PIN : 078416–000
American

Military

Heritage

General William W. Hartzog

Military History Offi ce

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

and

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2006
Foreword

To the 2001 Edition

 The Center of Military History is pleased to join the Training and Doctrine Command in reprinting General William W. Hartzog’s American Military 

Heritage. General Hartzog originally wrote this book almost thirty years ago, 

while he was an instructor at West Point. In 1998, TRADOC republished it 

to provide a reference that could help drill instructors and other Army leaders 

instill an appreciation for the lore and traditions that make up the Army’s rich 

heritage. American Military Heritage has been so well received that TRADOC 

has agreed to reprint it in cooperation with the Center to make it available to the 

Army as a whole. The reappearance of this volume is particularly appropriate 

this year, as the Army celebrates its 225th birthday.

 American Military Heritage is not offi cial history, per se. It differs 

from the lengthy, detailed, heavily documented offi cial volumes that the 

Center publishes on generally more specifi c subjects. American Military 

Heritage does present, in a readable and attractive format, stories, individual 

experiences, and traditions from which the Army has drawn inspiration over 

its long and proud history. In these pages, you can readily learn about such 

formative Army experiences as Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and D-Day; about 

such prominent Army heroes as George Washington, Elijah Churchill, Ulysses 

S. Grant, William H. Carney, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Audie Murphy; and 

about numerous details concerning Army daily life, uniforms, and equipment. 

 We treasure our Army’s heritage as we prepare to meet the challenges 

of the twenty-fi rst century. We trust that you will fi nd this book helpful in your 

work and that it will be a source of pride and inspiration as we march into the 

future of our Army and our nation.

Washington, D.C. JOHN S. BROWN

11 September 2000 Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History

First Printed 1998—CMH Pub 69–6–1
Foreword

 The United States has a proud heritage. Our history and the events that 

have molded our democratic way of life are important touchstones for all of us 

as citizens. Similarly, our military history contains the proud heritage of all of 

the men and women who have ever, or will ever, wear a uniform.

 I wrote much of this many years ago while I was an instructor at West 

Point. I wrote it because, while many books presented American military history, I found no one-volume source for information on those key bits of history 

that have become our military heritage. The same was true as we looked for 

ways to reemphasize the Army’s heritage now, at the close of the century. 

I remembered this collection of materials, and thought it might have some 

value. I asked that it be revised, expanded and published for distribution to 

drill sergeants and new second lieutenants, those who will be in the forefront 

of learning and responsible for passing on the Army’s proud past. 

 Our history and our heritage form a big part of who we are as individuals and as an organization. Not every story in this book is a positive one. 

But the Army learns from its mistakes as well as from its successes, and all of 

those events become part of our heritage.

 Many people have participated in this revision, and they are named 

in a separate acknowledgment page. My thanks to BG Jack Mountcastle and 

the many talented people at the Center of Military History. It is a much better 

work for their efforts. Profound thanks to Mr. Steve Gammons, who painstakingly formatted the manuscript into the computer; Dr. Bob Wright, LTC (Ret) 

Adrian Traas, Mr. Ted Ballard, Dr. Graham Cosmas, Dr. Ed Raines, Dr. Clay 

Laurie, Mr. Steve Gammons, Mr. Charles Anderson, Dr. Bill Hammond, Dr. 

Dave Hogan, LTC Jim Carafano, and Mr. Ned Bedessem for their revisions 

and additions; Mr. Walt Bradford, Mr. Jim Speraw, Mr. John Elsberg, Mr. Bill 

Epley, Ms. Marylou Gjernes, Dr. Terry Gough, Mr. Steve Hardyman, SGT 

Brent Holmes, COL Clyde Jonas, Mr. Jim Knight, SGT Jeffrey Manuszak, 

and Mr. Joe Webb for their advice and suggestions throughout the course of 

the work. Thanks also to Ms Diane Cline of the Institute of Heraldry for her 

recommendations on awards.

 I initially handed this work to Dr. Jim Stensvaag, the TRADOC Chief 

Historian, who took over the overall supervision of the project. He has succeeded 

in adeptly managing the many aspects of this work. Out of the TRADOC Military 

History Offi ce, Dr. Charlie Cureton insured that representations of uniforms 

were the best and most accurate. Dr. Jack Atwater at the Ordnance Museum at 

Aberdeen Proving Ground did the same for ordnance. Dr. Sue Canedy, Commander’s Planning Group, edited and tuned the text with an ear for the primary 

author’s voice. Mr. Ray Reuter, Army Training Support Center, took all of the 

parts and put them together into an outstanding design. If this source book is 

useful, it is because of the teamwork demonstrated by each of these members 

of the Total Army, along with many others unnamed.

June 1998 WILLIAM W. HARTZOG
iv

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii

Chapter 1. The Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Section I European Heritage and Early Colonization . . . . . . . .1

 Section II Weapons and Tactics Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

 Section III Uniform Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

 Section IV The Colonial Militia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

 Section V Braddock’s Defeat, 9 July 1755 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

 Section VI Notes on Rogers’ Rangers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Chapter 2. The American Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Section I Why the Revolution?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

 Section II The Will to Fight: Bunker Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

 Section III Building an Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

 Section IV Army Life, 1783–1800 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

 Section V Notes on Army Uniforms of the

 Revolutionary Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

 Section VI Notes On Weapons And Tactics 

 (Revolutionary Era) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

 Section VII Notes on Baron Friedrich Wilhelm

 Von Steuben . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

 Section VIII Notes on George Washington (1732–1799) . . . . .27

 Section IX Elijah Churchill and William Brown . . . . . . . . . . .30

 Section X Notes on the Founding of West Point . . . . . . . . . . .32

Chapter 3. The War of 1812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Section I The Complexion of the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

 Section II Notes on Zachary Taylor (1784–1850) . . . . . . . . . .34

 Section III Notes on Winfi eld Scott (1786–1866) . . . . . . . . . .35

 Section IV Notes on Uniforms 1810-1840 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

 Section V Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

 Section VI The Battle of New Orleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

Chapter 4. Westward Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

Section I The “Thirty Year Peace”and National

 Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

 Section II Westward Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

 Section III The Seminole Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

 Section IV Notes on Sylvanus Thayer and the 

 United States Military Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

 Section V Notes on John C. Calhoun and the 

 War Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
v

 Section VI The Army’s Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

 Section VII The Alamo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

Chapter 5. The Mexican War and After . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

Section I Mexican War and Postwar Overview . . . . . . . . . . . .55

 Section II Notes on the Battles of Palo Alto and

 Resaca De La Palma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

 Section III Notes on the Battle of Vera Cruz . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

 Section IV Notes on Uniforms of the Mexican War . . . . . . . .64

 Section V Scott and Taylor: A Contrast in Generalship . . . . . .66

 Section VI Notes on Weapons of the Mexican War Era . . . . . .67

Chapter 6. The Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

Section I Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

 Section II Notes on the Presidents Davis and Lincoln . . . . . . .74

 Section III Notes on the Commanders Lee and Grant . . . . . . .76

 Section IV NCO Heroes of the Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

 Section V Notes on Uniforms of the Civil War Era . . . . . . . . .80

 Section VI Notes on Weapons and Ordnance of the

 Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

 Section VII Notes on Insignia, Traditions and

 Decorations of the Civil War Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85

 Section VIII Gettysburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86

Chapter 7. The Army Develops in the Post Civil War and 

Spanish-American War Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94

Section I The Army’s Post-War Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94

 Section II Notes on the Buffalo Soldiers in the

 Indian Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

 Section III Notes on Family and Social Life

 (1870-1900) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98

 Section IV Notes on Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100

 Section V Notes on Weapons and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102

Section VI Notes on Spanish-American War

 Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104

 Section VII Notes on the Contributions of Elihu Root

 to the U. S. Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106

Section VIII The Philippines, 1898–1902 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108

Chapter 8. World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109

Section I The United States Army Enters the 

 Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109

 Section II Before the War, 1900–1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109

 Section III Early Army Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
vi

 Section IV The Panama Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

 Section V Pancho Villa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

 Section VI “The War To End All Wars” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

 Section VII Notes on Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

 Section VIII Notes on Awards and Decorations . . . . . . . . . . .121

 Section IX Notes on Weapons and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124

 Section X Notes on Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135

 Section XI Notes on General of the Armies 

 John J. Pershing and Staff Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136

 Section XII Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964 . . . . . . . . . . . .138

 Section XIII The Trench Soldier, A Profi le . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141

 Section XIV NCO Heroes of World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146

Chapter 9. World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148

Section I The World, A Battleground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148

 Section II Normandy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149

 Section III The Pacifi c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154

 Section IV Notes on Awards and Decorations . . . . . . . . . . . .155

 Section V Notes on Weapons and

 Technical Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159

 Section VI Notes on Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163

 Section VII Notes on General of the Army 

 George C. Marshall, 1880–1959 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164

 Section VIII Notes on General George S. Patton, Jr.,

 1885–1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165

 Section IX Notes on Dwight D. Eisenhower and 

 His Generalship During World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167

Section X Audie Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169

 Section XI Vernon J. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170

Chapter 10. Post-WW II and the Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . .171

 Section I Unrest and Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171

 Section II Notes on Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174

 Section III Notes on the U.S. Army Regimental System . . . .175

 Section IV Notes on Personal Services and Army Life,

 Circa 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177

 Section V Notes on Maxwell D. Taylor (1901–1987) . . . . . .179

 Section VI Notes on General Matthew B. Ridgway:

 A Study in Applied Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .180

 Section VII A Night with Easy Company. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182

Chapter 11. The Cold War Era: The Middle Years,

 1953–1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185
vii

 Section I International Tension and American

 National Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185

 Section II The Delicate Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .188

 Section III The Role of the Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191

Section IV Notes on Weapons and Equipment Developments 195

 Section V Notes on Uniforms of the Cold War Era . . . . . . . .197

 Section VI Notes on General Lyman L. Lemnitzer . . . . . . . .199

 Section VII Notes on Sergeant Elvis Aron Presley . . . . . . . .201

Chapter 12. The Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202

Section I A New Kind of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202

 Section II Ambush Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .204

 Section III Heroes of the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206

 Section IV Weapons and Equipment Development . . . . . . . .209

 Section V Notes on Awards of the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . .213

 Section VI Notes on Uniforms of the Vietnam War Era . . . .213

Chapter 13. The Post Vietnam Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214

Section I Reforming the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214

 Section II Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215

 Section III General Creighton W. Abrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .217

 Section IV General William E. Depuy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219

 Section V Notes on Weapons Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220

 Section VI Notes on Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .223

Chapter 14. The Transformed Army: Contingency and

 Combat After Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225

Section I Intervention in Grenada: Operation Urgent Fury . .225

 Section II Operation Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227

 Section III The Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229

 Section IV Mission to Somalia–Living the Creed . . . . . . . . .241

 Section V Uphold Democracy–The Joint Team in Action . . .243

 Section VI Operations in Bosnia–Trained and Ready . . . . . .244

 Section VII Notes on Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .246

 Section VIII Notes on Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247

Chapter 15. America’s Army after the Cold War 1991 and

 Into the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .249

Section I A Decade of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .249

Section II Reductions in the Post Cold War Army . . . . . . . .249

 Section III Doctrinal and Cultural Change in the

 Post Cold War Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .250

 Section IV Women in America’s Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .251
viii

 Section V Disaster on the Green Ramp–Taking Care

 of America’s Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .252

 Section VI Army Values–A Matter of Dignity and Respect . .252

 Section VII One Team–One Fight–One Future

 The Total Army and Ice Storm 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253

 Section XI Notes on Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255

 Section XII An Army on the Move – Shape,

 Respond, and Prepare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .256

 Postscript: Looking Into the Future From 1998 . . . . . . . . . . .257

Appendix A. The Medal Of Honor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .259

Appendix B. United States Army Commanding Generals, Chiefs of 

Staff, Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army . . . . . .263

Appendix C. Military Music . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267

Appendix D. The American Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .271

Appendix E. Principal Wars in which the United States

 Participated/U.S. Military Personnel Serving

 and Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .273

Appendix F. Worldwide U.S. Active Duty Military Deaths

 Selected Military Operations Since 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .275

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276
1

American Military Heritage

1

The Beginnings

Section I

European Heritage and Early Colonization

The United States Army, like Alex Haley, has roots. Only when soldiers 

realize that the Army and its institutions began as the British empire 

expanded into the New World during the seventeenth and eighteenth 

centuries, will they begin to understand their heritage as fi ghting men and 

fi nd the guide to behavior as defenders of the Constitution. Our military 

force started to take form fi rst when colonists fought for the mother country, 

and grew when the colonists’ desire for control over their own lives required 

them to fi ght for their independence from the mother country. The military 

system they created combined several European military traditions and 

modifi ed them to fi t a unique American environment, much the way our 

laws, morals, and other institutions are one-of-a-kind and still the children 

of older cultures. In the two centuries preceding the American Revolution, 

Great Britain, France and Spain each made some efforts toward colonization along the eastern sector of the North American continent. Britain 

had colonized the eastern seaboard from Maine to Georgia; France held 

Canada and Louisiana, and was attempting to expand into the Great Lakes 

area and along the Mississippi Valley; Spain held Florida and the Southwest.

Colonial North America

0 100 200 300 400

Miles

Appalacian Mts

Halifax

Port

Royal

Quebec

Montreal

Boston Albany

New York

Philadelphia

Jamestown (site)

Charleston

New Orleans

MD

PA

CT RI

MA

NH

NY

VA

NC

SC

GA

NJ

DE

C a n a d a

Lake 

Superior

Lake

Huron Lake Michigan

Lake Erie

Lake Ontario Lake

Champlain

A t l a n t i c

O c e a n 

St. Lawrence R.

Ohio R.

Mississippi R.

Ft. Duquesne (Ft. Pitt)

ME (Part of MA)
2

American Military Heritage

During the period from 1689 to 1763, the powers of Europe engaged in four 

wars. Each of these wars had a counterpart confl ict in the New World colonies, 

where both sides sought the allegiance of the Indian tribes. The last of these 

wars, known in the colonies as the French and Indian War, was, at its root, 

a struggle for the control of the North American continent. Although many 

small-scale, unrelated military efforts had been undertaken by the British 

colonists in defense of their holdings, they responded to the French invasion of 

the Ohio Valley in the early 1750s by generating major fi ghting forces. These 

forces are signifi cant to any student of heritage, for their formation was a successful attempt to merge contemporary European military techniques with the 

inherent restrictions of the thickly forested “battlefi elds” of the New World. 

This merger was not a smooth one nor was it accomplished without setbacks 

on the part of the British. (See Section V, Chapter 1.) The colonial warriors of 

the French and Indian War are often overlooked as a fi ghting force, for they 

served years before the colonies sought their independence. One can fi nd no 

stronger link, however, between the ancient European man-at-arms and the 

American soldier than the men who stood with Braddock or patrolled with 

Robert Rogers. Their efforts are outlined in the following chronology:

1754

 Jan 10 Detachment sent by the Ohio Company to build

 fort at junction of Monongahela and Allegeny 

 Rivers.

 April 17 French drive out Ensign Edward Ward’s

 detachment from the forks of the Ohio and

 rename the post Fort Duquesne. 

 July 3 MAJ George Washington surrenders, under 

 great odds, to French at Fort Necessity.

1755

 March 

 April Braddock plans four-fold attack on French.
3

American Military Heritage

 June Braddock cuts road through forest.

 July 9 Braddock’s disaster at Fort Duquesne.

1756

 May 17 Great Britain declares war on France.

 Aug 14 Ft. Oswego destroyed by French.

1757

 Aug 10 Fort William Henry captured by French.

1758

 July 8 Battle of Ticonderoga — British defeated by 

 French under Lord Montcalm.

 July 27 Louisburg falls to British.

 Nov 25 Fort Duquesne retaken by British and renamed 

 Fort Pitt.

1759

 July 25 Fort Niagara captured by British.

 Sep 13 Battle on Plains of Abraham overlooking 

 Quebec.

1763

 Feb 10 Treaty of Paris formally ends Seven Years War.

The New Jersey 

Regiment (Jersey 

Blues), 1755–1764
4

American Military Heritage

Section II

Weapons and Tactics Notes

1500 TO 1600

Technological developments of the three-century period extending roughly from 

1500 to 1800 focused mainly on the refi nement of basic gunpowder weapons. 

Tactics changed as armies learned better ways to employ the new weapons.

GROUP WEAPONS

Gun Carriages: Marked beginnings of fi eld artillery, since cannon mounted 

on carriages could be moved easier.

Iron Shot: Displaced stone shot; 

construction of cannon strengthened; 

made mostly of cast iron and brass.

Ship of War: Became primary 

fi ghting vessel, displacing galley; 

remained supreme for about three 

hundred years; principal types were 

the ship of the line and frigate (later 

roughly equivalent to the modern 

battleship and cruiser).

INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

Musket: A modifi cation of the arquebus, but originally larger and heavier; 

fi red from a rest. (The term musket is generally — and somewhat incorrectly 

— applied to all infantry shoulder 

fi rearms before the rifl e, )

Wheellock: Improved fi ring device 

for arquebus and musket, eliminating need for lighted match; ignition 

results from sparks caused by friction. 

Defensive body armor declined as 

small arms and cannon became more 

effective. 
5

American Military Heritage

1600 TO 1700

GROUP WEAPONS

Mobile Field Artillery: Improvements introduced by Gustavus Adolphus; 

weapons lighter, simpler, standardized in size and type; used aggressively in 

coordination with infantry and cavalry.

Solid Shot: Used in all cannon; basis for establishing bore 

size. Example — a 4-lb cannon 

with a three-inch bore fi red a 4-lb 

solid shot, 2.9 inches in diameter. 

Solid shot were used at long ranges 

against fortifi cations and troop formations; when fi red at ships, they were 

occasionally heated to cause fi res or ignite powder stores.

Hollow Shot: Precursor of shell; existed in sixteenth century, but comes 

into general use in seventeenth century. Other types of scatter-effect 

projectiles coming into common 

use: canister (also called case shot), 

in which metal balls were propelled 

from gun in can or case; in the case 

of grape shot, similar balls or pellets 

were propelled uncased, like modern 

shotgun pellets.

INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

LIGht Musket: Improvement introduced by Gustavus Adolphus; no need for 

a musket rest; fi red from shoulder like arquebus.

Grenades: Soldiers throwing these were called grenadiers. With musket 

improvements, grenades were little used for more than a century until high 

explosives made them really effective.

Flintlock: Introduced toward the end of the seventeenth century; increased 

reliability of the musket. Famous “Brown Bess” of the British Army from about 

1700 to 1850 was a fl intlock musket. Relatively accurate only up to 100 meters. 
6

American Military Heritage

Carried by British soldiers for over 100 years (1715–1835). During that 

time, the barrel length and weight were greatly reduced. Effi cient soldiers, 

fi ring without commands, could load and fi re four rounds per minute for a 

brief period.

LINEAR TACTICS AND SIEGE WARFARE

The linear tactics developed on European battlefi elds in the seventeenth and 

eighteenth centuries made sense when you remember that they took advantage 

of the weapons and the soldiers’ mobility as it existed. Each battle was a highly 

structured event in which troops marched onto the battlefi eld in a column and 

then deployed into lines, three or more ranks deep. The troops stood shoulder to 

shoulder and fi red massed volleys at their enemy. Soldiers received little or no 

training in marksmanship because the smoothbore fl intlock musket was not an 

individual weapon like a modern rifl e. It was a crew-served weapon system — 

the ‘weapon’ was actually an entire platoon fi ring in unison as a giant shotgun.

Battles took place only after extended maneuvering as each side tried to gain 

critical terrain and place the opposing force at a disadvantage. The commander 

put his artillery along the main battle line, his cavalry on the fl anks or in the 

rear and a reserve force behind the cavalry. When the battle itself began, the 

formations would move to within 50 or 100 meters of each other and then 

fi re volleys. The exchange would continue until one side or the other could 

carry the fi eld with a bayonet charge. At this point, the victorious commander 

could pursue the beaten foe or regroup his attacking forces for other missions.
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American Military Heritage

Not all eighteenth century warfare took place on open fi elds. A French engineer, 

Sabastian le Prestre, Marquis de Vauban, generated a set of formal concepts to 

govern both fortress construction and the attack and defense of such fortresses. 

Vauban developed a star-shaped fortress design, and his method of attacking 

such forts was known as “approach by parallel lines.”

Under Vauban’s system, sappers constructed the fi rst parallel about 600 meters 

from the fortress walls. They then dug zig-zag approach trenches forward 

about 200 meters to points from which they constructed a second parallel. By 

the same process, they dug a third parallel. Infantry and siege artillery moved 

forward as each parallel was completed until, in the third, they were beneath 

the outer wall of the fortress. From this vantage point, the artillery could 

breach the main wall and the infantry could take the fortress by storm. At this 

juncture, the fortress commander usually surrendered.

Section III

Uniform Notes

The following order, now preserved in the Emmett Collection of the New 

York Public Library, describes in detail the arms and accouterments of the 

day. Note that the militiamen being called to service are expected to bear the 

total expense of their own armaments.

To Shrimpton Hutchinson Esq.

 SIR

You are hereby ordered and directed, to 

compleat yourself with ARMS and Accourterments, by the 12th instant, upon failure thereof, 

you are liable to a FINE of THREE POUNDS; 

and for every Sixty Days after, a FINE OF SIX 

POUNDS, agreeable to law. 

Articles of equipment,

 A good Fire arm, with a Steel or Iron 

Ram-Rod, and a Spring to retain the same, a 

Worm, Priming wire and brush, and a Bayonet 

fi tted to your gun, a Scabbard and belt therefor, and a cutting Sword, or a Tomahawk or 

hatchet, a Pouch containing a cartridge box, 

that will hold fi fteen Rounds of Cartridges at 

least, a hundred buckshot, a jack knife and 

Tow for wadding, six Flints, one pound of 

powder, forty Leaden Balls fi tted to your gun, 

a knapsack and Blanket, a canteen or Wooden 

Bottle suffi cient to hold one Quart.
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American Military Heritage

Until the early stages of the Revolution, the basic uniform of the militiamen 

was simply the civilian dress in which he conducted his everyday activities. 

The sketch on the previous page depicts an example of the type of hunting 

dress worn by the colonial militia during the mid-18th century.

Section IV

The Colonial Militia

Great Britain, the source of most of the original settlers of the thirteen colonies, 

naturally exerted the fi rst infl uence on American institutions, including the military. One of the most fundamental notions incorporated by the colonists from 

English traditions was the belief that an individual who benefi ted from membership in a society had an obligation to use his talents and resources for the good of 

the society at large. In the military realm, this meant that every free, able-bodied 

male was required to own weapons and, when necessary, offer his services under 

local leaders to defend the community. Thus, everyone participated in the defense 

of a society in proportion to the benefi ts received from it.

Geography and political 

events in Britain during the 

seventeenth century shaped 

British military institutions 

along lines quite different 

from those in other European countries. Because 

Britain was an island, the 

navy, rather than the army, 

served as the fi rst line of 

defense. Britain thus did 

not need as large an army 

to defend the homeland; it 

could rely more on loosely-controlled militia and 

raise temporary armies 

of paid soldiers when it 

became necessary to send 

expeditionary forces to 

foreign shores. This arrangement pleased most 

Britons, since it was inexpensive and avoided major disruptions of everyday life. By the 1570s, the 

emerging militia effectively consisted of two categories. Most individuals 

carried out their lives in the “common militia” knowing that they had to serve 

only in a true crisis, when they would join a general mobilization. A far smaller 
9

American Military Heritage

group of volunteers formed “trained bands,” which held periodic musters or 

meetings to practice military skills. 

The struggle for power between the monarchy and the elected representatives 

in Parliament during the seventeenth century also had a major effect on British military institutions. During the English Civil War of the 1640s, Oliver 

Cromwell’s armed dictatorship, and the Restoration, relatively large armies 

caused extensive economic disruption and occasionally terrorized civilians. 

When the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 fi nally settled the issue in favor of 

a monarchy that had to share power with Parliament, the latter took steps to 

ensure that the king could not raise and maintain his own private army by 

requiring annual Parliamentary authorization for such a force. It also provided 

for a right to maintain arms by citizens outside the “standing army.”

When Englishmen settled 

in the New World, they 

brought the militia institution with them. None of the 

early colonies could afford 

the luxury of exempting 

most of the male population 

from training requirements. 

Instead, they expanded the 

trained band concept to 

include all settlers. Several 

regional patterns emerged 

fairly quickly. In the South, 

where the plantation economy caused dispersion of 

settlement, the settlers from 

a broad area formed a company, with each county 

establishing a regiment 

to control and administer 

the companies. In New 

England, religion and a 

different economy resulted 

in a town-based residential system. Each town formed one or more militia 

companies as soon as possible after organizing its local government; in areas 

of more dense population, the colonists formed more than one regiment in 

each county. Pennsylvania was the exception to the general pattern. Settled 

by pacifi sts, it did not establish a mandatory militia until 1777.

By the eighteenth century, the colonial militia showed several differences from 

the trained bands of Britain. The biggest difference lay in the fact that few free 
10

American Military Heritage

adult Americans were exempted by law from actual training. When war erupted 

between settlers and local Indians in Virginia and New England, militiamen 

actually had to fi ght in defense of their homes. When the colonists launched 

offensive operations against the tribes in retaliation, they used temporary detachments to avoid shutting down the economy, which would have happened 

if a complete mobilization of the militia took place. As the colony matured, the 

immediate danger subsided, but the standing militia remained active, giving 

basic training to the colony’s young men, providing a source of volunteers and 

draftees for the temporary detachments and expeditionary forces, and serving 

as a law-enforcement agency. Except for slaves, just about every adult male in 

a colony served in the militia at some point in his life.

Section V

Braddock’s Defeat, 9 July 1755

The efforts of a combined British and Colonial force to defeat a French, FrenchCanadian and Indian detachment at Fort Duquesne draw a painfully clear 

picture of the problems and frustrations of early warfare in the wilderness. In 

1754, the French occupied Fort Duquesne at the junction of the Allegheny and 

Monongahela Rivers and laid claim to the surrounding areas. Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia decided that such an 

acquisition could not be tolerated, and he sent a 

young colonial, Major George Washington, with 

a unit of Virginia militia to force the withdrawal 

of the French from the fort. The French drove 

back Washington and forced him to surrender.

Early the next year, Major General Edward 

Braddock, a British General of some forty-fi ve 

years of experience on European battlefi elds, 

arrived in the New World with two regiments 

of British regulars and the mission to fi nish 

Washington’s task. Braddock augmented his 

ranks with some Virginia and North Carolina 

provincials to increase his force to 2,200 

men. In June 1755, set out on the long trek through the wilderness to Fort 

Duquesne. Braddock moved through the wilderness in what was then a 

typical formation. A four hundred-man advance guard led the column, 

and axemen constructed a rough corduroy road en route to support the 

heavy baggage train that followed the formation. Although the soldiers 

had repeatedly lightened their packs, they still kept their knapsacks and 

haversacks. When the column had completed half its march, General Braddock decided that their progress had been so slow that he would divide 

the column and forge ahead with about 1,300 selected men, a few cannon, 

and some pack horses. 
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American Military Heritage

By the fi rst week in July, Braddock and his advance force had reached the 

Monongahela River at the point closest to Fort Duquesne. The advance guard 

under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage, cautiously crossed the river and began 

the last seven-mile movement to the fort. Suddenly, about three fourths of a 

mile into the forest, a hail of musket fi re cut into the British force. The size of 

the enemy force remains uncertain, but it probably consisted of less than 100 

French colonial troops, French Canadian militia, and Indians. The French 

commander had intended to ambush the British column at the crossing of the 

Monongahela, but, by the time the Indians joined him, he apparently sought 

to attack the British whenever he encountered them. He and his men deployed 

onto a hill and into a ravine on either side of the road and opened fi re just as 

the British vanguard passed between them. Gage, perhaps disastrously, fell 

back on Braddock’s advancing main body of troops and in doing so, caused 

considerable confusion. The French and Indian force fought well from the 

excellent cover and concealment of the forest and was able to pour deadly, 

effective fi re into the fl anks of Braddock’s confused and milling force. The 

British regulars repeatedly regrouped into lines to deliver the customary volleys against the enemy; however, as one regular wrote, “scarce an offi cer or 

soldier can say they ever saw at one time six of the enemy and the greatest 

part never saw a single man.” Two thirds of the British offi cers quickly fell 

dead or wounded. Braddock, himself critically wounded, fi nally ordered a 

retreat, but without the organization and regimented leadership of the linear 

battlefi eld, the retreat became a rout and the panic-stricken soldiers did not 

BRADDOCK'S EXPEDITION

June – July 1755

Approx. Route of English Troops

French and Indian Ambush

Miles

10 0 10 20 30

Ohio R.

Monongahela R.

Shenandoah R.

Potomac R.

Allegheny R.

Ft. Duquesne

Carlisle

Alexandria

Winchester

Ft. Cumberland

Ft. Necessity
12

American Military Heritage

stop even when they had reached the wagon trains many miles to the rear. The 

rout fell just short of total disaster only because the French and Indians did 

not pursue the fl eeing British.

Braddock’s expedition had been a disaster, but the colonial forces learned several 

lessons. Contrary to popular belief, they did not determine that regular forces or 

linear warfare were useless in America or that colonial militiamen were superior 

soldiers to British regulars. They decided, rather, that they had to make the 

tactical organization and techniques of the European battlefi eld more fl exible to 

cope with the rugged terrain 

of the Americas. The result 

was more open formations 

and a command structure 

that gave more authority 

to lower ranking offi cers, 

contributing to European 

innovations of the Napoleonic Wars such as the tactical mixing of the column 

and line as a fl exible system 

letting commanders rapidly 

adjust to changing terrain 

and battle conditions.

The Braddock disaster presented Americans with 

important lessons about 

the need to adapt to a new 

battle environment. Similar 

situations have continued 

to face American armed 

forces in each half century of their existence. The 

puny artillery that fi rst appeared on the World War I 

battlefi eld was quickly replaced by huge howitzers. The disjointed tactics of the 

1941 European battlefi eld were quite different from the tank/infantry machine 

that ground into the enemy’s heartland only three years later. Indeed, even the 

heavily weighted soldier and the defi nable front and rear of the “conventional” 

battlefi eld have evolved into the lightning quick, highly fl exible air assault 

units of the modern Army. As General Braddock was carried dying from the 

battlefi eld at Fort Duquesne, he is alleged to have murmured, “Another time we 

shall know better how to deal with them.” Perhaps Americans indeed learned 

the lesson for which he paid so dearly.

Captain Hezediah Dunn’s Company of Rangers, 

New Jersey Frontier Guard, 1756–1760
13

American Military Heritage

Section VI

Notes on Rogers’ Rangers

ROBERT ROGERS—THE MAN

“Born on Nov 7, 1731, in the village of Methuen, Massachusetts....” “... A 

tall man of great strength... his features bold and his glance piercing...an 

impression not only of a vigorous physique but of a vigorous mentality... his 

voice a rumble of bass...for all his size, he could slip through the wood like a 

phantom.... His outstanding characteristic however, was his immense courage, 

of the type that is a blend of fortitude and endurance... a man restless in mind 

and body with an immense fund of vital physical and mental energy that made 

him almost tireless when compared with others....”

ROGERS—THE RANGER LEADER

“In a day when offi cers of the Army kept themselves apart form other ranks, 

he was on terms of familiarity with his Rangers, but at the same time was able 

to maintain discipline with remarkable ease. Although he treated his men as 

equals, his superior knowledge, his ability, and especially his personality gave 

him the advantages of such treatment without the drawbacks; for all recognized 

his peculiar qualities of leadership.”

THE RANGER (LIGHT INFANTRY, CIRCA 1755)

“A heterogeneous crew...not mounted, even though their duties were often 

those usually performed by mounted troops...they were the eyes and ears of 

the Army... usually a hard-bitten crew...served in an active capacity all the 

year round...at home on snowshoes or on skates... forays by canoe and whale 

boat in summer by day and by night.”

RANGER WEAPONS AND UNIFORMS

“A woodland uniform varying in the different companies... smoothbores... tomahawks and scalping 

knife, a bullock’s horn for powder slung from the 

left shoulder, and a leather or sealskin bag about 

the waist for shot... offi cers carried a small compass 

fi xed to the bottom of the powder horn.”

STANDING ORDERS ROGERS’ RANGERS

Although the language differs, the principles 

advocated by Rogers are applicable today.

1. Don’t forget nothing.

2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet 

scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be 

ready to march at a minute’s warning.
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American Military Heritage

3. When you’re on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up 

on a deer. See the enemy fi rst.

4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you 

tell other folks about the Rangers, but don’t never lie to a Ranger or offi cer.

5. Don’t never take a chance you don’t have to.

6. When we’re on the march, we march single fi le, far enough apart so one 

shot can’t go through two men.

7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it’s hard to 

track us.

8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the 

least possible chance at us.

9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.

10. If we take prisoners, we keep ‘em separate till we have had time to examine 

them, so they can’t cook up a story between ‘em.

11. Don’t ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you 

won’t be ambushed.

12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to 

keep a scout 20 yards ahead, twenty yards on each fl ank and twenty yards in 

the rear, so the main body can’t be surprised and wiped out.

13. Every night you’ll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.

14. Don’t sit down to eat without posting sentries.

15. Don’t sleep beyond dawn. Dawn’s when the French and Indians attack.

16. Don’t cross a river by a regular ford.

17. If somebody’s trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, 

and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.

18. Don’t stand up when the enemy’s coming against you. Kneel down, lie 

down, hide behind a tree.

19. Let the enemy come till he’s almost close enough to touch. Then let him 

have it and jump out and fi nish him up with your hatchet.

Major Robert Rogers 1759.

Source:

LTC H. M. Jackson, Rogers’ Rangers, (London, 1953), Chapters 1 & 2.
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American Military Heritage

2

The American Revolution

Section I

Why the Revolution?

The causes of the American Revolution were complicated and rooted 

 deeply in European life and governmental practices of the era. To sim-

 plify a complex story, the colonists had developed to the point that — 

economically, socially, and governmentally — British control was no longer 

bearable. This chronology shows the events that followed from this bitter 

discontent.

Dec 1773 Boston Tea Party

Sep 1774 First Continental Congress

19 Apr 1775 Skirmish at Lexington begins Revolutionary 

 War

May 1775 Second Continental Congress

14 Jun 1775 Birthday of the United States Army

15 Jun 1775 George Washington appointed

 Commander-in-Chief

17 Mar 1776 Evacuation of Boston

4 July 1776 Declaration of Independence

26 Dec 1776 Battle of Trenton

17 Oct 1777 Burgoyne capitulates at Saratoga

1778 Von Steuben at Valley Forge

19 Oct 1781 Cornwallis surrenders at Yorktown

7 Aug 1782 Washington introduces the Badge for 

 Military Merit

2 May 1783 Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace 

 Establishment

25 Nov 1783 British evacuate New York

1790–91 Harmar and St. Clair expeditions against 

 the Indians

8 May 1792 Militia Act

 The Legion, commanded and trained by 

 Major General Anthony Wayne

20 Aug 1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers

1802 U.S. Military Academy founded at West 

 Point

7 Nov 1811 Battle of Tippecanoe 
16

American Military Heritage

Section II

The Will to Fight: Bunker Hill

Even after the New England colonies replaced their militia with volunteers following the clashes at Lexington and Concord, the American forces surrounding 

Boston in the spring of 1775 were a disorganized, loosely knit bunch of units 

and individuals interested in protecting their personal rights and property. In 

short, the American soldiers had not yet become an army. The Battle of Bunker 

Hill on June 17, 1775 began the transformation of these individuals into an 

army. At Bunker Hill, the colonists realized that they could indeed stand up 

to the mighty volleys and gleaming bayonets of the British regulars. In that 

realization was born the will — indeed, the heritage — of an army.

Charlestown

Boston

Roxbury

Charles R.

Waltham Cambridge

Route of British Troops,

18 – 19 April 1775

The Boston — Concord Area

Lexington

Sudbury R.

Mystic R.

Hog

I

Nook's

Hill

Dorchester

Heights

Bird I

Noddle's I

Apple I

Castle I

1 0 1 2

Miles

Medford

Concord

Watertown

Boston

Charlestown

Morton's

 Hill

Breed's Hill

Bunker

 Hill

Mystic R.

Causeway

0 1/2 1

Miles

As May turned to June, a council of general offi cers from the four separate 

New England armies were looking for ways to force Major General Sir Thomas 

Gage’s British troops from Boston. On the night of June 16, 1775, Israel 

Putnam, Thomas Gridley and William Prescott led about 1,000 troops onto 

the Charlestown peninsula across Bunker Hill, and onto Breed’s Hill, where 

they began construction of an earthen fortress overlooking Boston. A small 

party moved into the deserted village of Charlestown while the main force, 

in about four hours, built a shoulder-high redoubt capable of resisting musket 

and cannon fi re. At dawn, the British warship “Lively” fi red a broadside at 

the fort. To their amazement, sailors watched the cannon ball bounce from 

the earthworks. In Boston, General Gage handed loyalist Abijah Willard a 

spyglass and asked him if he could identify the lone fi gure standing atop the 

Breed’s Hill earthworks. Willard looked, turned to Gage and said that it was 

William Prescott, his own brother-in-law. “Will he fi ght?” Gage demanded. 

“I cannot answer for his men,” Willard replied,” but Prescott will fi ght you 

to the gates of hell.”
17

American Military Heritage

After observing as much activity as possible, Major General William 

Howe, commanding the 2,200-man British assault force, loaded his regulars into flat-bottom barges and, at about 1:30 p.m. began a movement 

to a landing site near Morton’s Point. These troops, who landed unopposed, were the pick of 

the British Army. They 

were dressed in full scarlet 

coats and even the Light 

Infantry of the line carried heavy packs as well 

as three days’ rations and 

ammunition. Howe was 

so confident of success 

that, after his landing, he 

had his men pile arms and 

eat their midday meal.

The noonday meal fi nished, 

Howe moved to the attack. 

He planned to hit the fl anks 

of the breastworks. Naval gunfi re from Admiral 

Samuel Graves’ warships 

used red-hot cannon balls 

to set fire to the houses 

in Charlestown so that 

they could not be used by 

snipers. Howe then began 

the assault with his right, 

or eastern, fl ank, moving 

Boston

Charlestown

Morton's 

Causeway Hill

X

X

Rail

fence Breast

work

Prescott's

position

GEN Howe

GEN Pigot Breed's Hill

Bunker Hill

Stonewall

Stark's position

Grenadier Company, 38th Regiment of Foot, 

1775–1776. 
18

American Military Heritage

slowly and majestically in the three near-perfect lines of the European 

battlefi eld. The defenders had occupied positions behind a low stone wall 

and patiently waited for the British to come well within musket range. When 

the British were within forty yards of the wall, the Americans fi red together 

and stopped the attack cold. A second time the British charged, this time 

further toward the American redoubt in the center, and for a second time, 

overwhelming fi re threw them back with terrible losses. In a last-ditch effort, 

employing reinforcements, Howe swept up the hill toward the American right, 

or western, fl ank. The American defenders there were out of ammunition and 

powder and their line grudgingly gave way. As the terrible line of British 

bayonets approached, the defenders fell back, fi rst to Bunker Hill and then 

off the peninsula entirely.

The British had won a victory but the Americans realized that they had stood 

up to some of the King’s fi nest troops and had infl icted more than twice as 

many casualties as they had suffered. This fi ght provided the morale boost 

needed to give the amateur soldiers of the colonies the will to fi ght on for 

their freedom.

Section III

Building an Army

After Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill, the Crown, in effect, gave the 

colonial revolutionaries time to build an army. The scope of the problem 

facing the members of the Second Continental Congress was indeed staggering. John Adams saw it most clearly when he said, “When fi fty or sixty 

men have a constitution to form for a great empire, at the same time that they 

have a country of 1,500 miles extent to fortify, millions to arm and train, a 

naval power to begin, an extensive commerce to regulate, numerous tribes 

of Indians to negotiate with, a standing army of twenty thousand men to 

raise, pay, victual, and offi cer, I really shall pity those fi fty or sixty men.” 

The already complex challenge of building an army was rendered nearly 

impossible by geographical and political differences between members of 

the Continental Congress. The creation of the Continental Army was easily 

one of the most signifi cant achievements of all the accomplishments of the 

statesmen of the era. 

In spite of all of the problems, on June 14, 1775, Congress voted to adopt 

the four New England armies (and a fi fth force which New York was in the 

process of organizing) as the Continental Army, the forerunner of today’s 

United States Army. Congress then quickly voted to raise ten companies of 

rifl emen to make the Continentals representative of the entire nation, and it 

chose George Washington, a Virginian, to be Commander-in-Chief. To assist 

Washington, Congress appointed twelve additional general offi cers and adopted 

a staff structure closely resembling that of the British Army.
19

American Military Heritage

Washington did not have a 

perfect initial impression 

of his men. He found them 

to be “... a mixed multitude 

of people... under very little 

discipline, order or government.” Seeing clearly the 

need for discipline among 

his soldiers, he quickly set 

about formulating regulations and building a staff 

to enforce them.

After half a year, Washington began to see that 

the numbers of troops “on 

hand” would fall far short 

of enlistment goals. His 

only available solution was 

to use short-term militia to 

fill his needs and, while 

building up his army’s 

strength, deal with the organization and logistical 

problems of his forces-inbeing. Unfortunately, the 

entire Continental Army had enlisted in 1775 for a duration of one year, a 

policy which would prove to be a serious error. Neither Washington nor any 

of his planners, however, anticipated anything other than a short campaign.

Certainly, the rabble that Washington found in the camps around Boston 

in the summer of 1775 did not resemble the Continental Army of 1778 or 

1779 but it was a beginning, for both the Continental Army and the United 

States Army.

Section IV

Army Life, 1783–1800

After the close of the Revolution, Congress reduced the size of the Army. In 

fact, for a brief period the entire Army consisted of just one artillery battery. 

In 1784, Congress, realizing the Indian threat to the nation’s borders, authorized a peacetime regular army of 700 men—a regiment with eight companies 

of Infantry and two of Artillery. The small force soon split among the tiny 

forts along the frontier country of the Ohio Valley. Its mission was keeping 

Colonel David Hall’s Delaware Regiment, 

Continental Line, 1777–1783
20

American Military Heritage

the peace by creating a no-man’s land between white adventurers and Indians. 

By 1789, Congress increased this force to 846 strong, although, as Secretary 

Henry Knox pointed out, the Army still needed 168 men “to complete the 

establishment” (reach full strength).

This small Army, called the First American Regiment and commanded 

by Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar, endured a dreary and isolated 

existence. The general pattern of fortress construction of the time called for 

a pentagonal log structure 

with multi-storied corner 

towers. The towers’ lower 

floors provided barracks 

space, while the upper 

fl oors housed cannon and, 

when necessary, fighting 

forces. Each garrison grew 

part of its own food in the 

fort’s garden. Social life 

on the frontier was virtually non-existent, and the 

soldier’s daily routine was 

either boring or dangerous, 

depending on the whims 

of the Indians. Many soldiers deserted, but those 

who stayed were a tough 

professional core of hearty 

veterans who could hold 

their own in any situation.

The Army’s pay tables (circa 1785) are quite interesting. Colonel Harmar 

drew $50 a month; his majors, $45; captains, $35; lieutenants, $26; and 

ensigns, $20. The lowly private of Harmar’s force drew a monthly salary 

of only $4. To understand what a soldier could do with his pay, however, 

remember that a thirsty troop could still buy an entire barrel of whiskey for 

a single dollar.

During the late 1780s, the Indians, feeling the press of civilization, became 

increasingly restless. In an attempt to settle the Indian problem, Arthur St. 

Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, directed that a military expedition 

be made against the Indian towns along the Maumee River near what is now 

Cincinnati. Harmer’s troops were largely raw recruits with a small core of 

The U.S. Battalion of Artillery, 1786–1794
21

American Military Heritage

veterans. Their commander 

moved his ill-trained, motley array into the wilderness only to meet successive defeats at the hands of 

the enemy. After a month’s 

efforts, Harmar returned 

to Fort Washington having lost a third of his pack 

train, nearly all of the militia (largely through desertion), and a quarter of his 

regulars. 

Although the Harmar expedition represents one of the 

most unsuccessful endeavors in the Army’s history, 

worse was to come. Encouraged by their successes, the 

Indians stepped up their 

activities all along the frontier. To meet the threats, 

Governor St. Clair, old and 

in failing health, raised a 

largely volunteer force of 

about 2,200 men and placed himself in command. In a dismal repeat of Harmar’s 

misfortunes, St. Clair’s force, amid snow, ice and rain, met the Indians about 

fi fty miles from what is now Fort Wayne, Indiana. The militia ran, leaving the 

regulars to be overrun by the triumphant Indians. Over 900 soldiers were left 

on the battlefi eld.

President Washington took steps to remedy the “lack of discipline and experience of the troops” to which he attributed the miserable failures of Harmar 

and St. Clair. He initiated, and Congress passed, laws to strengthen the militia 

and instituted a legionary system for the regular army. The essence of this 

system built combat teams called sub-legions, a unit roughly analogous to 

a modern battalion task force, into self-suffi cient, combined arms forces of 

infantry, light infantry, dragoons and artillery. To train and lead this force, 

Washington chose Major General “Mad” Anthony Wayne, one of his ablest 

commanders in the Revolution.

Wayne was able, smart, and organized. He took a year to build his legion into 

a strong, well disciplined striking force with one objective — to fi ght Indians 

in the wilderness and win. In 1794, the confrontation came. At Fallen Timbers, 

Infantry of the Legion of the United 

States, 1794
22

American Military Heritage

a mass of tangled thickets of uprooted trees and underbrush near present-day 

Toledo, Ohio, the legion met the enemy in force. A rumbling volley into the 

brush, a fi erce bayonet charge, and hard-riding Kentucky mounted rifl emen 

slashing from the fl anks were more than the enemy force could stand. Wayne’s 

discipline, organization and training had given the legion the will to soldier. 

The young country again had an Army.

Section V

Notes on Army Uniforms of

the Revolutionary Era

GENERAL

Throughout the American Revolution, the average fi ghting soldier might 

have appeared in any of a dozen different uniforms or combinations 

of uniforms. General Washington realized the need for uniforms and, 

throughout the war years, continuously attempted to establish a workable 

uniform policy. He achieved some success, but as in all wars, active 

campaigning caused wear and tear. The notes below give a summation 

of Washington’s efforts and examples of both militia uniforms and the 

clothing of members of the Continental Line.

WASHINGTON’S UNIFORM POLICIES

Pre-1775: Although most pre-1775 common soldiers wore civilian dress, 

several independent militia companies had devised their own colorful uniforms. 

Washington saw a need for badges of rank and directed a series of colored 

ribbons across the chest of general offi cers, colored cockades on the hats of 

fi eld and company offi cers, and colored worsted epaulettes on the shoulders 

of noncommissioned offi cers.

1775–76: Washington attempted to outfi t his infantry in linen frocks of the 

style worn by frontier rifl emen. He wanted a uniform that would be easily 

accessible to every soldier and that would make the enemy feel he was facing 

massed marksmen. His plan was only moderately successful.

1777–79: Washington ordered uniforms from France and initiated local 

manufacture that would provide some similarity for troops from neighboring states grouped in the same unit. This effort met with only temporary 

success.

1780: The Commander-in-Chief published a directive fi xing the color and style 

of general offi cers’ uniforms and artillery, cavalry and infantry, establishing 

gold bullion epaulettes for generals with various numbers of silver stars as 

the insignia of grade.
23

American Military Heritage

THE MILITIA

“Many colonial militia companies did adopt uniforms, and in some cases 

they were quite elaborate.... In Connecticut, the Governor’s Foot Guard 

wore scarlet coats, bearskin hats, and brown gaiters. Members of the City 

Troop of Philadelphia dressed in brown coats with white facings, white 

breeches, high boots, and round leather caps decorated with a buck’s tail 

and a silver cord.... The grenadier Company and light infantry of New 

York wore blue with red facings. The fusiliers wore the same colors with 

bearskin caps.”

THE CONTINENTAL LINE

Although some variance of color and style existed within each of the three 

segments of the Regular Continental Army (foot, horse and gunners), the 

examples here are composites that refl ect contemporary trends.

Thompson’s Pennsylvania Rifl e Battalion, 1770 “...deerskin hunting shirt, rifl e 

or musket ...canvas knapsack, hatchet ...powder horn and bayonet.”

Baylor’s 3d Continental Dragoons, 1778 “...white coats faced with blue ...sabre 

and fl intlock pistols.”

The Continental Artillery, 1780 “...dark blue 

or black coat faced with 

red... spontoon carried by 

officer....”

Washington and his staff,,

“...blue coats with buff 

facings and linings, yellow buttons, white or buff 

underclothes, epaulettes 

with appropriate stars...

all commissioned offi cers 

a cockade, and side arms, 

either a sword or a genteel 

bayonet.”

1

 Falls, pp 301.

5th Pennsylvania Regiment, Continental Line, 

1777–1783
24

American Military Heritage

Section VI

Notes on Weapons and Tactics

(Revolutionary Era)

The weapons (both group and individual) of the American Revolution were, 

for the most part, identical or similar to those used by European armies in the 

second half of the 18th century. Although few startling weapons developments 

occurred during this period, the improvements mentioned below occurred 

through a process of evolution.

GROUP

Howitzer: These pieces were much lighter and shorter than guns. Often, they 

only had bores of three calibers in length, and they usually had a narrowed 

chamber at the base of the bore for the 

powder charge. They were designed to 

fi re shell, grapeshot, and other antipersonnel ammunition. Their short barrels 

and special carriages enabled them to 

fi re either horizontally for short-range 

work or at a higher elevation to lob 

shells over a fortifi cation.

The American Revolution took place at a time of major innovations in the 

construction and employment of artillery. In Prussia, Frederick the Great reduced the weight and improved the mobility of his guns and introduced horse 

artillery, capable of keeping up with cavalry. Gribeauval of France adopted 

Frederick’s improvements and added many more, making French artillery by far 

the fi nest in Europe during the period 

just prior to the French Revolution and 

Napoleonic Wars.

Mortar: Sought to lob exploding 

shells over a high arc; they were particularly useful for sieges, where they 

could throw projectiles inside an enemy 

fortifi cation.

INDIVIDUAL

Bayonet: Replaced the pike, since infantrymen now could use the musket 

with attached bayonet for both missile and shock functions.

Rifl e: Had been used by sportsmen for a century or more, particularly in the 

Alps, but, despite its much greater accuracy and range, it had not proved suitable as a military weapon, because of the lack of a bayonet and the time nec-
25

American Military Heritage

essary to load. As the Kentucky Rifl e, it became 

common on the 

frontiers of the thirteen colonies, and it later 

played a signifi cant role in the Revolution. It was accurate 

for over 300 yards and more. 

Iron Ramrod: Introduced by Frederick the Great, it enabled the infantryman 

to double the rate of fi re of the fl intlock musket to about four rounds per minute.

GROUP

Shrapnel: Balls and pellets of grape shot and canister enclosed in a shell 

which burst by means of a time fuse near the target; named after its British 

inventor, General Sir Henry Shrapnel, who introduced it about 1784. ( Not to be 

confused with shell fragments, a common error of terminology of the 20th century.)

INDIVIDUAL

Mass Production of Small Arms: Introduced by Eli Whitney about 1790.

Revolutionary Tactics

GENERAL TACTICS

 “The means by which soldiers seek to achieve their ends in battle... the main 

factors which infl uence tactics are ground, weapons, armor, means of movement and of passing information and orders....”

EARLY 18TH CENTURY

 “Armies consisted of horse, foot, dragoons and cannon... [the] normal cavalryman was armed with a sword and a pair of pistols — he relied on shock action, 

charging at speed or on missile action, fi ring from the saddle and wheeling 

off to reload... infantry regiments consisted of musketeers and pikemen in the 

ratio of 2 to 1... dragoons were mounted infantry who usually fought on foot.... 

Artillery, though useful in battle, was seldom able to play a decisive part. The 

equipment was heavy and the means of traction, usually horses pulling tandem, 

but sometimes oxen, was ineffi cient. There was as yet no battery organization. 

In addition to this immobility, the rate of fi re was slow.”

MID 18TH CENTURY

The Continental Army’s organization closely followed that of the British. A 

British regiment consisted of eight platoons, each line up three men deep. One 

platoon fi red at a time, thus achieving a concentrated fi re at certain points of the 
26

American Military Heritage

enemy front. “... the introduction of Grenadier companies, one per battalion, 

gave the infantry a corps d’elite, particularly useful for storming parties in 

siege warfare...during this period the three arms — horse, foot and guns — 

were all equally useful in their ways, though the infantry were gaining ground 

steadily. The artillery were about to see a period of marked improvement and 

the cavalry were virtually standing still.”

Section VII

Notes on

Baron Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben

HIS YOUTH

The son of an engineer offi cer, Von Steuben was born in Magdeburg, Prussia on 

September 17, 1730. He joined the Prussian Army in 1746 as a lance corporal 

and rose to the rank of fi rst lieutenant and trainer of troops in the crack Lestwitz 

Regiment by the time of the Seven Years’ War. He was twice wounded in that 

war; as a reward for his gallantry, he received an appointment as principal staff 

offi cer of one of the Prussian “free corps” organized to counter Austrian light 

infantry. Although among Frederick the Great’s special corps of aides, he left 

the Prussian Army soon after the war, probably because of military politics 

and his commoner status.

INVOLVEMENT WITH THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Looking for employment, Steuben, in 1777, offered his services to Benjamin 

Franklin, the American representative in Paris. Congress, acting on the false 

information that he was a retired lieutenant general, accepted him as a volunteer 
27

American Military Heritage

without rank, and he arrived at Valley Forge on February 23, 1778. Washington, 

impressed with the new arrival, assigned him to prepare a system of “discipline, 

maneuvers, evolutions, [and] regulations for guards.”

AT VALLEY FORGE

Mixing French regulations, the British manual of arms, and his own observations since joining the Continental Army, Steuben drew up a simple but 

effi cient and fl exible system of maneuver that used both column and line 

formations and stressed the importance of kind 

and considerate treatment of the troops to discipline. An impressed Washington appointed 

Steuben his temporary inspector general, in 

which offi ce he supervised the training of the 

Continental Army in the new system. The 

Prussian soon became a popular fi gure among 

the troops, who gathered to watch the Baron 

train his “model company” using colorful but 

good-humored curses, delivered in a variety 

of languages. The members of the model 

company and selected offi cers then instructed 

other units of the Army. When the Continental 

Army again faced the British in June 1778 at 

the Battle of Monmouth Court House, it impressed observers with its enhanced performance. When Congress offi cially 

created the offi ce of Inspector General in February 1779, Steuben was the 

obvious choice.

POST-WAR

After the war, a grateful state of New York gave Steuben 16,000 acres of 

land, to which the Baron retired. He continued to write on military subjects, 

advocating a military academy and a Swiss militia system to supplement the 

small Regular Army. He died on his Mohawk Valley estate on November 28, 

1794, leaving his adopted nation greatly in his debt.

Section VIII

Notes on George Washington

(1732–1799)

As Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, as the man who presided 

over the Constitutional Convention, and as the fi rst president, George Washington was the leading fi gure in the formation of the American republic. Even 

to his contemporaries, the Virginian seemed larger than life. Possessed of an 

extraordinary strength of character, he displayed an integrity, self-discipline 

and devotion to duty that caused men to follow him. 
28

American Military Heritage

HIS YOUTH

Born on February 22, 1732 to a family of landed gentry in Westmoreland 

County, Virginia, Washington, as a younger son, seemed destined to an 

obscure existence as a farmer and land surveyor. But, in 1752, the death of 

his older brother Lawrence left him with Mount Vernon, a large plantation 

on the Potomac. He also succeeded his brother as one of the four adjutants 

responsible for training the colony’s militia and, in 1753, he received the 

rank of major.

EARLY MILITARY CAREER

When Washington entered military service, the French were making their 

bid for control of the disputed area beyond the Appalachian Mountains by 

constructing forts along the 

Ohio River Valley. Lieutenant Governor Robert 

Dinwiddie of Virginia sent 

Washington to warn the 

French to leave the area. 

When the French rejected 

Washington’s ultimatum, 

Dinwiddie sent a force of 

300 colonials under the 

young major to defend 

English claims to the area 

near present-day Pittsburgh. 

Washington won a preliminary skirmish with a French 

party, but a larger force 

compelled him to surrender. 

Washington later served as 

a volunteer aide with the 

doomed Braddock expedition, where he earned notice 

for his courage and tactical 

skills. He rose to overall command of Virginia’s frontier defenses, and led 

a brigade against Fort Duquesne. His service in the French and Indian War 

taught the young colonel much about the importance of discipline, terrain and 

administrative detail, lessons he would put to use in future years.

PRE-WAR PERIOD

After resigning his commission in 1758, Washington returned to Mount Vernon, 

where he married a wealthy widow, Martha Custis, and concentrated on his fl ourishing plantation. He also served in the Virginia House of Burgesses, emerging 

as a moderate among the opponents to Britain’s colonial policy. As war clouds 

gathered, Washington accepted the leadership of Virginia’s volunteer militia 
29

American Military Heritage

and represented his colony in the Continental Congress, where he served on 

various committees handling military matters.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

On June 15, 1775, the Second Continental Congress unanimously elected Washington as “General and Commander in Chief” of the Continental Army. For 

eight long years, serving without a salary, the general led the main American 

army while also supervising the overall American military effort. In his efforts 

to organize and maintain an army, he had to deal with Congress, jealous state 

governments, diffi cult allies, impulsive subordinates, and supply and fi nancial 

problems that frequently appeared too tough for a normal man to handle. Above 

all, he sought to preserve his army, believing that the Revolution could survive 

only if the Army remained intact. He avoided major defeats and where he saw 

an opportunity, as at Trenton, Princeton, and Yorktown, won critical victories. 

In the end, he kept an army in the fi eld long enough for the British to tire of the 

struggle. Without Washington’s foresight, integrity, and self-discipline, it is 

doubtful that the Revolution would have succeeded.

CONSTITUTION AND PRESIDENCY

After resigning his post, a step that shocked many Americans and Europeans 

who expected him to seize power, Washington returned to Mount Vernon to 

resume his agricultural and business interests. But the country could not allow 

him a comfortable retirement. In 1787, he served as president of the Constitutional Convention, lending prestige and dignity to the proceedings which 

provided the country with a true national government. When that government 
30

American Military Heritage

went into operation, the choice for the fi rst president was clear. For eight years, 

Washington provided the leadership necessary to set the new government on 

its proper course, jealously guarding its authority, refereeing between competing factions, and pursuing a policy of neutrality that kept the United States 

out of dangerous European wars.

FINAL YEARS

Having established many important precedents in his two terms, Washington 

established another by refusing to run for a third term. He retired to Mount 

Vernon in 1797. When he died there on December 14, 1799, almost all Americans agreed with one of his former offi cers who characterized him, “fi rst in 

war, fi rst in peace, and fi rst in the hearts of his countrymen.”

Section IX

Elijah Churchill and William Brown

The noncommissioned offi cer corps forms the backbone of any army, and George 

Washington’s Continental Army was no exception. Steuben’s regulations stressed 

the role of the NCO in the care, discipline, and training of the Army, and the 

NCO corps of the Continental Army distinguished itself on the drill fi eld and 

the battlefi eld. Two of the 

most notable NCOs were 

Elijah Churchill and William Brown.

In 1781, Elijah Churchill, a 

sergeant in the 2d Legionary Corps, conducted two 

daring raids against British 

outposts on Long Island. In 

a fi erce November storm, 

the sergeant led his men on 

a dangerous, twenty-mile 

journey across Long Island 

Sound as part of an elite 

task force. Thrown off 

course by the wind, they 

reached shore and marched 

several miles to the British 

post at Fort St. George. 

They overwhelmed the 

surprised garrison, burned a 

supply boat, and destroyed 

enormous stocks of enemy 2nd Regiment of Continental Light

Dragoons, Dismounted Service, 1780
31

American Military Heritage

supplies, before returning to their base. In this 

action, as in the later raid against Fort Slongo, 

Churchill did not lose a single man.

William Brown, a sergeant in the 5th Connecticut 

Regiment, earned distinction in the most important campaign of the Revolutionary War, the 

victory at Yorktown. When the Americans and 

French stormed the outer works of Yorktown on 

the night of October 14, 1781, Sergeant Brown 

led the advance party against redoubt number 

10. Unwilling to wait for combat engineers to 

clear the obstacles facing his party, he led his 

men over and through the obstacles to overrun 

the fort in a surprise assault. Within ten minutes, 

the Americans had the fort. Sergeant Brown had 

been wounded in the hand by a bayonet, but 

his heroism and that of his fellow soldiers, had 

hastened the fall of Yorktown, which surrendered 

on October 17.

For their heroism, Sergeants Churchill and 

Brown received the Badge of Military Merit 

during the same ceremony on May 3, 1783.
32

American Military Heritage

Section X

Notes on the Founding of West Point

George Washington, although not a professional soldier himself, was outspoken about the unreliability of militia troops and amateur offi cers. Just two 

days before his death, he wrote to Alexander Hamilton that the establishment 

of a military academy in America “upon a respectable and extensive basis, 

has ever been considered by one as an object of primary importance to this 

country; and while I was in the chair of government, I omitted no opportunity 

of recommending it, in any public speeches and other ways, to the attention 

of the legislature.”

The Academy offi cially came into being on 16 March 1802, when Congress 

authorized a Corps of Engineers, set its strength at 7 offi cers and 10 cadets, 

and directed that they form a military academy at West Point, New York. West 

Point had been a key fortress on the Hudson River during the Revolution, and 

the new United States Military Academy began operations there on 4 July 

1802, using buildings already in existence. The experience of the Continental 

Army during the Revolutionary War had demonstrated the need for competent 

technicians in all branches of the service. In addition, Congress hoped that 

the Academy would provide a center for the practical study of the science and 

engineering to help build a growing nation.

Source:

Mark M. Boatner, III, Military Customs and Traditions, (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1956), pp 77–79

Stephenson

Put-in-Bay

Ft Malden

Ft Detroit

York (Toronto)

Kingston

Georgian Bay

Oswego

Sacketts Harbor

Ogdensburg

Plattsburg

Richelieu R. Lake

Champlain

Montreal Ottawa R.

St. Lawrence R.

Mohawk R.

L o w e r C a n a d a

U p p e r C a n a d a

M i c h i g a n

T e r r i t o r y

Buffalo

Ft Niagara

Lake Ontario

N e w Y o r k

P e n n s y l v a n i a 

Ft Erie

Erie

(Presque Isle)

Lake Erie

Lake Huron

Pittsburg

New York

Newburgh

Hudson R.

M a s s.

C o n n.

Albany

VT

NH

NJ

The Northern Frontier

in the war of 1812

Battle of the Thames,

5 Oct 1813

Miles

0 100

Thames R.
33

American Military Heritage

3

The War of 1812

Section I

The Complexion of the War

Scholars have debated the origins of the War of 1812 for years. The most 

 likely causes appear to have been the seizure of American ships and the 

 kidnapping of American sailors by the Royal Navy. A second and only 

slightly less signifi cant factor was a wide spread belief that the British were 

venturing into the Ohio Valley from Canada and were supplying the Indians 

with muskets and other equipment for raids against frontier settlements.

The United States entered the war with several handicaps. At the outbreak of 

the war, the tiny U.S. Army was scattered among many small frontier forts. 

In addition to the weak military force in being, Americans did not wholeheartedly support the war effort. Faulty strategy also hampered the American 

war effort. The bulk of the enemy and the most important parts of Canada 

could best be reached by an invasion along Lake Champlain and the Richelieu 

River. Partly because of New England’s weak support for the war, however, 

the Americans conducted their initial attacks further to the west, around the 

western tip of Lake Erie and in the Niagara region.

The war progressed through three periods. During the fi rst year of the war, 

Britain, hard pressed in Europe, could offer little resistance to American military initiatives. In the second stage, from 1813 until early 1814, the British 

established a blockade but still found themselves short of manpower. The 

Americans won their fi rst small victories during this period. By 1814, Great 

Britain had defeated Napoleon and was able to transfer large forces to America. 

The American Army and its commanders, however, had matured and, in these 

fi nal months of the war, the United States won its greatest victories.

The following chronology lists some of the highlights of the three stages of 

the war.

1812 Small actions center around forts on the North- 

 ern Frontier. British win most of these. In many 

 areas, American militia refuses to cross the 

 border into Canada.

1813

 May 26 Battle of Sackett’s Harbor
34

American Military Heritage

 British abandon Fort George and Queenston 

 but Americans fail to pursue.

 Sep 10 Americans gain control of Lake Erie

 Oct 5 Thames River Battle

 Dec British regain Fort George and take Fort 

 Niagara

1814 

 Jul 5 Battle of Chippewa 

 Jul 25 Battle of Lundy’s Lane— Brown’s invasion of 

 Canada halted.

 Aug 24 Battle of Bladensburg and the burning of 

 Washington.

 Sep 11 Lake Champlain

 Dec 24 Treaty of Ghent

1815

 Jan 8 Jackson’s triumph at New Orleans

Section II

Notes on Zachary Taylor

(1784–1850)

EARLY MILITARY LIFE

Taylor was born in Orange County, Virginia on November 24, 1784. After a 

boyhood on the Kentucky frontier, he received a commission as a fi rst lieutenant of infantry in 1808. Two years later, he was promoted to captain.

THE WAR OF 1812

In September 1812, Taylor won distinction for his gallant defense of Fort Harrison on the Wabash River in the Indiana Territory. He received a promotion 

to brevet major for his service.

THE INDIAN WARS

After service in the Black Hawk War, Taylor, now a colonel, served in the 

Seminole Wars. In 1837, he infl icted a serious defeat on the Seminoles and 

their Mikasuki allies on the north shore of Lake Okeechobee, Florida. For his 

achievements, he was promoted to brevet brigadier general.

THE WAR WITH MEXICO

Initial Campaign: As relations between the United States and Mexico deteriorated in 1845, President James K. Polk ordered Taylor to Corpus Christi, 

Texas to take command of American troops there. In early 1846, Polk ordered 
35

American Military Heritage

Taylor to advance into the disputed territory between the Nueces River and the 

Rio Grande. When Mexican and American patrols clashed, the United States 

declared war on Mexico. At Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma in May 1846, 

Taylor defeated larger Mexican forces under General Mariano Arista. His 

victories made him a national hero.

Latter Stages of the War: After capturing the 

city of Monterey in September, Taylor’s force 

was greatly reduced by the transfer of his best 

units to Major General Winfi eld Scott’s campaign 

against Veracruz and Mexico City. Learning of 

these depletions, General Antonio Lopez de 

Santa Anna, the Mexican chief of state, launched 

an offensive against Taylor’s much smaller army. 

On rugged terrain at Buena Vista in February 

1847, Taylor skillfully used his artillery to win 

an overwhelming victory, which catapulted him 

into the presidency two years later. He died in 

offi ce on July 9, 1850.

TAYLOR, THE MAN AND SOLDIER

Taylor represented the Army before West Point professionalism. Rough-hewn, 

unpretentious, almost unschooled, and unimaginative, his steady rise through 

the ranks refl ected luck and perseverance more than brilliance or knowledge 

of the art of war. But “Old Rough and Ready” displayed a degree of physical and moral courage that earned the admiration of those serving under him, 

including Ulysses S. Grant. According to legend, he sat on his horse at the 

battle of Buena Vista, with one leg thrown over the pommel of his saddle, 

disregarding two Mexican bullets that ripped through his farmer’s coat. His 

determination and refusal to admit defeat, as much as any other factor, were 

responsible for the American victory in that battle.

Section III

Notes on Winfi eld Scott

(1786–1866)

EARLY LIFE AND SCHOOLING

The son of a Revolutionary War veteran, Scott was born near Petersburg, 

Virginia on June 13, 1786. After briefl y studying law and serving in the 

Virginia militia he joined the Army in 1807, rising to the rank of captain 

of light artillery by 1809. Unimpressed by the quality of his colleagues, he 

considered returning to the legal profession and, at one point, denounced 

his commander as a traitor, an offense that earned him relief of his commission for a year.
36

American Military Heritage

THE WAR OF 1812

With Congress’ declaration of war against Great Britain in June 1812, Scott 

received the rank of lieutenant colonel. He earned distinction in the attack on 

Queenston Heights but was captured. After his exchange, he again distinguished 

himself in the battle at Fort George, where he was wounded. Promoted to 

brigadier general, he trained his troops to such a high level that even the British were impressed with their performance at the battle of Chippewa. He was 

badly wounded a few days later at Lundy’s Lane. But he emerged from the war 

as a brevet major general and recipient of medals from Congress and Virginia.

PEACE TIME CONTRIBUTIONS

After the War of 1812, Scott prepared manuals of infantry tactics and studied 

military affairs for a time in Europe. He participated in the Black Hawk War 

of 1832 and the campaigns against the Seminoles and the Creeks. In 1841, he 

rose to the post of commanding general of the U.S. Army, a post he held for 

the next twenty years.

WAR WITH MEXICO

Despite Taylor’s victories in northern Mexico at the start of the Mexican 

War, President Polk determined that a sea-based campaign against Veracruz and Mexico City would more effectively bring the confl ict to a close. 

With some reluctance, he gave the command 

to Scott, whose ties to Polk’s political opponents were well-known. After capturing 

Veracruz in a skillful amphibious expedition 

and siege, Scott and his small army cut loose 

from their communications, a risky step that 

aroused the concern of many observers, including the Duke of Wellington. But Scott 

and his soldiers were equal to the challenge. 

Defeating superior enemy forces in battle after 

battle, they penetrated deep into the Valley of 

Mexico and captured the capital. The brilliant 

campaign cemented Scott’s place in American 

military history.

CIVIL WAR AND THE FINAL YEARS

For his services in the Mexican War, Scott earned a retroactive promotion to 

brevet lieutenant general in 1855. In 1852, he had run for President but was 

defeated by Franklin Pierce. When the Civil War erupted, Scott prepared a 

strategic plan for a coastal blockade and the seizure of the Mississippi River 

to divide and conquer the South. Although the press sarcastically called it 

the Anaconda Plan after the snake which kills prey by strangling it, Northern 

strategists pretty much carried out the war just that way. Scott at 75 was not 

prepared mentally or physically to fi ght the war, and he retired in 1861 to 
37

American Military Heritage

West Point after the fi asco at Manassas. By his death on May 29, 1866, however, he had lived to see the Union preserved.

SCOTT THE MAN AND SOLDIER

Scott was, in many ways, the opposite of Taylor — big, refi ned, and so vain 

and pompous that his nickname was “Old Fuss and Feathers.” But even his 

critics had to admit his military ability. A diligent student of military affairs, he 

displayed a profound grasp of the intricacies of strategy, tactics and logistics. 

At the same time, his intelligence and humanity in administering occupied 

Mexico earned such respect from the Mexicans that some of them offered to 

make him a dictator. He was the outstanding American military leader of the 

period between the Revolution and the Civil War.

Section IV

Notes on Uniforms, 1810–1840

1810–1813: By this time, the uniform of the Revolution had disappeared. 

The Army adopted a coat with short skirts cut at the waste and high collars. 

Enlisted men and company offi cers wore a uniform cap with visor, and general 

and staff offi cers retained the cocked hat in the form of the chapeau de bras, 

a hat with a stiff brim turned up on two sides. Beginning in 1813, the colored 

facings were eliminated from the coats. Shortages of cloth and funds during 

the war caused a lack of uniformity even within units. 

U.S. Army Staff 

Offi cers, 1813
38

American Military Heritage

1816: “A need was recognized for a less formal 

(undress) uniform... but 

coat collars were still ‘as 

high in front as the chin 

will permit in turning the 

head’.... [By this time,]

West Point cadets had 

begun to wear gray uniforms.”

1820’s: “Army regulations of ’21 stated ‘Dark 

blue as the national color, 

when a different one is 

not expressly prescribed. 

All uniform coats will be 

of that color’...chevrons 

denoted Captains and 

Lieutenants ....Higher 

laced shoes were adopted 

and were called bootees.” 

By 1817, the Army had 

also adopted the forage 

cap.

18th U.S. Infantry 

Regiment, 1814–1815

U.S. Artillery Regiments, 

Winter Uniform, 

1825–1832
39

American Military Heritage

1830’s: “In 1832, the 

single breasted coat for 

officers was traded for a 

double breasted [coat]... 

high boots disappeared 

and were replaced with 

shoes...staff offi cers wore 

aiguillettes (a gold cord 

circling the right shoulder 

and hanging in loops across 

the chest.... Crossed cannon 

were adopted as the insignia for the Artillery;... the 

Eagle was adopted as the 

insignia of rank for colonels....” Shoulder straps as 

we know them today were 

introduced in 1834.

2nd U.S. Infantry 

Regiment, Winter Full 

Dress, 1841–1851

1st U.S. Dragoon 

Regiment, Full Dress, 

1836–1851
40

American Military Heritage

1840: “The turreted castle 

was adopted as the Engineer Corps insignia... the 

USMA cadet now wore a 

tall beaver stovepipe.”

U.S. Corps of Cadets, 

U.S.M.A., 1853–1861

U.S. Company of 

Sappers, Miners, and 

Pontoniers, Winter Full 

Dress, 1846–1851
41

American Military Heritage

Section V

Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane

A military giant of the nineteenth-century U.S. Army, Winfi eld Scott, played a 

key role in the War of 1812. As a 27-year-old brigadier general commanding 

a brigade in the army of Major General Jacob Brown, Scott found himself on 

July 5, 1814, at Chippewa, New York. In celebration of Independence Day, 

he had promised his brigade a parade, but as he moved his 1, 300 men to a 

nearby plain, he found, instead of a reviewing party, an enemy force of nearly 

4, 000 British regulars under General Phineas Riall. Scott moved to the attack. 

Riall saw before him an avancing line clad in gray, due to the shortage of blue 

fabric normally worn by American regular troops. Undoubtedly, Riall thought 

Scott’s force to be militia and probably felt his men would make short work of 

such inexperienced troops. In spite of heavy British fi re, Scott’s men continued 

a precise, well-schooled advance. “These by Gad!” the startled Riall is supposed to have stated, “these are regulars!” The British broke and eventually 

crumbled as they fell back across Chippewa Creek.

Three weeks later, Riall and Brown met again at Lundy’s Lane (near Niagra 

Falls), one of the costliest battles of the war when casualty percentages are 

considered. The battle began in the afternoon and raged far into the night. 

When it had ended, both sides found their forces riddled, and both claimed a 

victory. From the perspective of America’s military heritage, one of the most 

enduring traditions from Lundy’s Lane was a three-word quotation from a 

regimental commander in one of Brown’s brigades. Brown ordered Colonel 

James Miller’s regiment in his reserve to take the British main battery. As 

Colonel Miller led his men forward, General Brown pointed to the objective 

and asked Miller if his men could take it. His reply is proudly emblazoned on 

the emblem of his unit’s modern successor: “I’ll try, sir.”
42

American Military Heritage

Section VI

The Battle of New Orleans

In the twentieth century, man can send messages to the moon with virtually 

no delays in transmission time. In 1814, a trans-Atlantic message took two 

months to deliver. As a result, thousands of soldiers lost their lives in the Battle 

of New Orleans fought in 1815 after signing of the peace treaty.

Peace negotiations were in progress in late 1814 when Major General Sir 

Edward Pakenham departed Great Britain to take command of an expedition 

to attack the Gulf Coast. When he arrived in the vicinity of New Orleans, 

Pakenham found that his forces had already fought a three-hour skirmish 

with the defending forces, commanded by Major General Andrew Jackson. Casualties to both sides had been heavy but the results inconclusive. 

Although the Americans dug in using traditional fi eld works, they took 

advantage of huge cotton bales and casks from the city’s docks to strengthen 

their defenses. Jackson’s troops included a mixture of regulars, Louisiana 

militia, Tennessee rifl emen, free African-Americans, some sailors and, 

reputedly, several drunks who woke from a euphoric slumber to fi nd a 

weapon in their hands.

By January 8, 1815, Pakenham felt prepared to attempt a frontal assault on the 

American positions. In the early morning mist, his troops, marching in line as 

if on parade, advanced on Jackson’s cotton-bale defenses. They were met by 

a murderous fi re, fi rst from the American artillery and then from the rifl emen 

among the defenders. More than 2,000 British troops fell including two of 

their general offi cers. Eight Americans died. A small British force advanced 

on the far side of the river but did not continue the attack after seeing the main 

thrust falter. For a brief period, Jackson had the opportunity to counterattack, 

but he feared that the British were just regrouping to attack elsewhere. He 

left the battered remnants of Pakenham’s force in a swiftly assembled camp. 

After about ten days, the British re-embarked and sailed away. Only then did 

the British and American forces learn of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent 

ending the war on Christmas Eve, 1814. 

One of the strongest lessons to emerge from this battle was Jackson’s awareness of the capabilities and limitations of his forces. Although he anchored his 

defenses with regulars, his forces included a mixture of inexperienced militia 

“reservists” whom Jackson accurately judged would break in an open battle 

with the British. To prevent this, he directed the construction of strong material defensive positions, not for the physical protection they provided but for 

the psychological boost they gave to his militia. His judgment proved sound. 

The defense of New Orleans lives today in the “Cotton baler” nickname of 

the 7th Infantry.
43

American Military Heritage

4

Westward Expansion

Section I

The “Thirty Year Peace” and National

Expansion

In 1815, the armies of Napoleon and Wellington met at Waterloo and fi nally 

brought to an end the long series of Napoleonic wars that had plagued Europe. 

Brigadier General Winfi eld Scott, who had traveled to Europe as a military 

observer, believed British success on the continent could cause another 

war between the United States and Great Britain. He further feared that the 

tactical, administrative, and training lessons garnered in the Napoleonic 

wars would make the British a most overpowering, if not undefeatable, foe. 

Yet, although his suppositions at the time seemed well founded, the United 

States would experience thirty years of relative peace. As a result, the nation 

concentrated on internal development and expansion, with the U.S. Army 

serving as a key agent in these endeavors.

Throughout the Army’s existence, the senior service has responded to the 

needs of the government, both in policy and in action. During the fi rst half 

of the nineteenth century, interrupted only by the War of 1812, this direction 

included much more than international warfare. In some cases, Army personnel undertook tasks that helped shape the direction and long-range policies of 

the nation. In this respect, the pre-Civil War Army played a unique role in the 

nation’s development. Examples of such events are highlighted below, and 

several are examined in this chapter.

1803 Louisiana Purchase

1804–06 Lewis and Clark expedition

1806–07 Captain Pike’s expedition

1815 Regular Army authorized at 10,000, plus the 

 Corps of Engineers

1817 First Seminole War 

1819 Florida ceded to the United States
44

American Military Heritage

1820 John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, draws up 

 “Expansible Army Concept”

1821 Army strength reduced; Major General Brown 

 stationed in Washington; he later becomes 

 Commanding General of the Army 

1822 Recruiting Depots opened in major cities; es- 

 tablishment of General Recruiting Service for 

 the Army. General Scott prepared new manual 

 of infantry tactics and Army Regulations of 

 1821

 First commissioned Surgeon General, Joseph 

 Lovell

1824 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1824 placed the 

 Corps of Engineers in control of nation’s 

 seaports and inland waterways

 Artillery School at Fort Monroe established

1832–35 Captain Benjamin Bonneville, 7th Infantry, 

 explores to the Pacifi c Coast 

1842–43 Lieutenant John C. Frémont’s exploration of 

 Oregon Trail to California 

1843 School for Infantry brigade drill established

Section II

Westward Exploration

In early 1804, President Thomas Jefferson made plans to explore the newly 

acquired Louisiana Territory. The previous year he had asked Congress for 

$2,500.00 to fi nance the exploration of the virgin territory west of the Mississippi River. On a rainy afternoon in May, Captain Meriwether Lewis and 

Lieutenant William Clark set out from St. Louis. They led a party consisting 

of fourteen soldiers of the Regular Army, nine hand-picked Kentucky frontiersmen, two French boatmen, Clark’s black servant, a civilian interpreter, 

Lewis’ Newfoundland dog, and, eventually, a Shoshone Indian squaw named 

Sacagawea and her infant child. Although Lewis and Clark had different personalities both displayed intelligence and resourcefulness. They complemented 
45

American Military Heritage

each other in their leadership and made a success of one of the rare cases of 

effective disunity of command.

The two explorers displayed their ingenuity while making preparations. They 

had to pack three years of goods in three small boats, a seemingly insurmountable problem, but one they adroitly mastered. They packed gunpowder in 

Chihuahua

Natchitoches

Pike's

Platte 

Santa 

Colorado 

Staked

Plain

Grande 

Platte

Arkansas 

Mississippi 

St. 

Columbia 

Sacramento 

Missouri 

Snake

Great 

Orleans

1803 – 1807

Miles

0 100 200 300 400 500

1805–1806

1806–1807

1804–1805

Lewis, 1806

Clark, 1806

Ohio R.

R.

R.

R.

R. R.

R.

R.

R.

Salt Lake

N.

S.

Peak

Fe

Rio 

New 

Louis

R.

R.

Westward Expansion and Exploration

Louisiana Purchase, 1803

Lewis and Clark, Date Indicated

Pike, Date Indicated

High ground above 3000 feet

thin sheets of lead which later they melted into bullets. Nearly every bale of 

supplies contained small packets of each of the expedition’s articles so that, 

if a bale was lost, the expedition would not be without the entire supply of 

any one article. Small lockers were placed along the sides of the boats so that 

in the event of attack the defenders could raise the lids to provide protection. 

The largest of the boats carried a new weapon for demonstration purposes, an 

air gun that did not need to be loaded, wadded or primed but was nearly as 

powerful as a Kentucky rifl e.

The expedition followed the Missouri River, crossed the Rocky Mountains, 

and journeyed to the Pacifi c, hoping to fi nd a continuous water route. Though 
46

American Military Heritage

that ultimate aim was not achieved, the expedition explored and mapped the 

water routes and observed and recorded information on the animals, plants, 

minerals, and other noteworthy details. Lewis and Clark also endeavored to 

make friendships with the Indian tribes they encountered and to establish trade 

with them if possible. Throughout the long trek the two offi cers repeatedly 

exhibited tact, ingenuity, and endurance. They completed their mission in 

September 1806. As a direct result of their efforts, a maze of trails westward 

opened, eventually resulting in the long wagon trains of the middle and late 

1800s.

While Lewis and Clark were conducting their journey west, Captain Zebulon 

Pike made two separate expeditions of a similar nature. The fi rst, in 1805–06 

was an excursion to the source of the Mississippi River. The second, a year 

later, found Pike moving westward into what is now Colorado, near the peak 

that bears his name, and then along a southern route into Mexico.

In each of the expeditions during this period, the U.S. Army played a unique 

role. In many cases the military reacted to the needs of the people and the 

government, and the Army led the way. As a result of these expeditions, the 

nation developed and expanded westward.

Section III

The Seminole Wars

In 1817, the Lower Creek and Seminole Indians carried out a series of 

raids and murders along the border between what is now Florida and 

Georgia. Since Florida belonged to Spain at the time, the United States 

did not cross the border in pursuit. In November, however, a large band 

of Indians ambushed an army supply boat on the Apalachicola River and 

killed or captured nearly all of the forty passengers, including the wives 

of soldiers. Slow-moving news caused nearly a month’s delay before the 

attack came to the attention of Washington. President James Monroe was 

outraged and immediately sent Major General Andrew Jackson to the 

border to take command.

Jackson interpreted the War Department’s instructions as permission to launch 

an invasion. He recruited a 3,000-man force of Kentucky, Tennessee, and 

Georgia militiamen as well as a friendly faction of the Creek Indians. For 

about three months, Jackson rampaged through Florida, burning Indian villages, destroying pockets of resistance as he encountered them, and leaving 

outposts in the Spanish territory. During this campaign, Jackson learned that 

the Indians who had conducted the raids had been agitated and trained by 

several adventurers from the Bahamas. When his troops located and captured 

two British citizens involved in these activities, Jackson tried them in a military 

court and had them executed.
47

American Military Heritage

General Jackson’s actions in invading Spanish territory and executing prisoners 

caused serious international problems. Fortunately, the British and Spanish 

governments did not press this matter. Negotiations with Spain for the purchase of Florida were already underway, with the United States taking formal 

possession in February 1819.

During this First Seminole 

War, the Army learned not 

to depend entirely on civilian suppliers for rations and 

other logistical support. 

Repeatedly, Army troops 

arrived at a prearranged 

delivery point to find no 

civilian supplier on hand. 

Congress remedied this 

problem in 1818, when it reestablished the Subsistence 

Department to improve the 

services provided by civilian contractors.

The Second Seminole War 

(1836–1842) began when 

the Seminoles, after giving 

up their ancestral lands by 

treaty, refused to leave and 

ambushed several small 

army forces in the area. 

This time, Washington 

dispatched Brgadier General Winfi eld Scott to organize a force to subdue the Indians. Scott made 

elaborate plans for his campaign but was unable to engage the Indians in 

strength. The Seminoles employed a form of guerrilla warfare totally unfamiliar to the American soldier and his commanders. During the following 

six years, Scott was succeeded by a series of commanders: Brevet Major 

General Thomas S. Jessup, Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor, and 

Brevet Brigadier General Walker K. Armistead. These offi cers tried with 

varying degrees of success to pin down the Indians. For instance, Taylor 

divided the whole area into small regions and attempted to run down the 

Indians with bloodhounds, a short-lived experiment that quickly roused the 

outrage of the American people. Finally, in 1841, Colonel William J. Worth 

campaigned through the summer, which kept the Indians from raising and 

harvesting that year’s food supply. His continuous campaigning brought the 

war to an offi cial end the following year.

4th U.S. Infantry Regiment, Summer 

Uniform, 1835–1842
48

American Military Heritage

As the First Seminole War prompted developments in the fi eld of logistics, 

the Second Seminole War revealed serious transportation defi ciencies. The 

Army possessed no wagons or light boats in its inventory suitable for the 

swamps and rivers of south Georgia and Florida. At General Jessup’s request, 

the Army hired mechanics and laborers to keep wagons and boats in repair. 

The War Department turned away from dependence on contractor-provided 

steamboats and switched to Army-owned steamboats, which were more reliable and cheaper. The Army also developed a light pontoon wagon with an 

India rubber cloth lining for crossing rivers. These lessons proved valuable 

during the Mexican War.

Section IV

Notes on Sylvanus Thayer and the

United States Military Academy

EARLY LIFE

Sylvanus Thayer was born in 1785 into a large family with military backgrounds in the Revolutionary War. At Dartmouth College, Thayer already 

knew Napoleon’s Italian Campaign “by heart.” He graduated from Dartmouth 

in 1807, completed the Military Academy’s requirements in one year, and received a commission. “In 1810 he served as assistant professor of mathematics 

at West Point, and he compiled a creditable record in the War of 1812.” He 

went to France in 1815 to 

study the European military 

schooling system. It was on 

this excursion that Thayer 

compiled the references, 

knowledge and classroom 

material that he would soon 

use as West Point’s fifth 

Superintendent.

THE

 SUPERINTENDENT

“The impression he made 

on cadets, the faculty, congressmen, and the public generally gave him the 

trust and support he needed 

in order to inaugurate his 

reforms. His personal appearance was majestic.... 

He carried himself with 

such dignity and dressed 
49

American Military Heritage

with such care that he looked like the ideal professional soldier.... His punctuality was unfailing and legendary.... He never married; the Academy was his 

only love.... The superintendent made each one of the cadets feel ‘that his eye 

was ever on them, both in their rooms and abroad, both in their studies and on 

parade.’ Thayer not only knew every cadet by name but had a general idea of 

where each stood in his class and how good, or poor, his behavior had been.”

THE DISCIPLINARIAN

“Thayer’s discipline was stricter even than that imposed upon students of civil 

colleges, and it was administered impartially and without fail.” He began his 

tenure by dismissing those cadets whom he considered “defi cient in natural 

abilities and destitute of qualities.” He limited cadet travel off post and initiated 

a one-year service obligation. “Thayer abolished the practice of annual vacations and instituted a summer encampment.” He instituted order of merit and 

continued the punishment tour system. Those cadets exceeding 200 demerits 

in one year were dismissed.

ACADEMY DEVELOPMENTS

Cadet Pay: “He also forbade them to bring money with them to West Point 

or to receive any from home, so that all cadets, rich or poor, lived on the same 

income — the $18.00 a month the government paid them.”

Relative Class Standing: “It was the merit roll, a device which allowed 

Thayer to rank each cadet within his class, so that at the end of four years he 

could say that the cadet ranking second in his class should be an engineer, 

while the cadet ranking thirty-fi rst ought to be in the infantry.”

Class Sectioning and Lesson Assignment: “It was that students should be 

taught in small sections, divided according to ability and that every student 

should be required to recite in class every day.... From then on each cadet 

received an assignment from the text each day, upon which he recited and 

was graded the next.”

General: In addition to the practices and customs mentioned above, Thayer 

instituted numerous systems and ideas such as regularly scheduled parades, 

post class examinations, a board of visitors and an entrance selection system. 

It is no wonder that he is referred to as the “Father of the Military Academy.”

Source:

Stephen E, Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore, 1966), 

pp. 63–86.
50

American Military Heritage

Section V

Notes on John C. Calhoun and the

War Department

CALHOUN’S INITIAL PROBLEMS

John C. Calhoun took offi ce as Secretary of War in 1817. He faced two major 

problems: postwar reorganization of the military establishment and meeting 

an outbreak of border warfare in the South. Public sentiment would not allow 

the retention of a large standing army. The Military Academy was in the throes 

of disorder over the dismissal of its superintendent. There was a tendency to 

economize after the tremendous expense of a war.

THE EXPANSIBLE ARMY CONCEPT

“Calhoun’s ‘expansible army’ was a national 

army, which would rely wholly on volunteers. 

It had, as he saw it, two tasks: to garrison the 

forts and posts and ‘keep in check our savage 

neighbors’.... This would be achieved by what 

be called in later years, ‘skeletonizing.’ Each 

infantry company would have a peacetime 

strength of thirty-seven men, to be reinforced 

to seventy-seven in time of need.... The result 

would be a powerful national force, unhampered 

by the state governors or the constitutional 

limitations on the use of the militia.” Calhoun’s 

plans, however, never went into effect.

CALHOUN’S LATER CONTRIBUTIONS

“During Calhoun’s tenure as Secretary of War the line of military posts and 

trading houses was extended into Indian territories west of the Mississippi, the 

supply and purchasing services of the Army were overhauled, and an improved 

diet was provided for the soldiers.... Calhoun also proposed a ‘school of practice’ 

for men in service, out of which in 1824 grew the Artillery School of Practice at 

Fort Monroe, Virginia.... One of Calhoun’s most important measures was an order 

requiring Army surgeons to keep detailed day-to-day weather records at all posts.”

WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION

“In 1821 the Regular Army was fi xed at seven regiments of infantry and four of 

artillery. The cavalry was abolished.... The Corps of Engineers was retained; and 

the cadets, who had been distributed to various regiments, were reassembled at 

West Point, in an authorized strength of 250, where the Engineers would train 

them.... The total authorized strength, men and offi cers, was 6,183.”

Sources: Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York,1956), pp 81, 83, 84.

George Gurney, A Pictorial History of the United States Army, (New York, 1966), pp. 

123–24.
51

American Military Heritage

Section VI

The Army’s Development

The history of the U.S. Army has recorded the shifts in organization, activities, and lifestyle of the American soldiers — aspects which, although of great 

importance to the warriors of the era, have not been given the attention they 

deserve since. One can fi nd many interesting topics in this area during the thirty 

years following the War of 1812. Each added its small bit or its particular tone 

to the fabric of the army of that period. 

REORGANIZATION AFTER THE WAR OF 1812

At the end of the war in 1815, the Regular Army totaled 33,000 men. Shortly 

thereafter, Congress set a ceiling of 10,000 men in addition to the unaltered 

Corps of Engineers. This army consisted of eight infantry regiments, eight 

artillery battalions, and one light artillery regiment. The Regiment of Light 

Dragoons (mounted infantry) was abolished. The Army also made provisions for a “General Staff,” although not of the same sort recognized today. 

The staff, under the Secretary of War, consisted of two major generals, four 

brigadier generals, an Adjutant, an Inspector General, a Quartermaster General, and several other special staff offi cers. The rest of the Army divided 

into territorial units, with the Division of the North (with four subordinate 

departments) under Major General Jacob Brown and the Division of the South 

(with fi ve subordinate departments) under Major General Andrew Jackson.

BREVET RANK

The custom of conferring temporary ranks, or “brevets,” on individuals for 

their outstanding service or gallantry remained in the Army until 1870. This 

custom proved both useful and confusing. While serving in his own regiment 

or corps, a “brevetted” offi cer was considered to be in his normal rank and 

seniority; however, should two different units serve together or on “other 

occasions,” according to the regulations, the offi cer assumed his brevet rank. 

This arrangement could, and did, present problems . George Armstrong Custer, 

for example, was brevetted a major general in the Civil War, but fought at the 

Little Big Horn as a lieutenant colonel. Nevertheless, he will probably always 

be known as “General Custer.”

ARMY RECRUITING

A reform of the recruiting system occurred in 1822. Prior to that time, each 

regiment had recruited individually, with many attractions and varying results. 

In 1822, the Eastern Department opened recruiting depots in New York, 

Philadelphia, and Baltimore to gain recruits for the Army at large. This system 

proved successful; however, each regiment continued to recruit separately, 

and, on occasion, entire volunteer units were raised. 
52

American Military Heritage

COAST AND HARBOR DEFENSES

While the Seminole Wars absorbed the Army’s tactical attention, its 

leaders pondered the strategic importance of defending the nation 

against possible conflict with England or France. As a result, Congress 

appropriated from $400,000 to $600,000 annually for the construction of 

harbor defenses. Some of these fortresses involved detailed design and 

construction, such as Fort Monroe, Virginia, but most were earthworks 

built over stone or brick walls. Arms also developed to keep pace with 

these needs. During the 1830s and 1840s, the Army placed heavy guns 

(24- and 32-pounders) in batteries overlooking sea approaches to some 

thirty-five east coast harbors.

THE ARMY MESS

Regimental- and post-level offi cers’ messes came into existence as a permanent 

custom in the U.S. Army in the fi rst half of the 19th Century. For instance, in 

1821, offi cers at Fort Independence in Boston Harbor dined in full dress each 

evening with a soldier, also in full dress, attending. In 1840, the 1st Artillery 

Regiment organized a mess in Houlton, Maine, and the West Point Army Mess 

came into existence a year later.

PAY IN THE 1830S

Pay in the 1830s ranged from $63.91 for second lieutenants to $172.66 for a 

full colonel. Brigadier and major generals made $257.75 and $401.50 a month 

respectively. Company commanders and staff offi cers made $10.00 a month 

extra. As an indication of the buying power of dollars in the 1830s, a soldier 

could buy a very respectable gallon of whiskey for about thirty cents. Enlisted 

pay at about $13.00 a month was competitive with civilian wages when room, 

board, and medical costs are factored.

OFFICERS AND NCOS

Although Congress initially rejected Calhoun’s expansible army program, the 

Secretary of War still sought to instill professionalism into the small offi cer 

and noncommissioned offi cer corps. The small number of offi cers quickly 

became overextended, creating a shortage at company levels. Efforts were 

made to improve NCO training out of necessity, but as the NCOs demonstrated 

their abilities, that process tended to accelerate. Some sergeants even found 

themselves commanding companies during the absence of the company commander and his offi cers.

The Army Regulations of 1821 were the fi rst to establish a systematic method 

of selecting noncommissioned offi cers. Each regimental commander appointed 

the NCOs based on the recommendation of the respective company commanders. Calhoun’s emphasis on standardizing NCO selection resulted directly 

from his desire to strengthen the corps’ professionalism. This attitude extended 

to uniforms. After years of experimentation, the Army adopted chevrons 
53

American Military Heritage

in 1821. NCO duties were set forth in Scott’s Infantry Drill Regulations. 

These regulations placed the ultimate responsibility for the training, wellbeing, and readiness of a company’s enlisted men on the NCOs in charge. 

Specifi cally, these included checking the appearance and conditions of barracks and the status and serviceability of the troops’ uniforms and equipment.

During the 1830s and 1840s, the only sources of combat experience for the 

junior offi cers and NCOs were the Seminole Wars, the bitter struggle against 

skillful Indian chief Black Hawk across the Mississippi River, and occasional 

campaigns as the frontier expanded westward. Because much of this service was 

performed by company- and battalion-sized elements drawn from scattered posts, 

junior officers and NCOs 

became involved in a much 

wider variety of activities 

other than a conventional 

conflict. Fortunately, this 

training prepared them for 

leadership responsibilities 

when war broke out with 

Mexico in 1846.

In 1842, at the conclusion 

of the Second Seminole 

War, Congress again cut 

the strength of the Army 

from 12,500 to 8,600. This 

reduction differed from the 

earlier one, because the 

legislators fi nally decided 

to follow Calhoun’s expansible army plan. Only 

the number of privates in 

each company was reduced. 

No regiments or companies 

were disbanded. This policy contributed to nurturing 

an experienced offi cer and 

NCO corps.

Source: 

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr. And Robert K. Wright, Jr., eds., The Story of the Noncommissioned Offi cer Corps: The Backbone of the Army (Washington, D.C., 1989), pp. 52, 

54, 57–58.

Indian Scout, Infantry Offi cer, Infantrymen in 

Summer and Winter Uniform, 1839
54

American Military Heritage

Section VII

The Alamo

Nearly every American has a mental picture of the Alamo — the dusty, brown, 

adobe brick mission; a handful of valiant Texans defending to the last man; 

and Davy Crockett dying courageously with weapon in hand. Only a small 

percentage of people today are aware of the circumstances of the Texas War 

for Independence, of which the Alamo was but a part.

In 1822, the United States recognized the newly independent Mexico, which 

at the time claimed Texas. Mexico adopted an attractive immigration policy, 

and 15,000 homesteaders and several thousand black slaves settled in the 

region. In 1830, due to intensifying boundary problems and unstable Mexican politics, Mexico reversed her position on immigrants and placed severe 

restrictions on homesteading in the northern territory. The problems that arose 

as a result grew into an open revolt in 1835, and, in 1836, Texas proclaimed 

independence. General Antonio López de Santa Anna, at the head of the 

Mexican Army, captured the fortress of the Alamo in a now historic siege 

that lasted thirteen days. The public outcry “Remember the Alamo” became 

a familiar exhortation, and volunteers rushed to Texas. On April 21, 1836, at 

San Jacinto, General Sam Houston, at the head of 743 raw troops, met and 

defeated a force of 1,600 veteran soldiers under Santa Anna. In March 1837, 

Texas became an independent Republic.

Most Texans felt that their independence was simply a declaration of separation 

from Mexico, and that the republic would be annexed by the United States as 

a state. The question of annexation, however, was heatedly debated because 

of the slavery controversy. As a result, Texas would not become a state for 

nearly ten years. During this period, the Texas–Mexico border endured ruthless border raids and continual unrest sparked by both Mexicans and Texans.
55

American Military Heritage

5

The Mexican War and After

Section I

Mexican War and Postwar Overview

On March 1, 1845, Congress voted to accept the Lone Star Republic as 

 a part of the Union. Mexico promptly severed diplomatic relations. 

 President James K. Polk hoped to settle the brewing storm through 

negotiations. In mid-June, anticipating a quick Texan acceptance of annexation, he ordered Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor to move his forces 

from Fort Jesup on the Louisiana border to a position “on or near” the Rio 

Grande. From that position, he would repel any invasion from Mexico. Taylor 

transported most of his 1,500-man force by steamboat from New Orleans and 

sent his dragoons of mounted infantrymen overland via San Antonio to the 

banks of the Nueces River near the hamlet of Corpus Christi. Over the next 

six months he built up his army to nearly 4,000 men and subjected it to a 

strict training regimen. In February 1846 he received orders from Washington 

The Mexican War 1846–1847

Axis of U.S. Advance

High ground above 6000 feet

0 100 200 300

Miles

Santa Fe

San

Diego

Gila R.

Kearny 1846 El Paso

Rio Grande R.

Texas

Pacific Ocean

Nueces R.

Doniphan 1847

Corpus 

Christi

Ft Isabel

Ft Brown

Matamoros

CamargoScott 1847

Lobas I

Cerro Garda

Vera Cruz Puebla

Mexico 

City

Jalapa

San Louis

Potosi

Lower California

Parras

Saltillo

Buena

Vista

Monterrey

Chihuahua

Tampico

Victoria

Upper California

ARK

LA Brazos R.

Sabine R.

Ft Jesup

Wool 1846

Taylor

1846
56

American Military Heritage

to advance to the Rio Grande. Meanwhile, negotiations had broken down, 

and Taylor began to construct Fort Texas (later to become Fort Brown) 

across the river from Matamoros. He also established a supply base at Point 

Isabel. The American general made peaceful overtures to the Mexican 

commander, who countered these by threats and 

warnings. On April 25, a 

Mexican force crossed the 

Rio Grande and attacked 

a dragoon reconnoitering 

patrol, killing and wounding several Americans and 

capturing the commander 

and the rest.

The war lasted a little over 

two years and took place 

in two major theaters of 

operation. First, President 

Polk wanted to seize all of 

the land in question north 

of the Rio Grande and Gila 

River and westward to the 

Pacifi c. His chief military 

planner and Commanding General of the Army, 

Major General Winfield 

Scott, planned to do this 

through a three pronged offensive. These actions took 

place after Taylor’s initial 

battlefi eld victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma on May 8–9, 1846 

and the declaration of war by the United States on May 13. Under this plan, 

Taylor’s force drove west to capture the key city of Monterrey in September 

1846. A second expedition under Brigadier General John E. Wool advanced 

from San Antonio into northern Mexico to join Taylor. The third prong 

under Colonel Stephen W. Kearny thrust westward to San Diego from Fort 

Leavenworth. Part of Kearny’s force under Col. Alexander W. Doniphan 

later moved south through Chihuahua to Parras. Fighting in northern Mexico 

essentially came to a close following Taylor’s narrow victory over Santa 

Anna at Buena Vista, a major achievement since Scott had taken most of 

his best troops to join his invasion of Mexico at Vera Cruz. The Americans 

settled into occupation duty and occasional clashes with Mexican guerrilla 

forces and bandits. 

Dragoon, Infantry Offi cer, Campaign Dress, 

Infantry Column, Campaign Dress, 1847
57

American Military Heritage

The second theater of operations in Washington’s master strategy opened 

in 1847 and involved an amphibious landing at Vera Cruz and a march 

to Mexico City. General Scott engineered, planned, organized, and commanded this campaign. After surrounding and capturing Vera Cruz, he 

advanced westward, winning along the way a series of victories at Cerro 

Gordo, Contreras, Churubusco and Chapultepec, until he reached his ultimate goal, Mexico City. Scott triumphantly entered the city on September 

14. Here too, the U.S. Army assumed occupation duties, mapped the region, 

and fought guerrillas and bandits preying on its line of communications 

to the coast. 

On February 2, 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe 

Hidalgo was signed. The occupation troops 

marched out of Mexico City in June, and on 

August 1, the last Americans boarded their transport ships at Vera Cruz and left Mexican soil. 

By the terms of this treaty, Mexico recognized 

the Rio Grande as the boundary of Texas and 

ceded New Mexico (including the present states 

of Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Nevada, a 

small corner of present-day Wyoming, and the 

western and southern portions of Colorado) and 

Upper California (the present state of California) 

to the United States.

The Mexican War produced many “fi rsts” in American military history. 

For the fi rst time, an American army fought house-to-house in city streets 

at Monterey. Also for the fi rst time, American forces deployed overseas to 
58

American Military Heritage

fi ght in a land whose climate, terrain, and people differed entirely from that 

with which they were accustomed. The amphibious landing at Vera Cruz 

and the use of transport vessels by both Taylor and Scott far surpassed 

earlier logistical efforts, and for the fi rst time, steamboats saw extensive 

service. Finally, the American army faced, for the fi rst time, the duties of 

establishing and administering a system of military government over an 

occupied nation.

The tactical improvements made possible by the advances in weapons, organization and training greatly contributed to the battlefi eld victories of the 

Mexican War. Then, as now, NCOs played a key role as trainers. Because 

they supervised daily drill, they worked with offi cers to master the “the school 

of the soldier,” as basic training was then known. For training purposes, a 

typical company in peacetime garrison organized enlisted men into four 

squads. In these squads soldiers learned various drills, practiced maneuvers 

at the company level, and gained skill and confi dence in handling artillery. 

At Palo Alto, Major Samuel Ringgold’s “fl ying artillery” battery epitomized 

these efforts when it galloped into action, unlimbered, loaded, and fi red 

point-blank into enemy guns, annihilating their crews. When the Mexicans 

broke through the Americans’ left fl ank at Buena Vista, American batteries 

quickly moved from point to point, mounting and dismounting, limbering 

and unlimbering, fi ring shot and canister at enemy ranks. These batteries and 

the handful of others available to Taylor and Scott enabled American troops, 

although usually outnumbered, to stage successful invasions and eventually 

force the Mexicans to sue for peace.

By 1848, the army had decreased to roughly the size of the army of 1815. 

The decade of the 1850s became one of the establishment of western frontier 

forts, particularly in the Mexican Cession territories, experimentation in 

arms and equipment, and slight increases in strength. One interesting (and 

short-lived) experiment entailed the use of camels as pack animals to supply 

frontier posts in the arid Southwest.

The small Corps of Topographical Engineers played a leading role. Some 

knowledge of the frontier had been gained by the earlier expeditions of 

Captain Benjamin L.E. Bonneville, an infantryman, who made valuable 

observations concerning the Pacifi c Coast in the 1830s; Colonel Stephen 

W. Kearny, who led a force of dragoons over the Oregon Trail in 1845; 

and Lieutenant John C. Frémont, a topographical engineer, who led several expeditions through the Rocky Mountains to California in the 1840s. 

More knowledge was gained during the war by topographical engineers 

attached to the commands in the fi eld. They recorded data and mapped 

the regions traversed. In the decade that followed the war, topographical 

engineers surveyed the new border with Mexico and surveyed routes for 

transcontinental railroads. 
59

American Military Heritage

The highlights below summarize the key dates in the development of the 

heritage of the U.S. Army during the Mexican War period:

1845 Texas accepts annexation statute

 General Taylor moves forces to Corpus Christi

1846

 Feb Move to Rio Grande and establish Fort Texas

 25 Apr Opening skirmish north of the Rio Grande

 8 May Battle of Palo Alto

 9 May Battle of Resaca de la Palma

 13 May War declared

 19–24 Sep Battle of Monterey

1846–47 Kearney, Wool, and Doniphan expeditions

1847

 22–23 Feb Battle of Buena Vista

 27 Mar Battle of Vera Cruz

 12 Apr Battles of Cerro Gordo, Contreras, 

 to 8 Sep Churubusco, and Chapultepec

 14 Sep Surrender of Mexico City and fi rst taste of 

 occupation duty

1848

 2 Feb Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo

1849 California Gold Rush

1848 to 1860 Exploration, pacifi cation of Indians, and sur- 

 vey for transcontinental railroads

Section II

Notes on the Battles of Palo Alto

 and Resaca De La Palma

One of the most turbulent battles of the Mexican War began on May 7, 1846, 

west of Fort Texas, in the thick scrub brush country near a small place called 

Palo Alto. General Taylor commanded the American forces, which included 

Major Ringgold’s fl ying artillery and two-18 pounder siege pieces. Taylor employed all of his artillery in the main line of battle with the heavier 18-pounders 

in the center. The Mexicans attempted to fl ank the southern end of the American force, but Lieutenant Randolph Ridgely and two of Ringgold’s artillery 

pieces unlimbered and smashed the Mexican charge. The artillery duel that 

followed the unsuccessful charge started several grass fi res, which obscured 
60

American Military Heritage

both battle lines for several hours. A later charge by the Mexican infantry 

into Taylor’s left fl ank met Captain James Duncan’s battery of conventional 

pieces, which quickly broke the enemy formations into small, disorganized 

bands. An infantry observer said, “Duncan’s fi re was terrible and awesome in its effect.” The indirect fi re of the Mexican 12-pounders, although 

Wagon

Train

8th

4th

3rd

4th

May

May

May

Churchill

Duncan

Duncan

Ridgely

Ridgely

3rd

5th Enemy's Last Position

Enemy's Original Line

R e s e r v e

N

U.S. Mexico

Infantry

Cavalry

Artillery

Battle of Palo Alto

May 8, 1846

0 1/2 1

Miles

Ringgold

First Deployed Position

Wagon Train

Guard

Enemy's Attempt

in Outflank
61

American Military Heritage

relatively heavy, did not match the versatility or the accuracy of Taylor’s 

artillery. The American victory, however, came at a price. Taylor lost his 

brilliant artilley commander, Maj. Ringgold, who was mortally wounded. 

This and subsequent battles plus the high rate of illnesses in armies of this 

period would cost the lives of more young offi cers and men.

8th 4th

4th

4th

4th

May

Rancheros

Reserve

Arista

3rd 5th

Battle of Resaca De La Palma

May 9, 1846

U.S. Mexico

Infantry

Cavalry

Artillery

N

Ridgely

Wagon

Train

Reserve

To Palo Alto
62

American Military Heritage

That evening, the Mexican 

Army withdrew to a dry 

riverbed, edged on both 

sides by thick, tangled vegetation. Taylor pursued but 

left the 18-pounders well to 

the rear. The opposing forces (deployed as shown on 

the map) found themselves 

limited, in artillery, to their 

fl ying batteries and smallest 

fi eld pieces. General Taylor 

wisely chose to employ 

infantry troops in the close 

terrain and, employing Capt. 

Charles A. May’s detachment of dragoons, routed 

the enemy from the battlefi eld. Careful battle analysis 

and eyewitness accounts of 

the battle of Resaca de la 

Palma indicate that Taylor’s 

bullheaded pursuit and his 

courageous infantry were 

simply superior in combat 

effectiveness to the Mexican 

General Mariano Arista and 

his previously highly touted 

cavalry armed with lances.

1st U.S. Dragoon Regiment, Undress Uniform, 

1845–1851

Mexican Army, 1835
63

American Military Heritage

Section III

Notes on the Battle of Vera Cruz

When General Scott arrived in Mexico in late December 1846, he took with 

him almost all of Taylor’s Regulars and left the northern army with only 

volunteers and artillery. The troops that Scott would use in the amphibious assault loaded into transports at the mouth of the Rio Grande and met the 

remainder of the invasion 

force at Lobos Island, almost fi fty miles south of 

Tampico. In a small boat, 

Scott, his commanders, 

and a party of engineer offi cers that included Robert 

E. Lee, George G. Meade, 

Joseph E. Johnston, and 

Pierre G.T. Beauregard 

came close to shore to reconnoiter and were almost 

hit by a shell fi red from an 

island fortress opposite 

Vera Cruz. If the shell 

had struck the vessel, the 

course of the Mexican War, as well as the Civil War, might have changed. 

Once Scott had selected the landing site (see map) and reconnoitered the 

harbor, he transferred the landing force from the transport ships to specially 

designed landing craft, consisting of sixty-fi ve surf boats that had been towed 

to the area by steamers. The entire force, backed by Commodore Matthew C. 

Perry’s 32-pounders and 8-inch naval guns, formed a semicircle and, as the 

signal gun fi red, rapidly swept toward the beach. With the seamen straining 

at their oars, the infantry soldiers with bayonets ready and the crash of naval 

gunfi re, the fi rst major amphibious landing of the U.S. Army had begun. The 

landing was largely unopposed, and in four hours, more than 10,000 men 

had gone safely ashore. Shortly after the landing, the New Orleans Bulletin

printed the following remarks:

The removal of a large body of troops from numerous transports 

into boats in an open sea — their subsequent disembarkation on the 

sea beach, on an enemy’s coast, through a surf, with all their arms 

and accouterments, without a single error or accident, requires great 

exertion, skill, and sound judgment.

A more recent Army concept of amphibious operations, probably without 

consulting the New Orleans Bulletin of 1847, envisions:

Commodore Perry's 

Fleet

Castle

City

N Scott's

Force

City and Castle of

Vera Cruz
64

American Military Heritage

Technical problems of logistics represented by loading thousands of 

troops and large quantities of material into ships at widely separated 

embarkation points, moving them to the objective, then landing them 

in exactly the proper sequence, usually on open beaches or landing 

zones and under fi re initially, all require extraordinary attention in 

the form of detailed planning.

The similarity between Scott’s fl otilla of double ended surf boats and the mighty 

armadas of Normandy and Inchon are evident. The Vera Cruz operation showed 

the rudiments of amphibious warfare doctrine and technique.

Section IV

Notes on Uniforms of the Mexican War

By today’s standards, both 

Taylor’s and Scott’s American armies in the Mexican 

War wore uniforms that 

exhibited a variety of types; 

only fi ve of the more colorful and unusual categories 

are considered here.

The Texas Ranger:

“Their clothing was of the 

roughest sort. For an upper garment a coarse red 

or blue shirt or a greasy 

fringed hunting jacket suffi ced; their trousers tucked 

into ‘mule’s ear’ boots 

or ‘breed leggins.’ Most 

wore the low crowned 

slouch hat so familiar in 

the Southwest of that day.”

The Mississippi Rifles:

“They too were rifl emen, 

but they carried the new 

percussion weapon just being issued to the Regulars. Their clothing was 

equally simple — red fl annel shirts, Panama hats, and white duck trousers, but 

the men were not frontiersmen. At their head rode Colonel Jefferson Davis.”

2d Artillery: “It was the only fully mounted ‘horse artillery’ in the entire army.... 

The men of this company were authorized a distinctive uniform — alone of all 

the Artillery, they wore dark blue jackets like the Dragoons, but trimmed with 

Colonel Hays’s Regiment, Texas 

Mounted Volunteers, 1846–1848
65

American Military Heritage

red instead of yellow lace.... After the war began, an 

additional ‘light’ company was authorized for each 

regiment....These foot artillerymen of the Third 

were uniformed and equipped as infantry when so 

serving, but they never gave up their yellow lace 

and brass buttons.” 

Topographical Engineers: “The offi cers of the 

Corps of Engineers and the affi liated topographical service were the 

elite of the Army.... 

It was their duty on campaign to construct temporary fortifi cations, bridges, and roads and to 

destroy enemy obstacles. They also planned 

marches and positions.... In short, the Engineer 

offi cer of the nineteenth century performed almost 

all the functions which today are assigned to a 

general staff; in particular, he was the intelligence 

offi cer.” Their uniforms were of somber blue hue 

trimmed in black velvet, and they wore forage 

caps in matching fabric.

Dragoon, 1853–1854: In 

1851 the Army adopted a 

French style uniform featuring frock coat and cap, 

and black leather accounterments which became 

the basis for the style of 

uniform worn throughout 

the Civil War.

Chevrons: The Army instituted chevrons to denote 

noncommissioned rank for 

wear on the fatigue dress. 

The chevrons were large, 

extending from seam to 

seam, and were worn by 

soldiers with the point upward. Chevrons took the 

color of the worsted lace of 

the branch: artillery, yellow; infantry, white; and 

dragoons, orange.

2nd U.S. Dragoon Regiment, 1851–1854
66

American Military Heritage

Section V

Scott and Taylor: A Contrast in Generalship

Although General Scott’s and General Taylor’s lives, experiences, characters and military efforts were different, history drew them into national 

prominence at the same time during the Mexican War. By the mid-1840s, 

the two generals had served their country faithfully for over thirty years in 

peace and war. Both had commanded large bodies of troops and had played 

major roles in the nation’s defense. Taylor and Scott had been the object 

of much political maneuvering and had, at varying times, been associated 

with the political party in power. In short, considering the constraints of 

the times, both were successful military men at the height of their careers. 

But there the similarities ended.

A product of the pre-West Point concept of the Army, Zachary Taylor, 

popularly known as “Old Rough and Ready,” was a cautious commander 

who, by his own admission, was old and tired. He had lost much of the 

sense of urgency and the burning ambition of his youth, and it seemed 

to take the violence of combat to arouse him. In his private letters and 

particularly after his early victories, Taylor expressed a desire to step 

down and allow Scott to assume the fi eld command. Rough-hewn, plain, 

almost unschooled, and unimaginative, his steady rise refl ected luck and 

determination more than brilliance or knowledge of the art of war. History 

has not judged Taylor a brilliant tactician or strategist, nor does he appear 

to have been a leader who became deeply involved in the details of his 

army’s operation. The key to Taylor’s success as a fi eld leader lay in an 

excellent physical and moral courage that earned the admiration of those 

serving under him, including Ulysses S. Grant. One fi nds many accounts 

of his having sat astride his horse, wearing his farmer’s coat, in the very 

heart of a raging battle with no apparent regard for his safety and a seeming disdain for the enemy’s fi re. 

As noted above, “Old Fuss and Feathers” Scott was in many ways the 

opposite of Taylor. Even in the heat of Mexico and under the constant 

strain of battle, the courtly Scott demanded exactness and precision in 

the dress and actions of his subordinates. Yet, for all his vanity, he was 

a remarkably successful general. Although involved in political and governmental maneuvers in Washington, he asked for the chance to assume 

command in the field and gain the acclaim and public applause accorded 

a victorious commander. A diligent student of military affairs, Scott displayed a profound grasp of the details of strategy, tactics and logistics. At 

the same time, his intelligence and humanity in administering occupied 

Mexico earned such respect from the Mexicans that some offered to make 
67

American Military Heritage

him a dictator. Scott’s personal courage could be equated with Taylor’s, 

but he supposedly displayed his fearlessness in a more planned and practical manner. The stately Virginian was the outstanding American military 

leader of the period between the Revolution and the Civil War.

What then really distinguished the generalship of Taylor from that of Scott 

and why are these differences so important? The differences lie primarily in 

the realms of personality, appearance and technique. Yet, although these styles 

of generalship differed widely, they both resulted in gifted and successful 

military leaders.

Section VI

Notes on Weapons of the Mexican War Era

The Mexican War was a war of muskets and cannon. As seen in the battles at 

Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the basic developments in artillery lay not 

in the construction of new equipment or shot, but in the techniques of their employment. The same 6-, 8- and 12-pounders that, for years, had proved massive 

and immobile on the battlefi elds of Europe became highly mobile and versatile 

weapons when the Army formed them into mounted batteries. The best known 

American example of entirely mounted artillery was, of course, Ringgold’s fl ying artillery at Palo Alto. Rifl ed barrels in fi eld pieces were the subject of many 

experiments during this period; however, they were neither suffi ciently perfected 

nor widely produced to be of great use before the American Civil War.

Individual weaponry, rifl es, muskets and pistols played a vital role in the close 

confi nes of battles such as Resaca de la Palma. The individual tools of war found 

in those dry river beds represented, for the most part, neither highly inventive nor 

contemporary masterpieces of the times. In most cases, they were twenty- and 

thirty-year-old weapons that had passed their periods of maximum usefulness 

and were nearing old age. A representative selection of the individual weapons 

of the Mexican War and pre-Civil War periods are shown below:

U.S. Flintlock Musket, Model 1822: This musket was a popular .69-caliber 

model, which Springfi eld and Harper’s Ferry Armories manufactured with but 

few alterations until 1840, It weighed 10 pounds and used a 16-inch bayonet. 

Some of these weapons still were in service in 1861, much to the alarm of the 

militia to whom they were issued. 

U.S. Percussion Musket, Model 1841: The Army issued this .69-caliber 

fi rearm at the front during the Mexican War, but it was ill-received by the 

soldiers. This musket had a rifl ed barrel patterned after a design by the French 

offi cer Minie.
68

American Military Heritage

Hall Flintlock Rifl e (1811): This was the Army’s fi rst breech loader and also 

one of the fi rst weapons to incorporate the concept of interchangeable parts. 

Soldiers found them more desirable than any of the existing muzzle loaders, 

but they were still not universally popular with the troops.

U.S. Percussion Pistol, Model 1842: This pistol was made by the Middletown, 

Springfi eld and Palmetto armories. The naval models of this .54-caliber pistol 

had an anchor stamped on the rear of the barrel.

U.S. Flintlock Pistol, Model 1836: This .54-caliber pistol was manufactured 

in both Milbury, Massachusetts, and Middletown, Connecticut, by small arms 

companies. It used an 8-inch barrel and was in production until 1844. Many of 

these pistols were converted to percussion mechanisms in the 1850s.

Colt Walker Revolver, 

Model 1847: This was one 

of Colt’s earlier models and 

one that was both popular 

with its contemporary users 

U.S. Rifl e, Percussion, Model 1841: This .54-caliber weapon was also produced by the Harper’s Ferry and Springfi eld armories and was known as the 

Mississippi or “Yager” rifl e. The Army fi rst issued the weapon to troops from 

Mississippi (thus the name) and employed it well into the Civil War. The patch 

box and cover in the stock were of brass.

U.S. Rifl ed Musket, Maynard Primer, Model 1855: This .58-caliber weapon 

used an unusual priming device, which was the invention of Dr. Edward 

Maynard. A supposedly waterproof tape with patches of fulminate at intervals 

was fed past the nipple by the gun’s hammer. As each patch was expended, it 

was cut off by the hammer and the next patch exposed. The operator of this 

fi rearm experienced a great deal of diffi culty in keeping the caps dry; thus the 

weapon enjoyed only a medium degree of popularity.
69

American Military Heritage

and one that has remained popular with collectors. Colt manufactured 1,000 

of them. 

Colt Army Dragoon Revolver: This was Colt’s popular “Dragoon” model, a 

name it drew from its users. This six-shot, .44 caliber, 14-inch pistol weighed 

4 pounds. The soldier carried one on his person and one in a saddle holster.

Wesson and Leavitt Percussion Revolver, 1837: One of the unique pistols 

of the period was this six shot, .40 caliber weapon whose cylinder could be 

turned in either direction by hand. One of the earliest American revolvers, 

it came in a .31 caliber version, and one could purchase several different 

barrel lengths.

Colt Navy Revolver, Model 1851: Many unusual, and occasionally bizarre, 

weapons appeared during the pre-Civil War period. This .36 caliber, six-shot 

revolver was one of the most successful and universally popular of the “unusual” efforts. It boasted a detachable stock with an inset canteen for holding 

drinking water. The canteen cap was held in place by a small metal chain.
70

American Military Heritage

6

The Civil War

Section I

Preliminaries

The Civil War was the most encompassing experience in the history of our 

nation. Over three million Americans served in either the Union or the Confederate armies, of whom over 600,000 died from combat or disease. Thousands 

more were wounded. Veteran amputees were a common sight in towns and 

cities in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America. The Civil War 

also gripped the economy and the very heart of the nation in a way that no event 

or series of events has done since. Scholars have estimated that four years of 

war cost the Federal government over three billion dollars; the economic cost 

to the nation as a whole is incalculable. Payments of benefi ts to the wives of 

some Union Army veterans continued into the late-1990s.

War in the 1860s encompassed many of the activities and feelings that war 

has embodied since its beginnings. Men marched, weapons fi red, cannon 

roared, the hooves of cavalry mounts drummed on dusty roads, men laughed 

and cried and died — all these things American 

soldiers have done in all wars. But the Civil War 

was unique in certain special ways. In this war, 

men occasionally fi red at each other in anger and 

then later in the day swapped tobacco, a bit of 

coffee, the hometown paper and such humor as 

was possible. This war saw a mixture of older 

customs and practices with modern technology 

and application. It saw the introduction of modern 

equipment and techniques that would eventually 

signal the end of massive infantry frontal attacks, 

advances by artillery in line with infantry, and 

the unsupported cavalry charge. And, it would 

see the beginning of the idea of “total war,” when 

the economical and social base of an enemy nation was subject to the same 

destruction as its armies.

Prior to the election of Abraham Lincoln as President on November 6, 1860, 

tensions over the issue of extending slavery into the western territories mounted 

alarmingly, and the nation moved closer toward disunion. Along with slavery, 

the shifting social, economic, political and constitutional problems of a fastgrowing nation created tensions between southern and northern states. With 
71

American Military Heritage

Lincoln’s election to the presidency, South Carolina declared that the union 

then existing between that state and other states, under the name of the 

“United States of America,” was dissolved. One by one, other southern 

states began to secede from the Union, joining South Carolina as part of the 

“Confederate States of America.” Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that an 

“insurrection” existed, and immediately called on the states of the Union to 

provide 75,000 militia for three month’s service. By May 1861, eleven southern states were in open 

armed rebellion against the 

Federal government. 

Both sides had to build almost entirely new armies. 

The United States Army 

early in 1861 consisted of 

fewer than 20,000 offi cers 

and men scattered in 198 

companies, the majority of 

which were in the Western 

territories. The North’s 

militia which numbered 

in the neighborhood of 

3,000,000 on paper was, 

in reality, nonexistent as 

a fighting force. A few 

militia units in both the 

North and the South had 

uniforms and had undergone some military training; however, the majority 

of such organizations had 

disintegrated to nothing 

more than social organizations. Of course, the militias of each of the states of the Confederacy were 

lost to the Union as their respective states seceded. When the break came, 

most enlisted men of the Regular Army continued to serve with the unit in 

which they were enlisted. However, of the 1,036 Regular Army offi cers on 

active duty, 286 resigned and offered their allegiance to the Confederacy. 

With the exception of Major General David E. Twiggs’ surrender of his 

entire command to Texas Confederates, the majority of the U.S. Army offi cers who decided to join the rebellion offi cially submitted resignations 

before their actual departures.

Several Southern-born offi cers in the United States forces decided to continue in Federal service. The most notable was the seventy-four-year-old 

3rd Regiment (Hussars), New York State 

Militia, 1850–1860
72

American Military Heritage

Commanding General of the Army, Winfi eld Scott. Many historians feel 

that he alone was capable of making a strategic analysis of the problems 

facing the two governments at the outset of the war. He did this and quickly 

recommended to President Lincoln a three-part plan. The fi rst part called for 

a blockade of Southern ports to cut off the possibility of outside economic 

aid. The second involved raising a large army to conduct an offensive down 

the Mississippi River to divide the Confederacy into halves. The fi nal stage 

would involve increased military pressure to overwhelm the rebel states both 

militarily and economically. The public discounted Scott’s plan because they 

expected the rebellion to be over by year’s end. But Scott’s “Anaconda Plan,” 

as it was called, would appear again, in the successful operations carried out 

by Grant and Sherman four long and costly years later.

Although many bloody, brilliant battles took place throughout the four long 

years of war, those fought in 1862 offer an overview of the tactics and techniques of many of the war’s great leaders. 

The chart on the following pages summarizes each of the battles mentioned 

and lists the opposing commanders and results.

West 1862

 Area/Date Actions Commander Result

6–15 Feb Twin Rivers Union: Grant Confederates sur-

 Campaign Confed: Johnston render forts and 

(6 Feb) (Fort Henry) abandon Kentucky 

(15 Feb) (Fort Donelson) and middle and west 

 Tennessee. Lost 

 local industry &

 transportation cen-

 ter at Nashville.

6 Apr Shiloh Union: Grant Confederates have

 Confed: Johnston 

 initial success but

 delay in attacking:

 lose advantage and 

 have to withdraw after

 Union counterattack.

 

10 Apr New Orleans Union: Butler Only Vicksburg and

 Confed: Lovell Port Hudson left 

 blocking Federal

 control of

 Mississippi. 
73

American Military Heritage

7 Oct Perryville Union: Buell Tactical stalemate

 Confed: Bragg but Confederate

 casualties force 

 them to withdraw. 

 

31 Dec–2 Jan Stones River Union: Rosecrans Tactically a draw

 (Nashville) Confed: Bragg but immobilized

 Union Army of the 

 Cumberland for

 six months.

East 1862

 Area/Date Actions Commander Result

23 Mar–9 Jun Shenandoah Union: Banks Six battles, fi ve

 Valley Confed: Jackson Confederate vic-

 tories. Prevented 

 Union reinforce-

 ment against Rich-

 mond and threatened

 Washington.

 

26 Jun–2 Jul Seven Days’ Union: McClellan Confederates pro-

 Battles Confed: Lee tect Richmond with

 small force, main

 body on offensive.

 Lee out-maneuvers

 McClellan but attacks

 badly coordinated &

 frontal attack costly.

 Both armies withdraw. 

13 Jul–30 Aug Second Union: McClellan, Lee in dangerous

 Manassas Pope position between

 (Bull Run) Confed: Lee, Pope and McClellan.

 Jackson Jackson out maneuvers 

 Pope, moves and 

 destroys Union sup-

 ply base. Lee’s

 daring and rapid 

 movement defeated

 Pope’s Army in

 presence of Mc-

 Clellan’s Army.
74

American Military Heritage

Area/Date Actions Commander Result

12 Sep–18 Sep Invasion of Union: McClellan Lee’s plan fell into 

 Maryland Confed:Lee enemy hands, 

 (Antietam) but McClellan fails

 to capitalize. 

 Although Lee 

 pinned between

 Antietam Creek & 

 Potomac by superior 

 force, the Union failed 

 to commit reserve and

 a bloody draw resulted.

 

13 Dec Fredericksburg Union: Burnside Lee on defensive and 

 Confed: Lee repulses Federal 

 frontal attacks. 

 Casualties: 

 Union —12,000; 

 Confederate—5,300

Section II

Notes on the Presidents Davis and Lincoln

JEFFERSON DAVIS, 1808–1889

Early Life: Born 1808 in a Kentucky log cabin, he attended back country 

schools and then Transylvania College. He entered West Point in 1824 and 

graduated 23d in class of 33.

Army Career: Davis served during his early army career as the commander 

of logging camps along the frontier, where he gained a reputation as a strong 

and fair offi cer. In 1834, he was forced to defend 

himself in a military court for having missed a 

formation while suffering from pneumonia. He 

did so skillfully and with such dignity that he 

was not only acquitted but gained a reputation 

for being self-confi dent and convincing in his 

arguments. Davis served with distinction as a 

senator and in the War with Mexico as the commander of the Mississippi Rifl es. He led his unit 

well and took deep personal pride in having won 

a victory at Buena Vista through the use of an 

innovative “V” formation.
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American Military Heritage

President of the Confederacy: Davis undertook the Presidency of the 

Confederacy with a self-professed deep sense of regret. He was uniquely 

qualifi ed, having served as a United States Senator, military commander, and 

Secretary of War. “Davis’ mind was rigid and sometimes overly theoretical, 

it was nevertheless brilliant, retentive, and disciplined. Furthermore, he was an 

articulate and sometimes moving spokesman for the aspirations of the South. 

He might often be too self-conscious in adherence to the Southern gentleman’s 

code, but he was in truth a high-minded gentleman of courage.”

Later Life: After the war’s conclusion, Davis was accused of complicity 

in Lincoln’s assassination and imprisoned by the Federal government for 

13 months at Fort Monroe. He was freed for lack of any credible evidence. 

After an unsuccessful attempt to head a failing insurance company, he retired 

to Mississippi plantation life. He died in 1889 and was buried in a Richmond 

cemetery near his former capital.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1809–1865

Boyhood and Youth: Born February 12, 1809 in the relative poverty of the 

Kentucky backwoods, he grew up in a one-room cabin in frontier Indiana. 

Young Lincoln attended only the equivalent of one year of formal schooling, 

but he had an insatiable thirst for books. He was noted equally for hard common sense and lanky, brawny arms.

Romance and Marriage: “Though a man’s man of the world of men, he 

[Lincoln] was on strange ground with women — cautious, indecisive, torn by 

a complexity of unfamiliar emotions.” Lincoln’s fi rst love, Anne Rutledge, 

died of a fever before their romance had progressed to marriage, throwing 

Lincoln into a period of deep despondency. After a brief brush with a relatively 

obscure Mary Owens, he met Mary Todd, the woman who was to become his 

wife. Though quite unlike in personality and temperament it was said of them, 

“...they were not always happy, but each would 

have been unhappy without the other and neither 

would have been happy alone.”

Congress and Debates: Lincoln opposed Stephen A. Douglas in a much publicized series of 

debates in conjunction with the Senate race of 

1858. He lost the race but gained the national 

recognition that would send him to the White 

House.

The President: “A tall, gaunt man of intense 

spirit and strong will. . .” During his Presidency, 

he met frequently with his war cabinet, binding 

the brilliance and energy of each of its members 
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American Military Heritage

into a loyalty to the Presidency and the national good. During the fi rst two years of 

the war, Lincoln appointed a series of generals (McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, 

Hooker and Meade) to command the eastern army, the Army of the Potomac. He 

suffered terribly as each of these men produced their costly defeats. However, 

in the spring of 1864, Lincoln “found his man” when he appointed General U.S. 

Grant commander of all Federal forces. The war ended within a year.

The Man: What would Lincoln say and do if he could reach across the years 

and speak to the current generation? Surely he would say as he said again 

and again, “I would do whatever will help men to be free — whatever will 

help free men to govern themselves....” Lincoln rose above the confusion of 

his time, rising above the minds of little men, and never lost the fi rm conviction that this free government was the “last best hope of earth” something 

to be treasured, protected, and fostered for future generations, even with the 

sacrifi ce of life itself.

Sources:

Alf J. Mapp, Jr., Frock Coats and Epaulets (New York, 1963), pp 17–134.

G. Lynn Sumner, Meet Abraham Lincoln (New York, 1946), pp 9–15, 45–71.

Section III

Notes on the Commanders Lee and Grant

ROBERT E. LEE, 1807–1870

Early Life: “Born in January 1807. . . studied Latin, Greek and Mathematics 

as a youth in Alexandria. . . appointed to the Military Academy in 1825....” Lee 

excelled both in academics and in discipline as a cadet. He graduated second 

in his class and served as the Adjutant of the Corps of Cadets.

U.S. Army Service: Commissioned a brevet 

lieutenant of engineers, Lee quickly established 

a reputation as a planner and constructor of 

fortifi cations at Fort Monroe, Fort Wool and 

Fort Pulaski. He served with distinction as a 

member of Winfi eld Scott’s staff during the 

War with Mexico and, in 1852, became the Superintendent of the Military Academy at West 

Point. In the period between that assignment 

and the beginning of the Civil War, Lee became 

a cavalry commander and served on the Texas 

frontier with the 2d Cavalry Regiment. After 

much personal soul searching as the war clouds 

gathered, Lee chose to tender his resignation 

from the U.S. Army on April 20, 1861, and to 

remain loyal to his home state of Virginia.
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American Military Heritage

War Commander: Lee accepted command of Virginia military forces just 

a few days after he had resigned his commission in the U.S. Army. In June 

1862, he was appointed commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, the 

Confederacy’s main fi ghting force in the East. The story of that army’s rise 

and fall is one of triumph and heartache, and its leader proved to be one of 

history’s truly great commanders. Always outnumbered and short of supplies, 

Lee led the Army of Northern Virginia to victories at Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and the Wilderness. On April 9, 1865 Robert E. 

Lee’s military career ended at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, when he 

surrendered his army to U.S. Grant.

Post-War Era: Lee served as the President of Washington University (later 

Washington and Lee University), in Lexington, Virginia. He died there on 

October 12, 1870.

Lee the Man: Many images of Lee linger even today — the young handsome 

engineer, the dutiful husband and father, the world-renowned commander and 

the fatherly college president. They are all Lee: A gentleman, a man who 

others — even his enemies — knew as a great leader and a man of honor.

ULYSSES S. GRANT, 1822–1885

Early Life: “Born in April 1822 in Ohio....” He was a student in several local schools but left his only boyhood mark as a horseman. It is said that he far 

outclassed his contemporaries in his ability to break and train spirited colts. In 

frontier Ohio, this ability in a boy roughly equated to modern expertise in a major 

sport. Grant was “one of the throngs” in the Class of 1843 at the Military Academy and graduated precisely in the middle of his class. He was a brevet second 

lieutenant with an annual salary of $779.00 and little possibility for promotion.

Pre-Civil War: Throughout the Mexican War, 

Grant served steadily and well as a quartermaster 

offi cer. Although he received a brevet promotion to captain, his military record was only 

average. In the slow, lonely and arduous life of 

the peacetime army, Grant began to regret his 

military occupation. He often took to drinking 

for consolation but this practice led to disciplinary problems. In 1854, to avoid courts-martial, 

he resigned his commission in the U.S. Army.

The General and President: In a dazzling tenyear period. Grant rose from a poor dirt farmer 

to command all American armies, and then lead the nation as its President 

during the critical post-war period. Although Grant never personally cared 

much for the life of a soldier, he totally applied himself throughout the war to 
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American Military Heritage

the goal of defeating the enemy. Through this single-mindedness of purpose, the 

man referred to as “short, stubby, seedy, stoop shouldered and undistinguished,” 

emerged as one of history’s great commanders. Although he was a strong and 

capable war leader, Grant was naive when it came to politics or the requirements 

of the Presidency. Historians graciously describe his two terms as lusterless.

The Man: Grant’s greatest asset was an infallible ability to thrust incisively 

to the root of a problem and then to pursue to completion his chosen course 

of action.

Sources:

Bruce Catton, U. S. Grant (New York, 1963), pp 17, 39, 51, 129 and 131.

Mapp, pp 122–135.

Phillip Von Doren Stern, Robert E. Lee, The Man and the Soldier (New York, 1963) 

selected information and photographs. 

Sumner, pg 61.

Section IV

NCO Heroes of the Civil War

Adna R. Chaffee: Chaffee was born in Ohio and enlisted in the Regular 

Army’s 6th Cavalry in July 1861. He became fi rst sergeant of Troop K in 

September 1862, the month he distinguished himself at the battle of Antietam. 

Commissioned a second lieutenant, Chaffee served in the Indian Wars and 

rose to command a brigade in the Spanish-American War. In 1904, he became 

Chief of Staff of the Army.

William H. Carney: Born in Virginia, Carney lived for many years in 

New Bedford, Massachusetts, where he became a sailor. In February 1863, 

he enlisted in the Union Army. At Fort Wagner, South Carolina on July 18, 

1863, his regiment, the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry stormed a 

strong Confederate position guarding the sea approaches to Charleston. When 

he saw his color sergeant fall to enemy fi re, Carney seized the fl ag before it 

struck the ground and carried it to the parapet, where he was hit in both legs, 

the chest, and the right arm. Yet, he insisted on carrying the colors as the 

regiment fell back. When he reached the fi eld hospital, he collapsed, stating, 

“The old fl ag never touched the ground, boys.” For his heroism, he received 

the Medal of Honor.

Christian A. Fleetwood: A Baltimore native, Fleetwood joined the Union 

Army in July 1863 and quickly advanced to the rank of sergeant major in 

the 4th United States Colored Troops. In 1864, he distinguished himself in 

the fi erce fi ghting around Richmond, Virginia. When two color sergeants 

fell at Chapin’s Farm, Fleetwood proudly seized the national colors and 
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American Military Heritage

carried them through the rest of the engagement. For his heroism, he received 

the Medal of Honor. At one point, he wrote in his diary, “This year has brought 

about many changes that at the beginning were or would have been thought 

impossible. The close of the year fi nds me a soldier for the cause of my race. 

May God bless the cause and enable me in the coming year to forward it on.” 

After he left the Army in May 1866, he joined the District of Columbia Militia, 

rising to the rank of major.

William McKinley: McKinley enlisted in the 23d Ohio Infantry in June 

1861. At the battle of Antietam, young McKinley was a commissary sergeant, in charge of his unit’s supplies. Realizing that the troops needed food 

as the bloody day wore on, he gathered some stragglers and led two mule 

teams with rations and hot coffee into the thick of the fi ghting. He received 

repeated warnings to retreat and lost one team of mules to enemy fi re, but 

did not return to the rear until his fellow soldiers had received their food. For 

his heroism, he received a direct commission as a second lieutenant, rose to 

the rank of major by the end of the war, and eventually became President of 

the United States.

Charles E. Morse: As 

a sergeant in Company 

I, 62d New York Volunteer Infantry, Morse was 

in the thick of the battle 

of the Wilderness on May 

5, 1864, when he saw his 

unit’s color sergeant fall, 

mortally wounded. Rushing 

to his fallen comrade, Morse 

raised the colors and rallied 

the men. Despite wounds, 

he carried the fl ag to the end 

of the engagement, receiving the Medal of Honor for 

his heroism.
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American Military Heritage

Section V

Notes on Uniforms of the Civil War Era

When the call to arms came 

in 1861, many state volunteer units reported for 

duty wearing a myriad of 

uniform styles. Although 

gray had been for years the 

generally accepted militia 

color, individual state regiments might adopt gray, 

blue, red, or green uniforms, or combinations 

thereof. A regiment could 

even have a separate uniform style or color for each 

of its companies. As the 

war progressed, most units 

found it more practical to 

adopt government issue 

uniforms. The Federal government had earlier adopted 

blue as the national color, 

and its standard uniform 

in 1860 was the dark blue 

coat and trousers. A shortage of dark blue trousers 

early in the war resulted in 

large numbers of Federal 

troops being issued light 

blue trousers.

 

The Southern government 

adopted gray as its national color and prescribed 

that color for its uniform. 

Though the Confederate 

soldier was less uniform 

than his northern counterpart, the rebel army was 

better clothed than initially 

believed. There are always 

going to be soldiers that 

manage to lose everything 

1st U.S. Dragoon Regiment, 1858–1861

Rockbridge Artillery, Virginia, 1862
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American Military Heritage

within a day of issue and hard campaigning took its 

toll, but at some point every year, the Confederate 

soldier was well dressed.

7th Regiment, New York State Militia — 1861: 

“Gray uniform with a blue overcoat, the low kepi 

so familiar at this period, the heavy knapsack and 

blanket, and the wide white belts all bespeak the 

crack militia regiment 

of the time.”

Federal Infantry 

1862: “Allowed freedom in the matter of 

clothes,...black hats, 

battered into a hundred 

shapes were seen.” 

Dark blue sack coat 

or blouse and sky blue 

trousers; “...brigades 

began wearing identifying bits of cloth (origin of unit insignia).”

1st South Carolina 

Infantry, U.S., 1862: One of the fi rst regiments 

of United States Colored Troops was assigned to 

Union forces operating along the south Carolina 

coast. There soldiers were issued a long dark blue 

frock coat, kepi, brass 

shoulder scales, and 

red trousers. 

Confederate Infantry 

1863: Although some 

Confederate infantrymen began the war 

well equipped, long 

marches and tough 

fi ghting soon reduced their essential equipment to 

the haversack, a blanket, a rubber blanket, a rifl e 

or musket and a handful of ammunition, a cup, and 

the absolute essentials of clothing.
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American Military Heritage

Section VI

Notes on Weapons and Ordnance of the Civil War

SHOULDER WEAPONS

The Civil War’s basic infantry weapon was the rifl ed musket. This weapon 

had already been developed and introduced into several of the other armies 

of the world during the preceding decade.

Minie Ball: In 1855, the caliber .58 “minie ball” was adopted for all rifl es. 

This conical bullet with a 

hollow base was invented 

by a French Army captain, 

Claude Minie, and made 

it possible to load a rifle 

as easily and quickly as a 

smoothbore musket (three 

rounds per minute). It thus 

provided the common infantryman with a weapon 

accurate at ranges up to 

600 yards. Because of a 

shortage of arms during the 

early years of the war, some 

American model muskets 

were contracted for and 

produced in Europe.

Sharp’s Percussion Carbines: This weapon had a .52 caliber linen-wrapped 

paper cartridge, weight of 8 pounds, and an accurate range of about 300 

yards. Five distinct types appeared between 1848 and 1863. Sharp carbines 

were loaded by depressing the trigger guard, inserting the cartridge, and 

pulling up the trigger guard. A knife edge on the front of the breech block 

cut off the rear of the cartridge, exposing the powder. The soldier cocked 

the hammer and placed a percussion cap on the nipple, and the carbine was 

then ready to fi re. During the Civil War, the Union Army purchased 80,512 

Sharp’s carbines.
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American Military Heritage

Spencer Repeating Arms: Caliber .52 to .56 rimfi re metallic cartridge; 

carbine weight 8 pounds, 4 ounces; rifl e weight 10 pounds. Christopher 

Spencer invented this magazine carbine in 1860, but it was repeatedly 

rejected for government use by the Ordnance Department until President 

Lincoln ordered their purchase in 1863. By December 1865, 12,471 Spencer 

rifl es and many thousands of carbines had been procured by the Ordnance 

Department. At fi rst loading was slow, as a 

soldier had to individually load each cartridge 

into the butt stock magazine, which held seven 

rounds. But later, a soldier could carry his 

cartridges in tin tubes — 7 cartridges to a tube, 

10 tubes to a cartridge box. He would hold the 

tube to the opening of the magazine and invert 

the weapon, and the cartridges then slid by 

gravity into the magazine. He could then load 

and fi re the weapon seven times as fast as the 

rifl e musket. He fi red the weapon by manually 

cocking the hammer, working the lever which 

formed the trigger 

guard back and forth, and pulling the trigger. 

Later models had a magazine cutoff next to the trigger 

which made it possible to fi re single rounds while holding the magazine in reserve. The weapon achieved an accurate range of about 400 yards.

Colt Revolving Rifl es: Colt revolving rifl es and carbines came in caliber 

.44 and .56 models, using Root’s patented side hammer mechanism. They 

were loaded like a percussion revolver, by placing the nitrate-treated, 

self-consuming charges in the chambers, ramming with the loading lever, and capping the nipples. Accuracy and range were good, but not 

comparable with the rifl e-musket due to the smaller powder charge and 

gas leakage between the cylinder and barrel. This gas leakage, so near 

the face, and the ever-present possibility of multiple chamber discharges, 

made them very unpopular with the troops. The Union Army purchased 

7,000 during the war.
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American Military Heritage

SIDEARMS

Colt Revolver, Model 1851: These six-shot, .36 caliber revolvers were loaded 

and fi red in the same way as the Colt rifl es previously described. The 1851 model 

was designed as a Navy revolver but it was used in large quantities by both the 

Northern and Southern armies.

MACHINE GUNS

Ingenious as some of them were, machine guns 

played little part in the war. Aside from military 

conserva tism, all such weapons of the period experienced major technical diffi culties. The weight 

of the weapons and their ammunition, their relative 

inaccuracy, their low cyclic rates of fi re, and complicated construction left the machine guns as merely 

interesting, unique, relatively untested machines. 

The Agar used a single barrel fed from a hopper; 

the Gatling gun was a multi-barrel, crank-operated 

weapon; and the Requa Battery was, in reality, a 

siege gun, fi ring twenty-fi ve rounds simultaneously.

 ARTILLERY

Siege and Garrison: The Civil War signaled a transition from the smoothbore 

to the rifl ed artillery. Both types of guns saw service in sieges against brick and 

stone forts and in support of ground forces, in such battles as Malvern Hill and 

Shiloh. The early tubes of cast iron were weak and subject to bursting. Later 

wrought-iron tubes were more reliable.

Seacoast: The heavier seacoast artillery pieces were 

dubbed “Columbiads” and 

were mounted on heavy 

casemates. Brick seacoast 

fortresses often permanently 

mounted them as shown.

Mortars: Heavy siege mortars such as that 

shown were capable of lofting a 220-lb. projectile over 4, 000 yards.
85

American Military Heritage

Section VII

Notes on Insignia, Traditions and

Decorations of the Civil War Era

INSIGNIA

Unit Designation: In the spring of 1863, the Union army adopted the use of 

distinctive badges to designate different army corps. Worn on the coat or hat, the 

shape of the badge indicated the corps to which the soldier was assigned, and was 

colored either red, white or blue to indicate either the fi rst, second or third division.

“First use of the ‘patch’, according to offi cial sources, is believed to have been 

when General Philip Kearney had his men wear a red diamond on their hats to 

designate the Third Division, III Corps, Army of the Potomac.”

Rank Designation: The infl uence of the rank designations used by both the U.S. 

Army and the Confederate Army can be seen today. The shoulder straps of the 

U.S. Army, adopted in 1851, have emerged virtually unchanged on the Army 

Blue uniforms worn by offi cers. The sleeve insignia used by the offi cers of the 

Confederacy came directly from the French, and was not seen again after 1865.

Branch Insignia: The Engineers, Cavalry and Signal Corps of the era wore 

unique insignia which are still used today. 

Regimental Traditions: The modern Army continues many proud traditions 

through regimental designations. For example, each modern unit bearing the 

designation of the Nineteenth Infantry Regiment is commanded by its junior 

second lieutenant on Organization Day, September 20. This commemorates 

the day in 1863 during the Battle of Chickamauga when the highest ranking 

offi cer left in action was a second lieutenant. The victory of that day also 

provided the unit’s nickname, “Rock of Chickamauga.”

DECORATIONS

At the beginning of the Civil War, the only “award” system in existence was the 

“brevet” promotion system. Brevet rank was honorary but could be assumed 

if assigned to a position calling for that grade. Brevet applied to offi cers only. 

Congress approved the establishment of the “Medal of Honor” for presentation 

to soldiers who “shall most distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action 

and other soldier-like qualities.” The Army presented the award throughout 

the era for acts of lesser magnitude than those for which it is now given.

The fi rst Medal of Honor was awarded by the Army to a surgeon, Colonel Bernard J. D. Irwin, for his actions in voluntarily leading an infantry party in a raid 

against an Apache band on the Western frontier in 1861. The Army awarded 

approximately 1,200 of the medals for heroic actions during the Civil War.

Source:

Mark M. Boatner, III, Military Customs and Traditions, (New York, 1956) pp 100–109. 
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American Military Heritage

Section VIII

Gettysburg

INTRODUCTION

By 1863 the war had entered what Union Major General William T. Sherman 

called its professional phase. The troops were well-trained and had acquired 

ample combat experience. Offi cers had generally mastered their jobs and 

were deploying their forces fairly skillfully in accordance with the day’s tactical principles. Furthermore, the increased range and accuracy of weapons, 

together with the nature of the terrain, had induced some changes in tactics, 

changes which were embodied in a revised infantry manual published in 1863. 

Thus, by the third year of the war, battles had begun to take on certain defi nite 

characteristics. The battle of Gettysburg is a case in point.

After the great victory at Chancellorsville, the Confederate cause in the eastern 

theater looked exceptionally bright. If 60,000 men could defeat 134,000, 

then the Confederacy’s inferiority in manpower was surely offset by superior 

generalship and skill at arms. In early June, Lee’s army left its camps at 

Fredericksburg, Virginia and headed north for Pennsylvania. Major General 

Joseph Hooker, commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, noticed the 

weakening of the Fredericksburg defenses, sent his cavalry to investigate. On 

June 9, the Union cavalry surprised Major General J. E. B. Stuart’s Confederate horsemen at Brandy Station, Virginia. Here, on an open plain, was fought 

one of the few mounted, sabre-swinging, cut-and-thrust cavalry combats of the 

Civil War. Although the Confederate cavalry had been superior to that point 

of the war, the Union horsemen at Brandy Station “came of age,” and Stuart 

was lucky to hold his position.

When General Hooker learned that Confederate infantry were west of the Blue 

Ridge and heading north, he moved to protect Washington and Baltimore. 

Lincoln, who had lost confi dence in Hooker after Chancellorsville, replaced 

him with Major General George G. Meade. As the Army of Northern Virginia 

marched through the valleys and deployed into Pennsylvania behind cavalry 

screens, Meade sent the Army of the Potomac north.

While protecting the mountain passes with some of his cavalry, Stuart took the 

remainder of his men and attempted to ride around the Union army. The ride 

was daring, but proved of little use to Lee. Although Stuart captured a number 

of enemy supply wagons, it was not until the afternoon of July 2 that he would 

rejoin the army, too late to have an important infl uence on the battle. Stuart’s 

absence had deprived Lee of prompt, accurate information about the Army 

of the Potomac. When Lee learned from a Confederate spy on June 28 that 

the Union army was north of the Potomac, he quickly ordered his widespread 

units to concentrate at once between Gettysburg and Cashtown.
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American Military Heritage

Outposts of both armies skirmished during the afternoon of June 30 near 

Gettysburg, the junction of twelve roads that led to Harrisburg, Philadelphia, 

Baltimore, Washington, and the mountain passes to the west. The rest was 

inevitable; the local commanders sent reports and recommendations to their 

Benner's

Hill

Culps

Hill

Meade's

Headquarters

Wolf Hill

Rock Creek

High water

mark

The Angle

Peach

Orchard

Little

Round

Top

Big

Round

Top

N

Gettysburg

To Hanover 14 Mi

College

To Hagerstown

Willoughby Run

To Taneytown 14 Mi

To Baltimore 53 Mi

To Chambersburg

W.M. R.R.

To Carlisle 27 Mi

Cemetery

Hill

Battle of Gettysburg

36 Mi

36 Mi

To Philadelphia 117 Mi

36 Mi

To Cavalry Battlefield

3 Mi

Seminary

Lee's

Headquarter's

site

Wheatfield

Devil's Den

To Washington 

DC 78 Mi

Union

Confederate

Miles

0 1/4 1/2 3/4 1

Main Battle Lines

July 2

Pickett's Charge

July 3

July 2

Spangler's

Spring

0 1/4 1/2

Miles

Cavalry

Battlefield Battle Line

Hanover Rd

To Ha

W.M. R.R.

rrisburg

July 1

Oak Ridge

Oak

Hill

Herr Ridge

McPherson Ridge
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American Military Heritage

superiors, who relayed them upward, so that both armies, still widely dispersed, 

started moving toward Gettysburg. 

THE FIRST DAY, JULY 1, 1863

On July 1, Union cavalrymen fought a dismounted action against advance infantry of Lieutenant General A. P. Hill’s corps northwest of town. The confl ict 

expanded when a division of the Union I Corps arrived on the fi eld to relieve 

the cavalry, and two divisions of the Union XI Corps took a position just 

north of the town. This initial action was followed by the arrival north of the 

town of Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell’s corps, which struck the Union 

XI Corps on its front and right fl ank. As the fi ghting grew in intensity, Lee 

rode toward the battlefi eld, unhappy that his forces were being drawn into a 

battle at a time and place not of his own choosing. He arrived just in time to 

see Confederate infantry drive the Federals through the town and back to the 

heights to the south, on Cemetery Hill, and he ordered Ewell to take Cemetery 

Hill, if possible. But Ewell failed to press his advantage, and the Confederates 

settled into positions extending in a great curve from northeast of Culp’s Hill, 

westward through Gettysburg, thence south along Seminary Ridge. During the 

night, the Federals, enjoying interior lines, moved troops onto the key points 

of Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and Cemetery Ridge.
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American Military Heritage

Lee had not wanted to fi ght at Gettysburg, but the victories of the day made it 

diffi cult to withdraw from hard-won ground. Hill’s and Ewell’s corps’ were 

on the fi eld, and two divisions of Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s corps 

arrived during the night. Longstreet’s third division, commanded by Major 

General George E. Pickett, would not arrive for another twenty-four hours. 

The new commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General Meade arrived during the night of July 1, and, as the rest of his army reached the area, 

he began to strengthen his lines. He briefl y considered offensive operations 

for the next day but fi nally decided to let the Confederates attack. 

THE SECOND DAY, JULY 2, 1863

Meade had completed his dispositions by the morning of July 2, and his line 

was strong except in two places. In the confusion, Little Round Top was occupied only by a signal station when the supporting cavalry was dispatched 

to guard the army trains and not replaced. Meanwhile, the commander of the 

Union III Corps, Major General Daniel E. Sickles, on his own responsibility, 

moved his line forward from the south end of Cemetery Ridge to higher ground 

Gettysburg

Stevens Run

G & H. R.R.

To York

To Hanover

Benner's

Hill

College

Rock Creek

To Hagerstown

Willoughby Run

Seminary Ridge

To Emmitsburg

Cemetery Ridge

To 

Taneytown

Culps

To Balitmore

To Chambersburg

Unfinished Railway

To Mummasburg

To Carlisle

To Harrisburg

Cemetery

Hill

N

Hill
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American Military Heritage

near the Peach Orchard, so that his corps lay in an exposed salient. By early 

afternoon, Meade had positioned seven corps along the Union battle line.

On the Confederate side, Lee had not been able to attack as early as he desired. 

Reconnaissance took time, and Longstreet’s two divisions did not reach their 

positions until afternoon. Generals in the Civil War tried to combine frontal 

assaults with envelopments and fl anking maneuvers, but the diffi culty of timing 

and coordinating the movements of such large bodies of men in broken terrain 

made maneuvers diffi cult. The action on the second day at Gettysburg graphically illustrates the problem. Lee wanted Longstreet to outfl ank the Federal 

Gettysburg

Willoughby Run

Seminary Ridge

Rock Creek

Wolf Hill

Baltimore Road

Taneytown Road

Culps

Hill Cemetery

Hill

Spangler's

Spring

Cemetery Ridge

Power's

Hill

Big

Round

Top

Little

Round

Top Emmitsburg Road

Peach

Orchard

Wheatfield

N

left, part of Hill’s corps to strike the center, while Ewell’s corps enveloped 

the right fl ank of Meade’s army. The attack did not start until 3:00 p.m., 

when Longstreet’s men, having deployed on unfamiliar ground, under a corps 

commander who preferred to take a defensive stance, advanced toward Little 

Round Top. Longstreet’s divisions and brigades advanced piecemeal, but with 

savage enthusiasm. At this point, Meade’s chief engineer Brigadier General 

Gouverneur K. Warren, discovering that no infantry held Little Round Top, 
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persuaded the commander of the V Corps, Major General George Sykes, to send 

two brigades and some artillery to the hill. They arrived just in time to hold the 

summit against a furious Confederate assault. When this attack bogged down, 

Longstreet threw troops against Sickles’ position in the Peach Orchard and the 

Wheatfi eld; this assault cracked the Federal line and drove as far as Cemetery 

Ridge before Meade’s reserves halted it. Lee then ordered his troops to attack 

progressively from right to left. One of Hill’s divisions assaulted Cemetery 

Ridge in piecemeal fashion, but was repulsed by Union troops there. On the 

north, Ewell attacked about 6:00 p.m. and captured some abandoned trenches, 

but the Federals posted behind stone walls proved too strong. As the day ended, 

the Federals held all their main positions. During the night, Meade, after requesting the opinions of his corps commanders, decided to defend, rather than 

attack, on July 3.

THE THIRD DAY, JULY 3, 1863 

Lee had hoped that with Pickett’s fresh division arriving on the fi eld, he could 

launch a full-scale, coordinated attack all along the line on the morning of 

July 3. However, Longstreet was reluctant to allow his two divisions, which 

Gettysburg

Cemetery 

Hill

Culps

Hill

Meade's

Headquarters Wolf Hill

Rock Creek

Baltimore Road

Stone

Wall

Clump of

Trees

Peach

Orchard

Little

Round

Top

Big

Round

Top

Taneytown Road

Emmitsburg Road

Willoughby Run

Line where Confederate column of assault formed

Seminary Ridge

Cemetery Ridge

N
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American Military Heritage

had fought the previous day, to continue the attack. They had suffered heavy 

casualties, and one division commander had been wounded and carried off 

the fi eld. With Federal forces now occupying Little Round Top in strength, 

Longstreet was concerned his divisions would be attacked in fl ank if they 

moved forward. Lee decided, therefore, that while Longstreet’s two divisions remained in place and protected the right fl ank, Pickett’s division 

would attack the Federal center along with two divisions of Hill’s corps. 

Lee had wanted Ewell to attack the Federal right fl ank during the attack on 

the center, but Meade’s troops attacked early on the morning of July 3 and 

drove Ewell’s men off their position on Culp’s Hill and out of supporting 

distance. Stuart’s cavalry, which had arrived the evening before, exhausted 

from its ride around the Federal army, was to strike Meade’s line in the rear, 

cutting off retreat when the center collapsed under Pickett’s assault. But 

Stuart was spotted moving around the Federal fl ank, attacked and driven 

off. Even without the support of Ewell and Stuart, Lee believed that he 

could not delay an attack. His army was living off the country and would 

soon strip it bare; his own communications were highly vulnerable; and the 

enemy before him was growing stronger with each passing day. Lee correctly surmised that the Federal center was weak, with no more than 2,000 

defenders. Pickett’s and Hill’s combined attacking force would consist 

of more than 12,000 troops. Lee ordered Longstreet to send Pickett’s and 

Hill’s divisions forward, preceded by an artillery barrage. At 1:00 p.m., 

approximately 140 Confederate guns opened fi re along Seminary Ridge in 

the greatest artillery bombardment witnessed on the American continent up 

to that time. For two hours, the barrage continued but did little more than 

tear up ground, destroy a few caissons, and expend ammunition. The Union 

artillery along Cemetery Ridge, numbering only eighty guns, had not been 

knocked out by the bombardment. It did, however, stop fi ring in order to 

conserve ammunition, and the silence seemed to be a signal that the Confederates should begin their attack.

Longstreet’s task force — forty-seven regiments — emerged from the woods 

on Seminary Ridge, dressed their lines as if on parade, and began a mile-long, 

twenty-minute march toward Cemetery Ridge. Union artillery opened fi re from 

along Cemetery Ridge and from the summit of Little Round Top, enfi lading 

the Confederate ranks. Suffering heavy casualties, the Confederates struggled 

to keep their formations. When the attackers reached the Emmitsburg Road, 

their lines and units became intermingled as they came within rifl e and canister range of the Union defenders. At point blank range, Union artillery fi red 

double charges of canister, while the infantry poured massed volleys into the 

gray mass. Fewer than 200 Confederates actually reached and crossed over 

the stone wall defended by Brigadier General John Gibbon’s 2d Division of 

the II Corps, and those few were soon killed, wounded, or captured. Pickett’s 

survivors withdrew to Seminary Ridge, and the fi ghting was over. 
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American Military Heritage

During the night of July 3, Lee pulled back his lines in anticipation of a Union 

counterattack the following day. But Meade and the Army of the Potomac 

were badly shaken by the bold assault and remained in place. On the night 

of July 4, the Army of Northern Virginia began its retreat back to Virginia.

CONCLUSION

At Gettysburg, both sides had fought hard and with great valor, suffering 51,000 

casualties in killed, wounded and missing. On November 19, 1863, President 

Lincoln spoke at the dedication of the Gettysburg National Cemetery to honor 

those who had fallen. His Gettysburg Address has since been called by many 

one of the great speeches in the English language.

Gettysburg was a stunning setback for the Confederacy. At Gettysburg, and 

at Vicksburg a day later, the South lost the ability to win victory with its own 

resources and could only hope that the North would eventually tire of the 

confl ict. Although the war continued for almost two more years, Gettysburg 

proved to be a crucial turning point.
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7

The Army Develops in the

 Post Civil War and Spanish-American War 

Periods

Section I

The Army’s Post-War Missions

Appomattox had scarcely faded into memory when the public clamor 

 began for the immediate demobilization of the Union Army, a process 

 that has repeated itself after each major American war. The senior 

military commanders, who had fought the war urged the continuance of 

a strong Army-in-being, but the general public, speaking through their 

civilian representatives, forced massive reductions in the wartime military 

structure. The end result was a relatively small military force, spread over 

a wide geographical area and bound to the accomplishment of three missions. By 1866, the army had decreased in size to fi ve artillery, ten cavalry, 

and forty-fi ve infantry regiments. In addition, Congress had provided for 

1,000 Indian scouts. The Army of the time was dispersed among nineteen 

territorial departments and fi ve geographical divisions. This geographical 

organization fl uctuated nearly annually until the completion of the Indian 

wars. By 1878, the entire Army had dwindled to 2,153 offi cers and 23,254 

enlisted men, divided into company-sized units along the western frontier. 

These units were often viewed as “police forces” rather than an “army” in 

the generally accepted sense of the word.

In spite of all of the diffi culties, reductions and dispersion, the post-Civil 

War Army performed three very diffi cult and different missions. It initially 

eliminated a threat posed by the French-supported Emperor Maximilian 

in Mexico. It also occupied and aided in the reconstruction of the Southern states, and it suppressed the hostile Indians and restored peace on the 

western frontier. Although all three of these missions were important, 

the last proved by far the most taxing in terms of efforts and hardships 

endured. From 1865 to 1891, the Army conducted 13 different campaigns 

and fought at least 1,067 separate engagements with various Indian nations 

on the western plains, including the Comanche, Modoc, Apache, Northern 

Cheyenne, Sioux, Nez Perce, Bannock, Piute, and Ute. Names of able 

leaders and warriors such as Sitting Bull, Geronimo, Santana, Joseph, and 

Low Dog became familiar to troopers in the West.
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American Military Heritage

In assessing the years between the end of the Civil War and the fi rst decades of 

the twentieth century, one fi nds that two different chains of events occur. The 

following section refl ects that feature, presenting, fi rst, a general chronology 

and, second, a short look at the Army’s role in the Indian campaigns.

GENERAL CHRONOLOGY

Jun 1866–Jan 1867 Sheridan deploys his army along the Mexican 

 Border to discourage France in Mexico 

Dec 1866 Massacre at Fort Phil Kearney 

Jul 1867 Wagon Box fi ght 

Dec 1867 Army garrisons Alaska with 250 men 

May 1869 Transcontinental railroad completed 

Aug 1871 New Orleans riots

Mar 1876 Crook’s Powder River Campaign 

25 Jun 1876 Battle of the Little Big Horn

24 Nov 1876 Battle of Crazy Woman’s Fork

Jul 1877 Railroad strike disorders 

Jul–21 Nov 1877 No Pay! 

May 1881 School of Application for Infantry and

 Cavalry established at Fort Leavenworth. 

Aug 1881–Jun 1884 Greely Expedition to Greenland 

Dec 1890 Battle of Wounded Knee 

15 Feb 1898 USS Maine blows up in Havana harbor

25 Apr 1898 U.S. declares war on Spain 

13 Jun–15 Jul 1898 Santiago campaign 

February 1899 End of Spanish-American War 

1899–1902 Philippine Insurrection 

Jun–Aug 1900 The Boxer Rebellion 

 Walter Reed conquers yellow fever 

INDIAN CAMPAIGNS

1865–1868 Southern Oregon, Idaho, Northern California 

 and Nevada 

1867–1875 Service Against the Comanches and

 Confederate Tribes in Kansas, Colorado, 

 Texas, New Mexico, and the Indian Territory 

1872–1873 The Modoc War in northeastern California 

1873 The Apaches in Arizona 

1876–1877 The Northern Cheyennes and the Sioux in the 

 Dakotas 

1877 The Nez Perce War in northeastern Oregon, 

 Idaho and Montana 
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American Military Heritage

1878 The Bannock War in Oregon, Washington, 

 Idaho, Montana and Wyoming 

1878–1879 The Northern Cheyennes in Kansas,

 Oklahoma, Wyoming, and Colorado 

1879 The Sheep-Eaters, Piutes and Bannocks in 

 Idaho 

1879–1880 The Utes in Colorado and Utah 

1885–1886 The Apaches in Arizona and New Mexico 

1890–1891 The Sioux in South Dakota (Ghost

 Dance uprising)

Section II

Notes on the Buffalo Soldiers

in the Indian Wars

GENERAL

Throughout recorded American history, the black soldier has served with 

valor and distinction. One of the nineteenth century’s hardest working, most 

widely deployed, and most collectively valorous units was the block of 

African-American regiments, the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th 

Infantry, known collectively as the Buffalo Soldiers. These units, formed by 

Act of Congress in 1866, campaigned against the western Indian tribes for 

the following thirty years.

THE ENEMY

Numbered among the foes of the “Buffalo Soldiers” were such formidable 

nations as the Apaches, Kiowas, Comanches, Ute, and Sioux. Great war 

chiefs such as Santana, Quanah Parker, Geronimo, Sitting Bull, and Big 

Foot led their respective bands against the black cavalrymen and were 

repeatedly defeated by the seemingly limitless determination of the pony 

soldiers; “ typical of their warfare was a deed of the grim chief Santana. 

He lay hidden behind a hill while a bugler was sounding calls in a camp. 

Before the bugler could take the instrument from his lips, the chief had 

galloped down on him, swept off his cap, seized him by the hair, and 

dragged him up across his pony’s withers, scalped him, and thundered away 

with wild shots of guards whistling past him.” Exposure to the elements 

tempered the Indian to a steel-like hardness. Many wore only a loin cloth 

and leggings, with a red fl annel strip wound about his straight dark hair. 

“Those who campaigned against him remembered him for his remarkable 

endurance... his sheer deadliness.”
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American Military Heritage

THE CAVALRYMAN

“A lot of drilling on foot and on horseback and enough parading to last you 

all your life... you had to keep your rifl e and saber clean,... the sergeants and 

corporals were tough as pig iron... sugar, biscuits, coffee, salt pork and bacon... 

when boots and saddles sounded, comfort was left behind....” The capabilities of an African-American as a cavalryman were questioned by some of the 

white offi cers of the 1880s. But an observer who rode and fought with the 

Buffalo Soldiers characterized them as tough, rock-hard warriors, the match 

of any cavalry in the world.

AN OLD TROOPER

In 1965, Private Simpson 

Mann, age 103, formerly 

of Troop F. 9th U.S. Cavalry, received a medal 

for his service in the Indian Wars. Although the

medal came three quarters of a century after 

his tour of duty, Mann’s 

memory of Pine Ridge, 

charging troopers, and 

the mighty Sioux warriors was crystal clear. He 

talked at length with his 

interviewer of the days 

of barracks music, the 

camaraderie of a good 

poker game, and the sheer 

terror of the hissing tomahawk. As the campaign 

medal was pinned to his 

robe, “... tears welled up 

in the eyes of the fi ne old 

cavalryman. He spoke 

almost in a whisper. ‘I’m 

very proud to receive this 

medal.’... His country 

was proud to give it, proud of the gallant memory of all the Buffalo 

Soldiers.”

Source:

Fairfax Downey, The Buffalo Soldiers in the Indian Wars, (New York, McGraw-Hill 

Book Company, 1969), pp 61–66, 68–70, 115, 118.

Signal Corps Sergeant, Cavalry Offi cer, New 

Mexico, Cavalrymen on Parade, 1880
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American Military Heritage

Section III

Notes on Family and Social Life (1870–1900)

Family life on the frontier was alternately dangerous, placid, monotonous, 

backbreaking and even occasionally “civilized,” but it was, above all, unique. 

In addition to the lack of the kitchen, plumbing, and automobiles of today, the 

military family of the late 1800s endured extreme heat and cold, long wagon 

marches, and fi erce Indian attacks. One such family was that of Andrew and 

Elizabeth Burt. Andrew Burt rose from the rank of private in 1862 to brigadier 

general in 1902. Through his eyes and those of his faithful wife, we can catch 

glimpses of Army life on the frontier. Mrs. Burt’s observations of her daily 

life show that, although the experience of her clan was quite different from 

that of present-day military families, they still found time for small pleasures 

and joys amidst the many adversities.

MRS. BURT’S OBSERVATIONS

“The band played every day at guard mounting, giving untiring pleasure. 

Through the many years spent in different posts, watching this daily formation 

never lost its interest.”

“I soon learned that in an army mess, one offi cer ordered the meals and controls 

the cook and assistant, if there is one, and at the end of the month divides the 

expenses among the members of the mess. Its hospitality is generally extended 

to those coming to the post and leaving it.”

“The winter was cold and snowy. We had many 

dances and social gatherings, all at our houses . 

. . Colonel Reeve often called the fi gures for the 

young people in the square dances, in the merriest 

manner. The two-step was then unknown but we 

waltzed with delight and danced the ‘gallop’.”

“At lunch ... served us a cup of tea and a simple meal 

consisting of a glass of milk and hardtack ... at Fort 

Leavenworth, a fi ne wind blew peppering our food 

with a fi ne sand that would sift into everything.”

“The beautiful pink and yellow blossoms of the 

prickly pear were profusely scattered over the sandy country among other 

lovely fl owers new to us... the Platte River with quicksand and fi ckle currents.... It is impossible to conceive of a more dreary waste than this whole 

road is — without tree or bush, grass thin and the Platte running over its wide, 

shallow bottom with its rapid current; no game or birds; nothing but the long 

dusty road with its occasional ox team, and the everlasting telegraph poles.”
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American Military Heritage

“Offi cers and their ladies combined to brighten the evenings with amateur 

theatricals.”

“During the winter at Fort Phil Kearny,... the snow was very deep and the 

weather remained bitter cold; the rations gave out entirely, and they were 

compelled to take the grain which was brought for the animals and boil it to 

make food with which to sustain the lives of the garrison.”

“Allow me to correct an impression too generally prevalent among civilians 

that an army offi cer’s uniform even is provided by the government and that 

the food we eat is all given us. No indeed; an offi cer pays for all he and his 

family eats and wears.”

“There was musical talent, too, among the ladies, who kindly contributed their 

share to the social entertainment. . . These diversions, in addition to the weekly 

hops, combined to make the long winter evenings pass in a happy social way, 

which without these aids would have been drearily monotonous.”

“The sutler’s store was the social and economic center of Fort Laramie’s transient population. The store was well stocked with every imaginable article, 

including fl our, bacon, tobacco, whiskey, wolf poison, beauty aids, beaver 

traps, shotguns, and carpet bags, and it was generally crowded with customers and loafers.”

“If there is no school, the children recite their lessons to their parents. In mild 

weather, people almost live on their porches, and generally, the houses in those 

days were built around a square — the parade ground — each house being in 

full view of the others.”

“By 1880, company barracks and offi cer’s quarters were one story frame, lined 

with brick, plain batten fi nish and painted a dull yellow. Coal oil and wood 

burning stoves were standard equipment. Except for the two story residence 

occupied by the commanding offi cer, all the ‘plumbing’ was outdoors, ‘ten 

feet to the rear of each kitchen. A cistern was built for each set of quarters 

which drained discharge into a small stream that fl ows in front of the post and 

empties in the river. Slops and excrete are hauled away and deposited on the 

commons Northeast of the post.”

These passages provide a small window into the Army home and social life 

of the Andrew Burts, who lived the life of an army offi cer and his wife for 

more than forty years on the frontier. In the words of Elizabeth Burt, their lives 

were in near equal parts, “Indians, Infants, and Infantry.”

Source:

Mattes, Merril J., ed., Indians, Infants, and Infantry, (Denver, 1960).
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American Military Heritage

Section IV

Notes on Uniforms

The uniforms of the Army during the period from the Civil War to World 

War I changed several times. The Army fought in several different climates 

under diverse conditions. Uniforms, therefore, were designed especially for 

the conditions of the battlefi eld. 

The 8th Infantry (ca. 1895): The fi eld uniform 

was very simple,... cap, plain blue coat and long 

trousers... armed with a Springfi eld rifl e single 

shot and bayonet.

Cuban Expedition (1898): This soldier is from 

an artillery regiment, and the offi cer is in the 

Medical Department. The soldier’s uniform consisted of dark blue and sky blue wool, trousers, 

and his rifl e was the bolt action Krag.

Medical Department 

Offi cer, Artillery Private, 

Cuba. Company Litter 

Bearers, Field Hospital, 

1898
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American Military Heritage

Infantry (1904): Khaki 

breeches, coat, felt hat and 

laced gaiters.... The officer’s uniform was similar 

but with brown leather leggings with sword.

Second Lieutenant c. 1890 

wearing the prescribed officer’s overcoat with the 

cape.

Infantry Offi cer and Sergeant, Philippines, Infantry in Field Dress, 1903
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American Military Heritage

Section V

Notes on Weapons and Tactics

Between the end of the Civil War and the early twentieth century, fi rearms and 

their employment went through several changes. These changes and improvements were accompanied by concurrent alterations in tactics. Although the 

Army fought no large-scale wars in which it could test the new weapons and 

tactics under battle conditions, the weapons and tactics developed prior to the 

turn of the century proved effective in the multiple small-scale skirmishes of 

the Indian Wars and in the early twentieth century confl icts.

WEAPONS

Springfi eld Model 1873: These Springfi eld models were nicknamed “Trapdoor Springfi elds.” After the Civil War, the Army possessed thousands of 

muzzle-loading, rifl ed muskets that the Ordnance Department wanted to convert into breech loaders. After a series of trials in 1865, the Army approved a 

system designed 

by the Master Armorer at Springfi eld Armory, Eskine S. Allin, for .58 caliber rimfi re. In 1866, the caliber was reduced to .50 by brazing a liner in the 

barrel; the Army designated this version the Model 1866. In 1870, the manufacturers strengthened the breech and shortened the rifl e, but they still constructed 

the rifl e mostly from converted Civil War muzzle loaders. In 1873, the caliber 

was reduced to .45, and the rifl e consisted of all new parts. The manufacturers 

reduced the weight from 9 1/4 to 8 1/4 pounds. The rate of fi re at the time was 

twelve to thirteen rounds per minute. At 500 yards, this rifl e placed its shots in 

a 15” diameter circle and penetrated 10.6 inches of white pine. The maximum 

range was 3,500 yards, with a time of fl ight of 21.2 seconds. This time of fl ight 

was so great that one fi nds instances of Indians seeing the puff of smoke from the 

rifl e, running behind cover, and watching the bullet pass. Corresponding models 

of carbines also appeared. The rifl e ammunition was designated the 45-70-405 

and the carbine 45-55-405. As in all black powder cartridges, the fi rst number 

is caliber, the middle is powder weight, and the last is bullet weight.

U.S. Rifl e, Magazine, Bolt Action, Krag-Jorgensen, Model 1892: The 

adoption of this rifl e was a giant step forward. Not only was it a repeater, but 
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American Military Heritage

it also fi red a smokeless .30 caliber cartridge. Using this weapon, a man could 

load and fi re 35 to 40 unaimed rounds of ammunition per minute and 20 aimed 

rounds in 54 seconds. Accuracy was comparable with the . 45-70. The muzzle 

velocity was 2,000 feet per second with the 220 grain service bullet. The rifl e 

weighed 9 pounds, 5 ounces. It was invented by two Norwegians, Krag and 

Jorgensen, and adopted by the Danish government in the late 1880s. A Board 

of Offi cers recommended it for the Army’s use in 1890, but it was not adopted 

by the Army until 1892. Through a delay occasioned by complaints from 

American inventors, manufacture did not begin until 1896. It was used by the 

Army until replaced by the Model 1903.

Hiram Maxim’s Machine Gun: In 

1881, Hiram Maxim, an American electrical engineer, developed an effi cient 

machine gun. His gun was completely 

different from the others of the time. The 

weapon used its own recoil to load, fi re 

and eject continuously while the operator held back the trigger. The cartridges 

were stored in a fl exible belt and the gun 

was cooled by a water jacket around the 

barrel. The British government agreed to buy the weapon if its weight could 

be reduced and cyclic rate of fi re increased. Maxim’s fi rst acceptable model 

weighed in the neighborhood of 40 pounds and boasted a cyclic rate of fi re of 

650 rounds per minute.

Gatlings in the Offense: Although the Gatling machine gun had existed since 

1861, it had primarily served as either an artillery weapon or in defense of 

artillery and other fi xed emplacements. In the Battle of San Juan Hill during 

the Spanish-American War of 1898, a battery of Gatling guns found themselves 

in close support of advancing infantrymen. Observers judged their fi repower 

to be devastating, and, at that moment, the principle of the use of machine 

weapons in the offense was born.

U.S. Rifl e, Magazine, Bolt Action, M1903: This model, using a modifi ed 

Mauser design, became the primary shoulder arm of the Army for nearly 

forty years. The 1903 

Springfi eld was a bolt-action, clip-fed rifl e with a much 

improved sighting system and a much better balanced stock. This 

weapon saw service throughout the World War I era and the post-war years 

and was considered to be the best available shoulder weapon in the world
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American Military Heritage

at the time. Improved versions of the ’03 were produced in volume as late as 1917. 

The rifl e weighed 8.7 pounds and its maximum effective range was 600 yards.

Smokeless Powder: The introduction of smokeless powder proved a boon 

to its users from two standpoints. It eliminated the tell-tale puff of smoke that 

revealed positions, and it permitted a more rapid rate of fi re, since it eliminated 

the need to wait for the smoke clouds to clear after each round was fi red.

TACTICS

The Role of the Cavalry: In spite of occasional dashing exploits in the Civil 

War, the battlefi eld role of massed mounted cavalry was over by the late 1800s 

due to the devastating fi repower of the new rifl es and artillery. Against the 

Plains Indians, the cavalry used their horses for mobility but usually dismounted 

for combat. At Santiago de Cuba in the Spanish-American War, a cavalry 

division under General Joseph (Fighting Joe) Wheeler, a former Confederate 

general, conducted their entire campaign dismounted. Although the cavalryman continued to be a part of the army well into the twentieth century, his 

functions were largely confi ned to scouting and raiding by 1900.

Infantry/Artillery: As the combat role of the Cavalry diminished due to the 

development of devastating weaponry, the role of the Infantry and the Artillery became increasingly more important. Against modern rifl es and machine 

guns, the artillery no longer could move forward with attacking infantry to 

render close support. Instead, American artillerymen began to develop equipment and doctrine for indirect fi re at long range, laying the groundwork for 

the mighty and responsive fi repower available to troops today. At the same 

time, the infantry began to use its fl exibility, ability to fi ght in small groups, 

and adaptability to extremely varied conditions to accomplish the total mission 

of defeat of the enemy. 

Section VI

Notes on Spanish-American War Mobilization

GENERAL

To evaluate the diffi culties that the Army encountered in mobilizing for the 

Spanish American War, one must examine the developmental steps that 

occurred during the army’s “dark ages” (1865–1898). The basic American 

concept of maintaining only a suffi cient fi ghting force to protect the country 

still prevailed. During this particular period, however, the forecasted force was 

insuffi cient in size, strength, training and logistical support.

Reorganization of the War Department: Prior to the Civil War, the high-level 

command links and channels of information were muddled and ineffective due 

to the existence of a Commander-in-Chief, a Secretary of War, and a Com-
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American Military Heritage

manding General of the Army, whose areas of interest and responsibilities were 

overlapping. The lack of clear channels of control often caused intense bickering among the individuals in the three positions, and, in fact, the Commanding 

General, on occasion, would establish his headquarters in a city other than Washington. During the latter third of the century, observers realized the problem, but 

continual resistance from the holders of the offi ces obstructed change. Thus, at 

the turn of the century, the Army possessed essentially the same organization.

Military Training in Civil Institutions: The origins of the idea of granting 

funds and teachers to civil institutions to teach military science can be traced 

to the Morrill Act of 1862, which granted land to fund the establishment of 

state agricultural colleges and provided for military training. This act became 

effective after the conclusion of the Civil War, and it is generally considered 

one of forerunners of today’s ROTC program. Although the War with Spain 

in 1898 brought a temporary halt to the program, enough men had received 

the instruction to establish at least a partially trained potential supply of prospective offi cers.

Army Schools: Although the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia, 

had been founded in 1824, the period just after the Civil War saw the 

expansion of the Army schooling system. It sought to give regular units 

concentrated training, to train offi cers appointed to the Army from civil 

life, and to give advanced training to graduates of the military academy. 

The period saw the opening of the School of Instruction for Light Artillery 

at Fort Riley, Kansas, the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the United States Engineer School at 

Willets Point, New York.

The Military Picture in 1898: High-level army management — that is, the 

General Staff and bureaus — presented a collection of loosely knit elements, 

and the leaders charged with their coordination, the Commanding General 

and the Secretary of War, were again locked in a power struggle. The Regular 

Army was scattered over some eighty posts across the country, with most of 

the troops at small posts in the West. On paper, the Militia, or National Guard, 

totaled nearly 116, 000 offi cers and men, but their training in combat and fi eld 

operations was sadly defi cient.

MOBILIZATION EFFORTS

Manpower: President McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers in 1898 after 

the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine resulted in a declaration of war with Spain. As 

the war expanded to include a second theater of operations in the Philippines, 

the President issued an additional call, this time for 75,000 men. The strength 

of the Regular Army increased solely through recruitment and, although it 

expanded rapidly, never quite reached the proposed total of 64,700.
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American Military Heritage

Supply: During mobilization for the war with Spain, the problems involved 

with the selection of campsites, procurement of equipment and uniforms, 

and the development of stockpiles of rations posed a major challenge. 

Existing stockpiles of weapons, clothing and uniforms were scanty and 

mixed, and the Army had contemplated no planning or systems to alter 

the defi ciencies. After much early confusion, staff bureaus and fi eld commanders overcame these diffi culties. Within two months of the start of 

mobilization, Army expeditions were on their way to Cuba, Puerto Rico 

and the Philippines; and the large volunteer force in the home camps was 

approaching a state of readiness. The Army met with comparative ease 

the post-war challenges of suppressing the Philippine insurrection and 

providing troops for an international expedition to China to put down 

anti-foreign rioting.

Training: The Regular Army had a good program of individual training but 

had conducted few or no large-scale exercises to allow the staffs and commanders to practice their functions. At the beginning of the Spanish-American 

War, a lack of high level staff training was particularly evident in the logistics 

fi eld and often caused such exasperating problems as a traffi c jam of loaded 

freight trains at Army camps in Florida.

Source:

Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The U.S. Army in the Spanish-American 

War, (2d ed. Shippensburg, Pa., 1994).

Section VII

Notes on the Contributions of Elihu Root

to the U.S. Army

STATE OF THE NATION

The problems of governing Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines after the 

Spanish-American War and post-war Army demobilization and reorganization 

confronted the new Secretary of War, Elihu Root, in July 1899.

Root’s Background: A wholly unmilitary New York corporation lawyer, 

Root knew little of the military or the art of war. President McKinley, however, chose him not on the basis of his military qualifi cations, but because of 

the need to administer the new American possessions being occupied by the 

military. Besides dealing with colonial problems, Root, infl uenced by Army 

offi cer reformers such as Leonard Wood, took on the task of reorganizing the 

Army so that it could wage modern warfare.

His General Ideas: Root strongly felt that the army was a mechanical instrument through which the country’s civilian leaders could implement or uphold 
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American Military Heritage

their strategy and decisions. He also observed 

that the Army in the state in which he found it 

was incapable of performing its role.

Preparation for War: Root felt that the preparation of the Army for war involved at least 

four things: A staff capable of long-range war 

planning; an agency capable of evaluating new 

war materials and recommending their adoption; 

a merit selection and advancement program for 

army offi cers; and large scale training exercises 

to maintain a high training level.

Recommendations for Improvement: Root’s plans to achieve an Army 

capable of the above tasks included the following ideas: To establish an Army 

War College to train the ablest and most competent offi cers of high grades; to 

select all War Department staff offi cers from the line and return them to the 

line at the end of their respective tours; to include provisions in the promotion 

system for the selection of outstanding offi cers for advanced promotion; and 

to make all offi cer promotions though a board of offi cers.

Reorganization of the General Staff: Root pushed a general staff bill in 1902, 

but, due to strong opposition by senior offi cers whose jobs would be affected by 

the legislation, he was unable to secure its approval until 1903. It then became 

known as the Reorganization Act of 1903 and included the following features: 

The organization of a general staff to perform long-range military planning; 

the abolishment of the Offi ce of Commanding General of the Army; and the 

establishment of the Offi ce of the Chief of Staff as a Presidential advisor and 

focal control point for high level army activities.

The Dick Militia Act, 1903: This act repealed the Militia Act of 1792. 

The new bill established state controlled, federally equipped and advised 

National Guard units that could be federalized for service within the United 

States. For use in foreign wars, national authority was still required to ask 

Guard units to volunteer. Foreign service was made compulsory by later 

legislation. 

Conclusions: Root’s work was strongly infl uenced by the concepts and writings of Emory Upton, which in turn were infl uenced by the writings of John C. 

Calhoun. It is realistic to assume that, had Root’s ideas not been heeded, the 

U.S. Army’s participation in the First World War would have been much less 

effective than it was. Although not a brilliant fi eld commander or a valorous 

warrior, Root’s link in our Army’s heritage is secure as a result of his planning, 

organizational concepts, and far-sighted goals. Root truly laid the institutional 

foundations of the U.S. Army of the twentieth century.
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American Military Heritage

Section VIII

The Philippines, 1898–1902

The Spanish-American War left the United States, for the fi rst time in its 

history, with colonial possessions. When the Spanish surrendered Manila in August 1898, the Army provided law enforcement, established a 

military court system, instituted a system of inspections and vaccines to 

improve sanitation, and reopened the port to revive commerce. To win 

over the Philippine revolutionaries who had fought the Spanish and who 

resisted becoming a colony of the United States, the Army adopted largescale civic action programs to improve ineffi cient public administration, 

and tackle unhealthy living conditions and lack of educational, economic, 

and political opportunity on the islands. American soldiers played a key 

role in a new public school system that would provide education to more 

than a small male elite. Given the sheer number of schools throughout 

the country, noncommissioned offi cers, as well as enlisted men, had to 

participate as teachers.

When an American unit moved into a town, NCOs supervised the construction of necessary facilities, while commanders detailed personnel as principals and teachers. By 1900, a Department of Public Instruction supervised 

the program. A centralized system thus employed the basic American methods of compulsory attendance, free primary and secondary schools, and specialized schools. Beyond the primary grades, the teachers conducted their 

classes in English. The system soon proved overwhelmingly popular among 

the Filipinos. Within fi ve months of the establishment of the Department 

of Public Instruction, over 100,000 students had enrolled in about 1,000 

schools, and the Army had 

distributed over $100,000 

worth of school materials. 

American soldiers passed 

on more than a formal 

elementary education. 

Filipinos discovered that 

they likedAmerican-style 

Christmas celebrations, 

complete with a soldier 

decked out as Santa Claus, 

and sports such as baseball and basketball.
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American Military Heritage

8

World War I

Section I

The United States Army Enters the

Twentieth Century

During the fi rst forty years of the twentieth century, the United States 

 underwent a transformation from one of several “great powers” to, 

 arguably, the most powerful nation in the world. The U.S. Army carried out its imperial responsibilities, experimented with new technologies of 

warfare, reorganized its mobilization structure, and fought its fi rst major war 

overseas. These new missions, and particularly the crucible of war, changed 

the Army. Still, the Army of 1941 shared much in common with the old frontier 

constabulary of the nineteenth century. 

1909 Army purchases its fi rst airplane 

1914 Completion of the Panama Canal

 Start of World War in Europe

1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico

 National Defense Act

April 1917 United States’ entry into World War I

May 1917 Selective Service Act

November 1918 Armistice ending World War I

1920 Amendments to the National Defense Act of 

1929 Stock market crash leads to the Great 

 Depression

1933 Adolph Hitler becomes Chancellor of Ger- 

 many

Section II

Before the War, 1900–1917

In the period between the turn of the century and 1917, the United States became a world power. Yet, even while the Navy was receiving large budgets 

to achieve its goal of becoming the most powerful in the world, the Army was 

struggling to modernize with limited funds. The General Staff, established 

in August 1903, became the central planning and coordinating agency in the 

War Department, preparing contingency plans, collecting information about 

foreign armies, supervising the Army educational system, and controlling 

operations. The General Staff planned, and the Army conducted, a number of 

contingency operations, including the second occupation of Cuba (1906–09) 
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American Military Heritage

and interventions in China after the fall of the Manchu dynasty (1912), at Vera 

Cruz (1914), and in Mexico (1916–17). The Army also maintained order and 

provided relief during several major natural disasters, most notably in San 

Francisco following the earthquake of 1906.

The Army school system continued to grow, adding the Army War College, 

the Infantry School, the Field Artillery School, the Signal School, and the 

Quartermaster School, among others. The old Infantry and Cavalry School at 

Fort Leavenworth expanded to become the Command and General Staff School, 

and began to attract as students some of the most profi cient junior offi cers in 

the service. Lack of funds, however, permitted only a small percentage of the 

Army’s offi cers to attend these schools.

The regiment remained the largest permanent unit, but the second Cuban occupation prompted the War Department to organize a division headquarters 

to control the Army and Marine Corps units involved. The outbreak of the 

Mexican Revolution in 1911 twice caused President William Howard Taft to 

mobilize provisional divisions on the Mexican border (1911 and 1913–15). 

These episodes, as well as the extensive program of maneuvers involving both 

Regular and National Guard units, gave American soldiers more experience 

with large formations than they had ever had in peacetime and added realism 

to the General Staff’s planning for wartime divisions and corps. 

Intellectual change characterized the era for the Army. To guide training, the 

General Staff issued the fi rst edition of Field Service Regulations in 1905, followed 

by revised editions in 1910, 1913, and 1914. The 1914 edition fi rst explained the 

concept of “combined arms.” The fi ve-paragraph fi eld order, developed at the 

Leavenworth Schools, became the standard form for Army operational orders. The 

fi eld artillery, which separated from the coast artillery in 1907, adopted indirect 

fi re as its primary mode of delivering shells on target. Both the infantry in 1904 

and the fi eld artillery in 1911 established professional journals.

Equipment also changed during this period, but given the Army’s level of 

funding, equipment modernization had much less impact than in the Navy. 

The Army adopted the 1903 bolt action Springfi eld Rifl e and a modern rapidfi re, three-inch gun for the fi eld artillery. During the 1906–07 war scare with 

Japan, the Chief of Ordnance stockpiled hand grenades and developed a trench 

mortar, because both he and the Chief of Staff believed that the next major 

war would involve extensive trench warfare. The Army issued two machine 

guns to each regiment of infantry and cavalry beginning in 1906. In 1909, the 

Army purchased the fi rst military airplane, and by early 1910, it planned to 

mobilize one aero company per army corps in the event of war. Automobiles 

and trucks began to replace the horse for transporting staff offi cers and hauling 

supplies. Army reformers failed to foresee, however, how these new weapons 

would interact on the battlefi eld.
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American Military Heritage

Many of the technical 

branches of the Army made 

signifi cant contributions in 

their own areas of expertise. With the acquisition of 

an overseas empire following the war with Spain, the 

Army Medical Department 

became a world leader in 

research on tropical medicine. In particular, the 

Yellow Fever Commission, 

led by Major Walter Reed, 

proved that the mosquito 

was the carrier of yellow 

fever. During the fi rst occupation of Cuba, 1899–1903, 

the Army succeeded in all 

but eliminating this deadly 

disease from the island. 

The Army Corps of Engineers continued to play a 

large role in public works; 

the Panama Canal was completed under the direction of an Army engineer, 

Colonel George W. Goethals. The Army Signal Corps, at the same time, 

experimented with wireless telegraphy, an early form of radio, and, in 1904, 

used it to transmit messages as far as 107 miles, then a world record. 

Section III

Early Army Aviation

The Army of the Potomac fi elded a Balloon Corps during the fi rst years of 

the Civil War. While somewhat useful as an observation platform to monitor 

Confederate movements, the balloons lacked the tactical mobility to accompany the troops on wide ranging maneuvers. Considerable friction also existed 

between the civilian balloonists and the offi cers charged with supporting the 

corps. After the battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863, the War Department 

allowed the organization to disband.

In the 1890s, the Signal Corps, responding to developments in European armies, 

acquired several observation balloons. A Signal Corps offi cer used a balloon 

for aerial observation in Cuba in 1898, with mixed results. Although the 

Signal Corps concentrated most of its efforts after the war with Spain on the 

expanding fi eld of electrical communications, it retained an interest in lighterthan-air experiments. At the same time, another Army agency, the Board of 

U.S. Army Signal Corps, 1891–1902
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American Military Heritage

Ordnance and Fortifi cation, funded experiments with heavier-than-air fl ight. 

In 1903, the Board funded experiments by Dr. Samuel P. Langley. They 

ended in failures that were both spectacular and public. The Army received 

considerable criticism from both Congress and the public for wasting public 

money on “impractical” schemes.

On December 17, 1903, nine days after Langley’s second failure, two bicycle 

mechanics from Dayton, Ohio, successfully fl ew the fi rst airplane in a controlled fl ight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. When they sought to sell the 

Army an airplane in 1906, the Board of Ordnance and Fortifi cation turned 

them down. The following year, after President Theodore Roosevelt personally intervened with the Board of Ordnance and Fortifi cation, the Signal Corps 

drafted the specifi cations for the fi rst Army airplane. Following trials at Ft. 

Myer, Virginia, the Army purchased a Wright Flyer in August 1909. 

Although the Army purchased the world’s fi rst military aircraft in 1909, 

European nations soon surpassed the Signal Corps’ air arm in both the 

quantity and quality of their machines. The German and the French armies 

were engaged in an arms race; both countries devoted far more money to 

aviation than the United States. Congress waited until fi scal year 1912 

to provide funds for additional aircraft. Until then the Army used contingency funds to fi nance aviation. Money, however, was only one of 

the reasons why aviation development lagged in the United States. Light 

engine technology was much more developed in Europe than the United 

States. American-built aircraft were consequently underpowered and 

prone to stalling, often with fatal results. Not until World War I, with the 

introduction of the Liberty engine, did American engines begin to compare 

favorably to European designs. 
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American Military Heritage

Despite these diffi culties, military aviation made progress in the United States. 

After receiving fl ying instruction from the Wrights, Lieutenant Frank P. Lahm 

became the fi rst Army pilot. In 1910 College Park, Maryland, became the site of 

the fi rst military airfi eld. The Signal Corps provided two aircraft to support the 

Maneuver Division the War Department assembled on the Mexican border in 1911. 

Two years later, with yet another division mobilizing in Texas, the Signal Corps 

formed the Army’s fi rst aviation unit, the 1st Aero Squadron (Provisional), to support it. The outbreak of World War I gave the War Department a large quantity of 

information about Allied aerial operations on the Western Front. Using high-level 

connections, the American military attache in London, Lieutenant Colonel George 

O. Squier, became the only offi cer from a neutral nation given free access to the 

British armies fi ghting in France. What the Army lacked was technical data on 

the design and construction of British, French, and Italian military aircraft. It did 

not receive this data until after the American entry into the war.

Section IV

The Panama Canal

One of the logical extensions of the United States’ 

new status as a world power 

was the need for a water 

route linking the Atlantic 

with the Pacifi c. In 1880, a 

French company attempted 

to build a canal across the 

isthmus of Panama, then 

a province of Colombia. 

Unprecedented engineering 

problems, tropical disease, 

and lack of fi nances contributed to the eventual collapse 

of the attempt. American 

interest in a Central American canal dated from the 

1850s. The 1890 publication of Captain (later Rear 

Admiral) Alfred Thayer 

Mahan’s The Infl uence of Seapower Upon History convinced many Americans, and particularly the young Theodore Roosevelt, that building a canal 

under American control was a pressing national need. In 1901, Roosevelt 

became president and set the legislative and political machinery in motion to 

gain the sole right to continue the work begun by the French. In the process, 

he supported a successful revolution by the Panamanians against a somewhat 

uncooperative Colombian government. 
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American Military Heritage

By 1904, Roosevelt had overcome all the obstacles, and the United States was 

ready to undertake the project. All previous attempts had contemplated building 

a sea-level canal, but a civilian engineer, John W. Stevens, successfully argued 

for a lock canal. Worn out by political infi ghting and a brutal climate, Stevens 

resigned in 1906. Roosevelt appointed Colonel George W. Goethals of the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers to fi nish the project. Goethals’ success owed much to 

the efforts of an Army medical team led by Colonel William Gorgas, a veteran 

of public health work in Cuba. Between 1904 and 1906, the team wiped out yellow fever in the Canal Zone and worked hard to reduce the incidence of malaria, 

which Gorgas considered the more dangerous. Sanitary work under Medical 

Department supervision included the construction of modern water and sewer 

systems for all the towns in the Canal Zone. As a result of the Army’s efforts 

on this project, the Panama Canal opened for shipping in 1914. 

Section V

Pancho Villa

In 1911, revolution erupted in Mexico. Although the revolutionaries quickly 

overthrew the government, a violent internal power struggle followed. After 

he became president in 1913, Woodrow Wilson intervened in Mexican affairs 

on several occasions to try to infl uence the outcome in a democratic direction. 

When fi ghting broke out between President Venustiano Carranza and one of 

his chief lieutenants, General Francisco “Pancho” Villa, President Wilson 

assisted Carranza. In retaliation, Villa raided across the border into New 

Mexico with some 485 followers.

The War Department had deployed units of the Regular Army at intervals 

along the border to prevent the violence in Mexico from spilling over into 

the United States. On the night of March 9, 1916, Villa struck Columbus, 

New Mexico, which was garrisoned by elements of the 13th Cavalry. After 

a confused fi ght at close quarters in the dark, the cavalrymen drove off the 

raiders. President Wilson, believing that he would have the permission of the 

Carranza government, directed Brigadier General John J. Pershing to pursue 

them into Mexico. However, the movement of the Punitive Expedition into 

Mexico angered the Mexican people, who were still sensitive to any incursion by forces of the United States which had been responsible for the loss of 

a substantial part of the nation a half-century before. In response, President 

Carranza denied Pershing the right to use the Mexican National Railway to 

supply his far-fl ung cavalry columns. Pershing improvised a supply line using automobiles and motor trucks obtained from the organic equipment of the 

1st Aero Squadron and purchased on the open market. The campaign into 

Mexico marked the Army’s fi rst large scale use of trucks in a line of supply.

The aircraft of the 1st Aero Squadron, commanded by Captain Benjamin D. 

Foulois, proved useful in the initial phases of the operation for reconnaissance 
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American Military Heritage

and coordination of the columns. Unfortunately, they lacked the power to fl y 

over the Mexican mountains. After numerous crashes, the squadron had to 

withdraw to the United States for refi tting. Both the potential of aviation and 

the problems that the squadron encountered led Congress to provide much 

more generously for aviation in the National Defense Act of 1916. 

Although Pershing pushed deep into Mexico, he was never able to catch 

Villa. American cavalry had several running fi ghts with the Villistas and 

broke up his main band, killing many of his chief lieutenants in the process. 

Increasing friction between Pershing’s command and the Mexican Army 

led to armed clashes at Parral and Carrizal. President Wilson ordered 

Pershing to fall back closer to the border, where he established a zone free 

of bandits and revolutionaries. At the same time, Wilson mobilized the 

National Guard on the border. Pershing withdrew his forces from Mexico 

in early 1917. But the Army had to maintain troops along the border 

throughout World War I. In fact, the Army fought its last major battle 

with the Villistas in 1919.

Pershing was bitterly disappointed about his failure to capture Villa and was 

opposed to the policy of withdrawing from Mexico. But he faithfully executed 

all the administration’s orders without public complaint. When President 

Wilson had to select a soldier to command American forces in France, he 

turned to the man who knew how to follow orders, the recently promoted 

Major General John J. Pershing.
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American Military Heritage

Section VI

“The War To End All Wars”

Between 1892 and 1914 the continent of Europe became an armed camp as 

two rival alliance systems of great powers vied for supremacy. The Triple 

Entente consisted of France, Russia, and (informally after 1906) Great Britain, 

while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy composed the Triple Alliance. 

The outbreak of war in the Balkans between Austria-Hungary and Serbia 

in July 1914 quickly drew all the major powers into the confl ict as the alliance obligations took effect. Russia, France’s ally, supported Serbia, and 

Germany supported its ally, Austria-Hungary. Thus, Germany faced a twofront confl ict. Italy fi rst declared its neutrality and then, in 1915, joined the 

Allies, as the members of the Triple Entente became known. By 1917, most 

minor European states had aligned themselves either for or against Germany. 

In France and Belgium, as early as October 1914, the troops on both sides began 

constructing what became an increasingly elaborate trench system known as 

the Western Front, stretching from the Swiss frontier to the English Channel. 

Offensives gained ground in yards, not miles, and cost tens of thousands of 

lives. On the fi rst day of the battle of the Somme, July 1, 1916, the British 

Army alone lost 100,000 casualties. 

Throughout the fi rst three years of the war, the United States consistently 

sought to maintain its neutrality. A series of incidents resulting from the 

German submarine blockade of France and Great Britain made this increas-
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American Military Heritage

ingly unlikely. As early as May 1915, the German submarine U-20 sank the 

great British liner Lusitania off the coast of Ireland, killing 128 Americans. 

Although this incident caused a war scare and touched off a large preparedness 

movement to provide trained reserves for the Army, the Wilson administration continued to seek a diplomatic solution. Under threat of war, the German 

government pledged in April 1916 to refrain from unrestricted submarine 

attacks on shipping. By January 1917, however, the German high command 

was convinced that it had accumulated enough submarines to starve the British Isles into submission. Germany renounced its earlier agreement. It also 

tried to convince Mexico to declare war on the United States by promising to 

return Mexico’s “lost provinces,” Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. British intelligence intercepted and deciphered the message, known as 

the Zimmerman Telegram, and turned it over to the Americans. The United 

States declared war on Germany and on its allies on April 6, 1917. 

The German leaders had anticipated an American declaration of war but had 

calculated that the U.S. Army was too weak to intervene in suffi cient strength 

before Germany won the war. Although Congress in the National Defense 

Act of 1916 had provided for an expanded Regular Army of 175,000 men in 

peacetime, backed by the 400,000-man National Guard and an Army Reserve, 

expansion had only barely begun when war was declared. The passage of a 

Selective Service Act in May 1917 allowed a relatively orderly mobilization 

of manpower until the Army reached a peak of approximately 3,000,000 men 

in November 1918. Industrial mobilization, on the other hand, proved much 

more chaotic, and the equipment shortages that resulted made unit training 

diffi cult for divisions in the United States. The supply situation remained a 

problem until the end of the war, and the Americans had to depend on their 

allies for most of the heavy equipment they used in combat.

Shortly after entering the war, President Wilson sent the advance elements 

of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) to France under the command 

of Major General John J. Pershing. Pershing organized a modern staff, set 

up a school system to train specialists, and prepared a training schedule for 

divisions as they deployed to France. But the American troops were slow 

to arrive. There were only four combat divisions in France by December 

1917. American planning looked toward launching a war-winning offensive 

in 1919. Pershing, meanwhile, came under heavy pressure from the British 

and the French to integrate Americans into their depleted armies — fi rst as 

individual replacements and later as units. He strongly opposed the fi rst 

proposal and only consented to the latter to facilitate unit training and for 

short periods during combat emergencies. President Wilson believed that 

only a strong, independent American Army would give him the leverage he 

needed at the end of the war to achieve a just and lasting peace in Europe. 

Not without diffi culty, Pershing ensured that the AEF was independent when 

the war ended.
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American Military Heritage

While the AEF slowly organized in France during 1917, the Germans knocked 

Russia out of the war. At the same time the German Army held off major 

French and British attacks on the Western Front, although at considerable cost. 

During the winter of 1917–18, the Germans transferred divisions from Russia 

to France and, in the spring of 1918, opened a series of offensives designed 

to win the war. American units helped stop the last two drives, and then the 

U.S. I Corps participated in 

the Allied counterattack at 

Soissons in July that marked 

the beginning of the German Army’s long retreat. 

In early September 1918, 

the U.S. First Army, under 

Pershing’s immediate command and reinforced with 

French divisions, successfully cleared the St. Mihiel 

salient and thereby removed 

any German threat to the 

rail lines leading to Verdun. 

Using Verdun as a base, the 

First Army then attacked 

north through the Argonne 

Forest toward the key rail 

center of Sedan as part of 

a general Allied offensive. 

Initially very successful, the 

Americans bogged down 

because of diffi cult terrain, 

skilled German defenders, 

and their own inexperience. 

After suffering high casualties, Pershing halted and reorganized, inserting a second fi eld army headquarters to provide better control over some thirty American 

combat divisions now in France. When the Americans resumed the attack in 

early November, First Army broke the German lines and pursued the enemy 

toward the Meuse River. An armistice ended the fi ghting on November 11, 1918.

 

At the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson succeeded in winning agreement on the formation of the League of Nations, an international organization 

designed to allow nations to settle disputes without war. By forcing Germany 

to pay substantial penalties, known as reparations, the Allies sowed some of 

the seeds of the next world war. The withdrawal of the United States into 

isolationism, signifi ed by the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty and 

the concurrent failure to join the League of Nations, also severely weakened 

the postwar balance of power. 
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American Military Heritage

Section VII

Notes on Legislation

Between 1916 and 1920 Congress passed three signifi cant laws, the National 

Defense Act of 1916, the Selective Service Act of 1917, and the 1920 Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916. Some of the most far reaching 

pieces of military legislation ever enacted in the United States, they served as 

the basis of U.S. military manpower policy between 1916 and 1972. Some 

provisions of these acts continue to affect the Army to this day. 

The National Defense Act—1916: The 1916 act, passed as a result of the 

Preparedness Movement and the dangers posed by World War I in Europe, was 

a comprehensive piece of legislation that affected all aspects of the military 

establishment. It provided that “the Army of the United States” would consist 

of “the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Offi cers’ Reserve Corps and 

the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the Service of the 

United States, and other such forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized 

by law.” The law increased the maximum peacetime strength of the Regular 

Army from 100,000 to 175,000, phased in over a period of fi ve years, and 

set the wartime strength at 286,000. The act called for the War Department 

to organize all mobile troops of the Regular Army and National Guard into 

brigades and divisions in peacetime and authorized the President to establish 

corps and fi eld armies in time of war or emergency. The legislation prescribed 

the composition of these units but only in general terms. It created a Regular 

Army enlisted reserve with an elaborate system of bounties to encourage men 

to stay in the reserve and re-enlist in time of war. It created the Reserve Offi cers Training Corps at all four-year, land-grant colleges and authorized the 

War Department to establish similar training detachments at other four-year 

colleges and universities and established a Regular Army offi cer reserve. Finally, it provided that individual members of the Organized Militia could be 

drafted into active service for an indefi nite period in time of war.

The Selective Service Act—1917: Congress and the Army sought to avoid 

the mistakes of the Civil War draft. During the Civil War, the War Department 

took six months to appoint enrollment boards and to conduct the registration. 

The enrollment offi cers went from house to house to conduct a military census 

and determine who was eligible. Some enrollment offi cers were killed, and 

many were injured. The resulting registration was incomplete and inaccurate. 

During World War I, while Congress debated the act, the War Department 

secretly worked out the administrative procedures. By the time the act became 

law, the War Department had completed all administrative plans. One of the 

key distinctions between the Civil War and World War I drafts lay not in the 

laws themselves, but in the registration regulations. Rather than requiring 

members or employees of the draft boards to go to individuals to register them 
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American Military Heritage

as a census taker would, the regulations made it the patriotic duty for all men 

of military age to come forward and register at a designated place. Once the 

War Department formulated this policy, it became logical and convenient to 

have the men report to their customary voting precincts to register. Registration, however, was only the preliminary step in the selective service process. 

The real work centered around who would serve. The local boards handled the 

major part of the selection work. Because the local boards were composed of 

the neighbors of the future selectees, the system achieved widespread grass 

roots support. About sixty-seven percent of the men serving in the Army during World War I entered under the Selective Service Act. In less than eighteen 

months, the system selected and brought into the armed forces 2,810,296 men. 

The law made all males between the ages of 21 and 30 subject to registration 

except for those in certain occupations, such as holders of civil offi ce, members 

of pacifi st religious sects, hardship cases, and individuals giving evidence of 

“moral turpitude.” The law established local boards comprised of minor offi cials and prominent citizens appointed by the President, who had the power 

to exempt individuals. Finally, it specifi cally prohibited the twin evils of the 

Civil War period, the hiring of substitutes and the payment of bounties to 

induce enlistments.

The 1920 Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916: This 

legislation is sometimes referred to as the National Defense Act of 1920. 

Although technically this legislation only made amendments to the earlier act, the amendments actually represented a genuine shift in policy. 

Congress passed he amendments after one of the most comprehensive 

debates on national military policy in American history. Two differing 

views emerged in testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee. The great wartime chief of staff, General Peyton C. March, wanted 

a large, skeletonized Regular Army of 500,000 men to be filled to war 

strength by the Army Reserve, kept up to strength by a continuation of 

wartime conscription. In contrast, Colonel John McAuley Palmer, General 

Pershing’s personal representative, championed the concept of the citizen 

soldier. He advocated a small, ready Regular Army, capable of handling all 

situations short of a general war. To provide trained reserves for a major 

conflict, whether Army Reserve or Guard, Palmer advocated a system 

of universal military training for all males of military age. Endorsed by 

Pershing, Palmer’s ideas, shorn of the universal military training provisions, became the basis of the 1920 amendments. They provided that 

“the Army of the United States” would consist of “the Regular Army, the 

National Guard while in the service of the United States, the organized 

Reserves, including the Officers’ Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve 

Corps.” The Regular Army would not exceed 280,000 enlisted men in 

peacetime. The amendments added three new branches—Air Service, 

Chemical Warfare Service, and Finance Department. Tanks became the 
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American Military Heritage

responsibility of the Infantry branch. The number of officers in each 

grade and the pay of the entire Army was fixed by statute. To facilitate 

mobilization, the peacetime Army would normally organize into brigades, 

divisions, and corps. The legislation left their composition to the discretion of the President. The President could also form field armies when 

he thought the situation justified it. The War Department General Staff 

received specific responsibility for preparing plans for national defense 

and the use of military forces for that purpose. The country was divided 

into corps areas for peacetime administration. 

During the prosperous 1920s, with public attention focused upon the fortunes 

to be made on Wall Street and the impulse toward isolationism still strong, 

Congress never fully funded the act. Initially Congress provided for 150,000 

Regulars, still substantially larger than the pre-1916 Regular Army, but after 

1927 cut it back to 117,000 men. The War Department divided the country 

into nine corps areas. Each was to contain one Regular Army, two National 

Guard, and two Reserve divisions. Given the authorized manning levels, the 

Regular divisions remained skeletons. Guard divisions, dependent on Federal drill pay, were usually at less than fi fty percent strength, with minimal 

training days. Reserve divisions were little more than paper organizations, 

with small cadres for mobilization. 

The onset of the Great Depression placed the whole program under even 

greater stress. During the period between the world wars, the United States 

possessed a national military policy adequate on paper to its needs. But lack 

of political commitment and the shortage of funds that resulted meant that the 

Army, although larger and better prepared for mobilization, was probably less 

ready to conduct operations than the pre-1916 Army.

Section VIII

Notes on Awards and Decorations

Societies have always valued individual courage, skill, and ability. Military 

medals, however, are a relatively recent invention. In the eighteenth century 

the king of England ordered medals to be presented to senior British military 

and naval leaders. During the American Revolution, the Continental Army 

adopted the practice with a democratic variation. On August 7, 1782, Lieutenant General George Washington established the Badge of Military Merit. 

Known commonly as the Purple Heart, it is generally held to be the fi rst 

award for valor without regard to rank. Although the Medal of Honor dates 

from the Civil War, the United States government waited until World War I 

to authorize and present a signifi cant number of awards and decorations for 

individual valor and distinguished service. A brief summary of these World 

War I-era medals and their stated use follows:
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American Military Heritage

The Distinguished Service Cross (DSC): President Wilson authorized this 

award in 1918 at the same time that the criteria for the award of the Medal of 

Honor were updated to their present strict requirements. The DSC was intended 

to rank just below the Medal of Honor. It was supposed to be awarded to any 

person who, while serving in any capacity with 

the Army of the United States, distinguished 

himself or herself by individual acts of extraordinary heroism in connection with military 

operations against an armed enemy under circumstances that did not justify the award of the 

Medal of Honor. The DSC was also awarded 

to members of civilian relief organizations who 

distinguished themselves while working with the Army in an area of actual 

operations. During World War I, the War Department presented more than 

5,000 DSCs and 100 bronze oak leaf clusters instead of a second award. Offi cers and men who had rendered conspicuous service prior to World War I 

became eligible for the medal as well. The DSC is a bronze cross and bears 

an American eagle, superimposed upon a laurel leaf. A scroll below the eagle 

has the inscription FOR VALOR. It is suspended from a blue ribbon with a 

border of narrow red and white stripes.

The Distinguished Service Medal: Congress created this medal to reward 

those persons, either military or civilian, who in positions of great responsibility rendered outstanding service to the United States Government. The medal 

was awarded to numerous offi cers, both American and foreign, as well as to 

many women during the World War I era. The 

fi rst group of these medals was presented in 1918 

to each of the military commanders of the allied 

armies. The medal is a bronze seal of the United 

States, surrounded by a lettered, blue enamel 

circlet suspended on a red and white ribbon.

The Silver Star: This award was originally a small silver star intended 

to be worn on a campaign medal to denote gallantry during that particular 

action. Approved for issue in 1918, it ranked just below the DSC. In 1932, 

a medal, consisting of a silver star suspended from a red, white, and blue 

pendant was authorized with a bronze oak leaf cluster to be added for each 

additional award. An interesting feature of this 

decoration is that it is, in the strictest sense, the 

only medal, other than the Medal of Honor, 

that is awarded for “gallantry in action.” One 

of the famous early holders of this decoration 

was General Pershing.

 Silver Star Ribbon

Distinguished

Service Medal Ribbon

Distinguished

Service Cross Ribbon
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American Military Heritage

The Distinguished Flying Cross: On July 2, 1926, Congress authorized 

the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Air Corps of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps 

including the National Guard and Organized Reserves following April 6, 

1917, distinguished himself by heroism or extraordinary achievement while 

participating in aerial fl ight. Although the decoration was made retroactive 

to World War I, it was more widely presented 

during the postwar period, with one of the fi rst 

awards going to Captain Charles A. Lindbergh 

for his trans-Atlantic fl ight in 1927. The medal 

consists of a bronze, four-bladed propeller suspended from a bar which is attached to a blue 

ribbon with red, white, and blue stripes.

The Soldier’s Medal: Congress established this medal at the same time that 

it authorized the Distinguished Flying Cross. The Soldier’s Medal is intended 

as an award to a member of the armed forces for heroism not involving actual 

confl ict with an enemy. Most of these medals have been awarded for heroic 

deeds in life-saving. Nearly three hundred were 

presented during the decade immediately following its authorization. The medal is a bronze 

octagon with a superimposed eagle suspended 

from a ribbon with two broad blue stripes at the 

edges and thirteen narrow white and red alternating stripes in the center.

The Purple Heart: On February 22, 1932, the two hundredth anniversary 

of George Washington’s birth, the War Department announced the revival 

of the Purple Heart. It was to be awarded to Army personnel who as a result 

of enemy action had received wounds necessitating treatment by a medical 

offi cer. The original award, designed by Pierre Charles L’Enfant, who later 

designed Washington, D.C., was a purple, heart-shaped cloth encased in a 

silver border. One of the two surviving originals also has the word “Merit” 

embroidered in the center and encircled by a wreath. The modern medal, 

designed by Elizabeth Will, consists of a purple heart in a light bronze border 

with a profi le of General Washington in the 

center. Above the heart is a miniature of the 

Washington family coat of arms between tiny 

sprays of green leaves. It hangs from a purple 

ribbon enclosed by thin silver stripes at the left 

and right borders.

 Purple Heart Ribbon

 Soldier’s Medal Ribbon

Distinguished

Flying Cross Ribbon
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American Military Heritage

Section IX

Notes on Weapons and Tactics

GENERAL

When the United States entered World War I, the factories that produced 

armaments and munitions were busy with orders for the British and French 

Armies. Even though the United States had pioneered interchangeable 

parts, assembly lines and mass production, it required approximately 

eighteen months to set up new factories and begin large scale production of equipment and munitions. Consequently, the AEF had to rely on 

French and British weapons on the Western Front. The following list, by 

no means complete, gives some of the weapons and equipment used by 

the soldiers of the AEF.

LIGHT WEAPONS AND MACHINE GUNS

American troops went to war with a mixture of allied weapons, including 

French machine guns, an odd weapon called the Chauchat 8-mm. machine 

rifl e, and ancestors of the modern light mortar and hand grenades. U.S. 

Army stocks of light automatic weapons were both small and obsolescent 

at the time of American entry into the war. The American inventor John 

M. Browning developed a family of machine guns that promised to be the 

best in the world, but production took time. The Browning automatic 

rifl e, best known by its famous acronym BAR, went into combat with the 

79th Division at St. Mihiel in September 1918. Divisions arriving from 

the United States after that time came equipped with them, but it took 

longer to reequip divisions already in France. The Browning model 1917 

.30 caliber machine gun only entered service at the front in one division 

in late September 1918. The only other truly “all American” weapon of 

the war was the automatic pistol .45 caliber model 1911, also of Browning’s design. Several of the more commonly used weapons of the war are 

discussed below:

United States Rifl e, .30 Caliber, Model 1917: The Springfi eld 1903 was 

very popular with American troops during the war, but they also used the .30 

caliber model 1917, a bolt-action magazine rifl e derived from the British Lee 

Enfi eld, pattern of 1914. The U.S. Army reworked its version to take standard 

Army .30 caliber cartridges, mounted in a clip of six. The sight was adjustable 

from 200 to 1,600 yards. The rifl e was a pound heavier and three inches longer 

than the 1903 Springfi eld. 

The locking system on the 1917 model was 

weaker than the one on the Springfi eld. Unlike the models 

produced for the British Army, however, the American version 
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American Military Heritage

featured interchangeable breech mechanisms. Through November 9, 1918 

the Army received 2,202,429 model 1917 rifl es. It used them to equip all 

draftee divisions and at least four National Guard divisions. The National 

Guard divisions that fought in France with the British Expeditionary Forces, 

the 27th and 33d Divisions, received British Lee Enfi elds.

Russian Three-Line Rifl e, 7.62-mm: This bolt-action magazine rifl e loaded 

from the top along the lines of the Mossin and Nagant, the standard rifl e of 

the Imperial Russian Army. The magazine had a capacity for fi ve cartridges. 

The Remington Arms Company and the New England Westinghouse Company 

had large contracts from the Russian government at the time of the March 1918 

Revolution. The War Department wanted these companies to manufacture the 

Browning .50 caliber machine gun. To enable them to keep their skilled work 

forces together, the department purchased all the Russian rifl es manufactured 

by the companies until they could put their machine gun lines into production. 

The Army thus acquired 280,049 Russian-pattern rifl es, all of which the War 

Department shipped to the states for distribution to Guard units.

French Chauchat Automatic Rifl e: This air-cooled automatic rifl e was 

widely used by the French, the Belgians and the Americans during World War 

I. The French and Belgian models employed a crescent-shaped magazine, 

while the American version, a modifi cation of the model 1915 Chauchat, used 

a straight magazine. Both magazines had a 20-shot capacity. The rate of fi re 

was 300 rounds per minute, operated by the long recoil system. It weighed 

19 1/2 pounds, including a folding bipod. The fi rst American divisions arriving in France were equipped with this weapon out of French Army stocks. 

This version used 8-mm. ammunition, but was subsequently redesigned to 

take U.S. .30 caliber cartridges. Beginning on 31 December 1917, American 

divisions received their Chauchats prior to sailing for France. Bad design 

and poor manufacture meant that the gun was plagued with “parts breakage, 

feed jams, and cartridges sticking in the chamber as soon as the barrel became 

slightly hot.” The long recoil meant that it was almost impossible to keep 

the weapon on target. As soon as these limitations became widely known, 

American troops discarded great numbers of Chauchats on the battlefi elds of 

France. Lack of an adequate machine gun program in the U.S. Army prior 

to the war meant that most of the AEF had to use the Chauchat 

until the Armistice.
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American Military Heritage

Hotchkiss Machine Gun, Model 1914: The standard machine gun in the 

French Army, it enjoyed a great reputation for reliability and accuracy. Beltfed, gas-operated, and air-cooled, it was fi rst developed for use by the French 

Army in North Africa. Chambered for the standard French Army rifl e ammunition, the 8-mm. model 1886 Lebel cartridge, the gun could fi re 400 rounds per 

minute. The fi rst twelve U.S. combat divisions to arrive in France received 

8-mm. models from the French Army. In order to simplify ammunition supply, 

the War Department converted these to standard .30/06 rifl e cartridges. The 

model 1914 received much credit for the French Fourth Army’s successful 

defense of the Marne River in July 1918. 

Automatic Pistol, .45 Caliber, Model 1911: This standard Army-issue 

weapon was the Army’s response to juramenado, a custom of the Moros, the 

Moslems living in the southern Philippines. The Moros would attack Christians 

with long knives while in a religious frenzy until they themselves were killed. 

The standard Army pistol of .38 caliber proved too lightweight when faced 

with such fanaticism. Offi cers were sometime hacked to death by Moros after 

emptying their revolvers into 

assailants, who eventually died 

themselves. The .45 caliber 

model 1911 was designed with 

suffi cient hitting power to knock 

a large male in full charge to the ground with one 

hit. A revolver that could penetrate white pine to a 

depth of 1 inch at a range of 25 yards was considered to have 

infl icted a serious wound on a man. The model 1911 penetrated 

white pine at that range to a depth of 6 inches. The magazine 

carried seven cartridges. Under test conditions, an operator beginning with an empty magazine fi red 21 shots in 28 seconds, all of which 

struck a man-sized target stationed 25 yards away. The trajectory was fl at up 

to 75 yards, the distance the Ordnance Department considered the limits of 

its accuracy. It was a handy weapon in a trench fi ght.

George M. Chinn, The Machine Gun: History, Evolution, and Development of Manual, 

Automatic, and Airborne Repeating Weapons, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1951).

ARTILLERY

World War I on the Western Front was very much an artilleryman’s war. 

Modern artillery dates from the French Army’s adoption of the model 1897 

75-mm. gun. It was the fi rst piece capable of quick fi re; a hydraulic recoil 

returned the gun to battery after every shot. The carriage remained stationary 

throughout the recoil, permitting a great increase in the speed of fi re. When 

soldiers prepared the trail (that part of the gun carriage that rested on the 

ground) so that the tube reached a 45-degree elevation, it achieved a maximum range of 9,482 yards. The French Army planned to use the guns close 
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American Military Heritage

to the infantry fi ring line, in plain view of the enemy, in what was known 

as direct fi re mode. The rapid fi re would sweep the enemy infantry quickly 

from the front. The British 

Army, however, opted for 

a system of indirect fi re as 

its standard artillery tactic. 

Direct fire allowed close 

coordination of action by 

infantry and the accompanying artillery and simplifi ed the problem of massing fi re. Gunners simply 

established gun lines in 

which their pieces lay in 

close physical proximity to 

one another. Virtually all 

Western armies before the 

war, including the U.S. Army, still regarded infantry fi re as decisive for establishing fi re superiority over an opponent. Artillery only assisted the infantry.

The opening battles of 1914 settled many questions of tactics. Direct fi re 

was guaranteed to cause the artillery excessive losses, not only of men but 

materiel. It could only be adopted in a tactical emergency. The French 75, 

excellent weapon that it was, still was not suffi cient by itself in all situations. 

When attacking fortifi cations, artillery needed to throw heavier shells at higher 

angles than the gun could provide. Large caliber howitzers were necessary.

The Allied armies developed techniques to deal with the unprecedented 

situation facing them. The British Army perfected the tactic of the rolling 

barrage, which consisted of moving a line of shell fi re, usually shrapnel, at 

a slow pace about 100 yards in front of the advancing infantry. It became 

standard practice, following the disastrous fi rst day of the Somme offensive, 
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American Military Heritage

to provide “a creeper” to support all infantry attacks. Carefully plotted map 

fi re enabled artillery to support the initial stages of attacks, concentrating fi re 

on strong points, likely artillery positions, and counterattack routes. But once 

the attacking infantry outran its supporting artillery, it quickly became vulnerable to counterattack. After a period of forward defense, the German Army 

adopted just this sort of fl exible, opportunistic theory of defense, allowing 

Allied infantry to penetrate deeply into a defensive zone and then cutting off 

its escape routes and destroying it. Such was the state of artillery tactics and 

materiel when units of the AEF entered the front line in 1918. 

As early as 1902 the U.S. Army adopted its fi rst rapid-fi re artillery, the 

3-inch gun. Indirect fi re as the primary mode of delivery of support 

to the infantry became doctrine in 1905. The Army also embraced a complete system of modern artillery later that same 

decade. But shortages of trained personnel and equipment 

hampered progress. By 1917 the fi eld artillery had only 

600 model 1902 3-inch guns and only a few samples 

of the other weapons. Even the 3-inch gun had 

one design feature that limited its utility. It 

had a single trail, which gave it greater 

stability when drawn by a team of 

horses but limited its traverse to only 4 

degrees to either side of center. With 

the trail in the center, the tube could 

only elevate to fi re at an angle of 16 

degrees. This characteristic limited the gun’s range to 6,500 yards, considered too 

short given the conditions prevailing on the Western Front.

To remedy the defect, the Ordnance Department designed and built a split-trail 

carriage that would allow elevation of the tube to 40 degrees with an appreciable 

increase in range. Unfortunately, it was rushed prematurely into production and 

the design proved a bad one. Known in the service as “the crime of 1916” after its 

model year, it was never employed in combat. Instead General Pershing outfi tted 

the AEF with primarily French equipment—the model 1897 75-mm. gun, the 

155-mm. howitzer, and the 240-mm. howitzer. It also adopted the 8-inch howitzer standard in the British Army. The Ordnance Department contracted with 

American fi rms to build the French equipment. The Army received its fi rst model 

1897 75-mm. guns from American plants just as the Armistice ended the war.
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American Military Heritage

TANK WARFARE

The British fi rst employed tanks during the battle of the Somme in 1916, but 

in such limited numbers that they did not achieve any far-reaching tactical 

results. They did demonstrate considerable potential, however. At the fi rst 

battle of Cambrai on November 20, 1917, the British Third Army used tanks 

in mass for the fi rst time and briefl y broke the German line. The Germans 

eventually restored their position through a massive counterattack, the second 

battle of Cambrai. 

Prior to American entry into the war, U.S. Army observers reported that tanks 

had accomplished little. Based on their analysis, the War Department early 

in 1917 offi cially adopted the position that tanks were a failure. Upon his 

arrival in France, however, General Pershing established a tank committee to 

examine the issue. These offi cers became quite enthusiastic about the tank’s 

potential, and Pershing consequently organized an AEF tank program. The 

Americans standardized their tank program on two models — a French Renault 

tank and a heavy British Mark V tank. The Renault weighed fi ve tons and 

carried a two-man crew. It used a hand-cranked turret in which it mounted 

either a 37-mm. gun or an 8-mm. machine gun. It could cross a trench seven 

feet wide and had a maximum speed of six miles per hour. The Ordnance 

Department designed an American version, the six-ton tank, model 1917, 

which substituted an American automobile engine for the Renault engine. It 

was 2 miles per hour slower than its French model. The Mark V came in two 

confi gurations: the “male,” with its two 57-mm. guns and fi ve machine guns, 

and the “female,” with seven machine guns. It weighed over thirty tons and 

required a crew of eight. 
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American Military Heritage

The primary responsibility of tanks in the AEF 

was to assist the infantry, 

although Captain George 

S. Patton, Jr., who would 

achieve greater fame in a 

later war, wanted to use 

light tanks for exploitation 

after a breakthrough. The 

1st Tank Brigade (Provisional), later redesignated 

the 304th Tank Brigade, equipped with Renault tanks and commanded by 

Patton, supported V Corps at St. Mihiel. It proved of only limited use because 

of the diffi cult terrain and impassable trenches. During the early stages of the 

Meuse–Argonne offensive, the brigade provided valuable support for the I 

Corps but suffered 125 percent losses while doing so. On November 1, when 

the U.S. First Army launched its fi nal major attack of the war, the remnants of 

the brigade assisted the 2d Division in breaking the German lines. The AEF 

had too few tanks, and they suffered from too many mechanical breakdowns, 

to implement Patton’s concept. 

GAS

In 1914, Germany boasted the world’s leading chemical industry. The German Army could draw upon a wealth of technical expertise and productive 

capacity that gave it a technological advantage until the last year of the war. 

The stalemate that developed on the Western Front in late 1914 created the 

circumstances in which the German high command fi rst approved the use of 

gas. German soldiers opened over 5,000 cylinders of poison gas at Ypres at 

1700 on April 22, 1915. Soon, 168 tons of chlorine in the form of a greenishyellow cloud were gently rolling across no-man’s land toward the French 

45th Algerian Division. This division, new to the front line and composed of 

colonial troops, broke for the rear. Approximately 20,000 men were gassed; 

some 5,000 died. 

Very soon after the attack, all the armies on the Western Front adopted 

protective masks. Anti-gas discipline became a major consideration in all 

combat forces. Advances in technique and tactics improved the delivery of 

gas, barrages of which delivered by shell fi re became the method favored by 

both sides. Gas, increasingly more lethal, became just another cost of doing 

business on the Western Front. 

The fi rst masks were developed by the Germans and had a greased leather 

face piece with a charcoal-fi lled canister below. French, Belgian, and British masks had an cloth face piece impregnated with a resin mixture with 

a chemically treated cotton pad as a fi lter. It could be regenerated with 
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American Military Heritage

urine in an emergency. The British redesigned their mask in 1916 to use a 

canister similar to the German, but carried in a bag on the chest and connected 

to the mask by a hose. The United States adopted and used this mask, known 

colloquially as the “British box mask,” up to the early days of World War 

II. In areas subjected to heavy gas shelling, the Army handed out French 

Tissot masks and gloves. The fi nest gas mask developed by any army during 

World War I, the Tissot was very bulky. Normally, it was used by artillery 

rather than infantry, although commanders made exceptions based on the 

tactical situation. 

By 1918 the British and the French armies liberally used toxic gases in both 

the offensive and the defensive. On the attack, they drenched suspected 

machine gun and artillery positions with mustard gas and then maneuvered 

around the gassed areas. These locales thus played much the same tactical 

role in the offensive as minefi elds did in World War II. Although by August 

1918, the U.S. First Army staff was convinced of the soundness of these 

ideas, Pershing failed to appreciate their importance. First Army made little 

use of mustard gas during the St. Mihiel offensive. Only the III Corps, of 

the three American corps involved, used gas in the opening phases of the 

Meuse–Argonne offensive. Once the artillery moved forward to support the 

subsequent phases of the attack, it no longer received gas shells. The shells 

were caught in a massive traffi c jam that developed in the army’s rear area. 

Not until November 1, with Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett in command 

of the First Army, did the Americans adopt Allied techniques. The liberal 

use of gas helped break the German line. Thus, only at the very end of the 

confl ict did the Americans demonstrate a level of mastery of gas warfare that 

approached British and French standards.
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American Military Heritage

HELMETS

Intendant-General Adrian of the French Army 

developed the fi rst modern military helmet. In 

1915, he talked with a soldier who told him that 

he owed his life to the fact that “he was wearing his metal food bowl” under his cloth kepi. 

A rifl e bullet had glanced off the bowl. Adrian 

immediately commissioned the manufacture of a 

number of metal skull caps, one of which he wore 

for several days under his own kepi until he was 

satisfi ed that soldiers in the trenches could wear 

them without discomfort. The French Army 

then began issuing them to the combat troops. 

By 1917, all the belligerents issued steel helmets 

to their troops.

At this time the German steel industry was more technically advanced than its 

competitors in Great Britain, France, or even the United States. Consequently, 

the “coal scuttle helmet” worn by German and allied Austrian troops gave good 

ballistic protection to both the top and sides of the head. French and British steel 

makers lacked the capacity to “draw” the steel, that is shape it around the wearer’s 

head, without weakening 

it. The famous “Poilu” 

helmet that resulted from 

the idea of General Adrian, 

subsequently adopted by 

the Belgian and Italian as 

well as the French armies, 

provided some protection 

to the side of the head at the 

expense of overall strength. 

The British Army, on the 

other hand, adopted a “pancake” style helmet, a simple 

dome with a brim, that gave 

maximum protection to the 

top of the head and none at all to the sides. The War Department selected the 

British helmet but directed the Ordnance Department to design something better. These efforts ultimately led to the M1 helmet adopted during World War II. 

SHRAPNEL

Also called “case shot” or “spherical case shot” in the nineteenth century. In 

1784, Lieutenant Henry Shrapnel, an Englishman, invented a spherical explosive 

shell fi lled with round lead projectiles positioned around a bursting charge. A 

time fuse, later a percussion fuse, would set off the bursting charge and scatter 
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American Military Heritage

the enclosed bullets. This artillery projectile increased the range of scatter shot 

from 300 or 400 yards to 1600 yards. The British fi rst used shrapnel shells 

against American troops in the War of 1812. The U.S. Army soon adopted this 

type of explosive shell and used it from the Mexican War through World War 

I. Soon after elongated shells developed, shrapnel was adapted to them and 

consequently became a much more deadly weapon. Case shot, when fi red 

from a smooth-bore cannon, might be in any of several attitudes in fl ight when 

the charge exploded. A rifl ed gun and the elongated shell made it possible to 

predict the shell’s position at the point of explosion and cover a wide area with 

fi re. It was shrapnel in the new shells that made the 75-mm. gun, model 1897, 

such a potential war winner in the opinion of the French General Staff prior to 

the outbreak of World War I.

 

The quick-fi re gun in combination with shrapnel shells were a deadly combination to infantry advancing in the open. Once the infantry entrenched, the 

artilleries of the rival armies switched largely to high explosive shells with thin 

casings. These shells scattered fragments not unlike shrapnel near the point 

of explosion. All artilleries, however, continued to use shrapnel, particularly 

when troops were in the open in the attack. Eventually, artillery accounted 

for 75 percent of the battlefi eld casualties during the war.

AIRPOWER

In the early stages of the war, the airplane functioned as a reconnaissance and 

artillery spotting device. The presence of aircraft over the battle zone meant 

that offensive preparations could be observed, and surprise in the operational 

sense became impossible to achieve. The aerial artillery observer, whether 

in a captive balloon or biplane, contributed to the stalemate on the ground 

by making armies even more inclined to stay within their fortifi cations and 

avoid the fi re of enemy artillery. Fighter aircraft evolved to protect friendly 

obser-vation planes and to deny the air space over the front lines to enemy 

observation. Control of the air in 1914–18 terms meant blinding the opposing 

army and hampering his artillery. Loss of control of 

the air did not prevent an 

army from attacking. The 

British Expeditionary Forces 

launched and sustained the 

Flanders campaign during 

the summer and fall of 1917 

when the Germans controlled 

the air. Not until the spring of 

1918 did air affect the ground 

battle. In March 1918 the 

Germans broke the British 
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American Military Heritage

Fifth Army’s lines. The Royal Air Force threw masses of aircraft against the 

attackers, appreciably slowing the advance until suffi cient reserves arrived to 

restore the line. Then in September, during the St. Mihiel offensive, Brigadier General William Mitchell, the commander of the U.S. First Army Air 

Service, defeated a battalion-size counterattack force, using aircraft alone. 

Attacks against ground targets were just coming into use as the war ended. 

Bombardment was much better developed, but at Pershing’s insistence, the 

Americans directed all such efforts against depots and rail lines along routes 

used by the Germans. The British and Germans attempted to conduct strategic 

bombardment campaigns with limited results. But the concept fi red General 

Mitchell’s imagination, and after the war, he sought both this capacity and 

independence from the Army. During the war observation was primary. Of 

the forty-fi ve squadrons the Air Service, AEF, committed to combat, the great 

majority were observation units. 

ORGANIZATION

General Pershing and his key staff advisors deliberately adopted a much 

larger standard division than that common in other armies on the Western 

Front. On paper pre-war American divisions were triangular, each consisting of three brigades of three infantry regiments each. Pershing’s staff, anticipating conditions on the Western Front, selected a square confi guration. 

Each American division contained two infantry brigades of two infantry 

regiments and one machine gun battalion each, and another machine gun 

battalion that reported directed to division headquarters. They were backed 

by an artillery brigade of three regiments plus the usual support troops. 

Two regiments were armed with French 75-mm. guns, model 1897, and 

operated in direct support of the infantry brigades. The third regiment, with 

a general support mission, was equipped with 155-mm. howitzers. This 

unit was simply huge by Western Front standards of 1918. In that year, 

British divisions contained an average of 11,800 offi cers and men; French 

divisions 11,400; and German divisions 12,300. An American division, 

on the other hand, contained 28,000 offi cers and men when fully manned. 

American infantry companies, 250 strong, were designed to take losses 

and keep on going. Clearly, Pershing wanted to maximize combat power 

and minimize maneuver.

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

While building a division intended to burst through the German defenses 

on the Western Front, Pershing emphasized the need for Americans to 

defeat the German Army in “open warfare.” The concept was based on 

the prewar infantryman’s bible, Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911. It envisioned the use of aimed rifle fire to establish fire superiority. But this 

approach was often at odds with the detailed training directives prepared 

by his staff and simply not feasible on the Western Front. Trench warfare 

called for new tactics based on artillery-infantry liaison and the use of 
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American Military Heritage

specialized weapons, such as trench mortars and hand grenades. Pershing 

used the open-warfare argument to justify the need for an independent 

Army and prevent moves to use Americans as replacements in the British 

and French armies. But open warfare defied the realities of the Western 

Front, as the Allied generals knew from three years of experience. Pershing simultaneously undermined his own prestige with the Allies and 

undercut the effectiveness of his own troops. He consequently made his 

military objective — the defeat of the German Army — that much more 

difficult to achieve.

Section X

Notes on Uniforms

The War Department adopted olive drab woolen uniforms in 1902 to 

provide a service dress for wear in the fi eld and in garrison. The service 

hat of olive drab felt had the “Montana” peak and by 1910 was known as 

the campaign hat. Enlisted men wore cords of varying colors around the 

crown of the hat to denote 

their branch of service. 

The leggings were of olive 

drab canvas. The uniform 

on the left was worn by 

members of the AEF after 

arrival overseas. Puttees 

— that is wrapped, wool 

leggings — replaced the 

standard leggings. The 

field uniform in France 

also added a steel helmet 

and an overcoat roll attached to the haversack 

and pack carrier. A small, 

soft cloth “overseas” cap, 

the origin of the modern 

garrison cap, replaced the 

service hat.

Red Cross Nurse, Army Nurse, 

Medical Offi cer, Military Police, 

Medical Troops, Ambulance, 1918
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American Military Heritage

Secion XI

Notes on General of the Armies

John J. Pershing and Staff Organization

General Pershing is best known for his service as commander-in-chief of the 

AEF during World War I. He thus became the fi rst American offi cer to command American soldiers on European soil. Pershing was born at Laclead, 

Missouri, in 1860 and attended public schools in that state until he entered 

the U.S. Military Academy in 1882. Upon graduation four years later, he 

joined the 10th Cavalry, one of two Regular Army cavalry regiments with 

black enlisted men and mostly white offi cers. He participated in the last of 

the Indian campaigns against the Apaches and the Sioux. He was serving 

as an instructor of tactics at West Point at the outbreak of hostilities in 1898 

against Spain. He took part in the Santiago campaign and in the charge up 

San Juan (actually Kettle) Hill.

 

At the end of the war, the 

War Department transferred him to the newly 

acquired colony in the 

Far East, the Philippines. 

Pershing served in the 

Moro Provinces in the 

southern islands. The 

inhabitants of the interior were fiercely independent Moslems who 

lived in separate clans 

and engaged almost continuously in petty warfare 

with one another and with 

the Christian Filipinos who had settled around the Spanish garrisons 

along the coast. During over three hundred years of colonial rule, Spain 

had not succeeded in pacifying the interior of Mindanao and the other 

islands. Pershing quickly became familiar with local customs. He first 

became advisor to column commanders and ultimately commanded a 

brigade-size force while still a captain. The department commander arranged this by simply ordering all Pershing’s seniors to remain in garrison 

when the troops took the field. Pershing accomplished his ends mainly 

by diplomacy with a minimum of fighting.

A skilled fi eld soldier, Pershing was equally adept in Washington. Ordered 

to the capital as a member of the War Department General Staff, he met and 

married Frances Warren, the daughter of Senator Francis E. Warren, the chair-
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man of the Senate Military Affairs Committee and a power in the Republican 

Party. Pershing was posted to Tokyo as military attache and observer with 

the Japanese armies in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–06). 

In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt jumped Pershing ahead of 862 of his 

fellow offi cers and promoted him to the rank of brigadier general. Two more 

tours in the Philippines followed. From 1906 to 1908, Pershing commanded 

one of the few brigades in the peacetime Army, at Fort William McKinley 

outside Manila. Following a tour as military observer in the Balkans, he 

returned to the southern Islands to become the last military governor of the 

Moro Provinces.

Upon his return to the United States, Pershing received command of a brigade posted on the Mexican border. While there he suffered an immense 

personal tragedy. His wife and three young daughters burned to death in 

a fi re in their quarters at the Presidio of San Francisco. Only a young son 

survived. Pershing coped with his grief by burying himself in work. In 1916, 

the Pancho Villa raid across the border led President Wilson to dispatch the 

Punitive Expedition under Pershing. Given the diffi culties with Germany, 

Wilson did not want a war with Mexico. When Mexican public opinion 

came out strongly against the American intervention, Pershing’s cool head 

and diplomatic skills contributed to a peaceful resolution. He remained on 

the Mexican border until ordered to France in command of the American 

forces. Shortly after his arrival in France, he was promoted to the rank of 

full general. 

The AEF drew heavily on French models in its organization and staff doctrine. When Pershing arrived in France, the British and Belgian armies held 

the left wing of the Western Front, protecting the tiny strip of Belgium still 

in Allied possession and the all-important channel ports through which ran 

the British Army’s lines of communication to England. The center of the 

line covered Paris, the administrative and transportation center of France and 

consequently the most important zone of operations for the French Army. 

That left the right fl ank as the potential area for an independent American 

fi eld army. Geography thus dictated that the Americans be more closely 

associated with the French than the British Army. The Americans adopted 

French doctrine and equipment wholesale. To ease coordination between 

the two armies, Pershing decided to adopt French staff organization as well. 

The prewar U.S. Army had modeled its staffs along German lines, but Congress had kept the number of staff offi cers so small that it had not been able 

to organize staffs for fi eld units except on an episodic basis. Consequently, 

knowledge of staff organization and procedures was not widespread or 

deeply embedded among the Americans. Pershing’s decision introduced 

the famous G-system of staff organization into the American Army. As he 

described the new organization:
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A well organized General Staff through which the commander exercises his functions is essential to a successful modern army . . . . 

The General Staff is naturally divided into fi ve groups each with its 

own chief who is an assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. G-1 

is in charge of organization and equipment of troops, replacements 

tonnage, priority of overseas shipment, the auxiliary welfare association, and cognate subjects. G-2 has censorship, enemy intelligence, 

gathering and disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all 

similar subjects; G-3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans, 

movement of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G-4 

coordinates important questions of supply, construction, transportation arrangements for combat, and of the operations of the service of 

supply and of hospitalization of the sick and wounded. G-5 supervises 

the various schools and has general direction and coordination of 

education and training.

Pershing had much less scope for innovation in the operational aspects of his 

command than in the organizational. At the operational level of war, he personally urged the attack on the St. Mihiel salient and carried it out with vigor 

in September 1918. This operation was the fi rst large scale offensive by a predominantly American force. During the Meuse–Argonne offensive (September 

26–November 11, 1918), Pershing demonstrated that as a tactician he was far 

too conventional. He threw masses of infantry into frontal assaults against German machine gun posts at great cost in lives. He was also very skeptical of the 

value of the new appliances of war — the airplane and, particularly, the tank. 

In large part, his views refl ected the fact that creating a modern American fi eld 

army, literally from the ground up, and negotiating with Allies left him too little 

time to master the complexities of warfare on the Western Front. Despite his 

shortcomings, Pershing built the AEF into a force that helped deliver victory.

As a reward for his achievements, Congress in July 1919 advanced him to 

the rank of general of the armies. He also became chief of staff of the Army, 

serving from July 1921 until September 1924, when he retired. His prestige 

was such that until World War II, he exercised great infl uence on senior appointments in the Army. In 1939 he backed his protégé Brigadier General 

George C. Marshall to be chief of staff. Pershing died in July 1948.

Section XII

Douglas MacArthur

1880–1964

General Douglas MacArthur’s accomplishments during and after World War 

II have overshadowed his career prior to December 7, 1941, but those earlier 

years were fi lled with more achievements than most soldiers are able to accomplish during an entire lifetime.
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MacArthur was born at Little Rock, Arkansas, on January 26, 1880, but his 

earliest memories were of Fort Wingate, New Mexico, where his father, 

Captain Arthur MacArthur, 13th Infantry, took station in the summer of 1880. 

Douglas grew up with stories of the Civil War and the Indian Wars. As a 

nineteen-year-old regimental commander, his father had won a Medal of Honor 

leading the attack on Missionary Ridge in November 1863. Often during Douglas’ childhood, 

the post’s guardhouse held Apache prisoners of 

war. In these surroundings, Douglas developed 

an attachment to the service in his early youth 

that he never lost. He was deeply infl uenced by 

his mother, Mary Pickney Hardy MacArthur. 

The tie between the two was so strong that, rather 

than accompany her husband to the Philippines, 

she lived at West Point for the four years Douglas 

was there. He entered the U.S. Military Academy 

in 1899. He graduated in 1903 with an outstanding scholastic average of 98.14 percent.

Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, MacArthur accompanied the 3d 

Battalion of Engineers to the Philippines. In November 1903 while cutting 

timber for construction, he was ambushed by two Filipino guerrillas. Although 

one slug passed through the crown of his campaign hat, he calmly drew his 

service revolver and killed both his assailants. His ability to think clearly and 

act quickly under fi re, of which this was the fi rst example, became legendary 

in the service.

 

In 1905 the War Department assigned him to Tokyo where he became aide to 

his father, now a major general, who had been the senior American military 

observer with the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War. The elder 

MacArthur intended to fi nish his tour by making a comprehensive inspection of the major armies of Asia. The tour thus had the promise of furthering 

Douglas’s professional development, but his father’s favoritism had a negative 

consequence. During this assignment, Douglas slowly began to develop the 

attitude that, because of his relation to his father, he deserved special treatment.

The pomp and ceremony to which he was subjected on this tour as General 

MacArthur’s aide was suffi cient to turn any young offi cer’s head. Assigned 

as a student in the Engineer School of Application at Washington Barracks 

(now Fort McNair) in Washington, D.C., MacArthur performed exceptionally well until, as another mark of esteem for his father, he was assigned 

as an additional duty to be a social aide to President Theodore Roosevelt. 

Caught in the heady social whirl of the White House, MacArthur neglected 

his studies. Assigned to the Milwaukee Engineer District in August 1907, he 

received a severe reprimand, backed by the Chief of Engineers, for neglecting his responsibilities in the reconstruction of the harbor at Manitowoc, 
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Wisconsin. The small pre-World War I offi cer corps, where promotion was 

by seniority and everyone knew everyone else, was much more tolerant of 

mistakes than was the rule later in the century. But MacArthur was on the 

verge of acquiring a reputation that would relegate him to a series of time 

serving assignments until he retired for age. 

MacArthur saved his career by hard work and strict application of duty, but 

he never quite lost the habit of requesting special exemptions for himself. In 

1908, he assumed command of Company K, 3d Battalion of Engineers, at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Rated the lowest of the twenty-one companies 

on the post, he trained the company until it rated highest at the post’s next 

general inspection. Assigned as a temporary duty to develop a short course 

on explosives and pioneering in the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas, he 

did so in such a manner that the commandant of the school asked for him to 

teach the course at the appropriate time in the curriculum for the next three 

years he was at Fort Leavenworth. The success of the course at Riley led 

to his introducing a course on “practical and theoretical demolitions” at the 

Leavenworth Schools. MacArthur wrote the Army’s manual on explosives. 

Before he left Leavenworth, he became the head of the department of military 

engineering of the Field Engineer School.

Assigned to the Offi ce of the Chief of Staff in 1912, MacArthur favorably impressed the chief of staff, Major General Leonard Wood, who became one of his 

patrons. In 1914, the Army occupied the Mexican port of Vera Cruz, following 

its seizure by a Navy and Marine Corps landing force. With war threatening, 

it became essential for the General Staff to obtain up-to-date information on 

the route between Vera Cruz and Mexico City. Wood sent MacArthur on a 

secret mission behind Mexican lines to obtain the needed information. He 

succeeded in a daring reconnaissance for which he was recommended but did 

not receive the Medal of Honor.

As a staff offi cer, MacArthur was involved in drafting legislation that became the 

National Security Act of 1916. Appointed as liaison to the press — his offi cial 

title was press censor — he was instrumental in obtaining popular support for the 

Selective Service Act of 1917. In the process he gained a very favorable reputation among the reporters covering the War Department. MacArthur was one of 

the few offi cers on the General Staff in favor of mobilizing the National Guard in 

1917, and it was his advice that President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of War 

Newton D. Baker followed. Baker, concerned about maintaining and strengthening 

what he perceived as fragile popular support for the war effort, wondered aloud to 

MacArthur which Guard division should go overseas fi rst and inevitably receive 

the fi rst casualties. MacArthur suggested forming a composite division from Guard 

units all over the country. “It will,” he commented, “stretch across the country like 

a rainbow.” His suggestion became the 42d Division (the “Rainbow” Division), 

and, promoted to colonel, MacArthur became its chief of staff. 
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American Military Heritage

The 42d Division played a key role in defeating the last German offensive, 

part of the Champagne–Marne Defensive, and then joined in the Allied counterattack, the Aisne–Marne Offensive. Rewarded with promotion to brigadier 

general and command of the 84th Infantry Brigade, MacArthur led this unit 

at St. Mihiel and the opening phases of the Meuse–Argonne offensive. Late 

in the confl ict, MacArthur succeeded to command of the division and thereby 

became the youngest division commander in the AEF. He was decorated 

thirteen times and cited many other times for conspicuous bravery.

Assigned at the end of the war as superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, MacArthur started the fi rst comprehensive reforms at West Point in over 

100 years. After commands in both the Philippines and the United States, he 

became chief of staff of the Army from November 21, 1930 until October 1, 

1935. The Great Depression and the fi nancial strains it placed on the Army 

budget dominated his tour. He succeeded in maintaining the offi cer corps intact 

against budget cutters. Only by retaining extra offi cers, he argued, could the 

Army mobilize when the next emergency occurred. Unfortunately, his success came at the price of gutting the Army’s modernization budget. Within 

budgetary constraints, he tried to make Army war planning — both industrial 

and manpower mobilization plans — more realistic. During his tour, the Army 

assumed responsibility for administration of Civilian Conservation Corps 

camps. Upon retirement from active service, he was hired as a military advisor 

by the Philippine government, scheduled to receive full independence from 

the United States in 1946. In July 1941, with the possibility of war between 

the United States and Japan increasing, President Roosevelt recalled him to 

active duty with the rank of lieutenant general and named him commander of 

U.S. Forces in the Far East. He was in Manila when the Japanese attacked.

Section XIII

The Trench Soldier, A Profi le

Combat on the Western Front was unlike any that preceded or followed it. Sieges 

have been a part of warfare since the beginning of recorded history, but the scale, 

duration, and intensity of this siege made it unique. Millions of men along a 

line that stretched some 300 miles fought for four years. Gains during most of 

that period were measured in yards. Tens of thousands of men died to take a 

few square miles of territory, and in the areas where the armies launched major 

offensives, hundreds of thousands died. The infantry lived in a lunar landscape 

where artillery killed at a distance and the enemy was rarely seen. It was into 

this environment that the men of the AEF were thrust in 1918. 

Lieutenant (later Captain) Jeremiah M. Evarts commanded the 4th Platoon, 

Company E, 18th Infantry, in the 1st Division, AEF. In the spring of 1918 the 

division took up position near the village of Cantigny, then in German hands. 
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American Military Heritage

The sector, he later recalled, “was wholly disorganized.” Front line trenches were 

little more than two feet in depth. His position lacked dugouts and communication trenches. His platoon covered a 200-yard front from three small trenches.

 

The largest was possibly 75 yards and contained seven or eight bays. 

The ground of that trench was very chalky and each man experimented 

in fi nding cover by digging a hole of some variety in the side of the 

trench under the parapet. It was better than being rained on. Sometimes 

a direct hit on the parapet from a 77 [standard German Army fi eld gun] 

would bury the occupant undamaged under a couple of feet of earth. 

Anything larger than a 77 meant no further worry. Men lived in that 

sector the most extraordinary game of life and death ever invented — 

lived on their wits, their nerves, and that sixth sense which combined 

all other senses, and were assisted to live once each twenty-four hours 

— if the chow party was lucky — by a slice of meat, a spoonful of 

sour mashed potatoes, 

a canteen of water, a 

canteen cup of coffee, 

a half-loaf of bread, a 

beautiful country, and 

sometimes a sunny sky.

Twenty years later Evarts 

recalled his men with a mixture of awe and affection.

Jackson: Evarts’ platoon sergeant came into 

the trench with a Private 

Jackson (a fi ctitious name) 

in tow. Jackson had experienced a near escape 

from a shell and was on the 

verge of breakdown. He 

cried and prayed aloud as 

each enemy artillery shell 

came in. The men in his 

squad were ready to shoot 

him. The shelling was bad 

enough, but Jackson and 

the shelling were too much 

to bear. Evarts felt tempted 

to say that he felt like weeping and praying every time 

a shell landed close to him, 
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American Military Heritage

and he suspected that the sergeant felt the same way. Evarts, however, remained 

silent. No one spoke of their emotions in the front lines. It required all their 

energy just to endure conditions there. Instead, Evarts assigned Jackson to 

the platoon command post in hopes that he could settle him.

The gloominess and wetness were almost unbelievable. I sat and 

watched Jackson without talking to him and waited for the evening 

bombardment to commence. Was he completely down and out, I 

wondered, and if he was, what could one do? I feared the coming 

bombardment which was as certain as the rain, but I was interested 

in seeing what Jackson would do. I knew enough to realize that here 

was a person who suffered terribly with nothing to think about (he 

being a private) to take his mind off his suffering. What would he 

do and what could I do?

The German artillery commenced according to schedule. It generally 

lasted from three-quarters of an hour to two hours at that time of day. 

Jackson commenced to shake badly and he showed his terror in his 

face more than anybody I had ever seen. Finally he lay fl at on his 

stomach in the mud and water on the bottom of the trench and wept 

and wept. He shook all over. It was perfectly terrible and I was at a 

complete loss as to what I should do. I waited and watched him, I 

don’t know how long, but fi nally I couldn’t stand it any longer and 

I reached down, grabbed him by the shoulder, and dragged him up 

beside me. He was covered with mud and the tears rolled down his 

face. I held his shoulder and said, ‘Now, Jackson, what the hell is 

the use of doing that? It only makes things much worse for you and 

it makes me feel like lying down in the mud and crying myself, and 

that would be a hell of a thing, wouldn’t it?’ He went on weeping, 

and I hung on to his shoulder. I told him I was just as scared as he 

was, if not more so. (I think I probably was.) Finally I suppose it 

penetrated his mind that I had hold of his shoulder and was talking 

to him. I doubt if he had realized it before in his agony. He went on 

shaking but stopped crying.

Evarts made daily rounds of the platoon position after dark with one of his 

noncommissioned offi cers. He included Jackson in those rounds. Jackson 

was frightened, but he went. Evarts continued this routine every day. Jackson was never more than a few paces away. He stopped crying but he still 

shook under shell fi re. Evarts talked to him whenever he had an opportunity 

to steady him. Evarts had discovered when making his rounds that Jackson 

did not have a friend left alive in the platoon. Evarts believed that part of 

his problem was that he was lonely and isolated. When the company moved 

back into reserve, Evarts was relieved to be able to send Jackson back to his 

squad. Providing therapy under shell fi re was draining. Before the company 
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American Military Heritage

moved back into line, Evarts took Jackson aside and had a long talk. Evarts 

told him that he would be all right. And he needed to remember that he was not 

alone in his fears. Every man in the company was just as frightened as he was. 

On the evening of July 17, 1918, Evarts once more took Jackson aside to tell 

him that the company would go into the attack the next morning. “I told him 

to stay by his corporal and that he would get along all right. We shook hands. 

Separately I told the corporal that Jackson must be within eight paces of him 

at all times. I did not think the latter and its implications were really necessary 

as I was sure that Jackson would be all right. It seemed to me that his heart 

had been tried enough by that time.” 

The attack lasted most of fi ve days. “On the morning of the 24th of July I 

called the roll of the company. Jackson was not present. His corporal told me 

with tears in his eyes that he had acted well.”

Six Quarts of Cognac: Evarts had one eternal private in his platoon, the type 

of soldier who seems to crop up in every platoon of our army in each of its 

wars. His name was Olsen. He was twice Evarts’ age, twice his size, had red 

hair, and yellowed gapping teeth. He was both a tremendous line soldier and 

a drunken bum when not in combat.

The only time he [Olsen] was ever nervous was one morning at 

Cantigny. He and Shea [one of the noncommissioned offi cers] were 

sitting out in front of the mud trench at dawn to see if they could get 

a shot at a late patrol. Olsen had his legs apart and a dud 77 landed 

between them. He only missed being castrated by about ten inches. He 

and Shea came over to tell me about it. Shea said Olsen’s expression 

as he looked at the hole was simply wonderful.

Shortly after the dud incident when the company was in reserve, Olsen went 

AWOL for two days. Two of his platoon mates fi nally came to Evarts and 

said that Olsen had been located in a cave in the edge of “no man’s land”. He 

was drunk and he had a loaded rifl e. He was threatening to shoot anyone who 

tried to get him. Evarts crawled to the cave and ordered Olsen to come out.

There was a considerable scuffi ng around in the cave and soon he 

crawled out the entrance, fully armed and bayonet fi xed. With his 

red beard, dirty face, and fi lthy uniform he was about the most disreputable looking person I ever saw. He saluted, grinning broadly, 

and held out a full bottle of cognac he was carrying in his pocket. I 

felt like laughing. Instead I was very severe.

A bit of questioning determined that Olsen had found and downed fi ve quarts 

of cognac in the cave prior to his giving himself up. The company com-
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American Military Heritage

mander wanted to send Olsen back to the front line as a punishment. Evarts 

convinced him that Olsen was too valuable a man to take a chance on breaking 

his spirit. Instead, “Olsen sweated out the fi ve quarts at hard labor digging 

trenches in the village for protection from air raids. I think he probably would 

have enjoyed the line more. The bottle of cognac was consumed at the offi cer’ 

mess. Olsen was never absent again.”

Canned Moroccan: About 1000 on a fi ne morning in front of Cantigny 

everyone in Evart’s platoon was getting hungry. 

The food had been blown up two nights in succession, once on the 

way up, once in the trench. There would be fourteen more hours of 

hunger at least. There was nothing to be done about it, and I was 

about to escape by sleeping when [Sergeant] Shea appeared. He 

asked me if he could borrow my fi eld glasses. I gave them to him, 

and he went back to the mud trench. He often borrowed them to 

look for machine guns.

I woke as usual about two in the afternoon, hungrier than ever. I sat 

in the sun in the corner of the bay by the P.C. (post of command) 

and went through the usual afternoon ritual of picking out cooties 

and their eggs from my undershirt and listening to the bombardment.

To Evarts’ astonishment, Shea suddenly appeared in the bay with his hand 

tucked into his shirt. He walked over to Evarts and in a whisper asked him 

if he wanted something to eat. Evarts replied that he defi nitely did, and Shea 

produced two cans of corned beef, which quickly disappeared. Later, Evarts 

asked Shea how he had found the scarce treat. 

Well, Lieutenant, you remember I borrowed your glasses this morning. You know that line of dead Moroccans down in the valley where 

they ran into a machine gun? (There was a line of about twenty.) I 

looked them over with the glasses and decided it was worth trying. 

I got a can off two out of six. They had been dead a long while....

He had spent four hours crawling on his belly for 200 yards and back 

again under the eyes of the German balloons and the German sentries 

in Cantigny. He had searched six Moroccans who had been dead 

for more than twenty days. He had won and divided the winnings.

Later, in the Meuse–Argonne offensive, when all the offi cers in the company 

were killed or severely wounded, Shea assumed command and successfully 

led the company for two days in the advance of the American Army.

Jeremiah M. Evarts, Cantigny: A Corner of the War (New York, 1938).
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American Military Heritage

Section XIV

NCO Heroes of World War I

Alvin C. York: The greatest enlisted hero of World War I was born in 

Pall Mall, deep in the Cumberland Mountains of Tennessee, on December 

13, 1887. As a young man, he earned a reputation for drinking, gambling, 

and unruly behavior, but a religious conversion in 1915 transformed him 

into a pious, fundamentalist Christian. York applied for conscientious 

objector status when the United States entered World War I, but his local 

board drafted him anyway. Torn between his beliefs and his patriotism, 

York finally became convinced that the United States was fighting the 

battle of the Lord and that his Christian duty demanded his participation. 

He sailed for France in May 1918 with the 82d Division.

On October 8, during the Meuse–Argonne offensive, York, now a corporal, 

and his unit were pinned down by hostile fire. Attempting to outflank 

a German machine gun nest, he and sixteen other doughboys surprised 

and captured a German battalion headquarters at breakfast. Almost immediately, the Americans came under fire from machine guns on a hill 

twenty-five yards to the front, and nine were killed or wounded. When 

six Germans charged his position, York calmly used his marksmanship 

with the pistol to shoot all six, starting with the man furthest from the 

front — a trick he later stated he learned while hunting wild turkeys 

near home. The battalion commander then 

surrendered the machine gun positions. As 

the Americans returned to their lines, they 

rounded up other enemy machine gunners 

that they passed. In all, York received credit 

for killing 25 Germans, capturing 132, and 

silencing 35 machine guns. The Allied 

commander-in-chief, French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, called his feat, “the greatest thing 

accomplished by any private soldier of all 

the armies of Europe.” York was promoted 

to sergeant and received the Medal of Honor 

and the Croix de Guerre for his exploits. 

Samuel Woodfill: Sergeant York may have emerged as a national hero, 

but Sergeant (later Major) Sam Woodfill received from General Pershing the ultimate tribute as “the outstanding soldier of the AEF.” Born in 

Belleview, Indiana on January 6, 1883, Woodfill enlisted in the Regular 

Army at Louisville, Kentucky on March 8, 1901. When he deployed 
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American Military Heritage

to France in April 1918 with the 5th Division, he received a promotion 

to first lieutenant and company commander in the “National Army,” 

the overall force the United States had mobilized to fight World War I, 

but he remained a sergeant in the Regular Army. On October 12, 1918, 

Woodfill was leading his company near Cunel, France, when his troops 

came under heavy machine gun fire. Ordering two of his soldiers to 

pin down the enemy, he personally moved around the position’s flank, 

shooting three members of the crew as they appeared. When the fourth 

member of the crew, an officer, rushed Woodfill, the latter, unable to club 

the German with his rifle, finished him with a shot from his pistol after 

a hand-to-hand fight. Continuing to advance, the company encountered 

another machine gun nest. In the face of heavy fire, Woodfill led his company in the attack, shooting several enemy 

troops, capturing three others, and silencing 

the gun. When yet another machine gun nest 

challenged the American advance, Woodfill 

charged the position, killed five with his rifle 

and started to jump into the position with his 

pistol, only to have two other gunners, only a 

few yards away, turn their gun on him. Unable 

to kill them with his pistol, Woodfill grabbed 

a pick and dispatched them. The company 

could now continue its advance to the objective. For his heroism, he received the Medal 

of Honor, as well as numerous other citations 

for his bravery in the course of the war.

After the war, Woodfi ll returned to his permanent grade of sergeant and served 

at a series of Army posts until his retirement in 1923, at the Regular grade of 

master sergeant. He died on August 10, 1951.
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American Military Heritage

9

World War II

Section I

The World, A Battleground

At about one o’clock in the afternoon of December 7, 1941, the fi rst 

 word of the Japanese attack on the U.S. Navy’s Pacifi c Fleet in Pearl 

 Harbor began to trickle into Washington, D.C. The news shocked both 

the general public and high military offi cials. Although tensions between the 

United States and Japan had been building for some time, the attack still came 

as a surprise. Even those who knew war was imminent had expected the fi rst 

blow to come in the Philippines or Southeast Asia.

The attack on Pearl Harbor had been brilliantly executed by the Japanese 

fl eet. The six Japanese carriers, which carried 360 fi ghters, fi ghter-bombers, 

and torpedo bombers, had come more than 3,500 miles through the open 

sea. They had remained virtually undetected until the fi rst attacking planes 

had approached within 135 miles of their target, far too late for the Americans to mount a defense. The attacking force severely damaged the fl eet at 

anchor and destroyed a signifi cant portion of the land-based aircraft in the 

area belonging to the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps. Strangely, the 

Japanese failed to destroy drydocks, ship repair facilities, and fuel storage 

depots, which allowed the Americans to begin a rapid recovery. Nonetheless, the combined attacks on Pearl Harbor and American 

bases in the Philippines crippled America’s ability to strike 

back for at least next six months. Several small 

American island possessions in the Pacifi c were also 

isolated and overrun, Alaska lay open to invasion, and the majority of the West coast of the 

Americas lay open to attack. 

Suddenly, the United States was 

involved in a full-fl edged, two front 

war that would grow until almost the 

entire world became engaged. One can 

truly say that World War II was the 

exciting story of the American fi ghting 

man. This chapter seeks to offer a bit 

of the “fl avor” of Normandy, Remagen, 
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American Military Heritage

Banzai attacks, the Tiger tank, and the soldiers who knew them fi rst hand. 

The following chronology lists just a few of the events during this period:

1 Sep 1939 Nazi Invasion of Poland — War

 begins in Europe

16 Sep 1940 First peacetime military draft in U.S. 

 history following passage of the 

 Conscription Act of 1940

7 Dec 1941 Pearl Harbor attacked

9 Apr 1942 Fall of Bataan

6 May 1942 Fall of Corregidor

3–6 Jun 1942 Battle of Midway; turning point

 in Pacifi c

7 Aug 1942 U.S. Marines launch Pacifi c offensive 

 at Guadalcanal

Sep 1942 U.S. Army begins offensive

 operations in New Guinea

8 Nov 1942 Allied landings in North Africa

10 Jul 1943 Allied landings in Sicily

Sep 1943 Allied landings in Italy; Italy

 surrenders

6 Jun 1944 Allied landings in Normandy

20 Oct 1944 American troops return to the

 Philippines

16 Dec–3 Jan 1944 Battle of the Bulge

7 May 1945 Surrender of Axis in Europe

 (V–E Day)

14 Aug 1945 War against Japan ends (V–J Day)

2 Sep 1945 Offi cial Japanese surrender

Section II

Normandy

PRE-INVASION ACTIVITIES

The “Germany First” strategy, determined by the British and Americans at the 

ARCADIA Conference in Washington from December 1941 to January 1942, 

fi nally became a reality in 1944. The striking characteristic of the invasion of 

Fortress Europe to a student of the heritage of the U.S. Army is the vast scale 

of the operation, the challenge it posed to the Army of the time, and the small 

stories of the individual fi ghting men that really show the fabric of the Army’s 

spirit. One can fi nd no better summary of the importance of this effort than 

the words of the Supreme Allied Commander to his men:
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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force!

 “You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward 

which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world 

are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and 

brothers-in-arms on other Fronts you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny 

over oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a 

free world.

 “Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, 

well equipped and battle-hardened. He will fi ght savagely.

 “But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi 

triumphs of 1940–41. The United Nations have infl icted upon the 

Germans great defeats in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive 

has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to 

wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed 

at our disposal great reserves of trained fi ghting men. The tide has 

turned! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!

 “I have full confi dence in your courage, devotion to duty and 

skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory!

 “Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty 

God upon this great and noble undertaking.

 

Dwight D. Eisenhower

One cannot say that the Normandy invasion was typical of the war in Europe 

to that point. Yet, the men, the activities, the equipment, and the weapons did 

represent warfare of the time. The invasion, above all, required enormous 

amounts of planning and organization before any soldier set foot on the 

Normandy beaches.

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

In 1943, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff chose a British offi cer, 

Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, as the Chief of Staff to the Supreme 

Allied Commander, who at that time was yet unnamed. Under Morgan’s direction, plans for several different invasion possibilities were prepared, based on 

various estimated degrees of enemy strength. One, a plan called OVERLORD, 

was based on the assumption that the German armed forces would still be a 
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powerful threat at the time of the invasion. This proposal was the basis for the 

fi nal OVERLORD plan that was developed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower 

and his command, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, 

in 1944. General Eisenhower’s leading commanders appear above. They are 

(from left to right) Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, Admiral Sir Bertram 

Ramsay, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, General Eisenhower, General 

Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, 

and Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith.

General Montgomery, commanding the 21st Army Group, would serve as the 

overall ground commander for the invasion. The two invasion armies under 

his command would be the British Second Army under Lieutenant General 

Miles Dempsey and the First U.S. Army under General Bradley.

THE INVASION PLAN

The organization and training of the invasion forces is a story unto itself. 

The Allied command took great lengths to insure that the men who went 

ashore were as well trained and equipped as any soldiers in history. Extraordinary deception plans included both the efforts of undercover agents and 

the “construction” of decoy “armies.” All of these deceptions tried to make 

German leaders believe that the invasion would occur at the narrowest point 

in the English Channel at the Pas-de-Calais, rather than its actual location in 

Normandy. Finally, planners chose the beaches and gave each assault force a 

code name corresponding with its specifi c beach target, Utah, Omaha, Gold, 

Juno, and Sword. The fi nal plan was then issued by the high level planners to 

the forces. All would land on their respective beaches, build up forces, and 

then break out from the beachhead.

The feats of the two U.S. Army Airborne Divisions that made the drop into Normandy are 

almost beyond belief, especially to those experienced in both combat and airborne operations. 

The 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions, along 

with their British airborne counterparts, received 

the mission of securing bridges, crossroads, 

canals, and communications sites at both ends 

of the invasion zone. They would thus prevent 
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the Germans from reinforcing and communicating with their forces at the beachheads. Airborne operations involve highly detailed planning, and the Normandy 

invasion came at a time when American soldiers had been conducting operational 

jumps for only a short time. Although little doctrine or experience existed, the 

imaginations and planning abilities of many fi rst-rate offi cers had been heavily 

involved in preparing for the combat jump. Offi cers, NCOs, and their troopers 

were trained and ready when the transport aircraft and gliders left their airfi elds 

for Normandy. Looking back, it seems that the paratroopers were truly released 

on “...the winds of heaven,” for only a small percentage of either division ever 

came close to their objectives, and those troopers who did reach the ground 

safely were scattered over fi fteen or twenty miles. The night quickly turned into 

a series of isolated two- and three-man battles, creating a great deal of panic and 

confusion among enemy forces behind the invasion beaches. As interesting as 

this story is, the real tale lies in the feelings, ideas, fears, and courage of the men 

who stood in the door of those planes on that night when the greatest invasion in 

the history of warfare was beginning. From the regimental history of the 501st 

Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division come these impressions:

The night of June 6 was sullen and rainy. Fitful gusts of wind rocked the 

planes. Within the cabins, we sat with darkened faces and stared out at 

the darkened countryside far below. . . the men said short prayers, bowing their blackened heads where they sat... the man who is going into 

combat does not feel much different from the man who is going to make 

his fi rst parachute jump. What lies ahead of him is too unfamiliar to be 

frightening... the tracer bullets were speckling up into the sky in streams, 

thousands of them... the popping noise sounded, oddly, as though it were 

close underneath the plane... at the shouted order, we shuffl ed to our 

feet. . . there was a new sound in the sky, an odd enveloping WOP... a red 

light glowed over the door... there were more explosions, all semblance 

of formation had been lost, men had gotten sick and vomited on the 

fl oor, shrapnel tore up through the greasy pools... machine gun bullets 

tore through the wings like the chattering of gravel.... Over the door like 

a signal of relief, the green light went on. . . the anxious men dove out... 

dazed, he fl oated down... the only sounds were the sharp cracking of the 

bullets that struck the edge of his nylon canopy.
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American Military Heritage

The most commonly held and repeated impression of those involved in the 

early airborne phases of the Normandy invasion was that, from the time that 

each man left the door of his plane until the linkup with ground forces many 

days later, every paratrooper was a fi ghting soldier, whether he was a general 

or private. When one realizes that fact, the personal valor and courage of the 

men of the 101st and the 82d Airborne Divisions in the invasion becomes a 

monument in itself.

THE INFANTRYMAN

As is basically the case in any land battle, the infantryman in Normandy 

bore the brunt of the combat. Here are a few random impressions of one of 

those men:

A rising, surging sea carried the invasion fl eet into the night... the 

voyage seemed lonely and interminable, cold... an air of unreality... the coastal batteries were silent... 

when the tide began to run out, most of 

the small craft came to rest short of the 

belt of obstacles... the beach was almost 

invisible... blasted by gunfi re and bombs... 

the ramps are down... waist deep in water, 

fl oundering, fi nding your feet wading in, 

rifl es held high... the din was insane... the 

cries of men in the water... the sudden 

searing sheets of fl ame, the thunderous 

explosions as craft were hit by enemy shell 

and mortar fi re... order began to grow out 

of chaos, men tried to the limits of endurance regained their feet, lifted up their 

heads and began to fi ght for more than their 

lives. Finally, the tremendous tide of men 

and vehicles pressed on, steadily wave upon wave building up on 

the beaches... the men were in, the damn deed done. 

 THE ENEMY

An understanding of the enemy is essential to a grasp of the diffi culty 

and complexity of the task facing Allied forces in the invasion of Northwest Europe. A grand offensive strategy on the part of Hitler during 1943 

simply did not exist, although the German armed forces had formulated a 

grand defensive strategy that would keep the Allies at bay for more than 

two years. This overall strategic weakness, however, did not blunt the efforts of Hitler’s commanders in the west at the time, Field Marshals Gerd 

von Rundstedt and Erwin Rommel, who were responsible for the defense 

of the vast French coast line where the invasion was to occur. The senior 

of the two, von Rundstedt, believed that the Allies would attack at the 

narrowest point of the English Channel at the Pas-de-Calais and thus 
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American Military Heritage

place themselves closest to the heartland of Germany. Rommel, who felt that 

an attack at Normandy was probable, was forced to prepare defensive plans 

and fortifi cations for the entire French coast, while trying to obtain units 

and equipment from an increasingly hard-pressed German nation. Later 

history has showed us that in this case, Rommel faced an impossible task, 

but he managed to build a defensive position of enormous proportions. 

Since his objective was to stop the Allied invasion on the beaches, the 

weight of Rommel’s defense lay in a series of water obstacles and heavy 

gun emplacements.

Section III

The Pacifi c

World War II in the Pacifi c made unique demands on the talents and capabilities of the U.S. Army. The foot soldier with the rifl e and grenade had 

the nasty, poorly-understood and, at the time, thankless job of rooting the 

enemy from his caves on the tiny tropical islands in the Pacifi c Ocean. This 

soldier participated in the amphibious assaults and the agonizingly slowmoving combat across the coral reefs of each island. This same soldier 

eventually so weakened the armed forces and morale of the enemy that the 

atomic bomb could bring an abrupt end to the confl ict. Whether he wore 

the uniform of a U.S. Marine or the insignia of one of several different U.S. 

Army divisions, he was an American fi ghting man with a job to do, and he 

did that job well. The following are the comments of a group of unnamed 

writers who accompanied several small units of these soldiers as they accomplished their tasks.
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American Military Heritage

It was like going through a miniature Grand Canyon... the rocks 

had to be painfully and methodically cleared time and time again 

but the enemy seemed to always reappear from inner caves... white 

clouds from American smoke grenades made the scene unearthly... 

the air was fi lled with the noise of exploding grenades... the exposed stones and caves looked like an ogre’s mouth... from one 

of the “teeth” a Nambu machinegun chattered, a soldier caught 

upright stopped suddenly... the enemy was in a coordinated defense, pillboxes, guns, mortars and machineguns... two automatic 

rifl emen peeked over the lip of the shellhole in which they had 

been resting, They tried to see where the bullets were coming 

from. They spotted an opening in the rocks and fi red at it.... Other 

soldiers, sensing a fi ght, waved to each other and began to close 

in... they covered each other with carbines and rifl es and edged 

slowly toward the rocky hole... a blaze of enemy small arms fi re 

came from at least fi ve different parts of the ridge... they stopped, 

huddled behind rocks and waited... they studied the wounded men 

lying in the open, fi nally, a little corporal from New York City 

licked his lips and handed his rifl e to the man next to him... here 

goes, he said, and was off in a fast crawl... he had almost reached 

him when there was another burst of fi re and he stiffened, the 

injured man had also been hit... a supply Captain coming up from 

the rear saw what was happening and radioed for tanks... when they 

arrived, the step by step cleaning out began again, smoke bombs 

and phosphorous grenades... bazookas and automatic weapons... 

dynamite charges and fl amethrowers... long jets of liquid fl ame 

into the holes and along the curving walls of the tunnels... the 

roaring fl ame did the trick... the scene became wild and terrible.... 

Almost forty scared and beaten men emerged from different holes, 

they were sent to the rear... the battle of the ridge was over and 

demolition crews began to seal the caves. 

Section IV

Notes on Awards and Decorations

Following is a series of descriptions of the physical appearance and 

requirements for the most notable decorations authorized during, or as a 

direct result of, World War II. During this era, the Army presented large 

numbers of awards to U.S. personnel as well as other members of the 

Allied forces. Each of the decorations discussed is currently authorized 

for presentation on essentially the same basis as that stipulated on its 

authorization date.
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American Military Heritage

The Legion of Merit: The Legion of Merit was established by an Act 

of Congress of July 20, 1942, amended by an executive order of March 

15, 1955. It is awarded to U.S. soldiers and to nationals of other countries 

“who shall have distinguished themselves 

by exceptionally meritorious conduct in the 

performance of outstanding services” since 

September 8, 1939, the date of the President’s 

proclamation of the state of emergency that led 

to World War II.

The Legion of Merit is also the fi rst award to have different degrees. If a holder 

of the Legion of Merit in one degree subsequently receives another such award, 

it is never in a degree lower than the original one. The degrees of Chief Commander and Commander are conferred on members of foreign governments only 

and are awarded for services comparable to those for which the Distinguished 

Service Medal is given to members of the United States armed forces.

The medal is a fi ve-pointed American white star and is bordered in purplered enamel. In the center of the star is a circle of clouds surrounding a fi eld 

of blue with thirteen white stars. Backing the star in its angles is a laurel 

wreath and in each angle there are two crossed arrows pointing outward. The 

opposite side of the medal bears the inscription, “United States of America,” 

and within a central disk, “Annuit Coeptis MDCCLXXXII.” The ribbon is 

essentially the same as that of the Purple Heart, with the exception that it is 

less purple and more red. 

The Bronze Star: This decoration, authorized by Executive Order No. 9419, 

February 4, 1944, is awarded to any service personnel in any branch of the military service who, while serving in any capacity 

with the armed forces of the United States on or 

after December 6, 1941, shall have distinguished 

themselves by heroic or meritorious achievement 

or service, not involving participation in aerial 

fl ight, in connection with military operations 

against an armed enemy.

The award recognizes acts of heroism performed in ground combat if they are 

of lesser degree than that required for the Silver Star. It also recognizes single 

acts of merit and meritorious service if the service or achievement is of a lesser 

degree than that deemed worthy of the Legion of Merit, but the recipient must 

have accomplished such service with distinction.

The medal is in the shape of a fi ve-pointed star 1 1/2 inches from point to 

point. In its center is a smaller raised star. The small star is set on a raised 

ten-pointed fi gure, from which rays extend to the points of the outer star. The 

Legion of

Merit Ribbon

Bronze Star

Medal Ribbon
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American Military Heritage

reverse of the medal also has a raised center, with rays extending to the fi ve points 

of the star. Inscribed on this are the words “Heroic or Meritorious Achievement,” 

encircling a blank space of the recipient’s name. The ribbon is predominantly 

red, with a narrow blue center stripe fl anked on either side by a narrow white 

stripe, and a narrow white stripe at the outer edge. A bronze “V” on the ribbon 

denotes the medal having been awarded for valor. 

Air Medal: The Air Medal is the second United States Decoration established for the aviation service of the military and naval forces. It was created 

by Executive Order 9158, 11 May 1942, but made retroactive to September 8, 

1939. It may be awarded to “Any person who, while serving in any capacity 

in or with Army (Navy and Marine Corps) of the 

United States subsequent to September 8, 1939, 

has distinguished or shall distinguish himself by 

meritorious achievement while participating in 

aerial fl ight.”

The medal ranks below the Distinguished Flying Cross and may be awarded 

for either meritorious service or for valor. When awarded for valor, a “V” 

device is affi xed to the pendant. The medal itself depicts an eagle poised in 

front of a sunburst struck in bronze. The medal is suspended from a yellow 

and purple ribbon. 

Army Commendation Medal: This decoration — originally only a ribbon 

— was authorized in 1945 by War Department Circular 377. The medal 

itself was not authorized until 1949. The award goes to any member of the 

armed forces of the United States who, while serving in any capacity with 

the Army on or after December 7, 1941, shall have distinguished himself 

or herself, either in combat or noncombat action, by meritorious service. 

The award may be made, upon application, to individuals who were commended on or after December 7, 1941, and prior to January 1, 1946, in a 

letter, certifi cate, or order of commendation 

(not a letter of appreciation) signed by an offi cer of the rank of major general or higher, for 

meritorious achievement or service performed 

subsequent to December 7, 1941. Individuals 

awarded a Commendation Ribbon prior to 

October 1, 1949, are, upon application, issued 

the Commendation Medal.

The medal is a bronze hexagon, with one point up. In the center of the reverse 

side is an American bald eagle, facing left, its wings displayed and grasping 

three crossed arrows, points to the left, in its talons. The wing tips extend to 

the outer edge of the medal. Upon the eagle’s breast is a shield paly of thirteen 

sections and a chief.

Air Medal

Ribbon

Army Commendation

Medal Ribbon
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The reverse of the medal bears the words “For Military,” set in two lines, with 

a wide panel for the recipient’s name centered below them, and under this the 

word “Merit.” At the bottom is a sprig of laurel, pointing left. The ribbon has 

alternating narrow stripes, fi ve of white and four of green, fl anked on either 

side by a wide green stripe, with a narrow white stripe at the edge. A bronze 

“V” is worn on the ribbon to denote that the award is for valor in combat.

Only one Commendation Medal may be awarded to any individual. A second 

or succeeding award is indicated by an oak leaf cluster worn on the ribbon. 

Good Conduct Medal: The Army Good Conduct Medal was authorized by 

Executive Order 8809, 28 June 1941, for award to soldiers who shall have honorably completed three continuous years of active military service subsequent 

to August 26, 1940, and who are recommended by their commanding offi cers 

for exemplary behavior, effi ciency, and fi delity. 

Persons awarded this medal must have had character and effi ciency ratings of excellent or higher 

throughout the qualifying period, including time 

spent in attendance at service schools, and there 

must have been no convictions by court martial.

During wartime the Good Conduct Medal may be awarded on completion of one 

year of continuous service rather than three; an executive order of 1943 lowered 

the qualifying period for World War II, and in 1953 another such order made 

the one-year ruling apply to service during the Korean confl ict (1950–1954), 

and during any future period in which the United States is at war.

The medal, on one side, has an eagle with wings displayed and inverted, standing 

on a closed book and a Roman sword. Encircling it is the inscription “Effi ciency, 

Honor, Fidelity.” On the other side of the medal is a fi ve-pointed star, slightly 

above center, with a scroll beneath for the recipient’s name. Above the star are the 

words “For Good” and below the scroll the word “Conduct. “ A wreath, formed 

of a laurel branch on the left and an oak branch on the right, surrounds the whole 

design. The ribbon is scarlet with three narrow white stripes at either edge.

Only one Good Conduct Medal may be awarded to any individual. For a 

second or subsequent award, a clasp is worn, consisting of a bar 1 3/8 inches 

long and 1/8 inch wide, which has suspension loops.

Special skills and qualifi cations badges were authorized for wear during this 

period and have been used since although, in some cases, the specifi c requirements for such awards have been altered. Among such awards are the Combat 

and Expert Infantryman’s Badges, the combat and expert medical badges, and 

the parachutist, glider and driver qualifi cation badges.

Good Conduct 

Medal Ribbon
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REVIEW OF DECORATIONS

While the awarding of medals, particularly for heroism, should be based solely 

on the merits of the act itself, we know that such is not always the case. During 

World War II, for example, many soldiers of African-American or Asian origin 

received the Distinguished Service Medal with little or no consideration for 

the Medal of Honor, because of who they were. Recognizing that segregation 

and the racial mistrust of the era may have played a role in the awarding of 

the medals, the Army undertook another review of DSM awards during the 

1990s and, where the evidence warranted a change, conferred the nation’s 

highest military honor.

Section V

Notes on Weapons

and Technical Developments

GENERAL

World War II introduced a new age in the mass production of military materiel 

and the close cooperation of all sectors of industry to aid in the production of 

this country’s military needs. As a result of the need to counter sophisticated 

weaponry on the battlefi eld employed by Japan and Germany, the degree of 

sophistication in weaponry and war machinery of the U.S. Army developed 

to a greater extent than ever before, even when compared to the revolution 

experienced before and during World War I. A selection of the weapons of 

each side provides a sampling of these developments.

THE UNITED STATES: GROUND WEAPONRY

U.S. Rifl e, .30 Cal., M-1: During World War I, the U.S. Army realized the 

value of greater infantry fi repower and, as a result, conducted a search after 

the war for a semi-automatic rifl e.

In 1919, John C. Garand was hired by the U.S. 

Government and went to the Springfi eld Armory 

to design a rifl e for the .276 Pederson cartridge. 

In 1929, fi eld trials with one of Garand’s designs 

proved so successful that the weapon was further 

refi ned, converted to .30 caliber, and adopted by 

the armed forces as the U.S. Rifl e, .30 Cal., M-1. 

This rifl e used an eight-round, clip-loaded, box 

magazine which ejected the clip after the eighth 

round was fi red. The rifl e weighed 9 1/2 pounds; 

10 1/2 pounds with bayonet.

Browning Automatic Rifl e, .30 Cal., M1918: This automatic rife was developed during the last year of World War I and provided excellent service for 

American and Allied forces throughout World War II and the Korean confl ict. 
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It employed a 20-round, box magazine and fi red the standard .30 caliber rifl e 

cartridge. It was gas-operated, air-cooled, and fi red from an open bolt at a 

cyclic rate of 500 rounds per minute. It would also fi re semi-automatically. 

The BAR weighed 15 1/2 pounds unloaded and was accurate to a range of 

about 800 yards.

U. S Rocket Launcher 2.36-Inch: The rocket launcher was developed by the 

U.S. Ordnance Department at Aberdeen, Maryland, in 1942, and was immediately nicknamed “Bazooka” after comedian Robert Burns’ musical instrument, 

which consisted of odd pieces of pipe and fi ttings. The Bazooka was a hollow pipe, open at both ends. The secret of its target effect is the “MONROE” 

effect, discovered in 1888 by Dr. Charles Monroe, an American chemist. He 

discovered that cavities in high explosives provide a jet stream of fi re and 

metal with terrifi c power, which concentrates to the middle of the inverted 

cone. The projectile weighed 3 1/2 pounds. German anti-tank weapons were 

greatly superior to this weapon, however.

The M-4 Sherman Tank: The U.S. Army found itself outgunned in tank 

warfare by Germany until late in the war. By the time of the Normandy invasion, however, American 

technicians had developed 

in the M-4 “Sherman” tank 

an easy to manufacture and 

durable tank chassis with 

very good suspension and 

a low-maintenance, rugged 

transmission. The radial 

gasoline engine allowed 

both high speed and mobility on the road and off. The 

addition of a long-barreled 

75-mm. gun provided the 

much needed velocity and 

fi repower that earlier models lacked. Over 55,000 M-4 “Sherman” tanks were 

manufactured during World War II.

The Airplane: The P-51 “Mustang” and P-38 “Lightning” series of fi ghters 

saw steady and continued service from 1941 until 1945. For strategic bombing, the United States followed a policy of daylight precision strikes, building 

heavy, well-armed bombers such as the B-17, B-24, and B-29.

The “Jeep”: The American truck, quarter ton, 4x4/ standard, popularly known 

as the “Jeep,” was used by all of the Allied powers on every fi ghting front. It 

was a cheap to produce, yet rugged, general purpose vehicle (the nickname Jeep 

came from the initials “GP” which stood for “general purpose,” bolstered by 

an odd little character of the same name in the Al Capp cartoon, “Lil Abner.”). 
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American Military Heritage

Manufactured by Ford and the Willys Overland Motor Company, the Jeep could 

be equipped with a canvas top, brackets to carry casualty stretchers, or a variety 

of armaments from .30 to .50 caliber machine guns to the 75 mm recoilless rifl e. 

The four-wheel-drive Jeep was also capable of towing trailers, fuel and water 

tanks, and howitzers. Its 4-cylinder, 134 cubic-inch gasoline engine provided 

for a top speed of nearly 65 miles per hour.

The 105-mm. Howitzer: The 105-mm. howitzer was the main fi eld piece of 

the U.S. Army artillery on all fi ghting fronts during the war, and it provided the 

American soldier with an awesome amount of fi re support. The M2A1 model 

weighed 1,080 pounds and 

could fi re four rounds per 

minute at a velocity of 

1,550 feet per second to a 

distance of just over seven 

miles. One of the main 

advantages of the 105-mm. 

howitzer was its ability to 

be towed at speeds of up to 

35 miles per hour, allowing 

for great mobility on the 

battlefi eld.

GERMAN GROUND WEAPONRY

Machine Gun MG 42: Developed from its lighter predecessor the MG 34, 

the MG 42 was adopted in 1942 and fi red the 7.92-mm. service cartridge. The 

most remarkable 

feature of this 

weapon was its 

barrel change 

design. By retracting the bolt 

and moving the 

latch on the right 

side of the barrel 

housing forward 

and outward, the 

operator could 

drop out the barrel without touching it. This weapon was fed by fi fty-round, 

non-disintegrating metal belts which could be linked together. The cyclic rate 

of fi re was 1200 rounds per minute and the weapon weighed 25 pounds. The 

high rate of fi re wasted ammunition and caused the gun to climb entirely too 

much to fully utilize the accuracy of the German service cartridge.
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American Military Heritage

The Anti-Tank Mine: The Germans used about forty types of anti-tank mines, 

among which were:

Pressure Mine: A circular mine with a fl at top and bottom, enclosed in two 

saucer-shaped covers. In the center, the mine had a small plate covering a safety 

screw. A pressure of 250 pounds on the lid sets off one or more of the fi ve 

pressure igniters which, in turn, set off the main charge of 5 pounds of T. N. T.

German Tellermine (35-T-M-35 Stahl): This model had a fl uted pressure 

plate which extended over the entire mine. This plate prevented sand from 

blowing off a buried mine. Tellermines saw service mainly in North Africa. 

In the center was a pressure plate and on the bottom and one side were two additional igniter holes. 

The mine weighed twenty-one pounds and used 

a detonating charge of twelve pounds. It took a 

pressure of 175 to 400 pounds to set off this mine.

The Tank: German tank development began in 1934. By 1939, four types 

of tanks had evolved — the Pz Kpfw (Panzerkampfwagen or armored fi ghting vehicle) I, II, III, and IV. The German Blitzkrieg campaigns launched 

between 1939 and 1942 used these models. By 1941, the Pz Kpfw I and II 

had become outdated, while the larger III and IV were modifi ed with thicker 

armor and a larger gun. These modifi cations appeared in many models and 

used a 50-mm. gun and some the short 75-mm. cannon. Later German tanks 

included the Mark V “Panther,” which was perhaps the best tank of the war 

and appeared in 1943. Intended as a match for the Russian T-34, the medium 

“Panther” had excellent fi re control, thick armor, and a powerful high-velocity 

75-mm. gun. Its gasoline engine provided both high speed and good mobility. 

Over 5,000 “Panthers” were produced prior to Germany’s defeat. The later 

“Tiger” tank, the Mark VI, shared many of the fi ne qualities of the “Panther,” 

including thick armor and superior armament in its 75-mm. high-velocity gun 

which could penetrate 112-mm. of armor at 500 yards. The “Tiger” was not 

as maneuverable as the lighter “Panther,” however, and was mechanically 

unreliable. Fewer than 1,000 were produced .

JAPANESE GROUND WEAPONRY

The two principal infantry rifl es that the Japanese used during World War II 

were the Type 38, 6.5-mm. (Model 1905) and the Type 99, 7.7-mm. (Model 

1939). Type 99 paratrooper rifl es, could be disassembled by turning the screw 

on the right side of the receiver counterclockwise. The barrel and receiver 

group could then be separated.

When the soldier cocked his weapon, he set the safety by pushing the knob at the 

rear of the bolt with the palm of the hand and twisted forty-fi ve degrees to the 

right. The two arms on the rear sight could unfold and were supposed to provide 
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American Military Heritage

a lead on fl ying aircraft. The operator loaded the box magazine with a 5-round 

stripper clip and unloaded the weapon by pulling the latch on the inside of the 

trigger guard, which released the fl oor plate. The weapon weighed 8.8 pounds; 

its range was slightly less that of U.S. .30 caliber weapons.

Section VI

Notes on Uniforms

GENERAL

As World War II approached, the Army provided the fi eld soldier with a sensible 

combat outfi t. It appeared in 

different versions, depending 

upon the soldier’s branch and 

role. The basic uniform was 

a light-weight, wind-resistant 

jacket, shirt, trousers and 

laced canvas leggings. A 

practical steel helmet and 

liner also came into service.

Uniforms worn in the European Theater by general 

offi cers were often adapted 

for his particular locality 

and needs. The short jacket, 

copied from the British 

battle dress, became known 

as the “IKE” jacket and was 

widely used by the Army 

until the early 1950s.

The airborne soldier’s uniform featured a jacket and 

“baggy” trousers. During the early part of the 

war, the paratrooper was 

the only soldier issued 

the jump boot, and he became fi ercely, possessively 

proud of them. Jump boots 

were eventually issued by 

the Army to the other types 

of field soldiers. On his 

dress uniform, (not shown) 

1st U.S. Armored Division, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 

1940–1942
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American Military Heritage

the airborne soldier wore a special cap insignia, 

a silver parachutist skill badge, and a shoulder 

tab identifying his status. These devices continue to contribute to the fi erce pride and proud 

heritage of the paratrooper.

The types of uniforms worn by members of the 

Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps in non-combat 

situations were modeled after civilian styles 

but made of the same material as men’s utility 

uniform. When in combat, WAACs and nurses 

wore fatigue uniforms similar in design and style 

to those of their male counterparts.

Section VII

Notes on General of the Army

George C. Marshall, 1880–1959

In 1901, George C. Marshall graduated from the Virginia Military Institute, 

where, during his senior year, he served as the First Captain of the Corps 

of Cadets. In February 1902, he received a commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army and was assigned to the Thirteenth Infantry in the 

Philippines. After several years in the American West and Pacifi c areas, he 

returned to Fort Leavenworth to attend the Infantry-Cavalry School, where 

he became a senior honor graduate in 1907. He was then assigned to attend 

the Army Staff College, also at Fort Leavenworth. Here, too, he fi nished at 

the head of his class.

Between 1913 and 1916, Marshall returned to the Philippines, where he impressed his superiors. Brigadier General James Franklin Bell, the Department 

Commander, called Marshall, “the greatest military genius since Stonewall 

Jackson.” Lieutenant Colonel Johnson Hagood, in response to the question in 

an effi ciency report on whether he would like to have Marshall in his command, 

responded, “Yes, but I would prefer to serve under his command.” Hagood 

called Marshall, “a military genius,” and recommended that he be made “a 

brigadier general in the regular Army, and every day this is postponed is a 

loss to the Army and the nation.” 

When the United States entered World War I, Marshall went from the 

Philippines to France as a captain on the staff of the 1st Infantry Division. 

He served as a staff offi cer in the battles of Cantigny, Aisne–Marne, and 

St. Mihiel. Within a year of his landing in France, he had reached the rank 

of full colonel and was the chief of the operations section (G–3), First 

U.S. Army. 
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After the war, he reverted to his prewar rank of captain and became an aide to 

General Pershing. By 1924, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Between 

the wars, he served as executive offi cer of the 15th Infantry in China, assistant commandant of the Infantry School, commander of the 8th Infantry, with the Illinois 

National Guard, and commander of the 5th Infantry Brigade. In 1938, Marshall 

became Chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department, and he became 

Chief of Staff in September 1939, passing over thirty-four other offi cers. As Chief 

of Staff during World War II, he played a central role in Allied grand strategy, 

while supervising the building of the U.S. Army 

into one of the most powerful fi ghting machines 

in history. In December 1944, Marshall became 

General of the Army. British Prime Minister Sir 

Winston Churchill called him, “the organizer of 

victory,” and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 

when faced with the decision of whether to permit 

Marshall to command the Normandy invasion, 

fi nally concluded, “I didn’t feel I could sleep at 

ease if you were out of Washington.” Perhaps the 

greatest compliment came from Secretary of War 

Henry L. Stimson, who had been involved with 

the U.S. Army since the turn of the century. At 

Marshall’s retirement ceremony at the end of the 

war, Stimson told him, “I have seen a great many 

soldiers in my lifetime, and you, sir, are the fi nest soldier I have ever known.”

But the postwar United States could not allow Marshall to retire. President 

Truman appointed him “Special Representative of the President to China,” 

with the personal rank of ambassador. Following this important assignment 

he became Secretary of State and developed the European Recovery Program, 

which became known as the Marshall Plan. After the start of the Korean War 

in 1950, President Truman called on Marshall to serve as Secretary of Defense, 

a position he held until September 1951.

As the capstone to his already illustrious career, Marshall received the Nobel 

Peace Prize for his European recovery plan. It might seem rather unexpected 

that a professional soldier dedicated to the art of waging war could receive such 

an award. But Marshall, even though he won fame during history’s greatest 

war, was a man of peace, a true soldier-statesman for the “American century.”

Section VIII

Notes on General George S. Patton, Jr.,

1885–1945

One would be hard-pressed to fi nd another American soldier as aggressive, 

colorful, and swashbuckling as George S. Patton, Jr. In his own army, in friendly 
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and enemy armies, men marveled at his aggressiveness and daring. They talked of his unrelenting demand for discipline, soldierly dress, and 

bearing. They laughed at, or despaired of, the 

unprintable speeches Patton delivered to inspire 

his troops to battle. They joked at, or shrank 

from, his unique, blistering vocabulary, which 

was richer than most old cavalry sergeants could 

muster. They argued about his colorful personality, his numerous scandals, and even his tactics. 

Patton’s reputation was widely known; and, as 

usually happens in such cases, one fi nds many 

varied opinions of the man and the soldier.

George S. Patton, Jr., was born near San Gabriel, California, in 1885. During 

his early years, he benefi ted from an active outdoor life on the family ranch, 

laying the foundation for a tremendous physique that would carry him through 

life with limitless energy and enthusiasm.

He began his military education at an early age and while his formal schooling was sparse, George managed to attend the Virginia Military Institute for 

a year before entering the U.S. Military Academy at West Point with the 

Class of 1908.

Patton’s life at the U.S. Military Academy was fi lled with little but hard work. 

He was dyslexic, and reading any but the shortest of passages was a struggle. 

Nonetheless, he felt compelled to read all of the ancient and modern military 

classics of history and theory. He failed plebe math but came back to graduate 

with the Class of 1909. He excelled in all military subjects, and in his First 

Class year, he served as the battalion adjutant. Patton participated actively in 

athletics, and, although unsuccessful in winning letters in football because of 

multiple injuries, he won his letter in track and broke the Academy record for 

the low hurdles. His athletics continued after graduation, too, for he entered 

the 1912 Olympics as the only United States representative in the “Modern 

Pentathlon,” fi nishing fourth in a fi eld of forty-three.

Patton’s choice of branches upon graduation was the cavalry. His early service 

included a position on General Pershing’s staff with the Mexican Punitive 

Expedition in 1916. He so gained the confi dence of his superiors that Pershing 

later named him to command Headquarters Troop of the American Expeditionary Forces. He was promoted to captain and went overseas with the fi rst 

American troops. However, he soon tired of his inactive headquarters life and 

requested reassignment to a fi ghting unit. General Pershing offered him the 

choice of an infantry battalion or duty with the new U.S. Army Tank Corps. He 

joined the tank unit, was soon promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, and received 
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American Military Heritage

command of the fi rst U.S. Army tank brigade. His service with the tanks brought 

him a promotion to colonel and recognition as one of the outstanding offi cers 

of his age and grade. During this period, he received the Distinguished Service 

Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Purple Heart.

After the war, Patton continued to work for the development of the tank as a 

weapon. But when the tanks came under the control of the infantry, he returned to 

his fi rst love, the cavalry. He served with the cavalry until the start of World War 

II. His duties included several tours with the General Staff Corps, and at every 

opportunity he urged the joint use of cavalry and tanks. In 1940, he went to Fort 

Benning to train the nucleus of an armored force, and he later received command 

of the 2d Armored Division. He retained this command until early 1942 when he 

took command of the unit that would become the Western Task Force in the invasion of North Africa. Throughout this time, his initiative and drive were always in 

evidence, and his name became synonymous with effi ciency and determination.

General Patton’s exploits during the remainder of World War II became 

legendary. In Tunisia, he whipped a demoralized U.S. II Corps into shape 

after the defeat at Kasserine Pass. In Sicily, he raced from one end of the 

island to the other, foiling all enemy attempts to slow his forces. In France, he 

displayed a mobility and determination that astonished friend and foe alike. 

During the Battle of the Bulge, he turned his Third U.S. Army at a moment’s 

notice in response to the German offensive and broke the siege of Bastogne. 

He then played a key role in the fi nal campaign across Germany. He then 

commanded occupation forces until his death on December 21, 1945, as result 

of an automobile accident.

Section IX

Notes on Dwight D. Eisenhower

and His Generalship During World War II

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower’s stature as a great military offi cer, 

college president, and President of the United States has, if anything, grown 

over the years. If one examines several key points of his life and experiences, 

it is possible to see some of the forces that made him a living part of America’s 

heritage and the modern giant of the heritage of the U.S. Army.

Although Eisenhower commanded the largest invasion force in American history and became Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army after the war, in 1939, he was a 

lieutenant colonel serving as an aide to General MacArthur in the Pacifi c. After 

his graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1915, he had served in staff 

and command positions and attended the military schools considered normal for 

an offi cer of his rank and branch. Dwight Eisenhower, however, came of age in 

a peacetime Army that saw few promotions and advancements. It was an army 
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American Military Heritage

without a war and one that endured long periods 

of little training, little funding, and nearly no new 

equipment. Eisenhower learned early to use each 

available minute for study and self improvement, 

which he practiced throughout his life. Thus, when 

he became a high level commander in Europe after 

twenty-six years in an army of little action, he 

proved more than ready.

Although seldom considered a fi ghting general, 

Eisenhower possessed an acute sense of tactics 

and, on several occasions, demonstrated his ability to generate sound tactical maneuvers while 

practicing the diplomacy needed to command a 

force composed of the forces of many nations. 

For instance, during the breakout from the Normandy beaches, he held the 

bulk of the German forces in contact in one general area with relatively light 

forces while allowing Bradley and Patton to skirt the enemy in the West and 

trap them in the Falaise Pocket.

In the Battle of the Bulge, he recognized the strength of the German attack 

before any of his commanders and rapidly moved reserves to stem the tide. At 

a time when discouragement ran rampant in Allied councils, he retained his 

characteristic optimism, emphasizing that the battle represented an opportunity 

not a setback. During his fi nal bouts with the enemy west of the Rhine River, 

he ordered a series of double envelopments that handed Hitler a major defeat.

In addition to his responsibilities as a military commander, General Eisenhower, 

as the Supreme Allied Commander, was required to deal with Prime Minister 

Churchill of Great Britain and General Charles De Gaulle of France, as well as 

other representatives of countries and military services, on a day-by-day basis. 

He accomplished this with understanding and patience. His tact and powers 

of persuasion have been praised by nearly every author that has examined 

his career; however, at no time did these attributes stand him in greater stead 

than in the trying days of a world confl ict. In addition to his own abilities, 

Eisenhower understood the value of talent and surrounded himself with the 

most capable, energetic, and effective commanders and staff offi cers that he 

could fi nd. Probably more important than his ability in fi nding these people 

was the fact that he listened to their advice and always had a broad base of 

knowledge upon which to base any decision.

SUMMARY

Eisenhower’s reputation as a great commander is assured not only by the vast 

numbers of men that he led and their lasting accomplishments, but because of his 

personal accomplishments as a man. In a nation that did not prepare for war, he 
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American Military Heritage

prepared himself for that unwanted eventuality. When that same nation needed 

him as president, he was ready. He served freedom’s cause with every personal 

resource at his command, and it was, indeed, more than enough. He is most worthy 

of the label “great fi ghting general, great man.”

Section X

Audie Murphy

The son of a sharecropper, Audie Murphy was born in Hunt County in northeast 

Texas, on June 20, 1924. During his boyhood, he often listened to the stories of 

World War I veterans and decided that he wanted to become a soldier. At age 

sixteen, he attempted to join the U.S. Marines but was rejected because of his 

size. After failing in an attempt to join the paratroopers, he joined the infantry. 

Assigned to the 3d Infantry Division, he soon had the opportunity to show what he 

was made of. Although not fearless, and occasionally critical of those who were, 

he did possess a grasp of small-unit tactics. He served with distinction in Sicily 

and the Italian campaign, gaining promotions and the fi rst of several decorations.

After the 3d Infantry Division participated in the invasion of southern France, 

Murphy received a battlefi eld commission. On January 26, 1945, near the 

village of Holtzwihr just outside Strasbourg, the Germans launched an attack 

against his company’s forward positions with six tanks and 250 infantrymen. 

Ordering his men to withdraw, Murphy remained behind on an abandoned 

tank destroyer, calling in artillery fi re against the enemy advance. Although the 

tank destroyer was on the point of exploding, he climbed on top of it and used 

the vehicle’s machine gun against the enemy attack, continuing to fi re until he 

had exhausted his ammunition. He eventually killed enough Germans—later 

estimated to be about fi fty—to break up the assault. Although wounded, he 

then recalled his company and led them in a counterattack. For his bravery, 

Murphy received the Medal of Honor. 

At the end of the war, Murphy was the most decorated American soldier, having won twenty-eight 

medals, including three French and one Belgian 

decorations. Leaving the Army, he began a career 

in motion pictures and wrote his memoirs. He 

later attempted a business career but was forced 

into bankruptcy in 1968. It was on a business trip, 

near Roanoke, Virginia on May 28, 1971, that 

Audie Murphy was killed in the crash of a private 

plane. Although his postwar career was marked 

by much adversity, his record as a combat soldier 

remains undimmed.
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American Military Heritage

Section XI

Vernon J. Baker

Like Audie Murphy, First Lieutenant Vernon 

J. Baker, an African-American, distinguished 

himself in combat in Italy, near the village of 

Viareggio. Here, according to the Medal of 

Honor citation, on 5 and 6 April 1945, then 

Second Lieutenant Baker demonstrated outstanding courage and leadership in destroying 

German installations, personnel, and equipment 

during his company’s attack against a strongly 

entrenched enemy in mountainous terrain. When 

his company was stopped by the concentration of 

fi re from several machine gun emplacements, he 

crawled to one position and destroyed it, killing 

three Germans. Continuing forward, he attacked 

an enemy observation post and killed its two occupants. With the aid of one of 

his men, Lieutenant Baker then attacked two more machine gun nests, killing 

or wounding the four enemy soldiers in these positions. He then covered the 

evacuation of the wounded personnel of his company by occupying an exposed 

position and drawing the enemy’s fi re. On the following night, Lieutenant 

Baker voluntarily led a battalion advance through enemy minefi elds and heavy 

fi re toward the division objective. Second Lieutenant Baker’s fi ghting spirit 

and daring leadership were an inspiration to his men and exemplify the highest 

traditions of the Armed Forces.
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American Military Heritage

10

Post-WW II and the Korean War

Section I

Unrest and Hostilities

At the conclusion of the War in the Pacifi c, the United States and the 

 Soviet Union had arbitrarily divided Korea at the 38th Parallel, the 

 Americans stationing troops below the Parallel and the Soviet Union 

above it. At Yalta, the Americans and Soviets considered a four power 

trusteeship, administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, 

and the United Kingdom, until Korea had suffi ciently developed to choose 

its own government. But the Soviets presented demands unacceptable to 

the Americans, while aiding the relatively secret growth of a Communist 

government in North Korea. In 1947 and 1948, the United Nations attempted 

to act as a go-between in North and South Korea’s arguments over unifi cation and independence, and particularly on the subject of elections. The 

Soviet Union protested that the United Nations had no jurisdiction over 

Korea and that foreign troops must be withdrawn before the creation of 

a unifi ed Korean government. When South Korea held elections in May 

1948, the North Koreans did not participate. They barred United Nations 

observers from entering the country and did not recognize the results of the 

elections. After the elections, both the United States and the Soviet Union 

withdrew their troops from Korea and left the country divided. From that 

point, South Korea became a target of varied forms of warfare by the North. 

These attempts ranged from border raids and guerrilla warfare to more subtle 

attempts to strangle the economy of the country and subvert the government 

through propaganda.

Striking without warning in the pre-dawn hours of June 25, 1950, seven divisions and an armored brigade of the 135,000-man North Korean People’s 

Army drove across the 38th Parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea. 

The invasion clearly represented a clash between two factions of the same 

country’s population, but it was, in a broader sense, a confrontation between 

the two major power blocs that had emerged from World War II. During the 

ensuing months, badly mauled South Korean forces retreated in the face of 

the invasion, United Nations forces regrouped in the southern tip of Korea, 

and General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of UN forces, conducted a 

brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon and a breakout from the “Pusan Perimeter.” The UN forces drove north to the Korean–Chinese border on the Yalu 

River, only to meet the massive intervention of Communist Chinese forces. 

After the Chinese drove UN troops back to the area of the 38th Parallel, a long 
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costly stalemate and negotiations between the two sides resulted. Finally, the 

two sides signed an armistice, leaving a restless peace and a divided country.

Although, in some respects, the Korean confl ict could be called a minor war 

when compared with World War I and World War II, it proved both devastating and unique. For the fi rst time, the United Nations had enforced a policy 

against armed aggression. A unifi ed commander and his staff built an effective 

The Korean Conflict

1950 – 1951

United Nations Line,

Date Indicated

Pusan

Taegu

P'ohang-dong

Samch'ok

Chumunjin

Y e l l o w 

 

 S e a

 S e a 

 o f

J a p a n

0 50 100

Miles

38o

38o

Taejon

P'yongt'aek Han R.

Osan

Inch'on

Kaesong

Wonsan

Ch'ongch'on R.

Yalu R.

Changjin Res

Pujon Res

Iwon

Hyesanjin

Ch'osan

Sinanju

Sinuiju

M a n c h u r i a 

Hungnam

Suwon

Seoul

Hamhung

Ansong

5 Sep 1950

25 Jun 1951

25 Nov 1950

Wonju 25 Jan 1951

Kum R.

Naktong R.

Yudam-ni

Ch'ongjin

P'yongyang
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American Military Heritage

fi ghting force from troops of many nations, armed with their own weapons 

but sustained by standardized supporting agencies. The Korean confl ict saw 

the United States Army overcome personnel shortages, equipment renovation 

and supply diffi culties, inadequate training programs, and the ever-present 

problems of the fl ow of offi cer and enlisted replacements.

The North Korean Army demonstrated what to the occidental soldier seemed 

foolhardy concepts of tactics, particularly during the latter stages of the confl ict. The North Korean Army did not possess the weapons or the ammunition 

to conduct a toe-to-toe slugging match with the better equipped and supplied 

United Nations forces, but it did have one commodity that the UN troops did 

not have—manpower. In many cases, the Communists seemed simply to 

substitute bodies for weapons and to casually expend a soldier as one might 

fi re ammunition.

The Army learned many lessons on the battlefi elds of Korea, but perhaps the 

most signifi cant was the important relationship of terrain to armored warfare. 

For nearly the entire fi rst year of the war, tanks performed in the same offensive roles that they had assumed in World War II. But commanders soon 

learned that the mountainous terrain of Korea severely restricted the heavy 

vehicles and fi nally limited them to a fi re support role. Thus, of the combat 

arms, infantry and artillery dominated the battlefi eld. The dates and events 

listed below represent pivotal points in the Korean War:

25 June 1950 North Korean People’s Army invades

 South Korea.

15 Sep 1950 The U.S. Army X Corps, spearheaded by the 

 U.S. 1st Marine Division, lands at Inchon.

16 Sep 1950 Eighth U.S. Army begins offensive to break 

 out of the Pusan beachhead.

20 Nov 1950 Communist Chinese cross the Yalu River to 

 enter the war and attack UN forces.

21 Feb 1951 Eighth U.S. Army launches Operation 

 KILLER, a counterattack by IX and 

 X Corps to drive Chinese Communist forces 

 north of the Han River.

20 Apr 1953 Operation LITTLE SWITCH, the exchange of 

 sick and wounded prisoners of war by United

 Nations and Chinese and North Korean forces, 

 begins. The exchange is completed on

 April 26, 1953.

27 Jul 1953 Armistice is signed in Korea.

5 Aug 1953 Operation BIG SWITCH, the exchange of

 prisoners of war, begins.
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American Military Heritage

Section II

Notes on Uniforms

GENERAL

In great part, the uniforms of 1950 were those of the fi nal era of World War II, 

with slight modifi cations for different parts of the world. Three distinct types 

of dress existed; however, as is shown, one fi nds a degree of similarity in the 

basic garments, especially in the fi eld uniforms.

351st U.S. Infantry Regiment These are the uniforms of one of the proudest 

American units in the Korean War. These soldiers wear the winter gear used 

throughout the war. The helmet tops an olive green and a cotton fi eld jacket 

worn over heavy woolen shirt and trousers. 

351st U.S. Infantry Regiment (Winter Field Uniform), 1951
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American Military Heritage

Section III

Notes on the U.S. Army Regimental System

“Remember your regiment and follow your offi cers.” So spoke Captain Charles 

A. May to the 2d Dragoons just prior to their attack at Resaca De la Palma 

on May 9, 1846. 

This quotation is indicative of the fi erce pride, loyalty, even reverence, 

that soldiers in battle historically have reserved for their unit. Even during peacetime when good commanders and high esprit prevail, it is not 

uncommon to fi nd soldiers springing to action to defend the reputation of 

their unit by means of an impromptu physical contest with the members 

of some rival unit.

For some time it has been recognized that in order to capitalize on this natural 

pride of a soldier in his unit, that unit’s history, lineage, battle streamers, 

and distinctive insignia should be carefully preserved. Unfortunately, our 

army has been required to expand so rapidly during periods of crisis that 

many units were created suddenly and could not benefi t by being awarded 

the colors and lineage of an older tradition-laden unit. Demobilization following wars resulted in mass inactivation of units and further complicated 

the problem of retaining unit designations and histories. Periodic reorganizations of the army have also shown the need for a system of retaining 

previous unit designations.

In order to meet this requirement the Combat Arms Regimental System, 

commonly known as CARS, was established on 24 January 1957. CARS 

was designed to permit the retention of our most famous regiments while 

meeting the requirement for tactical fl exibility on the modern battlefi eld. 

In the 1980s, CARS was succeeded by the United States Army Regimental 

System, or USARS, which includes non-combat arms branches.

Although tactical regiments no longer exist (armored cavalry, ranger, and 

special operations aviation regiments excepted) as units in the active army, 

their distinguished histories are preserved by the U.S. Army Regimental 

System. Regiments have always been the foundation of the Army’s combat 

power and the primary source of army history and tradition. The history of 

the U.S. Army is a history of its fi ghting regiments.

Although the number of regiments in our Army has varied from 1 to well 

over 300, in almost all of them the members have tried in some fashion to 

commemorate certain acts of valor which were a source of unit pride.
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American Military Heritage

The 19th Infantry, for example, held the line for two days during the battle 

of Chickamauga in September 1863, but withstood such determined attacks 

that at the end of the second day half the regiment had become casualties. 

By the time the battle was ended, a second lieutenant was commanding 

the regiment — all of his seniors having fallen in battle. This inspired the 

regimental tradition that a second lieutenant be given command during 19th 

Infantry Regimental Day ceremonies, and the gold bar of a second lieutenant 

is now part of the unit’s crest. Soldiers of the 3d Infantry, the Old Guard, wear 

around their left shoulder a small black leather strap with a buff colored piece 

of leather woven along its length. This dates back to the 18th century when 

the regiment’s members 

wove distinctive strands 

of buckskin in their knapsack straps. Men took 

great pride in the regimental colors and carried them into battle. The 

colors were a symbol to 

be preserved and revered.

An example of how the 

USARS designations 

function is provided 

by the 1st Battalion, 3d 

Air Defense Artillery. 

Although it is a battalion-sized organization, 

it retains the colors and 

lineage of an element of 

the old 3d Regiment of 

Artillery. Thus, it is called 

the 1st Battalion, 3d Air 

Defense Artillery, or 1-3 

ADA. Several different 

numbered battalions can 

be assigned the same regimental designation. As the lowest numbered active 

battalion of the 3d Air Defense Artillery, 1-3 ADA is the custodian of the 3d 

ADA regimental history and property.

The U.S. Army Regimental System is designed to maintain the history and 

traditions of our fi ghting units regardless of future tactical reorganizations.

“. . . to the best of military knowledge a Regiment never loses its Rank....”

 —General George Washington, 1775.

3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard) 

Ceremonial Dress, 1966
177

American Military Heritage

Section IV

Notes on Personal Services and Army Life, Circa 1950

GENERAL

Soldiers can cite many intangibles, such as memories, friendships, and the 

satisfaction of achievements as major reasons why they serve in the army. 

Nevertheless, a serviceman must eat, be paid, and have a place to sleep. These 

material aspects of the soldier’s life during the period of the Korean War serve 

as interesting comparisons with similar services of his Revolutionary and Civil 

War ancestors and modern counterparts.

THE ENLISTED MAN

In the Regular units of 1950, a large number of World War II veterans still 

formed training cadres for those men recruited after the war. The average 

enlisted man received a base pay of about seventy-fi ve dollars a month, ate 

in a company mess, and could live in “adequate” government quarters. The 

perpetual private had long since left the ranks, and milkshakes had become 

more popular than whiskey. The noncommissioned offi cer of the 1950s was a 

bright, studious, serious-minded soldier who was probably married and raising 

a family. He wore stripes as had his predecessors for nearly a century. The 

Army also began to use used small green shoulder tabs to designate a combat 

leader position.

THE ARMY MESS

At one time in the army, a great deal of individuality existed in the Army mess 

system. Each unit received funds to purchase additional food from the local 

economy of whatever area the unit was serving in. Therefore, most messes 

engaged in a great deal of competition to insure that their food and its preparation were the best in the Regiment. In 1950, the army modernized the mess 

system by standardizing the Army master menu, thereby providing for greater 

uniformity of mess service throughout the Army. This practice abolished 

much of the individuality of the mess, but it also protected the members of 

the companies that had poor mess sergeants and would have suffered under 

the more loosely run system.

ARMY EDUCATION

The Army enjoyed a long tradition of military education outside of training. In addition to strictly military instruction, the Army in the early 

nineteenth century had instituted educational programs for soldiers who 

wanted more than just their limited civilian education and military training. 

During World War II, the United States Armed Forces Institute had offered 

courses both in the continental United States and abroad. After the war, the 

Army Field Forces became responsible for the Army’s Military Schooling System, and that system continued to grow throughout the decade of 
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American Military Heritage

the 1950s. Later, correspondence courses and on-campus exchange programs were established at many of the colleges and universities located 

near military bases. Both of these programs proved popular and benefi cial 

and remain in existence today.

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Reorganization Act of 1950 confi rmed the power of the Secretary of 

the Army to administer departmental affairs and fi rmly established his 

position as the immediate superior of the Chief of Staff of the Army. It 

also divided the subordinate units of the Army Field Forces into six army 

areas and made the command responsible for training within the United 

States. Under this act, the Infantry Branch was retained; fi eld, coast, and 

antiaircraft artillery merged into the Artillery Branch; tank and cavalry units 

consolidated into the new Armor Branch. The act also authorized fourteen 

services to give technical or administrative support to the combat arms, 

or otherwise to serve the Army as a whole. Artillery split again into Field 

Artillery and Air Defense Artillery in 1968. Army Aviation, equipped 

with small fi xed-wing craft and helicopters, became a separate branch of 

the Army in 1983 and was fully integrated into the combined arms team.
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Section V

Notes on Maxwell D. Taylor (1901–1987)

Born on August 26, 1901 in Keytesville, Missouri, Maxwell D. Taylor 

graduated fourth in his class from the United States Military Academy in 

1922 and received a commission in the Engineer Corps. His fi rst overseas 

assignment was at Schofi eld Barracks, Hawaii, where he soon became the 

aide to the Commanding General. Lieutenant Taylor returned to the Military 

Academy as an instructor in French and Spanish in 1927. In 1933, he attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. After 

this assignment, he was promoted to captain and assigned to Tokyo to study 

the Japanese language. From Tokyo, he went to China, where he served as 

an assistant military attaché.

In June 1939, Captain Taylor returned to the United States where he attended 

the Army War College. Next, Taylor went on a special assignment to Latin 

America. In March 1940, he was promoted to major and subsequently assigned 

to the War Department General Staff. 

 In July 1942, Taylor joined the 82d Infantry 

Division as the chief of staff. He assisted in 

organizing the fi rst airborne division of the 

Army. Receiving his appointment to brigadier 

general in December 1942, he went overseas 

with the division the following March as the 

Division Artillery Commander. In March 

1944, Taylor became the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division. Accompanied by a contingent of his command, he 

became the fi rst general to land on Normandy. 

His command led a successful assault on a 

river causeway, clearing the way for advancing 

seaborne units. For his performance, he was awarded the Distinguished 

Service Cross and the British Service Cross.

After about a month’s combat, the division returned to England to prepare for 

subsequent operations. In September 1944, the 101st Airborne Division liberated Eindhoven, the fi rst Dutch city to be freed by the Allies. After hard fi ghting in Holland, the division withdrew into theater reserve. In mid-December 

1944, Taylor returned temporarily to Washington on a special mission. During 

his absence, General MacAuliffe assumed temporary command and led the 

division in the well-known Battle of the Bulge.
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In September 1945 General Taylor, at forty-four, became the thirty-seventh 

Superintendent of the United States Military Academy. His superintendency 

paralleled that of General MacArthur’s in reform. He revised and balanced 

the curriculum, enlarged the physical facilities, and expanded the faculty. He 

continued to stress character building, military training and leadership, and a 

full athletic program.

Subsequently, General Taylor commanded the Eighth Army in Korea, and 

was named the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1955. Keenly aware of the danger of total reliance on nuclear deterrence, he retired in 1959 and authored 

a book entitled The Uncertain Trumpet. Recalled to active duty to become 

President Kennedy’s special military advisor, he next became the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and subsequently the United States Ambassador to 

South Vietnam. During his retirement, he wrote his memoirs and numerous 

other works on national security issues, and lectured widely on defense. He 

died in Washington on April 19, 1987.

Section VI

Notes on General Matthew B. Ridgway:

A Study in Applied Leadership

Born at Fort Monroe, Virginia on March 3, 1895, Matthew B. Ridgway graduated from West Point in 1917 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of 

infantry. He served in a number of infantry posts during the interwar years, 

rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. During World War II, he earned fame 

as the commander of the 82d Airborne Division and later the XVIII Airborne 

Corps. After the war, he served as the American representative on the United 

Nations Military Staff Committee, commanded Caribbean Command, and 

became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, rising to the rank of 

lieutenant general.

On Christmas Eve 1950, Ridgway, his wife, and their son were quietly celebrating the evening in their home at Fort Myer, Virginia. A phone call from 

the Chief of Staff of the Army, General J. Lawton Collins, broke the quiet 

evening for the Ridgways. General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army commander in the war in Korea, had just been killed in a jeep wreck, and General 

Ridgway had been designated to replace him. 

Ridgway’s thoughts at this juncture can only be imagined. He certainly realized 

the diffi culties and responsibilities of his position. The American and South 

Korean forces in Korea were in nearly full retreat along the peninsula. General 

MacArthur’s brilliantly conceived end run to Inchon had liberated vast areas 

of the Korean peninsula from the enemy and had decimated the North Korean 

Army, but the rugged, well equipped Red Chinese troops that had poured 
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across the border had infl icted a nasty defeat on the Eighth Army. Thus Ridgway 

knew that he would be taking command of an army moving to the rear under 

great pressure, an army whose fi ghting spirit had reached a low ebb. He knew 

that his task would be immense.

Matthew B. Ridgway was no stranger to immense challenges, as his World 

War II record showed. A fi ghting general, he had repeatedly inspired his men 

through his own demonstrated leadership ability. With his trademark hand 

grenade always visible on his suspenders, he had become a familiar sight for 

paratroopers on the front lines. 

General Ridgway’s operations as commander of the Eighth Army in Korea 

have been well recorded, but he has earned perhaps his greatest fame for the 

way in which he rallied Eighth Army. He devoted major portions of each of 

his days in visits to each of his units that he could reach. He liked to talk to 

the enlisted men of his commands, so that he could determine the needs of 

the lowest private. Whenever he could, he saw that these needs were met. He 

was severe with subordinate commanders and staff alike.

He chafed under the restrictions of his defense plan, 

for he wanted to assume the offensive. He knew 

that only through the offense could he achieve the 

victories that would shorten and ultimately end 

the war. When he fi nally launched his offensives, 

General Ridgway repeatedly displayed a complete 

knowledge and fi rm faith in the proven tactics of 

the offense. He demanded that all weapons and 

resources at hand be employed in an orchestrated 

attack. The Eighth Army quickly developed a profi ciency in the basic doctrine of offensive warfare 

and that, along with the presence of the erect and 

confi dent man with the hand grenades taped to his 

harness, proved more than enough.

Ridgway’s own evaluation of the entire Korean situation provides a crystal 

clear picture of his devotion as a soldier and the basis upon which his capabilities as a leader were founded. It was this leadership that inspired the men of a 

demoralized and retreating unit, and it was this leadership that ultimately made 

the Eighth Army one of the fi nest fi eld forces that has ever fought for America.

Ridgway became perhaps the most respected American military fi gure of 

the 1950s. When President Truman relieved General MacArthur in April 

1951, he chose Ridgway to succeed MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief, 

Far East. Ridgway later served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
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from 1952 to 1953. From 1953 to 1955, he served as Chief of Staff of the 

Army, resigning out of concern over the impact of the Eisenhower Administration’s budget cuts on the Army. In retirement, Ridgway pursued 

a successful career in business until his death in Fox Chapel, Pennsylvania 

on July 26, 1993.

Section VII

A Night with Easy Company

On November 25, 1950, Easy Company of the 27th Infantry Regiment (Wolfhounds), commanded by Captain Reginald B. Desiderio, was spearheading 

the advance of the 25th Infantry Division. The story of the two following 

nights in the life of Easy Company provide a brief insight into the type of 

combat encountered and the type of man who fought in the Korean war. 

Easy Company’s saga is retold by Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall in 

his volume, The River and the Gauntlet.

The piece of terrain on which the action took place resembled an acutely 

cornered horseshoe lying on its side. As Easy would eventually discover, 

the Chinese were holding the northern arm of the hill, which was parallel to 

and about 200 yards from the southern arm. Intermittent small arms fi re from 

the northern hill swept across the relatively open ground on the southern 

surface of the hill. Easy’s mission was to secure the southern leg of the 

hill mass and hold it as a part of a blocking position. The company had just 

been roused by its offi cers from a well-deserved sleep in a rear area position, 

but the men fell quickly to their tasks and started toward their assigned 

defensive area. As the lead elements of the company cleared the crest of 

the hill from the south, strong enemy fi re erupted, and Easy’s commander 

had to “leap-frog” his platoons into position, using the covering fi re of one 

to support the next as it crested the hill. The fi rst impression of the lead 

men was that the tracers 

seemed to fl oat at them, 

and that they could see 

enemy soldiers in their 

fl ashes as they fi red their 

weapons. Easy settled 

into position and began 

to entrench facing the 

enemy fire. Desiderio 

made his way to his higher 

headquarters command 

post in an attempt to gain 

the services of several 

tanks that he had seen 

25 November 1950

Yards

0 100 200
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parked there. Within fi fteen minutes, he led fi ve tanks back to his perimeter. 

His timing was perfect, for the tanks had just topped the southern rise when 

the fi rst Chinese charge “...broke against the position.”

Sergeant Bryers was on a machine gun on the extreme left fl ank of 

the company ... white phosphorous had started a grassfi re... Bryers 

saw about 100 of the enemy rush forward... they suddenly broke in 

half... charging across the saddle on the left... the others as if to turn 

Easy’s right fl ank .... Some fell from the fi re, others scattered and 

advanced to the slope of Easy’s hill.... Bugles were now blowing 

from both ends of the Chinese line.... The armor drew bullets like 

magnet.... These were the terms of the fi ght for the next two hours. 

The Chinese kept walking into it and with the armor and all infantry 

weapons fi ring, Easy continued killing.

Although fourteen Easy Company men fell during the clash, three unexpected 

replacements had arrived on the scene and fought courageously through the 

night. As the fi ght was progressing, the Task Force commander had seen three 

men seemingly malingering in the vicinity of his command post and, without 

further questioning, had sent them to Easy Company’s position. It was later 

learned that these three stalwarts were an Air Force fi ghter pilot and two enlisted men who had been in the vicinity on offi cial business.

The company fought on. During the engagement, the mortar section found 

itself without night sighting devices. Each gunner had to smoke about two 

packs of cigarettes, so that, by the glow of the stub, he could see the sights 

on his mortar. Their coughing reputedly grew steadily worse as the night 

progressed. Throughout the entire encounter, Captain Desiderio found himself 

either directing the tank fi re into enemy masses or making the “rounds” of 

his own subordinate leaders in a calm and professional manner. His steady 

presence made itself felt to all who remembered the night.

Having tested the American position, the enemy withdrew. The American 

infantrymen understood that it had been the presence of the tanks that had 

caused his departure. Even though the fi ght had lasted only a short time, the 

fi ve tanks had used forty-fi ve boxes of .50 caliber ammunition.

The night was not yet over, however, for just before fi rst light, the enemy 

readied another attack. Chinese troops crawled within fi fteen yards of the perimeter, each clutching several fragmentation grenades. They also positioned 

several machine guns on top of their hill, commanding an excellent view of 

Easy’s positions. At a pre-arranged signal, a “...shower of potato mashers 

dropped inside the perimeter.” Just after the initial barrage of grenades, the 

enemy force tried a fi erce frontal attack, fi ring rifl es and burp guns as they ran 

wildly toward Easy’s positions. 
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The wild momentum of the 

attack carried the enemy 

waves through the right 

flank of Easy’s line and 

pushed back that platoon 

nearly to the tank positions. 

Desiderio, staggering from 

his own wound, repeatedly 

called to his men to “Hold 

till daylight and you’ve got 

it made!” At the height of 

the battle, two of the tanks, their commanders feeling that the position was 

hopeless and that they would surely be overrun in a few minutes, began to 

withdraw their vehicles. Captain Desiderio stood in front of the retreating 

tanks and beat on their hulls with a rifl e butt, “Goddamn it, you’ve got to stay 

and fi ght! Goddamn it, we’re not quitting!” As a result of the shock effect of 

his sheer audacity and anger, the tanks stood their ground and continued the 

fi ght. As the enemy continued to swarm through the right fl ank, Desiderio 

yelled to one of his lieutenants, “They’re coming on us now. You take one 

side and I’ll take the other, and we’ll stop them.” Those were his last words. 

Personally charging the enemy penetration with his carbine and grenades, he 

fell mortally wounded.

Although the loss of its commander devastated Easy Company, one can fi nd 

no greater testimonial to his effi ciency as a company commander than to 

observe that he had trained the unit so well that it functioned even after his 

death. Another of the company’s leaders rallied the remnants of the platoon, 

armed them with grenades, and conducted a “grenade” march back over the 

same ground over which they had just retreated. Later that day, Easy Company 

withdrew toward the remainder of the division. The long night had ended.

What can the contemporary reader of the saga of this small unit on the obscure 

hill so many years ago learn from the tale? Easy Company won a Distinguished 

Unit Citation that night, and its commander was posthumously awarded the 

Medal of Honor. Beyond these examples of the personal and group valor 

stands the lesson that applies to other battlefi elds in other times. The crushing 

fi repower of armor, even when stationary, again proved a major factor. The 

grenade emerged as an awesome weapon when used profusely at close range. 

The BAR and machine gun again established themselves as among the primary 

weapons of the battlefi eld. Finally, the eternal lesson of battle again asserted 

itself—that the ultimate weapons are the soldier himself and his will to win.

Source:

S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the 

Chinese Communist Forces, November, 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, 

Korea, (New York, 1953)
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11

The Cold War Era: The Middle Years, 

1953–1973

Section I

International Tension and American

National Military Strategy

Dwight D. Eisenhower took offi ce as the thirty-fourth president of the 

 United States on January 20, 1953. Joseph Stalin, ruler of the Soviet 

 Union, died on March 5, 1953. These two events defi ne the beginning 

of the middle period of the Cold War. 

Eisenhower came into offi ce convinced that the Cold War would be a long-term 

confl ict and that the United States needed to position itself for the long haul. A 

fi scal conservative, Eisenhower believed that the government should not overstrain the economy by maintaining a large military establishment in peacetime. 

He fi rst sought to end the war in Korea — both for long-range strategic and 

short-term domestic political reasons. Then he was ready to implement a new 

long-term national military strategy, which he called the “New Look.”

The “New Look” received formal expression in a document known as National 

Security Council (NSC) paper 162/2, formally approved in October 1953. In 

Eisenhower’s view, the new atomic weapons were both more effi cient and effective than conventional arms. NSC 162/2 stated that, in the future, American 

military policy would rest on “the capacity for infl icting massive retaliation 

through offensive striking power.” Massive retaliation meant, quite simply, an 

all-out atomic attack. The authors recognized that challenges might arise on 

the borders of the Soviet empire that would not warrant atomic attack. They 

preferred to use secret means to manage the problem, rather than conventional 

forces. The New Look was prepared as a blueprint for preventing future wars 

rather than as a guide on how to fi ght them. This concept was called deterrence. In the budgetary battles of the 1950s, the Air Force, which possessed 

the nation’s atomic strike force in the Strategic Air Command, became the big 

winner, and the Army became the big loser.

During the 1950s the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, put little emphasis 

on long-range manned bombers. Instead the Soviets concentrated on the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The success of the Soviets 

in orbiting the fi rst satellite, Sputnik I, in 1957 was the fi rst public indication 

of their substantial progress. Power struggles in the Soviet Union after the 
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American Military Heritage

death of Stalin led to considerable unrest in Eastern Europe, with riots in East 

Berlin in 1953, workers’ protests in Poland in 1956, and a nationalist revolt in 

Hungary later the same year. Stalin’s successors showed themselves quite willing 

to use the Soviet Army to crush opposition. Even more dangerous from the Soviet point of view was the challenge by the Chinese dictator, Mao Zhe Dong, for 

leadership of the worldwide Communist movement. Most Westerners remained 

unaware of this struggle in the 1950s and continued to regard Communism as 

a single movement obeying orders from Moscow. 

At the same time, America’s two leading European 

allies, Great Britain and 

France, retained colonial 

empires. Because World 

War II had sparked intense 

national feelings among 

colonial peoples, both the 

Soviet Union and China attempted to take advantage 

of this situation to weaken 

the Western alliance and to 

place local Communists in 

power. One of the most diffi cult tasks facing American leaders was distinguishing between truly nationalist uprisings and Communist takeovers. Given all the 

cultural differences involved, they did not always succeed. 

Army offi cers and academics criticized the national military strategy of the 

Eisenhower Administration as too rigid and infl exible to cope with these defense challenges. Massive retaliation, argued Generals Matthew B. Ridgway 

and Maxwell D. Taylor, successive Chiefs of Staff of the Army, would deter 

only a general war. But wars on the edges of the Soviet sphere of infl uence — 

whether new Koreas or the “wars of national liberation” — appeared much more 

likely. Massive retaliation appeared to be such an overreaction to these kinds of 

provocations that no one would take the threat seriously. Such attitudes would 

prevent the United States from stopping lesser confl icts. Defense intellectuals 

like Henry A. Kissinger argued for a wider range of nuclear options—tactical 

nuclear weapons — to deter aggressors. The thrust of this argument, developed 

over almost a decade of discussion, was that the United States needed a variety 

of military capacities to respond to the new Communist challenges.

In 1960, the Democratic candidate for president, John F. Kennedy, took up this 

theme in his campaign. After his election, the New Look gave way to the “Strategy of Flexible Response.” The Kennedy administration built up conventional 

forces to handle outright aggression, while emphasizing unconventional forces, 

such as the Army Special Forces, to counter Communist insurgencies. These 

policies contributed to American involvement in the ground war in Vietnam 
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following Kennedy’s assassination. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s inability 

to rally public support for the war and his administration’s failure to impose 

economic controls led to runaway infl ation that undercut the basis for American 

military power.

 

President Richard M. Nixon entered offi ce in 1969. Like Eisenhower in 

1953, Nixon was pledged to fi nd an early end to an unpopular war. Unlike 

Eisenhower, Nixon took more than four years to achieve his goal. The war 

continued another two years and only ended with the fall of the South Vietnamese government. Nixon and his chief foreign policy advisor, Kissinger, 

believed that American power was declining and Soviet power increasing. 

They hoped to use a temporary military superiority to negotiate a balance of 

power between the two countries. This whole process of engagement through 

negotiation became known as détente. 

By the late 1960s the deterioration of the relations between the Soviet 

Union and China was obvious. The Nixon-Kissinger opening to China in 

1972 was an attempt to position the United States to play off one Communist 

giant against the other and to achieve, by diplomatic maneuver, goals that 

could no longer be achieved by economic and military power. The Nixon 

Doctrine stated the national military policy of the administration as it applied to the world outside western Europe, Japan, and South Korea. To 

prevent future Communist aggression, the United States would assist those 

countries under threat with air and naval power. But each country would 

have to supply the ground troops. As long as the American involvement 

continued in Vietnam, the administration could not fully implement this 

policy. Once the war ended, the Army underwent a signifi cant reduction 

in strength and infl uence.

1953 Jan Eisenhower inaugurated

 Mar Death of Stalin

 Oct NSC 162/2 initiates the “New Look” 

1957 Oct Soviet Union launches ‘Sputnik’ 

 Nov Soviet Union launches Sputnik II

1958 Jan U.S. launches Satellite, Explorer I

 Aug China attacks islands of Quemoy and Matsu 

 Dec Fidel Castro seizes power in Cuba 

1961 Aug Communists erect Berlin Wall

1962 Oct Cuban missile crisis

1964 Aug U.S. warships attacked in Gulf of Tonkin, U.S. 

 enters Vietnam War

1965 Apr U.S. Troops intervene in Dominican Republic

1972 Feb President Nixon travels to China and meets 

 with Mao Zhe Dong
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Section II

The Delicate Balance

Although the death of the isolated and nearly paranoid Joseph Stalin may have 

contributed to a safer world, the world seemed anything but safe to people 

who lived through the decade of the 1950s. The introduction of nuclear 

weapons appeared to make the world even more dangerous. A delicate balance of power existed throughout the world. Senior Army offi cers did not 

believe that nuclear weapons made war obsolete. They continued to prepare 

the Army to fi ght a conventional war that might turn into a nuclear war. At 

the same time, the Army played an important role in counterbalancing Soviet 

power. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), hydrogen bombs, 

tactical nuclear weapons, and guided missiles shaped the Army in important 

ways during these years.

NATO

American rearmament in the 1950s closely paralleled the efforts of other 

nations that had joined with the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) to protect the critical area in Western Europe. The 

initial American contribution to NATO consisted of six Army divisions 

and impressive air and naval forces. Moreover, American equipment and 

American economic assistance to NATO nations became vital factors in 

enabling the alliance to maintain forces in the fi eld. By mid-1953, NATO 

could deploy approximately 50 divisions, together with about 4,000 tactical 

aircraft and 1,600 naval vessels. The addition of Greece and Turkey to 

the alliance in 1952 provided important fl ank protection and added about 

twenty-fi ve additional divisions to NATO’s strength. American planners 

hoped that, in case of a Soviet move, the national Communist forces of Yugoslavia would also oppose the Soviet Union. While a great disparity still 

existed between the massive forces of the Soviet 

Union and its satellites 

(known collectively as the 

Warsaw Pact) and those 

of the western alliance, 

there was good reason to 

believe that NATO forces, backed by American 

air-atomic power, would 

act as a suffi cient deterrent to Soviet aggression 

in Europe. 
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THE HYDROGEN BOMB

The Soviet Union’s explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949 set off a debate in 

the U.S. government and the scientifi c community as to whether the United 

States should immediately launch a crash project to build a thermonuclear 

bomb. There was special concern that the Soviets might have already begun 

work on a hydrogen bomb, and President Harry S. Truman authorized work 

to begin. On November 1, 1952 the United States exploded its fi rst fusion 

weapon, code-named Mike, at Eniwetok Atoll, one of two American atomic 

testing grounds in the Pacifi c. One scientist thirty miles away noted that the 

explosion “looked as if it blotted out the whole horizon.” The Soviet Union 

followed with its own thermonuclear detonation less than a year later, in August 1953. Whereas the Mike device was not portable and was exploded on a 

tower, the Soviets dropped their bomb from an aircraft. 

The development of thermonuclear bombs, whose destructive power was thousands of times more powerful than that of atomic weapons, meant that they would 

be the relative measure of power between the Soviet Union and the United States 

for the remainder of the decade and beyond. Weapons so large and destructive could have only one military function — to wipe out cities. As such, they 

became the weapon of delivery for the Air Force. Only in the 1960s, with the 

development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, would the Navy claim 

part of the Air Force monopoly. The Army never did. In an institutional sense, 

the introduction of hydrogen bombs solidifi ed the Air Force’s claim to be the 

nation’s premier service. Only in wartime could the Army dispute that claim.

Source:

Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, (New York, 1995).

TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS

When General J. Lawton Collins became Army Chief of Staff in 1949, he 

was convinced that atomic weapons were absolutely essential for the defense 

of NATO. The Army began working out a doctrine for employing them in a 

tactical setting. At the same time, the Army had to develop an effective delivery system. The fi rst efforts focused on artillery. The Army produced a “safe 

and effective” nuclear shell that was slim enough to fi t a 280-mm. gun barrel 

and rugged enough to withstand premature explosion when it was suddenly 

propelled out of the tube of a gun by a chemical explosion.

From these beginnings, the Army developed, successfully tested, and then fi elded 

an atomic cannon as a tactical nuclear delivery system. An unwieldy 280-mm. 

howitzer with a limited range of seventeen miles, the atomic cannon was hard to 

maneuver. Cross-country movement was simply impossible. The system’s limited 

range meant that it had to be positioned far forward to shield friendly forces from 

the blast effects — which made it vulnerable to capture. It was a fi rst, but not 
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a particularly usable fi rst. Although the Army developed smaller warheads for 

lighter and more maneuverable artillery pieces, the potential ranges of missiles 

quickly attracted the attention of senior Army leaders.

Source:

J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: An Autobiography, (Baton Rouge, La, 1979).

GUIDED MISSILES

Guided missiles and rockets were one of the most exciting areas of military innovation during the 1950s. They provided radical improvements in weapon range, 

accuracy, reliability, and, when combined with nuclear warheads, destructiveness. During the 1950s, all the services became involved in developing guided 

missiles. The Army concentrated its efforts in three areas — space exploration, 

Continental air defense, and surface-to-surface tactical missiles. The service ran 

its missile program out of its Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. The arsenal built 

its key research element around a team of German rocket scientists, headed by 

Wernher von Braun, whom the Army had brought to the United States at the end 

of World War II. By the mid-1950s, the Army’s program was more technically 

successful and further advanced than comparable efforts in the other services.

 

Continental air defense pitted the Army against the Air Force over their respective roles in air defense. The Newport Agreements, reached shortly after the 

creation of the National Military Establishment (forerunner of the Department 

of Defense) in 1947, gave the continental air defense mission to the Air Force at 

a time when the emphasis was on manned interceptors. Yet, the agreement also 

stated that one of the Army’s primary functions was to organize, equip, and train 

air defense units. The Army used this authority to take over the ground-to-air 

defense role. The Eisenhower administration came to offi ce vitally concerned 

about the lack of adequate continental air defenses. If Soviet bombers could 

attack American cities at will, then the credibility of massive retaliation came 

into question. In effect, the Soviets could hold the American cities hostage 

to prevent an atomic assault by the U.S. Air Force in response to Soviet aggression in Europe or Asia. The Army developed a series of surface-to-air 

missiles designed to bring down high-fl ying Soviet bombers. Nike Ajax had a 

limited range of twenty-fi ve miles and a conventional warhead. Its successor, 

Nike Hercules, boasted a longer range and a nuclear warhead. A follow-on, 

Nike Zeus, under development at the end of the Eisenhower administration, 

promised a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was never 

fully deployed — a victim of technical problems, limited funding during the 

1960s because of the war in Vietnam, and the Nixon administration’s attempt 

to limit military spending and improve relations with the Soviet Union.

Continental air defense took a substantial portion of the Army’s research and 

development budget and had only a secondary relationship to the Army’s 

primary mission — fi ghting and winning the land battle. The third area of mis-
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sile development, surface-to-surface missiles, however, directly related to 

this mission. The Army, again only after considerable disagreement with the 

Air Force over roles and missions, developed a series of rockets and missiles 

capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Air Force, however, did succeed 

in preventing the Army from deploying intermediate range ballistic missiles, 

so the Redstone Missile was restricted to space exploration. It carried the fi rst 

American satellite into earth orbit in January 1958.

Army surface-to-surface missiles offered a wide range of types. On one end of 

the spectrum was the Davy Crockett, a 150-pound rocket that lifted a miniature 

atomic warhead 1 1/4 miles; this range was insuffi cient to remove the crew 

from the blast effects. On the other end of the spectrum was the Pershing I, a 

guided missile with a 500-mile range. One of the consequences of integrating 

atomic weapons at all levels of the force structure was that, by the late 1950s, 

the Army was incapable of waging sustained combat without resorting to the 

use of tactical atomic weapons.

Section III

The Role of the Reserve

Throughout the Cold War era, the reserve components of the Army played a vital role in the balance of power that helped keep the “Cold War” cold. Without 

the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, the United States would not 

have been able to fi ght World Wars I or II and would have struggled to wage 

the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The business of the Reserve and National Guard 

was readiness. They took this duty seriously, but, like the Regular Army, the 

reserve components faced major changes during the Cold War. 

After World War II, the United States possessed a reserve force structured and 

equipped to fi ght another war like the one they had just waged. Policy makers and soldiers in the following years struggled with the question of the role 

of reserve forces in an age when total mobilization might never happen. As 

always, politics played a large role in the evolution of reserve policy. Some 

of the key developments between 1945 and 1973 are listed below.

THE GRAY BOARD STUDY

Following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, Secretary of 

Defense James V. Forrestal appointed a Committee on Civilian Components, 

headed by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, to make a “comprehensive, objective, and impartial study” of the Organized Reserves and the 

National Guard. On June 30, 1948 the Gray Board submitted its report. As 

far as the Army was concerned, its major and most controversial proposal was 

to merge the Organized Reserves and the National Guard into a federalized 

“National Guard of the United States.” The National Guard would remain in 
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existence but directly under federal control. The dual obligation to federal and 

state governments was, in the opinion of the board members, outmoded. This 

recommendation was controversial politically and went down to defeat. The 

idea of merging the two components under federal control did not resurface 

again until the 1960s. 

KOREAN WAR

Immediately prior to the outbreak of war in June 1950, Congress extended 

the Selective Service Act, but fi ve years of neglect had left the Army unprepared for any military operations short of a full scale mobilization. As 

soon as the United States became involved, Congress also extended existing enlistments. Not one of the four divisions of the Eighth U.S. Army on 

occupation duty in Japan was at full strength. As the closest Army units 

to the scene of the confl ict, they were the fi rst to go. The Army cannibalized existing units in the fi rst days of the war to bring up to strength the 

units committed to the fi ghting from both Japan and the United States. 

Operating under the authority conferred by a congressional declaration of 

emergency, the Department of the Army federalized four National Guard 

divisions in September 1950. The Army sent two to the Far East. The 

other two divisions deployed to Europe to support NATO. After the Chinese entered the fi ghting in November 1950, the Department of the Army 

activated four more National Guard divisions, which it used for training 

draftees in the continental United States.

 

The Army also called 404 Organized Reserve units and 10,584 individual Organized Reserve offi cers to active duty during July and August 1950. Because 

the administration feared that the invasion of South Korea might be the fi rst 

move toward a general war with the Soviet Union, the Department of the Army 

did not want to strip offi cers out of units that would need them in a wider war. 

Consequently, the Department of the Army called to active duty offi cers of the 

Organized Reserve Corps not assigned to Reserve units. In September 1951 

the Army reversed its policy and began to call up offi cers from Reserve units 

fi rst. By then it was clear that there would be no general war.

UMTS ACT OF 1951

Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall regarded military service as one of 

the obligations of citizenship. His return to government service as Secretary 

of Defense in September 1950 revitalized attempts to secure universal military 

training legislation. In June 1951, Congress passed the Universal Military 

Training and Service Act. Although the act contained a statement of the 

principle that all citizens were obligated to give military service, the act was 

important because it extended the draft and established a total military obligation of eight years. It thereby guaranteed a continuing fl ow of manpower into 

the Organized Reserve Corps.

 
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ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT OF 1952

The act reaffi rmed the separate existence of seven reserve components: the 

National Guard of the United States; the Army Reserve, which replaced the 

old Organized Reserve Corps; Naval Reserve; Marine Corps Reserve; the Air 

National Guard of the United States; the Air Force Reserve; and the Coast 

Guard Reserve. For each of these components, the law created categories of 

ready, standby, and retired reservists, the basic tiered structure for the reserve 

components that remains to this day.

AMENDMENTS TO THE ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT (RFA) OF 1952

This legislation is sometimes referred to as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 

1955 because of the major policy changes it introduced. It provided various 

methods by which young men could serve their military obligation. All draftees 

or enlistees aged 18 or older, whether in the Regular Army or Army Reserve, had 

to serve a total of six years. Everyone served one year in the stand-by reserves 

and at least two years of active duty. Their choices involved the exact mix of 

active duty and ready reserve service. Younger enlistees in the Army Reserve 

were obligated to serve only six months of active duty and the remainder of their 

time in the Reserves. Young men who enlisted in the Army National Guard did 

not incur an obligation for active duty training. Men in both these categories, 

however, incurred a total obligation for eight years. This legislation in conjunction with the 1952 law which it amended served as the statutory basis for reserve 

component policy throughout the remainder of the Cold War.

ONE ARMY CONCEPT

This policy, initiated by the Department of the Army in 1958, proclaimed that 

the Active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard comprised 

a single team with a single mission. It sought to enhance the status of both 

the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. 

THE SECOND BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961–1962

During the summer of 1961, the Soviet government, led by Premier Nikita S. 

Khrushchev, began a new round of pressure on the Western position in Berlin. 

On July 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the mobilization of 

150,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists, including two National Guard 

divisions, one National Guard armored regiment, and one Army Reserve training division to train draftees. In mid-August 1961, East German border guards 

began erecting barbed wire barriers around the western zone of Berlin, blocking free access to all parts of the city. The barrier stopped the massive fl ow of 

refugees to the West that had grown as tension had increased over the summer.

The crisis ultimately ended in a kind of stalemate. The West remained in Berlin 

but the wall, converted into a concrete and masonry structure, also stayed in 

place. Consequently, the Soviets achieved their important secondary objective 
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of ending the refugee crisis which threatened to destabilize their East German 

satellite. The Wall also became a symbol for the lack of freedom in Communist 

countries. Its destruction in 1989 signaled the end of the Cold War.

POST-BERLIN CRISIS

REORGANIZATION OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Berlin mobilization revealed a number of problems in the Army’s reserve 

components. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations sponsored two major 

pieces of legislation and undertook one major reorganization to deal with them. 

The Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963 (REP-63) established a uniform sixyear obligation of military service for young men once they entered the service. 

The program allowed them to choose to complete their reserve obligation in 

either the Army Reserve or the Army National Guard, and set a minimum 

of four months active duty training but allowed whatever additional military 

training was needed to permit an individual to become qualifi ed in a military 

occupation specialty. While REP-63 provided both greater uniformity in the 

career patterns of individual reservists and fl exibility in their training, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara addressed the structure of the reserve 

forces in what became known as the Second McNamara Reorganization. The 

number of Army National Guard divisions declined from 27 before the Berlin 

crisis to 23, while the number of Army Reserve divisions dropped from 10 to 

6. McNamara used the savings generated by the smaller force structure to 

improve readiness in the remaining units. The Department of the Army still had 

great diffi culty in attracting enough offi cers to fi ll its active and reserve force 

structure. The ROTC Vitalization Act, signed into law by President Lyndon 

B. Johnson on October 13, 1964, authorized retainer pay to ROTC students 

and fi nancial assistance under scholarships. The legislation also required all 

senior division Reserve Offi cer Training Corps cadets enrolled in the advance 

course to enlist in the U.S. Army Reserve. U.S. Army Reserve Control Groups 

would carry the cadets on their rosters until commissioning. On the eve of a 

major confl ict, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had succeeded in 

modernizing the Army’s reserve components.

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS IN THE VIETNAM WAR

In May and June 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara toured South Vietnam to 

assess the military situation following a series of defeats that the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong had infl icted on the South Vietnamese. McNamara 

recommended a substantial increase in the number of U.S. military personnel in 

country, from 75,000 to 175,000; the introduction of ground combat units; the 

declaration of a national emergency by the president; and a call to active duty 

of 125,000 reservists. President Johnson resolved to send additional forces to 

South Vietnam but to do so gradually. He also decided not to declare a national 

emergency and not to call up reserves. Although President Johnson never explained the reasons for these decisions, most commentators believe that they were 

largely political ones. He was moving toward war while at the same time pushing 
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for major social programs 

known as the “Great Society.” He meant to have, in 

the phrase of the day, both 

“guns and butter.”

The North Koreans seized a 

U.S. Navy intelligence ship, 

the U.S.S. Pueblo, in January 1968. That act caused 

the Johnson administration 

to make its fi rst reserve callup—all reservists and units came from the Naval Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, 

and the Air National Guard. Although this call-up was unrelated to the war in 

Vietnam, most of the units activated eventually served there. The Tet Offensive, 

one week after the capture of the Pueblo and its crew, produced a fl urry of plans 

to call up Army Reserve and National Guard units. The question of a reserve 

call-up became intertwined with the debate in the Johnson administration over 

whether to continue to send more troops to Vietnam. Ultimately, President 

Johnson decided not to do so. Consequently, the actual reserve call-up was quite 

modest, about 70,000 men. The largest unit ordered into active service was an 

infantry brigade. As troop levels fell in Vietnam during the Nixon administration, the need for any additional reserve call-ups disappeared.

Section IV

Notes on Weapons and 

Equipment Developments

The Korean War spurred rearmament and resulted in vast improvements in the 

Army’s arsenal of weaponry. Most of this equipment did not reach the troops 

in quantity until after the fi ghting ended. The technical advances were, in some 

cases, very great and the resulting items proved to be long-lasting. A few of 

the major improvements in ground fi repower from this period are listed below: 

The M-14 Rifl e (7.62-mm.): Following the adoption of the M-1 rifl e by the 

Army during World War II, the Ordnance Department began the search for a 

lightweight automatic rifl e with the killing power of the M-1 but a higher volume 

of fi re. Adopted in 1957, the M-14 was, in effect, an improved M-1. Only a half 

pound lighter than the M-1, it was a .30 caliber shoulder weapon with a maximum 
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effective range of 460 meters and a maximum range of 3,725 meters. Durable 

and stable, this weapon could produce either semi- or fully-automatic fi re. It used 

a twenty-round magazine and weighed around ten pounds when fully loaded. It 

was the United States Army’s fi rst attempt to adopt a shoulder arm that would 

use the NATO standard cartridge. But some Army leaders considered shortrange automatic fi re to be wasteful. They feared that if everyone could fi re full 

automatic, units could not be kept resupplied with ammunition. Consequently, 

the Army planned to equip only a few men per squad with M-14s fi tted with a 

selector switch to fi re full automatic. All other members of the squad would be 

able to fi re only semi-automatically.

The Anti-aircraft Redeye Missile, XM41E1: This rocket-propelled infrared 

homing missile was one of the fi rst generation of air defense missiles launched 

by individual soldiers, a concept pioneered by the U.S. Army. It consisted of 

a guidance section, a warhead/fuse section, a two-stage solid propelled rocket 

motor, and a tail assembly. It weighed approximately twenty-nine pounds. Carried by a soldier who fi red it from his shoulder, the missile armed itself after it 

had traveled approximately 120 feet from the gunner. The Redeye would selfdestruct if it did not hit a target within fi fteen seconds after fi ring. Its purpose 

was “to provide short-range air defense of tactical operations, critical assets, and 

moving columns against low-fl ying aircraft.” It was “organic to battalions or 

squadrons of armored, airborne, air assault, infantry, and mechanized infantry 

divisions.” Normally, it was also assigned or attached “to separate brigades, 

armored cavalry regiments, nondivisional artillery battalions, and selected task 

units.” Because individual soldiers could easily carry the Redeye, the concept 

of employment called for its positioning throughout the forward area, thereby 

denying any aircraft safe rendezvous areas or corridors of approach.

Source:

Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, (Ft. Bliss, Tex., 1966), FM 32–17, Redeye 

Guided Missile System, December 1966 (Washington, D.C., 1966),

The M-60 Main Battle Tank: The Department of the Army selected the XM60 

main battle tank for production in December 1958. Vehicles began joining units 

in 1960. Armed with a 105-mm. main gun and capable of carrying 59 rounds of 

mixed types of ammunition, the M-60 was a formidable weapons system. The 

M60A1 followed in October 1960. It featured a redesigned turret with greater 

protection and could carry sixty-three 105-mm. rounds. With a minimum of 

two machine gun mounts and a road speed of 48 kilometers-per-hour, the M-60 

compared favorably to the armor and anti-tank weapons of any potential enemies. 

During the 1960s, the Army experimented with the Shillelagh gun-missile system 

as an alternative to the 105-mm. gun, but it did not prove successful. The Army 

therefore continued to upgrade the basic model. The A-3 version featured a ruby 

laser rangefi nder and a solid state ballistic computer. It had a range of from 200 

to 5,000 meters and “greatly increased fi ring accuracy.” The M-60 provides 

an example of the development of hardware as a result of Cold War pressures. 
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The Army used it primarily in Europe to counter the Russian armor threat. The 

Army phased the last M60A3 models out of active units in late 1992.

Source:

Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 1996–97, 17th ed. (Alexandria, 

Va., [1996]), Fred W. Crimson, U.S. Military Tracked Vehicles (Osceola, Wis., 1992).

The CH-47 Chinook Helicopter: Originally developed in 1958, this helicopter 

began to join units in 1962. During the Vietnam War, the principal mission of the 

Chinook was to provide air transportation for troops and cargo. It also was used 

extensively for aerial movement of artillery, evacuation of wounded, recovery 

of downed aircraft and evacuation of civilians from battle areas. Armed with 

three .30 caliber machine guns, the Chinook was capable of carrying 33 combat 

soldiers anywhere within its 115-mile range. The Chinook had a maximum speed 

of 178 miles per hour and cruised at about 168 miles per hour.

Section V

Notes on Uniforms of the Cold War Era

Although the Army attempted to upgrade its uniforms following World War 

II, it had not completed the process when the Korean War broke out. During 

the confl ict, the Army had 

to draw upon stockpiles of 

World War II uniforms. 

More changes came after the 

war. These developments 

are described below. 

New uniforms, carrying on 

the Army’s traditional blue, 

reappeared after World 

War II, and a new Army 

green semi-dress uniform 

came into use after 1956. 

These two uniforms, Army 

Blue and Army Green, are 

shown here.

In the left foreground, a 

master sergeant assigned to 

the 1st Armored Division 

wears the green uniform. His 

single-breasted coat has a roll 

collar and gilt buttons. On 

his collar, he wears the round 1st AD Master Sergeant, Transportation 

Corps Offi cer
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American Military Heritage

gilt insignia, on both sleeves the golden yellow chevrons of his grade, and on his 

left shoulder the 1st Armored Division shoulder sleeve insignia. The sergeant’s 

green service cap has a round gilt national coat of arms in the front and gilt buttons on the black leather strap. The black leather, also seen in the cap visor and 

the sergeant’s shoes, is a change from the russet leather worn in the Army from 

the Spanish-American War to this time.

In the right foreground stands a major of the Transportation Corps in the Army 

Blue uniform. His dark blue, single-breasted coat has gilt buttons and the letters 

U.S. in gilt on the collar. His branch is indicated by the gilt insignia of a ship’s 

steering wheel and a winged car wheel on a rail on his lapels, as well as by the 

brick red branch color shown on the stripe of the sleeve of his coat, on the cap 

band, and on the background of his shoulder straps, all of which are bordered with 

gold. His rank is shown by the gold oak leaves on his shoulder straps and the 

gold embroidery on the black visor of his dark blue cap. He wears the light blue 

trousers with a gold lace stripe down the side worn by offi cers. On the front of his 

cap is the gold colored coat of arms of the United States: the strap and buttons are 

also gold. In the background are enlisted men in olive green fi eld/work uniforms.

Field/Work Uniforms (1963): In the right and left foreground are a private fi rst 

class and a fi rst lieutenant, 

and in the left background is 

a fi rst sergeant, all participating in a demonstration by the 

82d Airborne Division about 

1963. They wear the olive 

green fi eld uniforms introduced during the 1950s and 

carry the M-14 rifl e. Note 

the compactness of their dark 

olive drab equipment, the 

large ammunition pouches, 

the location of various items 

of equipment—especially 

the protective mask—and 

the “arrangement of the 

torso and thigh web straps 

so as to most effi ciently secure the variety of personal 

equipment they must carry.” 

Two features mark the men 

as airborne soldiers—the 

special chin-strap harness 

worn with the helmet and

 the red, white, and blue 

Offi cer, Private and Sergeant, AirborneTroops, 

Woman’s Army Corps Offi cer, 1963
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“AA” insignia worn by the 82d Division in World War I with the “airborne” tab 

added during World War II. The sergeant’s gold chevrons show the form of the 

insignia for this grade in 1963 .

In the right background is a Women’s Army Corps (WAC) offi cer passing 

by in her Army Blue uniform trimmed in gold. The green background on her 

shoulder straps and the green stripe on her sleeve indicate her branch.

Section VI

Notes on General Lyman L. Lemnitzer

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer served as a senior staff offi cer during World War 

II. His experiences vaulted him to the highest levels of the U.S. Army. He 

held high-ranking positions for two decades, making him almost unparalleled 

among post-World War II offi cers.

 

Born on August 29, 1899 in Honesdale, Pennsylvania, Lemnitzer graduated 

from West Point in 1920 and was commissioned in the coast artillery. From 

then until the outbreak of World War II, his assignments alternated between 

duty with troops and assignments as a student and instructor in the Army 

schools. He also became one of the Army’s leading marksmen as a member 

of the Coast Artillery Rifl e Team.

A member of the last prewar class at the Army 

War College (1940), he established “a fi rm reputation as a thorough and imaginative planner,” 

which earned him a position in the War Plans 

Division of the War Department General Staff. 

Shortly after the U.S. entered World War II, the 

War Department promoted him to the rank of 

brigadier general. Sent to England in 1942 to 

command an anti-aircraft brigade, he simultaneously served on General Eisenhower’s staff as 

assistant chief of staff for plans and operations. 

Lemnitzer directed the fi nal, detailed preparations 

for the landings and operations in North Africa, 

Operation TORCH. He accompanied Major General Mark Clark on his famous submarine mission to North Africa for secret talks 

with pro-Allied French offi cers. Lemnitzer received the Legion of Merit for his 

part in this very dangerous assignment. In January 1943 as deputy chief of staff 

to General Clark, he assisted in organizing the Fifth U.S. Army headquarters. 

He resumed command of his brigade in February and continued in that capacity 

until the German surrender in Tunisia in May 1943. In the Sicilian and Italian 

campaigns he served as Deputy Chief of Staff to Sir Harold Alexander, when 
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American Military Heritage

Alexander was commander of the Anglo-American Fifteenth Army Group and 

later Allied Commander-in-Chief in Italy. In this capacity Lemnitzer took part 

in negotiating the surrender of the German armies in Italy in May 1945.

After the war, Lemnitzer became deputy commander of the National War 

College and later director of the Offi ce of Military Assistance, planning aid to 

Atlantic Pact Nations. In 1951–52, he led the 7th Infantry Division in Korea at 

the battles of Heartbreak Ridge, the Punch Bowl, and Mundung-ni Valley and 

in the fi ghting in the Chorwon Valley. During this period, he won the Silver 

Star for “conspicuous gallantry.” From 1952 to 1955, as deputy chief of staff 

for plans and research of the United States Army, he was heavily involved in 

the development of both guided missiles and tactical nuclear weapons. Promoted to full general in 1955, he became commander in chief of the United 

States and United Nations forces in the Far East. Appointed Army vice chief 

of staff in 1957, he succeeded General Maxwell D. Taylor as chief of staff in 

1959. The following year he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Lemnitzer followed General Lauris Norstad in 1963 as the supreme commander 

of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, a post which he held until his 

retirement in 1969. He died on November 12, 1988.

Lemnitzer enjoyed a well earned reputation as “a brilliant war planner and 

military diplomat.” He made one of his most valuable contributions as deputy 

commandant at the National War College from August 1947 until October 

1949. As he recalled in retirement:

I was a part of General Eisenhower’s staff [early in World War II]....

We went into a world situation where it was no longer 100 percent 

military, but it was divided up between politics, diplomacy, economics, military, and everything thrown into a dictionary. In our observation, I’m talking about General [Alfred M.] Gruenther, General 

Eisenhower, and myself, that when we put an American offi cer into 

one of these strange areas of responsibilities, he did as well as could 

be expected. But whenever we picked a British offi cer, he seemed 

to do better. In each case when we looked behind it, we found that 

this guy had come from the Imperial Defense College....The British 

had had the foresight to see that war was going to involve a hell of a 

lot more than it had in the past.

Source:

Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer by Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. Bickson, 17 February 1972, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania.

Eisenhower, Gruenther, and Lemnitzer pressed hard after the war for the 

establishment of a similar school in the United States. The National War 

College was the result.
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Section VII

Notes on Sergeant Elvis Aron Presley

Elvis Presley was at the height of his singing career when he received his draft 

notice in 1958. He entered the Army at Memphis, Tennessee, on March 24, 

1958. After spending three days at the Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, Reception 

Station, he was assigned to Fort Hood, Texas. He took basic and advanced 

military training as a member of Company A, 2d Medium Tank Battalion, 

37th Armor, at that post. Like many other 

Cold War-era soldiers, Presley then rotated to 

Germany for his overseas service. He was assigned to Company D and subsequently to the 

Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Medium Tank 

Battalion, 32d Armor stationed at Friedberg, 

units of the 3d Armored Division. He arrived 

insisting that he wanted to be treated like any 

other soldier, a desire which the Army tried to 

accommodate. During the four days that he 

processed-in at Friedberg, the Army allowed 

reporters to conduct as many interviews and 

photographers to take as many pictures as they 

liked. After that, except for occasional formal press conferences, the Army 

declared him and all those who worked with him off-limits to the media. His 

celebrity status did cause occasional problems. One of the missions of the 

reconnaissance platoon was to place soldiers at crossroads to direct the battalion 

when moving in convoy. If Presley’s fans recognized him (he was by this 

point an international star), they could easily create a traffi c jam and block the 

convoy’s route. His platoon sergeant, M. Sgt. Ira Jones, tried to minimize his 

assignment to traffi c direction, but sometimes it could not be avoided. Presley 

would hide behind cover until one of the serials of the battalion’s convoy drew 

almost abreast and then step out and motion it in the correct direction. One of 

the offi cers in the battalion recalled: “Elvis, along with everyone else in the 

battalion, worked like hell in the snow, rain, sleet, and wind of harsh German 

winters. We left our families for weeks on end to be out in maneuver areas or 

on weapons fi ring ranges. Our training was deadly serious; after all, we were 

training to kill people.” Presley impressed everyone by being a team player. 

He was promoted to sergeant before he completed his tour. He left active 

duty at Fort Dix, New Jersey, on March 5, 1960, and received his discharge 

from the Army Reserve on March 23, 1964. He was the most famous Army 

enlisted man of the era.

Source:

William J. Taylor, Jr., Elvis in the Army: The King of Rock n’ Roll as Seen By an 

Offi cer Who Served With Him (Novato, Calif., 1995).
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12

The Vietnam War

Section I

 A New Kind of War

I

n Vietnam, the U.S. Army fought a much different kind of war. In the past, 

 the Army had successfully used conventional tactics and weapons against 

 an identifi able enemy along clear battle lines. Vietnam was different. 

The Army faced an insurgent force — a true “people’s army” which used 

conventional, guerrilla, and psychological tactics in a struggle for the loyalty 

of civilians rather than for territory. The enemy was not always immediately 

apparent and the battlefi eld was anywhere and everywhere.

U.S. involvement in Vietnam dated from World War II, but the number of 

American soldiers on the ground was small until the Kennedy administration. 

The Kennedy administration relied on American advisors working with the 

South Vietnamese forces. During the Johnson administration, the scope of 

the war widened, and units were deployed. By 1969 troop strength had risen 

from 23,000 to 543,000. 

The fi rst combat test for the Army came in October 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley, 

northeast of Saigon. The climax came in mid-November when two battalions 

of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) collided with a North Vietnamese 
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American Military Heritage

Bangkok

Vientiane

Phnom Penh

T h a i l a n d

L a o s

G u l f o f T h a i l a n d

C a m b o d i a 

S o u t h

C h i n a 

S e a

S o u t h

V i e t n a m

H a i n a n

Saigon

Luang Prabang

Da Lat

Nha Trang

Tu Bong

Siem Reap

Bassac

Qui Nhon

Can Tho

Da Nang

G u l f o f T o n k i n

Hanoi

DMZ

Communist

Supply Route

Hue

N o r t h V i e t n a m

regiment. During the four-day battle, the 1st Cav overcame repeated ambushes 

and assaults to secure the fi rst American victory in Vietnam.

During the next two years, American forces and their South Vietnamese allies 

conducted countless search and destroy operations aimed at infl icting maxi-
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mum casualties while keeping the Communist forces away from major cities 

and agricultural areas. 

The heaviest fi ghting of the entire war came as a result of the Tet Offensive, 

a coordinated set of attacks on cities, bases and provincial capitals in South 

Vietnam by Communist forces. Launched during a holiday season, the attacks forced rapid troop shifts to reinforce critical areas. The largest battles 

occurred at Khe Sanh, a key Marine combat base, and Hue City, the ancient 

imperial capital of Vietnam.

While the Tet Offensive was technically a victory for the American armed 

forces, it aroused increased opposition to the war on the American home front. 

In 1969, the Nixon administration began the gradual withdrawal of forces 

from Vietnam, and the last combat units left in the summer of 1972. The war 

came to an end for the United States when a cease-fi re was declared in 1973. 

The war came to an end for Vietnam in 1975 when North Vietnamese forces 

unifi ed the country.

Section II

Ambush Patrol

In Vietnam, the American Army’s biggest challenge was one it had not dealt 

with since the Indian wars — fi nding the enemy. Because of their home fi eld 

advantage and technological disadvantage, the Vietnamese truly fought the 

war on their turf, picking 

the times and places for 

each meeting engagement. 

Consequently, ambush patrols characterized much of 

the war. A typical ambush 

patrol by the 2d Battalion, 

28th Infantry, 1st Infantry 

Division, shows some of 

the more common problems NCOs and junior offi cers faced. 

As part of Operation COCOA BEACH, Lieutenant Colonel Kyle W. Bowie’s 2d 

Battalion moved by foot on March 3, 1966, from its brigade base at Lai Khe 

to Lo Ke, a rubber plantation 25 miles north of Saigon. There, it established 

a defensive perimeter in fl at terrain with a clear fi eld of fi re on all sides. The 

next day, Company A patrolled to the west and overran a small Viet Cong 

base camp. Company B, searching to the north, found a deep trench that had 

recently been occupied by a sizable force. Thinking that a large enemy unit 

must be nearby, Colonel Bowie arranged with brigade headquarters for air 
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American Military Heritage

and artillery support. His men built up their defensive positions, and sent out 

three 15-man ambush patrols to the northwest, east, and southwest, plus a 

four-man listening post in the thick jungle to the west. About thirty minutes 

after midnight, Bowie was notifi ed by radio that a Viet Cong regiment lay four 

kilometers northeast of his position. He then ordered his companies to “stand 

to” at 0530 and get ready for a fi ght.

At about 0545, 2d Lieutenant Robert J. Hibbs and his ambush patrol northwest of the perimeter heard movement from the east. A group of women and 

children approached on a road that ran past his position, carrying weapons 

and ammunition. Using a night vision device, Hibbs could see a Viet Cong 

company moving toward his position from the north. The two enemy groups 

stopped only about 75 meters from Hibbs’ position, and a man in a white robe 

talked to the women and children. Hibbs told his men to turn their claymore 

mines toward the enemy and get ready to throw hand grenades. After a few 

minutes the man in the white robe led the enemy company further south. When 

the Viet Cong entered Hibbs’ killing zone, his men fi red the claymores, and 

threw their grenades. The enemy was completely surprised and suffered many 

casualties. Under Bowie’s orders, Hibbs and his men withdrew toward the 

main perimeter, and on their way surprised and scattered another Viet Cong 

company that was advancing to attack the perimeter. Covering the retreat of 

his men, Hibbs was killed, but his patrol reached the perimeter about 0630. 

The courageous lieutenant later received a posthumous Medal of Honor.

To the south, Company 

A’s ambush patrol had also 

spotted an enemy force 

moving toward the perimeter. Using the darkness, the 

patrol joined onto the tail of 

a passing enemy squad. As 

the unit neared the perimeter, the patrol opened fi re 

and threw grenades, then 

made a break for safety. 

Realizing that an all-out attack was imminent, Colonel 

Bowie called in his third ambush patrol and listening post. The Americans 

had all returned to the main perimeter by 0630.

Within fi ve minutes, a series of enemy attacks began. The Viet Cong fi rst 

assaulted the position from the northwest, then from the northeast, then from 

the east. Just after 0700, they tried again, this time from the southwest. The 

Americans threw back each attack. Meanwhile, the brigade commander sent 

his ready reaction force, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, by helicopter to cut 
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American Military Heritage

the enemy’s line of retreat to the north and east. As the 1st Battalion arrived, 

it distracted the enemy’s attention from the 2d Battalion perimeter. By 1200, 

the Viet Cong were retreating, and Bowie sent a patrol to maintain contact 

with the fl eeing enemy troops. This patrol called in artillery fi re to break up 

a potential Viet Cong ambush position.

For Colonel Bowie and his 2d Battalion, it had been a good night’s work. The 

ambush patrols had provided him with enough advance notice to strengthen 

his defenses, and, at the same time, had disrupted Viet Cong plans. When the 

enemy attack came, it suffered severe casualties while infl icting little damage 

on the Americans. Often on the receiving end of surprise night attacks, the 

Americans had turned the tables on the enemy.

Section III

Heroes of the Vietnam War

Donlan, Roger H.C. The fi rst Medal of Honor recipient in the Vietnam War, 

Captain Donlan commanded Special Forces Detachment A-726 at Camp Nam 

Dong in northernmost I Corps Tactical Zone. The camp occupied a key position along an infi ltration trail used by many North Vietnamese units on their 

way south to reinforce the Viet Cong. On the night of July 6, 1964, an enemy 

battalion, after a mortar bombardment, assaulted the Nam Dong perimeter. 

During the fi ve-hour battle that followed, Captain Donlan directed the defense 

of his camp while many of his comrades fell. He was wounded several times. 

When the enemy force called off its attacks and retreated into the jungle, it 

left fi fty-four dead inside and outside the camp perimeter.

Marm, Walter J., Jr. While serving as a platoon leader in the 1st Cavalry 

Division, Lieutenant Marm was leading his platoon, accompanied by the rest 
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of the company, on a relief mission in the Ia Drang Valley on November 14, 

1965. Under heavy fi re from a concealed machine gun nest, the members 

of the platoon took cover but soon realized they could not hold out for long. 

Taking the situation into his own hands, Marm deliberately exposed himself 

to enemy fi re and, once he had located the nest, attempted to destroy it with an 

anti-tank weapon. When the nest continued to fi re, Marm rushed across thirty 

meters of open ground and hurled grenades at the enemy. Severely wounded, 

he nevertheless continued the attack with his rifl e and grenades until he had 

wiped out the position. He later received the Medal of Honor.

Davis, Sammy L. A cannoneer in Battery C, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, 9th 

Infantry Division, Private First Class Davis and his comrades received a rude 

awakening when an enemy mortar barrage hit their position near Cai Lay at 

0200 on November 18, 1967. The attack that followed rolled over a friendly 

listening post and paused on the far side of a river that anchored one side of 

the fi re support base perimeter. Davis and his fellow crew members rushed to 

their artillery piece only to be knocked to the ground by an enemy recoilless 

rocket round. Amidst continuous enemy fi re, Davis struggled back to the gun, 

lowered the barrel, and fi red the piece by himself to prevent a cross-river assault 

on his position. As the enemy reeled from the direct fi re, Davis disregarded his 

wounds and crossed the river on an infl atable mattress to rescue his comrades. 

Not until all had returned safely inside the battery perimeter would Davis accept medical assistance. For his heroism, Davis received the Medal of Honor.

Lemon, Peter C. A machine gunner in the 1st 

Cavalry Division, Specialist 4 Lemon and his 

unit were at Fire Support Base Illingworth in 

Tay Ninh Province when 

the position came under 

heavy attack on April 

1, 1970. Lemon turned 

back several enemy assaults with his rifle and 

a machine gun until both 

malfunctioned. He then 

threw hand grenades until 

the determined Viet Cong 

were so close they had to 

be engaged in hand-tohand combat. Despite a 

grenade wound, Lemon 

carried a more seriously 
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wounded comrade to an 

aid station, then returned 

to the endangered perimeter 

and stopped more enemy 

assaults by again throwing 

hand grenades and confronting attackers hand-to-hand. 

By now wounded three 

times, Lemon grabbed a 

machine gun and, standing 

atop an embankment in full 

view of the attackers, rallied 

the defenders in his sector 

and indicated enemy locations with his own bursts of fi re before collapsing of 

exhaustion. For his heroism, Specialist Lemon received the Medal of Honor.

Johnson, Dwight H. A tank driver in the 69th Armor, which was operating 

with the 4th Infantry Division near Dak To in the Central Highlands, Specialist 

5 Johnson was part of a reaction force called to assist another element of his 

platoon on January 15, 1968. As he maneuvered toward the enemy, Johnson’s 

tank threw a track, and he 

had to dismount. Armed 

with only a .45 caliber pistol, Johnson killed several 

enemy before running out 

of ammunition. He then 

returned to his disabled tank 

through heavy enemy fi re, 

retrieved a submachine gun, 

and killed more enemy soldiers until he again ran out 

of ammunition. Running to 

another tank, he extricated 

a wounded man and carried 

him to shelter in an armored personnel carrier. Returning to the same tank, 

Johnson fi red the main gun until it jammed. Again armed with only a pistol, 

he killed several more enemy troops near the tank, then returned to his own 

vehicle and, fi ring the external machine gun, turned away more assaults until 

the situation was brought under control. For his heroism, Specialist Johnson 

received the Medal of Honor.

Roberts, Gordon R. A rifl eman in the 101st Airborne Division, Specialist 

4 Roberts was moving with his platoon to assist a company pinned down on a 

ridgeline in I Corps Tactical Zone on July 11, 1969. Nearing the endangered 

unit, Roberts’ platoon was also stopped by heavy enemy fi re from a network of 
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bunkers. To break the stalemate, Roberts crawled and ran toward the nearest 

enemy bunker and killed its occupants. From the fi rst bunker Roberts could 

see other positions, which took him under fi re as he surveyed the area. Without hesitation, he charged and silenced three more bunkers, using discarded 

weapons as the enemy shot his own out of his hands. Since he had advanced 

too far in front of his own platoon to use their support, Specialist Roberts 

fought his way through intense enemy fi re to join the immobilized company. 

There, he rallied survivors to hold their position and moved wounded out of 

lines of fi re until an evacuation could be organized. For his heroism, Specialist 

Roberts received the Medal of Honor.

Section IV

Weapons and Equipment Development

UH-1 Iroquois Utility Helicopter: The UH-1 helicopter — called the 

“Huey” by soldiers — was the most widely used rotary wing aircraft in the 

Vietnam War. Developed and improved by the Army between 1959 and 1969, 

the Huey made possible a 

number of innovations in 

fi eld operations, performing command and control and reconnaissance 

missions, troop transport, 

armed escort of transport 

helicopters, fi re suppression 

for ground units, insertion 

and extraction of covert 

patrols, and timely medical 

evacuation that allowed many seriously wounded soldiers to survive. The 

Huey carried eleven passengers, or six litter patients, and a crew of two, and 

its 1,100-horsepower turbine engine powered the 9,500-pound, single rotor 

“chopper” at a cruising speed of 106 miles per hour.

M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier: The APC solved the problem of moving 

troops across the many rice paddies and swamps of the coastal lowlands and 

the Mekong River Delta. Introduced 

in 1962, the 11.5-ton tracked vehicle 

carried twelve soldiers including 

the driver. With the addition of a 

.50 caliber machinegun the vehicle 

became a more potent offensive 

weapon and, between troop movements, could assume a defensive 

role as well.
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M-16A1 Rifl e: First ordered by the Army in large quantities in 1963 to replace 

the M-14 rifl e, the M-16A1 gave soldiers more fi repower while reducing the 

weapons/equipment load they had to carry. The 

rifl e alone weighs only seven pounds loaded, 

and its 5.56-mm. cartridge weighs only half that 

of the NATO 7.62-mm. round. Operating at a 

cyclic rate of fi re of 750 rounds per minute when 

on automatic, the M-16A1 enabled one soldier 

to deliver more fi re on a target than an entire 

squad in World War II. Many an enemy ambush 

disintegrated when U.S. soldiers followed the fi eld wisdom of the Vietnam 

War: “Put your sixteen on rock ‘n’ roll and fi re up the Cong!”

M-79 Grenade Launcher: A 

single-shot, percussion-fi red shoulder weapon fi rst issued in 1961, the 

M-79 was designed to enable squads 

and platoons to cover the fi re support gap between maximum grenade 

throwing distance and minimum 

mortar range. Its 40-mm. fragmentation projectile has an effective range 

of fi ve meters, ideal for neutralizing hidden enemy concentrations such as those 

waiting in an ambush position.

M-72 Antitank Rocket with Launcher: First distributed in 1962, the M-72 

gave infantry squads a light, easy to operate weapon effective against enemy 

armor. Weighing only fi ve pounds and packaged in 

a disposable launcher barrel and ignition assembly, 

the M-72 provided a new fl exibility to both the 

infantryman and his squad leader. Rather than having to coordinate with higher command echelons 

and wait for artillery or air support, the squad and 

platoon leader could immediately attack fortifi ed 

positions. Built around a 66-mm. rocket capable of neutralizing a heavy tank, 

the M-72 was used more frequently in Vietnam against bunkers and crew-served 

weapons positions than armored vehicles.

M-60 Machine Gun: Already in use before the 1965 large-unit buildup in 

Vietnam, the M-60 incorporated several features that allowed easy adaptation to 

a variety of combat situations. An easily detachable barrel enabled gunners to 

continue fi ring without interruption due to overheating, and the fold-out bipod 

attached to the stock assembly allowed the gunner to move the weapon to a new 

location, drop to the prone position, and resume fi ring without delay. Primarily 

a ground weapon, the M-60 could be mounted on vehicles and helicopters for 
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counterambush and landing 

zone preparation tasks. The 

versatile weapon fi red the 

7.62-mm. NATO ammunition to a range of 3,200 meters. In an emergency, the 

sustained rate of fi re of 150 

rounds per minute could 

increase to an automatic 

fi re rate of 550 rounds per 

minute. Although ideally 

operated on a tripod by a 

three-man crew, the M-60 

was light enough at twentythree pounds to be fi red by one soldier from the sitting or standing position.

AN/PRC-25 Radio: The need for reliable communications became especially obvious in Vietnam, where the terrain and enemy tactics dictated that 

small units often operate independently for extended periods. First issued 

in 1963, the AN/PRC-25 was a transistorized, 

frequency modulated set with a range of fi ve 

miles, three times the capacity of the radios it replaced. Weighing 21.5 pounds and smaller than 

a backpack, the radio was easily transported 

and offered no interference if the operator had 

to fi re his weapon.

AN/PVS-2 Night Vision Sight: The Viet Cong preferred night operations to 

avoid U.S. air and artillery support. To combat the enemy’s night tactics, the 

Army developed and distributed the Night Vision Sight, a portable, hand-held, 

battery-powered, electro-optical instrument for passive observation and aimed 

fi re of weapons. Better known as the “starlight scope,” the device concentrated 

and intensifi ed available light from stars and the moon to bring into view objects 

as far away as 400 meters.

M-18A1 Antipersonnel Mine: More widely known as the “Claymore” mine, 

the M-18A1 was a lightweight directional mine used for defense against massed 

enemy attacks. The mine consisted of layers encased in a curved, rectangular, 

molded frame of fi berglass-fi lled polystyrene. The frame measured 8.5 inches 

long, 3.25 inches high, and 1.4 inches wide. The 

layer at the front of the mine was a plastic matrix 

containing 700 steel balls, while the layer behind 

housed the explosive. The curvature of the frame 

dispersed the steel balls through a 60-degree arc 

50 meters from the mine. A soldier could detonate 
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the mine by any one of three methods: an electrical blasting cap and magneto 

fi ring device, a non-electric blasting cap, or a lanyard and pull-type fi ring device.

Food Packet, Long Range Patrol: The new fi eld ration developed during 

the Vietnam War was the LRP packet, designed by the Army for missions out 

of resupply range for periods of up to ten days. Because of its light weight 

—only eleven ounces per packet — the “lurp ration,” as it was called by the 

troops, could be carried in large quantities without adding appreciably to a 

soldier’s load. Each ration packet consisted of a precooked, freeze-dehydrated 

main dish in a reconstitution package and several other components, such as a 

confection, fruitcake bar, coffee, cream, sugar, toilet paper, and matches. A 

soldier could prepare the 1,000-plus calorie meal by adding hot water or eat 

it from the package like popcorn.

Air Cavalry: The major organizational innovation of the Vietnam War was the air cavalry division, the fastest moving large unit in the history 

of the U.S. Army. Deployed to Vietnam in 1965 

as the 1st Cavalry Division and equipped with 

over 400 helicopters, the new formation allowed 

Vietnamese and American commanders to jump 

battalions and brigades over the jungles, swamps, 

roads, and mountains that had rendered French 

and South Vietnamese units so vulnerable to the 

favorite tactic of the Viet Cong, the ambush.

Riverine Force: To combine mobility and fi re superiority in the impassable 

swamps and paddies of the Mekong River Delta south and west of Saigon, 

the U.S. command formed the joint Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force. This 

force consisted of an Army 

division supported by Navy 

units. One Army brigade 

would operate afl oat, while 

two others would remain 

at riverside bases. Operational units of the force 

included four River Assault 

Squadrons, each consisting of some 100 vessels. 

Two-thirds of these boats were Navy medium landing craft, converted to fulfi ll 

command and control, troop carrier, and fi re support missions. Thirty-two vessels were high-speed armed patrol boats, which carried out landing support and 

interdiction roles. Other craft included barges serving as helicopter landing zones 

and artillery fi rebases, non-self-propelled barracks ships, salvage vessels, and 

“airboats,” which used large, above-water propellers to plow through marshes.
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American Military Heritage

Section V

Notes on Awards of the Vietnam War

Vietnam Service Medal: Originally approved 

by the President in 1965, the VSM was awarded 

to all members of the armed forces of the United 

States who served in Vietnam or in bordering 

waters or airspace between 3 July 1965 and 28 

March 1973.

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal: Awarded by the Republic of Vietnam to all American 

military personnel who served at least six months 

in Vietnam or in units that had supported incountry combat units from outside the borders of 

Vietnam. Soldiers who were wounded, captured, 

or killed in action less than six months after their arrival also received the VCM.

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry: Awarded by the Republic of 

Vietnam to American and allied service members who had exhibited either 

individual or unit heroism. In 1974, after the withdrawal of American combat 

units, the Republic of Vietnam awarded the VCG to all American units with 

Vietnam service between 8 February 1962 and 28 March 1973, regardless of 

prior awards of the same decoration.

Section VI

Notes on Uniforms of the Vietnam War Era

The U.S. Army made a variety of improvements to its fi eld uniforms during the 

Vietnam War. Among the most obvious were jungle utilities and the jungle boot, 

both designed to stand up to the humid weather and the water-logged terrain of 

Southeast Asia. The Army made the new utilities 

of cotton poplin, which had better “breathing” 

capacity than other materials and dried quickly 

after immersion. The new boots featured a deep 

tread sole, more resistant to mine blasts and mudcaking, and treated leather at the toe and heel, with 

vents at the arch and nylon uppers.

Other uniform innovations included the substitution of nylon for cotton in the web gear and 

the rucksack, a camoufl age helmet cover, and 

improvements to the fl ak jacket, a uniform addition fi rst used in the Korean War.

Vietnam Service

Medal Ribbon

Republic of Vietnam

Campaign Medal Ribbon
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American Military Heritage

13

The Post Vietnam Era

Section I

Reforming the Army

The end of American involvement in the Vietnam War marked one of the 

 lowest points in the history of the U.S. Army. Without a special appro-

 priation to pay for the war, the confl ict had drained the service fi nancially. In turning against the war the American people seemed to have turned 

against their army as well, and that antipathy fostered similar discontent in 

the service. Mainly draftees, those individuals resented their service in the 

Army and disobeyed their offi cers. Determined to evade control wherever possible, up to 40 percent in Europe in 1972 admitted to drug abuse, particularly 

hashish. Seven percent were chronic heroin users, and 12 percent had been 

charged with serious crimes. Meanwhile, interracial relations were so bad that 

confl icts between blacks and whites appeared almost routine in some localities. 

Doctrine and force structure were outdated, the Army’s organization was too 

cumbersome, and the quality of enlistees was at an all-time low.

From these beginnings, during the 1970s and 1980s, arose the rejuvenated force 

that held the line to the end of the Cold War and that won an overwhelming 

victory in the Gulf War. Part of the reason was the creation of the Training and 

Doctrine Command. Its job was to reform the Army. Leaders made a concerted 

effort to improve professionalism, leadership, and the quality of the offi cer and 

NCO corps. Additionally and simultaneously, aggressive action was taken to 

address the drug abuse, racial discord, and the morale problems that had plagued 

the Army. The Army focused on basic mission and undertook a virtual revolution in training. Individual and group performance standards were set and 

standardized, and then attention turned to doctrine, materiel and organization.

TRADOC created and carried out sustained programs of training reform, 

doctrine revision, and equipment and force modernization. The Army of Excellence that conducted Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989 and DESERT

STORM in the Persian Gulf in 1991 was the result. 

The following chronology lists some of the main steps in this transformation:

1973 30 June End of the draft; Volunteer Army 

 (VOLAR) goes into full operation 

 Oct Arab-Israeli War yields 

 many lessons for the future of warfare
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American Military Heritage

1976 July TRADOC issues new edition of FM 

 100–5, emphasizing doctrine of

 Active Defense

1980 Feb M1 Abrams tank begins to arrive in 

 Army battalions after an eight-year 

 development

 24–25 Apr Mission to rescue hostages in

 Teheran, Iran ends in embarrassing 

 failure at Desert One

 16 Oct Establishment of the National

 Training Center

1982 Aug New edition of FM 100–5 introduces 

 AirLand Battle doctrine

1983 June First class of School of Advanced 

 Military Studies at Fort 

 Leavenworth, Kansas

 25–28 Oct URGENT FURY in Grenada

 Dec Army receives fi rst AH-64A Apache 

 helicopters

1986 1 Oct Goldwater–Nichols Defense 

 Reorganization Act signed 

 into law

1989 20 Dec Operation JUST CAUSE begins in 

 Panama

Section II

Reforms

In 1971, Congress ordered the end of the draft by midyear 1973. Given the 

unpopularity of the Vietnam war and the military in general, few young Americans with any potential were attracted to Army life. As a result, by 1974, 40 

percent of the new recruits lacked high school diplomas and 41 percent scored 

in the lowest acceptable mental aptitude range.

Gradually the situation changed. A rise in unemployment combined with the 

Army’s emphasis on education and the development of job skills applicable 

to civilian life encouraged better quality recruits. The quality continued into 

the 1980s. Congress passed a series of pay increases and other incentives, like 
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American Military Heritage

the GI Bill and the Army 

College Fund, that made 

enlistment even more attractive. Helping itself, the 

Army launched a powerful 

public relations campaign, 

best represented by the slogan “Be All You Can Be.” 

By 1991, 98 percent of all 

enlistees had high school 

diplomas and 75 percent 

were in the upper mental 

categories. Unauthorized 

absences dropped by 80 

percent and courts martial 

by 64 percent. Positive indicators of drug abuse fell 

from 25 percent in 1979 to 

1 percent in 1989.

 

Many people were instrumental in the transformation of the Army. One of 

the leaders of the reform movement was General Creighton W. (Abe) Abrams. 

As Chief of Staff of the Army from 1972 until his death in 1974, General 

Abrams confronted the Army’s problems head on. He pressed Congress and 

the White House to authorize the development of fi ve new weapons systems, 

the M-1 Tank, the M-2/3 Bradley fi ghting vehicle, the UH-60 Blackhawk 

and AH-64 Apache helicopters, and the Patriot air defense system. He issued 

orders to his commanders to round up and court martial drug pushers and gang 

leaders and to begin random drug tests to identify abusers. The program had 

quick results. In a single four month period in Europe during 1973, the Army 

discharged 1,300 soldiers for discipline or drug related offenses. 

Another reform that made a lasting impact on the Army was the Total Force 

policy. Having served as Vice Chief of Staff during the Vietnam buildup, 

Abrams remembered fi rsthand the shortages and dislocations caused by the 

administration’s failure to call up the Reserves. The Total Force policy paired 

active and reserve elements, forming round-out brigades to ensure full strength 

and requisite augmentation.

Working in consonance with General Abrams, General William E. (Bill) DePuy, 

Commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, took the fi rst steps to 

align the Army’s doctrine and training regimens with the political and military realities. Drawing heavily from the lessons learned from the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, 

U.S. Army Band (Pershing’s Own), 1970
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American Military Heritage

DePuy launched a revision of 

FM 100–5, Operations. The 

work was written in simple 

English and initially bound 

in loose-leaf notebooks to 

encourage discussion and 

changes. From this revision came AirLand Battle 

doctrine, which stressed the 

interplay of air and ground 

forces in any confl ict, and 

set up a close, rear, and deep 

battlefi eld.

DePuy also launched an evaluation and modifi cation of the training system. 

What resulted was a virtual revolution — the systems approach to training 

was emplaced which brought in the ARTEP and the SQT and forced training to a set standard. Realistic training was devised with the creation of 

the Army’s combat training centers — the National Training Center at Fort 

Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany 

were established over the late 1970s and early 1980s to provide practice 

fi elds for live training.

Education was also reformed as evidenced by the development of the TRADOC 

School Model, the revamping of programs of instruction, and creation of the 

Noncommissioned Offi cers Education System. Education and leader development became an acknowledged pillar in the development of a strong Army.

Section III

General Creighton W. Abrams 

Creighton Williams Abrams was born in Springfi eld, Massachusetts, on 

September 15, 1914, and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1936. 

Following tours with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Armored Division, 

he joined the 4th Armored Division in 1941. Promoted to lieutenant colonel 

in 1942, he stayed with the division until VE Day in 1945.

During World War II, Abrams developed an approach to combat that much 

resembled what General Mark Clark characterized as “careful planning and 

violent execution.” As commander of the 4th Armored Division’s 37th Tank 

Battalion, he served as General George S. Patton, Jr.’s point man in the victorious Allied sweep across Europe. It was he, in his Sherman tank “Thunderbolt,” 

who led the relief column into Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. He 
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also spearheaded the Allied dash across the Rhine, advancing so rapidly that he 

reportedly once surprised a German general with his boots up on his desk. “I like 

to be out on the point where there’s nothing but me and the goddamn Germans,” 

he growled, “and we can fi ght by ourselves.” Patton admired Abrams. “I’m supposed to be the best tank commander in the Army,” the hard-nosed old general 

once remarked, “but I have one peer, Abe Abrams. He’s the world’s champion.”

Following the War, Abrams served as director of tactics at the Armor School, 

where he rewrote the Army’s fi eld manuals for armored operations in wartime. 

In 1956, after assignments in Europe and Korea, he advanced to the rank of 

brigadier general. He became a major general in 1960.

At that point, Abrams became a crisis manager. He commanded the 3d Armored 

Division in Germany during the 1961 crisis in Berlin that saw the construction of 

the Berlin Wall. The next year, he was stationed 

in the Pentagon’s Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Military Operations. While there, in the 

fall of 1962, he received command of the Federal 

troops that deployed to quell racial disorders at 

the University of Mississippi. He did the same in 

Birmingham, Alabama, during the Spring of 1963. 

“I cannot recall any situation,” he remarked after 

those experiences, “when the opportunity was 

greater to slip off the gangplank into the quicksand. 

There couldn’t be too much force, or too little. It 

was a time when you didn’t use a sledge hammer 

when a tack hammer would do better.”

Abrams’ rise was rapid after his service in Birmingham. Returning to Germany 

later in 1963, he achieved the rank of Lieutenant General and command of V 

Corps. He received his fourth star scarcely a year after that, along with promotion to Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Abrams became Deputy Commander 

of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in 1967. A year later, 

he became General William C. Westmoreland’s successor as Commander. 

A crisis manager again, he presided over some of the most diffi cult years of 

the war, the period in which military morale slumped and the Army began its 

descent into the depths. While Chief of Staff of the Army from 1972 to 1974, 

Abrams set the course that would revive the Army, but he died prematurely 

in 1974 without ever seeing the fruits of his labors.

As a commander, Abrams was demanding. When problems in the fi eld arose 

during his time in Vietnam, he was soon on the spot, gruff and growling, surrounded by a great billow of cigar smoke. More than willing to admit his own 

mistakes — “The higher up you get up the greasy pole,” he remarked, “the 
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American Military Heritage

more your tail shows.” — he had no stomach for lies or exaggerated offi cial 

optimism. He wanted the facts straight and to the point. A lover of cigars and 

classical music, he hated the sorrow and anguish war caused and yearned for a 

better world. But when danger beckoned, he was always at, or near, the point.

Section IV

General William E. DePuy

General William E. DePuy was born in North Dakota in 1919 and entered the 

Army from ROTC in 1941. During World War II, he served with the 357th Infantry Regiment of the 90th Division, seeing action in both the Normandy invasion 

and the Battle of the Bulge. During its fi rst eleven 

months in the fi eld, the 90th suffered 25,000 casualties, including 150 percent of its offi cers. The 

experience made a lasting impression upon DePuy, 

who earned two Purple Hearts himself. Analyzing 

what had happened after the war, he noted that the 

troops of the 90th were as good as those in any other 

division but that their training had been technical 

and mechanical, rather than tactical. “Men and 

units proceeded through the program whether they 

learned or not,” he said. “. . . If you could survive 

the schedule you were presumed to be trained.” As 

a result, most soldiers learned the practical dimensions of their craft only after entering battle, when luck and natural cunning took 

over. In Normandy, however, offi cers and enlisted men often became casualties 

within a day or two, well before they could learn their business. Things only began 

to change after the campaign had ended, DePuy concluded, when losses declined 

and soldiers fi nally had a chance to ponder their experiences.

DePuy could do little with his insights at fi rst. Emerging from the war, he 

began an active career that included service as a Russian student, a military 

attache in Hungary, a tour of duty with the CIA in Washington, a battalion 

commander with the 4th Division in Germany, and a tour in the Offi ce of the 

Chief of Staff of the Army. Promoted to brigadier general in 1962, after a 

stint as a battle group commander with the 3d Infantry Division, he returned 

to Washington to become the Director of Special Warfare in the Offi ce of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Two years later, after a year as 

Director of Plans and Programs in the Offi ce of the Assistant Chief of Staff 

for Force Development, he traveled to South Vietnam to become Director of 

Operations (J–3) for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

An expert on counterinsurgency by the time he reached Vietnam, DePuy became 

a forceful advocate of fi repower. Taking command of the 1st Infantry Division in 
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1966, he invented the cloverleaf tactic. Under that approach, a force would drop 

by helicopter into a landing zone, split into squads, and then branch off into the 

jungle along circular routes that curled backed upon themselves in a manner that 

resembled the outline of a cloverleaf. Units that met with no opposition would 

end up where they started. Those that did would fi nd and fi x the enemy’s forces 

so that artillery and air power could fi nish them off.

By the time he left Vietnam in 1968, DePuy had acquired a reputation as 

one of the Army’s most intelligent generals. Upon his return, he became 

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Following that, in 1973, he took 

charge as Commanding General of the Army’s new Training and Doctrine 

Command. In that position, he fi nally had a chance to draw upon his World 

War II experience. Asserting that “In Normandy, the 90th Division was a 

killing machine — of our own troops!” he made revision of the training 

process his fi rst priority. Where in the past training had been oriented toward 

time — “in the next hour we will discuss the operation of the PRC-77 radio” 

— he tuned it to performance — “at the completion of this demonstration, 

you will be required to place the PRC-77 into operation in the proper manner. If you cannot do that, you will repeat the instruction on an individual 

basis.” As a result of these efforts, he would say in 1985, the performance 

and battle capabilities of the Army rose from the twenty to the sixty percent 

level and continued to climb.

Hard-nosed and energetic, DePuy left his mark on the post-Vietnam Army. 

Before his death in 1992, he recalled that the Army had given him “an exciting and satisfying life... a purpose and a fulfi llment.” Although not without 

imperfections and sometimes hard to love, it was “solid and honest and sincere 

in its unremitting efforts to achieve excellence.”

Section V

Notes on Weapons Systems 

The M-1 Abrams Tank: The Abrams Tank became part of the Army’s inventory in February 1980. Weighing more than 69 tons but propelled by a high 

performance turbine engine, it has a top speed of 41 miles an hour and a range 

of 288 miles. Eight feet high, 

12 feet wide, and 32.3 feet 

long when measured with its 

gun, the vehicle shows a low 

profi le and is diffi cult to target. 

Nevertheless, it is a fi rst-rate 

predator. Mounting either a 

105-mm. (M1) or a 120-mm. 

(M1A1) smoothbore gun, 

augmented with thermal-
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imaging night sights, laser range fi nders, and digital ballistic computers, it is 

capable of destructive and accurate fi re at ranges in excess of 3,000 meters. The 

tank’s secondary weapons include the ever reliable .50 caliber and 7.62-mm. 

machine guns. Clad in Chobham-spaced armor — ceramic blocks set in resin 

between layers of conventional armor — and containing compartmentalized fuel 

and ammunition stores, the Abrams can withstand the harshest combat while affording its crew superior protection. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, some 

took direct hits from Iraqi tanks but never slowed. Their crews only learned what 

had happened at the end of the day, when they dismounted and saw the marks of 

shell bursts on their vehicles.

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War demonstrated that 

tanks, whatever their sophistication, still need the protection of infantry to survive 

in some high intensity combat environments. The old M-113 armored personnel carrier, however, was too slow to keep up with the new Abrams. The Army 

designed the Bradley to fi ll the need. It operates at the same speed as the Abrams 

tank while providing substantially greater protection 

for its passengers and threeman crew than the M-113. 

The vehicle comes in two 

versions. The M-2 Infantry 

Fighting Vehicle transports 

a squad of infantry and is 

designed to provide combat 

units with a light armored 

fi ghting vehicle capable of 

augmenting their anti-armor capabilities. The M-3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle carries a scout section in addition to its crew and is supposed to provide scout and 

armored cavalry units with a vehicle for screening, reconnaissance, and security 

missions. Each Bradley measures 20.5 feet in length and 10.5 feet in width, while 

standing 9.7 feet high. Both weigh slightly less than 25 tons and have top speeds 

and operating ranges compatible with those of the Abrams. Their primary armament is a 25-mm. cannon. Their secondary weapons include a 7.62-mm. machine 

gun and two launch tubes for TOW (tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided) 

missiles. The infantry model has fi ring ports for modifi ed M-16 rifl es.

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV): Also known as the “Hummer,” the HMMWV is a versatile, four-wheeldrive tactical vehicle. Built on the M-998 

chassis, it comes with various modules and 

kits that allow for a number of confi gurations, 

including armament carrier for the TOW missile system, ambulance, and cargo-and-troop 
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carrier. It is 15 feet long, 7.1 feet wide, 6 feet high, weighs 3.8 tons, and 

reaches a top speed of 65 miles per hour with a range of 300 miles. It can 

carry either TOW missiles, a .50 caliber or 7.62-mm. machine gun, or a 

40-mm. Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher.

The AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter: The Vietnam experience had 

shown that the Army’s existing helicopter, the AH-1 Cobra, was vulnerable 

to light antiaircraft fi re and lacked the maneuverability to fl y close to the 

ground over long periods. The Apache fi lled the 

gap. Equipped with night vision equipment and 

target sensing devices, it can fl y some 300 miles 

at low altitude, even after dark, at a speed of 

227 miles per hour. Once it reached its target, 

it can defeat an enemy’s defenses with infrared 

countermeasures or radar jammers. It carries 

sixteen HELLFIRE (helicopter launched, fi re 

and forget) anti-tank missiles in four launchers, 

or seventy-six Hydra 70 folding fi n rockets, or a half-and-half combination 

of the two. It also has a 30-mm. chain gun mounted in its nose. Counting 

its rotors, the Apache is 58.3 feet long and possesses a wingspan of 16.3 

feet. The machine itself is 6.5 feet wide and stands 12.7 feet in height. It 

weighs 10.5 tons.

The UH-60 Black Hawk Utility Helicopter: Fielded as a replacement for 

the Vietnam War’s UH-1 “Huey” helicopter, the Black Hawk can fi ll either a 

utility or an assault role. With a top speed of 184 miles per hour and a range 

of 368 miles without auxiliary gas tanks and well over a thousand with them, 

it is fl exible enough to accomplish air cavalry, electronic warfare, or medical 

evacuation missions. As a 

utility aircraft, it can lift, 

along with its own crew 

of from three to four men, 

an entire infantry squad 

of eleven men with their 

equipment or a 105-mm. 

M102 howitzer with its sixman crew and thirty rounds 

of ammunition. The aircraft 

stands 12.3 feet in height, 

spans 64.9 feet in length 

with its rotors, and is 8 feet 

wide. It normally carries a 

7.62-mm. machine gun.
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American Military Heritage

The Patriot Missile Air Defense System: 

The Patriot provides protection against enemy 

planes and tactical ballistic missiles. It consists 

of the M901 launch station, a remotely operated 

four-canister unit on an M-860 semi-trailer with 

its own electronics pack, data link cable, and 

generator. Either an M-818 tractor or the M-983 

heavy expanded mobility tactical truck can pull 

the M-901. The Patriot usually deploys in a battery of fi ve to eight launchers, supported by an 

electric power plant, an OE-349/MRC antenna 

mast group, an AN/MPQ-53 radar unit, and an 

AN/MSQ-116 engagement control center. Each 

battery also has other support vehicles, including 

missile reload trailer transporters and maintenance trucks. The missiles fl y at a velocity of Mach 3.7, can reach an altitude 

of 24,240 meters, and have a range of 160 kilometers.

Section VI

Notes on Uniforms

The Battle Dress Uniform: The soldier of the 1980s also received a new 

camoufl age uniform. Reinforced with patches on the elbows, knees, and seat 

and slightly heavier than the wash and wear jungle fatigues of the 1970s, 

its “bush type” coat and trousers are more durable than their predecessors 

and can be worn in mild weather. Given their loose fi t, they also provide 

their wearers with more ventilation and thus more comfort. A camoufl age 

cap comes with the uniform. It is wind resistant and water repellent. Special 

dyes reduce the outfi t’s infrared signature, an important asset on modern 

day battlefi elds.

The Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT): Introduced in 1985, PASGT includes a new protective vest and a molded, 

laminated, Kevlar helmet. 

For comfort, fi t, and protection, the Army’s new 

fragmentation vest is a 

major improvement over 

the old fl ak jacket, which 

had been around since 

1950. Its inner core is 

the reason. Composed of 

fourteen ounces of a cloth 
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American Military Heritage

compounded from Kevlar, a tough polymer 

originally developed by DuPont to replace 

steel belts in radial ires, it offers one of the 

best shields in the world against wounds from 

fragmentation grenades and other munitions.

The new helmet, a one-piece item molded from 

the same Kevlar, replaced the M-1 helmet, 

which had been in the Army’s inventory since 

1941. The product of eleven years of research 

and testing that led to some thirty-two separate 

studies and three U.S. patents, it weighs about 

the same as its predecessor, but soldiers who 

have worn both say it feels lighter because of its 

better fi t and improved stability. Covering eleven percent more of a soldier’s 

head than the M1 by folding down over his ears and around the nape of his 

neck, it will withstand impact from a projectile 2 times greater than before. 

It reduces head injuries in combat by from 25 to 30 percent.

The helmet met with considerable resistance from within the ranks when 

introduced because of its superficial resemblance to the old German helmet of World War II. In fact, the German design had been the product of an 

artist’s concept rather than of solid scientific research and was not nearly 

as good as even the M-1. Acceptance came only in 1983, when the troops 

of the 82nd Airborne Division wore the Kevlar helmet during Operation 

URGENT FURY in Grenada. In two well documented cases, the helmet 

stopped fragments from a 20-mm. missile and a round from an AK47 rifle. 

“Stopping that round was luck, like a Doug Flutie Hail Mary pass,” one of 

the helmet’s developers, Lawrence McManus of the Army’s Research and 

Development Center at 

Natik, Massachusetts, remarked, but the response 

was quick. Units throughout the armed services 

began to put in orders. By 

1988, nearly two million 

PASGT helmets were in 

use.
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14

The Transformed Army:

Contingency and Combat After

Vietnam

Section I

Intervention in Grenada:

Operation URGENT FURY

Many of the problems facing the Army after the Vietnam War came to 

 a head in 1983, during the American invasion of the Caribbean 

 island of Grenada. The largest American military undertaking since 

the end of the Vietnam confl ict, Operation URGENT FURY was a response to 

the overthrow and execution of Grenada’s Marxist leader, Maurice Bishop, 

by a gang of even more radical Communists. Already concerned that Grenada 

was about to become a Soviet satellite, President Ronald Reagan decided to 

eliminate the threat by sending a task force. Several hundred Cubans were 

present on the island, upgrading its airport or serving as military trainers. 

Once the airport was completed, so the reasoning went, its lengthened runway 

would advance the introduction of Soviet forces and military equipment into 

the Caribbean and disrupt the entire region.

The attack came on the night of October 24–25. Under cover of darkness, 

special operations teams moved to capture a radio broadcasting tower six kilometers north of Grenada’s capital city, St. Georges; to secure Government 

House and the British Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon; and to gain the 

release of political detainees in a local prison. The attacks on the tower and 

Government House succeeded, but insuffi cient planning and a lack of timely 

air support left the special operators exposed in both locales and forced them 

to abandon the tower. Poor intelligence and fl awed planning also hindered 

the attack on the prison, where the helicopters were repulsed by unexpectedly 

heavy antiaircraft fi re.

Although disappointing, none of those developments had much weight in the 

overall scheme of things. The joint task force directed its primary attack at Grenada’s main airport, located at Point Salinas on the island’s southwest coast, and 

a secondary attack by the Marines at the Pearls airport on the northern coast. 

Under instructions to secure the runway at Port Salinas, the commander of the 1st 

Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), Lieutenant Colonel Wes Taylor, and his men 

arrived over that target shortly before dawn on the morning of the twenty-fi fth.
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American Military Heritage

Taylor’s men were also operating at a disadvantage. They had only a photocopied British Overseas Development map to guide them, and their communications frequencies were incompatible with the joint task force’s headquarters 

offshore. Furthermore, the intelligence they possessed was so poor that they 

were en route by air to the combat zone before they learned that the troops 

defending Salinas had blocked the airport’s runway. As a result, they would 

have to parachute into the airfi eld under enemy fi re. 

Flying in the dark, forty-fi ve men to an aircraft, Taylor’s Rangers jumped into 

a hail of red and green enemy tracers that cut through the air all around them. 

Although enemy fi re damaged some of the planes, none of the men were hit. 

Once they had landed, the forty-four men of the fi rst wave initially thought 

that they were under automatic weapons fi re from the hills above the airport. 

After a few moments, however, it became clear that the defenders were mainly 

fi ring at the approaching aircraft bearing the remainder of Taylor’s battalion. 

Concluding that he and his men were at little immediate risk, Taylor ordered 

everyone to clear the runway, which was littered with abandoned bulldozers, 

trucks, 55-gallon drums, and stakes connected by wire.

By 0730, all of Taylor’s men had arrived. The colonel directed Company A, 

under Captain John Abizaid, to rescue a group of American medical students 

located on a college campus code-named True Blue near the eastern end of 

the runway. Before the Rangers could move to the campus, however, Abizaid 

recognized that they would have to clear Cuban positions in the hills north of 

the area. With Taylor’s approval, he ordered his 1st and 3d platoons to attack 

into the hills, while his 2nd took a roundabout course along the coastline to 

the college.

The two assault platoons drove forward, fi ring as they went and shouting in 

Spanish for the Cubans to surrender. The Cubans responded with obscenities 

and gunfi re. One Ranger went down, the only American to be killed in the battle 

for the runway. Fighting at a disadvantage and with enemy fi re increasing, 

Sergeant Manous Boles recognized that an armored vehicle might tip the odds 

in his unit’s favor. Spying a bulldozer on the runway, he started it, raised its 

blade, and drove it toward the enemy’s positions, hunching down behind the 

blade. Other Rangers took up station to the sides of the vehicle, also taking 

cover behind the blade. Plowing into the enemy’s positions and fi ring in every 

direction, the force cleared the hill and took its objective.

While Boles was improvising with such success, Taylor’s Company B pushed 

west into the hills overlooking the airport’s control tower and terminal. The 

unit took heavy fi re for a time but killed one Cuban and captured twenty-two 

without suffering serious casualties of its own. By mid-morning, the Cubans 

had pulled out of the hills, leaving both True Blue and the airfi eld in American 

hands, and C-130 aircraft were beginning to land a stream of reinforcements.
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American Military Heritage

Fighting continued for three more days, with the Rangers, backed by the 

82nd Airborne Division, carrying out most of the remaining combat tasks 

in the region around Point Salinas, while Marine units conducted operations 

elsewhere on island. Two days after the capture of Point Salinas, the Rangers rescued a second group of American students trapped on a campus some 

distance up the coast. They also conducted an airmobile assault on a Cuban 

barracks complex north of the airport. 

Repeatedly throughout URGENT FURY, as was the case with Boles, the ingenuity 

of the troops compensated for the poor planning and lack of radio connections 

that continued to impede the operation. On one occasion, a young forward air 

controller used a refl ecting mirror to pinpoint a house concealing an enemy 

recoilless rifl e. By the end of the operation, despite losses that amounted to 

eight killed and sixty-nine wounded, the task force had attained virtually all of 

their objectives. Observing it all, the task force’s deputy commander, Major 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, could only remark that the American soldier 

had carried the day. “Even though higher headquarters screws it up every way 

you can possibly screw it up,” he told interviewers, “it is the initiative and 

valor . . . of the small units, the small-unit leadership, and the soldiers on the 

ground that will win for you every time.” 

Section II

Operation JUST CAUSE

URGENT FURY occurred while the Army and the other military services were 

still repairing the damage left by the Vietnam War. Over the years that followed, spurred by what they had learned in the Caribbean, the services made 

readiness a primary theme. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater–Nichols 

Act to improve the conduct of joint operations by strengthening the positions 

of both operational commanders in chief and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. Meanwhile, benefi tting from a long-needed infusion of funds, the 

Army made imaginative use of combat simulators in training and continued to 

invest in such technical innovations as night vision equipment. The effect of 

all those efforts and of the continuing heavy emphasis on leadership development became clear when President George Bush ordered American forces to 

intervene in Panama in late December 1989. 

Operation JUST CAUSE was the result of the increase in assaults on American 

servicemen in Panama, and of evidence that the country’s leader, General 

Manuel Noriega, was involved in drug traffi cking. The effort came under the 

overall direction of the Chief of the Southern Command, General Maxwell 

W. Thurman, who had been specially selected for the job. Thurman’s close 

friend, the Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. Carl Stiner, 

would actually conduct the mission. The team the two put together included 

regular and special operations forces from all of the military services. 
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American Military Heritage

The attack that Thurman and Stiner devised was one of the most complicated 

in American history. It included a range of simultaneous, airborne, night 

assaults against twenty-seven targets across the country. Preparations were 

painstaking. Unlike URGENT FURY, which the services conducted on the spur 

of the moment with little advance planning, many of the units involved in 

JUST CAUSE conducted full-scale rehearsals to prepare for any eventuality. 

In addition, all the units involved would have the benefi t of thorough intelligence coordination, and all, once they went into action, would have access 

to compatible communications circuits.

Those preparations paid 

off. The operation initially 

went as planned, with 

American forces gaining 

the upper hand almost immediately. Special operations forces infi ltrated key 

targets around Panama 

City. Rangers parachuted 

into Rio Hato Airfield, 

fifty miles to the west, 

to keep Noriega’s forces 

located in that area from 

joining the fi ght. Despite heavy odds, a Special Forces team kept a mechanized task force from crossing the Pacora River bridge in Panama City. 

While they were doing that and other units were moving to secure the 

locks, dams, and waterways of the Panama Canal, Task Force BAYONET, 

composed of the 193rd Infantry Brigade reinforced by the 5th Infantry 

and tanks from the 82nd Airborne, attacked Noriega’s headquarters, the 

so-called Commandancia.

The fi ghting was occasionally heavy, especially around the Commandancia 

and the Tinajitas army barracks, which housed Noriega’s elite Tiger Company. Time and again, American troops showed their discipline and good 

training. “As soldiers attempted to move into their blocking positions, they 

received heavy volumes of machine gun fi re from PDF soldiers fi ghting from 

the multi-story buildings above them,” the commander of the 4th Battalion of 

the 6th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel James W. Reed recalled. “Many, if not 

most, of the PDF soldiers were dressed in civilian clothes, and many of them 

fought from the civilian apartment buildings which ringed the area. I recall 

being impressed by the fi re discipline of our soldiers as they fi red upon only 

those personnel who were actively engaging us. Fighting in built-up areas 

really tests small-unit leaders.... Once the battle for the Comman dancia was 

joined, it truly was a story of junior leaders taking charge, doing what had to 

be done, and controlling their people.”
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American Military Heritage

By evening of the fi rst day, most of Noriega’s forces had abandoned their 

equipment and fl ed. The attack, much of it under cover of darkness and often 

with precision weapons, had proved too much for them.

The disappearance of the enemy left the American troops with an unexpected 

role. Since parts of Panama City had suffered heavy damage, the city’s people in 

some areas lacked food and water and such basic services as police protection. 

Over the days that followed, the Americans fi lled the gap. The troops had come 

looking “for aggressive action,” Command Sergeant Major Thurman Beaver 

of the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, remarked, “and didn’t want to be policemen, 

but they accepted that role when it came.... [They] were very, very disciplined 

during their missions and didn’t fi re their weapons at animals, each other, or 

even at armed Panamanian shopkeepers, who were protecting their property 

from looters.... I’m proud of everybody in this battalion.”

It was an effort in which everyone could take pride, the climax of more than 

fi fteen years of hard rebuilding. Over that time, the Army had recreated itself, 

shedding old weapons for new while making the diffi cult switch from the 

draft to an all-volunteer format. In the process, it had fi ne-tuned its thinking 

and adjusted its doctrine to make the best use of the American soldier’s fi nest 

traits — his imagination and creativity. When a crisis rose again, just a year 

later in the Persian Gulf, all was in readiness. The American people could once 

more say that they had the best Army in the world.

Section III

The Gulf War

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM 

When Iraqi tanks overran Kuwait in early August 1990, the United States and 

the rest of the world community reacted quickly to contain and then roll back the 

Iraqi aggression. A string of resolutions from the United Nations condemned 

the Iraqi action and imposed an embargo on Iraq. The armed forces of many 

countries, including 297,000 troops of the U.S. Army, rushed to the defense of 

Saudi Arabia, and then prepared to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The defense 

of Saudi Arabia received the designation Operation DESERT SHIELD. When Iraq 

did not withdraw from its ill-obtained gains by the January 15 deadline set 

by the United Nations, the coalition launched Operation DESERT STORM. For 

over a month, American and allied aircraft pounded the Iraqis, knocking out 

communications, destroying key facilities, and wearing down the Iraqi force 

poised to defend Kuwait. Finally, on February 24, the allies launched their 

ground attack. While U.S. Marines, an Army armored brigade, and Arab forces 

drove north over the Kuwaiti–Saudi border toward Kuwait City, the XVIII 

Airborne Corps to the northwest rapidly advanced 260 miles across the desert to 

reach the Euphrates River, cutting most of the Iraqi lines of retreat. Meanwhile, 

the VII Corps, carrying out the main effort, attacked across the Iraqi border 
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American Military Heritage

and struck the fl ank of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. In ninety hours of maneuver 

and combat against the Republican Guard, the cream of the Iraqi Army, the 

VII Corps wiped out over a dozen Iraqi divisions and captured nearly 22,000 

Iraqis at the cost of 22 soldiers killed. In all, coalition forces destroyed 3,847 

of 4,280 enemy tanks, captured an estimated 60,000 Iraqi prisoners, and left, 

at most, seven of the 43 Iraqi combat divisions capable of continued offensive 

operations. The Americans lost 148 killed.

Although the long-term implications of the war remain unclear and its conduct 

at the highest levels a matter of some dispute, the campaign itself was one of 

the most lop-sided victories in American military history. Never before had 

mechanized forces moved so far, so fast, with so much combat power. The 

coalition forces, including the U.S. Army, had decisively defeated the fourthlargest army in the world at a cost which, while real enough to those who paid 

it, was amazingly low for a confl ict on such a scale. In the Middle East, the 

war, at the least, curbed Iraqi ambitions and, indirectly, boosted the ArabIsraeli peace process. In the United States, the war inspired renewed pride in 

the nation’s armed forces after the anti-military feeling that arose as a result 

of the Vietnam War. And, for the professional soldiers of the U.S. Army, the 

war was the capstone of their efforts to rebuild a force that had almost disintegrated in the dismal aftermath of the Vietnam years. Once again, the U.S. 

Army appeared as an effi cient, professional force and reliable instrument for 

the defense of American interests around the globe. 

1990

 Aug 2 Iraq invades Kuwait

 Aug 6 Saudi Arabia requests U.S. assistance 

 Aug 9 First elements of the 82d Airborne Division 

 arrive in Saudi Arabia

 Aug 13 Equipment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) 

 leaves Savannah, Georgia for Saudi Arabi

 Aug 17 First ship carrying prepositioned Army 

 equipment arrives in Saudi Arabia

 Aug 23 Secretary of Defense authorizes call up of 

 25,000 National Guardsmen and Army

 Reservists for combat and combat service support 

 units

 Aug 27 First fast sealift ship reaches Saudi Arabia and 

 begins off-loading; fi rst M-1 Abrams tanks 

 arrive in theater

 Aug 29 82d Airborne Division closes in theater

 Sep 12 Major combat elements of 24th Infantry

 Division (Mech) close in theater

 Oct 6 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) closes 

 in theater
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American Military Heritage

 Oct 22 1st Cavalry Division closes in theater

 Nov 8 VII Corps and 1st Infantry Division alerted 

 for deployment

 Nov 14 Secretary of Defense increases Army 

 selected Reserve call-up authority to 

 80,000 and authorizes call-up of Reserve

 combat units

 Nov 21 VII Corps begins deployment from 

 Germany to Saudi Arabia

 Nov 30 First Army National Guard roundout brigades 

 called to active duty

 Dec 1 XVIII Airborne Corps closes in theater

 Dec 6 First ship carrying VII Corps equipment 

 arrives in theater

1991

 Jan 15 UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal

 Jan 17 Operation DESERT STORM begins

 Jan 18–19 Iraq fi res fi rst Scud missiles at Israel 

 and Saudi Arabia

 Jan 20 XVIII Airborne and VII Corps begin 

 movement to forward assembly areas for 

 ground phase of the campaign

 Feb 3 XVIII Airborne and VII Corps (minus

 elements of 3d Armored Division) complete 

 movement to forward assembly areas

 Feb 6 VII Corps closes in theater with the arrival of 

 the last elements of the 3d Armored Division

 Feb 24 Coalition forces begin ground phase of 

 campaign

 Feb 28 Temporary cease-fi re initiated

 Mar 3 Cease fi re terms accepted by Iraq at Safwan 

 Airfi eld

 Mar 8 Redeployment of Army units begins

 Apr 7 Iraq accepts UN cease-fi re conditions and 

 resolutions

TASK FORCE NORMANDY UNLEASHES THE STORM

When Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Cody’s 1st Battalion of the 101st Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, arrived in Saudi Arabia with its AH-64 

Apache helicopters in mid August 1990, it enjoyed the reputation of being 

the best maintained, best prepared Apache battalion in the theater. It therefore 

seemed the natural choice for the mission that would open Operation DESERT

STORM: an undetected fl ight deep into southwest Iraq to eliminate two key early 

warning radar sites and clear a 20-mile wide corridor for over 100 American 
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American Military Heritage

and coalition aircraft to enter Iraqi air space. From his battalion, Cody carefully 

selected crews to form a task force, which he named Task Force NORMANDY in 

honor of the 101st Airborne Division troopers who had parachuted into Normandy during World War II. In cooperation with the U.S. Air Force’s 20th 

Special Operations Squadron, these crews fl ew hundreds of miles in exercises 

and practiced hitting ground targets with their HELLFIRE missiles, 2.75-inch 

rockets, and 30-mm. cannons. Cody divided his task force into two teams, 

one for each site.

After arriving at the lonely outpost of Al Jouf, 100 miles south of the Iraqi 

border, on January 14, the task force received the order to proceed about 1400 

on January 16. At 0100 the next morning, Cody led the White Team out of 

Al Jouf, while Captain Newman D. Shuffl ebarger led the Red Team. By 0237, 

both teams had closed within three to six kilometers of their targets and hovered 

in position fi fty feet above the ground, awaiting the “10 seconds” call from 

each team leader. At ten seconds before 0238, First Lieutenant Thomas R. 

Drew in the lead helicopter of the White Team broke the silence with the terse 

phrase, “Party in ten.” Ten seconds later, the two groups launched a salvo of 

HELLFIRE missiles.

 

The Iraqis were completely surprised. Neither group took antiaircraft fi re as it 

destroyed its targets. Twenty-two minutes after the attack, as the Apaches raced 

south, coalition planes poured through the gap in such numbers that the helicopter 

pilots dubbed them, “Aluminum Overcast.” When asked later about the factors 

contributing to the mission’s success, Drew pinpointed: “training — we had 
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American Military Heritage

trained so well that the mission could not fail; teamwork — a group of Americans 

working toward a common goal cannot be stopped; leadership—the leadership 

in the Task Force was truly outstanding; and the Cody Factor — he is extremely 

intelligent and he has a strength within that drives him to be the best he can be in 

everything.” Cody himself added another factor. “The Apache,” he stated, “is 

the fi nest combat helicopter ever produced — bar none.”

MCMASTER AT 73 EASTING

By the early afternoon of February 26, 1991, the third day of the ground offensive, 

the Iraqi defense of Kuwait was obviously crumbling. To the east, U.S. Marines, 

Army tankers of the Tiger Brigade, and other coalition troops drove on Kuwait 

City, from which Iraqi troops were already fl eeing along the so-called “Highway 

of Death.” To the west, the XVIII Airborne Corps, protecting the coalition’s fl ank, 

had driven into the Euphrates River valley. Between the Marines and coalition 

forces and the XVIII Airborne Corps, the VII Corps was turning the direction of 

its advance from the northeast to the east as it strove to come to grips with the 

Republican Guard divisions in the Iraqi rear areas. Screening the advance of the 

1st Infantry Division in the VII Corps center was Colonel Leonard D. Holder’s 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. As the cavalrymen emerged from another dust 

storm, they encountered the Iraqis desperately trying to reposition tanks, artillery, 

and other vehicles to meet the massive blow from the west. 

About 1600, Captain H. McMaster’s Eagle Troop of the 2d Squadron, 2d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, was approaching 73 Easting, a north-south line on military 

maps. He later described the ensuing action: “It was 1618 hours. The sandstorm 

had not let up. I was issuing fi nal instructions to the troop when my tank crested 

another, almost imperceptible rise. As we came over the top, SSG Koch [his 

tank gunner] yelled ‘Tanks, direct front!’ In an instant, I counted eight tanks in 

dug-in fi ghting positions. Large mounds of loose dirt were pushed up in front 

of the vehicles, and they were easily discernible to the naked eye....They were 

close! Koch hit the button on the laser range fi nder and the display under the gun 

sight showed 1,420 meters. I yelled, ‘Fire, fi re Sabot’.... As Koch depressed the 

trigger, the gun breach recoiled and the HEAT round fl ew toward the enemy tank 

....The enemy tank exploded in a huge fi reball as Koch swung onto another tank. 

This tank was much closer and was positioned forward of the main defense. It was 

swinging its turret toward our tank. Taylor [the loader] actuated the ammunition 

door. As the door slid open, he grabbed a Sabot round, slammed it in the breach 

and screamed, ‘Up!’ Only three seconds had elapsed since we destroyed the fi rst 

tank. I was talking on the radio as Koch let the round go. The enemy tank’s turret 

separated from its hull in a hail of sparks. The tank hull burst into fl ames as the 

penetrator ignited the fuel and ammunition compartments.

“PFC Hedenskog [his tank driver] slowed the tank down to about 20 kilometers 

an hour. He spotted an enemy minefi eld and was weaving between the mines 

while trying to keep the tank’s thick frontal armor toward the most dangerous 
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American Military Heritage

enemy tank.... Two T-72s fi red on us but their rounds fell short on either side 

of the tank. Taylor threw in another Sabot round. As Koch destroyed another 

T-72, our two tank platoons crested the ridge. The seconds of solo fi ghting 

had seemed an eternity. All of the troop’s tanks were now in the fi ght. Eight 

more T-72s erupted into fl ames as the tanks fi red their fi rst rounds.... The 

enemy was now in a panic.... Enemy tanks and BMPs (Soviet-made armored 

personnel carriers) erupted in innumerable fi reballs. The troop was cutting a 

fi ve-kilometer wide swath of destruction through the enemy’s defense.”

It had been an awesome demonstration of profi ciency and teamwork for the 

American tankers. Firing every two seconds with deadly accuracy, McMaster’s crew had knocked out three tanks in seven seconds. Within twenty-three 

more minutes, the troop demolished another 5 tanks and 30 armored vehicles. 

Only nine American tanks had wiped out a force four times their size, in the 

process penetrating three miles through the elite of the Iraqi armed forces. 

At 73 Easting and numerous other engagements in the Gulf War, the Army 

showed that years of weapons and doctrinal development — and tough, realistic 

training — had paid off in a force that could fi ght even the initial engagement 

of a war with considerable skill. 

CONTRIBUTIONS OF SUPPORT TROOPS TO

VICTORY IN THE GULF WAR 

When the fi rst American troops arrived in Saudi Arabia during the anxious 

days immediately following Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait, they 

faced a major challenge in creating the logistical base necessary to support a 
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large force. The Saudis did 

possess a good telephone 

system, excellent port facilities, modern airfields, 

some good roads, and a few 

unoccupied housing developments that could serve as 

improvised barracks. But facilities away from the cities 

were often primitive, and, 

even in Dhahran, the initial 

troop arrivals overwhelmed 

the local resources to accommodate them. As one 

logistical offi cer put it, “we just didn’t have anything. We had... soldiers here 

with no place to put them, no way to get them out of here if we did have a place 

to put them, and diffi culty in feeding them.” The newly arriving paratroopers 

took whatever living space they could fi nd, digging slit trenches for latrines and 

sleeping on the sand, handball or tennis courts, or on the grounds of the U.S. 

Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia. When Army Central Command’s 

deputy commander for logistics, Major General William G. Pagonis, landed in 

Riyadh on August 8, he found a shortage of trained logisticians and staff for 

the task ahead. Three training offi cers from the training mission had tried to 

handle arrangements for the incoming soldiers, but, lacking personnel, facilities, 

resources, or information, they were soon exhausted.

From these unpromising beginnings, General Pagonis and his support troops 

achieved a logistical miracle. In less than half a year, they unloaded 500 

ships and 9,000 aircraft, containing 126,400 tracked and wheeled vehicles, 

38,000 containers, 1,800,000 tons of cargo, and more than 350,000 soldiers, 

airmen, Marines, sailors, and civilians. This buildup, in addition to the shipment of troops, equipment, vehicles, and supplies to Saudi Arabia, was an 

achievement of vast proportions for Army logisticians, the equivalent of 

moving a city the size of Atlanta halfway around the world and establishing 

it in a new surrounding. For this achievement, the Army owed an immense 

debt to its reserve components. More than seventy percent of the soldiers 

who built the new theater came from the National Guard or Army Reserve.

The logistical buildup began within days of the disembarkation of the fi rst 

American troops. Four prepositioned ships, bearing rations, blankets, medical 

supplies, refrigerated trailers, and water purifi cation units, arrived from the 

offshore island base of Diego Garcia to service the most essential needs of the 

troops. Then transports began to arrive from the United States, bearing vehicles, aircraft, and sea-land containers with ammunition, spare parts, and other 

supplies. During October, Pagonis’ Provisional Support Command established 
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two huge forward logistical bases to provide critical medical, maintenance, fuel, 

and ammunition resupply services. These bases had perimeters of as much as 

eighty miles, within which they dispersed combat service facilities, each with 

low, earthen hills around its borders. When the Bush Administration decided 

to send the VII Corps to Saudi Arabia, the logisticians established three more 

bases to support the new arrivals. Along the road nets that connected these 

key points, support troops established convoy support centers, each providing 

fuel, latrines, food, tents, and limited repair facilities. At the convoy support 

centers and other points in the theater, roving hamburger stands, dubbed 

“Wolfmobiles” after Pagonis’ food service advisor, soon became a frequent and 

welcome sight for American troops tired of local cuisine and MREs (MealsReady-to-Eat). The Saudis gave enormously to the buildup, providing, along 

with telecommunications and port facilities, 4,800 tents, 333 heavy equipment 

transporting trucks, and millions of meals and gallons of fuel.

By the start of the air war in January, the logisticians had largely accomplished their incredible feat of 

building a supply structure in Saudi 

Arabia, but they now faced another 

major venture. Once allied air forces 

had established aerial supremacy, the 

VII and XVIII Airborne Corps could 

start to reposition for the movement 

around the Iraqi western fl ank—a 

330-mile shift for the VII Corps, 

500 for the XVIII Airborne Corps. 

Even before the two corps started 

their shift, supply troops moved west 

to establish a forward logistics base 

for each corps. By February 24, the 

day the ground offensive opened, 

each base had 29 days of food, 5.2 days of fuel, and 45 days of ammunition.

The shift west by the two corps began on January 20 and continued for the next 

three weeks. To save tracked vehicles from excessive wear during the move, the 

22d Support Command acquired almost 4,000 heavy trucks and gave them to the 

corps. Pagonis obtained these trucks from American military inventories in the 

theater, European donations, local commercial sources, and loans, including an 

entire Egyptian battalion of heavy equipment transporters. Over 2,000 civilian 

drivers, many contracted from India, joined military personnel for the movement. 

Through the rest of January and February, these drivers worked long hours, moving troops and equipment northwest along the Tapline Road to the corps assembly 

areas. If an Iraqi pilot had penetrated the air space over the border area during 

the great move west, he would have been astonished by the panorama of “mile 
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after mile of tank transporters, gasoline tankers, troop and ammunition carriers,” 

fi lling the Tapline Road.

In the end, the short duration of the ground offensive reduced the need for 

the extensive store of supplies that the logisticians had stocked in the forward 

bases. Still, the theater’s support troops could take considerable pride in their 

achievements between August 1990 and March 1991. The support that they 

provided in fi rst building the base and then shifting two corps around the Iraqi 

fl ank made possible the overwhelming allied victory in the Gulf War.

SOLDIER LIFE IN SAUDI ARABIA

American soldiers living and working in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia faced a 

variety of challenges, including stress, boredom, physical discomfort, the diffi culties of dealing with an unfamiliar culture, and the harsh desert environment. 

Troops had to watch for the scorpions, 

sand vipers, and camel spiders which 

roamed the desert fl oor, and fl ies were 

a constant nuisance. At the forward 

bases, many basic items formerly 

taken for granted reached the status 

of luxury goods. For some GIs, every 

meal was an MRE, and the water in 

their canteens was often hot by mid 

morning. Aviators had a hard time 

negotiating the desert terrain, especially at night when the dunes could 

be almost invisible. American troops 

stationed in urban areas enjoyed more amenities, but they also had to acclimate 

themselves to Saudi Arabia’s Islamic culture, with its ban on alcohol and the 

practice of religions other than Islam, its restrictions on women showing their 

faces on the streets, and its frequent daily prayers toward Mecca.

Both the Americans and the Saudis made concessions to each other to keep 

tensions to a minimum, but American troops still had to deal with a series of 

unfamiliar restrictions. Despite the law against women driving in Saudi Arabia, 

American servicewomen could drive discreetly while on duty, but those who 

ventured off base had to adhere to Saudi laws on appearance and behavior. 

The Army enforced the Saudi prohibition of alcoholic beverages, one of the 

consequences of which was an increased use of tobacco. Army leaders asked 

chaplains to be discrete in religious observances, and requested that soldiers 

refrain from displaying religious symbols in areas frequented by Saudis. 

Chaplains displayed considerable ingenuity in working around many of the 

restrictions. To circumvent Saudi laws on the use of wine, for example, they 

introduced a “chaplain consumable resupply kit” that contained a two-week 

supply of materials for the sacrament.
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In the fi eld, support troops quickly established mobile fi eld PXs, distributed 

health and comfort items, installed facilities for the Armed Forces Radio and 

Television Service, and instituted mail service. The long period away from 

home, and the lack of access in many cases to telephone service, made mail 

an especially valued commodity among the troops. After the fi rst few weeks 

of DESERT SHIELD, the theater was fl ooded by mail from the United States, 

much of it from individuals writing supportive letters to “any soldier.” In 

December alone, 2.3 million pounds of mail were arriving every week in the 

area of operations. 

Given the need for diversion, recreation offi cers played an especially critical role. As one recreation offi cer later remembered, “Our mission...was to 

provide recreation activities and opportunities for the soldiers. Most facilities 

provided sodas, popcorn, snacks, care packages, 

gift packages, ‘any soldier’ mail, videotape loan, 

free books, video viewing, bands, board games, 

weight equipment, volleyball courts, ping pong 

tables, pool tables, chilled water bottles, free 

newspapers, and recreation equipment issue, 

including everything from VCRs and popcorn 

poppers to radio/cassette players....Aside from 

the individual services provided, the big chore 

was to distribute donated items, ‘any soldier’ mail, 

care packages, etc. This proved to be a massive 

undertaking as patriotism was high in the United 

States. Donations by the plane and ship-load arrived daily during the initial war effort.” 

Much of the soldiers’ time was devoted to maintenance. Under the harsh desert 

conditions, vehicles had to be greased and engines washed with water repeatedly; even the use of a helicopter for an hour meant four hours of mechanics 

turning wrenches afterward. Air fi lters on wheeled vehicles had to be changed 

two to three times daily. To guard against the effects of sand and dust, aviators 

applied special paint, and later tape, to the leading edges of helicopter rotor 

blades, and mechanics developed improved particle separators, and tested and 

purchased windscreen covers.

American troops in the fi eld adapted to the harsh conditions as best they could. 

They showed remarkable improvisation in building homes in the desert. As 

they became accustomed to the hot, dry climate, their water requirements 

returned to about three gallons per man per day after reaching as high as six 

gallons immediately after the deployment. Boredom, however, remained a 

problem under daily conditions characterized by one private fi rst class as “heat, 

fl ies, and training.” Such special functions as Thanksgiving dinner helped 

ward off much of the boredom, but perhaps the most valuable tool was a sense 
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American Military Heritage

of humor. According to one would-be reporter, “During area improvement 

yesterday, SSgt. Craig Blauvelt, while reaching for a box of sand, was suddenly 

stung by a scorpion. He was immediately rushed to the area medical facility. 

Despite the valiant efforts of some of the top medical experts in the area, the 

scorpion was pronounced dead at 11:30 a.m. local time.”

FAMILY SUPPORT DURING THE GULF WAR

For Supply Spc. Michele Brown, a 21-year-old single mother, the Gulf War 

proved an especially harrowing ordeal. She left her three-year-old daughter with 

her mother, when her unit, the 202d Military Intelligence Battalion, deployed 

to the Persian Gulf. While in Saudi Arabia, she learned that her daughter had 

been hospitalized with asthma. “It’s hard being a single mother and going to 

war,” she stated, “I don’t want to be here.” 

Fortunately, the Army had in place by the deployment to Saudi Arabia an 

extensive family support system. Family support took many forms. Over 

160 Army-sponsored family assistance centers provided 24-hour service 

to families encountering problems. 

Under one roof, they assembled 

chaplains, lawyers, relief workers, 

and other social service specialists. 

Aided by volunteers, these professionals monitored possible trouble 

areas, provided information and 

counseling, and trained unit support 

groups. Briefi ngs provided family 

members with the latest information 

from the desert. To support reservists 

and families at installations without 

family assistance centers, the Army 

established a 24-hour toll free hotline 

in an operations center at the Community and Family Support Center 

in Alexandria, Virginia. Volunteers 

were especially essential to the success of family support during Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm.

MASTER SERGEANT SIMS,

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 4 CRISAFULLI, AND

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSION SR 008

On the evening of February 23, 1991, three men of Team B, Special Forces 

Operational Detachment A-532 under Master Sergeant Jeffrey W. Sims infi ltrated by Blackhawk helicopter to a landing zone near Qawam am Hamzal, 

deep inside Iraq. After moving four kilometers to the mission area, Sergeant 
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American Military Heritage

Sims stood watch while his two companions hastily dug four feet into the 

clay soil to construct a hideout. From there, with a clear fi eld of observation 

over Highway 7, they were in a good position to carry out their mission of 

spotting any Iraqi vehicles moving over that route into the sector opposite 

XVIII Airborne Corps.

But the mission, despite its promising beginning, soon went awry. At 

daylight, the Special Forces troopers found themselves surrounded by goat 

herds and shepherds, many with children. The contingent attempted to remain concealed, but a villager and his young daughter soon discovered the 

entrance to their hiding place. Emerging quickly from the hole, Sergeant 

Sims apprehended the two, only to see twenty more villagers nearby. He and 

his team released their captives and tried to fi gure another way to continue 

their mission, but, within moments, the villagers opened on the party with 

single-shot rifl es.

Under the random fi re, the team retreated 100 meters down an irrigation 

ditch. There, they stopped to assess the situation and called for close air 

support and an emergency exfi ltration. Moving another 500 meters up the 

wadi, they encountered a truck with over fi fty soldiers. The group took a 

defensive position and prepared to fi ght for their survival. Firing selectively 

to avoid hitting women and children, they picked off the enemy leaders with 

aimed shots and waited for help. But their situation appeared desperate.

Finally, one and one-half hours after they fi rst reported the compromise, an 

F-16 appeared. Firing a marker rocket into the middle of the enemy position, 

the F-16 then dropped cluster bombs on the enemy in the open, killing or 

wounded an estimated fi fty Iraqis. The presence of the F-16 and its successors on station kept the enemy at bay, although enemy troops continued to 

circle the position.

At 1414, Sims and his beleaguered compatriots heard an exfi ltration helicopter approaching and Sims popped a white pen fl air. The crew chief of the 

helicopter initially thought the fl are was an enemy missile launch, but the 

crew then spotted the team’s VF17 panel and notifi ed the pilot, Chief Warrant Offi cer 4 James Crisafulli of the 3d Battalion, 160th Special Operations 

Aviation Regiment. Standing the Blackhawk on its nose, Crisafulli jumped 

his helicopter over a power line, pointed the nose toward the team, and landed 

in a controlled crash. One team sergeant quickly jumped on the plane, but 

as Sims moved to board, enemy rounds landed between him and the aircraft. 

One of the helicopter crew killed two Iraqis approaching the craft from the 

rear, while a crew chief killed three more Iraqis approaching from another 

direction. Once he was sure that Sims and everybody else were aboard, 

Crisafulli took off as soon as possible. 
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American Military Heritage

The Blackhawk had sustained such severe damage from the rescue that it remained out of commission for the rest of the war. One round had barely missed 

a control rod, and another had almost hit a rack of M203 rounds. Enemy fi re 

had hit the rotors in several places. It was a much relieved helicopter crew 

and Special Forces contingent that returned to base.

For their heroism, Chief Warrant Offi cer Crisafulli received the Distinguished 

Flying Cross, and Sergeant Sims received the Silver Star. Sims and his team 

had not accomplished their primary mission. Nevertheless, they had shown 

great courage and resourcefulness, fought hard when cornered, and in the end, 

survived to fi ght another day. And they were deeply grateful for their rescue 

by Chief Warrant Offi cer Crisafulli and his helicopter crew. As Sims later 

remarked, “I’ll do anything in this world — go through hell with gasoline 

drawers on — if I know that we got people like that pilot backing us up....

That pilot saved our lives.”

Section IV

Mission to Somalia—Living the Creed

Soon after the overwhelming success of DESERT STORM in 1991, the Army 

began to learn the meaning of the transition from a force focused on a particular threat to one ready to meet any contingency. The rapid collapse of 

Soviet power was accompanied by major disturbances around the world. In 

almost every corner of the earth, fi ghting between different groups broke out. 

In some cases, this confl ict took the form of border disputes between nations. 

In other parts of the world, confrontation traced its roots to ethnic confl ict, 

where groups with different languages, religions, and cultures fought for the 

control of fl edgling governments. 

Since these confl icts had the potential to cause entire geographic regions 

to fl are up, many affected the interests and security of the United States. 

Thus, American leaders called on their military forces to perform a range 

of military operations from combat to peacekeeping and humanitarian 

assistance. Army doctrine changed to refl ect this new reality, evolving 

a whole new category of peace operations. Although the Army had conducted many of these kinds of operations throughout its history, the new 

doctrine refl ected the expectation that, in the future, it would perform them 

as a matter of course.

Following an initial mission of assisting and protecting the Kurds in northern Iraq through Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the Army carried out its next 

major peacetime mission in Somalia, a country with serious problems. 
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Somalia lies in the northeast corner of the African continent, on the coast 

of the Gulf of Aden. After a decade of chronic economic and political 

turmoil, the nation was torn by civil war. Severe drought and an enormous 

fl ood of refugees added to the misery of its people. By 1991 the entire 

southern half of the nation, including the capital Mogadishu, was one giant war zone. One of President George Bush’s last actions in offi ce was 

to dispatch American troops to Somalia as part of a United Nations force 

in December 1992. The UN force was supposed to stop clan violence and 

begin moving food and supplies to the Somali people.

 

The initial humanitarian mission soon expanded beyond its original bounds. 

American troops moved into Somalia without incident and began to bring 

food to the starving population in the countryside. After successfully combating famine, they stayed in Somalia to help stabilize the country and secure 

a political solution to the civil war. Violence against them and other United 

Nations peacekeepers increased. After fi fteen months, President Bill Clinton 

ordered the troops home. During combat in Somalia, 30 American troops had 

been killed and 175 wounded. As the United States left, the two biggest clans 

signed a peace agreement.

The mission in Somalia demonstrated that, even in peacetime, being part 

of America’s Army entails service and sacrifice. In the four years after 

DESERT STORM, the Army awarded over 600 purple hearts, even though 

it had only participated in operations short of war during this period. 

Soldiers often found that they were never very far from risk and danger. 

Every day, they demonstrated that words like duty, honor, and selfless 

service to the nation were more than words — they were a creed by which 

every soldier lived. 

The most tragic and inspiring act of “living the creed” during these operations short of war occurred in Operation RESTORE HOPE. During a firefight 

in Mogadishu, October 3–4, 1993, Somali gunfire forced a Black Hawk 

helicopter to crash land in 

enemy territory. From another helicopter, Master 

Sergeant Gary I. Gordon 

and Sergeant First Class 

Randall D. Shugart fired 

their rifles to protect their 

comrades at the crash site 

below hem, even though 

they themselves came 

under a heavy barrage 

of fire. With Somali 

gunmen closing on four 
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critically wounded soldiers at the crash site, the 

two NCOs volunteered to 

help and fought their way 

through to the wounded 

crew. They provided 

cover until they ran out 

of ammunition. When 

Sergeant Shugart fell fatally wounded, Sergeant 

Gordon picked up a rifle 

from the crash site and 

handed the weapon and 

five rounds to the pilot. 

Sergeant Gordon said, “Good Luck” and, armed only with a pistol, continued the fight until he was killed. For their heroism, Sergeant Gordon 

and Sergeant Shugart each received the Medal of Honor.

The courage shown by these two valiant NCOs exemplifi ed the American 

soldier’s commitment to the Army’s values and traditions. As Stephanie 

Shugart said so eloquently at the award ceremony for her late husband, “It 

takes a special person to not only read a creed and memorize a creed, but to 

live a creed.” Living the creed is what Army courage means. 

In operations short of war, however, a soldier needs more than bravery in battle. 

Soldiering also involves the moral courage, refl ected in discipline and mental 

toughness, to handle both lethal and non-lethal situations. Today’s soldiers 

must be able to follow disciplined rules of engagement under stressful and 

demanding conditions. Soldiers in Somalia and the many other operations that 

the United States has conducted since the end of the Cold War have demonstrated that America’s Army remains the best trained, best disciplined, and 

most courageous force in the world.

Section V

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY—The Joint Team

in Action

Only a few months after the disaster on the Green Ramp (see page 253) and 

less than a year after their departure from Somalia, American forces embarked 

upon another major mission. Like Somalia, the Caribbean nation of Haiti was 

plagued by political and economic confl ict. After a coup in 1991 ousted a 

democratically elected government, the Haitian people were ruled by a military dictatorship characterized by harshness and gross human rights abuses. 

Conditions became so bad that the United States, along with its regional allies, 

prepared to use force to oust Haiti’s illegitimate government. 
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In the case of Haiti, the United States planned an operation using forces from 

the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. From the smallest unit to the 

highest levels, commanders and staff offi cers found that being a professional 

in a post-Cold War force required not only expertise in ground operations, but 

an understanding and knowledge of the systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures employed by the other services. 

On September 19, 1994, following successful last-minute negotiations 

by an American delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter, the 

U.S. Army landed peacefully at the Port-Au-Prince International Airport 

to initiate Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. On almost a moment’s notice, 

the Army transformed the operation from one of combat to one of nation 

building. The new aims of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY — restoring civil order, 

assisting in the reorganization of the Haitian armed forces and police, 

and easing the transition to a democratic government — were achieved 

on October 15, 1994, with the successful return of Haitian President Jean 

Bertrand Aristide.

 

While this operation was marked by many “fi rsts” for the Army, such as the 

employment of a Navy aircraft carrier as a base and the positioning of command and control facilities aboard the USS Mt. Whitney, the highly trained, 

physically tough, combat-ready soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who 

turned policy into action provided the real cornerstone. Operations in Haiti 

proved to be another example that soldiers in the 1990s were expected to 

conduct joint operations as a matter of course.

Section VI

Operations in Bosnia—Trained and Ready

With the end of the Cold War, the central European country of Yugoslavia 

split into a number of independent republics. Bosnia, one of these new nations, quickly fell into a bitter civil war. Concerned about widespread human 

rights abuses, waves of refugees, and the threat of ethnic confl ict spreading 

beyond Bosnia’s borders, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

in 1995 agreed to provide a military force to supervise the implementation 

of peace accords reached at a conference in 

Dayton, Ohio.

The NATO contingent included forces from the 

United States Army in Europe (USAREUR). 

Before the fi rst troops from the 1st Armored 

Division deployed from Germany to Bosnia, 

all troops completed pre-deployment training. 

One of the features of the Army’s success during 

the Cold War had been tough, realistic training, 
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American Military Heritage

based on the Army’s eight-step training model. The principles of good training 

were important to any kind of operation and were the key to executing a safe 

and successful mission.

The rewards of training were demonstrated at the outset of the Army’s mission in 

Bosnia. In order to enter the country, the 1st Armored Division had to bridge the 

Sava River, which marked the border with Croatia. This mission — the construction of the longest assault bridge in modern history — was conducted by Army 

engineers under the most diffi cult conditions with no casualties or serious injuries. 

Despite rain, cold, snow, mud, and a fl ooding river, the bridge was complete on 

December 31, 1995. Around the globe, people were impressed by the technical 

competence, drive, and determination of the American soldier. As Sgt. Lawrence 

Galuski of the 502d Engineer Company said, “We can’t be stopped; we’ve had 

fl oods, high water, rain snow – makes no difference. We still bridged it.” 

Bridging the Sava River proved to be the fi rst of a series of successful operations in Bosnia as the NATO force carried out the charter of the Dayton Peace 

Accords. In 1998, Army forces still remained in Bosnia. Although their mission was not yet complete, they had accomplished a great deal. As the Army 

Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, concluded:

Our soldiers in Bosnia have shown that they have handled this high 

tempo of operations very well. They have demonstrated the importance of tough, realistic training, the importance of discipline and the 

importance of professionalism. They have made a difference over there. 

As I talk to them, I always tell them that people can argue the policy, 

whether we should be there or not, but what people can’t argue with is 

the fact that they have saved thousands of lives. I absolutely believe 

that’s true. They’re doing a great job — and that’s not by chance. It’s 

because they went through a tough realistic training program. 

The success of the Army’s operations in Bosnia are a testimony not only to the 

American soldier, but to the best training system in the world, a system designed 

to make sure that every soldier was prepared before he went into harm’s way.
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Section VII

Notes on Uniforms

During the Gulf War, the Army made several changes to its desert combat 

uniform (DCU). To make the uniform more comfortable, designers eliminated the shirt yoke and elbow, seat, and knee patches and made plans to 

test a lighter fabric than the existing half-cotton, half-nylon blend. At the 

start of DESERT SHIELD, the standard Army desert DCU contained seven 

colors, a pattern commonly known among the soldiers as “chocolate 

chip.” About the start of DESERT SHIELD in August, the Army changed the 

fabric design from seven to three colors. Because of the time necessary 

for procurement, however, most soldiers in the Gulf wore the seven-color 

design. Many units, especially those of VII Corps, never received DCUs 

and, like the soldier in the Rumayiah oil fi elds painting, went to war in 

their temperate, “woodland”— pattern battle dress uniforms. Since the 

Gulf confl ict was a coalition war, the troops wore American fl ags on the 

sleeves of their uniforms; these fl ags placed the blue fi eld to the left. Later 

issue fl ags placed the blue fi eld to the right, because Army regulations 

called for its display on the right sleeve, and heraldry stipulated that the 

blue canton be forward.

The Army’s hot-weather gear required several changes with the deployment to the Gulf. Designed for Vietnam, the hot-weather boot proved 

unsuitable for the desert environment. Its black and olive-green color 

attracted heat, as did the steel insert designed to protect the foot from 

booby-trap stakes, and the drainage 

holes in its instep allowed sand to 

enter. Many soldiers plugged the 

holes by melting parachute cord into 

them. A new desert version of the 

hot-weather boot changed the color to 

desert tan, reversed the upper of the 

boot to fl esh-side leather, eliminated 

the holes, and replaced the stainless 

steel plate with a thermal barrier. 

This “Schwarzkopf boot” also had 

improved ankle support, a padded 

collar, and a form-fi tting contoured 

insole. Designers provided for the 

addition of parkas to compensate for 

the nighttime drops in temperatures in 

the Arabian desert. The parkas came 

in a grid-print, mottled, two-color 

camouflage, designed to confuse 

night vision devices.
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Individual equipment for the desert environment did not change radically. 

The soldier from the 101st Airborne Division is carrying the All-Purpose, 

Lightweight, Individual Carrying Equipment (ALICE). The soldier in the 

Rumayiah oil fi elds painting is carrying the M-16A2 rifl e, a version of the 

M-16 allowing more selective, three-round bursts than its predecessor. Note 

the M-17A1 protective mask with the Military-Oriented Protective Posture 

(MOPP) suit that he is wearing. Brown cloth rags and camoufl age-print 

mosquito nets were issued to some troops, who often wore them over the 

face, mouth, and neck.

Section VIII

Notes on Awards

The Southwest Asia Service Medal: The Southwest Asia Service Medal 

(SWASM) was established by Executive Order 12754, March 12, 1991. Its 

depiction of a tank, armored personnel carrier, helicopter, ship, and aircraft 

with a desert and seascape recognizes the joint nature of the operation. The 

reverse side, with an upraised sword, entwined 

with a palm frond and with “United States of 

America” around the edge, symbolizes military 

might and preparedness in defense of peace. 

The sand-colored ribbon, with red, white, blue, 

green and black stripes, represents the colors of 

the United States and coalition members.

The SWASM is awarded to members of the American armed forces serving in Southwest Asia and contiguous waters or airspace from August 2, 

1990 to a date to be determined. American servicemen and servicewomen 

who served in Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan between January 

17 and April 11, 1991 also are eligible for this award, although they must 

have been under U.S. Central Command or directly supporting military 

operations in the combat theater. To be eligible, a service member must be 

attached to, or regularly serve for one or more days with an organization 

participating in operations, or he must be serving on temporary duty for 

thirty consecutive days or sixty nonconsecutive days although the latter 

stipulation may be waived for those participating in actual combat operations. Also eligible were those who lost their lives while participating in 

DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM. One bronze service star can be worn on 

the suspension and service ribbon of the SWASM for participation in each 

designated campaign.

The Kuwait Liberation Medal of the Government of Saudi Arabia: 

The Kuwait Liberation Medal is awarded by the government of Saudi 

Arabia to members of the American armed forces who participated in 

Southwest Asia

Service Medal Ribbon
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American Military Heritage

DESERT STORM between January 17 and February 28, 1991. The sunburst on 

the medal symbolizes the light of freedom. The globe shows the theater 

of operations, and it is encircled by a palm, signifying victory. The palm 

tree with crossed sabers is the emblem of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

Green, red, white, and black are the colors of the fl ag of Kuwait. Green 

and white are the colors in the fl ag of Saudi Arabia. 

To be eligible for the Kuwait Liberation 

Medal, personnel must have been attached to, 

or regularly served for one or more days with, 

an organization participating in operations, 

or they must have been serving on temporary 

duty for thirty consecutive days, although the 

latter stipulation may be waved by the U.S. 

Army’s Personnel Command for those who participated in actual combat 

operations. PERSCOM may also issue the award without regard to length 

of service to the next of kin for those who lost their lives while participating 

in DESERT STORM. The Department of Defense authorized issue of the medal 

on January 3, 1992. An initial issue to eligible personnel from a onetime 

stock provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia was accomplished by 

the Army in 1992.

The Kuwait Liberation Medal of the Government of Kuwait: The Kuwait Liberation Medal is awarded to American servicemen who participated 

in Operation DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM, or their aftermath, between 

August 2, 1990 and August 31, 1993. The obverse bears the coat of arms 

of Kuwait, consisting of a shield of the fl ag design in color superimposed on 

a winged falcon. Falconry is the sport of kings in the Persian Gulf, and the 

falcon symbolizes Kuwaiti prowess. The falcon supports a disk containing a 

sailing ship, symbolic of Kuwait’s history as a 

nation of seafarers, and the full name of Kuwait 

is written at the top of the disk. The inscription 

1991 with Arabic letters appears at the top of 

the disk. On the reverse is a map of Kuwait on a 

rayed background. Of the colors in the award, 

black stands for battlefi elds, white for deeds, 

green for meadows, and red for the blood of 

Kuwait’s enemies.

The government of Kuwait offered the medal to members of the American 

armed forces on July 16, 1994. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry accepted 

the medal on March 16, 1995.

Kuwait Liberation

Medal Ribbon

(Government of Saudi 

Arabia)

Kuwait Liberation

Medal Ribbon

(Government of 

Kuwait)
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American Military Heritage

15

America’s Army after the Cold War, 1991 

and Into the Future

Section I

A Decade of Change

The end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s marked the close 

 of a half-century of global tension between the United States and the 

 Soviet Union. New opportunities and emerging threats have characterized the post-Cold War era. As was the case after past wars, the Army has 

undergone cuts in personnel and force structure. At the same time, it has 

sought new ways of handling changes in doctrine without sacrifi cing readiness. 

Indeed, the Army’s most remarkable achievement in the fi rst decade of the 

post-Cold War world was that, throughout this period of dramatic change, the 

force not only remained trained and ready, but also performed a great number 

of unique and demanding missions around the world such as in Somalia, Haiti, 

and Bosnia, discussed in the previous chapter.

Section II

Reductions in the Post Cold War Army 

In the 1990s, the Army underwent major structural changes. Between 1990 

and 1996, the service reduced the number of its divisions from twenty-eight 

to eighteen, the fewest since the Korean War, ten in the active component and 

eight in the United States Army National Guard. In all, cuts took over 630,000 

people from the Army’s active component, the Army National Guard, the 

United States Army Reserve, and the Army’s civilian component, leaving an 

Army which today ranks eighth in the world in size.

The reduction in the number of divisions was a challenge for the Army. Many 

of its most honored units disappeared from its force structure— among others, 

the VII U.S. Corps, the 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 24th Infantry Divisions, and the 

2d Armored and 3d Armored Divisions cased their colors. To ensure that the 

active Army continued to draw on its rich heritage and traditions, the Army 

also refl agged (renamed) several units. 

In addition to the changes in the active component, the Army conducted a 

major reorganization of its reserve components. All the combat forces in the 

United States Army Reserve were transferred to the Army National Guard. 
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The Guard and Reserve also endured force reductions, although together 

they still comprised fi fty-four percent of the Army. By the end of 1996, 

most of the refl aggings of the reserve components and the active force had 

been fi nished, completing one of the largest reorganizations of the Army 

in the modern era. In all, the Army inactivated or refl agged over 400 units 

from corps to battalion.

Every soldier and veteran feels a strong unit allegiance. Inactivation ceremonies were characterized by tremendous sadness, but also by dignity and 

pride. Ceremonies were signifi cant not only to the units, but also to friends 

and neighbors in nearby civilian communities. These reactions demonstrated 

the power of the Army’s traditions and heritage to motivate and inspire young 

soldiers. As the Army grows smaller, lineages and honors have more importance than ever, because they help to build strong and cohesive organizations 

that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for their members 

in diffi cult and turbulent times.

Section III

Doctrinal and Cultural Change

in the Post-Cold War Army

The Cold War was a very dangerous, but predictable era in the Army’s history. Almost everything that the Army did during the Cold War centered on 

defeating a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The Army wrote doctrine to 

counter the Soviet Red Army, trained at its Combat Training Centers against 

opposing forces structured like the Red Army, and modernized its equipment to defeat the Red Army. All of that changed with the disbanding of 

the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Army required a 

change in outlook, a transition from a force focused on a particular threat to a 

more fl exible organization with a wide range of capabilities to meet the new, 

uncertain challenges of the 21st Century.

Shortly after DESERT STORM, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) established six Battle Labs to experiment with changing methods 

of warfare and aid the application of new technology to military uses. Before 

the Battle Labs, it normally took six years for the Army to develop and deploy a new system envisioned by researchers; the goal of Battle Labs was to 

reduce the cycle to one year. The labs linked the developers directly to units 

in the fi eld, often having soldiers experiment with prototypes during a training exercise and then provide feedback directly to the engineer who designed 

the system. Using the practical knowledge and shrewd judgment of soldiers 

early in the design process gave the Army a distinct advantage in developing 

and fi elding new equipment.
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In July 1994, the Army embarked on the next stage of its transformation: the 

implementation of the new ideas and initiatives that would shape the future 

force. Called Force XXI, the new process was designed to spearhead the development of Army XXI, the modernized force that would see the Army into 

the next century. The Force XXI process centered on a series of Advanced 

Warfi ghting Experiments (AWE) using real soldiers in real units to test new 

systems and operational concepts. Between 1994 and 1998, the Army conducted six AWEs with forces ranging from battalion to division size.

Section IV

Women in America’s Army

During the Gulf War, many Americans realized for the fi rst time the huge 

contribution that women now make to today’s Army. Women served in the 

air, at sea, and on the ground, performing as pilots, military police, communications specialists, operations offi cers, and in a variety of other roles. 

They drove jeeps and heavy trucks, refueled tanks, delivered supplies, and 

guarded harbors. On television, and in newspapers and magazines, millions 

of Americans saw women capably performing duties that had formerly been 

reserved for men.

The superb performance of military 

women in the Gulf reopened the debate 

over whether women should serve in 

ground combat positions. In 1992, a 

Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 

decided to continue the ban as far as 

the Army was concerned. But in 1993, 

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin ordered 

the armed forces to remove most restrictions barring women from aerial or naval 

combat. Restrictions against women in 

ground combat remained in place but 

under increasing fi re.

In an address to the Reserve Offi cers Association on January 27, 1998, the 

Army’s Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, alluded to the key role played 

by women in today’s military. During a recent trip to Bosnia, he had visited 

the 396th Combat Support Hospital, a Reserve unit from Washington state. 

The hospital’s commander, Colonel Kristine Campbell, was the fi rst woman 

to command a hospital unit in a combat area. Her achievement would probably 

have received more attention except for the fact that “fi rsts” by women were 

becoming almost commonplace in America’s Army.
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American Military Heritage

 Section V

Disaster on the Green Ramp—Taking Care

of America’s Army

While American forces were disengaging from operations in Somalia, the attention of those back in the United States was diverted by a terrible tragedy at 

Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. On March 23, 1994, several hundred 

paratroopers from nearby Fort Bragg had assembled on Green Ramp, an area 

adjacent to the airstrip. Two aircraft that were landing collided, creating a 

massive fi reball that killed or injured more than one hundred soldiers. The 

disaster was the worst peacetime loss of life suffered by the 82d Airborne 

Division since its activation during World War II. 

The story of the disaster on Green Ramp, however, goes beyond the horrible 

training accident. Soldiers, doctors, medics, chaplains, and volunteers came 

together to respond to the needs of the victims and their family members. 

Two days after the tragedy, President Clinton toured the crash sites and met 

with victims and support personnel. The President stated, “I wish everyone 

in America could see the faces and the eyes and the spirit of these people. 

They would realize how fortunate we are to be served by men and women 

like them. They are so brave and selfl ess.” In the end, the story of the Green 

Ramp disaster was as much about the courage, determination and teamwork 

of the Fort Bragg community as it was about the terrible loss of brave and 

faithful soldiers. 

 

The family support programs that underlay the military and civilian response 

to the Green Ramp disaster followed in a long tradition of the Army helping its own. Since the fi rst days on the frontier, family and community 

programs have been an important part of Army life. The Army at heart has 

always considered itself a community, bringing together soldiers, civilian 

employees, and families. Communities thrive when people care about one 

another, work for one another, and trust one another. This sense of community has provided a source of strength and support for the Army family 

in troubled times.

 Section VI

Army Values—A Matter Of Dignity

and Respect

Although the Army’s post-Cold War accomplishments were impressive, the 

institution itself underwent serious scrutiny. Even though extremist behavior, 

racial and sexual discrimination, and sexual misconduct are opposed to everything the Army stands for, the service encountered some serious problems 

in these areas. The most publicized incidents occurred at Aberdeen Proving 
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American Military Heritage

Ground, Maryland, where soldiers faced court martial on charges involving 

sexual offenses. The event gained worldwide media attention. 

In the wake of the events at Aberdeen, the Army commissioned two major 

investigations. The two reports provided the Army with an occasion to reaffi rm 

its commitment to basic values. Both found that the Army was fundamentally 

sound and that its men and women were committed to the highest standards 

of values, discipline, and teamwork. Nevertheless, the reports portrayed a 

weakening in the trust and respect for human dignity between some leaders 

and soldiers. The bedrock of the Army is its commitment to seven core values: 

duty, honor, personal courage, loyalty, integrity, respect, and selfl ess service. 

Sexual discrimination, harassment and abuse undermined every one of those 

values, threatening the readiness of the force and ultimately the security of 

the nation. 

The Army recognized that the issue of sexual harassment and discrimination 

was essentially about leadership and standards. In response to the two reports 

the Army developed a long-range Human Relations Action Plan to ensure that 

the tragic events at Aberdeen would never be repeated. Although the Army’s 

action plan included a number of wide ranging initiatives, the core of the plan 

emphasized challenging and empowering leaders to set the right standards. 

General Reimer put it best when he concluded:

A sergeant major once told me that, “the Army is an easy place in 

which to succeed. The Army has standards for everything and all 

we have to do to get ahead is to meet those standards.” He had it 

about right. Every time leaders fall off a commitment to standards, 

trouble follows. We must ensure that all leaders understand standards and enforce them as well as set the example. In particular, 

I have charged our Noncommissioned Offi cers Corps with being 

the keeper of Army standards. Standards are the “crown jewels of 

the Army”; without them soldiers will never know what to expect 

from their leaders.

Section VII

One Team—One Fight—One Future

The Total Army and Ice Storm 98

The Army’s mission in the 1990s is too great for any one of its components. 

Operations in Bosnia, with twenty-fi ve percent of Army forces originating in 

the reserve components, provide a case in point. In fact, every mission that 

the Army has conducted from DESERT STORM to Bosnia shows that success can 

only be achieved by a Total Army effort, uniting the capabilities of the active 

force, Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve.
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American Military Heritage

To symbolize its commitment to the principles of a 

Total Army, the Army, in 

October 1997, adopted a 

concept called “One Team, 

One Fight, One Future.” 

More than just a slogan, 

these words reflect three 

ideas at the core of the 

Army’s effort to provide the 

most effective and effi cient 

ground force for the 21st 

Century. The Total Army 

represented “one team”: 

The active United States 

Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. This Total Army 

would always wage “one fi ght,” as part of an integrated joint combat force in 

concert with other federal agencies providing for the common defense. Finally, 

the Total Army would work for “one future” — a better and more secure place 

for America in a safer and more prosperous world.

 

Only a few months after the Army began to develop a series of “One Team, 

One Fight, One Future” initiatives, an event occurred that demonstrated the 

importance of the combined efforts of the Total Army. During the second week 

of January 1998, a sudden winter storm hammered eastern Canada, upstate 

New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine in a fi ve-day torrent of rain 

and sleet. The storm covered much of the northeastern United States with a 

blanket of ice. It left hundreds of thousands of people without electricity and 

stranded many without heat or food.

 

Before the weather had cleared, the soldiers of America’s Army everywhere 

responded to the crisis. In Maine, over 1,000 National Guard troops helped 

their friends, neighbors, and civilian authorities cope with Ice Storm 98. “First 

we’re trying to keep people from freezing,” said Major David Duehring, who 

helped the Maine Emergency Management Agency coordinate the Guard’s 

response to the storm. To help deal with the power shortage, the Massachusetts National Guard trucked to Maine nineteen generators, including three 

100-kilowatt units on fl atbed trucks and fi ve technicians to operate them.

 

Active duty soldiers from Fort Drum, New York, also joined in the effort. 

Hundreds of soldiers deployed throughout a six-county disaster area, helping to 

remove debris and providing emergency services. Troopers of the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, worked to clear fallen tree limbs from a cemetery 

near Clayton, New York, while soldiers from the 110th Military Intelligence 

Battalion and the 41st Engineer Battalion served hot meals in a Canton, New 
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American Military Heritage

York shelter. It was a Total Army effort. As Staff Sergeant Richard Trotter, a 

cook with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 110th MI Bn said, “It lets 

us give the community an outlook of what we do in the military, and it lets us 

show, yes, the military cares.” The Army’s response to Ice Storm 98 not only 

showed that soldiers care, but it demonstrated what the combined capabilities of 

the force could achieve when the Total Army committed to an effort.

Section XI

Notes on Equipment

Force XXI Land Warrior (LW): The Force XXI 

land warrior program meets the Army’s pressing need 

to improve the individual soldier’s performance, 

deadliness, and ability to survive. The advanced 

technologies developed by this program lower 

the weight carried by the soldier while adding 

to his capabilities. These innovations include 

an integrated sight and improved weapon interface and radio enhancements, among others. 

It especially stresses the use of products of the 

commercial microelectronics and telecommunications industries to achieve light, miniaturized 

components. 

The M-1A2 Abrams Tank: The M1A2 tank represents a major advance on 

the M1A1 model. The new Abrams provides the tank commander with an 

independent thermal viewer and an improved weapon station. It also includes 

position/navigation equipment and a distributed data and power architecture. The digital data architecture makes the M1A2 the fi rst fully integrated, 

computer-driven ground combat system. The M1A2 was approved for rate 

production in April 1994. 

In October of that year, 

the contractor delivered 

the first M1A2 upgrade. 

The first unit equipped 

with the new tank was 

the 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood 

in December 1995. The 

Army’s current program 

seeks to fi eld M1A2 tanks 

throughout the Army while 

reducing the inventory of 

older M1A1 tanks.
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American Military Heritage

Section XII 

An Army on the Move—Shape,

Respond, and Prepare

The need for land power during peacetime is greater than ever. Since the end 

of the Cold War, soldiers have gone around the world, handling a broad range 

of military missions. Army troops have participated in twenty-eight of the 

thirty-two major post-Cold War deployments by American forces, providing 

over sixty percent of the personnel involved in those operations. In 1997, 

for example, the Army stationed 31,000 Active, Reserve and National Guard 

soldiers in seventy countries around the world. Approximately 62,000 men 

and women were either preparing to deploy, deploying, or had just returned 

from operations. Thus, during the year, a large portion of the Army’s soldiers were on the move, supporting active operational commitments, while 

others were training and preparing for all types of military operations. The 

requirements of America’s post-Cold War defense have made the U.S. Army 

busier than ever.

 

Where the Army goes in the future will largely depend on the national military 

strategy. Strategy is important to the armed forces; it defi nes the ways, means, 

and ends of how America applies its military power. Strategy drives what kind 

of equipment the Army has, the size of the force, and how, when, where and 

why that force will be used. 

Today, the nation’s military strategy rests on three pillars – “shape, respond, and 

prepare.” Responding is the ability to answer a crisis, wherever and whenever it 

arises. The ability to respond, however, is not enough. It is better to deal with 

problems before they become too big, and to diminish threats before they become dangers to national interests. Therefore, American strategy also includes 

being able to shape the international environment, creating the conditions that 

will make the world safer for America’s children and grandchildren. Finally, 

the strategy requires preparation now for the challenges of the 21st Century by 

modernizing the force, by introducing technology to ensure American soldiers 

have an overwhelming advantage in the next battle. 

Thus, the national military strategy lays out three demanding and important 

tasks for the soldiers and leaders of the Total Army. If the history of the 1990s 

is any measure, the Army will, without a doubt, be equal to the challenge. In 

fact, the Army will always succeed as long as it continues to rely on its greatest asset — soldiers, the men and women of America’s Army, who will help 

move the nation into the 21st century.
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American Military Heritage

Postscript:

Looking Into the Future From 1998

Changes in warfare became apparent during Operations JUST CAUSE and 

DESERT STORM, and the Army began changing in order to take advantage 

of the international change, the bow wave of technology that marked 

the onset of the Information Age, and the military reductions that were 

imposed to accommodate a lesser threat. Indeed, during the years after 

the end of the Cold War and into the new century, the Army has been 

focused on change — change in the way we do business, change in the 

way we change. 

Training and Doctrine Command was charged with the mission of transforming the tactical Army. TRADOC focused on doing that across all the 

Army’s mission areas: doctrine, training, leader development, equipment, 

and force design, ensuring quality in each area. The process of change is 

called Force XXI.

The Army is moving into the future in a new way. The service no longer has 

the time or resources to proceed in a step-by-step, sequential, linear fashion. Rather we are engaging in holistic spiral development — developing, 

experimenting, analyzing, deciding, then developing some more. It takes 

about one fi fth the time the old process would have taken, and is reaping all 

kinds of benefi ts.

We are building the basis for Army XXI, tomorrow’s Army. Because of our 

spiral development process, and because we are addressing the six Army 

imperatives simultaneously, any change that we make affects all the other 

imperatives. Each equipment change, for instance, inspires change in doctrine, 

which then affects training, leader development, force design, and people. So 

there is no such thing as isolated change.

In the beginning of our experimentation process, some years ago, we 

concentrated on materiel improvements. As technology was pushing the 

equipment end, we responded. The 1994 Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training Center, our first large-scale experiment, 

showed us that integration of materiel alone was not improvement; that 

a force is modernized only when all the mission areas are addressed. We 

took that lesson, and the NTC rotation in the spring of 1997 showcased 

a wholly restructured force and a wholly restructured way of thinking 

of change.
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We have been revamping our doctrine, to include manuals on digitized and 

non-digitized operations, division organization, and even our capstone manual 

FM 100–5. Along the lines of equipment, perhaps the easiest to see, we are 

importing combat computers, information management systems, total asset 

visibility, on old and new weapons platforms, just to name a few innovations. 

In leader development we are concentrating on decision-making at all levels 

and the character attributes that best support that ability. We are continuing to 

emphasize the importance of the warrior ethos and the signifi cance of valuesbased, competent and confi dent people. In training, we are experimenting with 

schools linked to units, fi eld training linked to simulations and simulators, 

training devices embedded in operational equipment, and distance learning. 

And in force design we are looking at a redesign of the division which will 

give us more lethality, mobility, fl exibility, survivability, and responsiveness. 

What we are doing is creating tomorrow’s Army. This is an exciting time for 

the Army — we are seeing pieces of the future today!

The foundation of the future is apparent today. Today, the TRADOC commander of 2010 is a lieutenant colonel in battalion command. The brigade 

commanders of Army XXI are currently company commanders. Army XXI’s 

drill sergeants are in high school. They are all moving up in a world far different than the world I grew up in. Their world in 2010 will move faster; their 

army will move faster. They will have more information at their fi ngertips; 

they will know much more about their battlefi elds. Their doctrine, equipment, 

organizations may be different. But the soldiers will be the same — well 

trained, educated, motivated, dedicated — ready to face whatever the future 

hands them. As they always have.
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Appendix

 A

The Medal Of Honor

The United States Army be- stows awards for both service and bravery. The Army uses the phrase “pyramid 

of Honor” to describe its award system. This system 

indeed resembles a pyramid in which many receive 

those awards at its broad base, but only a precious 

few earn the decoration that stands alone at its pinnacle. That decoration is the Medal of Honor, a title 

majestic in its simplicity. The qualifi cations for the 

Medal of Honor are severe: “The recipient must have 

risked his life ‘... above and beyond the call of duty 

while in actual confl ict with an enemy.’” Further, the 

act must have demonstrated conspicuous “gallantry and 

intrepidity.” In other words, the act must have shown 

selflessness and nobility beyond that for which any 

other form of award might suffi ce. One might, at this 

point, perceive that the Medal of Honor is reserved for a very select group of 

men who willing ly involve themselves in military acts without equal, and this 

is certainly the intention of the medal. The awarding of the medal is, accordingly, jealously guarded through a system of laws, regulations, and boards of 

offi cers which permit little margin for error or doubt.

The deed of the potential medal winner must be substantiated by the incontestable evidence of at least two eyewitnesses, must meet those requirements 

already mentioned and must be the type of effort which, if the soldier had not 

performed it, would not have subjected the soldier concerned to any justifi ed 

criticism. 

It should be noted that, although the Army usually awards the medal for an 

act committed in battle, some precedents exist for its award for acts during 

peacetime. Captain Charles A. Lindbergh received the medal for his “heroic 

skill and courage as a navigator, at the risk of his life for his nonstop fl ight 

in his airplane from New York to Paris, France, May 20–21, 1927.” The 

Army posthumously made a similar award to Brigadier General William 

C. Mitchell in 1948 for his outstanding service as a pioneer in the fi eld 

of military aviation. Six other soldiers, sailors, and airmen have received 

the Medal of Honor for similar events. Nevertheless, in war or peace, this 

decoration remains the highest that the nation can bestow.
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The actual medal awarded to members of the Army and the Air Force is different in design from that awarded members of other branches of the armed 

services. The Army Medal of Honor was created by an Act of Congress on 

July 12, 1862. The law called for the issue of the award in “... the name of 

Congress”; thus, it is occasionally referred to as the “congressional” Medal 

of Honor. Each detail of the medal is rich in meaning and tradition. The 

thirteen stars on the ribbon symbolize the original thirteen states, and the 

eagle represents the nation itself. The laurel wreath backing the fi ve-pointed 

star represents wreaths worn by the leaders of ancient Rome. A bust of 

Minerva, the Roman goddess of wisdom and technical skill, appears in the 

center of the star.

One must look far back into the history of the Army to fi nd a specifi c reason for the Medal of Honor’s existence. It is a bit simple to say only that 

the nation needed a signifi cant decoration to recognize gallantry and that 

Congress established a medal to fi ll that need. A more accurate tracing of 

the medal’s development fi nds it to be a several-step affair, beginning with 

the concept of George Washington, who provided for an award to recognize 

the soldier, sailor or marine who distinguished himself through valorous 

or gallant acts. Washington instituted the Purple Heart at Newburgh, New 

York on August 7, 1782, as a decoration for “singular meritorious action.” 

Three men received the Purple Heart under these regulations in 1783. 

Army records show no other recipients of the Purple Heart during this 

particular era. In 1847, a “Certifi cate of Merit” recognized the valorous 

soldier of the Mexican War. However, it did not provide for a medal, but 

simply a certifi cate — a document. Congress later directed that holders of 

the award that were still in the service would receive extra pay of some 

$2.00 per month. Congress continued, however, to deny the award of a 

medal or other form of decoration. 

During the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, a system of “brevet” promotions 

recognized bravery and exceptional performance of members of the armed 

services. This system allowed an offi cer mentioned in dispatches to carry a 

rank higher than that which he held and for that offi cer to wear that temporary 

grade. By the Civil War, the brevet system had been politically abused to such 

an extent that it sometimes failed to represent the brevet recipient’s courage 

or manner of performance.

In 1861, the Chairman of the Senate Naval committee introduced a bill to 

create a Medal of Honor for Navy and Marine Corps servicemen. That bill, 

approved by President Lincoln on December 21, 1861, produced the fi rst 

badge or medal to signify gallantry in action or “other soldier like qualities.” 

Two months later, a similar bill provided for a like award for members of the 

Army and Volunteer Forces.
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The fi rst actual Medals of Honor went to six members of the now famous 

Andrews raiding party. In 1862, they had slipped deep into Confederate 

territory and captured an entire train. Their mission — to destroy bridges on 

the railroad to block Confederate reinforcements — proved a success due to 

their unquestionable gallantry and courage. Of the twenty-two members of 

the party, nineteen eventually received the medal. The earliest dated award 

of the Medal of Honor was to Bernard J. D. Irwin, a young Irish immigrant 

doctor. Although he did not receive the medal until early 1864, his award 

honored his heroism in February 1861, before 

the medal was created, when he voluntarily led 

a party through hostile Indian territory to rescue 

a surrounded detail of soldiers.

Each war has produced its own particular “brand” 

of Medal of Honor recipients, and each has displayed its own particular fl avor of language in 

the phrases used in the citation of each medal. 

Some of the most colorful of all of the historic 

citations occurred during the Civil War. They 

were sprinkled with words such as “... saving a 

wounded comrade under murderous fi re, voluntarily extinguishing the fuse of a burning shell 

which had been thrown into the lines of the regiment by the enemy,” and “... among the fi rst to mount the enemy’s works in 

the assault.” Recipients of the Medal of Honor participated in major battles, 

such as the Wilderness and Gettysburg, as well as in smaller, more obscure 

skirmishes. During the Civil War were established the high standards which 

still remain today.

The Medal of Honor has played its part through each of the succeeding 

confl icts in which the nation has participated. The medal was present on the 

Western Plains with obscure Indian scouts named Blanquet, Elastousoo and 

Nantaie, as well as with troopers with more familiar names such as Taylor and 

O’Sullivan. In the thirty years of confl ict on the plains between the forces of 

the United States and the mighty Indian nations — the Sioux, the Comanche, 

the Apache and all of the rest of the plains tribes — the brave and courageous 

received the medal. The medal has been awarded in each confl ict of the 20th 

century, in Cuba, St. Mihiel, Alsace, Lorraine, Normandy, Bougainville, Leyte, 

Guam, Korea and in South Vietnam, and in each of these wars and on all of 

these battlefi elds, it has acknowledged that rare act which is truly “above and 

beyond” the call of duty.
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More legislative action has taken place in regard to the awarding and protection of the Medal of Honor than in relation to any other award of any armed 

service of this nation. Congress has repeatedly acted to safeguard the award 

and to preserve the prestige and intent involved with its bestowal. Periodically, boards have convened to review the decisions made in each case of its 

presentation, and close scrutiny is made of the facts and actions involved. In 

some cases, awards already made have been recalled when, in the opinion of 

the review board in session, it was in the best interests of the preservation of 

the standards of the medal. All of these measures have added to the retention 

of the medal at its rightful place at the apex of the pyramid of armed forces 

heraldry honors. 
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Appendix

B

United States Army

 Commanding Generals,

Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of War

and

Secretaries of the Army

United States Army Commanding Generals

Continental Army General and Commander In Chief

Gen. George Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Jun 1775–23 Dec 1783

Senior Offi cer

Maj. Gen. Henry Knox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Dec 1783–20 Jun 1784

United States Army Senior Offi cer

Maj. John Doughty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Jun 1784–12 Aug 1784

Lt. Col. Commandant Josiah Harmar . . . . . . . . . 12 Aug 1784–4 Mar 1791

Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Mar 1791–5 Mar 1792

Brevet Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Apr 1792–15 Dec 1796

Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Dec 1796–13 Jul 1798

Lt. Gen. George Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Jul 1798–14 Dec 1799

Maj. Gen. Alexander Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Dec 1799–15 Jun 1800

Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Jun 1800–27 Jan 1812

Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Jan 1812–15 Jun 1815

Maj. Gen. Jacob J. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Jun 1815–Jun 1821

Commanding General

Gen. Jacob J. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jun 1821–24 Feb 1828

Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 May 1828–25 Jun 1841

Maj. Gen. Winfi eld Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Jul 1841–1 Nov 1861

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nov 1861–11 Mar 1862

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Jul 1862–9 Mar 1864

Gen. Ulysses S. Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Mar 1864–4 Mar 1869

Gen. William T. Sherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Mar 1869–1 Nov 1883

Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nov 1883–5 Aug 1888

Maj. Gen. John McA. Schofi eld . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Aug 1888–29 Sep 1895

Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Oct 1895–8 Aug 1903
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American Military Heritage

United States Army Chiefs of Staff 

Lt. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Aug 1903–8 Jan 1904

Lt. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Jan 1904–14 Jan 1906

Lt. Gen. John C. Bates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Jan 1906–13 Apr 1906

Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Apr 1906–21 Apr 1910

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Apr 1910–21 Apr 1914

Maj. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon . . . . . . . . . 22 Apr 1914–16 Nov 1914

Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Nov 1914–22 Sep 1917

Gen. Tasker H. Bliss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Sep 1917–19 May 1918

Gen. Peyton C. March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 May 1918–30 Jun 1921

Gen. of the Armies John J. Pershing . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jul 1921–13 Sep 1924

Maj. Gen. John L. Hines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Sep 1924–20 Nov 1926

Gen. Charles P. Summerall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Nov 1926–20 Nov 1930

Gen. Douglas MacArthur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Nov 1930–1 Oct 1935

Gen. Malin Craig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Oct 1935–31 Aug 1939

Gen. of the Army George C. Marshall . . . . . . . . 1 Sep 1939–18 Nov 1945

Gen. of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower . . . . . 19 Nov 1945–6 Feb 1948

Gen. Omar N. Bradley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Feb 1948–15 Aug 1949

Gen. J. Lawton Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Aug 1949–14 Aug 1953

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Aug 1953–29 Jun 1955

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Jun 1955–30 Jun 1959

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jul 1959–30 Sep 1960

Gen. George H. Decker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Oct 1960–30 Sep 1962

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Oct 1962–2 Jul 1964

Gen. Harold K. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Jul 1964–2 Jul 1968

Gen. William C. Westmoreland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Jul 1968–30 Jun 1972

Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr. (Acting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jul 1972–11 Oct 1972

Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Oct 1972–4 Sep 1974

Gen. Frederick C. Weyand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Oct 1974–30 Sep 1976

Gen. Bernard W. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Oct 1976–21 Jun 1979

Gen. Edward C. Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Jun 1979–21 Jun 1983

Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Jul 1983–23 Jun 1987

Gen. Carl E. Vuono . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Jun 1987–21 Jun 1991

Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Jun 1991–20 Jun 1995

Gen. Dennis J. Reimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Jun 1995–22 Jun 1999

Gen. Eric K. Shinseki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Jun 1999–1 June 2003

Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Aug 2003–Present

United States Army Secretaries of War

Henry Knox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Sep 1789–31 Dec 1794

Timothy Pickering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Jan 1795–10 Dec 1795
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American Military Heritage

James McHenry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Jan 1796–13 May 1800

Samuel Dexter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 May 1800–31 Jan 1801

Henry Dearborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1801–7 Mar 1809

William Eustis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Mar 1809–13 Jan 1813

John Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Jan1813–27 Sep 1814

James Monroe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Sep 1814–2 Mar 1815 

William H. Crawford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Aug 1815–22 Oct 1816

John C. Calhoun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Oct 1817–7 Mar 1825

James Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Mar 1825–23 May 1828

Peter B. Porter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 May 1828–9 Mar 1829

John H. Eaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Mar 1829–18 Jun1831

Lewis Cass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Aug 1831– 5 Oct 1836

Joel R. Poinsett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Mar 1837–5 Mar 1841

John Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1841–13 Sep 1841

John C. Spencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Oct 1841– 3 Mar 1843

James M. Porter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Mar 1843–30 Jan1844

William Wilkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Feb 1844–4 Mar 1845

William L. Marcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Mar 1845–4 Mar 1849

George W. Crawford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Mar 1849–23 Jul 1850

Charles M. Conrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Aug 1850–7 Mar 1853

Jefferson Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Mar 1853–6 Mar 1857

John B. Floyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Mar 1857–29 Dec 1860

Joseph Holt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Jan 1861–5 Mar 1861

Simon Cameron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1861–15 Jan 1862

Edwin M. Stanton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Jan 1862–28 May 1868

John M. Schofi eld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jun 1868–13 Mar 1869

John A. Rawlins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Mar 1869–6 Sep 1869

William W. Belknap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Oct 1869–2 Mar 1876

Alphonso Taft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Mar 1876–22 May 1876

James D. Cameron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 May 1876–3 Mar 1877

George W. McCrary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Mar 1877–10 Dec 1879

Alexander Ramsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Dec 1879–5 Mar 1881

Robert T. Lincoln . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1881–5 Mar 1885

William C. Endicott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1885–5 Mar 1889

Redfi eld Proctor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1889–5 Nov 1891

Stephen B. Elkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Dec 1891–5 Mar 1893

Daniel S. Lamont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1893–5 Mar 1897

Russell A. Alger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1897–1 Aug 1899

Elihu Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Aug 1899–31 Jan 1904

William H. Taft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Feb 1904–30 Jun 1908

Luke E. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jul 1908–11 Mar 1909

Jacob M. Dickinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Mar 1909–21 May 1911

Henry L. Stimson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 May 1911–4 Mar 1913

Lindley M. Garrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1913–10 Feb 1916
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American Military Heritage

Newton D. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Mar 1916–4 Mar 1921

John W. Weeks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mar 1921–13 Oct 1925

Dwight F. Davis1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Oct 1925–5 Mar 1929

James W. Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Mar 1929–18 Nov 1929

Patrick J. Hurley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Dec 1929–3 Mar 1933

George H. Dern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Mar 1933–27 Aug 1936

Harry H. Woodring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Sep 1936–20 Jun 1940

Henry L. Stimson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Jul 1940–21 Sep 1945

Robert P. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Sep1945–18 Jul 1947

Kenneth C. Royall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Jul 1947–17 Sep 1947

Secretaries of the Army

Kenneth C. Royall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Sep1947–27 Apr 1949

Gordon Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Jun 1949–12 Apr 1950

Frank Pace. Jr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Apr 1950–20 Jan 1953

Robert T. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Feb 1953–21 Jul 1955

Wilber M. Brucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Jul 1955–19 Jan 1961

Elvis J. Stahr, Jr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Jan 1961–30 Jun 1962

Cyrus R. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Jul 1962–21 Jan 1964

Stephen Ailes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Jan 1964–l Jul 1965

Stanley R. Resor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Jul 1965–20 Jun 1971

Robert F. Froehlke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jul 1971–4 May 1973

Howard H. Callaway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 May 1973–3 Jul 1975

Martin R. Hoffmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Aug 1975–13 Feb 1977

Clifford L. Alexander, Jr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Feb 1977–20 Jan 1981

John O. Marsh Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Jan 1981–14 Aug 1989

Michael P. W. Stone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Aug 1989–19 Jan 1993

W. Shannon (acting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Jan 1993–6 Aug 1993

Gordon R. Sullivan (acting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Aug 1993–21 Nov 1993

Togo D. West, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Nov 1993–1 Jan 1998

Robert M. Walker (acting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Jan 1998–1 Jul 1998

Louis Caldera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Jul 1998–20 Jan 2001

Thomas E. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 May 2001–9 May 2003

Romie L. (Les) Brownlee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 May 2003–18 Nov 2004

Francis J. Harvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Nov 2004–Present
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Appendix

C

Military Music

As is the case with most of the tactics, techniques, and weaponry of the 

United States Army, the music of the Army fi nds its roots deep in the history of European warfare. During the half century just before the American 

Revolution, German military bands enjoyed a reputation superior to all 

of the others in Europe. They were very unlike anything that one might 

recognize today as a military band. They had no drums, no cymbals, and 

none of the pomp and bombast normally associated with military music. 

These early German bands consisted of two fl utes, two oboes, two horns, 

either one or two trumpets, two bassoons, and a bass trombone. A major 

change in the complexion of military music took place in England during 

this period when the clarinet successfully replaced the oboe as the major 

wind instrument in marching units. 

One of the earliest efforts to bring music of this level to the colonial 

settlers took place in Boston in 1773. Mr. Josiah Flagg (1738–1794), 

himself a consummate musical artist, established a band of wind instrumentalists and vocalists and gave several concerts in Faneuil Hall. 

Unfortunately, nearly all instrumental music was viewed by the peoples 

of Boston as “works of the devil” at that particular time and, as a result, 

Flagg’s efforts were ill received by the general populace. As seemingly 

unsuccessful as he was, Flagg is recognized as one of the nation’s earliest bandsmen and certainly a strong contributor to the military music of 

the Revolutionary War era.

The first recorded notes of the now famous “fife and drum” were heard 

during a celebration after Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys drove 

the British from Fort Ticonderoga. During the same early stages of the war, 

the Americans used the drum much like today’s bugle to “call” troops to 

various formations and activities. The drum first received mention in the 

orders of the Commander-in-Chief, dated July 14, 1775. In those orders, 

General George Washington directed that the drum would beat the major 

divisions and duties of each “military” day from Reveille to Taptoo (now 

called tatoo). In many units during non-battle conditions, the ceremony 

of Reveille which started each day was a long, pompous affair, which included the massed fifes and drums of the regiment playing, oddly enough, 

several British tunes along with the day’s first “calls.” In 1778, musical 
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American Military Heritage

uniformity was beginning to appear within the Continental Army. Each 

regiment possessed a fife major and a drum major, and a superintendent 

of music for the entire Army had been appointed. Fifers and drummers 

received the same monthly pay as a corporal, or 7 and 1/3 rd dollars per 

month. As the war progressed, it became increasingly difficult to maintain an entire band organization in any regiment. As would happen in the 

many wars to come, the fifer and drummer, when needed, went into the 

line as riflemen, and they soon found it extremely difficult to play and 

fight at the same time.

General Washington early realized the signifi cance and stirring qualities of 

martial music. Even in some of the darkest times of the war at the frozen camp 

of Valley Forge, he wrote these words:

At Valley Forge on May 7, 1778, at nine o’clock in the morning, 

the American Army was on parade. A gala parade, with cheers and 

rejoicing; the fi fers and drummers playing as if they were celebrating some victory. It was a day of jubilee, held in commemoration 

of the beginning of an armed alliance between France and the 

United States.

The fi nal musical ceremony of the Revolutionary War took place at Rings 

Ferry, New York during the summer following Lord Cornwallis’ surrender to General Washington at Yorktown. The Americans were holding a 

review for General Rochambeau of the French Army, and on that day, all 

of the music was decidedly French. In 1783, the American Army was, in 

effect, disbanded and the fi rst chapter of the history of American military 

music ended.

By the outbreak of the Civil War, the art of military music had reappeared and 

begun to fl ourish to an extent not foreseen by even the wildest of dreamers. 

Each of the militia regiments called to service by the Union had a military 

band. When one considers that four or fi ve regiments formed each brigade, 

and that a division consisted of three or more brigades, the sound of military 

music must have been signifi cant indeed. In addition to the militia bands, as 

each new regiment of volunteers formed, twenty-four men per regiment found 

themselves assigned as bandsmen. The pay for bandsmen of the Civil War 

period was generally as follows:

Chief musician (leader) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $45.00 per month 

One-Fourth of the bandsmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $34.00 per month 

One-Fourth of the bandsmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $20.00 per month 

One-Half of the bandsmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $17.00 per month 

Drum Major . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $17.00 per month 

Fifers, Buglers and Drummers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12.00 per month 
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As fi ghting intensifi ed, the same attrition of bandsmen and fi nally of bands 

that had occurred during the Revolution again took place. The regimental 

band became a ready source for stretcher bearers and medics on the battlefi eld. Few regimental level bands were able to remain intact throughout 

the war. 

The music of the Civil War inspired its listeners both on the fi eld of battle 

and on the parade ground. General Phil Sheridan appreciated its combat 

value. On April 1, 1865, as he sat on his horse during the battle of Five 

Forks, he listened to one of his brigade bands playing “Nelly Bly” under 

heavy enemy fi re. He encouraged the band to continue its good work and 

remarked to a member of his staff that “Music has done its share, and more 

than its share in winning this war.” In 1865, shortly after the close of the 

war, the Grand Army of the Republic marched in review from the Capitol 

to the White House. Each brigade had its own band and played continuously 

throughout the line of march. Both the North and South in the Civil War 

had several camp songs that have survived. The Army of the Union had its 

famous, “Glory Hallelujah,” and “John Brown’s Body,” the latter of which 

has survived (with Julia Ward Howe’s words), as the “Battle Hymn of the 

Republic.” The South had its “Lorena,” “Bonnie Blue Flag,” and the ever 

popular “Dixie.”

In the period between 1866 and 1941, military music and bands within the 

United States Army continued to fl ourish. Each war had its own distinctive 

music. Still familiar today are the bouncing rhythms of “Over There,” and 

stirring strains of “The Stars and Stripes Forever.” Of all the men and all the 

music involved during this era, one giant stands far above the rest. John Philip 

Sousa has been dubbed in American history as the “March King,” but he also 

rightly holds the distinction of being the nation’s most popular bandmaster and 

composer. At a very early age, Sousa was recognized as a concert violinist, 

and he played with several musical groups of note in the Washington area. 

By the turn of the century, Sousa had his own band of forty-nine musicians, 

using nearly all of the accepted musical instruments of the world. During his 

career, Sousa was decorated by numerous foreign heads of state, and during 

the First World War, held the rank of Lieutenant Commander in the Naval 

Reserve. By the end of his career, Sousa’s compositions numbered over three 

hundred and included ten operas, eight suites, a symphony, and over one hundred marches. He died in 1932, and is buried in the congressional cemetery 

in Washington, D. C.

A major force in the development of military music in the United States 

has been the United States Military Academy Band at West Point, New 

York. The unit, active today, can trace its continual existence to the fi fers 

and drummers of the West Point garrison during the American Revolution. 
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In 1782, General Washington gave a great banquet in honor of the reigning 

rulers of France, and it is recorded that at that banquet, martial music was 

rendered by the musicians at West Point. In 1802, a congressional order 

formally provided for four musicians within each of the twenty companies 

of the Academy’s staff and faculty. In 1816, a Lieutenant Gardiner was appointed as the band’s fi rst Commanding Offi cer. The band’s duties throughout its history have centered almost exclusively on cadets. From the fi rst 

of May until the fi rst of November, dress parades and daily formations are 

accompanied by the band. During the summer months, the band performs 

concerts in an outdoor band shell on the Academy’s scenic Trophy Point, 

and the band also performs in a multitude of other shows, dances, and formations. It is certainly safe to say that had military music not been part of 

our Army’s heritage, it would have been sorely missed.
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Appendix

D

The American Flag

Several events in American 

history have immortalized 

the particular fl ag fl ying at 

that time and place. In each 

case, the flag provided a 

symbol of liberty and a free 

nation, a nation united.

One of the most memorable 

of these fl ags fl ew over the 

Capitol in Washington, D.C. 

on December 7, 1941. That 

same fl ag was raised on December 8, 1941, as war was 

declared on Japan and also 3 

days later, as Germany and 

Italy formally became enemies of the United States. 

Four very long years later, the same fl ag again fl ew as the Japanese accepted 

surrender terms and World War II came to an end.

The U.S. Military Academy Museum houses, in one of its numerous display 

cases, a small torn remnant of red and white bunting. That tattered bit is all that 

remains of the fl ag that fl ew over Corregidor during World War II. Before the 

fortress fell, Colonel Paul Bunker burned the fl ag to preclude its capture. As 

it burned, he cut a small piece and sewed the fragment under his shirt pocket. 

Before Bunker died in a POW camp, he gave the bunting to Colonel Delbert 

Ausmus, a fellow prisoner, and bade him carry the remnant to the Secretary 

of War. Ausmus carried the bit under his pocket until his release from the 

camp. After the war, the torn fragment was enshrined in the Academy Museum.

One of the myths of the fl ag’s gallant history is that the “fi rst” fl ag was made by 

Betsy Ross as the result of a specifi c request by General Washington. Several 

fl ags of varied design were carried by various groups prior to Betsy Ross’ effort. 

Many of the era’s banners took as their themes the struggle of the early settlers 

in the wilderness with beavers, pine trees, rattlesnakes and the like. Such mottos 

as “Hope,” “Liberty,” and “Don’t Tread on Me” were commonplace. The fi rst 

true “Stars and Stripes” were adopted by Congress on June 14, 1777; however, 

Congress did not specify the pattern of the stars on the blue background. Although 
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fl agmakers used several different star arrangements, the “Betsy Ross” fl ag arranged 

the stars in a circle. This version has been the one most universally accepted as 

“Old Glory.” General Washington explained the symbolism of the components of 

the “Star Spangled Banner” fi rst fl own by the Continental Army as follows, “We 

take the stars from heaven, the red from our mother country, separating by white 

stripes showing that we have separated from her, and the white stripes shall go 

down to prosperity representing liberty.”

Over ensuing years, the fl ag underwent several alterations. In 1794, after the 

admission of two new states, the fl ag was altered to bear fi fteen stars and fi fteen 

stripes. By 1828, the fl ag consisted merely of thirteen stripes to represent the 

original thirteen colonies, with an additional star added to the blue fi eld for 

each new state in the United States. The fl ag grew in this fashion until 1912, 

when a forty-eight-star fi eld heralded the addition of Arizona and New Mexico. 

Alaska became the forty-ninth star in 1959, and Hawaii the fi ftieth in 1960. 

No particular star in the galaxy of the fl ag represents a particular state; rather, 

they collectively represent the United States.

Much has been spoken and written about the American fl ag, but few have 

captured the essence of its meaning to the common man in a more penetrating 

fashion than did President Woodrow Wilson in his 1917 Flag Day message:

We celebrate the day of its birth, and from its birth until now, it has 

witnessed a great history, has fl oated on high the symbol of great events, 

of a great plan of life worked out by a great people.... Woe be to the 

man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high 

resolution when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and 

made secure for the salvation of the nation. We are ready to plead at 

the bar of history, and our fl ag shall wear a new luster. Once more we 

shall make good with our lives and-fortunes the great faith to which 

we were born, and a new glory shall shine in the face of our people.

Throughout the many years of the nation’s existence, people of all walks of 

life and of every race and religion have served valiantly the country for which 

the fl ag waves. The modern United States Army is but another link in that long 

and strong chain. In the 1970s, that same fl ag was used as a hippie’s shirt and 

as a car sticker or poster. It has been burned and battered by dissident groups, 

defi led by radical demonstrators, and at the same time, used to honor the caskets 

of thousands of veterans as they are laid to rest. Through all this turmoil, the 

tricolored banner has remained the true, fi rm symbol of a great nation. Where 

the fl ag was fi rst fl own, who made it or when the idea of the banner was born, 

are certainly of less importance than the profound legacy of two centuries of 

citizens and soldiers who have honored its existence. Its greatness is truly 

inseparable from that of our country’s past, present and future. Thus, it has 

been and continues to be the one unchanging symbol of the United States.
273

American Military Heritage

Appendix

E

Principal Wars in which the United States 

Participated

U.S. Military Personnel Serving

and Casualties

 War Branch Wounds

 or of Number Battle Other not

 Confl ict Service Serving Deaths Deaths Mortal 

Revolutionary Total — 4,435 — 6,188

 War Army — 4,044 — 6,004

 1775–1783 Navy — 342 — 114

 Marines — 49 — 70

 War of 1812 Total 286,730 2,260 — 4,505

 1812–1815 Army — 1,950 — 4,000

 Navy — 265 — 439

 Marines — 45 — 66

 Mexican War Total l78,718 1,733 11,550 4,152

 1846–1848 Army — 1,721 11,550 4,102

 Navy — 1 — 3

 Marines — 11 — 47

 Civil War Total 2,213,363 140,414 224,097 281,881

 1861–1865 Army 2,128,948 138,154 221,374 280,040

( Union Forces Navy — 2,112 2,411 1,710

 Only) Marines 84,415 148 312 131

 Spanish - Total 306,760 385 2,061 1,662

 American Army 280,564 369 2,061 1,594

 War Navy 22,875 10 — 47

 Marines 3,321 6 — 21

 World War I Total 4,734,991 53,402 63,114 204,002

 1917–1918 Army 4,057,101 50,510 55,868 93,663

 Navy 599,051 431 6,856 819

 Marines 78,839 2,461 390 9,520

 
274

American Military Heritage

 War Branch Wounds

 or of Number Battle Other not

 Confl ict Service Serving Deaths Deaths Mortal

 World War II Total 16,112,566 291,557 113,842 671,846

 1941–1946 Army 11,260,000 234,874 83,400 565,861

 Navy 4,183,466 36,950 25,664 37,778

 Marines 669,100 19,733 4,778 68,207

 Korean Total 5,720,000 33,651 3,262 103,284

 Confl ict Army 2,834,000 27,709 2,452 77,596

1950–1953 Navy 1,177,000 475 173 1,576

 Marines 424,000 4,269 339 23,744

 Air Force 1,285,000 1,198 298 368

 Vietnam Total 8,744,000 47,378 10,799 153,303

 Confl ict Army 4,368,000 30,922 7,273 96,802

1964–1973 Navy 1,842,000 1,631 931 4,178

 Marines 794,000 13,084 1,753 51,392

 Air Force 1,740,000 1,741 842 931
275

American Military Heritage

Appendix

F

Worldwide U.S. Active Duty Military Deaths

Selected Military Operations Since 1980

 Military Casualty Air Marine

 Operation/Incident Type Army Navy Force Corps Total 

 

Iranian Hostage Nonhostile 0 0 5 3 8

Rescue Mission 

April 25, 1980 

Lebanon Hostile 3 19 0 234 256

Peacekeeping, Nonhostile 5 2 0 2 9

August 25, 1982 – Total 8 21 0 236 265 

February 26, 1984 * 

 

URGENT FURY, Hostile 11 4 0 3 18 

Grenada, 1983 Nonhostile 1 0 0 0 1 

 Total 12 4 0 3 19 

 

JUST CAUSE, Hostile 18 4 0 1 23 

Panama, 1989 

 

Persian Gulf War,

1990 – 1991

DESERT SHIELD Nonhostile 21 36 9 18 184

DESERT STORM Hostile 98 6 20 24 148 

 Nonhostile 105 146 26 151 

 Total 203 20 26 50 299 

 

DESERT SHIELD/STORM Total 224 56 35 68 383 

 

RESTORE HOPE/ Hostile 27 0 0 2 29 

UNOSOM, Somalia, Nonhostile 4 0 0 8 14

1992 – 1992 Total 31 0 8 4 43 

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Nonhostile 3 0 0 1 4 

Haiti, 1994 – 1996 

* Place of Casualty, Lebanon 
276

American Military Heritage

Acknowledgments

Illustrations courtesy Company of Military Historians:

 By H. Charles McBarron:

 Pages 3, 12, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 30, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47, 62, 64, 65, 71, 

 80, 111, 163, 176, 216

By Frederick T. Chapman: Page 40

By George Woodbridge: Page 80

Artwork courtesy of Don Troiani:

 “Union Standard Bearer, 3rd U.S. Infantry,” page 79

 “7th Regiment, New York State Militia,” page 81

 “Federal Infantryman,” page 81

 “1st South Carolina Infantry, U.S.,” page 81

 “3rd New Jersey Volunteer Cavalry,” page 83

 “Cemetery Hill, Battle of Gettysburg, July 1,” page 88

 “The High Water Mark, Battle of Gettysburg, July 3,” page 93

Photograph courtesy of Dr. William Schultz, page 65, upper right

Photograph courtesy Anne K. Brown Collection, page 65, middle left

Illustrations of weapons on pages 4, 5, 24, 25, 68, 82, 83, 84, 102, 103, 124, 

125, 127, 128, 162, 195, 217 courtesy: The Diagram Group, Weapons: An 

International Encyclopedia From 5000 B.C. to 2000 A. D., St. Martins Press, 

(New York, 1990). 

Maps created by Ms. Stefanie Giangrande.
277

American Military Heritage

Index

Readers should begin searches with the extensive subheadings in the Table of 

Contents. This rudimentary index concentrates on references in the text which 

may not be obvious in subheadings or which clarify them.

A

Abrams, Creighton W., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Alamo, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Antitank rocket, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Apache, see helicopters

Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Armor, personal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Army, Continental, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 23

Army, United States,

 Chiefs of Staff, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

 Cold War era, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

 Commanding Generals, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

 education in, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 

 family and social life, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98, 177

 Korean War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 

 Mexican War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

 mobilization, Spanish-American War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 

 operations since 1980, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 

 organization of, 1950, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

 pay in 1830s, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

 personnel serving, by war or operation, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 . 

 post-Berlin Crisis, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

 post-Civil War and Spanish-American War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

 post-Cold War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

 post-Vietnam, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

 post-World War II, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

 pre-World War I, 1900–1917, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 . 

 reorganization after 1812, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

 Reserve components, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

 Secretaries of the Army, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

 Secretaries of War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265–67

 Spanish-American War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

 Vietnam, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

 War of 1812, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 westward expansion and exploration, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44–46

 women in, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

 World War II, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
278

American Military Heritage

Army, United States, life in,

 1783–1800, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 1870–1900, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

 enlisted life in 1950s, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Artillery, World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Aviation, early, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Awards, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . see decorations

B

Baker, Vernon J., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Bayonet, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Bosnia, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Braddock, Sir Edward, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Bradley Fighting Vehicle, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Brown, William, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Buffalo soldiers, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Bunker Hill, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Burt, Elizabeth, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

C

Carriages, gun, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Casualties, active duty military, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Chippewa, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Churchill, Elijah, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Civil War, United States, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Coast and harbor defenses, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Courage, personal, 16, 28–30, 31, 34, 36, 42, 45, 54, 66, 78-79, 96, 146–47, 

150, 153, 155–59, 166–67, 169, 170, 183–84, 205–06, 206–09, 225–27, 233–41, 

241–43

Colonization, American, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Crisafulli, James, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

D

Davis, Jefferson, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74–75

Davis, Sammy L., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Deaths, active duty military, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Decorations,

 Air Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

 Army Commendation Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

 Bronze Star, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

 Civil War era, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

 Distinguished Flying Cross, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
279

American Military Heritage

 Distinguished Service Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122, 159

 Good Conduct Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

 Gulf War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

 Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

 Kuwait Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

 Legion of Merit, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

 Medal of Honor, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159, 259

 Purple Heart, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

 Silver Star, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

 Soldier’s Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

 Southwest Asia Service Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

 Vietnam Campaign Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

 Vietnam Service Medal, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

 Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

DePuy, William, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219–20

DESERT SHIELD, Operation, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229–41

DESERT STORM, Operation, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229–41

Donlan, Roger H.C., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Duty, 13–14, 19–20, 36, 41, 42, 48, 60–62, 70, 76, 77, 92, 139–41, 150, 164–65, 

165–67, 167–68, 180–81, 199–200, 201, 204–09, 219–20, 234–37, 251

E

Eisenhower, Dwight D., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

F

Flag, United States, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Flintlock, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Food Packet, LRP, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Force XXI, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

G

Gas, World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

German soldiers, WWII, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Gettysburg, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Grant, Ulysses S., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Gray Board, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Grenada, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Grenade launcher, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Grenades, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
280

American Military Heritage

H

Helicopters,

 AH-64A Apache, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

 CH-47 Chinook, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

 UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

 UH-60A Black Hawk, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Helmets, World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Heritage, European, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Honor, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35, 37, 41, 54, 66, 75, 76–77, 140–41

Howitzer, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 105mm, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Hydrogen bomb, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

I

Ice Storm ’98, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Integrity, . . . . . . . . . 27, 35, 48, 66, 136, 164–65, 167–68, 182–84, 217–20

L

Lee, Robert E., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Lemnitzer, Lyman L., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Lemon, Peter C., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Lincoln, Abraham, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Loyalty, 20, 27, 50, 70, 71–72, 77, 96, 97, 146, 155, 170, 179–80, 182–84, 

204, 207, 208, 209, 216–17

Lundy’s Lane, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

M

MacArthur, Douglas C., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Machine guns, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

 Hotchkiss, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

 M-42, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

 M-60, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 

Marm, Walter J., Jr., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Marshall, George C., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

McMaster, H.R., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

 73 Easting, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Militia, colonial, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Mines,

 antipersonnel, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

 anti-tank, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

 German Tellermine, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

 pressure, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
281

American Military Heritage

Missiles,

 anti-aircraft, Redeye, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

 guided, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Mortar, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Murphy, Audie, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Music, military, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267–70

Musket, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

N

National Defense Act of 1916, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119, 120

National Military Strategy, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

New Orleans, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Night vision sight, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Non-commissioned Offi cers,

 1830s, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

 Civil War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Normandy, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149, 231

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

O

Operations,

 Bosnia, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244–45

 DESERT SHIELD, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229–41

 DESERT STORM, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229–41

 JUST CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227–29

 Philippines, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

 Somalia, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241–43

 UPHOLD DEMOCRACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243–44

 URGENT FURY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225–27

Organization,

 air cavalry, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

fi eld artillery, mobile, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 regimental system, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

 riverine force, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

P

Palo Alto, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Panama, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

 canal built in, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Patriot Air Defense System, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Patton, George S., Jr., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
282

American Military Heritage

Personal courage, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . see courage

Pistols,

 .45 caliber, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

 Colt Army revolver, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

 Colt Navy revolver, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

 Wesson and Leavitt revolver, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Presley, Elvis Aron, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

R

Radio AN/PRC 25, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Recruiting reform, 1822, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Resaca de la Palma, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Reserve components, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . see Army, United States

Respect, . . . . . . . . 41, 49, 78–79, 91–92, 142–44, 165, 175, 201, 218, 239

Revolution, American, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Ridgway, Matthew B., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Rifl es,

 Browning Automatic, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

 .30 caliber (1917), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

 .30 caliber M-1, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

 Chauchat automatic, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

 M-16, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

 Revolution, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Russian three-line, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Rocket launcher, U.S., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Rogers, Robert, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Rogers’ Rangers, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Root, Elihu, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

S

Scott, Winfi eld, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35, 66

Secretaries of the Army, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

Secretaries of War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265–67

Selective Service Act, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Selfl ess service, . . . . . . . . 27–30, 58, 74–76, 98–99, 106–07, 108, 141, 155, 

170, 237–39, 239–45, 252, 253–55

Shot,

 hollow, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 solid, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Shrapnel, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 132

Siege warfare, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Somalia, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Steuben, Frederich Wilhelm von, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
283

American Military Heritage

T

Tactics,

 1500–1600, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

 1600–1700, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 18th Century, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 linear, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 Post-Civil War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102, 104

 Revolutionary War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124, 136

Tanks,

 German, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

 M-1 Abrams (also M1A1 and M1A2), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

 M-4 Sherman, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

 M-60 Main Battle, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

 warfare, World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Taylor, Maxwell D., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Taylor, Zachary, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Thayer, Sylvanus, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

U

Uniforms,

 1810–1840, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 battle dress, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

 changes (1963), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

 Civil War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

 Cold War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

 Gulf War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

 Korean War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

 Mexican War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

 Post-Civil War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

 Revolutionary War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 Vietnam War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

 World War II, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

United States Military Academy, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Universal Military Training and Service Act, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

V

Values (see also loyalty, duty, respect, selfl ess service, honor, integrity,

 courage), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Vehicles,

 armored personnel carrier, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), . . 221 

Vera Cruz, Battle of, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
284

American Military Heritage

W

Wars,

 listed, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

 1812, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 French and Indian, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

 Gulf War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

 Indian, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

 Korean Confl ict, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

 Mexican War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 55

 Seminole Wars, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

 Spanish-American War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

 Vietnam, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

 World War II, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Washington, George, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Weapons (see also individual weapons by type)

 1500–1600, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

 1600–1700, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 atomic, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

 Civil War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

 German, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

 Japanese, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

 Mexican War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

 post-Civil War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

 post-Korea, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

 post-Vietnam, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

 Revolutionary War, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Vietnam Era, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

 World War I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

 World War II, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

West Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see United States Military Academy)

Wheellock, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Woodfi ll, Samuel, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Y

York, Alvin C., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
PIN : 078416–000