THEUSAFINTHEPERSIAN GULF WAR

On Target

Organizing and Executing the

Strategic Air Campaign

Against Iraq

Richard G. Davis

Air Force History and Museums Program

United States Air Force

Washington, D.C., 2002
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air

Force History and Museums Program, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of

Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Davis, Richard G.

On target : organizing and executing the strategic air campaign against Iraq / Richard G.

Davis.

p. cm. — (The USAF in the Persian Gulf War)

1. Persian Gulf War, 1991—Aerial operations, American. 2. Persian Gulf War, 1991—

Campaigns—Iraq. 3. United States. Air Force—History—Persian Gulf War, 1991. I.

Title. II. Series.

DS79.744.A47 D39 2002

956.7044'248—dc21

2002015525
Other Publications

from the

AIR FORCE HISTORY AND MUSEUMS PROGRAM

NOTICE: This volume covers only strategic air operations over Iraqi territory.

For coverage of air matters in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, please read

Perry Jamieson’s Lucrative Targets.

Richard G. Davis, Roots of Conflict: A Military Perspective on the Middle East

and Persian Gulf Crisis, 1993.

Perry Jamieson, Lucrative Targets: The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of

Operations, 2001.

Steven B. Michael, The Persian Gulf War: An Air Staff Chronology of Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, forthcoming.

William T. Y’Blood, The Eagle and The Scorpion: The Desert Shield First Phase

Deployment, forthcoming.

William T. Y’Blood, Sharpening the Eagles Talons: USAF and the Desert Shield

Second Phase Deployment, forthcoming.

Diane T. Putney, Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign,

forthcoming.

Foreword

The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 capped an era of USAF modernization

and enhanced readiness begun in the late 1970s and that continued through the

1980s. The long lead-time weapons acquisition and training programs, begun a

decade or more earlier, came to fruition against a far different opponent and in

an unforeseen locale than that envisioned by their creators. The force designed

to counter the superpower foe of the Cold War, the USSR, never fought a direct

battle against that enemy during the existence of the Soviet Union. Instead, the

USAF fought the first war of the so-called New World Order, a war that had as

much in common with the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century as it had

with the high-technology wars of the late twentieth century.

The USAF shouldered the bulk of the fighting for the first thirty-nine of the

conflict’s forty-two days. This volume covers the air offensive against strategic

military and economic targets within the pre-August 1990 borders of Iraq. The

offensive air plan once again displayed the ability of the U.S. military to turn the

necessity of improvisation into a virtue when, in mid-August 1990, an element

of the Air Staff in the Pentagon wrote the basis of the offensive plan in ten days.

The plan was founded upon the precepts of Col. John A. Warden III’s air power

theories—centers of gravity, shock effect, and the importance of leadership-related targets. Once the outline plan reached the arena of operations, the U.S. Central

Air Forces (CENTAF), under the able leadership of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner,

adopted the targeting philosophy of the plan and, after many modifications

owing to new targets and an increased force structure, employed it with devastating effect.

The author describes not only the outstanding performance of USAF men

and machines but also the difficulties and complexities of coordinating the many

elements of air and staff operations. Among these were the complex coordination

of the fighters with their tankers, the speedy transmission of data from the allseeing eyes of AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, the multiple bomb runs over chemical and biological warfare bunkers, and the shortcomings of certain types of

intelligence. All these factors impacted on mission effectiveness. The author also

diagrams how outside influences—political pressure from neutrals, such as the

Israelis, and from public news media—can affect the direction of the bombing

effort.

Although this account of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf concentrates

on the operational history of a six-week war, it also places that war into its largv
er political and military context, especially in its tale of the interplay between the

U.S. military and civilian leadership. It illustrates, with reference to actual missions, the operational advantages of stealth fighter bombers as well as their vulnerabilities. Davis presents the reader with a detailed account of one of the

USAF’s most important air operations in the last half of the twentieth century.

In the decade after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the pattern of strategic air

operations against Iraq became the template for USAF operations over Bosnia

and during the air war over Serbia and, most recently, in Afghanistan as well. In

planning for air operations in the Balkans, USAF officers were strongly influenced by John A. Warden’s methodology and ideology with its emphasis on centers of gravity and strikes on leadership targets. Stealth air combat operations,

inaugurated en masse in the Gulf War, became even more prevalent with the

introduction of the B–2 bomber. Likewise, the use of precision weapons grew.

The aversion of western democracies to both military and civilian casualties and

their effect on targeting, tactics, and strategy first encountered over Iraq became

more pronounced in subsequent conflicts—as did the continuing challenge in

matching accurate intelligence to precision weapons.

Because of these enduring trends, study of the Persian Gulf War will continue to offer members of the service and the public valuable insights and information applicable to current military affairs.

RICHARD P. HALLION

The Air Force Historian

vi

Foreword
Author’s Note

This work is focused on the “offensive air campaign against Iraq,” a term

implying that the strategic phase of the air campaign that attacked military and

economic targets in Iraq proper was part of a larger overall air operation. The

author also uses the term “strategic air campaign” sometimes interchangeably

with “offensive air campaign” to refer to the strategic phase of the campaign, not

the overall campaign. No air operation occurs in a vacuum, especially one

involving the vast geographic distances of the theater of operations and the

numerous military units supplied by the Coalition partners. The author, therefore,

has made a thorough effort to place the Persian Gulf War in its larger political

and military context to explain the motivations behind the Coalition’s conduct of

the campaign. The professionalism of the USAF also profoundly affected the

conduct of operations. It is important to understand that the unprecedentedly high

morale, discipline, and training of U.S. servicemen and women, which rested to

some extent upon honoring local customs and the strictures of Islam and to a

greater extent on the all-volunteer military, had a positive affect on operations.

The extraordinary air plan, hastily developed for the strategic phase of the

campaign by the Air Staff, provided the linchpin for this narrative. The underlying targeting philosophy of the plan, not necessarily all its details, drove the final

prewar preparations and directed much of the first ten days of the war, as well as

heavily influenced air operations to the conflict’s end. The plan’s goals and

objectives, drawn up by airmen and approved by the national leadership, provide

a ready-made yardstick for judging the USAF’s performance in the strategic air

phases of operations against Iraq. Neither in the light of operations in the Balkans

nor those in Afghanistan in the decade since this work’s creation has the author

found reason to change his original conclusions as expressed here.

Many people assisted me in the research and preparation of this volume. The

support of my wife, Lois, my daughter, Erin, and my sons, Owen and Colin,

enabled me to spend many long hours away from home at the classified word

processor in my office and at Langley and Shaw AFBs and Hurlburt Field.

Several members of the Air Force History Field Program gave freely of their

time, supplying useful advice and directing me through valuable records in their

custody. In particular, I would like to thank Grant M. Hales, George W. Bradley

III, James M. George, CMSgt. Gerald Wright, Jeffery S. Underwood, David L.

Rosmer, Barry R. Barlow, Patrick E. Murray, Herbert A. Mason, Jr., and SSgt.

Randy G. Bergeron. Dr. Wayne Thompson, assigned to the Center for Air Force

vii
History, served as the Checkmate historian from early August 1990 through June

1991 and as then as Senior Historical Advisor to the Gulf War Air Power Survey.

Historians owe a permanent debt to him for the documentation he collected and

preserved. He generously shared his unique knowledge of wartime planning and

personnel with all members of the History Support Office Desert Shield/Storm

writing team. The reviewers of the first draft of the manuscript, Gen. Charles A.

Horner, Lt. Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Col. John A. Warden III, Col. George K.

Williams, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, and Herman

Wolk, earned the author’s gratitude for their painstaking and honest work, which

revealed new insights into wartime operations. I would further also like to thank

my colleagues in the Air Force History Support Office—especially Dr. Perry D.

Jamieson, Dr. Diane T. Putney, and William T. (Tom) Y’Blood—Dr. Alfred

(Fred) M. Beck, and Jacob (Jack) Neufeld. Finally, the Air Force Historian, Dr.

Richard P. Hallion showed an unflagging interest in this work, which included

taking time from his schedule to serve as the initial reader of the manuscript

RICHARD G. DAVIS

viii

Author’s Note
The Author

The author, Dr. Richard G. Davis, joined the USAF history program in 1980,

transferring to the Air Staff History Branch in 1985 and to the Histories Division

in 1990. He has published several articles on World War II strategic bombing and

a military biography on one of the USAF’s leading practitioners of strategic

bombing, General Carl A. Spaatz. Davis became familiar with modern service

programs and doctrine by covering the Program Objective Memorandum and

issues surrounding the interservice agreements known as the “31 Initiatives”

from 1985 to 1990.

ix

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Author’s Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Desert Shield

1: The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2: The Initial Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3: The Offensive Air Campaign Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

4: The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Desert Storm

5: The Decision for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

6: Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

7: Weather and the Great Scud Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

8: Continuing the Air Offensive against Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

9: Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Availability of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

Illustrations

F–111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

F–15E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

General Norman Schwarzkopf and Prince Khalid bin Sultan . . . . . . . . 40

TR–1; KC–10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner and General Michael J. Dugan . . . . . . . . . 59

GBU–10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

General Merrill A. “Tony” McPeak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Planning maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

F–111; F–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

xi
General John T. Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner and Col. Hal M. Hornburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

General Colin L. Powell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

F–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Destroyed bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

JSTARS aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

IOC and SOC regional map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

B–52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

CBU–87s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

F–111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Destroyed rocket propellant plant (UN Photo 159129 / H. Arvidsson) . . 215

Satellite imagery of Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Lt. Gen. Buster C. Glosson and Lt. Col. David A. Deptula . . . . . . . . . . 227

Maj. Gen. John A. Corder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

Black Hole personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Postattack Scud storage bunkers (USNphoto) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Warsaw Pact hardened aircraft shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

KC–10s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Tab Vee hardened aircraft shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

F–117A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Aircraft bunker and shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

Destroyed Iraqi warehouse; nerve agent component jerry cans

(UN Photos 158687 (bottom) and 158689 (top) / both H. Arvidsson) . . . 295

Nerve agent incineration chamber; nerve agent hydrolysis plant

(UN Photos 159110 (left) and 159116 (right) / both H. Arvidsson) . . . . . 311

xii

Contents
Chapter One

The Kuwait Crisis and the

Decision to Intervene

We know that Washington’s threats are those of a

paper tiger. America is still nursing the disasters

from the Vietnam War, and no American official,

be it even George Bush, would dare to do anything serious against the Arab nation.

Iraqi editorial, August 2, 1990.1

On August 2, 1990, the Republic of Iraq occupied the Emirate of Kuwait,

extinguished its government and armed forces, and annexed it. The Iraqi leader,

Saddam Hussein, had achieved a strategic surprise over the United States and the

Arab powers in the Persian Gulf as dramatic as that of Egyptian President Anwar

Sadat over the Israelis in October 1973.2 This action followed an escalating dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. In brief, the Kuwaitis refused to kowtow to three

Iraqi demands: forgiveness of billions of dollars of loans extended to Iraq during

its war with Iran in the 1980s, adherence to lower Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) petroleum sales quotas, and the halting of alleged

overexploitation of the Rumaila oil field,3 which extends across a portion of the

border shared by the two nations. Although the Iraqis may have prepared for

1

Preface

1. From an editorial cited in Norman Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War:

Blueprint for Defeat,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, No. 1 (Mar 1992), p. 3.

2. For a discussion of this and its implications for the conduct and analysis of U.S. foreign relations, see P. Edward Haley, “Saddam Surprises the United States: Learning from ‘The

Revolution of August 2,’” Armed Forces and Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal 22, No. 2

(Winter 1995/96), pp. 159–185.

3. Carlye Murphy, “Persian Gulf Crisis Swells: Iraqi Is Given New Title,” Washington

Post, Jul 20, 1990, p. A12.
their move far in advance,4 the Kuwaitis’ rejection of their demands provided the

proximate cause of the invasion. Iraq also had tenuous claims, unrecognized by

the international community, to overall suzerainty of Kuwait on the basis of

administrative arrangements with Great Britain in the 1920s through 1940s, the

Ottoman Turkish Empire in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, and the

even earlier Baghdad caliphate. When Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, substituted action for rhetoric by seizing his neighbor, he transformed a regional quarrel into a world crisis. Saddam also doubled his proven petroleum reserves to

approximately 200 billion barrels and gained control of about 20 percent of the

entire world’s crude oil production. Within a week of the fall of Kuwait City, the

first of hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen began to

arrive in Saudi Arabia for the dual purpose of protecting that monarchy from

Iraqi aggression and of reversing the conquest of Kuwait. When U.S. and world

economic sanctions, political pressure, and diplomatic negotiations all failed in

the face of Saddam Hussein’s unbending determination to retain his newly

acquired nineteenth province, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and their many

allies were left with only two choices: war or surrender.

Surrender had unthinkable domestic political consequences for the alliance’s

leaders and guaranteed international anarchy by allowing the world’s revisionist

powers to act on their desires to rearrange the globe to their advantage, free from

the threat of reprisal. Therefore, the president of the United States, George H. W.

Bush; the king of Saudi Arabia, Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud; and their allies

decided upon war.

The Persian Gulf War began early in the morning of January 17, 1991, with

massive allied air strikes on Iraq and Iraqi targets in Kuwait. The United States

Air Force (USAF) spearheaded this air offensive and furnished the bulk of the

attacking aircraft. During the forty-two days of fighting, the USAF and its

Coalition and other U.S. service partners simultaneously conducted three, and

then four, closely coordinated phases of a single air campaign. The first phase,

which began the war and continued until its conclusion, struck at strategic targets

deep in Iraq; the second phase suppressed Iraqi air defenses in Kuwait and southern Iraq; the third attacked Iraqi regular army and Republican Guard ground

units to prepare the way for a possible Coalition ground assault; and the fourth

supplied close air support (CAS) to attacking Coalition units. The strategic air

campaign that constituted the initial phase of the four-phase plan sought to isolate and incapacitate Saddam Hussein’s government; gain and maintain air

supremacy in order to permit unhindered air operations; destroy Iraqi nuclear,

biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons capability; and eliminate Iraq’s offensive military capability, which included key military production facilities and

2

On Target

4. James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf

War (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), p. 72. Blackwell refers to unnamed intelligence sources

who claim that the Iraqis had trained on one-to-one mock-ups of Kuwait in a base camp in

southeastern Iraq since 1989.
infrastructure and instruments of power projection, such as the Iraqi Air Force

(IZAF), the Republican Guard, and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).5 This

work will emphasize USAF operational planning and combat operations while

focusing on the role of the USAF in the diplomatic and military moves undertaken by the U.S. government in the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities and during the hostilities themselves.

The Kuwait Crisis

Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, initiated a series of

diplomatic and military actions and reactions culminating in an armed conflict

between Iraq and an international Coalition headed by the United States. During

the period between the fall of Kuwait and the outbreak of hostilities on January

17, 1991, the USAF played a significant role. Using the major diplomatic, military, and political decisions of the U.S. government as a chronological framework, this section will examine the buildup of USAF units and aircraft within the

area of responsibility (AOR); discuss command arrangements defining both the

USAF’s position within the overall American military effort and the USAF’s

internal command arrangements within the AOR; and, lastly, concentrate on the

service’s planning and preparations for an offensive air campaign against Iraq.

This chapter examines how the governments of the United States, Iraq, and

Saudi Arabia combined to create the situation least desired by Iraq: the direct

intervention of a global superpower against Iraq’s interests. If Iraq could prevent

the direct intervention of a non-Gulf power within the Gulf, then Iraqi domination of the region was ensured. However, Iraq contained only a single locus of

decision-making—Saddam Hussein. He initiated the crisis, and his judgement as

to the likelihood of outside interference would drive events. His insular viewpoint and the sycophantic nature of information channels available to him

adversely affected his ability to calculate the risks he indulged in. This chapter,

and those that follow, for all their focus on the actions of the USAF, spin a cautionary tale on the millennium-old sin of hubris.

USAF technological trends and doctrinal thought under development for

almost twenty years culminated in this short though precise and destructive

strategic bombing campaign. Some technical developments had proceeded openly, such as advances in navigation made possible by the satellites of the Global

Positioning System (GPS); others, such as electronic combat devices and precision guided munitions (PGMs), proceeded in acknowledged but secret projects;

some, such as stealth flight technology, hatched and matured out of public sight

in the so-called supersecret “black world.” At the same time, the USAF also

began to assess its strategic warfighting doctrine (see especially Chapter 3) in an

3

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

5. Brfg Slide, “Air Campaign Plan & Targets,” Reflections on Desert Storm: The Air

Campaign, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, Comd Gen, 9AF, n.d. [May 1991].
effort to adapt to changing circumstances and technology. A brief review of the

background of some of these important changes is necessary.

Operations Linebacker I and Linebacker II, which were conducted by U.S.

air power over North Vietnam from May to October 1972 and in December 1972,

served as both a harbinger and a last hurrah for the old order of strategic bombardment. In Linebacker I, launched to counter a massive North Vietnamese

ground offensive into the Republic of South Vietnam’s northernmost provinces,

USAF fighter-bombers made the first sustained use of PGMs. They employed

electro-optically guided bombs and also laser-guided bombs known generically

as glide bomb units (GBUs) to strike key bridges and other pinpoint targets. For

example, on May 10, 12, and 13, 1972, PGMs “dropped”6 seven bridges, including the infamous Paul Doumer Bridge and the bridge at Thanh Hoa, “the bridge

that would never go down.” Heavy air defenses had prevented conventional

attacks on these two bridges for five years. Between April 6 and June 30, 1972,

PGM-equipped F–4Cs of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Ubon, Royal

Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), destroyed 106 bridges including some heretofore

off-limits spans near the Chinese border.7 The dropping of numerous bridges in

rapid succession interrupted North Vietnamese logistics by overtaxing repair

capabilities and denying alternate routes.

The USAF was slow to address the doctrinal implications of this new level

of bombing accuracy. It did not equip the major portion of the combat aircraft it

procured between 1972 and 1990—the F–15C, F–16, and A–10 series—with

GBU-delivery capability.8 The service did upgrade its PGM technology by further developing its initial delivery system, Paveway I. Paveway II (GBUs–10,

–12, and –16) featured improved guidance, structural improvements, and folding

wings that allowed strike aircraft to carry more of these weapons. Paveway II

became operational in the mid-1970s. Paveway III (GBUs–22, –24, and –27)

went into service in the mid-1980s with improved maneuverability, an autopilot,

a laser scanner for target location, and low-level launch capability.9 By mid-1990

the USAF’s entire PGM-capable fleet consisted of only 125 to 135 fighter

4

On Target

6. These attacks characteristically left bridge spans all or partially severed from their supports and resting in the water. The structures appeared as if they had dropped into the water.

USAF pilots quickly made note of this, and service slang began to refer to bridges as “dropped”

rather than destroyed. It is a more accurate term in that a permanent bridge is not “destroyed”

unless its concrete abutments and piers are demolished.

7. Maj. A.J.C. Lavalle, ed., The Tale of Two Bridges, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph

Series (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), Vol. 1, Monogr, 1 pp. 84–86.

8. The F–16 and the A–10 can deliver the Maverick air-to-ground missile (AGM–65). It

is a precision guided munition designed for an anti-armor role, and it achieved excellent results

in attacks on Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers. The Maverick does not have the penetration, weight, or quantity of high explosives required for use in strategic bombardment.

9. Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), App E “The ‘Smart’ Bomb,” pp. 303–307. This is a useful short history of GBU use and development. Also see Ray Braybrook, “On Target!: A

Review of Precision Air Attacks in the Gulf War,” Air International 41, No. 4 (Oct 1991), pp.

177–182.
bombers: 64 swing-wing F–111Fs, 56 stealth F–117As, and a handful of F–4Es.

A further 24 F–15E Strike Eagles would replace the F–4Es and come on-line as

PGM-capable aircraft by the end of 1990.10

While many nations and the other U.S. armed services possessed PGMs by

1990, the USAF alone possessed an air-delivered PGM with hard-target penetrating capacity.11 By May 1988 the BLU–109/B (I–2000) penetrating bomb had

completed much of its initial operational tests and evaluations both in an unguided version (intended for F–16s) and in guided versions for PGM-capable aircraft.12 The cleanly designed 2,000-pound bomb’s ballistic and handling characteristics were similar to the standard American Mk–84 blast and fragmentation

bomb, which simplified its employment in the field. But this version had a body

of 1-inch-thick, high-strength forged steel that encased 550 pounds of Tritonal

explosive filler and a tail-mounted, delayed-action fuse. Striking with a high

kinetic impact velocity and at the proper angle of impact, the bomb could penetrate six feet of hardened concrete or several feet of rubble and other filler.13

However, a strike with too shallow an impact angle contributed to the J-hooking

effect, in which the weapon moved sideways rather than downward with a consequent lessening of its penetration. (The Paveway III [GBU–24 and –27] also

5

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

10. For the F–117 figure, see slide 741622, Air Force Stealth Technology Review, June

10–14, 1991, Checkmate, Desert Storm Files, F–117. As of mid-1990 the F–15E Strike Eagles

of the 4th TFW, Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C., had not yet received their LANTIRN targeting

pods. Although one of the 4th’s squadrons was in operational status and the other was in the

process of working up, none of its planes were PGM-capable. By the beginning of 1991, both

squadrons had deployed to CENTAF, and some had targeting pods.

11. The British Royal Air Force possessed the JP–233 airfield-denial munition capable of

penetrating hardened concrete runways. It was not designed for use against structures. A hardened structure is an individual building or facility sheathed in several feet of specially hardened

steel-reinforced concrete. The structure may also be covered with several feet of rubble and

earth. Earth fill, hardened concrete, and sheet steel plate may alternate in covering a single

super-hardened facility. A conventional high-explosive bomb will either explode on contact or

only dig a slight hole in a hardened structure before exploding. It essentially does no damage

other than obliterating aerials and other soft protrusions from the target. A penetrating munition can burrow through several feet of hardened material to explode within the target.

12. Capt. Jeffery A. Paulk, “Unguided BLU–109/B,” USAF Fighter Weapons Review,

Spring 1990, p. 32.

13. Ibid., p. 33.

F-111 mounted with

four Paveway laserguided bombs
came in I–2000 penetrator variants for the F–111F and F–117A respectively.)

When joined to a guided delivery system, the BLU–109 offered a weapons system of awesome lethality and surgical precision. Like the Belgians at Eben

Emael in May 1940, the Iraqis in January 1991 would find hardened concrete

insufficient insurance against a foe’s ingenuity.

If Linebacker I pointed to the future, Linebacker II sent a somewhat mixed

signal to the analyst. Linebacker II intended not only to deny valuable matériel

and safe areas to the enemy, but to break his will and force him to return to the

peace table. It attempted to do so by employing large-scale B–52 strikes on key

targets primarily in the Hanoi-Haiphong areas. With approximately 200 B–52Ds

and Gs available at Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), Guam, and at U-Tapao,

RTAFB, the USAF launched eleven days of massed heavy bomber raids of 60 to

129 aircraft equipped with radar bombsights and conventional iron bombs.14

From December 18 to 29, 1972, American bombers blasted over thirty-four targets, including marshaling yards, storage and warehouse facilities, fabrication

plants, and airfields with 500- and 750-pound bombs. They flew 729 sorties,

dropped 15,237 tons of bombs, and lost 15 B–52s, for a loss rate of 2 percent.15

Because of the enormous bomblift of the B–52D—up to fifty tons—the amount

of high explosives delivered in a raid of twenty-five B–52s compared favorably

to that of a typical 750- to 1,000-plane B–17 raid of the Eighth Air Force during

World War II. The Linebacker II missions, with single formations of aircraft

occupying over seventy miles of airspace, marked the end of the era of massed

heavy bombers conducting strategic bombing. By the end of the 1960s, not even

the United States, much less any other power, could afford to build and maintain

large numbers of heavy, multiengine bombers with their insatiable demands on

national resources and trained personnel. From 624 B–52s and FB–111s in Fiscal

Year 1973,16 the USAF strategic bomber inventory steadily declined to a projected total of 266 B–1s, B–2s, and B–52s in FY 1993.17

Another aspect of Linebacker II presaged Gulf War air operations. During

Linebacker II, large numbers of other combat aircraft flew in support of the

attacking bombers. For example, a raid of thirty B–52s on Haiphong on December 22, 1972, required the assistance of sixty-five supporting aircraft including

EB–66 and EA–6B U.S. Navy (USN) electronic countermeasures craft; F–105

6

On Target

14. See Brig. Gen. James R. McCarthy and Lt. Col. George B. Allison, Linebacker II: A

View from the Rock, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Airpower

Research Institute, Air War College, 1979), Vol. 6, Monogr 8, for a day-by-day description of

the campaign.

15. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, June 1991), p. 263.

16. USAF, Statistical Digest, Fiscal Year 1973 (28th ed.), Jul 31, 1974, p. 59.

17. Maj. Gen. Robert M. Alexander, “Force Structure for the Future,” in Richard H.

Schultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the

Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Jul 1992), p. 220. In September 1990 the

Strategic Air Command had approximately 300 bombers of which a little more than 200 were

B–52Gs and –Hs.
Iron Hands to suppress surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses; F–4 Hunter/

Killers to suppress antiaircraft artillery (AAA); and numerous other F–4s to provide close escort, MiG combat air patrol (CAP); chaff delivery (metallic streamers delivered in bundles from aircraft to deceive and mislead enemy radar), and

chaff delivery escort.18 In World War II the Eighth Air Force required one fighter escort for two bombers, but the complexity, layering, and integration of modern electronic/missile/gun/aircraft air defenses has reversed that ratio, a consideration that goes far to justify the expense of a modern air defense system. An

attack by thirty bombers exposed ninety-five aircraft to enemy countermeasures.

This further militated against mass bomber attacks; the attacking force simply

became too large to defend. Multifaceted air defenses demanded equally complex responses from attacking aircraft. This compelled the attacker to divide his

force into aircraft specializing in different roles and to combine those aircraft into

packages tailored to meet the specific threats within the expected target area.

After the war in Southeast Asia, the USAF continued the practice of developing

strike packages as part of its overall target planning methodology. The Gulf War

planners made heavy use of force packaging.

Making oneself invisible to the eye of the foe has been the stuff of legend

for thousands of years. More recently it has become the province of technology.

From 1940 to the mid-1970s, aerial opponents sought to jam, spoof, or destroy

radar with electronic countermeasures by dispensing various configurations of

chaff and by developing antiradiation missiles to home on and destroy emitters.

Such brute force or active methods proved subject to counter-countermeasures,

interfered with one’s own electronic equipment, and were seldom broad enough

to blind every specific threat. The U.S. experience in Vietnam and the Israeli

experience in the October 1973 war of flying against ever more complex air

defenses, however, stimulated interest in the development of a passive response

to this problem—air vehicles designed to present little or no radar cross section

(RCS) from any angle and with a minimal heat signature to foil infrared (IR)

detection. In late 1978 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the USAF began

development of a stealth combat aircraft,19 the first combat aircraft designed on

the basis of RCS needs, not aerodynamic or flight performance requirements.20

In November 1988 the USAF brought the F–117A stealth fighter out of the

black world and introduced its distinctive appearance, but not its sophisticated

technology, to public view.21 It first flew in June 1981, and the service took deliv7

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

18. McCarthy and Allison, Linebacker II, p. 101.

19. See Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, pp. 293–294, for a thumbnail sketch of the stealth fighter’s development.

20. Lockheed had experience in this field. In the 1960s the design of the SR–71 strategic

reconnaissance aircraft, built at Lockheed’s “skunk works,” gave considerable attention to

reduction of its radar image. In the 1970s Lockheed built the Have Blue technology demonstrator, the first aircraft designed and built for stealth.

21. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: DoD, Jul 1991), p. 6-2.
ery of the last of the fifty-nine aircraft contracted for in June 1990. Given the aircraft’s impact on future technology, its potential against enemy air defenses, and

its effectiveness as a bombing platform, the USAF received a bargain, especially when compared to the USAF’s investment in the B–1, B–2, and C–17 aircraft

or such specialty aircraft as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

(JSTARS), all of which cost far in excess of $100 million per unit. In 1991 dollars, the total F–117 program cost a relatively modest $8.2 billion overall, with a

unit flyaway cost (airframe, engines [installed], electronics, ordnance, and armament) of $52.5 million.22 The F–111F had a unit flyaway cost of $10.9 million in

1973 currency23 (roughly equal to $45 million in 1991), but it required a supporting package of electronics-jamming aircraft and aircraft capable of suppressing enemy air defenses to reach its target. The F–117 needed no support

other than tanker refueling, thus saving the large costs (fuel, weapons, refueling,

and maintenance, not to mention possible loss of aircraft and personnel) associated with escorts. To minimize financial risk and expense and to speed the

F–117’s development, Lockheed used parts from both the F/A–18 and F–16

fighters as well as adapted existing attack, computer, and electronics systems.

The F–16’s fly-by-wire digital flight-control system proved particularly beneficial in controlling the dynamically unstable F–117 aircraft. Computer modeling,

at levels far exceeding those available to previous designers, greatly assisted

development.

Stealth technology evolved during World War II with the introduction of the

British Mosquito light bomber, constructed of plywood for a low radar return,

and with later models of the German U-boat snorkel,24 relatively small devices

coated with a radar-absorbent material. Stealth technology uses surface shaping

to eliminate direct returns, minimize dwell, and produce deceptive returns and

uses radar-absorbent materials to reduce RCS. RCS has no direct relationship to

the aircraft’s physical cross section. Stealth was not intended to make an aircraft

invisible; rather, the intent was to make an aircraft difficult to detect and virtually impossible to track and engage. Stealth works against all types of radars. A

powerful ground search radar may get a weakened return, but less powerful SAM

and AAA tracking radars or airborne fighter-interceptor radars will not get a

image suitable for lock-on of their weapons system and thus be unable to engage

the stealth aircraft. To reduce the chance of being sighted, the F–117 attacks only

at night, and since visual tracking is eliminated, only a very lucky random shot

8

On Target

22. Brfg Slide, “F–117 Program,” Air Force Stealth Technology Review, June 10–14,

1991, Checkmate, Desert Storm Files, F–117.

23. Marcelle Size Knaack, Post–World War II Fighters, 1945–1973, USAF Reference

Series (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), p. 259 n. 113.

24. The snorkel was a captive buoy with an air hose attached. It allowed a submarine to

stay below the surface, avoiding detection, and still use its air-breathing diesel engines and conserve or recharge its electric drives. Use of the more powerful diesel engines doubled a submarine’s speed. However, improved radar permitted the Allies to locate even the snorkel.

Hence the Germans countered with radar-absorbent material.
will bring the aircraft down. With stealth, it can operate in areas closed to other

attacking planes and can threaten high-value targets.25

The USAF scored a unique technological triumph with the F–117A. Like

Great Britain in 1905–1906 when it introduced the dreadnought all-big-gun battleship, the United States, with stealth, deployed a weapons technology of dramatic political, military, and even economic impact. Just as the dreadnought

invalidated the battle fleets of Britain’s enemies, stealth aircraft nullified the

standing air defenses of the Soviet Union and other states. The tremendous

Soviet investment in comprehensive and redundant radar warning networks and

air defenses now required upgrading with a technological counter to stealth, if

such could be developed, and at staggering expense. Unlike Wilhelmine

Germany, the Soviet Union, in the throes of a profound societal and economic

crisis, had little choice but to accept, for the time being, a U.S. monopoly on

stealth and its own vulnerability to these aircraft.

Other newly deployed technological devices from satellites to the secure

facsimile (fax) machine aided air operations in matters both great and small.

Space-based systems proved invaluable. Three satellites of the Defense Support

System, originally designed to warn of a Soviet ballistic missile attack against

the United States, scanned Iraq for the exhaust glow from SRBM, or Scud,

launches.26 The Navstar GPS satellite network revolutionized air and surface

navigation. Hand-held receivers and other more accurate receivers in aircraft,

vehicles, ships, and weapons allowed Coalition forces to locate their positions to

within sixty feet instead of within eight miles, as had been the case with older

ground-based navigation systems. Three satellites of the Defense Meteorological

Satellite Program and three commercial weather satellites provided accurate

weather updates in as little as ninety minutes and sometimes allowed near realtime retargeting of missions. The Defense Communications Satellite System

provided thousands of secure circuits, while intelligence satellites, including the

commercial Landsat system, ferreted out enemy surface dispositions. The secure

fax and telephone systems of the U.S. military concealed information from the

enemy and allowed unprecedented direct access between lower echelon staffs in

the United States and in the theater of operations.27

U.S. military war plans and planners, however, had not fully assimilated the

import of these changes in aeronautical, munitions, and satellite technology. In

fact, deployment planning, not integrated warfighting, dominated the attention of

9

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

25. Public Lecture, Richard P. Hallion, “The Stealth Revolution,” Smithsonian Institution,

Washington, D.C., April 4, 1992. While assigned to the Air Force Systems Command in the

1980s, Dr. Hallion served as an Air Force historian with responsibility for the F–117A and

other programs.

26. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), p. 194.

27. See the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Vol. 4, pt. 2, Space Operations (1st

ed.), for a detailed survey of satellite contributions.
the staffs of both the U.S. Combined Theater Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and

their subordinate service component commanders.

In the beginning of 1990, the AOR of the United States Central Command

(CENTCOM) covered a broad region comprising much of the Muslim world.

Within its purview fell the following nations: Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya,

Somalia, Djibouti, the Yemen Arab Republic, the Democratic Republic of

Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait,

Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The AOR further included the Red

Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Oman.

The USAF Ninth Air Force, headquartered at Shaw AFB, South Carolina,

provided the initial air combat units and the air command and staff elements of

the U.S. Air Force Component, Central Command (CENTAF). The commander

of the Ninth Air Force, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF, served as the Air

Component Commander of USAF units in the AOR and as the Commander of

the Central Command Air Forces (COMCENTAF). He also held the post of Joint

Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) with responsibility for limited control, planning, and coordination with the air elements of the other services at the

direction of the Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT).

Several factors combined to make the Ninth Air Force/CENTAF headquarters staff an unusually cohesive and homogeneous body. In the mid-1980s, the

USAF entered a period of continuing fiscal constraints when the Reagan administration’s defense buildup ceased and defense funding no longer kept pace with

inflation. As one of its reactions to this situation, the service introduced a policy

to limit the frequency of costly permanent change of station (PCS) moves for its

personnel. The reduction of PCS moves had a completely unplanned, but beneficial, effect on the Ninth Air Force. By the summer of 1990, many members of

the staff had worked together for four, five, six, or more years. With the staff free

of the periodic turnover of personnel, which usually meant that at any one time,

one-third of all officers had not yet learned their jobs, the Ninth Air Force had

10

On Target

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner
the luxury of time with which to examine and attempt to solve the problems of

the AOR and to learn to know and trust one another.

In the years before the summer of 1990, the Ninth Air Force staff participated in Blue Flag staff exercises and other types of exercises dealing with command and organization problems in the Persian Gulf. In the Blue Flag of early

1990 and in Exercise Internal Look of July 1990, the CENTAF staff explored its

possible responses to Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia. During these and

earlier exercises, the CENTAF staff worked to hammer out the bumps in one of

its principal air control tools, the air tasking order (ATO).28 In theory, the daily

ATO scheduled all aircraft flights of all services and nations within an AOR. The

ATO also served to coordinate with air defense forces and prevent aircraft from

entering all types of restricted areas.29 A complicated daily ATO could reach telephone-book size; hence units received only the portions covering themselves and

their supporting organizations. In the period before the present crisis, the

CENTAF staff had made substantial progress in working up a flyable, or executable, ATO. In doing so, they had discovered that experience mattered greatly

in the preparation of an ATO, an art form almost as much as a mechanical

process.30 Because of the large distances in the AOR between likely bases and

likely targets, most strikes would require air-to-air refueling of aircraft: no

tankers, no strikes. Therefore, coordination and scheduling of tankers assumed

primary importance, so the CENTAF staff decided before the conflict to reverse

the normal ATO planning process which treated tankers as an afterthought to

strike planning, and to build the ATO around the tankers by initially creating an

optimal schedule for them, and then adding the combat and other missions to it.

However, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Strategic Air Command

(SAC) tanker planners, who controlled the tanker inputs to the theater ATO,

insisted on a less radical solution. They agreed to amend the normal process that

treated tankers as an afterthought to strike planning and to build the ATO in conjunction with the tanker plan. This meant that the strike planners built their plans

within the constraints of the tankers, rather than having the tankers attempting to

match their availability to preplanned strikes.

The Achilles’ heel of the ATO lay in the comprehensiveness of its attempt

to control almost every aspect of operations. The unraveling of a single thread,

such as a last-minute tanker air abort or a unit misreading its assignment, could

cause a cascade of changes throughout the ATO as the planners scrambled to

rearrange schedules. The initial change might mean 10 or 15 other changes down

the line. Furthermore, as the number of missions incorporated into a single ATO

increased arithmetically, the number of associated deconfliction, identifica11

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

28. GWAPS, Vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning (2d ed.: Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 41–54.

29. GWAPS, Vol. 1, pt. 2, Command and Control (2d ed.), pp. 13–21, 144–154.

30. Intvw, Lt. Col. David L. Waterstreet, Chief, Combat Plans Automation Branch, DCS/

Ops, 9AF, with Drs. Richard G. Davis, Center for Air Force History (CAFH), and Barry

Barlow, 9AF History Office (9AF/HO), at Shaw AFB, S.C., Mar 6, 1992.
tion–friend-or-foe (IFF), tanker, and other calculations seemed to increase

exponentially.31 This made a large ATO unwieldy and, in theory, liable to fail of

its own weight, especially if forced into numerous rapid changes in response to

enemy counterpressure. Once the aircraft controlled by the ATO approached

enemy territory, the plan provided for some flexibility in that controllers on the

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft could divert strikes to

other targets if necessary. In fact, officers who prepared the ATO, as a matter of

policy, regularly flew on the AWACS to oversee the execution of the ATOs they

had written. Having to correct their own mistakes and problems helped the ATO

writers produce more finished products.

The Ninth Air Force’s precrisis exercises and preparations refined the ATO,

but they do not seem to have had the same effect on its Directorate of Intelligence. The exercises did not, and could not, allow for some of the difficulties

intelligence would encounter. They could not accurately simulate the day-to-day

interface with the national intelligence agencies, which during the campaign

would prove more time-consuming than imagined. Nor could they anticipate the

bottleneck that CENTCOM J–2 would become because of its stunted size. Also,

the rehearsed nature of the exercises allowed for rapid retrieval of preplanned or

anticipated intelligence data and for fully functioning specialized intelligence

communications links. The exercises further gave USAF planners and operators

unrealistic expectations as to the quality, quantity, and speed of distribution of

intelligence material. In short, failure to accurately simulate wartime conditions

would leave both the intelligence and the regular staffs scrambling to remedy the

problems of timely dissemination and the required configuration of intelligence

data. As the CENTAF staff members would discover to their dismay, near-realtime intelligence might have meant almost instantaneous collection, but analysis

and delivery to the field might take many hours, if not days.

The long service times shared among CENTAF staff members and the focus

of the CENTAF operations and planning sections on the ATO had a potential

drawback. Cohesion can also become group-think, and even the professional officers of the CENTAF staff might, without realizing it, become overly committed

to their own point of view. For example, their concentration on the ATO, in some

respects necessary because of its complexity, might tend to blind the staff members to other methods of approaching questions of targeting and direction.

The insularity of the Ninth Air Force meant that the command, from top to

bottom, suffered from a lack of knowledge of and practical experience with the

F–117A stealth fighter and with the use, effects, and implications of PGMs and

their delivery systems. The F–117As had only recently emerged from the supersecret black world of highly security-classified military projects, and the service

had assigned them to a fighter wing in the Twelfth Air Force. Likewise, the Ninth

Air Force lacked experience with the service’s most effective non-stealth, PGM12

On Target

31. Ibid.
capable aircraft, the F–111F, assigned to the 48th TFW of the Third Air Force in

Great Britain. The Ninth Air Force’s sole peacetime PGM-capable wing, the 4th

TFW stationed at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, was in the process of

replacing its Vietnam-era F–4Es—the USAF’s oldest PGM-capable aircraft

equipped with the least-modern delivery system—with the brand-new F–15E

Strike Eagle. However, the first squadron of F–15Es did not enter service until

shortly before the crisis began and had not yet qualified to carry PGM munitions.

In addition, that squadron began operations only with its low-altitude navigation

and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) navigation pods, not its targeting

pods. The targeting pods which equipped the second squadron (which remained

in the United States until December 1990) did not begin to arrive until September

1990. Those factors combined to keep Ninth Air Force planning and operations

personnel almost totally unfamiliar with the new weapons system. The possible

failure to fully appreciate the opportunities offered by stealth aircraft and PGMs

might, at some point, handicap the Ninth Air Force’s ability to plan a full-scale

air campaign. These possible shortcomings, however, should not obscure the

advantages possessed by the CENTAF staff, particularly its extensive knowledge

of and experience in the theater of operations.

For more than forty years the CENTCOM theater of operations had served

as one of the arenas of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet

Union. After the end of the Second World War, the globe’s two superpowers

competed for influence in every geographic region. The struggle touched the

nations surrounding the Persian Gulf, which possessed 57 percent of the world’s

total proven petroleum reserves. Soviet control of that resource would greatly

expand their influence, especially in Western Europe and Japan which relied

heavily on oil from the region. As a consequence, U.S. planning focused on

countering possible Soviet actions. However by the late 1980s, the Soviet Union

appeared to have entered a prolonged period of internal difficulties that gravely

weakened its internal cohesion and control of its satellites in Eastern Europe. In

effect, the Soviets conceded the Cold War, and although their military capacity

13

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

F–15E Strike Eagle
remained great, their willingness to employ it beyond their own borders seemed

minimal. The diminution of the Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf did not eliminate the danger of that area’s control by a power inimical to the United States.

Would-be regional hegemons unfriendly to the West, such as Iran and Iraq, had

the potential to dominate the other, weaker Gulf states. Iran’s August 1988 defeat

by Iraq left Iraq as the region’s most militarily powerful country. With its highly

centralized leadership, secular regime, large military machine, and advanced programs in NBC weapons of mass destruction, Iraq posed an immediate short-term

threat to the stability of the region. Iran, with a population more than twice that

of Iraq’s and led by Muslim fundamentalists who had a broad appeal in the Gulf,

also had an atomic weapons program under way but needed, perhaps, a decade

to rebuild itself after ten years of revolution and war. Iran, if and when it recovered, represented the long-term and possibly more serious strategic threat to the

region. However, CENTCOM’s planning did not immediately recognize this

changed strategic landscape.

When General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army (USA), assumed command of CENTCOM in November 1988, he found his two principal war plans

outdated. He ordered CENTCOM’s plans changed to reflect the results of the

Iran-Iraq War. The resulting CENTCOM plan, Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002–

90, mirrored the new strategic realities. One important feature of this new plan

greatly increased the strength of U.S. forces scheduled to deploy to the area in

the event of conflict. This expanded deployment amply illustrated how the overall lessening of the Soviet threat, which shrank the United States’ need to commit large forces to directly counter that diminished irritation, freed U.S. forces

for use in other sensitive areas of interest. OPLAN 1002–90’s main scenario centered on an Iraqi threat against Persian Gulf oil fields.32 It specified a call-up of

U.S. reserves if conflict broke out. National policy decisions taken in the 1970s

and 1980s to transfer important combat and support functions to the ready

reserves and the National Guard made this call-up mandatory. To perform effectively in prolonged combat, all three services required the activation of selected

reserve formations. Also intended by this policy was that the call-up of thousands

of reservists from their homes and jobs would tend to ensure that the executive

branch of the Federal government (i.e. the president) could not commit large

forces to an overseas conflict without involving all sections and segments of the

citizenry, not just members of the all-volunteer professional military. In theory,

the necessity to activate the reserves placed a brake on a president’s desire to

indulge in frivolous overseas or ill-considered military adventurism—he would

use his call-up authority sparingly to avoid domestic political implications like a

loss of popularity. Obversely, when serious foreign events did force a military

call-up, the entire populace, not just the families of military men and women,

would tend to support successful prosecution of the conflict. Politicians oppos14

On Target

32. GWAPS, Vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning (2d ed.), pp. 27–35.
ing a president gained a check on his options, while the U.S. military, perhaps,

avoided the situation of the Vietnam War when it fought with a divided nation

behind it.

The plan divided operations into three phases. In Phase I, major force

deployments would demonstrate U.S. resolve and position forces to execute the

combat phases of the plan. By August 1990, CENTCOM headquarters’ planners

had not completely finished with some crucial nuts and bolts of this plan. In particular, the plan had no approved time-phased force and deployment data

(TPFDD), a computer-generated data base that supplied much of the information

necessary for sequencing the overall deployment for the plan, delineated the type

of actual unit required by the plan, and indicated points of origin and departure

and exact routing of units and equipment. The TPFDD also contained vital data

on non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements conducted concurrently

with deployment, as well as detailed estimates of transportation requirements to

be filled by common-user lift resources and by theater resources. When the

movement to Saudi Arabia began in August, the lack of a TPFDD would force

the deployment planners to resort to on-the-fly and ad hoc calculations. Constant

changes in deployment schedules and equipment requirements would further

aggravate management of the flood of men and machines into Saudi Arabia, producing a situation that increased both the stress and confusion experienced by

CENTCOM and its component staffs and commanders.33

In Phase II the planners apparently envisioned a modest and limited assault

on Iraq. This meshed with the assumption that Phase II would begin as a reaction to an Iraqi land attack and that the main priority of air would be to slow and

attrit Iraqi ground forces, not to strike deep into Iraq. Phase II targets were selected to establish local air superiority, keep the IZAF out of the ground war, and

damage Iraq’s oil export industry.34

In Phase III, when the Americans and their allies began a counteroffensive,

the targeting strategy sent aircraft to Baghdad and beyond. Scud targets had top

priority, followed by chemical weapons (CW) production and storage facilities.

Then came the Baghdad nuclear power plant and research facility and the pump

stations on the northern Iraqi pipelines. The powerhouse of Iraq’s largest electrical generating plant, Ajaji Bayji, and Iraq’s largest petroleum refinery, both near

Baghdad, had lesser priority. Iraqi command and control (C2) targets had the lowest, but still important, priority. The C2 targets consisted of strictly military facilities—four in Baghdad and three in southern Iraq. Phase III targeting strategy

increased the punishment of Iraq’s oil industry and hit important missile, CW,

and nuclear research targets as well as military C2. It was an extremely conserv15

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

33. See William T. Y’Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion: The USAF and the Desert

Shield First-Phase Deployment, 7 August–8 November 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air

Force History, 1992), pp. 72–73, for a discussion of the difficulties caused by the absence of a

completed TPFDD.

34. GWAPS, Vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning (2d ed.), pp. 35–38.
ative, solid piece of planning, in part because its designers had purposely limited themselves to targets on which they had sufficient intelligence information.35

Rather than indulge in speculation, Ninth Air Force planners chose to limit themselves to what they knew they could accomplish. The Ninth Air Force targeting

strategy reflected judgments that heavily influenced CENTAF defensive planning throughout the initial phase of the crisis. Future CENTAF D-day plans

assumed that the effort to counter an Iraqi ground assault would absorb a large

percentage of USAF assets and that the intent of any bombing deep into Iraq

would be to inflict military and economic punishment.

As part of its preparations for OPLAN 1002–90, Ninth Air Force intelligence officers began in March 1990 to assemble targeting information of potential targets in Iraq.36 Although the Ninth Air Force’s planning and targeting

efforts would be superseded by a radically different and unrelated Air Staff conceived plan (see Chapter 3), they offer a view of the likeliest alternative to the

plan employed. They further demonstrate the direction toward which the Ninth

Air Force directed its efforts throughout August 1990. In fact, CENTAF’s socalled D-day Plan—a reaction plan for an Iraqi ground assault into Saudi Arabia

for which CENTAF prepared ATOs until well into November 1990—descended

directly from this early work.

OPLAN 1002–90, like all of CENTCOM’s deployment plans, rested on the

logistical bedrock of munitions and supplies prepositioned in the Gulf, in Diego

Garcia, or in military bases in the continental United States, such as Holloman

AFB in New Mexico. The Afloat Positioning Force—twelve civilian-manned

vessels at Diego Garcia—carried ammunition, fuel, refrigerated and dry cargo,

airfield construction equipment, and supplies for all three services. USAF supplies filled three of the ships, the last of which had not reached its station and was

off the French Mediterranean coast. In the event of a deployment, all three ships

would head for designated ports to unload. Within the theater, the USAF had a

large land-based prepositioning program, Harvest Falcon, for its own needs.37

The magnificent air base infrastructure of Saudi Arabia provided CENTAF

with a superb foundation for deployment. Without these bases, the USAF would

have lacked the ability to effectively perform its mission against Iraq. One cannot overstate the importance of their contribution to the operation’s success.

Harvest Falcon assets could provide a tent city in a few days, but only the host

nation could provide the runways suitable for USAF aircraft. Either from pride

or foresight or both, the Saudis endowed the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) with

a series of large new air bases able to accommodate a much larger force than the

16

On Target

35. [Brfg], “OPLAN 1002–90 Targeting Strategy,” n.d. [ca. late summer 1990], [File:

Colonel Christopher Christon, 9AF DCS/IN].

36. Msg, 121428Z Mar 90, 9TIS to TACOPS, Langley AFB, Subj: ATTG Request, [File

No. 9TIS: Colonel Christopher Christon 9AF, DCS/IN].

37. William T. Y’Blood, “The Eagle and the Scorpion: The USAF in Desert Shield, the

Deployment Phase,” draft, December 1991, pp. 37–38.
host unit. With the possible exception of the Iraqis, the Saudis built some of the

most physically impressive bases in the world. They greatly exceeded NATO

standards and possessed features such as long runways and taxiways, hardened

aircraft shelters (HASs) with air pressurization systems to combat attack with

CW and biological weapons (BW), and sunken ramps from the shelters to the

taxiways. The Saudis sited their bases to confront a series of different eventualities. Tabuk Air Base (AB), adjacent to Jordan, placed Saudi aircraft within range

of Israel, to threaten that country and demonstrate solidarity with Arab

confrontation states. Taif AB, a brand-new base, not yet even occupied by the

RSAF, guarded the Holy City of Mecca and projected Saudi air power into the

Red Sea and the coasts of the Sudan and Ethiopia. Khamis Mushait AB, another

spanking new base in southeastern Saudi Arabia near Yemen, covered the Bab al

Mandab, where the Red Sea joins the Indian Ocean, and provided support for

operations involving the two Yemens, sources of disquiet for the Saudis. The

Saudis placed King Khalid Military City approximately forty miles south of the

Iraqi– Kuwaiti–Saudi Arabian tristate border. From there it supplied potential

coverage of Kuwait; of Iraq, especially the Iraqi-Iranian battlefields around

Basra; and of the Al Faw Peninsula, Abadan, and other important parts of Iran.

Dhahran AB, near the Saudi coast at the midpoint of the Persian Gulf, covered

Gulf shipping and the oil fields; confronted Iran and, to a lesser extent, Iraq; and

provided some coverage of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Al Kharj

AB and Riyadh AB covered the oil fields and the center of the country. Unlike

other bases, Al Kharj AB consisted of little more than a large runway in the sand.

It required much American and local effort to make it serviceable, and it did not

become fully operational until December. Large Saudi commercial fields such as

King Fahd International, near Dhahran; King Khalid International, near Riyadh;

and Jeddah could further support incoming USAF air units. Other Gulf countries,

in particular the UAE, supplied almost a dozen other bases.

The Saudis may have overbuilt their bases for several reasons. They faced

widely separated threats with a relatively efficient but small air force. Instead of

spending inordinate sums on maintaining large forces at each corner of their

country to ward off the unlikely event of trouble everywhere at the same time, it

seemed more sensible, more economical, and less threatening to the monarchy to

have smaller forces that could move to reinforce trouble spots when the need

arose. An extra-large base could obviously prove most efficient in handling a

rapid influx of augmenting units drawn from elsewhere in the country. Many

Saudi bases seemed designed to house a large percentage of the RSAF, if the

need arose. The Saudis further had the advantages of prolific funding, abundant

labor, and nearly unlimited space in which to expand. Circumstances enabled

them to build not just for the current force, but for the future. Also, Arab culture

tends to take the long view, which some Americans mistake for inordinate slowness. In the case of their airfields, the Saudis, who see themselves as a growing

regional power, may well have based their construction schemes on the prospect

17

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 
of a greatly expanded force structure. A large investment in current capital

improvements might well pay handsome dividends in years to come, and a lavish physical plant kept its utility far longer and aged far less rapidly than modern

combat aircraft. In this connection, the Saudis’ Strategic Reserve Program is an

excellent example. In that ongoing program, the Saudis have given up to $4 billion to Swedish contractors to build hardened underground oil and refined-product storage caverns connected by extensive pipelines. It shows an unusual foresight for the holder of the world’s largest oil fields to spend billions for a strategic reserve.38

An additional, widely accepted theory for the Saudis’ overbuilt bases rests

on conjecture, unsupported by firm documentary evidence. The Saudis may have

anticipated an eventuality when an outside power, almost assuredly the United

States, would send air units to their country. Those who support this theory point

to the oversight of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the design and construction of the bases. At the time they purchased modern U.S. fighter aircraft—F–5s

and F–15s—the Saudis simultaneously requested the construction of modern

bases;39 available funds allowed the Corps to accommodate them, meeting or

exceeding all U.S. standards. Given the politics of the region, it seems unlikely

that the Saudi government would have ever committed itself to U.S. basing in

advance of an event, but for whatever reason, when CENTAF needed the space,

the Saudis could supply much of it.

The U.S. government had little choice but to adopt a relatively passive policy in the Persian Gulf. As the Bush administration examined the American position in the Gulf, particularly toward Iraq, in April 1989 it faced three options—

coercion, containment, or co-option. None among America’s Gulf friends, the

international situation, nor American public opinion would support an expanded

military presence in the region, let alone confrontation with potential Iraqi

aggression. Containment of Iraq—in the face of Soviet, French, and British

desire to pursue massive arms sales and of U.S. farmers’ equally intent pursuit

of agricultural sales—also foundered from lack of support. Since the United

States could hardly ignore the strongest military power in the world’s greatest

oil-producing region, it, perforce, selected the third option, that of attempting to

bring Iraq and Saddam Hussein into the community of nations.40 Although the

selected policy may seem supine in retrospect, at the time it fitted the political

resources available. Its dangers lay in bureaucratic ossification or self-delusion

18

On Target

38. Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia Unveiled (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1991), p. 49. This cite refers only to the information on the Strategic Reserve.

39. Telecon, Personnel of Saudi Branch (SAF/IARS) of the Deputy Under Secretary of

the Air Force (International Affairs), May 4, 1992. A search of this office’s files revealed no

record of any formal agreement with the Saudis on USAF contingency use of RSAF bases.

However, examination of the earliest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Letters of Agreement

(LOA) concerning fighter sales to Saudi Arabia disclosed the fact that the Saudis consistently

purchased bases as well as aircraft.

40. James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution,

War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), pp. 262–263.
(the inability or unwillingness of U.S. officials to reexamine the policy in light

of changed circumstances) and in the timing of when to replace the carrot (good

relations or credit, for example) with the stick (loss of credit, severe restrictions

on weapons technology, and so forth).

Iraq had emerged from the Iran-Iraq War saddled with debts of $80 billion,

including a $30 billion short-term hard-currency debt owed the United States,

Japan, and European nations.41 In the two years following its victory over Iran,

Iraq made little effort to repay this debt or to scale back its armed forces, which

it retained close to their wartime establishments of 1 million, or to cut back on

extensive public projects and subsidies. Iraq further pursued aggressive and

expensive military research and development (R&D) programs in NBC

weapons; exotic arms, such as the massive cannons designed by Canadian ordnance expert Gerald Bull; and in short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The

government also built extensive munitions and small- and heavy-arms plants.

Saddam refused to renegotiate or reschedule his foreign debt, in part because that

would have meant opening his nation’s financial books to foreign bankers, and

in part because he hoped to find other ways out of his fiscal dilemma. The fall of

world oil prices in late 1989 and early 1990 reduced the hard-currency earnings

of Iraq’s most valuable export and placed increased pressure on its credit and

economy. Lack of additional credit might bankrupt the regime, costing it prestige

and denying it the ability to make large purchases abroad. Other alternatives such

as cutting back on internal subsidies and improvement projects might cause popular unrest, while demobilizing portions of the armed forces could weaken Iraq’s

strong position in the region’s power politics. Since he would not reduce expenses, Saddam attempted to expand income, notably by obtaining an increase in the

price of oil. He could force the price upward either by convincing OPEC to support a higher oil price or by exerting direct or indirect control over the other militarily weak oil producers in the Gulf. Saddam’s degree of financial desperation

would serve as the measure of the amount of intimidation and force he would

apply to his neighbors.

At an Arab League summit meeting in Baghdad on May 30, 1990, Saddam

complained to a group of Arab heads of state about Kuwait’s “economic warfare” against Iraq. The same meeting may also have produced a sharp personal

confrontation between Saddam and the Emir of Kuwait, who rejected out of hand

Saddam’s demands for territorial concessions and debt forgiveness.42 Almost

seven weeks later, on July 17, in his National Day speech to the nation, Saddam

accused Kuwait and the UAE of conspiring with the United States to lower world

oil prices and weaken Iraq. He threatened direct action against the Gulf states

unless they discontinued their policy of oil overproduction, which lowered the

world market price and cost Iraq billions of dollars of lost revenue. The next day

19

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

41. Don Oberdorfer, “Missed Signals in the Middle East,” Washington Post Magazine,

March 17, 1991, p. 23.

42. Ibid., p. 36.
the Iraqi media published a letter from Iraq to the Arab League that accused the

Kuwaitis of stealing billions of dollars worth of Iraqi oil from the Rumaila oil

field that underlies both countries, of building military installations on Iraqi territory, and of refusing to forgive massive Kuwaiti loans to Iraq during the IranIraq War. The Kuwaitis denied the charges and put their armed forces on full alert

on July 18. The following day, U.S. intelligence detected the movement of

Republican Guard forces from the Baghdad area toward the Kuwaiti border.43 In

the meantime, Saddam tightened his grip on Iraq, possibly to forestall objections

to the initiatives he intended to undertake in the near future, by having himself

proclaimed President for Life.

Even as Iraqi forces flowed toward Kuwait, the State Department issued

new instructions to American embassies in the Middle East. A brief cable supplied policy guidance on the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. In all contacts with Arab counterparts U.S. diplomats were to stress two points:

disputes should be settled by peaceful means, not intimidation and threats of

force. Second, the United States takes no position on the substance of bilateral

issues concerning Iraq and Kuwait. However, U.S. policy is unchanged. We

remain committed to ensure the free flow of oil from the Gulf and to support the

sovereignty and integrity of the Gulf states...we will continue to defend our vital

interests in the Gulf.44

On July 21, the situation went from name-calling to bona fide crisis. On that

day, U.S. photographic imagery confirmed reports from Western military

attachés that two Iraqi armored divisions had moved south toward the Kuwaiti

border. In addition, the UAE, alarmed at the possibility of Iraqi air attacks on its

offshore oil facilities, planned to begin a 24-hour CAP. The UAE requested two

USAF KC–135 tankers for aerial refueling, and the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi

warned it suspected that the UAE regarded this request as a test of U.S. desire to

respond to a crisis in the Gulf. According to General Schwarzkopf, the State

Department opposed this initial request, which caused him to appeal for its

approval directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General

Colin L. Powell, USA, and to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney.45

Secretary of State James A. Baker III overruled his department’s Near Eastern

Bureau and supported the request, which President Bush approved on July 23.46

The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Saddam on July 25.

Although she had taken up her post in August 1988, Ambassador Glaspie, a

career Foreign Service Officer known for her wide contacts in and accurate political judgments of the Arab world, had never before privately met the Iraqi dicta20

On Target

43. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (2d ed.,

Washington, D.C.: DoD, April 1992), p. 334.

44. Baker and DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, p. 271.

45. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take a

Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pp. 292–293.

46. Baker and DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, p. 271.
tor. The meeting occurred in somewhat unusual circumstances. An official of the

Iraqi Foreign Ministry asked to see Ambassador Glaspie in his office. When she

arrived, he unexpectedly escorted her to a car, which took her to see Saddam.

Ambassador Glaspie had no prior warning that she would see Saddam, and no

American aides accompanied her. When the ambassador entered Saddam’s office

at approximately noon, she also found Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the president’s office director, two note-takers, and an Iraqi interpreter present. According

to Ambassador Glaspie, this meeting was unique. In the memory of the current

diplomatic corps in Baghdad, Saddam had never summoned an ambassador

before.47 Saddam held in his hands two official American statements delivered

by Glaspie to the Foreign Ministry earlier that morning, with a request that the

ministry pass them to Saddam. One announced the UAE-U.S. refueling exercise,

and the other, an official transcript, detailed the remarks that the official U.S.

State Department spokesman, Margaret Tutwiler, had made the previous day.

Tutwiler seemingly sent a mixed message. The United States, she stated,

believes that “Iraq and others know that there is no place for coercion and intimidation in a civilized world.” But, in response to questions, she admitted the

United States did not have “any defense treaties with Kuwait and there are no

special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”48 While hardly comparable

to Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s public exclusion of South Korea from U.S.

defense obligations in early 1950, which many commentators interpret as a factor in the eventual North Korean attack, Tutwiler’s remarks must have puzzled

Saddam, who had absolutely no experience with an open press, let alone an official American press conference where reporters’ questions not only do not have

prior government approval, but are confrontational, if not hostile. The refueling

exercise also perturbed Saddam. He correctly evaluated it as U.S. muscle-flexing

and pressure on behalf of Kuwait and the UAE. He may also have seen the presence of U.S. forces at bases in the Arabian Peninsula as an entering wedge for a

much greater U.S. commitment, if such proved necessary. Finally, he suspected

the move preceded a U.S. “decision to take sides.”49

The exact contents of Ambassador Glaspie’s and Saddam’s two-hour talk

have become shrouded in controversy. Because the ambassador had no entourage

with her, no official U.S. transcript exists. The publicly released Iraqi transcript

contains important unacknowledged lacunae. This description relies on

Ambassador Glaspie’s after-the-fact report to her superiors. Saddam began with

a short review of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Then, in a revealing scrap of analysis,

Saddam explained why the United States had not intervened directly in the Iran21

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

47. Msg, 251246Z Jul 90, AMEMB Baghdad to SECSTATE #04237, Subj: Saddam’s

Message of Friendship to President Bush, cited in Capt. Steven B. Michael, comp., Operation

Desert Shield: A Chronology of the Deployment to the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Office

of the Air Force Historian, Air Staff Historical Study, 1991), p. 6.

48. Oberdorfer, “Missed Signals in the Middle East,” p. 39.

49. Msg, 251246Z Jul 90, AMEMB Baghdad to SECSTATE, Subj: Saddam’s Message of

Friendship to President Bush, cited in Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, p. 6.
Iraq War: “public opinion in the U.S. Government, to say nothing of geography,

would have made it impossible for the Americans to accept 10,000 dead in a single battle, as IRAQ did.” The United States’ support for its friends in the Gulf

could only indicate a “flagrant bias” against Iraq, and U.S. maneuvers with the

UAE and Kuwait (the United States had no military maneuvers with Kuwait)

“encouraged them in their ungenerous policies.” The United States had a right to

friends in the Gulf, but why did it encourage them to oppose Iraq’s interests? He

believed that the United States wanted peace, but why did it use such “arm-twisting”? His people’s pride, claimed Saddam, would force him to respond to the

United States’ forceful methods, even though he realized that U.S. aircraft and

missiles could hurt Iraq deeply. He asked “that the U.S. Government not force

IRAQ to the point of humiliation at which logic must be disregarded.” He also

asked the United States not to assume any particular role in intra-Arab disputes.

After questioning Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney’s inflammatory statements and the United States’ invitation to high-level Israeli officials to visit

Washington, he repeated an earlier theme, warning that the Iraqis knew the

nature of war and wanted no more of it, but “do not push us to it; do not make it

the only option left with which we can protect our dignity.” After an expression

of support for the Palestinians, Saddam concluded by reiterating his hope for better relations: “although we will not pant for it, we will do our part as friends.”50

Once the Iraqi strongman ran down, the ambassador began her reply.

Apparently she remained subject to the directions of National Security Directive

(NSD) 26, which encouraged a somewhat pro-Iraqi stance, and to the new guidance of July 19. She reassured Saddam that President Bush had instructed her to

broaden and deepen relations with Iraq and that President Bush would control the

anti-Iraqi circles in the U.S. government but that he could not control the U.S.

media. Saddam said he understood. Ambassador Glaspie pointed out that

President Bush had demonstrated his desire for improved relations by opposing

sanction legislation. Saddam laughed and noted that Congress had already prohibited everything but wheat, and no doubt it would soon declare even that a

dual-use item. The ambassador spoke of President Bush’s concern for peace.

Next she asked if it was unreasonable, in light of Saddam’s and Aziz’s threatening statements that Kuwait’s actions equaled military aggression and the move of

the Republican Guard to the border, for the United States to ask what did Saddam

intend? Saddam acknowledged the reasonableness of her question and granted

the United States’ concern for, and indeed its duty as a superpower to seek, peace

in the region. Then he returned to his economic problems, appealing to the

ambassador, “but how can we make them (KUWAIT and UAE) understand how

deeply we are suffering?” He added that the financial situation would soon make

it necessary to cut the pensions of widows and orphans. At this point, the proceedings became Chaplinesque as the interpreter and one of the note-takers

broke down and wept.

22

On Target

50. Ibid.
When his entourage regained its composure, Saddam claimed that he had

tried virtually every means to reach an accommodation with Kuwait and the

UAE, only to fail because of their dishonesty. Then he left the room to take an

urgent call from the President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. When Saddam returned,

Ambassador Glaspie asked if the two Arab leaders had made any progress in

defusing the dispute. Saddam replied that the Kuwaitis had agreed to negotiate.

The Kuwaiti Crown Prince/Prime Minister would meet in Riyadh with Saddam’s

number-two man. Next, the Kuwaitis would come to Baghdad on Saturday,

Sunday, or, at the latest, on Monday, July 30. (In actuality no meetings in

Baghdad ever occurred.) Saddam stated, “I told Mubarak nothing would happen

until the meeting” and nothing would happen after the meeting if the Kuwaitis

“give us some hope.” This news “delighted” the ambassador. In a specific reference to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute over their border, demarcated by the British in

1961 when they established an independent Kuwait, the ambassador observed

that she had served in Kuwait twenty years earlier and “then, as now, we took no

position on these Arab affairs.” Critics of U.S. policy have seized on this statement of the ambassador as an example of the U.S. government’s failure to convey to Saddam its determination to resist aggression against Kuwait. But

Ambassador Glaspie had merely restated standard U.S. and State Department

policy. The U.S. government routinely refuses to take positions on border disputes. Given the number of international boundary disputes and conflicting territorial and ethnic claims as well as the number of countries involved in them, if

the U.S. government expressed definite opinions on changing current maps, it

would soon find itself embroiled in quarrels with half the nations of the earth.

The meeting closed with Saddam’s request that Ambassador Glaspie convey his

warm greetings and his message to President Bush.51

In a congressional hearing after the war, in March 1991, Congressman Lee

Hamilton asked Ambassador Glaspie, “But you never said to him, ‘Mr.

President, if you go across the line with your forces into Kuwait, we will fight’”?

Glaspie replied, “Absolutely not. I did not need to say that. If I felt I needed to

say that, I would have asked the President after the meeting for permission to say

that. I had no doubt in my mind that he knew that we meant business.”52

The significance of the only Saddam-Glaspie talk lay less in its diplomatic

import than in its revelation of Saddam’s thought process and of the image he

sought to convey to the United States. Certainly, Saddam had so mastered the arts

of deviousness, dissimulation, and propaganda that he calculated almost all of his

public utterances, not to mention his private ones, with one aim— to advance his

personal goals. However, the fact that an objective listener may detect falsehoods

or obvious mistakes in Saddam’s statements does not mean that Saddam, himself, knew he had lied or erred. It was more than possible, perhaps likely, that

23

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

51. Ibid.

52. U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the

Middle East, United States–Iraq Relations, 102d Cong., 1st sess., Mar 21, 1991, pp. 10–11.
Saddam actually believed in a great many of the stereotypes and in the conspiratorial behavior he attributed to others. Therefore, although many of the dictator’s

remarks in these talks appeared publicly in other forums, the Saddam-Glaspie

talk, in which Saddam spoke in the idiom of his stereotypes, fears, and prejudices, gave a relatively accurate picture of his motivations for invading Kuwait

and of many of his subsequent actions. Saddam admitted that a huge international debt placed his country in an economic bind and that he required higher

oil prices to escape it. However, the UAE and Kuwait, two countries he protected from the Iranians, had adopted “miserly and selfish” policies, thwarting any

oil price increase. They refused all Iraqi overtures to alter their policies, consequently deepening the Iraqi financial crisis. If they pressed Iraq to the wall,

Saddam would take military action. He expressed a contradictory opinion of the

United States. He acknowledged not only its superpower status, but its status as

the major power in the Middle East, and he admitted its right to concern itself

with the peace of the Gulf. He feared that it had decided to take sides with Iraq’s

opponents. He also feared that the United States might push him into a corner,

and, if it did, he would have no choice but to fight, whatever the repercussions

for Iraq. Yet he doubted both the United States’ will and its ability to intervene,

referring to U.S. public opinion against heavy casualties and to the United States’

geographic distance from the Gulf. This last belief combined fixed attitudes and

ignorance. Saddam may well have assumed correctly that the American public

would not countenance 10,000 dead, but he miscalculated his ability to inflict

such casualties. Second, the USAF’s air transport fleet would give the lie to

Saddam’s assumption of relative safety through geographic distance. Saddam did

not believe the United States would fight. As long as he maintained that conviction, he would act as if he had a free hand in the Gulf. Misjudgment of this

magnitude has preceded many catastrophes.

Ambassador Glaspie emerged from this meeting somewhat encouraged, but

subsequent events proved her optimism unfounded. Much of the rest of the U.S.

intelligence and diplomatic community seems to have shared her self-deception.

To what extent her conversation affected Saddam’s judgment, only he could say.

But one must wonder how the workings of the State Department’s personnel system designated a female for such a posting. April Glaspie was the first female

ever assigned as a U.S. ambassador to an Arab country, and only the second

woman ever assigned as head of mission to a Muslim country.53 The U.S. government may have intended her assignment to demonstrate to Saddam the egalitarian and nonsexist nature of American society. However, this gesture might

well have severely limited the ability of the two nations to communicate. Quite

possibly, Saddam regarded the appointment of a woman as an insult; in any case,

24

On Target

53. See U.S. Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and

United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778–1990, Dept. State Pub. No. 9825 (Washington, D.C.:

GPO, Jan 1991). From August 11, 1981, to August 3, 1984, Jane C. Coon served as American

Ambassador to Bangladesh.
as an Arab male he would have found it extremely difficult either to take Ambassador Glaspie seriously or to give credence to any generalized warnings she

might deliver. Of course, given the dictator’s mindset, he would probably have

discounted any message delivered by any American, but the presence of a female

ambassador, no matter how well qualified otherwise, minimized the possibility

of a successful exchange. Furthermore, the U.S. policy expressed in NSD–26, of

attempting to draw Saddam Hussein into the community of nations rather than to

coerce him into more peaceful paths, tied the Ambassador’s hands and made her

appear even weaker to her hosts.

The 87th session of OPEC began on July 26 in Geneva. Within twenty-four

hours, the oil ministers agreed to an overall 22.5-million-barrel per day production ceiling and to raise the benchmark price for oil for the first time in four

years—from $18 to $20 a barrel. Prompted the next day by Saudi Arabia and

Venezuela, the ministers set the target price per barrel at $21. Despite Kuwait’s

and the UAE’s agreement to abide by OPEC’s new arrangements, the session did

not fulfill Saddam’s expectations. The Iraqis had lobbied for a price of $25 per

barrel. Their failure to achieve it promised further shortages of revenue and

heightened Saddam’s fiscal difficulties. Alarmed at Saddam’s human-rights

record and the escalating shrillness of his foreign policy, the U.S. Congress, over

the opposition of President Bush, imposed economic sanctions on Iraq on July

27, 1990. The sanctions canceled $700 million in agricultural loan guarantees

and prohibited the transfer of militarily useful technology. The same day, CENTCOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sent intelligence officers to

Kuwait, and the DIA received an exception from the National Disclosure Policy

from Secretary Cheney, which allowed it to begin sharing intelligence information with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.54 As the end of the month neared,

some U.S. intelligence assessments became more gloomy. The day after the congressional action, the State Department ordered Ambassador Glaspie to

Washington for a high-level review of the situation. She postponed her departure

for two days to determine whether the Iraqis actually left for the Jeddah negotiations.55 On July 29, in spite of assurances by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak

that Saddam would not invade Kuwait, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

warned of an imminent Iraqi invasion. The UAE requested an extension of Ivory

Justice, the joint refueling exercise that was initiated as a response to the UAE

request for aerial refueling, the same day. On July 30, Ambassador Glaspie

returned to Washington; apparently she used a previously planned vacation trip

to avoid the appearance of a diplomatic break.56 U.S. intelligence confirmed that

25

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

54. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 334.

55. Haley, “Saddam Surprises the United States,” p. 182 n. 43.

56. The State Department’s Historical Office confirms that Ambassador Glaspie’s trip was

a private trip and not an official recall for consultation or other type of formal diplomatic maneuver. However, the ambassador had provided the Iraqi government with thirty days’ notice of her

intention to leave the country in order to secure necessary care for her aged mother. Within the

State Department, high-level officials apparently discussed the consequences of canceling
Iraq had massed most of the Republican Guard and other troops—for a total of

120,000 men, 750 tanks, 500 armored vehicles, and 700 artillery pieces—on the

Kuwaiti border. It noted that these forces continued to make limited preparations

for military action. This force outnumbered the Kuwaiti armed forces by a 6 to 1

ratio.

Finally, on July 31, under the mediation of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Iraqi

and Kuwaiti representatives met in Jeddah to negotiate an end to the crisis. After

having thoroughly frightened the Kuwaitis for two weeks, Saddam sent a highlevel delegation headed by his number-two man in the Baath Party and in the

Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim; his Deputy Prime Minister,

Sadun Hammadi; and his cousin and Minister of Local Government, Ali Hasan

Al-Majid to demonstrate that he meant to negotiate seriously. The Kuwaitis,

either from courage or miscalculation, signaled that they did not intend to tamely submit by sending a much lower level delegation, not headed by the Emir.57

That same day, all eight divisions of the Republican Guard completed their

deployment on the Kuwaiti border, with the two armored divisions arrayed offensively. On the morning of August 1, both the CIA and the DIA issued warnings

that the Iraqis would attack within as little as twenty-four hours.58 In the “tank,”

the war room of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at the Pentagon, General Schwarzkopf informed the Chiefs and Secretary Cheney of the CENTCOM options

should shooting begin. The general predicted that Saddam would seize Kuwait

down to the 30th parallel. In response, he presented “detailed plans” for air and

sea strikes which included military headquarters, power plants, and factories

“that we could quickly destroy.”59 Although delivered immediately, these carrier-mounted blows would have little weight behind them. At this point, it seems

CENTCOM still thought of air power for punishment or retaliation rather than as

a strategic weapon. Even as the agencies made their predictions, the talks in

Jeddah collapsed. The Kuwaitis, unaware that Saddam had cocked the pistol

aimed at their heads and under the misapprehension that they had come to bargain rather than to surrender, refused to pay the stiff protection fee demanded by

the Iraqis: forgiveness of $10 billion in war debts, reparations for the $2.4 billion

in oil stolen from the Rumaila oil field, and territorial concessions. The two parties scheduled no further sessions.60

26

On Target

Glaspie’s trip and keeping her in place. They decided that postponing her scheduled departure

would send the wrong signal (over concern with Saddam’s demands) and allowed her to leave

the country.

57. Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, pp. 7–10; Oberdorfer, “Missing Signals in the

Middle East,” p. 40; Congressional Research Service (CRS), Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: A Chronology

of Events, July 17, 1990–March 3, 1991, pp. CRS-63–CRS-65.

58. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp.

218–219.

59. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 295.

60. CRS, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Chronology, p. CRS-63. One can only wonder what would

have been the effect in Munich in October 1938 had a Czech delegation arrived and stated that

it intended to defend all its territory no matter what the French and English intended to give the
The Decision to Intervene

The instant when and the exact reasons why Saddam decided to invade

Kuwait may never be known. Nonetheless, by the evening of August 1, Baghdad

time, Saddam apparently saw no acceptable peaceful options for solving his

financial problems. OPEC had raised prices by only 10 percent, hardly enough

to cover expected inflation, and the Kuwaitis, unlike the Saudis, had balked at

forgiving his debts or making other financial concessions. With intimidation having failed and no immediate prospect of an increase in oil revenue to cover

expenses, Saddam resorted to force and allowed his tanks to roll into Kuwait in

the early morning of August 2. Within hours, the Iraqis occupied all of Kuwait

and installed a revolutionary government to replace the Al-Sabah dynasty. The

Emir of Kuwait fled to Saudi Arabia, where he established a government-inexile. DIA analysts evaluated the Iraqi forces as more than sufficient to conduct

an attack into Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.61

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait differed in two important respects from their

invasion of Iran ten years earlier. Against Iran, Saddam had timed the blow

somewhat favorably, striking a diplomatically isolated nation, in internal turmoil,

with disorganized armed forces. But the Iraqis botched the execution of their

offensive by moving too slowly and hesitantly. The reverse occurred in Kuwait.

The Iraqis overwhelmed the Kuwaiti armed forces, many of whom fled to Saudi

Arabia, including the bulk of the Kuwaiti Air Force, but they could not have chosen a less favorable time. Saddam, of course, targeted Kuwait for several reasons: historical claims to its territory; its supposed cheating on OPEC oil quotas;

and the fact that his forces lacked strategic mobility, which limited them to

assaults on next-door neighbors. Two other factors must have entered Saddam’s

calculations: First, no Gulf state could successfully oppose him militarily without massive assistance from the United States. Second, the Kuwaitis had an additional vulnerability—most of the Arab world seemed to have a visceral dislike

for them. The Kuwaitis, with the highest per capita income in the world, imported hundreds of thousands of foreign workers from the Arab world, including

many Palestinians, and from places such as India, Pakistan, and the Philippines,

to supply manual labor and to perform boring and repetitive clerical jobs in their

economy. Although the Kuwaitis paid the outside workers well by ordinary Third

World standards, they naturally paid themselves better and reserved the top jobs

for themselves. Abuse of foreign workers, who could hope for little redress from

the Kuwaiti courts, and of the workers’ contracts added to their unhappiness.

Within Kuwait, many had reason to detest their employers. When the workers

returned or wrote letters home, their dissatisfaction spread. Many Arabs in

impoverished countries contrasted their own lot with that of the Kuwaitis and

27

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

Germans. The European powers could have been no more flummoxed than the Iraqis and

Saudis.

61. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 334.
envied them. Even as late as July 30, 1990, the Omanis indicated privately to the

United States that they sympathized with many of the Iraqi complaints about the

Kuwaitis’ greed.62 Saddam may have convinced himself that other Arab nations

might greet his actions against the Kuwaitis with neutrality, if not approval. In

Kuwait as in Iran, he misjudged the determination of his opponents to resist his

aggression.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait differed markedly from the Iraqi invasion of

Iran. As early as February 12, 1990, Saddam had indicated in a personal conversation in Baghdad with the senior American diplomat dealing with the Gulf, John

Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, that he

realized the Soviets were “finished as a world power” and that the United States

now had a “free hand” in the international arena.63 Saddam assessed the chances

of Soviet intervention as nil. He grasped the fact that the United States had the

capability to intervene in the Gulf or elsewhere, but he assumed that the

Americans lacked the will to act. Critics of prewar American policy toward Iraq

make this supposed assumption of the dictator the key to their case that the

United States failed to convince Saddam that it would oppose him and therefore,

because of that failure, bears much responsibility for his subsequent actions.

These critics point to statements by U.S. officials—such as the statement of

Ambassador Glaspie contained in the Iraqi transcript of her talk with Saddam

that “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait”—as evidence that the United States sent a confusing message

to the Iraqis. However, when one examines the entire tenor of U.S. actions and

communications to Iraq for the period shortly before the invasion of Kuwait, one

can see that the Americans staked out a strong position opposing any Iraqi military action. But what the Americans may have done with some of their more

ambiguous communications was to give Saddam the message he wanted to hear,

while not realizing that he was not internalizing the message they meant to convey. All this discussion credits Saddam with a rational thought process. Given his

consistently brutal treatment of all who dared oppose him, the Iraqi dictator may

have acted completely emotionally and simply lost his patience and decided to

extinguish Kuwait because Kuwait had what he wanted and wouldn’t give it to

him.

Although the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait seemed to emerge from a relatively

short crisis, most observers could not help but regard it as serious step toward the

fulfillment of Saddam’s long-held dream of domination of the Persian Gulf, the

Arab world, and the international oil market. Not only did ownership of Iraq’s

and Kuwait’s oil supplies give Saddam direct control of approximately 15 percent of the world’s known petroleum reserves, the presence of his elite

Republican Guard armored divisions disposed offensively in Kuwait pointed a

28

On Target

62. Msg, 300654Z July 90, AMEMB Muscat to SECSTATE, Subj: Omani Reaction to

Iraq-Kuwait Confrontation, cited in Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, p. 9

63. Oberdorfer, “Missed Signals in the Middle East,” p. 20.
sword directly at the heart of Saudi Arabia, the possessor of at least 25 percent

of the world’s known oil reserves. The bulk of these reserves lay in the Saudi

Eastern Province, which borders Kuwait.64 Even if Saddam refrained from overrunning Saudi Arabia at this juncture, as a master of force and intimidation he

would surely use his new position to blackmail the Saudis into ratcheting the oil

price upward.

The international community promptly took action. Fourteen of the fifteen

members of the Security Council of the United Nations (UN), including Cuba,

passed Resolution 660 (1990), which demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately

and unconditionally, and it called upon the two parties to begin intensive negotiations. Only Yemen, a consistent supporter of Iraq, abstained from this vote.

On August 2, General Schwarzkopf briefed President Bush at a meeting of

the National Security Council in the White House. At General Powell’s urging,

the CINCCENT confined himself to describing how immediately available sea

power and air power moves could “demonstrate U.S. determination and, if necessary, punish Iraq.”65 He did not expound on OPLAN 1002–90’s deployment

plans to Saudi Arabia. Since the USAF had not yet sent aircraft to the theater, it

would seem that General Schwarzkopf envisioned the initial riposte to consist of

strikes from USN carriers and Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs). The

extremely accurate TLAM could make a mess of any number of appropriate soft

targets in Iraq. By the end of the meeting, less than fourteen hours after the invasion, President Bush indicated his intention to fight if the Iraqis made hostages

of the U.S. embassy personnel in Kuwait and indicated he would consider an

Iraqi assault on Saudi Arabia as a casus belli between the United States and

Iraq.66 On August 3, President Bush banned imports from Iraq and froze its

assets in the United States. The Iraqis responded to U.S. and Western European

criticism by seizing 4,000 Westerners as hostages. The following day, Saturday,

the president held a meeting at Camp David with his key national security and

military advisors to discuss American options concerning the use of force in the

crisis. Those present included Vice President J. Danforth Quayle; Secretary of

State Baker; Secretary of Defense Cheney; National Security Advisor Brent

Scowcroft; Director of the CIA, Judge William H. Webster; General Powell; the

presidential Chief of Staff, John H. Sununu; the president’s Press Secretary,

Marlin Fitzwater; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz;

General Schwarzkopf; and General Horner.

The air planning for the briefing presented on August 4 rested solely on the

targeting work done by the Ninth Air Force staff at earlier exercises like Internal

Look in 1990 and during the first three days of August. At this point, General

Schwarzkopf still operated within the confines of OPLAN 1002–90, which did

29

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

64. Msg, 281618Z Jul 90, State to SORAX, Subj: Secretary’s Morning Summary/Intelligence Roundup, cited in Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, p. 7.

65. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 297–298.

66. Ibid., p. 298.
not envision an offensive air campaign directed at Iraq but, as he stated, did provide for a retaliatory campaign if needed. At this early stage in the crisis, General

Schwarzkopf feared that Saddam might do something “heinous” with the

American embassy personnel in Kuwait, as the Iranians had done in Tehran.

General Schwarzkopf wanted a plan that provided for retaliation or punishment

should such an event occur.67 General Powell recommended that if the president

ordered the plan executed, he also call up 200,000 reservists and activate the

Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Secretary Cheney asked if the air campaign would

achieve its goals and observed that in the past air power had not fulfilled its

promises. General Horner responded that four favorable factors made this a different situation: the open terrain made for a target-rich environment; Iraq had no

experience in operating under air attack; the USAF had large numbers of PGMs;

and air attack could adversely affect the morale of Iraqi rear echelons, which had

never undergone air attack before.68 This answer temporarily mollified Secretary

Cheney.

In the end, the single most significant fact to emerge from the session at

Camp David was that the president and his principal national security advisors

never appeared to question the basic premise that the United States would send

military forces to Saudi Arabia to assist it against Iraqi pressure, provided the

Saudis would accept them. The meeting instead revolved around an examination

of the practical aspects of mounting the expeditionary force.

Later on August 4, King Fahd and President Bush agreed that the a highlevel U.S. military delegation should come to Jeddah to inform the king of U.S.

capabilities and plans and to share sensitive intelligence on Iraqi dispositions

with him. The next day, the two countries decided to have the delegation leave

at once. On the White House lawn, the president made a strong public statement,

possibly meant to give Saddam pause and the Saudis encouragement. He noted

that talks with U.S. allies had revealed a consensus not “to accept anything less

than the total withdrawal from Kuwait of Iraqi forces, and no puppet regime.”

When reporters asked the president about military action, he responded, “watch

and learn,” and he added, “I view very seriously our determination to reverse out

this aggression....This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against

Kuwait.” At 1430 EDT Secretary Cheney; Robert Gates, the Deputy National

Security Advisor; General Schwarzkopf; Under Secretary Wolfowitz; General

Horner; Lt. Gen. John J. Yeosock, USA, Commander, U.S. Army Component,

CENTCOM (ARCENT);69 Maj. Gen. Donald L. Kaufman, USAF, head of the

30

On Target

67. Telecon, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret.), with Dr. Diane Putney, CAFH,

Bolling AFB, May 5, 1992.

68. MR, Col. Douglas Roach, USAF, Dep Asst Dir Joint and NSC Matters, Air Staff,

DCS/O&P, Subj: Camp David Discussions Re: Iraq, Saturday, 4 Aug 90, Aug 4, 1990 [File No.

CK/DS/JCS]. Also see Woodward, Commanders, pp. 247–252. Woodward has a fairly complete account of this meeting based on access to more detailed information or notes.

69. General Yeosock’s position corresponded in some respects to General Horner’s. As

Commanding General of the U.S. Third Army, he provided the army forces assigned to CENT-
U.S. training mission to Saudi Arabia; and Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Ambassador

to Saudi Arabia, took off from Andrews AFB, Maryland, stopped for refueling

in the Azores, and landed, after a sixteen-hour flight, in Jeddah at approximately

1300 local time (1300L), Monday, August 6. A few hours later, in another action

affecting the crisis, the UN Security Council, with Yemen and Cuba abstaining,

passed Resolution 661 (1990) which banned all but humanitarian imports and

exports from and to Iraq and Kuwait and imposed other fiscal and economic

sanctions.

That evening, the Saudis brought the American party to the royal family’s

private council room at the summer palace. The principals met King Fahd,

Crown Prince Abd Allah, the Foreign Minister, the Deputy Defense Minister,

and others. Ambassador Prince Bandar translated for both sides. According to

Bob Woodward, Secretary Cheney had already briefed OPLAN 1002–90 to

Prince Bandar, who wholeheartedly supported it.70 They discussed available

intelligence, diplomatic developments, the military situation in the Gulf, and

President Bush’s efforts to organize international economic and political sanctions against Iraq, and they provided the Saudis with a detailed rundown of U.S.

military capabilities. King Fahd listened to the briefings and to Secretary

Cheney. King Fahd and Prince Abd Allah asked questions. King Fahd held a

brief family council with the Royal Princes at the meeting. Almost to a man, they

advised caution. Then King Fahd turned to Secretary Cheney and said simply in

English, “Okay.” The deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia began almost

immediately.71

Apparently, the king had already overcome one of the obstacles that had

made the Saudis appear to waffle in their response to the crisis—the possible

objection of the ulama, or Wahhabi-Muslim religious hierarchy. It might seem

curious to secularized Americans, raised in an atmosphere that assumes a separation between church and state as a matter of course, that with the enemy at the

door, a head of state would have to obtain the consent of his country’s religious

authorities to call in friendly outside troops. Such a situation existed in Saudi

Arabia, where religious and civil authority inextricably intermingled. King

Fahd’s decision to consult the ulama was more than a courtesy and less than an

obligation. Twenty years of intensive modernization had weakened some of the

religious party’s grip on the population, but vestiges of the wave of Islamic fun31

The Kuwait Crisis and the Decision to Intervene 

COM. As Commanding General of Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), he served as

commander of all army forces under General Schwarzkopf. However, whereas General Horner

also served as Theater Air Component Commander and the JFACC with some responsibilities

for all USAF, USN, USMC, and Army air, General Yeosock did not serve as the Ground

Component Commander with some responsibility and command functions over the USMC

ground forces. General Schwarzkopf served as his own land component commander, possibly

to prevent Army–Marine Corps friction or possibly to place an Army four-star over a Marine

Corps three-star, making for a clearer chain of command.

70. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 244, 266.

71. News Brfg, SecDef Cheney, Wednesday, August 8, 1990, 1:00 P.M. [CK/DS/ SECDEF]; Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 305.
damentalism that in 1979 had swept the Shah of Iran from power had also

washed ashore in Saudi Arabia. Many of the lesser clergy had come to criticize

the ulama for compromising too readily with the state. In any case, at some point

before the meeting with the American delegation, King Fahd had ascertained that

the ulama would allow the presence of tens of thousands of infidel soldiers in

Saudi Arabia. If the ulama had withheld their consent, popular resentment within the country might have made U.S. deployment difficult, but probably not

impossible.

Secretary Cheney promptly telephoned President Bush, told him of the

king’s request, and obtained his authorization to begin sending U.S. forces into

the country. General Schwarzkopf turned to General Horner and said, “Chuck

start them moving.”72 Early on August 7, Secretary Cheney issued formal

instructions to Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf to begin the buildup of forces,

thus making that date C-day, the date on which the movement of troops, cargo,

and weapons systems from their place of origin commences. This decision inaugurated the first stage of the deployment of U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia. The

U.S. government intended to provide almost 200,000 men and women from all

four services to create a force capable of defending their ally against any Iraqi

military threat. In accordance with General Horner’s August 4 briefing to the

president, if hostilities broke out, the USAF contingent of this force, CENTAF,

would gain air superiority within the AOR, disrupt or harass any attacking

ground forces, interdict their supply lines, and if the Iraqis used CW or other

weapons of mass destruction, make retaliatory strikes on appropriate targets in

Iraq proper.

The decision of the U.S. government to send a large expeditionary force to

Saudi Arabia and the Saudis’ decision to accept it should have given Saddam

Hussein pause. But as the greatest victim of his own stereotypes, Saddam was

convinced that the will of the American nation would break before his own. In

212 B.C., Archimedes of Syracuse, who invented some of the precision weapons

of his time, said he could move the world if he possessed a long enough lever.

Two thousand years afterward, Saddam felt that he had in his hands the lever to

move a nation—casualties, or the threat of them. America would not absorb the

number of bodies needed to subdue his forces. He would respond to each increment of American forces with more forces of his own to keep the body-bag toll

too high for his enemy.

32

On Target

72. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 305.
Chapter Two

The Initial Deployment

The decision to send ground, air, and naval forces to the Persian Gulf initiated a vast movement of cargo ships, aircraft, combat units, and support personnel to Saudi Arabia. Because of air’s ability to rapidly span the globe, the aircraft

of the USAF played a crucial role in the beginning of the American buildup. The

first ground troops and equipment arrived via air. USAF combat aircraft came

early, and their numbers increased rapidly. During August and much of September 1990 they would have shouldered the burden of defending Saudi Arabia

while the ground forces fought a delaying action. The early days set the organizational and administrative foundations for many later actions as prepositioned

supplies and equipment kept the readiness of the lightly supported incoming

units high. This chapter addresses the hurried and harried days from the arrival

of the 1st TFW’s F–15Cs to the appearance of the heavy tanks of the 24th

Infantry Division (Mechanized), when CENTCOM at last felt able to stop any

Iraqi drive.

When General Schwarzkopf departed Jeddah on the morning of August 7,

the day the Turkish government shut off the pipelines carrying Iraqi oil through

its territory, he left General Horner behind as Commander, CENTCOM (COMCENTCOM) Forward with instructions to establish a headquarters in Saudi

Arabia and to oversee the initial stages of the U.S. buildup. Because the early

stages of force deployment consisted of many air units and depended heavily on

airlift, General Schwarzkopf left General Horner behind to organize the reception of the force. General Schwarzkopf returned to the United States to help prepare the dispatch of the ground and logistics forces, which involved far more personnel and heavy equipment than the first echelons did. This unexpected delegation to General Horner indicated the CINCCENT’s faith in him, but it introduced

one of the first hitches into CENTAF’s deployment: no one had anticipated the

detailing of the commanding officer to a different position at the start of move33

Preface
ment. General Horner promptly left Jeddah, located on the Red Sea about 50

miles from Mecca and far from the scene of potential conflict, for Saudi Arabia’s

capital city, Riyadh, approximately 300 miles by air from the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. This move put the major U.S. and Saudi military headquarters in close proximity, almost literally cheek-to-cheek. It also introduced another dislocation in

the projected deployment, in that U.S. forces had no support infrastructure in

Riyadh because the original plans had assumed the establishment of an American

headquarters in Muscat, Oman.1 Once in Riyadh, Generals Horner and Yeosock

and their logistics staffs moved into office space in the building of the Saudi

Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA). General Horner’s CENTAF staff

arrived in Riyadh on August 8 and established itself in the RSAF Headquarters

(RSAF HQ) building. By the following day it had already set up a rudimentary

Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) and prepared a preliminary ATO.2 Maj. Gen.

Thomas R. Olsen, USAF, General Horner’s deputy, became the COMCENTAF

Forward. Also on August 9, General Powell sent General Schwarzkopf his formal mission statement:

USCINCCENT forces will deploy to the AOR and take actions in concert with

host nation forces, friendly regional forces, and other allies to defend against an

Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. Be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.

SWA [Southwest Asia] Operations are hereby designated Operation Desert

Shield.3

General Schwarzkopf followed this up by issuing a definitive operation

order (OPORD) for Desert Shield; a portion of it defined the command relationships and the responsibilities of each of CENTCOM’s component commanders.

General Horner received detailed direction on his roles as the JFACC and as the

COMCENTAF. In theory, the USAF views the JFACC as the instrument ensuring unity of command, or at least of direction, for all theater air assets including

those belonging to the USN, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), USA, USAF, and associated allied forces. This is a key point of USAF doctrine that insists on unity of

command within a theater of all air assets by an experienced air officer, usually

but not always a member of the USAF. Command of all air by a knowledgeable

airman would prevent the wasting of air power by parceling it out into small nonself-supporting packets tied to individual ground units with their individual

objectives. An overall air leader, working under the theater commander, could

focus large amounts of air at decisive points and have the flexibility to switch

34

On Target

1. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen, USAF (Ret.), with Drs. Richard G. Davis and Perry

D. Jamieson, CAFH, and Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, at Shaw AFB, S.C., Mar 5, 1992.

2. Intvw, Lt. Col. Jeffrey S. Feinstein, 9AF Chief of Plans and Exercise Div (DOXE), with

Drs. Richard G. Davis and Perry Jamieson, CAFH, and Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, at Shaw AFB,

S.C., Mar 3, 1992.

3. Audio Transcript, General Horner Comments, n.d. [April 1991], pp. 3–4; Msg,

091332Z Aug 90, CJCS to USCINCCENT, Subj: Operation Desert Shield.
forces to handle any new situations. The service first gained partial recognition

of this principle in 1943 with the issuance of Field Manual 100–20, and it has

continued to hold this tenet as sacrosanct. However, the USAF has failed to

impose this viewpoint on the other services, in large part because USAF officers

do not serve as Unified CINCs. The army and naval officers who do serve as

CINCs have different conceptions of the JFACC’s role. General Schwarzkopf, in

many respects a supporter if not an advocate of air power, proved no exception.

On August 10 in his OPORD, General Schwarzkopf directed his 26th tasking

assignment to COMCENTAF, requiring him in part to

Serve as the [JFACC] to ensure unity of effort for the conduct of theater air

operations. JFACC responsibilities include:

Planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking based on USCINCCENT apportionment decisions. The JFACC has OPCON [operational control] over Air Force assigned or attached aircraft units/-

assets with the exception of SOF [Special Operations Forces] and

SAC tanker aircraft. The JFACC will exercise TACON [tactical control] of SAC tanker sorties supporting JFACC air operations and will

exercise TACON of Navy and Marine sorties provided in accordance

with sub paragraphs below.

Recommending to USCINCCENT apportionment of theater air sorties to various missions or geographic areas in coordination with

COMUSARCENT [Commander, U.S. Army Component, CENTCOM], COMUSMARCENT [Commander, U.S. Marine Forces,

CENTCOM], COMUSNAVCENT [Commander, U.S. Naval Component, CENTCOM], COMSOCCENT [Commander, Special Operations Command, CENTCOM], and other commanders supporting

USCENTCOM, as appropriate. This does not preclude the forwarding

of apportionment recommendations by any component commander

directly to USCINCCENT.

4

The above grant of authority did not make the JFACC a man with unquestioned

responsibility for direction of air power within the theater. It seemed to make him

little more than the CINCCENT’s operations officer for air. The JFACC would

base his planning, coordination, and allocation decisions on the CINCCENT’s

apportionment decisions. Though the JFACC could recommend apportionment

of sorties, he had to do so by coordinating with, not by directing, the other component commanders. The JFACC had no power to compel their obedience. If the

other component commanders disagreed with the JFACC, they could forward

their recommendations directly to the CINC, eliminating the USAF from the

process all together. This restriction exceeded even the official JCS definition of

the JFACC’s duties.5 Whereas the USAF may have envisioned the JFACC as

something akin to a powerful overall air leader, in the war in Southwest Asia the

35

The Initial Deployment

4. Msg, 101100Z Aug 90, USCINCCENT to COMUSCENTAF et al., Subj: Desert Shield

OPORD.

5. See Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub

1–02, s.v. “joint force air component commander” for the approved definition of the JFACC.
JFACC numbered only first among equals. The JFACC in CENTCOM would

have only as much freedom as the CINCCENT permitted. On the other hand,

General Schwarzkopf had given the JFACC a defined authority which exceeded

that granted in earlier operations. Air power enthusiasts, such as some members

of Checkmate, applauded the CENTCOM JFACC authorizations as a step forward.6

General Schwarzkopf may have circumscribed the functions of General

Horner the JFACC, perhaps to guard his own prerogatives as a Joint Force Commander, but he gave General Horner the air component commander the full and

traditional measures of responsibility. He charged his air component commander

with the following tasks:

Supporting or implementing deterrent measures as required,

Directing coordination with the other component commanders and supporting

forces to ensure integration of air operations within the CINC’s concept of operations,

Integrating supporting maritime air resources through COMJTFME [Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East]. Naval forces in support of CENTCOM

will make available to COMCENTAF all sorties in excess of those required for

Naval warfare tasks.

In accordance with JCS agreements, General Schwarzkopf granted a large exception to the USMC. The Marine Commander retained operational control of his

organic aircraft, and those aircraft had the primary mission of supporting USMC

ground elements. In joint operations, USMC aircraft would normally support the

USMC mission. The Marine Commander would make sorties available to the

CINCCENT for direction by the air component commander to provide air

defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. The Marine

Commander would follow the same procedure for those sorties in excess of the

USMC’s support requirements, which would allow the air component commander to direct the excess sorties to the support of other portions of the theater’s

forces. But General Schwarzkopf limited the USMC’s exception when it came to

his own prerogatives. He added:

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater or Joint Force

Commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect

efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF [Marine

Air-Ground Task Force] tactical air sorties when it has been determined by the

Joint Force Commander that they are required for higher priority missions), and

direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort

in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force.

The Desert Shield OPORD gave the COMCENTAF several other duties. It

required him to serve as the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) with author36

On Target

6. Intvw, Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, Dep Directorate of Warfighting Concepts (XOXW),

with Drs. Richard G. Davis and Diane T. Putney, CAFH, at CAFH Offices, Bolling AFB, D.C.,

Jan 14, 1993.
ity to establish a combined integrated air defense and airspace control system in

coordination with other component, supporting, and friendly forces. It appointed

him the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) in order to increase operational flexibility by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of air space. The ACA

had responsibility for the establishment of procedures to facilitate routing and

recognition of friendly aircraft and for the establishment of identification and

weapons engagement zones. Furthermore, it directed the COMCENTAF to act as

the coordinating authority for CENTCOM interdiction operations, with responsibility for coordinating interdiction planning in operations involving forces of

two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. In that capacity,

COMCENTAF had the authority to require consultation between the agencies

involved, but he had no authority to compel agreement. If the parties could not

obtain essential agreement, they should refer the matter to the CINCCENT.

General Schwarzkopf charged his air component commander to conduct counterair, CAS, and interdiction operations and to assume responsibility for combat

search and rescue (CSAR), theater aeromedical evacuation, coordination of

B–52 operations and strategic reconnaissance missions, preparation for aerial

refueling support, and augmenting the Saudi Arabian reconnaissance and surveillance capability.7 Nowhere in the CINCCENT’s Desert Shield operations

order did he instruct CENTAF to develop a plan for, or prepare for, or in any way

undertake offensive air operations against Iraq.

What General Schwarzkopf would not grant to the JFACC, he did not give

to the air component commander, who also did not have the authority to force the

agreement of other components in multiservice arrangements. The USMC

obtained a strong, but in some aspects hazy, exemption from much of the air

component commander’s coordination. The requirement for the USMC and USN

to hand over excess sorties depended entirely on those services’ desire to cooperate. However, the power to determine the rules of engagement (ROE), IFF procedures, air defense zones, control of tanker assets, deconfliction, and so on—

many of which operated through the mechanism of the ATO—gave the air component commander the power, when used judiciously, to have an inordinately

large voice in not only who would fly, but when and where. Furthermore, the

ATO, which reflected the air component commander’s tactical control of USN,

USMC, and friendly aircraft, would prove a useful tool in pushing the other services in the direction the air component commander wished. The air component

commander lacked the legal power to coerce cooperation, but with the subtle, or

not so subtle, manipulation of his secondary powers he could, in practice, greatly increase his control of air operations. As General Horner acknowledged one

year after war, “the ATO is the JFACC.”8

37

The Initial Deployment

7. Msg, 101100Z Aug 90, USCINCCENT to COMUSCENTAF et al., Subj: Desert Shield

OPORD. The message has been slightly paraphrased to delete repetitious phrasing.

8. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner with Drs. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, Perry D. Jamieson, CAFH, and Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, at Shaw AFB, Mar 4, 1992.
Not only the other services, but also a portion of the USAF objected to coming under the control of General Horner as JFACC. Organizationally a Unified

CINC, the CINC of the Special Operations Command (CINCSOC) commanded

the USAF components of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). Within CENTCOM, the SOF had their own component, Central Command Special Operations

Command (SOCCENT), which in theory had a coequal status with CENTAF,

ARCENT, NAVCENT, and MARCENT. In practice, its commander, a full

colonel, had far less influence than the other three-star component commanders.

Nonetheless, the SOCCENT commander and his Air Component Commander

(AFSOCCENT) represented a distinct and virtually separate community within

the U.S. armed services. Once in the SOF community, men and equipment tend

to lose their service identities and adopt that of the special forces. By their very

loyalty to one another, their specialized combined training, and their unique doctrine and equipment, members of the SOF community form cohesive, dedicated,

and highly motivated units. The bulk of the helicopters in the USAF inventory

belong to USAF SOF units; those helicopters had specialized capabilities that

allowed them to penetrate enemy territory by night or day and to insert or pick

up SOF ground teams. All USAF AC–130 gunships were also associated with

the SOF forces. The U.S. Army Special Forces had come into being in the early

1960s as part a renewed interest in counterinsurgency, and by the 1980s, the

Special Forces had become closely associated with theories of low-intensity conflict, which went beyond counterinsurgency. In any case, the SOF mission

assumed operations in a theater or area relatively free of both heavy enemy air

defenses and of large numbers of friendly aircraft. Neither factor held true for the

CENTCOM AOR.

Both the integrated Coalition air defense system, based on RSAF–CENTAF

arrangements, and the Saudi government had extreme sensitivity to Coalition

flights over Saudi territory. This meant the ATO had to schedule Army SOCCENT flights, but the SOF commanders objected that this compromised the

security of their missions and possibly made them subject to unsuitable mission

assignments conceived by unqualified headquarters personnel. In addition, the

gunships, without the defenses to fly over Iraq, lacked a mission within the theater. Furthermore, the theater had no organization capable of CSAR, of locating

and retrieving shot-down or crashed air crews. The SOF helicopters in the

AOR—eight MH–53s and eight MH–60s with penetrating capability and trained

crews—seemed to offer the solution to this problem, but the SOF commanders

pointed out that their personnel had no training for CSAR, their helicopters were

intended solely for the support of SOF operations, and that the CSAR mission for

the AOR would consume far too much of their specialized resources and effort.

General Horner sought to resolve these matters by having the AFSOCCENT

transferred to CENTAF, where he could assign tasks as he willed. Apparently,

General Schwarzkopf disapproved this, but he did allow General Horner to

assume operational control of the gunships, which received the mission of assist38

On Target
ing the air base ground defense forces. In addition, the AFSOCCENT forces had

to participate in the ATO process and to accept the CSAR mission. Although

General Horner had not brought the AFSOCCENT assets into CENTAF, he had

once again subordinated another air element to the air control processes which

he defined and controlled.

One further consideration bears on the amount of influence exercised by the

COMCENTAF: his personal relationship with the CINCCENT. If General

Schwarzkopf and General Horner had disliked one another or if General

Schwarzkopf had failed to respect General Horner’s professional abilities, then

General Horner and his service would have retreated to the last rank of the

CINCCENT’s advisors. Under the stress of war and wide responsibility, commanders turn toward those they trust. Norm Schwarzkopf trusted Chuck Horner.

At this harried time in the second week of August, General Horner made the

acquaintance of His Royal Highness Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan bin

Abd al-Aziz of the RSAF. Prince Khalid—an intensely ambitious 41-year-old

officer educated at the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and in U.S.

military staff schools, and with twenty-one years of military experience—served

as commander of the Saudi Air Defense System.9 His older brother, Bandar bin

Sultan, served as the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. His father, Prince

Sultan Abd al-Aziz, the Minister of Defense and Aviation, a full brother to King

Fahd, was the third in line to the Saudi throne. General Prince Khalid’s grandfather was Abd al-Aziz, the first king of Saudi Arabia. At this instant, however,

General Prince Khalid found himself with reduced responsibilities; the crisis situation had caused the air defense system to come directly under the RSAF, eliminating many of his duties. But he loyally supported the policies of his father and

uncle who had approved the American presence in their country. Therefore, he

used his considerable influence to aid General Horner in establishing headquarters sites in Riyadh. General Horner spoke of Prince Khalid’s aggressiveness in

solving problems and of his helpfulness. In one instance, the Prince, with a telephone call to his father, secured the future site of CENTCOM headquarters in the

basement of the MODA headquarters building, which contained a two-story C2

center, considerable floor space, and several big amphitheaters, all unused by the

Saudis.10

Eventually the Prince, a handsome man with a distinguished military bearing, became Commander of the Joint Islamic-Arab Forces, a position that made

him the Saudi opposite to General Schwarzkopf and placed under his command

all the Saudi armed forces and the armed contingents contributed by the Syrians,

Egyptians, Moroccans, and French, among others, many of whom would have

found it politically inexpedient to serve directly under American command. This

new and visible post may also have served to elevate Prince Khalid’s position

39

The Initial Deployment

9. Caryle Murphy, “‘Glass Ceiling’ in House of Saud: Princes Find Few Jobs at Top,”

Washington Post, March 15, 1992, p. A25.

10. Audio Transcript, General Horner Comments, n.d. [Apr 1991], pp. 3–4.
within the Royal family, giving him additional status as a warrior and war hero.

The sons of Abd al-Aziz eligible for the crown had reached their late 60s or early

70s, so in the not-too-distant future, Prince Khalid’s generation might offer

viable candidates for a throne that always stayed in the Saud family but that did

not always have to pass from father to eldest son. In fact, Prince Khalid, who did

not have his brother Bandar’s easy relationship with the king, may have overplayed his hand. In September 1991, King Fahd promoted him to general and

accepted his resignation from the service.11

On C-day, strategic airlift operations began with the flight of a C–141 from

Charleston AFB, South Carolina. At Langley AFB, Virginia, F–15Cs of the 1st

TFW’s 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) left for Saudi Arabia within eighteen hours of the deployment order. After refueling seven times in flight, all twenty-four of the squadron’s fully armed aircraft arrived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,

within thirty-four hours after receipt of the deployment order. However, the

honor of being the first deploying aircraft to land in Saudi Arabia belongs to one

of five E–3 AWACS aircraft from Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. It landed in Riyadh a

half-hour before the first F–15C. These two units comprised the first USAF aircraft to take station within the AOR in support of operations. Other aircraft followed rapidly. On August 9, another of the 1st TFW’s squadrons arrived, bringing the total of F–15Cs to forty-five plus sixteen support aircraft.12 Simple logic

demanded that the first USAF combat aircraft in the AOR be F–15Cs, the service’s most advanced air-to-air fighter. If combat occurred immediately, they

would assist the RSAF against the IZAF and fight to ensure the skies stayed in

allied control so that additional allied air and ground units could enter Saudi

Arabia in safety. Allied control of the air would also keep the IZAF from aiding

its ground forces. That same day, all the members of the UN Security Council

voided the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, announced the previous day, by passing

Resolution 662 (1990).

40

On Target

11. Murphy, “‘Glass Ceiling’ in House of Saud,” p. A25.

12. Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, pp. 12–17.

General Schwarzkopf and

Prince Khalid bin Sultan
USN aircraft from the decks of the USS Eisenhower, in the eastern Mediterranean Sea on August 8, and from the USS Independence, which took up station in the North Arabian Sea at 1600L August 9, could aid in the conflict. Each

carrier possessed a composite wing of fighter, strike, and specialized aircraft

including approximately twenty F–14 air-to-air fighters, an aircraft equivalent to

the F–15C. With organic refueling assets, carriers could provide support for

strike packages of moderate range. For operations encompassing virtually all

naval air strikes from the Red Sea as well as many from the Persian Gulf, USN

aircraft required refuelings from USAF tankers to reach the combat area and

return; their ability to fly missions over the area of conflict was restricted because

of the longer flight times required. In addition, refueling not only required USAF

tankers, but it required those tankers to carry the less-volatile and less-powerful

USN standard JP–5 jet fuel rather than the USAF standard JP–4 jet fuel. When

mixed, a small amount of JP–4 would contaminate the JP–5. Tankers could

switch fuels only with difficulty because their systems had to be completely

flushed to change fuel. The two fuels had wildly contrasting flash points:

–20°Celsius (approximately 25° Fahrenheit) for JP–4 versus JP–5’s 65° Celsius

(approximately 300° Fahrenheit). As little as 10 percent of JP–4 mixed with JP–5

lowered the latter’s flash point to 30° Celsius (185° F). Carrier safety required

the higher flash point. USAF and USN aircraft also used different refueling hardware (the USAF boom versus the NATO-standard USN baskets) which made

reconfiguring tankers time-consuming. In short, once USAF tankers began to

service USN aircraft, those tankers became, in practice, dedicated to the USN

and unavailable for the USAF inventory. After the Persian Gulf War, the USN

acknowledged that available tankerage (USN and USAF) had proved insufficient

“to employ most efficiently and effectively six aircraft carriers”; it suggested that

the USAF agree to allocate specific tankers and fuel to each carrier battle group

to “preclude Navy pursuit of dedicated organic or land-based tankers in a constrained fiscal environment.”13 The F–14s, provided their lack of compatible IFF

equipment could be overcome, would naturally have made a powerful contribution to any air battle, but at a much greater expense than a lesser number of

F–15Cs.

On August 10, 19 F–15Es and 24 F–16s reached the AOR. The F–15Es went

to Oman and the F–16s took station in the UAE. The basing of these units directly involved and committed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations early in the

crisis. The first 7 B–52Gs arrived at Diego Garcia on August 13; the first 24

A–10s and 3 EC–130s closed on Saudi Arabia on August 19; and the initial 20

F– 4G Wild Weasels and 18 F–117A Stealth fighters flew into Bahraini and

Saudi fields on August 21. By this date USAF airlift operations had delivered a

total of 25,150 tons of cargo and 33,864 passengers and had raised sortie totals

41

The Initial Deployment

13. Navy Annex (NODM 11–91: Ser 602G/1S609350) to the Joint Assessment Report

(SJS 2571/618–02), pp. B–5, B–6, Subj: Tanker Support to the Navy [File No.

CK/DS/Lessons- JCS/CINCS].
in and out of Saudi Arabia to 89 for C–5s and to 195 for C–141s. By August 16,

Desert Shield had placed an unprecedented strain on the military airlift fleet. For

the first time in history, the United States had committed its entire strategic airlift capability worldwide. The next day, Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command (CINCTRANSCOM) General Hansford T. Johnson activated

for the first time ever the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, adding 17 aircraft capable of

carrying 1,920 passengers per day and 21 aircraft with a cargo airlift capacity of

490 tons per day. This action increased airlift, but it did not fully meet projected

requirements. In addition to the airlift, the first “afloat” prepositioned ship dedicated to USAF logistics, Advantage, arrived in Saudi Arabia carrying B–52

ammunition and air base assets. CENTAF continued to grow: 8 EF–111As

arrived on August 25 and 18 F–111Fs came in the next day. By September 4,

1990 (C+28 days), CENTAF had grown to a force of 23,854 personnel, including 1,243 women. CENTCOM personnel in the AOR totaled 104,304 (2,494

women). CENTAF air assets consisted of the following 619 aircraft:14

Combat Aircraft Support Aircraft

A–10 96 C–20 1

B–52G 20 C–21 4

EC–130 7 C–130 70

EF–111A 10 AWACS 6

F–4G 24 EC–130E 6

F–15C 72 HC–130 4

F–15E 24 KC–135 79

F–16 120 MC–130 4

F–111F 32 MH–53 8

F–117A 18 RC–135 4

RF–4C 6

TR–1 2

U–2 2

Total 423 Total 196

This rapid buildup of air power demonstrated several of the advantages the

United States gained by having a complete or integrated air force, as opposed to

one devoted almost exclusively to combat aircraft. Every USAF combat aircraft

flew into the theater with the assistance of multiple air-to-air refuelings provided by USAF jet tanker aircraft. Other tankers stationed within the AOR gave

U.S. and allied aircraft based in the UAE and at remote Saudi bases the ability to

operate over the potential zone of conflict. Without USAF tankers, USN carrier

battle groups would have had to enter the narrow, shallow, and easily mined

Persian Gulf to mount their limited strikes on Iraqi targets. The necessity for self42

On Target

14. Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, pp. 18–44. Aircraft numbers cited were taken

from the USCINCCENT Sitreps.
protection would have further limited the striking force of the carrier battle

groups. USAF strategic airlift not only brought in enough logistical items and

munitions to make its combat aircraft nearly self-supporting, it also flew in most

of the Army’s personnel and all of its initial combat units, such as the combatready brigade of the 82d Airborne Division. While C–5s and C–141s made the

long hauls from the continental United States and Germany, the many smaller

C–130s trucked vital items throughout the AOR. Without strategic and tactical

airlift, the United States’ extension of aid to the Gulf, or indeed to any area more

than 100 miles from the continental United States, either could not have been

undertaken at all or could have been undertaken only by time-consuming and

cumbersome sealift, making prompt reaction to the crisis impossible.

The speedy influx of USAF assets into the AOR obviously had immediate

tactical and strategic implications. The service followed up the air-to-air-dedicated F–15Cs with hundreds of combat aircraft capable of air-to-ground attack.

The A–10, an aircraft designed from the ground up as a tank killer, and the F–16,

a dual-purpose aircraft with a primary role as a strike aircraft and a distinctly secondary role as an air-to-air interceptor, could perform interdiction and CAS missions to directly aid allied ground forces against enemy ground attack. The

F–15Es deployed in the AOR did not yet have their LANTIRN targeting pods

and could not use PGMs. They would fly deep interdiction raids. The F–111Fs

and the F–117As with their self-designating laser-directed bombs, many of

which had the ability to penetrate several feet of steel-reinforced concrete, could

43

The Initial Deployment

TR–1 reconnaissance

aircraft

KC–10 tanker aircraft
strike hardened aircraft shelters; military command, control, and communications (C3) centers; BW and CW munitions storage facilities; and other targets

requiring PGMs. The USN possessed no penetrating munitions, which would

have made it impossible for naval air to get at the IZAF in its hardened aircraft

shelters.

During the first four weeks of Desert Shield, if not longer, the work of bedding down new forces, scheduling additional units, creating a logistical infrastructure to support the current and future forces, setting up training and familiarization periods, and planning to repel any Iraqi assault went on in a pressurecooker atmosphere that mixed too much stress with too little time. Most personnel worked 18 to 20 hours a day, while on the Kuwaiti border a handful of ground

forces confronted more than 100,000 Iraqis. The Saudis had deployed much of

their army on the Omani and Yemeni borders, and it took some time to redeploy

it. On August 8, when General Horner met with the Saudi Chiefs of Staff, he

found them polite but noncommittal, and he suspected that they had not yet

received official word in Jeddah of King Fahd’s decisions.15 The Saudi military

had no clear idea of the threat opposing them. General Horner noted that the

Americans soon provided detailed overhead photography that greatly aided the

Saudis in making decisions concerning their country’s defense.16

From the moment of their arrival on August 8, CENTAF staff members

plunged into the tasks confronting them. Two basic decisions influenced the

deployment. The first was that General Schwarzkopf did not order the implementation of a specific deployment order, such as the drafts prepared for OPLAN

1002–90. This left the units and planners unsure as to the ultimate basing assignments and the supporting arrangements for the bases. It also confused personnel

and left them unsure as to what items to bring with them. In at least two

instances, this had potentially serious consequences. Lack of a specific deployment order apparently prompted someone in personnel to apply the full weight

of existing regulation to the standard individual deployment orders which resulted in the insertion of a clause, in some orders, requiring officers to bring

sidearms to Saudi Arabia. Since some officers could not obtain standard-issue

service weapons, they brought their own nonstandard weapons. This caused

some difficulty with the Saudis and permitted dozens of untrained personnel to

have access to deadly weapons. Some members of the Air Security Police feared

that if the USAF personnel within the RSAF HQ building ever panicked, friendly fire alone could leave the interior of the building looking like the aftermath of

the gunfight at the O.K. Corral. Happily, the excess sidearms produced no significant incidents.17

44

On Target

15. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

16. Audio Transcript, General Horner Comments, n.d. [Apr 1991], p. 6.

17. General Horner, contradicting the Ninth Air Force security police, has told the author

that USAF officers in the RSAF HQ did not carry firearms. See Ltr, Gen. Charles A. Horner,

CINC, North American Aerospace Defense Comd, to Dr. Richard P. Hallion, Jr., AF Historian,

Subj: Review/Comments on Draft Manuscript “The Offensive Air Campaign Against Iraq,” Dec
As an appropriate comment on the modern American way of war, a deployment mixup over electronic gizmos caused more difficulties than the one caused

by guns and bullets. In the continental United States, Ninth Air Force officers

deployed to exercises with their service-issue personal computers (PCs). In fact,

some of the PCs used in the just-completed Internal Look at the end of July

remained at Shaw AFB, still packed on pallets. However, when the crisis forced

officers to report to Saudi Arabia, the absence of a deployment order specifically authorizing them to bring their PCs caused many officers to leave this piece of

equipment behind. An immediate, severe, and unplanned shortage of computing

power resulted.18 While the mental image of staff officers scurrying about trying

to cope with a PC famine provokes a certain amount of grim humor, the computing shortage had potentially serious consequences. In the last half of the

1980s the USAF had encouraged the almost universal application of minicomputers for word, data, and graphics processing in completing nearly all the dayto-day staff work. So well had this initiative succeeded that by August 1990 the

CENTAF staff, and every other USAF staff, had come to rely heavily on the PC,

some standard straight-from-the-box commercial software, and several modified

commercial or uniquely USAF-created programs. Lack of this necessary support

greatly increased the workload and increased the possibility of errors in logistics

and the ATO. Trying to manage an entire numbered air force’s logistics, especially one in the process of deploying more than 10,000 miles away from its

home bases, with only one PC quickly gave the CENTAF staff a new appreciation of the definition of bottleneck. If the old army marched on its stomach, then

the modern air force flies on its keyboard. It would appear that the deployment

difficulties may have forced the CENTAF staff to fall back on a de facto implementation of OPLAN 1002–90. One officer, who brought his copy of the plan,

testified that it immediately became a best-seller with other officers desperate to

impose a coherent scheme on the movement.19

In a second crucial decision, General Schwarzkopf directed the components

to give first priority to the shipping of combat units and combat support personnel at the expense of communications, intelligence, and less-critical personnel

and equipment.20 The lack of communications forced CENTAF and its subordinate wings to fall back on the Saudi commercial telephone system and secure fax

machines in the possession of RSAF base host units.21 During this initial phase,

45

The Initial Deployment

8, 1992. Anecdotal evidence suggests it is quite possible that General Horner did not initially

realize the prevalence of sidearms within his command. However, an egregious discharge of

weapons during an inspection in the field convinced him to drastically curtail their use—an

order his headquarters staff may have taken seriously indeed.

18. Intvw, Lt. Col. Waterstreet, Mar 6, 1992.

19. Intvw, Lt. Col. Feinstein, Mar 3, 1992.

20. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 311.

21. Intvw, Col. James C. Crigger, Jr., with Dr. Richard G. Davis, Mar 5, 1992. Colonel

Crigger recalls this decision but could not identify the commander who made it. Either General

Schwarzkopf or, perhaps, General Horner could have made this decision on priorities.
CENTAF Forward had only one international telephone line for all business with

the continental United States, and the Saudis held General Olsen personally

responsible for the thousands of dollars worth of calls billed to that phone. Also

in this phase, the need for personnel expert in secure communications and the

specialized communications links required by its somewhat exotic systems

severely hampered the ability of the CENTAF Directorate of Intelligence

(CENTAF/IN) to perform its mission. At this precise moment, with all personnel

involved suffering from frayed tempers due to excessive workloads, the planners, operations officers, and combat units felt an overriding need for intelligence

just as CENTAF/IN was experiencing its lowest capabilities. This mismatch of

need and capability contributed to a not always warranted exasperation with

intelligence within CENTAF for the remainder of the campaign.22

As the fighter and supporting wings and squadrons deployed to the AOR,

basing became an almost first-come, first-served affair. CENTAF began with only

a notional plan for bed-down and with no written basing agreements with Saudi

Arabia or any of the GCC countries. It founded its initial planning on an assumption of fifteen bases, and it ended up requiring twenty-two. Some units had their

basing changed in flight. The 4th TFW’s F–15Es left the United States headed for

Seeb, on the Gulf of Oman. The aircraft diverted to Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, and,

while literally on the ramps, the 4th TFW received permission from the Omanis

to base at Thumrait, in southern Oman, 1,100 miles one-way from Baghdad. They

moved forward to Al Kharj in November 1990. The F–117As of the 37th TFW

found their home-away-from-home at Khamis Mushait, in the southern corner of

Saudi Arabia, near Yemen, and they ended up almost as far from Baghdad as the

4th TFW’s F–15Es. However, method more than chance dictated this move. The

remote location of the base would give the still security-sensitive F–117A aircraft

additional protection from prying eyes, would help to prevent surprise attacks, and

would ensure against capture by enemy ground forces. In addition, the base had

enough hardened aircraft shelters to house the 37th TFW’s aircraft, and its altitude

and physical location mimicked the 37th TFW’s home base at Tonepah Test

Range, Nevada.23 Since the 37th TFW’s prime mission would require it to attack

heavily defended targets deep in Iraq, its location on the Yemeni border would

place additional strain on the AOR tanker fleet.

The basing of the 1st TFW at Dhahran, which was approximately 250 miles

from Kuwait City, allowed it, in conjunction with the RSAF, to cover the oil

fields, the vital northern Saudi ports, the AWACS aircraft, and the direct land

route from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia. If necessary, the 1st TFW could provide

escort for the A–10s of the 23d and 354th TFWs based at nearby King Fahd

International Airport while they attacked invading Iraqis. The 35th TFW’s F–4G

46

On Target

22. Much anecdotal information also states that clashes of personality between ranking

intelligence officers and heads of outside organizations also contributed to the differences

between intelligence, operations, and planners.

23. Intvw, Col. Crigger, Mar 5, 1992.
Wild Weasels operating from Shaikh Isa in Bahrain, also close to Dhahran, could

support the A–10s and F–15Cs or the F–16s flying in from Doha, Qatar, and

from Al Minhad in northern Oman. The F–16s, with their relatively short range

and somewhat distant bases, would require large-scale tanker support. In northwestern Saudi Arabia, the F–15Cs of the 33d TFW anchored the other end of the

Saudi-Iraqi border and could provide escort for aircraft attacking Scud sites and

airfields in western Iraq. The EF–111As and F–111Fs occupied Taif, near Mecca,

where they could strike north to Baghdad and beyond. However, the USAF could

not strike into the northernmost regions of Iraq from its southern operating bases

unless the aircraft refueled over Iraq itself, a risky procedure. This circumstance

made it desirable to obtain the use of bases in Turkey in order to attack targets in

northern Iraq. Close examination of the basing pattern again reveals the dependence of the force on tankers. Whereas in Europe and South Korea, the tactical

air forces contend with short distances and optimistically assume the availability of functional air bases close to the front for refueling and rearming, CENTAF

encountered the opposite. As the CENTAF Director of Operations stated a year

after the conflict, “Tankers were the long pole in the tent,” the most difficult single factor to contend with.24

The rapid force buildup placed a great strain on logistics and made the presence of the Harvest Falcon prepositioned base assets and munitions of inestimable value. Both Generals Horner and Olsen spoke of the key contribution

made by the Harvest Falcon program and expressed satisfaction with the work of

the contractor who had maintained the matériel.25

As one section of the CENTAF staff struggled with bed-down, another, consisting in the beginning of ten to twenty officers, began to prepare a plan for

defensive operations. These defensive plans rested heavily on the targeting and

planning work done earlier in the summer by the Ninth Air Force in preparing

for OPLAN 1002–90. Like virtually every other American serviceman and

woman in Saudi Arabia, the defensive planners shared the expectation that

Saddam might send his armored forces south at any moment to seize the oil

fields. Although their fears would subside with the continuing reinforcement of

American soldiers, initially they worked with the grim awareness that unless air

power could perform a miracle, success for the men of the 82d Airborne Division

and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) could quickly become a forlorn

hope. The first plan did not even provide for forward ground air controllers; it

merely sought to keep the pressure on the Iraqis with attacks by a steady flow of

aircraft. As the plan matured, it added forward ground air controllers and additional missions.26 Because of its hasty preparation and the expected critical situation of the ground forces, the plan apparently did not contemplate an extended

air offensive into Iraq.

47

The Initial Deployment

24. Ibid.

25. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, March 4, 1992; Intvw, Maj. Gen. Olsen, Mar 5, 1992.

26. Intvw, Col. Crigger, Mar 5, 1992.
The presence of American aircraft in Saudi Arabia necessitated control of

those aircraft and coordination of their activities with the Saudis and the USN—

in other words, CENTAF needed a functioning ATO. Although the initial lack of

computing power made the first ATOs somewhat sketchy, the relatively small

number of aircraft involved allowed the planners to fall back on the stubby-pencil method—preparation by hand. The first CENTAF ATOs succeeded in

establishing the precedent that the theater ATO controlled virtually all flying.

From their beginning, these ATOs coordinated flights with the Saudi air defense

system; this entering wedge allowed CENTAF to mesh the emerging CENTCOM air defense system with the Saudi system and enabled General Horner to

prevent the establishment of an independent air defense system by the USMC,

whose flights had to be included in the Saudi-CENTCOM system instead.27

General Olsen recounted that similar reasoning forced the USN into the RSAFCENTCOM air defense system. He visited each of the carrier battle groups and

convinced their commanders of the necessity of a single, integrated theater air

defense system. To their credit, the admirals, who had become habituated to supplying their own independent air defense for their battle groups, agreed.28 The

USN had the responsibility of passing the ATO to other Coalition naval units.

Since the ATO contained the daily information on coordination with the air

defense system, USMC and USN aircraft soon found themselves obliged to

become part of the ATO system. Only the battle group self-protection missions,

taking place solely over water, did not come under the ATO. However, integration into the ATO did not necessarily mean that USN and USMC simply handed

over their aircraft to USAF planners. In many instances, the other two services

explained the missions they wished to fly, and the USAF either wrote the ATO

to satisfy them or negotiated the changes. As General Horner had observed, the

ATO became the JFACC.

The RSAF approached the early ATOs gingerly. As the body responsible for

Saudi input to the ATO, RSAF HQ gained the power to force all RSAF units to

conform to its orders if they wished to fly. The ATO also gave RSAF HQ an additional measure of control over the foreign air forces in its territory. The Saudis’

grasped that ATO restrictions would allow them a much greater control of their

airspace, and they insisted that all aircraft of whatever origin become part of it.

The Saudis also continued their commercial air operations, which supplied

another reason for thoroughly planned and controlled air operations so that accidents and disruption of commercial service would be prevented. For CENTAF,

bringing the Saudis into the ATO not only simplified the practical problems of

handling RSAF aircraft, it brought the RSAF into the planning process and

familiarized the RSAF with the complexities of large-scale operations.

Heretofore, RSAF wings had operated on a day-to-day basis, with little thought

of or need to consider the effect that their operations would have other air units.

48

On Target

27. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

28. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Olsen, Mar 5, 1992.
Within a few days, the American-Saudi alliance became a multinational

Coalition. On August 8, Great Britain announced it would send armed forces to

Saudi Arabia. Two days later, the Arab League (twelve of twenty-three members

voting in favor) agreed to send military forces to protect the Persian Gulf states

from an Iraqi attack. Egyptian troops arrived on August 11, Moroccan troops on

August 14, and Syrian troops on August 15. French combat helicopters landed in

Saudi Arabia on August 27. That same day all members of the GCC (Saudi

Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman) agreed to make their facilities available to

foreign troops, which increased the number of air bases available for the beddown of USAF aircraft. Eventually, the Syrian contingent would include the 9th

Syrian Armored Division and a special forces unit—in all, numbering almost

40,000 men—while the Egyptians would send two divisions and a special forces

regiment—for a force of nearly 70,000 men, the third-largest contingent after the

Americans and the Saudis. For this help, the Egyptians received as one of their

considerations the forgiveness of a $7.1 billion military debt to the United States,

making each Egyptian soldier worth approximately $100,000 for his country’s

treasury. Because the Egyptians had little prospect of ever paying this debt, its

forgiveness represented a gesture of more symbolic than practical significance.

The states of the Arabian Peninsula reached the same pragmatic conclusion. By

October 24, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar had topped the

Americans by canceling $8.3 billion in Egyptian debts. Each Egyptian soldier

may not have been worth his weight in gold, but each was worth approximately

40 pounds of the yellow metal to his nation’s treasury. These moves helped

Egypt’s international balance sheets, but they probably had little effect on its

overall credit rating. The Egyptians may have placed greater value on the chance

to become once again a full-fledged member of the Arab community, a status

they had forfeited by making peace with the Israelis. The Syrians, too, hoped to

gain acceptance and legitimacy in both the Arab and Western worlds. The

Syrian’s superpower patron of three decades, the Soviet Union, had become

impotent, making it necessary for them to repair their relations with the

conservative Arab states and the West.

The ghost of Task Force Smith haunted the American commanders facing

the Iraqis. The first American ground unit to participate in the conflict in South

Korea, Task Force Smith, a less than battalion-sized unit of approximately 560

men from the 24th Infantry Division, encountered on July 5, 1950, the onrushing

North Korean 4th Infantry Division and an attached armored regiment. The poorly trained, incompletely equipped, out-of-condition men and officers of Task

Force Smith, fresh from undemanding occupation duty in Japan, stood for six

hours until they exhausted their ammunition before retreating in disarray, abandoning their wounded, their heavy weapons, and their artillery, after imposing

minimal delay on the enemy and suffering approximately 175 casualties at the

hands of the North Korean People’s Army.29

49

The Initial Deployment

29. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, United States Army in the
The American commanders in Saudi Arabia, whose forces had a far higher

state of readiness than the ragtag collection of soldiers hastily assembled for Task

Force Smith, still wished to avoid having to commit their men to such a onesided and hopeless confrontation. The 2,300-man ready brigade of the 82d

Airborne Division and perhaps a like number of Saudis faced odds of 25 to 1 in

terms of raw numbers of bodies. They also confronted hundreds of medium tanks

and armored personnel carriers with only light antitank weapons. Little wonder

that the soldiers of the 82d Division joked that if war should come, their mission

was to act as speed bumps for Iraqi tanks. In fact, only Saudi troops faced the

Iraqis on the border. CINCCENT’s OPORD 1 for Desert Shield made the first

task of the initial Army combat units the assumption of defensive positions

around the “critical oil and port facilities” near Dhahran, almost 200 miles from

the Kuwaiti-Saudi border.30 The immediate follow-on American ground units,

most of the remaining units of the 82d Airborne Division plus the aviation

brigade task force of the 101st Air Assault Division, and an MEB, all of which

had arrived by August 20, experienced the same drawback of relatively light

armament. These lightly equipped units could react rapidly and were easily transportable by air or sea, but they sacrificed heavy weapons because their bulk and

the weight of their supporting equipment would have consumed too much airlift

capacity. The weight and bulk limitations on airlift placed a premium on prepositioning heavy equipment either within a possible combat theater or on cargo

ships stationed within relatively rapid sailing time of a potential conflict.

Seaborne heavy equipment took time to arrive. Helicopters and other heavy

items belonging to the 101st Air Assault Division averaged 20 to 25 days in transit from the U.S. East Coast port of Jacksonville, Florida, and the last of the division’s ships did not arrive until October 5.31 Transit times did not include time

for loading and unloading or time for travel to and from ports. Only the midSeptember arrival of the last division of the USA’s XVIII Corps—the 24th

Infantry Division (Mechanized), which had only two of its three brigades—

would begin to redress the balance. However, much of the 24th Division’s heavy

equipment—especially its advanced M1A1 tanks which outclassed anything in

the Iraqi inventory—would have to come by sealift. As a consequence, the

USAF placed heavy emphasis on bringing in air-to-ground munitions, especially antitank varieties; nearly all the USAF munitions on prepositioned ships were

of the air-to-ground type. By August 23 (C+16), the move to the Persian Gulf had

50

On Target

Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), GPO, 1972),

pp. 81– 82; Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950),

United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, GPO, 1961), pp. 60–76.

30. Msg, 101100Z Aug 90, CINCCENT to JCS et al., Subject: Operation Desert Shield.

[File No. CK/DS/CENTCOM]

31. Brfg Slide, Lt. Gen. J. H. Binford Peay III, USA, DCS Ops & Plans (formerly CG,

101st Air Assault Div), “On the Power Projection of the 101st Division,” Washington Strategy

Seminar, Series on Air Power and the New American Security Environment, Rayburn House

Office Building, Washington, D.C., Mar 13, 1992.
put such strains on the services’ active-duty manpower that the Secretary Cheney

authorized a call-up of 49,703 reservists by October 1.32 General Horner summed

up the first three weeks of the crisis: “Every night we say, ‘What if they attack

tonight? What do we do?’” He added, “These three weeks have seemed like three

years.”33 Meanwhile, the UN Security Council continued to tighten the screws on

Saddam. On August 25, with Cuba and Yemen abstaining, Resolution 665 (1990)

established a maritime force in the Persian Gulf to inspect all Gulf shipping to

ensure that it comply with the embargo against Iraq. This enlarged NAVCENT’s

responsibilities.

A CENTCOM briefing given on August 20 to a conference between General

Powell and the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands projected (as it

turned out, somewhat optimistically) the arrival dates of U.S. forces. CENTCOM

did not expect to attain a “high confidence defense” until September 25.34 In fact,

by September 12, General Schwarzkopf admitted to the Washington Post that the

completion date for the ground buildup had slipped six weeks to mid-November,

delayed in part by the breakdown of ships carrying heavy equipment and by a

drop in daily airlift flights owing to maintenance issues.35 The movement to

Saudi Arabia strained the USAF airlift fleet and the eighty-one cargo and freight

ships dedicated to U.S. military requirements. Some of those dedicated ships

even had to undergo the time-consuming task of unloading their normal commercial cargoes and then sailing to a military embarkation port to load, but the

services managed to meet their sealift requirement without preemptive requisitions. If Saddam had chosen to fight earlier and force the U.S. forces in the AOR

to consume heavy equipment and munitions at a far faster rate, the U.S. military’s air and sealift capability might have fallen short of requirements. A postwar JCS Mobility Study recognized this potential shortfall. It recommended a

long-term program to raise the number of prepositioned ships worldwide from 21

to 32, to augment the two-division surge sealift from 8 to 19 ships, and to

increase the number of Department of Defense (DoD) dedicated ships from 81 to

104, including an increase in the specialized vehicle-carrying, quick-loading,

roll-on roll-off ships.36

The Iraqis responded to the growing array of Coalition forces in Saudi

Arabia. They withdrew the Republican Guard divisions that had staged the inva51

The Initial Deployment

32. Patrick Tyler, “Cheney Authorizes Mobilization of 49,703 Reservists,” Washington

Post, Aug 24, 1990, p. A1.

33. Molly Moore, “Saudi Ground Defenses Still Mirage Thin,” Washington Post, Aug 30,

1990, pp. A1, A34.

34. Brfg Slides, CENTCOM, “Desert Shield Current Closure Estimate” and “USCENTCOM Troop Strength: Deployment of Forces to Saudi Arabia,” CJCS and CINC’s Conference,

National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Aug 20–21, 1990 [CK/DS/CENTCOMPlans].

35. Molly Moore, “Buildup in Gulf Reported Behind,” Washington Post, p. A1.

36. Brfg Slide, Lt. Gen. Henry Viccellio, Jr., USAF, Dir Joint Staff, JCS, “The JCS

Mobility Study,” Washington Strategy Seminar, Series on Air Power and the New American

Security Environment, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Mar 13, 1992.
sion to southern Iraq, where they would serve as a mobile reserve. They also

replaced their Republican Guards with lesser quality regular divisions, doubling

the manpower available for action in Kuwait. On August 22, the IZAF twice violated Saudi airspace in a possible test of Coalition alert and response procedures.

A week earlier, in an act of cynicism, ruthless calculation, expediency, and

brazen boldness coupled with impudent assurance and insolence, Saddam on

August 15 made Iran a peace offer it could not refuse—withdrawal of all Iraqi

troops from Iranian soil, recognition of the disputed prewar borders (including

the Shatt-al-Arab), and release of all prisoners of war. Iran immediately accepted Saddam’s offer to return the fruits of his eight-year war against it. However,

the Iranians could not in a day or even a year rebuild their shattered armed forces.

They could mount no dangerous military threat to Saddam. The Iranian-Iraqi

peace would allow the Iraqis, over the course of three or four months, to add an

additional 25 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and 1 mechanized division

(200,000–250,000 men) to the like number already in and about Kuwait. It would

give Saddam the option, if he so desired, to extend his defenses from the Wadi al

Batin on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border to the Iraqi-Saudi border, toward Jordan.

Furthermore, Iraqi military engineers had the ability to create strong defenses for

the new infantry forces to occupy. This large new increment of force also threatened to give the Iraqis the ability to launch a major attack southward.37 A little

more than three weeks later, on September 9, Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz became

the first high-ranking Iraqi official to visit Iran in ten years when he flew to

Teheran to appeal for help in circumventing the UN embargo. Three days later,

Iran’s chief cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, announced that an Islamic holy war

against the United States and its troops in the Gulf was justified. By October 14,

the two countries had reopened their embassies and resumed normal diplomatic

ties.

While events on the Iranian front may have given Saddam cheer, those of the

international oil market must have proved frustrating indeed. By invading

Kuwait and pressuring Saudi Arabia, Saddam must have hoped to corner the

world oil market and drive up the price of petroleum. He succeeded. On August

3 the spot price of oil rose $3.49 a barrel to $24.49, rose again to $28.05 on

August 6, fell three days later to $26.00, climbed on August 22 to a five-year

high of $31.22, by September 17 reached $33.73, on September 24 went up to

$38.35, and by October 11 surpassed $40.00 per barrel, nearly double the precrisis price. Then the price broke. By October 18 it had fallen to $37, but by the following day it was $28 per barrel, still a 33-percent increase over the precrisis

price. In addition, OPEC thumbed its nose at Iraq by authorizing larger production quotas for its members, including up to 2 million barrels a day for Saudi

Arabia. Saddam had driven up the price, but none of the revenue flowed into his

52

On Target

37. Msg, 222044Z Aug 90, DIA Washington to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iraq—Military

Impact of Rapprochement with Iran [File No. T/HO/2/DIA].
coffers; instead, his enemies enriched themselves at his expense. On October 18,

reduced to offering oil at the old $21 per barrel price, he found no takers. The

next day, in a move subsequently suspended, the Iraqi Oil Ministry announced

the rationing of motor oil and gasoline because of a shortage of refining additives.38

On August 20 President Bush signed National Security Directive 45

(NSD–45), “U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” that

retroactively approved several decisions already taken and laid out a coordinated

scheme of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military responses to the crisis.39 The

president stated in the directive that the United States had “interests in the

Persian Gulf vital to national security” including access to oil and the stability

and security of “key friendly states in the region.” He further stated his intention

to defend those interests with military force “if necessary and appropriate.” Next

came a restatement of the President’s four major objectives in the Gulf:

Immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from

Kuwait,

Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government,

Maintenance of the security and stability of the Persian Gulf, and

Protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.40

The directive outlined a coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military

strategy. NSD–45 called for diplomatic efforts to maximize worldwide support

for the U.S. position. In the economic sense, it supported tight sanctions against

Iraq and directed the appropriate U.S. governmental agencies to encourage world

oil producers to increase output and investigate a coordinated drawdown of

strategic petroleum reserves with other nations. As for military action, the directive gave U.S. forces in the region a mission to “deter and defend” and instructed them to prepare to enforce Chapter 7, Article 57 of the UN charter and its resolutions related to the crisis. NSD–45 envisioned U.S. armed forces joining two

multinational forces: one to deter aggression against Saudi Arabia; the other to

free Kuwait by enforcing economic sanctions. As part of the enforcement of economic sanctions, the president authorized U.S. forces to establish a blockade of

Iraqi seaborne commerce. Finally, NSD–45 indicated a U.S. willingness to

accept a UN-led military effort, but only if U.S. commanders found the UN command arrangements acceptable and if the UN had an adequate command structure in place and operating.

NSD–45 illustrated that at this early stage of the crisis the Bush administration had not yet adopted a policy of applying military force directly against Iraq.

53

The Initial Deployment

38. CRS, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Chronology.

39. NSD–45, “U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Aug 20, 1990.

40. The Bush administration had stated these or very similar goals as early as August 8,

1990. At that time USAF planners in the Pentagon included such a statement of four

“President’s Objectives” in their initial planning assumptions. See Msg, 100145Z Aug 90,

TACOPS, Langley AFB, to CENTCOM FWD, Lt Gen Horner, Subj: “Air Campaign Briefing”

[File No. TAC/HO].
U.S. armed forces would defend Saudi Arabia and deter further Iraqi aggression;

they would not attack Iraq nor Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The United States would

attempt to build and maintain an international Coalition against Iraq and would

even consider serving in a UN command. It is inconceivable that such a command would not have paralleled the arrangements for the police action in Korea

in which U.S. commanders held the major decision-making positions. The

administration showed little interest in Soviet military assistance and preferred to

keep the Soviets from gaining prestige and influence in the Gulf. Nor could one

accurately gauge the Soviet’s attitude, or at least the attitude of the Soviet military, toward their former client in Baghdad. As with the Trojan horse, the Soviets

were best left outside the Coalition’s gates. But NSD–45 also testified to the

president’s determination to pursue measures designed to bring about an Iraqi

withdrawal from Kuwait. The establishment of a sea blockade ran the risk of

allowing the Iraqis to stage a series of provocations and tests of will, which might

weaken the Coalition and turn U.S. public opinion. Likewise, an ineffective

blockade would send Saddam a signal that his foes lacked the determination to

face him down. The president’s implementation of a blockade to enforce the

sanctions and the U.S. execution of it kept Saddam economically isolated while

it weakened his ability to wage war.

In this early period, CENTCOM planning remained essentially reactive. It

did not envision launching a major attack on the Iraqis. In both OPORD 1 of

August 10 and OPORD 3 of September 7 it retained the three-phased operation

laid out in OPLAN 1002–90: Phase I emphasized deterrence and training; Phase

II moved U.S. ground forces north to defend the critical oil stabilization and distribution facilities at Abqaiq (near Dhahran), with USAF and RSAF aircraft flying counterair, interdiction, and CAS missions designed to delay and disrupt the

Iraqi advance; and Phase III, after the Iraqis had suffered sufficient attrition,

would have U.S. forces counterattack to regain lost facilities and “restore the

integrity of the Saudi Arabian border.” Neither OPORD spoke of ground attacks

into Iraq or Kuwait. However, in the only reference to actions directly against

Iraq proper in either order, OPORD 3 instructed the USN to prepare to execute

preplanned TLAM strikes against “targets in Iraq” during Phase II.

The weakness of the land forces meant that in the first few weeks of the crisis, air power had the primary responsibility for stopping an assault, not to mention preserving allied ground units. This obliged CENTAF to focus on defensive

planning and the bed-down and training of current and expected forces.

CENTAF’s concentration on the immediate situation and the lack of any requirement for an offensive air campaign in the precrisis OPLANs discouraged it from

developing such a plan in the early phases of the crisis. Furthermore, CENTAF/

Ninth Air Force, like its parent USAF command, the Tactical Air Command

(TAC), may have been unable to distance itself from its firm commitment to

USA cooperation, as expressed in the Joint AirLand Battle espoused by TAC and

the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. It is possible that this focus on air54

On Target
ground cooperation predisposed CENTAF to conform to the ground scheme of

operations and reactions at the expense of the independent operations that characterize an offensive air campaign.

In the initial deployment, CENTCOM accomplished its primary mission:

deter further Iraqi aggression and defend Saudi Arabia. CENTAF found appropriate bases for most of its forces, established an integrated Coalition air defense

network, and brought the bulk of Coalition and other U.S. aviation into the rubric

of the ATO. With hard work and sensitivity, CENTAF built upon the harmonious

relations with the RSAF, created in part by previous training exercises and foreign military sales. The ability of the two air forces to cooperate withstood the

crisis and the ensuing conflict without a single major incident. Finally, the firststage deployments served as the springboard for other moves. The U.S. government would have to decide if it would continue to defend or if it would give itself

the option to initiate military action against Saddam. A decision to go after the

Iraqis would require an offensive plan and more force. The following chapters

will discuss the evolution of an offensive plan, in which the strategic air and the

air-ground support phases would form the centerpiece, and the method by which

the U.S. government arrived at the decision to give itself the offensive option.

55

The Initial Deployment
56

On Target
Chapter Three

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

Psychological operations are inherent to this

operation and will be as important as strike operations. Every mission will have critical political

and psychological overtones; every bomb will

have a psychological impact as well.

COMUSCENTAF, OPORD Offensive Campaign

September 2, 1990

The development of the offensive air plan for the Kuwait crisis quickly

became a contest between the radical air power ideas espoused by a small group

of unorthodox air theoreticians on the Air Staff in the Pentagon and the more

conventional, but not necessarily less valid, thinking that dominated CENTAF

and other portions of the service. This chapter will show that at crucial times, singularly strong-minded, properly placed individuals—such as Col. John A.

Warden III, USAF, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, USAF, and Brig. Gen. Buster C.

Glosson, USAF—can grasp the flow of events, if for an instant, and permanently redirect them, only to merge back into the crowd when the predestined

moment has passed. This chapter will also follow the process by which an

unproven idea works its way through a large bureaucracy, and how a unique formulation sometimes requires a familiar facade for acceptance.

The Genesis of the Strategic Air Plan

The creation of an offensive air campaign plan for CENTAF came from an

agency outside CENTAF and CENTCOM. The USAF Air Staff began official

work on such a plan on August 8, 1990. Its involvement in this effort came as the

direct result of a request for assistance from General Schwarzkopf to the Chief

of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF). When General Schwarzkopf left Jeddah on

57

Preface
August 7, General Horner stated that General Schwarzkopf informed him he

intended to ask the Joint Staff in the Pentagon for assistance in preparing an air

plan.1 At some point during the journey to Saudi Arabia, probably as a result of

the Camp David meeting and discussions of August 4, Secretary Cheney

instructed the CJCS and the CINCCENT

to develop an offensive option that would be available to the President in case

Saddam Hussein chose to engage in further aggression or other unacceptable

behavior, such as killing Kuwaiti citizens or foreign nationals in Kuwait or

Iraq.2

As the CINCCENT realized, the development of such an option required more

detailed planning and heavier raids than what he himself termed the “symbolic

air strikes” for punishment and retaliation that CENTCOM had heretofore submitted to the president.3 Upon arrival at HQ CENTCOM at MacDill AFB,

Florida, General Schwarzkopf telephoned General Powell. Both generals understood that for the next few weeks, during the period of ground force weakness,

air would have to carry the burden of any offensive. During his conversation with

the CJCS, General Schwarzkopf realized that the Joint Staff did not have the

capability to prepare the large-scale air plan he required. With the Ninth Air

Force staff already fully occupied and with the necessity to keep any air strike

plans against Iraq under close hold for security and diplomatic purposes, the Air

Staff seemed the most appropriate planning agency. General Schwarzkopf told

General Powell, “I’d like to ask the Air Staff [for help].” In spite of his request,

Schwarzkopf worried that by bringing in Washington he might be repeating the

mistakes of Vietnam. However, both he and General Powell agreed they needed

a plan to “retaliate” against Iraq if it did something heinous, such as harming

hostages. General Powell alerted the CSAF, General Michael J. Dugan, who had

left the Pentagon on a trip to Boston, and General Schwarzkopf called the USAF

planners.4 The Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General John M. Loh, took

General Schwarzkopf’s call. General Schwarzkopf explained that given their

present overloads the CENTCOM and CENTAF staffs could not spare the

resources to do yet more planning, so he needed Air Staff assistance to formulate

a retaliation air plan for use against Iraq. He asked for the plan as soon as possible. General Loh did not hesitate to accept the task. He knew that a portion of the

Air Staff had already begun to explore the possibilities of an attack on Saddam

and his country.

The CINCCENT asked for a plan to strike deep into Iraq to damage or

destroy targets valued by the Iraqis. He must certainly have had in mind the Iraqi

NBC warfare capabilities, and he probably had in mind military, industrial, and

58

On Target

1. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

2. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 65.

3. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 313.

4. Telecon, Gen. Schwarzkopf, May 5, 1992.
communications systems as targets of “punishment” or “retaliation.” But when

an air officer hears instructions to go deep into the enemy homeland and hit sensitive targets, he thinks not of retaliation missions, but of strategic strikes.

General Schwarzkopf asked for one thing. He would get another. By the time his

requested plan had been returned to him, it had mutated from vengeance to a concept for a full-blown strategic air campaign accompanied by some operational

planning explaining it.

General Schwarzkopf’s appeal quickly ended up on the desk of the Director

of Plans, Maj. Gen. R. Minter Alexander. Of necessity, it bypassed the Deputy

Chief of Staff (DCS), Plans and Operations, Lt. Gen. Jimmie V. Adams, who was

out of the Washington area on temporary duty. In his turn, General Alexander

sent for his Deputy Director for Warfighting Concepts, Colonel Warden. The two

officers then met with General Loh in his office.5 At that point, to paraphrase

Shakespeare, the man and the moment met and jumped as one.

Colonel Warden, a career fighter pilot, had come to the Air Staff more than

two years earlier after finishing an abbreviated tour of duty as commander of the

36th TFW at Bitburg, Germany. Under the then-DCS of Plans and Operations,

Lt. Gen. Harley Hughes, Colonel Warden had led the Air Staff section concerned

with Exercise Constant Demo, an exercise to study the effects of battle damage

and possible defensive measures on a single NATO air base. As conceived, the

59

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

5. Intvw, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, Chief Air Planner, CENTAF Special Planning Group,

with TSgt. Theodore J. Turner, CENTAF/HO, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Nov 1, 1990, p. 2. The

sequence of events presented in this paragraph is somewhat conjectural. There are some questions as to what exactly General Schwarzkopf asked for, as to what he actually intended to

deliver, and as to exactly how the request got from General Loh to Colonel Warden. I believe

I have given the explanation most consistent with the known circumstances.

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner with

General Michael J. Dugan, Chief

of Staff of the USAF when he visited Riyadh early in the campaign.
exercise repeated many of the features of Exercise Salty Demo undertaken in

1985. Colonel Warden proposed to increase the utility of the exercise by enlarging Constant Demo to a Seventeenth Air Force exercise to include several bases

and to study the air campaign from an operational basis. His energy and ideas

impressed General Hughes’s successor, Lt. Gen. Michael J. Dugan, who served

in the post from March 1, 1988, to April 30, 1989, and the Director of Plans,

Office of the DCS, Plans and Operations, Maj. Gen. Charles G. Boyd, who

served in that position from May 22, 1988, to August 14, 1989.6 Early in his posting, General Dugan asked Colonel Warden to prepare a paper on the operational

art of war. The colonel suggested that the USAF ought to prepare a coherent air

strategy, like the USN’s maritime strategy and the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle,

which would give service members an overarching concept of their mission. To

accomplish this, he suggested that a new deputy directorate be established within the Directorate of Plans. General Boyd implemented this suggestion soon after

assuming his post. Dugan, Boyd, and Warden wished to reinvigorate service

thinking about the operational art of war, air strategy, and the independent uses

and functions of air power. They agreed that the USAF had lost its bearings and

had become too subordinate to the Army and Navy. Colonel Warden became the

Deputy Director for Warfighting Concepts Development, later shortened to Warfighting Concepts. By July 1988, the Concepts Division, the Doctrine Division,

the Long-Range Planning Division, and the Strategy Division had all become

part of Warfighting Concepts. Sometime in late 1989, this deputate acquired the

Checkmate Division, so-called because it specialized in Red (usually Soviet) and

Blue (U.S. and allied) analysis of warfighting problems and scenarios.7

Colonel Warden found his milieu in this deputy directorate. He had read

widely and pondered deeply about the role of air power in modern warfare. He

had literally written the book about air campaign planning: The Air Campaign:

Planning for Combat.

8 Once established as Deputy Director, he encouraged other

intelligent and thoughtful officers to join his organization. A powerful and determined thinker himself, Colonel Warden tolerated dissent and promoted fresh and

innovative thinking about air power. Sheltered by his superiors from other portions of the USAF’s establishment and encouraged by their approval of his organization’s work, Colonel Warden and his subordinates began to examine some

the service’s basic doctrines.9

60

On Target

6. Intvw, Col. John A. Warden III, Special Advisor to the Vice President for Policy Studies

and National Security Affairs, with Drs. Diane T. Putney, Richard G. Davis, and Perry D.

Jamieson, CAFH, at the Office of the Air Force Historian, Bolling AFB, D.C., Feb 6, 1992.

7. Intvw, Col. John A. Warden III, Comdr, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), with

Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at Col. Warden’s Offices, Spaatz Building, ASC, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., Mar 2, 1993.

8. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.:

National Defense University Press, 1988).

9. Audiotape Intvw, Col. David R. Tretler, Deputy Air Force Historian, with Dr. Richard

G. Davis, CAFH, Jan 14, 1992. Colonel Tretler served in the Deputy Directorate for Warfighting Concepts in 1988 and 1989.
The approximately eighty officers who comprised the Deputy Directorate

for Warfighting Concepts numbered within their ranks officers from each of the

USAF major commands (MAJCOMs). This helped to discourage parochialism

in the directorate’s approach. However, one major community within the service

with expertise essential for the development of plans and warfighting knowledge

had little or no representation in Colonel Warden’s group of officers—intelligence. Security compartmentalization kept intelligence personnel in the their

own stove-piped career patterns, separate from the service as a whole. If the

Warden group had immersed itself in intelligence, it would have become

enmeshed in security restrictions, which would have defeated its raison d’être:

the promulgation of new thought and ideas. Yet this failure to form a solid connection between the new planning and the old intelligence contained the seeds of

future problems. Neither party was fluent in the other’s language, and during the

crisis in the Gulf they would lose much time in asking the wrong questions or in

preparing the wrong answers.

The thinking within the deputy directorate quickly distanced itself from the

U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle concepts that had gained wide acceptance in the

USAF’s TAC. In brief, the AirLand Battle pictured USAF elements working

largely in support of Army forces over a front several hundred miles deep as well

as wide, in a central European battlefield, against numerically superior Warsaw

Pact mechanized forces supported by numerous reinforcing units. As recently as

1986, General Charles A. Gabriel, then CSAF, had enthusiastically supported

AirLand Battle.10 The creation, sponsorship, and direction of a new organization

within the Air Staff to develop warfighting concepts was a reaction to this vision,

which tied the tactical air forces so tightly to the needs of the ground forces. In

Colonel Warden’s opinion, tying the USAF to Army support would allow the

Army to call the tune and make the USAF conform to the Army plan of action.

Instead of an air campaign, one would have an Army ATO.11

Using principles derived both from Colonel Warden’s thinking (most clearly revealed in his previously mentioned book) and from critiques and analyses of

USAF doctrine and selected examples of past operations, members of the deputy

directorate began to develop warfighting concepts in keeping with their charter.

The Warden group’s ideas seemed to possess a rare combination of uncluttered

elegance, economy, and rationality. One could explain them quickly and in simple terms, yet when applied to past or current situations, they cut to the heart of

matters and seemed to solve complex problems. As with most intellectually

based activities, group members never attained absolute consensus on the exact

method of conducting an air campaign, but, as their thinking matured, much coalesced around a set of conceptions at once theoretical and practical.

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The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

10. For a description of AirLand Battle concepts and of General Gabriel’s backing of

them, see Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force-Army Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, Air Staff Historical Study, 1987).

11. Intvw, Col. Warden, Feb 6, 1992.
While many of the following concepts restate classic air power and military

axioms, and indeed in many respects the ideas of the Warden group return to the

classic air power theories of the 1930s, the emphasis of the individual group

members on basic practical considerations of planning, rather than on rote formulation, make them unique and valuable to their service. They defined an air

campaign as a series of connected, coherent operations that when combined

would lead to the achievement of the assigned objective. They accepted the air

power truism that a single air commander must control all air operations within

the AOR. They began to conceive of an air campaign as being waged through

some combination of independent, parallel, and supporting air operations.

Independent air operations could, in and of themselves, lead directly to the

attainment of strategic- or operational-level objectives. Such operations would

generally occur during periods of no or of only light surface actions. Parallel air

operations worked separately though in conjunction with concurrent surface

operations to achieve a broad common objective. Supporting operations were

efforts tied directly and immediately to the operations of surface forces.

However, the Warden group did not think of these roles as straitjackets or as

mutually exclusive. The inherent and unparalleled flexibility of air power would

allow it to switch back and forth between independent, parallel, and supporting

roles at will, depending on the needs of the situation, or would allow it to conduct all three types of operations simultaneously. Of course, having conceded air

power’s flexibility, group members acknowledged that air power produced the

most military return when used in either independent or parallel operations.

Supporting operations generally offered a much more limited range of effects

and exposed air forces to the heavy AAA and mobile missile air defenses accompanying surface forces.12

Believing in the indivisibility of air power, the Warden group resisted compartmentalizing or parceling air forces among various mission or aircraft types.

Thus they energetically supported the notion of using fighter aircraft to carry out

“strategic” operations when appropriate. This led them to an intentional recrudescence of much of the classical pre–World War II strategic thought. But while

framers of the Air War Plans Division’s Plan No. 1 were forced when contemplating a non-nuclear strategic campaign to employ overoptimistic assumptions

as to the bombing accuracy and destructive capacity of their B–17 and B–24

bomber weapons systems, the Warden group enjoyed the luxury of technology

that could match their theory.

When they envisioned the planning of an air campaign to achieve the objectives specified by a theater CINC, the Warden group believed that the air planner should first determine the enemy’s center or centers of gravity, i.e. those

characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which an enemy derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Planners discovered these cen62

On Target

12. Intvw, Col. Tretler, Jan 14, 1992.
ters of gravity by analyzing key elements of the enemy’s strength and situation

and then by locating the critical vulnerabilities that, when attacked, would most

unbalance him. Centers of gravity might not always equate to specific target systems because critical vulnerabilities might cut across several target systems. The

key center of gravity in any conflict, according to Colonel Warden, was the

enemy’s leadership—its survival, its continued resistance to your will, and its

military forces and other elements of national power. This stress upon leadership

as a target would prove a key consideration in the initial offensive air plan that

Colonel Warden and his subordinates developed against Iraq. The planner’s

function did not cease with identification of the centers of gravity. Many factors,

such as weather, air defenses, and the overall friendly and enemy situation, affect

the campaign. The planner must consider these as well as the stated objectives

and the forces at his disposal. Then, all the while accounting for the previous factors, he can ponder the best means for employing his forces coherently and cohesively.13

The rewards gained by the attainment of air superiority—like freedom of

friendly air and ground movement—and the corresponding penalties on the

enemy—like the loss of mobility and increased difficulty of resupply—normally made its achievement a necessity and the first mission of the air campaign

planner. The Warden group accepted this time-honored air principle unreservedly. Next they accepted the concept of force packages as a requirement in mission

planning. Force packaging, or the assignment of different aircraft types with different specialized functions to cooperate as an integrated group in a single attack

on a specific target, had its infancy in World War II when the U.S. Army Air

Forces (USAAF), faced with a strong air-to-air threat, routinely assigned longrange fighters to escort heavy bombers to and from their targets. The practice

flowered during the war in Southeast Asia and has since become standard in the

USAF. The multilayered Warsaw Pact air defenses and the need for bombing

accuracy necessitated aircraft that specialized in the many tasks needed to survive and complete the mission.

The Warden group also began to challenge USAF planning orthodoxy by

subtly shifting the emphasis with respect to the desired result of air operations.

Too often in the past, traditional mission planning sought to achieve a desired

level of destruction of the target. Target work sheets, photographic imagery and

interpretation, and force packaging revolved around the assignment of sufficient

weapons to achieve the desired level of destruction. In an invaluable insight,

Colonel Warden insisted on the need to abandon the line of thought that the

object of a given mission was simply to destroy or to blow up as much as possible. Instead, he argued for missions planned in combinations designed to produce

a desired effect on the enemy. Blasting an atomic research facility to dust might

have less effect on forcing the enemy to quit than would a series of limited

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The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

13. Ibid.
attacks against various elements of the enemy’s leadership structure. Emphasis

on effect had a wider implication, in that it encouraged the planner to concentrate

less on discrete target systems and to look for tactical, operational, and strategic

points within a center of gravity, to search for interconnections between target

systems, and to seek means for achieving the larger political objectives by using

innovative targeting.

In August 1988 Colonel Warden circulated within the deputy directorate a

paper that attempted to use graphic representations to codify his targeting and

strategic ideas.14 The model incorporated graphics to demonstrate the relative

importance of the strategic targets contained within a nation-state. His visualization consisted of five concentric rings that resembled an archery target. Each ring

contained specific strategic target sets, ranked by the effect their loss would have

on the nation’s government. The innermost ring, or bull’s-eye, contained the

nation’s leadership and its connections to the population and armed forces. The

ring adjacent to the bull’s-eye contained the nation’s key production, such as

energy, advanced research facilities, and bottleneck industries. The third ring

encompassed the nation’s infrastructure, such as transportation systems. The

nation’s population constituted the fourth ring. In considering population as a target set, Colonel Warden did not intend that an attacker conduct operations meant

to physically destroy the inhabitants; rather he intended the attacker should conduct strategic psychological operations (PSYOP) designed to break the morale of

the populace and/or lower its support of the war effort and the ruling regime. The

outermost ring contained the most difficult and costly targets to destroy—the

nation’s fielded military forces. Although the air offensive must penetrate the

hard rind of the fifth ring to reach the softer, interior rings, a sustained attack on

targets in the fifth ring would consume resources more effectively used elsewhere.

The ordering of the five rings also delineated their relative vulnerability to

attack. The outermost ring of fielded military forces consisted of numerous dispersed targets, all of which had the capacity to shoot back (i.e. many targets, difficult to destroy), while the fourth ring of population presented an extremely diffuse target, both physically and psychologically. Its destruction, even on a minor

percentage basis, contradicted U.S. policy and would produce worldwide ill will

(i.e. many targets, hard to influence). The third ring, infrastructure, offered a

large number of targets of differing degrees of difficulty. Individually, they might

be vulnerable, but in their totality they would consume much effort and perhaps

yield substantial results (i.e. many targets, good return). The second ring offered

a far more vulnerable target. Hitting a few vital spots in key plants could crash

entire sectors of the enemy’s war economy and its ability to continue the conflict

(i.e. few targets, high return). Finally, an attacker would find the enemy leadership the most vulnerable target of all. Theoretically, knocking out a handful of

64

On Target

14. Audiotape, Col. John A. Warden III, Commandant, ACSC, “Review and Comments

on Draft Manuscript,” Mar 2, 1993.
superhardened bunkers beheaded a nation’s decision-makers in a single raid (i.e.

very few and difficult targets, very high return). The members of the deputy

directorate soon adopted this model, which Colonel Warden has continued to

develop,15 and often used its methodology in their planning.

Ironically, many of the warfighting concepts developed in the deputy directorate, dominated by TAC officers, echoed those developed earlier in SAC. This

was less a case of reinventing the wheel than of confronting variations of the

same problem—attack planning. Heretofore, TAC and the Unified Commands

had fixed their attention on readying forces and deploying them to the area of crisis and had spent much less time on considering precisely what to do with the

forces when they arrived. However, SAC, for at least the past three decades

(when it no longer had to forward deploy and recover its shorter ranged B–47s

or even its older B–29s and B–50s to foreign bases), always maintained, in

effect, a force almost 100-percent deployed. Once freed from deployment problems and given a force ready for instant mission assignment and carrying

weapons guaranteed to destroy a target for each weapon successfully delivered,

SAC planners could address the issues of target systems, centers of gravity, overall effect, and strike sequencing. The nature of the conflict forced SAC planners

to expend the bulk of their efforts on the first few hours of war. After the force

completed the first mission or two, one could hardly imagine what conditions

would confront it, or even if any coherent force or enemy remained. SAC planners integrated their ideas into one constantly updated master attack plan (MAP),

the single integrated operations plan. Of course, a huge difference in scale separated SAC from the Warden group. SAC planners had the resources, time, and an

ultimate responsibility magnitudes of order greater than the level of responsibility held by the Deputy directorate. Yet in a sense, both groups accomplished their

missions: SAC, because it never used its plan; the Deputy directorate, because a

plan based on its concepts led the USAF to victory over Iraq.

Because of the Warden group’s emphasis on offensive air operations, targeting, and planning, its members tended to approach some of the more mundane

aspects of day-to-day operations as having secondary importance. Although they

acknowledged that an ATO was necessary, that operations required it, and that

the tactical air forces regarded it as crucial for specific tasking, they implicitly

and explicitly thought of the ATO as only a “processing mechanism” or an

“administrative vehicle” for planned operations. This had validity as a philosophical construct, but in practice it led the group to display a somewhat condescending attitude toward the ATO and those who prepared it, whom they sometimes referred to as “scribes.” This attitude, which sometimes masked their realization of the ATO’s importance, proved germinal to future conflict.16

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The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

15. Paper/Speech, John A. Warden, “Strategic Warfare: The Enemy as a System,” Jan 3,

1993. This paper contains Colonel Warden’s expansion of the five rings and his analysis of the

Persian Gulf War in terms of the rings.

16. Members of the Warden group take strong exception to this paragraph. However, in
As the concepts within the deputy directorate matured, Colonel Warden

oversaw the planning exercises that tested them. For example, in the spring of

1990, under the aegis of Checkmate, the deputy directorate explored an interdiction campaign against a large-scale but limited non-nuclear Soviet offensive in

Central Europe. This study identified a center of gravity affecting the Soviet

offensive and further identified centers of gravity (usually specific key targets)

within that target system. In a day or two, the offensive froze in its tracks.

Colonel Warden increased the value and effectiveness of these straw-man exercises by having all the officers within the deputate critique the exercise plans en

masse. This tactic not only elucidated the weaknesses and strengths of the plans

but it exposed all his officers to the new concepts and their still-embryonic planning methodology. Because of the decline of the Soviet Union, Colonel Warden

had begun to consider non-Soviet scenarios, including some in the Middle East.17

Thus, when Colonel Warden entered General Loh’s office and received from him

the directive to assist General Schwarzkopf in planning an offensive air campaign, he was truly the right man, in the right place, at the right time.

Instant Thunder

In fact Colonel Warden had already begun an informal examination of the

offensive air planning for Desert Shield. For the next two days after he ended a

vacation cruise on Saturday, August 4, the colonel had worked on a notional plan

for action. He did so even though he knew that the Goldwater-Nichols DoD

Reform Act of 1986 did not give service staffs authority to plan operations independent of a Unified CINC. Colonel Warden informed General Alexander of his

effort, and General Alexander may have informed General Loh. For two hours

on August 7, Colonel Warden and Colonel Deptula of the Secretary of the Air

Force’s Staff Group and formerly of the Deputy Directorate for Warfighting

Concepts discussed the planned flow of aircraft to the theater. Colonel Deptula

had gleaned that information from message traffic in the Pentagon message center, which he had followed throughout the day.18 Both officers criticized the

establishment of an overly defensive force posture apparently under way in

Saudi Arabia. They questioned the decision to send F–111Es, which had no PGM

66

On Target

several interviews with CENTAF and Warden group personnel, the author detected the attitude

described above, as had the CENTAF officers who prepared the ATO. That the members of the

Deputy directorate are unaware of the effect their attitude has on others does not make it any

less real.

17. Intvw, Col. Tretler, Jan 14, 1992.

18. Intvw, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, CC/58th FTS, Eglin AFB, Fla., with Drs. Richard

G. Davis and Diane T. Putney, CAFH, at Bolling AFB, D.C., Dec 12, 1992. Also see Brfg,

“U.S. Air Campaign,” n.d., fax annotated, “USCENTCOM, MacDill AFB, CCJ–6CB, FRI 04

AUG 90, 03:13” [File No. Colonel James Crigger, 9AF DCS/OPS]. This briefing gives the

Ninth Air Force plan in detail.

Several members of the Ninth Air Force Staff insisted to the author that the Ninth had sent

a copy of its preliminary planning slides to the Air Staff before August 7. In the above interview, Colonel Deptula stated he had never seen the briefing before.
capability, instead of PGM-capable F–111Fs, and wondered at the lack of

B–52Gs stationed at Diego Garcia. However, they concluded that the Air Staff

could do little to influence the CINCCENT’s mission. Still intrigued with the

problem, Warden invited Deptula to return the next day to do some brainstorming with other deputate stalwarts on how air power could most effectively cause

Saddam to evacuate Kuwait.

The next day, August 8, at approximately 0820 EDT, General Schwarzkopf

made his call to General Loh, who in turn summoned Colonel Warden. Upon

returning to the sub-basement of the Pentagon in the Checkmate area, Colonel

Warden called in three, possibly five, other USAF officers from his deputy directorate: Lt. Col. Ronald Stanfill, who had helped plan the 1986 attack on Libya,

Operation El Dorado Canyon; Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, who had assisted in

the strategic planning leading to Operation Just Cause against Panama; and

Colonel Deptula.19 These men identified the centers of gravity in Iraq most critical for Saddam. They sought the quickest way to force Saddam out of Kuwait

and the surest means to achieve their other objective—the denial of any significant offensive power to the Iraqi military. This preliminary work became the

germ for an offensive air campaign named Instant Thunder.20 Checkmate chose

the name purposely to contrast its intended quick and decisive blow against Iraqi

centers of gravity with the sprawling, interminable Rolling Thunder bombing

campaign against North Vietnam.

Members of Colonel Warden’s Deputy directorate worked frantically to

assemble a briefing describing their concepts. As was, is, and assuredly will be

the norm for rush staff projects, the group labored around the clock, requisition67

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

19. Intvw, Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, USAF, Assistant Chief, Strategy Division, Deputy

Directorate for Warfighting Concepts (XOXWS), with Drs. Richard G. Davis and Diane T.

Putney, CAFH, at Bolling AFB, D.C., Dec 7, 1992. See Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990,

who recalls that the “brainstorming” session occurred before General Schwarzkopf’s telephone

call came.

20. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990.

Loaders guide a GBU–10

onto an F–111.
ing expertise, information, and slides from many other officers on the Air Staff.

A dozen intelligence officers, targeteers from Bolling AFB, across the Potomac

River in Washington, D.C., joined the group immediately. This indicated Colonel

Warden’s unusual proclivity for setting up working arrangements between organizations and individuals with special expertise to facilitate his planning. This

temporary grouping represented one of the few reasonably harmonious relationships between the offensive air planners and USAF intelligence officers throughout the crisis and the conflict. In addition, Checkmate sent copies of its notional

briefing to TAC and SAC and asked for assistance. TAC replied that they would

review the product when the Air Staff finished it. SAC promptly sent a halfdozen weapons systems and refueling experts to the Pentagon to assist the effort.

On August 9, one week to the day after Saddam’s tanks clanked into Kuwait,

Colonel Warden presented the Instant Thunder briefing to General Loh. General

Loh asked Colonel Warden to upgrade certain types of Iraqi military production

facilities to the key target category. That same day, General Loh presented the

concepts of the briefing to General Powell who approved it, ordered it fleshed

out, and directed its presentation to General Schwarzkopf the next day. However,

TAC, in spite of a personal request from General Dugan, continued to refuse to

participate in Instant Thunder planning.21

On Friday, August 10, Colonel Warden flew to HQ CENTCOM and presented the Instant Thunder briefing to General Schwarzkopf. Fewer than ten officers, including General Alexander, Colonel Warden, and Colonel Harvey, attended. Colonel Warden and his officers recognized the dual opportunity this briefing presented them. If General Schwarzkopf approved it, they would have prepared a significant portion of a CINC’s war plan, and one that might be

employed. Second, they would have cleared a major bureaucratic hurdle by

bringing their concepts from the windowless cellar of the Pentagon, where members of their own service dismissed them, to a position that not only exposed

them to the highest professional authorities but also gained their endorsement.

Consequently, the air officers took pains to offer the brief in a fashion designed

to capture General Schwarzkopf’s attention, interest, and approval. For instance,

they knew of the general’s interest in military history and his wide readings in

that field. They further reasoned that the general’s and their own educations at

the undergraduate service academies gave them a common language and background. Therefore, the briefers decided to employ examples from military history as a form of intellectual shorthand to speed up the complicated brief and ease

the transmission of their ideas. In addition, Colonel Warden “was an absolutely

brilliant briefer,” engaging the principal (the chief recipient of the presentation)

by changing the tone or pitch (not the facts) of the brief in the middle of his deliv68

On Target

21. Daily Notes, Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, Meeting of Gen. Loh, Maj. Gen. Alexander,

Col. Warden, Lt. Col. Stanfill, and Lt. Col. Harvey, 0830 Aug 10, 1990 [GWAPS, Harvey

Files].
ery.22 This mode of presentation, based in part on common historical analogies,

produced a somewhat bombastic-sounding brief.

Two examples plucked from this session supply the flavor of the offensive

air planner’s dramaturgy. At one point Colonel Warden promised General

Schwarzkopf that the offensive air campaign would be his “Inchon,” a reference

to the last masterstroke of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in September 1950 during the Korean War. Both men knew that at Inchon, a South Korean

port city to the west of Seoul, General MacArthur had almost driven North Korea

from the war by a daring amphibious landing hundreds of miles behind the main

North Korean lines, at that time located in the heel of the Korean Peninsula near

Pusan. The landing cut North Korean lines of communications (LOCs) and

helped produce a disastrous retreat of the enemy’s armies from the south. By

using the example of Inchon, the colonel made the point that the offensive air

campaign would strike far behind Iraqi front lines and might well produce a

panic and rout in the Iraqi front-line forces.

The second example had a more ominous connotation. Colonel Warden

compared the offensive air plan to the right wing of the von Schlieffen Plan, the

basis of the pre–World War I Imperial German war plan. That plan called for the

bulk of the German armies to wheel on a wide sweep through Belgium and northern France, with their right flank touching the English Channel, and to trap the

French Army against the Franco-German border. The much weaker left-flank

German armies would engage and delay the expected French offensive into

Alsace-Lorraine. The plan failed for a number of reasons, but popular and selfinterested analysis has attributed its unsuccessful result to the Chief of the

German General Staff, Colonel-General Helmuth von Moltke (the Younger),

who changed the plan before the war to reinforce the left-flank armies, guarding

recently developed industries, at the expense of the right-flank armies, which

consequently lacked the strength to accomplish their task. In a single phrase,

Colonel Warden sketched for the CINC the image of a unstoppable air offensive

able crush the Iraqis, but only if too much of its strength was not diverted to other

tasks, such as inordinate numbers of ground support missions for U.S. troops.

General Schwarzkopf rejected this analogy and instructed Colonel Warden not to

use it again,23 a reasonable indication that General Schwarzkopf, unlike Colonel

Warden, considered the strategic air campaign an option, but not the main option,

for eventual use against Iraq.

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The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

22. Intvw, Lt. Col. Harvey, Dec 7, 1992.

During his association with Colonel Warden from the spring of 1990 through summer

1991, Colonel Harvey viewed dozens of briefs delivered by Colonel Warden to general officers

and senior civilian officials such as Secretary Cheney. Colonel Harvey also attended nearly all

of Colonel Warden’s significant Instant Thunder presentations including the ones to General

Schwarzkopf on August 10 and 17, to General Powell on August 11, and to General Horner on

August 20. He was the only officer to take notes at the August 10 briefing at CENTCOM HQ.

23. Notes, Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, Checkmate, CENTCOM HQ, MacDill AFB, Aug

17, 1990.
Of course, presentation by example works only so long as both the presenter and the audience draw the same analogy, something supposedly assured by a

common military education. Unfortunately, many analogies lend themselves to

several interpretations. The two mentioned above may have produced a contrary

impression in a diplomatic or political context. In the intoxicating afterglow of

Inchon, UN forces overreached themselves by driving far into North Korea and

eventually provoking massive intervention by the Chinese Communists, which

prolonged the war and expended tens of thousands of lives. Inchon was a brilliant tactical success, but its isolation from the strategic and political context produced a debacle. The von Schlieffen Plan suffered from a similar overconcentration on military considerations at the expense of the diplomatic and political context. No single German action at the start of World War I played a larger role in

bringing the British Empire into the fray in support of the Franco-Russian

Alliance than German violation of Belgian neutrality. In addition, some have

argued that Count von Schlieffen missed the point entirely and should have

launched the main German offensive against the Russians in the east, where the

bulk of the Austro-Hungarian armies could have supported it. One could say the

plan showed that a misdirected offensive could do far more harm than good. The

Coalition did not repeat these mistakes.

In any case, the briefing pleased General Schwarzkopf mightily. He

remarked enthusiastically, “You have restored my faith in the United States Air

Force,”24 and “Do it! You have my approval 100 percent. This is absolutely

essential.”25 The briefing appealed to him, but he wanted to see the plan in a

more fully realized form. He asked Colonel Warden to look at the possibilities of

operations from Turkey and of changing the aircraft deployment flow, and he

recommended that NBC warfare targets, including storage, have a higher priority. During the brief, General Schwarzkopf made it clear that he respected the

defensive ability of the Iraqi forces and sounded a theme he would continue

throughout the planning when he stressed the need to avoid U.S. and allied casualties.26 The desire for low casualties reflected both the general’s genuine concern for the well-being of the men and women under his command and his calculation that high casualty lists would quickly erode domestic U.S. support for

the operation. He instructed Colonel Warden to put some more meat on the concepts, get them to General Powell before Monday, and return to him in a week.

The next morning, August 11, Colonel Warden briefed the CJCS on the

results of his presentation at CENTCOM. As he had the previous day with

General Schwarzkopf, Colonel Warden drew General Powell’s attention to the

example of the pre-Normandy invasion air campaign in World War II. At that

time, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, had

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On Target

24. Intvw, Col. Warden, Feb 6, 1992.

25. MemoRec, Subj: Instant Thunder Briefing to USCINCCENT, 10 August/1320–1400/

HQ CENTCOM/J3 Office/MacDill AFB, FL, 1830 Aug 10, 1990.

26. Intvw, Col. Warden, Feb 6, 1992.
pulled a significant portion of the bombing effort from strategic targets deep in

Germany to conduct a campaign of attrition against the French and Belgian

transportation systems. Colonel Warden argued against splitting the bombing

effort and advocated that the strategic air assault on Iraq form a discrete phase.27

General Powell approved the brief. In fact, he raised the concern that Instant

Thunder might prove so effective that Saddam would withdraw from Kuwait

before the United States had the opportunity to smash his ground forces. He

wanted to ensure that Saddam did not walk away without penalty and suggested

that the Air Force might destroy Iraqi armored units occupying Kuwait. General

Powell stated that he wanted to see burnt-out Iraqi tanks as kilometer signposts

all the way back to Baghdad.28 Phase III of Desert Storm, the air attack on Iraqi

ground units in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), stemmed, in part, from

these remarks of the CJCS. He asked for a short version—five slides—to give to

higher authorities.29 Powell further indicated, as noted above, that he intended to

make Checkmate a joint organization. The chairman reviewed the concept with

Secretary Cheney, who approved it.30

When Colonel Warden and the planning group reassembled in the

Checkmate area on Saturday, August 11, they found themselves transmogrified.

With a simple bit of legerdemain, General Powell had legalized their planning

efforts for a Unified Command by making them a planning extension of the Joint

Staff’s Director J–3 (Operations).31 Unlike the Air Staff, the Joint Staff had legislative approval for direct contact to the Unified and Specified CINCs. Forty

USMC and USN aviation officers and a handful of Army officers quickly

descended upon the planning group, and Colonel Warden observed that “they

focused strictly on mechanical work, almost creating a mini-ATO.”32 As individuals, the new officers contributed expertise and performed loyally and well,

but only on paper did they turn a USAF organization into a joint one.

The next day, August 12, 1990, the group gave the briefing to the DCS,

Plans and Operations, General Adams, who had returned to Washington. General

Adams’s physical absence from the Pentagon during the period between General

Schwarzkopf’s request for assistance and the first offensive air plan briefing to

the CINCCENT had allowed Colonel Warden almost direct access to General

Loh. This, given General Adams’s vehement personal disapproval of Air Staff

involvement in direct planning for a Unified CINC, which was based on logical

professional and legal considerations, may have proved significant in the offensive air plan’s ultimate acceptance. In the course of the day, General Adams

attended a meeting in the tank, or JCS Operations Room, with the operations

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The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

27. Brfg, Col. Warden to the Center for Air Force History, “Instant Thunder and the Strategic Air Campaign,” Feb 6, 1992.

28. Intvw, Col. Harvey, Dec 7, 1992.

29. Intvw, Col. Warden, Feb 6, 1992.

30. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 65.

31. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990.

32. Intvw, Col. Warden , Feb 6, 1992.
deputies of the other services. General Powell attended as well. They discussed

the requirements for an air campaign. Afterward, the Director, Joint Staff, Lt.

Gen. Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, and the Director, J–5 (Strategic Plans and

Policy), Lt. Gen. George L. Butler, USAF, asked General Adams to stay and

come into the J–3’s office. Butler informed Adams that Schwarzkopf needed an

air campaign integrated with the Army and the Navy, but the Joint Staff did not

have the capability to assemble it. Therefore, to take advantage of the Checkmate

planning group’s capabilities within a JCS setting, Generals Carns and Butler

deputized General Adams as interim J–3 (Operations) for Air.33 This move further regularized the position of the planning group’s status as an official

appendage of the Joint Staff. Although not completely convinced of its propriety,

General Adams accepted his new joint obligation. He also personally ensured

that General Horner knew and was not blind-sided by the moves afoot in the

Pentagon.

In addition to the USN and USMC officers joining Checkmate, the Air Staff

brought in weapons systems experts from the USAF MAJCOMs and officers

from the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. They joined the SAC officers who had

arrived earlier.34 The additional manpower contributed to developing the target

lists and devising methods for obtaining the most effective attacks. The B–52Gs,

for example, received a large role in hitting CW-capable Iraqi airfields. SAC

planners may already have introduced the B–52-carried air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), which the planners euphemistically referred to as LRBs (longrange bombs). (This euphemism appeared in the August 10 brief to General

Schwarzkopf.) Since only the specially equipped B–52s based at Barksdale AFB,

Louisiana, had the capability to carry the ALCMs, this was the germ of a mission flown on the first day of the war. Likewise, USN planners may have brought

the TLAMs into the targeteering calculations. As one of those present recalled,

the planners, who packed a room, literally ran a target auction, with some calling out “who can hit this target,” while others responded by shouting out what

weapons system they could put on it.35

During the week, planning group members expanded the briefing to accommodate their own ideas and the suggestions of general officers. They presented

the brief to the chiefs of all the services, except the Army’s, and to a wide spectrum of other interested officers. The decision to place the plan before a wider

audience proved beneficial. The give-and-take of these extended briefings

72

On Target

33. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Jimmie V. Adams, DCS Plans & Ops, HQ USAF, with Jacob Neufeld,

Air Staff Historian, Dec 17, 1990.

34. See Intvws, Maj. Michael B. Hoyes, Chief Current Ops, 422d Test & Eval Sq , Nellis

AFB, Nev., with Donna Clark, USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Ctr, Mar 29, 1991; and Lt. Col.

J. Thomits, SAC/DOOB, by Dr. Kent M. Beck, May 15, 1991.

35. Intvw, Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl, GWAPS, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at

Crystal City, Arlington, Va., 1315–1515 Dec 15, 1992.

Colonel Kuehl served in the doctrine portion of the Deputy Directorate for War Fighting

Concepts. During the crisis and conflict he served with the Checkmate planning group.
allowed the planning group the opportunity to refine their thoughts. The briefings also to some degree co-opted the recipients, thereby partially countering the

natural tendency of the other services, or constituencies within the services, to

reject new ideas because of the not-invented-here syndrome. On August 14 and

15, Colonel Warden briefed Generals Dugan and Loh along with Secretary of the

Air Force Donald B. Rice. The two generals expressed their concerns and offered

advice on Instant Thunder. General Loh wished to ensure that the plan emphasize the key targets important to Saddam and his infrastructure. He suggested

making the plan as detailed as possible and producing one as highly integrated

as that used by the Israeli Air Force over Lebanon in 1982. General Dugan suggested developing detailed strike packages and directed the planners to “be bold

and imaginative.” He also wanted the planners to consult with the most knowledgeable Iraqi experts available, because Saddam “doesn’t care about military or

economic targets but [only] about self, family, mistresses.” He wanted to know

“what kind of targets will play on Arab culture, what will really get to” Saddam?

General Dugan stressed the importance of the concept of the strategic air campaign, noting that the “army mop up is a tactical thing for the on scene commander.” The general wholeheartedly agreed with the Warden group’s analysis

of the von Schlieffen Plan—“keep the emphasis on a strategic attack, don’t allow

diversion of effort to operational or tactical concerns about the Iraqi army in

Kuwait.” Finally, he directed the “staff to press hard on planning for Instant

Thunder.”36 These exhortations from the highest levels apparently had little

effect on the strategic air plan; they reinforced the views already held. But the

expansive comments of General Dugan and their tenor may well have foreshadowed subsequent events.

As Air Staff planners worked furiously to turn out their plan, on August 14

General Powell flew to MacDill AFB to confer with General Schwarzkopf. The

CINCCENT presented his current offensive plans and stated his mission in bullish terms: “when directed, USCINCCENT conducts offensive operations to eject

Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore original Kuwait/Iraq border.” The plan

revealed the extent to which the CENTCOM staff had already incorporated the

ideas of Instant Thunder into their own work and, just as importantly, indicated

that the CINCCENT did not view a strategically oriented air operation as a warwinning stroke in and of itself. Rather, General Schwarzkopf intended to incorporate Instant Thunder into a larger multiphased scheme that included ground

operations to drive Iraq from Kuwait. The targeting of Iraqi targets closely followed the Warden group’s recommendations—the electrical grid; C3 and telecommunications (the Checkmate planners applied the term “telecommunica73

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

36. Msg, 110001Z Sep 90, XOXW, HQ USAF, to USCENTAF FWD HQ [Col. Warden

to Brig. Gen. Glosson], Subj: Concerns. Also see Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, “Comments and

Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993. Colonel Deptula recalls both the referenced document and the comments contained in it. He places them as comments made during

the above briefings.
tions” to civilian communications and control to distinguish it from military C3);

and strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. At points, the CENTCOM

plan even repeated some of the Air Staff phrases such as “Hussein Regime” and

“internal oil distribution network.”37

On August 15, during a visit to the Pentagon, President Bush, Secretary

Cheney, General Powell, and the Joint Chiefs received a briefing from General

Schwarzkopf on Desert Shield and on the Kuwait situation, which probably

included the five strategic air campaign slides prepared by Checkmate. The

slides predicted that the air campaign would “incapacitate or discredit [the]

Hussein regime,” eliminate Iraqi offensive/defensive capability, and create conditions leading to an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The campaign would target

the Hussein regime, not the Iraqi people, and would render the “Hussein regime

destroyed or impotent.” After the strategic air campaign, the USAF would begin

attacks on the Iraqi army in Kuwait, destroy as many weapons as possible, and

“leave Hussein, if still in power, in [a] weakened state.”38

At the same time, General Powell shocked General Schwarzkopf by extracting from him a very preliminary, rudimentary, and risky plan for using American

troops to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait, and he presented it to the president for

discussion. By mid-August the Bush administration had already begun to think

beyond the simple defense of Saudi Arabia. At a speech to Pentagon employees

later that day, the president called Saddam a liar and compared him to Adolph

Hitler, hardly the rhetoric one would use to promote compromise.39

The JCS sponsor for the Instant Thunder brief, Deputy Director for National

Military Command Systems (J–36), Maj. Gen. James W. Meier, USAF, received

it on August 16, one day before the scheduled rebrief of CENTCOM. He

demanded so many changes that they threatened to delay the process, which

forced him to modify his position, as did Colonel Warden’s firm and careerthreatening insistence that the brief must not suffer substantial change. General

Meier agreed to let the brief go forward with fewer changes, rather than risk a

crucial delay. By the time the presenters arrived at HQ CENTCOM on Friday,

August 17, they had prepared a more complete scheme that had a notional attack

plan for the first twenty-four hours, with sorties, time over targets, mission numbers, types of aircraft, and a complete operations order. The operations order had

74

On Target

37. Brfg Slides, CINCCENT to CJCS, portions annotated, “Aug 14 ‘90 17:56 USCENTCOM–CCJ3–PT(SPEC TECH OPS),” faxed by Lt. Col. Lucyshyn, CENTCOM CCJ3–PT, to

Lt. Col. Stanfill, XOXW.

38. Brfg Slides 1–5 (see slides “Campaign Objectives” and “Campaign Results”), annotated, “General Myer [Meier?] took to CJCS, 1030/ 14 Aug 90” [File No. GWAPS/CK/ CHSH/

Folder 5].

I thank my colleague Dr. Diane T. Putney for locating these slides and informing me of

their importance. Dr. Putney has discovered a direct reference by President Bush to the air campaign plan briefing he had just received in the transcript of a speech he gave to Pentagon

employees in the center courtyard lawn on August 15, 1990.

39. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 315–316.
consumed the work of several individuals for the entire week. It included annexes for PSYOP, rescue, C2, logistics, and munitions, among other topics, and a

layout for the first day’s attacks.40 More than fifty officers attended the briefing,

half from Checkmate and half from CENTCOM.

Colonel Warden delivered all but the intelligence/targeteering portion of the

“Iraqi Air Campaign: Instant Thunder” briefing to General Schwarzkopf and his

staff. Colonel Warden defined the air campaign as a “focused, intense [emphasis

added]” effort designed to incapacitate Iraq’s leadership and destroy its key military capability in a “short [emphasis added]” time (days not weeks), while leaving Iraq’s basic civilian infrastructure intact. It did not provide for a long-term

effort designed to give escalation options to counter Iraqi moves. Instant Thunder

assumed that time favored Saddam and suggested an air attack against Iraq to

avoid prolonged ground combat and heavy losses and to provide friendly Arab

states the ability to conduct follow-on operations and “reconstitution” against a

weakened Iraq. Instant Thunder had five goals:

Isolate Saddam (target Saddam’s regime, not the Iraqi people),

Eliminate Iraq’s offensive capability,

Incapacitate Iraq’s national leadership,

Reduce the threat to friendly nations, and

Minimize damage to enhance rebuilding (minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage).

The first and third goals corresponded to Colonel Warden’s principal center of

gravity—leadership. The second and fourth goals meant attacks on what Colonel

Warden considered the target least likely to produce immediate effect—a

nation’s fielded forces. The planners added the last goal from a desire to enhance

future diplomacy and avoid condemnation for overbombing and unnecessary

destruction. The strategic air campaign would seek to accomplish its goals by pitting American strengths against Iraqi weaknesses.41

In its selection of targets, Instant Thunder conformed to the five-ring intellectual model previously developed by Colonel Warden. It selected nine target

systems, with at least one selected from four of Colonel Warden’s five rings. The

Instant Thunder strategic targets follow, with the specific target systems appearing in boldface type:

Leadership

Saddam regime

Telecommunications and C3 (military, civil)

Key Production

Electricity

75

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

40. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990; Intvw, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, SECAF

Working Group, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Nov 20,

1991.

41. Brfg Slides 1–5, Instant Thunder Brief, Aug 24, 1990 [File No. CK/Deptula Box 7/

Theater Campaign Slide/Brief] This document carries the following notation “as presented to

CSAF–14 Aug; CINC–17 Aug; CENTAF/CC–20 Aug.”
Oil (internal distribution and storage, not production export capability)

Nuclear, biological, and chemical research facilities

Military research production and storage

Infrastructure

Railroads

Population

Psychological operations directed at Iraqis, foreign workers, and soldiers

in Kuwait

Fielded Force

Destroy Strategic air defenses

Destroy Strategic offensive forces: (bombers, missiles)

The planners first called for Instant Thunder to use PSYOP and deception to

assist in gaining air superiority, which they would achieve by ruining Iraqi air

defenses, attacking airfields, and destroying the IZAF with offensive and defensive counterair sweeps. Then, air would strike the selected strategic target sets

enumerated above. The operation would emphasize PGMs. The planners justified their selection of the nine target systems on the following basis: Destroying

strategic air defenses would leave Iraq defenseless and minimize the threat to

friendly forces. Destroying Iraq’s strategic offensive forces would reduce Iraq’s

threat to adjacent states in both the long and short terms. Given that all Iraqi decision-making centered in Saddam, his regime represented the most important center of gravity. Attacking telecommunications and C3 would rupture Saddam’s

links with his people, his internal security, and his armed forces. Attacks on electricity would cripple production and create confusion, while strikes on refinedoil distribution and manufacturing sites would paralyze domestic and military

internal movement. The loss of railroads would complicate the movement of

goods and services, and the destruction of NBC research facilities and of military research, production, and storage facilities would reduce the long-term international threat of terror weapons while limiting Iraq’s offensive capability both

now and in the future.42

The USAF’s senior targeteer on the Air Staff, Col. James R. Blackburn, Jr.,

Director of Targets for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, delivered the

target section of the presentation. As on other occasions, Colonel Blackburn’s

professional presentation of the precise targets and the exact spots on them that

the aircraft would hit impressed his audience. His viewers could now correlate

the more theoretical portions of Instant Thunder to actual visual images. In all,

Instant Thunder went after 84 targets, of which strategic air defenses accounted

for 10; CW for 10; telecommunications, 19; electricity, 10; military support and

production, 15; oil, 6; airfields, 7; and ports, 1 (Iraq’s only naval base).43

Planners predicted significant results from the campaign: destruction of the

strategic air defenses, a long-term setback for CW research and production; iso76

On Target

42. Brfg Slides 6–10, Instant Thunder Brief, Aug 24, 1990.

43. Ibid.
lation and incapacitation of the national leadership; disruption and loss of effectiveness for telecommunications, railroads, military airfields, and key military

production and storage; a large drop in internal oil consumption; and the loss of

much of the electricity for Baghdad as well as some for the country at large. They

intended to mount the operation with USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft including

2 B–52G squadrons, 1 F–111F squadron, 1 F–15E squadron, 32 fighter/attack

squadrons, 1 F–117A squadron, 3 or more suppression of enemy air defenses

(SEAD) squadrons, Compass Calls, AWACS, TLAMs, and Volant Solos. Operations would continue around the clock for approximately six days with 1,200

sorties on the first day, and 900 per day thereafter. Operations would commence

with a multiaxis, multitarget night strike, with a follow-on attack that same night.

Thereafter, the air forces would attack throughout the 24-hour period (A.M./P.M./

night). On days 1 and 2 the aircraft would cover the strategic target list; on days

3 and 4 they would reattack on the basis of bomb damage assessments (BDAs)

and emphasize targets with offensive capabilities; and on days 5 and 6 they

would make a maximum effort against CW production and military-support

infrastructure.44

Neither at this time nor at the briefing of August 10 did General

Schwarzkopf question the plan’s six-day timetable. In fact, at the earlier brief, he

had calculated that the time would probably fit into practical political considerations: two days of attack, two days of UN debate and vote on the attack, and a

48-hour deadline to a UN-imposed cease-fire. Nor did General Powell raise

objection to the time schedule when he heard the brief on August 11.45

Instant Thunder contained an execution plan for the first day. At one hour

after sunset, the first wave of 163 sorties would engage air defense headquarters

and systems, CW-capable airfields, the Presidential Palace in Baghdad, electrical power plants, and telecommunications. This attacking echelon relied heavily

on the impact of numerous LRBs that would impact as the aircraft egressed. The

briefing expanded its explanation of the activities of the first wave by supplying

a campaign flow chart delineating the mission and exact target of each aircraft in

the wave. One hour before sunrise, the second wave of 131 sorties would hit the

southern airfields and CW and leadership targets. In addition to the strike and

supporting aircraft, Coalition forces would retain almost 300 fighters for contingencies as well as the 24-hour manning of barrier CAPs and protection of highvalue airborne assets (HVAAs) such as AWACS, Hawkeyes, and airborne battlefield command, control, and communications (ABCCC) aircraft.46

During the first two days of the strategic campaign, the execution plan further required a major SEAD effort, which projected the use of high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) to suppress or destroy SAM sites. After the initial

SEAD effort, the cumulative damage to the Iraqi air defenses would allow for

77

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

44. Brfg Slides 12–16, Instant Thunder Brief, Aug 24, 1990.

45. Audiotape, Col. Warden, Mar 2, 1993.

46. Brfg Slides 17, 18, 22, Instant Thunder Brief, Aug 24, 1990.
force packaging heavier on strike aircraft and lighter on support aircraft. Instant

Thunder assigned aircraft to targets on the basis of capability, but it employed a

somewhat simplistic method of deconfliction. It sent USAF, USN, and USMC

aircraft over Iraq according to the target’s proximity to the strike aircraft’s base.

USN aircraft flying from the USS Eisenhower and the USS Saratoga in the Red

Sea would attack targets in an area approximately between the Jordanian border

and eastern Baghdad. USAF aircraft would attack the most heavily defended and

target-rich region: western Baghdad and central Iraq. USMC aviation, numerically the smallest U.S. contingent, would concentrate on southern and central

Iraq, while USN aircraft flying from the USS Independence in the Arabian Sea

would strike targets around Iraq’s second largest city, Basra, and Iraq’s naval

base at Umm Qasr. Although the presentation noted that deception operations

were not critical for success, it observed that they would reduce casualties and

facilitate military operations. One fact cannot be emphasized too heavily—

Instant Thunder made PSYOP a critical element of the campaign. It called for

destruction of Iraqi television and broadcast stations and the substitution of U.S.

broadcasts, and for the separation of Saddam’s regime from the support of the

people and military. The planners conceived of Instant Thunder as a war-winning

plan, not just a blueprint to punish Iraq. Punishment alone would not alienate the

populace from the regime. That is why the planners believed it necessary to

destroy the regime’s means of communications with the people (TV and radio

transmitters) and its means of control (the Baath Party Headquarters and associated buildings and the intelligence and security agencies) and to shake the population’s and the ruling elite’s faith in the regime by demonstrating that the government itself was vulnerable to attack. Colonel Warden promised that the air

campaign “would isolate and incapacitate the regime and create the conditions

under which Saddam’s departure from power would be more likely.”47 The

extreme concentration on attacking political and leadership targets had never

before served as a focus of an extended strategic bombing plan. The implicit

promise of Instant Thunder to bring about a change in the Iraqi government represented a leap into unknown territory and an extremely far-reaching assertion of

the potency of air power. By assuming that Saddam’s highly centralized state

would prove vulnerable to the type of leadership and PSYOP attack proposed,

Instant Thunder promised to fatally undermine the current Iraqi regime, a

promise that committed it to a formidable task.

The planners expected the campaign’s results to match its major goals:

National leadership command and control destroyed,

Iraq’s strategic offense and defense, including missiles and long-range aircraft,

eliminated for an extended period,

78

On Target

47. See Review Comments, Lt. Col. B. E. Harvey, Dec 1992 [All review comments held

in the custody of the Air Force History Support Office (AFHSO), Bolling AFB, D.C.]. Colonel

Harvey was one of Colonel Warden’s close associates during the creation of Instant Thunder;

he attended all major Instant Thunder briefings, August 9–20, 1990.
Iraq’s internal economy disrupted,

Iraq’s capability to export oil not significantly degraded, and

Iraqi military reduced to a strength that would allow the combat capabilities of

the nations of the Arabian Peninsula to effectively counter it.

If Iraq responded to Instant Thunder by attacking Saudi Arabia, the planners

pointed to the availability within the AOR of 96 A–10s, 40 AV–8Bs, 36 F/A–18s,

and 105 attack helicopters for air-to-ground strike missions. Also, some of the

targets addressed by Instant Thunder (such as air superiority, C2, and interdiction) would severely impact any Iraqi ground offensive. Together, Instant

Thunder and battlefield air could stop any ground advance, with only a minimal

impact on the strategic air campaign.48

According to the authors of Instant Thunder, certain possible logistical

shortcomings and other limiting factors could hamper the operation. Among the

munitions problems, the planners considered the availability of HARMs (AGM–

88s)—1,100 of which still awaited airlift from USAF stocks in Europe—and the

availability of I–2000 hard-target penetrating bomb bodies for the GBU–27—

163 of which had not arrived from stocks in Europe. Furthermore, the ground

refueling capacity of Saudi bases might not meet sortie surge requirements, and

the strategic campaign required a munitions supply line from port to base, which

would assure that sufficient assembled complete rounds were present at the point

of use. The authors also noted that the plan would require constant updating to

reflect the latest intelligence and the political status of nations in the region, and

they pointed out that the EC–130 Volant Solo had not yet been included in planning. The final item addressed a concern that would plague operations throughout the USAF presence in the peninsula: CSAR. The briefing observed that the

Joint Rescue Coordination Center at Scott AFB, Illinois, had no orders and ought

to be collocated with the TACC in Saudi Arabia.49

The Instant Thunder strategic air campaign would serve as the basis for the

offensive air campaign plan eventually employed against Iraq. The plan had

many strong points, most arising from the air power philosophies underlying its

development. As promised, it pitted American strengths against Iraqi weaknesses, it attacked well-considered centers of gravity, and it maximized the use of

PGMs. In a country with a leadership as centralized as Iraq’s, the priority given

to disrupting C2 promised excellent results. In short, the plan would have created havoc and chaos throughout Iraq.

Instant Thunder also had its flaws, many in tactical or operational details

that might have seriously hampered its execution. Its simplistic air control

scheme would probably have broken down. Due to insufficient intelligence

information, it failed to schedule important sites and facilities for attack. Some

of these targets, such as Scud sites, left intact missiles within range of Israel, con79

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

48. Brfg Slides 20, 23–25, Instant Thunder Brief, Aug 24, 1990.

49. Brfg Slides 27–30, Instant Thunder Brief, Aug 24, 1990.
ferring on them a prime political importance. The plan also appeared to rely too

heavily on B–52G-carried ALCMs, perhaps in order to cover targets in northern

Iraq. The limited numbers of these missiles would probably have made their

large-scale use impracticable. The plan’s treatment of a possible Iraqi ground

riposte seemed cavalier, as did its bland assurance that such a maneuver would

not impede execution of the strategic campaign, which seemed too optimistic.

The planners’ charter provides expiation for this: General Schwarzkopf had

ordered a plan oriented to the offensive and had specifically stated that CENTAF

would handle the defensive air aspects. Nor was Instant Thunder an OPORD

based on available in-place forces. It required repositioning and additional tactical and operational planning to go into effect.50 Finally and most seriously for the

cause of air power, the planners fell into the classic error of overpromise as to

results. Nothing could have more fatally harmed their concepts. Given the original target list and resources, Instant Thunder would probably not have been as

decisive as it claimed. Nonetheless, when considered in its entirety, the plan supplied a sound conceptual foundation for further work.

The Checkmate planners had traveled to MacDill AFB on August 17 in the

expectation that they would hand over the OPORD, give a complete concept

brief, and return to Washington, having completed their task of assisting the

CINCCENT in the preparation of an offensive air campaign. Indeed General

Schwarzkopf received the brief enthusiastically, so enthusiastically that he told

Checkmate to “take it over and brief General Horner.”51 On the aircraft back to

Washington that day, Colonel Warden selected his original brainstorming core

team—Colonels Harvey, Deptula, and Stanfill–to fly to Riyadh with him to present the Instant Thunder brief. That evening, Colonel Deptula and his boss,

Secretary of the Air Force Rice, discussed the meeting with the CINCCENT. Dr.

Rice asked for the possible execution date of Instant Thunder. Colonel Deptula

responded that thinking currently centered on the end of September 1990. Then

the secretary indicated the desirability of an earlier execution date. The colonel

allowed that some planners had discussed mid-September. Dr. Rice wondered if

a still earlier date, such as September 6, might be possible. At that point, the

CSAF, General Dugan, entered the room and joined the conversation. He too

wished for an early execution date.52 This high-level desire for an early date

undoubtedly added to the pressure on the Checkmate planners. Secretary Rice

and General Dugan apparently believed that the sooner they could offer this plan

as executable to the National Command Authorities (NCA), the better. First, the

sooner its execution, the less time the Iraqis would have to entrench in Kuwait.

Second, even if not executed, it gave the president a useful policy option, and a

president seldom has too many arrows in his quiver.

80

On Target

50. Review Comments, Col. Harvey, Dec 1992.

51. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990.

52. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 20, 1991.
Instant Thunder Transformed into the Offensive Air Campaign Plan

When the Checkmate planners arrived in Riyadh and presented Instant

Thunder to General Horner at CENTCOM Forward, they would find that the hot

Arabian summer sun could not prevent a chilly reception. General Horner, of

course, expected to receive some type of “air plan” because General Schwarzkopf had informed him on August 7, just before returning to the United States,

that he intended to ask the Joint Staff for such a plan.53 In addition General

Horner had already heard of Instant Thunder twice over, and neither time had it

favorably impressed him. On August 9, 1990, the DCS for Plans, HQ TAC, Brig.

Gen. Thomas R. Griffith, sent General Horner a message in which he explained

that General Robert D. Russ, Commander of TAC, had asked him to review “an

Iraqi air campaign plan developed by AF/XOX [USAF Directorate of Plans]

(supposedly with the blessing of General Schwarzkopf).”54 General Griffith

described the earliest Instant Thunder notional briefing held August 8, and

offered a TAC-authored alternative. The TAC alternative illustrated the differences in approach between the Deputy Directorate for Warfighting Concepts and

the TAC staff. The TAC plan placed all air assets under the JFACC. It added a

defensive air component giving air a deterrent role and required air to “establish

a visible defensive air posture” to aid in the enforcement of economic sanctions

and to defend and preserve the independence of Saudi Arabia. Offensively, air

would gain air superiority, “attack and destroy all means to conduct chemical

[CW] operations,” interdict critical items of resupply to Iraqi field forces,” and

“support ground scheme of maneuver of ground force commander.” Once the

ground offensive started, air would conduct extensive CAS and battlefield air

interdiction operations to support it. On order, air would extend strategic bombing to include economic targets. The TAC target list included CW and strategic

delivery systems as first priority, then it specified oil. But the target list had only

a generic term, “strategic targets,” and it envisioned bombing divisions and higher military echelons, the integrated air defense system, and national communications to the field forces. Whereas Checkmate, at the CINCCENT’s specific

request, had confined itself to a plan relying solely on air power and working

independently to bring Iraq low, TAC drew up a more conventional and traditional plan. Although both plans treated air as a component force supporting the

Unified Command, the TAC plan conformed to the role expected of the USAF in

almost all Unified CINC planning. On his copy of the message, General Horner,

referring to Instant Thunder or the TAC plan, or more likely both, wrote, “How

can a person in an Ivory Tower far from the front, not knowing what needs to be

done (guidance), write such a message? Will wonders never cease?” General

81

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

53. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

54. Msg, 100145Z Aug 90, Brig. Gen. Griffith, TACOPS, Langley AFB, VA//XP//, for Lt.

Gen. Horner, CENTCOM FWD, Subj: Air Campaign Briefing [File No. CK/DS/Deptula/Box

5].
Horner may have found suggestions from TAC headquarters at Langley AFB,

Virginia, as objectionable as those from the Pentagon in Washington.

A few days later, between August 14th and 17th, General Horner received a

briefing based on a more mature version of the Instant Thunder plan from Lt.

Col. Steven Wilson. General Adams had sent Colonel Wilson to Riyadh to act as

facilitator from the Air Staff to assist CENTAF on bed-down and other matters.

When Colonel Wilson left the Pentagon on August 12, he obtained the slides of

the Instant Thunder brief from Colonel Deptula. Colonel Wilson walked through

the brief with General Horner, but Colonel Wilson had not participated in the

plan’s development and he did not know many of the subtle points nor the reasoning that lay behind various aspects of it. The general put Colonel Wilson

through an extremely tough session, and the Colonel’s understandable inability

to fully explicate the plan must have raised further doubts in General Horner’s

mind about the validity of a concept prepared for him without his knowledge or

participation. General Horner noted that during this period General Adams had

called to assure him that the Air Staff had no intention of usurping his planning

functions and meant only to suggest targeting.55 General Horner reflected his

negative feelings when General Schwarzkopf called to inform him of the Air

Staff’s role in the planning. General Schwarzkopf recalled that when he told

General Horner, the general was “upset” and said, “I’m the air component commander.” General Horner stated that this was “Washington interference and

Vietnam all over again.” General Schwarzkopf tried to reassure him and

promised to send the plan over.56 Later that day, General Horner called General

Glosson, second in command of the Joint Task Force (JTF) Middle East, and

asked him to come to Riyadh and begin thinking about putting an air campaign

together.57 General Glosson had worked closely with General Horner at various

stages in his career, including as executive officer and squadron commander at

Nellis AFB, Nevada, and as wing commander of the 1st TFW at Langley AFB.

The Checkmate team left Washington on August 18 and flew into Riyadh

the next day, blissfully unaware that General Schwarzkopf had, in effect, sandbagged them. They presented their briefing to the CENTAF staff that evening

and to General Horner on the afternoon of August 20. The participants agree on

the outline of their presentation. One described the atmosphere of the latter breifing as “tense.”58 Both General Horner and Colonel Warden agree that they had

two sharp exchanges during the brief. At one point, General Horner stated that

stopping Iraqi tanks from entering Saudi Arabia currently concerned him more

than mounting an immediate attack on targets deep in Iraq. Colonel Warden dis82

On Target

55. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

56. Telecon, Gen. Schwarzkopf, May 5, 1992; Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p.

320.

57. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Buster C. Glosson with Drs. Richard G. Davis, Diane T. Putney, and

Perry D. Jamieson, CAFH, at Bolling AFB, D.C., Dec 12, 1991.

58. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 20, 1991.
missed this with a reference to traditionally slow overall average rate of advance

of armored ground forces. The two men also clashed over the use of the word

“strategic” in the brief,59 and they disagreed over the effectiveness of PGMs versus precision-delivered weapons, with General Horner, an F–16 pilot, confident

of the accuracy of the latter.60 Somewhat later, General Horner asked Colonel

Warden to return to Washington and to leave his superstars behind—Colonels

Deptula, Harvey, and Stanfill.

This is the instant when Colonel Warden retreats from center stage. He had

imposed his targeting philosophy on the offensive air campaign and had sold it

to Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf—crucial for its eventual success. In the

months to come, Colonel Warden would perform the important, but secondary,

roles of supplying valuable intelligence information and additional planning

from Washington to the theater and of running interference for the theater in fulfilling its requests for aid.

Shortly after the war, in April 1991, General Horner recalled his criticisms

of Instant Thunder. He acknowledged the excellence of Checkmate’s target materials and praised the new intelligence they gave him on munitions production and

storage, research and development, and Iraqi C2. However, Checkmate had built

a “seriously flawed” campaign that lacked depth in terms of air operations. The

planners did not fully understand how to conduct their operations. Instant

Thunder “was very poor” in terms of execution and failed to account for protecting the force and in providing for an Iraqi ground-forces attack from Kuwait.

“It was very embryonic,” he added, “and really didn’t withstand the commonsense test.”61 General Horner’s opinion of Instant Thunder reflected the concerns

of a man occupying two difficult positions. In the near future as the JFACC he

would coordinate the entire AOR air component. This would make him the man

responsible for executing Instant Thunder. He also commanded CENTCOM Forward which, until General Schwarzkopf’s return to the AOR, made him the officer who would control all American forces in Saudi Arabia for the first crucial

hours should the Iraqis cross the border, as they might at any minute. In addition

to his professional concerns, much anecdotal evidence suggests that General

Horner found the Air Staff messengers more objectionable than the message.

Instant Thunder’s concept of a strategic air campaign had gained endorsement

from both Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, but Colonel Warden, Checkmate,

and doctrinal portions of the Air Staff did not seem appropriate or competent

vehicles to prepare the CENTCOM offensive air plan. Hence, General Horner

directed Colonel Warden to return stateside, but he kept Warden’s key planners.

They could remain and apply their expertise to preparing a CENTAF offensive

air plan, for which General Horner, because of pressing needs elsewhere, had

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The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

59. Intvw, Col. Warden, Feb 6, 1992; Intvw, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner with Lt. Cols.

Suzanne Gehri and Richard Reynolds, CADRE, ARI, Dec 3, 1991.

60. Review Comments, Col. Harvey, Dec 1992.

61. Audiotape Transcript, General Horner Comments, n.d. [Apr 1991].
heretofore been unable to allocate manpower. General Horner may have changed

some of the players, but most important, he established an offensive campaign

planning group within the theater. This new group would turn a conceptual plan

into reality.

Other CENTAF participants in the briefing reflected General Horner’s

views. In a phrase, they summed up Instant Thunder as “a good idea, but a bad

sell.” For them it resurrected the specter of Vietnam when President Lyndon B.

Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s whiz kids in the

Pentagon had controlled targeting from more than 10,000 miles away.62 They

further perceived the presentation as saying “here’s your plan,” rather than saying “here’s a plan.” Whereas Checkmate had brought in dozens of planners and

had spent a week working on an executable air plan—quite an effort from their

perspective—the CENTAF staff saw an incomplete plan, with no ATO, that did

not reflect the manner in which they dealt with real-world air operations. The

plan also struck the CENTAF staff as a case of parallel development of a notional plan to punish Iraq, one that they had assembled in the beginning of the month.

In all probability, the CENTAF staff, a cohesive body of long-service officers,

may have felt a few pangs of the traditional resentment of many field organizations toward higher headquarters and outsiders, but most of the staff put such

feelings aside and conducted themselves in a professional, though perhaps not

enthusiastic, manner toward the offensive air campaign planners.

On the evening of August 21, General Horner appointed General Glosson as

Director, CENTAF Campaign Plans. General Glosson had just vacated his position as Deputy Commander, JTF Middle East, where his duties in relation to

Exercise Ivory Justice had helped him develop smooth working relations with

Gulf leaders, with General Schwarzkopf, and with the CENTCOM staff. In the

months to come, General Glosson formed a solid relationship with General

Schwarzkopf on air matters. General Glosson also had exceptionally good connections in Washington, where he had served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Legislative Affairs just before his posting to the Persian Gulf.63

General Horner instructed General Glosson to put together an executable offensive air plan against Iraq. Horner expected Glosson to have the plan ready for

presentation to Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell by September 15.64

General Glosson’s appointment gave him the opportunity to become one of

the principal actors in the offensive air campaign. A man of great energy, he used

it to overcome the objections of others to the plan and to work around bureaucratic and physical obstacles. In short order he assumed the role of the plan’s

chief spokesman, explicating and justifying it to audiences as disparate as the intheater USAF wing commanders and the President of the United States.

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On Target

62. Intvw, Col. Crigger, Mar 5, 1992.

63. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993.

64. Intvw, Brig. Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Dir CENTAF Campaign Plans, with TSgt. Theodore J. Turner, CENTAF/HO, Oct 17, 1990.
The next morning, when General Glosson took command of the three former Instant Thunder colonels and of Colonel Wilson from the Air Staff, he found

a group of frustrated officers. In the jockeying for resources, manpower, office

space, supplies, and equipment, they had lost out at every turn to the already

established CENTAF staff sections. Quite understandably they saw this as a case

of bureaucratic obstructionism. But the CENTAF staff had its own priorities and

had little to share in the way of assets or time. The RSAF could only provide

space by moving their people out of offices or opening up nonsecure storerooms.

The need for a secure working area led General Glosson to appropriate for the

planners a 20 x 40 foot conference room adjacent to General Horner’s office on

the third floor of the RSAF HQ building in Riyadh. The room had two doors: one

to the office shared by Generals Horner and Olsen; the other to the hallway. To

provide expertise in each of the USAF weapons systems in-theater, General

Glosson had each wing provide two representatives to the planning group. Soon

twenty officers, working day and night with an average of four hours’ sleep per

day, occupied the space. Quite literally during this period, a officer would crawl

under a table or desk to catch a quick nap. Five of the officers, hand-picked by

CENTAF Director of Operations Col. James R. Crigger, belonged the Ninth Air

Force/CENTAF staff, and they brought with them their expertise in creating an

executable ATO and their knowledge of local circumstances. They immediately

set about restructuring Instant Thunder’s communications and IFF plans to conform to conditions already existing in the AOR, especially the USAF-RSAF air

defense network.65

The campaign planners, a group of outsiders competing against an interlocking series of previously established personal and professional relationships

within the CENTAF staff, perceived themselves as victims of a classic bureaucratic “slow roll” that systematically denied them the resources they required to

fulfill their mission. The campaign planners pointed to several circumstances in

support of their contention. They had no permanently assigned clerical personnel but had to make do with three part-timers, assigned to other units, who

worked three eight-hour shifts doing word processing on a desktop PC in another office on an as-available basis. Apparently, the great CENTAF Forward PC

famine, although intense, had been short-lived. The special planners complained

that the regular CENTAF planning staff failed to relinquish any of its eight desktop PCs and allocated only two laptop PCs to the campaign planners.66 This

eventually forced General Glosson to purchase a Macintosh PC for $5,000 in the

open market in Riyadh to give the unit some computing power. These limitations

85

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

65. Intvw, Lt. Col. Waterstreet, Mar 6, 1992; Ltr, Horner to Hallion, Subj: Review/Comments on Draft Manuscript, Dec 8, 1992.

66. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 9.

Colonel Deptula is vehement in his recollection that CENTAF had a relative abundance of PCs,

none of which came the campaign planners’ way.
made it difficult to use software designed to aid in preparing ATOs and to establish a working interactive data base for targeting.67

Security and intelligence considerations, some of which stemmed from

legitimate operational and diplomatic concerns and others from years of peacetime routinization within the services’ and the nation’s security and intelligence

communities, further isolated the campaign planners. In the beginning, Generals

Schwarzkopf and Horner wished to conceal the existence of a plans group working on the implementation of an American air attack on Iraq. Revelation of such

a resolve at this critical juncture might inspire U.S. domestic opposition or, worse

still, disrupt the Coalition-building efforts of U.S. diplomacy. Revelation of the

plan might possibly even provoke Saddam into preemptive actions, causing the

very state of affairs that the United States had intervened to prevent. Those reasons alone justified the campaign planning group’s establishment as a security

classified compartmented activity.

The nature of the campaign planners’ work demanded that they have access

to intelligence, such as satellite imagery, and weapons systems data, such as

black-world developments that carried the requirement for information to be

classified as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). But the planners’

work area was not rated as a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

(SCIF) and, therefore, was not supposed to contain SCI. The CENTAF SCIF

occupied a building a ten-minute-walk away. This either put the campaign planners at a serious disadvantage or forced them to bend the security rules. Security

rules placed an additional burden on the unit by defining its work as a special

access-required activity, which imposed strict security requirements as to the

planners’ ability to discuss their work with persons not having the appropriate

clearance. This further interfered with the planners’ work by severely limiting

their ability to conduct integrated operational research across the different service communities. It also isolated them from the CENTAF/IN staff and led to the

unit’s nickname. CENTAF headquarters staffers soon noticed that information

and personnel sent to the CENTAF special planning group never seemed to come

out (because of security restrictions). Comparing this to the phenomenon of a

collapsed star, whose great density gives it gravity so powerful that nothing, not

even light, can escape it, CENTAF staffers dubbed the special planning group the

“Black Hole,” an analogy whose many aspects summed up the CENTAF staff’s

opinions.

From the beginning, the intelligence community failed to satisfy the requirements of the campaign planners. When Checkmate had briefed General Schwarzkopf on August 17, it had already prepared a target folder for each of Instant

Thunder’s eighty-four targets. However, when Colonel Warden prepared to take

the brief to Riyadh, the director of targets for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Colonel Blackburn (whose Air Staff unit had helped prepare the mater86

On Target

67. File 201, Desert Storm Monograph Project, AFHSO.
ial), insisted instead upon sending the folders to the Defense Mapping Agency

for mensuration of the coordinates. Colonel Blackburn also sent copies to CENTCOM/IN and kept a copy for himself. The Checkmate planners never saw the

folders again. The campaign planners had difficulty in getting target imagery

from CENTAF/IN; furthermore, in the first few weeks their lack of specialized

equipment to read imagery would have also hampered them.68 The combined

lack of support, lack of cooperation, their isolation, and the scarcity of appropriate information, coupled with the pressure to produce an executable offensive

campaign plan, forced the planners to literally return to the basics.

General Glosson immediately made two contributions: he obtained intelligence information from CENTAF/IN and he had each of the combat wings send

two officers to the planning cell. These officers served as extra hands in the physical processing of the ATO, and more importantly, they performed a quality control function by supplying specific expertise about the capabilities of their

weapons systems. They further served as a planning liaison with their units. Both

Generals Horner and Glosson thought the latter action firmly grounded the planners within the theater.69 In the initial days, General Horner regarded contact

with Checkmate with suspicion, but by the end of the campaign he and General

Glosson both acknowledged the important contributions of that unit. Checkmate

served as an intelligence fusion center. It gathered information from the DIA,

CIA, the Air Force Intelligence Agency, and other sources and passed it to the

planning cell. This information proved inordinately valuable because of the

inability to obtain timely intelligence through normal channels. General Glosson

further raided CENTAF for officers experienced in logistics, operations, plans,

intelligence, electronic combat, the building of execution orders, and the assembling of ATOs. He also used his own wide array of personal and agency contacts

to contribute to the flow of information into the special planners.

Within two weeks, Colonels Harvey, Wilson, and Stanfill returned to the

Pentagon, while Colonel Deptula remained in the theater. Whereas Colonel

Warden had steered the planning process until Instant Thunder’s arrival in-theater, General Glosson and Colonel Deptula guided it thereafter. General

Glosson’s energy, can-do ability to produce results and support when requested,

and easy working relationships with his superiors greatly eased the progress of

the planning process. Colonel Deptula kept the plan true to its ideological roots

and planned (and in essence controlled) the attacks on Iraq’s strategic targets.

Without his overarching direction, the strategic offensive might have assumed a

very different shape. Colonel Deptula, the man with the responsibility for preparing the MAP, the centerpiece of the offensive air campaign, had not only worked

with Colonel Warden but had spent a tour of duty flying F–15Cs directly under

General Horner’s command. Deptula quickly established an excellent relation87

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

68. Ibid.

69. Intvw, Brig. Gen. Glosson, Oct 17, 1990.
ship with General Glosson as well. Both wore the patch of the USAF Fighter

Weapons School, whose fighter-pilot graduates regarded themselves as in the

front rank of their profession. Colonel Deptula believed he had General

Glosson’s confidence, and the general valued the colonel’s ability to combine

and give equal weight to both concepts and operational reality.

Even if they desired to do otherwise, which they did not, the pressure-cooker situation of the planning cell would have forced its members to use Instant

Thunder as the basis of their work, for they had nothing else. General Glosson

noted with some chagrin the group’s surprise in discovering that “we did not

have a [CENTCOM] plan, in being, that we could just modify to our particular

situation.”70 Most of the campaign planners worked almost nonstop to prepare an

executable plan, which, as far as they calculated, might go into effect immediately. A far smaller group proceeded to prepare for General Horner a brief to give

to General Schwarzkopf explaining the offensive air campaign. The group simply proceeded to convert Instant Thunder to a CENTAF product, taking special

care to “change some things that were said in the [Instant Thunder] briefing to

adjust to [local] sensitivities.”71 When General Glosson presented the brief on

August 26 to General Horner, Brig. Gen. Lawrence Henry (in charge of

CENTAF electronic warfare), Brig. Gen. Patrick Caruana (who commanded the

SAC B–52Gs and tankers under CENTAF), and Colonel Crigger (head of

CENTAF Operations), General Horner called the briefing “terrible” and “confused” and figuratively threw General Glosson from his office. As General

Horner later observed, the briefing still had too much Instant Thunder in it.72

With General Horner’s additional directions, the planners reconfigured the presentation and produced, within approximately two weeks, a brief acceptable to

General Horner. The brief employed maps and acetate overlays that addressed

the air campaign in terms of sequencing missions and targeting. This presentation eventually reached the JCS and NCA.73 It gave General Horner, in the first

week of September, an overview of the plan that he could support and defend to

General Schwarzkopf and to others.74 The brief also allowed General Horner to

familiarize himself with Instant Thunder’s targeting philosophy and the layout of

the initial attacks. He thoroughly questioned the briefing authors on the whys and

wherefores of their work.

This attention paid to a briefing might seem disproportionate, but as one can

surmise from the preceding information, briefings and the concomitant interchanges among participants represent one of the principal methods of transmitting thoughts and concepts within the higher levels of the U.S. military. In a

forum stressing both brevity and conciseness in speech and skill in using spe88

On Target

70. Ibid.

71. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990.

72. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Dec 3, 1991.

73. Audiotape Transcript, Gen. Horner Comments, n.d. [Apr 1991].

74. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 20, 1991.
cialized jargon and technical terms to convey difficult concepts, the graphical

layout of a briefing matters greatly because it either helps or hinders an easy

comprehension of the ideas presented. The very process of delivering or sponsoring this new brief would publicly commit General Horner to the air campaign

plan and the concepts behind it.

Not only briefings, but the practical problems of preparing an executable

war plan engaged the campaign planners’ attention. In addition to their general

lack of resources and their directive to produce a plan in a week to ten days, two

major problems—lack of hard intelligence data and the standard method of

apportioning attacking assets to specific targets—militated against the adoption

of traditional attack-planning routines. Within the USAF, targeting had become

a highly standardized process, in part because of the accumulated inertia of

almost twenty years of peacetime thinking and in part because of the need for the

service’s educational system to present its instructional material in a coherent,

simplified manner that would ease both instruction and the learning process.

After the traditional targeteer received the target list, he determined the desired

percentage of destruction for a particular target. Then he determined the number

and type of weapons needed on-target (which could vary according to the delivery platform) to assure the desired level of destruction, and he transferred that

data to the target-planning worksheets. The Joint Munitions Effects Manual outlined and assisted in this procedure. Next, the traditional planners would assemble a force package based on both the aircraft needed to assure destruction and

the aircraft needed to protect the bomb-droppers from the enemy’s defense array.

Hence, a force package would contain a certain number of weapons carriers, a

certain number of SEAD aircraft, a defined number of force-protection aircraft,

and additional aircraft providing air cover to protect the other aircraft approaching the target—all to ensure achievement of the desired level of destruction. The

traditional planner would continue down the target list, determining levels of

destruction and preparing force packages until he had apportioned all attack

assets. As noted earlier, this conventional method of planning emphasized

destruction and was, therefore, antithetical to the Warden group’s basic premises

of shock and effect. Additionally, the traditional method depended on the availability of overhead imagery, and Colonel Deptula did not have access to a complete stock of it. Nor did he have the luxury of time; the frenzied press for an

immediately executable plan meant he could not wait for imagery to become

available. He started without it. This led to some inappropriate targeting, such as

assigning F/A–18s, which lacked penetrating munitions, to attack regional command posts that were providing enemy air defense information but were not

known to be hardened. The eventual arrival of imagery in the five months before

the actual execution of the air offensive allowed for correction of such errors, but

the lack of imagery did not delay planning.75 As Colonel Deptula explained:

89

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

75. See Intvws, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990, and Nov 20, 1991, for a detailed discussion of this problem.
“The combination of my focus on achieving effects rather than absolute destruction, the lack of available imagery, the pressure to turn out an executable plan

quickly, plus the capabilities of stealth resulted in the conception of attack

scheme based on the simultaneous, or carefully sequenced, attack on multiple,

usually inter-related, targets.” By utilizing this principle of “simultaneity,”

Colonel Deptula hoped to substantially increase the shock delivered to the

enemy. In employing simultaneity, he also rejected the more traditional methods

of attack-sequencing, such as beginning the air campaign with a “roll-back campaign” that concentrated on suppression of first-line enemy air defenses, with

successive attacks on deeper air defenses, and only after the success of the rollback phase, of switching to interdiction or strategic bombing. Stealth technology, which gave virtual immunity from enemy air defenses, eliminated the need

for an extensive roll-back campaign. General Glosson endorsed the scheme and

overrode the objections of CENTAF planners and intelligence targeteers.76

Colonel Deptula’s objection to the traditional manner of force-packaging

attack assets on the basis of levels of destruction went to the heart of the matter.

Simply put, traditional force-packaging severely limits the number of targets hit

at any one time. Also, the conventional methods ranked or prioritized targets in

strict order of importance, and then matched the force packages against them

until the daily attack assets ran out. The next day the attacks would resume, in

ranked order, against targets not previously struck. General Glosson’s air campaign planners, who had authored Instant Thunder and had championed many of

the concepts of the Warden group, wished to emphasize simultaneity and effect,

not destruction. For example, instead of attempting to achieve 80-percent

destruction of fifteen CW storage areas scattered throughout Iraq on a single day,

thereby dispersing the effort and forfeiting the advantages of saturating the

defenses, and then attempting to achieve the same level of destruction against ten

equally scattered BW storage areas the subsequent day, as one might well do

under the traditional methods, one could go for effect by employing a carefully

sequenced series of raids—maximizing mutual protection to the attackers—that

dropped over one section of Iraq a few well-placed bombs on key targets belonging to several target groups, thus disrupting a wide spectrum of enemy activities.

During the last ten days of August, as he labored to turn the initial Instant

Thunder aircraft allotment and attack flow charts of August 16 and 18 into a new

MAP, Colonel Deptula initiated the concept of simultaneity and pushed the concept of bombing for effect to new limits, especially in his use of the F–117A

stealth light bomber. He expounded on part of his thinking in this area by making the unarguable observation that if he were working in a building and a oneton bomb detonated in the adjacent corridor, he might not be hurt, but he surely

wouldn’t be operating with 100-percent efficiency for the next few days either.

90

On Target

76. Intvw, Col. Tretler, Jan 14, 1992. Also see Deptula “Comments and Review of the

Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993.
In other words, one doesn’t have to flatten a facility to disrupt it. Given the number of Iraqi strategic targets, which continually grew as more intelligence arrived,

Colonel Deptula confronted a relative shortage of strike assets available. This

added to his incentive to avoid overconcentrating on a single target. In the first

night, the first wave of Instant Thunder had scheduled eight F–117As each

against two targets. Instead of putting thirty-two PGMs on just two targets,

Colonel Deptula, driven by numbers and philosophy, gave eighteen of the 37th

TFW’s F–117As fifteen targets, with three of the fifteen to be attacked by two

aircraft. He spread the strikes between four target systems instead of one. In the

second wave he intended to send thirty-one F–117As to hit twenty-seven targets

and four target systems.77 Colonel Deptula had a high, and as it turned out wellconsidered, confidence in PGMs and in the F–117A’s ability to function with

operational freedom. In fact, because of its ability to deliver its munitions directly on target, the aircraft not only provided effect, it usually supplied a high level

of destruction as well. Few targets in Iraq could survive one or two correctly

aimed GBU–27s. The F–117A’s combination of extreme accuracy and operational invisibility made it, after the tanker, the most important aircraft in the

offensive air campaign. The plan built its force packages exclusively to exploit

the Coalition’s advantages—for example stealth, night operations, precision

cruise missiles, drones, airborne refueling, and night-capable attack helicopters—versus the Iraqis’ weaknesses.

In addition to the F–117As, the early September MAP made other decisions

that remained permanent parts of subsequent plans. If necessary, the first mission

(to consist of four F–15Cs) would be ready to shoot down any airborne Iraqi

AWACS 30 minutes before the start of any scheduled hostilities, that is, at H–30

minutes; SOF would take out early warning radars at H–21 minutes; then F–

117As would destroy the Nukhayb intercept operations center (IOC) at H–09

minutes. This would allow F–15Es to attack Scud sites in Western Iraq while the

F–117As that had penetrated earlier worked over the Baghdad area at H+05 minutes. At about H+50 minutes, a large SEAD package would engage the southwestern Baghdad air defenses and attempt to suppress them with HARMs. Also,

some of the first day’s missions would have drone support (BQM–74s), which

would help to distract Iraqi air defenses by giving them realistic but false targets.

Checkmate proved particularly important in locating drones owned by the USN

(BQM–34s) and those produced by Northrop Aviation for the Saudis (BQM–

74s).78 Although the Israelis had used drones with great effect for reconnaissance

and SEAD in the Lebanon War of 1982, the USAF had seemed uninterested in

91

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

77. Lists, Lt. Col. Deptula, Instant Thunder, by Campaign Flow, Aug 16, 1990, and Instant

Thunder, by Aircraft Type, Aug 18, 1990; MAP, Sep 16, 1990. Colonel Deptula has stated to

the author that he had rescheduled the F–117s by the beginning of September.

78. Msg, 080103Z Sep 90, HQ USAF, XOXW to USCENTAF FWD HQs [Col. Warden

to Brig. Gen. Glosson], Subj: Drone Support for Instant Thunder [File No. CK/Air Staff/OutMsg].
them. In this instance, as elsewhere, the strategic planners demonstrated their

willingness to depart from the conventional. However, like Instant Thunder, this

initial CENTAF plan did not provide for air attacks on Iraqi ground forces. The

plan did incorporate TLAMs and attempted to use them with maximum effect by

scheduling one TLAM to land on a military target, mostly in Baghdad, every ten

minutes during the daylight hours of the morning.79

When Colonel Deptula handed over his first CENTAF MAP to the campaign

planning personnel who prepared the ATO, he encountered another glitch in the

process which he remarked was “not so much a problem as it was an indication

of the limited focus of TAC planners.”80 The creators of the Computer Assisted

Force Management System (CAFMS)—a software package to aid in the preparation and deconfliction of flight times, flight routes, altitudes, refueling rendezvous, and other details involved in the direction of hundreds of aircraft—had

never envisioned controlling aircraft assigned to strategic missions. Colonel

Deptula had indicated to the ATO cell that he wanted several strategic attack missions entered, but he was informed that no such mission existed and that the

CAFMS was capable of identifying only interdiction, counterair (offensive and

defensive as well as SEAD), and CAS missions.

The ATO and the MAP both had vital and distinct positions in the offensive

air campaign. According to Chief Planner Colonel Deptula, the MAP represented the end product of planning whereas the ATO represented the process of turning a plan into executable operations. As noted, the MAP focused on achieving

desired effects on a target system rather than on a specific level of destruction per

target. Each MAP consisted of a sequence of attacks for an individual 24-hour

period, and it contained the time on target, target number, target description,

number and type of weapons systems, and supporting systems for each strike

package. The MAP drove the planning and provided a clear script of what would

happen, when it would happen, and who would do it. After the chief planner had

assembled the MAP, it was typed into a laptop computer from which tanker

experts, assigned to the planning cell from SAC forces controlled by CENTAF,

developed the aerial tanker refueling plan based on the MAP’s routing and attack

requirements. The air refueling plan contained schedules of tanker tracks, altitudes, fuel offloads, call signs, and air refueling times. SAC personnel clung to

the traditional method of building the refueling plan around the OPLAN rather

than the reverse, which CENTAF personnel judged more efficient. CAFMS

helped create the ATO by splicing the two plans, adding technical information,

and fine-tuning the results to ensure that no airspace conflict would occur among

the hundreds of fast-moving aircraft traveling at various altitudes and flying to

and from Iraq as well as between crowded air bases. Without the ATO, the air92

On Target

79. MAP, Sep 16, 1990.

80. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p.

12.
craft could not fly. If the MAP acted as the brain of the offensive air campaign,

then the ATO labored as its heart.81

As one could see, MAP changes due to updated intelligence, new forces, or

enemy moves would have reverberations in the ATO. From August 20 through

January 16, the MAP and its associated ATO underwent numerous changes and

refinements, all requiring reshuffling and redistribution of the changes to the

units. By the time of the first two days of preplanned attacks—January 17 and

18, 1991—the MAP and its ATO had converged until they paralleled each other

as closely and as smoothly as the rails of a bullet train. Once the air campaign

passed the initial attacks, the MAP and the ATO began to diverge as events like

timely intelligence and rapidly changing priorities created changes in the ATO

after the daily MAP had been completed. In the early weeks of Desert Shield,

CENTAF prepared several different ATOs. CENTAF combat operations generated two separate ATOs: the daily training ATO and the defensive ATO. Neither

concerned offensive action. Because of its status as a code-word security compartmented function, the strategic planning cell generated its own ATO for the

first two days of the operation. For the period before the war, the planning cell

provided integrated plans for only the first forty-eight hours. After that time, they

assumed that the frictions of warfare would necessitate daily planning to account

for the unforeseen and unanticipated. After assembling their ATO, the offensive

planners would use the heavy printers of the regular CENTAF ATO division late

at night, then lug the 100-page or larger printouts back to their office for verification and packaging. Once they accomplished this, planning group officers

boarded C–21s and hand-carried the ATOs to the units.82

The wing commanders learned the details of the offensive planning preparations in the last few days of August when members of the special planning

group, hand-carrying copies of the initial offensive ATOs, arrived at the wings.

The planners met a mixed reception, and on at least three occasions the wings

failed to meet the courier.83 In early September General Glosson fully read the

wing commanders into the plan at their meeting in Riyadh. He instructed them

to establish a small, secret offensive air campaign planning cell within their

wings to review their portions of the MAP and associated ATO for errors and

refinements. Later in September CENTAF informed the British Royal Air Force

contingent of the plan and accepted an RAF representative into the special campaign planning group. The RAF representative almost immediately made one

93

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

81. Talking Paper, Lt. Col. Deptula, Chief Planner, JFACC Special Planning Group,

“JFACC Directorate of Campaign Plans,” Nov 4, 1991.

82. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1 1990; Talking Paper, Lt. Col. Deptula, “JFACC Directorate of Campaign Plans,” Nov 4, 1991.

83. Intvw, Comdr. Donald W. McSwain, USN, Office of the CNO, with Dr. Richard G.

Davis, CAFH, Bolling AFB, at the Pentagon, Rm 5E613, Apr 7, 1992. The commander escorted the courier and recalls at least three instances when the wing did not meet them. General

Glosson confirmed these incidents. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Glosson, Dec 12, 1991.
valuable contribution: he corrected the planning staff’s outdated maps to show

the current 1990 Iraqi-Saudi border.84

In the last half of August and the first days of September 1990, the offensive

air campaign underwent two substantive changes, both originating outside the

USAF. First, the offensive air campaign became a portion of the overall CENTCOM war plan; second, the reduction if not destruction of the elite Iraqi

Republican Guard became a task assigned to the offensive air campaign. On

August 26, the day that he deployed forward to Riyadh, General Schwarzkopf

briefed both General Powell and Secretary Cheney on his concept of operations

for an offensive campaign. Three weeks earlier President Bush had made such a

campaign likely, given Iraqi intransigence, with his public pronouncement that

the occupation of Kuwait “would not stand.” General Schwarzkopf stated that

when directed he would conduct “offensive operations to eject Iraqi forces from

Kuwait and restore original Kuwait/Iraq Border.” He made seven assumptions:

Iraq would still hold American citizens hostage,

Iraqi forces would remain in Kuwait,

Friendly nations would not restrict U.S. actions,

Offensive operations would not begin until C+120 days,

The NCA would authorize cross-border operations into Iraq,

Iraq would use chemical weapons if attacked, and

Jordan, Iran, and Israel would maintain their neutrality.

Next General Schwarzkopf broke down his proposed campaign into four phases

and summarized each. Phase I, the strategic air campaign, was based on Instant

Thunder. When he received the August 17 Instant Thunder briefing, he was “preoccupied” with the offensive planning already begun at General Powell’s orders.

When General Schwarzkopf had heard the earlier presentation on August 10, he

perceived immediately it went beyond his request for a “retaliation” plan and

could serve as an important piece of CENTCOM’s plans. In fact he saw that the

plan could “double” with the “offensive planning” under way. In the evening of

August 17, General Schwarzkopf and his staff put together the four phases of the

campaign, which now appeared in their initial form.85 He placed the strategic air

campaign into context by observing that it would not begin until CENTCOM’s

ground forces had established adequate ground defenses and that after four to six

days of main effort, it would continue at a “reduced level until conflict termination.” In Phase II, preparation of the battlefield, air would “improve ground combat ratio adequate for the attack.” Phase II would immediately follow Phase I or,

if the resources existed, could occur concurrently with Phase I. In Phase II, air

would roll back Iraqi air defenses and attack forward-deployed Iraqi ground

94

On Target

84. Intvw, Capt. William Bruner, USAF, GWAPS (NBC and F–111 planning officer,

Special Campaign Planning Staff), with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at Crystal City, Arlington, Va., Mar 19, 1992.

85. Telecon, Gen Schwarzkopf, May 5, 1992.
forces, their reserves, and their counterattack capability. Phase II would continue throughout the remainder of the conflict, including supplying “continuous and

concentrated attacks to produce favorable combat ratios in front of advancing

and attacking Coalition ground forces.” In Phase III, assault into Kuwait, the

ground forces would retake Kuwait and restore its borders. It would commence

when the ground force ratios favored offensive action and would destroy the

main Iraqi defenses, isolate the Iraqis in Kuwait City, block Republican Guard

counterattacks, and launch a deep attack on Iraqi reserves. Phase III would last

until it rendered the main Iraqi forces combat-ineffective, destroyed Iraqi tactical reserves, and isolated Kuwait City. Phase IV, end state, restored the borders,

established a multinational defense force, declared a U.S./Pan-Arab victory, and

announced U.S. withdrawal intentions. CENTCOM would initiate Phase IV

when force ratios favored pursuit or continued attack north of Kuwait City; if it

could not procure favorable force ratios, it would establish a defense west of

Kuwait City. Phase IV had three priority missions: secure the areas south of Kuwait City, defend Kuwait’s northern and western borders, and clear Kuwait City

or conduct any necessary mop-up actions. Phase IV would last until a multinational force assumed the defense of Kuwait.86

As one would have expected of an Army four-star general serving as a

Unified CINC, General Schwarzkopf proposed a combined air and ground campaign. But he also recognized the advantages of a strategic air campaign, based

on the concepts advocated by the Air Staff, for disrupting the Iraqi leadership,

crippling Iraq’s strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, and lowering its

population’s will to resist. He further saw the utility of allowing the strategic

campaign to continue, albeit at a reduced level, throughout the conflict. He

assumed, and events confirmed his belief, that if conflict came, the air campaign

would not in and of itself force Saddam to concede. Consequently, he planned for

a ground offensive, which required that air power would soften enemy ground

forces before the battle and would support Coalition ground forces during the

conflict. In Phase I the general permitted air power to operate independently; in

Phase II he required that it operate in parallel and in a supporting role to perform

interdiction and CAS. Interdiction and attack on deep reserves were tasks only

air power could perform. As for CAS, at this stage in the planning General

Schwarzkopf could not have known that he would eventually receive massive

armored reinforcements beyond those already scheduled to deploy. Except for

the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), he had few heavily armed units, and to

undertake an offensive he would need a maximum of air-delivered firepower to

overcome his deficiency in artillery and other heavy weapons. In the time before

January 17, 1991, many of the details of the offensive against Iraq would change,

95

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

86. Brfg, “Offensive Campaign: Concept of Operations Outline,” Aug 26, 1990 [File No.

CK/DS/CENTCOM]. This copy carries the following annotation: “Schwarzkopf Brief to

CJCS/SECDEF.”
including the phases, but with this plan General Schwarzkopf had sketched in

much of the campaign’s eventual outline.

The CENTAF campaign planners learned of their place in the overall plan

on August 26 during General Glosson’s initial briefing of General Horner when

the CENTAF commander informed Glosson of the contents of Schwarzkopf’s

brief. This did not affect the initial MAPs for the first three days; however, the

planning cell began to sketch out a scheme for carrying a reduced strategic attack

through Phases II and III as well.87 On September 2, at the direction of General

Schwarzkopf, General Glosson informed the planning group that the Republican

Guard had become an additional, separate target system. This came about, in

part, because of General Powell’s concerns. As noted previously, during Colonel

Warden’s August 11 brief to General Powell on Instant Thunder, the CJCS

remarked that even if the Iraqis withdrew from Kuwait, he didn’t want them to

retain an effective ground force. General Schwarzkopf shared this view.

According to General Horner, General Schwarzkopf expressed and continued to

express concern about the Republican Guard from at least as early as April

1990.88 General Schwarzkopf considered the Republican Guard to be Iraq’s most

effective ground units for providing both defense and power projection.

Additionally, he believed that because of their loyalty (bought by special treatment and elitist recruiting) and military effectiveness, these units served as a

valuable prop to the regime, providing internal security. Their destruction would

serve to destabilize Saddam’s hold on the country and ease the tasks of the

Coalition ground forces in any future ground conflict. The decision added 28

ground-force targets, which, combined with the 15 military-support production

targets already on the campaign target list, produced a subtotal of 43 Republican

Guard and military-support targets. The planners further augmented the target

list with 15 strategic targets, for an overall gain in excess of 50 percent, from 84

to 127.

Initially, the Checkmate planners, who had placed the Republican Guard (as

a fielded military force) in the outermost of their five strategic rings, had reservations about adding it to their target sets. Colonel Warden pointed to the difficulty of locating and identifying Republican Guard units that had left Kuwait.

Tracking and monitoring them could require significant intelligence assets, and

strikes on a dug-in enemy ground force would consume large numbers of

weapons to incapacitate cannon fodder, whereas a few weapons on Baghdad

might incapacitate the national leadership. Besides, while the Republican Guard

remained in the rear, it offered only a low threat to friendly ground forces.

Attacking a portion of Iraq’s army did not equate with the other targets, such as

leadership, C3, and key supply points. Finally, Colonel Warden decried the dedication of large numbers of sorties against “elusive tactical objectives with mar96

On Target

87. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 20, 1990.

88. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.
ginal/minimal results instead of using these sorties against fixed and achievable

targets.” Hitting the Republican Guard could reduce the overall effectiveness of

the strategic air campaign.89 In spite of this protest, the CINCCENT’s directive

to include the Republican Guard in the offensive air campaign became effective

immediately.

The addition of ground forces as a target expanded the role of the F–16s in

the offensive air campaign. In late August the planners intended to use that aircraft during the first forty-eight hours in a strike on the Al Kut IOC and on limited strikes on CW production on the outskirts of Baghdad. To reach Baghdad,

without refueling over Iraqi territory, the F–16s carried external fuel tanks and a

reduced ordnance load. The Republican Guard target set offered much closer targets, which eventually permitted even the A–10s to participate in the offensive

air campaign. This, in turn, meant the extension of the MAP and its associated

ATO to cover all USAF assets in the AOR.

The AOR also contained non-USAF assets. For instance, the RAF had sent

Tornado attack aircraft (GR–1s), Tornado fighter aircraft, and an excellent

Tornado reconnaissance variant. British representation on the campaign planning

staff added to the RAF’s uniformly excellent record of performance and cooperation. The other Coalition air forces cooperated with no serious difficulties, and

after some delays most of their governments allowed them to operate over Iraq

as well as over Kuwait.

The USMC proved somewhat less cooperative. On August 29 General

Glosson and Colonel Deptula briefed the air campaign plan to USMC Air

Commander Maj. Gen. Royal Moore. Although General Moore seemed to

approve the plan’s basic premises, he agreed to make available to the air campaign plan 100 percent of the Corps’s EA–6s and A–6s, but only 50 percent of

its F/A–18s, and none of the AV–8s.90

General Moore’s decision may not have been entirely in keeping with one of

the longest-standing USAF doctrines—the insistence on placing all air power

under a single commander. Yet, given the equally explicit USMC air doctrine

requiring that marine air support marine ground forces and given the USMC’s

exposed position facing Iraqi armored units, the fact that the campaign plan did

not yet include Iraqi ground forces, and the short range of the AV–8s, General

Moore might well be said to have been quite cooperative. Doctrine should not

overrule obvious common sense. A didactic insistence on putting every single

airframe at every single instant under the JFACC might well do more harm to

interservice cooperation than the damage incurred by a generous laissez-faire

attitude. Throughout the course of the campaign, and to his great credit, General

Horner, in the interest of harmony, turned a blind eye to the attempts of USN and

97

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

89. Msg, 062332Z Sep 90, Col. Warden, XOXW, to Brig. Gen. Glosson, Chief, CENTAF

Campaign Planning Unit, Subj: Targeting Iraq’s Republican Guard Army.

90. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 20, 1991; Audiotape Transcript, General Horner Comments, n.d. [April 1991].
USMC aviation to circumvent the JFACC process. From the early stages of the

campaign, General Horner adopted the position that if, on occasion, the aviation

of the other services wished to do their own thing, so be it. He had USAF assets

in-theater to perform any task the CINCCENT required.

General Horner affixed his imprimatur to the plan on September 2, 1990. On

that date he signed and issued COMUSCENTAF OPORD Offensive Campaign—Phase I.91 The next day General Glosson presented the revised campaign

plan to General Schwarzkopf. Eight days later, on the evening of September 11,

General Glosson presented the briefing to Generals Dugan and Adams in Riyadh

during the CSAF’s visit to the AOR. It apparently conformed to the chief’s

expectations. The CSAF also brought the special planning group several hundred

pounds of targeting material, destined for the target folders of the combat wings.

Colonel Deptula collected the material as soon as possible.92

General Powell got the briefing on September 13; by then, the target list had

grown to 171 entries. At all three briefings, General Glosson stated that CENTAF

could execute the plan as of September 13.93 The final slide of the brief,

“RESULTS,” revealed how completely CENTAF had adopted the principles of

Instant Thunder. The air campaign would “destroy military capability,” “eliminate government control,” and “generate internal strife,” which would

“Decapitate [the] Saddam Regime” and result in its “change.”94 But the new formulation also reduced significantly one possibly crucial aspect of the original

Checkmate plan: The CENTAF plan made no overt provision for PSYOP to aid

in a campaign to wean the Iraqi people from their state.95 In addition, bureaucratic constraints in the United States, including a lack of appropriate Arabic-language programming and delays in its development, further handicapped efforts

to conduct PSYOP against Saddam’s regime.96

Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell not only approved the plan and its execution date, they also made the important decision to have the offensive air campaign plan be their primary response to an Iraqi attack. If necessary, the A–10s

98

On Target

91. OPORD, COMUSCENTAF, Offensive Campaign—Phase I, Sep 2, 1990 [File No.

CK/Deptula Box 12].

92. Intvw, Col. Warden, Feb 6, 1992.

93. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 1, 1990.

94. Brfg Slide, Brig. Gen. Glosson to CJCS, Riyadh, “RESULTS,” Sep 13, 1990 [File No.

AFHSO microfilm reel 10198, frame 25].

95. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992. Also see Deptula, “Comments and Review of

the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 14. Colonel Deptula notes that during the conflict the Coalition conducted “several psychological operations,” but not to the extent envisioned by Instant Thunder. He further points the finger at the CENTCOM staff bureaucracy

which “inhibited” attempts to conduct “some strategic” PSYOP.

96. Intvw, Col. Warden, Feb 6, 1992. Lack of proper material had hounded earlier USAF

PSYOP attempts. During Operation Just Cause against Panama, the EC–130 Volant Solo aircraft, for lack of anything better, had adopted the fiendish plan of substituting children’s cartoons and old situation comedies for regular Panamanian TV. More substantial cultural differences would obviously lessen the worth of such a tactic over Iraq.
held in reserve would delay the Iraqi ground forces.97 This aggressive decision

relegated the D-day plan to secondary status and demonstrated the overarching

priority Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf gave to damaging Iraq’s strategic

offensive and defensive capacities and to limiting its prospects for creating future

mischief. It showed their faith in the ability of their soldiers and marines, supported with minimal air cover, to defend against Iraqi ground forces. The decision may also simply have shown that, with the Republican Guard withdrawn

from Kuwait and replaced by regular Iraqi units, the two generals judged the

chances of an attack as low and the efficiency of the regular Iraqi army on the

offensive as even lower. By September 15 General Powell had informed the president that the Coalition had sufficient air forces in Saudi Arabia “to execute and

sustain an offensive strategic air campaign against Iraq, should he order one.”98

On September 25, the UN Security Council expanded the maritime blockade,

with Cuba voting against it, as specified in Resolution 670 (1990) to include all

air travel to and from Iraq. This restricted the Iraqis’ ability to obtain crucial

spare parts, and it increased their isolation.

During his trip to and from Saudi Arabia, especially during the ten-hour

return flight, General Dugan candidly discussed in broad terms and, on the

record, aspects of the offensive air campaign plan. He expressed his views on the

conduct of a possible conflict against Iraq with reporters of the Los Angeles

Times, the Washington Post, and Aviation Week & Space Technology. The Times

and the Post broke the story on Sunday, September 16, 1990. “Senior U.S. Air

Force officials” described U.S. war plans as calling for the rapid and massive

bombing of key military targets in Iraq and air strikes directed against Saddam

and his inner circle. The articles stated that General Dugan had noted that U.S.

target planners had assembled lists of Iraqi targets in the following order of priority: air defenses; airfields and warplanes; ballistic missile sites; C3; NBC and

munitions plants; and Iraqi armored formations. This order roughly paralleled

that of the CENTAF offensive air campaign. “If push comes to shove,” General

Dugan added, “the cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad.” He explicitly

targeted Saddam saying, “He [Saddam] ought to be at the focus of our efforts.”

Apparently, the general also let slip that Israeli sources had suggested that the

most important items to Saddam were his family, personal guard, and mistress.

While personalizing the leadership target set on Saddam himself, this emphasis

on leadership echoed that of the offensive air campaign. When speaking of the

air campaign, General Dugan observed, “We are looking for centers of gravity

that air power could take on that would make a difference early on.” This statement applied directly to the philosophy underlying the offensive air campaign.

General Dugan also spoke of future options and appeared to adopt a view slight99

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

97. Information Paper, “CINCCENT Campaign Plan Options” (marked, “Given to CSAF

[General Merrill A. McPeak] 30 Nov 90”), n.d. This paper was part of a package given to

General McPeak to prepare him for a meeting with President Bush at Camp David.

98. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 94.
ing to the army: “But when you finally get down to violence, in my view it’s [air

power] the only option. That does not mean that the ground forces that are there

would not be used to intimidate, to demonstrate, to do lots of things. I just don’t

see us conducting a big ground invasion.” General Dugan knew that General

Schwarzkopf, as his first option, intended to employ the offensive air campaign,

and that General Powell agreed to it. After noting that a ground attack could get

very “bloody,” he stated, “Our nation has pursued for decades the policy that has

substituted machines and technology for human lives. I think especially in this

environment we will continue that policy.” When specifically asked if the JCS

and General Schwarzkopf concurred with his views, General Dugan stated,

“They agree with that policy, yes.”99

The CSAF’s remarks alienated General Powell and infuriated Secretary

Cheney. The secretary called National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who

agreed to state during his appearance on the TV show “Face the Nation” later in

the day that General Dugan was not in the chain of command and did not speak

for the administration. General Dugan had crossed the line on a strong Secretary

of Defense who did not hesitate to publicly reprimand his service chiefs. On

March 24, 1989, in his first press conference and after only eight days in office,

Secretary Cheney had rebuked General Dugan’s predecessor as CSAF, General

Larry D. Welch, for negotiating about strategic missile programs with members

of Congress. (Service chiefs do not have the legal authority to negotiate legislation with Congress on behalf of the defense secretary or the president; they may

only inform and advise.) In fact, General Welch had permission from Deputy

Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV to talk to members of Congress and to

share information on the missile programs. It is not clear whether General Welch

ever actually negotiated with the legislators, but Secretary Cheney ensured that

in the future his service chiefs would take care to avoid giving the appearance of

overstepping their authority. On September 17, after consulting with President

Bush and discussing the matter with General Powell, Secretary Cheney fired the

CSAF, who became only the second service chief relieved of his office since the

end of World War II. The defense secretary cited nine reasons for his decision:

1. General Dugan’s bad judgment,

2. The discussion of operational plans and a priority listing of targets,

3. Acting as the self-appointed spokesman for the JCS and the CINC,

4. The setting of a bad example, especially for USAF personnel,

5. The cavalier treatment of casualties,

6. The citing of an intent to break the executive order banning participation in

assassinations,

7. The potential revelation of classified information about size and disposition

of American forces,

8. Denigration of the role of the other services, and

100

On Target

99. John D. Morrocco, “U.S. War Plan: Air Strikes to Topple Hussein Regime,” Aviation

Week & Space Technology, Sep 24, 1990, pp. 16–18. Also see Woodward, Commanders, pp.

290–292.
9. Raising sensitive matters of diplomacy, including obtaining targeting information from Israel.100

General Dugan’s departure removed from the service his personal championship

of the effort to take a fresh look at service doctrine and methodology, especially

the examination of the decisiveness of independent air power such as that undertaken by the Deputy Directorate for Warfighting Concepts. Secretary Cheney

nominated, and the Senate confirmed, on October 30, 1990, General Merrill A.

McPeak, the Commander of the Pacific Air Forces, as the new CSAF.

General Dugan’s dismissal had no discernible effect on the status or details

of the offensive air campaign plan. The decision of Generals Powell and

Schwarzkopf to implement the plan in response to any Iraqi attack meant that the

theories of the Warden group might undergo a trial by fire. If the crisis had

reached a resolution before combat, then the air campaign plan would have

remained a little-known oddity, more important for its indication of American

will to bomb Iraq than for the method used. If CENTAF had returned to its U.S.

bases without firing a shot, Instant Thunder would never have excited the fierce

debate over its origins and implementation that it has, not only in the services’

schools and “doctrine shops,” but in plans, operations, and intelligence sections

as well.

Refining the Offensive Air Plan

On the afternoon of October 6, 1991, General Powell picked up his secure

phone and called General Schwarzkopf. The CJCS ordered the CINCCENT to

send a team to Washington to brief the JCS, Secretary Cheney, and “possibly the

President” on plans for an offensive land and air campaign against Iraq. General

101

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

100. News Briefing Transcript, SecDef Richard B. Cheney, DoD, OASD (Public Affairs),

Monday, Sep 17, 1990, 1430 EDT. Secretary Cheney described his reasons for asking for General Dugan’s resignation at this press briefing [Supporting Document I–27, CY 1990 Air Staff

Annual History, Air Staff History Branch, AFHSO]. Also see Woodward, Commanders, pp.

292–293 and previous pages for General Powell’s reaction to General Dugan’s statements.

Chief of Staff of the USAF, General

Merrill A. “Tony” McPeak
Schwarzkopf instantly protested with words to the effect that as far as an effective ground campaign went, he had absolutely nothing. General Powell blandly

replied, “your offensive air plan is so good that I want these people to hear it, but

you can’t brief just the air plan; you must brief the ground plan too.”101 The order

to present offensive options to the White House touched General Schwarzkopf’s

darkest fear—that the NCA would order him into a risky attack with insufficient

force. In his memoirs, General Schwarzkopf stated, “I was now under orders to

send in a plan I believed could result in a bloodbath.”102 The CINCCENT prepared the briefers carefully; warned them not to give optimistic can-do replies to

high-level questioning; and gave four slides to the head of the team, CENTCOM

Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, USMC, to present at the end of the

brief. On October 10, 1990, the CENTCOM team briefed the JCS and Secretary

Cheney in the “tank” in the Pentagon. The next day they gave their presentation

at the White House. General Glosson addressed President Bush, Secretary

Cheney, General Powell, Secretary of State Baker, White House Chief of Staff

Sununu, and National Security Advisor Scowcroft, among others, on the strategic air campaign. Glosson presented the first three phases of the four-phase brief.

He started with a discussion of the Iraqi air defense posture and included

specifics on the SAM and AAA threats in the H–2 and H–3 airfield areas and in

the Baghdad and Basra areas. An examination of major Iraqi airfields and dispersal fields followed. The president asked how the Coalition forces would close

the runways. General Glosson replied that RAF and RSAF GR–1s would drop

JP–233 munitions which cratered and mined runways and taxiways. F–111Fs

with 2,000-pound bombs would additionally crater the runways. Attention then

turned to the Iraqi air defense warning and control network. It consisted of the

air defense operations center (ADOC) in Baghdad, the five sector operations centers (SOCs)—H–3, Kirkuk, Taji, South, and V (in Kuwait)—and the sixteen

IOCs that reported to the SOCs.103

After setting the stage, General Glosson began to explain the “offensive air

campaign.” It had three centers of gravity: leadership, military forces, and infrastructure. The strike force consisted of the following aircraft:

Combat Aircraft

Aircraft No. Aircraft No. Aircraft No.

F–117A 18 GR–1 RAF 200 A–7 22

F–15E 24 GR–1 RSAF 25 F–15C 72

F–111F 32 F–16 12 F–14 54

A–6E 67 F/A–18 42

B–52G 20 F/A–18 USMC 24

102

On Target

101. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 358.

102. Ibid.

103. Brfg Slides 1–4, Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990; MemoRec, Brig. Gen. Buster C.

Glosson, Subj: Questions at Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990 [File No. CK/Deptula/Box 12].
Twelve additional F–117As would join the attack force from the United States

within sixty hours, and 96 A–10s, 132 AH–64/AH–1s, 40 AV–8Bs, and 24 F/A–

18(M)s would defend or initiate Phases II and III. The supporting force composition follows:

Support Aircraft

Aircraft No. Aircraft No. Aircraft No.

F–4G 36 E–3 6 KC–10 6

EF–111A 14 RC–135 4 KC–135 88

EA–6 24 U–2R/TR–1 4 SOF 45

EC–130 13 RF–4 6

An additional 24 KC–10s and 64 KC–135s would close from the United States

within sixty hours. Secretary Baker’s inquiry as to why the operation needed so

many tanker aircraft initiated a short discussion. General Glosson pointed to the

requirements of the USN carriers as the primary reason. He acknowledged that

the USMC and USAF needed them too. He cited the F–15Es based in Thumrait,

Oman, located 1,100 miles one-way from Baghdad. General Powell ended the

discussion by observing that we had probably not used the forward bases because

of their proximity to Iraqi border.104

The number of targets associated with the offensive air campaign had more

than doubled from the original 84 of Instant Thunder; they now numbered 218.

Each of the ten targets systems grew and would continue to grow until the end of

the crisis and subsequent war in the Persian Gulf:

Target System Instant Thunder Presidential Brief

Strategic Air Defense 10 40

Strategic CW & Scuds 8 20

Leadership 5 15

Republican Guard & 15 43

Military Support

Telecommunications 19 27

Electricity 10 18

Oil 6 10

Railroads 3 12

Airfields 7 27

Ports 1 6

This increase in numbers reflected the results of additional intelligence and study

of Iraq. After explaining the target systems, General Glosson sketched the attack

plan for the first 24 hours. It provided for 822 attack sorties (265 predawn, 266

morning, 97 afternoon, and 194 night sorties) and 536 sorties for defense, or for

103

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

104. Brfg Slides 5–8, Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990; MemoRec, Brig. Gen. Buster C.

Glosson, Questions at Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990.
Phases II and III. He followed this with a map of Iraq and acetate overlays that

graphically illustrated the first day’s attack sequence and objectives. In addition

to other points throughout Iraq, the first wave’s strikes would hit seventeen targets in the Baghdad area: the Baghdad presidential residence and bunker, Abu

Ghurayb presidential grounds and bunker, Salman Pak BW bunkers, Taji SOC,

Taji presidential retreat, Al Taqaddum airfield, Balad Southeast (SE) airfield,

Taji IOC, Taji Military Relay Facility, the Baghdad “AT&T” telephone

exchange, Baghdad Air Defense Headquarters, the Presidential Grounds, Baath

Party Headquarters, the Presidential Palace, the Baghdad TV transmitter, and the

Baghdad telecommunications center. The next three waves would reattack two of

those targets and twenty-three new ones in the Baghdad area. On day 2, Coalition

forces would reattack twenty of the first day’s targets, additional targets not covered in the first twenty-four hours, and key targets that BDA indicated as requiring additional attacks. Days 3 through 6 would continue the routine of hitting

targets not yet struck and reattacking those requiring it. As possible limiting factors, General Glosson noted the closure times of reinforcements. In addition to

the already mentioned F–117As and tankers, the general referred to the USS

Saratoga carrier battle group (60 hours’ closure to its battle station) and the

ALCMs (20 hours’ closure on B–52Gs flying from Barksdale AFB). At the end

of the offensive air campaign, the Americans expected to have achieved destruction of the Iraqi leadership’s C2, disruption and attrition of the Republican Guard,

disruption of the Iraqi leadership’s ability to communicate with the populace,

destruction of key electrical grids and oil supply, destruction of Iraqi NBC capability, and disruption of Iraq’s military resupply capability.105

The various facets of Phase I evoked several questions. President Bush

wanted to know why the battleship USS Wisconsin was so close to Iraq and the

104

On Target

105. Brfg Slides 9–14, and paper copies of overlays, Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990.

Planning maps for the

air strikes
carriers so far back. General Glosson answered that the carriers’ safety concerned the USN, and General Powell added that a battlewagon could take a lot

more punishment than a carrier could. Secretary Baker asked a question that

brought into focus the planning of an air offensive. How did the USAF know that

the Iraqis could not detect the F–117A? Had the service actually flown any

F–117As over Iraq? The general replied that they had tested Iraqi defenses and

detected nothing to indicate that the Iraqis had seen anything. The issue of damage to sites of historical or religious significance arose when the president asked

if the general was sure that the Royal Palace had no symbolic value to the Iraqi

people. General Glosson responded that he knew it had no religious value. (After

the briefing, the palace came off the target list.) The president then turned to the

CJCS and asked him to ensure that the target lists contained no targets of historic

or religious significance. General Glosson further remarked that the planners had

already removed targets because of their proximity to shrines, had restricted runin headings, and had selected the most accurate systems to avoid religious targets. General Powell observed that the services had worked the problem from the

beginning. The general also reassured the president on the accuracy of the

TLAMs and stated that the planners had put a minimum of three each on the

power plants to ensure sufficient damage.

President Bush queried what would Saddam be able to do after Phase I? A

short discussion ensued. General Glosson began by stating that Saddam would

lose the ability to effectively communicate with his people, would lose C2 to his

forces, would have significant problems in reinforcing Kuwait because of LOC

cuts, and would have to deal with disruption throughout the country. Secretary

Baker interjected that the phrase “decapitate Saddam” used in the briefing was

misleading. The general answered that the slide was only intended to indicate the

difficulties Saddam would have in controlling his army and his people and that

his country would be visibly in disarray.

Next the briefing offered a concise description of Phases II and III. In Phase

II, obtaining air supremacy in Kuwait, the bulk of the Coalition air forces would

attack the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) covering Kuwait and southern

Iraq and either destroy it or roll it back. USAF, RAF, and RSAF planes would

strike southern Iraq and the western Kuwaiti border, more USAF aircraft would

attack southwestern Kuwait, while USMC aircraft worked over southeastern

Kuwait and USN aircraft plastered northeastern Kuwait. Once Phase II succeeded, Phase III attacks would begin on the Republican Guard stationed in southern

Iraq, followed by attacks on the regular Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait. The full

weight of Coalition air power—including the A–10s, AV–8Bs, and Jaguars,

heretofore held in reserve to retard an Iraqi ground-led counterattack—would

begin a battle of attrition against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, paying particular

attention to armor, C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence),

and the Iraqi logistics base. Phase III would take seven to ten days to complete,

in addition to the time required for Phases I and II, and during the last two phas105

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan
es the Coalition would continue to strike Phase I targets at a reduced level. As

the general explained Phase III, White House Chief of Staff Sununu referred to

the U.S. Embassy staff in Kuwait City. At that time the staff still maintained the

embassy in support of the official U.S. position that Kuwait remain a sovereign,

independent state. The Iraqis, who had illegally annexed Kuwait, surrounded the

embassy, virtually making hostages of the staff. The White House Chief of Staff

asked if the operation included a plan to get the embassy staff out of Kuwait

when Phase I began. General Glosson said it had not, but General Powell stated

the problem was being worked another way.

Then the Secretary of State asked for the Coalition air loss rates for each

phase. The general gave the planners’ projections: 10 to 15 aircraft in the first 24

hours of Phase I, with a high of 40 aircraft for the entire phase; 2 to 3 aircraft, at

most, for Phase II; and for Phase III, if initiated after Phases I and II, 8 to 10 aircraft for the first 2 days, and 1 to 3 per day thereafter. Secretary Baker then

inquired as to the differences between Vietnam and Iraq. The general explained

that the NCA had permitted the service to use its full force to deal with the problem—to cut the trunk instead of clipping the branches. The president observed

that the logistics differed greatly, because the Vietnamese had China and others

unloading at the ports. The general agreed, citing the total embargo on Iraq and

citing that in this conflict the services would strike the enemy’s major LOCs

rather than overfly them, as they had the ships unloading in Haiphong Harbor.

The president, revealing his concern over Saddam, quizzed the briefer, “What do

you say to people who say Saddam Hussein will rise up out of the rubble on

national TV and say ‘Here I am’?” “He might do that,” responded the general,

“but not on his television or radio networks.” He would need outside help for

that. General Powell cautioned that the Americans would have to be prepared for

a dramatic postattack announcement from Saddam and not be seduced into thinking that Coalition forces would “get him for sure.” Secretary Cheney reaffirmed

this point, “We’ve got to be careful not to lead people to expect that Saddam will

be eliminated personally in Phase I.” This ended General Glosson’s section of the

presentation.

Lt. Col. Joseph Purvis, USA, presented Phase IV, the land campaign.

Colonel Purvis headed of a team of graduates from the Army’s elite School of

Advanced Military Studies, the school from Leavenworth, Kansas, that specializes in campaign planning. General Schwarzkopf had requested the four-man

team in mid-September to supplement CENTCOM staff thinking. He told the

Leavenworth planners to “assume a ground attack will follow an air campaign.”106 Much like the officers of Colonel Warden’s Deputy Directorate for

Warfighting Concepts, these so-called Jedi Knights had engaged in the systematic reappraisal of their service’s method of warfare.107 They also had much to do

106

On Target

106. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 354.

107. Telecon, Maj. Gen. Buster C. Glosson with Richard G. Davis, CAFH, Feb 3, 1992.
with ARCENT’s offensive planning. The hurriedly assembled Army plan (the

planners completed the first draft only on October 6) lacked the polish of the

well-rehearsed briefing of General Glosson. ARCENT like CENTAF seems to

have spent its energy concentrating on defense and bed-down. Because the

American and Coalition ground forces had insufficient numbers to launch a

flanking movement on the Iraqi forces while simultaneously holding the front

lines, the planners had little choice but to adopt a scheme that provided for an

assault through the stiffest Iraqi defenses, followed by seizure of a key road junction deep in Kuwait and a battle of attrition against Iraqi reinforcements. The

plan predicted 10,000 American casualties, including 2,000 dead. It further committed all American ground forces to combat, leaving no reserves.108 The plan

may have been no more than an exercise to prove the impossibility of mounting

an attack using the Coalition ground forces then present in the AOR.109 During

this brief, those present had more questions and observations. Unfortunately

General Glosson recorded only their questions, not the answers, because he had

not given the brief. Nevertheless, the questions reveal the thought processes of

the administration. The president wanted to know why the services thought so

highly of the Iraqis. His information indicated Saddam might cut and run at the

first bombs. “Are we seeing any impact of sanctions? Food and water?” asked

President Bush, “I’m told large portions are ready to give up, but you indicate

that’s not true.” Later the president queried, “Why not do Phase I, II, and III, then

stop?” President Bush certainly did not appear to think of the Iraqis as ten feet

tall.110

After the Phase IV presentation, General Johnston put up the slides showing

General Schwarzkopf’s concerns, which in effect impeached the just-delivered

ground offensive briefing. The commander warned against a plan that dispensed

with reserves, noted that the Saudis had not yet agreed to any attack, and cautioned against underestimating Iraqi fighting ability. In part of his final slide, the

CINCCENT gave his overall assessment:

Offensive ground plan not solid. We do not have the capability to attack on [the]

ground at this time.

Need additional Heavy Corps to guarantee successful outcome.

Defensive Plan Solid—As promised the President during the first week of

August, United States military forces are now capable of defending Saudi

Arabia and executing a wide range of retaliatory attacks against Iraq.111

With his implied, if not overt, refusal to attack without reinforcements, General

Schwarzkopf confronted his military and civilian superiors with a classic dilemma. Do you support your commander in the field, or do you replace him or force

107

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

108. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 356–358.

109. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 305–306.

110. Brfg Slides 16–18 and Charts G–I, Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990; MemoRec, Brig.

Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Questions at Presidential Brief, Oct 11 1990.

111. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 359–360.
him to carry out contradictory orders and take the consequences if your imposed

solution fails? The answer to that question relies not just upon the field commander’s record of success, but upon the temper of the government. Secretary

Cheney, General Powell, presumably the president, and others had at least twenty-four hours’ notice of the field commander’s stance. Nonetheless, at least one

of those present made a less than sotto voce reference to General George B.

McClellan, a Union army commander early in the American Civil War who

moved too slowly and exaggerated his difficulties. Another remarked, “My God,

he’s already got all the force he needs, why won’t he attack?”112 However,

President Bush stepped up to the situation. The president softly asked for additional information, “How many more people will you need?” He received the

answer that General Schwarzkopf required three heavy divisions. Secretary

Baker apparently had the last comment: the force fielded so far appeared too

American and did not include enough Arabs.113 General Powell quickly relayed

the results of the briefing to General Schwarzkopf that “the White House is very

comfortable with the air plan, but there was a lot of criticism of the ground

attack.”114

For the president, this briefing represented but one part of a larger puzzle—

how to get Saddam out of Kuwait. He could wait either for an indeterminate period or for the economic sanctions to bite and hope that the international Coalition

held together, that the Saudis kept their nerve and could withstand the indefinite

presence of Western soldiers in their country, that sanctions would not break

down, that U.S. domestic support would hold firm, and that Saddam would blink

and retreat rather than subject his land, his people, and above all his regime to

ruin. If President Bush did not choose to defend and deter, he could attack, cutting the Gordian knot, and use military force to eject Saddam from Kuwait and

weaken the Iraqis to prevent their harming their neighbors. This course of action

appeared to offer speed and decisiveness, but if American military inefficiency

should result in high losses and disproportionately small results, serious domestic and international political consequences would ensue. However, throughout

the crisis and the following conflict, President Bush evinced complete faith the

U.S. military. He demonstrated this by exercising his powers as CINC at the minimum while allowing his generals and admirals to fight his war. For example, the

president’s reception of this briefing illustrated his treatment and understanding

of military affairs. His questions show that he understood the matters under discussion and would support the air plan presented to him. Phase IV, because of its

head-on attack into the Iraqi defenses, troubled President Bush and Secretary

Cheney. They further realized that no matter what offensive land option they

108

On Target

112. Ibid., p. 361.

113. Brfg Slides 16–18 and Charts G–I, Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990; MemoRec, Brig.

Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Questions at Presidential Brief, Oct 11, 1990.

114. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 361–362.
selected, it would require more troops.115 When the conflict came, the Army

would use a much more innovative plan.

This briefing, as none other had, locked the offensive air campaign into

place as a key element in any conflict with Iraq. Except to add targets, as more

aircraft and intelligence became available, the plan changed little from this point

forward. Interestingly enough, the national leadership began to express reservations at this point concerning the offensive air plan’s ambitious goal of changing

the regime in Baghdad. Their doubts may have sprung from a healthy skepticism

of military planning or, just as likely, from a desire not to go too clearly on record

as advocating the elimination of Saddam, should that effort fail. In any case, the

NCA and other high-level administration decision-makers approved of the outline and details of the plan.

From its inception through its execution, the target base of the offensive air

campaign matured as the campaign planners garnered additional intelligence

information, with NBC targets presenting major technical and humanitarian concerns. Chief among these was the possible catastrophic consequence of destroying NBC storage and production facilities. Would their destruction spread their

contents to the surrounding, unprotected civilian population and beyond?

Somewhat surprisingly, nuclear facilities appeared to offer the least risk of excessive collateral damage. As early as August 8, U.S. intelligence estimated for the

Air Staff that destruction of all three reactors and associated research facilities,

which might contain minute amounts of plutonium, “will result in a negligible

probability of any radioactive contamination extending more than 1 nm [1.15

miles] from Tuwaitha.”116 Its heavy air defenses not withstanding, the minimal

harmful side effects expected from the bombing of the Tuwaitha complex

ensured its targeting for destruction.

Bombing Iraq’s BW and CW assets presented equally daunting problems

concerning the safety of Iraqi and other civilians of the region. Air planners

delayed a final decision on targeting BW and CW until late December 1990. At

that point they decided to use “a combination of timing of attacks and choosing

proper munitions”117 to destroy Saddam’s possible trump cards.118

The decision to strike Iraqi BW production and storage facilities proved

well-reasoned and necessary. Failure to attack the BW and CW targets would

109

The Offensive Air Campaign Plan

115. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 67; Woodward, Commanders, p.

307.

116. Memo, Capt. Richard C. Runchey, USAF Nuclear Intelligence Analyst (AFIA/

INKS), for AF/CC, Subj: Your Question on Iraq’s Osirak Reactor, Aug 8, 1990; Point Paper,

Capt Richard C. Runchey, AFIA/INKS, “Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex—Impact of Air Strikes,”

Aug 9 1990 [File No. CK/Air Staff/Nuclear].

117. GWAPS, Vol. 4, pt. 1, Weapons, Tactics, and Training (2d ed.), p. 179

118. See Intvw, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula with Drs. Richard G. Davis, Diane T. Putney,

Perry D. Jamieson, and CAFH, Nov 29, 1991. Colonel Deptula strongly implies that the data

about anthrax’s rapid deterioration when exposed to sunlight finalized the decision to bomb the

BW bunkers.
have sent precisely the wrong signal to Saddam, to the Libyans, and to other

regimes known or suspected to have BW R&D and production under way. If the

very possession of weaponized or bulk BW could possibly be seen as carrying

with it an implicit immunity from attack, then this inherent self-protection could

only encourage its proliferation. Many more nations would have an even greater

incentive to enter the game. In the actual event, no significant incident of contamination has surfaced as a result of the Coalition’s bombings, and one of

Saddam’s most potent terror-weapon programs received a significant setback.

This chapter demonstrates that the offensive air plan employed by the USAF

in the Persian Gulf War originated with a small group of radical air power advocates on the Air Staff and matured under the care of the CENTAF special-campaign planning group and General Horner, who delegated the task to these planners and allowed them to complete their task with virtually no interference.

Phase I of the air campaign had its roots in the Warden group’s philosophy of

analysis of the opponent’s weaknesses, selection of his centers of gravity, and

targeting for effect. By seizing his two weeks on center stage during the conflict’s

original air planning, Colonel Warden imposed his own vision on the strategic air

operations of the campaign. In most important respects, Phase I of the conflict

equates with Colonel Warden’s original Instant Thunder concepts. However,

General Glosson, Colonel Deptula, and many others in Riyadh spent months

applying the elbow grease that turned Instant Thunder from a brilliant concept

into a executable OPLAN. General Glosson contributed energy, enthusiasm,

clout, and his services as a go-between for the campaign planners and CENTAF.

Without his support, encouragement, and belief, the concepts in the original plan

might have been jettisoned. Colonel Deptula pushed the ideas of attack sequencing and of simultaneity to their logical end points, and he developed the MAP,

the planning control-point for the air offensive against Iraq. Without Colonel

Deptula, the results of the offensive air campaign might have been substantially

different. This chapter further shows that the request for an offensive air plan

came from Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, outside the service, and that

CENTAF itself initially resented the plan and forced cosmetic changes on it.

Nonetheless, General Horner fostered the plan, refined it, and made it his own,

even to the extent of allowing General Glosson to make a charter member of the

Warden group, Colonel Deptula, the chief of the special campaign planning

group, which oversaw the plan’s development. Finally, the unswerving support

of the two army generals, who saw the plan as but a portion of their overall

scheme of operations, kept the concept alive and pushed it to actualization. The

U.S. government’s forthcoming decision to provide the forces necessary to execute an offensive option increased the probability of the air campaign plan’s use.

Once employed, the unique nature of the air campaign made the plan’s construction the singularly important criterion in assessing the USAF’s performance.

110

On Target
Chapter Four

The Offensive Deployment,

Morale, and Training

This chapter examines two themes: the decision of President Bush to authorize the deployment of additional forces to implement a ground offensive, if necessary; and the morale, discipline, training, rules of engagement (ROE), and

organization of CENTAF. The decision for an offensive deployment was a

response to the actions of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi dictator continued to pour

more men and matériel into his newly conquered province. The weight of Iraqi

manpower and the depth and seeming complexity of their ground defenses invalidated CENTCOM’s initial ground plan: a frontal assault into Kuwait. At the

same time, the open Iraqi left flank invited a turning movement, but the movement to the west of a U.S. heavy armored force strong enough to conduct such a

turning operation necessitated doubling the force, the so-called two-corps option.

The U.S. XVIII Corps—a quick-reaction force with one lightly armed airborne

division, one almost as lightly armed air assault division, and one mechanized

division at two-thirds strength—could not conduct a mobile offensive against the

heavily armored Iraqis. Nor did the Coalition have sufficient troops to protect the

line from the Persian Gulf to the turning force and protect the open left flank of

the turning force as it advanced into Iraq. If the United States wished to fight a

war of movement and avoid dancing to Iraq’s tune of an assault on prepared

defenses, it needed more armored ground troops. Mobile warfare also promised

to maximize U.S. advantages; emphasize Iraqi shortcomings; and produce fewer

Coalition casualties, an extremely important consideration to President Bush and

his civilian and military advisors. Logistics, force structure, and the eased strategic situation in Western Europe dictated that the heavy corps, if it came, would

arrive from Germany.

Once the U.S. government made known its intention to attack if required,

the condition of its fighting forces became a matter of prime importance. Several

111

Preface
factors distinguish an armed service from an armed mob. Both may have uniforms and employ the same weapons, but the intangible factors such as morale,

discipline, training, and organization make one a reliable instrument of national

will and the other a will-o’-the-wisp liable to scatter before the first stiff wind.

Choosing the Offensive Option

On October 22, 1990, General Schwarzkopf changed his analysis of Iraq’s

least likely course of action from withdrawal to attack. In decreasing order of

probability, he assessed Iraq’s actions as defend, reinforce, withdraw, and attack.

To meet these potentialities, he had 217,198 Americans, including 10,287

women. Of this total, CENTAF personnel accounted for 31,439 (1,958 women).1

In CENTCOM’s opinion, this indicated that Saddam would probably not take

offensive action, which meant that he would not provide an overt excuse to initiate hostilities. Also on October 22, General Powell flew into Riyadh and immediately met with General Schwarzkopf. A week earlier, General Schwarzkopf

had anticipated General Powell; he instructed his staff to begin planning for a

two-corps offensive as well as a single corps offensive. The concept of a twocorps offensive rested on the assumption that by the beginning of Phase IV, the

air campaign would have thoroughly wrecked the Iraqi C3 system. Army planners also assumed Iraqi use of CW.2 In part, the expanded directive stemmed

from White House dissatisfaction with a frontal assault, expressed October 11

during a CENTCOM briefing of the NCA. The CJCS listened to briefings on

both the single and double corps options. After a comprehensive discussion of

both options, he directed the CINCCENT to continue planning the two-corps

alternative. He also asked General Schwarzkopf to state his force needs for an

offensive against Kuwait and Iraq. It seems probable that General Schwarzkopf

asked for a doubling of the USAF component and for three additional carrier battle groups, an additional Marine division, and the U.S. Army VII Corps. The VII

Corps, stationed in Germany, consisted of the entire 1st and 3d Armored

Divisions, a portion of the 2d Armored Division, the 42d Field Artillery Brigade,

an air defense brigade, and assorted corps troops. Its soldiers had the army’s most

modern tank, the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank with the 120-mm gun; Bradley

armored personnel carriers; and a high state of readiness and training. General

Powell purportedly offered to round out VII Corps with the 1st Infantry Division

(Mechanized) from Fort Riley, Kansas. General Powell agreed to seek Secretary

Cheney’s and President Bush’s approval of the reinforcements. Also, he cautioned General Schwarzkopf that the mood in the U.S. capital city shifted rapidly according to the political wind. The bellicosity displayed at the October 11

briefing had succumbed to talk of extending economic sanctions and to preoccu112

On Target

1. Msg, 222115Z Oct 90, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subj: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 103.

2. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 67.
pation with the federal budget crisis and the upcoming national elections.3 On

October 25, the CJCS returned to Washington. That same day, the Congress and

the president reached a budget compromise after a long and relatively unseemly

fight that had increased the public esteem of neither. The settlement of the budget issue, which among other things kept Desert Shield costs off the books,

helped clear the way for the administration to devote its full energies to the Gulf

crisis.

Starting on the morning of the same day, Secretary Cheney broadly hinted

to three TV networks—ABC, CBS, and NBC—that “we are not at the point yet

where we want to stop adding forces.” When asked if as many as 100,000 more

servicemen and women might go to the Gulf, he replied, “it’s conceivable that

we’ll end up with that big of an increase.” On October 29 Secretary Baker

addressed the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. He stated, “We will not rule

out a possible use of force if Iraq continues to occupy Kuwait.” On October 30,

as scheduled, President Bush met with fifteen congressional leaders from both

houses and parties to discuss the crisis. These events, and the upcoming congressional elections, seem to have convinced Saddam that attack might come at

any moment. On October 30 he placed his military on high alert in anticipation

of a U.S.-led attack. CENTCOM reported “higher than normal” Iraqi air activity and higher transport activity that day. The next day, a State Department official told the Washington Times, “we are edging closer to the military option.”4

The president appears to have decided to implement the offensive option on

October 31, after his discussion of the matter with Secretaries Baker and Cheney,

the National Security Advisor, and the CJCS, who undoubtedly revealed the

result of his recent trip to Riyadh. Before the public announcement of the doubling of the force, postponed until after the congressional elections six days

hence, the president sent Secretary Baker to take last-minute soundings of the

opinions of the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Great Britain,

France, and the USSR.5 General Schwarzkopf learned of the president’s decision

immediately.6 On the morning of November 1 he sent the following message to

his component commanders:

1. Although there is no definitive theater campaign concept for a wide ranging,

large scale military offensive against Iraq, it is prudent that we consider such

an operation and look at associated requirements and capabilities as soon as

possible.

2. Along that line, I ask each of you to consider a hypothetical offensive campaign in which you would be provided necessary forces to execute an exten113

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

3. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 366–367.

4. Msg, 302115Z Oct 90, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subject: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 111; Andrew Borowiec, “U.S. Strategy ‘Edging Closer’ to War,”

Washington Times, Oct 31, 1990, p. 1. Also see CRS, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Chronology, p. CRS42.

5. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 319–321.

6. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 370.
sive air, naval, and ground offensive campaign against Iraq. Assume no constraints on availability of additional forces. Within that context, request you

provide ASAP a broad concept of operations and additional forces required.

Request also the approximate number of personnel added to current personnel ceiling.

3. I emphasize the need to keep this close hold. Although this will preclude

coordination with higher service and other headquarters, political sensitivities

require absolute operational security as this time.7

The first sentence of this message offended both General Glosson and Colonel

Deptula. They had a wide-ranging, large-scale military offensive plan already

accepted by the CINCCENT, and they believed their air plan could be executed

by mid-November. They suspected that the CENTCOM staff had decided to play

for more time to prepare an Army-dominated offensive.8 Nonetheless, General

Horner replied that he felt comfortable with his strength for Phase I, but if

General Schwarzkopf contemplated a large ground offensive, he could use additional forces.9

On November 1, USAF personnel in Saudi Arabia numbered 31,456, including 2,020 women in the overall American total of 229,154 service personnel,

including 11,894 women. The number of USAF aircraft in Saudi Arabia follows:10

Combat Aircraft Support Aircraft

A–10 96 C–20 1

AC–130 5 C–21 8

B–52G 20 C–29 1

EC–130H (CC) 5 C–130 95

EC–130E (VS) 2 E–3 (AWACS) 6

EF–111A 14 EC–130E 6

F–4G 36 HC–130 4

F–15C 72 KC–10 6

F–15E 24 KC–135 114

F–16 120 MC–130 4

F–111F 32 MH–53 8

F–117A 18 MH–60 4

RC–135 4

RF–4C 6

TR–1 2

U–2 3

114

On Target

7. Msg. 011030Z Nov 90, USCINCCENT to COMUSNAVCENT, COMUSMARCENT,

COMUSARCENT MAIN, USCENTAF FWD HQs ELEMENT, COMSOCCENT (personal),

Subj: Campaign Requirements [File No. TAC/HO/TS]T.

8. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Air Offensive,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 15.

9. Memo, Col.Warden, XOXW, for Lt. Gen. Adams, XO, Subj: re: Our Conversation This

Morning, Some Additional Thoughts, Nov 8, 1990 [File No. CK/AS/Deployment-Second Increment].

10. Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, p. 113.
Three Navy carriers and the Marines could supply an additional 318 U.S. aircraft.

On November 2 Secretary Baker met with King Fahd. The king agreed to

the presence of additional U.S. forces and to helping convince the other Arab

Coalition members to accept possible hostilities. The king also acknowledged

Israel’s right of self-defense in this instance and he promised that, in the event of

Israeli retaliation against an Iraqi attack, his forces would continue to fight with

the Coalition, as long as the Coalition did not ally itself with Israel. Given the

volatility of Arab-Israeli relations and the sparks sure to fly from any Israeli

attack on Saddam, the king made an extraordinarily courageous commitment,

one that a severe popular reaction might possibly invalidate. Secretary Baker and

King Fahd firmed up host nation arrangements for provisioning U.S. forces and

the wartime Coalition military command structure with Saudi-supplied fuel,

water, transportation, fresh food, and accommodations. At General Schwarzkopf’s instigation, Secretary Baker presented the king with the following definition of wartime C2: “should military operations commence, a joint command as

currently exits will continue; however, the commander of U.S. forces will have

final approval authority for all military operations.” As General Schwarzkopf

explained, the first clause was a nod to Saudi sovereignty: It continued the

appearance of equality. The second clause allowed the Americans to retain control of offensive planning and operations.11

Six days later, on November 8, President Bush announced to the American

people his decision to adopt the offensive option. In addition to the forces already

promised to General Schwarzkopf, the president activated three National Guard

“round out” brigades, one each from Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, with

the intention of sending them to California for desert warfare training. On the day

before the announcement, Secretary Cheney initiated the first combat reserve

call-up since the Korean War, more than forty years earlier, by giving the Marine

Corps permission to summon 3,000 reservists. On November 9, Secretary

Cheney stated that the United States would not rotate its forces in the Persian

Gulf, and those servicemen and women already in the AOR would stay for the

duration of the crisis. Then on November 14 he approved the possible call-up of

an additional 72,500 National Guard and reserve troops for service in the Gulf.

This more than doubled the DoD’s ceiling of reservists permitted on active duty

at one time to 125,000. General Powell supported these actions with a deployment order, approved by Secretary Cheney. The general stated that the additional forces would support Desert Shield, increase the pressure on Iraq, and improve

the flexibility of U.S. and Coalition forces in the region. He directed the closure

of all reinforcements to the AOR by January 15, 1991 (C+161 days).12

115

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

11. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 373.

12. Msg, 081440Z Nov 90, CJCS to CINCEUR et al., Subj: Southwest Asia (SWA)

Military Operations [File No. CK/AS/SPECAT].
General Powell’s deployment order did not give specific air requirements, a

situation General Schwarzkopf soon remedied. On November 10 General

Schwarzkopf sent the Joint Staff his needs from the USAF, based on General

Horner’s requirements.13 The following aircraft were to arrive no later than

December 15: 18 F–117As, 18 F–111Fs, 24 F–15Cs, 12 RF–4Cs, 8 B–52Gs, and

64 KC tankers. Although the offensive air campaign had always assumed the closure of 12 F–117s prior to execution, the extra 6 F–117As, the self-designating

laser-equipped F–111Fs, and the extra tankers in this first echelon had the capacity to expand greatly the destructive potential of Phase I. A second echelon of

reinforcements to support a ground campaign consisted of 14 F–111Fs, 24

F–15Es, 6 F–117s, 12 F–4Gs, 48 F–16s, 48 A–10s, 4 E–3As, 32 C–130s (the

final number dependent on Army requirements), and 39 KC–135s (15 to support

Navy operations). General Schwarzkopf further requested a force of 48 F–16s,

14 B–52Gs, and 5 AC–130s to be earmarked for deployment but held in reserve.

Taken as a whole, this requirement gave CENTAF virtually the entire USAF

inventory of fully self-designating PGM-capable aircraft as well as large percentages of other combat and support aircraft.14 The accuracy of the 100 to 110

PGM-capable aircraft greatly leveraged their combat effectiveness, making them

116

On Target

13. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” p. 15.

14. Msg, 101730Z Nov 90, USCINCCENT to The Joint Staff, Washington D.C., Subj:

Follow-on Air Forces for Operation Desert Shield.

An F–111 receiving hangar

maintenance

An F–15 receiving an engine

change
the equal of a non-PGM force three or four times their size, much as the Prussian

needle-gun proved more deadly than the Austrian rifled musket in the six-weeklong Austro-Prussian War of 1866. General Powell approved this request on

November 16, but he delayed the arrival of most aircraft to no later than January

15 and placed more tankers on call and on 120-hour alert.15

While the multinational Coalition against Iraq gave the United States the

mantle of international approval for its actions, the Coalition also imposed a

check on the Americans’ freedom of action, in that the existence of the Coalition

forced the Americans to consult their partners before making major decisions.

An authorization to use force to solve the crisis could not come from Washington

alone; the UN resolutions, passed in accordance with the UN charter, provided

the legal basis for the embargoes and other sanctions so far taken against Iraq.

Therefore, the UN Security Council would have to pass such a resolution. This

presented the United States with a delicate, but by no means insolvable, diplomatic problem. The Security Council had passed the lesser resolutions by lopsided majorities, with only Yemen or Cuba consistently abstaining or voting in

the negative. However, under the procedural rules of the Security Council, which

rotated the chairmanship monthly, in alphabetical order, Yemen would chair the

council for the month of December 1990. This would enable it to hamper and

delay the passage of any further resolutions until the next month. To avoid that

difficulty, the authorizing resolution had to be procured in November, when the

United States headed the council. Each of the five great powers also had the right

to veto any vote of the Council. The United States, Great Britain, and France had

sent troops to aid Saudi Arabia, making it reasonably certain they would authorize the use of force, but the two Communist powers, the USSR and China, posed

potential problems.

On November 15 President Bush publicly informed the American people

and Saddam that a domestic and international “ticking clock” now limited the

time available to the Iraqis to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis.16 That same

day, Secretary Baker landed in Brussels to begin a series of visits to nine members of the UN Security Council, and Yevgeny Primakov, President Gorbachev’s

special envoy to the Gulf and the leading Soviet Middle East expert, issued a

stern statement. Although he favored delaying the resolution on force in order to

give Saddam one more chance to save face by leaving Kuwait, he observed that

if the initiative failed, the UN should pass a resolution authorizing force and

immediately take military action against Iraq.17 Presidents Bush and Gorbachev

met in Paris to discuss the situation. Their meeting ended on November 19 with117

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

15. Msg, 161540Z Nov 90, CJCS to USCINCCENT, Subj: Follow-on Air Forces for

Operation Desert Shield [DEPORD CJCS77] [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10211, frames

1269–1271].

16. Ann Devroy and Dan Balz, “Bush Says Time Is Limited for Peaceful Gulf Solution,”

Washington Post, Nov 16, 1990, p. 1.

17. Paul Lewis, “Soviet Aid Urges Delay of U.N. Move on Force in Gulf,” New York

Times, Nov 16, 1990, p. 1.
out a Soviet endorsement of a resolution on force. But in subsequent face-to-face

meetings in Moscow with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and President

Gorbachev, Secretary Baker obtained the Soviets’ consent for the use of force.

President Gorbachev made it clear that continuing to allow Saddam to operate

outside of international rules would jeopardize Gorbachev’s own visions of a

new Soviet state and a reformed international order. President Gorbachev’s decision removed the most serious obstacle to a UN resolution on force. Secretary

Baker judged that the People’s Republic of China would follow the Soviet lead.

Saddam made his own response; he announced he would send an additional six

or seven divisions to Kuwait, recall 60,000 reservists, and conscript 100,000

more men. The following compilation indicates the major types of U.S. military

aircraft present in the CENTCOM AOR from September 1, 1990, to February 1,

1991.18 Aircraft capable of delivering laser-guided bombs are indicated with

boldface type.

Service Aircraft Type Sep 1 Oct 1 Nov 1 Dec 1 Jan 1 Feb 1

USAF F–15C Fighter 70 72 72 72 96 96

F–4G WW 24 36 36 36 48 49

F–16 Ftr/Attack 106 120 120 120 168 212

A–10 Attack 72 96 96 96 120 144

AC–130 Gunship 0 5 5 4 4 2

F–117A Bomber 18 18 18 18 36 42

F–15E Bomber 24 23 24 24 46 48

F–111F Bomber 18 32 32 52 64 64

B–52 Bomber 20 20 20 20 20 36

RF–4C Recon 6 6 6 6 6 18

JSTARS Srvl & Ctrl 0 0 0 0 2 2

E–3B/C Srvl & Ctrl 6 6 6 6 7 11

EF–111 EW 10 14 14 14 18 18

KC–10 Tanker 0 6 6 6 6 30

KC–135Q Tanker 79 93 114 115 164 194

C–130 Airlift 70 95 96 96 96 149

EC–130E ABCCC 6 6 6 6 6 6

USN F–14 Fighter 56 76 76 76 76 109

F/A–18 Ftr/Attack 58 58 58 88 88 89

A–7E Ftr/Attack 0 24 24 24 24 24

A–6E Bomber 35 48 48 62 62 96

E–2C Srvl & Ctrl 12 17 17 21 21 29

EA–6B EW 12 17 17 21 21 27

KA–6D Tanker 8 12 12 16 16 16

S–3A/B Recon 23 31 31 31 31 43

USMC F/A–18 Ftr/Attack 48 48 48 48 72 78

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On Target

18. GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 1, A Statistical Compendium, Table 9 “U.S. Air Order of Battle by

Aircraft and Service” (1st ed.), pp. 31–32.
AV–8B Attack 40 60 60 60 81 84

OV–10 Srvl & Ctrl 0 8 8 8 8 19

EA–6 EW 12 12 12 12 12 12

A–6 Bomber 9 10 10 10 20 20

KC–130 Tanker 6 8 8 8 12 15

President Bush continued his trip to Saudi Arabia where he and Mrs. Bush

spent Thanksgiving Day with U.S. military personnel. The next day he met with

Syrian President Assad in Geneva. By November 25 foreign diplomats confirmed the statements of U.S. officials that the United States had the votes necessary to procure the needed resolution. The only remaining dispute revolved

around the ultimatum’s deadline: the United States wanted it to be January 1, and

the Soviets wanted January 15. Perhaps not coincidentally, on November 27, two

days before the UN vote, the Gulf states offered $6 billion, including $4 billion

from Saudi Arabia, in financial aid to the Soviet Union in consideration for

Soviet support during the crisis.19 Finally, on November 29, the UN Security

Council passed Resolution 678 (1990) by a vote of 12 in favor, 2 opposed

(Yemen and Cuba), and 1 abstention (China). The resolution demanded that Iraq

comply fully with all earlier relevant resolutions and stated that it would allow

Iraq “one final opportunity, as a pause of good will, to do so.” Then, if Iraq

refused to comply by January 15, the resolution authorized the member states

cooperating with the government of Kuwait “to use all necessary means to

uphold and implement 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to

restore international peace and security in the area.” The resolution further

requested “all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in

pursuance of” the above authorization.20

Morale and Cultural Differences

As their nation edged from confrontation to conflict, the men and women of

CENTAF sought to keep the force at maximum efficiency. However, their presence, and that of all other American service personnel, presented their Saudi ally

with a problem. The Americans had come to defend Saudi Arabia, not to

Westernize or modernize it, but their massive numbers and total ignorance of

Arabic culture offered the potential of both destabilizing the Saudis and damaging the personal relations between the two allies. On August 15 General Horner

issued a circular to all U.S. commanders in Saudi Arabia, “Awareness of HostNation Sensitivities.” He reminded the commanders that most Saudi government

institutions were extensions of Islam and that Islam was a way of life, not just a

religion. He noted that “to offend a tenet of Islam is to cut at the very heart and

soul of the Saudi nation.” He observed that through unintentional misunder119

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

19. CRS, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Chronology, p. CRS-37.

20. Msg, 300047Z Nov 90, USMission USUN, New York, to SECSTATE, Washington,

D.C., Subj: “SC Adopts Resolution Authorizing Use of Force.”
standings, service personnel had already offended the sensibilities of the Saudis

“and all of us must learn that some types of behavior acceptable in the United

States are illegal in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” He warned that unless service personnel became aware of their ignorance, they might undo all that they

had accomplished so far. General Horner next set out specific rules of conduct:

Civilian Dress: No Shorts, T-Shirts, or tank-tops; Conservative clothing only,

such as long pants and conservative shirts; Women should pay especial attention to the need to dress modestly, no tight fitting slacks, excessive jewelry, and

uncovered legs and arms in public. In addition, the Saudis find the wearing of

earrings extremely offensive, and of course one should wear religious jewelry

(crosses etc.) under their clothing.

Women in Society: Islam teaches that women hold a special place of honor and

dignity in society and must be protected from dishonor. It follows that American

female personnel should not venture out alone in public when off-duty, nor

should they travel in the company of only one male companion (unless married

to each other). Female personnel may drive vehicles in the performance of their

duty, if in full uniform, including hat, but it is against the law for them to drive

off duty.

Alcohol: Not permitted in Saudi Arabia.

Public Affection: Public displays of affection between men and women, such as

holding hands and kissing, violate Saudi public morals. Fornication and adultery are serious criminal offenses.

Indecent Publications: In addition to sexually-oriented publications, fashion

magazines containing lingerie ads, and “swimsuit” editions of popular magazines are all considered grossly immoral. Possession of such items is a criminal

offense and can result in a heavy fine.

Spoken Words: Profanity in public places is unacceptable. Criticism of the

Saudi King, nation, or people is criminal defamation.

Gambling: Including lotteries, sports pools, card games, etc., is illegal, and

Public Profile: Tell your people to keep a lower profile. Large gatherings of uniformed personnel in front of billeting motels invites unwanted attention and

encourages unwanted security incidents. Personnel should wait inside for shuttle buses.21

Although necessary, these restrictions had some negative impact on morale

and probably had the not-unintended side effect of discouraging social intercourse with the Saudis. After the conflict, General Horner acknowledged that

one aspect of the policy of making U.S. cantonments as hospitable as possible

was to give servicemen and women little reason to leave the base and interact

with the Saudi populace.22 General Horner’s chief of staff, Col. George L.

Getchell, also acknowledged a policy of keeping service personnel out of sight

and apart from the Saudi populace.23 Separation discouraged possible incidents.

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On Target

21. Memo, USCENTCOM FWD for all U.S. Comdrs, Subj: Awareness of Host-Nation

Sensitivities, Aug 15, 1990 [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10203, frames 502–503.]

22. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

23. Intvw, Col. George L. Getchell, C/S 9AF, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at Shaw

AFB, S.C., Mar 2, 1992.
Even the order of August 15 revealed a less than full comprehension of Saudi

mores. A subsequent information card given to all personnel noted that the

Saudis found the wearing of earrings by men, not women, offensive.24

On August 30, after consultation with the U.S. political advisor in Saudi

Arabia over draft orders containing explicit details,25 General Schwarzkopf followed up General Horner’s advice to the commanders by issuing to all forces

under his command the much more binding and authoritative General Order 1

(GO–1), “Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel Serving in the USCENTCOM

AOR.” GO–1 prohibited certain activities, and its violation could serve as the

basis for a court-martial or other military disciplinary action. General Schwarzkopf stated that Desert Shield had placed U.S. forces in countries where Arabic

customs and Islamic law prohibited or restricted “certain activities generally permissible in Western societies.” The maintenance of those restrictions is, he noted,

“essential to preserving U.S.-host nation relations and the combined operations

of U.S. and friendly forces.” GO–1 prohibited the following eight activities:

The purchase, use, or sale of privately owned firearms, ammunition, or explosives and their introduction into the AOR.

Entering into a Mosque or any other site of Islamic religious significance,

unless ordered by military authority or required by military necessity.

Introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture or consumption of any

alcoholic beverage.

Introduction, possession, use, sale, creation or display of any porno graphic

photograph, videotape, movie, drawing, book, or magazine or similar representations. This includes not only obscene items but items of “art” which display

human genitalia, uncovered women’s breasts, or any human sexual act.

Introduction, possession, display, etc. of any “sexually explicit” book, magazine, videotape, etc. that displays the human anatomy in any unclothed or semiclothed manner and which display portions of the human torso (i.e. the area

below the neck, above the knees, and inside the shoulders), such as body-building magazines, swimsuit editions, underwear ads and catalogues, as well as

visual mediums that infer but do not directly show human genitalia, women’s

breasts, or human sexual acts.

All forms of gambling,

Removing, possessing, selling, defacing, or destroying archeological artifacts or

national treasures, and

Selling, bartering or exchanging currency other than at the official host-nation

exchange rate.

As for the taking of war trophies, should that occasion arise, the order strictly

limited trophies to items of captured enemy military clothing (such as hats, belts,

shirts), enemy insignia, and individual items of military equipment (such as helmets, load-bearing equipment, canteens, mess kits, and ammunition pouches).

121

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

24. Information Handout Card, “Cultural Sensitivities for U.S. Military Personnel in

Saudi Arabia,” n.d. [File No. TAC/HO/18/GO–1].

25. Intvw, Col. Getchell, Mar 2, 1992.
Nongovernment, private enemy property could not be confiscated. For all prohibited items except alcohol, General Schwarzkopf allowed a grace period of

seventy-two hours to dispose of the offending material.26

General Schwarzkopf again revealed his intense interest in ensuring amicable relations with the Saudi people by following up GO–1 with an admonition to

his commanders. He informed the JCS that “every commander in the AOR has

been personally instructed to make himself and his people aware of the local

Islamic customs.” He ordered the establishment at every major command location of community relations action councils to improve communication and

understanding. These would preclude problems and resolve, at the lowest level,

any issue that did arise.27

As the services’ experience in Saudi Arabia grew, so did the list of do’s and

don’ts. The information card handed out to all service members contained several pieces of new advice. Regarding Saudi women it stated, “Dating is not

allowed. Don’t stare or attempt to strike up a conversation.” At the Muslim

prayer times, five each day, service personnel should remember that all business

and commercial establishments must close and restaurants may suspend service.

The handout recommended, “Leave politely...at these times if asked.” On photography it suggested,

avoid photographing military or civilian installations and equipment, places,

mosques, military or civilian police, oil fields, Saudi women, etc. Do not photograph people at close range (particularly women) without permission.

Consider purchasing one of the many fine pictorial guides of the Kingdom

instead.

As for time it observed, “don’t be impatient with local people. It’s interpreted as

a sign of insincerity or lack of self-control. If you hurry, they may take offense.”

The handout warned of the two cultures’ conflicting definitions of personal

space, stating that “Arabs stand close together when talking. Americans may find

this uncomfortable at first but should avoid backing away.” Because the unintentional injury sometimes causes the most harm, the handout offered the following, “never sit and expose the sole of your shoe or bottom of your feet to an

Arab—it’s an insult.” Be aware of patronizing your hosts, it instructed; “don’t

talk down to someone who doesn’t speak English well.” Conversation also

offered pitfalls: one should follow his or her Saudi host’s lead, avoid asking

questions about Arab women (impolite), and avoid discussing politics and religion. The instructions emphatically stated, “don’t discuss Israel at all. Our gov122

On Target

26. GO–1, HQ USCENTCOM, Subj: Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel Serving in

the USCENTCOM AOR, Aug 30, 1990 [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10204, frames

491–493].

27. Msg, 152115Z Sep 90, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subj: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 61. For General Schwarzkopf’s description of some of the cultural incidents he dealt with and his philosophy in handling Arab culture, see Schwarzkopf, It

Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 332–339.
ernment policy toward Israel is complex, and any discussion may create more

misunderstandings.” Be careful of admiring an Arab’s personal possessions, the

handout warned. “By Arab custom, [the owner of the admired item] may present

it to you, amid much embarrassment. However, never refuse an Arab’s gift—this

is also considered insulting.”28

The handout had detailed instructions on how to deal with the Muttawwa, or

religious police. The Muttawwa do not belong to the civil police, but rather to the

Committee for Enforcing the Right and Forbidding the Wrong, also termed

Public Morality Committees. Established in 1925 by religious zealots, they seek

to safeguard the conservative Wahhabi-Muslim ideology of Saudi Arabia. They

have no legal power to investigate or prosecute crimes, but as concerned

Muslims they have the right and traditional duty to make the equivalent of a citizen’s arrest. They report violations to the legally competent authorities, usually

the police, and often seize offenders and deliver them to the local police station

where the crime could be investigated. In Riyadh in 1982 and 1983, they

detained persons they believed intoxicated, stopped individuals in the company

of a member of the opposite sex to determine if they were married, and “raided”

local supermarkets to enforce their views as to the proper attire of a modern

Saudi woman.29 Clearly, repeated incidents involving the Muttawwa and service

personnel might spark misunderstandings and provoke violence by both parties,

which had the potential to escalate into serious difficulties with and for the hostnation government. Of the Muttawwa, the handout counseled nonviolence and

limited cooperation:

They enforce Muslim rules including the dress code, prayer time, etc. Some

zealous Muttawwa will confront Americans. If confronted by a Muttawwa,

attempt to quietly slip away. If they try to take you into custody, insist on the

presence of a uniformed police officer. When he arrives show him your armed

forces I.D. You may be released at this time. If not, accompany them to the

police station where you will eventually be released. Report the incident to your

commander.

Finally, at the end of the handout’s daunting list of possible miscues and errors,

it concluded glowingly, “Don’t be misled, Saudi Arabia is a fascinating country,

and its people are friendly and generous in many cases. You may be the first

American some Saudis have met. This is a terrific opportunity to show them how

really wonderful Americans are. Do it!”30

In fairness, one must point out that the Saudis too, had their concerns. One

Saudi officer spoke of the widespread disbelief of the U.S. buildup. Although he

accepted the necessity for it, the idea of Israel’s benefactor in Saudi Arabia went

123

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

28. Information Card, “Cultural Sensitivities,” n.d.

29. Joseph P. Saba, “The Law of Saudi Arabia,” U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi

Arabia, Country Law Study for Saudi Arabia, Feb 22, 1984, p. 25 [File No. AFHSO microfilm

reel 10203, frame 1596].

30. Information Card, “Cultural Sensitivities,” n.d.
beyond “normal thought.” Many Saudis, he added, wanted the United States to

leave the instant it had pacified Iraq.31 A long-term, highly visible American

presence could destabilize the regime and discredit it as a guardian of Islam’s

most holy places.

Further, the number of women in the American armed forces and their roles

in the services, especially female officers ordering men about, must undoubtedly have shocked the Saudis. During General Horner’s first meeting with the

Saudi service chiefs on August 8, the Saudis’ senior military officer, General

Muhammad al Saleh Al-Hammad, Chief of the Joint Staff, Ministry of Defense

and Aviation, asked, “Are you bringing women?”32 General Horner replied affirmatively. Female CENTAF Forward personnel faced immediate problems. No

woman had ever before set foot in the RSAF HQ building. The building also contained a Mosque, from which the Saudis apparently intended to exclude all U.S.

personnel, particularly women. In addition, the building had no specified

women’s rest room. The Americans solved this by roping off one of the rest

rooms for use by female personnel.33 Although these and other irksome restrictions understandably infuriated U.S. female military personnel, both cultures

eventually attained a modicum of understanding. In time, the Americans developed a useful strategy that somewhat eased the role of, but by no means all of,

the restrictions on American servicewomen in Saudi Arabia. The Americans

informed the Saudis that female personnel in full uniform were soldiers and

would be treated as soldiers, including having the right to operate motor vehicles.

Out of uniform, female personnel were subject to local mores, such as the prohibition against driving, but they normally did not have to follow the strictest dress

codes, such as wearing the abayah, the black robe that covers Saudi women from

head to foot. When King Fahd gave permission for U.S. forces to enter his land,

the aspect of women among the American service personnel present may not

have occurred to him, nor would most of his subjects have even conceived of it.

American efforts to inform their servicemen and women of some of the differences between their and the Saudis’ cultures may have served to frighten more

than to educate, much as the anti-venereal disease films did to the troops’ grandfathers in World War II. In this earlier time, one could determine how effective

the films were by the subsequent rate of sick calls (reduced in the short run).

Likewise, one can gauge the relationship between U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia

and the people of their host nation. Some incidents occurred but none was so

serious as to complicate U.S.-Saudi relations. Measured by this standard, the vast

bulk of U.S. service personnel in Saudi Arabia comported themselves well.

Not all the restrictions in GO–1 proved detrimental to morale—some personnel simply ignored them. As of November 1, the CENTAF judge advocate

124

On Target

31. Msg, 072212Z Sep 90, DIA, Washington D.C., to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Saudi

Arabia: Attitudes on Gulf Crisis [File No. T/HO/2/DIA-Sept].

32. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

33. Intvw, Col. Getchell, Mar 2, 1992.
noted a total of eleven drunk and disorderly offenses and the same number of

violations of GO–1. Yet on the whole, GO–1 and the lack of any local alternatives helped produce the driest and probably least profane and least raunchy

force ever fielded by the U.S. military.34 One soldier joked when asked the perennial question, “What are we fighting [in Saudi Arabia] for?” He responded, “To

dry out all the alcoholics.” As one observer pointed out, the average soldier,

sailor, or airman spent a great deal of time in his or her base compound and may

have come into contact more often with third-party nationals, such as Saudihired, non-Saudi truck drivers, than with the host nation populace.35

The mix of restrictive conditions (especially the scarcity of spirits), the high

level of motivation produced by the crisis, and the top-to-bottom professionalism

of the military (CENTCOM fielded the largest U.S. military force ever to engage

in combat without having in its ranks a single conscript) helped create a superbly

disciplined command. As of January 25, 1991, the cumulative court-martial rates

of CENTCOM when compared to the FY 1989 worldwide rates for all U.S. services showed a dramatic difference. For every 100,000 service personnel worldwide, 157 received general courts-martial and 365 received special courts-martial. For CENTCOM, 3 per 100,000 underwent general courts-martial and 11.8

per 100,000 underwent special courts-martial, rates 30 to 40 times less than the

norm. As for Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 15 nonjudicial punishments, CENTCOM had accumulated 2,817, including 16 officers, as of January

25, 1991. CENTAF compiled an exceptional disciplinary record over the period:

1 general court-martial, 1 special court-martial, and only 188 (including 8 officers) Article 15s. In part, CENTAF had such a large percentage of officer Article

15s because the USAF has a higher percentage of commissioned personnel than

the other services.36

The cultural isolation and increasingly long periods away from their families, with no firm word on a rotation policy, adversely affected the morale of

USAF personnel in the AOR. In the first week of September, CENTAF Staff

Chaplain Lt. Col. James T. Elwell visited nine air bases. He found Bateen, on the

UAE peninsula in the Gulf, with its at least 70-percent humidity and its more

than 120° Fahrenheit temperatures the most physically uncomfortable. He

assessed morale as high but noted that the lack of a return date to the United

States presented a key morale issue. The lower-grade enlisted personnel lacked

work, leading to boredom, and female personnel felt “like prisoners.” However,

in Oman and Bahrain, more liberal states than Saudi Arabia, servicewomen had

only loose or nonexistent restrictions. The chaplain also disclosed that his organ125

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

34. Brfg Slide, “Military Justice: Most Common Offenses,” n.d. [carries notation a/o 1

Nov 90] [File No. AFHSO microfilm, reel 10204, frame 290].

35. Charles Moskos and John Wattendorf, “Troops in the Desert,” IUS Newsletter, No. 9,

Mar 1991.

36. Brfg Slides, CENTAF Judge Advocate, n.d. [Feb 1991] [File No. AFHSO microfilm

reel 10204, frames 198, 200].
ization had been granted one of the first exemptions to a part of GO–1—General

Schwarzkopf had authorized them to import sacramental wine. Colonel Elwell

then reported on the chaplains’ plans for caring for the dying and wounded in the

field, should the conflict come. His teams would attempt to maintain sensitivity

to local customs, but “during actual conflict, it will be disruptive, to say the least,

and possibly impossible to keep `looking over our shoulders’ to see if any national is around who could be offended by our religious practices.” He suggested that

the U.S. government might wish to discuss and arrive at a policy on the issue of

religious practice on the battlefield and in the hospital ward.37

Maintenance of morale is an important command responsibility. CENTCOM took several measures to support it. With CENTCOM’s help and cooperation, many entertainers, Hollywood personalities, and celebrities visited the

troops on show tours. The Steve Martin and Jay Leno tours visited thirty-two

bases, including four CENTAF facilities.38 Bob Hope brought a Christmas show

from December 23 to 29. Its male members put on shows in Riyadh, Al Jubayl,

and King Fahd, but cultural sensitivities limited its female members—Ann

Jillian, Marie Osmond, and the Pointer Sisters—to performances in Bahrain and

on Navy ships. The command also chartered cruise ships as rest and recreation

facilities. The first berthed on December 24 and immediately went into service.

It provided quiet areas, swimming, base exchange retail operations, barber/beauty shops, a book store, amusement, games, entertainment, and bar operations. It

had access to a beach area and sightseeing tours. The services based their respective allotments of the ships’ accommodations on the number of personnel they

had deployed in Saudi Arabia. Initially, CENTAF had one hundred slots. An

individual’s recreation cycle would run from the afternoon of the first day to the

morning of the fourth. Priority went to airmen longest in theater and serving in

the harshest conditions. Members of the 1st and 354th TFWs comprised the first

USAF increment. In a spontaneous outpouring of concern and support, the

American public and U.S. corporations donated recreational and other items for

the troops’ welfare. A short list of CENTAF’s share of this largesse included 416

electronic games, 77 camcorders, 59 TVs, 62 VCRs, 41,420 blank VCR tapes,

1,130 radios, 1,500 whiffle balls, 5,050 blank cassette tapes, and 9 boxes of footballs. Alas, Army and Marine personnel appear not to have shared the donated

comic books, caramel corn, and Twinkies.39

While these organized activities had a positive effect on the service members, individuals for the most part sustained themselves with more traditional

props to morale—comradeship and esprit within their units. In this conflict, even

126

On Target

37. Rpt, Lt. Col. James T. Elwell to CENTAF/CC, Current Findings at CENTAF FWD,

Sep 11, 1990 [File No. TAC/CTC/Box 5 folder 6].

38. Memo, Col. Joseph A. Crozier, Jr., USAF, CENTAF Dir Personnel, for Lt. Gen.

Horner, Subj: Commander’s Daily Update, Nov 27, 1990 [given to General Horner on Dec 1,

1990] [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10216, frame 30].

39. Msg, 041030Z Jan 91, USCENTAF/DPS to HQ USAF/DPMW, Washington D.C.,

Subj: MWR Update—Operation Desert Shield [File No. T/CT/52/-].
more than in Vietnam, American service personnel found enormous satisfaction

and relief in popular music. Boom boxes blared Madonna and rap music, and at

least one observer concluded that this was the first American force to go into battle wearing Walkman radios.40

The lack of a rotation policy seems to have constituted the single most consistently detrimental morale factor. If the crisis had continued another few

months, anxiety over lack of rotation might have become debilitating. By

January 7, 1991, the CENTAF chaplain reported,

The number of counseling cases concerning rotation policies and marital/family concerns continues to grow. Morale had taken a slight downward trend. We

anticipate this to continue until some firm decisions about rotation policies or

unless some type of armed conflict begins.41

This preoccupation with rotation, albeit understandable, raised an issue with consequences for future deployments. In this instance, the U.S. military could not

simultaneously field a large force and have a rotation policy. All U.S. armed

forces face the prospect of an indefinite and constant pressure to shrink their

manpower as a result of both the end of the Cold War and the necessity to reduce

all nonentitlement programs in the federal budget, a result of the U.S. government’s inability to align revenues with expenditures. It follows, therefore, in any

upcoming long-term deployment involving more than a few units and perhaps

100,000 personnel that the possibility of rotation becomes remote, unless the

armed services return to the politically expedient but unsatisfactory and extremely disruptive personnel practices of the Vietnam War. Such practices nearly

wrecked the Army and left all the services with worldwide shortfalls of trained

personnel, hollow units, and damaged morale. If large-scale rotation is impractical, then the services must face the alternative squarely. They should state a policy of no rotation for large deployments in advance of those contingencies, and

in such circumstances they should study and provide for appropriate measures to

maintain morale. Such a policy will unfavorably affect personnel, but not as

unfavorably as would constant speculation and uncertainty about current policy.

At the very least, personnel and their families could make firm plans for their

future. Another alternative exists: the U.S. might choose to attempt to end crises

quickly, before the uncertainty of possible rotation weakens morale. Putting U.S.

military response on such a hair trigger could so shorten the list of political and

diplomatic options as to make that alternative counterproductive.

The Final Preparations, Administration, and Training

As the UN Security Council deadline of January 15 approached and Saddam

remained as obdurate as ever, CENTAF continued or even stepped up prepara127

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

40. Moskos and Wattendorf, “Troops in the Desert.”

41. Monthly Rpt, Col. Peter M. Hansen, USAF, CENTAF/CH, to USCENTCOM/CCCH,

Jan 7, 1991.
tions for combat. Several different facets of the effort are examined here, including the definition of wartime ROE and the compilation of a joint no-fire target

list (JNFTL), that is sites exempt from attack by Coalition air forces; air training

for the offensive air campaign; CENTAF reorganization; and the deployment of

JSTARS.

The writing of CENTCOM’s peacetime ROE presented fewer problems than

the preparation the wartime ROE, which CENTCOM did not finalize until

January 14, 1991. Three factors complicated the creation of a wartime ROE: the

security compartmented nature of the offensive air campaign plan, differences

among the Coalition members’ languages and national ROEs, and differences

between the USAF and USN. Compartmentalization of the planning for the

offensive air campaign prevented coordinating the plan and its objectives with

the CENTAF staff charged with preparing ROEs, in particular, the director of air

defense. The director had the responsibility of integrating the air defenses of the

Coalition forces and of other U.S. services into the RSAF-CENTAF air defense

system established at the beginning of the crisis. The differing air defense doctrines of the Coalition members necessitated coordination between the offensive

air plan and the air defense plan. The ATO would reflect the results of this coordination. Ignorance of the offensive plan hampered other USAF and USN

drafters of the ROE because they did not understand how—and from what directions, with what aircraft, and at what times—the Coalition air forces would

attack Iraq. By early October 1990, a single member of the air campaign planning staff, Maj. Larry L. Heintzelman, who had experience in preparing ROEs

and had contacts with the CENTAF director of air defense, acted as a liaison

between the two organizations. He shouldered much of the burden of reviewing

and coordinating an offensive ROE for the theater. Members of the special planning group with extensive air-to-air experience—General Glosson, Colonel

Deptula, and Maj. John Turk—and AWACS representatives developed the air-toair ROE for the offensive air campaign. They spent many hours creating an ROE

acceptable to operators, those personnel who actually fly the missions. In particular, General Glosson, who had experienced first-hand the restrictive ROE in the

war in Southeast Asia, was determined not to handicap Coalition pilots. The

ROE committee had to maintain air discipline sufficient to keep incidents of fratricide (casualties inflicted by friendly fire) at a minimum. The process eventually resulted in a unique concept—an ROE written by operators for operators.42

The first wartime ROE, prepared in mid-August, consisted of only a single sheet

of rules which permitted U.S. forces to cross the border and attack anything that

might interfere with their operations; the second wartime ROE did not appear

until October 6.43

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On Target

42. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 15.

43. Intvw, Maj. Heintzelman with TSgt. Saluda, “Rules of Engagement,” Mar 14, 1991

[File No. T/CT/21/Olsen & Heintzelman].
This draft ROE reflected the difficulties in crafting a set of rules applicable

to a diverse Coalition. Many of the U.S. rules and documentary references carried a Secret/Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals classification that prevented

their release to many Coalition members. Also, because few Coalition members

had English as a native language, ROEs meant for the entire Coalition required

extremely clear and precise drafting, which played hob with the complex conditional phrasing and reliance on if/then logic employed in traditional ROEs. With

CENTCOM approval, the October 6 ROE used a format of supplying a short

basic document, with explanatory tabs or annexes. Major Heintzelman had distilled this ROE from the fourteen-page prewar ROE to a three-page basic document and four tabs, one of which was a beyond visual range (BVR) rule of

engagement.

Apparently, none of the Coalition partners objected to the draft ROE. But the

USN took almost four weeks to reply, and it had several problems with the treatment of BVR engagements. The Navy’s worry concerned the differences

between the USAF’s resources and their less-capable equipment. CENTAF ROE

threatened to prevent the Navy and its excellent Phoenix (AIM–54) system from

participating in the air-to-air fight against a 700-plane air force.

Part of the ROE problem between the two services stemmed from the differing capabilities of their air-to-air missiles. Both services used the AIM–7 and

AIM–9 missiles, but the Navy’s AIM–54 had other capabilities that it did not

wish to relinquish. In a December 18 draft, CENTAF attempted to meet some of

the Navy’s ROE concerns. It provided a contingency scheme whereby the Navy’s

aircraft could obtain necessary clearances. Instead, on December 24, the Navy

suggested restricted operations zones, which provided that when a Navy package

attacked Iraq, planners would fence off the Navy’s route from other Coalition aircraft.44 Such a scheme would have completely uncoordinated the simultaneity

and shock effect of the offensive air campaign and unnecessarily clogged the

three main air approaches for the benefit of a tiny number of aircraft with no penetrating munitions, few self-designating lasers, and little range.

At last, in the first week of January, a representative from CENTCOM,

Major Heintzelman, and several officers from one of the carrier groups met to

thrash out a modus operandi for full use of the Navy’s weapons systems. After

two days of negotiation they developed the “special BVR zone.” Tying the Navy

aircraft into the ATO and the AWACS gave the JFACC stronger control over

Navy missions. During the negotiations it became clear to all parties that if a

Navy flight abused the process, the AWACS would refuse to turn on any more

zones, ever.

On January 7, CENTAF sent out another draft ROE and asked for approval

from all the components and from CENTCOM. Although the Navy objected to

129

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

44. Ibid.; Staff Summary Sheet, Col. Sykes and Maj. Heintzelman, [CENTAF] DAD/JA,

Subj: Desert Shield Wartime Rules of Engagement (ROE), Dec 18, 1990.
several points, three presented potential problems: naval mining, procedures for

solo BVR flights, and promulgation of the ROE by CENTAF instead of by

CENTCOM. Apparently, the mining issue went in the Navy’s favor. CENTAF

agreed to modify the solo BVR rules to allow Navy aircraft that could not meet

all solo criteria to fire AIM–54s. CENTCOM rejected the possible Navy attempt

to undermine the JFACC by having CENTCOM issue the wartime ROE and then

allow General Horner, as the JFACC, to issue the regulation. However, the

CENTCOM staff did seek to eliminate the portion of the ROE that defined neutrality and to restrict the rules of hot pursuit, obviating them. CENTCOM acceded to this reasoning. In the realm of hot pursuit, CENTAF had envisioned a situation in which Iraqi war planes would seek shelter in neutral airspace, shed their

pursuit, and immediately bounce out into Iraqi space and line up a shot at

Coalition aircraft. The two sides worked out a compromise that would allow

Coalition aircraft to defend themselves in border-crossing situations.45

Approximately seventy-two hours before the start of Desert Storm, the approved

wartime ROE went to the units.

CENTAF’s wartime ROEs accomplished their major objectives. They provided an operating environment that, despite the activity of more than 1,400 aircraft, held incidents of friendly air-to-air fire to a minimum, with only two incidents recorded. They also allowed Coalition aircraft, including USN aircraft, to

operate almost unhindered over Iraq while avoiding any international incidents

with either Jordan or Iran. The ROE did prevent hot pursuit of Iraqi aircraft fleeing to Iran once they had crossed the Iranian border; the diplomatic repercussions

of a large-scale violation of the Iranian international boundary may well have

outweighed the residual military value of the Iraqi aircraft marooned in Iran.

Unlike earlier conflicts when the NCA could not refrain from tweaking the ROE

to conform to political objectives, these ROEs seemed remarkably free from outside interference. Aside from the initial JCS peacetime ROE and its eventual

approval by General Schwarzkopf, the JFACC and the air components prepared

the ROEs without interference. Of course, unlike earlier conflicts such as Korea

and Vietnam, the possible conflict with Iraq had no enemy sanctuaries or potentially hostile powers capable of or likely to massively intervene on the side of

Iraq. The neutral powers, Jordan and Iran, might scowl fiercely and indulge in

anti-Coalition rhetoric, but they seemed far more likely to maintain their neutrality than to risk an incident for the sake of Iraq. In this instance, at least, the

situation in the Persian Gulf was simpler than those elsewhere.

The preservation of Iraq’s internationally significant humanitarian, historic,

and religious sites had a close association with the ROEs. Human civilization had

originated almost 6,000 years ago in the lands now occupied by Iraq. In

Mesopotamia, the region between and bordered by the Tigris and Euphrates

Rivers, great cities and cultures had arisen and vanished. The ruins of ancient Ur,

130

On Target

45. Intvw, Maj. Heintzelman, “Rules of Engagement,” Mar 14, 1991.
perhaps mankind’s first city, lies just to the southwest of An Nasiriyah (site of a

major bridge across the Euphrates) and adjacent to Tallil Airfield, one of the

most important military targets in southern Iraq. The capitals of long-gone

empires dot Iraq—Babylon; Ctesiphon, with the world’s widest remaining brickwork vault; Nippur; Nimrud; Nineveh, directly across the river from Mosul; and

Al Kufa, the first Arab capital of Iraq. Several important Shia Muslim shrines,

including Husayn’s Tomb in Karbala and Ali’s tomb in An Najaf, also required

protection. The final, preconflict JNFTL, issued January 16, 1991, listed a wide

range of such targets exempt from attack.

The topic of collateral damage—unintentional injury inflicted upon persons

and property in proximity with but not connected to the target of an attack—

relates closely to the JNFTL. The term, in fact, has become a euphemism for

enemy civilian casualties resulting from friendly bombing or shelling. The possibility of such casualties in a conflict with Iraq and the potential for Iraq to produce sensational propaganda with mischievous effects on world and domestic

opinion naturally concerned the USAF, and likely General Powell and the president as well.46 Of the 238 identified strategic targets as of early November 1990,

more than one-third (93) were in close proximity (within three miles) of suburban (40) or urban (53) areas. This included some leadership targets, electrical targets (some in urban areas), telecommunications targets, and many railroad targets. In Baghdad, residential areas surrounded or contained 19 targets and

abutted 6 more. The special planners took several precautions to minimize collateral damage.47

Checkmate supplemented the CENTAF effort with a computer-based study

employing the Threat Related Attrition software package. The USAF Surgeon

General used the software as a standard source of casualty data, as did the Air

Staff DCS for Personnel. The study focused on night operations over Baghdad,

the most densely populated area of Iraq, and used the most accurate weapons systems in the U.S. inventory: the F–117A/GBU–27, the F–111F/GBU–24, and the

TLAM. It counted only the noncombatant casualties inflicted from U.S. weapons

system malfunctions or human error. Checkmate assumed that the fog of war

would drive the numbers of dead and injured toward the high side of the predictions, but it noted that careful crew preparation before the attack could reduce

civilian losses. In Checkmate’s judgment, the F–117A’s characteristics perfectly

suited it for the mission, and also night attacks would reduce noncombatant casualties because civilians would have left their places of employment near potential targets and returned home. Checkmate surmised that pilot error in misidenti131

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

46. Talking Paper, “Limiting Collateral Damage,” n.d. [ca. early Nov 1990] [carries annotation “as prepared by Buck Rogers and Oly Olsen of the Special Campaign Planning Group”;

see further annotations “for CSAF mtg w/Pres, Camp David 1 Dec 90,” and on the third page,

“Briefed CINC, Delivered to Chairman for Presidential Brief—8 Nov 90”] [File No. CK/AS/-

CSAF].

47. Talking Paper, “Limiting Collateral Damage,” n.d. [ca. early Nov 1990].
fying targets, rather than weapon malfunctions, would cause most of the damage.

Lastly, the study recommended immediate postattack reconnaissance imagery to

establish casualty estimates based on actual impact points; such estimates would

help counter anticipated Iraqi charges.48 With its relatively reassuring estimate of

low noncombatant casualties based on precisely the attack methodology the special campaign planners meant to employ, this report, which Checkmate sent to

General Glosson and possibly to others, may have strengthened the resolve of the

special planners to continue in the course they pursued without fear of negative

consequences.

Twenty centuries ago the military historian Josephus, an Israelite general

who submitted to the forces of Rome (the superpower of his day), said of his captors, “their exercises are battles without bloodshed, and their battles are bloody

exercises.”49 The Roman legions, like any first-class military unit, trained constantly—as does the USAF. In the five months between the arrival of the 1st

TFW in August and the outbreak of the conflict in January, all units of CENTAF

trained intensively for their expected combat roles. During the initial period after

Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, the first U.S. aircraft into theater stayed at alert status to guard against any aggressive Iraqi moves. When the immediacy of the

Iraqi threat subsided, USAF units began a training program to maintain skills, to

practice coordination of strike packages, and to familiarize and coordinate all

units with the advanced electronic and communications assets available to them

in the AWACS and ABCCC aircraft.

By September 6, 1990, CENTAF had already begun to plan for small-scale

exercises to coordinate the use and connectivity of electronic assets. At the same

time, CENTAF forces began to coordinate more realistic air-to-ground tactical

training, including the reduction of low-level training restrictions and the

increased use of Saudi practice ranges for live and dry tactics. Within ten days,

CENTAF forces began flying large practice interdiction packages: on September

16 forty F–16s comprised one package. This represented an instance of an F–16

wing commander beginning to practice his portion of the offensive air campaign

ATO. F–16s seldom flew in such large packages, and the wing commander

wished to give his pilots the necessary training. Many of the wing commanders

followed this tactic, without revealing their true intentions to their pilots; they

broke out bits and pieces of their segment of the offensive plan and had them

written into the daily training ATO.50 Because of the classified nature of the plan,

Coalition aircraft did not exercise the plan all at once, which would have given

the Iraqis exposure to it; instead, they flew parts of it, while other aircraft flew

132

On Target

48. Memo, Col. Warden for Brig. Gen. Glosson, Nov 14, 1990, attachment No. 2: Point

Paper “Threat Related Attrition (THREAT) Application for Operation Desert Shield” [CK: TS

90–XOXWF–004].

49. Josephus, 37–100 A.D., cited in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and

Naval Quotations (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1966), p. 328.

50. Intvw, Capt. Bruner, Mar 19, 1992.
other missions.51 Four days later, CENTAF aircraft flew night packages of four

F–15Cs and twelve F–111Fs and day packages comprising F–16s, F–4Gs, and

Saudi Tornados. Also, the A–10s began to fly ground-force familiarization

flights over the Eastern Province. F–4Gs and five B–52Gs flew a low-level strike

package on September 24. Two days later, CENTAF aircraft cooperated with

RAF and RSAF in a single package as well as conducted CAS exercises with

USMC and ABCCC aircraft. F–117As formed a part of one of three packages

flown on September 29.52 The pace and the complexity of training accelerated in

the coming months.

For the period between October 1 and January 15, CENTAF aircraft averaged almost 500 flights daily, quadruple the number of detected Iraqi flights.53

This would indicate that during the months before the conflict, CENTAF aircraft

and pilots trained at a rate of, at the very least, twice that of Iraqi aircraft and

pilots. This, like so many other factors, would work to the benefit of the

Coalition. Canadian CF–18s constituted part of one of four strike packages on

October 10. By October 14, CENTCOM reported that training had progressed

from small, single-unit missions to large, multinational strike packages accompanied by opposition air, escort fighters, early warning aircraft, and Wild Weasel

support. After the conflict, the commander of the 35th Provisional Tactical

Fighter Wing [TFW(P)] (the F–4G Wild Weasels based at Shaik Isa AB)

observed that this period for extended training allowed his aircrews to build a

war plan that included two significant changes in their normal mode of operations. Before deployment, HQ TAC restrictions had not allowed its airmen to

practice night flying operations. After the unit’s arrival in the AOR, it began

extensive tactical and theoretical discussions and dedicated one-third of its training sorties to nighttime Wild Weasel missions. In addition, the wing adjusted its

HARM-firing doctrine for night conditions. Second, after evaluating the Iraqi

threat environment, the wing refined its tactics and practiced for medium-altitude

(15,000–19,000 feet) operations. For example, the distance from planned air-toair refueling areas meant that the F–4Gs would have no loiter time in the

Baghdad area and would have to flow a stream of formations through the region,

limiting the collection of electronics order of battle data and time on station.

Accordingly, the wing allowed each four-ship formation the flexibility to tailor

HARM-firing doctrine to the mission flow plan and support requirements as well

as to employ all methods of HARM deconfliction, such as threat type, geographic position, time, and position in the flow.54

133

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

51. Intvw, Lt. Col. Waterstreet, Mar 6 1992.

52. Msg, 062115Z Sep 90, USCINCCENT to JCS, Subj: Sitrep, cited in Michael, Desert

Shield Chronology, p. 50. For other dates in this paragraph, see appropriate Sitreps as cited in

Michael.

53. Michael, Desert Shield Chronology, Chart “CENTAF-IRAQ Flight Activity,” following p. 78 [compiled from figures in CENTCOM Sitreps].

54. Msg, 211330Z Mar 91, 35TFW(P) Deployed/CC to CENTAF/DO, Subj: 35 TFW(P)

Combat Effectiveness Reviews [File No. CK/DS/F–4G].
Training and maneuver casualties constitute one of the hardest and leastacknowledged facts of military life. Usually they are directly proportional to the

size and rigorousness of the exercise. Not only expense but also the greater

chance for deadly and crippling mistakes and accidents limit the number of large,

peacetime exercises. Only services unaccountable to the public, such as the

Japanese Imperial Navy in the 1930s and early 1940s, can indulge in prolonged

and rigorous training under field conditions. By October 12 CENTAF aircraft

had suffered four Class A accidents (accidents involving serious damage to an

aircraft and or death or serious injury to the air or ground crew). Two were an

F–111F and an RF–4C flying into the ground on different occasions as they practiced maneuvers to avoid enemy fire. In reaction, General Horner imposed height

limitations on CENTAF aircraft: 5,000 feet above ground level (AGL) for air-toair operations, and 1,000 feet AGL on continuation training. He noted that when

the commanders advised that they had received and understood the message, he

would reduce the limits.55 Almost immediately he allowed the B–52Gs to train

at 500 feet AGL.

Exercise Imminent Thunder, a precursor to Instant Thunder, began on

November 15 (C+100 days). It exercised major portions of the offensive plan and

included nine strike packages and one CAS package involving more than 700

aircraft. The exercise integrated joint and combined air, ground, and naval forces.

The next day Coalition forces flew twelve strike packages in a simulation of D+1

day missions. The IZAF responded to this air activity by sharply reducing its

own flying.56 The exercise ended on November 21 (C+106) after several days of

large CAS exercises and a total of approximately 4,000 Coalition air sorties.

From December 5 (C+120) through December 7 (C+122), Coalition aircraft

conducted Exercise Desert Force and participated in seventeen strike packages

and live firings on Saudi ranges. This and other exercises provided experience

not just for the combat aircraft, known in current service slang as “shooters,” but

for the support aircraft as well. The strike packages flew distances and routes

corresponding to their ultimate missions. Along the way, both types of aircraft

had to coordinate their actions with the tankers and coordinate their procedures

with the electronic-support aircraft. The Coalition partners and other U.S. services found the missions of particular utility—live firing reinforced marksmanship, weapons procedures, and ground-crew weapons handling. As December

progressed into January, Coalition aircraft flew bigger and bigger portions of the

first night attack plan. The practice missions revealed some flaws in various

aspects of the upcoming strike, and the special campaign planners adjusted their

work accordingly.

134

On Target

55. 120900Z Oct 1990, COMUSCENTAF to COMTAC et al, Subj: Desert Shield Accidents [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10161].

56. Msg, 172115Z Oct 90, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subj: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 130.
At their more leisurely pace, the Iraqis also prepared for future conflict; on

Christmas Day, six Iraqi air bases and thirty fighters conducted a simultaneous

countrywide nighttime ground-controlled intercept exercise.57 The late December Iraqi night flying reflected an overall growth in their night training to 25 percent of their total training sorties, a response to anticipated Coalition tactics.

From October to December, Iraqi night air combat training increased from 5 percent to 35 percent of all sorties. Southern bases and bases around Baghdad in particular boosted their night air-combat training schedules.58 The sixth of January

saw Coalition training in dissimilar aerial combat tactics, low-level navigation,

surface attack, and aerial refueling. That night, CENTAF prepared for a key element of the anticipated operations by conducting a large-scale tanker surge exercise.

As the UN Security Council deadline of January 15 approached, CENTAF

units began to cease practicing for war and to prepare for it. From January 12

(C+158) onward, air-to-ground and air-to-air units loaded some or all assigned

aircraft with the weapon mixes specified in the first night’s MAP. On January 13

(C+159), tankers practiced manning wartime orbits.59 While Coalition training

did not precisely duplicate wartime conditions, it did sharpen skills and pinpoint

some weaknesses. In the first three days of conflict—when Iraqi defenses were

at their maximum, Coalition pilots were at their most inexperienced, and tanker

tracks occupied almost all altitudes—not one air-to-air collision occurred. Quick

reflexes and dumb luck account for some of that achievement, but much belongs

to the many hours spent training.

Clear lines of authority permit the members of an organization to focus on

their tasks without the distraction of competing or contradictory instructions. In

the military, basic combat units up to the brigade or wing and often to the division level tend to have fixed tables of organization and equipment that delineate

explicit chains of command. This prevents uncertainty and hesitation at the point

of combat, factors that produce wasted effort and unnecessary casualties at best,

and total defeat at worst. Higher command levels have more flexible organizations to reflect their unique adaptation to specific functions and missions, and

their position in the overall command hierarchy. In his own person, General

Horner commanded or controlled three distinct entities: the U.S. Ninth Air Force,

CENTCOM air forces, and the Joint Force air component. As a USAF general,

he commanded the Ninth Air Force, a tactical air force consisting of fighter and

attack aircraft assigned to TAC. Besides his duties as a USAF numbered air force

commander, General Horner had a responsibility to support the CINCCENT,

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The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

57. Msg, 272115Z Dec 90, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subj: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 177.

58. Msg, 031018Z Jan 91, CENTAF/IN to AIG 12929 (INTREP 91–006), Subj: Iraqi

Night Flying Trends [File No. T/CT/52/-].

59. Msg, 162115Z Jan 91, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subj: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 209.
should that commander require air forces to accomplish his mission. The decision to send forces to Saudi Arabia, part of CENTCOM’s geographic AOR,

meant that General Horner came under General Schwarzkopf’s authority as commander of CENTAF. As COMCENTAF, General Horner had the responsibility

to organize the forces under his command and control and to carry out the orders

of General Schwarzkopf, a relatively straightforward task.

Within CENTAF, the extent of General Horner’s legal control over his units

varied with the unit’s command of origin (its regular USAF MAJCOM assignment). He had direct command and control over Ninth Air Force and other units

seconded from TAC. SAC retained combatant command of all its aircraft (tankers, B–52Gs, U–2s, and TR–1s). It passed operational control, which included

mission planning and execution authority, of B–52Gs deployed to the AOR and

B–52Gs in the continental U.S. and assigned to support Desert Shield to the

CINCCENT. The CINCSAC delegated operational control of his tankers to the

subordinate numbered air forces (the Eighth and the Fifteenth) and to the commander of 17th Provisional Air Division [17th AD(P)], who was dual-hatted as

the director of Strategic Forces (STRATFOR). The STRATFOR commander had

operational control of tankers specifically assigned to support CENTCOM. The

JFACC had tactical control of all tanker sorties supporting CENTCOM operations. SAC retained operational control of reconnaissance assets including mission execution, but it delegated tactical control to the 17th AD(P). Assignment

of reconnaissance missions would have to go through the Strategic

Reconnaissance Center at HQ SAC.60 The USAF Commander of Airlift Forces

(COMALF) also wore another hat—Commander, 16th Provisional Air Division

[16th AD(P)]. He had a command relationship with CENTAF similar to that of

the STRATFOR commander. These two air divisions came into existence in late

August 1990. General Horner retained direct command of the tactical combat

and electronic support units.

136

On Target

60. Msg, 241900Z Aug 90, CINCSAC to 8 AF, Barksdale AFB et al., Subj: Command

Relationships of SAC Forces Supporting Desert Shield [T/HO/19/SAC Command Relationship].

The CINCSAC, General John T.

Chain, inspects a forward operating location.
This arrangement sufficed until the influx of new units in November forced

a change. On November 22 after a review of CENTAF’s organization, General

Horner asked TAC to exercise its legal authority to create two new provisional

air divisions. General Horner pointed out that his span of control had grown to

an unwieldy size, spread over 2 provisional air divisions, 17 operational units,

and 25 staff agencies. The air division structure worked well for the tanker and

airlift forces, and he wished to apply it to the operational forces which had over

700 aircraft assigned to them. Two new provisional air divisions would significantly reduce COMCENTAF’s span of control. General Horner intended to

attach his ten operational fighter wings—the 1st (F–15Cs) at Dhahran, the 4th

(F–15Cs, F–15Es, and F–16s) at Al Kharj, the 23d (A–10s) at King Fahd, the 33d

(F–15Cs) at Tabuk, the 37th (F–117s) at Khamis Mushait, the 48th (F–111Fs) at

Taif, the 354th (A–10s) at King Fahd, the 363d (F–16Cs) at Al Dhafra, the 388th

(F–16Cs) at Al Minhad, and the 401st (F–16Cs) at Doha—to a proposed 14th

Provisional Air Division [14th AD(P)]. He wished to assign his electronic combat, C2, reconnaissance, and miscellaneous units to a proposed 15th Provisional

Air Division [15th AD(P)]. Nine units would constitute the 15th AD(P): the 7th

Airborne Command and Control Squadron, the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing

(F–4Gs), the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron, the 117th Tactical

Reconnaissance Wing, the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing (EF–111As), the 390th

Electronic Combat Squadron, the 507th Tactical Air Control Wing, the 552

Provisional Airborne Warning Wing , and the 4409th Provisional Operational

Support Wing.61 On December 5, TAC published orders confirming CENTAF’s

request.62

A week later, after appointing General Glosson to command the 14th AD(P)

and Brig. Gen. Glenn A. Profitt II to command the 15th AD(P), General Horner

again asked TAC to regularize changes he had made in CENTAF. (He had standardized and streamlined his subordinate wing structures.) Using the same unit

137

The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

61. Msg, 220930Z Nov 90, USCENTAF Deputy Comdr Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen to

USCENTAF REAR, Langley AFB, Subj: Establishment of Provisional Air Divisions for

Desert Shield.

62. SO GB–14, HQ TAC, Dec 5, 1990.

The JFACC, Lt. Gen. Charles A.

Horner, is greeted on his arrival

in Saudi Arabia by Col. Hal M.

Hornburg, commander of the

4th FW(P).
numbers, General Horner redesignated his tactical air force wings from

“deployed” to provisional, and he created eight provisional combat support

groups, each assigned to their respective provisional tactical fighter wings. Three

fighter wings, the 23d, 388th, and 401st TFWs (who shared bases as tenants), did

not get support groups. The host wing commander would also serve as the installation commander.63 HQ TAC ratified these changes on December 20.64

Also in late December General Horner reorganized the HQ CENTAF staff,

which had swollen to at least 2,000 personnel including 500 in intelligence who

worked double 12-hour shifts.65 To transition the plans staffs into a heightened

state of readiness for a possible wartime situation, he created the Directorate of

Campaign Plans by combining the Black Hole with portions of the CENTAF

Combat Operations Planning Staff that performed the D-day defensive planning

in the event of an Iraqi attack, the ATO staff that prepared the daily training ATO,

and the Airborne Combat Element (ACE) that staffed the AWACS aircraft. The

merger joined the Black Hole’s 30 to 40 personnel with the 400 or more members of the other organizations. This total included two shifts of officers who

worked twelve hours apiece. The ATO portion of the new directorate had

approximately 250 personnel.66

The new organization contained three divisions: the Guidance, Apportionment, and Tasking (GAT) Division; the ATO Division; and the ACE Division.

The GAT Division contained specialized planning and targeting cells. Former Dday planners became the KTO Planning Cell, which matched them to the target

base each had studied for the past five months. The former Black Hole became

the Iraq (Strategic) Planning Cell. Supporting planning cells for electronic combat, Scud and NBC planning, surface operations, liaison, and analysis rounded out

the division. The combined planning cells forming the GAT Division occupied a

large storage room in the basement of the RSAF HQ building that now became

known as the Black Hole. Within the GAT Division, all completed targeting

recommendations flowed to Colonel Deptula who reviewed, selected, and assembled them into a final MAP. After reviewing the plan with General Glosson and

obtaining his approval, Colonel Deptula handed the plan to the GAT Division

night shift, which transcribed the MAP onto target-planning work sheets, the only

format familiar to the ATO planners. The night shift carried the work sheets down

the hall to the ATO Division, and the ATO Division began the complex task of

processing the daily ATO. Significant changes to the MAP resulting from current

operations went back to the GAT Division for approval. This approval process

soon developed its own bureaucratic control mechanism—the MAP change

138

On Target

63. Msg, 120600Z Dec 90, COMCENTAF to USCENTAF REAR, Subj: USCENTAF

Organization Structure.

64. SO GB–18, HQ TAC, Dec 20, 1990.

65. Intvw, Col. Getchell, Mar 2, 1992.

66. Intvw, Col. Crigger, Mar 5, 1992; Intvw, Capt. J. Hawkins, SAC/DOOQ, with Dr.

Kent M. Beck, SAC/HO, Omaha, Neb., April 30, 1991 [File No. SAC/HO Historian’s Working

File].
sheet—which tracked changes and required the usual assortment of personal initials. The ATO Division did not go through the time-consuming and relatively

pointless task of resubmitting for approval the many minor changes to the MAP

developed in the course of refining the daily ATO. After the first two days of combat operations, the daily mass of minor and last-minute changes altered the GAT

Division’s function: it became concerned with the execution as well as the planning of operations. The ACE Division comprised the air war coordinators onboard

the AWACS and assisted them in managing the day-to-day execution of the war.67

Officers from the other two divisions served in the ACE Division to observe and

control the plans they had helped to create. General Glosson retained command of

the new directorate. This reorganization established an organization that conformed to the anticipated standard USAF 72-hour wartime planning sequence.

The GAT Division would plan for the day after tomorrow (72 hours), the ATO

Division would process the plan for the next day’s execution of operations (48

hours), and the ACE Division would oversee the execution of the current day’s

operation.68 Reality upset this idealized scheme, as Colonel Deptula described the

functioning of the directorate in practice:

In actuality the GAT Division became involved in current operations adjustments which in turn affected the plan for the next day, which would drive

changes for the following day. Since the master attack plans were the purview

of the GAT, and they were the ones who understood the direction of the air campaign, they accordingly subsumed the tasks of execution oversight as well as

planning for 48, as well as 72 hours in advance. General Glosson’s position [as]

both the Director of Campaign Plans and the Commander of the 14th Air

Division allowed him to pick up the phone and make things happen without

having to go through an intermediary.69

To no ones’ surprise, late-arriving high-priority changes inserted before execution produced many unexpected stumbles in the anticipated planning sequence.

To adapt to these high-priority changes inside the planning cycle, General

Glosson established a ground attack alert force of eight F–111Fs with a four-hour

reaction time. In this context, ground refers to the aircraft’s location while on

alert, not a dedication to support Coalition land forces.

The December reorganizations left CENTAF better prepared for future conflict, with changes affecting the offensive air campaign having a special import.

They papered over organizational conflict between two competing air planning

entities. Instead of continuing as a special access–required function, isolated

from the CENTAF HQ staff, the Black Hole planners joined the rest of the

CENTAF planners in three new rooms recently acquired in the basement of the

RSAF HQ building. The new space provided the spark for the reorganization and

demonstrated how physical factors can impinge on organizational politics. The

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The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

67. Talking Paper, Lt. Col. Deptula, “JFACC Directorate of Campaign Plans,” Nov 4,

1991.

68. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Olsen, Mar 5, 1992.

69. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 17.
Black Hole now formed part of a new integrated organization that planned for

attacks on Kuwait as well as on Iraq and whose plan would be understood by the

airborne controllers who would direct it and attempt to compensate for unexpected contingencies. Most importantly, the GAT Division and the MAP would

continue to act as the baseline, or starting point, for each day’s activity during the

air campaign. This ensured that the strategic principles of the Warden group

would have—insofar as Colonel Deptula and Generals Glosson and Horner

allowed them to—a disproportionately large influence in the direction of the air

campaign.

The entire staff of the 14th AD(P) consisted of one man, its commander,

General Glosson. But this assignment placed the general in the direct chain of

command of CENTAF’s mailed fist of twenty-six tactical fighter squadrons. He

retained his post as Director of Campaign Plans, which gave him the dual responsibility of planning and directing much of the campaign. A single intellect, subject to higher authority, controlled plans and operations. This situation had

advantages and disadvantages. From the perspective of higher commanders, it

maximized the efficiency of both sides of the equation by reducing loss of information through transmission errors and from organizational static while it

opened channels for mutual feedback. When General Glosson learned of new

opportunities or received updated intelligence, he could pick up a secure phone,

call a unit, and change its orders, bypassing any intervening organizational step.

At least one combat wing commander stated that in the subsequent months he

dealt far more often with General Glosson as his division commander than with

Glosson, Director of Plans.70 The very directness of this communications channel, in the eyes of more junior officers who occupied intervening positions in the

system, constituted its very weakness. In their eyes, the direct access to the units

and occasional lapses of the 14th AD(P) in forwarding new orders to the ATO

Division gummed up the ATO and its associated systems. As described earlier,

each change in the ATO created a cascade of subsequent changes affecting the

entire document and possibly future operations. If the ATO writers did not know

of the change or had too little time to track its ramifications through the order,

then other units might find no tankers at the refueling points or discover themselves flying reciprocal courses, with units flying the changes. To the ATO

Division, the use of direct access showed a failure to understand the complexities of the process.71 Two years after the reorganization, General Horner seconded this opinion stating: “The Directorate [sic] of Campaign Plans having his own

intel network and tasking directly to the units without using the ATO process

caused many problems in scheduling support aircraft (tankers, SEAD, etc.) and

complicated the execution of the daily ATO.”72 These differing viewpoints illus140

On Target

70. Intvw, Brig. Gen. Hal M. Hornburg, formerly Comdr, 4th TFW(P), with Dr. Richard

G. Davis, CAFH, at the Pentagon, D.C., Jan 24, 1993.

71. File 201, Desert Storm Monograph Project, AFHSO.

72. Ltr, Horner to Hallion, Subj: Review/Comments on Draft Manuscript, Dec 8, 1992.
trate how, after a certain established point, the ATO with its all encompassing

complexity and inelasticity tended to demand the placement of restrictions on

rapid response and initiative, and also, how such restrictions frustrated those who

controlled operations. Direct access, when not abused, allows for the rapid

response and initiative necessary for combat operations and to some extent

compensates for the inelasticity inherent in the planning process. Any organization or organism so tied to its internal processes that it no longer rapidly and

effectively responds to outside stimuli is headed for extinction.

On January 12, 1991, two aircraft reinforced CENTAF. Each of the two

modified Boeing 707s (EA–8s) carried the JSTARS housed in a 26-foot-long

“canoe” under the forward part of the aircraft’s fuselage. The system consisted

of an advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR), an operations and control subsystem, and a surveillance and control data link to a specially designed groundstation module (GSM). The SAR had the capability of supplying wide-area surveillance of the battlefield. It had two modes of operation: as a moving-target

indicator able to track mobile targets and as a SAR imager able to spotlight and

accurately detect fixed targets. Operators could select areas and obtain imagery

of them from the aircraft. The system would generate fixed-target indication

reports. The system could switch between moving- and fixed-target indicators at

will. The operations and control subsystem allowed weapons controllers to display and manipulate the radar data. It enabled joint mission crewmembers to perform real-time surveillance and target analysis, attack planning, attack support,

and postattack assessment in addition to their radar management functions. Some

service members had a more succinct description of the system’s capabilities;

they called the GSM “the upside down AWACS.”

For all its marvelous properties, JSTARS had substantial potential problems,

most owing to the fact that the service had not scheduled the system’s initial

operational capability until 1997. Developmental and operational testing had

barely begun. The two prototypes sitting on the ramp at King Khalid International Airport comprised the world’s entire supply of JSTARS. The program

had started in 1985 with Grumman Aerospace Corporation as the prime contractor and with substantial inputs from Boeing Military Aircraft (supplying reconditioned airframes, intended to save the expense of buying new) and from

Norden Electronics (the SAR). The program had suffered large cost overruns and

delays due to poor management, severe software problems, and difficulties with

nonstandard construction in the airframes. By mid-1990, the service had begun

to seriously consider fining the contractor for nonperformance. The service contemplated buying at most 22 or 23 aircraft at a flyaway cost of approximately

$400 million to $450 million each. That many aircraft would provide enough

three-aircraft orbits for Europe, Korea, and one or two contingencies. Although

the USAF managed the contract, the Army, the chief beneficiary of the aircraft’s

ability to locate multiple ground targets simultaneously, had an intense interest in

the project’s successful completion, especially when one realizes that the Army

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The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training
had made a heavy investment of its relatively sparse funds in GSMs. The Army

would certainly regard the USAF’s cancellation of the project as a blatant act of

bad faith. On the other hand, if the system worked as planned, it might relieve

the USAF of a significant portion of its CAS mission by improving the effectiveness of Army artillery, missiles, and attack helicopters. Congress, too, had an

opinion on JSTARS. In late 1990 the House of Representative’s FY 1991 authorization bill canceled the project. The House FY 1991 DoD appropriations bill

reversed this cancellation, but support for the project in Congress had clearly

eroded and might erode further. Without a positive performance, JSTARS might

well join Skybolt, the XB–70A, and the atomic aircraft engine on the scrapheap

of expensive might-have-beens.

General Schwarzkopf personally gave the JSTARS a chance to prove itself.

In 1990 the system participated in two tests in Europe: one in February and an

Operational Field Demonstration in September and October. The second demonstration proved decisive. The Army commanders who saw the JSTARS’s capability went wild. The VII Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Frederick Franks, Jr., stated, “Gentlemen I have seen it, it is real and it is the most reliable thing I have.”73

Undoubtedly General Franks and others expressed their enthusiasm to General

Schwarzkopf. General Horner did not completely share General Franks’s enthusiasm; he appreciated the opportunities offered by the system but feared that premature deployment might compromise its future development. General Horner

wanted assurances that he could employ the system without ultimately killing

it.74 On December 5 General Schwarzkopf requested that the JSTARS program

directors come to Riyadh to brief him on the system. He asked that they come

prepared to answer several questions: What would distinguish the system’s performance in the controlled demonstrations in Europe from its performance in

Saudi Arabia? Can two aircraft deploy to Saudi Arabia? Can the aircraft fly a 20-

hour mission?75 On December 17 General Schwarzkopf heard the briefing. The

JSTARS representatives answered that they could deploy two aircraft; that the

system could perform extended missions, but at a heavy cost in future operations;

and that they could deploy in thirty days, with thirty days’ worth of spares.76 Two

days later, General Schwarzkopf told the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, “USCENTCOM has reviewed Joint STARS current capabilities and believes that the system, aircraft, and ground station modules can make a significant contribution to

Desert Shield operations.” He further requested the system’s deployment to

142

On Target

73. Brfg Slide, “JSTARS in Support of Desert Shield,” Dec 17, 1990 [File No. AFHSO

microfilm reel 10211, frame 201].

74. Intvw, Lt. Gen. Horner, Mar 4, 1992.

75. Msg, 051215Z Dec 90, USCINCCENT to AMCPEO IEW, Ft. Monmouth, N.J., Subj:

Request for JSTARS Briefing, tab 1 to SSS, Subj: JSTARS Briefing, Lt Col Perozzi, CENTAF

[File No. T/CT/13/3].

76. Brfg Slide, “CENTCOM Questions: JSTARS in Support of Desert Shield,” Dec17,

1990. [File No. T/CT/13/3]
Saudi Arabia as soon as possible, with an operational date no later than January

15.77

General Schwarzkopf’s request caused some dismay in the USAF Systems

Command. The commander of the Electronic Systems Division, Lt. Gen. Gorden

Fornell, worried that deployment of a system so early in its life cycle would

make his division accountable for any failure, even one not related to the system,

such as a collapsed landing gear. In addition, deployment would carry with it

many associated costs, not the least of which involved allowing the prime contractor to escape nonperformance penalties. (Deploying the aircraft could give

the contractor grounds to claim that the service had broken the contract.)

Furthermore, workers would have to bring both aircraft to a standardized

configuration. Heretofore the contractor had used one aircraft to leapfrog the

other with new developments. The problem of finding and manufacturing oneof-a-kind spares for an experimental system might prove difficult to surmount.

Contractor personnel, especially the electronics and software Ph.D.-types necessary to keep the system operating, would have to deploy as well. Of the 164

deployed personnel, more than 60 were civilians; Systems Command and TAC

supplied 53, and the Army an additional 33. The system would be inordinately

expensive to support and operate. JSTARS program officials estimated that the

projected six-week deployment would cost $30 million and result in a three- to

six-month slip in the program. But whatever General Schwarzkopf wanted, he

got. On January 14, the USAF’s newest unit, the 4411st Provisional Joint

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Squadron sent its first bird out on an

operational mission to calibrate its systems along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border.78

As has often happened with technological advances, the theoretical capabilities of JSTARS threatened to outstrip the ability of its parent organizations to

employ it properly. The system combined intelligence collection (surveillance)

and operations (near real-time targeting). The former appealed to the ground

commanders because JSTARS supplied a fairly accurate picture of enemy

ground movements. The real-time targeting appealed to the USAF because it

would enable this service to divert aircraft to bona fide targets. The way these

two services manned the aircraft’s operator stations reflected the services’ different outlooks. The Army used intelligence personnel while the Air Force used

operations personnel. Air Force personnel had difficulty in interpreting ground

images because of a lack of training and familiarity. When the system was fully

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The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training

77. Msg, 191330Z Dec 90, USCINCCENT to Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., Subj: Joint

STARS Deployment [File No. T/CT/13/3].

78. See Charles D. Lloyd, “A Technological Success Story: Joint STARS and Operation

Desert Storm,” Air Power History 38, No. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 32, for System Command’s reaction to General Schwarzkopf’s request and for squadron personnel figures. Brfg Slide,

“Summary: JSTARS in Support of Desert Shield,” Dec 17, 1990 [File No. AFHSO microfilm

reel 10211, frame 222]. See Peter Grier, “Joint STARS Does Its Stuff,” Air Force Magazine 74,

No. 6 (Jun 1991), p. 40, for the first operational mission. SO GB–21, HQ TAC, Jan 10, 1991

[File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10216, frame 1041].
operational, it could supply both types of information simultaneously. However,

in the early stage of system’s development when it was deployed to the theater,

it could fulfill both functions, but they could only be performed one at a time.

This constriction of information outflow initially led both the theater intelligence

and operations organizations to seek to stake a claim to a controlling interest in

the type of JSTARS’s output. The Army wanted to ensure that the system would

support ground offensive preparations and operations. On January 14, General

Schwarzkopf issued instructions on JSTARS utilization. In them he rejected

CENTAF suggestions that would have placed the system under the JFACC.79

Instead, General Schwarzkopf would retain operational control by establishing

overall priorities based on the needs of each component force. CENTAF would

have tactical control of the system, subject to the CINCCENT’s overall guidance,

especially his “daily weight of effort.” The CINCCENT directed that the system

support his “theater indications and warning, targeting, and enemy situation

development needs.” In the initial phases of the upcoming operation, the bulk of

the JSTARS effort would support the air campaign. As the air effort shifted in

support of ground operations, so would the focus of the JSTARS effort. If, during an individual mission, the aircraft should receive conflicting radar coverage

change requests from ARCENT, MARCENT, and CENTAF, the aircraft commander, in consultation with the TACC, would arbitrate the request. As CENTAF

Deputy Director of Operations Colonel Crigger ruefully acknowledged, the

JSTARS might be too good, in that it would give the ground commanders too

complete a picture of the front opposite them. This could lead ground commanders to demand that the USAF hit all targets located on their front, clearly an

impossible feat as well as a misuse of air power.80 The CINCCENT also expected the system to conduct future targeting and radar intelligence collection.

Intelligence requirements, established at the daily CENTCOM J–2 reconnaissance meeting, would go to CENTAF for collection. CENTAF would coordinate

aircraft tracks and times with CENTCOM’s Joint Reconnaissance Center for

synchronization with other airborne reconnaissance activities.81

General Schwarzkopf’s decision on JSTARS reflected his philosophy of

keeping joint matters in the hands of the CINCCENT. JSTARS had joint manning and served joint needs; it just happened that the USAF ran the platform. It

does not appear that General Schwarzkopf harbored hostility for air power: He

enthusiastically supported the offensive air campaign and maintained good relations with his air officers. But from his perspective, he believed that all U.S.

forces in the AOR formed a whole, or a team, in which no one component should

race ahead of any other. The general may have thought that the JFACC would

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On Target

79. Draft, CENTAF/DO, Desert Shield JSTARS Concept of Operation, Jan 9, 1991 [File

No. T/CT/13/3 (annotated, “CENTAF 1st draft”)].

80. Intvw, Col. Crigger, Mar 5, 1992.

81. Msg, 141136Z Jan 91, USCINCCENT to CENTAF, Subj: JSTARS Utilization [File

No. T/CT/13/JSTARS].
siphon off too much of his own authority as the Unified CINC. In any case,

General Schwarzkopf consistently refused to give the JFACC unlimited authority over the air war, to the frustration of his USAF officers.

The U.S. decision to pursue the offensive option was the response to the

Iraqis’ refusal to disgorge Kuwait. Once reinforcements arrived, CENTCOM’s

mission would inevitably shift from deterring Iraq and defending Saudi Arabia

to the tasks of expelling Iraq from Kuwait and of damaging or removing Iraq’s

missile and NBC capabilities. In the face of continuing Iraqi intransigence, the

presence of new forces would inexorably push American leadership toward the

decision to use military force to solve the situation. The next chapter will

describe that decision. Also, the forces already in Saudi Arabia demonstrated a

professionalism unknown to a massed American force at the beginning of a conflict. Until the Persian Gulf crisis, the United States had never in its history fielded a large force composed entirely of professional soldiers at the beginning of

hostilities. The armies at New York, Bladensburg, Manassas, San Juan Hill, the

Marne, Kasserine Pass, and Pusan consisted of volunteers and conscripts trained

barely, if at all, in the use of their arms and still struggling to master the basics

of their trade. In Saudi Arabia, the opposite held true. Americans in the Gulf may

have trained no more industriously than their forebears, but they built on a far

superior base of knowledge. The American servicemen and women in the Gulf

honed an already sharp weapon into a blade of razor sharpness that their commanders could wield with a dexterity unobtainable by their foe. Generals Horner

and Schwarzkopf, and others, provided their force with an atmosphere conducive

to success: clear lines of command and authority, well-defined and constant rules

of engagement, and a healthy working arrangement with the far different culture

present in their host country. The fortuitous ban on alcohol simplified discipline

throughout the force, but the care with which the CINCCENT and CENTCOM

educated their men and women in the complexities of Islam and enforced in their

troops a respect for that religion kept a possibly volatile situation well under control. Not only their training but their behavior toward their hosts showed the professionalism of the American women and men in uniform. That professionalism

proved as decisive a factor in the upcoming conflict as the technological edge

enjoyed by the USAF.

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The Offensive Deployment, Morale, and Training
146

On Target
Chapter Five

The Decision for War

In a very real sense the war in the Persian Gulf had been inevitable since the

fifth of August 1990 when President Bush announced publicly that Saddam

Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait “would not stand.” Saddam responded by annexing Kuwait and making it an integral part of Iraq. By locking themselves into diametrically opposed positions, the two presidents, Bush and Saddam, ensured a

situation in which neither could compromise without losing face, internationally

and domestically. In the ensuing months, both leaders engaged in a prolonged

match of open diplomatic moves, gestures for media effect, armed forces

buildups, economic gamesmanship, and name-calling. As the potential for conflict heightened, neither leader judged that he could sacrifice a significant portion of his nation’s vital interests, as he perceived them, to avoid the looming

conflict. Iraq needed Kuwait’s oil to rescue its economy. Meanwhile, to preserve

its economic well-being, the United States could not allow a radical regime to

control Kuwait and threaten Saudi Arabia. President Bush’s decision to employ

VII Corps gave the train to war a full head of steam, and UN Security Council

Resolution 678 (1990), passed on November 29, tied down the safety valve. In

its broadest grant of power since the Korean War, the council authorized the

Coalition to use “all necessary means” to force Iraq from Kuwait if Iraq did not

withdraw by January 15, 1991. If the two leaders could not reach a modus vivendi in forty-seven days, then President Bush, upon whom rested the onus of liberating Kuwait, would either have to use military force or admit that he lacked the

will to cross his personal Rubicon.

The Decision for War

On November 30, 1990, to demonstrate his willingness “to go the extra mile

for peace” and solve the crisis, President Bush invited Iraqi Foreign Minister

Tariq Aziz to come to the United States in mid-December and offered to send

147

Preface
Secretary Baker to Baghdad between December 15 and January 15. The

démarche shocked the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin

Sultan. He feared that the offer sent Saddam a message of weakness and offered

him an opportunity for further delay. But as National Security Advisor Scowcroft

explained to him, the president had made the offer for domestic as well as international politics. The president believed that the American people expected him

to make every effort for peace. Secretary Baker may also have favored the offer,

in part because he had come to believe that the only way to ensure that a message got through to Saddam was to deliver it in person. Whatever the U.S.

domestic political benefit, Prince Bandar had read Saddam correctly. The Iraqi

dictator told Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s Middle Eastern Advisor,

Yevgeny Primakov, that the offer invalidated Moscow’s warning of an inevitable

conflict.1 A short time later the Washington Post published the results of poll

indicating that 90 percent of the American population supported the offer. On the

day of the president’s proposal, two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Admiral William Crowe and General David Jones, testified to the Senate Armed

Services Committee that the United States should not rush into a war with Iraq.2

On December 1 Saddam accepted President Bush’s bid for peace, but he placed

a condition on it that Palestine and other occupied Arab lands must form the first

item under discussion. The president rejected this linkage of Kuwait to the

Palestinian problem.

The next day Saddam continued his manipulation of the thousands of

Western and Soviet hostages he had seized in early August. After a personal

meeting with Muhammad Ali, former world heavyweight boxing champion,

Saddam released into his custody two Canadian and six British hostages. On

December 3 the Soviets reported that Saddam had given permission for 1,000

Soviet citizens to leave. Twenty-four hours later the Iraqis gave all 3,232 Soviet

citizens in its custody freedom to leave. This behavior illustrated the capricious

fashion in which Saddam dealt with his hostages. He had seized them in an

attempt to gain political leverage over their native countries. He had seen the

United States, in particular, bend its regional foreign policy into pretzel-like

shapes over a few dozen hostages held in Iran and a half-dozen in Lebanon. At

this point, however, Saddam encountered a media phenomena, the toddler-downthe-well syndrome (when a two-year-old child trapped in a well in Texas is big

news, but a mud slide killing hundreds of people in Peru, as had occurred in

1987, is not). By making too large a statement, Saddam lost his supposed advantage. The world found it hard to personalize his hostages because he had so

many.

Saddam had the hostages distributed to various targets throughout Iraq, hoping to deter Coalition bombing. In this he succeeded. Had he but known that

148

On Target

1. Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset,” p. 7.

2. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 336–337.
General Glosson had instructed Colonel Deptula to red-line all targets reported

to have hostages present, Saddam might never have moved them. However,

according to Colonel Deptula, the Iraqis had, for the most part, placed the

hostages in locations that would not inhibit the offensive air campaign.3 This was

an indication, perhaps, that the Iraqis either had little understanding of the goals

of a strategic attack or, more likely, had little idea of their vulnerability to one.

The Iraqis actually placed the hostages on several targeted sites, but PGMs and

nonlethal weapons could attack the specified aiming points of those targets with

no harm to the hostages.4

When it appeared that the hostages constituted a wasting asset, Saddam

began to release them a few at time to visiting international statesmen and personalities. Those personages merely had to travel to Baghdad, make the appropriate homage to Saddam, and depart with a handful of their countrymen. This

slightly demeaning game benefited all its players. The powerless pawns, the

hostages, gained their freedom. The white knights, the visiting dignitaries,

gained the regard of their partisans in the homeland as peacemakers and as rescuers of the helpless. Saddam, the king struggling to escape check, had his ego

stroked and gained prestige with his countrymen and fellow Arabs, who either

naively accepted the game at face value or savored the pervasive hypocrisy of all

involved in the affair. Few could fail to appreciate the irony of members of the

first world coming to kowtow to a member of the third. After a number of eminent visitors secured the release of numerous hostages from various countries, on

December 6 Saddam announced the ending of the travel ban imposed on foreigners, and within a week all American hostages had left Iraq. President Bush

remarked, “when you don’t have Americans there, and if force is required that’s

just one less worry I’ve got.” Senior U.S. military officials admitted to the press

that they could now revise targeting to attack all targets.5 By January 15, all nonIraqi nationals who wished to leave Iraq had gone. If one accepts the proposition

that a sovereign state may take hostages (which is, of course, against international law), one must wonder at Saddam’s handling of his hostage resource. He

seems to have paid dearly in lost respect and international anger and sold cheaply for the benefit of out-of-power politicos or for ineffective propaganda. His

infamous televised audience with the British hostages backfired and provided his

opponents with a tremendous propaganda coup. Once Saddam had accepted the

opprobrium for hostage-taking, he might well have continued the gamble and

used his prisoners as human shields indefinitely. This might have made subsequent Coalition air operations more difficult and costly. Perhaps Saddam’s own

self-image prevented this—a paladin does not hold the helpless in thrall.

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The Decision for War

3. Telecon, Lt. Col. Deptula, SECAF Working Group, with Dr. Wayne Thompson, AF/

CAFH, Sep 13, 1991.

4. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 19.

5. John M. Broder, “With Its Hostages Out, U.S. Revises List of Iraqi Targets,” Los

Angeles Times, Dec 13, 1990, p. 1.
As the last act of the hostage drama ended, the tragicomedy of the Secretary

Baker-Foreign Minister Aziz missions continued. On December 9 the Iraqis stated their willingness to meet Secretary Baker before January 12. The Secretary

suggested that the date be earlier than January 3 instead, only to have the Iraqis

shift it to January 12. This date was perilously close to the deadline and seemed

to offer the chance for the Iraqis to use delaying tactics. On the thirteenth of

December, the day the United States finally evacuated its embassy in Kuwait

City, the United States rejected the Iraqi proposal. Two days later, Iraq responded by canceling Foreign Minister Aziz’s December 17 visit to Washington.

Secretary Baker maintained the U.S. position of not meeting in Baghdad after

January 3. On the last day of the year, an unnamed Iraqi official stated Iraq would

consider scheduling meetings between the Iraqi and U.S. presidents and foreign

ministers if the United States cared to make another proposal. The White House

announced on January 3 that Secretary Baker could meet on January 8, 9, or 10

in Geneva with Foreign Minister Aziz. The next day the Iraqis agreed to a foreign ministers meeting on January 9.

The military and domestic political aspects of the crisis overshadowed crisis

diplomacy. In mid-month, Amnesty International, a respected international

human rights organization known for its willingness to condemn abuses wherever found—including in the United States and in its friends and clients—issued a

damning report on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Based on uncorroborated

interviews with expatriate Kuwaitis and eyewitnesses, the report testified to illegal Iraqi arrests, detentions, torture, and executions. It gave numerous instances

of kidnaping, disappearances, and gang rape. The report also spoke of medical

atrocities, such as killing a patient by disconnecting her from her dialysis

machine, and the killing of 312 premature infants by removing them from their

incubators in order to send the machines to Iraq.6 The report horrified and

enraged President Bush, who spoke of his anger to reporter David Frost during

the taping of a interview for later broadcast. The report may have nudged the

president toward war. He told Frost that the United States could have a better

world if it stood up to Saddam, but not if it compromised with him. The president added, “We have such a clear moral case....It’s that big. It’s that important.

Nothing like this since World War II. Nothing of this moral importance since

World War II.” By December 17 National Security Advisor Scowcroft purportedly told Prince Bandar, “the President has made up his mind,” and regarded subsequent moves as “exercises.”7

The President may have committed himself to the use of force on an emotional level, but he apparently sent General Powell and Secretary Cheney to the

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On Target

6. Amnesty International, Iraq/Occupied Kuwait: Human Rights Violations Since 2 August 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Amnesty International USA, December 19, 1990). For the medical atrocities, see AI Index: MDE 14/16/90, pp. 55, 57. The AI interviewers seemed particularly credulous of the accounts of their informants. Postoccupation investigations in Kuwait

failed to confirm some of the conditions alluded to in the report.

7. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 343–345.
Gulf to assure himself of the viability of General Schwarzkopf’s war plans and

the readiness of the force. They arrived in Riyadh on December 19 and almost

immediately found themselves caught in the back blast of a faux pas committed

by General Schwarzkopf’s second in command, Lt. Gen. Calvin A. H. Waller,

USA. General Waller had a thirty-minute interview with eight reporters traveling

with the chairman and the secretary. A few hours of candor ended a career for

General Dugan; for General Waller, one candid answer embarrassed the secretary

and the administration. The general simply admitted that all his troops would not

be ready for “combat activities” by January 15 and that he couldn’t “imagine”

the president ordering an offensive so soon.8 Despite White House denials,

General Waller had not erred; many of the VII Corps’ units and soldiers would

not have shipped into the theater or have had an adequate time to train and acclimatize by January 15. The next day DoD press spokesman, Pete Williams, told

the press that the secretary would not draw any conclusions until he had completed his five-day stay in the AOR. In the meantime, General Waller’s statement

continued the American pattern of sending contradictory messages to Saddam,

who undoubtedly found solace in it and may have discounted later, firmer messages because of it.

On December 20 General Glosson briefed Secretary Cheney, Under

Secretary Wolfowitz, General Powell, General Schwarzkopf, and General

Horner on the latest variant of the four phases of the offensive air campaign.

Phase I, the strategic air campaign, would be the primary focus for approximately three to six days; Phase II, air supremacy in the KTO, would overlap Phase I

and last one or two days; Phase IIIA, battlefield preparation attacks on the

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The Decision for War

8. Barton Gellman, “General: U.S. Troops Won’t Be Ready,” Washington Post, Dec 20,

1990, p. A1.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

General Colin L. Powell
Republican Guard, would have first priority next and continue in full force until

day ten. Phase IIIB, battlefield preparation attacks on Iraqi forces in Kuwait,

would begin day eight and would continue until initiation of Phase IV, ground

attack, sometime between days fourteen and eighteen. The ground offensive

would last approximately two weeks. The times and duration of each phase

assumed average weather. While each phase was identified with a number for

days of duration, those were the days of maximum effort, with some degree of

effort in each phase at all times.9 From December 18 to January 15 an additional 373 U.S. aircraft (218 USAF and 155 USN) would reinforce the theater, which

would increase the first day’s planned strike sorties by almost 800. Strategic targets almost tripled from the original 84 to 238, showing large increases in leadership (from 5 to 32), railroad and bridge (3 to 28), and airfield (7 to 28) target

systems. The Iraqis had 20 primary airfields, 13 active dispersal fields, and 19

additional available dispersal fields. Intelligence credited the Iraqis with 500

(including 262 interceptors and 177 attack models) first-line aircraft, almost all

of Soviet manufacture, and 37 Soviet attack helicopters. For air defense, they had

complete coverage of their airspace from 478 early warning radars, 75 high-frequency radars, and 154 acquisition radars. Ground air defenses included 3,679

SAMs, 972 AAA sites, 2,404 guns, and 6,100 mobile guns.10 The Baghdad area

alone had 522 SAMs, 380 AAA sites, and 1,267 guns, making it more heavily

defended than Murmansk and giving its defenses twice the density of the most

heavily defended target in Eastern Europe. The Iraqi IADS was a key target.11

The briefing explored two sensitive target systems in depth: Scuds and CW

and BW production and storage. (The following information, undoubtedly known

to those attending, is intended to help the reader put the briefing in context.)

Intelligence credited the Iraqis with 550 to 700 short-range ballistic missiles

(SRBMs) divided into three types, all based on the same Soviet design: the Scud

B, or R–300E. In 1986 Iraq purchased 300 Scud Bs from the Soviet Union. The

design of the missile had originated in the late 1950s or early 1960s and attained

initial operational capability in 1965. It had a single-stage storable-liquid rocket

engine and weighed 6,300 kilograms (approximately 7 tons). It employed an inertial guidance system with three gyros, used internal graphite jet-vane steering, and

had a warhead that detached from the missile body during the final fall toward its

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On Target

9. MemoRec, Lt. Gen. Buster C. Glosson, DCS, Plans & Ops, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula,

and Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, “Review Session on The Offensive Air Campaign,” Dec 11,

1993.

Two years after General Glosson delivered this briefing, both he and Colonel Deptula

vehemently insist that in this briefing the number of days associated with each phase was

approximate and did not constitute a firm commitment by the USAF to fulfill the full objectives of each phase in the specified time limit.

10. For a more detailed breakdown of Iraqi SAM and AAA defenses, see the section, “The

Offensive Air Campaign: The Opposing Forces,” beginning on page 166, this volume.

11. Brfg Slides 1–9 and 6m, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,” Dec 20, 1990 [File No. Black Hole/GWAPS notebook 18 General Glosson Briefs/tab

5, 20 Dec 90].
target. With a normal warhead its range was 290 to 300 kilometers (about 183

miles) and its nominal circular error of probability (CEP) was 1,250 meters (3⁄4

mile). It usually deployed on the Soviet-built MAZ–543 eight-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).12 Iraq, possibly with outside assistance, heavily

modified the original Scud B design and produced and manufactured two

improved models: the Al Husayn (named for Prophet Mohammed’s martyred

grandson, a Shia saint) and the Al Hijarah. The two Iraqi-built missiles could use

the MAZ–543 TEL or an indigenously manufactured trailer-mounted mobile

erector-launcher (MEL). In early December, DIA estimated that the Iraqis possessed nine to twelve MAZ–543s.13 September estimates from Checkmate indicated an upper limit of forty-four TELs/MELs,14 but six weeks later a combined

U.S. intelligence agencies estimate put the number at nineteen.15

Unlike the Scud B, the Iraqi missiles could also launch from fixed sites. The

Al Hijarah had a range of 750 kilometers (465 miles), and the Al Husayn, 600

kilometers (370 miles). The Iraqi modifications had not increased the missile’s

accuracy; their variants had nominal CEPs of perhaps 3,000 meters (nearly 2

miles).16 Given their inaccuracy and small payloads, the Iraqi missiles had little

military value, but their political worth outweighed a negligible conventional

military potential. When aimed at a heavily populated area, they made a loud

noise coming in, created a big bang, broke many windows on impact, and panicked civilians. During the War of the Cities in 1988 when Iraq and Iran had

exchanged missiles aimed at each other’s major cities, the Iraqis had maintained

a rate of fire triple that of their opponent’s—a result of a larger inventory rather

than superior ability. In any case, the peppering of the Iranian capital with missiles had caused more than a million persons to evacuate the city and lowered the

morale of those left behind.

Every nation in the Persian Gulf area had absorbed the Iranian lesson on

missiles. The use of similar missiles in Afghanistan by the communist government in Kabul had further made its mark. The morale of Saudis and the other

Arabs might plummet in the face of a sustained bombardment, making the maintenance of the Coalition more problematic. U.S. concern for possible Israeli reaction to missile firings probably exceeded its worries over an Arab reaction. The

Israelis had a standard and uncompromising response to acts of terrorism—retaliation against the perpetrators. The U.S. government, because of its long-standing support of the state of Israel and the large amounts of annual military and

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The Decision for War

12. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol.

2, The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), pp. 496–497.

13. Msg, 070600Z Dec 90, DIA, Washington D.C., to DIACURINTEL.

14. Msg, 012100Z Sep 90, HQ USAF [Col. Warden] to Brig. Gen. Glosson, Subject:

SRBM Threat [File No. CK/A-Staff/Out-Msg].

15. Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 36.2–5–90, CIA, “Iraq As a Military

Adversary,” October 1990, p. 14 [T/CT/76/Iraq].

16. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), pp. 13–14, p. 14 Chart “Iraqi Missile

Capabilities.”
economic backing granted to Israel, had much diplomatic leverage on the Israelis

and could use that leverage to restrain them. However, the government of Israel

had domestic as well as international pressures. If enough missiles landed on

Israeli soil, the government might feel compelled to strike back at Iraq, performing the very action that Saddam had hoped to provoke.

One Israeli attack on Iraq, depending on the circumstances, might or might

not shatter the Coalition. Not only would Israel be attacking an Arab state, but

Israel would have to violate either Jordanian, Syrian, or Saudi airspace to do so.

The Jordanians had already made it clear they would defend their airspace, as

had the Syrians. The Saudis had greatly strengthened their air defenses in the

areas near Israel, a result of Israel’s violation of their airspace on the way to

bomb the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor. The Saudis would have to defend their airspace or appear to be in league with the Israelis. Repeated Israeli attacks on Iraq

would cause Syria and other Arab states to abandon the Coalition and discredit

all Arab governments that supported action against Saddam. In such an event,

Saddam would win a political victory. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, political

victory can prove of more consequence than can a force of arms. In a sense,

Scuds gave Saddam his best, and possibly only, chance for victory. As a result,

the U.S. government would have no choice but to pay almost any price to deny

Saddam the full use of his missiles.

Another facet of the Iraqi SRBMs offered an additional threat. In a speech

on April 1, 1990, Saddam announced that Iraq had developed binary CWs,

heretofore possessed by only two other countries in the world: the United States

and the Soviet Union. Later in the same speech, he clearly articulated the threat

by warning Israel that, if she struck Iraqi weapons plants, “By God, we will make

the fire eat up half of Israel.”17 Further, the Iraqis were known to be working on

BW and nuclear weapons. They had employed CW extensively against the

Iranians. If their SRBMs could take NBC warheads, inaccuracy would not

remain a serious problem. This added to the sense of panic in the civilian populations that surrounded Iraq. It also complicated the military problem in that a

half-dozen or more SRBMs impacting on the same base might contaminate and

disable it. Of course, a nuclear warhead, which seemed least likely given what

the Coalition had learned about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, presented the

greatest civilian and military difficulty. If Saddam, by some dark miracle, had

actually acquired an atomic weapon or two, one could only hope that a sense of

self-preservation would prevent him from using it. Postwar reports from UN

inspection teams have shown that the Iraqis had a more advanced nuclear

weapons program than had been suspected. Also, Saddam is reputed to have personally handed U.S. satellite imagery to Soviet defense officials and asked for

and received Soviet training on deception of satellite and other intelligence collection means for his armed forces.18

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On Target

17. Oberdorfer, “Missed Signals in the Middle East,”p. 23.

18. William Scott Malone, “Did the U.S. Teach Iraq to Hide Its Terror Arms?” Washing-
The briefing itself did not include all of this background information.

Rather, it explained how CENTAF proposed to counter the SRBM menace. The

Iraqis had established fixed launch sites in western Iraq.19 These facilities, of

questionable value in a conflict because of their immobility, constituted

Saddam’s open threat to Israel. At his pleasure he could have the launchers

armed and pointed at Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the nuclear facility at Dimona in the

Negev desert, all within range. CENTAF proposed an initial attack of eighteen

F–15Es, without self-designating laser targeting pods, which would strike the

area at H-hour. In southern Iraq, west of Basra, the Iraqis had both mobile launch

sites and presurveyed mobile launch sites. The Iraqis had established two more

launch sites in Kuwait. From Jalibah airfield in southern Iraq, SRBMs could

reach Riyadh and Bahrain, putting civilians, vital Coalition debarkation and supply ports, close-in air bases, and most Coalition ground forces under the gun.

Coalition air forces would hit all the airfields in the first day as part of the air

defense suppression missions. Current intelligence estimates gave the Iraqis an

estimated thirty-six mobile Scud launchers. At H-hour plus one hour (H+1),

F–111Fs, F–16Ls (F–16s equipped with the LANTIRN navigation pod),

F/A–18s, and A–6Ms (USMC A–6s) would attack mobile Scud storage facilities

in the west and the airfield storage areas in the south and in Kuwait. At first light

(0600) on day 2, F–16s would strike Scud production, assembly, propellant, and

test facilities near Baghdad. Such facilities offered a large enough target to obviate the need for PGMs. Within thirty-six hours Coalition air would strike every

facet of Scud production and launch.20

As discussed in Chapter 3, CW and BW production and storage presented a

difficult bombing problem because of the consequences of possible widespread

dispersion of toxic and infectious agents. After assessing the risks associated

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The Decision for War

ton Post, Nov 3, 1991, pp. C1, C4.

19. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 14.

20. Brfg Slides 9–12, Brig Gen Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,”

Dec 20, 1990.

LANTIRN-equipped F–15
with CW targets as low, the special air campaign planners had scheduled CW

production and storage for attack. But not until this briefing did the Black Hole

planners receive authoritative permission to destroy the BW storage bunkers.

BW production involved somewhat less risk because the manufacturing facilities

did not store large amounts of the finished products. As part of their trip to the

theater, the secretary and the chairman gave final approval of the decision to

bomb the bunkers. In any case, the four major CW and BW production and storage centers would come under attack on day 1. (The details of the actual attack

on January 17, 1991, would differ slightly from those proposed in this briefing.)

Night-flying F–15Es would smash key portions of the Salman Pak research facility at H+1, while F–16s would pulverize the Habbaniyah CW production facility during the day, at H+14. Also on day 1, eleven USN-launched TLAMs would

impact on the Samarra CW and BW research, production, and storage facility to

the north of Baghdad, out of range of aircraft flying from Saudi Arabia, and

seven more would explode in the Taji CW and BW research facility, an extremely large, heavily defended military industrial complex also to the north of

Baghdad. The thirteen identified CW storage bunkers and the four BW storage

bunkers (two each at Karbala ammunition facility and Salman Pak CW and BW

research facility) would come under attack by H+2, mostly by F–117As. (New

intelligence would change these target identifications by January 17.) F–111Es

from Turkey would dust the two farthest north, Kirkuk West ammunition depot

and Tikrit ammunition depot, with CBU–8921 mines at H+10 minutes and at

H+17 minutes. (Aircraft did not fly from Turkey until the second night of the

war, causing the cancellation of these attacks.) During the second night, F–117As

or F–15Es, probably refueling from tankers flying inside Iraq, would finish the

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On Target

21. The CBU–89 cluster bomb (Gator) contains 72 BLU–91/B antitank mines and 22

BLU–92/B antipersonnel mines. Within two minutes of landing, the mines arm themselves and

will detonate upon target detection, mine disturbance, low battery voltage, or self-destruct timeout. The antitank mine is effective against tanks and armored vehicles. The antipersonnel mine

consists of eight tripwires and tripwire sensors, four per face. The tripwires can deploy up to

40 feet in length; detonation occurs when a target actuates a tripwire.

A destroyed underground

bunker
job. The BW storage bunkers offered a ticklish problem, and the briefing went to

great lengths to describe the vulnerabilities of the agents, the attack techniques,

and the possible damage.

The discussion seemed more upbeat than the one occurring in the Black

Hole at the same time. As mentioned previously, the method of attack initially

chosen was a mixture of timed strikes and carefully selected munitions. By the

beginning of the conflict the planners had modified the attack scheme and

increased its accuracy.22 The aircraft would not begin the attack until just before

dawn. Destruction would preclude military use but would not totally destroy the

agents, which would decay in sunlight.23 The area of possible contamination

depended on the wind speed—a twenty-knot wind would produce an eightymile-long cloud. But, as a slide demonstrated, the weather and the wind in Iraq

conformed to the norm in the northern hemisphere and traveled from west to

east, carrying contamination away from Baghdad. The briefing further justified

pounding the BW bunkers with a reference to the protocols to the 1949 Geneva

Convention, Articles 56 and 57. The slide interpreted the articles as follows:

“installations containing dangerous forces (such as biological warfare production

facilities and storage bunkers) lose their protection against attack if they are used

in direct support of military operations and an ‘...attack is the only feasible way

to terminate support.’” In addition, the plan took “all feasible precaution in the

choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event

minimizing incidental loss of civilian life.”24

By the end of the sixth day25 of the strategic air campaign, the briefing

claimed air power would have:

Destroyed the Iraqi leadership’s military command and control,

Destroyed Iraq’s NBC capability,

Disrupted and attrited the Republican Guard,

Disrupted the Iraqi leadership’s ability to communicate with the populace,

Destroyed key electrical grids and oil storage, and

Limited the resupply capacity of the Iraqi military in Kuwait.26

Phase II had one goal: establishment of air supremacy over Kuwait and

adjoining regions of Iraq containing Iraqi forces capable of intervention in

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The Decision for War

22. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 20.

23. Brfg Slide 14, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,” Dec

20, 1990.

24. Brfg Slides 13–16a, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,” Dec20, 1990.

25. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 21.

Colonel Deptula recalls: “No one was hung up on six days. That was an approximation,

and partially an indicator that we wanted to conduct these operations quickly. The key to

achieving the results stated in the briefing was completion of the strategic air campaign—not

six days.

26. Brfg Slide 17, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,” Dec

20, 1990.
Kuwait. This would provide an environment conducive to the conduct of air and

ground attacks. At the end of two days, USAF F–4G Wild Weasels, F–16s,

F–15Es, F–111Fs, and EF–111As, and USN F/A–18s and EA–6s would destroy

all radar-controlled surface-to-air threats with AGM–88 HARMs and CBU–

71s.27

In this type of fighting—aircraft against ground radar—the F–4G had a distinct advantage over the other two airframes that fired HARMs—the F/A–18 and

the F–16.28 During Phase II, the planners hoped that the use of HARMs and other

electronic countermeasures would decapitate the Iraqi air defense system in the

south and over Kuwait. Once those defenses ceased to operate effectively, their

lack would expose Saddam’s ground forces to the full fury of Coalition air attack

in a battle of concealment, spade, and sandbag versus IR seeker, laser designator, and cluster bomb.

In Phases IIIA and IIIB, CENTAF claimed it could render the Republican

Guard only 50-percent effective with five days of effort and only 10-percent

effective with nine days of effort. As General Glosson informed his wing commanders in mid-December, the Coalition intended to expend approximately 600

sorties per day on the Republican Guard.29 With twelve days of additional effort,

CENTAF could disable, destroy, or render ineffective 50 percent of the armored

fighting vehicles, artillery tubes, and troops in Kuwait. With eighteen days’

effort, it could reduce to only 10-percent effectiveness Saddam’s remaining

armor, artillery, and troops in Kuwait. Such actions would leave the KTO prepared for the offensive ground campaign to liberate Kuwait and would achieve

the president’s objectives with a minimal loss of life.30 The ground force assault

should be like toppling an undermined wall.

These seemingly ambitious assertions actually represented declarations

scaled down from those of a few weeks earlier. On December 1, 1990, General

Glosson had briefed General Schwarzkopf on Phases II and III. CENTAF

claimed the same level of destruction but estimated that Iraqi forces in Kuwait

would become ineffective as a fighting force.31 Apparently General Schwarzkopf

rejected this contention. For both the December 1 and December 20 briefings,

Phase IV showed the fruition of Army planning. Both briefings showed the socalled Hail Mary envelopment of the Iraqi right flank. The Hail Mary required

the XVIII Corps, on the extreme Coalition left flank, to break through lightly

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On Target

27. Brfg Slides 18–21, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,”

Dec 20, 1990.

28. Intvw, Maj. Mike Leggett, HQ TAC Directorate of Operations, Electronic Combat

Division, with TSgt. Marcus R. Walker, CENTAF/HO, at RSAF HQ, Riyadh, Oct 16, 1990.

29. Brfg, Brig. Gen. Glosson to USAF wing commanders, Dec 18, 1990 [File No. Black

Hole/GWAPS notebook 18 General Glosson Briefs].

30. Brfg Slides 28–30, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,”

Dec 20, 1990.

31. Brfg Slide, Brig. Gen. Glosson to Gen. Schwarzkopf, “Theater Campaign: Summary,

Phase III—Kuwait,” Dec 1, 1990 [File No. Black Hole/GWAPS notebook 18 General Glosson

Briefs].
held Iraqi lines and drive due north to An Nasiriyah in order to seal off the battlefield from the west. Concurrently, the armor-heavy VII Corps, to the right of

XVIII Corps, would pierce through more heavily defended Iraqi positions, just

to the west of Wadi al Batin and the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. The VII Corps would

then drive north and wheel to the east, either to flank the Republican Guard

forces or to engage them in an encounter battle should they move to the west and

south to confront the Coalition thrust. The briefing given to Secretary Cheney

also illustrated the final ground arrangements along the Kuwaiti borders—the

U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force sandwiched between two Arab Corps.32

Finally, the briefing addressed the effects of weather and moonlight on the

air campaign. Using historical weather data, based on the previous fourteen

years, General Glosson stated that on average a weather front passed west to east

through Iraq every three to five days. On two of those days, clouds would produce ceilings of 10,000 feet or less; on the other three to five days, relatively

clear conditions would predominate. For Baghdad, ceilings of 10,000 feet or

greater with visibility of five or more statute miles should occur at least 62 percent of the time in January and 69 percent of the time in February. If all went

according to schedule, as seldom happens in warfare, the Coalition could mount

its air and ground offensives in favorable weather and lunar conditions.

In all, the air briefing promised Secretary Cheney that air power would:

Establish air superiority over Iraq,

prevent air attack,

preclude Scud attack,

Destroy leadership communication,

with military,

with populace,

Destroy NBC research, production, and storage,

Destroy transportation nodes that resupply Iraqi forces in Kuwait,

Destroy 50% of Republican Guard’s armor, artillery, and personnel,

Shape the battlefield for the ground forces, and

Provide constant firepower for the ground forces.33

During the briefing, if not earlier, General Schwarzkopf probably informed

Secretary Cheney that the Saudi Joint Forces commander, General Prince Khalid,

had on December 13 already agreed to the outline of the offensive plan and that

the CENTCOM staff and Joint Force’s staff had begun to develop an OPLAN for

a combined operation, Operation Desert Storm, which he expected to issue in

draft form shortly.34

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The Decision for War

32. Brfg Slide 34, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,” Dec

20, 1990.

33. Brfg Slide 35, Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef Cheney, “Offensive Air Campaign,” Dec

20, 1990.

34. Cvr Ltr, Maj. Gen. R. B. Johnston, USMC, CENTCOM C/S to U.S. Component Commanders, Subj: Combined OPLAN Review, Dec 30, 1990.
The campaign sketched by this briefing demonstrated the difficulty of

mounting prolonged, strategic air operations within the context of a ground campaign. As history had shown in the Normandy Invasion of June 1944, strategically oriented air power will always be called upon “to shape” the battlefield in

order to avoid excessive ground casualties.35 Neither general nor politician finds

it easy to resist the attractive but doubtful proposition that bombing which directly assists ground forces reduces casualties, at least in the short run, while bombing the enemy’s resources will only bring the war to a halt slowly. The war in the

Persian Gulf would prove no exception. Phases III and IV called for the widespread use of F–117As, F–111Fs, and F–15Es against ground troop targets. The

use of these aircraft would hamper the fulfillment of the goals of the strategic air

campaign. After six days of concentrated bombing, followed by several weeks of

a 15-percent effort (including a far greater percentage of PGMs), the strategic air

campaign was to have destroyed 238 key targets, wiped out Iraq’s weapons of

mass destruction, isolated its leadership, and damaged key sections of its industry. But once the Army had finalized its offensive ground campaign planning, it,

like the USAF, would have to justify the national treasure expended on its

upkeep in the past, present, and, most of all, in the fiscally restrained future by

visibly delivering some of the heaviest blows against Saddam. The strategic air

campaign could succeed completely only if American leadership could avoid the

temptation to divert too many of its air resources to assist the ground campaign.

Given the inexorable pressure from the ground forces to proceed from Phases II

and III into the full-fledged ground assault of Phase IV, such an outcome seemed

problematic.

Once again, air power’s flexibility might prove its undoing. The accuracy

and range of aerial firepower, from just beyond the range of ground-based

artillery to hundreds of miles deep inside enemy territory, offer a plethora of

employment options. Some air services, such as the Soviets in World War II,

found it impossible to resist the pull from the ground forces for maximum assistance. The USAAF in World War II, except for the significant Normandy decision previously mentioned, finessed the question of tactical versus strategic

apportionment by providing an overwhelming number of specialized aircraft for

both tasks. Yet one of the implications of having fewer, more versatile, more

expensive, more capable aircraft in the future is that those aircraft will always be

shifted from deep strategic missions to support and interdiction missions for the

ground forces because the nation possesses no other aircraft capable of performing such missions. The NCA and theater CINCs will have to discipline themselves not to make the inevitable switch from strategic to tactical employment

too precipitately.

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On Target

35. For a discussion of this controversy, see W.W. Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower’s Decision of March 25, 1944 (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press,

1981).
Secretary Cheney and General Powell found the plan satisfactory. They told

General Schwarzkopf to expect execution of the air phases soon after January 15.

When General Powell visited his old unit, the 2d Brigade, 101st Air Assault

Division, he told them, “be ready for war.”36 The next day Secretary Cheney told

the men and women of the 354th TFW(P) that the Coalition approached the

“moment of truth” when “we may have to use force to get him [Saddam] out” of

Kuwait.37 Upon his return to Washington, December 23, the secretary stated:

“One has to conclude that the situation is not improving and that the days are

drawing closer when we may be forced to resort to military force.”38 On

Christmas Eve, Secretary Cheney and General Powell briefed National Security

Advisor Scowcroft and the president at Camp David. Supposedly, they informed

the president that General Waller had spoken the plain truth; the ground forces

could not attack until mid-February. However, Secretary Cheney noted the professionalism of the air campaign and his satisfaction with its details. Both the

secretary and the chairman assured the president that the air campaign could

begin by January 15, before the ground forces had been built up to full strength.

Their visit to the theater had also apparently convinced them that the troops’

morale would suffer if they had to wait too long after the January 15 deadline.

The president agreed and told them to think seriously about beginning the air

campaign at the best and soonest point after January 15. The three further agreed

that the beginning of the ground war would require a separate presidential decision. After the meeting, on December 26th General Powell talked to General

Schwarzkopf, informed him of the president’s intention to launch the air offensive soon after January 15, and obtained his recommended execution date and

time.39 General Schwarzkopf recommended 0300 Saudi time on January 17,

1991—a moonless night, perfect for the F–117As. General Glosson had suggested this exact date to General Schwarzkopf in August 1990.40 By December

28 senior administration officials stated to the press that the president had decided the United States would launch a massive military attack on Iraqi forces if Iraq

did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15. Because delay would increase

American casualties, the president would act regardless of public or congressional opinion.41 The next day, as the president spoke to a congressional delegation at the White House on the Gulf crisis, the CJCS received President Bush’s

authorization to send the warning order for Desert Storm (which contained the

recommended start time) to General Schwarzkopf.42

161

The Decision for War

36. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 348–349.

37. CRS, Chronology: Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, p. CRS-32.

38. Thomas Lippman and Barton Gellman, “Cheney Ends Gulf Tour on Fiery Note,”

Washington Post, Dec 24, 1990, p. A1.

39. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 399–400.

40. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 21.

41. Jack Nelson, “Bush Determined Not to Delay Gulf Attack,” Los Angeles Times, Dec

28, 1990, p. 1.

42. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 352–353. Woodward gives the specific time of the warn-
Time remained for diplomatic and political maneuvering. Reversing his previous insistence that he would not engage in talks with the Iraqis after January 3,

the president, as noted earlier, had offered on that date to have Secretary Baker

meet with the Iraqi Foreign Minister in Geneva on January 8, 9, or 10. The Iraqis

accepted on January 4 the offer for a January 9 meeting. Also on January 4 the

leaders of the House and Senate announced they would begin a debate on U.S.

policy in the Persian Gulf on January 10, with especial reference to the president’s authority to go to war without a congressional declaration of war. Four

days later the president responded with a blunt letter to Congress asking for a

resolution approving the use of “all necessary means” to remove Iraq from

Kuwait. This would put Congress on record as concurring with UN Resolution

678 (1990). The president’s request risked a chance for a humiliating and damaging congressional rebuff, but a more likely result would be an open-ended

debate on policy with no responsibility attached. Asking Congress for a specific

resolution forced it to stop debating and go on record as “yea” or “nay.” President

Bush assumed that a majority of both houses could not bring themselves to publicly oppose him against such a foe as Saddam. For his part, on January 7, Iraqi

Army Day, Saddam addressed his nation and braced his people for war stating:

“We do not believe the sacrifices will be small” and promised “the mother of all

battles.”

The January 9th six-and-a-half-hour meeting between Secretary Baker and

Foreign Minister Aziz produced the international drama of two nations meeting

to avert war. The tension was heightened by the strain of a long meeting with no

news to the press, seemingly pointless haggling over the acceptance of a personal letter from President Bush to President Saddam (which showed how much

Saddam’s own people feared to be the bearers of bad news), profoundly gloomy

press conferences, and absolutely no movement by either side from positions

held at the beginning of the meeting. Neither party had come to negotiate, only

to confirm current positions. Afterward Secretary Baker stated, “Regrettably, I

heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility.” For his part, Foreign

Minister Aziz said his country was “preparing for the worst” and would

“absolutely” respond by attacking Israel.43 Both parties intended to use the

Baker-Aziz meeting as a stone in their own propaganda slings in order to display

to the Gulf nations, to their own internal domestic audiences, and to the rest of

world their own reasonableness and desire for peace, while demonstrating their

enemy’s intractability. That same day, President Bush held a press conference in

which he stated that Saddam’s rejection of a diplomatic solution discouraged

him. Saddam told a Baath Party gathering that the Iraqi armed forces would

162

On Target

ing order (CJCS to USCINCCENT) as 291612Z Dec 90. General Schwarzkopf says he did not

receive a verbal warning order until January 8, 1991. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p.

407.

43. Thomas Friedman, “Baker-Aziz Talks on Gulf Fail,” New York Times, Jan 10, 1991,

p. 1.
defeat U.S. forces in the Gulf. The January 9 meeting had little practical significance, but as a psychological harbinger it effectively set the stage for armed conflict by demonstrating the uselessness of further dialogue.

After this illusory peace opportunity, the events of the final week of peace

in the Gulf region marched to their denouement. On January 10, as both houses

of Congress began their debate on whether or not to give economic sanctions

more time to work or instead to authorize the president to use U.S. armed forces

to expel Iraq from Kuwait, the press reported that Coalition ground forces had

begun to move in strength toward the Kuwaiti border. At the same time,

Secretary Baker, who had flown directly from Switzerland to Saudi Arabia,

apparently officially obtained the Saudis’ agreement to offensive operations

against both Kuwait and Iraq. On January 12, President Assad of Syria informed

Secretary Baker that his forces would defend Saudi Arabia but would not attack

Iraq. Also on that date, the United States closed its embassy in Baghdad and

requested that all but four Iraqi diplomats accredited to the United States leave

Washington. The House of Representatives and the Senate concluded their

debates. In the House, a large majority voted 302 to 131 for House Concurrent

Resolution 32, which affirmed Congress’ constitutional authority to declare war

and stated that U.S. offensive action against Iraq must have congressional

approval. However, the House defeated the resolution in favor of sanctions and

voted 250 to 183 for House Joint Resolution 77 which authorized the president

to use force to implement UN Resolution 678. Also on January 12, the Senate

followed a similar course of action. By a vote of 46 to 53 its members defeated

Senate Joint Resolution 1, which continued sanctions and stated that Congress

must approve future use of U.S. military force, and by a vote of 52 to 47 they

passed Senate Joint Resolution 2, which authorized the president to use force to

expel Iraq from Kuwait in accordance with UN Resolution 678. (A three-vote

change would have defeated this authorization.) Then, with unanimous consent,

the Senate voted to substitute the House version, House Joint Resolution 77, for

Senate Joint Resolution 2. House Joint Resolution 77 required that the president

certify both that the United States had used “all appropriate diplomatic and other

peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the” UN Security Council

Resolutions, and that those means had failed.44 The president signed the resolution into law (Public Law 102–1) on January 14, the same day the Iraqi National

Assembly unanimously granted President Saddam Hussein all necessary authority needed to confront the Coalition. On January 13 the Secretary General of the

UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, left Baghdad after having failed to obtain hope of a

settlement. On the 14th and 15th of the month, last-ditch French, European

Community, Libyan, and Yemeni peace efforts either collapsed or achieved nothing. On the day the UN deadline to Iraq expired, Egyptian President Mubarak

163

The Decision for War

44. U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Resolution 77, Section 2(b) REQUIREMENT

FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY [capitalization in original], 102d Cong., Jan 3, 1991.
followed Syria’s lead and stated that Egyptian troops would defend Saudi Arabia

but would not attack Iraq. The next day, January 16, large majorities in the

French and British parliaments approved the use of their armed forces to eject the

Iraqis from Kuwait. Apparently, the opposition of the French Minister of War led

the French Assembly to authorize the use of French troops or aircraft inside

Kuwait but not in Iraq proper.45

In the forty-eight hours before 1900 EST January 16, 1991, when the first

bomb should explode, President Bush took the steps necessary to begin armed

conflict between the United States and Iraq. On the morning of January 15 he

signed National Security Directive 54 (NSD–54), “Responding to Iraqi

Aggression in the Gulf.” In its first words, NSD–54 justified the U.S. presence

in the Gulf, declaring: “Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security.” Then NSD–54 designated Iraq as “clearly a power with interests inimical to our own” and noted that

economic sanctions had not ended the occupation of Kuwait and gave no

prospect of doing so. Delaying action to permit sanctions to take full effect

“would increase the costs of eventual military action, threaten the political cohesion of the coalition of countries arrayed against Iraq, allow for the continued

brutalization of the Kuwaiti people and the destruction of their country, and

cause added damage to the U.S. and world economies.” The document also set

guidelines for the defense of vital U.S. interests when confronted with “the unacceptable Iraqi aggression and its consequences.” In NSD–54, citing his constitutional authority, House Joint Resolution 77, and the appropriate UN resolutions,

the president stated, “I hereby authorize military actions designed to bring about

Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. These actions are to be conducted against Iraq

and Iraqi forces in Kuwait....” The president did not authorize an exact time and

date for commencement of hostilities.

He gave the armed forces permission to use force for four “purposes”:

To effect the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi

forces from Kuwait,

To restore Kuwait’s legitimate government,

To protect the lives of American citizens abroad, and

To promote the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

These objectives repeated the goals the president had stated as early as August

20, 1990, in NSD–45. They represented no expansion of his original aims.

To attain those purposes he directed U.S. and Coalition forces to “seek to”

fulfill the following “missions,” many of which simply restated objectives

already advanced by the services:

Defend Saudi Arabia and other GCC states against attack;

Preclude Iraqi launch of ballistic missiles against neighboring states and friendly forces;

164

On Target

45. CRS, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Chronology, pp. CRS-27–CRS-29.
Destroy Iraq’s NBC capabilities;

Destroy Iraq’s C3 capabilities;

Eliminate the Republican Guards as an effective fighting force; and

Conduct operations designed to drive Iraq’s forces from Kuwait, break the will

of Iraqi forces, discourage Iraqi use of NBC weapons, encourage the defection of Iraqi forces, and weaken Iraqi popular support for the current government.

In acting to achieve the above purposes and missions, the president instructed the

armed forces to take “every reasonable effort” to minimize U.S. and Coalition

casualties and to “reduce collateral damage incident to military attacks, taking

special precautions to minimize civilian casualties and damage to non-military

economic infrastructure, energy-related facilities, and religious sites.”

The document laid out additional administration policy for the AOR. The

United States would seek the maximum participation of all members of the

Coalition in all aspects of operations against both Kuwait and Iraq. The United

States would encourage Syria and Turkey to increase their forces along their borders with Iraq in order to draw off Iraqi forces from the KTO. The United States

would discourage Israel from participating in any military action, especially a

preemptive attack. “Should Israel be threatened with imminent attack or be

attacked by Iraq, the United States will respond with force against Iraq and will

discourage Israeli participation in hostilities.” Likewise the United States would

discourage Jordanian participation in hostilities, Jordanian aid or support for

Iraqi military efforts, and violation of Jordanian airspace or territory. The U.S.

government recognized “the territorial integrity of Iraq and will not support

efforts to change current boundaries.” Only in the event that Saddam employed

weapons of mass destruction, supported terrorist acts against the Coalition anywhere in the world, or destroyed Kuwait’s oil fields would it become “an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq.” The

president reserved the option to authorize further punitive measures against Iraq.

Next, he asked the appropriate U.S. governmental organizations to present to him

all measures necessary to stabilize energy supplies and prices during hostilities.

The president closed by stating: “Military operations will come to an end only

when I have determined that the objectives [purposes] set forth above have been

met.46

The necessity of a unitary Iraqi state as a barrier against Iranian expansionism formed the basis of U.S. policy toward Iraq since the fall of the Shah in 1979.

Presidents Reagan and Bush had no fondness for Saddam and his regime, but

they tolerated and even assisted it when it looked as if the Iranians might overwhelm it. Saddam’s initiation of the Kuwait crisis had presented the Americans

with a quandary: how to restrain Iraq without destroying it. The optimum solu165

The Decision for War

46. National Security Directive 54, “Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf,” Jan 15,

1991.
tion lay in a change in regime, or at least the head of regime. American policy

desired a strong Iraqi state to prevent fragmentation along ethnic lines and to

serve as a buffer for the weaker Persian Gulf states against Iran. This need for a

centralized Iraqi state accounts for NSD–54’s seeming magnanimity toward Iraq

and its desire to separate Saddam from the people (if Saddam is separated from

his populace, will he not fall of his own weight?). NSD–54’s desire to retain Iraq,

but not Saddam, reflected part of the appeal of Instant Thunder and its successors to the highest levels of American policymaking. The strategic air campaign

plan consistently promised to eliminate or weaken the regime without making

war on the average Iraqi in the street.

After signing NSD–54, the president authorized Secretary Cheney to sign a

formal execution order for Desert Storm for immediate transmission to General

Schwarzkopf. On January 16 at 0735 EST, seven ALCM-equipped B–52Gs of

the Eighth Air Force’s 2d Bombardment Wing (BW) began the longest combat

mission ever flown (thirty-five hours flight time, four refuelings, and a 14,000-

mile round-trip) by departing Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, to attack electrical

power plants in Iraq.47 With the B–52Gs already in the air, President Bush certified to Congress, in accordance with House Joint Resolution 77, that diplomacy,

economic sanctions, and all other peaceful means had failed to remove the Iraqis

from Kuwait; only force remained.48 That morning Secretary Baker reputedly

informed Ambassador Bandar of the exact time of the beginning of the offensive.

Prince Bandar quickly passed the information to King Fahd. At 1700 EST, two

hours before H-hour, Secretary Cheney notified Israeli Defense Minister Moshe

Arens of the impending air assault. The administration had given Secretary

Cheney the responsibility of overseeing military coordination with the Israelis, a

delicate task of balancing the Israeli’s need to know against the necessity of

keeping them separated from the Coalition. One-half hour later, the U.S. Navy

fired the first unrecallable shots of the war in the Gulf. The Aegis-class cruiser

USS Bunker Hill and the battleship USS Wisconsin began firing TLAMs, timed

to begin landing at 0306L on Iraqi targets.49 This act, unlike the B–52Gs

launched from Barksdale AFB, committed the Coalition to hostilities.

The Offensive Air Campaign: The Opposing Forces

The forty-three-day Coalition campaign against Iraq could have only one

outcome: the total military defeat of Iraq. Strategically, qualitatively, operationally, tactically, and aerially, the Iraqi armed forces confronted severe disad166

On Target

47. Msg, 170831Z Jan 92, SecDef, Washington, D.C., to AIG 8798 et al, Subj: DoD Press

Conference, Jan 16, 1992. Also see George Leopold and Barbara Opall, “AF Cites 14,000-mile

Raid As Proof of ‘Global Reach,’” Air Force Times, p. 23 Feb 3, 1992.

48. Ltr, President George Bush to Robert C. Byrd, President Pro Tempore of the Senate,

Jan 16, 1991, plus enclosure, “Report for Use in Connection with Section 2(b) of the Joint

Congressional Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq.”

49. Woodward, Commanders, pp. 370–371.
vantages when they opposed Coalition forces. USAF and other Coalition air

forces quickly compounded these difficulties with a coordinated strategic bombing campaign, which opened the conflict. By establishing immediate control of

the air, Iraqi ground forces were left open to around-the-clock air attacks. We will

now begin to examine the air operations of the six-week offensive air campaign

directed against Iraq and gauge their effectiveness and significance.

Iraq faced a hopeless strategic situation—isolated from its major arms suppliers; blockaded by land, sea, and air from most arms and industrial imports; its

overseas assets frozen; and unable to export oil or other goods. Coalition forces

stood opposite its southern borders; neutral powers of varying hostility surrounded it on the east, north, and northwest. Only the economically and militarily weak state of Jordan on its western border assumed a friendly stance, and it

even paid lip service to the UN-imposed embargo and sanctions. Qualitatively,

the Iraqi armed forces would operate at irreversible disadvantage when compared to Coalition forces. With the possible exception of raw numbers of men,

tanks, and artillery pieces, the Iraqi armed forces were inferior in every way to

the forces they opposed. Most Iraqi air and ground equipment consisted of 1950s

and 1960s Soviet designs, probably two generations or more behind their U.S.

and Coalition equivalents. Even the best Iraqi ground equipment, such as the

T–72M tank and the towed GC–45 155-mm artillery, had operational shortcomings when compared with Coalition arms. The bulk of Iraqi ground force personnel consisted of inadequately trained conscripts and reservists who had little

motivation, many of whom came from portions of the population somewhat

disaffected from the ruling Baath Regime. They demonstrated their disaffection

with high desertion and AWOL rates. The Republican Guard, which constituted

one-fifth of the Iraqi manpower in the theater, had the best weapons, the most

complete training, and the most loyal and high-quality personnel. Three

Republican Guard heavy divisions and five infantry divisions occupied reserve

positions in the KTO at the rear of all other Iraqi forces, positions farthest away

from Coalition aircraft. This added distance and concomitant logistical consumption made them the most difficult units for Coalition air to attack. An additional four newly raised Republican Guard divisions (one heavy and three

infantry) remained within Iraq serving internal security duties. The Republican

Guard divisions within the KTO represented a possible threat to Coalition

ground operations. Of course, all Iraqi equipment suffered from poor, if any,

maintenance and inadequate operator training. The departure of foreign technicians left the Iraqi Army unable to perform depot-level maintenance.50 The

Coalition ground forces had many qualitative advantages. Three of the largest

components—the American, Saudi, and British forces—were composed of volunteers, as were the French, whose conscription law forbade overseas service for

draftees. Personnel of the American, British, and French forces had far higher

167

The Decision for War

50. GWAPS, Vol 1, pt. 1, Planning (2d ed.), pp. 78–79.
training, motivation, and overall readiness than their Iraqi foes, and the deployed

units were famous for their esprit and accomplishment, for example the U.S. 1st

Infantry Division (the Big Red One), the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, units of the

U.S. Marine Corps, the British 7th Armored Brigade (The Desert Rats), and portions of the French Foreign Legion. The cutting edge of the Coalition ground

forces—the American ground forces—had superior armor equipment, such as

the M1A1 tank, artillery fire control, intelligence, battlefield communications,

and combat helicopters.

In the KTO and in southern Iraq the Iraqi ground forces confronted the classic dilemmas of desert warfare—an open flank impossible to close and lack of

cover or concealment to protect friendly forces from enemy air operations. When

the British had fought the Germans and Italians in the Egyptian desert almost

fifty years earlier, they had encountered the offensive advantages and defensive

problems of an open flank. In Lt. Gen. Sir Richard O’Connor’s smashing offensive against the Italian Tenth Army, O’Connor’s troops employed flanking

attacks to destroy a force many times their size. But when confronted with

German General Erwin Rommel, a master of movement warfare, they had

repeatedly failed to resolve the obstacle. At the decisive battle of El Alamein in

July–October 1942, terrain proved a key factor in the British success because it

allowed the British to establish a compact defensive line with one flank resting

on the Mediterranean and the other resting on impassable ground, which the Axis

mobile forces could not bypass. This produced a battle of attrition that favored

the British because it minimized the Axis advantage in maneuver combat, maximized British logistical strength, and compelled frontal attacks on prepared

defenses. Saddam’s army had no such favorable terrain. While the Persian Gulf

anchored the Iraqi left, their right flank extended hundreds of miles along the

Iraqi-Saudi and Iraqi-Jordanian borders. If the Iraqis stretched their forces thin to

cover the entire line, they offered the Coalition the opportunity to penetrate the

defenses at will. If the Iraqis kept their defensive line thick and let the flank hang

in the air, the Coalition forces could go around it. In either case, the mobility and

firepower of Coalition ground forces, once they had broken or circumvented

Iraqi lines, would enable the Coalition to mount a devastating assault on the main

Iraqi forces.

In fact, Saddam worsened the Iraqi position by fixating on the defense of

Kuwait. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Hitler’s preoccupation with

Stalingrad, he poured his divisions into the Emirate to create a defense in depth

while leaving his exposed flank thin. Coalition deception operations, designed to

foster an Iraqi belief in a USMC amphibious invasion of Kuwait, succeeded in

convincing the Iraqis to devote considerable resources to defending the coastline,

which diverted their forces from the front-line defenses but still left them sitting

in a potential trap in Kuwait. As late as January 15, two days before the opening

of the conflict, American intelligence reported the movement of artillery to the

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On Target
Kuwaiti shoreline.51 In the region of the northern Kuwaiti border and where that

border curves south, the Iraqis placed their theater reserve forces, approximately

eight divisions of the Republican Guard. From that position, the reserves could

either counterattack Coalition breakthroughs in Kuwait or swing to the west to

confront a Coalition flank attack. The placement of the Republican Guard also

allowed them to block the retreat of their own forces, should that become necessary. The positioning of the Iraqi operational reserves showed their underestimation of air power. During their eight-year war with Iran, they had seldom encountered an Iranian air-ground attack and had never had a significant land movement

halted or delayed by air attack. They appeared to assume their good fortune

would continue.

Like all desert terrain, the area of Kuwait and southern Iraq offered highly

favorable conditions for air-to-ground attacks, almost all of which would accrue

to the possessor of air superiority or supremacy. Lack of cover and the difficulty

of concealment for armored vehicles, trucks, artillery, supply dumps, and all

types of military facilities allowed Coalition IR and other high-tech sensors on

tactical aircraft to work in target-rich, uncluttered, and nearly ideal conditions.

Likewise JSTARS, TR–1s, RF–4Cs, satellites, and other Coalition reconnaissance assets would operate under excellent conditions. An army operating in a

desert had increased logistical needs for water and other items, which made it

more vulnerable to air interdiction and offered more targets for air power. By its

nature, slightly populated desert terrain freed air attackers from the constraints

imposed by the requirement to avoid collateral damage. Finally, lack of jungle

and mountains made it easier for tactical airlift to assist advancing forces by

landing on roads and by flying slower and lower on supply drops. Unlike

Vietnam where the rain forest proved a formidable opponent, the desert in Iraq

and Kuwait would maximize USAF combat strengths and Iraqi vulnerabilities.

At the tactical level, the Iraqi Army established a line of tank traps—high

sandbanks and interconnected strongpoints defended in depth and immediately

169

The Decision for War

51. Msg, 170632Z Jan 1991, DIA, Washington, D.C., Iraq Regional ITF, to DIACURINTEL [File No. T/HO/3/JAN].

JSTARS aircraft
supported by numerous towed artillery pieces and organic armored formations.

These traps extended along the Kuwaiti coastline, the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, and

approximately 40 miles along the Iraqi-Saudi border, 175 miles in all.52 They

heavily mined the approaches to the positions with antipersonnel and antiarmor

devices and employed razor wire. Iraqi combat engineers built 2,000 kilometers

(1,240 miles) of tactical roads behind Iraqi positions, constructed a 150-kilometer (993-mile) spur rail line to connect Kuwait City with the Iraqi national railway at Az Zubayr, installed a 100-kilometer (62-mile) water pipeline connecting

southern Iraq with Kuwait, and demonstrated their expertise in massive works of

combat engineering.53 The Republican Guard and other reserve units benefited

by receiving particularly well laid-out, concealed, deep, and damage-proof vehicle and personnel shelters. Front-line units had much less protection. However,

in many cases the Iraqis failed to lay their minefields properly and neglected to

cover them and other obstacles with supporting fire. The Iraqi reliance on towed

artillery with little or no overhead cover left it extremely vulnerable to counterbattery fire and air attack. Without massive artillery support, which had formed

the basis of their successful defensive tactics against Iran, Iraqi front-line units

lost much of their effectiveness. The Coalition made the Iraqi Army’s artillery

one of its prime objectives in the preparatory air campaign. To launch prompt

counterattacks or reinforce advanced units, the Iraqis emplaced mechanized and

armored reserves a few miles behind the front lines. As they had done in the their

war against Iran, they dispersed their artillery and armor and dug them in, limiting their mobility but providing them with a measure of increased protection.

In theory this scheme of defense would give the Iraqis all the advantages traditionally accruing to the defender. The defense had worked reasonably well

against the frontal assaults of a lightly armed Iranian infantry that lacked the discipline and mobility to fully exploit breaks in its enemy’s defenses. However,

heavily armored Coalition forces with their great mobility, tremendous firepower, and high-technology weapons proved an altogether different foe. The static

defensive front line of the Iraqis, with extremely limited or no lateral movement

of the front-line units, gave the Iraqis certain defensive strengths but conceded

offensive advantages to the Coalition. Western newspaper accounts, which published charts attributing the Iraqis with a manpower advantage of tens of thousands of men in the theater, erred on two accounts: first, they overestimated the

strength of Iraqi units, many of which entered the theater understrength; second,

they seemed to imply, to those unschooled in warfare, that every attacker would

encounter one if not more defenders. Because of Iraq’s static defenses and lack

of military intelligence (Coalition control of the air prevented Iraqi aerial surveillance, as did their own inability to mount effective ground reconnaissance

patrols), the Coalition instead had little difficulty in massing overwhelming force

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On Target

52. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, p. 408.

53. GWAPS, Vol 1., pt 1, Planning (2d ed.), p. 73, citing U.S. intelligence reports.
against selected Iraqi sectors and units—scattering them, breaking into their rear

areas, and engaging them, if necessary, in mobile combat. To their advantage, the

Western forces in the Coalition had trained for more than forty years to fight a

mobile Soviet force; the Iraqis had shown only a limited capability for mobile

action in the previous Iran-Iraq War.

Air power increased the Coalition’s strategic, operational, and tactical

advantages manyfold. Coalition air forces had superior numbers and far better

technology and training than the IZAF had. As of January 16, 1991, the USAF

had 47,731 personnel in the AOR54 with approximately 2,900 assigned to

CENTAF HQ in Riyadh.55 These personnel supported the 1,131 USAF aircraft

deployed in Desert Storm as of January 16, 1991:56

Combat Aircraft Support Aircraft

A/OA–10 144 C–20 1

AC–130 4 C–21 8

B–52G 20 C–130 128

EC–130 (CC) 5 AWACS 10

EC–130 (VS) 2 EC–130E 6

EF–111A 18 HC–130 4

F–4G 48 JSTARS 2

F–15C 96 KC–10 30

F–15E 48 KC–135 194

F–16 210 MC–130 4

F–111F 64 MH–53 8

F–117A 36 MH–60 8

RC–135 6

RF–4C 18

TR–1 4

U–2 5

The USN and USMC supplied 724 more aircraft, including 99 F–14s, 213 A–6s

and A/V–8s, and 168 F/A–18s. As of January 11 the individual Coalition partners had also contributed considerable air strength. A CENTCOM situation

report credited them with supplying 1,386 fighters and fighter-bombers, 849

helicopters, and 256 civilian transports.57

Iraq could counter this aerial juggernaut with an inventory of approximately 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft. Upon close examination, however, the total tally of

171

The Decision for War

54. Msg 162115Z Jan 91, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subject: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 212.

55. Intvw, Comdr. McSwain, Apr 7, 1992.

56. Msg. 162115Z Jan 91, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subject: Sitrep, cited in Michael,

Desert Shield Chronology, p. 213.

57. GWAPS, Vol., 5, pt 1, A Statistical Compendium, Table 10 “Allied Order of Battle”

(2d ed.), p. 44.
combat-capable aircraft reduced much of the IZAF’s apparent potency. Included

in the Iraqi inventory were trainer aircraft like L–29 Mayas and L–39

Albatrosses that had only a dubious combat value, or MiG–17 fighter/trainers

that had become totally obsolete except they were employed against lightly

armed Kurdish irregulars. Of greater concern to the Coalition forces were Iraq’s

obsolescent Tu–16 and Tu–22 bombers, not because of their minimal combat

value, but because of their capacity to deliver CW and possibly BW and because

of their range, 1,850 and 1,570 nautical miles respectively. Still, one such

bomber, skillfully flown a few feet off the ground and aided by Coalition inattention and overconfidence, might sneak through the defenses and, with a great

deal of luck, inflict much mischief. Of course, the chances for success for the

Iraqi ground attack force depended on its ability to survive on its fields, to fly

unimpeded to the ground battle area, and to operate with freedom against enemy

forces. Without air superiority or parity, the Iraqi ground attack force could not

significantly affect the outcome of ground operations.

The Iraqi interceptor forces faced the enormous task of defending their

nation’s airspace against an enemy numerically, qualitatively, and technologically superior. On January 12, 1991, a meeting of the Iraqi Tactics Analysis Team

held under the aegis of TAC and the Electronic Security Command, with attendees from the Air Weapons Center, Navy Fighter Weapons School (TopGun),

Naval Strike Warfare Center, U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), SAC Tactics

School, DIA, and various USAF intelligence organizations, examined the Iraqi

interceptor force. It assessed the MiG–29 as the Iraqi’s best interceptor “comparable to the latest U.S. fighters” because of its performance, its ability to “lookdown” and “shoot-down” low-altitude aircraft over land and its ability to carry

the AA–11 advanced IR missile. However, they noted that the MiG–29’s pilots

had recently transitioned to the aircraft from MiG–23s and Su–25s and did not

yet measure up to the Coalition F–1E pilots. Some variants of the Mirage F–1E

could also serve as capable fighters. The MiG–23Gs and MiG–25s had frontquarter IR and depressed-angle capability. They and the F–1Es compared to the

F–4/Phantom II in capability. The radar capability of the remainder of the interceptor force—MiG–21s, F–7s, and MiG–23Es—was limited, forcing these aircraft almost exclusively into day and point-defense roles. The analysis team

thought their quality dramatically less. In the team’s opinion, the IZAF was

“essentially out of its league in facing U.S./Allied air power.” Overall it found

Iraqi combat training “extremely basic and mission execution is GCI [groundcontrolled interception] dependent and apparently rigid.” Although the team recognized that “some competent pilots exist,” longtime observation had confirmed

that Iraqi training and tactics “lack rigor and sophistication.” Nonetheless, the

team cautioned that Iraq possessed sufficient hardened aircraft shelters to house

its entire fighter inventory, which would make it difficult to be knocked out in a

single blow. Also, because of their disadvantages, the fighters would work close172

On Target
ly with the SAM and AAA air defenses.58 This report indicated, by its tone and

predictions, that the Coalition air forces anticipated speedy establishment of air

supremacy over Iraq. Once the Iraqi fighter force no longer contested Coalition

control of the air, the remainder of the Iraqi air effort, if any, would cease because

it could not survive.

Within Saudi Arabia, CENTAF/IN had even more optimistic assessments.

The MiG–29 seemed less formidable close-up. It had below-average pilots, even

the Soviet advisors judged them as not as good as Soviet pilots, and it lacked the

AA–11 advanced missile. In addition, its pilots spent little time in training for

look-down, shoot-down engagements. MiG–29 pilots, like most Iraqi fighter

pilots, flew only nine hours a month, most of the time with visual flight rules.

Iraqi fighter pilots were weak on maneuver combat, disliked high-G and highpower moves, and overly depended on GCI. Even the F–1E pilots, the Iraqis’

best, received ratings of below average from their instructor pilots. CENTAF/IN

did not consider the MiG–29 to “pose a major threat to multinational force air

operations” because of the low proficiency of its pilots, their rudimentary tactics

and reliance on GCI, and the lack of spares and Soviet maintenance support.59

The Coalition gained further insight into the workings of the MiG–29 from the

West German Air Force which had inherited several of the advanced aircraft

when it absorbed the East German Air Force upon the second unification of

Germany. The RAF, with five USAF representatives present, flew its Tornados

and Jaguars for a week against the German MiGs at the Ingolstadt Flight Test

Center.60 Presumably, all three air forces gained useful information. A week after

the start of the war, on January 22, the USAF took delivery of a MiG–29 on loan,

possibly from the Germans. Intensive exploitation of its electronics and other

features followed.61 Thus even the most modern of Iraq’s interceptors had given

up many of its secrets to the Coalition before the first aerial engagement, or soon

thereafter.

After subtracting the more than 200 MiG–21s in its interceptor inventory,

which had only a marginal capability against Coalition aircraft, Iraq possessed

approximately 170 modern interceptors. These aircraft were all inferior export

versions of Soviet or French aircraft and all suffered from spare parts shortages

and maintenance shortfalls. Approximately one-third of the pilots of the modern

aircraft met average Western pilot standards of proficiency; the remainder had

varying degrees of inadequate training. General Glosson put it most succinctly,

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The Decision for War

58. Msg, 161800Z Jan 91, 99th Strategic Weapons Wing, Ellsworth AFB, S.D., to AIG

9471, retransmission of msg, 120422Z Jan 91, HQ ESC, Subj: Iraqi Tactics Analysis Team

Report (ITAT 91–1) [File No. SAC/HO, DS Working Archives, File 9.0 Intell].

59. Msg, Oct 90, CENTAF INTREP 90–92, Subj: Iraqi Fulcrum Capabilities and

Employment and MiG Tactics Response to IIR [File No. T/CT/folder #2].

60. Msg, 061550Z Nov 90, HQ USAF to Bonn, FRG, Subj: IIR 6 834 0075 91/ Military

Cooperation for MiG–29 Evaluation, Desert Shield [File No. CK/AS/IAF].

61. Msg, 161130Z Feb 91, HQ USAF Systems Command, Andrews AFB, Md.//IN to HQ

USAF, D.C.//IN, Subj: HAVE LOAN SPOT Report No. 3 [File No. T/CT/74/IN].
declaring, “the Iraqis don’t have fifty pilots worth a damn.”62 Almost all Iraqi

pilots lacked aggressiveness and were overly dependent on GCI techniques. If

the Iraqi interceptor fleet lost its GCI capability, its effectiveness would fall to

practically nil.63 With GCI capability, its modern fighters might interfere in

Coalition operations in the short run, but Coalition aircraft would soon drive

them from the skies. If the Iraqi interceptors refused to engage in combat and

stayed in their hardened shelters, they would have conceded air supremacy to the

Coalition, but their very existence and potential for harm would impose some

check on Coalition air operations.

As discussed previously, the Iraqis had a complex air defense system consisting of thousands of SAMs;64 7,000 AAA pieces, 4,000 no larger than 23 mm;

and hundreds of search radars controlled by an interlocking chain of hardened

operations centers directed from a single facility in Baghdad. The head of the

IZAF also served as chief of Iraq’s integrated air defenses. The system’s design

optimized SAM capabilities for medium and higher altitudes, minimally 10,000

feet AGL, while the AAA covered the altitudes below 10,000 feet AGL. Unlike

the popular image, Iraq did not possess enormous numbers of SAMs. Iraqi air

defense doctrine differed profoundly from Soviet doctrine inasmuch as the

Iraqis’ emphasized point, not area, defense. Approximately 3,700 SAMs distributed among 105 batteries defended strategic points within Iraq, and almost 65

percent of the SAMs defended the Baghdad area. In addition, the Iraqis assigned

52 percent of their AAA belonging to their air defense force and consisting mostly of ZSU–23–4 and S–60 (57-mm) AAA pieces (1,276 guns) to the Baghdad

region. Few of the guns had radar guidance. The system employed four types of

second-line Soviet SAMs—the SA–2 (Guideline), SA–3 (Goa), SA–6 (Gainful),

and SA–8 (Gecko)—and the Franco-German Roland. They represented a mix of

differing capabilities and effectiveness. The SA–2, designed in the early 1950s,

had an operational range of 22 to 32 miles and an effective maximum altitude of

80,000 to 120,000 feet (depending on the model). The SA–3, which first became

operational in 1961, had an effective range of 11 miles and an effective maximum altitude of slightly over 55,000 feet. The Soviets had designed and used

both missiles for point and area defense of strategic targets. Both types employed

external guidance. The Soviets designed the SA–6 and SA–8 as low- and medi174

On Target

62. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 21.

63. SNIE 36.2–5–90, Oct1990, p. 18.

64. See Brfg Slide 8, “SAM/AAA Threat,” Brig. Gen. Glosson to CJCS and SecDef, Dec

20, 1990. This briefing, and one given two days earlier to the AOR wing commanders, credited Iraq with a total of 3,679 SA–2, SA–3, SA–6, SA–8 and Roland radar directed missiles,

some of which had backup electro-optical and IR capabilities—all allotted to point defenses in

Iraq and available to oppose the air offensive. The point defenses did not include 6,500 SA–7s,

400 SA–9s, 192 SA–13s, and 288 SA–14s, most of them organic to the air defense formations

of Iraqi ground units. Like their combat aircraft inventory, the Iraqi SAM force contained many

older missiles approaching obsolescence; the design of the SA–2 went back to the early 1950s,

and the SA–6 had seen action against the Israelis in 1973.
um-altitude tactical systems to accompany its ground forces. The Iraqis incorporated them into their domestic air defenses instead. The SA–6, probably the most

dangerous system to Coalition aircraft, became operational in the 1970s. It had

capabilities against high-performance aircraft, a semiactive homing capability, a

maximum operational range of 15 miles, and a maximum effective altitude of

30,000 to 45,000 feet (depending on the model). The SA–8 reached its IOC in

1974. Its maximum operational range was 8 miles and its maximum effective

altitude was 20,000 feet.65 The Soviets had fielded upgraded replacement systems for all four missiles. By mid-January, the Iraqis may also have deployed two

batteries of U.S.-designed and -manufactured Hawk antiaircraft missiles that

they had captured from the Kuwaitis and placed in the Baghdad area.66 Lack of

training and familiarity with this system probably limited its Iraqi operator’s

ability to attain its maximum performance of a 25-mile range and 50,000-foot

altitude. The Hawk possessed modern guidance and countermeasure capabilities

and offered a potentially severe threat to Coalition operations.67

The configuration of the Iraqi missile defenses had several implications. The

Iraqis lacked sufficient missiles to cover both their large army and the strategic

targets in their homeland. Apparently as a result of practices adopted during the

war with Iran, they choose to concentrate their higher performance missiles to

defend their population and key targets, in particular Baghdad, Basra, the western Scud launching sites, and the northern oil fields. This meant that Coalition

aircraft flying against those targets would face relatively stiffer defenses. But the

concentration of defenses in a few areas left much of the rest of the country undefended and allowed Coalition aircraft to approach targets from different directions. The Republican Guard units and Iraqi armored divisions retained some

organic SA–6 and SA–8 batteries. The Iraqi ground forces’ possession of numerous low- to medium-altitude missiles reinforced the Coalition’s determination to

limit friendly aircraft losses by conducting ground support operations at medium

altitudes above 15,000 feet unless they found it absolutely necessary to do otherwise. By declining to position their higher altitude missiles to cover their army,

the Iraqis granted Coalition air power a medium-altitude sanctuary from which

to devastate their ground forces. Conversely, the presence of a multilayered missile defense over portions of Iraq forced most of the Coalition aircraft flying

strategic missions against Iraq to fly in packages employing electronic countermeasures and HARM-carrying aircraft. Fortunately, the Iraqis’ highest altitude

missiles, the SA–2s and SA–3s, approached the end of their operational life

spans, and the thirty years since their initial deployment had allowed the USAF

175

The Decision for War

65. DIA, Fact Book: Communist World Forces (DST–2660Z–013–90, Sep 1990), pp. 5-

63–5-74.

66. Msg, 120136 Jan 91, DIA Serial 36–91, Subj: Iraq: Readiness of Iraqi Forces for War

on 15 January, DOI 11 Jan 91 [T/HO/3/Jan].

67. For details on the HAWK, see Jane’s Weapon Systems, 1987–1988 (London: Jane’s

Publishing, 1987), pp. 181–182.
and several allied air forces to develop effective countermeasures to them. Like

those Coalition aircraft committed against the Iraqi ground forces, aircraft carrying out strategic missions would find it expedient not to descend below 15,000

to 20,000 feet into the range of AAA and tactical SAMs.68

In the middle to late 1980s, the Iraqis designed and the French built a sophisticated automated C3 system for its air defense known as the Kari system (Iraq

spelled backwards in French). The Iraqis configured the Kari system to counter

the most likely regional threats: Iran, Israel, and Syria. Consequently, the layout

of the western and central sectors created a dead zone pointed directly at Baghdad from Saudi Arabia.69

In Exercise Internal Look 90 and elsewhere, the Ninth Air Force had begun

to examine the Iraqi air defenses even before the crisis broke. CENTAF continued and expanded these efforts. Destruction of the operations centers and neutralization of key radars would blind the Iraqis’ GCI fleet and force Iraqi AAA

and SAM batteries into an autonomous mode of operation in which they would

fall back on their own individual radars or use optical sighting with little or no

cooperation with any other air defense units. The inability to direct fighter interceptions and the loss of capacity to both pool tracking information and concentrate fire would significantly degrade the effectiveness of Iraq’s air defenses.

The philosophy underlying the USAF plan of attack on the Iraqi IADS paralleled that of the overall offensive air plan. The first bombs dropped on Iraq

would hit an IOC, and much of the rest of the first day’s missions would be

aimed to disrupt and shock the air defense system into inoperability with a series

of simultaneous, widespread strikes.70 An air defense system without integration

quickly becomes an organization whose capabilities equal far less than the sum

of its parts. Obviously, to hamstring the Iraqi air defense system was a high priority. To dissipate it would lower Coalition casualties and increase the accuracy

of Coalition pilots who, if they stayed above 10,000 feet AGL, would not have

their attention distracted by a constant need to avoid SAMs and AAA. The first

Coalition air attacks of January 17, 1991, struck portions of the Iraqi IADS.

The Coalition air attacks of January 17 and 18 closely followed the MAPs

and ATOs prepared by the Directorate of Campaign Plans for the first two days

of the campaign. Since the special campaign planners and others had worked

twenty-four-hours a day on these plans for five months and the units had practiced their portions of the plan for almost as long, the MAP and the ATO

corresponded in every detail. Success has many fathers, but the bulk of the cred176

On Target

68. Brfg Slide 8, “SAM/AAA Threat” CENTAF/CC Brief to the SECDEF, Dec 20, 19 90;

DIA, Fact Book, pp. 5-75–5-82.

69. Intvw, Brig. Gen. Larry Henry, USAF, with GWAPS personnel, “Electronic Combat

in Desert Shield/Storm,” Aug 28, 1992 [GWAPS, National Archives, Record Group 358].

70. Intvw, Maj. Steve Satchwell, USAF, HQ USAF, ACS/Studies & Analysis, with Dr.

Richard G. Davis, CAFH, Apr 29, 1992, at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Major Satchwell

served in the Black Hole and GAT Division from October 1990 to February 1991. He worked

as an expert on aircraft attrition and as a consultant to the Iraqi Air Defense targeting cell.
it for spectacular achievements of the first forty-eight hours of Desert Storm

must go to the men in cockpits who repeatedly risked their lives and bodies to

accomplish their assigned tasks. Yet, without careful planning, the Coalition

might have consumed the courage and skill of the air crews for naught by sending them to incorrect targets or failing to properly suppress enemy air defenses.

Phase I of the Coalition air plan, the air offensive against Iraq, ensured that such

waste did not occur. Phase I descended directly from the Instant Thunder campaign plan of August 1990 and reflected the air power philosophy and ideas of

Col. John A. Warden III and his fellow workers in the Deputy Directorate of

Warfighting Concepts in the Air Staff’s Directorate of Plans. Phase I struck Iraqi

centers of gravity such as leadership, strategic weapons, and NBC production

and storage with the intention of disrupting the Iraqi chain of command and

shocking the Iraqi nation. But the offensive air campaign had matured since leaving the Pentagon, and many of its details differed from the original. The target

base had almost tripled, from 84 to 238 sites, and the plan itself had become only

the lead phase in a joint assault on Iraq and the Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait.

	




	

	



 

	




	





	


	




177

The Decision for War
The creation of the plan from its conception through its final permutations

required the combined effort of dozens of persons in Riyadh, in Washington, and

in the field in Saudi Arabia. One officer directed the plan’s formation almost continuously from August to H-hour, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula. His tireless efforts

to perfect the plan while holding it true to the ideals of the Warden group earned

him, within CENTAF, the nickname “ProAP,” “prophet of air power.” Like

Commander Minoru Genda, the naval aviator who did much of the planning for

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Colonel Deptula’s impassioned belief in the

decisiveness of air power and in the necessity of carrying the offensive air plan

to the achievement of its objectives converted some of his superior officers, such

as General Glosson, into champions of the plan, or at least convinced others to

support it.

Colonel Deptula and the other air campaign planners faced a situation

Commander Genda would have envied. The Coalition’s first strikes formed the

spearhead of the major strategic focus rather than their being a sideshow. From

the plan’s inception, air would make repeated attacks to gain the initial objectives. Colonel Deptula’s superiors not only supported the intent and methodology of the plan, but General Horner had made it his own, General Schwarzkopf

had asked for its creation and approved it, and Secretary Cheney had accepted it

since October 1990. By the first of November 1990, if not earlier, the force available for operations outnumbered the IZAF in terms of raw numbers and had decisive advantages in technology and quality of personnel. Not only did Colonel

Deptula have big battalions, his were better. In addition, unlike the 1941 Japan

confronting the continental United States, Coalition air forces found that all but

the northern part of Iraq lay open to air attack from Saudi Arabia, making

Baghdad—surrounded by air bases, the hub of Iraqi leadership, of Iraq’s C3

structure, of its NBC and military production and research facilities, and the center of its heavy air defenses—vulnerable. Once Iraq’s interceptor-based air

defenses cracked and the Coalition adopted medium-altitude tactics to neutralize

much of its SAM and AAA capability, Iraq lay open to assault.

The Coalition campaign air plan would strike Saddam and his defenses from

two directions: one was conventional, the other was not. The conventional attack

sought first to immobilize the Iraqi air defenses and then to use the Coalition’s

conventional aircraft to destroy or damage many of the 238 strategic targets as

well as numerous tactical ones. The TLAMs, ALCMs, and the F–117As formed

the unconventional arm of the assault. They had no need to wait for the breakdown of the Iraqi air defenses because they carried their own specialized form of

air superiority: near, but not complete, invisibility to Iraqi radar or other forms of

detection. They would begin an immediate attack on Iraq’s most sensitive targets.

The F–117A with its sharpshooting weapons delivery and near invulnerability

would create a legend in Desert Storm with incalculable effect on future opponents of the USAF. At 0022L on January 17, 1991, ten F–117As from the 415th

TFS, 37th TFW(P), headed north from Khamis Mushait. They intended to attack

178

On Target
sixteen targets including air defense SOCs, IOCs, and facilities in Baghdad such

as the ADOC, IZAF HQ, telephone centers, and presidential grounds at Abu

Ghurayb.71

The MAP laid out the missions of the F–117As and all others for the first

attack wave. Although at the time a highly classified document, the first day’s

MAP had relatively wide distribution. From Saudi Arabia to Washington, civilian officials such as Secretary Cheney, National Security Advisor Scowcroft,

President Bush, and military officers that included Generals Powell and Horner,

the CENTAF staff, and Checkmate officials sat with their copies in front of TV

monitors, watching the Cable News Network (CNN) which had reporters broadcasting directly from Baghdad. When the American bombs began to go off in the

Iraqi capital at the H-hour of 0300L January 17, Iraqi time, which was 1900 EST

January 16 in the United States, viewers would participate in a unique experience, the first BDA direct via live commercial television.

179

The Decision for War

71. Harold P. Myers, “Nighthawks Over Iraq: A Chronology of the F–117A Stealth

Fighter in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” HQ 37th FW/HO 12 AF, TAC: Special

Study 37FW/HO–91–1, Jan 9, 1992.
180

On Target
Chapter Six

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad:

The Initial Attacks

The First Twenty-Four Hours

In Baghdad at 0230L on January 17, an hour when the human body seems

to reach both a physiological and psychological nadir, Iraqi radar operators peering 150 to 200 miles deep into Saudi Arabia saw nothing they had not seen

dozens of times before. From early September, the Coalition had begun to move

a nightly tanker track (a series of aircraft refueling from the same group of

tankers) slowly west until it stopped opposite the portion of the Iraqi border closest to Baghdad. Since August, the AWACS orbits and the CAPs had maintained

standard locations. Now, however, four F–15Cs sought not only to protect their

own HVAA, but they would shoot down the Iraqi AWACS (which could serve as

IOCs for the air defense system) if it put in an extremely rare appearance. The

Iraqi operators may not even have noticed that on this night the tanker track came

within thirty miles of the border before turning for home. At 0235L (H–25 minutes) they almost certainly did not notice ten F–117As drop off the tankers, button up, place themselves in the stealth mode, and continue north. Two of the

F–117As (Thunder 36 and Thunder 37) veered to the northwest to strike air

defense control centers. One (Thunder 6) flew east to bomb the SOC controlling

the Iraqi southern air defense sector. The remaining seven F–117As pointed

toward thirteen targets in the Baghdad area. Other nonstealthy aircraft also hurried to participate in the first wave of the first attack.1 During the first night of

the conflict, the weather cooperated by supplying almost cloudless skies over

181

Preface

1. MAP, First 24 Hours, 2121 Jan 16, 1991, p. 1; Intvw, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, USAF,

Chief, Iraqi Cell, GAT Division, Directorate of Campaign Plans, CENTAF HQ, with Drs.

Richard G. Davis, Diane T. Putney, and Perry D. Jamieson, CAFH, at the Pentagon, Jan 8,

1992. In this interview, Colonel Deptula describes the first twenty-four hours of the attack and

its related MAP on a line-by-line basis.
northern Saudi Arabia and Iraq.2 The first wave of aircraft would find its targets

in the clear.

At 0220L Task Force Normandy, consisting of twelve American helicopters,

crossed the Iraqi border. Three MH–53J Pave Lows of the 20th Special

Operations Squadron, using specialized night-operating equipment and equipped

with GPS receivers, led nine Army AH–64 Apache gunships of the 101st Air

Assault Division to their target. Nineteen minutes later, at H–21, after flying in

low to avoid radar detection and taking a roundabout route to miss Bedouin

camps and Iraqi ground observers, the Apaches used AGM–114 Hellfire missiles, Hydra 70 (2.75-inch) rockets, and cannon fire to destroy two Iraqi early

warning radar sites.3 There are unconfirmed indications that one of the targets

may have gotten off a message before its destruction, or the radars may have had

“deadman” circuits with their associated IOC. If this permanently open circuit

were to shut off, alarms would sound at the IOC, alerting it to possible trouble.

Videotapes reveal that Iraqi AAA in the Baghdad area began to fire heavily at

H–20 when no Coalition aircraft were overhead.4 In addition, subsequent

American intelligence noted that by H–15, numerous radars associated with Iraqi

SAMs had become active in the Baghdad area, apparently in reaction to the

Coalition attacks.5 Nonetheless, the elimination of these two western radar sites

created a gap in local Iraqi coverage that allowed three separate groups of

American and British aircraft to cross the border with less chance of detection as

they penetrated Iraqi airspace en route to their targets. One group, consisting of

three of the 366th TFW(P)’s EF–111As, headed for an area southwest of Bagh182

On Target

2. Memo, 1st Lt. James A. Cotturone, Jr., USAF, Weather Officer 33d TFW(P), to 33d

TFW/HO, Subj: Weather History for Operation Desert Storm, 17 Jan 91–19 Jan 91, n.d. [ca.

Jan 20, 1991] [File No. T/UH]. Three types of information have been most difficult to procure

for this study: 1) data on scheduled missions actually flown or canceled by specific units; 2)

BDA data, particularly for specific missions flown by specific aircraft; and 3) comprehensible

day-to-day weather data for conditions affecting air operations. Lieutenant Cotturone compiled

a day-by-day weather history for the campaign that not only included the regions in which the

33d TFW(P) operated, i.e. much of western and central Iraq, but, in a separate analysis, also

gave a daily weather picture for the entire theater. Information on missions flown or aborted or

from specific BDAs has come to light in an extremely piecemeal, nonsystematic fashion.

Regrettably, such information is available to the historian for only a small fraction of the missions.

At this point in the narrative the reader is forewarned that he or she is about to encounter

one of the principal methodological obstacles to the preparation of this volume. As of the date

of its composition, August 1992, there were no reliable figures as to CENTAF and Coalition

sorties, strikes, and missions. The USAF units employed used different reporting systems and

completed them with varying degrees of diligence. The reader should keep in mind that the following mission descriptions are based on what the planners wanted to happen—not, in all

cases, on what actually happened. Consequently, the specific number and type of aircraft sent

on a particular mission or flown may be at variance from the number cited in the text.

3. Draft Historical Study, HQ AFSOC/HO, “Air Force Special Operations Command in

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” [ca. Jan 1992], p. 25.

4. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

5. Msg, 170632Z Jan 1991, DIA, Washington, D.C., Iraq Regional ITF, to DIACURINTEL.
dad from which to provide electronic jamming support for the second wave of

attacking F–117As. The initial wave of F–117As over Baghdad relied solely on

stealth and surprise. Another group, a strike package of twenty-two F–15Es of

the 4th TFW(P), headed for five Scud launching areas containing fixed launchers in northwest Iraq and one at H–2 airfield. To avoid attention, the F–15Es of

the 4th TFW(P)’s 336th TFS would fly without top cover. After takeoff from Al

Kharj AB they flew northwest, hitting their tankers at 20,000 feet in Saudi airspace, 300 miles from the Iraqi border and beyond detection range of Iraqi

radars. The tankers had their lights off and were difficult to locate. Once they

released from the tankers, approximately 100 miles from the border, the F–15Es

lost altitude until they barreled along, 300 to 500 feet above deck.6 With this mission, the planners hoped to demonstrate to Israel that the Coalition intended to

strike the SRBM complex from the opening instant of operations.7 A third package of two EF–111A jammers and four Tornado GR–1s, carrying the highly

effective air-launched antiradiation missile (ALARM), coordinated their actions

with the F–15Es.8

The F–15Es carried LANTIRN navigation pods but not LANTIRN laser-targeting pods. The initial attack on twenty-six permanent Scud launchers in western Iraq, scheduled for H+5 minutes, would use Mk–20 Rockeyes delivered at

low level to increase accuracy.9 The Rockeye contained 247 Mk–118 shapedcharge submunitions each weighing 1.32 pounds and designed to penetrate hard

targets such as tanks and buildings. As the F–15Es entered Iraqi airspace the

USAF E–3 AWACS aircraft in the western orbit detected no Iraqi aircraft air183

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

6. Intvw, Lt. Col. Steven L. Turner, 336th TFS/CC, with Frederick D. Claypool, 4th TFW/

HO, Seymour Johnson AFB, Jul 19, 1991, pp. 8–9.

7. Audiotape, Col. Warden, “Review and Comments on Draft Manuscript,” Mar 2, 1993.

8. Annotations on Colonel Deptula’s copy of the MAP, First 24 Hours, indicate that three

of these F–15Es may have aborted at H–0030 and did not participate in the mission.

9. The LANTIRN system consisted of a navigation pod and a targeting pod. The navigation pod, carried by all forty-eight F–15Es in the AOR and a few F–16s (designated in the MAP

as F–16Ls), contained a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor to create daylight-quality

video images of terrain and utilized terrain-following radar to enable the aircraft to operate in

all weather conditions, day or night. The first targeting pod came into service on the F–15Es in

mid-September 1990, and nine reached the theater when the 335th TFS deployed to Al Kharj

AB, Saudi Arabia, south of Riyadh, in late December 1990. The targeting pod gave higher-definition images than the navigation pod, and it contained laser designator and tracking systems.

It made the aircraft that carried it capable of controlling PGMs. Because of the shortage of targeting pods, the 4th TFW(P)’s 336th and 335th TFSs routinely employed “buddy-lasing” in

which an F–15E with a targeting pod would designate and control for its Laser Guided Bombs

(LGBs) and then do the same for smart weapons being carried by its wingman who did not have

a targeting pod. This doubled the number of passes over an objective, but accomplished the

mission. The 336th TFS, which arrived in the AOR in August 1990, had to familiarize itself

with the targeting pod during combat. In mid-February the wing possessed fifteen targeting

pods, but only ten functioned properly. For additional information on LANTIRN and the 4th

TFW(P), see Frederick D. Claypool, “4th Tactical Fighter Wing in Southwest Asia (Desert

Shield/Desert Storm): August 1990–June 1991,” Vol. 1, Nov 12, 1991, pp. 10, 29, 54–55. For

the armament of the F–15Es, see First 24 Hours, Sequential Target Flow, 0200 January 8, 1991

[File No. CK/Deptula Box 9/Master Target List].
borne.10 Planners scheduled this attack on the first wave, fearing that Saddam, in

his first retaliation, would lash out at Israel.11 He would employ his most effective weapons in range of it—the Scuds situated in the western part of his territory. To minimize the possibility of Israeli intervention, the Americans struck the

permanent or fixed Scud sites there at once.

Thunder 36 and Thunder 37 widened the breach begun by Task Force

Normandy by dropping at H–9 the first bombs on Iraq, successfully landing one

bomb on each of the two bunkers of the Nukhayb IOC, which supervised the

Iraqi air defense and warning net that included the two stations the helicopters

had destroyed.12 The IOCs consisted of two separate bunkers (the IOC and associated reporting post). Each required a hit to be rendered ineffective or destroyed.

The two F–117As proceeded west-northwest to their next targets, the Iraqi western sector SOC and the air defense communications sector headquarters, both at

airfield H–3, which controlled the Nukhayb IOC. Unfortunately, neither aircraft

scored a hit. In the meantime, the F–15Es roared in on their targets. The commander of the 336th TFS, Lt. Col. Steven L. Turner, USAF, led the six-aircraft

cell assaulting H–2 airfield. Defenses included 150 AAA pieces and 10 SAM

sites. On the flight in he reported,

It was like flying over North Carolina. Lights were on, people were driving

down the highway, and when I climbed up to roll in on H–2 airfield...it looked

like RDU [Raleigh Durham Airport]. The lights were on, the strobe lights were

on leading the way to the runways, I actually didn’t need to use my FLIR [forward-looking infrared]...I could see what I was going to bomb.13

The atmosphere changed abruptly when the first bombs hit at H+5. Within three

minutes the remaining aircraft of Colonel Turner’s cell delivered their weapons.

Wildly and, as it appeared to the colonel, without direction, the Iraqis filled the

air with AAA and SAMs. Many raids against the Scuds would follow this one as

the conflict wore on. The NCA, anxious to avoid Israeli intervention, had directed CENTCOM to maintain a permanent air presence over the H–2 and H–3

areas.14 Postraid intelligence found that the mission inflicted no damage to the

H–2 airfield fixed Scud sites or to the Wadi al Jabariyah, Wadi ar Ratqa, and

Wadi Amij SRBM launch complex.15 Postwar analysis indicates that the Iraqis

never used the fixed sites. Nonetheless, from a political standpoint the United

184

On Target

10. Msg, 171700Z Jan 91, 552d Airborne Warning and Control Wing (AWCW), Subj:

Special Misrep AWACS West [File No. T/CT/60/33 TFW].

11. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

12. Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days 1–34: Day, ATO Mission Number, Target

Name, DMPI, BE Number, Weapons, Hit or Miss, Reason for Miss, Aircraft Tail Number, and

Pilot, n.d. [ca. late Feb 1991] [File No. CK/Deptula 7/37 TFW].

13. Claypool, “4th TFW in Southwest Asia,” Vol. 1, p. 44, citing draft intvw, Lt. Col.

Turner, Jul 19, 1991.

14. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

15. Msg, 180600Z Jan 91, DIA to DIACURINTELL, Subj: Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update

[File No. T/HO/3/JAN].
States had demonstrated its intent, from the opening gun, to do its utmost to suppress Scud targets within launch distance of Israel.

On the return flight, at approximately fifty miles from the Saudi border, the

F–15Es encountered far more dangerous threats. An Iraqi MiG–2916 had left the

Baghdad area, probably from Al Taqaddum airfield, and headed south on a

course to intercept. Several miles northeast of Mudaysis airfield a flight of

F–15Cs of the 33d TFW(P) picked it up. Capt. Jon K. Kelk, USAF (callsign

Pennzoil 63), acquired the bandit on his radar, and the AWACS declared the aircraft hostile. Captain Kelk used his F–15C’s look-down, shoot-down capability

and fired one AIM–7 missile at the fighter below him. A few seconds later he

observed a “sparkling flame,” and the aircraft disappeared.17 The captain had

made the first air-to-air kill of the conflict. A few minutes later several F–1 interceptors18 scrambled from Mudaysis airfield apparently to down the Strike

Eagles. American AWACS in the western orbit promptly vectored a four-ship

flight of F–15Cs from the 33d TFW(P) to interfere with the enemy’s plans. These

fighters, other F–15Cs of the 1st TFW(P), and F–14s of the USN had swept

across several portions of the Iraqi border at H-hour to catch any fighters that

might intrude into Coalition operations. Intelligence had indicated that pairs or

flights of Iraqi fighters stood on alert at ten airfields.19 The B Flight Commander,

Capt. Robert E. Greater, USAF (callsign Citgo 65), targeted the enemy leader.

After his first radar lock-on failed, Captain Greater reestablished lock at about

the same time the AWACS declared the aircraft hostile. Captain Greater fired one

AIM–7M at the interceptor below him. He saw the missile detonate and its target turn into a fireball that impacted the ground ten seconds later. He and his

wingman, 1st Lt. Scott G. Maw, USAF, both locked onto a trailing aircraft that

crashed into the ground thirty seconds later, untouched by the Americans. It

seems that the fate of his companion and the reaction of his radar warning receiver to the F–15C lock-ons so rattled the pilot, supposedly one of Iraq’s finest, that

he reacted into the ground. An interested observer, twenty miles from the shootdown, Colonel Turner, saw the two fireballs and assumed that the Iraqi wingman

had accidentally blasted his leader and had then run himself into the ground.

Likewise, Capt. William Bruner, USAF, a member of the CENTAF Directorate

of Plans, flying that night with the ACE of the western AWACS, observed the

engagement and concluded that “if that was the best the Iraqis could do, it would

not be nearly good enough.”20

185

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

16. GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 1, A Statistical Compendium, Table 206 “Coalition Air-to-Air Kill

Matrix” (2d ed.), p. 653.

17. Ltr, Col. Rick Parsons to CENTAF DO, Subj: Air-to-Air Kill Confirmation, n.d. [ca.

Mar 1. 1991] [File No. T/CT/60/33].

18. GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 1, A Statistical Compendium, Table 206 “Coalition Air-to-Air Kill

Matrix” (2d ed.), p. 653.

19. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

20. Memo, Col. Rick N. Parsons, Comdr 33rd TFW, to CENTAF/DO, Subj: Air-to-Air

Kill Confirmation, n.d., includes statements of Captain Greater and 1st Lt Maw and KILL-
Even before the F–15Es released over the Scud targets, two F–117As sent

the first bombs into downtown Baghdad at H-hour. Thunder 10 and Hail 1 scored

direct hits on the Baghdad AT&T Building (this building had no connection with

the similarly named U.S.-based company) and the Baghdad telecommunications

center. At 1901 EST CNN noted a hit on the city. Then Hail 1 turned west to

place a bomb squarely on the southwest bunker of Al Taqaddum IOC, and

Thunder 10 continued north where it hit the Iraqi C2 bunker No. 2 in the vast Taji

military complex. The bomb landed on target but failed to penetrate it. The air

planners were confronted with a substantial technical complexity in that the

F–117A needed precise intelligence in order identify the correct target and determine a precise aiming point. For this reason and others, the F–117As appeared

to skip in and out of Baghdad. F–117As often hit a target in downtown Baghdad

and continued on to a facility a few miles beyond the capital’s limits.

At H-hour (1900 EST) CNN announced that an explosion had occurred at

the telecommunications center and showed AAA spraying the air. The bombs of

the remaining six F–117As began to land five minutes later. Simultaneously, 175

miles to the southeast, Thunder 6, sent against the southern sector SOC at Tallil

airfield, the IZAF’s most important southern base, hit its target twice. Five of the

remaining bombs found their marks—the southeast edge of one of the bunkers

of the Taji SOC, Ar Ramadi Radio Relay No. 2, the Abu Ghurayb Presidential

Palace, and twice more, the AT&T Building. On hardened targets the F–117As

used GBU–27s; on other buildings they used GBU–10s. As they would throughout the conflict, all the F–117As returned safely to base.21

The 37th TFW(P) had requested jamming support for its first missions over

Baghdad. On these missions, which promised to be the most difficult, the 37th

TFW(P) would encounter the enemy’s strong and, as yet, undamaged air defenses. Although hard to detect, the stealthy aircraft were not completely invisible.

On the correct radar, they might appear as a faint flickering return, which the

operator might pick up and pass on to the IOC. There is no evidence that the

Iraqis successfully tracked or targeted stealth flights; however, the numerous

operating radars and plentiful means of communications around the capital on

the first night increased the odds that favored their detection. Electronic jamming

would reduce such odds to nil as the operators sought to overcome the interference by turning up the gain on their radars (something akin to adjusting the contrast on a TV), which would cause the flickering to fade away. In a sense, the

F–117A gained more from jamming than any other aircraft because this aircraft

tended to disappear, whereas other aircraft still produced some return. In this

186

On Target

REPS; Msg, 171700Z Jan 91, AWACS West Orbit Misrep; Claypool, “4th TFW in Southwest

Asia,” Vol. 1, p. 44, citing draft intvw, Lt. Col. Turner, Jul 19, 1991; Intvw, Capt. Bruner, Mar

19, 1992. During the conflict Captain Bruner served in the Special Planning Group and the

GAT Division.

21. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 13–19, 1991, p. 15; Printout, F–117A

Mission Results, Days 1–34, p. 1.
instance the F–117As gained little from the three EF–111As. One EF–111A

departed station before setting up jamming because he detected an Iraqi aircraft

closing in. The other two appear to have set up jamming at a range so far from

Baghdad that they may have accomplished little.22

In the meantime, Capt. Steven W. Tate of the 1st TFW(P), leading a flight of

four F–15Cs in support of the EF–111As, had established a CAP position approximately fifty miles west of Al Jarrah airfield. He locked onto a target. After

employing appropriate recognition techniques, he identified the target as an Iraqi

Mirage F–1.23 He fired one AIM–7 and closed before the missile impacted and the

target exploded.24 His kill came shortly after Captain Kelk’s kill to the west.

On the heels of the F–117As, Navy TLAMs streaked into the Baghdad area

from the east. From H+6 to H+11, six slammed into Baath Party Headquarters

and eight into the Presidential Palace. The missiles could not penetrate, but they

could destroy soft structures. In an even more destructive blow, three TLAMs

exploded in six of the power plants and electrical transformer yards surrounding

the capital, including Baghdad’s largest, the Dawrah plant. At 1910 EST CNN

reported the loss of electricity throughout the city of Baghdad. This thrust damaged the power plants producing 14 percent of Iraq’s total electric output and

may have shut down temporarily the transformer yards connecting the city to the

national power grid. The air planners had specified the aiming points for the electrical targets as the center of the transformer yards or the center of the switching

yards. Coalition planners hoped to deprive the capital and the national leadership

of electric power, add to any confusion, and complicate communications. The

Kari system’s computers and communications depended on commercial electricity. Loss of electricity would disrupt the air defense control system, forcing individual SAM batteries to operate in autonomous modes with their own radars. It

would also force many government, military, and air defense units to fall back on

inconvenient and inadequately maintained backup generators. Several minutes

after this barrage ceased, at H+30, up to twenty additional TLAMs crashed into

the Scud missile support facility in the Taji complex.25

Some of TLAMs used special warheads. Eyewitnesses to the attacks on the

Taji and Dawrah plants claim that on January 17, 1991, Coalition aircraft

“dropped metallic nets” that “short-circuited” the electrical network.26 Actually,

187

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

22. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992; [Point Paper], [Lt. Col. Deptula], “F–117s and

Electronic Combat Support During the Gulf War,” n.d., [ca. Nov 1991].

23. GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 1, A Statistical Compendium, Table 206 “Coalition Air-to-Air Kill

Matrix” (2d ed.), p. 653.

24. Msg, 191444Z Mar 91, 1st TFW Deployed to USCENTAF Deployed/DO, Subj: Airto-Air Kill Confirmation [File No. T/CT/60/1 TFW].

25. MAP, 1st Day, Jan16, 1991; Brfg Slide “0002–0025,” in intvw, Comdr. McSwain, Apr

7, 1992. For aiming points, see First 24 Hours, Sequential Target Flow, 0200 Jan 8, 1991.

26. Rpt, Harvard Study Team, “Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War,” May 1991, pp.

22–24. Members of this study team made an extensive survey of the damage inflicted on the

Iraqi power system and interviewed many Iraqi eyewitnesses to power plant bombings to support their thesis. They contend that the poor state of the postwar power industry contributes to 
some of the TLAMs had employed highly secret special warheads filled with

thousands of small, 3⁄4- by 1⁄2-inch rolls of long, fine carbon fibers. (Not until a

year after the conflict did news of the warheads leave the black world and enter

the public domain.) When they arrived at their target, the missiles scattered

spools of carbon that unrolled over the outdoor portion of the switching system

that transferred electricity from generators to the power lines. When automatic

circuit breakers detected power surges in the switching yard, they shut down the

generators. Carbon fibers also festooned the plants’ exteriors, producing short

circuits in power lines and transformers. Plant employees noted that within a day,

wind blew the rolls and fibers from surrounding fields back over whatever portion of the outside electrical facilities that had been cleared. The use of carbon

fibers enabled the Coalition, according to the air planners, to put the Iraqi electrical system out of action for military purposes without so damaging it that it

could not be speedily repaired in postwar reconstruction.27 In any case, the fibers

cut the flow of electricity to Baghdad and its ADOC immediately, perhaps more

surely than conventional means. After the first day, the Americans do not appear

to have employed these fibers again. Nor did they employ them on every power

plant in Iraq. At that particular time, the carbon-fiber warheads proved the most

effective weapon. After the first days of the conflict, conventional attacks put the

plants out of action for longer periods.

Coalition planners hoped that the damage, disruption, and shock spread by

initial F–117A and TLAM sorties would help prepare the way for strikes by the

nonstealthy bulk of their aircraft. As the first bombs landed in Iraq, Coalition aircraft, which had queued up just beyond range of Iraqi early warning radar to top

off their tanks from 160 tankers, pushed forward. From 0345L (H+45) to 0420L

(H+120) on January 17, more than 160 USN, RAF, and USAF combat aircraft

aided by drones went after targets in western, central, and eastern Iraq. They concentrated on SEAD, air base, and Scud targets. In the west, a force of three EA–

6s, ten A–7s, four ground-attack variant Tornados, six F–111Fs, four F–14s, and

three BQM–74 drones attacked facilities at H–3 airfield.28 The EA–6Bs and

A–7s provided electronic jamming and SEAD, while the Tornados using specialized munitions, such as the JP–233, attacked the main H–3 runway and a subsidiary highway airstrip. The F–14s flew CAP for the EA–6Bs. The F–111Fs had

the ticklish job of eliminating the H–3 airfield CW storage facility; the last two

mined the area of the CW storage with CBU–89s.29

188

On Target

the decline in public health by depriving Iraq of the ability to purify its water. Water purification plants require electricity to operate.

27. David A. Fulghum, “Secret Carbon Fiber Warheads Blinded Iraqi Air Defenses,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr 27, 1992, pp. 18–20.

28. After Action Rpt, CENTAF/EC, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Oct 1991, sec. 5,

p. 11. The USAF acquired and launched thirty-seven BQM–74 drones against Iraq, all in the

first two days and all in support of missions against heavily defended targets such as Baghdad

and H–3 airfield. Drones formed a large percentage of the downed aircraft claimed by the

Iraqis.

29. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991.
In the Baghdad area, from 0348L to 0355L the wave’s largest mission consisting of one package each of USN and USAF aircraft flew a combined SEAD

operation. The Red Sea carriers sent three F–14s, three EA–6Bs, ten F/A–18s

with HARMs, eight A–7s with HARMs, two A–6s with tactical air-launched

decoys (TALDs—aircraft-launched gliders used to deceive enemy air defenses),

and three KA–6 tankers. They entered the capital’s air defense area from the west

while the USAF package of three EF–111As and twelve F–4Gs entered the

defense area from the south. Six BQM–74 drones, launched from Saudi Arabia

by the USAF, preceded the SEAD force.30 The planners expected this mission to

evoke a substantial Iraqi response. When the wave of 160 conventional aircraft

(dubbed the “Gorilla” package because of its size and destructive potential)

appeared on enemy radar screens and spread out to attack targets over a broad

area, the planners hoped that the Iraqis would “pull out all the stops.” If the two

packages heading straight for Baghdad seemed particularly threatening, the

Iraqis might well light them up with radar and hurl their SAMs and fighters. But

the packages heading to the Baghdad area were a ruse, unable to drop any bombs.

The Americans had configured them with drones, TALDs, and HARM-carrying

A–7s, F/A–18s, and F–4Gs expressly to counterattack Iraqi air defenses. At 1946

EST and 1955 EST, CNN reported extensive AAA fire as the Iraqis opened up

on the drones preceding the package. During Desert Shield the Iraqis had maintained well-disciplined emissions control of their systems. Indeed, strict emissions control had actually interfered with their training. However, the onset of

hostilities and associated disorientation might break their regimen and give the

SEAD forces the opportunity to punish Iraqi air defenses. Since the TLAM carbon-fiber attack had apparently turned off the Kari network’s electricity, the

packages’ antiradiation missiles should have a field day against the SAM batteries’ organic radars. If this joint USAF-USN SEAD ploy succeeded in weakening

Iraqi defenses, especially at the medium altitudes covered by SAMs, then other

Coalition strike aircraft, such as the F–16, would be able to hit targets west of the

capital without excessive concern over any remaining Iraqi resistance. The packages were timed to assist a group of F–117As scheduled to hit targets in downtown Baghdad at 0420L.31 Unfortunately, the Navy package suffered the first

Coalition pilot killed in action when it lost an F/A–18, possibly to an Iraqi

MiG–25.32 Given the nature of the attacks’ targets—mobile radars, AAA batteries, and SAM sites—intelligence during and after the conflict was unable to

exactly assess the degree of damage inflicted.

Anecdotal evidence from U.S. pilots flying subsequent attacks in the area

indicates that this attack impaired Iraqi air defenses. Lt. Col. George W. Walton,

Commander, 561st TFS, 35th TFW(P), led the flight of twelve F–4Gs on the mis189

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

30. Ibid.

31. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

32. Initial reports attributed this loss to a SAM, but subsequent investigation revealed a

MiG–25 as the probable culprit. The cause of the loss has yet to be confirmed.
sion. He noted, “It was a target-rich environment. The emitters came on and

stayed on for the entire flight of the missile.” He added that they went as deep as

they could, almost into central Baghdad, to take out as many defenses as possible. Conditions combined to produce “HARM Heaven”; for a space of twenty

minutes the Americans loosed antiradiation missiles at a rate of almost one every

fifteen seconds (the Navy package fired 45 HARMs and the Wild Weasels loosed

22).33 In all probability the effort did contribute to a decline in Iraqi air defenses. During the first two days of the war, the F–4G HARMs were used to their

greatest effect.34 Surviving enemy operators adjusted their tactics. Such measures may have preserved Iraqi radars, but they reduced the SAMs they serviced

to electro-optical or IR guidance. For the remainder of the conflict, Iraqi SAM

batteries appeared to rely on nonradar-directed barrage fire thus rapidly consuming their missile stocks. Furthermore, the Iraqis seemed untrained in operating

their SAMs without radars, and in effect launched a great many “flying telephone

poles,” or undirected missiles. Most Iraqi AAA did not have radar direction.35

Other aircraft attacked targets in central Iraq to the north and south of

Baghdad. At 0350L two GR–1s with ALARMs supported four more GR–1s

attacking the runway of Al Asad airfield to the northwest of Baghdad. Five minutes later, two F–15Es struck the An Najaf IOC, the only nonhardened IOC, to

the south of Baghdad. At the same time and for the next fifteen minutes, thirteen

B–52Gs of the 4300th Provisional Bombardment Wing from Diego Garcia, five

GR–1As (Tornados carrying reconnaissance pods), four GR–1s, and six F–15Es

swept in low over five Iraqi aircraft forward operating locations (FOLs).

Coalition intelligence had noted recent air activity at all of them.36 The big

bombers had entered Iraq flying low and left the same way to minimize their

exposure to Iraqi early warning radar.37 These FOLs may not have had completely developed facilities, but some had hardened aircraft shelters, and all

could support aircraft. The five fields—Mudaysis, Al Khafi highway strip, Wadi

al Khirr, Ghalaysan, and As Salman—stood relatively close to the border and

were not heavily defended. Not under the main Iraqi air defense umbrella, they

made safe targets for the B–52Gs, which would not have to fly into a dense, fully

operating missile belt. The last aircraft spread CBU–89s over the field’s mainte190

On Target

33. James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, Va.: Air Force Association, 1992),

p. 71. Also see GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 1, Operations (2d ed.), p. 132.

34. After Action Rpt, CENTAF/EC, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Oct 1991, sec. 5,

p. 3.

35. Intvw, Maj. Satchwell, Apr 29, 1992.

36. Intvw, Lt. Col. Robert Eskridge, USAF, GWAPS, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH,

May 28, 1992, at Crystal City, Arlington, Va.

37. Worksheet, 17th Air Division, B–52 Mission, Jan 17, 1991 [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10240]. This worksheet and later ones in the series supply numbers of aircraft, times

over target, weapons, targets, tactics (flight profile), and supporting aircraft, plus a small outline map showing target locations for each B–52 mission.
nance areas; the first two had released their bombs on the taxiways at the ends of

the runways.38

The first two B–52Gs of each cell carried special British 1,000-pound

bombs (UK 1000s) armed with British Thorne multifunction bomb fuses. These

bombs had stronger cases than U.S. general-purpose bombs and could therefore

withstand and survive impacts that U.S. weapons could not. The UK 1000 could

deny the Iraqis the use of the bases for a longer period than any iron bomb in the

U.S. inventory. Mid-October tests proved that the B–52G could carry the weapon

and verified that the Thorne fuses could function with the bombs. The RAF supplied 500 bombs from its own stocks, which arrived in Diego Garcia on

December 6. They certainly caused headaches for the Iraqi emergency ordnance

disposal teams and made the fields dangerous to use. The B–52Gs did not

employ this munition again.39

The planners hoped that the combination of UK 1000s and CBUs would prevent the Iraqis from exploding the minelets with high-pressure fire hoses and

thus easily clearing the fields.40 At Ghalaysan, As Salman, Wadi al Khirr, and

Mudaysis, GR–1s and F–15Es attacked the runways with penetrating munitions.

After the raids, the GR–1As flew a reconnaissance mission over each location to

determine damage. Between 0400L and 0420L, six F–111Fs, supported by three

EF–111As (which had also assisted the western Baghdad SEAD package), struck

facilities at Balad SE airfield to the northeast of Baghdad. Five minutes earlier,

eight A–6s, four GR–1s, and one GR–1A, taking pictures, hit facilities and the

runway at one of Iraq’s most important bases, Al Taqaddum.41

As Coalition air forces exploded bombs throughout central Iraq, they did the

same to eastern Iraq and Kuwait. Their aircraft sought out airfields, Scud facili191

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

38. Capt. Doug Fries, USAF, “The BUFF at War,” Air Force Magazine 75, No. 6 (Jun

1992), p. 44.

39. Hist, SAC, Jan 1–Dec 31, 1990, Vol. 1, Narrative, pp. 220–221, 227, 484–485.

40. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

41. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991.

A B–52 loaded with bombs
ties, and CW bunkers. At 0340L, eleven F–111Fs carrying GBU–24s and

CBU–89s, and four Tornado interdictor/strike variants (IDSs) carrying JP–233

munitions and aided by two EF–111s and four F–4Gs attacked runways, Scud

shelters, and CW storage bunkers at Jalibah airfield between Nasiriyah and Basra

and at Al Jarrah airfield, to the northwest of Nasiriyah. The first two F–111Fs

attacking the CW bunker at Al Jarrah carried penetrating munitions. The last

F–111F carried CBU–89s. CW bunkers at airfields, especially those at southern

airfields, offered a serious potential hazard to the Coalition. If the Iraqis chose to

initiate CW, aircraft could deliver these weapons most quickly to Coalition units

and bases flying from southern airfields. From 0357L through 0420L on January

17, a SEAD and strike package of four F–4Gs; three USMC EA–6Bs and two

USN EA–6Bs; ten USMC F/A–18s and seven USN F/A–18s carrying HARMs;

four A–6s and Tornado IDSs carrying bombs; and four F/A–18s flying target

CAP—all supported by BQM–74 drones—attacked Kuwait and Shaibah airfield

in Iraq to the south of Basra. Such a large package with its high ratio of SEAD

and escort-to-strike aircraft (30 to 8) was in stark contrast to two F–117As that

might well have accomplished the identical task. At the same time, another package of eight F–16s equipped with LANTIRN navigation pods, two A–6s and 8

F–111Fs supported by BQM–74 drones, four F–4Gs which aided the strike on

Shaibah as well, and one EA–6 with an escort of two F–14s attempted to destroy

the Scud shelters at Ahmed al Jaber and Ali al Saleem airfields in southern

Kuwait. Scuds launched from these areas could reach important Coalition airfields, vital unloading ports on the Persian Gulf, and Saudi centers of population.

The destruction or immobilization of Scuds in Kuwait had a high political and

military priority. The 48th TFW(P)’s F–111Fs carried GBU–24s to destroy or

damage the shelters while the 388th TFW’s F–16s all carried CBU–89s with

delayed fuse settings to impede damage control and possible launches. Within

minutes of the Kuwait mission, a USN and USMC package of eight F/A–18s

with bombs, six F/A–18s with HARMs, four F/A–18 flying CAP, one F/A–18

employing TALDs, four EA–6Bs, eight A–6s, eight GR–1s, and one GR–1A

swept over Tallil airfield (adjacent to the ruins of Ur, and Iraq’s most important

southern base), attacking the runway and Scud shelters. It also hit the Scud shelter at Qurnah airfield to the west of Basra. Four of the package’s F/A–18s struck

at the Nasiriyah power plant to the north of Tallil airfield.42 In coordination with

the previous package, four F–15Es attempted to pick off the two solar-powered

fiber-optic repeater stations at Tallil and As Samawah airfields.43 The USAF continued its fusillade against the southern Scuds by sending F–111Fs to destroy

their shelters at As Salman airfield to the west of Basra and at Qalat Salih airfield

to the northwest of Basra. These attacks lasted from 0410L to 0445L.44

192

On Target

42. Ibid.

43. Msg, 111500Z Jan 91, CINCCENT to COMUSCENTAF, Subj: Iraq: Possible Dedicated Scud Command and Control Capability [File No. T/CT/10/15].

44. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991.
The aircraft of the Gorilla package exited Iraq by crossing its border within

a twenty-mile corridor over six points coordinated in advance with Coalition air

defenses. Red Sea carrier-based USN aircraft which bombed targets in the vicinity of H–3 airfield or Baghdad left Iraq from the far southwest and from an area

south of Wadi al Khirr. USAF and RSAF planes smiting central Iraq left from

two points, one at the Wadi al Khirr and one somewhat farther to the east, south

of Ghalaysan airfield. USAF, RSAF, and RAF aircraft working over southern

Iraq exited at a point at the west end of the former neutral zone, while USAF,

RAF, and USMC aircraft cutting up eastern Iraq and Kuwait exited at a point at

the east end of the former neutral zone. USN aircraft flying against Kuwait and

southern Iraq from the carriers in the far Persian Gulf or in the Gulf of Oman

went directly to the Persian Gulf from the Iraqi coast.45

After thrusting at targets all around Baghdad, the USAF returned to the capital area at 0420L when the commander of the 37th TFW(P) led a flight of ten

F–117As to hammer communications, leadership, and air defense objectives.

The colonel could not hit his first target, but he did strike the Baghdad sector

SOC at Taji military complex, as did two other F–117As. Other pilots landed

bombs on the northeast bunker of Al Taqaddum airfield IOC, the Maiden Square

telecommunications and automated telephone exchange, North Taji C2 bunker

No. 2, the presidential bunker, the Habbaniyah troposcatter station, IZAF

Headquarters (New), and the eastern bunker of the Salman Pak IOC. IZAF

Headquarters (New), not only had four major above-ground structures, including

the main headquarters building, but five large, hardened bunkers.46 Spectacular

tape footage released a few days later in the war of an F–117A sending a GBU

through the center of the headquarters building roof and the subsequent explosion blowing debris from all four sides of the building revealed a virtuoso

achievement. This footage, however, led the uninformed into believing that the

headquarters building was a soft target. The F–117As failed to hit key

communications targets. Nonetheless, CNN went off the air for four minutes during this attack. The Iraqis were left with a greater C3 capacity than anticipated.

Individual F–117As penetrated western Iraq and the Kuwait and Basra regions,

achieving mixed results. One walloped his air defense targets with direct impacts

on the western bunkers at both Ar Rutbah IOC (near H–3 airfield) and H–3 airfield IOC; weather prevented another from dropping on the east bunker of the Az

Zubayr IOC and the command bunker of the “V” sector (Kuwait) SOC.47

193

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

45. Brfg Slide, “RTF Flow,” in intvw, Comdr. McSwain, Apr 7, 1992.

46. DIA Directorate for Imagery Exploitation, Desert Storm BDA: Imagery Review, Defense Imagery Reference Series, Apr 1991, Vol. 1, pp. 36–37. This publication’s cover shows

four sequenced frames from the F–117A videotape of the shot down the center of the roof of

the main IZAF Headquarters building. DIA’s selection of a videotape sequence, rather than any

of the numerous other photos available to it, to illustrate a DIA BDA publication has implications for the BDA dispute within the AOR.

47. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 13–19, 1991; Printout, F–117A

Mission Results, Days 1–34, p. 1.
The third flight of F–117As to enter Iraq on the first night intended to defang

a goodly proportion of the bunkers reported to contain BW weapons.48 At

approximately 0500L, an hour before sunrise, seven F–117As carrying GBU–

27s were to attack BW bunkers Nos. 1 and 2 at Salman Pak (just to the south of

Baghdad), and six bunkers at four other locations. Ten minutes later, four

F–117As were to drop their second bombs on four other BW bunkers on an Iraqi

airfield. As noted, the BW bunkers presented technical and possible public health

problems. In conjunction with the F–117A strike and just subsequent to it, four

F–111Fs carrying CBU–87 combined-effects munitions and CBU–89s were to

ignite and mine the Salman Pak BW bunkers. The CBU–87 carried 202

BLU–97/B combined-effects bomblets. A SEAD force of four EF–111As and

eight F–4Gs was to back up the F–111Fs. This force was large in relation to the

unit it would support; the planners anticipated opposition and wanted to ensure

the delivery of the CBU–89s. Fourteen other F–111Fs, loaded with CBU–87s

and CBU–89s would come in behind the F–117As at the other targets.49 Since

these objectives had lighter defenses, a SEAD package would not accompany the

remaining F–111Fs. Soon after the F–111Fs finished, the sun would rise and, if

all went well, complete the destruction of the bunkers’ contents.

In terms of the F–117A’s usual performance, this crucial mission misfired

badly.50 Thunder 62 landed his two bombs on Salman Pak BW bunker No. 1 and

Hail 53 landed his first bomb on the southeast bunker at Diwaniyah. It is possible the raids encountered a regional weather phenomenon that reaches its height

in the month of January. Most Iraqis live within a few miles of the two major

rivers and established their cities and towns accordingly. Therefore, the Iraqis,

without any thought of thwarting Coalition air operations, had placed logistical

resources, ammunition dumps, and most important, the majority of the BW

bunkers scheduled for the mission within a few miles of fog-producing rivers.

Coalition aircraft were plagued by a dilemma during this mission and others

throughout the campaign against Iraq: the stillness of the early mornings an hour

or two before dawn would maximize the development of fog over the targets but

would minimize the dissipation of toxic agents released over populated areas.

194

On Target

48. See DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, p. 50, for an excellent aerial photo and discussion of this type of bunker.

49. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 9; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992. In his

interview, Colonel Deptula states that the MAP listing of these bunkers is in error. All are BW

bunkers; none is a CW bunker.

50. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 13–19, 1991, p. 17 chart, “Day One

Targets and Results, January 16–17, 1991, Wave 3.” The report contains a discrepancy in the

narrative that applies to this chart. It states that five of sixteen bombs found their mark. A careful examination of the chart, however, shows only three hits for the sixteen bombs loaded for

the mission. Of the sixteen bombs loaded, the chart lists three hits, ten misses, one hung bomb,

and two bombs unaccounted for. Both aircraft listed with only one bomb dropped were either

targeted with two bombs for the same target (and as having missed) or diverted and already

missed with their first bomb. These aircraft may not have dropped a second bomb. It would

seem that, at best, the F–117As hit three of thirteen targets, or 23 percent success rate.
This raid highlighted two aspects of the F–117A’s performance. In any previous air campaign the air officer in charge would have begged for a bomber that

could place one of ten bombs precisely on target. In fact, the raid’s bombs on target represented an order of magnitude of improvement over the standard

American bombing of World War II. Still, the laws of Clausewitzian friction in

warfare applied as much to the F–117A, whatever its bombing accuracy, as to

any other weapon. The unanticipated does happen. In fact, the F–117A’s almost

uncanny ability to deliver ordnance on target may have given the planners

unwarranted faith and led them to depend too heavily on it. Overdependence on

a single weapons system or source of information and neglect of the alternatives

has, in the long run, almost always resulted in defeat.

The USN maintained the pressure as night turned to day. At 0525L aircraft

from the USS Ranger raided targets at the main Iraqi naval base, Umm Qasr.

Four F–14s, two A–6s, and an EA–6 supplied escort and SEAD to six attacking

A–6s. An hour and a half later, four F–14s from the USS John F. Kennedy in the

Red Sea swept the H–3 airfield. The Americans maintained a visible presence

over western Iraq to guard against Iraqi moves designed to bring Israel into the

conflict. The air planners dubbed this exercise, part of a larger effort to reassure

the Israelis, “Israeli presence.”51 In addition, two RF–4Cs examined the western

Scud launching areas for damage and possible activities. Between 0700L and

0900L, two TLAMs struck the helicopter ramps at Shaibah airfield. The

Coalition naval forces hoped to discourage the enemy’s use of French-built helicopters equipped with antiship missiles.52

As the sun rose on the morning of January 17, 1991, Coalition aircraft specializing in daytime combat took to the skies to continue the around-the-clock

scourging of Iraq’s defenses and defenders. However, the sun also brought

clouds to northern Saudi Arabia, southern Iraq, and Kuwait. This made air-to-air

refueling over those areas more difficult, but it did not significantly affect oper195

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

51. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 16, 1992; Brfg Slide, “0530–0900,” in intvw, Comdr.

McSwain, April 7, 1992.

52. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991.

An F–111 with CBU–87

cluster bombs ready for

loading
ations.53 At 0730L sixteen F–16s, preceded by a sweep of four F–15Cs, unloaded

on the As Samawah oil refinery (approximately halfway between Baghdad and

Basra). The refinery did not have heavy defenses and was a large target. Twelve

more F–16s hit microwave antennas and communications revetments in eastern

Iraq at 0800L.

The air planners had received word during the late stages of their work,

straight from General Horner to Colonel Deptula, that all aircraft must participate when the days of combat replaced the days of preparation. The general hated

the thought that low morale might be created as combat pilots sat on the ground

eating their hearts out while their compatriots flew against the foe. Fortunately,

the Iraqi armed forces offered sufficient targets to employ all pilots and aircraft.

Between 0810L and 1130L twenty-four A–10s working in pairs shot up eight

Iraqi early warning sites between the southern Iraqi-Kuwaiti and the central

Iraqi-Saudi borders, an attack warning site at As Salman, the Nukhayb GCI site,

and the already bombed Nukhayb IOC. This mission promptly became known as

“Wart Weaseling”—a play on the A–10’s unofficial nickname, the “Warthog,”

and the nickname of the F–4G, “Wild Weasel.”54 Wart Weaseling demonstrated

the versatility of any airframe used with imagination and an understanding of its

vulnerabilities. The A–10s with their 30-mm guns and the AGM–65s could chew

up radar sites as easily as armored fighting vehicles could.

Finally, the turn of the Barksdale B–52Gs arrived. Carrying thirty-eight of

the USAF’s total of forty-four conventional ALCMs, they launched thirty-four of

them, of which at least eight failed to function properly.55 From 0830L to 1200L,

the ALCMs impacted eight targets—five communications points spread from

Taji to Basra that included four radio relays and the Latifiya satellite communications station, plus three electric power plants, the one at Al Musayyib, 70 kilometers (43 miles) south of Baghdad, the second largest power plant in Iraq, and

two in northern Iraq, at Mosul.56 Coalition aircraft flying from Saudi Arabia

would have had difficulty reaching such northerly targets. Over the Mosul plants,

the ALCMs aimed for the switching and transformer yards. Over the Al

Musayyib plant they aimed for the power substation.57 Official BDA data on the

precise results of this first use of the ALCM is unavailable (in large part because

the highly classified nature of the program did not allow the education of BDA

analysts in what type of damage to look for). The SAC intelligence staff claimed

that the mission destroyed seven of its targets and damaged the eighth.58 In any

196

On Target

53. Memo, 1st Lt. Cotturone, Subj: Weather History for Operation Desert Storm, n.d. [ca.

January 20, 1991].

54. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 9; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

55. Brfg Slide, “0530–0900,” in intvw, Comdr. McSwain, Apr 7, 1992.

56. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991; DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Jul 1991, Vol. 3, pp.

48–49.

57. First 24 Hours, Sequential Target Flow, 0200 8 Jan 1991.

58. Rpt, HQ SAC, “Black Weapon, Covert Mission: The Conventional ALCM, Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, 1986–1991,” May 29, 1992, p. 39.
case, eyewitnesses at the Al Musayyib facility told a team of visiting American

public health experts that on January 17 Coalition attacks destroyed three of the

plant’s four generating units and damaged the other, in addition to destroying a

power substation. The MAP of January 17 schedules no attacks other than the

ALCMs for the Al Musayyib plant on that date.59

Over Kuwait from 0835L to 0850L sixteen F–16s of the 401st TFW(P)

planned to attack two Scud sites. An additional thirty-six F–16s would begin the

Phase II air campaign, SEAD in Kuwait, by striking nine SA–2, SA–3, and SA–6

sites. The MAP even specified bomb loadings. Ten F–4Gs of the 35th TFW(P)

and two EF–111As provided SEAD. On each of the Scud sites at Ahmed Al

Jaber and Ali al Saleem airfields, four F–16s would drop 2,000-pound MK–84

general-purpose bombs and four F–16s would drop CBU–89s with forty-eighthour delays. Against the SAM sites, including two at Kuwait International

Airport, flights of four F–16s would employ three aircraft carrying standard

Mk–84s, one of which would be carrying 500-pound Mk–82 and Mk–84 bombs

armed with FMU–113 nose fuses. The FMU–113 was a proximity fuse, factory

preset to explode at approximately fifteen feet aboveground. Under this kind of

bombing, SAM crews lacking sufficient overhead cover might find themselves

and their equipment full of shrapnel. However, in this instance the attack failed.

When the Iraqis detected the incoming F–16s, they launched a volley of SAMs

with minimal radar guidance. The volley caused no physical damage, but when

the F–16s saw the missiles emerging from the clouds below, they broke off their

attack. The Iraqis’ short on-air-time technique surprised the Wild Weasels, which

did not launch any HARMs.60 The Iraqis continued such SAM operations, founded on a fear of HARMs, for the remainder of the conflict.

With the Iraqis at the SAM sites in Kuwait forced to keep their heads down,

Coalition air units could operate at medium altitudes freed of missile fire and

more safely attack other targets in the area. Furthermore, the Iraqis, as a matter

of doctrine, reserved most of their radar-guided SAMs for the point defense of

strategic assets rather than defense of their ground forces. Iraqi Regular Army

armored and mechanized divisions had SA–9s and ZSU–23–4 guns in their air

defense batteries. The three Republican Guard armored divisions deployed in

reserve in northern Kuwait and adjacent portions of Iraq had SA–13s in place of

SA–9s.61 Nonetheless, by NATO and Soviet standards, the Iraqi ground forces

had inadequate SAM defenses.

Not all of the A–10s indulged in Wart Weaseling. Starting at 0920L and continuing at half-hour intervals until dusk (1800L), flights of eight A–10s each

attacked targets of opportunity within the Iraqi ground forces occupying the tri197

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

59. Rpt, Harvard Study Team, “Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War,” May 1991, p.

23; MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991.

60. After Action Report, CENTAF/EC, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Oct 1991, sec.

7, p. 2.

61. Ibid., sec. 2, p. 6.
border area. They gave priority, in decreasing order, to troops; petroleum, oil,

and lubricant (POL) dumps and targets; artillery; and armor. Colonel Deptula,

Chief Planner, had logically argued that destruction of POL targets deserved top

priority because it would result in greater disruption and damage to the enemy.

Killing fuel trucks would stop tanks and other vehicles whereas killing individual soldiers, among hundreds of thousands, would have little effect. General

Horner overruled him. Iraqi troops in the triborder area had the potential to

mount a hasty and immediate ground assault across the Saudi border in response

to the opening of hostilities. Air attacks might either discourage such a move or

damage and weaken it before it commenced. Three eight-plane flights of F–16s

from the 388th TFW(P) aided by four BQM–74 drones attempted to compound

confusion and disorder by bludgeoning three important Republican Guard targets—the Shaibah ground forces command facility, the General Headquarters,

Forward, of the Republican Guard at Basra, and the Al Rafirinah C2 center near

Az Zubayr. Two RF–4Cs would follow up this raid to record results. This bombing began the softening up of Iraqi forces in the KTO in preparation for future

ground actions and initiated Phase III, preparation of the battlefield, of the air

campaign plan. Henceforward, the first three phases of the air campaign plan

would proceed with the weight of Coalition air effort shifting from one to the

other.62

As the A–10s and F–16s began to harass the enemy in and near Kuwait,

Marine air flew deeper into Iraq to punish Tallil. From 0930L to 0945L, a strike

of eight F/A–18s carrying bombs, four F/A–18s flying target CAP, and two

EA–6B jammers and four F/A–18s with HARMs flying SEAD, all from the 3d

Marine Air Wing, hit the Tallil IOC and the An Nasiriyah troposcatter station. An

offensive counterair sweep of eight F–15Cs from the 1st TFW(P) aided the

USMC package. Simultaneously, a USMC-RAF package tackled the southwest

runway of Ar Rumaylah airfield near the northern Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Four

F/A–18s flew target CAP while two EA–6Bs and four F/A–18 (HARMs) provided SEAD for four GR–1s damaging the runway. Iraqi defensive fire downed

one GR–1. At 1100L, F–14s and F/A–18s swept the H–3 area of western Iraq. At

1230L USMC aircraft attacked targets on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi coast and on Failake

Island. Six bomb-carrying F/A–18s, with eight F/A–18 (HARMs), two EA–6Bs,

and two A–6 (TALDs) suppressing air defenses, and four F/A–18s escorting the

EA–6Bs struck two SAM sites on the coast and a radar station of Failake Island.

The SAMs and the radar represented a particular threat to USN aircraft flying to

and from their carriers in the Gulf.63

Throughout the daylight hours Navy TLAMs (at $1.35 million apiece) roiled

the pot in central Iraq. From 1000L to 1500L they attacked seven different targets, landing at randomly timed intervals to spread out the attack and give Iraqi

198

On Target

62. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 13; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

63. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 14; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.
nerves and bomb shelters no respite. The air planners, who developed this tactic

to satisfy General Horner’s desire to apply force throughout Iraq continuously

rather than at peak periods,64 scheduled three TLAMs for the Baghdad EastSoutheast transformer station, ten for the Baghdad Ministry of Defense/Army

Headquarters, six for the Az Zubayr petroleum pumping station and manifold

near Basra, eleven for the Samarra CW production and storage facilities to the

north of Baghdad, three for the Ajaji turbine power plant Bayji north of Samarra,

ten for the Latifiya solid propellant plant to the south of Baghdad, and twenty for

the Taji tactical strategic missile-support facility to the north of Baghdad.65 The

air planners specified the transformer yards as the aiming point for the electrical

targets. The attack on the Ajaji turbo electric plant, the largest power plant in

Iraq, which supplied 13 percent of Iraq’s total electric power, again used the carbon-fiber warheads with their special properties against electrical generating systems. Eyewitnesses told the Harvard Public Health Team that Coalition aircraft

“dropped metallic nets on Beiji [sic], short-circuiting the plant’s electrical network.” They added that the plant ceased operations at that moment, on January

17, and did not regain partial capacity until March 31, 1991.66 The damaging of

the oil pipeline and refineries in southern Iraq would, in theory, deny immediate

POL to the Iraqis, forcing them to limit movement to conserve stocks on hand

and to bring in fuel from the north. This necessity would expose the fuel and its

transport to destruction and impose greater strains on Iraqi transport and logistical systems.

At 1400L the planners had scheduled a large USN-USMC package to work

over the IOC and railyard at Az Zubayr. Az Zubayr possessed the last Iraqi rail

marshaling yard before Kuwait, an oil refinery, and crucial oil pipeline facilities.

It served as a major logistics facility and supply head for the entire Kuwaiti front.

However, weather forced the fourteen F/A–18 (HARMs), four EA–6Bs, ten

F/A–18 escorts, three KA–6 tankers, and ten F/A–18 bomb carriers to divert to a

target of opportunity—Iraqi patrol boats. At the same instant, the USN attacked

western Iraq as well. The Red Sea carriers sent a force to the H–2 and H–3 areas.

As in any force of conventional aircraft going into heavily defended enemy territory, the supporting aircraft far outnumbered the attack aircraft. The eighteen

attackers (the fourteen F/A–18s striking the H–3 petroleum pumping station,

H–3 SOC, H–3 IOC, and the H–3 troposcatter site as well as the four A–7s

attacking H–2 airfield facilities) required thirty-eight support aircraft: eight

KA–6 tankers, sixteen F–14s flying sweeps, and fourteen assorted aircraft flying

199

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

64. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

65. Brfg Slide “0900–1400 TLAM,” in intvw, Comdr. McSwain, Apr 7, 1992. The MAP

states that this effort would expend fifty TLAMs. But Commander McSwain states, presumably from USN sources, that it took sixty-three. He added thirteen TLAMs to the total expended on the Taji SSM support facility. In this case, I have given the after-the-fact USN report

more weight than the MAP.

66. Rpt, Harvard Study Team, “Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War,” May 1991, p.

22.
SEAD—a ratio of better than two to one. Twenty minutes later, flying as far as

it possibly could without additional air-to-air refuelings (an absolute premium on

the first day; the tanker fleet was strained to its limits), USMC air attacked the

Al Amarah IOC near the Tigris River a little more than one hundred miles from

Basra. The USMC fliers used twelve F/A–18s and EA–6Bs to aid four attacking

USN F/A–18s. The Coalition air forces could afford to whack the Amarah IOC

somewhat late in the day because it tended a network aimed in the wrong direction, at Iran. Still, the built-in redundancy of the Kari system allowed the Amarah

IOC to serve as a backup for other already disrupted Kari modules in the southern sector. The Amarah IOC was not crucial enough to blast on the first wave,

but it was not insignificant enough to ignore permanently.67

At 1500L the F–16s revisited Kuwait. One group of sixteen F–16s swooped

down on the runway and facilities of Ali al Saleem airfield while another group

of sixteen F–16s, with a group of four F/A–18s escorting one EA–6B from the

USS Midway and with four F–4Gs flying shotgun, peppered the runway and

adjacent facilities of Ahmed Al Jaber airfield. The F–16s dropped Mk–84s with

nose plugs to achieve greater penetration and destruction of the runway’s concrete. The F–16s punishing the facilities dropped Mk–84s with proximity fuses

(FMU–113s). After these airfields were suppressed, any Iraqi aircraft on raids

directed at Coalition bases would be forced to fly from more distant bases without refueling or stopping in Kuwait. So would Iraqi aircraft carrying CW or BW.

A half-hour later eight F–16s of the 401st TFW(P) with four F–15Cs sweeping

in front and four F–4Gs providing SEAD struck two CW bunkers at Tallil airfield. The planners directed that the last F–16 over each bunker carry CBUs. The

Coalition wished to retard or eliminate the ability of the Iraqis to load their aircraft with CW.68

Then CENTAF took advantage of the large SEAD operation conducted the

previous night west of Baghdad. Around 1700L forty F–16s of the 363d TFW(P)

preceded by four BQM–74 drones, four EF–111As, and eight F–4Gs giving

SEAD support and accompanied by sixteen sweeping F–15Cs pummeled the

runway and facilities at Al Taqaddum airfield and the petroleum storage site at

Habbaniyah. The last two F–16s over the Al Taqaddum runways and facilities

dropped CBUs.69 During this mission’s flight into the target area, the centralorbit AWACS aircraft (the middle of three AWACS orbits maintained full-time

by the Coalition) detected two MiG–29s70 flying northeast of Mudaysis. The

Iraqis probably originated at Al Asad airfield. The AWACS alerted the flight of

eight F–15s, four of which continued with the package while the other four

turned toward the MiG–29s. The F–15Cs picked up the MiG–29s flying south.

200

On Target

67. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, pp. 15–16; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

68. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 16; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

69. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 17; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

70. GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 2, A Statistical Compendium, Table 206 “Coalition Air-to-Air Kill

Matrix” (2d ed.), p. 653.
The Iraqis immediately turned north and increased speed. A stern chase closed

the distance to eighteen miles when the MiGs turned on their pursuers. Capt.

Charles J. Magill, an exchange pilot from the USMC, launched two AIM–7s, and

Capt. Rhory R. Draeger, USAF, launched one AIM–7. All of the missiles hit their

targets, destroying both. Neither victorious pilot spotted parachutes.71 The package continued unmolested to its destination, attacking oil storage facilities on the

way. (The Coalition wanted Iraq’s domestic oil industry out of commission, not

completely destroyed because the country would need this commodity to earn

capital through export when rebuilding after the war.) Al Taqaddum airfield was

one of the largest and best-equipped fields in Iraq. It also served as one of the

centers of advanced flight training for the IZAF (Rasheed airfield to the east of

Baghdad served as another). The special campaign planners assumed that the

presence of so many available instructor pilots, presumably among the best in

their service, would increase the likelihood that any Iraqi aircraft flown from Al

Taqaddum would have competent if not better hands at their controls.72 These

factors encouraged CENTAF to keep the airfield suppressed.

In mid-January night comes early. Baghdad itself sits on approximately the

same latitude as Charleston, South Carolina. At 1830L, not long after sunset,

twelve F–111Fs (three groups of four each) swept over three of the four Iraqi

FOLs hit the previous evening—As Salman North, Wadi al Khirr, and Mudaysis.

Ninety minutes later, four F–14s, an EA–6B, and eight A–6s from the USS

Ranger attacked air defense reporting posts and a control van for the Chinesemanufactured CSSC–2 (Silkworm) antiship missile at Al Faw and Mina Al Bakr

on the Iraqi coast. Then, between 2015L and 2030L stealth fighters of the 37th

TFW(P) returned to the skies over Baghdad. Massive Iraqi AAA barrages fired

blindly into the air and filled the first few thousand feet over the capital with an

expensive and ineffective display of pyrotechnics. Only the so-called golden BB,

an extremely lucky one-in-several-million shot, might damage or down one of

the F–117As. But that did not stop the Iraqis from trying to get that shot or the

American pilots from anticipating an unwanted object going bump in the night.

After takeoff at 1739L, twelve F–117As of the 415th TFS left Khamis Mushait

for the Iraqi capital. One aborted en route when its antenna failed to retract. Of

the remaining eleven F–117As, one went west, where it hit the H–3 SOC and

failed to drop on the Ar Rutbah IOC; another went east to strike the Al Kut and

Al Amarah IOCs. However, an air abort caused it to return to base before dropping any bombs. Nine F–117As attacked targets in or near Baghdad. The aircrafts’ videotape recorders (VTRs) revealed bomb strikes on several important

targets—the Khan Al Mahiwil AM transmitter, the Salman Pak AM transmitter,

Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) HQ on the North Taji military-related facility No.

201

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

71. Statement, Capt. Charles J. Magill; Msgs, 171700Z Jan 91, 33d TFW(P)/IN to

USCENTAF FWD/IN/DO, Subj: Killrep #2, and 172359Z Jan 1991, Subj: Special Misrep

AWACS Central Orbit.

72. Intvw, Maj. Satchwell, Apr 29, 1992.
2 (civilian command bunker), the Ministry of Defense National Computer

Center, IZAF HQ (two hits), and one of the Iraqi AWACs (Baghdad–1, an Il–76)

aircraft at Saddam International Airport (two hits). The IIS collected foreign

intelligence, conducted operations against dissidents, and monitored Iraqi students. It also played a major role in securing foreign technology, foreign R&D,

and foreign equipment for Iraq’s NBC and missile programs. The Ministry of

Defense National Computer Center reportedly housed battle management computers and helped coordinate operations between the Iraqi military services.73

The elimination of the Iraqi AWACs deprived them of airborne IOC.

Because of their extraordinary capabilities, the F–117As were invariably

sent against the most difficult and crucial targets. When they destroyed or damaged their objectives, as they did far more often than not, their achievement

became, over time, a given. Thus their misses have seemed magnified in part

because they were so unexpected. Such seems the case with at least one of the

targets not hit on this raid. The bird that had air-aborted earlier in the evening carried a couple of eggs destined for two of Iraq’s three known nuclear reactors, the

Osirak and Isis units at the Iraqi nuclear complex at Tuwaitha. Of the four bombs

on four different aircraft destined for the Abu Ghurayb C3 bunker, three missed

and one was not dropped. Two bombs missed targets in the Taji complex, others

missed the Al Taqaddum and Taji IOCs, and a last bomb missed VIP bunker No.

25 (a possible location for Saddam). VIP bunker No. 25, one of thirty-five hardened-concrete bomb shelters constructed by two Scandinavian firms in Baghdad,

had opulent accommodations and reportedly rested on steel-spring shock

absorbers. It seemed likely, therefore, that Saddam or others of the highest leadership levels would use it. The planners had known of its purpose since October

1990.74 Of eighteen bombs dropped, ten found their mark (56 percent).75

One hundred miles north of Baghdad and a few minutes after the F–117As

departed the Baghdad region, four F–111Fs, with two EF–111As flying SEAD,

approached Saddam’s hometown, Tikrit. To reach such a deep target they had

risked conducting an air-to-air refueling over south-central Iraq from KC–135

tankers escorted by F–15Cs.76 If the Iraqis had dared to turn on their radars they

might have located and disrupted the vulnerable refueling operation. Instead, the

F–111Fs took on fresh fuel, and the tankers returned to base without incident. At

2040L the F–111Fs scored a direct PGM hit on the leadership bunker at

Saddam’s Tikrit residence (Saddam built such C2 bunkers at all of his palaces and

202

On Target

73. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 18–19, 22–23.

74. TDFIRDB–315/27389–90, Msg, 221913Z Oct 90, CIA to DIA, Subj: Comments on

Reinforced Bunker Construction in Iraq [File No. Deptula Box 11C/No. 3]; Conversation notes,

Lt. Col. Ben Harvey, XOXWF, with CIA Representative, Oct 24, 1990; MemoRec, Capt.

Leeper, XOXWF, Subj: Imagery Questions with CIA/DIA, Nov 5, 1990 [File No. CK/AS/12-

Leadership C3].

75. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 13–19, 1991, pp. 12, 18; MAP, First

24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 18.

76. Brfg Slide, “1700–1735[Z],” in intvw, Comdr. McSwain, Apr 7, 1992.
retreats).77 This mission and the raid coming in just behind it sent a message to

the people of Tikrit and possibly to Saddam—the conflict has found you; if the

raid had picked off Saddam, well and good. With the start of hostilities Saddam

became a legitimate target. Colonel Deptula stated, however, that the planners

never expected to get Saddam; they hoped that if they wrecked his personal and

governmental command facilities, they might so undercut him that he would fall

of his own weight.78

Then, a few minutes before 2100L, two B–52Gs penetrated into northern

Iraq. Aided by the two EF–111As that had flown in with the previous mission,

they struck the Al Sahra undergraduate pilot training base, approximately one

hundred miles north of Baghdad.79 Al Sahra airfield had a significance that

somewhat belied its prosaic function. It housed the Iraqi Air Academy and was

close to Tikrit. Saddam and his clan, from which he drew much of the leadership

of the regime and the armed forces, hailed from Tikrit and its environs. The

regime considered the residents of Tikrit its most trustworthy supporters. They

had confirmed Saddam’s opinion with loyal service. Consequently, the city

enjoyed a favored status and benefited from many public works and pork barrel

projects. Saddam had even transferred the IZAF Academy from Baghdad to Al

Sahra in one such scheme, which removed the students from the relatively open

atmosphere of the capital to a far more closed location under tighter mental and

physical controls. The targeting of Tikrit or its environs suited the planner’s

intentions to bomb for psychological effect. Since September 1990, Checkmate

and others had suggested the northern Iraqi town for special treatment.80 The

special campaign planners wished to drive home to the Tikritis that the consequences of what Saddam had done would affect all of Iraq.81 Downtown Tikrit

offered no target lucrative enough to justify the possible collateral damage a raid

might cause. Likewise, bombing the Air Academy itself, with its freshly

scrubbed and youthful students might not convey to the Tikritis, or the world, the

proper impression. Therefore, by process of elimination, the planners set their

sights on Al Sahra airfield.

They chose to send the B–52G against this target. The B–52G fit the requirements of the mission. First, it could go deep inside Iraq, where the target was

located; second, because the target did not justify the use of PGMs, it was accu203

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

77. See Msg, 181347Z Jan 91, CENTAF/IN to AIG 12982, Subject: CENTAF Air Combat

Assessment/Current Bomb Damage Assessment [File No. T/CT/59/-]. This early assessment

reports a direct hit on the target.

78. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.

79. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 17.

80. MemoRec, Lt. Col. Ben Harvey, Targeting Tikrit, Oct 14, 1990; Msg,192105Z Sep 90,

HQ USAF/XOXOC to CENTAF FWD [Brig. Gen. Glosson], Subj: Iraqi Contingency Targets

[File No. CK/Deptula Box 13/Planning Material]. Marginalia on the message indicates that

General Glosson approved B–52 raids on the Tikrit Ammunition Dump (seven miles NNW of

the city) and the Tikrit East Airfield and a F–16 raid on the Tikriti Military Barracks (twenty

miles NNW of the city), if the pilots “make sure only Iraqi mil[itary] personnel!”

81. Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.
rate enough to hit a large airfield, whereas it might not successfully bomb a lesser sized complex. The B–52Gs further fitted the essentially psychological character of the mission because its bombload, the largest in the AOR, would make

a big enough bang and, perhaps, rattle enough windows to create within the

Tikritis their first stirrings of doubt. The two bombers made low-altitude runs in

to the target. The first aircraft dropped his ordnance successfully, which, if nothing else, alerted the defenders. To escape unnecessary risk, the second B–52G

turned away at sixty seconds before its scheduled time-to-go because of a “curtain of AAA” fire.82

As the B–52Gs flew north of Baghdad, eight F–111Fs and four GR–1s, with

four F–4Gs and two EF–111As riding SEAD and four F–15Cs on a sweep,

bombed the runways and base facilities at Al Jarrah to the south of Baghdad. At

2100L three B–52Gs supported by four F–4Gs and four F–15Cs made the first

bombing mission against combat troops of the Republican Guard, hitting the

Tawakalna Mechanized Division from high altitude. From that time until the end

of the conflict CENTAF promised to have at least three B–52Gs on some portion

of the Republican Guard every three hours.83

Just forty-eight hours earlier, this particular mission had provided the occasion for one of the CINCCENT’s celebrated flare-ups. On January 15, Colonel

Deptula, with Generals Horner, Glosson, and Caruana present, briefed General

Schwarzkopf on the first day’s operation. When Colonel Deptula began to

describe this mission at the tail end of the first twenty-four hours’ operations,

General Schwarzkopf, who had apparently become angrier and angrier as the

briefing continued, erupted. He began to vent his anger at what he regarded as a

betrayal by the Air Force. “You’ve deceived me,” he stormed. “For five months,”

he added, “you’ve been telling me that you’d start on the Republican Guard from

the first instant.” When the colonel attempted to explain that CENTAF first had

to suppress Iraqi defenses before it could bring in the vulnerable B–52Gs,

General Schwarzkopf would have none of it. General Horner, as the CINCCENT’s air component commander, bore the brunt of a tirade that seemed to go

on and on. “If I don’t have someone here that does what I want [him] to do,”

growled General Schwarzkopf, “I’ll find somebody that does.” After everyone

but Generals Schwarzkopf and Horner had left the room, one of the air officers

observed that he had never in his career seen a four-star general give a three-star

general such a chewing-out. For a few hours General Glosson and Colonel Deptula sat in RSAF HQ in an agony of anticipation, fearing that they would have to

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On Target

82. Draft Rpt, SAC/DO, “Operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm: The Bomber Story,”

p. 29 [File No. SAC/HO, Historians Working files]. The evidence on whether this mission actually flew as scheduled is somewhat contradictory. The ATO, which has a block to indicate if a

mission actually flew, says “yes.” STRATFOR records have no documentation on it, but they

seem to imply that it did not fly. “The Bomber Story,” prepared in Omaha, contains details of

the second aircraft turning back. This made it more probable, in my judgment, that the raid flew

as scheduled.

83. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 18; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.
rearrange, at this extremely late hour, the first day’s MAP and ATO. The preparation and distribution of the two top secret documents presented a very laborintensive and time-sensitive project that might well become undone. To procure

aircraft that could survive against the more intense Iraqi defenses to be encountered early in the day, the planners would have to take F–15Es and F–111Fs off

Scuds. In hopes of salvaging the situation, the two officers set up the briefing

map they had used during the past five months for General Schwarzkopf in

General Horner’s office. They annotated the map to show that what they had just

briefed to General Schwarzkopf did not differ from what they had always briefed

to him. They waited and waited. The changes never came. Shortly thereafter

Colonel Deptula met General Horner and others in the headquarter’s elevator.

General Horner stated that there would be no changes. General Schwarzkopf had

eventually cooled off, apologized, and stated that he understood the problem.84

Apparently when the CINCCENT had an attack of nerves, he did not suffer

alone.

From 2227 to 2320L, three packages of aircraft smashed up targets in the

Basra area. Preceded by the last four BQM–74 drones, a large USMC strike of

ten A–6s and eighteen F/A–18s attacked the Basra petroleum factory, three highway and rail bridges near Basra, the Shaibah airfield facilities, and the marshaling yard at Az Zubayr. Four GR–1s plowed up the runways at Shaibah, and four

EA–6Bs and six F/A–18s (HARMs) provided SEAD. As the attack ceased, two

new missions hit the Basra area. First, sixteen F–15Es placed a second attack on

the Basra petroleum refinery, hit the Al Qurnah highway bridge (west), and the

Al Basra turbine power plant Hartha. Then, six USN A–6s bombed the Ash

Shuaybah railroad station and its aircraft maintenance and repair facilities while

two EA–6Bs and six F/A–18 (HARMs) with four F/A–18 escorting the EA–6Bs

flew air defense suppression.85

The three strike packages furthered several Coalition goals. They began the

bridge-bombing campaign in the south. This campaign had two objectives—

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Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

84. File 201, Desert Storm Monograph Project, AFHSO.

85. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, p. 19.

F–111F from RAF Lakenheath’s 48th TFW(P)
restrict the flow of logistics and reinforcements into Kuwait and, perhaps even

more important, prevent the Republican Guard from deploying out of the KTO.

General Schwarzkopf and many others regarded the Republican Guard as one of

their prime objectives because its loss would remove a crucial prop to Saddam’s

regime and destroy the cream of his army. Likewise, the immediate hitting of

railroad marshaling yards closest to the KTO would create logistical and redeployment bottlenecks. Iraq had only one single-line railway through Baghdad,

Basra, and Umm Qasr. Az Zubayr, which had a rail junction of lines to Basra, to

Umm Qasr, and a bypass link around Basra to the main line, was the chief supply transshipment point to Kuwait. The town stood astride the only paved highway connecting Basra and Kuwait, and only trucks could carry supplies south.

Furthermore, an armored force such as the Republican Guard does not travel

great distances on its own relatively delicate treads. It moves most efficiently on

large trucks with specially designed flatbed trailers, known as tank or heavyequipment transporters, or by railroad flatcar. The Iraqis had an inordinately

large number of tank transporters. Thus damaging the roads and rails would

delay the movement of the Republican Guard. The bombing of the petroleum

refinery would remove the source of refined oil products closest to the Iraqi

ground forces in the KTO. The halting of refinery production would eventually

affect the mobility of the Iraqi ground forces and the IZAF. However, achieving

these classic goals would take time and might not bear fruit during the conflict.

Turning off the spigots at the refineries would have a more immediate effect on

Iraqi civilians. They would face bothersome gasoline lines, shortages of kerosene

for heating and cooking (in winter), and lack of diesel and other fuels for backup generators used to replace the downed electrical facilities. Saddam’s populace

would have yet more reasons for dissatisfaction and would certainly feel the bite

of the conflict more keenly.

Decommissioning Basra’s chief power plant, the 800,000 kilowatt Al Basra

turbine power plant Hartha which supplied 8 percent of all of Iraq’s power,86

plunged Iraq’s second-largest city into gloom, both spiritual and physical, denied

power to the national Iraqi electrical grid, and further worsened the general chaos

and confusion in southern Iraq. As they did only during the first two days of the

war, the Strike Eagles of the 4th TFW(P) came in on the deck. The big fighters

achieved results commensurate with their courage and skill: eyewitnesses at the

plant reported a devastatingly thorough and accurate attack. The Harvard public

health team learned that “on January 17, missiles [sic] hit all four steam boilers,

the fuel station, the plant’s water treatment unit, water cooling and distribution

pumps, the power house, and the administration building.” The severely damaged plant ceased to operate and did not regain any capacity until April 1, 1991.87

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On Target

86. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 3, pp. 50–51.

87. Rpt, Harvard Study Team, “Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War,” pp. 24–25. I

could discover no record of TLAMs or ALCMs scheduled to impact this plant on January 17.
The Iraqis extracted a price in return. Maj. Thomas E. Koritz, the aircraft

commander, and Lt. Col. Donnie P. Holland, the weapons systems officer, failed

to return. Other members of the flight had last seen them as they climbed out of

the target area. Initial reports attributed their loss to possible AAA. At conflict’s

end the Iraqis returned the bodies of the two officers to the USAF.88 Koritz and

Holland were the first USAF casualties in the war. Some question exists as to the

aiming points of the F–15Es. Planning documents indicate that they should have

hit the plant’s transformer yard.89 The planners selected the transformers because

intelligence indicated that knocking them out would put the entire plant out of

production. (After the war, they would be less troublesome for the Iraqis to

replace.) The planners originally intended not to damage the electrical plants

more than necessary. The air units, however, may not have been privy to this

intention and may have done their own planning on aiming points. Postwar

BDA, after eleven additional raids on the plant, still shows only moderate damage to the transformer yard.90

At 2300L to 2315L a USN-RAF package returned to three airfields in western Iraq: Nine A–6s attacked H–2 and H–3 airfields while eight GR–1s attacked

the runways at Al Asad. Two sweeps of F–14s, nine aircraft total, and SEAD

support consisting of five EA–6Bs, three A–7s, and four F/A–18s (HARMs)

assisted the strike aircraft. A second package of Tornados immediately followed

the first mission. Eight Tornado IDSs supported by four GR–1s (ALARMs)

attacked runways at H–3 and H–2 and the petroleum pumping station at H–3. At

2315L six F–111Fs with jamming support from two EF–111As struck Scud shelters at Qalat Salih while GR–1s rehit the runways at Mudaysis and Wadi al Khirr

between 2330L and 2400L. These FOLs of the IZAF came in for special attention on the first day because their aircraft posed the greatest potential threat to

Coalition air operations. These aircraft offered, at best, a minimal threat to head

south and disrupt tanker and HVAA operations, and their presence and location

gave them some capacity to interfere with ongoing offensive operations. At

0100L on January 18 two TLAMs were scheduled to hit government control centers in Baghdad. At 0100L and again at 0250L, a cell of B–52Gs, escorted by

F–15Cs and F–4Gs, bombed the Tawakalna Division of the Republican Guard.

The USN canceled the final mission of the first twenty-four hours, a strike of six

F/A–18s carrying standoff, land-attack missiles (SLAMs) on an important communications link in the Kari system.91

Air operations during the first day naturally reflected the targeting philosophy of their planners. As discussed in Chapter 3, the air power theories of

Colonel Warden of the Air Staff and of the other members of his deputate had

evolved toward a new method of applying air power for effect and shock, not just

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Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

88. Claypool, “4th TFW in Southwest Asia,” Vol. 1, pp. 74–75.

89. First 24 Hours, Sequential Target Flow, 0200 Jan 8, 1991.

90. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 3, pp. 50–51.

91. MAP, First 24 Hours, Jan 16, 1991, pp. 20–21; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.
destruction. They did not deny the value of destruction but thought that current

USAF attack planning methodology overemphasized it. They were interested in

exploring more thoroughly the value of creating chaos, confusion, and lowered

morale and efficiency by striking a wider range of targets. Colonel Deptula, the

chief planner for Phase I of Desert Storm, had not only worked closely with

Colonel Warden but had also, in planning the offensive air campaign against

Iraq, initiated the concept of simultaneity. Additionally, he pushed to their logical conclusions the concepts of targeting for effect and strike sequencing, discussed but not fully matured by the Warden group. Bombing for effect, by its

very nature, requires wide-ranging, carefully timed, well-coordinated attacks. In

the first twenty-four hours alone, Coalition air forces struck more than 100 targets, divided among 10 target systems, in 248 separate attacks. They concentrated on leadership, C3, the strategic air defense system, airfields, electricity,

domestic oil production, LOCs into Kuwait, and the Republican Guard. The

Coalition air forces, aided by TLAMs, hit three-quarters of Iraq on an aroundthe-clock basis and, from Tikrit to Basra, brought the conflict to the populace

without significant collateral damage.

The failure to take out the Iraqi BW bunkers constituted the most significant

shortfall of the first day’s execution. Depending on Iraqi capabilities, which no

intelligence could describe with absolute certainty, that failure had the potential

for catastrophic consequences. A target system such as nuclear weapons R&D

and production or BW, the poor man’s A-bomb, may point to the Achilles heel

of a pure application of the bombing-for-effect theory. Some targets simply must

be destroyed. In the meantime, the Coalition rendered much of the electrical

industry inoperative, and the Iraqis shut down the remainder of their capacity.

The loss of electricity in the first hours of the conflict represented an important

success for the theory of bombing for effect. Only a few bombs and missiles of

thousands dropped and 13 targets of 160 attacked inactivated the electrical system without demolishing it and produced an outcome far greater than the

Coalition’s expenditure.

The Second Twenty-Four Hours

In the second twenty-four hours of the conflict the preplanned attacks, which

were not finalized until January 12, continued. Two other significant events

occurred—the advent of USAF attacks on Iraq from the territory of the Republic

of Turkey and the successful Iraqi launch of SRBMs against Israel. Weather left

most of Iraq under fair skies, but southern Iraq and Kuwait came under low

clouds, causing some mission cancellations.92 In the first attack, from 0400L to

0420L on January 18, twelve F–117As struck in the west, in the east, and in the

208

On Target

92. Memo, 1st Lt. Cotturone, Subj: Weather History of Desert Storm, n.d. [ca.Jan 20,

1991].
Baghdad area. They concentrated on air defense targets. In the west, a single

F–117A hit both the H–3 and Nukhayb IOCs. Two others hit both the SOC and

the IOC at Tallil.93 In the center of Iraq, roughly fifty miles to the west of

Baghdad and close to the Al Taqaddum airfield, three F–117As smashed BW

bunkers at Habbaniyah and Fallujah. Two F–117As used GBU–27s to damage

the BW depot at Habbaniyah and BW bunker No. 1 at Fallujah, but the plane that

had dropped on Habbaniyah could not drop on its second objective because the

target could not be precisely identified. The other F–117A had just come from

the west where it pounded the BW bunker at Qabatiya, approximately 150 miles

from Baghdad. The five remaining F–117As pressed on to the national capital.

Fog 02 achieved two hits on an I-Hawk battery that the Iraqis had captured from

the Kuwaitis and employed in the Baghdad defenses. Its capabilities and its

American-designed electronic defenses made it potentially more effective than

any other SAM in the Iraqi inventory, and therefore a prime target. Mist 03

placed two GBU–27s on the Baghdad air defense SOC at Taji. The last F–117A

dropped one of its GBU–27s on the Baghdad radio relay terminal but the guidance system on the other failed.94

As AAA filled the air over the capital, far to its north the aircraft of JTF

Proven Force began their initial bombing runs on Iraqi electronic warfare (EW)

sites north of Mosul at 0410L. Flying through overcast at 3,000 feet and with

three-mile visibility and fog, ten F–111Es of the 20th TFW carrying CBU–58s

attacked radars at Basiqah Northeast, Machurah Dawg North, and Sununi. Eight

F–15Cs of the 36th TFW, two F–4Gs of the 52d TFW, and an EC–130 Compass

Call of the 66th Electronic Combat Wing provided fighter escort and SEAD for

the strike aircraft.95 JTF Proven Force’s first raid and the ones that followed complicated the Iraqis’ already overwhelming air defense problems by requiring

them to deal with air attacks from two different directions and to actively defend

their northern region, which most Coalition planes in the south did not have the

range to reach.

JTF Proven Force came into existence as a result of initiatives by the U.S.

European Command (EUCOM) and enjoyed singular command and control

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Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

93. Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days 1–34, p. 2. The printout lists “PE, NO TAPE”

[pilot error, no videotape of bombing] and records the delivery as a miss for the mission against

the Al Kut IOC. This reflects peacetime record-keeping, which did not recognize a bomb hit

unless verification, i.e. a videotape, existed. When the VTR did not operate properly or ate the

tape, the wing, following USAF policy on PGMs, credited the pilot with a miss. This practice

creates the somewhat anomalous situation, especially in wartime, of a unit deliberately recording some of its successes as failures. Given the overall accuracy of the weapons system, one

can reasonably assume that at least half the bombs counted as misses because of videotape or

VTR problems actually struck their targets.

94. MAP, Second 24 Hours, 0640L Jan 18, 1991, p. 1; Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th

TFW(P), Jan 13–19, 1991; Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days 1–34, p. 2.

95. CMSgt. Jerome E. Schroeder, HQ USAFE/HO, and SMSgt. Thomas L. Raab, 17 AF/

HO, “History of Joint Task Force (JTF) Proven Force” (Ramstein AB, FRG: HQ USAFE/ HO,

Dec 13, 1991), p. 53.
arrangements with CENTCOM, CENTAF, and its host nation, Turkey. Soon after

the invasion of Kuwait, units of USAFE began a contingency plan for a “second

front” against Iraq from Turkey. The plan soon grew from flight demonstrations

to combat operations. The USAFE Commander, General Robert C. Oaks, USAF,

briefed the plan to the CINC EUCOM (CINCEUR), General John Galvin, USA,

on the fourth or fifth of September. General Galvin saw potential in it and subsequently briefed it to General Powell. By October 12, 1990, USAFE began to

prepare for the possible deployment of ninety-nine aircraft to three Turkish

bases, with the bulk going to Incirlik AB. As a NATO and USAF main operating

base, Incirlik had support and maintenance facilities and ground equipment

designed to service USAF aircraft. It also had prepositioned war readiness spares

kits (WRSKs) and base-level self-sufficiency spares to enable it to sustain prolonged operations. A large influx of personnel would require the erection of temporary quarters, such as a tent city, but the base already had U.S. exchanges and

mess halls, which could stretch to provide the necessities.

In peacetime, Incirlik AB hosted scheduled NATO exercises, and USAFE

fighter units deployed to Turkey for training on the extensive Konya weapons

ranges. In September 1990, for example, fourteen F–111Es arrived for weapons

training and four F–16s from the 401st TFW deployed to meet NATO commitments. The U.S. State Department obtained extensions from the Turkish government allowing the aircraft to remain in place long after their scheduled departure,

and Saddam assuredly knew almost immediately of the aircraft’s movement. On

December 16, the 36th TFW deployed ten F–15Cs for weapons training. At the

end of December, in exchange for a commitment to train Turkish pilots in air-toair refueling, four KC–135 tankers augmented the U.S. forces at Incirlik AB.

Furthermore, the U.S. government also asked the Turkish government for permission to nearly double its combat air forces in Turkey with forty-eight additional aircraft. Throughout the fall and winter, USAFE continued at the rate of

two missions per day to support and supply combat operations from Turkey.96

As USAFE actions went forward on one rail, negotiations with the Turkish

General Staff (TGS) and the Turkish government proceeded on a parallel rail.

The strategic decline of the USSR greatly benefited Turkey, in that it reduced the

threat from an age-old, more powerful antagonist. As a member of NATO, an

alliance formed for the purpose of containing the Soviets, Turkey maintained

large, but increasingly obsolescent, armed forces. In numbers, Iraq’s armed

forces exceeded Turkey’s, but in maintenance and training, particularly of its air

force, Turkey’s undoubtedly exceeded or at the very least equaled Saddam’s best

units. Although Turkey and Iraq shared a border, Turkey held height and defense

advantages because the border ran through the foothills of a Turkish mountain

range. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis had proved remarkably inept at mountain warfare. Thus Turkey seemed to have little to reason to fear its neighbor’s

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On Target

96. Schroeder and Raab, “History of JTF Proven Force,” pp. 1–4.
aggression. It did, however, have reason to fear the implications of allowing

Coalition air attacks from within its territory. Its opposition political parties

would not approve any attacks from Turkish soil. Turkey still wished to maintain

the remnants of its Ottoman heritage, and an attack on an Arab country might

damage its position in the Middle East. On the other hand, Turkey had already

joined the Coalition, shutting down an Iraqi oil export pipeline. It had also

applied for membership in the European Common Market, many of whose members had already supplied Coalition troops. How would Turkey’s failure to support the foreign policy goals of those countries affect its possible membership?

Lastly, the United States—Turkey’s ally and long-standing friend, its major arms

and spare parts supplier, an annual contributor of hundreds of millions of dollars

of foreign aid whose armed forces pumped millions of dollars into its domestic

economy every year, and a nation that might assist it in modernizing its military

establishment—pressed for permission to use Turkey’s facilities against Iraq.

These countervailing pressures took time to resolve. The TGS negotiated

with a liaison team from USAFE for several months and reached understandings

on CSAR services, deployment of munitions, preparation of unit logistics support packages, host nation support, and contracting for maintenance of fuel capability at Incirlik AB. But some approvals took the form of in-principle-only

agreements, and continued under discussion. Other approvals did not come until

the last minute.97 On January 14, 1991, the Turkish Foreign Ministry approved a

U.S. request for forty-eight additional combat aircraft, placing three conditions

on this grant: 1) aircraft could not conduct offensive operations against Iraq without specific permission from Turkey; 2) details on aircraft arrival, deployment,

and activities had to be fully coordinated with the TGS; and 3) the Turkish

government retained the option to withdraw its approval of this request.

Secretary of Defense Cheney had anticipated approval and had already authorized the deployment of fourteen F–15Cs, twelve F–4Gs, twelve F–16s, four

F–111Es, and six EF–111As, all of which arrived by January 18.98 Turkey continued to consider U.S. requests for additional tankers, AWACS, and EC–130

Compass Call aircraft.

On the first day of the offensive air campaign, January 17, the Turkish parliament, along strict party lines, voted 250 to 148 to approve the United States’

use of Incirlik AB and Turkish airspace to combat Iraq.99 The lateness of

Turkey’s approval forced the JTF and the TGS to finalize procedures rapidly for

coordination and approval of airspace control, safe-passage procedures, and air

refueling tracks. Turkey agreed to allow six refueling areas and two operating

areas for the AWACS and the RC–135s and further established two standardized

routes for the Incirlik-based aircraft flying to and from the Iraqi border. Each

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Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

97. Ibid., p. 25 Table II–1 “TGS JTF Beddown Issue Approval.”

98. Msg, 170418Z Jan 91, CJCS to USCINCEUR, Subj: Proven Force Support [Deployment Order] [File No. T/HO/26/JTF].

99. Schroeder and Raab, “History of JTF Proven Force,” pp. 30, 32.
route had specific ingress and egress points that were ten miles wide with a margin of error of four miles on either side. One route was reserved exclusively for

night operations, and the other, exclusively for day. Planes entering Turkey outside these points would be subject to fire from Turkish air defenses.100 As of

January 18, 1991, JTF Proven Force had the following aircraft assigned:

Aircraft No. Aircraft No. Aircraft No.

F–15C 24 F–4G 7 MC–130 1

F–111E 18 F–16 (WW) 12 HC–130 6

EF–111A 6 EC–130 3 MH–53J 5

F–16 24 KC–135A 12 E–3B 2

Turkey belonged to the AOR of CINCEUR who provided liaison with the

host nation; bases; force commander; manning, logistical, and administrative

support units; and aircraft through his air component commander, the USAFE

commander. However, JTF Proven Force conducted its combat operations in

Iraq, which belonged to the AOR of CINCCENT. Given the large scale of the

conflict and the extent of the CINCCENT’s geographic responsibilities, forces

would inevitably operate across differing AORs. In this event, which had been

anticipated, the JCS had devised a formula that made one or more CINCs the

supporting commander, and made the CINC responsible for combat operations

the supported commander. At least four CINCs supported CENTCOM: CINCTRANSCOM, CINCSAC, CINCSOC, and CINCEUR. CINCEUR retained

operational control of JTF Proven Force through its commander, Maj. Gen.

James L. Jamerson, USAF. Jamerson had operational control of all units assigned

to JTF Proven Force and also gained tactical control of all CINCEUR forces in

Turkey. Operational control gave a commander far-reaching powers to direct all

phases of a unit’s activities including planning, logistics, personnel, military justice, and combat. Tactical control gave a commander far less power over a unit,

limiting him to broad direction over the performance of a specific task or mission with little authority, other than coordination, to specify how a unit would

plan and execute its duty. The two forms of control resembled the difference

between owning and renting a property.

JTF Proven Force came under the tactical control of General Schwarzkopf

“for mission-specific tasking and/or assignment to a geographic AOR within

CENTCOM AOR as mutually agreed between C[ommander]JTF and USCINCCENT.”101 General Schwarzkopf formally expressed his concept of the JTF’s

command relationship with him shortly after the JTF’s first raid over Iraq. On

January 18, 1991, he directed that CENTAF “include all Proven Force missions

and targets in the Air Tasking Order and will coordinate theater CSAR operations

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On Target

100. Ibid., pp. 49–50.

101. Msg, 231243Z Dec 90, USCINCEUR to et al, Subj: OPORD for JTF Proven Force,

1–001 [File No. T/CT/49/-].
to include JTF Proven Force operations.” He further authorized direct liaison

between CENTAF and the JTF. Lastly, General Schwarzkopf delegated his tactical control of the JTF to General Horner as COMCENTAF.102 The JTF and

CENTAF quickly developed a practical working relationship that began during

discussions between General Horner and General Jamerson in Riyadh on January

3. The two Generals agreed to a loosely defined line, initially drawn at 35°00’N,

which gave the northern one-third of Iraq to the JTF and deconflicted the operations of the two forces until the Directorate of Plans established procedures

incorporating the JTF into the MAP. Both parties realized that this line could

move north or south depending on the situation in Iraq. General Horner hoped

that the JTF would be able to begin operations and gave its contingent an ATO

for their initial activities. He stated that he would treat the JTF as another element in the ATO. However, this proved impractical. Eventually, the Iraqi Planning Cell directed operations by specifying targets for the JTF—essentially furnishing mission-type orders, which included the basis encyclopedia numbers.

The JTF used that information to develop its own ATO and to plan strikes for

minimum risk and maximum destruction. The 7440th Provisional Composite

Wing [CW(P)], established by USAFE on January 16, served as the command

formation of the air element of the JTF. It prepared the local ATO. The JTF could

also nominate its own targets to JFACC. As the conflict progressed and the JTF’s

knowledge of northern Iraq increased, so did its target nominations. To avoid

fratricide and other complications, the JTF also had to advise the JFACC whenever it planned to send one of the 7440th CW(P)’s aircraft below the demarcation line.103 For statistical purposes CENTCOM and CENTAF excluded the aircraft and combat sorties of the JTF from their own totals.

A package of twelve F–111Fs and eight F–15Es with two EF–111As and

eight F–15Cs in support flew fifty-five miles to the northwest of Baghdad and

pounded Balad SE airfield’s facilities and runways at 0430L, fifteen minutes

after the F–117As had struck targets in Baghdad itself. To further pressure the

capital region, four F111Fs with SEAD backing from four F–4Gs and two EF–

111As attempted to collapse a CW bunker at Al Taqaddum airfield.104 The presence of such a bunker at one of Iraq’s largest air bases and the home base of

Iraq’s only medium bombers made it an important target.105 Nor did the Coalition

aircraft give western Iraq a respite. At 0445L a combination of eight F–111Fs

and eight GR–1s (four with ALARMs), aided by two EF–111As and four F–15s,

struck H–2 airfield and the facilities and runways at H–3 airfield. Two more

F–111Fs, coming in at 0505L, followed up an F–117A strike at 0500L on the

213

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

102. Msg, 180845Z Jan 91, USCINCCENT to USCINCEUR, COMUSCENTAF, and JTF

Proven Force, Subj: Frag Order [File No. T/CT/77/JTF].

103. Intvw, Maj. Gen. James L. Jamerson, Comdr, JTF Proven Force, with CMSgt. James

E. Schroeder, JTF Proven Force, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, Mar 27, 1991, pp. 6, 8.

104. See DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 58–59, for imagery of this bunker.

105. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 2, p. 18.
Qabatiya BW bunker, dousing it with CBU–89s. Five minutes later, six F–111Fs

with two EF–111As supplying SEAD gave the same treatment to the BW

bunkers at Habbaniyah and Fallujah, cracked open five minutes earlier by

F–117As. From 0500L on, numerous packages headed for the KTO where they

concentrated on Silkworm targets, Scud shelters, airfields, logistics areas, and

Iraqi ground forces, including three Republican Guard Divisions.106

Weather forced the cancellation of a morning (0930L) USN package from

the Red Sea carriers directed at Al Asad airfield 100 miles northwest of Baghdad.

At 1000L, forty F–16s of the 363rd TFW(P), sixteen F–15Cs on sweeps, and a

SEAD group of eight F–4Gs and two EF–111As bombed military and artillery

production targets at Habbaniyah, a Scud plant at Fallujah, and a rocket-engine

plant at Shahiyat. Ten minutes later another large package of forty-four F–16s

with eight F–15Cs and four RSAF F–15s on covering sweeps and eight F–4Gs

and two EF–111As providing SEAD attacked Scud support and military support

facilities to the south of Baghdad. A squadron of RAF attack-variant Tornados

based in Dhahran were a last-minute addition to this package.107 In groups of

four or eight aircraft they hit rocket propellant plants, suspected Scud production

facilities, surface-to-surface missile (SSM) equipment production facilities, an

explosives plant in Latifiya, an arms plant in Al Iskandariyah, and rocket-motor

test facilities in Al Musayyib. Wart Weaseling also continued. From 1030L

through 1259L pairs of A–10s punished border early warning sites. Some flew

deeper into western Iraq: one pair tackled an EW site at H–3 SE airfield, a dispersal field for the main H–3 operating base; another took out a site near Ar

Rutbah. Throughout the morning and early afternoon from 0530L to 1400L,

TLAMs rained down on five Iraqi targets—the Ministry of Defense computer

center, the Az Zubayr IOC, the Al Mawsil power plant, the Al Basra refinery, and

the Abu Ghurayb presidential grounds.108 By the end of the second day the USN

had expended 216 TLAMs, 64 percent of its total launches for Desert Storm.109

The pummeling of strategic targets continued into the night. At 1700L eight

Tornado IDSs cratered the runways at As Salman and Ghalaysan airfields. An

hour later eight F–15Es split into pairs; one attacked four rail and highway

bridges, three of which crossed the Euphrates; one at An Nasiriyah and two at As

Samawah, and one blocked a crucial highway link near Ar Rumaylah. CENTAF

had sent the F–15Es to take down the bridges, not so much to stop supplies and

reinforcements from getting into the KTO as to stop the Republican Guard from

getting out of it. The MAP specifically designated the bridges as “Republican

Guard Escape Routes.”110 The first wave of 10 F–117As began a twenty-minute

214

On Target

106. MAP, Second 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, pp. 2–5.

107. Review Comments, Lt. Col. Thomas D. Smith, USAF, Air Staff XOXS, on Lt. Col.

Harvey’s comment copy, November 4, 1992.

108. MAP, Second 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, pp. 6–9.

109. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 125.

110. MAP, Second 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, p. 10.
attack on the Baghdad area at 2100L while an additional four F–117As assailed

Kuwaiti targets with little success.111

At 2200L eight GR–1s aided by two EF–111As and followed by a reconnaissance GR–1A began to attack the runways at Balad SE airfield to the northwest of Baghdad. At the same time, a package from the Red Sea carriers consisting of two EA–6Bs and eight A–7s flying SEAD, four F/A–18 and twelve

A–6 strike aircraft, and four F–14s protecting the HVAA attacked three targets in

northwest Iraq. The A–6s pounced on the Al Hadithah power plant and the Al

Hadithah TV station 130 miles to the northwest of Baghdad. This continued the

Coalition’s policy of bringing the conflict home to Iraqi civilians without directly harming them and of separating them from the regime. The F/A–18s, carrying

SLAMs, worked over the yellow cake–uranium extraction area of the Al Qaim

superphosphate fertilizer plant near the Syrian border, 200 miles northwest of

Baghdad. In the south at the same time, four F–4Gs supported four B–52Gs in

an attempt to bomb the Umayjah petroleum refinery four miles south of

Nasiriyah. Four B–52Gs struck at the As Samawah petroleum refinery, four-andone-half miles south of that city, thirty minutes later. Both cells of B–52Gs made

low-level attacks, and one received battle damage.112 The Mudaysis airfield runway received the not-so-gentle attentions of four Tornado IDSs at 2300L. Al Kut

on the Tigris began to come under attack at the same time when four F–15Es

struck at its highway bridge over the river and its TV transmitter. Part of the same

package, eight GR–1s gouged the runways at Al Jarrah airfield, and four F–4Gs

provided SEAD. In a simultaneous mission 125 miles to the south of Al Kut,

fourteen F–111Fs aided by two EF–111s and protected by four F–15Cs attempt215

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

111. Ibid.; Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 13–19, 1991, p. 20. Also see

DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 125. This document, also known as “The

Title V Report to Congress,” reports this F–117A raid as follows: “An hour before midnight, a

dozen F–117s bombed key C3, leadership, and strategic air defense installations, including the

ministries of Defense, Information, and Internal Security in downtown Baghdad.”

112. Worksheet, 17th Air Division, B–52 Mission, January 18, 1991 [File No. AFHSO

microfilm reel 10240].

This building once

housed a 300-gallon

solid rocket propellant

mixer.
ed to knock out two highway bridges over the Euphrates near An Nasiriyah and

a long railroad bridge spanning a deep wadi near Saqash. Significant damage to

the railroad bridge would sever the single-track rail line between Baghdad and

Basra, greatly reducing the ability of the Iraqis to give logistical support to their

army in Kuwait. In spite of their large purchases of foreign matériel, the Iraqis

had not procured enough trucks to completely motorize their army and their supply services. The loss of the rail line would not only deprive the Iraqis of railborne supply but would force them, if they wished to remedy the supply deficit,

into substituting motor transport, which insured greater attrition of their already

inadequate truck fleet. Two of the F–111Fs attacked the radio relay station in An

Nasiriyah.

At 2335L a package of five F–111F and four GR–1 strike aircraft assisted by

four GR–1s (ALARMs) and four F–15Cs flew into western Iraq where they hit

the H–2 airfield runway and a suspected CW storage facility at H–3 airfield. A

reconnaissance GR–1A flew in last to capture the results of these and earlier missions. Eight more of the 48th TFW(P)’s F–111Fs supported by two EF–111s of

the 366th TFW(P), also based at Taif, bored into central Iraq where they hoped

to hammer yet two more bridges—the railroad bridge over the Euphrates at

Muftul Waddam, just south of Saqash, and the Al Kifl highway bridge over the

Shatt Ash Shamiyah,113 approximately sixty miles south of Baghdad.

At 0300L on January 19 the F–117As again attempted to bomb Baghdad and

other targets in Iraq. This attack proved unsuccessful. In one of the last two packages of the second day, both at about 0350L, four B–52Gs from Moron AB

should have struck at the missile research facility in Mosul, the primary missile

R&D complex in Iraq. This mission cancelled while airborne. In the other package, eight Tornado IDSs punctured the runways at Wadi al Khirr airfield and the

Al Khafi highway strip.114

Throughout air power history weather has prevented or spoiled more combat missions than any other single factor. No blame should attach to the F–117A

(or its pilots) because it could not exceed its design and equipment limitations.

However, the inability of the USAF and Coalition to continue to strike key targets in Baghdad and elsewhere at this important juncture of the campaign illustrates one of the greatest potential drawbacks to the theories of centers of gravity, of simultaneity, and of shock. If some factor should intervene to delay or halt

the campaign, the enemy may quickly regain his equilibrium. In some fights it is

not enough to knock your opponent down; you must break his legs to keep him

from returning to the ring. In going for the quick, economical, and seemingly

precise victory, air power purists may not end up with the kill. Against a differ216

On Target

113. Just to the south of Al Kifl, the Euphrates River splits into two major channels, the

Euphrates and the Shatt Ash Shamiyah, that continue to flow separately for approximately fifty

miles until they reunite just west of Ash Shinafiya.

114. MAP, Second 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, pp. 11–13; Printout, F–117A Mission Results,

Days 1–34; Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 13–19, 1991, p. 21.
ent foe, the failure to close down his BW storage facilities, wreck his major

nuclear facilities, and destroy significant targets in his capital as soon as possible

may result in a far less felicitous outcome.

After forty-eight hours of intense, exhilarating, and at times terrifying effort,

what had the offensive air campaign against Iraq accomplished? As of 2400L on

January 18, CENTAF, MARCENT, NAVCENT, and the Coalition partners had

flown 4,588 sorties and destroyed seventeen Iraqi aircraft at a cost of eleven of

their own.115 The sorties divided fairly evenly between combat and support. In

briefing President Bush on January 18, the Joint Staff made several claims,

among them that Coalition air forces had attacked 169 of 298 targets:

Target System Targets Attacked No. of Targets

Air Defense and Airfields 51 67

C3 40 65

NBC Production and Delivery 23 49

(including Scud sites)

Military Infrastructure 49 106

Republican Guards 6 11

and Forces in Kuwait

Coalition air forces had assailed all known fixed Scud launcher rails, engaging

fourteen; they also claimed to have destroyed ten MELs. CENTAF had also

attacked the Taji storage facility and mobile Scud hiding places. In addition,

Coalition air forces had achieved “significant degradation” of Iraq’s air defenses

and had destroyed all of its air defenses and EW capability in the south. The

President heard that Coalition air forces had killed all radars and, except for

Baghdad, had blinded Iraq’s air defenses, rendering them “largely ineffective.”116

However, the JCS made more modest claims for other target systems. They

admitted that C3 for the Iraqi national command authorities was “largely intact,”

as was military C3 between Baghdad and Basra. Bombing had disrupted military

land-line C3 within Kuwait, an assumption validated by the fact that all major

Iraqi units in the theater had resorted to radio communications. Coalition bombing had damaged some TV facilities, but most remained operational as did Radio

Baghdad. In addition to the Scud targets attacked, Coalition air forces had struck

at BW and CW storage sites and production infrastructure, but the capability

remained to produce these types of warfare. The Coalition had inflicted limited

injury to Iraq’s military support infrastructure, a system intended for additional

targeting later in the campaign. Air strikes had severely damaged Republican

Guard C3 but had otherwise caused “no known significant damage” to Saddam’s

elite troops.117

217

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

115. Msg, 192115Z Jan 91, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Subject: “SITREP.”

116. Brfg Slides, Presidential Brief, “Operation Desert Storm,” Jan 18, 1991 [File No.

CK/DS/JCS].

117. Ibid.
In some respects the results of the first two days of Phase I more than justified the targeting concepts approved by General Horner and employed by

General Glosson and Colonel Deptula. Within the first two hours of hostilities,

the C2 elements of the Kari system succumbed to Coalition bombing and electronic harassment, forcing Iraqi SAMs and AAA to fall back on nearautonomous modes of operation.118 Although the Iraqis eventually replaced

many of the EW radars lost to Wart Weaseling and brought many of the SOCs

and IOC partially back on-line, the haphazard timing of these reinstatements and

the constant Coalition bombing of active radar sites ensured that the Iraqis’

IADS would operate at a small fraction of its prewar capability. The breakdown

of the Iraqis’ air defense system and the IZAF’s inability and unwillingness to

protect its airspace gave the Coalition de facto air supremacy from the opening

moment. Once air power has the political direction and military capability to

attack every significant enemy target and faces only ground opposition, it is a

matter of time until the enemy’s industry and armed forces are destroyed.

The initial and widespread bombing and missile attacks on the electrical and

petroleum industries had immediate effects on Iraq. In addition to the power

plants literally short-circuited into inoperability, the Iraqis shut down their

remaining plants, forcing the military and leadership to rely upon backup generators and depriving the populace of the source of power that provides virtually

all of the labor-saving amenities of everyday life. Forty-eight hours of bombing

nearly erased fifty years of development. The shutdown of the domestic oil

refineries, largely accomplished in the attack’s first days, would eventually affect

military operations if the conflict continued long enough. The rationing of oil and

gasoline in a country with some of the largest petroleum reserves in the world

might have to be instituted. The loss of gasoline and diesel fuel for the domestic

market would speedily disrupt the economic distribution system and cause no

end of inconvenience to the average Iraqi; it would dry up some backup electrical generators as well. Unlike Germany in World War II, Iraq did not have large

reserves of spare parts, slave labor, and skilled technicians with which to repair

the damage.119 Nor did it have the capacity to fabricate many key items. When

the electricity and the oil stopped, they would stay stopped until the Coalition

allowed them to restart. Coalition leaders may have hoped that the average

Iraqi’s dissatisfaction with living conditions would lead to Saddam’s ouster.

They underestimated Saddam’s popularity and the grip of his security services.

Nonetheless, Iraqi morale plummeted and productivity declined.

The first two days of bombing made some progress against SRBM production and support but, in spite of the briefing to the president, virtually none was

218

On Target

118. After Action Rpt, CENTAF/EC, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Oct 1991, sec. 5,

pp. 1, 2.

119. For a detailed discussion of the bombing of the German oil industry, see Richard G.

Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, GPO, 1993).
made against the fielded missiles and their launchers. Once Iraq began to fire its

missiles, the pressure from Israel and to a much lesser extent from Saudi Arabia

would force the Coalition to divert air assets from operations to Scud suppression. Anti-Scud operations would become the single largest strategic diversion of

air power during the conflict. The initial air assault had damaged less than onehalf of Iraq’s CW and BW storage. It inflicted some damage on its nuclear facilities, a target that did not require immediate destruction. The Coalition’s failure

to eradicate NBC targets gave the Iraqis a chance to employ these weapons if

they chose to do so, or more likely, it presented the Iraqis with an opportunity to

disperse an unknown quantity of test equipment and special munitions, which in

all likelihood had already been done. From another perspective, the Iraqis’ failure to deploy BW and CW assets in the first forty-eight hours of the attack

stemmed directly from the confusion and chaos in its C3 apparatus, a result of the

widespread air offensive.

When assessed as a whole, the initial air attacks inflicted light to moderate

damage on most of the nonindustrial targets struck.120 This followed the intent of

the offensive air campaign’s designers who had purposely designed the assault to

achieve shock and disruption rather than assured destruction. Although they took

calculated risks, especially with NBC targeting, the air planners’ opening moves

had pried the Iraqi clam apart and left its soft interior exposed to more punishing

thrusts. The first attacks succeeded brilliantly.

219

Thunder and Hail over Baghdad: The Initial Attacks

120. Msg, 171817Z Jan 91, CENTAF/IN to all units, Subj: CENTAF Air Combat Assessment/Current Bomb Damage Assessment; Msg, 181347Z Jan 91, CENTAF/IN to AIG 12982,

Subj: CENTAF Air Combat Assessment/Current Bomb Damage Assessment; Msg, 191539Z

Jan 91, CENTAF/IN to AIG 12982, Subj: Combat Assessment/Current Bomb Damage Assessment.

The targets in the above reports include a representative sample of those attacked by each

type of USAF aircraft. The question of the exact damage inflicted by each individual mission

on each separate target will probably never be answered with 100-percent certainty. Too many

variables, such as problems of BDA collection, crew misidentification, bombs dropped through

clouds, and Iraqi redundancy affect the equation. Anyone who speaks with assurance on the

definite results of more than five to ten missions during any air war ought to be regarded with

some suspicion. The author of this work is well aware of the problem of defining a “successful” mission and has discovered that in many instances it means that aircraft flew to their target and dropped their ordnance, with little idea of accuracy of delivery. Even aircraft carrying

PGM-capable weapons systems, which have VTRs, can make errors in interpretation of results.

They just do it less often. We need only look at the BDA for the IOCs and SOCs after two days

of conflict and after the conflict’s close to discover that a “hit” or “hits” do not always physically incapacitate a target. That, of course, leads to the totally unverifiable (at least without

physical possession) problem of “actual or real” kills versus “functional or practical” kills—an

area of airpower theology the reader must untangle for himself.
220

On Target
Chapter Seven

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

Phase I, the strategic air offensive, continued for another seven days. Two

factors beyond General Horner’s control adversely affected its outcome. In the

first, the weather turned in favor of the Iraqis. On the third day of the conflict,

the first of a series of bad weather fronts began to sweep across the AOR, limiting air operations.1 In the second, the Iraqis began firing SRBMs at the state of

Israel on the second night of the war. Because only the breakup of the Coalition

gave Saddam a respectable chance for a political victory, repercussions from an

Israeli intervention in the conflict offered a viable prospect for shattering the

alliance. Both the Iraqi and U.S. governments realized the potential consequence

should the Israelis use armed force.

General Horner ruefully observed at the beginning of the third day of the

campaign, “we have been busy chasing mobile Scuds and hampered by weather.” In order of priority, the CENTAF list of targets read: Scuds; C2 bunkers not

completely destroyed; recovering airfields; key CW and military research, production, and storage facilities; leadership and telecommunications targets in

Baghdad; petroleum storage facilities; the Republican Guard in Kuwait; and

Iraqi logistics support.2

The disruption of the Kari air defense system produced a long-anticipated

change in CENTAF tactics. Beginning on day three, CENTAF instructed tactical

units conducting strategic and deep interdiction raids to switch from low-level to

medium-altitude attacks of 10,000 feet or higher.3 Since August 1990 the special

planners had contemplated making this switch to minimize aircraft attrition and

221

Preface

1. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 126.

2. Msg, 190800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #163. See

Commander’s comments section.

3. Rpt, HQ Air Weather Service, “Air Weather Service Contribution to Winning the War—

the Value of Weather Support: Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield Report 1,” May 23, 1991 p.

1. This document concentrates on air tactics and the relationship to weather.
preserve aircrews as soon as the attack against Kari succeeded.4 Heretofore,

some units, such as the 4th TFW(P), had employed low-level tactics. Other units

such as the 48th TFW(P) used the so-called European scenario tactic of flying in

at low altitude, popping up to a higher altitude to lock-on and deliver weapons,

then resuming low altitude to return. The service had designed both tactics as a

means to counter an expected Soviet-style opponent who would employ many

SAMs to deny the intruder medium altitudes and numerous interceptors, many of

which could not locate and engage low-flying aircraft. At the end of the first

forty-eight hours, CENTAF assessed the major Iraqi air defense threat not as its

SAMs and aircraft, but as its numerous AAA pieces, the bulk of which lost effectiveness at altitudes above 10,000 feet. CENTAF strongly suggested, but did not

require, that units flying CAS and related missions abandon low-level tactics.

The switch to higher altitudes produced a tradeoff in weather conditions by

greatly increasing the primary operational weather thresholds. At 1,000 feet,

Desert Storm targets would fall below thresholds only 1 to 2 percent of the time.

At 10,000 feet the same targets fell below the operational weather threshold 33

percent of the time. Ceilings below 10,000 feet became a conventional weather

tactical decision aid in determining whether or not to dispatch missions. Over

CENTAF’s bases, the threshold for recovery of aircraft ranged from a minimum

222

On Target

4. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 26.

Satellite imagery of weather

patterns over the Middle East
of 300 feet with one mile visibility to unlimited with conditions above 500 feet

and two miles visibility.5

During the next ninety-six hours of the air offensive, weather hampered

operations in several ways. It caused CENTAF to cancel outright 10 percent of

each of the next four days’ scheduled force packages, and it had the same if not

a greater effect on the total number of scheduled sorties. Not only did poor

weather over the strike aircraft bases and carriers result in cancellations, but

weather also prevented the all-important tankers from accomplishing their operations and interfered with after-action reviews. Weather further led some strikes

to divert to alternate targets, as the F–117As began to do on the night of January

18. By the morning of January 20, CENTAF reported a prioritized policy: “in

event of bad target weather, we are using airfields (to include hardened aircraft

shelters for F–117A’s), Republican Guard units, Iraqi forces and defenses on

Faylaka Island, coastal AAA batteries, and Umm Qasr Missile Site as alternate

targets.”6

In the first ten days of the air campaign, poor visibility or low overcast conditions forced CENTAF to cancel approximately 15 percent of its scheduled

attack sorties.7 In the first seventy-two hours, F–117As lost 48 percent of their

targets.8 USAF climatologists estimated that for January and February 1991 the

weather over Baghdad and Kuwait City was twice as severe as the reported average. (They also noticed that host-nation weather observers routinely reported the

weather to be better than it actually was, and they suspected this habit may have

skewed the fourteen-year average on which their predictions were based.)9

Weather affected both bombing accuracy and intelligence. Without verified

intelligence on actual damage, neither CENTAF/IN nor the national intelligence

agencies could provide authoritative BDAs. Without BDAs, planners and operators worked in the dark, unable to gauge whether or not to restrike an old target

or proceed to a new one. This shortfall of BDA intelligence had unfortunate

organizational consequences. General Glosson’s Directorate of Campaign Plans

and its predecessor, the CENTAF special planning group, had never had a good

working relationship with Col. Christopher Christon’s Directorate of Intelligence, a problem both activities blamed almost entirely on the other. Colonel

Christon had assigned five of his officers directly to the campaign planning shop,

but they suffered from two faults difficult to overcome. First, they were junior in

rank to almost all the operators and, therefore, lacked influence. Second, they

223

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

5. Rpt, “Air Weather Service Contribution,” May 23, 1991, p. 1, attachment 1.

6. Msg, 200800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Desert Shield Sitrep #164

[190300Z–200300Z] [File No. T/CT/66/-].

7. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 169.

8. Brfg Slide, Air Combat Command, “F–117 Smart Weapons Initiative,” Amended

Program Objective Memorandum (APOM) Submission, FY 2000–2005, n.d. [ca. summer

1999].

9. GWAPS, Vol. 3, pt. 2, Support (2d ed.), pp. 85–88.
had access only to the intelligence that CENTAF/IN had access to.10 One might

also note that these intelligence officers consisted of recent augmentees to

CENTAF/IN from other intelligence organizations within the service and were,

in effect, outsiders in that organization as well.11 As a consequence, the influx of

CENTAF/IN personnel did little to ease matters between the two organizations.

Weather-enforced delays in BDA created yet another seemingly unavoidable

tangle in the two organizations’ relationship. Just as the planners ended their preplanned attacks of the first two days, they encountered the need to perform

detailed planning for future days. The December HQ CENTAF reorganization

had attached the planners to the ATO shop and its rigid seventy-two-hour planning schedule. The campaign planners initially prepared the first forty-eight

hours of the war in five months—a time in which the expansion of the target list,

the expansion of the force, the need for a plan that could become effective at any

time, and enemy moves and countermoves caused extensive changes. The planners now faced the task on a daily basis of creating a new plan for execution

forty-eight hours away while remaining focused on the next day’s plan as well as

the current day’s plan. For reasons of flexibility, the campaign planners, with

General Horner’s encouragement, decided not to draw up detailed plans for

strikes more than two days into the future. They feared that providing a detailed

campaign map too far in advance might lock CENTAF into courses of action that

could be invalidated by evolving and unforeseen circumstances.

At this juncture, the campaign planners faced an intense need for BDA while

CENTAF/IN could not, or in the planners’ opinion would not, give it to them.

CENTAF/IN was already reeling from demands for imagery collection and dissemination that totaled four times its anticipated workload and had to be transmitted through nonstandard communications systems. The specialized security

classifications of the information further hampered its efficient distribution.12

This situation and the tension associated with it as men under stress clashed

permanently thwarted the relationship between the two sections of the same

headquarters. To a man, the campaign planners began to further develop their

own intelligence contacts. General Glosson intensified his working relationship

224

On Target

10. Memo, Lt. Comdr. D. J. Muir, Subj: The Targeting Process in Operation Desert Storm,

Mar 4, 1991 [File No. Comdr. Don McSwain, 7 April 1992]. Commander Muir served in the

GAT Division from December 18, 1990, to March 4, 1991.

Also see a rebuttal from Colonel Deptula who states, “LCDR Dan Muir was not privy to

the details of the targeting process—he was an assistant in contributing information about

bridge targets. Muir didn’t come on-board until after the war started, and was not aware of the

intel-planner interactions that had occurred the many months prior to the war. The whole intelplanner issue is very complex and deserves much more insight than Dan Muir possesses.

Additionally intelligence, logic, maturity, and ability to adapt were all far more critical in gaining ‘influence’ in the special planning group and the Black Hole than rank.” Lt Col Deptula,

“Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 26.

11. Intvw, Capt. John Glock, USAF, Intelligence Officer, Special Campaign Planners,

with Drs. Diane T. Putney and Richard G. Davis, CAFH, Aug 8, 1992, at Crystal City, Arlington, Va.

12. GWAPS, Vol. 4, pt. 2, Space Operations (1st ed.), p. 176.
with Rear Adm. Mike McConnell. Colonel Deptula turned even more to Checkmate and Colonel Warden. Checkmate acted as an intelligence fusion center, collecting information from agencies throughout the Washington, D.C., area. For

example, one of the Instant Thunder planners, Lt. Col. Ben E. Harvey, served as

the chief of Checkmate’s DIA BDA Support Section. In this capacity, he provided operators to each of DIA’s four BDA cells in the Washington, D.C., area. In

turn, these operators assisted DIA in BDA and gathered much raw intelligence,

which Checkmate used to augment the Black Hole in planning attack options and

evaluating the effect of the air campaign to date.13

Compared to sources direct from Washington, CENTAF/IN operated at the

end of the chain of command that imposed, by its very design, institutional

delays at each level. When CENTAF/IN received certain pieces of information,

hours after the campaign planners did, its “late and old” information merely confirmed the campaign planners’ position. A naval officer in contact with the campaign planners observed that Checkmate and DIA “completely cut CENTAF/IN

out of the loop. The planners often had intelligence information that was totally

unknown to the operational intelligence people and targeteers.”14 The puzzled

onlooker added that the normal interaction one would expect to find between

operations and intelligence in the fleet—the equivalent of wing-level, not theater-level organization—did not exist. In reviewing these circumstances, Colonel

Deptula made the following analysis, which presents the planners’ position:

The Black Hole Planners had pleaded with CENTAF Intel to provide them with

photos of targets, provide additional personnel to analyze PGM video tapes

(bomb camera footage), and to interpret BDA in a timely fashion. Unfortunately

intel could not break away from its established procedures and adapt to the

speed required of the planning cycle. CENTAF/IN continued throughout the

war to produce target recommendations that were either already in the Master

Attack Plan or which the planners had obtained from other sources and had

already been hit (primarily their own review of bomb camera film). CENTAF/IN did provide one service worthwhile to the planners, and that was the

identification of DMPI’s [designated mean points of impact] on targets selected

for the Master Attack Plan.15

CENTAF/IN also neglected to put the planners on the distribution list for the

combat aircraft mission reports, which contained useful information on detonations and effects.16 General Glosson, as 14th AD(P) Commander circumvented

this by ordering the F–111F and F–117A units to forward summaries of all video225

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

13. Review Comments, Lt. Col. B. E. Harvey, Dec 1992.

Colonel Harvey added, “This was not done to circumvent CENTAF/IN, but to ensure the

planners and operators got information that CENTAF/IN could not or would not provide.”

14. Memo, Lt. Comdr. D. J. Muir, Mar 4, 1991, Subj: The Targeting Process in Operation

Desert Storm.

15. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 27.

16. Intvw, Maj. Robert J. Heston, USAF, 37th TFW(P) Dir Intel, Aug 9, 1990–Mar 31,

1991, with Mark D. Mandeles, GWAPS, and Lt. Col. Stanford S. Terry, USAF, GWAPS, Oct

16 and 19, 1992.
tape recordings to the planners. In short order the GAT Division had set up a

daily courier run to hand-carry the tape from the wings to the Black Hole. The

videotapes became one of the planners primary BDA sources.

Since the planners had personnel assigned directly from each of the combat

units, they used this resource to garner further intelligence. This again short-circuited standard channels from wing intelligence to CENTAF/IN to the planners.

Many months after the conflict, General Horner supported his intelligence staff

by stating,

The method of setting up their own intel network caused the CENTAF/IN to be

out of the loop on issues for which he was responsible, creating a working environment that was not conducive to a smooth working relationship. The major

reason for the breakdown was the actions of the Director of Campaign Plans not

keeping CENTAF/IN in the loop.17

The establishment of alternative intelligence sources furnished an example

of how control of decision-making and operations tended to accrue to the

Directorate of Campaign Plan’s GAT Division. Not only did that division supply

the bulk of the targeting (which drives any air campaign), it had direct access to

the combat units. It also now had its own intelligence sources and, by the end of

the week, would have its own weather officer (the CENTAF weather component

was located in the RSAF HQ building, only a few feet from the Black Hole).

Access to both improved weather data, especially from dedicated weather satellites. Additionally, more immediate expert interpretation of weather data allowed

the planners the flexibility to work around areas of poor operating weather by

scheduling missions to clear areas and deleting those intended for socked-in

areas. This increased the number and effectiveness of missions sent to suitable

areas during much of the campaign. In the first few days of the conflict, the

necessity of hitting the preplanned targets on schedule caused many weather

aborts or no-drops. A similar situation would occur at the close of the campaign

as aircraft attempted to operate in minimal conditions in order to aid the ground

offensive. As the head of the directorate and commander of the 14th AD(P),

General Glosson, had operational command of the fighter force and could, in theory, ensure the execution of the GAT Division’s plans.

Planning difficulties caused many last-minute mission changes in the ATO;

diverging viewpoints between members of the GAT and ATO Divisions caused

others. The first two days’ ATOs, as discussed earlier, were completely scripted

documents that maximized tanker and support aircraft use. The tight security

hold on the Black Hole’s activities had forced it to prepare the first day’s ATOs

by itself, without reference to the regular ATO preparers (who continued their

regular task of creating the daily CENTAF training ATO). When the GAT

Division completed the first two days’ ATOs, security required it to hand-carry

them to the wings, again bypassing the usual ATO process. Thus when the regu226

On Target

17. Ltr, Horner to Hallion, Subj: Review/Comments on Draft Manuscript, Dec 8, 1992.
lar ATO shop was confronted with having to begin day 3 planning, its personnel

had never seen any of the GAT plans before and had to rapidly switch gears mentally from the daily training ATO to the combat ATO. For their part, members of

the GAT Division had adopted some procedures new to the ATO shop, and GAT

members assumed that the ATO could be prepared speedily from their MAP

sheets. This lack of coordination, when coupled to the Scud diversion and weather problems, threatened to produce large numbers of daily changes whose effects

significantly delayed the ATO’s preparation and its distribution to the wings.18

Delay in distribution to the wings, if prolonged, would affect the wings’ ability

to plan and execute their missions (no aiming point, no deconfliction, no tanker

and support rendezvous, no calls signs and squawks, etc.). The precision wings,

especially the F–117As of the 37th TFW(P), found last-minute changes particularly disruptive because of the changes they imposed on the complex planning,

targeting, and weaponeering procedures. In the wings, last-minute changes

soaked up an inordinate amount of labor.

It took five days to iron out the worst of the problems. On days 4 and 5, for

instance, the ATO had two of its three wartime highs for changes. The tankers in

particular proved a problem. They could not routinely continue to achieve the

high number of daily sorties they had flown on days 1and 2. Consequently, the

227

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

18. Intvw, Maj. Gen. John A. Corder, USAF, Dir Ops, CENTAF, with Robert L. Mandler,

USAF Air Warfare Center Historian, Dec 21, 1991, pp. 60–61.

Lt. Gen. Buster C. Glosson (foreground) and Lt. Col. David A.

Deptula discuss the execution of

the air war from their quarters in

Riyadh.
planners and the ATO were forced to reduce the number of tanker sorties to

approximately 265 a day. In an attempt to ease the burden and speed delivery of

the ATO, Maj. Gen. John A. Corder, CENTAF Director of Operations, directed

that the GAT planners cut back the number of daily packages from 55 or 60 to

40.19 For the balance of the conflict, mission changes numbered approximately

15 to 20 per day. Handling these last-minute changes provided CENTAF TACC

with a good deal of work. Had CENTAF not completely solved the problem of

numerous changes, the war’s overall outcome would not have been substantially

different, but the efficiency of Coalition air power would have suffered as a result

of the reduced flexibility of employment.

Throughout the campaign, the planners and fraggers (those who prepared the

fragmentary orders for the force packages that would fly the missions) had to balance the priority of hitting time-sensitive targets with the need to keep the ATO

clean. Target and timing changes, which accounted for 40 percent of all ATO

changes (5,800 and 3,500, respectively, of 23,000 changes) caused the wings the

greatest problems because they required substantial reworking. Likewise, target

and timing changes cost the planners lost opportunities because the need for new

photos and intelligence crowded out requests already in the daily planning

cycle.20 General Glosson, who feared that the conflict might end at any moment

and who trusted, correctly, that his planning and ATO divisions and his combat

wings had a greater capacity to adjust to change than they admitted, came down

decisively in favor of striking time-sensitive targets as soon as possible.

The second factor that was beyond General Horner’s control but that had the

potential to adversely affect the outcome of the strategic air offensive involved

the Iraqis’ use of Scuds. For several months before the Gulf War, the possibility

that Iraq would initiate missile strikes against the state of Israel and that Israel

would respond with counterstrikes on Iraq had troubled the U.S. government. A

228

On Target

19. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Corder, Dec 21, 1991, pp. 15–19.

20. For a complete discussion ATO changes and their significance see GWAPS, Vol. 1, pt.

2, Command and Control (2d ed.), pp. 212–232.

Maj. Gen. John A.

Corder in a joint planning session to determine targets and support responsibilities
few days before the outbreak of hostilities a high-level U.S. delegation consisting of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Under Secretary

of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz traveled to Israel to urge restraint. Eagleburger assured Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that the United States would

consider any Iraqi attack on Israel as a casus belli and that, in any case, Coalition

air operations would completely suppress Scud launches from western Iraq.21

Apparently Rabin accepted the assurances but gave no ironclad commitment not

to react in what he considered his state’s best interests.

Once the Coalition air offensive had begun to peel away the basic infrastructure of Iraq’s civilian and military economies, the Iraqis jarred the Coalition with

a volatile reminder of the nature of Middle Eastern politics by launching SRBMs

at Israel. In the space of twenty-eight minutes, from 0259L to 0327L January 18,

1991, Iraq sent from their western Scud areas a volley of seven SRBMs with conventional warheads toward two Israeli centers of population; Haifa was the target of two of the missiles, and Tel Aviv, of five.22 The strike on a neutral country injured twelve persons. Meanwhile, three Israelis died of suffocation when

they put their gas masks on incorrectly; several others needed treatment when

they injected themselves with atropine, an antidote for nerve gas. This placed the

government of Israel under strong domestic pressure to adhere to its standard

policy of speedy retaliation for incidents of terrorism. Publicly, the Israeli government responded to the pressure by choosing to follow a policy of moderation.

It announced that it would not retaliate for this attack, but it would do so if the

rockets continued to fall. The U.S. government sought to support a policy of nonretaliation by pursuing two different paths. First, it encouraged the Israeli government not to intervene by using diplomatic pressure supported with an

increased flow of military and intelligence information, an increased liaison and

229

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

21. GWAPS, Vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning (1st ed.), p. 108.; (2d ed.), p. 103.

22. Msg, 230604Z Feb 91, DEFSMAC to DEFSMAC OT, White House, Subj: Mideast

Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 23 February 1991. The summary notes that

one of the two SRBMs directed at Haifa may have failed in flight.

Black Hole planners in their

Riyadh office

space
coordination between the two countries’ armed services, and military assistance

for the air defenses of Israel. Second, the United States pressed the Coalition military forces to destroy and delay the SRBMs at their source in Iraq.

Privately the Israeli government may have taken a much more forceful position. Secretary Cheney spent the nights of January 16 and 17 in his office, but on

the night of January 18 he went home to rest. When word of the Scud launches

on Israel reached Washington, he hurried to his office to activate the special

communications circuit with his opposite number in Tel Aviv, Israeli Minister of

Defense Moshe Arens, who possibly initiated the call. Defense Minister Arens

stated that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had a dozen F–16s airborne and prepared

to strike at Iraq. He demanded either the Coalition IFF codes or that Coalition air

forces stand down from operations in western Iraq for four hours in order to allow

Israeli air strikes. If the Scud attacks continued, he informed the secretary, Israel

intended to put ground forces into the Iraqi Scud areas. He asked the United

States to use its good offices to obtain permission to use Jordanian or Saudi airspace. Secretary Cheney refused to comply, but he promised to raise the matter

with the president at once. In less than one hour, President Bush, his top aides,

and National Security Advisor Scowcroft met in Scowcroft’s office. The president called Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, expressed his regrets at the

Scud attack, attempted to convince the prime minister of the folly of attacking

Iraq, and offered to defend Israel directly with American Patriot missiles and

crews from U.S. bases in Germany. The Patriot had some capability to defend

against short-range or tactical ballistic missiles such as the Scud. He further indicated that Coalition air forces would redouble their efforts against Scuds.23 Prime

Minister Shamir accepted the Patriots and the president’s reassurances, for the

time being. Fortunately, the U.S. government had some diplomatic space in which

to maneuver. A week before the conflict, Secretary of State Baker had visited several Arab capitals and, except for an ambiguous response from Syria, received

assurances that the Arab allies would accept a “one-time” Israeli attack on Iraq.24

At 0815L on January 19 the Iraqis fired four more missiles from western

Iraq aimed at Tel Aviv. Three of the rockets hit the Tel Aviv area, reportedly

wounding ten persons slightly. Israeli television reported that Israeli military

sources said U.S. attacks against SRBM launch sites were unsatisfactory and

U.S. efforts to destroy the MELs were unacceptable. In the meantime, the

Jordanian Ambassador to France stated that his country would remain neutral in

any Iraqi-Israeli dispute, but Jordan would prevent any aircraft, including Israeli,

from violating Jordanian airspace. The next day the Syrian ambassador to France

stated that if Israel attacked Jordan, Syria would intervene on Jordan’s behalf.25

Clearly, Saddam had stirred the coals under the Middle Eastern pot. The United

230

On Target

23. “Bombs Over Baghdad,” Newsweek Desert Storm Commemorative Edition, pp. 72–

73.

24. Ibid., p. 71.

25. CRS, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Chronology, pp. CRS-25–CRS-26.
States would quickly have to throw water on the fire by restraining Israel in order

to prevent an unpalatable mess.

After the Israelis accepted the four batteries of Patriot antiaircraft missiles,

the Americans moved with alacrity. Two batteries, a total of approximately seventy-five missiles, arrived on January 19. In December 1990 the United States

had already sold and delivered to the Israelis two batteries of Patriots, but the

Israelis had insisted on a more advanced configuration than the one deployed

with U.S. forces. This delayed the Israeli initial operational capability of their

own Patriots because of the wait for the assembly of latest models and the need

for additional training. The Israeli crews received abbreviated training in the

United States, and American maintenance personnel temporarily supported the

batteries.26 As a lesson drawn from their earlier wars, the Israeli always made a

point of obtaining the most advanced technology available.

The American-configured Patriot achieved its initial operational capability

in 1982. A Patriot battery, or fire-unit, consisted of one multifunction phasedarray radar, one engagement control station with fire control computer and communications facilities, one to eight launchers with four missiles per launcher, and

one electrical power plant. The Army designed the system for the point defense

of such facilities as logistics bases, headquarters, airfields, and other military targets not usually found in populated areas.27 The performance characteristics of

the Iraqi SRBMs pushed the Patriot to the limit of its capabilities. Yet the

wartime performance of the 158 Patriots fired, which partially intercepted most

of the incoming Scuds, did not deter the DoD from concluding that “the best

approach to defeating enemy ballistic missiles is to seek out and destroy them on

the ground.”28

The open stationing of U.S. military units in the territory of the state of Israel

created a new precedent in relations between the two states and for the region. In

the minds of the Arabs, and some Israelis and Americans, there had always existed an implied, if unofficial, U.S. commitment to use its armed forces to save

Israel from a catastrophic defeat. However, that occasion had not arisen in the

forty-two years of Israel’s existence. The impact of Iraqi SRBMs on Israeli soil

demonstrated positively that, given the appropriate circumstances, the U.S. government would, indeed, reinforce Israeli defenses with American troops.

Although the United States had sent in troops to prevent Israel from attacking an

Arab power, it had established that it would put troops in Israel and could do so

again. The Israelis proved that they would accept American troops, even under a

favorable overall military situation. For the Arabs, the presence of American

units in the land of their enemy confirmed what they had long suspected. For

Arabs, Israelis, and Americans, this move may have long-term and unforeseeable

consequences.

231

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

26. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (1st ed.), App. T “Performance of Selected

Weapons Systems,” p. T-201.

27. Ibid., pp. T-200, 201.

28. Ibid., pp. T-202, T-203.
The United States had good reason to make extraordinary gestures in its

efforts to shut off Saddam’s best hope of a political victory. After the second

Scud attack on the morning of January 19, the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister,

during a television interview, stated that Israel would retaliate, but he refused to

specify when or how.29 Shortly before the conflict, the Israeli government had

issued gas masks to the general public. Detailed instructions accompanied the

masks on how to prepare airtight rooms in personal dwelling spaces. The government also issued atropine, a nerve gas antidote. These actions greatly

increased the general level of anxiety within the population and gave further

proof of the seriousness with which the state of Israel regarded the threat. It further suggests that Israeli intelligence services definitively credited Saddam’s

missiles with CW and/or BW warheads.

The United States sent not only troops to Israel but also diplomats and airmen in the hope of preventing retaliation. At five in the morning of January 18,

only a few hours after the initial Iraqi SRBM launch at Tel Aviv, General

Schwarzkopf telephoned General Horner and instructed him to send a senior air

officer to Israel as soon as possible. General Horner selected his deputy, General

Olsen, who with the commander of the IAF, Maj. Gen. Hvihu Ben-Nun, had

attended the National War College in Washington, D.C. General Schwarzkopf

personally gave General Olsen his orders, instructing him to go to Israel and tell

the Israelis exactly when and how CENTAF intended to stifle the SRBM threat.

Washington also provided the forum to coordinate the American diplomatic and

military efforts to hold back the Israelis. General Olsen had a dual task: first, to

reassure the Israelis that the Coalition had the military means and methods to

scotch the Scuds, and second, to convince the Israelis of the military impracticality of attempting the task themselves. Without IFF codes and with no ATO

coordination with Coalition air defenses or strike packages, an IAF raid on the

SRBM launching areas might accidentally provoke costly air battles. Since the

Coalition military, at this level, also refused to coordinate with the Israelis by

marking off a sector of Iraq for IAF use only, IAF operations might suffer heavy

losses for little gain. They might even rupture a coalition engaged in a quest to

destroy Iraq’s offensive military capabilities, a prime Israeli foreign policy goal.

After receiving his orders, General Olsen spent much of the rest of the day

working with the campaign planners as they revised their plans to increase the

effort against SRBMs. He found that they had not yet given the problem a thorough examination. When General Olsen left Riyadh at 1600 January 18, 1991,

he took with him only the most rudimentary of plans.30 The planners would continue to try to silence the fixed sites. They would maintain a ground alert force

232

On Target

29. Msg, 191953Z Jan 91, DIA to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update,

Date of Information: (0930 EST) January 19, 1991 [File No. T/HO/3/JAN].

30. Background Paper, Maj. Russ Thompson, Capt. Tom Clemmons, and Capt. Philip

Saur, CENTAF, “How to Kill Scud Missiles: Lessons Learned from Desert Storm,” n.d. [ca.

Mar 1991] [File No. T/CT/10/15].
of F–15Es at Al Kharj AB, more than an hour from the targets, to track mobile

Scuds as soon as possible after they launched. When conditions warranted, they

would put in SOF teams to try to locate sites from the ground. Iraqi air defenses

in the west had not yet deteriorated sufficiently to allow the establishment of an

airborne alert. Within a day or two, CENTAF would have developed a far more

active and sophisticated response to the SRBMs.

A Scud false alert in Israel delayed General Olsen in Cairo, and he did not

arrive in Tel Aviv until 0115L. Three hours later, four SRBMs impacted in Israel.

By that time the general had already begun discussions with the IAF, whose vice

commander had met him upon arrival and escorted him to General Ben-Nun’s

office at IAF HQ. On January 20 diplomatic firepower arrived in the person of

Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger, who returned to coordinate the U.S.-

Israeli response to the missile attacks. Under Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz

flew in shortly afterward. The grim attitudes of their Israeli counterparts soon

convinced the two officials that they faced a dangerous situation. According to

General Olsen, one had to be in Tel Aviv at this time to grasp how close to the

brink of retaliation the Israelis had come.31 For the next few days, in their meetings with the Americans, the Israelis gave a chilling impression of a government

that saw its own best interests quite differently than did its closest friends.

In order to buy time for Coalition SRBM countermeasures to produce results

and to placate the Israelis, the Americans had little choice but to broaden their

information-sharing arrangement with the IAF. The next day the pendulum

seemed to swing in the opposite direction when Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.

Dan Shomron stated in a national television interview that the United States had

made a tremendous effort to locate and destroy the Scud launchers. He added that

his country “will have to live with this threat: they are truly doing everything

possible.” When asked about Israel Defense Forces (IDF) retaliation plans, he

noted Israel’s policy of self-restraint in the matter.32 But single SRBM launches

against Israel on the nights of January 22 and 23 pushed the pendulum in the

opposite direction. The first missile landed in a residential area near Tel Aviv,

wounding ninety-eight, killing one, and causing two fatal heart attacks. A Patriot

successfully intercepted the second missile. The U.S. defense attaché described

the IDF’s successful highlighting of U.S. accomplishments in western Iraq as key

to keeping political pressure from forcing military action. Advance planning

information, continued American air presence over H–2 and H–3, and timely

BDA was “required to help the IDF keep the Israeli political leaders comfortable...all that can be done is being done.” A public opinion poll conducted on

January 23 revealed that 76 percent of the Israeli public believed Israel should

not retaliate.33

233

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

31. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Olsen, Mar 5, 1992.

32. Msg, 220900Z Jan 91, DIA to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update

[File No. T/HO/3/JAN].

33. Msg, 261157Z Jan 91, CIA to et al., Subj: Middle East Brief OCPAS 91–022 for 26
The next night, Saddam’s rocketeers sent, in their single busiest night, eight

missiles against Israel and two against Saudi Arabia. Patriots intercepted the

Israeli-bound SRBMs, but falling debris killed one person and injured forty. On

January 26 four more SRBMs interrupted all activity is Israel but inflicted no

casualties. On January 27 the Israeli government eased the tightened nerves of

the populace a half-turn by reopening the schools, which it had closed two weeks

earlier. That moved children out of crowded, airtight rooms and away from frazzled parents. It further showed resolve to the Palestinians and the Iraqis and took

little risk inasmuch as Scud launches had not occurred during school hours.34 The

same day, Maj. Gen. Malcolm B. Armstrong, a USAF officer experienced in

Israeli affairs and with good Israeli contacts, was seconded from his post as

Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability, J–7, of the Joint Staff in

Washington, D.C., to replace General Olsen. The two USAF generals went to the

Ministry of Defense to discuss the Coalition’s latest anti-Scud efforts in light of

the twelve missiles fired upon Israel in two days. General Olsen left Tel Aviv on

Sunday, January 28, and returned to Riyadh.35 In all, the Iraqis would fire fortytwo SRBMs at Israel. In the first ten days of the war they fired twenty-four; in

the final thirty-one days, sixteen fell on eleven occasions.36 When he left Tel

Aviv, neither General Olsen nor anyone else could know that the worst had

passed. As the USAF anti-Scud liaison with the IAF, the general had performed

a valuable role in helping prevent a political victory for Saddam.

Interestingly enough, the Iraqis launched more SRBMs at Saudi Arabia and

Bahrain (forty-six) than they had at Israel (forty-two), possibly because more

launchers survived, at various times, in the east than in the west. In no instance

did the Iraqis fire more than eight missiles in one day from either launch area;

after January 23, they fired no more than four in one day from a single launch

area.37 The SRBMs aimed from eastern Iraq toward the south encountered the

same nemesis as those fired at Israel—the Army’s Patriot antiballistic missile

system. The southern Patriots proved as effective as their western counterparts

and intercepted most of the Scuds, which did not inflict substantial damage. The

SRBMs fired south at Arabs and the Coalition did not have the potentially dangerous political consequences of those fired at the Israelis. The Saudis could

hardly claim the status of innocent bystanders when their aircraft staged daily

attacks on Iraqi targets and they hosted the great bulk of the Coalition forces. Nor

could the allies legitimately protest Iraqi responses to their offensive.

234

On Target

January 1991 [File No. T/HO/2/CIA].

34. Msg, 290800Z Jan 91, DIA to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update,

Date of Information: (0100 EST) January 29, 1991.

35. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Olsen, Mar 5, 1991.

36. Brfg Slide, Steven L. Head, Special Asst to Dep Dir, Defense Resch & Engring,

Tactical Warfare Progs, Under SecDef for Acquisition, “Scud (Al Abbas) Firings,” Briefing:

Conduct and Performance of the Air Campaign in Operation Desert Storm, Mar 21, 1991. Two

missiles apparently broke up in flight before reaching Israel.

37. Brfg Slide, “Scud (Al Abbas) Firings,” Steven L. Head Brief, Mar 21, 1991.
But as Hitler had demonstrated forty-six years earlier with his V–1 and V–2

weapons that were fired at Britain and Antwerp, random area attacks by pilotless

self-propelled bombs cause anxiety, fear, loss of sleep, and loss of productivity

within the target population—at rates wildly disproportionate to the physical

damage and casualties inflicted. Saddam’s conventional warhead Scuds produced similar results in the Saudi civil population and in the Coalition forces.

Because Coalition intelligence credited the Iraqis SRBMs with both CW and BW

capability, the Coalition forces had to assume, until proven otherwise, that each

missile carried such agents. When troops and ground crews went on Scud alert,

they had to don their CW protective gear (a time-consuming, nerve-wracking

ordeal) and stay in their gear until the all-clear sounded. Personnel rapidly lost

efficiency when working in their confining, steaming hot, bulky suits. Special

warheads, landing amidst the less well-protected Saudi civilian population,

might ignite a panic and shake popular support for the king. CENTCOM’s

conservative Scud warning criteria increased the anxiety and other problems

associated with the SRBMs. Working on the principle of better to be safe than

sorry, CENTCOM instructed United States Space Command (SPACECOM) to

warn it of any situation that looked like a Scud launch. Normally SPACECOM

confirmed or canceled an alert within minutes, but even a false alarm added to

the strain of those within Scud range of Iraq.38 Thus, the immense nuisance value

of the SRBMs endowed them an importance far beyond their almost inconsequential military effectiveness. Accordingly, the air planners had to ensure that

the eastern SRBM launch area, or launch basket, received almost as much attention as the western launch basket.

By the end of the third day of the offensive air campaign, campaign planners

had a far better appreciation of the difficulties presented by Scuds than they had

before the conflict. Range crucially affected Scud operations in two ways.

Available evidence suggests that in the course of modifying their Sovietdesigned missiles, the Iraqis eliminated a feature that allowed for variation of the

missile’s range at the time of launch. All Iraqi SRBM launches seem to have

occurred at maximum range. Thus any Coalition action that forced SRBMs from

their launch baskets or forced Iraqi retreats to safe, densely populated areas or

cities, like Baghdad, automatically reduced the Scud’s range and put Riyadh and

other targets out of danger. Also, the limited range of the SRBMs confined their

operations to three areas within Iraq. To strike Israel at extreme range, the missiles had to fire from western Iraq in areas around H–2 airfield and north of the

Saudi border. The area’s rough topography supplied ravines to hide in, as well as

road bridges, underpasses, and culverts to hide under. In eastern Iraq, the Coalition had located previously surveyed mobile launch sites near Qurnah, forty

miles northwest of Basra, and placed Scud storage facilities at southern air bases

and two airfields in Kuwait. The Scuds in the southern Iraqi-Kuwaiti launch bas235

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

38. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (1st ed.), App. K, p. K-44.
ket concentrated on Riyadh, while those in the Qurnah basket launched at

Bahrain. In the east the more even terrain favored the Coalition’s efforts to find

the launch sites compared with its chances in the west. All three launch baskets

left the Iraqis with ample room for dispersal and concealment, but the range-constricted SRBM launch baskets permitted targets of a relatively manageable size

that allowed CENTAF to concentrate its strength.39 Obviously, the warnings

issued by SPACECOM after firing proved important in locating Scuds. Given ten

minutes after its launching, a mobile Scud could move five miles from its firing

site; given fifteen minutes it could move nine miles from the firing site or twelve

miles from it if the vehicle took a road.40

In the next few days CENTAF fleshed out and implemented the anti-Scud

plan that General Olsen had presented to the Israelis on January 19: kill the fixed

sites, maintain an alert force to go after SRBM MELs/TELs immediately after

launch, and when circumstances allowed, put SOF teams into the area to spot for

attacking aircraft. That same day CENTAF made SRBMs its first targeting priority. General Horner reported, “I have made finding and destroying Scuds our

primary effort, ahead of other strategic air campaign targets and Republican

Guards.”41 On January 20, Scuds continued to be CENTAF’s first-priority target

of the offensive air campaign.42 That day the planners scheduled the USMC to

fly four A–6s and two F/A–18s, with supporting aircraft, against Scud shelters at

Tallil airfield at 0500L. Four hours later sixteen F–16s from the 363d TFW(P),

part of a larger package from the same wing, hit a probable Scud engine plant at

Fallujah and a rocket-engine plant at Shahiyat, both in the Baghdad area. At

0915L another large package of F–16s, this time from the 388th TFW(P),

attacked south of Baghdad; thirty-two F–16s went after several SRBM production and support facilities in the Latifiya area. A second large package of F–16s

from the 363d TFW(P), with SEAD support from USMC EA–6Bs, split off 16

F–16s to attack the Shahiyat rocket facility near Tallil airfield at 1645L. Then at

2000L, twenty-two F–15Es, with SEAD support, struck four SRBM launch complexes in the western launch basket: Wadi ar Ratqa and Wadi al Jabariyah both

near the Syrian border and Wadi Amij and Qasr Amij both near H–2 airfield. In

addition to those specific raids, ten A–10s sat ground alert at Al Jouf FOL from

0500L to 1700L to operate over the western Scud launch basket, if needed.43

Counting support aircraft combat sorties, the planners had scheduled about 15

percent of the effort on January 20 against SRBMs.

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On Target

39. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 14 Map “Iraqi Missile Capabilities.” The most commonly used Iraqi Scud variant, the Al Husayn, had a 600-kilometer (475-

mile) range with a 300-kilogram warhead.

40. Ibid., p. 167. Also see Msg, 260052Z Jan 91, CENTAF/IN to et al., Subj: Intrep

91–148 “Scud Baskets Identified” [File No. T/CT/17/-].

41. Msg, 200800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #164 [File No.

T/CT/66/-].

42. Msg, 210800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #165 [File No.

T/CT/66/-].

43. MAP, Fourth 24 Hours, [1921] Jan 19, 1991 [T/HO/25/Master Attack Plan].
The planners continued the effort to keep Israel out of the war in the early

morning of fifth day of the air offensive, January 21. They rescheduled two packages of F–111Fs from air defense and SRBM targets in Kuwait and Tallil to send

them to Scud sites near H–2 and H–3 airfields at 0530L. The aircraft involved

included twenty-six F–111Fs, eight F–4Gs, six EF–111As, and sixteen F–15Cs.

During the day, the ten A–10s at Al Jouf began flying armed reconnaissance of

the western Scud launch basket, with each aircraft making three turnarounds a

day. In their thirty sorties, the A–10s attacked launch locations provided by intelligence, LOCs, and SRBM concealment locations. How much the A–10s hurt the

Scuds cannot realistically be determined, but they did shoot up just about everything else in the region. By the end of the conflict they had claimed 91 tanks, 32

armored personnel carriers, 306 vehicles, 40 AAA pieces, 92 radar antennas, 25

satellite dishes, 6 helicopters, and 5 diesel train engines destroyed, plus a like

number damaged. They also claimed forty MELs/TELs destroyed—four more

than in the entire Iraqi inventory.44 In the afternoon at 1500L, two packages of

USN aircraft from the decks of three carriers comprising 18 A–7s, 32 F/A–18s,

28 F–14s, and 4 EA–6Bs would strike SRBM support facilities at Latifiya and

Ar Ramadi to the south and west of Baghdad. Ar Ramadi housed the home base,

barracks, training facilities, and command center for one of Iraq’s three SRBM

brigades. It also contained a fiber-optic repeater station believed to play a part in

Scud C3. For a half-hour beginning at 1610L at least four F–16s of the 138th

TFS, an Air National Guard Unit from Syracuse, New York, and known as the

Boys from Syracuse, flew armed reconnaissance looking for Scuds in northern

Kuwait. The F–16’s limited fuel capacity prevented it from flying armed reconnaissance or loitering over the more distant Scud launch baskets. H–2 and H–3

airfields would receive another pounding at approximately 1630L from forty

F–16s, and that night eight GR–1s would revisit H–3 at 2045L. The 4th TFW(P),

which would soon earn the nom de guerre Scudbusters, would send twenty-eight

F–15Es to attack the Scud storage areas in the west near Qasr Amij, Wadi Amij,

Wadi al Jabariyah, and Wadi ar Ratqa at 2115L. The F–15E’s extended range,

maneuverability, and PGM capability made it ideal for patrolling the western

Scud launch basket. A little more than an hour later, the planners penciled-in

twelve F–111Fs to bomb Scud storage at Ar Ramadi and Qubaysah, both to the

west of Baghdad.45 These 200 anti-Scud sorties represented approximately 20

percent of the daily total of combat sorties.

By the evening of January 21, CENTAF had begun to strengthen its intelligence-gathering efforts against the Scud. The organization needed to know

exactly where to look quickly in order to locate and track the MELs/TELs and

support vehicles. The JSTARS maintained an orbit over an area of northeastern

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Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

44. Memo, [Al Jouf/CC to 354 TFW/CC/DO/MA], Subj: A–10 Special Operations [and]

Scud Hunting, plus attached “BDA Summary for 21 January–27 February 1991” [File No.

T/CT/10/15].

45. MAP, Fifth 24 Hours, Jan 20, 1991 [File No. T/HO/25/Master Plan].
Saudi Arabia each night to watch for Iraqi ground movement in Kuwait and

southern Iraq. Coalition ground forces placed a premium on this ability, which

they regarded as nearly essential for their operations. Given warning, JSTARS

could also locate Scud firing sites in Kuwait and southern Iraq. The need to

dampen activity in the western Scud launch basket impinged even on these priorities. By January 21, if not earlier, the JSTARS aircraft had to interrupt its

nightly orbit to fly west for a single pass to cover the SRBM areas within range

of Israel.46

The pattern held for January 22, as CENTAF again reported that the “primary emphasis was on Scud missiles.”47 After three days of low clouds and fog,

the weather cleared over most of Iraq north and west of Basra.48 The day began

with twelve F–15Es and twenty F–16 LANTIRNs on Scud alert. At 0500L the

planners sent the USMC to hit SRBM shelters at Tallil with four A–6s, two

F/A–18s, and fourteen assorted support aircraft. From 0545L through 0630L the

MAP called for three packages of F–111Fs and F–15Es to fly south of Baghdad

and raze the Kahn Al Mahawil barracks, the main training SRBM training facility and a SRBM brigade headquarters. However, bad weather led to cancellation

before its twenty strike and six support aircraft could take off on their mission.

In the morning starting at 0800L, the planners provided for strikes on SAM and

Scud sites near H–2 airfield by twenty-four F–16s and sixteen support aircraft,

and at H–3 airfield by twenty-four F–16s with forty-three Navy aircraft from the

Red Sea carriers. The Scud sites near Al Jaber airfield in Kuwait would receive

the attentions of eight F–16s and four other Coalition aircraft, with four F–4Gs

supplying SEAD at 0900L. Harassment by the A–10s more than doubled for the

day, as ten more Thunderbolt IIs began Scud hunting over the eastern and the

Kuwaiti launch baskets. This time, both groups of Scud hunters had assistance

from four OA–10s that flew two-hour forward air controller missions from

0700L to 1700L. Repeated F–16 strikes on the SAMs near H–2 and H–3 would

help to protect the western Scud hunters.

A Red Sea carrier package of sixteen A–7s, with ten F–14 escorts, two

EA–6Bs SEAD, and three other assisting aircraft, would work over Scud storage

at Qasr Amij and Wadi Amij near H–2 airfield at 1500L. Three hours later, more

naval aviation (sixteen F/A–18s and fifteen other subsidiary aircraft) from the

Red Sea would fly close to the Syrian border to plaster Scud support facilities at

Wadi ar Ratqa and Wadi al Jabariyah. Twenty-four USAF F–16s with sixteen

238

On Target

46. Point Paper, Maj. Greenwood, XOOTC, “JSTARS Contribution to Detection of Mobile SCUD Launchers,” Jan 18, 1991 [File No. CK/DS/Deptula/12-SCUD]; Msg, 222030Z Jan

91, USCENTAF/DO [Maj. Gen. John A. Corder] to USCINCCENT/CCJ2/CCJ3, Subj: Joint

STARS Operations [File No. C/CT/11/3].

47. Msg, 230800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #167 [File No.

T/CT/66/-].

48. Kenneth R. Walters, Sr., Maj. Kathleen M. Traxler, et al., Gulf War Weather (Scott

AFB, Ill.: USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Mar 1992 [USAFETAC/TN—

92/003]), sec. 3, pp. 16–18.
SEAD and escort aircraft would attack SAMs and Scud sites near H–3 airfield at

1600L, and a half-hour later a force of the same composition would strike SAMs

and Scud sites at H–2 airfield. At dusk, twelve F–16 LANTIRNs from the 388th

TFW(P) took over the eastern Scud alert. On the night of January 22 beginning

at 2000L, four B–52Gs attacked H–2 Scud facilities while eight IDS Tornados

smashed H–3 airfield and Scuds. The planners even assigned one of SOCCENT’s AC–130s to the hunt from 1900L to 2200L. At 2130L, eight F–15Es

attacked fiber-optic stations at Jalibah and Ramadi (between H–2 and Baghdad).

As the F–15Es rolled in, four B–52Gs and eight IDS Tornados with four F–15s

escorts and four F–4Gs would attack H–3 airfield.49

On the evening of January 22, General Schwarzkopf added a new wrinkle to

the Scud hunt. Each evening he held a meeting with key members of his staff and

the component commanders or their representatives. General Horner attended,

usually accompanied by General Glosson. At these meetings General Schwarzkopf set the theater priorities for the coming twenty-four to forty-eight hours. On

this night, he instructed General Glosson to begin scheduling anti-Scud airborne

alert aircraft from 1800L to 0900L.50 Both General Schwarzkopf and General

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Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

49. MAP, Fifth 24 Hours, 1514L Jan 21, 1991.

50. Personal Notes, Brig. Gen. Glosson, Dir Campaign Plans, “CINCCENT Daily Priorities” [File No. T/CT/58/Campaign Plans (Black Hole)].

Iraqi Scud missile storage bunkers after a strike by A–7E Corsair aircraft
Glosson understood that the Scud CAP would apply to the western launch basket immediately. Whether General Schwarzkopf came up with this idea on his

own or had it suggested to him by someone (perhaps in Washington) is unknown.

In any case, when General Glosson returned to the RSAF HQ building, he had

the CINCCENT’s orders written into the plans.51 Until that point it appears that

CENTAF had judged the SAM threat in the area as too severe for a CAP, and

General Schwarzkopf overrode this. On January 22 CENTAF conducted several

large anti-SAM raids on the H–2 and H–3 airfield areas and may have judged

that those raids had lowered the threat sufficiently to permit an airborne alert.

In the west, the airborne alert force consisted of twelve F–15Es in three fouraircraft flights, each consisting of two pairs of aircraft. The first flight sat on twohour ground alert. The second flight stayed on thirty-minute ground alert. The

last flight, instead of staying on thirty-minute alert, as the planners had provided, took to the air. Of the four F–15Es in the air, both pairs would patrol the

vicinity of the launch basket (approximately 33°40’N, 41°00’E) and cycle back

to tanker aircraft in a manner that guaranteed at least one pair on-station at all

times. While on patrol, the aircraft would conduct SAR, LANTIRN, and visual

reconnaissance of possible launch locations. They would attack with CBU–87s

and GBU–10s as required, which indicated that one plane in every pair had the

LANTIRN targeting pod. If intelligence could identify a target during the patrol,

the aircraft would hit it immediately. If neither reconnaissance nor intelligence

turned up a target by the end of the patrol, the aircraft would attack a preplanned,

Scud-related target as it went off-station. Upon landing, the wing would generate the flight back to ground-alert status. Anytime airborne aircraft attacked a target or came off-station, aircraft from ground alert would replace them.52

For the next five days, January 23–27, the Scud hunt continued at a high

rate. On January 23 CENTAF alone expended almost 200 sorties, more than half

against fixed sites, in its largest anti-Scud effort of the war. On January 27

CENTAF expended over 150 sorties. Over the same period, Saddam’s rocketeers

replied with eighteen SRBMs. During the first ten days of the conflict, they averaged nearly five launches a day. For the remainder of the war, they averaged one

a day.53 After January 27 the Scud hunt settled into a routine in which CENTAF

spent between seventy to eighty sorties per day on the effort. Activity continued

at that level until the beginning of the ground war. Scud hunting gained regular

adherents as CENTAF assigned aircraft to specialized tasks. Four to six F–111Fs,

armed with four GBU–24s each, systematically destroyed large road culverts

used as daylight hiding places by Scud forces. Every night one cell of three

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On Target

51. Air Guidance Letter, COMUSCENTAF, Subj: ATO Planning Guidance for D+6, page

4 of 9 “Operations Guidance,” n.d. [22 Jan 1991] [File No. AF/CAFH Microfilm reel no.

10217].

52. Memo, [handwritten, no author], Subj: Scud Suppression Tactics and Procedures as of

272300Z Jan 91, n.d. [Jan 27, 1991] [File No. T/CT/10/15].

53. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf, p. 57.
B–52Gs would strike SRBM support and storage facilities in the launch basket

or in the H–2 and H–3 areas. On most nights, the USN would also send four to

six A–6s to hit SRBM launch locations, storage sites, and support facilities. On

some nights the F–117As would attack the HASs at H–1, H–2, and H–3 airfield

complexes. Intelligence suspected that the shelters might hold MELs and

SRBMs. Over the eastern launch basket, twelve F–16 LANTIRNs took the role

of the F–15Es, while JSTARS gave Coalition aircraft a clear look of the region,

which had flatter topography than the western launch basket. CENTAF was further prepared to divert occasional B–52G strikes from the Republican Guard for

intelligence and JSTARS Scud locations. On top of this fixed effort, the campaign planners would send three to five additional packages daily to take on more

SRBM targets. During the day, pairs of A–10s from Al Jouf continued to rake

over everything that moved within a fifty-mile radius of the center of the launch

basket.54

In the later part of the anti-Scud campaign, February 17th proved a representative day. The previous evening, the Iraqis had launched one SRBM toward

Haifa and three toward southern Israel. Radio Baghdad claimed that the Iraqis

had intended the three southern rockets for the Israelis’ nuclear reactor at

Dimona.55 The planners responded to this by adding eighteen F–111Fs, with

EF–111A jamming and F–4G support, on specific targets to the standard alerts

of twenty A–10s at Al Jouf and twenty-four F–15Es on night air alert. Lt. Col.

Steven L. Turner, commander of the 336th TFS, 4th TFW(P), who flew thirtyone missions during the conflict, described the routine of the Scudbusters. When

the air portion of their alert came due, the F–15E four-ship flight, fully loaded

with ordnance and light on fuel, would take off from Al Kharj, climb to 20,000

feet, and fly north for an hour and fifteen minutes until the Strike Eagles met a

tanker. After downloading 20,000 pounds of fuel, “you’d go into Iraq and sort of

play tag. The other guys would come out [and] you’d go in.” Once in Iraq they

would stay for one hour at medium altitude and attack using iron bombs or

GBUs. Only a quarter of the aircraft had targeting pods. The mission lasted 41⁄2

to 5 hours.56

Clear weather aided the aircrews on the night of February 17 as the daytime

clouds over Iraq departed by 1900L.57 Within four or five hours, more clouds

moved into the western Scud launch basket. From 1922L to 1950L, two F–15Es

(Camaros 37 and 38) encountered no threats. They dropped twenty-four Mk–82s.

On their first target they reported secondary explosions, which indicated their

weapons hit targets containing fuel, explosives, or some other volatile material,

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Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

54. Memo, [handwritten, no author], Subj: Scud Suppression Tactics and Procedures as of

272300Z Jan 91, n.d. [Jan 27, 1991].

55. Msg, 230604Z Feb 91, Defense Special Missile Activity (DEFSMAC) to DEFSMAC/OSCAR TANGO White House, Subj: Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary

through 23 February 1991 [File No. T/CT/10/15].

56. Intvw, Lt. Col. Turner, Jul 9, 1991, p. 12.

57. Walters and Traxler, Gulf War Weather, sec. 3, pp. 72–73.
but they had no BDA to report. At the same time, Camaros 35 and 36 received

coordinates from AWACS on a possible Scud site. Investigation revealed a complex near a road. Camaro 35 dropped three Mk–84s with one dud and two hits.

Camaro 36’s laser designator went on the fritz, and he dropped only iron bombs

which he also carried on this mission. The flight proceeded to Wadi al Jabariyah.

In all they dropped twelve bombs, produced no secondaries, and encountered no

threats. At 2044L Chevys 65 and 66, each carrying eight GBU–12s, struck buildings, radar, troposcatter facilities, an ammunition dump, which produced spectacular secondaries, and “a large bermed area with a hot spot” that produced a

massive secondary. They noted AAA from Al Taqqadum airfield. A functioning

PGM capability obviously transformed the F–15E into a far more deadly bird.

Between 2051L and 2123L, Firebirds 67 and 68 demonstrated what the aircraft

could do without a working target pod. On their first drop, each put a GBU–12

on target at the Wadi Amij SRBM site; they then proceeded to drop fourteen

GBU–12s on EW sites at H–1 airfield. They had never received prestrike

imagery on the target and had no idea what to hit. Firebird 68’s laser failed on

the first bomb, so his wingman provided buddy-lasing for the remaining six

bombs. Of the fourteen GBUs released, twelve hit short and one went wild

because of laser failure. Nevertheless, they reported damaging buildings in the

center of the complex, downing two possible microwave towers and hitting a

possible building, a possible vehicle, and a possible bunker. Nine more two-ship

flights trawled the area until 0500L February 18. Some dropped their ordnance,

others attacked ammunition dumps, buildings, radar sites, and so forth. At 2345L

Packard 41 may have actually flushed the quarry. He placed two Mk–84s on a

fixed SRBM site at Wadi al Jabariyah, and secondaries that sent smoke as high

as 6,000 feet rewarded his aim. His partner, Packard 42, put three GBU–12s on

fixed SRBM sites No. 2 and No. 3 and received massive secondary explosions.58

The anti-Scud campaign involved CENTAF in an attritional contest between

one opponent having massive resources but limited time, against another having

fixed resources and large amounts of time and space. In such a battle, results on

a single day do not stand alone. Only when the struggle ends or has continued

over an appreciable period can an analyst view the range of results and see points

where trends emerge. The CENTAF effort on February 17 differed little from

those the days of the anti-Scud campaign that preceded and followed it, with one

exception. In late February, B–52Gs and F–15Es seeded large areas with mines

to restrict Scud movements.59 One fact does emerge: either from coincidence or

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On Target

58. Msgs, 172145Z Feb 91, 4TFW/IN to CENTAF/IN, Subj: Misrep 336 TFS No. 312;

MSN 3535E/Camaro 37–38; 172105Z Feb 91, 4TFW/IN to CENTAF/IN, Subj: Misrep 335

TFS No. 260; MSN 3535E/Camaro 35–36; 172250Z Feb 91, 4TFW/IN to CENTAF/IN, Subj:

Misrep 335 TFS No. 261; MSN Scud Alert/Firebird 67–68; 180028Z Feb 91, 4TFW/IN to

CENTAF/IN, Subj: Misrep 335 TFS No. 264; MSN 3565A/Chevy 65–66; and 172358Z Feb

91, 4TFW/IN to CENTAF/IN, Subj: Misrep 335 TFS No. 262; MSN Scud Alert/Packard 41–42

[File No. T/CT/10/15].

59. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1992, p. 28.
as a direct result of the skill and persistence of U.S. pilots, the Iraqis in the western Scud launch basket would never again after February 17 launch more than

two missiles in any single day.

Ironically, Scuds killed and wounded more Americans than any other single

Iraqi weapons system. On February 25, the Iraqis fired one SRBM at Bahrain

which a Patriot intercepted, and one at Dhahran which struck a temporary barracks full of American troops. This essentially random event killed twenty-eight

U.S. soldiers, including three women, and wounded ninety-seven more. One

lucky shot created 25 percent of the overall American total of dead and wounded for the entire campaign.60 With improved accuracy and range, the SRBMs

might have presented a significant military problem. In precrisis exercises, for

instance, Americans, when playing as Iraqis, had used accurate SRBMs on

CENTAF headquarters areas with most disruptive results. But it was the Scud’s

potential for political disruption rather than its military utility that brought the

Coalition greater fear.

In the final analysis, the anti-SRBM campaign raises two important questions: How much Coalition effort did it consume? and What did it accomplish?

CENTAF flew at least 2,500 anti-Scud sorties out of approximately 29,400 combat sorties.61 This equates to roughly 8 percent of all combat flights, or one of

every 12.5 sorties flown. If the number of missions against fiber-optic targets and

those against some Scud-related industrial facilities are added, then the Scud

hunt would have consumed closer to 10 percent of all of CENTAF’s wartime

combat sorties. In the first twelve days of the conflict, the CENTAF anti-Scud

effort probably required an even higher percentage of combat sorties–16 or 17

percent; in the latter three-quarters of the campaign, the effort fell to approximately 6 or 7 percent.62 These missions would also have consumed a proportionate amount of supporting sorties and services. However, during the first

twelve days of the conflict, when General Horner added the 16 percent of his

effort lost to Scuds to the 15 percent lost to weather, he had reason for concern.

Such diversions would not prevent him from achieving his goals, but they might

impose bothersome delays and possibly make it appear that air power had overpromised its capabilities to the ground forces.

The suppression of thirty-six or fewer MELs/TELS, the suppression of their

large storage/logistical base, and the suppression of the impressive and costly

investment in manufacturing and missile R&D that supported them consumed 10

percent of the effort of the USAF, and much of that went to what amounted to little more than flailing in the air. Half of the anti-Scud effort went toward fixed

cites, culverts, and highway overpasses thought to conceal mobile Scuds. Thirty

percent of the effort struck ballistic missile production and infrastructure, and

only fifteen percent involved attacks on MELs. Another 1,000 Scud alert sorties

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Weather and the Great Scud Hunt

60. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, p. 185.

61. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf, pp. 56, 89.

62. Ibid., p.57, Chart “Sorties Against Scuds.”
attacked targets other than Scuds.63 Did the resources devoted to the anti-SRBM

effort prevent or delay Coalition air power from accomplishing a single one of

its daily or overall goals? They did not. In no instance during the war did the

Coalition have too few aircraft in the air or on the ground to meet any contingency. There may have been an occasion when a few more aircraft would have

made things more comfortable, but no situation has come to light when members

of the Coalition forces perished from the lack of available air power. Ten percent

of the USAF’s effort represented a nuisance factor to CENTAF. To the Coalition,

the cost of the effort meant little as opposed to the consequences had Israel

attacked Iraq. To prevent a political victory for Saddam, the United States would

willingly have paid a far higher price.

Saddam’s rocketeers stood to their weapons in an exemplary fashion and

underwent grueling hardships to protect them from Coalition air power. They

died hard. If their effort went only into the equation of what the anti-Scud campaign cost Iraq, then they served their nation well. However, from the Scud

launch baskets to Baghdad and Kirkuk, there extended a bombed-out trail of

smashed communications links, burnt vehicles, razed training facilities,

destroyed factories, and ruined test facilities and laboratories. The regime of

Saddam Hussein had expended a fortune in oil revenue to build an SRBM industry that had now suffered a serious setback. For the lack of a few dozen miles in

range, Saddam lost his best chance to win the war. In another year or two, the

SRBMs might have become an unmanageable problem.

It is tempting and probably reasonable to assume that CENTAF’s anti-Scud

campaign accomplished its overarching goal. It prevented the breakup of the

Coalition and victory for Saddam. In a technical sense, the Scud hunters won

their battle of attrition against their opponent. After the first ten days of the war,

the daily SRBM launch rate declined by nearly 75 percent.64 After that, although

the Scud hunters could not stop the firings, they reduced them and spaced them

farther apart. Immediate U.S. intelligence postwar assessments credited the antiScud effort with reducing Iraq’s capacity to build and support SRBMs by 70 to

80 percent. Subsequent analysis has proved this estimate optimistic. Later postwar information has made it clear that many of the plants bombed contained no

equipment, stocks, or documentation because the Iraqis had evacuated and dispersed their manufacturing capacity before hostilities began.65 Also, the apparent

causal relationship between increased bombing and reduced SRBM firings might

be false. Logistical and maintenance problems, such as having to overhaul

MELs/TELs after a set number of launches (which greatly stresses the vehicle)

might induce a period of mandatory standdowns coinciding with the increase in

244

On Target

63. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), pp. 331–332.

64. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 165 Table “Dedicated Scud

Sorties/Scuds Launched.” The figures are 48 Scuds launched in the first 10 days (4.8 per day)

versus 40 Scuds launched in the last 33 days (1.2 per day) for a 75-percent reduction in firings.

65. Ibid., p. 156.
CENTAF’s effort. Still, until further study produces evidence to the contrary, the

anti-Scud campaign seems to have disrupted a substantial portion of Iraq’s

capabilities. More importantly, the campaign suppressed the SRBMs when their

suppression made the difference between the dissolution of the Coalition and its

eventual success.

245

Weather and the Great Scud Hunt
246

On Target
Chapter Eight

Continuing the Air Offensive

Against Iraq

Although weather and SRBMs slowed the momentum of the strategic phase

of the air offensive against Iraq, the Coalition air forces continued to strike

telling blows on Iraq’s vital targets. For the first ten days of the air assault, from

January 17 to 26, 1991, the daily air effort devoted to strategic targets exceeded

that devoted to preparing battlefield targets in the KTO.1 On January 27, 1991,

CENTAF proclaimed the achievement of air supremacy. On the same date, the

number of Coalition air sorties expended in destroying or crippling the Iraqi

ground forces and to supporting the Coalition ground force objectives first

exceeded the number of sorties directed toward strategic targets in Iraq. For each

of the remaining thirty-two days of the conflict, sorties in support of ground

objectives outnumbered those expended in pursuit of strategic goals. By January

30, strategic sorties fell to a daily average of 250, including 60 to 80 per day for

Scuds, while ground sorties steadily rose from 750 per day on January 30 to

1,250 per day by G-day, February 24, 1991, the day the ground offensive began.2

Strategic air planners like General Glosson and Colonel Deptula naturally

believed the shift to Phase III, the preparation of the battlefield, had occurred too

precipitately. In their opinion, a few more days of strategic bombing would have

gravely weakened Iraq’s ability to resist and would have more than compensated for the air power denied the Coalition troops confronting the enemy in

Kuwait.3 The shift of air assets to the KTO proved inexorable. From January 27

onward, the strategic air offensive against Iraq changed from the broad systemic

attack of the original Instant Thunder concept to a more traditional battle of attri247

Preface

1. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 101 Chart “Air Campaign—Sorties

by Phase.”

2. Ibid.

3. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Glosson, Dec 12, 1991; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Jan 8, 1992.
tion that concentrated on the bombing of defined target systems. After January

26, Phase I progressed at a reduced pace, but it still consumed 15 to 25 percent

of the daily air effort. When the IZAF chose to preserve itself on the ground in

its HASs rather than engage in one-sided battles against Coalition aircraft, the

Allies responded by using PGMs against the shelters. This tactic forced the Iraqis

to send their most effective combat aircraft to internment in Iran rather have them

destroyed in their hiding places. HASs became a regular part of the F–111F’s and

F–117A’s diets as these aircraft became the mainstays of the air offensive over

Iraq. This chapter will follow the changes of emphasis in the strategic air campaign in the period after the initial attacks. It will examine how the strategic campaign gained definitive air supremacy by breaking the back of the IZAF; how it

aided the Coalition ground forces by attacking Iraqi LOCs between Baghdad and

Kuwait; and how it maintained a steady effort to grind down Iraq’s strategic target systems to deny that rogue state the means to persist in its aggressive behavior toward its neighbors.

On the third day of the Coalition air offensive, planners began to transition

from their preplanned attacks to a 72-hour planning cycle. This idealized planning schedule rapidly compressed in the face of reality to a 33-hour cycle, measured from the time of the MAP’s completion until the first bomb was released

on its MAP-assigned target.4 Approximately half of the missions that day flew

strikes planned before the war; the other half flew strikes conceived under

wartime conditions. The third day saw the lowest number of daily anti-Scud sorties of any day from the beginning of the air campaign until the start of the

ground offensive. Like the first two days, day 3 directed its anti-Scud effort solely at fixed launch sites and the SRBM research, assembly, and support industry.

From the fourth day onward, anti-Scud missions began to target the mobile

SRBM TELs/MELs as well.5 In the early morning of January 19, weather canceled the first wave of F–117A attacks and delayed their missions until evening.

At 0400L, 16 F–15Es accompanied by 2 EF–111As and 4 F–4Gs struck at the

Rufah SRBM facility, the An Nasiriyah troposcatter facility, and the IOCs at

Karbala and An Najaf, all to the south of Baghdad. To the south of this mission,

F–16 LANTIRNs and F–15Es simultaneously struck the Republican Guard and

other targets in the KTO. Starting at 0500L, 20 F–111Fs and 4 EF–111As hit targets to the west and north of Baghdad; the Ar Rutbah IOC; Tikrit South airfield;

and the Qubaysah storage, ammunition, and Scud depot.6 The 363d TFW(P) sent

48 of its F–16s to targets just west of Baghdad at 0700L. Two EF 111As, 4

F–4Gs, and 16 F–15Cs accompanied them. Half of the aircraft worked over base

facilities at Al Taqaddum airfield, and half went after CW production facilities at

Habbaniyah. At 0715L CENTAF had intended to send the first aircraft other than

F–117As to downtown Baghdad. Forty F–16s (of the 388th TFW[P]), 8 F–4Gs,

248

On Target

4. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 29.

5. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf, p. 57, Chart “Sorties Against Scuds.”

6. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 3, pp. 118–119.
and 16 F–15Cs would strike large buildings in Baghdad. However, weather and

the heavy AAA defenses of Baghdad, visible to the F–117As and on CNN, led

the planners to cancel the mission. As one of the planners pointed out, SEAD

worked on missiles, not on guns.7 Bad weather also persuaded CENTAF to divert

the 401st TFW(P)’s originally scheduled bombing run of 16 F–16s and 8 F–15Cs

flying escort in the Baghdad area from a strike on the capital to an attack on the

Ar Rumaylah airfield.8

In the KTO, USN, USMC, and ground attack aircraft pounded the Republican Guard. The A–10s continued Wart Weaseling as well as standing pairs on

CSAR support alert at King Kahlid Military City and King Fahd airfields. At

1200L, a Navy package of A–7s, F/A–18s, EA–6Bs, and F–14s from the Red Sea

hit targets to the south of Baghdad—the Al Musayyib rocket test facility, the Al

Iskandariyah arms plant (artillery shell production), and the Latifiya explosives

and ammunition plant at Al Qa Qaa, the primary producer of propellants and

explosives in Iraq and a site with munitions-loading capability, including Scud

warheads.9 At 1500L CENTAF canceled another package of the 363d TFW(P)

aimed at building complexes in downtown Baghdad. A half-hour later, unaided

by the distraction that the canceled package over Baghdad could have provided,

a package of 70 F–16s (each loaded with two 2,000-pound Mk–84 bombs), 12

F–15Cs, 2 EF–111As, and 8 F–4Gs of the 388th and 401st TFW(P)s bored in on

the Baghdad nuclear research facility located at Tuwaitha, a suburb south of

Baghdad.10 This complex, divided into quadrants by a large earthen berm, had

three nuclear reactors: the Isis reactor, the Osirak reactor, and another built by the

Soviets.11 The facility had its own self-contained air defense district and was one

of the most heavily defended targets in Iraq. Its protection included heavy AAA

guns and SA–6s. The weather worsened as this package left its bases just north

of the Iraqi border, and when it broke out of the weather, AAA fire disrupted its

formation. About a quarter of the pilots could not relocate the formation and

returned to base. The 388th TFW(P), which supplied about 75 percent of the

F–16s, led the attack. The F–4Gs that assisted them expended all their HARMs

during the course of the fighting. The weaponless F–4Gs and the F–15Cs, which

had encountered no air opposition, departed, leaving the F–16s of the 401st

TFW(P)’s 614th TFS with no air cover. As the 614th TFS approached their

objective, AAA and SAMs subjected them to heavy fire, shooting down two air249

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

7. Intvw, Lt. Col. Eskridge, May 27, 1992. Colonel Eskridge served with the Special

Planners from August 1990 to March 1991 and flew several F–117A combat missions.

8. MAP, Third 24 Hours, 2236 January 18, 1991, pp. 1–3; DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol.

3, pp. 164–165. For the diversion of the Taji raid, see DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War

(2d ed.), p. 169.

9. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 3, pp. 116–117, 140–141.

10. MAP, Third 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, p. 8; DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d

ed.), p. 126. The MAP lists fifty-six F–16s, but also shows another sixteen F–16s going to

downtown Baghdad. The DoD source indicates 70 F–16s. I assume that CENTAF redirected

the sorties from Baghdad to Tuwaitha.

11. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 46–47.
craft and damaging two more.12 The pilots of the two downed F–16Cs, Maj.

Jeffery S. Tice and Capt. Harry M. Roberts, became the first two USAF prisoners of war in Iraqi hands. The Iraqis had administered an object lesson on the

importance of combined tactics for air strikes.

From 1930L to 1945L, 2 EF–111As and 4 F–4Gs supported 11 B–52Gs.

divided into cells. The B–52Gs carried 750-pound Mk–117R bombs and

employed low-level tactics to strike targets in central and northern Iraq: the Batra

missile production factory (one of Iraq’s two Scud-B research, production, and

assembly facilities, located a few miles west of Baghdad), and the Habbaniyah

motor-case factory (the only Iraqi facility for building solid-fuel missile engine

casings and located adjacent to Iraq’s only artillery and gun-tube manufacturing

plant).13 The two targets to the west of the capital fell within the SEAD zone

established on the first night, covered large physical areas, possessed unhardened

industrial buildings, and appeared to have light AAA defenses—a combination

that made them good B–52 targets. Targeting the Tikrit ammunition dump, a

lightly defended and extensive target, once again forcibly reminded the citizens

of Saddam’s hometown that the war did not exempt them.14 To the far west, at

2000L, Coalition aircraft hit H–3 and H–3 highway strip runways. The Red Sea

carriers sent 4 F–14s and 2 EA–6Bs to further assist the package. To the south,

the RAF sent 16 GR–1s with 4 F–15Cs escorting to attack with JP–233 munitions the runways at Tallil and Jalibah airfields.15

The first wave of the night’s F–117As began their attempts to strike their targets at 2100L on January 19. As usual, they assailed targets in western and southern Iraq as well as those in Baghdad. To the west, an F–117A scored bull’s-eyes

on the Ar Rutbah IOC and the H–3 SOC. The aircraft attacking Baghdad had

mixed results. However, one pilot put two GBU–10s on the Fallujah telecommunications center, another put a GBU–10 into the Baghdad synchronous communications satellite–radio relay terminal at Ad Dujayl, and a third pilot hit his

secondary target the Al Kifl highway bridge.16

From 2200L to 2230L, USMC aircraft struck bridges in the An Nasiriyah

area, and aircraft from the USS Midway hit bridges over the Euphrates in the

Basra area. Aircraft from the Red Sea carriers attacked two targets: the Samarra

CW research, production, and storage facility to the south of Tikrit, Iraq’s only

250

On Target

12. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 126. This account says that the

F–4Gs and the F–15Cs left the area but it does not account for the EF–111As. I assume that the

EF–111As continued their electronic support. For BDA, see hand-prepared charts dated Jan 17

to Feb 28, 1991, in File No. T/CT/75/Battle Damage.

13. Worksheet, 17th Air Division, B–52 Mission, Jan 19, 1991; DIA, Desert Storm BDA,

Vol. 3, pp. 154–155, 162–163. The B–52 mission worksheet has annotations moving some

B–52 missions from low- to high-level attack tactics, but these missions were left unchanged.

One must assume that the aircraft did as intended.

14. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 50–51.

15. MAP, Third 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, p. 9.

16. Ibid., p. 10; Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 19–20, 1991, p. 22, “Day

Four Targets and Results/415 TFS/Wave 1”; Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days 1–34.
identified CW-agent production facility and its only known CW-agent filling

facility; and the Abu Rajesh petroleum products storage facility north of Tikrit,

the second-largest military fuel storage facility identified in Iraq. It stored in

three groups of buried POL storage tanks the operating and reserve fuel for the

units located in the area.17 The attacking force consisted of 12 A–6 strike aircraft,

6 F–14 escorts, and 2 A–7, 4 F/A–18, and 2 EA–6B SEADs. Then, the 48th

TFW(P)’s F–111Fs had their turn. To the west of Baghdad, starting at 2300L, 4

F–111Fs attempted to smash facilities at Habbaniyah airfield, while 8 Tornado

IDSs tore up its runways and 4 F–4Gs and 2 EF–111As provided support. Forty

minutes later, more F–111Fs attacked to the north and south of Baghdad. Two

aircraft each hit the Taji BW facility and the Salman Pak CW and BW facilities.

Four more F–111Fs attempted to finish off the Al Amarah IOC. At 2340L, 4

GR–1s with 4 GR–1 (ALARMs) assisting hit H–2 airfield.18

As usual, most of the stealth aircraft utilized their special capabilities to

attack targets in the heavily defended Baghdad area. Rain 12 put two GBU–10s

into the multistory Baghdad automatic telephone exchange, Jenoub postal, telegraph, and telephone (PTT) building. This and subsequent attacks rendered one

of Baghdad’s main telephone switching centers inoperable by February 1. Rain

11 made one of the war’s most visible hits when it put two GBU–10s on the roof

of the eleven-story Baghdad multipurpose exchange, Al Karakh PTT in westcentral Baghdad. The building served as a major switching center for international traffic as well as one of the regional switches serving Baghdad. It had a

distinctive, round, masonry radio-microwave relay tower with a beehive-shaped

several-story-tall minaret that dominated it and the adjacent skyline. As CNN

and imagery reported on January 20, the weapons severely damaged the building, dropping the tower, destroying the top three floors on the building’s southern side, and damaging its lower floors.19 Ice 16 struck the Baghdad main signals

intelligence station (the Iraqi-equivalent National Security Agency) with a

GBU– 10 and the North Taji military-related facility No. 2 with a GBU–27. A

second pilot with the same targets misidentified the signals facility and dropped

on the wrong target—an unidentified bridge. Two other aircraft each released a

GBU–27 on the Abu Ghurayb national C3 bunker.20

For the next three days of the air campaign, bad weather stalled over much

of Kuwait and Iraq causing cancellation of 10 to 15 percent of the air effort,

diversion of a substantial portion of the sorties to secondary targets, and lessened

effectiveness of the raids that actually reached their primary targets. The increasing anti-Scud effort siphoned off more of the force. General Horner made the

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Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

17. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 76–77 [Samarra], Vol. 3, pp. 6–7 [Abu Rajesh].

Postwar imagery revealed no apparent damage to Abu Rajesh.

18. MAP, Third 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, pp. 11–12.

19. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 4, pp. 16–17, 40–41.

20. MAP, Third 24 Hours, Jan 18, 1991, p. 13; Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days

1–34, p. 4.
anti-SRBM effort the prime objective of CENTAF for January 20, 21, and 22.

For the rest of the force, the planned targets remained much the same. Early in

the morning of January 20, twenty F–111Fs and support aircraft attacked the H–3

airfield and its associated CW bunkers. An hour later, at 0500L, fifteen F–117As

struck air defenses, communications, and BW/CW sites in Kuwait and in

Baghdad. The Baghdad TV transmitter, the Ministry of Defense, and the BW

facility at Taji took two hits each. Simultaneously, twelve F–111Fs, some armed

with CBU–89s, attacked BW bunkers south of Baghdad. The F–16s and F–15Es

spent much of the day in the Scud hunt, bombing SRBM and military-support

targets in central Iraq. That night, at 2300L, twenty F–111Fs and two cells of

B–52Gs with F–15Cs and EF–111As supporting pummeled the Balad SE airfield. Three hours afterward, a late change of plan pulled twelve F–117As from

the HASs at two Iraqi airfields, which the planners thought might conceal

SRBMs, and sent them after BW targets and communications. This caused the

37th TFW(P) to completely change its bombloads.21

Day 5 of the air campaign (D+4) followed the pattern set the previous day.

During the daytime, the bulk of the A–10s and OA–10s attacked Iraqi targets in

the KTO while the remaining attackers flew Scud reconnaissance. The F–16s hit

H–2 and H–3 airfields, the Republican Guard, and Iraqi LOCs in Kuwait and

southern Iraq; stood Scud alert; and sent a package of 32 F–16s, with support,

from the 363d TFW(P) against Habbaniyah chemical facility No. 1 and to Al

Taqaddum airfield. B–52Gs struck the Republican Guard, targets in Mosul, and

air defenses. Scud targets absorbed the attentions of the F–15Es and F–111Fs.

Marines attacked Iraqi military targets and bridges in the south. The Persian Gulf

carriers assisted the marines and attacked naval targets while the Red Sea carriers sent missions against SRBM production facilities to the south of Baghdad.

Iraqi ground forces and LOCs felt the less than gentle ministrations of other

Coalition aircraft.22 The F–117As shook off the bad weather that had spoiled

their performances for the past few days and smashed targets near Baghdad and

in the west. At roughly 2115L on January 21, eleven F–117As began their runs

over targets in the Baghdad area. For the first time in the campaign, the 37th

TFW(P)’s GBU–10s struck home at the nuclear complex in Tuwaitha: two

weapons hit each of the four reactors. GBU–27s hit the ADOC and the VIP bomb

shelter No. 25, while another GBU–10 tore into the Baghdad main signals sta252

On Target

21. Printout, F–117 Mission Results, Days 1–34, p. 5; Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th

TFW(P), Jan 20–26, 1991, pp. 15–16; MAP, Fourth 24 Hours, 1700L Jan 19, 1991.

22. MAP, Fifth 24 Hours, 1600L Jan 20, 1991.

By this time the MAP corresponded little with the missions actually flown. Targets, times,

and some force composition may have changed. Nonetheless, the MAP still accurately represented the intended priorities and objectives of the planners and the top leadership in CENTAF.

When I have more definitive data on a mission, such as Misreps, printouts, or oral histories, I

give that far more weight than the details provided in the MAP. However, the ATO and Misreps

provide such a mass of detail, much of it unverifiable or indigestible to the uninitiated, that they

have become too cumbersome for any but the most intensive and knowledgeable research.
tion and two more hit the Jenoub PTT telecommunications switching center. To

the west, one GBU–10 hit the H–2 IOC and two struck the Bir Akirshah air

warning site. Two aircraft aborted before reaching their targets. Postraid assessments showed damage to the Osirak reactor building, destruction of the Isis reactor core and housing, damage to a uranium storage facility, and significant

destruction (a direct hit on the reactor housing) of the Soviet reactor.23

A little less than nine hours later, the air raid sirens in Baghdad again sounded the call to shelter. Fourteen F–117As of the 416th TFS began to silently send

American bombs gliding toward their objectives. Four GBU–10s crushed the

nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, a site for the production of the causative organism

for anthrax. Four more hit two I-Hawk sites, while two landed on each of the following locations: Camp Taji (one of Saddam’s recreational facilities), the new

Presidential Palace Dome, Baghdad Security Forces HQ, the Taji suspected BW

facility, and the Baghdad telecommunications center. Single bombs hit the Iraqi

CIA and North Taji military-related facility No. 2. The wing counted as misses

one bomb dropped on the Ministry of Defense and one on IZAF HQ because

VTR mechanical or tape failures prevented validation of either release. Finally,

four GBU–10s wrecked the Abu Ghurayb “Infant Formula” plant. The bombing

of this ostensible infant formula plant supplied one of first examples of the international press’s propensity during the war to take questionable or half-understood circumstances and inflate them to make exciting news copy. It had not produced any infant formula for an appreciable period. The Iraqis’ had camouflaged

the building with paint, hardly in keeping with its putative function. The bombing leveled two-thirds of the complex including the steam-generation plant and

the storage tanks.24 If the unvalidated bombs (no videotape recording) landed on

their targets, every single bomb released on the mission hit its primary target.

The 461th TFS might have done even better, but unfortunately it had to leave two

aircraft behind because target information failed to arrive.25

Coalition Air Supremacy and the Flight of the Iraqi Air Force

With one notable exception, Coalition air attacks on D+5 (January 22) followed the trend set the previous days. The A–10s, some F–16s, the B–52Gs, the

USN, the USMC, and the Coalition partners concentrated on the Republican

Guard and heavy Iraqi divisions in the KTO. The anti-SRBM campaign retained

the overall highest priority, soaking up the A–10, F–16, and F–15E alert forces.

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Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

23. Info Memo, Capt. Richard C. Runchey, USAF, for INKS, Subj: Damage to Iraqi

Nuclear Facilities, Jan 25, 1991 [File No. CK/DS/Hoyes/TGT]; Msg, 230737Z Jan 91, CIA to

15 AF, Subj: Middle East Brief OCPAS MEAB 91/019 for January 1991 [File No. T/HO/2/

CIA].

24. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 72–73.

25. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), January 20–26, 1991, p. 10 [for information on canceling missions because of lack of intelligence], pp. 17–18 [for bombing results].

Also see Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days 1–34, p. 6.
Additional F–16s hit SAM and Scud sites at the H–2 and H–3 airfields, while the

USN hit Scud sites on the Syrian border. The planners sent the F–111Fs after

bridges and BW/CW bunkers.26 CENTAF departed from business as usual when

it significantly changed tactics on the methods it employed to destroy the IZAF.

Coalition air attacks on the Kari system, which disrupted Iraqi SAM and GCI

control, and the refusal of the IZAF to commit its full interceptor strength to

combat, after losing eight aircraft the first day, allowed Coalition air to operate

freely in medium altitudes above 10,000 feet. Air planners had designed the early

attacks to foil the SAMs, but they had not anticipated the weak response of the

IZAF. After the night of January 18/19, the Iraqis ceased all night flying and

CAPs.27 Early USAF analysis of the initial air-to-air engagements highlighted

the abysmal state of Iraqi interceptor pilot training.28 Overall, the Iraqis averaged

about thirty sorties per day during the first week.29 The IZAF seemed to revert to

a Maginot Line mentality of passive reliance on earth and concrete, as did much

of the rest of the Iraqi military establishment.

The Iraqis placed their aircraft into 594 HASs apportioned throughout their

air base structure. These hardened facilities fell into four distinct model types.

The most common was the so-called Tab Vee. Its design met or exceeded NATO

standards. Tab Vees have little internal storage; consequently, the Iraqis placed

pyramid-shaped personnel bunkers for the air and ground crews nearby.30 The

IZAF also had “trapezoid” shelters. These had built-in annexes for munitions,

ground support, and crew rest. Two small fighter aircraft, such as MiG–21s,

could fit within.31 “Quick Turn” shelters, the oldest in the Iraqi inventory, could

protect one aircraft. Iraq had sixty “Yugoslav” HASs, a Yugoslavian design built

by Belgian contractors. It came in two variants—the single-bay drive-in and the

single-bay drive-through. Within each shelter, the design provided annexes for

munitions, tools, and personnel. In addition to the above-mentioned four types of

HASs, at several airfields the Iraqis had hardened maintenance shelters, double

bunkers connected by equipment annexes and usually built to the standard of the

254

On Target

26. MAP, Sixth 24 Hours, Jan 21, 1991, pp. 1–9 [File No. T/HO/25/Master Plan].

27. Msg, 020800Z Mar 91, USCENTAF/DO to USCINCCENT/CCJ3, Subj: Nighttime

CAP Requirements [File No. T/CT/84/DO]; Brfg Slide No. 1, “Notable IZAF Firsts and Lasts,”

Mr. Steve Dunn, HQ TAC/INYT to HQ USAF/INKT, Iraqi Air Employment Summary, Apr 29,

1991 [File No. CK/DS/OVERV-April 91].

28. Msgs, 192142Z Jan 91, CENTAF/IN to et al., Subj: Intrep 91–098; AA–10/Alamo

Employment [File No. T/CT/17/-], and 250900Z Jan 91, TAC IDHS Langley AFB/TACOPS/INO to AIG 663, Subj: TAC Special Assessment 008–91; Iraqi Air Force Employment—

Week One [File No. T/CT/52/-].

29. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 128.

30. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 2, pp 1–91.

Examination of photographs of bombed Iraqi airfields shows that on the majority of occasions pilots appear to have avoided the personnel shelters while smashing the HASs all around

them. In several instances, however, personnel shelters received direct hits. No consistent policy seems evident.

31. Airfield Attack Plan, [Checkmate], n.d. [Jan 23, 1991], attachment 1 “Location and

Vulnerability of Iraqi Aircraft Bunkers,” and attachment 2 “Bunker Descriptions.”
single-bay shelters at the base. These shelters could hold from four to six aircraft.32

Its large HAS inventory conferred upon the IZAF virtual invulnerability

against its anticipated foes—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel—provided it stayed

underground, not over it. The Iraqis assumed the shelters would also resist

Coalition bombing. In this they erred. The PGMs of the USAF’s F–15Es,

F–111Fs, and F–117As and the RAF’s Buccaneers (designating for Tornados)

could pick out an HAS as easily as an IOC or a BW bunker, and once the bomb

penetrated the outer skin of the HAS, the shelter’s very structure would contain

the resulting explosion, maximizing the damage to its contents.

For much of the first week of the conflict, Coalition air forces had attacked

runways, taxiways, maintenance hangars, and control facilities at Iraqi air bases

to hinder or curtail Iraqi air operations. Flying into the strength of the multiple

Iraqi AAA batteries defending the bases, Coalition aircraft had dropped hundreds

of tons of munitions that ranged from generic iron bombs through specialized

UK–1000s, JP–233s, CBU–58s, CBU–87s, and CBU–89s, many equipped with

time-delayed fuses. The Iraqis responded with picks, spades, and quick-drying

cement (which cured in 25 to 60 minutes) and with fire hoses to explode the

bomblets. Many Iraqi fields had dedicated concrete plants or engineering equipment, and all Iraqi fields had dedicated runway-repair capability.33 Had the Iraqis

possessed the desire to use their aircraft, the Coalition airfield-suppression effort

would not have stopped them indefinitely. But the Coalition effort achieved its

designated purpose: it halted a mass takeoff of the IZAF in the first crucial hours

and days of the conflict, when such an action might have wrought havoc on

Coalition air plans. However, airfield suppression, in the long run, may cost the

attacker more than the defender. It can consume more sorties than the attacker

can spare, and the economics of sophisticated aircraft and weapons versus manual labor seems a losing proposition.

255

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

32. Ibid.

The author has seen no detailed studies of Iraqi HASs and assumes that their construction

conformed to designed specifications. However, one cannot completely discount widespread

cheating in HAS construction, a distinct possibility in the Middle East. This might invalidate

conclusions drawn as to the effectiveness of the PGM attacks on these targets.

33. Point Paper, Lt. Col. Dan Kuehl, XOXWD, “Iraqi Runway Repair Capability,” Jan 22,

199 [File No. CK/DS/HOYES/Misc].

Warsaw Pact–style HAS
The growing expense of the airfield campaign and the IZAF’s intention to

conserve its strength and fight on its own terms became obvious on both sides of

the Atlantic. On January 21 Checkmate had phoned the strategic planning cell to

urge it to begin a shelter-busting program. Checkmate followed two days later

with a fax of a more polished three-day plan.34 However, by that time the campaign planners had already begun to implement a shelter-attack plan which they

had assembled at General Glosson’s direction in October 1990.35 By the night of

January 21, the Iraqi planning cell decided to switch tactics against the IZAF and

its fields. For the past few days, CENTAF had instructed aircraft to strike HASs

as alternates if they could not attack primary targets; now the planning cell drastically reduced its attacks on airfield infrastructure and ordered aircraft to target

HASs as first priority.36 If the IZAF would not come up and fight, let it die in its

holes.

At sunset on January 22, fourteen F117As of the 415th TFS departed

Khamis Mushait for central Iraq. The planners had originally scheduled them for

communications, NBC, and leadership targets in the Baghdad area,37 but sometime in the previous twenty-four hours the F–117As received a new target:

Yugoslav HASs at Balad SE airfield, roughly 45 miles north of Baghdad. This

raid began the Coalition’s shelter-busting campaign. Thirteen of the stealth fighters reached the target, and their GBU–10s struck home.38 The AWACS and its

F–15C escorts participated in this mission. At 2130L the AWACS pushed its

F–15C CAP north of the border (receiving a new CAP, the F–15s scrambled to

replace the ones ordered north) to engage twenty aircraft fleeing Balad SE. A

tanker refueled the F–15Cs north of the Iraqi border. Before the end of the conflict, the tankers established tanker refueling tracks over Iraqi territory.39 Unfor256

On Target

34. Brfg Slide, [Checkmate],“‘Shelter Busting’ Forces Iraqi Exodus to Iran,” n.d. [Feb

1991] [File No. CK/DS/Air Superiority]; Airfield Attack Plan, [Checkmate], fax notation,

1200Z 23 January 1991 [File No. CK/DS/Hoyes/Misc].

35. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 29.

36. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 128.

37. MAP, Sixth 24 Hours, 1500Z Jan 21, 1991, p. 5 [File No. TAC/HO/25/Master Plan].

38. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 20–26, 1991, p. 19 [File No. T/UH];

DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 128.

The Contingency Historical Report makes no mention of a weather divert or last-minute

changes in orders. This would seem to confirm that the raid intended to hit the airfield from its

inception. The DoD source speaks of the F–117A raid on Balad SE as part of the shelter campaign.

39. Chronology, 17th Air Division (Provisional)/STRATFOR Operation Desert Storm,

Jan 17–Mar 17, 1991, Entry for Jan 22, 1991 [File No. T/CT/84/Hosterman Chron]. Also see

supporting document No. 30 for this chronology, a map carrying General Horner’s personal

annotations that describe this mission. Also see Historian’s STRATFOR/17ADP Staff Meeting

Notes, Operation Desert Storm [File No. SAC/HO/Historian’s Working Files]. The entry for

January 22 states that the first tanker to go into Iraq did so to refuel an AWACS and its fourship F–15C CAP involved in a CSAR mission for a Navy pilot (Lt. Devon Jones?), which

would place tankers over Iraq on January 21. In the same document, see the entry for the

January 29th Staff Meeting in which General Caruana reported that F–117A refueling tracks

had taken tankers as far north as 32° to 30° north latitude “into Iraq and halfway to Baghdad!”
tunately, the effort achieved no kills, a result Colonel Deptula attributed to “bungled weaponeering on the part of CENTAF intell.” Until this mission, campaign

planners had entrusted the weaponeering, or selection of weapons, for the

F–117As to the CENTAF/IN community. Colonel Deptula had naturally assumed

that intelligence would select 2,000-pound case-hardened GBU–27 penetrating

weapons; instead, it selected non-penetrating 2,000-pound GBU–10s. The shelters remained intact; the aircraft did not flee. From that mission until the end of

the war, Deptula personally weaponeered the F–117As, breaking another professional link with CENTAF/IN.40 At 2000L, B–52Gs would pound the H–2 and

H–3 airfields and Scud facilities. Two hours later, at 2200L, planners sent twenty F–111Fs to attack Al Asad airfield. Twenty more Aardvarks would repeat the

raid the next night. In addition to its twelve Yugoslav shelters and six Tab Vee

shelters, Al Asad had twenty concrete hangars recessed into hills, each able to

hold up to half a squadron’s aircraft. The recessed hangars did not have protective doors. Eight F–111Fs carrying four GBUs apiece would bomb the shelters,

while twelve F–111Fs struck the base runways and facilities.41

Although by D+6 (January 23) General Horner had informed Washington

that “we have established air superiority over Iraq and can fly throughout [the]

country with relative impunity,”42 the shelter-busting campaign continued. For

both January 23 and 24, it had a priority second only to Scuds.43 The planners

scheduled the F–111Fs for the bulk of the work because the airfields did not have

defenses on the scale of the Baghdad region and the F–111Fs could carry twice

as many precision weapons as the F–117As could. On the night of January 23/24,

planners instructed the 48th TFW(P) to send 20 F–111Fs to the H–2 airfield (24

257

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

40. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 30.

41. MAP, Sixth 24 Hours, 1500Z Jan 21, 1991, p. 6.

42. Msg, 230800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #167 [File No.

T/CT/66/-].

43. Msgs, 240800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #168 [File No.

AFHSO microfilm reel 10160], and 250800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj:

Sitrep #169. [File No. T/CT/66/-]

Three KC–10 tanker

aircraft.
Tab Vee HASs); they followed that mission by assigning 20 F–111Fs to the H–3

airfield (15 Tab Vee, 5 Trapezoid, and 12 Quick Turn HASs) and 12 more to Al

Taqaddum (10 Tab Vee, 13 Trapezoid, and 13 Quick Turn HASs) the next day.

(These raids might cripple Iraq’s capability of launching a fighter attack on

Israel.) The next night, January 24/25, the planners hit the southern airfields

sending 20 F–111Fs to Jalibah SE (24 Tab Vee HASs) on the Kuwaiti border and

10 more Aardvarks to Shaibah airfield (14 Trapezoid HASs) near Basra. Eight

and 12 F–111Fs, penciled in by the planners for the bombing of Wadi al Khirr

dispersal field (12 Tab Vee HASs) and Al Asad airfield, respectively, would hit

their targets in the nighttime hours of January 25. The assault continued into the

night of January 25/26 as the planners assigned 20 F–111Fs to Tallil airfield and

repeated the raid with 16 F–111Fs on the evening of January 26.44

The F–117As assisted. After two nights in which weather frustrated efforts

to take down road and rail bridges over various wadis and the Euphrates River

between Baghdad and Basra, early in the morning of January 25 the 37th

TFW(P) attacked Al Asad airfield and Kirkuk (14 Tab Vee and 10 Quick Turn

HASs) and Qayyarah (36 Tab Vee HASs) airfields in the far north. Of 25

weapons released, 9 GBU–27s hit Al Asad, 6 hit Kirkuk, and 5 smashed into

Qayyarah. A mission so far to the north involved bringing the supporting tankers

and their escorts into southern Iraq. That same morning out to the west, a raid of

10 F–117As on the HASs at H–2 and H–3 airfields was unsuccessful. A repeat

raid the next day produced only marginally improved results. Eight more F–

258

On Target

44. List, compiled by CENTAF, Directorate of Campaign Plans, GAT Division, Iraqi

Planning Cell, “Targets Attacked by Day by Aircraft,” Jan 25–Mar 6, 1991, pp. 1–3 “Attacks

on Airfields as of 1/25/91” [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10264, starting frame 1104].

Colonel Deptula created this document in August 1990. It reflects missions planned or

“fragged” and not missions executed. He designed it as a planning aid to track what he had targeted and the level of effort to be applied to individual targets. This document was assembled

in the planning cycle later than the MAP was. The authors of the MAP completed their work

in the evening, but the compilers of this document did not begin their work until the following

morning. Thus the document reflects any changes made by the Campaign Planning officers in

the early morning hours. Because of the difficulty in determining mission execution, the author

uses this document to indicate more the intent of CENTAF planners than the exact execution

by the units involved.

Destroyed Tab Vee HAS 
117As of the 416th TFS attacked H–2 and H–3 in the succeeding wave on the

morning of January 26. They had hits with 8 of the GBU–27s they dropped. On

the night of January 26/27, the F–117As returned to the far north. Attacks on the

Kirkuk and Mosul airfields achieved 5 hits. One of the bombs impacted directly

on a MiG–23 at Mosul. A second wave of F–117As also struck northern targets

including Al Sahra, Kirkuk, Qayyarah, Muhammad, and Al Asad airfields. The

wing had designated Al Asad as the alternate for any aircraft unable to find its

targets in the north.45 On January 27, 1991, CENTAF proclaimed that it had

“achieved air supremacy.”46 By the end of the conflict, Coalition air forces had

destroyed or severely damaged over 60 percent of the IZAF’s 594 HASs.47 The

RAF made a substantial contribution to the campaign, expending 28 percent of

its entire PGM effort on HASs.48 This 96-hour effort achieved much of that damage.

For three days the IZAF withstood the bombardment. On the third day,

January 25, a day of excellent flying weather, the IZAF failed to mount a single

fighter sortie.49 During those days, the Iraqi leadership had time to evaluate the

new Coalition tactic and to formulate and disseminate an answer. Raids to the

west, north, and south had shown that the Coalition could reach and destroy

HASs in every corner of Iraq. The initial days of air combat had demonstrated

that the IZAF could not survive against Coalition aircraft and pilots. For the

IZAF, staying in its shelters meant slow but sure destruction. Confrontation also

meant sure destruction. Only flight remained. Before the antishelter campaign

began, Iraq had set in motion plans to provide an option for escape. The Iraqis

followed their pattern of the Iran-Iraq War when they dispersed their planes

throughout other Persian Gulf nations to avoid Iranian air counterattacks. Events

forced the Iraqis to attempt to repeat this process for Desert Storm.

By January 21 the Iraqis had sent at least twenty-five aircraft to Iran. Among

them were a Soviet-built Il–76 military transport, a Boeing 727 intelligence platform, and two Iraqi airborne early warning platforms, Adnan 1 and Baghdad 1.

The Iraqi civilian aircraft sent included airliners looted from Kuwait. The

Iranians made no objection to their neighbor’s actions and attempted to disperse

the aircraft to less conspicuous military airfields. Beginning on January 26, 1991,

Iraqi combat aircraft began to leave their bunkers to flee to Iran. More than twenty-five left the first day; during the next three days more retired to the sanctuary

of their hereditary foe. By January 28 a total of 82 Iraqi fighters— including topof-the-line aircraft such as 31 F–1s, 8 MiG–29s, and 16 Su–24s—sat on Iranian

259

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

45. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 20–26, 1991, pp. 24–30.

46. Msg, 280800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #171.

47. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 154.

48. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 101.

49. Msg, 260713Z Jan 91, DIA Washington to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update [File No. T/HO/3/DIA-Jan].
airfields.50 By February 10 at least forty-seven additional fixed-wing combat aircraft had joined them.51

The bug-out of the IZAF at first puzzled the Coalition. Initially, some suspected the movement represented defections resulting from a failed air force

attempt to overthrow Saddam, as unconfirmed rumors of executions of highranking officers circulated in the news media. Alternatively, the exodus to Iran

might represent an attempt to stage an Iraqi air strike from an Iranian safe haven,

a possibility that concerned the carrier admirals in the Persian Gulf. In western

Iran, mountains would conceal aircraft approaching the Gulf almost to the

water’s edge. Consequently, Exocet-capable F–1s might be able to launch an

attack that would give the carriers only minimal warning. Although Coalition

intelligence did not know the maintenance status or armament of the refugee

Iraqi aircraft, it seemed unlikely that the Iranians would allow an attack from

their territory. As the war progressed, the potential for Iraq and Iran to become

allies lessened, for the Iranians had little desire to expose themselves to the same

degree of punishment as that meted out to their neighbor. For public consumption, the highest levels of Iranian leadership had firmly stated their intention to

remain neutral, bringing them into opposition with fundamentalist elements that

wished to protect the Iraqi Shia shrines and others who feared excessive U.S.

influence in the region. On January 25, President Rafsanjani called those who

wished to side with Saddam “simple-minded illiterate youngsters.” Supreme

Leader Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that Saddam’s cause was not an Islamic

cause and condemned him for oppressing his nation and leading it into the “burning furnace” to sate his personal ambition.52 It seemed most probable to

American intelligence that Saddam had sent his best aircraft across the border to

preserve them with the hope of retrieving them after the conflict.53

CENTAF responded to the Iraqi démarche by positioning barrier CAPs of

F–15s and, somewhat later, of F–14s to halt flights between Iraq and Iran. This

stopped all movement for several days, leading the Coalition to reduce the CAPs.

The Iraqis used the opportunity of fewer CAPs to push forty more combat aircraft across the Iranian border on February 6 and 7. CENTAF promptly restored

260

On Target

50. Msgs, 290212Z Jan 91, DIA Washington to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iranian Support

to

Iraq [File No. T/HO/3/DIA-Jan], and 302107Z Jan 91, DIA Washington to DIACURINTEL,

Subj: Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update, Date of Information: (0930 EST) January 30, 1991 [File

No. T/HO/3/DIA-Jan].

51. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 154.

52. Item of Interest, Lt. Col. William E. Stevens, USAF, Chief, Middle East/Africa/South

Asia Div, Dep Directorate for Regional Plans & Policy, Directorate of Plans, DCS/P&O, HQ

USAF, Subj: Iran’s Neutrality, n.d. [January 30, 1991]. [File No. CK/AS/Iran]

53. Msg, 290212Z Jan 91, DIA Washington to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iranian Support to

Iraq [File No. T/HO/3/DIA-Jan]; Working Paper, Red Team (AF/XOXWP), Subj: Update on

Iranian Scenario (“Dramatic Strike” 23 Jan 91), Jan 26, 1991 [File No. CK/DS/IZ–Offensive

Capability].
the barrier CAPs at full strength, virtually shutting down Iraqi flights to Iran for

the remainder of the conflict.54

The out-of-country skedaddle of the IZAF’s best had several repercussions.

Although the Iraqis had virtually conceded air supremacy to the Coalition with

their unaggressive employment of their assets and their low flight rates, more

than 95 percent of their air force survived into late January. The continued existence of the force allowed it to pose a constant threat to the Coalition in the worst

case of either a single-shot do-or-die action with BW/CW weapons at a location

and time of the Iraqis’ own choosing, or damaging hit-and-run raids in circumstances favorable to themselves. The rout of 15 percent of the total force to Iran

had an even more deleterious effect on the striking power of the IZAF than raw

numbers suggest. Almost 40 percent of the IZAF’s newest and most modern aircraft (F–1s, Su–24s, and MiG–29s) now sat on Iranian military fields. In fighting power, the IZAF had lost perhaps 25 to 30 percent of its punch. Many of the

aircraft remaining in Iraq, such as the MiG–21s, had short ranges that hampered

their ability to conduct offensive operations. Once the barrier CAPs shut off their

escape routes and the anti-HAS campaign demonstrated the false security of their

concrete sanctuaries, the IZAF undertook a program of thorough dispersal. The

program took advantage of the known Coalition predilections to avoid collateral

damage to civilians and antiquities by snuggling fighters up to ancient ziggurats

and parking combat aircraft in residential neighborhoods.55 Dispersal preserved

the assets at the cost of maintenance and reaction time.56 Aircraft sent far from

their bases would deteriorate and require time to be towed back. This increased

the warning time available to the Coalition prior to any Iraqi air offensive, and in

practice it removed much of threat posed by the IZAF.

In the long run, the Iranians gained the most from the Iraqi internments. Had

the Iraqis won some form of victory or bloody stalemate, then the Iranians could

have returned the aircraft and taken advantage of previously negotiated concessions or earn Saddam’s goodwill (for what that was worth). If the Iraqis lost

badly, then the Iranians could keep more than $1 billion worth of modern aircraft,

while subtracting more than 100 fixed-wing combat aircraft from the ranks of

their archenemy and adding them to their own stocks. The Iranians kept the

planes. Furthermore, they undoubtedly calculated that the states of the former

Soviet Union would happily sign maintenance and training contracts on the aircraft in exchange for hard currency. The presence of the Iraqis’ jets and the

Iranians’ potential either to restrain or to aid the Iraqis may have prompted the

United States to take a less provocative stance toward Iran.

261

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

54. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 129; Talking Paper, Maj. Michael

B. Hoyes, XOXW, “Allied Shelter Busting vs. Iraqi Aircraft Exodus to Iran,” Feb 7, 1991 [File

No. CK/DS/Air Superiority].

55. Msg, 140605Z Feb 91, SSO DIA to DIXOS et al., Subj: DIA Commonwealth Intsum—Middle East/Africa 168–91/14 Feb 91: Iraq-Kuwait Situation Update [File No. T/CT/

59/-]

56. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 154.
Grinding Down the Iraqi Target Base

When the number of daily Coalition air sorties devoted to the KTO and to

supporting the ground forces surpassed those expended on targets in Iraq, the

nature of the strategic air campaign changed. The initial strategic attacks had

disrupted the easily available and highly leveraged target sets like oil, electricity, and Iraq’s Kari system. The remaining targets—the R&D and manufacturing

of SRBMs, NBC matériel, and military support items—presented large, diffuse

categories that could absorb vast quantities of bombing and still retain a considerable percentage of their assets intact. Other target sets such as bridges and

communications systems, particularly the fiber-optic network, offered technically difficult and resilient targets. Yet demands of the anti-Scud and ground

campaign diminished the sizable strategic force that initiated the offensive air

campaign. First the Saudi-based F–16s and B–52Gs joined the A–10s and

AV–8Bs and the Allied air forces in the tactical effort in the KTO. After January

29 and through the end of the conflict, the planners scheduled virtually no

strategic missions for Saudi-based F–16s.57 The strategic campaign could now

call on approximately 100 PGM-capable F–117As, F–111Fs, and F–15Es; the

RAF (which added more PGM capability); Red Sea carrier aircraft (some with

PGM capability); F–16 LANTIRNs and A–10s committed to Scud alert; and the

96 combat aircraft of JTF Proven Force, none of which at that time possessed

PGM capability. All these aircraft, except the F–117As, would require tanker,

jamming, and SEAD support. In addition, Scud hunting and tank plinking, in

which PGM-capable F–15Es and F–111Fs used 500-pound GBU–12 laser-guided bombs to pick off Iraqi armor at night, siphoned off additional PGM aircraft.

After January 28, few F–15Es, other than those assigned to the Great Scud

Hunt, flew in the strategic campaign. By February 5, the 48th TFW(P) averaged

only a third at most of its total sorties against targets on the strategic master target list.58 Finally, in mid-February the USN moved one of its three Red

Sea–based carriers, the USS America, to the Persian Gulf, where it could assist

in the upcoming ground offensive, a further subtraction from the strategic cam262

On Target

57. See List, compiled by CENTAF, Directorate of Campaign Plans, GAT Division, Iraqi

Planning Cell, “Targets Attacked by Day by Aircraft,” Jan 25–Mar 6, 1991 [File No. AFHSO

microfilm reel no. 10264, starting frame 1104].

This document is a compilation of all missions scheduled in the initial MAPs during the

conflict. It does not reflect mission changes, the missions as finally published in the ATO, or

the missions as executed by the units. Nonetheless, the document clearly shows the targeting

intentions of the strategic planners and CENTAF leadership. The author of this volume has

found the above document 75- to 85-percent accurate for individual missions flown as scheduled and definitive in tracking targeting and aircraft usage trends. When possible, the author

has verified individual missions against unit histories and other documentation. The immense

task of verifying the 112,000 Coalition air sorties and 65,000 CENTAF sorties is outside the

scope of this work and will, in all probability, never be definitively prepared. See footnote 44

on page 258 for additional comments on this subject.

58. Ibid.; Master Target List, CENTAF, Directorate of Campaign Plans, GAT Division,

Iraqi Planning Cell, Mar 1, 1991 [File No. AF/CAFH microfilm reel 10264].
paign. To partially offset this loss of aircraft, CENTAF directed the 37th

TFW(P) to begin flying three missions instead of two every evening, which the

wing commenced to do on January 25.59 On January 26, six F–117As from the

continental United States reinforced the wing, enabling it to maintain the

increased operating pace.60 However, not even the F–117As could entirely avoid

missions in the KTO, where certain key targets required their extreme accuracy.

For the remaining thirty-two days of the conflict, the strategic campaign averaged approximately 250 missions daily, one-third of them with PGM-capable

aircraft.

Once again, the F–117A’s stealth characteristics and uncannily accurate

bombing allowed it to become the mainstay of the air offensive against Iraq.

Only the F–117A could strike targets in downtown Baghdad, and it could strike

with a minimum of effort from other CENTAF elements, freeing them to support

conventional aircraft. Further, the F–117A’s bombing accuracy gave it the relative effectiveness of a much larger number of conventional aircraft. The accuracy of the 37th TFW(P)’s F–117As enabled the wing to deliver on target more

ordnance than any three or four non-PGM-capable air force wings combined.

The luxury of air supremacy or superiority allowed air-to-air refueling, even over

the enemy’s homeland. It greatly extended the F–117A’s operational range.

Nonetheless, accuracy, freedom of the air, and the effort of the other non-PGM

aircraft enabled the strategic campaign to maintain the pressure on Iraq.

From January 27 through February 5, Coalition air forces struck numerous

targets throughout Iraq. B–52Gs and several large formations of F–111Fs and

F–117As continued the HAS-busting campaign. On the evening January 27, the

planners sent 12 F–111Fs to strike Al Jarrah airfield and 20 F–111Fs to savage

Jalibah airfield. The next evening they sent 20 F–111Fs to Tallil and 13 F–117As

to the H–2 airfield to follow up a morning raid composed of 16 F–111Fs. January

29 saw 26 F–111F sent to Al Taqaddum, and on February 2 and 3, squadronsized formations of F–111Fs and F–117As supplemented the daily raids by other

Coalition aircraft on H–3. In this period, planners penciled in five squadron-sized

263

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

59. For a description of operations that began on the night of January 24/25, 1991, see

Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Jan 20–26, 1991, p. 23.

60. Msg, 250800Z Jan 91, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, Subj: Sitrep #169 [File No.

T/CT/66/-].

F–117A
F–117A raids on Balad SE and its tough Yugoslav shelters. This time the aircraft

carried GBU–27s. Three large F–111F missions also went to hit the two Kuwaiti

airfields, Al Jaber and Ali Al Salem. The planners intended other squadron-sized

F–111F raids to hit Al Asad, Shayka Mazhar, and Qalat Salih airfields, this to

maintain unrelenting pressure on the IZAF’s main operating bases and HASs.

The strategic campaign also invested great effort in NBC and communications

targets. In many instances, CENTAF sent paired or single F–117As to pick off

targets like the CW bunkers at Tallil, Al Jarrah, and Al Taqaddum airfields. On

February 3, one F–117A went to the far north to attack a CW bunker at Qayyarah

West airfield that had eluded strikes by JTF Proven Force. On separate evenings,

one sixteen-ship and two four-ship F–111F formations attempted to hit CW

bunkers at H–3, as did a mission of six F–117As. Other small F–117A missions

went after probable CW production sites at Habbaniyah. Four larger F–117A

raids (consisting of four or five aircraft each) and a twenty-aircraft F–111F mission struck the Tuwaitha nuclear complex; two squadron-sized F–111F missions

went after the Latifiya solid-fuel propellant plant. Five large and small F–117A

missions struck Salman Pak, while six small F–117A missions bombed the Abu

Ghurayb suspected BW facility near Baghdad. B–52Gs from Moron bombed the

Al Qaim phosphate plant on February 5th.61

Although many of these raids comprised one or two aircraft, most consisted

of larger formations. This demonstrated the planners’ increasing emphasis on

destruction of the target. PGMs enhanced the effect of this option as well. Unlike

previous wars, no longer did dozens of aircraft attack with the hope of landing

six or seven bombs within the factory’s fences. Four or five F–117As or even

fewer F–111Fs could attack with a different aiming point for each weapon and

expect to destroy the six to eight key pieces of machinery or the particular part

of the plant’s construction most valuable to the facility. Twenty F–111Fs sent to

Tuwaitha could mean up to eighty different aiming points or multiple GBUs on

the same hardened or sensitive point. Repeated smaller raids could produce the

same effect.

C3 targets seemed just as susceptible to sharpshooting as to brute force. Only

twice between January 27 and February 5 did the planners schedule more than

two PGM aircraft to attack a C3 target. They sent four F–111Fs to Ad Dujayl

communications satellite terminal to reduce Saddam’s contact with the outside

world and six F–117As to the Basra radio transmitter-receiver to hinder

communications between Basra and Baghdad. On most attacks, a single F–117A

composed the attacking force. Single F–117As on different nights repeatedly

attacked TV transmitters at Baghdad, Al Kut, Al Amarah, As Samawah, Basra,

Umm Qasr, Az Zubayr, Al Ahmadi, Ar Rawdatyn, and Al Jahrah. Other

F–117As hit radio transmitters and radio relays. With these missions, CENTAF

264

On Target

61. “Targets Attacked by Day by Aircraft,” Printout, Feb 4, 1991: Eleventh through Twentieth 24 Hours.
hoped to redeem its promise to separate Saddam from the people. Further attacks

attempted to smash telephone exchanges in the lesser Iraqi cities. F–117As

struck exchanges in Al Kut, An Nasiriyah, and Ash Shuaybah. F–117As also

attacked signals intelligence facilities in the KTO and Baghdad. For the last time

in the conflict the planners purposely struck at the Iraqi electrical system; small

raids went after nine lesser generating plants, including two missions by JTF

Proven Force against the Mosul and Dibs plants.62

Missions against leadership targets conducted exclusively by F–117As followed an essentially all-or-nothing pattern. Four-ship flights attacked the IZAF

HQ’s hardened bunkers on February 2 and 4. Twice as many four-ship flights

attacked the hardened bunker under the new Presidential Palace (purportedly one

of Saddam’s prewar favorite resting places) on January 29 and 31 (this, during

the Battle of Khafji), and again on February 2 and 4. Otherwise, single aircraft

rocked the boat at Abu Ghurayb, Taji, the Ministry of Defense, the Security

Service, and VIP bomb shelter No. 25. Single aircraft attacked both the Ministry

of Military Industry and the IIS HQ on five separate nights. Two individual aircraft struck the Baghdad Republican Guard barracks. These missions kept the

Iraqi leadership uneasy, insecure, and on the run, precluding access to their most

secure communications systems. The missions must also have had a somewhat

daunting effect on the Iraqi security and military bureaucracies. Also participating in attacking the immense Iraqi military support target system were JTF

Proven Force; some Saudi-based F–16s, B–52Gs, and Tornados; and F–111Fs

and F–117As. On January 27, twenty-four F–16s attacked the Basra missile

plant. B–52Gs unloaded on ammunition dumps at Ar Rumaylah in the south and

Tall Al Lahm in the north. One squadron-sized F–111F mission attacked the

Baghdad aircraft repair depot at Rasheed airfield while two other large F–111F

formations struck the Latifiya ammunition plant Al Qa Qaa on January 31 and

February 2. On five separate occasions, Tornados, F–111Fs, and F–117As

attempted to hit the BW bunkers at An Nasiriyah. On January 31, sixteen

F–111Fs attacked the Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant, and on February 3, ten

F–111Fs hit another Scud target, the Latifiya Scud plant. F–117As flailed away

at other BW bunkers in Karbala and Ad Diwaniyah. SAM support facilities in

Baghdad and Shaibah airfield, near Basra, received packages of high-explosives

from F–117As and Tornados, respectively. Within the military support target system, facilities with application to other target systems would have priority

because they would attract the planners’ attention by disrupting multiple systems

with one attack. Military support targets relating to Scuds, BW, and SAMs would

obviously come up first in the planners’ sights.63

Iraqi bridges did not escape the attention of Coalition air forces. On January

27 the Gulf carriers sent three packages of F/A–18s to attack three of the Basra

265

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.
bridges. The disappointing results of these attacks solidified CENTAF’s determination to greatly scale back bridge bombing by non-PGM-capable aircraft. For

the next nine days, F–111Fs, F–117As, and a few A–6s flew missions against

twenty-five Iraqi rail and road bridges and ferries between Basra and Baghdad.

Bridges, especially those spanning the Euphrates River or deep gorges, formed

the key bottleneck in the Iraqi LOCs because the Iraqis could not easily work

around their loss. Given the generally flat terrain between Basra and Baghdad,

the Iraqis’ demonstrated skill at road repairs, and their stockpile of rails and rail

equipment, to blow out trackage and post hole highways would have accomplished little.64 Downed bridges over major obstacles presented the enemy with

a more difficult problem. Some bridges underwent repeated attacks. The twolane highway bridge at Ar Rumaylah (approximately halfway between An

Nasiriyah and Basra) absorbed two A–6 strikes on January 28; two F–111F missions on January 29; a single F–117A strike on January 29, January 31, and

February 1; four 4 F–111F strikes on February 2; and two F–111F missions

February 5. These raids severely damaged the bridge, but the shallow channel

enabled the Iraqis to rapidly construct earthen bypasses.65 PGM-capable

Coalition aircraft hit another bridge six times; four bridges, five times each; and

four additional bridges, four times each. On February 5, Checkmate briefed

Secretary Cheney that air operations had destroyed 22 of 24 critical bridges.66

To keep Iraqi air defenses suppressed, planners invested in attacks against

five IOCs and three SOCs and in seven strikes against the ADOC in Baghdad.

Most of these missions consisted of one or two aircraft. On the evening of

January 27, each of three groups of four F–15Es attacked a fiber-optic target at

Jalibal, Tallil, and As Samawah. Single F–117As followed up the these attacks

on February 1 and added a new target, Tall Afar airfield, between the Syrian border and Mosul. The Red Sea carriers also sent three packages of F/A–18s against

Scud targets on January 27. On January 30, planners scheduled paired F–117As

against two of the Baghdad bridges over the Tigris. The mission achieved partial

success even though the pilots’ view of the bridges was obscured in poor weather. One pilot released his weapons and reported two hits on the Jumhuriya bridge,

266

On Target

64. Msg, 270550Z Dec 90, DIA to DIACURINTEL, Subj: Iraq: Ability of LOC’s to Withstand an Air Interdiction Campaign [File No. T/HO/3/DIA-Dec]. The DIA judged that only a

campaign of attrition would greatly reduce Iraqi transport capability. This judgment may have

influenced later assessments of CENTAF accomplishments.

65. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 3, pp. 86–88.

66. Brfg Slide, Col. John A. Warden III, “Strategic Resupply Baghdad to Southern Iraq,”

SecDef Richard B. Cheney Briefing, 1100–1210 Feb 6, 1991, in Checkmate Map/War Room,

Pentagon. In the evening, at Colonel Deptula’s Request, Checkmate faxed a copy of this brief

to the Black Hole (see fax notation in margins, “WED 06 FEB 91 21:20”). Colonel Deptula

hoped to use the brief to prepare General Horner and General Glosson for Secretary Cheney’s

upcoming visit to Riyadh. Annotations indicate that General Horner reviewed it on February 7.

Annotations on the bridge slide (probably General Glosson’s) indicate that by February 7

CENTAF had put all twenty-four key bridges “in the water” and had attacked eight more

bridges, destroying three of them.
but he had no videotape to substantiate his claim.67 One target received multiple

raids. F–117A missions attacked the SRBM launcher final assembly plant at

Baghdad on February 2 and February 5. Although this may have locked the door

after the TELs had fled, it no doubt slowed any increase in production of the

device.68

From February 6 to 14 the strategic air campaign continued with the same

theme, but with variations. Twenty-four Iraqi airfields received Coalition raids.

A squadron-sized raid of F–117As supplemented by eight GR–1 Tornados and

four Buccaneers buddy-lasing for eight GR–1s struck Al Jarrah. Other Coalition

aircraft struck H–3 airfield four times and H–3 SW five times while JTF Proven

Force sent its F–111Es and F–16s to hit Qayyarah airfield once and Kirkuk airfield five times. A single F–117A and four B–52Gs also hit Kirkuk airfield on

separate nights. The French Air Force raided Shaibah airfield twice with its

Mirage 2000s and Jaguars, and the RAF added a strike of four Buccaneers and

two GR–1s. Red Sea naval aircraft attacked Al Taqaddum on February 14 after

bombing Shayka Mazhar, Tikrit East, and Al Asad airfields on earlier days.

Aircraft from the Gulf carriers went after Qalat Salih and Tallil. Ten F–117As

struck HASs at Rasheed airfield, east of Baghdad, on February 6, while F–117A

formations of equal or larger size attacked Balad SE, Al Kut, and New H–1 airfields. These raids kept the initiative from the IZAF and continued the IZAF’s

attrition in its shelters and dispersal areas. The campaign planners scheduled

eleven CW targets in the eight-day period. Three times, JTF Proven Force sent

four F–111Es plus support to assault the BW bunker at Qayyarah. Eight times,

JTF Proven Force sent either its F–16s or F–111Es to the Mosul nuclear production facility. Mission reports indicated numerous hits on the nuclear facility.69

The JTF also attacked CW bunkers at Kirkuk four times. F–117As also attacked

the Kirkuk CW bunkers. On the night of February 9/10, nine F–117As struck at

the ammunition and CW bunkers at Qayyarah West and Kirkuk.70 Two nights

later, ten more F–117As returned to the same targets.

During this period, February 7 to 9, 1991, Secretary Cheney and the CJCS

returned to Riyadh to finalize the decision to proceed with the ground offensive.

The CENTAF briefing gave them an extremely optimistic assessment of the

results of the strategic air war to date. In part, CENTAF stated that it had struck

all Scud production facilities and its pilots reported the destruction of thirty-five

MELs/TELs. Although the briefing cited 144 strategic sorties for February 8, it

stated that continuing the strategic effort would require only 80 sorties a day,

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Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

67. Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days 1–34, p. 17; Contingency Historical Rpt, Jan

27–Feb 2, 1991, p. 22.

68. “Targets Attacked by Day by Aircraft,” Printout, Feb 4, 1991: Eleventh through Twentieth 24 Hours.

69. Misrep, Capt. C. McCurdy, 7440 CW(P)/IN, Subj: Bomb Damage Assessment [by target and mission], Mar 1, 1991, pp. 49–50 [File No. TAC/HO 7449th Wg Prov, Box USAFE-9/

BDA].

70. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 3–9, 1991, p. 38 [File No. T/UH].
with a like number daily for Scuds. Defensive air patrols for HVAA and other

counterair functions required 372 daily sorties. When G-day, the start of the

ground campaign, arrived, the Coalition air forces could supply the ground

forces with 1,148 sorties per day. With a ratio of only one strategic sortie for

every fourteen ground support sorties, the strategic campaign against Iraq had

become not just a secondary but a tertiary objective. The brief made no mention

of leadership targets other than C3, of separating the Iraqi populace from its leadership, or of decapitating or changing the Iraqi regime.71

The Army presentation gave a window of four days, February 21–24, and

selected February 23 as the optimum time for the assault. Generals Powell and

Schwarzkopf and the other senior army officers present strongly backed the plan.

General Powell openly expressed fear that the Iraqis would crumble and run,

denying the Coalition the chance to destroy them. Secretary Cheney spoke little.72 However, the Secretary and General Powell accepted the recommendations

and briefed them to President Bush on their return on February 10. The president

ordered the implementation of the plan.

In the meantime, the strategic campaign continued to strike its objectives.

From February 6 to 14, planners scheduled strikes on fifty-three separate communications targets. Sending out single or paired F–117As, they finished the tactic begun the week before by hitting additional Iraqi TV and radio stations as

well as several signals intelligence facilities, telephone exchanges in minor

cities, and radio relays throughout the nation. They sent aircraft after fiber-optic

repeaters at pumping station No. 4 and at Jirishan. On February 8 the planners

scheduled for attack all seven Baghdad bridges over the Tigris, including the

spans carrying fiber-optics and communications. Instead, the twelve F–117As

involved hit targets on the outskirts of Baghdad.73 This was an instance of a political decision to change targeting.74 The bridges had high visibility with the international press corps in Baghdad. Then on the night of February 13/14, four pairs

of F–117As directly assisted the Coalition ground forces by attacking the forward headquarters of both the Iraqi III and IV Corps and the Iraqi Army GHQ

Forward, especially its communications facilities.75 The communications bombing continued the pressure on Iraqi communications, forcing the leadership to

rely on less secure and more roundabout means. The ongoing destruction of

phone exchanges, radio relays, and TV and radio transmitters hampered communications between the regime and the populace, making control of rumors and

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On Target

71. Brfg,”Theater Air Campaign,” annotated, “Gen. Horner’s Brief to SECDEF/CJCS

presented 9 Feb 91” [File No. AFHSO microfilm reel 10198, starting frame 307]. (This microfilm copy is of a document in the Deptula Papers, where it can also be found.)

72. Memo, Lt. Col. Deptula to Checkmate, Subj: Feedback from SECDEF/CJCS Meeting

with CINC and Component Commanders, Feb 9, 1991 [File No. CK/DS/KTO-RPG].

73. MAP, Twenty-third 24 Hours,1730L Feb 7, 1991 ), p. 14 [File No. TAC/CT/Box 3];

Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 3–9, 1991, p. 34.

74. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 32.

75. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 10–16, 1991, p. 28.
defeatism more uncertain. The loss or damage of impossible or difficult to

replace communications switches and equipment would lead to further loss of

capability.

The planners called for strikes on twenty-six military support targets. In

most cases, each package included four or more strike aircraft. With the exception of BW bunkers, these targets usually consisted of large research or production complexes, and as such lent themselves as easily to the shotgun weapons

delivery approach of conventional strike aircraft as they did to PGMs. The vast

Taji military-industrial complex north of Baghdad presented the prime example.

If an aircraft delivered its ordnance within Taji, its weapons would smash something of value to the Iraqi military even if they missed their target by half a mile.

The Iraqis would pay the price for their administrative and authoritarian proclivity for centralization. Taji’s huge expanse of repair shops, fabrication and assembly facilities, and warehouses centered it in the sights of the air campaign planners. They ticketed F–117As and A–6s for the Taji engine repair facility; B–52Gs

for the Taji fabrication plant; more F–117As for the Taji armored fighting-vehicle repair depot; and, on February 14, twelve B–52Gs for the Taji missile repair

facility. To get a large formation of the big bombers to the Baghdad area,

CENTAF had the F–117As strike a dozen high-altitude-capable SAM–2 and

SAM–3 sites in the immediate vicinity on the night of February 10/11. They hit

sixteen of twenty primary aiming points, allowing the B–52Gs to operate safely.76 In unrelated actions, naval aircraft hit SAM support facilities at Fallujah,

Shaibah, and Al Jarrah. B–52Gs and A–6s bombed the Salah Al Din SAM plant.

Paired F–117As twice attempted to finish off BW bunkers at Ad Diwaniyah and

Tikrit. Ten F–111Fs hit the Latifiya explosives plant on February 11, while multiple raids of F–117As, GR–1s, and A–6s worked over two important Scud-related targets in the city—the liquid propellant plant and the SSM equipment

production facility. Six B–52Gs bombed the Al Iskandariyah arms plant on February 14, and on the same night five F–117As struck at the Tar Miya rocket facility in far northern Iraq. JTF Proven Force maintained its hammering of the Mosul

missile R&D production plant and the Mosul suspected missile facility. This

facet of the strategic bombing campaign hoped to strip from the Iraqis the ability to field and maintain armed forces, capable of offensive action, for years to

come.77

The planners rained further blows on the Iraqi petroleum industry, sending

strikes to sixteen targets in the period between February 5 and 14. In a calculated attempt to worsen Iraq’s internal fuel situation, already hamstrung by its

inability to produce new fuel (and possibly by a blockade-induced shortage of

crucial additives), ten of these missions went to oil storage facilities in such

places as Habbaniyah, Basra, An Najaf, Ar Ramadi, An Nasiriyah, Al Amarah,

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Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

76. Ibid., p. 17.

77. “Targets Attacked by Day by Aircraft,” Printout, Feb 14, 1991: Twentieth through

Twenty-ninth 24 Hours.
and Al Kut. The destruction of fuel would hamper the Iraqis’ residual ability to

supply their front—the necessity for further mileage, due to bypasses, and

rougher usage due to poorer roads already hindered them—and it would possibly restrict the Iraqi ground forces’ ability to maneuver. This illustrates the synergistic operation of a well-run strategic bombing offensive. Attacking bridges

means more (diesel) fuel consumed by rerouted trucks; forcing the increased use

of backup generators means more diesel fuel required in the cities; shutting down

the oil pipelines means more fuel-consuming fuel trucks are required to transport

fuel to the cities; and stopping electricity in winter compels the populace to resort

to oil-based heat and cooking (wood is not an option in Baghdad, or many other

places), further pressuring the regime and the petroleum supply. Attacking petroleum storage compounds these issues. The Coalition also meant to hit refineries

at Basra, Bayji, As Sammawah, Kirkuk, and Uwaysah to ensure that the oil spigot stayed closed. Tornados and the aircraft of JTF Proven Force conducted the

bulk of these raids. The RAF Tornados gained a longer stride from the USAF’s

recent certification, allowing them to draw fuel from USAF tankers. Eight of the

GR–1s went north to Al Hadithah pumping station K–3 on February 7, and six

B–52Gs followed up their attack on February 9. Tornados also were scheduled

to go after the pumping station and manifolds at Az Zubayr.78 A successful attack

on Az Zubayr would further complicate petroleum resupply for the Iraqi army in

the KTO.

From February 6 to 14, the RAF, the USN, and CENTAF attempted to drop

twenty-nine major bridges, most between Basra and Baghdad. Appropriately, the

RAF attacked the lion’s share—19 bridges. It hit key bridges over the Euphrates

at Fallujah, Ar Ramadi, and Al Kifl. U.S. naval aircraft, with follow-up missions

by F–111Fs, attacked two Basra bridges. Further, F–111Fs twice struck the Basra

bridge over the Shatt al Arab; they also struck the An Nasiriyah pontoon bridge

and the Amarah highway bridge. As noted above, CENTAF did not execute the

F–117A attacks planned for the Baghdad bridges. Damaging and dropping

bridges lowered drastically the Iraqi ability to supply the front and caused all

sorts of inconvenience and disruption in the internal economy. Iraqi air defense

and Scuds came in for their share of suppressive fire. On the night of February

7/8, two F–117s hit the ADOC in Baghdad. On other nights, F–117As pasted

IOCs at Al Amarah, Al Kut, Salman, and Karbala. Two F–117A raids, one consisting of four aircraft, hit the alternate ADOC at Balad SE. The USN struck Al

Jarrah IOC with two F/A–18s and two A–6s on February 8. These raids kept Kari

inoperative and unable to be restored. The anti-Scud effort by the strategic forces

showed a decline in the period. The Red Sea carriers sent sixteen F/A–18s to the

Latifiya solid-propellant plant on February 11 while the F–117As concentrated

on radio and fiber-optic links between Baghdad and the Scud launch baskets.

One mission, a scheduled bombing of the Baghdad Al Ahrar fiber-optic bridge,

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On Target

78. Ibid.
did not fly. JTF Proven Force twice sent twenty-aircraft formations of its F–16s

and once sent four F–111Es against the Ash Sharqat suspected missile facility.79

These efforts and those of the regular Scudbusters helped keep the Iraqi SRBM

threat within tolerable limits.

During the period from February 6 to 14, 1991, a mission against one facility within the leadership target set caused the greatest furor of the air campaign.

In the blackness of the early morning of February 13, 1991, each of two F–117As

(Heat 34 and Rain 37) released a single case-hardened 2,000-pound penetrating

laser-guided bomb targeted for the roof of the Al Firdos bunker in the midst of

southeastern Baghdad. The first weapon hit the building’s roof a few yards from

its aiming point. The second clipped the corner of one of the burster slabs on its

top and probably failed to penetrate the bunker.80 The resultant blast killed and

wounded hundreds of Iraqi civilians using the facility as an air raid shelter. The

survivors probably owe their lives to the fact that the American pilots missed

their aiming points by a few feet. If the bombs, as intended, had penetrated the

roof and struck the shelter’s fuel or oxygen tanks, sparking secondary explosions

contained within the building, few would have lived.81 Neither bomb landed on

or near the bunker’s entrances. The Iraqis themselves or the shelter’s water tanks

(possibly ruptured in the bombing) flooded the facility’s bottom floor. On the

morning of February 13 and for the next forty-eight hours this story dominated

the international and U.S. media coverage of the war. In the face of widespread

horror at the slaughter of women and children, the U.S. government maintained

that it possessed irrefutable intelligence that the Iraqis had operated a C3 center

in the building’s basement and had cynically allowed civilians to use the shelter

to cover its military purpose.

By the beginning of December the special campaign planners had added

some shelters to their target list as C3 bunkers, and scheduled them for strikes on

the third day of hostilities. When General Glosson briefed the air campaign to

Secretary Cheney and General Powell, his backup slides contained the name of

every target on the planners’ master target list, including the bunkers.82 On

January 2, 1991, Colonel Deptula, who had left Saudi Arabia in November when

the initial attack plans had been completed, returned to fine-tune the plans, at

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Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

79. Ibid.

80. Intvw, Maj. Michael B. Hoyes, USAF, Chief Curr Ops, 422d Test & Eval Squad, and

Capt. John Wilcox, USAF, 422d Test & Eval Squad Wpns Off, with Donna Clark, USAF Tac

Ftr Wpns Cen, Nellis AFB, Nev., Mar 29, 1991.

Both officers worked in Checkmate during the conflict and had seen videotape of the Al

Firdos bunker mission. At this point in the interview they discussed the bomb impacts while

viewing imagery of the bunker.

81. Memo, Checkmate XOXWF to Lt. Col. Deptula, CENTAF, Directorate of Campaign

Plans, Subj: Destruction and PSYOP Campaign Against Iraqi Security Forces and Ruling Elite,

with atach showing DMPI for Al Firdos district (F-type) bunker.

82. List, Campaign Target Coverage, Dec 18, 1990, p. 6 [File No. 9AF, HQ/DCS/OPS/

Colonel James Crigger]; Bfg Slide 5F, “Targets Leadership,” Brig. Gen. Glosson to SecDef

Cheney, Gen. Powell, and Gen. Schwarzkopf, Dec 20, 1990.
General Glosson’s request. He carried with him numerous target intelligence

photos including the bunkers. The photos revealed that the bunkers were scattered all over Baghdad and in close proximity to centers of population.83

In late January and early February, as it became clear that the Iraqis would

not collapse immediately, ideas, probably unrelated to each other, suggesting the

bombing of sensitive or heretofore protected targets began to circulate in Riyadh

and Washington. The two Baghdad bridges that CENTAF attacked on January 30

were fiber-optic bridges. Their special importance to Scud communications

probably served as justification for the strike. Shortly before that raid General

Horner had recommended to General Schwarzkopf that he allow CENTAF to add

to the strategic target list for destruction two highly visible and sensitive targets

in Baghdad. The next day Checkmate suggested a renewed attack on leadership

targets. It noted that an accurate strike on a bunker would rupture fuel or oxygen

tanks, creating significant secondary explosions within the facility. The planners

also included a detailed chart of impact velocities and angles to ensure that

BLU–109s dropped on the shelters would deliver their entire blast within the

facility. However, an unknown hand at Checkmate added a word of caution:

“Dave [Deptula]—Unable to validate military interests at this time for these targets. Please Hold until either you or we get more info on how these bunkers are

used.”84 CENTAF/IN seconded the target nomination on February 7 by also suggesting F–117A strikes on the ten district bunkers.85 Nonetheless, Colonel

Deptula did not target any of the bunkers at this time.86

On the night of February 8/9 the planners had intended to attack all the

Baghdad bridges. The aircraft went to Baghdad as scheduled, but they hit different targets. Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf had rescinded the bridge targets.87

The next night after the secretary and the CJCS had left the theater, F–117As hit

two of the Baghdad bridges.88 The MAP had listed them as secondary targets for

the night’s mission, and the campaign planners had neglected to pull them.89 The

dropped bridges produced an understandably negative reaction from General

Schwarzkopf. At his daily meeting with the components on February 10, the

CINCCENT told General Glosson that CENTAF would bomb no bridges in

Baghdad unless approved by him.90 The timing of this decision, just after discussion with General Powell and Secretary Cheney, raises the possibility that the

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On Target

83. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 33.

84. Memo, Subj: Additional Leadership Targets List [prioritized], Date of Information:

(1730Z) Jan 31, 1991, annotated, “faxed on 1 Feb 90 at 0155 to Maj Rodgers,” additional annotation, “See note [on bunkers] on page 3 initialed J[ohn] W[arden].”

85. Memo, HQ USCENTAF FWD (Targets) to distribution, Subj: ATO Daily Prioritized

Target Nominations, Feb 7, 1991 [File No. AF/CAFH microfilm reel 10198, frame 718].

86. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 33.

87. File 201, Desert Storm Monograph Project, AFHSO.

88. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 3–9, 1991, p. 36.

89. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 34.

90. Personal Notes, Brig. Gen. Glosson, “CINCCENT Daily Priorities,” entry for Feb 12,

1991.
NCA wished to avoid any incidents of collateral damage or bad press reports

from the Western news correspondents in Baghdad.

On February 8 information from Washington via Checkmate indicated that

the Iraqis had begun to use the Al Firdos bunker as a communications center. The

atmosphere within the Iraq planning cell caused its members to put their own

unique spin on the new information. The rift between the campaign planners and

CENTAF/IN caused the planners to lean heavily on Washington sources. The Al

Firdos district bunker news had come through Checkmate, which was a strong

endorsement. The planners tended to act immediately on the “hot tips” received

from Washington, a trait that further alienated them from CENTAF/IN whose

members noted, with some justice, that most of the “hot intell” would not cool

off if the planners waited to insert it in the regular planning cycle. Some targets

by their very nature, such as factories and bunkers, were not likely to pick up and

disappear in 72 hours. If the planners followed their pattern, they would have

begun to act on the information quickly. But this did not preclude a searching discussion within the Black Hole. General Glosson, Colonel Deptula, and other

planners, including attached intelligence officers, met and deliberated on

whether or not and when to strike the bunker.91 Given the planners’ focus on

leadership targets and associated leadership C3, they not surprisingly decided to

target it. On February 11, CENTAF/IN also put the bunker on its “hit list.”92

Some questions about the decision to strike the Al Firdos district bunker

must remain unanswered at this time, either because the relevant intelligence

material carries classification levels that prevent its dissemination or because of

the reticence of the CENTAF decision-makers to discuss the incident. The raid

itself appears in the MAP as a handwritten substitution, added sometime after

1507L February 11. The substitution switched seven F–117As from the Abu

Ghurayb presidential grounds and bunkers to targets recommended earlier in the

day by Checkmate, including the Al Firdos district bunker93 It would seem that

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Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

91. Intvw, Capt. John Glock, USAF, GWAPS, Targeteer/Intel Off in CENTAF Directorate

of Planning, August 1990–March 1991, with Drs. Diane T. Putney and Richard G. Davis,

CAFH, Aug 27, 1992, at Crystal City, Arlington, Va. Captain Glock supplies useful inside

information on the initial intell/planner difficulties of August 1990 and the problems in coordinating traditional targeting methodology with the unorthodox procedures in the Black Hole.

92. Memo, HQ USCENTAF FWD to distribution, Subj: ATO Daily Prioritized Target

Nominations, attachment, “Leadership Hit List,” Feb 11, 1991 [File No. AF/CAFH microfilm

reel 10198, frame 684]. This recommendation notes that DIA reports the bunker as recently

activated.

93. MAP, Twenty-seventh 24 Hours, 1507L Feb 11, 1991, p. 13 [File No. AF/CAFH

microfilm reel 10199, frame 354]. The designation of Baath Party Headquarters as a target contains an anomaly. The MAP supplies the Master Target List number (L11) and the basic encyclopedia number (BE 0427DA0202) for Baath Party Headquarters, but it describes the target

as “GVT CMD CTR BK2,” which does not appear on the Master Target List (unless one

assumes it is North Taji command bunker No. 2). The North Taji bunker, thought to house civilian leadership, would be a logical target in conjunction with the Al Firdos district bunker. I cannot document when or if the planners received the Checkmate message (dated 110000Z Feb 91,

see previous footnote), but this late switch to a target set corresponding exactly to Checkmate’s

recommendations seems more than coincidental.
Checkmate, as well as CENTAF, shared targeting responsibility for the raid. The

attack occurred during the third and final F–117A wave of the day. The first two

waves launched at approximately 1730L (dusk) and 2130L. Their mission orders

usually arrived in the wing in the early morning, 10 to 12 hours before takeoff.

Wave 3, which launched at about 0145L the next morning, did not usually get its

mission orders until 2045L, five hours before takeoff.94 This staggered receipt of

mission orders allowed flexibility in targeting or retargeting for the final wave.

Given its situation next to a school, near a mosque, and in the midst of a residential area, the bunker would require precision imagery for a precision strike.

Last, the question of intent arises. The strike on the bunker occurred at the

end of a series of bombing attacks on Iraqi leadership targets in and around

Baghdad. The F–117A second wave of the night of February 11/12 struck IIS

HQ, the Ministry of Information, and Baath Party HQ. Wave 3 hit Military

Intelligence HQ, Abu Ghurayb C3 bunker, and the Ministry of Information. The

evening of February 12, as the first wave made its attacks on Baghdad, General

Schwarzkopf held his daily priorities meeting with his components. He told

General Glosson, “no tgt [target] hit in Baghdad without CINC [CINCCENT]

approval,” and added, “‘Absolutely’ [emphasis in original] no bridge in Baghdad

without CINC [CINCCENT] approval–don’t expect approval.”95 General Glosson and Colonel Deptula took this direction to mean that General Schwarzkopf

would henceforth check with the NCA before releasing any target in Baghdad.

Thereafter, in spite of the events of the next few hours, they noted some delay in

approval but not a flat ban on Baghdad targets.96 However, the number of leadership targets scheduled and struck declined precipitously. From the night of

February 13/14 until the night of February 22/23, the F–117As hit only one leadership target in Iraq. On the night of February 18/19, three F–117As dropped six

weapons on the IZAF HQ (New). Not until the preparatory bombing directly

related to the start of the ground war began was CENTAF allowed to resume

leadership targeting in Baghdad.97 In Checkmate, one officer expressed the universal feeling when he stated, “we were very upset about that [hold on Baghdad

targets] because we were putting pressure on Baghdad and the Hussein Regime,

and now we’re giving them two or three days of slack.”98

One unanswerable question about the Al Firdos district bunker remains.

Why did hundreds of civilians occupy it when after four weeks of bombing it

should have been clear even to the average Iraqi that you were as safe in your

274

On Target

94. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37 TFW(P), Feb 10–16, 1991, p. 27. The daily narrative

in this history records the arrival times of the frag orders for each wave and the takeoff time of

the waves.

95. Personal Notes, Brig. Gen. Glosson, “CINCCENT Daily Priorities,” entry for Feb 12,

1991.

96. Intvw, Maj. Gen. Glosson, Dec 12, 1991; Intvw, Lt. Col. Deptula, Nov 20, 1991.

97. “Targets Attacked Day by Day by Aircraft,” Printouts: Thirtieth through Forty-third

24 Hours. Also see the appropriately dated 37th TFW(P) Contingency History Reports.

98. Intvw, Maj. Hoyes and Capt. Wilcox, Mar 29, 1991, p. 40.
bed from Coalition bombs as you would be in a bomb shelter? Some have suggested a diabolical plot on the part of Saddam and his security agencies to set up

the Americans. While possible, it seems rather too subtle to be convincing.

Others have suggested that the occupants were family members either of the

intelligence personnel working in the basement or of high-ranking government

officials, a somewhat more probable explanation. An intelligence officer from

the Black Hole suggested to the author what seems the most likely reason for the

presence of so many civilians in the bunker. One might be safe in one’s bed from

bombs, but with no electricity in Baghdad, you could not get a hot shower, or

cook, or drink, or do laundry unless you pulled rank and got your family into one

of the bunkers designed to operate for days or weeks independently of the outside world. Rank has always had its privilege, and sometimes, its punishment.

General Schwarzkopf imposed his new layer of control too late to halt that

night’s waves of F–117As. The first wave of the night of February 12/13 went

after IZAF HQ, the Ministry of Defense, North Taji military-related facility No.

2 (with nine GBU–27 case-hardened penetrators), and the Baghdad conference

center (a prestige project built when Saddam expected to host the Conference of

the World’s Unaligned Nations). Wave 2 maintained or heightened the pressure

on the Iraqi capital. In addition to bombing two telephone exchanges and the

international TV and press buildings and the Baghdad International Receiver/

Radio, it slammed the Military Intelligence HQ, Baath Party HQ, and Iraqi CIA

HQ. Finally, in wave 3, the 37th TFW(P) attacked two Baghdad bridges (not

fiber-optic bridges), Baghdad Baath Party HQ, Iraqi CIA HQ, Security Forces

HQ, Military Intelligence HQ, the Baghdad presidential residence and bunker,

and the Camp Taji presidential residence, as well as the Al Firdos district

bunker.99

At the time of this series of leadership attacks, Saddam played host to Soviet

Envoy Yevgeny M. Primakov. On February 12 the Iraqis claimed that the raids

represented an attempt of the Coalition to wreck the peacemaking efforts of the

Soviets.100 The next day, Primakov toured the ruined Al Firdos bunker. In fact,

at this time the diplomatic logjam began to show the first slight signs of breaking up. When Primakov met with Saddam, he had the foresight to bring Soviet

satellite imagery with him. With the imagery, he convinced Saddam of the extent

of the damage done by Coalition bombing.101 Saddam’s reaction to bad news and

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Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

99. Printout, F–117A Mission Results, Days 1–34.

100. Capt. Steven B. Michael, comp., The Persian Gulf War: An Air Staff Chronology of

Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, Air Staff Historical Study, 1992), p. 326.

101. Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset,” p. 25. Primakov had served as a Pravda reporter

before rising to head the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies. From 1985 to 1989 he served as

Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Throughout his career

he had close ties with the KGB, and by 1994 he had risen to the post of head of the Russian

Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Given his intelligence connections, his personal friendship

with Gorbachev, and his expertise in the Middle East, his claim that he brought satellite

imagery to Saddam seems reasonable.
its bearers, as well as his insistence on sycophancy, had completely discouraged

his entourage from passing along to him the actual amount of damage Iraq had

suffered. Primakov’s offer of Soviet good offices, his new realization of his losses, and perhaps the damage inflicted before his own eyes on his leadership apparatus brought about a change in his policy. Saddam reportedly told Primakov that

Iraq would cooperate in efforts to achieve a cease-fire.

The bombing of the Al Firdos district bunker affected the course of the

offensive air campaign. The U.S. government had imposed targeting restrictions

on Baghdad before the weapons impacted the bunker. These restrictions became

more frequent and absolute. CENTAF continued to bomb targets in the Baghdad

area (NBC, Scud, and military support targets), albeit at a reduced rate (in part

because many targets were already destroyed). This kept the city on edge. But

prohibition on downtown Baghdad targets—such as C2 nodes, leadership, and

telecommunications—obviously eased some measure of the Iraqis’ burdens.102

Public support of the world and within the United States for Desert Storm may

have momentarily wavered, but it held firm. The support of CJCS and the CINCCENT for targets in Baghdad withered.

From February 15 through 23 the strategic air campaign struck at targets

throughout Iraq. Seventeen airfields saw a minimum of one raid each. The RAF

Buccaneer/GR–1 combination abandoned bridge bombing to concentrate on airfield HASs; it blasted seven Iraqi airfields including Tallil (twice), Jalibah (three

times), and Ar Rumaylah (three times)—airfields capable of interfering with the

anticipated ground operations. Two ten-aircraft or larger raids of F–117As followed up the RAF raids on Jalibah with missions on February 19 and 20. The

Red Sea carrier aircraft hit Al Asad and Shayka Mazhar, while JTF Proven Force

dispatched F–111Es south to strike Taji airfield. The raids continued the attrition

and dispersal of the IZAF. Because the Coalition wished to leave Iraq with as

276

On Target

102. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p.

36.

Aircraft bunker

and shelter at

Tallil airfield
diminished an NBC capability as possible, the air campaign planners scheduled

attacks on seventeen nuclear and CW targets. Squadron-sized raids of F–117As

worked over the Latifiya solid-propellant plant six times, the Baghdad nuclear

facility twice, and the Baghdad suspected research facility and the Taji SSM

equipment plant once each. Pairs of F–117As hit the Al Taqaddum, Mosul, and

Qayyarah West CW bunkers twice and gave equal attention to the BW bunkers

at Habbaniyah and Taji. JTF Proven Force F–16s bombed the Al Hadre CW

bunkers, and B–52Gs added their ordnance to the Taji SSM equipment plant.

These raids may have hit nothing but empty buildings because the Iraqis may

have already moved and concealed the bunkers’ and plants’ contents. But by

forcing the Iraqis to undertake a dispersal program to counter the threat of

Coalition air strikes, the Coalition inflicted damage and delay on Iraq’s CW and

BW programs. At a minimum, a policy of dispersal forced Iraq to dismantle

equipment and store its CW and BW under less than optimum conditions, halted

their production, created potential distribution problems to the field, and imposed

some wastage.

The Coalition air planners ticketed fourteen C3 targets for attack during the

period. JTF Proven Force sent its F–16s to the Kirkuk AM transmitter and the

two Mosul direction-finding stations while the Red Sea carriers sent F/A–18s to

the Al Qaim air warning site twice. F–117As hit two targets in Tikrit on February

21 as well as the Jenoub PTT three times, the Baghdad jammer and transmitter

five times, and the pumping station No. 4 fiber-optic repeater four times. The

raids, when successful, knocked out Iraqi work-arounds, slowed communications, and forced the use of less secure communications systems. Iraq’s military

support industry also required pruning to lessen its capability for rapid future

growth. The air planners hoped to snip off thirty-one targets during the period.

Formations of eight or more F–117As attacked the Latifiya Scud plant twice and

the Ar Ramadi ammunition dump and the Baghdad SAM support plant once

each. Formations of six F–117As hit the Shahiyat liquid-fuel plant four times and

the Habbaniyah artillery and motor-case factories once each. The aircraft of JTF

Proven Force struck Irbil ammunition dump (8 F–111Es), K–2 missile storage

(16 F–16s), Mosul military R&D facility (four raids of 16, 20, 16, and 8 F–16s,

respectively), and Taji airport (four times). The B–52Gs from Moron AB and

RAF Fairford found many appropriate targets, including Taji airport (6 aircraft),

Taji rocket plant (10 planes), Taji tank repair (6), Al Hadre ammunition dump

(4), Al Iskandariyah arms plant (6), and Habbaniyah artillery production plant

(two raids of 9 and 6 aircraft each). Short of inspecting dispersal areas throughout every meter of Iraq, one cannot make an accurate BDA of these missions. At

a minimum, they destroyed millions of dollars worth of industrial structures, at

little cost to the Coalition. They probably caught an indeterminate amount of

industrial machinery as well, which the Iraqis cannot replace until the lifting of

UN economic sanctions.

277

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq
Thirteen bridges between Basra and Baghdad came under attack during the

period February 15–23. F–117As and F–111Fs each attacked five bridges; GR–1s

working alone and groups of F/A–18s attacked the others. In addition, three

B–52Gs were to strike the Battikha railway station and yards, and four F/A–18s

and two A–6s would hit those at Az Zubayr. Paired F–117As also went north to

Tikrit where they bombed the rail yard, a bridge, and the radio communications

control building on February 21. The bridge bombing kept the LOC snarled

between Baghdad and the KTO. It further gave the good citizens of Tikrit a

reminder that the Coalition had not forgotten them. During this period, Scud

launchings increased to a level not seen for almost three weeks with the result that

F–111Fs and F–117As joined the Scud hunt. On February 17, two F–117As and

twelve F–111Fs tried with little success to shut the mine openings suspected of

harboring Scud equipment near Al Qaim. Paired F–117As attacked three fiberoptic stations at Tallil, As Samawah, and Karbala four times each, hoping to disrupt the network between the capital and Basra. Aircraft from the Red Sea carriers would strike at Al Qaim propellant storage and Wadi al Jabariyah Scud storage. Scud launchings continued through the first day of the ground offensive.103

End Game

At 0400L February 24, 1991, the Coalition ground offensive against Kuwait

and Iraq commenced. The air war had now become the air-ground war. Secretary

Cheney and General Powell had initially reviewed the army plan of operations

employed during the conflict on their December 19–20, 1990, visit to the AOR.

The secretary and the chairman approved the plan and on returning to Washington briefed the president, who also approved General Schwarzkopf’s ground

plan. The three agreed that the actual start of the ground campaign would require

a formal presidential decision.104 On February 10, after a briefing on the secretary’s and chairman’s visit to CENTCOM, the president authorized the commencement of a ground offensive, probably on or about February 23.

Soon after Secretary Cheney’s departure from Saudi Arabia on February 9,

Saddam had begun to change his diplomatic position. On February 15 Saddam

announced that Iraq would discuss compliance with the UN Security Council

resolutions calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait if the Coalition met certain

conditions that included an immediate cease-fire. Not only did he tie his offer to

the Arab-Israeli dispute by demanding that Israel withdraw from the occupied

lands, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon, he disputed the right of the Al-Sabah

family to govern Kuwait. He demanded that all Iraq’s foreign debts be forgiven,

even by countries not members of the Coalition, that all Coalition forces introduced after August 2, 1990, be withdrawn in one month, and that the Coalition

278

On Target

103. “Targets Attacked Day by Day by Aircraft,” Printouts: Thirtieth through Forty-third

24 Hours. Also see the appropriately dated 37th TFW(P) Contingency Historical Reports.

104. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 231.
rebuild all facilities damaged by their actions.105 As usual, Saddam made his first

offer at the high end of the exchange; President Bush and the other leaders dismissed the offer out of hand—they expected to receive a surrender, not to offer

one. It is possible that the timing of Saddam’s offer stemmed not only from

Envoy Primakov’s visit but from the worldwide negative reaction and consequent sympathy for Iraq arising from the Al Firdos district bunker incident. In

addition, the halt on the bombing of leadership targets in the Baghdad that was

imposed on February 14 may have been perceived by the Iraqis as a response to

the peace offer, rather than as an attempt to avoid more collateral damage.

On February 17, Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz arrived in Moscow with

Saddam’s orders to explore the possibility of Soviet sponsorship or guarantees of

a peace settlement. One source reported that the Iraqis would cancel their

February 15 offer (which was dead in any case) and agree to withdraw from

Kuwait in return for the territorial integrity of Iraq, a Soviet commitment to push

for progress on the Palestinian problem (but no linkage of that issue to a Gulf settlement), the lifting of UN sanctions and embargoes, and a Soviet commitment

to rearm Iraq.106 These meetings in Moscow, whatever Foreign Minister Aziz’s

actual writ, indicated that Saddam now sought some means out of his difficulties

acceptable to himself. If he and the Soviets could arrive at formula satisfactory

to both Iraq and substantial portions of world opinion, Saddam might stalemate

the Coalition. Both powers had incentives to reach a settlement. The Iraqis

wished to salvage all they could; the Soviet regime needed a diplomatic triumph

to increase its internal prestige. The Iraqi-Soviet talks added a new element of

urgency to Coalition operations; given time, the Soviets and the Iraqis would

devise some proposal. Only days or hours might remain to complete operations.

On February 18, President Gorbachev presented his personal peace plan, which

he had not discussed in advance with other leaders of the Coalition, to Foreign

Minister Aziz, who promptly returned to Baghdad to brief Saddam on its contents. The Foreign Minister had stayed in Moscow less than sixteen hours. The

plan called for full Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in compliance with appropriate UN resolutions. President Bush, British Prime Minister John Major, and other

Coalition leaders rejected the plan the following day. On February 20, the

Americans and the British informed the Soviets that they had rejected the proposal because it lacked a tight timetable for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and

did not compel Iraq to accept UN resolutions.107 The pace of diplomatic events

279

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

105. Patrick E. Tyler, “Iraqis Speak of a Withdrawal but Impose List of Conditions: Bush

Denounces ‘Cruel Hoax,’” New York Times, Feb 16, 1991, p. 1.

106. Msg, 180029Z Feb 91, CIA to DIA et al., Subj: Negotiating Position for Iraqi

Foreign Minister’s 17 February Discussions in Moscow [File No. CK/DS/War Termination].

107. Michael Dobbs, “Gorbachev Offers Peace Plan to Iraq,” Washington Post, Feb 19,

1991, p. 1; David Lamb, “Schwarzkopf Says Iraqi Military Is Losing Tanks, on Verge of Collapse,” Washington Post, Feb 20, 1991, p. 1; Andrew Rosenthal, “Bush Criticizes Soviet Plan

As Inadequate to End War: Iraqi May Revisit Moscow,” New York Times, Feb 20, 1991, p. 1;

Paul Lewis, “U.S. and Britain Insist on Deadline,” New York Times, Feb 21, 1991, p. 1.
had quickened. Not only did the American ground commanders fear an end to

the war before a ground offensive, but some portions of the USAF saw the last

chance to end the war with air power alone rapidly fading away.

In the evening of February 18, Checkmate faxed a new proposal to Riyadh.

It called for CENTAF to concentrate its air operations for forty-eight hours to

“induce Iraq to sue for peace immediately on terms acceptable to the Coalition;

to avoid a ground conflict with its attendant casualties.”108 The proposal bore all

the hallmarks of a Warden group-inspired bombing plan.

On February 21, Colonel Deptula submitted seven leadership targets to

General Horner and asked him to obtain General Schwarzkopf’s approval to hit

them. Deptula cited intelligence indicating that Saddam’s grip on Iraq had substantially weakened. In their discussion of the memo, Colonel Deptula and

General Glosson reduced the recommended targets from seven to five, and

General Glosson elected to pass the request directly to General Schwarzkopf.109

This appeal did not gain a positive response. There would be no CENTAF

attempt to win the war before the start of the ground offensive.

Starting on the night of February 22/23, 1991, the strategic air campaign

began to conduct raids designed to directly aid the impending ground campaign.

On that night, ten F–117As left Khamis Mushait to strike Iraqi intelligence and

special operations headquarters in Baghdad. One aircraft suffered an air abort but

the other nine attacked.110 A week earlier, on the night of February 15/16, the

F–117As flew their closest mission to the ground troops. Fourteen of the black

birds swooped in on a portion of the Iraqi trench lines to attack an Iraqi incendiary defense system. The Iraqis had dug a series of open antitank-antipersonnel

ditches in front of their trenches and had constructed a system of pipes and

pumps capable of filling the ditches with crude oil. In theory, when set alight, the

oil would make an effective barrier and smoke screen. The F–117As attacked the

oil system’s T-junctions and distribution points and the Az Zubayr pump station.111

In the night of February 23/24 and on the following day, several strategic

raids assisted the opening of the ground offensive. They occurred in some of the

worst weather seen during the campaign. Two missions of six Buccaneers and

fifteen GR–1s each struck Tallil and Jalibah airfields. Two Buccaneers and four

GR–1s also hit Al Kut airfield. These raids and those of the previous few days

would reduce interference from the IZAF’s ground attack forces. From the

evening of February 22/23 straight through February 24/25, the strike aircraft of

JTF Proven Force bombed portions of the Taji complex on the outskirts of Baghdad. They targeted the Taji airport, tank-repair facilities, SAM training areas, the

280

On Target

108. Memo, [Checkmate] to [CENTAF], Subj: Capitalizing on Cracks in the Iraqi High

Command, annotated, “Faxed 18 Feb 91 2240L” [File No. CK/DS/12-leadership].

109. Deptula, “Comments and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 36.

110. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 17–23, 1991, p. 35.

111. Ibid., Feb 10–16, 1991, p. 35.
steel fabrication plant, and SSM storage and support facilities. The Gulf carriers

sent six F/A–18s to hit the Rumaylah highway bridge while pairs of F–111Fs and

F/A–18s attacked spans at An Nasiriyah, Ash Shuyukh, and Basra early on

February 24.112 The closure of the few working spans between Basra and Baghdad, if achieved, would prevent an Iraqi retreat. In retrospect, the bridges and

other road bottlenecks might have been given higher priority during the ground

offensive.

The F–117As returned to Baghdad and other sensitive targets as the

Coalition land forces began to move forward. The evening’s first wave consisted of thirty-two aircraft, the largest single mission sent out to date by the 37th

TFW(P). It scored three hits on the Baghdad IIS HQ, seven hits on the Baghdad

Special Security Services, eight on the Baghdad bomb assembly plant, eleven on

CW bunkers and facilities at Samarra, and ten on the Ishkandariyah ammunition

plant. The night’s second, and final, wave which targeted communications in the

KTO ran into foul weather. It achieved only two hits; the Az Zubayr cable drop

and the Mufrash radio relay. The pattern continued on the night of February

24/25. The first wave placed its weapons on the Abu Ghurayb presidential complex (possibly the guard compound), Al Narawan, and on CW bunkers and facilities at Samarra. The next wave hit the Baghdad Special Security Services, Al

Narawan, again, the Kirkuk ammunition depot, and the Abu Ghurayb presidential complex. The third wave, consisting of ten aircraft, struck the Al Musayyib

rocket-motor plant and the Abu Ghurayb presidential complex.113 The planners

intended the attacks on the intelligence and security organizations in the capital

to keep the regime off balance and concerned about its survival rather than concentrating on the battle to the south.

General Schwarzkopf supported CENTAF’s leadership and prestige targeting. Not only had he obtained approval from Washington for the individual targets, but on the evening of February 24 he asked General Powell to obtain permission to strike two targets eliminated from the list before the war—a triumphal

arch of arms holding crossed swords and a giant statue of Saddam, both in downtown Baghdad. General Powell agreed to seek approval from the president. At

1510L the next day, the CJCS gave the CINCCENT the go-ahead, but he called

back three hours later to rescind it. General Schwarzkopf sourly attributed the

stopping and starting to second thoughts from Washington lawyers. At the conflict’s end, the two monuments still stood, untouched by U.S. bombs.114

As the F–117As made life difficult for the Iraqis near Baghdad, other Coalition aircraft attacked airfields and bridges. When weather permitted, large formations of Buccaneers and GR–1s targeted Al Taqaddum and Shayka Mazhar

airfields throughout February 25, 26, and 27. They also worked over Habbaniyah

281

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

112. “Targets Attacked Day by Day by Aircraft,” Printout: Thirtieth through Thirty-ninth

24 Hours.

113. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 24–Mar 2, 1991, pp. 15–18.

114. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, pp. 455, 457.
airfield on February 26 and 27. Red Sea carrier A–6s and A–7s attacked H–3 airfield on February 26 and 27, and Coalition aircraft hit Tallil airfield on February

25. Coalition aircraft, USN F/A–18s, and USAF F–16s struck Al Asad airfield

from February 25 to 27. These missions hit IZAF main operating fields that

housed ground attack aircraft or CW-capable helicopters to prevent these forces

from entering the ground fight. JTF Proven Force continued to harass northern

Iraq. On February 25 its F–16s and F–111Es hit the Mosul missile R&D facility,

the Mosul suspected military R&D facility, the Tar Miya nuclear facility, and

Kirkuk airfield. The next day, the JTF spent all its force on the Mosul R&D facilities and an unidentified production factory. On its last day of operations,

February 27, it sent 24 F–16s to the Taji steel fabrication plant, 12 F–16s and 2

F–4Es (its one and only PGM mission of the conflict) to a Mosul production factory, 7 F–16s to the Mosul missile R&D facility, and 15 F–111Es to the Taji steel

fabrication plant.115 The large expanse of the plant made it an ideal iron-bomb

target. Gulf carrier aircraft and F–111Fs continued operations against bridges,

striking at eight spans, pontoons, or bypasses on February 25 and 26.116

On the night of February 26/27 the 37th TFW(P) launched two attack waves

with thirty-one aircraft in the first wave and thirty-two in the second. The planners pointed the entire first wave at leadership targets. No bombs hit their primary targets. For the planners, this had to be the most frustrating F–117A mission of the conflict. Most of the second wave did not go to Baghdad. Eight bombs

intended for the rocket test and fuel facilities at Shahiyat hit home, as did two

intended for the Habbaniyah artillery plant. Weather, an air abort, and a cancellation kept many bombs from dropping. For the night, the aircraft of 37th

TFW(P) returned to base with 114 bombs still in their bays.117 If the ground

offensive had not required every ounce of support, the wing might not have

launched a plane.

The F–117A’s last day in combat brought a happier result. The first wave of

twenty aircraft headed for the capital. Eighteen would hit Baath Party HQ at least

once. Eight GBUs struck the Salman Pak CW and BW research facilities; aircraft

on the ground at Baghdad Muthenna airfield received four bombs intended for

them; nineteen spoiled Baath Party HQ. Evidence that CENTAF had successfully made its mark was obtained when imagery dated February 28 documented

severe damage to the regime’s headquarters.118 At 2130L on February 27 the sec282

On Target

115. Rpt, D. Neilson, HQ USAFE Ops Anal Div, “[7440 CW(P) BDA, by date, January

18–February 27, 1991],” Mar 6, 1991 [File No. T/HO/USAFE Box 9–7440th Wg Prov/BDA].

116. “Targets Attacked Day by Day by Aircraft,” Printout: Thirtieth through Thirty-ninth

24 Hours.

117. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 24–Mar 2, 1991, pp. 19–23.

118. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 38–39.

At the time, the planners thought that among the targets hit was a large statue of Saddam,

one of many scattered about Iraq, but it was not the mammoth statue in downtown Baghdad

that General Schwarzkopf had asked Washington for permission to destroy on February 24. In

fact the statue hit in front of Baath Party Headquarters was to the founder of the party, not to

Saddam.
ond wave took off. Even before it reached its targets, CENTAF HQ recalled the

wing, cancelled the night’s third wave, and put future missions on hold, with

orders to stand by should events dictate renewed fighting. At approximately the

instant when the second wave began its bomb runs (0015L February 28),

CENTAF informed the wing that the CINCCENT had suspended all operations

to give the Iraqis a chance to sign a cease-fire. The final F–117A mission of the

conflict consisted of ten aircraft, all aimed at a single complex—the Al Musayyib

missile R&D and production facility and the associated rocket-motor factory and

rocket-motor test facility. One aircraft aborted and the other nine obtained many

hits, two of which missed their primary target and struck nearby buildings. The

last F–117A mission of the conflict, after their standard 2,000-mile round-trip

flight, touched down in Khamis Mushait at 0341L February 28.119

On the night of February 27/28, the 48TFW(P) sent one of its last missions

to a target that had withstood CENTAF from the first day of the war, the North

Taji command bunker.120 But the Aardvarks carried a new and untried weapon,

two GBU–28 hard-target penetrating munitions. The GBU–28 weighed 4,700

pounds was built around an Army-surplus 8-inch howitzer barrel machined to

accept the pieces and parts of a BLU–109. Unlike many of the service’s weapons,

the GBU–28 resulted from a hasty design using off-the-shelf components and

existing technology. The service had begun the usual treadmill of acquisition

road maps, concept briefings, calls for ideas, mission need statements, and so

forth in mid-October. Maj. Gen. Michael E. Ryan, TAC Director of Operations,

and Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, Director of Tactical Programs, Office of the

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, were instrumental in directing the procurement of the GBU–28 as well as in assuring its delivery to the theater in record time.121 They reviewed the contractors’ proposals on February 8,

selected the design, and ordered twenty-eight bombs (including two for testing)

for $17 million. By February 17 the first two warheads had arrived at Eglin AFB,

Florida, for testing, before going to Nellis AFB and Holloman AFB for further

tests. On February 24, at Tonopah Range, an F–111F established successful separation by dropping an inert bomb with a live fuse. Two days later, in a sled test

at Holloman AFB, the bomb hit its target with tremendous force. CENTAF

requested two bombs immediately.

At 1245Z February 26, a C–141 took off from Eglin AFB with two GBU–

28s; it arrived at Taif, Saudi Arabia, at approximately 1000Z February 27.122

Eglin noted that even if the fuse failed, “a kinetic weapon (4,700 lbs at 1,400 ft

per sec) will still have a serious impact on any bunker hit. Suggest both weapons

down the same hole. See what crawls out.”123 The CENTAF planners, in a last283

Continuing the Air Offensive Against Iraq

119. Contingency Historical Rpt, 37th TFW(P), Feb 24–Mar 2, 1991, pp. 13, 24–27.

120. GWAPS, Vol. 4, pt. 1, Weapons, Tactics, and Training (2d ed.), pp. 43–44.

121. Deptula, “Comment and Review of the Offensive Air Campaign,” Feb 3, 1993, p. 37.

122. Point Paper, Maj. Young, LGXX, “GBU–28/B LGB,” Feb 27, 1991 [File No.

CK/DS/12-leadership].

123. Msg, n.d. [Feb 26, 1991], TAWC/TX to CENTAF/DO, Subj: GBU–28 (HTPM).
minute raid, followed the Air Weapons Center’s recommendations. That evening

F–111Fs dropped the two bombs on Taji bunker No. 2. One missed, because the

pilot could not correctly identify the target. The other landed dead-center on the

bunker.124 It impacted far more forcefully than the smaller GBU–27s, and camera footage showed a blast, indicating proper fuse functioning.125 The GBU–28

went from concept to battlefield use in 41⁄2 months (17 days for actual hardware

development), a testimony to the ability of necessity to drive acquisition. Its use

demonstrated the difficulty of evaluating the damage inflicted by PGMs, a problem from the campaign’s start to its finish.

284

On Target

124. Donna L. Clark and SSgt. Douglas B. Lawson, “Nellis Air Force Base Contributions

toward the Persian Gulf Conflict,” Vol. 1, “Narrative and Appendices,” Aug 2, 1990–Sep 30,

1991, pp. 108–114.

125. DIA, Desert Storm BDA, Vol. 1, pp. 28–29.
Chapter Nine

Assessment

War outcome will be determined by a single

massed strike by precision-guided conventional

weapons. Consequently, the traditional role of

armed forces equipped with infantry, tanks, and

artillery is virtually eliminated.

Maj Gen Slipchenko

Red Army, September 1990

NDU General Staff Exchange1

A strategic bombing campaign must answer three fundamental questions:

Did it expend its efforts on targets vital to the enemy’s conduct of the war? Did

it select targets vulnerable to friendly air action? Did it contribute decisively to

the overall success of air, ground, and sea operations, and to the national political objectives? For air power in the Gulf War a quick answer to all three is “yes.”

It is profitable, however, to examine each aspect in greater detail and learn what

succeeded and what failed.

Lack of BDA data and the inability to definitively prove cause and effect

relationships between bombing and eventual outcome has hampered analysis of

all air operations. The war in the Persian Gulf proves no exception. A large percentage of U.S.-produced BDA and associated imagery on the war as well as

electronic and cryptographic intelligence lies in the security-classified vaults of

intelligence agencies. The fragmentation of the U.S. intelligence community into

a conglomeration of independent fiefdoms means that information may remain

unavailable for decades. The scraps of BDA and other intelligence that have

285

Preface

1. SOV M 91–20030X, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Subj: USSR: Initial Military

Reaction to Desert Storm, Feb 26, 1991, p. 3. General Slipchenko is further identified as Chief

of Military Science, General Staff Academy.
escaped the system leave large lacunae and serve only to enhance the image of

the organization that preserved or leaked it. Without access to significant BDA,

analysis of the Gulf War bombing must be speculative and subject to major revision. However, the data available suffices to supply a portrait, but not a photograph, of the conflict’s results.

Beginning with Instant Thunder on August 10, 1990, through General

Schwarzkopf’s final Desert Storm OPORD of January 16, 1991, the supporters

and the authors of the offensive air campaign expected much and promised more.

Analysis of the offensive air campaign’s results must rest on “unconnected facts”

strung together by “informed logic,” none of which can stand alone. The traditional method of BDA interpretation, favored by professional civilian and military intelligence analysts and other congenital skeptics, quickly becomes an exercise in double-entry bookkeeping. First, examination of target imagery is made,

preferably imagery from two independent sources, so that one confirms the

other. Next, the number of plants damaged and destroyed is determined. Then,

the percentage of targets still operable is derived. For example, fifty-four key

bridges support the Iraqi Army in Kuwait. If nine are down and two are damaged,

then the Iraqi supply line has suffered a 20-percent loss of throughput, and air

power has 80 percent of its goal remaining. This method of interpretation is

career-safe for the analyst, who can always point to the imagery in case of dispute, and conservative for the military planner, for it minimizes unpleasant surprises. It rests on indisputable “facts” and refuses to expand on them.

However, members of the CENTAF Directorate of Campaign Plans and the

Warden group would argue that the new style of air warfare has left the traditional method of BDA as “plinked” as any Iraqi T–55 in the desert. They take a

more holistic, systems-oriented approach to BDA. We cannot, they would argue,

look only at a single target set in isolation; it exists as a fully integrated portion

of the enemy’s economy and transport system. It both affects and is affected by

what happens to the enemy as a whole. For example, the closure of 20 percent of

the bridges may reduce supply throughput by far more or far less than 20 percent.

If bombing has damaged communications, truck backups vulnerable to air action

may occur at the downed bridges or at the other 80 percent of the now overloaded

bridges. If bombing has reduced the domestic oil supply, trucks forced to divert

or left sitting in traffic jams will consume fuel at a higher rate and deplete

remaining stocks more quickly. If electricity has shut down because of air operations, drawbridges may not function, hampering riverine traffic and further slowing supply to the front, or manual operation may be required, which would delay

truck traffic and cause shipping and vehicle jams. Downed bridges may have

housed key fiber optics or other C3 lines, or their loss may have split a city in

half, fostering popular dissatisfaction with the regime. Ripples of disruption

caused by the loss of bridges impact the entire enemy state and reinforce and are

reinforced by other bombing. This reasoning, if unconstrained, could lead an

analyst to the most optimistic or pessimistic of conclusions. Adherents of the tra286

On Target
ditional method of BDA find it little better than reading tea leaves—entirely too

speculative. A spacious middle ground exists between these alternatives and

serves as a starting point for this analysis.

In mid-August 1990, Instant Thunder sketched a six-day stand-alone strategic air campaign designed to force Iraq to surrender. It called for 5,700 sorties

(including SEAD and offensive sweeps) directed against ten strategic target systems. In days 1 and 2 it would hit its eighty-four-target list; on days 3 and 4 it

would reattack the list; and on days 5 and 6 it would exert maximum effort

against CW production and military-support infrastructure. As of September 1,

1990, it expected to produce its high level of sorties by attacking throughout the

day and employing 547 USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft plus approximately 100

Coalition aircraft. The PGM capable aircraft consisted of twenty-four F–117As,

thirty-two F–111Fs, and fifty-five USN/USMC A–6s. The planning further

assumed a summer attack, good flying weather, little time for the Iraqis to disperse strategic assets, and a duration of six days. General Schwarzkopf incorporated major features of Instant Thunder into his own plan of action that he presented to Secretary Cheney and General Powell on August 25, 1990. He intended to give four to six days of major air effort to the strategic plan and to continue it at a reduced effort thereafter.2 The air campaign no longer stood alone; it

had become part of the buildup to a ground offensive. Nor did it have a definite

cutoff date. Its targeting philosophy remained unchanged. General Horner’s

September 2, 1990, OPORD, Offensive Campaign—Phase I, written by the special planning group, also subsumed major elements of Instant Thunder.

Examination of the physical results of the strategic air campaign against

Iraq, insofar as they are presently known and based on the target sets developed

by the CENTAF special planning group, reveals the extent of air power’s accomplishment.

The “Core”3 Strategic Target Sets

The core strategic target sets, target sets most important to maintaining

Iraq’s current and future military capability, consisted of Iraq’s

1. National Leadership,

2. Military and civil C3,

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Assessment

2. Brfg, [Schwarzkopf to CJCS/SECDEF], “Offensive Campaign Concept of Operations

Outline,” Aug 26, 1990 [File No. CK/DS/CENTCOM].

3. I have borrowed the term “core” from the GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 265. The chief authors of that volume, Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keaney,

use it to define what they consider “the eight ‘strategic’ target categories that were perceived

by those who planned and executed the Desert Storm air campaign as constituting the core of

Iraq’s current and future military power.” However, I have deleted one of their eight categories,

“Rail and Highway Bridges,” from the “core” and placed that into what I designate the “mixed”

target category. Since much of Iraq’s political status in the region rested on its powerful military capabilities, attack on those capabilities can also be constituted as an attack on its political

position in the region, as well.
3. Electric power generation,

4. Oil refineries, distribution, and storage,

5. NBC weapons research, development, and production,

6. Military support (research, development, production, and storage of conventional armaments), and

7. Scuds.

The strategic air campaign targeted Iraqi leadership and C3 targets in order

to incapacitate the regime4 and slow the Iraqi leadership’s capability to react and

transmit their decisions. From January 16, 1991, to February 28, 1991, the number of leadership targets grew from 33 to 44 while the C2 targets grew from 56

to 146.5 The latter target set grew because of the necessity to widen the target

base to ensure a shutdown in alternate means of civil and military communications.

In the past half-century the flow of information and the speed of information

exchanged between a modern military and its leadership has greatly expanded.

Narrowing and slowing a foe’s information flow delays his reaction time, and it

can be progressive, causing him to fall further and further behind your actions

until he is knocked out. The inclusion for the first time of these target sets in a

strategic air attack stemmed directly from the ideas of the Warden group.

However, the promises of August 1990—incapacitation of the regime and the

severing of its communications with the forces in Kuwait—were based on inadequate intelligence. Some important means of communication remained

unknown until a few days before the war; some were too closely associated with

off-limits targets; some were more damage-resistant than realized; some were

difficult (small) targets even for PGMs; and some remained hidden throughout

the entire course of the war.

Other than images of damaged facilities, such as the well-known strike

footage of the IZAF HQ and the news footage of the destruction of the minaretshaped microwave tower of the Al Karakh telephone exchange building, no solid

data is available to connect bombing of leadership and of C2 with specific consequences. Nevertheless, the bombing of primary facilities did force the Iraqi

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On Target

4. Warden expected that leadership bombing would result in Saddam Hussein’s elimination or overthrow. Most others, including some of his own planners, thought not. But they did

not deny that Saddam Hussein’s overthrow would be a welcome and positive result of bombing leadership targets, even if it was not a given. In September 1990 the Black Hole proposed

to “Decapitate the Saddam Regime,” and bring about a change in regime. (See Brfg Slide 17,

Brig Gen Glosson to CJCS, Sep 13, 1990.) When General Glosson briefed President Bush on

October 11, 1990, he stated that the strategic air campaign would destroy the Iraqi leadership’s

command and communications and disrupt its ability to communicate with the Iraqi people.

Glosson also received the impression the President did not want to go on the record as authorizing the targeting Saddam Hussein directly. [It was permissible to target Hussein, but you are

on your own—without explicit presidential authorization]. (See GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects

and Effectveness (2d ed.), p. 277.)

5. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 280 Fig. 30 “Total Strikes

Against L and CCC during Desert Storm.”
leadership to resort to less secure methods for communication,6 a circumstance

especially welcomed during the ground war by Coalition forces.7 Prisoner

accounts were replete with reports of Iraqi units dependent for information on

messages delivered by bicycle or motorcycle. Bombing of security and intelligence ministries assuredly disrupted their operations that caused some decline in

productivity, some loss of files, and some loss of control over the populace. The

Shia and Kurdish rebellions against the Iraqi central government, which erupted

after the war, probably underscored the regime’s loss of control. The visit of

Soviet special envoy Yevgeny Primakov to Saddam Hussein in Baghdad from

February 12 to 14, 1991, shed some light on Saddam Hussein’s communication’s

difficulties. Primakov brought with him Soviet satellite imagery of Iraq to show

the Iraqi president, and he seemed surprised at the extent of the damage.8 From

that point onward,9 using Soviet good offices, Saddam Hussein began to actively seek a way out of his predicament.

Although the bombing of C3 targets apparently had little effect on Saddam

Hussein’s control of his Scuds, the PGM seemed to be the ideal weapon for use

in attacking Iraqi government buildings and communications centers. As the war

progressed, however, it became clear that the planners had selected more elusive

and redundant targets than they had suspected; fiber-optic networks and computerized switching systems provided difficult targets. Some of these networks

ran along the Baghdad-Tigris bridges. Stealth bombers cut the spans on two

bridges, but apparently fear of international condemnation coupled with the Al

Firdos bunker incident led Washington10 to place the remaining bridges off-limits in mid-February.11 The leadership and communications targets placed off-limits in Baghdad were the only target systems subjected to detailed approval and

review by higher authorities, not only Schwarzkopf and Powell, but possibly others. This higher review prevented full execution of the attack on these systems.

The Instant Thunder planners, as part of their integrated attack on the

regime, had also hoped to use another weapon to separate Saddam Hussein from

the populace, PSYOP. They thought this might be effective against such a high289

Assessment

6. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 150.

7. Ibid., p. 152.

8. Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset,” p. 25.

9. The bombing of the Al Firdos bunker, which took place during Primakov’s visit, may

also have affected Saddam Hussein’s calculations.

10. The origin of the Baghdad targeting holds is a problem requiring further investigation.

General Schwarzkopf placed the Baghdad bridges off-limits in early February. After the Al

Firdos bunker incident on February 13, General Horner had to obtain General Schwarzkopf’s

approval for any targets in downtown Baghdad. General Schwarzkopf, in turn, discussed the

targets with General Powell in Washington before granting his permission. General Powell

seems to have imposed this restriction by his own authority, but there is some evidence that the

target hold may have come from the White House. Secretary Cheney apparently went to the

White House to get the bombing hold removed on February 21, 1991. See GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt.

1, Operations (2d ed.), pp. 241–243.

11. GWAPS, Vol 2, pt, 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 287.
ly centralized state. However, bureaucratic problems within the United States

and fears of the host nations in the Arabian peninsula stymied implementation of

such operations, denying an effective follow-up punch to the attack on Iraqi leadership. In any case, the regime did not fall, and it still possessed a minimal ability to communicate with its forces in Kuwait and its organs of control in other

areas.

Bombing loosened the bonds between Saddam and the more disaffected

populations of his state. It prevented the speedy transfer of his orders, thus slowing his response to crisis. It forced him to live on the run, thereby limiting his

access to key, top-of-the-line communications individuals. It damaged his prestige, because all could see that he had clearly misjudged both the international

situation and the ability of his armed forces to deal with it. It weakened his

organs of internal control by destroying files, facilities, C2, and perhaps key personnel; it thus degraded the functioning of Iraq’s vast security bureaucracy, a

characteristic of any police state. It facilitated insurrection.

The international embargo; the condemnation of the Arab world and erstwhile arms suppliers such as France and the USSR; and the seemingly unstoppable Coalition ground offensive, which visibly destroyed thousands of armored

fighting vehicles and captured tens of thousands of Iraqis, greatly influenced the

rebels’ decision-making. Air power served as an enabling element, not the sole

determinant, of rebellion. In a sense, the Shia made a calculation similar to that

made by the anticommunist Polish Home Army in Warsaw at the end of July

1944. The Poles rose against the Germans on August 1 in an attempt to seize the

capital and turn it over to the Western-recognized government in exile. But the

success of the uprising depended on the continued pressure of the Red Army,

which would have prevented the Germans’ concentration on Warsaw and would

break through to relieve the city. Instead, the Soviets, in an apparently calculated move directed by Stalin, halted their Summer Offensive in Central Poland and

abandoned the Home Army. Similarly, but not so cynically, the Coalition-Iraqi

cease-fire negotiated at the Safwan airfield should have made the Iraqi rebels

pause. In both cases the decision to fight appears to have been made on the

assumption of speedy relief on the ground (the Shia may also have been misled

by the Iranians on the level of aid to be expected).

However, such was Saddam’s grasp on his country and so maladroit was the

timing of the rebels that the dictator even managed to survive (by how close a

margin the West may never know) the catastrophic situation in which he had

placed himself. There are indications that Saddam’s security forces, well aware

of the concentration of the regular forces in Kuwait, took extensive and thorough

precautions to prevent such uprisings.12 The significant portions of both the relatively organized Kurdish jacquerie and the more spontaneous Shia mutiny

occurred after the Safwan cease-fire. Neither of the two rebellious factions seems

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On Target

12. GWAPS, Vol, 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 378.
to have made a concerted effort to synchronize their actions, which allowed

Saddam to fight and subdue them as separate forces rather than as a combined

entity. By rising after the cessation of Coalition military action, the insurgents

sacrificed two major advantages. Had they begun fighting before the cease-fire,

they might have been able to claim they acted on direct Coalition urgings and

might have had an exceedingly small chance of gaining Coalition aid or a continuation of hostilities against Iraq. Instead, they waited until the rump of

Saddam’s armed force was free to devote its energies to suppressing them rather

than having to hide in dugouts to avoid Coalition bombing. How would the rebellions have fared had the Iraqi armed forces been unable to move, communicate,

or even supply themselves? The poor timing and coordination of the two uprisings, no doubt in part because of the enfeebled state of Iraqi internal communications induced by Coalition bombing, doomed them. It also left the

Coalition open to the same charge leveled against the Western nations in the

aftermath of the Hungarian revolution of 1956—having egged on the rebels with

no intention of aiding them.

The Hussein regime did not fall. The disappointment of air planners

stemmed from overly ambitious goals and circumstances beyond their control.

Still, the bombing of the leadership and communications network served a vital

purpose. It caused the regime untold inconveniences, possibly slowed effective

communication and thus interfered with Hussein’s responses to the Coalition

onslaught, forced expenditure of valuable and not easily replaced spares, consumed specialized repair efforts, and damaged government buildings and key

communications facilities.

The bombing of C3 and leadership targets consumed approximately 1,000

sorties, 8 percent of the entire strategic effort but only 2 percent of overall

Coalition air effort. The result of that bombing may have been minimal, as some

critics have claimed, or extensive, as some air power advocates have hoped.

Until, or if ever, hard evidence of its effects is obtained from unbiased Iraqi

sources, the outside analyst can form no certain opinion as to its actual effectiveness. However, given the potentially great benefits of such bombing, an

investment of a small fraction of the air effort toward it seems reasonable and

justifiable, in both the Persian Gulf War and for future strategic efforts. Conversely, given the fact that no hard data are available concerning the actual

results, building an air campaign around or devoting a substantial portion of an

air campaign against these target systems in the future would be too great a leap

of faith into an uncertain area and would rest on the unsubstantiated claim and

the wishes of only one faction of air power activists. The eventual place of C3

and leadership bombing and their respective priorities in the scheme of air campaign operations is, at best, yet to be determined. More experience, testing, and

hard information are required.

Iraq’s twenty-five major electrical plants constituted a compact, highly

leveraged target system. Their loss would force the Iraqi military to use backup

291

Assessment
generators, greatly complicating its operations, and would probably inflict some

hardship on the civilian population, weakening its loyalty to the regime.

Coalition air attacks, the vast majority employing TLAMs, shut down the southern and central Iraqi power grids within hours of the initial attacks. The appropriate weapon applied to a vulnerable target produced outstanding results.

Three refineries produced 90 percent of Iraq’s refined petroleum products.

TLAMs hit the distillation towers of two of those refineries in the first two

days.13 Aircraft equipped with missiles other than PGMs also conducted extensive raids on Iraqi refineries. By the conflict’s end, the production of finished

petroleum products had dropped precipitously. Nevertheless, despite many successful strikes on Iraqi oil-tank farms and other storage facilities, the Iraqi military had considerable finished petroleum stocks spread throughout in its military

logistics system and supply dumps, where from the air it could not easily be distinguished from other supplies. Given these supplies and the relative lack of

IZAF and Iraqi ground force activity until the last of the conflict, the oil bombing may not have had a direct effect on the war’s outcome. The planners, of

course, could not foresee the conflict’s speedy conclusion, and military prudence

dictated an attack on this system that in the long run controlled Iraqi mobility,

hence the assault on oil.

As an added effect of hitting these two related targets, electricity and finished petroleum, the planners had hoped that lack of heat, hot water, cooking

fuel, private automobile fuel, and labor-saving electric appliances would combine to alienate the populace from their leadership and help contribute to its

change. This stress added to everyday living certainly angered and frustrated

Iraqi civilians and may have fostered some feeling of malaise. When added to

traditional grievances, it may have helped spark the Shia and Kurdish mutinies.

But the air planners underestimated the strength of the Iraqi internal security

apparatus and its ability to bank or deflect the fires of popular dissatisfaction

from the regime and the stake that Saddam Hussein’s Sunni followers had in the

status quo. Even when the bombing of electrical and petroleum targets is combined with that of leadership and C2 targets, the regime survived, though barely.

This underestimation of the hold that a police state has on its thralls was not

unique to USAF planners. Outside observers also underestimated the hold of

both the Nazi and Soviet states on their populace before World War II. One might

also suggest that the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s resulted more from

a recognition of economic failure among the regime’s ruling elite than from disapproval by the general population. As to the strength of an internal security

apparatus, the continued survival of the KGB and its successors provides an

object lesson in their durability and strength.

For both the electrical and petroleum target systems the planners’ had sought

to limit damage in order to facilitate eventual and speedy repairs.14 In order to

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On Target

13. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 299.

14. The planners assumed Saddam Hussein would have fallen and there would be few or
stop the flow of electricity to the Iraqi national power grid, Coalition air power

did not have to bomb the electrical generating plants into rubble; they merely had

to stop their operations for a few weeks or months, during the time of the actual

fighting. To encourage oil exports, they did not bomb oil fields nor did they

intend to level refineries. In the immediate postwar period, the Iraqi government

and several international visitors indulged in breast-beating over the public

health and economic consequences of the damage inflicted on the electrical

power and oil systems. However, despite a continuing international embargo and

noncooperation from Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq had recovered much of its

electrical generating capacity by mid-1992, and by October 1992 it was exporting finished petroleum products.15 So much for Iraqi claims of excessive damage

inflicted on these targets by air power. Coalition air power accomplished its goals

perfectly: a shutdown of electricity and finished petroleum production during the

conflict with little long-term effect on Iraqi capacity. The location of these targets, beyond city areas, resulted in little collateral damage. They were an almost

perfect example of the Warden’s groups theories of bombing for effect, not

destruction.

The Coalition attempted to destroy Saddam Hussein’s NBC weapons R&D

and production because they served as key tools in his efforts to destabilize the

Persian Gulf region. They formed part of the original Instant Thunder plan which

promised to “destroy,” that is obliterate, these target sets. That plan, however,

was based on quite limited intelligence and intended for execution in late August

1990. Although more intelligence did become available, the Iraqis also gained

five months to take countermeasures. By January 16, 1991, the earlier promise

of “destruction”16 of these targets, if ever viable, had become a planning goal

rather than a realistic objective. Iraq’s NBC capabilities proved far less accessible than the air planners had imagined. After the 1981 Israeli air raid on their

reactor complex at Tuwaitha, just south of Baghdad, the Iraqis dispersed and

duplicated all the important segments of their nuclear program. Before the war

began, they removed all fissionable materials, equipment, and documentation

from facilities and dispersed and/or buried it.17 Moreover, U.S. intelligence failed

to locate and identify the bulk of Iraq’s nuclear effort.

The strategic air campaign planners on January 16, 1991, carried only two

nuclear targets: Tuwaitha and the Al Qaim uranium mine near the Syrian border.

The list grew to eight (five destroyed and two damaged) by the end of war. The

facilities the USAF knew about, it hit hard. But by October 1991 UN inspection

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Assessment

no import restrictions on the new regime. By making oil and electricity unavailable during the

conflict but speedily available to the new regime, the planners hoped to a strengthen Saddam

Hussein’s successors in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

15. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), pp. 308, 310.

16. The author has discussed the use of the word “destroy” in relationship to Iraqi NBC

capabilities with members of Checkmate and the Black Hole. They intended to totally eliminate all such capability, not just damage it.

17. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), pp. 314–315.
teams, hindered by the Iraqis as much as they dared, had uncovered twenty-one

nuclear weapons–related facilities.18 Lack of adequate intelligence, not lack of

capability, hindered aerial destruction of the Iraqi nuclear program. To an

unknown extent, but certainly consisting of many months, the Coalition air effort

and the forced dispersion delayed the Iraqi atomic bomb project.19

Attacks on Iraq’s CW and BW production and research facilities fared only

marginally better than those on Iraq’s nuclear effort. The Coalition destroyed or

heavily damaged 75 percent of Iraq’s known CW research and production and

almost all of its known BW capability.20 Nonetheless, in addition to facilities it

concealed or those that had escaped Coalition intelligence, Iraq had a fair-sized

pharmaceutical industry that on relatively short notice could convert to CW purposes and could produce enough material to threaten its neighbors. As for the

weapons themselves, UN inspectors located more than 150,000 CW-capable

artillery shells but found no evidence of actual BW.21 The strategic bombing

campaign delayed production and reconstitution of this target system for an indeterminate period that was certainly many months, if not years. It failed to remove

these terror weapons as a destabilizing element in regional politics. The planners’

promise to “destroy” them was a promise beyond the capability of air power

alone.

In all, NBC targets accounted for only 7 percent of the strategic air campaign’s total sorties. Significantly, little evidence exists to show that the strategic

air planners received pressure from higher authorities to increase their efforts

against these systems. The higher U.S. authorities, of course, worked with the

same intelligence limitations as did the air planners, and like them, apparently

did not realize that the attack on Iraq’s NBC complexes had failed to destroy

them.

The inability of air power to strike such weapons from Saddam Hussein’s

hand raises a problem of disturbing magnitude for international political and military leaders alike. Such weapons are an all-or-nothing proposition. If a potential

foe retains just a handful of them, or the ability to produce them quickly, he is in

almost as good a political/diplomatic/military position as if he had dozens or

hundreds of them. But unless an enemy is physically occupied and his land thoroughly searched (100-percent accurate intelligence), one can never ensure that

the enemy has none. In fact, the Iraqis have demonstrated that even the most sensitive components can be relocated at will, which makes them virtually invulnerable to any nonnuclear weapon. By January 1991 Iraq had 20,000 modern

centrifuges, three separate and concealed methods of uranium extraction, and 25

pounds of enriched uranium (one-third the amount needed for an A-bomb). Iraq

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On Target

18. Ibid., p. 328.

19. Evidence indicates that Iraq had launched a crash program to produce one A-bomb in

August 1990. The outbreak of hostilities apparently halted this program.

20. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 155.

21. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 325 n. 137.
had even begun preliminary research on a fusion bomb.22 U.S. intelligence knew

virtually nothing of these developments. The lesson is no less ominous now than

it was in 1945—any nation wishing to expend the resources can acquire and

maintain atomic and other terror weapons. Ultimately, without a basic change in

the philosophy of a nation’s ruling class, such as occurred in West Germany’s

and Japan’s ruling class after World War II, physical destruction is not enough.

Air power cannot bomb the desire for these weapons from Saddam Hussein’s

psyche, nor can it remove the knowledge of them from the minds of Iraq’s physicists, biologists, and chemists. Indeed, five months after the war, Iraq’s chief

nuclear scientist, Dr. Jarrar Dhia Jaffar, stated that when Iraq began reconstruction of its war industries, it would follow the results of its own bombing survey

“so as to better survive aggression.”23

The U.S. decision to devote minimal national intelligence priorities to Iraq

and its NBC weapons programs before August 1990 resulted in a failure to identify the extent and diversity of these programs. That shortfall caused a breakdown in the link between intelligence, targeting, and campaign planners that

295

Assessment

22. Ibid., pp. 315–316.

23. Ltr, David A. Kay to Barry Watts, GWAPS, Oct 20, 1992 [GWAPS, National Archives, Record Group 375].

Stored in the destroyed warehouse at the Iraqi Muhammadiyat storage site (upper

left) had been sarin-filled bombs, and the jerry cans at the Al Walid airbase that

the inspectors are viewing contain a component for nerve agent bombs.
interfered with the necessity for the closest possible relationship among them—

weak intelligence makes poor plans. In the event, not only national intelligence

but air power failed. Air power is not just technology, it is the power projection

of an air service fully integrated as to all aspects of the military profession to

include intelligence, logistics, operations, plans, and personnel. In this instance,

USAF intelligence and plans did not work as a fully functioning team. To create

a more effective force, the USAF must take a closer look at how it integrates its

intelligence function with the remainder of the service.

The strategic air campaign planners struck at Iraq’s massive military storage

and production network in order to reduce Saddam Hussein’s ability to field and

sustain his armed forces for future use in destabilizing the Persian Gulf area. The

target system included Scud component production and assembly. Twenty-two

percent (2,756) of the total sorties of the strategic air campaign and probably

even more of the strategic air campaign’s total bomb tonnage went into this target system. This equaled the amount of sorties expended on Scuds (2,767). Other

than American BDA data, little evidence is available to determine whether the

Coalition’s air effort inflicted significant, lasting damage to this target category

or whether the Iraqis once again dodged the bullet with a dispersal program.

Certainly Coalition aircraft destroyed or heavily damaged many physical plants

and possibly some equipment too bulky to move. As a DoD report stated,

At least 30 percent of Iraq’s conventional weapons production capability, which

made small arms, artillery, small- and large-caliber ammunition, electronic and

optical systems, and repaired armored vehicles, was damaged or destroyed.24

The damage to those specific key maintenance and manufacturing bottlenecks as

well as to specialty metallurgy and aircraft engine repair meant that the effect on

overall Iraqi arms production was probably even greater than the loss of 30 percent of production capability. Nonetheless, given its size, diffusion, lack of high

priority, and the short duration of the conflict, the bulk of the target system survived.

In all probability the Scud diversion saved this large, easily located target

system from even more damage, as did the concentration of air effort on Iraqi

ground forces in the KTO. A greater use of non-PGM-carrying B–52s and F–16s,

as well as PGM sorties diverted from tank plinking, would have inflicted far

greater harm on the military-support target system, with the possible disadvantage of also inflicting greater collateral damage. The strategic air campaign

inflicted expensive and inconvenient damage to this target system. Air power had

the capacity to virtually destroy Iraq’s conventional military manufacturing system, but only with a commitment of resources greater than those available to the

strategic air campaign. Once Saddam Hussein regains access to the international

arms market, as he assuredly will at some point, the Iraqis will rapidly repair

their conventional arms industry.

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On Target

24. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 159.
The strategic air campaign planners also directed the attack on Scud support

facilities, communications and testing centers, and launchers in order to protect

Coalition forces and procure stability in the Persian Gulf region. They targeted

the Scuds to prevent Saddam Hussein from using them to attack Israel and provoke Israeli retaliation, which might have fractured the Coalition.25 Coalition

bombing heavily damaged almost all known production and research facilities,

but subsequent UN inspection revealed that the Iraqis had removed most Scud

production equipment, components, and documents before the air campaign

began. The DoD Final Report ruefully stated that the “actual damage to Scud

production and storage facilities is less than previously thought.”26

The attack on Scud MELs failed to destroy any significant number of them.

The Iraqis never used the exposed fixed launchers. Bombs expended on them

served little purpose. By the end of August the Iraqis had dispersed their MELs

to areas within range of Israel and Saudi Arabia, where they continued to operate until the end of the conflict. The MELs proved a difficult target for strike aircraft. A MEL could move more than five miles from its firing site in ten minutes

without the use of roads. To mislead Coalition aircraft, the Iraqis employed

numerous high- and low-quality decoys, some indistinguishable from the actual

launcher at more than twenty-five yards. Launcher crews practiced extreme electronic emissions control and nighttime light discipline and had streamlined

Soviet launch procedures, shaving launch time from hours to minutes. The crews

received their launching instructions via landlines and couriers, which made

interpretation by Coalition electronic intelligence impossible.

In late 1990 USAF exploitation flights against a borrowed launcher and

crew showed that U.S. strike aircraft had difficulty in visually or electronically

acquiring launchers in daytime and that at night these sensory organs and devices

proved even less effective.27 The Iraqi mobile Scuds were a mismatch of available weapons to the selected target. The missiles were invulnerable to air attack

because they could not be located with existing air technology. However, a

friendly ground spotter might physically locate a mobile Scud and fix it with his

own laser designator to illuminate the target for a laser-guided weapon. As of

early February, when Coalition air had already expended more than half its total

effort against Scuds, no confirmed kills of Scud MELs had yet been recorded.28

Even if Coalition aircraft did manage to destroy one or two launchers later in the

remainder of the war, it still illustrates the relative immunity of the Scud to air

attack. Although the air planners had constantly upgraded Scud targeting priority before the war, as evidenced by their breaking it out as a separate target sys297

Assessment

25. As noted, the Iraqis possessed an inventory of several hundred missiles, several fixed

launchers (simple rails on a concrete pad), and probably no more than twenty-five to forty

MELs. For a detailed discussion, see GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.),

pp. 317–319, 336.

26. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 156.

27. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), pp. 334–336.

28. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 168.
tem and by scheduling some of the very first air strikes against it, they underestimated the Scud’s survivability. After the war UN inspectors oversaw the

destruction of nineteen MELs and several decoys that Iraqis admitted they still

possessed.29

The Coalition anti-Scud effort was not a complete loss to the overall war

effort. It kept the rate of Scud firings to levels tolerable to both the Israelis and

Saudis. Israeli counterattacks might have given Saddam Hussein his one chance

to end the war on favorable terms. The comparative success of the Scuds presented a troubling new problem for air power. Scuds were relatively cheap to

purchase or produce, easy to hide, and accurate enough to inflict great, if indiscriminate, damage when fitted with NBC warheads. The Scud confronts modern

air forces with many of the problems of guerrilla warfare, with all its complications. Militarily, the anti-Scud effort was a successful strategic diversion

imposed by the Iraqis on the Coalition–strategic sorties expended on those missiles might have damaged targets of more lasting significance. But in the political and diplomatic sense, they failed. Scuds neither drove Saudi Arabia from the

conflict nor dragged Israel into it.

The core target sets and the methods and means used to attack them were the

centerpiece of the strategic air campaign against Iraq, which expended 65 percent of its effort (8,188 sorties) against them. They were targets of vital importance to the Iraqi war effort. As will be seen below, their vulnerability to air

attack varied. The attack on the Iraqi leadership and C3 produced problematic

and unverifiable results. It failed in its primary objective, the deposition of

Saddam Hussein, to such an extent that it discredited the entire concept of

employing air power alone to overthrow a police state. But the secondary results

of the attacks greatly complicated the Iraqis’ ability to prosecute their war effort

and should constitute a useful line of attack for future strategic air operations.

The assault may have been fraught with failure, but it was potentially useful.

In contrast, the attacks on electrical and oil targets, especially the electrical

targets, were uniformly successful. They produced immediate and damaging

results and to some extent validated the Warden group’s methodology of searching for centers of gravity and bombing for effect. The attack on NBC targets was

effective against known targets and inflicted significant delay on Iraqi weapons

programs, but it did not destroy them because intelligence shortfalls denied air

power the opportunity to strike these target systems in their entirety. The results

of the assault on this target system must receive a split grade of “A” for effort but

“D” for results.

In the same vein, strikes on the Iraqi military support caused delays in production and consequent delay in full reconstitution of the Iraqi armed forces, but

they did not destroy Iraqi capabilities. Of course, delay in and of itself might

prove beneficial to Iraq’s neighbors, if they use the time granted them to prepare

298

On Target

29. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), pp. 334, 336.
their defenses against a renascent Saddam Hussein. This aspect of the campaign

should conclusively demonstrate the difficulty of bombing the military support

industry which, in spite of Saddam Hussein’s centralizing proclivities, proved

too diffuse for the resources available. It was the very type of low-leverage target system that the original Warden group had sought to avoid. Instead of bombing the many factories that produce the arms directly for the military, it is far

more economical to disrupt the power sources and transportation nets that feed

them.

Finally, the Scud target system illustrates the intimate link between military

and political power. When considered alone, the anti-Scud effort was an almost

complete military failure that raises disturbing problems for future air power

campaigns. But when one examines the anti-Scud effort in the Clausewitzian

sense, that is viewing warfare as extension of the state’s politics, then the antiScud effort justified the military resources invested in it by keeping Israel neutral. At the strategic level, almost every target system will involve both political

and military calculus. In this instance the political objective was paramount, and

the assault on the target system was ironically successful.

Self-Defense Targets

The achievement of air superiority and the protection of friendly bases and

forces are necessities for a successful strategic air campaign. To guarantee those

prerequisites, Coalition air forces attacked three strategic target sets dealing with

Iraqi defenses capable of harming Coalition air and naval forces or protecting the

“core” strategic targets:

1. The Iraqi IADS,

2. The IZAF, and

3. The Iraqi Navy with its associated port facilities and antishipping missiles.

The Coalition directed 29 percent of its strategic air effort to the suppression or

destruction of these three target sets vital to Iraqi and Coalition war efforts. These

Iraqi targets proved extremely vulnerable to Coalition air action.

CENTAF planners directed their first air action against Iraq’s strategic IADS

as the first prong of the Coalition’s effort to gain air supremacy over the area of

conflict. Coalition air forces could not attack 7,000 AAA pieces and 3,700 SAMs

individually, but they could attack the element that controlled and integrated the

guns and missiles. The near destruction of the Kari C2 illustrated the effectiveness of concentrating on a system’s center of gravity. Kari, including its most

effective backup capability, consisted of fewer than thirty large and easily identifiable targets with probably only twice as many aiming points. A relatively

small system such as Kari, the center of gravity of the Iraqi air defense system,

lent itself to the quick, hard strike envisioned by the campaign planners.

Coalition aircraft antiradiation missiles intimidated Iraqi SAM and AAA radar

operators who hesitated to operate their equipment lest their signal lock-on

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Assessment
attract a destructive response. Many Iraqi search radars succumbed to roving

USAF A–10As. Within hours of the start of hostilities, Coalition aircraft could

operate with impunity at high and medium altitudes.30 They took losses only

when they chose to operate at low altitude during the last weeks of the conflict,

when Coalition aircraft began more accurate, low-level attacks on Iraqi ground

forces in advance of the Coalition ground offensive, and when they supplied

CAS for the ground offensive that began on February 24, 1991. By January 27,

Western intelligence detected no C3 activity at the SOC level and only limited

activity at the IOCs.31 At the end of the conflict, the DIA assessed the degradation of the overall Iraqi air defense system at 75 percent or greater. The Kari system had cost $400 million and taken a decade to install. DIA judged it would take

a similar period, plus five years for personnel training, to reconstitute it. Until

then and until Iraq learned to fight a modern air war, “its C2 and air defenses will

remain ineffective against sophisticated air forces.”32 The ability of the Coalition

air forces to operate with near impunity above 10,000 feet for all but the first two

days of the conflict testifies to the effectiveness of the attack on Iraq’s air defenses. The defeat of the Iraqi IADS allowed Coalition air power freedom of the air.

This speedy accomplishment was a success for the strategic air campaign.

Iraqi airfields and the aircraft they housed absorbed 24 percent (3,047) of the

strategic air campaign’s total sorties. Initial Coalition air attacks concentrated on

runway denial and then switched to HASs. These attacks destroyed or forced out

of the country half of the IZAF and damaged its essential support facilities and

equipment; the remaining IZAF would suffer from spare parts, maintenance, and

training problems until it regained access to the international arms market. Given

the Coalition air forces’ lopsided advantages in quality and quantity of men and

matériel, destruction of the IZAF was but a question of time and blood and how

much of each the Coalition wished to sacrifice. The Coalition lost only one

F/A–18 and pilot in air-to-air combat (to a look-down, shoot-down MiG–25) and

only a handful of aircraft and pilots in missions against airfields.33 It achieved air

superiority the moment the first F–15C crossed into Iraqi airspace, and air

supremacy soon after. The USAF had trained for counterair operations, and its

use of PGMs denied the Iraqis a secure sanctuary. The Coalition air forces

achieved a more complete success sooner than even they had anticipated.

Of Iraq’s 750 or more fixed-wing combat aircraft, at least 109 fled to Iran,

151 fell victim to Coalition bombing, and 33 were shot down.34 Coalition ground

300

On Target

30. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 154.

31. Point Paper, Maj. Terry New, XOXWF, “BDA—Desert Storm—Operator’s Look (As

of 27 Jan/0900L Baghdad),” 0420 EST January 27, 1991.

32. Msg, 140205Z Mar 91, DIA to CINCCENT et al., Subj: Final BDA Status Report

[File No. CK/DS/BDA/=DIA].

33. The sources disagree on this. According to somewhat inconclusive evidence, a

MiG–25 or a MiG–29 may have shot down a USN F/A–18, killing the pilot, near Baghdad on

the night of January 16/17, 1991.

34. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 154.
forces captured 31 additional aircraft. The remaining aircraft, many dispersed to

bare-bones sites and suffering a lack of maintenance even by IZAF standards,

would find it difficult to reconstitute into an adequate self-defense force.

Unfortunately for Saddam’s own people, the few flyable postwar aircraft and

helicopters available to the IZAF more than sufficed to help brutally crush the

Kurdish rebellion in the north and the Shia insurrection in the south. While

Coalition bombing could not prevent a residual IZAF from “doing its thing,”

engaging in its own internal policy goals on lightly armed guerrillas and unarmed

civilians, it did achieve its goal of destroying the IZAF’s ability to project itself

beyond the borders of Iraq for at least as long as it would take the international

arms market to rearm Saddam.

Strategic Targets: Level of Effort35

Strategic No. of Strategic Strategic Effort Strategic Effort

Target Set Combat Sorties Including Excluding

Attacks Against Attacks Against

Republican Guard Republican Guard

Electrical Power 215 1% 2%

Naval 247 2% 2%

Leadership 429 2% 3%

Air Defense 436 2% 3%

Oil 518 3% 4%

C3 601 3% 5%

Railway & High- 712 4% 6%

way Bridges

NBC 902 5% 7%

Military Support 2,756 15% 22%

Scuds 2,767 15% 22%

Airfields 3,047 17% 24%

Republican Guard 5,646 31% —

Total No. of strategic sorties: 18,276

No. of strategic sorties excluding those against Republican Guard: 12,630

Strategic effort of total air combat 36% 24%

The USN, relying heavily on its air arm, overwhelmed the Iraqi Navy. It

destroyed 11 of 13 antiship missile boats, destroyed or damaged 143 of 165 Iraqi

combatant vessels, and eliminated 3 of 7 shore-based antiship missile sites. It

also heavily damaged both of Iraq’s naval facilities.36 This, plus the absence of

any air threat, allowed the Coalition to bring its American aircraft carriers closer to Iraq, easing the air refueling workload. The elimination of the Iraqi Navy

also increased the effectiveness of a major Coalition deception plan—the threat

of a USMC amphibious invasion near Kuwait City. The Iraqi naval target system

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Assessment

35. This table is based on DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 159 Chart

“Strategic Targets Level of Effort.”

36. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 157.
absorbed 2 percent (247 sorties) of the total strategic effort, to which the USN

added approximately another 750 tactical sorties.37

The attack on Iraq’s defenses was by far the most successful portion of the

strategic air campaign against Iraq because it posed the simplest strategic problem. American intelligence could easily locate the massive facilities (hardened

air operations centers, airfields, and naval ports) that supported them, while the

Iraqis could hardly dismantle, disperse, and bury them. SAMs and AAA without

central control rapidly lose effectiveness, as do aircraft and ships separated from

their permanent bases.

The “Mixed” Target Sets

The two “mixed” target systems of the strategic air campaign–the rail and

highway bridges and the Republican Guard—possessed political and strictly military aspects that belonged to both the tactical air campaign conducted by the

Coalition in the KTO and the strategic air campaign against Iraq. The bombing

of bridges for the purposes of interdicting Iraqi LOCs38 into Kuwait and depriving the Iraqi forces there of the necessary means to fight is a strictly military

objective. The destruction of bridges to prevent the escape from Kuwait of the

Iraqi ground forces, particularly the Republican Guard (permitting their destruction there and preventing their subsequent use by the regime in Iraq to ensure its

internal security), involved both military and political considerations.

The strategic air campaign expended 6 percent of its effort against bridges,39

a vital target system but less critical to the Iraqi war effort than the air planners

had anticipated. This target system proved highly resistant to the effects of dumb

bombs but vulnerable to PGMs. The strategic air campaign destroyed or heavily

damaged three-fourths of the major bridges between Baghdad and Basra, including all nine of the railroad bridges.40 This single-track railroad carried a large

302

On Target

37. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 89.

38. LOCs are all routes—land, water, and air—that connect an operating military force

with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Department of

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1–02, s.v. line of communications.

39. I count all bridge sorties, even the 55 percent conducted by F–16s, F/A–18s, and other

non-PGM-equipped aircraft, as belonging to the strategic air campaign. The aircraft serving as

the bombing platform, even though identified with “strategic” bombing, such as a B–17 or

B–52, or with “tactical” bombing, such as a P–47 or F–105, does not define whether or not a

target is strategic or tactical. Depending on the situation, such as the “mixed” Gulf War targets

sets, a given target set can have aspects of both. In this case I place bridges in the category of

strategic bombing because the physical targeting and planning was handled by the CENTAF

strategic air planners, many of the targets lay outside the KTO, and, as will be discussed below,

the political objective of destroying the Republican Guard may have had more practical significance than the objective of restricting Iraqi supply lines.

40. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 158. GWAPS offers a more pessimistic view, noting that by February 28, 1991, bombing had rendered all the railroad bridges

unusable but only a little less than a third of the highway bridges unusable. (See GWAPS, Vol.

2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 181. The difference in the two figures stems from
majority of Iraqi Army and Republican Guard heavy equipment when those units

moved for other than tactical or battlefield operations. Complete loss of Iraqi rail

capacity from the KTO inhibited any speedy retreat of Iraqi armored and mechanized units. The elimination of rail transport also limited the capacity of Iraqi

lines of supply to Az Zubayr on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, which served as the

Iraqi supply head for their troops in Kuwait. Loss of highway bridges reduced

truck traffic to Az Zubayr and from there down the four-lane superhighway

which linked Az Zubayr to Kuwait City and points west and south. The Iraqis’

ability to resupply their forces in Kuwait dropped to a small fraction of its prewar level.41

Bridge bombing produced traffic jams vulnerable to Coalition air action and

increased the wear and tear on the Iraqi motor transport fleet which was forced

to travel greater distances to find alternative routes. In response the Iraqis built

numerous pontoon bridges (of much lesser capacity than the permanent structures they replaced) and other work-around solutions such as earthen causeways.

Coalition air countered by destroying many of them and by mounting frequent

“river reconnaissance” patrols to disrupt these Iraqi efforts. As in Linebacker I,

the PGM proved the most effective weapon against bridges. PGMs constituted

45 percent of Coalition bomb tonnage expended on bridges and inflicted the bulk

of the damage to them. In this instance the strategic air campaign achieved a

good match between weapons capability and the target system attacked.

Anticipating the interdiction campaign, Iraq’s forces in Kuwait partially offset the effect of Coalition air power’s severe constriction of their LOCs by stockpiling large amounts of supply and matériel in the months between their invasion

of Kuwait and mid-January 1991. In fact, the vast physical extent of the numerous, revetted, and highly dispersed Iraqi supply dumps so discouraged the

Coalition tactical air planners that they “never attempted a coherent campaign to

interdict the flow of supplies into the theater.”42 Iraqi forces in Kuwait had consumed only a fraction of the supplies available in theater before the ground offensive commenced on February 24, 1991.43 Had the ground war lasted for an

303

Assessment

differing definitions of bridges. DoD, like CENTAF and Checkmate, counted only the fiftyfour “major” bridges, while GWAPS counted all bridges.

41. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), pp. 188–189.

42. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 1, Operations (2d ed.), pp. 321–322.

43. The Coalition tactical air campaign in Kuwait succeeded in greatly complicating Iraqi

supply distribution from their dumps in Kuwait to the unit logistics centers and thence to the

troops in the field by attacking supply convoys and even individual trucks. Although the Iraqis

had adequate supplies in Kuwait they could not get them to the front, where some units had few

or no deliveries of rations and water from the beginning of the air offensive. This interference

with Iraqi supply distribution resulted more from the pattern of Coalition tactical air attack than

from a consistent assault on the supply system. Coalition aircraft operating in their assigned kill

boxes routinely struck at any moving target (supply, fuel, and water trucks are more vulnerable

to enemy fire than armored fighting vehicles) or at any target in the open (the Iraqis did not routinely park their trucks in revetments). Reports from Iraqi prisoners of war reveal that tactical

air power had caused serious logistical difficulties for the Iraqi front-line forces. (See GWAPS,

Vol. 2, pt. 1, Operations (2d ed.), p. 323.
extended period of intense combat, the lack of resupply capacity would have

become a fatal handicap.

Schwarzkopf’s OPORD of January 16, 1991, reflecting his instructions from

Secretary Cheney, identified the Republican Guard as an “Iraqi center of gravity,”44 that is a target essential to the Iraqi conduct of the war and the survival of

the Saddam Hussein regime. The DoD Final Report states that 31 percent

(5,646) of the total strategic air campaign sorties flew against these units.

Although the number of strategic sorties expended on the Republican Guard is

“official,” it is a most misleading number in two ways. Inclusion of all Coalition

air sorties flown against the Republican Guard in the summarized total for strategic target sets (it is the largest number of sorties flown against any of the twelve

target strategic target sets) overstates the overall size and level of the strategic

effort by one-third as compared with both the Coalition’s air effort in Kuwait and

the Coalition’s overall air effort.45 Second, as will be explained below, a higher

percentage of Republican Guard units and their heavy equipment escaped

destruction in Kuwait as compared to any other portion of the Iraqi army.46

Categorizing all sorties flown against the Republican Guard as part of the strategic air campaign appears to put the blame, if any, for failure to destroy the

Republican Guard on the strategic air campaign alone, to its detriment. It also, to

some extent, absolves tactical air power, Coalition ground forces, and the

American military and political leadership of their responsibility for any failure

to destroy Saddam Hussein’s political lifeguards.

The fact that much of the Republican Guard survived the war intact has

become an increasingly controversial and heated matter that has already generated revisionist interpretations.47 Much like the successful German and Italian

evacuation from Sicily in August 1943 that occurred in the face of overwhelming Allied land, sea, and air superiority, the survival of the Republican Guard

rested as much on a complicated series of decisions taken by Coalition air and

ground commanders and political leaders as it did on Iraqi initiatives. Saddam

304

On Target

44. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War p. 159.

45. GWAPS, a study paid for by the USAF and much less widely circulated than the

unclassified DoD Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress uses “strikes,”

defined as the delivery of a weapon against a specific target, instead of “sorties.” Using the

CENTAF strategic air planners’ Master Target List target categories, it records only 33 strikes

of the total 9,731 strategic strikes against Republican Guard targets (the least of any target category). GWAPS also notes that the strategic campaign flew only 9,731 of a total of 41,309

Coalition strikes, 24 percent of the Coalition air effort. (See GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 1, A Statistical

Compendium (2d ed.), p. 517 Table 185 “Strikes by Master Target List Categories.”

46. Some of these surviving Republican Guard units, as well as other Republican Guard

formations never committed to the KTO and held in Baghdad during the conflict (to provide

security for the Saddam Hussein Regime), proved instrumental in suppressing the postwar Shia

and Kurdish insurrections.

47. For an example of the controversy beginning to surround this subject, see Ltr, William

S. Lind to Editor, Proceedings, Dec 1993, pp. 23–24, and J. G. Burton “Pushing Them Out the

Back Door,” Proceedings, Jun 1993, pp. 37–42.
Hussein committed eight divisions of the Republican Guard to Kuwait.48 The

three heavy divisions, the Tawakalna (We Trust in God) Mechanized Division

and the Hammurabi and Madinah Armored Divisions held second-echelon, or

reserve, positions on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. After an operation, such as in the

invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqis habitually withdrew the Republican Guard from

the front to rest, rehabilitate, and retrain for future operations and to maintain

their elite edge by avoiding the daily depletion of human resources and matériel

associated with front-line duty. Because of their internal security functions, it

was essential that Saddam’s regime preserve their fighting ability at all times.

The southern and westernmost, as well as the most powerful, of the three divisions, the Tawakalna, occupied a position covering the Wadi al-Batin where the

Iraqis anticipated a major Coalition ground attack. Its placement also gave it the

potential to swing westward to confront a Coalition flanking attack (the actual

Coalition maneuver), making it the most militarily threatening of the Republican

Guard divisions. Consequently, it received the heaviest aerial bombardment of

any of Republican Guard division.49 The Madinah Division had dug in and dispersed at the point where the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border began to curve to the south,

while the Hammurabi Division stood on the border midway between the Persian

Gulf and the Madinah Division.50

When the Coalition ground and air commanders referred to the Republican

Guard, they invariably meant these three units. The three kill boxes containing

the heavy Republican Guard Divisions and parts or all of eight of the twelve regular Iraqi Army heavy divisions ranked as the top three boxes in numbers of

Coalition air strikes, absorbing nearly one-third of the total fixed-wing strike sorties allotted to the KTO.51 Prior to G-day, the Republican Guard heavy divisions

had lost 24 percent of their armored fighting vehicles.52 By the end of the war,

the Iraqi Army deployed in the KTO had suffered the loss of approximately 76

percent of its tanks, 55 percent of its armored personnel carriers, and 90 percent

305

Assessment

48. Two to four independent Republican Guard brigades and some lesser units remained

deep in Iraq where they performed internal security duties, such as being the only troops

allowed to garrison Baghdad.

49. The two strike boxes (AE6 and AF6) that contained the Tawakalna Division received

almost one-quarter of all the Coalition fixed-wing strike sorties directed at kill boxes in the

KTO. See GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 1, A Statistical Compendium (2d ed.), p. 468, Table 181 “Kill

Box Strikes.”

50. 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), OPLAN Desert Storm 91–3 (Offensive Operations), Jan 17, 1991, App. 1 “Intelligence Estimate,” Tab C “Enemy Situation,” to Annex B

“Intelligence,” to the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) OPLAN DESERT STORM, pp. B-1–C-3,

C-4, published in full in 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team, Operation Desert

Storm, Attack Plan OPLAN 91–3 (Fort Stewart, Ga.: 24th Infantry Division [Mech], Apr 1991).

51. GWAPS, Vol. 5, pt. 1, A Statistical Compendium (2d ed.), pp. 464–465, Table 179

“KTO Ground Order of Battle (as of 21 Feb 91),” and p. 468, Table 181 “Kill Box Strikes.”

Table 181 notes that the three boxes (AF7, AG7, and AE6) received 6,517 strikes of the 21,973

sent against kill boxes.

52. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report, p. 106.
of its artillery; the Republican Guard heavy divisions had suffered a 50-percent

loss in the same categories.53

Several factors account for the lighter loss of the Republican Guard heavy

divisions. First was the nature of the desert itself. Many analysts have remarked

that the open spaces of the desert served air power well by making concealment

more difficult for the enemy and by revealing its movement. Few have noted that

the desert sand gave the defenders a somewhat compensating advantage. Sand

absorbed and muffled the high-explosive effects and concussion of bombs and

shells. Unlike more compact soils, which help spread the blast and fragments

over a wide area, sand limits a shell’s impact.54 This factor reduced secondary

bomb damage and made direct-hit accuracy even more important. In fact rereview of tank-plinking videotapes and other data appears to reveal that the kill

rate of the GBU–12/F–111F combination for Republican Guard armor was

somewhere between 35 and 45 percent—an outstanding ratio, albeit less than

original CENTAF estimates.55

The Republican Guard’s geographic position in the Iraqi theater reserve,

fifty or more miles removed from the front line, enabled it to exit the theater or

avoid combat before becoming fully engaged with Coalition ground forces. The

Tawakalna Division, the closest Republican Guard division to the front, suffered

the heaviest loss.56 The heavy divisions’ geographic positions also put them closer to the Iraqi military’s excellent combat engineering corps, which apparently

constructed more permanent and more bombproof revetments for the Republican

Guard heavy divisions’ equipment than it provided for other Iraqi formations

closer to the front. In addition, their distance from the front line meant that the

heavy divisions did not have to deploy themselves into relatively tight tactical

defensive positions intended to repel immediate Coalition ground attacks.

Instead, they could disperse themselves over a much wider physical area that further attenuated the effect of tactical bombing done in the bulk with non-PGM

ordnance. This extra protection made them a more difficult target. Their distance

from the front increased the logistical effort needed to mount an air package

against them, and their heavier air defenses57 made approaching them more cost306

On Target

53. Ibid.

54. Conversely, correctly timed air bursts and proximity fused shells or bombs can be very

effective in the desert because their blast is still spread over a wide area and the defender finds

it more difficult to prepare shelters with adequate overhead cover because of a dearth of proper and easily available local building materials

55. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 36.

56. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (1st ed.), p. 217, Table 15 “Equipment

Destroyed or Abandoned in Republican Guard Heavy Division Areas.” The Tawakalna Division lost approximately 93 percent of its tanks, 76 percent of its armored personnel carriers, and

50 percent of its artillery.

57. Iraqi Regular Army division air defense elements had a very few obsolescent Soviet

SA–2s or –3s (maximum altitude, 25,000 meters or 82,000 ft), a few more modern SA–9s

(maximum effective altitude, only 4,500 meters or 14,760 ft), and some shoulder-launched

SAMs. Republican Guard division air defense elements possessed more plentiful numbers of
ly for Coalition aircraft. Both factors tended to decrease the accuracy of Coalition air attacks. The Coalition policy of avoiding casualties also contributed the

Republican Guard’s survival. When CENTAF lost two A–10As to ground air

defenses in Republican Guard areas on February 15, 1991, it limited that aircraft

to less deep penetrations.58 At the insistence of the Coalition ground force corps

commanders and as part of the overall theater deception plan, the CINCCENT

also concentrated tactical air efforts upon the Iraqi front-line divisions, which

lessened the effort applied against the Republican Guard.59

During the Coalition ground assault, U.S. Army VII Corps caught up with

the Tawakalna Division, apparently serving as a rear guard, and inflicted severe

casualties on it. VII Corps also encountered elements of the Madinah Division

(which suffered about a 50-percent loss of equipment from all Coalition ground

and air action) as it retreating into the assembled Iraqi forces near Basra, an area

known as the Basra pocket. The Hammurabi Division (which a sustained 25-percent loss of equipment to all Coalition action) also retreated into the Basra pocket. Unlike the desert, the Basra pocket contained a large city, its suburbs, and

numerous farming villages. Imagery shows that the Republican Guard and other

Iraqi ground forces, well aware of the Coalition policy of limiting collateral damage, took advantage of that policy to huddle as close as possible to civilian structures in the pocket. This fact, plus poor weather that lowered bombing accuracy,

frustrated air operations, as did other factors. The close proximity of Coalition

ground forces which heightened chances of instances of losses to friendly fire

necessitated carefully identified ground targets. General Schwarzkopf placed

Iraqi territory bordering the Islamic Republic of Iran off-limits in order to avoid

airspace incursions and unnecessary international incidents.60 Nonetheless, by

the last day of the war, Coalition air power had damaged or destroyed all bridges

permitting egress from the pocket.61 On February 28, 1991, both the Hammurabi

and Madinah Divisions were in Iraqi-controlled territory in the Basra pocket.

The tale of the Republican Guard infantry62 and Iraqi Special Forces divisions is quickly told. They occupied positions at least ten to fifteen miles behind

the Republican Guard heavy divisions in an arc stretching from An Nasiriyah to

the Persian Gulf, which made them the Iraqi ground units closest to the easiest

escape routes (the Euphrates River and Basra bridges) and the furthest removed

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Assessment

the more modern Soviet SA–6s (maximum effective altitude, 10–15,000 meters or 33–49,200

ft) and SA–13s (maximum effective altitude, 5,500 meters or 18,040 ft), as well as more modern shoulder-launched missiles. All Iraqi heavy divisions had plentiful AAA.

58. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), pp. 141–143

59. Ibid., p. 254.

60. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 1, Operations (2d ed.), p. 313.

61. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 256.

62. U.S. intelligence sources differed as to the exact number of Republican Guard infantry

divisions in the theater and variously place the number at two, three, or four divisions. GWAPS

uses the high figure. I see no reason to disagree. GWAPS places the infantry divisions, from

west to east within the KTO, as follows: Nebuchadnezzar, Baghdad, Adnan, and Al-Faw. The

Special Forces division appears to have stationed one brigade at each end of this line.
from Coalition ground and air forces of all the Iraqi ground forces in the KTO.63

As cynics have pointed out, they not only occupied reserve positions, but positions that blocked the retreat of individual Iraqi deserters from all other Iraqi

ground forces. These units may not have brought their organic armor battalions

into the theater and, as infantry forces far from the potential ground battle areas,

they offered little military threat to Coalition ground operations. If they moved

forward, they would have to oppose heavy Coalition units from the march or

from hastily prepared defensive positions, both of which offered little prospect

of their long-term survival. As infantry divisions far from the ground battle

zones, they received far less tactical air bombardment than the Republican Guard

and Regular Army heavy divisions received. They made no attempt to engage

Coalition ground forces. By the end of the first twenty-four hours of the ground

war, three of these divisions had left the theater.64 The remaining two either left

the theater soon after or else retreated to the relative safety of the Basra pocket.

Although not unscathed by Coalition air operations, the casualties sustained by

all five divisions are unknown.65 It seems probable that they suffered light casualties in the course of the war. These units, not the heavy Republican Guard divisions, aided by troops left in Iraq and other relatively intact units escaping from

the theater would prove decisive in suppressing the Kurdish and Shia uprisings.66

Even if the ground campaign had continued for another 24 to 48 hours and forced

the surrender of the Basra pocket, Coalition ground and air power failed to

destroy the Republican Guard as a political prop to the Hussein regime.

The theater commander directed his air and ground forces against the

Republican Guard, a force he himself had designated as a center of gravity in a

fashion that emphasized its military threat to Coalition ground operations, not its

political function in maintaining the regime. He concentrated his ground and air

forces on the three Republican Guard heavy divisions and made little effort

against the Republican Guard infantry, which had little military significance and

was a difficult target for both air and ground operations. Given that the theater

commander’s direction of effort accented the tactical rather than the strategic

implications of the target system and that the CENTAF tactical air planners handled the physical targeting and planning for all strikes against the target system,67

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On Target

63. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 222, Map 8 “Cumulative

Air Strikes by Kill Box, 17 Jan–28 Feb 1991 (Total Strikes 21,391).”

64. Ibid., p. 251.

65. Ibid.

66. The lightly armed, haphazardly organized and trained, and internationally isolated

rebels would stand little chance of sustained resistance against the Iraqi Army units, let alone

the Republican Guard. The Iraqis also had large stockpiles of second-line armored and other

equipment, notably around Tikrit, that they could and did use to reequip their forces. Thus they

could readily field repatriated prisoners or units that had escaped with their personnel but had

abandoned their equipment.

67. In fact the internal records of the CENTAF Strategic Planning Cell do not list a single

mission against the Republican Guard in Kuwait, but only for the Guard headquarters in Baghdad, as part of the campaign against leadership and C3 targets. The CENTAF strategic planners 
the Republican Guard in practice and in actuality was not a strategic target system. This statement is not meant to obviate the fact that air power failed to

destroy the Republican Guard nor to assign fault for that failure solely with tactical air power. Rather, it is merely meant to say that the survival of the Republican Guard should not be used as a circumstance to discredit the concept of

strategic bombing as a method of waging war. The inability to destroy the

Republican Guard accentuates the current limitations of air power to destroy

such a target.

All forms of military power, including air power, have inherent limitations.

The bombing of the Republican Guard heavy divisions as well as NBC targets,

Scuds, and, to a lesser extent, the military support industry illustrates a key limitation of conventionally armed (versus nuclear-armed) air power. Dispersal and

concealment of targets drastically affects bombing results. Obviously, if aircraft

cannot see a target because it is too small or is hidden, even if the aircraft are

armed with PGMs, they cannot strike their target and must resort to the most

inefficient type of attack: area bombing—drenching a geographic location with

a tremendous volume of ordnance. Area bombing’s inordinately great consumption of air power resources compared to the questionable results it achieves

makes it a tactic of last resort because of how it affects the resources committed

to any other theater, or even those committed to national air operations. If every

PGM-capable aircraft available to the Coalition had bombed every visible foxhole in the Republican Guard areas for one or two straight weeks, or one or two

days of every week, possibly shutting down the strategic air campaign in the

process, would the possible achievement of one Coalition war aim justify abandoning the other war aims? In the case of the Republican Guard, Schwarzkopf

and Horner correctly judged that it did not.

In addition, the option of massing aircraft still available for tactical purposes

no longer applies to conventionally armed strategic air power. Hence, the search

by current air power theoreticians, such as the Warden group members, for compact, key targets or centers of gravity. As for the strategic bombardment of Iraq,

would concentration on NBC or Scud targets, all of which could not even be

located in the first place, have justified the virtual cessation of the bombing of

airfields, bridges, electrical power sources, and so on?

In spite of the well-deserved praise for the USAF’s superlative performance

in the Gulf War, that conflict did reveal two potentially grave organizational

flaws: the difficulty of melding the USAF planning, operations, and intelligence

functions into a smoothly functioning team, and the lack of an organization at the

operational level charged with strategic targeting and planning. Looking back on

the war, General Horner stated,

One final area that requires significant attention and change is intelligence.

In peacetime, we train our intelligence personnel to hedge, to be mediocre rather

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Assessment

obviously did not consider the Guard a “strategic target.” (CENTAF Strategic Planning Cell,

“Missions-Day-by-Day Log.”)
than wrong. In wartime, it all starts and ends with intelligence. Intel defines

what you need to do and how you will do it. Each of the various communities

that make up our military staffs—A–2 Intelligence, A–3 Operations, A–4

Logistics and A–6 Communications—is important. But each develops self-serving organizational walls and formal processes of interaction designed to protect

its own prerogatives. This is inappropriate in war, where success depends on

detailed interaction among all of them. Where air power is concerned, staffs

should be reorganized so that the artificial walls of the past are eliminated and

cooperation is enhanced. Perhaps the way to do this is to create a functional staff

along the lines of “strategy” needed to plan the campaign and “execution” needed to carry out the ATO once it is created.68

As of 1997 the service had not addressed the problems observed by General

Horner. After the war, the Black Hole, always an ad hoc group, disappeared as

its members returned to regular duties. Within two years of the war’s end, an Air

Staff reorganization eliminated the Deputy Directorate of Warfighting Concepts.

As of 1997 within the USAF’s numbered air forces, which will form the core of

the USAF components of any Joint Command, strategic thinking has been instituted only haphazardly. What should be done is yet to be decided, but the longer

the problems continue, the less likely their solution and the more likely their

reoccurrence in a future conflict become.

Of the twelve target sets attacked in the strategic air campaign against Iraq,

Coalition air power fully achieved its goals in four—electrical power, Iraqi

IADS, IZAF, and Iraqi Navy. Attacks against oil and bridges were physically

destructive but probably moot because of the war’s short duration. The result of

attacks against leadership, C3, and Republican Guard infantry divisions cannot

be verified, but the Coalition devoted only 1,030 sorties of 12,630 strategic sorties to leadership and communications, a small gamble of resources against the

gains envisioned and which to some unknown extent may have been achieved.

The air attacks on Scuds and to a lesser extent on NBC targets failed militarily.

These were targets very resistant to conventional air power. But keeping the

Coalition intact and delaying Iraq’s special weapons programs for months, if not

years, are not negative results politically. In this instance, the political result

gained through military action outweighed the fact that military action itself

accomplished much less than was hoped or claimed. The same equation applies

to Iraq’s military support industry, except that in this case military action was

more successful, and the political effect, somewhat less.

The strategic air campaign, especially when compared to earlier strategic

bombing, had a final and significant achievement: avoidance of large numbers of

civilian (and military) casualties. Three years after end of the conflict, both civilian and military casualties inflicted on Iraq by Coalition air operations remain a

matter of great controversy.69 In an estimate for enemy forces in the KTO only,

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On Target

68. Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret.), “Air Power Growing Beyond Desert Storm,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology 146, No. 16 (Apr 16, 1997), p. 74.

69. The U.S. government has stated no official estimate of Iraqi casualties. Consequently,
later disavowed by the U.S. government, the DIA guessed, with an error factor

of ±50 percent or greater:

Killed in action: Approx. 100,000

Wounded in action: Approx. 300,000

Deserters: Approx. 150,00070

In an interview televised in January 1992, General Horner guessed the casualty

figure to be between 10,000 and 30,000 and noted the absence of mass graves

and large numbers of dead on the battlefield. As John G. Heidenrich, former DIA

analyst and Iraqi Army analyst and author of the best article on this subject,

points out, the Coalition counted only 2,000 wounded among its 69,000 plus

prisoners. This is a telling figure that undermines most previous estimates. In a

traditional conflict, the ratio of wounded to killed is three to one. Given Iraq’s

underdeveloped support services and its inability to evacuate casualties (because

of air interdiction), its casualty ratio may have been as low as two to one. Given

that Coalition forces discovered no mass graves, no field or other types of hospitals, and no bunkers filled to the brim with the dying and wounded, where are

Iraq’s 200,000 wounded and 100,000 dead? Surely it would not have been in

Iraq’s interest to conceal such horrific scenes from the international press as it

sought to bolster its image as a small, put-upon Arab nation. How did so many

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Assessment

the opinions expressed in this discussion are those of the author and do not reflect the official

judgment of the Department of Defense or the USAF.

70. Estimate, DIA, response to a FOIA request, May 1991, cited in John G. Heidenrich,

“The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?” Foreign Policy, No. 90 (Spring 1993), p. 109. This

article seems one of the most sensible, conservative, logical, and balanced discussions on the

topic of Iraqi casualties. It greatly influenced the author’s opinions on this subject.

The incineration chamber on the left and the large-scale nerve agent hydrolysis

plant on the right are to be used for the destruction of chemical agents, due to

begin a few months after these pictures were taken.
wounded get away when their healthy compatriots did not? Heidenrich gave a

low figure of 3,000 dead and 7,000 wounded in the KTO; U.S. News and World

Report gave a figure of 8,000 dead and 24,000 wounded total. The House Armed

Services Committee attributed 9,000 dead and 17,000 wounded to the air campaign alone.71 These low casualties are a testimonial to the accuracy of the

Coalition air assault which concentrated on vehicles, equipment, and facilities

rather than on human beings. As for Iraqi civilian bombing casualties,

Greenpeace, an international environmental and pacifist organization, listed

them as 2,278 dead and 5,976 wounded.72 Greenpeace also attributes 70,000 to

110,000 civilian deaths to detrimental health effects after the hostilities ended.

Whatever one makes of those figures, one must attribute a substantial portion of

the guilt for them to Saddam’s regime and its refusal to cooperate with the UN

postwar embargo.

On balance, the strategic bombardment of Iraq did not achieve the lofty

goals set for it by the USAF Air Staff (Checkmate) and the CENTAF special

planning group (though it came much closer to fulfilling the theater commander’s more modest expectations), but it played a great role in fulfilling President

Bush’s announced political objectives. To say that the strategic air campaign

against Iraq failed because it was not 100-percent successful would mean adopting an argument of perfection, which no work of mankind has yet achieved. Such

an argument reduces the most successful air campaign of the second half of the

twentieth century to a nullity. As with any military operation, the strategic bombardment of Iraq had flaws and shortcomings, some of which the enemy failed

to use to its advantage.

Although the air campaign went well, like the remainder of the American

effort in the Persian Gulf War, it rested on a weak economic foundation. Tin cup

in hand, the U.S. government went to its allies and extracted almost $54 billion

in cash and other subsidies to pay for the American war effort. Without this funding, the United States might have been hard-pressed to field the multidivision,

multicarrier, multiwing force that overwhelmed the Iraqis. Throughout Desert

Shield, the executive and legislative branches of the federal government were at

loggerheads over how to address taxation and the federal deficit. These important negotiations only ended shortly before the conflict and might have been even

more complicated had the parties had to find tens of billions of dollars of additional revenue. Of course, a dire national emergency could have started the government money presses rolling, but that would not have solved the nation’s basic

economic problems. It would appear that for the future, America’s attenuated

economic base will severely limit the United States’ international options, forcing it to participate in coalition warfare because it can not afford economically to

go it alone in a major crisis. An activist U.S. foreign policy has become far more

expensive.

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On Target

71. All figures cited in Heidenrich, “How Many Iraqis Died?” pp. 113–114.

72. GWAPS, Vol 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 305.
The Implications

Every USAF unit and organization associated with Desert Shield/Storm, as

well as those from the other services, has generated “lessons learned” reports

covering its aspect of the war. These often highly technical reports contain much

useful information, but it is not the purpose of this study to compile lists of suggestions and regurgitate them. Instead, this conclusion will briefly examine the

use and application of military power and its effects on the employing organization and on the enemy during the war in the Persian Gulf.

Earlier in the twentieth century, the USAF fought in four so-called strategic

bombing campaigns: those against Germany and Japan in World War II and those

against North Korea and North Vietnam in the post–World War II era. A brief

examination of these campaigns, particularly their political objectives rather than

the technology extant, puts the war in the Persian Gulf into perspective. From

1943 to 1945 the USAAF fought at the side of RAF Bomber Command in a daylight and nighttime Combined Bomber Offensive directed at Hitler’s Germany.

The British, who could not overcome the daytime defenses over Europe, chose

to bomb at night, when accuracy shortfalls soon forced them to resort to the area

bombing of German cities. The RAF justified this policy on the grounds that the

destruction of workers’ houses and communities would substantially lower production and weaken morale. In fact, the bombing of houses in German city centers, which the RAF could hit, left workers with little choice but to spend more

time at the war factories on the cities’ outskirts, which the RAF had difficulty hitting. In some instances, production in German cities, after an initial dip,

increased after RAF bombing. The bombing may have lowered morale, but the

dreaded Secret State Police (Gestapo) and other organs of the regime ensured

that low morale and antigovernment humor did not turn to open disaffection. The

USAAF in Europe took on German daytime defenses directly and reduced the

Luftwaffe to impotence. They then launched a precision bombing campaign targeting German synthetic oil production (a small, compact system of two dozen

targets) and an area bombing campaign against rail marshaling yards in German

cities. The synthetic oil campaign hamstrung the German air and ground forces,

while the marshaling yard campaign gave the weakening German war economy

its final push into ruin and inflicted significant collateral damage. At one point

the Anglo-American allies even considered a strategic bombing campaign directed at German leaders and organs of control, such as the S.S. protection squads

and the Gestapo.73 On February 3, 1945, the U.S. Eighth Air Force attempted to

spark a German surrender by bombing the center of government in Berlin, but

the only result obtained was large-scale collateral damage to the heart of the

German capital. Despite almost 2 million tons of bombs and the presence of

almost 5,000 heavy bombers, the RAF and USAAF strategic bombing did not

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Assessment

73. Richard G. Davis, “Operation ‘Thunderclap’: The US Army Air Forces and the

Bombing of Berlin,” Journal of Strategic Studies 14, No.1 (March 1991), pp. 90–111.
separate the German people from their leaders, nor did it weaken the German

government’s ability to maintain its iron grip. Their effort did subject German

cities and industry to significant damage. The Combined Bomber Offensive

proved to be one of the decisive factors in defeating the Germans, but it was not

the only factor. Without the constant attritional pressure of the Allied ground

forces from the west and south and the Red Army from the east, as well as the

ground forces’ physical occupation of Germany, air power would not have collapsed the German state.

In the Far East, the USAAF Twentieth Air Force’s bombing of Japan was

one of the most significant elements in the surrender of that state. Even before

the use of atomic weapons, conventional strategic bombing, aerial mining, and

the USN’s submarine warfare against her seaborne commerce brought Japan’s

industry and internal economy to a halt, and U.S. and British Commonwealth

naval and ground forces destroyed the Imperial Navy and decisively defeated

major units of the Imperial Army. Although Japan could not mount an effective

defense against the high-flying U.S. B–29 heavy bombers, those bombers failed

to successfully complete a daylight precision bombing campaign against her.

Weather, the jet stream, and the immense distances from bases to targets all combined to render the U.S. effort ineffective. However, starting in March 1945 the

USAAF switched to a low-level, night, area bombing campaign directed at the

heart of Japan’s major cities. The campaign leveled metropolitan Japan, inflicted great collateral damage, caused untold misery among civilians, lowered

morale, and applied the coup de grâce to war production. Like the strategic

bombing campaign in Europe, American bombing failed to weaken the hold on

the people by a regime that had not only the cords of a police state but the bonds

of religion to tie the people to the state. If the Japanese leadership had wished to

resist a ground invasion of the home islands, untold millions of their followers

would have perished or committed suicide before accepting defeat. The use of

atomic weapons, the Soviet declaration of war, and the rapid conquest of Japan’s

holdings on the mainland of Asia eliminated the last vestige of hope and enabled

a peace group within the Japanese leadership to gain control and force a surrender. Did unconventional weapons spark capitulation? Undoubtedly, but they

served only as one decisive consideration in a host of disasters confronting the

enemy. Strategic air power unaided did not bring down the Japanese state.

The strategic bombing of North Korea and North Vietnam produced less satisfactory results than those obtained in World War II. Neither state depended on

its own industry to produce the war matériel it consumed. In addition, U.S. international political policy fenced off some crucial targets from air attack, thus limiting these wars. Aside from Swedish iron ore and ball bearings, no vital war

matériel reached German or Japanese borders without going through occupied

territory or ocean area open to unrestricted bombing. In both the North Korean

and North Vietnamese cases, their logistical support ran on rail lines through

neutral (technically nonbelligerent) countries (particularly the People’s Republic

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On Target
of China) or on neutral shipping for their entire length. Thus the Chinese end of

the bridges over the Yalu River to Korea and the Chinese rail transit points to

Vietnam remained officially off-limits for the duration of the respective conflicts.

Likewise, Soviet shipping in Haiphong could not be struck. In Korea, the USAF

used the radio-controlled Tarzon bomb—a heavier version of the more primitive

smart weapons developed for use in World War II—to successfully attack

bridges. In spring 1972, the USAF used first-generation laser-guided bombs in

Operation Linebacker I. These weapons proved effective against bridges and

their defenses that had heretofore repelled air assault. This constriction of their

lines of communication played a key part in bringing a large-scale conventional

North Vietnamese ground offensive to a halt.

From December 20 to 30, 1972, in Operation Linebacker II, the USAF executed a classic strategic bombing campaign. In many respects, the Christmas

bombing was perhaps the most effective strategic bombing campaign ever conducted. Its effectiveness rested on its limited scope and its limited aims. Instead

of diffusing force over many targets with a too broad or a too ill-defined objective, Linebacker II focused appropriate force at a few targets in a limited area,

Hanoi-Haiphong. And it sought to gain a specific and achievable goal. By

December 1972, the North Vietnamese government had already virtually won its

war to unify the country in its Paris negotitaions with the United States. The

United States had offered very favorable terms, including the right to retain

100,000 regular People’s Army of Vietnam soldiers on South Vietnamese territory, and it appeared certain that the U.S. Congress would shortly terminate funding for the American war effort.74 In spite of this, the North Vietnamese government refused to sign the Paris accords and delayed in hopes of gaining an even

more favorable position. U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger concluded that only the application of more military force to

threaten the North Vietnamese leadership could bring that leadership to sign the

offer on the table. President Nixon, therefore, ordered the bombing of key logistics targets in the area around the North Vietnamese capital, Hanoi, and its major

seaport, Haiphong. In eleven days the USAF flew 729 B–52 sorties against 34

targets, expended 15,000 tons of ordnance, and claimed destruction of or damage to 372 pieces of rolling stock, 1,600 military structures, 3 million gallons of

petroleum products, and 80 percent of the electrical power production system.75

Many tactical air sorties added further damage. The North Vietnamese gave in to

the pressure and returned to the bargaining table, where they had already gained

so much. It made little sense to continue to absorb tremendous and expensive

punishment, with still more damage in prospect, when the Americans had

already offered to effectively undercut the South Vietnamese regime.76

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Assessment

74. Tilford, Setup, pp. 240–265.

75. McCarthy and Allison, Linebacker II, p. 171.

76. See Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 177–202; and Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back:
In the instance of North Vietnam, its leadership had something to lose from

continued strategic bombing. The German and Japanese regimes, thanks in part

to the Allies’ unconditional surrender demands and to the Allies’ obvious determination to replace the regimes, had no incentive to negotiate to stop the bombing no matter how damaging it became. As Winston S. Churchill, the British

Prime Minister, said of Nazi Germany: “They were all more than happy to fight

to the last man as long as each of them could guarantee he would be that last

man.” The direct bombing of leadership targets did not induce the North Vietnamese to negotiate; the threat of further damage brought the response. In Iraq

different circumstances applied.

Whether or not a greater effort of several hundred additional sorties would

have raised the air accomplishments from significant disruption to complete

destruction of this target system cannot be known. But as long as the Iraqis possessed matériel unknown to or dispersed from Coalition air planners, additional

sorties against known and empty targets would have had no consequence, which

emphasizes once again the critical importance of intelligence and the ability to

follow up by other means.

The USAF scored a unique achievement with its air-to-air missiles. Of the

23 kills credited to the F–15Cs/AIM–7 combination during hostilities, sixteen

involved missiles fired from BVR. This accomplishment had no precedent and

marked Desert Storm as the first conflict with a significant percentage (40 percent overall) of BVR air-to-air kills. It demonstrated a high degree of training,

discipline, and situational awareness on the part of USAF pilots and controllers

that should give other air forces pause.77

Aircraft maintenance rates supply yet another example of excellent results

concealing a potential flaw. The initial maintenance estimates had been based on

the assumption there would be no cannibalization or use of nondeploying aircrafts’ WRSKs. Instead, combat aircraft consistently reported higher wartime

than peacetime fully-mission-capable rates, in large part because of cannibalization and use of nondeployed aircraft and nondeployed WRSKs.78 A fraction of

the USAF aircraft fleet became fully mission-capable at the expense of the rest

of the inventory. What is more, given Congressional propensity to underfund

WRSK and less glamorous spare parts, the losses may never be made good, to

the detriment of the entire USAF inventory. Here again one wonders how many

of the cannibalized aircraft could have been made quickly available if another

combat contingency had arisen or how the aircraft would have sustained themselves when they arrived.

The shock, damage, confusion, and discouragement heaped on Iraq by the

offensive air campaign represents the most significant achievement of air power

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On Target

The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force

History and Museums Program, 2000), pp. 255–280, for in-depth and insightful analyses of this

bombing campaign.

77. GWAPS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (2d ed.), p. 113.

78. GWAPS, Vol. 3, pt. 1, Logistics (2d ed.), pp. 350–351.
in the last half of the twentieth century. Plans begin to crumble long before the

first bullet is fired. Offering more than a plan can reasonably expect to deliver

runs the danger of discrediting both the plan and the basis of its conception.

Given the disparity in arms, manpower, and technology between the Coalition

and Iraq, one might well wonder if almost any plan would have worked as well.

While one might not have been able to take any three USAF pilots, lock them in

a room, instruct them to assemble a strategic bombing plan, and have them produce Instant Thunder in three days, twenty USAF planners, intelligence officers,

and operators forced to work closely together for five months with access to all

material available to the special campaign planners would probably have developed a plan capable of squashing Iraq and employing PGMs, TLAMs, and

stealth. What then was the unique achievement of the strategic air campaign as

executed?

The offensive air campaign as planned and executed created a new synthesis of ideas and technology that maximized the destructive force of air power

employing nonnuclear weapons. Almost any Coalition air war plan would have

loosed on Iraq all of the weapons systems employed in actuality, but most, if not

all, of those other plans would have utilized more conventional targeting that did

not emphasize the interconnections and leverage of the various Iraqi targets.

Some, but not all, of the plans might have made Saddam a target, as with alQaddafi in Libya, but it is doubtful that they would have systematically bombed

TV and radio stations, internal security agencies, and Tikrit in doing so.

Technology without insightful direction does not produce maximum effect. The

Warden group conceived and created a specific, systematically thought-out doctrine on the application of conventionally armed strategic air power in the 1990s,

something that the USAF as an institution had not yet accomplished. Building on

the tenets of the Warden group, Colonel Deptula added simultaneity and pushed

the concept of bombing for effect (on morale as well as on physical surroundings) to the furthest limit. As executed, Phase I attacked the twelve target systems developed by the Air Staff in a manner that followed Air Staff concepts

(Generals Horner and Glosson approved actual attacks). In its use of PGMs, the

strategic campaign also freed numerous aircraft for ground support and for dropping “dumb” bombs on the Iraqi Army. In short, anybody could have done a

Phase I strategic air campaign, but the planners in Riyadh and the air and ground

crews throughout the Persian Gulf region from August 1990 to March 1991 did

it better. They and no one else marched to a new quickstep, first piped by a band

of men in the subbasement of the Pentagon.

The bombing/targeting philosophy of bombing for effect, not for destruction, of hitting key centers of gravity, not entire target systems, and of simultaneity, along with the associated concepts, has a specific application to specific

circumstances. However, it is difficult to conceive of any bombing plan that will

release the grasp of a police state on its populace or that will absolutely destroy

a large, dispersed, and concealed target system. Attritional bombing campaigns

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Assessment
can break up a great power’s transportation net or his key industries; a brief,

quick-hitting campaign can do the same for a lesser power such as many of the

less-ready, less well-trained states that form the bulk of the international community. In a conventional war versus another great power, like Russia or China,

an Instant Thunder–style assault at the commencement of hostilities could well

disrupt an enemy’s offensive and render him more vulnerable to a riposte.

However, the sheer geographic extent of those powers, as compared to Iraq,

would make it quite difficult to reach meaningful centers of gravity without a

correspondingly greater effort involving, perhaps, long-range cruise missiles and

penetrating stealthy bombers. Negligible military powers, such as Grenada and

Panama, would succumb speedily to any well-planned use of overwhelming military force. It would not appear necessary from either the standpoint of world

public opinion or military requirements to bombard such a power for forty-eight

to ninety-six hours with an Instant Thunder–style plan to break its will to fight

when it probably had little expectation of seriously opposing the United States or

the UN in the first place.

Instant Thunder concepts may have their greatest applicability in conflicts

against regional and middling powers like Iraq. In such cases, basing, warning

time, and target intelligence considerations would be paramount. If no regional

ally existed to make friendly land bases freely available, then USN aircraft would

have to conduct much of the operation, presumedly to cover for a USMC

amphibious landing. The probability of either of those services adopting radical

USAF air campaign planning methods seems remote. If land bases make USAF

operations possible, the opening situation becomes critical. If the USAF arrives

in the midst of an enemy air and land offensive, the political, host-country, and

friendly ground-force pressures to provide maximum and immediate CAS and

interdiction may prevent the launching of an Instant Thunder or prevent the

mounting of strategic strikes with sufficient force. However, if precrisis preparations ensure adequate targeting and intelligence databases, something lacking in

the Kuwait crisis, then an Instant Thunder–like plan could help disrupt an enemy

attack or assist a friendly ground attack. Finally, exact target information on

potential foes or critical points is the sine qua non of an Instant Thunder or any

bombing plan. The CINC’s contingency plans must consist of more than simple

deployment plans and unit schedules. With the approval of the CINC, the USAF

component of each unified command should have a detailed 48-hour MAP and

ATO, based on Instant Thunder concepts, with comprehensive target folders

containing recent imagery and other intelligence data for the most likely or most

urgent situations. The ability to execute such a plan immediately would greatly

increase the effectiveness of any air response. Just as important, the USAF

should train or make its headquarters component belonging to each Unified

Command aware of the full capabilities of the weapons systems it will employ.

Such action would prevent a repetition of the case of the Ninth Air Force.

Circumstances had denied it the opportunity to familiarize itself with the F–117A

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On Target
and other PGM systems. If in the future the service intends to employ “black

world” systems or systems unfamiliar to the deploying headquarters, it should

seriously consider assigning to the plans, operations, and intelligence sections of

the deploying headquarters additional personnel with in-depth and current

knowledge of the new systems. Given the foreseeable strategic future, it seems

likely the United States will find itself involved in many situations requiring the

use of force or the threatened use of force against powers of middle rank. The

concepts of Instant Thunder are well adapted to such contingencies and ought to

be employed by service planners. However, the planners and senior military

leaders must avoid the temptation to overpromise on the effectiveness of air

operations.

Air power broke the back of the Iraqi military and its industrial support

infrastructure. This work has dealt with only one prong of that attack, the strategic assault on leadership, national-level C3, NBC capability, the military industrial support structure, Scuds, the IZAF, and Iraqi’s air defenses. Equally important operations against Iraqi LOCs, the Iraqi Army, and Republican Guard units

formed the other prong of the air attack. Those operations are covered in another volume in this series, but here, suffice it to say, their impact on the Hussein

regime proved as discouraging and deadly as did the bombing deep within the

Iraqi state. In fact, the synergy between the two portions of the air assault contributed to making the cumulative effect of the entire air effort greater than the

sum of its parts. Of 109,876 total sorties of all types flown during the Persian

Gulf War, Coalition aircraft flew approximately 50,000 strike or combat sorties,

5,150 USN fleet defense sorties, and 3,270 USAF defensive counterair sorties.

The offensive air campaign consumed at most 18,276 of them—24 to 36 percent

of the total combat sorties.79 A breakdown of the strategic sorties clearly shows

both the disruption and the economy of force an attacker can achieve in directing air attacks at enemy centers of gravity. Fifteen percent of the strategic campaign fell on the Iraqi military support complex, a large, widespread, and relatively vulnerable target system. CENTAF bombing destroyed or damaged 30

percent of Iraq’s conventional weapons manufacturing and repair capability.80

Less than one bomb in six of the strategic campaign, and only one of every twenty dropped by the Coalition as a whole, fell on Iraq’s remaining target systems.

Twenty-five hundred sorties, the majority employing PGMs directed at NBC

capability, railroads and bridges, C3, oil refining and storage, air defenses, leadership, and electrical power delivered a tremendous blow to the Iraqi state.

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Assessment

79. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 159 Chart “Strategic Targets Level

of Effort”; Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf, p. 89 Table “Shares of US Air Sorties: D-Day to Cease

Fire.” I assume that the DoD Final Report includes both combat and support sorties in its total

(it gives no clue). However, if its data includes just combat sorties, then the offensive campaign

absorbed 62 percent of CENTAF’s combat sorties, which seems too large a figure, given the

massive air attacks on Iraqi ground forces throughout the campaign. DoD, Final Report (2d

ed.), p. 159.

80. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (2d ed.), p. 159.
The strategic bombing campaign against Iraq was a decisive factor in the

Coalitions’s defeat of Iraq. When joined to the tactical air effort against Iraqi

forces in Kuwait, which consumed almost three-fourths of the total air effort, air

power was the decisive factor in the Coalition’s quick and almost bloodless victory in the Persian Gulf War.

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On Target
Glossary

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AADC Area Air Defense Commander

AB Air Base

ABCCC airborne battlefield command, control, and communications

ACA Airspace Control Authority

ACE airborne combat element

AD(P) Provisional Air Division

ADOC [Iraqi] air defense operations center

AFB Air Force Base

AFSOCCENT Central Command Special Operations Command Air Component Commander

AGL above ground level

ALARM air-launched antiradiation missile

ALCM air-launched cruise missile

AOR area of responsibility

ARCENT U.S. Army Component, Central Command

ATO air tasking order

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BDA bomb damage assessment

Black Hole CENTAF planning group

BVR beyond visual range

BW Bombardment Wing; biological weapons; biological warfare

C2 command and control

C3 command, control, and communications

C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence

CAFMS Computer Assisted Force Management System

CAP combat air patrol

CAS close air support

CC Compass Call

C-day the day deployment commenced

CENTAF U.S. Air Force Component, Central Command

CENTAF/IN U.S. Air Force Component, Central Command intelligence

CENTCOM United States Central Command

321

Preface
CENTCOM/IN United States Central Command intelligence

CEP circular error probable

Checkmate Air Staff planning group

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC Commander in Chief

CINCCENT Commander in Chief United States Central Command

CINCEUR Commander in Chief U.S. European Command

CINCSAC Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command

CINCSOC Commander in Chief Special Operations Command

CINCTRANSCOM Commander in Chief U.S. Transportation Command

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CNN Cable News Network

COMALF Commander, USAF Airlift Forces

COMCENTAF Commander, U.S. Air Force Component, Central Command

COMCENTCOM Commander, Central Command

CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force

CSAR combat search and rescue

CW chemical weapons; chemical warfare

CW(P) Provisional Composite Wing

DCS Deputy Chief of Staff

D-day the day designated for initiation of military operations

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DoD Department of Defense

ECW Electronic Combat Wing

EDT Eastern Daylight Time

EMCON emissions control

EST Eastern Standard Time

EUCOM U.S. European Command

EW electronic warfare [Iraqi]

FOL forward operating location

FW Tactical Fighter Wing

GAT Guidance, Apportionment, and Tasking

GBU glide bomb unit

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GCI ground controlled interception

G-day the beginning day of the ground campaign

GO General Order

GPS Global Positioning System

GSM ground-station module

HARM high-speed antiradiation missile

HAS hardened aircraft shelter

H-hour the moment the strategic air campaign began

HQ Headquarters

322

On Target
HVAA high-value airborne asset

IADS [Iraqi] Integrated Air Defense System

IAF Israeli Air Force

IDF Israel Defense Forces

IDS interdictor/strike variant

IFF identification–friend-or-foe

IIS Iraqi Intelligence Service

IOC intercept operations center [Iraqi]

IR infrared

IZAF Iraqi Air Force

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander

JNFTL joint no-fire target list [p. 128]

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTF Joint Task Force

KTO Kuwaiti Theater of Operations

L local clock time [24-hour clock]

LANTIRN Low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night

LOC line of communications

LRB long-range bomb

MAJCOM major command [USAF]

MAP master attack plan

MARCENT U.S. Marine Corps Component, Central Command

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEL mobile erector-launcher

MODA Ministry of Defense and Aviation [Saudi]

NAVCENT U.S. Navy Component, Central Command

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCA National Command Authorities

nm nautical mile(s)

NSD National Security Directive

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

PC personal computer

PCS permanent change of station

PGM precision guided munition

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricant

PSYOP psychological operation

PTT postal, telegraph, and telephone

R&D research and development

RAF [British] Royal Air Force

RCS radar cross section

323

Glossary
ROE rules of engagement

RSAF Royal Saudi Air Force

RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base

SAC Strategic Air Command 

SAM surface-to-air missile

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

Scud short-range ballistic missile [Iraqi]

SE southeast

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SLAM standoff, land-attack missile

SOC sector operations center [Iraqi]

SOCCENT Central Command Special Operations Command

SOF Special Operations Forces

SPACECOM United States Space Command

SRBM short-range ballistic missile

SSM surface-to-surface missile

STRATFOR Strategic Forces

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACC Tactical Air Control Center

TALD tactical air-launched decoy

TEL transporter-erector-launcher

TFS Tactical Fighter Squadron

TFW(P) Provisional Tactical Fighter Wing

TFW Tactical Fighter Wing

TGS Turkish General Staff

TLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

UAE United Arab Emirates

USA United States Army

USAAF U.S. Army Air Forces

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE U.S. Air Forces Europe

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

VCR videocassette recorder

VS Volant Solo

VTR videotape recorder

WRSK war readiness spares kit

WW Wild Weasel

324

On Target
325

Availability of Sources

The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review (OASD–PA) cleared this monograph for publication.

Many of its notes cite classified documents or interviews. That OASD–PA cleared

this monograph for publication does not mean that its sources have been declassified or even reviewed. In the cases of a document’s publication in both classified and unclassified versions, the designation “2d ed.” indicates that the unclassified version is being used. Some source documents remain classified, and in

some cases a document’s title or the identification of an entire source remains

classified.

Bibliography

Primary Documentation

This study relied almost entirely on security classified USAF documents

gathered from the Historian’s Office (HO) of the former Tactical Air Command

and from the Checkmate Office in the Pentagon. The records of both of these

organizations dealing with Desert Shield/Desert Storm were deposited for posterity in the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell AFB,

Alabama, in 1993.

The TAC/HO Desert Storm collection consisted of three series of records.

The most important series comprised the CENTAF Historian’s Files. The CENTAF Historian, CMSgt. John Burton, served at CENTAF HQ in Riyadh and supervised the work of USAF field historians with the wings and elsewhere. These

CENTAF/HO files fill eighty-one Hollinger boxes and include intelligence

reports sent to CENTAF and generated by CENTAF/IN; a complete set of MAPs;

CENTAF/DCS daily inputs to CENTAF/CC; JSTARS and Scud hunt material;

CINCCENT, CENTAF, ARCENT, MARCENT, and NAVCENT sitreps; and

assorted interviews with Generals Olsen and Glosson and with Colonel Deptula.

This body of records contains the most thorough collection of CENTAF HQ

records and should be a part of any scholar’s research. TAC/HO also assembled

its own collection of Desert Storm material This series fills approximately thirty-five Hollinger boxes with documents and messages gathered from the staff

sections of the former TAC HQ. It has useful runs of documents that include

appropriate CIA and DIA intelligence reports. Unit histories constitute the last of

the three TAC/HO record series. These works are of uneven quality, but the 37th

Fighter Wing Contingency Historical Reports and the JTF Proven Force material proved of great value. All these records will be available on microfilm at

AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, at a future date.

The Checkmate records fell into two series. The first consisted of the historically valuable records collected by Dr. Wayne Thompson, a USAF historian

temporarily attached to Checkmate from August 1990 through June 1991. Dr.

Thompson filled several file cabinets with Checkmate planning material, intelligence information forwarded to CENTAF, targeting material, and Air Staff cor327
respondence which he took with him when he transferred to the Gulf War Air

Power Survey (GWAPS) Office in Arlington, Virginia. This material represents

an unparalleled insight into the planning of Instant Thunder, the Checkmate contribution to the war, and Air Staff activities during the war. When GWAPS closed

its doors in 1994, its records went to AFHRA, Maxwell AFB. The second series

of Checkmate records consisted of the Lt. Col. David A. Deptula Gulf War

Collection. While in Riyadh, Colonel Deptula retained many of his historically

valuable records detailing the making of the MAPs, prewar planning, target

selection, BDA, intelligence, and correspondence with the Air Staff. No history

of the strategic bombing campaign against Iraq could be written without Colonel

Deptula’s records. The colonel has retained these records, but he allowed the

Center for Air Force History, the present-day Air Force History Support Office,

to make copies of them.

The author also gained copies of valuable records from members of the

Ninth Air Force staff, including General Horner’s personal Desert Storm file, and

members of the former SAC/HO.

Original sources cited in this work are annotated using the following system:

First letter=repository:

•T=TAC

•CK=Checkmate

•S=SAC

•AF/CAFH=Center for Air Force History, now named the Air

Force History Support Office

Second letter=collection:

•CT=CENTAF Collection

•U=Unit History Collection

•DS=Desert Storm

•Deptula=Deptula Collection.

Third letter or digit=box number within the collection.

Fourth letter=folder title.

Therefore, the designation “[File No. T/CT/45/IN]” indicates the material being

cited can be retrieved from TAC/HO, CENTAF Collection, Box 45, Folder IN.

Interviews

Adams, Lt. Gen. Jimmie V., HQ USAF DCS Plans & Ops, with Jacob Neufeld,

Air Staff Historian, December 17, 1990.

Bruner, Capt. William, GWAPS Analyst, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at

GWAPS Offices, March 19, 1992.

Christon, Col. Christopher, 9AF DCS/IN, with Drs. Richard G. Davis, CAFH,

and Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, at Shaw AFB, S.C., March 4, 1992.

Corder, Maj. Gen. John A., CENTAF Dir Ops, with Robert L. Mandler, USAF

Air Warfare Center Historian, December 21, 1991, pp. 60–61.

328

On Target
Crigger, Colonel James C., Jr., 9AF DCS/Ops, with Dr. Richard G. Davis,

CAFH, at Shaw AFB, S.C., March 5, 1992.

Deptula, Lt. Col. David A., CENTAF Chief Air Planner, with TSgt. Theodore J.

Turner, CENTAF/HO, at Riyadh, November 1, 1990.

Deptula, Lt. Col.David A., Secy AF Working Group, with Drs. Richard G. Davis,

Diane L. Putney, and Perry Jamieson, CAFH, at the Pentagon, November

20, 27, and 29, 1991, and January 8 and 16, 1992.

Deptula, Lt. Col. David A., 58th FTS CC, Eglin AFB, Fla., with Drs. Richard G.

Davis and Diane T. Putney, CAFH, at Bolling AFB, D.C., December 12,

1992. 

Eskridge, Lt. Col. Robert, GWAPS Analyst, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH,

at GWAPS Offices, Arlington, Va., March 19 and May 27 and 28, 1992.

Feinstein, Lt. Col. Jeffrey S., 9AF DO, with Drs. Richard G. Davis and Perry

Jamieson, CAFH, and Dr. Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, Shaw AFB, S.C., March

3, 1992.

Getchell, Col. George L., 9AF C/S, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at Shaw

AFB, S.C., March 2, 1992.

Glock, Capt. John, CENTAF Directorate of Planning Targeteer/Intel Officer,

with Drs. Diane T. Putney and Richard G. Davis, CAFH, Aug 8 and 27,

1992, at Crystal City, Arlington, Va.

Glosson, Brig. Gen. Buster C., DCS/P&O Air Staff, with TSgt. Theodore Turner,

CENTAF/HO, at Riyadh, October 17, 1990.

Glosson, Maj. Gen. Buster C. DCS/P&O Air Staff, with Drs. Richard G. Davis,

Diane T. Putney, and Perry Jamieson, CAFH, at CAFH Offices, Bolling

AFB, D.C., December 12, 1991.

Harvey, Lt. Col. Bernard E., USAF Deputy Directorate for Warfighting Concepts, with Drs. Richard G. Davis and Diane T. Putney, CAFH, at Bolling

AFB, D.C., December 7, 1992, and January 14, 1993.

Hawkins, Capt. J., SAC/DOOQ, with Dr. Kent M. Beck, SAC/HO, Omaha, Neb.,

April 30, 1991.

Heintzelman, Maj.,with TSgt. Saluda, “Rules of Engagement,” Mar 14, 1991

[File No. T/CT/21/Olsen & Heintzelman].

Henry, Brig. Gen. Larry, USAF, with GWAPS personnel, “Electronic Combat in

Desert Shield/Storm,” August 28, 1992.

Hente, Lt. Col. Scott (Ret), formerly tanker planner, CENTAF GAT, with Dr.

Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at Peterson AFB, Colo., October 4, 1993.

Heston, Maj. Robert J., 37th TFW(P) Dir Intel, Aug 9, 1990–Mar 31, 1991, with

Mark D. Mandeles, GWAPS, and Lt. Col. Stanford S. Terry, USAF,

GWAPS, October 16 and 19, 1992.

Hornburg, Brig. Gen. Hal M., Air Staff, formerly 4 TFW/CC, with Dr. Richard

G. Davis, at the Pentagon, January 24, 1993.

Horner, Lt. Gen. Charles A., with Lt. Cols. Suzanne Gehri and Richard

Reynolds, CADRE, ARI, December 3, 1991.

329

Bibliography
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and Perry Jamieson, CAFH, and Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, Shaw AFB, S.C.,

March 4, 1992.

Horner, Lt. Gen. Charles A., COMAFSPACECOM, comments on questions submitted by TAC/HO, January 28, 1992; transcribed, April 1992.

Hoyes, Maj. Michael B., and Wilcox, Capt. John B., with Ms. Donna Clark,

Historian, USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis AFB, Nev., March

29, 1991.

Jamerson, Maj. Gen. James L., JTF Proven Force Commander, with CMSgt.

Jerome E. Schroder, at Incirlik AB, March 27, 1991.

Kuehl, Lt. Col. Daniel T., GWAPS, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at Crystal

City, Arlington, Va., 1315–1515 Dec 15, 1992.

Leggett, Maj. Mike, HQ TAC Directorate of Operations, Electronic Combat

Division, with TSgt. Marcus R. Walker, CENTAF/HO, at RSAF HQ,

Riyadh, October 16, 1990.

McSwain, Comdr. Donald W., CNO, Naval Strike Warfare Requirements, with

Dr. Richard G. Davis, at the Pentagon, April 7, 1992.

Olsen, Maj. Gen. Thomas R. (Ret), 9AF CV, with Drs. Richard G. Davis and

Perry Jamieson, CAFH, and Dr. Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, at Shaw AFB, S.C.,

March 5, 1992.

Satchwell, Maj. Steve, USAF Studies and Analysis, with Dr. Richard G .Davis,

CAFH, at the Pentagon, D.C., April 29, 1992.

Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman, USA (Ret), CINCCENTCOM, telephone

conversation with Dr. Diane T. Putney, May 5, 1992.

Setnor, Maj. Michael P., AF/IG, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at CAFH

Offices, Bolling AFB, D.C., May 5, 1992.

Terry, Maj. Stanford, GWAPS Analyst, with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at

GWAPS Offices, Arlington, Va., April 9, 1992.

Thomits, Lt. Col. J., SAC Directorate of Operations, with Dr. Kent M. Beck,

SAC Historian, Offutt AFB, Neb., May 15, 1991.

Tretler, Col. David R., Deputy Air Force Historian, audiotape made with Dr.

Richard G. Davis, CAFH, January 14, 1992.

Turner, Lt. Col. Steven L., 336th TFS/CC, with Frederick D. Claypool, 4th

TFW/HO, Seymour Johnson AFB, July 19, 1991, pp. 8–9.

Warden, Col. John A., III, Vice President’s Council on Efficiency, with Drs.

Diane T. Putney, Perry Jamieson, and Richard G. Davis, CAFH, Bolling

AFB, D.C., February 6, 1992.

Warden, Col. John A., III, Comdr, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC),

with Dr. Richard G. Davis, CAFH, at Col. Warden’s Offices, Spaatz

Building, ASC, Maxwell AFB, Ala., March 2, 1993.

Waterstreet, Lt. Col. David L., 9AF/DO, Chief of Combat Plans, with Drs.

Richard G. Davis, CAFH, and Barry Barlow, 9AF/HO, at Shaw AFB, SC,

March 6, 1992.

330

On Target
Official U.S. Government Publications and Unit Histories

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November

1950). United States Army in the Korean War. Washington, D.C.: OCMH,

GPO, 1961.

Clark, Donna L., and Lawson, SSgt. Douglas B. “Nellis Air Force Base Contributions toward the Persian Gulf Conflict.” Vol. 1. September 1991.

Claypool, Frederick D. “4th Tactical Fighter Wing in Southwest Asia (Desert

Shield/Desert Storm): August 1990–June 1991.” November 12, 1991.

Davis, Richard G. Roots of Conflict: A Military Perspective on the Middle East

and Persian Gulf Crisis. Center for Air Force History, 1993.

Davis, Richard G. The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force–Army Cooperation.

Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987.

Defense Intelligence Agency Directorate for Imagery Exploitation. Desert Storm

BDA: Imagery Review, Vols. I–IV. Defense Imagery Reference Series, 1991.

Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to

Congress. Washington, D.C.: DoD, July 1991.

Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to

Congress Pursuant to Title V. Washington, D.C.: DoD, April 1992.

———. Defense 91: Almanac. Arlington, Va.: DoD, September–October 1991.

Gulf War Air Power Survey. Vols. I–V. Washington, D.C.: USAF, GPO, 1993.

Keaney, Thomas A., and Cohen, Eliot A. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary

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Mann, Edward C., III. Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower

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Mason, Herbert A., Bergeron, SSgt. Randy G., and Scharf, Cynthia. “Air Force

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Deployment to the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Air Force

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States Air Force, Vol. II: 1950–1997. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History

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against Iraq. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, January 1995.

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331

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Walters, Kenneth R., Sr., Traxler, Maj. Kathleen M., et al. Gulf War Weather.

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1992.

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334

On Target
Aardvark. See Aircraft, U.S., F–111E

“Aardvark”; Aircraft, U.S., F–

111F “Aardvark”

Abadan, Iran: 17

Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, Fahd ibn

decision to go to war: 2

intervention to prevent war: 26

meeting with Secretary Baker: 115

meeting with U.S. military delegation:

30–31

Abd al-Aziz, Allah: 31

Abd al-Aziz, Bandar bin Sultan

meeting with U.S. military delegation:

31

on President Bush’s peace offer: 148

Saudi Ambassador to the U.S.: 39

told of President Bush’s decision to go

to war: 150, 166

Abd al-Aziz, Khalid bin Sultan bin

briefed on offensive plan: 159

Commander, Joint Islamic-Arab Forces:

39–40

Commander, Saudi Air Defense System:

39

photo of: 40

Abd al-Aziz, Sultan: 39

Above ground level (AGL) limitations: 134

Abqaiq oil facilities: 54

Abu Dhabi, UAE: 20

Abu Rajesh petroleum facility: 251

Acheson, Dean: 21

Ad Dawhah, Qatar. See Doha, Qatar

Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq: 265, 269

Ad Dujayl, Iraq: 250, 264

Adams, Jimmie

DCS, Plans and Operations: 59

Director J–3 (Operations) for Air, interim: 72

in Instant Thunder briefings: 71–72

in OPORD Offensive Campaign—Phase

I briefings: 988

sent Col. Wilson as facilitator: 82

Aden, Gulf of: 10

Aeromedical evacuation: 37

Afghanistan: 10, 153

Ahmed Al Jaber airfield: 192, 200

Air base ground defense: 38–39

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat:

60

Air Component Commander: 38–39. See

also Horner, Charles

Air defense

AADC responsibility: 37

of Coalition countries: 234, 243

establishment of: 48

of Israel

in air campaign planning: 73

interception of SRBMs: 233–234

in NSD–54 administrative policy: 165

Patriot missiles: 230–234

target of Iraqi SRBMs: 79–80, 154,

176, 184, 228–234

priority of Lt. Gen. Horner: 82–83

ROE: 128

in TAC offensive air campaign plan: 81

Air defense communications sector headquarters: 184

Air defense operation center (ADOC): 102,

188, 209, 252

Air Force Intelligence Agency: 87

Air National Guard: 237

Air order of battle

335

Preface

Index

Boldface references indicate photographs and illustrations
A–6E “Intruder”: 102, 118–119, 171

A–7E “Corsair II”: 102, 118

A–10 “Thunderbolt II”: 42, 79, 103, 114,

118, 171

ABCCC: 118

AC–130 “Spectre”: 114, 118, 171

AH–1 “Cobra”: 103

AH–64 “Apache”: 103

AV–8B “Harrier II”: 79, 103, 171

AWACS: 42, 171

B–52G “Stratofortress”: 42, 102, 114,

118, 171

C–20 “Gulfstream”: 42, 114, 171

C–21: 42, 114, 171

C–29 “C-Fin”: 114

C–130 “Hercules”: 42, 114, 118, 171

E–2C “Hawkeye”: 118

E–3 “Sentry”: 103, 114

E–3B “Sentry”: 118, 212

E–3C “Sentry”: 118

EA–6B “Prowler”: 103, 118–119

EA–8 (JSTARS): 118, 171

EC–130E “Volant Solo”: 42, 103, 114,

118, 171, 212

EC–130H “Compass Call”: 42, 114, 171

EF–111A “Raven”: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171, 212

F–4G “Wild Weasel”: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171, 212

F–14 “Tomcat”: 102, 118, 171

F–15C “Eagle”: 42, 102, 114, 118, 171,

212

F–15E “Strike Eagle”: 42, 102, 114, 118,

171

F–16 “Fighting Falcon”: 42, 102, 114,

118, 171, 212

F–16 “Wild Weasel”: 212

F–111E “Aardvark”: 212

F–111F “Aardvark”: 42, 102, 114, 118,

171

F–117A “Nighthawk”: 42, 102–103,

114, 118, 171

F/A –18 “Hornet”: 79, 102, 118, 171

F/A –18M “Hornet”: 103

GR–1 “Tornado”: 102

HC–130 “Hercules”: 42, 114, 171, 212

JSTARS: 118, 171

KA–6D “Intruder”: 118

KC–10 “Extender”: 103, 114, 118, 171

KC–130 “Hercules”: 119

KC–135 “Stratotanker”: 42, 103, 114,

171

KC–135A “Stratotanker”: 212

KC–135Q “Stratotanker”: 118

MC–130 “Combat Talon”: 42, 114, 171,

212

MH–53 “Pave Low”: 42, 114, 171

MH–53J “Pave Low”: 212

MH–60 “Pave Hawk”: 114, 171

OV–10 “Bronco”: 118, 119

RC–135 “Rivet Joint”: 42, 103, 114, 171

RF–4C “Phantom II”: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171

S–3A “Viking”: 118

S–3B “Viking”: 118

SR–71 “Blackbird”: 7n20

TR–1: 42, 103, 114, 171

U–2: 42, 114, 171

U–2R: 103

Air superiority: 63, 81, 157–158

Air tasking order (ATO). See United States

Air Force Component, Central

Command (USCENTAF), air

tasking order (ATO)

Air traffic control system: 37

Air War Plans Division: 62

Air Weapons Center, Eglin AFB, Florida:

283–284

Aircraft, Coalition

Buccaneer

bombing of

Al Jarrah airfield: 267

Al Kut airfield: 280

Al Taqaddum airfield: 281

Ar Rumaylah HASs: 276

Habbaniyah airfield: 281

Jalibah airfield: 280

Jalibah HASs: 276

Shaibah airfield: 267

Shayka Mazhar airfield: 281

Tallil airfield: 280

Tallil HASs: 276

designating targets for Tornados: 255

CF–18 “Hornet”: 133

F–5E “Tiger II”: 18

F–15C “Eagle”: 18

GR–1 “Tornado”

air order of battle: 102

336

On Target
bombing of

Al Asad airfield: 190, 207

Al Hadithah pumping station: 270

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 214

Al Jarrah airfield: 204, 215, 267

Al Khafi highway strip: 190

Al Kut airfield: 280

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

214

Al Taqaddum airfield: 191, 281

An Nasiriyah BW bunkers: 265

Ar Rumaylah airfield: 198

Ar Rumaylah HASs: 276

Baghdad SAM support facilities:

265

Balad Southeast airfield: 215

Ghalaysan airfield: 190–191

H–2 airfield: 213, 216, 251

H–3 airfield: 188, 213

H–3 CW storage facility: 216

H–3 SRBM launch site: 237

Habbaniyah airfield: 281

Jalibah airfield: 250, 280

Jalibah HASs: 276

Latifiya explosives plant: 214

Mudaysis airfield: 190–191, 207

Qurna SRBM shelter: 192

As Salman airfield: 190–191

Shaibah airfield: 205, 267

Shaibah SAM support facilities:

265

Shayka Mazhar airfield: 281

Tallil airfield: 192, 250, 280

Tallil HASs: 276

Wadi al Khirr airfield: 190–191,

207

Buccaneer aircraft designating targets

for: 255

deployment of: 97

loss to Iraqi air defense: 198

vs. MiG–29 “Fulcrum”: 173

number in strike force: 102

refueling from USAF tankers: 270

SEAD support for bombing of

Al Asad airfield: 190–191

H–2 airfield: 213, 216, 251

H–2 SRBM launch site: 183

H–3 airfield: 213

H–3 CW storage facility: 216

SRBM launch sites: 183

in tests at Ingolstadt Flight Test Center: 173

training exercises: 133

use of JP–233 airfield-denial munitions

H–3 airfield: 188

Jalibah airfield: 250

Tallil airfield: 250

GR–1 (IDS) “Tornado”

bombing of

Al Jarrah airfield: 192

Al Khafi highway strip: 216

As Salman airfield: 214

Ghalaysan airfield: 214

H–2 airfield: 207

H–3 airfield: 207, 239

H–3 petroleum pumping station:

207

Habbaniyah airfield: 251

Jalibah airfield: 192

Kuwait airfield: 192

Mudaysis airfield: 215

Shaibah airfield: 192

Wadi al Khirr airfield: 216

use of JP–233 airfield-denial munitions: 192

GR–1A “Tornado”

deployment of: 97

reconnaissance missions: 190–192,

215–216

GR–1B/T2A “Jaguar”

bombing of Shaibah airfield: 267

vs. MiG–29 “Fulcrum”: 173

in tests at Ingolstadt Flight Test Center: 173

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

105

Mirage 2000: 267

RR299 “Mosquito”: 8

Aircraft, Iraqi

AWACS: 91, 201

F–7 Chinese fighter: 172

helicopters: 152, 195

Il–76 “Candid”: 259

L–29 “Maya”: 172

L–39 “Albatross”: 172

MiG–17 “Fresco”: 172

MiG–21 “Fishbed”: 172–173, 261

337

Index
MiG–23E “Flogger”: 172

MiG–23G “Flogger”: 172, 259

MiG–25 “Foxbat”: 172, 189, 300,

300n33

MiG–29 “Fulcrum”

assessment of: 172–173

vs. F–15C “Eagle”

Draeger, Rhory R.: 201

Kelk, Jon K.: 185

Magill, Charles J.: 201

vs. F/A –18 “Hornet”: 300n33

vs. GR–1 “Tornado”: 173

retreat to Iran: 259

Mirage F–1E

assessment of: 172–173

attack capability: 260

vs. F–15C “Eagle”: 185, 187

retreat to Iran: 259

Su–24 “Fencer”: 259

Su–25 “Grach”: 172

Tu–16 “Badger”: 172

Tu–22 “Blinder”: 172

Aircraft, U.S. See also Decoys; Drones

A–6E “Intruder”

air order of battle: 102, 119, 171

bombing of

Abu Rajesh petroleum facility: 251

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192

Al Faw IADS: 201

Al Hadithah power plant: 215

Al Hadithah TV station: 215

Al Jarrah IOC: 270

Al Taqaddum airfield: 191

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192

Ar Rumaylah bridge: 266

Ash Shuaybah railroad station and

airfield: 205

Az Zubayr marshaling yard: 205

Basra petroleum factory: 205

H–2 airfield: 207

H–3 airfield: 207, 282

Kuwait airfield: 192

Mina Al Bakr IADS: 201

Qurna SRBM shelter: 192

Salah Al Din SAM plant: 269

Samarra CW facilities: 251

Shaibah airfield: 192, 205

SRBM support/storage facilities:

241

Taji engine repair facility: 269

Tallil airfield: 192

Tallil SRBM shelters: 236, 238

Tikrit CW facilities: 251

Umm Qasr naval base: 195

CAP mission: 195

PGM capability: 287

SEAD support for bombing of

Baghdad IADS: 189

Failake Island and Kuwait/Iraq

coast: 198

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

97, 102

A–6M “Intruder”: 155

A–7E “Corsair II”

air order of battle: 102, 118

bombing of

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 249

Al Musay rocket test facility: 249

Ar Ramadi SRBM support facilities: 237

Baghdad IADS: 189

H–2 airfield: 199

H–3 airfield: 282

Latifiya explosives plant: 249

Latifiya SRBM support facilities:

237

Qasr Amij SRBM launch complex:

238

SRBM missile storage bunkers:

239

Wadi Amij SRBM launch complex:

238

SEAD support for bombing of

Abu Rajesh petroleum facility: 251

Al Asad airfield: 207

Al Hadithah power plant: 215

Al Hadithah TV station: 215

Al Qaim fertilizer plant: 215

H–2 airfield: 207

H–3 airfield: 188, 207

Samarra CW facilities: 251

Tikrit CW facilities: 251

A–10 “Thunderbolt II”

in 23d TFW: 137

in 354th TFW: 137

after action assessment: 237

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171

attack on

338

On Target
Ar Rutbah EW site: 214

early warning radar sites: 196, 214

H–3 EW site: 214

Iraqi Army: 198

launch baskets: 241

Nukhayb GCI site: 196

Nukhayb IOC: 196

POL equipment and facilities: 198

As Salman warning site: 196

attack priority: 197–198

CSAR support alert: 249

deployment of: 41, 46

GBU-delivery capability: 4

in Instant Thunder plan: 79

missions: 43

reconnaissance of Scud launch baskets: 236–237

on Scud hunt: 238

training exercises: 133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

98–99, 105, 116

“Wart Weaseling”: 196

A–10A “Thunderbolt II”: 307

ABCCC: 77, 118, 132–133

AC–130 “Spectre”

air order of battle: 114, 118, 171

mission of: 38–39

Scud interdiction missions: 239

in SOF units: 38

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116

AH–1 “Cobra”: 103

AH–64 “Apache”: 103

AV–8B “Harrier II”

air order of battle: 103, 118–119, 119,

171

availability for USCENTAF campaign: 97

in Instant Thunder plan: 79

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

105

AWACS

ACE division staffing: 138–139

air order of battle: 42, 171

changes to ATO by: 12

an HVAA: 77

in Instant Thunder plan: 77

operating areas over Turkey: 211

SRBM launch site detection: 242

training with Coalition forces: 132

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

128, 129

B–1 “Lancer”: 6, 8

B–2 “Spirit”: 6, 8

B–17 “Flying Fortress”: 6, 62

B–24 “Liberator”: 62

B–29 “Superfortress”: 65, 314

B–47 “Stratojet”: 65

B–50 “Superfortress”: 65

B–52D “Stratofortress”

aircraft for support of: 6–7

bombing of Haiphong, Vietnam: 6

in Operation Linebacker II: 315

B–52G “Stratofortress”

air order of battle: 42, 102, 114, 118,

171

ALCMs: 72, 104, 196–197

bombing of

Al Hadithah pumping station: 270

Al Hadre ammunition dump: 277

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 269,

277

Al Qaim phosphate plant: 264

Al Sahra airbase: 203–204

Ar Rumaylah ammunition dump:

265

Balad Southeast airfield: 252

Batra missile production factory:

250

Battikha railway station: 278

H–2 airfield: 257

H–2 SRBM launch site: 239, 257

H–3 airfield: 239, 257

H–3 SRBM launch site: 257

Habbaniyah artillery factory: 277

Habbaniyah motor-case factory:

250

IZAF FOL attack: 190

Kirkuk airfield: 267

Mosul missile research facility: 216

Mosul Republican Guard sites: 252

Salah Al Din SAM plant: 269

As Samawah petroleum refinery:

215

SRBM support/storage facilities:

241

339

Index
Taji fabrication plant: 269

Taji facilities: 277

Taji missile support facility: 269

Tall Al Lahm ammunition dump:

265

Tawakalna Mechanized Division:

204, 207

Tikrit ammunition dump: 250

Umayjah petroleum refinery: 215

deployed to Diego Garcia: 41, 67

in Instant Thunder plan: 72, 77, 80

longest combat mission flown: 166

mining of SRBM launch areas: 242

from Moron AB: 216

number in strike force: 102

in Operation Linebacker II: 6–7

photo of: 191

strategic vs. tactical missions: 262

training exercises: 133

in USAF inventory (FY 1993): 6n17

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

104, 116

B–52H “Stratofortress”: 6n17

BQM–34 drones: 91

BQM–74 drones. See Drones

C–5 “Galaxy”: 41–43

C–17 “Globemaster III”: 8

C–20 “Gulfstream”: 42, 114, 171

C–21: 42, 93, 114, 171

C–29 “C-Fin”: 114

C–130 “Hercules”

air order of battle: 42, 114, 118, 171

airlift operations: 43

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116

C–141 “Starlifter”: 40, 41–43, 283

E–2C “Hawkeye”

air order of battle: 118

an HVAA: 77

E–3 “Sentry”

air order of battle: 103, 114

first deployed aircraft in Saudi Arabia:

40

number in support force: 103

surveillance of Iraqi airspace: 183

E–3A “Sentry”: 116

E–3B “Sentry”: 118, 212

E–3C “Sentry”: 118

EA–6B “Prowler”

air order of battle: 103, 118–119

availability of: 97

number in support force: 103

Operation Linebacker II support: 6

SEAD support for bombing of

Abu Rajesh petroleum facility: 251

Ahmed Al Jaber airfield: 200

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192

Al Amarah IOC: 200

Al Asad airfield: 207

Al Faw IADS: 201

Al Hadithah power plant: 215

Al Hadithah TV station: 215

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 249

Al Musay rocket test facility: 249

Al Qaim fertilizer plant: 215

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

198

Ar Ramadi SRBM support facilities: 237

Ar Rumaylah airfield: 198

Ash Shuaybah railroad station and

airfield: 205

Az Zubayr IOC: 199

Az Zubayr railyard: 199

Baghdad IADS: 189

Failake Island and Kuwait/Iraq

coast: 198

H–2 airfield: 207

H–2 highway strip runways: 250

H–3 airfield: 188, 207

H–3 highway strip runways: 250

Kuwait airfield: 192

Latifiya explosives plant: 249

Latifiya SRBM support facilities:

237

Mina Al Bakr IADS: 201

patrol boats: 199

Qasr Amij SRBM launch complex:

238

Qurna SRBM shelter: 192

Samarra CW facilities: 251

Shahiyat rocket facility: 236

Shaibah airfield: 192, 205

Tallil airfield: 192

Tallil IOC: 198

Tikrit CW facilities: 251

340

On Target
Umm Qasr naval base: 195

Wadi Amij SRBM launch complex:

238

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

158

EA–8 (JSTARS)

air order of battle: 118, 171

data from, joint use of: 143–144

deployment of: 141

description of: 141

detection of SRBM launch sites: 238,

241

vs. F–117A: 8

first operational mission: 143

OPCON of: 144

photo of: 169

procurement of: 141–142

surveillance of Iraqi ground forces:

237–238

TACON of: 144

target information from: 144

use of in desert conditions: 169

EB–66 “Destroyer”: 6

EC–130 “Commando Solo”: 41–42

EC–130E “Volant Solo”

ABCCC aircraft: 118

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171

in Instant Thunder plan: 77, 79

in JTF Proven Force: 212

number in support force: 103

in Operation Just Cause: 98n96

EC–130H “Compass Call”

air order of battle: 42, 114, 171

in Instant Thunder plan: 77

in JTF Proven Force: 212

SEAD support for bombing of

Basiqah Northeast: 209

Machurah Dawg North: 209

Sununi: 209

EF–111A “Raven”

in 366th TFW: 137

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171

deployment to theater: 42, 47

deployment to Turkey: 211

in JTF Proven Force: 212

number in support force: 103

SEAD support for bombing of

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

197

Al Fallujah BW bunkers: 214

Al Fallujah SRBM plant: 214

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 214

Al Jarrah airfield: 192, 204

Al Kifl highway bridge: 216

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

214

Al Sahra airbase: 202

Al Taqaddum airfield: 200, 248

Al Taqaddum CW bunker: 213

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 197

An Nasiriyah bridges: 215–216

Ar Rutbah IOC: 248

Baghdad: 182–183, 186–187

Baghdad IADS: 189

Balad Southeast airfield: 191, 213,

215, 252

Batra missile production factory:

250

H–2 airfield: 213

H–2 SRBM launch site: 183, 237

H–3 airfield: 213

H–3 SRBM launch site: 237

Habbaniyah airfield: 251

Habbaniyah BW bunkers: 214

Habbaniyah CW production facilities: 248

Habbaniyah military/artillery production facilities: 214

Habbaniyah motor-case factory:

250

Habbaniyah petroleum storage

facility: 200

Jalibah airfield: 192

Karbala IOC: 248

Latifiya explosives plant: 214

Muftul Waddam bridge: 216

An Najaf IOC: 248

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

248

Qalat Salih SRBM shelters: 207

Qubaysah storage, ammunition, and

Scud depot: 248

Rufah SRBM facility: 248

Salman Pak BW bunkers: 194

Saqash railroad bridge: 215–216

SRBM launch sites: 241

341

Index
SRBM launch sites in northwest

Iraq: 183

Tikrit ammunition dump: 250

Tikrit C2 leadership bunker: 202

Tikrit South airfield: 248

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 249

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

158

F–4 “Phantom”: 7, 172

F–4C “Phantom II”: 4

F–4E “Phantom II”

bombing of Taji military complex:

282

PGM capability: 4–5

replacement of: 5, 13

F–4G “Wild Weasel”

in 35th TFW: 137

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171

bombing of Baghdad IADS: 189–190

deployment to theater: 41, 46–47

deployment to Turkey: 211

for destruction of surface-to-air

threats: 158

in “HARM Heaven”: 190

in JTF Proven Force: 212

number in support force: 103

SEAD support for bombing of

Ahmed Al Jaber airfield: 200

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192, 197

Al Fallujah SRBM plant: 214

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 214

Al Jaber SRBM launch sites: 238

Al Jarrah airfield: 192, 204, 215

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

214

Al Taqaddum airfield: 200, 248

Al Taqaddum CW bunker: 213

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192,

197

Baghdad: 248–249

Basiqah Northeast: 209

Batra missile production factory:

250

H–2 SRBM launch site: 237

H–3 airfield: 239

H–3 SRBM launch site: 237

Habbaniyah airfield: 251

Habbaniyah CW production facilities: 248

Habbaniyah military/artillery production facilities: 214

Habbaniyah motor-case factory:

250

Habbaniyah petroleum storage

facility: 200

Jalibah airfield: 192

Karbala IOC: 248

Kuwait airfield: 192

Latifiya explosives plant: 214

Machurah Dawg North: 209

An Najaf IOC: 248

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

248

Rufah SRBM facility: 248

Salman Pak BW bunkers: 194

Shaibah airfield: 192

SRBM launch sites: 241

Sununi: 209

Tallil CW bunkers: 200

Tawakalna Mechanized Division:

204, 207

Tikrit ammunition dump: 250

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 249

Umayjah petroleum refinery: 215

training exercises: 133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116

“Wart Weaseling”: 196

F–14 “Tomcat”

air order of battle: 102, 118, 171

on aircraft carriers: 41

barrier CAP for IZAF aircraft: 260–

261

bombing of

Al Faw IADS: 201

Ar Ramadi SRBM support facilities: 237

Latifiya SRBM support facilities:

237

Mina Al Bakr IADS: 201

CAP for bombing of

Abu Rajesh petroleum facility: 251

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192

Al Asad airfield: 207

Al Hadithah power plant: 215

342

On Target
Al Hadithah TV station: 215

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 249

Al Musay rocket test facility: 249

Al Qaim fertilizer plant: 215

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192

Baghdad IADS: 189

H–2 airfield: 207

H–2 highway strip runways: 250

H–2 SRBM launch site: 185

H–3 airfield: 188, 207

H–3 highway strip runways: 250

H–3 IOC: 199

H–3 petroleum pumping station:

199

H–3 SOC: 199

H–3 troposcatter site: 199

Latifiya explosives plant: 249

northwest Iraq SRBM sites: 185

Qasr Amij SRBM launch complex:

238

Samarra CW facilities: 251

Tikrit CW facilities: 251

Umm Qasr naval base: 195

Wadi Amij SRBM launch complex:

238

IFF on: 41

number in strike force: 102

sweep of H–3 area: 195, 198

F–15C “Eagle”

in 1st TFW: 137

in 4th TFW: 137

in 33d TFW: 137

air order of battle: 42, 102, 114, 118,

171

barrier CAP for IZAF aircraft: 260–

261

for CAP: 40

CAP for bombing of

Al Fallujah SRBM plant: 214

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 214

Al Jarrah airfield: 204

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

214

Al Taqaddum airfield: 200, 248

An Nasiriyah bridges: 215–216

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

198

Ar Rumaylah airfield: 249

Baghdad: 187, 248–249

Balad Southeast airfield: 213, 252

Balad Southeast airfield HASs: 256

Basiqah Northeast: 209

H–2 airfield: 213, 216

H–2 SRBM launch site: 185, 237

H–3 airfield: 213, 239

H–3 CW storage facility: 216

H–3 SRBM launch site: 237

Habbaniyah CW production facilities: 248

Habbaniyah military/artillery production facilities: 214

Habbaniyah petroleum storage

facility: 200

Jalibah airfield: 250

Latifiya explosives plant: 214

Machurah Dawg North: 209

northwest Iraq SRBM sites: 185

As Samawah oil refinery: 196

Saqash railroad bridge: 215–216

Sununi: 209

Tallil airfield: 250

Tallil CW bunkers: 200

Tallil IOC: 198

Tawakalna Mechanized Division:

204, 207

Tikrit C2 leadership bunker: 202

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 249

deployment to Dhahran AB, Saudi

Arabia: 40, 47

deployment to Turkey: 210–211

for destruction of Iraqi AWACS: 91

first fighter aircraft in AOR: 40

GBU-delivery capability: 4

in JTF Proven Force: 212

kill rate of, with AIM–7: 316

MiG–29 kill: 185

number in strike force: 102

photo of: 116

training exercises: 133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116

F–15E “Strike Eagle”

in 4th TFW: 137

air order of battle: 42, 102, 114, 118,

171

bombing of

Al Basrah Hartha turbine power

plant: 205, 206–207

343

Index
Al Khafi highway strip: 190

Al Kut bridge: 215

Al Kut TV station: 215

Al Qurnah highway bridge: 205

An Nasiriyah bridge: 214

Ar Rumaylah bridge: 214

Balad Southeast airfield: 213

Basra petroleum factory: 205

Ghalaysan airfield: 190–191

H–2 airfield: 184

H–2 SRBM launch site: 183

Jalibah fiber-optic stations: 239

Jalibal fiber-optic link: 266

Kahn Al Mahawil barracks: 238

Karbala IOC: 248

Mudaysis airfield: 190–191

An Najaf IOC: 190, 248

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

248

Qasr Amij SRBM launch complex:

236, 237

Ramadi fiber-optic stations: 239

Republican Guard sites: 248

Rufah SRBM facility: 248

As Salman airfield: 190–191

As Samawah airfield: 192

As Samawah bridges: 214

As Samawah fiber-optic stations:

266

SRBM launch sites: 183, 241–242

Tallil fiber-optic link: 266

Tallil fiber-optic repeater station:

192

Wadi al Jabariyah SRBM launch

complex: 236, 237

Wadi al Khirr airfield: 190–191

Wadi Amij SRBM launch complex:

236, 237

Wadi Ar Ratqa SRBM launch complex: 236, 237

“buddy-lasing”: 183n9

deployment to theater: 41, 46, 103

destruction of Iraqi SRBMs: 91, 155

in Instant Thunder plan: 77

interdiction of SRBMs: 233

LANTIRN

deployment of: 5n10, 13, 43, 183n9

photo of: 155

for Scudbusting: 240

mining of SRBM launch areas: 242

missions: 43

number in strike force: 102

PGM capability: 5, 5n10, 13, 43,

183n9

photo of: 13

as “Scudbuster”: 237, 240, 252

strategic vs. tactical missions: 262

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116, 156, 158

F–16 “Fighting Falcon”

in 4th TFW: 137

aerial refueling requirements: 47

air order of battle: 42, 102, 114, 118,

171

bombing of

Ahmed Al Jaber airfield: 200

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM site: 197

Al Asad, Iraq: 282

Al Fallujah SRBM engine plant:

236

Al Fallujah SRBM plant: 214

Al Hadre CW bunkers: 277

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 214

Al Jaber SRBM launch sites: 238

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

214

Al Rafirinah Command and Control Center: 198

Al Taqaddum airfield: 200, 248,

252

Ali al Saleem airfield: 200

Ali al Saleem SRBM site: 197

Ar Rumaylah airfield: 249

Ash Sharqat missile facility: 271

Baghdad: 248–249

Basra missile plant: 265

H–2 airfield: 252

H–2 SRBM launch site: 237, 238

H–3 airfield: 252

H–3 SAM and SRBM sites: 238

H–3 SRBM launch site: 237, 238

Habbaniyah chemical facility No.

1: 252

Habbaniyah CW production facilities: 248

Habbaniyah military/artillery production facilities: 214

Habbaniyah petroleum storage

344

On Target
facility: 200

K–2 missile storage: 277

Kirkuk airfield: 267, 282

Kirkuk AM transmitter: 277

Kuwait IAP SAM site: 197

Latifiya explosives plant: 214

Latifiya SRBM production facilities: 236

microwave communication facilities: 196

Mosul direction-finding stations:

277

Mosul military R&D facility: 277,

282

Mosul nuclear production facility:

267

Qayyarah airfield: 267

Republican Guard General HQ:

198

Republican Guard LOCs: 252

As Samawah oil refinery: 196

Shahiyat rocket facility: 236

Shaibah ground forces command

facility: 198

Taji military complex: 282

Tallil CW bunkers: 200

Tar Miya nuclear facility: 282

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 249

CAS missions: 97

deployment for Turkey for NATO

support: 210

deployment to Turkey: 211

deployment to UAE: 41

vs. F–4G “Wild Weasel”: 158

GBU-delivery capability: 4

in JTF Proven Force: 212

missions: 43

number in strike force: 102

parts from, used in F–117A: 8

as “Scudbuster”: 237, 252

strategic vs. tactical missions: 262

targets: 156

training exercises: 132–133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116, 155

F–16 “Wild Weasel”: 212

F–16C “Fighting Falcon”

in 363d TFW: 137

in 388th TFW: 137

in 401st TFW: 137

bombing of Tuwaitha nuclear facility:

249–250

shot down over Tuwaitha nuclear

facility: 249–250

F–16L “Fighting Falcon”

bombing of

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192

Republican Guard sites: 248

LANTIRN

capability of: 183n9

for Scudbusting: 192

munitions, CBU–89 “Gator”: 192

as “Scudbuster”: 239, 241

for SEAD missions: 155, 183n9

F–105 “Thunderchief”: 6–7

F–111E “Aardvark”

basing of aircraft: 156

bombing of

Ash Sharqat missile facility: 271

Basiqah Northeast: 209

Irbil ammunition dump: 277

Kirkuk airfield: 267, 282

Machurah Dawg North: 209

Mosul military R&D facility: 282

Mosul nuclear production facility:

267

Qayyarah airfield: 267

Qayyarah BW bunkers: 267

Sununi: 209

Taji airfield: 276

Taji military complex: 282

Tar Miya nuclear facility: 282

decision to send to AOR: 66–67

deployment to Turkey: 210, 211

vs. F–111F: 66–67

in JTF Proven Force: 212

PGM capability: 66–67

targets: 156

F–111F “Aardvark”

in 48th TFW: 137

air order of battle: 42, 102, 114, 118,

171

bombing of

Abu Ghurayb BW facility: 264

Ad Dujayl communications satellite

terminal: 264

345

Index
Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192

Al Amarah highway bridge: 270

Al Amarah IOC: 251

Al Asad airfield: 257, 264

Al Fallujah BW bunkers: 214

Al Jaber airfield: 264

Al Jarrah airfield: 192, 204, 263

Al Kifl highway bridge: 216

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

265

Al Qaim mines: 278

Al Taqaddum airfield: 263

Al Taqaddum CW bunker: 213

Al Taqaddum HASs: 258

Ali al Saleem airfield: 264

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192

An Nasiriyah bridges: 215–216

An Nasiriyah BW bunkers: 265

An Nasiriyah pontoon bridge: 270,

281

An Nasiriyah radio relay station:

216

Ar Ramadi Scud storage center:

237

Ar Rumaylah bridge: 266

Ar Rutbah IOC: 248

As Salman North FOL: 201

As Salman SRBM shelter: 192

Balad Southeast airfield: 191, 213,

252

Basra bridges: 270

BW bunkers south of Baghdad: 252

H–2 airfield: 213, 216, 263

H–2 HASs: 257–258

H–2 SRBM launch site: 237

H–3 airfield: 213, 252, 263

H–3 CW bunkers: 264

H–3 CW storage facility: 188, 216,

252

H–3 HASs: 257–258

H–3 SRBM launch site: 237

Habbaniyah airfield: 251

Habbaniyah BW bunkers: 214

Jalibah airfield: 192, 263

Jalibah Southeast HASs: 258

Kahn Al Mahawil barracks: 238

Latifiya ammunition plant: 265

Latifiya explosives plant: 269

Latifiya Scud plant: 265

Latifiya solid propellant plant: 264

Mudaysis FOL airfield: 201

Muftul Waddam bridge: 216

North Taji facility (No. 2): 283–284

Qabatiya BW bunker: 213–214

Qalat Salih airfield: 264

Qalat Salih SRBM shelters: 192,

207

Qubaysah SRBM support facilities:

237

Qubaysah storage, ammunition, and

Scud depot: 248

Rasheed aircraft repair depot: 265

Salman Pak BW bunkers: 194, 251

Salman Pak CW facility: 251

Saqash railroad bridge: 215–216

Shaibah HASs: 258

Shayka Mazhar airfield: 264

SRBM launch sites: 241

SRBM shelters: 240

Taji BW facility: 251

Tallil airfield: 263

Tallil HASs: 258

Tikrit C2 leadership bunker: 202

Tikrit South airfield: 248

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 264

Wadi al Khirr FOL airfield: 201

Wadi al Khirr HASs: 258

bombing of Iraqi runways: 102

Class A accidents: 134

collateral damage estimations: 131

cost of: 8

deployment of to theater: 42

deployment to Taif AB, Saudi Arabia:

47

vs. F–111E: 66–67

vs. F–117A: 257

formation of ground attack alert force:

139

hard-target penetration bombing: 5–6,

43–44

in Instant Thunder plan: 77

kill rate of, with GBU–12 munition:

306

missions: 43–44

munitions: 192

number in strike force: 102

PGM capability: 4–5, 66–67, 287

346

On Target
photo of, with CBU–87s: 195

photos of: 5, 116, 205

planning for combat use of: 12–13

refueling over Iraq: 202

training exercises: 133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116, 155, 158

F–117A “Nighthawk”

in 37th TFW: 137

air order of battle: 42, 102–103, 114,

118, 171

bombing of

V sector (Kuwait) SOC: 193

Abu Ghurayb C3 bunker: 202, 251,

274

Abu Ghurayb “Infant Formula”

plant: 253

Abu Ghurayb presidential complex:

281

Abu Ghurayb Presidential Palace:

186

Ad Diwaniyah BW bunkers: 265,

269

Ad Duyayl relay terminal: 250

ADOC: 252, 270

Air defense communications sector

headquarters: 184

Al Amarah IOC: 270

Al Asad HASs: 258–259

Al Fallujah BW bunkers: 209, 214

Al Fallujah telecommunications

center: 250

Al Firdos bunker: 271

Al Iskandariyah ammunition plant:

281

Al Jarrah airfield: 267

Al Jarrah CW bunkers: 264

Al Karakh PTT building: 251

Al Kifl highway bridge: 250

Al Kut airfield: 267

Al Kut IOC: 270

Al Kut telephone exchange: 265

Al Musayyib missile R&D facilities: 283

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

281

Al Narawan: 281

Al Qaim mines: 278

Al Sahra HASs: 259

Al Taqaddum CW bunker: 264, 277

Al Taqaddum IOC: 186, 193, 202

An Nasiriyah BW bunkers: 265

An Nasiriyah telephone exchange:

265

Ar Ramadi ammunition dump: 277

Ar Ramadi Radio Relay (No. 2):

186

Ar Rumaylah bridge: 266

Ar Rutbah IOC: 193, 250

As Samawah fiber-optic stations:

266, 278

Ash Shuaybah telephone exchange:

265

Az Zubayr cable drop: 281

Az Zubayr IOC: 193

Az Zubayr pumping station: 280

Baath Party Headquarters: 274–

275, 282

Baghdad: 216

Baghdad AT&T Building: 186

Baghdad bomb assembly plant: 281

Baghdad intelligence station: 251

Baghdad jammer and transmitter:

277

Baghdad Ministry of Defense: 252

Baghdad nuclear facilities: 277

Baghdad Republican Guard barracks: 265

Baghdad SAM support facilities:

265, 277

Baghdad Security Forces HQ: 253

Baghdad signals station: 252

Baghdad SOC: 193

Baghdad SRBM assembly plant:

267

Baghdad telecommunications center: 186, 253

Baghdad TV transmitter: 252

Balad SE ADOC: 270

Balad SE airfield: 267

Balad SE airfield HASs: 256, 263–

264

Basra radio transmitter-receiver:

264

Bir Akirshah air warning site: 252

C2 bunker (No. 2): 186

Camp Taji: 253, 275

Diwaniyah BW bunkers: 194

347

Index
H–1 airfield: 267

H–2 airfield: 263

H–2 HASs: 258–259

H–2 IOC: 252

H–3 airfield: 263

H–3 CW bunkers: 264

H–3 HASs: 258–259

H–3 IOC: 193, 209

H–3 SOC: 184, 201, 250

Habbaniyah artillery factory: 277,

282

Habbaniyah BW bunkers: 209, 214,

277

Habbaniyah CW production facilities: 264

Habbaniyah motor-case factory:

277

Habbaniyah troposcatter station:

193

HAS: 241

I-Hawk battery: 209, 253

IIS HQ: 201, 265, 274, 281

incendiary defense system: 280

Iraqi Army III/IV Corps HQs: 268

Iraqi AWACS at Saddam IAP: 201

Iraqi CIA building: 253, 275

Iraqi intelligence/special ops HQ:

280

IZAF Headquarters (New): 193,

201, 274–275

IZAF HQ bunkers: 265

Jalibah HASs: 276

Jalibal fiber-optic link: 266

Jenoub PTT building: 251–252,

277

Jumhuriya bridge: 266

Karbala BW bunkers: 265

Karbala fiber-optic stations: 278

Karbala IOC: 270

Khan Al Mahiwil AM transmitter:

201

Kirkuk airfield: 267

Kirkuk ammunition depot: 281

Kirkuk CW bunkers: 267

Kirkuk HASs: 258–259

Latifiya liquid propellant plant: 269

Latifiya solid propellant plant: 277

Latifiya SRBM facilities: 277

Latifiya SSM facility: 269

Maiden Square telecommunications

center: 193

Military Intelligence HQ: 274–275

Ministry of Defense National

Computer Center: 201

Ministry of Defense offices: 214–

215, 215n111, 265, 275

Ministry of Information offices:

214–215, 215n111, 274

Ministry of Internal Security

offices: 214–215, 215n111

Ministry of Military Industry: 265

Mosul CW bunkers: 277

Mosul HASs: 259

Mufrash radio relay: 281

Muhammad airfield: 259

Muthenna airfield: 282

North Taji facility (No. 2): 251,

253, 275

Nukhayb IOC: 184, 209

Presidential bunker: 193

Presidential Palace: 253, 265

Qabatiya BW bunker: 209,

213–214

Qayyarah HASs: 258–259

Qayyarah West CW bunkers: 267,

277

Rasheed HASs: 267

SA–2 sites: 269

SA–3 sites: 269

Salman Pak: 264

Salman Pak AM transmitter: 201

Salman Pak BW/CW facilities:

194, 282

Salman Pak IOC: 193, 270

Samarra CW facilities: 281

Security Forces HQ: 275

Shahiyat liquid-fuel plant: 277, 282

Shahiyat rocket facility: 282

Shaibah SAM support facilities:

265

Special Security Services: 281

Taji armored vehicle repair depot:

269

Taji BW facility: 252, 253, 277

Taji C2 bunker (No. 2): 193

Taji engine repair facility: 269

Taji SOC: 186

Taji SSM equipment plant: 277

348

On Target
Tall Afar airfield: 266

Tallil CW bunkers: 264

Tallil fiber-optic link: 266

Tallil fiber-optic stations: 278

Tallil IOC: 209

Tallil SOC: 186, 209

Tar Miya rocket facility: 269

Tikrit: 277

Tikrit BW bunkers: 269

Tikrit radio communications facility: 278

Tikrit railyard and bridge: 278

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 252–253,

264

TV and radio transmitters: 264, 268

VIP bunker (No. 25): 252, 265

choice of weapons: 257

collateral damage estimations: 131

combat performance

bombing accuracy: 263, 282

against difficult targets: 202

impact of weather on: 194–195,

216–217

cost of: 8

deployment of: 41, 46

development of: 7–9

vs. F–111F: 257

first mission in Desert Storm: 178–

179

hard-target penetration bombing: 5–6,

43–44, 91

impact of last minute changes on: 252

in Instant Thunder plan: 77

Iraqi tracking and targeting of: 186

loss record: 186

missions: 43–44

number in strike force: 102

PGM capability: 4–5, 287

photo of: 263

planning for combat use of: 12, 105,

318

receipt of mission orders: 274

targets: 156

training exercises: 133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116

F/A–18 “Hornet”

air order of battle: 102, 118, 171

availability for USCENTAF

campaign: 97

bombing of

Al Amarah IOC: 200

Al Asad airfield: 282

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 249

Al Jarrah IOC: 270

Al Musay rocket test facility: 249

Al Qaim air warning site: 277

Al Qaim fertilizer plant: 215

An Nasiriyah pontoon bridge: 281

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

198

Ar Ramadi SRBM support facilities: 237

Ar Rumaylah bridge: 281

Az Zubayr IOC: 199

Az Zubayr marshaling yard: 205

Az Zubayr railyard: 199, 278

Baghdad IADS: 189

Basra bridges: 265–266

Basra petroleum factory: 205

Failake Island and Kuwait/Iraq

coast: 198

H–3 IOC: 199

H–3 petroleum pumping station:

199

H–3 SOC: 199

H–3 troposcatter site: 199

Kari system: 207

Kuwait airfield: 192

Latifiya explosives plant: 249

Latifiya solid propellant plant: 270

Latifiya SRBM support facilities:

237

Nasiriyah power plant: 192

patrol boats: 199

Qurna SRBM shelter: 192

Shaibah airfield: 192, 205

Tallil airfield: 192

Tallil IOC: 198

Tallil SRBM shelters: 236, 238

Wadi al Jabariyah, Iraq: 238

Wadi Ar Ratqa SRBM launch complex: 238

CAP for bombing of

Ahmed Al Jaber airfield: 200

Al Amarah IOC: 200

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

198

349

Index
Ar Rumaylah airfield: 198

Ash Shuaybah railroad station and

airfield: 205

Az Zubayr IOC: 199

Az Zubayr railyard: 199

Failake Island and Kuwait/Iraq

coast: 198

Kuwait airfield: 192

patrol boats: 199

Shaibah airfield: 192

Tallil airfield: 192

Tallil IOC: 198

vs. F–4G “Wild Weasel”: 158

in Instant Thunder plan: 79

loss of during bombing of Baghdad:

189, 300, 300n33

number in strike force: 102

parts from, used in F–117A: 8

as “Scudbuster”: 266

SEAD support for bombing of

Abu Rajesh petroleum facility: 251

Al Asad airfield: 207

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station:

198

Ar Rumaylah airfield: 198

Ash Shuaybah railroad station and

airfield: 205

Az Zubayr IOC: 199

Az Zubayr railyard: 199

Failake Island and Kuwait/Iraq

coast: 198

H–2 airfield: 207

H–3 airfield: 207

patrol boats: 199

Samarra CW facilities: 251

Shaibah airfield: 205

Tallil IOC: 198

Tikrit CW facilities: 251

sweep of H–3 area: 198

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

155, 158

F/A –18M “Hornet”: 103

FB–111 “Switchblade”: 6

HC–130 “Hercules”

air order of battle: 42, 114, 171

in JTF Proven Force: 212

KA–6D “Intruder”

air order of battle: 118

tanker support for bombing of

Az Zubayr IOC: 199

Az Zubayr railyard: 199

Baghdad IADS: 189

H–3 IOC: 199

H–3 petroleum pumping station:

199

H–3 SOC: 199

H–3 troposcatter site: 199

patrol boats: 199

KC–10 “Extender”

air order of battle: 103, 114, 118, 171

photo of: 43, 257

KC–130 “Hercules”: 119

KC–135 “Stratotanker”

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 171

deployment for Turkey for training:

210

operating areas over Turkey: 211

tanker support for bombing missions:

202

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116

KC–135A “Stratotanker”: 212

KC–135Q “Stratotanker”: 118

MC–130 “Combat Talon”

air order of battle: 42, 114, 171

in JTF Proven Force: 212

MH–53 “Pave Low”

air order of battle: 42, 114, 171

for SOF missions in AOR: 38

MH–53J “Pave Low”

in JTF Proven Force: 212

in Task Force Normandy: 182

MH–60 “Pave Hawk”

air order of battle: 114, 171

for SOF missions in AOR: 38

MH–64 “Apache”: 182

OA–10 “Thunderbolt II”: 171, 238

OV–10 “Bronco”: 119

RC–135 “Rivet Joint”

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 171

operating areas over Turkey: 211

RF–4C “Phantom II”

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 118,

171

Class A accidents: 134

reconnaissance of bombing of

Al Rafirinah C2 center: 198

Republican Guard General HQ,

350

On Target
Forward, Basra: 198

Shaibah ground forces command

facility: 198

SRBM sites: 195

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116

use of in desert conditions: 169

S–3A “Viking”: 118

S–3B “Viking”: 118

SR–71 “Blackbird”: 7n20

TR–1

air order of battle: 42, 103, 114, 171

photo of: 43

use of in desert conditions: 169

U–2: 42, 114, 171

U–2R: 103

Airspace Control Authority (ACA) duties:

37

Ajaji Bayji power plant: 15, 199

Al Amarah, Iraq

highway bridge: 270

IOC: 200, 251, 270

oil storage facilities: 269

TV transmitters: 264

Al Asad airfield

facilities: 214, 267, 276, 282

HASs: 257–258

MiG–29 “Fulcrum” base: 200

runway: 190, 207

Al Basrah, Iraq. See Basra, Iraq

Al Dhafra airfield: 137

Al Fallujah, Iraq

bridges: 270

BW bunkers: 209, 214

SAM support facilities: 269

Scud plant: 214

SRBM engine plant: 236

telecommunications center: 250

Al Faw, Iraq: 17, 201

Al Firdos bunker: 271, 273–275

Al Hadithah, Iraq: 215, 270

Al Hadre: 277

Al Hijarah SRBM: 153

Al Husayn SRBM: 153, 236n39

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 214, 249, 269,

277, 281

Al Jaber airfield: 238

bombing of: 264

Al Jarrah airfield

bombing of: 267

CW bunkers: 264

CW storage facility: 192

facilities: 204

HASs: 263

IOC: 270

Mirage F–1E base: 187

runways: 192, 204, 215

SAM support facilities: 269

SRBM shelters: 192

TV transmitters: 264

Al Jouf airfield: 236–237

Al Karakh PTT building: 251, 288

Al Khafi highway strip: 190, 216

Al Kharj AB, Saudi Arabia

4th TFW base: 137

335th TFS base: 183n9

336th TFS base: 183

deployment of F–15Es to: 46

site planning of: 17

Al Kifl highway bridge: 216, 250, 270

Al Kufa, archaeological site: 131

Al Kut, Iraq

in air campaign plan: 97

airfield: 267, 280

bridge: 215

IOC: 270

oil storage facilities: 269

telephone exchange: 265

TV station: 215

TV transmitters: 264

Al Mawsil, Iraq. See Mosul, Iraq

Al Minhad airfield, Oman: 47, 137

Al Musayyib, Iraq

missile R&D facilities: 283

power plant: 196–197

rocket-motor plant: 214, 265, 281

rocket test facility: 249

Al Narawan complex: 281

Al Qa Qaa: 249, 265

Al Qaim, Iraq

fertilizer plant: 215

phosphate plant: 264

propellant storage: 278

SRBMs hidden in mines: 278

uranium mine: 293

Al Qurnah, Iraq: 192, 235–236

Al Rafirinah C2 center: 198

Al Sahra airfield: 203, 259

351

Index
Al Taqaddum airfield

bombing of: 267, 281

CW bunkers: 213, 264, 277

facilities: 200, 248

HASs: 258, 263

IOC: 186, 193, 202

MiG–29s based at: 185

runways: 200

target of air campaign: 201

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 104

Al Walid airbase: 295

Albatross: 172

Alexander, R. Minter: 59, 68

Ali al Saleem airfield: 192, 200, 264

Ali, Muhammad: 148

An Najaf, Iraq

archaeological site near: 131

IOC: 190, 248

oil storage facilities: 269

An Nasiriyah, Iraq

archaeological site near: 130–131

in Army campaign planning: 158–159

bridge: 214–216, 250, 281

BW bunkers: 265

oil storage facilities: 269

pontoon bridge: 270

telephone exchange: 265

troposcatter station: 198, 248

Andersen AFB, Guam: 6

Andrews AFB, Maryland: 31

Anthrax: 109n118, 253

Antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

altitude coverage of: 174

GC–45 (155-mm): 167

Iraqi response to SEAD: 190

quantity of: 152, 174

radar: 174

S–60 (57-mm): 174

suppression of: 7. See also Suppression

of enemy air defenses (SEAD)

ZSU–23–4 antiaircraft vehicle: 174, 197

Apache helicopter: 103, 182

Ar Ramadi, Iraq

ammunition dump: 277

bridges: 270

oil storage facilities: 269

Radio Relay No. 2: 186

SRBM support facilities: 237

Ar Rawdatyn TV transmitter: 264

Ar Rumaylah airfield

ammunition dump: 265

bombing of: 198

bridge: 214, 266, 281

HASs: 276

Ar Rutbah, Iraq

EW site: 214

IOC: 193, 248, 250

Arab League: 19–20, 49

Archer missile: 172–173

Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)

duties: 36–37

Area of responsibility (AOR) of USCENTCOM: 10

Arens, Moshe: 166, 230

Armstrong, Malcolm: 234

As Salman airfield: 190–192, 196, 201

As Samawah, Iraq

airfield: 192

bridges: 214

fiber-optic stations: 266, 278

refinery: 196, 215, 270

TV transmitters: 264

Ash Sharqat missile facility: 271

Ash Shuaybah railroad station and airfield:

205

Ash Shuaybah telephone exchange: 265

Ash Shuyukh bridge: 281

al-Assad, Bashar: 119, 163

Austro-Prussian War of 1866: 117

Aviation Week & Space Technology: 99

“Awareness of Host-Nation Sensitivities”:

119–120

Az Zubayr, Iraq

Al Rafirinah C2 center: 198

cable drop: 281

IOC: 193, 199, 214

petroleum pumping/storage facility: 199,

270, 280

railyard: 170, 199, 205–206, 278

supply center: 303

TV transmitters: 264

Aziz, Tariq

on attacking Israel: 162

invited to meet with President Bush:

147–148, 150

meeting with Ambassador Glaspie: 21,

22

meeting with Secretary Baker: 162

352

On Target
visit to Iran: 52

visit to Moscow: 279

Bab al Mandab: 17

Babylon: 131

Badger: 172

Baghdad, Iraq

Abu Ghurayb

BW bunkers: 264

C3 bunker: 202, 251

“Infant Formula” plant: 253

presidential complex: 186, 214, 265,

281

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

104

ADOC: 102, 188, 209, 252

Al Karakh PTT building: 251, 288

AT&T Building: 186

Baath Party Headquarters

bombing of: 187, 274–275, 282

in Instant Thunder plan: 78

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

104

bomb assembly plant: 281

bombing of: 216, 248–249

BW bunkers south of: 252

CNN coverage of: 186, 187, 249

conference center: 275

East-Southeast transformer station: 199

governmental control centers: 207

I-Hawk battery: 209

IADS: 175, 189–190

IIS HQ: 201–202, 265, 274, 281

in Instant Thunder plan: 78

intelligence station: 251

Iraqi CIA building: 253

jammer and transmitter: 277

Jenoub PTT building: 251–252, 277

loss of F/A–18 over: 189, 300, 300n33

Ministry of Defense: 252

Ministry of Defense/Army HQ: 199

Ministry of Defense computer center:

214

Muthenna airfield: 282

nuclear facilities: 277

in OPLAN 1002–90: 15

power plants: 187–188

Presidential Palace: 187, 253

Radio Baghdad: 217, 241

Republican Guard barracks: 265

SAM support facilities: 265, 277

SAMs in: 102

Security Forces HQ: 253

signals station: 252

SOC: 193

Special Security Services: 281

SRBM assembly plant: 267

in strike packages: 104

telecommunications center: 186, 253

transformer station: 199

TV and radio transmitters: 264

TV transmitter: 252

United States Embassy: 20–25, 163

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 104

VIP bunker (No. 25): 202, 252

Bahrain

Coalition member: 49

deployment of F–4Gs to: 41, 46–47

restrictions on U.S. military personnel

in: 125

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Baker, James

in Camp David briefing on Kuwait invasion: 29

on Coalition force diversity: 108

on F–117A stealth capabilities: 105

on Israeli retaliation for SRBM attacks:

230

meeting with King Fahd: 115

meeting with President al-Assad: 163

meeting with President Gorbachev: 118

meeting with Secretary Aziz: 162

on possibility of war: 112

on projected Coalition air loss rates: 106

proposed meeting with Saddam Hussein:

147–148, 150

on request for KC–135 aerial refueling

by UAE: 20

Saudi agreement to offensive operations:

163

on tanker requirements: 103

on Vietnam vs. Iraq: 106

visit to world leaders: 112, 117

Balad Southeast airfield

ADOC: 270

bombing of: 213, 215, 267

HASs: 258

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 104

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana: 72, 104, 166

353

Index
Basiqah Northeast EW facilities: 209

Basra, Iraq

bridges: 205, 265–266, 281

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

IADS of: 175

Instant Thunder target: 78

missile plant: 265

oil storage facilities: 269

petroleum factory: 205

radio transmitter-receiver: 264

refinery: 214, 270

Republican Guard General HQ, Forward, Basra: 198

Bateen AB, UAE: 125

Batra missile production factory: 250

Battikha railway station: 278

Battle of Khafji: 265

Bayji refinery: 270

Behavior, in host nation: 119–124

Ben-Nun, Hvihu: 232

Beyond visual range (BVR) zones: 129–

130, 316

Billeting of military personnel: 120–121

Biological weapons (BW). See also Nuclear, biological, and chemical

(NBC) weapons

anthrax in: 109n118

authorization to destroy: 156

destruction of: 294

Bir Akirshah air warning site: 252

Black Hole

authorization to destroy BW facilities:

156

creation of: 86

in Directorate of Campaign Plans: 138–

140

dissolution of: 310

intelligence personnel in: 224n10, 229

reliance on Checkmate for intelligence

data: 225

use of videotapes for BDA: 226

Blackburn, James: 76, 86–87

Blinder: 172

Bolling AFB, Washington, District of

Columbia: 68

Bomb damage assessment (BDA)

assessment of by targeteer: 63–64, 89–

90, 286

of bridges: 302–303

concept of bombing for effect: 317–318

conventional weapons production: 296–

299

data, for planners: 223–225, 285–286

in desert environment: 306, 306 n54

of HASs: 259

of IADS: 217–218, 299–300

in Instant Thunder plan: 77

of Iraqi Army: 305–306

of Iraqi Navy: 299, 301–302

of IZAF: 299, 300–301

to Kari system: 217, 299–300

of leadership and C2 targets: 217–218,

288–289, 291, 298

level of effort: 301

limitations of: 309

live via commercial television: 179

of LOCs: 302–303

of MELs: 217, 297–298

of NBC facilities and weapons: 217,

293–296

photo for: 215

of POL: 292–293, 298

of power plants: 217, 291–293, 298

of Republican Guard facilities, units, and

weapons: 217, 304–309

of SRBMs: 217–219, 296–299

of supply distribution system: 302–303,

303n43

of transportation systems: 302–303

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 104,

286–287

use of videotapes for: 226

weather impact on: 223

Bombs

BLU–91/B: 156n21

BLU–92/B: 156n21

BLU–97/B: 194

BLU–109/B (I–2000): 5–6, 79, 283

CBU–58: 209

CBU–71: 158

CBU–87: 194, 240

CBU–89 “Gator”

for attack on

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM site: 192,

197

Al Khafi highway strip: 190–191

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192,

197

354

On Target
As Salman airfield: 190–191

BW bunkers south of Baghdad: 252

Ghalaysan airfield: 190–191

H–3 CW storage facility: 188

Jalibah airfield: 192

Mudaysis airfield: 190–191

Qabatiya BW bunker: 213–214

Salman Pak BW bunker: 194

Wadi al Khirr airfield: 190–191

description of: 156, 156n21

electro-optically guided bombs: 4

fuses

FMU–113 nose: 197

Thorne: 191

GBU–10

for attack on

Abu Ghurayb “Infant Formula”

plant: 253

Ad Duyayl relay terminal: 250

Al Fallujah telecommunications

center: 250

Al Karakh PTT building: 251

Baghdad intelligence station: 251

Baghdad Security Forces HQ: 253

Baghdad signals station: 252

Baghdad telecommunications center: 253

Balad Southeast airfield HAS: 256

Camp Taji: 253

I-Hawk battery: 253

Iraqi CIA building: 253

Jenoub PTT building: 251–252

North Taji facility (No. 2): 253

Presidential Palace: 253

SRBM launch site: 240

Taji BW facility: 253

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 252–253

VIP bunker (No. 25): 252

delivery systems: 4

for HAS bombing: 257

for nonhardened targets: 186

photo of: 67

GBU–12

for antiarmor missions: 262

for attack on

H–1 EW site: 242

SRBM launch site: 242

Wadi al Jabariyah SRBM launch

complex: 242

Wadi Amij SRBM launch complex:

242

delivery systems: 4

kill rate of: 306

GBU–16: 4

GBU–22: 4

GBU–24

for attack on

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192

Jalibah airfield: 192

SRBM shelter: 240

collateral damage estimations: 131

delivery system: 4

for hard-target penetration: 5–6

GBU–27

for attack on

ADOC: 252

Al Fallujah BW bunker: 209

Balad SE airfield HAS: 264

Habbaniyah BW bunker: 209

North Taji facility (No. 2): 251, 275

Salman Pak BW bunker: 194

Taji SOC: 209

VIP bunker (No. 25): 252

collateral damage estimations: 131

delivery system: 4

for hard-target penetration: 5–6, 186

for HAS bombing: 257

in Instant Thunder plan: 79

GBU–28: 283–284

Paveway delivery system for GBUs:

4–6

JP–233 airfield-denial munition

H–3 airfield: 188

for hard-target penetration: 5n11

Jalibah airfield: 192, 250

Tallil airfield: 250

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

102

laser-guided bombs (LGBs)

“buddy-lasing”: 183n9

use of in Vietnam: 4, 315

long-range bombs (LRBs): 77

Mk–20 “Rockeyes”: 183

Mk–82: 197, 241

Mk–84

for attack on

355

Index
Ahmed Al Jaber airfield: 200

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM site: 197

Ali al Saleem airfield: 200

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 197

Kuwait IAP SRBM site: 197

SAM sites: 197

Tuwaitha nuclear facility: 249

Wadi al Jabariyah SRBM launch

complex: 242

vs. BLU–109/B: 5

Mk–117R: 250

Mk–118: 183

Tarzon: 315

UK 1000: 191

Boyd, Charles: 60

Bradley armored personnel carriers: 112

British. See Great Britain

Bronco: 119

Bruner, William: 185

Bull, Gerald: 19

Bush, George H. W.

activation of National Guard: 115

approval of request for KC–135 aerial

refueling by UAE: 20

briefed on force readiness: 161

briefings on offensive air campaign: 74,

99

briefings on USCENTCOM war plan:

102–109

check on CINCCENT war preparations:

150–151

as Commander in Chief: 108–109

consulted on Gen. Dugan’s firing: 100

decision to go to war: 2, 147, 164–166

foreign policy, towards Iraq: 18–19, 53,

115

go ahead for ground attack: 268, 278

on human rights abuses in Kuwait: 150

implementation of offensive option decision: 112

on Israeli retaliation for Scud attacks:

230

letter to Congress: 162

meeting with President al-Assad: 119

meeting with President Gorbachev: 117–

118

objectives in the Persian Gulf: 53, 108

opposition to economic sanctions on

Iraq: 25

peace offer: 148

reference to, in Iraqi editorial: 1

on rejection of diplomatic solution: 162

rejection of Gorbachev peace plan: 279

response to invasion: 29–30, 108

on Saddam Hussein’s response to peace

offer: 148

signing of Public Law 102–1: 163

statement on Kuwait invasion: 30

support of Gen. Schwarzkopf: 108–109

on targets: 165

on time available for peaceful solution:

117

Butler, George L.: 72

Cable News Network (CNN)

coverage of Desert Storm: 179

live BDA: 186

loss of power in Baghdad: 187

video of AAA defenses in Baghdad: 249

Canada

Canadian aircraft in strike package: 133

Canadian hostages in Iraq: 148

Candid: 259

Cantonment, in host nations: 120–121

Carns, Michael: 72

Caruana, Patrick: 88, 204–205

Casualties

after action assessment: 310–312

estimation of: 131–132

first Coalition pilot killed in action: 189,

300

first USAF airmen killed in action: 207

minimization of, NSD–54 goal: 165

from SRBM: 243

during training and maneuvers: 134

C-day: 32, 40, 94

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 25, 29,

87

Chaff and flares: 7

Chain, John: 136

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS). See also Powell,

Colin

Crowe, William: 148

Jones, David: 148

on offensive air campaign plan, request

for: 58

on request for KC–135 aerial refueling

by UAE: 20

356

On Target
Chaplains: 125–127

Charleston AFB, South Carolina: 40

Checkmate Division, Warfighting Concepts

Directorate

on bridge bombing: 266, 266n66

collateral damage estimations: 131–132

concentrated bombing plan: 280

establishment of: 60

HAS attack plan: 256

intelligence gathering of: 87, 225

a joint organization: 71–72

SRBM quantity estimate: 153

strategic bombing goals: 312

on targets: 272

Chemical weapons (CW): 154, 294. See

also Nuclear, biological, and

chemical (NBC) weapons

Cheney, Richard

activation of National Guard: 115

anticipation of TGS support: 211

approval of deployment order: 115

approval of ground attack plan: 268, 278

approval of USCENTCOM war plan:

161

authorization to deploy U.S. forces to

Saudi Arabia: 32

briefing on Instant Thunder: 71

briefings on USCENTCOM war plan:

102–109, 151–152

in Camp David briefing on Kuwait invasion: 29–30

check on CINCCENT war preparations:

150–151

firing of Gen. Dugan: 100–101

on force readiness: 161

on goals of air campaign: 30

on Israeli retaliation for Scud attacks:

230

in meeting King Fahd: 30

on need of military force: 161

notification of Secretary Arens: 166

offensive air campaign plan, request for:

58

on request for KC–135 aerial refueling

by UAE: 20

reserve call up: 50–51, 115

rotation of forces in Persian Gulf: 115

Saddam Hussein on: 22

on size of USCENTCOM force: 112

strategic air war briefing: 267–268

on targets: 289n10

USCENTCOM briefing of prior to Kuwait invasion: 26

vigil during Desert Storm: 230

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF).

See also Dugan, Michael

briefings on Instant Thunder: 70, 72–73

Gabriel, Charles: 61

legal authority of: 100

McPeak, Merrill, “Tony”: 101, 101

request for assistance from Gen

Schwarzkopf: 57–59

support of Joint AirLand Battle: 61

targeting data from: 98

Welch, Larry: 100

Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA): 72

Chief of Staff of the Navy (CSN): 72

Chief of Staff, Ninth Air Force: 120

China

F–7 fighter from: 172

Instant Thunder-style assault on: 318

in UN Security Council: 117

vote on UN Resolution 678: 119

Christon, Christopher: 223

Churchill, Winston: 316

Circular error of probability (CEP): 153

Civil Reserve Air Fleet: 30, 42

Clausewitz, Carl von: 195, 299

Close air support (CAS)

CAFMS for: 92

COMUSCENTAF duty: 37

ground-force familiarization flights: 133

in Imminent Thunder: 134

impact of on strategic air campaign: 318

JSTARS impact on: 142

low-level tactics during: 222

in OPORDs for Desert Shield: 54

in Phase II of USCENTCOM war plan:

95

in Phases III/IV of air campaign: 2, 247–

248

in prioritization of A–10 missions: 198

vs. strategic attack: 160

in TAC offensive air campaign plan: 81

Cobra helicopter: 103

Cold War: 13–14

Combat air patrol (CAP)

barrier, for IZAF aircraft: 260–261

357

Index
in Instant Thunder plan: 77

of offshore oil facilities, by UAE: 20

in Operation Linebacker II: 7

by RSAF: 214

SRBM interdiction missions: 239–240

Combat search and rescue (CSAR)

COMUSCENTAF duty: 37

inclusion of JTF Proven Force: 212–213

in Instant Thunder plan: 79

services, from Turkey: 211

use of SOF for: 38–39

Combat Talon. See Aircraft, U.S., MC–130

“Combat Talon”

Command and control (C2

) operations: 115

Command, control, and communications

(C3

) systems. See also Aircraft, U.S., ABCCC; Aircraft,

U.S., AWACS

destruction of Iraqi, NSD–54 goal: 165

initial deployment to Saudi Arabia: 45–

46

targeting of Iraqi LOCs: 69, 73–75

Command, control, communications, and

intelligence (C3

I) systems: 105

Commander, 4th FW(P): 137

Commander, 14th AD(P): 137

Commander, 15th AD(P): 137

Commander, 16th AD(P): 136

Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF):

136

Commander, Area Air Defense: 36–37

Commander in Chief, European Command

(CINCEUR): 210, 212

Commander in Chief, Special Operations

Command (CINCSOC): 38,

212

Commander in Chief, Specified Commands: 51, 71

Commander in Chief, Strategic Command

(CINCSAC): 136, 212

Commander in Chief, Unified Commands

air campaign planning: 81

Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reform Act of

1986: 66

JCS staff contact with: 71

in USCENTCOM briefing on Desert

Shield deployments: 51

Commander in Chief, United States Central

Command (CINCCENT). See

also Schwarzkopf, H. Norman

JFACC direction from: 10, 35

JSTARS management: 144

mission statement: 34

Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (CINCTRANSCOM): 42, 212

Commander, Electronic Systems Division:

143

Commander, Joint Force Air Component.

See Horner, Charles

Commander, Joint Islamic-Arab Forces:

39–40

Commander, Joint Task Force Proven

Force: 212

Commander, Pacific Air Forces: 101

Commander, Saudi Air Defense System: 39

Commander, VII Corps, USA, Germany:

142

Commander, Special Operations Command, Central Command

(COMSOCCENT): 35, 38

Commander, Tactical Air Command: 81

Commander, Theater Air Component: 36–

37. See also Horner, Charles

Commander, United States Air Forces

Europe (COMUSAFE): 210

Commander, United States Army Component, Central Command

(COMUSARCENT): 35. See

also Yeosock, John

Commander, United States Central Command (COMUSCENTCOM).

See Horner, Charles; Schwarzkopf, H. Norman

Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces (COMUSCENTAF): 35–38. See also

Horner, Charles; Olsen,

Thomas

Commander, United States Marine Forces,

Central Command (COMUSMARCENT): 35–37

Commander, United States Naval Component, Central Command

(COMUSNAVCENT): 35–37

Commanders in Chief, United States Combined Theater: 9–10, 212. See

also Schwarzkopf, H. Norman

358

On Target
Commanders, Joint Task Force Middle

East (COMJTFME). See also

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman

Abd al-Aziz, Khalid bin Sultan bin: 39–

40

Glosson, Buster: 82

OPCON of USMC aircraft: 36

resource integration: 36

Commando Solo: 41–42

Committee for Enforcing the Right and

Forbidding the Wrong: 123

Compass Call. See Aircraft, U.S., EC–

130H “Compass Call”

Computer Assisted Force Management

System (CAFMS): 92

Computers: 45, 85, 85n66

Congress: 162–163

Corder, John A.: 228, 228

Corsair. See Aircraft, U.S., A–7E “Corsair

II”

Counterair operations: 37, 54, 92

Crigger, James R.: 85, 88, 144

Crowe, William: 148

Ctesiphon: 131

Cuba

on resolution for Persian Gulf War: 117

on UN Resolution 660 (1990): 29

on UN Resolution 661 (1990): 31

on UN Resolution 665 (1990): 51

on UN Resolution 670 (1990): 99

on UN Resolution 678 (1990): 119

Dawrah power plant: 187

D-day Plan: 16, 99

Decoys. See also Drones

tactical air-launched (TALDs): 189, 192,

198

used by Iraq: 297

Defense Communications Satellite System:

9

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 25,

87, 225, 266n64

Defense Mapping Agency: 86–87

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program:

9

Defense Support System: 9

Deptula, David

assigned to USCENTAF campaign planning directorate: 85

concept of bombing for effect: 317

criticism of defensive air campaign

plans: 66

development of air-to-air ROE: 128

on final strategic air targets: 280

first day’s air operation briefing to Gen.

Schwarzkopf: 204–205

on GAT division: 139

on Gen. Schwarzkopf’s war plan request

(November 1, 1990): 114

influence of on air campaign plan

developer of MAP: 87–88

on Directorate of Campaign Plans: 140

on Phase I of Desert Storm: 110, 207–

208

as “prophet of air power”: 178

initial offensive air campaign planning:

67

on intelligence/planning relationship:

224n10, 225

MAP preparation: 87, 90–92, 138–140

on Phase III of Desert Storm: 247

photo of: 227

on POL targets: 198

refinement of target list: 271–272

reliance on Checkmate for intelligence

data: 225

request to stay in Saudi Arabia by Lt.

Gen. Horner: 83

in Secretary of the Air Force’s Staff

Group: 66

on simultaneity: 90–91, 317

on strike packages: 89–91

on targets containing hostages: 149

weaponeering for F–117A missions: 257

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Legislative Affairs: 84

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, HQ TAC:

81

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations: 59. See also Adams,

Jimmie; Dugan, Michael

Deputy Director for National Military

Command Systems (J–36): 74

Deputy Directorate for Warfighting Concepts

approach vs. TAC staff planners: 81

briefings on Instant Thunder: 68–71

divisions: 60

elimination of: 310

359

Index
intelligence personnel in: 61

as JCS J–3 planning extension: 71

offensive air campaign planning: 61–66

support of Joint AirLand Battle: 61

Deputy Secretary of Defense: 100

Desert Rats: 168

Designated mean points of impact

(DMPIs): 225

Destroyer: 6

Dhahran AB, Saudi Arabia: 17, 40, 46, 137

Diego Garcia: 16, 41, 190

Dimona nuclear facility: 155, 241

Director, J–5 (Strategic Plans and Policy):

72

Director, Joint Staff, JCS: 72

Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability: 234

Director of Plans, Office of the DCS, Plans

and Operations: 59, 60, 68

Director of Tactical Programs, Office of the

Assistant Secretary of the Air

Force for Acquisitions: 283

Director of Targets for the Assistant Chief

of Staff, Intelligence: 76, 86–

87

Diwaniyah BW bunkers: 194

Djibouti: 10

Doctrine Division, Warfighting Concepts

Directorate: 60

Doha, Qatar: 47, 137

Draeger, Rhory: 201

Drones. See also Decoys

BQM–34 drones: 91

BQM–74 drones

after action assessment: 188n28

SEAD support for bombing of

Ahmed Al Jaber SRBM shelter:

192

Al Rafirinah Command and Control Center: 198

Al Taqaddum airfield: 200

Ali al Saleem SRBM shelter: 192

Baghdad IADS: 189

Basra petroleum factory: 205

H–3 airfield: 188

Habbaniyah petroleum storage

facility: 200

Kuwait airfield: 192

Republican Guard General HQ: 198

Shaibah airfield: 192

Shaibah ground forces command

facility: 198

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 91

Dugan, Michael

briefings on Instant Thunder: 70, 72–73

briefings on OPORD Offensive Campaign—Phase I: 988

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF):

58

Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), Plans and

Operations: 60

on development of strike packages: 73

execution date for Instant Thunder: 80

firing of: 100

on Instant Thunder targets: 73

photo of: 59

request for TAC participation in Instant

Thunder planning: 68

on USCENTAF offensive air campaign

plan: 99–100

Eagle. See Aircraft, U.S., F–15C “Eagle”

Eagleburger, Lawrence: 229, 233

Eglin AFB, Florida: 283

Egypt

Coalition member: 49

debts forgiven: 49

intervention to prevent war: 23, 25

in Joint Islamic-Arab Forces: 39

role in Desert Storm: 163–164

Secretary Baker’s November 1990 trip

to: 112

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Eisenhower, Dwight: 70–71

El Alamein: 168

Electro-optically guided bombs: 4

Elwell, James: 125–126

Equipment tables: 135

Ethiopia: 10, 17

Exercises/Plans

ATO use in: 11, 132–133

Blue Flag: 11

Constant Demo: 59–60

Desert Force: 134

Have Blue: 7n20

Imminent Thunder: 134

Instant Thunder

after action assessment: 287

aircraft for: 77

360

On Target
basis of USCENTAF campaign: 85,

88

on China: 318

debate over: 101

evolution of plan: 67–75

execution plan: 77–78

goals of: 75, 78–79

impact on USCENTCOM war plan:

94, 177

initial planning of: 67

Lt. Gen. Horner on: 80–84

operations order: 74–75

predictions of impact on Iraq: 76–77

strengths of: 79

strike packages

adjustments to, from SEAD: 77–78

mission objectives of: 63–65

requirement for detailed: 73

vs. USCENTAF campaign plan:

103

vs. TAC offensive air campaign plan:

81

targets: 75–76, 86–87, 103–104

targets of: 75–76, 103

timetable of: 77

type air campaign, against USSR: 318

weaknesses of: 79–80

Internal Look: 11, 29, 176

Ivory Justice: 25, 84

IZAF Christmas 1990: 135

Salty Demo: 59–60

training: 132–133

Extender. See Aircraft, U.S., KC–10 “Extender”

“Face the Nation”: 100

Failake Island: 198

Fairford RAF base: 277

Falcon. See Aircraft, U.S., F–16 “Fighting

Falcon”

Fallujah. See Al Fallujah, Iraq

Fencer: 259

Field Manual 100–20: 35

Fighting Falcon. See Aircraft, U.S., F–16

“Fighting Falcon”

Fishbed. See Aircraft, Iraqi, MiG–21 “Fishbed”

Fitzwater, Marlin: 29

Flogger: 172, 259

Flying Fortress: 6, 62

Foreign Military Sales: 18n39

Fornell, Gorden: 143

Forward air controller missions: 238

Forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor:

183n9

Forward operating locations (FOLs):

190–191, 214

Foxbat. See Aircraft, Iraqi, MiG–25 “Foxbat”

France

Coalition member: 49

intervention to prevent war: 163

in Joint Islamic-Arab Forces: 39

Parliament’s approval to use military

force: 164

Secretary Baker’s November 1990 trip

to: 112

in UN Security Council: 117

Franks, Frederick: 142

Freeman, Charles: 30–31

Fresco: 172

Friendly fire incidents: 130

Frost, David: 150

Fuel, aircraft: 41, 79, 103

Fulcrum. See Aircraft, Iraqi, MiG–29 “Fulcrum”

Gabriel, Charles: 61

Gainful. See Missiles, surface-to-air

(SAMs), SA–6 “Gainful”

Galaxy: 41–43

Galvin, John: 210

Gaskin. See Missiles, surface-to-air

(SAMs), SA–9 “Gaskin”

Gates, Robert: 30

Gator. See Bombs, CBU–89 “Gator”

G-day: 247, 268

Gecko: 174–175

Genda, Minoru: 178

General Order 1 (GO–1): 121–125

Geneva Convention Articles: 157

Georgia National Guard: 115

Germany: 173

Getchell, George: 120

Ghalaysan airfield: 190–191, 214

Glaspie, April: 20–25, 28

Global Positioning System (GPS): 9, 182

Globemaster III: 8

Glosson, Buster

air war plan briefings: 88–89, 96–98,

361

Index
102–106, 151, 158

appointment as Director, USCENTAF

Campaign Plans: 138–139

assignments with Lt. Gen. Horner: 82

bypassing of ATO division: 140

on Checkmate: 87

Commander, 14th AD(P): 137, 140

control of plans and operations: 140

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Legislative Affairs: 84

Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force

Middle East (JTFME): 82, 84

development of air-to-air ROE: 128

Director, USCENTAF Campaign Plans:

84, 226

on final strategic air targets: 280

first day’s air operation briefing to Gen.

Schwarzkopf: 204–205

on Gen. Schwarzkopf’s war plan request

(November 1, 1990): 114

on hostages: 149

influence of, on air campaign plan: 84–

88, 110

intelligence gathering: 224–226

in Ivory Justice: 84

on IZAF pilots: 173–174

on Phase III of Desert Storm: 247

photo of: 227

on Republican Guard as target: 96

on simultaneity: 90

on starting date of Desert Storm: 161

on targeting: 228

theater wing commanders, interaction

with: 93, 140

trust of Gen. Schwarzkopf: 84

videotape request: 225–226

Goa. See Missiles, surface-to-air (SAMs),

SA–3 “Goa”

Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reform Act of

1986: 66

Gopher. See Missiles, surface-to-air

(SAMs), SA–13 “Gopher”

Gorbachev, Mikhail

on Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: 117–118

peace plan for Iraq: 279

Grach: 172

Grail: 174n64

Great Britain

British hostages in Iraq: 148, 149

Coalition member: 49

Parliament’s approval to use military

force: 164

Royal Air Force (RAF)

JP–233 airfield-denial munition: 5n11

PGM use: 259

tests at Ingolstadt Flight Test Center:

173

training exercises: 133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

93–94, 102

Royal Army: 168

Royal Navy: 9

von Schlieffen Plan impact on: 69–70

Secretary Baker’s November 1990 trip

to: 112

in UN Security Council: 117

Greater, Robert: 185

Gremlin: 174n64

Grenada: 318

Griffith, Thomas: 81

Ground-controlled interception (GCI):

172–174

Ground-station modules (GSMs): 141–142

Guidance, Apportionment, and Tasking

(GAT) division. See United

States Air Force Component,

Central Command (USCENTAF), Guidance, Apportionment, and Tasking (GAT) division

Guideline. See Missiles, surface-to-air

(SAMs), SA–2 “Guideline”

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): 41, 49

Gulfstream: 42, 114, 171

H–1 area: 242, 267

H–2 area

airfield: 207, 213, 251–252, 257, 263

airfield facilities: 199

HASs: 257–259

highway strip runways: 250

IOC: 252

in offensive battle plan: 102

permanent air presence over: 184

runways: 207, 216

SRBM launch site: 183–185, 237–240,

257

H–3 area

airfield: 207, 239, 252, 267, 282

bombing of: 263

CW bunkers: 264

362

On Target
CW storage facility: 188, 216, 252

EW site: 214

facilities: 213

HASs: 257–259

highway strip runways: 250

IOC: 193, 199, 209

in offensive battle plan: 102

permanent air presence over: 184

petroleum pumping station: 199, 207

runways: 188, 207, 213

SAM sites: 238–240

SOC: 102, 184, 199, 201, 250

SRBM launch sites: 237–240, 257

sweep of: 195, 198

troposcatter site: 199

Habbaniyah, Iraq

airfield: 251, 281

artillery production plant: 277, 282

BW bunkers: 209, 214, 277

chemical facility No. 1: 252

CW production facilities: 248, 264

military/artillery production: 214

motor-case factory: 250

oil storage facilities: 269

petroleum storage facility: 200

targeting of: 156, 250

troposcatter station: 193

Haifa, Israel: 155

Hamilton, Lee: 23

Al-Hammad, Muhammad al Saleh: 124

Hammadi, Sadun: 26

Hardened aircraft shelters (HASs)

attack plan: 256

construction of: 255n32

design of: 17

MELs in: 241

models of: 254–255

PGMs for destruction of: 255

photo of: 255, 258

prioritization of attacks upon: 256

on RSAF bases: 17

SRBMs hidden in: 241

targeting of: 248

Hartha power plant: 206

Harvard Public Health Team study

Ajaji Bayji power plant: 199

Al Basrah Hartha turbine power plant:

206–207

Al Musayyib power plant: 197

Dawrah power plant: 187–188n26

Taji power plant: 187–188n26

Harvey, Bernard

assigned to USCENTAF campaign planning directorate: 85

briefings on Instant Thunder: 69n22

Chief, Checkmate DIA BDA Support

Section: 225

in initial offensive air campaign planning: 67

on intelligence data: 225n13

planned Operation Just Cause: 67

requested to stay in Saudi Arabia by Lt.

Gen. Horner: 83

return to Pentagon: 87

review of Instant Thunder plan: 68

Heidenrich, John: 311–312

Heintzelman, Larry: 128–129

Hellfire missile: 182

Henry, Lawrence: 88

Hercules. See Aircraft, U.S., C–130 “Hercules”; Aircraft, U.S., HC–130

“Hercules”; Aircraft, U.S.,

KC–130 “Hercules”

High-value airborne assets (HVAAs): 77

Holland, Donnie: 207

Holloman AFB, New Mexico: 16, 283

Hope, Bob: 126

Hornburg, Hal: 137

Horner, Charles

AGL limitations for USCENTAF aircraft: 134

on “Awareness of Host-Nation Sensitivities”: 119–120

briefings on USCENTAF air campaign

plan: 151–152

on bypassing of ATO division: 140

in Camp David briefing on Kuwait invasion: 29–30

on casualties: 311

on Checkmate: 87

Commander, Central Command Air

Forces (COMCENTAF): 10,

135–136, 213

Commander, Central Command (COMUSCENTCOM) Forward: 33–

34, 83

Commander, Ninth Air Force: 10, 135–

136

Commander, Theater Air Component:

10, 30–31n69, 35–38, 136

363

Index
concealment of attack plan: 86

on Desert Shield’s first weeks: 51

establishment of headquarters in Riyadh,

Saudi Arabia: 34

on final strategic air targets: 280

first day’s air operation briefing to Gen.

Schwarzkopf: 204–205

on goals of air campaign: 30, 86

on Harvest Falcon program: 47

influence of, on air campaign plan: 110

initial deployment response to hostilities

plan: 32

on initial USCENTAF campaign plan

briefing: 88

on Instant Thunder: 72, 81–84

on intelligence/planning relationship:

226, 309–310

interservice cooperation: 97–98

Joint Force Air Component Commander

(JFACC): 10, 135

ATO planning, preparation, and execution: 37, 48

interservice cooperation: 97–98

response to Instant Thunder plan: 83

tasks, duties, and responsibilities: 30–

31n69, 34–38

on JSTARS: 142

on JTF Proven Force missions in air

planning: 213

in meeting King Fahd (August 6): 30

on participation of all pilots: 196

photo of: 10, 59, 137

on Prince Khalid: 47

on prioritization of air attacks: 198

reorganization of USCENTAF: 137–138

reply to Gen. Schwarzkopf’s manning

level request (November 1,

1990): 114

on Saudi border protection: 44, 82–83

on Scuds on target list: 236

on SEAD efforts: 251–252

on TAC offensive air campaign plan:

81– 82

on targets: 289n10

transfer of AFSOCCENT to USCENTAF: 38–39

trust of Gen. Schwarzkopf: 39

USCENTAF/IAF liaison, assignment of:

232

Hornet. See Aircraft, Coalition, CF–18

“Hornet”; Aircraft, U.S., F/A–

18 “Hornet”

Hughes, Harley: 59

Husayn’s Tomb: 131

Hussein, Saddam

ability to assess risks: 3, 28

on CW: 154

decision to invade Kuwait: 27–29, 147

giving U.S. satellite imagery to Soviets:

154

handling of hostages: 148–149

on Israel: 148, 278

on Kuwait government: 278

meeting with Ambassador Glaspie: 20–

25

“the mother of all battles” speech: 162

in offensive air campaign plan: 106

peace offer to Iran: 52

on President Bush’s peace offer: 148

proclaimed President for Life: 20

response to Coalition buildup: 118

response to financial crisis: 19–20, 27

on Soviet cease-fire efforts: 275–276

tactics of, similarity to Hitler: 168

target of air campaign: 202–203

on upcoming war: 162, 163

withdrawal from Kuwait, conditions for:

148, 278–279

Ibrahim, Izzat: 26

Identification–friend-or-foe (IFF): 37, 41

Incirlik AB, Turkey: 210

Indian Ocean

Diego Garcia: 16, 41, 190

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

Infrared (IR) detection: 7

Integrated Air Defense System (IADS):

152, 174–175. See also Intercept operations centers

(IOCs); Sector operations centers (SOCs); Suppression of

enemy air defenses (SEAD)

configuration of: 175–176

doctrine of: 174

drawing of: 177

Kari system

after action assessment: 217, 299–300

Al Amarah IOC in: 200

configuration of: 176

364

On Target
damage to: 270

impact on USCENTAF tactics: 221–

222

use of commercial power by: 187

Intelligence. See also Bomb damage

assessment (BDA)

after action assessment: 309–310

compartmentalization of: 285

Intercept operations centers (IOCs)

Al Amarah: 200, 251, 270

Al Jarrah: 270

Al Kut: 270

Al Taqaddum: 186, 193, 202

Ar Rutbah: 193, 248, 250

Az Zubayr: 193, 199, 214

H–2 area: 252

H–3 area: 193, 199, 209

Karbala: 248, 270

in Kari system: 200

An Najaf: 190, 248

Nukhayb: 91, 184, 196, 209

in offensive battle plan: 102

Salman Pak: 193, 270

Taji: 202

Tallil: 198, 209

Interdiction missions

CAFMS for: 92

COMUSCENTAF duty: 37

in OPORDs for Desert Shield: 54

in Phase II of USCENTCOM war plan:

95

in TAC offensive air campaign plan: 81

Intruder. See Aircraft, U.S., A–6E “Intruder”; Aircraft, U.S., KA–6D

“Intruder”

Iran, Islamic Republic of

border with Iraq: 307

CW attacks on: 154

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

IZAF aircraft sheltered in: 130, 259–

261, 300

Kari system configured for attack by:

176

neutrality of: 94, 130

peace offer from Iraq: 52

threat to Persian Gulf stability: 14

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

War of the Cities: 153

Iraq, Republic of

archaeological sites in: 130–131

C2 centers: 15–16

crude oil production: 2

demands on Kuwait: 1, 19, 26

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

financial instability: 1, 19–20

Iraq-Soviet peace talks: 279

loss of communications in: 289–291

National Assembly: 163

petroleum reserves: 2, 28

preparation for Kuwait attack: 2n4, 20,

25–26

response to Desert Shield: 51–52

Special Forces: 307–308

targets in OPLAN 1002–90: 15

threat to Persian Gulf stability: 14, 19–

20

unity of: 165–166

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

war with Iran

debt from: 1, 19–20, 24

defensive operations: 170

vs. Kuwait invasion: 27–28

lack of United States involvement in:

20–21

militarization after: 52

peace offer to end: 52

use of CW: 154

War of the Cities: 153

Iraqi Air Force (IZAF)

after action assessment: 300–301

Air Academy: 203

aircraft: 152, 171–172

in archaeological sites: 261

bombing of IZAF HQ: 193, 201

in charge of IADS: 174

in civilian residential neighborhoods:

261

dispersal of aircraft: 259–261

exercises: 135

helicopters with antiship missiles: 195

in Instant Thunder plan: 76

in OPLAN 1002–90: 15

reconnaissance missions: 170

response to Imminent Thunder: 134

response to offensive air campaign: 254

retreat to Iran: 248, 259–260

target of air campaign: 2–3

training, assessment of: 172

365

Index
in USCENTAF campaign planning: 103,

152

violation of Saudi airspace (August 22,

1990): 52

Iraqi Army. See also Republican Guard

in civilian residential neighborhoods:

307

equipment: 167

incendiary defense system: 280

in Instant Thunder plan: 71, 76

personnel: 167

preparation for offensive campaign:

169–170

target of air campaign: 2

Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) HQ: 201–

202, 265, 274, 281

Iraqi Navy

after action assessment: 301–302

patrol boats: 199

Umm Qasr naval base: 76, 78, 103

Iraqi Tactics Analysis Team: 172–173

Irbil ammunition dump: 277

Isis nuclear reactor: 202, 249, 252–253

Israel

attack on Osirak nuclear reactor: 154

consideration of, in offensive air campaign planning: 73

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

first SRBM strikes in: 229

Iraqi threat of NBC weapons attack on:

154

Kari system configured for attack by:

176

neutrality of: 94

in NSD–54 administrative policy: 165

response to terrorism: 153–154

retaliation for SRBM attacks: 232–233

right to self-defense: 115

target of Iraqi SRBMs: 79–80, 184, 229–

234

as topic of discussion: 122–123

use of drones by: 91

Italian Tenth Army: 168

Jaffar, Jarrar Dhia: 295

Jalibah, Iraq

airfield: 250, 263, 280

CW storage facility: 192

fiber-optic link: 266

fiber-optic stations: 239

HASs: 258, 276

runways: 192

SRBM shelters: 192

Jamerson, James: 212

Jedi Knights: 106

Jenoub PTT building: 251–252, 277

J-hooking effect: 5

Jirishan fiber-optic repeaters: 268

Johnson, Hansford: 42

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 84

Johnston, Robert: 102

Joint AirLand Battle: 54–55, 60–61

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

briefing on General Order 1 (GO–1):

122

definition of JFACC duties: 35

Director J–3 (Operations): 71. See also

Adams, Jimmie

Director, J–5 (Strategic Plans and Policy): 72

Director, Joint Staff: 72

formula for CINC support of CINCCENT: 212

Mobility Study on Desert Shield: 51

on offensive air campaign plan, request

for: 58

on OPCON of USMC aircraft: 36

USCENTCOM briefing of prior to Kuwait invasion: 26

Joint Force Air Component Commander

(JFACC). See also Horner,

Charles

ATO planning, preparation, and execution: 37, 48

authority of: 144–145

control of Navy strike packages: 129

interservice cooperation: 97

JTF Proven Force targets: 213

OPCON of aircraft: 136

in TAC offensive air campaign plan: 81

TACON of JSTARS: 144

tasks, duties, and responsibilities: 30–

31n69, 34–38

Joint Munitions Effects Manual: 89

Joint no-fire target list (JNFTL): 128, 130–

131

Joint Reconnaissance Center: 144

Joint Rescue Coordination Center, Scott

AFB, Illinois: 79

366

On Target
Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME): 36.

See also Glosson, Buster;

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman

Joint Task Force Proven Force

air order of battle: 212

ATO and strike planning: 213

bombing of

Al Hadre CW bunkers: 277

Basiqah Northeast: 209

Dibs power plants: 265

Irbil ammunition dump: 277

K–2 missile storage: 277

Kirkuk airfield: 282

Kirkuk AM transmitter: 277

Kirkuk CW bunkers: 267

Machurah Dawg North: 209

Mosul direction-finding stations: 277

Mosul military R&D facility: 277,

282

Mosul missile research facility: 269

Mosul power plants: 265

Qayyarah airfield: 267

Qayyarah BW bunkers: 267

Sununi: 209

Taji airfield: 277

Taji military complex: 280–282

Tar Miya nuclear facility: 282

history of: 209–210

OPCON of aircraft: 212

PGM capability: 262, 282

Jones, David: 148

Jordan

defense of airspace: 154, 230

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

neutrality of: 94, 130, 167

in NSD–54 administrative policy: 165

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Josephus: 132

Jumhuriya bridge: 266

Karbala, Iraq

ammunition facility in: 156

archaeological site near: 131

BW bunkers: 265

fiber-optic stations: 278

IOC: 248, 270

Kari system. See Integrated air defense system (IADS), Kari system

Kaufman, Donald: 30–31

Kelk, Jon: 185

Kelly, John: 28

Kenya: 10

Khamis Mushait AB, Saudi Arabia: 17, 46,

137

Khomeini, Ali: 52, 260

King Fahd International Airport (IAP),

Saudi Arabia

A–10 CSAR support alert at: 249

deployment of aircraft to: 46, 141

deployment of U.S. forces through: 17

King Khalid International Airport (IAP),

Saudi Arabia: 17

King Khalid Military City, Saudi Arabia:

17, 249

Kirkuk, Iraq

airfield: 267, 282

AM transmitter: 277

ammunition depot: 281

ammunition facility: 156

HASs: 258–259

refinery: 270

SOC: 102

Kissinger, Henry: 315

Konya weapons ranges: 210

Korean War

4th Infantry Division, North Korean

People’s Army: 49

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized): 49

China’s logistical support of North Korea: 314–315

vs. Desert Shield/Storm: 54

enemy sanctuaries: 130

Inchon battle: 69–70

MacArthur, Douglas: 69

operation plans for battles over: 47

Secretary of States remarks on: 21

strategic bombing of North Korea: 314–

315

Tarzon bomb: 315

Task Force Smith: 49–50

Koritz, Thomas: 207

Kuehl, Daniel: 72n35

Kurds: 290–291, 308, 308n66

Kuwait, Emirate of

accused of oil price setting: 19

air force: 27

causes of invasion: 2, 19–20, 27–28

defense treaty with United States: 21

Egyptian debts forgiven: 49

367

Index
factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

human rights abuses in: 150

Iraqi demands on: 1, 19–20, 26

Iraqi SOCs in: 102, 193

response to Iraqi troop movements: 20

Saddam Hussein’s view of: 21–24

sharing of intelligence data with: 25

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Kuwait International Airport (IAP): 192

Lancer: 6, 8

Landsat communications system: 9

Langley AFB, Virginia: 40

Latifiya facilities

ammunition plant: 265

explosives plant: 214, 249, 269

liquid propellant plant: 269

satellite communications station: 196

solid propellant plant: 199, 264, 277

SRBM facilities: 236–237, 265, 277

SSM facility: 214, 269

target of air campaign: 249

Leno, Jay: 126

Letters of Agreement: 18n39

Liberator: 62

Libya: 110, 163, 317

Lines of communications (LOCs)

after action assessment: 302–303

definition of: 302n38

targeting of Iraqi: 69, 73–74

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation: 7–8, 7n20

Loh, John: 58, 68, 73

Long-Range Planning Division, Warfighting Concepts Directorate: 60

Los Angeles Times: 99

Los Angeles World Affairs Council: 112

Louisiana National Guard: 115

Low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN)

system

deployment of

on F–15E: 5n10, 13, 43, 183n9

on F–16L: 183n9

description of: 183n9

PGM control: 183n9

photo of on F–15E: 155

for Scudbusting: 192, 240

MacArthur, Douglas: 69

Machurah Dawg North EW facilities: 209

Magill, Charles: 201

Al-Majid, Ali Hasan: 26

Major, John: 279

Martin, Steve: 126

Masqatt, Oman: 34

Master attack plan (MAP). See Deptula,

David; Strategic Air Command (SAC); United States

Air Force Component, Central

Command (USCENTAF)

Maverick: 4n8, 196

Maw, Scott G.: 185

Maya: 172

McClellan, George: 108

McConnell, Mike: 224–225

McNamara, Robert: 84

McPeak, Merrill, “Tony”: 101, 101

Mecca, Saudi Arabia: 17

Meier, James: 74

Mina Al Bakr air defense posts: 201

Mining operations: 129–130, 242

Ministry of Defense National Computer

Center: 201, 202

Missiles. See also Precision guided munitions (PGMs)

air-to-air

AA–11 “Archer”: 172–173

AIM–7 “Sparrow”

kill rate of, with F–15C: 316

MiG–29 kills: 185, 201

Mirage F–1E kill: 187

use of, ROE for: 129

AIM–7M “Sparrow”: 185

AIM–9 “Sidewinder”: 129

AIM–54 “Phoenix”: 129–130

in dogfights: 316

air-to-ground

AGM–65 “Maverick”: 4n8, 196

AGM–88 high-speed antiradiation

missiles “HARMs”

Al Asad airfield attack: 207

An Nasiriyah troposcatter station

attack: 198

Ar Rumaylah airfield attack: 198

Ash Shuaybah railroad station and

airfield attack: 205

availability of: 79

Az Zubayr IOC attack: 199

Az Zubayr railyard attack: 199

Baghdad IADS attack: 189–190

368

On Target
deconfliction: 133

destruction of surface-to-air threats:

158

Failake Island attack: 198

firing doctrine of F–4G “Wild

Weasels”: 133

H–2 airfield attack: 207

H–3 airfield attack: 207

in “HARM Heaven”: 190

in Instant Thunder plan: 77–78

Kuwait airfield attack: 192

Qurna SRBM shelter attack: 192

Shaibah airfield attack: 192, 205

Tallil airfield attack: 192

Tallil IOC attack: 198

Tuwaitha nuclear facility attack:

249

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

91

AGM–114 “Hellfire”: 182

air-launched antiradiation (ALARMs)

for SEAD at

Al Asad airfield: 190

H–2 airfield: 207, 213, 216, 251

H–3 airfield: 207, 213

H–3 CW storage facility: 216

H–3 petroleum pumping station:

207

SRBM launch sites: 183

air-launched cruise (ALCMs)

Al Musayyib power plant attack:

196

in Instant Thunder plan: 72, 80

Iraqi communication systems

attack: 196

Latifiya satellite communications

station attack: 196

Mosul power plant attack: 196

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

104

Hydra 70 rockets: 182

antiship

CSSC–2 “Silkworm”: 201, 214

Exocet: 260

K–2 storage: 277

standoff, land-attack (SLAMs): 207, 215

surface-to-air (SAMs)

altitude coverage of: 174

Hawk antiaircraft: 175, 209, 253

minimal radar guidance strategy: 197

Patriot antiballistic

delivered to Israel: 231

design of: 231

interception of SRBMs: 233–234,

243

promised Israel by President Bush:

230

quantity of: 152, 174n64

radar: 152

in Republican Guard units: 175, 197,

306–307n57

Roland: 174

SA–2 “Guideline”

countermeasures for: 175–176

in Iraqi IADS: 174

in Iraqi Regular Army units:

306n57

operational capabilities of: 174

range of: 306n57

SA–3 “Goa”

countermeasures for: 175–176

in Iraqi IADS: 174

in Iraqi Regular Army units:

306n57

operational capabilities of: 174

range of: 306n57

SA–6 “Gainful”

operational capabilities of: 174–175

range of: 306–307n57

in Republican Guard units: 175,

306–307n57

in Tuwaitha nuclear facility IADS:

249

SA–7 “Grail”: 174n64

SA–8 “Gecko”: 174–175

SA–9 “Gaskin”

in Iraqi IADS: 174n64

in Iraqi Regular Army units: 197,

306n57

quantity of: 174n64

range of: 306n57

SA–13 “Gopher”

in Iraqi IADS: 174n64

quantity of: 174n64

range of: 306–307n57

in Republican Guard units: 197,

306–307n57

SA–14 “Gremlin”: 174n64

369

Index
suppression. See also Suppression of

enemy air defenses (SEAD)

in Instant Thunder plan: 77–78

in Operation Linebacker II: 6–7

surface-to-surface (SSMs)

medium-range ballistic missiles: 19,

81

short-range ballistic missiles

(SRBMs) “Scuds”

after action assessment: 232–233,

236–237, 240–241, 243–245,

248

Bahrain attack: 234, 243

CEP of: 153

vs. German V rockets: 235

in HAS: 241

in Instant Thunder plan: 79–80

Iraq’s capacity to build and maintain: 244

Israel attack: 228–234

launch detection by Defense Support System: 9

launch sites targeting Israel:

184–185

MAZ–543: 153

mobile erector-launchers (MELs)

for: 153, 217, 236, 237, 241,

243–245, 297–298

political value of: 153–154

production facilities: 214

protection of: 175, 235–236

R–300E: 152–153

R&D programs: 19

range of: 153, 235

research, production, and assembly

facility: 250

Saudi Arabia attack: 234, 243

speed of: 236, 236n39

suppression of: 237, 239–241, 252,

266. See also Suppression of

enemy air defenses (SEAD)

in TAC offensive air campaign

plan: 81

target of air campaign: 2–3

technical description of: 152–153

transporter-erector-launchers

(TELs) for: 153, 236, 237

in USCENTAF campaign plan: 15,

155

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

91, 152–155

Tomahawk land-attack (TLAMs)

Abu Ghurayb Presidential Palace

attack: 214

accuracy of: 105

Ajaji Bayji power plant attack: 199

Al Basrah refinery attack: 214

Al Mawsil power plant attack: 214

Az Zubayr IOC attack: 214

Az Zubayr petroleum

pumping/storage facility

attack: 199

Baath Party Headquarters attack:

187

Baghdad governmental control centers attack: 207

Baghdad Ministry of

Defense/Army HQ attack: 199

Baghdad Ministry of Defense computer center attack: 214

Baghdad transformer station attack:

199

firing rate of: 214

first shots of Desert Storm: 166

in initial Kuwaiti invasion response

plan: 29

in Instant Thunder plan: 72, 77

Latifiya solid propellant plant

attack: 199

in OPORD 3 for Desert Shield: 54

Presidential Palace attack: 187

Samarra CW facilities attack: 199

Shaibah helicopter ramps attack:

195

special warhead on: 187–188

Taji missile support facility attack:

199

Taji SRBM support facility attack:

187

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

91, 105, 131, 156

Mississippi National Guard: 115

Moltke, Helmuth von: 69

Moore, Royal: 97

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR):

126–127

Morocco: 39, 49

Moron AB, Spain: 216

370

On Target
Mosquito: 8

Mosul, Iraq

archaeological site near: 131

CW bunkers: 277

direction-finding stations: 277

HASs: 259

military R&D facility: 277, 282

missile research facility: 216

nuclear production facility: 267

power plants: 196, 214

Republican Guard sites: 252

Mudaysis airfield

bombing of: 190–191, 201, 207, 215

Mirage F–1Es based at: 185

Mufrash radio relay: 281

Muftul Waddam bridge: 216

Muhammad airfield: 259

Muhammadiyat storage site: 295

Muir, Dan: 224n10

Murbarak, Hosni: 23, 25, 163–164

Muscat, Oman: 34

Muttawwa: 123

Nasiriyah power plant: 192

National Command Authorities (NCA)

approval of USCENTAF campaign: 109

authorization of operations: 94

Persian Gulf War attack order: 102

presentation of offensive air campaign

plan to: 80

ROE tweaking: 130

National Disclosure Policy: 25

National Guard

call-up of, in OPLAN 1002–90: 14

Georgia: 115

Louisiana: 115

Mississippi: 115

New York: 237

National Security Advisor: 30. See also

Scowcroft, Brent

Gates, Robert: 30

National Security Council: 29

National Security Directive 26 (NSD–26):

18, 22, 25

National Security Directive 45 (NSD–45):

53–54, 164

National Security Directive 54 (NSD–54):

164–166

Nellis AFB, Nevada: 82, 283

New York Air National Guard: 237

Nighthawk. See Aircraft, U.S., F–117A

“Nighthawk”

Nimrud: 131

Nineveh: 131

Nippur: 131

Nixon, Richard M.: 315

Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)

weapons. See also Biological

weapons (BW); Chemical

weapons (CW)

after action assessment: 208

bombing of: 277

destruction of, NSD–54 goal: 165

development of: 154

Geneva Convention Articles on: 157

HAS designed to mitigate: 17

in Instant Thunder plan: 76, 287

Iraqi use of in battle: 94, 112, 154

in OPLAN 1002–90: 15

in Phase I of offensive air attack: 2

photo of destroyed bunker: 156

planned response to use of: 32

protective gear, donning of: 235

R&D programs, in Iran: 14

R&D programs, in Iraq: 14, 19

storage facilities: 295

in TAC offensive air campaign plan: 81

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

103–104, 109–110, 154–156

USCINCCENT on: 70

Nukhayb: 91, 196, 209

Oaks, Robert: 210

O’Connor, Richard: 168

Oil. See also Petroleum, oil, and lubricant

(POL) facilities

in Instant Thunder plan: 75, 78–79

in OPLAN 1002–90: 15

price of, after Kuwait invasion: 52–53

rationing of: 53

sales quotas: 1, 27, 52

setting of oil prices: 19–20, 25, 27

in TAC offensive air campaign: 81

target of air campaign: 201

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 103,

157

Olsen, Thomas

briefing on Instant Thunder: 82

Commander, Central Command Air Forces (COMUSCENTAF): 34

371

Index
on Harvest Falcon program: 47

responsibility for USCENTAF telephone

bills: 46

USCENTAF/IAF liaison, assignment as:

232–234

visitation of carrier battle groups: 48

Oman

Coalition member: 49

deployment of aircraft to: 41, 46–47

Gulf of: 10

on Kuwaiti greed: 28

plans for establishment of headquarters

in: 34

restrictions on U.S. military personnel

in: 125

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Operation Orders (OPORDs)

1 (OPORD 1): 34, 54

3 (OPORD 3): 54

Instant Thunder as: 79–80

Offensive Campaign—Phase I: 98, 2877

phases of: 54

Operation Plan (OPLAN)

1002–90

adherence to: 29–30

briefing on: 31

development of: 14–16

implementation of: 44

vs. OPORDs: 54

for Desert Storm: 159

Operational Control (OPCON)

of JSTARS: 144

of JTF Proven Force: 212

of MARCENT aircraft: 36–37

of SAC aircraft: 35, 136

of SOF aircraft: 35

of USARCENT aircraft: 35, 37

of USMC aircraft: 36

of USNAVCENT aircraft: 35–37

Operations

Desert Shield

after action assessment: 54–55

ATO planning, preparation, and execution: 48

basing of aircraft: 46–47

Coalition formation: 49

command authority, air operations:

33–39

communication systems for: 45–46

computers: 45

defensive operations planning for: 47,

48–49

designation of Southwest Asia Operations as: 34

effect on oil prices: 52–53

first deployed aircraft: 40

Harvest Falcon, role in: 47

preparation for offensive campaign:

145

prioritization of asset transportation:

45–46, 50–51

SAC ATO planning during: 11

Saudi ground troops, deployment of:

44

sea blockade of Iraq: 53–54

strategic airlift operations: 40–43

USCENTAF assets: 42

USCENTAF ATO planning during: 11

USCENTAF personnel, deployment

of: 44

USCENTAF training exercises: 132–

133

Desert Storm

after action assessment: 208

air order of battle: 171

execution order for: 166

SAC ATO planning during: 11

USCENTAF ATO planning during: 11

vs. Vietnam: 169

vs. WWII African campaign: 168

El Dorado Canyon: 67

Just Cause: 67, 98nn95–96

Linebacker I: 4, 303, 315

Linebacker II: 4, 6–7, 315

Rolling Thunder: 67

Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC)

sales quotas: 1, 27, 52

setting of oil prices: 19–20, 25, 27

Osirak nuclear reactor

bombing of: 202, 252–253

Israeli attack on: 154, 202, 293

Pakistan: 10

Panama: 318

Pave Hawk: 38, 114, 171

Pave Low

air order of battle: 114, 171

in JTF Proven Force: 212

372

On Target
for SOF missions in AOR: 38

in Task Force Normandy: 182

Paveway I: 4

Paveway II: 4

Paveway III: 4–6

Perez de Cuellar, Javier: 163

Persian Gulf: 10

Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) facilities. See also Oil

Abu Rajesh facility: 251

loss of, impact on Iraq: 270

in prioritization of A–10 missions: 198

storage facilities: 269–270

target of air campaign: 206

Phantom: 7, 172

Phantom II

bombing of Taji military complex: 282

PGM capability: 4–5

replacement of: 5, 13

in Vietnam: 4

Phoenix: 129–130

Plans. See Exercises/Plans

Poland: 290

Powell, Colin

on aircraft basing in theater: 103

approval of ground attack plan: 268, 278

approval of Instant Thunder plan: 68

approval of USCENTAF campaign: 98–

99

approval of USCENTCOM war plan:

161

briefing from CINCCENT (August 14):

73

briefings on USCENTCOM war plan:

102–109, 151–152

in Camp David briefing on Kuwait invasion: 29–30

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS): 58

check on CINCCENT war preparations:

150–151

Civil Reserve Air Fleet activation: 30

consulted on Gen. Dugan’s firing: 100

deployment order for Persian Gulf: 115–

116

Desert Storm warning order: 161

faith in ground forces: 99

on force readiness: 161

on Instant Thunder objectives: 71, 96

on Iraqi Army response to ground

attack: 268

Joint Task Force Proven Force plan,

briefed on: 210

on one- vs. two-corps offensive: 112

photo of: 151

ready reserve call up: 30

on request for KC–135 aerial refueling

by UAE: 20

request for offensive battle plan: 74,

101–102

on starting date of Desert Storm: 161

strategic air war briefing: 267–268

on targets: 272, 276, 281, 289n10

on U.S. Embassy staff in Kuwait City:

106

in USCENTCOM briefing on Desert

Shield deployments: 51

Power plants. See also Harvard Public

Health Team study

BDA of: 217, 291–293, 298

bombing of, by TLAMs: 199

in Instant Thunder plan: 73, 75

in USCENTAF campaign plan: 105

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 103,

157

Precision guided munitions (PGMs). See

also Bombs; Missiles

“buddy-lasing”: 183n9

on F–15E: 5, 5n10, 13, 43, 183n9

first use of in combat: 4

for hard-target penetration: 5

for HAS destruction: 255

in Instant Thunder plan: 83

LANTIRN control of: 183n9

vs. precision-delivered weapons: 83

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

116–117

Prepositioned assets: 50–51

Advantage: 42

Afloat Positioning Force: 16

Harvest Falcon: 16, 47

Primakov, Yevgeny

on Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: 117

provided satellite imagery to Iraq: 275,

289

on Saddam Hussein’s response to peace

offer: 148

Prisoners of war: 250

373

Index
Profitt, Glenn: 137

“Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel

Serving in the USCENTCOM

AOR”: 121–122

Prowler. See Aircraft, U.S., EA–6B

“Prowler”

Psychological operations (PSYOPs)

bombing of Tikrit: 202–203

in COMUSCENTAF OPORD: 57

in Instant Thunder plan: 64, 76, 78, 289–

290

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 98,

98nn95–96

Public Morality Committees: 123

Purvis, Joseph: 106

Qabatiya BW bunker: 209, 213–214

al-Qaddafi, Muammar: 317

Qalat Salih

airfield: 264, 267

SRBM shelters: 192, 207

Qasr Amij SRBM launch complex: 236–

238

Qatar

deployment of F–16s to: 47

Egyptian debts forgiven: 49

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Qayyarah

airfield: 267

BW bunkers: 267

CW bunkers: 264, 277

HASs: 258–259

Quayle, J. Danforth: 29

Qubaysah: 237, 248

Rabin, Yitzhak: 229

Radar: 8, 152, 174

Radar cross section (RCS): 7–8

Radio Baghdad: 217, 241

Rafsanjani, Hashemi: 260

Railroads

after action assessment: 302–303, 302–

303n40

in Instant Thunder plan: 76

from Kuwait City to Az Zubayr: 170

target of air campaign: 206, 216

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 103,

152

Ralston, Joseph: 283

Ramadi fiber-optic stations: 239

Rasheed airfield: 201, 265, 267

Raven. See Aircraft, U.S., EF–111A

“Raven”

Red Sea: 10, 17, 41

Republican Guard, Iraq

after action assessment: 304–309

battle with VII U.S. Army Corps: 307

destruction of, NSD–54 goal: 165

equipment: 167

escape routes: 214

General HQ, Forward, Basra: 198

in Instant Thunder plan: 96–97

LOCs: 252

in OPORD for Desert Shield: 304

personnel: 167

positioning of: 167, 169

preparation for Kuwait attack: 20

response to Desert Shield: 51–52

SAMs: 175, 197, 306–307n57

shelters for: 170

sites in Kuwait: 248

survival of: 304n46

target of air campaign: 2–3

transportation system, destruction of:

205–206, 303–304

units

Hammurabi Armored Division: 305

Madinah Armored Division: 305

Tawakalna Mechanized Division: 204,

207, 305–306, 306n56

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 96–

97, 157

in USCENTCOM war plan: 94, 96

Reserve forces, U.S.: 14, 30, 115

Rice, Donald: 73, 80

Rivet Joint. See Aircraft, U.S., RC–135

“Rivet Joint”

Riyadh AB, Saudi Arabia: 17, 59

Roberts, Harry: 250

Rommel, Erwin: 168

Royal Air Force. See Great Britain, Royal

Air Force (RAF); Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of, Royal Saudi

Air Force

Rufah SRBM facility: 248

Rumaila oil field: 1, 19–20

Russ, Robert: 81

Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

374

On Target
Ryan, Michael: 283

Al-Sabah, Mohammed Sabah al-Salam: 27,

278

Sadat, Anwar: 1

Saddam International Airport (IAP): 201

Safwan airfield: 290

Salah Al Din SAM plant: 269

Salman Pak

AM transmitter: 201

bombing of: 264

BW bunkers: 194, 251

CW facilities: 251

IOC: 193, 270

in USCENTAF campaign plan: 104, 156

Samarra, Iraq

CW bunkers: 281

CW facilities: 199, 250–251

in USCENTAF campaign plan: 156

Saqash railroad bridge: 215–216

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

agreement to host Coalition forces: 2,

15, 31–32

agreement to offensive operations: 163

aid to USSR: 119

air base infrastructure: 16–18

Coalition member: 49

Egyptian debts forgiven: 49

Iraqi debt forgiven: 27

military headquarters in: 34

Ministry of Defense and Aviation

(MODA) headquarters: 34, 39

petroleum reserves: 28–29

Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF)

air base infrastructure: 16–18

ATO planning, preparation, and execution: 48

CAP for bombing of

Al Iskandariyah arms plant: 214

Al Musayyib rocket-motor plant:

214

Latifiya explosives plant: 214

headquarters, use of by USCENTAF:

34

initial deployment assessment: 55

OPORD missions: 54

training exercises: 133

in USCENTAF campaign planning:

102

use of ATO: 48

use of drones: 91

Secretary Baker’s November 1990 trip

to: 112

setting of oil prices: 25

sharing of intelligence data with: 25

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

von Schlieffen Plan: 69, 73

School of Advanced Military Studies,

Leavenworth, Kansas: 106

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman

additional aircraft needed for offensive

war: 116

approval of USCENTAF campaign: 98–

99

assessment of war plan (October 11):

107–108

authorization to deploy U.S. forces to

Saudi Arabia: 32

briefings on USCENTAF air campaign

plan: 151–152

in Camp David briefing on Kuwait invasion: 29–30

Commander, Central Command (COMUSCENTCOM): 14

Commander in Chief, Central Command

(CINCCENT): 33

Commander, Joint Task Force Middle

East (COMJTFME): 36

comparison to Gen. McClellan: 108

concealment of attack plan: 86

concern for U.S. Embassy personnel: 30

on deployment orders: 44

deployment to Saudi Arabia: 94

desire for low casualties: 70

faith in ground forces: 99

on final strategic air targets: 280

force needs for Desert Storm: 108, 112

on Gen. Powell’s request for offensive

battle plan: 74, 101–102

Ground Component Commander: 30–

31n69

incorporation of Instant Thunder ideas:

287

on Iraqi Republican Guard: 96

JCS briefing prior to Kuwait invasion:

26

JFACC direction from: 34–36

on JSTARS: 142–143

on JTF Proven Force missions in air

375

Index
planning: 212–213

on Lt. Gen. Horner’s response to Instant

Thunder: 82

in meeting King Fahd (August 6): 30

on military behavior in AOR: 121–122

National Security Council briefing on

Kuwait invasion: 29

on NBC targets: 70

on offensive mission objectives: 73, 96,

112–113

photo of: 40

placing Iran/Iraq border off-limits: 307

preparation for expeditionary force

deployment: 33

preparation for ground offensive: 112–

114

on prioritization of shipments: 45

request for a retaliation air plan: 57–59

on request for KC–135 aerial refueling

by UAE: 20

request for School of Advanced Military

Studies input: 106

request for USCENTAF/IAF liaison: 232

review of Instant Thunder plan: 68–69

setting of theater priorities: 239–240

on starting date of Desert Storm: 161

TACON of JTF Proven Force: 212

on targets: 204–205, 272–276, 281,

289n10

on timing of NCA attack order: 102

trust in Lt. Gen. Horner: 39

on USCENTAF Phase III assertions: 158

Scowcroft, Brent

briefed on force readiness: 161

briefings on USCENTCOM war plan:

102–109

in Camp David briefing on Kuwait invasion: 29

on Gen. Dugan’s USCENTAF campaign

remarks: 100

on President Bush’s decision to go to

war: 150

on President Bush’s peace offer: 148

Scud. See Missiles, surface-to-surface

(SSMs), short-range ballistic

missiles (SRBMs) “Scuds”

Secretary of Defense: 84. See also Cheney,

Richard

Secretary General of the United Nations:

163

Secretary of State: 21. See also Baker,

James

Sector operations centers (SOCs)

H–3 area: 102, 184, 199, 201, 250

Kirkuk: 102

South: 102

Taji: 102, 186, 193, 209

Tallil: 186, 209

V (in Kuwait): 102, 193

Security police: 44, 44–45n17

Seeb, Oman: 46

Senate Armed Services Committee: 148

Sensitive Compartmented Information

Facility (SCIF): 86

Sentry. See Aircraft, U.S., E–3 “Sentry”

Shahiyat rocket facility: 214, 236, 282

Shaibah

airfield: 192, 205

ground forces command facility: 198

HASs: 258

helicopter ramps: 195

SAM support facilities: 265, 269

Shaikh Isa airfield, Bahrain: 46–47

Shamir, Yitzhak: 230

Shatt-al-Arab, Iran: 52

Shayka Mazhar airfield: 264, 267, 276, 281

Shevardnadze, Eduard: 118

Shia Muslim: 131, 290–291, 308, 308n66

Shomron, Dan: 233

Sicily: 304

Sidewinder: 129

Simultaneity: 90, 129, 216–217

Somalia: 10

South SOC: 102

Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

Sparrow. See Missiles, air-to-air, AIM–7

“Sparrow”

Special Operations Command, Central

Command (SOCCENT): 35,

38–39

Special Operations Forces (SOF)

20th Special Operations Squadron: 182

for air base ground defense: 38–39

aircraft: 103

for CSAR: 38–39

376

On Target
from Egypt: 49

SRBM launch site missions: 233, 236

from Syria: 49

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 91,

103

Spectre. See Aircraft, U.S., AC–130 “Spectre”

Spirit: 6, 8

Stanfill, Ronald: 67, 83, 85, 87

Starlifter: 40, 41–43, 283

Stealth technology: 7–8

Strategic Air Command (SAC)

air component commander coordination

with: 37

air refueling plan: 92, 103

ATO input from: 11, 92

bomber inventory (FY 1993): 6n17

CINCSAC visit to AOR: 136

combat aerial refueling: 183, 202, 227,

256, 256n39

deployment support: 42–43, 47

in exercises: 135

fuel carried by tankers: 41, 103

longest combat mission flown: 166

MAP use by: 65, 92

offensive air campaign planning by: 65,

68

OPCON of aircraft: 35, 136

OPLAN adherence by: 92

TACON of aircraft: 35, 136

USN support: 41, 103

Strategic Forces (STRATFOR), Director:

136

Strategic Reconnaissance Center, Offutt

AFB, Nebraska: 136

Strategic Reserve Program: 18

Stratofortress. See Aircraft, U.S., B–52D

“Stratofortress”; Aircraft,

U.S., B–52G “Stratofortress”

Stratojet: 65

Stratotanker. See Aircraft, U.S., KC–135

“Stratotanker”

Strike Eagle. See Aircraft, U.S., F–15E

“Strike Eagle”

Sudan: 10, 17

Sununi EW facilities: 209

Sununu, John: 29, 102–109

Superfortress: 65

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)

aircraft for: 155

CAFMS for: 92

GCI destruction: 176

in Instant Thunder plan: 77–78

Iraqi response to: 190

missiles vs. guns: 249

objective of first air attacks: 176

ratio of SEAD/escort-to-strike aircraft:

192, 199–200

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 91,

105, 158

use of drones for: 91

Surgeon General of the USAF: 131

Switchblade: 6

Synthetic aperture radar (SAR): 141, 240

Syria

9th Syrian Armored Division: 49

Coalition member: 49

defense of airspace: 154, 230

in Joint Islamic-Arab Forces: 39

Kari system configured for attack by:

176

in NSD–54 administrative policy: 165

role in Desert Storm: 163

Tables of organization: 135

Tabuk AB, Saudi Arabia: 17, 137

Tactical Air Command (TAC)

CAFMS use: 92

Lt. Gen Horner’s span of control in:

135–136

offensive air campaign planning by

adherence to Joint AirLand

Battle: 54–55, 61

in response to Instant Thunder plan:

68, 81

weakness of: 65, 92

Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

changes to ATO, handling of: 228

collocation with JRCC: 79

establishment of: 34

JSTARS mission management: 144

Tactical control (TACON)

by air component commander: 36–38

by JFACC: 35–36

of JSTARS: 144

of JTF Proven Force: 212

377

Index
of MARCENT aircraft: 35–37

of SAC aircraft: 35, 136

of SOF aircraft: 38

of USARCENT aircraft: 35, 37

of USNAVCENT aircraft: 35–37

Tactical Fighter Weapons Center: 72

Taft, William: 100

Taif AB, Saudi Arabia: 17, 47, 137, 216

Taji

airfield: 276

bombing of: 280–281

BW bunkers: 277

BW facility: 156, 251–253

C2 bunker (No. 2): 186, 193

CW facility: 156

IIS HQ: 201–202

IOC: 202

missile support facility: 199

North Taji facility (No. 2): 251, 253,

283–284

repair facilities: 269

Saddam Hussein’s recreational camp:

253

SOC: 102, 186, 209

SRBM support facility: 187

SSM equipment plant: 277

target of air campaign: 269

in USCENTAF campaign plan: 104

Tall Afar airfield: 266

Tall Al Lahm ammunition dump: 265

Tallil

airfield: 250, 263, 267, 280

archaeological sites near: 130–131, 192

bombed aircraft bunker: 276

CW bunkers: 200, 264

fiber-optic stations: 266, 278

HASs: 258, 276

IOC: 198, 209

runways: 192

SOC: 186, 209

SRBM shelters: 192, 236

Tanks

M1A1 Abrams tank: 50, 112, 168

T–72M: 167

Tar Miya nuclear facility: 282

Tar Miya rocket facility: 269

Targets. See also Bomb damage assessment

(BDA)

centers of gravity as: 62–63, 177, 216

Col. Warden’s choice of: 64–65, 89, 177,

288n4

level of effort: 301

list given reporters by Gen. Dugan: 99

political value of: 268

strategic sets: 287–288

system list

August list: 96

September list: 98

October list: 103

December–January list: 152

January 19, 1991, list: 221

Instant Thunder: 76, 103

weather impact on choice of: 223

Task Force Normandy: 182

Tate, Steven: 187

Tel Aviv, Israel: 155

Threat Related Attrition: 131–132

Thumrait, Oman: 46

Thunderbolt II. See Aircraft, U.S., A–10

“Thunderbolt II”

Thunderchief: 6–7

Tice, Jeffery: 250

Tiger II: 18

Tikrit, Iraq

ammunition dump: 250

ammunition facility: 156

bombing of: 277

BW bunkers: 269

C2 leadership bunker: 202–203

CW facilities: 250–251

East airfield: 267

radio communications facility: 278

railyard and bridge: 278

South airfield: 248

Time-phased force and deployment data

(TPFDD): 15

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma: 40

Tomcat. See Aircraft, U.S., F–14 “Tomcat”

Tornado. See Aircraft, Coalition, GR–1

“Tornado”

Tretler, David: 60n9

Tritonal explosives: 5

Turk, John: 128

Turkey

basing of aircraft: 47, 70, 156

in CINCEUR AOR: 212

extensions from U.S. State Department

for aircraft basing: 210

378

On Target
Iraqi oil pipeline shut down: 211

JTF Proven Force bases in: 209–210

in NSD–54 administrative policy: 165

Secretary Baker’s November 1990 trip

to: 112

U.S. negotiations with: 210–211

Turner, Steven

on H–2 airfield bombing: 184

on IZAF pilots: 185

on Scudbuster routine: 241

Tutwiler, Margaret: 21

Tuwaitha nuclear facility

BDA: 293–294

bombing of: 202, 249, 252–253, 264

description of: 249

IADS: 249

in USCENTAF campaign plan: 109

Ulama: 31–32

Umayjah petroleum refinery: 215

Umm Qasr naval base: 78, 103, 195, 264

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ):

125

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR)

aid from Arab states to: 119

air defense doctrine: 174

Coalition member: 54

as enemy in exercises: 66

impact of stealth technology on: 9

influence of, on USCENTCOM planning: 13–14

Instant Thunder-style assault on: 318

intelligence data deception training: 154

Iraq-Soviet peace talks: 279

on Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: 118

missile attacks in Afghanistan: 153

nuclear reactor in Iraq: 249, 253

R–300E SRBM: 152–153

Secretary Baker’s November 1990 trip

to: 112

Soviet hostages in Iraq: 148

support of Desert Shield: 54

in UN Security Council: 117

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

accused of oil price setting: 19

air bases in: 17

Coalition member: 49

Egyptian debts forgiven: 49

F–16s deployed to: 41

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

request for KC–135 aerial refueling: 20.

See also Exercises/Plans,

Ivory Justice

response to Iraqi troop movements: 20

Saddam Hussein’s view of: 21–24

sharing of intelligence data with: 25

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

United Kingdom (UK). See Great Britain

United Nations (UN) Security Council

blockade of air travel to Iraq: 99

call for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait:

29

procedural rules of: 117

Resolution 660 (1990): 29

Resolution 661 (1990): 31

Resolution 662 (1990): 40

Resolution 665 (1990): 51

Resolution 670 (1990): 99

Resolution 678 (1990): 119, 147, 162,

163

resolution for Persian Gulf War: 117, 119

sanctions on Iraq and Kuwait: 31

shipping inspections: 51

support of, NSD 45: 53–54

UN maritime force in Persian Gulf,

establishment of: 51

voided Iraqi annexation of Kuwait: 40

United States Air Force (USAF)

1st Tactical Fighter Wing: 40, 46, 126,

137

2d Bombardment Wing: 166

Third Air Force: 12–13

4th Tactical Fighter Wing: 5n10, 13, 46,

137, 137, 222, 241

7th Airborne Command and Control

Squadron: 137

Eighth Air Force: 6, 7, 136, 166, 313

8th Tactical Fighter Wing: 4

Ninth Air Force: 5n10, 10–13, 16, 47,

318. See also United States

Air Force Component, Central

Command (USCENTAF)

Twelfth Air Force: 12

14th Provisional Air Division [AD(P)]:

137

Fifteenth Air Force: 136

15th Provisional Air Division [AD(P)]:

137

379

Index
16th Provisional Air Division [AD(P)]:

136

17th Provisional Air Division [AD(P)]:

136

Seventeenth Air Force: 60

Twentieth Air Force: 314

20th Special Operations Squadron: 182

20th Tactical Fighter Wing: 209

23d Tactical Fighter Wing: 46, 137–138

33d Tactical Fighter Wing: 47, 137, 185

35th Tactical Fighter Wing: 46–47, 133,

137, 189–190

36th Tactical Fighter Wing: 209–210

37th Tactical Fighter Wing: 46, 137, 227

41st Electronic Combat Squadron: 137

48th Tactical Fighter Wing: 12–13, 137,

222, 262

52d Tactical Fighter Wing: 209

66th Electronic Combat Wing: 209

117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing:

137

138th Tactical Fighter Squadron: 237

335th Tactical Fighter Squadron: 183n9

354th Tactical Fighter Wing: 46–47,

126, 137, 161

363d Tactical Fighter Wing: 137

366th Tactical Fighter Wing: 137

388th Tactical Fighter Wing: 137–138

390th Electronic Combat Squadron: 137

401st Tactical Fighter Wing: 137–138,

210

415th Tactical Fighter Squadron: 178,

201

416th Tactical Fighter Squadron: 258–

259

507th Tactical Air Control Wing: 137

552d Provisional Airborne Warning

Wing: 137

561st Tactical Fighter Squadron: 189–

190

641st Tactical Fighter Squadron: 249–

250

4300th Provisional Bombardment Wing

[BW(P)]: 190

4409th Provisional Operational Support

Wing: 137

4411th Provisional Joint Surveillance

Target Radar System

Squadron: 143

7440th Provisional Composite Wing

[CW(P)]: 213

after action assessment: 318–319,

319n79

airlift: 136

Fighter Weapons School: 87–88

fuels used by: 41

maintenance rates: 316

MiG–29 loaned to: 173

PGM use: 5–6

request for KC–135 aerial refueling by

UAE: 20

SOF support: 38

stealth technology development: 7–9

use of RSAF bases: 18n39

United States Air Force Component, Central Command (USCENTAF)

ACE division: 138–139

air tasking order (ATO)

vs. actual missions flown: 140–141,

252

CAFMS for development of: 92–93

for D-day Plan: 16, 93

delivery system for: 93

for Desert Shield: 48

for expeditionary force deployment:

34

in Joint AirLand Battle concepts: 61

JTF Proven Force missions in: 212–

213

lessons learned: 318

vs. MAP: 92–93

for Navy strike packages: 129

preparation of in war: 224

SOCCENT missions in: 38–39

Warden group view of: 65, 65–66n16

weaknesses of: 11–12

airlift: 41–42

ATO division: 138–140, 226–228

campaign planning

adherence to Joint AirLand Battle

concepts: 54–55

after action assessment: 11–13, 110,

177–179, 309–310, 317–318

attack sequence: 103–104

changes to, after exercises: 134

for defensive operations: 47, 54

estimated air loss rates: 106

goals of: 104, 157–159, 285

380

On Target
Instant Thunder basis of: 88–89, 98

intelligence

access to: 86–87

alternative sources for: 226–228

canceling missions due to lack of:

253

from Checkmate Division: 68, 225,

225n13

from Directorate of Intelligence:

86–87, 223–225, 273

from JSTARS: 143–144

from videotapes: 225–226

for rescue of hostages: 106

ROE: 37, 128–130

strike packages

assembly of: 63–64, 89–90

mission objectives of: 89, 105

naval support of: 103, 129

for training exercises: 132–133

tactics: 254

targets

archaeological sites near: 130–131

collateral damage potential: 131–

132, 165

containing hostages: 148–149

first day’s air operations: 152

of historic or religious significance:

105, 130–131

intelligence data on: 86–87

joint no-fire target list: 128, 130–

131

list from CSAF: 98

selection of: 89

simultaneity vs. attack-sequencing:

90–91

team formation: 84–85

telecommunications for: 85–86

USCENTCOM war plan impact on:

94–96

Class A accidents: 134

Combat Operations Planning Staff: 138

communication systems for: 45–46

computers for: 45, 85, 85n66

court-martial rates: 125

D-day Plan: 16

defensive counterair sorties: 319

deployment of staff officers to: 44–45

Directorate of Campaign Plans

vs. Directorate of Intelligence: 223–

226, 224n10

establishment of: 138–140

internal working relationships: 226–

228

Directorate of Intelligence

after action assessment: 223–225

communication systems for: 46

data for campaign planning: 86–87

vs. Directorate of Campaign Plans:

223–226, 224n10

exercises vs. real war experience: 12

IZAF assessment: 173

material handling by: 12

personnel: 223–224

processing of data: 224–225

targeting information from: 86–87,

273

weaponeering by: 257

Guidance, Apportionment, and Tasking

(GAT) division: 138–140,

226–227

initial deployment of: 55

JTF Proven Force liaison: 213

master attack plan (MAP)

vs. actual missions flown: 252n22

for all air operations: 97

assembly of: 138–140

vs. ATO: 92–93

change sheet: 138–139

cycle time: 248

distribution of: 179

lessons learned: 318

from Ninth Air Force: 10

personnel: 42, 112, 125–127, 171

security police: 44, 44–45n17

staff chaplain: 125–126

training exercises: 132–133

UCMJ Article 15 punishments: 125

United States Army (USA)

1st Armored Division: 112

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized): 112,

168

2d Armored Division: 112

2d Brigade: 161

3d Armored Division: 112

Third Army: 30–31n69

VII Corps

battle with Republican Guard: 307

combat readiness of: 151

381

Index
Commander, on JSTARS: 142

impact of Desert Shield deployment:

147

request for by Gen. Schwarzkopf: 112

XVIII Corps: 50, 111, 158–159

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized):

33, 50, 95

42d Field Artillery Brigade: 112

82d Airborne Division: 43, 47, 50, 168

101st Air Assault Division: 50, 161, 182

adherence to Joint AirLand Battle: 54–

55

aircraft: 38, 182

assumptions for two-corps offensive

campaign: 112

ATO planning, preparation, and execution: 37

in Checkmate Division, Warfighting

Concepts Directorate: 71

in Instant Thunder plan: 79

interest in JSTARS: 141–142

Joint AirLand Battle: 54–55, 60

offensive land campaign planning: 106–

107

Special Operations Forces in: 38

transportation of personnel to AOR: 43

United States Army Component, Central

Command (USARCENT)

in Army campaign planning: 159

OPCON of aircraft: 35, 37

OPORD 1: 50

TACON of aircraft: 35, 37

tasking: 50

use of JSTARS: 144

United States Army Corps of Engineers: 18

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)

air order of battle: 118–119

area of responsibility: 10

Chief of Staff: 102

communication systems in Saudi Arabia:

45–46

community relations action councils:

122

court-martial rates: 125

Directorate of Intelligence (J–2): 12, 25,

87, 144. See also Intelligence

establishment of forward headquarters:

39

initial deployment assessment: 55

Operation Order 1 (OPORD 1): 34, 54

Operation Order 3 (OPORD 3): 54

personnel: 42, 112, 124–127

Soviet influence on planning: 13–14

TPFDD: 15

training exercises: 132–133

UCMJ Article 15 punishments: 125

war plan: 73, 94–97, 101–108

United States Combined Theater Commanders in Chief (CINC):

9–10. See also Schwarzkopf,

H. Norman

United States Embassy, Abu Dhabi, UAE:

20

United States Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq: 20–

25, 163

United States Embassy, Kuwait City, Kuwait: 29–30, 106, 150

United States Embassy, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 30–31

United States Embassy, Tehran, Iran: 30

United States House of Representatives

debate over Persian Gulf War: 163

House Concurrent Resolution 32: 163

House Joint Resolution 77: 163, 166

letter from President Bush: 162

United States Marine Component, Central

Command (MARCENT)

Air Commander: 97

Ground Component Commander: 30–

31n69

MAGTF aircraft: 36

OPCON of aircraft: 36–37

TACON of aircraft: 35–37

training exercises: 133

use of JSTARS: 144

United States Marine Corps (USMC)

3d Marine Air Wing: 198

air doctrine: 97

amphibious assault on Kuwait: 168

ATO planning, preparation, and execution: 37, 48

in Checkmate Division, Warfighting

Concepts Directorate: 71

Marine Air-Ground Task Force

(MAGTF): 36

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB):

47, 50, 159, 168

382

On Target
reserve call up: 115

in USCENTAF campaign planning: 97

United States Naval Component, Central

Command (USNAVCENT)

OPCON of aircraft: 35–37

TACON of aircraft: 35–37

United States Navy (USN)

aerial refueling requirements: 41, 103

ATO planning, preparation, and execution: 37, 48

BQM–34 drone use: 91

carriers, location in theater: 104–105

in Checkmate Division, Warfighting

Concepts Directorate: 71

execution of preplanned TLAM strikes

on Iraq: 54

first shots of Desert Storm: 166

fleet defense sorties: 319

hard-target penetration capability: 44

JP–5 fuel: 41, 103

loss of F/A–18: 189, 300

maritime strategy: 60

in Operation Linebacker II: 6

Phoenix (AIM–54) missile: 129–130

ROE: 128–130

shipping inspections: 51

UN Resolution 665 (1990) impact on: 51

USS America: 262

USS Bunker Hill: 166

USS Eisenhower: 41, 78

USS Independence: 41, 78

USS John F. Kennedy: 195

USS Midway: 200, 250

USS Ranger: 195, 201

USS Saratoga: 78, 104

USS Wisconsin: 104–105, 166

United States Senate: 163

United States Space Command (SPACECOM): 235–236

United States State Department

Ambassador Glaspie’s meeting with

Saddam Hussein: 20–25

approval of request for KC–135 aerial

refueling by UAE: 20

assignment of female ambassador to

Iraq: 24–25

extensions from Turkey for aircraft: 210

on Israeli retaliation for Scud attacks:

229–230

United States of America

accused of oil price setting: 19

chairmanship of UN Security Council

(December 1990): 117

defense commitments to Kuwait: 21

economic sanctions on Iraq: 25

foreign policy in Persian Gulf: 18–19, 25

lack of involvement in Iran-Iraq war: 22

response to hostage taking: 148

Ur: 130–131, 192

Uwaysha refinery: 270

Venezuela: 25

Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force: 58,

68, 73

Videotape: 201, 225–226, 253

Vietnam War

bombing of Haiphong: 6–7, 315

bombing of Hanoi: 6, 315

bombing of Paul Doumer Bridge: 4

bombing of Thanh Hoa bridge: 4

China’s support of North Vietnam: 106,

314–315

enemy sanctuaries: 130

vs. Gulf War: 106, 169

Iron Hand flights: 6–7

Johnson, Lyndon: 84

MiG combat air patrol (MiGCAP): 7

Operation Linebacker I: 4, 303, 315

Operation Linebacker II: 4, 6–7, 315

Operation Rolling Thunder: 67

strategic bombing in: 314–316

U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand: 6

USSR’s support of North Vietnam: 315

Volant Solo. See Aircraft, U.S., EC–130E

“Volant Solo”

Wadi al Batin: 52, 305

Wadi al Jabariyah SRBM launch complex:

184, 236–238, 242, 278

Wadi al Khirr airfield

bombing of: 201, 207, 216

HASs: 258

an Iraqi FOL: 190–191

Wadi Amij SRBM launch complex: 184,

236–238, 242

Wadi Ar Ratqa SRBM launch complex:

184, 236–238

Wahhabi-Muslim religious hierarchy: 31–

32

Waller, Calvin: 151, 161

383

Index
Walton, George: 189–190

War readiness spares kits (WRSKs): 210,

316

War trophies: 121–122

Warden, John

36th TFW: 59

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat: 60

appointment as Deputy Director for

Warfighting Concepts: 59–60

briefing style: 68–69

briefings on Instant Thunder: 68–71, 73,

75, 80–83

criticism of defensive air campaign

plans: 66

definition of air campaign: 75

influence of, on air campaign plan

choice of targets: 177

on Directorate of Campaign Plans:

140

first day’s air operations: 207–208

on Phase I of Desert Storm: 110

on Instant Thunder targets: 78

on Iraqi Republican Guard: 96–97

on mission objectives: 63–64

on operational art of war: 60

on planning an air war campaign: 63

preparation for offensive air campaign

planning: 66

on psychological operations: 64

request to leave Saudi Arabia by Lt.

Gen. Horner: 83

targeting and strategic ideas: 64–65, 89,

288n4

use of historical analogies: 69–71

Wart Weaseling: 217

Warthog. See Aircraft, U.S., A–10 “Thunderbolt II”

Washington Post

Gen. Dugan’s remarks to: 99

Gen. Schwarzkopf’s remarks to: 51

poll on President Bush’s peace offer

(November 30, 1990): 148

Washington Times: 112

Weather

effect of, in air campaign plan: 159,

216–217

on first night of Desert Storm: 181–182

fog: 194

impact on air operations: 223–224, 238,

243

operational thresholds: 222–223

satellite monitoring of: 9

satellite photo of SWA: 222

Webster, William: 29

Welch, Larry: 100

Wild Weasel. See Aircraft, U.S., F–4G

“Wild Weasel”; Aircraft, U.S.,

F–16 “Wild Weasel”

Williams, Pete: 151

Wilson, Steven: 82, 85, 87

Wolfowitz, Paul: 29–30, 151–152, 229,

233

Women, military: 42, 114, 124

World War I: 69–70

World War II

Desert Storm vs. African campaign: 168

German V rockets: 235

Japanese Imperial Navy: 134

lessons learned: 295

Maginot Line: 254

night bombing during: 313–314

pre-Normandy invasion air campaign:

70–71

stealth technology development: 8, 8n24

United States Army Air Force (USAAF)

Air War Plans Division Plan 1: 62

B–17 “Flying Fortress”: 6–7, 62

B–24 “Liberator”: 62

bombing of Japan: 314

Combined Bomber Offensive: 313–

314

offensive air campaign in Europe: 70–

71

strike packages, development of: 63

tactical vs. strategic air warfare: 160

USSR’s abandonment of Polish Army:

290

Yemen Arab Republic

chairmanship of UN Security Council

(December 1990): 117

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

intervention to prevent war: 163

support of Iraq: 29

UN Resolution 660: 29

UN Resolution 661: 31

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Yemen, Democratic Republic of

384

On Target
chairmanship of UN Security Council

(December 1990): 117

factor in site of RSAF bases: 17

intervention to prevent war: 163

support of Iraq: 29

UN Resolution 660: 29

UN Resolution 661: 31

in USCENTCOM’s AOR: 10

Yeosock, John: 30, 30–31n69, 34

385

Index