Merrill’s Marauders: 

Combined Operations in 

Northern Burma in 1944 

bY 

Gary 3. Bjorge 

Printed courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of IMilitary History, 

Washington, D.C. 

Combat Studies Institute 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Bjorge, Gary 4. 

Merrillk Marauders : combined operations in northern Burma in 

1944 / by Gary J Bjorge 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references 

1. United States. Army. Composite Unit (Provisional), 5307%History. 2. World War. E939- 

1945 

Regimental histories-United States. 3. World Ww, 1939-1945-Campaigns-Burma. I. Title. 

DT67.6.B56 1966 

940.54’ 1273--&20 96-20759 

CIP 
CONTENTS 

Illustrations I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,................................... I ..,.................... _ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .._... v 

Text . . . . II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ .,........................,.......,. ~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~....~...........................................................................................~... 4x 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 54 

. . . 

Ill 
ILLUSTRATLONS 

Maps 

1. Disposition of forces, 1 December 1943 . ..~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . 9 

2. Operations in northern Hukawng Valley, January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E 5 

3. Advance to Walawbum, 23 February-4 March 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ .. . . . . . . . . . . . I .,...... 20 

4. Fight at Walawbum, 4-8 March 1944 _ .. . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ .. . . . . . t 22 

5. Xnkangahtawng, 12-23 March 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . s .. . . . . . . . . l.~ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 

6. Shaduzup and Nhpum Ca, 24-29 March 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .._.... ..^. . . . . . . . . _.. . . . . . . . 29 

7. Advance to Myitkyina, 28 April-17 May 1944 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

8. Myitkyina, 18 May-end of July 1944 .,.......... .,.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 

V 
D uring World War II, the United States fought as a member of 

the largest military coalition ever formed. Across the world, millions 

of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen joined with the fighting 

forces of other nations to defeat the Axis Powers. As they did so, 

they wrote many new chapters in the history of coalition warfare and 

combined operations. Of those chapters, none illustrates the benefits 

and the difficulties inherent in this type of warfare more vividly than 

does the story ofwhat happened to “Merrill’s Marauders” in northern 

Burma. 

“Merrill’s Marauders” is the popular name given to the U.S. 

Army’s 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) (also known by its code 

name Galahad), a regiment-sized unit organized and trained for 

long-range penetration behind enemy lines in Japanese-held Burma 

in World War II. The 5307th had a short history. Recruitment for 

the unit began on 1 September 1943, and it was disbanded on 10 

August 1944. The unit did not reach India until 3 1 October 1943 and 

was only in combat in Burma from the end of February 1944 to the 

first days of August. But during that period, the 5307th established 

an impressive record. In fighting against Japanese forces and in its 

constant struggle against disease, leeches, insects, harsh terrain, and 

the weather, the “Marauders” earned the following Distinguished 

Unit Citation: 

The 5307th Composite Unit (Prov) was the first United States 

ground combat force to meet the enemy in World War II on the 

continent of Asia. After a series of successful engagements in the 

Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys of North Burma, in March and April 

1944, the unit was called on to lead a march over jungle trails through 

extremely mountainous terrain against stubborn resistance in an attack 

on Myitkyina. The unit proved equal its task, overcame all the obstacles put in its way by the enemy, and the weather and, after a brilliant 

operation 17 May 1944, seized the airfield at Myitkyina, an objective 

of great tacticai importance in the campaign, and assisted in the capture 

of Myitkyina on 3 August 1944. The successful accomplishment of 

this mission marks the 5307th Composite Unit (Prov) as an outstanding 

combat force and reflects great credit on Allied Arms.’ 

1 
2 

The accomplishments of the 5307th, however, were achieved at a 

tremendous human cost. The total strength of the unit at the beginning 

of its operations was 2,997 officers and men. Because some of the 

men received rear-echelon assignments such as parachute riggers and 

“kickers’“(i.e., men who kicked bundIes of supplies out of transport 

aircraft during air drops), the actual number of men who set out on 

the first mission on 24 February was 2,750. Af%er this operation 

ended with the capture of Walawbum on 7 March, about 2,500 

remained to carry on2 The unit’s second mission, from 12 March to 

9 April, resulted in 67 men killed and 379 evacuated because of 

wounds or illness. Thereby reduced to about 2,000 men, the 5307th 

was augmented by Chinese and native Kachin soldiers for its third 

mission, the operation to take the Myitkyina airfield, which began on 

28 April. Only 1,3 10 Americans reached this objective, and between 

17 May and 1 June, the large majority of these men, most of whom 

were suffering from disease, were evacuated by air to rear-area 

hospitals. By the time the town of Myitkyina was taken, only about 

200 of the original Galahad force was present3 A week after 

Myitkyina fell, on 10 August 1944, the 5307th, utterly worn out and 

depleted, was disbanded. 

Why did the 5307th end up this way? Why was the first U.S. 

combat unit to fight on the Asian continent driven until it suffered 

over 80 percent casuahies and experienced what an inspector general’s report described as “an almost complete breakdown of morale 

in the major portion of the umt ’ “?5 Colonel Charles N. Hunter, the 

second ranking (and sometime ranking) officer of the unit during its 

existence, expected heavy casualties from the start. In briefings at 

the War Department in September 1943, he was told that casualties 

were projected to reach 85 percent.6 But at the end of the 5307th’s 

campaign, he still felt that the unit had been badly misused and had 

suffered unnecessarily. Years later, in a book about the 5307th titled 

Galahad, he placed the blame for what happened to the unit squarely 

on the personality and personal ambition of the campaign’s commander, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell: 

Galahad Force was the most beat upon, most misunderstood, most 

mishandled, most written about, most heroic, and yet most unrewarded 
3 

regimental sized unit that participated in World War II. That it was 

expendable was understood from its inception; what was not understood and has never been adequatefy explained, is why it was expended 

to bolster the e P o of an erstwhile Theater Commander such as “Vinegar 

Joe” Stilwell. 

Colonel Hunter’s account of events is compelling and moving. It 

is easy to understand why he felt that Stilwell had sacrificed the 

5307th to bolster his ego. Yet in assessing the criticism of Stilwell, 

it must not be forgotten that, during this period, he was acting under 

orders from above and was under pressure to achieve specific military 

objectives set by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In 

addition, Stilwell had to cope with the problems created in the 

China-Burma-India theater of war (CBI) by coalition warfare and the 

need to conduct combined operations. In this theater, more than in 

any other theater in which the United States fought during World War 

II, the problems peculiar to coalition warfare were present. While 

the coalition partners of the United States in the CBI-China and Great 

Britain-helped augment United States resources and contributed 

significantly to the war against Japan, they also created situations that 

forced Stilwell to lay heavy burdens on the 5307th. Ultimately, it 

was not so much that the 5307th was a victim of Stilwell’s ego, but 

that both the 5307th and Stilwell were affected by the exigencies and 

requirements of coalition warfare and combined operations. 

Coalitions, by nature, are somewhat delicate creations. They are 

formed by sovereign nations who join together to provide the strength 

of numbers for the pursuit of a common goal or goals. But national 

differences in strategic aims can diminish the force a coalition can 

bring to bear at a particular place and time. Also, differences in 

military capabilities, warfighting doctrine, cultural traditions, social 

values, and language can make it difficult for coalition forces to 

achieve unity of effort in combined operations. All of these debilitating conditions were present in the CBI as the three coalition 

partners sought to fight the war against Japan in ways consistent with 

their national objectives. Interestingly, because of these different 

objectives, neither Great Britain, the former colonial ruler of Burma, 

nor China-who would regain a land link to the outside world if 
4 

northern Burma were retaken-were as committed to retaking northem Burma as was the United States. These different viewpoints had 

created tensions in the coalition since the start of the war. In 1944, 

lack of agreement about what to do in Burma contributed greatly to 

what happened to the 5307th. 

The British did not give a high priority to retaking northern Burma 

because of doubts about Chinese military capabilities and the beIief 

that reestablishing a land link to China would not make much 

difference in the war against Japan. Great Britain’s’primary focus 

remained on Europe and the Mediterranean area. The British did not 

want to commit large forces to retaking Burma, and at the great war 

conferences of 1943) they consistently argued either for reducing the 

scale of operations to be undertaken in Burma or for bypassing Burma 

altogether and going to Sumatra. 

China’s position was that of Chiang K’ai-shek, president and 

commander of the Chinese Army. His government was weak and 

faced many internal challenges, especially from the Communists. He 

did not want to see his military forces c.onsumed in battles with the 

Japanese because he would then have fewer troops to support him in 

internal disputes. He welcomed American aid and sought more. Yet 

he was also Leery of training and assistance programs because they 

might strengthen his domestic rivals. As Stilwelll told GeneraI 

George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army in mid-1943, 

“‘[Chiang] did not want the regime to have a large, efficient ground 

force for fear that its commander w-ould inevitably challenge his 

position as China’s leader.“’ Chiang’s fundamental approach to the 

war with Japan was to adopt a defensive posture and let the United 

States win it for him, preferably with air power. He was more 

interested in expanding the airlift from India to China than in reestablishing a Iand link. 

In contrast to Great Britain and China, the United States took an 

activist position on Burma and on China itself. As opposed to 

Britain’s negative view of what China could offer, the United States 

saw China’s geographic position and large manpower pool as great 

assets, America believed that it was possible to improve the Chinese 
5 

Army so that it could make a positive contribution to the coming 

offensive against Japan. Even before becoming an active belligerent, 

the United States, in May 194 1, had begun sending Iend-lease material to China. In July 194 1, the American Military Mission to China 

had been established to help China procure weapons to fight its war 

against Japan and to train personnel to use them. Stilwell had been 

sent to China in February 1942 to expand this effort, with specific 

orders to “increase the effectiveness of United States assistanc,e to the 

Chinese government for the prosecution of the war and to assist in 

improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Arn~y.“~ After the 

Japanese occupied Burma in the spring of 1942 and cut China’s last 

Iandline of communication to the outside world, the United States 

made reestablishing that land link a high priority. Overland transportation was seen as essential to providing more aid to China. 

At the coalition war conferences convened during 1943, the concept of Burma as the route to China led the United States to stress 

continually the need to retake Burma. At the Casablanca Conference, 

held on 14-23 January, the American JCS put an offensive to retake 

Burma high on the conference agenda and obtained British agreement 

to conduct the operation in the winter of 1943-44. At the Trident 

Conference held in Washington in May 1943, the United States 

agreed with the British that developments in the war in Europe made 

it advisable to scale back this offensive so that it would just cover 

northern Burma. At American insistence, however, it was also 

agreed that a land link to China through this area must be gained 

during the coming winter dry season. 

Three months later, the Quadrant Conference, held in Quebec, 

Canada, on 19-24 August, reaffirmed the need for restoring land 

communications with China. Looking into the future, American and 

British planners envisioned Chinese forces and U.S. forces in the 

Pacific converging on the Canton-Hong Kong area. Once emplaced 

there, these forces would drive north to liberate north China and 

establish staging areas for operations against .T;pan. The year 1947 

was set for operations against Japan proper. Retaking northern 

Burma and constructing the Ledo Road south through Myitkyina to 

the old Burma Road was a fundamental part of this strategic plan, in 
that the road would bring in supplies for the Chinese forces that would 

move toward Cantan from the northwest. 

The Quadrant Conference also led to the U.S. decision to send a 

combat unit, Galahad, to CBI to participate in the upcoming winter 

offensive. The U.S. Army had long had a large number of support 

units in the theater. In late December 1942, the U.S. 823d Engineer 

Aviation Battalion had taken over construction from the British of 

the part of the Ledo Road that lay in India. U.S. medical personnel, 

quartermaster units, and air corps units also had steadily increased in 

number during 1942 and 1943. But despite StiIwell’s requests (since 

July 1942) for a U.S. combat corps-or at least a division-no 

fighting units had been sent to the theater. Now, one was going, 

perhaps to demonstrate the seriousness of America’s interest in 

retaking northern Burma. Or, perhaps, it was being sent as a reward 

to Brigadier Orde C. Wingate for his aggressiveness, which the 

United States had found in short supply among the British generals 

in India. 

Wingate was an innovative thinker, who before being assigned to 

the British forces in Burma in early 1942 had gained experience in 

guerrilIa warfare in Palestine and Ethiopia. Analyzing the tactics 

used by the Japanese in capturing Burma, he determined that the key 

to their success was superior mobility. Repeatedly, Japanese units 

had moved quickly along small trails in the jungle to outflank and 

envelop road-bound AlIied units. Wingate’s answer to this tactical 

challenge was to free Allied units from reliance on roads. He 

proposed forming highly mobile units (long-range penetration 

groups [LRPGs]) that would be inserted deep behind the Japanese 

lines by gliders and transport aircraft and supplied from the air. It 

was assumed that this method of supply would allow the LRPGs to 

outmaneuver the Japanese and attack their lines of communications 

at will. Following the cancellation of an offensive into Burma scheduled for hilarch 1943, General Archibald Wave& Supreme Commander, India, had authorized Wingate to carry out a raid into Burma 

to test the vahdity of Wingate’s theories. Despite incurring high 

losses and effecting little lasting damage, the raid captured the public 

imagination with its daring. Prime Minister Winston Churchill in- 
7 

vited Wingate to London for a personal briefing and then took him 

to Quebec to attend the Quadrant Conference. There, Wingate won 

approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) for an expanded 

program of LRPG operations in Burma. General Marshall and 

Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army 

Air Corps, were so impressed by Wingate’s presentation that they 

agreed to send approximately 3,000 American infantrymen to India 

to form an LRPG code-named Galahad. They also decided to send 

two of the Air Corps’ best airmen, Colonel Philip G. Cochran and 

Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Alison to India “to activate and command 

No. 1 Air Commando, a custom-made aggregation of liaison aircraft, 

helicopters, light bombers, fighters, gliderFi and transports” that 

wouId support Wingate’s LRPG operations. 

While Galahad was forming in the United States and moving 

across the Pacific, plans were being made by the newly created 

Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) to implement the decisions of the 

Trident-Quadrant Conferences. The British established SEAC to 

provide stronger direction to the upcoming operations in Burma. Its 

geographical area of responsibility included Burma, Ceylon, Sumatra, Malaya-but not India or China. Reflecting the preponderance 

of British forces in the theater, a British offcer, Vice Admiral Lord 

Louis Mountbatten, was named supreme Allied commander. Stilwell was appointed Mountbatten’s acting deputy, but Stilwell’s 

American operationa theater, CBI, was not made subordinate to 

SEAC. Also, Stilwell, in his position as Allied chief of staff to 

General Chiang K’ai-shek, was not subordinate to Mountbatten. 

Related to the establishment of SEAC was a crisis in Stilwell’s 

command relationship to Chiang. When Mountbatten went to 

Chungking, China’s wartime capital, on 16 October to meet Chiang 

and establish a personal relationship, he was told that Chiang not only 

did not want Stilwell appointed as Mountbatten’s deputy but wished 

to have Stilwell recalled to Washington. Mountbatten objected 

strongly to such a change so close to the upcoming offensive into 

Burma and precipitated two days of negotiations that ended with 

Stilwell ostensibly returned to favor. But ritual smiles and professions of a new, deeper level of mutual understanding could not 
8 

reverse the damage already done. StilwelI became more distrustful 

of Chiang, and a cloud hung over their relationship. 

Based on the Quadrant decisions, the CCS gave SEAC two objectives. One was to carry out operations “for the capture of Upper 

Burma in order to improve,,;p air route and establish overland 

communications with China. The other was “to continue to build 

up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the 

development of air facikities with a view to a) keeping China in the 

war, b) intensifying operations against the Japanese, e) maintaining 

increased U.S. and Chinese air forces in China, and d) equipping 

Chinese ground forces.‘” l3 

To achieve these two objectives, the capture of Myitkyina was 

deemed essential. Japanese fighter planes flying from their air base 

at Myitkyina were able to harass the air route between northeast India 

(Assam) and China and keep the transports flying farther north over 

higher mountains in the Himalayas. Taking Myitkyina would eliminate this fighter threat. It would also improve greatly the air transport 

link between India and China, making it possible for transport aircraft 

to fly a more direct route, at lower altitude, thereby saving fuel and 

increasing payloads. Furthermore, Myitkyina was on the existing 

prewar road network in Burma, so once the Ledo Road was completed through Mogaung to Myitkyina, it would be relatively easy to 

extend it to the old Burma Road (see map I). 

SEAC planners developed a multifaceted plan named Champion 

to retake northern Burma and presented it at the Sextant Conference 

held in Cairo, Egypt, in November 1943. The first phase of the plan 

called for the advance of the Chinese Army in India (CAI) into 

northwest Burma to provide a protective screen for the engineers 

constructing the Ledo Road. This phase was already under way by 

the time of Sextant. Road building had resumed in earnest In October 

following the end of the summer monsoon. In the second phase, two 

British corps were to invade Burma from the west and southwest in 

mid-January. In February, three LRPGs were to be landed in central 

Burma. In addition, a major amphibious landing would be effected.14 Meanwhile, fifteen Chinese divisions (the Y-Force or Yoke 
Map I 
10 

Force that had been equipped and trained by the United States) were 

expected to attack the Japanese westward from Yunnan province (in 

China} into eastern Burma. This Y-Force had also been scheduled 

to take part in an offensive into Burma in March 1943, but Chiang 

K’ai-shek had withdrawn his agreement to employ this force and 

thereby scuttled the offensive. Now, at year’s end in Cairo, Chiang 

was meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill for the first time, and it 

was assumed that his firm commitment to join in this new operation 

could be obtained. 

Once again, however, the vagaries of coalition warfare intervened. 

The Sextant Conference ended without a clear commitment by 

Chiang K’ai-shek for Chinese participation in Champion Then, after 

Sextant, decisions reached by Churchill and Roosevelt with Stalin at 

Teheran ensured that Chiang would not become involved. At Teheran, Roosevelt and Churchill committed themselves to a cross-Char-rnel assault and a landing in southern France as soon as possible, and 

Stalin promised to enter the war against Japan after Germany was 

defeated. This led Churchill to voice strong opposition to the amphibious landing that was part of Champion, even though Chiang had 

made it clear that such an operation was a prerequisite for his sending 

the Y-Force into Burma. Churchill, at this point, felt that China 

mattered little in the war against Japan. He believed that Stalin’s 

promise to join the war against Japan after Germany’s defeat meant 

that Russian bases would soon be available, and in his opinion, such 

bases would be better than anything the Chinese could offer. 1 5 Also, 

Churchill wanted the amphibious landing craft allocated to Champion shifted to the Mediterranean to be used in the landing in southern 

France. On 5 December, Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to Churchill’s 

request (overruling the JCS for the only time during the war), and a 

message was sent to Chiang explaining their decision. Chiang replied 

that without an amphibious landing to divert Japanese forces, he 

could not risk sending the Y-Force into Burma. 

On 12 December, Stilwelt returned to Chungking from Cairo and 

tried to change Chiang’s mind about employing the Y-Force. He was 

unsuccessful. On 18 December, however, Chiang made a significant 

concession and gave Stilweh complete authority over the CAI. The 
11 

entry in Stilwell’s personal diary for 19 December reveals the excitement and the hope that this move engendered: 

19 December. First time in history. G-mo [Generalissimo Chiang 

K’ai-shek] gave me ml1 command of the Ledo [X force] trodps. 

Without strings-said there would be no interference and that it was 

“my army.” Gave me full power to fue any and al1 officers. Cautioned 

me not to sacrifice it to British interests. Otherwise, use it as I saw fit. 

Madame [Chiang K’ai-shek’s wife] promised to get this in writing so 

I could show it to all concerned. 

It took a long time, but apparently confidence has been established. 

A month or so ago I was to be fired and now he gives me a blank check. 

If the bastards will only fight, we can make a dent in the Japs. There 

is a chance for us to work down to Myitkyina, block off below 

Mogaung and actually make the junction, even with Yoke sitting on its 

tukas. This may be wishfui thinking in a big way, but it could be.r6 

In a nutshell, this diary entry captures the nature of Stilwell’s 

problems. In keeping with the Quadrant-Sextant goal of retaking 

northern Burma, he was focused on the objectives of capturing 

Myitkyina and linking up with the Y-Force (Yoke Force) attacking 

from Yunnan. But if the Y-Force did not advance, he was not sure 

if the Redo Force (the two divisions called the CAI or the X-Force) 

could reach Myitkyina and make the Einkup alone. Stilwell acknowledged that all hope of suczess might be wishful thinking, but he was 

determined to give his enterprise a try. A letter written to his wife on 

the same day further reveals his thoughts: 

Put down 1X December 1943 as the day, when for the first time in 

history, a foreigner was given command of Chinese troops with full 

control over all officers and no strings attached. . I . This has been a 

long uphill fight and when I think of some of our commanders who are 

handed a ready-made, fully equipped, well-trained army of Americans 

to work with, it makes me wonder if I’m not working out some of my 

past sins, They gave me a shoestring and now we’ve run it up to 

considerable proportions: The question is, will it snap when we put 

the weight on it? I’ve had word from Peanut [Stilwell’s name for 

Chiang K’ai-shek] that I can get away from this dump tomorrow. That 

means I’ll spend Christmas with the Conmcianists in the jungle. . . . 

Until this mess is cleaned up I wouldn’t want to be doing anything but 

working at it, and you wouldn’t want me to either, thank God. l7 
12 

Stilwell’s reference to the shoestring that has been run up to 

“considerable proportions” refers to the CAI, a force that was his own 

creation. In May 1942, he had looked at the 9,000 Chinese soldiers 

who had retreated from Burma into India and seen the nucleus of a 

force that could play an important role in a campaign to retake 

northern Burma. Overcoming British doubts, resistance from the 

government of India, and Chiang K’ai-shek’s reluctance, he had 

obtained agreement to equip and train not only those 9,000 troops but 

23,000 more soldiers that were to be flown in from China. A former 

camp for Italian prisoners of war located northwest of Calcutta at 

Ramgarh was selected as the training site, and on 26 August 1942, 

the Ramgarh Training Center was activated.*’ On 20 October, the 

first of the Chinese soldiers to be sent from China arrived in India. I9 

The first goal was to train two complete divisions, the 22d and the 

38th. Later, the training program was expanded to include another 

division, the 30th, and the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group, 

commanded by Colonel Rothwell H. Brown of the U.S. Army. 

General Stilwell observing the training of Chinese troops at the Ramgarh Training Center 
13 

For Stilwell, building the CA1 was a way to obtain the military 

force that he feared the United States would never be able to provide 

him. He also viewed it as an opportunity to test his deeply held belief 

that Chinese soldiers, if properly trained, equipped, fed, and led, 

would be the equal of soldiers anywhere. In an agreement reached 

on 24 July 1942, Chiang K’ai-shek had given Stilwell command of 

the CA1 at Ramgarh and control of its training; the Chinese were to 

handle administration and discipline.20 With this much freedom of 

action, Stilwell initiated an American-style training program with 

American instructors. They taught the use of rifles, light and heavy 

machine guns, 60-mm and 81 -mm mortars, rocket launchers, hand 

grenades, 37-n-n-n antitank guns, and the functional specialties required by modern warfare. Artillery units learned how to use 75-mm 

pack artillery, 10%mm and 155~mm howitzers, and assault guns. All 

units received training in jungle warfare. For medical service personnel, special emphasis was given to field sanitation so that the 

diseases that had taken a heavy toll in Burma in the spring of 1942 

could at least be partially prevented.“’ 

As Stilwell flew toward Burma on 20 December, he was not 

worried about the technical proficiency of the CAI. That had been 

developed and tested at Ramgarh. What conc.erned him was the lack 

of aggressive leadership on the part of Chinese officers. The CAI’s 

38th Division had entered the Hukawng Valley in October to screen 

the engineers building the Ledo Road and had been stopped by 

elements of the Japanese 18th Division. Stilwell was unhappy with 

the 38th Division’s inability to push ahead and, after arriving at the 

front on 21 December, he tried various methods to develop some 

forward momentum. He talked directly to the division commander, 

Sun Li-jen, and issued him firm, detailed orders. He also went down 

to the front to observe what was happening and to try to force the unit 

into action. One battalion commander from the 38th Division recounts how Stilwell sometimes drove down to regimental headquarters in his jeep and stayed until the regimental or, in some cases, even 

the division commander acted to ,e$minate an enemy position that 

was blocking forward movement.- Stilwell acknowledged that the 

Japanese were a tough foe and that the terrain was very difficult. But 
General Stilaell, Major General Sun Lbjen (extreme left) and Lieutenant General Lo Cho-ying 

(center) inspect Chinese Army troops in India at Ramgwh 

he also saw the Chinese failure to advance as resulting, in large part, 

from their own errors: “Dissipation of force I . . . Piece-meal action 

. . . . Extreme caution and extreme slowness of movement . . . . Fear 

of imaginary terrors . . . . Bad recon and security . . . . Fear of going 

around . . . . Result-Loss of men. Loss of chance to bag Japs.” 

(See map 2.) 

Stilweil looked to the 5307th as a solution to severa ofthese errors, 

especially the “fear of going around.” Galahad had been formed, as 

has already been noted, to be an LRPG under Wingate. Its training 

was focused on developing the cross-country mobility that would 

enable Stilwell to conduct the “end run” (enveloping) maneuvers that 

he felt were needed to encircle the Japanese and dislodge them from 

their dug-in defenses. But Stilwell would not be able to employ the 

5307th in his operation until the end of February. He would have to 

wait, satisfying himself with the knowledge that at least he had finally 

taken control of the unit from the British. 
Map 2 

When Stilwell first heard that Galahad, the first American ground 

combat troops to be sent to CBI, would be coming to India to be part 

of Wingate’s force, he was extremely angry, as the following entry 

in his diary on 1 September 1943, makes clear: 

What’s the matter with our people? After a long struggle, we get a 

handful of U.S. troops, and by God, they tell us they are to operate 

under WINGATE! We don’t know enough to handle them, but that 

exhibitionist does! And what has he done? Made an abortive jaunt to 
16 

K&ha, got caught E. of the Irrawaddy and come out with a loss of 

W%--Net result, cut the RR that our people had already cut [by air 

attacks]. Now he”s an expert. This is enough to discourage ChristzJ 

Sfilwell then began a series ofmoves in which he attemped to gain 

operational control of Galahad. These efforts finaIIy reached the 

point where General Marshall felt compelled to send him a message 

confirming Wingates’ operational control over the 5307th and reminding him that coaIition warfare required compromise: 

Ail American troops in China, Burma, India (including Galahad) 

are under your command. As Deputy Commander to Mountbatten you 

are to employ your forces, including Chinese troops attached by the 

Generalissimo, so as to insure an effective united effort by South-East 

Asian Command. Galahad was dispatched to India to take part in 

long-range penetration operations. If these operations are to be commanded by Wingate, the American group should operate in combat 

under his central direction. The individual and unit training as weil as 

administration and supply must remain the responsibility of General 

StEIweH. However, their training must be closely co-ordinated with that 

of the British. . . .We must all eat some crow if we are to fight the same 

war together. The impact on the Japs is the pay-off.‘” 

.’ 

Stilwell, however, did not give up his pursuit of Galahad. At the 

Sextant Conference, he and his chief of staff for plans and operations, 

G3 for CBI, Colonel Frank D. Merrill, discussed the employment of 

Galahad with Marshall and finally convinced him to support a 

transfer of operational control of the unit to Stilwell. Before the 

conference ended, a decision was reached. Galahad was to be assigned to Stilwell.*” 

On I January 1343, Galahad was officially designated the 5307th 

Composite Regiment. The next day, the name was changed to 

Composite Unit (Provisional). Apparently, this name change was 

necessitated by the realization. that the man chosen by StilweIl to 

command the unit, Frank D. Merrill, was now a brigadier general and 

should command more than a provisional regiment. ” Merrill arrived 

at the 5307th’s training area in central India on 4 January and assumed 

command immediately. Within days, despite Hunter’s feeling that 

the 5307th needed another month oftraining, hJenil1 radioed StiIweEI 

that the unit’s “training had advanced to a state which would permit 
17 

its being committed to action. “” On 8 January, the 5307th was 

attached to Stilwell’s field comrn;nd in northern Burma and directed 

to move to Ledo by 7 February. 

The 5307th moved from Ramgarh to Ledo by train, covering a 

distance of around l>OOO miles. Then they marched 140 miles by 

foot on the newly completed Ledo Road to Ningbyen, a small village 

in the northern Hukawng Valley. There, the unit assembled during 

20-2 1 February, received an airdrop of supplies, and prepared for its 

first mission. 

While the 5307th was moving from Ramgarh to Ningbyen, on the 

battle line CA1 fighting was improving. In amessage sent to Marshall 

on 28 January, Stilwell expressed satisfaction with the Chinese 

soldiers” performance and also made reference to something that 

constantIy irritated him, namely, British unwillingness to recognize 

CAI accomplishments: “My opinion of the Chinese soldier is what 

it has always been. With good training, equipment, and leadership, 

General Stilwell and Brigadier General Merrill confer at Merrill’s headquarters 
he is as good as anybody . . . The foregoing is heartily concurred in 

by all liaison officers with whom I have talked. P.S. I will keep you 

informed of developments, sincei3;uspect you will hear very little 

about us in SEAC communiques. On 24 February, Stilwell told 

Marshall that a mistake by the 22d Division’s 66th Regiment had cost 

them a c.hance to encircle some Japanese, but he gave Marshall a 

favorable assessment for both the 22d and 38th Divisions. He 

reported that Chinese morale was high and said that he was hoping 

for a “better performance during the next step.“” 1 This step was to 

be the 5307th’s first operation. 

Even as the CAI was advancing in the field and the 5307th was 

moving forward to join the fighting, there was, at the strategic-political level, some backsliding by the coalition partners. C.hiang K’aishek’s continued refusal to send his Y-Force across the Salween 

River into Burma was evidence of the low priority China gave the 

campaign. The CAI’s slow rate of movement reflected the Chinese 

fear of failure. This situation, in turn, encouraged the British feeling, 

long held, that nothing worthwhile could be accomplished in northern 

Burma. Firm British support for the north Burma campaign was 

essential because Burma was in a British theater and Stilwell had two 

British superiors whose approval was required for him to act. In his 

position as the acting deputy commander of SEAC, Stilwell was 

Mountbatten”s superior. In addition, on 3 1 December, Stilwell had 

plac.ed his field combat command that controlled the CA1 and the 

5307th under General William J. Slim, commander of the British 

Fourteenth Army. In early January, the British planners in SEAC 

began trying to torpedo Stilwell’s offensive. Looking at the Ledo 

Force? s slow rate of advance, they were very doubtful that Myitkyina 

could be taken soon enough to allow the Ledo Road to be constructed 

before the monsoon rains came. Without this road link, they concluded, Myitkyina could not be held.32 In place of Stilwell’s campaign, they revived-and Mountbatten approved-an earlier plan to 

bypass Burma and attack Sumatra as a step toward retaking the Dutch 

East Indies and Singapore.33 This led StiIwell to write angrily in his 

diary on 8 January: “Louis [Mountbatten] welches on entire program 

[for Burma offensive]. G-mo’s fault of course. Limey program: (1) 
19 

Stop road at Ledo. (2) Do not attack Burma. (3) Go to Sumatra. (4) 

Include Hongkong in SEAC!‘“34 

Stilwell’s anger deepened when he learned that Mountbatten was 

preparing to dispatch a mission to London and Washington in February to promote his new plan. Without notifying Mountbatten, 

Stilwell sent his own mission led by Brigadier General Hayden L. 

Boatner, his chief of staff and deputy commander of the CAI, to 

Washington to present his views to the JCS. After the JCS strongly 

opposed Mountbatten”s plan, Mountbatten blamed Stilwell’s mission 

for influencing their actions and asked that Stilwell be relieved of his 

SEAC duties on the grounds of insubordination.35 Marshall quickly 

intervened and saved Stilwell’s job by explaining to the British that 

the JCS had consistently opposed the concept underlying Mountbatten’s proposed operation and that Stilwell’s mission had not affected 

their position. In characteristic fashion, Marshall also sent a message 

to StilwelI, on 2 March, directing him to see Mountbatten at once and 

reestablish good personal relations. The meeting was held on 6 

March and achieved that objective. Mountbatten assured Stilwell 

that he supported his campaign. 

While Stilwell was meeting with Mountbatten, the first combined 

operation involving the 5307th and the CA1 was drawing to a 

successful conclusion. This strengthened Stilwell”s position that the 

Japanese could be defeated, northern Burma retaken, and the Ledo 

Road completed. But, Stilwell told Mountbatten, holding northern 

Burma would take more than two Chinese divisions. He encouraged 

Mountbatten to put pressure on Chiang K’ai-shek to get the Y-Force 

committed. He also asked Mountbatten to help squelch the $;tractors 

of the American-Chinese campaign in northern Burma. These 

people, in Stilwell’s opinion, were hurting his efforts to build up 

Chinese confidence and make Chiang feel that his troops in Burma 

were gaining glory for both China and for Chiang himself. 

The first operation involving the 5307th had begun on the morning 

of 24 February with the front line positioned approximately fifteen 

kilometers north of Maingkwan, the former administrative center of 

the Hukawng Valley and the largest town in northern Burma (see map 
20 

3) While the main body of the Chinese 38th and 22d Divisions and 

the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group put pressure on the 18th 
21 

Division front north of Maingkwan, the 5307th, with the 38th Division’s 113th Regiment following, moved east around the 18th Division’s right flank. StiPwell’s intention was to have the 5307th 

establish a roadblock well behind the front and trap the 18th Division. 

On 28 February, Stilwell, having decided that the roadblock should 

be located at Walawbum, a small village some fifteen kilometers 

south of Maingkwan, sent out a liaison aircraft to dehver his order to 

move there as rapidly as possible. On 2 March, the 5307th crossed 

the Tanai River, some twenty kilometers northeast of Walawbum, set 

up an assembly area, and received its final orders from StiIweIl’s 

headquarters. Movement toward Walawbum began at dawn on 3 

March. During the day, the 5307th’~ 1 st Battalion secured a dropping 

zone at Lagang Ga, and the 3d Battalion set up heavy weapons 

commanding the road south of the town. On the morning of4 March, 

the 2d Battalion reached the road about a mile and a half west of town 

and set up a roadblock.37 

The Japanese response was quick in coming. After learning of the 

5307th”s presence, General Giichi Tanaka, the commander of the 

18th Division, decided that he could use a small rear guard to delay 

the cautious Chinese and turn the bulk of his two regiments to face 

the threat in his rear. On 3 March, just as the 5307th w-as moving 

forward to establish its positions, the Japanese 55th Regiment began 

to move south toward the 5307th’s right flank and the 56th Regiment 

began to move southeastward toward its left flank.38 

Heavy Japanese attacks began on 4 March and continued through 

the next day. The 2d Battalion of the 5307th received especially 

heavy blows ? and after fighting for thirty-six hours without food and 

water and with ammunitian running low, it abandoned its roadblock 

on the night of 5 March and withdrew to Wesu Ga (see map 4).‘9 

During this time, Allied aircraft bombed and strafed apparent Japanese troop concentrations. The air attack diminished Tanaka’s ability 

to execute his plan, but his failure to destroy the 5307th was due more 

to the arrival of the Chinese tank force led by Colonel Brown On 

the afternoon of 5 March, this unit pushed into an area between the 

18th Division headquarters and 56th Regiment headquarters and, 

without realizing the significance of its target, began firing on 
Map4 

Tanaka’s command post.4o T he tanks were also blocking the trial 

that the 55th Regiment was to use for its attack. Face with this 

situation, Tanaka decided, late on 5 March, to move his force to the 

west between the advancing 22d Division and the 261 Battalion 

roadblock and reestablish a line across the Kamaing Road south of 

Walawbum. Because of the slow advance of the 22d Division, Tanaka 

was able to accomplish this maneuver and escape what could have 

become a trap. 

- 
23 

On 7 March, in keeping with Stilwell’s orders to keep casualties 

low,“’ Merrill arranged for the 113th Regiment to take over the 

5307th”s positions, and the 5307th withdrew from the battle. Its first 

mission thus ended as a success. Casualties had been light: only 

eight men had been killed and thirty-seven wounded during the 

fighting in which an estimated 800 Japanese had died.42 The 5307th 

had proven its ability to move cross-country supported by long-distance radio communication and regular airdrops. It had also worked 

successfully with the Chinese and another group that had become part 

of the combined force, the native Kachin people. 

The importance of support from the Iocal inhabitants cannot be 

overestimated. General William J. Slim has noted the value of the 

help given the Japanese by the Burmese in the spring of 1942: “For 

warning of our proximity they relie~$rgely on Burman informers, 

and for their routes on local guides. Charlton Ogburn, a veteran 

of the 5307th, writes in his book The &farauders that, in northern 

Burma, the situation was reversed to the great benefit of the Allies: 

The advantage the Japanese had in having only to hide and wait and 

hold on. . would have forced us to pay an exorbitant price for any 

~ucce~sses, despite the Allies’ superiority in numbers and virtual command of the air, but for one asset we had: the local population was with 

us. Thinly settIed as the hills of northern Burma were, that factor made 

a critical difference. 44 

The Americans made a conscious effort to gain and nurture this 

asset. Boatner directed the medical units attached to the CAI “to 

fiu-nlsh medic-al attention to the natives as far as practicable to obtain 

their friendship for the U.S. Army.‘““’ Hunter mentions how the 

5307th never watered their pack animals at village springs and 

sometimes carried water a fairly long distance to their animals in 

order to avoid damaging the springs and 24+$tating the natives in 

whose good graces we wished to remain. Ogburn notes that 

enlisting the cooperation of the Kachins was ‘&an important job of one 

of the most important members of the 5,3h$7th, our British liaison 

officer, Captain Charles Evan Darlington. Darlington had served 

as a political officer in the area before the war and had lived in 
24 

Maingkwan for five years. He was known and respected among the 

Kachins and, in Ogburn’s words, “was indispensable not only as a 

supplier of guides but as a guide himself.“48 

The 5307th’s first mission also showed its ability to coordinate 

action with CA1 units. Despite the language barrier and differences 

between the Americans and the Chinese in diet, methods of cooking, 

personal mannerisms, and ways of setting up camp, they developed 

a feeling of mutual respect. The Americans understood that they 

needed the numbers provided by the Chinese. Because the 5307th 

had no artillery, the Americans also appreciated Chinese firepower. 

Ogburn describes the warm welcome given the Chinese artillery 

when the 113th Regiment relieved the 5307th at Walawbum: 

As the columns moved past each other, we heard cheering in 

American voices from up ahead. It grew louder, coming down the line 

toward us, and when it reached us, we could see the cause. In the 

Chinese column, a battery of pack artillery was moving forward with 

the infantry. We too cheered while the Chinese beamed. The pieces 

were only ‘7%millimeter howitzers and hardly a match for the 105’s 

and walloping 150’s with which the Japanese had visited humiliation 

on us, but all the same, they were guns and they could throw shells and 

they were on our side and they were a stirring sight.“g 

Unfortunately for the 5307th, however, even as the Chinese were 

helping them fight the Japanese at Walawbum, they were seriously 

degrading the health of the unit by unintentionally contaminating the 

drinking water. Hunter notes that before the 5307th pulled out of 

Walawbum, 350 c.ases of amoebic dysentery were diagnosed because 

of contaminated drinking water: “Only too late at Walawbum did we 

learn that the Chinese units were using the stream, from which we 

obtained our drinking water, as a latrine. Those men who, through 

force of circumstance or by choice, relied on halizone tablets to purify 

their drinking wate; soon became the victims of amoebic dysentery 

of the worst type. This situation was undoubtedly exacerbated by 

a difference in Chinese and American habits. Ogburn states that the 

Chinese “took time to boil all their drinking water, [while] . . . far 

from boiling what they drank, many of the Marauders could not even 

be bothered to await the action ofthe halizone tablets in their canteens 
25 

but would pop the tablets in their mouths like aspirin and wash them 

down with a pint of water dipped out of a trail side stream.“3* 

After the battle for Walawbum, the Japanese retained control of 

only a small part of the southern Hukawng ValIey. To keep the 

momentum of the CA1 advance, push the Japanese out of the Hukawng Valley, and enter the Mogaung Valley, Stilwell now directed 

the 5307th to undertake another envelopment of 18th Division positions. The 1 st Battalion, followed at a day’s interval by the 113th 

Regiment, was to conduct a shallow envelopment and block the 

Kamaing Road south of the Japanese positions along the Jambu Bum 

ridge. the high ground that divided the Hukawng and Mogaung 

Valleys. Meanwhile, the 2d and 3d Battalions were to swing farther 

east around the Japanese and then move west to block the road in the 

Inkangahtawng area, some five miles south of the Ist Battalion’s 

roadblock. At the same time, the 22d Division and the 1 st Provisional 

Tank Group were to launch an attack south along the Kamaing Road 

over the Jarnbu Bum ridge (see map 5). 

The movement of the 5307th began on 12 March. Rugged terrain 

and delaying actions by the Japanese slow-ed the advance of the 1st 

Battalion. Not until early 28 March did the force establish a roadblock just below Shaduzup. At this point, they were some ten mires 

south of the 22d Division’s’ lead elements. Fighting was heavy 

throughout the day, with the Japanese using artillery to support 

repeated infantry assaults. During the night, the 113th Regiment 

moved in to relieve the 1 st Battalion from its roadblock responsibility. On 29 March, the battalion moved a mile to the northeast to rest 

near a mobile hospital unit. In action on the Kamaing Road, the 

battalion had lost eight men killed and thirty-five wounded.52 

Merrill’s instructions to the 1 st Battalion were to rejoin the main 

body of the 5307th after its mission w-as completed. Accordingly, on 

30 March, the battalion began to backtrack north to Janpan. Its orders 

were to make this march in easy stages because the route was 

difficult. In one 5yea, a day’s march of ten hours yielded only one 

mile of progress. 
26 

Map 5 
27 

On 1 April, the importance of long-distance communication for 

the 5307th was demonstrated when a sack of grain being dropped 

from a supply plane fell on the 1 st Battalion’s only long-range radio 

and put it out of operation. On 3 April, after two days out of contact 

with his headquarters, the battalion commander felt so uneasy that he 

decided to go to Shaduzup and find out what was happening. Using 

the Chinese radio net there, he learned that the 2d and 3d Battalions 

were in desperate straits at Hsamshingyang and Nhpum Ga and 

received orders to move to that location as rapidly as possible to 

render assistance.5” 

The difficulty now facing the 5307th had been caused by Stilwell’s 

decision to divide the force in an attempt to accelerate the destruction 

of the 18th Division. When planning for this operation had begun, 

Merrill and Sun Li-jen, the 38th Division commander, had advocated 

keeping all of the 5307th and the 1 P 3th Regiment together to establish 

a single roadblock at Shaduzup. Stilwell, however, wanted two 

General Stilwell and Major General Sun Li-jen at Sun’s headquarters. Colonel Edward J. McNally. 

the U.S. liaison officer with Sun‘s division, is seated at left 
28 

roadblocks, one at Shaduzup and a second one ten miles farther south 

in the Inkangahtawng area. He believed that a force making a wide 

swing around the right flank of the Japanese could make a deep 

penetration without being detected. His concept, then, was to have 

two simultaneous attacks on the Kamaing Road while the 22d Division attacked on the Jambu Rum front. It was assumed that, with 

Japanese attention divided three ways, it would be impossible for 

them to mount a coherent defense. It was also assumed that soon 

after the 2d and 3d Battalions established their roadblock, the 113th 

Regiment, moving down from Shaduzup, would make contact with 

them.55 

Simultaneity in these attacks, however, was not achieved. During 

the night of 22 March, Stilwell sent a radio message to Merrill: “Japs 

withdrawing down the road. Jambu Bum fell today. Come fast 

now.“56 On 23 March, Merrill responded by ordering the 2d and 3d 

Battalions to rush forward. While these two units reached the 

Kamaing Road thirty-six hours earlier than originally planned, the 

1st Battalion had fallen far behind schedule because of the rough 

terrain and was still four days from Shaduzup. Nevertheless, due to 

Stilwell’s message, the 2d Battalion, after reaching the area north of 

Inkangahtawng early on the morning of 24 March, proceeded to 

attack the village. If the Chinese had moved south from Jambu Bum 

more quickly, and if the 1 st Battalion roadblock had been established 

at this time, this attack might have been successful, But with a slow 

Chinese advance and no distracting roadblock at Shaduzup, the 

Japanese were able to concentrate their forces against the 2d and 3d 

Battalions. Soon, these two battalions were imperiled. The lay of 

the land had forced them to move into a position where they had a 

long, exposed left flank, and they were susceptible to being cut off. 

The Japanese began moving to do exactly that (see map 6). 

After a day of heavy fighting that failed to take Inkangahtawng, 

the 2d Battalion commander decided that he had no choice but to 

withdraw eastward toward Manpin. As this withdrawal was taking 

place on 25 March, the danger presented by the reinforced Japanese 

battalion striking north from Kamaing became clear. If this force 

reached Auche before the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5303th did, this 
29 

Map 6 

portion of the 5307th would be cut off from its route of withdrawal 

northward to Nhpum Ga. To slow the Japanese advance, two platoons 

were sent to block the two trails running north from Kamaing. These 

units successfully fought a series of delaying actions on 26, 2’7, and 

28 March that allowed the main body to pass through Auche on the 

27th and 28th. 

With the 2d and 3d Battalions retiring from the Kamaing Road, 

Stilwell decided that this was an opportune time to travel to 

Chungking to meet with Chiang K’ai-shek. As he flew off to China 

on 27 March, however, events were taking another dramatic turn. A 

Japanese sketch showing their intention to continue moving north 
Damaged MM? tanks south of the Jambu Bum heights 

through Auche to threaten the left flank of the 22d Division was 

brought into Stilweli’s headquarters. Since the Japanese could not 

be allowed to complete this maneuver, the 2d and 3d Battahons were 

ordered to stop them. 

In response to this order, Merrill placed the 2d Battalion on the 

high ground at Nhpum Ga and deployed the 3d Battalion to defend 

an airstrip at Hsamshingyang, some three miles to the north. This 

division of his force was required because Merrill had over 100 

wounded who needed to be evacuated by air and the Nhpum Ga 

heights dominated the airstrip.57 The 3d Battalion was also to 

provide a reserve force and be responsible for keeping the traii 

between Hsamshingyang and Nhpum Ga open. 

The stage was now set for one of the most difficult periods in the 

short history of the 5307th. The 2d Battalion had hardly finished 

building its defensive perimeter when the Japanese began attacking 
31 

on 28 March. This same day, Merrill suffered a heart attack and 

Colonel Charles N. Hunter relieved him. Then, on 31 March, the 

Japanese succeeded in cutting the trail between Hsamshingyang and 

Nhpum Ga. For more than a week, the Japanese repulsed all attempts 

to reopen the trail and kept the 2d Battalion isolated except for 

airdrops. During this time, repeated Japanese artillery barrages and 

infantry assaults inflicted serious casualties on the 2d Battalion. 

Disease, inadequate nourishment, fatigue, and stress also took their 

toll. On 7 April, a tired and hungry 1st Battalion arrived in 

Hsamshingyang after a grueling march from the Shaduzup area, and 

the next day they added their strength (only 250 men from the 

battalion were physically able to join in the effort> to another attempt 

by the 3d Battalion to break through to the 2d Battalion. Slight 

progress was made on 8 April, and then, suddenly, during the 

afternoon of 9 April, the Japanese withdrew. The battle had been 

won, but the cost to the 5307th had been high. In fighting at the 

attempted roadblock at lnkanghtawng, seven men had been killed and 

twelve wounded. The Nhpum Ga battle: moreover, resulted in 

fifty-two men killed and 302 wounded. In addition, seventy-seven 

sick soldiers were evacuated after the fighting ended.58 

After the battle at Nhpum Ga, the 5307th was given several days’ 

rest, and new outfits of clothing were issued. In addition, nutritious 

ten-in-one rations were delivered, and mail was received for the first 

time in two months.59 But baths and new clothes could not alter 

reality; the unit was worn out: 

Terribly exhausted; suffering extensively and persistently from 

malaria, diarrhea, and both bacillary and amebic dysentery; beset by 

festering skin lesions, infected scratches and bites; depleted by 500 

miles of marching on packaged rations, the Marauders were sorely 

stricken. They had lost 700 men killed, wounded, disabled by nonbattle 

injuries, and, most of all, sick. Over half of this number had been 

evacuated from 2d Battalion alone. Many remaining in the regiment 

were more or less ifi, and their physic6$ condition was too poor to 

respond quickly to medication and rest. 

Clearly, at this point, the 5307th was facing a mounting health 

crisis that threw the unit’s ability to undertake another mission into 

question. Combat losses, even including the heavy losses suffered 
32 

in the fighting at Nhpum Ga, were below projected levels. Nonbattle 

casualties that required evacuation, however, were much higher than 

expected and were rising rapidly. In February and March, they 

totaled 200. In April, alone, they numbered 304, as the effects of the 

harsh battlefield conditions at Nhpum Ga began to be felt61 At 

Nhpum Ga, the 5307th had suffered because it was ordered to fight 

in a static defensive role for which it was neither trained nor equipped. 

Then the heat and diseases of tropicat Burma combined to add to the 

unit’s misery: 

The deserted villages of Hsamshingyang and Nphum Ga . . . became 

saturated with insect pests and disease organisms produced in decaying 

animals and men, foul water, and fecal wastes. Mental health, too. was 

imperiled for the troops on the hill . . . [as] their casualties accumulated 

on the spot, visible and pitiable testaments to the waste of battle and 

the fate that might befall the entire force. Scrub typhus appeared. 

Malaria recurrences flared up ominously. The diarrheas and dysenteries became rampant. Chronic disabiIities took acute forms. When the 

siege lifted, the men nearly collapsed with exhaustion and sickness. 6.2 

Outwardly, the 5307th seemed to recover as it rested and received 

good food and good medical treatment at Hsamshingyang, but the 

exhaustion and illness ofthe soldiers c&d not be overcome with just 

a few days rest. Many, if not most, of the soldiers were beginning to 

suffer from malnutrition due to extended use of the K-rations that, as 

Hunter notes, were “a near starvation diet . . . designed to be . . . 

consumed only under emergency conditions when no other food 

could be made available.“63 Also; numerous soldiers suffered from 

chronic diseases that were sure to flare up again as soon as they began 

to experience anxiety and exert themselves. The consensus among 

the men of the 5307th was that the unit needed to go “into rainy-monsoon qy,:y somewhere to recuperate and reorganize for the next 

season. 

This was not to happen. Higher authorities wanted Myitkyina 

taken. Stilwell was motivated by his own deep desire to take the 

airfield and the town before the onset of the summer rainy season. 

The .JCS had also made their position clear: the minimum objective 

in n~rtb,~yrrna was “the seizing and hoIding of Myitkyina this dry 

season. Furthermore, developments within the coalition at the 
33 

strategic-political and operational levels were putting pressure on 

Stilwell to act. Since the tactical situation and the nature of the forces 

under his command meant that Myitkyina could only be reached and 

attacked by a task force led by the 5307th: the die was cast. The 

5307th would be ordered to undertake a third mission. 

The pressure to take Myitkyina that Stilwell felt from the coalition 

partners w-as the result of new British and Chinese support for his 

north Burma campaign. Because that support was in large measure 

a response to U.S. pressure, he knew that he could not slacken his 

efforts. When Boatner had met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

on 18 February while on his mission to Washington for Stilwell, 

Roosevelt had expressed his frustration about the situation in Burma. 

He had told Boatner that he was more dis;satisfied with the progress 

of the war there than in any other place. In response: Boatner had 

urged the president to ask the British and Chinese to be more 

aggressive in Burma. This the president did. He expressed his views 

to Churchill, and in a letter delivered to Chiang K’ai-shek on 20 

March, FDR diplomatically praised the accomplishments of the 

Ledo Force while asking for action by the Y-Force to take advantage 

of the Japanese dispersal: 

Your C.hinese Corps on the Ledo Road has administered a serious 

setback to the Japanese with heavy losses to the enemy in men and also 

in ground and prestige. It is a magnificent outfit. General StilwelI was 

able to employ the United States regiment to considerable advantage 

and altogether the heavy reverse administered to the crack Eighteenth 

Japanese Division represents an important victor)i. . . 

I am communicating my views to you at length and in considerable 

detail in the hope that you will give orders to the commander of your 

Yunnan force to cooperate in developing what appears to be a 

opportunity. 1 send my very warm regards. Signed Roosevelt. 68 reat 

Chiang K’ai-shek responded to Roosevelt’s Ietter on 27 March, the 

day before he met with Stilwell in Chungking. In his reply, he again 

expressed his regrets about conditions in China that made it impossible to send the Y-Force into Burma, but he did make a major 

concession, saying, “‘I have 1 e . decided to dispatch to India by air as 

many troops in Yunnan as can be spared in order to reinforce the 

- 
34 

troops in Ledo, thus enabling the latter to carry on their task of 

defeating the enemy.“@ 

This letter did not satisfy President Roosevelt. On 3 April, he sent 

Chiang a more strongly worded message about the need to send the 

Y-Force into action immediately. Roosevelt stated plainly that the 

United States had been training and equipping the Yoke Force for 

just such an opportunity and that, if it did not move now, this effort 

could not be justified. On IO April, Marshall followed up this 

message with a message to StiIwell telling him to stop Iend-lease 

shipments to the Y-Force. To forestall this move, on 14 April, the 

Chinese agreed to order an offensive by the Y-Force into Burma.69 

In mid-April, therefore, Stilwell knew that President Roosevelt 

had personally intervened with Churchill and Chiang K’ai-shek to 

gain more support for his campaign. He aIso had received the 

benefits of that intervention. During his meetings in Chungking on 

28 and 29 March, the Chinese had agreed to send two divisions, the 

50th and the 14th, to north Burma. Then, roughly two weeks later, 

they had agreed to send the Y-Force into Burma. If, after all of this 

had been accomplished, Stilwell did nothing, he would be wasting 

Roosevelt’s efforts and embarrassing the president in front of the 

Chinese. Stilwell also felt that he would be squandering the support 

he had been receiving from the British, especially General Slim. 

The British support was extremely important because of the major 

Japanese offensive into eastern India that had been launched on 8 

March, just two days after Stiiwell and Mountbatten had met to settle 

their misunderstandings. The offensive had been anticipated, but its 

strength had not. Three Japanese divisions advanced to surround 

lmphal and Kohima, and by the beginning of April, it seemed possible 

that the Japanese might cut the lines of communication supporting 

both Stilwell’s forces and the airfields used to fly supplies into China. 

StilwelI had recognized the seriousness of the threat and, after returning from Chungking, had decided to offer General Slim the use of his 

38th Division-even though he knew that this would mean the end 

of his advance and all hope of reaching Myitkyina before the monsoon rains came. But to his great surprise and relief, when he had 
35 

met with Slim: Mountbatten, and Major General W. D. A. Lentaigne 

(Brigadier Wingate’s successor) at Jorhat, India, on 3 April, to discuss 

the situation, the British had stood firmly behind him. Slim had told 

him that he could keep the 38th Division and also the two new 

Chinese divisions that were arriving.70 Slim had also guaranteed that 

any possible interruption of the line of communication to Ledo would 

not exceed ten days and that the LRPGs (nicknamed “Chindits’“) 

flown into central Burma in early March would continue to support 

Stilwell’s campaign in the north instead of shifting their attention to 

the west.‘l 

At the Jorhat meeting, Slim and Stilwell also discussed the possibility of reaching Myitkyina ahead of the rains. Since Slim was 

leaving him in control of the three CAI divisions-the 22d, 3Oth, and 

38th; the two new divisions, the 14th and the 50th; and Galahad-Stilwell was optimistic that he still could do it. On 3 March, 

when Slim had visited Stilwell’s headquarters at the start of the 

operation to take Maingkwan and Walawbum, Stilwell had told him 

about his idea for a rapid thrust across the Kumon Range to approach 

Myitkyina from the north. Whether or not he could actually do it, 

Stilwell said, depended on how things went and when he captured 

Shaduzup?” Shaduzup was taken on 29 March. On 3 April, with 

his force of more than five divisions left intact, Stilwell told Slim that 

he expected to be in Myitkyina about 20 May.73 

Originally, when Stilwell had taken field command of the CA1 in 

December, his vision of how to take Myitkyina had been for the 22d 

and 38th Divisions simply to advance across the Hukawng Valley, 

push over the Jambu Bum ridge, move down the Mogaung Valley to 

Mogaung, and then attack northeastward to Myitkyina. The 5307th 

was to aid this advance by making deep flanking movements that cut 

Japanese lines of communication and disrupted Japanese defenses. 

Stilwell also had hopes that, at some point, a Y-Force offensive would 

facilitate his advance by drawing Japanese forces away from north 

Burma, However, the slow progress of the CA1 in December, January, and February-coupled with the failure of the Y-Force to 

move-had made it less and less likely that this plan would bring his 

force to Myitkyina before the rains. 
36 

Then, in February, Brigadier J. F. Bowerman, commander of the 

British Fort Hertz area in northern Burma, had suggested to Stilwell 

that a little-known pass through the Kumon Range east of Shaduzup 

could be used b r a mobile force like Galahad to attack Myitkyina 

from the north. This idea had appealed to Stilwell because it offered 72 

the chance to make up for lost time. Not only could he break free 

from the slow pace of CAT movement, his force could outflank the 

Japanese forces defending the Mogaung Valley and achieve surprise 

at Myitkyina. This was the plan that Stilwell discussed with Slim 

on 3 March and again on 3 April. This is what Slim knew Stilwell 

intended to do when Slim told him on 3 April to “push on for 

Myitkyina as hard as he could go.“75 

By mid-April, StiltveIl was confident that a deep strike by a 

Galahad-Eed force could reach Myitkyina. Studies of the terrain and 

trail network indicated that a task force could cross the Kumon Range. 

The new Chinese divisions, moreover, would soon be available. The 

airlift of the 50th Division into Maingkwan was almost corn leted, +A and the 14th Division was assembling at airfields in Yunnan. The 

only major question remaining before intitiating the operation, already code-named End Run, was the condition of the 5307th after the 

battle at Nhpum Ga. 

To determine the status of the 5307th, Stilwell sent his G3. Colonel 

Henry L. Kinnison, to Hsamshingyang shortly after the fighting 

ended to see firsthand hew the men looked. Kinnison told Hunter 

about Stilwell’s intention to organize a task force to go over the 

Kumon Range and approach Myitkyina from the north, and the two 

of them, as Hunter recalls, “discussed the condition of the men and 

animals in detai1.“77 During this time, Hunter apparently did not 

object to sending the 5307th on this mission. fn his memoirs, he only 

note;;pt he asked for “one week’s rest before leaving Hsamshingya%% Merrill, too, did not object to the mission. Perhaps both he 

and Hunter believed taking Myitkyina justified additional sacrifice 

on the part of the 5307th. Maybe they felt that objections were futile 

because of Stilwell’s views that will power could overcome some of 

the debilitating effects of tropical diseases, and that soft-hearted 

medical officers were probably contributing to the high evacuation 
37 

rate for illness in the 530?th.79 In any case, when Stilwell told Merrill 

that he knew he was asking Galahad for more effort than could fairly 

be expected of it and that he had no other option but to do so,” he 

left Merrill with no basis to oppose the operation. 

Stilwell had no eh0ic.e but to use the 5307th to execute End Run 

because the nature of the forces he commanded made it necessary for 

Americans to lead the Myitkyina task force. The Chinese were not 

trained for long-distance cross-country maneuver through the jungle. 

They also lacked the aggressiveness for such an undertaking. Moreover, any attempt by Stilwell to send a Chinese force alone against 

Myitkyina would certainly have been opposed by Chiang K’ai-shek 

as being too risky.. Another problem was that a Chinese force wouId 

have required Kachin guides, but the Kachins did not like the Chinese. Slim notes that in the retreat from Burma in April-May 1942, 

the Chinese troops fleeing north through the Mogaung and Hukavvng 

ValIeys had looted villages with “no law and little mercy.“8Y As a 

result, in Ogburn’s words, “The &chins disliked and feared the 

Chinese at least as much as the Japanese.7’82 To ensure full, effective 

participation by the Chinese and the Kachins, the force moving on 

Myitkyina had to be a combined force under AmerEc.an command. 

On 17 April, two days after the 50th Division had completed its 

move from Yunnan to Rdaingkwan, Stifwell met tlrith his staff and 

Merrill to discuss the plan. On 2 1 April, Stilweh set up the task force 

to seize Myitkyina. Because the 5307th had lost approximately 50 

percent of its strength and was down to about 1,400 men, it needed 

to be augmented by Chinese and Kachin soldiers. Three combat 

teams commanded by Americans were created, and Merrill was given 

overa command. H Force, under Hunter, contained the 1 st Battalion 

of Galahad, the 150th Regiment of the 50th Division, the 3d Company of the Animal Transport Regiment, and a battery of 22d Division artillery. K Force, under Colonel Kinnison, contained the 3d 

Battalion of Galahad and the 88th Regiment of the 30th Division. M 

Force, under Colonel McGee (2d Battalion commander), contained 

the 2d Battalion of Galahad and 300 Kachinsg3 
38 

On 22 April, two days short of the ?Xl week of rest that Hunter 

had requested,S4 the 5307th left HsEshingyang and began the 

twenty-mile march north to Naubum. There, the battalions set 

about organizing the combat teams and preparing for the operation. 

On 28 April, K Force moved out. H Force followed two days later. 

On 7 May, M Force started on its way (see map 7). 

Despite their illnesses and fatigue, the soldiers of the 5307th set 

out for Myitkyina in fairly high spirits. When they had first heard of 

this mission, they had been filled with disbelief and resentment. They 

had felt that Stilwell’s headquarters “was either ignorant of the shape 

[the unit was] in or indifferent to it-or out of its mind.“86 However, 

their outlook improved after they were promised that, after capturing 

the Myitkyina air&p, they would be relieved and flown to a rest and 

recreation area. As Ogburn states, “We had it from General Merrill 

himself that . . e we would be . . . a party to cause taxpayers a 

shudder . . . 

8 and given furloughs.” 

I&ven 

This vision gave them the will 

to see this new mission through. 

Troops of Merrill’s Marauders resting on a mountain trail 
39 
40 

The hard reality of the march-the rain, the mud, the steep narrow 

trails where exhausted animals slipped and fell down mountain sides 

carrying their precious loads with them, the effects of disease and 

mahmtrition, and the atta&s of insects and leeches-ah of these 

things soon began to sap the soldiers will. The conditions were far 

more difficult than any of them had encountered previously, and 

many soldiers had to be evacuated because they were too sick and 

weak to continue. At some points, groups of men were left behind 

with the promise that help would be sent. Yet most of the troops did 

manage to keep movmg forward, and on 17 May, H Force attacked 

and captured the main Myitkyina airfield. 

The men of the 5307th thought that this victory meant they would 

be released from their hardship, but-despite the earlier promises-it 

was not to be. Again, tactical necessity and the nature of combined 

operations made it impossible to relieve them. Instead of being flown 

out, they were committed to a positional battle against a growing 

Japanese force that was vigorously defending the town of Myitkyina 

and threatening to recapture the airfield. As explained by Boatner 

Later, Stilwell felt that he had to keep Galahad at Myitkyina for four 

reasons: 

1. GALAHAD was the only U.S. combat unit in the theater available for the assault on Myitkyina. 

2. The Chinese 88th and 150th Regiments that marched over the 

Kumon Range with GALAHAD had felt evacuations for sicknessifatigue in spite of their heavy casualties. 

3. Since early May Stilwell had been resisting heavy pressure to 

evacuate 3d Indian Division [Lentaigne’s LRPG Chindit force). 

4. The Japanese lines were only 1,500 rards from the airstrip which 82 was the only base and source of supply. (see map 8.) 

Reason four expresses Stillwell’s tactical need to keep the 5307th 

at Myitkyina and reflects the simple requirement to have sufficient 

soldiers in Myitkyina to handle the Japanese. This was a growing 

requirement as Japanese strength increased. After 2 1 May, Stilwell 

was even forced to pull two battalions of Army engineers off Ledo 

Road construction work and rush them to Myitkyina as reinforce- 
41 

- 
, 

42 

ments.90 In addition,ssued to try totihaps increase, t personnel at i, a 

directive was issued to hold the number of sick and fatigued soldiers 

being evacuated down to an absolute minimum.91 Second, staff 

officers in the rear were ordered to comb their areas for earlier 

Galahad evacuees and send as many as possible back to the unit.92 

At this time, there was no possibility of relieving the 5307th. The 

situation demanded that the unit stay in the fight. 

CoaIition warfare and the nature of combined operations were also 

making relief ofthe 5307th out of the question. The 5307th was the 

onIy U.S. combat unit in the theater. This gave it a symbolic significance beyond the combat power that its soldiers could generate. 

Stilwell wanted the Chinese to continue fighting, and he wanted the 

units of the Indian 3d Division (Wingate’s-Lentaigne’s Chindits) 

that were withdrawing northward toward Mogaung and Myitkyina to 

hold their ground. To achieve these goals, he needed the presence of 

the 5307th on the battle line. Facing a classic problem inherent in 

combined operations, StiIwelI was determined not to “let the impression be created that [he was] withholding U.S. troops from combat 

in a sector where as an Allied co-mmander [he] was keeping British 

and Chinese troops in combat.“” 

Keeping the 5307th in Myitkyina was, therefore, Stilwell’s way of 

addressing a fundamental problem of combined operations-maintaining teamwork and trust and keeping all forces united in their 

efforts. The 1993 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, states clearly 

that, in combined operations, “missions should be perceived as 

appropriate and achievable for the forces to y,h$h they are given and 

equitable in terms of burden and risk sharing. The key phrase here 

is “equitable in terms of burden and risk sharing,” for in combined 

operations, the surest way to create discord is to create the impression 

that the units of one nation are being favored in some way over the 

units of another. When units of one nation are under the command 

of an officer from a different country, the danger of such impressions 

being formed is especially high. This is why FM 100-5, Operations, 

states that ‘:;.ional contingents normally retain command of their 

own forces. Stilwell, an American, was commander of the CAE, 

and since 17 May, the Chindits had also been attached to his eom- 
43 

mand. As the combined force commander, he certainly did not want 

to be seen as playing favorites with the 5307th. 

Stilwell’s situation was already delicate because of high Chinese 

casualties and a feehng among the Chinese that their tasks were more 

difficult than those assigned to the 5307th. Lieutenant General 

Zheng Dongguo, who had been sent to India to command the CAI in 

the field if Stilwell did not, felt that the Chinese were being given the 

hardest and most dangerous missions, and that the Americans were 

looking for something that could be taken easiIy. Then, when the 

Americans got in trouble, as they did at Walawbum, they would call 

on the Chinese for help.96 He Junheng, deputy division command;; 

and chief of staff of the 38th Division, had the same complaint. 

Certainly, in terms of combat casualties, the Chinese were paying a 

heavier price than the Americans. By 15 April, Chinese casualties in 

north Burma were as follows: 22d Division, 800 men killed and 

2,000 men wounded; and 38th Division, 658 men killed and 1,450 

men wounded.98 Reflecting the heavy fighting around Myitkyina, 

the 150th Regiment of the 50th Division by 20 May had taken 67 1 

battle casualties.g9 Boatner was well aware of Chinese concerns and 

felt embarrassed in his dealings with the Chinese because of the 

53OTth’s withdrawals from its roadblocks.100 Under these circumstances, withdrawing the 5307th from Myitkyina and sending it back 

to India would undoubtedly have harmed the combined force’s sense 

of unity. 

Chinese attitudes were also a concern for Stilwell as he dealt with 

Lentaigne’s requests to allow the Chindits to withdraw quickly to the 

north. The Chindits were wearing out just like the 5307th was, and 

Lentaigne felt that they were no longer fit for service. But Stilwell 

worried about what would happen to Chinese morale if troops who 

had only ente\;+ combat in March passed through their lines on the 

way to India. Also, following close behind the Chindits were 

Japanese moving northward. If the Chindits did not hold their 

blocking positions south of Mogaung, these Japanese units would 

move north to fight against the 38th and 22d Divisions in the 

Mogaung Valley and reinforce the Japanese at Myitkyina. Thus, 

Stilwell refused Lentaigne’s request and ordered him to hold the 
44 

Japanese well south of Mogaung. Stilwell’s answer to statements 

about the greatly weakened physic.al condition of the Chindits was to 

respond that the 5307th had been through as much: if not more, and 

was still in the field. 

This, then, was Stilwell’s solution to the problem of equitable 

burden sharing. Every nation’s units were to suffer equally. Looking 

at the 5307th’s experience from this perspective, it can be realized 

that the unit was not sacrificed, as Colonel Hunter charged, to satisfy 

Stilwell”s ego. It just happened that it was the only American combat 

unit available, and the combined force that Stilwell commanded 

needed American participation. Stilwell had, as he told General 

Merrill, no choice but to ask Galahad for more than could normally 

be expected of it. Without Galahad to help hold up the coalition 

banner of shared suffering, the combined force would have lacked a 

crucial unifying element and a catalyst for action. 

Fatigue, disease, malnourishment, and the stress of battle continued to weaken Stilwell’s soldiers. Added to this was the feeling by 

the members of the unit that they had been lied to and abused-an 

impression that spread through the unit after the men learned that they 

were going to be kept at Mpitkyina. Morale fell precipitately and, with 

it, the me.n’s physical well-being. Shortly after the 5307th had 

reached Myitkyina, the regimental and battalion surgeons had reeomrnended that the entire unit be withdrawn because of its wretched 

physical condition. lo2 For the reasons discussed above, this advice 

was not heeded. The directive to hold down medical evacuations and 

efforts to beat down fevers with medication led to no improvement. 

During the last two weeks of May, evacuations due to illness ran 

about 75-100 per day, with a peak day of 1 34.1°3 Steadily, the unit 

faded away. By 30 May, the 2d Battalion, which had started off for 

Myitkyina with 27 officers and 537 men, had only 12 men left in 

action. lo4 The situation in the 3d Battalion was about the same. Only 

the 1st Battalion still had some strength-a handful of officers and 

200 men.la5 In his diary em ‘;4 7 for this day, Stilwell was forced to 

write, “Galahad is just shot.“’ 6 
45 

At this time, the 5307th truly was nonoperational, but it was to 

continue in existence for two more months On 25 h/fay, 2,500 

Gafahad “replacements” landed in Bombay, India, and were rushed 

to Myitkyina as quickly as possible. In earIy June; these soldiers and 

the remnants of the 5307th were organized into one “old” Galahad 

battalion and two ‘*new?’ Galahad battalions. With the two engineer 

battalions that on 8 June were grouped into a provisional regiment, 

they maintained the American presence in what was now the siege 

of Myitkyina. But the “new’f Galahad was not the ‘“old” Galahad and 

never really could be. That force had experienced something special 

and accomplished something extraordinary. It was fitting, therefore, 

that after Myitkyina fell, the 5307th was disbanded. The fate of the 

organization thus mirrored what had happened to virtually all of the 

men who had served witk it. In the campaign to reach and take the 

strategic objective of Myitkyina, they had reached the limit of what 

they couId do and could do no more. 

There is much to be gained by examining the experiences of the 

5307th. The soldiers established an inspirational standard of endurance and courage in the face of an extremeIy harsh naturaI environment and a dedicated foe. The unit’s Iong cross-country movements 

illustrate the innovative use of the new capabilities given military 

forces at the time by advances in communications technology and 

aerial resupply techniques. But no lessons to be learned are greater 

than those related to the conduct of combined or multinational 

operations. If, as Colonel Hunter asserts, “Galahad Force was the 

most beat upon . I . regimental-sized unit that participated in WorId 

W7ar lI,“‘07 the reason for this happening is to be found most of all 

in the combined nature ofthe northern Burma campaign. As the only 

American combat unit vvithin the combined force, Galahad could not 

avoid being given the special burdens that came from being Americans. Their presence was required to form viabEe multinational task 

forces when the units of other countries could not or would not work 

together alone. Their participation in operations was necessary to 

encourage the units of other nations to stay in the struggle and to fight 

hard. The 5307th was the means by which the American field 

commander, General StiIweII, showed that he was not asking more 
46 

of his coalition partners than he was asking of American soldiers. 

What was especially damaging to the 5307th was that it was a smaI1 

unit and the only US. combat unit under StilweEl’s command. It had 

to bear Americ.a”s fighting burden alone. Eventually, and perhaps 

inevitably, it collapsed under the weight of its combined load. 
47 

NOTES 

1. CharEes N. Hunter. Galahad (Sm Antonio, TX: The Naylor Co., 1963): 

215-16. 

2. U.S. War Department, Intelligence Division, hilerridl j: Marauders (Eebrua~-&&+ 1945 (Washington, DC: War Department, 1945), 45. 

3. Ibid., 113. 

4. Hunter, Galahad, 2 13. 

5. Charlton Ogburn, The h4lmmfers (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 1 

6. Hunter, Galahad, 2. 

7. Ibid., l-2. 

8. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, StiEwell’s Mission to China (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1953), 

353. 

9. Ibid., 182. 

10. Ibid., 358. 

11. Ibid., 366. 

12. Charles F. Romanus and RiEey Sunderland, %/well’s Command Problems 

(Washington: DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 

1956), 9. 

13. Ibid., 9. 

14. Ibid., 62 

15. Ibid., 68. 

16. Joseph W. Stilwell, The StilweEl Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), 266. 

17. Ibid., 266-67. 

18. Romanus and Sunderland, Stir”luell’s Mission to China, 214. 

19. Ibid., 215. 
48 

20. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 117. 

21. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell ‘s Mission to China, 2 18. 

22. Wang Jiren, -“Con:: Yindu Zhengxun Dao Fangong Gaojie (From reorganization and training in India to victory in the counteroffensive),” in Yuansheng 

Yinmian Kangzhan (The war of resistance of the expeditionary army in India 

and Burma), ed. by the Historical Materials Research Committee ofthe Chinese 

People’s Political Consultative Conference (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi 

Chubanshe. 1990), 327. 

23 I Romanus and Sunderland, SfiluzeEl’s Command Problems, 128-29. 

24. James H. Stone, Crisis Fleeting: Original Reports on Miirary MediciPze in 

hzdia and Burma in the Second Wurid War (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1969), 293. 

25. Ogkwn, The Mwarrders, 60. 

26. Hunter, Galahad. 10. 

27. Ibid., 6. 

28. Ibid.: 12. 

29. U.S. War Department, Merrili’s Marauders, 16. 

30. h4essage, Stilwell to MarshalI, 28 January 1944, in Stilwell’s Personal File: 

China-Bwma-India 1942-1944, ed. by Riley Sunder-land and Charles F. RQmanus (Wilmington, DE: Scholariy Resources, Inc., 1976), 1373. 

31. Message, Stiiwell to Marshall, 24 February 1944, in Sunderland and Romanus, 

SfilweEC s Personal File, 1424. 

32. Romanus and Sunderland, Stil~vell’s Command Problems, 163. 

33. Ibid., 160. 

34. Stiliwell, The Stilwell Papers, 276. 

35. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, 163. 

36. Ibid., 169-70. 

37. Ibid., 150. 

38. Ibid. 

39. Ibid., 152. 
49 

40. Ibid. 

41. Ibid., 154. 

42. U. S. War Department, Merrill’s hlarauders, 45. 

43. Slim, William, Viscount, Defeat into Vicroq (London: PAPERMAC, 1986), 

121. 

44. Ogbum, The Marauders, 103. 

45. Gordon S. Seagrave, Burma Surgeon Returns (New York: W. W. Norton and 

Company, 1946), 64. 

46. Hunter, G&had, 58. 

47.Ogbu1~1, The Marauders, 105. 

4X. Ibid., 106. 

49. Ibid., 133. 

50. Hunter, GulaFmd, 5 1. 

5 1. Ogbum, The Marauders, 226. 

52. U.S. War Department, MerriD’s Marauders, 57. 

53. Ibid., 5X. 

54. Ibid., 59. 

55. Ibid., 65. 

56. Ibid., 63. 

57. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Probiems; 183. 

58. Hunter, Galahad, 8 l-82. 

59. Ogbum, The Marauders, 219. 

60. Stone, Crisis Fleeting, 33 1. 

61. Ibid., 389. 

62. Ibid., 389-90. 

63. Hunter, Gahxhad, 16. 

64. Ogbum, The Marauders, 2 19. 

65. Message, Marshall to Stiiwell, 2 1 February 1944, in Sunderland and Romanus, 

Stilwell ‘s Personal File, 14 19. 

66. Romanus and Sunderland, StilweH’s Command Problems, 164. 
50 

67. Letter, Roosevelt to Chiang K’ai-shek, 20 March 1944, in Sunderland and 

Romanus, Sti&eil ‘s Personal File, 1533. 

68. Message, Chiang K’ai-shek to Rooseve.lt, 27 March 1944, in Sunderland and 

Romanus, Stik~t,ell’s Personal FiLee, 1557-58. 

69. Romanus and Sunderland, Sfilweell’s CommaEd Problems, 3 13. 

70. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 272. 

71. Ibid., 268. 

72. Ibid., 255. 

73, Ibid., 273. 

74. Ian Fellowes-Gordon, Be i5/(agic War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 

1!?71), 47. 

75. Slim, Defeat info Victory, 273. 

76. Romanus and SunderEand, Stilwll’s Command ProbEems, 202-3. 

77. Hunter, G&had, 85. 

78. Ibid. 

79. Stone, Crisis Fleeting, 297. 

80. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s CommandProblems, 225. 

81, Slim, Defeat info VicOqv, 108. 

82. Ogburn, The Marartlders: 105. 

83. Romanus and Sunderland, StilweIE’s CommandProblems, 223. 

84. Hunter, Galahad, 187. 

85. Ogbum, The Marauders, 227. 

86. Ibid., 225. 

87. Kunter, Galahad, 88. 

88. Ogburn; The Marazlders, 227. 

89. Romanus and Sunderland, Stiiwell’s Command Problems, 239-N. 

90. Ibid., 237. 

91. U.S. War Department, Merrill’s iMarauders, E Il. 

92. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, 239. 

93. Ibid. 
94. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Uperafions (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1993), 5-3. 

95. Ibid 

96. Zheng Dongguo, “Zhongguo Zhuyinjun Shimo” (The whole story of the 

Chinese Army in India), in Yuanzheng Yinmian Kangzhan (The war of 

resistance of the expeditionary army in India and Burma}, ed. by the Historical 

Materials Research Committee ofthe Chinese People’s Political Consultative 

Conference (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1990), 82. 

97. He Junheng, “ZhuanzhanzhongYinmian Zhanqu dexinbian Di Sanshiba Shi” 

(The New 38th Division’s service in the successive battles of the India-Burma 

theater of operations), in Yuanzheng Yinmian Kangzhan (The war of resistance 

of the expeditonary army in India and Burma), ed. by the Historical Materials 

Research Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1990), 147-48. 

98. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, 188. 

99. Ibid., 230. 

100. Ibid., 189 note 

101. Ibid., 230. 

102. Stone, Crisis Fleeting, 354. 

103. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwe& s Command Problems, 239. 

104. Stone, Crisis Heeting, 354. 

105. Ibid. 

106. Stilwell, The Stiiwell Papers, 301. 

107. Hunter, Galahad, 2. 
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DC Gary J. Bjorge is a histmim with the 

Cambat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Csmmand 

and General staff College, Fort LeaveEmvortb, 

Kartsa. A graduate ofthc University ofMimema-Tw:tns Cities, he earned three MA degrees 

and a Ptm. degree frarn the University of 

~~56o~s~~~adjsa~. Bjorge sewed for several 

years as an off?eer in the Far East with the U.S. 

Navy: worked as the East Asian Bibliogrqkr 

at the WE-rivenity ~f~is~~~si~-~a~~s~~, and at 

the Uniwersity of#aasas, and ah ‘men&t at the 

University of Kansas. He is the author of 

p~wmerows artides and reviews on militaq history 

sopies. His sranslatbns of Chinese shoti stories 

have appeared in several anthologies ofm 

Chinese 1ieerarure.