CHINESE MILITARY SCENARIOS AGAINST TAIWAN: 

PREMISES, OPTIONS, IMPLICATIONS 

by 

Lawrence E. Grinter 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 19 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan: 

Premises, Options, Implications 

Lawrence E. Grinter 

December 2002 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 19 and previous papers in this series are

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 19 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents: 

 Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

The Author................................................................................................. iii 

Introduction..................................................................................................1 

Threats, Deterrence, and Enticements: 

Beijing’s Multi-Pronged Strategy Toward Taipei .......................................2 

Destabilization Short of War. ......................................................................6 

Blockade. .....................................................................................................7 

Seaborne Invasion with Air Support............................................................9 

Missile Attack............................................................................................10 

Probabilities and Implications ...................................................................11 

Notes..........................................................................................................15 
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

ii
The Author 

Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter is a Professor of Asian Studies, Air War

College, teaches and writes on Asian and global security issues including 

WMD proliferation. He is co-editor of the following: Battlefield of the

Future (Air University Press, 1995); Looking Back on the Vietnam War

(Praeger, 1993); Security, Policy and Strategy in the Pacific Rim (Rienner,

1989); The American War in Vietnam (Greenwood, 1987); East Asian

Conflict Zones (St. Martins, 1987); and Asian-Pacific Security (Rienner, 

1986). Dr. Grinter is also the author of 40 scholarly articles on Asian 

security issues. He received his Bachelor or Science from the University 

of Florida in 1963, Master of Science from the University of North 

Carolina, Chapel Hill in 1968, and his Ph.D. from the University of North

Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1972. 
iv
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 1

Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan: 

Premises, Options, Implications 

Lawrence E. Grinter 

When Beijing fell to Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in October 1949, 

major elements of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomingtang (KMT) armies had 

already slipped across the Taiwan Strait to the island of Formosa from where 

the KMT government continued to claim jurisdiction over the mainland. 

Thus, while the fighting ended in China’s civil war, the political conflict 

continued, as it does today. Although the Taipei government long ago 

dropped its claim to the mainland, Beijing continues to claim sovereignty 

over Taiwan, and threatens Taipei with war if it declares “independence.” 

In the half century since Mao’s triumph, the United States has sought 

to preclude a new war between China’s communists on the mainland and 

the nationalists on Taiwan. Particularly since normalizing relations with 

Beijing in January 1979, Washington has tried to steer a middle course, 

seeking to avoid too close an identification with the Republic of China 

(ROC) and too hostile a stance toward the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC). The ultimate U.S. goal is to deter both an attack by China and a 

declaration of independence by Taiwan, while encouraging a peaceful 

resolution. This delicate, at times, contradictory, policy has been labeled 

“strategic ambiguity.” 

When China intervened in the Korean War, the U.S. interposed

elements of the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. During the Second 

Indochina War, as the U.S. bombed North Vietnam, China relocated key 

elements of its industry farther inland. When Beijing normalized relations

with Washington in early 1979, the U.S. Congress moved to continue the 

military assistance relationship with Taipei through the Taiwan Relations

Act, which continues to govern U.S.-Taiwan relations. And during more 

recent events and crises in Sino-U.S. relations, like the June 1989 

Tiananmen Square massacre, the 1995-96 PRC missile firings, or the April 

2001 EP-3E incident, the United States, China and Taiwan have all 

interacted regarding Strait security. 

But what if, in Beijing’s view, China’s current deterrence/enticement 

policies toward Taiwan begin to falter, or worse, break down completely? 

What are the likely options Beijing might choose to regain control of the
2 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

situation? And what would be the implications of various Chinese attack

options on Taiwan and on the U.S.? This paper explores those questions. 

It is likely that China’s leaders principal goal toward Taiwan is to 

politically absorb the island and its population under peaceful

circumstances if that is possible. Second, and related to that goal, PRC 

leaders wish to deter what Beijing considers to be any rash independence 

moves by the Taipei government, and to dissuade any military

intervention by the United States. Third, should China’s 

deterrent/enticement policy toward Taiwan falter, the mainland leadership

may choose to militarily intervene, creating new circumstances favorable 

to Beijing. Fourth, should Beijing’s leaders conclude China must go to 

war over Taiwan, they will aim to fight, win, and take the island by force. 

This thinking assumes that if China’s stick and carrot 

deterrent/enticement policy falters, Beijing’s leaders would employ a 

gradual escalation policy of coercion and pressure, signaling their 

seriousness and measuring responses before initiating war against Taiwan. 

However, others have argued that one future day the Chinese might forego 

gradual escalation, if they were determined to press ahead with 

reunification, and opt for an overwhelming surprise attack on Taiwan, 

attempting to present the world with a fait accompli. 

The author believes this last option is an unlikely choice, in part 

because U.S. intelligence would very likely pick up Beijing's military 

preparations for an attack and Washington would move, in concert with 

Taiwan, to counter it. The Chinese leaders likely would be deterred from 

such an unprovoked or surprise attack on Taiwan that would wreck 

China’s relations with much of the world. Nevertheless, the preemptive

use of force by China cannot be totally ruled out. Chinese leaders 

understand surprise and deception, and have employed them before 

against the United States and others. 

Threats, Deterrence, and Enticements: Beijing’s MultiPronged Strategy Toward Taipei 

Under President Jiang Zemin, a nationalistic China has increased 

pressure on Taiwan to unite with the mainland under Beijing’s “one

China” concept. The People’s Republic of China continues to use a 

variety of enticements, ploys, and threats toward the Republic of China.
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 3

Success for Beijing in deterring a Taiwan declaration of independence, or 

U.S. military intervention, or possibly a ROC move toward nuclear 

weapons, depends on the PRC convincing Taipei's leaders that it will 

attack if they take one or more of these steps and convincing Washington 

that it is not worth the costs – political, economic, or in risks to U.S. naval

and air assets – to intervene.1

Of course, Chinese authorities understand, even as they deny it, that 

raising pressure on Taiwan produces reactions in the ROC and in the

United States that jeopardize other PRC policy goals. Chinese pressure

has hardened the positions of Taiwanese independence advocates who 

press on President Chen Shui-bian’s government. Chinese pressure tactics 

also harden views in the U.S. Congress and the conservative US media 

that, in turn, push the Bush administration to adopt tougher U.S. policies 

toward China. 

To give China’s deterrent posture credibility, Beijing's leaders use a

spectrum of measures – political, economic, and military – designed to 

convince both Taipei and Washington that the PRC is serious. Political 

aspects of deterrence involve the constant drumbeat of propaganda about 

Taiwan as the “sovereign territory of the PRC,” as “an internal matter,” 

and that “foreign forces must not intervene.” 

Simultaneously, Beijing also proposes a variety of “reasonable” and 

“liberal” formulas for “re-unifying the motherland” under “one China.”2

 

Chinese diplomats repeatedly caution Washington that American arms

sales to Taiwan have “serious implications” for Sino-U.S. relations.3

Economically, the PRC relies on the anxieties of investors and 

insurers whenever there is tension around the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, the

missile threats of 1995 and 1996 saw a near collapse of the Taiwan stock 

market and temporary disinvestment of billions of dollars.4 However, 

China also encourages the transfer of Taiwanese manufacturing assets to 

the mainland, an accelerating phenomenon that some worry will produce a 

“hollowing out” of Taiwan industry, as is happening in the case of Hong 

Kong.5

 Moreover, the growing economic engagement between China and 

Taiwan carries higher risks for Taipei than for Beijing. Should war occur, 

most of Taiwan’s investments on the mainland presumably would go 

down the drain. 

The military aspects of China’s Taiwan policy concentrate on

intimidating Taipei through PRC weapons acquisitions, exercises, crossing 

provocation thresholds, and signaling PRC warfighting capabilities. As 

stated in the Pentagon’s 1999 report to Congress on the Taiwan situation, 
4 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

the Chinese military buildup, including the short-range ballistic missile 

(SRBM) deployments opposite Taiwan, is projected to be over 600 by 

2005, and will give the PRC the ability to mount a serious attack and to

degrade Taiwan’s key military facilities and economic infrastructure. 

Also by 2005, the PRC is expected to gain air superiority over Taiwan, if 

the United States is left out of the equation.6

At present, Taiwan holds the technological edge in 4th generation jet 

aircraft. Its 150 F-16s and 58 Mirage 2000-5s, if engaged in an air battle, 

can beat the PRC’s current 70 Su-27s and 20 Su-30s. But China's Air

Force has over 3,000 other fighter aircraft backing up those Su-27s, and 

has another 130 Su-27s and 40 Su-30s on order.7

 Many of China’s older 

aircraft are obsolete, but the People’s Liberation Army Air Force

(PLAAF) combat strategy could push swarms of expendable fighters into 

the air battle, drawing off the Republic of China Air Force’s (ROCAF’s) 

best assets, before sending in the Su-27s and Su-30s to achieve air 

supremacy, a necessary first step to a forced reunification of Taiwan with 

the mainland regime.

8

At sea, China’s navy is moving from an obsolescent “brown water” 

navy to a force reaching for sea control out to the “second island chain”

(the Japanese Philippine-Singapore axis), which also includes Taiwan. 

Notable recent PRC acquisitions include Russian Kilo-class

submarines and Sovremenny destroyers. Behind these new platforms are 

63 other People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) tactical submarines

compared to Taiwan's four. The PRC also possesses 60 other principal 

surface combatants compared to Taiwan’s 32.9

 Therefore, at present in a 

straightforward naval battle, without U.S. military intervention, China’s 

navy likely would prevail against Taiwan’s naval forces, assuming it also 

can neutralize Taiwan’s air power. 

Defensive planning by Taiwan authorities requires more than simply 

matching or trumping China’s growing air and naval capabilities. 

Thinking through strategies to counter probable PRC coercion and attack 

options is necessary. It can be assumed that deception and denial will

characterize both sides' strategies. After all, both governments are steeped 

in the principles of Sun Tzu and other Asian strategists that emphasize 

such deception practices.

Also of interest is President Chen’s announced defense concept of 

“decisive campaign beyond boundary.” Its details demonstrate Taiwanese 

thinking about preempting a looming Chinese attack, going after PRC 

staging areas early in a crisis, seizing the initiative, and launching spoiling 
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 5

attacks by targeting a variety of PRC military bases and missile launch

sites. There is also some support within the Taiwan government for

acquisition of an offensive counter-force capability, principally SRBMs 

and air assets capable of hitting Chinese missile launch sites, ports, etc.

Chen’s concept and these other views have prompted wide-ranging debate 

in Taiwan.10

To date, Beijing’s policies, Taiwan's reactions, and American

“strategic ambiguity” have kept the peace in the Strait area. There has 

been no formal Taiwanese declaration of independence, no explicit tie

between Taiwan and Washington, and no known ROC nuclear weapons. 

Moreover, President Chen Shui-bian’s May 2000 inauguration 

remarks should have eased Beijing’s concern about the Chen 

administration’s “independence” option. As Chen commented, so long as

“the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I 

pledge that during my term in office I will not declare independence, I will 

not change the national title, I will not push for the inclusion of the socalled ‘state-to-state’ description in the Constitution, and I will not 

promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question 

of independence or unification.”11 

Nothing subsequent to these remarks, including the DPP’s December 

2001 enlargement of its position in the ROC legislature, and Chen’s 

periodic calls on Beijing to negotiate, should have jeopardized the Beijing 

leaders’ assumptions, assuming Chinese rationality, of an unprovocative 

ROC government.12 Thus, Beijing’s deterrent policy, so far, is working. 

However, should things change, Beijing's leaders would be faced 

with the option of doing nothing, and probably suffering a severe loss of

face, or of escalating pressure on Taiwan to reverse the situation. This 

author believes that the Chinese will fight rather than lose face. Others

argue that, irrespective of Taiwan’s actions, Beijing could seek to lull 

Taipei and Washington into a false sense of security, then mount a 

massive surprise attack on the Republic of China.13 Whatever Beijing’s

secret timetable or lack of one, and whatever premises China's leaders

use to evaluate Taiwan, it is wise to assume that the decision-makers and

planners in Beijing are weighing the risks and outcomes of various 

conflict scenarios. Here are the most frequently discussed options, 

which are not mutually exclusive. 
6 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

Destabilization Short of War 

Should Taiwan’s regime still persist in overtly pursuing a 

“declaration of independence” from the mainland, despite the PRC’s 

growing military threats, Beijing’s leaders could seek to coerce Taiwan’s

government through a multifaceted destabilization campaign. Indeed, 

Beijing has been actively testing various destabilizing measures against 

Taiwan for years.14 Objectionable moves by Taipei, or simple worry in 

Beijing that Taiwan was slipping out of its grasp, could trigger 

destabilization moves. Such a PRC campaign could be conducted in ways

to minimize outside (U.S.) intervention, while producing serious trauma in 

Taiwan. Publicly, Beijing’s actions could be conveyed as “self-defense” 

or “assistance to Taiwanese patriots,” or “restoring peace.” 

Simultaneously Beijing would emphasize “conciliation” offers seeking to 

work with or fashion “patriotic elements,” or possibly to provide an 

alternative government on the island. 

The varieties and combinations of destabilizing measures Beijing

could employ against Taiwan might include measures such as: 

 harassment of commercial shipping and/or air traffic; 

 information/disinformation warfare attacks; 

 special operations against critical infrastructure nodes or facilities; 

 manipulation of Taiwan stock markets or computer attacks on

banks; 

 calls for liberation from Taiwanese “compatriots;” 

 harassment by Su-27s and F-8s over the Taiwan Strait; 

 computer attacks on key communications, transportation hubs, and 

air and sea traffic controls...an “electronic Pearl Harbor;” 

 ballistic missile tests near Taiwan; 

 seizure of offshore islands.15

Beijing’s destabilization measures likely would aim at reversing 

threatening trends, creating internal chaos in Taiwan, or might even have

the purpose of instigating a major breakdown in the ROC’s ability to 

govern effectively, trends that Beijing could exploit with offers to 
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 7

Taiwanese “patriots” inviting them to join a “greater China.” The PRC 

might, for example, offer more privileges and guarantees than those given 

Hong Kong or Macao when those two territories were being brought under 

PRC control. Authorities in Taipei anticipate these tactics, knowing they 

could be orchestrated in a limited fashion, or as precursors to a full-scale

Chinese attack on Taiwan. 

Blockade 

Should it come to armed conflict with Taiwan, a middle course for 

China would be to initiate an escalating naval blockade, using units from 

the East China Sea Fleet to starve Taiwan, by denying it re-supply and 

support from the outside. Taiwan is heavily dependent on seaborne cargo 

imports.16 Beijing probably would not call its naval action a “blockade”

since, in international law, the term is defined as an act of war. Instead, 

under the guise of naval and air “exercises,” which incidentally have been 

enlarging,17 possibly accompanied by missile “tests,” China could warn

and convince merchant ships and commercial aircraft to vacate the Taiwan 

Strait area. Fast PRC patrol boats could be positioned off Keelung and 

Kaohsiung harbors, and PLAN submarines could be flooded into the

Strait, while overhead, Su-27s and F-8s could provide an intimidating 

presence by buzzing Taiwan’s western coast and sea commerce below. 

A Chinese blockade of Taiwan’s western ports is more feasible than

on the eastern coast, since extending a blockade around to Taiwan’s 

eastern shores in the present or near future would overextend 

PLAN/PLAAF capabilities and more easily expose them to US naval and

air intervention. Perhaps Beijing’s spokesman would characterize such a 

blockade as protecting Chinese “shipping” or “nationals,” seeking to buy 

time and trying to force Taiwan to lose its nerve, while attempting to 

influence Washington to keep U.S. naval/air reactions at low levels. 

Seeking to limit U.S. or other outside interference, authorities in Beijing 

might declare they were explicitly limiting offensive operations against 

Taiwan, or might promise to avoid offensive operations against U.S. naval 

or air forces if they stay out of the fray. 

However, if Beijing moved to blockade Taiwan’s western side, the

PRC has at its command more than 60 diesel submarines, many of which 

could be inserted into the Strait. Such a force would seriously complicate 
8 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

Taiwanese seaborne transport and re-supply. Given the acoustic 

complexity of the Strait, submarine signature control technology would 

not be required. 

PLAN officers have considered conducting surprise “guerrilla” 

attacks at sea, using “irregular” forces such as junk ships, as well as 

elements of China’s civilian merchant fleet. PRC planners have looked at 

using tactics such as towing acoustic decoys, or seeding decoys, 

transponder buoys or radar reflectors to confuse rival commanders and 

their forces. PRC plans also have considered trying to snare enemy 

submarines in explodible heavy nets18 – all this could be integral to a 

“stealth” blockade scenario aimed at denying reinforcement to Taiwan. 

Should the Chinese navy opt for a more explicit, high profile naval/air 

blockade of Taiwan, the PLAN would rely on recent high technology

platforms like its current inventory of four Russian Kilo-class submarines 

soon to be twelve, and surface combat vessels like its Luhu-class guided 

missile destroyers with their foreign designed diesel-gas turbines, weapons 

suites, torpedoes, and fire control systems, and the Russian Sovremenny 

destroyers with their SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles.19

At present China’s navy does not yet have enough Kilos and 

Sovremennys to win against the U.S. Navy in an extended conventional 

fight, but more Kilos and Sovremennys are on order, and the 7,300-ton 

Sovremenny is a serious offensive firepower platform. In addition to its 

SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles, it has four five-inch guns, wake homing 

torpedoes, and batteries of anti-aircraft missiles and guns. 

“Its enough,” comments RADM Eric McVadon (USN-Retired), “to 

make the U.S. 7th Fleet think twice.”20 Or the Chinese might try to

preempt the United States by getting in the first blow. As Bernard Cole

writes: “Chinese naval strategists appear to understand the vast gulf in 

capabilities between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy. As a result, PLAN 

planners should be expected to try to seize the initiative in an operational 

situation where the United States might be a participant.”21

The United States could respond with a variety of actions against a 

PRC blockade of Taiwan to include hitting PLAN and PLAAF facilities 

supporting the blockade. But China would have the advantage of fighting 

close to its bases until, and if, repeated U.S. carrier air strikes took their 

toll.22 It should be noted that any combat between two nuclear powers 

such as the United States and PRC would be exceedingly dangerous and 

this fact should inhibit the actions of both sides. 
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 9

Taiwan’s present counter to the PRC’s naval capabilities is a slow

naval buildup, but Taipei currently still has only four functioning 

submarines, all of them of WWII vintage. In its April 2001 decision, the 

Bush Administration offered Taiwan new diesel electric submarines, P-3 

Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and Kidd-class destroyers, but not equipped 

with the Aegis anti-missile system. The sale has not yet occurred.23 

Taiwan’s difficulty in absorbing Aegis technology also may have been a 

factor in the prolonged discussions between Taipei and Washington. 24 

Seaborne Invasion with Air Support 

Triggered by a complete breakdown in China's deterrent policy, 

Beijing could order an invasion of Taiwan. The Politburo nevertheless

still might hope to avoid direct conflict with Washington stating that 

China would not hit American assets unless the U.S. directly threatened 

PLA Navy and PLA Air Force operations. Chinese air superiority would 

have to precede any invasion so that PLA Navy barges and troop carriers, 

as well as airborne troops, had a chance. Recall that successful U.S. 

invasions of Okinawa, Normandy and Inchon all had U.S. air superiority. 

Nevertheless, the recent Pentagon report warns that “China has a large 

fleet of about 600 military and civilian landing craft which could be used 

for ship-to-shore operations.25 However, the number of relevant Chinese 

airborne troops is estimated at only approximately 15,000.26 Thus, a 

serious air battle might be expected between the PLAAF and the ROCAF 

before the PRC invaded. 

Presently a PRC seaborne and air supported invasion of Taiwan is 

judged to be impractical. The PRC does not yet have enough troop 

carriers, or sustainability, for a combined naval-land-air operation. In 

spring 1999, the DOD estimated that the PLA Navy had the sealift 

capacity to carry only one infantry division.27 Even if China acquired new 

invasion capabilities, and sought to draft the merchant fleet, the PLAN 

faces serious obstacles in trying to gain control of action around the 

Taiwan Strait. 

In Bernard Cole’s assessment PLA Navy modernization has been 

“haphazard” and “incoherent” given the constraints on the navy’s budget, 

poor industrial quality, and leadership.28 Moreover, Taiwan has natural 

barriers against a seaborne invasion including rocky coasts and 
10 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

inhospitable shore areas opposite the mainland. The west coast of Taiwan, 

for example, has mud flats extending two to five miles out to sea, huge 

cliffs, and tides that fluctuate to average variations of 15 feet per day, as 

well as two monsoon seasons. 

ROC-occupied islands adjacent to the mainland China coast also act 

as an early warning system. Add in the ROC’s robust layered shore-based 

coastal defenses, and the effect is to make an amphibious invasion of 

Taiwan very difficult in the near term, even as China acquires more 

transport craft.29

Nevertheless, the Chinese navy has underway a purchase of eight 

more Russian kilo-class diesel-electric submarines which are quiet boats 

with advanced sonar equipment, in addition to its 63 older diesel powered 

submarines. And the PLA Navy is adding new principal surface 

combatants to its current 60, to include Russian-guided missile destroyers 

and guided missile frigates. China is also expanding its rapid reaction 

units, and establishing offshore satellite stations. 

The net effect regarding Taiwan, writes Bernard Cole, is that,

“Beijing is building a navy capable of decisively influencing the 

operational aspects of the Taiwan and South China Sea situations should 

diplomacy and the other instruments of statecraft fail.”30

Missile Attack

If China’s policy of deterrence and enticement were to fail, the 

starkest option for Beijing, presumably in concert with an invasion of 

Taiwan, would be a ballistic missile attack, launched from Fujian and 

Jiangxi provinces, against Taiwan’s principal land targets, air bases, and 

naval facilities. Given these missiles’ short flight time, about seven to 

eight minutes, and Beijing’s efforts to conceal the missiles’ firing

positions,

31 Taiwan could not counter them. 

China’s SRBM buildup in the south has been steady and ominous; the 

PRC now has approximately 350 M-9 and M-11 missiles in the south, and 

evidently are adding 50 to 70 per year.32 Any Chinese missile attacks

against Taiwan would represent the most extreme action, an all out war—

whether motivated by deliberation or desperation in the Politburo. A 

missile attack could wreak havoc on the island. Infrastructure, logistics,

and community centers likely would be turned to rubble, given the 
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 11

currently poor targeting precision of the SRBMs. A missile attack also

would produce huge foreign economic disinvestment in China and in 

Taiwan, setting back the PRC’s foreign relations and reputation for years. 

Taiwan likely would strike back with everything it had, doing what 

damage it could to southern and eastern China. If such a war took place 

Beijing conceivably would spare most key Taiwan population centers, 

possibly because of fear of US retaliation against Chinese cities. 

However, Taiwan, in danger of losing its national identity, might not show 

such restraint, and here we can only speculate about what weapons, 

including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Taipei authorities have 

and might employ. 

There is no publicly available information to indicate that Taiwan has 

successfully built any nuclear weapons or bomb cores. However diversion 

of nuclear materials in Taiwan evidently occurred in the mid-1970s and 

again in 1987. As Michael Klare wrote in 1993: “U.S. officials 

discovered that Taipei had begun construction of a small plutonium 

extraction facility and was planning to reprocess spent fuel from a 40-

megawatt research reactor at Lung Tan. Pressure was again applied by 

Washington, and Taipei agreed for a second time to abandon its nuclear 

weapons research.”33 Nevertheless there are periodic unsubstantiated 

reports that the ROC continues to conduct military nuclear research. The 

PRC, by comparison, is believed to have at least 450 operational nuclear 

weapons and the flexibility to fit them into missiles, aircraft, ships, and

artillery pieces.34 It is likely that Taiwan has the capability for chemical

and biological warfare, as it is believed does the PRC.35

Probabilities and Implications 

So what is the most likely military strategy that Beijing would 

employ against Taiwan if its policy of deterrence and enticement fails 

toward the ROC? It always has the option of a surprise attack, and

perhaps the enlarging Chinese naval and air exercises opposite Taiwan 

using surface ships, submarines, aircraft and amphibious troops, are laying

the basis for an eventual Chinese “naval/air bridge” across the Strait. But 

to pull it off at this time, China's capabilities are very limited. More 

likely, if China chose conflict options, it would conduct a three-phased 

campaign, holding off the second and third phases until PRC leaders could 
12 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

determine if their coercive objectives against Taiwan were realized early 

on, and if escalation dominance could be maintained. Phase one would be

a destabilization campaign, as outlined, to try to reverse objectionable 

actions by Taipei. Should that fail, Beijing could escalate the conflict and 

implement a partial blockade of the island threatening escalation. If that 

also failed, China might choose to strike Taiwan using a multiphased 

attack scenario. SRBM attacks against key ROC infrastructure nodes and 

military facilities would be possible. The PLA Air Force could initiate an

air battle. Finally, the next escalating step might be a combined airborne 

assault and a seaborne invasion by Chinese forces. In such a war much of

Taiwan and coastal China would be badly damaged, and this author 

assumes the U.S. would come to Taiwan’s defense. 

Should China attack Taiwan, either as a jump-off from ongoing naval 

and air exercises, or in a sequenced, testing manner as previously outlined, 

a fundamental question for U.S. war fighters, assuming Washington came

to Taiwan’s defense, is whether U.S. contingency plans already exist, or 

whether they would have to be cobbled together in the midst of a

developing crisis. If planning is in place, that would simplify

Washington’s pre-hostilities actions. If not, the U.S. response would have 

to be developed through “crisis action planning.” 

How well are the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy positioned and 

configured to challenge a Chinese attack on Taiwan? The Chinese attack 

scenarios outlined above are principally tactical in nature except for the 

SRBM attack. Likewise the general U.S. response, unless Washington 

decided to attack the PRC mainland, also would be tactical, involving 

actions initiated by U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and U.S. Air Force fighter 

units already in the Asia/Pacific theater. 

The U.S. Navy usually has two aircraft carrier battle groups in the 

Western Pacific, but at any one time they can be spread between the Sea 

of Japan and Hawaii. The U.S. Air Force has conventional air units 

stationed in Hawaii, South Korea, Alaska, in mainland Japan and on 

Okinawa, but they would require extensive tanker support to operate in a

Taiwan defensive action. 

How might the U.S. respond to a Chinese military campaign against 

Taiwan? Using what Washington calls “flexible deterrent options,” the

Pacific Command might be ordered to place aircraft carriers near or into

the Taiwan Strait, or seek to conduct joint maritime exercises with the 

Taiwan navy, or move additional F-15s and other assets to Okinawa or to 

the northern Philippines, assuming Tokyo and Manila granted permission. 
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 13

A concurrent option might involve conducting freedom of navigation and 

air corridor exercises in the Strait area. These operations would be 

necessary to setting up a U.S. war fighting capability, whether or not they 

successfully deterred the Chinese from further action. 

More seriously, if Taiwanese forces could not hold out, could the 

U.S. Navy get a blocking force onto the west side of Taiwan before PLAN 

and PLAAF assault forces had established a secure naval/air bridge across 

the Strait? And could U.S. Air Force fighter jets based in the region

interdict Chinese air and support operations before PLA Air Force sorties 

had seriously worn down the ROC Air Force? The answer to both these 

questions, today in late 2002, is probably yes. But what about in 2005 and 

after? 

Finally if, in assisting Taiwan, U.S. leaders in Washington might

conclude that the United States forces would have to strike a limited 

number of mainland Chinese facilities supporting the PRC assault, i.e., 

ports, airfields, command bunkers, radar and satellite facilities, etc. 

Undoubtedly the PRC would defend those assets and might widen the

conflict by attacking other U.S. assets. Given the existence of nuclear 

weapons on both sides, the dangers in escalation are obvious. 

Presuming the conflict remained localized to the Taiwan Strait area, the 

mission of the USAF Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) likely would be to 

limit the numbers and effectiveness of PLAN and PLAAF forces engaged

against Taiwan while trying to hold China’s SRBM launch sites hostage, 

pending a reduction of hostilities. GSTF actions would reduce the flow of 

PLAAF and PLAN assets going against Taiwan giving ROC and U.S. 

defending forces time to blunt and destroy the front edge of the attacking 

Chinese forces. Of course, the U.S. Pacific Command and Taiwan’s armed 

forces would have to establish secure war fighting links for synchronization 

of actions and deconfliction of assets, electronic identification of friends and 

foes, and jamming and disruption of PRC communications, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance assets supporting the attack. 

All this is clearly hypothetical. This author believes that Beijing’s 

leaders, like Washington’s, want to avoid this kind of tragedy. 

Nevertheless, deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan is the responsibility of 

all parties involved in the Strait problem and, so far, deterrence has 

worked. But the situation is not static, and it requires continued attention

and serious planning by Washington and Taipei as long as the People’s 

Republic of China continues to threaten the Republic of China. 
14 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 15

Notes 

1. Refusing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, China has posited these 

principal triggers for a decision to attack the island nation: a Taiwan declaration of

independence, foreign intervention in Taiwan’s affairs, acquisition of nuclear weapons, 

an internal unrest on Taiwan. Nevertheless, Beijing's February 2000 “White Paper"

added another reason (probably on Jiang Zemin’s insistence): failure by Taiwan to come

into unification discussions with Beijing in a “reasonable” time. See Ministry of

Defense, “China’s National Defense, 2000,” Beijing. February 2000. Also see the U.S.

Department of Defense “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic

of China.” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization

Act, Washington DC, 12 July 2002, 46. 

2. See, for example, China Post, staff, “Beijing mulling ‘one China, four zones’

concept: Official,” www.chinapost.com.tw, 13 August 2001. Taipei, however, insists on

its own interpretation of “one China.” See President Chen Shui-bian’s remarks on 10 

December 2001, as reported in The China Post, 10 December 2001, 

www.chinapost.com.tw/p. In October 2002, Beijing shifted to a more threatening tone

toward Taiwan. See Premier Zhu Rongji’s remarks at the 53rd founding of the PRC, as

reported in Susan V. Lawrence, “China Party’s Path Is Unclear-As Communist Elite 

Gather to Mark National Day, Leadership Issues Loom,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 1 

October 2002, A3. 

3. Or as China's Vice President, Hu Jintao, put it in comments in Washington on

1 May 2002, “a retrogression may occur in Sino-US relations.” David Sands and Bill

Sammon, “Hu takes hard line on Taiwan,” The Washington Times, 2 May 2002, 1.

4. The figure may have been as high as $14 billion resulting from the PRC's July 

1995 missile firings north of Taiwan. Private estimate by a European economist as cited 

in Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett, II, Red Dragon Rising, Communist 

China’s Military Threat to America (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., Inc., 1999), 154. 

5. Author’s discussions with businessmen in Hong Kong, March 2002. The issue 

has sparked a vigorous debate in Taiwan. See, for example, Lin Miao-Jung, “Cabinet is

censured on China investment rush,” Taipei Times,19 September 2002. 

www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/09/19/print 0000168612. And as a Chinese official 

interviewed in early 2002 stated: “Our economy is our best weapon. We wont attack 

them. We will buy them. It’s very Chinese.” See John Pomphret, “China Sees Interest

Tied to U.S.,” Washington Post, 2 February 2002, A-18. 

6. DoD Report as cited in “U.S. Defense Policy Toward Taiwan: Indefensible,” 

Senate Staff, 8 March 2001. 

7. IISS, Military Balance 2000-2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 2000), 196-197, 183, and Military Balance 2001-2002, 190. Also see DoD,
16 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

“Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” 12 July 2002,

16-18.

8. Conversations with ROCAF officers, Taipei, September 1999. Clearly, however, 

command and control constraints and constricted airspace would limit the number of

fighters the PLAAF could effectively employ in a Strait air battle. 

9. IISS, Military Balance 2001-2002, 189, 209. Two of Taiwan’s four submarines

are WWII vintage training craft. 

10. See Chen Shui-bian, “Declaring the Concept of ‘Decisive Campaign Beyond

Boundry,’” Taiwan Defense Affairs Quarterly, 2000, as cited and interpreted in

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “Homeland Defense with Taiwanese Characteristics,” in 

Andrew Scobell, Ed., The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War

(Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001), 145-147. Also see Michael D. 

Swaine with Loren H. Runyon, Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia, NBR 

Analysis, June 2002 (Seattle WA: NBR 2002), 52-53.

11. Chen Shui-bian, “Taiwan Stands Up,” inauguration remarks, 20 May 2000,

Taipei. 

12. See “Victory unlikely to worsen relations,” in the China Daily as cited in

“Chinese media sees little change in cross-strait ties,” The Straits Times, 4 December 

2001. President Chen has repeatedly challenged Beijing to respond to Taiwanese 

goodwill. Nevertheless, Taipei also has had to remind Beijing it will not be “bullied,

dwarfed, or marginalized.” See Lin Chieh-yu, “Chen raises pitch of anti-China rhetoric.” 

Taipei Times, 4 August 2002, as in www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/08/04

13. Richard L. Russell, “What if....China attacks Taiwan!” Parameters, Fall 2001,

76-91. The Pentagon has noted that PLA doctrine “includes the option of preemptive

military action.” Also see “Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98

National Defense Authorization Act” as cited in Edward Timperlake and William C.

Triplett II, Red Dragon Rising (Washington, D.C.,: Regnery Publishing, Inc.1999) 160. 

The premise among some analysts in the U.S. about the likelihood of a surprise Chinese

attack may be growing. As the most recent Pentagon report states: “Chinese doctrine is

moving toward the goal of surprise, deception and shock effect...[against] Taipei.” See 

DoD “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” 12 July

2002, 2.

14. See, for example, Damon Bristow, “Cyber-warfare rages across Taiwan Strait,”

Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2000, 40-46. Taipei claims hundreds of computer

network attacks by China. The ROC admits to counterattacking PRC computer networks. 

Recent cross-strait charges of cyber hacker attacks are reported in, BBC Monitoring Asia

Pacific-Political, “Taiwan military has never interfered with mainland TV signals, official

says,” London, 1 October 2002, 1.
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 17

15. More details are found in Timperlake & Triplett, Red Dragon Rising, 159-165.

16. See U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Report to Congress, The

National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States 

and China, (Washington DC: U.S.-China Security Review Commission, 15 July 2002),

162. 

17. In May 2002 the PLA began large military maneuvers, possibly to continue for

months, along the Chinese coast opposite Taiwan. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough,

“Inside the Ring: Mock Invasion,” Washington Times, 31 May 2002, 9.

18. Commander Frank Boric, USN, “Sub Tzu and the Art of Submarine Warfare,”

Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1995, 66-67. Also see the concepts of Liu 

Huaqing, commander of the PLAN from 1982 to 1987, about surprise guerilla-like 

attacks at sea. As interpreted in Bernard C. Cole, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” in 

Colonel Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army After Next (Carlisle, PA:

Strategic Studies Institution, August 2000), 293.

19. On 24 June 2002, the Washington Post reported that China was in negotiations

with Russia for eight more Kilo-class submarines, two more Sovremenny-class 

destroyers as well as 40 Su-30 fighter-bombers. See John Pomfret, “China to Buy 8

More Russian Submarines,” Washington Post, 25 June 2002, 15. Also see June Teufel 

Dreyer, “Taiwan’s Military: A View from Afar,” in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese 

Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI, December 1999), 294-

296, and IISS, Military Balance 2001-2002, 189. 

20. Timperlake and Triplett, Red Dragon Rising, 167. Also see the IISS view of

these destroyers use for combating U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, IISS, Military 

Balance 2001-2002, 172. 

21. Cole, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” in Puska, 303. 

22. Taking on the U.S. Navy in a Taiwan Strait fight is something Chinese analysts

have to be assessing; I assume they are evaluating vulnerabilities in U.S. aircraft carrier 

battle groups, whose characteristics include their prominent signature, reliance on

complex logistics, limited ASW and anti-mine capabilities. Also see Jeffrey Record, 

“Thinking about China and War,” Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2001, 76. 

23. IISS, Military Balance 2001-2002, p 173. Also see CNA, Kaohsiung, “China 

Shipbuilding says it can build submarines if given the specifications,” Taipei Times, 7 

June 2002, 1, and Jason Dean, "U.S. Conference Masks Shift," Asian Wall Street Journal, 

11 March, 2002, A-3. 

24. See Brian Hsu, “Taiwan navy not ready for AEGIS,” 22 March 2001,

www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/03/22story/0000078556. 
18 . . . Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan

25. See U.S. DoD, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic 

of China,” 12 July 2002, 3. 

26. Out of a total of 35000 listed by IISS, all under PLAAF command. See IISS,

Military Balance 2001-2002, 188. 

27. U.S. DoD report as cited in Red Dragon Rising, 157. 

28. Cole, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” in Puska, 300-301. 

29. David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage,”

The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2000, 122-123. 

30. Cole, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” in Puska, 313. Also see Cole’s comments in

the Washington Post, 25 June 2002, 15. 

31. June Teufel Dreyer to author, May 2002. Also see U.S.-China Security Review

Commission, Report to Congress, 15 July 2002, 161. 

32. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring: Chinese Missile Test,” 

Washington Times, 22 March 2002, 9. Also see staff reporter, “U.S. accuses Beijing of

strait missile build-up,” Hong Kong iMail, 29 August 2001, citing a Washington Times

report. http://hk-imail.singtao.com, 29 August 2001. Also see IISS, Military Balance 

2001-2002, 188. Also see DoD “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 

Republic of China,” 12 July 2002, 2, 16, 51. Details on PLA SRMBs opposite Taiwan

are found in Michael D. Swaine with Loren H. Runyon, Ballistic Missiles and Missile 

Defense in Asia, NBR Analysis, June 2002 (Seattle WA, NBR 2002), 15-16. 

33. Michael Klare, “The Next Great Arms Race,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, 

149-150. Also see Gerald Segal, “Taiwan’s Nuclear Card,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 4 

August 1998, and David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare 

Avoided,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jan/Feb 1998, 54-60. 

34. As of 1998 China had approximately 300 strategic and 150 tactical nuclear

warheads. See Rodney Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A 

Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Corporation, 1999), 54-55. 

35. See Barry M. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation (Westport, CT: 

Praeger Publishers, 1999), 5-17. Also see Sidney D. Drell et. al., (eds.) The New Terror: 

Fighting the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford CA: Hoover 

Institution Press, 1999), 30-31. 
Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan . . . 19

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

 The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to 

provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the 

USAF, to assist them in their activities to counter the threats posed by 

adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction 

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USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

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The Counterproliferation Papers 

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