situation in the time provided; otherwise, the enemy may escape the 

desired effects of AI. 

Attrition of the Enemy 

 AI can attrit enemy forces and materiel, tipping the balance of forces in favor of 

friendly units. AI against enemy fielded forces has traditionally been more limited than 

the other effects, mainly due to the difficulty of finding and targeting individual guns or 

vehicles. Although modern sensor and weapons technology enables us to more 

accurately engage enemy targets, commanders must not be lulled into the belief that 

this will assure the direct destruction of enemy forces. Resources, terrain, weather, 

enemy actions, and enemy characteristics are just a few variables to consider when 

developing an AI strategy. 

 The fact that directly attacking individual enemy forces is possible does not mean 

that it is always the most efficient approach in terms of munitions and sorties available. 

Although the direct destruction of individual enemy forces has an immediate impact on 

enemy combat power, it usually requires more assets due to the larger number of 

individual targets—especially if they are dispersed or dug in. Often, the isolation of 

large enemy formations by destroying enemy logistics nets, sustaining resources, and 

supporting infrastructure can achieve more widespread results than attacking individual 

tanks or artillery pieces. 

 Terrain and weather affect the ability to attrit enemy forces. Attacking an enemy 

in open terrain in good weather significantly differs from striking an enemy in rough 

wooded terrain under a layer of adverse weather. As an example, exposed Iraqi forces 

were much easier AI targets for coalition airpower during Operation DESERT STORM 
26

than dispersed Serbian forces that took cover using trees, valleys, and adverse weather 

conditions during Operation ALLIED FORCE. 

 

 Enemy characteristics influence an attrition-based strategy. The number and 

vulnerability of enemy fielded force components, along with the enemy’s ability to 

replace its losses, must be weighed against the expected results of targeting the 

supporting infrastructure. An attrition-based strategy against enemy fielded forces 

tends to produce intense localized results with fewer disruptive effects across the entire 

enemy system. Psychologically disruptive effects, however, may prove to be an added 

benefit. Enemy movement also influences the ability to destroy enemy fielded forces. 

During DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM, the presence of coalition land forces 

forced the enemy to react en masse, leaving them detectable and exposed to air attack. 

However, because Operation ALLIED FORCE saw no use of significant coalition land 

forces, the Serbs were able to use dispersion, deception, and concealment tactics. 

Thus, friendly ground maneuver that forces an enemy to react and become predictable 

can make an attrition strategy viable and more effective. Retreating enemy forces 

remain a legitimate target in AI operations as such forces may be available for continual 

use by the opposing commander. However, surrendering (or surrendered) forces are 

not legitimate targets, if it has been established that such forces are surrendering, and 

the attacking force is in a position to know of the surrender. 

TYPES OF AIR INTERDICTION REQUESTS 

 AI requests fall into two categories: preplanned and immediate. Each type of 

request is influenced by a variety of factors. Unless time constraints dictate otherwise, 

preplanned requests should always be accomplished to allow for proper weapon-target 

combination, target area tactics planning, threat avoidance, weather study, and other 

variables, to maximize the probability of target destruction with minimum losses. 

Attacking mobile or short-notice targets provides a more flexible response that can 

capitalize on opportunities, but lack of mission planning can reduce effectiveness and 

higher friendly losses may be expected. Real-time information technology and digital 

cockpit imagery reduces, but does not eliminate, this factor. 

Preplanned Requests 

 Preplanned AI is the normal method of operation in which aircraft attack 

prearranged or planned targets. This mode is used to hit specific targets that are known 

in advance, and detailed intelligence information is available to support strike planning. 

Preplanned attacks are normally flown against fixed targets or against mobile targets 

that are not expected to move in the interval between planning and execution (e.g., 

revetted tanks). Target information for scheduled AI can come from sources that vary 

from overhead reconnaissance to ground-based SOF. Preplanned AI is conducted 

within the normal air tasking cycle and provides enough time for close coordination with 

other joint force components. It is crucial for component liaisons to communicate and 

work together to facilitate centralized planning and effective integration, and avoid 

duplicating effort. Preplanned AI requests evolve into scheduled and on-call missions. 
27

 Scheduled missions are planned against targets on which air attacks are 

delivered at a specific time. 

 On-call missions are planned against targets other than scheduled missions 

for which a need can be anticipated but which will be delivered upon request 

rather than a specific time. 

 On-call AI missions can produce responsive, flexible effects. In cases where a 

specific area to search for enemy AI targets cannot be predetermined, these missions 

are designated as XAI or GAI on the ATO and may be put on an airborne alert status. 

The appropriate C2 agency provides guidance to a specific target, kill box, or target 

area. XAI missions will normally be given a target priority list or other guidance defining 

which targets to attack for greatest disruption of the enemy. This set of target priorities 

may be available prior to takeoff, or may be passed in flight by an appropriate C2 

agency such as a forward air controller (FAC), a SCAR, an air support operations center 

(ASOC), an AWACS, or an E-8 JSTARS. If no targets are discovered in the designated 

area, XAI missions should be prepared to proceed to a backup target if available or 

requested by the designated controlling agency. Planners should attempt to match 

proper weapons loads with expected target types to maximize XAI effects. When 

flexible AI is flown in direct support of the surface component, the target priorities should 

reflect those established by the surface component and communicated via the 

appropriate component liaison officer (LNO) within the theater air-ground system 

(TAGS). The ASOC normally coordinates and directs preplanned AI requests flown 

short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). 

Immediate Requests 

 Immediate AI meets specific requests which arise during the course of a battle 

and which by their sudden nature are not planned in accordance with the normal ATO 

process. Immediate AI requests can respond to unplanned or unanticipated targets that 

require urgent, time-critical attention. It should be noted that many immediate requests 

for AI allow sufficient time for in-depth planning prior to execution even if those requests 

fall inside of the normal 72-hour air tasking cycle that defines “immediate.” Immediate 

AI often responds to attack requests against dynamic and time-sensitive targets. 

Dynamic targeting. Dynamic targeting is the active process of identifying, prosecuting, 

and effectively engaging emerging targets. The primary focus of dynamic targeting 

should be the prosecution of JFC designated and prioritized time-sensitive targets (TST) 

and functional component-critical targets. The destruction of these priority targets is 

considered critical for achieving JFC objectives and thus requires the establishment of 

detailed decision and authorization guidance for each designated target type to ensure 

rapid and effective engagement. It is important to limit the total number of TST class 

designations to only those meeting the definition of JP 1-02 and to provide to all levels 

of C2 and force application clear guidance on what constitutes a TST/component-critical 

target to avoid diversion of assets from the JFC’s overall plan. 
28

Time-sensitive targets. The CFACC may recommend TSTs to the JFC. TSTs are 

those targets of such high priority that the JFC designates them as requiring immediate 

response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly 

forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity (JP 1-02). TSTs are 

prosecuted using the dynamic targeting process above, but are of higher priority and 

may require additional coordination with other components and/or the joint task force. 

The destruction of these high payoff targets is considered critical for achieving JFC 

objectives. The JFC is ultimately responsible for TST prosecution and relies on the 

component commanders for conducting TST operations. 

 When using on-call or dynamically re-tasked assets, immediate AI often relies on 

an offboard sensor such as JSTARS to provide initial target detection and attack 

targeting information. Using real-time target information via data-link, response times 

can be as short as a few minutes, depending on the distances and C2 arrangements 

involved. Immediate AI requests allow airborne assets to exploit enemy vulnerability 

that may be of limited duration. It can work particularly well when attacking enemy 

ground forces on the move in the enemy rear area and provide a responsive use of 

counterland attack when supporting the ground component. The ASOC normally 

coordinates and directs immediate AI requests flown short of the FSCL. 

 The same quick-responsive nature of immediate AI that allows it to take 

advantage of fleeting opportunities can also have a negative impact on individual 

mission success. Scheduled missions allow aircrews more time to study the target 

imagery and to align attack axes to optimize weapons effects. Detailed study can 

reduce threat exposure and allow mission planners to optimize the weapon’s fusing for 

maximum effect. Preplanning allows better packaging of strike and support assets 

when required. The bottom line for dynamic targeting of airborne assets is that it should 

be used in those cases when the need for a short reaction time outweighs the reduced 

effectiveness that may result when compared with preplanned operations. Moreover, 

opportunity costs must be considered. Commanders should ensure the benefits of 

diverting air and space power away from a preplanned target outweigh the costs by 

pondering several variables. Is it affordable to delay striking a preplanned target? What 

are the priorities? Will diverting airpower to an unplanned target create greater effects 

or is it less efficient? In short, the payoff of striking a dynamic target should be worth 

the cost of diverting preplanned assets. 

 To increase battlespace awareness during dynamic targeting, C2 elements must 

ensure that aircrews have the most current information pertaining to the location of 

SOF, friendly ground forces, and no-strike target lists. 

ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE AI OPERATIONS 

 In addition to the elements of effective counterland operations previously 

discussed, there are particular considerations that are especially applicable to AI 

operations. These include the elements normally required to successfully prosecute AI 

operations (integration with surface maneuver and effective C2 systems) and those 
29

desired effects of typical interdiction operations (channeled enemy movements, high 

rates of consumption, logistics constriction, and urgent movement). To what degree 

each element contributes to the operation varies with the nature of the conflict, 

geographic location, weather, and characteristics of the enemy. 

Integration with Surface Maneuver 

An important factor in successful AI operations is integrating air maneuver with 

surface maneuver. Planning and conducting AI and surface operations within a 

coherent framework enhances their synergistic effect in those operations involving air, 

space, and surface forces. Proper integration can create a dilemma for the enemy 

commander as he reacts to the resulting combined and complementary effects of air 

and surface combat power. Two complementary maneuver schemes serve as an 

example. The first involves airpower fixing enemy surface forces, thus allowing ground 

forces to engage. Airpower can hold enemy ground forces in place leaving friendly land 

forces free to maneuver. If the enemy counters surface maneuver with movement, 

losses from air attack (due to reduced concealment, greater detectability, and increased 

predictability) may become unacceptable. As a result, measures required to minimize 

losses from AI leave the enemy more susceptible to defeat by friendly surface forces. 

The second scheme involves surface forces fixing enemy forces, thus allowing airpower 

to engage the enemy. An actual or threatened surface advance can force an enemy to 

respond with counter maneuvers or resupply. By placing sustained pressure on the 

enemy, surface combat increases target acquisition by flushing the enemy from 

concealment thereby enabling airpower to destroy enemy forces at a faster rate than 

can be replaced. Close coordination among all components will help maximize enemy 

vulnerability to AI. 

 Mission-type orders allow for the optimum employment of air and space forces by 

maximizing effects and increasing employment flexibility. For example, using broad 

guidance, the JFC may direct theater-wide interdiction of all enemy second echelon 

forces. The CFACC can then conduct a tailored interdiction effort against those forces 

with specific targeting guidance being developed at the component or even tactical 

level. In another example, the land component commander might indicate to the 

CFACC that delay or disruption of a particular enemy ground force is the highest priority 

for air support. The CFACC can then determine the best way to achieve those desired 

effects, since he has the best means for determining how to attack the enemy with air 

and space power. Surface commanders requesting supporting AI should clearly state 

how it will enable or enhance their operations, listing both the desired effects and effects 

to be avoided. The latter might include consequences of destroying LOCs critical to the 

ground scheme of maneuver or the hazards associated with air-delivered cluster 

munitions and mines. Airmen at the tactical and operational levels, especially those in 

the field advising the ground component on proper use of air and space power, can 

facilitate the commander’s intent process by ensuring that air support requests clearly 

state the desired effects. 

 
30

A thorough assessment of 

the enemy’s ability to reconstitute or 

work around air interdiction damage 

is vital to success. 

Sustained and Concentrated Pressure on the Enemy 

Two key characteristics of successful counterland operations are sustained and 

concentrated efforts. AI especially demands sustained, persistent action. Success or 

failure often comes down to the balance between the enemy’s ability to repair the 

damage versus friendly ability to inflict more damage to the system being interdicted. 

Sustained pressure can be applied at the source (through strategic attack), at the 

delivery end (on the battlefield), and through AI against the forces and infrastructure in 

between. Therefore, persistence is a critical element in ensuring the prolonged effect of 

both AI and CAS. Eventually, resourceful enemies may potentially circumvent even the 

most prolonged effects of air attack. Effective employment of ISR assets provides 

critical information to the CFACC on the results 

of the opening attacks and on the effect 

achieved over time by the air and space 

operation as a whole. Such information will be 

used in reattack decisions and in deciding when 

to attack follow-on targets while the enemy 

attempts to recover from the original attacks. AI 

is often directed against replaceable systems 

(vehicles, weapons, POL, communications 

systems) and repairable systems such as 

bridges or railroad lines. Therefore, pressure 

should be sufficient to impede efforts to replace 

or repair affected targets and cause stress on 

the entire enemy operation. This requirement 

applies particularly to operations of long 

duration, because time normally allows the 

enemy to restore losses. Attacks on key repair 

and replacement assets may be advisable if 

such targets represent the weak link in the 

enemy’s support infrastructure. Concentrating 

the effects of counterland operations against 

critical targets is essential due to the generally 

limited numbers of AI and CAS-capable assets. 

Accurate, Timely, and Relevant Intelligence 

Accurate information about the enemy’s support characteristics, force 

structure, and ability to adapt is imperative to successful AI. Accurate, timely, and 

relevant intelligence provides information about the enemy’s probable course(s) of 

action, identifies interrelated target systems, allows the CFACC to anticipate enemy 

actions, and facilitates correct assessment. A prerequisite for planning counterland 

operations is an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the enemy and how 

the enemy is most likely to fight. Accurate intelligence allows commanders to develop 

achievable objectives, select appropriate targets, apply the appropriate weapon and 

delivery systems, and keep abreast of the enemy’s response. In order to accomplish 

this, commanders require information systems that facilitate exploitation and 
31

dissemination of real-time and near real-time intelligence. Such intelligence is 

particularly useful in dealing with targets that may have near or immediate effect on 

surface forces or whose location was not accurately known. Intelligence operations 

must support the joint counterland effort to enhance unity of effort. To that end, AI 

targets must be identified and then prioritized in relation to their importance in achieving 

campaign objectives. 

SUMMARY 

 AI represents a flexible and lethal form of air and space power that can be used 

in various ways to prosecute the joint battle. However employed, certain principles such 

as centralized control/decentralized execution must be followed to achieve maximum 

effectiveness with minimum losses. The objective of AI is to divert, disrupt, delay, or 

destroy enemy land forces and their supporting capabilities. AI can channel enemy 

movement, constrain logistics, disrupt communications, or force urgent movement to put 

the enemy in a favorable position for friendly forces to exploit. To be most effective, AI 

requires persistence, concentration, joint integration, and accurate intelligence. 

Whether supporting the ground offensive by attacking ground-nominated targets or 

decisively halting an enemy advance with theater-wide interdiction, AI provides a 

powerful tool for defeating the enemy ground force. 

An army can be defeated by one of two main alternative means—not 

necessarily mutually exclusive: We can strike at the enemy’s troops themselves, 

either by killing them or preventing them from being in the right place at the right 

time; or we can ruin their fighting efficiency by depriving them of their supplies of 

food and war material of all kinds on which they depend for existence as a fighting 

force. 

— Wing Commander J. C. Slessor, 

Air Power and Armies, 1936
32

CHAPTER THREE 

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 

DEFINITION 

 CAS is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which 

are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air 

mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 1-02). Employing ordnance 

within close proximity of ground troops and the requirement for detailed integration are 

two characteristics that distinguish CAS from other types of air warfare. 

 Close proximity. Close proximity does not represent a specific distance. 

Instead, it is situational and implies a range within which some form of 

terminal attack control is required for fratricide prevention. Thus, CAS is not 

defined by a specific region of the theater/JOA. Instead, it can be conducted 

at any place and time friendly surface forces are in close proximity to enemy 

forces. For example, CAS can be employed in support of SOF operating 

anywhere in the JOA, as long as there are friendly troops within close 

proximity to the enemy forces being attacked. 

 Detailed integration. The requirement for detailed integration because of 

fires, proximity, or movement is the determining factor for CAS. Detailed 

integration describes a level of coordination required to achieve desired 

effects while minimizing the risk of fratricide—from either surface fires or airdelivered weapons. Because of this level of integration, each element must 

be controlled in real time to prevent fratricide of ground or air forces. 

Procedures should be flexible enough so that CAS, surface fires, and the 

ground scheme of maneuver are not overly restricted. The range at which the 

preponderance of effects against the enemy shifts from surface fires to 

airpower should define the maximum range requiring detailed integration—

this depth is a good point for planners to consider delineating between CAS 

and AI. 

RESPONSIBILITIES 

 The JFC establishes the guidance and priorities for CAS in the concept of 

operations (CONOPS), operation or campaign plans, and air apportionment decision, 

and by making capabilities and forces available to the components. 

The greatest benefit derived from the tactical air force was in the offensive 

action of the fighter-bomber in blunting the power of the armored thrust and 

striking specific targets on the front of the ground troops. 

— General Omar Bradley, USA 
33

 The CFACC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks 

assigned by the establishing commander. For CAS, these responsibilities normally 

include recommending air apportionment, allocating forces/capabilities made available 

from the JFC and components, creating and executing the ATO, and other applicable 

actions associated with CAS execution. The CFACC maintains close coordination with 

the other component commanders to ensure CAS requirements are being met in 

accordance with JFC guidance. 

CAS OBJECTIVES 

 

CAS provides firepower in offensive and defensive operations, day or night, to 

destroy, suppress, neutralize, disrupt, fix, or delay enemy forces in close proximity to 

friendly ground forces. For CAS to be employed effectively, it should be prioritized 

against targets that present the greatest threat to the supported friendly surface force. 

Moreover, CAS assets should arrive in a timely manner. CAS that arrives late may be 

ineffective due to the fluid nature of ground battle. 

Almost any enemy threat in close proximity to friendly forces on the modern 

battlefield is suitable for CAS targeting. However, indiscriminate CAS application 

against inappropriate targets decreases mission effectiveness, increases the risk of 

fratricide, and may dilute availability of CAS aircraft to an unacceptable level. Although 

there is no single category of targets most suitable for CAS application, mobile targets 

and their supporting firepower (in general) present the most immediate threat to friendly 

surface forces and thus are prime candidates for consideration. This is especially true 

when supporting light forces, such as airborne or amphibious units, since they are not 

able to bring as much organic heavy firepower into battle as heavier mechanized or 

armored units. CAS provides the surface commander with highly mobile, responsive, 

and concentrated firepower. It enhances the element of surprise, is capable of 

employing munitions with great precision, and is able to attack targets that are 

inaccessible or invulnerable to available surface fire. 

The success of both offensive and defensive CAS operations in 

contiguous, linear warfare may depend on massing effects at decisive points—

not diluting them across the entire battlefield. During large-scale ground operations, 

there are often more requests for CAS than can be attacked by the available air assets. 

As a result, CAS should be focused in those critical areas where friendly surface forces 

lack the organic firepower to handle the situation themselves. The centralized C2 of 

CAS employment is essential to allow the massing of its effects where needed most. 

This may often be beyond the troops-in-contact (TIC) range, as CAS missions operating 

there will have reduced risk of fratricide, and enemy forces destroyed or delayed there 

are often kept from engaging friendly surface forces. Surface commanders should 

properly prioritize and focus the firepower of apportioned and allocated CAS at decisive 

places and times to achieve their objectives. Distributing CAS among many competing 

requests dilutes the effects of those assets and may result in less, rather than more 

effective air support to ground forces. 
34

CAS EFFECTS 

 When it is necessary to provide troops in contact with supporting fires, CAS can 

devastate enemy forces while spearheading offensive operations or covering retrograde 

operations. CAS can also be used for the purposes of harassment, suppression, and 

neutralization. However, because those effects are typically assigned to surface fire 

support assets, such use may represent a less efficient use of limited CAS missions. 

On one hand, ground commanders should use their organic firepower when better 

suited for the task before calling in requests for CAS. On the other hand, a ground 

commander’s organic firepower—particularly longer range systems—may not always be 

the most appropriate fire support asset. Thus, when planned and integrated well, CAS 

provides desired effects that can be exploited by the maneuver commander. Ultimately, 

each of the different CAS applications must be weighed against other, potentially more 

effective, uses for CAS-capable assets such as AI or even strategic attack. CAS is 

applicable throughout the range of military operations and typically generates the 

following benefits: 

Facilitate Ground Action 

 CAS enhances opportunities for ground commanders to seize the initiative 

through offensive action. CAS can facilitate the offensive by providing the capability to 

deliver a wide range of weapons, massed or distributed as necessary, and by creating 

opportunities to break through enemy lines, protecting the flanks of a penetration, or 

preventing the counter-maneuver of enemy surface forces. Defensive requirements to 

blunt an enemy offensive may also dictate the need for close support. CAS can protect 

the maneuver and retrograde movement of surface forces, protect rear area 

movements, or create avenues of escape. CAS aircraft may also be used to provide 

escort and suppressive supporting firepower for air mobile and airborne forces, and to 

conduct surveillance and security for landing forces or patrol and probing operations. 

Induce Shock, Disruption, and Disorder 

 CAS should be massed to apply concentrated firepower where it is most needed 

by the ground commander. When applied en masse, CAS has immediate physical and 

psychological effects on enemy capabilities. Since available assets are usually limited, 

CAS is applied against targets of immediate concern to surface forces when those 

forces cannot produce the desired effect with organic weapons alone, when surface 

forces are committed without heavy organic weapons support, or when the disposition 

of targets prevents successful attack by surface firepower. When used against enemy 

targets that are beyond TIC range, CAS often provides support that is more effective to 

the ground force due to the decreased risk of fratricide and the reduced interference of 

CAS with organic surface fires. The task of CAS is to provide selective and 

discriminating firepower, when and where needed, in support of surface forces. 
35

AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION 

 For joint air operations providing CAS, integration starts at the operational level 

during the air apportionment process. Whether conducting offensive or defensive 

operations, commanders plan for CAS at key points throughout the width and depth of 

the battlefield where they anticipate close action with the enemy. Using JFC priorities 

and commensurate with other mission requirements, the CFACC postures air assets to 

optimize support to requesting units. The operation order (OPORD), ATO, airspace 

control order (ACO), and special instructions (SPINS) provide the framework for 

integrating joint air operation’s CAS into the commander’s CONOPS. This framework is 

crucial to the effective and safe employment of CAS. In addition, component liaison 

elements (such as the battlefield coordination detachment [BCD], naval and amphibious 

liaison element [NALE], special operations liaison element [SOLE], Marine liaison officer 

[MARLO], etc.) should ensure air-ground integration and synchronization through 

effective communication and coordination. 

 CAS missions are integrated with the organic fire of surface units to achieve 

mutual support, increase the overall destruction of enemy forces, suppress enemy air 

defenses (SEAD), and ensure air support is delivered when and where required. This 

detailed integration is accomplished by parallel air and surface force control systems 

that extend through all levels of command. These systems integrate air maneuver with 

surface firepower to fulfill fire support requirements as they occur and deconflict air 

maneuver units from surface fires. Augmentation of surface firepower by CAS can 

decisively contribute to surface combat success during breakthroughs, counterattacks, 

defense against enemy assaults, and surprise attacks. Moreover, CAS may also be 

called upon to enhance SOF teams operating beyond the range of organic surface fires, 

support SOF teams during emergency situations, or support combat search and rescue 

(CSAR) situations. CAS is particularly important to offset shortages of surface firepower 

during the critical landing stages of airborne, air-mobile, and amphibious operations by 

friendly forces. 

 Whether conducted during major operations and campaigns or lower-intensity 

warfare, the need for terminal attack control, the unpredictability of the tactical situation, 

the risk of fratricide, and the proliferation of lethal ground-based air defenses can make 

CAS especially challenging. When friendly forces are within close proximity, more 

restrictive control measures are required to integrate CAS with surface maneuver while 

avoiding fratricide. The fluidity of the ground situation that exists within this close 

proximity requires real-time direction from a terminal controller to ensure that targets of 

highest priority to the ground commander are struck to produce immediate effects. 

Thus, to ensure that CAS is available, responsive, and used to maximum effect, CAS 

operations should closely integrate with the surface component commander's scheme 

of maneuver. The mobility and firepower of CAS can make an immediate and direct 

contribution to the surface battle when all players work together. 
36

TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROL 

 A need for flexible, real-time targeting guidance and fratricide avoidance are 

critical considerations when conducting CAS. To integrate air-ground operations safely 

and effectively, either a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) or a FAC(A) provides 

terminal control for CAS missions. A JTAC is a qualified (certified) Service member 

who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and 

other air operations (JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CAS). A 

qualified and current JTAC will be recognized across the Department of Defense as 

capable and authorized to perform terminal attack control. A FAC(A) is a specifically 

trained and qualified rated officer who controls aircraft engaged in CAS while airborne. 

A FAC(A) can greatly enhance the effectiveness of CAS by providing an airborne 

perspective to CAS aircraft while facilitating situational awareness, deconfliction, 

efficient target area flow, and accurate weapons release. 

 All air- or ground-based operators, controllers, and observers within the theater 

air control system (TACS)/Army air-ground system (AAGS) must understand the 

capabilities and limitations of their various methods to accurately determine the 

positions of enemy, neutral, and friendly positions. The decision as to what level of 

accuracy, under what form of delivery, and with what weapons needs to be made at the 

tactical level and can be largely predetermined and disseminated in products such as 

SPINS and TTPs. 

 The three types of terminal control discussed below were developed for use in 

CAS but are not exclusive to this application. While most often applied in CAS with 

troops in contact, all three types of control can be applied during other forms of attack 

where proximity of friendlies and/or a need for some form of terminal attack guidance 

exists. An example of this would be the use of small teams of special operators 

scouting for lucrative targets deep in enemy-controlled territory, and providing target 

description, coordinates, and other information as required. 

 

Types of Terminal Control 

 Recent technological advances in aircraft capabilities, weapons systems and 

munitions have provided JTACs additional tools to maximize effects of fires while 

reducing the risk of fratricide when employing airpower in close proximity to friendly 

forces. GPS-equipped aircraft and munitions, laser range finders/designators, and 

digital system capabilities are technologies that can be exploited in the CAS mission 

area. Regardless of general guidance listed here, specific procedures for Type 1-3 

terminal attack control should always be addressed in theater SPINS or rules of 

engagement (ROE). 

 Types 1, 2, and 3 control are the three types of terminal attack control. Each 

type is characterized by a specific set of procedures outlined in JP 3-09.3. The ground 

commander considers the situation and issues guidance to the JTAC based on 

recommendations from his ALO on staff and associated risks identified in the tactical 

risk assessment. The intent is to offer the lowest level supported commander the 
37

latitude to determine which type of terminal attack control best accomplishes the 

mission. Risk level is not directly tied to a given type of terminal attack control. The 

three types of control are not ordnance-specific and the tactical situation will define the 

risk level (e.g., GPS and digital targeting systems used in Type 2 control may be a 

better mitigation of risk than using non-guided free-fall munitions under Type 1 control). 

It is important to understand the most important risk mitigation tool is target verification 

prior to attack. Therefore, when delivering guided weapons, the point designated by the 

aircraft sensor, or the coordinates entered into an inertial guided weapon may be more 

practical factors for risk mitigation as opposed to attack aircraft nose position. Only a 

JTAC or FAC(A) can provide type 1-3 terminal control. The following discussion 

provides an operational description of types 1-3 control of CAS and matches CAS 

procedures established in joint doctrine. 

 

 Type 1. The JTAC must visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target 

for each attack (JP 3-09.3). “Visually acquire” is literally eyes-on or via optics 

such as binoculars, without the use of third party devices such as laptops or 

other digital imagery. Analysis of attacking aircraft geometry is required to 

reduce the risk of the attack affecting friendly forces. Language barriers when 

controlling coalition aircraft, lack of confidence in a particular platform, ability 

to operate in adverse weather, or aircrew capability are all examples where 

visual means of terminal attack control may be the method of choice. 

 Type 2. Type 2 control will be used when the JTAC requires control of 

individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition of the attacking 

aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft 

are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons 

release/launch (JP 3-09.3). Examples of conditions when type 2 control may 

be applicable are night, adverse weather, and high altitude or standoff 

weapons employment. An example of equipment when type 2 control is 

applicable is the use of a Predator or targeting pod sensor aimpoint via 

remotely operated video enhanced receiver. A JTAC who can see a laser 

spot on the target, or a real-time feed from a targeting pod, may be better 

able to deconflict an attack from friendly forces than one relying on visual 

contact with an attacking aircraft at high altitude. Currently fielded technology 

has the capability to improve the flow of information between the JTAC and 

pilot. These tools are an additional means to ensure the destruction of the 

enemy and prevent fratricide, and in many cases are a more reliable means 

of aimpoint verification than observing the attacker’s nose position. 

 Type 3. Type 3 control is used when the JTAC requires the ability to provide 

clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement subject to specific 

attack restrictions. Type 3 control does not require the JTAC to visually 

acquire the aircraft or the target; however, all targeting data must be 

coordinated through the supported commander’s battle staff (JP 3-09.3). 

During type 3 control, JTACs provide attacking aircraft targeting restrictions 

(e.g., time, geographic boundaries, final attack heading, specific target set, 

etc.) and then grant a “blanket” weapons release clearance to meet the 
38

prescribed restrictions. The JTAC will monitor radio transmissions and other 

available digital information to maintain control of the engagement. The JTAC 

maintains abort authority. Observers may be used to provide targeting data 

and the target mark during type 3 Control. Type 3 is a CAS terminal attack 

control procedure and should not be confused with terminal guidance 

operations or AI. Missions attacking targets not in close proximity to 

friendly forces, and beyond the range requiring detailed integration with 

surface fires and maneuver, should be conducted using AI procedures 

vice CAS.

 JTAC/FAC(A)s will provide the type of control as part of the CAS brief. It is not 

unusual to have two types of control in effect at one time for different flights. For 

example, a JTAC/FAC(A) may control helicopters working Type 2 control from an attack 

position outside the JTAC/FAC(A)’s field of view while simultaneously controlling 

medium or low altitude fixed-wing attacks under Type 1 or 3 control. The JTAC/FAC(A) 

maintains the flexibility to change the type of terminal attack control at any time within 

guidelines established by the supported commander. Senior commanders may impose 

restrictions that will prevent subordinate commanders from using certain types of 

terminal attack control. However, the intent is for senior commanders to provide 

guidance that allows the lowest level supported commander to make the decision based 

on the situation. The JTAC/FAC(A) maintains abort authority in all cases.

Armed Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Considerations 

 Clearance of fires and CAS final control for armed UA need to be clearly 

established before combat operations begin. The following guidelines are based on 

combat operations in Southwest Asia that were applied successfully with the Predator 

UA. Armed UA procedures should follow the same procedures as other CAS airframes 

in most cases, but there are situations that require additional consideration. The air 

support request (ASR) process typically begins when a ground commander requests 

CAS from the ASOC through the Air Force air request net (AFARN), also referred to as 

the joint air request net (JARN) (see figure 4.1). The ASR process often works in 

reverse when an ISR-tasked UA (e.g., Predator) locates hostile forces in an area that 

requires detailed integration with or is in close proximity to ground forces. In this case, 

the UA operator usually informs the ground commander (through the ASOC or the direct 

air support center [DASC]) that a recently discovered target may require CAS as 

opposed to the ground commander making the request. There are two basic cases that 

an armed UA could require clearance of fires and final control. These cases all assume 

that targets identified by a UA meet ROE requirements. 

 Case 1. UA on an ASR tasking in communication with a JTAC who is in 

communication with the ground force commander. 

In this case, follow standard CAS procedures. The local ground commander 

clears and gives approval for fires in the target area, and the JTAC provides final 

control. 
39

 Case 2. UA on an ISR tasking that is not in communication with ground 

forces. 

In this case, the UA operator should receive approval to terminate the ISR 

tasking temporarily. CAOC UAS responsibilities should transition from the senior 

intelligence duty officer to the senior offensive duty officer. Overall C2 should transition 

from the CAOC to the ASOC or DASC. The UA operator should contact the ASOC or 

DASC to ensure the appropriate ground commander is contacted through appropriate 

command channels. If the local ground commander has an available JTAC, the ASOC 

or DASC should provide a C2 and datalink frequency for the UA operator to facilitate 

clearance of fires. 

 Terminal attack control and clearance of fires is important to the effective 

employment of armed UA during CAS. There is an increased chance of fratricide, midair collision, and confusion if procedures are not clearly defined. These risks are further 

increased with the increase of armed UA. It must be made clear that the procedures 

listed above are specific to past operations in Southwest Asia. Because every conflict is 

different, these procedures may not apply exactly to another combat situation. The 

bottom line: commanders should ensure the SPINS include clear and precise 

procedures for armed UA. 

Verification 

 Because there is no requirement for the JTAC to visually acquire the target or 

attack aircraft in Type 2 or 3 control, JTACs may be required to coordinate CAS attacks 

using targeting information from an observer or other asset with real time targeting 

information. The JTAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls 

based on the information provided by additional observers or targeting sensors. The 

JTAC must consider the timeliness and accuracy of targeting information when relying 

on any form of remote targeting. 

 One of the fundamental requirements of types 1 and 2 CAS control, especially in 

a TIC situation, is the ability of the JTAC or the FAC(A) to verify the attacking aircraft’s 

aimpoint prior to clearing weapons release. This is typically accomplished either by 

visual observation of the attacking aircraft, a laser spot, direct data link, or other 

verification of the shooter’s sensor aimpoint when employing PGMs. 

While recent technological advances in weaponry and digital/data link systems 

have provided significant enhancements to the CAS mission, it is imperative that 

commanders and operators fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the 

systems brought to the fight. Descriptive dialog between the JTAC and aircraft will often 

provide the best means of mitigating risk and producing the desired effect on target. It 

is essential that all CAS participants use standard procedures and terminology (see JP 

3-09.3 and AFTTP [I] 3-2.6, Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of 

Firepower [JFIRE]). 
40

CAS Execution with Non-JTAC Personnel 

 Units that have a reasonable expectation to conduct terminal attack control need 

to have certified JTACs available. In rare circumstances, the ground commander might 

require CAS when no JTAC is available. This is considered a non-standard procedure 

and should be treated as an emergency. In these instances, qualified JTACs, FAC(A)s, 

and/or CAS aircrew should assist these personnel/units to the greatest extent possible 

in order to bring fires to bear. Due to the complexity of CAS, the ground commander 

must consider the increased risk of fratricide when using personnel who are not 

qualified JTACs and accept full responsibility for the results of the attacks. The 

requester must notify/alert their command element when a JTAC or FAC(A) is 

unavailable. If the ground commander accepts the risk, he forwards the request to the 

CAS controlling agency. This information will alert the CAS controlling agency 

(ASOC/DASC or CAOC) that aircrew will be working with non-JTAC qualified personnel. 

See Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Inter-Service) (AFTTP [I]) 3-2.6, 

JFIRE, for a detailed discussion. 

FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE 

 The Air Force defines fratricide as the employment of weapons by friendly forces 

that results in the unintentional death, injury, or damage to US, allied, or coalition 

personnel, equipment, or facilities. Air operations in close proximity to friendly forces 

require particular emphasis on the avoidance of fratricide. CAS requires detailed 

planning, coordination, and training for effective and safe execution. Though 

occasionally the result of malfunctioning weapons, fratricide has often been the result of 

confusion on and over the battlefield. Causes include misidentification of targets, target 

location errors, target or friendly locations incorrectly transmitted or received, and loss 

of situational awareness by terminal controllers, CAS aircrews, or air support request 

agencies. Items such as detailed mission planning, standardized procedures for 

friendly force tracking and supporting immediate air requests, realistic training/mission 

rehearsal, use of friendly tagging or tracking devices, and effective staff, FAC/air officer 

and ALO coordination, and sound clearance of fires procedures can significantly reduce 

the likelihood of fratricide. 

All participants in the CAS employment process are responsible for the effective 

and safe planning and execution of CAS. Each participant must make every effort 

possible to identify friendly units and enemy forces correctly prior to targeting, clearing 

fires, and weapons release. Combat identification (CID) is the process of attaining an 

accurate characterization of detected objects to the extent that high confidence and 

timely application of military options and weapon resources can occur. Performed in 

accordance with ROE, CID characterizations enable engagement decisions and the 

subsequent use, or prohibition of use, of lethal and nonlethal weaponry to accomplish 

military objectives (see JP 3-09.3 for further discussion). It is critical for all involved in 

the CAS process to realize that their actions can either prevent or contribute to 

unintentional or inadvertent friendly fire incidents. 
41

 Risk assessment is a critical factor in preventing fratricide. As the battlefield 

situation changes, commanders and staffs should make continuous tactical risk 

assessments. Risk assessments involve the processing of available information to 

ascertain a level of acceptable risk to friendly forces or noncombatants. Based on the 

current risk assessment, the supported commander will weigh the benefits and liabilities 

of authorizing specific weapons types or a particular type of terminal attack control. 

Considerations during risk assessment should include, but not be limited to, the 

following: capabilities of units involved, information flow, uncertainty, communications 

reliability, battle tracking, targeting information, weather, and ordnance effects. 

 Proximity of friendly troops is also a key factor during risk assessment. JTACs 

and aircrews must use additional caution when conducting CAS when friendly troops 

are within one kilometer (km) of enemy targets. The JTAC should regard friendly forces 

within one km as a “troops in contact” situation and thus advise the supported 

commander. However, friendly forces outside one km may still be subject to weapons 

effects. Although a TIC situation does not necessarily dictate a specific type of control, 

CAS participants must carefully weigh the types of terminal attack control, aircraft 

delivery parameter restrictions, and the choice of munitions against the risk of fratricide. 

 Risk-estimate distances allow commanders to estimate the danger to friendly 

troops from a CAS attack. The distances are defined by the probability of incapacitation 

(PI) to ground troops. Weapon size and distance of impact to ground troops affect PI. 

Moreover, different surroundings such as target elevation, terrain, buildings, trees, etc., 

can significantly reduce or increase PI. When there is a .1% (1/1000) chance of 

incapacitation, the distance is considered “danger close.” The supported commander 

must accept responsibility for the risk to friendly forces when targets are inside danger 

close range. Risk acceptance is confirmed when the supported commander passes his 

initials to the attacking CAS aircraft through the JTAC, signifying that he accepts the risk 

inherent in danger close deliveries. When ordnance is a factor in the safety of friendly 

troops, the aircraft’s axis of attack should normally be parallel to the friendly force’s axis 

or orientation. This will preclude long and/or short deliveries from being a factor to 

friendly forces. See JP 3-09.3 and AFTTP(I) 3-2.6 for a detailed discussion of riskestimate distance. 

 Fratricide avoidance is crucial to the effective employment of CAS. 

Commanders, components, and units should conduct joint training and rehearsals on a 

regular basis that routinely exercise CAS scenarios to develop the skill sets and 

familiarity required for success. 

TYPES OF CAS REQUESTS 

 There are various methods of requesting CAS, depending on how fluid the 

situation is and how much premission intelligence on the target is available. Unlike 

other forms of air attack, with CAS it is very rare to know the precise target prior to 

takeoff. It is important to note the difference between CAS missions and CAS requests. 

The conditions driving a CAS request may change right up to the time the CAS flight 
42

lead checks in with the joint terminal attack controller due to the fluid nature of the 

battlefield, while such changes may or may not affect the actual execution timing of 

CAS missions. The ground component may have a pre-identified list of CAS targets, 

but the battlefield situation often delays the decision as to which target’s destruction or 

disruption is the highest priority. 

Preplanned Requests for CAS 

 Preplanned requests for CAS mean the aircraft flying the missions are scheduled 

for a particular time or time period, which normally coincides with the anticipated time 

when CAS will be needed most by the ground component. Preplanned requests for 

CAS will result in one of two types of mission: scheduled or on-call. 

 Scheduled CAS (listed as CAS on the ATO) is the preferred method of 

employment because it puts the CAS assets over the area of the battlefield 

where they are needed most, at a specific time on target, and where a need 

for CAS has been established in advance. Scheduled missions will normally 

have a specific contact point, at a specific time, to expect handoff to a groundor air-based FAC. Scheduled CAS missions are the most likely to have good 

intelligence on the expected type of target, resulting in a better munitionstarget match. Although joint doctrine states that a specific target must be 

identified when requesting scheduled CAS, the reality of fluid battlefield 

environments makes identifying a CAS target days in advance very difficult. 

 On-call CAS involves putting the aircraft on ground-based or airborne alert 

(often listed as GCAS or XCAS in the TIC) during a preplanned time period 

when the need for CAS is likely, but not guaranteed. This is a less efficient 

use of CAS resources, as the assets involved may or may not actually employ 

against the enemy unless a backup target is provided or there is a plan to 

move excess CAS sorties to AI within the ground commander’s AO. 

Therefore, commanders or planners should consider tasking XCAS flights 

with a back-up mission in case they do not use their ordnance for CAS. 

 Push CAS is a form of preplanned XCAS that provides massed on-call CAS 

when needed. When a significant number of CAS assets are available and the tactical 

situation dictates, a continuous flow system providing a constant stream of CAS 

missions to the contact points may be employed. Push CAS represents a proactive 

method of distributing CAS that differs from a request-driven or “pull” method. While 

similar in concept to other preplanned CAS missions, push CAS differs because it is 

planned and often flown before the actual request for CAS is made by the supported 

ground component. Push CAS missions are scheduled to arrive at a specified contact 

point at a specified time, normally in a continuous flow, to provide constant CAS assets 

available to support the ground unit(s) identified as the main weight of effort. The term 

push refers to the fact that CAS missions are “pushed” forward to the ASOC, DASC, 

FAC(A), or JTAC before the formal CAS request is made; those assets not needed for 

CAS should be pushed to preplanned backup targets so the sorties are not wasted. 

Push CAS works best in an environment where many CAS targets are available, so the 
43

assets involved will likely have a lucrative target to attack. Although push CAS 

significantly cuts response times, the number of sorties required is often high and the 

advantages gained must be weighed against the other potential uses for these assets 

(such as interdicting known targets). Therefore, planners should regularly assess how 

much push CAS to use based on such factors as available assets, existing targets, and 

the ground scheme of maneuver. 

Immediate Requests for CAS 

 Immediate requests for CAS usually result from unanticipated or unplanned 

needs on the battlefield, often of an emergency nature, that require diverting or 

rescheduling aircraft from other missions. Immediate requests may also result from less 

emergent circumstances, where there simply wasn’t sufficient time to plan the mission 

in time for the ATO cycle. While this demonstrates that not all immediate requests result 

in hasty mission planning, immediate requests tend to result in missions that are likely 

to be less well planned or executed due to their nature and will have an increased risk 

of fratricide. Immediate requests can be filled with ground or airborne alert CAS, if 

available, or by diverting aircraft from preplanned CAS (or even AI) missions that are of 

lower priority. The need for immediate CAS can be reduced by apportioning the proper 

amount of air and space power to support the ground scheme of maneuver, based on 

the overall theater priorities. The number or duration of troops in contact may be 

reduced or avoided altogether with the appropriate level of assets apportioned to AI. 

THE ORIGINS OF “PUSH CAS”

The successful DESERT STORM tactic of 

“push CAS” can trace its origins at least 

back to World War II. By 1944, the USAAF 

and RAF in Italy had perfected a method of 

flowing fighters into the CAS area on a 

regular, prescheduled basis. This system, 

known as “Cabrank” for its similarity to a line 

of taxicabs waiting for passengers, provided 

a constant flow of fighters overhead the 

ground controllers, then known as “Rovers.” 

If not needed for close air support, these 

missions pressed on to a preplanned 

backup target, typically a bridge 

or other interdiction target of known value to the enemy. The Cabrank system 

was possible because of Allied air superiority and large numbers of counterland 

assets, and provided the ground force with very responsive air support. Cabrank 

response time was as little as a few minutes, while traditional CAS missions that 

were only scheduled in response to specific requests by the ground force might 

not arrive for several hours. At left, P-47 Thunderbolts en route to a counterland 

target. 
44

When immediate requests result in CAS requirements that exceed the CAS 

apportionment, the CFACC may be unable to fill lower priority requests due to higher 

priority missions or request additional CAS apportionment from the JFC. The decision 

on whether or not to increase CAS apportionment will be based primarily on the gravity 

of the ground situation and the contribution to theater strategy being made by the 

available CAS-capable assets committed elsewhere. 

 There are several factors to consider before diverting counterland aircraft for 

immediate CAS requests. First, the aircrew must be CAS qualified for all but 

emergency situations. To ensure target destruction and fratricide avoidance, CAS 

requires extensive knowledge and familiarity with specialized CAS procedures. Second, 

the aircrew should have suitable mission materials such as required maps, code words, 

and communications gear. Finally, CAS aircraft should have appropriate ordnance—

fusing and weapons effects are critical factors when attacking targets in close proximity 

to friendly forces, and especially so in urban environments or where avoiding collateral 

damage is at a premium. 

CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE CAS 

 CAS is one of the most complex missions performed by the Air Force. The very 

complexity can limit the overall efficiency of CAS, but it is the only way to get air support 

against enemy targets in close proximity to friendly positions. Effective CAS requires 

proper training, equipment, and an understanding of the strengths and limitations of air 

and space power. In addition to the elements that facilitate effective counterland 

discussed in Chapter 1 (air superiority, joint complementary operations, appropriate 

munitions, and favorable environment), the following factors are crucial to the effective 

conduct of CAS: 

Training and Proficiency 

 CAS training should integrate all maneuver and fire support elements involved in 

executing CAS. Maintaining proficiency allows aircrews, sister Service personnel, and 

JTACs to adapt to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. 

Aircrew and terminal controller skill is vital to the success of CAS. Commanders 

should emphasize joint training that routinely exercises CAS tactics, techniques, and 

procedures to maintain aircrew and controller proficiency. Combat experience has 

shown that when CAS is not practiced and proficiency is not maintained, a long time is 

spent at the opening of the next conflict relearning CAS procedure—to the detriment of 

friendly forces. 

Planning and Integration 

 Effective CAS relies on thorough, coherent planning and detailed integration of 

air support and ground operations. The ability to mass CAS at a decisive point and to 

provide the supporting fires needed to achieve the commander’s objectives is made 

possible through detailed integration with ground forces. The preferred use of a CAS 
45

asset is to have it pre-planned and pre-briefed. Training and rehearsals provide 

participants an opportunity to practice operations/procedures, gain familiarity with the 

terrain, identify airspace restrictions, and discover any shortfalls. Participants should 

include aircrews, ground forces, liason elements, and C2 agencies such as the 

ASOC/DASC. 

 Familiarity with the local battlefield situation is also critical to the success of CAS. 

When extended periods of CAS are expected, combat effectiveness is increased when 

the same units remain tasked to provide CAS over the same portions of the battlefield. 

This allows the pilots and intelligence personnel to become very familiar with the local 

terrain and enemy operations, as well as develop closer ties with the specific ground 

units being supported. This liaison should be strengthened through close contact 

between air and surface units whenever possible, a job that can be greatly facilitated by 

the Army ground liaison officers (GLOs) attached to flying units as well as ALOs and 

battlefield Airmen operating alongside surface forces. 

Integrated C2 Infrastructure 

CAS requires an integrated, flexible C2 structure to identify requirements, 

request support, prioritize competing requirements, task units, move CAS forces to the 

target area, provide threat warning updates, enhance CID procedures, etc. Accordingly, 

C2 requires dependable and interoperable communications among aircrews, air control 

agencies, JTACs, ground forces, requesting commanders, and fire support agencies. 

Any airspace control measures and fire support coordinating measures should allow for 

timely employment of CAS without adversely affecting other fire support assets. 

 Flexible and responsive C2 permits requests for CAS, coordinated with the 

appropriate agencies, to be originated at any level of command within the supported 

surface force or by elements of the TACS, such as ALOs and JTACs. During stability 

operations, additional restrictions may be imposed (such as increased focus on 

collateral damage estimates [CDE] or more restrictive ROE)—therefore, expect a 

possible decrease in flexibility. The interval of time between a unit's request for air 

support and the delivery of the supporting attack is a critical factor in CAS effectiveness. 

Prompt response times allow a commander to exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities 

and to survive in a defensive situation. The CFACC may grant launch and divert 

authority of scheduled CAS assets to the ASOC to facilitate reduced response time. 

Diverted airborne aircraft from lower priority missions may also be used. However, a 

balance is required between the most effective use of resources and their response 

times. Effective C2 also enhances the ability to integrate CAS with surface operations, 

coordinate support, and update or warn of threats to CAS assets. The depth at which 

the ASOC will control operations depends a great deal on the ability to both 

communicate with forces and maintain situation awareness on targets, threats, and 

other factors. The authority to redirect aircraft to or from missions beyond the FSCL 

should remain centralized at the CAOC, while the authority to flow CAS assets to and 

from shallow AI targets short of the FSCL is often delegated to the ASOC or tactical air 

control party (TACP). An ASOC is normally tasked to support an Army unit but can also 

support units from other organizations (e.g., special operations, coalition forces). It may 
46

also augment other missions requiring airspace control (e.g., humanitarian efforts). The 

placement of the ASOC with Army or special operations echelons under conditions of 

non-traditional support requires a particular focus on joint capabilities to control the 

airspace, integrate fire support assets, provide high-fidelity ISR, communicate critical 

weather forecasts and reports, and provide airlift support to ground maneuver forces. 

 Since CAS operates in close proximity to friendly surface units, reliable 

communications are mandatory. JTACs normally provide targeting instructions, final 

attack clearance, and fratricide avoidance instructions to CAS aircraft. FAC(A)s can 

also provide this capability and will normally be in contact with JTACs to determine 

targeting, ground scheme of maneuver, coordination measures, and details on the 

location of friendly forces. Since CAS requires the highest level of integration between 

air and ground maneuver, specific communications procedures and training are 

required for air and ground terminal attack controllers and CAS aircrews. This process 

can be expedited if the ASOC provides an AO update prior to pushing the aircrew to the 

FAC(A)/JTAC. Standard procedures and terminology are published in JP 3-09.3 and 

AFTTP (I) 3-2.6, and may be modified by theater and local standards. 

CAS requires interoperable communications between air and surface forces. 

Mismatched equipment slows coordination of fire support, and lack of secure or 

frequency-agile radios may lead to compromised, garbled, or noncommunicated 

mission data. Such simple errors as having the air and ground components deploy with 

different codes/frequencies for their communications equipment can delay the proper 

execution of CAS. As with the other aspects of CAS, the only way to ensure 

interoperable communications in war is to conduct fully integrated exercises during 

peacetime. 

Target Marking 

 CAS effectiveness is greatly improved with timely and accurate target marks. 

Target marking builds situational awareness, identifies specific targets in an array, 

reduces the possibility of fratricide, and facilitates terminal attack control. When 

commanders or planners foresee a shortfall in ability to mark for CAS, they should 

request that capability during the planning phase. Marking can identify both friendly and 

enemy positions in addition to being overt or covert. 

 Target marking can be accomplished through various means, including smoke 

rockets or rounds, laser designation, and flares. Timely and accurate marking can 

greatly increase the accuracy of CAS attacks and will also reduce the chances of 

fratricide. With the use of low light and infrared systems becoming more widespread, 

the use of marking devices in those spectra can be more effective than visible target 

marking, depending on how the aircrew actually acquires the target and employs 

ordnance on it. When marking targets, JTACs must be aware that there is a potential 

risk of highlighting their position to the enemy. 
47

Streamlined and Flexible Procedures 

 CAS must be responsive to be effective. Responsive CAS allows air and space 

power to exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities. Because the modern battlefield can be 

extremely dynamic, the CAS C2 system must also be flexible enough to rapidly change 

targets, tactics, or weapons. The requestor is usually in the best position to determine 

fire support requirements. Techniques for improving responsiveness include: 

 Effective planning and rehearsal between air and ground units. 

 Using forward operating bases (FOBs) or forward operating locations near the 

area of operations. 

 Placing aircrews in a designated ground or airborne alert status. 

 Delegating launch and divert authority to subordinate units. 

 Positioning JTACs and ALOs to facilitate continuous coordination with ground 

units, communication with aircraft, and observation of enemy locations. 

 Flexible and responsive procedures are critical for effective employment of CAS. 

The tactical employment of CAS is centrally controlled by the ASOC and decentrally 

executed at the tactical level. Launch and divert authority of scheduled CAS assets at 

the ASOC or airborne controlling agency provides reduced response time. Aircraft 

diverted from lower priority missions may also be used, however, a balance is required 

between rapid response and efficient use of limited assets. Effective C2 also enhances 

the ability to integrate CAS with surface operations, coordinate support, and update or 

warn of threats to CAS assets. 

 Requests for CAS, coordinated with the appropriate agencies, may be originated 

at any level of command within the supported surface force. Regardless of the intensity 

of the conflict, the ASOC will operate the AFARN/JARN to receive air support requests 

from the TACPs supporting the ground commanders. The air request net permits the 

TACP at each level of command to review the CAS requests as it goes up to the ASOC 

(see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). This stepping-stone approach allows intermediate 

ground commanders to filter low priority requests (or requesting units) or use other fires 

(e.g., MLRS; artillery, etc.) to attack the target, ensuring that only the highest priority 

CAS requests are reviewed at the ASOC. Because CAS sorties are a high-value, 

limited asset, ground commanders at each level must prioritize where and when to 

employ CAS to maximize its effectiveness on the battlefield. This prevents the ASOC 

from being overwhelmed with unnecessary or low priority requests. The ASOC may 

develop abbreviated message/request formats to speed the flow of information between 

C2 nodes. If conducting detached, distributed, or autonomous operations, SOF may 

have to set up unique procedures with the ASOC or CAOC to facilitate requests for air 

support. 
48

Successful CAS requires precise teamwork between air and ground elements. 

SUMMARY 

 CAS is an extremely demanding mission conducted in close proximity to ground 

forces and requires detailed integration with the fires and maneuver of those forces. 

Using JFC guidance and priorities, the CFACC recommends CAS apportionment. CAS 

supports friendly surface forces in offensive or defensive operations, anywhere, 

anytime, and across the range of military operations. CAS requests can be either 

preplanned or immediate. CAS requires type 1, 2, or 3 control to identify targets, deliver 

accurate ordnance, and prevent fratricide. CAS requires specialized training, 

proficiency, integration, C2, target marking, and flexible procedures to increase its 

responsiveness.
49

CHAPTER FOUR 

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS 

Counterland operations using advanced sensors, weapons, and information 

technology give Airmen an unmatched capability to achieve desired effects against an 

enemy in today’s modern combat environment. Although counterland operations 

continue to become more lethal, these technological advantages may be ineffectual 

unless commanders and their staffs understand the complex C2 mechanisms 

associated with these operations. This chapter discusses the unique command, control, 

and coordinating elements inherent to counterland operations and describes 

battlespace geometry and fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs). 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 

 The CFACC's authority, guidance, and responsibilities are assigned by the JFC 

and include, but are not limited to, recommending apportionment to the JFC as well as 

planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking air and space power based on the JFC's 

apportionment guidance. Since there will rarely be enough counterland-capable assets 

to meet all demands, a single air commander can best ensure the unity of effort 

required for optimal use of those assets; designating a CFACC adheres to the principle 

of unity of command. See AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, for a more complete 

discussion of the CFACC’s responsibilities. 

 The CFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall AI effort. 

When designated as the supported commander, the CFACC will conduct theater-wide 

or JOA-wide AI in direct support of the JFC’s overall theater objectives. The JFC sets 

overall theater priorities, which guide air component objectives and determine the level 

of support that air and ground maneuver will provide each other. Based on the JFC’s 

guidance, the CFACC will normally establish the specific priorities for theater-wide AI 

and will apply these priorities to AI targets located both outside and inside any surface 

AOs. Surface commanders can determine specific AI targets or, more preferably, 

provide requested effects to the air component that allow more leeway in tactical 

mission planning and a more efficient use of the apportioned airpower. This way the 

CFACC can best determine how to support surface commanders who, in turn, will 

receive more effective air support. 

I will tell you that a commander without the proper C2 assets commands 

nothing except a desk. You must have the ability to communicate with the forces 

under your command. You must have the ability to exchange information with 

them freely, frequently, and on a global basis. 

— General Ronald R. Fogleman, CSAF, 1994-1997 
50

 The intent of centrally prioritizing air and space power is to provide the 

effectiveness against all relevant targets, consistent with the theater commander’s 

strategy. When the number of productive targets exceeds air and space power’s ability 

to attack them, centralized prioritization ensures that lower-priority targets are not hit 

first, regardless of whether they were nominated by an air or surface component. It is 

important to remember that all components support the JFC’s overall strategy—there 

should not be great disparities between the various components’ priorities for air and 

space power as long as the overall objective remains in view. 

Throughout the entire process, CAS operations remain under the control of 

the joint air component while supporting the joint land component. The JFC 

apportions CAS and AI based on his overall strategy and CFACC recommendation. 

The supported commander distributes CAS sorties to the various functions, areas, and 

missions to support the JFC’s apportionment decision. The CFACC assigns CAS and 

AI missions to units via the ATO. Ground force commanders request CAS in advance 

of operations as part of their overall concept of operations and may distribute the CAS 

to those ground forces expected to require air support the most. While the ground 

component commander is normally the supported commander for CAS, direct control of 

CAS missions rests with the Air Force’s ASOC, tactical air coordinator (airborne) 

(TAC[A]), FAC(A), and JTACS. 

 The surface commander distributes sorties allocated to CAS where his scheme 

of maneuver most requires them. The air-to-ground portion of the TACS is responsible 

for providing an air component liaison to the various echelons of ground command and 

terminal targeting and control who helps ensure aerial maneuver is integrated with the 

ground scheme of maneuver. The air liaison function should also guide the ground 

commander in the optimum distribution of CAS among his various units, keeping in 

mind that air and space power is most effective when concentrated at the decisive 

points. These decisive points may sometimes be located deep in the battlespace where 

SOF may be operating. 

 To create synergy with special operations, the combination of SOF and airpower 

requires cooperative support relationships. There may be occasions where the joint 

force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) is the supported 

commander for CAS and AI within the joint special operations area (JSOA). Normally 

the joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC) will provide the 

required C2 elements, such as the joint air control element (JACE), to coordinate and 

control allocated conventional air power. At the request of the JFSOCC, the CFACC 

provides elements and C2 nodes to SOF. This may include placing a liaison or C2 

element with the JFSOCC, joint special operations task force, or other SOF elements. 

 There may also be occasions where the JFSOCC is a supporting commander for 

AI sorties. Whether operating under control of the CFACC or the JFSOCC, SOF and air 

maneuver elements must be coordinated. Coordination is crucial because air and SOF 

assets often share common areas and operate in the deep JOA. SOF aviation and land 

assets are integrated closely in all joint air operations, from planning through execution. 
51

To ensure this, the JFSOCC provides the CFACC a SOLE to coordinate, deconflict, and 

integrate SOF operations, strategy, and plans with CFACC forces. 

 Command relationships below the level of the CFACC are exercised using the 

TACS. Decisions, such as the degree of battle management authority delegated to 

subordinate command elements, must balance between the commander’s intent, 

communications connectivity, time constraints, and access to information. As with all 

C2, the CFACC must clearly state what level of decision-making authority is possessed 

by subordinate TACS elements to avoid confusion. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE 

Counterland operations require an integrated, flexible, and responsive C2 

structure to process air and space power requirements, and a dependable, 

interoperable, and secure communications architecture to exercise control. The JFC 

normally exercises operational control (OPCON) through component commanders. The 

CFACC staff located in the CAOC will task and allocate resources for counterland 

operations in support of joint operations using host component organic C2 architecture. 

Reliable, secure communications are required to exchange information among all 

participants. In joint operations, components provide and operate the C2 systems, 

which have similar functions at each level of command. The CFACC tasks air 

capabilities and forces made available for joint tasking through the CAOC and 

appropriate Service component C2 systems to ensure the proper integration of air and 

space power with the ground scheme of maneuver. The following discussion briefly 

describes each Service component’s C2 architecture for conducting counterland 

operations. 

Theater Air Control System (TACS) 

 The TACS is the CFACC’s mechanism for tasking and controlling theater air and 

space power. It consists of airborne and ground elements to conduct tailored C2 of 

counterland operations. The structure of the TACS should reflect sensor coverage, 

component liaison elements, and the communications required to provide adequate 

support. The TACS provides the CFACC the capability to centrally plan and 

control joint air operations through the CAOC while facilitating decentralized 

execution through the subordinate elements of the TACS. 

 As an organic Air Force weapon system, the TACS remains under command of 

the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). The COMAFFOR’s focal point for 

tasking and exercising OPCON over Air Force forces is the CAOC, which is the senior 

element of the TACS. In multinational commands, the name and function of certain 

TACS elements may differ, but multinational air components have similar capabilities. 
52

Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) 

 Closely related to, and interconnected with, the TACS is the AAGS. The AAGS 

provides for interface between Army and tactical air support agencies of other Services 

in the planning, evaluating, processing, and coordinating of air support requirements 

and operations (JP 1-02). Using organic staff members and communications equipment, 

the AAGS works in conjunction with the TACS to coordinate and integrate both Army 

component aviation support and air component support with Army ground maneuver. 

Army airspace C2 (A2C2) elements are at the senior Army echelon and may extend 

down through all tactical command levels to the maneuver battalion. 

 Primary coordination between the TACS and the AAGS starts with the Army’s 

BCD in the CAOC and the air component coordination element (ACCE) liaison at the 

joint force land component commander’s (JFLCC) headquarters. The ASOC is the next 

level of Air Force-Army integration. While the CAOC provides overall theater control of 

air and space power, the ASOC provides primary control of airpower in support of the 

Army. Integration then continues down through the air component liaisons aligned with 

land combat forces and ultimately provides terminal targeting and control. Terminal 

attack control of CAS assets is the final step in the TACS for CAS execution. There are 

both ground and air elements of the TACS to accomplish this mission. When 

integrated, the TACS and AAGS are collectively known as the TACS-AAGS (Figure 

4.1). 

Figure 4.1. Key Air Force and Army components of the TACS-AAGS 

Battalion TACP 

Brigade 

Division 

Corps 

II 

X 

XX 

XXX 

Land 

Component 

AOC 

BCD ACCE 

JFC 

AWACS/CRC 

A2C2 

A2C2 

TACP 

TACS-AAGS Connectivity 

EOC 

(WG, GP, SQN) 

GLO 

JSTARS 

FAC(A) 

Air Force Air Request Net (AFARN/JARN)

TACP 

A2C2 

TACP A2C2 

ASOC 
53

 The Army is transforming its force structure into self-contained modular units that 

facilitate expeditionary operations. Command echelons will transform to a lighter, lean 

force. The Army intends to replace its current structure with an organization built 

around an operational-level command headquarters, a warfighting headquarters, and 

brigade combat teams (BCTs). As the Army transitions to its modular force, Air Force 

C2 elements similar to the ACCE, ASOC, and TACPs will reside at appropriate Army 

echelons. For further details, see Army Field Manual (FM) 3-52 and draft FM 3-91(I) / 

3-92(I). 

Navy Tactical Air Control System (NTACS) 

 The NTACS is the principal air control system afloat. The NTACS is comprised 

of the Navy tactical air control center (TACC), tactical air direction center (TADC), and 

helicopter direction center. The Navy TACC is the primary air control agency within the 

area of operations from which all air operations supporting the amphibious task force 

are controlled. 

Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) 

 The MACCS consists of various air C2 agencies designed to provide the Marine 

air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation combat element commander with the ability to 

monitor, supervise, and influence the application of Marine air. Like the Air Force, 

Marine aviation's philosophy is one of centralized control and decentralized execution. 

The Marine force's focal point for tasking and exercising operational control over Marine 

Corps air forces is the tactical air command center (TACC), which performs similar 

duties for organic Marine aviation that the CAOC performs for joint air component 

operations. The DASC is roughly equivalent to the Air Force’s ASOC, while at lower 

echelons of command the Marine system uses the same TACP label for air support 

liaisons as the TACS-AAGS. 

 During the conduct of an amphibious operation, elements of both Navy and 

Marine systems are used to different degrees from the beginning of the operation until 

the C2 of aircraft and missiles is phased ashore. Under the commander, amphibious 

task force, the Navy TACC, typically onboard the amphibious flagship, will normally be 

established as the agency responsible for controlling all air operations within the 

allocated airspace regardless of mission or origin, to include supporting arms. As the 

amphibious operation proceeds, C2 of aviation operations is phased ashore and 

command responsibilities for landing force air operations shift from the Navy to the 

Marines as MACCS agencies are established on the ground. For further discussion of 

air support to amphibious operations, see JP 3-09.3. 
54

 

Figure 4.2. Navy/Marine Corps CAS Connectivity (source: JP 3-09.3) 

Special Operations 

 Theater special operations are normally under the control of the JFSOCC. If 

designated by the JFSOCC, control of SOF airpower is normally exercised by a 

JSOACC. If a JSOACC has not been designated, then SOF airpower is controlled by 

its Service component within the joint force special operations command. Principal 

organizations and personnel that support coordination of CAS for SOF are the SOLE, 
55

JACE, the special operations C2 element, special tactics teams, and JTAC-qualified 

SOF personnel. 

Theater Air Ground System (TAGS) 

 The digitalization of the modern battlefield has improved the CFACC’s ability to 

command and control air and space power. The speed and non-linear aspects of 

modern warfare, as well as the precision of today’s weapons, dictate close coordination 

on the battlefield among the JFC’s components. The CFACC must ensure all elements 

of the TACS are in place and the various liaison positions throughout the command 

chain filled prior to, or as soon as possible after, the start of an operation or campaign. 

When all elements of the TACS, AAGS, MACCS, and NTACS integrate, the entire 

system is labeled the TAGS. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS 

Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) 

 The AOC is the operations command center of the JFACC and provides the 

capability to lead, monitor, and direct the activities of assigned or attached forces. It is 

the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes personnel and equipment from all the 

necessary disciplines to ensure the effective conduct of air and space operations (e.g., 

communications, operations, intelligence, etc.). The AOC weapon system is known as 

the “Falconer” and will normally be designated the joint air and space operations center 

(JAOC) or CAOC during joint or combined operations. 

 The AOC is the senior operational-level element responsible for planning, 

directing, coordinating, controlling, and assessing air and space operations. Although 

actual theater AOC organizational structures may vary, the five basic functions 

performed by all large AOCs include: 1) strategy development; 2) combat planning; 3) 

combat operations; 4) air mobility; and 5) ISR. Using these functions, the AOC is a 

centralized hub for developing an air scheme of maneuver, generating a joint air 

operations plan (JAOP), allocating resources, tasking forces through an ATO, managing 

airspace through an airspace control order (ACO), and conducting operational 

assessment. Although the Air Force provides the core manpower capability for the 

AOC, other Service component commands contributing air and space forces may 

provide personnel in accordance with the magnitude of their force contribution. The 

AOC can perform a wide range of functions that can be tailored to a specific mission 

and scaled to the associated task force presented to the JFC. 

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) 

 The ASOC is the primary control agency of the TACS for execution of air and 

space power in direct support of land operations—its primary mission is to control air 

operations short of the FSCL. Normally collocated with the senior Army fires element, 

the ASOC coordinates and directs air support for land forces at corps level and below. 

The ASOC is directly subordinate to the AOC, and is responsible for the coordination 
56

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

During the initial stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, an ASOC 

was not deployed and established to handle the air war in Afghanistan. This 

hampered airpower in a number of different ways. Real-time target updates, 

target prioritization for air assets, and aircraft deconfliction in the target area 

were often accomplished solely by on-station FAC(A)s. The lack of an ASOC 

caused counterland assets to waste valuable time and fuel looking for 

correct/any information on the ground order of battle. Moreover, mission 

essentials such as frequencies to contact ground forces, preliminary 9-line 

briefings, or any target information other than a set of friendly coordinates (that 

may have been 8-24 hours old) were lacking. These shortcomings slowed 

airpower’s responsiveness. If C2 air assets had been made readily available to 

control counterland operations, they could have filled the void until a suitable 

TACS was deployed and established, thus improving the efficiency of airpower. 

—Various Sources 

and control of air component missions in its assigned area. Located within the 

supported ground commander’s AO, the ASOC’s designated area typically extends to 

the FSCL for actual control of mission execution, and may extend to the corps’ forward 

boundary for planning and advisory purposes. In the latter capacity, the ASOC 

commander and staff advise the corps commander on CAS employment and target 

nominations for those AI and SEAD missions that support the ground force and that part 

of airborne ISR and airlift that directly supports the ground component. Air missions 

that fly within the ASOC’s control area but do not directly support the ground component 

will normally be coordinated through the ASOC to deconflict with ground force 

maneuver and fires in addition to receiving target and threat updates. 

 The ASOC also provides rapid response to requests for air support and is 

capable of assisting time-sensitive targeting and friendly force location information to 

CAS, AI, SEAD, air mobility, and ISR missions. The AOC will normally delegate launch 

or divert authority for alert CAS missions to the ASOC, providing a faster response time 

when air support is needed. The decision to delegate re-targeting authority to the 

ASOC for specific AI missions inside the FSCL will depend on actual circumstances, 

including the timeliness required for getting desired effects on target. Unless 

specifically delegated, however, targeting authority for all AI missions remains with the 

AOC. 

 The ASOC is normally sourced and formed from an Air Force air support 

operations group (ASOG) and the Commander of the ASOG is normally dual-hatted as 

the director of the ASOC. In this dual role, the director of the ASOC normally exercises 

OPCON and administrative control as delegated from the COMAFFOR over Air Force 

forces assigned or attached to the ASOC. Further, when operating within a joint 

environment, the director of the ASOC normally exercises tactical control (TACON) of 
57

joint forces made available for tasking through an ASOC. The director of the ASOC 

usually acts as the corps ALO and the CFACC’s primary representative to the senior 

tactical ground commanders. Air Force ASOCs do not deploy independently, and rely 

on their associated ground forces for much of their logistics support. They may be 

tailored in size depending on the task and character of the conflict. ASOC members 

must be strongly versed in Air Force doctrine and capabilities across the spectrum to 

include counterland, counterair, SEAD, ISR, information operations, and personnel 

recovery operations. 

 Three principles should be considered when employing an ASOC. First, an 

ASOC should not be divided other than to relocate it. The ASOC derives synergy and 

efficiency from a group of highly trained Airmen working together, in concert. Splitting 

an ASOC team may degrade its ability to effectively complete its mission. Second, the 

ASOC needs to be located in a relatively secure location. The firepower an ASOC can 

bring to the fight dwarfs nearly anything else on the battlefield. If taken out through 

enemy action, friendly ground forces will lose a significant force multiplier. However, 

security must be weighed against radio limitations. In order to control airpower, an 

ASOC needs the ability to communicate with the aircraft. Thus, the third principle is that 

the ASOC should be located where it can maintain line of sight communications with 

aircraft to its maximum operating depth. While high frequency and satellite radio 

enhance the range of the AFARN/JARN, many aircraft communications are restricted by 

several factors. Radio power, antenna size, etc., are factors that impact 

communications ranges. Terrain is another consideration. If located in a valley, the 

ASOC’s communication range will be reduced because of line-of-sight restrictions. 

 An emerging concept is being developed jointly by the Air Force and the ground 

Services to enhance joint collaborative efforts through complete integration, rather than 

just deconfliction, of joint assets. One example might be the establishing of a joint airground control cell (JAGC2). It would include a functioning Air Force ASOC and 

appropriate TACP, highest echelon Army fire and effects cell, airspace control, and 

other Army or special operations C2 elements. The combined actions of these various 

elements would be the mission of the JAGC2. 
58

Joint Air-Ground Control Cell (JAGC2) Concept

As all Services transform and as a result from lessons learned during 

combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-2005), the imperative to build C2 

structures has highlighted both doctrinal and technical air/ground integration 

issues. The concept would enhance the joint collaborative efforts through complete 

integration rather than just deconfliction of joint assets. It might include a 

functioning Air Force ASOC, appropriate Air Force TACP, highest echelon Army 

FSC, A2C2 and other Army or special operations C2 elements. Envisioned as an 

integrating cell, the JAGC2 would focus the efforts of the various functional cells on 

planning, and rapid coordination, deconfliction, and control of all air operations out 

to the FSCL, integrating the functions currently performed by the ASOC, TACP, 

and A2C2. The overlying authority would remain the theater airspace control 

authority (ACA), which is normally delegated to the CFACC by the JFC. 

Additionally, through fully integrated intelligence, targeting and fires, the JAGC2 

would facilitate the rapid employment of all fires while simultaneously expediting 

the attack of emerging high value TSTs within the ground commander’s AO. 

The JAGC2 concept is rapidly being developed as an integrated answer to 

joint issues such as providing C2 for rapidly expanding numbers of unmanned 

aircraft, and will better enable dynamic targeting of ground targets in the vicinity of 

friendly ground operations. 

—Various Sources 

Control and Reporting Center (CRC) 

 The CRC is a deployable, ground based command, control, and communications 

radar element of the TACS. A CRC is subordinate to the CAOC and provides the 

CFACC with real-time operational control of forces. The CRC gives the CAOC a current 

air picture and status of air defense assets through voice communications, direct 

computer interface, or both. It performs centralized C2 of joint operations by conducting 

threat warning, battle management, weapons control, combat identification, and 

strategic communications. It can facilitate decentralized execution of air defense and 

airspace control functions by detecting and identifying hostile airborne objects or by 

scrambling and diverting air defense aircraft. In a limited capacity, the CRC can relay 

CAOC/ASOC information to and from aircraft. The CRC integrates a comprehensive air 

picture via multiple data links from air-, sea-, and land-based sensors and surveillance 

and control radars. 

Expeditionary Operations Center (EOC) 

 Similar to a wing operations center (WOC), the EOC is a deployed wing/group 

commander’s C2 element that includes a command post, command section, and other 

planning and support elements as required. The EOC is subordinate to the CAOC and 

functions as the operations center for all units assigned or attached to an expeditionary 
59

wing/group. The EOC has voice and data communications (direct and secure where 

required) with assigned and attached units, the CAOC, control and reporting centers, 

the ASOC, and aircraft within line of sight. The EOC ensures sorties are generated to 

accomplish CAS and AI missions as directed by the ATO and may recommend 

weapons load changes based on factors including weapons availability and desired 

effects. Once tasked with CAS missions, EOCs have the authority to liaise directly with 

ASOCs and DASCs to ensure aircrews have the most recent information for their 

intended target area. Using the communications link to the CAOC and ASOC, EOCs 

provide a critical link for ground alert scrambles, TST, and dynamic targeting information 

passage. A GLO within the EOC is essential to facilitate an effective interface between 

air and ground units when conducting dynamic counterland operations. 

 

Airborne C2 

 Airborne C2 manages airborne assets operating beyond the normal 

communication coverage of ground TACS elements and can act either as a selfcontained airborne command post or as a relay for ground-based command centers 

such as the ASOC. With properly trained aircrew, airborne C2 performs various CAOC 

and ASOC functions to expedite C2 while extending the range of radio communications 

of C2 nodes. Moreover, airborne C2 platforms ensure continuity of operations in the 

event that elements of the TACS are not yet deployed or have been disabled. Attack 

aircraft checking in for CAS or AI targets within the land component AO often 

communicate with airborne C2 as opposed to talking directly with the ASOC, due to 

radio and line-of-sight limitations. 

 The airborne battlefield C2 center was an airborne extension of the CAOC/ASOC 

and functioned as a key link in the C2 network for counterland operations. Although this 

mission is no longer associated with the EC-130E, elements of the airborne C2 center 

mission have migrated between other systems such as AWACS, JSTARS, and CRCs. 

One limitation of this single-platform approach is that aircraft such as AWACS and 

JSTARS normally have a different primary mission than acting as an extension of the 

ASOC. For example, their orbit location for proper air-to-air or air-to-ground radar 

coverage may move them out of contact range with the ASOC. A dedicated UA or nearspace communications relay for the ASOC may be a better option when feasible. 
60

 

 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. JSTARS is an airborne 

joint surveillance, targeting, and battle management C2 system designed to 

provide near real-time, wide-area surveillance and targeting information on 

moving and stationary ground targets. It is a key link in the C2 network for 

counterland operations. JSTARS is a theater-wide C2 platform that conducts 

ground surveillance to develop an understanding of the enemy situation and 

supports counterland attack operations. However, the JFC determines the 

most effective use of JSTARS based on the situation and the concept of 

operations. JSTARS is also capable of supporting air operations to include 

AI, CAS, offensive counterair, and other special missions spanning the range 

of military operations. JSTARS’ mission priorities are established by the JFC 

based on the overall campaign objectives. The system has both airborne and 

ground-based segments. It is equipped with communications and battle 

COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS AT AL KHAFJI 

During the evening of 29 January 1991, the Iraqi Army set elements of three 

divisions in motion southward out of their static positions in occupied Kuwait. While 

their ultimate objectives are not known, there is no question that all three advances 

were aimed at engaging coalition forces, with the largest ground battle developing in 

the Saudi town of Ra’s al Khafji. As news of the initial contacts with Iraqi ground 

forces flowed into the air control center at Riyadh, additional sorties by E-8 JSTARS 

surveillance aircraft and fighters armed for air interdiction were ordered. 

While JSTARS located, tracked, and provided vectors to the columns of 

advancing Iraqi vehicles, flights of fighters, bombers, attack aircraft, and attack 

helicopters from all of the Services closed in for the kill. Close air support was flown 

in and around Khafji itself in support of engaged coalition ground forces, resulting in 

heavy losses to the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division. Further north, the other two lines 

of Iraqi advance suddenly found themselves very exposed, with their own movement 

serving only to highlight themselves as targets. Coalition air interdiction missions 

took full advantage of this, using a variety of night vision devices and precision guided 

munitions to inflict even greater damage and stop the Iraqi advance. After losing 

hundreds of vehicles and taking thousands of casualties, the Iraqis abandoned the 

attack as a costly failure. Airpower assets like the E-8 JSTARS (below left) were key 

in achieving the results depicted in photograph to the right. 

 
61

management displays, and can host a CAOC element and/or perform some 

ASOC functions. 

 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). AWACS is an airborne 

radar control and battle management element of the TACS. It has the ability 

to provide detection and control of aircraft below and beyond the coverage of 

ground-based radar, or when ground-based radar elements are not available. 

In a limited capacity, AWACS can perform the roles of an alternate control 

and reporting center, alternate CAOC combat operations division, and can 

relay ASOC information to and from aircraft as well as perform limited 

additional ASOC functions. 

 Unmanned aircraft (UA). Besides their proven ISR, target cueing, and 

weapons capability, UA can act as a communications link when equipped with 

appropriate communications gear. This can be very useful in small-scale 

operations or stability operations when low-density, high-demand (LDHD) 

aircraft such as AWACS or JSTARS are unavailable. Without LDHD C2 

platforms in theater and confronted with line-of-sight radio limitations, 

commanders should consider dedicating some UA for C2 support to provide 

the vital link between the ASOC and inbound combat aircraft tasked for CAS. 

LIAISON ELEMENTS

 Effective liaison coordination is crucial to successful counterland operations. 

Liaisons within the CAOC include the NALE, the MARLO, and the SOLE. In addition to 

coordinating targeting processes, these liaison functions are vital for coordinating kill 

box deconfliction. In the rare instance that a non-Air Force CFACC is designated, the 

COMAFFOR should assign an Air Force liaison element to the CAOC. 

Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) 

 The commander, Army forces’ (COMARFOR’s) liaison element to the CFACC is 

the BCD located in the CAOC. The BCD facilitates the direct coordination between 

tactical air and Army units for scheduled CAS planning. The BCD also processes the 

COMARFOR’s AI target nominations and acts throughout planning and execution to 

ensure proper representation of ground component priorities in the overall process. 

Moreover, the BCD should inform the Army force commander of which nominated 

targets that were or were not included on the target list for incorporation into the ATO, 

and the approval status of preplanned CAS requests. This feedback loop is critical, as 

land commanders must know which requested targets did/did not meet the JFC’s 

priority requirements for air attack. During the execution process, the BCD provides 

current land picture information to the CAOC on both friendly and enemy ground forces. 

Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) 

 When required, the CFACC may establish and deploy an ACCE to other 

functional component commanders’ headquarters (especially the land component) 

and/or to the JFC’s headquarters to better integrate air and space operations across the 
62

overall joint force. The ACCE director is the CFACC’s personal liaison and primary 

representative to the other commanders in the operation. The ACCE director derives all 

of his or her authority from the CFACC. The ACCE team facilitates interaction and 

communication between the respective staffs, but should not be used for formal request 

and coordination processes such as those employed by the BCD. 

 The ACCE team reaches back to their respective counterparts in the CAOC to 

provide the other headquarters commander information on the best way to employ air 

and space power. This is a two-way relationship in that the ACCE not only provides 

information and flow to the CFACC but must also help ensure CFACC information is 

flowing to and understood by the JFC, JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC. 

 The ACCE is task organized to best serve the CFACC’s range of operations. 

Generally, the ACCE should include functional areas such as operations, plans, and 

intelligence and, depending on the operation, may also include a logistics, a mobility, 

and/or a space functional area. For major operations and campaigns with a 24-hour 

battle rhythm, the ACCE should have sufficient personnel to work each of the duty 

shifts. For smaller operations, the ACCE may have as few as one person performing 

both the operations and plans functions and one person performing the intelligence 

function. 

 While a relatively new concept, the ACCE has proven valuable in large-scale 

operations, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian operations. For more guidance on the 

ACCE, see AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, and the ACCE Handbook. 

Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) 

 The primary function of the GLO is to provide liaison between land elements and 

air elements providing air support to the JFLCC. GLOs are usually assigned to air 

wings and operate out of an EOC when the wing is deployed forward. The GLO reports 

to the BCD, interprets the land battle for the EOC, assists tactical planning coordination 

between the flying unit and supported ground unit(s), briefs aircrew, and relays mission 

results to the BCD. 

Air Liaison Officer (ALO) 

 An ALO is a rated officer, aligned with a land maneuver unit, who functions as 

the primary advisor to individual land commanders on the capabilities and limitations of 

air power. Acting as a land commander’s expert on air and space operations, ALOs 

must be involved in the supported land commander’s military decision-making process 

so they can perform detailed air support planning with their own staff. ALOs are 

assigned to all land maneuver units at the corps, division, and brigade levels. Battalion 

ALOs (BALOs) are highly experienced enlisted JTACs who normally perform this 

function at the battalion level. 
63

Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) 

 The TACP is the principal Air Force liaison element aligned with Army maneuver 

units from corps through battalion. The primary mission of corps through brigade-level 

TACPs is to advise their respective land commanders on the capabilities and limitations 

of air and space power as well as assist the ground commander in planning, requesting, 

and coordinating CAS. At the battalion level, TACPs are normally organized to request 

and control aircraft. The TACP is the CFACC’s primary representative to the tactical 

land commander and provides terminal attack control. In the TACS chain of command, 

TACPs are under ASOC control. While they operate in the field, colocated with the 

ground units they support, TACP personnel remain under the OPCON of the 

COMAFFOR. 

TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROL 

Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) 

 The JTAC is the TACP terminal air control expert. The JTAC provides 

recommendations on the integration of CAS with the ground commander’s scheme of 

maneuver. JTACs are qualified to perform terminal attack control of individual CAS 

missions. A JTAC should be trained to: 1) know the enemy situation, selected targets, 

and location of friendly units; 2) know the supported unit’s plans, position, and needs; 

3) validate targets of opportunity; 4) advise the commander on proper employment of air 

assets; 5) submit immediate requests for CAS; 6) control CAS with supported 

commander’s approval; and 7) perform battle damage assessment (BDA). Only 

specially trained and certified individuals are authorized to perform this duty. JTACs 

must receive clearance from the land maneuver commander whom they are attached to 

before authorizing aircraft to expend ordnance. 

Joint Fires Observer (JFO) 

 A JFO is a trained and qualified Service member who can request, adjust, and 

control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of types 2 and 3 

CAS terminal attack controls, and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations. 

Trained JFOs, in conjunction with JTACs, assist maneuver commanders with timely 

planning, synchronization, and responsive execution of joint fires and effects. The 

intent of a JFO is to add joint warfighting capability, not circumvent the need for qualified 

JTACs. JFOs expand the target set available to ground commanders by passing 

accurate targeting information to both the JTAC and aircrew. 

Special Tactics Team (STT) 

 Air Force STTs are composed primarily of special operations combat control and 

pararescue personnel. Combat control personnel are JTAC-qualified and support SOF 

ground elements by providing air-ground interface, fire support, target designation, C2 

communications, airfield survey, and terminal control operations. 
64

Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]) 

 The FAC(A) is an airborne extension of the TACP. Only specially trained and 

certified aircrews are authorized to perform this duty, as it requires detailed knowledge 

of friendly and target locations, artillery, available aircraft weapons and fuel states, the 

ability to conduct all three types of terminal attack control, and the flexibility to prioritize 

and adjust in a dynamic environment. FAC(A)s must receive land maneuver 

commander clearance, normally through the TACP, before expending or authorizing 

other aircraft to expend ordnance. The FAC(A) may provide terminal control, relay CAS 

briefings, provide immediate target and threat reconnaissance, and mark targets for 

attacking aircraft. Threats and weather permitting, the FAC(A) can see well beyond the 

visual range of ground-based JTACs. The FAC(A) can perform tactical battle 

management by cycling aircraft through the target area, while prioritizing targets in 

coordination with the JTAC. In this role, the FAC(A) is operating as a TAC(A). The 

FAC(A) may provide positive identification (PID), CDE, and immediate BDA. 

Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC[A]) 

 A TAC(A) is “an officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the actions of other 

aircraft engaged in air support of ground or sea forces” (JP 1-02). Normally performed 

by an officer on a JSTARS or as a FAC(A), the TAC(A) provides a communication relay 

between the TACP and attack aircraft as well as other agencies of the TACS. It also 

expedites CAS aircraft-to-FAC hand-off during heavy CAS operations. Air Force twoship FAC(A) flights, especially in higher threat environments, may divide responsibilities 

so that one aircraft fills the normal FAC(A) role while the second becomes a TAC(A). 

Special Operations Liaison Element 

 The SOLE is a team provided by the JFSOCC to integrate and synchronize 

special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air 

operations. The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel 

in divisions of the CAOC providing a SOF presence that is aware of the activities of 

SOF units in the field and visibility of SOF operations in the air tasking order and the 

airspace control order. The SOLE coordinates appropriate fire support coordinating 

measures, targeting, and airspace to integrate and synchronize fires to avoid duplication 

and fratricide. 

BATTLESPACE GEOMETRY AND COORDINATION 

 Since counterland is normally conducted in conjunction with friendly land forces, 

FSCMs must be established to integrate joint fires and avoid fratricide. During major 

operations and campaigns, FSCMs are established for adjacent lanes of maneuver and 

are linear in nature. Major operations may also involve rapidly advancing ground 

maneuver or widely distributed ground operations; either of these approaches will 

require non-linear FSCMs. Moreover, when conducting stability operations, the linear 

battlespace also tends to dissolve into pockets of dispersed operations and 

noncontiguous AOs. Since counterland is applicable across the entire spectrum of war, 
65

XX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

Contiguous Areas

Of Operations

Noncontiguous Areas

Of Operations

XX

XX

XXX

XX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

XX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

Contiguous Areas

Of Operations

Noncontiguous Areas

Of Operations

Subordinate units receive AOs that 

do not share boundaries. The higher

headquarters retains responsibility 

for the unassigned portion of its AO.

Adjacent, subordinate unit AOs 

share boundaries. In this case, the 

higher headquarters has assigned all 

of its AO to subordinate units

XX

CAS and AI require FSCMs that are flexible, simple, effective, and relevant to conflicts 

characterized by linear and nonlinear operations. Before discussing coordination 

measures, a brief background on battlespace geometry will provide a better 

understanding for the types of FSCMs required in linear and nonlinear operations. 

Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operations 

 Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous. When they are 

contiguous, a boundary separates them. When operational areas are noncontiguous, 

they do not share a boundary; the concept of operations links the elements of the force. 

A noncontiguous operational area normally is characterized by a 360-degree boundary. 

The higher headquarters is responsible for the area between noncontiguous operational 

areas (JP 3-0, Joint Operations). 

Figure 4.3. Contiguous vs. Noncontiguous Operations (Depicted as a Corps AO) 

Linear and Nonlinear Operations 

In linear operations, commanders direct and sustain combat power toward 

enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of 

operations along lines of operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOT). 

In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in 

relation to other friendly forces. This positioning usually results in contiguous operations 

where surface forces share boundaries. Linear operations are normally conducted 
66

Rear

Area

Rear

Area

Rear

Area

XX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

Contiguous Areas

of Operations

Noncontiguous Areas

of Operations

XXX

XXX

Linear Operations Linear Operations

Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XX XX

FLOT

FEBA FEBA

FLOT

XX XX

Rear

Area

Rear

Area

Rear

Area

Rear

Area

Rear

Area

Rear

Area

XX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

XX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

XX

XXX

XX

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Contiguous Areas

of Operations

Noncontiguous Areas

of Operations

XXX

XXX

Linear Operations Linear Operations

Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XX XX

FLOT

FEBA FEBA

FLOT

XX XX

against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces 

friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow 

commanders to concentrate and integrate combat power more easily. World War I, 

World War II, and Korea offer multiple examples of linear operations while more recent 

examples include the four-day ground maneuver during Operation DESERT STORM 

and the drive to Baghdad during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Figure 4.4. Linear vs. Nonlinear Operations (Depicted as a Corps AO) 

In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference 

to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points and 

are characterized by noncontiguous operations. Nonlinear operations emphasize 

simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations from selected bases. 

Nonlinear operations place a premium on intelligence, aerial mobility, and sustainment. 
67

Often integrated with ground maneuver, swift aerial attack delivering concentrated, 

precise fire against several decisive points can induce paralysis and shock among 

enemy troops and commanders. Operations JUST CAUSE and ENDURING 

FREEDOM are examples of nonlinear operations. The joint forces orient more on their 

assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling 

critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other 

friendly forces. To protect themselves and achieve objectives, ground forces rely 

heavily on air and space power to provide battlespace awareness, mobility advantages, 

and freedom of action. 

 Depending on the situation, the JFC may conduct linear or nonlinear offensive 

and defensive operations in contiguous and noncontiguous areas. Linear contiguous 

warfare typically characterizes major operations and campaigns while stability 

operations are usually nonlinear and noncontiguous. 

LINEAR COORDINATION MEASURES 

 Various boundaries and coordination measures are used for airspace control and 

fire support coordination when planning and executing counterland operations. The 

measures help to integrate air and ground maneuver, ensure deconfliction, avoid 

fratricide, and identify which parts of the battlespace require specialized control 

procedures. The JFC may define lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs 

for the various surface components. The following discussion centers on linear 

boundaries and coordination measures that play a significant role in counterland 

operations. 

Forward Boundary (FB) 

 The forward boundary defines a component’s outer AO and is the farthest limit of 

an organization's responsibility. The organization is responsible for deep operations to 

that limit. Within the JOA, the next higher headquarters is responsible for coordinating 

deep operations beyond the FB. In offensive operations, the forward boundary may 

move from phase line to phase line, depending on the battlefield situation. 

Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) 

 The FLOT is a line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces 

during linear operations at a specific time. The forward line of own troops normally 

identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The zone between the 

FLOT and the FSCL is typically the area over which friendly ground forces intend to 

maneuver in the near future and may also be the area within which ground force organic 

fires are employed. This zone is the area where air operations are normally executed 

through the ASOC. 

Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) 

 FSCMs are necessary to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and 

simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. FSCMs are divided into two 

categories: permissive and restrictive. Permissive FSCMs facilitate attacks and include 
68

coordinated fire lines (CFL), free fire areas (FFA), and FSCL. Restrictive measures 

safeguard friendly forces and include no-fire areas (NFA), restrictive fire areas (RFA), 

restrictive fire lines (RFL), and airspace coordination areas. When supporting the land 

component commander, airpower must operate within the confines of all JFLCC 

FSCMs. In order to reduce the risk of fratricide and still take advantage of airpower’s 

inherent flexibility and versatility, FSCMs must be clearly defined, easily controlled, and 

not overly restrictive. For detailed information on FSCMs, see JP 3-09.3. 

 Historically, linear operations have used linear FSCMs such as the FSCL. 

However, as operations move towards being non-linear, dispersed component AOs 

necessitate the need for nonlinear FSCMs such as kill boxes. Advancements in data 

link technology and digital information have increased the potential for combat forces to 

effectively coordinate and conduct nonlinear operations. Non-linear operations require 

Airmen to continually evaluate the capabilities of the controlling ASOC to ensure 

adequate resources (manning, radios, frequencies, computer support, etc.) are 

available to meet the C2 needs of aircraft operating in ever-increasing dispersed JFLCC 

AOs in the JOA. During kill box operations, the CAOC maintains C2 of aircraft outside 

the JFLCC’s AO while the ASOC typically maintains responsibility for aircraft inside the 

JFLCC’s AO. The following section describes the most significant and controversial 

FSCM that pertains to counterland operations—the FSCL. 

Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) 

 The FSCL is a permissive FSCM established and adjusted by appropriate land or 

amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, 

subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious 

attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. The FSCL 

does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep 

operations or a zone for CAS. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based 

weapons systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond a 

FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary 

reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL 

must ensure the attack will not produce adverse attacks on, or to the rear of, the line. 

Short of an FSCL, the appropriate land or amphibious force commander controls all airto-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations. The FSCL should follow welldefined terrain features or use a common reference system. Coordination of attacks 

beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special 

operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this 

coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure 

to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. The 

purpose, establishing authority, employment, and placement of the FSCL must be 

understood to effectively execute counterland operations within a surface AO. 

 The purpose of the FSCL is to ensure the coordination of fire not under the 

surface commander’s control but which may affect his current tactical situation. The 

land component commander typically sets the FSCL after coordinating with all affected 

component commanders. All attacks short of the FSCL must be coordinated with the 

establishing component, primarily to ensure proper integration and prevent fratricide. 
69

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES 

 OIF employed traditional FSCMs. Because of the Army’s extensive process 

required for changing linear FSCMs, moving the FSCL proved to be a time 

consuming process. Therefore, the initial FSCL was placed well beyond the range of 

land fires in order to accommodate the anticipated rapid movement of land forces 

into Iraq. 

 The deep placement of the FSCL hampered the efficiency of airpower. 

Ground forces, and their associated TACPs, were incapable of detailed integration 

beyond the range of their organic fires because no one was able to observe 

adversary targets. Aircrews were still required to comply with coordination 

procedures short of the FSCL. The time-consuming clearance process hindered the 

expeditious attack of fleeting targets beyond the range of the organic artillery. As a 

result, the area between the maximum range of land fires and the established FSCL 

created a sanctuary for enemy forces. 

 

 The FSCL should be near the maximum operating range of organic tube 

artillery since beyond that point air and space power provides the preponderance of 

effects. 

Because of this, the FSCL is often used as the forward limit of the airspace controlled 

by the ASOC. This mandates the various ASOCs and other TACS components have 

the required connectivity to monitor not only air activity out to the FSCL but also be able 

to monitor friendly and enemy ground positions, surface-to-air threats, and all other key 

aspects of situational awareness. Likewise, when the ground component attacks 

targets beyond the FSCL (such as long-range ATACMS shots against high-value 

targets) it is required to coordinate with the air component to ensure deconfliction and 

prevent multiple assets attacking the same target. 

The optimum placement of the FSCL varies with specific battlefield 

circumstances, but typically it should be placed where the preponderance of effects on 

the battlefield shifts from the ground component to the air component. In this way, the 

FSCL placement maximizes the overall effectiveness of the joint force, and each 

component will suffer only a small reduction in efficiency. To place the FSCL so deep 

or shallow that one component is given complete freedom to operate usually results in 

the other components being so restricted that overall joint effectiveness suffers. The 

proper location for the FSCL may also shift from one phase of the war to the next, 

depending on the scale and scope of each component’s contribution during that phase. 

FSCL placement must also take into account the ground scheme of maneuver and 

should be based on anticipated, not current, ground force positions at the time the 

FSCL will be active. History has shown that placing the FSCL too deep is detrimental to 

overall joint force effectiveness and may even provide the enemy a sanctuary from 

effective air attack. 
70

Joint Operations Area 

 Forward 

Boundary 

FSCL 

FLOT 

CAS Targets 

AI Targets 

= Troops in Contact 

= Surface AO 

= JOA 

The preponderance of kinetic effects shifts from landpower to airpower 

near the maximum range of organic field artillery. Therefore, under all but the 

most rapid ground maneuvers, the FSCL is normally placed near the maximum 

range of tube artillery because air and space power provides the most 

expeditious attack of surface targets beyond that point. To facilitate a rapidly 

moving battlefield, a common practice is to establish “on-call FSCLs” in advance that 

can be activated as the ground force moves. In the past, establishing the FSCL along 

an easily identifiable terrain feature has been critical to success. Modern digitization, 

along with advanced navigation equipment such as GPS, has reduced the importance 

of this factor. When possible, however, using obvious terrain features for FSCLs can 

still prevent errors from happening in the heat and confusion of battle. 

Figure 4.5. Notional JOA with Surface AO and FLOT/CL/FB Relationship 
71

 Although normally thought of as a JFLCC responsibility, FSCL placement should 

be part of the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) process. This ensures all 

components are able to integrate and maximize effects in support of JFC objectives.

Joint doctrine does not define a depth or range for placing the FSCL in relation to the 

FLOT or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). This permits the theater commander 

to tailor FSCL placement according to specific battle conditions that optimize joint 

operations. Theater commanders may employ the FSCL to achieve different desired 

effects. 

The FSCL is primarily used to establish C2 procedures for planning and 

execution purposes—it does not define mission types. Missions flown beyond the 

FSCL will typically not use the ASOC, as they are beyond the distance where detailed 

integration is required. However, CAS missions can be flown in the portions of the 

battlespace beyond the FSCL when friendly troops are operating there and require 

support. Ground forces such as SOF teams that often operate deep should include the 

appropriate TACS element for CAS control and have a liaison element at the CAOC. 

Short of the FSCL, all missions will typically require check-in with the ASOC while en 

route to the target for an update on potential targets, surface-to-air threats, and friendly 

troop locations. CAS missions will normally be handed off to a JTAC or FAC(A) for 

terminal attack control. Even those short-of-the-FSCL missions that usually do not 

directly support the ground component, such as counterair or strategic attack, will 

normally contact the ASOC/airborne C2 for situation updates and deconfliction while in 

the ASOC’s airspace. 

 When the land component attacks targets beyond the FSCL, it is required to 

coordinate with the CAOC to ensure deconfliction and to prevent multiple assets from 

attacking the same target. Land forces that often operate deep such as special 

operations teams should include the appropriate TACS element for terminal attack 

control and have contact with the SOLE at the CAOC. 

 

Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL) 

 The Marine Corps has used an additional FSCM for a Marine-controlled AO, 

called a battlefield coordination line, roughly equivalent to the FSCL for an Armycontrolled AO. The BCL is a supplementary FSCM that facilitates the expeditious attack 

of surface targets of opportunity. Unlike the FSCL, the BCL is used to help delineate 

CAS and AI procedures, and is highly effective when used in conjunction with kill boxes. 

Because the BCL is set at the maximum range of organic tube artillery, any sorties 

flown short of the BCL are typically designated as CAS. This allows counterland 

airpower to attack surface targets beyond the BCL using minimal coordination 

procedures with ground forces. 
72

The Marines put in place a supplementary battlefield coordination line to 

speed “expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity” between the BCL and 

the more distant FSCL as Marine doctrine defined it. A typical BCL extended 18.6 

[kilometers] out from the FLOT—roughly the range of [155] mm artillery. Air strikes 

short of this line were typically Type I, II, or III CAS calling for varying degrees of 

control. Beyond the battlefield coordination line, the “kill boxes” could be opened 

more easily, and the DASC was able to put its brisk procedures into play.... All 

levels monitored the air requests and intervened only to stop them. The DASC was 

co-located with [the fire support coordination center], who updated the ground 

picture as the DASC personnel worked the air picture.... The Marines used 

procedural control with aircraft checking in at control points to give route headings 

which the DASC controller cross-referenced.... Aircrews quickly caught on to the 

fact that the DASC could give them targets fast.... Soon the flow of coalition strike 

sorties, planned and unplanned, far exceeded anything the Marine air planners 

thought the CAOC would give them. 

—Dr. Rebecca Grant, 

 “Marine Air in the Mainstream,” Air Force Magazine, June 2004. 

NONLINEAR COORDINATION MEASURES 

 In conflicts characterized by nonlinear operations, ground forces occupy pockets 

that may have large distances of open terrain between them (often occupied by the 

enemy). Under such circumstances, the classic linear concepts such as the FSCL may 

need adjustment. One option is to create an alternate FSCM based on a common 

reference system (such as a standardized box, circle, or other easily employed shape) 

to accomplish the same task that the FSCL performs for the linear battlespace. 

Although it is highly effective in nonlinear war, the common reference system is also 

very useful in linear operations. The following discussion centers on using a common 

reference system and kill boxes. 

Area Reference System (ARS) 

 An ARS is primarily an operational-level administrative measure used to 

coordinate geographical areas rapidly for battlespace deconfliction and synchronization. 

An ARS should simplify communications and procedures between the components. 

 Commanders may use any ARS they deem appropriate, but if an ARS is 

developed without a lead organization or unified effort, separate grid systems may be 

developed or used that are not only incompatible but may negatively impact counterland 

operations. Global Area Reference System (GARS) is the ARS developed and 

approved by the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, military 

Services, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the Secretary of Defense as 

of December 2005. It is now the standardized battlespace area reference system which 
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impacts not only Service doctrine, joint doctrine, and multi-Service tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (MTTP), but also the entire spectrum of battlespace deconfliction. 

 The GARS uses a grid system with a simple, universal identifier recognizable by 

each component and their associated C2 and attack assets. Three numbers followed 

by two letters describe a unique 30-minute by 30-minute area. A graphical depiction of 

the proposed reference system is in Figure 4.6. The point of origin for the system is 90 

degrees south and 180 degrees east/west. The areas described by GARS are 

coincident with even numbered WGS-84 degree and minute lines. Latitude and 

longitude coordinate references easily define cells since they are common and exist on 

most military operational graphs and charts. They should also allow for easy 

interpretation using digital displays common in the tactical weapon systems of all 

components. GARS is highly useful in facilitating rapid attacks on TSTs and for 

expediting deconfliction of friendly force locations although it is not designed to support 

precise targeting. Rather than transmitting a series of latitudes and longitudes, an area 

can be defined by a brief yet succinct number/letter character string. 

Figure 4.6. GARS Layout and Naming Convention 

 GARS is also useful because it enables establishment of appropriate control and 

coordination measures that can be mutually coordinated, deconflicted, and 

synchronized via a simple, common, mutually understood, and agreed upon reference 

system. A detailed discussion of GARS is located in JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence 

Support to Joint Operations. Additional discussion of reference system attributes in 
74

general can be found in JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, Appendix D, “Common 

Reference Systems: Area and Point”. 

Kill Box Operations 

 A kill box is a three-dimensional area reference that enables timely, effective 

coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks (JP 1-02). It combines traditional 

aspects of both an airspace control measure (ACM) and FSCM, used to facilitate the 

expeditious air-to-surface attack of targets, which could also be augmented by or 

integrated with surface-to-surface indirect fires. When established, the primary purpose 

is to allow air assets to conduct interdiction against surface targets without further 

coordination with the establishing commander and without terminal attack control. A kill 

box will not be established specifically for CAS missions. When used to integrate air-tosurface and surface-to-surface fires, the kill box will have appropriate restrictions. 

Restrictive FSCMs and ACMs will always have priority when established in a kill box. 

For an in-depth discussion, see AFTTP (I) 3-2.59, Kill Box. 

 A kill box is established and adjusted by the appropriate supported commander 

and is an extension of an existing support relationship established by the JFC. Kill box 

boundaries normally are defined using an area reference system (e.g., GARS), but 

could follow other boundaries such as well-defined terrain features or may be located by 

grid or by a radius from a center point. Changes to a kill box require notification of all 

affected forces within the JOA and must allow sufficient time for these forces and/or 

components to incorporate the kill box change. When building a kill box construct, the 

entire JOA can be mapped using an ARS (such as grids and keypads used in the 

GARS) before the start of an operation or campaign. 

 Tactical fire support control procedures within a theater of operations may use 

colors and specific terminology to describe the status of kill boxes within a JOA. 

 Blue Kill Box. A blue kill box permits air-to-surface fires effects in the kill box 

without further coordination with the establishing headquarters. 

 Purple Kill Box. A purple kill box permits the integration of surface-tosurface fires with air-to-surface fires into the purple kill box without further 

coordination. 

 Established. A kill box that is in effect, either via the joint targeting cycle or 

execution period. Information about the time it becomes effective, the 

duration, or other attributes will be published and disseminated in the ACO. 

 Open. Term used to describe a portion or portions of a kill box that are open 

to fires without further coordination or deconfliction. An established kill box is 

inherently open, until closed or cancelled. (AFTTP [I] 3-2.59) 

 Active. An established kill box that has aircraft flying in the space defined by 

the box or effects of air or other joint fires within the boundaries of the kill box. 
75

 Cold. An established kill box that is not active. All portions of the kill box are 

open to fires unless identified as closed. 

 Closed. Term used to describe a portion or portions of an established kill box 

in which fires or effects of fires are not allowed without further coordination. 

 Cancelled. The kill box is no longer in effect. 

 Although use of kill boxes is not mandatory, the kill box system reduces the 

coordination required to fulfill support requirements with maximum flexibility. Kill boxes 

support the commander’s objectives and concept of operations, including designated 

target priority, effects, and timing of fires. C2 updates on kill boxes will be accomplished 

(e.g., altitude restrictions, frequency use, established control measures within the kill 

box) via appropriate C2 systems. With appropriate restrictions, surface-to-surface fires 

may occur simultaneously with air-to-surface strikes. Kill boxes can augment use of 

traditional FSCMs, such as FSCL, CFL, and BCL. They can help the commander focus 

the effort of air assets. When traditional FSCMs are not useful or are less applicable, 

the kill box can be the primary method for identifying areas to focus air assets in. Five 

factors should be considered when building a kill box system. 

 A kill box is an ACM/FSCM, and is not a reference system. Kill box 

boundaries are normally defined using an area reference system, which 

provides the construct (a two-dimensional system), and a kill box is the 

application. The addition of altitude restrictions makes a kill box a threedimensional paradigm. 

 Applicable ROE, collateral damage guidance and restrictions, PID, and the 

SPINS must still be followed in a kill box. 

 The decision to use a kill box requires careful consideration by the controlling 

authority. If used, its size, location, and timing is based on estimates of the 

situation and concept of operations. The commander must consider 

disposition of enemy forces, friendly forces, anticipated rates of movement, 

concept and tempo of the operation, surface-to-surface weapon capabilities, 

and other factors. 

 A kill box is an ACM/FSCM that may contain other measures within its 

boundaries (e.g., NFA, restricted operating zones [ROZ], and airspace 

coordination areas). 

 Integration of air-to-surface and surface-to-surface fires requires application 

of appropriate restrictions: altitude, time separation, or lateral separation. 

The supported commander will determine which of these is appropriate for 

the mission and ensure dissemination through the appropriate C2 nodes. 
76

Figure 4.7. Notional Kill Box Construct 

The CAOC is the CFACC’s C2 element responsible for coordinating fires in 

CFACC-controlled kill boxes. Other components must coordinate with the CAOC prior 

to entering or engaging targets in a CFACC kill box. This is normally done through the 

various liaison elements attached to the CAOC, i.e., the BCD, the NALE, the MARLO, 

and the SOLE. Through the ATO, the CAOC tasks airpower to enter and engage 

targets in kill boxes without further coordination with other components 

The ASOC is the CFACC’s agency for coordinating the use of airpower in JFLCC 

kill boxes. Through the TACS-AAGS, the ASOC funnels airpower to JFLCC kill boxes. 

The ASOC has authority to divert airpower between JFLCC kill boxes, but the CAOC 

retains the authority to divert air assets from CFACC to JFLCC kill boxes or vice versa. 

Traditional FSCM concepts still have a place in kill box operations. In place of 

“on-call FSCLs,” C2 measures must be established to quickly transfer kill boxes from 

CFACC to JFLCC control to accommodate cases of rapid friendly land force movement. 

In these cases, the ACCE liaison to the JFLCC, the BCD liaison to the CAOC, the 

CAOC’s communications with the ASOC, and the senior ALO interface with the senior 

tactical land commander are critical. FLOTs still exist in kill box operations. However, 

as operations become more non-linear, FLOT definition becomes more difficult. 
77

Between the time an aircrew steps to an aircraft and when the aircrew arrives in the kill 

box, the FLOT may change dramatically. During non-linear operations (with or without 

kill boxes), ASOC resource requirements increase. However, procedures for 

transferring kill boxes from CFACC to JFLCC control and the ACCE’s liaison to the 

JFLCC on AI target nominations take on added importance. 

 The JFSOCC may task STT to support the CFACC in CFACC kill boxes. These 

taskings may include finding and fixing targets as well as providing laser designation 

support (autonomous terminal guidance operations). Although these scenarios do not 

constitute CAS, they do require some coordination. This necessitates that air assets 

coordinate with the JFSOCC’s C2 structure before entering or attacking targets in the 

keypads. 

Combined Kill Box and Traditional FSCM Operations 

 A combination of kill box and traditional FSCMs is possible, such as when a 

single large advance is made from a classic linear battlefield (such as operations during 

OIF). Here the standard FSCL could be used for the slower moving ground forces, and 

a localized JFLCC kill box system could be created in front of, or behind, a rapid 

advance. This allows for more efficient air attack on non-engaged enemy land forces, 

the greatest freedom of land and aerial maneuver, and enhanced combat 

effectiveness—especially during non-linear operations. 

 C2 of air and space power in these situations is conducted through the TACS as 

previously discussed. The ASOC is responsible for all air operations short of the FSCL 

as well in JFLCC kill boxes. The CAOC maintains responsibility for airpower operations 

beyond the FSCL and in CFACC kill boxes. 

SUMMARY 

 Understanding the TACS is crucial to effective counterland operations. Air 

operations are centrally controlled through the CAOC and decentrally executed by the 

lower echelon elements of the TACS. FSCMs must be flexible and efficient for the 

successful employment of counterland operations. The FSCL is an important FSCM in 

linear combat operations while the kill box system is suited for either linear/non-linear or 

contiguous/non-contiguous conflicts. 

 Theater commanders are beginning to employ kill boxes in lieu of or in 

combination with FSCLs to facilitate expeditious coordination of effects. Digitization of 

the battlespace aids this effort as it dramatically increases situational awareness and 

will significantly improve the commanders’ ability to rapidly attack threats through proper 

kill box management. Kill boxes also provide one way to do counterland targeting in 

near-real time against mobile ground forces that defy long range preplanning. The use 

of kill boxes improves coordination and control measures throughout the JOA and 

provides a tool to help manage nonlinear and integrated joint operations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 

CONDUCTING COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS 

 Air and space power has attributes that allow it to be employed in diverse and 

multiple combat tasks across the joint operations area. However, there is rarely enough 

air and space power available to satisfy all demands. Effective counterland operations 

call for centralized control and decentralized execution. The CFACC optimizes the use 

of normally scarce air and space assets through centralized control. Centralized control 

also minimizes undue dissipation and fragmentation of effort and ensures coherence 

and focus on essential JFC objectives. Because no single commander can personally 

direct all the detailed actions of a typical complement of assigned and available air and 

space forces, decentralized execution of air missions is necessary and is accomplished 

by delegating appropriate authority for detailed mission planning and execution. 

Decentralized execution ensures effective employment of limited assets, allows tactical 

adaptation, and accommodates the Services' different employment concepts and 

procedures. 

 The intent of this chapter is to give commanders and planners a broad 

perspective on planning and employment considerations for counterland operations. 

Detailed discussion of the air and space estimate process and the air tasking cycle is 

contained in AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, and AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting, 

respectively. This chapter will begin with broad planning considerations for course of 

action development and then discuss elements pertinent to each phase of the air 

tasking cycle. 

BASIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

Supporting Counterland Operations 

 Both AI and CAS operations require the full spectrum of support, from logistics to 

force protection to administrative services. Logistics and other combat support are key 

enablers to counterland operations. Key factors affecting logistics supportability include 

force beddown and base support planning, deployment and sustainment of munitions 

and fuel, and maintenance support for critical spares. A robust air mobility capability, 

especially for intratheater movement, is critical for getting this logistical support to the 

bases that require it. As an expeditionary force, these key support issues assume even 

greater importance. This section highlights some of the support aspects that are 

particularly important to the counterland function. 

We are not preparing the battlefield, we are destroying it. 

—Sign posted in the “Black Hole” planning cell during DESERT STORM 
79

 Munitions Requirements. As the arsenal of precision-guided munitions that 

can be employed in counterland continues to grow, maintaining proper stocks 

at operating locations becomes increasingly important. There will usually be 

tradeoffs involved in deciding which weapons to employ against specific 

targets, and availability will often be a factor. Proper knowledge of the 

munitions available at each air base, carrier battle group, etc., along with their 

weapons resupply capability, is mandatory. Those munitions with the 

greatest potential for accuracy, destructiveness, or standoff range are often in 

the shortest supply. Targeteers and weaponeers should keep in mind factors 

such as anticipated length of the campaign, munitions needs of the various 

campaign phases, and tradeoffs of each weapons type when making 

munitions recommendations. 

 Air Refueling. Air Force air refueling aircraft have evolved from their 

traditional role of supporting long range strategic attack to become an 

essential, integrated part of counterland force packaging. Tanker aircraft are 

a force multiplier that enhances, or in some cases enables, counterland 

operations by allowing access to a wider range of targets and payloads. 

Station times will be increased for airborne alert AI and CAS missions, 

AIR REFUELING—A CRITICAL ENABLER 

Air refueling is a key part of most air component operations and extends the 

range, payload, and endurance of counterland assets, thereby increasing their 

effectiveness. In some cases, counterland missions would not be possible at all 

without air refueling capability. As this DESERT STORM photo of an Air Force KC135 refueling Marine F/A-18s demonstrates, air refueling is a key factor in all air 

component operations, whether US Air Force, other Service, or allied nation forces 

are involved. Air refueling is a key enabler to initial force deployment as well, since 

most counterland aircraft lack the range to deploy directly to or from the combat 

theater on their own. 
80

providing decreased response times and increasing the counterland effect on 

the enemy. One of the key tasks for ATO production teams is to optimize use 

of the available tankers; availability of refueling booms and drogues is often 

the limiting factor that determines how many counterland targets can be 

attacked in a given cycle. 

While technically a “support” asset, air refueling has become such an integrated 

part of counterland force packaging that it would be difficult to imagine operating without 

the enhanced capabilities it provides. For example, enemy antiship defenses may force 

an aircraft carrier to stand off from the counterland area, requiring Air Force refueling 

support to get carrier aviation to the fight. When air superiority is in dispute, and enemy 

aircraft and missiles threaten air bases close to the ground fighting, air refueling may be 

the only way to get counterland missions to the fight from protected bases further to the 

rear. 

Target Development 

 

 During target development, the planned targeting process should relate specific 

targets to objectives, desired effects, and accompanying actions. Target development 

requires thorough examination of the adversary as a system to understand where 

critical linkages and vulnerabilities lie. Target development involves four distinct 

functions: 1) target analysis, 2) target validation, 3) target nomination, and 4) collection 

and exploitation requirements. The product of this phase is the joint integrated 

prioritized target list (JIPTL). AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting, provides information on air 

planning and the targeting process. 

 Once potential targets are identified, intelligence provides precise location of 

individual target elements, status of defenses, and other information necessary for the 

detailed planning of counterland missions. Warfare is dynamic and demands that 

friendly forces adapt their methods to cope with enemy responses. The ability to detect, 

assess, and properly choose targets is a function of several attributes discussed in the 

following paragraphs. 

 The suitability of a target set for attack is often decided by a combination of its 

criticality and vulnerability. For example, fewer conveyances and depots in an enemy 

transportation system increase the enemy's dependence on that system, therefore, 

each potential target in that transportation system becomes more critical. Conversely, 

an enemy possessing a varied, dispersed transportation system is less operationally 

vulnerable to infrastructure interdiction. Tactical vulnerability refers to the ease of 

attacking a particular target, based on hardening, defenses, etc., once it has been 

identified that the attack will produce the desired effects. Tactical vulnerability is 

important, as the benefit of attacking a target must be balanced against the expected 

cost. Timing is also key to a particular target’s criticality to the enemy. For example, 

rotary-wing forces typically operate from forward arming and refueling points that are 

mobile and thus not exceedingly hardened. Catching an enemy helicopter force at such 

a location could yield high payoffs in terms of both forces and infrastructure destroyed. 

When marshalling for an attack, or deploying for transport to the forward area, ground 
81

combat units may be exceedingly vulnerable for short periods. The enemy may risk this 

temporary vulnerability in order to get their forces into combat, but proper friendly 

intelligence can create opportunities for high payoff attacks by allowing planners to 

focus on the exact time of maximum enemy vulnerability. 

 Mobile targets will normally require a different approach than fixed targets, 

whether attacking actual enemy combat forces or their fielded support. Modern sensors 

such as moving target indicators can often locate and compute accurate bombing 

solutions for any moving vehicle on a battlefield, and the heat generated by operating 

engines and equipment often makes mobile units easily located by either onboard 

sensors or precision-guided munitions. In some theaters, the CAOC employs a 

dynamic targeting cell to ensure planning both maximizes the effectiveness of 

counterland attack on mobile targets and integrates the effort with the ground scheme of 

maneuver. Fixed targets may be harder to identify with onboard sensors and may be 

more hardened against weapons effects, but their fixed nature makes target location 

easier and simplifies targeting by weapons such as GPS-aided bombs or missiles. 

 Environmental factors need consideration during target development. Target 

area environmental conditions include terrain features, adverse weather, time of 

day/night, humidity and temperature effects, solar activity, and active or passive 

defense measures (such as smoke and camouflage). These may act to conceal 

targets, reduce visibility, and degrade weapon systems and overall counterland 

capabilities. Lunar illumination and weather conditions can drastically affect the ability 

of onboard sensors to both locate and identify targets. Terrain features may restrict 

target acquisition in some bandwidths, thus requiring specialized weapons, sensors, 

and tactics. The flexibility of different sensors and munitions that allow use of optical, 

near and far spectrum infrared (IR), radar, and GPS for target acquisition, marking, and 

weapons guidance gives the counterland planner many options to counter the natural 

and artificial obstacles to success. However, the flexibility of these same sensors and 

weapons may be limited depending on environment conditions 

 During the target development phase, planners should coordinate with other 

organizations and components to prevent fratricide, collateral damage, or a propaganda 

advantage for the enemy. Extensive coordination is required with the land component 

and SOLE to facilitate this. Examples of operations requiring this level of coordination 

are personnel recovery and information operations, to include public affairs.

 The JFSOCC must deconflict special operations through the JFC and with the 

other component commanders to avoid fratricide. CAOC personnel should work 

through the BCD within the CAOC and the ASOC to ensure that air and space 

component targeting is coordinated with and deconflicted from land component 

operations. Careful crafting and placement of FSCMs can facilitate this. 
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Urban Considerations 

 Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations, as appropriate, from stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

operations to major operations and campaigns. Doctrine for joint urban operations, 

outlined in JP 3-06, describes the triad of terrain, population, and infrastructure that 

must be considered before and during operations in that environment. Urban warfare is 

specific to an environment, and should not be substituted with related terms of irregular 

or asymmetric warfare. 

 While urban environments vary greatly, challenges to counterland operations can 

be expected in identification of combatants, collateral damage, preservation of 

infrastructure, restrictive rules of engagement, line-of-sight issues (to include targeting 

as well as communications), and freedom of maneuver. C2 of air power does not 

change in the urban environment, but tactics, techniques, and procedures may be vastly 

different from those employed on the open battlefield. 

 Planners must consider that ground operations will be largely decentralized due 

to communication limitations, and coordination will be time-consuming to prevent 

fratricide and mitigate collateral damage. Large munitions may be traded for increased 

loiter time in fuel, as smaller precise weapons with tailored effects are more desirable 

for employment. 

 Collateral damage in cities or towns that have not been evacuated will represent 

a great risk that must be considered and minimized. One real, alleged, or staged 

collateral damage or fratricide event can have strategic impact, affecting ROE, SPINS, 

host nation restrictions on operations, etc. Planners should integrate public affairs and 

psychological operations into counterland operations from strategy development 

through mission execution. Public information planners must be involved early in the 

process to mitigate negative events and leverage successes during counterland 

operations. Next, planners need to account for weather effects caused by the urban 

environment. Factors include increased pollution and aerosols affecting target 

detection, warmer temperatures affecting IR signatures, and variable wind speeds 

affected by building layout. Finally, urban operations, by their very nature, involve 

significant law of armed conflict considerations. In particular, commanders and aircrew 

must determine whether the operation is a military necessity and whether the potential 

harm to noncombatants outweighs the importance of the operation. 

 CAS will be difficult when supporting house-to-house ground fighting, where the 

task of locating and identifying friendly positions may prove highly demanding. Locating 

the proper enemy targets will also be more difficult, and the obstructions due to 

multistory structures will hamper both sensor and weapon line-of-sight. Techniques 

such as overlaying tactical charts and local street maps may prove useful in identifying 

enemy and friendly positions. CAS in an urban environment requires increased reliance 

on friendly ground forces to locate and mark targets, since enemy combat units will 

often be concealed inside buildings. Aircrew will have to give extra attention to the axis 
83

of attack and target designation; the problem may be similar to attacking enemy forces 

in steep mountainous terrain. Larger urban areas with more vertically developed 

buildings add increased elevation issues to the targeting problem, and the combination 

of tall buildings and narrow streets can cause an “urban canyon” effect leading to 

masking issues for line-of-sight munitions and targeting sensors. Munitions effects will 

vary greatly depending on whether the enemy can be attacked in the open versus inside 

buildings, requiring both patience and flexibility for mission success. When performing 

CAS in an urban environment, buildings may interfere with communications between air 

and ground, complicating the coordination process. Ground forces may also have 

difficulty marking targets for CAS aircraft in an urban environment, and careful 

consideration must be given to the type of terminal attack control selected. The AC-130 

gunship and PGM-equipped fighters using small diameter munitions have proven 

particularly effective in many urban operations with their combination of precision 

accuracy and wide range of onboard sensors. The AC-130 and MQ-1 Predator have 

been useful in urban environments, where extended loiter times are often necessary to 

pinpoint target sets in close proximity to noncombatants. 

Irregular Warfare 

 Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations. Irregular warfare, as of the date of this document, is not defined in 

Air Force or Joint publications. If it is to follow the concept for irregular forces defined in 

JP 1-02, irregular warfare may be defined as warfare performed by armed individuals or 

groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal 

security forces. Irregular warfare is not urban warfare, and may or may not be 

conducted in that environment. Because they share similar challenges, the misuse of 

terminology is easy to make. Like urban warfare, irregular warfare will likely have 

increased levels of deception, proximity and confusion with noncombatants, restrictive 

rules of engagement, and reduced ability to mass forces upon the enemy. In irregular 

warfare, technologically superior forces can be challenged by an elusive adversary that 

refuses to mass, and adapts to target the superior force asymmetrically. The primary 

distinction to be drawn is that irregular warfare is conducted by irregular forces. 

Irregular warfare includes a wide variety of operations and activities that occur either in 

isolation or within traditional types of operations (see AFDD 2). 

 Within irregular warfare, there are two general approaches: waging irregular 

warfare (primarily offensive in nature) and countering irregular threats (primarily 

defensive in nature). While they appear to represent two opposite ends of the 

spectrum, they do share similarities: they both include protraction, intertwining military 

and non-military methods, participation by violent individuals and groups that do not 

belong to the regular armed forces or police of any state, and a struggle for control or 

influence over, and the support of, the host population. 
84

Weaponeering and Allocation 

 Weaponeering is the process of estimating the quantity and types of lethal and 

nonlethal weapons needed to achieve desired effects against specific targets. 

Weaponeering considers such things as the desired effects against the target (both 

direct weapons effects and indirect desired outcomes), target vulnerability, delivery 

accuracy, damage criteria, and weapon reliability. Targeting personnel quantify the 

expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets 

to produce desired effects. 

 Weapons effects are always a critical part of targeting for counterland. Some 

munitions and fuses are designed for very specific applications and are effective against 

certain targets with little or no capability against others. Good intelligence data on 

target information is vital to the proper matching of munition to target. Likewise, the 

flexibility of some munitions and fuses to provide multiple effects allows planners 

options for maximum effect against preplanned targets, and in many cases allows 

inflight selection of weapons/fuse settings for dynamic targets. The latter capability is 

especially important for CAS and XAI, when the specific target type is not normally 

known prior to takeoff. When possible, combat aircraft should have a variety of 

munitions to meet operational requirements. 

 Allocation is the distribution of limited resources among competing requirements 

for employment. Allocation assigns specific air assets and targets against the 

apportionment priorities. After allocation, the master air attack plan is created that 

matches assets against AI and strategic targets. Following allocation, the distribution 

process matches CAS assets against support requests, which should be planned by the 

ASOC in conjunction with ground force planning. The final step of the process is the 

actual ATO production, which packages the attacking and supporting assets to achieve 

optimum effect against the enemy. 

 AI targets nominated by the ground component are not often presented in the 

standardized “basic encyclopedia” (BE) number designation, which is another reason to 

retain flexibility in counterland planning. If the ground component needs a particular 

enemy unit attacked, and that unit meets the requisite priority criteria, planners must 

ensure that particular enemy unit is affected to the level required. This requires the 

CAOC planners to maintain awareness of that enemy unit’s position; the BCD can help 

with this task. Instead of concern over a particular enemy unit, the ground component 

may have a certain geographic area of concern to its scheme of maneuver. In this 

case, the friendly ground force requires an attack on any enemy forces that happen to 

be there. Planning methods must therefore allow for either an area or unit-specific 

focus for AI targeting, especially for ground-nominated targets. Attacks against large 

ground forces are most effective when prioritized targeting guidance is included in the 

nomination, such as artillery first, armor second, etc. When possible, however, air 

support can be most effective when the ground component specifies mission-type 

orders or desired effects against an enemy unit, such as “delay enemy X Brigade 72 

hours from achieving contact” or “fix enemy Y Division in place for 48 hours.” The air-
85

ground system works best when the ground component requests overall battlefield 

effects, rather than specific targets, due to the greater ability of the air component to 

analyze the enemy force for proper air and space power targeting. 

 Before the actual ATO is put into production, justified changes to targets and 

targeting priority can be incorporated. Once the ATO is put into final production, 

approved changes are typically passed on to the combat operations division for 

incorporation either at tactical unit level planning or during actual mission execution. If 

the enemy ground force does move to an unexpected location, it is not likely to have 

moved far enough to require much repackaging of counterland missions. This allows 

for a relatively simple retargeting of a given flight or strike package to the new target 

location. Any changes must account for differing air defenses, proximity to friendly 

ground forces, and other factors before final approval. 

 For those missions where lucrative targets are highly likely, but preplanned 

locations are not available, airborne or ground alert may be appropriate. This is the 

most common method employed for CAS, where there is typically not a pre-identified 

target prior to mission execution. Airborne alert AI can be used to provide up-to-theminute flexibility, where final targeting guidance comes from offboard sources such as 

JSTARS or UA. Airborne alert missions should only be planned when lucrative targets 

are likely to exist, otherwise the missions will be wasted. The “push” system of 

providing preplanned backup targets for both CAS and AI alleviates this problem to 

some extent; this procedure gives each mission a fixed target of some military value in 

case the primary target fails to materialize. 

EXECUTION PLANNING AND FORCE EXECUTION 

 Execution planning includes the preparation necessary for combat units to 

accomplish the decentralized execution of the ATO. It generally consists of the 12 

hours immediately prior to the start of a given day’s ATO execution period. Force 

execution refers to the 24-hour period in which a particular ATO is executed by combat 

units. The CAOC assists in preparing input for, supporting, and monitoring execution. 

This section briefly touches on these topics to make the reader aware of its connection 

with counterland operations. For more information, see AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting. 

 During execution, the CAOC is the central agency for revising the tasking of air 

and space forces. It is also responsible for coordinating and deconflicting any changes 

with appropriate agencies or components. Due to battlespace dynamics, the CFACC 

may be required to make changes to planned operations during execution. The CAOC 

must be flexible and responsive to changes required during execution of the ATO. 

Forces not apportioned for joint or combined operations, but included on the ATO for 

coordination purposes, can be redirected only with the approval of the respective 

component or allied commanders. During execution, the CFACC is also responsible for 

retargeting air assets to respond to moving targets or changing priorities. 

 Dynamic targeting includes the prosecution of targets that emerge during ATO 

execution that commanders deem worthy of prosecution. The dynamic targeting 
86

process is not separate from the air tasking cycle or planned targeting process and is 

time-sensitive to some degree. The combat operations division (COD) has overall 

responsibility for implementation of the dynamic targeting process. Successful dynamic 

targeting, however, requires a great deal of prior planning and coordination with other 

divisions within the CAOC and with other components. If dynamic targeting is to be 

done correctly, planners must decide upon CONOPS that make assets available to the 

COD prior to the start of execution. This can be done in a number of ways. Among the 

most common methods are: 

 Preplanned target reference methods and FSCM such as kill boxes. 

 Pre-positioned or on-call ISR and strike packages for rapid response to 

emerging targets. 

 Using intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) to 

determine the most probable areas where targets will emerge during 

execution. 

 Coordination and synchronization of dynamic targeting operations by 

streamlining and developing procedures for rapid handover of the mission 

tasking to another component for mission execution if the air and space 

component cannot attack a target that emerges. 

 LNOs from other components or Services may be very helpful during the 

dynamic targeting process. LNOs—particularly the SOLE—may be able to provide the 

CFACC with additional options for dealing with emerging targets and may be able to 

provide locations and activities of SOF and other friendly forces to assist with the 

F2T2EA of counterland targets, or to at least assist in deconfliction. 

AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION 

 A quick survey of the various types of ground maneuver reveals some insight as 

to how counterland operations should be employed when directly supporting the ground 

battle. The same survey yields some lessons for employing ground forces when air and 

space power provides the bulk of battlefield effects on the enemy. The important 

question does not focus on which component is the more decisive, but how best to 

combine the available air and surface combat power for the quickest and most cost 

effective victory. 

 During the movement to contact by ground forces, the initial combat between 

friendly and enemy units will occur using supporting air assets and artillery. 

Counterland’s main contribution during this phase is AI—to disrupt the enemy forces 

that will subsequently be engaged by friendly ground units, or to destroy them prior to 

contact. Enemy second echelon forces are also valuable targets in this phase, when AI 

seeks to isolate the enemy front-line units from their support and reinforcements. 

Ground forces may make good use of organic rotary-wing assets to screen ahead and 
87

to the flanks during movement to contact, a task that can be supplemented by fixedwing counterland assets when needed. 

 Meeting engagements occur when friendly and enemy ground forces engage 

while both are on the move. Hasty attacks occur with little time for detailed planning, 

typically within 24 hours of first contact with the enemy. In both of these modes of 

ground combat, there may not be time for the normal target nomination and air 

component apportionment processes to occur before missions must be flown. 

Depending on the amount of air support required, and other theater priorities for air and 

space power, missions may be diverted or reroled to fly CAS or AI missions. Since 

preplanned targets may not be available, counterland assets may be forced into greater 

use of airborne alert or general grid box target locations for AI missions. Flexibility will 

be paramount because enemy vulnerabilities that are susceptible to air attack may 

appear on short notice. Under these circumstances, it is especially important for the 

ASOC and TACPs to remain tightly integrated with their ground component 

counterparts, as confusion over both friendly and enemy troop positions and 

movements is likely. 

 A hasty ground engagement may often be the result of a desire to attack quickly 

to surprise the enemy, so they will likely be suffering from the same short-notice 

reaction that affects friendly planning and air-ground coordination. When significant 

friendly counterland assets are not available or when air superiority has not been 

achieved, the friendly ground force should be cautious about schemes of maneuver that 

increase the likelihood of meeting engagements or hasty attacks, unless sufficient 

organic surface firepower exists to deal with the enemy force. 

 A deliberate attack occurs when adequate time for planning and coordination 

exists; this is the preferred mode of ground advance. Air and ground components will 

have time for properly detailed coordination, establish on-call FSCLs, nominate 

appropriate AI targets to achieve desired battlefield results, and ensure air superiority 

that minimizes the enemy’s use of air to support their own army. 

 Exploitation of breakthroughs into the enemy rear, potentially combined with the 

use of airborne or air assault forces, achieves maximum disruption when combined with 

counterland aerial maneuver. Integrated air-ground operations against the enemy, 

possibly over a multi-phased offensive, require the advanced planning that only a 

deliberate attack provides. The need for both flexibility and close coordination between 

air and ground components grows as friendly ground forces push deeper into enemy 

territory. The rate of ground advance must continually be balanced with the 

effectiveness of air attack in achieving theater objectives and with the relative merits of 

ground versus air and space maneuver as they come into play. Proper advancement of 

the FSCL is one of the key issues during rapid ground advance as the factors of air and 

space power effectiveness, potential fratricide, and freedom of ground maneuver are 

weighed. 
88

 A spoiling attack is launched from a defensive position to disrupt a forming 

enemy offensive and may act to divert enemy attention from the main ground offensive 

to be launched elsewhere. Since disruption of the enemy is the main objective, the use 

of counterland can contribute greatly to success. Enemy forces may be particularly 

vulnerable while marshalling for an attack, and second-echelon forces may be more 

vulnerable to AI while moving up to reinforce an enemy offensive. Successful 

interdiction of enemy exploitation forces may persuade the enemy to call off an attack, 

since they would then have no ground force to consolidate any gains. 

 Mobile defense is a concept in which friendly ground forces use fire and 

movement tactics over a given area to slow and disrupt the enemy advance. Air and 

space power’s greatest contribution to mobile defense may be with AI close to the 

battlefield to slow the enemy’s movement through destruction of POL, lines of 

communication, and other infrastructure targets whose destruction will guarantee that 

friendly ground forces retain greater mobility than the enemy. In mobile defense both 

the friendly and enemy positions can become difficult to accurately track, and the 

ASOCs and TACPs again become a critical link when heavy CAS is required. The risk 

of fratricide will increase during mobile operations, so organic surface firepower should 

always be used when available. 

 Area defense is more static and involves a direct confrontation with the enemy 

along a defensible line of contact. Under these circumstances counterland missions 

can be flown in closer proximity to ground forces with reduced chance of fratricide, and 

the more static nature of the conflict will reduce the impact of attacks on enemy mobility. 

Enemy ammunition stocks, artillery tubes, and rocket launchers may become higher 

priority targets for AI and CAS during area defense. If air superiority is challenged or 

lost, friendly surface forces in static positions will likely become very vulnerable to 

enemy air and missile attack, since fixed ground positions are vulnerable to a lower 

level of air and space technology than mobile forces. 

 Target defenses may distract aircrews and hamper their ability to identify and 

attack targets. Detection assets like JSTARS, or intelligence sources such as human 

and imagery intelligence will often enhance target acquisition capability. However, 

enemy air defenses may still hamper the aircrews’ ability to visually acquire their 

targets, due to required high speeds, low or very high altitudes, or restricted ingress 

routing necessary to minimize the risk of engagement. Effective force packaging can 

negate the impact of enemy air defenses and achieve temporary local air superiority. A 

longer-lasting effect is achieved by first eliminating or negating enemy surface-to-air 

defenses as part of an overall air superiority operation. Many current SEAD assets are 

multirole, and once the bulk of the enemy surface-to-air defense has been eliminated 

these forces can be reroled into the main counterland effort. Missions against CAS 

targets can often use ground force artillery, rockets, and attack helicopters to suppress 

enemy air defenses, which also free fixed-wing assets to directly attack the primary 

targets. The ground component also possesses a limited capability to suppress enemy 

air defenses at longer ranges through the use of ATACMS and attack helicopter assets. 
89

SUMMARY 

 It cannot be overemphasized that proper counterland planning, as with all air 

component planning, requires a full consideration of the capabilities and limitations of air 

and space power during the initial development of overall theater strategy. Historically, 

theater campaign planners have taken a land-centric view of how the campaign should 

unfold through its various phases, then examined how airpower would support it. This 

approach is inefficient, especially in light of the fact that in recent campaigns, airpower 

has been responsible for damaging or destroying the majority of enemy systems. 

 True joint planning requires that all components be equally involved in planning 

the various stages of a military campaign. How counterland fits into the larger picture of 

a specific strategy will depend on numerous variables, but there should be no 

preconceived notions about the decisiveness of any one component. Instead of 

individual component decisiveness, it is better to plan in terms of the required 

components of a decisive joint force. Likewise, friction and the fog of war should never 

be ruled out. Any plan that assumes perfect knowledge of the enemy is doomed to 

failure; proper counterland planning must provide some last-minute flexibility for reaction 

to unanticipated enemy movement. 

Counterland requires effective training and education to ensure success in war. 

“Train like you fight” is the prevailing training philosophy in the United States Air Force. 

This strongly applies to counterland operations because the various interconnected 

parts that comprise this capability must be trained and thoroughly exercised by all 

parties if success in combat is to be achieved. AI requires accurate intelligence, 

thorough planning, and flexible execution to achieve desired effects, whether conducted 

independently or indirectly supporting surface forces. The orchestration required by the 

air and ground components in the CAS environment can make it one of the most difficult 

missions performed by the Air Force. To integrate effectively within the combined force, 

Airmen must accomplish realistic training scenarios, share ideas within the joint 

community, and advocate the proper use of counterland air and space power. Only 

then will the investment of peacetime preparation pay exponential dividends during 

combat. 
90

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the 

Air Force Doctrine Center web page at: https://www.doctrine.af.mil)

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power 

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare 

AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting

Joint Publications 

Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations 

Joint Pub 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations

Joint Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support 

(CAS)

Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Publications― available on their website: 

https://wwwmil.alsa.mil/index.html)

AFTTP(I) 3-2.29, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for 

Aviation Urban Operations

AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, MTTP for Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE)

AFTTP(I) 3-2.59, MTTP for Kill box Employment (Kill Box)

AFTTP(I) 3-2.17, MTTP for the Theater Air Ground System (TAGS)

AFTTP(I) 3-2.3, MTTP for Time-Sensitive Targets (TST)

Other Publications 

Cohen, Eliot A. & Keaney, Thomas A. Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian 

Gulf. Naval Institute Press, 1995. 

Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. 

New York: The Free Press, 1989. 

Cooling, Benjamin F. (ed.) Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. 

Office of Air Force History, 1990. 
91

Deichmann, Paul & Price, Alfred. (ed.) Spearhead For Blitzkrieg. New York: Ivy Books, 

1999. 

 

Drew, Dennis M. “US Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to 

Confusion.” The Journal of Military History 62, (October 1998): 809-32. 

Eduard, Mark. Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars. Center for Air Force History, 1994. 

Fadok, Lt Col David S. “John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’s Quest for Strategic 

Paralysis.” In Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory. Edited by Col 

(Ret) Phillip S. Meilinger. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997. 

Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea. Office of Air Force History, 

1983. 

Gilster, Herman L. The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected 

Campaigns. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1993. 

Givens, Robert P. Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the 

Theater Campaign. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2002. 

Grant, Rebecca. Gulf War II: Air and Space Power Led the Way. Air Force Association 

Special Report, September 2003. Arlington: Aerospace Education Foundation, 

2003. 

Hosmer, Stephen T. Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941-

1994: Lessons for U.S. Commanders. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996. 

Hughes, Thomas A. OVERLORD: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical 

Air Power in World War II. Free Press, 1995. 

Kennett, Lee. The First Air War. Smithsonian, 1991. 

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports. Office of Air Force History, 1987 

(originally published in 1949). 

Lambeth, Benjamin S. NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational 

Assessment. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001. 

Mets, David R. The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists. 

Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1999. 

Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell 

University Press, 1996. 
92

Rudel, Hans Ulrich. Stuka Pilot. Bantam, 1979 (first published in US by Ballantine in 

1958). 

Slessor, J.C. Air Power and Armies. Oxford University Press, 1936. 

Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The USAF and North Vietnam, 1966-1973. 

Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000. 

Warden III, John A.. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Fort McNair: National 

Defense University Press, 1988. 
93

 GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

A2C2 Army airspace command and control 

AAGS Army air-ground system 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACCE air component coordination element 

ACM airspace control measure 

ACO airspace control order 

AFARN Air Force air request net 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AI air interdiction 

ALO air liaison officer 

ALSA Air Land Sea Application (Center) 

AO area of operations 

AOC air and space operations center 

ARS area reference system 

ASOC air support operations center 

ASOG air support operations group 

ASR air support request 

ATACMS Army tactical missile system 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS airborne warning and control system 

BALO battalion air liaison officer 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BCL battlefield coordination line 

BCT brigade combat team 

BDA battle damage assessment 

BE basic encyclopedia 

C2 command and control 

CAOC combined air and space operations center 

CAS close air support 

CDE collateral damage estimate 

CFACC combined force air and space component commander 

CFL coordinated fire lines 

CID combat identification 

CL coordination line 

COD combat operations division 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

COMARFOR Commander, Army forces 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CRC control and reporting center 
94

CSAR combat search and rescue 

DASC direct air support center 

EOC expeditionary operations center 

EW electronic warfare 

FAC forward air controller 

FAC(A) forward air controller, airborne 

FB forward boundary 

FEBA forward edge of the battle area 

FFA free fire area 

FLOT forward line of the troops 

FM field manual 

FOB forward operating base 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

F2T2EA find, fix, track, target, engage and assess 

GAI ground alert, air interdiction 

GARS global area reference system 

GCAS ground alert, close air support 

GLO ground liaison officer 

GPS global positioning system 

IAM inertially guided munitions 

IO information operations 

IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

IR infrared 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JACE Joint air control element 

JAGC2 joint air-ground control cell 

JAOC joint air and space operations center 

JAOP joint air and space operations plan 

JARN joint air request net 

JDAM joint direct attack munitions 

JFACC joint force air and space component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFIRE Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of 

Firepower 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFO joint fires observer 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list 

JOA joint operations area 
95

JP joint publication 

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTAC joint terminal attack controller 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

km kilometer 

LD/HD low-density, high-demand 

LOC lines of communications 

LNO liaison officer 

MACCS Marine air command and control system 

MAGTF Marine air ground task force 

MARLO Marine liaison officer 

MTTP multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NALE naval and amphibious liaison element

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NFA no-fire area 

NTACS Navy tactical air control system 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

OPCON operational control 

OPORD operations order 

PA public affairs 

PGM precision-guided munitions 

PI probability of incapacitation 

PID positive identification 

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RAF Royal Air Force (UK) 

RFA restricted fire area 

ROE rules of engagement 

ROZ restricted operating zone 

SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance 

SEAD suppression of enemy air defense 

SOF special operations forces 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SPINS special instructions 

STT special tactics team 
96

TAC(A) tactical air coordinator, airborne 

TACC tactical air control center (US Navy and USMC) 

TACON tactical control 

TACP tactical air control parties 

TACS theater air control system 

TADC tactical air direction center 

TAGS theater air ground system 

TBMCS theater battle management core systems 

TIC troops-in-contact 

TST time-sensitive targets 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UA unmanned aircraft 

UAS unmanned aerial system 

USAAF United States Army Air Forces 

WGS-84 World Geodetic System 1984 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WOC wing operations center 

XAI airborne alert, air interdiction 

XCAS airborne alert, close air support 

Definitions 

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the 

enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against 

friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of 

each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 

1-02) [Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s 

military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly 

forces, or to otherwise achieve joint force commander objectives. Air interdiction 

is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of 

each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. 

Also called AI.] [AFDD 2-1.3] {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and 

are offered for clarity.} 

air liaison officer. The senior tactical air control party member attached to a 

ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on 

air power. An air liaison officer is usually an aeronautically rated officer. Also 

called ALO. (JP 1-02) 

basic encyclopedia. A compilation of identified installations and physical areas 
97

of potential significance as objectives for attack. Also called BE. (JP 1-02)

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating 

coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, 

or areas. (JP 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a 

strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02) 

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at 

accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

(JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile 

targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed 

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also 

called CAS. (JP 1-02)

close proximity. As used in relation to close air support, close proximity refers 

to the distance within which some form of terminal attack control is required for 

targeting direction and fratricide prevention. (AFDD 2-1.3) 

counterland. Air and space operations against enemy land force capabilities to 

create effects that achieve joint force commander objectives. The main 

objectives of counterland operations are to dominate the surface environment 

and prevent the opponent from doing the same. (AFDD 1) 

detailed integration. As used in relation to close air support (CAS), detailed 

integration refers to the level of coordination required to achieve the desired 

effects without overly restricting CAS attacks, surface firepower, or the ground 

scheme of maneuver. It is also necessary to protect aircraft from the unintended 

effects of friendly surface fire. The maximum range requiring detailed integration 

is typically bounded by the range at which organic surface firepower provides the 

preponderance of effect on the enemy. (AFDD 2-1.3) 

forward air controller. An officer (aviator/pilot) member of the tactical air control 

party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in close 

air support of ground troops. Also called FAC. (JP 1-02)

forward air controller (airborne). A specifically trained and qualified aviation 

officer who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air support 

of ground troops. The forward air controller (airborne) is normally an airborne 

extension of the tactical air control party. Also called FAC(A). (JP 1-02)

fratricide. The employment of weapons by friendly forces which results in the 

unintentional death, injury, or damage to US, allied, or coalition personnel, 
98

equipment, or facilities. (AFDD 2-1.3)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface 

military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. See 

also air interdiction. (JP 1-02) [Interdiction operations are joint actions to divert, 

disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used 

effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise meet joint force commander 

objectives.] (AFDD 2-1.3) 

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of 

two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military 

forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained 

in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is 

authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more 

components in coordinated action toward a common objective. (JP 1-02)

joint fires observer. A trained Service member who can request, adjust, and 

control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of type 2 

and 3 close air support terminal attack controls, and perform autonomous 

terminal guidance operations. Also called JFO. (USA, USAF, USSOCOM 14 Nov 

05 MOA) [The intent of a JFO is to add joint warfighting capability, not circumvent 

the need for qualified JTACs.] (AFDD 2-1.3) See also type 1, 2, and 3 terminal 

control.

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and 

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may 

be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority 

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing 

commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02) [The joint air and space component 

commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center to command 

and control the integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force 

commander’s objectives. This title emphasizes the Air Force position that air 

power and space power together create effects that cannot be achieved through 

air or space power alone.] [AFDD 2] {Words in brackets apply only to the Air 

Force and are offered for clarity.} 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint 
99

force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint terminal attack controller. A qualified (certified) Service member who, 

from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air 

support and other offensive air operations. A qualified and current joint terminal 

attack controller will be recognized across the Department of Defense as capable 

and authorized to perform terminal attack control. Also called JTAC. (JP 1-02)

kill box. A three-dimensional area reference that enables timely, effective 

coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks. (JP 1-02) [A generic term 

for airspace control measures used by the theater air control system for 

controlling air-to-ground operations. An active kill box signifies: 1) airspace 

potentially occupied by attack aircraft, 2) underlying surface zone that contains 

known or suspected enemy targets, 3) underlying surface zone known to be clear 

of friendly forces. Kill boxes are complementary to, and do not preclude or 

conflict with, other airspace control measures.] [AFDD 2-1.3] {Words in brackets 

apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

killer scout. Armed fighters or attack aircraft used for air interdiction, typically in 

an armed reconnaissance role, to validate and mark targets for dedicated attack 

missions against lucrative targets in a specified geographic zone. Killer Scouts 

are normally used as part of the command and control interface to coordinate 

multiple flights, identify or neutralize targets and enemy air defenses, and provide 

battle damage assessment. (AFDD 2-1.3)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of 

advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on 

the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or 

vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in 

the battlespace through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position 

of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-

02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the 

accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. 

Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be 

accomplished. (JP 1-02)

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or 

operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct 

of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art 

translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design and, 

ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (JP 

1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders 
100

at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control 

is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated 

within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant 

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and 

the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the 

Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and 

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational 

control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and 

joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. 

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force 

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and 

forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control 

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of 

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, 

discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major 

operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic 

objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link 

tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish 

the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, 

initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these 

events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do 

tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and 

provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic 

objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information 

and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 

groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or 

reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 

Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 

sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 

economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad 

conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, 

clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across 

the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in 

conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies 

and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. 
101

Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and 

political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from 

friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 

indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

special operations liaison element (SOLE). A special operations liaison team 

provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint 

force air component commander (if designated), or appropriate Service 

component air command and control organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and 

integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with 

conventional air operations. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of 

a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) 

security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to 

accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and 

multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess 

risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop 

global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military 

forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also 

operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that 

helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or 

supplies other forces in combat. See also supported commander; supporting 

commander. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all 

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint 

operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term 

refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in 

response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the 

context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives 

assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is 

responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the 

assistance required. See also support; supporting commander. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or 

other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. 

Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as 

appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander 

who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and 

who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported 

commander. See also support; supported commander. (JP 1-02)
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synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and 

purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and 

time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and 

methods in concert with the operation plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 

limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within 

the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. 

Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be 

delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant 

command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the 

command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing 

commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary 

of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and 

directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within 

the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. See also operational control.

(JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are 

planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units 

or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 

maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to 

achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level 

of war. (JP 1-02)

terminal attack control. The authority to control the maneuver of and grant 

weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. (JP 1-02)

terminal attack controller. A qualified officer or enlisted member who, from a 

forward ground or airborne position, provides terminal control to aircraft 

performing close air support to ground forces. While terminal attack controllers 

operate with the ground forces they support, their personnel normally remain 

under the command of the component providing the close air support. Also called 

TAC. (AFDD 2-1.3) 

terminal control. 1. The authority to direct aircraft to maneuver into a position to 

deliver ordnance, passengers, or cargo to a specific location or target. Terminal 

control is a type of air control. 2. Any electronic, mechanical, or visual control 

given to aircraft to facilitate target acquisition and resolution. (JP 1-02) 

terminal guidance. 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between 

midcourse guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, 

mechanical, visual, or other assistance given an aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival 

at, operation within or over, landing upon, or departure from an air landing or 

airdrop facility. 3. Any electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communication that 
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provides approaching aircraft or weapons additional information regarding a 

specific location or target. Terminal guidance is not a type of air control. Those 

providing terminal guidance do not have weapons release authority, or authority

to direct the maneuver of aircraft. See also terminal control. (JP 1-02)

Type 1 control. Type 1 control is used when the JTAC must visually acquire the 

attacking aircraft and the target for each attack. Analysis of attacking aircraft 

geometry is required to reduce the risk of the attack affecting friendly forces. (JP 

3-09.3) 

Type 2 control. Type 2 control will be used when the JTAC requires control of 

individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition of the attacking 

aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft are 

not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release/ launch. (JP 

3-09.3) 

Type 3 control. Type 3 control is used when the JTAC requires the ability to 

provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement subject to 

specific attack restrictions. Type 3 control does not require the JTAC to visually 

acquire the aircraft or the target; however, all targeting data must be coordinated 

through the supported commander’s battle staff. (JP 3-09.3)