Beating International Terrorism

An Action Strategy for Preemption

and Punishment

Revised Edition

by

S TEPHEN S LOAN

Professor of Political Science

University of Oklahoma

Visiting Research Fellow

Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute

for the Prevention of Terrorism

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2000
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sloan, Stephen, 1936–

Beating International Terrorism.

Revised Edition.

“April 2000.”

 Bibliography: p. 83

 1. Terrorism. 2. Terrorism—Prevention—Government

 policy–United States. I. Title.

 ISBN 1-58566-079-5

Disclaimer

Cover: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building,

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington DC 20402

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

ii
This edition is dedicated to:

Col Donald D. Stevens, USAF, Retired

A warrior, a scholar, a leader, and a gentleman

who inspired and supported me in the continuing battle for

innovation in the realm of doctrine, policy, and strategy

against the forces of conventional wisdom.

and

To those who lost their lives in the

Murrah Building attack, the survivors,

and those who came to comfort and aid them.

May the work of the Oklahoma City National

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

honor them by assisting democratic societies

in combating terrorism.
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

PROLOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

FOREWORD TO FIRST EDITION . . . . . . . . . xvii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii

1 A MATTER OF DEFINITION . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Terrorism as a Psychological Weapon . . . . . . 2

Terrorism as a Form of Communication . . . . 3

Terrorism as a Form of Criminality . . . . . . . 4

Terrorism as a Form of Political Warfare . . . . 5

Terrorism as a Form of Warfare . . . . . . . . . 5

Terrorism as a Strategy in a New

 Type of Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2 A MATTER OF DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The Semantics of Counterterrorism:

 A Quasi-Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . 13

Counterterrorism: A Matter of Doctrine . . . . . 17

Fundamental Doctrine: Is Terrorism a

 Form of Warfare? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Environmental Doctrine: The Impact of

 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Organizational Doctrine: The Bureaucratic

 Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

v
Chapter Page

3 FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION . . . . . . . . 27

Fighting in the Gray Area of Conflict:

 The Problem of Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . 28

Target and Force Selection in Counterterrorism

and Terrorism Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 Terrorist State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 State-Sponsored Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . 33

 Terrorist Groups Without

 State Sponsorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

 Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The Need to Apply Terrorist Organizational

 Doctrine to Counter and

 Preempt Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

The Use of Existing Forces in

 Terrorism Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

A New Force to Fight a New Form of Warfare . . 40

Placing the New Force in a

 Broader Organizational Context . . . . . . . 43

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4 POLICY DIMENSIONS: RECOGNITION,

 RESOLVE, AND ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5 TOWARD AN ACTIVE STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . 57

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

6 THE VICE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE . . . . . . 61

EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Illustrations

Figure Page

1 Spectrum of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 Analytical Framework for

 Counterterrorism Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3 Special Operations Umbrella . . . . . . . . . . . 39

vi
About the Author

Dr. Stephen Sloan, professor of political science at the

University of Oklahoma, received his MA and PhD degrees at New

York University. While on leave from the University of Oklahoma,

he was a senior associate at Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Inc.,

where he was in charge of the firm’s counterterrorism practice.

Prior to that he was a senior research fellow at Air University’s

Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education at

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Doctor Sloan engaged in his

initial fieldwork in the Republic of Indonesia, in 1965–66. In

1972–73 he was a Fulbright professor at Tribhuvan University in

Nepal. He is a member of the steering committee and is the first

visiting fellow of the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute

for the Prevention of Terrorism.

Professor Sloan has lectured at the National War College and

the Army War College. He has conducted more than 16

simulations of terrorist incidents with concerned personnel and

units in the United States and overseas. He has also conducted

crisis management workshops for multinational corporations and

for the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Professor Sloan’s articles

have been syndicated by the New York Times News Service and

published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and

by scholarly and popular journals.

Dr. Sloan is a member of the International Institute for

Strategic Studies and the Consortium for the Study of

Intelligence. In addition to Beating International Terrorism: An

Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment, he has written

A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience and

co-edited with Richard H. Shultz Jr. Responding to the

Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management. He has also

authored Simulating Terrorism and The Pocket Guide to Safe

Travel; co-authored with Harry Pizer Corporate Aviation

Security: The Next Frontier in Aerospace Operations; and

co-edited with Edwin G. Corr Low-Intensity Conflict: Old

Threats in a New World. Dr. Sloan’s latest book, co-edited with

Sean Anderson, is Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, published

by Scarecrow Press in 1995.

vii
Foreword

The face of terrorism has changed considerably in the

13-plus years since Beating International Terrorism was first

published. Whereas we once considered terrorism to be

primarily a tool of our archenemies in the Soviet Union, it

currently has many faces and is much harder to fight.

With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, there is no

superpower counterpoise to the United States. People, and

states, with perceived grievances against us are attacking in

the only way they dare: with terrorist tactics. Terrorist groups

proliferate, and the threat is more ambiguous and more

complicated. More state sponsors have entered the field, and

so have groups without the backing of any government—for

example, criminals who are out for monetary rather than

political gains.

Terrorist groups now are typically smaller and harder to

detect. They may have no hierarchy as such, but they can

coordinate their actions by means of the Internet. This makes

them harder for intelligence services to penetrate. But in light

of the growing easy availability of weapons of mass

destruction—particularly biological ones—prior knowledge

and effective action may be even more important to protect

our nation.

With the publication of this revised edition, Dr. Stephen

Sloan, an internationally recognized expert on the subject, has

taken a fresh look at the terrorist-fighting strategy he

proposed in 1986 while serving a two-year tour with Air

University’s Center for (now College of) Aerospace Doctrine,

Research, and Education. He finds that although his original

proposal for fighting terrorists in their own nests was sound

for the time, the present-day situation calls for a much more

stringent and long-term approach involving information

warfare, special operations capability, and international

cooperation.

Dr. Sloan finds that, even faced with these new threats, US

efforts against terrorism are blunted by bureaucratic infighting

and turf battles. The question continues: Is terrorism a criminal

ix
act or an act of war? How we fight it depends on how that

question is answered. He believes our efforts are still

essentially reactive, and while we are learning to meet the

challenge, the learning curve is much too slow. We hope this

book will promote continued thought and discussion in the

still very real “war in the shadows.”

JAMES L. RUTTLER JR.

Colonel, USAF

Commander

College of Aerospace Doctrine, 

 Research and Education

x
Prologue

The initial study of Beating International Terrorism: An

Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment was published

in 1986. The nearly 14 years that have passed since then have

witnessed profound events that have altered the international

political landscape. Moreover, these changes may also have a

global impact as we enter into the uncertainty of a new

millennium.

In reassessing the study I have found that there is both

continuity and change in the dark landscape of terrorism.

This prologue addresses the changes—both anticipated and

unanticipated by the author—that have impacted the views

developed in the initial study. In the epilogue I address where

the “action strategy” has met the test of time and where it has

fallen victim to the rapid and fundamental transition that

characterizes current international affairs. I then seek to

adjust the action strategy to meet the challenges created by a

new threat environment. As in the first study, “The

suggestions are directed to those people who may be called

upon to direct US offensive forces in a very real if undeclared

war, war in the shadows—the war against terrorism.”1

It is humbling to engage in a reassessment of an earlier

study. The process serves to underscore how difficult it is to

evolve policies, doctrines, and strategies that can stand the

test of time. The challenge may be particularly onerous in the

clandestine and convoluted world of terrorism where one looks

through the glass darkly. For, if there is a “fog of war” there is

most certainly a “smog of terrorism.” That smog may have led

to miscalculations by the author, but they are miscalculations

shared by many scholars, policy makers, and quasi-seers who

failed to discern various broader changes in the political and

technological global arena. Three miscalculations in particular

have had a major impact on reevaluating the characteristics of

terrorism and the concomitant means of combating it.

In the first place, when the study was written the cold war

had become intensified as the result of the pronouncements of

a president—Ronald Reagan—who modified the classic policy

xi
of containment to a more dynamic and outreaching offensive

against the “evil empire.” Because of this policy shift,

Washington was engaged in implementing its own form of

proxy or surrogate warfare against Moscow in Central

America, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas. A renewed

activist foreign policy, which included the massive buildup of

American forces, started a process that sought to banish the

Vietnam syndrome. In this activist policy, international

terrorism was largely seen to be a form of proxy war that was

particularly effectively employed by Moscow and its client

states. Although senior intelligence officials and academic

specialists rejected the contention that Moscow was the

controller of international terrorism, such books as Claire

Sterling’s The Terror Network were cited to illustrate that the

Soviet hand was involved in many acts and campaigns of

terrorism as part of a strategy to subvert the will of the Western

Alliance and promote instability throughout the third world. 2

Yet, at the same time, the focus on superpower competition

in which not only terrorism but also state-sponsored terrorism

was part of a global strategy provided an outward coherence

for those who sought to explain the significance of terrorism

as an integral part of Soviet strategy in the context of the cold

war. But the outward coherence that could be used to provide

the framework to understand and combat terrorism would be

destroyed as a result of the largely unforeseen remarkable and

rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, perhaps best

manifested by the breakdown of the Berlin Wall. With the end

of the cold war and the emergence of the United States as the

major military superpower came a whole new set of conditions

that not only would transform the cold war into the New World

Order but would lead to a “new world disorder.” In this highly

unstable setting the coherence of the balance of “nuclear

terrorism” between Moscow and Washington would be

replaced by a more ambiguous conflict environment. In this

new environment it would be more difficult to define who were

the terrorists and what their goals were, much less how the

United States could combat them.

In the second place, when the study was written the

following statement was valid: “Terrorism is still not viewed by

the public as a serious threat to national security and one

xii
that requires decisive action. Terrorism is still primarily

perceived to be a form of violence that happens to other people

in other countries.”3 But two events literally brought the war

home: the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on

26 February 1993 and the bombing of the Murrah Federal

Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995. The World Trade

Center incident was the first massive terrorist attack in the

United States. The impact of the attack—despite its

magnitude—was somewhat mitigated to the American public

because it happened on one of the coasts where such

activities were, to some degree, expected and because it

involved “foreign” terrorists. The second bombing, however,

broke the insularity of those in the interior of the country. For,

if a city in the “heartland” could be subject to attack not only

by homegrown terrorists but in the person of a young man

who had served with distinction in the GuIf War, any town or

city could be vulnerable. In many ways the political and

psychological shockwaves that moved outward from

Oklahoma had more of an impact than those that moved

inward from New York City.

The impact of the second attack had particular meaning to

the author. I have been studying terrorism for over 25 years,

and one of my earliest monographs in 1980 was a study titled

Terrorism Preparedness on the State and Local Level: An

Oklahoma Perspective.

4

 When the study was published, the

attitude on the part of many of the informed public reflected

the prevailing attitudes. “Is it necessary? It won’t happen

here.” But that attitude, that innocence or ignorance, would

give way to a new reality in the face of 168 deaths, over 800

injured people, and the trauma to a community that is still

undergoing a healing process. I would also add that while my

concern about domestic acts was real, how could I anticipate

that the most lethal act of terrorism in the United States at

the time would take place only 12 blocks from my house? And

how could I anticipate that I would be spending the next five

days on-site seeking to help the public understand the nature

of terrorism? The tragedy also led to my commitment to help

develop and participate in the Oklahoma City National

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism as a means

xiii
of identifying and developing appropriate policies to meet

future threats.

The third change was technological in nature, and its future

impact may be the most difficult to discern or counter. When I

wrote the early draft of Beating International Terrorism, I relied

on yellow pad and pen, or typewriter. It was only later in my

first year at the Center for (now College of) Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) that I acquired a

Macintosh, which at the time was more sophisticated than the

government-issued personal computers used by my colleagues

in the military. How could we know that in the course of the

next one and one-half decades we would experience not only a

revolution in computer technology but the transformation of

the Internet from a tool used by the military and scientific

community to the most rapidly growing mode of contemporary

communication of data (if not of knowledge production)?

However, in Beating International Terrorism, there were areas

of technological innovation that I was sensitive to. I was

concerned about the impact of technological change on

terrorists’ weaponry long before the term weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) became part of the public lexicon of

threats. Moreover, I did emphasize that with the introduction

of commercial use of jet aircraft into the transportation system

we had witnessed the development of “nonterritorial

terrorism.” Perpetrators could seize aircraft flying at over 500

miles an hour at 30,000 feet and, by operating in the medium

of the aerospace, ignore the arbitrary boundaries of

nation-states. 5 Furthermore, I recognized that terrorists could

spread their message of fear and intimidation via the medium

of television; but nowhere did I recognize the profound impact

of the Internet, where cyberspace and the World Wide Web

would extend and enhance the field of operations and

capabilities of current and future terrorists.

These three changes, along with other developments, have

made me reconsider the major elements of the “action

strategy” I formulated in 1984–85. In the epilogue to this

edition I suggest which of my conclusions may have stood the

test of time and which have not. Even though I have learned

painful lessons about the dangers of suggesting policies,

strategies, and doctrine based on the always imperfect and

xiv
incomplete understanding of current and particularly future

developments, I then suggest what measures should be

considered to meet the always changing but enduring threat

of terrorism. In effect, I push the envelope, but hopefully at my

academic peril and not the readers’.

Notes

1. Stephen Sloan, Beating International Terrorism (Maxwell Air Force

Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), xvii.

2. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International

Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Reader’s Digest Press,

1981).

3. Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force Report on Combating

Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 2.

4. Michael McEwen and Stephen Sloan, Terrorism Preparedness on the

State and Local Level: An Oklahoma Perspective, Clandestine Technology

and Tactics Series (Gaithersburg, Md.: The International Association of

Chiefs of Police), 1981.

5. Stephen Sloan, The Anatomy of Non-Territorial Terrorism: An Analytical

Essay, Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series (Gaithersburg, Md.:

International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978).

xv
Foreword

to the

First Edition

Terrorism has become the scourge of the 1980s. It has

spread worldwide as independent political groups and minor

states attempt to press their internal and international claims

against the establishment. And, as Dr. Sloan notes in his

preface, the struggle against terrorism is not going well.

This study proposes a bold new approach to the problem

which includes the involvement of the United States military

in preemptive operations. Such an approach differs radically

from past policies and will certainly be very controversial.

However, it does provide a basis for the discussion of new

ideas badly needed to counteract this sinister, protracted,

global war being fought in the shadows.

JOHN C. FRYER JR.

Colonel, USAF

Commander

Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

 Research, and Education

[March 1986]

xvii
Preface

The war against terrorism is not going well. Despite the bold

pronouncements by the current administration, the United

States essentially reacts—and often, badly—to attacks on its

citizens and interests overseas. To the American public the

coverage of such incidents has often projected an image of a

government whose strong rhetoric to bring the war home

against terrorists and their sponsor states has not been

translated to meaningful action. Equally alarming is the fact

that the media, rightly or wrongly, has also projected to

foreign audiences the image of an often truculent and

self-righteous superpower that is ineffective in countering

skilled and determined adversaries who have taken the

offensive in an increasingly violent form of armed conflict.

While these images may not be correct, they do highlight an

unpleasant reality. Despite the bold policy statements, those

who engage in attacks on the United States have carried out

their operations with relative impunity. Furthermore, despite

the proliferation of security measures and increased training

in counterterrorist tactics, despite its stated desire to go on

the offensive, Washington still finds itself in an essentially

passive and reactive posture.

While there are a variety of reasons for this reactive posture,

there is a central omission in the US desire to engage the

terrorists offensively. This omission is the absence of a

systematic doctrine to counter terrorism in general and, more

specifically, a doctrine of terrorism preemption that can form

the foundation for developing the necessary capabilities and

policies to take the initiative away from the terrorists.

To those who are understandably concerned with the

pressing operational requirements of responding to immediate

threats or acts of terrorism, a discussion of doctrine may

appear to be a luxury that cannot be considered by policy

makers, officials, and officers who live in what they view to be

“the real world.” But unless doctrinal issues are addressed,

Washington will continue essentially to react to short-term

crises instead of developing the capacity to engage in both

xix
short-term operations and long-term campaigns against the

practitioners of modern terrorism.

As we shall see, terrorism can be viewed to be a form of

criminality, an aspect of intense political competition and

subversion, a manifestation of the changing nature of warfare,

or indeed a new form of warfare. Depending on the

perspective, one can stress the importance of the law

enforcement function, the use of diplomacy, the crucial role of

the intelligence community, or the requirement to engage in

military action against terrorists and their sponsors.

Unfortunately, until now the use of military force has been

considered only as a last-resort option in response to an

ongoing incident. Moreover, discussing retaliation after the

fact continues to generate more heat than light in the ongoing

debate of how the United States should combat terrorism.

The reluctance to use the military option to reactive

missions, much less in preemptive ones, is a ramification of a

fundamental omission in developing a meaningful capability

to engage the terrorists. That is, despite the call for concerted

forceful action against terrorists on the part of the current

political leadership, terrorism is still not viewed by various

civilian policy makers in general and by the military in

particular to be a form of warfare that requires action by the

military services. If there has not been a counterterrorism

doctrine, and more specifically a doctrine of terrorism

preemption, it is in large part because the services are

unwilling to accept the view that terrorism is a new form of

warfare that requires a military doctrine to combat it. Various

military officers have dodged the issue altogether by

suggesting that they cannot be involved in formulating

counterterrorism or terrorism preemption doctrine unless

there is guidance from the civilian leadership. One can

suggest, however, that this may be a convenient means

whereby the military can avoid facing the disquieting fact that

they may not have the desire or capability to engage in this

new form of warfare. The senior officers and officials in the

defense establishment would perhaps rather fight the old wars

or hopefully be prepared to fight the most unlikely type of

future wars. But even as they talk, the terrorists have already

declared a war on and initiated action against the United

xx
States and its allies. Therefore, like it or not, the military must

evolve doctrine that will enable it, along with the law

enforcement community, the foreign policy establishment, and

the intelligence community, to take an active and, when

necessary, a preeminent role in using the tactics and

strategies of the art of war not only to respond to but to take

the initiative against those who are now practicing terroristic

warfare. Indeed, it is an obligation of the services to develop

the necessary doctrine and force for use if and when

Washington and the public call upon them to search out and

destroy an increasingly dangerous and sophisticated enemy in

a global theater of operations.

This is not to suggest that such a doctrine should deal solely

with the use of armed force. Since terrorism has many

characteristics, is fought on many fronts, and is constantly

changing, the military must work very closely with all those

organizations and agencies responsible for combating

terrorism. However, this study posits the view that the

military, like it or not, must provide the doctrinal leadership in

what has become a very real war.

The ensuing pages present a discussion of how such a

doctrine can be evolved and implemented into a framework for

action. Neither the discussion nor the framework should be

taken literally. They are primarily meant as a base point for

further necessary discussion on an area of investigation that

largely has been ignored because of a concern over immediate

exigencies. Furthermore, the framework does not provide

specific operational requirements to engage effectively in

terrorism preemption. Such a discussion falls within the

realm of those with the operational experience within both the

intelligence community and the services who are capable of

planning and conducting the necessary operations and

campaigns. Moreover, even if the author were capable of

engaging in such a discussion, given its sensitive nature, it

would hardly be appropriate to deal with the operational arts

in an open publication.

Finally, this study relates both doctrine and capabilities—

present and future—to a brief evaluation of existing policy. The

policy dimensions of course are vital, for in the public discussion

in Washington insufficient attention is given to the new reality:

xxi
The military must learn to fight a new form of warfare. It may

not be the type of war they would prefer to fight, or a war of

their making, but it is a real and ongoing war.

This study is written primarily for senior- and middle-level

officials and officers who will be responsible for conducting the

war against terrorism if and when they are called upon to do

so. The author deeply appreciates the opportunity to conduct

his research at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research,

and Education (CADRE), Air University, Maxwell Air Force

Base, Alabama. His association with CADRE has given him

the opportunity to gain insights through discussions with

dedicated officers from all of the services who have shared

knowledge and viewpoints that are not readily available in the

academic community. In turn, the author hopes that his

perspective as an academic with operational and policy

concerns dealing with terrorism can assist those who must

engage the adversary by providing a different viewpoint that

may help focus on the measures necessary to bring the war

home to the terrorists.

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions and

support of the following people: Col Donald D. Stevens,

commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education; Col Dennis M. Drew, director, Airpower Research

Institute; Col Keith W. Geiger, chief, Airpower Doctrine

Division; and Lt Col Fred J. Reule, deputy director for

research and chief, Command Research Division. Special

thanks to Lt Col Jerome W. Klingaman, USAF, Retired, for his

insights on low-intensity conflict, and Col James P. Nance for

introducing me to the complexities of special operations; and

finally, to my editor, Thomas E. Mackin, for his great

assistance in revising the manuscript and to the personnel of

the Production Division for their efforts in preparing my study

for publication.

STEPHEN SLOAN

Senior Research Fellow

Airpower Research Institute

xxii
Introduction

The modern age of terrorism was ushered in by the

massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in

Munich in 1972. Since that time the fleeting electronic images

of hooded terrorists holding hostages and authorities at bay

have been projected on the television screen with depressing

regularity. The skyjackings, bombings, hostage takings,

assassinations, and other acts of carnage continue to seize the

world’s headlines and reinforce a public perception that the

international community is unwilling or unable to respond

to—much less take the initiative against—those who are

engaging in an increasingly destructive assault on the fragile

civil order.

Unfortunately, that perception is essentially correct. Despite

general statements of condemnation, the drafting of treaties,

and other diplomatic initiatives, a unified international

approach to combat terrorism is not even remotely in sight. As

the bloodletting continues, the semantic battle over what

constitutes terrorism often takes precedence over concrete

action to combat it.

On the regional level the responses to terrorism have been

more encouraging. Cooperation has taken place, particularly

between the United States and its Western allies. The sharing

of intelligence and the refinement of security measures to

prevent or respond to incidents has increased. But the

cooperation has rarely resulted in concerted unified action

against terrorists and, when appropriate, their sponsor states.

When there have been successful actions against terrorists,

as in the case of Entebbe or Mogadishu, such successes were

primarily the result of the resolve of individual states not to

give in to terrorist blackmail. Experience sadly confirms that

in the struggle against terrorism, each government in the final

analysis must depend on its own will and resources in

responding to terrorist attacks against its citizens and

interests.

The United States’s record in meeting the challenges posed

by terrorism is undistinguished. The brief moment of national

xxiii
euphoria that resulted from the interception of the aircraft

carrying the perpetrators of the Achille Lauro affair in 1985

and the bombing of Libya in 1986 cannot obscure the fact

that America’s own war on terrorism has been characterized

primarily by a national sense of helplessness and rage during

and after each incident. The seizure of the American Embassy

in Iran, the bombing and resultant loss of 241 lives at the

Marine Landing Team Headquarters in Beirut, and the

continuing assaults on citizens and interests overseas have

left scars on the national psyche.

Since President Nixon, the official policy of no concessions

to terrorists’ demands has been violated in incident after

incident. The current administration has maintained the same

fiction, as witness the negotiations and concessions that led to

the freeing of the passengers on TWA Flight 847 in Lebanon in

1985. Yet, President Reagan and a number of his senior

advisors have stated publicly that they will take an even

stronger position against international terrorism than

previous administrations. Bold rhetoric has been enunciated,

including the call for an “active strategy” and “preemptive

measures” against “state sponsored terrorism.” Yet current

programs to combat terrorism remain essentially defensive

and reactive with emphasis still being placed on expensive

target-hardening programs and the refinement of crisis

management techniques.

The reasons for this reactive and defensive stance are

complex and interrelated. At the most senior official level,

there are still no consistent long-term policies. Each situation

determines the response, and even if military action has been

taken it has only been initiated after the terrorists have

struck. Furthermore, the memory of the abortive Iranian

hostage rescue attempt raises serious questions concerning

the ability of the United States to react to, much less go on the

offensive against, the terrorists. With each new crisis the same

scenario is played out with little variation in theme. The

concern over the fate of the hostages, heightened by extensive

media coverage, leads to drawn-out negotiation instead of

effective military action against the perpetrators. The lack of

policies and action is also the result of the fact that the

so-called war on terrorism often degenerates into a partisan

xxiv
debate within Congress. Polemics over “left wing terrorists”

and “right wing freedom fighters” have promoted political

disunity in the face of skillful and determined adversaries.

Finally—and perhaps most fundamentally—despite the outcry

that accompanies each incident, terrorism is still not viewed

by the public as a serious threat to national security and one

that requires decisive action. Terrorism is still primarily

perceived to be a form of violence that happens to other people

in other countries. The general climate of opinion does not

provide the type of support that is necessary if the war is to be

brought home against terrorism.

But even if the resolve developed within the political

leadership and the public not only to react strongly but indeed

to seize the initiative against terrorists and their state

sponsors, it is by no means clear whether the military—who

might be called on to engage in offensive preemptive

operations and campaigns against terrorists—would be

capable of carrying out such missions. The uncertainty is

based in part on whether the services, individually and jointly,

have the capability to take the offensive. But, more

significantly, the uncertainty is predicated on a more basic

question: Does the military have a counterterrorism doctrine,

a doctrine that can provide the basis for the development of

the necessary forces and strategies to take the initiative in

both short-term operations and long-term campaigns against

enemies who are growing in strength and sophistication? This

study takes the position that present doctrine associated with

combating terrorism is significantly flawed, that it is

essentially reactive in nature, and consequently cannot be

used effectively as the foundation for the development of the

necessary organizations and forces that must be created if the

cycle of crisis and reaction is ever to be broken. It discusses

the major elements required to develop a doctrine that can

assist the services in bringing the war home against the

terrorists if and when they are called upon to do so by the

political leadership and the American people.

Chapter 1, “A Matter of Definition,” presents the major

characteristics of modern terrorism and discusses how they

have been transformed by changes in technology and in the

international system into a potent weapon of political,

xxv
psychological, and armed conflict that has yet to be fully

appreciated by the military establishment. Chapter 2, “A

Matter of Doctrine,” suggests that current concepts are

inadequate in laying the groundwork for an offensive

capability. It then discusses how a new conceptualization can

provide the basis for preemptive military initiatives against

terrorism. Chapter 3, “Force and Target Selection,” addresses

how different types of doctrine can drive the acquisition of the

kinds of forces capable of taking the offensive against

terrorists and their sponsor states. Chapter 4, “Policy

Dimensions: Recognition, Resolve, and Action” presents an

analytical framework for the selection and use of existing

forces as well as the development of new forces against

different types of terrorist targets. Chapter 5, “Toward an

Active Strategy,” suggests changes required before policy

makers can develop or implement a counterterrorism

capability. The suggestions are directed to those people who

may be called on to direct US offensive forces in the very real,

if undeclared, war in the shadows—the war against terrorism.

Chapter 6, “The Vice President’s Task Force,” is a kind of

postscript to the first edition, concerning findings released

after completion of the original study.

xxvi
Chapter 1

A Matter of Definition

To develop a doctrine of counterterrorism, we must under -

stand the nature of the threat. Unfortunately, subjective factors intrude that impede such understanding. The term terrorism is often used in a pejorative manner, and the debate over

what constitutes it is largely based on different definitions

that are used either to condemn or justify the act. “Terrorism”

is an emotion-laden term that is often employed as a rhetorical weapon by those who hold different political ideologies.

The adage “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom

fighter” may be true, but it does not contribute much to the

discussion. Whether they are terrorists or freedom fighters,

their victims face a grim and often final reality.

While there are conflicting definitions over what constitutes

terrorism, a number of them suggest common characteristics;

and an understanding of how these characteristics have been

transformed by modern technology can provide the basis for

appreciating the major elements of the threat. Such an appreciation provides the foundation for the development of a counterterrorism doctrine.

Despite numerous incidents of what often appear to be bru -

tal and mindless violence, terrorism is premeditated, calcu -

lated use of force to achieve certain objectives. Terrorism can

be defined as “a purposeful human activity primarily directed

toward the creation of a general climate of fear designed to

influence, in ways desired by the protagonists, other human

beings, and through them some course of events.”1

Terrorism therefore is goal-directed violence. Those who

practice it may not appear rational, but their actions are far

from mindless. Terrorism is used to promote certain responses

from the immediate victims and from a larger audience. It is a

weapon that is used in different types of conflict.

1
Terrorism as a Psychological Weapon

Since terrorism is “directed toward the creation of a general

climate of fear,”2 it must be stressed that terrorism is first a

psychological weapon, for those who use it play on the most

elemental fears. As one definition cogently notes, “Terror is a

natural phenomenon, terrorism is the conscious exploitation

of it.”3

Those who engage in terrorism seek to exploit both individ -

ual and collective fears of what might happen. Terrorists seek

to establish a threshold of fear and intimidation by engaging

in acts that force individuals and groups to accept the existence of life-threatening scenarios not of their own making.

Through bombings, skyjackings, hostage taking, and other

acts, the successful terrorist group creates a pervasive agenda

of fear—an agenda that becomes salient to the experience of

an audience forced to realize after an act of carnage that

“there but for the grace of God go I.”

Terrorists enjoy ultimate success when they can instill into

the target audience a sense of powerlessness and helplessness. Acts of terrorism therefore are employed to create a

particular mental state, a state of dread “aimed at the people

watching.”4 But beyond individuals, acts of terrorism are also

directed at institutions, for as Richard Clutterbuck notes,

“Terrorism aims, by the use of violence or the threat of vio -

lence, to coerce governments, authorities, or populations by

inducing fear.”5

In the final analysis any doctrine that would counter terror -

ism must therefore recognize that it is “a form of psychological

operations (PSYOP) . . . Many other characteristics of terrorism are argued by the drafters of competing definitions, but

virtually all include words to the effect that acts of terrorism

are directed at a target audience and not just the immediate

victim. Without this provision, terrorism would be indistinguishable from other acts of violence.”

6

 [Emphasis added]

Since the psychological aspects of terrorism must be dealt

with, it is important to reconcile the need for awareness with

the equally compelling requirement not to overstate the threat.

For as one authority notes, “It is imperative that the distincBEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

2
tion between sensitivity and alertness not be blurred; and that

the close interdependence between them not be ignored.”7

But perhaps most significant in developing a doctrine to

actively counter terrorism is a recognition of the requirement

that the techniques of psychological intimidation as practiced

by the terrorists can be turned against them. Gazit and Handel note: “Psychological warfare is a powerful weapon in the

war against terrorism. Its aim is to hit the terrorist organiza -

tion at its most vulnerable spot—the motivation of its mem -

bers and the readiness of others to join its ranks and operate

within its framework.”8

If an offensive is to be launched against terrorists, the

authorities must engage in their own campaigns to generate fear.

Terrorism as a Form of Communication

Since terrorism as a psychological weapon is aimed at a

broader audience than the immediate victims, it is important

to recognize that terrorism is also a form of communication.

As another definition puts it, “Terrorism is the threat of vio -

lence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public

attention.”9

Terrorists engage in “armed propaganda.” The terrorist

group’s aim is to “communicate something on a small or national scale about its objectives, such as specific demands,

simple assertions of its existence, or evidence of its power to

control the course of events and to enforce subsequent demands. The terrorist minority needs to demonstrate its ability

to weaken, intimidate, or bring down a government, or change

the nature of a society or a government policy, in order to gain

recognition for itself and its objectives (whether or not the

latter is articulated). Thus terrorists seek to control communication for their own use and deny its use to society.”1 0

Any doctrine to counter terrorism must incorporate the

means by which the message of fear and intimidation can be

not only blunted but also replaced by a signal that the

authorities can eliminate the agenda of fear created by terrorist acts. Through overt operations the authorities must convey

“to the people watching” that they are meeting the terrorist

A MATTER OF DEFINITION

3
threat effectively. But equally important, through the use of

both overt and covert measures, they must have the capacity

to signal to the terrorists that they cannot engage in their acts

of carnage with impunity. Just as terrorists seek to force their

message on “the world’s consciousness,”1 1 so must a doctrine

of counterterrorism convey to the public and the terrorists

that the government is able and willing to take the initiative

away from the terrorists.

Terrorism as a Form of Criminality

While terrorism is certainly “a form of violent criminal behavior,” it is vital that any doctrine associated with countering

terrorism carefully differentiate between the act and the behavior. Terrorism is without question a crime, but those who

practice it may perceive themselves to be soldiers in a real, if

undeclared, war. Furthermore, various states that engage in

or sponsor terrorism view such measures as an element in a

strategy of warfare. Finally, the line between differentiating

between terrorism as a criminal act and as an act of political

or armed conflict is increasingly being blurred, as perhaps

best illustrated by the marriages of convenience between drug

dealers and terrorist groups that have led to the development

of narcoterrorism. Terrorists are criminals, but it is important

to recognize that terrorism is also a different order of conflict,

and that to beat it will require the involvement not only of the

law enforcement community but of the military as well. It

must be stressed, however, that recognizing that terrorism

may be more than a criminal act does not imply that the

perpetrator has some degree of legitimacy for his or her actions. As Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick notes: “Terrorism is political in

a way that crime is not; the terrorists act in the name of some

political, some public purpose. [However,] while the conception of the actor transforms the act, and while a purpose

related to a public goal makes an act political, it does not

make it moral. A public purpose does not make a terrorist who

has been arrested a political prisoner.”1 2

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

4
Terrorism as a Form of Political Warfare

Despite the blurring effect between criminality and political

action, it is vital that terrorism on an organizational or govern -

mental level—as contrasted to the level of individual motiva -

tion—be placed in the context of intense political competition.

Terrorism has been and will continue to be used as an instru -

ment of political subversion. Terrorism is therefore one of the

tactics and strategies associated with the concept of “indirect

aggression” as developed by the Soviet Union and practiced by

a number of states. It is “the systematic attempt to undermine

a society with the ultimate goal of causing the collapse of law

and order and the loss of confidence in the state.”1 3

Terrorism has become a major instrument in protracted

political warfare that exists within an environment of neither

war nor peace. Those who would evolve a doctrine of counterterrorism must develop the capability to engage in their

own form of political warfare; this in turn emphasizes the

crucial role of the intelligence community in gathering information and carrying out operations against terrorists and

their sponsor states. As we shall discuss, in this type of warfare the arbitrary “Green Door Syndrome” that separates the

various intelligence communities must be breached. New

forces may have to be developed to integrate both functions. In

the war against terrorism the relationship between political

warfare and armed conflict is so interdependent that counterterrorist forces may be required to ignore the arbitrary division between intense political competition on the one hand

and subversion and armed conflict on the other.

Terrorism as a Form of Warfare

Yet, in the final analysis, while terrorism is a form of psychological and political warfare, it has increasingly become

either a manifestation of the changing nature of armed conflict

or indeed a new form of warfare that is the result of a technological revolution and accompanying changes in the international political arena. This creates a most vexing problem for

those who would develop doctrine not necessarily based on

A MATTER OF DEFINITION

5
the principles of warfare grounded on historical experience.

They face the onerous challenge of developing the necessary

forces and appropriate strategies to engage in a form of com -

bat that poses as many unique problems as are now associated with the emergence of space warfare. Brian Jenkins notes

that “warfare in the future will be less coherent. Warfare will

cease to be finite.”1 4

The “less coherent” nature of warfare particularly applies to

what Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick has called “terrorist war, [that] is

part of a total war which sees the whole society as an enemy,

and all members of a society as appropriate objects for violent

action.”1 5 The need to meet the changing nature of warfare in

general and terrorism in particular cannot be overstated. For as

Richard Clutterbuck succinctly notes: “Guerrilla warfare and terrorism, rural and urban, internal or international, has undoubtedly become the primary form of conflict of our time.”1 6

The problems associated with countering terrorism as a new

form of warfare are the central concern of the following chapters. For only now is the military being forced to address the

question of how to take the field against adversaries who may

have drawn on traditional legacies of hatred and conflict to

wage a new type of armed warfare through the utilization of

modern technology.

Terrorism as a Strategy in a New

Type of Warfare

As a result of the joint technological revolution in transportation and communication, the psychological and political attributes of terrorism have been transformed and magnified.

Even though terrorism has evolved from an old tradition, con -

temporary terrorism is indeed a new form of conflict. Since

Munich, there is something new and invidious in the annals of

human conflict.

The introduction of jet aircraft in the 1950s and early 1960s

gave terrorists a degree of mobility and a field of operations

undreamed of by their most dedicated and skillful predecessors. They could literally strike at targets of opportunity on a

global basis in a matter of hours. As a result of technological

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

6
change, a new form of terrorism emerged. Terrorism was no

longer essentially a tactic associated with campaigns of political or armed subversion whose primary goal was the seizure of

state power in a territorially based conflict. Modern, technologically enhanced terrorists could now engage in operations

thousands of miles away from their base of operations or from

a disputed strife zone. In effect the last decades have been

marked by the development of nonterritorial terrorism which

has become strategic in nature (fig. 1). It is a form of terrorism

not confined to a specific geographical area. 1 7 It is essential to

differentiate between it and the terrorism associated with the

tactics of an insurgency. Modern, nonterritorial terrorism does

not fit neatly within that part of the spectrum of conflict now

commonly referred to as low-intensity conflict. The following

statement should be kept in mind by those who would develop

doctrine to combat this new form of violence. “Terrorism is an

important aspect of low-intensity conflict. A proper definition

should specify local internal terrorism to distinguish this form

of violence from nonterritorial terrorism, a form that is not

necessarily low-intensity in nature. Local internal terrorism is

properly described as a tactic employed in the low-intensity

phase of guerrilla warfare and insurrection. International ter -

rorism has strategic implications in the field of armed diplo -

macy.”1 8 Therefore, as we shall see existing doctrine, strategy,

and forces that have been developed to engage in low-intensity

conflict may not be appropriate to counter modern, nonterrito -

rial terrorism.

Placed in an even broader perspective, it is important to

recognize that the strategic, as contrasted to tactical, importance of international terrorism is largely the result of the fact

that the technology that transformed terrorism has also transformed the international system. Both superpowers and

smaller states have employed terrorism as a significant

weapon in the changing international environment.

At the level of superpower confrontation, the massive destructive power of both nuclear and conventional weapons

limits the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union

based on their mutual recognition that unless alternatives to

direct military confrontation can be found, the ultimate result

could be global holocaust. (Interestingly, this condition has

A MATTER OF DEFINITION

7
been termed the “balance of nuclear terror.”) The confrontation

experience of the Cuban missile crisis may explain in part why

the United States resorted to only limited action in the attempt to free the hostages in Iran. The superpowers have

sought to limit their use of military force at a lower level in

order to avoid direct confrontation. The Soviet Union in parFigure 1. Spectrum of Conflict

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

8
ticular has supported client states who in turn have trained

and equipped various groups to use terrorism as a form of

“indirect aggression” that can challenge Washington’s global

strategic position. This is not to suggest that Moscow is behind the unified “terror network,”1 9 but it serves to underscore

how the Soviet Union has employed terrorism as a strategic

weapon through the use of “active measures [which] constitute a dynamic and integrated array of overt and covert tech -

niques for influencing events and behavior in, and actions of,

foreign countries.”2 0

To the USSR, terrorism is not narrowly defined as simply a

form of violence. It is placed within a very broad spectrum of

political warfare and armed conflict that ranges from overt

and covert propaganda to “paramilitary operations, composed

of a wide variety of Soviet activities in support of terrorist

groups and insurgent movements.”2 1 Terrorism is therefore an

offensive weapon in what is ultimately a systematic campaign

of intensive political conflict. It is just one element in an approach that integrates the tactics and strategies of political

and armed conflict. In combating terrorism, the United States

will have to address whether it can develop its own variation of

“active measures,” Soviet style, as one means of taking the

offensive against terrorist groups and their state sponsors.

If the Soviet Union has employed terrorism as a way of

avoiding the technological nightmare of nuclear war, other

states have used it to compensate for the preponderance of

military power held by Washington and Moscow. The seizure

of the hostages in Iran points to another ominous characteristic of modern terrorism: states are not only sponsoring

terrorist groups but are emulating their tactics as an instru -

ment of foreign policy. It is not significant in the Iranian case

that the act may have been initiated by nongovernmental

groups. What is important is that holding those Americans in

Iran became a state-sanctioned and state-sponsored terrorist

act employed as a means of dramatizing a cause and attempting to pressure a more powerful state to overreact or acquiesce

to a number of demands. The Iranians were highly successful.

The title of the American Broadcasting Company’s long running coverage of the incident, “America Held Hostage,” effectively conveyed the similarity between an act conducted by an

A MATTER OF DEFINITION

9
international terrorist group and by a government employing

the tactics of international terrorism.

The Iranian seizure of the US embassy was not the traditional “state terrorism” or “enforcement terrorism” of the past

aimed at controlling or intimidating the local population.2 2 It

was directed at a foreign adversary and audience whose representatives were held in captivity. Moreover, beyond their own

frontiers such rogue or outlaw states as Iran and Libya have

supported nonterritorial terrorist groups as a technique in

what can be viewed as a new diplomatic method—“armed diplomacy”—for carrying out foreign policy. 2 3 To these states,

acts of terrorism are as surely a part of this new and perverse

diplomacy as the exchange of ambassadors of the past. What

we are now witnessing is a variant of the gunboat diplomacy

practiced by the major imperial powers during the nineteenth

century. Now smaller states can threaten major powers with

relative impunity; and when and if these rogue states and the

terrorist groups they support achieve a nuclear capability,

they can engage in a form of intimidation undreamed in the

past.

It is therefore important that in the development of a counterterrorism doctrine and capability, emphasis be placed in a

broader political context than the use of force; and it must

also be recognized that terrorism is a manifestation of the

changing nature of war. For as Brian Jenkins perceptively

notes in placing the tragedy of Lebanon* in a broader com -

parative perspective: “The conflict in Lebanon is likely to be

representative of armed conflict worldwide in the last quarter

of the twentieth century: a mixture of conventional warfare,

classic guerrilla warfare, and campaigns of terrorism, openly

fought and secretly waged, often without regard to national

frontiers, by armies, as well as irregular forces, directly or

indirectly.”24

If the United States is to develop an offensive doctrine of

counterterrorism, it must learn to fight a new form of warfare

in which it may not be able to draw on the experiences of the

past.

*23 October 1983: Suicide truck bomb killed 241 Marines at the Marine com -

pound, Beirut, Lebanon.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

10
Notes

1. H. H. A. Cooper, Evaluating the Terrorist Threat, Principles of Applied

Risk Assessment, Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series (Gaithersburg,

Md.: The International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1974), 4. Terrorism

always poses an unacceptable challenge to the principles on which organized society rests, for those acting in this way seek to arrogate to them -

selves, and use in perverse ways, powers exclusively reserved to the state.

Terrorism as an autonomous concept manifests itself through the distinc -

tive deployment of a variety of criminal acts calculated to harm human life,

property, and other interests.

2. Ibid.

3. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and

Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 3.

4. Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, re -

search paper no. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy

(Los Angeles, Calif.: Crescent Publications, 1974), 4.

5. Richard Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists (London: Farber and

Farber Limited, 1977), 21.

6. Michael T. McEwen, “Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The

Unused Weapon,” Military Review 66, no. 1 (January 1986): 62.

7. Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Intelligence,” in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s: Counterintelligence, ed.

Roy Godson (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Research Center, 1980),

141.

8. Ibid.

9. Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, 3.

10. Francis P. Hoeber, “Terrorism, Sabotage and Telecommunications,”

International Security Review 7, no. 2 (February 1982): 289.

11. As taken from an interview with a terrorist on the CBS-BBC production entitled “Terrorist International,” which aired on 60 Minutes, 9 March

1976.

12. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, “Defining Terrorism,” Catholicism in Crisis,

September 1984 (from an address originally presented at the Jonathan

Institute’s Conference on International Terrorism, Washington, D.C., 25

June 1984), 56.

13. Roberta D. Goren, The Soviet Union and Terrorism, ed. Jillian Becker

(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 14.

14. Brian Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: The

Rand Corporation, June 1983), 6.

15. Kirkpatrick.

16. Clutterbuck, 16.

17. For a discussion of the major characteristics of nonterritorial terror -

ism see Stephen Sloan, The Anatomy of Nonterritorial Terrorism: An Analytical Essay, Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series (Gaithersburg, Md.:

The International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1981).

A MATTER OF DEFINITION

11
18. Jerome W. Klingaman, “The Definition of Low-Intensity Conflict and

Its Relation to US Defense Capabilities,” in Air Power for Counterinsurgency,

an unpublished manuscript, 9.

19. As taken from the title of the book Terror Network: The Secret War of

International Terrorism, by Claire Sterling (New York: Holt, Rinehart and

Winston, Reader’s Digest Press, 1981). The author does not suggest that

there is a monolithic network controlled by the Soviet Union. However, she

effectively shows the complicated linkages among various groups and Mos -

cow’s involvement with them.

20. Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures

in Soviet Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 16.

21. Ibid., 33.

22. Thomas Perry Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,”

Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1986), 123.

23. For a discussion of how the development of contemporary terrorism

is a manifestation of the technological impact that is transforming the

international political arena, and for a description of “armed diplomacy,” see

Stephen Sloan, “International Terrorism: Conceptual Problems and Implications,” Journal of Thought 1 7, no. 2 (Summer 1982).

24. Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, 2.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

12
Chapter 2

A Matter of Doctrine

If the ability to engage in offensive operations against terrorists and their sponsor states is to be realized, questions of

definition and doctrinal issues must be addressed. If these two

factors are ignored, the foundation for the development of the

necessary strategies, organizations, and forces capable of

bringing home the war against terrorism will not be realized.

The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. In the first

place, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of the terms

employed by the services to provide guidance about the types

of measures that are used to meet the threat. Do the existing

terms essentially perpetuate a reactive and defensive posture

despite the call for an “active” strategy? Or, are they subject to

a reinterpretation more in keeping with the traditional objective of seizing the initiative? Should new terms be developed to

provide the necessary direction for moving beyond the posture

of reaction that has characterized the United States’ actions

against threats and acts of terrorism? In the second place, the

reinterpretation of existing terminology or the development of

a new terminology to meet the terrorist challenge will have

meaning only if such an endeavor is placed within the broader

context of doctrine development. For unless there is a clearly

enunciated and integrated doctrine to combat terrorism, the

government in general and the armed services in particular

will not have the basis to initiate effective action systematically against modern nonterritorial terrorism.

The Semantics of Counterterrorism:

A Quasi-Offensive Posture

A lack of semantic clarity in terminology used to provide

guidance for measures to combat terrorism can be discerned

in Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, Protection of DOD

Personnel and Resources Against Terrorist Acts, which “up -

dates established uniform DOD policies and responsibilities

13
and gives guidance on dealing with assassinations, bombings

and other terrorist threats.”1

This directive enunciates two types of measures to deal with

the threat:

Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used by the Department of Defense

to reduce vulnerability of DOD personnel, their dependents, facilities,

and equipment to terrorist acts.

Counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to respond to terrorist

acts, including the gathering of information and threat analysis in

support of those measures. 2

The definition of antiterrorism is clear enough, but that of

counterterrorism is contradictory in nature—perhaps sympto -

matic of a lack of conceptual agreement on how terrorism

should be combated. While counterterrorism is defined as “offensive measures,” such measures are taken “to respond to a

terrorist act.” Consequently, DOD has set the requirement to

develop measures which, although apparently offensive in

character, are at best quasi-offensive and in effect simply rein -

force the defensive character of the programs directed toward

dealing with terrorism.

The question of terminology is further complicated by the

implications of the development of a more offensive posture by

the Army. The introduction to FC 100-37, Terrorism Counteraction, says that “antiterrorism and counterterrorism are two

major areas of the US Army role in terrorism counteraction.

Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures taken to reduce

vulnerability to terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken in response to terrorist acts. It is

stressed, however, that there is no distinct separation between

the two areas, and considerations that apply in one area also

apply to the other. Intelligence, for example, as discussed in

antiterrorism, has equal importance in counterterrorism.”3

Thus, although terrorism counteraction may appear to suggest a more dynamic posture on the part of the Army, the

definitions of antiterrorism and counterterrorism are essen -

tially the same as they are in DOD Directive 2000.12, and

they retain the reactive posture of the past. There may indeed

be a justification for “no distinct separation between the two

areas” in regard to having an integrated approach in dealing

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

14
with what are essentially defensive measures, but such an

integration may not be applicable for offensive measures

against terrorists. There is a difference in how the intelligence

process should be used in offensive as contrasted to defensive

operations against terrorism.

The Department of Defense may, however, be slowly moving

in the direction of developing a more aggressive posture in

combating terrorism. In the current edition of JCS Pub 1,

Directory of Military and Associated Terms, the only term used

in reference to terrorism is Terrorist Threat Condition, defined

as a level of terrorist threat to US military facilities and per -

sonnel (THREATCON). 4 The forthcoming edition, now in draft,

will also incorporate a new definition of counterterrorism: “Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terror -

ism.”5 This definition may be a step in the right direction, because most current counterterrorism measures are passive ones

taken primarily to prevent terrorism; they are neither offensive

nor responsive to a particular act.

The more active connotation of the new definition is closer

to the type of measures that Israel has used in the conduct of

offensive measures against terrorists, their organizations,

their supporters, and their sponsor states. That is:

Counterforce Measures: Countermeasures taken to reduce terrorists’

resources and hence their capability to strike.

Impeding: Countermeasures designed to intercept a particular strike

before it is carried out.6

It should be noted however that the term counterforce has a

different meaning to Israelis than to the US military. As defined

in JCS Pub 1, counterforce is “the employment of strategic air

and missile forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent,

selected military capabilities of an enemy force under any cir -

cumstances by which hostilities may be initiated.”

7

While it is possible to consider the theoretical use of strategic forces against terrorists, it is unlikely that those forces

would meet the unique requirements of engaging in a war

against terrorism. In addition, it may be advisable to broaden

the definition of counterterrorism based on the Israeli model.

Indeed, there have been attempts to change the definition in

this direction. Thus, in a draft version of Air Force Manual

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE

15
2-5, Tactical Air Operations Special Air Warfare, counterter -

rorism operations are described as “those offensive operations

conducted to alleviate an in-being or potential terrorism or

hostage situation, including the gathering of information and

threat analysis in support of those operations. Operations

may be overt or clandestine in nature, and may take the form

of swift surgical operations or protracted campaigns. Opera -

tions may use anything from subtle persuasion to overwhelm -

ing force.”8

The use of the words “alleviate an in-being or potential ter -

rorism . . . situation” suggests that operations can be con -

ducted before an incident occurs. The statement that such

operations may involve “protracted campaigns” properly im -

plies that the United States must move beyond the realm of ad

hoc hostage rescue attempts and into the arena of the grinding war of attrition required to defeat terrorism. And as we

shall see, the use of the words “subtle persuasion” recognizes

the importance of psychological operations in the protracted

war against terrorism.

Capt Willard L. Elledge Jr. comes even closer to developing

a concept that places counterterrorism (CT) in a distinctly

offensive mode. “CT involves much more than the ‘raid’ or

‘rescue’ that sometimes culminates a CT operation. The entire

process is a continuous one, involving intelligence gather -

ing, force planning, interagency coordination, and unique

logistic requirements. This ongoing characteristic separates

CT as a concept distinct from the ‘one shot’ direct action

mission.”9

Even more to the point is his definition of counterterrorism

as “those activities conducted by an individual or an agency to

preempt or terminate a terrorist act. CT is generally offensive

in nature as compared to anti-terrorism, which is generally

defensive.”1 0

Yet the author falls short in developing a basis for opera -

tions that would truly seize the initiative, for he notes that CT

is “generally offensive.” The definition does not completely cut

the conceptual tie between antiterrorism and counterter -

rorism, although it is a quantum leap forward from the confu -

sion created by the term “terrorism counteraction.”

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

16
If a truly offensive doctrine and capability is to be realized, it

may be necessary to recognize the requirement for a new third

category of measures to combat terrorism which could be

placed under the heading of terrorism preemption. The term

could be defined as “those offensive military and associated

actions by the services and other appropriate agencies that

are initiated against terrorists, their organizations, supporters,

and sponsor states to prevent or deter acts or campaigns of

terrorism directed against US citizens and interests.”

The introduction of a new category of measures would dic -

tate succinctly the need for pure offensive measures against

terrorists and their state sponsors. However, it is doubtful

that the concept of the associated term “terrorism preemption”

will be realized unless we recognize that contemporary nonter -

ritorial terrorism has become a form of warfare that requires

the development of the necessary doctrine, strategy, and

forces to combat it. Until there is the recognition of the changing nature of terrorism, the United States and the armed services will continue essentially to react to future incidents.

Counterterrorism:

A Matter of Doctrine

If the ability to engage in offensive operations against terrorists and their sponsor states is to come to fruition—whether

such operations are placed within an expanded definition of

counterterrorism missions or under a new heading of terrorism preemption—the definitional questions must be addressed

in the broader context of doctrine development. Doctrine pro -

vides the theoretical core for the steps that are necessary to

effectively engage those groups and states that are now practicing a new type of warfare that has become a growing threat

to national security. While there are many definitions and

interpretations of what constitutes doctrine, the term as em -

ployed here refers to beliefs and assumptions on the nature and

conduct of war that are based on a study of the past and an

analysis of current and future changes in the international environment.

Doctrine, of course, does not exist in a vacuum. Overem -

phasis on short-term policy and politics can impede sound

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE

17
doctrinal development; it can also prevent the proper consid -

eration of fundamental changes in the nature of warfare and

the way Americans must react to those changes over the long

term. Furthermore, while such changes in policy from the

civilian leadership do largely direct doctrine, particularly in

the short term, it is incumbent on the respective services to

address necessary adjustments in order to be able to under -

stand and strategize effectively in the changing environment of

warfare. Thus, while the constraints in civilian policy making

must be taken into account, there is a need to formulate “an

unconstrained doctrine [which] offers more continuity . . .

(There are always real world restrictions; civilian policy is just

one of them.) But it is a risky matter to allow outside influ -

ences to hinder the formulation of basic military truths.”1 1

The services have the obligation to evolve the necessary

doctrine to prepare to fight wars that may not be fully recognized by the existing leadership and the public. The services

must stand ready with a body of concepts and capabilities if

and when they are called upon to protect national security

from adversaries and threats that even now may not be fully

appreciated.

Lt Col Dennis Drew has provided an excellent framework for

the understanding and application of different types of doc -

trine that can be used to formulate a foundation for an inte -

grated capability to engage in terrorism preemption. He suggests that there are essentially three types of doctrine:

fundamental, environmental, and organizational. 1 2 These

terms are used below to enunciate an overarching doctrine of

terrorism preemption.

Fundamental Doctrine:

Is Terrorism a Form of Warfare?

In dealing with acts of terrorism, it is first important to

place the nature of the act in the most basic context. Here is

where one must address the question of fundamental doc -

trine, which “as the name implies forms the foundation for all

other types of doctrine. Its scope is broad and its concepts

relatively abstract. Essentially, fundamental doctrine consists

of beliefs about the purpose of the military, the nature of war,

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

18
the relationship of military force to other power instruments

and similar subject matter on which less abstract beliefs are

founded.”1 3

The development of fundamental doctrine on terrorism in

general and, more specifically, of an offensive doctrine of

counterterrorism or terrorism preemption has been hindered

by the continuing lack of agreement on whether terrorism

should be seen as a form of warfare that is therefore subject to

doctrine related to the art and science of warfare. Recently,

senior civilian officials and military officers have enunciated

the view that terrorism has indeed become a form of warfare.

Thus, Robert C. McFarlane, former assistant to the president

for national security affairs, stated: “Our problem for the fu -

ture is that below the threshold where deterrence works, below the strategic level, we face an insidious new threat. This

threat is not war as we have known it, not the threat of

nuclear attack, but this new form of warfare, of terrorism.”1 4

Adm James Watkins, chief of naval operations, shared this

point of view. “Like it or not, we and our allies are engaged in

a new form of global warfare, unlike other traditional forms of

warfare, which is difficult to deal with in a coherent and

planned fashion.”1 5

CIA Director William J. Casey also offered his view of terrorism as a form of war when he said: “We are engaged here in a

new form of low-intensity warfare against an enemy that is

hard to find and harder still to defend against.”1 6

The Long Commission Report on the events surrounding the

deaths of the 241 marines in the bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing Team headquarters in Beirut also placed that

event in a broader perspective than an act of terrorism. The

report noted that the bombing “was tantamount to an act of

war using the medium of terrorism. Terrorist warfare spon -

sored by sovereign states or organized political entities to

achieve political objectives is a threat to the United States and

is increasing at an alarming rate.”1 7

Finally, former Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr not only

addressed the fact that terrorism has become a form of war -

fare but also related this development to the crucial importance of doctrine in discussing different challenges now faced

by the military leadership. “A third challenge to our military

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE

19
leadership is to make sure doctrine keeps pace with the evolv -

ing threat. We need only to go back in history to illustrate that

we must never again prepare to fight ‘the last war.’ Future

warfare may not exist in the traditional sense. It may be noth -

ing more than well-organized and coordinated terrorism, per -

petrated by highly dedicated and heavily armed terrorists on a

mass scale.”1 8

Secretary Orr raised and answered a question that is the

major concern of this chapter: “Does our current military doc -

trine accommodate this threat? I think not.”1 9

The reasons for this absence of accommodation, despite the

pronouncements of senior officials that terrorism is a form of

warfare, may be based on the following considerations. In the

first place, the political pronouncements do not address military doctrine. Indeed they do not necessarily reflect what policy is. Rather, they are primarily declaratory statements of

what policies toward terrorism should be. (The disparity between the public official position on meeting the terrorist

threat and the actual policy formulation and implementation

is discussed in chapter 4.) In the second place, despite the

rhetoric, the respective services still view terrorism essentially

as a criminal act and not a form of warfare. This position can

be readily seen in the definition of terrorism used by the Department of Defense: “The unlawful use or threatened use of

force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property, with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments and societies, often for political and ideo -

logical purposes.”2 0

There is certainly no question that terrorism is a criminal

act that falls largely under the purview of the civilian and

military law enforcement community. But such an approach

does not meet the current challenge. Since nonterritorial in -

ternational terrorism has increasingly become an act of war, it

is necessary to develop military doctrine associated with com -

bat arms to counter the threat. Until the change of emphasis

is made to apply military rather than police operations against

terrorists, preventive and reactive measures will continue to

take precedence over preemptive measures by different types

of combat forces and associated agencies. It should be

stressed, however, that although the line between domestic

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

20
and international terrorism will increasingly be blurred, incidents of domestic terrorism should continue to be treated as

criminal acts to be dealt with by the law enforcement community under the leadership of the Federal Bureau of Investiga -

tion, the “lead agency” in dealing with terrorism. Grant Wardlaw effectively explains why the police and not military forces

should be used against threats or acts of domestic terrorism

when he discusses traditional police doctrine in a democratic

society from a British perspective. “Probably of foremost im -

portance is the doctrine of ‘minimum force versus maximum

violence.’ The principle of the use of minimum force is central

to all British-tradition police forces. In essence it has meant

the use of minimum force to deter, restrain, or if necessary,

contain violence, and to preserve the public order. The aims of

minimum force are to protect the public, avoid the escalation

of violence or confrontation when it can be avoided, foster

public support for the police by displays of restraint and im -

partiality, and bring about the termination of a threatening

situation with a minimum amount of personal and physical

damage possible.”2 1

Wardlaw then notes that in addition to democratic constitu -

tional constraints, the military should not be involved unless

it is absolutely essential in dealing with domestic incidents.

“This ethos may be contrasted with that which pervades the

action of the army. As a rule the army is trained to apply the

maximum force that is necessary to take the objective and

eliminate an enemy. The army need not usually be worried

about causing damage or loss of life, gaining or maintaining

public support or avoiding confrontation. It seems obvious

that in a society which is not accustomed to the sight of

heavily armed detachments on public order duty with the

public, the army is unsuited in both training and doctrine for

an internal security role.”2 2

While Wardlaw’s statements certainly have validity in com -

bating domestic terrorism, what he refers to as “the military

ethos” may very well be the appropriate means by which the

respective services can and should engage in terrorism preemption against international terrorists. However, it should

also be noted that Wardlaw’s description of military ethos may

be too simplistic. For, if the correct forces and strategies are

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE

21
employed, the military and associated agencies can engage in

different operations against terrorists that can range from the

use of “maximum force” to covert or clandestine campaigns

employing the techniques of psychological warfare and the

skills of special operations forces to engage in the very selective threat or use of “minimum force.”*

Finally, the line between domestic and international terrorism is being further eroded by the development of the relation -

ship between various terrorist groups and those involved in

the narcotics trade. With the development of narcoterrorism,

which does not recognize national boundaries, the role of the

military in assisting domestic and foreign law enforcement

agencies is being expanded by revising posse comitatus legislation to lessen constraints on the military. 2 3

But even with these changes, the services have yet to cross

the bridge and develop a war-fighting doctrine related to actively combating terrorism. The military services still treat ter -

rorism as criminal activity unrelated to the conduct of warfare. Until there is a change in emphasis, a doctrine of

reaction will act as a barrier to the development of a dynamic

doctrine of expanded counterterrorism or terrorism preemption. It should also be noted, although the subject is beyond

the scope of this study, that just as the military faces the

onerous task of redefining its role in combating terrorism, so

does the law enforcement community face the challenge of

adjusting to the reality that domestic terrorism may be a serious threat to national security when it is supported by foreign

adversaries who are now practicing this form of “indirect aggression” against the United States.

Environmental Doctrine:

The Impact of Technology

Environmental doctrine is “a compilation of beliefs about

the employment of military forces within a particular operating medium.”2 4 Since modern terrorism is very much a product of technology, we cannot overstate the importance of envi-

*Author’s note: The US military now places much more emphasis on avoiding

“collateral” damage and civilian casualties.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

22
ronmental doctrine in developing a capacity for terrorism preemption. Such a doctrine is “significantly influenced by factors

such as geography and technology.”2 5

The “operating medium” in which terrorists engage in their

own form of warfare has become increasingly complex. Since

technology has led to the development of nonterritorial terrorism, those who would engage in terrorism preemption have to

operate in a multidimensional medium, for the terrorists can

strike at targets of opportunity thousands of miles away from

a disputed strike zone. Furthermore, through skyjacking they

can conduct operations that transcend and ignore the arbitrary legalistic boundaries of the nation-state system. In a

very real sense, modern terrorists can be said to be engaging

in their own limited strategic form of “aerospace warfare.”

Those who must address the complexities of possibly waging

war in the “aerospace medium . . . the total expanse beyond

the Earth’s surface”2 6 can draw on the experience of those who

are now faced with combating nonterritorial terrorists. In both

types of war the field of operations is not limited, the line

between offensive and defensive measures is not clearly demarked, targets are numerous, and new forces may have to be

created to operate in a new battlefield environment. Finally, in

this multidimensional medium, just as in the case of potential

future space warfare, the necessity to coordinate the applica -

tion of sea, land, and air power creates serious organizational

questions concerning the roles and missions of the respective

services in converting a doctrine of terrorism preemption into

a reality.

Organizational Doctrine:

The Bureaucratic Battle

In the final analysis, terrorism preemption will never be

realized unless the proper mix of existing forces and the development of new forces progresses to meet the unique challenges of modern terrorism. The requirement is for an organizational doctrine of terrorism preemption, a doctrine that is

“best defined as basic beliefs about the organization of a particular military organization, or group of closely linked organizations.”2 7 Unfortunately, the formulation of this type of doc -

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE

23
trine can generate the most heated debates within and among

the respective services as parochial interests, fueled by the

competition for increasingly scarce financial resources, may

take precedence over a unified approach to terrorism preemption. This is to be expected, for “organizational doctrine is very

narrow in scope [and] tends to change relatively frequently in

order to remain current. This contrasts sharply with the almost timeless qualities of fundamental doctrine. Environ -

mental doctrine would also seem to have considerable staying

power.”2 8

If and when the strong declaratory statements calling for a

war against terrorism are transformed into an action-oriented

policy, all the services, as well as concerned civilian organiza -

tions and agencies, will seek to stake out their own bureaucratic turf. In so doing, they might replicate, on a tragically

grander scale, the problems that contributed to the failure of

Desert One—the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission. The

next chapter addresses the means by which proper force selection can be achieved in order to lessen the dangers of en -

gaging in an ineffectual bureaucratic war rather than in effective military action to combat and preempt terrorism.

Notes

1. DOD Directive 2000.12, Protection of DOD Personnel and Resources

Against Terrorist Acts, 12 February 1982, 1.

2. Ibid.

3. US Army Field Circular 100–37, Terrorism Counteraction , 15 July

1984, 1.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS Pub) 1, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 April 1984, 370.

5. HQ USAF/SPO Message 0217027 December 1985, subj: DOD Ap -

proved Terminology–Terrorism Terms.

6. Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy

Analysis of Countermeasures (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1980) 9.

7. JCS Pub 1, 94.

8. Draft revision of Air Force Manual 2–5, Tactical Air Operations—Spe -

cial Air Warfare, 1985, 3.

9. Willard L. Elledge Jr., “Sorting Out the Semantics of Low-Intensity

Conflict,” a paper prepared for presentation at the Ninth Air University Air

Power Symposium, The Role of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., 11–13 March 1985, 7.

10. Ibid.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

24
11. Charles D. Friedenstein, Lt Col, USAF, “The Uniqueness of Space

Doctrine,” Air University Review 3 7, no. 1 (November–December 1985): 16.

12. Dennis M. Drew, Lt Col, USAF, “Of Trees and Leaves: A New View of

Doctrine,” Air University Review 3 3, no. 2 (January–February 1982): 43.

13. Ibid.

14. Robert C. McFarlane, “Terrorism and the Future of Free Society,”

address to the National Strategy Information Center, Defense International

Forum, 25 March 1985, 14. News Release, National Strategy Information

Center.

15. James D. Watkins, Adm, USN, “Terrorism: An Already Declared

War,” Wings of Gold, Summer 1984, 19.

16. William J. Casey, “International Terrorism: Potent Challenge to

American Security,” Vital Speeches of the Day , 15 September 1985, 713.

17. “Holloway Commission Report,” Joint Special Operations Planning

Workshop, reprint of “Special Operations Review Group,” Aviation Week and

Space Technology 15 (16–17), 22 (140–144), 29 (84–91) September 1980.

18. Verne Orr, “Perspectives on Leadership,” Air University Review 36,

no. 6 (September–October 1985): 53.

19. Ibid.

20. DOD Directive 2000.12, Protection of DOD Personnel and Resources

Against Terrorist Acts, Washington, D.C., 12 February 1982, 1.

21. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Countermea -

sures (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 90. Quote

on “minimum force” from Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State

(London: Macmillian, 1977), 43.

22. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 90.

23. For a discussion of the constraints on military involvement under

the Posse Comitatus Act, see William Regis Farrell, The US Government

Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy (Boulder: Westview

Publishers, 1982): 52–59.

24. Drew, 44.

25. Ibid.

26. Draft of AFM 1–1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, 27 November 1985, 3.

27. Drew, 45.

28. Ibid.

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE

25
Chapter 3

Force and Target Selection

Since terrorism can be considered a new form of warfare, we

must address problems associated with developing organiza -

tional doctrine related either to an expanded counterterrorism

capability or the development of terrorism preemption forces.

Unless such doctrine is enunciated, neither existing nor new

forces will be able to engage in preemptive operations against

the terrorists or their organizations, supporters, and sponsor

states.

The problem of developing doctrine is exacerbated by a number

of factors that have been briefly noted earlier. First, since nonterritorial terrorism takes place in a multidimensional medium,

forces who would be required to initiate offensive operations

would have to have the capacity to function in such a medium.

Second, since nonterritorial terrorism takes place across the spec -

trum of armed conflict, close coordination among a mix of

forces—both conventional and unconventional—would be essen -

tial to counter or preempt terrorism campaigns and missions.

Third, since terrorism preemption does not simply refer to the

offensive use of armed force against terrorists, assets that are

capable of engaging in political and psychological warfare against

nonterritorial terrorists might be essential components of any

preemptive operation.

The formulation of organizational doctrine does not take

place in a vacuum. Indeed, such doctrine is exceedingly sensitive to existing institutional arrangements and competition

among various bureaucratic structures, be they civilian or

military in nature. This competition is particularly intensive in

current efforts to combat terrorism. Since the Reagan administration has placed fighting terrorism high on its declaratory

policy agenda, and since incidents are likely to increase and

become more destructive, the bureaucratic infighting to stake

out a role and therefore justify the acquisition of additional

resources has intensified and will continue to do so. Moreover,

a number of studies indicate that the war on terrorism has

been characterized as primarily a bureaucratic battle among

27
those agencies and departments that may be more concerned

with maximizing their position in Washington than with sys -

tematically addressing the short- and long-term implications

of modern terrorism’s threat to national security. As a pioneer -

ing study of the US government’s response to terrorism notes:

“Bureaucratic and organizational imperatives common to all

agencies—i.e., factoring of problems, parochial priorities, goals

and the sequential attention to them, standard operating pro -

cedures, concern over uncertainty, resistance to change, and

much more—hinder needed cooperation.”1

The lack of cooperation based on a desire to keep “current”

in the bureaucratic arena certainly can be applied to the superheated administrative environment in which the war

against terrorism is being conducted in Washington. Yet organizational doctrine, while inherently sensitive to existing bu -

reaucratic realities, should not be solely dependent on them.

As employed in this chapter, organizational doctrine is a

means of developing the necessary administrative and armed

capability to take the offensive against terrorism predicated on

long-term goals instead of short-term bureaucratic competition and resultant constraints.

The development of an organizational doctrine of terrorism

preemption in this chapter addresses the following questions:

(1) How can existing large-scale organizations and forces adjust to operating in the ambiguous field of operations that

marks terrorism as a form of less “coherent” warfare? (2) What

types of forces, either jointly or individually, should be used in

preempting different types of targets, ranging from the individ -

ual terrorist cell to the organizational infrastructure or, when

appropriate, the sponsoring state? (3) Is it necessary to develop new forces to counter what can be regarded as the

organizational structure of modern terrorism?

Fighting in the Gray Area of Conflict:

The Problem of Ambiguity

Because modern terrorists operate in a multidimensional

medium, in a condition of neither war nor peace, where the

adversary and his supporters may not be clearly detected,

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

28
existing forces face serious problems in conducting offensive

operations in an inherently ambiguous battlefield. If there is a

fog of war, there is now also a smog of terrorism. Two often

contradictory approaches have been used to address military

roles and missions in counterterrorism and terrorism preemption. On the one hand, there are those who would suggest that

existing conventional forces could be used with relatively few

modifications to combat terrorism. On the other hand, there

are those who would maintain that counterterrorism in gen -

eral and, more specifically, terrorism preemption require an

emphasis on the employment of special operations forces. The

doctrinal issue in such debates may not necessarily relate to

fundamental questions of war fighting in reference to selecting

the right force or forces to combat terrorism. Rather, it may

relate to the means by which we can justify the use of existing

forces within and among the military and intelligence services

to engage in what the current administration has increasingly

called a vital mission. Thus, the proponents of aerospace

power could stress the importance of the application of both

conventional and unconventional airpower through the planning and launching of operations against terrorist installa -

tions or the installations of the states that sponsor them. For

example, one author “supports the proposition that the full

range of air power capabilities should be explored”2 in countering terrorism and makes an interesting case for the use of

the B-52 in such missions.

The proponents of sea power have also suggested that the

Navy may have a role in combating terrorism. The deployment

of the fleet against a state that sponsors terrorism (as a form

of coercive diplomacy) or a naval bombardment against suspected terrorist installations, whether effective or not, have

been postulated to justify a Navy counterterrorist mission. In

regard to land-based operations, certainly the Marine Corps

and the Army have had to address whether their conventional

forces could or should be involved in counterterrorist opera -

tions. In the case of the Corps, the bombing of the Marine

Battalion Team headquarters in Lebanon illustrated how a

service may be forced to take on a mission it is ill equipped to

deal with. In contrast, one of the ways the Army has sought to

justify the development of the light infantry division is to note

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

29
its utility in engaging in different types of potential counterter -

rorist operations. 3

This is not to suggest that there are not missions which

require the use of both conventional and special forces to

counter different types of terrorist threats and acts. However,

given the current concern over terrorism, there is a real danger that within and among the respective services, organiza -

tional doctrine associated with counterterrorism and terrorism

preemption is and will be driven by the current capabilities of

both conventional and special operations forces of the respective services and their desire to justify the expansion of their

roles and missions in an area of major policy concern without

adequate attention to the real nature of the threat. In effect,

the services may be in search of a counterterrorist mission for

their existing organizations rather than being willing to tailor

new units to this new style of warfare.

But in a war that may have to be conducted on an inher -

ently ambiguous battlefield, organizational doctrine should be

based on war-fighting requirements that can effectively

counter or preempt terrorists and their sponsors, and not on

bureaucratic competition. Therefore, there are some initial

guidelines that should be considered in developing effective

organizational doctrine to meet threats and acts of terrorism.

First, since terrorists often operate in a nonterritorial battle -

field, it is essential that there be very close coordination—in -

deed, possibly integration—among those forces who would

combat terrorism. Second, while there is a requirement for the

specialization of function among forces who would be involved

in terrorist preemption missions (since terrorism does span

the spectrum of conflict), it is also important that there be a

unity and a flexibility that will enable the necessary forces to

coordinate their efforts in meeting a form of armed conflict

that is not neatly categorized as either low-, medium-, or highintensity conflict. In order to achieve this goal, the following

operational doctrine and accompanying analytical framework

may assist both planners and policy makers in selecting the

proper forces to conduct terrorism preemption against the

proper targets.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

30
Target and Force Selection in

Counterterrorism and Terrorism Preemption

It is not our purpose in this section to discuss the measures

that should be employed in terrorism preemption missions

and campaigns. Such a discussion belongs to those schooled

in the tradecraft of intelligence operations. Moreover, given the

sensitive nature of the topic, such a discussion would hardly

be appropriate for inclusion in an open publication. It can be

assumed, however, that the intelligence community has, and

is refining, a capability to engage in terrorism preemption if or

when it is called upon to do so. The answer to the question

whether such a call will be made depends on changes in

national policies toward combating threats and acts of terrorism. The policy dimensions are examined in chapter 4. Never -

theless, a basic guideline for target and force selection can be

stated as follows: The more ambiguous the terrorist target, the

more likely the requirement for a preemptive operation of a

covert nature.

In developing a doctrine to provide the appropriate means to

engage in terrorism preemption, an analytical framework can

prove useful. The framework is meant to provide a basic over -

view of how to select forces and targets in terrorism preemption operations and campaigns. Of course, it must be adjusted

to meet the unique aspects of different threats and incidents.

Constituting that framework, the following factors should be

considered in counterterrorism or terrorism preemption: (1)

the type of target, (2) the type of force, (3) the constraints on

the use of force, and (4) the degree of operational disclosure.

While each situation differs, various patterns can be used

as a means of engaging in proper force selection and applica -

tion (fig. 2). Let us examine several possible situations.

Terrorist State

In this scenario a country is overtly using the tactics of

nonterritorial international terrorism against United States

citizens and interests overseas. The seizure of hostages, an

assault on an embassy or other American installation, the

holding of a skyjacked aircraft, and similar incidents would

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

31
BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

32
fall under this heading. While this is not a form of statespon sored terrorism, it is, in effect, a terrorist state practicing

the most violent form of “armed diplomacy.” Such an act

comes perilously close to being, if indeed it is not, an act of

war. It would justify counterterrorist operations that should

be initiated as quickly as possible, since the action probably

does not lend itself to extensive negotiations. Negotiation can

be employed, however, not necessarily to seek the release of

the hostages but to provide more time to launch operations.

The type of target selected for a retaliatory strike could be a

governmental installation, particularly a military base. The

type of forces used could be conventional or special assets,

employed either individually or jointly. Extensive constraints

would be necessary on the use of force in “surgical strikes” to

lessen the possibility of civilian casualties and retaliation

against US citizens, since public disclosure would be widespread once the operation was launched. This type of overt

action would signal to the American public the resolve and

capability of the government to respond effectively to an incident. It would also signal to the terrorist state that such actions could not be carried out with impunity. The same selection of forces and targets could be applied preemptively when

there is overwhelming evidence that the terrorist state is about

to initiate an attack against American citizens and interests.

State-Sponsored Terrorism

In this scenario it is more difficult to ascertain whether the

state is directly involved in preparing for or engaging in an act

of terrorism. It may be doing so while lying about that support

to the rest of the world. The state may be actually supporting

nonterritorial international terrorist groups as a form of “indirect aggression” against the target state—for our purposes, the

United States. Nevertheless, if there is a clear indication of the

state’s culpability, direct action can be taken against the

sponsoring state and the terrorist organization just as in the

case against the terrorist state. Since the relationship between

the state and the terrorist group is less clear, a requirement

for covert operations may have to be considered with the pro -

vision to engage in “plausible denial” if necessary.

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

33
Both conventional and special operations forces could be

employed overtly, and so there continues to be a requirement

for constraints on the use of force. However, the choice of

targets is no longer limited to regular military forces and in -

stallations but may include specific terrorist groups and their

home installations, requiring covert action. Here, Brian,

Jenkins’ observations concerning the need to engage in terrorism preemption against state-sponsored terrorism is particu -

larly well taken: “Here we confront a campaign of terrorism

instigated and directed by a handful of adversary states. Its

violence is deadlier and can have a serious effect on American

policy. Here, defensive measures may not be enough.”

4

 [Emphasis added]

Terrorist Groups Without State Sponsorship

In this scenario one moves further into the ambiguous area of

neither war nor peace. It is difficult to initiate action against a

government which is either not willing or not able to deal with its

own terrorists. Furthermore, the terrorist groups can essentially

be viewed to be “nonstate actors,” and therefore it is difficult to

consider the use of regular military forces against them.5

Since there may not be a “smoking pistol” to prove state

culpability or involvement, there are serious questions con -

cerning the use of any military forces in either counterter -

rorism or terrorism preemption operations. However, if we recognize that such terrorists are engaging in a form of warfare,

we can consider covert military operations, particularly by

personnel and assets drawn from the special forces community. Moreover, as we shall see, it may be advisable to develop

a new force to fight this war in the shadows. In such opera -

tions, the targets may be irregular forces and terrorist organizations. Since such operations essentially would be covert,

there would be fewer constraints on the use of force. The

operation would signal to the terrorist groups that they will

pay the price for their actions. As the operations would be

covert, the signal would not be meant for broad public awareness.

In countering these terrorist groups, we should also use

long-term psychological operations to break down the will of

the terrorists and their supporters. Further, preemptive measBEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

34
ures can be considered before such groups gain the capacity

to initiate assaults against US citizens and interests.

Terrorists

This is perhaps the most difficult type of scenario to con -

sider. While the terrorists may perceive themselves to be en -

gaging in their own nonterritorial, nonstate form of warfare,

they nevertheless are civilian actors and therefore it is difficult

to justify the use of military forces against them. Moreover,

since the targets are human intensive and very small, counterterrorism and terrorism preemption missions might be best

carried out by the clandestine services of the intelligence com -

munity.

It should be noted however that even if the operation is

complex, experience has shown that once small terrorist cells

go tactical they are difficult to stop, particularly when they

select softer targets of opportunity. It is therefore vital to con -

sider terrorism preemption before such individuals initiate

their movement to the potential target. As noted earlier, it may

be necessary to consider developing a new force to carry out

such missions. Terrorism is a form of warfare in a gray area,

and a preemption force would have to have the ability to

engage in black operations. Given the highly clandestine nature of such missions, the constraints on the use of force

would be virtually nonexistent since no operational disclosure

would be anticipated. It should be noted that in such opera -

tions, it may be difficult not only to target the organizational

structure of large terrorist groups but even more challenging

to target the individual cells of very small, free-floating terrorist groups.

Finally, one may consider the use of surrogates for counterterrorism and terrorism preemption missions. But it must

be kept in mind that while such operations might enhance

plausible denial, once surrogates are employed it becomes

increasingly difficult to exercise effective command and con -

trol over them. A good case in point is the alleged CIA involve -

ment in the training of a counterterrorist unit implicated in a

car bombing in Lebanon that killed more than 80 people and

injured 200. 6

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

35
These, then, are alternatives that can be considered in

moving through the spectrum from a reactive, overt posture to

a preemptive, clandestine one against those who engage in

terrorist warfare.

The Need to Apply Terrorist

Organizational Doctrine to Counter

and Preempt Terrorism

As one moves beyond the threat posed by terrorist states

and state-sponsored terrorism, there is a serious vacuum in

reference to the development of organizational and operational

doctrine and capabilities in regard to terrorism preemption. As

a result of the experience of the hostage rescue attempt in

Iran, there have been impressive advances in the training and

equipping of counterterrorist forces. These assets can engage

in the inherently complex and risky, essentially reactive, operations against terrorists and their sponsor states. The issue

is not so much one of capability but of resolve on the part of

the leadership and willingness by the public to take strong

measures against terrorism.

There may be serious questions related to the ability of the

intelligence community to conduct covert operations against

small, free-floating terrorist groups. But questions and information concerning such operations are beyond the scope of

this study. What is clear, however, is that we have yet to see

the development of a military capability to conduct covert

preemptive operations in the gray area between terrorist state

and state-sponsored terrorism. We are not able to employ

present counterterrorist forces and strategies against small,

free-floating terrorist groups, rightfully the responsibility of

the intelligence community. What is missing is the formula -

tion of the organizational and operational doctrine needed to

lay the foundation for the development of a military force that

can engage in terrorism preemption, the existing gap in the

war on terrorism. The development of such a military force

could signal the recognition that terrorism is a form of warfare

demanding new forces to combat it. But developing a capability to fight this new form of warfare will require modification of

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

36
current organizational structures and resources within the

armed services to combine existing special operations capa -

bilities with the ability to conduct covert operations of the type

more commonly associated with the clandestine services of

the intelligence community.

The key to such an organization would first be its structure,

then its personnel and its mission. The structural issue must

be addressed first because such a new force will be doomed to

failure from the outset unless it employs the “organizational

doctrine” of modern terrorism for its own objectives.

In an insightful article discussing the major characteristics

of the infrastructure of terrorist groups, J. K. Zawodny defines

infrastructure as “internal organization structure, including

formal and informal networks within it.” He notes: “On the

basis of this writer’s thirty years of studies of extralegal violent

organizations he would describe the contemporary terrorist

infrastructure as centrifugal. . . . The centrifugal infrastructure

resembles that of a solar system in which the leader is the sun

in the center and the members are like planets around, usually within the range of his direct impact. Thus, in the ladder

system the leader is on the top, in the centrifugal system the

leader . . . is in the center.”

7

It is precisely because current military organizations em -

phasize the use of a traditional ladder hierarchy that they may

lack the organizational doctrine and capabilities necessary to

engage the terrorists in their own field of operations—the clandestine cellular structure. Thus, while the centrifugal system

“secures direct and faster communication” and provides the

means for “the intensity, frequency, and facility with which

many terrorist organizations interact and cooperate among

themselves,”8 the ladder system often acts as a barrier to fast

communication and execution of operations. With the emphasis on a command hierarchy, the differentiation between staff

and line function, and problems of coordination with often

competing hierarchies, existing forces that might be assigned

a preemption mission against terrorist groups may lack the

organizational doctrine essential to bring the war home

against the terrorist organizations. The terrorists have effectively used the Jacobin model of political organization, “one of

center-periphery relationships where power is concentrated in

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

37
a single center.”9

 If a terrorist preemption force is to be created, it would have to have a similar model to meet its mission

requirements of engaging the terrorists in their own battle -

field. But the centrifugal model has liabilities to terrorist organizations that can be exploited by counterterrorist or terrorist preemption forces.

The fact that a centrifugal organization may be essentially

self-contained can lead to factionalization, as a local cell may

attempt to maintain its independence from a higher authority.

The use of psychological operations can create disunity and

impair terrorists’ ability to act by playing off the small cen -

trifugal cells or mini organizations against each other and

against a broader movement. Furthermore, while the centrifu -

gal organization might foster faster communication among its

own members, the emphasis on local initiative can be a liability in the development of large-scale terrorist campaigns that

might be easier to direct from a traditional ladder hierarchy.

Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, a terrorist preemption

force would be well advised to consider modifying the centrifu -

gal model for use against the terrorists, even if such a model is

at odds with traditional military organization and structure. 1 0

The Use of Existing Forces in

Terrorism Preemption

In addition to considering the development of a new force to

engage in terrorism preemption, we should also note that the

special operations community as it now exists and with possible organizational changes has a significant role in the war on

terrorism. Certainly four types of operations that fall under

what Captain Elledge calls the special operations umbrella

(fig. 3) are essential in combating terrorism:

• Direct action missions involve unilateral action by US

special operations forces in a hostile environment.

• Counterterrorism involves continuous activities dedicated

to preempting and terminating a terrorist act.

• Psychological operations enhance the successes of the

other special operations subsets by contributing to political objectives and exploiting cultural susceptibilities.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

38
• Unconventional warfare involves assisting guerrilla forces

engaged in a revolutionary war. 1 1

The last type of operation, unconventional warfare (UW), is

particularly attuned to providing the basis to counter or

Figure 3. Special Operations Umbrella

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

39
preempt those who engage in nonterritorial terrorism. For, as

defined in JCS Pub 1, UW not only provides the basis to

operate in a nonterritorial field of operations but also recognizes the need for paramilitary operations.

Unconventional warfare—A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary

operations conducted in an enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically

sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited

to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage,

and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature.

These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be

prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous

personnel, usually supported in varying degrees by (an) external

source(s) during conditions of neither war nor peace. 1 2 [Emphasis

added]

Special forces units therefore could readily adjust their mis -

sion to engage nonterritorial terrorists in “politically sensitive

territory,” conduct “paramilitary operations,” and promote

“subversion” to counter the subversive actions that are often

part and parcel of terrorism; and they have the ability to

engage in the war in the shadows through the use of “covert”

or “clandestine” operations against the terrorists and their

sponsor states.

But while the special operations community does have a

vital role to play, it can be suggested that existing forces are

primarily concerned with preparing to meet the growing challenge of responding to territorially based low-intensity con -

flicts or, when necessary, with being involved in direct action

missions associated with hostage rescue, retaliations, and

other essentially reactive counterterrorist operations. These

are such broad mission requirements that, despite the revitali -

zation of SOF, the best answer may be a small new force with

terrorism preemption as its primary mission. 1 3

A New Force to Fight a New

Form of Warfare

In the final analysis, if an offensive war against terrorism is

ever going to become a reality, it may be necessary to create a

new force that can operate in the gray area of terrorist warfare. Admittedly, there is always the danger that such an

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

40
approach falls in the old tradition of attempting to solve a

problem by creating yet one more organization. However,

events have served to underscore that it is now time for the

United States to move beyond the reactive phase to meet an

enduring and growing threat to national security. It may be

necessary to engage in force innovation to meet what can

rightfully be viewed as a type of warfare that existing conven -

tional and special operations units alone cannot fight.

Certain factors should be considered in the potential development of a terrorism preemption force. Firstly, the force in

question should be exceedingly small. It should consist of a

core membership of no more than 200 personnel. In effect, its

small size would enable it to adapt the centrifugal organiza -

tional model that has been used effectively by various terrorist

groups—to use terrorist organizational doctrine against the

terrorists. The personnel recruited for the force could be

drawn largely from the special operations community. As such

they would be expected not only to have the ability to engage

in covert and clandestine operations in politically sensitive

areas but also to have the necessary language and area exper -

tise to conduct operations in regions where the terrorists

could both prepare and initiate operations. Such an organiza -

tion would require a long-term career commitment of its core

members, for only then could they acquire the necessary skills

to live and survive in the terrorist environment. Only in this

manner could they develop the ability to engage in short-term

operations and long-term campaigns of terrorism preemption.

Secondly, because of the vital role of intelligence in conducting offensive operations against terrorists, a cadre of intelligence officers from the Clandestine Service of the Central In -

telligence Agency should also be integrated into the force.

They too would be dedicated to a rigorous career in combating

terrorism. Operationally they would be detached from the

agency and become an integral part of the new force, but they

would maintain the ability to use agency assets for supple -

mental assistance when required. In that way, they would

meet a vital requirement for the development of a terrorism

preemption force. Joe Poyer succinctly makes the case for

requiring intelligence dissemination to counterterrorism

forces. “By including an intelligence role as part of the C-T

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

41
Team, efficient and speedy distribution of information on a

controllable need-to-know basis is enhanced over the traditional methods of interdepartmental and interservice coopera -

tion.”1 4

The same requirement also would obviously be vital to ter -

rorism preemption forces. It should be noted that there would

be a separation of function between the clandestine collectors

of the intelligence community and the military who would be

involved in carrying out terrorism preemption operations, so

that the former would not be compromised; however, there

would be a close interrelationship between them.

The need for integration of the necessary assets has been

stated in a broader context by Howard R. Simpson, who wrote

a pioneering article, “Organizing for Counter-Terrorism.” He

suggested that the proposed new force must not be wholly

military. There should be minimum representation from the

civilian departments and agencies involved. 1 5

It should be stressed, though, that the requirement for a

tightly integrated force requires more than “representation

from the civilian departments and agencies involved.” Person -

nel from such agencies should be detached for a very extended

period to serve in the terrorism preemption force. In effect,

such a force would neither be a joint civilian and military unit

nor a joint service force. As we shall discuss shortly, such a

unit may have to be “deep purple”—that is, a fully integrated

sixth military force to combat terrorism.

Such a proposed force should have very clear and uncluttered lines of communication, command, and control and ideally would report directly to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. It would have top priority on using the assets of conven -

tional forces and the special operations community if particu -

lar operations required their involvement. Personnel from the

force could also be used to help existing counterterrorist

forces to carry out their essentially reactive missions. How -

ever, the sixth force would primarily be concerned with con -

ducting preemption campaigns against terrorist groups and

their sponsor states.

The force would not necessarily fall under the coordination

of the special operations community since, as noted earlier,

the battle against nonterritorial terrorism spans the spectrum

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

42
of conflict. The broader issues of coordination of operation of

this new force within the existing military and organizational

framework and potential changes within it that are now being

considered are discussed later in this chapter.

The terrorism preemption force could be involved in shortterm missions when there are indications that a terrorist state

or state-sponsored terrorists are about to initiate an opera -

tion. However, emphasis would be on the capacity to engage in

long-term operations against the terrorists which would in -

volve conducting disinformation and psychological operations

through the process of infiltrating the support mechanisms to

the inner core cells. Admittedly, the ability to conduct such

operations requires a level of expertise in the arcane tradecraft

of covert action as well as profound language and area exper -

tise. But such capabilities can be achieved and such forces

succeed if there is a commitment to develop the necessary

organization to fight the protracted war of global attrition

known as modern terrorism.

Placing the New Force in a Broader

Organizational Context

If a new force were to be created, where would it fit in the

existing military organization? That determination unfortu -

nately would not be based solely on an objective analysis of

the best ways to combat terrorism but also on continuing

bureaucratic competition within military and civilian organiza -

tions that are or might be involved in fighting terrorism. It is

important to note that this study does not have a particular

organizational bias. There is no attempt to advocate placing

such a force or forces in any existing organization. Yet, the

author recognizes that there are those individuals and groups

who will fight for their own bureaucratic territorial imperative.

The differentiation between local, internal terrorism and in -

ternational, nonterritorial terrorism bears repeating. The former is primarily associated with the tactics employed in a

low-intensity, territorial based conflict, which would largely

fall under the purview of the special operations community.

The latter can be strategic in nature and span the spectrum of

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

43
conflict. Therefore, while special operations forces would cer -

tainly be required on various missions to preempt terrorism,

special operations does not have a monopoly on such mis -

sions. Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian has addressed this point indirectly. For, while he notes that special operations are “specifi -

cally designed for counterterrorist operations,” he also states

that “many special operations can be conducted as a joint

civilian-military undertaking. In brief, special operations can

tend to be ‘quick strike and withdrawal’ in character, on a

target or targets that are identifiable and limited in scope. This

also characterizes the missions of units engaged in special

operations—limited to achieve a particular short-range military or political purpose.”1 6

The need to differentiate between special operations and

terrorism preemption is apparent. In the first place, special

operations “tend to be quick strike and withdrawal” and “to

achieve . . . short-range military and political objectives.” In

contrast, terrorism preemption requires in addition the capa -

bility to engage in protracted operations and campaigns

against terrorists and their sources of support. Furthermore,

special operations missions are “designed for counterterror

operations,” which as noted earlier are essentially reactive in

nature in contrast to the offensive character of terrorism preemption missions. Therefore it is by no means clear that ter -

rorism preemption forces should be placed under the staff or

operational umbrella of the special operations community.

The reason for the possible requirement of the separation

between terrorism preemption and special operations may

also be based on another consideration. As matters now

stand, while there has been an impressive buildup of special

operations forces, that expansion is in part a recognition of

the fact that such forces may be called upon to engage in such

a wide variety of existing missions as to strain their capabilities against present and future low-intensity threats and con -

flicts as well as counterterrorist operations. Would it be advis -

able to add yet one more area of responsibility to already

strained forces?

The correct placement of a terrorism preemption force is

further complicated by present organizational constraints and

potential tensions within the military in regards to the planBEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

44
ning and conducting of special operations. As matters now

stand, the major organizational focal point for special opera -

tions is the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA). A description of its genesis and mission follows.

The most important organizational step in the Special Operations

Forces buildup took place in October 1983, just days before the

Grenada invasion. At that time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the

establishment of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA), an

interservice planning agency for special operations. The 61-man

JSOA, headed by Major General Wesley Rice, USMC, was activated

January 1, 1984, with the mandate to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff

in all aspects of special operations, including strategy, planning,

budget, resource development and allocation, doctrine, training and

the use of forces. The JSOA has four divisions (Research,

Development, and Acquisitions; Joint Actions; Special Intelligence;

and Supporting Operations) and many branches, including

“Unconventional Warfare/Direct Action,” “Contingency Operations,”

“Psychological Operations,” “Operational Security/Deception,” and

“Support Activities.”1 7

JSOA primarily has a staff and advisory function to assist

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters related to special opera -

tions. It does not have its own assets to engage in operational

missions.

To repeat, it is debatable whether a terrorism preemption

force should be placed in an organization primarily concerned

with special operations, since terrorism preemption does not

solely or even primarily fit within those types of missions.

Since the JSOA does not have its own assets, it is question -

able whether such an arrangement could provide the necessary independence and capability to engage in long-term ter -

rorism preemption missions. Furthermore, such a force would

require a great deal of operational flexibility and an uncluttered chain of command. Finally, there may be inherent

strains between the JSOA staff function and existing opera -

tional counterterrorist forces which could be further com -

pounded if JSOA were given oversight of terrorism preemption

forces that would engage in activities not solely within the

concepts or competence of the existing special operations

community.

It might therefore be necessary to return to the considera -

tion that a deep purple force be created, a force designed

specifically for terrorism preemption. But where would it fit

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

45
beyond the ultimate control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Noel

C. Koch, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for

security affairs, suggests that it is not even advisable to con -

sider the creation of what he calls a “sixth service for special

operations.” “No, I don’t agree at all that you should put everybody in a purple suit or a pink suit. But the pressure you see

on this point really is a reflection of increasing frustra -

tion—that everybody sees the necessity for the capability to be

in place and adequate for the problem.”1 8

Despite his reluctance to entertain the development of such a

service, Koch notes that “we need to create something that doesn’t

depend on the mercy of the existing services. You need something

that makes special operations function jointly. You need to have a

doctrine that’s common, equipment that’s common. You can’t

have people using their credit cards in the middle of a combat

zone trying to call Fort Bragg.”1 9 [Emphasis added]

But it is precisely the lack of conceptual clarity on the

differences between local internal terrorism, nonterritorial ter -

rorism, counterterrorism, and terrorism preemption that will

hinder the development of “something new.” The issue has

been joined now that there has been the call for the considera -

tion of the development of a Defense Special Operations

Agency (DSOA) that would “gear up the US military to counter

terrorism, to fight low-intensity wars . . . and to prepare to go

behind enemy lines in the first days of a major war to disrupt

transportation and organize resistance.”2 0

It is not yet clear what the organization and mission of such

an agency would be. Would it primarily be a replacement for

JSOA? Would it have its own assets, or would it still primarily

be dependent on the respective unified commands? Would it

primarily be concerned with special operations in general and

have the mission of engaging in essentially reactive counterterrorism missions, or would it also direct forces who would

be involved in terrorism preemption? Could DSOA provide the

necessary home for both the special forces community and ter -

rorism preemption forces, or may it be necessary to move beyond Mr. Koch’s view and create a “sixth force”?

Another alternative toward achieving a terrorism preemption capability is to expand the mission of existing counterter -

rorist forces within the military. The development of a DSOA

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

46
with its own assets might be a step in the right direction in

developing the ability to fight “dirty little wars.”2 1 But whether

such an organization should also be assigned the mission of

engaging in terrorism preemption remains to be seen. For in

the final analysis, is the military willing to effect necessary

organizational changes to engage the terrorists in the war in

the shadows?

Even if the willingness to innovate is there, the final funda -

mental issue must be addressed. That is, do the United States

government and people have the resolve to take the offensive

against terrorists? This issue is discussed in the following

chapter on the policy dimensions in the war on terrorism.

Notes

1. William Regis Farrell, The US Government Response to Terrorism: In

Search of An Effective Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 4. This is a

pioneering book on the topic and should be read by those interested in the

history of Washington’s struggle to combat terrorism.

2. Clarence 0. Herrington Jr., Maj, USAF, “B-52s in an Anti-Terrorist

Role,” The Role of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict, Appendix 2, Symposium Papers (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, May 1985), 389.

3. For a finely balanced discussion of the light infantry see William J.

Olson, “The Light Infantry Initiative,” Military Review 60, no. 6 (June 1985).

4. Brian Michael Jenkins, “We Needn’t Rule Out the Use of Force

Against Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, 2 May 1985, 5.

5. For a discussion on nonstate actors as they relate to terrorism see

Stephen Sloan, “International Terrorism: Conceptual Problems and Implications,” Journal of Thought, Summer 1982.

6. “CIA Operation Reportedly Ended With Unauthorized Lebanese Blast,”

Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 May 1985.

7. J. K. Zawodny, “Infrastructure of Terrorist Organization,” Conflict

Quarterly 1, no. 4 (Spring 1981): 24.

8. Ibid., 26.

9. Daniel L. E1azar, American Federalism: A View From the States, third

edition (Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1984), 55.

10. Maj Lonnie R. Mouser has specifically addressed the requirement for

the military to develop the necessary organizational framework to counter

terrorism through the use of hybrid organization, which he defines as “an

adaptive structure typically using elements of two or more structures to

meet a specific need. Often combines a functional structure with a nontraditional program structure.” America’s Unified Military Forces: Toward an

Organizational Framework for Terrorism Counteraction, an unpublished re -

port for the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., 1986, 58. He suggests that such a hybrid organizational form would be

FORCE AND TARGET SELECTION

47
appropriate for the development of a low-intensity warfare directorate at the

unified command level to effectively meet the requirements for terrorism

counteraction programs and operations.

11. Willard L. Elledge Jr., Capt, USAF, “Sorting Out the Semantics of

Low-Intensity Conflict,” The Role of Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, 12.

12. JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 April

1984, 383.

13. For a discussion of the revitalization see “The Buildup of US Special

Operations Forces,” Asian Defence Journal, November 1985, 4–30.

14. Joe Poyer, “Countering the Modern Terrorist: Specialized Operations

Come of Age,” Combat Arms, September 1985: 72.

15. Howard R. Simpson, “Organizing for Counter-Terrorism,” Strategic

Review 10, no. 1 (Winter 1982): 8. This is an innovative article. It was

among the first to address the need for a fundamental reorganization in

Washington’s war on terrorism. The author’s suggestions of a “central

Counterterrorist Office . . . to plan preventive action” and a permanent,

self-sustaining, mobile, counterterrorist force trained and ready for quick deployment under the direction of the Counterterrorist Office, are well taken.

16. Sam C. Sarkesian, “The Open Society: Defensive Measures,” a paper

prepared for Conference on Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations,

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., April 17–19,

1985, 9.

17. “The Buildup of US Special Operations Forces,” 18.

18. “Official Ponders Future of Special Operations,” Air Force Times 2

(December 1985), 22.

19. Ibid. The event Secretary Koch refers to actually happened in the

Grenada operation.

20. “Bill Would Put Special Forces Under Single Command,” The Advertiser-Journal, 8 December 1985 (Montgomery, Ala.), 1. For an excellent

article on the debate surrounding possible reorganization of the special

forces community, see Senator William S. Cohen, “Fix for an SOF Capability

that is Most Assuredly Broken,” Armed Forces Journal, January 1986,

38–45.

21. As taken from Neil C. Livingstone’s “Fighting Terrorism and ‘Dirty

Little Wars,’” Air University Review 35, no. 3 (March–April 1984), 4–16.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

48
Chapter 4

Policy Dimensions: Recognition,

Resolve, and Action

In the final analysis the development of and the willingness

to use the necessary forces to preempt terrorism will take

place only if there is a consensus on the part of the political

leadership to enunciate policies that would bring the war

home against terrorists and their supporters. The development of such a consensus in turn ultimately can take place

only when the public is willing to recognize that the United

States is involved in a very real, if undeclared, form of warfare.

Unfortunately, despite the call for stronger measures,

Washington still essentially reacts to incidents. The massacres

in 1985 at the Rome and Vienna airports and the accompanying charges of Libyan involvement have still to lead to con -

certed action. Very early in his administration, shortly after

the Iranian hostages were released, President Reagan warned

terrorists that “when the rules of international behavior are

violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribu -

tion.”1 The April 1986 raid on Libya was the first example of

the promised strong action. The US has essentially continued

a policy of inaction even though Secretary of State Shultz

struck a more dynamic posture on 25 October 1985 when he

proclaimed, “We must reach a consensus in this country that

our response should go beyond passive defense to consider

means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our

goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and

experience has taught us over the years that one of the best

deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure

measures would take place against those who engage in it. We

should take steps to carry out such measures.”2

A later speech perhaps best expressed Shultz’s desire to

aggressively take the initiative from the terrorists and their

state sponsors. In indirect response to British Prime Minister

Margaret Thatcher’s view that military retaliation against ter -

rorism would be contrary to international law, Shultz rejoined:

49
Some have suggested . . . that even to contemplate using force is to

lower ourselves to the barbaric level of the terrorist. I want to take this

issue head on.

It is absurd . . . to argue that international law prohibits us from

capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace, from attacking

them on the soil of other nations, or from using force against states

that support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas.

International law requires no such result. . . . A nation attacked by

terrorists is permitted to use force to preempt future attacks, to seize

terrorists or to rescue its citizens when no other means is available.

We are right to be reluctant to unsheath our sword . . . but we cannot

let the ambiguities of the terrorist threat reduce us to total impotence.

. . . A policy filled with so many qualifications and conditions that they

all could never be met would amount to a policy of paralysis.

It would amount to an admission that, with all our weaponry and

power, we are helpless to defend our citizens, our interests and our

values. This I simply do not accept. . . . State supported terror will

increase through our submission to it, not from our active resistance.

We should use our military power only if the stakes justify it, if other

means are not available, and then only in a manner appropriate to a

clear objective. . . . But we cannot opt out of every contest. We cannot

wait for absolute certainty and clarity. If we do the world’s future will

be determined by others—most likely by those who are the most

brutal, the most unscrupulous, and the most hostile to everything we

believe in.3

Yet this call for an “active strategy” has not been accepted

unanimously within the administration. Indeed there has

been a public division between Secretary of State Shultz and

Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Thus, while Weinberger

shared Shultz’s desire to act against those who engage in a

form of violence that has been particularly directed against

American military personnel and installations, he enunciated

a series of conditions that he considered essential before military forces should be involved in armed conflict.

If we decide it is necessary to put combat forces into a given situation,

we should do so wholehearted1y and with the intention of winning!

If we decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have

clearly defined military and political objectives.

Before the US commits combat forces abroad there must be a

reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people

and their representatives in Congress. 4

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

50
Yet, as previously noted, in the war on terrorism there are

few if any decisive victories. Moreover, given the state of current doctrine, the US military is still struggling to define both

its capabilities and its objectives. Finally, and perhaps most

disturbingly, it is by no means clear “that the American people

and their elected representatives in Congress” would support

the type of actions required to initiate a policy of terrorism

preemption in more than name only. Thus, not atypically, no

less an elder statesman than George Ball, undersecretary of

state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, took issue

directly with Secretary Shultz’s call for preemptive strikes in

even stronger language than that of Secretary Weinberger.

Ball placed the issue of preemption in a comparative perspective by noting the Israeli and British approaches in combating

terrorism. Ball said Shultz

has permitted his obsession with terrorism to distort his normally

judicious view of the world. Not only should America, he insists,

retaliate with force against terrorist violence; it should not hold back

from launching preemptive strikes to thwart terrorist attacks merely

because such strikes might entail some innocent civilian casualties.

For guidance, he recommends that we look to Israel as “a model of

how a nation should approach the dilemma of trying to balance law

and justice with self-preservation.”

The last comment is singularly revealing because Israel exemplifies

not balance but excess. Since it is a small, insecure country

surrounded by enemies, self-preservation is its dominant imperative.

So it is hardly surprising that one reads almost weekly of a bombing

attack on some Arab village aimed at destroying a “P.L.O.

headquarters” or a “terrorist base.”

Because America by contrast [is] a huge nation living in secure

borders and obligated by its leadership role to uphold international

standards, our problems are sharply different in nature and

dimension. Thus, if we need a model, we might more appropriately

turn to Britain, which, while suffering terrorist afflictions, has kept

faith with the humane principles and practices that are our own

common heritage. Had the British followed the Israeli pattern, they

might have answered the Irish Republican Army’s bombing of the

Grand Hotel in Brighton by blowing up part of the Roman Catholic

section of Belfast. Or, in the pattern of Israel’s performance in

Lebanon, they might have attacked Dublin because some I.R.A.

members were thought to be hiding there . . . . Let us take care that

we are not led, through panic and anger, to embrace counter-terror

and international lynch law and thus reduce our nation’s conduct to

the squalid level of the terrorists. Our prime objective should be to

POLICY DIMENSIONS

51
correct or mitigate the fundamental grievances that nourish terrorism

rather than engage in preemptive and retaliatory killings of those

affected by such grievances. 5

The debate over the use of military force against terrorists is

further complicated by current US involvement in Central

America. The term terrorism has often been used as a partisan

weapon by both those who support what they call “freedom

fighters” whose goal is to topple the Sandinista regime and

those who contend that such forces are nothing more than

“right wing death squads.” The lack of agreement on an offen -

sive policy of armed intervention to combat terrorism is also

fueled by the notion that the war on terrorism calls for the use

of covert and clandestine operations that have been looked

upon with disfavor by a congressional oversight process dis -

trustful of the intelligence community’s ability to avoid the

excesses of the Watergate era. Nor has the intelligence com -

munity done much to dispel this concern, as witness congressional objections over not being fully notified about the mining

of a Nicaraguan harbor and charges that the Central Intelli -

gence Agency was supporting a terrorist group implicated in

the killing of innocent civilians in Beirut.

But on an even more basic level, the public at large has

mixed feelings in regards to combating terrorism. A sense of

frustration and helplessness is coupled with a desire to take

action; but such action must reflect basic American ideals. As

a recent report noted,

Even though those Americans surveyed believe the government is

virtually helpless when it comes to catching terrorists, they feel

something should be done. Solutions recommended include

international cooperation among countries, including economic

sanctions, and tighter security at airports and aboard aircraft. Active

measures such as military actions are much more controversial

among those interviewed, although welcomed by many.

With regard to policy on terrorism, most responded that there was no

cohesive policy, but said there should be one. There is an awareness

that the United States will not negotiate with terrorists. Those

interviewed believe a policy on terrorism should reflect national

values: respect for individual life, respect for law, and respect for the

sovereignty of nations.

Under the umbrella of such a policy, Americans would still welcome

actions against terrorists that are swift, forceful, and even aggressive.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

52
There is growing evidence the American people support timely,

well-conceived, well-executed operations, such as the capture of the

Achille Lauro hijackers. They endorse similar actions even if

inadvertent casualties result.6

But how the desire for “action” can be reconciled with

“national values” remains to be seen.

This ambiguity ultimately points to perhaps the most fundamental reason for an aversion to engaging in terrorism preemption and other types of “dirty little wars.”7

 American values still call for the initiation of a conflict by a formal

declaration of war after an enemy has initiated open hostilities

that justify a response—a war that will be conducted under

idealized rules of “fair play.” These values and ideals were

severely tested during the Vietnam era, when a generation

that had fought “the good war” and a generation that had not

were largely divided over US involvement in a “dirty” uncon -

ventional war. In Vietnam the American ideal was at odds with

the measures that were necessary in fighting an unconven -

tional, territorially based insurgency where terrorism was a

tactic either in support of or against the existing government.

Can the American public be expected to embrace the use of

force in an even more invidious undeclared war, the war

against terrorism itself? 8

A final question must be raised: Under what conditions

would the public accept the need to engage in a covert

preemptive war against terrorism? And it is here that a crucial

irony must be considered. After there are sufficient bombings,

assassinations, and other acts of terrorism directed against

US citizens and interests at home and abroad, Americans will

accept the need for action. But by then it might be too late to

consider limited covert or clandestine operations. Rather,

there might be clamor to engage in large-scale conventional

operations, thereby escalating the war against terrorism in the

spectrum of conflict. As one observer noted regarding attitudes related to the conduct of armed operations against ter -

rorists, “It is not yet clear what actions would be taken in

implementing a preemptive and retaliatory policy nor is it

clear how extensive these actions would be. Some maintain

that retaliation can best be accomplished by clandestine

agents, but this implies a covert capability that some experts

POLICY DIMENSIONS

53
argue is not present, and also does not meet the need to

satisfy the public’s desire that terrorism be punished.”

9

 [Emphasis added]

This “public desire” can lead to an overreaction. Our lack of

a capability within the military/intelligence community for

clandestine and covert preemptive operations against the ter -

rorists and their sponsor states will encourage terrorists in

even more violent acts, and the possibility of an overreaction

to such carnage cannot be ignored; for it is in the national

character of the United States to conduct foreign relations and

wage war. As George F. Kennan noted in his classic work,

American Diplomacy 1900–1950: “A democracy is peace-loving.

It does not like to go to war. It is slow to rise to provocation.

When it has been provoked to the point where it must grasp

the sword it does not easily forgive its adversary for having

produced the situation. The fact of the provocation becomes

itself the issue. Democracy fights in anger—it fights for the

very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish

the power that was rash enough to provoke it—to teach that

power a lesson it will not forget. To prevent the thing from

happening again such a war must be carried out to the bitter

end.”1 0

And in so doing the democracy risks fulfilling a goal directly

held by terrorists globally—to become a force to be reckoned

with, that by its provocative acts can force a superpower to

overreact and create an international state of siege that

threatens the existence not only of the democracy but (in this

age of the balance of nuclear terror) of the world as we know it.

Faced with this threat, policy makers must provide alternatives to such an Armageddon by recognizing that it is necessary now to engage in terrorism preemption at a lower level of

conflict in order to avoid escalation. They and the public must

learn that it may be necessary to fight a new form of warfare—a war which may be not of their own making and is

contrary to their values. The military, which shares these values, has the additional responsibility of developing doctrine

that transcends the policies of the moment, a doctrine under

which to fight the ongoing war against terrorism.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

54
Notes

1. Ronald Reagan, Editorial Research Reports, 27 March 1981, 3.

2. George P. Shultz, “Terrorism and the Modern World,” Current Policy

no. 629, 29 October 1984, 5.

3. “Shultz Supports Armed Reprisals,” New York Times, 16 January

1986, 8.

4. “Frustrating Search for Answers,” US News & World Report, 24 December

1985, 21.

5. George Ball, “Shultz is Wrong on Terrorism,” New York Times, 16

December 1984, E21.

6. Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terror -

ism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1986), 17–18.

7. As taken from the title of an excellent article by Neil C. Livingstone,

“Fighting Terrorism and Dirty Little Wars,” Air University Review 35, no. 3

(March–April 1984).

8. For an interesting discussion on American values associated with the

conduct of war, see Donald Vought, “American Culture and American

Arms,” Lessons From an Unconventional War: Reassessing US Strategies for

Future Conflict, ed. Richard A. Hunt and Richard A. Shultz Jr., (New York:

Pergamon Press, 1982)

9. Allen S. Nance, Anti-terrorist Issues Raised by the Reagan Administra -

tion’s Proposals, Report No. 84–165F, Congressional Research Service, the

Library of Congress, 27 September 1984, 3.

10. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900–1950 (New York: New

American Library 1951), 66.

POLICY DIMENSIONS

55
Chapter 5

Toward an Active Strategy

By the time this book is written there doubtlessly will be

other terrorist attacks against US citizens and interests over -

seas. That such assaults will take place affirms the fact that

there can never be a totally effective program to deter or prevent a determined adversary from seeking softer targets of

opportunity in what he perceives to be a justified war against

all. But one can hope, based on a growing concern within the

government and the public, that increasingly more effective

intelligence can help to stop various terrorist groups before

they can initiate operations. It must be recognized, however,

that in the final analysis there will be additional victims; for

although effective intelligence coupled with good physical security measures and personal awareness may indeed lessen

the availability of particularly significant targets, such measures may at the same time cause the terrorists to seek alter -

natives in what can be called a grim process of target displacement. This does not mean to suggest that antiterrorist

measures are not important; target hardening is not a zero

sum game. But the public must recognize that no matter how

good the intelligence and associated measures, casualties not

only will continue but likely will increase as a result of the

terrorists’ need to be less discriminate in targeting, given the

hardening of particularly symbolic targets. Furthermore, the

terrorists now face the challenge of engaging in more dramatic

and violent acts of terrorism if they wish to attract the atten -

tion of a media that has become somewhat jaded to the “con -

ventional” bombing or hostage taking. It is therefore vital to

convey the message to the public that although necessary

measures are being taken, there are no fail-safe mechanisms,

and innocent Americans will continue to be victims of terrorism. Recognizing this fact is essential in order to lessen the

shock value of incidents which have aided the terrorists in

obtaining publicity and in projecting an image of the United

States as a paper tiger in the war on terrorism.

57
Beyond demonstrating that the government has the resolve

to deter terrorism and conveying to the public that there cannot be total security, another factor must be considered, particularly in regard to hostage takings. The United States as a

government and as a people must address two vexing con -

cerns: (1) the immediate fate of the hostages balanced against

long-term security of US interests and (2) the value of pro -

tracted negotiations weighed against immediate action to free

hostages.

In the first place, if the seizure is a hostile act against the United

States and its policies, Washington itself becomes, essentially, the

primary hostage. Tragically, the terrorists often view the hostages . . .

as no more than cards in a game of armed negotiation. While it is

understandable and commendable that Washington will do everything

possible to seek the safe release of the hostages, we cannot ignore the

long-term ramifications of placing the individual hostages’ lives at the

forefront in resolving incidents. The freeing of the passengers on Flight

847 (for example) was clearly a tactical victory, but the long-term

strategic implications of that incident are still not fully evaluated. In

seeking a diplomatic tactical victory, the United States violated the “no

concessions” policy, thus encouraging future incidents. Through the

media, the terrorists were able to engage in “armed propaganda” and

make Washington appear powerless. 1

Therefore, while it is not an attractive proposition, American

citizens must recognize that in the protracted global war of

attrition practiced by terrorists, citizens will be targeted; but

the laudable desire to seek the safe release of hostages can

have a negative long-term impact. The fate of hostages unfortunately may have to be placed in a broader perspective of

long-term issues of the security of American citizens and

questions associated with basic national interests.

A second factor particularly relates to counterterrorist operations as contrasted to terrorism preemption operations.

Until now, conventional wisdom in regard to hostage negotia -

tion techniques and the management of incidents

suggests that force should be used only as a last resort in responding

to an incident [but] the requirement to use force at the outset of an

incident relates to [another] axiom of negotiations—one that may not

be applicable to politically motivated acts of terrorism similar to the

Flight 847 seizure. Conventional wisdom dictates that time is on the

side of the authorities because they have the preponderance of force

and control the environment beyond the skyjacked aircraft or the

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

58
barricade. But this axiom did not apply in the case of the seizure of

the US Embassy in Teheran, where the Iranian Government engaged

in what can be called officially sanctioned hostage taking, nor in the

case of Flight 847 where elements of the host government were either

incapable of action or were tacitly supporting the government hostage

takers. And time will work against the United States in this age of

state-sponsored terrorism.2

The American public must recognize that any hostage rescue operations or other counterterrorist missions are exceedingly complex and are always on the razor’s edge of failure.

Such a recognition will enable the public to accept the fact

that, as in the abortive Iranian hostage rescue, there may be

future failures which would result in the loss of the lives of

American military personnel and hostages. But it is also im -

portant that the public recognize that such risks may be necessary if the United States is to achieve any credibility in

responding to acts of terrorism. As to publicity, there certainly

may be successful operations which because of their covert

nature may not readily be exposed to public view; but when

there are open successes they should be covered extensively to

show the American people and the world that the US can

engage the adversary effectively.

Beyond these essentially reactive measures, it is vital to

reaffirm the need to develop an “active strategy” in more than

name only. The development of such a strategy and attendant

capability is of course ultimately based on the need for a

policy of strong preemptive measures that can only be

achieved when the public recognizes that terrorism is a form

of warfare. In large part, that recognition can only be achieved

through effective leadership and accompanying public diplo -

macy that sends a clear, nonpartisan message that terrorism

can and must be combated offensively and not treated primar -

ily in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Yet the development of

such awareness takes time and, unfortunately, is not likely to

happen unless there is a marked escalation of assaults

against Americans; in which case there is always the danger

of overreaction.

Regardless of whether the awareness develops, the armed

services must take on the responsibility of developing the doc -

trine and forces to combat terrorism and must do so now.

While the current organizational format to meet the threat is

TOWARD AN ACTIVE STRATEGY

59
stated basically in terms of a lead-agency concept which

places State in charge on foreign incidents, Justice on domestic ones, and the FAA on skyjackings, this arrangement ignores a fundamental fact. If international terrorism is a form

of warfare, it should be the Department of Defense that develops the necessary forces not only to react effectively to incidents but to engage in terrorism preemption. Such missions

and campaigns, as noted earlier, may require the services to

develop and refine not only a conventional and special opera -

tions preemptive capability but, even more challenging, an

ability to engage in clandestine military operations. In effect, if

the terrorists have learned to wage a new form of warfare the

United States military has the responsibility to engage in such

a conflict. It is not a question of whether the services feel

comfortable in taking on such a role. Like it or not, they must

learn to take the offensive in whatever ways are possible

against those who are now changing the face of conflict and

waging war against the United States. In the final analysis the

ability to engage the enemy is not based on yet another largescale administrative organization accompanied by bureaucratic conflict, but on an acceptance of the need for a highly

trained small force that has adjusted the terrorist organiza -

tional doctrine to give it the ability to preempt terrorism. It is

not a question of which service should be given what mission:

there must be a unity of effort, a unity that until now has been

sadly lacking in this war.

Developing a doctrine of terrorism preemption and concomitant capabilities, along with the necessary policy guidance,

can enable the United States to demolish the image that it is

powerless not only to combat terrorists but to seize the initia -

tive from them. Such a capability will not eliminate terrorism;

but coupled with firm resolve, it can enable this nation and its

allies to effectively engage those who would seek to destroy the

civil order through their acts of carnage. It is time to declare

war against terrorism.

Notes

1. Stephen Sloan, “TWA Flight 847,” United States Naval Institute

Proceedings 112, no. 2, 80.

2. Ibid.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

60
Chapter 6

The Vice President’s Task Force

Shortly after this study was completed but before it was

published, the government issued the Public Report of the Vice

President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism. In his opening

letter, the executive director, Adm J. L. Holloway III, enunciated the mission of the task force. “When President Reagan

asked our Task Force to review the nation’s program to com -

bat terrorism, it was not primarily a mandate to correct specific deficiencies, but one to reassess US priorities and policies, to insure that current programs make the best use of

available assets, and to determine if our national program is

properly coordinated to achieve the most effective results.”

The report therefore can be viewed to be the most current

and authoritative evaluation of US programs and policies to -

ward meeting threats and acts of terrorism. This chapter dis -

cusses selected statements and recommendations in the report that relate to the major theme of this book—the

requirement for the US to develop the necessary doctrine,

policies, capabilities, and organizations to take the offensive

against terrorists and their sponsor states. The chapter does

not specifically address the bureaucratic competition and the

related decision-making process that took place during the life of

the task force, nor does it examine all aspects of the report. That

is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief analysis of

the report can serve to highlight whether Washington is moving

to develop an offensive policy and capability or is essentially

perpetuating the reactive posture against terrorism.

In the initial section of the task force report under the heading The Nature of Terrorism are two statements that bear directly on whether there has been a change in Washington’s

orientation toward seizing the initiative against terrorism. The

first is the definition of terrorism as, still, primarily a criminal

act: “It is the unlawful use or threat of violence against per -

sons or property to further political or social objectives. It is

generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals, or groups to modify their behavior or policy.”

61
The emphasis on the criminal nature of the act is in continuity with existing definitions used by the Department of Defense and other government agencies. Domestic terrorism

should primarily be viewed as a type of crime that is clearly

the responsibility of the law enforcement community on the

national, state, and local levels. However, the task force report

primarily addresses international terrorism, which is not only a

criminal act but an act associated with intense political com -

petition and subversion. It is a new form of diplomacy and

most significantly a manifestation of the changing nature of

armed conflict or, indeed, a new form of warfare.

The report does take into account the fact that terrorism

can be viewed to be a form of warfare. “Some experts see

terrorism as the lower end of the warfare spectrum, a form of

low-intensity, unconventional aggression.” But this view is

qualified immediately: “Others, however, believe that referring

to it as war rather than criminal activity lends dignity to

terrorists and places their acts in the context of accepted

international behavior.”

Thus, while the task force recognizes that terrorism appears

at “the lower end of the conflict spectrum,” the qualification

acts as a barrier to the development of a war-fighting doctrine

that is crucial in developing a counterterrorism doctrine and a

doctrine of terrorism preemption. Moreover, by stating that

terrorism can be viewed to be a form of “low-intensity, uncon -

ventional aggression,” the report fails to differentiate between

local internal terrorism and nonterritorial international terrorism.

The emphasis on terrorism as essentially a criminal act

instead of an act of warfare does not provide a necessary

break with past definitions and therefore may continue to act

as a barrier to the development of an offensive policy, doctrine,

and capability. Since international terrorism is still primarily

placed within the purview of the law enforcement community,

the report’s discussion of the nature of terrorism may rein -

force a posture of reaction as contrasted to preemption.

Yet, despite the unwillingness to break with the past and

specifically recognize that terrorism has become a form of

warfare, the task force has recognized that terrorism is

changing—the second indication of a change in Washington’s

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

62
approach to the problem. The report presents three main cate -

gories of terrorists:

Self-supported terrorists [who] primarily rely on their own initiative,

such as extortion, kidnapping, bank robberies, and narcotic

trafficking, to support their activities[;] those individuals who may

engage in terrorism for limited tactical purposes and [who] lacking

safe havens tend to be extremely security conscious, keeping their

numbers small to avoid penetration efforts[; and] state-sponsored or

aided terrorist groups [who] frequently are larger in number, have the

advantages or protection of state agencies and are able to access state

intelligence resources. Because of this host country-provided safe

haven and the compartmented operations of terrorist organizations, it

is extremely difficult to penetrate such groups. Moreover, they are

subject to limited control by their sponsors and may be expected to

carry out attacks for them.

Nowhere in these categories is there a specific recognition

that, in addition to “individuals who may engage in terrorism

for limited tactical purposes,” there are people who use terrorism as a strategic weapon—a curious omission in light of

shock waves generated by the bombing of Marine headquar -

ters in Beirut that largely destroyed a crucial aspect of US

Middle Eastern policy. Yet, it should be noted that the report

clearly recognizes that terrorism has become a new if per -

verted form of diplomacy: “Terrorism has become another

means of conducting foreign affairs.”

In the section entitled US Policy and Response to Terrorism,

there is a fine statement on current policy and its evolution.

The report then discusses what it calls Range of Responses to

Terrorism, which includes Managing Terrorist Incidents, Coping

with the Threat, and Alleviating Causes of Terrorism. It is only

in the management section that preemption is specifically discussed. Preemption is described as action “designed to keep an

attack from occurring. Preemptive success is limited by the

extent to which timely, accurate intelligence is available. Eve -

ryday activities that can preempt attacks [include] altering

travel routes or avoiding routine schedules. Successful preemption of terrorist attacks is seldom publicized because of the

sensitive intelligence that may be compromised.”

Placing preemption under the heading Managing Terrorist

Incidents creates a conceptual problem at the outset. Preemption, by definition, prevents or deters incidents through offen -

sive measures; it cannot be used to respond to them after they

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE

63
have happened. In addition, while one of the options men -

tioned is Counterattacking or Force Options, it is viewed in an

essentially reactive manner. “Counterattacking or Force Op -

tions—Forceful resolution of a terrorist incident can be risky,

as evidenced by the recent episode involving the Egyptian

airliner in Malta; careful planning and accurate, detailed intelligence are required to minimize risk.”

Equally vexing is that in regard to retaliation, and especially

the requirement for offensive actions, the task force would still

wish to fight the terrorists under the ideals of the conduct of a

so-called “good” or “clean” war. As the report notes, “Our prin -

ciples of justice will not permit random retaliation against

groups or countries. However, when perpetrators of terrorism

can be identified and located, our policy is to act against

terrorism without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering

democratic values.”

While this is certainly an ideal, in the war on terrorism we

cannot afford neatly defined rules of engagement based on

idealized values. Finally, under responses, the military option

is addressed briefly: “A successful deterrent strategy may require judicious employment of military force to resolve an incident.” But in the dirty war against terrorism, it is very difficult

to define, much less employ, “judicious” force.

In the heading entitled Considerations in Determining Responses, the vice president’s report effectively addresses the

use of military force and a military show of force. It brings to

the public attention that “counterterrorism missions are highrisk/high-gain operations which can have a severe impact on

US prestige if they fail.” Such a concern is valid, but doesn’t

the statement of the potential negative risk act as a potential

impediment to employing necessary military action? The sec -

tion also notes that a “US military show of force may intimidate

the terrorists and their sponsors.” This statement effectively

recognizes the importance of coercive diplomacy as a form of

psychological operations against terrorism.

In the Task Force Conclusions and Recommendations there

is the important recognition that “international terrorism is

clearly a growing problem and priority, requiring expanded

cooperation with other countries to combat it.” But the follow -

ing statement raises questions whether the United States will

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

64
be able to take the offensive. “The Task Force’s review of the

current national program to combat terrorism found our inter -

agency system and the lead agency concept for dealing with

incidents to be soundly conceived.”

The difficulty with this statement is twofold. First, the con -

clusion essentially continues to address the means to react to

incidents, not to preempt them. Second, it is debatable

whether the lead agency concept, which is based on bureaucratic imperatives, can provide the basis for unity of effort

necessary to effectively take the offensive against terrorists

and their sponsor states. Certainly the suggestions for poten -

tial changes under the lead agency concept, including the

need for a national planning document to “allow quick identifi -

cation of agencies responsible for particular aspects of terrorism and their available resources,” is well taken. Moreover, the

suggestion that “the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism

should prepare and submit to the NSC for approval, policy

criteria for deciding when, if, and how to use force to preempt,

react, and retaliate” is necessary if we are to avoid the contin -

ued ad hoc response that has characterized Washington’s actions toward incidents. Furthermore, the call for “a full-time

NSC position with support staff . . . to strengthen coordination

of our national program” can help to promote the necessary

integration of effort to combat terrorism. Despite these valid

points, it would appear that although the report may have

been the result of, or may have achieved, a bureaucratic con -

sensus by maintaining the lead agency concept, it has not

broken sufficiently with the past to address specifically the

need for a more tightly integrated force within the Department

of Defense. This failure occurs, in part, because the report is

reluctant to recognize that terrorism is a form of warfare that

may require preemptive military action.

In conclusion, the Public Report of the Vice President’s Task

Force on Combating Terrorism may be a well-written and balanced treatment of present organization, programs, and policies to meet the threat. But one wishes that it had gone further

and recommended a series of steps that could be used to provide

the basis for the employment of terrorism preemption forces that

would make an “active strategy” a reality.

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE

65
Epilogue

It is a dubious but refreshing task to write an epilogue for a

book I wrote over 14 years ago. “Dubious” because it forces me

to recognize errors in my predictive capabilities; “refreshing”

because it gives me an opportunity to reformulate my views on

terrorism and on an “action strategy” to meet present changes

in an international conflict environment and, hopefully, to adjust to future changes. Perhaps my errors and revisions can

assist those who must address today’s tactical challenges and

tomorrow’s strategic demands posed by terrorism.

The foundation of the initial study was in good part based

on the erroneous assumption that the cold war would con -

tinue in the near and midterm. Who would believe that the

very president who would launch his own form of holy war

against Moscow would also become a peacemaker while help -

ing to set into motion a process that would lead to the dis -

mantling of the structure of the cold war? The result of this

fundamental change is only now being tentatively assessed,

but one thing is ironically clear—the end of the cold war has

created an increasingly ambiguous conflict environment. And,

this environment has complicated the task of understanding

how and by whom terrorism will be employed as a political

weapon. There are so many new players.

As noted in the prologue, the initial study did not accept the

premise that the Soviet Union controlled “The Terror Network.” Nevertheless, there was recognition that Moscow did

establish its own capabilities to support a wide variety of ter -

rorist states and organizations in pursuit of its international

objectives. Today, Moscow’s involvement in state-sponsored

terrorism has greatly diminished, although the relationship

between state officials, organized crime, and terrorists in pursuit of financial gains and political objectives cannot be dis -

missed. But there is now a wide variety of both old and new

states (as well as nonstate actors in the form of criminal enter -

prises) who, emboldened by the vacuum created by the end of

the cold war, will use terror tactics and strategies in their own

campaigns against the industrialized countries and traditional

societies when they are confronted with the strains of uneven

67
technological and political modernization. These states are using, and in all likelihood will continue to use, state sponsorship of terrorism as one element of their asymmetric political

conflict, violence, and more specifically, warfare, which is defined as follows: “Asymmetric warfare is a set of operational

practices aimed at negating advantages and exploiting vulner -

abilities rather than engaging in traditional force-on-force en -

gagements. The incentive to engage in asymmetric warfare is

usually the greatest for the weaker power in defense [and one

could add offense] against a stronger [and often extraregional]

foe.”1

Not faced by the constraints of its superpower patrons—since

the United States is, for the present, the sole remaining military

superpower—these new states have aimed and likely will con -

tinue to aim their attacks directly at the United States and

indirectly against its allies. Moreover, the more ambiguous

conflict environment has been further exacerbated by the

emergence of a wide variety of new groups, ranging from existing states to secessionist movements to organized crime, that

will resort to terrorism to achieve their goals.

We also see the continuation and multiplying of groups who

seek to achieve their own vision of preordained utopia by

using terrorism. They thus help promote universal and regional instability and reactionary revolution, which may be

part of the broader “clash of civilizations” enunciated by Sa -

muel Huntington.2 This dream is not the monopoly of any

single religion: American ayatollahs may not share the same

vision or capabilities as their Middle Eastern counterparts,

but they do share a belief system that is often used to justify

the resort to terrorism as a religious necessity, just as the

Marxist-Leninists justified their acts of carnage based on a

historical imperative. Yet at the same time—and in many ways

more difficult to identify or counter—is the emergence, or reemergence, of primordial groups who, fueled by real and per -

ceived historical injustices, may well use terrorism in their

separatist endeavors toward self-determination. Which new

group will resort to terrorism as a reaction to what they regard

to be “terrorism from above”—regime repression—in the pursuit of freedom? Is it accidental that we will see a reassertion

of traditional parochial values, loyalties, and communities in

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

68
an increasingly interdependent and expanding technological

universe?

The ambiguous conflict environment therefore probably not

only will increase the number of nations that use state-spon sored

terrorism as a weapon but also will afford them an opportu -

nity to recruit a wide variety of new groups to act as their

surrogates against the United States and its interests. These

factors will challenge Washington to revise policies and attendant

capabilities to meet the new threats in several ways.

First, the focus in regards to state sponsorship will have to

be expanded. It is important that the intelligence community

identify now what new states may embark on their own forms

of proxy war through the use of terrorism against the United

States. A failure to anticipate these new groups could perpetu -

ate a policy of reaction. The identification of and concomitant

actions against known state sponsors—Cuba, Iran, Iraq,

Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria—are important and

should continue; but, the intelligence community also should

provide necessary information to policy makers so they can

apply appropriate political, economic, and, if necessary, military actions to deter states from employing a whole new range

of terrorist groups who for their own reasons are willing clients of state sponsorship.

Second, the focus on identifying sponsors should be ex -

tended beyond states. With the emergence of subnational and

transnational movements and groups, the source of support

for terrorism will extend beyond the financial resources and

intelligence services in the capital cities. Secessionist move -

ments, for example, may increasingly seek to expand their

capabilities not only by directly employing terrorism in a strife

area but also by supporting and cooperating with other terror -

ist groups. On the other hand, transnational movements not

necessarily related to a specific state may also sponsor terrorism as part of campaigns of regional and global destabiliza -

tion, conflict, and violence. The increased entrance into the

field of these other sponsors further complicates the challenge

of identifying them and taking proactive measures. Two of

these nonstate sponsors are of particular concern.

In the short run, the existence of the Bin Laden network

illustrates that there are terrorist entrepreneurs who have

EPILOGUE

69
their own deep pockets to directly conduct or support terrorists in pursuit of their objectives. Secondly, with the increased

nexus of criminal/terrorist organizations, narcoterrorists, and

other organized criminal networks also have the financial ca -

pabilities as well as the organizational capability to replace

states as the leading sponsors of terrorism. In sum, we must

extend the focus on sponsorship beyond states, as emphasized in the “action strategy,” and we must be more proactive

in pursuing the goal to dry up financial support, logistics,

organization, and training for the various new groups willing

to become clients of new sponsors.

The increased number of terrorist groups—both state and

nonstate—raises another set of questions on what may be

viewed as a crucial issue: the challenges created not only by

the increasingly diverse new terrorist organizations but also

by changes in terrorist organizational doctrine. The latter may

be more challenging than the former to those responsible for

combating terrorism. In the initial study emphasis was placed

on J. K. Zawodny’s pioneering and insightful article which

zeroed in on the “centrifugal” infrastructure of terrorist organizations and how that infrastructure influenced the behavior of

terrorists.3 If anything, that structure has been altered by new

groups in two significant ways. First, the new groups may no

longer be centrifugal combat cells that are part of larger ter -

rorist organizations. When the action strategy was formulated,

despite the compartmentalization of such cells they ultimately

might have been identified and neutralized by penetrating the

terrorist organization through its leadership, its front groups,

and vulnerable support and logistics elements within the clandestine organization. But increasingly we see the development

of “free-floating” terrorist cells which are not dependent on

support from a larger organization. They function in an environment of hatred where they can acquire in an ad hoc manner necessary funding, arms, and other support; but they

exist in their own self-contained universe that is difficult to

identify, much less penetrate and apprehend. Moreover, in all

probability these free-floating cells do not have a track record

of previous incidents, so there is no modus operandi that can

help analysts identify who they are and how they act. They

may not engage in a campaign of orchestrated terrorism, but

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

70
in a single or only a few incidents that might appear to the

authorities to be isolated acts of terror. In the United States

these self-contained groups maintain their self-sufficiency under the principle of “leadership resistance.”4

The task of identifying these cells is further complicated by

the fact that they may consist of only one or two individuals

pursuing their own form of violence against the civil order.

These “bubba” cells, composed of individuals often trained in

survivalist techniques, not reliant on a support mechanism,

and lacking a track record, have proved and will increasingly

prove difficult to counter. The Unabomber serves to under -

score how difficult it is to apprehend a single individual, and

the Murrah Building bombing underscores how a very small

group could engage in the worst terrorist attack in the United

States. Moreover, these microgroups have engaged in terrorist

acts not only in the United States. In the United Kingdom and

on the continent, a wide variety of cells have converted their

ideological venom into violence in the form of hate crimes that

may or may not be primarily politically motivated, against

religious, racial, ethnic, or other individuals and communities

they seek to terrorize. The capability of these groups for vio -

lence and their ability to avoid detection and apprehension are

further enhanced by a second consideration: the impact of the

Internet.

In the past these centrifugal cells, whether they existed as

part of a larger organization or by themselves, were limited in

their ability to engage in concerted terrorist campaigns since

they lacked the command and control capabilities for coordinating their actions without compromising their security as

self-contained, independent cells. Now, as a result of the development of the Internet, there is the potential for more coordination among these groups without sacrificing the security

they have achieved by not being part of a larger, more penetrable organization. Cyberspace has provided these groups

with a means of coordination and expanded operations undreamed of by those skyjackers who initiated their actions in

the medium of the aerospace. This development is a manifestation of a new chapter in the evolution of terrorism related to

“netwar,” defined as

EPILOGUE

71
an emerging mode of conflict and crime at the societal levels, involving

measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists use

network forms of organization and related doctrines and strategies,

and technologies attendant to the Information Age. These protagonists

are likely to consist of dispersed small groups who communicate,

coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner

without a precise central command. Thus, information netwar differs

from the modes of conf1ict and crime in which protagonists prefer

formal, stand-alone hierarchical organizations, doctrines, and

strategies, as in the past. 5

In effect, these are centrifugal organizations that have utilized

the Internet as a force multiplier.

These changes will test the capabilities of those charged

with countering terrorism. Moreover, this development and

the acceleration of netwar and associated cyber and information warfare have serious implications in regards to the ability

of democratic political and social orders to reconcile the need

to maintain individual rights and due process in the face of

potential governmental intrusiveness in the right to privacy,

justified as a means of countering netwar as a threat to national security.

Perhaps the most daunting challenge created by terrorism,

particularly in reference to formulating policies to combat it,

deals with a fundamental problem associated with the nature

of terrorism that was discussed in the initial study, and

which, if anything, has become even more significant today.

The action strategy recognized that there was no official governmental agreement on whether terrorism was essentially a

form of criminality or an act of war. Indeed there was a basic

disagreement that was enunciated by the vice president’s task

force report in 1986 and continues today. “Some experts see

terrorism at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, a form of

low-intensity, unconventional aggression. Others, however,

believe that referring to it as war rather than a criminal activ -

ity lends dignity to terrorists and places their acts in the

context of accepted international behavior.”6

While an uneasy bureaucratic consensus remains in the

form of the lead agency initiated under the Carter administra -

tion and refined during the Reagan administration, the con -

cept was primarily intended to handle incidents. Thus, if an

incident occurred outside of the United States, coordination of

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

72
the investigation would be in the hands of the Department of

State. Domestically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

would coordinate investigation under the auspices of the Department of Justice. The coordinator would be the Federal

Aviation Administration when incidents took place aboard air -

craft. However, in evolving a full-scale approach to preventing

and responding to terrorism, there was a lack of cohesion for

the following reasons. First, more than 40 agencies conduct

terrorism-related activities on the national level, ranging from

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the

Department of Energy. Each has its own areas of expertise

and bureaucratic agenda. This can act as a barrier against the

development of full unity of effort to combat all the stages of

terrorist threats, acts, and outcomes.7 In addition, while major

cities have developed permanent terrorism task forces, rela -

tionships and coordination with the multiplicity of state and

local law enforcement departments and agencies are still com -

plicated by bureaucratic turf battles. But the ambiguity of the

nature of terrorism is perhaps most cogently seen in the

changing roles of the military and the FBI in dealing with

present and future terrorist threats and acts. The military has

increasingly found itself directly involved in domestic law en -

forcement despite the strictures of posse comitatus, which

largely prohibits the armed services from having anything

other than a supporting role in law enforcement. Despite these

constraints the “war on drugs” and later the “war on domestic

terrorism” have blurred the line between support and opera -

tional roles. The very contentious debate over the role of the

military at Waco underscores the problems of clearly defining

roles and missions in a domestic context. This ambiguity

could also be seen in a controversy that resulted when US

Marines shot a Mexican goat herder while they were involved

in the questionable role of border control.

The ambiguity has also been enhanced by the greatly ex -

panding role of the FBI in regards to not only domestic but

also to international threats and incidents. Domestically,

largely as a result of the mass terrorism by Aum Shrinrikyo’s

Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system, the growing demand by political leaders and policy makers for measures

against such threats has led to the passage of legislation and

EPILOGUE

73
executive orders that have expanded the jurisdiction and ca -

pabilities of the Bureau to combat chemical, biological, and

nuclear threats of mass terrorism. The need for further capa -

bilities has also been exacerbated by the growing and welltaken fear that rogue states and terrorists can independently

or cooperatively acquire and use weapons of mass destruction

against the United States and its allies and in general desta -

bilize an already very unstable international system. As a result we have now seen the creation of the Office of National

Preparedness, which is funded to address threats posed by

“super terrorism” against the population and critical infra -

structures of the United States. Further complicating the

problem of achieving a unity of effort is the fact that the FBI

has also been charged not only to engage in full-scale investigations of terrorist incidents which have resulted in the death

and injuries of Americans overseas but also to engage in operations against alleged and known terrorists on the high seas

and in other countries.

On the state and local level we have also seen an expansion

of the roles and capabilities of the police. First under the war

on drugs and now under the war against domestic terrorism,

we have witnessed the arming, equipping, and training of local

and state law enforcement to the degree that they have become increasingly militarized. The long-term policy concerns

cannot be dismissed. The United States, as a democratic civil

order, faces the increasingly daunting task of maintaining the

delicate line between civil–military relations and civil–law en -

forcement relationships. This tension is perhaps best seen

today under the call for the development of policies, doctrine,

and capabilities that would charge the military to be involved

in what is being called Homeland Defense.

Such a defense is not a replacement for the civil defense

practiced during World War II and the cold war; it is a defense

not yet clearly defined even in the realm of doctrine. Homeland

Defense places the military in a position where it could be

involved in maintaining domestic order beyond the traditional

role (particularly of the National Guard) of being activated in

support of local authorities in the face of civil disturbances.

Furthermore, the National Guard Bureau is now confronted

not only with expanding roles in the domestic arena but also

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

74
with being integrally involved in peace support operations

overseas in conjunction with the regular military.

Given the understandable concern particularly about mass

terrorism, government organizations, along with the health

profession, are now deeply involved in developing programs to

monitor, help prevent, and be ready to take the appropriate

measures in the aftermath of a major chemical, biological, or

nuclear incident. In particular, FEMA and the Center for Dis -

ease Control are gearing up now, more than ever, to face

incidents of mass terrorism. With the vital requirement to

have FEMA and associated agencies participate in countering

terrorism, the problem of coordination will be further complicated. Thus, the ambiguous nature of terrorism has led to

more complexity in meeting both the continuing and changing

threats of terrorism.

Since Beating International Terrorism placed a major emphasis on the military’s role in meeting the terrorist threat, how

have the suggestions concerning the role of the armed forces

weathered the passage of time and events, and how has the

military adjusted to a changing terrorist threat environment?

Despite the fact that the end of the cold war and ongoing

technological developments have led to a “revolution in military affairs,” one must wonder how much has changed in the

military’s role in combating terrorism.

DOD Directive 2000.21, Protection of DOD Personnel Against

Terrorist Attack (September 15, 1996), has essentially not been

modified since its 1982 predecessor was cited and discussed

in the action strategy. Antiterrorism and counterterrorism still

remain the two types of measures used to head off or respond

to the threat. There is movement toward a more active posture

in regards to the updated definition of counterterrorism, which

now includes the words “prevent” and “deter” before the original “to respond to a terrorist attack.” But while “deter” may

open the doctrinal door for proactive measures, the military

program remains primarily reactive in character. The official

recognition of Terrorism Counteraction with its two subhead -

ings, antiterrorism and counterterrorism, also continues in effect. The reluctance to take the offensive continues, along with

the unwillingness to officially, doctrinally, and operationally

recognize the need for a second major heading to combat

EPILOGUE

75
terrorism: terrorism preemption . Moreover, one can suggest

that this defensive posture has not only continued but has

been intensified as a result of the bombings at the Khobar

Towers and other military installations, as well as at the em -

bassies in Kenya and Tanzania. “Force protection” is now at

the forefront of measures directed at meeting the terrorist

threat.

If anything, it seems the call for terrorism preemption has

been placed even further on the back burner as a siege men -

tality increasingly drives operations overseas. Thus, for example, while peace support operations require that the military

move beyond the perimeter and into the community, com -

manders focus on a gate-and-key approach, with an emphasis

on physical security that may prevent peacekeeping or peace

enforcement forces from actively carrying out their mission.

There are, of course, incidents where the military has taken a

more active role, most notably in the seizure of alleged and

convicted terrorists in support of the FBI. One can certainly

make a case for the contention that there have been various

special operations of an offensive nature that remain classified. But even when the armed services execute what the

president may see as an offensive action, it is often still reactive in nature. The use of cruise missiles against a factory in

the Sudan purportedly supplying biological agents to terrorists and the cruise missile attack in Afghanistan that sought

to at least disrupt Bin Laden’s network remain essentially a

high-tech response against terrorism.

In light of these developments and in the face of the continuity and change that characterize current and future terror -

ist threats, actions, and outcomes, are the suggestions made

in chapter 3 concerning force and target selection valid? In

reviewing the analytical framework for counterterrorism operations, one could suggest the following. First, reflecting the

ambiguity resulting from the end of the cold war and the

profoundly diminished role of the “Russian hand,” state spon -

sorship will continue, though one can anticipate that there

will be two changes.

First, more states may become sponsors as a manifestation

of their desire to engage in asymmetric warfare against US

interests. Perhaps even more ominous, there will increasingly

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

76
be a marriage of convenience between states and various

criminal enterprises in pursuit of monetary goals, such as we

have witnessed in the past between states and narcoterrorists.

These alliances will be particularly attractive for elements in

states that face serious financial problems and in failed states

where the absence of central control provides the opportunity

for revenue in an international black market.

Second, we may increasingly witness the growing signifi -

cance of the threats created not only by state sponsorship but

also by small networks of criminally motivated terrorist groups

and individual organizations that do not have political agen -

das or seek publicity. In the information age, and with the

availability of new weapons, these entities may select a whole

new host of vulnerable infrastructures and (in what can be

called net terrorism) engage in a form of international extortion undreamed of by present terrorist groups.

Given these possible developments, the roles and missions

of the US military may again have to be reevaluated in com -

bating terrorism. Reactive operations in the form of rescue

and various types of strikes and raids will continue, along

with the increasing use of a new generation of high-precision

standoff weapons. In the realm of special operations, one can

also anticipate a continuing requirement to engage in hostage

rescue operations and a wide variety of counterterrorism mis -

sions that may be subject to significant changes, particularly

as the US military has to modify its capabilities to engage in

preemptive operations. These changes may have to integrate

requirements in (1) coalition operations against terrorists and

(2) enhanced coordination with law enforcement and intelligence communities.

We see a precursor to coalition operations of counterter -

rorism and terrorism preemption in the capture of war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. The reality is that the present

call for humanitarian intervention will enable coalition forces

to engage in counterterrorism and terrorism preemption mis -

sions and justify them on the same grounds: that the greater

good of the international community transcends the rights of

sovereign states. One can also anticipate that the complexity

of engaging in joint operations—much less coalition opera -

tions—will be further complicated by the need to develop a far

EPILOGUE

77
closer relationship between military and law enforcement

forces, as well as the intelligence community, to preempt ter -

rorist actions. As noted earlier, such cooperation is being

forged under the call for Homeland Defense, which raises serious domestic issues associated with military–civil relationships.

In the international arena we may well also see a requirement for the development of multinational preemptive forces

combining military, law enforcement, and intelligence functions. In a sense this would be the internationalization and

expansion of the “sixth military force” to combat terrorism.

Indeed, it may not be a military force but an integrated military–civil terrorism preemption force. But perhaps most demanding of all in seeking to develop preemptive force is the

following problem that such a force must address.

As noted earlier, the terrorists now have the ability and desire,

in many instances, to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency as

“free-floating” terrorist cells. Yet, at the same time, they also

now have the increased ability to maintain their security but

engage with other cells and organizations in concerted campaigns through the use of the Internet. Consequently, any new

terrorism preemptive force will have to include a cadre of

highly proficient experts schooled in the art and science of

engaging in terrorism preemption in cyberspace. These ex -

perts must also be able to fully engage with both defensive

and offensive capabilities against a new generation of terrorists trained in their own form of information warfare. But all of

these capabilities will not be realized unless this type of force

can emulate the organizational doctrine and structure of ter -

rorist organizations. This will be difficult to do, for just as in

the initial study, there will be impediments to achieving such

goals. Chief among these impediments are (1) the continuation

of bureaucratic turf and jurisdictional battles that will hamper

the development of a national, regional, and international organizational unity of effort in preempting terrorism, and (2)

the classic problem of providing such a force with the necessary flexibility to carry out their missions while (equally im -

portant) holding the members accountable for their actions in

regards to both the law and policy directions. The ghost of

Irangate remains, and it has been succeeded by new “gates”

that will continue to challenge the ability of the United States

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

78
and other democratic societies to employ covert forces while

holding them accountable in an open society.

Finally, despite marked advances in technology and capa -

bilities to combat terrorism, a number of the major problems

that were discussed in the original study continue. First, the

nature of the conflict is still to be defined although there has

been an expansion of the “law enforcement approach” in meeting the international threat. Since such an approach contin -

ues to emphasize the gathering of evidence and is largely

reactive, its limitations may become more painfully apparent

in the future. Second, US policy still primarily remains reactive and episodic in approach. There is an absence of the

development of long-term planning, policy, and strategy. The

government’s focus and the public’s attention span shift based

on the latest threat or incident. The warnings about the development of domestic terrorist threats were there but not

heeded until after the bombings of the World Trade Center

and the Murrah Building. The dangers posed by chemical,

biological, and nuclear threats were placed in the background

until the Aum Shinrikyo opened our eyes to the reality of the

threat of mass terrorism.

Unless the United States moves beyond the short-term defense/reactive mode in combating terrorism, unless Washington and its allies fashion and implement consistent long-term

policies based on strategic assessments of the enduring yet

continually changing threat of both domestic and international terrorism, we may still react—and worse yet, overreact—to future incidents and campaigns of terrorism. Since the

initial study the United States has learned a great deal, but

given the heightened challenges created by a new generation

of terrorists, we cannot, dare not, primarily react to incidents.

In an age of mass terrorism, the stakes are too high. The need

for vision translated into policy and action is even more cru -

cial now than when Beating International Terrorism was first

published, in 1986. The United States and the international

community must take the initiative against terrorism.

Notes

1. Paul H. Herman Jr., “Asymmetric Warfare: Sizing the Threat,” Low

Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 6, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 176.

EPILOGUE

79
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World

Order (New York: Touchstone Books, Simon and Schuster, 1997).

3. J. K. Zawodny, “Infrastructure of Terrorist Organization,” Conflict

Quarterly 1, no. 4 (Spring 1981): 24.

4. The term has been popularized by a Klan leader, Louis Beam. How -

ever, it has been used by various resistance groups for over 100 years.

From discussion with John George, co-author with Laid Wilcox, Extremists,

Militia, Supremacists, Klansmen, Communists and Others (Buffalo:

Prometheus Books, 1996).

5. John Arquilla, David Ronfedt, and Michael Zanini, “Networks, Netwar,

and Information Age Terrorism,” in Ian 0. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, and others,

Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999), 47.

6. Public Report on the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 2.

7. For an excellent study see Current and Projected US Strategy and

Policy for Combating Terrorism, report prepared for Raytheon Systems Com -

pany by Hicks and Associates, Inc., December, 1998.

BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

80
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to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management.

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83
Sterling, Claire. The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,

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Speeches

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“Bill Would Put Special Forces Under Single Command.” The

Montgomery, Ala., Advertiser–Journal, 8 December 1985.

“CIA Operations Reportedly Ended With Unauthorized Lebanese Blast.” Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 May 1985.

Jenkins, Brian. “We Needn’t Rule Out the Use of Force.” Los

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ary 1986.

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and Space Technology, 15, 22, 29 September 1980.

Nance, Allen S. Anti-Terrorist Issues Raised by the Reagan

Administration’s Proposals. Report No. 84–165F. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, the Library of

Congress, 27 September 1984.

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1973.

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December 1985.

85
Regulations, Pamphlets, and Directives

DOD Directive 2000.11, Protection of DOD Personnel and Resources Against Terrorist Acts, 12 February 1982.

HQ USAF/SPO Message 0217027, December 1985, subject:

DOD Approved Terminology–Terrorism Terms. JCS Pub 1,

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 April 1984.

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July 1984.

Symposium Proceedings

Elledge, Willard L., Jr., Capt, USAF. “Sorting out the Semantics of Low-Intensity Conflict.” The Role of Air Power in

Low-Intensity Conflict, appendix 1, symposium papers.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air War College, May 1985.

Herrington, Clarence D., Maj, USAF. “B-52s in Antiterrorist

Role.” The Role of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict, appendix 2, symposium papers. Maxwell Air Force Base,

Ala.: Air War College, May 1985.

Unpublished Papers and Manuscripts

Draft of AFM 1–1, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine,” 27 November

1985.

Klingaman, Jerome W. “The Definition of Low-Intensity Conflict and Its Relations to US Defense Capabilities.” In “Air

Power for Counterinsurgency,” an unpublished manu -

script.

Mouser, Lonnie R., Maj, USAF. “America’s Unified Military

Forces: Toward an Organizational Framework for Terrorism Counteraction .” An unpublished report for the Air

Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air

Force Base, Ala., 1986.

Sarkesian, Sam C. “The Open Society: Defensive Measures.”

Paper prepared for Conference on Terrorism and Other

Forms of Low-Intensity Operations, The Fletcher School of

Law and Diplomacy, 17–19 April 1985.

86
Current Selective Bibliography

Anderson, Sean, and Stephen Sloan. Historical Dictionary of

Terrorism. Metuchen, N. J., and London: The Scarecrow

Press, Inc., 1995.

George, John, and Laird Wilcox. Extremists, Militia, Supremacists, Klansmen, Communists, and Others. Buffalo, N.Y.:

Prometheus Books, 1996.

Current and Projected US Strategy and Policy for Combating

Terrorism. Report prepared for Raytheon Systems Com -

pany by Hicks and Associates. McLean, Va.: Hicks and

Associates, December 1998.

Jervas, Gunnar, ed. FOA Report on Terrorism. Stockholm: Defense Research Establishment, June 1998.

Kaplan, David E., and Andrew Marshall. The Cult at the End of

the World . New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1996.

Simon, Jeffrey D. The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience

With Terrorism. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University

Press, 1994.

Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorist. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

87
Beating International Terrorism

An Action Strategy For Preemption

And Punishment

Revised Edition

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Tom Mackin

Copy Editor

Sherry C. Terrell

Book Design and Cover Art

Steven C. Garst

Composition and

Prepress Production

Vivian D. O’Neal