AIRPOWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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Captain Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF

Research Paper 2001-03

August 2001

Wizardry for Air Campaigns

Signals Intelligence Support to the Cockpit
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Title of Paper Wizardry for Air Campaigns Signals Intelligence Support to the

Cockpit

Author Captain Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF

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i

Executive Summary

In order for all applications of airpower -- including counter-air, deep interdiction

strike, air landing, and combat search and rescue -- to succeed, they must be informed by

comprehensive data on targets. Moreover, it would be helpful if intelligence included the

intentions and capabilities of opponents. Getting signals intelligence data to the cockpit

and pilots for instantaneous use on the battlefield is the objective. Signals intelligence can

provide needed information, but its collection, processing, analysis, and distribution is

secretive. Consequently, an operator is slow to get even minimal data. Real-time signals

intelligence support to the cockpit is an on-going challenge, but it is not as cosmic or

fantasy-based as some believe. Three historical examples illustrate what can be done

when operations and intelligence ensure that critical data reach the battlefield in a timely

fashion.

For example, during World War II both Eighth and Ninth Air Forces were able to tap

into British expertise in the integration of intelligence with air operations. Targets,

intercept opportunities, and general battlefield information were collected and passed to

airborne fighters, greatly increasing the efficiency of air force operations in Northwest

Europe. At one point intercepted enciphered German data were deciphered and passed to

USAAF fighters in fifteen minutes -- an extraordinary achievement given the technology

of the day. Confronted with linguistic and operational challenges, commanders in Korea

forgot their World War II successes with intercepts. This hindered the establishment of a

voice intercept and fighter vector capability. After General Earl Partridge used his

personal influence, signals intelligence units of the newly formed USAF helped F-86

pilots successfully engage communist MiG pilots during the Korean War. 

The Vietnam War had numerous intercept operations, but the factors of timeliness

and relevance to an aircrew were not addressed until 1972 when Linebacker operations

showed senior air commanders critical gaps in intelligence data utilization. The ìTeaballî

weapons control center, established in 1972, not only collated diverse intelligence inputs,

but had a friendly radar air picture giving commanders and controllers a comprehensive

view of North Vietnamese air space. This underpinned U.S. success in obtaining air

superiority. This control center facilitated the transmittal of precise and user-friendly data

to fightersí cockpits. It serves as a model for the future. 

In spite of initiatives and dollars spent there is still a lot to do to improve real-time

intelligence support to air operations. Dissemination architecture, doctrine, training, and

education require improvements and innovations. Excessive secrecy, a plague in

peacetime, has to be removed so that operations can be planned and executed. Lack of

understanding can be overcome by exercises, but signals intelligence support is more

vital today than fifty years ago. The existing structures and systems still fall short, and the

next generation of weapons and aircraft require more, not less, signals intelligence data.

Todayís weapons systems, which make concepts like precision strike and effects based

operations possible, require superior intelligence data in order to be effective.
iii

Table of Contents 

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. i

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS............................................................................................. iv

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

WORLD WAR II............................................................................................................... 5

KOREA..............................................................................................................................15

VIETNAM .........................................................................................................................23

POST-VIETNAM AND ANALYSIS................................................................................31

RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................................................35

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...............................................................................................37
iv

List of Illustrations

Page

Figure 1. USAAF used a variety of units to collect signals intelligence data to

protect bomber formations and to vector fighters towards the Luftwaffe, but

particularly the Kingsdown Switch and the 951st SRI (A). (Authorís

depiction, with graphic design assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong).........................7

Figure 2. A diagram of the 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile (German) and its tie-ins

with British SIGINT sites 1944-45. (Original from Major Ted Silversteinís

papers).......................................................................................................................10

Figure 3. Artistís depiction of one of the mobile vans used by 3rd RSM (G) in

Western Europe, a British vehicle with American van body attached.

(Authorís depiction with graphic design assistance of Mr. Daniel

Armstrong) ...............................................................................................................11

Figure 4. Artistís depiction of a typical camouflaged 3rd RSM (G) site in France

or Belgium 1944. The antenna was used to intercept German

communications. (Authorís depiction with graphic design assistance of

Mr. Daniel Armstrong) .............................................................................................12

Figure 5. Korean peninsula. The map shows the 1954 DMZ line, MiG alley, and

the location of Cho-Do island that was critical in detecting MiG operations

over North Korea. (Authorís depiction with graphic design assistance of

Mr. Daniel Armstrong) .............................................................................................20

Figure 6. A graphic representation of ìTeaballî operations in 1972. The 300-mile

line-of-sight UHF link to ìLuzon,î the KC-135 radio-relay aircraft, ended

up being the Achilles heel of ìTeaball.î (Authorís depiction with graphic

design assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong).............................................................26

Figure 7. The numerous feeds into ìTeaballî provided the near real-time data

necessary to defeat the North Vietnamese air force. (Authorís depiction with

graphic design assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong)................................................28
1

Introduction

Intelligence and surveillance of enemy forces are critical to execution of any military

operation.1 They give indications and warning of enemy intentions and provide up-todate data on enemy force dispositions. Both are essential to help planners prepare air

campaigns and commanders execute air operations. While other forms of intelligence are

vital in military operations, only signals intelligence (SIGINT) data can be delivered in a

near real-time manner, as other intelligence disciplines require some processing.2

This study examines the evolution of near real-time intelligence support to air

operations in three wars: Eighth Air Force operations during World War II, support to

U.S. aircraft operating in ìMiG Alleyî over North Korea during the Korean War 1950-

1954, and the ìTeaballî weapons control center support to U.S. aircraft operating over

North Vietnam during Linebacker II in 1972. 

Historically, national intelligence efforts were directed towards strategic indicators

and warning. This meant that little tactical military data were gathered in peacetime. The

military had to rely on its own means, or go without. The intelligence community, as a

whole, has typically been poorly prepared for combat operations on short notice. It has

required a long lead time to acquire data, personnel, and resources to support combat

operations. Both intelligence and reconnaissance were criticized by military leaders in the

Korean and Vietnam conflicts for lack of support to combat commanders. Even during

Desert Storm it took months to build an intelligence infrastructure in Saudi Arabia to

support the theater.

 

1 General William W. Momeyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C. US GPO, 1978) 202-203;

231-233. He stresses how important intelligence is in mission planning and targeting. He also mentions (pp.

154-55) how intelligence was critical in directly supporting air operations over North Vietnam in 1972.

Colonel John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National

Defense University Press, 1988), (p. 35). Two JCS publications also discuss the importance of good

intelligence, JCS Pub. 3-51 Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations, and JCS Pub. 2-0 Doctrine for

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 2 This statement while taken from intelligence doctrine publications is not quite current. The U-2

Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance System (CARS) at Beale AFB processes SIGINT and imagery

intelligence (IMINT) data (both electro-optical and radar) in near-realtime. 
2

Overview of real-time intelligence

There are many types of intelligence that can provide effective support to air

operations. Most intelligence is essential for mission planning purposes, but only certain

sources of intelligence give the near real-time data needed by aircrews during a mission.

Intelligence support during combat operations is crucial to overall battlefield success.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) provides immediate threat warning and updates on targets.

SIGINT is made up of two components, electronic intelligence (ELINT) and

communications intelligence (COMINT). ELINT is information on enemy threats and

capabilities of systems such as radars, surface-to-air missile systems, and non-voice datalinks. It also provides accurate location information. However, it is susceptible to

deception and is limited to line of sight collection. COMINT provides information on

enemy intentions and assists in determining the enemy command and control structure.

Shortfalls of COMINT are the requirement for linguists and the need of line of sight with

a transmitter in the UHF/VHF frequency band.3 The biggest drawback from an

operational standpoint, however, is that intelligence derived from COMINT is highly

classified to protect sources, and selective in distribution. A collector of signals

intelligence does not want the enemy to even suspect that his communications, by

whatever means he conducts them, are being monitored, for fear that other frequencies,

new codes, or different forms of communications will be substituted. Thus signals

intelligence remains one of the most classified and protected intelligence categories. This

concern, however, must be counterbalanced by military necessity, winning and achieving

oneís political and military goals. Dissemination of these products in historical examples

shows that during military operations information must flow to decision-makers in a

timely manner in order to be useful and relevant. 4

Although air operations require a great deal of intelligence data, signals

intelligence holds a unique key to successful air operations. SIGINT operations to tactical

military commanders include a dynamic update capability during the execution phase of

military operations, especially in direct support to combat aircraft. The aircrew needs the

most timely intelligence to keep them ahead of the enemy on the battlefield. SIGINT can

provide this. After planning a mission, and while en route to their targets, aircrews still

require intelligence updates about their targets, routes, and hostile threats. While they

already know enemy capabilities and anticipated reactions, updates on actual changes in

the enemyís force disposition require that new intelligence be passed to aircrews. This

would include threat updates, enemy order of battle changes (e.g., movement of a

surface-to-air missile launch site), and observed enemy reactions. These data are only

useful if passed in near real-time. Rear area analysts can do little with the data and

aircrews can suffer without it.

 

3 The interception of high frequency bands is not a problem since the signal while losing strength still can

be picked up hundreds of miles from the transmitting source. The UHF/VHF bands are used primarily for

air to air and air to ground transmissions, their signal strength drops with distance, thus SIGINT collection

must be relatively close, no more than 400 miles from site of transmissions in order to intercept these

signals.

4 The description of each type of intelligence comes from JCS Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C., Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 August 2000).
3

This intelligence is vital to a number of air force personnel involved in operations

and operational support. During air operations, weapons or battle controllers require

timely updates from intelligence operations. Today these battle managers5

 are airborne in

such platforms as E-3 AWACS, E-8 JSTARS or EC-130 ABCCC, but in pervious

conflicts these officers worked in ground control intercept (GCI) sites. Personnel at these

radar sites guided aircraft to their targets. While weapons controllers6

 at GCI sites

positioned fighters to optimally engage the enemy, ABCCC controllers support attack

missions with updates on mobile targets. SIGINT provides updates on locations of enemy

threats, enemy intentions, and enemy movements. This support to air battle managers is

critical during air campaigns.

Air-to-ground platforms need real-time data so that they can find and hit their

targets. Mobile targets are the most difficult to find on a battlefield and updated

information is required by bombers in order to strike their targets with precision. Air-toair fighter crews need current data on aircraft and mobile systems which could engage

them or the attacking aircraft. SIGINT can help a fighter detect a target beyond its radar

horizon and then cue the aircraft to be placed into an optimal position. Identifying aircraft

types allows air defenders and escorts to attack higher priority targets and provides

information on what types of threats they face. While information can be passed by

secure radio, 21st century data-link technology is making it possible to display this data in

the cockpit of fighter-sized aircraft. 

The previous paragraphs describe the ideal, but what does near real-time

intelligence in practice look like? We do have historical examples that give us valuable

information on the employment of, but especially the problems with, near-real-time

SIGINT support. These case studies hammer home a number of lessons that are relevant.

While SIGINT has been used by aircrews since 1940, this study looks at American action

in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. To a large degree, the United States has regressed

during World War II when there were operational intelligence interfaces at every level of

command, meeting the needs of the expeditionary Air Force. In Korea and Vietnam the

learning process was steep. Operational intelligence interface during the Vietnam war

did not occur until 1972 when the war was winding down! Bureaucratic policies and over

centralization, coupled with budgetary pressures and a lack of interest by senior

leadership in intelligence, have left gaps that warfighters must struggle to fill during

operations and conflicts in the 21st century.

 

5 Battle managers and weapons controllers are job descriptions of officers who manage the air battle from

command and control nodes and authorize weapons release. 

6 Their duty title has been changed to air battle managers.
5

World War II

The large scale introduction of radio communications and mechanical cipher

machines during World War II led to technological innovations in military operations.

The dramatically increased use of radio suggests that World War II should be the starting

point of this study. At the start of World War II the Germans used a machine-encrypted

code system called Engima. The British broke the code at Bletchley Park and the data

gleaned from this coding system was designated Ultra.7 The British also analyzed low

grade ciphers (not machine encrypted) and voice and Morse systems used by the

Germans. Since 1940 the RAFís Y service, an RAF signals intelligence organization,

intercepted enciphered Luftwaffe communications8

 and clear voice transmissions

supplying these data to the Royal Air Force (RAF).9

 The intercepted Y service data gave

RAF fighter controllers information to intercept German formations during the Battle of

Britain. The U.S. lacked a comparable signals intelligence organization to deal with

tactical signals when Japanese forces struck Pearl Harbor.

The U.S. Eighth Air Force in 1942 created a system similar to the British Y

service units to decrypt enemy communications. The 124th Signal Radio Intelligence

(SRI) company, part of Military Intelligence or G-2, was the specialized unit stood up for

Eighth Air Force. A long acrimonious debate had raged in Washington D.C. between the

intelligence and communications branches as to who would control signals intelligence

units. A compromise was achieved providing that military intelligence handled tactical

signals and the signals corps handled the strategic ones. In addition air and ground

branches of the U.S. Army organized signals intelligence units. The Army Air Forces,

requiring the same specialized RAF intelligence, wanted separate units. In 1943 the SRI

companies expanded. The RAF also integrated a large number of Americans at its

intercept sites, RAF Cheadle and RAF Kingsdown. Eighth Air Force radio intelligence

 

7 These data were deciphered at Bletchley Park and an American contingent supplied by Signals

Intelligence Service operated here after 1942. This information was limited in distribution and Special

Security Officers or SSOs handled the Ultra classified intelligence. Although the terms ULTRA and

MAGIC are generically used to refer to allied codebreaking efforts during World War II, they actually refer

to different systems. The British effort was primarily against the German coded radio traffic generated by

the German Enigma machine. The decoded intelligence data were given the codeword ULTRA to assist in

special handling and control of this sensitive information. The primary American effort was against

Japanese coded radio traffic generated by the Purple machine. This decoded intelligence was given the

codeword MAGIC, also for control of the information. The Americans and British shared ULTRA and

MAGIC information extensively and assisted each otherís efforts to exploit the data to the greatest extent

possible.

8 Engima encrypted communications were broken by Station X or Bletchley Park and send to the RAF in a

manner that disguised their origin.

9 Aileen Clayton, The Enemy is Listening (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982) is the only first person

account of the RAF Y service in World War II.
6

units assigned to RAF Chicksands intercepted German Engima traffic. These American

units were controlled by the Signals Intelligence Service (SIS), a Signal Corps entity.10

The Eighth Air Force used Y decrypts to plan and execute its operations over

Europe from 1943 to 1945. Planners of daylight bomber missions learned from Luftwaffe

intercepts the location of active fighter bases, how and where fighters assembled, how

fighters timed their attacks against American bombers, and the endurance and range of

fighters.11 As the Eighth Air Force bombers flew early missions without any long range

fighter escort, the planners attempted to select routes avoiding known Luftwaffe fighter

bases. Operational planners used diversionary fighter sweeps and deceptive measures to

lure fighters away from the main bomber force. Y intelligence revealed the effectiveness

of these measures. This in turn allowed Eighth Air Force planners to judge the

effectiveness of their route planning in confusing Luftwaffe fighter controllers. Planners

used Y intelligence data to develop a system of escort relays that enabled fighters to

spend longer periods protecting bombers. Y intelligence also disclosed changes and

improvements in the Luftwaffe fighter command and control system. While this was not

a direct example of near real- time intelligence, other uses of Y intelligence were.

For example, Eighth Air Force exploited Y intelligence nearly real-time during

bombing missions over Western Europe. Activated in 1943, the RAF Kingsdown Switch

produced and disseminated near real-time intelligence from voice intercepts to the pilots

of Eighth Fighter Command as they flew escort missions and fighter sweeps in Northwest

Europe. The RAF Kingsdown Switch was an intelligence analysis center where

communications intelligence was collected and analyzed. The secure telephone hookup

gave Eighth Air Force access to the intelligence data while missions were in progress.

The gathered intelligence was passed directly into the fighter control room, AJAX, at the

headquarters of the VIII Fighter Command. AJAX, in turn, passed it to the fighter control

centers (FCCs) of three subordinated wings: the 65th, 66th, and 67th Fighter Wings.12

Specially trained intelligence and operations officers held conference calls and moved

aircraft according to intercepted data engaging Luftwaffe fighters and protecting bomber

formations. 

 

10 F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World

War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majestyís Stationery Officer, 1979), 5

Volumes. George F. Howe, American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe (Special

Research History #391). Dr. Diane T. Putney, ìAllied Y Intelligence and the Daylight Air War in Europeî

(Washington D.C.: Society of Military Historians, 1996).

11 Peter Gray Lucas, ìTactical Signals of the German Air Force,î in F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds,

Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 246-49. 12 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War , Volume 3, Part 1, pp. 308-22. The

Kingsdown hookup is also described in Dr. Putneyís ìAllied Y Intelligence and the Daylight Air War in

Europe.î
7

Western Europe SIGINT Operations

Autumn 1943-Spring 1945

Kingsdown

Switch

951st

Special Radio

Intelligence

Company,

Aviation

AJAX

8th Fighter Command

GCI

GCI / EW

Radars

AAA

Intercepted Transmissions

GCI, Radar, and AAA

by Kingsdown RAF

Aircraft Intercepted Outbound

Transmissions from GCI

Intercepted Luftwaffe

Communications from GCI

Relayed Back to

Special Radio Intelligence

Luftwaffe

Fighters

USAAAF

Fighters

8th Air Force

Bombers

(Airborne Intercept

Operators On Board)

Figure 1. USAAF used a variety of units to collect signals intelligence data to protect

bomber formations and to vector fighters towards the Luftwaffe, but particularly

the Kingsdown Switch and the 951st SRI (A). (Authorís depiction, with graphic design

assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong)

Since Eighth Air Force bombers flew outside the range of UK-based tracking

radars, US fighter controllers used intercepted Luftwaffe communications from Y

intelligence to locate Allied bombers on raids over Germany. As longer ranged fighter

escorts entered the USAAF inventory, the RAF Kingsdown Switch increased in value as

wing controllers operating exclusively on Y intelligence vectored P-51s and P-38s to

Luftwaffe fighter assembly areas. U.S. fighters could then engage Luftwaffe fighters far

from Allied bombers, seriously disrupting the Luftwaffe plan and sequence of attack.

This helps to explain how the Allies were able to gain and maintain air superiority so

necessary for OVERLOAD, the ground invasion of the continent.

By March 1944 the Luftwaffe withdrew its fighters further east to strengthen the

inner defenses of the Reich. The Luftwaffe withdrew so far that UK-based Y intelligence

collection sites could no longer intercept its communications. But the Y intelligence

service did not go completely deaf. It still intercepted data from the large command and

control bunkers located throughout Germany, the bunkers that controlled Luftwaffe air

movements and anti-aircraft fire over Germany.

When the Allies advanced onto the Italian peninsula, Y intelligence intercepts

from North Africa were affected because Italian mountain ranges and the Alps made

ground based radio interception from North Africa difficult. To solve the reception
8

problem beginning in 1943, the Fifteenth Air Force used German-speaking linguists

abroad B-24 bomber formations to hand record Luftwaffe communications. Using just

paper and pencil, the intercept operators were soon overwhelmed by the number of

Luftwaffe communications they intercepted. To improve collection the Air Force

installed the first tape recorders in B-24s, allowing the operator to concentrate on

gathering signals and evaluating them, rather than having to write intercepts down.

Airborne Y intelligence interception continued in the Mediterranean theater until 8 May

1945. In 1944 the Eighth Air Force in northeast Europe adopted these procedures,

assigning six operators, two with each of the three bombardment divisions. This small

investment in airborne Y operations produced excellent intelligence data. Information

relayed back by these operators to RAF Kingsdown Switch was, in turn, relayed to

fighters over northwest Europe within 20 minutes after interception. Eighth Air Force

used its airborne Y intelligence flights until V-E Day.

As planning for OVERLOAD, the invasion of the European continent, got

underway, allied tactical air forces, like their strategic bombing counterparts, wanted to

ensure that they would have the means to collect, analyze, and use Y intelligence. Ninth

Air Force and its primary components, the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands (TACs)

and the IX Bomber Command, all sought Y intelligence. In March 1944 the Army Air

Force reassigned the 951st Signal Radio Intelligence Company Aviation, an Eighth Air

Force unit collecting Luftwaffe communications for RAF Cheadle, to Ninth Air Force

and redesignated it 3rd Army Air Forces (AAF) Radio Squadron Mobile (RSM) (German

[G]). This unit was self-contained and mobile and was equipped to ìprovide radio

intelligence to the Air Force Commander and to the Theater Commander by means of

radio intercept, radio direction finding, traffic analysis, and the evaluation of enemy air

radio traffic, telegraph and voice.î13 In July 1944 the AAF had nine RSMs worldwide to

intercept German or Japanese traffic.14

Code breaking tools were frequently nothing more than people, paper, pencils,

and six to eight radios in a detachment monitoring German radio frequencies. In some

cases the operators just kept searching the frequency band until they found something.

This work was conducted in a radio trailer. The intercept message would then be send to

a direction finding (D/F) van where triangulation got a fix on the radio transmissions. The

message would come to the crypto-analysts van, where teams would break out or decode

the message into plain German and then translate it into English. The message was then

sent to Ninth Air Force, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF),

RAF Cheadle, and the Air Ministry in London. The radio, direction finding, and decrypt

vans delivered the decrypted and translated Y intelligence data by telephone landlines

and motorcycle messengers to users. This procedure was designed to protect the source of

 

13 Unit citation in Major ìTedî Silverstein paperís deposited in AFHRA Maxwell AFB. 14 General Kenney had to make do with an Australian intercept unit on New Guinea until more Americans

were trained. In the Pacific the U.S. Navy employed Radio Intelligence Units (RIU) on ships, especially

aircraft carriers. These collected Japanese tactical aircraft communications and provided valuable

information allowing carrier-based naval aircraft to intercept and destroy many Japanese aircraft. (ìThe

Employment of Mobile Radio Intelligence Units by Commands Afloat During World War II,î in Ronald H.

Spector, Listening to the Enemy: Key Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War

with Japan [Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1988], 76-79).
9

the intelligence and deny the Germans the opportunity to figure out that the Allies were

breaking their message traffic.

Eager for better operational interface with its signals intelligence collectors, the

Army Air Force broke larger formations into smaller units to integrate them into every

part of the expeditionary force retaking France and Western Europe. The 3rd RSM (G)

was divided into three detachments to support Ninth Air Force units. Detachment A

stayed with Ninth Air Force, Detachment B went to IX TAC and 70th Fighter Wing, and

Detachment C supported XIX TAC and the 100th Fighter Wing. Detachment B landed in

France on 8 June 1944, with the rest of the unit arriving shortly thereafter. The unit

intercepted its first transmission on 9 June.15 In short order the detachment set up near

Cricqueville which had a perforated steel plank airfield from which 354th Fighter Group

flew P-51s. Meanwhile, Detachment A produced order of battle reports and situation

reports and stayed in close touch with RAF Cheadle to assist in codebreaking.

Detachments B and C passed all intelligence they intercepted directly to fighter control

centers (FCCs) of the tactical air commands which, in turn, radioed American fighters

and bombers. On 6 October 1944 Detachment D was set up to support XXIX TAC with

Y intelligence. Concurrently Detachment A moved to support air planners at SHAEF,

while Detachment E took over supporting Ninth Air Force. 

The Y intelligence provided decrypts that helped destroy Luftwaffe aircraft. For

the period 8 June to 26 October 1944, the 3rd RSM (G) received credit for a large number

of enemy aircraft kills. Detachment A produced intelligence resulting in 73 enemy

aircraft destroyed, 3 probably destroyed, and 8 damaged. During the German evacuation

from southern France, Detachment Aís decrypts revealed that bases near Cognac,

Bourges, and Dijon were Luftwaffe evacuation centers and active at certain times. Based

on Y intelligence a single fighter sweep against Cognac and Dijon on 25 August 1944

destroyed 33 aircraft on the ground.16

 

15 Arnold Franco, Code to Victory (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1998), p. 65. This is the

only account written by a member of the 3rd RSM(G) and covers the unit from the UK till Arnold Francoís

discharge in 1945 from the Army.

16 Eleven Ju-52 transports, two FW-200 transports, three Ju-88 bombers, one Do-217 Bomber, one Fw-190

fighter and one Me-109 fighter. Major Hyman ìTedî Theodore Silverstein, Organization and Operation of

Tactical Radio Intercept Squadron (German) Assigned to a Tactical Air Force, undated, in AFHRA under

personal papers. These papers offer a remarkable glimpse of what tactical collection of SIGINT was like in

1944/45 in Europe.
10

RAF Canterbury

RAF Kingsdown UK RAF CHEADLE

British Air Ministry London

AI 4

Agencies

Theater Det. "A"

(CW)

S. I. S.

SHAEF

Ninth

Air Force

Det. "E" S. I. S.

Ninth A.F.

IX

TAC

FCC

SIS

FCC

SIS

FCC

SIS

Det. "B"

(Voice)

XIX

TAC

Det. "C"

(Voice)

XXIX

TAC

Det. "D"

(Voice)

Telephone

CW

CW Broadcast

Teletype

Courier

Figure 2. A diagram of the 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile (German) and its tie-ins with

British SIGINT sites 1944-45. (Original from Major Ted Silversteinís papers)

Detachment B, feeding data to the 70th Wing, was credited with 199 Luftwaffe

aircraft destroyed, 36 probable, and 26 damaged. Y intelligence passed to fighter

controllers contributed to Allied fighters attacking Luftwaffe forward landing strips and

the radar plotting station near St. Lo. Detachment C was credited with two Luftwaffe

aircraft destroyed, as it had no linguists and its XIX TAC fighters attacked more ground

than air targets during the Normandy campaign. The ground results were impressive

though with 150 tanks and armored vehicles destroyed.
11

Figure 3. Artistís depiction of one of the mobile vans used by 3rd RSM (G) in

Western Europe, a British vehicle with American van body attached. 

(Authorís depiction with graphic design assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong)

Units of the 3rd RSM (G) also supported the microwave early warning (MEW )

radar sites of both Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, which provided radar controllers with

advanced warning of airborne Luftwaffe aircraft. These radars helped to direct aircraft

towards targets and also managed air traffic over newly liberated countries in Western

Europe. Y intelligence reports allowed controllers to identify their radar targets as

friendly or enemy, ensuring that Luftwaffe and not allied aircraft were targeted. The

RSM personnel could, by listening to Luftwaffe frequencies and carefully cataloging call

signs, tell what type of aircraft were flying and, by triangulation, could help radar

controllers pinpoint enemy aircraft. Each of the TACs in Ninth Air Force had a MEW

site which the RSM detachments supported as well. These radar sets allowed USAAF and

RAF fighters to be vectored against Luftwaffe aircraft. Ninth Air Force moved these

radar sets to the continent of Europe in August 1944, and they relocated with every Allied

advance towards Germany. The Eighth Air Force set, the most powerful, was moved

from the UK to Holland, codenamed Oakland, in November 1944. This station controlled

fighters by directing them to their rendezvous points with bomber formations. Realizing

how valuable the Kingsdown Switch was, General Spaatz requested the RAF to relocate

part of their Y intelligence service to work with this site in Western Europe. Since the

Luftwaffe had pulled further back, and Eighth Air Force radar control was now also

located on the continent, General Spaatz was eager to continue Y intelligence support. In

the meantime 3rd RSM (G)ís detachments B and D fed the MEW site Y intelligence. In
12

November 1944 the RAF started the move which then was halted due to the Ardennes

offensive. In March 1945 the RAFís 364th Wireless Unit relocated to Belgium to provide

data to the Army Air Forceís Oakland site.

Luftwaffe anti-aircraft (flak) messages sent by radio were a useful source of Y

intelligence. German anti-aircraft units were told by command and control units when

they could fire to avoid hitting Luftwaffe fighters operating against allied bombers. These

messages also established safe zones through which Luftwaffe aircraft flew on their

missions. These messages could be used by RSM intercept operaters to determine what

kinds of operations the Luftwaffe was planning or conducting. If bombing strikes cut

landlines, the Luftwaffe was forced to use radio links to warn flak units of friendly

Luftwaffe aircraft in their vicinity. These radio communications were vital in helping

Eighth Air Force steer clear of fighter concentrations and intercept Luftwaffe fighters

before they could mass against bomber raids. The RSM also tracked other Luftwaffe

movements, including supply flights to the beleagued garrisons in French ports such as

Lorient and Brest, and battlefield interdiction bombing sorties early in the Normandy

operation. The resupply sorties were targeted in the hope that a lack of food and

ammunition would force the early surrender of these port cities. Intercepts also allowed

3rd RSM (G) personnel to warn U.S. AAA of German aircraft approaching Allied

frontlines. 

Figure 4. Artistís depiction of a typical camouflaged 3rd RSM (G) site in France or

Belgium 1944. The antenna was used to intercept German communications.

(Authorís depiction with graphic design assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong)
13

In 1944, preparations for the Ardennes offensive (the Battle of the Bulge) caused

the German High Command to impose strict signal silence. Detachment A of the 3rd

RSM (G) may be the only allied unit that picked up signals indicating preparations for the

German operation. On 16 December 1944, using the Luftwaffe AAA as their source,

codebreakers heard that 90 Ju-52 transports and 15 Ju-88 medium bombers were being

moved in Germany. The message was cancelled but then repeated on December 17th. The

aircraft carried Lt. Col. Von Der Heydteís Luftwaffe paratroopers who were to jump

behind Allied lines and cause confusion. This fact was unknown to the codebreakers, but

based on observed air traffic patterns, the 3rd RSM reported some sort of operation was

being mounted by the Germans. The message was passed to SHAEF and acknowledged,

but no action was taken by higher headquarters since no one really believed the Germans

could mount an operation this late in the war. Moreover, Ultra, the German Engima code

traffic, revealed nothing. On December 18th, finding German parachutes at Detachment

Bís site in Jalhay, Belgium, the unit under Capt. Silverstein evacuated the site, saving it

from the German ground assault. Capt. Silverstein wrote after the war that he believed,

based on the reduced volume of intercepts in December 1944, that the Germans were

using strict signal security to hide their preparations from the Allies. After-action

reporting indicates that while the detachmentís signal was intercepted and passed on to

higher headquarters, no one acted on it until the German attack began. German signal

security was unusually good during the Battle of the Bulge.17 This gave U.S. SIGINT

units little information with which to support Allied aircraft.

Aircrews had to make electronic compromises in their conduct of the air war over

Europe. Jamming to protect the bomber formations from radar-guided flak was conducted

exclusively by the 36th Bomb Squadron (Heavy) with modified B-17s and then B-24s. As

it turned out, this airborne jamming also disrupted Luftwaffe communications links, both

radio and Morse operated, which in turn degraded the ability of the Y service to intercept

valuable communications.18 Therefore careful coordination with jammers was required to

ensure that the 3rd RSM (G) could still listen to and gather Y intelligence from relevant

forces. This jamming in 1944/45 over Germany illustrates a point that continues to pit

operations against intelligence to the present day: When do you jam or destroy a

communications node, and when is it better to leave a site operational in order to gather

signals intelligence data? This issue is only resolved at the highest level of command and

frequently will find a theater commander at odds with his intelligence chief.

Signals intelligence benefited the Allies and evolved throughout the war. The

final innovation in signals intelligence in World War II appeared in the Mosquito

fighterís airborne radar system that could interrogate the German Identification Friend or

Foe (IFF) system on the Me-262 jet fighter that appeared in late 1944. IFF operates in

various modes and is a system that monitors the positions of friendly aircraft through a

transponder. A radar control facility (either airborne or on the ground) sends out an

 

17 Franco, 159. 18 Alfred Price, Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare (New York: Charles Scribnerís

Sons, 1978); Martin Streetly, Confound and Destroy. 100 Group and the Bomber Support Campaign

(New York: Janeís Publishing, 1978); Stephen Hutton, Squadron of Deception. The 36th Bomb Squadron in

World War II (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd, 1999).
14

interrogation signal which is received by the IFF transponder on the aircraft. The

transponder automatically responds to the query by sending a coded message that

identifies the friendly aircraft. The system on the Mosquito allowed a fast escort fighter

to home in on the signal and shoot down Me-262s, considered a major threat to Eighth

Air Force bomber formations. Several were shot down in this manner during March and

April 1945.
15

Korea

At the end of World War II rapid demobilization of ground based signals

intelligence squadrons (radio squadrons mobile [RSMs]) left only minimal expertise in

these units. In 1947 when the Air Force became a separate service, the existing nine RSM

squadrons19 were divided between the Army and the Air Force. The USAF received three

RSMs - one in Europe, one in the U.S., and one in the Far East. The U.S. Army kept six

RSMs which were formed into the Army Security Agency (ASA). The Air Force

squadrons were formed into the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS).

Decimated by post-war budget cuts, the USAFSS directed its primary collection effort at

the Soviet Union. In 1949 the DOD established the Armed Forces Security Agency

(AFSA) which was supposed to manage the cryptological activities of all three services,

thus eliminating duplication of effort and streamlining management. None of these plans

worked, however, since the new agency lacked the legal authority to manage U.S.

SIGINT on a centralized basis. They actually proved to be more of a bureaucratic

hindrance during the Korean War.20 As a result, most collected signals intelligence in

Asia was forwarded to the United States for processing and collation. Few members of

the Far East Command (FECOM), General MacArthurís headquarters in Tokyo, were

allowed to see the finished intelligence products. The Far East Air Force stationed in

Japan thus could provide little useful target intelligence on Korea to its aircrews.

The two central missions that preoccupied U.S. intelligence gathering activities

involving SIGINT in Asia were the Soviet nuclear threat and observing Communist

Chinese threats towards Taiwan. SIGINT also emphasized listening for perceived

communist infiltration in occupied Japan, rather than monitoring developments elsewhere

in Asia, in places such as Korea or Vietnam. 

With the outbreak of the Korean war, intelligence information collected in Asia

was still processed through agencies located in the U.S., naturally precluding any timely

distribution. Pilots flying in support of U.N. and U.S. operations in Korea had very little

useful tactical intelligence. Shortly after the Korean War broke out, two highly critical

reports decried U.S. intelligence support to Asia theater commanders.21 The Joint Chiefs

 

19 During World War II both the Army and Army Air Forces had used the nine established RSMs for

cryptological work.

20 David Hatch with Robert Louis Benson, The Korean War: The SIGINT Background,

www.nsa.gov/korea/papers/sigint_background_korean_war.htm. 21 Major General Glenn Barcus, An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the USAF in Korea (Washington,

D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 25 June ñ 31 December 1950) and Robert Stearns, Korean Evaluation

Project. Report on Air Operations (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 16 January 1951).

These documents highlight many deficiencies noted on the early conduct of USAF operations in the Korean

conflict and focus heavily on lack of intelligence support. See also Complete Air Staff Comments ñStearnís

Report Conclusions (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 20 March 1951) and Robert Futrell

ìUSAF Intelligence in the Korean Warî in The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective, edited by
16

of Staff described COMINT in the Far East in 1950 as ìfar short of requirements for

peacetime and incapable of handling a vastly greater load during wartime.î22

Manpower shortages, lack of linguists, and dated equipment all meant that the

U.S. SIGINT establishment was unprepared for the war that came to the Korean

peninsula.23 Air Force intelligence squadrons assigned to Korea lacked personnel and

equipment. The 1st RSM based at Johnson AB, Japan, with an additional D/F site at

Misawa in northern Japan, provided tactical support at the outbreak of the war. But

intelligence gaps forced Fifth Air Force, commanding air operations over Korea, to

monitor developments inside Korea using a team of trusted South Koreans. However, this

collection effort provided little information useful to tactical or strategic missions.24 ROK

troops were quickly formed into a SIGINT unit managed by American officers. The

North Korean invasion of the South initially received little COMINT attention as the

United States had larger global strategic concerns. Immediately after the first U.S soldiers

were sent to South Korea, however, most of the COMINT sites in Asia were directed to

monitor whether Soviet ground forces were intervening in Korea. After the Inchon

landing on 25 September 1950 and the advance towards the Yalu, Stalin decided to

intervene in the war. On 1 November 1950 three Soviet fighter aviation divisions with

MiG-15s began flying missions. An additional 50,000 troops provided security to the

Soviet base complexes in Manchuria. The Soviet air force rotated its fighter units in

Manchuria throughout the war. They were the dominant communist force, especially

early in the war. Chinese MiGs did not come on line until December 1951 and North

Korean MiGs only started operations in January 1952.25 The first air activity reports were

produced in Autumn 1951 by COMINT personnel. 

During World War II linguists had been trained on-the-job in both theaters of war.

However, since no one had anticipated a conflict in Korea there were no American

Korean linguists in the U.S. military. The bulk of the intelligence work involved

direction finding, the pinpointing of emitters, and a unique cryptological product --

traffic analysis. Traffic Analysis attempts to ascertain valuable intelligence data without

decoding or translating a message. Valuable information can be gleaned by watching who

is sending messages to whom. It can reveal the enemyís location, strength, and purpose,

even if the enemyís codes and encryption systems are unbroken. Silence is not an option

on a modern battlefield where units move rapidly and must be supplied on the move. Air

operations always have some emissions -- radio, radar, transponder, or datalink -- that can

be exploited, even if encrypted. 

 

Lt. Col. Walter Hitchcock (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1991) for more on these

shortcomings.

22 Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, commonly referred to as the ìBrownell

Committee Report,î Special Research History 123, National Archives and Records Administration, Record

Group 457, pp. 59-60.

23 Maj. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus, USAF Oral History Program Interview (conducted by Lt. Col. John N. Dick

at Solana Beach, California, 10-13 August 1976), pp. 214-17. 

24 David Hatch with Robert Louis Benson, The Korean War: The SIGINT Background,

www.nsa.gov/korea/papers/sigint_background_korean_war.htm. 25 Ralph Wetterhan, ìThe Russians of MiG Alley,î ROA Magazine, August 2000, p. 70.
17

In order to conduct successful intercept operations in the Korean War,

communications intelligence operators needed the enemy to communicate on

frequencies, which they could receive. As with air operations conducted in World War II,

air planners laid on tactical bombing missions during the Korean war to destroy portions

of the North Korean communications infrastructure in order to give COMINT a better

chance of accessing useable intelligence. After the successful landing at Inchon the JCS

ordered FECOM to destroy all telegraph repeater stations. This would prevent the North

Koreans from using land lines that provided secure message traffic. Target intelligence

on the North Korean ground communications system revealed there were only seven

stations. On 24 September FECOM ordered FEAF to destroy seven telegraph repeater

stations, especially those at Pyongyang and Wonson.26 The FEAF lost three B-26s in

strikes at Pyongyang and Wonson due to a heavy concentration of anti-aircraft guns, but

the strikes were successful. U.S. SIGINT units gained a dramatic increase in militarily

significant radio communications that established the intent of communist air and ground

actions. The U.S. did not operate alone in the U.N. command. The Hong Kong-based

RAF 376th Signals unit intercepted Chinese traffic, and these data were relayed to Korean

battlefield commanders and their intelligence staffs in Korea and in Japan.27

Following the appearance of Soviet-made MiG-15 jet fighters over the Yalu river,

on 13 November 1950 the commander of Fifth Air Force, Maj. Gen. Earl Partridge,

dispatched his only SIGINT unit to Sinanju airfield in North Korea to intercept the air to

ground communications of the MiG-15s. At about the same time in November 1950,

after repeated requests from Fifth Air Force, the 1st RSM finally moved a detachment to

Korea. The 1st RSM component of the USAF Security Service did not belong to Fifth Air

Force and thus had to await approval from Washington D.C. before moving. Saved by

sheer luck from being captured during the first Chinese attack, the 1st RSM set up

operations in Seoul. The Chinese attack prompted FECOM to request Chinese linguists,

especially those who spoke or understood the Manchurian dialect. Until they arrived,

COMINT voice interception operations could not conducted.28

In December 1950, with the arrival of Chinese linguists in Korea, the 1st RSM

provided useful intelligence. It confirmed that the Chinese Peopleís Liberation Army Air

Force (PLAAF) would not interfere with an evacuation operation near Hamhung.29 The

linguists also began flying radio intercept missions behind the frontline in C-47 transport

aircraft to increase their field of view and intercept possibilities.30 The fact that Russian

pilots were flying some of the MiG-15s soon created a demand for Russian linguists.

After Russian transmissions were picked up in Manchuria and not from Vladivostok an

intense effort began to gather the background of these Russian transmissions. It soon

 

26 Matthew Aid, ìUS HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War,î from ìApproach of War to the Chinese

Intervention,î in Intelligence and National Security (Winter 1999), p. 52. 27 Desmond Ball, ìOver and Out: Signals Intelligence in Hong Kongî in Intelligence and National Security

(July 1996), p. 62.

28 History, Far East Air Force, July-December 1950 (Yokota AB, Japan, undated), p. 375. 29 Most Chinese linguists were stationed on Taiwan to monitor the Peopleís Republic of China. The U.S.

military did not have a large cadre of Chinese linguists since China had been an ally from 1945-49 and had

relied on Nationalists for linguist work.

30 Unit 4, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Taegu South Airfield (K-37) in South Korea.
18

emerged that Russian pilots, GCI controllers, and airfield tower personnel were talking in

their mother tongue.

 Able to read Chinese air force (PLAAF) codes, 1st RSM intelligence allowed

USAF fighters to intercept Chinese MiGs shortly after they crossed the Yalu river. This

intelligence information gave U.S. and U.N. fighters an edge since they knew where the

communist aircraft would be. U.S. radar ground controllers could provide vectors to

intercepting U.S. aircraft allowing them to move behind communist aircraft or at least

avoid ambushes. The fact that some ground chatter could be picked up in Manchuria

before the MiGs took off, allowed U.S. fighters to avoid long fruitless orbits near MiG

Alley. COMINT also permitted the monitoring of North Korean airfieldsí status and

readiness allowing FEAF to bomb them before they achieved operational status.31 On 19

June 1951, Fifth Air Force was alerted via COMINT that the PLAAF wanted to use

Soviet supplied IL-10 bombers to intervene in the ground war. The next day P-51s

spotted eight Il-10s, and in an ensuring dogfight the P-51s shot down two Il-10s. When

Chinese Yak-9 fighters appeared they were jumped by another flight of P-51s resulting in

one Yak-9 shot down.32 Then Chinese MiG-15s joined the fracas and were, in turn, met

by F-86s. The F-86s damaged four MiG-15s but the MiGs got a P-51.33

When the ground war bogged down into a stalemate, USAF bombing missions

increased. Consequently, during the spring of 1951, the number of B-29 bomber losses

mounted. SAC pressed FEAF commanders to provide real-time warning to the bombers.

On 6 August 1951, advisory support, as this type of support was now labeled,

commenced on the island of Paengyong-Do off the North Korean coast. But it shut down

a month later when reception of communications links proved poor. Other success

followed, however, when, on 30 November 1951, a force of 31 F-86s was vectored

towards a Chinese attack force of 12 Tu-2 bombers, 16 La-9 fighters and 16 MiG-15 jet

fighters. The USAF shot down eight Tu-2 bombers, three La-9s and one MiG-15 with

only one F-86 damaged.34 The initial operations-intelligence interface also allowed

USAFSS to protect B-26 night-intruder missions from PLAAF night fighters. On 23

April 1952 the 1st RSM co-located a detachment with a tactical control site operated by

606th Air Control and Warning (AC&W), code-named ìHorse-radish,î a tactical control

site near K-6, an airfield located at Pyong'taek.35 Also in April 1952, radar control and

signals intelligence operations moved to Cho-Do, another island off the west coast of

North Korea. COMINT information could thus be passed immediately to controllers who

could vector fighters or move bombers away from PLAAF activity. 

 

31 Robert F. Futrell, The US Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History,

1983), pp. 287-93.

32 Official USAF History lists only 1 Yak-9 downed, while the 606th ACW lists more aircraft downed. This

discrepancy probably results from damaged aircraft crashing and data picked up via COMINT.

33 Futrell, p. 310; Hitchcock, p. 286. 34 Futrell, p. 415. 35 History of the 606th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 1-31 May 1952 (Yokota, Japan:

5AF/FEAF, undated), pp. 6-9.
19

In late autumn 1951, COMINT analysts had noticed a shift in PLAAF radio

communications frequencies from HF to VHF. The shorter range VHF radio links

required COMINT sites to be located closer to the Yalu to pickup air-to-ground

transmissions.36 An additional RSM, the 15th , was formed to provide expanded SIGINT

coverage to USAF units operating from South Korea. At this new site the 15th was able to

provide support to U.S. fighters over most of the Korean peninsula, including the Yalu

river.37 Getting SIGINT support to the GCI site took a while. Proposed in August 1952,

by Capt. Delmar C. Lang of the 1st RSM, it took the personal intervention of Maj. Gen.

Partridge, Commander Fifth Air Force, in December 1952 to bring about a merger of

intelligence and GCI capabilities. Concerned about the lack of low altitude radar

coverage over the Yalu river, General Partridge requested that SIGINT enhance the

operational air picture for controllers. In response to this request, USAFSS personnel

already located on Cho-Do island, as a detachment of the 15th Radio Squadron Mobile,

started to provide real time intelligence information to the GCI controllers of Detachment

2, 608th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron on the island. This intelligence allowed

USAF F-86s to avoid traps or to be vectored to intercept targets.38 Able to listen to

Chinese and Russian MiG-15 radio links, COMINT helped the GCI controllers with their

air picture. The result was a dramatic increase in MiG kills. Between October 1952 and

July 1953 American fighters shot down 345 MiG-15 fighters for a loss of only 18 F-86s.

During the months of May and June 1953 133 MiG-15s were shot down for the loss of

only one F-86.39 Unfortunately there is no statistical data to allow any definitive

conclusions as to what degree SIGINT contributed to these numbers, but the fact that

ratios changed can only lead to the assumption that SIGINT played a role in shooting

down MiGs.

 

36 Far East Air Force, FEAF ECM History during the Korean Conflict, K720.04C AFHRA, Maxwell AFB,

pp. 6-14.

37 ìHistory of the 608th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 1-31 May 1952 through 1-31 August

1953î (Yokota, Japan: 5AF/FEAF, undated).

38 Delmar C. Lang papers in National Archives. 39 Futrell, pp. 60-110 and 652-6; Histories of the 502nd Tactical Control group, 606th Aircraft Control and

Warning Squadron, and the 608th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron from mid-1952 to mid-1953

provided the MiG kill statistics.
20

MANCHURIA

NORTH

KOREA

SOUTH

KOREA

Antung Huichon

Sinuiju

Sinanju

MIG ALLEY

Pyongyang

Cho-Do

Paengyang Do

SEA of JAPAN

YELLOW SEA

Sui-ho Res.

Kaesong

Seoul

0 25 50 75 100 125 150

Korea Operations 1950-1953

Statute Miles

Location of

15th RSM and

608 ACW

Figure 5. Korean peninsula. The map shows the 1954 DMZ line, MiG alley, and the

location of Cho-Do island that was critical in detecting MiG operations over North

Korea. (Authorís depiction with graphic design assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong)

The spring of 1953 marked the beginning of airborne COMINT collection over

Korea. SACís RB-29 strategic reconnaissance aircraft had been flying missions around

the Soviet Union and China, but rarely flew missions over Korea. As the RB-29 force

aged it was replaced by RB-50 aircraft in strategic reconnaissance squadrons. In

December 1952, RB-50Gs began to accompany SAC bomber aircraft (B-29

Superfortresses) on bombing missions over North Korea. The purpose was to afford

ELINT support to the bomber formation. Electronic intelligence in this case meant

protecting the bombers from radars and searchlights that tracked them and guided AAA
21

fire toward them. Jamming equipment carried by the SAC B-29s could only function if

the correct North Korean/Chinese/Soviet frequencies were detected and USAF jamming

equipment programmed. The RB-50s also carried a linguist to monitor radios and record

any useful information for analysis on the ground, as well as to warn the bomber

formation of any immediate threat such as that from communist night fighters. Specially

modified RB-50Gs also orbited over the Yellow Sea or flew racetrack patterns collecting

COMINT on North Korean and Chinese communications.40

The Soviet forces in Manchuria tried to make life hard for USAF pilots in the

Korean War. Colonel Walker ìBudî Mahurin, an F-86 pilot with four MiG kills, recalls

being scrambled by GCI and not finding any MiGs at the vectored location. Mistrusting

the GCI operators, he went to their site and discovered that linguists were listening to

Russian transmissions and that scrambles were called based on SIGINT data vice actual

radar plots. A Russian interviewed in 2000 explained why the F-86s frequently did not

find any MiGs in spite of the intercepted Russian voice transmissions. The Soviets

listened to American radio transmissions in South Korea and if the weather was bad over

Manchuria would make fake transmissions to lure aircraft into the air where they found

no opponents. This type of deception is a hallmark of Russian electronic reconnaissance

operations. For national security reasons Colonel Mahurin never revealed this fact to his

pilots. 41

After the Korean War, developing and maintaining this SIGINT capability

received little official attention. The SIGINT operations in South Korea were transformed

into fixed site operations with a strategic focus. The RSMs were redesignated as security

squadrons and their primary focus became the Soviet Union and monitoring strategic

communications links for signs of hostility. The airborne collection capability expanded

under Strategic Air Command, but it too was focused on the Soviet Union and its most

threatening satellites. The hard-won tactical abilities were lost to the Air Force when the

focus shifted to other intelligence problems. As with the inter-war period between World

 

40 ìHistorical Report,î 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, Medium, Photo, 1 April ñ30 April 1953

(Kadena, Japan, undated); Far East Air Force, FEAF ECM History during the Korean Conflict, K720.04C

AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, p. 20.

 The U. S. Navy had a Naval Security Group stationed in Japan and sent detachments of linguists on board

ships operating off the coasts of Korea. In 1951, for example, the USS New Jersey and USS Essex had such

detachments embarked. This practice dates back to World War II. (Seventh Fleet, Commander Seventh

Fleet Report of Operations, March 28, 1951 ñ March 3, 1952, Enclosure 1, Annex E, p. 5, Operational

Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C.

41 Ralph Wetterhan, ìThe Russians of MiG Alleyî in ROA Magazine (August 2000), p. 74.
22

War II and the Korean War (1945 to 1950), the focus of the period between the Korean

War and start of the Vietnam War (1954 to 1965) was on gathering strategic intelligence

about the rapidly growing military and nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. Thus, the

United States was guaranteed to enter another Asian war unprepared for signals

intelligence support to tactical air operations.
23

Vietnam 

When U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War increased in August 1964, there were

no intelligence assets in country. As operations in 1966 escalated into ìRolling Thunderî

air strikes over North Vietnam, Seventh Air Force required better intelligence support

and tactical air control to counter the aggressive North Vietnamese air force. It took four

years to build the network. In April 1965 the first three EC-121Ds airborne early

warning and control aircraft (AWACS) had arrived at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.42 They

flew orbits over the Gulf of Tonkin preventing North Vietnamese fighters from shooting

down U.S. aircraft. Extending the American radar picture into North Vietnam, the EC121D was equipped with search and height finding radars and an identification friend or

foe (IFF) system to plot U.S. aircraft positions. Although they were an improvement over

existing ground-based radars, the EC-121Ds had limited capabilities. Their radars broke

down frequently, and they had no other data such as communications intercepts to

characterize the radar targets. Seventh Air Force was not happy with initial EC-121D

operations.43 However, improvement soon came in the form of EC-121Ks that could

interrogate enemy IFF systems and thus establish the position of North Vietnamese

fighters.44 This technical innovation, which had worked so well in the final months of

World War II against Luftwaffe Me262 jet fighters, now was used to exploit Vietnamese

reliance on IFF transceivers to direct the air battles over Hanoi. A test aircraft was

deployed from the U.S. to Vietnam in July 1967 under the codename ìRivet Top.î When

it proved successful, all EC-121Ds were modified into EC-121Ks. USAF Security

Service personnel manned four positions on the EC-121K aircraft to monitor North

Vietnamese ground control intercept (GCI) communications, and to employ the IFF

interrogation equipment. They provided near-real-time support to USAF and USN

aircraft flying over North Vietnam.45 This information provided by the EC-121Ks

reduced the number of North Vietnamese intercepts of U.S. fighter-bombers, allowing

more U.S. bombs to hit their targets with fewer losses.46

In 1966 work on an automated system of intelligence and a tactical air control

system named ìCombat Lightingî was started on Monkey Mountain near Da Nang,

South Vietnam. It was planned to be a ground-based operations and intelligence fusion

center. The EC-121Ks only flew when air strikes were scheduled over North Vietnam

and Laos, thus did not provide 24/7 coverage. By 1969, the Southeast Asian ìCombat

 

42 Originally based outside of Saigon, the EC-121s were later moved to Thailand to cut down their transit

times to stations in Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin.

43 ìCollege Eye Special Report,î Project CHECO (Hickam AFB, Hawaii: PACAF, 1 November 1968). 44 QRC-248 in College Eye Special report, pp. 18-19. 45 ìProject Red Baron II: Air to Air Encounters in Southeast Asia, Volume II,î Part 1 (Nellis AFB: USAF

Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, January 1973), D-3; Stephen Hardy, ìAir Force Hits the Intelligence

Fastball,î Journal of Electronic Defense (January 1992), pp. 29-31. 46 ìProject Red Baron II: Air to Air Encounters in Southeast Asia,î Volume III, Part 2 (Nellis AFB: USAF

Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, March 1973), statistical tables in appendix 3.
24

Lightingî tactical systems linked USAF, USN, USMC, and USA tactical data systems

together, forming a comprehensive air picture over North Vietnam.47 It provided a realtime exchange of tactical air operations information throughout the theater for the first

time. While this system received a variety of inputs from intelligence collectors

throughout Southeast Asia, classification problems and dissemination concerns by

national intelligence agencies which ìownedî the data meant that little information was

actually passed to aircrews operating over North Vietnam. The USAF also made use of

the radar picket ship code named ìRed Crownî in the Gulf of Tonkin. This ship had

naval SIGINT, national SIGINT, and an E-248 airborne radar feed linked into its Combat

Information Center (CIC), giving it a complete picture of the air situation over Hanoi.

Because of the curvature of the earth, the shipís radar could only look up the Red River

delta to Hanoi.

U.S. pilots, already frustrated by the small amount of data provided to them, felt

betrayed when they learned that some losses over Vietnam could have been prevented if

intelligence data had been shared with them. ELINT data which revealed SA-2 launch

sites were not passed to pilots until confirmed by an additional source. This policy raised

loss rates significantly since SA-2 sites only transmitted when engaging a U.S. aircraft.

The problem was one of sources, methods, and security protecting SIGINT. Because the

pilots lacked proper security clearance, only a few signals intelligence tidbits could be

provided to them. Signals intelligence, even then, was classified at top secret or higher,

and access was granted to only a few individuals. Lack of effective analysis and

restrictive classification also limited dissemination of data. This problem persisted until

1972 and was a classic example of the ìgreen door syndromeî -- a caustic euphemism for

intelligence data kept locked away in a vault in the squadron or wing operations

buildings, usually behind a green door.49

On 9 May 1972, following a three-year (1968 to 1971) curtailment of air activity

over North Vietnam during peace talks, President Nixon ordered renewed bombing of the

north. This new bombing campaign came in response to a North Vietnamese invasion of

South Vietnam. During the truce the North Vietnamese air force was rebuilt and the

North Vietnamese air defense network was greatly expanded. It was considered by many

air operations planners to be one of the finest air defense systems in the world. With the

resumption of full-scale bombing on 10 May 1972, the U.S. soon suffered shocking

losses to these defenses. From 10 May to 31 July 1972, the U.S. aircraft shot down 31

MiGs while losing 21 aircraft to MiGs and an additional 27 tactical aircraft to SAMs and

AAA. During June and July, when the North Vietnamese air force was most effective, it

shot down 13 U.S. aircraft while losing only 11 MiGs in aerial combat.50 One factor in

 

47 ìSoutheast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface,î Project CHECO (Hickam AFB: PACAF, 1 January

1975), p. 3. This is an excellent text on how data systems developed and were used throughout the

Vietnam War. 

48 The E-2 was a small AWACS aircraft that used a radar to extend the radar horizon of a carrier task force.

In the Gulf of Tonkin, the E-2 monitored air strikes in the Red River valley over Hanoi.

49 Robert Futrell, et al., Aces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1965-

1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1976), pp.31-66. 50 ìLinebacker: Overview of the First 120 Days,î Project CHECO (Hickam AFB: PACAF: 27 September

1973), pp. 44-45 and ìRed Baronî, Vol III. Part 1, p. 88.
25

this unacceptable kill:loss ratio was North Vietnamese radar control and the lack of

American radar warning.

In response to these losses, Gen. John Vogt, 7th Air Force commander, demanded

a better system to provide MiG warnings to U.S. aircraft operating outside existing radar

coverage. The elements of the tactical air control system discussed earlier had serious

radar limitations. They could not provide effective low altitude radar support to strike and

escort packages coming from bases in Thailand to targets in North Vietnam. Gen. Vogt

sent an eyes-only message to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John D. Ryan, describing his

analysis of the air war over North Vietnam. He bluntly pointed out that the USAF was

losing the air war. The problem boiled down to increasingly proficient North Vietnamese

pilots using single high speed passes firing Atoll air-to-air missiles, and inexperienced

U.S. pilots rotated into the combat zone every year. Compounding the problem was the

unsatisfactory way intelligence information was relayed to pilots using the UHF guard

channel.51

Gen. Vogt asked for Air Staff help. Gen. Ryan directed AF/IN and the quick

reaction group in AF/XOO to take immediate action. He forcefully stated that he wanted

action, ìnot another staff study, not a briefing, not a plan.î52 An Air Staff action group

was organized, consisting of Lt. Col. William Kirk, Maj. Ernie Short, and Mr. Delmar

Lang. Lang of the NSA had set up the Cho-Do operation during the Korean War as a

USAF captain. He had repeatedly offered to do the same in Vietnam, but commanders in

Southeast Asia had turned him down. After running into opposition from 7th AF/IN

opposed to giving aircrews ìraw dataî directly, the team moved its operation to Nakhon

Phanom (NKP) Royal Thai Air Force Base. Here the team assembled control vans and

radios that allowed it to monitor North Vietnamese air operations. Intelligence personnel

tracked, plotted, and recorded air movements and passed the data on to weapons

controllers in communication with the USAF strike packages over North Vietnam. In

order to broadcast the intelligence information on UHF radios to pilots over North

Vietnam, the team developed a KC-135 radio relay aircraft, call sign ìLuzon.î The

weapons control center site at NKP used the call sign ìTeaball.î53 The center also had

access to radar data from EC-121Ks, code-named ìDisco,î orbiting over Laos and the

Gulf of Tonkin. This meant that weapons controllers could cue aircraft towards or away

from North Vietnamese threats, since the weapons controllers saw both pictures -- the

USAF/USN radar returns and North Vietnamese data on their map displays.

 

51 Maj. Gen. Doyle Larson, ìDirect Intelligence Support in Vietnam. Project ëTeaballí,î in American

Intelligence Journal (Spring/Summer 1994) 56-58. 52 Maj. Gen. Doyle Larson, ìDirect Intelligence Support in Vietnam. Project ëTeaballí,î in American

Intelligence Journal (Spring/Summer 1994) 56. 53 Maj. Gen. Jack Bellamy, ìCORONA HARVEST, End of Tour Reportî (Assistant Director Air

Operations MACV/J-3, COMUSSAG/7th Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, 15 August 1974).
26

Mekong

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

BURMA LAOS

CHINA

Hanoi

NORTH

VIETNAM

SOUTH

VIETNAM

Teaball

Nakohn Phanom AB

Radar Picket Ship

Red Crown

American

Strike Package

AEW & C

Disco

AEW & C

Disco

Luzon

Radio Relay Aircraft

Figure 6. A graphic representation of ìTeaballî operations in 1972. The 300-mile

line-of-sight UHF link to ìLuzon,î the KC-135 radio-relay aircraft, ended up being

the Achilles heel of ìTeaball.î (Authorís depiction with graphic design assistance of Mr. Daniel

Armstrong)

To get over the ill feelings pilots still felt towards intelligence and the ìgreen door

syndrome,î Lt. Col. Kirk personally briefed every wing in Southeast Asia on the

capabilities and workings of ìTeaball.î Pilots could not be told that some of the data

would come from COMINT, but Lt. Col. Kirk stated that they (the pilots) should ìpay

attention when I call you on your discrete UHF channel.î54 He made sure the pilots

understood that accurate data would be passed to them and they were to follow it. He did

this by stripping the collection data from the COMINT and ELINT and just telling pilots

approach vectors and pertinent threats.

 On 26 July 1972 ìTeaballî commenced operations.55 ëTeaballí daily operations

functioned like this: RC-135C/Ms orbited over Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin collecting

 

54 Maj. Gen. Doyle Larson, ìDirect Intelligence Support in Vietnam. Project ìTeaballî,î in American

Intelligence Journal (Spring/Summer 1994) pp. 56-58. 55 ìHistory of Linebacker Operations 10 May 1972 ñ 23 October 1972î (Tan Son Nhut AB: 7th Air Force,

undated), pp. 51-53.
27

both COMINT and ELINT. These data were passed, via a USAFSS squadron at NKP, to

ìTeaballísî operations room. U-2s also orbited over Laos and the Gulf at a very high

altitude passing their collected data to ìTeaball.î In the ìTeaballî operations room the

SIGINT data were collated with radar data from the EC-121 orbiting over Laos and the

Gulf of Tonkin, as well as with ground-based radar data. Using a data-link the U.S.

Navyís radar picket ship, ìRed Crown,î sent its radar picture and U.S. Navy SIGINT data

to ìTeaball.î Together these sources gave ìTeaballî access to all data forms being

collected real-time over North Vietnam. 

Once analyzed, warnings and intentions of the North Vietnamese air force were

sent via radio relay KC-135s to U.S. fighters flying over North Vietnam. In addition to

ìTeaball,î ìRed Crown,î in constant data-link communications with ìTeaball,î could

also send warnings directly to U.S. aircraft flying over North Vietnam. The basis of

ìTeaballísî success was the highly classified ìIron Horseî system, a computerized

system assimilating and displaying collected SIGINT data to a few cleared weapons

controllers in the ìTeaballî operations room. An NSA system, ìIron Horse,î was manned

by USAFSS personnel. It improved threat advisories issued by ìTeaball.î56 ìTeaballî

passed the data to U.S. aircrews in the same format used by ìRed Crownî and EC121Ks.57 This format made operations easier for the pilots who were used to calls being

made from a ìbullís eyeî point in North Vietnam. Bullís eye is an aviation term used to

help pilots pinpoint threats or traffic relative to their own positions. The data are passed

to the pilot in the form of a compass heading, speed, and vector. During Linebacker II

and before, the bullís eye was usually Hanoi. In recent operations bullís eye points have

been varied to avoid compromise. 

 

56 ìSoutheast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface,î Project CHECO (Hickam AFB: PACAF, 1 January

1975), p. 7.

57 ìRed Baron III,î Vol. III, Part 1, p. 88.
28

Teaball Net

RC-135M

(Combat Apple)

RC-135C

(Burning Pipe)

KC-135

(Radio Relay Aircraft)

Gulf of Tonkin

6906

Security

Squadron

Teaball

Nakon

Phanom

RTAFB

(Thailand)

6929

Security

Squadron

U-2

(Olympic Torch)

EC-121

(Disco)

EC-121M

(Big Look)

EA-3B

(Sea Wing USN Deep Sea)

Strikes Over

North Vietnam

CTF77

(Red Crown)

Gulf of Tonkin

Figure 7. The numerous feeds into ìTeaballî provided the near real-time data

necessary to defeat the North Vietnamese air force. (Authorís depiction with graphic design

assistance of Mr. Daniel Armstrong)

ìTeaballî provided critical GCI assistance in 16 of the 59 air-to-air engagements

during this period. From 29 July until the end of the war, U.S. aircraft shot down 30

MiGs while losing only 10 aircraft in air-to-air engagements. While other factors also

contributed, General Vogt commented that ìall these improvements did not work before

ìTeaballî but they all worked after ëTeaballí.î58 On 28 August 1972 ìTeaballî helped

Capt. Steve Richie in an F-4D score a kill on a MiG-21.59

Despite successes with ìTeaball,î there were some shortfalls with the system. The

intelligence information collated at ìTeaballî enabled the weapons controllers to provide

minute by minute plotting of North Vietnamese air force air activity. But the plots usually

ran a few minutes late (usually 2 minutes), due to delays in passing the information from

intelligence sources. Although near real-time, even one minute can be too late when

aircraft have 1000-knot closing speeds. Aircrew debriefs state that ìTeaballî information

was most useful in providing the early tip-off of enemy activity but was not useful during

engagements. Another problem with ìTeaballî was reliance on a KC-135 radio relay

aircraft to pass threat warning information; it proved to be the weak link in the network.

The radio relay gear on board the KC-135 experienced frequent outages, and ìTeaballî

 

58 Gen. John W. Vogt Jr., Project CHECO Interview (conducted by Claude Morita, 12 November 1972);

also ìHistory of Linebacker Operations, 10 May 1972 ñ 23 October 1972î (Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam:

Headquarters 7th Air Force, undated), pp. 68-69. 59 ìRed Baron III,î Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 99-102.
29

communications personnel spent weeks trying to obtain optimal frequencies.60 The fact

that a KC-135 radio relay system did not work is puzzling in light of the fact that SAC

used a series of EC-135 variants to maintain a complex multiple node communications

and datalink system over the U.S. for nuclear alert. These aircraft utilized some of the

same equipment installed on ìLuzonî radio relay aircraft.61 Claims that this radio relay

link was being disrupted by U.S. jamming aircraft were never substantiated.62 An

additional limitation was that the intelligence collection aircraft did not operate

continuously in support of ìTeaball.î Even with those limitations, aircrew comments

regarding ìTeaballî information were generally positive. After the U.S. withdrew from

active air operations in Vietnam, U.S. air operations over Cambodia were run from

ìTeaballî until after the Mayaguez rescue and the removal of U.S. forces from Thailand.

ìTeaballî possessed another feature that assisted in planning air operations: the

ability to replay engagements over North Vietnam. The radar plot data and intelligence

data collected were stored on magnetic tape and this feature allowed air commanders to

replay entire engagements or an entire dayís flying. It also allowed the commander of the

7th Air Force to monitor Chinese border violations. But most important for aircrew, it

allowed for post-mission analysis. All radar plots and SIGINT data could be displayed,

thus permitting American planners to judge the tactics and engagement criteria of their

North Vietnamese counterparts. This technical ability, now incorporated in most

command and control systems, is vital in designing new and better air tactics against foes.

The video replay feature also helped save lives; stored data allowed search and rescue

coordinators to pinpoint downed airmenís positions, thus narrowing the search and

response times to save shot-down crews.

Drone operations over North Vietnam, code named ìBuffalo Hunter,î were vital

for the imagery and ELINT data they were able to bring back. These unmanned drones

could fly over the most heavily defended targets in North Vietnam, saving aircrew and

aircraft from such dangerous missions. Launched outside of North Vietnamese air space,

the drones were controlled from a mother ship, a DC-130, and recovered in mid-air by

CH-3 helicopters. ìTeaball,î using intercepted North Vietnamese COMINT, was able to

prevent the interception of these drones by helping the drone control officer on board the

DC-130 mother ship. Since neither ìRed Crownî (U.S. Navy ship) nor ìDiscoî (USAF

EC-121K) radars could track the drone as it flew over North Vietnam, ìTeaballî

command and control capabilities relied on intercepted COMINT for success of these

missions.63

ìTeaballî shows that intelligence support to mission execution was valuable and

suggests obvious ways to apply it in the future. SIGINT operations incorporated into EC-

 

60 ìRadio Relay Operationsî (376th Strategic Wing message 020700Z Oct 72) and ìRadio Relay Backup

Capabilityî (Headquarters 7th Air Force messages 051045Z Jan 73 and 051136Z Jan 73) detail some of

the radio relay problems and the efforts undertaken to solve them. 

61 SAC flew a large number of EC-135s to command and control nuclear forces, but was unwilling to give

up any of these aircraft during the Vietnam war, due to their SIOP commitment.

62 See ìProject Red Baron,î Vol. III, Part 1. 63 ìSoutheast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface,î Project CHECO (Hickam AFB: PACAF, 1 January

1975), p. 40.
30

121K operations and the weapons center significantly enhanced the ability of the tactical

air control system to support the execution of tactical air operations over North Vietnam.

However, the fact that ìTeaballî was not established until 1972, in spite of earlier offers

from the NSA, is difficult to understand, but perhaps can be attributed to the gradual

escalation of the Vietnam War. A lack of understanding of intelligence systems and

capabilities prevented the establishment of an effective SIGINT support system until U.S.

losses over North Vietnam reached a painful threshold. But Vietnam did not end the

problem for Air Force operators. Classification of post-Vietnam operational data

prevents a candid review of all situations, but tidbits of after-action reports provide

evidence that problems continue to exist.

A Post Vietnam Sample of the Problem

Security considerations make it difficult to comment on or provide more than

sketchy details on recent SIGINT support. However, one small example illustrates a lack

of integration of SIGINT by the military. In 1986 the U.S. launched Operation EL

DORADO CANYON against Libya. The USAF portion of the mission involved a nearly

eight-hour flight from the United Kingdom to Libya by F-111 strike aircraft. During

those eight hours and, in spite of the fact that a RC-135 was on station supporting the

carrier task force off the coast of Libya, no updates were provided to the F-111s or EF111s. Considering the fact that the purpose of the strike was to attack terrorist targets

which are small and mobile, and that the strike force would face mobile surface-to-air

missile batteries, eight hours is an awfully long time to go without updating your target

intelligence.64

 

64 James P. Marshall, ìNear-Real-Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefieldî (Maxwell AFB: AU Press,

1994), p. 42.
31

Post-Vietnam and Analysis 

The ability to move signals intelligence data to aircraft cockpits has existed since

World War II. Without sophisticated electronic dissemination systems, 8th Air Force used

British and USAAF Y intelligence data to defeat the Luftwaffe in 1944/45. During World

War II the Radio Squadron Mobiles could decrypt vital data and pass information on to

operational controllers in about 20 minutes. While not real-time by todayís standards,

these data were still fresh enough to allow the Air Force to prevail over or defeat large

Luftwaffe concentrations. More importantly, the data allowed fighter-bombers to strafe

valuable targets, thus contributing to the German defeat in France. 

After great difficulty in starting SIGINT operations in Korea, the USAF finally

did use COMINT to achieve a decisive edge in aerial combat in Korea. By the time the

Cho-Do island operation began interception of SIGINT, data could be provided in

minutes. This was vital since air combat was now in the jet age and took place in fleeting

seconds rather than minutes. 

In Vietnam twenty years later, ìTeaballî could pass information faster, but

aircrews in Project Red Baron reports after the war said what ìTeaballî did was provide

better warning times. Once combat got close, most pilots relied on ìDisco,î the EC-121

AWACS, or ìRed Crown,î the Navy radar picket ship, to assist in the kill. Nevertheless

ìTeaballî did reduce the appalling losses of previous months in the Vietnam air war.

Project Red Baron was an Air Warfare Center study at Nellis AFB that documented all

air-to-air encounters over North Vietnam and analyzed the data for tactics and doctrine

improvements for the USAF fighter community. Begun during the Vietnam War, it was

completed in 1975 and contains the comprehensive data base on air-to-air encounters.

The ìgreen door syndrome,î a belief that valuable intelligence should be kept

from air force operators and decision makers, continues to haunt the Air Force and sister

services. Bureaucratic politics, lack of understanding, and a blindness to the new

battlefield -- especially when confronted with a shortened decision cycle -- have kept

changes in intelligence data distribution to a minimum. The underlying problems of

security clearance -- how much do you tell an operator, and do you compromise

intelligence sources by revealing certain data -- have remained with the U.S. military

until the present day. Efforts have been undertaken since DESERT STORM to increase

the number of people cleared for SIGINT data, and new multi-level access intelligence

systems are being developed to allow greater dissemination of the data. But bureaucratic

struggles take time and results to date have been mixed.

As the three historical examples show, signals intelligence plays a crucial role in

air operations, and technology continues to lead to further innovations in this field. Today

intelligence data are passed directly to fighters via a secure data link and displayed in the

cockpit on a ìheads upî display. This allows the pilot to be kept apprised of his target
32

while flying his mission. But task saturation -- that is, the workload in single-seat

aircraft -- and other technical and bureaucratic problems still need be solved. One

solution is to let someone else on the datalink cue the pilotís weapons to the target. This,

however, raises other problems such as bandwidth in current datalink technology.

A long-running problem that continues today is the compartmentalization of

intelligence gathered on a daily basis, in order to protect the sources and methods of

collection. Information must be sanitized, that is, stripped of information that indicates

its source and origin, before the intelligence community will give it to the operational

user. While a valid caution, this level of secrecy has fostered a feeling within the

operational community that the ìgood stuffî is kept behind the green door.

An additional problem that hurt the Air Force most in Korea is the fact that

linguists require a long time to train and that both the Air Force (and the other armed

services) and the National Security Agency often do not have trained personnel in the

right language when a crisis erupts. The lead time to train a linguist to do basic

translation is usually a year to eighteen months. To train someone to do voice intercept

with the level of proficiency required for a battlefield takes longer and probably cannot

be accomplished while a conflict is ongoing, although the duration of the Vietnam War

did allow linguists to be trained. Finding linguists for modern conflicts which are short in

duration is a far greater challenge, if not impossible. Building a robust signals

intelligence structure is an even greater challenge. Once the communication links are

intercepted and translated, specialist personnel are required to fuse the data with other

intelligence sources in order to make it useable by aircrews. These personnel must be

trained in peace time. Some of these challenges were met by starting a series of Green

Flag exercises at Nellis AFB akin to Red Flags, but they usually demonstrated

shortcomings and were rarely used as vehicles to fix identified problems.

Precision strike and SIGINT targeting are some of the innovations that make

SIGINT a dynamic force multiplier on the battlefield. Near-real-time processing of

signals intelligence, particularly for use by weapons capable of striking beyond the range

of organic sensors, is a new but effective use of SIGINT. While the shooterís organic

sensors, may be incapable of providing sufficient targeting information the more capable

intelligence sensors are under the control of different national intelligence organizations

and are often not available for use by theater commanders. Targeting must be a

combination of operations and intelligence assets working together. Decision cycles have

gotten significantly smaller on the modern battlefield, with increased automation of

command and control systems. SIGINT as the ears and, to a degree, the eyes of the

commander must be responsive to these needs. 

Speed in gathering, decrypting, and displaying data is vital for modern command

and control systems. Aircrews in the future may fly several missions a day. There will

be no time to do extensive target and threat study. The aircrew will have to rely on nearreal-time intelligence to update situational awareness en route to the target area.

Information on mobile targets must be passed to aircraft en route, and targeting data in

turn passed via aircraft computer to stand-off weapons.
33

The primary reason for the delay in using tactical SIGINT in Korea and Vietnam

was the national strategic-level focus of SIGINT collection during peacetime. The United

States feared a nuclear surprise attack more than any other threat during the Cold War,

thus virually all intelligence resources were devoted to this issue. After each conflict,

Korea and Vietnam, the signals intelligence community returned to examining the

strategic threat. Budgetary cuts, and lack of foreknowledge of which third world conflict

might require U.S. signals intelligence expertise, kept the U.S. signals intelligence

organizations from making far-reaching changes until the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Additional strains were a lack of familiarity and training with SIGINT by aircrews and

commanders, and security restrictions on releasing SIGINT information. Both of these

problems have not entirely disappeared. 

It may seem trite, but we keep identifying the same lesson. No matter how good

our intelligence product is, it is worthless unless we can get it to the commander in a

timely manner and in a useable form. Timeliness of near-real-time intelligence data plays

an even greater role on the 21st century battlefield. As the decision loops go from being

man-centric to machine- or automation-centric, better, faster, quality data is required to

allow aircraft and new weapons to attack and successfully destroy enemy targets.

Commanders, command and control networks, and aircrews themselves require better,

faster data in order to have situational awareness and to survive on the modern battlefield. 
35

Recommendations

1. Establish a better, more comprehensive training program and incorporate intelligence

training, showing limitations and capabilities, in all levels of USAF training.

2. Establish a true multi-level user-friendly intelligence system with common data bases

to allow all Air Force operational personnel access to intelligence data. The

intelligence community also needs to establish data bases which will merge with Air

Force planning systems. Eliminate overlapping and redundant systems.

3. Redraft charters of national-level intelligence agencies to reflect national and strategic

commitments, and wartime tactical missions. ìSupport to military operationsî sounds

like and frequently means ìno-support today GI.î

4. Redraft intelligence support plans so that SIGINT plays the key role that it can and

should play in military operations, especially for future weapons systems.

5. Play SIGINT wargames in ACSC/AWC level schools and model SIGINT futures in

Title 10 wargames.

6. Enhance operatorsí knowledge of intelligence through a userís book that is

unclassified to allow widest distribution. Restrictive manuals tend not to get read or

consulted.

7. Improve education and guidance to intelligence personnel on the best way to conduct

intelligence operations. Behind the ìgreen doorî no longer works.

8. Develop and refine doctrine to allow intelligence personnel and operators to work

simultaneously in supporting air operations. 

9. Increased collection capabilities require more analytical support, and qualified

linguists to meet 21st century contingencies.
37

Acknowledgements

A number of individuals made this study possible. At the Airpower Research

Institute, I would like to thank Col. Al Howey, Lt. Col. Eric Ash, Maj. Mark Grandstaff,

Dr. Jim Titus, Dr. Lee Dowdy, Dr. Dan Mortensen, and Dr. Ken Werrell. Ms. Cathy

Parker and Ms. Tawanda Eaves provided critical support in editing and illustrating the

manuscript. Mr. Daniel Armstrong at the Air University Press provided exceptional

graphic support. Dr. Dianne Putney from OSD/HO provided me with a copy of her

research into World War II SIGINT, and Mrs. Mary Silverstein, wife of Maj. Ted

Silverstein, who was the operations officer of the 3rd RSM (G) in World War II,

graciously provided her husbandís papers to make this research possible.

My research was aided by Mr. Milton Steele and Mr. Joe Craver of the Air Force

Historical Records Agency. The interlibrary loan staff at Air University Library headed

by Ms. Edith Williams was immensely helpful in obtaining countless books and

magazines. 

Most of all, this study was made possible by the support of my family: Sheila-Llyn,

Viktoria, and Alexandra.
38

The Author

Captain Gilles Van Nederveen is Associate Editor of the Aerospace Power Journal

at Maxwell AFB. A career intelligence officer, his previous assignments included RC135, E-8, and EC-130 flying tours. In addition to having served as an airborne

intelligence officer, he has also served as a political-military affairs officer, signals and

imagery analyst, and test engineer.
Air University

Donald A. Lamontagne, Lieutenant General, USAF, Commander

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

Bobby J. Wilkes, Colonel, USAF, Commander

Air Power Research Institute

James R. W. Titus, PhD, Dean of Research, Air University

Allan W. Howey, Colonel, USAF, Director