[Cite as State v. Stewart, 2024-Ohio-1448.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 23AP-203

v. : (C.P.C. No. 22CR-1978)

Jonathan N. Stewart, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on April 16, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Taylor 

Mick, for appellee.

On brief: Brian J. Rigg, for appellant.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jonathan N. Stewart, appeals from a judgment of 

conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas pursuant 

to a jury verdict finding him guilty of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a 

second-degree felony, and guilty as to the related firearm specification. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On May 5, 2022, appellant was indicted on one count of felonious assault, in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11, a second-degree felony, with a three-year firearm specification. 

The indictment alleged the foregoing offenses occurred on or about March 22, 2022, when 

appellant knowingly caused serious physical harm to Tizonna L. Stewart, and/or did 

knowingly cause or attempt to cause serious physical harm to her, by means of a deadly 
No. 23AP-203 2

weapon or dangerous ordnance, to wit a firearm. Appellant entered a not guilty plea to the 

charges and requested a jury trial. On January 9, 2023, a jury trial commenced. At trial,

the following evidence was adduced.

{¶ 3} B.T. testified that on March 22, 2022, she was working as a cashier at the 

Sunoco gas station located at 7700 Kennedy Road in Franklin County, Ohio (“the Sunoco”). 

Sometime after 9:00 p.m., she took her break and went outside. While she was talking to 

her ex-boyfriend on her phone, she heard what sounded like gunshots and looked up. 

Before she ran back inside the store, she observed one vehicle pulling out of the parking lot 

and another vehicle chasing behind it. She testified that both vehicles had been parked near 

the dumpsters before pulling out of the parking lot. She further testified that it was dark 

outside and so she was unable to observe many details about the vehicles or their drivers; 

however, she saw a tan vehicle pull up just before the shooting, and that same tan vehicle 

was the vehicle chasing the other vehicle out of the parking lot. When the police arrived, 

B.T. gave them a statement. The police also collected security footage from the Sunoco’s 

surveillance cameras, which B.T. confirmed faced the parking lot and the fuel pumps.

{¶ 4} Daniel Melton, a 911 dispatcher for the city of Columbus, testified that on 

March 22, 2022 he was working in his capacity as a 911 dispatcher. At approximately 9:30 

p.m. that evening, he received a call from a female—later identified as Tizonna Stewart—

who reported she had been shot at the Sunoco. The state admitted a recording of the 911 

call, which was approximately seven minutes long, into evidence. During the call, Ms. 

Stewart reported she was fleeing in her vehicle because she was being chased by the shooter. 

Mr. Melton attempted to track Ms. Stewart’s location and guide her to a well-populated 

area where she could safely meet first responders. During the course of the 911 call, Ms. 

Stewart reported she was driving near Mount Carmel East Hospital before driving into 

Whitehall. Ms. Stewart eventually told Mr. Melton she had been able to lose the shooter 

somewhere near East Broad Street and Yearling Road. Ms. Stewart made contact with 

police officers at the intersection of Main Street and James Road, whereupon the 911 call 

ended.

{¶ 5} Officer Tyler Hicks with the Columbus Police Department (“CPD”) was on 

duty at the time Daniel Melton received the 911 call from Ms. Stewart. Officer Hicks heard 

the dispatch call over the radio for a shooting reported nearby. The dispatcher informed 
No. 23AP-203 3

officers that the female victim had reported that her husband—later identified as 

appellant1—had shot her. Officer Hicks turned on his body worn camera (“BWC”) as he 

responded to the shooting, and the BWC footage was introduced and admitted into 

evidence as state’s exhibit E.

{¶ 6} Officer Hicks testified that the dispatcher reported that Ms. Stewart was 

driving a silver Lexus, and the male suspect was driving a gold Cadillac. The dispatched 

also informed officers that there had been another call earlier that same day involving two 

vehicles that matched the same description. Another officer, Officer South, had responded 

to the earlier incident. Officer South responded over the radio that the earlier incident had 

involved a dispute during which appellant allegedly shot at Ms. Stewart. However, Ms. 

Stewart refused to cooperate with Officer South when he responded to the earlier call, so he 

was unable to provide further information. Officer Hicks was already familiar with 

appellant and Ms. Stewart because during the earlier incident Officer South had called 

Officer Hicks to ask his advice on options for proceeding without the cooperation of Ms. 

Stewart.

{¶ 7} Officer Hicks further testified that the dispatcher kept the responding officers 

updated on Ms. Stewart’s location, beginning at the Sunoco and continuing eastbound past 

Mount Carmel East. Officer Hicks, along with a new officer riding along for training 

purposes, eventually encountered Ms. Stewart near the intersection of Main Street and 

James Road. Ms. Stewart was outside of her vehicle and waving her arms frantically to flag 

down the officers. She had a large, blood stain on her sweatshirt, and he could see there 

had been “quite a bit of blood loss.” (Jan. 10, 2023 Tr. Vol. II at 75.) Officer Hicks cut off 

the sweatshirt and applied a tourniquet until medics could arrive at the scene.

{¶ 8} Officer Hicks testified that Ms. Stewart initially told him that she knew who 

had shot her and knows all of his information, but she did not want to talk about it until she 

felt safe. She told Officer Hicks that she was shot at the Sunoco and that there should be 

cameras. Once the medics arrived at the scene and they were loading Ms. Stewart into the 

ambulance for transport to the hospital, Officer Hicks asked her for the shooter’s name. 

Ms. Stewart provided appellant’s full name and his date of birth.

1 Appellant and Ms. Stewart’s marriage certificate was admitted into evidence by stipulation. (See State’s Ex. 

B.)
No. 23AP-203 4

{¶ 9} Sarah Wagner, a firefighter and paramedic with the Columbus Fire 

Department, provided emergency care to Ms. Stewart during her transport to Mount 

Carmel East Hospital. Ms. Wagner provided testimony which indicated Ms. Stewart had 

been shot in her arm/shoulder and in her right upper chest and her run report corroborated 

same. Ms. Stewart was alert, oriented, and able to communicate during the transport. Ms. 

Wagner testified that during the transport, Ms. Stewart reported she had been shot by her 

husband (appellant).

{¶ 10} Officer Hicks followed the ambulance to the hospital and remained with Ms. 

Stewart throughout the night. Angela Nelson, a trauma nurse, collected Ms. Stewart’s 

clothing and provided it to Officer Hicks. During the course of treatment provided to Ms. 

Stewart, a projectile from a bullet was extracted from her right breast. Officer Hicks 

collected the projectile after it was extracted. While he was still at the hospital, Officer Hicks 

called the Whitehall Police Department (“Whitehall PD”) to ask whether they had any 

“Flock” camera surveillance footage that might be relevant to the investigation.

{¶ 11} Lieutenant Bryan Smith, a Whitehall PD officer, testified that he was working 

in his capacity as a supervisor on March 22, 2022. Lieutenant Smith testified that Whitehall 

PD had recently hired a third-party contractor named “Flock Safety” to install surveillance 

cameras at various intersections throughout the city of Whitehall. Lieutenant Smith 

explained that a “Flock” camera takes a photograph of every vehicle that passes through a 

given camera’s intersection throughout the course of the day. Lieutenant Smith received a 

request to search the Flock database for any images of the make and model of appellant’s 

car, as well as its license plate, to determine whether any cameras had captured a 

photograph of the suspect vehicle in the area around the time of the shooting. Lieutenant

Smith found a photograph of appellant’s car taken by camera No. 16, located at the 

intersection of East Main Street and Maplewood Avenue. He emailed the photograph to 

Officer Hicks. The car was registered to “Jonathan Stewart” (appellant). Officer Hicks 

found Ms. Stewart approximately 5 blocks away from camera No. 16.

{¶ 12} Detective Jeffrey Cromwell of the CPD testified he was assigned to the 

investigation the night of the shooting. At that time, he was working in the domestic 

violence unit. Detective Cromwell first went to the hospital to interview and photograph 

Ms. Stewart. He then went to the Sunoco to collect evidence and photograph the scene. At 
No. 23AP-203 5

the scene, Detective Cromwell observed and photographed shattered glass in the parking 

lot near the dumpsters. He also photographed and collected a shell casing found in the 

same area. However, a gun was never recovered, so ballistics testing could not be conducted 

to match the shell casing to a specific weapon.

{¶ 13} After finishing his investigation at the Sunoco, Detective Cromwell reported 

to the intersection of Main Street and James Road, where a grey Lexus with license plate 

HJN **** registered to Tizonna L. Stewart was being guarded by another CPD officer. The 

vehicle’s front passenger window had been shot out and there was glass inside the vehicle. 

Detective Cromwell photographed the vehicle and the clothing left behind after Officer 

Hicks had cut it off Ms. Stewart.

{¶ 14} The state concluded its presentation of evidence by presenting the testimony 

and reports of two forensic nurses who had treated Ms. Stewart at Mount Carmel East 

Hospital. Angela Nelson testified that she treated Ms. Stewart upon her arrival, took 

photographs of Ms. Stewart’s injuries, and consoled Ms. Stewart as the bullet projectile was 

removed from her chest.

{¶ 15} Finally, Julie Foor testified she had cared for Ms. Stewart after Ms. Nelson’s 

shift had ended. Ms. Foor took a full history and report from Ms. Stewart. During the 

course of taking this history and report, Ms. Stewart identified appellant as the person who 

shot her. Ms. Foor testified that Ms. Stewart told her that appellant had attacked her and 

strangled her earlier that day, stating that Ms. Stewart told her that “he choked me in the 

a.m. about 8:00 a.m.” and “he shot me in the evening.” (Jan. 11, 2023 Tr. Vol. III at 78-

80.) The state then rested its case, and defendant-appellant likewise rested without calling 

any additional witnesses.

{¶ 16} At the close of the state’s case, outside of the presence of the jury, defense 

counsel moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29. (Tr. Vol. III at 117-20.) The trial court 

denied the motion. Id. at 128. Subsequently, at the close of the defense’s case, again outside 

of the presence of the jury, defense counsel renewed his motion for acquittal based on 

Crim.R. 29. Id. at 153. The trial court again denied the motion. Id. at 154.

{¶ 17} At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant 

guilty of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a second-degree felony, and guilty 

as to the firearm specification. On January 12, 2023, appellant was informed of the jury’s 
No. 23AP-203 6

verdicts in open court, and the court ordered a presentence investigation. On February 23, 

2023, a sentencing hearing was held pursuant to R.C. 2929.19, and on February 28, 2023 

the trial court issued a judgment entry which reflected the verdict of the jury and imposed 

a sentence of 11 years in prison with an indefinite sentence of up to 15 years.

{¶ 18} This timely appeal followed.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 19} Appellant asserts the following two assignments of error for our review:

[I.] The trial court erred when it denied Jonathan Stewart’s 

Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal.

[II.] The verdicts of guilt as to all three counts were against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

(Sic passim.)

III. Discussion

A. First and Second Assignments of Error–Motion for Acquittal

(Sufficiency of the Evidence) and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 20} Appellant’s two assignments of error are interrelated in that they challenge 

both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and we therefore address them together. 

In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion for acquittal. In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the verdict 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find no merit in either of appellant’s 

contentions.

{¶ 21} Crim.R. 29(A) provides, in relevant part, “[t]he court on motion of a 

defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the 

entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, 

information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such 

offense or offenses.” Crim.R. 29(A). “Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal standard that 

tests whether the evidence introduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a verdict.” State 

v. Cassell, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1093, 2010-Ohio-1881, ¶ 36, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 

Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Whether a conviction is supported by legally sufficient 

evidence is a question of law. State v. Flood, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-206, 2019-Ohio-2524, 

¶ 16, citing Thompkins at 386.
No. 23AP-203 7

{¶ 22} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court 

must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph 

two of the syllabus. In conducting a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘an appellate 

court does not engage in a determination of witness credibility; rather it essentially assumes 

the state’s witnesses testified truthfully and determines if that testimony satisfies each 

element of the crime.’ ” Flood at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Bankston, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-668,

2009-Ohio-754, ¶ 4, citing State v. Woodward, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-398, 2004-Ohio-4418,

¶ 16.

{¶ 23} Comparatively, “[w]hile sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy 

regarding whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law, 

the criminal manifest weight of the evidence standard addresses the evidence’s effect of 

inducing belief.” Cassell at ¶ 38, citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio2202, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins at 386. “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a 

trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate 

court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the 

conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). 

“ ‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that 

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 

Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). This discretionary authority “ ‘should be exercised 

only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” 

Id., quoting Martin at 175.

{¶ 24} Furthermore, “ ‘[w]hile the jury may take note of the inconsistencies and 

resolve or discount them accordingly, * * * such inconsistences do not render defendant’s 

conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” State v. Gullick,

10th Dist. No. 13AP-317, 2014-Ohio-1642, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. No. 

95APA09-1236 (May 28, 1996). “A jury, as the finder of fact and the sole judge of the weight 
No. 23AP-203 8

of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, may believe or disbelieve all, part, or 

none of a witness’s testimony.” Id., citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964).

{¶ 25} A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because 

the jury believed the state’s version of events over the appellant’s version. Gullick at ¶ 11, 

citing State v. Houston, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-875, 2005-Ohio-4249, ¶ 38 (reversed and 

remanded in part on other grounds). Rather, a reviewing court must give great deference 

to the jury’s determination of witness credibility. Id., citing State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. 

No. 05AP-415, 2006-Ohio-2070, ¶ 19. This is so because the jury “ ‘ “is best able to view 

the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these 

observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” ’ ” State v. Huber, 10th 

Dist. No. 18AP-668, 2019-Ohio-1862, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Cattledge, 10th Dist. No. 10AP105, 2010-Ohio-4953, ¶ 6, quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 

(1984).

{¶ 26} Appellant challenges his conviction on the count of felonious assault, in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11. R.C. 2903.11 provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:

(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another's 

unborn;

(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to 

another's unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous 

ordnance.

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2). In turn, “serious physical harm” is defined as:

(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would 

normally require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric 

treatment;

(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;

(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent 

incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some 

temporary, substantial incapacity;

(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent 

disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious 

disfigurement;
No. 23AP-203 9

(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration 

as to result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree 

of prolonged or intractable pain.

R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a) through (e).

{¶ 27} In his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant argues that the 

state presented no evidence identifying him as the perpetrator, that the evidence failed to 

show that appellant was at the Sunoco on the date and time of the incident, and that the 

evidence failed to show that appellant was in possession of a firearm. (Appellant’s Brief at 

8-9.) Appellant further asserts that the evidence was insufficient because, in the absence 

of any testimony of Ms. Stewart, there was no direct in-court identification of appellant as 

the perpetrator. None of these assertions has merit.

{¶ 28} It is well-settled that the state may establish the identity of a perpetrator by 

the use of direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Bias, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-329, 2022-

Ohio-4643, ¶ 36, citing State v. Watkins, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-807, 2016-Ohio-1029, ¶ 22, 

citing State v. Mickens, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-626, 2009-Ohio-1973, ¶ 18. “Circumstantial 

evidence is the proof of facts by direct evidence from which the trier of fact may infer or 

derive by reasoning other facts in accordance with the common experience of mankind.” 

(Internal quotations and citation omitted.) State v. Robinson, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-5, 2018-

Ohio-1809, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Griesheimer, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1039, 2007-Ohio-837, 

¶ 26. Circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence. Robinson

at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 238 (1990) (noting “ ‘[C]ircumstantial 

evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if that evidence would convince the average 

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”).

{¶ 29} Here, the evidence presented at trial by the state included B.T.’s testimony 

that she heard gunshots in the Sunoco parking lot and observed an individual in a tan 

vehicle chasing another vehicle out of the parking lot immediately after she heard the 

gunshots. The Sunoco’s surveillance cameras recorded this incident on video. Detective 

Cromwell testified that he observed shattered glass in the parking lot near the dumpsters 

and he collected a shell casing found in the same area. Mr. Melton’s testimony, as well as 

the recording of the 911 call admitted into evidence as state’s exhibit A, establish that after 

Ms. Stewart left the Sunoco parking lot after being shot, she was chased by her husband 
No. 23AP-203 10

(appellant) in a separate vehicle as she drove from Columbus to Whitehall until the point 

at which she encountered Officer Hicks at the intersection of Main Street and James Road. 

Ms. Stewart’s statements reporting that appellant was chasing her during this time frame 

were supported by the photograph of appellant’s vehicle captured by Whitehall’s Flock 

surveillance camera No. 16, which was located only 5 blocks from the intersection where 

Ms. Stewart was found with two gunshot wounds.

{¶ 30} Furthermore, although Ms. Stewart did not testify at trial, multiple 

statements made by her identifying appellant as her assailant were admitted into evidence. 

Officer Hicks testified that Ms. Stewart identified appellant as the person who shot her in 

the immediate aftermath of the shooting. Ms. Stewart also identified appellant as the 

shooter in several statements she made during the course of her treatment both in the 

ambulance during transport to Mount Carmel East Hospital and at the hospital. These 

statements identifying appellant as the perpetrator were established via the testimony and 

reports of EMT Sarah Wagner, forensic nurse Angela Nelson, and forensic nurse Julie Foor. 

Notably, there was no evidence presented by the defense which identified another possible 

assailant.

{¶ 31} The foregoing evidence is entirely consistent with a jury finding that 

appellant was the perpetrator of the shooting against Ms. Stewart. Construing the evidence 

in favor of the state, we conclude it was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that appellant

had committed felonious assault with a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by 

R.C. 2903.11. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to establish appellant’s identity as the 

perpetrator of the charges against him, and the trial court properly overruled appellant’s 

motions for acquittal made pursuant to Crim.R. 29.

{¶ 32} The manifest weight of the evidence also supports appellant’s conviction for 

felonious assault with a firearm specification. As set forth above, under a manifest weight 

of the evidence analysis, although we are able to consider the credibility of the witnesses in 

conducting our review, “we are guided by the presumption that the jury * * * ‘is best able to 

view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use 

these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’ ” Cattledge at

¶ 6, quoting Seasons Coal Co., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80. In this case, the jury was entirely free 

to believe the testimony of the witnesses presented by the state. See Gullick at ¶ 11. Indeed, 
No. 23AP-203 11

“the testimony of one witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction.” 

State v. Hood, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-656, 2015-Ohio-5373, ¶ 11, citing State v. Strong, 10th 

Dist. No. 09AP-874, 2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42.

{¶ 33} Moreover, “a prerequisite for any reversal on manifest-weight grounds is 

conflicting evidence.” State v. Tate, 140 Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-Ohio-3667, ¶ 20 (court of 

appeals erred in reversing conviction based on manifest weight where evidence of 

perpetrator’s identity was overwhelming). Here, there was no conflicting evidence as to the 

identity of the perpetrator. Instead, as noted above, appellant was the only person 

identified as the person responsible for shooting Ms. Stewart. And as we have already 

found, the state presented sufficient evidence to establish identity and all other elements of 

felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in engaging in the limited weighing of 

the evidence which we are permitted, we cannot say the jury clearly lost its way when it 

found appellant guilty of felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find 

that the manifest weight of the evidence supports appellant’s conviction.

{¶ 34} In sum, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the evidence was 

insufficient or that the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 

justice that his conviction on the charge of felonious assault with a gun specification must 

be reversed and a new trial ordered. Because appellant’s conviction was supported by 

sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, his first and 

second assignments of error are overruled.

IV. Disposition

{¶ 35} Having overruled both appellant’s first and second assignments of error, we 

affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

MENTEL, P.J., and EDELSTEIN, J., concur.