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i 

65–294 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–186] 

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PHASED 

ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE 

DEFENSE IN EUROPE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 1, 2010 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROB ANDREWS, New Jersey 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

BILL OWENS, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, December 1, 2010, Status of Implementing the Phased Adaptive 

Approach to Missile Defense in Europe ............................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, December 1, 2010 ............................................................................... 35 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2010 

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO 

MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Macy, Rear Adm. Archer M., Jr., Director, Joint Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Organization, Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................................................... 9 

Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .............................................................. 5 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 7 

Rose, Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Space and Defense Policy, U.S. 

Department of State ............................................................................................ 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 39 

Macy, Rear Adm. Archer M., Jr. ..................................................................... 64 

Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D. .......................................................................... 41 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J. ............................................................................ 50 

Rose, Frank ....................................................................................................... 76 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 

and International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................. 81 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 86 

(1) 

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PHASED ADAPTIVE 

APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 1, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:16 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R. Langevin 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good afternoon. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee will come to order. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Last year, on September 17th, President Obama 

announced the new Phased, Adaptive Approach strategy, or the 

PAA, for defending Europe and the United States against the growing threat of a ballistic missile attack, particularly from Iran. In 

his announcement, the President said, and I quote, ‘‘Our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, 

and swifter defenses of American forces and American allies.’’ 

Last February, as part of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

signed by the Secretary of Defense, the PAA strategy was expanded 

to address other regional missile threats. 

Today, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee will review the Administration’s work on implementing the Phased, Adaptive Approach over the last year. We will hear from four distinguished witnesses: 

Dr. Jim Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy; 

Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director of the Missile 

Defense Agency; 

Rear Admiral Archer Macy, Jr., Director of the Joint Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense Organization for the Joint Staff; 

And, finally, Mr. Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Space and Defense Policy. 

I want to thank each of our witnesses for appearing today and 

for your upcoming testimony. I also want to congratulate our witnesses and the Administration as a whole for reaching agreement 

during the recent Lisbon Summit on a strategic framework for 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. This framework establishes the objective of achieving, ‘‘the capability to defend our 

populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core 
2 

element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.’’ 

NATO-izing missile defense was a primary goal that my predecessor, Chairwoman Tauscher, pressed for during her tenure in 

this job. Hopefully the agreement reached at the Lisbon Summit 

will pave the way for rapid implementation of the PAA and open 

opportunities for sharing the burden of regional missile defenses 

with our allies and friends. 

Today, about a year and two months after the announcement, 

the subcommittee will have an opportunity to hear from key administration witnesses on efforts to implement the PAA. In that regard, we asked our witnesses to address three key questions: 

First, what are the key technical milestones that we should be 

watching for in each phase of the plan, and where do we stand in 

achieving those milestones? More broadly, where do we stand in 

defining the technical objectives and components for each phase? 

Second, where do we stand in completing the operational plans 

and assessment of missile inventory requirements for each phase 

of the PAA? Specifically, when can we expect to see the results of 

the next Joint Capabilities Mix study? 

Finally, where do we stand in defining the requirements for basing elements of each phase of the PAA on European soil and on 

completing the necessary agreements with each of the host nations? 

With that, I want to say thanks again to each of our witnesses 

for making time to testify before the subcommittee today, and we 

look forward to hearing your views on the questions before the subcommittee today. 

Before I turn the floor over to our ranking member, Mr. Turner, 

for his opening statement, I would like to note that this will be the 

last hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee during the 111th 

Congress and, thus, my last hearing as chairman. Let me just say 

that it has been a pleasure to chair the subcommittee over the last 

year and a half, and I would like to thank all of my colleagues for 

their contributions to our work. Thank you. 

But, specifically, I would like to thank the ranking member for 

his partnership in this endeavor. We did not always agree or see 

eye to eye, but I always valued his advice and counsel, and I have 

certainly appreciated his support in this entire process and his 

input. So thank you for that, Mike. 

With that, the Armed Services Committee is a unique institution 

in the House, and I am certainly proud to be part of the bipartisan 

tradition we have maintained from its hearings. 

With that, I want to turn it over now to the ranking member, 

Mr. Turner, for any questions or comments that he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

our Chairman Langevin for his bipartisanship and spirit, and his 

leadership of this subcommittee. We certainly know that in the Na-
3 

tional Defense Authorization Act, there are a number of issues that 

you affected very positively, and we greatly appreciate your leadership, specifically in the area of directed energy, and we certainly 

look forward to continuing in the next Congress your important 

focus upon the issue of cyber threats. 

I would like to welcome Dr. Miller, Mr. Rose, Admiral Macy, and 

General O’Reilly. Let me start with a statement on the Phased, 

Adaptive Approach that I made last April at our missile defense 

budget hearing. 

I offered: There is an opportunity to gain bipartisan support on 

these plans, but the committee must have confidence that the PAA 

is the best approach for protecting the United States and our European allies. Our ability to do effective oversight and to hold the Administration accountable for its implementation of the PAA is 

based on a continuous dialogue and information exchange that 

must occur between the Administration and our committee. 

However, since the Administration’s announcement over a year 

ago, this committee has repeatedly sought greater detail on plans, 

analysis, and resource requirements for the PAA. The lack of responsiveness to those requests led to the bipartisan legislative requirements that were placed in the House-passed defense bill, 

seeking information and cooperation with Congress. 

I appreciate efforts by several of you over the last two months 

to remedy this situation. I met with General O’Reilly in October to 

discuss program plans, and yesterday the chairman and I received 

a briefing on how the PAA decision was made. 

We are beginning to get a greater insight into the PAA, but there 

is still a lot we don’t know yet. The Institute for Defense Analyses 

was tasked to conduct an independent assessment of the PAA and 

report to Congress by June 1st, 2010. I understand the bulk of 

their work was completed last summer, but the report is stuck in 

interdepartment coordination. I am interested in finding when we 

should expect to receive this report. 

Also at our committee’s request, the Government Accountability 

Office, the GAO, conducted a review of the European Phased, 

Adaptive Approach, EPAA, and concluded although the EPAA identified four phases of capability and timeframes for deployment, several key activities necessary to establish an acquisition decision 

framework remain undefined. These include finalizing EPAA architectures, systems, quantities and locations, determining key toplevel EPAA acquisition decision points, and determining what constitutes phase completion. 

In short, the Department has a significant amount of work ahead 

of it to translate its policy decision into a concrete, implementable 

architecture. 

We still have several outstanding questions on the details of 

PAA, and I hope that our witnesses will address some of those 

today in their testimony. 

First, as stated by the White House last September, the PAA approach was based upon an assumption that the long-range missile 

threat is ‘‘slower to develop.’’ However, since then, troubling new 

details have emerged on both North Korea and Iran’s long-range 

missile programs, and recent revelations show that Iran has 19 
4 

BM–25 advanced ballistic missiles it acquired from North Korea in 

its arsenals today that can reach Berlin and Moscow. 

I have previously stated my concern about a gap in the PAA coverage for the United States. The ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 

missile] threat from Iran could materialize as early as 2015, according to the latest intelligence assessments, yet the PAA is not 

planned to cover the United States until 2020. 

Now, there would also appear to be a gap in defensive coverage 

against ballistic missiles that can reach Western and Central Europe. Do these threat assessments change your approach in any 

way? 

Second, the Administration has committed to a hedging strategy 

for defense of the homeland in case the long-range threat comes 

earlier or technical issues arise with the SM–3 [Standard Missile3] Block IIA or IIB interceptors. Can our witnesses today discuss 

the details of this strategy, including any acquisition plans and key 

decision points necessary to employ the hedge? 

Third, the Administration’s approach to missile defense in Europe places emphasis on proven technology, yet we have since 

learned that the SM–3 Block IIB interceptor will be a new missile. 

The SM–3 Block IIA and Airborne Infrared System are still in 

early design and development, and the PTSS [Precision Tracking 

Space System] satellite system doesn’t yet exist. The GAO found 

that ‘‘system schedules are highly optimized in technology development, testing, production, and integration, leaving little room for 

potential delays.’’ So how are these technological risks being addressed? 

Fourth, when will the Department determine force structure and 

inventory requirements for the PAA, and when will a total cost estimate be completed? Our committee will be challenged in assessing whether the budget is sufficient if we do not know the required 

quantities and costs to implement the PAA. 

Fifth, I would appreciate an update on the status of host nation 

discussions for the land-based Aegis sites and forward-based radar. 

NATO’s endorsement of territorial missile defense at the Lisbon 

Summit is very positive and I commend you and your predecessors’ 

efforts towards this outcome. I am also interested in U.S. plans for 

NATO-izing the PAA as well as plans for allies’ contributions toward PAA. 

Lastly, press reports continue to surface that indicate that the 

U.S. and Russia are negotiating some sort of missile defense agreement led by Under Secretary of State Tauscher and her Russian 

counterparts. I remain concerned that the Administration might 

allow Russia to shape its missile defense plans, particularly for 

long-range missile defenses in Europe, in exchange for Moscow’s 

adherence to the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] 

Treaty. I would appreciate our witnesses discussing the exact nature and scope of the missile defense discussions that are ongoing 

with Russia. 

On a final note, I want to once again thank Chairman Langevin. 

I appreciate your leadership and look forward to working with you 

on the important bipartisan oversight issues that we face in the 

112th Congress. And I want to thank our witnesses here today for 
5 

their contribution to what is the important issues of our national 

security. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I want to thank the ranking member. 

Now we turn it over to our witnesses and ask each of them to 

summarize their written statements in about five minutes. The 

committee has received full written statements from each of the 

witnesses, and without objection those statements will be made 

part of the record. 

With that, Dr. Miller, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PH.D., PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure to join my colleagues, General O’Reilly, 

Admiral Macy, and Mr. Rose. 

As the chairman stated, in September of 2009, the President approved what was a unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a Phased, Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe. Since that time, the Administration has made tremendous progress; most recently, as noted, at 

the Lisbon Summit, where allies agreed to pursue a territorial missile defense to protect NATO populations and territories. We are 

here to provide the subcommittee with a progress report, and in 

the interests of time we will all briefly summarize our statements. 

As you know, the European Phased, Adaptive Approach has four 

phases. The Administration plans to deploy all four phases and has 

made excellent progress on each over the last year. 

Phase 1, which starts in 2011, will rely on the SM–3, Standard 

Missile 3, Block IA interceptor, based on ships. We have had a 

number of successful tests of this interceptor. It remains in production. Some are deployed; 112 will be delivered by fiscal year 2012. 

The Navy continues to convert Aegis ships to have a ballistic 

missile defense capability. We currently have 20 BMD-capable 

ships, and will convert to a total of 37 by the end of fiscal year 

2015. 

In early 2011, a BMD-capable Aegis ship carrying SM–3 Block IA 

interceptors will be deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean and 

Phase 1 of the EPAA will have started. 

We still have one important phase, one test to accomplish. We 

plan to deploy a forward-based radar in southern Europe in 2011. 

We are currently in discussions with potential host nations, and 

while no decision has been made, we expect to meet the deployment timeline in 2011. 

In Phase 2, which starts in the 2015 timeframe, we will continue 

with ship-based deployments and add a land-based Standard Missile-3 site in Romania. Romania agreed to host U.S. interceptors in 

February of this year and follow-on negotiations are underway. We 

plan to deploy 24 SM–3 interceptors in Romania. During Phase 2, 

these interceptors will be upgraded and we will add the improved 

Block IB of the Standard Missile-3. 
6 

The Department of Defense is now developing the SM–3 Block 

IIB. Some 180 of these missiles will be delivered by fiscal year 2015 

when Phase 2 starts, and 324 by fiscal year 2017. 

In Phase 3, which starts in the 2018 timeframe, we will deploy 

it at a land-based SM–3 site in Poland. Poland agreed to host this 

site in October 2009, not long after we announced the European 

Phased, Adaptive Approach. In July of 2010, Poland and the 

United States signed a protocol amending our ballistic missile defense agreement and, in addition, we have signed and ratified a 

supplemental status of forces agreement with Poland. 

In Phase 3, we will introduce another new variant of the SM– 

3 missile, the IIA, which is currently in development in a cooperative program with the Japanese. It will have its first intercept test 

in 2014 and will enter service by 2018. We plan to deploy 24 SM– 

3 interceptors in Poland. That means we will have 48 land-based 

SM–3 interceptors deployed by Phase 3; 24 in Romania and 24 in 

Poland. That is about five times the number of interceptors 

planned under the previous third site approach. We will also have 

additional reloads in storage, plus the ship-based interceptors I referred to before. 

Finally, Phase 4 will occur in the 2020 timeframe. The key added 

capability for Phase 4 will be the next-generation SM–3 interceptor, the Block IIB. This interceptor will provide early intercept 

capability against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and, very importantly, against potential ICBM threats from 

Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East. 

The Missile Defense Agency is conducting concept development 

and component technology development during this fiscal year for 

the SM–3 Block IIB, and the request for proposals for the concept 

development for this missile was issued in October of 2010. So we 

are on track for all four phases of the Phased, Adaptive Approach 

in Europe. 

We have also made tremendous progress in NATO. Shortly after 

the announcement of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach in 

fall 2009, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated his strong 

support. In December 2009, all NATO foreign ministers unanimously welcomed the EPAA, and at the Lisbon Summit, concluded 

about two weeks ago, NATO leaders agreed to a new NATO mission: to protecting the Alliance’s populations and territories against 

ballistic missile attacks. 

As part of the announcement of the EPAA last year, the Administration welcomed Russian cooperation on missile defenses. Seeking missile defense cooperation with Russia makes good sense, but 

it is not new. President Reagan proposed such cooperation with the 

Soviet Union in the 1980s; President G.W. Bush pursued cooperation on missile defense with Russia throughout his Administration. 

Some have suggested recently that the U.S. proposal for ballistic 

missile defense cooperation with Russia represents a ‘‘secret deal.’’ 

This is nonsense. There is no ‘‘secret deal’’ on missile defense nor 

negotiations for such a thing. 

The Administration has told Congress repeatedly, including in 

testimony, that we are pursuing missile defense cooperation with 

Russia. These discussions are separate from New START discussions that have taken place, and in conducting these discussions 
7 

the Administration has made clear to Russia, to allies, to Congress, 

and to all others that the United States will not agree to any limitations or constraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses and that 

the United States intends to continue improving and deploying 

BMD systems to defend the United States, our deployed forces, and 

our allies and partners. 

Finally, as we implement EPAA, we also continue to maintain 

and improve our defenses of the homeland. The U.S. homeland is 

currently protected against a threat of limited ICBM attack by 30 

ground-based interceptors which will all be deployed by the end of 

this fiscal year at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, California. So we have a capability today to counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran. 

At the same time, because the threat is unpredictable, we are 

hedging by completing Missile Field 2 in Alaska to allow for rapid 

emplacement of up to eight additional ground-based interceptors, 

and we are also continuing development of the two-stage groundbased interceptor. And as I noted before, the EPAA, the European 

Phased, Adaptive Approach, will also contribute to the defense of 

the United States homeland. 

In conclusion, the threat posed by ballistic missiles is real and 

it is growing. As we said in our Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 

it is growing both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our missile defenses today are also very real, and our capabilities are also growing, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 

We look forward to working with this subcommittee and with 

Congress in implementing the European Phased, Adaptive Approach and in implementing the rest of our missile defense efforts 

as well. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Miller can be found in the 

Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Miller. I want to thank you for 

your testimony. 

With that, I now recognize General O’Reilly for your opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General O’REILLY. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking 

Member Turner, other distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

It is my honor to testify before you today on the status of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach, or EPAA, for developing missile 

defense of our homeland, deployed forces, and NATO European allies. 

The Missile Defense Agency, or MDA, is committed to disciplined 

management to efficiently create effective missile defense in the 

four phases outlined by the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

Over the next decade, we are developing integrated missile defense that will provide robust capability using advanced sensors 

and a combination of interceptors for multiple intercept opportunities against short-, medium-, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, or SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs and ICBMs. 
8 

During the past year, we have made significant progress in implementing the EPAA, and I report to you that we are executing 

all of our programs according to the EPAA timelines. 

Our greatest priority remains strengthening homeland missile 

defense. We continue to upgrade our ground-based midcourse defense system, expand our sensor network, and develop a new interceptor, the SM–3 IIB, which will add a layer of defense against potential future ICBMs launched from current regional threats. 

During the past year, we emplaced the 30th ground-based interceptor, or GBI, restarted the GBI production supply chain, upgraded two of the original GBIs, conducted the first two-stage GBI 

flight test, installed a training node at Fort Greely, Alaska, upgraded the Thule, Greenland, early warning radar, and planned 

the Clear early warning radar upgrade in Alaska. Finally, we are 

on track to complete construction of our missile fields at Fort 

Greely by February 2012. 

Much progress has been made in 2010 developing the EPAA 

Phase 1, which will provide initial protection of southern Europe 

from existing SRBM and MRBM threats. During the past year, we 

increased the number of BMD-capable ships to 20, we delivered 26 

SM–3 IA interceptors, and supported the Japanese conducting the 

tenth intercept of an SRBM with the SM–3 IA interceptor. 

We intercepted the lowest altitude engageable target of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, delivered a 

second THAAD battery, and began the initial production of 26 

interceptors and two more THAAD batteries. Initially, we demonstrated the integration of the AN/TPY–2 [Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance] radar with THAAD or Aegis in eight 

flight tests and began refurbishment of an AN/TPY–2 radar for deployment in southern or southeastern Europe next year. Finally, 

we supported multiple interoperability demonstrations with the 

NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense System. 

EPAA development Phase 2 will be completed by 2015 and will 

provide greater defense against larger missile raid sizes and improve discrimination of ballistic missile threats, using remote radars and the SM–3 IB and SM–3 IA interceptors at sea and in a 

land-based or ashore configuration. 

During the past year, we awarded the Aegis Ashore systems engineering contract and supported a U.S.-Romanian site selection 

team for the first deployed Aegis Ashore site. We also have begun 

at-sea operational testing of the upgraded Aegis fire control software for EPAA Phase 2 on the USS Lake Erie. 

EPAA development Phase 3 will be completed in 2018 and provide defense against increasing raid sizes of SRBMs, MRBMs, and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles over large areas of Europe, 

using the SM–3 IIA interceptors at sea and at Aegis Ashore sites 

in Romania and Poland, Airborne Infrared, or ABIR, remotely piloted vehicles and the Precision Tracking Space System, or PTSS. 

During the past year, we began ground testing the SM–3 IIA interceptor components with the Japanese in preparation for flight 

test in 2014. We conducted five ABIR flight tests demonstrating 

missile tracking accuracy. We tracked missiles from space with the 

Space Surveillance Tracking System, and completed a concept re-
9 

view for the PTSS to support production planning contracts starting in 2011. 

EPAA development Phase 4 will be completed in 2020 and provide early intercept capability against large raid sizes of MRBMs 

and IRBMs and potential ICBMs from today’s regional threats. 

During the past year, we completed the SM–3 IIB System Concept Review and solicited three competitive concept definition contracts of which one industry team will be selected in 2013 to complete development and begin flight testing of the SM–3 IIB in 2016. 

Finally, in fiscal year 2010, the Missile Defense Agency, in full 

collaboration with the developmental and operational test communities, updated our test plans for the EPAA, which include 72 flight 

tests and 107 ground tests over the next decade. 

I look forward to answering your questions, and thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly can be found in the 

Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

Before we go to Admiral Macy, we have a vote on right now. I 

think we will be able to get through Admiral Macy’s testimony, and 

then we will recess and then go to vote. There are five votes, and 

then we will return for Mr. Rose’s testimony and then go into questions. 

With that, Admiral Macy, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ARCHER M. MACY, JR., DIRECTOR, 

JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral MACY. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, 

Ranking Member Turner, and other distinguished members of the 

subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Phased, 

Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense along with Dr. Miller, General O’Reilly and Mr. Rose. 

I will summarize the operational benefits of the PAA as the U.S. 

approach to missile defense which is responsive to both congressional direction and the warfighters’ needs. I will also touch on the 

planning and analysis undertaken by the Joint Staff to help guide 

decisions on maximizing combatant commander war-fighting capability. Additional details are contained in my submitted written 

testimony. 

While a majority of our remarks today will address the European 

Phased, Adaptive Approach in some detail, I want to emphasize 

here that the PAA is a conceptual approach to providing ballistic 

missile defense capability for the homeland and our forces, allies, 

and partners in different regions, circumstances, and times. It is a 

realignment and an operational enhancement of our BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] plans and is not a replacement. The 

realignment provides us with a greater capability through a flexible and adaptable approach which focuses on protecting those most 

at risk today, while continuing to improve our capability against 

future threats. 

As has been noted by the Congress, the most pressing threat for 

our deployed forces today is the increasing number of short-range 

and medium-range ballistic missiles. The PAA addresses these 

issues head-on. 
10 

The U.S. cannot afford to build the number of launchers, interceptors, and sensors it would take for each combatant commander 

to have his own dedicated BMDS capability that can address all 

the potential strikes that could be launched at any time. What the 

PAA provides instead is a balanced investment that has the capability to engage the range of threats, can be tailored to the geography, political circumstances, and defense capabilities of regional 

partners, and has the flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets 

where and when they are needed. 

The PAA concept provides the United States with an enhanced 

capability to respond to regional threats worldwide, no matter 

where they emerge, and to strengthen defense of the homeland. 

The PAA is phased to advances in our own technical and operational capabilities for ballistic missile defense, and it is adaptive 

to trends and advances in potential adversarial threats. 

We speak of four phases in advances of our technical capabilities. 

However, the same number and timing of application of individual 

phases may not be applied in each combatant commander’s AOR 

[area of responsibility] the same way. We are developing plans for 

phases for each AOR with the European PAA currently being the 

most advanced, a majority of which General O’Reilly has described. 

I earlier alluded to the planning and analysis we have underway 

to support PAA implementation, and as the chairman and Mr. Turner noted, this includes the Joint Capabiliies Mix study. We previously conducted JCM–1 in 2005–2006, and JCM–2 in 2007–2008. 

The latter was briefed to this subcommittee in September of that 

last year. 

The final report on the current assessment, JCM–3, which focuses on the force requirements for the PAA, will not be completed 

until March of 2011, so I do not have any results I can discuss 

today. However, I think it is important to understand what this 

study is, how it is being executed, and the kind of results that will 

be produced. I will note that I look forward to the opportunity next 

spring to discuss those results with this subcommittee when they 

are available. 

JCM–3 is examining our missile defense strategy in the PAA to 

inform decisions on the number and type of sensors, launchers, and 

interceptors we require. In order to determine force needs at this 

level of granularity, we have to take into account how the combatant commands intend to employ them, what the threats are, and 

generally how the threat will be expected to be employed. 

The analysis is being executed by JIAMDO [Joint Integrated Air 

and Missile Defense Organization], my organization, in conjunction 

with representatives from the combatant commands, the Missile 

Defense Agency, the services, and OSD [Office of the Secretary of 

Defense] Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, CAPE. 

In parallel with the JCM–3 study, the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic 

Command, and the staffs of PACOM [United States Pacific Command], EUCOM [United States European Command] and 

CENTCOM [United States Central Command] are conducting formal planning for how the PAA will be implemented in their areas 

of responsibility. Further, EUCOM is working closely with NATO 

to develop the concept of operations, command and control plans, 

and planning factors for the implementation of the recent NATO 
11 

decision at Lisbon to incorporate missile defense as a core element 

of the collective defense. 

In conclusion, the Department is investing a significant portion 

of its budget in missile defense and the PAA is providing the necessary framework to ensure it is invested effectively and wisely 

and, most importantly, meets the warfighters’ needs. We have established a solid process and an analytic approach to monitor and 

guide the implementation of the PAA, and we expect to develop 

and field the phases in the most operationally effective and costefficient manner possible. 

Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Macy can be found in the 

Appendix on page 64.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral Macy. 

As I said, we are going to recess right now. We will begin, when 

we return, with Mr. Rose’s testimony, and then go into questions. 

With that, the subcommittee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The committee will come to order. I want to 

thank our witnesses for their patience. With that, I want to resume 

now by turning the floor over to Mr. Rose, last but not least. We 

look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK ROSE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SPACE AND DEFENSE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary ROSE. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Turner, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Obama administration’s efforts to implement the 

European Phased, Adaptive Approach, or EPAA. 

As many of you know, I worked for this subcommittee for two 

and a half years, and this is my first opportunity to sit on the other 

side of the table and testify. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Under Secretary Tauscher sends her regrets that she could not 

participate in person. Instead, she has prepared a statement and 

has asked that it be included in the record of today’s hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus my opening remarks today 

on the progress we have made in implementing the EPAA over the 

past year. Last year, President Obama committed the United 

States to a comprehensive new plan to provide missile defense protection to our NATO Allies and the United States. This plan will 

defend against the existing short- and medium-range threat and 

evolve as the threat evolves. This plan has opened up new opportunities for cooperation with our Allies and has enhanced NATO’s Article 5 commitment to collective defense. 

At the Lisbon summit two weeks ago, NATO agreed to develop 

a missile defense capability to defend its territory, populations, and 

forces against ballistic missile attack. In the summit declaration, 

NATO heads of state and government stated, ‘‘The threat to NATO 

European populations, territory, and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing. As missile defence forms part 
12 

of a broader response to counter this threat, we have decided that 

the Alliance will develop a missile defence capability to pursue its 

core task of collective defence.’’ 

Additionally, the Alliance agreed to expand its missile defense 

command and control system to include territorial missile defense. 

This will enable voluntary national contributions from the United 

States and other NATO Allies to plug into the overall NATO capability. 

Finally, the Alliance welcomed the EPAA as an important national contribution to this NATO capability. 

Mr. Chairman, it is important to know that while NATO has 

been involved in missile defense since the late 1990s, that work has 

been strictly limited to defending its military forces from ballistic 

missile attack, not defending its territory and populations. It has 

been a long-standing bipartisan goal of the United States to expand 

the Alliance’s work on missile defense, to include defense of territory and populations. Therefore, the significance of NATO’s decision on missile defense at Lisbon should not be underestimated. It 

is a major diplomatic victory for the United States and the Alliance 

as a whole. 

In addition to the recent success at NATO, we have also made 

significant progress in implementing the bilateral agreements that 

are necessary to deploy elements of the EPAA in Europe. 

On the deployment of the Phase 1 radar in southeastern Europe, 

once agreement on a location has been reached, we are prepared 

to immediately begin formal negotiations on a basing agreement. 

For Phase 2, Romania has agreed to host a land-based SM–3 

site. We began negotiations on a basing agreement in June of this 

year, and are making excellent progress towards a final document. 

The United States and Romania already have a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement in force. 

Finally, Poland agreed in October 2009, to host the Phase 3 SM– 

3 site. On July 3, 2010, the United States and Poland signed a protocol amending the original 2008 Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement, which will allow for the deployment of a land-based SM–3 

interceptor site in Poland. The next step is to bring this agreement 

into force through ratification by the Polish Parliament. Earlier, in 

February 2010, the Polish Government ratified a supplemental 

SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] agreement with the United 

States. 

Before I close, let me touch on the subject of missile defense in 

Russia. Like the previous Administration, we believe that missile 

defense cooperation with Russia, both bilaterally and at NATO, is 

in the national security interest of the United States. In Lisbon two 

weeks ago, NATO and Russia agreed on a number of missile defense cooperative activities, including the resumption of theater 

missile defense exercises. 

As President Obama stated, by moving ahead with cooperation 

on missile defense, we can turn a source of past tension into a 

source of cooperation against a shared threat. That said, even as 

we seek greater cooperation with Russia on missile defense, the 

United States will continue to reject any constraints or limitations 

on our missile defense programs. Restrictions or limitations on U.S. 

missile defense capabilities are not under discussion. Let me reit-
13 

erate what Secretary Miller said. There are no secret deals with 

Russia to limit our missile defenses. 

Finally, let me also say that Russia will not have a veto over 

U.S. missile defenses in Europe or anywhere. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, let me stop there. I will 

be happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rose can be found in the 

Appendix on page 76.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank Mr. Rose for his testimony, and I should 

also say welcome back, Mr. Rose, to the Congress and to the committee where you served prior to your current position. It is great 

to have you back, and you are one of two witnesses today that are 

alumni of the Armed Services Committee staff, the other being Dr. 

Miller. Welcome back to both of you, I should say. 

With respect also to Ms. Tauscher’s testimony, I ask unanimous 

consent that Secretary Tauscher’s testimony be inserted into the 

record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found in 

the Appendix on page 81.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would ask on a personal note on behalf of myself and the subcommittee to give our best to Secretary Tauscher 

and we look forward to seeing her in the very near future. 

With that, let me turn the first question to General O’Reilly. It 

is my intention also, I should mention, to do two rounds of questions. I am going to take latitude as chair for an extended period 

of time, and I will extend that courtesy to the ranking member. 

And then we will go to the five minute rule for the other members 

of the subcommittee. As I said, we will go to a second round of 

questions as well. 

Beginning with General O’Reilly, last October the subcommittee 

asked GAO to evaluate the Department’s plans for implementing 

the Phased, Adaptive Approach for missile defense in Europe. Last 

month, the GAO delivered a draft report. One of the key conclusions is, ‘‘The administration’s EPAA policy committed DOD to a 

schedule that will be challenging to meet based on the technical 

progress of missile defense element development and testing programs, and before the scope of the development efforts were fully 

understood.’’ 

So, General O’Reilly, could you tell us what measures are being 

considered to mitigate the consequences of any potential test failures or delays that might lead to production gaps or otherwise result in schedule delays for delivering planned capabilities to combatant commanders? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the plans that we have laid out for each 

of the elements of the Phased, Adaptive Approach were designed 

based on traditional development of missile systems and their fire 

control systems. We have looked at the development timelines, and 

the ones we have used in the Phased, Adaptive Approach are actually longer than what you can compare them to with our other missile defense programs. So our assessment is this is a conservative 

set of schedules. 

We have also laid in decision points, which I have briefed the 

GAO on, of different technological maturity levels that will be 
14 

reached before we move to each of the development phases of our 

program. So we deem this to be a very manageable risk and laid 

out in a very prudent approach to developing these systems. 

I will note that some of their analysis was comparing our missile 

developments of just the missile to system developments, which are 

more comprehensive. And one of the advantages of using the Aegis 

system as the mainstay for our capability for the EPAA is we 

evolve it from one fire control capability to the next, and in between we bring a new missile on board. And that does, in fact, reduce the amount of new technology that has to be applied and also 

has a more deliberate delivery approach. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, as a follow-on, since each successive phase 

delivers additional capability, how will you mitigate delays for 

equipment deployment in one phase from affecting preparations for 

the next phase? 

General O’REILLY. The capabilities are developed in phases that 

are aimed at specific threat classes that we are trying to negate. 

And, as we said, Phase 1 is aimed at medium ballistic missiles and 

short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. If we had a 

problem with the subsequent phase, in each phase it would usually 

equate to producing or deploying additional numbers of missile defense systems. Since our systems are flexible and since they are 

mobile, we have the ability to add capability in if we found in fact 

we needed—we only had shorter-range interceptors versus using 

longer-range ones of a subsequent phase. 

So we believe the adaptability itself of the system allows you to 

adjust to the capability that is available at any given time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

Dr. Miller, the GAO also concluded that ‘‘DOD has not fully implemented a management process that synchronizes the European 

Phased, Adaptive Approach acquisition activities and ensures 

transparency and accountability. The DOD has made progress in 

acquisition planning for technology development, system engineering and testing, partial progress in defining requirements and identifying stakeholders, but has not yet developed an EPAA acquisition decision schedule or an overall EPAA investment cost.’’ 

Dr. Miller, how do you respond to GAO’s concern expressed in 

the draft report to the committee? Does OSD have the appropriate 

acquisition plans with milestones and budget, to track progress in 

each phase of the PAA? 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer but 

then give an opportunity for General O’Reilly also to answer as the 

acquisition executive for the systems and for the missile systems 

involved here. 

At the outset of this effort and, indeed, throughout the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review, we looked at the likely costs associated 

with the Phased, Adaptive Approach and had an overall estimate 

for those costs associated with missiles, sensors, and so forth. As 

each of those programs matures, we have seen the refinement of 

those cost estimates and currently believe that we have a pretty 

good grasp on what the overall cost of this program will be. One 

of the uncertainties or one of the choices one makes is how to ascribe the cost of the Aegis BMD-capable ships associated with that. 

Because they are a global asset, we generally don’t include them 
15 

in our cost estimates for the cost of Phased, Adaptive Approach for 

Europe. 

Now with respect to oversight of the program, in addition to the 

Missile Defense Executive Board, which meets regularly and reviews this and other elements of missile defense, the Missile Defense Agency’s programs, including all of the Phased, Adaptive Approach-related programs, come in for, as you know, an annual review in the Department and get a pretty intensive scrub. And that 

has been the case this year, as it was throughout the course of the 

conduct of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

My sense is that we have a very good understanding of what the 

key technical risks are associated with each of the elements of the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach and that we have a—and that General 

O’Reilly and the Missile Defense Agency have a clear, lined-up program of activities that stretch from today through the coming decade for when the key milestones will be, when they need to get key 

systems on contract, and what other key decisions are. 

General O’REILLY. Thank you. Sir, for each one of our programs 

in the EPAA, as the acquisition executive I have established six 

baselines—cost, schedule, technical, operational, contracts, and test 

baselines. This is far more descriptive that is in a typical acquisition program baseline. Ours is more detailed. If there is a lead 

service involved, like the Navy or Army or Air Force, I have asked 

and received cooperation from their acquisition executives. So when 

I sign these baselines, the service that is going to be the lead service for these capabilities also signs the baseline after they have 

conducted their own reviews. So it is unprecedented that a joint 

program actually has two service acquisition executives, or the 

service acquisition executive and myself as missile defense. We perform twice the amount of reviews you would normally see. 

Also, as Dr. Miller said, the Missile Defense Executive Board 

does perform a lot of the duties that a Defense Acquisition Board 

would perform. So instead of typically having a Defense Acquisition 

Board review once every two to three years, I have a review once 

every two to three months. So it is a very integrated, technical 

management approach. It is very visible. And I have provided those 

baselines and we will continue to update those baselines over the 

course of the development of the EPAA. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, do you have an overall cost estimate on 

each phase of the PAA and sufficient mechanisms there to track 

that cost growth there? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, we do, and that is part of our baselines, not only for each individual element but also the aggregate, 

as we understand the definition of the architecture of the EPAA. 

And the reason I say that is we use an analytical architecture, but 

it is the combatant commander, the European Command, that determines what the war plans and the actual architecture will be. 

And that is submitted to the Joint Staff for approval. And that is 

currently going through that process. I will let Admiral Macy address that. But once that is produced we then can take our unit 

costs, and very quickly be able to determine precisely what the 

costs are. But we do have estimates today. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 
16 

Admiral Macy, in April we received testimony from the Department that, ‘‘The Joint Staff is leading a review which includes an 

examination of how the Global Force Management process will incorporate the updated missile defense policy and planning guidance 

contained in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. The review will 

be completed in the summer of 2010. Additionally, the Joint Capability Mix-3 study will determine inventory levels of BMD assets by 

spring 2011.’’ 

Admiral Macy, two related questions. First, can you provide us 

with an update on the status of the Global Force Management 

process? And, second, if the JCM–3 study is completed in the 

spring, how soon do you expect that inventory requirements and 

associated cost specifics to Phase 2, 3 and 4 can be formulated and 

made available to Congress? 

Admiral MACY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Global Force 

Management development project was a several-months-long effort 

to understand was there anything that was different about how 

you do ballistic missile defense and how you would handle the 

management of forces? We have for many years, of course, had 

Global Force Management. It is how you determine which divisions 

go where, which Air Force fighter squadrons go where, which ships 

go where in any given year. This is an effort that is run between 

the Joint Staff, Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command. 

So the study was to look at, okay, is there something different 

about ballistics missiles that affects that? There were some things 

learned out of that. Those have been folded into—and it did wrap 

up in the late spring, early summer. Those have since been 

wrapped into the effort that I alluded to earlier, which is the ongoing planning effort being led by Strategic Command on how to do 

management of ballistic missile defense in the different regions at 

different times and across the globe—the problem, of course, being 

that you have a finite number of ships, a number of THAAD batteries, a number of TPY–2 radars, and everybody wants them. So 

the question is, who gets them, and how often, and when do you 

need them? 

We don’t envision either the need or the ability to station everything 24–7, 365 wherever we might want it. And that comes into 

the Global Force Management on what will be, if you will, permanently emplaced; what will be on a regular deployment schedule; 

and what will be on a surge deployment schedule. That process is 

going on now. It goes through a series of reviews, culminating with 

reviews led by the Vice Chairman, and it will wrap up this coming 

spring. So I would expect that this spring, we will be able to come 

back and talk to you, on a global scale and on a management scale, 

how we would do that. Obviously, we are not going to get into the 

details of individual concept(?) plans, but we will be able to describe to you what we think will be the way we will manage that. 

At the same time—and these are interrelated because part of the 

discussion that you have with the COCOM [combatant command] 

about what do you think you need in a time of low tension versus 

what do you need in a time of high tension figures into, how does 

the COCOM think he is going to fight? As I discussed in my testimony, that drives how you do the JCM–3 study to figure out what 
17 

do you think you are going to need—how many interceptors, how 

many launching platforms, and how many sensor systems. 

And so as those two studies wind in and out between each other 

to figure out what is the answers, they will result in a set of options that the senior decisionmakers can look at and say okay, 

these are the ways in which I will deploy forces in times of low, 

medium and high tension and where to, and having decided that, 

these are how many I need to handle the steady state, and this is 

how many I need to handle the surge condition. We will be looking 

at things like utility curves; when do you not have to buy any more 

interceptors because it doesn’t buy you that many more days within a particular conflict? The details will obviously be classified. And 

when we come back in the spring we will have that discussion. We 

will be ready to go into a great deal of depth. 

So the date answer to your question, if you will, Mr. Chairman, 

is I hope to personally in the April timeframe be sitting down with 

your staffs as an initial review of the details preparatory to taking 

them up to the members of the committee. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you, Admiral. We look forward 

to that when it occurs. 

My final couple of areas for each of the witnesses, talking about 

base agreements and NATO integration. I wanted to, first of all, 

again congratulate you on the recent achievement at the NATO 

summit in Lisbon in gaining support for territorial missile defense 

and the PAA. The questions are for Mr. Rose and Dr. Miller. 

Looking forward, what are the remaining challenges in ratifying 

the necessary basing agreements in the host countries and in finalizing a location for the radar site in Phase 1? And then, for General 

O’Reilly or Dr. Miller, how does the recently announced NATO decision to facilitate integration of NATO members’ missile defense 

systems into a unified NATO framework affect the current EPAA 

plans? 

Secretary ROSE. Sir, let me start with Phase 1. We are discussing 

with a number of nations the potential deployment of the Phase 1 

radar. We are confident that we can meet, from a legal perspective 

in getting the agreements in place, the timeline of the end of 2011. 

With regards to Phase 2, the land-based SM–3 site in Romania, 

we are making good progress on the Ballistic Missile Defense 

Agreement. We already have an existing supplemental SOFA as 

well as a Defense Cooperation Agreement. So we hope to come to 

conclusion on that soon. I can’t give you a date because these negotiations—that is how negotiations go—but we are very confident 

that we will have the agreements in place for Phase 2. Now that 

will need to be ratified, the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement, by 

the Romanian Parliament. But we have been told by the Romanian 

Government they don’t foresee any challenges. 

With regards to Phase 3 and Phase 4, in Poland we signed a protocol this July to the 2008 basing agreement and we are awaiting 

ratification of that agreement by the Polish Parliament. 

With regards to NATO, now that the political decision has been 

made, the individual committees—the operational side of the 

house, the technical side of the house—will begin to do the work 

to implement that decision. 
18 

Secretary MILLER. I will just add very briefly with respect to the 

TPY–2 radar which we intend to deploy by the end of 2011, we currently have a couple deployed overseas there. They can be moved 

relatively rapidly. As you know, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we 

have one in Japan and we have put one in Israel. And we are still 

confident that the timelines for moving that equipment and getting 

that established are very achievable. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, and I would like to add as far as from 

point of interoperability, our systems were built from the beginning 

using NATO protocols and NATO standards so that our systems 

are interoperable with other systems that have been built to NATO 

standards. As I said in my testimony, the most effective missile defense is to have layers so you can have several opportunities to 

intercept an incoming missile. The U.S. contribution to NATO and 

EPAA is primarily an upper-tier, what we call, would be your first 

shot opportunity, either in outer space or in the upper atmosphere. 

Our fire control systems will be interlinked with the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System that NATO is developing, which would coordinate the utilization of their lower-tier 

systems, such as Patriot and some of the early Aegis missiles, and 

some of the other missile defense systems that they have already 

procured. So we will maximize the combined capability of both. 

We began two years ago with a direct link between the testbed. 

The laboratory that NATO uses to develop their command and control in Den Haag is directly connected with our laboratory in Colorado Springs, so that as we develop software we assure ourselves 

that they are interoperable, and we have taken that into account 

and it is a very useful tool having both of those for further development of command and control approaches. 

Sir, from an operational point of view, I would defer to Admiral 

Macy. 

Admiral MACY. Mr. Chairman, I have, in one of my other hats 

I have the privilege of being the U.S. representative to the NATO 

Air Defense Committee and, as such, have been involved in these 

discussions for quite some time. NATO has been discussing this 

over the past year at some length. There have been a number of 

position papers done. The NATO Air Defense Committee has done 

a number of papers coming out of previous tasking at the 

Strasbourg-Kehl summit of several years ago. There has already 

been initial CONOPS [Concept of Operations] development going 

on. It is both convenient and useful, of course, that the Commander 

of European Command is also SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] and the Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe is 

the NATO Commander AIRNORTH [Allied Air Forces Northern 

Europe]. So those staffs have been involved and already looking at 

what are the CONOPS, what are the processes and procedures. 

After Lisbon, the Secretary General has given direction that a 

number of committees look at this and be prepared to answer in 

some detail next spring such issues as CONOPS and command and 

control. So between that approach, of course, NATO and the United 

States have shared command and control for air defense for a great 

number of years. So we know how to do that, and we take that, 

and using the systems, as General O’Reilly mentioned, that have 

been built in conformance with NATO specifications, we believe we 
19 

are very well positioned to integrate the U.S. PAA contribution to 

NATO into the NATO BMD capability. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. I want to thank the witnesses for their 

answers to my questions. With that, I will now turn it over to the 

ranking member for his questions. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In addition to recognizing your service before we go on, with this being the last hearing of the subcommittee, I want to recognize Bob DeGrasse and 

Kari Bingen for their leadership roles in the staff in this committee. I think in the subcommittee we have had a very bipartisan 

relationship. And I know that I can attest and I know, Mr. Chairman, that you would also, that both Bob and Kari have worked 

diligently to ensure that both the subject matter and the members 

approach issues from a bipartisan basis. So I appreciate both Kari 

and Bob’s service and look forward to your dedication as we go into 

the 112th Congress. 

Gentlemen, almost all of you when you were giving your statements gave us some sense of the obvious criticism that I know you 

feel of the suspicion that there is a ‘‘secret deal’’ with Russia; that 

Russia might have veto power over our missile defense systems 

and that this Administration might agree to limitations on our missile defense. In fact, Dr. Miller, you state in your testimony on page 

7, ‘‘. . . the Administration has made clear to Russia and Allies 

that the United States will not agree to any limitations or constraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and that the United 

States intends to continue improving and deploying BMD systems.’’ 

The problem, gentlemen, I think is that the Phased, Adaptive 

Approach, though, is borne out of a limitation and a constraint that 

has been placed on our missile defense system. By having scrapped 

the third site where the ground-based missiles were intended for 

Poland, including the radar that was included to Czech Republic, 

this Administration unilaterally put a constraint and limitation 

and proposed, then, the Phased, Adaptive Approach, which was not 

mutually exclusive to the third site. It includes systems that were 

concurrently being developed. And that is an issue, I think, that 

puts a light over the issue of the Administration’s need to continue 

to say that they would not agree to limitations because they 

stepped forward initially with one. 

The second issue, I think, that causes each of you in your testimony to have to raise this issue is the fact of the statements that 

the Russians themselves are making. I have the Moscow Times report today about President Medvedev’s state of the nation address 

where he is reported to have said he warned the West that if 

NATO doesn’t reach a deal with Russia of the joint development of 

an anti-missile shield over Europe, a new arms race would start in 

the next decade and Russia would be forced to build up its offensive strategic forces. 

The Washington Post reports Putin having said that ‘‘if the missile defense system excludes Russia and includes installations 

along Russia’s borders, Moscow will see that as a threat and be 

forced to respond with an expansion and updating of its own weapons systems’’—this at a time when the Senate is being called to 

take up the issue of the New START Treaty where you have the 
20 

Russian leadership specifically singling out missile defense as a 

threat to their willingness to comply with the treaty that our Senate is now being asked to concur in. 

Which brings me to the issue, I think, that I would like you to 

deal with today, and that is the issue of since the third site was 

scrapped and the two-stage was preserved, according to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, as a hedging strategy for homeland 

defense in case, one, the long-range threat comes earlier or, two, 

technical issues arise with the later models of the SM–3 interceptor, it brings me to a question of, well, how do we evaluate this 

hedge? At what point would the Department make a decision to 

employ the hedge? What criteria would be used? And what threat 

indications and warning would you need to see ahead to make such 

a decision to deploy that two-stage? How long would it take to deploy if the decision is made so? And the third one is, in light of the 

statements that we saw today from the leadership of Russia, does 

your hedge strategy, if it is needed to be deployed, already violate 

what the Russian leaders are saying would be their continued commitment to the New START treaty? 

Dr. Miller, your thoughts. 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Turner, if I can, let me start by taking exception, if I can, to your characterization of the Phased, Adaptive 

Approach as a ‘‘limitation.’’ Frankly, the conclusion of the missile 

defense review work that we did and the conclusion of people at 

multiple levels in the Department of Defense is that it was a better 

idea, a better approach that would provide more capability sooner 

for the threats we have today and a more important delta to the 

capability for the longer-range threats we may see in the future. 

And I will come back to that point when I talk about hedging. 

With respect to Russian statements, we can expect the Russian 

Federation to do what is in its national interest. We are, of course, 

committed to do what is in the United States’ national interest. 

And the idea behind the ballistic missile defense cooperation is that 

in this area, because we both face threats from Iran and, potentially, other states, that there is room for cooperation and there is 

room for both of us to advance our interests and improve our security, and similarly for NATO and Russia through the NATO–Russia Council, that there is room for both to improve security. 

I will state, as well, that there is a long history of many in Russia wanting to slow down the U.S. missile defense program. I don’t 

think that we could be any more clear about the fact that we will 

not accept that and we will go forward and continue to improve our 

capabilities, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 

With respect to the question of the hedge, I think it is useful to 

think in terms of timeframes. If a missile—if an ICBM threat from 

Iran were to arise prior to 2017, the two-stage GBI is not going to 

be an effective hedge for that time window, from today to then, because that is about as quickly as we would expect that we could 

get it in place. And that is about when it would have been in place 

under the previous approach. 

So it is, I think, useful to remind ourselves that the first hedge— 

let me back up. The first objective of course is to prevent this from 

occurring in the first place. And that is what the sanctions with respect to the nuclear program are about, and what the pressure 
21 

track is about, as well as our offers for diplomacy, should they go 

that way. But it is useful to remind ourselves that we currently 

have deployed 30 ground-based interceptors and that these interceptors are intended—in fact, capable—of providing defense of the 

United States. 

The next hedge that is applicable before 2017 is that the Secretary of Defense last year made a decision to finish off Missile 

Field 2 at Fort Greely. And that means if we see an additional 

threat in terms of the quantity or the quality that could cause us 

to want to allocate more interceptors to a given re-entry vehicle if 

we thought it was a more sophisticated threat, those eight interceptors will be available, and those silos will be prepared. 

So within that timeframe, within the next seven years, that is 

what the hedge looks like. So the two-stage GBI really comes into 

play in the 2017 timeframe and later. And what we would look for 

is a combination of progress, if you can call it that, in the Iranian 

nuclear program and ICBM capabilities. And I think it is probably 

preferable not to go into details for indicators and warnings but I 

think it is fair to say that you look at not just the independent activities of those two but the efforts to make them and to provide 

a weaponized capability. 

You noted that some assessments have suggested that Iran could 

have a capability potentially as soon as 2015. I don’t take exception 

to that. There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty about the 

timeline. But, as I said, the first thing that it is essential to remember is that we have capabilities in place and we are prepared 

to augment them in that timeframe with our ground-based interceptors. And the rest of the hedge will come in later. 

With respect to the technical hedge for the—if there are challenges with later versions of the SM–3, we will see those in the 

coming years and then have a decision to make—if that is indeed 

the case—the decision of whether to attempt to correct the program, to simplify the program, to accelerate the program, et cetera, 

versus to bring in another capability, will be at that point on the 

table. 

Mr. TURNER. Before we go on, Dr. Miller, let me go back because 

there was a lot in that answer so let me try to break it down. The 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review states that the hedge for the twostage is, in case one, the long-range threat comes earlier or, two, 

technical issues arise with later models. Now you don’t disagree 

with that, right? 

Secretary MILLER. That is right. 

Mr. TURNER. So for this to be the policy and for this to be the 

policy that you agree with, it must mean that the hedge would be 

available prior to the Phased, Adaptive Approach being available 

because otherwise it wouldn’t say earlier. Is that correct? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. As you know, the Phase 4—— 

Mr. TURNER. Pause for a second. I just had to ask you this because you said the Phased, Adaptive Approach was going to be here 

sooner. And I just wanted to be clear because my understanding of 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Review was that the hedge was in 

case it was needed earlier than the Phased, Adaptive Approach 

would be available. And I just want to make certain you didn’t dis-
22 

agree with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, because that is 

what we have been operating on. 

Secretary MILLER. I agree with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and my comments about the Phased, Adaptive Approach providing capability earlier are with respect to the earlier phases of 

that Phased, Adaptive Approach. 

Mr. TURNER. But not the portion that relates to protection for the 

United States homeland and the protection that the two-stage 

would be providing. 

Secretary MILLER. Specifically, the two-stage GBI is a hedge. 

One of its functions can be as a hedge against challenges with 

Phase 4, which is the Standard Missile-3 IIB, homeland, which is 

intended to provide another layer for the United States. It will also 

provide an additional capability for ascent-phase intercept for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well. 

Mr. TURNER. Good. Now in light of the comments—and I know 

you are well versed in all the issues of START and missile defense—in light of the comments that we are hearing from Russia, 

if you were in a position to deploy the hedge do you believe that 

their statements indicate that deployment of the hedge would be a 

violation of their perspective on START? 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Turner, I don’t believe so. I have not seen 

a definitive statement in that regard. But I can say with some confidence that the answer to that would not affect the decision made, 

certainly, by this Administration, whether or not to go forward 

with the hedge. The statement that there will be no constraints or 

limitations on missile defense certainly applies to the hedge as well 

as to all other elements of our program. 

Mr. TURNER. Walk me through, then, for just a moment as to the 

timeline of the hedge. If next week we were to a position where the 

hedge was to be pursued because the threat had either come earlier 

or that we are now aware of technical issues with the later models 

of the SM–3 interceptor that moved your timeframe back, what is 

the timeframe for the deployment of the hedge? 

Secretary MILLER. For the two-stage ground-based interceptor, 

the soonest that we currently expect that we would be able to deploy in Europe would be in the ballpark of 2017. That is what the 

estimate—the estimate previously, at one point it looked possible 

to deploy earlier as we had delays in movement forward with the 

previous Administration’s plans. That slipped from an initial goal 

of 2013 to a later goal of 2015. And ultimately, because of the requirement to conduct additional testing and then the delays, also, 

in ratification for the Poland and the Czech Republic, that slipped 

into, I would say, the 2016 to 2018 timeframe. 

Mr. TURNER. Is that a rolling six to seven years then? You say 

2017 now but, I mean, let’s say it is three years from now and we 

are to have deployment. Are we still dealing with that type of 

delay? 

Secretary MILLER. There are steps that we can take to shorten 

that timeline, and I think General O’Reilly can talk to that for a 

moment. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, there is. Under the previous plan it 

was a six-year development of the missile field. The six-year development was triggered on successful testing of the two-stage GBI. 
23 

We did a successful test, the first of three, in February of this 

year—I am sorry, June of this year. And then we will next year 

have our first intercept. And then we have another two-stage GBI 

test currently scheduled for 2016. However, a two-stage GBI is configured like a three-stage, and we confirmed its performance last 

summer, except the third stage is literally missing. I mean it literally is the same length and everything is a three-stage. So the 

two-stage GBI, we believe, you can accelerate the qualification and 

the certification and the other requirements that were previously 

put by Congress on the performance of the two-stage before you 

begin construction. We completed 35 percent of the design of the 

missile field. So we archived all of that information. And so if we 

had to execute, we could in fact reduce that six-year down to perhaps one or two years shorter than that. Again, our trigger is—— 

Mr. TURNER. From five to four years. 

Secretary MILLER. Yes, sir. That wasn’t our current plan that we 

had previously, but that is what you would do if you had to shorten 

the construction cycle. And we were relieved of the requirement of 

continuing several tests of the SM–3 or—I mean the two-stage 

GBI. 

Mr. TURNER. And the reason—and I know you gentlemen are 

aware of the reason why I am asking the question, is to evaluate 

the viability of the hedge. I wanted your thoughts on will it be 

viewed as violating the Russian’s view of START? Can it be delivered on time? If the threat is there that would cause you to turn 

to the hedge, can you really deliver the hedge in a timeframe 

where it would be effective? 

And it sounds like your time periods—six, five, four—that you 

can shorten it somewhat, but you still have a relatively long lead 

time for the hedge to provide that protection to the U.S. homeland. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the next expansion of capability that we 

have is—and there will be several independent reviews that Congress has asked for and will receive. And they all indicate that the 

greatest capability that is needed, if there was a need for a hedge, 

is not specifically more interceptors. It is more capability to do discrimination and sensor management and so forth. And that aspect 

of the previous program we are actually accelerating over the 

EPAA—as I mentioned, the upgrades of the new radars. And we 

do have greater capability being developed on an accelerated level 

to help us with discrimination, which independent assessment indicates is where your greatest need would be. If you wanted additional firepower beyond adding eight missiles, which the timeframe 

for that is on the order of eight weeks to complete the population 

of the missile field, the next step would be to expand the number 

of refurbished missile field number one, which is about a twoyear—it would take two years to do that. So we do have some intermediate steps which you could employ if, in fact, a hedge was 

necessary that could shorten going to a deployment in Europe of 

several years to build a new missile field. 

Mr. TURNER. That just goes to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, I mean is the document of course that states that this will 

be a hedge and the two criteria for the deployment of the hedge. 

And I am just trying to evaluate, do you see a scenario in which 

that hedge would be deployed; would it be there timely, would it 
24 

be viewed as a violation from the Russians? So maybe I need to ask 

that in a different way, Dr. Miller. I mean, do you see a scenario 

in which the hedge would be deployed? 

Secretary MILLER. Sir, I think that that scenario is quite unlikely 

and I think it is—— 

Mr. TURNER. So do you not see a scenario in which—— 

Secretary MILLER. No, sir, I think it is unlikely. And I think it 

is unlikely for the following reason. And that is that we have a 

good program in place for Phased, Adaptive Approach. We have the 

capabilities coming into place that will allow testing in the next 

several years and will allow us to get a good sense of the SM–3 IIB 

and the technical risk there. If we discover at that point that the 

test history and the modeling that has led to the parameters of the 

system are incorrect and can’t be rapidly adjusted, then we have 

a decision—and General O’Reilly may want to talk about the 

timeline—in that timeframe to go for the hedge. I think we have 

done, and MDA and our teams have done, the analysis deeply 

enough that that technical hedge is unlikely to be necessary. 

With respect to the hedge for—but we are talking about obviously the protection of the United States, so that is why we, despite 

a low probability—there is a low probability, we hope, of an attack 

in the first place—but this is why it is still valuable to do this 

hedge. 

With respect to the hedging against an earlier arrival of the 

threat, as I said, I think you have to think about that in a different 

sort of layer, and that is that if it comes very quickly there is not 

going to be time to deploy a two-stage, even when compressed, and 

then the addition of GBIs at Fort Greely, is going to be a sensible 

thing to do. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, I really was not asking you a probability 

question. I mean I understand that I am certainly with you on the 

issue of let’s certainly hope and have an expectation that the probability of any of these circumstances would be very low. However, 

the Administration in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review did establish this as a hedge. And so I want to make certain that this 

language is not meaningless. And, therefore, my question to you of 

do you see any scenario where the hedge is deployed—— 

Secretary MILLER. I will give you a shorter answer, sir. Yes, the 

scenario would be either when there is a technical problem with 

the SM–3 IIB that we don’t see solving quickly. And that would be 

something that we will have insight in the next few years. And 

then if we see an Iranian capability for ICBM nuclear capability 

and its integration arising, then we will need to look hard at that 

hedge and whether, depending on what occurs, whether to try to 

accelerate the SM–3 IIB and/or to look to deploy a two-stage 

ground-based interceptor. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. The whole concept of a hedge, by the 

way, is this issue that we are all struggling with, which is a gap 

where the threat emerges or arrives prior to the capability being 

deployed. The concern with the Phased, Adaptive Approach and the 

number that you had indicated of the ICBM threat of perhaps 

being 2015 when we know the Phase Adaptive Approach doesn’t 

provide a response to that threat until 2020 provides us a five-year 

gap of which we have a concern, but as our whole discussion with 
25 

respect to the hedge and other issues of technical capability goes 

to, the emergence of that threat and the acceleration of our facing 

that threat posing, then, a wider gap between technical capability 

and present threat. Which takes me to the next portion of my questioning. 

When the White House announced the PAA last September, it 

said the new approach was based upon an assumption that the 

long-range missile threat was ‘‘slower to develop.’’ Recent reports 

indicate that Iran perhaps has 19 BM–25 advanced ballistic missiles that it acquired from North Korea in its arsenal that are capable of reaching Berlin and Moscow. Now, in all the hearings that 

we have had and all the discussions that we have had about the 

capability of Iran, the discussion of—the issue of the possibility of 

their acquiring this capability instead of just merely developing it 

has always been raised as an accelerator. 

When is the Phased, Adaptive Approach expected to provide coverage to Berlin? If the threat to Berlin, other Western and Central 

European population centers exists today, according to these reports, and the Phased, Adaptive Approach won’t cover these areas 

until 2018 at the earliest, then there would appear to be a present 

gap in the defensive coverage of Europe. What options are available 

to accelerate coverage of Europe; what appear to be very near-term 

threats; and any other thoughts that you would like to provide us 

on the issue of these reports? 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Turner, I don’t want to speak to intelligence assessments in open session either to confirm or deny the 

accuracy of the information that you have put out. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, it is information that is being reported. This 

is out in the public. This is not something that is in a classified 

discussion that we are having. What I have asked you is this is 

what is being reported; your thoughts, and how does that relate to 

the issue of a possible gap that we might have? 

Secretary MILLER. One of the advantages of the Phased, Adaptive Approach is that it is adaptive, and that if we see something 

coming earlier, we have the possibility to accelerate first by moving 

Aegis-capable ships with SM–3 interceptors and as the later interceptors come online, to be able to put them in additional locations 

as well. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, and if I may, without referring to, again, 

commenting on sensitive intel information, if you just looked at the 

distance of what you have said in your question between Berlin 

and Iran and other locations in the Middle East, if you take that 

distance, next spring we are actually intercepting a target of that 

range with our Phase 1 capability. Again, we have said we took a 

very conservative approach to developing the EPAA. But just to use 

the type of distances you are referring to, which is in the range of 

an intermediate-range ballistic missile, we said we would deploy in 

Phase 1, in my testimony, intermediate-range ballistic missile 

range, which is the range you are talking about to Berlin. And that 

will be Phase 1 capability. And we are testing live fire tests next 

spring against that range. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Rose, you indicated that there were no secret 

talks ongoing, which we are all very glad to hear, of course. But 

press reports do continue to surface that Under Secretary of State 
26 

Tauscher and her Russian counterpart are negotiating a missile defense agreement. Also, we are told that Secretary Tauscher signed 

out a Circular 175 memo last May for a missile defense agreement 

with Russia. According to the State Department’s Web site, a Circular 175 refers to regulations developed by the State Department 

to ensure the proper exercise of the treaty-making power and seeks 

to confirm that the making of treaties and other international 

agreements by the United States is carried out within constitutional and other legal limitations. 

What is the exact nature and scope of the missile defense negotiations that are going on with Russia, and would you please tell 

us the contents of the Circular 175? 

Secretary ROSE. Certainly. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. 

Let me start by saying that our discussions are focused strictly on 

cooperation. We are not discussing limiting our missile defenses in 

any way. Now, in order to facilitate cooperation, sir, you need to 

have an agreement in place to exchange information. Back in 2004 

the Bush administration began negotiating with Russia a Defense 

Technical Cooperation Agreement. What this agreement was, was 

a broad framework that allowed the two ministries of defense to exchange information not just on missile defense, but a variety of 

issues. 

The last DTCA, as we call it, negotiations with Russia were held 

in 2008. Now, earlier this year this Administration decided to propose a more limited form of the DTCA which would only address 

missile defense issues, the Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation 

Agreement. Basically, what the BMDCA was, was very simply a 

framework agreement which established a cooperation working 

group and it basically was a framework in which you could stick 

individual projects under that. 

For the record, we specifically included language in the agreement that said, ‘‘This agreement shall not constrain or limit parties’ respective BMD plans or capabilities numerically, qualitatively, operationally, geographically, or in any other way.’’ Now, 

we made this proposal to the Russian Government last spring and 

they said that they were not interested in negotiating a Ballistic 

Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement at that time. What we understand, and I will defer to Dr. Miller, is recently the Russian 

MOD [Ministry of Defense] has indicated an interest in restarting 

the negotiations on the broader DTCA. 

Sir, with your question about what Circular 175 authority is, it 

basically is a relatively routine matter in the State Department to 

ensure that when there is any international agreement, whether it 

be a supplemental SOFA, R&D [research and development] agreement, that there is adequate coordination across the interagency 

and that U.S. foreign policy objectives are fully—it is aligned with 

overall U.S. foreign policy objectives. So let me defer to Dr. Miller 

if he wants to add anything on the DTCA and the future of that. 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Rose is correct that it appears there is 

now at least a possible interest to have discussions to move toward 

a DTCA, Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement. What the 

scope of that will be is to be determined. The idea is to be able to 

have an umbrella agreement that then allows us to discuss possible 

technical cooperation in a number of different areas. 
27 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. We are now operating 

under the five-minute rule, and the chair now recognizes Mr. 

Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I got here just in 

time to be here under the five-minute rule. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate very much your being here. As happens 

quite often, Mr. Turner has stolen all of my questions. I will do a 

little variation here. 

General O’Reilly, you know, I know that you have had to deal 

with a lot of questions about the Phased, Adaptive Approach, and 

I want you to know that there is certainly no adversarial perspective in my mind at all, because I think you are doing a magnificent 

job and I think we are blessed to have you where you are in this 

country, and I am personally very grateful for that. 

That said, there is a lot of discussion about the PAA being suggested or touted as capable of providing a greater coverage sooner 

to all of our European allies compared to other missile defense 

plans, and I will just try to make that a general comment. But the 

previous approach of utilizing interceptors in Poland and radar in 

the Czech Republic was forecast at the time to provide about 75 

percent coverage of our European allies against longer-range missiles by 2013, with the remaining 25 percent of southeastern Europe covered with U.S. and NATO shorter-range missile defense 

systems. 

Given the timeframe of PAA, do you think that it will live up to 

the expectation of having greater coverage sooner, especially given 

the reality, it seems, that the Phased, Adaptive Approach has developed a little slower than we thought, and we and our allies are 

already, in my mind, perilously vulnerable to a ballistic missile 

threat given especially with Iran having new missile capability 

brought in from North Korea. 

Was there enough of a question there for you to pull out an answer? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, except for the comment that the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach, sir, was slower than—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you believe that the Phased, Adaptive Approach 

is developing as quickly as you anticipated? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We are in track for Phase 1, which 

will be next December. By then, we will have all of the capabilities 

that we have described delivered. And each one of those milestones 

are, in fact, the final date for the last delivery of a capability. But 

we are going to be delivering capability as it comes on board. 

For example, the fire control system for the next Aegis ship that 

is a Phase 2 capability, the Navy will be certifying that operationally next summer. So we will be three years ahead in that regard. 

So, again, we were very prudent and conservative when we laid out 

this, but we are delivering capability as soon as we can and we are 

testing it in an integrated fashion. For example, as I said, we are 

testing against an IRBM next spring with the Phase 1 capability. 

So, sir, I do believe we are on line to have a significant amount 

of schedule margin so that if we do have problems in development—and they do occur—but we have taken that into account his-
28 

torically, and we will—we have a very high confidence level to meet 

these milestones for all four of them. 

Mr. FRANKS. And it remains your perspective that we will have 

greater coverage sooner with PAA than we did with the European 

site. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. With the European site, the coverage 

was limited by the time of flight of a GBI. The missiles we are talking about now fly significantly shorter in time and, therefore, they 

can engage earlier. That is why we have a site in Romania that has 

been chosen, and a third site, it was in Poland, which is significantly further back. So from that vantage point, we do have a significant amount of coverage. 

Sir, and I respect your question on coverage, but I will say a 

major factor in our assessments was raid size. And having 10 missiles and deciding you needed more, it would take several years to 

expand a missile field, where in this capability you can expand it 

in weeks to additional sets of missiles. 

Mr. FRANKS. The last question—well, kind of a two-part question. The BM–25s from North Korea in Iran, do you think that 

those present any new issues that Phased, Adaptive Approach 

should take into consideration? And, secondly, if there is any area 

of coverage and reach, given the shorter arm of SM–3s, are there 

any areas that you feel like should be of special consideration to 

the committee or to the MDA? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, again, I cannot comment on intelligencetype information in this forum, but as I said in my testimony, we 

will have intermediate range and demonstrated intermediate-range 

ballistic missile capability next spring, before we deploy. And we 

have already shown we have very robust, 10 intercepts with the 

Aegis system of short-range missiles, and we have had seven out 

of seven intercepts with the THAAD system. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, seven out of seven is close enough. 

Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

We will now go to round two, and I have only one question, and 

General O’Reilly is the lucky winner of the question. 

Getting to costs, again, and contracting, General, first of all 

again, I do want to thank you for your testimony here today as well 

as your ongoing engagement with this committee’s efforts in pursuing information on missile defense efforts, and your overall effort 

has been stellar, an outstanding and a great service to the country. 

While the PAA is designed to move current technology into defense of Europe as soon as possible, there are clearly large technical developments required to achieve a lot of phases of the strategy. As we have seen with previous efforts for our domestic architecture, these large systems are initially bid through open competition, but it seems that once the initial contract is done, there are 

many years of sole-source follow-on contracts to provide support to 

these systems. This can obviously drive up long-term costs of large 

defense systems because it limits competition in later phases of the 

contract. 

So, General, my question to you is how does MDA plan to reach 

these aggressive development goals while keeping costs low? Is 

there any thought about working more with industry to better le-
29 

verage the research and development efforts already in development at small- and medium-size businesses in terms of upgrades 

and support? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, there is. First of all, in our advance 

research area, we have over 340 contracts that are with small businesses and universities today, and they are focused on the technologies we need for the later stages of the Phased, Adaptive Approach, and I am constantly engaged with small business. 

Second, in our larger contracts. I have required that they submit 

a plan of how they are going to utilize small business, and we have 

made it award fee criteria that we evaluate the large businesses on 

how they comply with the plans they proposed at the time of 

award. 

We are also going through a very large series of competitions, 

and some of these competitions are programs that have not had 

competition in over a decade. For example, the ground-based midcourse defense contract is up for competition. 

We make our decisions on to compete or not, not on the aggressiveness of the schedule, but on evaluating and surveys and input 

from industry, to see if there is more than one source out there 

that is a viable source. And we have had great cooperation from industry, and in some cases some of our proposals have had over 10 

industry teams indicate they are willing to propose. That is what 

we use for our criteria. 

In the case of the Aegis Ashore, we have extended the current 

Lockheed contract because they are the ones that developed the 

Aegis system to begin with. But we have also notified that after the 

initial deployments of taking the Aegis system on a ship and building it as close as possible to the one on land so that sailors don’t 

have to go through retraining or anything when they are using— 

or the logistics system—after we do the initial deployments, we will 

compete that also. 

So, sir, there is no contract in MDA which we have designated 

will not be competed in the future. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. I appreciate your answer. I have to say 

that that is encouraging to hear. It has been kind of a pet peeve 

of mine that we have these big legacy systems, and I have heard 

this from numerous small- and medium-size businesses, that they 

find it frustrating to be able to offer a product that might be much 

more effective at a lower cost, because there is just so much upfront investment that the big companies have made and so much 

investment that it makes sense for them to want to stick to the 

current technology and not do the upgrades. Again, small businesses have been frustrated and shut out in a lot of ways. 

But I am encouraged by your answer, and I hope that continues 

to be the case. Getting a better product, especially as technology 

improves so rapidly, and being able to get it at a lower cost, would 

benefit not only capabilities, but also the taxpayer. 

With that, my questions are completed. I will turn to the ranking 

member for round two. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just got two 

things I would like to ask. 

General O’Reilly, I would like to go back to your response on the 

issue of the emerging threat from Iran, the evolving threat from 
30 

Iran. Our discussion, and, again, our concern here is to try to find 

where the gaps are and how we are going to be able to respond to 

those gaps. 

The Phased, Adaptive Approach, viewed in the light of the scrapping of the third site is an approach that is in a race against 

emerging threats. The information that we had had about the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach, just conferring with staff, was that if 

the scenario is Iran and Berlin, that it is coverage that is not available until 2018. You indicated in Phase 1 you will have some intermediate-range ballistic missile effectiveness. 

If you could confer with our staff and provide us the information 

on that, because it is different than what our understanding is of 

your phases. We hope, of course, that every time that there is a gap 

that is identified, that your system is, as you all have described it, 

evolving and responsive so that we can respond to those gaps. So 

if you would please provide that information, I would appreciate it. 

The second thing goes again to the comparative of the Phased, 

Adaptive Approach into the system that was scrapped. The third 

site, and including the radar that was intended for Poland and the 

Czech Republic, would have provided coverage for the homeland of 

the United States and also provided coverage, as Mr. Franks was 

saying, for 75 percent of Europe. But there was coverage that was 

provided to homeland United States. 

In looking at the Phased, Adaptive Approach, as you all have acknowledged, Phase 4 is where coverage to the United States comes 

in, and that is the 2020 timeframe. The prior phases, 1, 2 and 3, 

are fairly focused on protecting Europe, and yet the United States 

is fully funding the Phased, Adaptive Approach, as near as I understand it and as I think our committee understands it. 

With that shift of shared benefit arises the question of shared 

contribution. I know we certainly are all very excited of NATO’s interest in NATO-izing a missile defense shield, but what is the current Administration’s approach to contributions from NATO Allies 

for the Phased, Adaptive Approach? 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Turner, as you know, we view the European Phased, Adaptive Approach as a U.S. contribution to missile 

defense for NATO. We have a vested and a very strong vested interest in that because, as you also know, we have more than 

100,000 troops there and we have, of course, additional Americans 

there as well. So there is something very directly, from an American perspective, involved in being able to defend in Europe. We 

also, as you know, conduct operations and move our forces through 

Europe and the European Command’s area of responsibility as 

well. 

Now, with respect to shared resources, each of the countries in 

NATO that wish to contribute at the lower tier, or if they contribute to an upper tier, will obviously fund that themselves. And 

we have the shared NATO resources into it, which each nation contributes for the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence 

Programme, which is the command and control elements, that both 

will make the Phased, Adaptive Approach plug in to the lower-tier 

systems and allow the lower-tier systems and any other upper-tier 

systems that are provided in the future to be able to work more 

effectively together. 
31 

So you have got national contributions, including from the 

United States; you have got the NATO contributions for ALTBMD 

[Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme] and 

the work involved in integrating those systems; and then you have 

got the countries that have Patriot and other systems in Europe 

that will then tie into that and then fund those capabilities. 

Secretary ROSE. Mr. Turner, I also think it is important that we 

note the important contributions of land and territory that Romania and Poland are providing to the PAA, to the defense of the 

United States as well as to the defense of the Alliance as a whole. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. 

Mr. Franks is now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess to couch the question in a way, General O’Reilly, that 

will not create a need for you to touch on anything sensitive, I 

think Mr. Turner’s phrase was it is a race, and certainly that 

seems to be the case. So I have two questions. 

Given potential vulnerabilities that we have, what areas of the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach, the knowledge points, or what areas, 

the milestones, would you like to see accelerated, given the potential threats that are emerging? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I do agree it is a race. The race, though— 

my perspective is, is not with the ICBM. The ICBM threat—again, 

we have 30 missiles. Even if you shot four against any one missile, 

30 interceptors, even if you shot four interceptors, you would need 

more than seven simultaneously launched ICBMs in order to overcome our current system. So we believe that is a great capability, 

and as I alluded to, we are in fact upgrading the sensors and other 

parts of the system to make those 30 interceptors much more capable. So that is for homeland defense. 

However, if you do not count the United States, Russia, China, 

or any of the European countries, there are still over 6,000 missiles 

out there, and that is where our capability is needed greatest. We 

have over—we are approaching about 1,000 Patriots, and we are 

increasing rapidly the number of Aegis against short-range ballistic 

missiles but that, by far, is where we are outpaced and outnumbered, and that is where our focus is on accelerating that early 

capability—this and Phase 2, from a global point of view. 

I would defer to Admiral Macy to elaborate on that. 

Admiral MACY. Really, the only thing to add is to refer back a 

little bit, sir—I don’t think you had a chance to join us—— 

Mr. FRANKS. And I apologize for that. 

Admiral MACY. No, sir, please, I wasn’t going there. Along with 

the JCM–3 study that we are doing to look at the number of interceptors and sensors and launch capabilities we need, we have a 

parallel planning going on within the Joint Staff and the COCOMs 

on how to fight in these areas. And we are looking at, okay, we are 

currently outgunned in the interceptors versus threat missiles. We 

expect that will, frankly, continue. So the question is how do you 

most effectively fight, how do you fight in such a way that you 

bring other elements of national power into the fight to end the 

fight as soon as you can do it? But certainly in the near term, I 

don’t think it is going to be a great flash of brilliance to anyone 
32 

on this committee that additional sensors and additional interceptors are going to be requisite. 

What we can’t answer to you right now is sort of, what is the 

upper end, what is the total cost? And we hope, once we get 

through these studies that I promised the chairman, I would look 

forward to coming back in the April timeframe to discuss with you, 

it will start to give us that answer. But in the near term, certainly, 

interceptors and sensors is the key, and every one of the combatant 

commanders is screaming for more. 

Mr. FRANK. General O’Reilly, let me take off of a comment that 

you made related to ICBMs. Obviously we are hoping that Iran is 

not going to be in a position to have ICBMs any time in the next 

few days. But given that concern, with the SM–3 capability and 

given that SM–3 at least at this point is sea-based, when do you 

anticipate an ability to intercept ICBMs coming to America from 

Iran? 

I realize that is pretty fundamental. But when do you anticipate 

that? I know there is no way to anticipate when they will have 

them. But when would you anticipate being able to, if it is just 

one—I know the raid issue is always a second question—but if it 

is just one ICBM coming from Tehran to New York, when we 

would be able to, with high likelihood, be able to intercept that? I 

know that is still a redundant coverage, but when we would be able 

to gain that redundant coverage? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, due to the number of interceptors which 

we have, the probability will be well over in the high nineties today 

of the GMD system being able to intercept that today. Again, our 

calculations along the same line say the number would have to be 

greater than seven, simultaneously launched, to start lowering 

that. And that is today. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am aware of that. But that is our GMD here. 

General O’REILLY. For the SM–3, I believe your question was for 

the SM–3 IIB. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am talking about redundant coverage in Europe. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. For the SM–3 IIB, our plans that— 

we, again, are in a competition to have companies come in and propose—but using historical plans, our first flight testing will be in 

2016, and that is a significant indicator of the integration of the 

missile and its performance and how it performs with the Aegis 

system. 

Unlike other missile systems, the Aegis system is already our 

backbone. So we can focus on just the missile development and, 

way before that, our ground systems and ground testing. But the 

first flight testing would be 2016. 

Mr. FRANKS. So potentially as early as 2017, 2018, we would 

have redundant protection over and above our GMD on shore—or 

I should say at Vandenberg and Fort Greely—we would have redundant protection from a potential ICBM coming from Iran as 

early as 2018? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, during that period of time, during 2017, 

2018, 2019, that is when we have our prototype missiles that we 

are testing. The actual production missiles, the plan is for 2020. 

That gives us four years of flight testing besides all of the ground 

testing. 
33 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary MILLER. Mr. Franks, Mr. Chairman, might I say something very briefly? 

Mr. Franks, when you talk about redundant capability, I think 

it is important to understand that the two-stage GBI is still a GBI. 

So if you have a problem such that the three-stage ground-based 

interceptors at Fort Greely and Vandenberg don’t work—and that 

is one of the reasons you are thinking about an independent capability—there is a high probability that that same problem would 

apply to the two-stage GBI. That is one of the big reasons why we 

see so much value in a different approach with the SM–3 IIB, because it has different phenomenology, a different set of capabilities. 

You can compensate for not having a two-stage GBI by launching 

more three-stage GBIs from the United States, and in any event, 

you are down to very small probability differences associated with 

intercept; because as General O’Reilly said, you start with a high 

level with the ground-based interceptors that we already have deployed. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I won’t respond, but I hear 

what you are saying. It is not exactly the direction I was going, because I am grateful that we don’t have that problem right in front 

of us. But one of my concerns here for a number of years, actually, 

has been the calculus that Iran makes in moving forward with nuclear capabilities, missile capabilities, on a number of different 

fronts. 

To the degree that we can convince them that any effort on their 

part strategically, and certainly tactically, would be less than optimal for them, I think that is important because it may, added to 

some of the other pressures that they are dealing with, threats 

from Israel, threats from—probably not us, unfortunately, but 

threats from Israel—you just wonder what it will take to dissuade 

them. It is almost as much psychology as it is military strategy and 

science. But I know you guys are doing your best and I am grateful 

you are on the job. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. With that, this hearing is 

drawing to a close. I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. Most especially I want to thank you all for your service to our Nation, particularly on this extraordinarily difficult and 

complicated issue. 

Obviously, the potential threats to the Nation are great. You 

bear heavy weights of responsibility in making sure that we have 

the most robust missile defense system in place. I can see that we 

are making steady progress, although it is very challenging, and we 

thank you for the work that you are doing. This committee stands 

to continue to work in partnership with you, and, again, I thank 

you for your great work. 

With that, I want to say what a privilege it has been to chair 

the subcommittee over the last two years. I had very big shoes to 

fill, and I still am trying to live up to the high standard that Secretary Tauscher has set for the subcommittee, and we thank her 

for her work. 

Let me say what a privilege it has been to work with Bob 

DeGrasse and Kari Bingen as well, and the rest of the Armed Services Committee staff. They are real stars on the Armed Services 
34 

Committee staff, and have put in countless hours to make our job 

easier and to make sure that this committee is providing effective 

oversight. We are grateful to both of you for your service to the 

subcommittee. 

Let me also say what a privilege again it has been to serve with 

the ranking member, Mr. Turner. He and I have had a strong partnership on this issue, these issues as well, and I appreciated his 

invaluable input. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, could I just add, sometimes you are 

thanking everyone else, but in an adversarial political environment, sometimes it is important to say things that are true and 

real. And I will tell you it has been hard to tell you were a Democrat on this committee, because you have simply done what you believed to be right for the country. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. You were doing so well up to that point. 

Mr. FRANKS. But I just want you to know, I don’t know how we 

could have had a more reasonable, more affable, more dedicated 

chairman to try to do what was right for the country, and you certainly have my respect. I didn’t vote for you, but I wish you everything good in the world, and you certainly have been wonderful to 

work with. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I thank the gentleman for his comments, 

and I take the comments in the spirit with which they were intended. 

With that, again, thank you to our witnesses, and keep up the 

great work. Members may have additional questions that they will 

submit to you, and you are asked to respond expeditiously in writing. 

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 1, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 1, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

DECEMBER 1, 2010 

(85) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Congress has been deeply concerned with the proliferation of 

cruise missile technology and its impact on U.S. deployed forces. On June 16, 2010, 

Secretary of Defense Gates testified before Congress that he was concerned with the 

‘‘. . . extraordinary Chinese deployment of all manner of cruise and ballistic missiles.’’ How does the Administration plan to address the threats of cruise missiles 

and unmanned air systems to the land-based components of the PAA that are focused on intercepting SRBM, MRBM and SRBM? 

Dr. MILLER. The Department considers cruise missiles (CMs) and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as part of the larger air-breathing threat set (as opposed to the 

ballistic missile threat), which also includes manned fighters and bombers. The defensive systems we have developed (e.g., F–22, Patriot, Aegis ships, E–3), and are 

developing or improving (e.g., F–35, advanced fighter radars, SM–6) will be capable 

of addressing the CM and UAS threats. Additionally, some of the systems that perform ballistic missile defense (BMD) also have an inherent capability to defend 

against CMs, UAS, and other air-breathing threats. Combatant Commander defensive plans account for the full spectrum of air and missile threats, and allocate air 

defense assets and capabilities to provide comprehensive coverage of all critical assets including BMD elements. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Congress has been deeply concerned with the proliferation of 

cruise missile technology and its impact on U.S. deployed forces. On June 16, 2010, 

Secretary of Defense Gates testified before Congress that he was concerned with the 

‘‘. . . extraordinary Chinese deployment of all manner of cruise and ballistic missiles.’’ How does the Administration plan to address the threats of cruise missiles 

and unmanned air systems to the land-based components of the PAA that are focused on intercepting SRBM, MRBM and SRBM? 

General O’Reilly. MDA’s mission does not include air-breathing threats. However, 

MDA works closely with the Services and the Joint Staff to ensure their systems 

are integrated with the Ballistic Missile Defense System to the greatest extent possible. 

Service capabilities that are or will be capable of addressing air-breathing threats 

include systems that are currently fielded (e.g. F–22, Patriot, Aegis ships, and E– 

3) and systems in development (e.g. F–35, advanced fighter radars, and SM–6). 

Combatant Commander defensive plans account for the full spectrum of air and 

missile threats, and allocate air defense assets and capabilities to provide comprehensive coverage of all critical assets including BMD elements. The Department 

is confident that the air defense systems being fielded are capable of preventing 

these threats from having a significant impact on our ballistic missile defense capability. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Congress has been deeply concerned with the proliferation of 

cruise missile technology and its impact on U.S. deployed forces. On June 16, 2010, 

Secretary of Defense Gates testified before Congress that he was concerned with the 

‘‘. . . extraordinary Chinese deployment of all manner of cruise and ballistic missiles.’’ How does the Administration plan to address the threats of cruise missiles 

and unmanned air systems to the land-based components of the PAA that are focused on intercepting SRBM, MRBM and SRBM? 

Admiral MACY. The Department considers cruise missiles (CMs) and unmanned 

aircraft systems (UAS) as part of the larger breathing threat set (as opposed to the 

ballistic missile threat), which also includes manned fighters and bombers. The defensive systems we have developed (e.g., F–22, Patriot, Aegis ships, E–3), and are 

developing or improving (e.g., F–35, advanced fighter radars, SM–6) will be capable 

of addressing the CM and UAS threats. Additionally, some of the systems that perform ballistic missile defense (BMD) also have an inherent capability to defend 

against CMs, UAS, and other breathing threats. Combatant Commander defensive 

plans account for the full spectrum of air and missile threats, and allocate air defense assets and capabilities to provide comprehensive coverage of all critical assets 

including BMD elements. The Department is confident that the air defense systems 

that are being fielded will be capable of preventing these threats from having a significant impact on our ballistic missile defense capability. 
86 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. We understand that the Missile Defense Agency conducted a summer study (in 2010) on the hedging strategy. Can you provide the committee with 

the study results and any other detailed contingency or hedge plans? 

Dr. MILLER. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) along with the support of Joint 

Staff, Combatant Commanders and Federally Funded Research and Development 

Centers, conducted and provided the summer study results to the Missile Defense 

Executive Board. The Department can provide, at the classified level, a summary 

of the results, as well as further hedge planning to the Committee. 

Mr. TURNER. You’ve stated that the U.S. homeland is currently protected against 

a threat of limited ICBM attack by 30 ground-based interceptors located at Fort 

Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California. Discuss why it was then necessary to 

provide further coverage of the United States homeland in Phase 4 of the European 

Phased, Adaptive Approach? What needs/requirements are Phase 4 capabilities expected to satisfy? 

Dr. MILLER. Phase 4 of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach (EPAA) provides 

defense in depth. The ability to put up more than one layer of defensive capability 

increases the likelihood of success. The SM–3 IIB interceptor, to be deployed in 

Phase 4 of the EPAA, will be the first layer of our homeland defense system, with 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) providing the second layer. Having another 

layer enhances the overall probability of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The SM–3 IIB provides a backup if for some reason there is a development or performance issue with the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), or a temporary outage or failure with the Ground-based Mid-course Defense system. The 

SM–3 IIB design and key components are different from that of the GBIs, which 

provides additional assurance that the overall U.S. defensive system will be able to 

defend the United States. 

Mr. TURNER. We appear to be seeing troubling new developments in both North 

Korea and Iran’s longer-range missile programs. Are you more concerned today than 

last year about the threat of Iran and North Korea developing and deploying an 

IRBM or ICBM? Do these threat developments change your approach in any way? 

Dr. MILLER. The European Phased, Adaptive Approach (EPAA) includes visible 

actions beginning in Phase 1, including the deployment of a BMD-capable Aegis 

ship to the Mediterranean and a forward-deployed AN–TPY2 radar in Southeastern 

Europe in 2011. The basing of land-based interceptor sites in Romania (by 2015 and 

Poland (by 2018) provides a more permanent and substantial posture; the signing 

and ratification of the agreements to support those bases demonstrates a commitment to missile defense that is visible to both our allies and potential adversaries. 

Mr. TURNER. A former OSD Policy official testified before this committee in March 

2007 that, ‘‘The advantage of mobility is flexibility . . . But there is also an important advantage to ground-based silos. That advantage is permanence . . . Both our 

allies and potential adversaries will know with certainty that a missile defense capability is in place. These missile defense assets then will be able to both assure 

allies and deter and dissuade adversaries at all times once they are fielded.’’ Do you 

believe a permanent force presence matters in the assurance of our allies? How does 

the U.S. provide that same assurance to allies and deterrence to potential adversaries with the European Phased, Adaptive Approach, especially since it relies on 

all mobile systems in the near- and mid-term that may not be available to deploy 

to Europe if allocated to other theaters? 

Dr. MILLER. The European Phased, Adaptive Approach (EPAA) includes visible 

actions beginning in Phase 1, including the deployment of a BMD-capable Aegis 

ship to the Mediterranean and a forward-deployed AN–TPY2 radar in Southeastern 

Europe. In addition to these actions, NATO decided to develop a missile defense capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces at the recent 

Lisbon Summit. As the United States makes the EPAA its contribution to this 

NATO effort, our Allies will know what the United States has committed to the collective defense of the Alliance and will have a say in operational planning. Finally, 

the basing commitments for the land-based interceptors sites from Poland and Romania, along with the signing and ratification of the agreements to support those 

bases, demonstrates a commitment to missile defense that is visible to both our allies and potential adversaries. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, you credited the Bush Administration with pursuing missile defense cooperation with Russia. Yet the Obama Administration has criticized 

its predecessors for lack of such cooperation. What is this Administration offering 

to Russia that you believe could lead to Moscow’s participation despite criticism 

from its government officials of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach and 

threats of an ‘‘arms race’’ if the U.S. improves its missile defenses? 
87 

Dr. MILLER. The Obama Administration believes that missile defense cooperation 

with Russia is in the national security interests of the United States, as did the 

Bush Administration. We believe that our ongoing efforts to work collaboratively 

with Russia in areas where both our countries share a mutual interest has created 

a significantly improved bilateral environment, and therefore an opportunity for, bilateral and multilateral BMD cooperation. 

An example of this opportunity in a multilateral context was the agreement by 

NATO and Russia at the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) meeting in Lisbon on November 20, 2010, to resume theater missile defense cooperation and to develop a 

comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for NATO–Russia BMD cooperation. 

In the context of our bilateral relationship, BMD cooperation can be a vehicle to 

bring both the U.S.-Russia and the NATO–Russia partnerships to a new level and 

could enable our two countries to work together in a coordinated manner against 

the common challenges, dangers, and threats of ballistic missiles of increasingly 

greater ranges, potentially equipped with weapons of mass destruction. 

As senior Administration officials have explained to Congress, as well as to their 

Russian counterparts, the United States will not agree to constrain or limit U.S. 

missile defenses qualitatively, quantitatively, operationally, geographically, or in 

any other way. The Administration is committed to the development and deployment of effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, 

and our allies and partners against existing and emerging threats. 

Mr. TURNER. We understand that the Missile Defense Agency conducted a summer study (in 2010) on the hedging strategy. Can you provide the committee with 

the study results and any other detailed contingency or hedge plans? 

General O’Reilly. As directed in the Defense Planning and Program Guidance 

(DPPG), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) along with the support of Joint Staff, 

Combatant Commanders and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 

conducted and provided the summer study results to the Missile Defense Executive 

Board. The Department can provide, at the classified level, a summary of the results 

to the Committee. 

Mr. TURNER. You’ve stated that the U.S. homeland is currently protected against 

a threat of limited ICBM attack by 30 ground-based interceptors located at Fort 

Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California. Discuss why it was then necessary to 

provide further coverage of the United States homeland in Phase 4 of the European 

Phased, Adaptive Approach? What needs/requirements are Phase 4 capabilities expected to satisfy? 

General O’Reilly. The 2020 Phase 4 architecture adds an additional layer of defensive capability that increases the likelihood of engagement success against evolving 

and projected ICBM threats from the Middle East. The interceptor’s reliability, 

availability, and probability the kill vehicle can acquire and engage a target are all 

factors in the probability of engagement success. Also, as independent BMD systems 

are layered, the probability of engagement success increases. The SM–3 IIB interceptor comprises the first layer of our homeland defense system, proving early intercept, and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense provides the second layer which enhances the overall probability of intercepting ICBMs with two different missile defense systems. In addition, by having two independent BMD components, the system is made more flexible and adaptable to changes in threat missile designs and 

capabilities. 

The development of the SM–3 IIB interceptor with a higher burnout velocity and 

a greater divert capability than other SM–3 variants provides an early intercept capability against MRBMs and IRBMs and a hedge to augment homeland defense 

against future potential ICBMs launched by today’s regional adversaries. Early 

intercept capabilities enhance battlespace with an extended engagement layer that 

avoids wasteful salvos by shooting an interceptor, evaluating the consequence, and 

shooting again only if the first intercept attempt was unsuccessful. Intercepting missiles early (pre-apogee) also degrades performance of midcourse countermeasures 

and counters post-apogee maneuvering reentry vehicles. 

Mr. TURNER. We appear to be seeing troubling new developments in both North 

Korea and Iran’s longer-range missile programs. Are you more concerned today than 

last year about the threat of Iran and North Korea developing and deploying an 

IRBM or ICBM? Do these threat developments change your approach in any way? 

General O’Reilly. We currently have a Ground-based Midcourse Defense system 

that can provide significant capability against limited ICBM attacks against all 

near-term estimated threats. We continue to upgrade the system to ensure we maintain the capability hedge. 

Mr. TURNER. You noted in your testimony that the Missile Defense Agency supported multiple interoperability demonstrations with NATO’s Active Layered The-
88 

ater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD). Can you elaborate on what these demonstrations have shown in terms of capability, interoperability, lessons learned, etc.? 

Also, provide a schedule and milestones for ALTBMD plans, including the integration of U.S. missile defense capabilities. 

General O’Reilly. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been working with the 

ALTBMD Program Office (PO) for the last four years to document U.S.-NATO interoperability requirements in Interface Control Documents (ICDs) and to test and 

demonstrate interoperability between U.S. and NATO missile defense systems. 

The MDA has participated in the following missile defense demonstrations, tests, 

and exercises with NATO and Alliance partners: 

January 2008: Initial interoperability demonstration between the U.S. Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications 

(C2BMC) System and a prototype of the NATO Air Command 

and Control System (ACCS). 

November 2008: Interoperability test between the U.S. Patriot system and a prototype of the NATO ACCS. 

January 2009: Interoperability test between the U.S. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) system and a prototype of the NATO ACCS. 

August 2009: Interoperability test between the U.S. C2BMC system and a simulation of the Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance–2 

(AN/TPY–2) system with a prototype of the NATO ACCS. 

July 2010: Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW), a warfighter exercise involving the mixture of simulated, hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL), 

and live systems from the U.S., NATO, Germany, Spain, and The 

Netherlands. This event focused on the development of joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). 

December 2010: NATO Ensemble Test 1, the first multinational interoperability 

test conducted by NATO with participation from the U.S., Germany, Italy, France, and The Netherlands. The U.S. systems involved in this test were live and HWIL representations of 

C2BMC, Aegis BMD, Patriot, and a simulation of AN/TPY–2. The 

NATO systems participating in the test were live versions of the 

ACCS prototype and Integrated Command and Control (ICC) that 

will be deployed as part of the NATO Interim Capability–2 

(InCa2) at the end of December 2010. 

The tests and exercises with NATO have proven the U.S. C2BMC & AN/TPY–2, 

Patriot, and Aegis BMD systems can interoperate with the NATO command and 

control systems and other Alliance systems using standardized Tactical Data Links 

communications (Link–16). The tests successfully demonstrated the two-way exchange of situational awareness, command and control, health and status, and engagement information between the U.S. and NATO systems. 

The emerging results from Ensemble Test 1 indicate the U.S. systems will also 

be interoperable using Link–16 with the German Patriot and Surface-to-Air Missiles 

Operations Center (SAMOC), the French Sol-Air Moyenne Porte`e Terrestre (SAMP/ 

T), the Italian SAMP/T and Horizon/Principal Anti-Air Missile System (Horizon/ 

PAAMS), and the Dutch Patriot and Air Defense and Command Frigate (ADCF). 

MDA, the ALTBMD PO, and military operators from the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 

successfully demonstrated during the JPOW exercise that the U.S. and NATO interoperability can support a variety of command and control Concept of Operations 

(CONOPs), preplanned engagement strategies, and upper-tier/lower-tier coordination schemes that are still being developed and agreed upon between the U.S. and 

NATO. 

The MDA and ALTBMD PO have also conducted a series of planning experiments 

to Demonstrate that military operators from NATO and the U.S. can exchange missile defense plans using a NATO approach for missile defense operations. As a result of these experiments, the MDA is currently working with NATO to revise the 

Interface Control Documents and implementation for the exchange of missile defense planning data. The revised approach is more collaborative and will reflect the 

planning method used by U.S. forces today. 

ALTBMD Program Office made Interim Capability–2 (InCa–2) available 

for operations in December 2010, Initial Operational Capability 

(IOC) Increment–1 in 2013 and IOC Increment–2 in late 2014. The first NATO 

upper-tier capability is projected in approximately 2016. The figure below 

illustrates the draft milestones for the interoperability of U.S. Phased, Adaptive 
89 

Mr. TURNER. Given the recent in-sourcing initiatives, and DoD proposals of trimming a percentage of contracting positions, what is the current MDA in-sourcing 

plan? How will the plan address personnel shortfalls and address the risks associated with the potential shortage of technical expertise? 

General O’Reilly. During the course of FY 2010 MDA established and filled 237 

civilian authorizations as a result of insourcing actions. The continuation of 

insourcing beyond FY 2010 will be subject to the Department’s final guidance for 

the 2012 President’s Budget. 

MDA policy also requires each employee to conduct, at a minimum, 80 hours of 

mandatory annual training. Functional Managers and supervisors develop and issue 

functional organizational training objectives and career guides to ensure a fully 

trained MDA workforce. Each level of supervision requires a commitment to develop 

employee skills and competencies needed to maintain effective job performance, taking into account present and future technical skills by employment category. Supervisors work with employees to develop Individual Development Plans that encompass a short-term, mid-term and long-term career development guide that is subject 

to supervisor approval, and included as part of the employee process evaluation. 

MDA employees are required to obtain annual certification for various skill sets and 

occupational fields. For example, as an acquisition centric agency, MDA requires 

employees to obtain Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Certification. DAU certification is a tiered program with levels one through three based on a combination 

of experience and responsibility. 

MDA has also established the Missile Defense Career Development Program 

(MDCDP) to ensure we have a workforce with technical expertise to meet emergent 

program requirements. The MDCDP is a two-year developmental program consisting of rotational assignments aimed at strengthening the overall experience of 

the participant and preparing them for conversion to a permanent government career upon completion. MDA presently has 279 participants in the MDCDP. 

MDA has significant technical expert resources (FFRDCs, UARs, CCS, universities, industry, national labs). We continue to align the application of this significant technical expertise to meet challenges while continuing to seek greater efficiency. 

Mr. TURNER. We understand that the Missile Defense Agency conducted a summer study (in 2010) on the hedging strategy. Can you provide the committee with 

the study results and any other detailed contingency or hedge plans? 

Admiral MACY. We must defer this question to the Missile Defense Agency, as the 

study results are classified and MDA has responsibility for access. 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral Macy, please provide the committee with any analysis and 

contingency plans for defense of the U.S. homeland under the following scenarios: 

1) where the missile fields in Alaska are not able to shoot, 2) where the missile 

fields in California are not able to shoot, or 3) one of the upgraded early-warning 

radars (e.g., at Fylingdales or Thule) are not operational. 

Admiral MACY. Specific contingency plans are more appropriately the purview of 

the combatant commander, and the Joint Staff would defer to U.S. Northern Command on this topic. However, as a general developmental principle, the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System is designed to provide backup capability for scenarios such 

as those described. 
90 

Mr. TURNER. You’ve stated that the U.S. homeland is currently protected against 

a threat of limited ICBM attack by 30 ground based interceptors located at Fort 

Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California. Discuss why it was then necessary to 

provide further coverage of the United States homeland in Phase 4 of the European 

Phased, Adaptive Approach? What needs/requirements are Phase 4 capabilities expected to satisfy? 

Admiral MACY. Phase 4 of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach (EPAA) addresses several requirements. The first is redundancy. The ability to put up more 

than one layer of defensive capability increases the likelihood of success. The SM– 

3 IIB interceptor, to be deployed in Phase 4 of the EPAA, will be the first layer of 

our homeland defense system, with Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) providing the second layer to enhance the overall probability of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Second, having an additional capability against an 

ICBM threat to the homeland provides a backup if for some reason there is a development or performance issue with the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), or a temporary outage or failure of one of the systems. Third, the SM–3 IIB design is different from that of the GBIs, which provides additional assurance that the system 

will be able to respond effectively to changes in threat missile designs or capabilities. Finally, the additional interceptors in Europe will allow us to engage raids of 

larger size should the growth of the threat inventory exceed current projections. 

Mr. TURNER. We appear to be seeing troubling new developments in both North 

Korea and Iran’s longer-range missile programs. Are you more concerned today than 

last year about the threat of Iran and North Korea developing and deploying an 

IRBM or ICBM? Do these threat developments change your approach in any way? 

Admiral MACY. We continue to watch North Korea and Iran closely, but there 

have been no developments that have necessitated significant changes to the 

planned development of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (BMDS). Because of continuing improvements in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 

system and the number of ground-based interceptors now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the 

United States possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North 

Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. With regard to deployment of BMD assets, the essence of a phased, adaptive approach to regional missile defense is the 

flexibility to phase our fielding to improvements in BMD capability, and to be adaptive to changes in the threat. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller credited the Bush Administration with pursuing missile 

defense cooperation with Russia. Yet the Obama Administration has criticized its 

predecessors for lack of such cooperation. What is this Administration offering to 

Russia that you believe could lead to Moscow’s participation despite criticism from 

its government officials of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach and threats of 

an ‘‘arms race’’ if the U.S. improves its missile defenses? 

Mr. ROSE. The Obama Administration believes that missile defense cooperation 

with Russia is in the national security interests of the United States, as did the 

Bush Administration. 

The Administration is optimistic about the prospects for ballistic missile defense 

(BMD) cooperation with Russia. We believe that our ongoing efforts to work collaboratively with Russia in areas where both our countries share a mutual interest has 

created a significantly improved bilateral environment, and therefore an opportunity 

for, bilateral and multilateral BMD cooperation. 

An example of this opportunity in a multilateral context was the agreement by 

NATO and Russia at the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) meeting in Lisbon on November 20, 2010, to resume theater missile defense cooperation and to develop a 

comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for NATO–Russia BMD cooperation. 

In the context of our bilateral relationship, the Administration’s view is that BMD 

cooperation may well be a vehicle to bring both the U.S.-Russia and the NATO–Russia partnerships to a new level and could enable our two countries to work together 

in a coordinated manner against the common challenges, dangers, and threats of 

ballistic missiles of increasingly greater ranges, potentially equipped with weapons 

of mass destruction. 

As senior Administration officials have explained to Congress, as well as to their 

Russian counterparts, the United States will not agree to constrain or limit U.S. 

missile defenses qualitatively, quantitatively, operationally, geographically, or in 

any other way. The Administration is committed to the development and deploy-
91 

ment of effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, 

and our allies and partners against existing and emerging threats. 

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