IV 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 1051 

Recognizing the importance of the national security risks posed by foreign 

adversary controlled social media applications. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 5, 2024 

Mr. GALLAGHER (for himself and Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce 

RESOLUTION 

Recognizing the importance of the national security risks 

posed by foreign adversary controlled social media applications. 

Whereas TikTok collects vast amounts of data on Americans, 

though the total extent of its collection is unknown: 

(1) On August 6, 2020, the President concluded 

that TikTok ‘‘automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users’’ and that TikTok’s ownership 

by ByteDance Ltd. enables the People’s Republic of 

China (referred to in this resolution as the ‘‘PRC’’) and 

Communist Party of China (referred to in this resolution 

as the ‘‘CCP’’) to gain access to ‘‘Americans’ personal 

and proprietary information,’’ potentially allowing the 

CCP ‘‘to track the locations of Federal employees and 


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contractors, build dossiers of personal information for 

blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage’’. 

(2) Outside reporting has confirmed the breadth of 

TikTok’s reach, concluding that its data collection practices extend to age, phone number, precise location, internet address, device used, phone contacts, social network 

connections, content of private messages sent through the 

application, and videos watched. 

(3) On November 11, 2022, Federal Communications Commissioner Brendan Carr explained that ‘‘underneath [TikTok], it operates as a very sophisticated surveillance app.’’. He characterized it as ‘‘a big risk’’ for 

multiple reasons, including espionage. The risk posed by 

TikTok is exacerbated by the difficulty in assessing precisely which categories of data it collects. For example, 

outside researchers have found embedded vulnerabilities 

that allow the company to collect more data than the application’s privacy policy indicates. 

Whereas PRC law requires obligatory, secret disclosure of 

data controlled by Chinese companies at the PRC’s unilateral request: 

(1) Pursuant to PRC law, the PRC can require a 

company headquartered in the PRC to surrender all its 

data to the PRC, making it an espionage tool of the 

CCP. 

(2) The National Intelligence Law, passed in China 

in 2017, states that ‘‘any organization’’ must assist or 

cooperate with CCP intelligence work. Such assistance or 

cooperation must also remain secret at the PRC’s request. 

(3) The PRC’s 2014 Counter-Espionage Law states 

that ‘‘relevant organizations . . . may not refuse’’ to collect evidence for an investigation. 


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(4) The PRC’s Data Security Law of 2021 states 

that the PRC has the power to access and control private 

data. 

(5) The PRC’s Counter-Espionage Law grants PRC 

security agencies nearly unfettered discretion, if acting 

under an effectively limitlessly capacious understanding 

of national security, to access data from companies. 

(6) On September 17, 2020, the Department of 

Commerce concluded that the PRC, to advance ‘‘its intelligence-gathering and to understand more about who to 

target for espionage, whether electronically or via human 

recruitment,’’ is constructing ‘‘massive databases of 

Americans’ personal information’’ and that ByteDance 

has close ties to the CCP, including a cooperation agreement with a security agency and over 130 CCP members 

in management positions. 

(7) On December 2, 2022, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, stated 

that TikTok’s data repositories on Americans ‘‘are in the 

hands of a government that doesn’t share our values and 

that has a mission that’s very much at odds with what’s 

in the best interests of the United States. . . . The 

[CCP] has shown a willingness to steal Americans data 

on a scale that dwarfs any other’’. 

(8) On December 5, 2022, the Director of National 

Intelligence, Avril Haines, stated, when asked about 

TikTok and PRC ownership, ‘‘It is extraordinary the degree to which [the PRC] . . . [is] developing frameworks 

for collecting foreign data and pulling it in, and their capacity to then turn that around and use it to target audiences for information campaigns and other things, but 

also to have it for the future so that they can use it for 

a variety of means’’. 


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(9) On December 16, 2022, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Burns, explained that 

‘‘because the parent company of TikTok is a [PRC] company, the [CCP] is able to insist upon extracting the private data of a lot of TikTok users in this country, and 

also to shape the content of what goes on to TikTok as 

well to suit the interests of the Chinese leadership’’. 

(10) On August 2, 2020, then-Secretary of State, 

Mike Pompeo, stated that PRC-based companies ‘‘are 

feeding data directly to the Chinese Communist Party, 

their national security apparatus’’. 

(11) Public reporting has repeatedly confirmed 

statements made by the executive branch regarding the 

tight interlinkages between ByteDance, TikTok, and the 

CCP. 

(A) The Secretary of ByteDance’s CCP committee, Zhang Fuping, also serves as ByteDance’s 

Editor-in-Chief and Vice President and has vowed 

that the CCP committee would ‘‘take the lead’’ 

across ‘‘all product lines and business lines’’, which 

include TikTok. 

(B) On May 30, 2023, public reporting revealed 

that TikTok has stored sensitive financial information, including the Social Security numbers and tax 

identifications of TikTok influencers and United 

States small businesses, on servers in China accessible by ByteDance employees. 

(C) On December 22, 2022, public reporting revealed that ByteDance employees accessed TikTok 

user data and IP addresses to monitor the physical 

locations of specific United States citizens. 

(D) On June 17, 2022, public reporting revealed that, according to leaked audio from more 


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than 80 internal TikTok meetings, China-based employees of ByteDance repeatedly accessed nonpublic 

data about United States TikTok users, including 

the physical locations of specific United States citizens. 

(E) On January 20, 2023, public reporting revealed that TikTok and ByteDance employees regularly engage in practice called ‘‘heating,’’ which is a 

manual push to ensure specific videos ‘‘achieve a 

certain number of video views’’. 

(F) In a court filing in June 2023, a former 

employee of ByteDance alleged that the CCP spied 

on pro-democracy protestors in Hong Kong in 2018 

by using backdoor access to TikTok to identify and 

monitor activists’ locations and communications. 

(G) On November 1, 2023, public reporting revealed that TikTok’s internal platform, which houses 

its most sensitive information, was inspected in person by CCP cybersecurity agents in the lead-up to 

the CCP’s 20th National Congress. 

Whereas the PRC’s access to American users’ data poses unacceptable risks to United States national security: 

(1) As a general matter, foreign adversary controlled 

social media applications present a clear threat to the national security of the United States. 

(2) The Department of Homeland Security has 

warned that the PRC’s data collection activities in particular have resulted in ‘‘numerous risks to U.S. businesses and customers, including: the theft of trade secrets, of intellectual property, and of other confidential 

business information; violations of U.S. export control 

laws; violations of U.S. privacy laws; breaches of contractual provisions and terms of service; security and privacy 


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risks to customers and employees; risk of PRC surveillance and tracking of regime critics; and reputational 

harm to U.S. businesses’’. These risks are imminent and 

other, unforeseen risks may also exist. 

(3) On September 28, 2023, the Department of 

State’s Global Engagement Center issued a report that 

found that ‘‘TikTok creates opportunities for PRC global 

censorship’’. The report stated that United States Government information as of late 2020 showed that 

‘‘ByteDance maintained a regularly updated internal list 

identifying people who were likely blocked or restricted 

from all ByteDance platforms, including TikTok, for reasons such as advocating for Uyghur independence’’. 

(4) On November 15, 2022, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified 

before the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives that TikTok’s national security 

concerns ‘‘include the possibility that the [CCP] could 

use it to control data collection on millions of users or 

control the recommendation algorithm, which could be 

used for influence operations if they so choose, or to control software on millions of devices, which gives it an opportunity to potentially technically compromise personal 

devices’’. 

(5) On March 8, 2023, the Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 

that the CCP, through its ownership of ByteDance, could 

use TikTok to collect and control users’ data and drive 

divisive narratives internationally. 

Whereas Congress has extensively investigated whether 

TikTok poses a national security threat because it is 

owned by ByteDance: 


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(1) On October 26, 2021, during the testimony of 

Michael Beckerman, TikTok head of public policy for the 

Americas, before a hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection of the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation of the Senate, lawmakers expressed concerns that TikTok’s audio and user location 

data could be used by the CCP. 

(2) On September 14, 2022, lawmakers expressed 

concerns over TikTok’s algorithm and content recommendations posing a national security threat during a 

hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs of the Senate with Vanessa 

Pappas, Chief Operating Officer of TikTok. 

(3) On March 23, 2023, during the testimony of 

TikTok CEO, Shou Chew, before the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, 

lawmakers expressed concerns about the safety and security of the application, including TikTok’s relationship 

with the CCP. 

(4) On February 28, 2023, former Deputy National 

Security Advisor, Matthew Pottinger, emphasized that it 

has already been confirmed that TikTok’s parent company ByteDance has used the application to surveil 

United States journalists as a means to identify and retaliate against potential sources. The PRC has also 

shown a willingness to harass individuals abroad who 

take stances that contradict the Communist Party lines. 

The application can further be employed to help manipulate social discourse and amplify false information to tens 

of millions of Americans. 

(5) On March 23, 2023, Nury Turkel, the Chair of 

the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, raised the alarm that TikTok’s parent comVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:18 Mar 06, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HR1051.IH HR1051

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pany, ByteDance, has a strategic partnership with China’s Ministry of Public Security, and China’s domestic 

version of the application, Douyin, has been used to collect data and sensitive information from Uyghurs and 

other oppressed ethnic minority groups. 

(6) On July 26, 2023, William Evanina, the former 

Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 

Center, pointed to TikTok as just one of many areas of 

concern that combine to paint a concerning picture of the 

CCP’s capabilities and intent as an adversarial, malign 

competitor. 

(7) On November 30, 2023, John Garnaut of the 

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) remarked 

that TikTok has sophisticated capabilities that create the 

risk that TikTok can clandestinely shape narratives and 

elevate favorable opinions while suppressing statements 

and news that the PRC deems negative. 

(8) On January 18, 2024, the Select Committee on 

Strategic Competition between the United States and the 

Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representatives was briefed by a set of senior interagency officials 

to discuss these matters. 

(9) On March 22, 2023, elements of the intelligence 

community provided a classified briefing on the threat to 

members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and leadership 

for the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 

House of Representatives. 

(10) On April 26, 2023, the executive branch provided a classified briefing on the threat to members of 

the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

Senate. 


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(11) On June 5, 2023, the executive branch provided a classified briefing on the threat to staff of the 

Committee on Banking of the Senate and the Committee 

on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. 

(12) In June 2023, at the request of the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the intelligence community provided a classified threat briefing open to all Members of the House of 

Representatives. 

(13) On November 15, 2023, elements of the intelligence community provided a classified briefing to the 

Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on, 

inter alia, the Peoples Republic of China’s conduct of 

global foreign malign influence operations, including 

through platforms such as TikTok. 

Whereas Congress and the executive branch are of one mind 

on the risks presented by TikTok’s data collection practices: 

(1) On May 15, 2019, the President issued an Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, which 

stated that ‘‘unrestricted acquisition or use in the United 

States of information and communications technology or 

services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied 

by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries . . . constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 

States’’. 

(2) On June 9, 2021, the President issued an Executive Order on Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data 


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from Foreign Adversaries, which stated that ‘‘[f]oreign 

adversary access to large repositories of United States 

persons’ data also presents a significant risk.’’ The EO 

stated that ‘‘the United States must act to protect 

against the risks associated with connected software applications that are designed, developed, manufactured, or 

supplied by persons owned or controlled by, or subject to 

the jurisdiction or direction of, a foreign adversary’’. 

(3) In May 2019, in connection with a review by the 

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 

(CFIUS), a company based in the PRC agreed to divest 

its interest in a popular software application reportedly 

due to concerns relating to potential access by the PRC 

to American user data from the application. 

(4) On July 8, 2020, then-National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, stated that the CCP uses TikTok 

and other PRC-owned applications to collect personal, 

private, and intimate data on Americans to use ‘‘for malign purposes’’. 

(5) On August 14, 2020, the President found ‘‘there 

is credible evidence . . . that ByteDance, Ltd. . . . 

might take action that threatens to impair the national 

security of the United States’’. 

(6) In February 2023, the Deputy Attorney General, 

Lisa Monaco, stated, ‘‘Our intelligence community has 

been very clear about [the CCP’s] efforts and intention 

to mold the use of [TikTok] using data in a worldview 

that is completely inconsistent with our own.’’. Deputy 

Attorney General Monaco also stated, ‘‘I don’t use 

TikTok and I would not advise anybody to do so because 

of [national security] concerns’’. 

(7) On July 13, 2022, Federal Communications 

Commission Commissioner, Brendan Carr, testified beVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:33 Mar 07, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HR1051.IH HR1051

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fore the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives that ‘‘there is a unique set of national security concerns when it comes to [TikTok]’’. 

(8) On March 23, 2023, the Secretary of State, 

Antony Blinken, testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that TikTok 

is a threat to national security that should be ‘‘ended one 

way or another’’. 

Whereas the executive branch has sought to address the risks 

identified above through requiring ByteDance to divest 

its ownership of TikTok: 

(1) On August 14, 2020, the President issued an 

Executive order directing ByteDance to divest any assets 

or property used to enable or support ByteDance’s operation of the TikTok application in the United States and 

any data obtained or derived from TikTok application or 

Musical.ly application users in the United States. The 

Order, however, remains the subject of litigation. 

(2) On August 6, 2020, the President issued an Executive order (E.O. 13942) that directed the Secretary of 

Commerce to take actions that would have prohibited certain transactions related to TikTok in 45 days if 

ByteDance failed to divest its ownership of TikTok. The 

companies and content creators using the TikTok mobile 

application filed lawsuits challenging those prohibitions, 

as a result of which two district courts issued preliminary 

injunctions enjoining the prohibitions. 

(3) Following the multiple judicial rulings that enjoined the executive branch from enforcing the regulations contemplated in E.O. 13942, on June 9, 2021, the 

President issued a new Executive order that rescinded 

E.O. 13942, and directed the Secretary of Commerce to 


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more broadly assess and take action, where possible, 

against connected software applications that pose a 

threat to national security. 

Whereas Congress has passed, and the executive branch has 

implemented, a ban on ByteDance-controlled applications 

like TikTok from Government devices because of the national security threat such applications pose; even so, the 

application’s widespread popularity limits the effectiveness of this step: 

(1) Prior to 2022, several Federal agencies, including the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland 

Security, had issued orders banning TikTok on devices 

for which those specific agencies are responsible. 

(2) On December 29, 2022, following its adoption by 

Congress, the President signed into law a bill banning 

the use of TikTok on Government devices due to the national security threat posed by the application under its 

current ownership. 

(3) A majority of States in the United States have 

also banned TikTok on State government devices due to 

the national security threat posed by the application 

under its current ownership. 

(4) To date, as long as TikTok is subject to the 

ownership or control of ByteDance, no alternative to preventing or prohibiting TikTok’s operation of the application in the United States has been identified that would 

be sufficient to address the above-identified risks. 

(5) The national security risks arise from and are 

related to the ownership or control of TikTok by a foreign adversary controlled company. Severing ties to such 

foreign adversary controlled company, for example by a 

full divestment, would mitigate such risks. 


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(6) As has been widely reported, TikTok, Inc. has 

proposed an alternative, a proposal referred to as 

‘‘Project Texas,’’ which is an initiative to try and satisfy 

concerns relating to TikTok’s handling of United States 

user data. 

(A) Under the proposal, United States user 

data would be stored in the United States, using the 

infrastructure of a trusted third party. 

(B) That initiative would have allowed the application algorithm, source code, and development 

activities to remain in China under ByteDance’s 

control and subject to PRC laws, albeit subject to 

proposed safeguards relating to cloud infrastructure 

and other data security concerns. Project Texas 

would also have allowed ByteDance to continue to 

have a role in certain aspects of TikTok’s United 

States operations. 

(C) Project Texas would have allowed TikTok 

to continue to rely on the engineers and back-end 

support in China to update its algorithms and the 

source code needed to run the TikTok application in 

the United States. 

(D) Allowing code development in and access to 

United States user data from China potentially exposes United States users to malicious code, backdoor vulnerabilities, surreptitious surveillance, and 

other problematic activities tied to source code development. 

(E) Allowing back-end support, code development, and operational activities to remain in China 

would also require TikTok to continue to send 

United States user data to China to update the machine learning algorithms and source code for the 


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application, and to conduct related back-end services, like managing users’ accounts. 

(7) On January 31, 2024, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified 

before the Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist 

Party of the House of Representatives that TikTok gives 

the PRC ‘‘the ability to control data collection on millions 

of users, which can be used for all sorts of intelligence 

operations or influence operations,’’ and ‘‘the ability, 

should they so choose, to control the software on millions 

of devices, which means the opportunity to technically 

compromise millions of devices’’. 

(8) The risks posed by TikTok’s data collection 

would be addressed by the Protecting Americans from 

Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, despite 

the potential that the PRC might purchase similar types 

of data from private data brokers. 

(9) The degree of risk posed by TikTok has increased alongside the application’s immense popularity in 

the United States. 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives has de2 termined that ByteDance and TikTok pose an unaccept3 able risk to the national security of the United States. 

Æ 


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