ARTILLERY

STRONG

Modernizing the Field Artillery

for the 21st Century

Boyd L. Dastrup, Ph.D.

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Cover image: The US Army Field Artillery branch insignia features two 

crossed field guns.
Artillery Strong

Modernizing the Field Artillery for the 21st Century

Boyd L. Dastrup

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

An imprint of The Army University Press
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dastrup, Boyd L., author. | Combat Studies Institute 

(U.S.). Press, publisher. | U.S. Army Field Artillery School.

Title: Artillery strong : modernizing the field artillery for the 

21st century / Boyd L. Dastrup.

Other titles: Operation Desert Storm and beyond | Modernizing 

the field artillery for the 21st century

Description: 1st edition. | Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Combat 

Studies Institute Press, [2018] | “US Army Field Artillery School 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma.” | Includes bibliographical references. 

Identifiers: LCCN 2018007419 (print) | LCCN 2018008403 

(ebook) | ISBN 9781940804255 | ISBN 9781940804255

Subjects: LCSH: Artillery, Field and mountain--United States-

-History--20th century. | Artillery, Field and mountain--United 

States--History--21st century. | United States. Army. Field Artillery-

-History.

Classification: LCC UA32 (ebook) | LCC UA32 .D375 2018 

(print) | DDC 358.1/2820973--dc23 | SUDOC D 110.2:AR 7

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018007419

2018

Editor

Diane R. Walker

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a wide 

variety of military topics. The views expressed in this CSI 

Press publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of 

Defense. A full list of digital CSI Press publications is available at http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/lde/csi/pubs.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an official publication of the CSI Press. It is prohibited to use the CSI’s official seal on 

any republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.

ii
iii

Preface

As the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat declined late in the 1980s 

and as the risk of low-intensity regional crises was simultaneously 

increasing, the United States dispatched military forces into Southwest Asia. This effort as part of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm was in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 

1990—to prevent further Iraqi aggression and protect American interests in the region. Operation Desert Storm validated the modernization of the Army’s heavy forces during the preceding two decades 

and simultaneously confirmed known field artillery deficiencies that 

needed to be corrected through further modernization to meet future 

military threats. 

The deficiencies highlighted by the Gulf War as well as the 

end of the Cold War and the escalating risk of regional crises generated interest in developing a strategically deployable and digitized Army able to fight across the spectrum of conflict anywhere 

in the world. Although the United States reduced both military 

spending and its military force and shifted funding from military 

to domestic programs following the demise of the Soviet threat in 

the 1990s, the Army and the Field Artillery still modernized their 

weapons and equipment.

As this modernization effort began producing substantive results, General Eric K. Shinseki, who became the Chief of Staff of 

the Army in June 1999, introduced his Transformation of the Army 

vision. Critical of the Army’s existing force structure as revealed by 

the difficulty of the 1999 Task Force Hawk deployment to Kosovo, 

General Shinseki pushed to improve the Army’s strategic mobility 

by equipping it with systems that possessed the robustness of Cold 

War heavy systems and the strategic deployability of light systems. 

Shinseki’s Transformation of the Army represented an explicit break 

with the ongoing modernization endeavor and its stress on light and 

heavy forces. It moved modernization in an entirely new direction 

with an emphasis on creating medium forces with the strategic mobility of the light forces and the staying power of the heavy forces 

while acquiring appropriate weapons and equipment. This effort 

continued under Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoo-
iv

maker, who adopted modularization, created brigade combat teams, 

and further developed new weapons and equipment. 

General Schoomaker’s modularization effort gave the Army 

the ability to deploy rapidly without creating temporary organizations and dramatically restructured the Army and the Field Artillery. However, the Global War on Terrorism during the first years 

of the 21st Century accelerated introduction of new field artillery 

systems and equipment; sped up the precision munition revolution; 

and transformed field artillery target acquisition, weapon platforms, 

support, and command and control. This study tells the story of the 

US Army’s Field Artillery from the Gulf War of 1991 through the 

first two decades of the 21st Century. 

This study originated as the US Army Field Artillery School 

published Operation Desert Storm and Beyond: Modernizing the 

Field Artillery in 2005. The 2005 edition covered field artillery developments during the 1990s. Major General (Retired) Fred F. Marty and Lieutenant General (Retired) David P. Valcourt, former US 

Army Field Artillery School Commandants, read the 2005 edition 

draft manuscript and made insightful comments. John Yager, who 

was on the ground floor for many of the combat developments as 

part of the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Sill, also 

provided solid comments regarding the 2005 draft manuscript.

With the passage of time, I decided to expand Operation Desert 

Storm and Beyond: Modernizing the Field Artillery by adding new 

material and retitling it as Artillery Strong: Modernizing the Field 

Artillery for the 21st Century. I revised chapters one and two from 

the original edition and wrote three additional chapters that examine 

developments since 1999 as well as an epilogue. Major General (Retired) David C. Ralston, former Assistant Commandant and Commandant of the US Army Field Artillery School, and Colonel (Retired) 

Frank J. Siltman, former Director of the Directorate of Training and 

Doctrine in the US Army Field Artillery School and current Director 

of Fort Sill’s Museum Directorate, read all five chapters of the Artillery Strong draft manuscript and made invaluable suggestions to improve the narrative. Both had firsthand experience with the dynamic 

changes in the Field Artillery during the latter 1990s as well as the 
v

first years of the 21st Century. I also acknowledge Ken Gott’s staff 

on the Research and Books Team at the Combat Studies Institute for 

their perceptive comments and recommendations for changes. Dr. 

Don Wright and Diane Walker did excellent work with editing the 

narrative. Any errors in fact are mine. 

Boyd L. Dastrup, Ph.D.

US Army Field Artillery School

Fort Sill, Oklahoma 
vi
vii

Contents page

Preface ........................................................................................... iii

Chapter 1: The Collision of Armed Forces .....................................1

The Short War .............................................................................1

Confronting the Deficiencies ....................................................18

Chapter 2: A New but Still Dangerous World ...............................31

A New World, Budget Reductions, and Restructuring .............31

Modernizing Field Artillery Systems ........................................37

New Doctrine for a New Age ....................................................49

Louisiana Maneuvers, Battle Laboratories, & Force XXI ........55

The Digital Puzzle .....................................................................63

The Army After Next ................................................................69

Chapter 3: Transforming the Force ...............................................93

The Beginnings .........................................................................93

Changing of the Guard ............................................................110

Systems for Transformation ....................................................118

Chapter 4: A New Century and the War on Terrorism ................145

Global War on Terrorism and the Field Artillery ....................146

Time of Reflection ..................................................................159

The Insurgency and the Field Artillery ...................................167

Chapter 5: More Modernization .................................................203

Lethal and Nonlethal Targeting ...............................................203

Munitions, Platforms, and Command and Control .................220

Force Structure and Doctrine ..................................................234

Epilogue: Into the Future ............................................................257

Glossary ......................................................................................267

Select Bibliography .....................................................................271

About the Author .........................................................................283
viii
ix

Figures page

Figure 1: Operation Desert Storm map. ...........................................7

Figure 2: M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. .............45

Figure 3: Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. ..........97

Figure 4: M109A6 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. ........109

Figure 5: Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. ..........................................126

Figure 6: Operation Iraqi Freedom map. .....................................149

Figure 7: Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicle. ..............164

Figure 8: M777 towed 155-millimeter howitzer. ........................170

Figure 9: AN/TPQ-50 countermortar radar. .................................205

Figure10: M1117 Armored Security Vehicle. ..............................209

Figure 11: Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder. ...............211

Figure 12: M119A2 towed 105-millimeter howitzer. ..................226

Figure 13: M109 Paladin Integrated Management howitzer. .......229

Figure 14: M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System. ................233
x
1

Chapter 1 

The Collision of Armed Forces

In the 1970s, the US Army began an extensive modernization 

endeavor focused on preparing it for combat against the numerically 

superior and well-equipped Soviet-led Warsaw Pact threat. Just as 

that effort reached fruition, Iraqi military forces invaded Kuwait in 

1990. The unanticipated invasion led to Operation Desert Shield of 

1990 and Operation Desert Storm of 1991. For the Field Artillery, 

Operation Desert Storm tested the effectiveness of the modernization effort that was underway.

The Short War

Following the Iraqi invasion, the United States and United Nations initiated Operation Desert Shield in August 1990 to defend 

Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack. Over a period of seven 

months, the Army deployed more than 500,000 active and reserve 

component Soldiers with their equipment and weapons to Southwest Asia as part of a massive Coalition military buildup. When 

Saddam Hussein failed to withdraw his forces from Kuwait by the 

15 January 1991 deadline established by President George H. Bush 

and supported by Congress and the United Nations, US-led Coalition forces from 36 nations launched Operation Desert Storm on 17 

January 1991 to drive Iraqi military forces out of Kuwait. That day, 

eight AH-64 Apache attack helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) destroyed two Iraqi radar facilities with Hellfire 

laser-guided missiles to permit allied bombers to penetrate Iraqi air 

space more easily. The attack was the first in an impressive air campaign that lasted through 23 February 1991 and systematically crippled Iraqi war-making capabilities by demolishing critical targets 

and neutralizing Republican Guard units and other ground units.1

While the January and February 1991 air campaign was shaping the battlefield for the ground war to follow, Coalition ground 

forces prepared for combat. Over a period of three weeks beginning 

on 17 January 1991, the Army shifted two corps and approximately 
2

65,000 armored and support vehicles from defensive positions in 

eastern Saudi Arabia to a forward assembly area west of Hafar al 

Batin. This massive buildup effectively positioned the Army for 

an aggressive offensive against Iraqi military forces that were arrayed on the battlefield in three distinct echelons along the Soviet 

model. The first echelon consisted of 15 poorly trained, ill-disciplined, ineptly led, and eclectically equipped infantry divisions that 

stretched from the Persian Gulf Coast about 200 miles inland. Behind these infantry divisions stood the second echelon of six regular 

armored divisions equipped with second-line Soviet armament and 

Third World systems. Their mission was to conduct division-level 

counterattacks against any allied penetration. Forming the greatest 

threat, Republican Guard units composed the third echelon. Originally an elite palace guard of two brigades, the Republican Guards 

had grown to 28 combat brigades by 1990 and possessed the most 

modern equipment of the Iraqi ground forces. Deployed well to the 

north, the Guard units were situated to serve as a strategic counterattack force and could be quickly withdrawn to Iraq if necessary to 

prevent their destruction.2

 Throughout the air campaign and the shifting of forces, the 

Field Artillery played a key role in protecting friendly aircraft from 

hostile air missile defense sites. Two days after the air war began 

on 15 January 1991, A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery 

Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Maples 

was moving westward along a busy two-lane Tapline Road—not anticipating any combat action on its way to its tactical assembly area 

as part of the US VII Corps movement. Around 1620 hours that day, 

the battery received a fire mission to destroy a surface-to-air missile 

site in Kuwait in support of B-52 bombing raids. First the Soldiers 

completed essential coordination with the Army and Air Force to 

ensure no friendly aircraft would be in the flight path of an Army 

Tactical Missile System, a long-range field artillery missile. Then at 

0042 hours on 18 January 1991, the battery launched two missiles 

that destroyed the surface-to-air missile site. Later that day, the same 

battery fired six more missiles to neutralize other surface-to-air missile sites. Besides supporting B-52 raids, these missions made A 

Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment the first US VII 
3

Corps unit to fire in anger since World War II.3

Over the next month, Army field artillery participated in other 

combat actions to pave the way for the ground war. Field artillery 

units conducted numerous “shoot and scoot” raids to neutralize or 

destroy surface-to-surface or surface-to-air missile sites and reduce 

the risk to friendly forces. The US VII Corps and US XVIII Airborne Corps frequently moved field artillery units into hostile territory where they could easily range high-payoff targets. Upon reaching hostile territory, the designated firing batteries would unleash a 

few salvos and then immediately change positions to avoid enemy 

field artillery fire. Meanwhile, a “silent battery” would remain ready 

to deliver fires on any enemy field artillery that dared to engage 

the raiding force. If such fire was not required, the “silent battery” 

would fire at the high-payoff target and depart quickly. When it became evident that Iraqi field artillery could not find them, the raiding 

batteries stayed in position and even closed their range to deliver 

killing fires on enemy forward positions, field artillery emplacements, command posts, air defense facilities, and supply depots.4

On 13 February 1991, B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th 

Field Artillery Regiment—a Multiple Launch Rocket System unit 

assigned to the 42d Field Artillery Brigade that supported the 1st 

Cavalry, 1st Infantry (Mechanized), and 3d Armored Divisions during Operation Desert Storm—and A Battery, 21st Field Artillery 

Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System), 1st Cavalry Division 

participated in a field artillery raid under the control of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. The three Multiple Launch Rocket System 

batteries lit up the night sky when they fired rockets on targets that 

had been generated from US VII Corps and 1st Cavalry Division 

intelligence and targeting assets. At ranges of 21 to 30 kilometers, 

they engaged 24 targets with almost 300 rockets in less than five 

minutes.5 This action, in the words of one US VII Corps commander, gave the batteries “valuable experience firing under combat conditions” and prepared them for ground combat action to follow.6

After completing preparations that included field artillery raids 

and cross-border patrols into no-man’s land, the ground war opened 

on 24 February 1991. That day, American and Allied ground forces 

attacked along a line that stretched from the Persian Gulf westward 
4

about 300 miles into the desert with the major thrusts coming on the 

flanks and a feint in the center. On the extreme left flank of the line, 

the US XVIII Airborne Corps—composed of the 6th French Light 

Division, 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air 

Assault), 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and commanded by Lieutenant General Gary E. 

Luck—invaded deep into Iraq to isolate the enemy and prevent reinforcements. They reached the Euphrates River Valley within days 

after the offensive started. Deployed on the right of the US XVIII 

Airborne Corps, the US VII Corps—consisting of the 1st Armored 

Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3d Armored Division, 1st 

Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1st British Armoured Division and led by Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr.—executed a massive wheeling maneuver north and east to encircle Iraqi 

forces and moved into a blocking position on 27 February 1991 

along the highway connecting Al Basrah and Kuwait City. In the 

meantime, the Joint Forces Command North composed of Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi Arabian military forces on the right of US 

VII Corps and in the center of the Allied line pushed beyond the 

Kuwaiti-Saudi border barriers toward Wadi al Batin to deceive the 

enemy into believing that a frontal assault was underway and then 

turned eastward. To the right of the Joint Forces Command North 

on the extreme Allied right flank stood the US Marines Central 

Command and the Joint Forces Command East respectively. As the 

Allies threatened amphibious landings along the coast, the 1st Brigade (Tiger) from the Army’s 2d Armored Division, the 1st and 2d 

Marine Divisions of the US Marines Central Command, and Saudi 

forces from the Joint Forces Command East crossed the eastern part 

of Kuwait’s southern border and drove toward Kuwait City. Within 

100 hours of the initial 24 February 1991 attacks, Allied ground 

forces employed aggressive combined arms operations; they routed 

Iraqi military forces and liberated Kuwait, causing the Coalition to 

halt all offensive operations on 28 February 1991 and end the war.

7

Although it was a short war, Operation Desert Storm tested the 

Army’s modernization effort. The Persian Gulf War revealed that 

doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel designed 

during the 1970s and 1980s for combat against Soviet and Warsaw 
5

Pact military forces produced a competent and well-equipped army.8

In July 1991 just a few months after the Gulf War ended, the 

Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, addressed Field Artillery modernization. In a report to the Director of the Center of 

Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, school officials 

recounted the effectiveness of field artillery doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel during combat operations.9

Despite significantly higher numbers of Iraqi field artillery pieces, 

many of which had superior ranges to American field artillery, the 

Army’s field artillery system of systems (target acquisition; command, control, communications, and computers; support and sustainment; and weapons and munitions) furnished overpowering fire 

superiority with massed fires (converging fires from many field artillery pieces, generally one or more battalions of 24 field pieces each, 

on a single target to inflict as much damage as possible). Such fires 

destroyed the enemy’s target acquisition capabilities, silenced enemy indirect fire systems (field artillery and mortars) through counterfire (field artillery fires delivered to suppress enemy field artillery 

or mortars to prevent them from interfering with the movement of 

friendly forces), and provided timely close support (field artillery 

fires designed to engage enemy forces, generally infantry or armor, 

blocking the advance of friendly forces) to maneuver commanders 

to allow them to move their forces with minimum disruption from 

enemy direct fires. Massed fires also cleared routes for friendly aircraft by engaging known and suspected air defense artillery sites.10

According to the Field Artillery School, Operation Desert Storm 

clearly underscored the value of the massed fires doctrine. In an April 

1991 Field Artillery article, Colonel David A. Rolston, who commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery for two 

years, evaluated the impact of massed fires on enemy troops and 

equipment. Rolston, who gave up command of the artillery unit in 

December 1990 to become Field Artillery School Deputy Assistant 

Commandant, wrote, “Training prior to the deployment and the operation itself reinforced that the Army should not dilute fire support 

by ‘nickel and diming’ the effort with fires on small and relatively 

insignificant targets. Hit the high-payoff targets with massed fires.”11

 Brigadier General (Retired) Paul F. Pearson, who served in 
6

various key positions in the Field Artillery School in the 1970s, and 

General (Retired) Glenn K. Otis, the former Commanding General of 

the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, concurred with Colonel Rolston’s incisive assessment. General Pearson and General Otis 

wrote that the massive use of field artillery fires paved the way for the 

rapid victory.12 They noted that the Americans and Allies employed 

field artillery fire support “in Desert Storm to the maximum in order 

to minimize the number of effective enemy units that our Soldiers in 

tanks and infantry fighting vehicles had to take on at close range.”13

In after action reports, maneuver commanders expressed similar thoughts about massed fires. In a 15 May 1991 letter to the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J. 

Hallada (1987–1991), about the US VII Corps’ 24 February 1991 

breaching operation, the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry 

Division, Major General Thomas G. Rhame, related: 

The performance of the Field Artillery in combat has 

caused all of us to remember what we had perhaps forgotten, namely its incredible destructive power and shock effect. The preparation fires I witnessed prior to our assault 

on the breachline were the most incredible sight I have 

seen in 27 years of service. The firepower generated by 

my DIVARTY [division artillery], the 42d, 75th and 142d 

FA [Field Artillery] Bdes [brigades] and the artillery of 

the 1st British Armoured Division was truly awesome.14

General Rhame’s comments about the impact of massed fires 

were understandable. Notwithstanding the 1983 Urgent Fury against 

the insurgents in Grenada and 1989 Just Cause in Panama against 

Manuel Noriega and his followers, the Army’s last extensive fighting experience came in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s. During that effort, fire support was generally decentralized at the battery level. To furnish fires for a particular maneuver unit’s area of 

operations and provide the maximum area coverage, the Army often 

located a battery with its supported infantry battalion on a fire base 

within range of another fire base for mutual fire support. With few 

exceptions, this dispersed battlefield organization precluded massing fire on a target from a battalion of three batteries let alone di-
7

vision artillery. Given this combat experience and the inability to 

replicate massed fires in peacetime training exercises at the Combat 

Training Centers, General Rhame and few Army officers witnessed 

or really understood the influence of massed fires until Operation 

Desert Storm.15

Ahvaz











 





 



JOINT FORCES

COMMAND NORTH

French 6th Light Division

MARINE CENTRAL

COMMAND

JOINT FORCES

COMMAND EAST



82d Airborne Division

24th Infantry Division

3d Armored

Cavalry Regiment

2d Armored

Cavalry Regiment 1st Infantry

Division

1st Cavalry

Division

1st Armored Division

3d Armored

Division

U.K. 1st Armoured Division

XVIII ABN CORPS

ARMY CENTRAL

COMMAND

VII CORPS

54th Special Forces

Group (Airborne)

2d Marine

Division

1st Marine

D vi ision

Arab Forces

Coalition

Forces

Coalition

Forces

Hafar al Batin

Ra’s al Khaji

Al Mish’ab

Al Ahmadi

As Salimayah

KUWAIT CITY

Al Jahrah

Ash Shabakah

As Salman

As Samawah

An Nasiriyah

Al Busayyah

Al Basrah

Az Zubayr

Umm Qasr

Bubiyan

Island

AS SALMAN

TALLIL

AL BASRAH WEST JALIBAH

KING KHALID MILITARY CITY

AL QAYSUMAH

SAFWAN

Khomamshahr

Abadan

Tigres River

Persian

Gulf

Al Burqan

Oil Field

Ar Rawdalayn

Oil Field

Ar Rumaylah

Oil Field

Sabiriyah

Oil Field

Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

Iraq Iran

Operation DESERT STORM

24–28 February 1991

Allied Advance, Phase 1

Allied Advance, Phase 2

Allied Advance, Phase 3

Allied Advance, Phase 4

Unit positions approximate

0 500 1000 1500 2000 and Above

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 40

miles

Airfield Roadblock

RAFHA

101st Airborne Division

AHMAD AL JABER

Al Wafrah

Arab Forces

1st Brigade 2d Armored Division

Figure 1: Operation Desert Storm map. Source: US Army Center of Military History.
8

Perhaps, the strongest endorsement about this impressive display of massed fires came from the Commander of the US VII Corps 

Artillery, Brigadier General Creighton Abrams Jr., and the Commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Colonel 

Michael L. Dodson. On 24 February 1991 in support of the US VII 

Corps assault, General Abrams allocated the 42d, 75th, and 142d 

Field Artillery Brigades, two division artilleries, and 10 Multiple 

Launch Rocket System batteries to create a Soviet-style attack at the 

breach area. General Abrams positioned approximately 22 artillery 

pieces for each kilometer of the attack zone. Prior to the attack, more 

than 350 field artillery pieces fired 11,000 rounds and 414 Multiple 

Launch Rocket System rockets in a field artillery preparation that 

lasted 30 minutes. Besides crushing Iraqi morale, this massed fire 

destroyed 50 tanks, 139 armored personnel carriers, and 152 field 

artillery pieces.16 Accurate and deadly massed field artillery fires 

crushed the enemy, destroyed its will to fight, and permitted the 1st 

Infantry Division (Mechanized) to roll virtually unopposed through 

the breach area.17 As the assault force moved forward to conduct the 

breach, there was no break in field artillery fire between the preparation and the fires in support of the movement.18

Colonel Dodson added his thoughts on the shock of massed 

fires that day. He reflected in a 25 March 1991 memorandum to the 

Commanding General of the US VII Corps, General Frederick M. 

Franks Jr.: “This is likely the first time in military history that an 

artillery preparation for a deliberate breaching operation has been 

so comprehensive that not one Soldier lost his life during the operation.”19 After noting the mass and speed of his division’s field 

artillery actions throughout the brief war and the breaching operation in particular, Colonel Dodson addressed the significance of fire 

support. He pointed out: “Following our artillery fires, not a single 

round of [enemy] artillery counterfire was received,” an indication 

that friendly field artillery did not have to worry about counterfire 

because enemy field artillery had been neutralized.20

As 1st Armored Division Artillery representatives also observed after the war, massed fires against enemy indirect fire systems and close support of friendly maneuver forces reflected the US 

VII Corps commander’s intent. In numerous warfighter seminars 
9

and training exercises conducted prior to the war, commanders emphasized firepower’s key role in defeating the enemy. “Pound them 

to jelly with fire support and then roll over them with maneuver” 

formed the core of their thinking.21 Command post exercises drilled 

battering the objective with fire support from air interdiction, close 

air support, attack helicopters, and field artillery then following up 

with aggressive maneuver assaults.22

Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps artillery also provided a 

compelling example of massed fires. After relative inactivity overnight, the corps renewed its attack early in the morning of 25 February 1991. The 18th Field Artillery Brigade and the 6th Battalion, 27th 

Field Artillery Regiment fired 10 brigade volleys on a series of enemy targets, including field artillery. “The brilliant MLRS [Multiple 

Launch Rocket System] fires lit the sky and invigorated our Soldiers 

as much as it disheartened the enemy,” reported Lieutenant Colonel 

Patrick C. Sweeney, the corps artillery operations officer.23 This firing 

broke the spirit of the enemy resistance. When asked why they surrendered, interrogated Iraqi prisoners of war pled, “No more rockets.”24

One captured enemy officer also related the effect of the day’s 

massed fires. He stated that moments after his battery fired a mission, Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions rained down 

on his position, destroying most of his weapons and killing two 

thirds of his soldiers. He added that the remainder of his soldiers 

immediately deserted their guns.25

One day later on 26 February 1991, the 42d Field Artillery 

Brigade commanded by Colonel Morris J. Boyd delivered massing fires in the VII Corps sector. “The advance continued at a brisk 

pace through the day meeting with only scattered, generally uncoordinated resistance,” Colonel Boyd and Captain Randy Mitchell, 

an assistant operations officer for the brigade, wrote.26 At dusk the 

situation abruptly changed. The 3d Armored Division, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) smashed headlong into elements of three Iraqi armored 

units. “In a furious night battle that followed, the Brigade found its 

assets heavily committed,” Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell reported.27 The brigade’s 3rd Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment 

and the 2nd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment massed fires 
10

from their M109A2A3 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzers in 

support of the M109A2A3s of the 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment, the 4th Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment, and 

2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment of the 3d Armored Division. Meanwhile the brigade’s 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery 

Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) provided rocket fires 

in a general support role. By dawn of 27 February 1991, the triple 

punch of close air, accurate and timely massed field artillery fires, 

and aggressive maneuver had broken the back of the Iraqi forces in 

the US VII Corps sector.28

In an after action report of the 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery 

Regiment of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade commanded by Colonel Floyd T. Banks and attached to the US XVIII Airborne Corps, 

leaders expressed comparable thoughts about massed fire later that 

day. On the evening of 27 February 1991, the 2d Battalion, 18th 

Field Artillery Regiment; the 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade; and the 3d Battalion, 27th 

Field Artillery Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

artillery received an emergency fire mission from the division’s lead 

brigade that was receiving incoming fire from the Hammurabi Republican Guard Force Command. The three field artillery battalions 

massed fires and crushed enemy resistance.29

The 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Regiment operations officer, Captain Alfred K. Grey II, furnished an even more descriptive 

account of that particular fight. As his unit was moving north in support of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the division’s lead 

elements began receiving incoming fire from the Hammurabi Republican Guards, forcing the division to respond. “We were the first unit 

in the 212th Brigade. . .to engage the target,” Captain Grey recalled.30

“Within 2 minutes and 10 seconds, we occupied hasty firing positions 

and fired our first volley. Our fires, massed with 2/17 FA [Field Artillery] and 3/27 FA [Field Artillery] on enemy armor and infantry positions caused mass casualties and a collapse of enemy resistance.”31

Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, eight-inch howitzer rounds, 

and 155-millimeter howitzer rounds wiped out the enemy forces.32

Field Artillery articles written by other Operation Desert Storm 

participants reached the same conclusion about massed fires. Major 
11

Mark S. Jensen of the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment 

of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade said that his battalion repeatedly 

massed Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets on enemy formations in support of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), or the 3d Armored Division to defeat the enemy 

decisively during the course of the ground war.33 Major Kenneth P. 

Graves of the US XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery described how the 

1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery Regiment of the West Virginia 

Army National Guard; the 1st Battalion, 181st Field Artillery Regiment of the Tennessee Army National Guard; and the 1st Battalion, 623d Field Artillery Regiment of the Kentucky Army National 

Guard also reaffirmed the value of massed fires.34 In the October 

1991 Field Artillery, Major Graves noted that the 18th and 212th 

Field Artillery Brigades and the 24th Infantry Division Artillery 

massed nine battalions in the early morning hours of the final day 

of the war in preparation to destroy the Hammurabi RGFC [Republic Guard Force Command] Armored Division.35 In light of these 

critiques and others, the Field Artillery School confidently briefed 

senior field artillery officers at a training seminar after the war “that 

massed fires are devastating.”36

As field artillery officers explained in after action reports, 

massed fires provided effective counterfire and close support in Operation Desert Storm in accordance with accepted doctrine. Fire support doctrine was developed by Major General David E. Ott while he 

was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 

1973 to 1976 and codified in Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support in 

Combined Arms Operations (1976), as a vital part of the modernization effort to make the Army more effective in a high-intensity war 

in Europe. The approach gave a single individual the authority to 

manage all field artillery fires in a corps. The force commander had 

the prerogative to employ corps and division artillery in the more 

important battle—counterfire or close support—depending upon the 

circumstances. The new fire support doctrine centralized command 

and control of field artillery fires more than previously, permitted 

field artillery resources to be directed more effectively against the 

gravest threat, and ended the confusing practice of dividing counterbattery work among the corps, the division, and even the direct 
12

support battalion. Equally as important, Field Manual 6-20 stressed 

the importance of massed fires to defeat the enemy.37

In the October 1991 Field Artillery, the Commandant of the 

Field Artillery School, Major General Fred F. Marty (1991–1993), 

discussed his observations about the effectiveness of counterfire in 

the Gulf War. He noted that Firefinder radars developed in the 1970s 

and fielded in the 1980s rapidly identified enemy targets and sent the 

data digitally or verbally to the guns. Then units used cannon and 

Multiple Launch Rocket System assets to silence Iraqi artillery by 

delivering “convincing” fires.38

Others made similar assessments about counterfire. A 1st Armored Division Artillery field artillery officer related, “In particular, 

we relied on the MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System] as the 

primary counterfire weapon system and in this role we were able to 

effectively silence all enemy artillery that fired at us.”39 A 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) field artillery officer likewise reported 

that artillery gunnery “synchronized [the] delivery of fires and effectively denied the enemy the freedom to maneuver while protecting the Victory Division’s capability to do so [with counterfire].”40

Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade assigned to US XVIII Airborne Corps indicated Iraqis referred 

to the field artillery rocket barrages as “iron rain.”41

The 42d Field Artillery Brigade intelligence officer also offered comments about the 26 February 1991 battle, during which 

the 3d Armored Division destroyed the Tawakalna Mech division 

and the 42d Field Artillery fired to suppress or destroy at least 60 

tubes of enemy artillery.42 He noted that the AH-64s received little 

response from Iraqi antiaircraft artillery or air defense artillery. The 

intelligence officer concluded, “The absence of enemy artillery. . 

.throughout the war indicates the effectiveness of US artillery. . . . 

Friendly direct fire units were never hampered by enemy artillery 

throughout the war.”43

Similarly, Colonel Garrett D. Bourne, Commander of the 210th 

Field Artillery Brigade attached to US VII Corps, wrote that the Multiple Launch Rocket System “proved to be indispensable in engaging the enemy out to great distances, allowing the maneuver units to 

become decisively engaged.”44 Along the same lines, 1st Armored 

Division Artillery leaders commented that the Multiple Launch 
13

Rocket System “performed superlatively” in its first combat test and 

added that they used it “as the primary counterfire weapon system 

and in this role we were able to effectively silence all enemy artillery 

that fired against us.”45 Fighting as part of US VII Corps, the division’s field artillery fired a 15-minute preparation of 192 Multiple 

Launch Rocket System rockets and 720 155-millimeter rounds on 

24 targets during the 26 February 1991 battle. When US VII Corps 

subsequently attacked, 1st Armored Division Artillery and other 

field artillery units repeatedly shifted fires to engage enemy field 

artillery to permit the maneuver forces to advance. During one twohour counterfire engagement on the afternoon of 27 February 1991, 

the 1st Armored Division’s field artillery fired 288 rockets and 480 

eight-inch rounds at 21 enemy field artillery positions. On average, 

American counterfire engaged enemy field artillery of the Medinah 

Division of the Republican Guard Army within six minutes after the 

enemy guns were acquired by a Firefinder Q-36 or Q-37 radar that 

day. Battle damage assessment after the war credited field artillery 

units with destroying 70 enemy field artillery tubes or their crews 

during this particular counterfire fight.46

In the meantime, the 3d Armored Division’s field artillery and 

reinforcing field artillery repeatedly provided counterfire on 26 February 1991. Supporting the 3d Armored Division’s second brigade, 

the 4th Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment and the 3d Battalion, 

20th Field Artillery Regiment of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade engaged enemy bunker complexes early in the evening to permit the 

maneuver arms to continue their advance with minimal resistance. 

Later, a Q-36 radar acquired active enemy indirect fire systems that 

the division’s field artillery subsequently destroyed by counterfire. 

Shortly after this action, a Q-36 radar located more enemy field artillery; then three 42d Field Artillery Brigade battalions—the 2d Battalion 3d Field Artillery, 2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, and 1st27th Field Artillery, massed fires to silence the enemy artillery.”47

Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, Commanding General of 

the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), referred to 212th Field 

Artillery Brigade efforts and the unit’s after action report during 

a 31 March 1992 briefing to the Field Artillery Conference at the 

Field Artillery School. He underscored the overriding significance 

of counterfire on the ground war: “First priority of FA [field artil-
14

lery] is to win the counterfire battle.”48

After reviewing after action reports, the Field Artillery School 

concurred with Major General McCaffrey and the 212th Field Artillery Brigade’s conclusions about the efficacy of counterfire. In 

a supportive appraisal of counterfire doctrine, the school noted, 

“The most important lesson here is that an aggressive proactive CB 

[counterbattery] policy pays tremendous dividends.”49 The school 

then noted, “The Firefinder family of radars was invaluable in detecting targets [indirect fire systems] and adjusting fire onto hostile 

positions [field artillery].”50

While counterfire was decisive, efforts to shift massed fires 

around the battlefield also played a pivotal role in furnishing close 

support to the maneuver arms and reinforcing the fire support team’s 

importance for coordinating close air support, naval gunfire, mortars, and field artillery for the maneuver commander. If it functioned as intended, the fire support team—a concept developed in 

the 1970s—would provide the maneuver commander with close fire 

support when and where he needed it. Along with counterfire, proactive and responsive close support would permit friendly maneuver 

forces to make contact with less effective enemy forces.51

Many field artillery officers observed firsthand the effect of 

close support. In a draft article on the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s operations during the war, Major John Klemencic and Captain John Thomson discussed their unit’s fire support as part of the 

US VII Corps’ offensive. From 24 to 26 February 1991, the regiment’s field artillery repeatedly shifted massed fires to strike dismounted Iraqi infantry and field artillery that had been acquired by 

Q-37 radars. During the Battle of 73 Easting on 26 February 1991, 

for example, the 6th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment of the 

210th Field Artillery Brigade shot more than 700 rounds at enemy 

targets in a direct support role to the 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Reflecting on its overall combat action in the Gulf, 

the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s unit history applauded friendly 

field artillery for furnishing responsive and effective close support.52

On the morning of 26 February 1991, the 1st Armored Division 

under US VII Corps experienced the same kind of close fire support. The division approached Al Busayyah and then turned toward 
15

the Medinah Division of the Republican Guards situated about 100 

kilometers to the east. As the division closed within 50 kilometers 

of the Medinah’s main position, the division’s intelligence (G-2) officer identified an enemy blocking position and sent the information 

to the division’s field artillery, which struck it with Multiple Launch 

Rocket System rockets. The same intelligence officer later picked up 

a second blocking position approximately 15 kilometers beyond the 

first. Again, the division’s field artillery bombarded the enemy with 

rockets. Specifically, the 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment in support of the 1st Armored Division recorded in an after 

action report about numerous massing fires on 26 and 27 February 1991 to support the maneuver forces. With support from 8-inch 

and 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers and massed rocket 

fires—called “Firestrike” by the battalion—the division attacked 65 

armored vehicles on 27 February 1991; they neutralized about 50 

percent of them according to Apache helicopters that assaulted the 

vehicles afterward and saw 25 to 30 burning.53

The 3d Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment of the 42d 

Field Artillery Brigade described comparable action on 26 February 

1991. After linking up with the 3d Armored Division and receiving a 

reinforcing mission to support the division’s 4th Battalion, 82d Field 

Artillery Regiment, the 3d Battalion moved east toward Iraqi positions. After making contact with the enemy, the division stopped and 

called for field artillery fires. In support of the division’s field artillery, the 3d Battalion opened up fire from its self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzers. Following this attack of more than 1,000 rounds, 

close air support from A-10s and attack helicopters hit the enemy.54

As might be expected, other field artillery officers furnished similar appraisals about the effectiveness of close support. The 2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade 

recounted providing many battalion massed fires on the evening of 26 

February 1991 in support of the 3d Armored Division in the US VII 

Corps sector. Following the war, the 2d Battalion recorded:

The battle raged throughout the evening and night with 

direct fire engagements, attack helicopters, CAS [close air 

support] and artillery raining steel on the Tawakalna. HE 
16

[high explosive shell] and white phosphorous proved particularly effective in the neutralization and destruction of 

the bunker complexes and associated ammunition caches 

as attested by the spectacular secondary explosions.55

In a report to the division G-3 (operations), the Commander of 

the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Colonel Ronald E. 

Townsend, wrote about his experience with close support. He noted:

Throughout the entire operation, artillery fire was timely, 

accurate, and lethal. . . . This is a tribute to the Soldiers on 

the gun line, forward observers, and fire direction centers. 

The artillery gunnery chain synchronized delivery of fires 

and effectively denied the enemy freedom to maneuver 

while protecting the Victory Division’s [24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)] capability to. . .[maneuver].56

On 17 June 1991, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade dispatched 

a memorandum to General Hallada about the unit’s combat actions. 

“Never before was this [the effectiveness of close support] more 

evident than in Iraq and Kuwait as the brigade provided accurate 

and timely fires to the maneuver forces,” the brigade reported.57

Along the same lines the 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) in the 75th Field Artillery 

Brigade attached to the US VII Corps wrote:

The dawn of this day [28 February 1991] saw our. . .brigade unleash it’s (sic) full combat power in a final prep to 

destroy remaining Iraqi units. . . . We had in effect set up 

a firing assembly line. SPLLs [Multiple Launch Rocket 

System Self-Propelled Loader/Launchers] would fire, 

drive up to new rocket pods, reload, and go right back out 

to fire again. This ritual was performed over and over.58

From the unit’s perspective, rocket and cannon fires furnished effective close support and helped destroy the Iraqi army.59

Upon succeeding Major General Hallada as the Commandant 

of the Field Artillery School in July 1991, Major General Marty described the contribution of close support in an October 1991 Field 

Artillery article:
17

Massed artillery fires provided the maneuver commander 

combat power at the time and place he needed it. This 

gave him overwhelming fire superiority and allowed him 

to maneuver to exploit the effects of fire.60

As indicated by combat action during Operation Desert Storm, 

convincing massed fires in the form of counterfire and close support silenced Iraqi artillery, helped to destroy the enemy’s will to 

fight, allowed the friendly maneuver forces to maintain the rapid 

pace of their attack, and saved friendly lives.61 To accomplish this, 

active Army, Army reserve component, and Marine field artillery 

units fired more than 57,000 rounds. Of these they shot almost 6,000 

rockets and 32 Army Tactical Missile System missiles; the rest were 

105-millimeter, 155-millimeter, and eight-inch rounds.62 Reflecting 

upon this contribution from a maneuver commander’s perspective, 

Major General McCaffrey wrote, “All of us appreciate the tremendous contribution of the artillery. Our enormous success was due, in 

large part to the artillery. The success of your counterfire limited our 

casualties.”63 On another occasion on 31 March 1992, McCaffrey 

said, “Field Artillery is the dominant combat force on the battlefield. Commanders must understand how to plan, synchronize, and 

deliver its firepower.”64

Although General McCaffrey and other Army officers praised 

the field artillery for its impressive performance in Desert Storm, the 

210th Field Artillery Brigade wisely cautioned against unabashed 

exuberance. In a 17 June 1991 memorandum to Major General Hallada, the unit recorded:

The success of the 210th FA [Field Artillery] BDE [brigade] in this war was phenomenal. The Soldiers were justifiably proud of their accomplishments. But let’s not forget that combined arms tactics and doctrine really won the 

war. . . . Outstanding fire support execution was the culmination of strenuous training with the maneuver unit.65

As counterfire and close support with massed fires suggested 

during Operation Desert Storm, the Army’s field artillery had fundamentally sound doctrine and performed well. By integrating target acquisition systems; command, control, communications, and 
18

computer systems; support and sustainment systems; and munitions 

and weapon systems, the units silenced enemy indirect fire systems 

and permitted the maneuver arms to advance relatively unscathed 

by enemy indirect and direct fires. Such performance in Operation 

Desert Storm validated fire support doctrine in Field Manual 6-20, 

Fire Support for Combined Arms Operations (1983), which was the 

field artillery’s capstone “how-to-fight” manual and the basic reference for fire support planning and coordination.

Confronting the Deficiencies

Although it highlighted existing strengths with fire support 

doctrine, Operation Desert Storm concurrently reinforced pre-war 

concerns held by many field artillery officers regarding equipment 

and weapon deficiencies that had not been eliminated through modernization. Many field artillery systems lacked the speed, mobility, 

and ranges required for the modern battlefield.

Of the major field artillery systems, the M981 Fire Support 

Team Vehicle adopted in the 1970s received the most scathing criticism from field artillery officers and Soldiers. During the Gulf War, 

the M981 validated pre-war apprehension because it was not sufficiently mobile to stay abreast of the faster M1 Abrams tank and 

M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. In their draft article about fire support during Operation Desert Storm, Major Klemencic and Captain 

Thomson described the M981 as “slow and unreliable.”66 They noted that the [2d Armored Cavalry] Regimental Commander and the 

Squadron Commander were cognizant of this problem and stressed 

not leaving the field artillery officers and Soldiers who rode in the 

slower vehicles; they were the eyes of the field artillery battalions 

with their ability to locate targets. In view of this, commanders had 

to consider the vehicle’s limitations as they planned operations or 

potentially do without effective and responsive fire support. 

The 1st Armored Division Artillery addressed the same issue 

and reached the same conclusion on 2 July 1991. It commented that 

the vehicle “is based on the old M113 family of vehicles and is not 

suitable for keeping up with the current M1 Abrams and M2/3 Bradley 

fleet of maneuver vehicles. . . . In the future, we need a fire support 

vehicle that can move as fast as the maneuver units it supports.”67
19

Along the same line, the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery wrote 

about its experience with the vehicle during the war. It explained, 

“During Desert Shield training and actual combat operations, the 

FISTV could not physically keep up with the sleeker M1 and M2 

even when they slowed down their pace significantly.”68 The offensive orientation of Operation Desert Storm built around AirLand 

Battle’s doctrine of speed and maneuver clearly reinforced the 

obsolescence of the vehicle and the need for a Bradley-based fire 

support team vehicle advocated as early as 1976–77 by the former 

Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Donald 

R. Keith (1976–77).69

Likewise, the war demonstrated the limited mobility of the AN/

TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars, often called Firefinder radars and 

introduced in the 1970s; the Tactical Fire Direction System adopted 

in the 1970s; the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer fielded in 

the late 1970s and early 1980s and used by the Army and the Marine 

Corps; and the M109A2/A3 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer 

introduced in the 1970s. Mounted on old five-ton trucks, Firefinder 

radars that had been designed to locate Soviet and Warsaw Pact indirect fires systems and the Tactical Fire Direction System that had 

been developed to compute gunnery solutions were not constructed 

for rapid movement and had difficulties keeping up with the maneuver arms. To overcome this critical limitation, some field artillery 

units loaded their Tactical Fire Direction System shelters, Firefinder 

radar shelters, and generators on Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Trucks to give them better cross country mobility and more speed. 

Also, in some instances, M109A2/A3 units could not support task 

forces because they could not stay abreast of the faster maneuver 

forces, while the M198 was slow to displace.70

The range inferiority of the Army’s field artillery in relation 

to Iraqi field artillery also alarmed many field artillery officers and 

Soldiers. Although the Multiple Launch Rocket System performed 

well in its first combat test and was accurate and lethal, the system lacked sufficient range.71 In fact, Colonel Vollney B. Corn Jr., 

who commanded the 1st Armored Division Artillery during Operation Desert Storm, and Captain Richard A. Lacquemont, who was 

the assistant operations officer for the 1st Armored Division during 
20

Operation Desert Storm, outlined the consequences of the system’s 

30-kilometer range. Four Iraqi cannon systems and two multiple 

rocket launcher systems had longer ranges than the Multiple Launch 

Rocket System. “In the hands of a better trained and more intelligent 

foe, these [Iraqi] systems could have made it extremely difficult for 

us in the counterartillery battle,” they related in an October 1991 

Field Artillery article.72

In June 1991, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade made a similar 

observation about the Multiple Launch Rocket System. It reported, 

“During the VII (US) Corps’ offensive covering force operations, 2 

ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] air scouts often identified high 

payoff targets at ranges beyond the current MLRS [Multiple Launch 

Rocket System] range. These targets were often engaged by CAS/AI 

[close air support/air interdiction] or helicopters when sorties were 

available and weather permitted.”73 In view of this example and 

their experiences with the Multiple Launch Rocket System, commanders from the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, the 1st Armored 

Division Artillery, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade, and Multiple 

Launch Rocket System units recommended extending the system’s 

range from 30 kilometers to 50 kilometers to provide critical standoff capabilities and stay abreast of likely improvements in international field artillery rocket systems. With a range of 23 kilometers, 

the M109A2/A3 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer was also 

outranged by conventional and extended-range munitions fired by 

Iraqi cannon artillery. To eliminate this stark imbalance, future cannons required ranges of 40 kilometers with conventional munitions 

and 50 kilometers with extended-range munitions. Without rocket 

and cannon field artillery systems with longer ranges than the enemy’s indirect fire systems, standoff capabilities would be sacrificed 

and counterfire would be seriously compromised.74

Besides recognizing the requirement for longer ranges, another 

significant Operation Desert Storm lesson focused on the need for 

more field artillery in the division and corps. Given the importance 

of the Multiple Launch Rocket System, a battery of nine Multiple 

Launch Rocket System M270 launchers in the division could be 

overworked if not simply overwhelmed by the demands of supporting the entire division and could not depend upon having the corps 
21

artillery’s Multiple Launch Rocket System battalion available when 

it was needed. To eliminate this problem, some field artillery officers 

with Gulf War combat experience favored equipping division artillery with a battalion of 27 M270 launchers to replace the battery of 

nine launchers. This would increase firepower, permit rotating fire 

missions among a greater number of launchers, and allow conducting maintenance and resting the crew.75

In addition to increasing the number of M270 launchers in the 

division, some field artillery commanders wanted more cannon artillery in the division. The commander of the 1st Infantry Division 

Artillery, Colonel Dodson, advocated making two additional cannon 

battalions organic to the division. This would give the division commander five cannon battalions (120 cannons) and sufficient fire support to conduct “most operations without further augmentation.”76

Field artillery officers with experience at the corps also espoused more cannon artillery as the commander of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade, Colonel Boyd, urged. In an insightful memorandum 

he wrote, “We can make up for a shortage of artillery by focusing 

what you do have at the right place and right time, but it isn’t easy.”77

More field artillery would make providing fire support easier.78

Although the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition 

was the overwhelming munition of choice for commanders and was 

devastatingly effective, its dud rate raised serious concerns.79 During 

the war, unexploded Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition 

bomblets from cannon and rocket systems formed hazardous minefields. Especially in soft sand, they created a significant battlefield 

hazard for friendly maneuver forces to negotiate. For example, a Multiple Launch Rocket System fire mission of 12 rockets, each containing 644 bomblets with an allowable dud rate of 2.5 percent, would 

produce a minefield of about 200 armed and deadly destructive munitions. Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition dud minefields hindered movement, compelled maneuver forces to alter their 

routes, and led to some injuries and deaths to friendly forces.80 In an 

after action report, Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell explained the 

conundrum. “DPICM [Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition] showed itself to be a ‘two-edge sword.’ While this munition was 

very effective against enemy targets, there were at times large num-
22

bers of unexploded ‘bomblets’ left littering the area that maneuver 

(and subsequently support units) had to cross,” they noted.81

Operation Desert Storm revealed another significant field artillery deficiency. Wire communications tied existing field artillery 

systems together to limit their freedom of movement. Based upon 

the growing significance of smart, precision, and wide-area munitions that would increase the vulnerability of all combat systems 

throughout the battlefield, future field artillery systems required the 

ability to operate autonomously and move freely without being tethered to wire communications. Shoot and scoot capabilities, emerging with Multiple Launch Rocket System M270 launcher, were required for all field artillery weapons systems.82

Another technological problem also shed light on a limitation of the Total Army concept and its implementation. Prior to the 

war, Army National Guard field artillery units lacked the Tactical 

Fire Direction System for computing technical and tactical gunnery 

problems and had to rely on manual methods that were slow and 

subject to human error. Captain Richard A. Needham and Major 

Russell Graves of the 142d Field Artillery Brigade of the Arkansas 

Army National Guard explained after the war: 

Until mobilization, the brigade had strictly manual TOCs 

[tactical operational centers]. Rotation to the National 

Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, with the 

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had uncovered a serious flaw in 

the Army’s Total Force concept. Manual TOCs don’t have 

a place in the digital realm. Heavy TACFIRE [Tactical Fire 

Direction System]-equipped units don’t have the time or 

assets to interface with manual TOCs.83

To be sure, Captain Needham and Major Graves touched on an 

important issue. Some of the modernization of the 1970s and 1980s 

had not yet reached the reserve components as part of the Total Army 

concept. In this particular instance, Army National Guard field artillery units still employed manual technical and tactical fire direction 

methods on the eve of Operation Desert Storm and searched frantically for Light Tactical Fire Direction Systems before deploying to 
23

the Gulf to give them automated fire direction capabilities and the 

ability to function as a team with active component field artillery 

units equipped with the Tactical Fire Direction System. Even though 

the contractor found sufficient numbers of the Light Tactical Fire 

Direction System to equip Army National Guard field artillery units, 

the rushed fielding schedules hindered proper training.84

Despite this critical deficiency, Operation Desert Storm substantiated 1970s and 1980s modernization efforts that were designed to counter the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat. Combat operations validated AirLand Battle fire support doctrine outlined in Field 

Manual 6-20. During the short war, field artillery units repeatedly 

provided effective and responsive massed fires to neutralize enemy 

indirect fire systems and facilitate the maneuver arms’ attack, while 

the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Army Tactical Missile 

System unequivocally demonstrated their ability to provide effective fire support. 

Combat operations also underscored critical deficiencies. The 

Firefinder radars, the M981 Fire Support Team Vehicle for the fire 

support observer team, the Tactical Fire Direction System for computing gunnery problems, the M198 howitzer, and the M109A2/A3 

howitzer lacked the speed to stay abreast of maneuver arm vehicles, 

while many Iraqi cannon and rocket systems outranged their American counterparts; and the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional 

Munition’s dud rate left impassable mine fields. Although these 

shortcomings did not detract from the Field Artillery’s overall solid 

performance against the Iraqi military forces, the branch had to replace these obsolete systems with modern ones to ensure effective 

counterfire and close support to stay abreast of the capabilities of 

foreign field artillery systems. Failure to modernize would compromise providing effective fire support on the future battlefield.
24

NOTES

1. For extensive discussion on the modernization of the 1970s and 

1980s, see Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, 1988); John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand 

Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, 

VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1984); 

John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s 

Army (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1997); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 

1995), Robert H. Scales Jr., ed., Certain Victory: United States Army in the 

Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), 

and Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991 (Fort 

Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, 1994, reprinted by 

the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003); Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

1991), 36–40, 108, 169–96, 214–36; H.O. Malone, ed., TRADOC Support 

to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study (Fort 

Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1992), 7–8; Department 

of the Army (DA), Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 

24. Thirty-six nations participated in the Coalition by committing ground, 

air, or naval forces. Of the 36 nations, the Arab allies (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 

and United Arab Emirates), the United Kingdom, France, and the United 

States contributed the most military forces. Turkey moved about 125,000 

forces along its borders to deter a possible Iraqi attack. See “Forces Committed,” Military Review, September 1991, 80–81, for details on the composition of the Coalition forces.

2. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003, 

3, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC); Robert H. Scales 

Jr., Firepower in Limited War, rev.ed., (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 

246–56; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 24.

3. Report from A Btry, 6-27 FA, Persian Gulf War, October 1990–

April 1991, 2, HRDC; Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hallada, “Diamond Brigade Desert Storm Comments and Results,” 23 May 

1991, HRDC; Scales, Firepower in Limited War, 260

4. Schubert and Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, 164–65.

5. Major Mark S. Jensen, “MLRS in Operation Desert Storm,” Field 

Artillery, August 1991, 30–33; Memorandum for Commander 42nd Field 

Artillery Brigade, “Battalion History,” 17 March 1991, HRDC; Report, 

“42nd Field Artillery Brigade Battle History,” undated, HRDC; Memoran-
25

dum, “1-27 FA Operations in South West Asia,” 5 June 1991, 14, HRDC; 

Report, “Focusing Combat Power: The Role of the FA Brigade,” 24 March 

1991, HRDC; Report, “Jayhawk,” undated, 5, HRDC.

6. Report, “Jayhawk,” undated, 5, HRDC.

7. Friedman, Desert Victory, 108, 169–96, 214–36; Malone, ed., 

TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 7–8; 

Schubert and Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, 166–67, 173–205; DA, 

Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 24–25.

8. Scales, ed., Certain Victory, 382–84; Malone, ed., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 67; Schubert and 

Kraus, ed., The Whirlwind War, 201–05.

9. Memorandum for Director of Center for Army Lessons Learned 

(CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS, “Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 10 July 1991, HRDC; Briefing, “Desert Storm Emerging Results,” undated, HRDC. 

10. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 9; “Operation 

Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 1–2. See Creighton W. Abrams, 

“The Gulf War and European Artillery,” Journal of the Royal Artillery, 

Autumn 2001, 41–44, for insights from a former field artillery commander 

in Operation Desert Storm about combat operations.

11. Colonel David Rolston, “Victory Artillery in Operation Desert 

Shield,” Field Artillery, April 1991, 4.

12. Brigadier General (Retired) Paul F. Pearson and General (Retired) Glenn K. Otis, “Desert Storm Fire Support: Classic AirLand Battle 

Operations,” Landpower Essay Series, AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 

June 1991, HRDC.

13. Pearson and Otis, “Desert Storm Fire Support.”

14. Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hallada, Commandant, USAFAS, “Operation Desert Storm Thoughts,” 15 May 1991, HRDC.

15. Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hallada, “Operation Desert Storm Thoughts;” Major General David E. Ott, Field Artillery: 

1954–1973 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1975), 38–49.

16. Scales, ed., Certain Victory, 226.

17. Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hallada, “Diamond 

Brigade Desert Storm Comments and Results,” 13; Captain Richard A. 

Needham and Major Russell Graves, “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,” 

Field Artillery, October 1991, 30–33. 

18. Memorandum for Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery, no 

subject, 25 March 1991, HRDC.

19. Memorandum for Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery. 

20. Memorandum for Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery. 

21. Memorandum with Appendices for Director, Fire Support and 

Combined Arms Operations Department (FSCAOD), “USAFAS Historical Document,” 2 July 1991, Appendix 1, HRDC.

22. “USAFAS Historical Document,” Appendix 1.
26

23. Memorandum for Record, “Chronicle of XVIII Airborne Corps 

Artillery Activity during Operation Desert Storm,” 2 May 1991, 9, HRDC. 

24. “Chronicle of XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery Activity during 

Operation Desert Storm,” 9. 

25. “Chronicle of XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery Activity during 

Operation Desert Storm,” 9. 

26. Report, “Focusing Combat Power,” 13 April 1991, 8, HRDC.

27. “Focusing Combat Power,” 8.

28. “Focusing Combat Power,” 8.

29. Memorandum for Commander, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, 

“Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm,” 17 June 

1991, part of Memorandum for G3, III Corps Artillery, “USAFAS Historical Document,” 20 June 1991, HRDC.

30. “Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm.”

31. “Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm.”

32. “Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm.”

33. Jensen, “MLRS in Operation Desert Storm,” 30–34.

34. Major Kenneth P. Graves, “Steel Rain – XVIII Airborne Corps 

Artillery in Desert Storm,” Field Artillery, October 1991, 49–56; “Field 

Artillery Commanders,” Field Artillery, December 1991, 29–32.

35. Graves, “Steel Rain,” 52.

36. “Desert Storm Emerging Results.”

37. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 4–5.

38. Major General Fred F. Marty, “FA on Target in the Storm,” Field 

Artillery, October 1991, 1.

39. “USAFAS Historical Document.”

40. Memorandum for GS, 24th ID (M), “Historical Narrative of the 

24 Divarty Actions in Operation Desert Storm,” undated, HRDC.

41. Report, “42nd Field Artillery Brigade: Operation Desert Storm,” 

13 April 1991, 8, HRDC.

42. Memorandum for Record, “Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine, 

Tactics, and Techniques,” 20 April 1991, HRDC.

43. “Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine, Tactics, and Techniques.”

44. Memorandum for VII (U.S.) Corps Artillery, G-3 Operations, 

“Summary of Significant Events for the 210th Field Artillery Brigade during Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991 to 10 March 1991,” 1 April 

1991, HRDC.

45. Memorandum for Director, FSCAOD, “USAFAS Historical 

Document.” 

46. Memorandum with Appendices for Director, FSCAOD, “USAFAS Historical Document,” Appendix 1.

47. 3d Armored Division Artillery, “Historical Summary, Operation Desert Storm, Phases III, IV, and V (24–28 February 1991),” HRDC; 

Memorandum for Director, FSCAOD, USAFAS, “USAFAS Historical 

Document,” 15 July 1991, HRDC.
27

48. Briefing, “Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future,” 31 

March 1992, HRDC.

49. Report, “Artillery Lessons of the Gulf War,” undated, HRDC. 

50. Report, “The Rattle in the Storm,” undated, in Memorandum for 

Director, FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 July 1991, HRDC.

51. Briefing, “Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future;” Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 6–7.

52. Major John Klemencic and Captain John Thomson, “Fire Support for the Corps Covering Force: A Desert Storm Perspective,” undated, 

draft article, 4–11, HRDC; Report, “Second Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

1990–1991,” 1–6, HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosure for Commander, “210th Field Artillery Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and 

Lessons Learned,” 17 June 1991, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “Historical Narrative of 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s Role in 

the Campaign to Liberate Kuwait, 23–28 February 1991,” 3 March 1991, 

HRDC.

53. Memorandum, “USAFAS Historical Document;” Memorandum 

for 42 FA Brigade, “4-27 FA Battle Report, 24 Feb–04 Mar 91,” in Memorandum for Director, FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 July 1991, HRDC. 

54. Report, “The Rattle in the Storm;” Memorandum for Director, 

FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 July 1991, HRDC. 

55. Report, “Combat Historical Summary,” undated, HRDC.

56. Memorandum for G3, 24th Infantry Division, “Historical Narrative of 24 DivArty Actions in Operation Desert Storm,” undated, HRDC.

57. Memorandum for Commander, USAFAS, “210th Field Artillery Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned.” 17 

June 1991, HRDC.

58. Report, “A/6-27 FA Persian Gulf War, Oct 90–Apr 91,” undated, 

14, HRDC.

59. “A/6-27 FA Persian Gulf War, Oct 90–Apr 91,” 14.

60. Marty, “FA on Target in the Storm,” 1.

61. USAFAS, “Field Artillery Desert Facts,” 2, HRDC.

62. Memorandum with Enclosures for Commandant USAFAS, 

“Desert Storm Rounds Fired,” 20 August 1991, HRDC.

63. USAFAS, “Field Artillery Desert Facts,” 3.

64. Briefing, “Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future.”

65. Memorandum with Enclosure for Commander, USAFAS, “210th 

Field Artillery Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons 

Learned.”

66. Klemencic and Thomson, “Fire Support for the Corps Covering 

Force,” undated, 6, HRDC. 

67. Memorandum with Enclosures for Director, FSCAOD, USAFAS, “USAFAS Historical Document,” 2 July 1991, Appendix 5, HRDC.

68. Memorandum with Enclosures for Brigadier General Franks, 

Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, “USAFAS Historical Document,” 27 
28

June 1991, Enclosure 2, HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosures for Commandant, USAFAS, “1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons 

Learned.” Note: Both documents have the quote.

69. Memorandum with Enclosures for Brigadier General Franks, Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, “USAFAS Historical Document,” Enclosure 2; “1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned;” 

Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 7–8.

70. Email with Attachment, “ Manuscript Review,” 35–36; Report, 

“3rd Armored Division Artillery After Action Review Comments,” undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Commanding General, XVIII Airborne 

Corps, “Operation Desert Storm After Action Report,” 22 March 1991, 

HRDC; “1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned;” 

Report, “Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned,” undated, HRDC; Memorandum for OIC, Weapon Systems Combat Performance Team, Army Material Command Forward, “Summary of Trends, Observations and Soldier 

Recommendations on Weapon Systems Combat Performance,” 1 May 

1991, ODS MPRI File Box, 33, HRDC.

71. Colonel Vollney B. Corn Jr., and Captain Richard A. Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” Field Artillery, October 1991, 10.

72. Corn and Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” 11.

73. Memorandum for Commander, USAFAS, “210th FA Brigade’s 

Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned., 17 June 1991, 

HRDC.

74. Memorandum for OIC, Weapon Systems Combat Performance 

Assessment Team, Army Material Command Forward, “Summary of 

Trends, Observations and Soldier Recommendations on Weapon Systems 

Combat Performance,” 36; “210th FA Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm 

Chronology and Lessons Learned;” “USAFAS Historical Document;” 

“1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned;” Corn and 

Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” 11–12.

75. Corn and Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” 12; Brigadier General 

Howard J. von Kaenel, former 82nd Airborne Division Artillery Commander, interview by author, 28 and 31 August 1992, HRDC; Memorandum for Commandant, “ 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned.”

76. Memorandum for Commandant, USAFAS, “Artillery for the 

Heavy Division,” 5 September 1991, HRDC.

77. Memorandum for Record, “Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine, 

Tactics, and Techniques,” 20 April 1991, HRDC.

78. “Thoughts on Desert Storm.”

79. Memorandum for Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), “AAR Comments, Operation Desert Storm,” 15 March 1991, 

HRDC; Report, “ Artillery Lessons of the Gulf War.”

80. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 40; Report, “42nd 

Field Artillery Brigade Desert Shield/Storms Lessons Learned,” undated, 
29

HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosures for Director FSCAOD, “USAFAS 

Historical Report,” 2 July 1991, Appendix 8, HRDC. 

81. Report, “Focusing Combat Power,” 13 April 1991, 6, HRDC.

82. Letter with Attachment, author to Major General Fred Marty, 10 

September 2003, 41, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 41; John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold 

War (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, 1996), 65.

83. Needham and Graves, “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,” 30–31.

84. Needham and Graves, “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,” 30–

31; Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 42.
30
31

Chapter 2 

A New but Still Dangerous World

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, 

and the 1989–1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union demolished 

the cornerstone of American foreign policy of deterring Soviet and 

Warsaw Pact military aggression in Europe, negated the need for 

stationing a large military force in Europe, and undermined the rationale for maintaining a large military establishment to provide for US 

national security. This abrupt conclusion of the Cold War prompted 

Congress to reduce the US military’s size and budget and prodded 

the US military to develop a new strategy during the 1990s to reflect 

the emerging international political environment. For the Army and 

the Field Artillery, power projection meant rewriting doctrine and 

introducing deployable weapon systems and equipment to complement those with less strategic mobility. Meanwhile the emerging 

budget reality required restructuring to accommodate shrinking end 

strength and funding. Simultaneously, the Army faced the imperative to implement lessons from Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. Working together, the end of the Cold War, Operation Desert 

Shield, and Operation Desert Storm caused the Army and the Field 

Artillery to restructure their forces and embark on a vast program to 

modernize their light and heavy forces.

A New World, Budget Reductions, and Restructuring

The post-Cold War world of the 1990s posed a dilemma for the 

Army. For the first time in five decades, the United States lacked a 

viable threat, meaning the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, to stimulate defense spending. Such circumstances motivated Congress to 

renew its determination to shrink the size of the military that Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm of 1990–1991 had 

temporarily derailed. After the Gulf War and the end of the Cold 

War, Congress picked up where it left off in 1990. Legislators started 

aggressively reducing the military’s budget again and began shifting money from military to domestic programs to achieve a peace 
32

dividend. This led to a massive reduction to the Army’s budget and 

mammoth force structure and personnel cuts. From five corps, 18 

active component divisions, and 10 reserve component (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) divisions in 1989, the Army’s force 

structure shrunk over a period of eight years to four corps, 10 active 

divisions, and eight Army National Guard divisions. Simultaneously, the Army trimmed its personnel strength in Europe from 215,000 

to 65,000 Soldiers and closed more than 700 installations in the 

continental United States and overseas. Voluntary early transition, 

voluntary separation incentives, special separation benefits, reduction-in-force actions, selective early retirement, and other programs 

meanwhile dropped the active Army’s personnel strength from 

770,000 to 480,000 and its reserve component personnel strength 

from 770,000 to 560,000 by 1999. The effort also included drastically decreasing the Army’s civilian workforce from 403,000 in 1989 

to 225,000 in 1999 through reduction-in-force actions and voluntary 

early retirement authority. At the completion of the downsizing, the 

active Army and its reserve components were the smallest that they 

had been since 1941 on the eve of World War II.1

For the Field Artillery, the downsizing also had a striking impact. In 1989, the Regular Army and its reserve components had a 

total of 218 field artillery battalions and 38 batteries, including batteries in armored cavalry regiments. While the Regular Army had 

96 battalions, the Guard had 105 and the Army Reserve had 17. By 

the end of the 1990s, 141 field artillery battalions and 22 batteries 

remained—12 in the active component and 10 in the Guard. The active Army had 50 battalions, and the Guard had 91 battalions. The 

restructuring left the Army Reserve without any field artillery by 

1996 and decreased the field artillery in the active component by 42 

percent and in the reserve component by 36 percent.2

To adjust to the enormous reductions, the Army reallocated its 

combat, combat support, and combat service support units among 

its active and reserve components to achieve better balance and retain its fighting capabilities during the 1990s and into the near future. In 1990, the Army National Guard provided 44 percent of the 

combat forces, 31 percent of the combat support, and 25 percent of 

the combat service support; the Army Reserve had 53 percent of the 
33

combat support and combat service support as well as a small portion of combat forces; and the active Army made up the rest.3

Based on 1993 recommendations from a comprehensive “bottom-up review,” Secretary of Defense Les Aspin subsequently initiated far-reaching reforms that restructured the Army. Over a period 

of years, the reforms realigned the preponderance of the Army’s 

reserve component combat capabilities in the Army National Guard 

and moved the bulk of the combat support and combat service support to the Army Reserve. Beginning in 1994 and continuing into 

1997, approximately 50 combat units moved from the Army Reserve to the Army National Guard, while more than 100 reserve 

component combat support and combat service support units shifted from the Army National Guard to the Army Reserve. By the time 

the revamping was completed in 1997, the Army National Guard 

provided 55 percent of the combat units, 46 percent of the combat 

support, and 25 percent of the combat service support while maintaining its state and civil missions. The Army Reserve shifted to 

primarily a support force with 20 percent of the combat support, 

47 percent of the combat service support, and one percent of the 

combat units. The active component filled in remaining combat, 

combat support, and combat service support. With the restructuring, the Army’s reserve components took on a more prominent role 

in national defense. Because of its severely decreased size, the active Army was more dependent—lacking the capability to sustain 

the demand for peacekeeping missions and routine deployments 

without being augmented.4

As might be expected, the Field Artillery felt the impact of this 

sweeping restructuring and downsizing. Moving to ensure responsive and effective fire support, the Army Science Board of November 

1995 examined the Army National Guard’s general support and direct 

support field artillery missions to determine if they should be modified. During Operation Desert Storm, the 142d Field Artillery Brigade 

of the Arkansas Army National Guard, the 196th Field Artillery Brigade of the Tennessee Army National Guard, and other Army National Guard field artillery units furnished effective general support 

after a short pre-deployment training period and could maintain their 

proficiency with this mission during their 39 days of annual training. 
34

Because direct support was more complicated, Soldiers would have 

difficulty achieving competence within the allotted annual training 

time. Such circumstances prompted the Army Science Board to propose abolishing the reserve component’s direct support field artillery 

mission but retaining its general support field artillery mission.5

Recognizing the validity of the recommendation, the Army reordered its field artillery missions. By the end of the decade, the Army 

National Guard retained 63 percent of the Army’s general support 

field artillery while the active component assumed the remaining 

general support as well as all direct support artillery responsibilities. 

Also, because much of the general support field artillery transferred 

to the Army National Guard, one of two field artillery brigades with 

a general support mission in the heavy forces was in the Guard in 

2000. In the light forces, three cannon battalions and one Multiple 

Launch Rocket System battalion of the XVIII Airborne Corps provided general support field artillery for all four light divisions (the 

10th Mountain Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division), two light separate 

brigades, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.6

To carry out the reorganized missions, the Army needed to rearm the Guard’s field artillery. Since the Soviet Union was no longer 

a credible nuclear-capable enemy and the Cold War had ended, the 

Army no longer required the M110 eight-inch self-propelled howitzer’s conventional and nuclear warheads in the Army of Excellence’s corps artillery. Additionally, the Gulf War demonstrated that 

the M110 lacked the speed to keep up with fast-moving Abrams 

tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, was manpower intensive, and had low survivability. With these reasons in mind, the 

Army decided in 1992 to replace it with the Multiple Launch Rocket 

System M270 launcher by converting active component and Guard 

M110 units into Multiple Launch Rocket System units. Major General Fred F. Marty, Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 

1991 to 1993, explained the change in a 1992 Field Artillery article 

on the state of the branch. He noted that a Multiple Launch Rocket 

System battalion provided up to 40 percent more firepower than an 

eight-inch howitzer battalion and required significantly fewer personnel. In an era of decreasing personnel, a weapon system with a 
35

smaller crew was crucial. Equally important, the Multiple Launch 

Rocket System M270 launcher was fast enough to stay abreast of 

the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle in combat.7

Twelve years later in 2004, the Army changed the last Guard 

unit from the M110 to the Multiple Launch Rocket System M270 

launcher when the Field Artillery School finished training the Colorado Army National Guard on the rocket system. Following this 

conversion, the Field Artillery had no nuclear capabilities for the 

first time since 1953 when it fired Atomic Annie at Frenchman’s 

Flats, Nevada, and then fielded the more modern field artillery system to the active component and Guard operational units.8

To satisfy Army National Guard requirements, the Army reduced the number of M109A6 (Paladin) 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers in the Army of Excellence heavy division that it 

formed during the 1980s to counter the Soviet and Warsaw Pact 

threat. The Army of Excellence heavy division had three battalions 

of M109A6s (72) for direct support and nine Multiple Launch Rocket System M270 launchers for general support. Because of plans 

to introduce the futuristic Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter 

howitzer, the precision Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition, the 

M270A1 launcher, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System Smart 

Tactical Rocket with its unprecedented lethality, the Army trimmed 

the number of Paladins in the heavy division to 54. By decreasing 

the number of howitzers, the Army abandoned the Army of Excellence cannon battalion of three eight-howitzer batteries (3x8 force 

structure) based on 1978 Legal Mix V Study recommendations for 

a cannon battalion of three six-howitzer batteries (3x6 force structure). This freed up Paladins for the Guard and personnel to form 

more Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries for general support 

in the heavy division. In 2003 following seven years of work, the 

Army completed transferring the extra Paladins gained by converting to the 3x6 force structure in the active force to the Army 

National Guard. Paladins replaced obsolete M109A2/A3 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzers and some M109A5 self-propelled 

155-millimeter howitzers to give the Guard a modern fleet of selfpropelled howitzers to complement its Multiple Launch Rocket System M270 launchers.9
36

To compensate for the loss of 155-millimeter self-propelled 

howitzers in the active and reserve components, the Army increased 

the number of M270 launchers in the Army of Excellence active 

heavy division. Recognizing the need for more field artillery firepower based on lessons learned from the Gulf War, the Field Artillery School submitted a plan to the Chief of Staff of the Army, 

General Gordon R. Sullivan, in the summer of 1992 to double the 

number of M270 launchers in the heavy division to 18 by creating a battalion of two batteries of nine launchers each (2x9 force 

structure). General Sullivan approved the concept, but funding and 

manpower constraints prevented implementation.10

Prompted by the 1993 Legal Mix VII Study and the November 

1995 Army Science Board Study that reinforced the requirement for 

more firepower and the availability of funding, the Army announced 

a major Multiple Launch Rocket System force structure initiative 

in June 1996. Beginning in 2000, the Army planned to add a second rocket battery in the heavy division to increase the number of 

launchers from nine to 18 and form a two-battery Multiple Launch 

Rocket System battalion.11

Even before the new organization could be implemented, the 

Army revamped the heavy division’s rocket resources again, creating a battalion of three batteries of six launchers each (3x6 force 

structure). This action made rocket batteries leaner while reducing 

the size of the battery’s battlefield footprint and logistical requirements, but retained the same number of launchers in the battalion 

to preserve firepower. Downsizing decreased the number of field 

artillery cannons in the heavy division, but new systems such as 

the M270A1 launcher and Paladin offset the reduction and greatly 

enhanced lethality to ensure responsive and effective fire support in 

the heavy division.12

Similarly, the Army overhauled its aging M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer units in the active and reserve component light divisions. It reduced the number of M198s in the battalion from 24 

to 18 by converting from the 3x8 force structure to the 3x6 force 

structure. This freed up M198s to replace the worst M198 guns and 

permitted the Army to send those cannons to the depots.13

Unquestionably, the end of the Cold War and Operation Des-
37

ert Storm caused serious personnel reductions and drove significant 

force structure changes in the Field Artillery. Through force restructuring, the Army shifted the Guard’s direct support mission to the 

active component while giving the Guard a portion of the general 

support mission—a role that Guard units had performed ably during the war in contrast to inadequate direct support mission performance. Additionally, the Army eliminated field artillery in the Army 

Reserve. This reorganization tied the active component and Army 

National Guard field artillery units more tightly together than they 

had ever been. Without the two Guard field artillery brigades that 

provided general support for each active component field artillery 

brigade, the active component’s field artillery would have difficulties providing fire support when it went to war. As part of transferring more responsibility to the Guard, the active component reduced 

the number of Paladins in the heavy division and modernized the reserve component—equipping it with excess Paladins created by the 

downsizing and replacing the aging, slow, nuclear-capable M110 

with Multiple Launch Rocket System M270 launchers. Restructuring effectively terminated Field Artillery nuclear capabilities in 

place since 1953 in favor of conventional firepower and simultaneously created a symbiotic relationship between the active component and the Guard. 

Modernizing Field Artillery Systems

The Army’s ability to dominate the future battlefield with a 

deployable force rested on equipping personnel with appropriate 

weapons and equipment, applying fire support lessons learned from 

Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, and implementing serious modernization. Existing fire support system of 

systems—target acquisition; weapons and munitions; command, 

control, and communications; and support—had been designed for 

fighting in Europe against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. 

They also supported the heavy forces with some recognition of the 

light forces’ requirements. To be a key player in power projection 

and complement new field artillery systems for the heavy forces, 

the Field Artillery School faced the imperative to introduce new or 

modernized systems with strategic deployability. 
38

In 1993, the school fully acknowledged the dilemma posed by 

current fire support systems. In a January 1993 report, the Army and 

the Field Artillery School concluded:

While today’s fire support systems are impressive, the requirement to keep pace in a changing world requires that 

we modernize continually. It is a given that the future field 

artillery force will be smaller. For it to remain effective, 

it must be more lethal with better systems and munitions, 

more survivable, and more deployable [than Cold War era 

systems].14

To accomplish this, the Field Artillery had to eliminate deficiencies identified during Operation Desert Shield and Operation 

Desert Storm while leveraging information technologies. Confronted by constrained budgets and an uncertain threat, the Field Artillery School announced a two-pronged approach in January 1993. It 

planned to improve existing serviceable platforms and systems by 

applying information-age technologies and develop totally new systems if existing systems could not be upgraded sufficiently to meet 

future needs. If modernization were done competently, it would 

create a power-projection force capable of winning an informationage war, conducting precision fires, and dominating the maneuver 

battle.15 The school judiciously explained in 1993, “The future battlefield will place new demands on the fire support system. The requirement to achieve land force dominance with minimum losses 

places increasing emphasis on the use of fires to defeat the enemy.”16

From the Field Artillery’s perspective, the requirement to conduct precision fires placed a conspicuous onus on target acquisition systems. They needed to locate targets with greater accuracy 

at greater ranges than ever before. Introduced in the late 1970s and 

early 1980s, the AN/TPQ-37 mortar locating radar and the AN/

TPQ-36 artillery locating radar were too large and heavy and used 

1970s technology. Future target acquisition systems would require 

increased strategic mobility and ranges, among other critical capabilities, to stay abreast of the changing battlefield.17

Anticipating the increased emphasis on strategic deployability, 

Major General Raphael J. Hallada, Commandant of the Field Artil-
39

lery School from 1987 to 1991, pushed to place the Q-36 radar on a 

trailer to improve strategic mobility for the heavy and light forces. 

Adopting General Hallada’s recommendation, the Army fielded the 

Q-36 Version Seven in 1994 then subsequently enhanced the system 

with electronic upgrades. In 1999, the Army started fielding the new 

Q-36 Version Eight suitable for the digitized battlefield required by 

the Force XXI campaign plan.18

Then as an interim solution until an enhanced AN/TPQ-47 

could be fielded, the Army initiated action in 1990 to improve the 

Q-37 to locate rockets and field artillery at longer ranges. The Army’s 

intention was to field the Q-47 early in the first decade of the 21st 

Century that would provide better tactical and strategic mobility, 

improve accuracy, double the detection range to 60 kilometers with 

cannon artillery, furnish targeting capabilities of 100 kilometers for 

rocket artillery and 300 kilometers for missile artillery, satisfy the 

requirements for the digitized battlefield and AirLand Operations, 

and replace all Q-37s. However, technological and software problems with the Q-47 radar forced the Army to stop developmental 

work in 2004 and continue using an enhanced Q-37.19

As the Army and Field Artillery worked to modernize the Q-36 

and Q-37 and develop an ill-fated Q-47 for detecting threat indirect 

fire systems and long-range precision strike capabilities, they also 

confronted the requirement to improve target acquisition for close 

support (field artillery fires designed to engage enemy infantry or 

armor that blocked advancing friendly forces) to the maneuver arms. 

After funding became available and the Cavalry and Infantry received their Bradley fighting vehicles, the Field Artillery replaced 

the aging and slow M981 with the Bradley A2 vehicle that maneuver 

arms had used in Operation Desert Storm. To make the Operation 

Desert Storm Bradley A2 suitable for fire support missions, the Army 

added a fire support mission package and started fielding the new 

version in the 1990s as the M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle.20

Because digitization or the employment of digital computers 

for command and control were inherent in Force XXI, the Army 

modernized the M7 Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle even more. 

In 1995, the Army upgraded it to the M7A1 to furnish information 

superiority and defeat the projected threat in the 21st Century. As 
40

part of continuing modernization efforts, the Army added a digitized 

fire support mission package and changed the name to the A3 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle in 1999.21

In the meantime, the Army worked to improve the lasing capabilities of the combat observation lasing team in the heavy and 

light forces by taking steps to replace its M981 vehicle. Designed 

for heavy and mechanized forces, the M981 presented a unique 

signature in the light forces and stood out because they used High 

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles as their scout vehicles. 

To eliminate this striking discrepancy, the Army adopted the M707 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle with a fire support 

mission package for the light forces. Initially known as the Striker, 

it became the Knight after 2002 to avoid confusion with the Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams being formed at the time. This system provided precision targeting capabilities for the heavy and light forces 

and had unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. In 2001, the 

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment received the first Knight vehicles for 

its combat observation lasing team. By the beginning of the 21st 

Century, the Field Artillery’s target acquisition systems fielded or 

being developed were capable of fighting on the digitized battlefield 

and more strategically deployable for a force projection army than 

their predecessors.22

To add precision capabilities to the Knight and the A3 Bradley 

Fire Support Team vehicle, field artillery officers and Soldiers—often called fire supporters—initially employed the Ground/Vehicular 

Laser Locator Designator to lase targets. However, the 107-pound 

system used early in the 1990s reduced the mobility of light fire 

support teams, did not meet their needs, and was not man-portable. 

In 1993 to 1994, the Field Artillery School responded to the need 

for a man-portable system to designate targets for the light forces 

by developing the requirement for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder to replace the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator. Combining technological advances in position/navigation, 

thermal sights, and laser development, the lightweight system was a 

compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted light forces 

or mounted operations on a Bradley fire support vehicle. Fielding 

began in 2004.23
41

Modernizing the Army’s cannon artillery moved forward at the 

same time as the Field Artillery adopted the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder.24 After seven years of development and testing, 

the Army started fielding the M109A6 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, commonly called the Paladin, in mid-1993. With its 

advanced technology, the Paladin possessed the capability to operate autonomously in dispersed operations, receive a fire mission, 

compute firing data, select and take up its firing position, automatically unlock and point its cannon, and fire and move out without 

any external technical assistance. Such characteristics permitted firing the first round from the move in less than 60 seconds and gave 

the system a “shoot-and-scoot” capability to protect the crew from 

hostile counterbattery fire. The Paladin was more responsive than 

the M109A2/A3, which took up to 11 minutes to respond to call to 

fire while on the move. The Paladin also had a maximum speed of 

35 miles-per-hour to give it the ability to keep up with the Abrams 

tank and Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and had secure digital 

and voice communications. Such revolutionary advances made it 

superior to older M109s.25

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Maxwell R. Thurman, a field artillery officer with close ties to the Field Artillery 

School, realized that while the Paladin was effective, it represented 

an interim solution. In November 1984, he directed the Army to 

begin work on the next-generation Advanced Field Artillery System 

self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer that would take advantage 

of quantum technological advances to improve availability, range, 

rate of fire, ammunition lethality, and battlefield mobility. However, 

a few years passed before serious developmental work started on the 

new system, which was designated as the Crusader in 1994.26

The Crusader would be a world-class cannon system capable 

of fighting on a digitized battlefield, would close the range gap between American and foreign systems, and would provide the mobility and survivability needed to keep pace with fast-moving maneuver operations, among other capabilities. Despite the anticipated 

gains, it faced critical challenges from detractors as it was being 

developed. Beginning early in 1995 and continuing over the next 

several years, opponents questioned the rationale for the howitzer. 
42

They urged adopting the German PzH2000 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer already in production both because it was a viable 

alternative and would be a cost-saving measure in an era of declining Army budgets. Although the PzH2000 was a sound system, the 

Undersecretary of Defense Dr. Paul G. Kaminiski repeatedly highlighted throughout 1996 that the German howitzer failed to satisfy 

the required criteria; he resisted adopting it and found support from 

an unexpected source.27 In 1996–1997, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the Crusader program to determine 

its status and the availability of viable alternatives. The GAO concluded in a 6 June 1997 report: “No existing artillery system met all 

of the Crusader requirements.”28

Armed with this solid endorsement, the Army continued work 

on Crusader and its resupply vehicle.29 Besides being suited to the 

digitized battlefield of the 21st Century, the 55-ton Crusader would 

operate completely autonomously, fire up to 10 rounds a minute at 

ranges in excess of 40 kilometers, and travel at speeds of more than 

48 kilometers per hour cross country and 67 kilometers per hour 

on a hard surface road. The Crusader would be accompanied by a 

45-ton resupply vehicle to keep the howitzer supplied with ammunition, fuel, and other supplies in forward positions so that it would 

not have to be pulled out of combat to rearm, refuel, and resupply. 

When it was fielded early in the 21st Century, the Crusader would 

dwarf the Paladin’s rate of fire of four rounds a minute and cross 

country speed of 35 kilometers per hour and speed of 56 kilometers 

per hour on hard surface roads. Moreover, a single Crusader would 

cover the same area as four Paladins, while two Crusaders would 

engage targets at the same rate as a six-howitzer Paladin battery.30

As discussed earlier, the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward-deployed forces in Europe to force 

projection from the continental United States at the end of the Cold 

War early in the 1990s. In keeping with this priority shift, the Army 

recognized the need to modernize its towed field artillery to complement the Crusader that was designed for a European-style, forceon-force battlefield. Through most of the 1980s, the M198 towed 

155-millimeter howitzer satisfied the Army. The howitzer had a 

range of 30 kilometers and weighed 15,000 pounds, making it the 

lightest towed 155-millimeter howitzer in the world. By the eve of 
43

Operation Desert Storm, the Army required a lighter, more mobile 

155-millimeter towed howitzer. In response, the Army completed a 

plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-millimeter howitzer, called the Advanced Towed Cannon System, to replace the 

aging and heavy M198.31

A couple years later in May 1993, the Marine Corps approved 

developing a lightweight 155-millimeter towed howitzer to provide 

close and long-range fire support. At the time the Marine Corps employed the obsolete M101 towed 105-millimeter howitzer as a contingency weapon because the M198 was too heavy.32

 Recognizing the Army’s requirement for a new lightweight 

towed 155-millimeter howitzer and the growing focus on power projection from the continental United States, the Army and the Marine Corps signed a memorandum of agreement in October 1993 to 

develop the XM777, with a maximum weight of 9,000 pounds and 

capable of firing rocket-assisted projectiles to a range of 30 kilometers. A joint Army-Marine Corps program managed by the Joint Program Management Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, existed 

in 1995 to manage developing the XM777. However, there was one 

basic difference between the two services’ howitzers. Because the 

Marine Corps had an immediate requirement for a towed 155-millimeter howitzer to replace the M198 and the M101 105-millimeter 

towed howitzer, it opted to field a howitzer without digital capabilities and to add them later. In comparison, the Army planned to develop a fully digitized lightweight 155-millimeter towed howitzer; and 

this meant that the Marine Corps’ howitzer would be fielded first.33

More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization 

package that was scheduled to be added to the Army’s XM777 distinguished it from the M198. As the Army explained, the digitization package would give the howitzer onboard advanced fire control 

capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers such 

as the Paladin M109A6 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer and 

the futuristic Crusader 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer under 

development. It also would eliminate the need for external survey, 

aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as 

self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easyto-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of the XM777 
44

superior to the M198. Additionally, the Towed Artillery Digitization 

package that was an automated fire direction system would be compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System that the 

Field Artillery employed as its command and control system.34

To distinguish the Army howitzer from the Marine Corps howitzer, the Joint Management Program Office designated the Army 

version as the XM777E1. With the emergence of the XM777E1, two 

XM777 programs coexisted—the XM777 type classified in 2003 as 

the M777 with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities 

for the Marine Corps and the Army howitzer with onboard automated fire control capabilities type classified as the M777E1 in 2003.35

In the meantime, the Army continued making improvements 

to other weapons. Largely through the efforts of personnel at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, the 82d Airborne Division obtained funding in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement Program to 

provide needed changes to the M119 towed 105-millimeter howitzer 

to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The 

original M119A1, which was towed by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, was type classified in 1985. In 1998, the Army 

made Block I improvements and then additional Block II upgrades in 

2002. Because of the aggregate differences, the Army designated the 

modified howitzer as the M119A2 on 15 February 2005.36

Power projection and Operation Desert Storm also highlighted 

the need to introduce the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and 

modernize the Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket and Army 

Tactical Missile System, a long-range field artillery missile. During 

the early 1980s, the 9th Infantry Division documented the requirement for a light multiple rocket launcher for the light forces, but the 

Army and the Field Artillery School instead continued focusing on 

the heavy forces. As the Cold War began waning at the end of the 

1980s, interest grew in projecting contingency forces to respond to 

worldwide crises. Similarly, Army and the Field Artillery School attitudes about a light deployable multiple rocket launcher to support 

the light forces moved from indifference to enthusiasm.37

Understanding the inherent limitations of tactical air support, 

naval gunfire, attack helicopters, and corps artillery as well as the 

need for mobile counterfire (field artillery fires delivered to suppress 
45

enemy field artillery or mortars to prevent them from interfering 

with the movement of friendly forces) for light forces, the Field Artillery School finally acknowledged the need for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System; the Multiple Launch Rocket System 

M270 launcher’s weight restricted its strategic mobility.38 In a 10 

April 1990 letter to General John W. Foss, Commanding General 

of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Hallada 

wrote, “I intend to develop a requirement by this July [1990] for a 

light weight MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System], wheeled or 

tracked, that is deployable on a C130, but. . .retains the munitions 

flexibility of the current system [M270 launcher].”39

Events in Southwest Asia reinforced General Hallada’s vision 

for a lighter multiple rocket launcher and pressured the Army to 

fund the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. In Operation Desert Shield of 1990, the Army flew M270 launchers from Fort Sill, 

Oklahoma, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to provide long-range 

fires for the initial units in theater. This was costly in terms of the 

number of aircraft required. Equally important, the launchers did 

not arrive with the initial forces, leaving them with 105-millimeter 

Figure 2: M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. 

Source: US Army photo by Sergeant Brian Glass.
46

towed artillery for fire support. “Had fighting begun immediately, 

the corps would have had no long range rocket artillery fires,” the 

XVIII Airborne Corps observed in a September 1991 message to 

Forces Command after Operation Desert Storm concluded.40 Given the strategic mobility limitations of the M270, long-range fire 

support would be tenuous in future anticipated power projection 

missions without the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm seemed to presage the future where armed forces would be deployed to distant 

hotspots, especially with the end of the Cold War, and the need for 

deployable field artillery.41

Although budget cuts made it challenging to find funds through 

most of the 1990s, the Army and the Field Artillery School pushed 

acquisition forward. After the successful mid-1998 Rapid Force 

Projection Initiative Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration with four High Mobility Artillery Rocket System prototypes at 

Fort Bragg, Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Gentry and Major Cullen G. Barabato of the 3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment 

of the XVIII Airborne Corps wrote, “HIMARS [High Mobility Artillery Rocket System] is a significant leap forward in fire support 

for early entry and light forces. Light force commanders who must 

deploy to undeveloped areas soon will have the firepower normally 

associated with heavier forces with the fielding of HIMARS early 

in the twenty-first century.”42 The commanding general of the XVIII 

Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General William F. Kernan, expressed 

similar thoughts in an interview: “HIMARS is paramount to our 

success and survivability.”43

The need to deploy for worldwide contingency operations grew 

more significant as the 20th Century drew to a close and the requirement for lightweight, mobile firepower grew exponentially. Enhanced 

firepower for light forces would improve survivability. The High 

Mobility Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher with its digital capabilities would furnish the requisite firepower and would shoot six 

rockets. In view of this, the Army approved an accelerated developmental program with the goal of equipping the first unit with the High 

Mobility Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher by 2005.44

Meanwhile, two critical factors encouraged modernizing the 
47

M270 launcher. Early in 1990, the Army realized that the M270 

was growing obsolete; its electronic parts were becoming more expensive and difficult to obtain by the 21st Century. To combat the 

growing obsolescence, the Army initiated the improved fire control 

systems program in 1992 to replace existing electronic systems and 

provide the growth potential for future munitions. Operation Desert 

Storm also demonstrated the need for a more responsive and survivable M270 to engage highly mobile targets, such as mobile rocket 

launchers. This led to the improved launcher mechanical system program in 1995 to decrease the launcher’s aiming and loading time.45

For a couple of years, the modifications existed as two separate 

programs. As a result of its integrated test program initiative, the 

Army combined the two programs in 1997 to produce the M270A1 

launcher for the digitized battlefield then fielded it early in the 21st 

Century. The M270A1 would shoot the entire family of Multiple 

Launch Rocket System munitions, including the Extended-Range 

Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket, the Guided Multiple 

Launch Rocket System rocket, and the Unitary Multiple Launch 

Rocket System rocket with its three different fuse capabilities. The 

proximity fuse capability would permit a large air burst over the target, while the point-detonating fuse capability would reduce the size 

of the burst to minimize collateral damage, a serious concern during 

the Gulf War. The time-delay fuse capability would allow the rocket 

to penetrate certain types of structures or targets and then detonate.46

As the Army worked to modernize the M270 launcher, it took 

action to improve its Army Tactical Missile System missile, eventually known as Army Tactical Missile System I. Based on their 1991 

experience in Operation Desert Storm, commanders, their staffs, and 

users visualized the need for a longer-range Army Tactical Missile 

System missile. Some insisted that the current range was inadequate 

and restricted the number of targets that could be engaged. With engineering changes, the system could achieve at least twice the range 

of the current, battle-tested Army Tactical Missile System I and give 

commanders more flexibility to attack deep targets; compensate for 

availability shortfalls with tactical air caused by other priorities, 

weather, and darkness; and attack targets more quickly than tactical 

air.47 In 1994, the Army designated the improved system as Army 
48

Tactical Missile System IA. It would have a range of 70 to 300 kilometers plus a Global Positioning System navigational system to 

give the Field Artillery a long-range precision missile. The Army 

Tactical Missile System I and IA both saw extensive action during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.48

Meanwhile, the Army launched work on the Army Tactical 

Missile System II and IIA that would have longer ranges than the 

Army Tactical Missile Systems I and IA and soon coupled the Army 

Tactical Missile System IIA with the Brilliant Anti-armor submunition, a precision munition intended to engage and destroy armored 

forces. When budget reductions ended development of the Tri-Service Standoff Missile in 1993, the Army decided to use the Army 

Tactical Missile System IIA to carry the submunition.49 Although 

the original justification for the submunition disappeared with the 

end of the Cold War, the Army explained in 1994:

The greatest potential threat to US Forces is that posed 

by armored and motorized forces. These highly mobile 

armored maneuver forces, supported by armed helicopters, are expected to pursue battlefield objectives using 

numerical force superiority, speed, and penetration.50

The Army also noted its inability to attack armored vehicles and 

surface-to-surface missile launchers beyond the range of close 

combat weapons and the urgent need for an autonomous, terminal 

homing submunition to defeat moving and stationary targets in the 

second echelon of the threat array. Upon fielding in the 21st Century, Block IIA with the Brilliant Anti-armor submunition would 

address those needs.51

To tie field artillery weapons, munitions, and sensors together, the Field Artillery meanwhile replaced the 1970s Tactical Fire 

Direction System with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 

System. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System was a 

network of computer stations that processed and exchanged information from the forward observer to the fire support element (field 

artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles; mortars; close air support; 

naval gunfire; and attack helicopters). It automatically processed 

fire requests, generated multiple tactical fire solutions, monitored 
49

mission execution, and supported the creation and distribution of 

fire support plans. The Field Artillery introduced the system’s software in incremental versions. Each was built on the previous to get 

it to the field sooner rather than waiting for the objective software to 

be completed. Fielded between 1996 and 2002, the Advanced Field 

Artillery Tactical Data System and its software offered unparalleled 

automated capabilities to process information rapidly and accurately and was a critical element of the Army Battlefield Command 

System—a digital command, control, communication, computers, 

and intelligence system of computers. To transmit and receive fire 

support messages, forward observers and fire support teams used 

the Pocket-Size Forward Entry Device with a laser range finder to 

locate a target accurately. The Lightweight Tactical Data System, 

known as the Centaur, served as a lightweight backup for the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System and computed technical fire 

direction data for cannon units.52

As indicated by field artillery systems during the last decade 

of the 20th Century and the first years of the 21st Century, the Field 

Artillery took a balanced approach to modernization. With power 

projection in mind, the Field Artillery started developing the M777 

and the High Mobility Artillery Rockets Systems. These light and 

strategically mobile systems were suitable for power projection. At 

the same time, the Field Artillery did not neglect its heavy forces—

adopting the Paladin and the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle and 

initiating development on the Crusader. 

Although weapons, munitions, and equipment efforts were 

important, digitization formed the heart of modernization efforts. 

The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System not only promised to 

enhance responsiveness by reducing the amount of time to process 

information from the forward observer to the firing unit but also 

signaled a move into the digital age.

New Doctrine for a New Age

The same European political events that drove concurrent 

downsizing and restructuring and simultaneous modernization of 

field artillery systems persuaded the Army to rewrite its fighting 

doctrine. Based on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks dur-
50

ing the early 1980s and the growing political fragmentation in Eastern Europe, AirLand Battle-Future studies from 1987 to 1990 outlined an umbrella concept for fighting throughout the world. They 

included a heavy concept for fighting in Europe, with an emphasis 

on deep, destructive fires and a linear front. Subsequent political 

events soon rendered the AirLand Battle-Future studies obsolete. 

The November 1990 Conventional Forces Reduction Treaty spelled 

an end to the applicability of the studies and to large military forces 

in Europe by bringing a termination to the Warsaw Pact and North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization military buildup. As a result of the 

treaty, smaller military forces would defend the same amount of 

territory that larger armies had guarded in the past. This abolished 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s continuous strategic front 

against the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat and created gaps between 

its units. The subsequent end of the Cold War in 1991 set in motion 

even more reductions in troop numbers in Europe and the imperative to reexamine Army doctrine.53

Understanding the necessity of adapting to changing political 

conditions and the emerging battlefield, General Foss and the Chief 

of Staff of the Army, General Carl E. Vuono, concurred about the 

urgent need to revise Army doctrine to reflect future international 

conditions. They simultaneously pushed to abandon AirLand Battle 

doctrine designed for fighting an echeloned threat on a linear front 

and the deep battle to attrit the enemy’s follow-on forces for a new 

warfighting doctrine. In February 1991, General Foss explained in 

his warfighting concept that long-range intelligence systems would 

detect enemy forces and that long-range precision fires from fire 

support systems would cover the gaps created by the smaller forces, 

destroy the enemy force on the non-linear battlefield, and set the 

conditions for decisive operations.54

Subsequently in March 1991, General Vuono endorsed General 

Foss’s basic concept and directed the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to formulate new doctrine for the post-Cold War 

world. General Vuono also reaffirmed the necessity to incorporate 

lessons learned from the recent Gulf War. Additionally, he emphasized force projection to regional hotspots as a vital aspect of the 

new doctrine with the end of the Cold War and its attending massive 
51

forward-deployment of troops in Europe. This led to extensive and 

heated discussions throughout the Army, conferences, and the August 1991 publication of US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution 

of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond.

55

US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, 

AirLand Operations, co-signed by the US Air Force Tactical Air 

Command Commanding General, expounded an overarching idea 

of future Army operations and provided a basis for the development 

of joint operations and doctrine. Although AirLand Operations signaled a continuation of AirLand Battle doctrine, the pamphlet also 

suggested a significant new orientation. Reflecting lessons from 

the recent Gulf War, it emphasized depth and simultaneous attack 

throughout the depth of the battlespace that permitted no sanctuary for the enemy to hide; non-linear maneuver warfare; decisive 

army operations as part of a joint, combined, and interagency team; 

and power projection on short notice.56 As envisioned by General 

Foss and other high-ranking Army officers, long-range operational 

fires from the country’s different military branches would destroy 

the enemy and minimize friendly casualties. Following this, tactical 

fires from air-, land-, or sea-based delivery systems would support 

maneuver forces attacks on enemy flanks and rear to avoid frontal 

assaults with their attending battle of attrition.57

Following the publication of 525-5, the US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command shifted its attention to rewriting Field Manual 

100-5, Operations, with the intention of incorporating AirLand Operations into it. This would make AirLand Operations doctrine and 

not just a concept for fighting. When he became the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Commanding General on 23 August 

1991, General Frederick M. Franks Jr. temporarily suspended work 

on the field manual to focus on doctrinal problems that had emerged 

during Operation Desert Storm. Based on his experience in the Gulf, 

he identified five battlefield dynamics of early entry and lethality, 

depth and simultaneous attack, battlespace, command and control 

(subsequently renamed battle command), and combat service support that required attention and incorporation into doctrine. For 

the Field Artillery School, depth and simultaneous attack loomed 
52

especially critical because the Field Artillery would be the major 

contributor. As the school and the US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command defined in August 1991, depth and simultaneous attack 

meant the simultaneous application of combat power throughout the 

depth of the battlefield. To execute depth and simultaneous attack, 

the school envisioned employing joint precision strikes at the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical functions.58

Using his battlefield dynamics as a foundation for revising 

Army doctrine, General Franks restarted work on Field Manual 100-

5, Operations, later in 1991 with the goal of internalizing the lessons 

of the Gulf War throughout the Army. He tasked the School of Advanced Military Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to assume the lead with the US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command’s service schools providing 

input as required. The School of Advanced Military Studies produced 

a draft Field Manual 100-5, Operations, by mid-1992 and distributed 

it to the service schools for comments. Major General Fred F. Marty, 

who was Field Artillery School Commandant from 1991 to 1993, 

criticized the draft in July 1992 as being too timid. He said that the 

manual required “hard-hitting language” to attract people’s attention 

and sell the Army’s position on joint precision strike and joint precision interdiction.59 Subsequently in the fall of 1992, the Field Artillery School explained in terse wording that the examination of depth 

and simultaneous attack was incomplete. The Army had to explain 

why the deep battle was critical and how to fight the deep battle. 

Also, the manual had to point out the Army’s ability to conduct precision interdiction as well as depth and simultaneous attack.60

Based on this critique, a team of writers in the school rewrote 

much of Field Manual 100-5 on its own initiative and submitted it 

with General Marty’s support to the School of Advanced Military 

Studies for review. Among other things, the school stressed the firepower and maneuver relationship, the lethality required for early 

deployers, and the importance of depth and simultaneous attack. In 

1993, the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory that 

was created in 1992 at Fort Sill as part of General Franks’ battle 

laboratory program broadened the initial definition of depth and simultaneous attack. It clarified that depth and simultaneous attack 
53

was the simultaneous application of combat power against an enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield. Depth and simultaneous 

attack would place all critical functions at risk and accelerate defeat 

by overwhelming the enemy with continuous, all-weather, simultaneous application of joint fires across the battlefield and by forcing 

the enemy commander to react to multiple threats rather than focusing on any single threat.61

Much to the Field Artillery School’s delight, General Franks 

accepted this definition, concurred with the school’s recommendations and revisions, and directed the School for Advanced Military 

Studies to rewrite the Field Manual 100-5 preliminary draft for 

staffing early in 1993. Although depth and simultaneous attack was 

the heart of the new battle dynamics, the draft manual still noted the 

potential of fighting outnumbered, which reflected previous 1970s 

and 1980s doctrine and demonstrated the difficulty of breaking with 

the past. Even so, General Franks believed that depth and simultaneous attack would prevent the enemy from finding a sanctuary 

or safety because combat power would be applied throughout the 

depth of the battlespace simultaneously and would stun and then 

rapidly defeat the enemy.62

On 14 June 1993, the Army’s 218th birthday, the Army published Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993), as the fourth edition 

of the field manual. Previous editions were published in 1976, 1982, 

and 1986. The new edition recognized worldwide changes since 

the end of the Cold War; the increased importance of peacekeeping, disaster assistance, and nation building; the imperative of joint 

US operations and combined operations with foreign allies; and the 

emerging information age. Additionally, the field manual defined 

the Army’s doctrine for defending the nation, addressed multiple 

threats, emphasized depth and simultaneous attack, and discussed 

the Army’s role as a power-projection force to reflect the necessity 

of deploying forces rapidly and effectively throughout the world as 

required. Just as important, the new field manual recast doctrine in 

the strategic and joint context by devoting chapters to joint operations and combined operations; it also introduced and described 

full-dimensional operations.63

From the Field Artillery School’s perspective, Field Manual 
54

100-5, Operations (1993), took advantage of American fire support 

superiority and equally as important modified the role of corps artillery. Employing AirLand Battle fire support doctrine that had been 

codified in Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1982 and 1986), the 

corps commander retained some of his field artillery assets and allocated the rest of his cannons and M270 launchers that could shoot 

the Army Tactical Missile System missile and the Multiple Launcher 

Rocket System rocket to support the division’s 3 field artillery battalions of 72 cannons and 9 Multiple Launch Rocket System launchers. With the help of corps artillery, division artillery provided counterfire and close support to the maneuver arms.64

Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993), changed the role of 

corps artillery. As part of a joint forces command, the corps commander would retain control of his Multiple Launch Rocket System 

and Army Tactical Missile System assets and assign them to attack 

specific targets with overwhelming firepower to hold all enemy functions at risk as part of the stress on depth and simultaneous attack. 

Conducted by the corps commander, long-range operational precision fires from rockets and missiles as well as indirect fire systems 

under development would be the major killers on the battlefield. They 

would disrupt, delay, degrade, or divert enemy capabilities and set the 

conditions for future battles. Once the long-range, operational, precision fires from rockets and missiles had sufficiently destroyed the enemy, the division’s direct and general support artillery would support 

the maneuver forces as they attacked the flanks and rear and then deliver the final blows with assistance from corps artillery as needed.65

Unlike AirLand Battle with its Europe orientation, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993), manifested the end of the Cold War 

and the beginning of a new era. Rejecting the long-held emphasis on 

defending Europe from a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack, AirLand Operations’ force projection focus underscored the need for versatile, 

deployable, strategically mobile, and lethal active and reserve forces 

that could respond rapidly to a crisis anyplace in the world. By doing this, AirLand Operations reflected a critical lesson coming out 

of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The Army 

had to be prepared to fight anywhere in the world at a moment’s notice—placing paramount emphasis on deployability and readiness. 
55

Louisiana Maneuvers, Battle Laboratories, & Force XXI

As it was writing Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993), doctrine that was the first major 1990s reform effort and would be applicable to the present and foreseeable international environment, 

the Army initiated a second major effort to modernize its fighting 

forces. In 1992, it organized the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers Task 

Force to help guide the Army into the 21st Century. Subsequently, 

the US Army Training and Doctrine Command established its battle 

laboratory program to complement and support the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers and conduct experiments using computers and field 

exercises. Two years later in 1994, the Army launched the Force 

XXI campaign plan with three axes of effort (modernization of the 

institutional Army, modernization of the operational forces under 

the Joint Venture rubric, and digitization of the force by expanding 

dependence on computers). Working together, the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers, the battle laboratories, and the Force XXI campaign 

plan created an aggressive and ambitious endeavor to move the 

Army from an Industrial-Age force to a deployable, InformationAge force with the ability to dominate the 21st Century battlefield. 

Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, recognized that the Army of Excellence of the 1980s was obsolete in 

the post-Cold War world as well as the need to go beyond rewriting doctrine. Thus he officially chartered and funded the Modern 

Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force on 22 May 1992 at the US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command. Inspired by the 1941 Louisiana 

Maneuvers that General George C. Marshall and Lieutenant General 

Lesley J. McNair developed to help prepare the Army for World War 

II, Sullivan wanted to organize and conduct the Modern Louisiana 

Maneuvers process to manage change, identify ideas for resolution, 

establish consensus among senior leaders, and serve as a headquarters for experimentation and change. Led by Brigadier General 

Tommy Franks, the task force was stood up and collocated with the 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command. By the end of 1992, the 

task force—essentially a think tank that brainstormed new ideas—

identified more than 200 issues for further study and refinement and 

presented the top 20 to the four-star generals who comprised the 

Modern Louisiana Maneuvers Board of Directors. Among other 
56

recommendations, task force members strongly encouraged exploiting digital information technologies to move the Army into the 21st 

Century and enhance situational awareness and lethality. Over the 

next four years the task force continued to explore various ideas to 

modernize the Army and employed the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s battle laboratory initiative as needed.66 It ceased 

operations in 1996 after organizing the Force XXI effort in 1994. 

Created in May 1992 by the commanding general of US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, General Frederick M. Franks Jr., 

the battle laboratory program helped define capabilities, identify requirements, and determine priorities for a power projection army 

of the future. The program also supported the Modern Louisiana 

Maneuvers process of modernizing the Army for the 21st Century 

battlefield. The battle laboratory program consisted of six battle 

laboratories (Battle Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Depth 

and Simultaneous Attack at Fort Sill; Mounted Battle Space at Fort 

Knox, Kentucky; Dismounted Battle Space at Fort Benning, Georgia; Combat Service Support at Fort Lee, Virginia; and Early Entry Lethality and Survivability at Fort Monroe, Virginia). The battle 

laboratories took advantage of simulations and computers that replicated reality to conduct their experiments and investigations into 

new concepts, emerging technologies, and procedures to determine 

the priorities and requirements for a power projection army. Through 

advanced concept technology demonstrations that identified and exhibited the military utility of emerging concepts and technologies as 

well as advanced technology demonstrations that showed the maturity and potential of advanced technologies for military operations, 

the battle laboratories energetically pursued a far-reaching agenda to 

help modernize the Army. Together, the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers and the battle laboratories promoted extensive change to move 

the Army into the 21st Century in the face of declining budgets.67

As it addressed capabilities vital for the future and fostered 

sweeping change, the battle laboratory concept unquestionably represented a significant break with the Cold War era threat-driven decision-making and combat developments process. Acknowledging 

this, General Franks mentioned: 
57

Current methods of determining requirements and setting 

priorities cannot keep pace, will not allow us to meet the 

budget challenges, will not allow us to maintain the edge. 

. . . Battlelabs are an initiative analyzing capabilities and 

requirements rather than depending on concepts based on 

analysis and comparison against a firm threat, like we had 

in the Cold War. We can’t depend on Cold War. . .processes to determine priorities.68

In seeking to increase battlefield effectiveness by optimizing 

technology, the battle laboratory program focused its energies on 

needed capabilities and not a specific threat as General Franks noted. Before any concept or equipment was tested in the field, the battle laboratories analyzed it. Outlining the process, Colonel William 

Hubbard, the Director of the Battle Lab Integration and Technology 

Directorate at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, explained that the battle laboratories would send the concept or technology through simulation then bring it back again, tweak it, send it 

back through again to get a near optimum solution, and then test it in 

rigorous field exercises.69 This methodology saved money without 

sacrificing quality.70

Fort Sill’s Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory 

(renamed the Fires Battle Laboratory in 2006) focused on improving fire support.71 The laboratory examined fire support concepts, 

analyzed new fire support technologies, conducted simulations that 

replicated reality, and participated in advanced concept technology 

and advanced technology demonstrations in support of the Field Artillery School, the battle laboratory endeavor, and the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers process.72

Two demonstrations were key to this effort. In October 1992 

within a couple months of being stood up, the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory participated in a precision strike demonstration at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, where 

Apache helicopters conducted a deep attack against targets out to 

150 kilometers. To support the attack, a live-fire mission with an 

Army Tactical Missile System suppressed enemy air defenses and 

validated the Automatic Target Handoff System. The system linked 
58

Air Force sensors with Army firing systems to reduce the time between locating the target and engaging it. Later in the year, the laboratory took part in Operation Desert Capture at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, where the Joint Surveillance and 

Attack Radar System (an Air Force airborne command and control 

system) Ground Station Module was linked to the Tactical Fire Direction System at Fort Sill for improved command and control and 

field artillery deep attack capabilities; the demonstration reaffirmed 

the ability to join Air Force sensors and Army indirect fire systems.73

The growing emphasis on deep attack (precision strike) operations during these exercises revealed the need for a specialized 

planning, coordination, and execution cell at the corps level and led 

to the organization of the Deep Operations Coordination Cell. As 

an extension of the corps fire support element, the cell would be 

responsible to the corps fire support coordinator for conducting all 

deep attack operations. The existing fire support element would retain its current functions but would not have the burden of planning 

and conducting deep attack/precision strike missions.74

During this 1992 to 1994 period, the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers process and the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory were examining ways to modernize the Army through computer simulations and field exercises as well as examining emerging 

technologies. Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated 

a comprehensive review of national defense strategy, force structure 

modernization in March 1993 in response to the end of the Cold War 

and the emergence of a new world order. As Secretary Aspin called 

it, the Bottom-Up Review moved the military’s attention away from 

the Soviet threat to regional threats; it viewed Iraq’s 1990 invasion 

of Kuwait as an example of the new world order that would require 

American attention in the future. With this in mind, the Bottom-Up 

Review published in October 1993 defined the strategy of power 

projection, the forces, and the budget required to move into the 21st 

Century with its perceived regional threats.75

The Bottom-Up Review’s focus on worldwide challenges 

prompted the Army to launch the Force XXI campaign plan developed by the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers task force. Building on the work of the battle laboratories, the campaign outlined 
59

making significant force structure changes, integrating advanced 

information technology (computers) more fully through its forces, 

and transforming operational units so that they could deploy more 

rapidly, would be more combat capable, and could dominate future 

battlefields with real-time situational awareness.76

The Force XXI campaign plan outlined three axes of modernization. The Joint Venture axis would redesign the operational Army 

through battle laboratory conceptual testing by employing advanced 

concept technology demonstrations and advanced technology demonstrations, advanced warfighting experiments with an experimental force, and digitization of command and control systems. A second axis outlined revamping the institutional Army that generated 

and sustained the operational Army. Led by the Army Digitization 

Office that would integrate all digitization efforts, the third axis set 

out to acquire digital information technology for the operational and 

institutional Army.77

On 8 March 1994, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon 

R. Sullivan, directed beginning the Force XXI campaign plan. Writing in the May 1994 Army, he explained:

Today, we are at the threshold of a new era, and we must 

proceed into it decisively. The industrial age is being superseded by the information age—the third wave—hard 

on the heels of the agrarian and industrial eras [first and 

second waves]. Our present Army is well configured to 

fight and win in the. . .industrial age, and we can handle 

agrarian-age forces as well. We have begun to move into 

the third-wave warfare, to evolve a new force for a new 

century—Force XXI.78

General Sullivan noted that the Army needed to adapt to the 

Information Age without any hesitation. It had to take advantage of 

the computer so that its operational forces could function at even 

greater performance levels in speed, space, and time and also break 

free of old concepts. The Force XXI initiative proposed to design a 

force projection Army for the 21st Century through Joint Venture 

that would leverage the power of people, information, and technology to win the nation’s wars and be a reality by 2010, although 
60

planned reforms would continue after that date.79

According to General Sullivan, doctrine served as the Force 

XXI’s engine of change. Within a year after publishing Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993)—with its emphasis on providing operational, long-range fires, countering multiple threats, and projecting 

power from the continental United States—the US Army Training and Doctrine Command published a revised Pamphlet 525-5, 

Force XXI Operations, on 1 August 1994. The new pamphlet built 

on Field Manual 100-5 (1993), which provided a short lead on the 

future, and allowed the Army to move forward in its thinking. Pamphlet 525-5 (1994) represented a continuation of change, continuity 

with the past, and growth that would enable the Army to remain a 

relevant, strategic force capable of decisive victory in the 21st Century with a high degree of strategic mobility. Besides explaining the 

importance of modularity to the future Army, the pamphlet outlined 

a future vision, provided an intellectual foundation for Force XXI, 

and furnished a vision of future conflict for the US Army Training 

and Doctrine Command’s Task Force XXI, its battle laboratories, 

doctrine writers, combat developers, and trainers.80

Using the August pamphlet as a foundation, the US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command rewrote doctrine as tasked by 

the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, who 

had served as Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School in the 1980s. On 25 October 1995, the Commanding 

General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, General 

William W. Hartzog, published a program directive that charged the 

School of Advanced Military Studies at the US Army Command 

and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to develop 

Force XXI doctrine. He explained that the new doctrine should 

build on the existing field manual and integrate peace operations, 

humanitarian assistance operations, power projection operations, 

and military operations short of general war into the body of operational doctrine. At the same time, General Hartzog emphasized 

the joint, interagency, and combined aspects of war as well as the 

incorporation of information technology at all levels of command 

more than his predecessors had done. In 1997, the school produced 

a final draft of the new field manual that reflected General Hartzog’s 
61

desired orientation. However, debates throughout the Army over 

terms and content continued into 1999 and forced a major rewrite to 

be completed that year. The Army redesignated Field Manual 100-5 

as Field Manual 3.0, Operations, in 2000 to keep it parallel with the 

joint force publications numbering system then approved it on 14 

June 2001 as official doctrine.81

Force XXI doctrine meanwhile compelled the Field Artillery 

School to revise fire support doctrine to keep it current with Field 

Manual 3.0.82 At the time, the Field Artillery was platform-based 

and possessed state-of-the-art howitzers and rocket launchers that 

shot “conventional, dumb, large amounts of ammunitions out onto 

the battlefield in support of maneuver forces.”83 Major General Leo 

J. Baxter, who was Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 

1997 to 1999, explained late in 1998 that the Field Artillery was in 

the process of shifting from a platform-based force to a munitionsbased force. This required the branch to move from managing weapon systems to directing fires effects by ensuring that they would be 

delivered at the right place and right time. Smart or brilliant munitions with increased ranges and lethality would give the Field Artillery precision and enhanced terminal effects on the target, making 

the location of the platform less important. Essentially, General Baxter envisioned “effects-based fires.”84 One field artillery officer commented as the school started writing fire support doctrine in March 

1999: “Current digital operations are just the old way of executing 

fire support operations, but now we sometimes plan and execute 

with computers. . . . We have refined and digitized. . .[fire support]; 

but, at its base, it has changed little since the early 20th Century” 

because it is still platform-based.85 Along with General Baxter, he 

called for completely revamping fire support doctrine to exploit the 

emerging information technology and precision munitions. Similar 

to General Baxter, he advocated effects-based operations with their 

emphasis on precision munitions as the preferred solution and urged 

abandoning platform-based operations.86

With this concept of munitions-based or effects-based operations that represented a radical departure from platform-based operations, the ground commander would no longer focus on the source 

of the supporting fires. Historically, the Field Artillery positioned 
62

firing platforms close to supported maneuver units and exercised 

centralized command and control through the fire direction center. 

Rather than concentrating on the source of fires as field artillery officers and Soldiers had done traditionally, the maneuver commander 

would focus on the effects required to accomplish the mission. The 

maneuver commander would describe the effects required and the 

effects coordination center would deliver them. The effects coordination cell concept was evolving in 1998 and 1999, with the Depth 

and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory testing it as part of its 

Future Fires Command and Control Concept Evaluation Program in 

the fall of 1999. However, the Field Artillery School foresaw that it 

would most likely be at the brigade and above echelons to integrate 

effects delivery systems and organizations.87

Under Major General Toney Stricklin, who succeeded Major 

General Baxter in 1999 to 2001, effects-based fires and effects further evolved. Upon arriving at the school in August 1999, General 

Stricklin outlined his concept of the effects coordination cell. The 

cell needed to be applicable for today’s Army to gain acceptance 

but lacked critical tools to function as envisioned. Implementing 

the full vision would require communications systems with greater 

bandwidth and more robust, firing platforms that had the ability to 

do more technical work than existing systems. In view of this, General Stricklin scaled back the Effects Coordination Cell’s functions 

and renamed it the Fires Effects Coordination Cell. This signified 

an evolution from the fire support element, was designed to gain 

wider acceptance throughout the Army, and signaled the shift from 

platform-based fires to effects-based fires.88

Besides providing the same functions as the fire support element at brigade and above echelons, the cell incorporated new ones. 

Upon becoming operational early in the 21st Century, the cell furnished deep operations that were formerly provided by the Deep 

Operations Coordination Cell at the corps and provided close support by controlling cannon, rocket, attack aviation, and close air 

support lethal effects. Just as important, the cell managed nonlethal 

effects, such as electronic warfare, civil affairs, information operations, and psychological operations. These last functions previously 

were beyond the purview of the fire support element at the battalion 
63

and the brigade; this broadened the scope of fire support functions 

beyond the traditional focus on lethal fires to the consideration of 

nonlethal effects.89

In 2000, the Army formed its first Fires Effects Coordination 

Cell based on successful 1999 and 2000 testing in the Future Fires 

Command and Control Concept Evaluation Program and advanced 

warfare experiments. The first Initial Brigade Combat Team included 

a Fires Effects Coordination Cell that was more capable than the fire 

support element that it replaced by having the capability to provide 

lethal and nonlethal effects.90 The team was organized at Fort Lewis, 

Washington, as part of the Transformation of the Army under Chief 

of Staff, General Eric Shinseki. As Colonel Jerry C. Hill and Major 

Carl R. Trout of Fort Sill explained late in 2000, “The addition of the 

nonlethal effects cell, with its diverse composition, is. . .significant. . 

. . It includes information operations, electronic attack, psychological 

operations (PSYOP), civil affairs, and legal assistance.”91 Continuing, 

they pointed out, “It also includes a tactical intelligence officer who 

is a key contributor to nonlethal targets. The FECC [Fires Effects Coordination Cell] has links to the common ground station (CGS) and 

all-source analysis system (ASAS). It is designed to exploit sensor 

technology and leverage organic, joint, and national assets.”92

By creating the Fires Effects Coordination Cell with its effectsbased orientation, the Field Artillery took a concrete step to move 

from platform-based fires and integrating nonlethal effects as a capability. As effects-based fires indicated, the Field Artillery entered 

a new age of fire support where effects were becoming more important than the firing platform and the ability to furnish nonlethal 

effects was growing more critical. 

The Digital Puzzle

Work continued to explore new technological and organizational solutions that would improve lethality and responsiveness and 

complement the writing of new doctrine as a Joint Venture priority, 

as well as developing the Fire Effects Coordination Cell. Continuing 

its simulation and virtual reality endeavor begun in 1992, the Depth 

and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory took part in 1995 to 

1998 Precision/Rapid Counter-Multiple Rocket Launcher Advanced 
64

Concept Technology Demonstrations that were conducted by the 

Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Project Office at Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia. The demonstrations were designed to furnish creative and 

innovative solutions to operational problems in response to combatant commanders’ and Office of Secretary of Defense requirements. 

At the time, about 70 percent of North Korea’s armed forces along 

the demilitarized zone were forward deployed. Such deployment included long-range field artillery and 240-millimeter multiple rocket 

launchers that were located in hardened mountainside sites. These 

systems had rapid emplacement, firing, and displacement capabilities; posed a threat to US and South Korean military forces; provided little reaction time and few indicators of an impending strike; 

and would need to be eliminated in the event of war. To offset these 

strengths, the demonstrations focused on deep strike capabilities of 

the Army Tactical Missile System I (the original Army Tactical Missile System that became operational in 1991 as a replacement to 

the conventional Lance missile), the Army Tactical Missile System 

IA that had a Global Positioning System in its guidance system to 

increase accuracy at long ranges and became operational in 1998, 

and Army Tactical Missile II that was under development. Army 

Tactical Missile II would carry the Brilliant Antiarmor Munition, 

a precision munition that was also under development. Ultimately, 

the demonstrations validated the ability of current and emerging 

advanced technologies to defeat a North Korean multiple rocket 

launcher attack within hours after a conflict began.93

As this advanced concept technology demonstration was concluding, the Department of Defense approved the Theater Precision 

Strike Operations Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration on 

21 November 1997. This new addition for Fiscal Year 1998 was in 

response to the Joint Forces Land Component Commander’s requirement for an enhanced capability for theater precision engagements 

and fires. As part of the demonstration, the Depth and Simultaneous 

Attack Battle Laboratory supported Foal Eagle, Reception, Staging, 

Onward Movement and Integration, SummerEx, Ulchi Focus Lens, 

and other exercises between 1998 and 2001. The exercises exhibited new capabilities to enhance interoperability among Army, Navy, 
65

and Air Force automated systems; improve counterfire; upgrade automated methods for deconflicting airspace; update information on 

potential targets; and enhance predictive battle damage assessment.94

While the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory 

and other TRADOC battle laboratories tested doctrine, organization, 

and emerging equipment employing advanced concept technology 

demonstrations and advanced technology demonstrations as a part 

of Joint Venture, advanced warfighting experiments capped Joint 

Venture. In April 1994, the Army conducted the Desert Hammer VI 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training Center, 

California—the first of several advanced warfighting experiments 

that would be conducted through 1997. Using a brigade-level task 

force from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the demonstration tested digital command and control systems and corresponding 

tactics, techniques, and procedures in a field setting. Through two 

weeks of intense, almost non-stop, simulation-enhanced force-onforce battles, the experiment clearly verified digitization’s capability 

to increase lethality and tempo.95

Addressing Desert Hammer VI of 1994, Major General John 

A. Dubia, Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 1993 to 

1995, explained the Field Artillery’s role in the experiment. Desert Hammer VI provided the Field Artillery with the opportunity 

to unveil its newest system, the M109A6 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer with digital and shoot-and-scoot capabilities that 

protected it from enemy counterfire. Called the Paladin, the howitzer far exceeded the performance of field artillery in previous National Training Center rotations. The howitzer also represented the 

greatest opportunity to rethink field artillery tactics since Gustavus 

Adolphus gave each regiment its own accompanying artillery piece 

in the 1630s, according to Lieutenant Colonel William M. Bransford, who commanded the 4th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment. During the exercise, Paladins from the 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) easily outpaced and outperformed the predecessor 

M109A2/A3 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, which depended on wire and analog communications. Major General Dubia 

also pointed out that the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle rep-
66

resented a quantum leap forward and would begin development in 

the fall of 1994 and be fielded in 1999. A mockup of the Advanced 

Field Artillery Tactical Data System and the Initial Fire Support 

Automation System likewise showed their ability to take the Field 

Artillery into the 21st Century with dramatic improvements in digitized command and control.96

Over the next several years, the Army scheduled additional advanced warfighting experiments. Between February and September 

1995, Task Force 2000—organized in the Field Artillery School in 

August 1994 to oversee the school’s participation in modernization 

activities—took part in the Focused Dispatch Advanced Warfighting Experiment for the heavy forces at Fort Knox, Kentucky. This 

follow-on to Desert Hammer VI consisted of a series of constructive and virtual simulations and a field training exercise with a portion of the forces live and a part portrayed in virtual and constructive simulations. The experiment centered on developing digitized 

doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for armored and 

mechanized forces. It also illustrated the advantages and disadvantages of sensor-to-sensor links and the importance of careful fire 

support planning and proper clearance of fires when employing 

sensor-to-shooter links.97

Subsequently, Task Force 2000 played a part in the November 

1995 Warrior Focus Advanced Warfare Experiment for light forces 

at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Warrior 

Focus compared the performance of a conventional, non-digitized 

light task force to a fully digitized light task force and found the latter 

to be superior in performance. In particular, it revealed the Advanced 

Field Artillery Tactical Data System’s ability to support fast tempos 

and the imperative to digitize the Advanced Towed Cannon Artillery 

System that was under development (later designated as the M777 

towed 155-millimeter howitzer) as well as the requirement for the 

Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder to lase and designate targets for precision munitions that were being developed.98

Subsequently, the Army conducted the Prairie Warrior 96 Advanced Warfighting Experiment and followed it with the Prairie 

Warrior 97 Advanced Warfighting Experiment. Carried out at the 

US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 
67

Kansas, both highlighted fires as a potentially dominant force on 

the 21st Century battlefield. They also confirmed the necessity to 

preserve division artillery as the command and control headquarters of the division’s fire support assets as well as the requirement 

for two field artillery brigades to reinforce the fires of a committed 

division. Equally as important, the experiments allowed students at 

the college to employ the Field Artillery’s most advanced future capabilities—the Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, the 

Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition, and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, which were in varying stages of development. 

The experiments confirmed that these systems were essential for 

expanding and dominating battlespace, that division artillery could 

plan and execute attacks much like a maneuver brigade, that the 

division artillery structure was essential, and that information technologies enhanced division artillery and fire support capabilities.99

Building on the 1996 to 1997 advanced warfighting experiments, the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment tested 

a modernized brigade combat team of two heavy battalions, one 

light infantry battalion, and a brigade support slice to demonstrate 

the potential improvements created by digitization. The March 1997 

experiment provided information for Force XXI on operational and 

organizational concepts as well as materiel acquisition opportunities 

and assessed the doctrinal, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldier impacts of information-age technologies.100

On a smaller scale, the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting 

Experiment offered a glimpse of the Field Artillery’s future. After 

noting that the school was still sifting through the vast expanse of 

data, Major General Leo Baxter, Chief of Field Artillery from 1997 

to 1999, noted late in 1997 that the fire support system was “capable of shaping battlespace and setting the conditions for decisive 

maneuver.”101 In fact, fires were critical for successful operations 

because they eliminated the enemy’s capability to fight in a coherent manner.102

These advanced warfighting experiments carried out during 

the late 1990s confirmed the ability of digital information technology to increase the lethality, survivability, and operating tempo of 

ground forces, including fire support. As a result, the Army pushed 
68

to develop digital systems and conducted an advanced warfighting 

experiment to test the Division XXI that would exploit information 

and communications technology to provide situational awareness 

and increased combat effectiveness as well as permit reducing the 

size of the division by 15 percent.103

On 15 March 1995, General Reimer designated the 2d Armored 

Division (reflagged in January 1996 as the 4th Mechanized Infantry 

Division), Fort Hood, Texas, as the Army’s experimental force to 

conduct the Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment and 

placed it under the operational control of the US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command.104 Held at Fort Hood in November 1997, the 

Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment capped the multiyear heavy forces experimentation effort and evaluated a conceptual 

digitized mechanized division, including emerging field artillery 

systems. Every divisional platform was equipped with a computer 

that was linked to the tactical Internet. The experiment clearly demonstrated that digitization permitted the commander to see where 

friendly and enemy units were on the battlefield for enhanced situational awareness; allowed the division to cover the battlespace of 

a current corps; and enabled reducing the number of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and personnel without sacrificing lethality and 

survivability to promote expeditionary capabilities that had been the 

province of the Army’s light forces. The successful experiment led 

the Army to convert the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) into a 

digital division by 2000.105

For the Field Artillery, lessons emerged quickly from the Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment. Fire support initiatives—the Brilliant Antitank and Sense-and-Destroy Armor munitions, the Crusader, the Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 Block II radar, and 

the M270A1 launcher—under development and the Advanced Field 

Artillery Tactical Data System being fielded provided seamless coverage of the division’s battlespace. The advanced warfighting experiment demonstrated the ability of division artillery with its three 

howitzer battalions (54 howitzers) and one Multiple Launch Rocket 

System battalion (18 launchers) with assistance from two reinforcing field artillery brigades of two howitzer battalions (36 howitzers) 

and one Multiple Rocket Launcher System battalion (18 launchers) 
69

to pave the way for decisive maneuver by killing hostile armor.106

Acknowledging that the Division XXI Advanced Warfighting 

Experiment of 1997 focused on the heavy division, the Army concurrently recognized the imperative to modernize its light forces for 

contingency operations and force projection. Prompted by this imperative, the Army decided in 1998 to digitize its light forces and 

organized the Rapid Force Project Initiative Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstrations. Based on the success of these demonstrations, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) participated 

in the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment 

in September 2000. The effort was part of the Millennium Challenge 

conducted by the Joint Forces Command to test ways to improve 

contingency force capabilities and serve as the foundation for light 

force modernization.107 Conclusions indicated that digitization improved situational awareness and enhanced lethality and versatility 

in light forces as they did with the heavy forces. As the US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat 

Developments noted in October 2000, the digitized light force demonstrated the ability to collect and exploit digital information and 

achieved demonstrable improvements over the non-digital force.108

With the disappearance of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat 

in Europe, the Force XXI Campaign Plan played a critical role in 

adapting the Army and the Field Artillery to a new international 

environment. Using battle laboratory assets, Force XXI tests and 

experiments demonstrated the potential of a digitized, strategically 

mobile, force projection ground force with unprecedented situational awareness and the capability to dominate the battlefield of the 

21st Century. For the Field Artillery, Force XXI reinforced the key 

role of field artillery fire support and the importance of systems being fielded and those in various stages of development. 

The Army After Next

As the Army pushed forward with Force XXI, it initiated the 

third reform effort. Early in 1996, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis R. Reimer, and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Commanding General, General William W. Hartzog, launched 

the Army After Next campaign plan to help Army leadership craft 
70

a vision of future Army requirements. Force XXI would field technologies for the near term and an Army that was smaller and more 

deployable than the Army of Excellence of the 1980s and 1990s and 

was becoming a reality as the 1990s came to a close. The Army After 

Next, also known as Objective Force, would be its successor—envisioning technologies for 2025 and creating a rapidly deployable, 

digitized force with unprecedented offensive capabilities.109

A 1996–97 study by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency developed suggestions for the Army After Next that were 

briefed to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command in October 

1997. Then in mid-1998, General Hartzog unveiled the Army After 

Next blueprint at a Pentagon presentation. The blueprint formulated 

a three-axis experimental plan to carry it beyond Force XXI—officially called Army XXI—to the Army After Next of 2025. The light 

axis centered on developing new equipment and force structure for 

the light contingency forces. The mechanized axis focused on fielding the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as the Army’s first digitized division and III Corps as the first mechanized corps during the 

first decade of the 21st Century to complete the Force XXI effort. 

The strike axis outlined creating a highly deployable brigade-size 

force to bridge the lethality and survivable gap between the early 

entry or light forces and campaign or mechanized forces.110

The incentive behind the strike axis stemmed from the Army’s 

experience during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 

which highlighted the necessity to change the Army dramatically. 

Deploying a heavy brigade to the Persian Gulf took 18 days in 

1990. In the future, US military forces would not have the luxury 

of taking so long shipping and organizing sufficient combat power 

into theater to prevent a major conflict. Potential enemies would not 

permit the Americans to build up their forces at their leisure and 

establish the terms of fighting. With this conclusion in the mind, the 

Army, the Defense Science Board, the Army Science Board, Army 

After Next studies, and other mid-1990s studies concluded that the 

American military would have to force its way into the theater of 

operations against armed opposition and would require a mobile, 

modular, deployable force in the future.111

As of 1998, neither the Army’s light forces nor its mechanized 
71

forces had the ability to deter or defeat an aggressor in the manner 

envisioned. Force XXI’s enhanced firepower, command and control, 

and survivability added early entry capabilities, and possessed strategic mobility. However, a Force XXI light force still lacked sufficient power to defeat a mechanized force. Force XXI also improved 

the mechanized forces’ command and control, strategic mobility, 

survivability, and lethality. However, the heavy forces still required 

prepositioned equipment to enhance strategic mobility. Task Force 

2000 action officers at the Field Artillery School and the US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command observed a critical deficiency. The 

Army lacked the capability to respond rapidly and effectively to regional hotspots with a medium force. During the previous two decades, the emphasis on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact caused 

the Army to organize heavy divisions for combat in Europe and light 

divisions for combat in other parts of the world.112

After two years of conceptual and developmental work, the US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command initiated strike force experimentation in 1998 to develop and field an adaptable, rapidly deployable force that would be decisive upon arrival and capitalize on the 

best of the light and mechanized forces. It would serve as a test bed 

for developing capabilities that would meet the Army’s long-term 

transformation objectives. The force would have 3,000 to 5,000 Soldiers and be equipped and trained to deploy anywhere in the world 

in four to seven days by air or sea in response to a wide spectrum of 

threats and contingencies—from early entry to peacekeeping operations. Equally important, the force would be more survivable, lethal, 

and maneuverable than existing early entry forces and would present a smaller and more sustainable profile than current heavy force 

designs. Although the deployable time of four to seven days certainly did not meet the 18-hour goal established by General Reimer, 

it eclipsed the 18 days required for the Army to deploy a heavy force 

to the Persian Gulf in Operation Desert Shield in 1990.113

The Army examined four options to meet the requirement for 

a lethal strike force that minimized the weakness of the light and 

heavy forces while maximizing their strengths. First, the Army 

could modernize the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment with near-term, 

off-the-shelf technology. Second, the Army could develop a proto-
72

type strike force by anticipating capabilities and technologies that 

land forces would require 25 to 30 years in the future. Third, the 

Army could upgrade the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment with leapahead technology. Fourth, the Army could design a force with force 

packaging and tactical tailoring that would be capable of intervening 

rapidly and decisively. As the US Army Training and Doctrine Command noted, options one through three centered on forming a standing organization and promoting unit cohesion as primary goals. In 

comparison, the fourth option focused on creating a highly deployable headquarters that could command and control a tailored force 

of Army of Excellence or Force XXI capabilities.114 Commenting 

on the options, General John N. Abrams, the US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command Commanding General, observed in October 

1998: “We’re probably going to have a blend of these ideas.”115

As General Reimer explained early in 1999, the Army planned 

to use the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to create a strike force that 

would provide an adaptive, near-term, early entry force capable of 

rapid strategic deployment. The regiment in effect would become a 

headquarters that was capable of being task-organized. Once fielded, the strike force would serve as a prototype for testing organizational structures, operational concepts, and critical Army After Next 

leader and Soldier skills.116

In early 1999, the final force structure design did not exist for 

a strike force that would be composed of modular units and employ 

advanced digital information technology to provide timely information. However, the Field Artillery School moved out to develop a 

strike force field artillery headquarters Effects Coordination Cell that 

would assemble real-time information, process that information, and 

apply the appropriate effects (lethal and nonlethal) to the required 

battlespace. Specifically, the Chief of the school’s Task Force 2000, 

Colonel Jerry C. Hill, remarked that the headquarters effects coordination node would have three major functional areas: an intelligence 

and targeting cell, a lethal effects cell, and a nonlethal effects cell. 

These cells would give the commander the desired effect, such as 

disrupting an enemy supply line or removing a communications center through air strikes, field artillery, or other methods.117

While designing its Effects Coordination Cell (later renamed 
73

the Fires Effects Coordination Cell), the school anticipated creating 

a composite field artillery battalion of the High Mobility Artillery 

Rocket System, the Advanced Technology Cannon Artillery System 

(later renamed M777 towed 155-millimeter howitzer), a platoon of 

AN/TPQ-47 radars, a terminal effects coordination platoon, and an 

electronic attack platoon for the Strike Force. While the rocket system would provide long-range fires, the cannon system would furnish close support operations. Functioning as part of the command 

post, the effects coordination platoon would have state-of-the-art 

communications equipment and would plan, coordinate, and synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects from space, sea, air, or ground 

delivery systems throughout the battlespace.118

As the Army worked on designing the Strike Force and the 

school was planning which fire support systems would be part of the 

Strike Force, the Army fielded its first heavy digital division as part 

of the Joint Venture portion of the Force XXI and the Army After 

Next modernization effort. Based on the successful Division XXI 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment of 1997 and the tasking of the 

Chief of Staff of the Army, the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

finished converting to the digitized force structure in 2000. The following year, the digitized 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) demonstrated its go-to-war capability under a realistic and demanding 

scenario in division capstone exercises in March and September 

2001.119 Commenting on the March 2001 exercise, the division’s 

commanding general, Major General Benjamin S. Griffin, noted, 

“the DCX [Division Capstone Exercise] provided us with a continuous operation in a tactical environment to challenge our communication systems, our digital systems, and our warfighting systems, 

against a very, very competent OPFOR [opposing force].”120

The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) successfully performed in both 2001 exercises, which validated transforming the 

division into a digital combat force and its ability to contribute to 

the III Armored Corps’ counteroffensive capability. The exercises 

highlighted the digitized division’s improved situational awareness, 

battlespace dominance, and ability to defeat the enemy at a time and 

place of the division’s choosing. The exercises also demonstrated 

the Field Artillery’s key role in setting the conditions for maneuver 
74

success on the battlefield. Further, they underscored its ability to 

provide timely and accurate fires as well as mass fires at critical 

phases of the fight throughout the depth of the battlefield using the 

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System that processed information rapidly and accurately and that was at the forefront of 

digitization in the Army, according to General Griffin.121

As the 2001 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) exercises indicated, the Field Artillery underwent significant changes during 

the 1990s. Although several years would pass before field artillery 

precision munitions, effects-based fires, and light, deployable systems and equipment for power projection from the United States to 

worldwide crises would become a reality, the Field Artillery aggressively started moving into the digital age that would improve fire 

support responsiveness and effectiveness by processing information 

more quickly than ever before and becoming more mobile without 

sacrificing lethality to support power projection.
75

NOTES

1. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000, Posture Statement File, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC), 19–21; 

U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1999, Posture Statement File, 

x, 4–5, 42, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 

Posture Statement File, 2, HRDC; Statement on the Posture of the U.S. 

Army for Fiscal Year 1998 (Extract), Posture Statement File, 4–6, HRDC; 

DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 31–37; DA, 

Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1987, 11; DA, Historical Summary 

for Fiscal Year 1996, 47; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992, 

13–14, 116–35; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 42–43; 

1994 TRADOC Annual Command History (ACH), 123; Brigadier General Leo J. Baxter, “Field Artillery: Vision 2020,” Field Artillery, December 1994, 10; Gregory Fontenot, et al., On Point: US Army in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2004), 5.

2. Janice E. McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery: 1775–2003 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 317; Major General Fred F. Marty, “State-of-the-Branch Address,” Field Artillery, December 1991, 2.

3. Major General William F. Ward, “Performance in Panama Underscores Readiness,” Army, October 1990, 104–13; Major General Donald Burdick, “An Essential Element of National Strategy,” Army, October 

1990, 116–21. 

4. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1997 (Extract), Posture Statement File, 7–8, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal 

Year 2000, Posture Statement File, 18, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary 

for Fiscal Year 1995, 53–58; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 

1996, 83; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 71–72; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999, 61; Briefing, “Senior Field Artillery Advisors Council,” 1995, HRDC.

5. John J. Todd and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Holt, “Army Science Board Study: How Much Field Artillery is Enough?” Field Artillery,

June 1995, 20–25; Major General Randall L. Rigby, “Fires for Division 

XXI,” Field Artillery, November–December 1995, 3.

6. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003, 

50, HRDC; Major General Randall L. Rigby, “3x6-2x9 MLRS Transition,” Field Artillery, September–October 1996, 18–21; Todd and Holt, 

“Army Science Board Study,” 20–25; U.S. Army Posture Statement for 

Fiscal Year 2000, Posture Statement File, 18, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture 

Statement for Fiscal Year 1997 (Extract), Posture Statement File, HRDC; 

Burdick, “An Essential Element of National Strategy,” 118; Briefing, “Senior Field Artillery Advisors Council,” 1995, HRDC; Captain Lawrence T. 

Hall and Captain Michael A. Sharp, “MLRS NET for the ARNG,” Field 
76

Artillery, March–April 1996, 44–45; McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 317.

7. Major General Fred F. Marty, “State-of-the-Branch 1992,” Field 

Artillery, November–December 1992, 1; Brigadier General William C. 

Bilo, “A Decisive Victory for Strategic Victory,” Field Artillery, March–

April 1995, 22; Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–

1991 (Fort Sill, OK: Office of the Command History, 1994, reprinted by 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 16.

8. Hall and Sharp, “MLRS NET for the ARNG,” 44–45; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 39–40; Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 

December 2003, 113; Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence M. Terranova, Chief, 

New Equipment Training Division, DOTD, interview by author, 27 January 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “G3/G4 Biweekly Update Report 27 October 2004,” HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Bi-weekly Update,” 12 October 2004, HRDC; McKenney, The Organizational History 

of Field Artillery, 1775–2003, 217.

9. Message, Chris Klein, DCD, to author, “3x6/2x9 Transition,” 

28 February 1997, HRDC; Rigby, “3x6-2x9 MLRS Transition,” 18–21; 

Major General Randall L. Rigby, “Mapping the Future: FA State of the 

Branch,” Field Artillery, November–December 1996, 4; Briefing, “3x6-

2x9,” January 1997, HRDC; Briefing, “AC/RC Rebalancing and TAA-11 

Field Artillery Allocation Rules,” 26 August 2003, HRDC; Major General 

Randall L. Rigby, “1996 Senior Fire Support Conference: Focusing Fires 

for Force XXI,” Field Artillery, May–June 1996, 18; Terranova, interview, 

27 January 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NET Input to 2004 

Annual Command History,” 3 February 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Updates to Original NSTD Command History,” 10 February 2004, 

HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence M. Terranova, interview by author, 

30 January 2004, HRDC; Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 16, 

71; McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 317–19. 

In the Army of Excellence of the 1980s, the heavy division had 72 M109 

howitzers as direct support and 9 MLRS launchers as general support. 

Corps Artillery had M110 howitzers and MLRS launchers. 

10. Rigby, “3x6 Cannon-2x9 MLRS Transition,” 18. 

11. Rigby, “FA State of the Branch 1996,” 4. 

12. Marty, “State-of-the-Branch Address 1992,” 2; Information Paper, “MLRS,” undated, MLRS File, HRDC; Field Manual 6-60, MLRS 

Operations, 23 April 1996, MLRS File, HRDC; Table of Organization 

and Equipment, 23 April 1999; Major General Leo J. Baxter, “Meeting 

the Future: State of the Field Artillery 1998,” Field Artillery, November–

December 1998, 1–6; “Transition,” Field Artillery, September–October 

1996, 18–21; Rigby, “Mapping the Future: FA State,” 1; Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. McPhee, “The Divisional MLRS Battalion in the DAWE,” 

Field Artillery, May–June 1998, 38–40; Fact Sheet, “M270 MLRS SelfPropelled Loader/Launchers,” undated, Force XXI File, HRDC; Briefing, 
77

“AC/RC Rebalancing and TAA-11 Field Artillery Allocation Rules, 26 

August 2003, HRDC.

13. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 

2003, 54. 

14. U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume II, G27.

15. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 

2003, 75; U.S Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995, Posture Statement File, 84, HRDC; 1991 USAFACFS ACH, 184; U.S. Army 

Modernization Plan, Volume II, G2-G6; 1994 TRADOC ACH, 136–38.

16. U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume II, G16.

17. Fact Sheet, “AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Weapon Locating System,” undated, Firefinder File, HRDC; “Eyes for the King of Battle,” 

http://www.infoage.org/ffsilver, Firefinder File, HRDC; 1986 USAFACFS Annual Historical Review (AHR), 88–91; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder 

II Radars,” 12 November 1987, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Radar,” 

31 December 1987, HRDC; Disposition Form, “Trip Report - FF Blk II 

Design Review,” 13 August 1987, HRDC; Disposition Form, “Trip Report - Design/Inprogress Review Firefinder Block II,” 5 October 1987, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Product Improvement Program,” 4 August 1988, HRDC; Major David F. McFarren, TSM Target Acquisition, 

interview by author, 7 February 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Distribution of 

Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 Radars,” 16 September 1988, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“Firefinder Improvement Program,” 22 November 1987, HRDC; Fact 

Sheet, “Firefinder Improvement Program,” 13 September 1989, HRDC; 

Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, interview by author, 22 February 1990, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Block IIB Material Change,” 20 

November 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Block IIB Configuration 

Decision,” 25 October 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Impact of FY90 Budget Cuts on Firefinder Block II,” 21 September 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“Firefinder Q-36 Improvement (Block II),” 20 August 1991, HRDC; Fact 

Sheet, “Firefinder Q-36 Improvement Program (Block II),” 14 January 

1992, HRDC; Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, interview by author, 5 February 2002, HRDC.

18. “Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update,” Field Artillery, December 1990, 53; Input to the Commanding General’s Monthly 

Update to TRADOC, 15 February 1991, HRDC; Ron Anderson, TSM 

Target Acquisition, interview by author, 7 March 1991, HRDC; Fact 

Sheet, “Firefinder Radar Product Improvement Programs,” 23 June 1995, 

HRDC; Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, interview by author, 11 

March 1996, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Radars, AN/TPQ-36 and 37,” 

21 February 1995, HRDC; Memorandum for Brigadier General Dean R. 

Ertwine, “Suspension of Q36(V)8 Fielding,” 7 January 1999, HRDC; Ron 

Anderson, Firefinder Program Manager, TSM Target Acquisition, interview by author, 17 February 1999, HRDC; Gordon Wehri, Chief, Target 

Acquisition Branch, Materiel, Requirements, and Integration Division, Di-
78

rectorate of Combat Developments (DCD), interview by author, 6 March 

2000, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder,” 21 January 1999, Firefinder File, 

HRDC.

19. Fact Sheet, “ATACS/COBRA Program,” 3 September 1991, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “ATACS,” 14 January 1992, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“ATACS, 3 September 1991, HRDC; Anderson, interview, 17 February 

1999; Wehri, interview, 6 March 2000; Operational Requirements Document for the AN/TPQ-47 Firefinder Radar, November 1999, HRDC; Fact 

Sheet, “Firefinder AN/TPQ-47 (formerly AN/TPQ-37 P3I Block II),” undated, Firefinder File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Artillery Locating Radar,” undated, Firefinder File, HRDC; Baxter, “Meeting 

the Future,” 1; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 86; Email with Attachment, “TPO 

Sensors History,” 27 March 2007, HRDC. The replacement system for the 

Q-37 went through several different names: the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System in 1990–1991, the Advanced Firefinder System in 

1992, the Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 Block II Pre-planned Product Improvement Program in 1993, the AN/TPQ-37 Block II in 1996, and the AN/

TPQ-47 in 1998.

20. Fact Sheet, “Bradley Fighting Vehicle System,” 9 August 2002, 

BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” 9 August 2002, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle Upgrade,” 26 March 2002, BFIST File, HRDC; Scott Gourley, 

“M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle,” Army, July 2002, 51–52.

21. Fact Sheet, “Bradley Fighting Vehicle (M2A3),” 26 November 

2001, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “BFIST Upgrade,” 26 March 2002, 

BFIST File, HRDC; Gourley, “M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle,” 

51–52; Fact Sheet, “MA2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” 9 August 2002, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “The A3 Bradley 

Fighting Vehicle,” undated, BFIST File, HRDC; Email, “BFIST/Striker,” 

27 February 2002, HRDC; Captain Robert S. Hribar, Material and Training Integration Division, FDIC, interview by author, 19 February 2002, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Bradley Program Overview,” 5–7 June 2001, HRDC; 

Fact Sheet, “BFIST,” 2002, HRDC; Memo, “None,” undated, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History,” 

24 March 2005, HRDC.

22. DA, Procurement Programs (Extract), FY 2003 Budget Estimate, 

February 2002, 396; Major General Michael D. Maples, “2002 State of 

the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2002, 4; Major Neil J. Hamill, Material Requirements and Integration Division, DCD, 

interview by author, 17 February 1998, HRDC; “BFIST is on the Way,” 

Field Artillery, May–June 1997, 45; Message, “Answers to Questions,” 18 

February 1998, HRDC; “Striker/Reconnaissance Team,” Field Artillery, 

January–February 1996, 38; Hibar, interview,19 February 2002; Email, 

“BFIST/Striker, 27 February 2002. 

23. 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFA-
79

CFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 145–46; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 

98–99. See footnotes in respective histories for detailed documents.

24. Major Roger A. Rains, “Readiness: The Field Artillery Takes 

Aim,” Army, March 1985, 41; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Browder A. 

Willis, “HELP for the M109 Self-Propelled Howitzer,” Field Artillery 

Journal, May–June 1983, 35–37; Decision Coordinating Paper, 155-mm 

SP Howitzer (HIP), November 1983, 2–3, HRDC; Briefing, “155-millimeter Self-propelled Howitzer Improvement Program,” undated, HRDC; 

Colonel (Retired) Anthony Pokorny, “Take the Tech,” Field Artillery 

Journal, September–October 1984, 21; Briefing, “Fire Support,” January 

1988, HRDC; Division Support Weapon System (DSWS) Main Report (S/

NOFORN WNINTEL), extract, July 1983, 4–16, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Decision Coordinating Paper, 155-millimeter SP Howitzer 

(HIP), November 1989, 3, 5–6, HRDC; Willis, “HELP for the M109 SelfPropelled Howitzer,” 35–37; “HELP Program Continues,” Field Artillery 

Journal, January–February 1983, 47

25. Fact Sheet, “M109A6 Paladin Self-propelled Howitzer,” undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Paladin Self-propelled howitzer, M109A6,” 

undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Paladin,” undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Paladin 155-millimeter Self-propelled Howitzer,” undated, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Kerry J. Loudenslager and Captain Ryan J. LaPorte, “Paladin 

Platoon Operations versus Battery Operations,” Field Artillery, January–

February 2001, 16–19. 

26. Briefing, “Advanced Field Artillery System,” 9 April 1986, 

HRDC.

27. U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume II, G18–G19. Also see 

FNs 60–71, 112–16, 1996 USAFACFS ACH.

28. Government Accountability Office Report, “Army Armored Systems,” 6 June 1997, 10–13, HRDC.

29. Briefing, “Crusader: The Army XXI Firepower Revolution,” 2 

February 1999, HRDC; Message with Enclosures, “Meeting with General 

Riscassi,” 2 October 1997, HRDC. This message contains the letters that 

General Baxter sent to members of the National Defense Panel explaining 

the revolutionary status of the Crusader—trying to win their support and 

prevent funding reductions.

30. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 

2003, 85; Fact Sheet, “Crusader,” 15 August 2002, Crusader File, HRDC; 

Fact Sheet, “Crusader 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer,” 15 August 2002, 

Crusader File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Crusader Advanced Field Artillery 

System,” undated, Crusader File, HRDC.

31. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003, 

86; Steve Johnson, TSM Cannon, DCD, interview by author, 10 March 

1994, HRDC;Memorandum, “Mission Need Statement for a Lightweight 

155-millimeter Howitzer,” 27 May 1993, HRDC; Steve Johnson, TSM 

Cannon, DCD, interview by author, 15 February 1995, HRDC; Memoran-
80

dum for Record, “Staff Input,” 12 April 1995, HRDC.

32. Memorandum, “Mission Need Statement for a Lightweight 

155-millimeter Towed Howitzer.” 

33. Memorandum, “Mission Need Statement for a Lightweight 

155-millimeter Towed Howitzer;” Memorandum of Agreement between 

the Department of the Army, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development, and U.S. Marine Corps, Combat Development Command, “Army and Marine Corps Agreement on the Joint 

Development of a Lightweight 155-millimeter Howitzer,” 18 October 

1993, HRDC; USAFAS Program and Project Summary Sheets, 1 February 

1994, 1-1-1-2, HRDC; Johnson, interview, 10 March 1994; Steve Johnson, TCM Cannon, DCD, interview by author, 21 February 1996, HRDC.

34. Email with Attachment, “LW155,” 1 March 2001, HRDC; Andrew Koch, “General Dynamics to Develop TAD System,” Jane’s Defense 

Weekly, 27 September 2000, 8; Email, “LW155 Info,” 16 February 2001, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “TAD,” undated, HRDC; “The XM777 Lightweight 

155-millimeter Howitzer,” Army, October 2000, 303–304; John Yager, 

TSM Cannon, DCD, interview with attachment by author, 16 February 

2001, HRDC. 

35. Briefing, “LW155 and TAD,” 5 March 2002, HRDC; Briefing, 

“Program Status Review of LW155,” 26 February 2002, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “LW155,” 10 March 2003, HRDC; 2002 USAFACFS 

ACH, 67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 72. 

36. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 115–16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 65; 

2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 66. 

37. Draft White Paper, U.S. Army Missile Command, Advanced Systems Concept Office, “Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System,” 17 January 

1990, HRDC.

38. Draft White Paper, “Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System;” Operational and Organizational Plan for the HIMARS, 21 December 1990, 

HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC, “Final Draft Operational and Organizational Plan for HIMARS,” 1 August 1990, HRDC.

39. Message, Commandant USAFAS to Commander TRADOC, 

“MLRS for Contingency Forces,” 10 April 1990, HRDC.

40. Message, Commander XVIII Airborne Corps to Commander 

Forces Command (FORSCOM), “Requirement for HIMARS in XVIII 

Corps,” 16 September 1991, HRDC.

41. Message, Commander TRADOC to Commander FORSCOM, 

“Requirement for HIMARS in XVIII Airborne Corps,” 6 November 1991, 

HRDC.

42. Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Gentry and Major Cullen G. Barbato, “HIMARS: Firepower for Early Entry Forces,” Field Artillery, January–February 1999, 19.

43. Lieutenant General William F. Kernan, interview by Patrecia S. 

Hollis, Field Artillery, January–February 1999, 3.
81

44. Information Paper, “HIMARS,” 27 February 2002, HIMARS File, 

HRDC; Information Paper, “HIMARS,” 2001, HIMARS File, HRDC; Information Paper, “HIMARS,” 23 December 1999, HIMARS File, HRDC; 

Information Paper, “HIMARS,” 2000, HIMARS File, HRDC.

45. Major Patrick J. Sutherland, TSM RAMS, interview with attachment by author, 24 February 2000, HRDC; Fiscal Year (FY) 99 Annual 

Report (Extract); Report (Summary), Director of Operational Testing and 

Evaluation, “MLRS M270A1 Launcher,” 12 February 1999, HRDC.

46. Fact Sheet, “MLRS Launcher Improvements,” 1998, HRDC; 

“M270A1 Production to Begin,” MLRS Dispatch, Third Quarter 1998, 5, 

HRDC; Report (Summary), “MLRS M270A1 Launcher;” Sutherland, interview, 24 February 2000; Email with Attachment, “MLRS,” 13 March 

2000, HRDC; Jeff Froysland, TSM RAMS, interview by author, 2 March 

2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Rockets,” 6 March 2000, 

HRDC; Memorandum for Director, TSM RAMS, “Coordination of 1999 

USAFACFS ACH, 29 March 2000, HRDC; Interview, Froysland, interview 

by author, 21 February 2001, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Input for 2000 Annual Command History,” 22 February 2001, HRDC.

47. 1995 USAFACFS ACH, 130–31.

48. 1995 USAFACFS ACH, 130; Fact Sheet, “ATACMS,” 1998, 

HRDC; Interview with Major Jay Hilliard, TSM RAMS, 5 February 1999, 

HRDC; Report (Summary), Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, “ATACMS Block IA,” 12 February 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Precision Guided Missiles and Rocket Review,” 15 April 2008, ATACMS File, 

HRDC; “Field Artillery and Mortar Systems,” Army, October 2005, 326–

36; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History,” 12 April 2012, HRDC; Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Deputy 

Director, interview by author, 10 February 2011, HRDC. See 2010 USAFAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, 105–110. 

49. Report (Summary), “ATACMS Block IA,” 12 February 1999.

50. Integrated Logistics Support Plan for the BAT Submunition, July 

1994, 1–2, HRDC.

51. Integrated Logistics Support Plan for the BAT Submunition, July 

1994, 1–2, HRDC.

52. 1994 USAFACFS ACH, 200–15; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 149–

51; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 111–13; 2012 USAFAS ACH, 97.

53. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CFE Negotiation 

on Conventional Arm Forces in Europe, 1989, 1–2, HRDC; U.S. Army, 

A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond, January 1990, HRDC; Bill 

Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), interview by author, 23 February 1990, HRDC; U.S. 

Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Conventional Forces-Europe 

Reductions, Initial Overview and the Field Artillery Perspective, 18 September 1989, 5–10, HRDC; USAFAS, Fighting at Parity in Post-CFE Europe, undated, HRDC; Anne W. Chapman et al., Prepare the Army for 
82

War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

1973–1998 (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1998), 155–64; John L. Romjue, American 

Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History 

Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996), 21–27. Note: 

Twenty-two members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact signed the 

Conventional Forces Europe Treaty in November 1990 after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.

54. Briefing, “Challenges for Field Artillery,” 26 April 1990, HRDC; 

Draft Trends and Implications for U.S. Army’s Future AirLand Battle, 30 

January 1991, 1–3, HRDC; General Carl E. Vuono, “Change, Continuity, 

and the Future of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, June 1991, 6–10; 

General John W. Foss, “AirLand Battle-Future,” Army, February 1991, 

20; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle Future, 12 February 1991, 

HRDC; U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume 2, G–7; 1991 U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Annual Command History 

(ACH), 6; The Army Modernization Plan, Volume I, January 1993, 2–3, 

HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1995, 8, 18, HRDC; 

John S. Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 

1989–2005 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 

2011), 35, 38, 41, 44–49, 65, 93; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 

1992, 12–18; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 42; U.S. 

Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1999, Posture Statement File, 2, 

4, HRDC; Statement on the Posture of the U.S. Army for Fiscal Year 1997 

(Extract), 12–13, HRDC; The Army Modernization Plan, January 1993, 

3; “Field Artillery Units Worldwide,” Field Artillery, December 1989, 

pullout; Harry E. Rothmann, Forging A New National Military Strategy 

in A Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 2–4; 

Fact Sheet, “AirLand Battle Future,” 16 April 1990, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,” 15 April 1990, HRDC; Foss, 

“AirLand Battle-Future,” 20–21; Briefing, “Challenges for the Field Artillery,” 26 April 1990, HRDC; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand BattleFuture,” 12 February 1991, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, AirLand 

Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Airland Battle for the Strategic 

Army of the 1990s and Beyond, 1 August 1991, 1, HRDC; Memorandum, 

“Draft AirLand Operations Concept Paper,” undated, HRDC; 1991 TRADOC ACH, 57–58; Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold 

War, 24, 26. 

55. Briefing, “Challenges for Field Artillery;” Draft Trends and Implications for U.S. Army’s Future AirLand Battle, 1; Vuono, “Change, 

Continuity, and the Future of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, 6–10; 

Foss, “AirLand Battle-Future,” Army, 20; Briefing, “Challenges for the 

Field Artillery,” 26 April 1990; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle 

Future, 12 February 1991; Fact Sheet, “AirLand Battle Future,” 16 April 
83

1990; Fact Sheet, “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 15 April 1990; 

Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle Future, 12 February 1991; 

TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, AirLand Operations, 1 August 1991, 1; Memorandum, “Draft AirLand Operations Concept Paper,” undated. 

56. Colonel John W. Reitz, “A Fire Supporter’s Guide to FM 100-5,” 

Field Artillery, December 1993, 10–15; Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 26, 35, 37, 96–112; FM 100-5, Operations, 

June 1993.

57. Fact Sheet, “AirLand Battle Future,” 16 April 1990, HRDC; 

Foss, “AirLand Battle-Future,” 24; Briefing, “Challenges for the Field 

Artillery,” 26 April 1990, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand 

Operations, 1 August 1991, 16–25; Reitz, “A Fire Supporter’s Guide to 

FM 100-5,” 10–15; FM 100-5, Operations, 6-1–7-14; Romjue, American 

Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 26.

58. Browder Willis, Deputy Director, Systems Integration and Priorities Division, DCD, interview by author, 19 May 1992, HRDC; Briefing, 

“Joint Precision Strike through a Gunner’s Eyes,” undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “Comments on Draft AirLand Operations and Joint 

Precision Interdiction/Joint Precision Strike Section for Annual Historical 

Review,” 21 May 1992, HRDC; Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the 

Post-Cold War World, 33. 

59. Information Paper, “Comments on FM 100-5 Preliminary Draft,” 

undated, HRDC. 

60. Information Paper, “Comments on FM 100-5 Preliminary Draft;” 

Message, DA to Commander FORSCOM et al., “Joint Warfighting,” 21 

July 1992, HRDC; Briefing, “How and Why the Army Shoots Deep,” 

24 July 1992, HRDC; Briefing, “FM 100-5 Updated,” 14 January 1993, 

HRDC. 

61. A Concept for Depth and Simultaneous Attack (Draft), 28 May 

1993, 1, 2, 5, 10, 11, HRDC; Major General John A. Dubia, “A Vision for 

Fire Support in the 21st Century: State of the Branch, 1993,” Armed Forces Journal, May 1991, 37; Memorandum for Commanding General, “Preliminary Draft of FM 100-5,” 25 September 1992, HRDC; Concept Paper, 

“Depth and Simultaneous Attack,” undated, HRDC; Preliminary Draft, “A 

Concept for Depth and Simultaneous Attack,” 21 December 1992, HRDC; 

Memorandum for Chief of Staff, “Visit to Fort Rucker,” 27–29 January 

1992, HRDC; Message, Marty to Franks, “Comments on FM 100-5 Preliminary Draft,” undated, HRDC; Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies 

Branch, DCD, interview by author, 1 February 1993, HRDC; Briefing, 

“FM 100-5 Update,” 14 January 1993, HRDC. 

62. Rittenhouse, interview, 1 February 1993; Briefing, “FM 100-5 

Update,” 14 January 1993, HRDC; Romjue, Army Doctrine for the PostCold War, 99. 

63. DA, Historical Summary for 1993, 41–42; Romjue, American 

Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 112; Chapman et al., Prepare the 
84

Army for War, 63; Benjamin King, Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-Year 

History of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms 

Center, 2013), 33–34; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 8. 

64. Letter with Attachment, author to Major General Fred Marty, 10 

September 2003, 59, HRDC; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle-Future,” 12 February 91, HRDC; C. William Rittenhouse, “Operation 

FireStrike,” Field Artillery, February 1991, 33–37; Rittenhouse, interview, 

11 February 1991.

65. Letter with Attachment, author to Marty, 10 September 2003, 

HRDC; Rittenhouse, “Operation Firestrike,” 33–37; Leighton L. Duitsman, “Army TACMS,” Field Artillery, January–February 1991, 38–41; 

Rittenhouse, interview, 11 February 1991; Briefing, “Fire Support and 

AirLand Battle-Future,” 12 February 1991; Major General Fred F. Marty, 

“Deep Operations,” Field Artillery, April 1993, 1–2; Reitz, “A Fire Supporter’s Guide to FM 100-5,” 10–15; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 1 August 

1991, 1–9; FM 100-5, Operations, 1-4–1-5; DA, Historical Summary for 

Fiscal Year 1993, 42; Brown, Kevlar Legions, 93; Major Mark B. Wroth, 

“Legal Mix VII: Directions for the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, December 1991, 42–43. See Romjue’s American Army Doctrine for the PostCold War, 38–99, for an in-depth discussion of the 1993 writing of FM 

100-5.

66. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 90, 103, 123; Romjue, American Army 

Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 137; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal 

Year 1992, 11–12; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 128; 

DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 54; “Force XXI: A Revolution and Evolution in Military Affairs,” ArmyLink News, 17 July 1996, 

Force XXI File, HRDC; Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher Jr., “Force 

XXI: Redesigning the Army through Warfighting Experiments,” Military 

Intelligence, 1996, Force XXI File, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Ellis, “Army Training XXI,” draft article, 1–2, HRDC; TRADOC Warrior 

XXI Campaign Plan (Extract), November 1995, 1–2, HRDC; TRADOC, 

Warnet XXI Action Plan (Extract), January 1996, 2, HRDC; TRADOC, 

Warfighter XXI Campaign Plan (Extract), 1995, 2, HRDC; Colonel David 

C. White and Lieutenant Colonel Clyde W. Ellis, “Army Training XXI,” 

Field Artillery, March–April 1996, 8–10; Romjue, American Doctrine 

for the Post-Cold War, 138–39; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 

1994, 53; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1995, 37; Chapman, et 

al., Prepare the Army for War, 64; James L. Yarrison, The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 

1999), 12, 13, 24, 25, 56; 1994 TRADOC Annual Command History, 23; 

Colonel Donald L.W. Kerr, “Depth and Simultaneous Attack: One Battle 

Lab Helping Forge the Army’s Future,” Field Artillery, April 1993, 35; 

DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 129; King, Victory Starts 

Here, 34; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 6–7.
85

67. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 90; Romjue, American Army Doctrine 

for the Post-Cold War, 73–77, 137; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal 

Year 1995, 40; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992, 11–12; DA, 

Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992, 11–12; Yarrison, The Modern 

Louisiana Maneuvers, 24–25; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 8–9; 1994 U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command Annual History, 21. 

68. “Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 

24 September 1992, 1. 

69. “Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan,” 1.

70. “Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan,” 1.

71. Email with Attachment, “Fires Battle Lab History 2010,” 8 April 

2011, HRDC. 

72. Fact Sheet, “ATCD, Korea,” 3 May 1994, HRDC; Briefing, 

“Joint Precision Strike Precision,” 1994, HRDC; Captain Douglas P. Vangordon, DSA Battle Lab, interview by author, 10 March 1995, HRDC; 

Memorandum for Director, JPSD Task Force, “Operational Input for STS 

FY94 Demonstration,” 21 February 1995, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “JPSD P/

RC MRL ACTD,” 21 February 1997, HRDC; JPSD Office, P/RC MRl 

OCONUS Demonstration, 1996, 5, HRDC; Memorandum for Command 

Historian, “Staff Input to 1995 Annual Command History,” 25 March 

1996, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Fires Battle Lab History 2010,” 8 

April 2011, HRDC; Yarrison, The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers, 23.

73. Kerr, “Depth and Simultaneous Attack: One Battle Lab Helping 

Forge the Army’s Future,” 35; Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab, 

Horizontal Integration of Precision Strike Capabilities: Rapid Response 

Initiatives, 17 June 1993, 1–2, hereafter cited as Summary Report, HRDC. 

74. Summary Report, 17 June 1993, 6–8. 

75. Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Extract), October 1993, iii, 1, 

HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999, 2. 

76. DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 54. 

77. DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 53; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1995, 37; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal 

Year 1999, 41; 1994 TRADOC Annual History, 17. 

78. General Gordon R. Sullivan, “A New Force for a New Century,” 

Army, May 1994, 26. 

79. Sullivan, “A New Force for a New Century,” 26; Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory Project Summary, Force XXI, 3 May 

1994, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999, 41; Yarrison, 

The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers, 57, 83. 

80. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 139–

41; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 41; DA, Historical 

Summary for Fiscal Year 1992, 12; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal 

Year 1994, 53; Chapman, et al., Prepare the Army for War, 29–30; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, 1 August 1994, preface, 

HRDC. 
86

81. FM 3.0, Operations; B. Bielinski, Doctrine Branch, WIDD, USAFAS, interview by author, 20 June 1999, HRDC; B. Bielinski, interview 

by author, 1 February 2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Trip Report 

from Semi-Annual Army Doctrine Conference,” 26 May 1999, HRDC; B. 

Bielinski, interview with attachment by author, 6 February 2001, HRDC; 

Information Paper, “New Numbering System for Fire Support and Field 

Artillery Manuals,” 26 June 2000, HRDC. 

82. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for 

the 21st Century,” Field Artillery, May–June 1998, 22–23; Major Gregory 

A. Palka, TF2000, interview by author, 20 March 1999, HRDC; Briefing, 

“The Effects Coordination Cell,” 24 March 1999, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Experimentation Program,” 24 March 1999, HRDC. 

83. “Futurists in the Field,” Missiles, Munitions, and Armor 2, 1999, 

18.

84. “Futurists in the Field,” 19. 

85. Message with Attachment, “ECC Info Requested,” 23 March 

1999, HRDC. 

86. Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for the 21st Century,” 22–23; 

Palka, interview, 30 March 1999; Briefing, “The Effects Coordination 

Cell,” 24 March 1999; Fact Sheet, Future Fires Command and Control 

Concept Experimentation Program,” 24 March 1999, HRDC; Baxter, 

“Meeting the Future: State of the Field Artillery,” 1.

87. Briefing, “The Effects Coordination Cell,” 24 March 1999; Briefing, “Future Fires Command and Control Concept Experimentation Program,” 9 December 98, HRDC; Memorandum for Major Gregory A. Palka, “SME Review of ECC for 1998 Annual Command History,” 31 March 

1999, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Future Fires Command and Control Concept 

Experimentation Program,” 24 March 1999, HRDC; Message with Attachment, “ECC Info Requested,” 23 March 1999, HRDC; Lieutenant 

Colonel Peter R. Baker, TF 2000, interview by author, 23 March 2000, 

HRDC; Email with Attachment, “BL History,” 14 March 2000, HRDC. 

88. Baker, interview, 23 March 2000; “Medium-weight Units to Take 

Advantage of Effects-Based Operations,” Inside the Army, 10 April 2000, 

6–8, HRDC.

89. Baker, interview, 23 March 2000; Email with Attachment, “Bat 

Lab Input to 2000 Annual Command History,” 20 April 2001, HRDC. 

90. Colonel Jerry C. Hill and Major Carl R. Trout, “Effects-Based 

Fire Support Coordination and Execution,” Field Artillery, November–December 2000, 6–7; Email with Attachment, “Bat Lab Input to 2000 Annual 

Command History,” 20 April 2001; Email with Attachment, “BL History,” 

1 March 2002, HRDC; Major General Toney Stricklin, “State of the Field 

Artillery 2000: Looking Ahead to the Objective Force,” Field Artillery, 

November–December 2000, 1–3; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) William 

A. Ross, “F2C2 Experiments for Rapid Transformation to Effects-Based 

Fires,” Field Artillery, November–December 2000, 16–18.
87

91. Hill and Trout, “Effects-Based Fire Support Coordination and 

Execution,” 7. 

92. Hill and Trout, “Effects-Based Fire Support Coordination and 

Execution,” 7.

93. Fact Sheet, “JPSD P/RC MLR ACTD,” 21 February 1997, 

HRDC; Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Office, P/RC MLR OCONUS Demonstration, 1996, 5, HRDC; Memorandum for Command Historian, “Staff Input to 1995 Annual Command History,” 25 March 1996, 

HRDC; Andreas Parsch Information Paper, “Lockheed Martin MGM-140 

ATACMS,” 2006, ATACMS File. 

94. Email with Attachment, “Bat Lab Input to 2000 Annual Command History”, 20 Apr 01, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “Battle Lab 

Input to 1998 Annual Command History,” 22 March 1999, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “TSPO History Piece,” 8 March 2000, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “BL History”, 1 March 2002, HRDC.

95. DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 54. 

96. Memorandum with Enclosure, “Draft Operational Concept for 

Field Artillery Experimentation in Task Force XXI,” 30 January 1995, 

HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosures, “USAFAS Heavy Advanced Warfighting Experiment Focused Dispatch Support Plan,” 7 February 1995, 

HRDC; Message, Commandant USAFAS to Commander USACAC, et 

al., “Establishment of Task Force 2000,” 7 September 1994, HRDC; Brigadier General Leo J. Baxter, “Field Artillery: Vision 2020,” Field Artillery, 

December 1994, 14; Memorandum for Record, “Task Force 2000 Mission 

Analysis,” 8 August 1994, HRDC; Major General John A. Dubia, “Force 

XXI and the Field Artillery: State of the Branch 1994,” Field Artillery, 

December 1994, 2; Memorandum for Record, “Lieutenant Colonel Jim 

Carafano’s Thoughts on Adding an Organization,” 1994, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel William M. Bransford, “Fire Support and Desert Hammer VI: 

The Advanced Warfighting Experiment,” Field Artillery, October 1994, 

40–43. 

97. Dubia, “Force XXI and the Field Artillery,” 2; Briefing, “TF 

2000 Overview,” January 1996, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Focused Dispatch 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment,” 23 October 1995, HRDC; Major 

Vince C. Weaver Jr., “Fires in AWE Focused Dispatch: A Step Toward 

Task Force XXI,” Field Artillery, March–April 1996, 38–40; Briefing, 

“Fires for Force XXI,” 1995, HRDC; Major General Leo J. Baxter, “Honing the Edge: State of the Field Artillery 1997,” Field Artillery, November–December 1997, 1. 

98. Message, “TF2000 Command History,” 7 February 1997, HRDC; 

Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Russell Jr. and Major Harold H. Worrell 

Jr., “Focus on Light Force XXI: AWE Warrior Focus,” Field Artillery, 

May–June 1996, 36–39; Fact Sheet, “Warrior Focus AWE,” 23 October 

1995, HRDC; Briefing, “Fires for Force XXI,” 1995; Briefing, “Task 

Force 2000,” January 1996, HRDC; 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Cen-
88

ter and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History, 145–46; 2001 

USAFACFS ACH, 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 89; 2003 USAFACFS 

ACH, 110; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 98–99. 

99. Fact Sheet, “Prairie Warrior 95 AWE,” 23 October 1995, HRDC; 

Briefing, “Task Force 2000,” January 1996; Baxter, “Honing the Edge,” 1; 

Message, “TF2000 Command History,” 7 February 1997; Prairie Warrior 

1996, Key Fire Support Insights (Extract), taken from Executive Summary, Final Report, HRDC; Dubia, “Force XXI and the Field Artillery,” 

3; Memorandum with Enclosures, “Draft Operational Concept for Field 

Artillery Experimentation in Task Force XXI,” 30 January 1995, HRDC; 

Memorandum with Enclosure, “Draft USAFAS Prairie Warrior 95 Advanced Warfighting Experiment Support Plan,” 10 January 1995, HRDC. 

100. TF XXI Experiment Directive (Extract), undated, 1–2, HRDC; 

Proposed Operational Concept for Field Artillery Experimentation in 

Task Force XXI (Draft), undated, HRDC; Message, “CSA 97-05 Random 

Thoughts While Running,” 30 April 1997, HRDC; Task Force XXI Final 

Report, Executive Summary, October 1997, 2–3, HRDC; Colonel Thomas 

R. Goedkoop and Captain Barry E. Venable, “Task Force XXI: An Overview,” Military Review, March–April 1997, 71; Colonel Steven A. Emison, “Post Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment,” Army 

Research, Development, and Acquisition, September–October 1997, 2–5; 

see TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, 1 August 1994, for 

background information, HRDC. 

101. Baxter, “Honing the Edge,” 1. 

102. Task Force XXI Final Report, Executive Summary, October 

1997, 8, HRDC; Briefing, “Task Force 2000 in Support of AWE,” February 1998, HRDC; Baxter, “Honing the Edge,” 1; Briefing, “Force XXI,” 

14 April 1997, HRDC; Dennis Steele, “Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment at NTC,” Army, May 1997, 14–22; Dennis Steele, 

“AWE: Testing Soldiers and Equipment,” Army, June 1997, 26–38. 

103. Message, “TF2000 Command History,” 7 February 1997; Major Vince C. Weaver, “Fires in AWE Focused Dispatch: A Step Toward 

Task Force XXI,” Field Artillery, March–April 1996, 38–40; Briefing, 

“Force XXI,” undated; Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Russell Jr. and 

Major Harold H. Worrell Jr., “Focus on Light Force XXI: AWE Warrior 

Focus,” Field Artillery, May–June 1996, 36–39; Task Force XXI Final 

Report, Executive Summary, October 1997, 2–3, HRDC; Goedkoop and 

Venable, “Task Force XXI: An Overview,” 71; “TRADOC Commander 

Reveals Some Results of Recent Force XXI AWE,” ArmyLink News, 8 

October 1997, Force XXI File, HRDC; Hanna, “Task Force XXI;” U.S. 

Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25, Posture Statement 

File, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, 4.

104. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25, Posture Statement File, HRDC; Letter with Attachment, author to Marty, 10 

September 2003, HRDC; Brown, Kevlar Legions, 91–97; DA, Historical 
89

Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, 63–64; Anne W. Chapman, et al., Prepare 

the Army for War, 31.

105. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25; 

Memorandum, “Division XXI AWE and First Digital Division Fielding 

Taskers,” 22 April 1997, HRDC; Briefing, “Improving the Interim Division Design: Adjusting for Task Force XXI,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Fires: The Cutting Edge,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Task Force 

2000 in Support of AWE,” February 1998; Major Henry J. Hester Jr. and 

Major Dean Mengel, Task Force 2000, interview by author, 30 January 

1998, HRDC; Memorandum for Mengel, “1997 USAFACFS ACH,” 12 

February 1998, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Division XXI AWE Insights,” undated, in Senior Fire Support Conference Packet, 9–13 February 1998, 

HRDC; “Division AWE Will Be Basis for 21st Century Fighting Force,” 

ArmyLink News, 28 October 1997, Force XXI File, HRDC; Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Fiscal Year 1997 Annual Report (Extract), 

“Battlefield Digitization: Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below, and the Tactical Internet,” Force XXI File, HRDC; Brown, Kevlar 

Legions, 103; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25, 

Posture Statement File, HRDC; Dennis Steele, “Dust, Digits, and Steel: 

Launching Warfare’s Future,” Army, June 2001, 21–36; “4th ID Shows 

Info Superiority at DCX,” ArmyLink News, 17 April 2001, HRDC; “Army 

Demonstrated Information Superiority at DDCX,” TRADOC News Service, 16 April 2001, HRDC; “First Digitized Division to be Challenged 

at NTC Exercise,” ArmyLink News, 19 March 2001, HRDC; Government 

Accountability Office Report, “Army Needs to Update Fielding Plan for 

First Digitized Corps,” July 2000, 3. Note that the Army designated the 

2d Armored Division as the experimental force for the AWEs in 1994 and 

later designated the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as the experimental force at Fort Hood, Texas, and that the Army fielded its first digitized 

division, the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division, in 2001.

106. Briefing, “Task Force 2000 in support of AWE,” February 1998; 

Fact Sheet, “Division XXI AWE, 1 July 1996, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 

525-71, Force XXI Division Operations Concept, 13 May 1996, HRDC; 

Briefing, “Improving the Interim Division Design,” undated, HRDC; 

Study Plan for Division XXI (Extract), October 1996, 1, HRDC; Briefing, 

“Proposed Force XXI Division Design, 26 February 1996, HRDC; Briefing, “Force XXI,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Organization Charts Division XXI,” 1997, HRDC; Briefing, “Army’s First Digitized Division,” 

undated, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Joint Venture Video teleconference,” 

27 May 1997, HRDC; Colonel David P. Valcourt and Lieutenant Colonel 

Lester C. Jauron, “Division Redesign: Fires for Force XXI,” Field Artillery, July–August 1997, 24; Memorandum, “Division XXI AWE and First 

Digital Division Fielding Taskers,” 22 April 1997; Briefing, “Improving 

the Interim Division Design: Adjusting for Task Force XXI,” undated, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Force XXI,” 29 April 1997; Mengel, interview, 30 Jan-
90

uary 1998; Memorandum for Mengel, “1997 USAFACFS ACH,” 19 February 1998, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Division XXI AWE Insights,” undated, 

in Senior Fire Support Conference Packet, 9–11 February 1998, HRDC. 

107. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 

2003, HRDC; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 82–83; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 25, Posture Statement File, HRDC. See FN 40 

in the 2000 USAFACFS ACH for a complete listing of documents.

108. TRADOC System Manager (TSM), All Source Analysis System, Newsletter, October 2000, HRDC; TSM, All Source Analysis System, Newsletter, January 2001, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for 

Fiscal Year 2001, 25; Joint Venture, TRADOC DCD Newsletter, “JCF 

AWE,” HRDC.

109. Lieutenant Colonel James J. Carafano, ed., “Strike Force Operational Concept Paper,” Soldiers are Our Credentials: The Collected 

Works and Select Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff of the Army 

(Washington, D.C.: The US Army Center of Military History, 2000), 254, 

256. 

110. Dennis Steele, “The Army XXI Heavy Division: First Blueprint 

of the Future Army,” Army, July 1998, 33–35; Briefing (Extract), “Army 

Experimentation Campaign Plan,” 1998, HRDC; Annual Report (Extract), 

“Army After Next,” 7 December 1998, ii, HRDC; Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hernandez, TF2000, “SME Review of AECP for 

1998 Annual Command History,” 31 March 1999, HRDC; DARPA Study, 

1 May 1997, HRDC. 

111. Memorandum for Hernandez, “SME Review of AECP for 1998 

Annual Command History,” 31 March 1999, HRDC; Information Paper, 

“U.S. Army Strike Force,” 4 March 1999, HRDC; TRADOC News Service, “Army Eyes New Swift Deployment Headquarters,” 4 March 1999, 

HRDC; Jim Caldwell, “Strike Force to be Army’s ‘Futures’ Test Bed,” 

Army News Service, 2 March 1999; Major Wayne A. Green, “Interim 

Strike Force Headquarters Digital LNO Nodes: Force Tailoring Enablers,” 

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, May 1999, 1. 

112. Briefing (Extract), “Army Experimentation Funding Campaign 

Plan,” 1998, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hernandez, TF2000, interview by author, 2 March 1999, HRDC; Major Christopher Mack and 

Major William M. Raymond Jr., “Strike Force: Fires for the Future,” Field 

Artillery, November–December 1998, 16–17. 

113. Mack and Raymond, “Strike Force,” 16–17; Information Paper, 

“U.S. Army Strike Force,” 2 March 1999, HRDC; “Strike Force Army’s 

‘Future’ Test Bed,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 4 March 1999, 2a; “The Strike 

Force Operational Concept,” 254. 

114. Message, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan, 29 September 

1998, HRDC; Jason Sherman, “Lighten Up,” Armed Forces Journal International, October 1998, 57–59. 
91

115. Sherman, “Lighten Up,” 57–59; Memorandum for Hernandez, 

“SME Review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command History,” 31 March 

1999. 

116. “The Strike Force Operational Concept Paper,” 254–63; “The 

Army After Next: Revolutionary Transformation,” Soldiers are Our Credentials, 270–73. 

117. Message with Attachment, “Strike Force Effects Coordination 

Node, 25 March 1999, HRDC; “Schoolhouse Developing ‘Effects’ Headquarters,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 4 March 1999, 2a; Fact Sheet, “Strike 

Force Headquarters Effects Coordination Node Development: A Depth 

and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab and Task Force 2;” “The Army After Next: Revolutionary Transformation,” Soldiers are Our Credentials, 

270–73; Issue Submission Force, undated, HRDC. 

118. Mack and Raymond, “Strike Force,” 18–19. 

119. Briefing, “Digitization: A Warfighter’s Perspective, 20 June 

2001, HRDC; Major Michael Rauhut, “Put Me In, Coach: From Experimental Force to Deployable Unit, The Transition of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized),” Army, June 2002, 65–70; Message with Attachment, 

“Strike Force Effects Coordination Node, 25 March 1999, HRDC; “Army 

Eyes New Swift Deployment Headquarters,” TRADOC News Service, 4 

March 1999, HRDC; Colonel Jerry Hill, DAC Futures Director, interview 

by author, 22 February 2000, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 2000, 41–42; Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hernandez, “SME review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command History,” 31 

March 1999; Message, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan,” 29 September 98, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Army Experimental Funding Campaign Plan,” 1998, HRDC; Briefing, “Division Capstone Experimental 

Campaign Plan Video Teleconference,” 29 February 1998, HRDC; Steele, 

“The Army XXI Heavy Division: First Blueprint of the Future Army,” 

34; Memorandum for Record, “1st Quarter Significant Activities for Major Raymond,” 12 January 1999, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1st 

Quarter FY99 Significant Activities,” 19 January 1999, HRDC; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, “Third quarter Significant Activities,” 31 

March 1999, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Ewing, TF2000, interview 

by author, 27 March 2000, HRDC; Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel 

Charles Hernandez, “SME Review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command 

History, 31 March 1999; Message, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan,” 

29 September 1998, HRDC; Briefing, “Division Capstone Exercise,” 16 

February 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan 

Video Teleconference, 29 February 1998, HRDC; Study Plan for the Division Capstone Exercise (Extract), January 2000, 2, HRDC. 

120. “4th ID Shows Info Superiority at DCX,” ArmyLink News, 17 

April 2001, HRDC. 

121. “4th ID Shows Info Superiority at DCX,” ArmyLink News; 

“Army Demonstrates Information Superiority at DCX,” TRADOC News 
92

Service, 16 April 2001; “First Digitized Division to be Challenged at NTC 

Exercise,” ArmyLink News, 19 March 2001; “Division Capstone Exercise 

II,” TRADOC Public Affairs Office, undated; Email, “DCX,” 11 March 

2002, HRDC; Briefing, “Digitization: A Warfighter’s Perspective,” 20 June 

2001, HRDC; Message with Attachment, “Strike Force Effects Coordination Node,” 25 March 1999, HRDC; “Army Eyes New Swift Deployment 

Headquarters,” TRADOC News Service, 4 March 1999, HRDC; Colonel 

Jerry Hill, DAC Futures Director, interview by author, 22 February 2000, 

HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 2000, 41–42; Memorandum for Hernandez, “SME review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command 

History,” 31 March 1999; Message “Army Experimental Campaign Plan,” 

29 September 1998, HRDC; Briefing, “Division Capstone Experimental 

Campaign Plan Video Teleconference, 29 February 1998, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1st Quarter Significant Activities for Major Raymond,” 12 January 1999, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1st Quarter 

FY99 Significant Activities,” 19 January 1999, HRDC; Memorandum for 

Assistant Commandant, “Third quarter Significant Activities,” 31 March 

1999, HRDC; Ewing, interview, 27 March 2000; Patrecia S. Hollis, “Digitizing the Army for the Objective Force,” Field Artillery, March–April 

2002, 2–4.
93

Chapter 3 

Transforming the Force

As the sweeping Force XXI and Army After Next efforts to 

implement the lessons of the Gulf War and carry the Army and the 

Field Artillery into the 21st Century began unfolding, the Army’s 

modernization priorities suddenly shifted. Called Transformation of 

the Army, this new course proposed to create medium forces with 

the lethality of the heavy forces, the strategic mobility of the light 

forces, and the ability to exploit the Information Age battlefields 

of the 21st Century. The centerpiece of the modernization effort 

focused on developing the self-contained modular brigade combat 

team and introducing Future Combat Systems made up of lightweight, networked weapon platforms. 

The Beginnings

During the latter years of the 1990s, a crisis erupted in Kosovo. 

To provide additional support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation Allied Force actions against the former Yugoslavian government during the unrest in Kosovo, General Wesley Clark, 

the 1997–2000 Supreme Allied Commander Europe of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization, decided in March 1999 to deploy Task 

Force Hawk from Germany to Kosovo. Composed primarily of AH64A Apache helicopters, the task force had the mission of augmenting the ongoing air campaign that was employing Air Force assets. 

The effort was not going well because poor weather hampered flying. On 4 April 1999, a Pentagon official announced the task force’s 

deployment, indicating that it would be on the ground in Macedonia within eight days. Eighteen days and 475 C-17 aircraft sorties 

later, the task force had 51 Apache helicopters and Multiple Launch 

Rocket System M270 launchers in place in Macedonia and was 

mission-capable. Because the routes from Macedonia into Kosovo 

were restricted by mountainous terrain and because the Serbs had 

strengthened their air defenses there anticipating an attack, heavy 

field artillery suppressive fires would be required to get the aviators 
94

through. While such fires would risk substantial politically unacceptable collateral damage, flying without them would entail risk 

and produce an intolerable number of friendly casualties. As the 

weather cleared, fixed-wing bombing efforts picked up. Meanwhile, 

cooperation with the Kosovo Liberation Army produced better target information. Target acquisition assets deployed with Task Force 

Hawk generated targets more quickly than the airmen could attack 

them. However, Serbian resistance was eroding, making ground 

combat unwarranted. As a result, Apache missions with their associated risks did not prove necessary.1

The failure to employ the Apaches and the length of time required to get the task force into theater prompted the Army’s critics 

to speak out. They challenged the Army’s relevance in light of the 

air campaign success and portrayed the Force XXI modernization 

effort as being too slow and deliberate. Meanwhile, the Quadrennial Defense Review characterized the modernization effort as being 

too limited in scope. Pre-positioning material configured unit sets 

and enhancements in sea and airlift boosted strategic mobility, but 

nothing had been done to alter the weight and size of the Army’s 

equipment. The Army’s near-term approach to strategic mobility 

had been to move the heavy forces more rapidly and make the light 

forces more lethal while the long-term goal envisioned making the 

heavy forces platforms lighter. Meanwhile, General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army, initiated a promising Strike Force 

experiment with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to capitalize on 

advanced information technologies and integrating assets from the 

heavy, light, and sustainment forces. However, these efforts did not 

address the weight of the heavy forces, which relied on the 72-ton 

M-1 Abrams tank and the 55-ton Crusader 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer that was under development.2

When he became the chief of staff of the Army in mid-1999, 

General Eric K. Shinseki espoused General Reimer’s modernization vision that he had helped fashion as vice chief of staff of 

the Army. At the same time, he faced criticism about Task Force 

Hawk’s slow deployment and from the Quadrennial Defense Review, which advocated more comprehensive modernization than 

General Reimer had initiated. This forced General Shinseki to ad-
95

dress the deficiencies clearly manifested by the task force. In June 

1999, he explained that the Army aspired to be the most respected 

and most feared ground force to those who threatened United States 

vital interests. This required the Army to improve its strategic responsiveness, develop a clear long-term strategy to improve operational jointness, implement Joint Vision 2010 goals (centered 

on achieving dominance across the spectrum of military operations 

and as the US Army’s conceptual template for future joint warfighting), and produce leaders for joint warfighting. The Army also had 

to integrate the active and reserve components completely; staff its 

combat units; and provide for the well-being of its soldiers, civilians, and family members.3

Although he recognized the importance of each goal, General 

Shinseki faced the imperative of improving strategic responsiveness 

to mitigate the adverse fallout from Task Force Hawk. From the 

general’s perspective, the world situation demanded a strategically 

responsive Army capable of operating throughout the range of conflict. Specifically, it required more versatile, lethal, and survivable 

forces than ever before. It had to have early entry forces capable 

of operating jointly without access to fixed forward bases and the 

power to slug it out and win campaigns decisively. Shinseki noted, 

“At this point in our march through history, our heavy forces are too 

heavy and our light forces lack staying power. Heavy forces must be 

more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, and 

tactically mobile.”4

Over the next several months, General Shinseki refined his 

vision—called the Transformation of the Army and sometimes referred to as the Army Transformation, the name of the effort initiated by General Reimer. In August 1999, General Shinseki’s Transformation included developing lighter, more deployable forces and 

equipment as well as standing up two Initial Brigade Combat Teams 

at Fort Lewis, Washington, to serve as a test bed for new ideas, force 

structure, weapons, and equipment. A major element of the Initial 

Brigade Combat Team effort would be to test off-the-shelf tracked 

and wheeled vehicles that appeared to offer the desired characteristics; this would give the transformation a quick start.5
96

Along with the Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, the general wanted to convert the Army into a more dominant and strategically responsive force and outlined his ideas to achieve this.6

 “To 

this end,” he told the attendees of the 45th Annual Meeting of the 

Association of the United States Army on 12 October 1999, “we will 

begin immediately to turn the entire Army into a full spectrum force 

which is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on 

the spectrum of operations.”7

 As the Director of the Transformation 

Axis at Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

Fort Monroe, Virginia, Colonel Joseph Rodriguez, and the Director 

of the Battle Laboratory Integration, Technology, and Concepts at 

the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Colonel Michael K. 

Mahaffey, noted in December 1999 that General Shinseki desired 

lighter heavy forces and heavier light forces and wanted to erase 

the distinction between them.8 This involved building a totally new 

force structure around combat systems with the survivability of the 

Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle but the strategic mobility of light systems so that an independent combat brigade could 

deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120 

hours, and five divisions within 30 days.9

From Shinseki’s perspective, the Army had a bifurcated force. 

It possessed equipment, such as the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle, and divisions that had been designed for the Cold War 

and European combat against the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat but 

could not go everywhere and had light forces that lacked the lethality or survivability to be placed in the middle of a high-intensity 

conflict. In view of combat and contingency operations in the 1990s, 

the Army needed a totally new force structure to handle future wars 

with survivable but deployable combat systems.10

The Transformation of the Army represented an abrupt change 

in the trajectory that modernization had been travelling for 20 years; 

it abandoned the emphasis on heavy and light divisions with their 

respective equipment and weapon systems. By the fall of 1999, General Shinseki had devised a three-prong developmental program. 

The first Legacy Force consisted of digitizing existing systems, such 

as the Bradley fighting vehicle and Abrams tank, to enhance situational awareness and introducing the Crusader 155-millimeter self-
97

propelled howitzer and the Comanche helicopter. The Interim Force 

would provide crossover capabilities between the Legacy Force and 

the Objective Force, build and deploy brigade-sized units of intermediate weight-equipped weapons and equipment with the most advanced information technologies that were available, and revolve 

around the Stryker Brigade Combat Team composed of mediumweight vehicles. The Objective Force reflected a vision of future 

warfare that would center on technologies yet to be developed, be 

built around the Future Combat System, a vehicle platform with different variants, consist of readily deployable forces, and support the 

full spectrum of conflict. Of the three prongs, the Interim Force and 

the Objective Force received the most attention and occupied the 

focal point of modernization.11

General Shinseki launched Transformation with the Initial 

Force that would pave the way for the Interim Force. Fielded between 2000 and 2003, the Initial Force would be composed of two 

Initial Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis that would be the prototypes for others to follow and would be equipped with off-the-shelf 

equipment and vehicles. Some equipment already in the Army’s 

inventory would be adapted to meet existing requirements. The 

initial brigades also would be retrofitted with the Interim Armored 

Vehicle, a medium-weight armored vehicle, when it was fielded to 

become part of the Interim Force.12 As US Army Training and DocFigure 3: Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. 

Source: US Army photo by Boyd L. Dastrup.
98

trine Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, 

Major General Daniel R. Zanini explained in November 1999 that 

the Army planned to equip the Interim Force with Interim Armored 

Vehicles between 2003 and 2010. Next, the Army would introduce 

the Objective Force with breakthrough technologies beginning in 

2008, with complete conversion around 2032.13

The Army pointed out that the three prongs would be parallel and complementary but distinct for about a decade.14 At a November 2000 briefing, General Shinseki explained that the Army 

had started work on the Initial Force late in 1999. Concurrent with 

this, the Army set out to modernize and recapitalize select current 

capabilities in the Legacy Force that was composed of heavy and 

light forces and was organized and equipped during the Cold War. 

Modernizing centered on developing new systems with improved 

warfighting capabilities. Additionally, the intent was to recapitalize by restoring aging fielded systems to a like-new condition and 

simultaneously adding improvements, such as advanced information technology, to address capability shortcomings. As General 

Shinseki noted, modernizing and recapitalizing the Legacy Force 

would extend Army capabilities into the future and guarantee nearterm fighting capabilities. From the general’s perspective, the March 

2001 Division Capstone Exercise Phase I at the National Training 

Center, Fort Irwin, California, validated the Legacy Force effort.15

Other Army officers shared the same conclusions about the 

exercise. Digitizing the Legacy Force permitted soldiers to move 

over battlespace that was larger than the Army of Excellence’s battlespace of the 1990s and allowed officers to leverage information. 

In 21 April 2001 comments about digitization, the Commander of 

the 4th Infantry Division artillery, Colonel Ben Allen, noted that 

digital command and control systems provided situational awareness because the division always knew where it was in relation to 

the enemy and could exploit that information. Ultimately, the exercise illustrated the importance of information dominance furnished 

by command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance systems as well as their prominent 

role in the Transformation of the Army.16

For the Field Artillery School, the Division Capstone Exercise 
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Phase I strengthened the Field Artillery’s role in the Legacy Force. 

In the November–December 2001 Field Artillery, Brigadier General William F. Engel, who was the school’s Assistant Commandant 

from 1999 to 2001, noted the Legacy Force’s dependence on fire 

support and the importance of fielding the next-generation Crusader 

self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer under development and the 

Multiple Launch Rocket System M270A1 launcher under development to Legacy Force units to complement the M109A6 (Paladin) 

self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer.17

As the Army worked to digitize the Legacy Force, the Interim 

Armored Vehicle fielding would initiate phase two (Interim Force) 

of transformation that would culminate when the last Interim Brigade Combat Team was fully manned, equipped, and trained. While 

Objective Force scientific and technological research and development would continue, the two Initial Brigade Combat Teams would 

be retrofitted with Interim Armored Vehicles to become Interim Brigade Combat Teams; they would join four Interim Brigade Combat Teams, including an Army National Guard brigade. The Interim Force would bridge the gap between the Legacy Force and the 

Objective Force. These six Interim Brigades would complement 

the Legacy Force and maximize lethality and survivability while 

increasing tactical, operational, and strategic maneuver; they also 

could be transported anywhere in the world within 96 hours and 

complement light or mechanized forces in a major regional contingency operation.18

For the Field Artillery, the Initial and Interim Brigade Combat 

Teams’ organization revealed a shocking ambivalence about the future role of fire support. Although field artillery was not included in 

the working draft organization of the Initial Brigade Combat Team, 

designers conceded its requirement and projected the need to procure 

an Interim Armored Vehicle-based self-propelled 155-millimeter 

howitzer for the team sometime in the near future. During a December 1999 briefing at the Pentagon, US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command representatives pointed out that they did not know exactly what type of field artillery would be a part of the brigade in 

the future. For the present, the Initial Brigade Combat Team would 

not have any field artillery, because existing weapons systems were 
100

too heavy and lacked strategic deployability. Leaving field artillery 

out introduced risk, because the brigade’s organic mortars simply 

lacked the ability to handle indirect fire support requirements.19

Analysis by the Field Artillery School highlighted the Initial 

Brigade Combat Team’s fire support deficiency and strengthened arguments for including fire support in the initial brigade. In December 

1999, the school pointed out in stark terms that the brigade would be 

vulnerable to counterfire and unacceptable high casualties without 

organic fire support beyond mortars. Based on this scrutiny, the US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command revamped fire support in the 

Initial and Interim Brigade Combat Teams in January 2000. It made 

fire support teams and sections organic to the brigades, created a 

Fires and Effects Coordination Cell to coordinate fire support, and 

added target acquisition radars. For weapons, the command included six deployable High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems M142 

launchers, which were basically a small Multiple Launch Rocket 

System that shot six rockets rather than 12 in the Initial Brigade, as 

well as 18 Interim Armored Vehicle-based self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzers in the Interim Brigade. According to the school, 

the proposed fire support organization would increase the volume 

of fire, provide close support, furnish proactive and reactive counterfire, and deliver shoot-and-scoot capabilities without sacrificing 

strategic and operational mobility.20

Placing the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in the Initial Brigade Combat Team, however, failed to diminish the risk. As 

of February 2000, the Army had only four High Mobility Artillery 

Rocket System prototypes—three at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and 

one at a factory in Dallas—and did not anticipate receiving the first 

production systems until 2002 at the earliest. For the near term, the 

Initial Brigade Combat Team would not have any fire support. To 

address this unacceptable situation, the Field Artillery School proposed substituting the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer for the 

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. General Shinseki concurred. 

On 3 March 2000, he resolved to use the M198 because of the decision to use off-the-shelf equipment if possible and because of the 

pressing requirement for organic fire support in the Initial Brigade. 

As outlined in April 2000, the M198 battalion in the Initial Brigade 
101

Combat Team would consist of three firing batteries of six howitzers 

each for a total of 18 howitzers in the battalion, a headquarters and 

headquarters battery, a target acquisition platoon of Firefinder AN/

TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars, and a medical platoon.21

Eventually, the Army planned to replace the M198 with modern technology. Although the Army still maintained that an Interim 

Armored Vehicle-based self-propelled howitzer would be the ideal 

for the Interim Force, the Army opted to replace the M198 with the 

lightweight towed 155-millimeter howitzer (type classified as the 

M777), a joint developmental program with the US Marine Corps. 

The imperative to have fire support in the Interim Brigade compelled the Army to reverse its earlier rejection of the M777 because 

it lacked the agility of a self-propelled howitzer and was not designed to fit on a C-130 aircraft with its prime mover. Yet, employing the M777 would be consistent with the Army’s desire to employ 

off-the-shelf or near-off-the-shelf equipment and would facilitate 

a transition to the Interim Armored Vehicle-based 155-millimeter 

self-propelled howitzer. When it was fielded, the Interim Armored 

Vehicle-based howitzer would replace the M777; the new weapon 

would possess the mobility and survivability equal to the maneuver 

force and would provide the lethality, precision engagement, and 

extended range to furnish responsive and accurate fires throughout 

the battlespace.22

While the Field Artillery School pushed the fire support imperative with the M198 and M777, the Army stood up its first Initial 

Brigade Combat Team. Starting in April 2001, the 3d Brigade, 2d 

Infantry Division converted to the Initial Brigade Combat Team design and achieved initial operational capability in December 2001. 

Although it had been constituted from a traditional light brigade, the 

3d Brigade demonstrated warfighting competency, the ability to perform as a unit, and the basic soundness of the initial brigade concept 

during testing in September 2001.23

 Subsequently, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division transformed to the Initial Brigade Combat Team design—with initial operational capability in December 2002. Both brigades trained using 

combat vehicles on loan from Canada and were scheduled to adopt 

Interim Armored Vehicles in the near future to make them Interim 
102

Brigade Combat Teams. Major General James M. Dubik, US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Commanding General for 

Transformation, explained that the Initial Brigade Combat Teams 

represented a short-term goal and the first step in transforming the 

Army to make it more deployable without losing survivability. The 

second step centered on forming Interim Brigade Combat Teams.24

As work on the Initial Brigade Combat Teams moved forward, 

the Interim Brigade Combat Team began taking shape in 2000. The 

brigade would need to participate in the full spectrum of conflict 

ranging from a major theater war to small scale contingency in an 

urban/close terrain setting and have core capabilities of high tactical 

mobility and robust dismounted assault. Given these requirements, 

the Army planned to organize it as a combined arms, self-contained, 

mounted infantry organization with the ability to reach throughout 

the battlespace as required. Major organic sub-elements would include three motorized, combined arms infantry battalions with organic mortar companies; a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 

acquisition squadron; an anti-tank company; a field artillery battalion of three firing batteries, a target acquisition platoon, a headquarters and headquarters battery, and a meteorological section; a survey 

company; a signal company; and a brigade headquarters and headquarters company.25

This notional design would help ensure responsive and proactive lethal and nonlethal fires. To accomplish this, the Interim 

Brigade Combat Team’s field artillery would be outfitted with the 

latest technology. Because the Interim Armored Vehicle-based selfpropelled 155-millimeter howitzer would not be available, the field 

artillery battalion would have 12 M198s divided into three batteries 

of four howitzers each. Plans were to use the M777 to replace the 

M198 in 2005, organized into a battalion of three batteries of six 

cannons each for a total of 18 in the battalion, and would be replaced 

by the Interim Armored Vehicle-based howitzer in the near future. 

These weapon systems, especially the self-propelled howitzer, and 

other field artillery systems would possess mobility and survivability that would be equal to the maneuver force and furnish lethal, 

precision fires.26

To ensure effects coordination and precision fires for the Initial 
103

and Interim Brigade Combat Teams and the Interim Division under 

development, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command made 

the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell central to the Field Artillery’s fire support role. This represented a significant break from 

the existing fire support organization. At the brigade level, the cell 

would perform the traditional functions of the fire support element; 

obtain guidance from the commander about the desired effects; and 

then plan, prepare, and direct the execution of the desired effects utilizing organic and non-organic means. Unlike the existing fire support element, the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell would provide 

expanded access to joint assets; furnish an ability to plan, coordinate, and employ lethal and nonlethal effects; perform a counterfire 

function; and focus on effects-based fires.27

Work on the Interim Brigade produced results by 2002. After becoming the first Initial Brigade Combat Team in 2001, the 3d 

Brigade, 2d Infantry Division received its Stryker Interim Armored 

Vehicles in May 2002 to become a self-contained Interim Brigade 

Combat Team. The vehicles were named after Medal of Honor winners Private First Class Stuart S. Stryker, who served in World War 

II, and Specialist Robert F. Stryker, who served in Vietnam. Redesignated as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team in June 2002 (also 

called Stryker Brigade Combat Team one), the 3d Brigade underwent a field training exercise early in 2003. The unit trained on the 

new armored vehicles; retained some “in-lieu-of” equipment; and 

underwent successful squad, platoon, and company evaluations in 

2003. With this, Transformation of the Army entered the second, or 

Interim Force, phase.28

While work on the Interim Brigade Combat Team moved forward, the Army started developing an Interim Division. As a February 2001 draft organizational and operational plan outlined, the 

division would provide the joint force commander with a strategically responsive, early-entry ground force that would be optimized 

for offensive operations and could support operations in any operational environment, such as a major theater of war or small-scale 

contingency.29 Equipped with Interim Armored Vehicles, the division would be organized around three brigade combat teams, one 

air cavalry brigade, a division artillery of three battalions of 18 
104

M777s each and one battery of nine High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

Systems M142 launchers, one engineer regiment, and one division 

maneuver sustainment brigade. Division troops would consist of 

a military intelligence battalion, a signal battalion, and an air defense artillery battery.30 As organized, division would be deployable 

within 120 hours, capable of fighting across the full spectrum of 

conflict, and normally deployed as part of a joint task force. Equally 

important, the division would expand the core capabilities of the 

Initial and Interim Brigades, be combat operational on arrival in 

theater, have an offensive orientation, and have overmatching operational and tactical mobility.31

From the perspective of the Army, the Interim Forces would 

provide operational and strategic advantages. An October 2000 Army 

Transformation briefing explained that the Interim Forces would 

ensure combat overmatch for American forces until the Objective 

Force capabilities could be fielded beginning in 2008 and would not 

be an experimental force for testing concepts. They would be fully 

trained and deployable and would provide warfighting capability.32

Equally important, the Interim Force would give the Army the ability to get forces on the ground quickly with the requisite combat 

power to influence a potential crisis. Although the Interim Force, 

including an interim armored cavalry regiment, would fill a capability gap with a highly deployable force, most of the Army would 

still consist of Legacy Forces until the Army started introducing the 

Objective Force in 2010.33

As a concept for the Interim Division emerged, the Army began 

work on the Objective Force. The development and fielding of the 

Future Combat System formed the heart of the Objective Force. The 

Future Combat System would consist of agile and fast unmanned 

and manned platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles and field 

artillery that would be tied together by a sophisticated communications system and automation.34 After fielding the Future Combat 

System during the second decade of the 21st Century, the Army 

would transform its Legacy and Interim Forces into the Objective 

Force over a period of several years—focused on achieving capabilities rather than being platform driven as the Army had been for 

years. The Objective Force would make the Army the world’s pre-
105

eminent land force for a broad range of missions—from support, including homeland security, to decisive warfighting—at every point 

on the military spectrum and would also include multi-functional 

and specialized units, such as a Strike Unit of Action, consisting of 

aviation, intelligence, target acquisition, and fires.35

An operational concept for fighting with the Objective Force 

unfolded over a period of several months beginning in 2000 and 

continuing into 2001. Although all levels of command remained 

undefined, two basic conceptual echelons emerged by November 

2001—Unit of Employment and Unit of Action. Comparable to a 

division and above organization, a Unit of Employment would be 

an offensively oriented, versatile, multi-dimensional force capable 

of performing a variety of roles and missions. For example, it would 

perform tasks assigned to Army of Excellence divisions and higher 

echelons, link Army ground and joint air forces, and orchestrate 

joint campaigns as required. Tailored to the mission, a Unit of Employment would also resource and execute combat operations; designate objectives; coordinate with multi-service, interagency, multinational, and non-governmental activities; and employ long-range 

fires, aviation, and sustainment. The Unit of Employment would 

also provide command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as tactical direction to Units of Action. In addition, the Unit of Employment would 

provide forces to Units of Action to augment their organic forces 

based on its mission and tactical requirements and would be capable 

of performing joint operations.36

A Unit of Action or Brigade Combat Team would have a fixed 

organization, be the tactical formation of the Objective Force, and 

be comparable to brigade and lower echelons in the Army of Excellence. As outlined in the draft November 2001 TRADOC Pamphlet 

525-3-91, The Objective Force, a Unit of Action would be the smallest combined arms unit that could be committed independently. It 

would close with the enemy and destroy it with integrated fire, maneuver, and tactical assault. The core of the Unit of Action would be 

three combined arms combat battalions. However, the modularity 

and Objective Force were only concepts as late as 2003.37

As the force structure for the Objective Force began taking 
106

shape in 2001, the Army envisaged a new operational environment. 

Unlike the Army’s existing force that was designed, equipped, and 

trained to confront an enemy that conducted highly centralized military operations, Objective Force units would face an entirely different operational environment in the 21st Century.38 At one end of the 

spectrum of conflict, creative and adaptive opponents would employ 

strategies to destroy American resolve by attacking the homeland, 

killing innocent civilians, and conducting prolonged operations. At 

the other end was the possibility of a major theater war. While the 

enemy would still retain the ability to fight in massed formations, 

American military forces could no longer depend on the enemy to 

array its forces in predictable formations. The enemy would seek 

advantages of weather and terrain, take sanctuary in complex terrain, employ terrain masking, and protect high-payoff targets by 

shielding them among non-combatants. Behind this wide spectrum 

of conflict would be the information revolution and technological 

advances that promised breakthroughs in surveillance and communications to create immense bases of knowledge for military planning and execution unprecedented in scope, volume, and accuracy.39

To fight successfully in the new operational environment, the 

Army would have to see first, understand first, act first, and finish 

decisively. To see first meant detecting, identifying, and tracking the 

individual components of enemy units and preventing the enemy 

from doing the same against Army forces. To understand first focused on following and anticipating the enemy’s intentions. To act 

first involved initiating decisive engagement at the Army’s chosen 

time and place, while to finish decisively denoted well-timed assaults, exploiting successes, and denying the enemy the opportunity 

to regroup or to continue the fight.40

Addressing this new battlefield, Major General Michael D. Maples, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 

2001 to 2003, talked about the increased requirement for true synergy 

between fire support and maneuver. In the September–October 2002 

Field Artillery, he wrote, “A commander may employ his maneuver 

force to attain positions of tactical advantage in order to employ his 

fires most effectively. In other circumstances, it may be the effects of 

fires that will permit the effective maneuver of forces.”41
107

Tasked by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to 

serve as the center for fires and effects, the Field Artillery School 

developed the concept of networked fires in 2002 to provide the 

required synergy between the maneuver arms and fire support.42 As 

explained by US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 

523-3-90, networked fires would be a triad of relevant sensors, effects capabilities, and battle command that would enable dynamic 

on-demand lethal and nonlethal fires as well as effects to be applied 

at the time and place of the commander’s choosing. To accomplish 

this, all sensors and shooters would be linked through the battle 

command system, which would permit vertical and horizontal integration and select the appropriate lethal or nonlethal effect upon receiving target information from the sensors. Ultimately, networked 

fires would focus on the effects and not the platform by applying the 

right delivery system or mix of systems to achieve the desired effect, 

called effects-based fires.43

Adopting new indirect fire systems and munitions would facilitate effects-based fires. To do this, the Army would eliminate Legacy Force systems, such as the M102 towed 105-millimeter howitzer, the M109A6 (Paladin) self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, 

the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer, and the Multiple Launch 

Rocket System, from the Army’s arsenal as the new systems came 

on board. Over a period of years, the total number of fire support 

platforms would be reduced from 10 in the Current Force structure 

to 4 in the Objective Force. When the transition had been completed 

by 2032, the field artillery force would consist of the Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight-System Cannon, the Future Combat 

System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (a rocket system), the 

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Crusader. If the 

82d Airborne Division and the 101st Air Assault Division remained 

unique, the school planned to keep the M119A1 towed 105-millimeter howitzer or replace it with a follow-on weapon system. Additionally, the school stressed the importance of precision and smart 

munitions—primarily the Excalibur Unitary munition for 155-millimeter howitzers, the Multiple Launch Rocket System Smart Tactical 

Rocket, and the Army Tactical Missile System.44

Despite the promising future, Transformation of the Army 
108

dealt the Field Artillery a serious blow.45 Late in 1999, the Army 

terminated the Multiple Launch Rocket System Smart Tactical 

Rocket and Army Tactical Missile System IIA programs to help 

fund forming the medium weight brigades and procuring appropriate weapon systems; additionally, it made the Army Tactical Missile System II the carrier for Brilliant Anti-armor submunition and 

even contemplated discontinuing the Crusader because it was too 

heavy and cumbersome.46

General Shinseki backed the Crusader because he liked its capabilities and its resupply vehicle, though he disliked their collective weight of more than 100 tons. Because General Shinseki wanted them to be an integral member of the Army’s dominant maneuver 

force, the Army restructured the Crusader program in December 

1999. It reduced the weight of the howitzer and its resupply vehicle 

to make them more strategically deployable without losing their key 

performance parameters to keep them a part of the modernizing the 

Field Artillery. In other words, the Army intended to field the lighter 

Crusader and the M270A1 under development to the Legacy Force 

even though most of it would be composed of M109A6 howitzers 

and M270 launchers.47

While digitization was a critical aspect of the transformation 

effort and ensured a place for the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System in the long-term, the Army and the Field Artillery did not anticipate losing the Crusader as soon as they did. The 

Army designated the Crusader as a Legacy to Objective Force system based on its 2000–2001 redesign to satisfy weight concerns 

that emerged in 1999; however, the debate over the system’s future 

arose again in 2002.48 As some critics in the Department of Defense 

suggested, the system represented a Cold War weapon and “oldthink approach to warfare” and should be eliminated as the Army 

transitioned to the medium weight force. Advocates still maintained 

that the Crusader had a place in the Army’s weapon inventory. In 

reality, the 55-ton howitzer and its 45-ton resupply vehicle lacked 

the desired strategic mobility and were more attuned to Cold War 

than projected future requirements.49

In the midst of this debate, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld canceled the Crusader program on 8 May 2002. He believed 
109

that it did not fit with the new threats of cyber war and terrorism, 

desired even more nimble and mobile forces for the 21st Century, 

and planned to transfer the savings created by its cancellation to 

new technologies.50 This permitted the Department of Defense and 

the Department of the Army to reallocate the funding from the terminated Crusader to support the Transformation of the Army. The 

extra money would be used to accelerate the development of the Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon and Future Combat 

System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, which were vital aspects 

of transformation; the Excalibur 155-millimeter family of precision 

munitions; the precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 

rocket; the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System; and the M777 

155-millimeter towed howitzer. The emphasis on developing such 

munitions and light, mobile weapon systems reflected the lessons 

learned from military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom 

in Afghanistan where the accuracy and responsiveness of precision 

weapons had been critical and had been impressive and where mobility reigned supreme.51

Figure 4: M109A6 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. 

Source: US Army photo by Staff Sergeant Jon Cupp.
110

As the Crusader developmental program and the proposals for 

new weapon systems with strategic mobility indicated, the Transformation of the Army altered the direction of field artillery modernization. General Shinseki planned to create a modular Army equipped 

with medium weight systems with strategic deployability and the 

attributes of Cold War heavy armored systems. Strategically deployable, survivable, and lethal field artillery systems would replace the 

heavy systems fielded during the Cold War; would be the wave of 

the future; and would arm new, lethal, modular organizations. A new 

Field Artillery would arise that would contrast remarkably with its 

Cold War ancestor.

Changing of the Guard

Upon becoming the Chief of Staff of the Army in August 2003, 

General Peter J. Schoomaker likewise acknowledged the pressing 

requirement to make the Army more responsive to United States 

national security requirements of the 21st Century. He noted the 

positive work accomplished through mid-2003, understood the imperative to fight the global war on terrorism, recognized the need to 

accelerate transformation, and added his twist to the process. 

As of 2003, the post-Cold War Army lacked the required flexibility and responsiveness to meet worldwide crises. In support of 

military operations during the past five years, for example, the Army 

had to modify its corps and divisions by dismantling or reorganizing them for operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. This often left behind forces that were essentially inoperable. 

Using existing formations required time-consuming restructuring 

before deploying. This difficulty coupled with the need to employ 

land forces immediately with little time to reorganize caused General 

Schoomaker to alter the transformation pace and direction that General Shinseki had started in 1999 and would take years to complete. 

Schoomaker replaced the Legacy Force and the Interim Force with 

the Current Force. He also replaced the Objective Force with the Future Force and started quickening the pace of fielding select Future 

Force capabilities to enhance the Current Force so that it would be 

relevant and ready to conduct major combat operations across the 

full spectrum of conflict. The most critical feature of Schoomaker’s 
111

effort was reorganizing the Army’s force structure around the modular combat brigade team.52

General Kevin Byrnes, commanding general of the US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, noted that in 2003, General 

Schoomaker made a significant departure from General Shinseki’s 

Legacy Force, Interim Force, and Objective Force concepts. In 

1999, the Army created a leisure transformation process that ran 

from the Legacy Force to Interim Force to the Objective Force and 

that would last into the third decade of the 21st Century. Given the 

1999–2001 international political scenario, this seemed to be satisfactory. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City 

and Washington DC reaffirmed the imperative to transform and also 

provided a sense of urgency. The Army had to initiate change faster 

than initially anticipated without risking the Current Force for the 

Future Force. Future capabilities had to be developed more rapidly 

and integrated into the Current Force rather than at some indeterminate time in the future.53

Later in 2003, the Capabilities Development Directorate at US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Futures Center described 

the process of implementing Schoomaker’s Current Force to Future 

Force initiative. First, the Army had to identify promising capabilities 

that were under development and get them to the field rapidly. For 

example, unmanned aerial vehicles and robots under development 

might not have the desired capabilities until 2010, but they could be 

employed by current leaders to furnish improved capabilities while 

the objective system was being developed. Second, the Army needed 

to integrate lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operating Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and other operations into doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel more rapidly 

and also become more joint-oriented than previously.54

As it sped up the process to introduce new technology, the 

Army began implementing lessons learned from recent combat operations by restructuring brigades, divisions, corps, and echelonsabove corps. Revamping its main combat unit, the division, was 

a high priority. Throughout most of the 20th Century, the division 

served as the Army’s primary fighting organization. Formed with 

a standard number of brigades or regiments and a division base of 
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specialty troops, the division fought battles to gain tactical advantage under the command of a corps. Although its battles typically 

took place over considerable space, the division’s brigades operated 

close to each other and depended on each other for reinforcement. 

Normally, the brigade had three or four combat maneuver battalions 

and received its specialty support from division-level units, such as 

division artillery. Even though doctrine stressed that brigade organization should be flexible, the tendency for habitual relationships 

between the combat brigades and their supporting units led to de 

facto fixed organizations that proved to be valuable in combat.55

Building on tactical experience from the last years of the 20th 

Century and wanting more flexibility for a force projection army, 

the Army abandoned the division as its primary fighting unit. Approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army in 2003, the combined 

arms maneuver brigade would replace the division, including the 

Interim Division under consideration, as the main combat unit. It 

would be self-contained and have three variants: a heavy (armored/

mechanized) brigade, an infantry brigade, and a Stryker brigade. 

These modular maneuver brigades would be approximately the size 

of 2003 task-organized brigades; would be stand-alone warfighting elements; would have organic maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, 

and logistics subunits; and would have a fixed table of organization 

and equipment. For fire support, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team 

would have 16 towed 105-millimeter howitzers (the M119 until a 

better towed 105-millimeter could be developed), one AN/TPQ-36 

radar, four Lightweight Countermortar Radars under development, 

one Profiler system that was a state-of-the-art meteorological system, and two Improved Positioning Azimuth Systems which were 

self-contained azimuth positioning systems for survey. The Heavy 

(later renamed Armored) Brigade Combat Team would have 16 selfpropelled 155-millimeter howitzers (Paladin), an AN/TPQ-37 (Version eight) radar, an AN/TPQ-36 radar, four Lightweight Countermortar Radars, one Profiler, and two Improved Positioning Azimuth 

Systems. Equipped with the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer 

as an interim solution until the M777 towed 155-millimeter howitzer could be fielded, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team would comprise the third standard maneuver brigade.56
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The Army began converting to modular Brigade Combat Teams 

in 2003 with the goal of completing the conversion for the active 

force and the National Guard force by 2010. The 3d Infantry Division, which had just returned in September 2003 from a deployment 

to Iraq, converted to the modular brigade concept and successfully 

tested it in March 2004 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 

California. Subsequently, the Army switched the 101st Airborne Division in 2004 and 10th Mountain Division in 2005 to modular brigades. By the end of 2006, the Army had 44 Brigade Combat Teams 

in the active force with more being formed and 28 Brigade Combat 

Teams in the Army National Guard. In view of this restructuring, 

Major General David Valcourt, who was the Fort Sill (Oklahoma) 

Commanding General and Commandant of the Field Artillery School 

from 2003 to 2005, made the formation of fires battalions for the Brigade Combat Team as the Field Artillery’s first priority.57

Although forming organic fires battalions for the Brigade 

Combat Team had the potential to create synergy between maneuver and fire support, modularization had a negative side. By dissolving corps artillery and division artillery, modularization eliminated 

senior field artillery headquarters relationships and responsibility at 

the corps and division levels. Further, it assumed that the Brigade 

Combat Team could provide sufficient readiness and administrative 

oversight for their organic fires battalions and that the fires brigades 

could function as a force field artillery headquarters. Also, the creation of a brigade combat team with its organic fires battalion placed 

responsibility for fire support training on the brigade commander, 

who was neither trained nor resourced to train field artillery officers 

and Soldiers in their core competencies. It moved the field artillery 

battalion commander to the maneuver brigade to become a staff officer as well as the fire support coordinator. This left battery commanders without any direct senior leadership.58

If the transformation proceeded as planned, the Army would 

have four brigade combat team (initially called Units of Action) variants by 2018: the Heavy (Armored) Brigade Combat Team, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and 

the Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team with an organic 

battalion of 18 Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight cannons 
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divided into three batteries of six cannons each, 60 Future Combat 

System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch Systems (a rocket system), unmanned aerial vehicles, and multi-mission radars. The Future Combat 

System Brigade Combat Team would have fully equipped units and 

advanced command and control capabilities and would be deployable 

on C-130, C-17, and C-5 aircraft to provide the desired responsiveness, deployability, agility, and versatility to meet full-spectrum operations worldwide. After all these modular brigades became operational, the Army would shift from a division-based to a brigade-based 

force capable of being tailored rapidly and effectively to close with 

and destroy the enemy. Each Brigade Combat Team could operate 

individually or collectively under control of a division headquarters.59

As outlined in the 23 January 2004 Unit of Employment Operations White Paper and refined in the 20 March 2004 Unit of 

Employment White Paper, the Army meanwhile planned to create 

modular headquarters for commanding the Brigade Combat Teams 

by restructuring its divisions, corps, and echelons above corps. They 

would be streamlined into two echelons: the Unit of Employment 

(UEy) and Unit of Employment (UEx). The UEy would serve as 

the theater, operational-level, land force and joint support organization; and the UEx would function as the primary warfighting headquarters above the Brigade Combat Teams. Most likely commanded 

by a lieutenant general, the UEy would consolidate most functions 

performed by the corps and Army service component commands 

into a single operational echelon and would be the primary vehicle 

for Army support to the regional component commander’s area of 

responsibility. Equally important, the UEy that was approved for 

standing up in November 2004 would be modular with the ability to 

be tailored, would command land forces in major operations, would 

support the rest of the joint team, would provide army capabilities 

to the combatant commander, and would tailor and support the UEx 

that had been approved for standing up in September 2004.60

The Unit of Employment Operations White Paper also outlined 

the UEx structure. As envisioned, the UEx would lack a fixed structure beyond its headquarters, because it would be completely modular and could be deployed as a pure headquarters without subordinate units. As a result, its supporting brigades—an aviation brigade, 
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a battlefield sustainment brigade, a maneuver enhancement brigade, 

a fires brigade, and a battlefield sustainment brigade—would be attached or assigned depending on the operations. Each brigade would 

have organic signal and sustainment capabilities. In addition, the 

UEx could control a mix of Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigade 

Combat Teams for different missions as well as six or more Brigade 

Combat Teams in protracted stability operations. Given its modularity, the UEx could adjust its organization for each operation. When 

the restructuring was complete, the Army would have Brigade Combat Teams and UEx and UEy units of employment to replace the 

existing brigade, division, corps, and army echelons of command.61

The Army further modified the UEy and UEx in 2005. It designated the UEy as an Army-level organization with a lieutenant 

general in command and the UEx as either a division- or corps-level 

command under a major general or a lieutenant general depending 

on its mission. As further explained late in 2005, the three-star UEx 

would be organized as an operational level unit, could function as 

the headquarters for a joint force land component, could provide 

command and control for two or more two-star UExs, and could 

function as an Army force as part of a joint force. The two-star UEx 

would still be modular, would be the warfighting headquarters, and 

could control up to six Maneuver Brigade Combat Teams.62

In 2006, the Army inched closer to completing work on the 

UEy and UEx. During the year, the Army developed a corps design 

(UEy) with a headquarters, a special troops battalion, and a tactical 

command post. The design also provided for a Fires and Effects Cell 

(also called a fire support cell) to integrate lethal and nonlethal fires; 

provide target production; and receive, prioritize, and action subordinate requests for fires and effects, among other responsibilities. 

The Army never completed work on the corps design as initially 

intended. In November 2007, the Chief of Staff of the Army decided 

to make the corps a tactical headquarters rather than an operational 

headquarters as had been the initial aim. This forced the Field Artillery School and other Army agencies to start over on the corps 

design in 2008. They made it a tactical and operational organization for command and control of major combat operation functions, 

comparable to the old corps.63
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Meanwhile, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

finished the modular (UEx) division headquarters design and force 

structure complete with a main command post, a tactical command 

post, a special troops battalion, and Fires and Effects Cell that would 

provide services similar to the corps fires cell. Representatives presented it to the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, 

on 2 August 2006 for review and approval. General Petraeus approved it and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command then 

sent the design to Forces Command and the Army’s divisions for 

staffing. The design added new capabilities, such as electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and information operations, to more 

traditional division functions.64 In mid-2007 following intense discussions, the Army approved the division redesign complete with 

maneuver enhancement, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, aviation, fires, and sustainment brigades and without a division artillery to coordinate and train subordinate field artillery battalions in the Brigade Combat Teams.65

As delineated in the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the 

fires brigade played a critical role in the modular division although it 

might not be stationed with the division. It would plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations to provide close support 

and precision strike for the joint force commander, the division, and 

the Brigade Combat Teams. The fires brigade could be task-organized 

with additional units, such as rocket and cannon battalions, depending 

on the situation. Its organic units included a headquarters and headquarters battery, a Fires and Effects Cell for planning and executing 

lethal and nonlethal effects, a support battalion for logistical support, 

a signal company, a target acquisition battery with four AN/TPQ-37 

Firefinder radars and two Lightweight Countermortar Radars, and 

an unmanned aerial vehicle company. With its organic rocket battalion—either Multiple Launch Rocket System or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System—the fires brigade could provide long-range 

fires to support the division in shaping the battlespace and conducting 

counterstrikes. However, the bulk of the fires from the fires brigade 

would come from assigned assets. Typically, this would be two rocket 

battalions and two cannon battalions. In some instances, the fires bri-
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gade would reinforce the Brigade Combat Teams with fires.66

To accomplish its close support mission, the fires brigade would 

normally employ a mix of cannon, rocket, and missile systems. This 

mix provided the brigade with the ability to furnish lethal effects 

while simultaneously limiting collateral damage; they also provided 

precision close support, among other functions. For such effects, the 

brigade would have to depend on joint fires. To eliminate this dependency and gap in fire support, the Army allotted armed unmanned 

aerial vehicles to provide the fires brigade with the precision organic capability to support shaping and close support operations. They 

also could penetrate threat airspace during day and night operations 

in all kinds of weather. As outlined in the December 2004 operational concept, the armed unmanned aerial vehicle would provide 

flexible, responsive precision close support fire to destroy critical 

enemy capabilities and shape subordinate unit operations. Equally 

important, the fires brigade’s armed unmanned aerial vehicles would 

provide flexible, responsive physical damage assessment of attack 

operations and long-range target acquisition capabilities.67

The first fires brigade that was not organic to the division—stood 

up on 16 December 2004—was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas, with the 2d Battalion, 20th Field 

Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) as an organic 

element. In 2004–05, the Field Artillery School anticipated a total 

of 12 fires brigades in the Total Force. Although General Valcourt 

consistently stated that in a perfect world each division would have 

a fires brigade, circumstances determined otherwise. Force structure constraints dictated a smaller number of fires brigades than the 

number of divisions. As the fires brigades were stood up, the Army 

deactivated division artilleries, corps artilleries, and Army National 

Guard brigade headquarters. Recognizing the importance of the fires 

brigade to division commanders for training and readiness, the Army 

acknowledged the need for more than initially projected in 2004–

05. The Total Army Analysis 2015 established the requirement for 

three more brigades to meet the increasing demand for their services. 

Funding constraints prevented the Army from getting the three additional fires brigades, forcing it to settle for two. As of May 2011, 

the Army had seven fires brigades in the active force and seven in the 
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reserve force for a total of 14 brigades. These supported 10 active 

component divisions and eight reserve component divisions.68

Thus, during the final years of General Schoomaker’s tenure and 

nearing the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, the Army had 

moved farther down the road of transformation by outlining concrete 

force structure and system acquisition plans to restructure the force 

radically. Through critical restructuring actions, the Army proposed 

to abandon the existing fixed division and brigade structure for divisions, which had the ability to be modified as required, and discarded the division as the primary combat unit for the modular Brigade 

Combat Team. Modularity promised to give the Army more flexibility than previously by permitting it to task-organize without tearing 

apart existing units and to organize forces for a specific mission.

Systems for Transformation

New weapons systems formed a key aspect of the Transformation of the Army. In 1999, General Shinseki initiated a plan to equip 

the Interim Brigade Combat Team with a family of medium-weight 

armored vehicles, called the Interim Armored Vehicle, and the Objective Force with the Future Combat System. This plan would create medium weight weapon systems that were as mobile as the light 

systems and as lethal as the heavy systems, would support power 

projection, and would create an army that could dominate the Information Age battlefield of the 21st Century. 

As the centerpiece of its near-term transformation effort, the 

Army needed to acquire the Interim Armored Vehicle, which would 

be capable of immediate employment upon arrival in the theater of 

operations and would maximize commonality. To accomplish this, 

the Army hosted vehicle demonstrations in December 1999 and January 2000 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Manufacturers displayed their 

medium weight armored vehicles to give a sense of what was available and possible. Nine contractors exhibited 35 different systems. 

Of these nine, only three manufacturers submitted tracked systems, 

and the only American firm was United Defense L.P., which produced nine variants of the M113 personnel carrier and the M8 armored gun system—a light tank system that the Army had canceled 

on the eve of production.69
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Following up, the Army held a series of June 2000 events to 

grade the performance and endurance of the 35 systems by running them through various tests to identify the most suitable one. As 

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Shenk, the Interim Armored Vehicle 

Program Manager at the Tank-automotive & Armaments Command, 

Dearborn, Michigan, explained, the Army used the tests to identify a 

family of vehicles that was air transportable, was capable of immediate employment upon arrival in the theater of operations, and had 

the greatest degree of commonality. Other desired characteristics included low sustainment costs, fuel economy, and maintainability.70

Deciding on the vehicle provoked a controversy. Even before 

the official selection process began, General Shinseki expressed his 

opinion in October 1999—indicating that he preferred a wheeled 

vehicle as a solution. This challenged the cultural bias against 

wheeled vehicles because the Army had favored tracks for combat 

vehicles at least since World War II. Tracked vehicle proponents 

feared that wheeled vehicles would be favored in the Interim Armored Vehicle competition at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and argued that tracked vehicles with their low ground pressure and greater traction offered better cross-country capabilities 

than wheeled vehicles. In the meantime, wheeled vehicle proponents pointed out that wheeled vehicles were simpler to maintain, 

were more reliable, and offered speed and agility while the supporters of tracked vehicles insisted that the Army would be foolish 

to go with wheeled vehicles just for their speed when they were 

vulnerable to getting stuck in mud and slowed down by rocks and 

other terrain over which tracks would glide. Reflecting a moderate 

position, Lieutenant Colonel Dana Pittard of the 3d Brigade, 2d 

Infantry Division that was converting to the Initial Brigade Combat 

Team organization at Fort Lewis, Washington, articulated his view 

in October 2000. He espoused adopting the best vehicle—whether 

it ran on wheels or tracks. Discussions through much of 2000 noted 

both merits and liabilities for each type of vehicle. Likewise, initial 

testing demonstrated the wheeled vehicle’s ability to travel faster 

on the road and the tracked vehicle’s cross-country superiority but 

failed to determine a clear winner, according to Colonel Shenk. Essentially, adopting either one meant tradeoffs.71
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After assessing the various candidates for its Interim Armored 

Vehicle, the Army announced its decision on 17 November 2000. It 

chose the Light Armored Vehicle III that was built by General Motors Defense and General Dynamics Land Systems, was already in 

production, and was employed by the US Marine Corps, the Canadian forces, the Saudi Arabian military, and the Australian army as the 

Interim Armored Vehicle platform. The company would manufacture its Light Armored Vehicle III in two variants: the infantry carrier 

vehicle and the mobile gun system. Both would be wheeled. The 

Light Armored Vehicle III would offer commonality and be the baseline for eight additional configurations (the mortar carrier vehicle; 

the anti-tank guided missile vehicle; the reconnaissance vehicle; the 

fire support vehicle; the engineer squad vehicle; the commander’s 

vehicle; the medical evacuation vehicle; and the nuclear, biological, 

and chemical reconnaissance vehicle) to reduce the logistical burden.72 Moreover, both variants could move at 60 miles per hour and 

travel in convoys at 40 miles per hour to provide the Interim Brigade 

Combat Team with tactical speed on the battlefield. Other benefits 

included strategic mobility via a C-130, low sustainment costs, and 

quiet operation that would permit stealthy movement in battle.73

A little more than two years after it selected the Light Armored 

Vehicle III as the Interim Armored Vehicle, the Army saw the fruits 

of its labors in 2002. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Army 

named the vehicle Stryker after two Medal of Honor recipients.74 On 

12 April 2002, General Shinseki accepted the first vehicle on behalf of the Army. Slated to be the workhorse of the Interim Brigade 

Combat Team, the vehicle represented the first of 2,000 to be delivered over the next decade. The system would provide the Interim 

Brigades with more firepower and protection than existing vehicles 

but would be more deployable than the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the M2 Abrams that were currently in the inventory.75 At 

the acceptance ceremony, General Shinseki noted, “It [the Stryker] 

resonates with what we expect it will give to the Army—a quick 

strike capability with greater staying power.”76

Millennium Challenge 2002, a joint Army-Air Force exercise, reinforced General Shinseki’s optimism by demonstrating the 

Stryker’s deployability. During the July–August 2002 exercise, the 
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Army airlifted a company of four Strykers via C-17 from Fort Lewis 

to an intermediate staging base. Then they were loaded onto C-130s 

and airlifted to an airfield in the middle of the National Training 

Center, Fort Irwin, California, where the Army conducted a joint 

interoperability exercise with the Marine Corps. From the Army’s 

perspective, the exercise reaffirmed the vehicle’s deployability even 

though some material deficiencies were noted that required fixing.77

The vehicle was a battlefield “enabler,” according to the Army.78

Echoing this, General Shinseki remarked at the 4 September 2002 

Association of the US Army meeting, “Stryker’s performance during Millennium Challenge at the National Training Center demonstrated the bridge for bringing together our rapidly deploying and 

versatile light forces and our lethal, survivable heavy forces.”79

Additional tests buttressed General Shinseki’s observation. 

During a series of operational evaluations in 2003, the Stryker demonstrated its strategic mobility once again. Arrowhead Lightning I, 

an operational evaluation of the Stryker vehicle and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team conducted at the National Training Center, employed six Air Force National Guard C-130 aircraft to fly 16 sorties 

on 1 April 2003 from the Southern California Logistics Airport to 

Bicycle Lake Army Airfield, a dirt landing strip at the National Training Center, then 21 more sorties on 2 April 2003. Altogether the Air 

Force National Guard transported 30 fully loaded Stryker vehicles 

with their crews to participate in a 10-day operational evaluation of 

the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division) to determine the vehicle’s operational readiness. Subsequently, 

the Stryker team transported Stryker vehicles by land, air, and sea 

to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, to 

participate in Arrowhead Lightning II. As a part of the test, the Army 

shipped 130 Stryker vehicles to the Fort Sill railhead facility; they 

arrived on 26 and 27 April 2003. After loading the vehicles onto 

railcars, Fort Sill and Fort Lewis personnel shipped them to Fort 

Polk. Observations from this certification exercise indicated that the 

Stryker vehicle and the brigade performed well and met the Army’s 

criteria and along with Millennium Challenge ended any opposition 

to the Light Armored Vehicle III serving as the Interim Armored Vehicle.80 Subsequently, Stryker vehicles and brigades started deploy-
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ing to Iraq in December 2003 in support of Operation Iraq Freedom. 

Later, the Field Artillery School received six Strykers in April 2004 

and November 2004 for training purposes.81

Meanwhile, work on the Future Combat System for the Objective Force moved forward with the goal of introducing leap-ahead 

technologies and operational capabilities. To field the Future Combat System, the Army and Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency launched a collaborative effort in May 2000 to define and 

demonstrate the Future Combat System. The Future Combat System would supplant the Stryker and be the primary weapon/troop 

carrying platform for the Objective Force. As the centerpiece of the 

Objective Force, the Future Combat System would be a family of 

vehicles with four primary functions of indirect fire, direct fire, infantry carrier, and sensor; have manned and unmanned variants; and 

be a system of battlefield capabilities. Ultimately, the Future Combat System would make the heavy forces lighter and the light forces 

more lethal, reduce logistical demands, function in the operational 

environment of the future, enable the Objective Force to dominate 

ground combat across the entire spectrum of operations, and enhance the Army’s ability to conduct decisive tactical maneuver.82

In May 2002, a vital component of the Future Combat System 

program received an unexpected windfall when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld terminated the Crusader program. He used 

savings from the terminated program to accelerate development of 

the Future Combat System cannon for the Objective Force.83 Out 

of this development emerged a concept technology demonstration 

program. United Defense and General Dynamics were the principle 

contractors to examine technological possibilities, furnish a material solution for the cannon, deliver block one capability by Fiscal 

Year 2008, and develop a strategy to achieve the objective solution. 

Six months later, the Army completed a study to determine the cannon’s requirements. Then in December 2002, the Army established 

a maximum range of 30 to 40 kilometers, a minimum range of 3 to 

4 kilometers, and a rate of fire of 6 to 10 rounds a minute plus automatic ammunition handling of all current and developmental munitions, interoperability with other Future Combat System systems, 

and C-130 deployability.84
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Late in 2002 and into early 2003, the Army outlined various 

options to field the block one Future Combat System Cannon, officially called the Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. Initially, the Army had four potential self-propelled variants—a 

tracked and a wheeled 105-millimeter howitzer and a tracked and 

a wheeled 155-millimeter howitzer. While either caliber was viable and while either tracks or wheels were also viable, the Army 

planned to select the best existing design features to field a demonstration model by October 2003 to serve as the basis of the block 

one cannon.85

To meet the deadline, the Field Artillery School merged the 

four variants early in 2003. Based on additional study, the school 

produced one option—a 155-millimeter caliber weapon system with 

a band track. Major General Michael D. Maples, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 2001 to 2003, explained 

the concept and the rationale for the selection on 29 January 2003. 

A single piece of steel-reinforced rubber would replace the conventional articulated steel tracks and thus offer increased mobility over 

wheeled versions during cross-country operations, be lighter than a 

wheeled variant, and meet the Future Combat System operational 

requirements for highway speed. The 155-millimeter caliber also 

would provide greater lethality and shoot more munition types.86

General Maples cautioned, “This. . .is not a recommendation to 

make a final decision on caliber or chassis design.”87

Within a few months, contractor United Defense Industries introduced and tested a cannon prototype at Yuma Proving Ground, 

Arizona. The prototype featured a modified XM777 155-millimeter howitzer tube mounted on a platform that had been designed 

by United Defense’s Ground Systems Division, a fully automated 

ammunition loading system, and a magazine that held 24 100-pound 

projectiles. The platform used a band-track system and was propelled by a hybrid electric diesel engine to provide improved mobility and reduced fuel consumption. In August 2003, the prototype 

successfully fired its first round. By the end of October 2003, the 

prototype had fired 140 rounds.88

Meanwhile in March 2003, the Army acknowledged the difficulty of designing the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon that would be 
124

deployable in a C-130 aircraft and searched for satisfactory compromises. A cannon that fully complied with the Future Combat System 

operational requirements would far exceed the weight restriction of 

20 tons and thus would not be C-130 deployable. In view of this, the 

Army conducted numerous analyses during the rest of 2003 to find 

a design that would meet the transportability requirements but retain the desired combat requirements. Some suggested design compromises were to eliminate automated resupply, reduce the caliber 

of the 155-millimeter tube to decrease the range capability, use a 

105-millimeter tube instead, limit the armor, and deploy the cannon 

with a limited amount of fuel and ammunition on board. As might be 

expected, the Army found these concessions to be unsatisfactory.89

In December 2003, the Army formed a team of experts from 

government and private industry to examine capability versus transportability. A month later, the team reported significant shortfalls 

in expected capabilities of combat platforms that could be moved 

on C-130s. It became clear that some requirements had to be modified to achieve C-130 transportability.90 Recognizing the difficulty 

of achieving the weight limitations, the Program Manager for Future 

Combat System, Unit of Action, Brigadier General Charles Cartwright, stopped work on the 20-ton version in November 2004 in 

favor of work on a 24-ton version.91

Meanwhile in May 2004, the Army and Field Artillery made a 

key decision on the caliber of the cannon. Based on careful analysis, 

they opted for a 38-caliber, 155-millimeter howitzer. The 155-millimeter howitzer tube was 58 percent more effective against personnel targets than the 105-millimeter tube under consideration and 82 

percent more effective against materiel targets than a 105-millimeter 

tube. Also, the Army and Field Artillery selected the 38-caliber tube 

over the longer 39-caliber tube—trading four kilometers of range 

using the M549 rocket-assisted projectile to save 1,367 pounds. This 

would make the cannon C-130 deployable with about 25 percent of 

its basic load of ammunition and still satisfy operational requirements 

for transportability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.92

As the Army examined the transportability and caliber issues, 

it restructured the Future Combat System program to meet congressional guidance and get new technology to the force faster. Restruc-
125

turing would accelerate the most critical and promising technologies 

within the program so the Army could more quickly insert Future 

Combat System technology into the operational force.93 Equally important, the cannon became the lead Future Combat System manned 

ground vehicle variant.94

After two years of developmental work on the cannon, Congress reduced funding for the Future Combat System program in 

2007, prompting the Army to restructure its modernization efforts 

again. It reduced the number of Future Combat System platforms 

from 18 to 14 and extended the timeline for buying and fielding the 

systems to stay within budget.95 As initially planned, the first Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team would have initial operational capability in 2010, with the prototype Non-Line-of-Sight 

Cannon being delivered in 2008. Although the fielding schedule was 

still being worked on, 2007 briefings showed changes. The initial 

operational capability for the first Future Combat System Brigade 

Combat Team would be 2014 under the new timeline, with full operational capability in 2017; the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon was still 

the lead variant in the Future Combat System family of systems; 

the cannon would have a common chassis with the Future Combat 

System family of vehicles and have similar interoperability, mobility, and survivability characteristics; and the cannon would leverage 

work done with the Crusader program.96

In 2008, Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon passed crucial milestones. 

BAE Systems placed the cannon on the Future Combat System 

manned ground vehicle that was the common platform for the eight 

manned variants. A unique mission module would be mounted and 

shown for the first time at the National Mall, Washington, D.C., in 

June 2008. After final laboratory testing on the prototype, BAE delivered it to the Army test site in August 2008 and the Army fired 

the first round on 17 September 2008. The Army continued testing 

through the rest of the year and planned to receive four more prototypes for testing.97 Major General Peter M. Vangjel, who was the 

Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence from 2007 

to 2009, commented in December 2008 about the cannon’s significance: “It is therefore imperative that we support NLOS-C.”98

Notwithstanding this success, General Vangjel’s strong sup-
126

port, and the overall solid progress of the Future Combat System development program, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced 

on 6 April 2009 that he would restructure program. He intended to 

accelerate select technologies to the Brigade Combat Teams and 

planned to cancel the manned ground vehicle component of the program with its eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on 

a common chassis to replace the M1 Abrams tank, the M1 Bradley 

infantry fighting vehicle, and the M109 Paladin self-propelled howitzer. As he explained, the manned ground vehicle program did not 

adequately reflect counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates further criticized 

the Future Combat System program because it did not include mineresistant, ambush-protected vehicles. Following Secretary Gates’s 

announcement, the Department of Defense issued an acquisition 

decision memorandum on 23 June 2009 that halted the Future Combat System program and cancelled work on the Non-Line-of-Sight 

Cannon to save money.99

Work on the Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight 

Launch System accompanied development of the Non-Line-ofFigure 5: Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. Source: US Army photo 

courtesy of Tank-automotive and Armaments Command.
127

Sight Cannon. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, who was the 

Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 1997 to 

1998, outlined the school’s vision of the future for fire support in 

the May–June 1998 Field Artillery. Among other things, he proposed an advanced fire support system that would be a family of 

precision missiles. They would be capable of attacking with precision or loitering over the target area before attacking with precision 

and would not require a large, heavy, expensive and crew-intensive 

launch platform.100

Out of this vision evolved the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency NetFires technology demonstration program. Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing Corporation began work in 1998 

to establish an initial concept. In 1999, the Depth and Simultaneous 

Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill became the US Army Training 

and Doctrine Command’s proponent to give the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency and the contractor teams the information 

needed to develop critical design parameters and system characteristics. One year later in August 2000, Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon started fabricating the system for a Precision Attack Missile and 

a Loiter Attack Missile. NetFires—later renamed the Future Combat 

System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System to avoid confusion with 

Fort Sill’s Networked Fires concept—would consist of a container/

launch unit with 15 containerized missiles and an on-board computer and communications system. The Non-Line-of-Sight Launch 

System would deliver the Loiter Attack Missile with a range of 70 

kilometers plus a loitering time of approximately 30 minutes and the 

Precision Attack Missile with a maximum range of 40 kilometers.101

Over a period of several years beginning in 2001, the NonLine-of-Sight Launch System development program designed, fabricated, tested, and demonstrated container-launched missiles that 

would provide massive, responsive, precision firepower early in a 

conflict. The system would be shipped in its launching container; 

would require no additional launch support equipment; and could 

be fired remotely from a truck, a variety of other platforms, or the 

ground. The missiles would be ready to fire almost immediately—a 

much faster response time and a higher potential rate of fire than 

possible with current howitzers or missile launchers—and would 
128

provide a precision non-line-of-sight capability. Equally important, 

it would be one of 18 Future Combat Systems core systems and 

would be organic to the Future Combat System Brigade Combat 

Team in the Objective Force.102

Although development was progressing on the container/

launch unit and the missiles for operational testing in 2010 and full 

operational capability in 2013, Congress considered terminating the 

program but decided to modify acquisition. The Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2005 subsequently cut the program’s 

funding by $15 million, accelerated work on the Precision Attack 

Missile, and slowed work on the Loiter Attack Missile. The bill retained the Loiter Attack Missile in the science and technology base 

for further maturation and permitted moving the Precision Attack 

Missile further into development because its technology was easier 

to integrate with the Current Force than the Loiter Attack Missile.103

Following the funding modification, the Army revamped its 

fielding plan with the intent to field the Precision Attack Missile and 

container/launch unit by 2008. To get it to the field as soon as possible, the Army accelerated development in phases or blocks, with 

prototypes developed in each one. Moving into the next phase or 

block meant that the prototype had to meet specific performance 

parameters. Also, as one of the first three Future Combat System 

systems to be employed in the Current Force, the Non-Line-ofSight Launch System with the Precision Attack Missile would be 

incorporated into the fires battalion of the Heavy (Armored) Brigade 

Combat Team. This organization later would be transformed into 

a modular brigade and finally became the Future Combat System 

Brigade Combat Team in 2014.104

Notwithstanding developmental progress after 2005, the Department of Defense announced an abrupt change in the Non-Lineof-Sight Launch System. After the Precision Attack Missile failed 

to hit four of six targets during a test in January–February 2010, 

the Army determined fixing the system’s problems would delay the 

program more than a year. Further, a review of the precision munitions portfolio determined that the missile was unaffordable and 

would not provide a cost-effective precision fire capability. Due 

to these various factors, the Army opted to pursue other capabili-
129

ties to engage a moving target in all weather conditions in order 

to fulfill the operational requirement defined for the Non-Line-ofSight Launch System. The Department of Defense concluded that 

the system was no longer required. In view of this, Secretary of the 

Army John H. McHugh recommended cancelling the program. The 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Ashton Carter, approved and authorized the program cancellation on 13 May 2010.105

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Non-Line-of-Sight 

Cannon System and the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System promised to revolutionize the branch, give it unprecedented lethality and 

tactical mobility, make it deployable for power projection, and be a 

vital part of the modular force. The demise of these systems during 

the first decade of the century left the branch with the less futuristic 

M777 and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System—and without 

the potential for medium-weight weapon systems that were critical 

parts of transformation. The M777 cannon and the High Mobility 

Rocket System offered strategic mobility but did not make a radical, 

innovative departure from their respective predecessors, which were 

the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer and the Multiple Launch 

Rocket System. The Field Artillery’s future that envisioned pioneering weapon systems arming a modular force had disappeared. Modularization would go on without key field artillery systems.
130

NOTES

1. John S. Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. 

Army 1989-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army, 

2011), 169–70. 

2. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 170–71. 

3. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 191; Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army, 23 

June 1999, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC); Email 

with Attachment, “CSA Expands on Presentation to AUSA in Oct,” 1 February 2000, HRDC; Email, “Initial Bde-Historical Reporting,” 22 December 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Transformation Campaign Plan,” 19 January 

2000, HRDC; Joint Vision 2010, 1, HRDC. 

4. Intent of the Chief of Staff, 23 June 1999, HRDC. 

5. Email with Attachment, “Information Paper,” 6 January 2000, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming the World’s Best Army into a Full Spectrum Force . . . Strategically Responsive and Dominant,” 10–11 January 

2000, HRDC; The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational 

Concept, 6 January 2000, 6, HRDC; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire 

Support,” January 2000, 10, HRDC. 

6. “Army Announces Vision for the Future,” US Army News Release, 12 October 1999, HRDC. 

7. General Eric K. Shinseki, Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon, 

45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, 12 

October 1999, HRDC. 

8. Briefing, “Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at Fort 

Lewis and the Planned Performance Demonstration at Fort Knox,” 16 December 1999, HRDC. 

9. Email with Attachment, “CSA Expands on Presentation to AUSA 

in Oct;” “Army Announces Vision for the Future,” US Army News Release; Information Memo, Department of the Army, “Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) Program Success,” 3 May 2002, IAV File, HRDC.

10. Email with Attachment, “CSA Expands on Presentation to AUSA 

in Oct.” 

11. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 197–98; Richard L. Kugler, “Case Study 

in Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces,” Case Studies in National Security Transformation Number 14, April 2008, 13, HRDC; Benjamin King, Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-Year History of the U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2013), 21–22. 

12. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 202; “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Work on New Vision to Start Soon,” Inside the Army, 29 November 

1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at 

Fort Lewis and the Planned Performance Demonstration at Fort Knox,” 

16 December 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire support,” January 2000, HRDC; “Complete Fielding of the Army’s Objective 
131

Force 32 Years Away, TCP Says,” Inside the Army, 31 July 2000, HRDC; 

U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 (Extract), Chapter 

Two, HRDC; Briefing, “Equipping the Brigade Combat Team,” 21 January 2000, HRDC. 

13. “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Work on New Vision to 

Start Soon,” Inside the Army, 29 November 1999, 8–9, HRDC; Briefing, 

“Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at Fort Lewis,” 16 December 1999; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire Support,” January 2000, 

HRDC; “Complete Fielding of the Army’s Objective Force,” Inside the 

Army, 1, 16. 

14. Information Paper, “AUSA Transform Panel Briefing,” 26 October 2000, HRDC; Brown, Kevlar Legions, 197. 

15. Briefing, “Recapitalization of the Legacy Force,: 17 October 2000, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000, 

HRDC; 2001 Army Modernization Plan (Extract), Executive Summary, 

11, 24, HRDC; Testimony, General Shinseki before Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 July 2001, HRDC; Information Paper, “CSA Remarks 

at AUSA Seminar,” 8 November 2001, HRDC. 

16. US Army Public Affairs Office Information Paper, “Power of 

Digitization Proves Worth During Army Force on Force Exercise, 18 April 

2001, HRDC; Information Paper, “4th ID shows Info Superiority in Division Capstone Exercise,” 20 April 2001, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “DCX 

I Observations,” 25 April 2001, HRDC; “Digital World meets Combat 

During Desert Exercise,” American Forces Information Service, 18 April 

2001, HRDC. 

17. Brigadier General William F. Engel, “Transforming Fires for the 

Objective Force,” Field Artillery, November–December 2001, 9–13. 

18. 2001 Army Modernization Plan (Extract) 10–21, HRDC; Information Paper, “AUSA Transform Panel Briefing,” 26 October 2000, 

HRDC; Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002, HRDC. 

19. “New Brigade Won’t Feature Organic Aviation or Cannon Capabilities,” Inside the Army, 29 November 1999, 1, 8, HRDC; Briefing, “Status of Brigade Combat Team Development,” 16 December 1999; Email, 

“IBCT,” 6 March 2000, HRDC. 

20. Briefing, “Transforming the World’s Best Army into a Full Spectrum Force . . . Strategically Responsive and Dominant,” 10–11 January 

2000, HRDC; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire Support,” January 

2000, HRDC; Email, “Description of Medium Armored Vehicle Variants 

for IBCT,” 11 January 2000, HRDC; Organizational and Operational Concept, the Brigade Combat Team, 6 January 2000, 20, 21, 23–24, HRDC; 

Email, “IBCT,” 6 March 2000, HRDC; Major General Toney Stricklin, 

“Transforming the FA and the Force,” Field Artillery, March–April 2000, 

1; IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept (Extract), 29 January 

2000, HRDC; Briefing, “IBCT Personnel and Equipment,” 29 January 

2000, HRDC. 
132

21. Organizational and Operational Concept, The Brigade Combat 

Team, 6 January 2000, 23–24; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire Support,” January 2000, HRDC; Email, “IBCT,” 6 March 2000; Major General Toney Stricklin, “The Field Artillery in Transformation,” Field Artillery, September–October 2000, 1–2; Email, “Transformation,” 15 March 

2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Medium Weight Force Fires and 

Effects Coordination Organizational and Operational Concept,” 15 May 

2000, HRDC; BCT Organizational and Operational Concept (Extract), 18 

April 2000, HRDC. 

22. Stricklin, “Transforming the FA and Force,” 1–2; “Army Postpones Plans to Outfit BCTs with Self-propelled Howitzers,” Inside the 

Army, 3 July 2000, 1, 5, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Transformation,” 15 May 2000, HRDC; Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept Document (Extract), Chapter 8, HRDC; 

Stricklin, “The Field Artillery in Transformation,” 1–2. 

23. “Army’s First IBCT Exceeds Expectation during Warfighter Exercise,” Inside the Army, 15 October 2001, 1, 11, HRDC; “BCT More Difficult for Enemy Forces, but OPFOR Finds Some Holes,” Inside the Army, 

15 October 2001, 12, HRDC; Colonel Steven L. Bailey, “Fires for the 

IBCT,” Field Artillery, November–December 2001, 5–8; “Army Officially Begins Transformation to Initial Brigade Combat Team,” Fort Lewis 

Press Release, 13 April 2000, HRDC; Briefing, “IBCT Organizational and 

Operational,” 8 January 2002, HRDC. 

24. “Initial Brigade Combat Teams Are First Step in Creating Objective Force,” Army News Service, Summer 2000, Initial Brigade Combat 

Team File, HRDC; “Army Officially Begins Creation of Initial Brigade 

Combat Teams,” Army News Service, Summer 2000, Initial Brigade 

Combat Team File, HRDC. 

25. Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Document (Extract), June 2000, Chapter 3, 19–20, Chapter 8, 1–12, 

HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Field Artillery Futures Update,” 2002, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002. 

26. Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational 

Document (Extract), June 2000, Chapter 3, 19–20, Chapter 8, 1–12; Briefing (Extract), “Field Artillery Futures Update,” 2002; Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002. 

27. Organizational and Operational Concept, the Brigade Combat 

Team, 6 January 2000, 43–45; Organizational and Operational Concept, 

the Brigade Combat Team, 3 February 2000, 42–44; Memorandum for 

Record, “Telephone Conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lackey, 

TF2000,” 17 May 2000, HRDC; Stricklin, “Transforming the FA and the 

Force,” 1; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, “First 

Quarter FY00 SIGACTS,” 18 January 2000, HRDC. 

28. Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Sharp, Task Force XXI, USAFAS, 

interview by author, 26 February 2003, HRDC; SBCT Monthly Bulle-
133

tin, January 2003, 1, HRDC; SBCT Monthly Bulletin, November 2002, 

1–2, HRDC; Operational Evaluation Plan for the 1st SBCT as Required 

by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 3 February 

2003, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, HRDC; Government Accountability Office Report, 

“Military Transformation,” May 2002, 4, 5, 8, HRDC; IBCT Monthly 

Bulletin, June 2002, 1, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Interim Brigade 

Combat Team,” 27 February 2003; News Briefing, “IBCT and IAVs,” 17 

May 2001, HRDC; “Army Statement on GAO Interim Armored Vehicle 

Protest Recommendation,” US Army News Release, 9 April 2001, HRDC; 

“Army Selects GM to Make Interim Armored Vehicle,” Army Link News, 

20 November 2000, HRDC; “Army Orients Interim Force Toward Pacific 

Rim to Achieve Balance,” Inside the Army, 16 July 2001, 1, 11, HRDC; 

Information Paper, “IAV,” 2001, HRDC; “Army Announced Name for Interim Armored Vehicle,” Army News Release, 27 February 2002, HRDC. 

29. Interim Division Organizational and Operational Plan, February 

2001, 1, 5, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002; 

Briefing, “None,” 12 October 2001, HRDC; Interim Division Organizational and Operational Plan, February 2001, 4, 10, 23, 25, HRDC.

30. Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002; Briefing, 

“None,” 12 October 2001; Interim Division Organizational and Operational Plan, February 2001, 4, 10, 23, 25, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“Transformation,” 15 May 2000, HRDC.

31. Email with Attachment, “Requirements Review Committee,” 27 

March 2000, HRDC. 

32. Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000, HRDC; 

Briefing (Extract), “MRI, Army Transformation and Combat Health Support,” 2 March 2001, HRDC.

33. Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000; Briefing 

(Extract), “MRI, Army Transformation and Combat Health Support,” 2 

March 2001, HRDC. 

34. Email with Attachment, “Objective Force Portion of the 2002 

Annual Command History,” 11 April 2003, HRDC. 

35. Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000; 2001 Army 

Modernization Plan (Extract), 29–33, HRDC; White Paper, “Concept for 

the Objective Force, November 2001,” 1–8, HRDC; General Accountability Office Report, “Military Transformation,” November 2001, 9; Information Paper, “AUSA Transform Panel Briefing,” 26 October 2000, 

HRDC; Engel, “Transforming Fires for the Objective Force,” 9–13; Email 

with Attachment, “Objective Force Portion of the 2002 Annual Command 

History,” 11 April 2003; The Army Budget for FY 2004, US Army News 

Release, 3 February 2003, HRDC.

36. Email with Attachment, “Objective Force Portion of the 2002 

Annual Command History,” 11 April 2003; Memorandum for Director, 

FDIC, “Coordination of 2002 USAFACFS Annual Command History,” 

14 April 2003, HRDC. 
134

37. Memorandum for Director, FDIC, “Coordination of 2002 USAFACFS Annual Command History,” 14 April 2003; 2001 USAFACFS 

ACH, 61–62. 

38. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9 (Draft), 6 November 2001, 6–7, 

HRDC. 

39. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9 (Draft), 6 November 2001, 8, 11; 

White Paper, “Concepts for the Objective Force,” November 2001, 3, 6, 

HRDC.

40. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 63. 

41. Major General Michael D. Maples, “The FA and the Objective 

Force: An Uncertain but Critical Future,” Field Artillery, September–October 2002, 2. 

42. Maples, “The FA and the Objective Force,” 3; Email with Attachments, “Objective Force and Unit of Action,” 30 March 2003, HRDC. 

43. Briefing, “Networked Fires,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Networked Fires,” 20 September 2002, HRDC; Maples, “The FA and the Objective Force,” 4; Email, “UA ORG Design EXSUM,” 30 March 2003, 

HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9, Objective Force Operational and 

Organizational Plan for the Maneuver Unit of Action, 22 July 2002, 43–46, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming the Army to the Objective Force, Status 

Report,” 8 January 2002, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon 

and O&O Crosswalk,” 30 March 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming 

the Army to the Objective Force,” 18 April 2002, HRDC; The Objective 

Force in 2015 White Paper, 8 December 2002, HRDC; Maples, “The FA 

and the Objective Force,” 4; Major (Retired) George A. Durham, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Frank T. Myers II, and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) 

Charles L. Hernandez, “The FCS-Based Force in the Future Battle,” Field 

Artillery, March–April 2002, 10–13; Email, “US ORG Design EXSUM,” 

30 March 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming the Army to the Objective Force, Status Report,” 8 January 2002. 

44. Briefing, “Transforming Field Artillery and Fire Support for the 

21st Century,” February 2001, HRDC; The Field Artillery Modernization 

and Transformation Plan, January 2001, 29–66, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Cmd History,” 19 April 2001, HRDC. 

45. “Army Announces Vision for the Future,” US Army News Release, 12 October 1999, HRDC; Vision Statement, 23 June 1999, HRDC; 

CSA Remarks at Dwight D. Eisenhower Luncheon, AUSA, 22 October 

2002, CSA Remarks File, 5, HRDC.

46. Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 5 January 2000, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Special Report,” 4 January 2000, HRDC; Major 

Stephen Hitz, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 7 March 2000, HRDC; 

“Secretary of the Army Says Crusader Still Viable,” Army Link News, 15 

November 1999, HRDC; U.S Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 

2001, Posture Statement File, 30, HRDC. In 2003, the Army terminated 

funding the Army Tactical Missile System II with the Brilliant Anti-Armor 
135

munition upon deciding to employ unmanned aerial vehicles to carry the 

munition.

47. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003, 

102, HRDC; Briefing, “Recapitalization of the Legacy Force,” 17 October 

2000, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Transformation, 17 October 2000, HRDC; 

2001 Army Modernization Plan (Extract), Executive Summary, 11, 24, 

HRDC; Testimony, General Shinseki before Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 July 2001, HRDC: Information Paper, “CSA Remarks at AUSA 

Seminar, 8 November 2001, HRDC; Engel, “Transforming Fires for the 

Objective Force,” 9–13; Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 1 March 

2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 5 March 2000, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Future of Heavy Systems,” 6 January 2000, 

HRDC; Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 1999 Annual Report (Extract), “Crusader,” HRDC; Major Donald L. Barnett, “Crusader 

Target Weight: 38 to 42 Tons,” Field Artillery, March–April 2000, 34–36.

48. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 83–86; Fact Sheet, “Timeline of Events,” 

undated, HRDC. 

49. Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 5 January 2000, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Article from DA PAO,” 10 January 2000, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “New Weapons System,” 6 January 2000, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Special Report,” 4 January 2000, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Escalation,” 14 February 2000, HRDC; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 55–65; Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002; 

Briefing, “None,” 12 October 2001, HRDC; Interim Division Organizational and Operational Plan, February 2001, 4, 10, 23, 25, HRDC; Email, 

with Attachment, “Prepared Opening Remarks for Major General Maples, 

20 February 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 11 March 

2003, HRDC.

50. “Rumsfeld Pulls Plug on Big Gun,” Reuters, 8 May 2002, HRDC; 

“Rumsfeld Dumps Crusader, Defends Decision,” CNN, 9 May 2002, 

HRDC; “Crusader Howitzer Gets the Axe,” Army Link News, 8 May 2002, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Discussion to the Crusader Alternative,” 

May–Jun 2002, HRDC; “GAO: Crusader Needs Mature Technology, Not 

Weight Reduction,” Inside the Army, 4 March 2002, 1, 11, HRDC; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, “Crusader Artillery Program Termination,” 13 May 2002, HRDC; Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 

“Request for Extension of Submission of Crusader Information,” 20 May 

2002, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Timeline of Events,” undated, HRDC.

51. “Defense Discusses Crusader Alternatives,” Defense Link, 15 

May 2002, HRDC; “Pentagon Already Has Plans for How to Spend Crusader Billions,” Inside the Army, 6 May 2002, 1, 13, 14, HRDC; Doug 

Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 6 February 

2003, HRDC; Department of Defense FY 2003 Budget Amendment for 

Crusader Termination (Extract), May 2002, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 11 March 2003, HRDC. In 2004, the Army cancelled 
136

work on the Comanche helicopter because developmental costs continued 

to rise and it did not fit with the future of the Army; it more closely fit the 

Cold War paradigm than the current and future operational battlefield, and 

the Army chose to concentrate on unmanned aerial vehicles. 

52. General Peter J. Schoomaker Speech with slides, December 

2003, HRDC; “Focus Task Force ‘Jump Starting’ Future,” Army Public 

Affairs, 27 January 2004, HRDC; Department of the Army (DA), “The 

Way Ahead,” 2003, 15, HRDC; General Peter J. Schoomaker Speech, 7 

October 2003, HRDC; “Initiatives to Improve Education System That Has 

Served the Army Well,” Army News Service, 23 April 2004, HRDC; Army 

Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, October 2004, 1-1, 

1-6, HRDC; Briefing, “Modular Army Overview,” 5 April 2004, HRDC; 

“Focus Task Force ‘Jump Starting’ Future,” Army Public Affairs; “Future 

Force,” GlobalSecurity.org, 25 February 2004, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Focus Areas,” 25 February 2004, HRDC; DA, 2003 U.S. Army Transformation Road Map (Extract), undated, Executive Summary, 11, HRDC; Don 

Bankston, Task Force XXI, FDIC, interview by author, 2 March 2004, 

HRDC; Memorandum with Attachment for Director, FDIC, 20 April 

2004, HRDC.

53. General Kevin Byrnes Speech, 15 October 2003, HRDC. 

54. “Focus Task Force ‘Jump Starting’ Future,” 27 January 2004; 

Interview, author with Bankston, 2 March 2004. 

55. 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 63; Army Comprehensive Guide to 

Modularity, 1-13, 1-14; White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 

20 March 2004, 10, HRDC. 

56. Briefing, “Chief of Field Artillery Update, November–December 

2004, HRDC; White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 20 March 

2004, 10–11, HRDC; “Army Announces FY05 and FY06 Modular Brigade Force Structure Decision,” US Army News Release, 23 July 2004, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Modular Army Overview;” Briefing, “U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation,” undated, HRDC; US Army, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap (Extract), July 2004, 3-2, 3-3, HRDC. 

57. Email with Attachment, “Transformation of the Army,” 4 April 

2005, HRDC; Interview, author with Bankston, 2 March 2004; “Army to 

Reset into Modular Brigade-Centric Force,” Army News Service, 24 February 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Chief of Field Artillery Update,” November–December 2004, HRDC; Report, “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for 

Congress,” 24 January 2007, 3, 10, HRDC; US Army, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap (Extract), July 2004, 3-3, HRDC.

58. 2007 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 26; Colonel Kevin M. Batule 

and Colonel (Retired) Theodore J. Janosko, “Training the Full-Spectrum 

BCT FSCOORD,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2008, 26–28, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “FSCOORD Course,” 10 February 2009, HRDC; Staff 
137

Action Sheet, 10 July 2009, HRDC; White Paper, “The King and I: The 

Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to provide Fire Support to 

Maneuver Commanders,” undated, 1–3, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Sean 

Bateman and Major Steven Hady, “King of Battle Once Again: An Organizational Design to Effectively Integrate Fires in Support of the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Force,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 

23–25.

59. White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 23 January 

2004, 7–8, HRDC; “Units of Action,” TRADOC News Service, 25 February 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “Recommended Design Balanced,” 23 January 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “Approved Infantry UA,” 23 February 2004, 

HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90 (Extract), U.S. Army Objective 

Force Operational and Organizational Plan, Maneuver Unit of Action, 30 

June 2003, 1-5, 1-6, 3-2, 3-32, HRDC; Coordinating Draft of TRADOC 

Pamphlet 525-3-9, 8, 9; Email with Attachment, “Transformation of the 

Army,” 24 March 2004, HRDC; Memorandum with Attachment for Director, FDIC, 20 April 2004, HRDC. 

60. Daniel L. Bankston, FDIC, interview by author, 3 March 2005, 

HRDC; White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 20 March 2004, 

9–12, HRDC; Briefing, “U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation,” undated, HRDC; Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 

1-10; Briefing, “Modular Army Overview;” White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 23 January 2004, 7–8, HRDC; “Units of Action,” 

TRADOC News Service; Briefing, “Recommended Design Balanced,” 23 

January 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “Approved Infantry UA,” 23 February 

2004, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90 (Extract), 1-5, 1-6, 3-2, 3-32; 

Coordinating Draft of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9, Future Force Fires 

and Effects Concept of Operation, 7 November 2003, 8, 9, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Transformation of the Army,” 24 March 2004, HRDC; 

Memorandum with Attachment for Director, FDIC, 20 April 2004, HRDC. 

61. Briefing, “How the UEx Fights,” 29 March 2004, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Transformation of the Army,” 4 April 2005, HRDC; 

Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, 1-16, 1-17, HRDC; White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 20 March 2004, 57–59, HRDC. 

62. Email with Attachment, “FA Vision and Transformation,” 4 April 

2006, HRDC; Daniel L. Bankston, FDIC, interview by author, 13 March 

2006, HRDC; Fires Brigade Operational and Organizational Plan (Extract), 26 July 2005, 8–11, HRDC; US Army, 2004 Army Transformation 

(Extract), July 2004, 3–6, HRDC.

63. Major Michael Hughes, Concepts Branch, CDID, interview 

by author, 9 April 2009, HRDC; Daniel L. Bankston, Chief, Concepts 

Branch, CDID, interview by author, 9 April 2009, HRDC; Information 

Paper, “Theater Army 5.1 Redesign Implications for Corps Fires Cells,” 

29 January 2009, HRDC; Briefing, “Theater Army Redesign 5.2 Update,” 

17 February 2009, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Transformation Por-
138

tion of the 2008 Annual Command History,” 14 May 2009, HRDC; Daniel L. Bankston, Chief, Concepts Branch, CDID, interview by author, 27 

March 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “Corps Headquarters Redesign Update,” 

13 April 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “Corps Headquarters Redesign,” 13 June 

2007, HRDC.

64. Daniel L. Bankston, interview by author, 28 February 2007, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Revised Modular Division Design, Final Requirements 

Determination Briefing,” 8 January 2007, HRDC; Minutes, 23rd Modularity Video Teleconference, 9 August 2006, HRDC; Minutes, 24th Modularity Video Teleconference, 11 October 2006, HRDC; Email, “Transformation Portion of 2006 Annual Command History,” 30 April 2007, HRDC; 

Briefing, “Modularity Overview,” 28 April 2006, HRDC. 

65. Lieutenant Colonel Telford E. Crisco Jr., “The Modular Force: 

Division Operations,” Military Review, January–February 2006, 95–100; 

Bankston, interview, 27 March 2008; US Army, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap (Extract), July 2004, 3–6, HRDC. 

66. Fires Brigade Operational and Organizational Plan (Extract), 26 

July 2005, 12–29; Briefing, “Fires Brigade,” 16 December 2005, HRDC. 

67. Email with Attachment, “Transformation Portion of 2006 Annual 

Command History,” 30 April 2007, HRDC. 

68. Captain Michael M. Stump, “4th ID Stands Up Army’s First 

Fires Brigade,” Field Artillery, January–February 2005, 27; “Brigade 

Combat Teams,” Field Artillery, November–December 2005, 40–45; Captain William H. Ward, “The Army’s First Fires Brigade,” Field Artillery, 

November–December 2005, 20; Report, “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: 

Issues for Congress,” 24 January 2007, 4, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“Transformation Portion of 2006 Annual Command History,” 30 April 

2007, HRDC; “U.S. Army Field Artillery Units,” Fires Bulletin, January–

February 2013, 47–59, 76–90; Email with Attachment, “Transformation 

Portion of the 2008 Annual Command History,” 14 May 2009, HRDC; 

Major General Peter M. Vangjel, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires Bulletin, 

July–September 2008, 1–3; Colonel Samuel R. White Jr., “The Fires Brigade: A Critical Capability in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” Fires Bulletin, 

May–June 2008, 41–45.

69. Directorate of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract), FY 2002, 

IAV File, HRDC; Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract), FY 

2001, IAV File, HRDC. 

70. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 75–76. 

71. Press Conference with Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and 

Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, 12 October 1999, 

HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Jane’s Today,” 11 October 2000, HRDC; 

“IAV Competition Reveals No Huge Differences Between Wheels, 

Tracks,” Inside the Army, 17 July 2000, 1, 11, HRDC; “Chosen Vehicle 

Less Important than New Concept, Observers Say,” Inside the Army, 9 

October 2000, 7–9, HRDC; “Kern Says Vehicle Award Does Not Settle 
139

Debate over Wheels and Tracks,” Inside the Army, 20 November 2000, 

6, HRDC; Edward F. Bruner, “Army Transformation and Modernization: 

Overview and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 4 

April 2001, IAV File, 6, HRDC. 

72. Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2000, IAV 

File, HRDC; Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2001, 

IAV File, HRDC. 

73. Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2000; Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2001; “Testing of New Interim Vehicle May Upset Army’s Fielding Schedule,” Inside the Army, 20 

November 2000, 1, 6, HRDC; Thomas M. Petty, “Transformation: From a 

Heavy to a Lighter Family of Armored Fighting Vehicles,” US Army War 

College, 2011, IAV File, 15, HRDC. 

74. Sharp, interview by author, 26 February 2003; SBCT Monthly 

Bulletin, January 2003, 1; SBCT Monthly Bulletin, November 2002, 1–2; 

Operational Evaluation Plan for the 1st SBCT, 3 February 2003, 1, 2, 8, 

9, 10, 12; Government Accountability Office Report, “Military Transformation,” 4, 5, 8; IBCT Monthly Bulletin, June 2002, 1; Email with 

Attachment, “Interim Brigade Combat Team,” 27 February 2003; News 

Briefing, “IBCT and IAVs,” 17 May 2001; “Army Statement on GAO 

Interim Armored Vehicle Protest Recommendation,” 9 April 2001; “Army 

Selects GM,” Army Link News, 20 November 2000; “Army Orients Interim Force,” Inside the Army, 16 July 2001, 1, 11; Information Paper, 

“IAV,” 2001 “Army Announced Name for Interim Armored Vehicle,” 27 

February 2002.

75. “Army Accepts First U.S.-built Stryker,” Army Link News, 15 

April 2002, HRDC; Information Memo, Department of the Army, “Stryker 

Interim Armored (IAV) Program Success,” 3 May 2002, IAV File, HRDC. 

76. CSA Remarks at IAV Rollout Ceremony, 12 April 2002, 3, 

HRDC.

77. Transcript of Stryker Facts Media Roundtable, US Army News 

Release, 15 October 2002, 3, 18, HRDC; “Army Transports Stryker on 

C-130,” Army Link News, 24 June 2002, HRDC; “First Units Train with 

Stryker IAVs,” Army Link News, 1 July 2002, HRDC; “First Stryker Arrives at Fort Lewis,” US Army News Release, 3 June 2002, HRDC; “Army 

Begins Fielding of Strykers,” Army Link News, 29 May 2002, HRDC; 

“Stryker Facts Media Roundtable October 15 and Stryker Air Deployability Demonstration October 16,” US Army News Release, 10 October 

2002, HRDC; “Narrative of Stryker Air Deployability Demonstration,” 

US Army News Release, 16 October 2002, HRDC.

78. “Strykers Boost Infantry Tactics at NTC,” Army Link News, 6 

August 2002, HRDC. 

79. Speech, Eric K. Shinseki, 4 September 2002, 5, HRDC. 

80. “Strykers on Road to Certification,” Army Link News, 31 March 

2003, HRDC; “8 Stryker Variants move on C-130s to NTC,” ArmyLink 
140

News, 4 April 2003, HRDC; “Stryker Brigade Completes Arrowhead 

Lightning I at NTC,” Army Link News, 14 April 2003, HRDC; “Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team in Action at JRTC,” Army News Release, 5 May 

2003, HRDC; “Stryker to Fill Interim, Middleweight Army Gap,” TRADOC PAO, 9 May 2003, HRDC; “Stryker Brigade Moves Across Country 

for Evaluation at Polk,” Army Link News, 15 May 2003, HRDC; “Stryker 

Brigade Completes Certification Exercise,” Army Link News, 2 June 2003, 

HRDC; “Sill Hosts Stryker Deployment Certex,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 8 

May 2003, 1a, 2a; “Stryker to Fill Interim Middleweight Army Gap,” Fort 

Sill Cannoneer, 8 May 2003, 2a; Defense Contract Management Agency, 

Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, Spring/Summer 2003, IAV File, HRDC. 

81. Colonel G. Keith Herring, “Flagship Sill: A Power Projection 

Platform for 100-Plus Years,” Field Artillery, March–June 2004, 19–21; 

Fact Sheet, “Stryker 8-Wheel Drive Armoured Combat Vehicles,” USA, 

4 February 2005, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Army Completes Stryker Brigade 

Certification,” undated, HRDC; DPTM SIGACTS, 30 April 2004, HRDC; 

DPTM SIGACTS, 12 October 2004, HRDC. 

82. “DARPA and Army Select Contractors for Future Combat Systems Programs,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense News Release, 9 May 2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Transformation 

Interview,” 15 September 2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Army 

Programs and Transformation Hearing,” 16 March 2000, HRDC; “The 

Real Battle Could Be the One for Money on the Hill,” Army Times, 28 

February 2000, 28; “The Army Hooah Guide to Army Transformation,” 

Army, February 2001, 21–42; Mission Need Statement for FCS, 2 November 2001, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FCS Industry Day,” 9 November 

2001, HRDC. 

83. Email with Attachment, “Testimony,” 20 February 2003, HRDC; 

“Authorizers Grant $293 million for FCS Non-line-of-Sight Cannon,” Inside the Army, 18 November 2002, 14–15, HRDC.

84. Email with Attachment, “FCS Cannon,” 11 March 2003, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Deputy Commanding General Sends,” 4 December 2002, HRDC; Briefing, “FCS Cannon Concept Technology Demonstration Update,” December 2002, HRDC.

85. Email with Attachment, “FCS Cannon;” Email, “FCS Cannon,” 

25 February 2003, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander TRADOC, 

“FCS Cannon Demonstrator,” 29 January 2003, HRDC; Major Charles J. 

Emerson, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 20 February 2003, HRDC.

86. Email with Attachment, “FCS Cannon,” 11 March 2003; Email, 

“FCS Cannon,” 25 February 2003, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander 

TRADOC, “FCS Cannon Demonstrator,” 29 January 2003. 

87. Memorandum for Commander TRADOC, “FCS Cannon Demonstrator,” 29 January 2003.

88. “Future Howitzer is Not Son of Crusader,” National Defense, 

May 2003; United Defense News Release, 8 September 2003, HRDC; 
141

United Defense News Release, 22 October 2003, HRDC; United Defense 

News Release, 30 July 2003, HRDC. 

89. Major Charles J. Emerson, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 5 

March 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon Design Paper v5,” 15 December 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon Excerpt-Valcourt Brief,” 3 January 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Trip Report,” 5 February 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“Draft Minutes from Briefing to Brigadier General Valcourt,” 8 January 

2004, HRDC. 

90. Email with Attachment, “Trip Report,” 5 February 2004, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon Entry for the 2003 Annual Command History,” 7 May 2004, HRDC. 

91. Major Charles J. Emerson, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 2 

March 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “NLOS Cannon Update,” undated, HRDC; 

“Army, Boeing, SAIC Accelerate Future Combat Systems’ Contribution 

to the Current Force,” Boeing News Release, 22 July 2004, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon,” 14 March 2005, HRDC. 

92. Doug R. Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, interview by 

author, 16 February 2005, HRDC; Major Charles J. Emerson, Major Mark 

H. Laflamme, and Colonel (Retired) James E. Cunningham, “NLOS Systems for the Modular and Future Forces,” Field Artillery, November–December 2005, 7–11; Major General David Valcourt, “Issues and Answers: 

NLOS-C Caliber Decision, Today’s Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound 

Bytes,” Field Artillery, July–August 2004, 1–3; Briefing, “Non-Line-ofSight Cannon Caliber Decision,” 10 May 2004, HRDC; Emerson, interview by author, 2 March 2005, HRDC.

93. “Army Accelerates Selected FCS Capabilities,” US Army News 

Release, 22 July 2004, HRDC; “Army Moves Up Fielding of Future 

Combat Systems,” Army News Service, 23 July 2004, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems,” undated, HRDC; 

Briefing, “NLOS Cannon Update,” undated; Email with Attachment, 

“NLOS Cannon,” 14 March 2005. 

94. Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon,” 14 March 2005; Briefing, “NLOS Cannon Update,” undated; Emerson, interview, 2 March 

2005; Fact Sheet, “Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems,” 

undated. 

95. Major Vincent J. Tolbert, TCM Cannon, interview with attachment by author, 27 February 2007, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “BAE Systems 

Fires First Round from NLOS Cannon Firing Platform,” 31 October 2006, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “NLOS Cannon Firing Platform,” 27 February 2007, 

HRDC; Major Vincent J. Tolbert, “NLOS Cannon: Meeting the Demands 

of Future Combat,” Field Artillery, March–April 2006, 10–12; Fact Sheet, 

“FCS Program Unveils BAE Systems NLOS Cannon Platform,” 2 October 2006, HRDC; “Army Takes Deliver of Cannon-firing Platform for 

FCS Manned Ground Vehicles,” Army News Release, 29 September 2006, 
142

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “BAE Systems First Round from NLOS Cannon Firing Platform,” 2 November 2006, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “NLOS Cannon and 

Mortar WSAR 28 August–1 September 2006, undated, HRDC; TCM Cannon FY 2006 Accomplishments, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Historical Update,” 31 March 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS-C 

Historical Comments,” 3 April 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“Historical Update,” 31 March 2008, HRDC.

96. Email with Attachment, “Historical Update,” 31 March 2008, 

HRDC; Information Paper, “FCS FY08 Program Adjustments,” undated, 

HRDC. 

97. Briefing, “Cannon Smart Book,” 30 January 2009, HRDC; BAE 

Information Paper, 13 June 2008, HRDC; BAE Information Paper, undated, HRDC; BAE Information Paper, 6 October 2008, HRDC; FCOE, Fort 

Sill on the Move, 15 December 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“NLOS Cannon April 2009,” 6 April 2009, HRDC. 

98. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 December 2008. 

99. Congressional Research Service, “Army Future Combat System Spin-outs and Ground Combat Vehicle: Background and Issues for 

Congress,” 30 November 2009, 3, HRDC; TCM Cannon Newsletter, June 

2009, HRDC; DOD News Release, 23 June 2009, HRDC.

100. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for 

the 21st Century,” Field Artillery, May–June 1998, 22–28. 

101. Email with Attachment, “BL History,” 5 March 2002, HRDC; 

Fact Sheet, “NLOS-LS/NetFires,” 12 December 2002, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“NLOS-LS,” 10 December 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “NetFires/NLOS-LS,” 

20 February 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launcher Upgrade and NLOS-LS,” 1 March 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“History Update,” 3 June 2004, HRDC; Memorandum with Attachment 

for Director TSM RAMS, “Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual 

Command History,” 4 April 2005, HRDC.

102. Email with Attachment, “BL History,” 5 March 2002, HRDC; 

Durham and Cunningham, “NetFires,” 5–9; Email with Attachment, “Additional History for 2000,” 25 February 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “NetFires/

NLOS-LS,” 20 February 2004; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launcher Upgrade and NLOS-LS,” 1 March 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “History Update,” 3 June 2004; “DOD Says Budget Cut, Ending 

NLOS-LS would be Detrimental to FCS,” Inside the Army, 12 July 2004, 

3; “Army Considering Cuts to FCS Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” 

Inside the Army, 12 May 2004, 1, 6, 7; Memorandum with Attachment for 

Director TSM RAMS, “2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History,” 4 

April 2005, HRDC.

103. Memorandum with Attachment for Director TSM RAMS, 

“2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History,” 4 April 2005; Fact Sheet, 

“Lockhart Raytheon JV Gets Billion Dollar Non-Line of Sight Contract,” 

23 March 2004, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Netfire Limited Liability Company 
143

Receives $1.1 Billion Contract for System Development,” 22 March 2004, 

HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” 27–28 

October 2004, HRDC; Captain Samual S. Ancira and Major Mark H. 

Laflamme, TSM RAMS, interview with attachment by author, 25 February 2005, HRDC; Emerson, Laflamme, and Cunningham, “NLOS Systems for the Modular and Future Forces,” 7–11; Email with Attachment, 

“Non-Line of Sight Launch System,” 28 February 2005, HRDC; Memorandum with Attachment for Director TSM RAMS, “2004 USAFACFS 

Annual Command History,” 4 April 2005. 

104. Email with Attachment, “Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” 

28 February 2005, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Future Combat Systems: 

FCS Documentation Plan and Spiral KPP Concept,” undated, HRDC; 

Briefing, “NLOS-LS Program Update,” 8 September 2004, HRDC; Interview with Attachment, author with Ancira and Laflamme, 25 February 

2005; Email with Attachment, “NLOS-LS,” 28 February 2005; Memorandum with Attachment for Director TSM RAMS, “2004 USAFACFS 

Annual Command History,” 4 April 2005. 

105. “Army Cancels Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” DOD 

News Release, 13 May 2010, HRDC; “Army Asks to Cancel NLOS-LS,” 

Army Times, 23 April 2010, HRDC; Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS, 

Deputy Director, interview by author, 10 February 2011, HRDC. 
144
145

Chapter 4 

A New Century and the War on Terrorism

On a calm, beautiful 11 September 2001 morning, Americans 

started their normal weekday in New York City and Washington D.C. 

As the 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 indicated, some were making their way across lower Manhattan, New York City, to the Twin 

Towers in World Trade Center complex where they were employed. 

About 200 miles to the south in Washington D.C., civilian and military personnel began their busy days in the Pentagon. Across the 

Potomac River, Congress reconvened after a summer break while 

the President of the United States, George W. Bush, jogged to open 

his day while visiting Sarasota, Florida. None of these people—or 

Americans in general—even remotely considered the possibility of 

a terrorist attack.

On 11 September 2001, 19 al-Qaeda terrorists brought the tranquility of the day to an abrupt halt when they flew airplanes into 

American landmarks in suicidal attacks. Two airplanes, American 

Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the 

North and South towers of the World Trade Center respectively. 

Within two hours, both towers collapsed—causing the partial or 

complete collapse of other World Trade Center complex buildings 

and significant damage to 10 major buildings in the vicinity. The 

third airplane, United Airlines Flight 77, slammed violently into the 

Pentagon, killing passengers as well as civilians and military personnel in the building. The fourth airplane, United Airlines Flight 

93, plowed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers overwhelmed the hijackers and prevented the flight from 

reaching its destination, which was assumed to be the White House. 

All onboard were killed. Approximately 3,000 people died in the 

attacks, including the 19 hijackers. The attacks sent many people to 

fiery and untimely deaths and propelled the country toward a war 

on terrorism with the support of the international community, which 

also expressed outrage over the attacks.
146

Global War on Terrorism and the Field Artillery

President Bush and his staff responded resolutely to the attacks. On 11 September 2001, he told his advisors that the United 

States would not only attack the perpetrators but also any countries 

that harbored them. This put Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia on alert for possible American military action. The following 

day, President Bush refined his position. In a 12 September 2001 

meeting with the National Security Council, he stressed that the 

United States was “at war with a new and different kind of enemy” 

and urged the council to develop a strategy to eliminate the terrorists and punish those who supported them; he gradually forged a 

coalition of nations to destroy al-Qaeda, the sponsor of the attacks, 

and its supporters.1

Beginning early in October 2001, the Coalition launched Operation Enduring Freedom, a military campaign against the Taliban 

regime in Afghanistan that backed al-Qaeda. US forces relied on 

special operation forces and air power for fire support in the initial 

stages because field artillery officers and Soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 

deployed without their field artillery. The intention was to keep the 

American logistical footprint as small as possible, because American leadership believed that the mission could be accomplished 

with organic mortars together with Army, Air Force, Marine, and 

Navy aviation assets. Even though mortars and aviation provided 

effective fire support, Operation Enduring Freedom generated an 

intense professional dialogue about the absence of field artillery 

during the initial days of fighting and the short-coming of joint fires 

for troops in close contact. In March 2002, Operation Anaconda, 

the final large-scale combat operation of Operation Enduring Freedom, was an overwhelming success by destroying the last remnants 

of the Taliban. It also served as a prime example of the limitations 

of airpower. During Operation Anaconda as in previous operations, 

ground forces relied on Air Force A-10 aircraft and Army AH-64 

Apache helicopters and mortars for close support. All provided effective fires, but troops on the ground recognized the need for responsive close support from field artillery—unavailable during the 

conflict. All participants in Operation Enduring Freedom agreed 
147

that Soldiers and Marines required effective fires in all weather and 

in all terrain, and this meant field artillery fires. Based on this, 82d 

Airborne Division fire supporters (field artillery officers and Soldiers) arrived in June 2002 with their M119 towed 105-millimeter 

howitzers and 120-millimeter mortars to replace the fire supporters 

from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and the 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault).2

Notwithstanding the lack of field artillery in its early days, Operation Enduring Freedom of 2001–02 produced impressive results. 

By the end of 2002, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were no longer capable 

of conducting major military operations. In view of this, Secretary 

of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld declared in May 2003 that major 

combat operations in Afghanistan had been completed. American 

forces would begin rebuilding the country while maintaining peace 

and order. Unfortunately, 2001–02 operations only served as the 

opening of a lengthy nation building and counterinsurgency campaign that continued into the second decade of the 21st Century to 

establish democracy as an alternative to Islamic extremism.3

Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein refused to comply with United 

Nations resolutions to disarm and eliminate his weapons of mass 

destruction. When he and his sons Uday and Qusay refused to leave 

Iraq, President Bush and American allies initiated military action, 

called Operation Iraqi Freedom, to remove Saddam Hussein from 

power. On 19 March 2003, Coalition military forces launched a decapitation strike with cruise missiles and bombs dropped by F117 

aircraft against Saddam and his top lieutenants while Coalition air 

forces struck long-range artillery emplacements, air defense sites, 

and surface-to-surface missile sites. Patriot air defense missiles, 

meanwhile, intercepted and destroyed two Iraqi missiles.4

The following day on 20 March 2003, Coalition forces that 

included more than 400,000 US military personnel stood ready to 

end the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein.5 US Central Command 

assembled US Army forces under the V Corps that was commanded 

by Lieutenant General William S. Wallace. The V Corps—initially 

composed of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault), and a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division 

and later adding the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)—attacked. 
148

To the east, the I Marine Expeditionary Force struck across the 

Kuwait-Iraq border to secure the Rumaylah Oil Field and then advanced along Highway 8 to An Nasiriyah, crossed the Euphrates 

River, and moved to Baghdad as American and Australian Special 

Forces secured Iraq’s western desert to suppress Scud missile attacks on Israel. Meanwhile, the British 1st Armoured Division and 

the British 3d Commando Brigade secured the area around Basra.6

On 20 March 2003, a field artillery bombardment along the 

Kuwait-Iraq border paved the way for the maneuver forces, which 

were led by three heavy brigade combat teams from the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized); together they assaulted into Iraq. The 

2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket 

System) from Fort Sill’s 214th Field Artillery Brigade opened the 

ground war when it fired Army Tactical Missile System I and IA 

(long-range precision field artillery missiles) at enemy corps, division, and corps artillery command posts stretching from Al Basrah 

to An Nasiriyah to Amarah. After this opening salvo, the battalion 

launched more missile strikes against Iraqi 11th Infantry Division 

air defense artillery and counterbattery assets near An Nasiriyah. 

During the initial attacks of the ground war, the battalion fired 63 

Army Tactical Missile System strikes into Iraq and destroyed political targets, such as Ba’ath Party and Fedayeen Saddam Headquarters, enemy air defense sites, and command and control centers 

deep within enemy territory up to 200 kilometers. Meanwhile, the 

41st Field Artillery Brigade and 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery 

Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) fired preemptive counterfire missions against the 

Iraqi 11th Infantry Division and 14th Infantry Division artilleries 

and the Iraqi 6th Tank Division artillery positioned from Al Basrah to An Nasiriyah. These fires shaped the battlefield by destroying 

critical command and control nodes and enemy headquarters.7

Early the following day on 21 March 2003, the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) ground attack under the cover of long-range 

missile fires began in earnest. The 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) had the goal to advance as rapidly and expeditiously as possible to Baghdad—deliberately bypassing cities and securing bridges 

for follow-on forces.8
149

From the initial destruction of border observation posts to silencing enemy indirect fire systems, massed fires from the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) organic M109A6 self-propelled 

155-millimeter howitzers (Paladins) and Multiple Launch Rocket 

System M270A1 launchers, close air support, and air interdiction 

allowed the division to maneuver freely after crossing into Iraq on 

21 March 2003.9

 Once the breach had been made, the division raced 

north along the Euphrates River on roads toward An Nasiriyah. As 

the division’s 3d Brigade Combat Team approached Tallil Airbase 

outside of An Nasiriyah to lure Iraqi forces into a trap, it ran into 

unexpected stiff resistance from the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division. 

The 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) Paladins (M109A6 selfKUWAIT

Baqubah

To Mosul

Tozkhurmato

Kanaqin

Mandali

Bayji

Tikrit

Ramadi Fallujah

Haglanyah

Hillah

Karbala

Nukhayb Najaf

Salman

Amarah

Jalibah

Rumaylah

Faw

Tallil

Air Base

IRAQ

IRAN

SAUDI

ARABIA

Lake

Qadisiyah

Lake

Habaniya

Lake

Tharthar

Lake

Razzaza

Lake

Hammar

Lake

Hawizah

Kuwait

City

Hantush

Air Base

Kut

Hayy

Persian Gulf

Basrah

Safwan

Sabat

Baghdad

Samawah

Nasiriyah

Qasr

Qurnah

Sammara

7

8

9 6

1

I MEF

1st (UK) AR Div

3d IN Div

82d Abn Div

101st AAslt Div

Diwaniyah

Shinafiyah

Figure 6: Operation Iraqi Freedom map. 

Source: Produced by Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
150

propelled 155-millimeter howitzers) from the 1st Battalion, 10th 

Field Artillery Regiment and 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment furnished direct support to the division’s 3d Brigade Combat 

Team and the 1st Brigade Combat Team while the division’s 1st 

Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket 

System) provided counterfire. Combined, maneuver and field artillery forces defeated elements of the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division 

on 21–22 March 2003 at Tallil Airbase, capturing enemy prisoners 

of war in the process. After taking control of the bridges around 

the city that spanned the Euphrates River, the 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) continued its race toward Baghdad—leaving the I 

Marine Expeditionary Force’s Task Force Tarawa to seize An Nasiriyah on 23 March 2003.10

As elements of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) assaulted Tallil Airbase, the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry and the 2d Brigade Combat Team raced through the 

desert northward beyond An Nasiriyah toward As Samawah and An 

Najaf, which composed the outer ring of defense surrounding Baghdad and was defended by the Republican Guard.11 With reinforcing 

fires from the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple 

Launch Rocket System) from the 214th Field Artillery Brigade, the 

cavalry squadron made the first contact with enemy defenses at As 

Samawah and was joined by the brigade combat team. Together, 

they encountered fierce enemy resistance that included mortar and 

field artillery fire. Near As Samawah, A Battery, 1st Battalion, 9th 

Field Artillery Regiment from the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) engaged human waves of Fedayeen paramilitary fighters at 

1,400 meters on 22 March 2003 as it supported Task Force 1-64’s 

mission to clear enemy bunkers and forces. Meanwhile the division’s 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch 

Rocket System) fired rockets in support of the cavalry squadron that 

was fighting a tenacious enemy willing to go to its death. After about 

two days of intense fighting that witnessed the enemy employing innocent men, women, and children as human shields, these elements 

of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) secured As Samawah on 

24 March 2003 and left enemy guerrilla fighters as the only resistance. This prompted Central Command to commit a brigade from 
151

the 82d Airborne Division to mop up the remaining resistance and 

protect the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) lines of communication so that the division could continue its drive north toward 

Karbala and then Baghdad.12

To the north of As Samawah in An Najaf that also sat astride 

the Euphrates River with several key bridges across the river, about 

3,000 soldiers from Saddam Hussein’s Al Qut Division armed with 

rocket-propelled guns and AK-47 rifles as well as paramilitary forces 

waited for the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 

and the 2d Brigade Combat Team. Providing fire support, American field artillery employed Multiple Launch Rocket System fires in 

danger close missions (shooting at enemy targets less than 450 meters from friendly forces) with great effectiveness. This action kept 

friendly soldiers alive to engage enemy soldiers who had come out 

of their defensive positions to attack the Americans. Coupled with 

close air support and direct fires from the maneuver arms, rocket 

fires from the 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple 

Launch Rocket System) of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

destroyed enemy strongholds, including one city block that contained a Ba’ath Party headquarters building and troop barracks, approximately 2,000 Fedayeen fighters, and around 100 vehicles; they 

also took possession of the bridges to the north and south of the city, 

with fighting tapering off by 27 March 2003.13

Before victory could be claimed at An Najaf, a blinding sandstorm with accompanying rain squalls blasted the area from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf on 24–27 March 2003. Winds reached a 

speed of 45 miles per hour and covered everything with a thick coat 

of sand. Field artillery officers and Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 

10th Field Artillery Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) referred to those days, especially 25–26 March 2003, as the 

Mars Days because the orange glow created by the blowing dust 

resembled a science fiction movie scene of life on distant planets.14

Despite its potential to stop operations, the storm presented a 

critical tactical opportunity. Besides permitting Central Command 

to refit, refresh, and resupply its ground forces and establish a large 

logistical base, it allowed the Coalition’s long-range unmanned 

aerial vehicles to watch the Iraqis concentrate their forces and then 
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begin redeploying them toward the V Corps and the I Marine Expeditionary Force. Coordinates that were passed from unmanned 

aerial vehicles allowed high-flying B-1 bombers and fighter bombers to attack Iraqi forces with infrared-guided bombs that could see 

through the blowing sand.15

During the sandstorm, field artillery systems furnished effective fires. The 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple 

Launch Rocket System) of the 214th Field Artillery Brigade and 

other field artillery units conducted numerous missions in support of 

the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Division 

(Air Assault), and the I Marine Expeditionary Force. To maintain 

operational tempo, for example, the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) fired more than 50 

missile strikes at various targets. One fire mission from the battalion 

came in support of the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry that was feinting to cross the Euphrates River near An Najaf to draw Republic 

Guard forces out of Baghdad. The feint worked; field artillery fires 

destroyed a large number of enemy vehicles moving south from 

Baghdad under the cover of the storm to reinforce An Najaf.16

As the sandstorm lifted, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) relieved the 1st Brigade Combat Team and the 2d Brigade 

Combat Team of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) at An Najaf 

on 28 March 2003 so that they could continue their march on Baghdad. Here, the airborne division experienced its first major combat 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom.17

During the battle for An Najaf, the 101st Airborne Division’s 

(Air Assault) 1st Brigade Combat Team’s and 2d Brigade Combat 

Team’s field artillery effectively employed indirect fires against confirmed enemy targets, enemy snipers, and observers on rooftops. For 

example, the division detached C Battery from its general support 1st 

Battalion, 377th Field Artillery Regiment, a M198 towed 155-millimeter artillery unit, to support its own M119 towed 105-millimeter 

firing batteries from the 3d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, and 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment. The division pushed these 

batteries right behind the armor formations to the outskirts of the 

city to engage the enemy at relatively short ranges and ensure fire 
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support coverage of the entire city.18

While elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 

fought around An Najaf, the 82d Airborne Division destroyed remnants of Republic Guard and Saddam Fedayeen forces that were disrupting lines of communication along Highway 8 in As Samawah. 

During that fight, fire support from the 2d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment’s two M119 towed 105-millimeter howitzer batteries repeatedly executed danger close missions by attacking enemy 

targets within 450 meters of friendly forces.19

As the 82d Airborne Division battled around As Samawah, 

the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) pushed toward the Karbala 

Gap. The Gap was about 50 miles south of Baghdad between the 

Salt Sea (Lake Razaza) to the west and the Euphrates River to the 

east. Defended by the Baghdad Division and elements of the Nebuchadnezzar Division, the Gap provided the only open approach to 

Baghdad that would avoid the urban sprawl in the Euphrates River 

Valley and serve as a solid supply route. To break through the Gap, 

the V Corps conducted five simultaneous attacks. The 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) attacked along the Euphrates River toward 

Al Hillah to draw Iraqi forces away from the Gap where the main 

attack would cross the Euphrates River, while the 3d Squadron, 7th 

Cavalry moved to the mouth of the Gap. The 101st Air Assault Division continued fighting in An Najaf to secure it as the 82d Airborne 

Division maintained its attack at As Samawah. An element of the 

101st Air Assault Division meanwhile conducted an armed reconnaissance to the south of the Salt Sea.20

Early in April 2003—under the cover of violent counterfire 

missions from V Corps field artillery and the effective employment of precision munitions—the 1st Brigade Combat Team, the 

2d Brigade Combat Team’s Task Force 4-64, and the 3d Brigade 

Combat Team from 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) attacked the 

Karbala Gap. As the 2d Brigade Combat Team of the 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) drew enemy forces away from the Karbala 

Gap toward Al Hillah supported by violent fires from the 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, the brigade combat teams and task force

attacked through the Karbala Gap toward Baghdad to the east of the 

Euphrates River. In the meantime, M270A1 launchers from the 3d 
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Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery 

Regiment engaged nine enemy targets in the town of Karbala with 

rockets. At the same time, the division’s 1st Battalion, 41st Field 

Artillery Regiment bombarded enemy positions in the town and the 

Karbala Gap on 1 April 2003 with 155-millimeter rounds.21 Over 

a period of 12 hours, field artillery fires destroyed 6 T-72 tanks, 13 

armored personnel carriers, and 15 air defense weapons. This action devastated the Medina Division of the Republican Guard and 

enemy defenses in general. As a team, M270A1 launchers in the 

meantime combined with Air Force close air support to destroy 60 

enemy vehicles and 15 field artillery weapons, set the conditions for 

encircling Baghdad, and establish the setting for the eventual collapse of the Iraqi government.22

As the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) attacked through the 

Karbala Gap, the 101st Airborne Division’s (Air Assault) 1st Brigade Combat Team and the 2d Brigade Combat Team eliminated 

remaining guerilla resistance to the south at An Najaf. The brigades 

employed armor, field artillery fire support, and army aviation while 

methodically moving through the city. They eliminated resistance; 

destroyed ammunition, equipment, and weapons; and seized key 

strong points then secured the city early in April 2003.23

Subsequently, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 

launched an attack on Al Hillah (ancient Babylon) to the north of 

An Najaf. Division artillery provided nine batteries in support of 

the 3d Brigade Combat Team’s direct support battalion. Specifically, 

the 3d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment received reinforcing fires from the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment; a 

battery from the 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment; and 

C Battery, 1st Battalion, 377th Field Artillery Regiment. Before the 

3d Brigade Combat Team attacked Al Hillah on 8 April 2003, these 

field artillery units massed rounds on single targets, fired as many 

as eight batteries simultaneously, and moved within the outskirts of 

the city. This permitted the 105-millimeter howitzers to range the 

entire city in support of the maneuver arms and played a key role in 

defeating enemy forces in the city.24

The 82d Airborne Division, meanwhile, protected vulnerable supply lines created by the rapid advance of the 3d Infantry 
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Division (Mechanized) and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force from 

attacks by remnants of Republican Guard and Saddam Fedayeen 

forces. With support from the 307th Engineers, the 2d Battalion, 

319th Field Artillery Regiment established two battery fire bases 

three kilometers southwest of As Samawah and received reinforcing infantry to help with battery defense if required. Immediately 

after occupying its position, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 319th Field 

Artillery Regiment opened fire on enemy mortars and positions 

on 29 March 2003. The battalion later furnished fire support when 

the division’s 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment assaulted the city after crossing the Euphrates River. The battalion 

fired more than 1,000 rounds in support of the liberation of As 

Samawah on 2 April 2003.25

As the 82d Airborne Division finished liberating As Samawah 

and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) eliminated the remaining resistance at An Najaf and Al Hillah, the 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) attacked Baghdad on 3 April 2003 with a field artillery preparation from organic assets and counterfire from the 214th 

Field Artillery Brigade and Army Tactical Missile Systems from the 

41st Field Artillery Brigade. Close air support and Multiple Launch 

Rocket System and cannon fires supported the division’s 1st Brigade 

Combat Team attack on the Saddam International Airport, later renamed Baghdad International Airport. The 1st Battalion, 41st Field 

Artillery Regiment from 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) fired 26 

missions on enemy strongholds, killing two T-72 tanks, destroying 

numerous bunkers and buildings, and suppressing enemy positions. 

Meanwhile, the division’s 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regiment and the 214th Field Artillery Brigade’s 2d Battalion, 4th Field 

Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System) engaged Special Republican Guard forces on the airfield complex. Multiple Launch Rocket 

System fires followed by cannon fires immediately preceded Task 

Force 3-69’s attack. Along with other attacks, this effort helped consolidate US forces around Baghdad and the airport. On 10 April 2003, 

the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the I Marine Expeditionary Force completed defeating enemy forces in the city, relying on 

fire support for counterfire and close support to the maneuver arms.26

In just 18 days, the V Corps battled its way from the Kuwait-Iraq 
156

border to Baghdad; major combat action ended on 10 April 2003.27

Many people thought that the fight would be long and that the enemy 

would possibly employ weapons of mass destruction. However, it 

was a swift victory for Coalition forces—with American field artillery performing brilliantly, according to the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) fired almost 14,000 155-millimeter rounds, including more than 120 Sense-and-Destroy-Armor precision munitions. 

The 101st Airborne Division’s (Air Assault) field artillery shot 516 

rounds, while the 2d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment of the 

82d Airborne Division fired more than 4,000 rounds. Most of those 

rounds came in support of light infantry in urban operations.28

Reflecting on his division’s operations, the Commanding General of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Major General Buford Blount III, gave credit to his fire support. Joint fires and field 

artillery paved the way for success and permitted his division to defeat the enemy and move from the Kuwait-Iraq border to Baghdad, 

where it occupied the Baghdad International Airport.29

The 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 82d Airborne Division fought their way 

along the Euphrates River to Baghdad and the 4th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) rushed forward from Kuwait as a follow-on force in 

April 2003. Simultaneous with these efforts to help secure Iraq after 

law and order had collapsed, other Coalition combat forces invaded 

Iraq. Composed of the 1st Marine Division, Task Force Tarawa, the 

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and the British 1st Armoured Division, 

the I Marine Expeditionary Force under the command of Lieutenant 

General James Conway crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border on 21 March 

2003. Covering the ground forces, field artillery fires from the 11th 

Marine Regiment engaged the Iraqi 51st Mechanized Infantry Division and the Iraqi III Regular Army Corps artillery, including the 

corps command and control node and long-range fires capabilities; 

the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division; and the Iraqi 6th Armored Division. 

The Marines defeated the Iraqis and secured the nearby oil infrastructure. Meanwhile, I Marine Expeditionary Force concentrated 

deep shaping fires on the Iraqi IV Regular Army Corps near Amarah 

and the Baghdad Republican Guard Infantry Division near Al Kut 

on its drive toward An Nasiriyah as the British 1st Armoured Divi-
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sion fought for Al Basrah.30

In the midst of this fighting, Task Force Tarawa received an order to conduct a relief in place of 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

in the vicinity of Tallil Airbase and the Highway 1 bridge across the 

Euphrates River west of An Nasiriyah. On the morning of 23 March 

2003, lead elements of the task force reached the city, where light 

fighting was anticipated. Instead, the Marines encountered fierce 

combat, depending on the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment for 

fire support. The battle raged the next day with fire support coming 

from the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment and I Battery, 3d Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment. On 25 March 2003, a raging sandstorm restricted fire support to field artillery fires. Once unmanned 

aerial vehicles could get into the air on 26 March 2003 and provide 

accurate targeting information, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment broke up an enemy attack of 2,000 and killed about 200 enemy 

soldiers. Fighting reached a crescendo on 26 March 2003, with fire 

missions declining the rest of the month. Only a few pockets of resistance around An Nasiriyah remained, and those were cleared out 

by the first week of April 2003.31

During the conflicts, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

had seized Highway 1 bridges over the Euphrates River to the west 

of the city and the bridge northwest of the city. Taking advantage of 

the situation, the 1st Marine Division led by the 3d Light Armored 

Reconnaissance Battalion and the 5th Regiment Combat Team continued its drive north toward Ad Diwaniyah. On 23 March 2003, the 

division crossed the Euphrates River and pressed along Highway 

1 toward Ad Diwaniyah. The following day, a blinding sandstorm 

reduced visibility to nearly zero, preventing close air support. Fire 

support from the 11th Marine Regiment protected the division’s 

lead elements from mortar and surface attack that day. During the 

next six days, the 11th Marine Regiment faced deteriorating weather conditions caused by the sandstorm, enemy mortar attacks, and 

repeated probes by Fedayeen death squads. Despite the challenges, 

the regiment continued to provide counterfire and suppressive fires 

along the division’s main supply route, Highway 1, to keep it open. 

On 31 March 2003, the division seized the Hantush Airstrip on 

Highway 1 near Ad Diwaniyah as enemy resistance weakened. One 

day later, the 5th Regiment Combat Team pushed eastward from Ad 
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Diwaniyah along Highway 27 that linked Highway 7 with Highway 

6 and captured a vital crossing over the Saddam Canal. On 2 April 

2003, the regiment seized the bridge across the Tigris River so that 

the division could skirt around Al Kut from the west.32

Simultaneously, the 1st Marine Division’s 1st Regiment Combat Team and the 7th Regiment Combat Team moved north along 

Highway 6 to Al Kut. The 1st Regiment Combat Team fixed the Al 

Kut defenders from the south as the 7th Regiment Combat Team attacked from the north. Once these units drew near to Al Kut, fierce 

fighting broke out on 3 April 2003. The 11th Marine Regiment field 

artillery destroyed enemy field artillery batteries, fortified positions, 

and a Baghdad Republican Guard regimental headquarters. They 

also helped crush the last remaining conventional capability around 

the city and cut the line linking Baghdad with Al Basrah. After participating in isolating the city, the 1st Marine Division turned its 

attention on 5 April 2003 to Baghdad; meanwhile, the 5th Regiment 

Combat Team took the lead and drove up Highway 6 with massed 

fire support from the 2d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment and the 3d 

Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment as required.33

Upon reaching the approaches to Baghdad on 5 April 2003, 

Marine field artillery participated in cordoning off the city and provided counterfire against Iraqi artillery. Anticipating that the city 

would be rigorously defended, Marine fires quickly decimated Iraqi 

defenses, causing them to crumble. By 10 April 2003, Marine field 

artillery had few targets to engage and fighting was effectively over 

as Saddam’s regime collapsed. The Marines then were ordered to 

Tikrit, where they quickly neutralized enemy forces there. The conventional war was over.34

In a relatively short period of time, US military forces and American allies brought Saddam’s regime to its knees. Beginning during 

the latter days of March 2003 and ending during the first days of April 

2003, they aggressively drove from the Kuwait-Iraq border and decisively defeated Iraqi ground forces that resisted their advance. The 

war reinforced the imperative of combined arms operations in which 

field artillery and maneuver arms formed an impressive team.
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Time of Reflection

On the heels of the 2003 combat operations came reflection 

about the Field Artillery’s ability to provide responsive indirect 

fires. After reading many after action reports from Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, Major General Michael D. Maples, who was the Commandant of the US Army Field Artillery School from 2001 to 2003, 

commented about Field Artillery’s contributions. In the September–October 2003 Field Artillery, he wrote, “Artillery played a key 

and essential role. Every commander cited artillery as indispensable 

during the fight.”35 In a brief report addressing this observation, the 

Center for Army Lessons Learned concurred, “Maneuver realizes 

the importance of FS [fire support] and how an effective integration 

of FS can add to the overall scheme of maneuver. Maneuver, at first, 

was hesitant to mass FA [field artillery] fires but after initial conflicts would not go into areas unless it was preceded by FA prep.”36

Repeatedly, field artillery units shifted fires around battlefields 

to permit the maneuver arms to advance or destroy the enemy.37 In 

its after action report, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) pointed out, “Field artillery, close air support (CAS), and air interdiction (AI) were instrumental in allowing the freedom of maneuver.”38

During the battle of As Samawah, for example, the 82d Airborne 

Division recounted close support’s ability to fix the enemy in place 

so that it could not flee. Once the enemy had been fixed in place, 

the division brought in close air support if additional fires were required to complete its destruction. “Any enemy trying to escape was 

immediately identified by KW [OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopters] 

who could either adjust artillery to destroy the escaping element or 

attack the escaping element directly,” the 82d Airborne Division recorded.39 However, the division explained, “During combat operations in As Samawah, ground-based fire support assets were the only 

reliable fire support system capable of responding to the dynamic 

nature of the enemy situation.”40 Responsive fires came within minutes after a call for fire.41

In a memorandum to the commander of the 325th Airborne 

Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne Division, Lieutenant Colonel 

Steven J. Smith of the 2d Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery 
160

Regiment reinforced the importance of field artillery fire support. 

Colonel Smith wrote that the use of field artillery indirect fires during the battle of As Samawah was critical because they set the conditions for the offensive operations to follow. “The Artillery was 

able to destroy a TST [time-sensitive target] that could have been 

lost if we waited for fixed or rotary wing assets; OH58’s simply did 

not have the firepower to destroy the target.”42

Writing in the September–October 2003 Field Artillery, the 3d 

Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery commander, Colonel Thomas G. Torrance, and the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator for the 3d 

Infantry Division (Mechanized), Lieutenant Colonel Noel T. Nicolle, 

expressed comparable thoughts about close support. “Despite the belief by some that the Field Artillery. . .has ‘walked away from the 

close fight,’ maneuver commanders in the 3d Infantry Division will 

argue otherwise—13,923 155-mm rounds and 794 MLRS [Multiple 

Launch Rocket System] rockets. . .in OIF back[ed] them up.”43

In some instances, however, the maneuver arms did not require 

massed fires. In a lengthy 29 April 2003 after action report, the 1st 

Battalion, 9th Field Artillery Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) noted, “The Battalion was able to provide effective 

observed fires on most Iraqi targets with only battery-level missions. 

The Iraqi force was spread across the battlefield in small pockets 

of resistance rather than large mechanized forces in well-prepared 

defenses.”44 In many instances, a battery one-volley or two-volley 

caused the enemy to surrender. The battalion only massed battalionlevel fires on radar acquisitions sent from division artillery.45

Counterfire also proved just as effective. In a brief report following the war, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) recorded, 

“Cannon artillery and counter fire operations were repeatedly of major value in support of maneuver forces and in destroying enemy 

mortars and artillery.”46 Similarly, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Brian L. 

Borer and Lieutenant Colonel Nicolle, both from the 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized), wrote that during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

the 3d Division Artillery engaged in an overwhelming successful 

counterfire effort. In 21 days, they processed more than 1,800 hostile acquisitions with no record of 3d Division Soldiers killed due 

to Iraqi mortar, cannon or rocket fire.47 They noted that the 3d Divi-
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sion Artillery fired 74 general support counterfire missions with an 

estimated battle damage assessment of more than 150 enemy artillery systems destroyed and 700 enemy killed in action.48 After the 

war the Assistant Division Commander of the 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), Brigadier General Lloyd J. Austin III, pointed out 

that his division fired 91 counterfire missions in 21 days to support 

the close fight.49

The V Corps Commanding General, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, commented that the Multiple Launch Rocket System was very effective in counterfire. “Every time the enemy tried 

to mass his artillery, he got whacked with something,” he recounted 

in an interview with the editor of the Field Artillery.

50

Although doctrine called for high-angle fires in an urban environment, field artillery officers and Soldiers preferred low-angle 

fires from field artillery systems as their method of choice. On 21 

July 2003, the 82d Airborne Division wrote that 105-millimeter 

fires used in conjunction with accurate target location were effective and limited collateral damage. During combat action in As Samawah, 82d Airborne Division elements employed field artillery 

and organic mortars in and around built-up areas with great effectiveness. In the battle for Baghdad, indirect fires also helped reduce 

enemy strongpoints in buildings that could not be taken out by direct fires alone. For example, Task Force 3-15 of the 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) that fought along Highway 8 in Baghdad 

employed indirect fires to destroy enemy-occupied buildings and 

secure their objectives with a minimal casualty rate. Limited visibility and close-in fighting compelled the task force to use danger 

close missions. During the battles, it started danger close missions 

at 400 to 600 meters in front of friendly forces and walked the 

rounds to within 200 meters in order to destroy enemy positions. 

This was done by keeping the friendly forces buttoned up and situationally aware of the mission.51

As a few field artillery officers noted, urban conditions in Iraq 

permitted employing low-angle field artillery systems in urban warfare. Except for Baghdad, most buildings in Iraqi cities were no 

more than three stories in height and did not require high-angle 

fires from mortars to fire over them. The longer range of low-angle 
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fires from field artillery systems decreased the number of moves, 

permitted indirect fire coverage, and provided greater accuracy than 

mortars. Although they recognized the value of field artillery in an 

urban environment, field artillery officers conceded that unique 

challenges still existed; they urged more study and review before 

making indirect fires from field artillery systems a critical part of 

urban warfare doctrine.52

Equally important, field artillery units delivered fires at a higher 

rate and greater volume per system than their Operation Desert Storm 

predecessors in 1991. While 54 M109A6 (Paladin) self-propelled 

155-millimeter howitzers fired 13,941 rounds, eight M198 towed 

155-millimeter howitzers shot 516 rounds. Sixty-two M119 towed 

105-millimeter howitzers hurled 4,107 projectiles at enemy targets. 

On average, the 155-millimeter howitzers responded to a call for fire 

in less than one minute. In comparison, their Operation Desert Storm 

predecessors took around three minutes to engage the enemy after a 

call for fire. Seventy-three M270A1 launchers fired 857 rockets and 

414 Army Tactical Missile Systems I, with the missiles engaging a 

target in less than seven minutes on average after a call for fire. This 

was 53 minutes faster than Army Tactical Missile System I attacks in 

Operation Desert Storm. From 20 March 2003 to 10 April 2003, field 

artillery units fired more than 450 Army Tactical Missile Systems (I 

and Ia) in support of joint combat operations. They also launched 13 

Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile Systems as part of the 

initial battlefield preparation prior to the ground campaign.53

During the early years of the 21st Century, the Army adopted the 

Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System, which was 

developed based on lessons learned in Kosovo in 1999. In that conflict, it became clear that commanders required a long-range weapon 

with precision attack capabilities to deliver a single 500-pound high 

explosive warhead using Global Positioning System guidance to 

engage a point target with minimal collateral damage in areas of 

dense foliage, deep snow cover, and built-up urban environments. 

The Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System delivered interim capabilities until the Army Tactical Missile System Ia 

Unitary could be fielded in the next couple of years. It provided the 

corps and joint task force commander with the capability to attack 
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time-sensitive targets where collateral damage, fratricide, bomblet 

dud rates, or aircraft risk might be a concern and participated in the 

initial battlefield preparation that allowed the Operation Iraqi Freedom ground campaign to begin in March 2003.54

Just as important, the Army Tactical Missile System provided 

all-weather fire support. During the Mother of All Sandstorms (24–

27 March 2003) with 100-meter visibility and winds gusting up to 

50 knots with thousands of Iraqi paramilitary in the area, “Groundbased indirect fires (Army Tactical Missile System) were absolutely 

critical,” according to Brigadier General Austin.55 This organic fire 

support capability allowed the ground commander to maneuver his 

forces out of contact while setting the conditions for his next fight 

and gave him the flexibility to adapt to overcome the actions of an 

interactive, thinking enemy.56

In fact, during the Mother of All Sandstorms, the 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) depended on indirect fires to kill the enemy. 

The maneuver arms caused the enemy to move so that intelligence 

assets could identify the enemy’s exact location. Once this had 

been accomplished, indirect fires from field artillery and mortars 

destroyed the enemy.57 Along these lines, Lieutenant Colonel Terry 

Ferrell of the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, the 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) noted that the only system capable of assisting the 

squadron in adverse weather conditions was the M270A1 launcher. 

Also, the M119 towed 105-millimeter howitzer provided accurate 

indirect fires in support of maneuver forces 24 hours a day with no 

limitations due to weather.58 As General Blount and other senior officers pointed out, massed Army field artillery fires, regardless of the 

weather, remained the key to victory as they had been in past wars.59

To complement this impressive capability, US Marine field artillery 

systems battered the enemy with 19,587 rounds.60

A relatively new organization, the Fires Effects Coordination Cell facilitated massing fires for the maneuver commanders 

in all weather. The cell was first envisioned by Major General Leo 

J. Baxter, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School 

from 1997 to 1999, and put into operation by his successor, Major General Toney Stricklin (1999 to 2001). It provided the same 

functions as the fire support element but added new ones. Besides 
164

coordinating indirect fires, the cell had the ability to conduct information operations, furnish deep operations previously done by the 

corps Deep Operations Coordination Cell, and coordinate nonlethal effects using electronic warfare and nonlethal munitions. These 

functions previously were beyond the purview of the fire support 

element at the brigade.61

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, the Fires Effects Coordination Cell did not function as intended by Generals Baxter and 

Stricklin. General Wallace noted that though it performed well, nonlethal effects such as civil affairs and information operations needed 

to be integrated into the cell. “The FECC [Fires Effects Coordination 

Cell] should be the manager of all effects on the battlefield,” he said.62

As much as doctrine proved to be sound and the Fires Effects 

Coordination Cell functioned well, Operation Iraqi Freedom also 

validated the effectiveness of field artillery systems that had been 

introduced since Operation Desert Storm of 1991. Fielded after Operation Desert Storm, the M109A6 Paladin self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer delivered responsive accurate fires within a couple 

of minutes of receiving a call-for-fire, stayed abreast of the maneuver forces, and had the ability to shoot from anywhere.63 Colonel 

Torrance and Lieutenant Colonel Nicolle of the 3d Infantry Division 

Figure 7: Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicle. 

Source: US Army photo by Sergeant First Class Gerald Mitchell.
165

(Mechanized) wrote, “The combat performance of the M109A6 Paladin was magnificent. It is an extremely capable system that consistently put rounds downrange in less than two minutes after mission 

receipt, even while on the march.”64

Other major field artillery systems received equally positive reviews. In the September-October 2003 Field Artillery, Torrance and 

Nicolle commented: “The M7 BFIST [Bradley Fire Support Team 

vehicle] performed brilliantly. For the first time, the artillery community has a vehicle that allows FISTs [Fire Support Teams] to keep 

up with their maneuver counterparts and remain in the fight.”65 The 

M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle gave the company fire support officer the ability to remain well forward in maneuver formations without compromising safety and initiated 407 of the 657 direct support fire missions for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized). 

In view of this, the division declared the M7 to be a winner.66 In 

counterfire fights, the M270A1 launcher that was just being fielded 

also lived up to its advance billing. Capable of being configured to 

shoot Army Tactical Missile System missiles, M270A1 launchers 

permitted V Corps artillery to engage deep targets accurately and 

more responsively than close air support. During the “Shock and 

Awe” attack that opened Operation Iraqi Freedom combat operations, Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System missiles destroyed enemy army headquarters with precision and served 

well in deep operations.67 The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System also made its debut. Linked with Firefinder AN/TPQ-36 and 

AN/TPQ-37 radars, the system provided fires for special operations 

forces as they maneuvered on the western front, while the Senseand-Destroy Armor Munition brought cannon field artillery into the 

precision age.68

Another major new system since Operation Desert Storm, the 

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System demonstrated its 

utility. From the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery’s perspective, the system passed with “flying colors.”69 It permitted passing fire commands digitally and rapidly to provide timely, accurate, 

and lethal fires in support of maneuver forces.70 V Corps artillery 

also pointed out that the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System “performed well throughout the operation.”71 Along the same 
166

lines, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) noted that the system 

“proved battle worthy in technical and tactical fire direction.”72

Notwithstanding this, the system exhibited deficiencies as did 

other field artillery systems. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 

System hardware was cumbersome, and its software also caused 

some problems.73 Every time a new problem with the software arose, 

the contractor created a new patch or version. Multiple software versions added to the issues. Discussing this, the 3d Battalion, 320th 

Field Artillery Regiment, noted, “If an NCO [noncommissioned officer] leaves for Drill Sergeant, Recruiting or some other duty that 

takes him out of Field Artillery for a year or more, he must be retrained upon his return because of the new version or patches that 

have come out.”74 This prompted the battalion to write that the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System and the artillery community needed to “slow down on the patches and look at a replacement.”75 Another unit, 2d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, 

pointed out that because of the numerous software changes and upgrades, operators had not been able to master the system’s many 

functions and troubleshooting procedures.76 In sum, the Advanced 

Field Artillery Tactical Data System needed to be more user-friendly 

to reduce operational unit training time. The 1st Battalion, 9th Field 

Artillery Regiment expressed comparable thoughts in its after action report. They indicated the system lacked the ability to perform 

fire missions at optimal speeds and noted that its software was not 

efficient and its hardware was not powerful enough. However, they 

noted that overall the system functioned well.77

Munitions and weapons also displayed shortcomings that required modifying. In an after action report after the offensive from 

the Kuwait-Iraqi border to Baghdad, V Corps commented that current Multiple Launch Rocket System range and precision limitations 

“do not allow for firing in the proximity of friendly troops or in areas 

of potential collateral damage. This unnecessarily makes close air 

support a more viable option for the maneuver commander.”78 Expediting the production and delivery of the Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket System Unitary and the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, both under development, would improve range and 

precision. Reflecting this line of thinking, the 3d Infantry Division 
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(Mechanized) also urged increasing the range of cannon and rocket 

artillery, which were consistently outranged by Iraqi field artillery; 

further, they recommended developing more precision munitions 

that would greatly enhance flexibility and lethality.79

Notwithstanding the limitations of the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System and the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, the 2003 invasion and rapid advance to Baghdad 

demonstrated that the Field Artillery was indispensable. Regardless 

of the weather, field artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles provided effective and responsive counterfire and close support to silence enemy indirect and direct fire systems so that the maneuver 

arms could move relatively unscathed. Meanwhile the Sense-andDestroy-Armor Munition, the Army Tactical Missile System I and 

IA, and the Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System 

furnished precision capabilities to minimize collateral damage, engage small targets, and complement massed fires. In short, combat 

operations validated 1990s modernization efforts that had improved 

field artillery mobility and lethality. 

The Insurgency and the Field Artillery

The insurgency that followed the 2003 Iraq invasion and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan had a threefold impact 

on the Field Artillery. First, it forced the Army to accelerate fielding of precision munitions, such as the Precision Guidance Kit, 

the Excalibur 155-millimeter precision munition, and the Guided 

Multiple Launch Rocket System munition. These would make the 

Field Artillery more lethal on the 21st Century battlefield and minimize collateral damage that undermined the American effort to gain 

the support of the Iraqi people. The Army also needed to accelerate fielding of sensors with the ability to locate targets precisely. 

Second, the insurgency emphasized nonstandard missions, such as 

civil affairs and patrolling, at the expense of fire support. Lacking 

opportunities to provide fire support, field artillery officer and Soldier core competencies deteriorated, which prompted the Field Artillery School to initiate programs to restore skills. Third, the Army 

required joint fires observers to coordinate close air support and 

joint fires in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Although it had been working to introduce precision munitions since the 1970s, the Army only produced a limited number 

and types. For example, the laser-designated Copperhead 155-millimeter munition employed during Operation Desert Storm had a 

slow response time, and the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition 

that was initially designed to attack Soviet armor was expensive. 

Restrictive American rules of engagement during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom were designed to minimize noncombatant injuries and death as well as collateral damage 

to non-military targets. Aware of this concern, adversaries dispersed 

their forces and often occupied positions in or near populated areas 

to discourage the Americans from employing field artillery. Such 

tactics placed a premium on precision munitions to engage enemy 

targets and forces without collateral damage. As a result, the Army 

accelerated developing and fielding of these munitions.

Because the high cost of Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition 

restricted its use during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army pursued a less expensive precision munition. On 20 November 2003, 

the Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command tasked the US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill 

to head a working group of military and industry representatives to 

conduct the Precision Effects Study. The study determined current 

or near-current precision engagement solutions and selected those 

with the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets, with the 

goal of fielding the new technology within 24 to 36 months.80

Although various suggestions emerged, the course-correcting 

fuse, renamed Precision Guidance Kit in 2005, offered much promise. Based on analysis of the proposed solutions during the first 

part of 2004, the center concluded that the Precision Guidance Kit 

would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-millimeter and 155-millimeter projectiles by using the Global Positioning System to provide location during flight and make trajectory corrections as required. The fuse would also drive down the size of the logistical tail 

by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement, 

would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile,” and 

would be cost effective.81

As of 2006, the Army planned to field the Precision Guidance 
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Kit in three increments. Increment I would permit the projectile 

to hit within 50 meters of the target, address urgent operational 

needs in the Global War on Terrorism, and be fielded in 2010. Increment II would minimize Global Positioning System interference 

and jamming; improve accuracy to 30 meters; address the entire 

155-millimeter family of platforms, munitions, and propellants; 

and be fielded in 2013. Increment III would add the 105-millimeter family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be 

fielded in 2014.82

Developmental problems forced the Army to push back fielding. After the Precision Guidance Kit fuse failed early in 2010, a 

team organized to investigate the situation pointed to design problems and recommended terminating the program or letting it slip so 

that fielding would be later than initially planned. In December 2010, 

the Army Systems Acquisition Review Board approved allowing the 

program to slip to make minor design changes and then field the Precision Guidance Kit Increment I in 2014 rather than 2010 as initially 

scheduled. The other increments would be fielded subsequently.83

Meanwhile, the Department of the Army G-3 directed an urgent 

material release on 17 May 2011 that accelerated fielding Increment 

I with reduced reliability to support Operation Enduring Freedom 

in Afghanistan. Based on a successful flight test in August–September 2011, the Army decided in March 2012 to fast-track fielding 

Increment I from 2014 to 2013. This decision gave the Precision 

Guidance Kit two developmental tracks—the baseline program and 

the urgent material release program. As the Army fielded the urgent 

material release in 2013–2014, it continued developing the baseline 

fuse with the objective of introducing it in 2020.84

Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without 

sacrificing accuracy, the Army concurrently explored adopting the 

XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially 

planned in 1995 and 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and-forget 

projectile with a Global Positioning System receiver and unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges 

(50 kilometers) to shape the close battle and improve survivability 

because it would be able to hit within six meters of the target. The 

projectile’s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose 
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Improved Conventional Munition for area targets; the Sense-andDestroy-Armor Munition for counterfire against self-propelled artillery or armor; or the Unitary Munition, a single high-explosive warhead for soft or hard precision targets. After it was fielded, Excalibur 

would give the Field Artillery improved fire support capabilities; 

be compatible with all digitized 155-millimeter howitzers, including the Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer under development; reduce fratricide; and be fielded with the Dual-Purpose 

Improved Conventional Munition in 2006, the Sense-and-DestroyArmor Munition in 2007, and the Unitary in 2010.85

Several years into development, insufficient funding and the 

early 2000 termination of the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition 

program prompted the Army to limit Excalibur’s initial development 

to the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. However, 

priorities shifted due to the fear of duds and collateral damage, the 

need for precision, and the Transformation of the Army process that 

was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat 

Team. In December 2000, Major General Toney Stricklin, the Commandant of the US Army Field Artillery School from 1999 to 2001, 

Figure 8: M777 towed 155-millimeter howitzer. 

Source: US Army photo by Chuck Wullenjohn.
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recommended switching Excalibur’s initial development from the 

Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, which often left unexploded bomblets, caused collateral damage, and was perceived to 

be too dangerous to civilians and soldiers alike. He suggested switching to the Unitary warhead. Concurring with General Stricklin, the 

Excalibur Program Manager subsequently deferred work on the DualPurpose Improved Conventional Munition warhead in January 2001 

and designated the Unitary as the primary Excalibur warhead because 

it would produce low collateral damage. This decision raised Unitary’s importance after it had languished as a low priority for years.86

To get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible to meet requirements generated by the Global War on Terrorism, the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense subsequently tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to accelerate fielding by employing “spiral development.”87 This approach would deliver sequential, increasing 

capability over time until the objective requirements were met. As 

announced by the Army Acquisition Executive on 28 August 2002, 

Unitary Excalibur Increment I would be fielded to the M777 towed 

155-millimeter howitzer in 2006. Increment II or the enhanced 

Unitary Excalibur with more capabilities would be fielded to the 

Future Combat System Cannon under development in 2008, while 

Increment III would satisfy the original munition requirements and 

would be fielded in 2010 or 2011.88

Studies in 2002 and 2003 validated Unitary Excalibur development. As a precision munition, it destroyed point targets and highvalue area targets at extended ranges in complex terrain and urban 

environments from dispersed locations and would fill existing deficiencies, such as the inability to destroy point targets and restrict 

collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, such capabilities would be crucial for US 

joint military forces to succeed.89

As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct advantages. The June 2002 Achieving Transformation in Fire Support 

Study determined that the firepower of existing Army field artillery 

systems would be improved much more with precision munitions, 

such as the Excalibur and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munition, than by investing in Crusader, which was being de-
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veloped as the next-generation self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. Also, the July 2002 Alternative Indirect Fire Study concluded 

that Excalibur Unitary was more effective against a wider variety of 

targets and at a greater range than current munitions—even when 

used with current target acquisition capabilities. The warhead would 

be less expensive because it could be used in smaller numbers than 

non-precision munitions. Subsequently, the March 2003 Non-Lineof-Sight Mix Study noted that Excalibur Unitary would greatly 

enhance the lethality of the current cannon force and validated the 

need for the munition. Ultimately, Excalibur and other precision 

munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than 

fielding the Crusader.90

Along with the studies, the Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command endorsed the urgent needs statement for the Excalibur in 

August 2004—creating the requirement to rush the munition to the 

operational forces. Although the product of the accelerated program 

would not satisfy the objective round capabilities, it met the urgent 

needs statement and created a parallel development program for 

Excalibur. Essentially, the urgent needs statement required splitting 

Increment I into two parts. Increment Ia-1, the urgent requirement 

munition, would provide the theater forces with an immediate need 

capability and have less capability. Increment Ia-2, the objective 

program, would have improved reliability and improved countermeasures and would be fielded to M777A2 155-millimeter towed 

howitzer and Paladin units.91

The urgent requirement Excalibur quickly demonstrated its 

value in combat. Following new equipment training, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the first operational firing of the munition 

on 5 May 2007 at a well-known insurgent safe house in Baghdad, Iraq. Elements from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment 

teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment to destroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007, 

other American operational units had fired the urgent requirement 

Excalibur in Operation Iraqi Freedom, while Canadian forces had 

fired it in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In February 

2008, American forces began firing the urgent requirement Excalibur in Operation Enduring Freedom when units equipped with the 
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M777A2 deployed to Afghanistan.92

Improvement efforts with the Multiple Launch Rocket System meanwhile focused on enhancing munitions to give them better 

range and precision. Although the Multiple Launch Rocket System 

performed well in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, its rockets and 

their submunitions raised serious questions. During the war, many 

Iraqi artillery assets outranged their Coalition counterparts, including Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions. Also, the high dud 

rate of Multiple Launch Rocket System submunitions raised concerns about the safety of soldiers passing through the impact areas. Together, the proliferation of long-range rocket systems and the 

high dud rate led to the requirement for an Extended Range Multiple 

Launch Rocket System rocket with a range of 45 kilometers and a 

lower submunition dud rate.93

After the Army started producing the extended-range rocket 

with the M77 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition in 

2001 to meet the range requirements identified in Operation Desert Storm, it began developing an extended-range Guided Multiple 

Launch Rocket System rocket that could be fired from the M270A1 

launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

System M142 launcher also under development. The accuracy of 

the traditional free-flight Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket degraded as the range to the target increased. In contrast, the guided 

rocket’s Global Positioning System-aided inertial navigation system 

improved accuracy from a minimum range of 15 kilometers to a 

maximum of 60 to 70 kilometers to attack area and point targets. 

The range depended on warhead weight and type of propellant. The 

guided rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision 

strikes, reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, 

and give the rocket an additional 15-kilometer range beyond the Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket. Such a range 

would permit hitting more targets and make the weapon system 

more survivable, because the rocket launcher could be positioned 

farther from the target. However, technical problems in 2000 and 

rising production costs caused the program to slip, with the initial 

operational capability moved from 2000 to 2006.94

A restructured schedule prompted the Army to hold a Special 
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Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 2001 to 

justify further development. As an integral part of the review, the 

1982 Nunn-McCurdy Act required the Army to determine if a system was essential to national security, calculate whether an alternative with equal or greater capability was available, ascertain if the 

program was adequately staffed to control costs, and assess if unit 

costs were reasonable. If the Army failed to answer the questions 

satisfactorily, development would be stopped. After the review favorably answered the questions, development continued.95

Even before operational testing could be completed on the 

Guided Unitary Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National 

Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and also Commander of the US 

Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement for 

the rocket on 28 March 2004. After the Army denied the request on 

13 September 2004, General Metz sent the Army an urgent needs 

statement for the rocket on 12 October 2004. He indicated that his 

forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive 

Multiple Launch Rocket System munition to integrate into joint fires 

in an urban environment, attack high pay-off targets, and provide 

large area coverage and that the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket 

System Unitary rocket met those requirements.96

On 6 January 2005, the Army endorsed General Metz’s request 

and accelerated work on the rocket to provide it sooner than 2006.97

On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3d Battalion, 13th Field Artillery Regiment fired a six-rocket mission at an insurgent safe house 

in an urban environment at 53 kilometers. They destroyed it, killing 

insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in the 

same area that killed more insurgents. One day later, A Battery, 3d 

Battalion, 13th Field Artillery Regiment shot six rockets at a bridge 

and destroyed it. In all instances, collateral damage to surrounding 

buildings was almost non-existent, according to participants.98

For precision munitions such as the Guided Unitary Multiple 

Launch Rocket System rocket to perform to their capabilities, they 

required sensors with the ability to locate a target precisely. Early 

in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser 

Locator Designator to lase targets for precision munitions, meaning 
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the Copperhead laser-designated munition. Because it weighed 107 

pounds, the system reduced the mobility of light fire support teams, 

did not meet their needs, and was not man-portable. In response to 

the noted deficiencies, the US Army Field Artillery School acquired 

the tripod-mounted Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder to replace the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locater Designator. In its target location configuration, the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 

weighed about 20 pounds, had the ability to locate targets accurately 

out to 10 kilometers, and could see the battlefield with a near allweather capability at shorter ranges.99 In 2002, the Army fielded 15 

low-rate initial production rangefinders to the 82d Airborne Division 

in Afghanistan after years of developmental work and completed 

fielding of full-rate production rangefinders in 2011.100

Seeking performance improvements and further weight reduction to enhance mobility for light units in view of Afghanistan combat operations, the Army introduced the improved accuracy tripodmounted Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder II (named to 

distinguish it from the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 

I). Fielding began in 2011 to units supporting Operation Enduring 

Freedom in Afghanistan.101

The mounted Fire Support Sensor System complemented this 

effort. It integrated the laser designation module from the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder onto the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System. The Army mounted the system 

on Knight and Bradley fire support vehicles and started fielding in 

2006. With the Fire Support Sensor System, the Army possessed 

the most capable observation, target location, and designation sensor on the battlefield.102

Besides encouraging an accelerated pace for developing and 

acquiring precision munitions and sophisticated sensors with the 

ability to locate targets precisely, the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted the Field Artillery School to reexamine its 

field artillery training for field artillery Soldiers. Beginning early in 

2005, the Field Artillery School observed that core competencies of 

officers attending the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course had 

been degraded. A school survey revealed that 90 percent of the students had not participated in qualification-table training and that 
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50 percent had not executed fire missions since attending the Field 

Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course as second lieutenants. This 

forced career course instructors to furnish remedial training so that 

the students could satisfactorily complete the course. Recognizing 

the seriousness of the training issues, the Assistant Commandant 

of the School, Colonel James M. McDonald, signed a memorandum of instruction on 28 November 2005 to redesign the Field 

Artillery Captain’s Career Course. In a bold move, Colonel McDonald stopped teaching the course to modernize it by eliminating 

Soviet-style tactics from the curriculum. The collaborative process 

involved the entire school and included students with insurgency 

experience as well as input from the field. The redesign endeavor 

optimized the course to ensure that the right competencies were being taught to prepare officers for insurgency warfare, that the most 

effective teaching methodologies were being utilized, and that the 

most effective training aids were being employed.103

Redesigning the school’s curriculum went beyond modernizing the 2005–2006 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course under 

Colonel McDonald. With the 2003 rise of the insurgency in Iraq, 

field artillery Soldiers devoted the bulk of their time to nonstandard 

missions, such as patrolling, providing base defense, and convoy 

operations. Because only a few field artillery units provided fire support, field artillery core competencies atrophied. As outlined in the 

20 July 2006 Army Campaign Plan Update, the Vice Chief of Staff 

of the Army, General Richard A. Cody, understood the effect of nonstandard missions. He directed the US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command to assess the competency of field artillery lieutenants to 

determine if nonstandard missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and 

Operation Enduring Freedom had degraded their basic branch skills 

and if they required additional or refresher training. Along with other Army leaders, General Cody understood the perishability of field 

artillery core skills; he noted they needed to be used to be retained.104

Tasked by General Cody to look at the skill levels of lieutenants, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command expanded the 

review to include staff sergeants, sergeants first class, captains, and 

majors and directed the Field Artillery School to determine the impact of nonstandard missions. The Field Artillery School surveyed 
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field artillery tactical commanders, school instructors, and Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course students in July 2006 to determine 

how seriously field artillery skills had been degraded. The survey indicated that although nonstandard missions reinforced basic leader 

skills, they caused lieutenants to lose branch technical skills of fire 

direction, fire support, and weapon-specific platoon leader skills.105

The survey also found that nonstandard missions eroded core skills 

for noncommissioned officers and hampered unit readiness. Major 

General David C. Ralston, who was the Commanding General of 

the US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill from 2005 to 2007, 

concluded in a 7 August 2006 memorandum to General Cody that 

officers and noncommissioned leaders at all levels had experienced 

the atrophy of field artillery skills.106

In his memorandum, Major General Ralston outlined ways to 

address the problem. He suggested the Field Artillery School could 

increase the length of the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course to 

allow more time to retrain senior lieutenants and captains in branch 

core competencies after having limited or no tactical experience 

with these functions since graduating from the basic course. Also, 

the school proposed to bring entire battalions back to proficiency 

after spending 18 or more months performing non-field artillery 

missions by sending mobile training teams to unit locations as required, a resource intensive solution, or by using the Fires Knowledge Network to provide web-based “reach back” training to Soldiers and units in the field.107

To implement the potential retraining options, Major General 

Ralston chartered the Field Artillery War on Terrorism Reset Task 

Force on 23 August 2006 to develop a plan to reset the Field Artillery force through institutional and unit training as proposed to General Cody. Regarding institutional training, the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System, the Officer Education System, and the 

Warrant Officer Education System were to focus on core field artillery and leader skills more than they had done—without expanding 

training time or increasing training costs because the Army would 

reject such measures. In March 2007, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy incorporated a four-day, live-fire exercise into its 

Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course for Military Occupational 
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Specialties 13B30 (Cannon Crewmember) and 13M30 (Multiple 

Launch Rocket System Crewmember); during the exercise, students 

would practice core competency tasks of training their subordinates 

to execute field artillery tasks.108

Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School energized its master 

gunner program to help offset the war on terrorism’s adverse impact on core field artillery skills. In 1997–1998, the Army created 

the master gunner position as part of reforming the noncommissioned officer force structure. The Army required the master gunner to be a sergeant first class with at least one year of experience as 

a firing or ammunition platoon sergeant and directed the individual 

to serve as the commander’s and command sergeant major’s weapon system expert on training, safety, and maintenance operations. 

Assigned to the battalion’s S-3 (operations), the person assisted 

in training, crew certifications, and other duties. Specifically, the 

master gunner executed certifications, certified commanders and 

senior leaders, supervised section or crew certifications of launcher/howitzer sections, and helped train Soldiers to function on their 

particular weapon system. As of 2005, master gunners served in 

Military Occupation Specialties 13B (Cannon Crewmember) and 

13M (Multiple-Launch Rocket Crew Member). Despite the demanding responsibilities and required expertise, the master gunner 

never received any formal instruction and relied on self-study to 

develop individual skills.109

When the Global War on Terrorism adversely impacted the Field 

Artillery, the Army realized the need to provide training for master 

gunners. The Field Artillery Master Gunner Division had been organized in 2005 to help train master gunners and digital master gunners 

as well as help field artillery units maintain proficiency. Beginning 

in 2006, the division conducted a two-week course for master gunners on cannon and rocket systems and for digital master gunners on 

fire direction systems. The courses taught current doctrine, training 

management, crew-served weapons, and small arms. Field artilleryspecific instruction taught master gunners and digital master gunners 

how to implement unit training and certification programs; they were 

the weapon system experts for all assigned weapons of the units, including small arms, or were the unit’s fire direction experts.110
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The restructuring team from the Field Artillery School and 

Noncommissioned Officer Academy also focused on master gunner 

responsibilities for preparing the Soldier for the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System. The unit master gunner (a sergeant first 

class) and the section chiefs would ensure that the Soldier received 

quality 10-, 20-, and 30-level Military Occupational Specialty training to prepare the individual for the Primary Leader Development 

Course, officially renamed the Warrior Leader Course by the School 

and Academy in 2005. During this course, the Soldier (corporal or 

specialist) would receive additional 30-level training in preparation for eventual attendance at the Basic Noncommissioned Officer 

Course, unofficially called the Noncommissioned Officer Intermediate Course by the school and academy, and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, unofficially called the Noncommissioned 

Officer Advanced Course by the school and academy.111

Major General Peter M. Vangjel, who succeeded Major General Ralston as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 

2007 to 2009, shared his predecessor’s view that fortifying the master gunner program and Noncommissioned Officer Education System courses was a step in the right direction to train Soldiers in field 

artillery core competencies. Supporting Major General Vangjel’s 

Field Artillery Campaign Plan, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine in the Field Artillery School and the Noncommissioned Officer 

Academy designed a plan to increase Field Artillery Noncommissioned Officer Education System course lengths to reset Soldiers in 

core skills; improve skill proficiency; incorporate additional training, such as nonlethal fires; and address current and emerging core 

competency requirements.112

Approved by Major General Vangjel, the plan addressed several key issues. Course length for the eight Field Artillery Military 

Occupational Specialties would expand as much as three weeks. Expansion was the most critical for 13B Cannon Platoon Sergeant and 

13D Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Specialist in the Advanced 

Noncommissioned Officer Course and in 13B Cannon Section Chief 

and 13F Fire Support Specialist in the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. Regardless of the course, expansion emphasized mastering rather than just becoming acquainted with skills and aimed to 
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develop critical thinking and adaptive, flexible leadership. According to the Command Sergeant Major Dean J. Keveles, the Commandant of the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the longer courses 

helped restore core field artillery skills and made graduates more 

adaptable to a complex operating environment of the first decade of 

the 21st Century.113

The expanded Noncommissioned Officer Academy courses 

that were approved by the US Training and Doctrine Command on 

10 July 2008 and began in 2009 played a vital role in transforming 

noncommissioned officer education. On 1 October 2009, the Academy’s Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course was redesignated as 

the Advanced Leader Course and its Advanced Noncommissioned 

Officer Course was redesignated as the Senior Leader Course. Beyond the name changes and increasing course length by an average of two weeks to accommodate more training, the course focus 

shifted from squad to squad/platoon in the Advanced Leader Course 

and from platoon to platoon/battery in the Senior Level Course.114

Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School tackled the atrophy of 

officer corps skills. In 2008, the Field Artillery Captain’s Career 

Course went through its third major redesign to keep it relevant with 

the contemporary operating environment. The first February 2006 

redesign, directed by Colonel McDonald, had answered the challenges, demands, and skills required by the contemporary operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second redesign that 

Major General Ralston implemented in February 2008 met the challenges of a corps of young officers who lacked field artillery experience, aligned the program of instruction with emerging doctrine, 

and revamped training to stay abreast of the changing contemporary 

operating environment. It also added a new command and control 

module, more in-depth instruction on coordinating nonlethal fires, 

updated counterinsurgency theory as well as planning and application instruction, and integrated more practical exercises to upgrade 

core competency skills. This was particularly critical for students 

who did not have fire support opportunities in their initial assignments in Iraq or Afghanistan.115

Even though the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course redesigns since 2006 had kept pace with emerging doctrine, three critical 
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gaps still existed in 2008 that led to a third redesign. Surveys conducted in December 2007 identified that two out of three captains 

who reported to the course had not performed traditional companygrade field artillery tasks or basic field artillery skills that they had 

learned in the Basic Officer Leader’s Course; deployments stressed 

non-standard missions at the expense of core field artillery missions. 

In 2008, almost 60 percent of the captains who attended the Field 

Artillery Captain’s Career Course had not performed a traditional 

field artillery job, lacked competency in core field artillery skills 

and the skills to be integrators of nonlethal fires as required by Field 

Manual 3-0, and required assignment-oriented training.116

To close these training gaps, the Field Artillery School increased 

the length of the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course in 2008. The 

first class under this third redesign was conducted starting in 2009. 

The previous 20-week course only familiarized students with many 

skills. This was particularly true concerning resetting field artillery 

captains with their core competencies—the most pressing concern 

being the atrophy of lethal skills. In view of this, Major General 

Vangjel supported a two-phase expansion program for the career 

course. The first phase or short-term fix would expand the course to 

24 weeks. The additional weeks would immerse student officers in 

practical applications to develop needed skills to become experts at 

coordinating lethal fires at the battalion level and delivering lethal 

fires at the battery level. The first phase of expansion would fix two 

of the three gaps—core competency and assignment-oriented training. The second or long-term solution would extend the course to 36 

weeks and address the gap of integrating nonlethal fires. According 

to Major General Vangjel, integrating nonlethal fires was a required 

core competency—a sentiment that was echoed by the Combined 

Arms Center Commander, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell 

IV, at the Fires Seminar in 2008. However, costs prevented expanding the course to 36 weeks.117

Revamping and expanding the training to 24 weeks to ensure 

competency in core skills paid dividends for officers. By 2012, captains received five weeks of US Army Training and Doctrine Command common core; four weeks of gunnery, advanced fire direction officer responsibilities, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 
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System, and weapons training; and 14 weeks of tactical and staff 

instruction. This instruction provided situation-based practical exercises on field artillery core competencies and other learning methodologies to develop agile and adaptive leaders for the full-spectrum 

battlefield who were technically proficient to serve as a battery commander, a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a field artillery battalion fire direction officer, or a battalion/brigade/brigade combat 

team staff officer. They also learned to coordinate lethal and nonlethal fires at the battalion level, with an emphasis on lethal effects 

that included employing precision munitions and providing fire support coordinator tasks and responsibilities.118

Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School restructured unit training to ensure that it met the organization’s needs for trained field artillery officers and Soldiers. In a 2 October 2006 briefing to the US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Commanding General, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the school outlined using paper-based training support packages, mobile training teams, 

video teleconferences, and web-based distance learning packages, 

among other means, for unit training. For unit-oriented reset training to succeed, each unit had to determine its needs so that the 

school could identify training products, assets, and methods; obtain 

funding; and prioritize training.119

While reset institutional training was still a one-size-fits-all 

approach, reset unit training support required a totally different 

methodology. The training revolved around reach-back services 

and mobile training teams. As it evolved in 2006 and 2007, reachback capabilities exploited the Internet. Soldiers could access more 

than 1,000 hours of interactive multi-media training subdivided by 

military occupational specialty and skill level by logging onto the 

Army Knowledge Network, later renamed Army Knowledge Online. For more robust training, the school provided mobile training teams. Unlike the normal mobile training team that taught a 

specific program of instruction regarding new equipment, reset 

mobile training was geared to individual unit needs. For example, 

one team taught refresher training on manual gunnery and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System to the 18th Fires Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Another team trained the 2d 
183

Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, 

in manual gunnery, survey, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical 

Data System, and the countermortar radar. Other teams conducted 

similar training with the 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 4th Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Campbell; and 4th Battalion, 319 Field 

Artillery Regiment in Afghanistan.120

The Field Artillery Master Gunner Division that had recently 

moved from the school’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine to the 

428th Field Artillery Brigade also sent reset mobile training teams 

to units. During 2007, the division helped field artillery certification and qualification by using the coach-teach-mentor methodology. While visiting a unit, the division’s team mentors established 

a certification plan. After meeting with the unit’s leadership, the 

team conducted workshops with the master gunner, operations sergeant, and platoon sergeants; meanwhile the digital master and his 

noncommissioned officers participated in a workshop to reset their 

skills. On the last day of training, the team divided unit personnel 

into working groups to facilitate developing a draft digital cannon 

or Multiple Launch Rocket System certification program. The Field 

Artillery Master Gunner Home Page complemented this initiative. 

The page had all points of contact and up-to-date examples of unit 

certification programs and standing operation procedures as well as 

changes in the Field Artillery. Also, the division supported the twoweek Field Artillery Master Gunner and Digital Master Course that 

taught current doctrine, training management, crew-served weapons, and small arms to cannon and rocket crewmembers and cannon 

and rocket fire direction specialists.121

Reset efforts continued unabated in 2008. Mobile training 

teams supplied training to noncommissioned officers in all military 

occupational specialties, trained the trainer, and developed subject 

matter expertise to help field artillery units regain core skills. For 

example, one mobile training team focused on training master gunners to ensure that the commander had a weapon system expert on 

training, safety, ammunition, and resupply and maintenance operations and to give a battalion an individual with the skills to help reset the unit. Besides training master gunners, mobile training teams 
184

provided reset training to 15 active component and National Guard 

battalions as well as 18 batteries at unit home station and in theater. The training included field artillery safety, manual gunnery, 

the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, the Improved 

Position and Azimuth Determining System, Military Occupational 

Specialty 13B Cannon Crewmember, and M198 155-towed artillery specific crew drill.122

With help from the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Major General Vangjel funded two contract mobile training 

teams—the Battery and Below Mobile Training Team and the Collective Training Evaluation Team—at the end of 2008. This was a 

major breakthrough for the reset effort. Through the end of the year, 

the school paid for reset mobile training teams by taking resources 

from other activities to fund the team. In some instances, the school 

took mobile training team instructors from the instructional base. 

By funding two contract mobile training teams, the school ended the 

practice of stripping resources from one activity to support another; 

instead, it now had dedicated reset mobile training teams.123

Both teams had the mission of restoring fires warfighting skills 

and field artillery core competencies and began conducting training in 2009. While the Battery and Below Mobile Training Team 

focused on leader training and train-the-trainer instruction covering cannon battery operations, the Collective Training Evaluation 

Team concentrated on collective and leader training on core field 

artillery skills and tasks at the platoon, battery, and battalion levels. 

Specifically, the teams deployed to the home station and developed, 

planned, and executed platoon, battery, and battalion fire support 

element/fire support team, combat observation lasing team, and fire 

direction center training. Such training enhanced the unit’s ability to 

operate within a full-spectrum environment.124

Over the next three years, both training teams furnished invaluable unit reset training that continued to be a high priority for 

the Field Artillery School and underwent a critical reorganization. 

Budget cuts in 2011 forced the school to merge them to form the 

Field Artillery Mobile Training Assistance Team that continued the 

mission of its predecessor organizations.125

Meanwhile, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
185

Freedom in Afghanistan demonstrated the warfighting potential of 

integrated joint fires. Coordinating joint attack of targets, synchronizing fires with maneuver, providing land fires to support aviation, 

achieving synergistic fires and effects, executing time-sensitive targeting, and deconflicting joint fires required joint standards and joint 

training. Major General Michael D. Maples, the Commandant of the 

Field Artillery School from 2001 to 2003, noted late in 2003 that to 

achieve the intent of emerging doctrine and realize the full potential 

of indirect fires and effects initially discussed in the Field Artillery 

School in the 1990s, the Army and joint forces would need to train 

extensively on the integration, coordination, and application of joint 

fires. This would require a universal observer from any service or 

special operation forces who would be capable of applying any effect from any service in any environment. Renamed the joint fires 

observer in 2005, the observer would be a trained service member 

who would request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires to 

include field artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire. Additionally, this 

individual would be authorized to provide targeting information 

and conduct terminal guidance operations in support of Types 2 and 

3 close air support when a joint terminal attack controller was not 

physically located with the forward observer and when the situation 

required immediate assistance from available close air support.126

Because the maneuver arms were not able to access joint fires 

in the form of close air support in Iraq and Afghanistan due to shortages of joint terminal attack controllers, the Air Force and Army 

increased their efforts to train joint fires observers. The Air Force 

planned to increase the number of joint terminal attack controllers 

in sufficient numbers to have one at the maneuver company by 2012 

by training more at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. In contrast, the 

Army envisioned using the joint fires observer at the maneuver 

platoon level as the eyes of the joint terminal attack controller in 

the field. Recognizing that the joint fires observer course conducted by the 57th Operations Group at Nellis Air Force Base would 

not produce sufficient numbers of graduates to satisfy its requirements, the Army resolved to train its own. As agreed upon by the Air 

Force and Army, Fort Sill developed a joint fires observer course. 

After the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate conducted a 
186

successful pilot course at Fort Sill in September 2005 using resources from the 138th Fighter Wing of the Oklahoma Army National 

Guard, the Army and Air Force signed a 14 November 2005 memorandum of agreement to support the Fort Sill course. Thus, two joint 

fires observer courses—one at Nellis Air Force Base and one at Fort 

Sill—existed in 2005. Two years later in 2007, Nellis Air Force Base 

stopped teaching its course. To compensate, Fort Sill increased its 

capacity to train joint fires observers employing Joint and Combined 

Integration Directorate resident and mobile training.127

Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 2010 to 2011, was influenced 

by the lessons learned from the Afghanistan and Iraq combat operations and the requirement for more joint fires observers than the 

mobile and resident training teams could provide. As a result, he introduced an initiative in mid-2011 to add joint fires observer familiarization training in the school. As a result, the school developed a 

20-hour online joint fires observer course for all second lieutenants 

and integrated an overview of joint fires observer training into the 

Basic Officer Leader’s Course; however, these actions did not produce certified joint fires observers. Later, Brigadier General Brian J. 

McKiernan, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School 

from 2012 to 2013, added a joint fires observer assignment-oriented training course following the Basic Officer Leader’s Course for 

second lieutenants who had graduated from the basic course and 

were assigned to a brigade combat team. Assignment-oriented training began in January 2012 and produced certified observers. Constrained by limited resources, only 48 second lieutenants received 

assignment-oriented training in 2012 and 2013.128

Recognizing the need for more joint fires observers, Brigadier 

General Christopher F. Bentley, who became the Commandant of the 

Field Artillery School in June 2013, integrated joint fires observer 

training into the Basic Officer Leader’s Course in July 2014 to certify 

second lieutenants as joint fires observers. However, the inclusion 

of this training forced the school to decrease gunnery instruction, 

causing gunnery scores to drop. Subsequently, the school modified 

joint fires observer training to familiarization training that was less 

extensive than certification training and increased its gunnery train-
187

ing. Regardless, joint fires observer training in the basic course complemented the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate’s resident 

and mobile training teams joint fires observer training.129

As the joint fires observers training reflected, the war on terrorism of the first decade of the 21st Century significantly influenced 

the Field Artillery. It accelerated fielding precision munitions that 

were not scheduled to be introduced until the second decade of the 

21st Century and forced the Field Artillery School to enhance training in core field artillery skills that had deteriorated in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the deleterious impact of nonstandard missions 

on officers and Soldiers. The war also stimulated the Field Artillery 

to develop the joint fires observer. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

basically pushed the Field Artillery into an age of precision munitions and joint operations.
188

NOTES

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 

“The 9/11 Commission Report,” 22 July 2004, 1–14, 330–32; Donald P. 

Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001–September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms 

Center, 2010), 1, 31, 173; Christopher N. Koonz, ed., Enduring Voices: 

Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005

(Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 2008), 1; Stephen 

A. Carney, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 2011), 34–123. 

2. Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War, 1, 173; Koonz, ed., Enduring Voices, 1; Major General Michael D. Maples, “2002 State of the 

Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2002, 1–4; Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F. Bentley, “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition 

Fire Support in Operation Enduring Freedom,” Field Artillery, September–October 2002, 10–14; Interview, Patrecia Slayden Hollis and Robert 

H. McElroy, Interview with Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Field 

Artillery, September–October 2002, 5–9. See Sean Naylor’s Not a Good 

Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2005) for an excellent, in-depth account of Operation 

Anaconda. 

3. Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War, 1, 173, 174; Koonz, ed., 

Enduring Voices, 1, 3, 173. 

4. “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology,” Army, May 2003, 47; 

Report, “Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, 4 August 2003, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC), 1–8; Gregory Fontenet, et al., 

On Point: US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 86; Report (Extract), “The Instant 

Lessons of the Iraq War,” 14 April 2003, 20-2. 

5. Report, “Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Numbers,” 30 April 

2003, 3, HRDC; Briefing, “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated, HRDC. 

6. Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 246; John J. McGrath, The 

Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment in the US Army

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 111–15.

7. Colonel Theodore J. Janosko and Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. 

Cheatham Jr., “The Sound of Thunder: VCA in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 

Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 33–38; Report, “2-4th FA OIF 

Summary,” undated, HRDC; Fontenet, et al., On Point, 87, 108; John J. 

McGrath, The Brigade, 111–14. 

8. Lieutenant Colonel William G. Pitts, “Overview: Field Artillery 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 
189

2–4; Major Robert W. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder 

in OIF,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 17–22; Janosko and 

Cheatham, “The Sound of Thunder,” 33–38; McGrath, The Brigade, 113. 

9. Report (Extract), “AAR 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 

Chapter 12, HRDC.

10. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,” 

17–22; Memorandum for Record, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 

2003, 7–11, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Operation Hammer Cobra II,” 20 

March–8 April 2003, HRDC; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 87–89, 115–23; 

Pitts, “Overview: Field Artillery in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 2–4; McGrath, The Brigade, 117–18. 

11. Colonel Thomas G. Torrance and Lieutenant Colonel Noel T. 

Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq: The 3d Div Arty in OIF,” Field Artillery, 

July–August 2003, 30; Email with Attachment, “214th FA Bde OIF AAR, 

20 May 2003,” HRDC; Briefing, “3ID (M) Command Brief,” undated, 

HRDC; Captain Rhett A. Taylor, et al., “MLRS AFATDS and Communications: Lessons Learned in OIF,” Field Artillery, July–August 2003, 36, 

HRDC; “3d ID Drives Toward Assault on Baghdad,” Army News Service, 

27 March 2003, HRDC; “3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,” Army 

News Service, 26 March 2003, HRDC; Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF: 

Fires for the Distributed Battlefield,” Field Artillery, September–October 

2003, 10–12; Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,” 

17–22; Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 2003), 

100; McGrath, The Brigade, 117–18. 

12. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22; 

Briefing (Extract), “Operation Hammer Cobra II,” 20 March–8 April 

2003, HRDC; Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 128; Fontenot, et al., On 

Point, 123–35. 

13. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22; 

Janosko and Cheatham, “The Sound of Thunder: VCA in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom,” 33–38; Report, “1-9th FA Historical Summary,” undated, 

HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Gantt, “Decisive Fires, Decisive 

Victory: 1-9 FA in OIF,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 29–32; 

“3ID Roots Out Hornet’s Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army Link News, 2 April 

2003, HRDC; Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 10–12; Memorandum for Record, 

“1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 2003, 16; Murray and Scales, The 

Iraq War, 100; Fontenet, et al., On Point, 195–209. 

14. Memorandum for Record, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 

March 2003, 18; Report, “2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery OIF Summary,” 

undated, HRDC. 

15. Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 171–72; McGrath, The Brigade, 121. 

16. “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology,” Army, May 2003, 

47–50; Report, “2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery OIF Summary,” undated, 
190

HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 

2003, 21–23. 

17. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated; Colonel William L. Greer, Major Martin J. Holland, and 

Captain Charles W. Kean, “101st Div Arty: Fighting with Artillery Fires in 

an Urban Environment,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 13–16. 

18. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16; Briefing 

(Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated; 

Report, “3-320th FA Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments,” undated, 

HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated; “TF 3-69 Leads 3ID to Outskirts of Baghdad,” Army News 

Service, 6 April 2003, HRDC; “3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,” 

Army News Service, 26 March 2003, HRDC; “3ID Roots Out Hornet’s 

Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army News Service, 2 April 2003; Report (Extract), 

“The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 32, 34, 35; Rooker, “Historical 

Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22; Report, “1-9th Field Artillery Historical Summary,” undated, HRDC. 

19. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated, HRDC; “TF 3-69 Leads 3ID to Outskirts of Baghdad,” 

Army News Service, 6 April 2003; “3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,” 

Army News Service, 26 March 2003, HRDC; “3ID Roots Out Hornet’s 

Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army News Service, 2 April 2003; Report (Extract), 

“The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 32, 34, 35; Rooker, “Historical 

Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22; Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st 

Div Arty,” 13–16; Captain Benjamin R. Luper, “82d Airborne Artillery 

in the Battle of As Samawah,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 

39–41; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 212–219. 

20. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom,” undated; Report, “1-9th Field Artillery Historical Summary,” 

undated, HRDC; Report, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 2003, 

33–34; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 212, 258–259. 

21. Report, “1-9 FA Historical Summary, undated, HRDC; Gantt, 

“Decisive Fires,” 29–32; Report (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom, undated, HRDC; Report, sub: Instant Lessons Learned 

of the Iraq War,” 39; Report, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF.” 

22. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated; Briefing, “3ID Command Brief,” undated, HRDC; Report 

(Extract), “The Instant Lessons of the Iraqi War,” 40, 41, 48, 49; Report, 

“1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 2003, 45–47; Fontenot, et al., On 

Point, 245–46.

23. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16; Report, “3-

320 FA Operations Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments,” undated, HRDC; 

Fontenet, et al., On Point, 265–72. 

24. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16; Report, “3-

320 FA Operations Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments,” undated. 
191

25. Luper, “82d Airborne Artillery in the Battle of As Samawah,” 

39–41. 

26. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,” 17–

22; Report, “1-41 Field Artillery Historical Summary, undated, HRDC; 

Report (Extract), “The Instant Lessons of the Iraqi War,” 47–55; Report, 

“1-41 FA Operation Iraqi Freedom Day-by-Day History, undated, HRDC; 

Janosko and Cheatham, “The Sound of Thunder,” 33–38; Report, “2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery OIF Summary, undated, HRDC. 

27. Pitts, “Overview,” 2–4; Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne 

Thunder in OIF,” 17–22; Janosko and Cheatham, “The Sound of Thunder,” 33–38.

28. Pitts, “Overview,” 2–4. 

29. Briefing, “3ID (M) OIF Lessons Learned,” undated; Torrance and 

Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 30–35; Briefing (Extract), “The Road 

to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom, undated, HRDC; “TF 3-69 Leads 

3ID to Outskirts of Baghdad,” Army News Service, 6 April 2003, HRDC; 

“3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,” Army News Service, 26 March 

2003, HRDC; “3ID Roots Out Hornet’s Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army News 

Service, 2 April 2003, HRDC; Report (Extract), “The Instant Lessons of 

the Iraq War,” 32, 34, 35; Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,” 17–22; Briefing, “3d Infantry Division Live Briefing from 

Iraq, 15 May 2003, HRDC.

30. “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 47; Pitts, “Overview,” 2–4; Report 

(Extract), “The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 23–26, 31; Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,” 17–22; Murray and Scales, 

The Iraq War, 65; Fontenet, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 87–90; Todd S. 

Brown, Battle Ground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 2007), 11; Lieutenant 

Colonel Paul M. Andrus, Lieutenant Colonel Randol D. Rule, and Major Robert J. Terselic, “I MEF Fires in OIF,” Field Artillery, March–June 

2004, 26–30. Note: The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was scheduled to enter Operation Iraqi Freedom through Turkey and attack from 

the north, but Turkey refused passage. This compelled redeploying the 

division through Kuwait. As a result, it did not participate in the rush to 

Baghdad as initially planned. It arrived after the initial combat operations 

had been completed and occupation was beginning. 

31. Walker, “Marine Artillery in the Battle of An Nasiriyah,” 24–28. 

32. Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Melillo, “Cannon Cockers at War: 

The 11th Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 24–28; Major Walker M. Field, “Marine Artillery in 

the Battle of An Nasiriyah,” Field Artillery, November–December 2003, 

26–30; Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Andrus, Lieutenant Colonel Randol 

D. Rule, and Major Robert J. Terselic, “I MEF Fires in OIF,” Field Artillery, March–June 2004, 26–30; Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Groen, et 

al., With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003 (Quantico, VA: History 
192

Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), 174, 177, 178, 184, 218–220; 

Fontenot, et al., On Point, 88. 

33. Melillo, “Cannon Cockers at War,” 24–28; Groen, et al., With the 

1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003, 254–55, 257. 

34. Melillo, “Cannon Cockers at War,” 24–28; Andrus, et al., “I MEF 

Fires in OIF,” 26–30; Groen, et al., With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 

2003, 331–32. 

35. Major General Michael D. Maples, “FA Priorities after OIF,” 

Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 1; Email, “Consolidated Listing 

of Links to OIF Observations, 13 August 2003, HRDC.

36. Report, “Operation Iraqi Freedom, Artillery, undated, HRDC. 

37. Briefing (Extract), “Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned, 

24 October 2003, HRDC. 

38. Report (Extract), “AAR 3d Infantry Division,” Chapter 12. 

39. Memorandum for Commander, V Corps, “Lessons Learned by 

82d Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 1 May 2003, 12, 

HRDC. 

40. Memorandum for Commander, V Corps, “Lessons Learned by 

82d Airborne Division,” 12.

41. Memorandum for Commander, V Corps, “Lessons Learned by 

82d Airborne Division,” 12.

42. Memorandum for Commander, 325th AIR 82d Airborne Division, 17 April 2003, HRDC. 

43. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 32. 

44. Memorandum for Record, “1-9FA Bn AAR,” 29 April 2003, 16, 

HRDC. 

45. Memorandum for Record, “1-9FA Bn AAR,” 3, 17. 

46. Report, “101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Interim Lessons 

Learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated, HRDC. 

47. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Brian L. Borer and Lieutenant Colonel 

Noel T. Nicolle, “Acquisition: 3d ID Counterfire in OIF,” Field Artillery, 

September–October 2003, 42. 

48. Borer and Nicolle, “Acquisition: 3d ID Counterfire,” 42.

49. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 10–12. 

50. Patrecia S. Hollis, “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces Equal 

Victory in Iraq,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 6. 

51. Report (Extract), “82d Airborne Division After Action Review,” 

21 July 2003, Fires Chapter, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1-9 FA Bn 

AAR, 29 April 2003, 7, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division; Greer, Holland, and Kean, 

“101st Div Arty,” 16; Report (Extract), “AAR 3d Infantry Division,” 16.

52. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16. 

53. Briefing, “U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Observations, 

Quick Look,” 26 August 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “OIF Total Artillery 

Rounds Fired,” undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Commandant, USA-
193

FAS, “Desert Storm Rounds Fired,” 20 August 91, HRDC. 

54. Email Message with Attachment, “History Update, 3 June 2004, 

HRDC; “Field artillery and Mortar Systems,” Army, October 2005, 327–

28; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “ATACMS,” 2011, HRDC.

55. Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 12; Fact Sheet, “Quick Reaction Unitary ATACMS Missile,” 20 February 2003, HRDC; Email 

Message with Attachment, “ATACMS-BAT,” 24 February 2003, HRDC; 

Memorandum for Director, TSM RAMS, with Attachment, “Coordination 

of 2002 Annual Command History,” 18 March 2003, HRDC. 

56. Email with Attachment, “ATACMS and BAT Input to 2003 Annual Command History,” 21 April 2004, HRDC. 

57. Report (Extract), “Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 11; Hollis, 

“Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces Equal Victory in Iraq,” 5–9. 

58. Memorandum for Commander, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division; Memorandum for Commander, V Corps, 

“Lessons Learned by the 82d Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom,” 12. 

59. Briefing, “3ID (M) OIF Lessons Learned;” Briefing (Extract), 

“Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned.” 

60. Maples, “FA Priorities after OIF,” 1; Briefing, “OIF Total Artillery Rounds Fired,” undated, HRDC; Report (Extract), “U.S. Army OIF 

Study Group Observations,” undated, HRDC. 

61. 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 93–94. 

62. Hollis, “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Equal Victory in Iraq,” 7. 

63. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 10; Briefing (Extract), “Fires in the Close 

Fight: OIF Lessons Learned,” 7 October 2003, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), 

“Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned.” 

64. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 31. 

65. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 31. 

66. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 31; Briefing 

(Extract), “Fires in the Close Fight;” Report (Extract), “AAR, 3d Infantry 

Division,” undated, 21, HRDC. 

67. Hollis, “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces Equal Victory in 

Iraq,” 6, 8; Report (Extract), “AAR, 3d Infantry Division,” 19; Report 

(Extract), “V Corps AAR,” undated, 3, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“214th FA Bde OIF AAR;” Pitts, “Overview,” 4; Interview, Lieutenant 

Colonel William G. Pitts, DOTD, USAFAS, with Colonel Thomas G. Torrance, Commander, 3d Infantry Division Artillery, revised version, 21 August 2003, HRDC; Interview, Lieutenant Colonel William G. Pitts, DOTD, 

USAFAS, with Colonel Theodore J. Janosko, Commander, V Corps Artillery, revised version, 21 August 2003, HRDC.

68. Pitts, “Overview,” 4; Briefing, “Fires in the Close Fight;” Report, 

“OIF, Arty Lessons Learned,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “3d Infantry Division Commander Live Briefing from Iraq,” 15 May 2003, 8, HRDC. 
194

69. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 32. 

70. Email with Attachment, “214th FA Bde AAR;” Taylor, et al., 

“MLRS AFATDS and Communications,” 36–39; Torrance and Nicolle, 

“Observations from Iraq,” 32. 

71. Report (Extract), “Field Artillery Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated, 4, HRDC. 

72. Report (Extract), “AAR, 3d Infantry Division,” 28. 

73. Memorandum for Record, “AAR Comments for Combat Operations in Iraq,” 17 April 2003, HRDC.

74. Report, “3-320th FA Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments.” 

75. Report, “3-320th FA Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments.”

76. Memorandum for Commander, 325th AIR, 82d ABN DIV. 

77. Memorandum for Record, “1-9 FA Bn AAR,” 18; Torrance and 

Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 32; Email, “214th FA Bde OIF AAR;” 

Report (Extract), “OEF/OIF Lessons Learned,” 17 October 2003, HRDC. 

78. Report (Extract), “Field Artillery Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 7. 

79. Report (Extract), “Field Artillery Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 7; Report, “AAR 3d Infantry Division,” 24–252. 

80. Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 10, 

HRDC; Approved Precision Effects Study Plan, undated; Memorandum 

for Commander, USAFACFS, et al., “Precision Effects Study,” 20 November 2003, HRDC; Precision Effects Study Announcement, undated, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Precision Effects,” undated, HRDC; Sandra I. Erwin, “Cannons, Rocket and Missiles: A Growth Industry in the Army,” 

National Defense, 1 October 2014; Thomas Hills, Senior Analyst, Analysis Branch, FDIC, interview by author, 23 May 2005, HRDC; Approved 

Precision Effects Study Plan, undated, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“Precision Effects Study,” 23 May 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“TCM Cannon Input.”

81. Email with Attachment, “Precision Effects Study,” 23 May 2005; 

Major General David P. Valcourt, “Issues and Answers: NLOS-C Caliber 

Decision, Today’s Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound Bytes,” Field Artillery, July–August 2004, 1–3; Routing Sheet, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“Rankings of 24 Proposals,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Precision Effects Study Results for TRADOC Commander,” 4 February 2004, HRDC; 

Briefing, “Phase II – Precision Effect Study Recommendations,” undated, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Courses of Action for Accelerated Course Correcting Fuse Development,” 30 April 2004, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Approval of 

the PGK Capability Development Document,” 22 January 2007, HRDC; 

Briefing, “PGK Increment I Capabilities Development Document,” 12 

May 2006, HRDC; Capability Development Document for the PGK (Extract), January 2007, Executive Summary, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“PGK, 105mm precision munition, and ACAAP,” 28 March 2007, HRDC.
195

82. Briefing, “TCM Cannon,” 2 November 2009, HRDC; Capability Development Document for the PGK (Extract), 11 July 12, Executive 

Summary, HRDC; Major John S. Moorhead, “Precision Guidance Kits 

(PGKs): Improving the Accuracy of Conventional Cannon Rounds,” Field 

Artillery, January–February 2007, 31–33; System Training Plan for PGK, 

10 February 2006, 1, HRDC; Briefing, “PGK Increment I Capabilities Development Document,” 12 May 2006, HRDC. 

83. Don Durant, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 3 March 

2011, HRDC; Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, interview with attachments 

by author, 22 February 2012, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer for Ammunition, “Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the 

XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit Increment I,” 21 January 2011, HRDC. 

84. Interview with Attachment, author with Worth, 22 February 

2011; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army, “Acceleration 

and Urgent Materiel Release for XM 1156 Precision Guidance Kit,” 17 

May 2011, HRDC; Interview, author with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. 

Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 February 2013, HRDC; 

DOT&E Information Paper, “PGK,” 2012, HRDC; Memorandum for 

Commander, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Approval 

of Capability Development Document in lieu of Capabilities Production 

Document for the Precision Guidance Kit,” 11 July 2012, HRDC. 

85. “The XM892 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile,” 

Army, October 2000, 304; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, 

interview by author, 8 February 2001, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Excalibur,” 

21 February 2001, HRDC; PEO Ground Combat Support Systems, Major General John F. Michitsch, interview by author, 2000, HRDC; Major 

Danny L. Sprengle, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 26 February 2001, 

HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Excalibur,” 2 March 2001, HRDC; 

Email, “Command History Coordination,” 6 April 2001, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Excalibur’s Role,” 30 April 2004, HRDC.

86. Sprengle, interview, 26 February 2001; Email, “Command History Coordination,” 6 April 2001, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Army Contract Boosts 

Raytheon Excalibur Program,” 17 October 2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TSMC Input,” 13 April 2001, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“Excalibur,” 2 March 2001; Email, “None,” 12 March 2002, HRDC; Major 

Danny J. Sprengle, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 6 February 2002, 

HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 4 February 2002, HRDC; Information Paper, “Excalibur and Trajectory Correctable Munitions Program Merger,” 21 November 2001, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Excalibur,” 20 February 2002, HRDC. 

87. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 12 February 2003, 

HRDC. 

88. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur,” 13 February 2003, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 12 February 2002, HRDC; 

Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC, “Operational Requirements 
196

Document,” 20 August 2002, HRDC; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of 

Staff, “Request for Approval for Change 2 to the Operational Requirements Document for the Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur,” 12 

February 2003, HRDC.

89. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 30 April 2004, 

HRDC. 

90. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 30 April 2004. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cancelled the Crusader program in 

2002 because it did not meet current and future field artillery needs and 

transferred savings to other technologies.

91. Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 December 2010, 

HRDC. 

92. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract) 31 December 2010, HRDC. 

93. 1999 USAFACFS Annual Command History (ACH), 126; John 

K. Yager and Jeffrey L. Froysland, “Improving the Effects of Fires with 

Precision Munitions,” Field Artillery, March–April 1997, 5–7; “Extended 

Range for MLRS Rockets in the Works,” Field Artillery, April 1992, 39; 

Program Executive Officer, Tactical Missiles, M270 Family of Munitions 

Modernization Plan (Extract), February 1993, HRDC. 

94. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Froysland, “Transformation: Bringing Precision to MLRS Rockets,” Field Artillery, March–April 2003, 17–

19; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Munitions,” 11 March 2003, HRDC. 

95. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 93–94; Jeff Froysland, TSM RAMS, 

interview by author, 4 February 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“Update on MLRS Rocket History,” 1 April 2003, HRDC.

96. Jeffrey L. Froysland, TSM RAMS, interview with attachments 

by author, 8 March 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Rocket 

Input to 2005 Annual Command History,” 8 March 2006, HRDC. 

97. Jeff Froysland, TSM RAMS, interview by author, 10 February 

2006, HRDC; “Lockheed Martin Delivers First Lot of Guided MLRS Unitary Rockets,” Global Investor, 26 May 2005, HRDC; “Lockheed Martin 

Completes Delivery of First Low-Rate Production Guided MLRS Rockets 

to the U.S. Army,” Lockheed News Release, 16 May 2005, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “MLRS Rocket Input to 2005 Annual Command History,” 8 March 2006, HRDC. 

98. Jeff Froysland, TCM RAMS, interview with attachment by author, 10 April 2007, HRDC. 

99. 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 145–46.

100. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 89; 2003 

USAFACFS ACH, 110; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 98–99; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 93–94; Information Paper, “LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012,” HRDC.

101. 2008 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), ACH, 131; Email with Attachment, “TPSO Sensor History 
197

for 2010,” 22 February 2010, HRDC; U.S. Army Field Artillery School 

(USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Information Paper, “LLDR AN/PED1,” 2012, HRDC. 

102. 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 96. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 91; 2008 

USAFCOEFS ACH, 129; Email with Attachment, “TPSO History for 

2010,” 22 February 2010, HRDC; “Ground Combat System,” Army, October 2011, 338; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, October 2009, 355; 

Raytheon Information Paper, “FS3,” 2011, HRDC. 

103. Briefing (Extract), “U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort 

Sill,” 1 February 2006, HRDC; Memorandum for AC, USAFACFS, 

“Memorandum of Instruction for USAFACS Course(s) Redesign,” 28 

November 2005, HRDC; Memorandum, “Memorandum of Instruction 

for USAFACS Course(s) Redesign,” 28 November 2005, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School,” 23 January 2006, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Course Redesign,” 9 February 

2006, HRDC; Colonel James M. McDonald, AC, USAFAS, interview by 

author, 26 January 2006, HRDC; Memorandum, “Memorandum of Instruction for USAFACS Redesign,” 28 November 2005, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “United States Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill,” 23 January 

2006, HRDC; Email, “Review of Manuscript,” 2 January 2016, HRDC.

104. Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Jeffrey L. Moyes, “MTTs: 

Resetting FA Core Competencies,” Fires Bulletin, July–September 2008, 

10–11; Major General David C. Ralston, “2006: State of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2006, 5; Briefing, “FA War on 

Terrorism Reset,” 22 November 2006, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Loyd 

Gerber, Reset Task Force, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, interview 

by author, 7 February 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “CG Update,” 18 September 

2006, HRDC. 

105. Memorandum for VCSA, “Response to VCSA Tasker to Assess 

FA Lieutenant Training,” 7 August 2006, HRDC; TRADOC Tasking Order, “TRADOC #IN 00564 - Armor and Field Artillery Branch Reviews,” 

29 August 2006, HRDC. 

106. Memorandum for VCSA, “Response to VCSA Tasker to Assess 

FA Lieutenant Training.” 

107. Memorandum for VCSA, “Response to VCSA Tasker to Assess 

FA Lieutenant Training;” Information Paper, “FA Competency Review,” 

undated, HRDC. 

108. Briefing, “FA War on Terrorism Reset,” 22 November 2006; 

Interview, author with Gerber, 7 February 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “School 

Updated,” 2 October 2006, HRDC; Information Paper, “FA Competency Review,” HRDC; Briefing, “Commander’s Call,” 22 February 2007, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Restoring Core Competencies,” undated, HRDC. 

109. Briefing, “Field Artillery Master Gunner Course,” 1 February 

2006, HRDC; Memorandum for Commader, TRADOC, “Justification for 

Training Growth,” 19 January 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “The Field Artil-
198

lery Master Gunner’s Course,” 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “The Field Artillery Master Gunner’s Course, Training Management and Development 

Plan,” 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Master Gunner Course,” 13 

June 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Master Gunner Division,” 2 

February 2006, HRDC.

110. Mission/Task Analysis for Mission/Task Analysis Development and Development of Artillery Tables (Extract), 16 August 2004, 1, 

HRDC; Briefing, “The Field Artillery Master Gunner’s Course,” 2005; 

Master Sergeant (Retired) Gregory D. Plant, DOTD, interview by author, 

1 February 2006, HRDC. 

111. Sergeant Major Edwin V. Blount, Training Development Division, DOTD, interview with attachment by author, 23 January 2006, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Master Gunner Course,” 17 January 

2006, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander TRADOC, “Justification for 

Training Growth,” 19 January 2005, in Briefing for Lieutenant General 

David Petraeus (Extract), CG/CAC, 23 January 2006, HRDC; “Master 

Gunner Division Created,” Field Artillery, September–October 2005, 37; 

Interview, author with Plant, 1 February 2006. 

112. Command Sergeant Major Dean Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring 

NCO Core Competency,” 20–21, HRDC; Briefing, “NCOEs Expansion 

and Transformation,” 5 September 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “The Requirement,” 30 May 2008, HRDC.

113. Jim Tice, “NCO Training Overhaul,” Army Times, 22 December 2008; Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring NCO Core Competency,” 20–21; 

Briefing, “NCOEs Expansion and Transformation,” 5 September 2008, 

HRDC; Memorandum (Draft) for Commanding General, TRADOC, 

“Field Artillery Branch Assessment,” 5 May 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “The 

Requirement,” 30 May 2008.

114. Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7, 3d Quarter October 

2009, 10, HRDC; Command Sergeant Major Joseph D. Smith, “The Senior 

NCO’s Perspective on the State of the Fires Center of Excellence,” Fires 

Bulletin, November–December 2009, 1–2; Fires Center of Excellence 

CSM Newsletter (Extract), March 2010, 12, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires-7, November 2009, 13, HRDC; Keveles, “NCOES: 

Restoring NCO Core Competency,” 20–21; Briefing, “NCOEs Expansion 

and Transformation,” 5 September 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “The Requirement,” 30 May 2008. 

115. 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 44. 

116. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Talcott, Major Cornelius L. 

Morgan, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Scott W. McKnight, “PME for FA 

Officers and Warrant Officers,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2009, 34–37; 

Information Paper, “Extension of FACCC Training,” 20 November 2007, 

HRDC; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 44.

117. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 45; Talcott, Morgan, and McKnight, 
199

“PME for FA Officers and Warrant Officers,” 34–37.

118. Email with Attachment, “428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual 

History,” 19 February 2013, HRDC.

119. Briefing, “FA War on Terrorism Reset,” 22 November 2006, 

HRDC; Interview, author with Gerber, 7 February 2007; Briefing, “School 

Updated,” 2 October 2006; Information Paper, “FA Competency Review,” 

HRDC. 

120. Briefing, “Commander’s Call,” 22 February 2007, HRDC; Interview with Attachment, author with Lieutenant Colonel Loyd Gerber 

and Lieutenant Colonel David Vineyard, Task Force Reset, 29 January 

2008, HRDC; Briefing, “Restoring Core Competencies,” undated, HRDC. 

In 2007, the Rand Corporation conducted a study about leader skill competencies and reached the same conclusions as the 2006 TRADOC and 

Department of the Army studies. See Email with Attachment, “Reset Rand 

Study,” 29 January 2008, HRDC; Email, “Reset Task Force,” 6 March 

2008, HRDC.

121. Lieutenant Colonel Loyd A. Gerber, “Reset: Rebuilding FA 

Core Competencies for Future Full-Spectrum Operations,” Field Artillery, 

March–April 2007, 14–18; Command Sergeant Major William S. High, 

“The FA Master Gunner and Reset of the Redeployed FA Battalion,” Field 

Artillery, January–February 2007, 1–3. 

122. Command Sergeant Major Joseph D. Smith, “The FA NCO: 

Absolutely Mission Essential,” Fires Bulletin, July–September 2008, 

4–5; Moyer, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,” 10–11; Briefing, 

“Field Artillery Reset,” 3 October 2008, HRDC. 

123. Email with Attachment, “Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command 

History,” 17 February 2009, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel David S. Lee, 

Chief, FA Lessons Learned/FA Reset, DOTD, interview by author, 17 February 2009, HRDC. 

124. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: 

Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, October–December 2008, 1–8; Briefing, “Field Artillery CTET,” 5 December 2008, 

HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training,” 10 December 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Reset Input to 2008 Annual 

Command History,” 11 February 2009, HRDC. 

125. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 31–32; 2009 USAFAS AH, 32; 

Briefing, “Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training,” 3 June 2010, HRDC; 

Briefing, “Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 May 2010, HRDC; 

Chris Atkinson, Executive Officer, 1-30 Field Artillery, 428 FAB, interview by author, 27 January 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, “Techwise, 

Fire Support Coordinator Course Gets Facelift,” 6 April 2012, HRDC; 

Briefing, “Maneuver Pre-command Course,” 1 February 2012, HRDC. 

126. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for 

the 21st Century,” Field Artillery, May–June 1989, 22–27; Major General 

Michael D. Maples, “The FA and the Objective Force: An Uncertain But 
200

Critical Future,” Field Artillery, September–October 2002, 1–4; 2004 U.S. 

Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command 

History (ACH), 47; Colonel Michael A. Longoria, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Andrews, and Lieutenant Colonel Steven P. Milliron, “Joint 

Fires Observer,” Field Artillery, September–October 2005, 30–34. Type 1 

Close Air Support (danger close) is when the risk of fratricide requires the 

controller to acquire the attacking aircraft and target visually. Type 2 Close 

Air Support is when visually acquiring the target is not possible. Type 3 

Close Air Support is when the attacking aircraft imposes a low risk of fratricide. See Major General David P. Valcourt, Brigadier General Robert T. 

Bray, and Command Sergeant Major Tommy Williams, “State of the Field 

Artillery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2004, 1–5. 

127. FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, November 2009, 19, 

HRDC; Email, “Governor’s Report 2010,” 22 February 2011, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Air Force 2010,” 22 February 2011, HRDC; Interview with Attachments, author with Lieutenant Colonel Rustan S. Schwichtenberg, Commander, 138th Combat Training Flight, JACI, 22 February 2011, HRDC; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 48; Information Paper, “JFO 

Course Information,” 1 December 2005, HRDC; Email, “JFOs,” 10 January 2006, HRDC; Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and the U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of 

Staff, Air and Space Operations, and the United States Special Operations 

Command, Director, Operations Support Group for Joint Fires Observer, 

14 November 2005, HRDC; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations and Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, 

13 October 2005, HRDC; Email, “JFO Information,” 10 January 2006; 

Email, “Number of JTACs Required,” 10 January 2006, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC, “Commander’s Statement – FY06 

TRADOC Budget Guidance,” undated, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“JFO and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History,” 28 February 2011, 

HRDC; Interview with Attachment, author with Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Todd, JACI, 10 February 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“JFO in 2011,” 16 February 2012, HRDC; Captain M.A. Markham, “The 

Need for Joint Fires Observer Program,” 19 February 2008, HRDC.

128. Email, “Joint Fires Observer Course and Joint Fires Observer 

Team,” 2 March 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “JFO in 2011,” 16 

February 2012, HRDC; Briefing, “FA BOLC B Course POI Review,” 2011, 

HRDC; Briefing, “BOLC/JFO Integration,” 2011, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013, HRDC; Sharon McBride, “Joint 

Fires Observer: Shouldn’t be ‘on the job’ Training,” Fires Bulletin, November–October 2011, 20–23; Briefing, “BOLC Brief to CG,” 21 April 

2011, HRDC; Email, “SITREP,” 7 July 2011, HRDC; Colonel Gary Hisle, 

Director, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate, interview by author, 

12 January 2012, HRDC; Major Elijah M. Ward, et al., “Modern Men of 

Mars: The Evolution of Junior Fire Supporters,” Fires Bulletin, January–
201

February 2012, 36–41; Email with Attachment, “428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History,” 19 February 2013, HRDC; “Fort Sill Educators 

Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 10 October 2013; JACI Opord, 1 October 2012, HRDC; Briefing, “428th Field 

Artillery Brigade PCC Overview,” 13 September 2013, HRDC; Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery 

Brigade, interview by author, 31 January 2014, HRDC; Email, “Joint Fires 

Observer Course and Joint Fires Observer Team,” 2 March 2012, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “JFO in 2011,” 16 February 2012, HRDC; Briefing, “FA BOLC B Course POI Review,” 2011, HRDC; Briefing, “BOLC/

JFO Integration,” 2011, HRDC 

129. Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2012, 14–16; Briefing (Extract), “Field 

Artillery Commandant’s Huddle,” 14 November 2013, HRDC; “Fort Sill 

Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 10 October 2013; Email with Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 1 August 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Cmdt SITREP,” 29 August 

2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 21 November 

2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 19 December 

2013, HRDC; Briefing, “FA BOLC B Redesign COA Decision Brief to 

FA Cmdt,” 29 October 2013, HRDC; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, 

December 2013, 1, 3–5; Email with Attachment, “428 FAB Input to 2013 

USAFAS Annual History,” 22 February 2014, HRDC; Michael Dooley, 

Deputy Commander, 428th FAB, interview by author, 24 January 2014, 

HRDC; Interview, author with Atkinson, 31 January 2014; Lieutenant 

Colonel Fernando Montoya, XO, 428th FAB, interview by author, 14 January 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “FA Commandant SITREP,” 

14 August 2014; Email with Attachment, “FA Commandant SITREP,” 11 

September 2014, HRDC; Briefing, “FABOLC Class 6-14 Overview,” 12 

September 2014, HRDC.
202
203

Chapter 5 

More Modernization 

The Global War on Terrorism and Transformation of the Army 

prompted the Field Artillery to extend its modernization effort beyond adopting precision munitions and creating the joint fires officer. 

The Field Artillery introduced new targeting systems for counterfire 

and sensors for locating targets accurately, developed a precision 

fires training program, embraced nonlethal fires and effects as a core 

competency for officers and soldiers to complement lethal fires and 

effects, and continued improving precision munitions and weapon 

platforms. Just as important, the branch implemented force structure 

changes by reinstituting division artillery.

Lethal and Nonlethal Targeting

During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the operational environment emphasized mobility and the escalating requirement to replace aging AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars with their limited scan capabilities. Responding to these 

priorities, the Army initiated work to replace the older equipment 

with state-of-the-art radars. To decrease developmental costs, the 

Futures Development and Integration Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, opted to modernize the Q-36 radar as the Enhanced AN/TPQ36 (EQ-36) truck-mounted radar with a range of 500 meters to 60 

kilometers. The center also wanted to reduce crew size requirements as compared to the Q-36 and Q-37 radars and ensure the 

replacement was capable of detecting projectiles fired from mortar, 

field artillery, and rocket systems and employing a 90-degree or 

360-degree sector search.1

Before work on the radar could be completed, an urgent material release request in 2008 caused the Army to field the less capable 

Quick Response Capability EQ-36 radar to support Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2010, the Army sent 

Quick Response Capability EQ-36s to Iraq and Afghanistan to effectively pinpoint incoming threat indirect fire for counterfire.2
204

Subsequently in 2011, the Army changed the EQ-36 radar’s 

designation to the AN/TPQ-53 and made it a program of record radar. Mounted on a five-ton truck, the Q-53 reduced operational and 

support costs from those of the Q-36 and Q-37 radars, had a range 

of 500 meters to 60 kilometers, could be emplaced in five minutes, 

could be displaced in two minutes, had an auto-leveling system, 

had a crew of four, had 90-degree and 360-degree search capability, and was linked by digital tactical radios to the Advanced Field 

Artillery Tactical Data System for mission processing.3 The Army 

began fielding the Q-53 radar in 2016 as a replacement to the legacy 

Q-36 and Q-37 radars.4

Although it planned to replace the Firefinder Q-37 radar—first 

fielded in the 1970s and modernized several times—the Army acknowledged during the first decade of the 21st Century that the Q-37 

would be around for several more years despite its obsolescence and 

associated sustainment expenses. To extend the aging Q-37’s usable 

life, the Army upgraded it for employment by the Heavy and Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams and the fires brigades by incorporating reliability and maintainability initiative kits in 2011 to 2012; the kits 

would reduce sustainment costs and increase the system’s life span 

beyond its scheduled retirement date of 2019.5

The Army simultaneously pushed to introduce the Lightweight 

Countermortar Radar to complement the larger Q-36, Q-37, and 

Q-53 radars. Because the existing Q-36 and Q-37 radars lacked the 

ability to scan 360 degrees and did not have the mobility required 

to accompany light and early entry forces, the Special Operations 

Forces expressed a critical need for a lightweight countermortar 

radar capable of scanning 360 degrees to detect short-range mortars 

rapidly for counterfire. This led to the development of the Quick 

Response Capability Lightweight Countermortar Radar (AN/TPQ48), which was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a range 

of 1,000 to 7,000 meters, the Q-48 could search 360 degrees to 

detect and track mortar fire within 100 yards of their points of origin—permitting counterfire to destroy fleeing improvised shooters, 

including those in urban areas.6

In 2004, the Army started fielding the Q-48 to Special Opera-
205

tions Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and initiated development of the 

Q-49 (Q-48 Version II), a successor system. With a target location 

error of 100-plus meters, the Q-48 radar met the immediate needs of 

deployed US Special Operations Command forces to locate mortars; 

however, improved accuracy would be needed for future versions. 

Fielded in 2005–2006, the Q-49 provided more rugged hardware and 

better software to locate a target within less than 75 meters to facilitate counterfire against enemy indirect fire systems.7

Two years later in 2008, US Army Training and Doctrine Command Program Office Sensors at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a document to develop the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (AN/TPQ50/Q-48 Version III) to track threat indirect fire systems and provide 

greater force protection capabilities. The Q-50 could be mounted on 

a vehicle, a feature that facilitated movement between two points 

and permitted rapid operational configuration. After successful February and March 2012 testing at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, 

the Army fielded the Q-50 radar beginning in 2013.8

Figure 9: AN/TPQ-50 countermortar radar. 

Source: US Army photo by Staff Sergeant Steven Littlefield.
206

As of 2013, the Field Artillery had five target acquisition radars—Q-36, Q-37, Q-48/49, Q-50, and Q-53, with a modernization 

plan for each. To guide radar acquisition in an era of constrained resources, the Field Artillery recognized the imperative to streamline 

radar acquisition. This led to a 2013 strategy to reduce the number 

of radars and provide a way forward to accomplish the branch’s core 

mission of detecting and tracking rockets, mortars, and cannon projectiles. In the near term (2015–2019), the Army planned to merge 

the short-range Q-48/49 radars (not programs of record) into the program of record Q-50 radar for short-range detection, retire the Firefinder Q-36 and Q-37 radars, and leave only the Q-53 for long-range 

target acquisition. This would reduce field artillery radars from five 

to two—the Q-50 and Q-53 that were already fielded. These radars 

provided the Field Artillery with 360-degree target acquisition capability, increased range, improved mobility, improved deployability, 

and decreased sustainment requirements compared with previous 

radars. They also gave the branch network capabilities to employ 

multiple counterfire radars to detect a target for more precise target 

location, reduced target location error, and made counterfire even 

more lethal. However, they could only detect a shooting indirect fire 

system. Silent systems remained invisible.9

Modernizing the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle for the 

heavy forces and the Knight vehicle for the heavy and light forces 

complemented the new radars. Late in the 1970s, a US Army Training and Doctrine Command working group, Close Support Study 

Group II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver 

forces. Besides reaffirming that the Fire Support Team created in the 

mid-1970s was still needed to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a 

mobile fire support vehicle that would ensure reliable, secure communications and be able to stay abreast of the maneuver forces.10

After funding had become available in the 1990s and the maneuver arms had received their Bradleys, the Army started equipping the Field Artillery with the Bradley with a fire support mission 

package as a replacement for the M981 Fire Support Vehicle. As of 

1995–1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two models—the M7 and M7A1. While the M7 would integrate a fire sup-
207

port mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 Operation Desert 

Storm chassis, the M7A1 would be more advanced and incorporate 

a fire support mission package on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis. After several years of developmental work and funding-driven 

program changes, the project manager redesignated the M7A1 as 

the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle (M2A3) and fielded it to 

counterattack units starting in 2004 as a complement to the M7 that 

entered the Army’s inventory in 2000.11

Cognizant of the M7’s limitations, the Army opted in 2010 to 

upgrade the Bradley M2, M3, and M7 to the M2A2 Operation Desert 

Storm-Situational Awareness configuration. This program brought 

the M7 close to the A3 by integrating the latest digitized electronics 

to provide optimal situational awareness, network connectivity, and 

enhanced communications hardware. This gave the Field Artillery 

two modernized Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle variants with 

the ability to designate targets accurately for precision munitions.12

Designed to maximize the employment of precision munitions, 

the Combat Observation Lasing Team also employed the M981 Fire 

Support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 that 

had been designed for armored and mechanized forces presented 

a unique signature for the light forces that used the High Mobility 

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle as their scout vehicles. In response 

to this discrepancy, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document that the Field Artillery School initially wrote in 

April 1997. The edited version would leverage fire support vehicle 

technology for the heavy and light forces. In the revised document, 

the Field Artillery School retained the Bradley Fire Support Team 

Vehicle for the heavy forces and recommended integrating the fire 

support mission equipment package onto a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle chassis—known as the Striker—for the Combat Observation Lasing Team in the heavy and light forces. This 

would provide the team with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, 

and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less conspicuous because it 

would present a common signature with other High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle-equipped light forces, save Bradley assets 

for fire support teams, and reduce operating costs for the Combat 
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Observation Lasing Team.13

Early in 1999, the Army type-classified the system as the 

M707 Striker (mounted on the M1025 High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle). The Army fielded it to the 82d Airborne Division in 2002 and to other active component units and Army National 

Guard units in 2003–2004. As noted earlier, the Army renamed the 

Striker as the Knight in 2002 to avoid confusion with the Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team.14

In December 2005, the Program Manager Office determined 

that the M1025 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle and 

its replacement, the M1114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle, could not support the Knight program. Because of armor 

added to protect against improvised electronic device attacks in Iraq, 

neither vehicle with the field artillery mission equipment package 

would be safe to operate. The increased vehicle weight created excessive operating restrictions. In January 2006, the Futures Development and Integration Center at Fort Sill urged finding a suitable 

replacement. Subsequently on 17 April 2006, the Army G-3/5/7 validated Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th 

Mountain Division with five Knight systems on a more survivable 

platform than the existing one. This encouraged the Product Manager Fire Support Systems to change the platform of the M707 Knight 

system from the M1114 to the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle.15

Subsequently, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Security Vehicles and designated them as the M1200 Armored Knight, 

equipping them with laser designators for precision targeting for 

employment by the Combat Observation Lasing Team. In October 2007, the 10th Mountain Division received five M1200s. One 

month later, the 101st Airborne Division took delivery of its first 

four M1200 vehicles. The Army began fielding the vehicles in February 2008 to Armored Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade 

Combat Teams, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and battlefield surveillance brigades; deliveries continued into 2013.16

Although developing a strategic fielding plan for new target 

acquisition radars for counterfire and updating Bradley Fire Support 

Team and Knight Vehicles were critical for precision targeting, the 

Field Artillery still required the ability to locate the target accurately. 
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Early in 2014, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Chief of Field Artillery for the 

Army from 2013 to 2014, remarked that accurate target location was 

the branch’s number one priority. Led by Brigadier General Bentley, the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School conducted a thorough examination of accurate predicted 

fires that were developed by the German army in World War I and 

that the American army had adopted after the war.17

During the early years of the 21st Century, the Fires Center of 

Excellence and the Field Artillery School recognized that Global 

Positioning System, digitized field artillery systems, and near-precision and precision munitions allowed the Field Artillery to be 

precise in all aspects of the five requirements for accurate predicted fires (accurate target location, firing location, weapon and ammunition information, accurate meteorological information, and 

accurate computational procedures). As Brigadier General Bentley 

pointed out on 6 May 2014, automated systems and near-precision 

and precision munitions permitted modifying the term from the 

five requirements for accurate predicted fire to the five requirements for accurate fire. Technology allowed the Field Artillery to 

Figure10: M1117 Armored Security Vehicle. 

Source: US Army photo by Staff Sergeant Kimberly Hackbarth.
210

be precise. The branch no longer needed to predict where a nearprecision or precision munition would hit, which was a significant 

change from the 100-year-old process of forecasting the impact 

points of ballistic munitions.18

Raising target location standards accompanied transforming 

the five requirements for accurate predicted fire to the five requirements for accurate fire. As the Field Artillery School explained in 

the fall of 2014, precision targeting was “non-negotiable.”19 With 

this vision, the school created the ratio of 80:10:10. The school 

determined that forward observers had to acquire an accurate grid 

coordinate 80 percent of the time. This meant achieving a Category I (6-meter target location error) and a Category II (15-meter 

target location error) or a precision grid coordinate 80 percent of 

the time, achieving a Category IV (50-meter target location error) 

10 percent of the time, and achieving a Category V/VI (200-meter 

target location error) 10 percent of the time. The school clarified, 

“This 80:10:10 ratio defines for us as professional Artillerymen 

the term accurate in the first requirement for accurate Fires. It also 

defines for us, as a profession of arms, how we train, certify and 

deliver accurate target locations in support of strategic, operational 

and tactical Fires.”20

For the dismounted forward observer to provide accurate target location and size, the Field Artillery School and Brigadier General Bentley acknowledged the importance of taking advantage of 

portable target designator systems already fielded and those scheduled for fielding in the near future. As the Global War on Terrorism demonstrated, the Field Artillery furnished responsive, effective fires with the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary 

employing deliberate targeting methods while the Air Force utilized 

the Joint Direct Attack Munition effectively for deliberate targeting. 

Deliberate targeting involved attacking targets that were detected, 

identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions in a 

tasking cycle. In contrast, dynamic targeting at the Army battalion 

and below involved attacking fleeting targets quickly. Although the 

Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces could refine 

grid coordinates for precision strikes, it generally resided at levels 

above the dismounted forward observer. Also, some dismounted 
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forward observers preferred maps, binoculars, and compasses rather 

than automated targeting designators. This limited the ability to obtain a precise coordinate location and minimized the effectiveness of 

coordinate locating munitions or precision munitions, which were 

employed frequently in deliberate and dynamic targeting missions 

and implementing the 80:10:10 targeting ratio.21

Influenced by this deficiency, the Army and Field Artillery 

reaffirmed the necessity to employ sensors capable of pinpointing a target location for a precision munition to hit. On 21 September 2010, the Army and the Field Artillery launched action to 

upgrade the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2 that was 

being fielded; the equipment could be employed by mounted or dismounted forces and had the ability to locate a target accurately for 

precision munitions. However, the designator required improved accuracy to support current and future precision munitions. To support 

this requirement, the Army adopted the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2H and retrofitted the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 1 and 2 as the 2H. Fielded beginning in 2014, the 

new system permitted the dismounted soldier to call for fire with 

Figure 11: Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder. 

Source: US Army photo by Technical Sergeant Brian E. Christiansen.
212

precision munitions and reduced target location error from approximately six meters to two meters.22

The pursuit of accurate target location and size also prompted 

development of a Joint Effects Targeting System for the dismounted 

forces. In June 2004, the Army/Marine Corps Board directed the 

services to develop a common laser-targeting device requirement. 

In response, the Army began developmental work on the handheld, 

binocular-like Joint Effects Targeting System. The system would 

consist of a Target Location Designation System and a Target Effects Coordination System. A forward observer equipped with the 

Joint Effects Targeting System with Target Location Designation 

System capabilities could recognize targets out to ranges of 3,000 

meters during the day and 1,300 meters during the night—with 

sufficient accuracy to employ precision munitions without mensuration. The Target Effects Coordination System software would 

provide blue force situational awareness on friendly and hostile military forces and communications interface with effects providers. In 

October 2006, the Department of Defense designated the Army as 

the lead for the system. The Army awarded developmental contracts 

in March 2013 and scheduled fielding for 2016, but technical and 

budgetary challenges pushed fielding back to 2018.23

Until the Joint Effects Targeting System could be fielded, the 

Army relied on the Quick Reaction Capability Hand-Held Targeting 

Device starting in 2013. It provided the dismounted forward observer with the ability to designate targets accurately within the standards required to employ precision munitions. The device bridged 

the gap between the existing target designation capability of 2013 

and the futuristic Joint Effects Targeting System.24

The Army developed and fielded the Fire Support Sensor System as it introduced the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 

2H for the mounted and dismounted forward observer and as it 

worked to acquire the Joint Effects Targeting System for the dismounted forward observer. In 2005, the Army began fielding the 

Fire Support Sensor System by fitting the system on the Knight 

vehicle employed by Combat Observation Lasing Teams. Beginning in 2007, the Army integrated the Fire Support Sensor System 

onto the M3A3 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle. While radars 
213

gave the Field Artillery improved counterfire capabilities on a mobile battlefield as well as networked capabilities, the target sensors 

gave the Field Artillery the ability to locate a target more accurately and facilitate exploiting precision munitions to complement 

unguided munitions.25

Precision munitions including the Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket System rocket and the Excalibur 155-millimeter munition, 

the reduction of the number of howitzers and rocket launchers in 

service, and the requirement to reduce or eliminate collateral damage highlighted the need to reduce the target location error through 

improved sensors and appropriately trained Soldiers who would use 

them.26 As early as Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army acknowledged that it lacked the ability to mensurate coordinates by 

absolutely measuring the height, latitude, and longitude of a point 

on the earth; these skills were critical to reduce target location error 

and ensure effective employment of coordinate-seeking or precision 

munitions. At the time, the Army relied on the Air Force to derive 

mensurate coordinates. Generally, it took up to 24 hours from the 

time that target information reached the Air Force until it came back 

to the Army for engaging. Pushing to reduce the turnaround time, 

the 75th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division developed a process in 2005–2006 to mensurate coordinates using Rainstorm, a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency-validated tool. 

This reduced turnaround time to minutes.27

However, a critical capability gap still existed. The Army 

lacked institutional training for target coordinate mensuration (the 

process to locate a target precisely), weaponeering (the process 

to determine the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal 

weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given 

target), and collateral damage estimation (the process for estimating 

collateral damage and casualties from conventional weapons and 

precision, unguided, and cluster munitions). To eliminate this gap,

the Army designated the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill as 

its functional manager for precision fires. Then in 2008, the Fires 

Center of Excellence made the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate its lead agency for developing a precision fires training 

program for target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and col-
214

lateral damage estimation; graduates would be certified by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a combatant command, or a 

combat support agency.28

After several months of hard work, the Joint and Combined 

Integration Directorate implemented a basic precision fires training 

program in September 2010. This program trained fire supporters 

to conduct target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation through three venues. The first venue 

utilized primary military education for Military Occupational Specialty 13F Fire Support Specialist, Military Occupational Specialty 

131A targeting warrant officers, and Military Occupational Specialty 13A field artillery officers to provide this training so that operational units could employ precision and conventional indirect fires 

accurately, achieve first-round target effects, and mitigate collateral 

damage. For the second venue, functional courses trained Military 

Occupational Specialist 13F Fire Support Specialists and Military 

Occupational Specialty 131A warrant officers who did not receive 

this training as part of their primary military education, as well as 

other services, partner nations, and individuals in targeting positions. 

Mobile training teams, the third venue, furnished unit training. Precision fires training in 2011 satisfied joint standards requirements 

and led to certification in target mensuration or collateral damage 

estimation or both. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

accredited the Target Coordinate Mensuration program in 2011, and 

the Joint Targeting School accredited the Collateral Damage Estimation program that same year. These gave the Army the ability to 

certify soldiers and others in target coordinate mensuration and collateral damage estimation.29

Armed with these certifications, the Fires Center of Excellence 

expanded its precision fires training. Directed by Major General 

David D. Halverson, its commanding general, the Fires Center of 

Excellence added precision fires courses in the Warrant Officer 

Instruction Branch and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy 

in 2012. The Warrant Officer Instruction Branch taught a Target 

Mensuration Only (taught only mensurating target coordinates) and 

Weaponeering in the Warrant Officer Basic Course as well as Target Mensuration Only in the Warrant Officer Advance Course. Both 
215

courses provided Collateral Damage Estimation instruction, while 

the Noncommissioned Officer Academy integrated Target Mensuration Only into its Military Occupational Specialty 13F Advanced 

Leader Course and the Military Occupational Specialty 13F Senior 

Leader Course and added Weaponeering and Collateral Damage 

Estimation to its Military Occupational Specialty 13F Senior Leader Course. In the meantime, functional courses taught by the Field 

Artillery School and mobile training teams bridged the gap for soldiers who did not have precision fires training in their professional 

military education.30

Subsequently, the Field Artillery School increased its precision 

fires training even more under Brigadier General Bentley’s guidance. In October 2013, the school set Target Mensuration Only and 

Collateral Damage Estimation certification as a requirement for 

graduation from its warrant officer courses.31

As precision fires training requests from the field increased, 

the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate’s Targeting Division 

meanwhile developed a course of action to increase the number of 

trained personnel while maintaining its ability to support resident 

training and mobile training teams. After a series of 2012 meetings, 

Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, Field Artillery School Commandant, decided to give Target Mensuration Only and Weaponeering instruction responsibility to the Warrant Officer Instruction 

Branch and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy. Directorate precision fires course instructors trained and certified instructors. This 

allowed Joint and Combined Integration Directorate precision fires 

instructors to focus on resident and mobile training team courses.32

Concurrently, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate 

obtained assistance from the Field Artillery Commandant’s Office to 

market its unit precision fires program so that soldiers in operational 

units would have the opportunity to become certified Target Mensuration Only instructors.Thanks to this initiative, operational units 

could certify soldiers in Target Mensuration Only while also providing a certified analyst capable of maintaining currency.33

On 1 February 2013, the 101st Air Assault Division developed 

the first unit precision fires program capable of creating analysts 

outside of the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate’s preci-
216

sion fires courses. This capability allowed the unit and the Army 

to save training dollars because it did not require precision fires 

mobile training teams. With the success of the 101st Air Assault 

Division’s program, 1st Armored Division, 10th Mountain Division, 82d Airborne Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Cavalry 

Division established their own unit precision fires programs to certify analysts and maintain the capability to grow and sustain Target 

Mensuration Only.34

Besides developing a precision fires training program to train 

soldiers to deliver precision munitions at Fort Sill and in operational units, the Field Artillery’s role in nonlethal targeting greatly 

expanded during the first decade of the 21st Century.35 Since the 

1990s, maneuver commanders had looked to their fire supporters to 

integrate lethal and nonlethal effects; however, combat operations 

early in the 21st Century took the Field Artillery beyond an informal arrangement for integrating lethal and nonlethal effects to one 

based on formal doctrine. Doctrine required field artillery officers 

and soldiers to look across a broad spectrum of targeting by integrating information operations, electronic attack, psychological operations, military deception, public affairs, and other nonlethal effects 

as required to complement lethal precision or conventional fires and 

to change their mindset. Field artillery officers and soldiers had to 

determine whether lethal effects or nonlethal effects would meet the 

desired effect rather than narrowly focusing lethal fires and effects 

as had been the practice for years.36

In response, the Field Artillery School developed a three-week 

Tactical Information Operations Course for brigade and below. The 

course taught students to identify the target then select the appropriate lethal or nonlethal effects that would achieve the commander’s 

desired result. Geared for staff sergeants through lieutenant colonels, the course focused on basic information operations, including 

electronic warfare, cultural awareness, and operational security.37

Concurrently, the Field Artillery School added other nonlethal 

courses. In 2005, it introduced a Joint Fires and Effects Course. Although funding constraints forced the school to stop teaching the 

course in 2013, the initial offering covered the skills and processes 

to apply and integrate the full range of operational lethal and nonle-
217

thal fires and effects; it also prepared students for the effects-based 

approach methodology to combat operations. A few years later in 

2007, the Field Artillery School created a Fire Support Coordinator Course to equip fire support coordinators with the right skills to 

integrate lethal and nonlethal effects. Despite the course’s success 

over its two years, budget cuts forced the school to eliminate both 

the class and its mobile training team counterpart during the latter 

months of 2011. To mitigate the training gap, the school incorporated one week of fire support coordinator training into the Field 

Artillery Captain’s Career Course. The school also added lethal and 

nonlethal fires and effects into the Noncommissioned Officer Education System and Warrant Officer Education System.38

At the same time, the Field Artillery ventured into electronic 

warfare as a part of its nonlethal mission. On 30 October 2003, the 

Department of Defense concluded that electronic warfare capabilities had to be improved to meet advances in the application and the 

use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny adversarial situational 

awareness, disrupt command and control, and develop targeting solutions to defeat weapons while protecting the United States’ electronic capabilities from being successfully attacked. Subsequently 

on 15 May 2004, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Commanding General designated the Combined Arms Center Commanding General at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the Army’s specified proponent for electronic warfare. Then on 23 November 2004, 

the Combined Arms Center Commanding General, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, selected the US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill as the lead for the Army’s electronic warfare attack 

for brigade, division, and corps. Working with the Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Sill developed a plan early in 2005 to revitalize electronic warfare within the Army; establish roles and responsibilities 

for electronic warfare functions; and begin the process of updating 

electronic warfare doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Initial analysis indicated that the 

responsibilities between information officers and fires coordinators 

were not clear, that joint electronic attack planning and coordination 

were largely ignored, and that there were multiple proponents for 

various aspects of electronic warfare. Equally important, electronic 
218

attack training did not meet current doctrine or organizations; and 

fire support coordinators lacked training on integrating and synchronizing electronic warfare assets. Only formal training could overcome these deficiencies.39

Based on this conclusion, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 

General Peter W. Chiarelli, took action. In May 2006, he directed 

the Army G-3 to establish electronic warfare as an enduring core 

warfighting competency within the Army and directed the G-3 to 

develop an electronic warfare force structure and operational concepts to strengthen the Army’s strategic vision and support the 

ground force component commander. This would enhance the Army’s ability to counter electronic threats proactively, help integrate 

lethal and nonlethal capabilities across the Army, and mitigate the 

threat that America’s enemies would employ electromagnetic spectrum, such as improvised explosive devices that had been so deadly 

in the War of Terrorism.40

To meet the immediate requirement for electronic warfare personnel, the Combined Arms Center directed the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Fires 

Center of Excellence at Fort Sill (known as the US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill until 2005) to create electronic warfare 

courses. In 2006, the Intelligence School developed a Tactical Electronic Warfare Practioners Course that awarded an additional skill 

identifier 1K and focused on countering radio-controlled improvised 

explosive devices. Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School conducted a pilot Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course in October 

2006 and January 2007 to train electronic warfare officers to plan, 

integrate, synchronize, and execute electronic warfare according to 

the commander’s scheme of maneuver. This course awarded an additional skill identifier 1J.41

The Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course served as a 

bridging strategy until an electronic warfare force structure could 

be stood up. In preparation for a proposed electronic warfare functional area, the Combined Arms Center directed the Fires Center 

of Excellence in August 2008 to construct an electronic warfare 

officer functional course, an electronic warfare integrator course 

for warrant officers, and an electronic warfare integrator course for 
219

enlisted personnel. This would permit the Army to field its own 

electronic warfare personnel to replace those provided by the Air 

Force and Navy.42

In concert with this tasking, the Fires Center of Excellence 

taught four electronic warfare courses to satisfy Functional Area 29 

training requirements for officers, Military Occupational Specialty 

290A for warrant officers, and Military Occupational Specialty 29E 

for enlisted soldiers by 2011. While the Army Operational Warfare 

Electronic Warfare Course still provided an additional skill identifier 1J to furnish deploying units with battalion and brigade electronic warfare personnel, the Functional Area 29 course prepared officers to serve as Army electronic warfare officers from the brigade 

to the Army Service Component command level. The course also 

provided training in the essential core skills necessary to perform 

electronic warfare functions in support of the commander’s concept 

of the operations. Additionally, it prepared electronic warfare officers to participate in electronic warfare operations at the tactical, 

operational, and strategic levels in a variety of Army and joint organizations. Meanwhile, the Electronic Warfare Warrant Officer Technician Military Occupational Specialty 290A course trained warrant 

officers to serve as electronic warfare integrators; and the Electronic 

Warfare Sergeant Noncommissioned Officer Course Military Occupational Skill 29E prepared enlisted soldiers to serve as Army electronic warfare specialists.43

However, the Field Artillery and Field Artillery School were 

only responsible for electronic warfare for a few years. In 2011, 

the Army transferred electronic warfare from the fires warfighting 

function to the mission command warfighting function as part of its 

Army Doctrine 2015 effort. Though the Fires Center of Excellence, 

Field Artillery School, and Field Artillery were no longer responsible for electronic warfare, their responsibility for nonlethal fires 

and effects remained.44

To this end, the Combined Arms Center Commanding General, 

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, and the Fires Center 

of Excellence Commanding General, Major General Peter M. Vangjel (2007–2009), addressed the importance of nonlethal effects. 

Lieutenant General Caldwell told leaders at the 2008 fires confer-
220

ence that providing nonlethal effects was now a core competency of 

field artillery officers and soldiers. In his vision of the future, Major 

General Vangjel reinforced this competency.45 A few years later, the 

August 2012 version of Army Doctrinal Publication 3-09 explained 

that the fires warfighting function included deliberate and dynamic 

targeting to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects against ground targets.46 Army doctrine solidified the responsibility for field artillery 

officers and soldiers to supply lethal and nonlethal effects equally as 

well. Field artillery officers and soldiers no longer had the option to 

consider nonlethal fires and effects. According to doctrine, they had 

to view it as a viable option and not as an afterthought as the practice 

had been for years.47

Making nonlethal fires and effects a core competency for field 

artillery officers and soldiers reflected the Field Artillery’s significant transformation during the first two decades of the 21st Century. For the previous two centuries, the Field Artillery focused on 

massed, lethal fires and effects to destroy targets and demonstrated 

little concern for collateral damage and noncombatant deaths. Because of increasing concern about collateral damage, field artillery 

officers and soldiers were forced to look across a broad spectrum of 

targeting; this required a new mindset. They had to consider nonlethal fires and effects as a viable alternative to lethal fires and effects.

Munitions, Platforms, and Command and Control

Concurrent with its doctrinal transformation, the Field Artillery needed to replace cluster munitions with munitions that did not 

produce collateral damage as well as field updated precision munitions, upgrade firing platforms, and modernize mission command 

systems. These measures would ensure that the branch would remain competitive in a world of rapidly changing technology and 

emerging threats. 

Over the years, cluster munitions generated controversy. They 

dispensed a large number of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area; lacked self-destruct capability; had the potential to remain hazardous for decades; and produced collateral damage to infrastructure, Soldiers, and civilians. Armies first used them in World 

War II, and at least 21 countries had employed them since. In the 
221

1960s and 1970s, the United States used them in Southeast Asia. 

The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that 9 to 

27 million cluster munitions remained unexploded in Laos alone. 

In the years since, the Soviets had utilized them in Afghanistan in 

the 1970s and 1980s, while the British employed them in the Falkland Islands in the 1980s. Subsequently, the United States employed 

cluster bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st 

Century during its Global War on Terrorism.48

Frustrated with the futile attempts to prohibit or restrict the use 

of cluster munitions, a group of nations led by Norway reached an 

agreement to ban them. In December 2008, 94 countries signed the 

Convention on Cluster Munitions, which banned their development, 

production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. By December 

2009, 103 countries had signed the convention. The United States, 

Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not 

participate in the talks that led to the agreement and abstained from 

signing the convention.49

In fact, the United States initially resisted bans against employing cluster munitions. As early as May 2008, Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull said the United 

States relied on cluster munitions as an important part of its defense strategy and preferred pursuing technological fixes to ensure 

that unexploded munitions would not be viable once a conflict was 

over. Moreover, if cluster munitions were eliminated, he argued, 

more money would be spent on new weapon systems, ammunition, 

and logistical resources to replace them. The United States further 

stated that most militaries would increase the use of massed field 

artillery and rocket barrages, which would increase the destruction 

of infrastructure.50

US leaders acknowledged that unexploded cluster munitions 

could cause unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure 

and recognized worldwide opposition to the Dual-Purpose Improved 

Conventional Munition that was an American field artillery cluster 

munition. Instead of eliminating the munition, the Department of 

Defense changed its cluster munition policy to require the military 

to design and procure cluster munitions with a 99-percent reliability rate, meaning that one percent or less of its bomblets would not 
222

detonate after they were dispensed from the carrier shell. In its 19 

June 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to 

Civilians memorandum, the Department of Defense officially announced a moratorium on the production and employment of cluster 

munitions that would leave more than one percent duds after arming. As soon as possible but no later than one year from 9 July 2008, 

the military and combatant commands would commence removing 

all cluster munitions from the active inventory that exceeded operational planning requirements or for which there would be no operational planning requirements. All excess cluster munitions would 

be demilitarized as soon as practicable. After 2018, United States 

military departments and combatant commands could only employ 

cluster munitions that would result in no more than one percent unexploded ordnance after arming. Previously, employing cluster munitions that exceeded the one-percent threshold had to be approved 

by the combatant commander.51

The Army recognized the need for the Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition and 

noted that the Unitary munition that was a single high-explosive 

warhead did not provide the same capability and effect. With this 

in mind, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, announced in June 2008 that the 

Army had decided to transition to an alternative warhead capability 

as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible. Subsequently, the Army announced its intention to procure the Guided 

Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary rocket in lieu of the DualPurpose Improved Conventional Munition warhead and develop a 

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead.52

After several years of development and successful testing 

demonstrated the munition’s reliability and accuracy, the Army announced in 2014 that the 200-pound Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead contained approximately 160,000 

preformed tungsten fragments, eliminated the possibility of any unexploded ordnance, and met the 2008 Department of Defense policy 

on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians memorandum. Equally important, the Army initiated full production in 2015.53

As the Army worked to acquire the Guided Multiple Launch 
223

Rocket System Alternative Warhead, it upgraded its arsenal of Army 

Tactical Missile Systems (a long-range field artillery missile), focusing on limiting collateral damage in keeping with the Department of 

Defense policy on cluster munitions. In response to an urgent need 

statement from Headquarters, US Forces Korea, the Army fielded 

the Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System in 2001 to 

complement the Army Tactical Missile System I and Ia. The I and Ia 

had anti-personnel and anti-material cluster submunitions that did not 

comply with the Department of Defense cluster munition policy and, 

therefore, could not be employed after 2018. The Quick Reaction 

Unitary, often called the Army Tactical Missile System Ia Unitary, 

had a deep strike capability for responsive precision employment in 

areas of dense foliage, deep snow cover, and built-up urban environments. With a range of 270 kilometers and a single 500-pound highexplosive warhead, it engaged point targets with minimal collateral 

damage at ranges comparable to the Army Tactical Missile System 

Ia, provided the corps and joint task force commander with the capability to attack time-sensitive targets, and augmented the Army Tactical Missile System I and Ia strikes that helped pave the way for the 

2003 ground campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom.54

Despite operational successes with the Army Tactical Missile 

System I and Ia and the Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System, insufficient funding prompted the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army, Claude M. Bolton Jr., to sign a memorandum to terminate the Army Tactical Missile System. His action cancelled contracts, and production facilities were closed out after final deliveries 

had been made in 2008.55

As of 2010, the Army had an inventory of approximately 2,000 

Army Tactical Missile Systems. This included the I and Ia, the 

Unitary (M48 and M57), and the Army Tactical Missile System II 

that was never fully operational. Nearly 65 percent of the missiles 

failed Department of Defense cluster munition policy compliancy 

requirements and could not be employed after 2018. To ensure that 

the stockpile of Army Tactical Missile Systems I and Ia with 2016 

expiration dates and the Unitary with a 2021 expiration date were 

available for employment, the Army designed a service life extension program in 2009 to extend the life of the I and Ia missiles by 
224

10 years. By refurbishing or replacing propulsion and navigation 

systems and replacing the non-compliant I and Ia warheads with the 

Unitary warhead, the service life extension program would provide 

time to complete an analysis and develop a successor to the Army 

Tactical Missile System.56

Understanding that the service life extension program did not 

satisfy long-term precision fires requirements, the 27 September 

2013 US Army Training and Doctrine Command Capability Needs 

Analysis noted the imperative to develop a long-range precision 

fires strategy. Without the Army Tactical Missile System, the Army 

lacked the capability to engage targets out to 499 kilometers and destroy strategic targets. Although viable options existed to eliminate 

the capability gap—ranging from joint assets to restarting the Army 

Tactical Missile System production—the Fires Center of Excellence 

at Fort Sill advocated developing a new missile because it would be 

the most cost-effective alternative for fielding a missile with longrange capability; they designed a block strategy to develop the new 

weapon in a timely and affordable manner.57

As of 2015, the first block or increment would hit targets from 

70 to 300 kilometers and would have two missiles per missile pod. 

This would not require any modifications to the current Army Tactical Missile System launcher or pod. Additionally, it would permit 

fielding the missile in 2022 and after the end of the Army Tactical 

Missile System’s shelf life. Initial capabilities would include 24/7 

all-weather precision area and time-sensitive capability to destroy 

tactical or strategic targets.58 The second increment or block would 

take advantage of emerging technologies to engage targets beyond 

300 kilometers. This range would most likely come from improved 

motor, lightweight airframe, and propulsion technologies.59

Removing the Army’s arsenal of cluster munitions extended to 

the 155-millimeter Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. 

To save money and prevent wasting the M483 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition carrier shell, the Army formulated 

a plan in 2011 to recycle the carrier shell as a replacement for aging or less capable munitions. The first munition using this recycle 

concept was the M1122 training round for the 155-millimeter howitzer. The M1122 replaced the M804 Low-cost Indirect Fire Training 
225

Round and then the M107 training round in 2012. Other munitions 

using the recycled M483 included the M1123 Infrared Illuminating 

Projectile and M1124 Visible Light Illuminating Projectile. A third 

round was the M110A3 White Phosphorous Smoke Projectile.60

As the Army and the Field Artillery initiated steps to eliminate 

cluster munitions, they continued work on the Precision Guidance 

Kit, a fuse with a Global Positioning System package that would 

turn a non-guided munition into a smart one as well as the Excalibur precision munition to minimize collateral damage and reduce the number of rounds to destroy a target. Following successful 

testing, the urgent material release Precision Guidance Kit began 

fielding in March 2013. The Army sent the fuse to M777 towed155-millimeter howitzer and M109 self-propelled 155-millimeter 

howitzer units in Afghanistan. The fuse achieved near-precision 

target effects when it was screwed onto the nose of a conventional 

155-millimeter projectile.61

Meanwhile, the Army continued developing a program-of-record Precision Guidance Kit fuse. In May 2015, it successfully completed an initial operational test and evaluation that demonstrated 

the fuse’s operational effectiveness, accuracy, operational suitability, and survivability. This permitted moving the fuse into full-rate 

production and adding anti-jamming capabilities to the fuse.62

The Field Artillery School concurrently continued participating in developing precision Excalibur Ia-2 and Ib that would be improvements over the Excalibur Ia-1 that had been fielded in Iraq and 

Afghanistan as an urgent material requirement. The Excalibur Ia-1 

had a range of 24 kilometers, while the Excalibur Ia-2 had a range 

of 37 kilometers and better accuracy. The Army concluded fielding 

Excalibur Ia-2 in 2012. Although funding constraints reduced the 

number to be produced, the Army Acquisition Executive approved 

full-rate production of Excalibur Ib on 25 June 2014.63

Introducing new weapon systems complemented developing 

new munitions. After several years of work in the 1990s, the contractor delivered prototypes of the XM777 towed 155-millimeter 

howitzer, also called the Lightweight 155. Unveiled at Picatinny 

Arsenal, New Jersey, in June 2000, the first prototypes held great 

promise. The howitzers’ reduced size and weight permitted towing 
226

by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft for strategic deployability. Additionally, the XM777 (designated as the M777) could be emplaced in three minutes or less, be 

displaced in two minutes or less, and fire faster than the M198—

with a range of 30 kilometers.64

Fielding the M777 with a conventional optical fire control 

system began as planned. On 19 January 2005, the Marine Corps 

received its first howitzers and conducted its first live fire at Fort 

Sill. Other howitzers were fielded to the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines 

at Twenty Nine Palms, California, and the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines at Camp Pendleton, California. On 19 December 2005, Colonel John M. Sullivan Jr., the 11th Marine Regiment Commander, 

certified that the Marine Corps had achieved its initial operational 

capability with the M777.65

Work on the software for the Towed Artillery Digitization package subsequently produced a sophisticated towed howitzer. Early in 

the fall of 2006, the Army tested an M777 digital fire control system 

at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. After successful software 

and material testing, Major General William M. Lenaers, US Army 

Figure 12: M119A2 towed 105-millimeter howitzer. 

Source: US Army photo by First Lieutenant Jonathan J. Springer.
227

Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command Commanding 

General, proceeded with full material release of the XM777E1 as 

the M777A1 in January 2007.66

Shortly afterward, the Army upgraded the M777A1 with software improvements to fire the Excalibur precision munition and redesignated it as the M777A2. Fielding of the howitzer began in July 

2007 and continued into 2010. At the same time, the Army retrofitted the M777 and the M777A1 as the M777A2. Then on 13 January 

2008, C Battery, 3d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment fired 

the first Excalibur in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 

from the M777A2; and later the 2d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery 

Regiment fired the first Excalibur from the howitzer in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom on 26 April 2008.67

After creating the Infantry Brigade Combat Team with its 

organic fires battalion in 2002, the Army required more towed 

105-millimeter howitzers than in its inventory. This led to a June 

2004 decision by a general officer steering committee to rebuild and 

refit old M102 towed 105-millimeter howitzers and press them into 

service. Pressured by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command and the US Army Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, the general officer steering committee reevaluated the decision in August 

2004 and ordered production of new M119A2 towed 105-millimeter howitzers to fill the shortages.68 Based on successful testing, the 

Army subsequently granted new production full materiel release 

for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008 and began fielding.69

With the fielding of the digitized M777A1 towed 155-millimeter howitzer and the phasing out of the M102 towed 105-millimeter 

howitzer, the M109A5 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, and 

the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer, the M119A2 would be 

the only howitzer in the Army’s inventory without digital capabilities. This would exacerbate the capability gap between the Infantry 

Brigade Combat Team that was equipped with the M119A2 and the 

Stryker Brigade Combat Team that was equipped with the M777A1. 

The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also prevent 

the howitzer from using the Precision Guidance Kit fuse. The lack 

of precision, in turn, would lead to less accuracy; make dispersed 

operations more difficult to perform; and decrease the survivability 
228

of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team. Influenced by these reasons, 

the Field Artillery School, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Army G-8 (Programming and Materiel Integration) 

developed the requirement in 2007 to digitize the M119A2 along the 

lines of the M777A1. Later on 24 January 2008, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, and Major General Peter M. 

Vangjel, the commanding general of the US Army Fires Center of 

Excellence and Fort Sill from 2007 to 2009, approved digitizing the 

M119A2 to give it the same self-locating, self-orienting, and digital 

communications capabilities as the M777A1 and M109A6 (Paladin) self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. The Army designated 

the digitized M119A2 as the M119A3.70

Fielding the M119A3 began in 2013 when the 3d Battalion, 

319th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the 

1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 1st Battalion, 78th Field Artillery Regiment, 428th 

Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, received their howitzers as part of 

a six-year fielding plan. With this action, all the Army’s towed artillery had digital capabilities for the first time.71

Weapons platform modernization also included the M109A6 

(Paladin) self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. In the fall of 2007, 

the US Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understanding establishing a public-private partnership to develop and sustain 

the Army’s M109 Family of Vehicles—the M109A6, the M992A2 

Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle, and the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle—through the Paladin Integrated Management. 

Then in May 2008, they signed a contract to design and develop the 

Paladin Integrated Management M109 system of vehicles.72

The Army intended for Paladin Integrated Management to improve readiness, avoid component obsolescence, and increase sustainability of the M109 platforms to mitigate size, weight, and power gaps required to support Heavy Brigade Combat Teams through 

2037. Operationally, upgrades would make the howitzer faster, 

more maneuverable, more sustainable, and more lethal as well as 

reduce the logistics footprint and operational and support costs. To 

achieve these objectives, Paladin Integrated Management would 

leverage commonality with Future Combat System’s Non-Line of 
229

Sight Cannon and the Heavy Brigade Combat Team’s Bradley fighting vehicle. For example, Paladin Integrated Management would 

use the Bradley’s engine, transmission, and track/suspension system and incorporate select technologies from the Non-Line-of-Sight 

Cannon—including but not limited to the automated projectile rammer and modern electric-gun drive system to replace the current hydraulic elevation and azimuth drives that were designed in the early 

1960s. Once delivered to the field, the Paladin Integrated Management M109 family of vehicles would give the Heavy Brigade Combat Team upgraded capabilities, including more maneuverability, a 

higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and improved delivery of accurate and timely fires. Then when Secretary of Defense 

Robert M. Gates cancelled the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon in April 

2009, the Paladin Integrated Management became the Army’s number one modernization effort.73

Meanwhile, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

stripped the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle from Paladin Integrated Management and tied it to a command and control vehicle 

to replace the M113, the M577, and the M1068 vehicles. In August 

2009, the Army awarded a contract to BAE to produce seven Paladin Integrated Management vehicles – five self-propelled howitzers 

and two carrier ammunition tracked vehicles. Five months later on 

Figure 13: M109 Paladin Integrated Management howitzer. 

Source: US Army photo by Sergeant Sean Harriman.
230

20 January 2010, the company unveiled its first M109 Paladin Integrated Management prototype howitzer.74

Over the next several years, the Army ran the Paladin Integrated Management howitzer through various tests to determine its suitability, reliability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability, among 

other things. After successful 2010 and 2011 tests, the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems announced that the howitzer 

had passed a major hurdle when the Defense Acquisition Executive 

approved production on 18 October 2013. The howitzer moved into 

low-rate initial production in 2014, with full-rate production scheduled for 2017 and the first unit equipped in 2017. While its cannon 

remained the same as the M109A6, the Paladin Integrated Management howitzer—designated the M109A7 in 2015—had a new chassis, engine, transmission, suspension system, and steering system.75

Modernizing the M270 and M142 launchers paralleled cannon 

developments. After fielding the M270A1 in 2002, the Army upgraded it. During 2005, the Army introduced the Improved Weapon Interface Unit, which was required for firing the Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket System munition—both the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition and Unitary.76 In 2005, the Army also completed 

other significant modification projects, including the Environmental 

Control Unit and Auxiliary Power Unit. The launcher cab’s existing ventilation system did not meet Manpower Personnel Integration 

requirements for a crew during firing and silent watch operations in 

all weather. Additionally, multiple radios and electronic equipment 

in the cab generated heat. To address these issues, the Army installed 

the Environment Control Unit to control adverse climate conditions 

and permit the maximum use of radios and computer systems as well 

as the Auxiliary Power Unit to reduce maintenance time and costs, 

provide electricity, and permit the launcher to remain powered while 

in the hide area with the main engine shut off.77

Meanwhile, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated 

that the threat had changed, requiring greater protection for the 

M270 crew. As explained in the January–February 2016 Fires Bulletin, the Improved Armored Cab would support current and future 

operations and provide greater protection against mines, improvised 

explosive devices, enemy artillery fragmentation and direct attack 
231

from small arms. Based on 2015 testing, the Army concluded that 

the Improved Armored Cab would furnish crew protection on par 

with the High Mobility Army Rocket System cab.78

With the increasing need for better communications over long 

distances, the Army also initiated development of a long-range communication system for the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the 

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. As of 2006, digital messages 

to the launchers were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery 

Tactical Data System via a Single Channel Ground and Airborne 

Radio System. This message flow was sequential from command 

and control node to command and control node. Line-of-sight radio 

communications limited the distance between each command and 

control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of 

time-sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased 

the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. The 

long-distance communication system as employed by 2015 integrated high-frequency radios and satellites to permit units to receive and 

send secure voice and digital fire missions over extended distances, 

reduced the physical and electronic footprint by expanding reach, 

and provided tactical flexibility when positioning launchers.79

Referred to as the “Big Three Modifications,” the Modular 

Launcher Communications System, Driver’s Vision Enhancement, 

and Blue Force Tracker gave soldiers three hardware upgrades that 

enhanced battlefield operation of the M270 mission. The Driver’s 

Vision Enhancement allowed drivers to conduct day and night operations and maneuver in smoke, fog, dust, or other battlefield obscurants, while the Blue Force Tracker delivered greater situational awareness through a small screen that showed the locations of 

friendly units as well as other battlefield intelligence.80

Concurrently, the Army pushed a fire control system upgrade. 

In addition to upgrading the obsolete fire control system, the upgrade 

provided fire control system software and hardware commonality 

between the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher 

and M270A1 launcher by taking advantage of the latest technology 

and better processors to enhance mission processing and make the 

fire control system more user-friendly. These modernization pro-
232

grams made the M270A1 more modern, survivable, and sustainable 

for the 21st Century battlefield.81

As it updated the M270A1, the Army fielded the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher beginning in 2005.82

Just as fielding began, the Army approved a 20 October 2005 urgent 

need statement by the 3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment at 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and XVIII Airborne Corps identifying 

the need for increased crew protection to counter the threat of small 

arms fire, field artillery fragments, and land mines in the Global 

War on Terrorism. Even with armor, the cab still had to meet C-130 

transportability requirements while achieving Standardization 

Agreement (STANAG) level II armor requirements. Developed in 

2005–2006 to meet the urgent need statement, the near-term armor 

solution used the Low Signature Armored Cab developed for use 

with the family of medium tactical vehicles. The Army designated 

the modified M142 as the Low-Signature Armored Cab-High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. The system’s appliqué armor consisted of 43 pieces of armor that could be installed on the cab in 

less than two hours and removed in less than one hour.83 Then late 

in 2006, the Army initiated work on the Increased Crew Protection 

to provide even greater crew protection. After test results indicated 

that the cab met the critical operational criteria, the Army awarded 

BAE Systems the contract for 64 Increased Crew Protection cab 

up-armor kits in 2009. Retrofitting all M142 launchers with cab 

was completed in 2012.84

As the Army developed the crew protection cab up-armor 

kit, it introduced hot panel capability for the M142. This allowed 

the launcher software to receive positional updates while in flight 

aboard a C-130 or C-17 aircraft—giving the M142 a true roll off 

and fire capability and allowing for greater flexibility to project 

force on the battlefield.85

For the past 20 years, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical 

Data System Increment I tied together the Field Artillery’s system 

of systems—weapons, sensors, and support systems—and served 

as the Field Artillery’s primary mission command system. It processed, analyzed, and exchanged combat information and furnished 

fully automated support for planning, coordinating, controlling, and 
233

executing fires and effects. Increment I supported mortars; field artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles; close air support; attack aviation; and naval surface fire support systems and was integrated with 

80 different battlefield systems from the US Army, Marine Corps, 

Navy, and Air Force as well as German, French, Turkish, and Italian 

fire support command and control systems.86

In June 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Increment II to replace Increment I. Increment II was designated as a 

software modification effort Version 7.0 and was slated for initial 

fielding in 2019. Then the fires command and control migration 

strategy would move all field artillery command and control systems 

under the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System around 

Figure 14: M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System. 

Source: US Army photo by John Hamilton.
234

2019–2025. These systems included the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device that forward observers and fire support teams used to 

compose, edit, transmit, receive, store, and display messages; process data; and monitor status as well as conduct, plan, and execute 

fire support missions. Other systems were the Lightweight Tactical 

Fire Direction System (Centaur), a backup system to the Advanced 

Field Artillery Tactical Data System; the Forward Observer System; 

and the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System that 

was also a command and control system tool.87

The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, the Pocketsized Forward Entry Device, Centaur, other digitized command and 

control systems, and digital-capable firing platforms were significant developments for the Field Artillery. They pushed the branch 

further into the age of precision munitions and digitization to complement conventional unguided munitions. 

Force Structure and Doctrine

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Army significantly 

overhauled its force structure. As previously discussed, it introduced 

the modular brigade combat team as its basic fighting organization 

to replace the division; placed a fires battalion within the Brigade 

Combat Team; furnished fires brigades to support brigade combat 

teams, divisions, corps, or joint task forces; and created functional 

brigades. The Army also wrote new doctrine. 

The formation of the Brigade Combat Team with its organic field artillery battalion and the elimination of division artillery 

abolished senior field artillery command headquarters at the division and corps. This action left the force with an inadequate number 

of force field artillery headquarters to support divisions and corps 

and to integrate fires and training and readiness oversight. Specifically, seven active component fires brigades supported 14 divisions 

and corps headquarters as well as the Eighth US Army in Korea. 

Under the modular concept, the Brigade Combat Team would provide training, readiness, and administrative oversight to its organic 

fires battalion, while the fires brigades would function as a force 

field artillery headquarters for divisions, corps, or joint task forces. 

However, the Field Artillery School and field artillery officers and 
235

Soldiers knew that the Brigade Combat Team would not provide 

such oversight and thus challenged the Brigade Combat Team concept. When the school opposed the concept, the Chief of Staff of the 

Army acknowledged at a Pentagon meeting that some things would 

be broken, but he basically dismissed the concerns—adding that it 

was important to move forward. Operational experience reinforced 

the school’s and field artillery officers’ and Soldiers’ fears about the 

Brigade Combat Team’s ability to furnish training, readiness, and 

administrative oversight.88

As the Army projected returning to combined arms operations 

and executing regionally aligned force missions, the modular design 

created several capability gaps. The echelon above brigade mission 

command field artillery force structure and organizational design 

did not sufficiently meet the combatant commander requirements 

as part of the joint force. It lacked the ability to integrate and synchronize fires effectively at the division and the corps in support of 

unified land operations. The organization also failed to provide fires 

battalion training and readiness oversight in the Brigade Combat 

Teams and could not provide consistent fire support certifications 

and leader development. This led to skill atrophy and neglected or 

misused fire support Soldiers. Major General James M. McDonald, 

who was the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence 

from 2012 to 2014, submitted a force design update to the Army in 

December 2012 to re-establish field artillery command headquarters 

in echelons above brigade at division and corps levels.89

The proposal established a division artillery without organic 

firing units for each active component division. The division artillery would be assigned to each active component division; would 

be stationed with the division; and would coordinate, integrate, and 

synchronize fires to achieve the division commander’s objectives. 

Meanwhile, the division artillery commander would serve as the 

fire support coordinator for the division. Moreover, division artillery 

could be tailored with a variety of fires battalions (rocket and cannon), unmanned aerial systems, and counter-rocket artillery; integrate 

and deliver fires; and furnish mission command to train and certify 

the Brigade Combat Team fires battalion and fires cell.90

Also, the proposal provided a field artillery brigade to be as-
236

signed to each active component corps as well as one to the US 

Eighth Army in Korea. The brigade would coordinate, integrate, 

and synchronize fires; provide long-range precision fires to the 

corps; and give the corps/US Eighth Army commander a headquarters that could plan, prepare, execute, and assess fires in support of 

operations. Additionally, it would provide counterstrike capability 

throughout the corps area of operations; and the field artillery brigade commander would serve as the fire support coordinator for the 

corps. In addition, the corps field artillery brigade would train and 

certify its subordinate field artillery battalions and allocate them to 

the division as required to provide reinforcing fires.91

In October 2013, the Army approved the echelon above brigade 

force design update. It created 10 division artilleries that would be 

assigned to the 10 active component divisions and retained four active component fires brigades that would be assigned to each corps 

and the Eighth Army. Later, the Army authorized redesignating fires 

battalions in the Brigade Combat Team and echelons above Brigade 

Combat Teams as field artillery battalions. To standardize naming 

convention within field artillery units, Major General McDonald 

also changed the fires brigade to the field artillery brigade.92

The Fires Center of Excellence force design update also modified the existing field artillery brigade in the Army National Guard 

with the same organizational design as the active component. The 

Army National Guard field artillery brigades would provide flexibility to the Total Army and perform the same functions as the active 

component field artillery brigades. However, they would be aligned 

with Army National Guard divisions for training affiliation, be capable of serving as a division artillery to support Army National Guard 

divisions during deployment, or provide reinforcing and counterfire capability to active component corps and joint task forces. The 

brigade’s primary function included coordination, integration, synchronization, employment of fires, and long-range precision fires to 

the corps. The number and mix of field artillery battalions assigned 

to the brigade would vary depending on mission and number as well 

as type of divisions assigned to the corps.93

In 2014, the Army started standing up division artillery; the last 

one stood up in 2016. Late in 2014, the Army converted the 212th 
237

Field Artillery Brigade to the 1st Armored Division Artillery and 

the 42d Field Artillery Brigade to the 3d Infantry Division Artillery. 

It also activated the 82d Airborne Division Artillery, 101st Air Assault Division Artillery, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, 2d Infantry Division Artillery, and 3d Infantry Division Artillery. US Army 

Forces Command noted that the Army’s decision to implement field 

artillery brigades and division artilleries would provide the Field 

Artillery with the capabilities to plan, synchronize, and coordinate 

strategic, operational, and tactical fires in support of the unified 

land commander and provide mission command for the training and 

readiness of attached field artillery units. This action would effectively reverse 12 years of continuing atrophy of field artillery skills 

as well as erosion of leader and professional development within the 

fires warfighting function—from basic section/platoon level skills 

to the ability to mass and synchronize fires in support of the maneuver commander. The division artillery commander of the 3d Infantry 

Division, Colonel John O’Grady, pointed out that the return of division artillery reflected the Army’s commitment to strengthen core 

skills that had been eroded by modularity and combat operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan.94

Many senior officers expressed apprehension that standing up 

division artilleries was a return to the old division artillery with its 

organic firing units that had existed through 2004 when modularization changed fire support organization. Brigadier General William 

A. Turner, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School 

and Chief of Field Artillery from 2014 to 2016, reassured maneuver Brigade Combat Team commanders about the positive aspects 

of the new division design. They would not lose their organic field 

artillery battalions to division artillery. Rather, the new division artillery would modernize the Field Artillery by adopting emerging 

technologies and empower the Brigade Combat Team’s field artillery battalion by moving fire support personnel from the maneuver battalion to the field artillery battalion. Division artillery would 

also plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations to 

provide close support and precision strike for the division; consist 

of a headquarters and headquarters battery, a signal platoon, and a 

target acquisition platoon; provide command oversight for training 
238

management and certification of Brigade Combat Team field artillery battalions and fire support cells; and provide an effective field 

artillery force structure for full-spectrum operations.95

Writing new doctrine paralleled the development of the division artillery. On 23 August 2011, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Commanding General, General Robert W. Cone, 

issued Doctrine 2015 guidance. Once completed, Doctrine 2015 

would give the Army well-defined enduring principles, tactics, and 

standard procedures. The transition to Doctrine 2015 required all 

doctrine publications to be reviewed and separated into new categories. General Cone noted that even though resources would be 

constrained, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command had to 

produce quality doctrine by its best and brightest. He concluded:

In summary, we need to make the development and implementation of Doctrine 2015 a priority. We must seize the 

initiative we now enjoy as we reflect on this decade of war 

our Army has fought. We have too many hard-earned lessons, and we must capitalize on the talent we have across 

our force to ensure. . .our Army. . .can win upon arrival 

[in theater].96

In his guidance, General Cone established key priorities. First, 

he wanted Army doctrine publications and Army doctrine reference 

publications to be completed by August 2012. Second, he directed 

field manuals to be finished by December 2013. Third, he wanted 

technique publications to be written by December 2015. To accomplish these goals, he authorized service schools, such as the Field 

Artillery School, to increase their manning levels commensurate 

with the workload and fill writing positions with the best qualified 

personnel who would be competitive for battalion command and 

beyond and had recent operational experience, subject matter expertise, and a fundamental understanding of Army concepts.97

Besides increasing the number of people required to author the 

publications, the Field Artillery School started writing its doctrinal 

publications and Army doctrine reference publications, field manuals, and Army technique publications in 2011. On 6 January 2012, 

the School submitted the initial draft of Army Doctrine Publication 
239

3-09 and the initial draft of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 

3-09 to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

and initiated work on Field Manual 3-09, Field Artillery Operations, which focused on fire support tactics and procedures.98

Several months later in August 2012, the Army published and 

distributed Army Doctrine Publication 3-09 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, both written by a team from Forces Command, the Air Defense Artillery, and the Field Artillery. An Army 

Doctrine Publication contained fundamental principles that guided 

military forces’ actions and expressed them so that Army forces 

could seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army Doctrine Publication 3-09 incorporated air and missile defense as well as electronic attack in the Army fires warfighting function; included fires from 

other services; and provided fires doctrine that would enable the development of interoperable, networked, and integrated systems that 

could execute multiple missions. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, meanwhile, served as a doctrinal manual for commanders, 

leaders, and staffs of the fires warfighting function and furnished 

a comprehensive explanation of all doctrinal principles in support 

of offensive and defensive tasks. In 2014, the Army revised Army 

Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09 to include the new division artillery and field artillery brigade concepts to anchor them firmly in 

doctrine then continued to make revisions in 2015.99 As of the end 

of 2015, Army Doctrine Publication 3-09 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09 manuals were current after revisions.100

Meanwhile in February 2016, the School completed a draft of 

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09.90, Division Artillery 

Operations and Fire Support for the Division. The manual explained 

division artillery’s three primary tasks for the division’s fires warfighting function as delivering fires; integrating all forms of Army, 

joint, and multinational fires; and conducting targeting.101

Concurrently, the Field Artillery School distributed drafts of 

Field Manual 3-09, Field Artillery Operations. With an intended 

audience of maneuver commanders and their staffs, this revised 

version of the 2011 Field Manual 3-09 covered field artillery operations, fire support, fire support and the operations process, and 

fire support coordination as well as other control measures in four 
240

chapters. Published in April 2014, Field Manual 3-09 gave the 

maneuver arms a single field manual on how the Field Artillery 

supported the maneuver missions during unified land operations. 

Later, the School updated the April 2014 Field Manual 3-09 based 

on a 1 May 2014 Field Artillery Brigade/Division Artillery white 

paper, which explained the role of the fire support coordinator and 

division artillery.102

Over a period of 25 years, modernization represented by writing new doctrine, restoring division artillery, adopting nonlethal fires 

and effects to complement lethal fires and effects, digitizing firing 

platforms, introducing precision munitions, and fielding the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System transformed the Field 

Artillery. Early in the 1990s, the Field Artillery relied on massed fires 

and a minimal amount of digitization. The modernized Field Artillery of 2015 relied on sophisticated computers to provide responsive 

lethal and nonlethal fires and effects and precision munitions. 
241

NOTES

1. Briefing, “The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar,” undated, Historical Research and Document Collection 

(HRDC); Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 

Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar,” undated, HRDC; Chief Warrant 

Officer 4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, interview by author, 8 March 2013, 

HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” undated, 

HRDC. 

2. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 

interview by author, 13 April 2012, HRDC; PM Radars Information Paper, “Q-37,” undated, HRDC; US Army Information Paper, “Enhanced 

Q-36,” undated, HRDC; Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” 2011, 

HRDC; “First US Army EQ-36 Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News, 

9 September 2010; Briefing, “The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire 

Target Acquisition Radar,” undated; DOT&E Information Paper, Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2010, HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” FY 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, “Army Technology,” 7 March 

2012, HRDC; Information Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires 

Brigade,” 29 November 2011, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), 

October 2011, 26, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 19 

May 2011, HRDC; Colonel David J. Brost, Director, TCM Fires Brigade, 

interview by author, 6 March 2013, HRDC; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/

TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, March 2013, HRDC; Memorandum for Record 

with Attachment, “Annual History,” 10 April 2013, HRDC; Jeff Froysland and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine 

Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, March–

April 2013, 40–43; Briefing, “Fire Modernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April 

2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 

March 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, 2013, HRDC. 

3. Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 April 2012; FCoE CSM 

Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC; DOT&E Information 

Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” FY 2011; Information Paper, US Army, 

undated, HRDC; Information Paper, “Army Technology,” 7 March 2012; 

Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 19 May 2011; Colonel David J. 

Brost, Director, TCM Fires Brigade, interview by author, 6 March 2013, 

HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 March 2013; “Update on AN/

TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–43; 

“Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 March 2013, 

3; Briefing, “Fire Modernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April 2013; Email 

with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; 

Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,” Army News, 17 October 2012; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “TPQ-53 Radar System,” 

10 December 2014, HRDC; DOT&E Report (Extract), FY 2014, 137–38, 
242

HRDC; DOT&E Report (Extract), FY 2011, 77–78, HRDC. 

4. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 

interview by author, 13 April 2012, HRDC; PM Radars Information Paper, “Q-37,” undated, HRDC; US Army Information Paper, “Enhanced 

Q-36,” undated, HRDC; Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” 2011, 

HRDC; “First US Army EQ-36 Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News, 

9 September 2010, HRDC; Briefing, “The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar,” undated, HRDC; DOT&E Information 

Paper, FY 2010, HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” FY 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, “Army Technology,” 7 March 

2012; Information Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade;” 

FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 19 May 2011; Colonel David J. Brost, Director, TCM Fires Brigade, interview by author, 6 March 2013, HRDC; 

“Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 March 2013; 

Memorandum for Record with Attachment, “Annual History,” 10 April 

2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–43; Briefing, “Fire Modernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin 

Information Paper, 2013; 2015 USAFAS AH, 104; “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, January–February 2016, 15–20, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM FAB-D History 

Document,” 9 March 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Q-53 Counterfire Target 

Acquisition Radar System,” Fiscal Year 2015, HRDC.

5. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 

interview by author, 13 April 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, ThalesRaytheonSystems, 2010, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 

19 May 2011; Information Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires 

Brigade;” Briefing, “Firefinder Radar AN/TPQ-37(V)8,” 2013, HRDC; 

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, interview by author, 8 

March 2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine 

Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–43; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014, HRDC. 

6. Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, HRDC; Scott R. Gourley, 

“Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army, April 2002; Lieutenant Junior Grade (US Navy) Jason Calandruccio, , “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Defense Contract Management Agency News, Winter 2002, 

HRDC; Briefing, “LCMR,” 21 October 2011, HRDC. AN/TPQ-48 was 

the initial designation of the LCMR as noted in Scott R. Gourley, “Soldier 

Armed,” Army, February 2011, 63–66.

7. Email with Attachment, “Updated Sensor History,” 15 March 

2011, HRDC; Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” 63–66; Briefing, “LCMR,” 21 

October 2011; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, HRDC; Colonel David J. Brost, Director, TCM Fires Brigade, inter-
243

view by author, 6 March 2013, HRDC; Prochniak, interview by author, 8 

March 2013.

8. Email with Attachment, “Updated Sensor History,” 15 March 

2011, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC; 

Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 April 2012; Briefing, “LCMR,” 21 

October 2011; PM Radars Information Paper, “LCMR,” undated, HRDC; 

Information Paper, “US Army Equipment,” undated, HRDC; Information 

Paper, “PM Radars,” 16 January 2013, HRDC; Presolicitation Synopsis 

for LCMR, 15 May 2012, HRDC; DAC for ARNG SITREP, April 2012, 

HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 19 May 2011; Information Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade;” Interview, 

Dastrup with Brost, 6 March 2013; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training 

and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–-43; 

“Update on AN/TPQ 53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 March 2013, 

3; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014, 

HRDC; Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,” Army News, 

17 October 2012; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “TPQ-53 Radar 

System,” 10 December 2014, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DPTMLPF,” 

December 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM FAB-D History 

Document,” 9 March 2016, HRDC.

9. Daryl Youngman, “Fires Radar Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, March–

April 2013, 45–47; Briefing, “Field Artillery Modernization,” 1 May 

2013, HRDC.

10. 2000 US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) 

Annual Command History (ACH), 138–39; 2004 US Army Field Artillery 

Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 96. 

Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC.

11. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 140–43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 86–

87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 106–07; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 94; Scott 

R. Gourley, “M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle,” Army, July 2002, 

51–52; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 106–07; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 107; 

2004 USAFACFS ACH, 94–95; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, October 2002, 343–50.

12. 2009 USAFAS AH, 131–32; Email, “BFIST, Knight, etc., Input 

to 2010 Annual History,” 9 March 2011, HRDC; Interview with Attachment, Dastrup with Brown, 17 February 2011; FCOE CSM Newsletter 

(Extract), Fires 7, October 2010, 10, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), March 2011, 30; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 

27; BAE Information Paper, 13 August 2012, HRDC; Colonel Scott Patton, Director, TCM Fires Cell, and Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, interview by author, 7 February 2013, HRDC; PEO Ground Combat Systems 

Information Paper, “Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” undated, HRDC. 

13. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 144. 

14. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 108; 

2002 USAFACFS ACH, 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 108; 2004 USA-
244

FACFS ACH, 96. 

15. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 90; 2008 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, 128.

16. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 128; “Ground Combat Systems,” 

Army, October 2011, 338–40; Information Paper, “M1200 Armored 

Knight,” 11 March 2013, HRDC; Information Paper, “Armored Knight,” 

undated, HRDC. 

17. Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, January–February 2014, 9–12. Brigadier General 

Christopher F. Bentley, “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, 

February 2014, 1; Captain Brock Lennon, “The Five Requirements for 

Accurate Fires in the 21st Century,” Redleg Update, February 2014, 3–4; 

Captain Brock Lennon, “Fire Requirements of Accurate Fire for the 21st 

Century,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2014, 51, 58; Michael D. Grice, On 

Gunnery: The Art and Science of Field Artillery from the American Civil 

War to the Dawn of the 21st Century (Charleston, SC: Booksurge Publishing, 2009), 105–12; Briefing, “The Five Requirements for Accurate Fire,” 

26 April 2016, HRDC. 

18. Lennon, “The Five Requirements for Accurate Fires,” 51, 58; 

Briefing, “The Field Artillery: 2025 and Beyond,” 6 May 2014, HRDC. 

19. “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Fires 

Bulletin, November–December 2014, HRDC.

20. “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Fires 

Bulletin. Also see Briefing, “The Field Artillery 2025 and Beyond,” 6 May 

2014. 

21. Interview with Attachments, Boyd L. Dastrup with Colonel 

Craig M. Newman, Doug Brown, and Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 March 

2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Documents,” 7 February 2013, 

HRDC; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, December 

2012; Major Alex Mora and Scott McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the 

Next Forward Observer Generation: Precision Fires Warrior,” Fires Bulletin, November–December 2013, 40–41; Bentley, “State of the Field Artillery,” 9–12. 

22. Interview with Attachments, Boyd L. Dastrup with Doug Brown, 

Deputy Director, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 February 2011, HRDC; Email, 

“BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History,” 9 March 2011, 

HRDC; Information Paper, “LLDR AN/PED-1,” 2012, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Documents,” 7 February 2013; PEO Soldier Information Paper, “LLDR,” 12 December 2012, HRDC; Brigadier General Brian 

J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, 

March–April 2013, 6–9; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cell 2014 

History,” 24 March 2014, HRDC; Bentley, “State of the Field Artillery,” 

9–12; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” 40–41. 

23. Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells History,” 9 April 
245

2015, HRDC. 

24. Email with Attachment, “Documents,” 7 February 13; McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” 6–9; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cell 2014 History,” 24 March 2014; McKiernan, “Field 

Artillery Modernization Strategy,” 6–9; Email with Attachment, “TCM 

Fires Cells History,” 9 April 2015; Capabilities Development Document 

for Joint Effects Targeting System (Extract), Executive Summary, 17 January 2013, HRDC; 2008 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill 

(USAFCOEFS) ACH, 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, October 2010, 26; Email with Attachment, “TPSO Sensor History for 2010,” 

22 February 2010, HRDC.

25. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 91; 2008 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, 129; Email with Attachment, 

“TPSO History for 2010,” 22 February 2010, HRDC; “Ground Combat 

System,” Army, October 2011, 338; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, 

October 2009, 355; Raytheon Information Paper, “FS3,” 2011, HRDC. 

26. Information Paper, “The Maneuver Commander’s most versatile 

and lethal weapon system, The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” 

undated, HRDC; Colonel John T. Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” 

Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 18–22. 

27. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Thomas Taccia, JACI, interview by author, 23 February 2011, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Precision Fires 

Course Input to 2010 Annual History,” 4 March 2011, HRDC. 

28. Briefing, “Precision Fires Program Brief,” 2010, HRDC; Information Paper, “Precision Fires Program,” October 2010, HRDC; Smith, 

“Training for Joint Operations,” 18–22; Chief Warrant Officer 4 Thomas 

Taccia, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” Infantry Bulletin, 

June–August 2011, 9–11. 

29. Information Paper, “Precision Fires Course,” 2010, HRDC; Briefing, “Precision Fires Program Brief,” 2010, HRDC; Information Paper, 

“Precision Fires Program,” October 2010, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with 

Taccia, 23 February 2011; Email, “Courses,” 10 February 2012, HRDC; 

Taccia, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” 9–11; Briefing 

(Extract), “Precision Fires Program Brief,” 2 July 2012, HRDC; Brigadier 

General Thomas S. Vandal, “Growing a New Field Artillery: Agile, Smart, 

Deadly,” Fires Bulletin, September–October 2011, 4–5; Information Paper, “TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions,” 

undated, HRDC. 

30. Email, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013, HRDC; Personal account: 

Chief Warrant Officer 5 Robert Tisdale, Precision Fires Division, FCoE, 

February 2013, in Email with Attachment, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013, 

HRDC; Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” 18–22; Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification and Program Accreditation,” 10 January 2013, HRDC.

31. Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” 
246

Redleg Update, December 2013, 1, 3–5; Bentley, “State of the Field Artillery,” 9–12. 

32. Personal Account, Tisdale, February 2013; Smith, “Training for 

Joint Operations,” 18–22; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification.”

33. Email with Attachment, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013; “TMO: 

Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions,” Redleg Update, December 2012.

34. Email with Attachment, “JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History,” 13 February 2014, HRDC. 

35. 2004 US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) 

Annual Command History (ACH), 45. 

36. Colonel Frank J. Siltman and Lieutenant Colonel John Frisbie, 

“Fire Support just got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency,” Fires Bulletin, July–September 2008, 6–8. 

37. Email with Attachment, “History TIOC,” 12 February 2007, 

HRDC; Email, “History TIOC,” 13 February 2007, HRDC; 2005 US Army 

Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 40; Briefing, “Tactical Information Operations Course After 

Action Review,” 6 November 2006, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Tactical Information Operations Course,” 22 January 2007, HRDC; Army Training Requirements and Resources System, 22 January 2007, HRDC; Major General David C. Ralston, “The FA and COIN: Continuity and Adaptation,” 

Field Artillery, July–August 2006, 1–3; Email with Attachment, “History 

TIOC,” 12 February 2007; Briefing, “Tactical Information Operations 

Course After Action Review,” 6 November 2006; Email with Attachment, 

“History TIOC,” 12 February 2007; Email, “Tactical Information Operations Course,” 27 February 2007; Email with Attachment, “428 FAB Input 

to 2013 USAFAS Annual History,” 22 February 2014, HRDC; Information Paper, “FACCC,” 23 January 2014, HRDC; Siltman and Frisbie, “Fire 

Support Just Got Harder,” 6–8; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 27; Colonel 

Kevin M. Batule and Colonel (Retired) Theodore J. Janosko, “Training the 

Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2008, 26–28.

38. Batule and Janosko, “Training the Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD,” 26–28; Theodore J. Janosko, FSCOORD Course Director, interview by author, 9 January 2009, HRDC; Memorandum, “FSCOORD 

Course Information Paper,” 20 November 2008, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Janosko, 9 January 2009; Email with Attachment, “FSCOORD 

Course,” 10 February 2009, HRDC; News Release, US Army Field Artillery School, 27 September 2011, HRDC; Redleg Update, 1–12 October 

2011, 3; Email with Attachment, “JACI and Joint Training,” 26 February 

2007, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “JOFEC,” 17 January 2007, HRDC; Email with 

Attachment, “History Brief,” 26 January 2007, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “JACI’s Portion of the 2006 Annual Command History, 12 April 

2007, HRDC; Siltman and Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder,” 6–8; 
247

Email with Attachment, “JACI and Joint Training,” 26 February 2007, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “JOFEC,” 17 January 2007, HRDC. In 2016 the Field 

Artillery School started teaching the Joint Fires and Effects Course again 

because of the demand for officers and Soldiers to provide lethal and nonlethal effects. 

39. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 43–44; Briefing, “Electronic Attack 

Mission Analysis Brief, 23 February 05, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“JACI’s Portion of the 2006 Annual Command History,” 12 April 2007; 

Alvin W. Peterson Jr., Northrup Gruman, EW Course Developer, interview by author, 23 February 2007, HRDC. 

40. Fact Sheet, “Electronic Warfare Career Field,” 14 January 2010, 

HRDC; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News, 

7 December 2006; Email, “HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order,” 

2006, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel James J. Looney, EW-DOTD, interview 

by author, 14 February 2011, HRDC; “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army News. 

41. Email, “EW MOS for Enlisted Soldiers and EW Functional Area 

for Officers,” 23 February 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Electronic Warfare,” 4 January 2007, HRDC; Alvin W. Peterson Jr., Northrup Gruman, 

EW Course Developer, interview by author, 23 February 2007, HRDC; 

Fact Sheet, “Electronic Warfare Career Field,” 14 January 2010; Email, 

“ HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order,” 2006; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News, 7 December 2006, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Electronic Operational Warfare Course,” 10 March 

2009, HRDC.

42. Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 14 February 2011; CAC 

OPORD 2008-231a Electronic Warfare Roles and Responsibilities, 18 

August 2008, HRDC. 

43. FCoE CSM Newsletter, October 2010, 14, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “DOTD,” 23 March 2010, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Army Operational 

Electronic Warfare Course,” 29 December 2010, HRDC; FIRES Forward, 

January 2010, HRDC; “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army 

News, 6 February 2009, HRDC; “Electronic Warfare a New Career Field,” 

Army News, 27 January 2011, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Electronic 

Warfare Course Input to Annual History,” 19 February 2011, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 19 January 2012; Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, 13; Email, “Electronic Warfare Input to Annual History,” 1 

March 2012, HRDC; Email, “Book Review,” 22 February 2016, HRDC.

44. Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 19 January 2012; Army Doctrine 

Publication 3-0, 13; Email, “Electronic Warfare Input to Annual History.” 

45. Siltman and Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency,” 6–8. 

46. Army Doctrinal Publication 3-09, August 2012, 1. 

47. Army Doctrinal Publication 3-09, 1.

48. Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Back-
248

ground and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 December 2009, 1–2, HRDC. 

49. Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” 3–4. 

50. Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” 3–4.

51. Memorandum, “DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, HRDC; Department of Defense 

News Release, “Cluster Munitions Policy Released,” 9 July 2008, HRDC; 

Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral 

Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 July 2008, HRDC. 

52. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 96; 

Briefing (Extract), “Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets Program Review,” 24 April 2007, HRDC; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7

(Extract), 3d Quarter 2009, 3; Briefing, “MLRS Family of Munitions,” 

January 2009, HRDC.

53. Directorate of Testing and Evaluation FY 2014 Report (Extract), 

109–110, HRDC; Briefing, “Fires Modernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April 

2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “Lockheed Martin Conducts Second Successful Production 

Qualification Flight Test of GMLRS Alternative Warhead,” 3 February 

2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “Lockheed Martin 

GMLRS Alternative Warhead Logs Successful Flight-Test Series, Shifts 

to Next Testing Phase,” 16 April 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “Lockheed Martin Completes Successful Operational Flight 

Tests of GMLRS Alternative Warhead,” 28 July 2014, HRDC; Briefing, 

“Precision Fires Launcher and Munitions System Overview,” undated, 

HRDC; DOT&E FY 2014 Report on Army Programs (Extract), HRDC. 

54. Fact Sheet, “Quick Reaction Unitary ATACMS Missile,” 20 February 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “ATACMS-BAT,” 24 February 2003, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, TSM RAMS, with Attachment, “Coordination of 2002 Annual Command History,” 18 March 

2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “History Update,” 3 June 2004, 

HRDC; Fact Sheet, “ATACMS Quick Reaction Unitary,” 10 February 

2006, HRDC; Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF: Fires for the Distributed 

Battlefield,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 12; Email with Attachment, “ATACMS and BAT Input to 2003 Annual Command History,” 

21 April 2004, HRDC.

55. Leighton Duitsman, Deputy Director, TCM Fires Brigade, interview by author, 10 February 2011, HRDC. 

56. Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager,” 40–44; Charles Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision 

Fires Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2014, 22–23; Information 

Paper, “ATACMS Service Life Extension Program,” 27 January 2010, 

HRDC; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3d Quarter 

2009, 3; Briefing, “MLRS Family of Munitions,” January 2009, HRDC. 
249

57. Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” 22–23. 

58. Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” 22–23; Major David Dykema, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Matt MacKenzie, and Captain 

Justin Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and Launchers,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2014, 55–58; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,” 

HRDC. 

59. Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” 22–23; 

Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and 

Launchers,” 55–58. 

60. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, interview 

by author, 22 February 2012, HRDC; Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 22 February 2012, HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 7 February 2012, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History,” 6 April 

2012, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, 

TCM BCT Fires, interview by author, 11 February 2013, HRDC; Picatinny Arsenal Information Paper, “Recycling Produces Cheaper, Safer, 

Realistic Artillery Rounds, 5 October 2012, HRDC; “TCM BCT Fires Update,” Redleg Update, July 2012; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TCM 

BCT Fires, interview by author, 5 February 2013, HRDC; “Picatinny Recycles Artillery Shells to Create Cheaper, Safer, more Reliable Training 

Rounds,” Army News, 8 January 2013, HRDC; Mark Belcher, TCM BCT 

Fires, interview by author, 25 February 2014, HRDC; Brown, interview, 

7 February 2012.

61. Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 2010, 

HRDC; Memorandum, “Acceleration and Urgent Materiel Release for 

XM 1156 Precision Guidance Kit,” 17 May 2011, HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “PGK,” 2012, HRDC; Audra Calloway, “Fort Bliss Soldiers 

First to Fire Army’s New Near-precision Artillery Rounds,” Army News, 

HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Approval of Capability Development Document in lieu 

of Capabilities Production Document for the Precision Guidance Kit,” 11 

July 2012, HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “PGK,” 2013, HRDC; 

Captain Cal A. Thomas and Sergeant First Class Jonathan S. Delong, “Regaining our Luster: How Fort Sill Institutional Training is Improving to 

meet Requirements for the 21st Century Field Artillery NCO,” Redleg Update, August 2014, 5–9, HRDC; Operational Test and Evaluation Director, 

Reasons Behind Program Delays, 2014 Update (Extract), 25 August 2014, 

HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF Synchronization, 2 July 2014, 

HRDC; Mark W. Belcher and Steven W. Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 18 February 2015, HRDC. 

62. DOT&E Information Paper, “PGK,” 2013; Operational Test and 

Evaluation Director, Reasons Behind Program Delays, 2014 Update (Extract), 25 August 2014, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF Syn-
250

chronization,” 2 July 2014, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Belcher and 

Worth, 18 February 2015; Memorandum for Major General Clark W. LeMasters Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/4, US Army Materiel Command, 

“Full Materiel Release for Fuse, Multi-portion: Precision Guidance Kit, 

M1156 (NA29),” 21 December 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, 

“TCM BCT Fires History,” 10 March 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Precision Guidance Kit,” Fiscal Year 2015, HRDC. 

63. Don DuRant, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 3 March 

2011, HRDC; Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, interview by author, 1 March 

2010, HRDC; TCM Newsletter, September 2009, HRDC; Briefing, “Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions systems,” 28 October 2009, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 2010, HRDC; 

DOT&E Information Paper, “Excalibur XM 982 Precision Engagement 

Projectiles,” undated, HRDC; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 

December 2010, HRDC; Pack and Belcher, interview, 11 February 2013; 

Donald DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager 

Brigade Combat Team Fires: One-Stop Shop for All Things Cannon,” 

Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 35–39; Briefing, “Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview,” 2012, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FSCOORD Seminar,” 29 August 2013, HRDC; Mark Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 

interview by author, 25 February 2014, HRDC; Information Paper, “Picatinny Completes Excalibur 1a-2 Production, Transitions to 1b,” 14 April 

2014, HRDC; TCM Newsletter, September 2009, HRDC; Briefing, “Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions Systems,” 28 October 2009, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 2010, HRDC; 

FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26; Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 22 February 

2012, HRDC; Memorandum for TCM Cannon, Colonel Michael Hartig, 6 

February 2012, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. 

Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, interview by author, 12 February 2013, HRDC; 

Raytheon Information Paper, “Raytheon’s Excalibur Ib Demonstrates Accuracy during Flight Tests,” 24 October 2012, HRDC; Memorandum for 

Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Approval of the Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur Ib Capability Production Document,” 18 December 2012, 

HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Ammunition, “Acquisition Decision Memorandum for Low Rate Initial Production of Increment Ib Excalibur M982E1,” 13 December 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munition Suite 2012,” 26 

February 2013, HRDC; Information Paper, “US Army Awards Raytheon 

$54 million for Excalibur Ib,” 10 September 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Excalibur and Munitions Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History,” 28 February 2014, HRDC; Raytheon Information Paper, “Excalibur 

Ib Enters Full Rate Production and Receives $52 million award,” 31 July 

2014, HRDC; Briefing, “Excalibur Increment 1b Full Rate Production 
251

ASARC Brief,” 25 June 2014, HRDC.

64. Briefing, “LW155,” 1998, HRDC; Scott Gourley, “Bolstering Fire 

Support,” Armed Forces Journal International, December 2001, 46–48; 

Email with Attachment, “LW155,” 7 March 2002, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, DCD, 4 February 

2002, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with John Yager, TSM Cannon, DCD, 1 

February 2002, HRDC; Briefing, “Arctic Task Model Study Results,” undated, HRDC; Interview with Attachment, Dastrup with John Yager, TSM 

Cannon, DCD, 11 February 2003, HRDC; Memorandum, “Independent 

Assessment Report for the Operational Assessment of the LW155 mm 

Howitzer,” 1 November 2002, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, 

Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity, “Evaluation of 

XM777 LW155 EMD Howitzer Accuracy,” undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, 

“XM777 and TAD Significant Activities Report,” 21 May 2002, HRDC; 

Fact Sheet, “Weekly Activities, 25 June–27 June 2002,” HRDC; Briefing, 

“LW155 and TAD,” June 2002, HRDC; Email, “2003 USAFACFS Annual 

Command History, LW155,” 10 May 2004, HRDC. 

65. 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 84; 2004 

USAFACFS ACH, 72; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 64–65; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 67. 

66. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 64; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 64–65; 

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 66; Briefing, “LW 155 Towed Artillery Digitization,” 12 June 2007, HRDC. 

67. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 68–69; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 87–

88; Email with Attachment, “LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History,” 16 

March 2011, HRDC; M777 155-millimeter Ultralightweight Field Howitzer, United Kingdom, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ufh, 30 

January 2014, HRDC; 2009 USAFAS AH, 87; Briefing, “LW 155 Towed 

Artillery Digitization,” 12 June 2007, HRDC. 

68. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 66–67; 

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 69. 

69. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 89–90; 2009 USAFAS AH, 90–91. 

70. 2006 USAFACFS ACH, 67–68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 70; 

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 90; Information Paper, “M119A2,” 27 October 

2010, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Digitized M119A2 Information 

Paper/Airdrop Certification,” 29 February 2012, HRDC; Joseph Lipinski, 

“Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” Army 

AL&T, July–September 2010, 21–24. 

71. Email with Attachment, “Historical M119A2,” 12 February 

2013, HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TCM BCT Fires, interview 

by author, 5 February 2013, HRDC; Email, “Historical M119A2,” 14 February 2013, HRDC; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Provides Quicker Firepower,” Army News, 6 December 2011; “Update on the 

Digitized M119A3 Program,” Redleg Update, March 2013; Colonel (Retired) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability 
252

Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things 

Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 35–39; “Fort Bragg First to 

Receive upgraded M119 Howitzers,” Army News, 6 May 2013, HRDC; 

Captain Dusty Gray, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 27 February 

2014, HRDC. 

72. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 70–71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 91. 

73. Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” 

Army News, 6 September 2011; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 70–71; 2008 

USAFCOEFS ACH, 91-92; 2009 USAFAS AH, 93-94; Interview with 

Attachments, Boyd L. Dastrup with Major Jeffrey R. White, TCM BCTFires, 25 February 2011, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “PIM Input for 

Ft. Sill Historian 2012,” 21 March 2012, HRDC. 

74. Interview with Attachments, Dastrup with White, 25 February 

2011; Email with Attachment, “PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012.” 

75. Email with Attachment, “PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012;” 

Interview with Attachment, Dastrup with White, 13 March 2012; Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer;” PEO Ground 

Combat Systems Information Paper, “Army’s Paladin Integrated Management Program Reaches Successful Milestone C Decision,” 24 October 

2013, HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Modernization Brief,” 26 April 

2013, HRDC; “Paladin Hybridizes for Future Fleet,” Army News, 18 November 2013; Fires Forward, November 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “M109 FOV Historical Record EXUM Compilation,” 6 March 

2014, HRDC; Captain Dusty Gray, TCM BCT Fires, interview by author, 

8 February 2013, HRDC; Briefing (Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 

January 2013, HRDC; “Update on the Paladin Integrated Management 

Program,” Redleg Update, 2–13 February 2013, HRDC; Email, “PIM Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History,” 22 February 2013, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Dr. Dastrup Article,” 9 April 2013, HRDC; Briefing, 

“Field Artillery Modernization Brief,” 26 April 2013, HRDC; Briefing 

(Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 January 2013, HRDC; Fires Forward, November 2013, HRDC; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 

“Paladin Integrated Management,” 16 April 2014, HRDC; BAE Information Paper, “M109A7,” undated, HRDC; Sam Tricoma, “Army Inducts 

Self-propelled Howitzer into Low-rate Initial Production,” Army News, 

19 May 2014. 

76. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 72–73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 75; 

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 77–78. 

77. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 72–73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 75; 

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 77–78. 

78. Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launchers and Munitions,” 8 

March 2013, HRDC; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Launchers,” 10 February 2014, HRDC; Briefing, “PFRMS 

Launcher and Munitions System Overview,” 2012, HRDC; Froysland and 

Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires 
253

Brigade,” 40–44; Briefing, “PRRMS Launcher and Munition System 

Overviews,” 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 

MLRS-Munitions History 2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Major Matt 

Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future,” Redstone 

Rocket, 17 July 2013; Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of 

Precision Fires and Launchers,” 5–8; Project Manager Precision Fires, 

Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket 

and Missile Systems,” March 2015, HRDC; Program Executive Office Information Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems,” undated, 

HRDC; “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” 

Fires Bulletin, January–February 2016, 15–22, Briefing, “Program Executive Office, Precision Fires, Rockets and Missile Systems,” undated, 

HRDC; Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA History Submission,” 21 

March 2017, HRDC.

79. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 78; 2009 USAFAS AH, 104; “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, 

January–February 15–22; Briefing, “Program Executive Office, Precision 

Fires, Rockets and Missile Systems,” undated, HRDC. 

80. “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” 

15–22; Briefing, “Program Executive Office, Precision Fires, Rockets and 

Missile Systems,” undated, HRDC. 

81. Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launchers and Munitions,” 8 

March 2013, HRDC; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Launchers;” Briefing, “PFRMS Launcher and Munitions 

System Overview,” 2012, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training 

and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–44; Briefing, “PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews,” 2012, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 

2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives 

Upgrades for Future;” Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of 

Precision Fires and Launchers,” 5–8; Project Manager Precision Fires, 

Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket 

and Missile Systems,” March 2015, HRDC; Program Executive Office Information Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems,” undated.

82. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 80; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 84; 2007 

USAFCOEFS ACH, 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 106–07; Precision 

Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Launchers.” 

83. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 80–81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 85; 

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, 110–11.

84. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 80–81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 

85; 2007 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 108; 2009 USAFAS AH, 111; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Launchers;” Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances in Precision Fires and 

Launchers,” 5–8; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–44. 
254

85. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 101, 

109; 2009 USAFAS AH, 104, 112; Email, “MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 

2011,” 19 April 2012, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), March 

2011, 28, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 25, 

HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011,” 

19 April 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launchers and 

Munitions,” 8 March 2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training 

and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–44; Briefing, “PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews, 2012, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 

2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives 

Upgrades for Future;” Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Launchers;” Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 

December 2011, HRDC; Briefing, “PFRMS Launcher and Munitions System Overview,” 2012; Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advanced of 

Precision Fires and Launchers,” 5–8; Program Executive Office, Precision 

Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, undated, HRDC. 

86. RDT&E Budget Justification, March 2014, HRDC. 

87. USMC Systems Information Paper, “AFATDS I and II,” undated; “AFATDS Version for US Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 

July 2012, HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Modernization,” 1 May 2013, 

HRDC; McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” 6–9; Briefing, “Fire Support Modernization Brief,” 26 April 2013, HRDC; Brigadier 

General Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” Redleg Update, 12–13 

December 2013, 1–5; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cell 2014 History,” 24 March 2014, HRDC; Army RDT&E Project Justification, February 2012, HRDC; Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification, March 2014, 

HRDC; Raytheon Information Paper, “JADOCS,” 2014; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 113; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 

103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 105; PEO Command, Control, Communications-Tactical Information Paper, “Family of Products,” HRDC; Kathryn Bailey, “Handheld Fires App Lightens the Load for Forward Observers,” Army News, 20 December 2013.

88. Lieutenant Colonel Sean Bateman and Major Steven Hady, “King 

of Battle Once Again: An Organizational Design to Effectively Integrate 

Fires in Support of Tactical, Operational and Strategic Force,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 23–25; Shirley Dismuke, “The 2013 State of 

Fires,” Fires Bulletin, July–August 2013, 14–15; Email with Attachment, 

“Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 March 2014, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Dr. Dastrup History,” 28 March 2014, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014, HRDC; Email, “Review of Manuscript,” 

2 January 2016, HRDC. 

89. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Bateman and 

Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” 23–25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of 
255

Fires,” 14–15; Email with Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 

March 2014; Email with Attachment, “Dr. Dastrup’s History,” 28 March 

2014; James McClary, Concepts Development Division, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, interview by author, 18 March 

2014, HRDC; Email, “Book Review,” 22 February 2016. 

90. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Bateman and 

Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” 23–25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of 

Fires,” 14–15; Email with Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 

March 2014; Email with Attachment, “Dr. Dastrup’s History,” 28 March 

2014. 

91. Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” 23–25; Email 

with Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 March 2014. 

92. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Memorandum for Commanding General, TRADOC, “Renaming all Fires Battalions 

and Fires Brigades,” 3 January 2014, HRDC; Email with Attachments, 

“DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Army Staffing Form, 19 September 2013, 

HRDC; Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 2 April 2014. 

93. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Email with 

Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 March 2014; Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 2 April 2014; “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for 

the BCT and Division,” Redleg Update, April 2014, 3–6. 

94. FORSCOM Implementation Order 9 April 2014, HRDC; “Division Artillery Returns to the Army,” Redleg Update, August 2014, 3–4; 

White Paper, “Field Artillery Brigade and Division Artillery,” 1 May 2014, 

HRDC; “Guns of Glory to return to Fort Campbell,” Fort Campbell Courier, 2 October 2014; “Artillery Forces Restructure at Fort Stewart with 

Return of Division Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, November–December 2014; 

“Col Christopher S. Moretti Assumes Command of 82d Airborne Division Artillery,” Fayetteville Observer, 16 October 2014; Corey Dickstein, 

“Marne Thunder DIVARTY Returns to 3ID,” Redleg Update, November 

2014, 3. 

95. USAFAS Information Paper, “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier 

for the BCT and Division,” 30 April 2014, HRDC; Colonel William A. 

Turner, “The Field Artillery Reorganization to Conduct Operational, Joint, 

and Multination Fires,” Fires Bulletin, July–August 2014, 6–7; Email with 

Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 13 March 2014, HRDC. 

96. Memorandum, “Doctrine 2015 Guidance,” 23 August 2011, 

HRDC; Email, “Army Doctrine 2015,” 7 March 2012, HRDC. 

97. Memorandum, “Doctrine 2015 Guidance,” 23 August 2011; Bo 

Bielinski, FA Supervisor, Doc Div, DOTD, interview by author, 15 February 2012, HRDC; Email, “Army Doctrine 2015,” 7 March 2012. 

98. Bielinski, interview by author, 15 February 2012; Briefing, “Field 

Artillery Doctrine Update,” 20 January 2012, HRDC; Email, “Army Doctrine 2015,” 7 March 2012. 

99. “DIVARTY Update,” Redleg Update, October 2014, 4; Briga-
256

dier General William Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Redleg 

Update, December 2014, 1–3, HRDC; “Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Update, August 2012, 2; Briefing, “Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing,” undated, HRDC; Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field 

Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2012, 14–16; “Revised FM 3-09 is 

in the Works,” Redleg Update, 2–13 February 2013, HRDC; Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09 (Extract), Fires, August 2012, 

Preface, HRDC; Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-09 (Extract), Fires, 

Introduction, HRDC; “DIVARTY Update,” Redleg Update, October 2014, 

4; Briefing (Extract), “Field Artillery Pre-command Course FSCOORD 

Seminars,” 17 August 2014, HRDC. 

100. “Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Update, August 2012, 2; Briefing, “Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing,” undated, HRDC; Brigadier 

General Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, 

May–June 2012, 14–16; “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works,” Redleg Update, 2–13 February 2013, HRDC; ADRP 3-09 (Extract), Fires, August 

2012, Preface, Introduction; “DIVARTY Update,” Redleg Update, October 

2014, 4; Briefing (Extract), “Field Artillery Pre-command Course FSCOORD Seminars,” 17 August 2014, HRDC; Brigadier General William A. 

Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, January–February 2015; Email, “FM 3-09,” 18 December 2015, HRDC; Email, “ADP 

3-09, ADRP 3-09, and ADRP 3-09.90,” 18 December 2015, HRDC. 

101. Army Technical Publication (ATP) 3-09.90, Division Artillery 

(DIVARTY) Operations and Fire Support for the Division (Draft, Extract) 

20 February 2015, HRDC; “Fires Forward,” March 2015, HRDC; Email, 

“FM 3-09,” 18 December 2015, HRDC; Email, “ADP 3-09, ADRP 3-09, 

and ADRP 3-09.90,” 18 December 2015.

102. “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works” Redleg Update, February 

2013; Sharon McBride, “FM 3-09 Field Artillery Operations and the Fire 

Support is the ‘Go To’ Document for Maneuver and Fires Commanders,” Redleg Update, November 2013, 6; Brigadier General Christopher 

F. Bentley, “2013 Year in Review,” Redleg Update, December 2013, 1–5; 

“DIVARTY Doctrine Update,” 4, HRDC; Bentley, “State of the Field 

Artillery,” 9–12; Command Sergeant Major Daniel Moriarty, “From the 

Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, November 2014, 1–2, 

HRDC; Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” 1–3; Briefing (Extract), 

“Field Artillery Pre-command Course FSCOORD Seminars,” 17 August 

2014, HRDC. 
257

Epilogue 

Into the Future

Looking into the future, the Field Artillery School understood 

in 2015 that it had to develop, evaluate, and institute future concepts, 

doctrine, and capabilities for the Field Artillery to keep it abreast of 

foreign field artilleries. To do this, the school would have to take 

advantage of emerging technologies. 

In 2015, the US Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, 

Oklahoma, completed “Azimuth 2015: A Strategy for the Future of 

Fires.” The strategy established a path to achieve mid- to long-range 

objectives through three major lines of effort. Line of effort one involved modernizing the Fires (Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery) force by developing Fires concepts and introducing new weapon 

systems and equipment. Line of effort two encompassed producing 

highly trained Fires Soldiers and Marines for the operational forces 

by improving education and training; and line of effort three concentrated on upgrading Fort Sill’s training ranges and facilities.1

Modernizing the Fires force addressed developing concepts 

and capabilities required for the current and future Field Artillery 

and embodied working closely with industry, materiel developers, 

research and development communities, and other Army commands 

to introduce new systems and equipment. For the Field Artillery, 

a strategy of one sensor, one shooter, and one mission command 

system ranked high as a priority for the long term. One sensor, one 

shooter, and one mission command system would shrink the Fires 

footprint considerably. Sometime in the future, one artillery platform 

would serve as an air defense artillery weapon system and as a field 

artillery weapon system; one radar would be used for air defense 

artillery and field artillery missions; and one mission control system 

would provide command and control for both artillery branches.2

Continuing to enhance precision fires also fell under Field 

Artillery modernization and was a key priority for Major General 

John G. Rossi, who was commanding general of the Fires Center 

of Excellence at Fort Sill from 2014 to 2016. Near-term fielding of 
258

the Joint Effects Targeting System would improve precision field 

artillery fires. This system would enable the dismounted observer 

(forward observer, joint target attack controller, special operations 

forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets as well as control 

all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack 

aviation, and naval gunfire). With a Joint Effects Targeting System, 

the forward observer could designate stationary targets out to five 

kilometers and moving targets out to three kilometers for a precision 

munition to attack and hit. Equally important, the system would reduce the length of time to mensurate (the process of locating a target 

precisely on a map by longitude and latitude for a guided munition 

to hit). With the Lightweight Laser Designated Rangefinder that was 

currently being used, a forward observer took 20 to 30 minutes to 

mensurate a target because coordinates had to be checked and rechecked by the fire support chain of command before permission 

was given to shoot a precision munition. The Joint Effects Targeting System—to be fielded by late 2018 or early 2019—promised 

to reduce the time by sending coordinates digitally through the fire 

support chain of command.3

A long-range precision fires system also played a prominent 

role in modernizing the Field Artillery to keep it abreast of foreign 

developments. In 2007, budget concerns prompted the Army to stop 

production on the long-range precision Army Tactical Missile System. The system had been initially fielded in the 1980s and served 

effectively in Operation Desert Storm of 1991 and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom of 2003. This left the Army without a long-range precision 

missile and created a serious capability gap as foreign militaries began fielding long-range precision missiles.4

In February 2013, the Army decided to develop a new longrange precision missile. It would have a 500 or more kilometer range 

with a 200 pound or larger warhead, be all-weather, leverage existing technologies, be compatible with M270A1 and M142 launchers 

already in the inventory, sustain and advance Army missile capability to 2050 and beyond, and be affordable. After three years of work, 

the Army awarded a contract to Raytheon in 2016 to start developing the missile and field it sometime in the 2020s.5
259

A long-range precision missile would also improve the Field 

Artillery’s cross-domain precision fires capability. This emerging 

warfighting concept aimed to employ air assets to attack ground attack weapons, and ground attack weapons would provide fires for 

air forces. This concept also included using Army cannon, rocket, 

and missiles fires from land-based batteries combined with nonlethal effects across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyber domains 

with the capacity to overmatch enemy capabilities.6

While developing a long-range precision missile was a longterm solution to cross-domain Fires capability, the Army required a 

short-term solution to strike maritime targets from land-based batteries. In 2016, after two years of pressure from Congress, the Army 

started investigating how to get back in the business of killing ships 

from land-based batteries—the first such effort since the Coast Artillery was abolished in 1950. Rather than developing a totally new 

missile system or buying one on the global market for such a mission, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced on 28 October 

2016 that the Department of Defense would upgrade the Field Artillery’s Army Tactical Missile System to hit moving targets on land or 

sea by integrating an existing seeker on its front. This would permit 

hitting a moving target from the land domain up to 300 kilometers into the maritime domain. For the Field Artillery, this capability would be revolutionary because at present it could only attack a 

stationary target with precision.7

Modernizing the Fires force also comprised efforts to exploit 

revolutionary capabilities. In August 2010, Major General David D. 

Halverson, who was the commanding general of the Fires Center of 

Excellence from 2009 to 2012, hosted a panel of senior leaders and 

retired general officers at Fort Sill to discuss the Army’s vulnerability to directed energy and electrodynamics kinetic energy weapon 

systems, often called electric fires. They noted deficiencies and recommended that the Army Space and Missile Defense Command/

Army Strategic Command provide an initial vulnerability assessment to the Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter W. Chiarelli.8

In June 2011, the Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

briefed General Chiarelli. Based on the briefing, he tasked the com-
260

mand to conduct a comprehensive electric fires assessment to identify current and emerging threat capabilities and recommend how to 

fill any gaps in electric fires capabilities. He also directed the Fires 

Center of Excellence to support the effort as a user representative. 

Subsequently, the center assigned the Fires Battle Laboratory in its 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate to take the 

lead for this endeavor. After several months of study, the Fires Center of Excellence and the Army Space and Missile Defense Command briefed General Chiarelli in January 2012 on their final assessment on electric fires. He directed further study and charged them to 

brief the incoming Vice Chief of Staff, General Lloyd J. Austin III.9

The Fires Center of Excellence briefed General Austin in August 2012 about the state of electric fires in the Army and about General Chiarelli’s June 2011 recommendation to form an Electric Fires 

Office under the Fires Battle Laboratory. General Austin concurred 

with the recommendation. Then in November 2012, the Fires Center of Excellence chartered the Electric Fires Office to work with 

the Fires Battle Laboratory and the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, provide subject matter expertise, and coordinate 

and conduct electric fires efforts across the Army. This effort would 

address the Army’s capabilities to counter the threat with “gamechanging technologies.”10

In line with this, the Electric Fires Office coordinated the Army’s first electric fires seminar in February 2013 to examine “gamechanging technologies.” Participants discussed the potential impact 

of electric fires on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy. Additionally, they gained a 

greater understanding of integrating electric fires into future planning, synchronization, and execution of missions. Specifically, seminar panels presented papers on energy particle beams, high-power 

microwaves, laser weapon systems, electro-chemical-thermal guns, 

and electromagnetic launches, among other topics.11

As part of the electric fires effort, Fort Sill constructed an electric fires range. After several years of work beginning in 2013, Fort 

Sill used its not-yet-completed electric fires range for the first time 

in 2016. The range permitted developers to observe and examine 

emerging electric fires technologies in a live-fire event as well as 
261

evaluate the technology through modeling and simulation.12

In April 2016, the Fires Battle Laboratory conducted the 2016 

Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment at the range. This experiment explored challenges with detecting, identifying, and defeating 

threat unmanned aerial systems. These systems represented a great 

danger because they had the potential to conduct reconnaissance and 

deliver nuclear, biological, chemical, or conventional weapons. Specifically, the experiment exhibited Army’s High Energy Laser Mobile Test Truck’s ability to acquire, track, engage, and destroy air and 

ground targets. The truck, an initiative pursued by the Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command, consisted of a truck-mounted laser 

platform designed to track and shoot down incoming enemy unmanned aerial systems, rockets, artillery, and mortars. During the 

experiment, the truck employed a 10-kilowatt high-energy laser and 

subsystems that shot down 15 unmanned aerial system targets. Future 

plans included developing a 50- or 100-kilowatt high-energy laser.13

Addressing this and other electric fires technologies, Major 

Michael Burke of the Capabilities Development and Integration 

Directorate’s Requirements Determination Division explained in 

2016 that electric fires experiments involved more than just investigating ways to shoot down incoming threats. They also encompassed electromagnetic launch technologies that used a magnetic 

field created by electricity to launch field artillery projectiles without the use of explosives or propellants. As the major explained, 

electric fires represented long-term solutions to resolve field artillery capability gaps.14

Concurrently, the Fires Battle Laboratory participated in a 

study that examined the possibility of employing a next-generation 

guided hypervelocity projectile fired from a 155-millimeter howitzer to intercept an aircraft. This would require allowing a traditional 

field artillery platform to connect to an air defense network then 

fire munitions capable of air engagements. Although BAE Systems 

was working on developing such a munition, the Field Artillery conceded that it was a long-term effort that was still in the science and 

technology phase of development.15

Fires Azimuth 2015, therefore, outlined a broad plan to move 

the Field Artillery into the future. Introducing the Joint Effects Tar-
262

geting System and a new long-range precision missile as well as 

modifying the Army Tactical Missile System represented significant 

improvements over field artillery systems of 2015. However, the 

one shooter, one sensor, and one mission command system concept 

as well as electric fires and a hypervelocity 155-millimeter munition promised to revolutionize the Field Artillery by taking it into a 

totally new era—making a total break with 2015 systems. 
263

NOTES

1. “Fires Strategy 2015: A Strategy for the Future of Fires,” 2015, 

1–2, 17, HRDC; Major General John G. Rossi, “The State of Fires,” Fires 

Bulletin, January–February 2016, 1–4. 

2. Rossi, “The State of Fires,” 1–4.

3. “Fires Strategy 2015: A Strategy for the Future of Fires,” 2015, 6, 

26, HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TCM BCT–Fires, interview 

with attachments by author, 17 February 2011, HRDC; Email, “BFIST, 

Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History,” 9 March 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, “Joint Effects Targeting System,” 12 June 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, “Joint Effects Targeting System Target Location Designation System,” undated, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Documents,” 

7 February 20 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells 

History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells 

History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF,” 27 

May 2015, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF,” December 2015, 

HRDC; Information Paper, “Joint Effects Targeting System Production,” 

31 October 2016, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA History Submission,” 21 March 2017, HRDC; Meghann Myers, “This New 

Targeting System Is Going to get Warheads on Foreheads in a Hurry,” 

Army Times, 29 September 2016.

4. Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, 4 October 2016, HRDC; 

Captain Joshua Urness, “Milley Addresses Attendees of AUSA Meeting,” 

Fires Bulletin, AUSA Special Issue 2016, 4; Army Warfighting Challenges, 2 December 2016, HRDC; Army Warfighting Challenges, 12 October 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “History of Rockets and Missiles,” 2007, 

26 February 2008, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Office, 

Missiles and Space, “Fiscal Year 2007 Termination Plans for the Army 

Tactical Missile,” 11 June 2007, HRDC; Email, “ATACMS,” 25 February 

2008, HRDC; Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Secretary, “FY07 Army 

Tactical Missile System Program Termination Plan,” 16 February 2007, 

HRDC; Email, “ATACMS,” 25 February 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Rocket and Missile 2007,” 25 March 2008, HRDC. 

5. Charles Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” Fires 

Bulletin, March–April 2014, 22–23; Information Paper, “Long Range Precision Fires,” 13 September 2016, HRDC; Information Paper, “US Army 

Awards Raytheon Long Range Precision Fires Risk Mitigation Contract,” 

23 August 2016, HRDC; Information Paper, “Long Range Precision 

Fires,” undated, HRDC; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration 

Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,” 16 

May 2014, HRDC; Major David Dykema, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Matt 

MacKenzie, and Captain Justin Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and 

Launchers,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2014, 55–58; “Fires Forward,” 
264

September 2016, HRDC; Briefing, “Portfolio Overview of the Precision 

Strike Association,” 18 March 2015, HRDC.

6. Email with Attachment, “USAFAS History Report,” 10 March 

2016, HRDC; “Fires Forward,” November 2016, HRDC; Army Warfighting Challenges, 12 October 2016, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “CDID 

2016 FA History Submission,” 21 March 2017, HRDC. 

7. “Fires Forward,” November 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg, “Carter, 

Roper Unveil Army’s New Ship-Killer Missile: ATACMS Upgrade,” Breaking Defense, 28 October 2016, accessed 25 January 2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/army-atacms-missile-will-kill-ships-secdef-carter; 

Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA History Submission,” 21 March 

2017, HRDC.

8. Susan Walker, Deputy Director, Fires Battle Laboratory, interview 

with attachments by author, 28 March 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “FBL History 2011,” 6 March 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History,” 2 April 2012, 

HRDC; Electric Fires Request for Information, 27 June 2012, HRDC; 

Email with Attachment, “Electric fires,” 20 March 2015, HRDC. 

9. Walker, interview with attachments, 28 March 2012; Email with 

Attachment, “FBL History 2011,” 6 March 2012; Email with Attachment, “Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History,” 2 April 2012; 

Email with Attachment, “Electric Fires,” 20 March 2015, HRDC; Email 

with Attachment, “Electric Fires,” 12 March 2014, HRDC; J.D. Leopold, 

“Campbell Takes Oath as Army’s Vice Chief of Staff,” Army News, 11 

March 2013. 

10. Memorandum for Record, “Establishment of the FCoE Electric Fires Office,” 21 November 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachments, 

“Electric Fires,” 12 March 2014. 

11. Fires Battle Laboratory History 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachments, “Electric Fires,” 12 March 14; Email with Attachment, “Electric 

Fires Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History,” 13 March 2014, HRDC.

12. 2015 USAFAS AH, 52–54; News Release, “Electric Fires Range 

Approved for Use at Fort Sill,” 17 June 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Electric fires v1 Doc,” 9 March 2016, HRDC. 

13. Shane Sandstrom, “Fort Sill High-Tech Range Assessment 

Approved,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2016, 30–31; Captain Jeffrey 

Jarimillo, “The Tactical Edge of Fires: Maneuver Fires Integration Experiment,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2016, 34–38; Fact Sheet, “High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator,” 28 December 2016, HRDC; 

Army Missile and Space Defense Command Information Paper, “HEL 

TVD,” January 2017, HRDC; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1–31 January 2016, HRDC; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1–31 March 2016, 

HRDC; Jeff Crawley, “Electric Fires Seminar Focuses on Future Battlefields,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 5 March 2015; “Fires Forward,” May 2016, 
265

HRDC; C. Todd Lopez, “Army Tests High Energy Laser in Exercise,” 

Army News, 17 May 2016. 

14. Crawley, “Electric Fires Seminar Focuses on Future Battlefields,” 

Fort Sill Cannoneer; News Release, “Electric fires Range Approved for 

Use at Fort Sill,” 17 June 2015; Email with Attachment, “Electric fires v1 

Doc,” 9 March 2016; Shane Sandstrom, “Fort Sill High-Tech Range Assessment Approved,” 30–31; Jarimillo, “The Tactical Edge of Fires: Maneuver Fires Integration Experiment,” 34–38. 

15. Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA History Submission,” 

21 March 2016, HRDC; BAE Systems Information Paper, “HVP, Hyper 

Velocity Projectile,” 2016, HRDC. 
266
267

Glossary

AAA Anti-aircraft Artillery

AAR After Action Review/After Action Report

AC Assistant Commandant

ACH Annual Command History

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

ADA Air Defense Artillery

ADP Army Doctrinal Publication

ADRP Army Doctrinal Reference Publication

AECP Army Experimentation Campaign Plan

AHR Annual Historical Review

AI Air Interdiction

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

ARNG Army National Guard

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATP Army Technical Publication

AUSA Association of the United States Army

AWE Army Warfighting Experiment

BAT Brilliant Anti-armor Submunition

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BDE Brigade

BFIST Bradley Fire Support Team

BL Battle Laboratory

BOLC Basic Officer Leader Course

CAC Combined Arms Center

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAS Close Air Support

CB Counterbattery

CDID Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate

CG Commanding General

CSA Chief of Staff of the Army

CSM Command Sergeant Major

DA Department of the Army

DAC Deputy Assistant Commandant
268

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCD Directorate of Combat Developments

DCX Division Capstone Exercise

DIVARTY Division Artillery

DOD Department of Defense

DOTD Directorate of Training and Doctrine

DOTE Directorate of Test and Evaluation

DOTLM Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, and 

Materiel

DOTLMPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, 

Material, Personnel, and Facilities

DPICM Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition

DPTM Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization

DSWS Division Support Weapon System Study

ECC Effects Coordination Cell

ESPAWS Enhanced Self-propelled Artillery Weapon Study

EW Electronic Warfare

EXSUM Executive Summary

GAO Government Accountability Office

GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System

GPS Global Positioning System

FA Field Artillery

FATDS Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems

FCoE Fires Center of Excellence

FCS Future Combat System

FECC Fires Effects Coordination Cell

FDIC Futures Development and Integration Center

F2C2 Future Fires Command and Control

FIST Fire Support Team

FISTV Fire Support Team Vehicle

FM Field Manual

FORSCOM Forces Command

FSCAOD Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department

FSCOORD Fire Support Coordinator

FY Fiscal Year

HE High Explosive

HELP Howitzer Extended Life Program
269

HEMMT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

HIP Howitzer Improvement Program

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army

HRDC Historical Research and Document Collection

IAV Interim Armored Vehicle/Initial Armored Vehicle

IBCT Initial Brigade Combat Team/Interim Brigade 

Combat Team

ID Infantry Division

IFSAS Initial Fire Support Automation System

JACI Joint and Combined Integration

JFO Joint Fires Officer

JPSD Joint Precision Strike Demonstration

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

LCMR Lightweight Countermortar Radar

LLDR Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder

LS Launch System

LW Lightweight

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

MOS Military Occupational Skill

MTT Mobile Training Team

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NCOES Noncommissioned Officer Education System

NET New Equipment Training

NLOS Non-line-of-Sight

NLOS-C Non-line-of-Sight Cannon

NLOS-LS Non-line-of-Sight Launch System

NTC National Training Center

OCONUS Outside Continental United States

ODS Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm

OIC Officer in Charge

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPFOR Opposing Force
270

PEO Program Executive Office/Program Executive Officer

PGK Precision Guidance Kit

PIM Paladin Improvement Management

RC Reserve Component

RAMS Rockets and Missiles Systems

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

RGFC Republican Guard Force Command

SADARM Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition

SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SIGACTS Significant Activities

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 

SITREP Situation Report

SME Subject Matter Expert

SPLLS Self-Propelled Loader/Launcher

STANAG Standardization Agreement

TAA Total Army Analysis

TACFIRE Tactical Fire Direction System

TAD Towed Artillery Digitization

TCM TRADOC Capabilities Manager

TCP Transformation Campaign Plan

TF Task Force

TOC Tactical Operation Center

TPSO Theater Precision Strike Operations

TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSM TRADOC System Manager

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USAFACFS United States Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill

USAFACS United States Field Artillery Center and School

USAFAS United States Army Field Artillery School

USAFCOEFS United States Fires Center of Excellence and Fort 

Sill

USMC United States Marine Corps

VCSA Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

WIDD Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate

XO Executive Officer
271

Select Bibliography

This bibliography only contains the books and articles used to 

write the book. For messages, fact sheets, information papers, reports, emails, and other comparable documents, please see the notes 

at the end of each chapter.

Manuscript Collections

Morris Swett Technical Library, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Historical Research and Document Collection, Historian’s Office, 

U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill

Government Documents

Department of the Army, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1987.

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991.

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992.

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993.

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994.

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1995.

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996. 

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999.

___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 2001.

Government Accountability Office, “Army Armored Systems,” 6 

June 1997, HRDC.

___. “Army Needs to Update Fielding Plan for First Digitized 

Corps,” July 2000.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 

“The 9/11 Commission Report,” 22 July 2004. 

United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Annual 

Command History/Annual Historical Review, 1986–2005.

United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill Annual 

Command History, 2006–2008.

United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, “Fires 

Strategy 2015: A Strategy for the Future of Fires,” 2015. 

United States Field Artillery School Annual History, 2009–2015.
272

United States Army Field Artillery School, Annual Historical Supplements, 1975, 1979, and 1983.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. Annual Command History, 1991–1994.

Books

Brown, John S. Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the 

U.S. Army 1989–2005. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2011. 

Brown, Todd S. Battle Ground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander. Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 

2007.

Carafano, James J., ed. Soldiers are Our Credentials: The Collected 

Works and Select Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff of the 

Army. Washington, DC: The US Army Center of Military History, 

2000. 

Carney, Stephen A. Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 

2011. 

Chapman, Anne W., Carol J. Lilly, John L. Romjue, and Susan 

Canedy. Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the 

Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–1998. Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, 1998. 

Dastrup, Boyd L. Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991. Fort 

Sill, OK: Office of the Command Historian, 1994, reprinted by 

the US Army Center of Military History, 2003.

___. Cedat Fortuna Peritis: A History of the Field Artillery School. 

Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2011.

Fontenot, Colonel (Retired) Gregory, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn. On Point: US Army in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Grice, Michael D. On Gunnery: The Art and Science of Field Artillery from the American Civil War to the Dawn of the 21st Century. Charleston, SC: Booksurge Publishing, 2009.
273

Groen, Michael S., and Contributors. With the 1st Marine Division 

in Iraq, 2003. Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps 

University, 2006.

Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William 

E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command 

and General Staff College, 1988.

King, Benjamin. Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-Year History of the 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms 

Center, 2013. 

Koonz, Christopher N. ed., Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the 

U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005. Washington 

D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army, 2008. 

Malone, Henry O., ed. TRADOC Support to Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study. Fort Monroe, VA: 

Office of the Command Historian, 1992.

McGrath, John J. The Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment in the U.S. Army. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

McKenney, Janice E. The Organizational History of the Field Artillery: 1775–2003. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military 

History, 2007.

Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A 

Military History. Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University 

Press, 2003. 

Naylor, Sean. Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda. New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2005.

Ott, Major General David E. Field Artillery: 1954–1963. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975.

Romjue, John L. American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War. 

Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, 1996.

___. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of 

Army Doctrine, 1973–1982. Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training 

and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1984.

___. The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army. 

Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, US Army 
274

Training and Doctrine Command, reprinted by the US Army Center of Military History, 1997.

Rose, Gideon. How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. 

New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010.

Scales, Robert H. Jr., ed. Certain Victory: United States Army in the 

Gulf War. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 

1993.

___. Firepower in Limited War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.

Schubert, Frank L., and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War: 

The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 

1995.

Wright, Donald P., James R. Bird, Steven W. Clay, Peter W. Connors, Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler Garcia, and Dennis F. 

Van Wey. A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in 

Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001–September 2005. 

Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army 

Combined Arms Center, 2010.

Yarrison, James L. The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers. Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1999.

Articles

Abrams, Creighton W. “The Gulf War and European Artillery.” 

Journal of the Royal Artillery (Autumn 2001): 41.

Bailey, Colonel Steven L. “Fires for the IBCT.” Field Artillery (November–December 2001): 5.

Barnett, Major Donald L. “Crusader Target Weight: 38 to 42 Tons.” 

Field Artillery (March–April 2000): 34.

Bateman, Lieutenant Colonel Sean, and Major Steven Hady, “King 

of Battle Once Again: An Organizational Design to Effectively 

Integrate Fires in Support of the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Force.” Fires Bulletin (March–April 2013): 23.

Batule, Colonel Kevin M., and Colonel (Retired) Theodore J. Janosko, “Training the Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD.” Fires Bulletin

(May–June 2008): 26.

Baxter, Brigadier General Leo J. “Field Artillery: Vision 2020.” 

Field Artillery (December 1994): 10.
275

Baxter, Major General Leo J. “Honing the Edge: State of the Field 

Artillery, 1997.” Field Artillery (November–December 1997): 1.

___. “Meeting the Future: State of the Field Artillery 1998.” Field 

Artillery (November–December 1998): 1.

Bentley, Brigadier General Christopher F. “State of the Field Artillery.” Fires Bulletin (January–February 2014): 9.

Bentley, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F. “Afghanistan: Joint and 

Coalition Fire Support in Operation Enduring Freedom.” Field 

Artillery (September–October 2002): 10.

Bilo, Brigadier General William C. “A Decisive Victory for Strategic Victory.” Field Artillery (March–April 1995): 22.

Bransford, Lieutenant Colonel William M. “Fire Support and Desert 

Hammer VI: The Advanced Warfighting Experiment.” Field Artillery (October 1994): 40.

Burdick, Major General Donald. “An Essential Element of National 

Strategy.” Army (October 1990): 116.

Corn, Colonel Vollney B. Jr., and Captain Richard A. Lacquemont. 

“Silver Bullets.” Field Artillery (October 1991): 10.

Crawley, Jeff. “Electric Fires Seminar Focuses on Future Battlefields.” Fort Sill Cannoneer (5 March 2015), www.army.mil.

Crisco, Lieutenant Colonel Telford E. Jr. “The Modular Force: Division Operations.” Military Review (January–February 2006): 95.

Dismuke, Shirley. “The 2013 State of Fires.” Fires Bulletin (July–

August 2013): 14.

Dubia, Major General John A. “A Vision for Fire Support in the 21st 

Century: State of the Branch, 1993.” Armed Forces Journal (May 

1991): 37.

___. “Force XXI and the Field Artillery: State of the Branch 1994.” 

Field Artillery (December 1994): 2.

Duitsman, Leighton L. “Army TACMS.” Field Artillery (January–

February 1991): 38.

Durham, Major (Retired) George A., and Colonel (Retired) James 

E. Cunningham. “NetFires: Precision Effects for the Objective 

Force.” Field Artillery (March–April 2002): 5.

Dykema, Major David, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Matt MacKenzie, 

and Captain Justin Teague. “Advances of Precision Fires and 

Launchers.” Fires Bulletin (March–April 2014): 55.
276

Emerson, Major Charles J., Major Mark H. Laflamme, and Colonel 

(Retired) James E. Cunningham. “NLOS Systems for the Modular and Future Forces.” Field Artillery (November–December 

2005): 7.

Emison, Colonel Steven A. “Post Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment.” Army Research, Development, and Acquisition (September–October 1997): 2.

Engel, Brigadier General William F. “Transforming Fires for the 

Objective Force.” Field Artillery (November–December 2001): 

9.

“Extended Range for MLRS Rockets in the Works.” Field Artillery

(April 1992): 39.

“Field Artillery Commanders.” Field Artillery (December 1991): 

pullout.

“Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update.” Field Artillery

(December 1990): 53.

“Field Artillery and Mortar Systems.” Army (October 2005): 326.

“Field Artillery Units Worldwide.” Field Artillery (December 1989): 

pullout.

“Forces Committed.” Military Review (September 1991): 80.

“Fort Sill Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices.” 

Fort Sill Cannoneer (10 October 2013). 

“Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan.” Fort Sill Cannoneer (24 

September 1992): 1.

Foss, General John W. “AirLand Battle-Future.” Army (February 

1991): 20.

Freedberg, Sydney J. “Carter, Roper Unveil Army’s New ShipKiller Strategy.” Breaking Defense, www.breakingdefense.com 

(28 October 2016).

Froysland, Jeff and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Scott Prochniak. “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade.” 

Fires Bulletin (March–April 2013): 40.

Gentry, Lieutenant Colonel Donald E., and Major Cullen G. Barbato. “HIMARS: Firepower for Early Entry Forces.” Field Artillery

(January–February 1999): 19.

Gerber, Lieutenant Colonel Loyd A. “Reset: Rebuilding FA Core 

Competencies for Future Full-Spectrum Operations.” Field Ar-
277

tillery (March–April 2007): 14.

Goedkoop, Colonel Thomas R., and Captain Barry E. Venable. 

“Task Force XXI: An Overview.” Military Review (March–April 

1997): 71.

Gourley, Scott. “Bolstering Fire Support.” Armed Forces Journal 

International (December 2001): 46.

___. “Soldiers Armed,” Army (February 2011): 63.

Graves, Major Kenneth P. “Steel Rain: XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery in Desert Storm.” Field Artillery (October 1991): 49.

“Ground Combat Systems.” Army (October 2011): 338.

“Ground Combat Systems.” Army (March 2013): 324.

Hall, Captain Lawrence T. Jr., and Captain Michael A. Sharp. “MLRS 

NET for the ARNG.” Field Artillery (March–April 1996): 44.

Herring, Colonel G. Keith. “Flagship Sill: A Power Projection Platform for 100-Plus Years.” Field Artillery (March–June 2004): 19. 

Hester, Captain Henry M. Jr., “Digitization in Task Force XXI.” 

Field Artillery (September–October 1996): 38.

Hill, Colonel Jerry C., and Major Carl R. Trout, “Effects-Based Fire 

Support Coordination and Execution.” Field Artillery (November–December 2009): 7.

Hollis, Patrecia. “3ID in OIF: Fires for the Distributed Battlefield.” 

Field Artillery (September–October 2003): 12. 

___. “Digitizing the Army for the Objective Force,” Field Artillery

(March–April 2002): 2–4

___. Interview with Lieutenant General William F. Kernan, Field 

Artillery (January–February 1999): 3.

___. “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces Equal Victory in Iraq,” 

Field Artillery (September–October 2003): 6

Hollis, Patrecia and Robert H. McElroy. Interview with Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Field Artillery (September–October 

2002): 5–9. 

Hutchinson, Charles. “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy.” Fires 

Bulletin (March–April 2014): 22.

Jarmillo, Captain Jeffrey. “The Tactical Edge of Fires: Maneuver Fires 

Integration Experiment.” Fires Bulletin (May–June 2016): 34.

Jensen, Major Mark S. “MLRS in Operation Desert Storm.” Field 
278

Artillery (August 1991): 30.

Kerr, Colonel Donald L.W. “Depth and Simultaneous Attack: One 

Battle Lab Helping Forge the Army’s Future.” Field Artillery

(April 1993): 35.

Koch, Andrew. “General Dynamics to Develop TAD System.” 

Jane’s Defense Weekly (27 September 2000): 8.

Lennon, Captain Brock. “Five Requirements of Accurate Fire for 

the 21st Century.” Fires Bulletin (May–June 2014): 51.

Leopold J.D. “Campbell Takes Oath as Army’s Vice Chief of Staff.” 

Army News (11 March 2013) 4.

Lipinski, Joseph. “Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire 

Control Systems.” Army AL&T (July–September 2010): 21.

Longoria, Colonel Michael A., Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Andrews, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Steven P. Milliron. “Joint Fires Observer.” Field Artillery (September–October 2005): 30.

Loudenslager, Lieutenant Colonel Kerry J., and Captain Ryan J. LaPorte, “Paladin Platoon Operations versus Battery Operations,” 

Field Artillery (January–February 2001): 16.

Mack, Major Christopher, and Major William J. Raymond Jr. “Strike 

Force: Fires for the Future.” Field Artillery (November–December 1998): 16.

Maples, Major General Michael D. “The FA and the Objective 

Force.” Field Artillery (September–October 2002): 2.

Marty, Major General Fred F. “Deep Operations.” Field Artillery

(April 1993): 1

___. “FA on Target in the Storm.” Field Artillery (October 1991): 1.

___. “State-of-the-Branch Address.” Field Artillery (November–

December 1991): 2.

___. “State-of-the-Branch 1992.” Field Artillery (November–December 1992): 1.

McBride, Sharon. “Joint Fires Observer: Shouldn’t be ‘on the job’ 

Training.” Fires Bulletin (November–October 2011): 20.

McKiernan, Brigadier General Brian J. “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy.” Fires Bulletin (March–April 2013): 6.

___. “State of the Field Artillery.” Fires Bulletin (May–June 2012): 

14.

McPhee, Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. “The Divisional MLRS 
279

Battalion in the DAWE.” Field Artillery (May–June 1998): 38.

Mora, Major Alex, and Scott McClellan. “PEO Soldier Supports the 

Next Forward Observer Generation.” Fires Bulletin (November–

December 2013): 40.

Myers, Megann. “This New Targeting Systems is Going to get 

Warheads on Foreheads in a Hurry.” Army Times (29 September 

2016).

O’Needham, Captain Richard A., and Major Russell Graves. “100 

Hours with Light TACFIRE.” Field Artillery (October 1991): 30.

Pearson, Brigadier General (Retired) Paul F., and General (Retired) 

Glenn K. Otis. “Desert Storm Fire Support: Classic Airland Battle Operation.” Landpower Essay Series, AUSA Institute of Land 

Warfare (June 1991). 

Ralston, Major General David C. “2006: State of the Field Artillery.” Field Artillery (November–December 2006): 5.

___. “The FA and COIN: Continuity and Adaptation.” Field Artillery (July–August 2006): 1.

Reitz, Colonel John W. “A Fire Supporter’s Guide to FM 100-5.” 

Field Artillery (December 1993): 10.

Rigby, Major General Randall L. “Fires for Division XXI: State of 

the Branch 1995.” Field Artillery (November–December 1995): 

1.

___. “Mapping the Future: FA State of the Branch, 1996.” Field 

Artillery (November–December 1996): 1.

___. “1996 Senior Fire Support Conference: Focusing Fires for 

Force XXI.” Field Artillery (May–June 1996): 18.

___. “3x6-2x9 MLRS Transition.” Field Artillery. (September–October 1996): 18.

Rittenhouse, C. William. “Fire Support on the Non-Linear Battlefield: The Shape of Things to Come.” Field Artillery (October 

1990): 36.

___. “Operation Firestrike.” Field Artillery (February 1991): 33.

Rolston, Col David. “Victory Artillery in Operation Desert Storm.” 

Field Artillery (April 1991): 4.

Ross, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) William A. “F2C2 Experiments 

for Rapid Transformation to Effects-Based Fires.” Field Artillery

(November–December 2000): 7.
280

Rossi, Major General John G. “The State of Fires.” Fires Bulletin

(January–February 2016): 1.

Russell, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Jr., and Major Harold H. 

Worrell Jr. “Focus on Light Force XXI: AWE Warrior Focus.” 

Field Artillery (May–June 1996): 36.

Sandstrom, Shane. “Fort Sill High-Tech Range Assessment Approved.” Fires Bulletin (March–April 2016): 30.

“Schoolhouse Developing ‘Effects’ Headquarters.” Fort Sill Cannoneer (4 March 1999): 2a.

Sherman, Jason. “Lighten Up.” Armed Forces Journal International

(October 1998): 57.

“Sill Hosts Stryker Deployment Certex.” Fort Sill Cannoneer (8 

May 2003): 1a, 2a.

Siltman, Colonel Frank J., and Lieutenant Colonel John P. Frisbie. 

“Fire Support Just Got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core 

Competency.” Fires Bulletin (July–September 2008): 6.

Smith, Colonel John T. “Training for Joint Operations.” Fires Bulletin (March–April 2013): 18.

Steele, Dennis. “AWE: Testing Soldiers and Equipment.” Army

(June 1997): 26.

___. “Dust, Digits, and Steel: Launching Warfare’s Future.” Army

(June 2001): 21.

___. “Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment at NTC.” 

Army (May 1997): 14.

___. “The Army XXI Heavy Division: First Blueprint of the Future 

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About the Author

Boyd L. Dastrup, a native of Ogden, Utah, received his B.S. 

from Weber State College, M.A. from Utah State University, and 

Ph.D. from Kansas State University and is currently the US Army 

Field Artillery School Historian. He has written The U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History (1982), 

Crusade in Nuremberg: Military Occupation, 1945–1949 (1985), 

King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery

(1992, 1993), Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991 (1994, 

2003), The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (1994), and Cedat Fortuna Peritis: A History of the Field Artillery School (2011). 

He has also written articles in A Guide to the Sources of United 

States Military History (1998), The Oxford Companion to American Military History (1999), and Professional Military Education in 

the United States: A Historical Dictionary (2000). Additionally, he 

wrote “Artillery as a Result of World War One” in King of Battle: 

Artillery in World War One (2016), “Artillery” in Oxford University 

Press online bibliographies (2017), and articles in other journals and 

anthologies and served as a subject matter expert for the History 

Channel on “Dangerous Missions: Forward Observation” (2001) 

and for the Discovery Channel on “Artillery Strikes” (2005).
284

Combat Studies Institute Press

An imprint of Army University Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Artillery Strong: Modernizing the Field Artillery for the 21st Century

AUP

CSI

Press

 Dastrup