Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Complexity, Organizational Blinders, and the SOCOM Design Way

(SDW) takes on the monumental task of explaining why the complex world is so difficult to comprehend and provides a way for 

navigating through it. The authors accomplish this utilizing U.S. 

Special Operations Command design techniques. This monograph is not just for the Special Operator or the Operational Planner. It is useful for anyone who is seeking out a better way to 

address problems that seem to have no solution. Dr. David Ellis 

and Mr. Charles Black provide the tools necessary to define the 

problem and develop an approach. The SDW needs to be seriously considered and put into practice if the community desires 

to make progress in complex and wicked problems.

ISBN 978-1-941715-34-5

Complexity, Organizational Blinders, 

and the SOCOM Design Way

David C. Ellis and Charles N. Black

JSOU Report 18-3

JSOU Report 18-3 Complexity, Organizational Blinders, and the SOCOM Design Way Ellis and Black 

This beautiful fractal explaining the sea is an educational interpretation of a “Mandelbrot set.” PHOTO BY DASARTS/SHUTTERSTOCK 
Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University and the 

Center for Strategic Studies

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission 

is to prepare SOF to shape the future strategic environment by providing 

specialized joint professional military education, developing SOF-specific 

undergraduate and graduate level curriculum and by fostering special operations research, analysis and outreach in support of USSOCOM objectives. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) 

where efforts center upon the USSOCOM mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Boyd L. Ballard, Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Francis X. Reidy, Deputy Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Elizabeth Sylvester, B.S., Journalism, JSOU Press Assistant Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 18-3

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2018

Complexity, 

Organizational Blinders, and 

the SOCOM Design Way

David C. Ellis and Charles N. Black
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to 

the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) is currently accepting written works 

relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information, please 

contact the CSS Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your interest 

in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in April 2018.

ISBN 978-1-941715-34-5
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Advancing SOF Cultural Engagement: The Malinowski Model for a Qualitative 

Approach, JSOU Report 18-2, Robert R. Greene Sands and Darby Arakelian

Growing SOLO: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities, 

JSOU Report 18-1, Troy White

Resistance Views: Tartu Resistance Seminar Essays on Unconventional Warfare and 

Small State Resistance, edited by Kevin D. Stringer and Glennis F. Napier

How Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence? 

JSOU Report 17-11, Robert Haddick

The Death of the Golden Hour and the Return of the Future Guerrilla Hospital, 

JSOU Report 17-10, Warner D. Farr

Property Rights and Social Justice as an Indicator of Stability: The SOF Nexus, 

JSOU Report 17-9, Bill Mandrick 

On the cover. Detail from the Exekias Vatican Amphora dated 530 B.C. depicts 

Achilles, on the left, playing a game with Ajax. PHOTO BY WORLD HISTORY 

ARCHIVE/NEWSCOM 

Back cover. This beautiful fractal explaining the sea is an educational interpretation 

of a “Mandelbrot set.” PHOTO BY DASARTS/SHUTTERSTOCK 
v

Contents

From the Director ........................................................................vii

Foreword ......................................................................................ix

About the Authors..........................................................................xi

Acknowledgements .....................................................................xiii

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1. Design Thinking: Appreciating the Context................. 13

Chapter 2. Complexity and Wicked Problems.............................. 29

Chapter 3. The Mother of All Blinders: Prediction in 

Open Systems ............................................................................. 45

Chapter 4. Heresy! The Desired Future as the Alternative for 

End States in Open Systems......................................................... 61

Chapter 5. The State of States: The Myth of Stability ..................... 79

Chapter 6. The Nation-State Paradigm and How the Internet 

Messes Everything Up.................................................................. 89

Chapter 7. Design Thinking: Defining the Problem and 

Developing an Approach........................................................... 105

Chapter 8. Conclusion............................................................... 113

Acronyms.................................................................................. 119

Glossary ................................................................................... 121

Endnotes.................................................................................... 127

vii

From the Director 

Many strategic level national security assessments of the operating 

environment or international arena describe conditions as complex, 

uncertain, wicked, or some other adjective implying “too hard to figure out.” 

Operational design, systemic design, design inquiry, and design thinking 

are only a few terms in vogue as innovative ways to look at problem sets 

and contemplate the situation or circumstances differently. Dave Ellis and 

Charles Black tackle this topic with examples, vignettes, and clearly defined 

key terms to make the concepts more digestible and understandable. 

The bulleted summaries at the end of each chapter are a nice touch, but 

do not expect to only consume those summaries and understand the total 

picture—it is just too complicated a subject to be reduced to a PowerPointlike consumable. Enjoy this and our other JSOU publications.

Boyd L. Ballard

Director, Center for Strategic Studies

ix

Foreword 

Dr. Dave Ellis and Mr. Charles Black’s Complexity, Organizational 

Blinders, and the SOCOM Design Way takes on the monumental task 

of explaining why the complex world is so difficult to comprehend and provides a way for navigating through it. The authors accomplish this utilizing 

U.S. Special Operations Command design techniques. It does not matter if 

the reader is familiar with these design concepts. Ellis and Black are successful at keeping the narrative from getting too “heavy” but at the same time 

challenging the reader to think “differently.” This text might even encourage 

the reader to sign up for a design course or two.

There are many blinders keeping the U.S. military and the Special Operations community from achieving success or even realizing progress in current operations. This monograph tackles many of these blinders (personal 

and organizational). The authors provide the tools to address complexity 

and “wicked problems.” One technique is to Appreciate the Context. Since 

any one individual or organization cannot comprehend all the dynamics of 

a system—only those aspects informed by their experience and bias—the 

SOCOM Design Way (SDW) advocates for teams working together with 

divergent perspectives to truly appreciate the context.

This monograph challenges the reader to think systemically vice in a 

linear fashion. This concept is important because it leads to a Range of Possible Futures instead of an end state. This might seem like heresy to a professional military education school-trained planner but it provides the planner 

with other solution sets that would not be possible using linear thinking. 

The reader is also challenged to re-conceptualize the nation-state paradigm. 

The military views the state as the source of power which leads to planning 

frameworks that reinforce those blinders. The design methodology espoused 

by the authors provides the reader with different ways to perceive social 

organization and power. Hopefully, the SDW can lead to better approaches 

to address complex and wicked problems.

This monograph is not just for the special operator or the operational 

planner. It is useful for anyone who is seeking out a better way to address 

problems that seem to have no solution. Ellis and Black provide the tools 

necessary to define the problem and develop an approach. The tendency 
x

will be to revert back to the traditional paradigms and linear thinking and, 

while it might be easier, it would be a mistake. The SDW needs to be seriously 

considered and put into practice if the community desires to make progress 

in complex and wicked problems. 

Peter M. McCabe, Ph.D.

Resident Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic Studies 
xi

About the Authors

Charles N. Black is the co-founder and managing partner at Xundis 

Global, LLC, which specializes in navigating complexity through 

creative and reflective application of design, strategy, and planning to realize favorable futures. Mr. 

Black is a retired Marine Corps officer with over 26 

years of diverse leadership, planning, and operational 

experiences with conventional, special operations, 

and coalition forces. He is a founding member of the 

JSOU Design Thinking Program and frequent subject 

matter expert facilitating design inquiries for the SOF 

enterprise.

Dr. David C. Ellis is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He holds a doctorate in international relations and 

comparative politics from the University of Florida, a master’s degree in 

international development with a specialization in 

international marketing from The George Washington University, and bachelor degrees in international 

studies and Spanish from Jacksonville University.

Dr. Ellis’s research on democratization and development in identity conflict spans over two decades. 

His interests in peacekeeping, conflict resolution, 

development, and atrocity in ethnic conflict focused 

his doctoral research on identity, social movements, 

organization and social learning theory, and economic growth theory. Dr. Ellis served as an All Source Intelligence analyst 

in USSOCOM’s J2 JICSOC from 2009-2013 and established its Socio-Cultural Awareness (SCA) section. His research interests at JSOU focus on the 

opportunities for USSOCOM to become a learning organization through 

design thinking applications and more robust socio-cultural analysis for 

intelligence, planning, and operations.

xiii

Acknowledgements

The concepts presented in the following pages result from the combined 

experience and education of four veterans of the special operations 

enterprise: Major Tracy Moss (United States Air Force, Retired); Lieutenant 

Colonel Charles Black (United States Marine Corps, Retired); Lieutenant 

Colonel Chris Phelps (United States Marine Corps, Retired); and Lieutenant Colonel Rick Newton (United States Air Force, Retired), Ph.D. While 

design thinking has been part of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) since 2006, its original systemic operational design form 

proved difficult to disseminate across the headquarters and was not often 

suited to the intrinsically bureaucratic problems encountered by action officers. By distilling the theoretical essence of design thinking into a pragmatic, 

experience-based, and accessible series of principles, Moss, Black, Phelps, 

and Newton created a framework and educational platform that personnel 

across the special operations enterprise have found useful, exciting, and in 

many ways liberating. The authors dedicate this monograph to the inspired 

team effort that went into the creation of the SOCOM Design Way.

In composing the monograph, friends and colleagues have been supremely 

insightful. Special gratitude is extended to Dr. Peter McCabe and Dr. Paul 

Lieber for their critique, encouragement, and recommendations for keeping 

the text accessible. Substantive contributions to content and practical experience were provided by Tracy Moss; Lieutenant Colonel Tom Searle, USA 

(Ret.), Ph.D.; Lieutenant Colonel Michael Manning, Rhode Island National 

Guard, Master Sergeant Tom O’Hare, Master Sergeant Michael Cutone, and 

Sergeant Brian Beliveau (Springfield, MA). Whether they know it or not their 

influence permeates the text and is greatly appreciated. Brenda Oppermann 

and Lieutenant Colonel Wes Howard (United States Army, Retired) generously gave their time to read early drafts and helped shape key portions. 

Without the love and support of family, endeavors such as this are impossible. For the long nights and absent weekends, special thanks go to Sonya 

and Charlie Black, and Neisy, Gabriela, and Isabela Ellis. Of course, all errors 

and omissions in the text are solely the fault of the authors.

1

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

Introduction 

The gods must be crazy; it is the only explanation. At the time of this 

writing, the Taliban in Afghanistan remain a persistent threat after 15 

years of combat,1 the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) holds large swathes 

of territory in the Middle East with a growing number of regional franchises 

popping up from Africa to Southeast Asia,2 and the U.S. military supports 

a Shiite-dominated Iraqi military poised to retake Mosul in parallel with 

Iranian-backed forces just five years after the U.S. triumphantly departed 

Iraq.3 At the same time, the U.S. military—Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

in particular—control the most elegantly lethal counterterrorism (CT) force 

in the history of warfare. How in the world is this possible? Something does 

not seem right, and the force knows it at the gut level. One thing that is not 

wrong is the heart of the force. It wants to get it right, and it wants to win.

The following pages offer a conversation about the unconscious assumptions that take SOF down the wrong path. The purpose is not to offer a silver 

bullet or claim to fix all of the problems of SOF. Rather, the purpose is to 

explain why the complex world is so difficult to comprehend and provide a 

way for navigating through it. In short, from elementary school on Americans are taught certain ways to see, understand, and predict events around 

them. The military specifically, and the United States Government (USG) 

more broadly, reinforces many of the schoolhouse lessons that shape how 

world events are framed. 

The fact that reality is interpreted through frames means some things are 

inherently included, and more importantly, others are inherently excluded. 

The dominant frames that exclude others are here labeled “blinders.” Blinders 

are natural. Everyone has them—the authors certainly do. Acknowledging 

the existence of blinders is not to diminish anyone’s intelligence. It simply 

means: (a) people have limits on what they can possibly know in life, (b) their 

jobs require them to focus on just a few ways of interpreting and reacting 

to events, and (c) their infinitesimally small number of social interactions 

in the grand scheme of humanity constrains their ability to empathize with 

others. No judgment; it just is.

For United States SOF the implications of operating and thinking 

with blinders are magnified by the nature of some special operations core 
2

JSOU Report 18-3

activities. Unconventional warfare (UW), civil affairs (CA), and military 

information support operations (MISO) activities4 all require a higher degree 

of empathy for or appreciation of foreign populations than is expected of 

most other military activities.5 It is the responsibility of SOF to become more 

self-aware about their blinders and work to overcome them to the best of 

their ability.

Unfortunately, in 2001 SOF were thrust into an unanticipated CT war, 

and they adapted in the best way they knew how—take the fight to the 

enemy and hunt it down. While initially adaptive and successful in the use 

of UW approaches against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s 

regime in Iraq,6 SOF soon became focused on the direct action (DA) and 

foreign internal defense (FID) missions to disrupt and degrade terrorist and 

insurgent networks.7 Since 2004, SOF have predominantly exercised their 

skills on the surgical strike end of the core activities spectrum either in a 

DA or FID capacity. 

Sixteen years at constant, high-paced war does something to people and 

institutions. It forces them to adapt quickly, amplify positive feedback, train 

to perfect the positive feedback, execute, and then repeat the cycle year after 

year. The problem is that the whole concept of positive feedback is itself 

a frame rooted in unstated assumptions. What if the frame and unstated 

assumptions emphasize the wrong elements? What if updated standard operating procedures (SOPs) and doctrine accentuate measures of performance 

instead of measures of effectiveness (MOE)? The authors believe blinders 

in SOF have had this very effect, which is why so many look around now 

thinking the gods must be crazy.

Why Design Thinking?

Army General Joseph Votel, Commander of USSOCOM 2014-2016, recognized in 2015 that the decade long CT fight by SOF had begun to homogenize 

SOF capability. He noted, “The SOF Enterprise needs to think critically and 

challenge current and often entrenched tenets in order to rekindle a culture 

of innovation and unconventionality that has been dulled by a decade and 

a half of constant conflict.”8

 In other words, General Votel realized that so 

much of the force had specialized in the DA mission for so long, and that 

so many new entrants to the community had only known DA and its FID 

corollary, that the SOF community’s blinders were starting to result in tunnel 
3

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

vision. The old adage, if you only have a hammer everything looks like a 

nail, seems more relevant than ever and is now a pervasive warning across 

the SOF community. Breaking the habits formed based on the blinders the 

force has internalized over 15 years is the hard part.

To counteract this tunnel vision and restore the proficiency of SOF across 

the entire range of core activities, General Votel initiated the SOCOM Design 

Way (SDW). He further noted, “We [USSOCOM] have evolved, grown, and 

become increasingly corporate in our processes and products. Our Enterprise 

requires an approach that facilitates and enhances the untapped creativity, 

critical reflection, and ability to innovate among our most valuable resource 

... our people.”9 Bureaucracies by their very nature force people to think and 

act in harmony to achieve economy of scale. Without SOPs, organizations 

could not deal with vast amounts of data and synthesize the hundreds of 

interactions their personnel have on a daily basis. But SOPs are a doubleedged sword, and right now they are hurting the enterprise more than many 

would care to admit.

Already the SDW has been applied to challenges faced by the headquarters’ J4, J5, and J6 with significant positive movement accruing against some 

entrenched SOPs. While design thinking has a longer operational pedigree 

within the headquarters, the SDW is the experience-based distillation of 

theory and practice into something practical and staff-friendly. The SDW was 

developed primarily for operational, strategic, and policy level matters, but 

it can apply comfortably at the low operational and tactical levels as it nests 

with operational design. Its utility is becoming more apparent as problems 

associated with a larger SOF bureaucracy--and transregional, Interagency, 

and multinational problems such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, 

and their relationship to transregional criminal organizations—consume 

more SOF attention. 

Operational Design or Design Thinking: What’s the 

Difference?

It is important to discuss what joint and Service specific doctrine say particularly as it relates to design. Whether joint or Service specific interpretations of design, the application of design is to the operational campaign and 

tactical levels of war. Joint Publication 5-0 describes operational design as 

being “built upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of 
4

JSOU Report 18-3

the OE [operating environment]; identifies and frames problems within that 

OE; and develops approaches, through the application of operational art, to 

resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and/or policy 

... The purpose of operational design and operational art is to produce an 

operational approach, allowing the commander to continue the joint planning process (JPP), translating broad strategic and operational concepts into 

specific missions and tasks and produce an executable plan.”10 The U.S. Army 

Figure 1. How the SOCOM Design Way relates to Operational Design. By itself, 

operational design emphasizes Commander’s guidance and enables a diverse array of 

units to converge on an objective (left). The emphasis on the Commander’s knowledge 

and perspective creates a significant potential for cognitive bias and blinders to (mis)

interpret conditions, especially where doctrine appears to answer operational and 

tactical requirements (middle). Design thinking complements operational design by 

inviting divergent perspectives to mitigate the impact of blinders with the approach 

resulting from the inquiry flowing where appropriate into Commander’s guidance 

for implementation in the operational design process (right).

Convergent

Action on an

Objective

Commander's Guidance

Operational Design

Potential for 

Ineffective Routine

Commander's Guidance

Impact of Cognitive Bias

(go with what you know)

Convergent

Action on an

Objective

Commander's Guidance

Operational Design

Divergent Thinking 

to Mitigate

 Cognitive

Bias

Commander's Wicked 

Problem

Design Thinking
5

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

describes design as a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understanding, visualizing, and describing unfamiliar problems in 

approaches to solving them with emphasis on operational problems.11 In each 

instance, the doctrine seeks to widen the considerations for Commanders 

and planners when creating the solution to the problem, often in the form 

of a formal plan or order. 

The SDW differs from but complements operational design in three 

important ways (see fig. 1). First, whereas operational design seeks to orchestrate the actions of dozens to potentially thousands of personnel to converge 

on an objective, design thinking is about deliberation and consciously seeking out perspectives that diverge to mitigate the impact of blinders and avoid 

misperceiving how the environment operates. Second, operational design 

relies heavily upon and defers to Commander’s guidance irrespective of 

his or her staff’s conclusions. In the SDW, the Commander attitudinally 

recognizes that the staff’s conclusions and learning form the foundation of 

Commander’s guidance, so there is a joint learning process that precludes 

the Commander from falling back upon his or her own blinders. The SDW 

is consequently action oriented and enables the Commander to reach actionable decisions while reducing the risks associated with cognitive bias and 

organizational SOPs. Finally, while operational design is useful for achieving military objectives within a chain of command, the SDW recognizes 

that many evolving SOF missions require coordinating activities with the 

interagency and partner nations (PN) whose own perspectives and blinders 

must be reconciled with the military’s. In such circumstances, shared perspectives of the challenges become crucial because the Commander cannot 

control the actions of others upon whom he or she must rely for mission 

success. The others must willingly act in accordance with the Commander’s 

approach because they think it is the right thing to do, but the Commander’s 

approach must take their perspectives and capabilities into consideration in 

the first place.

The SDW

The authors’ core premise is that the SDW provides the foundation for talking about, conceptualizing, deconstructing, analyzing, synthesizing, and 

acting in a complex adaptive world. It is a way of perceiving complexity and 

an attitude for operating in it. Above all, the SDW is an ethos of learning 
6

JSOU Report 18-3

and discovery. The SDW is a way of thinking that enables one to envision 

what might be possible, what should be created, or performed. In effect, 

SDW enables one to question the efficacy of a policy, strategy, or mission; 

an organizational structure; a long-standing process; and, in general, the 

organizational way of doing things. SDW is a way to navigate the ambiguous, 

dynamic, and uncertain space that joins politics and the strategic employment of military power. 

The SDW borrows from the design schools in the commercial world, 

but carefully blends the concepts with the operational requirements of the 

military environment.12 In SOF’ line of work, one cannot admire a problem 

forever. After all, the boss needs deliverables and the deadline is always yesterday. It adopts Nelson and Stolterman’s view that “Design is the ability to 

imagine that-which-does-not-yet-exist, to make it appear in concrete form 

as a new, purposeful addition to the real world.”13 The SDW is conceptualized as preceding the operational planning process, and it is here that it has 

greatest value. It is usually applied on the one hand at the strategic level to 

inform ideas on what operations might be necessary, and on the other hand 

to inform policy and capability development independent of operational 

planning.

SDW starts by making a distinction between simple, complicated, and 

complex problems.14 Simple problems are easy—the problems are quickly 

recognized, SOPs serve well, and problems get solved efficiently. Complicated 

problems are harder. The root causes of problems are not so easily understood and how to redress them takes expertise. This is usually best handled 

by subject matter experts (SMEs), but the solution is manageable. Technical 

problems are usually of this nature. Complex problems are altogether a different story than complicated ones. Complex problems have no recognizable 

cause and effect relationship, SMEs cannot necessarily provide the definitive solution, and the number of people impacted by decisions is unknown 

due to the nature of the problem. Social problems are typically of this type, 

sometimes called wicked problems, but more on this later. 

The SDW is not necessary for simple problems, nor even many complicated ones. It is when problems become persistent and seemingly unsolvable 

that the SDW is recommended. SDW blends the art of appreciation (empathy) with the science of planning, and it is synthesized into three elements 

(fig. 2). It is important to remember that the SDW is a constantly iterative 
7

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

activity—once just is not enough when it comes to complex problems. The 

three elements are:

1. Appreciate the context 

2. Define the problem 

3. Develop an approach 15

While the SDW is not linear in nature, it does have a logical starting 

point with Appreciate the Context. Inevitably, design participants want to 

begin with Define the Problem as soon as new information is learned, but 

this is why one iteration just is not enough. SDW requires the discipline of 

continuing the element of appreciation, accruing more information, and 

reevaluating what was thought to be known; in other words, keep learning! 

After a few iterations, it is possible and appropriate to Develop an Approach, 

but even this stage is likely to be provisional. In the process of developing an 

approach, design participants often discover new actors with equities, come 

to a new appreciation, or try an experiment with negative results. 

In the SDW, the most important element is appreciate the context, which 

is why this monograph addresses SOF blinders. Based on experience, the 

authors recommend dedicating around 65 percent of the available time on 

appreciation, another 25 percent on defining the problem, and the final 10 

percent on developing an approach. This is a rough estimate, but instructive. 

Opening one’s mind to diverse and divergent appreciations is truly a difficult 

task. It takes practice and perspective. 

Critical

Cyclic

Creative

Constant

Define the 

Problem

Develop an 

Approach

Appreciate 

the Context

Figure 2. SDW.
8

JSOU Report 18-3

The objective of this monograph is to provide a glimpse of the importance 

of doing so by tackling one of the most fundamentally impactful blinders in the USG—the construct of “the state.” 

The intention is to show how appreciating 

the state from a complex adaptive systems 

perspective brings to the fore a number of 

problems associated with the governmentcentric, stability-oriented mindset pervasive across the USG. Wicked problems are 

intrinsic to the state making authority-based 

models suitable in certain circumstances, but 

not others, especially where SOF are often 

tasked to operate. Chapters 2–6 progressively 

explain why the state is paradoxically a conceptual necessity for SOF, but 

also one of its key blinders.

What Follows

The SDW thrives when diverse perspectives are invited to and included in 

the discussion. To borrow a phrase learned at the Rhode Island School of 

Design, one of the world’s premier art and design universities, the goal is to 

become “generous listeners,”16 but this first requires an awareness of personal 

and organizational blinders. Otherwise, it becomes nearly impossible to hear 

and interpret what the interagency, partner nations, academics, specialists, 

businessmen and women, and others from outside the SOF community are 

trying to convey.

The chapters that follow are laid out in a progressive path for learning 

about the foundations of complexity and operating within it. While the three 

elements of the SDW are introduced in this monograph, it is not a primer 

or checklist on how to use it. Instead, the monograph introduces the base 

vocabulary and the principles of science necessary for comprehending the 

complexity dynamics in which SOF now operate. Each chapter consequently 

concludes with key terms and important summary points. The intent is 

to introduce some truly important insights from academia and industry 

without diverging too far from a conversational tone. Based on the authors’ 

experience, many of the concepts discussed are only occasionally touched 

upon in professional military education curricula. If successful, the reader 

Based on experience, the 

authors recommend dedicating around 65 percent 

of the available time on 

appreciation, another 25 

percent on defining the 

problem, and the final 10 

percent on developing an 

approach.
9

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

should be able to engage in more fruitful dialogue with others and generate 

richer appreciations of complex problems through the design way.

Chapter 1 provides the foundation for the SDW and covers three important ideas. First, it explains in more depth the Appreciate the Context element. 

This truly represents the most important component of the SDW and is 

where the majority of time is spent in any design inquiry. Second, it describes 

many of the typical sources of blinders impacting people on a daily basis. 

Third, it lays out the principles and ethics associated with the appreciation 

element. 

Chapter 2 starts to bring to the surface all the things middle school science classes left out and that social scientists are loathe to admit. Chapter 2 

provides the foundational concepts for more accurately understanding the 

source of complexity in the social world. Succinctly put, there are limits to 

prediction in the social world unlike the world of physics and chemistry. 

Americans have been brought up on the idea that they are the same, and this 

is the source of so much angst in the SOF enterprise because the military’s 

planning tools accept the prediction premise and drive activities along a 

linear, cause and effect path. Correcting this conceptual error will make the 

gods seem a bit saner.

Whereas chapter 2 covers the basic philosophy of complexity, chapters 

3 and 4 offer a brief historical account of how the most impactful blinders 

have culturally become part of Americans’ unconscious assumptions about 

how the world works. This is where Western science education is put under 

the microscope and its methods and application placed in proper context. 

Unsurprisingly, chapters 2 through 4 work together and constitute a critical 

baseline for framing the rest of the monograph. 

Chapters 5 and 6 directly address that singularly powerful blinder, the 

idea of “the state.” It is a valid, tangible, meaningful, and impactful frame. 

It is an important—indeed, essential—frame through which SOF must view 

things because the military is an extension of foreign policy. Yet, it is just one 

frame and its meaning changes depending on the vantage point. To facilitate 

the learning process, this blinder is separated into distinct components, 

which makes many contemporary challenges more comprehensible when 

reassembled. Building upon content in chapter 5, this part of the monograph 

essentially offers a new appreciation of the context for many readers, which 

lays the groundwork for applying the insights to the Define the Problem element in chapter 7.
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JSOU Report 18-3

Chapter 5 places the concept of the state in historical context. Most states 

in the world are less than seventy-five years old, yet most people tend to 

imagine them as permanent, enduring constructs. Chapter 5 provides some 

background on the notion of the state in order to make sense of how USG 

blinders cause them to become the center of all things political, military, and 

developmental. Whereas much military thinking treats states as the object 

of interest, the spotlight here concentrates on the building blocks comprising them, populations. It is a far messier approach, but entirely necessary 

for SOF to understand in the era of collapsing or failed governments. This 

discussion frames the last section of chapter 5 on the myth of stability in 

countries, especially those with illegitimate governments.

Chapter 6 dissects some common terms that significantly shape how the 

roles and powers of the state are viewed. In particular, the concept of legitimate government is discussed from both the perspectives of international 

relations and relational accountability. There is a critical difference between 

international legal legitimacy and popular legitimacy though military and 

other USG personnel tend to confuse them to their detriment. 

Chapter 6 concludes with an exploration of how the Western notion of 

the state being an unquestioningly geographic expression obscures modern 

trends through which “nations of the mind” become meaningful. Briefly, 

the military spends much of its time trying to figure out how to keep governments—at least the ones favorable to the USG—in control of the populations in their territories, fixed by internationally recognized boundaries, 

and supported legally based on the concept of sovereignty. Yet, states and 

nation-states are really just patterns of behavior, not fixed and unchangeable 

entities. Undoubtedly this is an uncomfortable proposition for many, but the 

justification for it will become clearer soon. If this idea can be accepted for 

a moment, then the impact of social media and other modern communication methods on mobilizing people across boundaries can be more readily 

perceived. This is the culminating point of the monograph for SOF since the 

UW side of the core activities, particularly special warfare, must incorporate 

this perspective to be competitive in the emerging international system. 

Chapter 6 concludes by discussing the impact of the internet on creating 

nations of the mind—what one might describe as ex-patriots, like ISIS lone 

wolves—and how they confound traditional conceptions of the state.

Chapters 7 and 8 bring the SDW full circle. Having offered an example of 

appreciation of the context across chapters 2 through 6, chapter 7 describes 
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

how to define the problem and develop an approach according to the SDW. 

Chapter 8 concludes the monograph by addressing some common challenges personnel face in the context of a busy, bureaucracy-laden workday. 

Examples of actual design inquiries are presented throughout the monograph along with the tangible benefits resulting from the efforts. The path 

ahead should be filled with discovery and “ah-ha” moments and hopefully 

provide some answers to questions lurking in the recesses of the reader’s 

subconscious. 

Key Terms 

Design Thinking, Appreciate the Context, Define the Problem, Develop an 

Approach, Wicked Problems, Design Inquiry

Summary

• The SDW is an attitude and ethic for navigating through and broadening perspectives on complex challenges.

• The SDW emphasizes divergent thinking to mitigate the impact of 

cognitive, physiological, and organizational biases, called blinders in 

this monograph.

• The SDW can complement operational design by informing Commander’s guidance, but serves as an important means of influence 

when Commanders lack formal authority over vital external partners, 

such as in interagency or coalition operations.

• The SDW was developed initially for operational, strategic, and policy-level challenges, but applies to bureaucratic and low operational 

problems as well.

• The SDW has three elements that function iteratively (appreciate the 

context, define the problem, and develop an approach), but the majority of the effort focuses on the appreciation of the context.

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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

Chapter 1. Design Thinking: Appreciating 

the Context

The SDW begins first by gaining and persistently updating an appreciation of the context. The appreciate the context element is the means by 

which divergent perspectives, interests, and practices are identified, analyzed, and later synthesized into a holistic perception on an issue. Whereas 

operational design focuses heavily on systematic analysis by determining and 

analyzing key variables, the SDW instead focuses on systems thinking and 

the relationships and interactions between actors and systems. Divergent perspectives are so important in the SDW because each person experiences the 

systemic interactions in different ways, and it is extremely difficult to even 

know the experiences exist outside a mechanism for giving voice to them.

It is important to note the use of the term “appreciate” instead of “understand.” The choice is much more than semantics because understanding 

involves a very high degree of cognition which is rarely attainable in a complex world. The reasons for this will be made clearer in chapters 2 and 3, 

but the short of it is that there are so many moving pieces in a complex 

environment that no one can truly understand all of them; their symbolic, 

political, or spiritual meanings to all participants; or the interests and challenges imposed upon participants due to changes in the system. While one 

might strive for understanding, in most cases the best one can approximate is 

likely just empathy.17 Appreciate the context 

is, consequently, more akin to looking at a 

piece of art where one seeks to interpret and 

give meaning based on his or her own perspective and perceived context. Appreciation 

is a very subjective, interpretive approach to 

learning and gaining the necessary insights 

to inform action. 

Blinders Are Natural, Roll with It

For decades researchers in the fields of biology and cognitive psychology 

have explored the various ways the human mind has evolved to consume, 

Appreciate the context is, 

consequently, more akin 

to looking at a piece of 

art where one seeks to 

interpret and give meaning 

based on his or her own 

perspective and perceived 

context.
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JSOU Report 18-3

categorize, process, select, and retain the thousands of data points to which 

the body is exposed on a daily basis. The general conclusion is that human 

biology plays tricks on the mind, but it is the only way people can make it 

through their busy days. Daniel Ariely notes:

Our visual and decision environments are filtered to us courtesy of 

our eyes, our ears, our senses of smell and touch, and the master of 

it all, our brain. By the time we comprehend and digest information, it is not necessarily a true reflection of reality. Instead, it is our 

representation of reality, and this is the input we base our decisions 

on. In essence we are limited to the tools nature has given us, and 

the natural way in which we make decisions is limited by the quality 

and the accuracy of these tools.18

In recent years there has been quite extensive authorship on how the 

body filters information, including both the positive and negative aspects 

associated with it.19 The range of potential blinders include biological sensing, cognitive biases, personality attributes, and role requirements. As one 

might guess, some of the blinders are physiological in nature, and they are 

not going to change. Roll with it. Others are social in nature, and they are 

not going to change. Roll with it. In the end, all people are creatures of habit, 

and the best they can do is compensate for what they know are universal 

personal weaknesses. 

The appreciate the context element of the SDW works precisely because it 

is a compensation mechanism that acknowledges people cannot change who 

or what they are. Every person is encumbered by cognitive and biological 

blinders—or said another way, every person has filters created, reinforced, 

and shaped by values instilled throughout his or her life through socialization, education, personal experiences, and the interpretation of those 

experiences. These are typically unshakeable and lead to the inclusion of 

information that reinforces the accepted explanations of a thing or idea or 

the exclusion of information that diverges from it. 

Personal Constraints on Perspective

The old saying that “truth is where you stand” cannot be overstated when 

confronting complex phenomena. Without devoting too much space to the 
15

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

enormous range of blinders to which each person is subject, the following 

constitutes a decent overview of just the biological influences on framing:

1. Remembering is different from experiencing since each person’s biological responses affect framing 20

2. Visual (mis)perception21 and illusion22 shape and color experience 

and memory 

3. Physical reactions to stress reduce mental acuity, meaning the brain 

has trouble processing information 23

4. Physical stress limits complex cognitive functions 24

5. Ego depletion weakens motivation, meaning “After exerting self-control 

in one task, you do not feel like making an effort in another, although 

you could do it if you really had to”25

6. Personalities with a penchant for impatience or impulsiveness rely on 

intuition and inherently subjective memory26

7. Confirmation bias results from the satisfaction and emotion associated with feeling knowledgeable about or familiar with something27 

Even decision making itself is, in an odd way, a key filter. Ariely’s work 

in the field of behavioral economics challenges the commonly accepted 

assumption that the average human acts rationally. Many readers are probably thinking, of course each person makes rational decisions according 

to his or her own self- interest. Or do they? Ariely’s research supports the 

uncomfortable idea that everyone acts “predictably irrational.” He writes that 

expectations, and many other invisible variables comprising the complexity 

of a particular context, subconsciously influence reasoning. For example, 

rationality is found to be heavily shaped by conversation, the use of particular terms to subconsciously convey infused meanings, the recency of a framing conversation, and the context in which a decision is placed given these 

factors.28 People also tend to engage in anchoring, which means their initial 

perception of the context is first impacted by the most relevant, seemingly 

similar reference point in memory. Even if the reference point is a flawed 

one, it sets the contextual framing all the way down the line.29

The SDW accepts the extensive research indicating that decision making 

is inherently biased and that people often misinterpret or ignore evidence 
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JSOU Report 18-3

all together. Nevertheless, studies show that decision errors can be reduced 

when contextual factors are included in the process.30 From a design perspective, the objective is to place events, ideas, or patterns in broader—even multiple and varied—context to gain a holistic appreciation of the issue before 

passing judgment and coming to action-oriented decisions. To accomplish 

this trick, however, it is necessary to briefly explore how people think. 

After more than 25 years of research on fast and slow thinking, Dan 

Kahneman offered what is commonly accepted as system 1 and system 2 

thinking. System 1 is what the brain relies upon most of the time. It is automatic, runs on intuition, and feels easy to use with seemingly no effort. 

People depend upon past experience and familiarity to get fast answers. To 

appreciate its value, imagine how hard the average day would be in terms of 

driving, using a computer, or interacting with others without this system in 

place. System 1 is far more influential than people think and informs most 

choices and judgments they make.31

System 2 thinking, on the other hand, comes in handy when “the spontaneous search for an intuitive solution sometimes fails ... In such cases 

we often find ourselves switching to a slower, more deliberate and effortful 

form of thinking.”32 System 2 thinking takes time, can be slow, exhausting, 

and seemingly painful. It requires challenging initial perceptions and core 

assumptions and can be disruptive to both personally held beliefs and organizational truths. In short, there is not much incentive to engage in system 

2 thinking until most system 1 solutions fail. In practical terms, the culture 

of the military is not overly conducive to system 2 thinking. Everyone’s day 

is full with email, administrivia, meetings, and actual work. Slowing down 

to deliberately think about problems is difficult both from the time-in-theday angle and the mundane expectation of what work looks like. Honestly 

speaking, how many people would be encouraged by their superiors to sit 

at their desk or in a conference room just reading about and discussing 

complex problems?

The implication is that military culture broadly, and SOF culture in 

particular, is underpinned by system 1 thinking. For most things, system 1 

thinking often gets validated quickly by system 2, and moves on to the next 

issue. Occasionally, system 2 thinking identifies a problem and overrides 

system 1, but it is hard to overcome habit and sometimes system 2 misses 

cues to take over.33 This often occurs when a person anchors on his or her 

past. For example, one might quickly assess an operational situation and 
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

draw comparisons to many previous experiences. From there one might 

draw conclusions and make judgments inappropriate for the new context. 

Given that people rely heavily on system 1 thinking, they depend upon 

intuition and heuristics to offer quick insight. A heuristic is a simple mental 

shortcut that helps humans find sufficient answers—albeit fallible—to perceived problems or questions.34 Associative memory is the core of system 1 

thinking, but it has inherent flaws. When seeking to gain an appreciation 

of complexity, it is important to recognize and guard against the system 1 

associative tendency that leads to over-simplification: 

When confronted with a problem—choosing a chess move or deciding whether to invest in a stock—the machinery of intuitive thought 

does the best it can. If the individual has relevant expertise, she will 

recognize the situation, and the intuitive solution that comes to her 

mind is likely to be correct ... When the question is difficult and a 

skilled solution is not available, intuition still has a shot: an answer 

may come to mind quickly—but it is not an answer to the original 

question ... This is the essence of intuitive heuristics: when faced 

with a difficult question, we often answer an easier one instead, 

usually without noticing the substitution.35

In his best-seller Blink, Malcolm Gladwell writes about what is called the 

“adaptive unconscious.”36 He writes, “Our unconscious is a powerful force. 

But it’s fallible. It’s not the case that our internal computer always shines 

through, instantly decoding the ‘truth’ of a situation. It can be thrown off, 

distracted, and disabled.”37

To place these insights in a SOF context, imagine a team is on its third 

rotation with a mission to train, advise, and assist a partner force. It is the 

team’s tenth deployment conducting similar missions. The adaptive unconscious and system 1 thinking guides the team to only see the similarities 

of the current situation to the past, strengthening the belief that it perhaps 

understands its operating context and that past successes will carry forward. 

Yet, this deployment, like each before, is unique and novel. Even if the team 

is partnered with the same force, operates on the same terrain, and confronts 

generally the same adversary, the complex system has evolved in many overt 

and perhaps even more imperceptible ways. This is a perpetually repeated 

example wherein past success and deep experience can in fact contribute to 

the creation of an organizational and individual blinder. When the mission 
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JSOU Report 18-3

becomes about the activity instead of the effect—the “got this” feeling—then 

it is time to pause and reflect.

The good news is that it is possible that “our snap judgements and first 

impressions can be educated and controlled.”38 System 2 is the more deliberate system and is associated with choice, especially the choice to think deeply 

and deliberately.39 The fact is that everyone depends upon both system 1 

and system 2 in their daily decision making, but engaging in system 2 often 

requires conscious effort and planning. Unsurprisingly, the appreciate the 

context element of the SDW has its roots in system 2 thinking because it 

forces participants to slow down, examine assumptions, and take the time to 

learn about systemic interactions they would otherwise not imagine. Oftentimes the problems people perceive are not the real issues driving events, but 

system 1 snap judgments fool them into thinking they know what is going on.

System 2 reflective thinking about past experience can help draw more 

accurate, or at least divergent, conclusions from hindsight and prompt more 

useful research and discovery efforts. The deliberate act of choosing to engage 

in system 2 thinking forces new frames on memories to promote results 

more accurate than would otherwise be the case with just ‘intuitive’ system 

1 thinking. Kahneman cautions against “our excessive confidence in what we 

believe we know, and our apparent inability to acknowledge the full extent of 

our ignorance and the uncertainty of the world we live in. We are prone to 

overestimate how much we understand about the world and to underestimate 

the role of chance in events. Overconfidence is fed by the illusory certainty 

of hindsight.”40 He credits Nassim Taleb, the author of The Black Swan for 

influencing his thoughts.41

Organizational Constraints on Perspective 

Beyond these personal blinders, everyone is also subject to blinders imposed 

by institutional dynamics. The purpose of an organization is to harness the 

abilities of a group of people to achieve a goal even when the individuals 

in the group have different motivations. During the 20th century, bureaucracy was perfected to achieve a high level of efficiency through rational 

systems, repetitive tasks, and specialization through roles, rules, and standard operating procedures.42 Organizations attempt as much as possible to 

cause people to see things in basically the same way since the more successful 

the organization is in creating a common culture, the more likely its rules, 
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

routines, and hierarchies will be accepted due to adherence to “collective 

meanings.”43 Unfortunately, these same norms of behavior and collective 

meaning might hinder the ability to see the forest because one can only see 

a single tree. Think again about the adage of a hammer looking for a nail. 

If organizational culture is rooted in a particular line of thinking it often 

limits consideration of alternative perspectives, especially those contrary to 

the established collective meanings. 

Consider how SOF core activities are often associated with specific SOF 

organizations. Observable biases often manifest when confronting an operational problem. For example, a special forces officer is likely to adopt UW as 

a filter through which he sees and interprets problems. On the other hand, 

an operator from the Navy would likely have a DA filter since UW is not part 

of the Navy’s traditional mission set. These mission frames are useful for the 

relevant individuals and units. However, these organizational filters foster 

convergent solutions to complex problems among members who might deny 

or prevent the emergence of novel approaches more suited to the context.

Gary Klein argues that organizations can and often do obstruct, suppress, or ignore insights hidden below the surface.44 All organizations, to 

include SOF, fall prey to what he refers to as the predictability trap, wherein 

the expectations of a predicted outcome limit the consideration of other 

options, ideas, or actions that might otherwise “detract from success” in 

achieving that prediction. If one believes counterinsurgency (COIN) is the 

path to victory when the CT centric approach predominates the organization, then evidence contravening the CT approach 

is often unconsciously ignored or undervalued if 

received at all. The challenge as expressed by Klein 

is that “insight” is the opposite of “predictability.”45

Insights can be disruptive, divert attention, and lead 

to a different, unexpected, and more emergent path. 

These perceived uncertainties can be viewed as organizational risk to be avoided. The biological response 

is often to fall back on system 1 thinking—back to intuition, past experience, 

and organizational mantras—to offer comfort that the decided path is the 

right one. 

This process is called path dependence, and it is something that appears 

throughout the monograph. In sum, creating institutions and organizations 

is cumbersome and painful. The initial starting conditions have to be just 

Insights can be 

disruptive, divert 

attention, and lead 

to a different, unexpected, and more 

emergent path.
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JSOU Report 18-3

right internally and in the environment for the organization to survive. 

Once an organization makes it, the goal is to scale up and replicate for 

expanded efficiency, so it needs everyone to tow the company line. Herein 

lies the dilemma of path dependency—the environment always changes, 

so the initial internal conditions that enabled the organization to survive 

might become unsuitable to the new external environment, but change is 

extraordinarily difficult both structurally and culturally.

Social pressure to conform or show distinction is real in human institutions and organizations46 and this helps to reinforce path dependency and 

organizational myths. It also makes innovation and creativity disruptive to 

the bureaucracy and potentially subversive from some leadership perspectives. The SDW was initiated by General Votel precisely because he believed 

the SOF enterprise’s system 1 thinking was taking too much of the oxygen 

from system 2. To correct the imbalance, he recognized the need to encourage system 2 as a way of doing business; that is, to initiate a change in organizational culture which continues today under USSOCOM Commander 

General Raymond A. Thomas. If one were to reflect on his or her own SOF 

organization, he or she might find current examples of how the way of doing 

things shapes expectations, drives specific behaviors, and discourages or 

suppresses divergent thinking. The SDW is needed now precisely because 

the SOF enterprise used to be divergent thinking.

Perspective is Everything

If appreciation is underpinned by context and subjectivity, it is crucial to first 

become self-aware of personal biases. Much like a pair of eyeglasses, everyone 

views the world through lenses and filters be they cognitive, organizational, 

structural, or procedural. Lenses serve to bring into focus things which are 

fuzzy, unclear, or blurry while filters limit the passage of information to the 

brain. Sunglasses are filters, purposefully designed to block UV and other 

light to protect the eyes. In the real world everyone has filters that prevent the 

passage of information to the brain despite the fact the information might 

be useful to inform a judgment. Oftentimes these filters are cognitive biases 

or prejudices layered like the bricks of a house over time.

For instance, consider the two images in figure 3. Both are of the city 

of Guernica in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War. The picture of the 

bombed building is equally truthful as Picasso’s famous 1937 painting 
21

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

Guernica, but the framing each presents results in a different interpretation 

of the same event. The photograph of Guernica typically taps into the more 

cognitive side of the brain. The observer is instantly transported back in time 

to the WWII-ish era, intuits high explosives, likely some kind of trajectory 

by which explosives were delivered, probably some form of metal work in the 

manufacturing of the explosives, etc. Death and destruction clearly occurred, 

but the way the experience is framed is probably of a technical nature. Now 

explore Picasso’s Guernica. It contains people and animals, chaos, suffering, distortion, death, grief, etc. The framing accesses an entirely different 

part of the brain. In fact, without the title, Guernica, the painting could be 

the tragedy of war anywhere at any time. Like Guernica, the real world is 

comprised of convergent and divergent perspectives, sometimes paradoxical, 

each dependent upon where one stands, the time, and the context.

Appreciating the context is not a one-time endeavor; rather, to maintain 

the appreciation it must be a continuous and iterative activity to make sense 

of the world—albeit a subjective interpretation. The next few chapters demonstrate that the world is an ever-changing system of innumerable actors, 

relationships, and factors each interdependently woven into a complex web 

that cannot be mapped nor fully deconstructed. No matter how much time 

and energy is applied, it is impossible to not be overwhelmed by the inestimable number of visible events, indicators, and nodes that are in fact signals 

and signs of more hidden complex systems. The military so often attempts 

to map and feed superficial-level data into some magical algorithm in the 

hope of mirroring the real world. Such an approach might have utility at the 

tactical level, yet is difficult to scale beyond narrowly focused mission sets. 

Figure 3. Two images of Guernica, Spain, in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil 

War. PHOTO (LEFT) BY BUNDESARCHIV, BILD 183-H25224/WIKIMEDIACOMMONS/CC-BY-SA 3.0. PHOTO BY JOSEPH MARTIN/NEWSCOM OF ART BY 

PABLO PICASSO IN THE REINA SOFÍA NATIONAL ART CENTER MUSEUM
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JSOU Report 18-3

When framing is discussed in design, the term is often used to mean 

two different things. First, it is the conscious and purposeful act of bounding one’s thinking, the system, or the issue at hand. The frame could be 

analogous to the window through which one views and interprets the world. 

The larger the frame, the broader the perspective one can have to learn, 

judge relationships between aspects of the system, and place actors, nodes 

or items within a broader context. The second meaning for framing refers 

to a deliberate rubric one might use to organize his or her thoughts about a 

particular topic in order to facilitate investigation and learning. This type of 

frame is also called a lens or, perhaps, a framework. Diplomatic, Information, 

Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) is 

an example of such a framework, but it only captures a very small portion 

of what the military needs to learn. Systems thinking is a powerful tool that 

can be used effectively to frame and learn about an issue and constitutes the 

main substance of the chapters that follow.

Each frame can be comprised of many different lenses, filters, or both. 

Much like eyeglasses, a lens serves to bring clarity, focus, and, in some 

instances, magnification. The fog of uncertainty can often be reduced by a 

lens that brings a specific aspect of the system into focus. Each frame may 

also have one or more filters. Filters serve to limit the passage of certain 

information or data. The filtering of information changes the interpretation. 

Unlike sun glasses that limit UV rays and visible light, personal filters are 

often cognitive or biological blinders about which one is typically unaware. 

As discussed above, cognitive filters might be comprised of bias, prejudice 

and belief systems that deny, diminish the importance of, or modify information in ways that skews the interpretation of the system. One cannot remove 

cognitive filters, but can be self-aware of them and purposefully seek to 

reduce their impact on the learning endeavor by including the perspectives 

of others in a spirit of empathy.47

Another useful technique is to change the scale to alter how the relationships in the system are perceived. For instance, one can learn different 

things by first viewing a small scale of a single panel on the ceiling of the 

Sistine Chapel, and then the entire ceiling with all the panels in view. Both 

scales offer the same information, but with different context. Changing scale 

means looking at the broader system (zoom out) to see relationships between 

entities, or drilling down on something to see the finite details—perhaps 

the moss on one tree in a large forest.48 It might be that the moss is not 
23

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

important, but this cannot be known until the investigation concludes after 

which the search continues elsewhere. 

Since everyone’s frames are limiting, it is essential to frame and reframe 

the system from different scopes and scales to promote learning. It means 

making a conscious effort to change perspectives by inviting in outside 

participants or those with significantly different backgrounds and interests. As SOF missions 

increasingly integrate interagency and PN capabilities, design thinking will become a base skill 

for many missions and inevitably enhance operational design efforts. The intent of appreciation is 

to purposefully use as many frames as possible 

to view and interpret the world—to learn despite 

knowing conclusions are incomplete and temporally bound in complexity. 

It’s an Attitude and an Ethic

The point of the discussion on appreciate the context is not if one has blinders, but whether one is self-aware enough to adopt behaviors that can help 

overcome them in order to accept and leverage new data to gain new insight 

and learning. In other words, appreciate the context is an attitude and ethic. 

This is a fundamental change to the way people are generally taught to interact with others and interpret the world. 

Given the nature of complexity, addressed in much greater detail in chapters 2 to 4, the SDW is careful to recognize the limits to perfect insight and 

knowledge. American military culture is often drawn to the notion that, with 

enough resources and data, uncertainty can be removed from the battlefield—in complete contradiction to the body of military theory. Whether one 

turns to Western or Eastern philosophies, the certainty of uncertainty-in-war 

remains at the forefront. The SDW asserts that understanding by common 

definition is fleeting and can only be attained in the most narrowly focused 

circumstance.

Appreciation is, therefore, a forever activity—it is about learning. The attitude is that one is aware he or she only sees the tip of an iceberg, but knows 

much more lies beneath the surface (see fig. 4). Appreciation as an ethic is forever seeking to explore the problem or issue in new directions, to include new 

As SOF missions 

increasingly integrate 

interagency and PN 

capabilities, design 

thinking will become 

a base skill for many 

missions and inevitably 

enhance operational 

design efforts.
24

JSOU Report 18-3

and oftentimes different 

or paradoxical perspectives with the purpose 

of gaining new insights 

to inform judgment and 

actions in complexity. It is 

also an acknowledgment 

that judgments are based 

on subjective, and therefore temporary, interpretations and will change 

as learning continues 

through further appreciation. Uncertainty and 

the dynamic nature of the 

real world are accepted 

as foundational perspectives, and one must 

always seek to synthesize 

new perspectives to create 

a more holistic view. 

The Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs Vignette (fig. 5) demonstrates the importance of appreciation from multiple angles. What originally 

looked like a funding problem to the personnel in the Office of Veterans 

Affairs transformed through a design inquiry into a different, more manageable problem altogether. The fresh perspective injected by the Rhode Island 

National Guard enabled the personnel to reimagine the issue and change 

their mental models for a fresh approach (revisited in chapter 7).

Where to Begin

Remember that appreciating the context refers to learning about the current 

state of the system, called the current context. Before even considering the 

future, one needs to explore the current world. There are many tools available from red teaming, planning, or critical thinking to begin appreciating. 

Perhaps the best way to start is with self-reflection to lay out assumptions 

and ward off constrained thinking. There is no right or wrong starting point 

Events

Evidence, Symptoms

Patterns/Trends

Rules, practices, 

doctrine, TTPs

Structures

Organizations, laws, 

authority, relationships

Mental Models

Beliefs, traditions, 

assumptions, values 

Figure 4. The Iceberg Model of analysis.
25

Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

for this endeavor. For example, employ a familiar heuristic to begin exploring what is thought to be known about the complex phenomena at issue. 

The critical aspect of beginning the appreciation element is to be open to 

an unconstrained or unstructured exploration of ideas, perspectives, and 

interpretations. Avoid convergent thought or gaining consensus, as this will 

ultimately limit learning. The reality is the world is messy, which is why 

appreciating the context requires generous listening. 

Key Terms

Systematic Analysis, Systems Thinking, Empathy, System 1 Thinking, System 

2 Thinking, Heuristic, Associative Memory, Path Dependence, Framing, 

Current Context

Summary

• Cognitive, biological, physiological, and organizational blinders are 

a natural, inevitable part of life, and the SDW compensates for this 

reality by seeking out and adopting an ethic of empathy for divergent 

perspectives.

• System 1 thinking constitutes the primary source of fast, intuitive 

thinking that makes it possible to work efficiently, but it is prone to 

blinders unless occasional efforts at slower, deliberate, system 2 thinking are untaken.

• People cannot eliminate blinders and frames, only be aware they have 

them and constantly challenge the assumptions they promote.

• Appreciating the context is an attitude of constant learning, but it is 

always self-consciously understood to be a subjective interpretation 

of reality.

Vignette. The Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs: Appreciation of the Context

In 2016, the Rhode Island National Guard was asked by the governor to 

assist the Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs (RIVETS) with a complex 

service delivery problem due to its familiarity with the SDW and access 

to the veteran community. An important aspect of the SDW is conveying 

learning and meaning through visualizations and metaphor, typically in the 

form of drawings or graphics because visuals convey powerful meanings and 
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Figure 5. Rhode Island Veterans Administration Design Inquiry Visualization of the Current Context.
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

emotions as seen with the Guernica example. The RIVETS Design Inquiry 

team generated the visualization and narrative (fig. 5) to convey its appreciation of the context.

Appreciation of the Context. “There is strong public support for Rhode 

Island’s Veterans and their families. This ‘sea of goodwill’ has led to numerous programs and services for those who have served and those who support them at home. However, there is no clear access point for Veterans and 

military families to engage this support and the services that have sprung 

from it. Without a collaborative, coordinated effort to address this challenge, too many Veterans who have shouldered the burden of our nation’s 

wars will continue to miss out on opportunities to improve their health and 

their economic well-being ... While there exists a ‘sea of goodwill’ in Rhode 

Island to assist Veterans, the waters are choppy and difficult to navigate. 

While there are few, if any, gaps in the services provided, the gaps that may 

exist are among the providers of services. In other words, robust, quality 

services are available but the delivery model is unconnected, uncoordinated, 

underfunded, and understaffed.”49

Comments. Note the islands of services in the sea of goodwill. There are no 

mechanisms to connect the service members, veterans, and their families 

to the service islands, and there is even a bridge to nowhere indicating how 

hard it is to use the available infrastructure. Some seize the initiative and 

swim to the islands while others independently navigate the sea in boats. Yet, 

the majority wander around trying to figure out how to access the available 

services without clear direction or a port of entry. This appreciation of the 

context depicts a significant degree of learning regarding the system of public 

and private veterans' services in Rhode Island, and transformed the RIVETS 

appreciation from a matter of increasing funding to the bureaucracy to one 

of coordination and marketing among providers. The outcome of this design 

inquiry is presented later in chapter 7. 

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Chapter 2. Complexity and Wicked 

Problems

It’s a complex world out there. Yes it is, but how does knowing this help? 

The answer is that it helps determine when to pull SOPs and doctrine 

out of the kit bag and when not to. Some things really are not complex at 

all, and there are great training and tools to address problems of this sort. 

Other things are far more complicated, and the training and tools just are 

not sufficient for getting the job done. The terms ‘complicated’ and ‘complex’ 

are often used interchangeably, but this muddies the waters on some very 

important points.

The introduction presents the idea that there is a difference between 

simple, complicated, and complex problems. This is not new or novel. Management science has been playing with these concepts for decades, and these 

distinctions are here borrowed from a particular model called the Cynefin 

Framework (fig. 6).50

The first thing to know is that the Cynefin Framework is a sense-making 

model. This is different than the models typically used during the workday called categorization models. Categorization models are very useful for 

figuring out which SOP to follow. Data comes in, the category with which 

it corresponds is determined, the SOP book is pulled off the shelf, and the 

correct procedure is executed. Simple day. With categorization models, the 

Figure 6. The Cynefin Framework.

Complex

• Cause and Effect Unknowable

• Probe—Sense—Respond

• Emergent Practice 

Chaos

• Instability

• Act—Sense—Respond

• Novel Practice 

Unordered

Ordered

Simple

• Cause and Effect Intuitive

• Sense—Categorize—Respond

• Best Practice 

Complicated

• Cause and Effect Obscured

• Sense—Analyze—Respond

• Good Practice 

Disorder
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model preexists the data. Data is jammed to fit the model regardless of how 

good a fit the model really is. As a result, this is where framing error comes 

into play and effectiveness in bureaucracy starts to erode.51

Sense-making models, on the other hand, are about determining what 

the data mean in the first place. In some cases, the first issue might be to 

explore whether the available categorization models are the right tools for the 

job. For this task sense-making tools are useful for figuring out the nature 

of the operating environment and for determining the appropriate types of 

activity given the situation. Moreover, because people have different views 

of the world, it is often the case that diverse groups view the same situation 

with different perspectives. The Cynefin Framework is a tool to determine 

the nature of the operating context and assist in reconciling the tensions 

inherent in group settings when people view the context of the environment 

in distinctive ways.52 So, why is there a disorder category in the Cynefin 

Framework? The disorder category represents the diversity of perspectives 

in a group; most people get confused about the domain in which they are 

operating, and the trick is to reconcile differences in sense-making so they 

are all operating in the same domain.53 However, to know the operating context, it is essential to know whether or not cause and effect can be predicted.

Much is written about cause and effect in chapters 2 and 3, and that is 

mainly because it is a key principle underlying the concept of complexity. 

The reason humans can send people to the moon, split atoms, or stream live 

video to cells phones is due to the scientific method rooted in determining 

how certain variables impact an outcome. The hard sciences, like physics, 

chemistry, and engineering are all rooted in laws of nature that pretty much 

hold all around the planet. People are really, really good at manipulating the 

world around them when they can determine cause and effect.

Here’s a quick, simple review of the scientific method on which Americans—most people in the Western world, really—have all been raised. With 

a scientific formula of A + B = C,54 an experiment can measure the impact 

of a change in variable A or variable B on outcome C. So, to measure and 

predict the impact of changing variable A on the outcome of C, variable B 

must have no changes at all—variable B must be held “constant” with no 

variation (nadda, zilch, completely the same). Any tweak to variable A that 

impacts outcome C can then be measured, statistically analyzed, made into 

a nice mathematical formula, and used for future prediction. Variable A 
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can then be held constant, variable B can be experimented with, and new 

predictions for how changes to variable B impact outcome C can be derived. 

Most modern technology is dependent on this type of cause and effect 

analysis, but there are limits to the process. First, the cause and effect model 

assumes it is possible to know all the variables impacting outcome C. Second, 

it assumes the variables can be controlled to a “nadda, zilch, completely the 

same” experiment to determine how a change in a variable causes an effect 

on the outcome of C. Third, it assumes the experiments can be completely 

reset, started from the exact same conditions with the exact same proportions of the variables, and tested over dozens, if not hundreds, of times.

When any of these three conditions fail, the whole cause and effect construct breaks down and things start to look complicated or, even worse, 

complex. The Cynefin Framework offers an idea of how to respond based 

on the sense-making of where cause and effect sit relative to the context. On 

the right side of the model, the system is described as ordered. Cause and 

effect are identifiable even if sometimes obscured. In the simple domain, 

cause and effect are readily known, categorization models are perfect for 

responding, and SOPs make all the sense in the world. In the complicated 

domain, cause and effect cannot be easily determined, so SMEs are often 

needed to help figure out the dynamics. Fortunately, SMEs can determine 

what is happening in the system and can chart a path based on their expertise. Here, SOPs and doctrine become problematic and less able to handle 

the nuance of the context.55

On the left side of the Cynefin Framework, the system is described as 

unordered. Cause and effect cannot be determined and it is not even clear 

what variables to include in the data. In the complex domain, not even SMEs 

have enough knowledge of the system to fully inform approaches to problems. There are just too many things going on above and below the surface 

and no variables can be held constant. In such an environment, the only 

way to judge what to do is to experiment, figure out what works well and 

amplify the activities, or figure out what fails and immediately shut it down 

once failure begins to happen. In the chaos domain, there is no logic or 

order to what is happening, and the only way to deal with the system is to 

impose order, sense the response, and adapt or experiment broadly to find 

better solutions.56

Sometimes it is possible to move a system from one domain to the next, 

but it first requires accurately identifying the correct starting position.57 For 
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JSOU Report 18-3

example, a series of positive, amplified activities in the complex domain can 

move a system over time to a complicated one. On the other hand, there is 

a danger lurking between the “simple” and “chaos” domains. For instance, 

the bureaucracy can come to see everything it deals with as a matter of categorization and jam everything into a matrixed SOP response.58 The more 

that happens, however, the more likely it is to get blindsided by changes in 

the environment. When that happens it can fall off the cliff of the “simple” 

domain into the chaos domain as it tries to figure out what just happened 

and why.59 Recovery is possible, but very expensive in terms of resources 

and labor.

So, why is the Cynefin Framework valuable? Precisely to frame when the 

SDW can help the most with different types of problems and provide warning about the consequences of allowing blinders 

from the simple domain to cause a fall off the cliff 

into chaos. The SDW is best suited for challenges 

in the complex and complicated domains, but in a 

pinch also helps attitudinally with how to act and 

think in the midst of chaos. Virtually all social 

interactions fit into these categories for reasons 

explained shortly. But, bureaucracy tends to jam 

as much as possible into the simple domain so 

that SOPs can produce economy of scale efficiencies. As discussed before, though, when every 

challenge is a nail, the hammer is the simple solution to all things and over 

the cliff we fall. 

The Foundations of Wicked Problems 

So, what is in the nature of complexity that makes cause and effect so difficult to discern? In reality, it is all about perception and the assumptions 

made regarding the predictability of human interactions. The backdrop of 

complexity goes back to middle school science class and the presumption of 

science and society being based on the orderly and progressive accumulation 

of knowledge. The scientific method is basically about systematic analysis and reducing an object to its component parts. In the previous simple 

model, outcome C can be reduced to variables A and B. Because we can 

control variables A and B, we can predict changes in outcome C based on 

The SDW is best 

suited for challenges 

in the complex and 

complicated domains, 

but in a pinch also 

helps attitudinally 

with how to act and 

think in the midst of 

chaos.
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

the mathematical models of how variables A and B impact C. In the social 

sciences, social scientists added in the idea of humans as “rational actors” in 

the 1950s in order to try to make them act like normal variables; it is hard to 

create mathematical models of human behavior when they act “irrationally,” 

or, in other words, against the assumptions of the models.60 The idea held 

that, “I might not understand all the cultures in the world, but I know what 

people ‘rationally’ want in life.” It is far easier to run an organization or play 

politics with a rational actor model, but when the variables fail to act like 

the model, it is not possible to “reduce” them after all. Reductionism and 

rationalism have been two of the most powerful underlying concepts in the 

Western cultural mindset for generations.61 They are intrinsic to how many 

see the world that they are often simply taken to be the way the world works.62

Complexity as an experience, then, is more about the frustration people 

feel when reality fails to abide by how they expect the world to work. This 

aspect of the issue will be addressed at the beginning of chapter 3. Suffice it 

to say, there is a robust recognition across the physical and social sciences 

nowadays that the expectation of a reducible, predictable, and stable world 

only applies to a slice of life, not all of it. While it worked well to launch the 

scientific revolution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has limits.63 

Complexity theory, especially those scholars working in the area of Complex Adaptive Systems, actually take the opposite perspective—that much of 

life is, yes, rooted in seemingly predictable patterns, but that these patterns 

rest upon a foundation of ever-changing building blocks. As the building 

blocks change, so do the foundation and the resulting patterns over time.64

There are two key issues for complexity theorists. First is the fact that most 

everything operates in a series of systems with each system composed of 

innumerable variables about which very little is known. Oftentimes these 

systems overlap and interact in unseen, but meaningful, ways. Under these 

circumstances, it is very difficult to determine when, how, or under which 

conditions the system interactions will occur and to what end. Second is the 

fact that the building blocks in each system change over time due to both 

external challenges and internal adaptation.65 Sometimes the environment 

changes, such as with the introduction of new technology like the internet 

and smartphones, but environmental changes can cause the underlying 

variables, in this case people, to change how they behave, which in turn 

changes the way the system operates. 
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Complexity from this perspective occurs because the cause and effect 

model that underpins science breaks down. Even within a single system, the 

variables cannot be held constant to determine their impact on the outcome. 

Moreover, an experiment can never be reset to the exact same conditions 

because life moves on—there are no do-overs in the real world. At best it is 

possible to approximate the original conditions to derive a sense of existing 

patterns and trends, some of which are more enduring than others thereby 

giving the sense or feel of a stable reality. Adding in the notion of systems 

interacting, or perhaps colliding, the challenges associated with predicting 

the future grow by magnitudes over time.

The internet and smartphone example is again instructive. Society’s 

building blocks, say children born in the early 1990s, adapted to the reality 

of a system of communication not tied to a corded phone or computer. Their 

behavior morphed over time to adapt to the new opportunity. However, 

the children born in the 2000s grew up in a society dominated by wireless, 

instant communication where the expectations and behaviors were already 

in place and passed down at a very early age. The building blocks of society 

changed naturally and by virtue of internal adaptation. People could choose 

to swear off wireless technology and prompt yet another internal change, 

but they likely will not. 

In terms of Complex Adaptive Systems, the taxi industry could not have 

imagined in 2000, when cell phones were really taking off, that Uber would 

emerge in the system to challenge its market. Yet, this is precisely the situation. Uber’s rise is actually based on a series of systems coming together in 

unpredictable ways. It required a system of cellular technology to mature, 

systems of political regulation to change, the system of computer companies 

to compete for handheld computers, the system of geospatial information 

service providers to integrate with cellular and computer companies, and 

the system of consumers to find private drivers more desirable than taxis. 

In 2000, most taxi companies probably assumed the public transportation 

system would remain static and that cell phones would provide another convenient form of communication with dispersed drivers. In Cynefin Framework terms, the taxi industry operated in the simple domain. Now it is a 

whole lot more complicated. 

So, what are the characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems? In general, 

they have six basic properties. They:
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

1. cannot be reduced to their underlying variables because they are 

interdependent 

2. exhibit nonlinear behavior with both positive and negative feedback 

loops acting on variables in different ways, making behavior and 

outcomes difficult to predict 

3. often exhibit some degree of path dependency based on initial ordering of variables, but the underlying ordering is susceptible to change 

over time 

4. exhibit emergence oftentimes emanating from systemic interaction among underlying variables rather than from a central control 

mechanism 

5. are prone to introducing deviations in underlying variables, which can 

lead to bursts of unexpected and disruptive change to the equilibrium 

and the emergence of new path dependent trends 

6. typically require a trans-disciplinary research approach given the 

range of systems and subsystems comprising them 66

There is a whole lot packed in these six attributes, and each aspect will be 

progressively discussed with examples throughout the subsequent chapters. 

For SOF, the most important take-away is the realization that: 

1. the traditional, linear planning process is ill-suited for inherently 

social challenges 

2. there really is not such a thing as an “end state,” just deviations in the 

system leading to new paths 

3. social problems require experience far beyond the military’s area of 

expertise 

The reason the SDW focuses heavily on appreciate the context is precisely 

due to the last point—it is impossible for any single organization or individual to fully comprehend the dynamics of a system, or even worse, a system 

of systems. At best, each person can come to an appreciation based on his 

or her own education, experience, and judgment, but it will be unavoidably 

limited. Working together in teams with divergent perspectives improves the 

chances for identifying the broad range of systemic trends and interactions.67
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Such is the nature of SOF-oriented, population-centric complex activities or problems. They often fail to respond to our initiatives in expected 

ways because there is often insufficient appreciation of the context of the 

underlying dynamics. Do not despair, though, it is not just SOF dealing 

with this problem. In fact, scholars in the urban planning discipline figured 

this out back in the 1960s—it has just taken 50-plus years to make its way to 

the military. Even worse, the social sciences, political science among them, 

continued to predominantly reinforce the reductionist and rationalist forms 

of scientific inquiry well into the 1990s. It has only been in the last 15 years 

that the perspective introduced here has become more prominent in the 

social sciences. 

In fact, urban planners in the 1960s came to describe some types of complex challenges as wicked problems (see fig. 7). Just as the U.S. was about 

to triumphantly win the technical marvel of the space race against the 

Soviet Union, it began to experience urban riots in the mid-to-late-1960s. 

Urban planners had successfully applied reductionist scientific principles for 

decades in the cities, solving numerous public health, transportation, and 

sanitation issues, but still some populations resented their expert, rationalist 

efforts.68 The scientists could not understand why until Horst Rittel in 1967 

succinctly identified the differences between the technical sciences and the 

social sciences.69

In short, Rittel observed that social problems could not be solved by 

reductionist approaches supported by rationalist assumptions. With the 

notion of “problem solving,” reductionism and rationalism require what is 

called a closed system and a single perspective of rationality. To reiterate, 

solving a problem assumes that variables A and B go together in such a way 

as to produce outcome C. What Rittel pointed out is that in social systems, 

variables A and B could produce outcome Z because variables J, R, and T 

were not known to somehow impact variables A and B. More importantly, 

Complex Adaptive systems theory argues that variables A and B could not be 

isolated from the systems containing variables J, R, and T even if desired.70 

Social systems defy the ability to control the variables and, therefore, 

control cause and effect. Instead of viewing the systems as something that 

can be a closed system for scientific research to experiment with cause and 

effect, Rittel adopted the perspective that it is necessary to start with the 

notion of social systems being open systems and, therefore, subject to different standards of scientific inquiry. This is truly the stuff of the complex 
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Wicked Problems

1. There is no definite formulation of the problem because it 

operates in a continuous feedback loop with its environment—it forever adapts in an open system.

2. There is no stopping rule, meaning the problem can never 

be reduced to its base variables.

3. There is no criteria for correctness in that there are no 

objective criteria for judging whether solutions are right, 

wrong, good, or bad. New realities simply emerge from the 

actions taken as a result of the solution concept.

4. There is no way to test the quality of a proposed solution 

since an experiment can never be completely reset to the 

original starting conditions.

5. There is no ultimate test of a solution, only implementation.

6. Once committed to a solution and a plan of action, consequences are permanent and cannot be undone.

7. There is no completely fixed list of permissible activities, 

just ones constrained by prescription or proscription.

8. There are no well-defined solutions, just options that result 

in new emergent trends.

9. Every wicked problem is unique making SOPs and doctrine 

conditional instead of authoritative.

10. The problem solver has no right to be wrong since actions 

have real consequences to the lives of others.

Figure 7. Characteristics of Wicked Problems. Adapted from Rittel and 

Webber (1973) and Skaburski (2008).
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domain in the Cynefin Framework. Rittel and Webber even go so far as to 

say social problems cannot be “solved,” just “re-solved” as new problems 

inevitably emerge from previous “solutions.”71

The challenges associated with rationalism and the assumptions underlying them were previously touched upon—rationality depends on perspective, so assumptions are context dependent for each person. Sure, groups of 

people might be generally disposed to similarities in rational thought if they 

are socialized in similar ways or incentivized to prize certain things over 

others. This is not about Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and such. This is not 

the level of social complexity addressed here. The real issue is how people 

mentally reconcile their gut need to scientifically reason their way through 

open systems when open systems undermine just about everything taught 

about cause and effect from middle school on up.

Closed versus Open Systems

Pretty much all military planning starts with the intent to achieve an end 

state, but the whole idea of an end state rests on the idea that the variables can 

be controlled to achieve an outcome. For instance, the JPP and the Military 

Decision Making Process (MDMP) both assume the commander provides 

guidance on a desired end state and then directs the staff to identify key 

variables essential to the enemy’s Center of Gravity (COG). In other words, 

military planning is rooted heavily in a systematic, reductionist analytical process derived from traditional scientific and engineering practices. 

The thing is, this process works for some applications. In fact, it is stellar 

inasmuch as it gets an amazing number of scattered people to synchronize 

their efforts to achieve a military outcome over a short period of time. Yet, 

the planning process never yields an actual end state, just a series of future 

beginnings.

In contrast, take a rocket for a moment—the epitome of man’s conquest of 

nature through the scientific method. A rocket is an enormously complicated 

piece of machinery with hundreds of subsystems interacting in a precise, 

balanced ballet to keep the astronauts within the vessel safe despite being 

beset upon by the harsh, unforgiving, crushing environment of space. It is 

complicated in Cynefin terms—not complex—because cause and effect are 

known for each subsystem, though it literally takes a multitude of rocket 

scientists to appreciate the totality of the undertaking. Nevertheless, a rocket 
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

is an enormous closed system. While it contains hundreds of subsystems, 

each operates according to predictable principles of physics, chemistry, and 

engineering. The principles are clearly predictable because at some point 

researchers in laboratories reduced and controlled all the variables in the 

subsystems, tested them under a variety of physical stresses, and built the 

components of the subsystems to precise operational specifications. Beyond 

that, each subsystem in the rocket is layered with monitors and sensors to 

ensure it functions properly to keep the astronauts safe. But it does not stop 

there. The closed system also contains water, food, cleaning supplies, fuel, 

and oxygen in sufficient quantity to return the astronauts safely to Earth. 

Every element of the rocket is predictable and mathematically quantifiable, 

from the weight of the rocket and all its equipment to the amount of fuel 

needed to launch it into orbit and return it safely, to the number of minutes 

of oxygen the astronauts have to breathe. In the end, there is a right answer 

to the puzzle of how the system works, every subsystem is linear and reducible, and there is a logical point at which the mission fails should the math 

not balance.

JPP and MDMP were brought back into the discussion as a reminder 

of just how pervasive the idea of a closed system is in military culture. The 

mindset and scientific principles underlying the ability to travel safely to 

space are also the same ones that led to the formulation of military planning. But just like the urban planners of the 1960s, military professionals 

are now coming to recognize that population-centric operations, such as 

COIN, irregular warfare (IW) and UW, defy the clean, sterile reductionism 

and rationalism JPP and MDMP intrinsically presume. 

A closed system perspective assumes that the units comprising the 

subsystems do not have the ability to change themselves (see fig. 8). In the 

example, the rocket is a rigid structure. It might be able to adapt to external 

stresses and return to an equilibrium condition72—that is, achieve internal 

stability—but nothing in the rocket is going to change how the units and 

system work. An open systems perspective, on the other hand, accepts that 

the units comprising the subsystems do have the ability to intentionally 

change themselves and that the external environment can introduce new 

properties that impact interactions among the units and subsystems. Both 

sources of change can lead to evolution in the system, causing the system to 

behave differently over time (see fig. 9).73
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Figure 8. Conditions for Closed Theoretical Systems.74

The open systems perspective introduces a nasty wrinkle in the way 

Americans have been brought up to view the world. People create things, 

like rockets, organizations, non-profit charities, sports teams, etc. We call 

these things, structures. There’s a chicken-or-the-egg problem here. It takes 

a group of people, called agents, to initially create every structure. Every 

person who experiences the structures thereafter thinks they are just part 

of the reality—they are just normal. So, the chicken-or-the-egg problem is 

formally called the agent-structure debate;75 which comes first, the structures 

into which agents were born, or the agents who created structures into which 

subsequent agents were born? The answer is, it does not really matter for the 

purposes of this discussion. Pick a starting point and go with it. Just know 

that causal predictability in the social realm is a canard.

Conditions for Closed Theoretical Systems

1. All relevant variables can be identified. 

2. The boundaries of the system are definite and immutable; 

it follows that it is clear which variables are exogenous and 

which are endogenous; these categories are fixed. 

3. Only the specified exogenous variables affect the system, 

and they do this in a known way. 

4. Relations between the included variables are either knowable or random. 

5. Agents (whether individuals or aggregates) are treated 

atomistically.

6. The nature of agents is treated as if constant.

7. The structure of the relationships between the components 

(variables, subsystems, agents) is treated as if it is either 

knowable or random.

8. The structural framework within which agents act is taken 

as given.
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The key take away is that cause and effect are unpredictable in the complex and chaotic domains precisely because the variables (people or agents) 

in the system are constantly changing as they adapt to a constantly changing structure. It is a wicked feedback loop that makes causal predictability 

nearly impossible. By now much of the frustration many experienced on 

deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations is likely making more 

sense. The planning process set in play expectations about how to achieve 

end states that were unlikely in the first place. Both Afghanistan and Iraq 

were extraordinarily open systems since the governance structures were so 

damaged. 

The idea of an open system is a significant departure from the standard 

expectations arising from training in the traditional scientific method and 

is well outside a typical military professional’s formal education. The closed 

system mindset is one of the most significant blinders affecting the force 

today. It is almost pernicious, not in a malicious way, but in the way it prevents alternative appreciations of the context from forming because it is so 

unwaveringly accepted as “the way the world works.” 

The Limits of Perfect Knowledge and the Need for 

Appreciating the Context

Ok, that was a lot to digest. Most readers probably took away some key 

points and left some other nuggets out. This happens because of the filtering 

issue mentioned in chapter 1. But it is an important result of the biological 

response to confronting social and conceptual complexity. Humans inevitably satisfice when it comes to seeking out and retaining information. The 

term satisfice is a blend of the words “satisfy” and 

“suffice.”76 In the end, there is so much going on in 

the day and there are so many data points competing for attention, the mind only permits a search 

for information to the point one is satisfied there is 

sufficient knowledge to make a decision. Whether 

searching for the best price on a new car or trying 

to figure out how to destroy a terrorist network, ultimately action must be 

taken at some point and the decision happens when one thinks there is 

enough information, not when one objectively has all information physically in existence.

Humans inevitably 

satisfice when it 

comes to seeking 

out and retaining 

information. 
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Figure 9. Conditions for Closed Theoretical Systems.77

Conditions for Open Systems

Real-world systems

1. The system is not atomistic; therefore at least one of the 

following holds:

a. Outcomes of actions cannot be inferred from individual 

actions (because of interactions). 

b. Agents and their interactions may change (for example 

agents may learn).

2. Structure and agency are interdependent.

3. Boundaries around and within the social or economic 

system are mutable; for at least of the following reasons:

a. Social structures may evolve. 

b. Connections between structures may change. 

c. The structure-agent relation may change. 

4. Identifiable social structures are embedded in larger structures; these may mutually interact, for the boundaries of 

a social system are in general partial or semi-permeable. 

Implications for theoretical systems

5. There may be important omitted variables or relations and/

or their effects on the system may be uncertain.

6. The classification into exogenous and endogenous variables 

may be neither fixed nor exhaustive.

7. Connections and/or boundaries between structures may 

be imperfectly known and/or may change.

8. There is imperfect knowledge of the relations between variables, relationships may not be stable.
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There are many reasons why the search for perfect knowledge is broken 

off. Some have to do with time constraints. War is dynamic and those who 

seize the initiative have the advantage. In less kinetic circumstances, everyone has arbitrary deadlines the boss sets. Others have to do with personality. 

Type A personalities make quick decisions and value decisive action. It is 

actually painful for many to sit and admire a problem beyond the point of 

satisficing. This is not a criticism, just a common personality trait. Still others 

have to do with competing priorities. People simply do not have the time or 

resources to achieve perfect knowledge even in the absence of deadlines or 

personality quirks.

Unsurprisingly, the reductionist and rationalist approaches typically 

assume the ability to achieve perfect knowledge. From the reductionist perspective, it is the only way to determine causation in a scientific experiment. 

Any indication of variance from predicted outcomes is further evidence 

that some other variable exists and must be sought out thereby reducing to 

yet another level. From the rationalist’s perspective, individuals must have 

perfect information to make rational decisions. The notion of satisficing put 

a big hole in the rationalists’ perspective, so they modified the model with 

the idea of bounded rationality,78 which incorporates the satisficing concept 

with mathematical precision. A Complex Adaptive Systems approach suggests both of these perspectives lose coherence in the real world because the 

way variables interact across open systems is irreducible, and individuals 

consequently never actually achieve perfect knowledge. 

The basic tools and vocabulary to think anew about the population-centric, social problems SOF are tasked to address are now on the table. Social 

problems tend to be complex, potentially even wicked, and they challenge 

the scientific notion of prediction. They emanate from multiple, overlapping 

systems of people (agents) interacting in such a way that they can intentionally order—and more importantly re-order—their own environments 

(structures), which leads to new patterns of behavior over time. The systems 

of agents and structures are also affected by phenomena external to them 

and respond oftentimes through new innovations or evolutions arising from 

changes in how the systems interact or among the relationships between the 

agents forming the structures. 

Once again, the notion of cause and effect underpinning traditional military planning becomes problematic when closed system assumptions are 

questioned. The military’s cultural reliance on system 1 thinking is similarly 
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problematic because it enables personal and organizational blinders to take 

hold when system 2 thinking is necessary for wicked problems. The limits to 

perfect knowledge also reinforce the absolute requirement for an appreciation of the context with diverse and divergent perspectives. Absent a process for incorporating broader system dynamics, reality will unforgivingly 

introduce shocks as people move out with their own limited perspectives 

and assumptions. Chapter 3 builds on this conceptual foundation to explain 

the limits to prediction in the social world that are often obscured in the way 

science is taught. For SOF to deal effectively with complexity dynamics, it is 

crucial to understand how science is coming to grips with its own blinders.

Key Terms

Cynefin Framework, sense-making models, reductionism, rationalism, closed 

system, open system, agent-structure debate, satisfice, bounded rationality

Summary

• The Cynefin Framework is a sense-making model for determining the 

nature of a problem and the appropriate responses based on whether 

cause and effect can be determined.

• Wicked problems occur in open systems where neither the number 

of variables impacting a system nor the relationships among them 

can be known.

• The appreciate the context element of SDW is so important because it 

is impossible for a single person or a small group to understand systemic dynamics based on personal experiences. Working together in 

teams with divergent perspectives improves the chances for identifying the broad range of systemic trends and interactions.

• Reductionist and rationalist approaches, which underlie operational 

design and planning, are ill-suited to address wicked problems because 

they presume cause and effect can be known.

• The SDW guards against the effects of satisficing and bounded rationality by emphasizing system 2 thinking over system 1 thinking.
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Chapter 3. The Mother of All Blinders: 

Prediction in Open Systems 

So, why is it important to know whether an operating environment is 

complicated or complex, whether cause and effect can be determined, 

whether or not all the variables can be known, and whether the system is 

closed or open? In the end, it is all about whether the future can be predicted. 

Most people born in Western societies have been brought up to believe that 

nature can be conquered, destiny made, and the future foreseen. To a certain extent, this is true. But there is a kink in all this. Most Americans have 

also been raised to think that the future can be predicted in a scientific 

manner—and that it should be attempted—just as the scientific method is 

used to predict outcomes in the physical sciences. As mentioned earlier, this 

in essence is the perspective underlying JPP and MDMP. 

For the U.S. military, and the USG more broadly, the belief in prediction 

in the social realm is the “mother of all blinders.” The affinity for prediction 

is more an American cultural phenomenon than a function of government 

culture per se. However, there is a clear bias within the USG that emphasizes 

the rational use of taxpayer resources based on predictive analysis over the 

irrational use of resources based on intuition and experimentation.79 Who 

can argue against that? Unfortunately, to some degree this monograph must, 

in order to place the mother of all blinders in historical and philosophical 

context. 

At the heart of prediction lies the essence of linear thinking. Linear 

thinking at its core is the unstated, often unconscious, assumption that all 

things in nature can be known if there is perfect knowledge of variables 

and the dynamics of cause and effect. Determining the variables and the 

consequences of their interactions lead to logical “if X, then Y” statements 

in a relatively straightforward, historically progressive—hence linear—way. 

Thomas Kuhn, one of the twentieth century’s most notable thinkers about 

science as a practice, observes that scientific disciplines often create the illusion of a linear path to knowledge creation as they explain their histories in 

textbooks. He writes:
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For reasons that are both obvious and highly functional, science 

textbooks ... refer only to that part of the work of past scientists that 

can easily be viewed as contributions to the statement and solution 

of the texts’ paradigm problems. Partly by selection and partly by 

distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are implicitly represented as 

having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific theory and method has made seem scientific ... 

The result is a persistent tendency to make the history of science look 

linear or cumulative, a tendency that even affects scientists looking 

back at their own research [emphasis added].80

In reality, Kuhn writes, scientific advances proceed along two different paths which, while cumulative, are not necessarily linear. He calls the 

seemingly straightforward, historically progressive path “normal science,” 

whereby scientists engage in the grind of the profession—conducting experiments, recording data, searching for causal relationships, testing hypotheses, 

etc.81 In more general terms, normal science is about solving the puzzles 

confronting humanity.82 Advances in knowledge are most certainly achieved 

through this process, and this path generates the stereotypical view of the 

lab coat scientist making gradual but steady progress with new discovery. 

The military version of normal science is doctrine—it tells the force what it 

is supposed to do, orients education and training around specific tasks, and 

provides handy tools to accomplish accepted military objectives. 

But the grind of science is made possible by the second kind of advance—

through the competition of paradigms. Paradigms are how scientists see, 

feel, and sense the world around them, which is typically conditioned by 

what textbooks teach them exists in the world.83 Paradigms constitute the 

dominant theories of causal relationships, their application to research, the 

nature of the puzzles to be solved, and the types of instrumentation and tools 

required to address them.84 Recent competing military paradigms include 

the revolution in military affairs, COIN, and cyber warfare. It is not that 

any single paradigm is right or wrong, each just addresses a different aspect 

of war. 

Kuhn revealed an extraordinary paradox in scientific advances: while 

normal science does achieve an almost linear accumulation of knowledge 

with immediate impact on daily life, the advances in paradigms that make 
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those normal science and technological discoveries possible often occur 

through nonlinear revolutions in the field of study. They rarely, if ever, come 

from the accumulation of knowledge derived from normal science experiments. Rather, paradigmatic revolutions come as a shock by scientists coming 

to perceive, or in SDW terminology, appreciate, the puzzles from a different 

perspective or with a different perception born of experience outside the 

practices of the “professionals.”85 Often the revolutions in knowledge occur 

because they are initiated by younger members of the profession who are 

not wedded to the blinders imposed upon them by the patriarchs of the 

existing paradigm.86 Shocks leading to advances in scientific knowledge, 

Kuhn concludes, have overwhelmingly been about how scientists perceive 

and interpret the world around them. Such discovery has been nonlinear in 

nature and the result of different appreciations of the context in which questions were asked and the lenses through which the questions were viewed.87 

For those only taught the linear view of scientific discovery, deficits in 

predictive capacity are not failures of the scientific method; rather, they are 

indicators of the immaturity of the particular scientific discipline.88 In the 

social realm, it is the belief that life unfolds along a relatively defined path. 

The trick to prediction in this case is to identify all the variables impacting 

life along the trajectory. Any error in prediction is assumed to be rooted in 

a flawed formula, imprecise data, or a logic defect in the theory. Renowned 

philosophers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries built entire careers 

and followings based on the premises of linear thinking. Indeed, the social 

sciences spent the better part of the twentieth century refining theories of 

society and mankind based on their tenets.89 Only in the last part of the 

twentieth century did it become more common to find scholars emphasizing 

that the social world is not comprised of puzzles with correct solutions, but 

novel, emergent currents to navigate.90

Linear thinking is so intrinsic to American culture that it is knowable 

only by the pain associated with trying to think in nonlinear terms. To 

think nonlinearly, one must distinguish between regularized patterns in 

human behavior that appear predictable and the capacity of the variables to 

intentionally change.91 Kiel writes:

Nonlinear systems are evidenced by dynamic relationships between 

variables in which the relationship between cause and effect may 

not be proportionate. Thus, in nonlinear systems seemingly minor 
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changes or disturbances may generate positive feedback, or amplifications, resulting in wholesale structural and behavioral change. 

Such change may result in a variety of possible outcomes. These 

outcomes may range from new states of equilibrium to novel states 

of increased complexity and organization, or even to ‘chaos’ in which 

predictability and organization break down.92

Everyone experiences time linearly as life unfolds along what on the surface appears to be a straight line—as though things only could have happened the way they did. This makes life seem predictable even though, all 

along the way, little perturbations in a person’s circle of life have changed 

the way he or she thinks, acts, or views interests with important cumulative 

effects. For perspective, imagine again what life would be like nowadays if 

cellphones and the internet had never been invented or government regulation purposefully squashed them in their infancy—truly alternate, viable, 

nonlinear universes. In other cases life is hit by a significant, unforeseeable 

Black Swan event that changes everything. Nonlinear thinking simply recognizes that the seemingly linear path of life, in fact, unfolds in a nonlinear 

way and will continue to do so. The only real solution is to accept it, adopt 

attitudes and behaviors that anticipate it, and figure out how to navigate it.

This chapter walks through the origins of linear thinking as a means 

of highlighting the conditions for which it is appropriate and why social 

problems undermine the predictive process. To do so, it briefly reviews the 

American cultural fascination with science and how it shaped the U.S. education system and culture over the twentieth century. It then discusses why 

the social sciences seem to have varying degrees of success with predictive 

analysis in the social realm with an objective of teasing out the nuances of 

causal analysis in open systems. In the process it exposes some fundamental problems with the highly linear concept of existing military planning. 

This is not to say there is not value in it—there most certainly is. But existing military planning principles must be put in proper context to prevent 

misapplying them.

The Enlightenment Hangover

The United States of America was born as an experiment during a grand era 

of discovery. Through extraordinary advances in philosophy and scientific 

method, the Age of Reason and the Age of Enlightenment ushered in a belief 
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

system whereby man could overcome his reliance on superstition, begin to 

understand and measure the natural world, and bring political order to the 

masses through the application of principled logic. Such philosophical fundamentals as empirical measurement, rationalism, the scientific method, and 

the basic tenets of classical political liberalism took shape between 1600 and 

1800 A.D. The goal of the philosophers straining against nature was to make 

a seemingly unpredictable and tenuous life more predictable and pleasant.93 

For Americans, the tangible benefits of this intellectual tradition were 

immediately apparent from the political foundations of the country to early 

advances in industrial technology. For context, until the early nineteenth 

century the entirety of humanity had relied for movement upon its own feet, 

those of animals, or the currents of the winds and waves. By the 1820s, steam 

power and the science associated with engineering, physics, and chemistry 

transformed human existence forever because man conquered the limits of 

speed and power imposed by nature. America, as much as any country in the 

world, adopted the philosophical and educational 

attributes of the Enlightenment period and continued to exploit, research, and perfect the application 

of science to life and industry. In many ways, the 

scientific revolution of the 1800s fueled America’s 

economic growth, greatly impacted its wars, and 

set in motion its meteoric rise in the international 

system. Sixty years after the widespread introduction of steam power, Americans invented the commercially viable light bulb, and 25 years later were 

flying. In just another 50 years, Americans were 

rocketing into space, masters of the seas, splitters of atoms, and citizens of 

the most economically influential country in history. Despite some important hiccups, a causality-based, empiricist, and seemingly linear scientific 

method made America much of what it is today.

Around the 1870s universities started programs of study in the social sciences due to the predictive power of the scientific, empirical methods evident 

in the physical sciences. There seemed to be no reason to think that society 

and politics would be immune to the scientific method of causal discovery.94

Advances in statistics, logic, sociology, psychology, and philosophy all contributed to the belief that social problems could be systematically reduced 

to their root variables, analyzed, mathematically represented, and resolved 

In many ways, the 

scientific revolution 

of the 1800s fueled 

America’s economic 

growth, greatly 

impacted its wars, 

and set in motion its 

meteoric rise in the 

international system.
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in practice just as occurred in the physical sciences.95 The gradual expansion 

of mass public education over the course of the twentieth century further 

reinforced the rational, empiricist image of science, be it of the physical or 

social variety. Today the term ‘science’ is almost universally equated with 

the scientific method rooted in linear, causal, reductionist analysis. As an 

American cultural feature, the idea of science is an almost uniformly understood reality. Truth be told, however, the science discussed and taught in 

the public sphere relates to only one, relatively constrained aspect of reality—closed systems.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, educators were trained to 

think in scientific terms, and giants such as John Dewey (of Dewey Decimal 

system fame) helped bring order and structure to learning.96 Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists and others reproduced the scientific 

method practiced by the physical sciences, such that they were described as 

having “lab coat envy.” Social scientists adopted the tried and true methods 

of the physical sciences, including controlled experiments, theory testing, 

statistical modeling, and reducing complex social phenomena to mathematical formulas.97 Unlike the physical sciences whose discoveries and laws work 

across locations (and galaxies in some cases), the social sciences experienced 

extraordinary difficulty deriving laws of human nature capable of predicting behavior and outcomes even within the same country over time and 

place.98 While there were voices airing concerns about the nature of social 

science throughout the twentieth century, the social sciences pushed forward 

under the premises and standards of the scientific method.99 Today, there 

is grudging acknowledgement in the social sciences that the hard science 

methodology is somewhat problematic for its problem set—open systems.100

For the military, it is important to note that the Service academies are 

heavily invested in the physical sciences, and for good reason. The engineering and technological challenges with which the military must contend 

require strong grounding in the principles of physics, chemistry, geometry, 

and other hard science disciplines. However, the unintended consequence 

of educating the force so heavily within a physical science perspective is 

that it reinforces many of the cognitive biases associated with the hard science methodology. Many of the difficulties SOF have experienced since 9/11 

have been the result of applying closed system, linear thinking to inherently open system, nonlinear problems, and the SDW can help resolve these 
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contradictions. It is not the gods who are crazy—it is actually just the mother 

of all blinders that makes it seem that way.

Hard Science versus Social Science

The Enlightenment hangover entices Americans to expect that the world 

conforms to (a) the principle of prediction, (b) the reducibility of phenomena 

to root variables, (c) the discoverability of cause and effect, and (d) the progressive accumulation of knowledge through the scientific method. The hard 

sciences have experienced such tremendous success following this premise 

because they are able to achieve causal predictability and the replicability 

of results that enable scientists to derive laws of nature.101 As discussed in 

chapter 2, the variables in the hard sciences can be controlled and held 

constant while the conditions of experimentation can be reset identically 

every time. The law of nature manifests because scientists can achieve a statistically significant result—statistically significant because there is always 

minute variation—such that they can have confidence moving forward that 

their predictions will come true. Because the variables can be controlled, 

the emphasis is on the rigor of following the best practices arising from the 

scientific method to credibly add to the body of knowledge on cause and 

effect. The basic nature of the hard sciences operating in closed systems is 

not even a thought—it simply is “science.”102

Laws of human nature have eluded the social sciences because there is 

a fundamental flaw in the assumption underlying the scientific method. 

Unlike the variables in the hard sciences which are reducible and knowable, the variables in the social sciences—people and the institutions they 

create—have the agency to decide how to act, to change themselves, and 

construct new relationships that alter the nature of the system in which they 

operate.103 This flips the notion of laboratory replicability, upon which the 

hard science method is entirely based, on its head.104 As Barton, Stephens, and 

Haslett note “laboratory science is a ‘special case’ of social science,” because 

in nature people live in open systems and variables cannot be controlled as 

in a closed system.105

To reduce “science” only to the hard science methodology is to engage in 

an egregious error of logic and philosophy. While it does have applicability 

to social science and can offer insight about human biological and social 

phenomena, it is problematic if taken out of proper context. Laboratory 
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studies and controlled experiments can produce informative results, but 

expectations must be measured when it comes to the social sciences and 

predictive analysis once subjects return to the natural, unconstrained, open 

environment.

So, what is the best way to think about social science given the contradictions between the assumptions of the scientific method and the reality of 

social experience? The answer lies in the attitude adopted to deal with the 

uncertainty inherent to open systems. The best the social sciences can hope 

to achieve is an approximation of casual inference, meaning cause and effect 

can never truly be known in an open system, so the focus is on the process of 

conducting science to arrive at an interpretation of cause and effect.106 King, 

Keohane, and Verba describe the essence of the issue:

Holland refers to this problem as the fundamental problem of causal 

inference, and it is indeed a fundamental problem since no matter 

how perfect the research design, no matter how much data we collect, 

no matter how perceptive the observers, no matter how diligent the 

research assistants, and no matter how much experimental control 

we have, we will never know a causal inference for certain. Indeed, 

most of the empirical issues of research designs that we discuss in 

this book involve this fundamental problem, and most of our suggestions constitute partial attempts to avoid it.107

The reader might think these scholars are social science skeptics. Quite 

the contrary, these are some of the most notable political scientists of the 

late-twentieth century. Indeed, they believe that the systematic rigor of social 

science is essential for generating knowledge on the human condition with 

the goal—however uncertain—of arriving at causal inference. Otherwise, all 

social life is left being a novel, unique experience for which casual observation is sufficient.108 They are honest about the discipline and simply want students of social science to adopt rigorous standards and subject their research 

to scrutiny.

Correlation versus Causation 

Return again to the requirement to distinguish between the regularized patterns of human behavior that offer the appearance of predictability and the 

ability to statistically predict behavior. The fact is there are patterns of social 
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behavior which philosophers and social scientists across the centuries have 

described as regularities, uniformities, generalizations, patterns, or classes 

of events.109 To the extent that people (agents) continue to behave as a group 

in accordance with legal (formal) or normative (informal) structures, it is 

possible to meaningfully simplify social complexity to patterns to derive 

some degree of causal inference. King, Keohane, and Verba continue:

There is no choice but to simplify. Systematic simplification is a 

crucial step to useful knowledge. As an economic historian has put 

it, if emphasis on uniqueness ‘is carried to the extreme of ignoring 

all regularities, the very possibility of social science is denied and 

historians are reduced to the aimlessness of balladeers.’110

The authors agree with this in principle, but there is a further caveat. As 

Kuhn warns, all science is first and foremost a matter of appreciation—the 

paradigm through which one views something creates filters and lenses 

emphasizing certain aspects while obscuring others. This truth is amplified 

in the social sciences because social regularities and patterns are fundamentally different than those occurring in nature. In short, what exists as 

a regularity in the social sciences is dependent upon what its scientists perceive, how they talk about it, and how they design their tools to measure the 

regularities they perceive.111 This is most certainly true in the military context 

as well. For example, how often did SOF or conventional forces enter a village in Iraq or Afghanistan and immediately ask if there was a school, clinic, 

or well that needed building because doctrine told the force those features 

were essential to promoting government legitimacy? While there might be 

a correlation, those features are not causal to government legitimacy.

King, Keohane, and Verba use the term causal inference because, in the 

social sciences, it is not possible to establish causal predictability like in the 

physical sciences. The best result, then, is establishing a correlation between 

the regular patterns of behavior perceived on a daily basis and the variables 

hypothesized to be driving them. The appearance of stable, repeated, often 

uniform behavior allows researchers to anticipate phenomena at higher levels 

of abstraction, and there is utility in the correlations developed, such as the 

likelihood of a traffic accident at certain intersections when it rains. It is not 

possible to know who will be in any given accident or the decisions setting 

it in motion, but just understanding the correlation can be useful. Again, 

the danger in an open system lies in assuming that the science behind a 
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convincing correlation is in fact predictive when the underlying variables 

are actually always in flux.

The dominant paradigm across the USG—the belief system underlying 

system 1 thinking—is that predictive analysis is possible in the social realm. 

There are numerous vendors, academics, and research institutes dedicated to 

this proposition, and there is a significant pot of money supporting the effort. 

Additionally, many claim that all the variables needed to predict the social 

future are available on the internet and simply require big data solutions to 

identify them. In the simple domain of the Cynefin Framework, this could 

work, but in the complex domain, this proposition is highly problematic. The 

authors hope that the preceding discussion on causal inference and causal 

predictability place the enthusiasm in proper context, but offer a few relevant 

contemporary examples below as to why. 

Statistics, Patterns, and Humility

Two recent examples on the limits to prediction in the social world instantly 

come to mind. The first is the global financial crisis of 2008 and the second 

is the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The former represents perhaps the most 

heavily modelled, data rich, and statistically elegant sector on Earth, while 

the latter represents the epitome of social science, scientific polling. In both 

cases the emphasis was on prediction and the result in both cases was complete surprise when the statistics failed to come true.

Financial transactions are among the most reported, regulated, and 

detailed social activities humans undertake, which make them perfect for 

predictive analysis. In fact, large financial firms employ extraordinarily 

sophisticated econometric models (imagine statistics with calculus) to predict the opportunity and risk associated with various financial vehicles.112 

During the 2000s, the housing boom was in part fueled by low interest rates 

and easy access to home mortgage loans.113 Many mortgages were guaranteed 

by the USG through the public-private companies Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac, but private-sector subprime lending companies, such as Countrywide, 

also contributed heavily to the mortgage bubble.114 Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac essentially made loans affordable to low income purchasers by reducing 

their interest rates through the provision of loan insurance to the lenders 

backed by the USG115—in short, the lenders could not lose.116 Statistically, the 

low interest rates were supposedly valid because Fannie Mae and Freddie 
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Ellis and Black: The SOCOM Design Way

Mac retained sufficient reserves to pay off the bad debt of defaulting purchasers based on historical averages.117

Financial investment firms in turn bundled real estate investment vehicles 

of varying degrees of risk and interest rates together to resell them as a product called “securities” and risk hedging vehicles called “derivatives.”118 The 

investment firms, some of the largest financial firms in the world, predicted 

the rate of default and the risk of exposure through advanced econometric 

modeling, and this worked because the patterns of behavior—the regularities 

(expected patterns) on the default of home loans—persisted ... that is, until 

they stopped.119 By late 2007, it became clear that the economy was cooling 

down and many home purchasers could no longer afford their loans, so the 

loan default rate skyrocketed. Large commercial financial firms like AIG 

and Lehman Brothers, and the government-backed Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac failed to bolster their cash reserves in the years preceding to sustain the 

default rate,120 which caused them to go bankrupt—instantly destroying the 

amazingly sophisticated econometric models underlying derivatives and, by 

extension, the entire financial system. All at once, few if any of the statistical 

models detailing the financial asset and risk positions of some of the largest 

financial firms on Earth could predict the future, and the global financial 

system almost completely collapsed because the firms could not determine 

what their assets were actually worth. 

Similarly, scientific polling has been a staple activity of the social sciences 

and even marketing firms for more than 75 years. The golden era of polling 

in the United States occurred from about the 1960s to the mid-1990s when 

random phone dialing ensured a reasonably good random sampling of the 

population since everyone used land lines and caller ID was not pervasive. 

By the mid-to-late 2000s, when cell phones and caller ID became almost 

universally available, scientific polling started experiencing significant problems—people were opting out of the sample when they did not recognize 

the phone number. Scientific polling became susceptible to response bias, 

meaning the researchers had to adjust—guess, really—the true proportional 

rate of response and recalculate their results accordingly.121

In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, early poll results conclusively 

showed Republican candidate Donald J. Trump had almost no chance of 

winning the election in a head-to-head match-up with Democrat Hillary 

Clinton.122 These results persisted through the primaries and into the general election. On the eve of the election, pollsters and news organizations 
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overwhelmingly concluded that Hillary Clinton would win in an Electoral 

College landslide with the question just being the size of the margin ... 

that is, until she did not.123 Despite the decades of election data, the almost 

daily polling activity, and the expertise of the political pundits, their paradigms and models generally failed to predict the actual outcome, President 

Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States in an Electoral College 

landslide. 

Throughout the primary election, political campaign experts and news 

pundits repeatedly used some variation of the phrase, “I’ve never seen anything like this.” Essentially what they were saying is that their paradigm 

of American politics—their underlying 

assumptions, expectations, and knowledge of the regularities and patterns of 

American voter behavior—were not able 

to model the behavior of a significant 

portion of the voting population. In fact, 

all scientific polling makes assumptions 

about the percentages of respondents relative to the actual reality, so they always 

recalculate their results to match their 

beliefs (predictions) about voter behavior. They often research recent elections for causal inference to model results, which means there is always an 

element of bias and random error. 

The random error is statistics-speak for the impact of the open system—

there are things going on below the surface or problems in the sample or 

the experiment that make the results susceptible to error typically to a 

magnitude of 3.5 percent–4.5 percent. In the hard sciences, this is generally 

unproblematic because the variation can be attributed to some variance in 

the environmental conditions so long as the results are replicable 95 percent 

of the time or more. Results outside the norm are thrown out as outliers and 

not statistically significant. When social science follows suit, it potentially 

throws away the more interesting nugget, that indicator of change on the 

horizon.124 Kiel summarizes well the logic and consequences of doing so:

Such a focus of course is intended to afford a generalized picture 

of the phenomenon examined. Average behavior also is seen as 

important since it serves as a source of system stability that reinforces 

In fact, all scientific polling 

makes assumptions about the 

percentages of respondents 

relative to the actual reality, so 

they always recalculate their 

results to match their beliefs 

(predictions) about voter 

behavior. 
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existing structural arrangements. Yet, investigations of nonlinear 

systems ... reveal that it is nonaverage behavior that often serves as 

an impetus for the amplification of nonlinearities and the potential 

for dramatic change. Seemingly minor changes can have unpredictable and massive effects in nonlinear systems ... Errors that 

initially appear minor may drive nonlinear systems to unexpected 

and unwelcome outcomes.125

All of this is to say that it is possible to observe patterns in open systems 

and to model them scientifically, but there is extraordinary risk associated 

with thinking the models are truly predictive in the same way as in closed 

systems. Even the best, most pragmatic social science statistical models are 

based on paradigms that only partially reveal aspects of reality—they inevitably overlook factors subtly changing the variables below the surface over 

time (more on this in chapter 4). Appreciation of the context is so important in the SDW because it highlights the fact everyone brings their own 

paradigms to the table, and the ethic of Appreciation is that each person’s 

perspective is always incomplete. Predicting behavior depends on sensitivity 

to the systemic interactions affecting patterns (regularities) at a low level, 

which in turn requires inviting diverse perspectives to learn how the system 

is being impacted and changed over time by the host of influences. Humility 

is essential in the SDW because each person can only ever partially model 

his or her own little sliver of the world.

Why Does This Matter to Me?

Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed some fairly thick material, but the “so what” of 

these chapters comes down to this: It is about how we think about things. 

Whereas operational design and other planning tools reinforce a linear, 

causality-based mindset, design thinking highlights the fact that systemic 

interactions create the potential for nonlinear dynamics for which traditional 

statistical, variable-based, reductionist methods simply cannot account. 

Divergent thinking is necessary as a check on bias and system 1 thinking, 

especially when there is an expectation that causal analysis is possible. 

American culture runs counter to the way the SDW asks the reader to 

view social dynamics. Americans are taught to think in causal, predictive, 

reductionist, and rationalist terms. Moreover, the natural, biological disposition to satisfice based on system 1 thinking leads to severely bounded 
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rationality even when attempting to think logically. In contrast, the SDW 

suggests that a more productive way to approach social reality is to expect 

“the pervasiveness of change, contradictions and nonlinear dynamics which 

stress that ‘diversity—not order—is normal.’”126 The American education 

system and modern bureaucracy want people to cram as much as possible 

into the simple domain in the Cynefin Framework. Hopefully by now it 

is clear why this attitude contributes to so much cognitive and emotional 

frustration across the force.

If the assumption of linear thinking is relaxed—the idea that life unfolds 

along a linear, predictable path—it becomes easier to identify the opportunities to influence how the variables in a system interact. In effect, this is the 

essence of FID, building partnership capacity (BPC), UW, MISO, and CA. 

The fallacy of linear thinking within established professional military paradigms is that it often misdirects attention toward the end state and away from 

the systemic impact actually happening. Thinking systemically involves “an 

understanding of interrelationships, a commitment to multiple perspectives, 

[and] an awareness of boundaries.”127 This is nonlinear, more circumspect, 

and more sensitive to lower level variables. In other words, it attitudinally 

empowers those dealing with wicked problems in a more productive way.

Thinking in systemic terms automatically accentuates the need for appreciation as a means of learning from one another. Each system, whether a 

function of culture, organization, or specialty, inculcates biases and assumptions in people through paradigmatic beliefs. The generic term for paradigms 

in this monograph is “blinders” because they inhibit the perception of reality 

in important ways. For one, paradigms tend to reinforce bias—what is often 

called groupthink. Additionally, the paradigms highlight certain variables 

deemed important while dismissing others, which in turn leads to measuring and tracking certain things while overlooking others. Finally, they tend 

to reinforce stereotypes based on personal and organizational experience. 

Local context and experience consequently matter greatly. However, the 

meaning and substance of experience varies depending on where one falls in 

the relationship of interaction. The only way to reconcile the natural, sometimes competing realities, is through a shared appreciation of the context.

It is generally uncomfortable for Americans to accept the idea of a world 

in which linear thinking is only conditionally applicable. It would be unsurprising for many people reading this to struggle with the notion, and that is 

alright. Americans are used to and comfortable with the hard sciences and 
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the scientific method, which are about puzzle solving—experimentation can 

reveal ever more precise calculations and measurements of cause and effect. 

Social science has no logical solution—there is no possibility of reducing it 

down to finite variables, so it is therefore not a matter of puzzles.128 To attitudinally move past the mother of all blinders—the reliance on and desire 

for predicting the social future—a few more ideas need to be introduced in 

chapter 4 to put this discussion in context. Chapter 4 builds upon the ideal 

of nonlinear interactions, which is the heart of complex adaptive systems 

perspective, and introduces the last of the vocabulary and concepts necessary for working with systemic thinking.

Key Terms 

Paradigm, Regularities, Causal Inference, Causal Prediction

Summary 

• Paradigms condition how people see, feel, sense, and think about the 

world around them. They inform ideas about cause and effect and 

create blinders by highlighting certain aspects of reality at the expense 

of others.

• Prediction in the social sciences is not possible in the same way as 

it is in the physical sciences. The best social sciences can hope for 

is causal inference instead of causal prediction due to the nature of 

open systems.

• The existence of regularities in human behavior present the illusion 

of statistical causal predictability in the social sciences, but they are 

only temporary because of the effects of nonlinear interactions in 

open systems.

• Appreciate the context in SDW offers the best potential to identify possible nonlinear effects to mitigate the impact of incorrect assumptions.

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Chapter 4. Heresy! The Desired Future 

as the Alternative for End States in Open 

Systems

The implication of the preceding chapter is that engaging in knowledge creation or prediction outside the use of the scientific method is 

typically considered unscientific. This stereotype also holds true in terms of 

military planning since it is rooted in engineering concepts. But this critique 

only holds if the hard science model is accepted as the gold standard.129 There 

are most certainly cases where it is. 

In the environments in which SOF typically operate, this is much harder 

to assert. Think back to the Cynefin Framework for a moment. If SOF are 

most likely to operate in the complex and chaotic domains or seek to influence the way a system operates in the complicated domain, they by definition 

have to navigate through circumstances where the structures reinforcing 

regularities are weakened and the incentives for new and novel innovation 

are strong. Retired Army General Stanley McChrystal et al. argue twentyfirst century warfare is heading this way, where shape-shifting, adaptive, 

decentralized, networked organizations gain an advantage over hierarchical, 

rigid, and centralized ones.130 They write: 

Our struggle in Iraq in 2004 is not an exception – it is the new norm. 

The models of organizational success that dominated the twentieth 

century have their roots in the industrial revolution and, simply put, 

the world has changed. The pursuit of “efficiency”—getting the most 

with the least investment of energy, time, or money—was once a 

laudable goal, but being effective in today’s world is less a question 

of optimizing for a known (and relatively stable) set of variables than 

responsiveness to a constantly shifting environment. Adaptability, 

not efficiency, must become our central competency.131

JPP and MDMP serve well for activities with bounded objectives and 

limited time horizons because the range of unknowns become manageable at least to some degree. But in working toward an end state, both tools 

reinforce a decision structure rooted in a centralized, hierarchical, linear 
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planning model for which the modern operating environment is poorly 

suited, particularly at the high operational and strategic levels.

Adopting the presumptions that prediction and moving toward an end 

state constitute the right approach lead to two problems: (a) they focus attention on the plan instead of how the systems of people and institutions respond 

and adapt to the intervention in the system, and (b) they subconsciously 

promote a short-term, solve-the-problem disposition. General McChrystal 

et al. again illustrate the subtle but important differences in perspective:

I later used a specific question when talking to junior officers and 

sergeants in small bases in Afghanistan: “If I told you that you 

weren’t going home until we win—what would you do differently?” 

At first they would chuckle, assuming I was joking, but soon realized I wasn’t. At that point most became very thoughtful. If they 

were forced to operate on a metric of task completion, rather than 

watching the clock until they went home, the implications would 

be significant. Almost all were good soldiers and leaders, but they 

had been shaped into thinking in terms of their tour of duty, a time 

horizon that rarely predicted successful mission completion.

Once they recalculated, their answers were impressive. Most adjusted 

their approach to take a longer view of solving the problem. You 

might expect them to seek a quicker solution and an earlier ticket 

home. But they were experienced enough to know that real solutions 

demand the long view—simple fixes are illusory.132

What SOF are now experiencing is very much akin to what Rittel and 

Webber experienced in the urban planning field fifty years ago. Public policy 

and planning were historically rooted in social engineering through a linear, 

reductionist, centrally planned model geared toward producing outputs 

or end states.133 Rittel and Webber introduced the concept of “re-solving” 

problems precisely because the discipline of urban planning attitudinally 

expected to “solve” them in the first place.

The reason the SDW emphasizes appreciation of the context over prediction for SOF is because in many cases not even the populations SOF want 

to influence or the enemies SOF target know where they are heading. When 

the social structures are broken or breaking, regularities in human behavior 

start to transform, which in turn hampers the ability to discover, explain, 
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and predict future behavior. Additionally, adaptive enemy organizations 

are smart enough to build where SOF are not looking, meaning they lay out 

feelers and exploit as circumstances permit. It is no accident that from the 

ashes of al-Qaeda in Iraq grew ISIS—it adapted, 

waited, and expanded as its context changed to 

the point it now boasts a worldwide franchise.

The SDW suggests that there is a more productive way to approach thinking about the 

future that still moves toward the intended 

effect of prediction without falling into the cognitive traps associated with causal prediction 

in open systems, especially as the seemingly 

stable patterns begin eroding. The SDW uses 

the term “desired future” as the alternative to a traditional planning end 

state. Chapter 4 first describes the foundations of nonlinear relationships 

that frustrate the innate human desire for stability in social systems. It then 

introduces the concept of desired futures—more importantly, the Range of 

Possible Futures—as a means of moving toward an objective while cognitively 

accepting the nonlinear path likely necessary to achieve it ... or something 

around it. In the end, thinking systemically and in nonlinear terms offers 

better preparation for policies and activities in complex environments where 

internal dynamics and external influences converge to render end states 

unpredictable and uncontrollable.134

What Middle School Science Classes Didn’t Teach You 

It says something about the natural human desire for stability that Americans often look back at the Cold War era as the “good old days” when Mutually Assured Destruction and proxy wars in the Third World provided a sense 

of order with patterns of predictable international politics.135 For over twenty 

years, Americans have been striving to restore “stability” to the international 

system with mixed results at best. Emilian Kavalski concludes Americans 

are so preoccupied with instability in the international system because they 

are conditioned by concepts of linear causality to think that equilibrium is 

the natural condition.136 As an instrument of foreign policy, SOF serve as 

key assets in the kit bag of national power. The twentieth century paradigm 

of international order seeks stability as a basic condition so that sovereign 

When the social structures are broken or 

breaking, regularities in 

human behavior start to 

transform, which in turn 

hampers the ability to 

discover, explain, and 

predict future behavior.
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states can govern the territory and populations within their legal purview. 

But as Kavalski indicates, the tendency to identify patterns or regularities 

in the social sciences fools people into thinking instability is the abnormal 

condition when in fact it is the norm.137 The conceptual error lies in the habit 

of viewing the international system through the paradigm of the state, which 

means all the changes occurring within the state’s boundaries all the time 

tend to be overlooked. Oftentimes SOF are seen as the tools for creating 

stability through their FID mission which primarily aids in breaking the 

networks threatening the perceived stability. 

It is hard to cognitively describe, but there is a flow to social systems from 

the Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, and it is does not neatly square 

with the concept of “stability” typically presumed to be the norm in society.138

That flow is expressed in the concept of emergence, and it is one of the core 

concepts challenging the idea of scientific prediction. Remember first that 

Reductionist approaches argue that prediction is possible if all the variables 

are known. In contrast, the concept of emergence asserts that some systems 

take on qualities and behaviors that cannot be predicted even with perfect 

knowledge of the variables constituting the system—the blending of building 

blocks yields a completely novel and distinct level of existence beyond the 

blocks comprising it. The clearest example of the idea of emergence is the 

human being.139 The building blocks of each human being consist of oxygen, 

hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and an assortment of other natural minerals. 

Yet when blended together they create an emergent existence with cognition, intention, agency, feelings—indeed, life—beyond the base building 

blocks. While the chemistry can be explained, the way each person acts is 

an emergent existence.

Social interactions and interrelationships often take on emergent qualities 

and cannot be predicted. As an early advocate noted, “Novelty is inherently 

incapable of being foretold,”140 and may be “scientifically interpreted and 

apprehended, but only after it has occurred.”141 In terms of the scientific 

method, strategic surprise occurs because the models of social interaction 

cannot account for emergent phenomena because they never happened 

before, so it was not even known such phenomena should be modeled in 

the first place. This is the essence of the Black Swan event made popular by 

Nassim Taleb. In retrospect, modelers can assemble the variables to show the 

model was capable of accounting for the emergence, which leads to the often 

errant thought that explaining the emergence of the recent past now enables 
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the future to be predicted yet again. When appreciated in the context of open 

systems and the limits to perfect information, the notion of emergence as a 

philosophical matter is instructive for SOF problem sets. Indeed, even some 

advocates of Reductionism assert that concepts of emergence make sense in 

light of “incompleteness of current theories, limits on computational ability, 

or limitations on our cognitive capacity.”142

To get a better sense of why emergence is possible, focus for a moment 

on how a single system is constituted according to the Complex Adaptive 

Systems perspective. There are four components: (1) the building blocks 

that exist in the environment (people as agents), (2) groupings of building 

blocks, called varieties (dubbed here organizations as agents), (3) constraints 

on the varieties (structures), and (4) a system mapping, which occurs when 

varieties (organizations) comprehend their environments and constraints 

and transmit the mapping as information. Mapping is the most important 

aspect because it is what enables agents (varieties) to intentionally act upon 

and change their structures (constraints) through new and novel relationships.143 This is the agent-structure debate (chicken or the egg) mentioned 

earlier in chapter 2.

According to the Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, the illusion of 

stability—or regularity—in the social realm results from the constraints. 

Strong constraints on behavior reproduce themselves over time and take on 

the properties of “culture.” Cultural constraints make sense in the time and 

environment in which they are created, but they do not remain static over 

time; they morph to adapt to changes in the environment.144 Tensions always 

arise within and among the subsystems—people want more material goods, 

need to protect spiritual artifacts, have to respond to changes in the environment, etc. This feedback loop does not lead to equilibrium—that only happens in closed systems.145 Rather, in open systems, there is a tendency towards 

homeostasis, a concept developed “to avoid the connotations of equilibrium, 

and to bring out the dynamic, processual, potential-maintaining properties 

of basically unstable physiological systems.”146 In this view, systemic relationships and interactions tend to form relatively stable structures, but only 

for a period of time, and as the environment introduces new tensions, the 

old relationships and interactions become brittle or give way to new, more 

successful innovations.147

The concept of homeostasis was further elaborated upon for the sociocultural realm to “express not only the structure-maintaining feature, but also 
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the structure-elaborating and changing feature of the inherently unstable 

system.”148 Complex Adaptive Systems scholars use the term morphogenesis 

to relay the idea that to maintain a steady state, a system might have to allow 

for changes in the underlying structures. This is profound and generally 

uncomfortable when interpreted through the Western, stability-oriented 

mindset. Buckley summarizes,

Thus, the complex, adaptive system as a continuing entity is not to 

be confused with the structure which that system may manifest at 

any time. Making this distinction allows us to state a fundamental 

principle of open, adaptive systems: Persistence or continuity of an 

adaptive system may require, as a necessary condition, change in 

its structure, the degree of change being a complex function of the 

internal state of the system, the state of its relevant environment, 

and the nature of the interchange between the two. Thus, animal 

species develop and persist or are continuously transformed (or 

become extinct) in terms of a change (or failure to change) of structure—sometimes extremely slow, sometimes very rapid.149

The morphogenesis concept creates the cognitive possibility for the 

appearance of social stability despite the fact that the building blocks of 

society are in constant flux—and necessarily so as they respond to internal 

and environmental challenges. Certain structural constraints seem durable, 

perhaps permanent, and are reinforced by hierarchies of authority150 that 

maintain the “essential variables” delimiting the cultural constraints from 

others.151 Remember for a moment the concept of path dependence from 

chapter 1; people tend to recreate their family habits, commutes to work, job 

functions, etc. every day because “the way things are done” get “locked in” 

their minds, hence the appearance of stability.152 Nevertheless, systems and 

subsystems constantly emerge from an unending process of structuring, 

destructuring, and restructuring,153 and those systems that fail to adapt or 

proactively prevent it are the ones that collapse catastrophically “by way of 

internal upheaval of ineffectiveness against external challenge.”154

Pixels, Patterns, and Pictures

The terms “emergence” and “morphogenesis” are hard to remember and 

probably not the best way to think about the basics of complexity theory. 
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Instead, think about something everyone knows about, digital pictures. The 

most basic element of a digital picture is a pixel, which can be any color in 

the rainbow. A pixel by itself is static, motionless, and meaningless. When 

it is placed next to others, a pixel begins to form a pattern, but only because 

it stands in a relationship with other pixels (see fig. 10).155 Digital pictures 

typically have numerous patterns that together form coherent image, meaning, and substance. In the morphogenesis concept, people are the pixels. The 

regularities that people create—and that social scientists love to quantitatively measure—form the patterns and social structures. All the patterns 

combine to form the picture. Introduce new pixels, perhaps by using photo 

manipulation software, and the overall meaning of the picture might change. 

The same is true of society which is always changing due to deaths, births, 

new technologies, and new ideologies among other factors.

Pause a moment now and think back to the collapse of the Soviet Union 

and the Arab Spring. Strategic surprise occurred in both cases because the 

patterns of social interaction at the government-to-government or state-tostate level continued with relative predictability—they were regularities in 

the fullest sense of the term. Appreciating the context from only the statecentric paradigm obscured the realignment of social forces at the lowest 

levels. Morphogenesis occurred at the pixel level for years and only when 

Figure 10. Morphogenesis in action. These images are examples of a Mandelbrot set from the micro level (left) to a macro level (right). Mandelbrot sets 

derive from simple mathematical rules to create complex, continuously changing visual images. While this image was originally a single, large, black dot, the 

formula produced self-replicating rules forcing internal changes that collapsed 

the original structure over time to generate the mutated images above. Changes 

occur internally at the margins, just like in states, but over time have significant 

impacts on the Picture’s behavior and appearance. Focusing only on the Picture 

misses the dynamism occurring among the Pixels! PHOTOS BY WIKIMEDIA 

COMMONS/ WOLFGANG BEYER/CC BY-SA 3.0

Pixels Patterns Picture
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the structural constraints gave way did the new form of things suddenly 

become manifest. Strategic surprise was not the result of an inability to 

sense things on the ground; rather, it was the result of whether such things 

mattered and should have been sensed in the first place! When precipitating 

events occurred—the attempted coup against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union 

and the self-immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia, respectively—no one 

truly knew the system interactions that would unfold. Frankly, they simply 

emerged as the pixels (movement leaders) and structures adapted to events 

in real time. 

The Desired Future and the Limits of End States

For military professionals emergence and morphogenesis have some profound implications. First, as an institution designed to kill people and break 

things, the military is best suited to destroying structures (constraints) and 

opening up the system to new, novel interactions by agents—this could be 

good, such as destroying Nazism in Germany, or bad, such as creating the 

space in Libya for jihadi Islamists to propagate. Which way it goes depends 

entirely on the alignment of the pixels and patterns (people and the organizations they form) along with their systems of interaction and resourcing. 

Second, it is far easier to think in terms of end states when the objective 

is destroying structures and moving forces along an axis of advance than 

when the objective is to build government and governance over the mediumto-long term. Neither is linear in actuality, but the former is more puzzlelike and tactically of shorter duration than the latter, which unleashes all 

the worst elements of wicked problems. Third, SOF missions, such as CA, 

MISO, FID, UW, and BPC all are conceptually oriented around the pixels 

and patterns (people and organizations as agents) and intrinsically impact 

the systemic interactions at the subnational level. Everything SOF does has 

a systemic impact downward as well as outward. And fourth, even with the 

most elegant Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) or the best 

placed human informants, predicting end states for wicked problems is still 

a bridge too far for any military force. 

The assertion that variables, factors, and influencers contributing to a 

future time, place, and condition are causally knowable and controllable in 

an open system under conflict conditions is consequently false, especially 

over time. In a complex world system where the human domain dominates, 
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it is a common fallacy to believe one can be empowered by computers, Big 

Data trend analysis, algorithmic modeling, and the scientific method to causally predict future systems and their behaviors. Again, this is not to say that 

modeling and trend analytics have no utility—they do, but here time and 

scale of the patterns become crucial limiting factors. It is only to highlight 

the cognitive problem to which one might fall prey—Americans expect and 

look for stable patterns of interaction and believe they can engage in social 

engineering to restore structures based on a linear planning process, such 

has JPP and MDMP. A Complex Adaptive Systems perspective makes such 

an expectation more circumspect and realistic. Kiel observes:

The static nature of linear and deterministic models reveals that 

these efforts provide at best a ‘snapshot’ of reality with, most likely, 

only short-term relevance. The determinism generally embedded 

in traditional linear models inhibits dynamics that may arise over 

time. This can result in naïve extrapolation based on assumptions of 

static relationships between relevant variables ... This understanding 

thus suggests a rethinking of the purposes of forecasting. Research 

in nonlinear dynamics reveals that it is possible to predict the onset 

of chaos in nonlinear systems (Baumol and Benhabib, 1989). Perhaps, a more prudent approach to forecasting then should focus on 

forecasting ‘symmetry-breaking’ events when existing structures 

break down generating extreme uncertainty as to structural and 

behavioral outcomes. Rather than attempting to identify specific 

outcomes based on ‘stable’ projections in nonlinear systems, a more 

appropriate focus for forecasting may concern the onset of structural 

disintegration (Loye and Eisler, 1987).156

For SOF, Kiel’s suggestion turns on its head the traditional American 

desire to determine patterns of behavior and to reinforce stability. Instead 

of asking “How do we achieve stability?” he suggests asking, “What might 

change the way the system’s pixels interact and cause a break in current 

patterns?” The stability-based question orients the mind to the high level 

structural design of authority (military and police) and does not necessarily 

require any effective knowledge about the society’s population or culture. 

In fact, it only really requires a paradigm of states and government—it is 

about power and organization. The systems-based question, on the other 

hand, first requires a deep appreciation of society’s agents (populations and 
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organizations), their norms of interaction, worldviews, structural constraints, 

and some sense of the social tensions driving innovation in their behavior. 

Only then can the currents of politics be navigated. The systems-based question could be used to determine U.S. and allied influence operations or to 

determine how enemies might seek to exploit socio-political vulnerabilities. 

Indeed, the systems-based question is the very essence of the Gray Zone, 

hybrid conflicts, or conflicts short of war.

Consider Joint Doctrine in this context for a moment. JP 5-0 clearly states 

it is just a guide, but the reality in practice—albeit subconsciously—is that 

U.S. military culture, training, and experience have ingrained a desire and 

belief in controlling variables to effect the COG.157 It leads to the attitude, 

“If I plan artfully enough, I can achieve my desired end state as precisely as 

I’ve envisioned it.” This is fraught with danger because it encourages a war 

of “chasing the MOE” to prove a concept with an intrinsically short-term 

perspective and, very often, one that is not a reflection of local reality but of 

American cultural paradigms. In short, planning an end state and focusing 

on it as the objective presents a cognitive and attitudinal trap as General 

McChrystal demonstrated in his question to his forward-deployed forces. 

Range of Possible Futures

The Complex Adaptive Systems orientation leads to a different way of looking 

at things, and the SDW offers an alternative perspective in that it considers a 

Range of Possible Futures instead of an end state (see fig. 11). The range of possible futures feature of SDW accepts that the future is indeterminate and not 

predictable beyond a high level of generalization. There is a starting point—

the current context—with agents, structures, constraints, patterns, trends, 

etc., but, like a cone of uncertainty used with predicting hurricane tracks, 

the range of possible futures recognizes that morphogenesis inevitably leads 

to changes in the variables over time, rendering reductionist, linear, time 

constrained COG analysis susceptible to error over time. As with scenario planning, the range of possible 

futures engages in a series of appreciations exploring possible tracks 

based on hypothetical changes in 

agents and structures. One scenario 

As with scenario planning, the 

range of possible futures engages 

in a series of appreciations exploring possible tracks based on 

hypothetical changes in agents 

and structures.
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is typically most favorable, and this is the desired future. It bears much in 

common with the intent of an end state in that it is the future seen as most 

beneficial. The key difference is that the SDW acknowledges limits on the 

ability to control the direction of future events and is consequently less 

concerned about the plan itself. Futures in the SDW are a matter of asking 

how the system is being influenced and how the system might be altered—if 

at all possible—to put a trend moving away from the desired future back on 

track. Unsurprisingly, the SDW stresses continuously updating appreciations 

of the context to determine how interventions and activities have impacted 

behavior in and among the systems in a perpetual, iterative process—as 

mentioned before, once is never enough!

Return again for a moment to the collapse of the Soviet Union. U.S. containment policy was predicated on the idea that internal contradictions in 

the Soviet Union would ultimately cause its demise, and the United States’ 

strategic objective was to deny the Soviet Union the outlets to overcome those 

contradictions. The desired future was the eventual elimination of the Soviet 

Union as a geostrategic and existential threat without the specificity and 

Figure 11. The Range of Acceptable Futures model.

Unacceptable Options

Unacceptable Options

Complex 

Challenge being 

Addressed

Tolerable

Possibility

Acceptable

Possibility

Desired

Possibility

Acceptable

Possibility

Tolerable

Possibility
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backward planning normally associated with an end state. How the U.S. got 

to that point was anything but linear and included communist victories in 

Vietnam and Central America, détente with China, and an American technological revolution among other things. It was impossible in 1947 to predict 

how the Soviet Union’s collapse would unfold in 1991; in fact, most analysts 

were surprised it fell apart at all. But, the desired future guided U.S. grand 

strategy and oriented statecraft toward a guiding light with adaptations and 

innovations along the way. Similarly, rather than focus on prediction, the 

SDW considers the possible emergent conditions influenced by known and 

unknown variables. As Taleb argues, life becomes simpler if one focuses on 

possible emergence in the system and its consequences instead of expending 

resources trying to predict the unpredictable.158

It might be apparent from this discussion that SDW requires a slightly 

different approach to logic and forecasting. Although the military spends 

an enormous amount of time trying to use history to predict future system 

behavior, the past does not predict the future though history can be instructive. The two main approaches to inference underlying the mainstream scientific method, the deductive and inductive approaches, assume the past 

can predict the future, but in different ways. Sherlock Holmes represents 

the master of the deductive approach. His “Elementary, my dear Watson,” 

approach starts with a logical conclusion and works backward to show how 

elements or variables fit as evidence along the logic chain. In the deductive approach, variables are logically presumed to have a causal impact 

or correlation with an outcome (usually based on some prior experience), 

and mainstream statistical testing then determines whether the presumption holds. Viagra represents the most notable recent case of the inductive 

approach through which testing reveals patterns, correlations, or causation 

without any prior notion of cause and effect. Pfizer scientists deduced based 

on experience the drug’s core ingredients would treat high blood pressure 

and coronary heart disease. Large scale clinical trials revealed the drug had 

no effect on heart issues, but male patients did report an interesting and 

well known side effect. The correlation from the original inductive analysis 

caused the scientists to deduce anew, and they conducted a further large 

scale clinical trial with the intent of focusing on Viagra’s newly discovered 

recreational purpose.159 The rest is history.

However, the morphogenesis concept of open systems illustrates that the 

variables of the past will not be the same variables of the future. There are, 
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therefore, limits to the value of deductive and inductive inference in open 

systems. This is not to say that inferences about a population’s future interests 

and behaviors cannot be derived—it is possible to do so since structural constraints do create path dependencies and even open systems generate seemingly stable patterns that endure for some period of time.160 The main point 

here is that unqualified application of prediction or predictive processes 

fool us into thinking the system can be controlled to achieve an end state 

when in reality the best to actually hope for is arriving at a new, ambiguous, 

future beginning.161 Even the greatest physicist today would caveat that any 

prediction is based on a conditional assessment due to the framing of the 

starting conditions.162 The use of history is in reality interpretative and has 

limits. However, history does help provide deeper insight into human decision making when confronted with particular problems if appreciated in 

the context of the time. Cultural constraints matter in creating path dependencies and patterns of behavior, but how a population interprets its history changes over time. John Lewis Gaddis, a renowned historian, says the 

“problem with the future is that it is so much less knowable than the past.”163 

Nevertheless, ancient history and the far future share common traits—each 

are opaque and avoid clear, consistent and agreed upon interpretations. 

In essence, prediction or forecasting in open social systems is more akin 

to conjecture based on informed judgment.164 Instead of logical deduction 

or induction, scenario planning the range of possible futures employs something called abductive inference or creative abduction. Khisty explains:

While trend extrapolation is based on inductive inference, and theoretical forecasting is based on deductive logic, informed judgment 

refers to knowledge based on experience, intuition, and insight. 

Informed judgments are often based on abductive inference, that 

is, the process of reasoning that begins with claims about the future 

and then works backwards to the information and assumption necessary to support claims. However, inductive, deductive, and abductive 

inferences are never completely separable in practice.165

Unlike deduction, which looks backward in time at logic and historical experience, creative abduction makes claims about possible futures and 

explores what new agents, structures, systemic interactions, etc. will have to 

occur in order to arrive at the possible future.166 Doing so for each possible 

scenario creates some of the Indications and Warning necessary to determine 
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where the system is trending in the cone of uncertainty, which can also 

demonstrate flaws in the existing appreciation of the context.

Everyone uses creative abduction in their lives. For example, most high 

school graduates recognize that they want a higher wage than they can 

achieve with the knowledge and skills earned to receive their diplomas. 

Many will decide to pursue a college education and one might decide, for 

instance, to become a renowned surgeon. To be a renowned surgeon stereotypically requires many steps, which is where the creative abduction comes 

in. One might think the path to acclaim requires a residency at a particular 

hospital, which requires a degree from one of three potential universities, 

which require certain grades and extracurricular activities, etc. While the 

student relies on her logic (and even perhaps even some empirical evidence 

from friends), it is her claim about the desired future that sets her behaviors 

in motion. One might ultimately fail in their bid to be a renowned surgeon, 

but might find they are a phenomenal medical instructor.

Creative abduction already has some application in the history of the SOF 

enterprise. Consider the initial preliminary military actions in Afghanistan 

following the horrific 9/11 attacks on the homeland. There was no existing 

plan given that the contemporary appreciation of the strategic landscape 

dismissed the Taliban-controlled country as a major threat. It therefore followed that no standing contingency plan or plans for invading Afghanistan 

had been developed. The U.S. military was blind to the notion that it might 

have a national security requirement beyond missile strikes wherein real 

military intervention in Central Asia would be a possible future. However, in 

short order, without a specific operations plan (OPLAN) fully developed, SOF 

rapidly and successfully executed effective military operations that directly 

led to the near term denial of Afghanistan as a safe haven to al-Qaeda and 

enabled the collapse of supporting Taliban government and influence. The 

desired future as outlined by the Bush administration was achieved without 

years of operational planning on the way in which it might be attained. However, once the concept of operations was developed, JPP and MDMP proved 

to be valuable tools as SOF destroyed Taliban and al-Qaeda structures. It 

has been the nation building effort, with all its wicked problems, that has 

stymied the U.S. and allied forces and allowed the Taliban to emerge in the 

system again.
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Think like a Great Explorer 

To best imagine the desired future, consider this view. Think of a great 

explorer—perhaps Columbus—preparing to embark on a voyage to discover a new route to India. He studied and considered the possible problems, planned for stores, recruited a crew, and produced a raw estimate on 

how to head West between the Atlantic’s latitudes to make the most of its 

prevailing wind patterns. Remember at that time there was no means to 

pinpoint one’s location longitudinally on the earth’s surface. Therefore, time 

could seem to stand still on windless days on the open ocean. Based on the 

extraordinary constraints on knowledge, Columbus, like his predecessors 

and the many that followed, embraced what the SDW refers to as the range 

of possible futures. 

The great explorers did not have the crutch of a 200-page, detailed 

OPLAN with supporting annexes to outline a “Schlieffen-like”167 approach 

to a clearly defined end state. Great explorers recognized their lack of control over the larger world, yet sailed into the unknown expecting to change 

course and speed often. Whether Columbus made landfall in India, Novia 

Scotia, or the Caribbean, he would have been successful. Missing land and 

sailing deeper into an infinite ocean would have been unfavorable. Moreover, 

he like the other great explorers continually appreciated the current context 

and navigated toward favorable outcomes. The great explorers adjusted for 

wind, current, and the human domain comprised of mutinous behavior from 

their crews. The divergent thinking to fully consider the range of possible 

futures is analogous to great explorers.

When considering the range of possible futures, it is helpful to think 

about what might emerge with or without intervention in the system. Explore 

the current context to identify and learn about various system drivers and 

reflect on or question the assumptions made about the direction and speed 

of systemic change. Is the system stable with slow change or turbulent with 

rapid change? If no interventions are made, how is the system trending, and 

how might it behave in the future? What is the future related to U.S. interests? Consider also bounding possible futures as either near or far futures, 

with both scaled or defined by the context of the issues at hand. In a COIN 

environment, for instance, tactically the near future might be a period of 

darkness as compared to a far future characterized by a dedicated effort 

to introduce new actors and systemic interactions that might take several 
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years. The further the future is desired, the greater the chance for disparity 

or variance among the range of possible futures. Again, the SDW focuses 

on possible not just “Likely” futures at this point. After exhausting efforts 

to identify the range of possible futures, the SDW then determines which of 

the possible futures will be favorable to SOF objectives. 

Certainly fostering a future oriented mindset is useful and necessary 

to align resources and activities toward a desired goal. The real question 

is whether it is possible to predict the future. Taleb refers to the American 

proclivity for prediction as a “teleological fallacy,” the illusion that people 

know exactly where they are going or that they know where they were in 

the past.168 The SDW builds upon his argument by adding that one does not 

know how to arrive at a desired future beyond any general sense, though it 

is comforting and necessary to “have a plan.” 

Complexity, emergence, and morphogenesis constitute a messy way to 

think about SOF operating environments, but as General McChrystal notes, 

adaptive enemies are the wave of the present. These three concepts go a long 

way in describing how states are influenced at the lowest levels and how to 

think about the future in nonlinear terms. As chapter 5 illustrates, states are 

always in a state of flux, so accepting that stability is a myth is the first step 

for effectively operating in complex dynamics.

Key Terms

Desired Future, Emergence, Morphogenesis, Deductive Approach, Inductive 

Approach, Creative Abduction

Summary 

• The concept of emergence asserts that some systems take on qualities 

and behaviors that cannot be predicted even with perfect knowledge 

of the variables constituting the system—the blending of building 

blocks yields a completely novel and distinct level of existence beyond 

the blocks comprising it.

• The concept of morphogenesis illustrates that prediction in the social 

sciences is always conditional because the variables (people) have the 

ability to intentionally change over time.

• Due to the uncertainty of the future and problems with prediction 

in the social realm, the SDW adopts the idea of a range of possible 
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futures with a desired future serving as the optimal trajectory toward 

which to strive.

• Creative abduction is the approach for navigating toward a desired 

future because it imagines the interventions in the system that need 

to occur so that the structures are in place to enable the desired future 

to manifest. 

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Chapter 5. The State of States: The Myth 

of Stability

We Think It, Therefore It Is

The previous few chapters together covered concepts that when combined produce an unorthodox perspective of how to view the “state.” 

What if the state is at its core a paradigm of social organization and authority whose pixels periodically establish self-replicating patterns of political 

behavior (despite those pixels being in a constant state of change) granted 

legal recognition by similarly structured entities? Might one think differently about how to view the picture, its various patterns, and the potential of 

each pixel? This description is not meant to be a definition of the state, just 

an alternative Appreciation of it as a living, always tenuous social experiment, which stands in contrast with traditional social science conceptions 

that take it to be an objectively real, legal entity that stands apart from the 

populations comprising it.169 Unlike rocks that have intrinsic material and 

physical properties, states only exist because people purposefully create their 

institutions,170 provide them the resources to generate and utilize force, and 

imbue them with meaningful symbols. Failed states demonstrate this point 

most dramatically because they cease to exist as states once people deny them 

the personnel, money, resources, and deference that enable the institutions 

of state to function.

Just as importantly, the complex adaptive systems perspective suggests 

that, as a tenuous social experiment, each state’s evolutionary trajectory is in 

many ways unpredictable over the medium to long term due to open system 

dynamics and the concept of emergence.171 For SOF, this is actually liberating in many ways since a number of its core activities relate to non-kinetic, 

system influencing missions. On the other hand, it means that threat actors, 

such as ISIS, al-Qaida, Russia, and Iran, also have the capacity to interrupt, 

undermine, or redirect the way a state’s pixels interact, especially if they 

keep at it over time.

As noted in chapter 3, a paradigm of the state is meaningful to the extent 

that it enables people to conceive of and talk about it via common frames of 

reference, vocabulary, and principles of discovery.172 Kuhn writes:
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Previously, we had principally examined the paradigm’s role as a 

vehicle for scientific theory. In that role it functions by telling the 

scientist about the entities that nature does and does not contain 

and about the ways in which those entities behave. That information 

provides a map whose details are elucidated by mature scientific 

research. And since nature is too complex and varied to be explored 

at random, that map is as essential as observation and experimentation to science’s continuing development [emphasis added].173

States are real, they exist, and are agents that have contributed to both 

extraordinary good and evil in human history. The paradigm of the state 

is therefore important, but as Kuhn warns, 

potentially blinding to other social factors. 

For the U.S. military, the paradigm of the 

state prompted the creation of intelligence 

tools like DIMEFIL and PMESII-PT174 which 

are meant to capture states’ centers of power 

and weakness. In other words, the paradigm 

of the “state” is what makes the DIMEFIL, PMESII-PT, and the Failed State 

Index meaningful tools in the first place.175

But, as illustrated by the pixels, patterns, and pictures discussion, it is 

but one paradigm of interaction and authority among people, and it might 

be a painfully inappropriate primary frame in many parts of the world. In 

an era of conditional sovereignty and fragile or failing states, it is perhaps 

better to appreciate the context from the perspective of how local actors are 

specifically encouraging morphogenesis in their societies over time. States 

only have agency to the extent their sub-units empower officials to carry 

out government services on their behalf, people identify with the state and 

its institutions, and/or the state can assert its will despite resistance from 

below.176 As changes in the environment and amongst the population and 

their interactions occur, so do the opportunities, constraints, and vulnerabilities for the state. It is important to remember that states are a recent 

human innovation whose evolution requires some context.

Call it 70-ish Years

As all good students of international relations will definitively answer, the 

modern state system stems from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which 

The paradigm of the 

state is therefore important, but as Kuhn warns, 

potentially blinding to 

other social factors.
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concluded the devastating 30 Years War in Europe. Westphalia established 

the main principles of inter-state relations, particularly regarding sovereignty, diplomacy, and warfare. It took another 200 years for the rest of the 

world to fall subject to the state system, most notably through the vehicle of 

colonial imperialism. While Americans are quick to think of imperialism as 

a thing of the ancient past, the truth is that there are still hundreds of people 

still alive today who, though centenarians, lived during the Ottoman, British, 

Russian, French, Dutch, and Portuguese Empires; Spanish imperial holdings 

were largely seized by the United States in the Spanish-American War over 

a decade prior. Together, these empires controlled the vast majority of the 

world’s territory and populations either directly or through weak proxies. 

Only in the 1950s and 1960s did these empires really begin to lose control of 

their decades-to-centuries-long domination.

The world Americans take to be objectively real, comprised of supposed 

nation-states, rooted in the rule of international law guaranteeing their sovereignty, the inviolability of their borders, the primacy of their national 

governments to administer to their own populations, and the non-use of 

force between them, is only about 70-ish years old, and even then there were 

only about 51 countries in existence when the principles were enshrined by 

the United Nations in 1945. In other words, the majority of the world’s recognized 193 states are just over sixty years old!177 While many people take 

the paradigm of the “state” to be an objective reality, for the majority of the 

world’s population, it is a relatively recent phenomenon.

While the nation-state system is relatively young for the majority of the 

world’s population, the systems of governance predating colonial domination 

are ancient and their residue persists in important ways; they oftentimes just 

do not conform to the image of nation-state centric government Americans 

and other Westerners take for granted. The theory of international law regulating interstate relationships assumes that war can be eliminated between 

states if legitimate state governments administering to their self-identifying 

nations are given the space to do so without the threat of interference from 

external forces. It is a balancing act focusing on a physics-based, reductionist 

equilibrium among states requiring equilibrium within states. 

From the foreign policy perspective—where the U.S. military comes in—

the key is to deter malign actors from destabilizing the equilibrium among 

states. It is a top-down perspective that concentrates attention on the paradigm of the state while fictionally separating governments’ behaviors from 
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the populations that comprise them.178 Or, perhaps most dangerously, this 

paradigm highlights the preservation of allied governments while diminishing the relevance of the internal social tensions among the pixels and 

patterns, interactions that give rise to state behavior in the first place.179

The Complex Adaptive Systems perspective asserts that a more productive 

view of the state is as a “complex ensemble of competing forces which offer 

unequal chances to groups within and outside the state to act for differing 

political purposes.”180 The morphogenesis concept holds that individuals’ 

expectations of or desire for a better life propel them to seek new relationships and technologies to improve their positions.181 They will continuously 

innovate as a result, sometimes with negative results (imprisonment, poverty, 

or death) and sometimes with positive ones (power, riches, or revolution).182

A state in this new paradigm is “only a relative stability of underlying, ongoing micro-processes. Only when we focus on these can we begin to get at the 

selection process whereby certain interactive relationships become relatively 

and temporarily stabilized into social and cultural structures.”183

While the traditional paradigm of the state taught from middle school 

through the graduate level reinforces the state as an objective, measurable, 

linear evolutionary entity, the appreciation from the complexity perspective 

takes it to be a subjective, constantly adapting, nonlinear, conditional system 

of systems. The weaker the central control in a state, the greater the chance 

for innovation, and positive feedback loops create the potential for rapid, 

unpredictable change.184 Whereas traditional concepts of foreign policy seek 

to make states relatively homogenous entities, the Complex Adaptive Systems 

perspective suggests that this is not really possible. Emergent systems result 

from heterogeneity and the initial starting conditions lead to radically different pixels, patterns, and pictures—the formula for stability in one state will 

not likely work in another!185 The authors hope that chapters 5 and 6 provide 

a learning path that leads to a new appreciation of the context of the state 

while providing both an example of the SDW’s utility and a more fruitful 

way of perceiving the environment in which SOF operate.

The State Viewed from Below

The paradigms of the state and state system pervasive in the American education system consequently create extraordinary blinders across the USG, but 

significantly hamper how SOF currently interpret their mission. As noted 
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previously, a good portion of SOF core activities are actually oriented toward 

the process of morphogenesis (influencing the pixels and patterns), but the 

DA and FID missions underlying the SOF identity in the CT and counternetwork wars direct the enterprise’s attention overwhelmingly toward state 

governments. How many intelligence and training resources actually enable 

or require SOF to learn deeply about various populations’ worldviews at 

the meso- and macro-levels, how they live their lives, and what they view 

as legitimate governance norms and values as opposed to how the government operates? Aside from basic language and etiquette courses for SOF and 

strong efforts to understand dynamics affecting partnered units, there are 

few. Yet the complexity perspective demonstrates that local context is the 

single most important factor in emergent systems.186

If a state is a system of systems,187 each comprised of individuals struggling for a better allocation of resources and influence, then it is crucial to 

also take a view of states from the bottom up. Westerners are raised to believe 

that all organizations, whether commercial or governmental, are supposed 

to operate on the basis of rationality, merit, and fairness. Beyond this, Ruth 

Lane argues that “mainstream analysts frequently define the state in idealistic terms, as perhaps the manifestation of the people’s sovereignty, or as 

the guarantor of its citizens’ rights, liberties, and freedoms. The standard 

top-down viewpoint, in other words, is entirely idealistic, announcing what 

the speaker thinks the state should be rather than what it is.”188 But, as Lane 

points out, “institutions will favor some groups in society, fairly or unfairly; 

and institutions will damage other groups, because institutions are the result 

not just of civil negotiations, as the sociologists tend to label them, but also 

of coercion and everyday acts of war.”189

Unfortunately, the most basic assumption of the nation-state—that the 

government is the legitimate representative of its population—is from a 

Complex Adaptive Systems perspective problematic, always conditional, 

and potentially a significant cognitive blinder. Even if race, religion, ethnicity, and other such identity markers are removed from the equation, 

complexity analysis concludes that tensions inevitably arise even within 

homogenous populations. Like-minded and similarly interested individuals 

are attracted to one another (homophily) and, to the extent they can easily 

interact (propinquity), create patterns, regularities, or institutions to pursue 

their collective ends. As systems of relationships, states have properties of 

“emergent social networks [which] are based on particularistic principles. 
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To the extent that friendship, homophily, and propinquity play roles, these 

networks are fundamentally ‘unfair.’”190 Innovative self-organization is a 

feature of all institutions and inherently the stuff of politics, “where it fills 

empty areas in which there are no official rules or procedures, and indeed 

sometimes it works against the official rules, in ways quite contradictory to 

the legal framework.”191

Viewed from below, the state is, as Buckley summarizes, “the systemic 

matrix of interacting, goal-seeking, deciding individuals and subgroups—

whether this matrix is part of a formal organization or only a loose collectivity ... And it is important to recognize that out of this matrix is generated, 

not only social structure, but also personality structure, and meaning 

structure.”192 The matrix could include civil society, the government, the 

media, ISIS, narco-traffickers, ideological revolutionaries, or keepers of the 

faith. Colanders and Kupers succinctly explain why the state stands apart:

While government is just another institution in a complex system, 

it is a very special kind of institution since it has been imbued with 

a particular property, namely it has significant power to influence 

the very rules that determine the emergent dynamics of the whole 

system ... The government is an institution to which agents have delegated the power to influence the interactions between themselves.193

The difficulty for SOF operating within a USG that understandably privileges state-to-state interactions above all others is that the paradigm of the 

state make it hard to appreciate how smaller subsystems operate within a 

state and affect the larger system of states.194 The state is the first among 

equals, but it is not an end in and of itself.

The Myth of Stability 

So many of our foreign policy discussions nowadays revolve around how to 

stabilize the international system or return to a stable international order 

(with the U.S. at the top). The intrinsic assumption is that the pixels of society, whether internal to states or among the society of states, can be balanced 

to achieve perpetual equilibrium. If a pixel moves out of place and upsets the 

equilibrium, then an intervention can put it back and restore the balance. 

Viewed from this perspective, there are right and wrong balances in the 

system’s patterns. Subconsciously a closed system approach to the world is 
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adopted; the challenge is to restore the variables in the equation back to the 

correct mix (a little governance here, a little more economic development 

there) to achieve a stabilizing effect among states. Rather than an emergent 

flow of subsystem interactions that evolve over time, there is a formulaic, 

cause and effect undertone to the stability mindset. 

SOF are therefore confronted with a paradox as a consequence of the idea 

of the nation-state. Stability among states was predicated on the assumption 

that war could be avoided by creating states with hard boundaries within 

which self-governing populations would achieve internal equilibrium and, 

hence, international equilibrium. Complex Adaptive Systems theory and 

emergence suggest that this notion of stability is a myth, and the rigid structures put into place to secure states actually make them more susceptible 

to catastrophic failure when their societies engage in destructuring faster 

than their states can adapt. As Wight notes, “There is never a point when 

the state project is completed within a given territory and thereafter operates 

according to its own fixed and inevitable logic.”195

From a SOF perspective, viewing states and societies as fluid systems 

of systems opens a world of opportunity to prompt emergence. In fact, the 

special warfare side of the core activities intrinsically operates with this 

perspective in mind. Social network theorist Charles Kadushin explains that 

informal, emergent networks will always arise to challenge the stable order 

because formal structures can never address all sociopolitical contingencies, 

which leaves space for new networks of influence to develop, new leaders 

to appear from below, and new relationships of interest or community to 

form.196 It is not hard to imagine how terrorists, narco-traffickers, revolutionaries, resource warlords, and others fit into this explanation when the 

state is deemed illegitimate by the local population or is simply nonexistent. 

From this framing, the systems comprising a state coevolve over time, with 

pixels and patterns endlessly competing for advantage over one another, and 

the government only influences their interactions and cannot fully control 

the system of systems.197

In contrast to the equilibrium view of states, complexity theory adopts of 

the concept of basins of attraction. Keeping with the fluid- and flow-oriented 

themes of complexity, these basins of attraction generate many quasi-stable 

leveling points instead of a single equilibrium balance. The basins fill as 

cracks in the system generate the space for innovators to flow, and when the 

flows experience positive feedback, the basins continue to fill, sometimes 
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rapidly.198 Complexity theorists note that flows can reach a tipping point 

when the trend, idea, interest, or behavior becomes self-replicating and 

self-sustaining199—that is, it becomes the “new normal.” But Colanders and 

Kupers warn that the idea of the tipping point actually misses the point: “The 

term is unfortunate, as it unduly emphasizes the point when change suddenly 

appears. In fact, as Gladwell explains, the real action happens long before 

the shift, when a head of steam builds up inside the system. While the Arab 

Spring seemed to erupt suddenly, it actually was the result of a long buildup 

of social tension. To the observer the tipping point looks like a point at which 

a relatively small event led the system to an alternative basin of attraction, but 

in fact the small event was simply the straw that broke the camel’s back.”200

Stability is a myth in international politics because the units are constantly being reconstituted as new basins of attraction alter the relationships 

in society. With morphogenesis forever altering (albeit, perhaps, very gradually) the picture of the state by rearranging the pixels and patterns, change 

not stability ought to be the expectation with the analysis looking toward 

how the subsystems of states interact to create new relations of influence. 

Importantly, the basins of attraction view of society and states highlights 

an often overlooked aspect of states. While the Western mind is constantly 

fixated on the society-building aspects of the state, the state can also have 

corrosive and dissipative impacts on the pixels and patterns of society.201 

Whether a state promotes centripetal or centrifugal basins of attraction 

depends on how its populations view its legitimacy. The C3 policing vignette 

illustrates how the state can promote centripetal effects even in the direst of 

circumstances using SOF principles to create new basins of attraction over 

time. The blinder imposed by the state paradigm is that the concept of international legitimacy is a different beast than domestic political legitimacy, 

and it is to this issue that chapter 6 turns. 

Key Terms

Basins of Attraction

Summary

• While the traditional paradigm of the state asserts it to be an objective, measurable, linear evolutionary entity, the appreciation from 

the Complex Adaptive Systems perspective takes it to be a subjective, 

constantly adapting, nonlinear, conditional system of systems.
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• There is never a point at which a state becomes a certainty, it is always 

a work in progress and can come undone depending on internal and 

external systemic tensions.

• Stability is a myth in the social realm because emergence and morphogenesis constantly introduce new tensions in a society.

• In Complex Adaptive Systems theory, basins of attraction replace stability and equilibrium as the fundamental nature of the system with 

popular support flowing to the attractors that offer the best solutions 

to popular needs. 

Vignette: C3 Policing in Springfield, MA as a New Basin of 

Attraction

In 2011, gangs ruled some of the streets of the North End in Springfield, 

MA. Some even brazenly rode four-wheelers with AK-47s strapped to their 

backs. Crime was rampant, 

residents were scared, and 

the police had few, if any, 

meaningful relationships 

with the community. 

Trooper Michael Cutone 

of the Massachusetts State 

Police and a Master Sergeant in the U.S. Special 

Forces Reserve with 30 

years of SOF experience 

joined forces with the 

Springfield Police Department to attack the root 

causes of lawlessness in the 

North End. Drawing upon 

his COIN experience outside Tal Afar, Iraq in 2005, 

Trooper Cutone initiated 

Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) policing in the North End. 

Instead of tackling crime through traditional policing paradigms, C3 

policing personnel “facilitate unity of effort and criminal intelligence 

Sgt. Brian Beliveau, left, and State Trooper 

Jon Blanchard listen as Sheri Kurtz, clinical 

director for Tapestry Health's LaVoz Program, talks about the South End. Beliveau 

and Blanchard are part of the newly expanded 

C-3 unit assigned to the South End. PHOTO 

BY SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
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gathering by, with, and through interagency, community, and private enterprise cooperation in order to detect, disrupt, degrade, and dismantle criminal activity.”202 The essence of the initiative is promoting relationships to 

enable bottom-up solutions to connect with governmental resources. C3 

personnel are selected, trained, and incentivized to build relationships with 

residents and local social service providers. To this end, C3 personnel hold 

weekly meetings with residents and interested interagency partners to discuss local concerns, air new ideas, and empower the resident pixels to form 

their own patterns. In other words, C3 policing was designed to create a 

new basin of attraction to redirect popular flows toward the state instead of 

settling in the puddles carved out by the gangs. 

Community members from Springfield, Massachusetts, attend a meeting on the 

C-3 Policing Initiative. A core aspect of the program is community involvement. 

PHOTO BY SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
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Chapter 6. The Nation-State Paradigm 

and How the Internet Messes Everything 

Up

Global connectivity gradually undermines national roots and augments or replaces them with a range of transnational bonds and 

identities. Imagine a world where people are loyal to cities and supply 

chains rather than nations, value credit cards and digital currency 

over citizenship, and seek community in cyberspace rather than 

country. – Parag Khanna, Connectography203

What Do We Mean by “Legitimate Government?”

In his classic text Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, international relations 

scholar Stephen Krasner identifies four types of sovereignty all states and 

their governments seek to achieve. They are:

1. International Legal Sovereignty. The legitimate right to govern a 

territory and population as recognized by the community of states;

2. Westphalian Sovereignty. The degree of authority a government can 

achieve over a territory and population without interference in its 

affairs by external governments;

3. Domestic Sovereignty. The degree of governance a government can 

achieve to administer to the population and protect its interests within 

its own borders.

4. Interdependence Sovereignty. The degree to which a government can 

control the flow of people, resources, capital, information, and other 

factors across its borders.204

Legitimacy in the field of international relations is typically oriented 

upon the tensions between international legal and Westphalian sovereignty. 

Recognition of a government’s international legal sovereignty is what grants 

it the legal right to govern and receive overt support from members of the 

community of states. It is the most basic condition for a government to be 
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considered legitimate and stands apart from whether it has any element 

of Westphalian or domestic sovereignty. In this context it is easy to make 

the distinction between the legitimate government of Somalia, whose writ 

extends barely into Mogadishu, and the “illegitimate” non-state actors who 

maintain domestic and interdependence sovereignty over large swaths 

of the territory and population putatively designated to the “legitimate 

government.”205

Legitimacy in this frame is entirely politically based on the interests of 

other governments and, therefore, is somewhat arbitrary. It derives from the 

top-down decision by the community of states—or a few powerful members 

thereof—that a government meets its standards regardless of whether or not 

the government is so judged by the population.206 When there is a disconnect 

between the legitimate government of a state and its own people, the trick 

in the Western mind is to enable the legitimate government to perform the 

functions of the government such that the people grow to view it as organically legitimate. Such is the reductionist, stability-oriented mindset which 

pervades the USG, most international aid and development organizations, 

and most Western allies of the United States. 

International Legitimacy is Different than Popular Legitimacy

The cause and effect assumption underlying the international legitimacy 

frame is that a nation-state’s sovereignty is the paramount concern for 

keeping states from fighting one another. International legitimacy, in this 

paradigm, is about a recognized government as expressed by foreigners and 

the desire to bring order, hierarchy, and predictability to complex social 

interactions within states to simplify and routinize the interactions among 

states. The non-interference aspect of sovereignty technically means that 

states should not care at all about the pixels and patterns of others. Obviously, this assumption is false otherwise the Special Warfare aspect of SOF 

would not exist. 

How many U.S. civilian and military personnel repeated from 2002-2017 

the trope to Afghan and Iraqi citizens that they were deployed to support 

the legitimate governments of those countries; how many also knew many 

Afghans and Iraqis believed their legitimate governments to be illegitimate from their own perspectives? From the international legal sovereignty 

frame, every single U.S. citizen who uttered the sentiment was truthful. 
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U.S. personnel brought with them a paradigm of government building upon 

decades of layered assumptions about legitimacy being based on international recognition; rooted in the material redistribution of society’s wealth or 

international development assistance; about the provision of social services, 

like healthcare, education, sanitation, and electricity; about the population’s 

right to consent to the power exercised over them;207 the primacy of central 

government to harness domestic and international resources to build the 

economy and institutions of government; and domestic legitimacy being a 

function of the procedural fairness (democratic process) by which the central 

government is held accountable.208

The U.S. military frame is, consequently, often about authority and power 

invested in the formal, central government of a state. This is natural since the 

military is an arm of foreign policy. It is doubly natural since the international relations discipline has reinforced this very perspective for the better 

part of fifty years. But, when the rubber meets the road it is the U.S. military 

that must interact with the pixels and patterns of states, and here the inadequacies of the nation-state, government-centric paradigm become unavoidably clear. Sovereign government authority has, assert Earnest and Rosenau, 

“migrated upward to international and non-governmental institutions and 

to global corporations; it has migrated downward to local governments, civil 

society, terrorist cells, and others. Authority therefore is problematic; most 

of us no longer assume the primacy of the nation-state.”209

From a Complex Adaptive Systems frame, international legitimacy is an 

important but severely limited appreciation of the context. Rather, organically legitimate governments grow up from their pixels and patterns to create 

a stable picture of a state; in other words, states with enduring governments 

have a positive feedback loop between the agents who create the structures 

and the structures that influence the new agents over time. Self-replicating political systems demonstrate a “stickiness” in that path dependence 

reinforces social regularities, especially when the basins of attraction are 

culturally and institutionally “deep.”210 Stability operations that start with 

the internationally recognized, legitimate government try to grow down to 

patterns and pixels regardless of whether they are organized in such a way 

as to create the desired picture. There is, to continue the metaphor, no depth 

and little to which the legitimate government can stick.

The paradox of stability-oriented activities from the complexity frame 

is that, because of the destruction of the social and political structures that 
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produce patterns and regularities in the population’s behavior, there is enormous need, incentive, and opportunity for innovative and emergent behavior 

as people seek to provide for their families or assert power and influence over 

resources and populations. As the Cynefin Framework indicates, the desire from 

the USG perspective is often to impose 

authority on the chaos or complexity to 

create some recognizable patterns, but 

this is costly and difficult to sustain. 

Authority through police and military 

force can limit complex socio-political 

interactions for a time, but cracks in the basins of authority eventually form 

and new, more attractive flows inevitably occur. No government’s control is 

ever complete, rather it influences the way agents’ interests and interactions 

emerge for better or worse.211

Unsurprisingly, it seems the imperative to establish or reinforce stability 

has grown more intense just as the range of interconnected systems increasingly undermines the stickiness of the state system. Futurist Parag Khanna 

summarizes the cognitive problem: 

International relations are so preoccupied with threats to sovereignty 

from the outside, and yet sovereignty is most visibly unraveled from 

within. Indeed, the growing power and connectivity of provinces 

and cities are driving devolution in the twenty-first century as significantly as decolonization did in the twentieth century ... Whether 

mayors or rebels, there are many ways to circumvent the prison of 

imposed nationhood. Maps of sovereign states thus betray the far 

fuzzier reality of hundreds of relatively autonomous nodes.212

The main issue is that the contemporary world has more potential sites 

of authority, both legal and moral, than before—legitimacy is not just about 

the government anymore.213 People have access to a variety of resources to 

sustain them when they resist a government’s rules, and they often learn 

how to effectively “game the system” for their own ends.214 It might very well 

be the case today that the nation-state centric paradigm promotes system 1 

thinking to assert more power and control when the second and third order 

Stability operations that 

start with the internationally 

recognized, legitimate government try to grow down to 

patterns and pixels regardless 

of whether they are organized 

in such a way as to create the 

desired picture.
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effects of such decisions result in worse fissures in some governmental basins 

of attraction.

Legitimacy in the complexity frame must have a bottom-up component 

to become sticky and deep. Popular legitimacy—the ultimate socio-political 

glue or deep basin of attraction—is, therefore, about relational accountability and the degree to which local populations perceive and act upon 

inequalities and injustices, especially as expressed through the institutions 

of governmental power. Joy Moncrieffe explains: “Relational approaches are, 

necessarily, concerned with the processes and power relations that prop up 

cultures of inequalities. These cultures of inequalities and injustices are not 

restricted to small communal pockets; instead, they permeate institutional 

frameworks, such that even the most carefully planned arrangements for 

checks and balances can carry histories and cultures in ways that warp the 

desired intent.”215 From the FID or UW perspective, appreciating how the 

pixels in a state perceive the justice and equity of their situation relative to 

those around them is a central concern whether for exploitation by SOF or 

for inoculating partner nations from the threat of subversion by state or 

non-state actors.

Popular legitimacy and relational accountability are entirely subjective. 

They result from personal and group reflections on and assessments of experiences in the context of expectations. They have less to do with formal 

governmental structure and more to do with the realities of life given cultural and social norms. While the Western mind is conditioned to think 

in terms of procedural legitimacy, such as with formal democracy and law 

making, this perspective is incomplete. Moncrieffe notes, “Within democracies, people may, in principle, have the freedom to choose – the liberal 

component (although even this may, in practice, be circumscribed) – but they 

may not have real freedoms, particularly to improve the quality of their lives. 

Furthermore, the limited electoral choices they are allowed can, in actuality, amount to a choice among degrees and forms of oppression.”216 Much of 

the reason for the Sunni insurgency in Iraq in 2004 was the perception that 

the U.S. would install a democratically elected, Shiite-dominated government which would effectively result in the Sunni population’s oppression. 

The fear was eventually reinforced by the creation of a Parliament without 

effective veto rules on Shiite majority decisions, and it was only the military 

and political influence of the U.S. as a basin of attraction that directed the 

Sunni political flow toward the state for a time. Once the U.S. basin broke in 
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2011, new flows to rival basins of attraction immediately began, precipitating 

in part the eventual conquest of predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq by ISIS 

in June 2014.

Informal, cultural institutions, such as tribes or traditional kingdoms, or 

competitor non-state actors, like narco-trafficking and terrorist organizations, can garner more popular legitimacy than formally recognized, “legitimate” governments. They sometimes form alternate basins of attraction 

with strong flows of popular legitimacy that drain the government’s own. 

To determine the potentially legitimate or competing basins of attraction, 

one must “examine the multiplicity of cultures that actually help to shape 

political systems in different ways, even within the same country context ...

Patterns of meanings are also entirely consequential for whether and how 

people engage as citizens. They develop out of people’s varied experiences of 

citizenship and, in turn, provide a lens for interpreting these experiences.”217

Appreciating the context with a wide variety of perspectives is crucial for 

mitigating the impact of system 1 biases. The implication of the Complex 

Adaptive Systems perspective is that intelligence is incomplete if it fails to 

incorporate the ethnographic, sociological, and micro-political components, 

for it is at this level that strategic surprise eventually bubbles to the surface.

The State as a Flow of Power

The myth of stability is about the myth of control. Control, power, and 

authority are not necessary to establish stability. Rather, complexity science 

shows that system interactions can reach a self-organizing and replicating 

stability on their own through the process of emergence.218 In fact, stability 

formed in this way can be quite sticky due to the natural flow of the pixels 

to the patterns, so the challenge is oftentimes better framed in terms of 

how to harness or redirect flows in a co-evolutionary framework so that 

the institutions of state run with the flows of society and allow for positive 

bottom-up solutions.219 Installing authority from the top-down oftentimes 

just creates friction against the natural flows—friction that myriad flows 

can erode over time.220

Remember for a moment the dynamics of wicked problems. Governments 

encounter problems imposing solutions when they see the world in terms 

of a linear, variable-based, problem-solving mindset seeking equilibrium 

in social relations. As Colanders and Kupers point out: “The complexity 
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frame conceptualizes the social system as a complex maze of interrelationships, with enormous micro-level changes underlying any seemingly static 

concepts. What might appear to be a stable macro equilibrium is actually 

the outcome of an underlying micro disequilibrium of constant change.”221 

Equilibrium is always a temporary moment in time and also a function of the 

level of abstraction chosen as a frame through which to view the context.222 

Here it is useful to return back to the Cynefin Framework to “sensemake” the operating environment. Where there are weak or very permissive governmental and social structures, there is excellent opportunity for 

emergence and the expectation should be for a high degree of morphogenesis. 

The political system may self-replicate, though changes to the basic order 

might occur periodically; in the U.S. context, for example, think of the 19th 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution granting women the right to vote ratified only in 1920. Where there are strong or very restrictive governmental 

and social structures, there is less interaction among people and groups for 

emergence, so the expectation should be for clear patterns or regularities, 

though morphogenesis is taking place in the available safe space wherever 

that might be, such as in universities, religious institutions, or basements. 

When changes occur, they tend to happen in rapid tipping point moments 

when the dam breaks and the social flows move to new, sometimes shallow 

basins of attraction. SOF tend to operate in environments where the potential for emergence is high due to weak government or after the dam breaks, 

called “far-from-equilibrium” environments. Morçöl explains: 

Some systems may move toward equilibrium conditions sometimes, but more often systems shift away from equilibrium. When 

a system is ‘far from equilibrium,’ the fluctuations in it may lead to 

new, unstable behavior. Under far-from-equilibrium conditions, 

systems are unstable and sensitive to external influences. They are 

more adaptive to their environments, and minute changes in the 

components of a system may lead to large-scale changes. Under farfrom-equilibrium conditions, a system reaches a bifurcation point. 

At that point it chooses between two paths: It either decays into 

chaos or reorganizes at a higher level. This is a form of nonlinear 

phase transition ... The laws of equilibrium are universal, because 

matter near equilibrium behaves in a repetitive way ... But under 
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far-from-equilibrium conditions, there is no repetition; a variety of 

options open up for a system’s behavior.223

Under such circumstances, it is impossible to predict how a system will 

behave at the macro-level. Instead, focusing on local level dynamics can at 

least offer a sense of the flows at play and the potential basins of attraction 

toward which they might trend.224

There is an important theoretical and operational effect between thinking in terms of coordinating social, economic, and political flows and controlling them through a central hierarchy.225 Under far-from-equilibrium 

circumstances, it might actually be more beneficial for SOF to purposefully 

search for, discover, and amplify a series of localized governance structures—

organically legitimate and relatively stable basins of attraction—and then 

through creative abduction seek mechanisms to align their flows so that 

emergence influences the system toward a desired future.226 In effect, this is 

what elements of UW, IW, CA, and MISO aim to achieve through different 

mechanisms. The problem emerges when these activities are implemented 

within a tactical to low-operational, near-term time horizon rather than a 

longer-term, high operational to strategic vision. Adopting the complexity 

frame might be the only real option since different populations in far-fromequilibrium environments experience it in qualitatively unique ways and 

from qualitatively different starting positions. Under such circumstances 

the SDW improves the chances of appreciating the context beyond what 

the operational design process requires because it invites in the divergent 

perspectives that matter for the initial stages of planning. Otherwise, forcing 

populations to conform to a cookie-cutter approach through a centralized 

government might be unwise227 and erode legitimacy as the dynamics of 

wicked problems become obvious. 

The Impact of the Internet and Social Media 

While there have always been civilizational and communal identities, the 

ideas of nation and nationalism date back only to approximately the lateeighteenth century. Yet, they became so natural to the political sense of self 

that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were riven by wars to secure 

them.228 Benedict Anderson describes the nation as: 
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An imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently 

limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even 

the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 

meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 

image of their communion ... In fact, all communities larger than 

primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) 

are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their 

falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.229

Because it is impossible to personally know all who reside in the nation, 

great emphasis is placed on the invention of tradition230 so that all members 

feel an affinity for one another and their territory. For nations to be viable 

over time, they must possess the fiction of being historically grounded. 

Anderson continues, “If nation-states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and 

‘historical,’ the nations to which they give political expression always loom 

out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless 

future. It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny.”231 There 

are three essential components of the nation:

The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, 

encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if 

elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.

It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an 

age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the 

legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.

Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the 

actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the 

nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.232

What enabled the formation of the national imagination, in Anderson’s 

analysis, were the establishment of national languages and print media in 

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These factors formed together as 

printing required more standardized language, which in turn contributed 

to a sense of shared national experience.233 In the twentieth century, states 

poured previously unimaginable resources into the effort to create the sense 

of the nation and nationalism through education and entertainment experiences. The rapid expansion of radio, basic education, print media, movies, 
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telephones, and later television transformed the information space in the 

twentieth century often for the purpose of reinforcing the nation-state 

project.

The inherent danger in the idea of the nation being an imagined community is that it is threatened by other imagined communities. The nation-state 

held the advantage for decades because the national identity was synonymous 

with territory and local community and was 

eventually enshrined in international law. In 

the internet age, this advantage still holds, 

but is certainly more contingent. The internet promotes unprecedented connectivity and 

the opportunity for morphogenesis because it 

increases by orders of magnitude the potential 

number of interactions in the system of systems. Moreover, the internet and affordable 

cellular communication eliminate the twin 

tyrannies of distance and time. Now people can communicate, share enormous amounts of information, and even manufacture items in real time 

from half way across of the globe.

Social Network Theory identifies two key contributing factors to social 

innovation and morphogenesis which were only briefly touched on previously in chapter 5: propinquity and homophily. Propinquity is the idea that 

two or more people or groups are more likely to be linked to each other if 

they are geographically near each other, especially if a common experience 

or interest (work or entertainment, for instance) brings them in frequent 

contact.234 Homophily occurs because two or more people and groups share 

characteristics (such as ideology, interests, norms and values, or experiences) 

in greater proportion to the people around them.235 Whereas the tyrannies 

of distance and time used to create de facto constraints on even the possibility of interaction across states and populations, the internet now obliterates 

them as factors leaving language the remaining barrier.236

Social media in particular is dedicated to identifying potentials for 

homophily and propinquity. Social media algorithms and other apps find 

ways to bring people together based on interests and values of almost every 

variety and stripe; think back to the Uber example in chapter 2. It is now possible that people have more in common with others in foreign countries than 

The internet promotes unprecedented connectivity 

and the opportunity for 

morphogenesis because 

it increases by orders of 

magnitude the potential 

number of interactions in 

the system of systems.
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their own neighbors and the opportunity to interact with them in real time, 

a structure that makes extra-national imagined communities entirely viable.

Looked at another way, the internet eliminates the friction of distance 

and time to enable the flow of ideas, capital, technology, information, and 

other resources.237 One observer likens the situation to circuits of people, 

groups, and supply chains. These circuits “have a life of their own” and 

represent agents whose interests attach to subnational nodes rather than 

their own nations.238

The internet messes everything up because it creates the possibility for 

nations of the mind to form in contrast to nations of territory and heritage. It empowers the pixels to form new patterns no matter where they 

reside, to bring new interests, loyalties, and non-national identities to the 

fore when in the past they could not generate the social mass to matter. If, 

as Khanna argues, “the fundamental property of all systems is to maximize 

flow: allowing all parts of a system to connect to all other parts,”239 then the 

internet is the quintessential conduit. Whether it is traditional territorial 

based nationalism or the nationalism of, perhaps, an imagined caliphate,240

the nation can still find its members, bring them together, and flow power 

thanks to the internet and social media. This potential for morphogenesis is 

not going away, making the internet the single most important contributor 

to nonlinear, complex dynamics in the twenty-first century.

A New Appreciation for Nations of the Mind

Hopefully, this brief, alternative exploration of the state offers a useful way 

of thinking about population-centric issues and the SDW’s value to SOF is 

now clear. Viewing the state only through a traditional frame brings with it 

a range of assumptions that potentially form impactful blinders. It takes a 

dedicated, system 2 learning effort to critically evaluate the hidden assumptions. In this example, the authors introduced Complex Adaptive Systems 

theory to show that even minor interactions between actors in far-fromequilibrium environments can produce nonlinear, emergent effects that drive 

the system in unpredictable directions as new attractors form.241 Further and 

in this context, the discussion on the internet age illustrates how technology 

now creates unparalleled opportunities for emergence and morphogenesis, 

and the advantage the nation-state once held in generating mass loyalty and 

identity is now compromised. The new operating environment requires a new 
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way of perceiving the system of systems so that change becomes a natural 

expectation and a force to be navigated instead of a problem to be solved.

The operational and strategic implications of this appreciation could 

enable SOF to reimagine the operating environment in important ways. In 

fact, the territorially-bound nation as imagined community has been weakened for decades. For example, a form of “sub-politics” has emerged from the 

international anti-capitalist, anarchist, and environmental social movements 

which Graham Taylor describes as emanating from the rejection of existing 

national and international government institutions and resulting in a “generalized and centerless form of politics.”242 The nation-state has and earns no 

legitimacy from this culture group, rather the planet is the central referent of 

identity and citizenship is premised on the abstract “right to have rights.”243

Taylor argues that this “Alternative Globalization Movement” (AGM) cannot 

be comprehended from the traditional perspective of a “nation” because it 

forms nonlinearly and dynamically through subjectively crafted meanings 

dependent on time and place.244 Unsurprisingly, he notes:

There has thus been an increasing tendency to portray social movements as fluid-like and marked by irregular and unexpected upsurges 

in activity and protest. Rapid mobilization is presented as the result 

of endogenous, self-reinforcing processes where small events and 

changes are amplified by positive feedback loops towards a ‘contagion 

effect’ and protest spreads like a forest fire ... The existence of free 

space allows movement through borders and boundaries such that 

social movements are able to transmute in unexpected locations.245

With the AGM having been born out of the anti-Western, anti-hegemonic 

social movement world, it is not altogether a stretch to hypothesize that 

members of the Islamist Jihadi movement have participated in and adapted 

these techniques.246 Indeed, on the surface there appear to be many parallels 

between the operations of the AGM and many internet and social media 

savvy organizations, like ISIS, that cultivate and put into action members 

of a non-territorial imagined community.

Demographically speaking, new nations of the mind might sprout simply 

by the homophily and propinquity fueled by the internet. Khanna cites a 

Zogby Analytics poll that finds first “globals” identify connectivity and 

sustainability as their prime values. They aren’t automatically loyal to the 

establishment at home or feel secure behind the borders that separate them 
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from ‘others’ abroad.”247 Indeed, Khanna proposes a number of compelling, 

alternative ways to view space and time. He contends that political geography (maps depicting political boundaries) should give way to “connectography” because territorial divisions as enshrined by nation-states are being 

superseded by connective infrastructure like highways, megacities, and the 

internet.248 At the same time, this connectivity stimulates devolution within 

nation-states as cities and their surrounding regions constantly adapt to the 

competitive connectivity of the global supply chain, sometimes through 

direct agreements with other foreign cities and companies.249 Instead of 

military conflict, Khanna envisions a Great Supply Chain War, which is “a 

race not to conquer but to connect physically and economically to the world’s 

most important supplies of raw materials, high technology, and fast-growing 

markets ... [and] infrastructure, supply chains, and markets are as crucial 

as territory, armies, and deterrence. The largest power does not always win; 

the most connected one does.”250

By adopting a frame of supply chain connectivity between cities and 

regional nodes instead of political division between states, Khanna perceives interesting dynamics, such as the potential for “neo-medievalism,” 

the rise of cities as the locus of power,251 and the formation of infrastructure 

alliances.252 He places great emphasis on the emergence of megacities due 

to their population size and economic value and notes the majority will fall 

within 50 miles of major water ways.253 He further perceives a trend in which 

“Mega-infrastructures overcome the hurdles of both natural and political 

geography, and mapping them reveals that the era of organizing the world 

according to political space (how we legally subdivide the globe) is giving 

way to organizing it according to functional space (how we actually use it) 

... As the lines that connect us supersede the borders that divide us, functional geography is becoming more important than political geography.”254 

In a world of rapid emergence, appreciating connections offers truly 

useful insight and certainly orients the mind differently than one steeped 

in political division and power politics. Khanna criticizes traditional political 

maps for their limited representation of the human experience.255 Instead, 

they should be a “synthesis of environmental science, politics, economics, 

culture, technology, and sociology—a curriculum curated through the study 

of connections rather than divisions,”256 because competitive connectivity is characterized by “devolution (the fragmentation of authority toward 

provinces), urbanization (the growing size and power of cities), dilution 
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(the genetic blending of populations through mass migration), mega-infrastructures (new pipelines, railways, and canals that morph geography), and 

digital connectivity (enabling new forms of community).”257 Connectography 

has in Khanna’s mind a political significance in that it focuses on the “lines 

we are installing now rather than the many contingent and arbitrary lines 

drawn in the past.”258

The introduction asserts that the most impactful blinder to SOF is the 

state. This is because, as Khanna warns, many people “still hold political 

boundaries to be the most fundamental man-made lines on the map out of 

a bias toward territory as the basis of power, the state as the unit of political 

organization, an assumption that only governments can order life within 

those states, and a belief that national identity is the primary source of people’s loyalty.”259 According to the Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, 

social organization is possible in ways different, but potentially as meaningful as that instituted by formal government, and the rate of change at 

the micro-level will only increase in the future leading to unforeseeable 

influences at the macro-level of intra- and interstate relations. In a world of 

imagined communities, it is quite possible that the nation as the focus of 

identity could in the twenty-first century become less certain as notions of 

legitimacy decouple from the state and groups engaged in sub-politics fall 

prey to manipulation by external actors. 

Key Terms

Relational Accountability, Imagined Community, Nations of the Mind

Summary

• While Americans typically focus on international legal sovereignty 

as the basis of a government’s legitimacy, relational accountability is 

how populations within a state determine its legitimacy.

• In far-from-equilibrium environments, it is advisable to discover natural basins of attraction and through creative abduction determine 

how they can be joined to form a self-replicating regularity instead 

of imposing authority from the top down, especially in the absence 

of organic links to the population.

• Imagined communities flow to basins of attraction (ethnicity, nationalism, ideology, interests, etc.), which used to be monopolized by the 
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nation-state, but they now have a wider variety of options for legitimate expression as a result of the internet.

• Technology and commercial interaction are changing the way people 

perceive their interests and align their loyalties such that nations of the 

mind credibly compete for legitimacy with territory-based nations as 

imagined communities. Framing challenges solely through the idea of 

the state presents significant blinders to other trends operating below 

and above the level of the state.

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Chapter 7. Design Thinking: Defining the 

Problem and Developing an Approach

A New Appreciation

Think back for a moment to the first paragraph of the monograph 

describing the advances of the Taliban, the rapid rise of ISIS, and the 

U.S. military effectively aligning with Iran’s interests in the fight to retake 

parts of Iraq. Viewed through the paradigm of the state, the strategic landscape looks like a mess. How can stability be restored when there are no good 

options for installing or supporting legitimate governments? Generally, the 

system 1 solution is to support the authority and control of allied governments through FID and economic development assistance. Hopefully, the 

journey through system 2 thinking in the preceding pages prompted the 

consideration that government-centric, linear, authority and development 

models work against the dynamics driving many operating environments.

Appreciating the context from a Complex Adaptive Systems frame generates new ways of thinking about many of the wicked problems confronting 

SOF in the twenty-first century. For example, as the re-conquest of ISIS held 

territory proceeds, what nonlinear, second and third order effects await the 

U.S. and SOF in particular? Was ISIS the problem needing only a military 

solution through the empowerment of local proxies or was ISIS just a symptom at the surface with the real problem lying far below the surface? Did ISIS 

serve as a useful basin of attraction with its elimination opening the door to 

some new basin, and what attractors might attract the flow of popular support? How might the USG and SOF create local basins of attraction—perhaps 

functional at first and later political—such that flows of popular support 

run faster and deeper to them than Islamist or ethno-sectarian ones? What 

morphogenic impacts did ISIS have on the youth that might manifest in 

destructive patterns in five years without an intervention in this subsystem? 

How might viewing Eastern Syria from a connectography perspective alter 

SOF operations to reinforce positive basins of attraction?

Instead of seeing instability, SOF can interpret the devolution of authority 

to new, more organic, and perhaps legitimate basins of attraction. From the 

complexity frame, the challenge is creating formal opportunity structures 
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for the range of bottom-up solutions to sprout and eventually merge.260 What 

that might look like and the form taken in building relationships is likely 

to be different in each context. It requires appreciating concepts of legitimacy, social tension, and power dynamics among groups as seen through the 

eyes of diverse local populations and from multiple angles within them.261

The activities SOF need to undertake in each environment then result from 

the best application of its diverse skills rather than predetermining how 

to restore stability through the extension of governmental authority and 

control.

From a design thinking perspective, it is the deep learning undertaken 

during extensive and often exhausting iterations of appreciating the context 

that defines the range of possible futures. New 

appreciations lead to new possibilities even if 

the pieces are not yet in place to influence the 

system as desired. Creative abduction is what 

empowers people to build toward the desired 

future. While not linear in substance, it at least 

allows people to think in terms of “influencing 

the system.” Once a desired future is chosen, the next element in the SDW 

is defining the problem.

Defining the Problem

The phrase “define the problem” has a very specific meaning in the SDW. 

While system 1 thinking induces most people to view the problem as the tip 

of the iceberg—the irritant demanding attention—there is much below the 

surface. The iceberg model (fig. 4) illustrates that the problem is often just 

the superficial and visible symptom of underlying conditions, trends, and 

patterns. In other words, the problem most of the time is not really the issue. 

The real problem most of the time is how the issue is framed and how 

formal and informal structures codify and incentivize behavior to deal with 

the issue. In other words, the define the problem element in SDW is typically about overcoming personal and organizational blinders. Since systems 

operate through structural relationships, problems are typically the result 

of tensions between the desired future and how the system’s structures have 

been made to interact. But structures themselves result from mental models 

or paradigms. Influence at the systems level is most effective if it affects 

New appreciations lead 

to new possibilities even 

if the pieces are not yet 

in place to influence the 

system as desired.
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peoples’ paradigms, because from paradigms flow the goals structures should 

strive to achieve, guidelines on appropriate behavior, and, consequently, the 

patterns and trends of behavior over time. 

Complex Adaptive Systems theory illustrates that to move the current 

context toward the desired future, new basins of attraction need to be introduced. These might come in the form of linking people together, creating 

formal or informal structures, or even just introducing and disseminating 

new concepts and vocabulary to influence how people frame issues (hence, 

this monograph). The problem in define the problem is, therefore, the gap 

between what currently exists in the mental models and structures in the 

system and what is determined through the process of creative abduction to 

be necessary to direct the flows to new basins of attraction.

Defining the problem is perhaps the most cognitively difficult aspect of 

the SDW. It demands one juxtapose many competing and often paradoxical 

perspectives and then make qualitative and subjective decisions about future 

trends.262 Doing this as an individual is hard—doing this collaboratively is 

extremely hard. Everyone on a team sees things a bit differently requiring 

a synthesis of perspectives, but this also enriches the SDW. These many 

interpretative frames each reveal their own truths about the system and its 

behavior. Much like a mosaic, the individual pieces together reveal a broader 

holistic view from which to make qualitative judgments and evaluations 

about the system as it is, its inertia, its propensity for and rate of change, 

and its possible futures. 

Confronting open, Complex Adaptive Systems requires cautiously scaling and scoping the problem. Given the enormity of many socio-political 

and bureaucratic problems, it is necessary to consciously determine how 

much of the elephant to bite off. The scale and scope of the problem must 

be sufficiently broad but not beyond one’s capacity to affect change. Said 

another way, it is oftentimes better to go small rather than go big in scale 

and scope because even small, successful interventions in the system can 

have significant influence in how it operates down the line. As time passes, 

the learning continues leading to new appreciations that might change how 

the problem is seen, so scope and scale have to be periodically revisited as 

new opportunities for intervention open and others close. Returning to the 

Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs vignette (fig. 14), the new appreciation of the context yielded a desired future that quickly focused attention 

on the gap in the system of Veterans assistance systems (represented by the 
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Figure 14. Rhode Island Veterans Administration Visualization of the Approach.
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islands in the visualization). The approach immediately followed and is being 

put into effect today. 

Vignette: The Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs—Defining the Problem

After a few iterations of appreciate the context, the Rhode Island National 

Guard and RIVETS established their desired future and produced a problem 

statement identifying the mental model and structural gaps in the Rhode 

Island veterans service provider community. Note how the approach visualization introduces a new connective hub, a metaphoric lighthouse to 

illuminate where members need to go, and emphasizes the importance of 

relationships to achieve a behavioral change in the system, represented by a 

series of ferry boats connecting members to the islands. The SDW enabled 

the Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs to become self-aware of its traditional paradigms of doing business and by 2017 to adapt the agency’s business 

practices for contemporary veterans issues, needs, and interests.

Problem Statement. “There is strong public support for Rhode Island’s 

Veterans and their families. This ‘sea of goodwill’ has led to a robust array 

of programs and services for those who have served and those who support them at home. Nevertheless, these resources and well-intentioned 

efforts are too often fragmented and disjointed. Moreover, there is no 

strategic messaging around the programs that exist or how Veterans can 

access them. In other words, we have the services available, but lack the 

communication, collaboration, coordination, and collective purpose to 

truly maximize their impact to improve the health and economic wellbeing of those we serve.”263 

The Approach. “Imagine a network of providers that serves the needs 

of current and former service members and their families, connected by 

a secure, web-based referral platform, and supported by a ‘coordination 

center.’ With a robust outreach and communications campaign, Veterans 

will either know how to access this network or be able to find it quickly 

and easily using popular search engines on the web. Member organizations 

of this network will understand the interrelated nature of the challenges 

our Veterans face. They will commit to being true partners with other 

network providers, and will work selflessly with them to meet the often 

multiple, overlapping needs of those we serve.”264
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Developing an Approach

As an action-oriented design thinking framework, the SDW conceptualizes 

developing an approach as the vision for intervening in the scoped portion 

of the complex system to influence, shape, change, or even sustain factors 

related to the problem. Rather than a roadmap to the future, the approach 

is the broader strategy for overcoming or mitigating the gap between the 

current context and the desired future. Recall that developing an approach 

generally receives about ten percent of the SDW effort because, once the hard 

work of appreciating the context and defining the problem has culminated, 

an approach to influencing the system tends to stand out.

An approach can intervene at multiple levels. In some cases it will inform 

and shape planning or policy guidance, longer horizon resource decisions 

like the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) process, or research and 

development priorities. In other instances the same learning and appreciation will enable the prioritization of current and near future priorities. More 

often an approach contributes to organizational alignment of thought and 

action across functional, policy development, and political offices. For an 

approach to be effective, an organization must be a learning organization 

willing and able to create, implement, and adapt the Approach as systemic 

conditions inevitably evolve. 

The SOCNORTH Commander’s Vision Framework vignette (fig. 15) illustrates how a design inquiry establishes new mental models, new structures 

of engagements, and new patterns of behavior which can be applied against 

discreet goals and objectives from appreciation of the context to an approach. 

One can also see from this vignette how developing an approach bridges the 

SDW with Operational Design and Operational Planning. In essence, an 

approach becomes Commander’s guidance once it moves from inquiry into 

action. Whereas SDW is self-consciously directed toward divergent thinking 

to overcome the impact of blinders, putting an approach into effect requires 

convergent thinking and processes over the short term. Operational design 

and operational planning are often useful for aligning the efforts of disparate units, components, directorates, agencies, and partner nations. There 

are discreet moments when seeking an end-state is appropriate. It is just a 

matter of properly recognizing them. 
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Vignette: Paradigm Shift and New Approach at SOCNORTH 

In September 2016, SOCNORTH Commander Brigadier General Christopher 

Burns sponsored a design inquiry facilitated by SDW faculty from the Joint 

Special Operations University and the Rhode Island National Guard Special Operations Detachment-Global. Having served as deputy Commander 

at SOCCENT, General Burns recognized the intrinsic differences between 

the SOCCENT and SOCNORTH AORs. The design inquiry explored the 

role SOCNORTH should play as a TSOC given the constraints placed on 

it by the U.S. Constitution. Note the emphasis on mental models and SOF 

identity in both the appreciation and the desired future in the resulting (U) 

Commander’s Vision Framework.

A New Appreciation. “SOCNORTH operates in a multifaceted environment, similar to a sports complex. Other TSOCs achieve their ends by 

playing baseball. While we play baseball in many of the same ways as other 

TSOCs, we are also part of many different teams (i.e. FBI, DOE, DHS, 

etc.) that play different games with varying rules. We are not always the 

quarterback or pitcher, sometimes we have a significant supporting role 

as a midfielder. Therefore, we are not just baseball players, but instead we 

are decathaletes, capable of excelling at multiple sports [emphasis added]. 

Our Future. “SOCNORTH is an organization that defends the Homeland 

in depth by creating a framework for ‘Cooperative Action’ with our DOD, 

IA, and international partners. We will complement the efforts of our 

international and IA partners while supporting, and, when appropriate, 

leading DOD efforts in the NORTHCOM AOR.” 

Our Approach. “To achieve our desired future, SOCNORTH must ... 

Broaden our Aperture ... Expand and refine our Capabilities ... Build 

our Network.”265
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Figure 15. SOCNORTH Visualization of the Commander's Framework.

Metaphorical SOCNORTH Sports Complex

1

2

3

4

5

FEMA Lead (DSCA)Emerging Opportunities

6

DOD Lead (Ex: Foreign CT)FBI Lead (Granite Shadow)DoS Lead (ICS & BPC)DHS Lead (Illicit Pathways & SIAs)

1234

56

Creating 

Cooperative 

Action Now
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Chapter 8. Conclusion

With each step forward, with each problem which we solve, we not 

only discover new and unsolved problems, but we also discover that 

where we believed that we were standing on firm and safe ground, 

all things are, in truth, insecure and in flux. - K.R. Popper266

As USSOCOM celebrates its 30th anniversary, it is an opportune time 

to reflect upon and think about how the SOF enterprise views itself, 

its place in world affairs, and the dynamics shaping how people and nations 

interact. The environmental conditions that gave birth to USSOCOM—the 

Cold War, the primacy of the nation-state, the faith in technology and planning, the tactics of terrorism, and the dynamics of low intensity conflict—

have changed in myriad ways. Yet the SOF enterprise, like all institutions, 

continues to self-replicate based on the paradigm of the by-gone era. For 

certain missions, this path dependency is not necessarily problematic; for 

others, it could be potentially catastrophic to continue business as usual. 

As General Votel sensed, it is probably time to take an honest look at the 

efficacy of the SOF enterprise relative to emerging and future requirements. 

The acceleration of political, social, and technological change portend a 

nonlinear, unpredictable, and turbulent future with instability, as viewed 

from the state-centric perspective, likely only to increase. Given the current level of stress on the force, it is fair to assume the SOF enterprise will 

not have the bandwidth to stem all the threats flowing through all the fissures in the state system. Once the money and manpower run out, system 1 

thinking will eventually give way to more deliberate system 2 thinking. The 

authors believe the force has arrived at this point even if the policy makers 

and bureaucracy lag behind.

While the substance of the monograph focused on the state-oriented 

aspects of traditional SOF core activities, the SDW has as much or more relevance to the countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and Counter-Transregional Threat Organization (CTTO) missions recently assigned to 

USSOCOM.267 In the interests of space, these missions were not highlighted 

in the text, but the concepts discussed in chapters 1 through 6 underlie 

them. The CWMD and CTTO missions are quintessential wicked problems 
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requiring SOF to reimagine their own cultures, paradigms of power and 

influence, and ways of working by, with, and through others.

While working in a joint environment often seems challenging enough, 

tackling threats that are inherently joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 

multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) are magnitudes more complex since 

authorities and permissions are distributed across a host of co-equal partners. In short, JIIM-C missions are coalitions of the willing where personal, 

professional, and organizational paradigms determine whether participants 

volunteer their limited resources and manpower. Nothing about this is linear. 

It is entirely subjective and demands a level of intentional creativity not often 

found in government bureaucracy. Establishing shared appreciations of the 

context are crucial for action in such missions as divergence in appreciation typically results in incoherent and uncoordinated interventions in the 

system.

The SOF enterprise’s key challenge in the coming years is to culturally 

move past its reliance on system 1 thinking to deliberately appreciate the 

wicked problems confronting it. The authors hope they provided the essential concepts, vocabulary, and framework for doing so in a more productive 

way. Because of technology, emergence is the most important dynamic of 

the contemporary era, and systems thinking is necessary to perceive and act 

upon the potential for emergence. As Nelson and Stolerman note, “systemics 

is the logic of design.”268 If SOF are to get in the game, they need a framework 

to both interpret systems and engage them. SDW is the framework for SOF.

Doing Wrong Really Right Still Goes Wrong

Resistance to change is common, especially in highly successful organizations. One could look at the SOF enterprise longitudinally from the 9/11 

attacks to the present day and clearly argue, for instance, that it is the industry leader in fighting terrorism. But what if terrorism is actually just a symptom, not really the problem? Russel Ackoff concluded after years of research 

and experience that “errors of omission, lost opportunities, are generally 

more critical than errors of commission. Organizational failure more often 

comes because of what an entity did not do than because of what they did.”269

For him, it is much better to do the right thing wrong, than to do the wrong 

thing right because the latter promotes replicating simple solutions until the 

organization falls right over the edge into chaos. 
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The SDW invites the real potential that SOF could be shown to be engaged 

in the wrong type of activity or that its structures and paradigms are incongruent with emergent conditions. If the enterprise adopts the attitude of a 

learning organization, the SDW can provide real value. If the enterprise hunkers down and protects its “truths,” the SDW will be severely constrained. 

Kadushin, though writing about private sector bureaucracy in general, captures the dynamics so many in the SOF enterprise regularly experience:

Management often simultaneously sends two contradictory messages. The first is an appeal to be entrepreneurial, change, innovate, 

network, be flexible, and be empowered. Second, and at the same 

time, management insists that it be consulted about all initiatives 

and maintain its prerogative to veto new ideas. Anything else is 

seen as an affront to authority. This is a double bind. The mid-level 

executive is caught in a no-win situation because both imperatives 

cannot be fulfilled simultaneously ... More often than not, however, 

the system is mired in the status quo while its members wonder why 

nothing changes.”270

The danger occurs when an organization’s culture becomes rigid and 

reinforces the myth that what it does is the right thing and then internalizes 

the activity as its core identity. This dynamic is a function of the expertise 

bias mentioned in chapter 1. Ackoff further warns that there is “nothing 

harder than to topple the fact that supports a deeply held prejudice denied 

by its holder.”271 SOF have innovated, have accomplished extraordinary tasks, 

have protected the nation from further harm, and they should take pride in 

their creativity over the years. General Votel’s caution, though, is to deliberately think about the operating environment—the changes in national, 

sub-national, and supra-national dynamics—to determine if the activities 

SOF engage in are the right ones for the context.

Clearly, leadership is crucial in the SDW. Commanders set the tone for 

discovery, and if their initial guidance is too restrictive or if they dismiss 

results that contradict biases and prejudices, the SDW will have only marginal value. However, if the Commander embraces the SDW as an attitude 

and ethic, the rewards could be extraordinary. This means that Commanders 

must have tolerance for innovation, disruptive questions, and, to Ackoff’s 

point, the occasional failure. The SDW is qualitatively and substantively 
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different than what most SOF have experienced, but it stands a better chance 

of determining the right thing to do which benefits everyone in the end.

I Don’t Have Time! Where to Focus Your Effort

The biggest hurdle to deliberate, system 2 thinking is the tyranny of time—

there just never seems to be enough time in a day to deal with mundane 

tasks let alone devote considerable time to reflection and deep thinking. The 

response to the question, “have you studied or looked at that issue closer?” 

is more often than not, “I don’t have time.” This response epitomizes the 

sense of urgency felt and seen across the enterprise and not just in operations 

centers. For those at the tactical level, urgency is a key driver. In other parts 

of the enterprise there is confusion between importance and urgency. The 

decade-long heightened sense of urgency for SOF has eroded the capacity 

and capability of the enterprise to promote organizational learning because 

it has culturally impelled personnel to rely on system 1 thinking. 

Indeed, SOF are creative, solution oriented, and respond quickly to 

emergent challenges. In the community there is a common phrase that “we 

operate at the speed of SOF”—a comparison to the CF asserting that SOF 

operate at a pace unlike any other in the DOD. This might well be valid. It 

is also valid that this same underlying ethic has contributed to a culture 

that limits the allocation of time for reflection and incentivizes decisiveness 

and action. Not all circumstances permit reflection, but certainly there are 

many situations that would be better served by slowing down, reflecting and 

appreciating the context, and figuring out what the real problem is.

Consequently, the effort must begin with leadership’s conscious decision 

to prioritize a few days of labor for appreciating the context over fighting off 

the alligators closest to the boat. While it might initially seem an inefficient 

use of time “to admire the problem,” the money invested in learning about 

systemic dynamics pays for itself when compared to the man hours wasted 

using the same ineffective routines against the same problems day after day, 

year after year. It requires the right framing and a belief that the benefits will 

accrue as subsequent iterations reveal more ways to intervene in the system. 

The effort also benefits from forming a core team and having the discipline to schedule Inquiries at regular intervals. Doing so ensures that 

individuals are accountable for assignments, and the core team is typically 

able to align schedules more frequently than is the case with larger groups. 
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Establishing near term, medium term, and long term milestones on the 

path to the desired Future is also typically useful. Small interventions are 

often necessary to generate momentum, establish relationships, and set the 

stage for larger initiatives (morphogenesis at its best). All leaders need to 

see something tangible from a design effort, so being conscious about deliverables establishes credibility over time. As insights and opportunities for 

intervention become readily apparent, the standard objections to taking time 

for deliberate thinking usually disappear.

In cases where leadership is disinterested in design thinking, the effort 

typically benefits from informal working groups deciding to meet for a 

few hours at a time on a regular basis. While not optimal, it still enables a 

substantially improved appreciation of the context, though implementing 

approaches faces added hurdles without leadership firmly on board. Nevertheless, everyone has some latitude in how they do their jobs, so finding 

or cultivating colleagues interested in design can yield substantial gains so 

long as one takes the first step and decides to make time.

How the SDW Can Help 

Thirty years ago joint was a four-letter word and special operations survived 

at the margins of the Services. When USSOCOM was established in 1987, 

it became the very example of an intervention in the system that the SDW 

elucidates. Today, SOF have moved from joint to JIIM-C and special operations constitute the force of choice among America’s leaders. Yet, the next 

thirty years of special operations history will be greatly shaped by the enterprise’s ability to reflect on its sense of self, global sociopolitical and military 

dynamics, its resulting roles and responsibilities, and how its tactical actions 

can truly produce disproportionate strategic effects in the emergent future. 

The environmental conditions into which USSOCOM was born have 

changed radically requiring new concepts, vocabulary, and ways of thinking 

for navigating through complexity and wicked problems. In the introduction 

the authors asserted: “The SDW provides the foundation for talking about, 

conceptualizing, deconstructing, analyzing, synthesizing, and acting in a 

complex adaptive world. It is a way of perceiving complexity and an attitude 

for operating in it. Above all, the SDW is an ethos of learning and discovery.” There was much to review and introduce to justify this claim, and a 

few blinders to confront in so doing. The authors believe that the future of 
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SOF is bright if it can break free of its traditional paradigms and appreciate 

anew its opportunities. Accomplishing this, however, can only occur with 

a change in SOF culture to better align with the dynamics of complexity.

While the journey through theory and philosophy in the preceding pages 

has been difficult, the authors hope that the learning and insights were worth 

the pain on the other end. Again, this monograph was not intended to be a 

primer on how to conduct practical design inquiries; rather, its sole intention 

was to introduce foundational design concepts and apply them to one of the 

most impactful paradigms with which SOF contend: the state. But with luck, 

the concepts discussed will resonate with enough pixels in the SOF enterprise 

to form new patterns and, perhaps, to a stronger, more impactful picture of 

U.S. Special Operations in the twenty-first century.
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Acronyms

AGM Alternative Globalization Movement

BPC building partnership capacity

CA civil affairs

COG Center of Gravity

COIN counterinsurgency

CT counterterrorism

CTTO Counter-Transregional Threat Organization

CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction

DA direct action 

FID foreign internal defense

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

IW irregular warfare

JIIM-C Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational, 

 and Commercial

JPP joint planning process

MDMP Military Decision Making Process

MISO military information support operations

MOE measures of effectiveness

OPLAN operations plan

PN partner nations

POM program objectives memorandum

RIVETS Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs

SDW SOCOM Design Way
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SME subject matter experts

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOPs standard operating procedures

USG United States Government

UW unconventional warfare
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Glossary 

1. Agent-Structure Debate. The recognition in the social sciences of 

the unending iterative process whereby social structures are created 

in the first instance by agents (people), but that the social structures 

then shape the reality of the world in which subsequent generations 

of agents act. (Chapter 2)

2. Appreciate the Context. The element of the SOCOM Design Way 

emphasizing the importance of learning about systemic interactions 

through the inclusion of divergent perspectives with a spirit of empathy. 

(Introduction and Chapter 1)

3. Associative Memory. The cognitive process whereby the mind accesses 

memory to discover past experiences similar to a current difficult 

question to derive an intuitive response, but subconsciously substitutes and answers a different, more familiar one resulting potentially 

in over-simplification of the issue. (Chapter 1)

4. Basins of Attraction. The concept in Complex Adaptive Systems 

theory that elements flow to attractors and level off in them so long as 

they serve as the best alternative, but emergence and morphogenesis 

create the potential for new attractors to arise leading to new flows 

over time. (Chapters 5 and 6)

5. Bounded Rationality. The idea that time and resource constraints, 

along with limits to human reasoning, restrict an individual’s ability 

to achieve perfect information and act in a perfectly rational manner. 

(Chapter 2)

6. Causal Inference. In the physical and social sciences, the ability to 

establish a correlation between variables and an outcome resulting 

a in a determination of cause and effect, albeit with a self-conscious 

degree of doubt about replicability of the findings. (Chapter 3)

7. Causal Predictability. In the physical and social sciences, the ability 

to establish a direct cause and effect relationship between variables 

and an outcome with a high degree of confidence and certainty of 

replicability. (Chapter 3)
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8. Closed System. The ideal condition in the physical and social sciences 

whereby external environmental factors can be prevented from interfering with an experiment and all internal variables can be controlled to 

determine causal interactions among the variables. (Chapters 2 and 3)

9. Complex Adaptive Systems Theory. A body of literature across the 

physical and social sciences rooted to the principle that change through 

emergence and morphogenesis make naturally occurring, nonlinear 

interactions more prevalent than previously recognized by Reductionist 

approaches to scientific investigation. (Chapters 2 and 3)

10. Creative Abduction. A method of investigation that imagines a future 

occurrence and then logically reasons backward the conditions that 

must come to fruition over time in order for that future to manifest. 

(Chapter 4)

11. Current Context. A statement in the SOCOM Design Way that 

describes the present interaction of the system of systems determined 

after multiple iterations of Appreciating the Context. (Chapters 1 and 7)

12. Cynefin Framework. A sense-making model designed for determining the degree of complexity of a situation based on the ability to 

ascertain cause and effect that also serves as a management tool for 

recommending corresponding behaviors and actions under different 

circumstances. (Chapter 2)

13. Deductive Approach. A method of investigation that first employs 

logical reasoning to determine causal relationships among variables 

and then empirically tests data to determine the validity of the reasoning. (Chapter 4)

14. Define the Problem. The element of the SOCOM Design Way that 

clearly identifies the gaps in the system at the mental model and structural levels that need to be redressed to move the system from the 

Current Context to the Desired Future. (Introduction and Chapter 7)

15. Design Inquiry. A functional investigation of a wicked problem utilizing Design Thinking principles, elements, and practices. (Chapters 

1 and 7)
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16. Design Thinking. The ability to imagine that-which-does-not-yet-exist, 

to make it appear in concrete form as a new, purposeful addition to 

the real world. (Introduction)

17. Desired Future. A vision of the future in the SOCOM Design Way 

that is deemed to be the most favorable condition among the Range 

of Possible Futures and toward which interventions in the system are 

oriented over time. (Introduction and Chapter 4)

18. Develop an Approach. The element of the SOCOM Design Way that 

produces a concept for intervening in the system to move from the 

Current Context to the Desired Future and which typically serves as 

or informs Commander’s Guidance in Operational Design. (Introduction and Chapter 7)

19. Emergence. An occurrence when a system takes on qualities and 

behaviors that cannot be predicted even with perfect knowledge of 

the variables constituting the system. The blending of variables yields 

a completely novel and distinct level of existence beyond the blocks 

comprising it. (Chapter 4)

20. Empathy. The capacity for being aware of, being sensitive to, and 

imagining the feelings of another’s experience without having explicitly 

shared the experience. (Chapter 1)

21. Framing. The conscious and purposeful act of bounding one’s thinking, 

the system, or the issue at hand, or the deliberate rubric an individual 

might use to organize his or her thoughts about a particular topic in 

order to facilitate investigation and learning. (Chapter 1)

22.Heuristic. A simple mental model, technique, or shortcut that helps 

an individual conceptualize or more deeply appreciate an idea or 

phenomenon. (Chapter 1)

23. Imagined Community. The idea that self-identifying groups of people, 

such as nations, exist as social fictions since the individual’s feeling of 

belonging with others is imagined due to the fact that he or she will 

only ever know an infinitesimally small percentage of the community’s 

members, yet the identity motivates behavior nonetheless. (Chapter 6)
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24.Inductive Approach. A method of investigation that first engages in 

empirical testing of data to identify correlations among variables and 

then logically determines potential causal relationships for further 

testing. (Chapter 4)

25. Morphogenesis. The concept in Complex Adaptive Systems theory 

that variables in the social realm have the capacity to intentionally 

change and form new, emergent interactions to better achieve their 

interests thereby undermining Reductionist principles of scientific 

investigation. (Chapters 4, 5, and 6)

26.Nations of the Mind. The idea that individuals now have the ability 

through modern communications technology to view themselves as 

belonging to extra-territorial imagined communities thereby eroding 

the primacy of the nation-state as the locus of moral and political 

legitimacy. (Chapter 6)

27. Open System. The condition in the physical and social sciences 

whereby external environmental factors cannot be prevented from 

interfering with an experiment, and all the variables that impact a 

phenomenon can neither be fully known nor controlled internally, 

leading to potentially nonlinear interactions among variables and 

only conditional causal inference through scientific investigation. 

(Chapters 2 and 3)

28. Paradigm. An individual’s beliefs about how the physical and social 

world works, which shapes how he or she sees, feels, senses, and thinks 

about reality. It informs ideas about cause and effect and creates blinders by highlighting certain aspects of reality at the expense of others. 

(Chapter 3)

29. Path Dependence. The process whereby people continuously replicate 

a behavioral pattern or an organizational practice based on institutionalized habit or the costs associated with organizational change 

regardless of whether it is suitable to the contemporary environment. 

(Chapter 1)

30. Rationalism. A model of human decision making and behavior in the 

social sciences that holds people act rationally to maximize benefits 

for themselves and minimize losses. (Chapters 2 and 3)
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31. Reductionism. A systematic approach to scientific investigation that 

seeks to determine causal predictability by describing, explaining, 

and predicting a phenomenon through progressively reducing it to 

the interactions of its base variables. (Chapters 2 and 3)

32. Regularities. The self-replicating patterns of human behavior that 

appear to predictably recur over time. (Chapter 3)

33. Relational Accountability. The perception of legitimacy of a social 

order as a function of the degree of inequality and injustice experienced 

by a subgroup of a population based on its own expectations, especially 

as the institutions of governmental exercise power and authority over 

it in relation to the rest of the population. (Chapter 6)

34.Satisfice. The blending of the words “satisfy” and “suffice” to connote 

that an individual only seeks out information to the point he or she is 

satisfied there is sufficient data to make an informed decision instead 

of continuing the search to achieve a level of perfect information. 

(Chapter 2)

35. Sense-Making Models. Models designed to enable an individual to 

conceptualize the nature of the environment in which he or she is 

situated in order to determine how best to respond. (Chapter 2)

36. System 1 Thinking. The aspect of cognitive processing that enables 

the mind to engage in seemingly automatic, intuitive, and effortless 

problem solving, and that depends heavily upon past experience and 

familiarity to produce fast solutions. (Chapter 1)

37. System 2 Thinking. The aspect of cognitive processing that enables 

the mind to engage in a slower, more deliberate, and effortful form 

of thinking in order to challenge initial perceptions and operating 

assumptions. (Chapter 1)

38. Systematic Analysis. A process or method of investigation that emphasizes breaking phenomena down into progressively smaller variables 

and units of analysis, sometimes according to a structured rubric, in 

order to determine how they contribute individually to the functioning of the whole. (Chapter 1)
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39. Systems Thinking. A frame of investigation related to Complex 

Adaptive Systems theory that emphasizes the interaction between 

social structures, the relationships between actors serving as connective nodes, and the potential for nonlinear, emergent phenomena to 

influence or change how systems and individuals behave. (Chapter 1)

40.Wicked Problems. Complex problems in open systems for which 

there are no recognizable cause and effect relationships, definitive 

solutions, or ways to determine all the potential variables interacting 

in the system. (Introduction and Chapter 2)
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Endnotes

1. “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2016,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 30 October 2016, 102–105; Bill 

Roggio, “Analysis: U.S. Military Assessment of Taliban Control of Afghan Districts Flawed,” The Long War Journal, 2 November 2016, accessed 7 November 

2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/analysis-us-militaryassessment-of-taliban-control-of-afghan-districts-is-flawed.php.

2. Frederick Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, et al., 

“Al Qaeda and ISIS: Existential Threats to the U.S. and Europe,” Institute for 

the Study of War (U.S. Grand Strategy: Destroying ISIS and al Qaeda, Report 

One), January 2016, 8, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/

PLANEX%20Report%201%20--%20FINALFINALFINAL.pdf; Karen Yourish, 

Derek Watkins, Tom Giratikanon and Jasmine C. Lee, “How Many People Have 

Been Killed in ISIS Attacks Around the World,” The New York Times, 16 July 

2016, accessed 7 November 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/

world/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html.

3. Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iran-trained militias join U.S-backed campaign on 

Mosul, flying Shi'ite flags,” Reuters, 30 October 2016, accessed 7 November 2016, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-iran-idUSKBN12U0UI.

4. U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167 (2011), accessed 18 August 2017, https://www.

gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/pdf/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleApartI-chap6-sec167.pdf, 161.

5. Empathy in this context is an umbrella term described by USASOC as Human 

Factors analysis. See, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 2nd Edition, ed. Nathan Bos (United States Army Special Operations 

Command, 2013), 3. The Marines have a history of population-centric engagement 

and continue to adapt as missions require. For example, see Small Wars Manual

(U.S. Marine Corps. FMFRP 12-15, 1940). Note also that the widely referenced 

U.S. Department of the Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual (2006) was 

jointly produced with the U.S. Marine Corps as MCWP 3-33.5.

6. USSOCOM History, 6th Edition (United States Special Operations Command 

History and Research Office, 2008), 91–96 and 121–125.

7. USSOCOM History, 129–135.; Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It 

Takes a Learning Organization – A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq (Tampa, 

FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2016).

8. Richard Newton, Tracy Moss, Charles N. Black, and Chris Phelps, “Design 

Thinking for the SOF Enterprise,” United States Special Operations Command 

White Paper, 29 January 2016, foreword.

9. Newton et al., “Design Thinking,” foreword.
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10. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (U.S. Department of Defense), 16 June 2017, 

IV-1.

11. ADP 5-0: The Operations Process (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 

accessed 12 July 2017, https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html, 1–3.

12. The concept of a design “way” is inspired by the work of Harold G. Nelson and 

Erik Stolterman, The Design Way: Intentional Change in an Unpredictable World

(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2014), 4–9.

13. Nelson and Stolterman, The Design Way, 12.

14. Kurtz and D.J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a 

Complex and Complicated World.” IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 462–483.

15. Newton et al., “Design Thinking,” 1–2.

16. “About: Campus Culture,” www.risd.edu, accessed 4 August 2017, http://www.

risd.edu/about/campus-culture. Its website states, “RISD’s culture of critique is 

based on constructive, inspirational and mutually supportive conversations, with 

students, faculty and staff interacting with openness, good faith and respect for 

differences.”

17. Nelson and Stolterman, The Design Way, 54.

18. Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions

(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 243.

19. For a popular, accessible review, see Mahzarin R. Banaji and Anthony G. Greenwald, Blind Spot: Hidden Biases of Good People, (New York: Delacorte Press, 

2013). While wildly read and cited, it is not without critics. See Thomas Bartlett, 

“Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias, Maybe Not,” The Chronicle of Higher 

Education (27 January 2017), accessed 30 June 2017, www.chronicle.com/article/

Can-We-Really-Measure-Implict/238807.

20. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 

2013), 14.

21. Ariely, Predictably Irrational, 7-14; Banaji and Greenwald, Blind Spot, 8–13.

22. Kahneman, Thinking, 25–28; Banaji and Greenwald, Blind Spot, 3–8.

23. Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking (New York: 

Little, Brown and Co., 2005), 225.

24. Kahneman, Thinking, 40.

25. Ibid., 42.

26. Ibid., 48.

27. Ibid., 65–67.

28. Ibid., 52–58; Gladwell, Blink, 52–61.

29. Ariely, Predictably Irrational, 30–34.

30. Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge: The 

MIT Press, 1998), 271–273.

31. Kahneman, Thinking, 13.
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32. Ibid., 13.

33. Ibid., 24–26.

34. Ibid., 98.

35. Ibid., 12.

36. Gladwell, Blink, 11.

37. Ibid., 15.

38. Ibid.

39. Kahneman, Thinking, 21.

40. Ibid., 13-14.

41. Ibid., 14.

42. Joel A.C. Baum and Tim J. Rowley, “Companion to Organizations: An Introduction,” Companion to Organizations (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), edited 

by Joel A.C. Baum, 4.

43. David Strang and Wesley D. Sine, “Interorganizational Institutions,” Companion 

to Organizations (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), edited by Joel A.C. Baum, 

498.

44. Gary A. Klein, Seeing What Others Don’t: The Remarkable Way We Gain Insights

(New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 151.

45. Klein, Seeing What Others Don’t, 153.

46. Ariely, Predictably Irrational, 231–238.

47. Nelson and Stolterman, The Design Way, 66–67.

48. Ibid., 63–64.

49. “Rhode Island Veterans Services Leadership Summit,” Rhode Island National 

Guard White Paper (February 2016).

50. Greg Brougham. The Cynefin Mini-Book: An Introduction to Complexity and the 

Cynefin Framework (Middletown: InfoQ.com, 2015).

51. Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 468.

52. Ibid., 473–475.

53. Ibid., 469–470.

54. The authors recognize the inherent error of this formula and beg the indulgence 

of scientifically trained readers. With the emphasis on the idea of control in 

experiments, it was deemed more useful to keep the formula as simple as possible 

as a teaching tool.

55. Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 468; Brougham, Cynefin, 

7; Bob Williams and Richard Hummelbrunner, Systems Concepts in Action: A 

Practitioner's Toolkit (Stanford: Stanford Business Books, 2009), 165–167.

56. Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 469; Brougham, Cynefin, 

7; Williams and Hummelbrunner, Systems Concepts, 167–168.
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57. Brougham, Cynefin, 30, 42–44; Williams and Hummelbrunner, Systems Concepts, 

175–176; Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 465.

58. Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 468.

59. Ibid., 475-476; Williams and Hummelbrunner, Systems Concepts, 172.

60. Donald J. Winiecki. “Rational, Natural, and Open: Organizational System 

Typologies and Their Relevance for Performance Improvement Professionals.” 

Performance Improvement 49, no. 5 (2010): 35-36; C. Jotin Khisty. “Can Wicked 

Problems Be Tackled Through Abductive Inferencing?” Journal of Urban Planning 

and Development 126, no. 3 (2000): 104–105; Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, 

Complexity and Public Policy: A New Approach to Twenty-First Century Politics, 

Policy and Society, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 23–24.

61. Paul Cairney, “Complexity Theory in Political Science and Public Policy,” Political Studies Review 10, (2012): 347–348.

62. For an excellent overview of all noted points, see Göktug Morçöl, A New Mind 

for Policy Analysis: Toward a Post-Newtonian and Postpositivist Epistemology 

and Methodology (Wesport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 11–25.

63. Gary M. Grobman, “Complexity Theory: A New Way to Look at Organizational 

Change,” Public Administration Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2005): 351–361; Antoine 

Bousquet and Simon Curtis. “Beyond Models and Metaphors: Complexity Theory, 

Systems Thinking, and International Relations.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24, no. 1 (2011): 43–47; Cairney, “Complexity Theory,” 346–351.

64. Walter Buckley, David Schwandt, and Jeffrey A. Goldstein. “Society as a Complex 

Adaptive System.” E:CO 10, no. 3, (2008): 89–90.

65. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 93–94.

66. Cairney, “Complexity Theory,” 348; see also Paul Cillers, “Knowing Complex 

Systems,” Managing Organizational Complexity: Philosophy, Theory, and Application (Greenwich: Information Age Publishing, 2005), 7–19.

67. Bousquet and Curtis, “Beyond Models,” 47.

68. Khisty, “Abductive Inferencing,” 104–105.

69. Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of 

Planning." Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155-169; Andrejs Skaburskis, “The Origin of 

‘Wicked Problems,’” Planning Theory & Practice 9, no. 2 (2008): 277–280.

70. Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 161–165; see also John Barton, John Stephens, 

and Tim Haslett. “Action Research: Its Foundations in Open Systems Thinking 

and Relationship to the Scientific Method.” Systemic Practice and Action Research 

22 (2009): 486.

71. Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 160.

72. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 89.

73. Ibid., 89; Bousquet and Curtis. “Beyond Models,” 47; Peter Winch, The Idea of a 

Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 

1990), 91.
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74. Victoria Chick and Sheila Dow, “The Meaning of Open Systems,” Journal of 

Economic Methodology, 12, no. 3 (2005): 367.

75. The debate extends back to the early years of social science, and continues to 

this day. Insightful and accessible attempts to reconcile the perspectives can 

be found with Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction 

of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 

1967) and Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory 

of Structuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). For an excellent 

overview from the International Relations perspective, see Colin Wight, Agents, 

Structures and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2006), 62–72.

76. Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957); Khisty, “Abductive 

Inferencing,” 105; Herbert A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 1983), 85.

77. Chick and Dow, “The Meaning,” 366.

78. Simon, Reason, 20–23.

79. For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) supports the U.S. Congress’s 

budget process by providing detailed statistical analysis and estimates. Yet even 

the CBO recognizes that the vagaries of politics make its predictions tentative 

at best, but it still goes through the motions. See https://www.cbo.gov/about/

processes#methodology. A Department of Defense variant of the same theme can 

be found with the Human Social Cultural Behavior Sciences initiative, which is 

heavily rooted in computational modeling for predictive analysis. See https://www.

onr.navy.mil/en/Media-Center/Fact-Sheets/Human-Social-Cultural-Behavior.

80. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Third Edition (Chicago: 

The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 138–139.

81. Kuhn, Structure, 25–29.

82. Ibid., 36–37.

83. Ibid., 64–65, 80.

84. Ibid., 10, 126.

85. Ibid., 122.

86. Ibid., 133.

87. Ibid., 111–135.

88. The belief that society’s variables can be known and revealed over time—at least 

to the degree of recognizing and predicting trends—dates back to the eighteenth 

and nineteenth centuries. See, for example, Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 

67–69.

89. Göktug Morçöl, “A New Systems Thinking: Implications of the Sciences of Complexity for Public Policy and Administration,” Public Administration Quarterly, 

vol. 29, no. 3 (2005): 312.
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90. L. Douglas Kiel, “Lessons from the Nonlinear Paradigm: Applications of the 

Theory of Dissipative Structures in the Social Sciences,” Social Science Quarterly

72, no. 3 (1991): 431–432.

91. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 83, 91.

92. Kiel, “Lessons,” 431.

93. Morçöl, A New Mind for Policy Analysis, 61-64; Geyer and Rihani, Complexity 

and Public Policy, 12–13; “Enlightenment” and “Enlightenment Philosophy,” 

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Second Edition, edited by Ted Honderich, 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 252–254.

94. Morçöl, A New Mind for Policy Analysis, 62; Geyer and Rihani, Complexity and 

Public Policy, 13.

95. David Hume and John Stuart Mills feature prominently in this regard (see Winch, 

The Idea of a Social Science). Others, notably Auguste Comte believed so fervently 

in this perspective he created his own cult built on the faith of scientific prediction (see “Comte, Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier,” and “Positivism,” The 

Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 153, 742–743).

96. For example, George C. Stone, “John Dewey’s Concept of Social Science as Social 

Inquiry,” International Social Science Review, 69 (1994); Greg Seals, “Conceptualizing Teaching as Science: John Dewey in Dialogue with the National Research 

Council,” Educational Theory, 54, no. 1 (2004), 1–26.

97. “Social Science, Philosophy of,” The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 878-879.

98. Geyer and Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy, 24–25.

99. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 1-3, 72; Morçöl, A New Mind for Policy 

Analysis, 65–77; Geyer and Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy, 13–24.

100. For example, King, Keohane, and Verba acknowledge in their widely used research 

primer the limits of causal inference in social sciences, but still advocate for the 

structured application of scientific research methods. Gary King, Robert Keohane, 

and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 

Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 6-7. See also Neil E. 

Harrison, “Thinking About the World We Make,” Complexity in World Politics: 

Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm, Neil E. Harrison, ed. (Albany: State 

University of New York Press, 2006), 12.

101. Barton, Stephens, and Haslett. “Action Research,” 478; Geyer and Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy, 13–14.

102. Morçöl, A New Mind for Policy Analysis, 11.

103. Cairney, “Complexity Theory,” 352.

104. Barton, Stephens, and Haslett. “Action Research,” 478.

105. Ibid., 484.

106. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 7.

107. Ibid., 79.

108. Ibid., 6.
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109. Ibid., 10; Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 83–86.

110. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 43.

111. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 85–86.

112. Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, All the Devils are Here: The Hidden History of 

the Financial Crisis (New York: Penguin, 2011), 52-58; The Financial Crisis Inquiry 

Report, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 2011), 44. The FCIC writes: “The increasing dependence on 

mathematics let the quants create more complex products and let their managers say, and maybe even believe, that they could better manage those products’ 

risk ... These models purported to predict with at least 95% certainty how much 

a firm could lose if market prices changed. But models relied on assumptions 

based on limited historical data; for mortgage-backed securities, the models 

would turn out to be woefully inadequate. And modeling human behavior was 

different from the problems the quants had addressed in graduate school. ‘It’s 

not like trying to shoot a rocket to the moon where you know the law of gravity,’ Emanuel Derman, a Columbia University finance professor who worked at 

Goldman Sachs for 17 years, told the Commission. ‘The way people feel about 

gravity on a given day isn’t going to affect the way the rocket behaves.’”

113. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 423.

114. Ibid., 102.

115. Timothy Howard, The Mortgage Wars: Inside Fannie Mae, Big-Money Politics, 

and the Collapse of the American Dream (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 

2014), 65–68.

116. McLean and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, 18–19, 46.

117. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 68–72.

118. Ibid., 43–51.

119. McLean and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, 285–291, 296–297; The Financial 

Crisis Inquiry Report, 118–122. The FCIC notes, “Moody’s did not, however, sufficiently account for the deteriorating quality of the loans being securitized. Fons 

described this problem to the FCIC: ‘I sat on this high level Structured Credit 

committee, which you’d think would be dealing with such issues [of declining 

mortgage-underwriting standards], and never once was it raised to this group 

or put on our agenda that the decline in quality that was going into pools, the 

impact possibly on ratings, other things ... We talked about everything but, you 

know, the elephant sitting on the table.’”

120. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 50, 65, 123; McLean and Nocera, All the 

Devils Are Here, 342–357.

121. Joel B. Pollak and Larry Schweikart, How Trump Won: The Inside Story of a 

Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2017), 11, 198.

122. Pollak and Schweikart, How Trump Won, 33–43.

123. Ibid., 2-3, 192–193.
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124. Kiel, “Lessons,” 435; David Colanders and Roland Kupers, Complexity and the 

Art of Public Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 122–123.

125. Kiel, “Lessons,” 435.

126. Emilian Kavalski, “The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complex International 

Relations Theory: Notes on the Application of Complexity Theory to the Study of 

International Life,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 3 (2007): 

436.

127. Williams and Hummelbrunner, Systems Concepts, 3.

128. Kuhn, Structure, 37.

129. Morçöl, “A New Systems Thinking,” 309.

130. Stanley McChrystal, Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell, Team 

of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York: Portfolio/

Penguin, 2015), 17–21, 24–26.

131. McChrystal et al, Team of Teams, 20.

132. Ibid., 230.

133. Morçöl, “A New Systems Thinking,” 314.

134. Ibid., 314.

135. Some international relations scholars actually describe the Cold War era as 

the aberration in history. Kavalski, “The Fifth Debate,” 443. See also Harrison, 

“Thinking About the World We Make,” 1.

136. Kavalski, “The Fifth Debate,” 435.

137. Ibid.

138. Graham Taylor, The New Political Sociology: Power, Ideology and Identity in an 

Age of Complexity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 120.

139. Reuben Ablowitz with Jeffrey Goldstein, “The Theory of Emergence.” E:CO 12, 

no. 3, (2010), 140–141.

140. Ablowitz and Goldstein, “Emergence,” 142.

141. Ibid., 143.

142. Kari Theurer, “Complexity-Based Theories of Emergence: Criticisms and Constraints.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28, no. 3 (2014): 280.

143. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 90.

144. Ibid., 91.

145. Ibid., 92.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid.
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150. Herbert Simon with Paul Cillers, “The Architecture of Complexity.” eds. Kurt A. 

Richardson, David Snowden, Peter M. Allen, and Jeffrey A. Goldstein, (Mansfield: 

ISCE Publishing, 2006), 502–507.

151. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 93.

152. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 54, 119–120.

153. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 93.

154. Ibid., 94.

155. Agent-based modeling often refers to individuals as “cells” and utilize rule matrices to demonstrate potential emergent patterns. See Ruth Lane, The Complexity of 

Self Government: Politics from the Bottom Up (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2017), 42.

156. Kiel, “Lessons,” 436.

157. Joint Publication 5-0, III-22–25.

158. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder (New York: 

Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2014), 134–137.

159. Jacque Wilson, “Viagra: The Little Blue Pill that Could,” www.cnn.com, 27 

March 2013, accessed 5 May 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/27/health/

viagra-anniversary-timeline/.

160. Kiel, “Lessons,” 437.

161. Morçöl, A New Mind for Policy Analysis, 246–252.

162. John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past 

(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), 76–77.

163. Gaddis, 56.

164. Khisty, “Abductive Inferencing,” 112.

165. Ibid., 112.

166. Ibid., 114.

167. Robert T. Foley, “The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan,” War in History, 10, no. 2, 

(2003).

168. Taleb, AntiFragile, 170–171.

169. Harrison, “Thinking About the World We Make,” 9.

170. Morçöl, A New Mind for Policy Analysis, 25.

171. Kavalski, “The Fifth Debate,” 437.

172. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 86.

173. Kuhn, Structure, 109.

174. PMESII-PT: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, 

Physical Environment, Time.

175. Kuhn, Structure, 27.
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176. Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 224; Harrison, “Thinking About the World We 

Make,” 7.

177. “Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present,” United Nations, accessed 

10 July 2017, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-unitednations-membership-1945-present/index.html.

178. Harrison, “Thinking About the World We Make,” 7.

179. Ibid., 8-9.

180. Wight, Agents, 222.

181. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 93.

182. Harrison, “Thinking About the World We Make,” 9.

183. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 96.

184. Harrison, “Thinking About the World We Make,” 5.

185. Kiel, “Lessons,” 437.

186. Lane, The Complexity of Self Government, 22.

187. Wight, Agents, 219. Wight describes the systems of systems: “A state can be considered a structuratum constituted of many structured organisational entities 

and institutions, which are themselves structured in certain ways. That is to say 

that the organisations and institutions which (in part) constitute the state stand 

in complex relations, hence are structured into a certain form. The entities that 

stand in these relations are ontologically varied and encompass both material and 

social aspects of existence. Hence one could identify economic organisations and 

institutions, political organisations and institutions, ideological organisations 

and institutions, cultural organisations and institutions, and so on.”

188. Lane, The Complexity of Self Government, 13.

189. Ibid., 52.

190. Charles Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 91.

191. Lane, The Complexity of Self Government, 62.

192. Buckley, Schwandt, and Goldstein, “Society,” 96.

193. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 24.

194. Cairney, “Complexity Theory,” 352.

195. Wight, Agents, 224.

196. Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks, 106.

197. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 58.

198. Ibid., 53.

199. Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks, 153; see also for the popularized 

version Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things can Make a Big 

Difference (New York: Back Bay Books, 2002).
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200. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 54.

201. Kiel, “Lessons,” 438–439.

202. Springfield Police Department C3 Policing, 2014, accessed 13 July 2017, https://

www.springfield-ma.gov/police/.

203. Khanna, Connectography, 56.

204. Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 11–25.

205. Krasner, Sovereignty, 4–5.

206. Ibid., 15.

207. Joy Moncrieffe, Relational Accountability: Complexities of Structural Injustice

(New York: Zed Books, 2011), 4.

208. Simon, Reason, 90.

209. Earnest and Rosenau, “Signifying Nothing?” 152–153.

210. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 54.

211. Ibid., 43.

212. Parag Khanna, Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization (New 

York: Random House, 2016), 64.

213. Neil E. Harrison, “Complex Systems in the Practice of World Politics,” Complexity 

in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm, Neil E. Harrison, 

ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 188.

214. Harrison, “Complex Systems,” 188–189; Moncrieffe, Relational Accountability, 

20.

215. Moncrieffe, Relational Accountability, 43.

216. Ibid., 7.

217. Ibid., 41.

218. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 48.

219. Ibid., 46.

220. Ibid., 28.

221. Ibid., 49.

222. Harrison, “Thinking About the World We Make,”11.

223. Morçöl, A New Mind for Policy Analysis, 177.

224. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 49.

225. Ibid., 26–27.

226. Ibid., 48.

227. Kiel, “Lessons,” 438.

228. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991), 4–5.

229. Ibid., 6.
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230. Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” The Invention of Tradition, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1995), 1–14.

231. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 11–12.

232. Ibid., 7.

233. Ibid., 33–46.

234. Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks, 18.

235. Ibid., 18–20.

236. Khanna, Connectography, 44; Valentine Moghadam, Globalization and Social 

Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement (Rowman & 

Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Lanham, 2013), 208.

237. Khanna, Connectography, 30-31.; Moghadam, Globalization and Social Movements, 8–11.

238. Ibid., 25.

239. Ibid., 31.

240. Ed Husain, The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside 

and Why I Left (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 142, 277.

241. Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (New York: Zone 

Books, 1997), 14.

242. Taylor, The New Political Sociology, 112.

243. Ibid., 118.

244. Ibid., 121.

245. Ibid., 120.

246. For example, reformed Islamist Ed Husain argues that Islamist organizations of 

which he was a member utilized tactics developed by radical leftist organizations 

and adapted for Islamist purposes. Husain, The Islamist, 94–95, 131, and 163–164; 

see also Maghadam who notes Syrian philosopher Sadik al-Azm’s analysis of 

radical Islamists adopting the action directe militant tactics of the extreme Left 

in 1970s Europe, Moghadam, Globalization and Social Movements, 128–130.

247. Khanna, Connectography, xxv.

248. Ibid., xvi-xvii.

249. Ibid., xvii, 21.

250. Ibid., 28.

251. Ibid., 49–51.

252. Ibid., xvi, xvii.

253. Ibid., xxii.

254. Ibid., 15.

255. Ibid., xx-xxi, 14.

256. Ibid., xxiv.
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257. Ibid., 19.

258. Ibid., 18.

259. Ibid., 18–19.

260. Colanders and Kupers, Complexity, 43.

261. Moncrieffe, Relational Accountability, 45.

262. Nelson and Stolterman, The Design Way, 141–146.

263. “Rhode Island Veterans Services Leadership Summit II – Problem Statement,” 

Rhode Island National Guard White Paper (May 2016).

264. “Rhode Island Veterans Services Leadership Summit II – A Proposed Desired 

Future State,” Rhode Island National Guard White Paper (May 2016).

265. “(U) Commander’s Vision Framework,” SOCNORTH White Paper (December 

2016).

266. Karl Popper, Popper Selections, edited David Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1934), foreword.

267. “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas III, U.S. Army Commander United 

States Special Operations Command before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” www.ussocom.

mil (2 May 2017), accessed 21 July 2017, http://www.socom.mil/Pages/posturestatement-hasc.aspx.

268. Nelson and Stolterman, The Design Way, 76.

269. Russell Ackoff, “A Major Mistake that Managers Make,” Handbook of Business 

Strategy, 7, no. 1 (2006), 225; for a publicly available copy see also: http://www.

acasa.upenn.edu/A_MAJOR_MISTAKE.pdf, 2.

270. Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks, 99–100.

271. Russell Ackoff, The Art of Problem Solving: Accompanied by Ackoff’s Fables (New 

York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987), 86.