AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Quality Air Force

in an Emergency

Leadership Principles and Concepts

for Emergency Response Forces

DAVID F. BIRD JR.

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 2

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 1996
Air University

Jay W. Kelley, Lt Gen, Commander

Air War College

D. Bruce Smith, Maj Gen, Commandant

Ronald J. Kurth, PhD, Dean

Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Series Editor

Gail Arnott, Col, Essay Advisor

Air University Press

Allan W. Howey, Col, Director

Bessie Varner, Content Editor

Carolyn McCormack, Copy Editor

Prepress Production: Linda Colson

Cover Design: Daniel Armstrong

Please send inquiries or comments to:

Editor

The Maxwell Papers

Air War College

Bldg 1401

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427

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Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related

concepts. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily

reflect the official opinion of the Department of the Air Force or the Air War College.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use

quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout

the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds

us that these quality principles apply to emergency response

forces----both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior

leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creat -

ing an environment to spark the highest performance by their

subordinates and not as giving up authority or control.

At wing level, the disaster control group forms in response

to a crisis incident ranging from an aircraft accident to natura l

disasters. Quality concepts and tools apply to this emergency

response organization’s plans, priorities, and the way it inter -

acts with the many different agencies involved in a major

complex crisis. Therefore, Bird expounds, senior leaders or

potential on-scene commanders should see quality as a stra -

tegic, integrated system with a leadership style that involves

everyone in the organization in controlling and continuously

improving ways to stabilize the incident.

Colonel Bird believes that quality concepts such as organizational vision, strategic planning, management by fact, customer

focus, and continuous improvement can turn an emergency

response force into a world-class organization. The USAF has

recognized the benefits of quality management principles and

has incorporated them into restructuring the service. The new

objective wing embodies sound quality concepts and should

permeate all functional areas in the Air Force. Hence, Bird

concludes, there is a need for a new type of emergency response

force that strengthens the chain of command, decentralizes

power, consolidates resources under a single commander,

streamlines the structure, and clarifies functional responsibilities

between squadrons. He describes such an emergency response

force structure within the chapters of this study.

D. BRUCE SMITH

Major General, USAF

Commandant

Air War College

iii

About the Author

Lt Col David F. Bird Jr. (BS, civil engineering, The Cita -

del; MBA, Michigan University) has been a career civil engi -

neering officer since 1978. He has held civil engineering

positions at base, major command, and Air Staff levels and

has served in planning and programming, construction,

environmental management, and inspector general functional areas. He has been the executive officer to the Air

Force Civil Engineer and a squadron commander. Colonel

Bird has been assigned in Tactical Air Command, Military

Airlift Command, Pacific Air Forces, and Air Combat Com -

mand both stateside and overseas. He has been involved in

over 15 aircraft incidents, natural disasters, and major re -

sponse operations. His duties on these responses have

ranged from surveying and mapping officer to squadron

operations officer to the on-site commander for the disaster

control group. He is a registered professional engineer in

the state of South Carolina and a licensed land surveyor in

the state of Louisiana. Colonel Bird is a graduate of Squad -

ron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and

the Air War College----all in residence.

v
Quality Air Force in an Emergency

The secret of a leader lies in the tests he has faced over the whole

course of his life and the habit of action he develops in meeting those

tests.

----Mikhail Gorbachev

It’s 1410 hours on a sunny and clear Wednesday after -

noon. You have just left the wing staff meeting, and you stop

in the hallway to talk with the other squadron commanders

before leaving the building. After a few minutes you leave,

looking forward to getting back to the squadron and going

over the notes you have just taken at the meeting. You hear

that familiar paging call on the fire crash net over your radio

as you walk to your car. After carrying a ‘‘brick’’ for over two

years, you’ve gotten used to the page. However, you still listen

to the first part of the broadcast to hear what type of emer -

gency the fire department is responding to. This time the

alarm-room operator is speaking quickly with some urgency

in his voice when he says, ‘‘Tower notifies us that two pilots

have ejected over the airfield, an F-16 is going down, and

parachutes are over the field!’’ The operations assistant fire

chief is across the runway training with the majority of the

firefighters in an abandoned facility. He answers the announcement with, ‘‘Control----Chief 3. I see the parachutes

and a large column of smoke on the southwest parking

ramp. We are responding.’’

After hearing this conversation on the radio, your atten -

tion has changed from the drive back to the squadron to

arriving at the incident scene. Driving to the flight line, you

monitor the crash net and hear Chief 3’s reports of secon -

dary explosions and requests for mutual aid from the local

county and city fire and ambulance companies. As you

turn the corner onto the flight line, you see a large smoke

plume rising into the sky. Then you hear the fire chief

announce that he has arrived at the incident and sees a

C-141 aircraft on fire and that he is assuming command as

the incident commander. You are somewhat relieved that

Chief 1 is near the scene. As you arrive at the incident, you

establish the on-scene command-and-control point and

prepare for the arrival of the group commander and the

1
disaster control group (DCG). This DCG contains 15--20

personnel from different agencies on base that will form

the command-and-control structure for the on-scene re -

sponse force at the incident.

You take a minute and look around the area. What you see

is a C-141 aircraft completely engulfed in flames with what

seems to be over 20 different fire trucks spraying foam on the

fire. You also notice aircraft debris spread across the parking

ramp, damaged buildings nearby, and some small fires in a

group of buildings across the ramp. Yet you do not see the

F-16 or a smoke plume from a crash site. You radio Chief 1

and tell him the location of the DCG. You also request an

update on the F-16’s status and location. The tower inter -

rupts you to announce that a C-130 has declared an in-flight

emergency with flight control problems due to a midair colli -

sion with the F-16. The tower goes on to say that the C-130

will be landing on the runway in two minutes. Meanwhile,

Chief 1 responds informing you that the F-16 appears to

have broken up into small pieces near the buildings across

the ramp, and he sees over 100 people injured, with at least

25 fatalities. You ask Chief 1 what available fire equipment

will respond to the emergency landing of the C-130. He re -

plies that no crash fire equipment is available. Your boss, the

group commander, then arrives to assume the on-scene com -

mander’s duties.

As the group commander arrives, you exchange information concerning the incident. You begin an update, telling

him first that there is a large-frame-aircraft fire involving a

C-141 parked on the ramp completely engulfed with flames

but with no indications of victims. However, there appears to

be a mass casualty situation involving 100 victims ----with

over 25 fatalities----across the ramp where the F-16 came to

rest. The two pilots in the F-16 have ejected and their condi -

tion is unknown. Finally, we have an in-flight emergency

involving a C-130 with flight control problems as a result of a

midair collision with the F-16. The C-130 is on final ap -

proach to the airfield and there is no firefighting equipment

available to respond to the runway.1

 The group commander

now questions you and asks, ‘‘What do we do next?’’

The group commander’s question is not a call for what

direction to give the emergency response forces. Instead, it is

2 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
a call for the leadership principles and concepts senior offi -

cers or on-scene commanders use in an emergency situation.

This leader faces the daunting task of bringing together a

multiagency disaster control group in the middle of a crisis to

stabilize a major emergency incident. The answer to the onscene commander’s question is to apply sound quality princi -

ples, techniques, and leadership concepts as a way to control

the incident. There are clear reasons why sound quality leader -

ship styles, and not other leadership styles of the past, apply.

From a senior leader’s perspective, quality concepts and principles do apply to emergency response forces both before and

during an emergency incident.

The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and

use quality principles as a way to improve our operations

throughout the service.2 The first place for senior leaders or

on-scene commanders to start is with the leadership style

that is appropriate in a crisis situation. This paper does

not define leadership in a crisis but assesses whether the

quality leadership model is appropriate for leading an

emergency response force.

There are a multitude of quality concepts defined by

leadership and management experts like Deming, Juran,

and Baldrige that apply to business. Emergency response

forces can and should use these same quality business

practices to improve their performance. This paper ex -

plores how best to use quality concepts for emergency re -

sponse forces and proposes a new organization for the

wing-level emergency response force. The Air Force needs

to change the way we lead, organize, and execute disaster

responses. Using sound quality principles is a good start.

Leadership Styles

Blessed are the people whose leaders can look destiny in the eye

without flinching but also without attempting to play God.

----Henry Kissinger

Years of Upheaval

A quality-focused organization can be very effective in

emergency responses and adapt to the dynamic challenges

it faces during a crisis. However, most people placed in a

BIRD 3
leadership position during a crisis will resort to a very

‘‘authoritative’’ approach versus a ‘‘decentralized’’ one. This

is understandable because of the way a crisis is charac -

terized. In a crisis, leaders are surprised. They feel they

must make decisions rapidly and that their superiors must

make decisions at the highest levels in the organization. 3

Also, many people assigned to lead emergency response

organizations as the on-scene commander have little or no

experience in a crisis situation. It is vital that senior leaders

not change their leadership style or tear down the chain of

command. Ideally, in a crisis, empowerment, planning,

trust, teamwork, and the chain of command must work

unimpeded.

Quality Skeptics

Skeptics of the total quality management (TQM) concept

that is reinventing government, sweeping public business,

and being implemented throughout the Air Force might say

that using quality in an emergency is absurd. Many skep -

tics believe quality stops when a crisis starts. 4

 They believe

that during an emergency there is no time to pull out the

‘‘Pareto charts’’ or form a ‘‘process action team’’ to make

group decisions. Quality can easily apply to business under -

takings when there is a widget to sell or a profit sheet to

balance. Most skeptics believe quality could never apply to

combat or emergency operations.

When faced with an emergency or crisis situation, most

leaders will personally take charge and control every detail

of the situation. Many senior leaders in the Air Force, espe -

cially current group commanders who came through the

ranks in the shadow of macho leaders from the past, have

a direct command-and-control mentality and try to micro -

manage each and every aspect of emergency response ef -

forts. At many Air Force installations, when the disaster

control group forms at an incident site, the on-scene com -

mander will require each member to stand on a placard on

the ground.5

 In addition, communications between DCG

members are all channeled through this commander.

These procedures are in place to allow the on-scene com -

mander to control every decision concerning the incident.

4 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
Many times this micromanagement type of leadership is

a result of unfamiliarity with emergency response opera -

tions. These leaders are ‘‘rookies’’ in the position of the

on-scene commander but hold very senior rank in the Air

Force and have many years of experience in leadership

positions. They are also first-time leaders in this type of

crisis since the vast majority of senior officers in the Air

Force are not former firefighters, medics, or security police

officers. Senior leaders in the Air Force come from an officer

corps made up of broadly experienced professionals ----not

technicians. On-scene commanders who use this commandand-control mentality in a complex situation like a major

emergency response will fail. They will fail because they

tend to rely exclusively on their own intelligence, past ex -

perience, and the perception they have of this chaos. 6

Senior leaders on an emergency response force should see

quality as an environment to create and not as giving up

authority or control. According to Gen Ronald R. Fogleman,

chief of staff of the Air Force, leaders create a climate in

which everyone can contribute to the maximum of their po -

tential. But the skeptics argue that leaders in a crisis, facing

a fast-paced situation where immediate action is required,

should resort to the traditional authoritative form of leader -

ship and decision making. For them, the quality method of

decision making that uses thorough analysis, participation,

and consensus building would not be appropriate. 7

 However,

this view of leadership applies only at the tactical level of an

emergency response. Quality concepts would not necessarily

apply when fire chiefs are setting up fire attack operations on

a burning C-141. Moreover, fire chiefs must demand clear

and concise compliance with their directions and decisions

during an actual fire attack operation. Everyone under their

command must obey without hesitation orders on where fire -

fighting equipment will stage and who will set up on the

aircraft without hesitation.

Senior leaders and potential on-scene commanders

should view quality in a much broader sense during a

major emergency response. Quality applies to how an emergency response organization plans, prioritizes, and inter -

acts with the many different agencies involved in a major

complex response. Therefore, quality should be seen as a

BIRD 5
strategically integrated system with a leadership style that

is applied before and during an emergency response.

Quality Operating Styles

In the Air Force, Quality Air Force (QAF) is a leadership

commitment and operational style that inspires trust,

teamwork, and continuous improvement.8

 It involves everyone in an organization in controlling and continuously im -

proving how work is performed.9

 An emergency response

organization is no different as it applies quality concepts

toward its business undertaking of emergency responses.

The functional organizations around the Air Force installa -

tion come together and form the disaster control group

made up of medical, security, firefighting, environmental,

aircraft maintenance, legal, public affairs, engineering, and

command-and-control personnel. The commander of this

disaster control group applies a quality leadership style

that teaches, encourages, sets the vision, and creates an

environment for outstanding productivity both during and

before an emergency. Gen John Michael Loh, commander

of Air Combat Command, says ‘‘leadership is the art of

inspiring others to achieve extraordinary goals and levels

of performance. It creates trust, which leads to teamwork

and the ability to work toward continuous improvement

together in a mission-oriented way, rather than a function -

ally oriented way.’’

10

The quality style of leadership for the on-scene com -

mander must be to focus all functional areas on the inci -

dent and to ensure there are no barriers to carrying out

each functional area’s mission. Quality leadership requires

restructuring the relationships between workers and leaders. Initial on-scene personnel responding to an emergency

will be midgrade civilians or noncommissioned officers

(NCO) making the early strategic decisions on how to stabi -

lize the incident. These strategic decisions can have a longterm effect on the total outcome of the emergency. This

initial response force could be one fire truck, a security

police patrol car, and one ambulance vehicle led by the

operations assistant fire chief. Senior leaders must fully

empower, train, and hold these personnel accountable.

Many times they will be the only ones to respond, because

6 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
the simplicity of the incident will allow them to stabilize it

without any more help. If the incident becomes more com -

plex, leaders could use a building-block approach by call -

ing upon those functions in the emergency response force

needed for a specific type of incident. 11 The on-scene commander’s job is not to direct and coordinate. If the buildingblock approach is to work, the senior leader must get everyone not only to think about their specialty but about how

to integrate their work with the overall focus on the inci -

dent. This is not the dictatorial, authoritative leadership

style so often taken by on-scene commanders in a crisis.

Instead, the leader’s job should be to shift from performing

the coordination to creating the environment that allows

other people to work productively and coordinate their own

activities.12

Applying Quality Principles

People ask the difference between a leader and a boss. . . . The

leader works in the open and the boss in covert. The leader leads,

and the boss drives.

----Theodore Roosevelt

QAF principles and techniques provide the tools to im -

prove the operations of an organization. This also applies

to an emergency response force made up of a multitude of

military and civilian agencies formed at the base during a

crisis. The quality concepts that apply are organizational

vision, strategic planning, management by fact, customer

focus, and continuous improvement. These concepts have

a proven track record in world-class organizations around

the globe and can apply to emergency response forces.

Organizational Vision

An organizational vision serves as the catalyst to accom -

plish the mission. Thomas E. Cronin, in his book Military

Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, says a vision provides an

organization and its members ‘‘a clear sense of direction . . .,

serves to clarify problems and choices, . . . builds morale . . .,

and provides possibilities and promise.’’ For subordinates to

BIRD 7
relate themselves to the unit, every leader of an organiza -

tion must have a vision.

An emergency response organization does not work to -

gether from day to day. That is why everyone must know

clearly the on-scene commander’s vision before they arrive

at the incident. A vision for emergency response organiza -

tions could be ‘‘Eliminate hazards, save lives, and protect

resources.’’ This vision sets the commander’s direction for

the responding team. It says first, the team will not place

any responding personnel in harm’s way until the hazards

are removed. It sets the tone of safety so response forces

help in the solution and do not become part of the prob -

lem. Second, it asserts that team members place a high

value on human lives with their concentrated efforts to

rescue anyone in danger. Last, the team will protect equip -

ment and facilities. Since every response is different, this

vision is broad enough to set strategic priorities for plan -

ning before the incident and to allow a framework where

tactical decisions can be made at the incident.

Strategic Planning

Strategic planning takes the vision and moves it into

action. There should be many levels of strategic planning

within the Air Force; only then can ideas, innovation, and

new approaches to mission accomplishment take hold in

an organization.13 QAF concepts for a wing-level strategic

plan must include the mission, vision, values, goals, objec -

tives, and action plans.14 The emergency response organization on base includes many different units within the Air

Force and the local and state government jurisdiction. De -

ciding goals, objectives, and action plans for the group

before an incident response is an invaluable practice.

Traditional strategic planning models can align and re -

view plans for emergency responses. Emergency incidents

are very complex these days because of hazardous materials

in aircraft composites, industrial shops on base, and the

chance for mass casualties in aircraft accidents. Emer -

gency forces available on an installation are undermanned

and underequipped; this results in the need for mutual aid

from local off-base organizations in the vast majority of

incidents.15 Available on-base firefighting equipment and

8 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
manpower, security personnel for area control, and medi -

cal treatment and transportation assets are not sufficient

for most major accidents or natural disasters. Therefore, a

sound gap analysis that assesses current capabilities to

meet the most probable scenario would generate clear re -

quirements for mutual aid from off-base emergency re -

sponse assets to an on-base response.

A sound strategic plan could provide advance warning

where the most likely incidents would occur. The plan would

identify where the dangerous materials are stored or used on

base, the routes most traveled by vehicles containing hazard -

ous materials, and potential aircraft accident zones associ -

ated with airfields. The plan could also determine the capa -

bilities needed before an emergency arose at an incident site

involving hazardous materials. Action plans developed as the

result of strategic planning efforts would identify equipment

items such as dump trucks, evacuation distances, type of

firefighting agent, and the decontamination methods needed

at a given incident site. Also, since Air Force aircraft involve

hazardous materials like hydrazine, a plan with goals and

objectives on how to stabilize the incident would benefit the

initial response crew. From an action plan, teams could de -

velop specific functional plans across all the areas and agen -

cies assigned to the response organizations before an accident involving hydrazine. The disaster response group’s

senior leadership would determine what additional firefight -

ing equipment, ambulances, and security forces were needed

from downtown assets and set in place the agreements with

local government agencies. Such arrangements would also

allow downtown agencies to train with on-base emergency

response forces. Then all initial responding elements would

be fully empowered to call for a particular ‘‘set’’ of augmentation without any bureaucratic approvals. Formal strategic

planning would determine mission requirements, objectives,

and action plans, resulting in more effective operations.

Customer Focus

Focusing on the customer is the highest priority for emer -

gency response forces. The bottom line of quality is ‘‘providing customers what they expect to receive.’’

16 Thus, no

customer’s desires, expectations, or preconceived notions

BIRD 9
should go unattended. Customers are anyone who receives

what the emergency response force is producing----incident

stabilization.17 This type of customer is thought of as external. There are also internal customers, who belong to organizations within the emergency response force. This type

of customer may depend on work or may produce work

that the emergency response force uses. 18 The emergency

response force’s understanding of quality must never differ

from that of their customers’.

Customers of an emergency response force are receiving

a service intended to save lives and protect resources. This

service involves the basic tenet of quality where achieving

or reaching for the highest standards is based on perform -

ance versus being satisfied with sloppy or fraudulent out -

comes.19 The emergency response force must provide its

product under many different conditions. On an Air Force

installation this may mean providing incident stabilization

for

• large-frame-aircraft incidents such as C-5s, C-141s,

or KC-10s involving up to 300 mass casualties;

• small-frame-aircraft incidents such as F-16s, F-15s,

or F-117s involving explosive munitions and deadly

hazardous materials;

• structural fires on base in large industrial shops;

• natural disasters from severe weather that includes

flooding, thunderstorms, or tornadoes;

• bomb threats involving hostages;

• nuclear-weapon incidents;

• vehicle accidents with trapped passengers or vehicles

transporting hazardous materials; and

• base-housing-area emergencies.

Senior leaders must ensure the external customer is

clearly defined in each of these possible incidents. They

must also set the standards of performance using quality

as a system of economically producing emergency services

to satisfy customer requirements.20

Internal customers must be satisfied by receiving products

or services conforming to their requirements. Thus internal

customers greatly impact the way emergency response

forces satisfy external customers. The disaster control

10 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
group comes together at a time of crisis, each member

bringing a special contribution to the mission. Senior leaders

must ensure that internal products or services are com -

bined to produce the highest quality performance to sup -

port the organization. This is accomplished when barriers

are removed between all the functional areas and everyone

is focused on the mission. By removing barriers between

functional areas, senior leaders empower this multiagency

response force. Most importantly, when the assistant operations fire chief----a midgrade civilian or NCO----calls for a

tow truck from the transportation motor pool, he can ex -

pect immediate service. Motor pool personnel must be em -

powered with the authority to respond to this request with -

out needing approval up their functional chain of

command. Stabilizing this particular incident may require

the motor pool to support the fire chief. In many cases, the

more we understand the needs of our ‘‘downstream customers,’’ the better the whole process works. 21

The one factor that makes customer focus more difficult

for emergency services is the element of danger. Over the

past 10 years in the United States, an average of 200 fire -

fighter fatalities and more than 100,000 injuries have oc -

curred per year.22 In a single year alone, over 6,100 victims

died in fire incidents and over 95,000 were injured, with

total property loss of $15 billion. 23 In the face of such violence and danger, response teams should do everything

possible to support customer requests. For the emergency

response force, no customer expectation is too strenuous,

too extreme, or too outrageous.

Management by Fact

Management by fact means the quality leader makes

decisions based on data, not guesswork. 24 This quality

concept is very important to an emergency response force,

since it would not place a human life in danger based on

hunches. Management by fact requires leaders to look for

root causes of problems rather than react to superficial

symptoms. The focus is on improving products and services

by improving how work gets done (the methods) instead of

simply what is done (the results). 25

BIRD 11
Approaching this complex emergency-response-force organization from a ‘‘results only’’ perspective would cause its

failure. New on-scene commanders have a tendency to meas -

ure activity and not production of the emergency services.

For example, some would say that a good measure of merit

would be how fast you can put a fire out from the time you

arrive at an incident. However, in some cases, emergency

response forces would let the fire burn out on its own rather

than attack it with water. To the layman, this tactic seems

inappropriate to the job of incident stabilization. On the con -

trary, sometimes putting water on burning hazardous mate -

rials produces a mixture that creates a larger environmental

clean-up spill than just allowing it to burn off into the atmos -

phere. In addition, some senior leaders have the ‘‘crash-anddash’’ mentality. They believe a good measure of merit is how

fast you can get everyone to an incident after you have been

notified. This indicator does you no good if you run up to an

incident faster than anyone else with the wrong crews. Emer -

gency response organizations should not look at results indi -

cators related to the final output. Rather they should look at

how the processes are performing in providing the services. 26

Senior leaders or potential on-scene commanders

should emphasize the methods within this total system of

emergency services. The interrelationships between firefighting, medical treatment or transportation, security control, environmental mitigation, command-and- control, explosive disposal, and engineering services are complex and

very interdependent. If senior leaders focus only on the

results, then little if any attention is paid to the processes

and systems that are the real capabilities of the emergency

response force.27 Senior leaders should focus on what

training people are receiving and how it is being integrated

with local and state response organizations. Is the equip -

ment fully operational and being maintained and up -

graded? What is the overall readiness of each of the units

that come together in a time of crisis?

Senior leaders or potential on-scene commanders have a

natural tendency to look for blame when a mishap occurs

during incident stabilization. Dr Joseph M. Juran pointed

out many years ago how incorrect the widely held belief

was that an organization would have very few problems if

12 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
only workers would do their jobs right. He pointed out that

the potential to eliminate mistakes lies mostly in improving

the system through which work is done, not in changing

the workers.28

Continuous Improvement

Continuous improvement provides the emergency response force with a long-term perspective in all its activi -

ties.29 The philosophy of an emergency response force ----like

all quality efforts----should be to constantly strive to improve. To do otherwise would engender a sense of compla -

cency, which leads to stagnation, which leads to ruin. 30

However, for an organization that functions only when a

crisis occurs, continuous improvement is very difficult to

achieve. The needed focus should be on goals and objec -

tives that support the vision defined in strategic planning.

Items to address include the level of equipment on hand

for specialized response teams; incident reporting times by

initial response teams; training for hazardous materials

accidents; and interoperability with local, state, and federal agencies. Senior leaders should create a consistency of

purpose to motivate a prosperous organization for longterm growth rather than short-term goals. 31

Investing in training and people will result in organiza -

tional growth. So often, units that perform day-to-day emer -

gency responses, such as the fire department, security po -

lice, and hospital, will train extensively on the tactics to

stabilize an incident. However, when a major incident that

requires many different agencies on an installation or a

downtown jurisdictional issue evolves, we find the emer -

gency response force disjointed and misguided. The emer -

gency response force must train frequently under the most

realistic conditions. This should involve all of the agencies

that make up the disaster control group as well as local

and state organizations. The emergency response force

must be trained to trust.32 The team must trust themselves, their equipment, and their leaders to set and en -

force standards that will result in the highest level of per -

formance. Training ultimately must result in people’s being

able to work unsupervised and to do things right the first

time.33

BIRD 13
The centerpiece for continuous improvement is people.

Many times people turn in gallant performances during a

crisis that go unrecognized. Examples of acts of courage

that often go unrewarded include a firefighting rescue crew

going into the back of a burning C-141 to see if the mainte -

nance crew got off the aircraft; a maintenance crew moving

an aircraft adjacent to a burning one to a safe distance

away; or a security policeman placing one of a hundred

burn victims in the backseat of a patrol car and taking the

victim to the hospital instead of waiting for an overtaxed

ambulance system to respond. These people often do not

receive recognition because of the fear associated with ma -

jor mishap investigations. Senior leaders should accentuate the performance of delivering this product called emer -

gency services and should not become trapped in the

search for accountability through investigative boards that

surround major mishaps. Deming’s belief that we should

eliminate fear within our organization applies to all of our

emergency response forces. In the Air Force, some people

believe that being a tyrant and threatening subordinates

exercises some tremendous power.34 The chief of staff believes we need to create a climate in which supervisors,

managers, and leaders at all levels don’t feel threatened by

new ideas and new innovations.35 The on-scene commanders

should publish a resolution that people will not lose their

jobs for their contribution to quality and productivity. 36

Senior leaders should always reward those who foster good

ideas and continuous improvement.

Continuous improvement for an emergency response

force must be part of the culture of a total quality organiza -

tion. Achieving improvement continuously does not occur

easily or quickly. It requires time, investment, and an un -

faltering commitment to respect the customer, who should

always be satisfied, and the people within the organization,

who are the critical resources. Continuous improvement

will force the emergency response force to look on quality

improvement as a long-term process that involves senior

leadership, midlevel leadership, and workers at all levels in

a continuous process. It is not a program that has a begin -

ning, a few milestones, and a conclusion. 37

14 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
A Proposed Change

 Destiny is not a matter of chance; it is a matter of choice.

----Anonymous

The Air Force as a whole has embraced the quality move -

ment and culture at many levels. In the late 1980s, the

Department of Defense saw ‘‘quality as absolutely vital to

our defense. . . .’’

38 The quality movement asked organizations to search for better ways of conducting their mis -

sions. Then in 1991, the objective-wing concept was devel -

oped and implemented throughout the Air Force. The main

purpose was to restructure the Air Force in a way that

reflects vision, incorporates modern management practices

associated with the quality movement, and builds combat

capability.39 It is now time for the emergency response

forces to change the way they do business ----to apply quality concepts. Now is the time to change the structure of the

old way emergency response forces delivered their product

and to reinvent it as an organization better in line with the

objective wing.

Air Force Restructure

The Air Force has restructured to meet its overall char -

ter of Global Reach----Global Power for the nation. To implement this strategy, the Air Force has undergone vast

changes in its goals and organization. This restructuring

occurred at the same time that the Air Force was receiving

smaller budgets. Reinventing the Air Force focused on

ways to improve combat capability and to increase peace -

time effectiveness. Reinventing was not seen as the same

thing as incremental change. Reinvention amounts to a

break with the past, a transformation. What should emerge

at the end is something really new. A 1991 Air Force white

paper stated that the reinventing of the Air Force had five

basic themes:

1. Make every effort to strengthen the chain of com -

mand through better alignment of responsibility,

authority, and accountability.

2. Decentralize, with the flow of power and people out

of headquarters and into the field. Large staffs are a

BIRD 15
thing of the past; the people in the field will be more

empowered to operate as teams with more authority

over how they function.

3. Consolidate resources under a single field commander

who has responsibility for a particular mission.

4. Streamline and flatten our structure by removing unnecessary layers to improve reaction time and process.

5. Clarify functional responsibilities with a view toward

untangling those organizational lines that have be -

come confused over the years.40

This new objective wing strategy became known as ‘‘one

wing, one base, one boss.’’

41 This strategy has squadron

commanders working for group commanders who work for

the wing commander. Hence, the wing commander is the

sole commander charged with responsibility to carry out

the mission of the installation. The objective-wing strategy

also made the squadron the point of executing the mission

or the fighting unit of the Air Force. This new objective

wing embodies the quality principles of teamwork, ac -

countability, and empowerment.

The Air Force’s quality movement aims at continuous

change and, more fundamentally, institutionalized change.

Changes to the way we practice different enterprises within

the Air Force have not permeated all functional areas. This

lack of change to align with the concepts of the objective

wing and the quality movement is evident in the way emer -

gency response forces operate.

A Need to Change

The management and organization of the emergency re -

sponse forces within the Air Force have not made any insti -

tutionalized changes. The vast majority of emergency re -

sponse forces are organized as outlined in Air Force

Regulation 355-1, Disaster Preparedness.

42 This same organization was described in this regulation in 1974. The

organization dictated in this regulation is directly opposite

to the objective-wing themes. As shown in figure 1, the

objective wing completely disbands the chain of command

established within the wing when an emergency occurs. At

the first moment of an incident, the disaster control group

16 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
comes together from a multitude of different squadrons,

each with its own functional areas. The squadron com -

mander is seen as just another functional area ----not as

within the chain of command to the on-scene commander.

For example, the mortuary affairs officer is a function of

the services squadron that works with that commander

day to day. The squadron commander knows the strengths

and weaknesses of mortuary affairs. Yet during an emer -

gency, the mortuary affairs officer reports directly to the

on-scene commander----with complete disregard for the

chain of command. This type of organization weakens the

chain of command and completely disrupts the responsi -

bility, authority, and accountability of all the squadrons

that come together to form the DCG.

The on-scene commander personally assumes the re -

sponsibility for stabilizing the incident by eliminating the

efforts of the total organization. The concept of a single

field commander who has all of the resources and respon -

sibility for a particular mission is embodied by this type of

organization. However, this kind of organization is set up

for failure because of its complexity. The on-scene com -

mander under this kind of organization has about 25 indi -

viduals reporting to him, creating a large span of control.

According to the National Fire Protection Association, the

industry standard for an effective span of control during a

crisis is five to seven individuals. 43 The on-scene comFigure 1. Old Disaster Control Group Organization

BIRD 17
mander makes all of the decisions and is the bottleneck for

information flow between functional areas.

This type of disaster control group will cause no flow of

power into the lowest level of the organization. Each of the

disaster control group’s functional areas are aligned under

the on-scene commander. This lack of empowerment hampers the efficiency of the emergency response forces. It also

creates an environment for the on-scene commander to

have a command-and-control mentality. This leadership

style will stifle an organization by not allowing the normal

teams within each squadron to operate with any authority.

The on-scene commanders in this situation are senior offi -

cers with many years of experience in leadership positions.

However, they will fall into a dictatorial and informationaloverload leadership style during a crisis under this type of

organization. The on-scene commander will try to make

every decision, to control the information flow, and to have

everyone in the emergency response force reporting to him

without regard to the chain of command. This type of

emergency response force organization lacks the precepts

of sound quality concepts.

A Proposal

A new organization is needed, one that is based on qual -

ity concepts and industry standards. Using the objectivewing themes, I propose an emergency response force as

outlined in figure 2. This new organization for the disaster

control group strengthens the chain of command, decentralizes power, consolidates resources under a single commander, streamlines the structure, and clarifies functional

responsibilities between squadrons.

The new organization is flexible enough to apply to any

emergency incident from aircraft accidents to natural dis -

asters. This structure uses the building-block approach to

determine what the organization would look like and what

type of resources are needed in a particular type of inci -

dent. Unlike the current disaster control group, the pro -

posed organization does not call for reorganizing the wing’s

chain of command at the first moment of a crisis. The

people in the organization work together the same way

during their day-to-day operations as they would during a

18 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
Fig

ure

2. N

e

w

Dis

a

ster C

o

ntrol Gro

u

p

Org

a

niz

atio

n
crisis. The everyday chain of command stays the same

when the disaster control group forms. The group com -

mander is the on-scene commander with squadron commanders reporting directly to the on-scene commander.

The squadron commanders are responsible for their func -

tional areas the same as before the DCG comes together.

Therefore, depending on the type of incident, the squadron

commanders can choose the type of functional areas they

need to respond to the incident.

This organization meets the tenets of quality and the

objective-wing strategy. The on-scene commander is the

sole commander and all of the resources are consolidated

under this single field commander to perform the mission.

This allows the commander to establish the vision, values,

and goals for the organization. The on-scene commander is

leading squadron commanders and a very large and com -

plex organization. This is normal; being placed into this job

during a crisis is not a different situation.

The commander blocks in figure 2 (at the top of the

organization chart) represent individuals at the incident

on-site command post. The subordinate blocks represent

the normal teams within a squadron that are empowered

to do their jobs in support of the mission. No longer would

everyone crowd around the fire chief’s truck to control the

incident or to search for information. Each squadron

would be performing its job with authority decentralized all

the way down to the lowest block in the organization.

Sound command and control would occur, with informa -

tion flow between the functional areas through the squad -

ron commanders to the on-scene commander as it is done

during normal operations. This new organization also re -

duces the span of control dramatically. The on-scene com -

mander supervises a manageable number of people during

a crisis, which conforms to the industry standard outlined

by the National Fire Protection Association. The organiza -

tion is also very flat, since a very small staff may go with

the on-scene commander to help in public affairs and legal

issues. Hence, we have one boss at one incident leading

commanders who understand their missions.

The concept of decentralization provides flexibility for

this type of organization. Figure 2 describes the largest and

20 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
most complex disaster control organization. This organization would activate during a major incident requiring all of

the resources outlined in figure 2. However, the initial re -

sponse forces would be much smaller, as shown in figure

3. This initial response force is fully empowered to make

the decisions needed to stabilize the incident. At most in -

stallations, the vast majority of ‘‘runs’’ by the emergency

response force consists of these functional areas. In most

cases, the on-scene commander would be the assistant

operations fire chief on duty empowered to determine if the

incident is stabilized. This midgrade civilian or NCO would

have the authority to terminate the incident at his discre -

tion. This small force would know its limits and could iden -

tify an incident type that needed more resources quickly. If

required, the on-scene commander would ask for more

resources, and the squadrons would bring the necessary

types of functional areas to the incident.

The ability to design the DCG to fit the current incident

is a major benefit. No longer would the group commander

call everyone out to an incident to find that over half of the

individuals responding are not needed for the emergency.

The DCG would configure the organization depending on

the type of crisis. A typical disaster control group might

look like figure 4 if a base were responding to a minor fuel

spill requiring containment, mitigation, and cleanup. The

natural building-block approach that adds to the initial

response force in figure 3 maintains the chain of com -

mand. Since the fire chief would most likely be the onscene commander, the new on-scene commander would

come from that chain of command to the group com -

Figure 3. Initial Response Force Organization

BIRD 21
mander. The on-scene commander would then be the civil

engineering squadron commander until more resources

are needed. Since the disaster control group would not

need the complete functions outlined in figure 2, a modi -

fied organization would be formed. This organization

would include the additional functions of bioenvironmental engineering, environmental management, and heavy

equipment from the civil engineering shops to stabilize

this type of incident. This natural adapting characteristic

clearly identifies each functional area responsibility and

untangles any lines of authority that may be confused

during a time of crisis.

This new organization capitalizes on the well-thoughtout objective wing. The disaster control group is in the

business of delivering a service that saves lives and pro -

tects resources. Emergency responses must stop being

treated by senior officers as a time to change the way they

should lead. We do not want people to check in their

brains when they come to work; thus, senior leaders

should not check in their successful leadership traits when

they come to a crisis. Let’s organize and lead as we know

Figure 4. Modified Disaster Control Group Organization

22 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
best----by focusing on the mission and the team, and by

trusting our experiences.

Conclusions

Perhaps in His wisdom the Almighty is trying to show us that a

leader may chart the way, may point out the road, but that many

leaders and many peoples must do the building.

----Eleanor Roosevelt

On the surface, applying quality principles in an emer -

gency situation may seem inappropriate. In a tactical

sense, where quick decisions must be made, the quality

precepts of thorough analysis, participation, and consensus building would not apply. However, quality is more

than charts and groupthink. It is a style of leadership that

is very appropriate to large, complex organizations. It is a

broad, strategic, integrated system of improvement that

senior leaders can effectively use to perform their missions.

Emergency organizations are large, face very complex

problems, and require heroic leadership in an environment

of chaos and danger.

The leadership style of trust, teamwork, and continuous

improvement applies to emergency organizations. It involves everyone in an organization in controlling and con -

tinuously improving performance. Ideally, the on-scene

commander applies the quality leadership precepts of

teaching, encouraging, setting the vision, and creating the

environment for outstanding productivity----before and during an emergency. This quality style of leadership will

minimize the barriers between functional areas and allow

the team to focus on the mission.

Quality concepts are tools for organizations to grow and

improve their operations both before and during an incident.

Quality concepts such as organizational vision, strategic

planning, management by fact, customer focus, and continuous improvement can turn an emergency response force into

a world-class organization. Emergency response forces can’t

afford not to deliver the product----human lives are at stake.

Setting the direction and planning for all contingencies must

be sparked by senior leadership. Senior leaders should make

BIRD 23
decisions using facts----not hunches----when responding to a

customer call, thus reducing the chance for mistakes. Fi -

nally, an emergency organization must always try to improve

its operations or it will degrade to ineffectiveness.

This paper proposes a possible organization for winglevel emergency response forces using sound quality concepts. It is based on the theme of the recent restructuring

of the Air Force using quality precepts to establish objec -

tive-wing structures. This new organization for the DCG

strengthens the chain of command, decentralizes power,

consolidates resources under a single commander, streamlines the structure, and clarifies functional responsibilities

between squadrons.

The Air Force has challenged organizations to improve

their operations. This new disaster control group organiza -

tion does just that!

Notes

1. The description of this aircraft accident is taken from a series of

after-action reports concerning an F-16, C-130, and C-141 incident on 23

March 1994 at Pope AFB, N.C.: ‘‘The Pope Incident----First Report’’ by

Jimmy Goodman, fire chief, Pope AFB, N.C.; ‘‘Initial Status Report to

HQ/ACC Battle Staff from the 23CES/CC on 25 March 1994 ’’ on emergency response efforts and costs of the aircraft accident 23 March 1994;

‘‘Alarm Room Log’’ dated 23 March 1994, Pope AFB Fire Department;

Memorandum, Department of Nursing, by Maj Patricia D. Horoho, Head

Nurse, DEM, Womack Army Medical Center, Ft Bragg, N.C., dated 6 April

1994.

2. The Quality Approach: Helping You Achieve Success in Today’s Air

Force, 2d ed. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Quality Institute, September

1994), 67.

3. Spanier, John, ‘‘The Games Policy Makers Play,’’ in Games Nations

Play, 7th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1990), 277 --281.

4. Lt Col Thomas F. Wynn Jr., ‘‘Total Quality Management and Combat Leadership: Does TQM Stop When the Bullets Start Flying? ’’ in Senior

Leaders View Quality: Selected Essays Class of 1994 (Maxwell Air Force

Base, Ala.: Air War College, 1994).

5. A call to 11 Air Force bases indicated that seven have placards they

use at incident sites to control the whereabouts of DCG members. At one

installation, they were preparing for an operational inspection and de -

cided to start this system of placards because of a new support group

commander.

6. Warren Bennis, On Becoming a Leader (Massachusetts: AddisonWesley Publishing Company, 1993), 1--11.

24 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY
7. J. Daniel Howard, ‘‘The Only Way Ahead,’’ Proceedings, June 1992,

86.

8. The Quality Approach, 1.

9. David K. Carr and Ian D. Littman, Excellence in Government: Total

Quality Management in the 1990s (Arlington, Va.: Coopers & Lybrand,

1993), 3.

10. Gen John Michael Loh, speech to the National Quality Month

Kick-Off at the Hampton Roads Quality Council, Hampton, Va., 1 October

1992.

11. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), The Incident

Command System, National Emergency Training Center, National Fire

Academy, NFA-ICS-SM, 1 August 1989, 1--6.

12. Tom Shoop, ‘‘Brave New Leadership,’’ Government Executive, July

1994, 24.

13. Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, ‘‘Creating A Strategic Vision: The Value

of Long-Range Planning,’’ Air University Review, September/October

1986, 16.

14. The Quality Approach, 23.

15. Air Force Manpower Standards (AFMS) for DMRD 967 were

changed and calculated for fire departments on Air Force installations,

considering which off-base mutual aid response would be available to

augment crews (dated 1991).

16. Dr Myron Tribus, Quality First: Selected Papers on Quality and

Productivity Improvement (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, 1987), 4.

17. Ibid., 28.

18. Ibid.

19. Barbara W. Tuchman, ‘‘The Decline of Quality,’’ New York Times

Magazine, 2 November 1980, 38.

20. David A. Garvin, Managing Quality: The Strategic and Competitive

Edge (New York: Free Press, 1988), 191--97.

21. Carr and Littman, 28.

22. FEMA, 1--4.

23. Ibid., 1--5.

24. Peter R. Scholtes et al., The Team Handbook: How to Use Teams to

Improve Quality (Madison, Wis.: Joiner Associates Inc., 1992), 1--2.

25. Ibid., 1--2.

26. Carr and Littman, 61.

27. Scholtes et al., 1--4.

28. J. M. Juran, ed., Quality Control Handbook (New York: McGrawHill, 1951), 24-8 through 24-15.

29. Lt Col Michael J. Prowse, ‘‘Total Quality Management: Good

Enough for Government Work,’’ Research Report no. AU-ARI-90-9 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1992), 50.

30. Carr and Littman, 66.

31. W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986), 24--26.

32. ‘‘ACC Quality,’’ Air Combat Command, presentation of ACC Qual -

ity to Vice President Gore in Summer 1993, 30.

33. Ibid., 30.

BIRD 25
34. Capt Robyn A. Chumley, ‘‘We’re in Good Hands,’’ Airman, January

1995, 2--7.

35. Ibid., 6.

36. Deming, 26.

37. John D. Rittenhouse, ‘‘Raising the Quality Standard in Defense

Manufacturing,’’ Defense Management Journal 22 (January--March 1993),

12--17.

38. US Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, memorandum , undated, DOD Handbook on Total Quality Management, inside front cover.

39. ‘‘Air Force Restructure,’’ Department of the Air Force white paper,

September 1991, 2.

40. Ibid., 2--3.

41. See Interim Technical Report, AL-TR-1992-0067, ‘‘Objective Wing

Alternatives and Logistics Issues’’ (Armstrong Laboratory: Frontier Technology, Inc., September 1992).

42. An informal poll of about 25 base civil engineers and 15 --20 fire

chiefs at the 1994 USAF Fire Conference revealed that most disaster

control groups were organized using AFR 355-1 with no thought to modify

it, even though AFI 32-4001 (published in May 1994) provided the flexibil -

ity to reorganize to any format.

43. FEMA, chap. 2--5.

26 QUALITY AIR FORCE IN AN EMERGENCY