Air University

Steven L. Kwast, Lieutenant General, Commander and President

Center for Strategy and Technology

W. Anthony Meeks, Colonel, Director
AIR UNIVERSITY

Center for Strategy and Technology

American Aerospace Power

Choosing to Lead in the

Twenty-First Century

Harry A. Foster

Maj Dylan A. Bell

Capt Darren R. Turner

The Occasional Papers series was established by the Center for Strategy and 

Technology (CSAT) as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term 

strategic thinking about technology and its implications for US national security. 

Copies of no. 71 in this series are available from the Center for Strategy and 

Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, 

on the CSAT Web site at http://csat.au.af.mil/. The fax number is (334) 953-6158; 

phone (334) 953-6150. 

Occasional Paper No. 71

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Foster, Harry A., 1965– | Bell, Dylan A. | Turner, Darren R. | Air

 University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology.

Title: American aerospace power choosing to lead in the twenty-first 

century

 / Harry A. Foster with Maj. Dylan A. Bell and Capt. Darren R. Turner.

Description: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama : Air University Press, 

2016. |

 Series: Occasional paper / Center for Strategy and Technology ; no. 71 |

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016010506 | ISBN 9781585662609 (alkaline paper)

Subjects: LCSH: Aeronautics, Military—United States. | Astronautics,

 Military—United States. | Air power—United States. | National

 security—United States. | United States—Military policy. | United

 States—Defenses.

Classification: LCC UG633 .F638 2016 | DDC 358.4/030973—dc23 LC 

record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016010506

Published by Air University Press in April 2016

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 

represent the views of the Center for Strategy and Technology, Air 

Force Research Institute, Air University Press, Air University, 

United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. This publication is cleared for public release 

and unlimited distribution.
iii

Contents

Page

List of Illustrations iii

Foreword v

About the Authors vii

Introduction 1

An Aerospace Nation by Choice 2

 Aerospace Power: Providing Options to Offset 

 the Advantage of Others 4

 Cold War Aftermath: Success, Divestment, 

 and Transition 6

 Cyberspace, Accelerating Technological Change, 

 and 9/11 10

 Toward 2035: Shifting Global Competition, Increasing

 Threats, Time for New Choices 14

 Needed: A Third Offset Strategy 16

 Returning to Aerospace to Defend America’s Horizons 20

Abbreviations 23

Illustrations

Figure Page

1 Air travel is now safest, most efficient mode of

transportation in the United States 1

2 Charles Lindbergh, Neil Armstrong 2

3 Smartphone, circa 2015 3

4 B-47 bombers in the early 1950s 5

5 Minuteman ICBM launch 5

6 B-2 stealth bomber 6
iv

7 US airpower over Kuwait, 1991 7

8 Low-cost tail kits on “dumb” bombs provide precision

guidance from the GPS 8

9 ASCI Red, fastest supercomputer, 1995 10

10 Joint terminal air controller on horseback in 

Afghansistan, 2001 11

11 C-17 delivers an armored vehicle in austere airfield 12

12 MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted vehicle 13
v

Foreword

Rarely does a work of military strategy elevate its vision beyond merely 

military concerns. Rarer still are strategies that compel the wise engagement 

of our military with the broader polity they serve—the American people. 

The strategy you are about to read is this rare exception. American Aerospace 

Power: Choosing to Lead in the Twenty-First Century offers a compelling 

vision for sustaining the American way of life for the next hundred years.

As challenges to world order and the American way of life appear around 

every corner, our instinct might be to ask, “What do we do now?” Wiser 

strategists, however, ask where have we been? Where have we historically 

gained our strength, preserved our advantage, and developed one of the 

most prosperous societies in the history of the world? This essay looks forward by first looking back, and it finds that America’s strengths as an aerospace nation laid the foundation for our unmatched prosperity over the 

past 100 years.

This is a story of civil-military partnerships at their finest, harnessing 

the innovation of industry, the insight of academia, the strength of the 

military, and the sweat equity of the American worker. Together, this aerospace nation propelled Charles Lindbergh across the Atlantic in 1927, 

rocketed Chuck Yeager through the sound barrier in 1947, landed Neil 

Armstrong on the moon in 1969, and hung the constellation of satellites 

that give communication, timing, and navigation to the entire world. As 

the authors make clear, American aerospace strength has been the fruit of 

toil matched with vision, not a birthright.

The challenge for a new century is to reclaim our aerospace roots as a 

nation. As the pace of technological change accelerates, and with it the 

potential threats to our American way of life, our aerospace power may 

prove to be the margin of our survival. The strategy outlined in this essay 

appeals not to a military audience, but to the American people; the task 

ahead of us is a national task, not just a military one. Our approach needs 

to be comprehensive once again, uniting our societal strengths in industry, 

technology, manufacturing, and innovation. American Aerospace Power

gives us a path forward, equally grand in its scope and detailed in its 

recommendations.

On balance, our national strengths are legion. The United States has been 

richly endowed with favorable geography, natural resources, oceans east and 

west, allies north and south, and a deep multiculturalism that attracts global 
vi

talent to our shores. We face critical challenges as a nation, but we face 

them from a position of strength. Our capacity to flourish as an aerospace 

nation may prove to be our greatest strength of all.

STEVEN L. KWAST

Lieutenant General, USAF

Air University Commander and President
vii

About the Authors

Mr. Harry A. Foster is deputy director of the Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force (CSAF)-chartered Blue Horizons Fellowship at Air University. Blue Horizons seeks to inform USAF strategic policy choices across a range of possible futures. Blue Horizons students explore and synthesize the key competitions, symmetries, asymmetries, opportunities and liabilities shaping 

the future of air, space and cyber power. 

Maj Dylan A. Bell and Capt Darren R. Turner are instructors at the 

Squadron Officer School.

1

Introduction

In 2016 an estimated 3.6 billion people will board a commercial airplane. That is more than one-half of the number of people on Earth. As 

they connect their devices to Wi-Fi and adjust their on-demand in-seat 

entertainment systems to better sit back, relax, and enjoy the flight, few will 

concern themselves with the technology that makes their journey and 

communication possible or with the high degree of safety and dependability 

that makes air travel so routine. Fewer still will consider the broader impact of aerospace power on the world: how it has shaped the globalized 

economy and provided military advantage. If any took the time to really 

consider the topic, they would discover that aerospace’s innovation and 

leadership is distinctly an American story.

Figure 1. Air travel is now the safest, most efficient mode of transportation 

in the United States

This is a short story of American aerospace power—its technology, its 

people, and its importance to future American prosperity and security. 

This story is important because the advantage the United States enjoys today as the world’s economic and technological leader is due in large part to 

its achievement and investment in aerospace. But, it is also a cautionary 

tale. America’s leadership position in aerospace is under threat commercially and militarily, not necessarily because of the actions of others (though 

they are omnipresent), but because American leadership is taken for 

granted. It is worth remembering that America’s leadership position in 

aerospace was a choice, not a birthright. Without Congressional action and 

the continued support and interest of the American people, it is a leadership position other nations are posturing to assume.
2

An Aerospace Nation by Choice

While geography marks the United States as a maritime nation, it is a 

uniquely aerospace nation by choice. This is not simply because the airplane was invented here over a century ago; rather, it is because the United 

States embraced aerospace as no other nation did for the better part of the 

twentieth century. The speed of technological advance in aerospace allowed Charles Lindbergh, the first man to fly the Atlantic nonstop in 1927, 

to know Chuck Yeager, the first man to break the sound barrier in 1947, to 

shake the hand of Neil Armstrong, the first man to walk on the moon in 

1969, and to fly the Atlantic in a 747 Jumbo Jet—all before his death in 1974.

Armstrong would live to see a second technological wave in cyberspace founded on the vast computer- and communications-based research for aerospace projects from the 1960s to the 1980s. Microsoft’s Bill 

Gates, Cisco Systems’s Leonard Bosack, Apple’s Steve Jobs, and even Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg would build mega-empires based on this aerospacerelated seed corn and, in the process, connect the world.

Figure 2. (Left) Charles Lindbergh, first to fly the Atlantic, 1927; (Right) Neil 

Armstrong, first man to walk on the moon, 1969

The rapid development of aerospace expertise in the United States did 

not happen through the ordinary force of the private sector. It resulted 

from investment choices in government-funded research and development (R&D) as well as risk acceptance by the president and Congress.

The demands of a world war and a cold war made much of this research 

necessary. The impact of technical advances reached far beyond the government realm, however. American airplane companies led in the jet age with 

innovations like the Boeing 707 and Douglass DC-8, because Congress 

chose to invest in jet refueling-tanker research in the early 1950s to allow 
3

bombers based in the United States to hold targets at risk at intercontinental 

distances. The United States entered the race to the moon and gained massive 

spin-offs in technology because of a president’s vision and public support.

These efforts produced countless technology seedlings that we take for 

granted today. Consider the modern smartphone used by half of all Americans. It places arguably the most powerful information tool ever conceived 

in the palm of our children’s hands. It connects to a store of knowledge that 

contains 4.5 billion pages of information; places this information into the 

context of time and location (within six feet); displays the phone’s orientation and acceleration, accesses what others did, saw, or heard before nearby; 

shares what others are seeing, hearing, and doing right now; and stores the 

user’s preferences. It then correlates this information on ultraresolution, 

spatially accurate maps that would have been highly classified just 20 years ago.

Figure 3. Smartphone, circa 2015

The file exchange protocols, optics and cameras, accelerometers, power 

sources, touch displays, and transmitter technologies incorporated into 

these devices have their roots in aerospace R&D. The key enabler behind 
4

these phones and their networks are highly accurate timing signals from 

the Air Force’s global positioning satellites that allow the networks to synchronize and the phone to determine its position. These are the same signals widely used by the military to locate and guide weapons to targets in 

defense of the interests of the United States and its allies.

The Global Positioning System (GPS), now indispensable as a common 

timing standard for global data networks and prolific as a positioning tool 

for just about everything, is an example of aerospace choices previous 

Congresses have made and presidents have supported. Unconvinced of its 

relative military utility, the services canceled the system for a brief period 

between 1980 and 1982. Congress and the Air Force, with advice from the 

Department of Defense (DOD), made difficult trade-offs to fund the system, 

never fully understanding its civilian uses or potential. Both made a bet on 

the promise of what a clock in space might produce. Today, the results are, 

of course, epic. 

The fruits of the choice to invest in leading edge aerospace technology 

development over decades changed the world. Supremacy in aerospace 

provided US corporations with a competitive advantage in the marketplace, spurred globalization, and enabled the United States to maintain its 

position as the world’s global economic leader at the turn of the twentiethfirst century. Along the way, these choices also enabled the United States to 

prevail in the Cold War as part of an aerospace-based competitive strategy 

against the Soviets and to shape the post–Cold War order.

Aerospace Power: Providing Options to Offset the Advantage

of Others

From the dawn of the nuclear age, aerospace power fueled two separate 

political-military strategies designed to overcome Soviet military advantages in the darkest days of the Cold War. Both of these “offset strategies” 

were essential to avoid the Soviet leadership’s cost-imposing plays designed 

to lure the United States into an unsustainable set of military investments. 

In the early 1950s nuclear-armed, long-range Strategic Air Command 

(SAC) bombers provided a way to offset Soviet conventional power in 

Europe. Rapid developments in transonic flight and air-to-air refueling enabled this approach. Investments in continental air defense and the SemiAutonomous Ground Environment, which pioneered electronic collaboration through connection of mainframe computers to radars by phone lines 

and microwave data links to form the first large-area data network—a key 

technology for going to the moon and, later, building the Internet—further 

reinforced these developments.
5

Figure 4. B-47 bombers in the early 1950s

A decade later, massive investments in hypersonic research and ballistic 

missile technology changed the competition again. The United States 

would field four intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems and one 

submarine-launched ballistic missile system within seven years. Meanwhile, hypersonic research forced the Soviets to channel large investments 

into new air defense designs to counter high-altitude, high-speed bombers 

like the Mach 3 North American XB-70 Valkyrie. Although the United 

States did not field this bomber, development and flight test of prototypes 

drove massive Soviet investment into countermeasures. This allowed the 

United States to compete at a lower cost rather than matching the Soviets 

solider for solider and tank for tank.

Figure 5. Minuteman ICBM launch
6

Later, as Soviet ballistic missiles grew in number and Soviet air defenses 

grew in strength in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States turned to a combination of enhanced space capabilities and radar-defeating stealth to offset 

the Soviet’s military advantage. Space surveillance programs, funded through 

the National Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office, provided 

leaders with real-time indications of missile warning and informed estimates 

of Soviet strength and locations. Meanwhile, stealth programs like the F-117 

provided survivable deep strike in central Europe, while the B-2 threatened 

strike from intercontinental range into the heart of the Soviet Union. The 

Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars,” funded research into space-based 

missile defense that threatened to offset Soviet investment in ballistic missiles by destroying the missiles inflight before they could reach their targets. 

Like the XB-70, Star Wars technologies caused a massive Soviet reaction despite the fact the system was never fielded. 

Figure 6. B-2 stealth bomber

Overwhelmed by political, operational, and technical innovation, the 

Soviets could no longer afford to compete. The Cold War ended peacefully 

with significant help from aerospace power. It was not an inevitable outcome; it was a strategic choice by US leaders to invest in aerospace to build 

the US advantage.

Cold War Aftermath: Success, Divestment, and Transition

The United States concluded the Cold War triumphantly in 1991 but was 

challenged near the very end of that era when Iraq invaded Kuwait in the fall 

of 1990. A coalition led by the United States ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait 

with a speed and effectiveness unprecedented in modern warfare. 

The US aerospace reconnaissance-strike complex was front and center—

finding critical nodes deep inside Iraq, striking them with high precision, and 

crippling the Iraqi air force and army across its breadth and depth. The decisive 

performance of aerospace power against Soviet-manufactured front-line air 

defense equipment and the impact of US intelligence, stealth, and precision 

weapon capabilities were impressive. The performance transformed US views 

on military risk as the president and Congress approached the New World 

Order and its decisions on aerospace investment.
7

Figure 7. US airpower over Kuwait, 1991

With absolutely minimum losses against what should have been a competent military force, US aerospace power provided presidents with a new, 

lower-risk tool for intervention. No-fly zones and punitive strikes would 

allow the United States to keep Saddam Hussein in check for more than a 

decade. In the 1990s aerospace power also enabled the United States to 

intervene twice to end ethic cleansing in the Balkans. In Kosovo, it was 

largely responsible for winning a war without a combat loss of life.

The overwhelming advantage aerospace power provided began to 

change views on aerospace investment as the United States entered a unipolar world. Aerospace advantage, coupled with the end of the Cold War, 

enabled the United States to reap a peace dividend that, paradoxically, permanently reduced the size of the US aerospace industrial base. As budgets 

shrank, investment in US aerospace slowed and the aerospace industrial 

base consolidated dramatically in the 1990s. Rockwell International’s aerospace components and McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing, Martin 

Marietta Corporation merged with Lockheed, and Grumman Aerospace 

Corporation merged with Northrop Corporation. Lockheed’s exit from the 

commercial market and the merger of McDonnell Douglas and Boeing left 

one major commercial aircraft manufacturer in the United States—even as 

European aircraft manufacturer, Airbus, began its rise.

Meanwhile, the fast-growing information technology sector began to 

replace aerospace as the prime career destination for young engineers. Indeed, by 2014 Google’s market value alone, nearly $400 billion, was more 

than double that of General Dynamics Corporation, Northrop Grumman 

Corporation, Lockheed Martin, and the Raytheon Company put together. 
8

At the same time, as fewer American students filled science, technology, 

engineering, and math classes in US universities, foreign students stepped 

in to fill the void, beginning a proliferation of technical knowledge outside 

the United States.

Stealth gave the United States an absolute advantage against Sovietdesigned equipment, which composed the air defenses and air forces of the 

most-likely US adversaries. This allowed reduced US investment in electronic warfare, which had been pivotal to a strike force’s survivability prior 

to stealth.

The combination of the growth in computational power, the establishment of US space superiority, and the proliferation of fiber communications lines with large bandwidth capacity enabled a golden age of intelligence gathering using aerospace. While collection platforms such as the 

strategically focused SR-71 were eliminated, ubiquitous satellite communication, improved sensors, GPS guidance, massive storage, rapid computer 

processing, and largely uncontested threat environments enabled the 

United States to reinvigorate its reconnaissance remotely piloted vehicle 

programs that had been largely abandoned in the 1970s.

The proliferation of precision weapons in US aerospace forces changed 

the economics of warfare. One precision weapon could inflict the same 

damage as dozens of unguided munitions. In Operation Desert Storm, laser precision guidance required pilots to release their weapons one at a 

time. By 1998 incorporation of low-cost GPS guidance kits onto “dumb” 

weapons removed this restriction. This significantly multiplied the striking 

power of each aircraft and dramatically compressed the time required to 

move through a target list. The impact of ubiquitous precision guidance 

was such a shift in capability that one commentator argued a single B-2 

could deliver the same destructive effects as 1,000 B-17s in World War II.1

Figure 8. Low-cost tail kits on “dumb” bombs provide precision guidance 

from the GPS

This “one bomb, one target” precision capability convinced the DOD 

and Congress that the number of fighter and bomber aircraft could safely 
9

be reduced. As a result, purchases of Air Force F-16s and F-15s ended, 

though the Navy continued its F-18 E/F program. Acquisition of the longrange B-2 stealth bomber ended at 20 aircraft, and production of the F-22 

fighter ended at 187.

Precision, along with the general supremacy of US aerospace, also enabled the United States to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. Several 

bilateral agreements between Russia and the United States saw reductions 

of strategic and tactical weapons as well as an end to underground testing. 

SAC stood down, the nuclear mission for the B-1 ended, the bulk of the 

B-52 force was retired, the new Peacekeeper ICBM was removed from 

service, and several Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines were converted 

to conventional strike platforms. Development on new nuclear weapon designs ended as well. The focus of the nuclear industrial base turned to monitoring the safety and reliability of the stockpile using analytic methods.

Desert Storm and its aftermath also set a series of slow-moving, geostrategic, and military reactions into motion. Following Desert Storm, the 

United States began a significant, permanent US military presence in the 

Middle East. This presence inspired radical Sunni groups to lash out with a 

series of high prolific attacks, culminating in the 2001 attack on the World 

Trade Center.

Desert Storm and China’s inability to contend with the US military dissuasion in the 1996 Taiwan crisis launched the Chinese government on an 

aggressive program of military reform, even as that country opened its 

economy to the globalized system that led to an economic miracle. Overcoming US advantage in aerospace became an obsession for the Chinese 

military in the subsequent two decades. Denying the effects of precision 

and power projection became the focus of Chinese strategy. As a result, 

China continued a longstanding tunneling program to move military 

capabilities underground; modernized its air force; developed a mobile, 

fiber-based air defense system; and fielded short- and intermediate-range 

precision-guided cruise and ballistic missiles designed to target US airbases and carriers.

Meanwhile Russia, struggling to reinvent itself after the collapse of the 

Soviet Union and finding itself unable to compete with Western military 

power, quietly began to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons for its 

defense. As US precision capabilities multiplied, Russia warned the West 

that an attack with precision weapons would be considered tantamount to 

a nuclear attack. In addition, Russia retained a significant space capability 

and developed new capabilities within cyberspace as technology advanced 

in the 1990s.

Iran, India, and North Korea successfully developed nuclear weapons, 

and Syria and Libya would try to do so as well, in an effort to dissuade an 

attack from neighbors or the United States. Iran also developed swarm 
10

techniques, using small boats designed to overcome US aerospace advantage and to threaten oil shipments in the Persian Gulf.

Cyberspace, Accelerating Technological Change, and 9/11

Three technological factors converged in the 1990s that launched globalization and further changed the nature of aerospace power. First, the 

rise of the World Wide Web, the rapid spread of fiber communications 

around the globe, and the growth of cyberspace began a process that deeply 

connected societies and enabled sharing of human knowledge on an 

unimaginable scale.

Second, the continuation of Moore’s law saw processing power and 

memory double every 18 months. This meant that the same processing 

power of the multimillion dollar ASCI Red supercomputer needed to 

maintain the US nuclear stockpile in 1995 could be found in the Microsoft 

Xbox One in 2013 at a cost of less than $400 around the world. For less 

than $2,500, seven Xbox Ones connected in parallel provided the supercomputer processing power originally needed to sequence the human 

genome in 2000.

Figure 9. ASCI Red, fastest supercomputer, 1995

Third, the rapid adoption of connected devices by people, governments, 

and corporations around the world proved disruptive, connecting 2.4 billion 

people (about one-third of the world’s population) to the Internet by 2014. 

It enabled terrorist groups to collaborate regardless of geography, provided 

an effective communications tool for insurgents to get their message out 

quickly, opened pathways for industrial and military espionage, and enabled access for attack or disruption. It also led to the rise of big data to 

map and understand millions of relationships for businesses to find customers 

and governments to find bad actors.
11

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were enabled, in large part, by the growth of 

cyberspace. E-mails, text messages, and wire transfers from overseas were 

a key part of al-Qaeda’s operations. Cyberspace was certainly front and 

center in the US response. It contributed not only to finding space to locate 

terrorist networks and their associates but also served as a communications vehicle to connect the intelligence assets of nations around the world 

to share massive amounts of data.

Cyberspace, combined with aerospace power, was instrumental in defeating the Taliban deep inside Afghanistan. Information, connectivity, 

precision, and direct delivery of supplies coupled with an enemy choosing 

to fight by conventional means in an uncontested aerospace environment, 

turned the “graveyard of empires” into a killing field.

Just as in Desert Storm, aerospace power provided an overwhelming 

advantage to a ground force—this time to the coalition’s Northern Alliance 

proxy force. A combination of commercial fiber between the Unites States 

and Europe and space connections between Europe and Central Asia enabled 

remotely piloted vehicles based in Pakistan and operating over Afghanistan to 

be flown from Nevada and their sensor data to be shared by secure means 

to intelligence specialists collaborating on networks spread from Germany 

to Virginia to California to Hawaii.

Figure 10. Joint terminal air controller on horseback in Afghanistan, 2001: 

the business end of a massive aerospace effort spanning the globe

It enabled air-refueling tankers, fighters, and bombers based literally 

thousands of miles apart to be synchronized with remote, ground-based 

joint terminal air controllers. Pilots took off without any idea of the target 

or timing. Planning was executed virtually and in real time.

The C-17 airlifter showcased its extreme short-field landing capability to 

deliver food, weapons, and ammunition directly to small, unimproved airfields from thousands of miles away. This direct delivery capability using 

large aircraft was unprecedented in warfare. It allowed the United States to 
12

move about half the cargo and troops used in Desert Storm into Afghanistan 

and surrounding countries with 80 percent fewer sorties in the first year of 

the war.

Figure 11. C-17 delivers an armored vehicle to austere airfield

In 2003 aerospace power responded to another crisis in Iraq. After another rapid and successful US invasion, however, the Iraqi insurgency began. 

An insurgency movement in Afghanistan soon followed. The limits of 

aerospace power quickly emerged as a thinking enemy sought alternative 

means to counter it.

Insurgents, clustered tightly with the civilian population, represented an 

asymmetric approach to US aerospace reconnaissance-strike complex. The 

targets, usually individuals or small cells, were hard to find. They usually 

operated in urban or mountainous areas, which limited the opportunity to 

strike when these individuals were found. As the insurgency grew in both 

countries, improvised explosive devices imposed cost on US forces and 

proved difficult to locate using existing airborne sensors.

Finding targets became increasingly important to success for aerospace 

power as striking targets was. Commanders had to choose between focusing 

aerospace capabilities on finding explosive devices and finding insurgents. 

Aerospace companies and intelligence agencies rushed to develop and produce remotely piloted vehicles, networking the sensors and weapons to 

meet the demands of this hider-finder competition.
13

Figure 12. MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted vehicle

The networked approach to warfare, fielded for Iraq and Afghanistan, 

was developed in a relatively permissive cyber environment. US cyber 

capabilities were hastily assembled given the pace of developments. Concepts that seemed logical and appropriate in the early 2000s did not anticipate 

the difficulty of overcoming cyber vulnerabilities or cyber espionage by the 

late 2010s.

The demands of war slashed funding for aerospace and shifted it to 

ground forces. Within the remaining topline budget, the war drove new 

aerospace budget priorities, derailed long-term investment plans, and 

refocused aerospace research development. Long-term research funding 

was slashed to meet the immediate needs of the war. For example, from 

2000–2012 company-funded R&D at the top US defense firms dropped 

from 3.5 percent to 2 percent of sales. By contrast, the leading commercial 

companies invest roughly 8 percent of company sales in R&D.

The high demand for aerospace assets over 25 years of no-fly zones 

and America’s two longest wars also rapidly aged the force. The need for 

continuous overwatch of US forces added thousands of hours to KC-135 

tankers and B-52s bought during the Kennedy administration. Today, the 

grandsons and granddaughters of the original maintenance personnel 

struggle to keep these fleets going. The stress was especially acute for the 

newer B-1, F-15, and F-16 fleets funded principally during the Reagan 

administration. These fleets, the work horses of the Air Force, are exhausted and showing their wear. Meanwhile, the C-17 fleet, among the 
14

newest in the Air Force, was flown with heavy loads at twice the normal 

rate of the rest of the transport fleet throughout the period. This will move 

forward by decades plans for replacement.

Toward 2035: Shifting Global Competition, 

Increasing Threats, Time for New Choices

The aerospace investments made in the 1980s and early 1990s proved 

their worth, providing the United States with a decisive advantage to defend US interests for over two decades. But the return on these investments 

is now diminishing as this force shows its age, mechanically and technologically. Worse, others are bringing new technologies and asymmetric tactics onto the scene to challenge US aerospace advantage as never before. 

Since the end of the Cold War, competitors have been watching, learning, 

and calculating. Storm clouds are building on the horizon.

Today’s aerospace force faces four overlapping negative trends that 

threaten to reduce its impact going forward unless new choices and investments are made by the president and Congress. The American people must 

support these new choices. As in the 1980s, the choices made today will set 

US capabilities for decades to come.

The first negative trend is that existing US aerospace assets need massive 

recapitalization at a time when budgets are flat and are expected to remain 

so. The peace dividend taken in aerospace forces during the mid-1990s 

means a host of capabilities require recapitalization all at once. But the 

problem is more difficult than that. As the geostrategic environment shifts, 

many of today’s capabilities need to be reimagined through innovation to 

keep ahead. It is impossible to square the corners of operating a force at 

high readiness for today’s threats, while recapitalizing legacy capabilities; 

introducing new, leap-ahead capabilities; and living within a flat budget.

Second, the rapid spread of technology—much of it due to cyber espionage—

is threatening the traditional US technical lead in many areas. US aerospace and defense no longer pace global R&D as in the 1980s. Indeed, estimates show about 80 percent of global R&D now occurs outside the United 

States. R&D in the US defense sector is down significantly over the past 15 

years. Across the US government, the automatic budget cuts known as 

sequestration cut $95 billion from R&D from 2013 to 2021. Moreover, a 

smaller, older aerospace labor force working in a few, large defense conglomerates means innovation may be difficult to achieve without an infusion of new talent and projects to capture this generation’s interest.

In addition, government research no longer reduces risk for commercial 

aerospace ventures to the degree it once did. For example, Boeing’s commercial aircraft division has built tube and wing jetliners since the 1950s, 

despite the fact that more fuel-efficient designs exist. The reason? The US 
15

military has not focused on massive improvement in fuel efficiency in its 

own designs to transfer to industry (though this may be changing).

Third, technological proliferation is undercutting the distinct advantages 

that the second offset strategy built in space, precision, and stealth. Disruptive 

capabilities in cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum threaten to deny 

the power of networking added in the 1990s.

•  The GPS, which depends on radio transmissions from satellites, is becoming increasing vulnerable to jamming, degrading the multiplying 

effects of US precision. At the same time, others are developing and 

proliferating alternative precision technologies. This proliferation of 

precision makes fixed assets like power stations and airfields extremely 

vulnerable, threatening the ability of the United States and its allies to 

project power in the same way it has for the past 60 years.

•  Modern surface-to-air missile systems and the introduction of powerful

lasers are reducing the survivability of aircraft and weapons. In tandem, the vulnerability of space assets to attack, jamming, or other inference also threatens to undercut the cornerstone of the second offset 

strategy. In 2014 nine countries had space-launch capability and 1,167 

satellites operated by 35 countries were in orbit. The opportunity for 

strategic surprise in space is growing. Together, these developments 

threaten to reverse the economic advantage of the US reconnaissancestrike complex that enabled the United States to locate targets globally 

from space and then employ a small number of aircraft to strike a 

large number of targets.

•  The processing power offered by supercomputers on a chip is reducing

the outsized stealth advantage the United States has enjoyed for 25 

years. Adding these powerful processors to old radars threatens to 

improve their capabilities substantially and is affordable. 

•  Cyber attacks threaten to unravel the speed and efficiency of the US

reconnaissance-strike complex and deny the current method of operating 

remotely piloted vehicles.

Fourth, the United States faces a broader set of regional challenges leaving 

Afghanistan than it had going in to the conflict. Although the United States 

does not seek conflict with either China or Russia, both countries seem 

intent on carving out a sphere of influence in their near abroad, directly 

threatening US allies and interests. Meanwhile, a budding Sunni-Shia civil 

war emerged in Syria that rapidly transitioned into a battle for Sunni Islam. 

All of this is happening even as Iran continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons, 

inviting proliferation by others. Across these regional challenges, new 

strategies are emerging combining elements of irregular warfare, conventional warfare, and counterintervention measures designed to undercut 

US aerospace power and dissuade US action. Moreover, each regional 
16

challenge is unique, varying by geography, alliance structures, stakes, and 

the aerospace capabilities required to contend successfully.

The Chinese threaten their neighbors’ sovereignty, using a combination 

of civilian fishing fleets, its coast guard, and surface navy to squat on disputed claims in an attempt to improve the legitimacy of its claims under 

international law. Meanwhile, its military is using precision ballistic missiles to threaten US air bases and carriers in the region to deny US aerospace power projection. This maritime irregular warfare activity, combined 

with counterintervention capabilities, is part of an integrated strategy to 

undercut US influence and security guarantees to allies and partners.

Russian advances into Georgia, the Ukraine, and Crimea under the pretense of protecting ethnic Russians reflect a similar intent to increase its 

sphere of influence. Instead of fishing fleets, the Russians have preceded 

these movements with insurgent and cyber activity designed to undercut 

local governance. Russian emphasis on nuclear use is intended to dissuade 

NATO from overt involvement. Russian violation of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty is also designed to intimidate the populations 

of Central Europe from becoming involved.

Finally, the combination of a Sunni civil war overlaid on a Sunni-Shia 

civil war in Syria and Iraq and beyond presents a nearly impossible military problem. The specter of a nuclear exchange increases the risk, potentially drawing in the United States on a large scale.

Needed: A Third Offset Strategy

These trends do not paint a happy picture for US power-projection 

capabilities. As we think about adapting to a world where the global environment’s rate of change is accelerating, our traditional view of winning 

and losing are giving way to very blurred categories. The concepts of enemy, 

warfare, battlefield, weapon, victory, and allies are very different today than 

they were just 10–20 years ago.

The first two offsets had a pretty clear motivation with a specific Soviet 

capability. The United States knew what it needed to offset, and US aerospace technology helped to do that.

As the United States considers a third offset, two major background 

threads must be addressed. First, the United States must surmount the ruts 

of its own status quo (for example, budgets, aircraft age, and acquisition 

processes) and advance paradigmatically rather than incrementally. With 

the Soviet Union gone, the United States has become, in some ways, its 

own worst enemy through bureaucratic inertia.

Second, a third offset must address the rate of change in the global conflict environment. The United States does not know where the next threat 

is coming from, what form the conflict will take, what medium it will be in, 

who comprises the threat, or whether our adversaries are state-based or 
17

hyper-empowered individuals. The next offset needs to counter the massive ambiguity in our threat perception more than ever before.

 The goal of a third offset, then, should provide the United States with a 

capability to undercut the counterintervention strategies being pursued 

around the world. This step would provide the United States with the freedom of action, even in highly contested environments, to address uncertainty. To do this, the United States retains advantages that others do not 

have—strong alliances, a creative workforce, and a knack for innovation. 

These advantages should figure prominently in the president’s and Congress’s choices on a possible third offset. The key question is “how?”

The Cold War choices were characterized as offsets of quality over quantity. 

A third offset will likely be characterized as choices of innovation over imitation. The seeds of success in this future competition lie in bounding and 

understanding complexity coupled with the speed and flexibility of a reengineered US reconnaissance-strike complex to act and adjust with a 

speed no other conflict medium can match. To do this, the United States 

must retain its global reconnaissance advantage, mitigate threats against 

precision, and find ways to operate even when forward basing is under 

threat. This will require systems engineering techniques applied across the 

aerospace reconnaissance-strike complex, experimentation with new warfighting and logistics techniques, and a new spirit of innovation in America’s 

aerospace industrial base.

A third offset begins by tackling tough problems within the US defense 

bureaucracy and Congress. Emphasis on platforms, today’s ultimate expression of military capability, must be replaced by a networked view of 

capabilities. Data fighting will likely be more important than dogfighting 

in this future environment. Future capabilities rest among a group of connected capabilities. Platforms remain important, but the United States will 

deter or not deter based on how well it can operate its reconnaissancestrike system as a whole.

Budgetary and program risk must be expressed not only in individual 

program terms (for example, a ship, an aircraft, a missile) but in systemic 

terms as well (for example, the reconnaissance system, the decision system, 

the strike system). This larger, systems-level view of defense programs is a 

significant paradigm change for the US military and Congress. If the 

United States does not move in this direction, however, a third offset strategy 

may not be fully executable.

Next, the United States must assess the available technological opportunities and make some investment choices. The following short list suggests 

where these opportunities lie. As with previous offsets, these investments 

should produce significant opportunities for commercial spin-off. 

Additive manufacturing. Materials and manufacturing are representative of the most basic level of opportunity. The advent of additive manufacturing and 3D printing potentially can change the cost curve of future 
18

weapons systems and could transform current concepts for logistics support. The Cold War choice between quality and quantity may no longer 

exist. Additive manufacturing may make possible high quality at high 

quantity at an affordable price. The Materials Genome Project, which assembles new materials at the atomic level, may offer materials with novel 

qualities that change the cost curve for production.

The private sector is currently driving much of this innovation, but military investments in this area could result in new, lighter structural materials 

for use in aircraft and vehicles. In addition, the ability to print on demand 

could restructure the defense industry, acquisition system, and logistics 

support systems as a whole. For example, whole classes of weapons could 

be designed and tested but not built in quantity unless needed. Spare parts 

may not need to be produced in large quantities, warehoused for decades, 

moved to the war zone, and then returned for repair.

Quantum computing. Quantum computing offers the ability to handle 

massive flows of data and sort it much faster than conventional computers. 

Connected sensors and databases of the future are the ultimate big data 

problem, far surpassing the Wal-Mart and Goggle examples of today. A 

breakthrough in quantum computing would provide the United States a 

leap ahead in capability. Commercial spin-offs could include optimizing 

air traffic flows into busy airports, relieving traffic congestion by adjusting 

stoplights in real time, or, when combined with additive manufacturing, 

providing a new wave of predictive, just-in-time delivery.

Fast lasers and clocks. Fast lasers operating at femtosecond speeds are 

a million times faster than today’s GPS powered clocks. These clocks promise 

to eliminate US military reliance on the GPS for position and time, enable 

massive data flows, and connect the optical and microwave portions of the 

electromagnetic spectrum. Like the GPS of the 1980s, we probably do not 

fully understand the full impact of this technology. The potential for commercial spin-offs is off the chart (think 1,000G on your cell phone). As this 

area is so high payoff, the United States must lead; it cannot follow.

Unmanned automation. Driverless cars represent the most commonly 

discussed commercial application of this technological class. It is technology 

that allows machines to take over lower-level, decision-based functions, 

leaving humans to make value judgments or sort ambiguous data. Automation would allow military employment from longer distances, eliminating the need for continuous communication with unmanned systems as is 

the case with remotely piloted vehicles today. From a commercial perspective, automation could improve aviation safety and increase capacity at airports. When put into cars, it promises to reduce traffic accidents, ease 

traffic congestion, and allow fractional ownership of vehicles.

Fractionation of systems. Closely related to automation is fractionation 

of systems. One may think of this as a number of smaller automated systems 

working together as a team to create a capability greater than any single 
19

member. Militarily, this could reduce vulnerabilities against advanced 

threats in air and space. Fractionation also enables building panoramas 

from multiple angles to provide better imagery data. An early version was 

developed to help detect improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan. You see the commercial spin-off of this technology every time you 

watch a 360–degree replay during football or baseball games.

Directed energy. Directed energy consists of coherent light (lasers) or 

focused microwave energy; each creates different effects. Lasers can offset 

the proliferation of precision by targeting projectiles in flight, though there 

are limitations due to weather, speed, and distance. High-powered microwaves can disable unprotected electronic devices. This research will spin 

off improved battery technology, advanced optics for the smartphone, and 

windows for high temperate applications.

Aircraft range improvements. The proliferation of precision threatens 

forward airfields and US air-refueling tanker bases. As a result, fuel efficiency and aircraft range will become increasingly important. New designs 

for large and small aircraft could include flying-wing concepts and new 

engine technology to reduce fuel consumption by 40–50 percent. A military production line would reduce development risk, much as the KC-135 

tanker reduced development risks for the Boeing 707, and enable a breakthrough in airliner design.

How would these technologies come together to retain US global reconnaissance advantage, mitigate threats against precision, and operate when 

forward access is under threat? First, these technologies offer the means to 

fractionate reconnaissance systems in air and space. Creating complexity 

for others will be as important as understanding complexity for the United 

States as part of a third offset. Fractionated capabilities require significantly 

more effort to defeat than a few exquisite platforms, making these capabilities more survivable and costly to defeat. Other steps, such as hosting 

military payloads on allied commercial systems, could serve to multilateralize a crisis and complicate the political calculus of those considering a 

broad-based attack.

Second, these technologies offer GPS alternatives for timing and positioning to keep US sensors, networks, and weapons synchronized. This is a 

vital capability that cuts across all three objectives of a third offset. They 

could also mitigate threats against precision capabilities by improving survivability of weapons and delivery platforms through the novel integration 

of stealth, hypersonics, intelligent swarms of expendable weapons, and 

electronic attack to reduce the effectiveness of modern air defense systems. 

As with fractionation, this integrated systems approach is costly and requires significant effort to overcome.

Finally, these technologies, combined with new approaches to logistics 

and the cooperation of allies, could enable the dispersal of a future force on 

a scale unimaginable today. This, along with new defensive capabilities and 
20

an increased emphasis on resiliency, could substantially reduce threats to 

forward basing. As with other measures, these actions increase others’ 

complexity, forcing shifts in investment to contend.

Along with increased dispersal, airfield defense, and resiliency measures, an increased emphasis on fuel efficiency and range could reduce 

tanker requirements. This would remove pressure on forward basing and 

logistics as well as enable basing diversity at greater distances.

In addition, aerospace capabilities would marry up with undersea capabilities like submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles, forming a 

“marriage of stealths” to create confusion and provide a persistent presence. Like a marriage, the arrangement would provide mutual support. 

Each element could “see” and “shoot” in support of the other. The limited 

payload and sensor look of the undersea force could be mitigated by aerospace forces. Meanwhile, the persistence of the undersea force could ensure targets are held at constant risk, despite the occasional coverage gap of 

aerospace forces.

Together, these steps would undercut the anti-intervention investments being made by Russia, China, and Iran. The investment to overcome US aerospace forces as described, whether based on land, at sea, or undersea, would be 

substantial. This cost barrier could reinforce the deterrent effect of US and 

allied forces. As in the Cold War, it may also spark countermoves by others that 

require follow-on adjustments to strategy over the coming decades.

Investment in a new, bold strategy would bolster US assurance guarantees 

to our closest friends and allies. For some, it could forestall choosing to 

invest in a nuclear capability as a hedge against diminished US conventional credibility. For the world, it would signal US commitments to freedom, 

democracy, and the rule of law—a world where smaller nations do not live 

in fear of larger neighbors.

Returning to Aerospace to Defend America’s Horizons

How the United States will function in the future security environment 

comes down to choices. To continue on the same course, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is a choice not to compete via aerospace. The 

second offset and incremental improvements in capabilities developed 

since the 1980s have run their course. However, the ambiguity of the future 

security environment makes the promise of aerospace more relevant than 

ever before. We must invest and develop new ways to contend.

Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet as there was with nuclear weapons, 

space, or stealth—no single word descriptor that captures the essence of 

the offset. Instead, a systems-engineered approach is required to develop 

an increasingly sophisticated reconnaissance-strike complex. This approach will maintain the US global reconnaissance advantage, mitigate 

threats against precision, and find ways to operate even when forward 

access is under threat.
21

If the United States chooses to pursue this approach, it must increase 

efforts in long-range R&D; support budget shifts that allow a simultaneous 

recapitalization and shift toward innovation in aerospace; build incentives 

for our best young people to study science, technology, engineering, and 

math; and rediscover the advantage aerospace can provide.

Without such a decision, the United States is headed toward parity in an 

even aerospace competition. We became an aerospace nation by choice, not 

by birthright. If we are to remain one, the people and Congress must act.

Notes

1. David A. Deptula, Effects-based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare

(Washington, DC: Air Force Association, 2001), 8.

23

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GPS Global Positioning System

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

R&D research and development

SAC Strategic Air Command

25

Center for Strategy and Technology

The Center for Strategy and Technology (CSAT) was established at the 

Air War College in 1996. Its purpose is to engage in long-term strategic 

thinking about technology and its implications for US national security. 

CSAT focuses on education, research, and publications that support the 

integration of technology into national strategy and policy. Its charter is to 

support faculty and student research; publish research through books, 

articles, and occasional papers; fund a regular program of guest speakers; 

and engage with collaborative research with US and international academic 

institutions. As an outside funded activity, CSAT enjoys the support of institutions in the strategic, scientific, and technological communities.

Essential to this program is establishing relationships with organizations in the Air Force and other Department of Defense agencies and identifying potential topics for research projects. Research conducted under 

the auspices of CSAT is published as Occasional Papers and disseminated 

to senior military and political officials, think tanks, educational institutions, and other interested parties. Through these publications, CSAT 

hopes to promote the integration of technology and strategy in support of 

US national security objectives.

For further information on the Center for Strategy and Technology, 

please contact

Col Tony Meeks, Director

Harry A. Foster, Deputy Director

John W. Pearse, Deputy Director

Lt Col Jeffrey W. Donnithorne, Deputy Director

Air War College

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

(334) 953-6996/6460/2985
26

Titles in the Occasional Paper Series

1

Reachback Operations for Air Campaign Planning and Execution

Scott M. Britten, September 1997

2

Lasers in Space: Technological Options for Enhancing US Military 

Capabilities

Mark E. Rogers, November 1997

3

Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy

Joseph Siniscalchi, March 1998

4

Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam and the 

American Use of Force since 1945

Jeffrey Record, March 1998

5

Lasers and Missile Defense: New Concepts for Space-Based and Ground 

Based Laser Weapons

William H. Possel, July 1998

6

Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological 

Inevitabilities

Thomas D. Bell, January 1999

7

Legal Constraints on Information Warfare

Mark Russell Shulman, March 1999

8

Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to

Use Force

Jeffrey Record, May 1999
27

9

Airborne and Space-Based Lasers: An Analysis of Technological and 

Operational Compatibility

Kenneth W. Barker, June 1999

10

Directed Energy and Fleet Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare

William J. McCarthy, May 2000

11

High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Implications

for Warfare

Eileen M. Walling, May 2000

12

Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations

John E. Ward Jr., May 2000

13

Cruise Missiles and Modern War: Strategic and Technological

Implications

David J. Nicholls, May 2000

14

Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations

Eric M. Sepp, May 2000

15 

Technology and Command: Implications for Military Operations in the 

Twenty-First Century

William B. McClure, July 2000

16

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations

David Glade, July 2000

17

Computer Networks and Information Warfare: Implications for Military 

Operations

David J. Gruber, July 2000
28

18

Failed States and Casualty Phobia: Implications for Force Structure and

Technology Choices

Jeffrey Record, October 2000

19

War as We Knew It: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs/Understanding 

Paralysis in Military Operations

Jan S. Breemer, December 2000

20

Using Lasers in Space: Laser Orbital Debris Removed and Asteroid 

Deflection

Johanthon W. Dampbell, December 2000

21

Weapons for Strategic Effect: How Important Is Technology?

Collin S. Gray, January 2001

22

U.S. Army Apache Helicopters and U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Forces:

Implications for Halting Military Operations

Brad Mason, June 2001

23

The End of Secrecy? Military Competitiveness in the Age of Transparency

Beth M. Kasper, August 2001

24

Space-Based Global Strike: Understanding Strategic and Military 

Implications

Larry G. Sills, August 2001

25

Precision Engagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding Promise or 

Wishful Thinking

Timothy J. Sakulich, December 2001

26

Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?

George B. Hept, January 2002
29

27

Unmanned Undersea Vehicles and Guided Missile Submarines: 

Technological and Operational Synergies

Edward A. Johnson Jr., February 2002

28

Attack Operations for Missile Defense 

Merrick E. Krause, May 2002

29

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Micro-Air Vehicles in the Service of Air Force 

Missions

Arthur F. Huber II, July 2002

30

Sustained Space Superiority: A National Strategy for the United States

Larry J. Schaefer, August 2002

31 

Hyperspectral Imagery: Warfighting through a Different Set of Eyes

Paul J. Pabich, October 2002

32

Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield: A New Vision for 2025

John P. Geis II, April 2003

33

Homeland Security and the Coast Guard: Postured for Technology 

Improvements

Arthur C. Walsh, June 2003

34

Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting our Phasers on Stun? Potential Strategic 

Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield

Erik L. Nutley, August 2003

35

Aircrew Performance Cutting-Edge Tech

Kris M. Belland, September 2003
30

36

Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution: Never Divide the Fleet?

Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, June 2004

37

The Decision Maker’s Guide to Robust, Reliable and Inexpensive Access to 

Space

Gary N. Henry, July 2004

38

Global Mobility: Anywhere, Anytime, Any Threat? Countering the 

MANPADS Challenge

Jacqueline D. van Ovost, December 2005

39

Strategies for Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems

Stephen Latchford, December 2005

40–51

Netted Bugs and Bombs: Implications for 2010

Edited by Marsha J. Kwolek. December 2005

Part I: Network Centric Operations: Promises and Pitfalls

Network Warfare Operations: Unleashing the Potential

Richard A. Lipsey

Network-Centric Operations: Challenges and Pitfalls

Eric E. Silbaugh

Network-Enable Precision Guided Munitions

Benjamin F. Koudelka Jr.

Lowering the High Ground: Using Near-Space Vehicles for Persistent C3ISR

Andrew J. Knoedler

Part II: UAVs in 2010: Lean and Lethal

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: SEAD and EW for the Future

James C. Horton

Small Power: The Role of Micro and Small UAVs in the Future

James M. Abatti

Pesky Critters

Kirk M. Kloepple
31

Pandora’s Box Opened Wide: UAVs Carrying Genetic Weapons

Daryl J. Hauck

Part III: Silver Bullets in Search of a Six Shooter

Perfecting War: Searching for the Silver Bullet

Eric J. Schnitzer

Who Pushes the Pickle Button?

John E. Marselus

Leveraging Simulation against the F-16 Flying Training Gap

Shaun R. McGrath

Electronic Pulse Threats in 2010

Colin R. Miller

52

Ground Truth: The Implications of Joint Interdependence for Air and 

Ground Operations

L. Ross Roberts, March 2006

53

“Heads, Not Tails”: How To Best Engage Theater Ballistic Missiles?

Ronald C. Wiegand, February 2006

54

Transcendental Terrorism and Dirty Bombs: Radiological Weapons

Threat Revisited

Chad Brown, February 2006

55

International Armament Cooperative Programs: Benefits, Liabilities, and 

Self-inflicted Wounds—the JSF as a Case Study

Stephen G. DiDomenico, February 2006

56

War without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation

Michael J. Hornitschek, May 2006

57–59

Streamlining DOD Acquisition: Balancing Schedule with Complexity

Edited by James Rothenflue and Marsha J. Kwolek, September 2006
32

A System as the Enemy: A Doctrinal Approach to Defense Force 

Modernization

Benjamin A. Drew

Impact of Weapons Systems Complexity on Systems Acquisition

Robert A. Dietrick

Faster Is Better . . . Can the USAF Acquisition Process be SAIV’D?

James L. Chittenden

60

The Seductive Effects of an Expeditionary Mindset

Michael Arnold, February 2007

61

The Air Force in SILICO—Computational Biology in 2025

Christopher Coates, November 2007

62

Biofuels: An Alternative to U.S. Air Force Petroleum Dependency

Mark S. Danigole, December 2007

63

Air Force and the Cyberspace Mission: Defending the Air Force’s Computer 

Network in the Future

Shane P. Courville, December 2007

64

Next Generation Nanotechnology Assembly Fabrication Methods: A Trend 

Forecast

Vincent T. Jovene Jr., January 2008

65

Blue Horizons II: Future Capabilities and Technologies for the Air Force 

in 2030 

John P. Geis II, Christopher J. Kinnan, Ted Hailes, Harry A. Foster, and 

David Blanks, July 2009

66

Resurgent Russia in 2030: Challenge for the USAF

Theodore C. Hailes, Ronald Buckley, David Blanks, Mark Butler, Phillip 

Preen, and Michael Tarlton, September 2009
33

67

Failed State 2030: Nigeria—A Case Study

Christopher J. Kinnan, Daniel B. Gordon, Mark D. DeLong, Douglas W. 

Jaquish, and Robert S. McAllum, February 2011

68

Discord or “Harmonious Society”? China in 2030

John P. Geis II, Scott E. Caine, Edwin F. Donaldson, Blaine D. Holt, and 

Ralph A. Sandfry, February 2011

69

Finding the Shape of Space

Christopher C. Shannon, Scott J. Scheppers, Dustin P. Ziegler, Brian C. 

McDonald, David Suh Hoon Menke, John P. Geis II, Amanda S. Birch, 

and Tosha N. Meridith, July 2011

70

Blue Horizons IV: Deterrence in the Age of Surprise

John P. Geis II, Grant T. Hammond, Harry A. Foster, and Theodore C. 

Hailes, January 2014