U.S. Army in the Cold War

Forging the Shield

The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

by

Donald A. Carter

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

CMH Pub 45–3–1

Carter, Donald A., 1955-

 Forging the shield : the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962 / by Donald A.

Carter.

 pages cm. -- (Army historical series)

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. United States--Armed Forces--Europe--History--20th century. 2. United

States. Army, Europe and Seventh Army--History--20th century. 3.

Europe--Military relations--United States. 4. United States--Military

relations--Europe. I. Title.

 UA26.E9C37 2015

 355.0094’09045--dc23

 2014047210

Cover: (second row, right) A tanker pauses to hand out candy to German children during 

Operation Sabre Knot. All other cover images are featured within the book.
iii

ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

Richard W. Stewart, General Editor

Advisory Committee

(As of November 2014)

Dr. Robert M. Citino Mr. Mark F. Averill

North Texas University Deputy Administrative

Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

Dr. Wayne E. Lee Lt. Gen. Kevin W. Mangum

University of North Carolina U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command

Dr. John A. Nagl Col. David Funk

The Haverford School U.S. Army War College

Brig. Gen. Christopher P. Hughes Brig. Gen. Timothy Trainor

U.S. Army Command and U.S. Military Academy

General Staff College

Dr. Geoffrey P. Megargee Dr. Richard W. Stewart

United States Holocaust U.S. Army Center of

Memorial Museum Military History

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Richard W. Stewart, Acting Director

Chief Historian Richard W. Stewart

Chief, Histories Division David W. Hogan Jr.

Chief, Historical Products Branch Beth F. MacKenzie

v

Contents

Page

Foreword . . 

The Author . 

Preface . . 

Chapter

1. Setting the Stage .

Germany in 1950 .

The Emerging Threat and the Move Toward 

Collective Security .

The European Command in 1950 .

Perceptions of a Rising Threat . 

2. The New Mission . 

Building the Seventh Army . 

 Growing Pains . 

Reorganization and Realignment . 

Identifying the Threat . 

Firepower and Mobility: The Seventh Army’s 

Conventional Doctrine . 

Early Thoughts on an Atomic Option . 

Development of the Communications Zone . 

Logistical Support for the New Mission . 

Berlin, 1951–1952: Standing Fast and Showing the Flag . 

The End of the Beginning . 

3. Growing Into the Role . 

1953: The Cold War Takes a New Turn . 

Keeping a Watchful Eye to the East . 

Changes in Command and Combat Readiness . 

The Seventh Army Goes Nuclear . 

Manning the Force: USAREUR’s Personnel Pipeline . .

Additions and Subtractions: Organizational Changes in 

USAREUR and the Seventh Army . .
vi

Chapter Page

Hardening the Support Structure . .

Settling in for the Long Haul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Noncombatant Evacuation Exercises . .

A Steadying Influence . .

4. Strengthening the Alliance . .

Building NATO’s Military Capabilities . .

Integrating USAREUR into the NATO 

Command Structure . .

Army Support for Military Assistance Programs 

in Europe . .

The Military Liaison Missions and the USAREUR

Soviet Relations Advisory Committee . .

Moving the Alliance Forward . .

5. Rearming the Germans . .

Working Toward a German Contribution to Western 

European Defense . .

Designing a Structure for German Integration— 

The European Defense Community . .

USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance . .

Final Plans for Training the New German Army . .

Building a New German Army . .

Completing the German Army Assistance Program . .

6. 1955: A Year of Transition . .

The New Look Comes to USAREUR . .

Striving for Combat Readiness . .

 Operation Gyroscope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

The End of the Occupation in Austria . .

The Effect of German Sovereignty on U.S. Forces 

in Europe . .

Reaching an Uneasy Equilibrium . .

7. Achieving Atomic Mindedness . .

The “Spirit of Geneva” Evaporates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Eisenhower Versus the Generals: The Army Struggles 

to Find a Role Within the New Look . .

New Leadership in USAREUR . .

The Effect of Funding Cuts on USAREUR . .

Training for Atomic Warfare . .

 Pentomic Reorganization . .

Adapting the Logistical Support Structure to Atomic 

Warfare . .

Complications of Alliance Defense Planning . .
vii

Chapter Page

8. Second Thoughts . .

The “New Look” Gets a New Look . .

Putting Pentomic to the Test . .

 Other Training . .

Rethinking Concept C and COMZ Realignment . .

The U.S. Army Southern European Task Force . .

Tying Up Loose Ends . .

 Managing Dependents . .

 Reconsiderations . .

9. Approaching Stalemate . .

Re-evaluating the Enemy . .

USAREUR’s Role in the American Intervention 

in Lebanon . .

The 1958 Berlin Crisis . .

Learning to Live with the Status Quo . .

10. Getting Along with the Neighbors . .

The Transfer of Military Liaison Functions from 

the Office of the High Commissioner to the 

European Command . .

Monitoring and Controlling the Message . .

Bones of Contention: Major Points of Friction Between 

German Civilians and the U.S. Army . .

Learning to Get Along at the Local Level: 

Orientation and Goodwill Programs . .

Maintaining the Relationships . .

Fitting in with the French . .

Charities and Disaster Relief: Being a Good Neighbor 

When it Counted . .

A Convergence of Cultures—Elvis Goes to Europe . .

11. The Berlin Crisis . .

“A Bone in the Throat” . .

Khrushchev Renews His Ultimatum . .

 The Wall . .

Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie . .

Winding Down the Confrontation . .

12. From New Look to Flexible Response . .

Looking Beyond Berlin: The Strategic Environment 

in 1961 . .

Creating a New Division . .

Equipping the Force for Flexible Response . .

 New Priorities . .
viii

Chapter Page

 Distractions . .

Looking Toward the Future . .

13. Conclusion: Defining an Era . .

Bibliographical Note . .

Acronyms . .

Map Symbols . .

Index . .

Tables

No.

1. U.S. Army Strength in Europe, January 1951–December 1952 . 

2. Seventh Army Logistical Support . 

Charts

No.

1. Organizational Structure of the European Command 

as of 31 December 1950 . 

2. Organizational Structure of the United States Army, 

Europe, 1 August 1952 . 

3. Organizational Structure Seventh Army, 31 January 1952 . 

4. Allied Command Europe . .

Maps

No.

1. Occupied Zones of Germany, August 1945 .

2. Seventh Army Deployment Zones, West Germany, 1951 . 

3. U.S. Army, Europe, Area Commands, 1 December 1952 . 

4. Primary Approaches for Soviet Attack . 

5. European Command, Bremerhaven Lines of Communication . 

6. Lines of Communication, France, 1950s . 

7. U.S. Army, Europe, Family Housing West Germany, 30 June 1953 . .

8. U.S. Army Training Cadres West German Army Troop 

Training Schools, 1956 . .

9. U.S. Army Tactical and Maintenance Teams, 

West German Divisions, February–June 1957 . .

10. NATO/USAREUR War Plan, Lech-Weser Line, 1955 . .

11. Seventh Army Command, West Germany, 1957 . .

12. Seventh Army Defense Lines, West Germany, 1957 . .

13. Nike Missile Sites, 30 June 1958 . .

14. Eastern Mediterranean Area, 1958 . .
ix

Page

15. Beirut and Vicinity, Lebanon, 1958 . .

16. Berlin Crossing Points, 1961 . .

17. Seventh Army Dispositions in 1962 . .

18. Allied Forces, Central Europe, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, 1962 . .

Illustrations

General Thomas Handy, September 1949 .

Lt. General Manton S. Eddy, August 1950 . 

12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, in Dorningheim, 

October 1951 . 

Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion build a ferry . 

19th Infantry patrol near Hanau, October 1951 . 

Soldiers conceal M26 tank near Hanau, October 1951 . 

V Corps Artillery Fire Support Control Center . 

Situation map for Exercise Combine, October 1951 .

Armored half track of the aggressor forces during 

Exercise Combine, October 1951 .

Field dental clinic, December 1952 . 

Soldiers prepare fried chicken during a field exercise, November 1952 . 

Headquarters, 7917th Labor Supervision Detachment, 

Fontenet tent area, January 1952 . 

571st Ordnance Ammunition Command, Captieux, France . 

LACM pulls up to a floating dock and crane . 

USNS Pvt. Francis X McGraw at Le Tur Belle, France . 

Troops unloading at La Pallice, France, April 1953 . 

East German border guards and tank, 19 June 1953 . 

Soviet tanks in Berlin, June 1953 . 

Lt. General Charles Bolte, January 1953 . 

Marshal of France Alphonse Juin and General Hoge . 

106-mm. recoilless rifle, October 1953 . 

Maj. Gen. James Gavin checks map coordinates . 

Brig. Gen. Raymond Bell, Lt. Gen. Anthony McAuliffe, Maj. Gen. 

Ira Swift, French Gen. Marcel Carpentier . 

43d Infantry Battalion and 67th Tank Battalion, 2d Armored

Division, move into attack position . 

A heavy tank company from 6th Infantry in Grunewald . 

43d Infantry Division conducting reconnaissance with “westland” 

forces in Gresenhren . .

Soldiers of Company K, 110th Infantry, move through the outskirts 

of Gerberstein . .

A 280-mm. cannon, October 1955 . .

1st Gun Section, Battery B, 59th Field Artillery Battalion . .

Gun crew of the 91st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion . .
x

Page

Battery B, 26th Field Artillery, 9th Infantry Division, October 1955 . .

5-gallon gas cans ready for stacking . .

M47 tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Housing project at Gelnhausen . .

Stars and Stripes was available in all PXs . .

Brig. Gen. George Rehn, General Lauris Norstad, and Maj. Gen. 

Dean Strother . .

General Matthew Ridgeway inspects French troops at Baderces . .

General Alfred Gruenther inspects the 2d Armored Division 

Honor Guard . .

Marshal of France General Alphonse Juin . .

General Hodes greets General Heusinger at the Heidelberg 

Airstrip, 21 June 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

German Army trainees attend class on the American carbine . .

An American instructor holds class on the carbine . .

Small-unit tactics being taught at German Army 

Officer Candidate School . .

Engineer technique course at German Army Officer 

Candidate School . .

An Honest John and launcher at Darmstadt on Armed 

Forces Day 1956 . .

General Hart and General Hodes discuss Exercise Cordon Bleu           . 2

Corporal missile at White Sands, New Mexico, October 1955 . .

Tanks from 1st Battalion, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

during Exercise Cordon Bleu .                                                       . 2

Aggressor forces in Dinkelsbühl during Exercise Cordon Bleu .           . 2

A real injury is evacuated during Exercise Cordon Bleu                         . 2

Troops board a train to Bremerhaven to take them to Kaiserslautern . .

Soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division arrive as part 

of Operation Gyroscope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

A soldier and his family are met by Maj. Gen. E. D. Post . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

Aerial view of the Böblingen housing area, August 1955 . .

The 350th Infantry prepare to case the unit colors . .

Soviet tanks in Budapest, 1956 . .

Tanks and wreckages outside Killian Barracks in Budapest . .

General Taylor, 1st Lt. Robert Breckenridge, and Brig. Gen. 

Stanton Babcock . .

Paul Simmon and Herman Hagen view the Nike missile 

display at Campbell Barracks . .

Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker and General Hodes . .

General Clarke . .

A 280-mm. gun is loaded onto British raft “Alice” . .

The V Corps communication center during Command Post 

Exercise Summer Stock .                                                                 . 2

Explosion from 3.5-in. rocket . .
xi

Page

A Gun jeep with 106-mm. recoilless rifle . .

SETAF’s 543d Field Artillery Missile Battalion prepares 

a Corporal missile . .

M59 armored personnel carrier . .

Soldiers board an H–34 helicopter . .

Corporal erector . .

Corporal missile ready for launch . .

General Clyde D. Eddleman . .

An H–34 helicopter airlifts a 105-mm. howitzer . .

Jeep equipped with recoilless rifles attached to an H–34 helicopter . .

Field maintenance shop in Rheinau . .

Corpsman administers Salk vaccine to U.S. dependents . .

SETAF helicopter transports a small chapel to the summit 

of Mt. Grignone . .

Rear Admiral Sherman R. Clark and Maj. Gen. John P. Daly . .

2d ACR trooper checks an East German guard tower near 

Hof, Germany . .

Russian military missile display . .

Tanks moving through Red Square . .

1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, 24th Infantry 

Division unloads west of Beirut . .

Soldiers of the 1st Airborne Battle Group move out after 

landing at Beirut airport . .

Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams . .

Soldiers catch up on the news in a foxhole in Beirut . .

A lifeguard on a stand made of C-rations watches soldiers 

swim in the Mediterranean . .

“Airborne Annie” helps soldiers lay wire in Lebanon . .

The 187th Infrantry, 1st Airborne Battle Group on patrol . .

A German child meets a man portraying a Native American 

in Mannheim . .

Red Diamond chorus and German orphans sing Christmas carols . .

Santa visits the children of Friedberg Kinderheim, December 1955 . .

Sgt. Elvis Presley briefs his reconnaissance team . .

Construction of the wall around Brandenburg Gate . .

“Wall of Shame” looking from East Berlin . .

1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, passes Helmstedt checkpoint . .

1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, waits at Helmstedt checkpoint . .

U.S. MPs on the West Berlin side of Wilhelmstrasse . .

U.S. armed patrol escorts a USAREUR-registered civilian 

vehicle into East Berlin . .

Reinforced rifle squad preparing to set up on border . .

Allied entry point to East Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie . .

Davy Crockett in Jeep mounted mode . .

A three-man crew prepares the Davy Crockett . .
xii

Page

Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson . .

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 2d Artillery, 8th Infantry Division during 

Exercise Wintershield II . .

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: pp. 8, 17, 19, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 

53, 54, 62, 64, 66, 67, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 103, 114, 115, 122, 

126, 129, 134, 147, 149, 150, 191, 194, 195, 200, 201, 213, 215, 216, 218, 221, 

227, 228, 229, 231, 254, 256, 260, 261, 266, 267, 269, 270, 292, 302, 303, 304, 

305, 316, 317, 320, 321, 323, 324, 334, 348, 349, 354, 356, 357, 399, 401, 413, 

414, 418, 419, 421, 422, 424, 425, 443, 444, 454, National Archives; 84, 85, 248, 

249, 336, 337, CORBIS; 153, 308, 350, U.S. Army; 355, 374, Stars and Stripes; 

450, Look Magazine.
xiii

Foreword

Most of the major military conflicts between the end of World War II 

in 1945 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were fought in Asia 

and the Middle East. Ironically, Europe, where no war was fought, was the 

epicenter of the Cold War. The stakes were highest there for both sides as two 

fundamentally opposed ideologies and political systems confronted each other 

across the so-called Iron Curtain. The forces of Western Europe and the United 

States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet 

Union and its European satellites created a rival Warsaw Pact. Both sides saw 

war in Europe as a potential Armageddon that could bring total victory or 

catastrophic defeat. As a result, both sides shaped their political and military 

strategies and arranged their military forces to fight that war. By the time the 

Cold War ended in 1989 with the destruction of the Berlin Wall—the Iron 

Curtain incarnate—and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, both sides 

had spent huge sums of money and devoted vast human resources to preparing 

for a war that thankfully never came.

In 1951, however, war in Europe seemed imminent and perhaps even 

inevitable. The East-West conflict had already gone hot a year earlier with the 

fighting on the Korean peninsula. To the leaders of the West, especially the 

United States, that far off conflict was seen as simply the prelude to the start 

of the main struggle for the real “prize”: Europe. The United States had joined 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, pledging military support for 

the nations of Western Europe in the event of Communist incursion. Thus, for 

the first time in its history, America had bound itself by treaty obligations as a 

member of a standing alliance. In February 1951, after a series of congressional 

hearings devoted to the subject, President Harry S. Truman determined to 

reinforce the weak U.S. occupation forces still in Europe with four additional 

divisions. The reactivation of the Seventh Army in Europe and its preparations 

to face the armies of the Soviet Union in defense of Western Europe marked 

the beginning of a forward deployed strategy for the United States Army that 

remained in place for the duration of the Cold War.

Forging the Shield tells the story of the U.S. Army in Europe during the 

critical 1950s and early 1960s. It spans the period between the return of major 

U.S. combat forces to Germany in 1951 and the aftermath of the Berlin crisis 

of 1961–1962. During that time, the troops in Europe became the public face 
xiv

of the Army to Europeans and Americans as well as to the rest of the world. 

The service directed almost all of its training, equipment, and force development toward that potential day when its troops would face Soviet divisions 

streaming through the Fulda Gap and into Germany. The establishment of 

a credible conventional deterrent in Germany, backed up with our nuclear 

forces, was one of the central linchpins of the U.S. strategy of containment of 

Soviet power. It was a visible symbol to the world that America had placed 

its flag and its soldiers—its citizens-in-arms—in harm’s way to reinforce its 

commitment to peace and freedom in Europe. This important volume tells the 

story of the U.S. Army in the early days of the Cold War as our commitment 

evolved into the multigenerational defense of Europe and the values of freedom. 

The Army in Europe has remained a central pillar of U.S. defense and foreign 

policy throughout the Cold War and into the new reality of post–Cold War 

Europe today.

Washington, D.C. RICHARD W. STEWART

1 February 2015 Chief Historian
xv

THE A

Donald A. Carter was born in Albany, New York, and grew up in Oneida, 

New York. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1977 

and served as a Field Artillery Officer until 1992. During that time, he received 

a Ph.D. in history from the Ohio State University in 1985 and served as a 

military history instructor, both at West Point and at the U.S. Army Field 

Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. After leaving the Army he joined 

the U.S. Army Center of Military History as an archivist. In 1995 he left 

CMH to serve with the Gulf War Declassification Project and the U.S. Army 

Declassification Activity. He returned to CMH in 2003 as a historian. His 

publications include “Eisenhower Versus The Generals,” in Journal of Military 

History (October 2007); “The U.S. Military Response to the 1960–1962 Berlin 

Crisis,” for a National Archives pamphlet commemorating the release of Cold 

War records; and “Wargames in Europe: The U.S. Army Experiments with 

Atomic Doctrine,” in Blueprints for Battle (University Press of Kentucky, 2012). 

He is married with two children and lives in Dale City, Virginia.

xvii

Pref

In the introduction to Volume I of American Military History, Richard 

W. Stewart argues that military history is more than the study of armed 

conflict, campaigns, and battles. It is also the story of how societies form their 

institutions for their collective security and how those institutions operate in 

war and peace. It is the story of soldiers and the subculture of which they are 

a part. In a broad sense, Stewart concluded, military history has to study the 

armed forces as institutions and as manifestations of the power of the state.1

This approach is particularly appropriate in the case of the Cold War, which 

was, by and large, a conflict contested by means other than combat. Throughout 

the extended face-off between the Communist and non-Communist blocs, both 

sides jockeyed for position in other ways, through economics, propaganda, 

public opinion, information management and distribution, intimidation, and 

in some cases, bluff.

For the most part, U.S. military and political leaders, and the intelligence 

networks that supported them, believed that the Soviet Union did not desire 

war with the West. To some extent, this was based on an assumption that 

no sane individual or government would risk global war—nuclear war—for 

whatever gains might be achieved in Europe. From there, it is not a great leap 

to the evolution of a grand strategy in Europe rooted in the perception of 

commitment. Neither the United States nor the nations of Western Europe had 

a desire to match the military strength of the Soviet Union. For most of the 

Cold War period, but particularly during the ten years immediately following 

the end of World War II, the West harbored a greater desire for economic and 

social recovery. With that in mind, beginning with the signing of the North 

Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the American strategy became one of demonstrating its 

determination to support the nations of Western Europe. As long as America’s 

military policies and structures showed its clear commitment to preventing 

Soviet expansion, U.S. leaders believed the Communists would not be tempted 

to launch an attack because of the expectation of an easy win. If the West could 

1 Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History, vol. 1, The United States Army and 

the Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

2005), pp. 1–4.
xviii

convince the Communists that the cost would not be worth the risk, the Bear 

would not attack.

Clearly, the linchpin of this strategy was the demonstrated, unequivocal 

guarantee of the United States to help defend Western Europe. Without the 

promise of U.S. manpower, industry, and military technology to back it up, 

no North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense was credible. For 

the United States, the down payment on its commitment was the reactivation 

of the Seventh Army in Europe in December 1950. By that time, the mighty 

armed force that had marched across the continent to subdue Nazi Germany 

in 1945 had evaporated, leaving behind a feeble shell barely capable of carrying 

out the occupation mission assigned to it. The return to Europe of a complete 

field army, and the development of command and control, administration, 

and the logistical infrastructure to support it sent a clear signal to the Soviets 

as intended. Whether it presented a credible forward defense in and of itself, 

or merely served as the trip wire for a nuclear response was never particularly 

relevant. The force represented an American commitment to the continent.

Throughout the 1950s, most of the senior officers and noncommissioned 

officers assigned to the command were veterans of World War II who retained 

much of the confidence they had gained through victory in that conflict. 

Although some new technologies had emerged, most of their vehicles, weapons, 

and equipment were the same they had used to defeat the Axis. While war with 

the Soviet Union was in no way a pleasant prospect, it was not yet the unthinkable Armageddon it would eventually become. With the successful testing of 

thermonuclear weapons still a few years off and without a clear understanding 

of the full implications of a nuclear exchange, many officers still considered the 

atomic bomb to be just another weapon in the American arsenal. Theirs was 

a generation that had not only invented the atomic bomb, but had employed 

it in combat, twice. It would be a few more years before the bomb, ballistic 

missiles, and concepts of deterrence and mutual assured destruction would 

come to dominate military strategic thought.

That being said, at least in the early days of the U.S. Army, Europe’s, 

(USAREUR) forward deployment mission, its leaders believed that they 

could give a good account of themselves in battle with the Soviets. While 

they acknowledged the Soviet’s numerical superiority, many believed that the 

training, doctrine, and the quality of the U.S. troops and equipment tended to 

even the odds. Through their maneuvers, tests, and exercises, USAREUR and 

the Seventh Army tried to develop the tactics and doctrine that would enable 

them to fight outnumbered and win. 

By the middle of the 1950s, the U.S. Army had become enmeshed in the 

larger strategic debates of the period. The growth in the number of atomic 

weapons and the development of larger, more powerful warheads threw into 

question existing beliefs and preconceptions of modern warfare. It was a time 

of soaring political rhetoric as leaders on both sides sought to reconcile national 

goals and ideals with the reality of the Cold War. In the United States the Army 

found itself struggling to justify its existence as it competed with the Air Force 
xix

and the Navy for money, resources, and a clearly defined role in the nation’s 

defense. Even though the Eisenhower administration retained its infatuation 

with atomic weapons and the Strategic Air Command, the president himself 

never wavered in his support for the Army’s mission in Europe. As a result, 

despite calls from many quarters for a downsizing, if not complete elimination 

of the Army’s ground combat responsibilities, the troops remained overseas as 

the cornerstone of NATO’s defense force. As such, USAREUR and the Seventh 

Army helped to preserve the traditions and skills of a ground combat force as 

the rest of the service grappled with larger strategic and institutional issues.

 Even though it was part of the larger debate, USAREUR had to keep its 

focus on more pragmatic concerns. New weapons and equipment inevitably led 

to changes in organization and doctrine. When the Army tried to take advantage 

of battlefield atomic weapons to offset cuts in troop strength and conventional 

arms and equipment by devising a new divisional organization, Seventh Army 

divisions converted to the new pentomic structure. The command spent the 

next several years testing and refining the new concept. 

With most of the national defense budget going to strategic programs that 

emphasized air and sea power, USAREUR struggled to meet its mission and 

support requirements with the limited resources available. U.S. Army leaders 

in Europe had to make difficult choices in allocating money for training, 

maintenance, and construction. These were crucial decisions, for in contrast to 

their counterparts in the United States, the leaders dealt with the Soviets and 

East Germans every day. They interacted with the West German government, 

its citizens, and ultimately, its armed forces on a regular basis. The command 

had to prepare for that time when political theory might erupt into reality. The 

officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army in Europe had to come up with realistic 

approaches and solutions to the very real issues they faced each day.

Nowhere was this more true, or the effects of the U.S. presence in Europe 

so keenly felt, as in the divided city of Berlin. Throughout the Cold War, but 

particularly during the period between the blockade and airlift from 1948 to 

1949 and the building of a wall separating eastern and western sections of the 

city in 1961, Berlin sat at the epicenter of the East-West conflict. American and 

Soviet military personnel, as well as Germans on both sides, faced each other 

on a daily basis and played a dangerous game of one-upmanship that could 

easily have escalated out of control. If war was going to erupt in Europe during 

this time, it was probably going to start in, or be about, Berlin. 

In many ways the 1950s represents a golden age in the history of the United 

States Army. Between the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the escalation 

of the conflict in Vietnam beginning in 1963, the force in Europe was what the 

American public identified as the United States Army. Its presence in Germany 

evoked memories among the millions of soldiers who had served there during 

World War II and the subsequent occupation. It was a force that was, for the 

most part, popular in Europe as a visible symbol of an American commitment 

to keep its allies free from Communist oppression. More important, the Army 

as an institution still enjoyed the prestige and respect of a civilian population 
xx

that had not yet heard of Vietnam. In the early 1960s, it would be the Army of 

Elvis, and a force popularized weekly on television by the Big Picture and on 

radio by the Army Hour.

It would perhaps be too much to say that it was the presence of the U.S. 

Army in Europe that saved the continent from Soviet domination. It is hard 

to measure to what extent the force served to deter Communist aggression. 

Nonetheless, it seems clear that, as the most visible expression of an American 

commitment to support the nations of Western Europe, the U.S. Army’s deployment there during the continent’s most vulnerable years posed an unacceptable 

risk to those who calculated the odds. Although Soviet planners could not 

predict with any degree of certainty what the American response would be, the 

presence of so many of its citizens on the continent, already prepared to fight, 

ensured that there would be one.

In a broader sense, the force in Europe during the 1950s provides the 

historical, doctrinal, and spiritual link between the G.I.’s of World War II and 

Korea and the grunts who would fight in Vietnam. For most of the period, 

the Soviet Union and the nations of the Warsaw Pact were the designated 

opponents against whom the American military prepared to fight. The U.S. 

Army, in particular, developed its weapons and equipment, designed its 

doctrine, organized its units, and trained its soldiers to fight the Soviets in 

Western Europe. It was not until the early 1960s and the construction of the 

Berlin Wall that the U.S. military began to turn its attention away from Western 

Europe and toward new potential conflicts in other parts of the world. The next 

decade would force the Army to prepare for a different kind of war as it began 

its intervention into Southeast Asia.

This book covers the period between 1951, the reactivation of the Seventh 

Army in Europe, and 1962, the immediate aftermath of the crisis leading up 

to the building of the Berlin Wall. As an official history of the U.S. Army, it 

is based, for the most part, on the records of that organization. Although its 

structure is essentially chronological, two topics stood out as transcending 

this approach and meriting independent discussion. The role of USAREUR 

in rearming and training the new German Army spans several years and is 

perhaps the Army’s single greatest contribution toward maintaining security 

in Western Europe. Likewise, the relationship between American soldiers and 

their French and West German hosts evolved over time and is a critical element 

in telling the story of the U.S. Army in Europe. Both subjects are discussed in 

depth in separate chapters at appropriate points in the book.

Although military jargon has been kept to a minimum, some German words 

or phrases that have become ubiquitous in the language of American soldiers, 

kasern and gasthaus come to mind, have been retained. For place names we 

have relied on the U.S. Board of Geographic Names. 

Many people contributed to the successful completion of this book. 

Although I cannot mention all of them here, a number deserve special thanks. 

As Chiefs of Military History, Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, Jeffrey Clarke, 

and Robert Dalessandro provided material and moral support throughout 
xxi

the book writing process. Likewise, the Chief Historian, Richard Stewart 

rendered important advice and assistance. In the Histories Division at CMH, 

David Hogan, William Hammond, Joel Meyerson, and James McNaughton 

read numerous chapters, provided essential guidance and advice, and helped 

to shepherd the work through to completion. Finally, my colleagues within 

the CMH Histories Division, Thomas Boghardt, David Goldman, and Mark 

Bradley provided thoughtful feedback to many of my drafts and shared much 

of their own research with me when I had run into difficulties.

Throughout my research, I received help from any number of historians, 

archivists, and librarians. At CMH, Chief Archivist Frank Shirer and librarians 

Carrie Sullivan and James Tobias cheerfully tolerated my frequent requests 

for research assistance and interlibrary loans. At the National Archives, 

Allan Lipton helped me to navigate through the classified records room while 

numerous archivists provided assistance in the military records reference room. 

At the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Richard 

Sommers, Tom Hendrix, and Richard Baker were more than generous in sharing 

their expertise and support. I must also thank George Watson at the Air Force 

Historical Studies Office for providing access to that agency’s holdings. Ken 

Finlayson at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Support 

Center introduced me to Rudy Horvath and provided additional information 

on his fascinating story. Overseas, Greg Pedlow at the NATO Historical Office 

helped to locate key documents at the NATO library and Andy Morris at U.S. 

Army, Europe, declassified Seventh Army war plans that were essential to my 

overall study.

As the manuscript began to come together, Brian Linn, Professor of History 

at Texas A&M University; Ingo Trauschweizer, Associate Professor at Ohio 

University; and Jonathan House, Professor and Chair of Military History at 

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, read the final draft and 

provided invaluable feedback and comments. On the CMH editorial staff, 

Cheryl Bratten and Diane Arms hammered my prose into something far more 

readable while cartographer Sherry Dowdy translated my sometimes confusing 

sketches into a fine collection of maps. Gene Snyder pulled the whole book 

together in the final layout process. 

Finally I would like to express my gratitude to my family for supporting 

my work throughout the many years, and also to Professors Allan Millett and 

Williamson Murray at the Ohio State University, who got me started along 

this road so many years ago.

The final work is the product of the efforts, guidance, and advice of all of 

those noted above. As always, I alone am responsible for whatever errors or 

inadequacies remain.

1 February 2015 Donald

Forging the Shield

The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

In the five and a half years following D-Day, the mission of U.S. troops 

in Europe had come almost full circle. From total war it had moved through 

demobilization and peacetime occupation to combat readiness as part of an 

international defense against Soviet expansionism and intimidation. In the 

process, the U.S. Army in Europe had begun planning and reorganizing for 

that new role, but in 1950, the troops and support facilities necessary to carry 

out the mission were lacking. The existing command structure in Europe, the 

European Command (EUCOM), was a product of the postwar occupation and 

unprepared to direct a theater of war. Perhaps most significantly, the absence 

of an established logistical system to support a buildup of U.S. forces made the 

American commitment to help defend Western Europe an empty promise at 

best. It seemed clear that if U.S. policy in Europe was to be credible, it would 

be necessary to reinforce U.S. forces there to a point where they could present 

a realistic counterweight to the threat posed by the Soviet Army.

Germany in 1950

Although American soldiers also manned garrisons in Austria and Trieste, 

the center of the U.S. Army’s presence in Europe was Germany. As 1950 began, 

the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union occupied those 

portions of Germany that they had inherited when they divided the defeated 

nation into four zones of occupation in 1945. The U.S. Zone covered the 

southern third of the country and consisted of the German states of Hesse, 

Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg, along with a smaller region surrounding 

the northern ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven on the North Sea. The British 

sector comprised the northwestern portion of Germany, and included the states 

of Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia. 

In the westernmost part of Germany, French forces occupied a smaller section 

that the Allies had carved out of the original American and British zones. It 

contained two barely contiguous regions that met at a single point along the 

Rhine River near Baden-Baden and included portions of Baden-Württemberg, 

Rhineland-Palatinate, and the Saarland. The Soviets claimed as their responsibility almost all of eastern Germany. Their occupation zone included the 

former German states of Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, and 

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The four Allied powers had also divided the 

1

Setting the Stage
NORTH

SEA

Mosel R

Rhine R

Danube R

Elbe R

Rhine R

B RITIS H

SOVIET

UNDER POLISH ADMINISTRA TION

F

R

E

N

C

H

AMERICAN

FOUR-POWER OCC UPATION

JOINT

A MERICAN-BRITISH

BERLIN

Kassel

Bremerhaven

Frankfurt

Kaiserslautern

Hamburg

Nuremberg

Munich

Stuttgart

Dresden

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Hannover

Erfurt

Leipzig

Heidelberg

PRAGUE

Stettin

DENMARK

SWEDEN

BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA

SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

L U XEMBOURG

OCCUPIED Z ONES OF GERMANY

August 1945

Zone Boundary

0

0 150 Miles

150 Kilometers

Map 1
Setting the Stage 3

German capital of Berlin into four sectors (Map 1). The portion controlled by 

the Soviet Union came to be called East Berlin, while the sectors controlled by 

the Western allies became West Berlin. Thus split, the city sat like an island in a 

Communist sea, one hundred miles east of the line that divided Soviet occupied 

Germany from the Western zones.

From the North Sea to Austria, and from France to the Elbe River, the three 

Western zones collectively covered an area of roughly 95,750 square miles. The 

population of 50.8 million included more than 8 million refugees or expellees, 

who had migrated or had been forced out of homes to the east. Topographically, 

the northern coastal plain was quite flat and, in the east, extended southward 

almost 120 miles. Farther west and throughout the central region the terrain 

was dotted with foothills and forests. In the southernmost areas, those that 

included the American-controlled states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, 

the elevation rose steadily and the rolling hills increased, culminating in the 

Bavarian Alps in the south and the Black Forest in the southwest. Most of the 

region’s major rivers, including the Rhine, Weser, and Elbe flowed from south 

to north, emptying into the North Sea. The Danube, however, flowed generally eastward from its source in the Black Forest, draining much of southern 

Germany and emptying eventually into the Black Sea.1

Less than five years after its surrender in 1945, the Western portion of 

occupied Germany was on its way to full political sovereignty. On 8 April 1949, 

the United States, Great Britain, and France signed an agreement merging 

their three zones and allowing the formation of a German-elected government. 

Referred to as the Occupation Statute, the agreement assigned to the new body 

all governmental powers except those designed to preserve the rights of the 

Western allies to keep and maintain troops in their assigned areas, to assume 

control in the event of an emergency, and to enforce the terms of the surrender. 

In accordance with the terms of surrender, the Allies had disbanded all German 

armed forces, leaving only local police and a small border patrol force. The 

agreement ended the period of military government in Germany and turned 

the remaining administrative responsibilities of occupation over to the Office of 

the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). This office consisted of 

eight major subdivisions that monitored and assisted the developing German 

government in the areas of economic affairs, political affairs, general counsel, 

military security, labor affairs, intelligence, public affairs, and administration. 

The first high commissioner, John J. McCloy, assumed his post in May 1949. 

Four months later, in September, the first freely elected German parliament 

since 1933 opened its first session in Bonn and established the German Federal 

Republic, or West Germany.2

1 Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Federal Republic of Germany: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 61–70. 2 Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945–1953 (Darmstadt, Germany: HQ, United States Army, Europe [USAREUR], Historical Office, 1953), p. 
4 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

By 1950, West Germany had begun to recover from the effects of Allied 

bombing, invasion, and occupation after World War II. Although its population 

had suffered painful food shortages during the initial years of the occupation, the 

recovery of many of the nation’s family-owned farms had restored agricultural 

production to near prewar levels, and Western assistance made up much of the 

shortfall. Postwar inspections revealed that German industry had not been 

destroyed to the extent that earlier bomb damage assessment had estimated. 

After five years, much of Germany’s coal and steel production had begun to 

recover, while other industries stood poised to begin a decade-long expansion 

that historians and economists would label the West German miracle. Observers 

in HICOG noted that the economy was still in a period of readjustment, required 

by the loss of resources and markets in the east. By the end of 1950, however, 

currency reform, and the introduction of the common deutsche mark (DM) 

across West Germany and West Berlin, seemed to be the necessary catalyst, 

and German industry began to approach prewar levels.3

For the most part, the Germans themselves were still somewhat ambivalent 

regarding their position in the developing rift between the former Allies. Even 

though the economy was beginning to pick up steam many still chafed at the 

limitations and restrictions placed on them by occupation rule. A steady stream 

of refugees from the East provided ample evidence that life under Communist 

rule was no better than their own, and quite possibly worse. Still, for most 

Germans, the eventual reunification of their divided nation was of far greater 

importance than the larger East-West conflict.4

The Emerging Threat and the Move Toward Collective Security

Almost as soon as the surrender documents had been signed in Europe, the 

ties that bound the Soviet Union to the Western allies began to disintegrate. 

Resistance from the United States and Western Europe to Soviet demands 

for reparations from Germany created friction between the former allies. 

Meanwhile, political pressure from the Soviet Union, reinforced by the presence 

of its victorious armies in the heart of Europe, drew Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, 

Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and, eventually, Czechoslovakia under 

Soviet domination. In February 1946, a lengthy telegram from the deputy head 

148; Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944–1955 (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 

1957), p. 305. 3 Zink, The United States in Germany, pp. 260, 293–303; McCloy’s Statement on Western 

European Integration, 19 Mar 1950, Entry 6, Rcds of the European Command, Record Group 

(RG) 549, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP). 4 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, 

and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 322–23. Detailed discussions of postwar Germany are included in Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945

(New York: Penguin, 2005); Keith Lowe, Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War 

II (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012); Mark Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making 

of the European Settlement, 1945–1953 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
Setting the Stage 5

of the U.S. Mission in Moscow, George F. Kennan, to the State Department 

provided a firsthand description of Soviet expansionism and warned that 

the West must act to contain it. Increasing Communist influence in France 

and Italy coupled with an active insurgency in Greece further fueled Western 

suspicions of Soviet intentions and, in March 1947, prompted President Harry 

S. Truman to declare a policy of American military and economic support 

for nations battling against Communist expansionism. In June of that same 

year, the Kremlin refused to cooperate with a plan by U.S. Secretary of State 

George C. Marshall for European recovery, forbade East European countries 

from participating, and launched a campaign in the Western press condemning 

the program.5

Tensions between the former allies came to a head in June 1948. They failed 

to agree on economic policies for occupied Germany, and the Western allies 

introduced, in their zones, currency reforms that replaced the reichsmark with 

a new deutsche mark. When the allies began to issue the new currency in the 

Western sectors of Berlin, the Soviets responded by increasing restrictions on 

road, rail, and barge traffic into the city until, by 24 June, they had cut off all 

Western ground access to Berlin.6

 During the next fifteen months, American 

and British pilots flew 2,343,301 tons of food, coal, and other essential supplies 

into the blockaded city. Although the Soviets officially lifted the blockade in 

May, the allies continued the airlift through the end of September 1949 to ensure 

that a suitable stockpile was in place.7

The growing Soviet pressure on Berlin and the larger sense of threat it 

instilled throughout Germany added momentum to an ongoing re-evaluation 

of the U.S. position in Western Europe. As part of a review of U.S. foreign 

policy in 1948, Kennan, the director of the State Department’s policy planning 

staff, had ventured that some form of political, military, and economic union 

in Western Europe would be necessary if those nations were to hold their own 

against Communist interference and encroachment. Planning was, in fact, well 

underway by then. It came to fruition in March 1948, with the signing of the 

Treaty of Brussels. The signatories—the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 

the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—resolved to work together to promote 

5 Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954 (Paris: North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, 1954), p. 5; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends 

and the World They Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 352–53; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 184–85, 194. 6 Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, p. 147; Min, HQ, European 

Command (EUCOM), Deputy Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 22, 29 Jun 1948, 

Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1947–1951, RG 549, NACP. 7 Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, p. 147. Varying interpretations 

of the early stages of the Cold War can be found in Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The 

American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 

John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 

Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); idem, We Now Know: Rethinking 

Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
6 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

European economic recovery and took the first steps toward establishing a 

program for their mutual security. Initial achievements included an integration 

of air defenses and the creation of a joint command structure known as the 

Western Union Defense Organization. On 30 April 1948, the defense ministers 

and military chiefs of staff of the five Treaty of Brussels countries began a 

series of meetings to study their military equipment needs and to determine 

what supplementary aid they could request from the United States. Beginning 

in July, American and Canadian defense leaders attended the meetings in a 

nonmember status.8

The following year, 1949, proved to be decisive in fully engaging the United 

States in the security interests of Western Europe. After nearly twelve months 

of preliminary talks, on 4 April, twelve Western nations including the United 

States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, which established the basis for an 

integrated defense of Western Europe. Under the terms of Article 5 of the treaty, 

all parties agreed that they would consider an attack against any one or more 

of them as an attack against all. Furthermore, in the event of such an attack, 

each nation pledged to render assistance, including the use of military force. 

In a departure from its historical position of nonalignment, the United States 

entered the alliance, committing its armed forces to the defense of foreign soil 

prior to an actual declaration of war. Despite concerns that the pact threatened 

the nation’s traditional abstention from foreign entanglements, the U.S. Senate 

ratified the treaty on 21 July.9

In a further expression of the American commitment, on 6 October, 

President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which 

authorized the allocation of $1 billion to NATO members for the purchase 

of equipment, materials, and services that would strengthen their capabilities 

for individual or collective defense. Congressional leaders debating the aid 

package tied it directly to European acceptance of a coordinated defense plan 

under a single unified command. Those in opposition to the bill argued that 

the European nations had not yet shown that they would be willing to make 

such a commitment. Despite these misgivings, early in December 1949 NATO’s 

8 Rpt, Review of Current Trends U.S. Foreign Policy, 24 Feb 1948, in Foreign Relations 

of the United States [FRUS], 1948, vol. 1, General; The United Nations (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1976), pt. 2, pp. 510–29; Ismay, NATO, p. 9; Lawrence S. Kaplan, 

NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 

2007), pp. 49–70. 9 Ismay, NATO, pp. 10–14; Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 

2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint 

History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), pp. 200–204. The formation 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is covered at length in Dean Acheson, Present at the 

Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969); Richard J. Barnet, The 

Alliance—America, Europe, Japan: Makers of the Postwar World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

1983); Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 (New 

York: Random House, 1982). 
Setting the Stage 7

twelve member nations met in Paris and gave unanimous approval to plans for 

an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area.10

The European Command in 1950

The major U.S. military headquarters in Europe in 1950 was the European 

Command, located in Heidelberg, Germany, and commanded by Army General 

Thomas T. Handy. Its varied responsibilities included the coordination of 

administrative and logistical support to its component commands, the preparation and coordination of emergency and evacuation plans for U.S. forces in 

Europe, and the coordination and review of budget requests and priorities. 

Although designated as a unified command by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, 

the headquarters was manned almost exclusively by Army personnel. On 1 

January 1950, the three service components of the command—United States 

Army, Europe (USAREUR); United States Air Force, Europe (USAFE); and 

United States Naval Force, Germany (USNAVFORGER)—represented a total 

of 103,038 assigned or attached military personnel.11

Also located in Heidelberg, USAREUR began 1950 as a fully operational 

headquarters responsible for the administration, support, and control of most 

U.S. Army units in the theater. Its major subordinate units included the U.S. 

Constabulary, headquartered at Vaihingen, Germany, ten miles northwest of 

Stuttgart; the 1st Infantry Division, headquartered at Bad Tölz, twenty miles 

south of Munich; and the various military posts that provided administrative 

and logistical support to American occupation troops throughout the U.S. Zone. 

In all, the command numbered about eighty-three thousand soldiers. Although it 

functioned as a separate headquarters, USAREUR remained closely associated 

with EUCOM throughout most of 1950. As in previous years, many personnel 

played dual roles within staff divisions of both organizations.12

In addition to Germany, U.S. Army forces performed postwar duties in 

other conquered nations of Europe. Almost fifteen thousand soldiers assigned 

to U.S. Forces, Austria, continued to perform occupation duties there. Another 

contingent of five thousand, identified as Trieste United States Troops (TRUST), 

helped to provide security in that city, which was located on the Italian Adriatic 

coast and had been divided between U.S. and British occupation forces on one 

side and the Yugoslav Army on the other. Although neither command belonged 

10 Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 1, The Formative 

Years: 1947–1950 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), 

pp. 504–08; Clayton Knowles, “Unifying of Europe to Fight Demanded as Arms Aid Price,” 

New York Times, 1 Aug 1949; “West Nations Approve Defense Plan,” Stars and Stripes, 2 Dec 

1949. 11 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 31–33, 68; Annual Narrative 

Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 8–10. Both in Historians files, CMH. 12 Ibid.
8 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

to EUCOM, reporting instead directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both relied 

on the command for administrative and logistical support. 

As the last remaining U.S. Army division serving with the occupation forces 

in Germany, the 1st Infantry Division had dispersed throughout the U.S. Zone 

and Berlin. In 1947, EUCOM initiated efforts to reassemble the majority of the 

division to serve as a theater reserve. The command relieved division personnel 

from most of their occupation duties and directed the division commander, Maj. 

Gen. Frank W. Milburn, to begin a program of tactical training and improved 

combat readiness. By 1950, however, most of its subordinate units remained 

scattered across the U.S. Zone while USAREUR and EUCOM leaders searched 

for suitable locations to consolidate them.13

13 Min, HQ, EUCOM, Monthly Conference of Commander in Chief with Major Commanders and Deputy Military Governor, 26 Mar 1947; Min, HQ, EUCOM, Deputy Commander in 

Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 15 Apr 1947; Rpt, HQ, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 5 Mar 

1947, G–3 Monthly Report. All in Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1947–1951, 

RG 549, NACP. Historical Division, EUCOM, Reorganization of Tactical Forces: V-E Day to 

1 January 1949, 1950, Historical Manuscript Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(CMH) Archives, Washington, D.C.

General Thomas Handy, the newly appointed commander of USAREUR, at the 10th 

Infantry during Exercise Harvest, September 1949.
Setting the Stage 9

At the same time, Army leaders in Europe also took steps to realign the 

U.S. Constabulary. Upon its activation in July 1946, the Constabulary’s mission 

had been to maintain general military and civil security, to assist the military 

government in carrying out its objectives, and to control the borders of the 

U.S. Zone of occupation. Constabulary troops also helped train a new German 

police force that handled most cases dealing with German civilians. At its peak 

the Constabulary consisted of thirty-two thousand men, organized into three 

brigades, nine regiments, and twenty-seven squadrons. Each squadron consisted 

of five troops, three mechanized with M5 or M8 armored cars and two motorized 

with jeeps. Additionally, each regiment had a light tank company equipped 

with M24 tanks, a section of nine liaison-type airplanes, a horse platoon of 

thirty mounted men for work in difficult terrain, and a motorcycle platoon for 

highway patrols. Headquarters and service troops provided administrative 

and maintenance support for each regiment. Constabulary units maintained 

an active patrol system and cooperated closely with German local and border 

police throughout the U.S. Zone.14 Separate constabulary squadrons operated 

in Berlin and Austria but were not part of the U.S. Constabulary proper.

By the end of 1948, German police had assumed responsibility for most 

security duties in the U.S. Zone and EUCOM ordered U.S. forces to begin 

reorganizing into a more tactical posture. On 20 December, the Constabulary 

completed a transformation into a more combat ready force by reorganizing 

its 2d, 6th, and 14th Regiments into armored cavalry regiments. The new units 

received shipments of light and heavy tanks and other new equipment, while 

an increased emphasis on recruiting in the United States helped to provide the 

additional manpower they required. At the same time, the command inactivated 

two other squadrons, the 15th and 37th, to provide personnel for two new field 

artillery battalions, the 70th and 74th.15 

Beginning in 1947 for elements of the 1st Infantry Division and in 1948 

for the three new armored cavalry regiments of the Constabulary, EUCOM 

conducted a tactical training program designed to return the units to an acceptable level of combat readiness. During the winter of 1948–1949, every battalion 

spent two weeks in cold weather training at Grafenwöhr, an old German Army 

training area about forty miles northwest of Nuremberg. Exercise Normal in

the summer of 1948 and Exercise Harvest in September 1949 provided the units

with an opportunity to demonstrate their combat proficiency. While observers 

noted that the participants exhibited excellent mobility and a sound grasp of 

14 Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, p. 69; Earl F. Ziemke, The 

U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946, Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003), p. 341; Kendall D. Gott, Mobility, Vigilance, and 

Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946–1953, Global War on Terrorism Occasional 

Paper 11 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), pp. 11–13. 15 Min, HQ, EUCOM, Deputy Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 13 Apr 

1948, Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1947–1951, RG 549, NACP; Historical 

Division, EUCOM, Reorganization of Tactical Forces: V-E Day to 1 January 1949, 1950. 
10 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

tactical fundamentals, they pointed out that much still remained to be done. 

In particular, General Handy noted that many of the World War II vintage 

vehicles and weapons could not stand up to the strain of the maneuvers.16 

Over the next year, additional exercises led EUCOM’s leaders to believe that 

the command was well trained by peacetime standards, but they acknowledged 

that it was difficult to apply a single set of measures to such evaluations. During 

Exercise Rainbow, conducted between 11 and 18 September 1950, the comma

once again tested its major combat units in a series of combat exercises. The 

enemy, portrayed by the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, attacked across the 

eastern border of the U.S. Zone on the morning of 11 September. Friendly 

forces, consisting of the 1st Infantry Division, the 14th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, and other elements of the Constabulary, withdrew to predetermined 

positions, conducted defensive operations, and launched a counteroffensive 

on 13 September. Assisted by simulated allied reinforcements, the defenders 

completed their operations by 18 September, attaining all objectives and driving 

the aggressor back across the border. On the basis of their performance during 

Exercise Rainbow, the EUCOM deputy chief of staff for operations, Brig. Gen

Edward T. Williams, estimated that Army elements within the command had an 

operational readiness of 85 percent but would need an additional three months 

of intensive training for them to be fully ready for combat.17 

Other efforts to restore the 1st Infantry Division and the Constabulary to 

higher levels of combat readiness were also beginning to pay off. One of the most 

significant developments was the progressive buildup to desired overstrengths 

of the major tactical units in the European Command. By the end of May 1950, 

the 1st Infantry Division was at 96.5 percent of its total personnel authorization 

while the Constabulary was at 97 percent. By mid-August, both organizations 

exceeded 100 percent of their authorized strengths (Chart 1).18

Despite the progress that EUCOM made, other impediments to combat 

readiness remained. As the number of troops assigned to EUCOM continued 

to rise, so too did the number of military dependents. Army leaders acknowledged the value to morale of having families accompany deploying soldiers, 

but also recognized the numerous challenges that would be associated with 

an increased civilian community. In several cases, a shortage of troop housing 

prevented the command from consolidating its tactical units. Because many 

units were still dispersed in occupation locations, they lacked ranges and 

local training areas where they could develop tactical skills on a daily basis. 

16 Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, pp. 174–75; “U.S. Maneuvers 

in Europe Go Back to Exercise Normal in 1948,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 Sep

1950; Interv, Lt Col Edward M. Knoff Jr. with Gen Thomas T. Handy, former Commanding 

General (CG), EUCOM, 1974, p. 20, Senior Officer Oral History Program, U.S. Army Military 

History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, p. 88; Omer Anderson, “Forces 

Proved Mobility in Exercise Rainbow,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Oct 1950. 18 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 70–71; Annual Narrativ

Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, p. 105.
HEADQUARTERS

EUROPEAN COMMAND

(EUCOM)

Located in Heidelberg

SEVENTH

U.S. ARMY

(7TH ARMY)

Vaihingen

* USAREUR, though still in existence, was no longer operational as of 31 December 1950.

Chart 1—Organizational Structure of the European Command*

as of 31 December 1950

U.S. NAVAL FORCES,

GERMANY

(USNAVFORGER)

Heidelberg

U.S. AIR FORCES,

IN EUROPE

(USAFE)

Wiesbaden

Military

Posts

Technical

And

Administrative

Services

66th

CIC

Detachment

Stuttgart

7888th

Special Troops

Heidelberg

7966th

EUCOM

Detachment

Paris

7756th

Audit Agency

Friedberg

7755th

Dependents

Schools

Detachment

Karlsruhe

7893d

U.S. Military Liaison Mission

to C-in-C Soviet Occcupied

Zone of Germany

Potsdam

7791st

Office of

U.S. Commander,

Berlin

Berlin**

7792d

Office of

High Commissioner,

Germany

Frankfurt**

* * Both units assigned to and administered by EUCOM but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner, Germany (HICOG) 

Units and

AgenciesAssigned

to EUCOM

Major

Commands

Source: Narrative Report, Headquarters, European Command, 1950.
12 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The only large-scale maneuver area available for training units of battalion 

size or larger was the former German Army site at Grafenwöhr. The force 

in Europe also lacked any semblance of a logistical support base capable of 

sustaining a wartime theater. Most of the maintenance, supply, ordnance, and 

other service units needed to support the combat elements were not available. 

Perhaps most important, almost all of EUCOM’s supplies and reinforcements 

came into the theater through the German port of Bremerhaven on the North 

Sea. The line of support linking the port and the command’s deployed units 

ran parallel to the border between the allied and Soviet zones in Germany 

and within easy reach of any potential Soviet advance.19

Perceptions of a Rising Threat

By the beginning of 1950, events had conspired to convince many military 

and political leaders in the United States that conflict with the Soviet Union was 

imminent. In September 1949, U.S. scientists picked up traces of radioactivity 

over the Pacific Ocean that indicated the Soviets had exploded their own atomic 

device. Although U.S. intelligence agencies had long reported that the Soviets 

were on the verge of such an achievement, to many U.S. officials, the loss of 

the American atomic monopoly was shocking. The victory of Mao Zedong’s 

forces in China in October 1949 reinforced fears that communism was still on 

the march worldwide. The fall of China seemed to expose Japan, India, and all 

of Southeast Asia to a similar fate. The Communist victory in China also gave 

rise to finger-pointing and recriminations in American politics. Disclosures that 

Soviet spies Alger Hiss and Klaus Fuchs had penetrated the State Department 

and the atomic laboratories at Los Alamos prompted Senator Joseph McCarthy, 

a Republican from Wisconsin, to begin a well-publicized hunt for Communists 

within the State Department and the Truman administration.20

Despite these diversions, U.S. strategic planners firmly kept their eyes on 

the Soviet Union as a potential foe. In December 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

had approved Joint Outline Emergency War Plan Offtackle, a revision to the

previous plan, Halfmoon, to reflect the strategic changes in Europe brought

about by the NATO alliance. According to Offtackle, in the event of war with

the Soviet Union, the United States would safeguard the western hemisphere 

and its own mobilization base, conduct a strategic defensive in the Far East, 

and wage a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia. In Europe, allied forces 

would defend essential areas along the periphery, pulling back to a line along 

the Pyrenees if they did not have to evacuate the continent altogether. The allies 

would conduct a sustained strategic air offensive from the United Kingdom, 

and whatever bases they could hold in southern Italy, the Mediterranean, or 

19 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 88, 111–15. 20 Walter S. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 4, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

National Policy, 1950–1952 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), p. 3; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 341–44.
Setting the Stage 13

North Africa. This air-sea offensive would destroy the vital elements of Soviet 

war-making capacity, defend base areas and lines of communication, provide 

aid to allied nations, and clear the way for an eventual counteroffensive and, 

if necessary, return to the European continent.21

The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 served to underscore a sense of 

urgency and imminent threat to Western Europe that had been growing since the 

Soviet imposition of the Berlin blockade in 1948. Although the North Korean 

invasion seemed to be a logical extension of the Communist victory in China, 

the Joint Chiefs considered the conflict in Asia to be a war against the wrong 

enemy. The action, however, provided an indication that the Soviets were no 

longer constrained from military action by the Western monopoly on atomic 

weapons. Analysts noted similarities between the situation in Korea and that 

in Germany, raising concerns that the next blow would fall in Europe. As with 

Korea, Germany had been divided into two parts, one of which was a Soviet 

satellite with aggressive intentions. Soviet armed forces in East Germany greatly 

outnumbered U.S. and NATO forces in Western Europe—forces that were only 

just beginning to mobilize. Nonetheless, for EUCOM, the immediate effect of 

the conflict, with its pressing requirements for manpower and logistics, was to 

postpone reinforcements and to delay shipments of new equipment.22

The concerns expressed by the Joint Chiefs were reinforced by U.S. 

intelligence reports. The newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

observed that the Soviet Union’s treatment of the Korean situation most likely 

reflected a belief that the Soviet bloc had reached a military and political position superior to that of the West. In view of the recent Soviet atomic test, CIA 

analysts believed that Moscow intended to exploit the end of the Western atomic 

monopoly, relying on its superiority in conventional forces to intimidate rather 

than to negotiate, therefore eschewing general war but increasing the tempo 

of pressure and agitation on Germany in order to feed a war scare throughout 

Europe. Other reports described an expansion of East German paramilitary 

forces and predicted that those units would soon constitute both a potential 

threat to West Germany and an even more immediate threat to West Berlin. 

These forces already included thirty-five thousand “alert police” assigned to field 

units of battalion-type organization that included infantry, artillery, tank, signal, 

and engineer components. Although the East German military headquarters had 

enough Soviet tanks and heavy artillery for training but too little for operational 

purposes, the reports insisted that the Soviets could remedy such deficiencies 

easily from stocks already in East Germany. The reports concluded that the 

rapid increase in East German military capabilities raised more and more of a 

possibility that the Soviets would wield them as instruments of policy toward 

21 Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952, pp. 83–84. 22 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, p. 1; Omar N. Bradley and Clay 

Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 582. European reactions to the North Korean invasion are described in Edward Fursdon, The European 

Defense Community: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980).
14 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

all of Germany. Their value as a psychological threat, moreover, seemed every 

bit as important as their actual military potential.23

With the threat in Europe growing and U.S. forces struggling to hold their 

lines in Korea, President Truman announced on 10 September 1950 that he 

had approved substantial increases in the strength of U.S. forces in Europe. 

Although the timing and nature of these increases required coordination with 

NATO allies and the approval of Congress, the president’s announcement 

reinforced the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and spurred the effort 

to increase the American presence on the continent.24

Truman’s decision elicited a response from the Army leaders in Europe as well. 

On 17 September, with the understanding that additional troops would soon be 

coming his way, the EUCOM commander, General Handy, requested authority 

from the Department of the Army to activate a field army headquarters within the 

command. He argued that the early experiences of U.S. forces in Korea indicated 

the need for a command and control element at that level. The new headquarters 

would oversee a self-contained force that could readily be transferred to allied 

operational command in case of an emergency. All Army units with tactical 

missions, including combat, combat support, and service support elements, 

would be assigned to the field army. In response to General Handy’s request, on 

24 November the Department of the Army reactivated the U.S. Seventh Army 

and placed it under the command of Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. At that time, 

EUCOM placed the 1st Infantry Division and all remaining elements of the U.S. 

Constabulary under Seventh Army command and inactivated the Constabulary 

headquarters. On 2 December, the Army reassigned all military posts previously 

under USAREUR control to EUCOM headquarters. With that action completed, 

the command made plans to discontinue Headquarters, United States Army, 

Europe. Meanwhile, the Seventh Army established its headquarters at Stuttgart 

and began to prepare for its new mission.25

23 National Intelligence Estimate, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Probable Soviet Moves 

to Exploit the Present Situation, 11 Dec 1950, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic 

Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH; Min, HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s 

Weekly Staff Conference Notes, 3 Jan 1950, Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1947–1951, RG 549, NACP; CIA, Probable Developments in Eastern Germany by the End of 

1951, 28 Sep 1950, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH. 24 Ltr, Louis Johnson, Sec Def, and Dean Acheson, Sec of State, to President Harry S. Truman, 8 Sep 1950, Proquest and National Security Archive, Digital National Security Archive 

(hereafter cited as Digital National Security Archive), copy in Historians files, CMH; “Truman 

OK’s Substantial Rise of American Forces in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 

Sep 1950. 25 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 37–38, 43; Memo, Dep Ch 

of Staff for Opns, EUCOM, for EUCOM Staff, 4 Oct 1950, sub: Organization of a Field Army 

Headquarters, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 549, 

NACP; Min, HQ, EUCOM, Minutes of Press Conference Held by Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy, 19 

Aug 1950, Entry 6, USAREUR, RG 549, NACP; “7th Army Revived; Eddy CG; Constab Hq 

Inactivated,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 25 Nov 1950.
As 1951 began, the U.S. Army in Europe had started planning and 

reorganizing for its new mission to participate in the defense of Western Europe 

along with the military forces of the NATO alliance. At the time, the Seventh 

Army remained largely a paper force, consisting only of the reconstituted 1st 

Infantry Division and various elements of the U.S. Constabulary, which was still 

in the process of reorganizing into armor and armored cavalry units. The Army 

headquarters in Europe had given little thought to the organization, tactics, 

and doctrine that it might employ in the event of a Soviet attack. Remedying 

these conceptual problems would take some time. The first step in this process 

would be to bring to Europe the military forces necessary to turn the promise 

of security into a reality.

Building the Seventh Army

The process of building a credible deterrent force began in December 1950, 

when the European Command (EUCOM) issued a letter of instruction to the 

Seventh Army’s commanding general outlining his responsibilities. In the letter, 

EUCOM delegated to the Seventh Army the primary mission of training and 

combat readiness. It also transferred various existing operational assignments 

and emergency and contingency plans to the Seventh Army that had previously 

fallen to the Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and it made 

that command responsible for the training and logistical support of all units, 

facilities, and installations that had come under its control. The Seventh Army 

also became accountable for all border security missions still assigned to U.S. 

forces, including the investigation of border incidents, interrogation of illegal 

border crossers, and liaison between U.S. and Soviet military forces operating 

in the occupied zones.1

With its headquarters up and running by the beginning of 1951, the Seventh 

Army was an army in name only. Its major elements included the understrength 

1st Infantry Division and the 2d, 6th, and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments. 

The 1st Infantry Division, “The Big Red One,” had not yet fully consolidated 

1 Letter of Instructions, HQ, EUCOM, 1 Dec 1950, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations 

General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.

2

The New Missio
16 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

its units from their occupation locations dispersed throughout the U.S. Zone. 

The three armored cavalry regiments had their headquarters at Augsburg, 

Straubing, and Fritzlar, Germany, but scattered most of their units across 

nearby towns and villages. EUCOM had pieced them together from various 

Constabulary squadrons to reduce overall manpower requirements and to create 

a mobile reserve force. A field artillery group, an air defense artillery group, and 

leftover elements of the Constabulary that EUCOM had not yet incorporated 

into reorganized units made up the rest of the army. Upon its activation, the 

Seventh Army assumed planning and operational responsibilities for alert 

orders, noncombatant evacuation, and interzonal agreements previously 

assigned to USAREUR and the Constabulary.2

The European Command’s original plan had been to discontinue 

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and to transfer all of its missions and 

responsibilities to the Seventh Army but several technicalities prevented that 

inactivation. Final review jurisdiction for courts-martial of Army personnel 

throughout Germany, Austria, Trieste, and other sites, for example, rested 

with the senior Army headquarters in Europe. As a result, because EUCOM 

was a joint command, USAREUR had to be retained at least as a paper 

organization in order to review the Seventh Army’s legal proceedings. Moreover, 

since Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy’s appointment as commanding general of the 

Seventh Army occurred while Congress was not in session, he had to remain 

on USAREUR’s rolls until Congress reconvened and confirmed his new 

appointment. Although all of its troops had been withdrawn, USAREUR thus 

remained in place for the time being without troops or units, but with General 

Eddy still assigned as commanding general.3

Eddy brought impressive credentials to his new assignment. He had served 

during World War I as a machine gun battalion commander and had been 

wounded in action late in the war. During World War II, he had commanded 

the 9th Infantry Division under General J. Lawton Collins and the XII Corps 

under General George S. Patton Jr. A future Army chief of staff, General 

William C. Westmoreland, who served as an artillery battalion commander 

in the 9th Division under Eddy, described his former commander as a great 

believer in giving responsibility to his subordinates and letting them go about 

their business with minimum interference. Another World War II contemporary, 

war correspondent Ernie Pyle, remarked that General Eddy had the personality 

of an old shoe, totally without arrogance or pretension. He carried a reputation 

as a talented military trainer. As historian Russell Weigley observed, during 

2 Troop List, HQ, Seventh Army, Jan 1951, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, Historical Section 1951, RG 338, NACP; Historical Division, EUCOM, Reorganization of Tactical 

Forces: V-E Day to 1 January 1949, 1950, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; 

Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, p. 64, Historians files, CMH. 3 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 43–44, Historians files, CMH.
The New Mission 1

the war Eddy had provided his officers with “perhaps the best schooling in 

divisional command to be had in the American Army.”4

Introducing himself to the Frankfurt Press Club in March 1951, General 

Eddy described his personal philosophy of training. He believed in less spit and 

polish and more time in the field. In that way, he could provide junior officers 

and sergeants with the opportunity to exercise leadership under actual field 

conditions. Most important, he proclaimed, was the necessity to maintain the 

edge of combat readiness. He compared himself to a football coach, preparing a 

team to play in some uncertain place, at some unknown time, or not at all. True 

to his word, throughout his tenure as Seventh Army commander, Eddy placed 

greater emphasis on training individuals and small units than on larger unit 

maneuvers and exercises. He expected his subordinate commanders, particularly 

platoon leaders and company commanders, to inspect training personally and to 

correct errors until their soldiers performed all tasks correctly. To the soldiers, 

Eddy presented something of a grandfatherly image but one that was backed 

4 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 

1944–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 13; Henry G. Phillips, The Making 

of a Professional: Manton S. Eddy, USA (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 204–16. 

General Eddy begins a five-day inspection of the 1st Infantry Division in August 1950.
18 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

up by considerable combat experience and an old soldier’s belief in the value 

of discipline and hard work.5

The decision in Washington to send four divisions to Europe in 1951 

prompted U.S. commanders in Europe to prepare a detailed and comprehensive 

program for receiving, processing, and locating the troops upon their arrival 

in the theater. For Seventh Army planners, tactical considerations took 

precedence, and they made every effort to keep the organization in a state 

of combat readiness. Even so, a lack of troop housing inevitably determined 

to some extent the temporary locations of many units, despite an expedited 

construction and rehabilitation program launched by the command. To each 

new unit that arrived in Europe, the Seventh Army assigned a sponsor unit 

of similar type and size. In addition to preparing quarters for the incoming 

troops and arranging for the initial issue of property and equipment, sponsor 

units dispatched an officer to meet the incoming commander at the port of 

debarkation and to advise him on matters of immediate concern to him and 

his subordinates.6

With plans in place, the new divisions began to arrive in May 1951. The first 

of the reinforcements to reach Europe, the 4th Infantry Division commanded 

by Maj. Gen. Harlan N. Hartness, had already begun training recruits for the 

duty, using a cadre of noncommissioned officers dispatched to the United States 

by the Seventh Army for that purpose. As it came ashore, the 4th Infantry 

Division moved into its assigned areas north and northeast of Frankfurt, 

near the convergence of the Rhine and Main Rivers. The next division, Maj. 

Gen. Williston B. Palmer’s 2d Armored Division, arrived in the summer. Its 

recruits had also undergone months of intensive training at Fort Hood, Texas, 

at the hands of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers 

from Europe. Envisioned by Seventh Army planners as the spearhead of a 

counterattack force, the division moved into barracks areas west of the Rhine 

River with major elements setting up headquarters in and around Mainz, Bad 

Kreuznach, and Baumholder. The 4th Infantry and the 2d Armored Divisions 

joined the 1st Infantry Division to form Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist’s V Corps, 

which set up headquarters in Frankfurt and became operational at the end of 

August 1951. When fully deployed, the V Corps fielded 687 tanks, 74 rifle and 

armored infantry companies, and 438 artillery tubes of 105-mm. or greater.7

5 Manton S. Eddy, “Speech to the Frankfurt Press Club,” 27 Mar 1951, Entry 33508, Seventh 

Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy, Cdr, Seventh Army, to Maj 

Gen John E. Dahlquist, Cdr, V Corps, 12 May 1952; DF, Col Raymond E. Bell, Asst Ch of Staff, 

G–3, Seventh Army, to Ch of Staff, Seventh Army, 3 May 1952, sub: Small Unit Leadership in 

Seventh Army. Both in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. Phil Bucknell, 

“Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Aug 1950. 6 Cmd Rpt, 1951, HQ, Seventh Army, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, Historical 

Section, 1951, RG 338, NACP (hereafter cited as Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951). 7 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Ltr, Eddy to Gen Thomas T. Handy, Cdr, EUCOM, 21 

May 1951; Ind, Maj Gen I. D. White, Dep Cdr, Seventh Army, to Commander in Chief (CINC), 

EUCOM, Dec 1950, sub: Location of Augmenting Troops. Both in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 
The New Mission 1

The V Corps commanders brought considerable European experience from 

their assignments during World War II to their new positions in the Seventh 

Army. General Dahlquist led the 36th Infantry Division from the beaches of 

southern France in August 1944 to the German plains in May 1945. General 

Hartness had served as the assistant division commander of the 26th Infantry 

Division, which fought with General Patton’s Third Army across Europe. 

General Palmer had commanded the VII Corps Artillery from Normandy to the 

Elbe River. Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, commander of the 1st Infantry 

Division, was the only senior leader in V Corps without European experience, 

having served in the War Department and in China during World War II.8

Because the Army had already committed most of its active forces to the 

war in Korea, the remaining two divisions deploying to Europe, the 28th and 

the 43d Infantry Divisions, were National Guard units mobilized in December 

1950. Both failed to muster more than half of their strength when they assembled 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Order of Battle, USAREUR, 31 Dec 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “Fifth Corps Command in Germany,” 

New York Times, 3 Aug 1951. 8 General Officers Biographies, Historians files, CMH.

Members of the 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, ride a tank through the town of 

Dorningheim in October 1951.
20 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and were filled out with draftees and volunteers. Due to a lack of transportation 

and insufficient training facilities in Germany, each division also spent months 

training in the United States before it shipped overseas in late 1951. When the 

two divisions arrived they joined the VII Corps, headquartered near Stuttgart 

and commanded by Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress. The 28th Division, under 

Maj. Gen. Daniel B. Strickler, occupied barracks near the cities of Ulm and 

Augsburg in southern Germany. The 43d Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. 

Kenneth F. Cramer, took up station in the area between Augsburg and Munich, 

a region that stretched fifty to one hundred miles farther east. Once all its units 

arrived in theater, the VII Corps accounted for 312 tanks, 62 rifle and armored 

infantry companies, and 324 artillery tubes 105-mm. or greater.9

The VII Corps commanders were a more diverse group than their V Corps 

counterparts. As National Guard and reserve officers, they were a bit older, 

and all had experience early in their careers as junior officers in Europe during 

World War I. General Burress had commanded the 100th Infantry Division 

during World War II, seeing continuous action between its commitment to 

combat in October 1944 through V-E Day. General Strickler came to Europe 

as a battalion commander with the 28th Infantry Division in July 1944; he 

had taken a reduction in rank in order to get a command with the division 

as it deployed overseas. General Cramer served in the Pacific, as the assistant 

division commander for the 24th Infantry Division.10

Throughout 1951, the command added smaller units to complete its order 

of battle. The three armored cavalry regiments already present in Europe—the 

2d, 6th, and 14th—occupied forward positions along the boundary between 

the U.S. and the Soviet Zones or along the Czechoslovakia border. They 

acted as a security screen for the V and VII Corps. In the north, the 14th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment patrolled the interzonal border between Hersfeld 

and Bamberg, providing the forward screen for the 1st and 4th Infantry 

Divisions. Farther south, in the VII Corps sector, the 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment patrolled between Bamberg and Regensburg to the front of the 28th 

Infantry Division, while the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment operated between 

Regensburg and Landshut, in front of the 43d Infantry Division. In order to 

strengthen the forward screen and to provide the armored cavalry regiments 

with some immediately available artillery, the Seventh Army assigned a separate 

armored infantry battalion and field artillery battalion to each regiment. The 

373d Armored Infantry Battalion at Wildflecken and the 631st Armored Field 

Artillery at Hammelburg worked with the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

The 371st Armored Infantry Battalion and the 70th Armored Field Artillery 

Battalion at Nuremberg aligned with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

Farther south, the 370th Armored Infantry Battalion at Munich and the 74th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion at Landshut went with the 6th Armored 

9 Ltr, Maj Gen Withers A. Burress, Cdr, VII Corps, to Eddy, 16 Jul 1951, Withers A. Burress 

Papers, MHI; Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Order of Battle, USAREUR, 31 Dec 1952. 10 General Officers Biographies.
The New Mission 2

Cavalry Regiment. The infantry battalions also provided forward observers 

and fire support communications networks that were lacking in the armored 

cavalry organization. Additional artillery and engineer battalions as well as 

other supporting elements continued to arrive throughout the year (Map 2).11

The Seventh Army assigned the armored cavalry regiments an additional 

mission of border security as a supplement to the West German border police. 

It directed the cavalry units to conduct 24-hour surveillance of critical points 

and avenues of approach, especially the borders between the U.S. occupation 

zone and the Soviet occupation zones in Austria and East Germany and between 

the U.S. occupation zone and Czechoslovakia. To accomplish this mission, 

the cavalry was to conduct mobile patrols along the border areas, to establish 

manned observation and listening posts, and to employ aerial observation as 

available. Patrols were to report any evidence of unusual troop movements or 

concentrations of forces on the other side of the border. As part of their normal 

routine, patrols would check in daily with German checkpoints and border 

patrols operating along their routes. Company and battalion headquarters 

would also communicate daily by telephone or by staff visit with German 

border authorities in their areas. EUCOM guidance specified that troops 

engaged in border missions were to be thoroughly trained, to be instructed to 

conduct themselves in a dignified manner, and to take no action that would 

cause embarrassment to the U.S. government.12

Seventh Army operational instructions also included detailed guidance 

for the border units. At a time agreed to by commanders, patrols from each 

regiment would establish physical contact at boundaries between their assigned 

sectors. All patrols and observation posts operated under tactical conditions. 

They carried basic loads of ammunition and maintained continuous radio 

contact. Instructions authorized the use of force as necessary, including the use 

of weapons, to apprehend unauthorized Soviet or Czechoslovakian military 

personnel within the U.S. Zone. The instructions also authorized the use of 

weapons to resist arrest or detention by Soviet or satellite authorities operating 

in the U.S. Zone.13

Patrols covered the entire border at least twice a day, once in daylight and 

once at night. They worked in twelve-hour shifts and consisted of not less than 

two combat loaded quarter-ton trucks, known popularly as jeeps, or one jeep 

and one M8 armored car mounting a 37-mm. gun. At a minimum the patrols 

11 Ibid.; William E. Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany (Heidelberg, Germany:

U.S. Army, Europe, 1984), pp. 88–93. 12 Memos, Lt Col V. M. Smith, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, Seventh Army, 2 May 1951, sub: 

Special Border Surveillance, Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, and Training, Classified 

General Correspondence, 1950–1952; and Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, Dir, Operations, Plans, 

Organization, and Training (OPOT) Div, for Dep Ch of Staff, Opns, 25 Aug 1952, sub: German 

Implementation of HICOG-EUCOM Policy on Border Operations, Entry 2045, USAREUR 

Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training. Both in RG 549, NACP. 13 Letter of Instructions, HQ, Seventh Army, Oct 1952, Border Operations, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
XXX

V

XXX

VII

X X

1

X X

4

X X

28

X X

43

X X

2

III

6

III

2

III

14

Frankfurt

Bad Hersfeld

Fulda

Schweinfurt

Bamberg Bayreuth

Amberg

Regensburg

Straubing

Landshut

Möhringen

BRITISH

Z ONE

FRENCH

Z ONE

FRENCH

Z ONE

Rhine R

Elbe R

Rhine R

EAST GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LIECHTENSTEIN

Erfurt

Nuremberg

Munich

Stuttgart

Dresden

BERLIN

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

BONN

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

Büdingen

 Butzbach

Friedberg

Würzburg

Aschaenburg

Kitzingen

Darmstadt

Mainz Bad Kreuznach

Baumholder

Ellwangen

Heilbronn

Ulm Augsburg

Mannheim

Bad Tölz

Gelnhausen

WEST GERMANY

SEVENTH ARMY DEPLO Y MENT ZONES

U .S. ARMY, EUROPE

1951

Command Boundary (approximate)

Corps Headquarters

Armored Cavalry Screen

Deployment Zones

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 2
The New Mission 2

consisted of a patrol leader, an assistant patrol leader, a radio operator, a 

machine gunner, and two drivers. One vehicle carried an SCR–506 AM radio 

while the other mounted a .30-caliber light machine gun. Patrols normally 

operated no closer than one hundred meters to the border and no farther away 

than ten kilometers. Ed Keaney, a sergeant with the 14th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, remembered:

Two ham sandwiches in a bag and maybe a K ration, out the gate and off to the 

tower by Munnerstadt which was our start point. . . . We would patrol all the 

way down to Königshofen and back. The border was little more than a plowed 

strip and a few stakes, it was easy to make a mistake.14

The border units also established observation posts, some permanent and 

others temporary. Each post was manned by a minimum of three soldiers, one 

to keep watch, one to record any notable observations and to work the radio, 

and the third to provide security for the outpost. Each team was cross trained 

so that team members could rotate functions. During periods of darkness or 

poor visibility, observation post personnel could move forward to preselected 

listening posts where they could still monitor activity in the immediate area. 

To the Germans living on both sides of the boundary the soldiers of the U.S. 

border patrols became some of the most enduring symbols of the Cold War.15

Growing Pains

The Seventh Army’s rapid expansion presented several challenges to its 

leaders. The augmentation caused the number of troops assigned in Europe to 

more than triple in less than two years. On 1 January 1951, the Seventh Army’s 

military strength had been 2,907 officers and 42,320 enlisted men and women. By 

the end of the year the numbers had increased to 9,818 and 152,410, respectively. 

Throughout the theater, the number of U.S. Army personnel in EUCOM rose 

from 86,146 assigned in December 1950 to 252,137 by the end of 1952 (Table 1).16

General Eddy complained, however, that many of the incoming soldiers 

were poorly trained draftees who did not meet his standards. Although their 

backgrounds and educational levels indicated that they had the potential to be 

good soldiers, the lack of supervision by junior officers and noncommissioned 

officers during their time in the replacement pipeline had eroded some of the 

military courtesy, alertness, and discipline that the general expected. Large 

numbers even lacked the basic education required for a successful tour in the 

14 Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, pp. 73–74. Quote from Ed Keaney, 2-14th 

ACR [2d Squadron, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment] on the Border, posted at http://www.

eaglehorse.org, copy in Historians files, CMH. 15 Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, pp. 73–74. 16 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, p. 68; Cmd Rpt, 1952, HQ, 

EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 46–49, Historians files, CMH.
24 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

service. Eddy pointed out to the Army chief of staff, General J. Lawton Collins, 

that more than sixteen thousand of the new troops arriving in his command 

required extra training to bring them up to the fifth grade level of education 

required by service regulations. This schooling, he concluded, imposed an 

undue burden on his command and reduced the amount of useful service time 

in Europe for those soldiers.17

The Seventh Army commander also reported that many of the new replacements had only a few months remaining on their enlistments. One group of 

1,537 soldiers that had recently arrived contained 8 percent with less than six 

months of service remaining and over 40 percent with less than nine months. 

He pointed out that a replacement arriving in August 1952 with six months 

of enlistment remaining had to depart the command in January 1953 to allow 

for shipping and separation processing time. That left him with only four and 

one-half months, barely sufficient time to orient him on his duties in Europe.18

In his reply, General Collins reminded Eddy that the Army was constrained 

by the two-year terms of service assumed by the draftees. Many of those soldiers 

being trained as specialists required eight or more months of training before the 

service could deploy them overseas. Nonetheless, Collins issued instructions 

that, as of 1 February 1953, all personnel being shipped overseas would have 

at least nine months of usable service time remaining.19

17 Ltrs, Eddy to Col Maxwell Emerson, Cdr, 2d Quartermaster Gp, 7 May 1951, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; and Eddy to Gen J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army Chief 

of Staff (CSA), 12 Sep 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954, RG 

549, NACP. For more on the manpower problems faced by the U.S. Army during this period, 

see William M. Donnelly, “‘The Best Army That Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances’: 

The U.S. Army, July 1951–July 1953,” Journal of Military History 71 (July 2007): 809–47. 18 Ltr, Eddy to Collins, 12 Sep 1952. 19 Ltr, Collins to Eddy, 20 Oct 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1954, RG 549, NACP. 

Table 1—U.S. Army Strength in Europe

January 1951–December 1952

Date

EUCOM/

USAREUR

Seventh 

Army

1 January 1951 86,146 45,227

1 January 1952 231,651 162,228

31 December 1952 252,137 152,711

Source: Annual Historical Report, EUCOM, 1950; Annual Historical Report, EUCOM/USAREUR, 

1952; Seventh Army Command Report, 1951.
The New Mission 2

With so many reinforcements arriving over the space of a few months, 

problems also arose with matching new units with their required equipment. 

In a letter dated 18 September 1951, Eddy notified General Mark W. Clark, 

chief of Army Field Forces, that many nondivisional support units were 

arriving in Germany without the minimum essential equipment required to 

carry out their missions. Some artillery units had trucks but no weapons, while 

another had received seventeen artillery pieces but no trucks to pull them. A 

few months later, the Seventh Army chief of artillery reported that thirteen 

heavy artillery battalions had arrived in theater with M4 tractors instead of 

the authorized M8 tractors. The limited ammunition carrying capacity of the 

M4 tractors forced EUCOM to issue additional two-and-one-half-ton trucks 

to make up the difference. For other units arriving without required items, 

the command sometimes took up to eighteen weeks to locate the missing 

equipment or to provide suitable replacements.20 

The most serious problem presented by the influx of reinforcements was a 

lack of suitable barracks to house the new troops. EUCOM had initiated an 

emergency construction program, but many incoming units still had to occupy 

facilities that placed them far from their intended deployment areas. Because the 

rehabilitation of existing kasernes—former German military installations—took 

less time than new construction, the command focused on preparing facilities it 

already owned, or could easily acquire from the Germans. By the end of 1951, 

work was in progress or already completed on seventy-six installations that 

EUCOM had acquired as part of its expansion plan.21

Unfortunately, as one EUCOM staff officer later noted, many units 

were “more or less stuck where the kasernes were,” at considerable distances 

from their deployment areas. The command simply did not have the money 

to purchase land near where the units ought to be. No one at the time, he 

concluded, was willing to push for more forward basing areas. As a result, the 

bulk of the Seventh Army’s tactical forces ended up located in the southern 

and central portion of the U.S. Zone and uncomfortably close to major centers 

of German population, cities such as Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Heidelberg, and 

Frankfurt. Although General Eddy attempted to relocate some units to the 

north and northeast along the main avenue of a possible Soviet advance, he 

noted that, no matter how he located them, large gaps remained.22

20 Ltr, Eddy to Gen Mark W. Clark, Ch of Army Field Forces, 18 Sep 1951; Rpt of Opns, 

HQ, Seventh Army Artillery, Jul 1952. Both in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, 

NACP. Memo, CWO W. R. Weigand, Asst Adj Gen, for CINC, EUCOM, 10 Apr 1952, sub: 

Units Arriving Without Full Equipment, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 21 Ltr, Eddy to Handy, 21 May 1951; Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, Building 

for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), pp. 63–76. 22 Quote from Interv, Lt Col James Shelton and Lt Col Edward Smith with Gen Bruce Palmer 

Jr., USAREUR G–3 Plans Ofcr, 27 Jan 1976, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI. Eddy, 

“Speech to Frankfurt Press Club,” 27 Mar 1951.
26 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Many of the resources necessary to begin preparing the troops for combat 

were also in short supply for EUCOM and the Seventh Army. The war in Korea 

caused occasional shortages in fuel and ammunition that could otherwise have 

gone to training. The most critical commodity, however, proved to be land. The 

combat units required firing ranges to support a wide variety of weapons as well 

as extensive tracts of open space for maneuver. The need to accommodate large 

bodies of troops spread across so wide an area further complicated matters. The 

addition of four new divisions plus associated army and corps headquarters and 

support elements necessitated the acquisition of much more land for training.23

Early in 1951, General Eddy laid out his requirements for additional training 

facilities in a letter to the EUCOM commander. He warned that planned 

troop increases would place a great strain on his available training resources, 

particularly firing ranges and maneuver space. He estimated that each division 

under his command would require maneuver space in its own locality suitable 

for use by units of up to regimental combat team size. He requested at least one 

additional major training area with facilities that could support division-level 

maneuvers and firing by tanks, artillery, and other long-range weapons. Eddy 

reminded General Handy that several of his units lacked areas where they 

could conduct small-unit training and independent exercises in the immediate 

vicinity of their kasernes. He recommended acquiring local training sites large 

enough to support small-arms firing ranges, facilities for demolitions training, 

and divisional training grounds where troops could train with a greater variety 

of weapons including mortars, grenades, rocket launchers, and .50-caliber 

machine guns.24

To alleviate some of the shortages, General Eddy recommended that U.S. 

forces acquire trespass rights from the Germans similar to those employed 

by the Wehrmacht in former days. This would allow U.S. forces to acquire 

the land they needed. In response, General Handy requested the assistance of 

John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, in negotiating with 

the Germans for the release of additional land for military use. By September 

1951, plans for local training areas began to take shape. EUCOM allocated 

the necessary funds and initiated an extensive range construction program.25

Requirements for large-scale maneuver areas presented different problems. 

Major exercises conducted by NATO, EUCOM, or the Seventh Army took place 

23 Memo, Col Richard Sears, EUCOM General Staff, for Ch of Army Field Forces, 22 Nov 

1950, sub: Strength and Training Status Report, Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1950–1952, RG 549, NACP; DF, Col Richard J. Hunt, Ch, Training Br, Seventh Army, to G–3, 

14 Mar 1951, sub: Additional Training Requirements for 1st Infantry Division, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Memo, G–3, Seventh Army, for Dep Ch of Staff 

for Opns, 17 Jan 1951, sub: Training Ammunition, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 

338, NACP. 24 Memo, Eddy for Handy, Jan 1951, sub: Summary of Seventh Army Training Needs, Entry 

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951. 25 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, p. 78; Seventh Army Cmd 

Rpt, 1951.
The New Mission 2

across much of West Germany with few restrictions on where troops could move 

or train. Such exercises precluded any live firing, however, and the expenses 

involved in reimbursing German civilians for damage done to their property 

or belongings forced Army leaders to limit most training to established areas. 

Existing sites at Grafenwöhr and Wildflecken had been adequate for unit 

training prior to the 1951 augmentations. A former Wehrmacht site in eastern 

Bavaria, Grafenwöhr had been the U.S. Army’s main training area since its 

return to tactical training in 1947. It covered more than fifty-six thousand acres 

and could house one thousand men in barracks and twenty thousand in tents. 

Grafenwöhr had varied terrain with rolling hills, forests, and lakes, which 

made it suitable for a wide range of activities. It was large enough to support 

multiple regiments, with small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery ranges. 

Plans to expand the facility to include tank and antiaircraft artillery ranges had 

been complicated by its proximity to the U.S.-Soviet zonal border and the need 

to relocate approximately fifteen thousand local civilians. Wildflecken was a 

much smaller training ground located approximately twenty miles southeast 

of Fulda. Opened by the Germans in 1938, the area served as a training site 

for low mountain warfare and had served as the training hub for several Nazi 

SS divisions during World War II. After the war, the area was one of the large 

collection points for displaced persons. The Seventh Army reopened the site as 

a training area in 1951. It covered 17,670 acres and could support a regimental 

combat team and light artillery. It also accommodated a number of small arms, 

machine gun, mortar, and demolition ranges.26

Army leaders looked for ways to supplement the two major training sites. 

In addition to Grafenwöhr and Wildflecken, American units had also trained 

periodically at Baumholder in the French Zone. In March, General Eddy and 

General Augustin Guillaume, the commanding general of French occupation 

forces in Germany, signed an agreement that standardized procedures governing 

use of the area. In exchange for maneuver and stationing rights in the U.S. 

Zone, the French turned over kasern and garrison portions of the area to the 

U.S. Army. The two forces agreed to joint use of ranges and training sites.27

A later pact signed in May divided the use of the training area on a fifty-fifty 

basis and gave the Seventh Army the right to full-time occupation of permanent 

housing at the camp. With that, U.S. troops and German construction crews 

descended on the facility to begin work on necessary improvements. By the end 

of the year, progress on the required ranges, recreation facilities, and additional 

26 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 200, Historians files, CMH; Wildflecken Training Area, posted at http://eaglehorse.org, copy in Historians files, CMH. 27 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Agreement Between Commanders in Chief of the United 

States Forces of Occupation and the French Forces of Occupation in Germany, 7 Mar 1951, 

Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Planning, Organization, and Training, Classified General 

Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP.
28 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

housing was well underway. Representatives of the two armies met quarterly 

to allocate range time and facilities.28

For the soldiers who trained there, Baumholder was renowned for its cold, 

rainy weather and the gritty mud that clung to everything and could literally 

dissolve boot socks. The only good thing about training at Baumholder, some 

remembered, was the French officers club. The food was outstanding and many 

American soldiers devoured the chateaubriand steak for two along with French 

fries and a dessert. Although the Alsatian beer was not terribly popular, the 

wine was always good.29

General Eddy’s recommendation that the Army requisition and establish 

a new division-size training area proved to be more difficult to carry out. The 

European Command had planned to obtain an area near Hammelburg, about 

sixty miles east of Frankfurt, but resistance from the local inhabitants was too 

strong. Early in 1952, however, the German government turned over to the 

U.S. Army a former German training site and some adjoining land near the 

town of Hohenfels.30 Comprising 40,378 acres, enough to accommodate two 

regimental combat teams, the area was located approximately twenty miles 

north of Regensburg. Further removed from the Czechoslovakian border than 

other U.S. training sites, Hohenfels was less vulnerable to a sudden attack from 

the east and a less provocative location for large-unit training. Work continued 

on the site through 1952, including construction of housing for ten thousand 

soldiers, tent areas for seven thousand more, thirty-two ranges of various 

types, and an urban combat facility designed to prepare troops for fighting in 

cities. The grounds were unsuitable for tank firing practice, however, due to 

restrictions on the types of ammunition that tanks could fire there. In the end, 

EUCOM abandoned proposals to expand the area so that tanks and antiaircraft 

artillery could fire because of the need to relocate civilians, the proximity of 

highways and railroads, and the requirement to shut down most of the training 

sites whenever larger-caliber ranges were in use.31

The lack of firing ranges for tank and antiaircraft artillery within the 

U.S. Zone proved to be an enduring problem. Throughout this period, U.S. 

forces used British tank ranges at Hohne, on the North German Plain east 

of Hannover; antiaircraft ranges at Putlos, about thirty miles east of Kiel on 

the Baltic Sea coast; and antiaircraft ranges on the Isle of Sylt, approximately 

28 Omer Anderson, “Boom Town,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 9 Dec 1951; DF, 

Ch, Training, Seventh Army, to G–3, 29 May 1951, sub: Report of Meeting Between EUCOM 

and FFA at Baden-Baden, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 29 David K. Holland’s vignette, in Tales from the Cold War: The 13th Armored Infantry Battalion on Freedom’s Frontier, ed. Donald M. Buchwald (Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 

2004), p. 83. 30 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951. 31 Grathwol and Moorhus, Building for Peace, p. 73; DF, Bell to Ch of Staff, Seventh Army, 

25 Jan 1952, sub: Report of Visit to Hohenfels and Hq Nurnberg Military Post, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, 

USAREUR, pp. 232–33, Historians files, CMH.
The New Mission 2

seventy miles north of Bremerhaven in the North Sea. The great distance U.S. 

soldiers had to travel to reach those facilities complicated support arrangements 

and constituted a serious security risk because the ranges were so far removed 

from the units’ designated defensive positions. For that reason, Army leaders 

continued to search for alternative sites.32 

Throughout the training process, perhaps the most important resource 

was the troops themselves. In order to turn groups of young, inexperienced 

soldiers into cohesive fighting units, the men had to be available for training 

and to remain in their assignments long enough for the full benefits of the 

process to take effect. This proved to be difficult to do. Shortly after the initial 

surge of reinforcements in 1951, many of the troops who had come to Europe 

with the new divisions returned to the United States, their terms of enlistment 

having expired. In the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, most of the national 

guardsmen who had become proficient in their combat specialties went home. 

The two units experienced a 35 percent loss in personnel between April and 

July 1952. The situation was even worse in the 4thInfantry Division, where 42 

percent of the enlisted strength departed for the United States between August 

and October.33 By the end of 1952, the Seventh Army reported that its training 

situation had become a treadmill on which units constantly labored but never 

advanced beyond a certain point.34

The availability of troops for training was complicated by the Seventh 

Army’s mission, which required its subordinate elements to maintain a presence 

in their designated sectors. This meant that the V Corps, for example, had 

to keep two armored cavalry squadrons, six infantry battalions, three tank 

battalions, four field artillery battalions, and various support organizations 

near areas of possible enemy approaches into the corps sector. In times of 

heightened tension, those forces had to leave their garrisons and move either 

to field locations or to defensive positions located along likely Soviet approach 

routes.35 Forces on alert could neither train at any distance from their home 

station, nor conduct any operations that might put excessive wear on their 

weapons, vehicles, or equipment because everything had to be ready to go to 

32 Memo, CG, 1st Constabulary Bde, for CG, Seventh Army, 16 Jan 1951, sub: Report of 

Operations at Hohne, Oct–Nov 1950, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; 

DF, Col Harold C. Davall, G–3 Training, Seventh Army, to G–3, 4 Nov 1952, sub: General 

Hendrick’s Conference, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Seventh Army 

Cmd Rpt, 1951; Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 75–78. 33 Ltr, Eddy to Collins, 12 Sep 1952; DF, Col Robert H. Adams, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, 

Seventh Army, to Ch of Staff, Seventh Army, sub: Enlisted Turnover in Newly Arrived Units, 

Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/

USAREUR, pp. 196–98. 34 Ltr, Eddy to Collins, 5 Nov 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 255. 35 Memo, Brig Gen Einar B. Gjelstein, Ch of Staff, Seventh Army, for Major Commands, 25 

Jul 1952, sub: Tactical Readiness of Seventh Army Units, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, 

RG 338, NACP.
30 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

war at a moment’s notice. The result was that many units could not conduct 

any significant field training except when they planned well enough in advance 

to visit one of the major training facilities once or twice a year.

Reorganization and Realignment

U.S. military leaders in Europe recognized the need for a command structure 

that could direct U.S. military units in the theater while maintaining an ability 

to integrate readily with NATO forces in an emergency. To that end, during the 

second half of 1952, the theater carried out a series of organizational changes 

to clarify command relationships and to align U.S. forces in Europe under 

NATO and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), leadership. Until August 1952, EUCOM was the senior U.S. military headquarters 

in Europe. A joint Army, Navy, and Air Force organization that answered 

originally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it had been responsible to SHAPE for 

operations since April 1951. In the meantime, the United States had activated 

two important military commands in Europe apart from EUCOM: the U.S. 

Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the U.S. Air Forces 

in Europe. In order to coordinate the administrative and supply activities of 

these two organizations with the main U.S. Army component in Europe, and 

to align all three underneath a single headquarters, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff created the U.S. European Command in August 1952. At the same time, 

General Matthew B. Ridgway succeeded General Dwight D. Eisenhower as 

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The establishment of the 

U.S. European Command gave Ridgway authority over U.S. forces in an area 

extending from Norway to Turkey.36

The reorganization had an effect that rippled down through the rest of 

the U.S. Army forces in the theater. Ridgway named the current EUCOM 

Commander, General Handy, to be his deputy and directed him to establish 

the new headquarters at Frankfurt. Two weeks later, on 15 August, the Seventh 

Army Commander, General Eddy, moved up to assume General Handy’s 

former position as commanding general of EUCOM, which had been redesignated U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, a World 

War II division commander who had most recently served as the deputy chief 

of staff for plans, U.S. Army, replaced Eddy as Seventh Army commander.37

36 HQ, USAREUR, General Concept of Command Structure and Relationships Under U.S. 

CINCEUR [Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command], 10 Sep 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/

USAREUR, pp. 1–2; Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, p. 156. 37 Msg, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), signed Ridgway, to Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 21 Jul 1952, Reference Number ALO–1374 and ALO–1375, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; James M. Quigley, “New 

7th Army Head Is Old Hand in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Oct 1952.
SEVENTH

U.S. ARMY

* Excluding Wiesbaden Military Post, but including Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.** Staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR, having certain assigned and attached units under command of respective chief of division, or director: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation.

Chart 2—Organizational Structure of United States Army, Europe

1 August 1952

TWELFTH

AIR FORCE

U.S. NAVAL FORCES

GERMANY

32d AAA

Brigade

66th CIC

Det

SP TRPS

HQ USAREUR

7961st

USAREUR Det

Military

Posts *

USAREUR

COMZ

7755th

Dependents

Schools

Detachment

7893d

U.S. Military Liaison Mission

to C-in-C Soviet Occcupied

Zone of Germany

7791st

Office of

U.S. Commander,

Berlin *****

7792d

Office of U.S.

High Commissioner,

Germany  

Subordinate

Commands

Major

Commands

Tech and ** 

Admin Divs

HEADQUARTERS,

U.S. ARMY,

EUROPE

7756th

Audit

Agency

7950th

JAMAG

***

Units

*** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting for operational purposes to U.S. EUCOM.  Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting for operational purposes directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.** *** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, on military matters but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on such functions as are directed.

Source: Command Report, Headquarters, USAREUR/EUCOM, 1952.
32 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

In the division of responsibilities between the two headquarters, U.S. 

EUCOM assumed command of all U.S. armed forces in Europe, excluding 

those in Berlin, Trieste, and Austria (Chart 2). U.S. Army, Europe, became 

the administrative headquarters for all Army forces in the same area, except 

for the forces in Austria and Trieste, both of which performed this function for 

themselves and reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The commander, 

U.S. EUCOM, delegated responsibility to the USAREUR commander for 

military aspects of the occupation of Germany and designated him as the single 

point of contact for dealing with the German Federal Republic and the Office 

of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. The primary mission assigned 

to the new U.S. EUCOM was to support the supreme allied commander and 

to represent U.S. policies and interests within SHAPE. In addition, it had 

responsibility for coordinating logistical and administrative matters of interest 

to all three military services, including procurement, negotiations for base rights, 

and military aspects of the Mutual Security Program for Europe.38

The system of military posts and subposts that had provided logistic and 

administrative support throughout the theater since 1947 also underwent 

reorganization (Map 3). This was particularly important because reinforcement 

and relocation of units and the introduction of support elements into France 

had drastically shifted concentrations of troops. Efforts to make the Seventh 

Army self-supporting had also served to lessen the importance of the support 

functions of military posts. 

With that in mind, USAREUR reduced its manpower requirements and 

administrative costs by consolidating dozens of posts and subposts throughout 

Germany into four principal commands. The Northern Area Command, led by 

Brig. Gen. Basil H. Perry, headquartered at Frankfurt, consolidated military 

posts and subposts around Frankfurt, Würzburg, and Bamberg. Under the 

command of General Cramer, the Southern Area Command, headquartered in 

Munich, absorbed installations located around Munich, Augsburg, Garmisch, 

Stuttgart, and Nuremberg. The Western Area Command included only the 

former Rhine Military Post along the western bank of the river. Its headquarters 

was at Kaiserslautern and it was commanded by Brig. Gen. Oliver W. Hughes. 

The former Heidelberg military post became the Headquarters Area Command 

under the leadership of Col. John F. Cassidy. The Berlin Command and the 

Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation were not included in the four areas but 

operated as separate commands assigned to USAREUR. The former Wiesbaden 

Military Post, which housed most of the U.S. Air Force personnel in the 

theater, came under the administrative control of the Twelfth Air Force. The 

four area commands reported directly to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 

38 Capt Russell A. Gugeler, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Redesignation of 

Headquarters European Command as Headquarters United States Army Europe 1952, 1954, 

Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives.
Rhine R

Elbe R

Rhine R

FRANCE

EAST GERMAN Y

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA

SWITZERLAND

NETHERLANDS

FRANKFURT DISTRICT

WÜRZBURG DISTRICT

NUREMBERG DISTRICT

AUGSBURG

DISTRICT

GARMISCH

DISTRICT

STUTTGART DISTRICT

MUNICH DISTRICT

WESTERN

AREA

SOUTHERN AREA

NORTHERN AREA

HEADQUARTERS

AREA

WIESBADEN

MILITARY POST

BERLIN

Kaiserslautern Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Munich

Erfurt

Kassel

Würzburg

Bamberg

Nuremberg

Regensburg

Karlsruhe

Stuttgart

Augsburg

Wiesbaden

Dresden

BERLIN Hannover

Bremerhaven

Hamburg

Pilsen

Garmisch

Leipzig

AREA COMMANDS

U .S. ARMY, EUROPE

1 December 1952

WEST GERMANY

Area Command Boundary (approximate)

District Boundary (approximate)

Area Command Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 3
34 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and inherited the same support missions previously performed by the posts and 

subposts.39

In general, area commanders were to provide supplies and services to units, 

agencies, and personnel stationed within their geographic areas. Responsibilities 

included the provision of such support services as medical and chaplain activities, the enforcement of rules of military conduct and discipline, the control of 

military police activities and functions, the maintenance of general and internal 

security and the preparation and justification of fund requirement estimates. In 

addition to their general courts-martial jurisdiction, area commanders assumed 

special and summary courts-martial jurisdiction over certain Army personnel 

located within their areas of responsibility.40

As if to recognize the de facto end of the Army’s role in the occupation 

of Germany, and its acceptance of its new mission to help defend Western 

Europe, USAREUR inactivated the last two remaining squadrons of the U.S. 

Constabulary. On 15 December 1952, with new units continuing to arrive and 

the command needing additional personnel to bring them up to full strength, 

the 15th and 24th Constabulary squadrons retired their colors and transferred 

their soldiers to other units within the Seventh Army.41

Identifying the Threat

As part of his tour of U.S. Army units in Europe in 1951, General 

Eisenhower asked soldiers, “Why are you in Germany?” Invariably, the answer 

was, “To keep the Russians out of Western Europe.” When the general then 

asked why that was important, soldiers frequently replied that if they had to 

fight the Soviets, it would be better to do so in Europe rather than wait to fight 

the battle in the United States. General Eddy believed that those two questions 

and the responses to them expressed the essence of the U.S. military mission 

in Germany. It was, therefore, essential for the soldiers and leaders under his 

command to learn as much as possible about their potential adversaries.42

39 Memorandum for Record (MFR), Brig Gen Edward J. O’Neill, USAREUR Acting Ch of 

Staff, 1 Dec 1952, sub: Conference on Reorganization with Generals Cramer, Perry, and O’Neill, 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 40 HQ, USAREUR, Monthly Post Commanders’ Conference Notes, 27 Oct 1952 and 1 Nov 

1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual 

Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 2; Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Area 

Commands in Germany: 1945–1970, Historians files, CMH. 41 Memo, Col Joseph A. Remus, Ch, USAREUR Organization and Equipment (O&E) Br, for 

CG, Seventh Army, 12 Nov 1952, sub: Inactivation of 15th and 24th Constabulary Squadrons, 

Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “USAREUR 

Orders Taps for Constabulary,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 Dec 1952. 42 DF, Bell to Ch of Staff, Seventh Army, 15 Aug 1951, sub: Letter for Commanding General’s 

Signature, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; “Why Are We in Europe? 

Yanks Ask: 12th Armored Battalion Explains Mission,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

17 Aug 1952.
The New Mission 3

The view from the Soviet side was somewhat different. Soviet leaders 

recognized that their devastated economy could not support a war with the 

West, and avoiding such a conflict became their most important objective. A 

history of bloody invasions from the West, however, had taught them to insulate 

themselves from Western expansionism. To that end, they intended to maintain 

their influence in Eastern Europe, holding those states as a buffer against 

Western encroachment. Also, because the most recent incursions had come at 

the hands of a united, militaristic Germany, it was an essential part of Soviet 

policy that Germany remain disarmed and, if not dismembered, then at least 

neutral or within the Soviet sphere of influence. Western protests over reparations exacted by the Soviets further bewildered Soviet leaders, who believed 

they had not received sufficient recognition for their World War II sacrifices. 

The growing mistrust of Western intentions, coupled with Joseph Stalin’s own 

personal paranoia only heightened the emerging Cold War tension.43

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 had forced the Soviet 

Union to build the largest army in the world. Although the Soviet armed forces 

had demobilized to some extent, by the end of 1950 they still outnumbered 

Western military units in Europe by approximately ten to one. By 1952, one 

NATO intelligence report estimated that the strength of Soviet bloc ground 

forces approached 6.5 million men, organized into 235 divisions. That number 

included sixty divisions from the satellite nations of Albania, Bulgaria, 

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Paramilitary forces in 

East Germany—trained, equipped, and supervised by the Soviets—provided 

an additional one hundred thousand soldiers. The report indicated that the 

strength, equipment, and fighting value of the satellite divisions were inferior to 

those of Soviet units, but it predicted an increase in numbers and an improvement in performance over the next few years. The report concluded that the 

expansion of its economy and the high state of readiness of its armed forces 

gave the Soviet Union the ability to launch a successful surprise attack against 

Western Europe, the Near East, or the Middle East. Soviet naval and air forces 

could also initiate attacks throughout the North Atlantic area.44

The CIA offered similar numbers in its own assessments but provided 

more detailed information about the Soviets’ economic potential and ability to 

mobilize. It warned that the Soviet economy was already at a high state of war 

readiness and that its productive capacity could maintain a major war effort 

without any significant escalation. One analysis predicted that the Soviet ground 

43 Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From 

Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jonathan Haslam, 

Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, Conn.: 

Yale University Press, 2011). 44 Rpt, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Atlantic Council Deputies, 8 

Feb 1952, sub: Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc 

Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, 

Organization, and Training Files, RG 549, NACP. 
36 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

forces could expand to a strength of 8 million men, organized into 320 divisions, 

within 30 days of beginning a full mobilization. Their satellites could also muster 

an additional five million reserves but would have difficulty equipping a ground 

force of that size. The CIA also believed that Soviet bloc forces were organized 

and positioned to initiate hostilities with little or no warning. Reinforcing 

this assessment, spot reports collected by Seventh Army intelligence analysts 

verified the forward deployment of numerous Soviet combat units throughout 

East Germany. Agency analysts concluded that the Soviets would continue to 

conduct aggressive political and psychological warfare and that the danger of 

military aggression would remain acute until the NATO powers achieved an 

adequate position of strength.45

The most immediate threat to Western forces in Germany was posed 

by the four regional commands the Soviets had left behind in their satellites 

and occupied territories. The Group of Occupation Forces in Germany, the 

Northern Group of Forces in Poland, the Central Group of Forces in Austria 

and Hungary, and the Southern Group of Forces in Romania each consisted 

of several infantry and tank formations of varying sizes that the Soviets could 

launch against the West.46

Far and away the most formidable of these formations was the Group of 

Occupation Forces in Germany. Formed in 1945 from the remnants of the 1st 

and 2d Belorussian Fronts, the group included six complete army headquarters: 

the 1st Guards Tank Army with its headquarters at Dresden, the 2d Guards 

Tank Army headquartered at Fürstenberg, the 3d Shock Army at Mägdeberg, 

the 3d Guards Mechanized Army at Luckenwalde, the 4th Guards Mechanized 

Army at Eberswalde, and the 8th Guards Army at Weimar-Nohra. Altogether, 

the Group of Occupation Forces in Germany constituted a mechanized 

force of 22 divisions with an estimated strength of 370,000 men. A July 1951 

NATO report on the Soviet order of battle estimated the force to consist of 

eight tank, ten mechanized, and four infantry divisions. Several intelligence 

reports throughout the period, however, noted that the Soviets were steadily 

upgrading the less mobile organizations. When fully mobilized, the Group of 

Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany included almost six thousand tanks 

and self-propelled guns with more than three thousand aircraft available in the 

theater. More ominously, NATO intelligence analysts believed that the Soviets 

45 CIA, The Strength and Capabilities of Soviet Bloc Forces to Conduct Military Operations 

Against NATO, 12 Oct 1951, CIA On-line Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, 

CMH; “100,000-Man Force Built in East Zone, UK Report,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Dec 1952; Mil Intel Rpts 66 to 68, HQ, Seventh Army, 5, 12, and 19 May 1952, Entry 

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. Several good works describe Soviet views 

regarding the relationship between military forces and political goals. Two are Harriet F. Scott 

and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); 

V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View) (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974). 46 Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 30–50–1, Handbook on the Soviet and Satellite 

Armies, March 1953, pp. 14–15.
The New Mission 3

could expand the force in Germany to 75 to 90 divisions and more than 50,000 

aircraft within a few weeks.47

As they attempted to prepare their defenses against this overwhelming 

force, U.S. military planners paid a great deal of attention to the tactics and 

doctrine of their potential opponent. They believed that Soviet battle doctrine 

in the postwar period would reflect the lessons the Red Army had learned while 

fighting the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front during World War II. A study 

of Red Army tactics during that conflict and reports from current Communist 

military exercises indicated that once the Soviets went on the offensive, they 

took advantage of their numerical edge in artillery and tanks to overwhelm their 

opponent. Massed artillery and mortars, often more than three hundred tubes 

per one thousand yards of front, bombarded enemy positions prior to an attack. 

Assault forces spearheaded by large numbers of tanks then struck defensive 

positions at several points across a broad front. Infantry divisions, organized 

like their western counterparts on a triangular basis, would advance on fronts as 

narrow as two miles with two regiments forward and one in reserve. Battalion 

and regimental commanders took positions where they could observe their entire 

formations throughout the attack, a clear difference from U.S. tactics where 

regimental commanders seldom could see both flanks of their formations in 

combat. A second division followed the leading wave, sometimes at a distance 

of less than 750 yards. When the first echelon began to slow down, the second 

reinforced or passed through as the circumstances required. Additional armored 

formations followed in subsequent waves, seeking to build on success until a 

breakthrough occurred. When it did, mechanized forces or cavalry pushed 

through the breach to attack the defender’s rear while less maneuverable infantry 

expanded the breach and mopped up along the main battle line.48

In this context, much of the organizational and technological development 

in the Soviet Army throughout the early 1950s focused on increasing the mobility 

of its offensive forces and the pace of their attacks. Reforms after World War 

II increased the number of tanks and assault guns in the attack and provided 

trucks and armored transport for much of the supporting infantry. Infantry regiments and divisions became mechanized, with a tank regiment assigned to each 

47 Ibid.; David C. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (London: Janes Publishing 

Company, 1981), p. 24; An. D to SHAPE Emergency Defense Plan (EDP) 1–52, An Estimate 

of Soviet Capabilities and Possible Courses of Action in the Event of a War Beginning Between 

Now and 1 July 1952, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH; App. A to International 

Defense Review (IDR) (51)–1, Soviet Land Forces in Germany Order of Battle, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH; Sean M. Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO 

Brigade in Germany, 1951–1993 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), p. 35. 48 Memo, Lt Gen Joseph M. Swing, Commandant, U.S. Army War College, for Ch, Army 

Field Forces, 18 May 1951, sub: Defense on a Wide Front, Annex C, Soviet Tactical Doctrine, 

Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training Files, RG 549, NACP; 

DA Pam 30–50–1, Handbook on the Soviet and Satellite Armies, March 1953, pp. 18–27; “Soviet 

Postwar Tactical Doctrine,” lecture material compiled and edited by the Office of the Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G–2, Historians files, CMH.
38 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

mechanized division. The increased mobility allowed commanders to maintain 

the rapid tempo of an attack, to facilitate surprise, to retain the initiative, and 

to hinder the enemy’s ability to recover and to delay the advance. As they had 

during World War II, Soviet military planners regarded the offensive as the 

principal form of warfare and considered defensive operations only when the 

balance of forces was unfavorable or when preparing to resume the attack.49 

In order to reassure their own troops in the face of such overwhelming Soviet 

military strength, U.S. intelligence briefings often focused on the hardships 

and vulnerabilities of the individual Soviet soldier. Briefers observed that the 

Soviet soldier was tough and accustomed to severe hardships but that he had 

been taught all his life to follow the orders of his superiors, both military and 

political. As a result, individual soldiers were unlikely to display initiative 

on their own in the absence of their leaders. U.S. analysts believed that the 

Soviets’ non-Slavic soldiers from east and central Asia were poorly educated 

and less disciplined. While some elite formations, such as those designated as 

Guards, would be formidable opponents, Western analysts believed that the 

regular Soviet units were inferior and not as well-trained and equipped as their 

Western counterparts.50

Overriding all U.S. and NATO concern for enemy doctrine and military 

capability, however, was the Soviet development of atomic weapons. By the 

beginning of 1951, the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union possessed plutonium 

bombs with an explosive power of roughly 20 kilotons. It predicted that by 

1954 the Soviets might have as many as two hundred such weapons at their 

disposal. Already, their air force had sufficient aircraft and bases of operation 

to attempt an atomic strike against the United States or the United Kingdom. 

With this in mind, most U.S. military and political leaders believed that the 

Soviets would retain their atomic weapons for strategic strikes against Western 

cities and that, until more were available, it was unlikely they would use them 

against military targets on a European battlefield. Because of this, USAREUR 

leaders expressed more immediate concern about the large stock of chemical 

weapons the Soviets already possessed and their research and development of 

biological agents.51

As they refined their analyses, Western intelligence agencies identified 

three primary avenues through which an invading Soviet force might advance 

into USAREUR’s sector (Map 4). The most important, known as the Hessian 

Corridor, ran in a generally southwesterly direction astride the Frankfurt49 Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View), pp. 171–73. 50 Rpt, USAREUR Intelligence School, sub: Outstanding General Characteristics Common 

to Soviet Soldiers, Entry 211, EUCOM General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 51 CIA, Estimate of Soviet Capabilities with Respect to New Weapons in 1951 and 1954, 2 

Feb 1950, CIA On-line Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH; CIA, The 

Strength and Capabilities of Soviet Bloc Forces to Conduct Military Operations Against NATO, 

12 Oct 1951. The development of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities is well covered in Steven 

J. Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945–1964 (Novato, 

Calif.: Presidio, 1993).
H O F C O R R I D O R

F U L D A G A P

N O R T H G E R M A N P L A I N

N O R T H A G

C E N T A G

Fulda

BERLIN

Kassel

Dortmund

Bremerhaven

Frankfurt

Kaiserslautern

Karlsruhe

Hamburg

Bremen

Nuremberg

Munich

Stuttgart

Cologne Dresden

BONN

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Rhine R

Elbe R

Rhine R

NORTH

SEA

DENMARK

EAST

GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LIECHTENSTEIN

WEST GERMANY

PRIMAR Y APPR O A CHES 

FOR SOVIE T A T T A C K

Main Axis of Attack

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 4
40 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Kassel autobahn, where gently rolling terrain favored large-scale mechanized 

operations. A portion of this approach, however, passed through a narrow 

region about fifty miles northeast of Frankfurt that was constricted by steep, 

wooded ridgelines. This potential choke point was known as the Fulda Gap. 

This was the most direct route from the Soviet Zone, and the Soviet 8th Guards 

Army was poised immediately across the border on the other side of the gap. 

Because the corridor was also the shortest route to France and the English 

Channel, and it exposed many of the major industrial cities in the U.S. Zone, 

the Seventh Army placed the V Corps, with its two infantry divisions and one 

armored division, in position to defend this approach.52

A second principal avenue of approach funneled through the Hof Gap, 

which began about one hundred miles east of Frankfurt and ran west-southwest 

from Nuremberg through Heilbronn and Karlsruhe. Although it was farther 

removed from the large Soviet army group in East Germany, it was readily 

accessible by smaller satellite forces in Czechoslovakia. The Seventh Army 

positioned the VII Corps, the smaller of the two, to defend this more indirect 

approach. Although the region’s well-developed system of east-west highways 

and generally favorable terrain offered an attacker excellent mobility, the 

analysts noted that the area’s forests and high ground gave defenders good 

observation and fields of fire.53

Other potential avenues of approach demanded less attention from 

the Seventh Army. The Meiningen Gap, midway between the two primary 

approaches, ran southwest from the zonal border near Mellrichstadt to the 

vicinity of Mannheim. The analysts noted that ridgelines and rivers within the 

area formed a natural series of obstacles and barriers that would slow a Soviet 

advance. The North German Plain stretching west from Berlin offered much 

more open terrain for an armored assault, and the Soviet 3d Shock Army 

occupied billets just across the border in East Germany. This route, however, 

ran outside the area for which the U.S. Army had primary responsibility. Halting 

an advance in that region would be the mission of the British Army of the 

Rhine, later reinforced by military forces from Belgium and the Netherlands.54

Firepower and Mobility: The Seventh Army’s Conventional Doctrine

Although it represented a formidable combat force, the Seventh Army could 

not match the numerical superiority possessed by the Soviets. Soviet forces 

within striking distance of Germany outnumbered U.S. and NATO units in 

personnel, tanks, and almost all major combat systems. As a result, from its 

52 An. B to SHAPE EDP 1–52, An Estimate of Soviet Capabilities and Possible Courses of 

Action in the Event of a War Between Now and 1 July 1952; HQ, Seventh Army, Effects of 

Weather and Terrain on Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Capabilities, 25 Feb 1957, Entry 

33505, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid.
The New Mission 4

inception, the Seventh Army had to develop battle plans that would enable it 

to fight and win while outnumbered. Leaders planned to do this by building on 

the service’s World War II organization and doctrine. Divisions retained their 

traditional triangular structure, providing for two maneuver elements that could 

advance together or independently toward one or more objectives, and maintain 

a reserve that would push forward to assist in exploiting a breakthrough. In a 

defensive posture, division commanders would normally deploy two regiments 

forward along the main battle line while keeping the third to the rear, poised 

to counterattack.

Reports of the General Board, European Theater of Operations, and 

studies by the Historical Section of Army Ground Forces reflected the serious 

and diligent effort the Army made to learn from and build on its experience in 

World War II. The Army established the board in June 1945 to prepare a factual 

analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed during the war 

by U.S. forces in the European theater. Its report comprised more than 8,000 

pages in 131 volumes and made recommendations for the future organization 

and employment of almost all elements of the Army.55

The Army’s return to Europe also prompted its leaders to look to the 

German experience in World War II for doctrinal guidance. Military historians 

invested considerable effort in analyzing Germany’s campaigns on the Eastern 

Front and cataloging the lessons to be learned. The USAREUR Historical 

Division sponsored a foreign military studies program based initially on 

interrogations of Germany’s senior military leaders shortly after V-E Day. 

Information gathered in this way formed the basis for a number of Department 

of the Army pamphlets on such topics as Soviet combat methods in World 

War II; war on the Eastern Front as told from the German High Command’s 

perspective; and studies of operations and tactics at the corps, division, and 

regimental levels. To supplement the program, senior German officers with 

World War II experience against the Soviets spoke before assembled groups 

of American officers.56

While, in hindsight, much of the German assistance and advice might have 

seemed self-serving and often misleading, the Army had few other places to 

turn. Although many German officers presented perceptions gained early in the 

war when the Soviet Army had presented little resistance, others had conducted 

withdrawals and delaying actions in the face of superior Soviet forces. At a 

time when any assistance was better than no assistance at all, many of the U.S. 

55 Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Report of the General Board, ETO, 1946, CMH 

Library. 56 DF, Col Walter H. Parsons Jr., Ch, Opns, Seventh Army Engrs, to G–4, 24 Apr 1952, 

sub: Manuscript Data Sheet (Campaign Against Russia: Employment of German Second Army 

Engineers), Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Min, HQ, USAREUR, 

Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 23 Jan 1957, Entry 2117, USAREUR Organizational Planning Files, 1957–1965, RG 549, NACP; Monthly Rpts of Opns, HQ, Seventh 

Army, Jul and Aug 1953, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 
42 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

planners were also willing to overlook some of the uglier aspects of the German 

conduct in the Soviet Union if it meant they might obtain a few bits of useful 

information. If the same German scientists and engineers who had designed 

the V–1 and V–2 rockets that rained down on London could now be hard at 

work designing American missiles, U.S. military planners saw no reason why 

they should not profit from the experiences of the German Army during the 

Soviet campaigns.57

As a result, American attention to the lessons posed by the German 

experience was soon reflected in the operational doctrine the Seventh Army 

employed. Already confronted by a lack of training areas suitable for large-scale 

maneuvers, the Seventh Army began to adopt the German Army’s strong 

emphasis on small-unit tactics. Its plan for the defense of Western Europe 

soon began to resemble the German system of mobile defense with a lack of 

fixed linear defense concepts and an emphasis on a more active resistance in 

which tanks replaced antitank guns and tank destroyers as the primary antitank 

weapon.58

The war in Korea also helped to shape U.S. Army doctrine in Germany. The 

conflict had been going on for six months by December 1950 when the United 

States reactivated the Seventh Army in Germany. Army leaders from the chief 

of staff on down recognized the importance of transferring information and 

lessons learned through hard experience in Korea to the rest of the service. In 

a letter to General Eddy, who had just taken command of the Seventh Army, 

Army Chief of Staff General Collins discussed lessons from the conflict that 

Eddy could apply to training in Germany. Collins did not believe that the U.S. 

experience in Korea to date indicated any need for drastic revisions in training 

and doctrine. Instead, he stressed the importance of aggressive leadership 

at all levels of command and insisted that training that developed absolute 

proficiency in basic combat skills and encouraged the innate resourcefulness 

of the American soldier would produce the best results. Eddy passed the letter 

on to his corps and division commanders.59

The formal training and doctrine apparatus of the Army also identified 

critical lessons from the conflict and distributed them across the force. Operating 

under a contract with the Department of the Army, the Operations Research 

Office at Johns Hopkins University submitted a semiannual report in June 

1952 that discussed thirteen ongoing projects in Korea. These included studies 

on the effectiveness and lethality of various weapons, guerrilla operations, the 

effect of fatigue on soldier performance, and the infantryman’s load. Although 

57 Edward J. Davies II and Ronald M. Smelser, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The NaziSoviet War in American Popular Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 58 Memo, Col Francis T. Pachler, Ch, EUCOM Plans Br, for Training Br, 14 Apr 1952, sub: 

Defense on a Wide Front, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 

549, NACP; Kevin R. Soutor, “To Stem the Tide: The German Report Series and Its Effect on 

American Defense Doctrine, 1948–1954,” Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993): 653–88. 59 Ltr, Collins to Eddy, 7 Feb 1951, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
The New Mission 4

distribution of the report was limited, copies did find their way to USAREUR 

and the Seventh Army headquarters.60 The Office of the Chief, Army Field 

Forces, also published extracts from classified command reports of units fighting 

in Korea. It furnished copies throughout the Army Staff and to all schools and 

major commands in the service. The extracts contained specific information 

and recommendations derived from unit experiences in combat. They suggested 

improvements in training, modifications in weapons and equipment, and tactical 

innovations across the force.61 In other training bulletins, the office published 

detailed critiques of significant combat actions in Korea. One paper, distributed 

in December 1951, contained a discussion of the battle for Hill 1243, known as 

Heartbreak Ridge. It noted the need for closer infantry-artillery-air coordination 

and careful prior planning of air and artillery support. The report also pointed 

out that the failure of junior officers to issue complete orders to their soldiers 

caused confusion during the action.62

In Europe, the USAREUR and Seventh Army training staffs provided 

opportunities for veterans coming to the command from Korea to share their 

experiences. Units at various levels scheduled lectures and meetings with 

these veterans and encouraged all personnel to attend.63 In January 1953, the 

28th Infantry Division in Germany and the 45th Infantry Division in Korea 

initiated a program in which soldiers in each unit exchanged letters with their 

counterparts in the other. Dubbed “Operation Buddy,” the program allowed 

the troops of the two divisions to form friendships and gave the men in Europe 

a chance to question and learn from their counterparts seeing action in Korea. 

In one such letter, the commander of a frontline company in the 45th Division 

related to his counterpart in the 28th the importance of training men in noise and 

light discipline at night. Being able to suppress a cough or to read a map without 

rustling the paper might make the difference in concealing a position from 

enemy infiltrators. Another letter between company first sergeants discussed the 

difficulties of keeping forward-deployed troops supplied with water. Brig. Gen. 

John G. Van Houten, assistant commander of the 28th Division, summarized 

60 Semiannual Rpt, Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 30 Jun 1952, 

Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 61 Memo, Col T. J. Smith, Asst Adj Gen, Army Field Forces, for Army Staff and Major 

Commands, 4 Dec 1952, sub: Dissemination of Combat Information, Entry 2105, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. Another formal attempt by the Army 

to capture and distribute tactical lessons learned from Korea resulted in the Army Historical 

Series publication by Russell A Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1954). 62 Office, Ch of Army Field Forces, Training Bull 8, Combat Information: Critique of Battle 

for Hill 1243, 27 Dec 1951, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 63 HQ, Seventh Army, Daily Bull, 30 Jan 1952, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 

338, NACP; “Korea Vets Tell 1st Div Officers of Tactical, Medical Problems,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 18 Jan 1953.
44 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the program by saying that it helped his men answer the question, “What can 

I do to make myself combat ready?”64

The conflict in Korea provided lessons in combating a numerically superior 

foe, but the nature of that war made Army leaders in Europe reluctant to place 

too much reliance on the developments in tactics, organization, and equipment 

that it seemed to suggest. Neither the North Korean nor the Chinese armies 

employed the type of mechanized assault force the Americans expected to 

face in Europe. While Korea highlighted the killing power of massed field 

artillery, a lesson not lost on those planning for combat in Europe, the country’s 

mountainous terrain channeled forces into narrow valleys and offered few 

opportunities for the war of movement emphasized by the German doctrine 

of mobile defense. Although the Army made a serious effort to incorporate 

lessons learned in Korea across the entire force, its senior officers also argued 

that nothing truly new had come to light. The chief of the Organization and 

Training Division of the General Staff, Brig. Gen. David A. D. Ogden, observed 

that, while units had learned some new techniques and ideas, in most instances 

it was a case of learning old lessons over again.65

The battle plans and operational doctrine that began to emerge in the 

Seventh Army in 1951 thus combined many of the elements gleaned from 

the Army’s most recent experiences. General Eddy, for example, recognized 

that a traditional fixed defense employing static, fortified positions would not 

hold in the face of the overwhelming numbers the Soviets could field. The 

Seventh Army lacked sufficient combat forces, he noted, to defend in strength 

all along its assigned front and even if he could gather the forces required to 

halt a determined attack, they would then present lucrative targets for massed 

Soviet artillery or air-dropped atomic munitions.66 Instead, embracing the 

German concept of mobile defense, he planned to deploy his armored cavalry 

regiments forward to provide early warning, to force the attackers into assault 

formations, and to determine the main directions of an attack. Once the units 

had made initial contact with an invading force as it crossed the interzonal 

border, the armored cavalry units would harass the advancing formations, 

inflicting casualties as they pulled back.67

Most of the Seventh Army battle plans assumed a period of rising hostilities, 

prior to an actual attack, during which the commander could position his 

forces and make final preparations for combat. Although the armored cavalry 

64 “Europe GI’s Adopt Korea Vets,” Army Times, 7 Feb 1953; “Buddy Men in Korea Pass 

the Word to Germany: Practice Night Problems,” Army Times, 4 Apr 1953. Quote from “28th 

Inf Buddy Mail Gives Zone Infantrymen Combat Hints Battle-Tested in Korea by 45th Div,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 23 Mar 1953. 65 “Army Fitting Korea Lessons into Training,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Jun 

1951. 66 Memo, Lt Col Fred J. Martineau, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Major Units and Staff, 

2 Apr 1952, sub: Defense on a Wide Front (Mobile Defense), Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 67 Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, pp. 88–93.
The New Mission 4

regiments occupied positions well forward—and Seventh Army’s standing 

orders required both corps to maintain a percentage of combat forces in the 

vicinity of the primary approach corridors—the vast majority of the army’s 

combat power occupied garrisons well removed from their initial battle positions. In order to get those units into position for combat, the Seventh Army 

established a three-level escalating alert system. During the initial level, an order 

for simple alert directed antiaircraft units to move to their assembly areas and 

engineer units to move to designated bridging or demolition sites. Upon receipt 

of the order, corps headquarters canceled all leaves and passes, and recalled 

their personnel from military schools. The order also directed units engaged 

in training away from their assigned battle positions to return to garrison to 

prepare for deployment.68

Two further alert levels completed the system. At the second level, the 

reinforced alert ordered further steps to prepare the Seventh Army for combat. 

Upon receipt of this order, the V and VII Corps began to deploy their units 

to initial battle positions. Air defense restricted zones became effective, and 

engineer units began construction of temporary bridges and ferries to aid 

in the evacuation of noncombatants. Other engineer units placed charges 

and prepared to execute demolition plans. Military police units, along with 

area commands, began the process of evacuating noncombatants from the 

anticipated battleground back to safe areas in France, Spain, and the United 

Kingdom. All tactical headquarters established and tested their designated 

communications nets. Area commands opened logistical supply points and 

initiated rear area security plans. The order for reinforced alert brought Seventh 

Army to the point where it was ready for war. The final level, the order for 

general alert, indicated that hostilities were imminent.69

The SHAPE Emergency Defense Plan for 1952 directed the Seventh Army, 

as part of Central Army Group (CENTAG), to conduct a delaying action as far 

forward as possible in order to allow time to evacuate noncombatants from the 

battle area and to allow the bulk of allied forces to withdraw to the west of a 

line marked by the Rhine and Ijessel Rivers in western Germany. This was the 

farthest to the east that SHAPE leaders believed they could hold a defensive 

line given the forces they had available. Once Soviet ground forces penetrated 

to the Rhine, a maximum allied effort, employing land and air forces with all 

forms of atomic support, would attempt to hold on that line. The plan called for 

withdrawing forces to make maximum use of demolitions to delay the Soviets 

and to deny them the use of important installations such as airfields, bridges, 

telecommunications sites, and supply dumps. Although Seventh Army units 

were to engage advancing Soviet units where they could in order to slow down 

the advance, the leadership’s paramount concern was to preserve its primary 

68 Operation Order (OPORD) OSA 2–52, Order for Simple Alert, HQ, Seventh Army, 10 

Aug 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 69 OPORD ORA 2–52, Order for Reinforced Alert, HQ, Seventh Army, 10 Aug 1952, Entry 

2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
46 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

forces intact for the defense of the Rhine. Wooded and hilly terrain in the area 

of the Fulda and Hof Gaps offered possible temporary defensive positions. 

Guidance from SHAPE headquarters also recommended delaying positions 

along the Weser and Ems Rivers in the north, on the Fulda River and nearby 

favorable defensive terrain in the center, and on the Main River–Ludwig Canal 

and Neckar River in the south.70

With this guidance in mind, as the cavalry units pulled back, they would 

eventually pass through forward elements of the infantry divisions. In the area 

around the Fulda Gap, the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment would pass off 

the delaying mission to detachments from the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions. 

Farther south, in the area around the Hof Gap, the 2d and 6th Armored 

Cavalry Regiments would hand off the battle to smaller elements of the 28th 

and 43d Infantry Divisions. These tank and infantry units would continue the 

delaying action and then withdraw to successive positions along riverlines, at 

70 An. B to SHAPE EDP 1–52, An Estimate of Soviet Capabilities and Possible Courses of 

Action in the Event of a War Between Now and 1 July 1952; An. C to SHAPE EDP 1–52, Operations in Retardation of Soviet Advances, 9 Jan 1952, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, 

CMH; Morris Honick and Edd M. Carter, SHAPE Histories: The New Approach, July 1953–

November 1956 (Brussels, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, 1976), p. 36.

Engineers from Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, build a ferry for the 1st Infantry 

Division during Exercise Combine.
The 19th Infantry patrol sets up a .57-mm. recoilless rifle near Hanau on 6 October 1951.

Soldiers use straw to conceal their M26 tank near Hanau during Exercise Combine in 

October 1951.
48 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

road junctions, and other potential choke points, trading space for time and 

inflicting maximum casualties on the Soviets as they advanced. A successful 

delaying action would depend on small combat forces holding critical road 

centers and dominant terrain for as long as possible by employing preplanned 

demolitions, minefields, and the fire of all supporting weapons. Commanders 

plotted “killing grounds,” where they could slow down and bottle up an 

advance long enough to concentrate all available firepower on the enemy forces. 

Nonetheless, the wide fronts that individual units would have to cover required 

U.S. forces to become more self-reliant. They could not expect to find friendly 

units immediately to their right or left.71

As the defenders continued to pull back, massed artillery and mortar fire 

would break up enemy assault formations and inflict casualties. Traditionally, 

massed artillery had always been one of the strengths of the U.S. Army, and 

doctrine for its employment specified that field artillery battalions were never 

to be held in reserve. Therefore, Seventh Army commanders positioned most 

of their artillery well forward to engage advancing Soviet forces as soon as 

possible. As attacking forces continued their advance, the artillery units would 

displace to the rear by battery, always keeping two-thirds of their firepower in 

action. U.S. commanders could call on forty-six battalions of field artillery and 

71 Memo, Col Robert C. Gildart, Acting Dep Ch of Staff, Plans, Seventh Army, for CG, 43d Inf 

Div, 21 May 1952, sub: Delaying Action, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.

The V Corps Artillery Fire Support Control Center, February 1952
The New Mission 4

eighteen battalions of antiaircraft artillery in addition to the mortars organic 

to their infantry battalions. The ability of American gunners to concentrate 

fire on a single target and to deliver it in a single, simultaneous volley (the 

time-on-target) had made them the most proficient in the world during World 

War II. This would be a considerable battlefield advantage.72

Maintaining the level of support necessary to do all this required an 

organization and system of communication that allowed rapid transmission 

of target information from a forward observer on the front line back to an 

artillery fire direction center farther to the rear. The extended distances that the 

defense had to cover and the frequent movement of all units involved tested the 

limits of existing communications equipment and systems for all of the Seventh 

Army’s units. General Eddy told EUCOM’s commander, General Handy, in 

1952 that if all the studies and boards conducted up to that point were correct, 

signal communications range requirements for the Army’s “Defense on a Wide 

Front” doctrine greatly exceeded existing capabilities. He believed his units 

needed additional radios and other modernized communications gear as soon 

as possible in order to implement the tactics Eddy envisioned.73

Despite the enormous firepower available to the Seventh Army, U.S. 

military leaders in Europe were under no illusion that they could halt a 

determined Soviet offensive without additional reinforcements. The distance 

between a potential Soviet crossing of the inter-German border and the main 

line of defense along the Rhine River was, in some places, less than eighty 

miles. Once the U.S. forces fell back to the west behind the Rhine, they lined 

up with elements of the French I Corps near Koblenz on their northern flank 

and elements of the French II Corps near Strasbourg on their southern flank. 

With the limited forces available, the best the NATO forces could hope for was 

to delay the enemy advance for as long as possible and to retain control of ports 

of entry along the French coast to allow reinforcing units to enter the theater. 

Most senior officers agreed that the Rhine River offered the best place for U.S. 

and allied forces to make their most determined defense. From that position, 

the CENTAG commander could launch local counterattacks to seal off enemy 

penetrations and to destroy isolated units. General Eddy planned to use the 

2d Armored Division in this capacity because the mission would put the unit’s 

mobility, firepower, and shock action to the best use. Army leaders recognized, 

however, that without timely reinforcements, or without the introduction of 

72 Memo, Col Lynwood D. Lott, Asst Adj Gen, EUCOM, for Seventh Army Distribution, 11 

Sep 1952, sub: Order of Battle, USAREUR, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; DA Field Manual (FM) 6–20, Artillery Tactics and Technique, 

October 1953. 73 HQ, Seventh Army, Training Cir 5, Infantry-Artillery Cooperation, 20 Oct 1952, Entry 

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Ltr, Eddy to Handy, 18 Apr 1952, Entry 

2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP.
50 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

atomic weapons in support of their defense, they could not hope to maintain 

the Rhine River defense line indefinitely.74

In 1951, the Seventh Army sought to test these ideas and to refine its battle 

plans in a series of major field exercises. Starting in October with Exercise 

Combine, observers noted that much of the force’s training seemed too

closely related to World War II tactical experiences. In the preliminary after 

action report on the exercise, umpires identified a need for further work and 

concentrated training on a wide range of subjects. In particular, they stressed 

a need for additional emphasis on small-unit training and individual soldier 

skills, particularly in the conduct of delaying actions, the type of operation in 

which they were most likely to be engaged. The report recommended that the 

tempo of the exercises be increased so that small-unit actions could take place 

at more nearly the speed that would be experienced under combat conditions.75

74 Memo, Pachler for Training Br, 14 Apr 1952, sub: Defense on a Wide Front; SHAPE 

Emergency Defense Plan 1–52, 1 Dec 1951, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH. 75 Preliminary After Action Report (AAR) FTX–51 (Combine), HQ, Seventh Army, Entry

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.

Situation map for Exercise Combine, October 1951
The New Mission 5

The most frequent issue that arose in exercise critiques was an unrealistic 

assumption that ground units would retain the same almost unlimited air 

support they had enjoyed during the campaign across Europe at the end of 

World War II. Even so, air-ground coordination was poor throughout the 

maneuvers. To some extent, this reflected the postwar military reorganization 

and the formation of an independent U.S. Air Force dedicated to the concept 

of strategic bombing. Also, as the commanding general of the Twelfth Air 

Force in Europe, Maj. Gen. Dean C. Strother, indicated, in the event of war his 

command would be concerned primarily with the defeat of the enemy air force 

in the air and not with the support of ground forces.76 Although the Twelfth 

Air Force supported most major exercises and its officers worked closely 

76 Drew Middleton, “Seventh Army in Line to Beat Off Attack by Aggressor from East,” New 

York Times, 4 Oct 1951; Memo, Martineau for Seventh Army Distribution, 14 Feb 1952, sub: 

Exercise Leap Year, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Drew Middleton

“Juin Depicts War Against the Russians,” New York Times, 12 Oct 1951; John Schlight, Help 

from Above: Air Force Close Air Support of the Army, 1946–1973 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force 

History and Museums Program, 2003), p. 189.

An armored half track of the aggressor forces moves out on a reconnaissance mission 

during Exercise Combine.
52 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

with Seventh Army representatives to refine close air support procedures, Air 

Force commanders placed a much lower degree of emphasis on training and 

equipping their forces for ground support missions than their Army Air Corps 

predecessors in World War II had. In particular, Army and Air Force leaders 

sparred over operational control of tactical air units in an emergency. Senior 

Army leaders, General Eddy in particular, pressed for ground force control 

over close air support. This position was anathema to Air Force doctrine and 

bitterly contested by its officers.77

Subsequent exercises over the next year helped to refine doctrine and war 

plans to some extent, but they were primarily designed to evaluate the level of 

training throughout the command. In July 1952, the Seventh Army participated 

in Command Post Exercise (CPX) Grand Alliance, conducted by the NATO

Central Army Group headquarters. Tactical headquarters and staffs down to 

division and separate brigade level participated in training that tested their 

abilities to orchestrate a range of military operations and to coordinate planning 

with headquarters and personnel of other nations. The most crucial aspect of 

the training was for unit headquarters and staffs at all levels to demonstrate an 

ability to communicate with one another. Criticisms of the operation noted poor 

signal planning and numerous lapses in communications security. Encryption 

and subsequent decryption of secure message traffic took far too much time 

to support fast-moving operations. The final report on the exercise concluded 

that all units required considerable improvement in the timely reporting of 

information, particularly that involving air support or enemy order of battle.78

Other exercises, such as Rose Bush and Equinox, in September 195

combined U.S. forces with allied units to test the ability of different nationalities 

to work in concert. In Rose Bush, components of the U.S. V Corps and th

French II Corps defended against an aggressor force composed of the U.S. 2d 

Armored Division and the French 1st Armored Division. Commanders staged 

the event as a free maneuver with no fixed scenario to restrain decision making. 

For three days, the defenders conducted an extended delaying action, counterattacking whenever possible, as the invaders advanced toward the Rhine. The 

critique that followed indicated that while communications security remained 

a concern, General Eddy’s emphasis on small-unit leadership and training had 

paid off for the Seventh Army in the competence and aggressiveness its soldiers 

and noncommissioned officers had shown. However, General Dahlquist, the V 

Corps commander, raised some concerns about the exercise’s lack of realism. 

77 Memo, Col Einar B. Gjelstein, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, Seventh Army, 17 Apr 

1951, sub: Joint Training Directive For Air-Ground Operations, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Ltr, Eddy to Gen John E. Hull, 

Vice Ch of Staff, 13 Feb 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP; Schlight, Help from Above, p. 219. 78 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Seventh Army, G–3 Section, 1–31 Jul 1952; Memo, Maj Fred E. Hansard, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 31 Jul 1952, sub: Critique of CPX Grand

Alliance. Both in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 33
The 43d Infantry Division field dental clinic, December 1952
54 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

He noted the great difficulty in trying to reproduce for the unit commanders the 

intensity of combat. He recounted an instance where he encountered a young 

soldier standing near a bridge whose job it was to inform oncoming units that 

the bridge had been blown up and the road had been mined. The procedure, 

the general said, could not replicate the stress faced by a young commander 

discovering the mines for himself.79

One week later the VII Corps took its turn in Exercise Equinox, with the

43d Infantry Division and elements of the French I Corps defending against 

attacks mounted by the 28th Division supported by the French 4th Division 

and a group from the French 25th Airborne Division. Despite some language 

and communication barriers, the two nations demonstrated their ability to 

79 HQ, Seventh Army, Critiques of Exercise Rosebud for Subordinate Seventh Army Units, 7

Sep 1952, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, Guest 

Observer Division, Exercise Rose Bush, Frankfurt Military Post, Critique Notes, 9 Sep 1952

V Corps Command Reports, RG 407, NACP; Howard Kennedy, “Here’s What Exercise Ros

Bush Was All About,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 Sep 1952

Soldiers fry chicken for Company E, 22d Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, during a field 

exercise in November 1952.
The New Mission 5

coordinate their actions. The maneuver director, French Lt. Gen. Roger J. 

Noiret, praised all participants for the teamwork they had exhibited.80

Early Thoughts on an Atomic Option

Through the end of 1951, the Seventh Army planned only for a conventional 

defense. Officially, the U.S. Army had yet to consider atomic weapons as 

firepower available to support a war on the ground. Nonetheless, some 

individual officers had already begun to consider how to use atomic weapons 

to support conventional battlefield maneuvers. Army professional publications 

such as Military Review and Army Information Digest had printed several 

articles on the subject.81 Then, in November 1951, the Army published Field 

Manual 100–31, Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons, which incorporated many of 

the ideas advanced in the professional journals into the service’s first attempt 

at formulating a tactical nuclear doctrine. The manual expressed the service’s 

position that atomic weapons were not “absolute” weapons that could end 

conflicts all by themselves. Instead, they were powerful new weapons that had 

to be properly integrated into tactical operations.82

From 2 January to 20 February 1952, the Army conducted a two-sided 

tactical exercise in upstate New York, employing the 3d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, the 11th Airborne Division, and the 278th Regimental Combat Team. 

Exercise Snowfall was the first maneuver to include the simulated tactical us

of atomic weapons. Both friendly and aggressor forces dropped notional atomic 

bombs from aircraft to break up enemy formations and to facilitate maneuvers 

on the ground. Commanders experimented with procedures for target selection 

and the effects of atomic explosions on troops and equipment.83

At the same time, the Army also initiated a series of tests at Yucca Flats, 

Nevada, to study the effects of an atomic detonation on troop behavior. Known 

as the Desert Rock exercises, the project exposed troops, under varying degree

of protection, to atomic explosions. The researchers also placed military equipment, vehicles, and tethered animals at assorted distances from the detonation 

to assess the blast and heat effects. Besides becoming conditioned to the 

concept of atomic combat, the participants in the effort learned that, properly 

dispersed and protected, they could survive an atomic explosion and continue 

80 Cmd Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 204–06; William G. Mahoney, “Noiret 

Cites Equinox Teamwork,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 28 Sep 1952. 81 “Time for an Atomic Army,” Combat Forces Journal 2 (November 1951): 30; “When an

A-Bomb Falls,” Army Information Digest 5 (April 1950): 18–24; Nels A. Parson Jr., “Tactical 

Use of Guided Missiles,” Army Information Digest 5 (September 1950): 30–35; E. W. Sheppard, “Defense in Atomic Warfare,” Military Review 29 (January 1949): 104–06; Maddrey A. 

Solomon, “Dispersion Is ‘Not’ the Answer,” Military Review 31 (June 1951): 41–48; Chester F. 

Allen, “Dispersed, Yet Organized,” Military Review 30 (July 1950): 24–30. 82 DA FM 100–31, Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons, November 1951. 83 Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935–1964 (Fort 

Monroe, Va.: U.S. Continental Army Command, 1969), p. 167.
56 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

their mission. Later tests in the series integrated live atomic explosions into 

maneuvers as troops left their foxholes and, accompanied by tanks, advanced 

toward ground zero.84 While the tests included periodic checks to determine 

levels of radioactive fallout, however, they demonstrated a lack of understanding 

of radiation’s long-term effects. Army training literature tended to treat the 

matter rather lightly. It remained for further tests and experiments to confirm 

the implications of radiation exposure.

In January 1952, the Army Staff submitted a draft circular, “Staff 

Organization and Procedures for Tactical Atomic Warfare,” to EUCOM 

with a request that it be tested in a command post exercise. The Seventh Army 

evaluated the procedures as part of Exercise Springtime, held 14–17 Apri

1952. The analysis that followed noted that normal processes for intelligence, 

reconnaissance, and communications were far too slow and inadequate for the 

timely recognition and development of target information for atomic attack. 

The exercise also revealed that the circular lacked sufficient detail on damage 

control following an enemy atomic strike. In particular, the Seventh Army 

staff recommended a review of the personnel and equipment required for the 

various types of labor and rescue squads. At least half of the observations 

dealt with necessary changes in medical services. The mass casualties resulting 

from an atomic strike, for example, would require evacuation and medical care 

beyond the capabilities of existing facilities and organizations. It would be the 

responsibility of commanders at all levels to assist the medical service by every 

means possible.85

Perhaps most significantly, the Seventh Army’s response noted that the 

proposed circular contained nothing on the employment of artillery as a means 

of delivery. In May 1952, Secretary of the Army Frank C. Pace described work 

underway to develop an artillery piece capable of firing an atomic projectile. 

Weighing about eighty-five tons, the prototype 280-mm. cannon had a range of 

about twenty miles and had to be moved while suspended between two heavy 

truck transporters. Although the gun had not yet fired a nuclear warhead, 

the Army had tested it with conventional ammunition. Pace claimed that the 

weapon could hit its target under any weather conditions and would be especially 

effective in defending against enemy forces massing for an attack. This was a 

particular point of interest to EUCOM and the Seventh Army, which had to 

84 Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, Rpt T–170, Troop Performance on 

a Training Maneuver Involving the Use of Atomic Weapons, 15 Mar 1952; “Tank-Infantry Unit 

to Step Up Realism in New A-Test Today,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Jun 1952; 

“Test Proves A-Attack Theory,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Jun 1952. 85 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Adj Gen’s Office, Draft Training Cir, 

Staff Organization and Procedures for Tactical Atomic Warfare, 30 Jan 1952, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; 2d Ind, HQ, Seventh Army, to Draft Training Cir, 

Staff Organization and Procedures for Tactical Atomic Warfare, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
The New Mission 5

rely on the Air Force to deliver any atomic munitions they might need on the 

battlefield.86

By this time, it was clear that the Army had come to see its forces in Europe 

as a sounding board and test bed for its evolving doctrine on atomic warfare. 

Even before the Seventh Army had completed its evaluation of the Army 

Staff’s draft circular, the Department of the Army sent both that command and 

EUCOM another draft training circular, this one entitled “Combined Arms 

Units in Atomic Warfare.” Between March and May 1952, both commands 

passed the document through appropriate staff sections for review and 

comment. The Seventh Army responded that the draft, which discussed the use 

of dispersed maneuver units to exploit the effects of a friendly atomic strike, was 

well written and urgently needed by units throughout the command. It passed 

its comments on to the next higher headquarters for a final response back to the 

Department of the Army. The impressions of the European Command echoed 

those of Seventh Army. In its response, however, EUCOM noted that training 

materials accompanying the circular overemphasized radiological capabilities 

and did not adequately describe prevention and protection techniques for 

troops deployed for combat. As part of his review, the EUCOM chemical 

officer recommended that chemical and biological training be included in the 

circular since those subjects were integral to Chemical, Biological, Radiological 

(CBR) training. His recommendation was overruled by EUCOM’s assistant 

chief of staff for operations, who believed the additions would unnecessarily 

complicate the circular.87

Despite these initial considerations at the theater-army level, training 

and tactical exercises in Europe remained focused on conventional warfare. 

The major maneuvers and command exercises for 1952 continued to test the 

Seventh Army’s ability to conduct a conventional defense. None of the major 

training events of 1952 made reference to atomic weapons in their scenarios or 

operations plans.88 North Wind, a VII Corps command post exercise conducted

in January 1952, did include an enemy atomic strike in its scenario, but that 

event had little impact on the scheme of maneuver for either side. Its primary 

purpose was to prompt units to take appropriate radiological decontamination 

measures. During the command post exercise critique, Seventh Army observers 

86 2d Ind, HQ, Seventh Army, to Draft Training Cir, Staff Organization and Procedures for 

Tactical Atomic Warfare; “Army Says New Atomic Gun Can Hit Targets Under Any Weather 

Conditions,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 May 1952; “Army Unveils World’s First 

Atom Artillery Piece,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Oct 1952. 87 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Seventh Army, G–3 Section, Mar, May 1952, Entry 33508, Seventh 

Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Memo, Lott for Ch of Army Field Forces, 28 May 1952, sub: 

Draft Training Circular, Combined Arms Units in Atomic Warfare, Entry 2045, USAREUR 

G3 Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training, RG 549, NACP. 88 HQ, VII Corps, Exercise Grande [sic] Alliance Operation Plan, 8 Jul 1952, Box 1747, VII

Corps Command Report, 1952, RG 338, NACP; Memo, Hansard for Seventh Army Distribution, 

31 Jul 1952, sub: Critique of CPX Grand Alliance; HQ, USAREUR, Fall Maneuvers—1952,

4 Aug 1952, Entry 2060, USAREUR Decimal File 1952, RG 549, NACP.
58 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

commented that although atomic play had been included in the scenario, 

individual and unit actions indicated that many still did not know what they 

needed to do in the event of an atomic attack.89

Development of the Communications Zone

Whatever doctrine it chose to employ, the Army would not be able to 

mount a successful defense in Europe until it developed a logistical base that 

would provide the ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and supplies the force would 

need to fight. Beginning in 1945, troops in Germany received supplies almost 

entirely through the port of Bremerhaven on the North Sea at the mouth of 

the Weser River. With its excellent cargo facilities and lines of communications 

south across the flat plains of northern Germany, the city was well suited to 

meet the needs of the occupation troops during times of peace. By mid-1948, 

however, the evolving Cold War raised serious concerns. The Berlin blockade, 

in particular, focused attention on the vulnerability of the supply line running 

south from Bremerhaven. It ran dangerously near the border between the two 

Germanys and could be cut both by land and air in any battle that developed.90

The European Command began a search for alternatives. Early in 1949, 

its Logistics Division initiated a series of studies and staff estimates evaluating 

possibilities for a new line of support. In peacetime it could supplement the 

one from Bremerhaven, but in the event of war, a new line of support would 

become the primary link between the logistical and industrial base in the United 

States and allied forces in Europe (Map 5).91

In November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the new line should 

run through France, whose two thousand miles of coastline and excellent port 

facilities made it the obvious choice, but whose political rivalries presented 

problems. By January 1950, a EUCOM survey team and representatives of 

the French General Staff had reached an agreement on the installations and 

facilities required, and a joint cost estimate for the entire project. It fell to the 

State Department and its representatives in France to negotiate the necessary 

agreements with the French government. Negotiations began slowly, as France’s 

internal political turmoil and the intense nationalism of its people made the 

stationing of foreign troops on its soil a difficult proposition. Frenchmen who 

vividly remembered the Nazi occupation of only a few years before could not 

be expected to welcome another alien body of troops within their borders, 

89 HQ, VII Corps, Exercise North Wind, 15 Jan 1952, Box 1744, VII Corps Command

Report, 1952, RG 407, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, Critique of Exercise North Wind, Entr

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338,NACP. 90 HQ, USAREUR Communications Zone (COMZ), 1 Feb 1956, Entry 2282, US

Information Division General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; D. J. Hickman, The United 

States Army in Europe, 1953–1963 (HQ, USAREUR, 1964), p. 151, copy in Historians files, 

CMH; Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, p. vi. 91 Jean R. Moenk, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Establishment of Communications 

Through France, 1950–1951, 1952, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives.
BRITISH Z ONE

FRENCH Z ONE

FRENCH Z ONE

A MERICAN Z ONE

SOVIET Z ONE

DENMARK

EAST GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LIECHTENSTEIN

Erfurt

Nuremberg

Munich

Dresden

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

BONN

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

Bremerhaven

Kassel

Dortmund

Kaiserslautern

Karlsruhe

Stuttgart

BERLIN

Frankfurt

Rhine R

Elbe R

Rhine R

NORTH

SEA

WEST GERMANY

BREMERHAVEN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

EUROPEAN C OMMAND

1950–1952

Main Supply Route

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 5
60 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

even if the troops seemed to improve the nation’s security. Moreover, an active 

Communist Party within the National Assembly would take advantage of this 

supposed infringement on French national sovereignty to stir up antigovernment 

feeling.92

The constitution of a new, more stable French government under Prime 

Minister Rene Pleven in July 1950 allowed an intensification of negotiations. 

On 6 November, the United States and France signed an executive agreement 

establishing a line of communications from the southwest port areas of

Bordeaux and La Pallice to the German frontier. As part of the agreement, the 

United States received port facilities, storage depots, the space to build more 

depots, and transportation rights on French highways and rail lines. The French 

agreed to contribute 2 billion francs, about $6 million, toward the cost of the 

enterprise. Associated technical agreements between the service arms of the two 

nations established a French-American Fiscal Liaison Office and a system of 

contracting for local labor and materials from the French economy.93 In order 

to minimize French sensitivity to the stationing of foreign troops on their soil, 

EUCOM initially avoided any reference to the evolving infrastructure as a Base 

Section or Communications Zone. The term line of communications served 

the purpose. Commonly understood in the military terminologies of France, 

the United States, and Great Britain, line of communications played down the 

command’s establishment of permanent military facilities (Map 6).94

At first, the Army had little to work with in starting up its new support base. 

Prior to the agreement, the only existing U.S. military organization in France 

had been the American Graves Registration Command, European Area. On 1 

December 1949, in anticipation of the final U.S.-French agreements, EUCOM 

activated the 7966th EUCOM Detachment and attached it to the Graves 

Registration Command. Most of the personnel from that command transferred 

to the 7966th EUCOM Detachment and the Graves Registration Command 

was later inactivated. In August 1950, EUCOM authorized the formation of the 

7964th and 7965th Area Commands to serve as base section and advance section 

headquarters for the line of communications in the event of an emergency. 

Within three months, it had shifted the 7966th Detachment from Paris to 

Orléans where it would serve as the headquarters for the line of communications. 

92 Ibid.; Memo, Col E. C. Gorsuch, USAREUR Budget Ofcr, for Comptroller of the Army, 

22 Oct 1953, sub: The USAREUR LOC, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 93 Moenk, Establishment of Communications Through France, 1950–1951, 1952; HQ, 

USAREUR, HQ, Base Section, EUCOM COMZ, G–3 Briefing Guide, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 94 Memo, 1st Lt J. S. Piccinni, Asst Adj Gen, EUCOM COMZ, for CINC, EUCOM, 16 Apr 1952, 

sub: Proposed Policy on Release of Information on New Installations and Facilities in France, Entry 

2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954, RG 549, NACP; Moenk, Establishment of 

Communications Through France, 1950–1951, 1952. For more information on U.S.-French negotiations concerning basing rights, see Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, U.S. Military Forces in 

Europe: The Early Years, 1945–1970 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).
S eine R

Seine

R

Loire R

Marne R

Rh ni e

R

hR

nô

R

e

Bay

o f

Biscay

Cherbourg

Le Havre Rouen

Dreux

Chartres

Orléans

Trois-Fontaines Strasbourg Nancy

Toul

Vitry-le-François

Verdun

Metz

Châlons

Reims

Fontainebleau

Melun

PARIS

Kaiserslautern

Saarbrücken Pirmasens

Lyon

Turin

Geneva

BERN

Dijon

Troyes

Le Mans

Tours

Chinon

Saumur

Angers Ingrandes

Nantes

Donges

Le Croisic

St. Nazaire

La Rochelle

Poitiers

Périgueux

Bussac

Rochefort

Fontenet

Angoulême

Braconne Limoges

Brest

Caen

Mérignac

Captieux

Bordeaux

ITAL Y

SWITZERLAND

BELGIUM

WEST

GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

FRANCE

1950s

POL (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant) PipelineRailroad

0 50

150 0 50 100 Miles

150 100 Kilometers

Map 6
62 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The 7965th Area Command moved into northeastern France, in the VerdunMetz area, to supervise the forward depots and the 7964th Area Command 

established its headquarters in La Rochelle, on the coast about eighty miles 

north of Bordeaux, to oversee the western ports and rear supply points.95

Five days after the signing of the agreement, on 11 November, approximately one thousand American troops from EUCOM ordnance, quartermaster, 

and other support units moved into France with three hundred trucks and one 

hundred trailers. Most of the convoy headed for the ports of Bordeaux and La 

Pallice to open operations there. In mid-November 1950, the first ships with 

supplies for the U.S. Army in Germany had docked at Bordeaux and began 

to unload.96

By July 1951, the French political scene had changed to such an extent 

that EUCOM was able to reorganize and rename its operating agency in 

France. On 15 July, with the blessing of the French leadership, the command 

95 HQ, Base Section, EUCOM COMZ, G–3 Briefing Guide; Moenk, Establishment of Communications Through France, 1950–1951, 1952. 96 HQ, USAREUR COMZ, 1 Feb 1956; Memo, Col Andrew P. O’Meara, Dep Dir for Plans, 

EUCOM, for D/Log, Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 16 Nov 1950, sub: Data for Reply to Questions 

by Press on Logistic Operations in France, Entry 6, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 

549, NACP.

Headquarters, 7917th Labor Supervision Detachment, Fontenet tent area in January 

1952. U.S. support units found spartan conditions as they moved into France and lived in 

temporary prefabricated barracks or tent cities.
The New Mission 6

announced the establishment of the EUCOM Communications Zone and 

redesignated the 7964th and 7965th Area Commands, as Base Section and 

Advance Section, respectively. The 7966th EUCOM Detachment became the 

Orléans Area Command supporting the Communications Zone headquarters 

and a number of smaller detachments in the area not included in the two 

larger commands. Under the new organization, the commanding general, 

Communications Zone, was responsible for the rapid development and 

operation of the line of communications and the preparation of plans for its 

rapid expansion to meet the emergency needs of EUCOM. In addition to being 

responsible for the procurement of all labor, facilities, and supplies from the 

French economy, he was to be the official representative of the commander 

in chief, EUCOM, in all negotiations with French governmental agencies.97

With the agreements concluded and headquarters elements in place, the 

establishment of the support network in France posed two primary problems; 

first, the organization, manning, and operation by U.S. forces of selected 

points in the system; and second, the relocation of existing depots from 

Germany to new sites west of the Rhine and the shipment of supply stocks 

to the new locations. As U.S. support units moved into France, they found 

living conditions to be particularly spartan. Almost no housing existed for 

troops and their families, and the Americans had no authority to requisition 

such properties as they had in Germany. Given the command emphasis 

on the construction of supply depots and storage facilities, troops lived 

in temporary, prefabricated barracks with some occupying tent cities for 

extended periods of time. Shortages of supplies and bureaucratic conflicts 

between U.S. military officials and local French governments delayed 

work on many projects. Of approximately eighty projects authorized for 

construction by EUCOM, work had begun on only twenty-nine by the end 

of 1951. The lack of facilities delayed the shift of strategic supplies to such 

an extent that by 31 December 1951, only 44 percent of the total tonnage 

was actually stored in France. Furthermore, inadequate storage facilities 

at many locations caused deterioration in some of the stock that had been 

moved. The ordnance depot at Captieux, sixty miles south of Bordeaux, 

received an average of sixty railcars a day loaded with ammunition. One 

USAREUR inspection found loads of ammunition lying along the soggy 

roadside for lack of any better place to store them.98

97 Memo, Piccinni for CINC, EUCOM, 16 Apr 1952, sub: Proposed Policy on Release of 

Information on New Installations and Facilities in France; Moenk, Establishment of Communications Through France, 1950–1951, 1952; Jean R. Moenk, The Line of Communications 

Through France, 1952–1953, 1955, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. 98 HQ, Base Section, EUCOM COMZ, G–3 Briefing Guide; Moenk, The Line of Communications Through France, 1952–1953, 1955; Memo, Col Joseph Horridge, Ordnance Ofcr, Seventh 

Army, for Ch of Staff, 30 Jan 1952, sub: Visit to Ordnance Installations Within the Communications Zone, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Hickman, The United 

States Army in Europe, p. 159; Grathwol and Moorhus, Building for Peace, pp. 88–89.
64 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Delays in construction continued throughout 1952. By midyear the 

commanding general of the Communications Zone, Maj. Gen. Samuel D. 

Sturgis Jr., reported that he faced three major challenges in that area: a 

shortage of engineers to carry out the necessary design and site adaptation; an 

acute shortage of general construction labor, particularly in the northeastern 

sector of France; and delays imposed by both U.S. and French regulations 

when negotiating working agreements with French construction agencies.99

After a visit with General Sturgis in December 1952, General Ridgway, 

SACEUR, noted that the entire process required greater command supervision. 

French construction firms lacked the capability to carry the combined peak 

loads of both U.S. Army and Air Force construction programs, and French 

governmental authorities were of little help in coordinating construction 

requirements. Excessive bureaucracy on both sides, and restrictions imposed by 

French government agencies charged with the aesthetic protection of the French 

landscape further complicated construction efforts. Although Ridgway believed 

that the situation could be improved if the U.S. chain of command could foresee 

99 Moenk, The Line of Communications Through France, 1952–1953, 1955; Ltr, Maj Gen 

Samuel D. Sturgis Jr., Cdr, EUCOM COMZ, to Brig Gen Edward T. Williams, Ch of Staff, 

27 Jun 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; 

Memo, Capt Dale N. Hyett, Management Br, for CINC, EUCOM, 4 Nov 1952, sub: Difficulties 

with the Government in France, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954, 

RG 549, NACP.

The 571st Ordnance Ammunition Command ordnance depot in Captieux, France, 

January 1952
The New Mission 6

trouble sufficiently in advance to initiate corrective action, he acknowledged 

that a shortage of construction materials and heavy machinery in France was 

also a major problem. As if to emphasize the importance the command attached 

to the effort in France, the EUCOM commander, General Handy, in a March 

1952 meeting with the senior officers in the command, declared that the front 

line in the effort to provide security for Europe was no longer the Seventh Army 

or the Twelfth Air Force—it was the line of communications.100

As the Communications Zone and the theater’s logistical infrastructure 

began to take shape, leaders prepared to keep the supply pipeline open under 

wartime conditions. World War II had taught them that there could be no 

guarantee that adequate port facilities would be consistently available to unload 

supply ships. Amphibious operations in the Pacific as well as initial operations 

in support of the Normandy beachhead had demonstrated the need for an 

over-the-beach logistical capability. In 1952, the command began a series of 

exercises to develop an organization capable of offloading ocean-going ships 

onto open beaches by means of small boats. The initial test, labeled Operation

SOB , for Supply over the Beach, occurred 4–8 June, at Pointe de Grave, Franc

60 miles north of Bordeaux. In just four and a half days, 1,500 troops from the 

Communications Zone Base Section used amphibious trucks and landing craft 

to unload some 6,500 tons of cargo and ammunition stored on pallets from the 

SS Nevadan. Winches and cranes on board the ship lifted the materiel into the 

smaller vessels, which then moved it to designated sites ashore. There, truck- or 

tractor-mounted cranes transferred it to land transport.101

In an evaluation of the exercise before the EUCOM staff, Deputy Director 

of the Logistics Division, Brig. Gen. Frank A. Henning, declared the operation 

a success. The pallet method appeared to be feasible if the cranes and other 

lifting devices required to do the job were available. General Henning concluded 

that, even with limitations imposed by unfavorable weather conditions, it 

would be possible, with continued training, to augment the port capacity of 

western France by this means. He recommended continuing the training as 

well as regularly scheduled tests and exercises with a view toward developing 

100 Ltr, Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), to 

Handy, 24 Dec 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; Grathwol and Moorhus, Building for Peace, pp. 86–89; HQ, EUCOM, Monthly Conference with Post Commanders and Selected Seventh Army Commanders, 31 Mar 1952, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. Works describing 

the evolution of the U.S. Army support base in Europe include James A. Huston, One for All: 

NATO Strategy and Logistics through the Formative Period (1949–1969) (Newark: University of 

Delaware Press, 1984); idem, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945–1953

(Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). 101 Initial Rpt, HQ, 7703d Transportation Major Port, First Supply Over The Beach Operation, 

4–8 Jun 1952, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP; 

“Troops End First Phase in Beachhead Games,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 11 Jun 

1952; “U.S., French Hit Beaches in Exercise,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Jun 1952.
66 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

unit skills and prestocking required equipment. Along that line, he announced 

that another ship would be unloaded at the same site in the following month.102

In August, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration, Allied 

Land Forces, Central Europe, Maj. Gen. Walter J. Muller suggested that 

USAREUR should view the potential shortage of port facilities in wartime as 

an allied, rather than just an American, problem. Under wartime conditions, 

most U.S. Army forces in Europe would come under the command of the 

NATO headquarters. In that light, General Muller requested that USAREUR 

consider a wider range of beaches throughout the theater. The repetition of 

exercises at known locations, he said, did little to collect the kind and amount 

of information desired by the NATO headquarters. Responding, USAREUR 

indicated that it considered the logistical exercises to be purely U.S. training 

and not subject to the approval of the allied headquarters. After making that 

point, however, it agreed that the command would get diminishing returns from 

experience gained in exercises held in the same or similar locations. As a result, 

102 HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference Notes Number 16, 24 Jun 

1952, Entry 2105,USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

LACM pulls up to a floating dock and crane to unload nine two-and-a-half-ton trucks.
Troops unloading into Army DUKW, part of OTB exercise at La Pallice, France, in April 1953

USNS Pvt. Francis X McGraw being unloaded during ODEX at Le Tur Belle, France, on 

20 June 1954.
68 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

subject to French approval, the command agreed to hold future exercises in 

areas desired by alliance members.103

Officials at the Department of the Army observed the training with great 

interest. In October, they submitted an assessment and guidance to USAREUR 

based on their analysis of the initial exercises. They suggested that the operations 

offered the opportunity to test and evaluate different types of containerized and 

palletized loads and the methods for unloading them. The training also served as 

an excellent vehicle to test experimental materiel-handling equipment. The guidance 

suggested that future exercises should attempt to deploy troops over the beaches 

to test the system’s ability to deal with personnel as well as cargo. In an effort to 

conduct the exercises under the most realistic conditions possible, the officials 

added that exercise planners should also consider the effects of mass destruction 

weapons on beach operations and that beaches large enough to permit the sort 

of wide dispersal of equipment and personnel required in an atomic environment 

should receive priority in the selection process. The document concluded with a 

recommendation that the exercises continue on a monthly basis.104

Logistical Support for the New Mission

While EUCOM struggled to bring the Communications Zone on line, it also 

addressed the administrative and logistical challenges that the initial buildup of 

forces in Europe entailed. The reinforcements coming to Europe would require 

vast quantities of food, ammunition, and fuel before they could become combat 

ready. In order to provide those resources, the command had to develop the 

organization and infrastructure to support such an effort.

In early January 1952, the deputy director of the EUCOM logistics division, 

General Henning, identified the problems involved in bringing the additional 

combat forces into the theater and preparing them for a forward defense mission. 

He reminded the EUCOM staff that the logistics division would have to plan 

for the support of units located across a broad area from France’s seaports to 

Berlin. Specific tasks and resources would have to be identified and delegated to 

unit commanders, military post commanders, and the chiefs of technical services 

at EUCOM headquarters. To accommodate incoming personnel, equipment, 

and supplies, those officers would have to forecast and prioritize requirements 

for storage facilities and housing. Next they had to acquire and position reserve 

stocks of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies that combat forces would need 

in the event of an enemy attack. Meanwhile, EUCOM needed to replace many 

103 HQ, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, Beach Supply Exercise, 19 Aug 1952; Memo, 

Maj Robert V. Roverts, Asst Adj Gen, for CINC, EUCOM, 26 Sep 1952, sub: Supply Over the 

Beach Exercises. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 

549, NACP. 104 Memo, W. L. Cheatham, Adj Gen, for Cdr, USAREUR, 29 Oct 1952, sub: Supply Over 

the Beach Exercises, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, 

NACP.
The New Mission 6

World War II–era vehicles and weapons with more up-to-date equipment, to 

repair and rebuild other unserviceable items, and to procure the construction 

materials necessary to begin work on barracks, family housing, hospitals, motor 

pools, and other facilities the incoming forces would require.105

The responsibility for the procurement and distribution of Class I supplies— 

primarily food for the almost three hundred thousand soldiers, sailors, and 

airmen to be stationed in Western Europe by the end of 1952—lay with the 

quartermaster section of the EUCOM logistics division. As troops began 

arriving in Europe in 1951, the EUCOM quartermaster, Maj. Gen. George 

A. Horkan, scoured Europe and North Africa for fresh fruits and vegetables, 

while receiving shipments of meat, canned goods, and packaged food directly 

from the United States. By the end of 1952, the Army’s food service program in 

Europe had grown to include sixty-six commissaries, thirteen bakeries, twelve 

coffee roasting plants, an ice cream plant, and other operations working around 

the clock to serve soldiers at more than seven hundred mess halls scattered 

throughout France and Germany. In addition to providing fresh food for 

soldiers both in garrison and in the field, quartermaster elements also purchased 

and provided packaged long-term rations that would be on hand at all times 

in case of an emergency. The European Command required all Army units 

except those stationed in England to maintain a prescribed load of three days 

of rations per soldier.106

The Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency was responsible for 

the procurement of all Class III products—petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

(POL)—for U.S. military forces everywhere. Military ships transported 

bulk petroleum products from the United States to Europe, where they were 

distributed by civilian companies under contract to the government. Tankers 

delivered about 15 million gallons of gasoline and 2 million gallons of diesel 

per month through the port of Bremerhaven. Additional fuel for use in France 

came through the port at Le Havre. Once contractors delivered bulk shipments 

to military posts and subposts, USAREUR and Seventh Army quartermasters 

controlled the distribution of POL to units.107

Preparing U.S. forces for combat in Europe required massive procurements 

and allocations of Class V materiel, ammunition—more so than any other 

105 HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference Notes Number 1, 8 Jan 

1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 106 “Cold Slows QM Vegetable Crops,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 9 Feb 1951; 

“USAREUR Food Service Aims to Please,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Jul 1953; 

Memo, Maj T. Q. Donaldson IV, Asst Sec of the General Staff, for USAREUR Distribution, 7 

Apr 1953, sub: Prescribed Loads (Class I & III), Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 107 Memos, Brig Gen Frank A. Henning, Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, for USAREUR Ch of Staff, 1 

Dec 1953, sub: Procurement of POL for US Forces in Europe, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; and Brig Gen John M. Lentz, Seventh Army Ch of 

Staff, for Seventh Army Distribution, 8 Apr 1952, sub: Information for Commanders of Newly 

Assigned Units, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
70 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

type of supply. Units preparing to fight a war with the Soviet Union required 

enormous amounts of ordnance, from basic small-arms ammunition to the 

man-size shells that the largest artillery pieces fired. One immediate complication 

in achieving this goal came from the war in Korea. From 1950 through 1953, 

USAREUR had to compete with units in combat for access to all types of 

ammunition.108 In the end, expanding industrial capacity in the United States 

was able to satisfy all requirements. 

In EUCOM, logistics, ordnance, and chemical officers used data from World 

War II to establish the amount of ammunition required in combat on a daily 

basis for each type of weapon. This calculation resulted in what was referred to 

as the basic load for each combat unit. Although some logisticians within the 

Department of the Army believed that combat experiences in Korea justified a 

reduced expenditure rate, Seventh Army leaders argued that combat in Europe 

would, in fact, require an even greater allocation of ammunition. They believed, 

for example, that the potential for air and armored combat in Europe greatly 

exceeded the threat posed in Korea. They also pointed out that superiority in 

artillery fire was essential to compensate for the Soviet’s preponderance in men 

and materiel. They felt so strongly about the need for increased basic loads for 

artillery units that many battalions maintained combat loads of ammunition 

greater than their authorized complement of vehicles could transport.109

For armor and artillery units, the ammunition supply problem was 

complicated by the variety of munitions each had to carry. Tanks mainly 

fired general-purpose, high-explosive shells but also needed armor-piercing 

rounds for use against other tanks and white phosphorus rounds to block an 

enemy’s line of sight with rapid-building plumes of smoke. Developments in 

engineering provided frequent upgrades in antitank munitions to cope with the 

improving armor enemy tanks continued to receive. Artillery units also carried 

an assortment of munitions as well as a number of different types of fuzes and 

propellants. In all cases, ordnance officers had to replace older ammunition 

with improved types when they became available.110

Although EUCOM had the primary mission to provide logistical support 

to Army units in theater, the Seventh Army also had to organize and train a 

108 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, p. 113. 109 HQ, USAREUR, Weekly Report of Important Subjects Pending, 16 May 1952, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Lt Col R. P. 

Scott, R&SC Section, for The Adj Gen (TAG), 29 Jan 1953, sub: Ground Ammunition Day of 

Supply, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; DF, 

Maj Warren S. Ducote, S–1, to Seventh Army Ch of Staff, 20 Aug 1953, sub: Adjustments in 

Basic Load of Artillery Ammunition, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 110 Memo, HQ, U.S. Constabulary, for CG, 1st Constabulary Bde, 3 Oct 1950, sub: Revision 

of Basic Loads, Tank Ammunition; HQ, USAREUR, Increase in WP Ammunition, 9 Nov 1950; 

Memo, Col S. G. Conley, Dir, OPOT, for USAREUR Ch of Staff, 22 Nov 1950, sub: Increase in 

Percent of White Phosphorus in Basic Load of Tank Ammunition. All in Entry 2052, USAREUR 

G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. Rpt of Opns, HQ, Seventh Army Artillery, Feb 1952, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
The New Mission 7

self-contained force that could operate independently under allied operational 

command. For that reason, instructions from EUCOM to the Seventh Army in 

December 1950 had made it clear that the command was to assume responsibility 

for its own logistical support wherever possible using its own assigned support 

units. Although it would always have to rely on higher echelons to maintain 

supply lines and to provide depot level maintenance, the Seventh Army would 

need sufficient transportation, maintenance, quartermaster, medical, and other 

support elements to sustain its forces in combat without other outside assistance.111

In his first year as Seventh Army commander, General Eddy drove his 

command to become logistically self-sustaining and able to provide all the 

support necessary for extended, independent operations. In that regard, Eddy 

listed four immediate goals to get the Seventh Army ready to go to war: the 

command needed to establish an initial stock of reserve and replacement equipment to support sustained operations; incoming units had to receive all of their 

authorized weapons and equipment; commanders and staffs had to implement 

procedures to conserve expendable supplies and materials; and maintenance 

officers had to devise a system of command maintenance inspections to ensure 

that vehicles and weapons were combat ready.112

Prescribed load directives required all Seventh Army units to have sufficient 

fuel on hand to move all of its wheeled vehicles 300 miles and all of its tracked 

vehicles 130 miles. The balance for the tracked vehicles, 170 miles, was to be 

prestocked in strategically located storage points. The Seventh Army established 

caches for the 1st Infantry Division at Bad Mergentheim and Schwäbisch Hall, 

locations along the route to its designated deployment area. Together, the 

two depots contained almost fifty thousand gallons of fuel, all of it stored in 

five-gallon cans. Hundreds of gallons of grease and oil were also on hand for the 

division’s use.113 In addition to these depots and others like them, USAREUR 

directed the Communications Zone to establish a special reserve capable of 

fueling full-scale operations for sixty days. The Seventh Army’s situation was 

complicated by the fact that all of the depots, shops, and supply points needed 

to sustain it were located almost entirely in the area where the main battle would 

occur. General Eddy commented that if the Soviets succeeded in pushing to 

the Rhine, the captured facilities and supplies would produce an excellent line 

of support for their army.114

111 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; HQ, EUCOM, Organization of a Field Army Headquarters, 

4 Oct 1950, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 112 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Order of Battle, USAREUR, as of 30 June 1953, Entry 

2130, USAREUR General Letters, 1953, RG 549, NACP. 113 Memo, Donaldson for USAREUR Distribution, 7 Apr 1953, sub: Prescribed Loads (Class 

I & III); DF, McGinley, G–4, to Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 26 Feb 1951, sub: Progress Report 

of Prestocked Supplies East of the Rhine River; Memo, Lt Col John R. Turner, Asst Adj Gen, 

for CINC, EUCOM, 8 Jun 1951, sub: Establishment of Additional Prestocked Supplies. Both 

in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 114 Memo, Col E. T. Henry, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 5 Sep 1953, sub: USAREUR Supply Distribution Policy Directive, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 
72 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The Seventh Army’s logistical self-sufficiency began to improve as more 

and more of its support units arrived in theater. Almost all of its quartermaster 

units arrived in Germany in 1951. The 2d Quartermaster Group established 

its headquarters in Kornwestheim, a suburb of Stuttgart. Its subordinate 

battalions, the 14th, 15th, and 35th Quartermaster Battalions set up operations 

in Darmstadt, Munich, and Ludwigsburg, respectively. The 7th Quartermaster 

Group established itself in Baumholder, the joint U.S.-French training area in 

the French Zone. One of its two component battalions, 327th, also set up in 

Baumholder while the other, the 56th, took up station in nearby Kaiserslautern. 

The new quartermaster units included two petroleum companies, one petroleum 

depot company, one laundry company, one clothing and general supply 

company, one repair maintenance company, two subsistence companies, one 

bakery company, one bath company, and three bath detachments. Many of these 

units were inexperienced, but they developed their skills through on-the-job 

training. Each also underwent thirty days of tactical training at Grafenwöhr.115

The Seventh Army quartermaster had hoped to draw all supplies from a 

distribution and storage system to be established by his own units by June 1951. 

The command failed to meet this goal, however, due to the unusually wide 

dispersion of its units across the U.S. Zone that its peacetime configuration 

required. At the end of the year, one-half of all subsistence and fuel supplies 

and almost all other commodities continued to pass through EUCOM depots. 

Nonetheless, leaders remained confident that enough Seventh Army units were 

available to provide necessary support to the Army if an emergency occurred 

and a move to tactical positions became necessary.116

The command’s maintenance and ammunition-handling capabilities 

came together in a similar manner. At the beginning of 1951, the Seventh 

Army had about half of the ordnance units necessary to attain self-sufficiency 

in those areas. By 1952, the 47th Ordnance Group at Ludwigsburg and the 

50th Ordnance Group at Sandhofen supervised six ordnance maintenance 

and supply battalions. These battalions, the 71st at Illesheim, the 80th at 

Esslingen, the 85th at Oberursel, the 8th at Griesheim, the 19th at Böblingen, 

and the 38th at Nellingen, included a mix of medium and heavy automotive 

maintenance companies, as well as separate detachments for the repair of small 

arms and heavy weapons. These enabled the Seventh Army to perform all of 

the maintenance it was authorized to do at its level. The repair and rebuilding 

of heavily damaged vehicles and equipment remained the responsibility of 

higher-level ordnance depots. The 57th Ordnance Group at Miesau oversaw 

the 82d Ordnance Ammunition Battalion at the same location. The 57th Group 

also controlled the 37th Ordnance Battalion, which ran the ammunition supply 

point at Münster, in the British Zone, through which Seventh Army drew all 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951. 115 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951. 116 HQ, Seventh Army, Status of Quartermaster Supply, 27 Dec 1950, Entry 33508, Seventh 

Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951.
The New Mission 7

of its training ammunition. Units requiring more than one railcar of munitions 

drew directly from the EUCOM Ammunition Depot, located about fifty miles 

southwest of Mannheim.117

Despite these additions, Col. Joseph Horridge, the Seventh Army ordnance 

officer, remained concerned about the forward deployment of so much of the 

theater’s depot and heavy maintenance operations. However, EUCOM had 

neither enough funds nor enough readily available space to relocate the facilities 

to safer locations west of the Rhine. As General Eddy had also pointed out in 

his command report, Colonel Horridge warned that the loss of those stocks 

and capabilities in an attack would seriously affect the entire theater’s ability 

to perform its mission. If captured by the Soviets those resources would greatly 

augment their capabilities.118

The distribution of supplies to dispersed troop units required a substantial 

hauling capacity, and the Seventh Army’s transport organizations also completed 

their deployment in 1951. The 10th Transportation Group headquarters at 

Kornwestheim oversaw three separate transportation battalions; the 27th, also 

at Kornwestheim; the 29th, stationed at Nellingen, about ten miles northwest of 

Ulm; and the 122d, at Zirndorf, a suburb of Nuremberg. Two additional truck 

battalions, the 38th and the 411th, supported the V and VII Corps directly. 

Although all equipment was on hand and leaders regarded vehicle maintenance 

as excellent, the Seventh Army transportation officer warned that the truck and 

car companies were operating at about 15 percent below authorized personnel 

strength. In addition, all of the command’s cargo trucks were rebuilt World 

War II surplus that would not hold up to heavy use over prolonged periods of 

time. While the truck battalions were technically part of the support structure, 

their primary function was to motorize the infantry divisions. Leaders estimated 

that it would take six truck companies, the usual complement of one battalion, 

to place one division on wheels. The truck companies participated in division 

training and exercises, providing other transportation services only when not 

needed by the infantry (Table 2).119

During 1952, the Seventh Army continued to move toward logistical 

self-sufficiency. However, a high rate of personnel turnover, a lack of 

individual training in specialized military support skills, shortages of tools and 

equipment in some maintenance and engineer units, and a lack of shop space 

and suitable work areas hampered progress toward that goal. Even so, work 

toward relocating support depots and storage sites for equipment stockpiles 

proceeded steadily. By September 1952, the force had repositioned almost all 

117 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; William M. Donnelly, “‘Under Army Orders’: The U.S. 

Army National Guard During the Korean War” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1998). 118 Memo, Horridge for Seventh Army Distribution, 27 Dec 1950, sub: Staff Study of Ordnance Requirements and Capabilities Under GAO, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, 

RG 338, NACP. 119 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; HQ, Seventh Army, Transportation Annex, 27 Dec 1950, 

Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
74 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

of its subsistence stocks to locations farther to the west, had established eleven 

prestock sites for fuel and lubricants in secure locations, and had entered 

into negotiations with the German government to acquire additional sites. 

Completed fuel storage sites included those at Mannheim, Schwäbisch Hall, Bad 

Mergentheim, and Böblingen. Construction of hardened ammunition storage 

areas likewise continued, with about 40 percent of the wartime stocks required 

by the combat forces in place. One site at Böblingen, southwest of Stuttgart, 

held one thousand tons of ammunition and another fifteen hundred tons of 

fortification material. Engineers also worked to expand existing storage sites, 

such as the prestock site for the 1st Infantry Division at Bad Mergentheim, 

about twenty-five miles south of Würzburg (Chart 3).120

Berlin, 1951–1952: Standing Fast and Showing the Flag

Throughout the early 1950s, Berlin remained a focal point for tensions 

between the United States and the Soviet Union. In January 1950, the Communists 

announced plans for a massive demonstration and parade of more than five 

hundred thousand East German youths through the Western sectors of Berlin 

during the Whitsuntide celebration on 30 May. Feeling that such a demonstration 

presented a serious threat to West Berlin security, the Americans, along with the 

British and French, alerted their forces and declared their intention to support 

the West Berlin police with military force if necessary. When the demonstrations 

and parade occurred with minimal violence or disruptions, Western authorities 

120 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Seventh Army, Ordnance Section, 1–31 Jan 1952, Entry 33508, Seventh 

Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Memos, G–4 for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 26 Feb 1951, 

sub: Progress Report of Prestocked Supplies East of the Rhine River, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; and Maj Gen Aaron Bradshaw Jr., Dir of Logistics, for Dep Ch of 

Staff for Admin, 19 Aug 1952, sub: Seventh Army Supply Problems, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

Table 2—Seventh Army Logistical Support

Type of Units

December

1950

December

1951

December

1952

Ordnance Battalions 4 7 8

Quartermaster Battalions 1 4 6

Transportation Battalions 3 5 5

Source: Seventh Army Command Report, 1951; U.S. Army Directory and Station List, December 

1952; Order of Battle, U.S. Army, Europe, 31 December 1952.
HEADQUARTERS

SEVENTH ARMY

Seventh Army

Artillery

34th AAA

Brig

Source: Order of Battle, EUCOM (U.S. Army), 31 January 1952.

Chart 3—Organizational Structure of Seventh Army

31 January 1952

12th AAA

Gp

242d AAA

Gp

8th AAA

Gp

Seventh Army

Engineers

11th Engr

Combat Gp

403d Engr

Base Dep

555th Engr

Combat Gp

Seventh Army

Troops

2d QM

Gp

7th QM

Gp

10th Trans

Hwy Trans Gp

47th Ord

Gp

50th Ord

Gp

1st CML

Bn

451st CML

SMK Gen Bn

40th Sig

Const Bn

97th Sig

Opns Bn

315th Sig

Const Bn

175th MP

Bn

532d MI

Svc Bn

31st Med

Gp

95th Med

Gp

V Corps

Headquarters

371st Armd

Inf Bn

373d Armd

Inf Bn

37th Engr

Combat Gp

322d Sig

Bn

38th Trans

Trk Bn

122d Trans

Trk Bn

36th Med

Bn

V Corps

Arty

1st Inf

Div

2d Armd

Div

4th Inf

Div

2d Armd

Cav Regt

14th Armd

Cav Regt

15th Const

Sqdn

24th Const

Sqdn

VII Corps

Headquarters

VII Corps

ARTY

28th Inf

Div

43d Inf

Div

6th Armd

Rgt

321st Sig

Bn

115th Engr

Combat Gp

211th Med

Bn
76 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

claimed that the failure of the Communists to cause a greater disturbance resulted 

in “a resounding defeat of Kremlin Cold War strategy.”121

By 1952, Berlin had settled into an uneasy equilibrium for the U.S. troops 

there. When EUCOM was redesignated as the U.S. Army, Europe, in August 

1952, its command relationship with the Berlin Command and the Office of the 

U.S. Commander, Berlin, remained unchanged. The U.S. Commander, Berlin, 

Maj. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson, reported directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, 

on military matters and to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany for issues 

related to civil affairs or dealings with city officials. The U.S. garrison in Berlin 

amounted to about forty-five hundred troops, which included the 6th Infantry, 

the 759th Military Police Battalion, and a number of smaller support units.

In May 1952, after the governments of the United States, France, and Great 

Britain had signed conventions with the Federal Republic of Germany that 

would begin its transition from occupied state to sovereign nation, the foreign 

ministers from the three allied nations signed a declaration reaffirming security 

assurances for Western Europe, Germany, and Berlin. The statement concluded 

that the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of military forces 

of the three powers within the city was an essential element for peace in the 

current international situation. Furthermore, the three powers affirmed that 

any attack on Berlin from any quarter would be regarded as an attack on their 

forces and themselves.122

Nonetheless, Soviet and East German harassment and propaganda persisted 

as irritants for U.S. soldiers stationed in the city. In May 1952, Communist 

authorities increased the tension, closing down the border between the eastern 

and western halves of Germany, leaving West Berlin as the last remaining exit 

point from which refugees could travel safely to West Germany. As a part of the 

process, in an effort to exercise tight control of people and freight moving into 

and out of the city, Communist border guards attempted to force the allies to 

observe complex new restrictions on their rights of access to the city. In the view 

of U.S. leaders, the only way to maintain freedom of movement into and out 

of Berlin was to exercise it on a regular basis and to refuse to comply with any 

and all efforts by the Soviets to impose limitations. As a result, the provision of 

escorts for military convoys and trains into and out of the U.S. sector became 

one of the primary missions for the soldiers of the Berlin Command.123

121 Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, 

Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. Msg, Handy to CSA, 28 Apr 1950; MFR, 

Brig Gen R. K. Taylor, Dir, EUCOM Intel Div, 30 May 1950, sub: Final Activities of the 

Deutschlandtreffen. Both in Entry 6, General Correspondence, EUCOM SGS, 1946–1951, RG 

549, NACP. 122 Tripartite Declaration Providing Security Assurances to Western Europe, Germany, and 

Berlin, 27 May 1952, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of 

State, 1985), pp. 384–85. 123 Msg, U.S. Cdr, Berlin (USCOB), signed Mathewson, to CINC, EUCOM, for Dir of Intel, 

21 Jun 1952, sub: Security Information; HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff 

Conference, 3 Jun 1952. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954, 
The New Mission 7

American soldiers and their dependents unfamiliar with border restrictions 

in and around the city were often detained by Soviet or East German police. 

Travelers deviating from the autobahn between Helmstedt and Berlin, the 

single highway authorized for access into the city from the west, quickly 

found themselves in the custody of Soviet or East German police. Although 

U.S. military police patrolled the corridor on a regular basis, their movements 

were often restricted by the Communist authorities. It was not uncommon for 

soldiers unfamiliar with the city’s transit systems to board the wrong bus or 

train and end up in East Berlin. There they were usually apprehended by East 

German police and detained, sometimes for months. In one extreme case, two 

American privates returning to their unit late in 1952 took the wrong train and 

found themselves in East Berlin where the Soviet authorities held them for six 

months offering them money, jobs, and university educations if they would turn 

Communist. As in most cases, once the Soviets had exhausted all propaganda 

value from the incident, they released the two to American custody.124

Near the end of 1952, U.S. and Soviet representatives met to discuss several 

locations along the U.S.-Soviet sector border where the demarcation line was 

in dispute. After cartographic experts determined several locations where the 

border had been incorrectly marked, both sides agreed to replace erroneous 

signs, but the action was not accomplished without incident. On 16 December, 

East German police arrested M. Sgt. William T. Rice of Headquarters 

Company, 7780th Composite Service Battalion, as he stood approximately three 

feet inside the Soviet Zone while surveying a newly erected marker. Since the 

sergeant was on duty performing a mission that had been negotiated between 

U.S. and Soviet authorities, his arrest and detention were unjustified. The 

Soviets returned him to U.S. custody without comment two days later. Before 

releasing him, however, they required him to sign a confession admitting that 

he had illegally crossed the Berlin border.125

Concerned by the continuing harassment and alarmed by the growth of the 

East German paramilitary forces, the Western allies in Berlin took initial steps 

to develop a coordinated plan for the defense of the city. A combined study 

completed in 1950 had concluded that, if all available East German forces were 

concentrated for a deliberate attack against the Western sectors of the city, the 

allied forces would probably not be able to offer effective resistance. The three 

Western headquarters formed a combined committee, which became known as 

the Allied Staff, Berlin, to study the issue and to recommend courses of action 

in the event of a Soviet or East German attack. By the end of 1952, the group 

RG 549, NACP. Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin: Cold 

War Outpost, 1945–1994 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), p. 74; U.S. Command, Berlin, and U.S. Army, Berlin, Pam 870–2, The Story of the Berlin Brigade, 1981. 124 “Handy Protests Soviet Curb on MP Patrols,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Jun 1952; 

“Freed from Soviet Custody,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 4 Aug 1952; Nathan Margolin, 

“Russ Offered Berlin Yanks ‘Bait’ to Stay,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 May 1953. 125 Cmd Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 406–07.
78 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

drew up its first combined plan for the defense of the city. Known as Operations 

Instructions Number 3, it called for each of the three national forces in West 

Berlin to form a defensive perimeter within its sector. The British would defend 

the area around the Olympic Stadium, the French around Tegel Airfield, and the 

Americans around Tempelhof Air Base. Each of the three allied garrisons would 

be responsible for defending its own base; or, if the situation demanded, the three 

national forces would be regrouped to defend any one of the three strongpoints. 

A series of exercises and studies indicated that, in any case, the Western allied 

garrisons would offer little more than token resistance to an attack by enemy 

military forces. The tests did, however, lay the groundwork for future planning.126

The End of the Beginning

Although USAREUR and the Seventh Army were still not prepared to face 

a serious offensive from the east by the end of 1952, they had made significant 

headway. In the place of what had been a single reconstructed division and odd 

leftover components of the Constabulary stood five full divisions and three 

armored cavalry regiments, organized into two corps and under the direction 

of a complete field army headquarters. Moreover, these combat elements were 

supported by ample artillery, engineers, and all the other combat and service 

support components the force would need to engage in battle. In France, the 

construction of depots, maintenance facilities, ammunition dumps, and the rest 

of the force’s logistical infrastructure was also well underway. Perhaps most 

important, the Army had taken major steps toward developing a headquarters 

organization in Europe that could provide wartime leadership and coordination to 

U.S. forces in the theater while also integrating into NATO’s command structure.

Nonetheless, critical challenges remained. The Seventh Army still lacked 

the training facilities, ranges, and sufficient prestocks of ammunition, fuel, and 

supplies to make it battle worthy. Despite the fact that its units ended 1952 at 

close to full strength, the rotation of more than one-third of its trained soldiers 

back to the United States during the year was a clear indication of another 

problem to solve. Finally, although the Army and the Air Force had begun 

an effort to coordinate a doctrine for close air support of ground forces, more 

work remained. Many leaders throughout USAREUR believed that only 

atomic weapons delivered on the battlefield would offset the Soviet superiority 

in conventional weapons. That conviction implied revisions in organization, 

equipment, and doctrine to fight in an atomic environment. These were issues 

that the Army would have to address if its deployment to Europe was to 

represent a fully credible deterrent.

126 Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962.
1953: The Cold War Takes a New Turn

The new year brought three important changes that would each have a direct 

impact on American military forces in Europe. In January, a new president, 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, assumed the role as commander in chief with a level of 

military experience far surpassing that of any of his predecessors since Ulysses 

S. Grant. Two months later, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin died without leaving 

a clearly designated successor, forcing U.S. intelligence services to speculate on 

what effect the transition might have on the situation in Europe. Finally, on 

27 July, after more than two years of talks, negotiators in P’anmunjom agreed 

to an armistice in Korea.

A military career that began in 1915, included service in two World Wars, 

and culminated in the role of supreme commander in Europe, gave Eisenhower 

ample stature to consider himself as an expert in military affairs. From 1922 

through 1925 he had been stationed in Panama as executive officer under Brig. 

Gen. Fox Conner, commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade and widely regarded 

as the smartest man in the Army. Service under General Douglas MacArthur 

in the Philippines from late 1935 through 1939 and under General George C. 

Marshall in the War Plans Division of the General Staff during the first six 

months of 1942 had prepared Eisenhower to assume the responsibilities of the 

supreme allied commander in Europe during World War II. He could truthfully 

say that he had learned his craft from some of the greatest military leaders of 

the twentieth century. After World War II, President Harry S. Truman had 

asked him to serve as Army chief of staff, a job in which he presided over the 

demobilization of the wartime Army. Later, in the spring of 1949, he had served 

as an informal chairman of the Joint Chiefs before the official creation of that 

position. In that role he experienced firsthand the intense debates as each service 

competed for its share of the shrinking military budget. 

Building on that background, the new president came into office convinced 

that a strong economy was the true source of national security. He believed that 

the Soviet Union and its satellites could never defeat the United States as long 

as the latter retained its superiority in productive capacity, so he encouraged 

military leaders to design a security policy and force structure that the nation 

could support over the long haul: enough to provide adequate security, but not 

so much as to damage the growth and stability of the nation’s economy. With 

3

Growing Into the R
80 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

those goals in mind, he viewed a balanced budget as a necessary component to a 

sound security policy. He felt so strongly about this that he made his Secretary 

of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, and his Budget Director, Joseph M. 

Dodge, major participants in meetings of the National Security Council.1

Eisenhower’s experience in World War II, and his analysis of the fighting 

in Korea, had led him to the conclusion that conventional ground forces were 

largely obsolete. The ruins he had seen throughout Europe reinforced in his 

mind the horrors of an extended ground war. He did not think that the nations 

of that region would survive another such conflict. Meanwhile, the United 

States had been fighting in Korea for almost three years without any discernible 

end in sight. Eisenhower was appalled at the amount of money the Truman 

administration was spending to pursue the war. The prolonged stalemate 

underscored for him the futility of trying to match the Soviet or Chinese armies 

on a man-for-man basis. To his mind, such “small wars” wasted manpower 

and placed an unacceptable burden on the economic resources of the nation.2

In May 1953, the new president convened a conference of scientists, 

statesmen, and military experts to evaluate possible national strategies for 

dealing with Communist expansionism. Because the initial meeting took place in 

the White House sunroom, Eisenhower dubbed the series of meetings “Project 

Solarium.” He appointed separate committees to study and then to present 

the case for three distinct courses of action. Alternative A was essentially a 

restatement of the containment policy aimed at sustaining U.S. armed forces 

over an extended period of time and aiding other nations in building up their 

own defenses. This option, however, did not specify any consequences for 

continued Soviet encroachment. Alternative B proposed identifying a clear 

line around the Soviet bloc beyond which it would not be allowed to expand. 

Any violation of that perimeter would be cause for general war. Alternative 

C called for actions up to and including military force to weaken the Soviet 

Union’s hold over its satellite empire and to encourage maximum disruption 

and popular resistance throughout Communist territories.3

After the three teams briefed their positions on 16 July, the president 

presented his observations. He noted that the only thing worse than losing a 

global war was winning one and wondered what the United States would do 

with the Soviet Union even if it did manage to defeat the Communist nation. 

1 Ltr, Eisenhower to Charles E. Wilson, 5 Jan 1955, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Louis Galambos, and Daun Van Ee, 21 vols. (Baltimore, Md.: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001), 16:1488–91; Memorandum of Discussion at the 

160th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 27 Aug 1953, and Memorandum of 

Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, 13 Oct 1953, both in 

FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 2, National Security Affairs, pt. 1, pp. 443–55 and 534–49, respectively. 2 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, vol. 1, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 454. 3 Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1953, and Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, 1 Jun 1953, both in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 2, 

National Security Affairs, pt. 1, pp. 349–66.
Growing Into the Role

It was clear to him that the United States had to continue a policy of assisting 

its allies in building up their own defenses. Although some of the aggressive 

actions proposed by Teams B and C would be included in aspects of the national 

strategy, it was clear that any measure of preventive or preemptive war was 

unacceptable. Rather than a strategy of liberation, variations on existing policies 

of containment would be much more desirable.4

With these goals in mind, the new administration adopted a strategic course 

it described as the New Look. This approach aimed at providing a sturdy 

military posture that the nation could maintain over an extended period of 

time, what Eisenhower referred to as “the long haul.” The policy emphasized 

airpower and a reliance on atomic weapons and stressed that they would be 

employed in the event of general war. In the president’s mind, no other kind of 

military conflict with the Communists was possible. Instead, the administration 

would rely on a combination of covert activities, psychological warfare, and 

propaganda to keep the Soviets off balance and to counter their efforts to 

intimidate the West.5

Public enthusiasm for curtailing the defense budget received a new impetus 

in July 1953 when an armistice brought the fighting in Korea to an end. 

Almost immediately, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson predicted that 

the administration could trim defense spending by as much as a billion dollars. 

Even so, defense officials acknowledged that it would be difficult to achieve 

additional savings in the immediate future because so many fixed costs would 

continue. In the short term, they said, they would be able to cut back on the use 

of consumables such as ammunition, reduce equipment repair, and terminate 

combat pay.6

4 Minutes of the 155th Meeting of the National Security Council, 16 Jul 1953, in FRUS, 

1952–1954, vol. 2, National Security Affairs, pt. 1, pp. 394–98; Robert J. Watson, History of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954 (Washington, 

D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), pp. 11–14. 5 Richard M. Leighton, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 3, Strategy, 

Money, and the New Look, 1953–1956 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001); Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954, pp. 

35–36; Hanson W. Baldwin, “The Pentagon’s Changes: New Demands Confront the Services, 

Proposed Budget Cuts Pose Problems,” New York Times, 14 May 1953; idem, “New Look of 

the U.S. Armed Forces Is Emerging at the Pentagon,” New York Times, 13 Dec 1953; Elie Abel, 

“President Offers Defense Formula,” New York Times, 8 Jan 1954. Works describing the evolution of Eisenhower’s New Look include Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and 

Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Robert R. Bowie and Richard 

H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security 

Policy, 1953–1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). Eisenhower’s approach to psychological warfare is described in Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda 

Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 6 Austin Stevens, “Defense Chiefs See Billion Cut in Arms,” New York Times, 27 Jul 1953; 

E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953–1957 (Detroit, 

Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1979).
82 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

As Army chief of staff, General Ridgway fought a rearguard action trying 

to maintain funding and personnel levels that he felt his service required to 

perform its mission. His poor relationship with Secretary Wilson, however, 

coupled with the latter’s enthusiastic deference to the president’s vast military 

experience usually placed the Army in an indefensible position. As a result, the 

service experienced a steady decline in its budget, manpower allocation, and 

influence within the American defense establishment.7

Although willing to reduce spending, the Army’s leaders took steps to 

mitigate public clamor for a hasty demobilization lest any movement of the sort 

snowball into a national demand to end deployments to Europe. They initiated 

a public relations and information campaign in which they emphasized that 

the rapid and disorganized draw down after World War II had left the United 

States in a position where it had not been able to respond to early Communist 

challenges. Soviet tactics, they said, remained sufficiently flexible to allow the 

Soviets to pursue their long-range goal of world domination in other theaters. 

The United States should not be lulled into believing that the truce in Korea 

represented a change in Soviet intentions. Continued vigilance was essential.8

Complicating matters, events in the Soviet Union also threatened to change 

the dynamic between the two Cold War superpowers. On 6 March, the Soviet 

Union announced the death of Stalin, the nation’s premier and general secretary 

of its Communist Party. To Western observers, Stalin had been the face of the 

Soviet Union through the purges of the 1930s, World War II, and the early 

stages of the Cold War. His death prompted wide speculation about possible 

Soviet responses. In the United States, Senator Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), 

the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, hoped that 

“moderates inclined to peace” would win out. The chairman of the House 

Armed Services Committee, Congressman Dewey J. Short (R-Mo.), warned, 

however, that the Soviet Union’s new leader might prove to be even more 

dangerous than his predecessor and could provoke conflict abroad in order to 

consolidate his position at home.9

The CIA produced a special intelligence estimate to assess the probable 

consequences of Stalin’s death and to identify his most likely successor. The 

report expressed the agency’s belief that Georgi M. Malenkov’s prominent role 

in the Communist Party and his planned elevation to the position since 1948 

suggested that no immediate challenge to his ascension would occur. Given the 

nature of the Soviet state, however, analysts believed that a struggle for power 

could develop at any time. Some contributors to the report warned that any 

disagreement that became so widespread as to involve the Soviet Army or the 

7 Donald A. Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” Journal of Military History 71 

(October 2007): 1169–99. 8 Memo, DA, Office of the Adj Gen, for Major Commands, 6 Oct 1953, sub: Post-Armistice 

Troop Deployment, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 9 “Ike Told How Stalin Illness Could Effect World Peace,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 5 Mar 1953. 
Growing Into the Role

internal security forces could prompt a violent response and might loosen Soviet 

control over its satellite states. The report also noted that, while ruthless and 

determined to spread Soviet power, Stalin had not let his ambitions steer him 

into reckless courses of action. At least initially, the new regime would lack his 

freedom of action and his ability to maneuver because it would lack his immense 

prestige and authority. As a result, it would probably exercise caution in the 

near future and adhere to established Soviet positions.10

For the time being, Soviet policy remained focused on two primary goals: 

to prevent the remilitarization of West Germany, and to hinder West German 

consolidation into the Western camp. In pursuit of those goals the Soviets 

maintained a steady stream of propaganda aimed at the West Germans, stressing 

a lack of freedom in the Federal Republic and the subversive influence of the 

United States in political affairs.11

Keeping a Watchful Eye to the East

Within a few months after Stalin’s death, it became clear that the basic 

economic and military strength of the Soviet empire remained intact. Although 

an internal struggle for power within the Soviet government had resulted in the 

arrest and execution of First Deputy Prime Minister Lavrentiy Beria and an 

increase in influence for new Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, 

there appeared to be no weakening of the control the government held over 

either its own population or its satellite clientele.12

The Soviet government and its military demonstrated their willingness to 

deal ruthlessly with any form of internal rebellion on 16 June 1953, when a 

demonstration by workers in East Berlin protesting against increased work 

quotas erupted into a full-scale riot. The next morning, as thirty thousand 

demonstrators overturned kiosks and tore down Communist flags and posters 

on the Potsdamer Platz, East German police opened fire on the crowd. A short 

time later, Soviet tanks, armored cars, and infantry deployed throughout the 

city in an attempt to bring the mob under control. East German and Soviet 

officials declared martial law, banned all gatherings of more than three persons, 

and established a curfew from 2000 until 0400. In the meantime, protests 

and disturbances had broken out in a number of cities across East Germany. 

The Soviets dispatched troops to Halle, Mägdeberg, Danzig, Jena, and other 

10 Rpt, Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to 

Leadership in the USSR, 12 Mar 1953, CIA, Pentagon Library National Security Archive Database, 

copy in Historians files, CMH; “Stalin Dies,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 Mar 1953. 11 Msg, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany to CINCEUR, 13 Aug 1954, sub: 

For Professor Conference 19 Aug 1954, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 

549, NACP. Haslam, Russia’s Cold War; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; and Zubok and 

Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War give detailed accounts on the evolution of Soviet policy. 12 National Intelligence Estimate, CIA, Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through Mid-1955, 18 Aug 

1953, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, 

CMH; “Beria Out in Soviet Shakeup,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 11 Jul 1953.
84 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

destinations in an attempt to maintain civil control. By the time order was 

restored, hundreds had been killed or wounded. West German officials would 

later report that in the aftermath of the rioting, the Soviets executed sixty-two 

of the primary instigators and arrested twenty-five thousand protesters. In the 

end, even though the disturbances subsided, Berlin clearly remained a powder 

keg at the center of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.13

More to the point for the U.S. Army in Europe was the continued strength 

and influence of the Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe. Although Western 

analysts at the time observed no substantial increase in numbers, they did report 

on a series of modernization programs under way throughout the force. It is now 

clear, however, that between 1952 and 1954, the Soviets embarked on their own 

version of the New Look. During that time, manpower strength in the Soviet 

Army declined almost 25 percent, from 4.3 million to 3.2 million. Although still 

greatly outnumbering those in the West, Soviet ground forces also received less 

funding and decreased in importance while funding and research increased for 

13 CIA, Comment on Berlin Uprising, 17 Jun 1953, CIA Freedom of Information Act 

Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH; HQ, USAREUR, Sixth CINCUSAREUR-HICOG-Commanders Conference, 29 Jun 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “Soviet Tanks Roll Into East Berlin to Bar New 

Revolt,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Jul 1953.

East German border guards and tank, 19 June 1953
Growing Into the Role

strategic aircraft and land-based rockets and missiles. Nonetheless, the Soviets 

retained their formidable base for expansion, and Western analysts believed that 

their troop strength could be almost doubled within a month of mobilization.14

By 1953, after several years of studying the Soviet Army and its soldiers 

as potential adversaries, U.S. Army leaders had prepared a slightly more 

nuanced analysis than earlier studies had presented. A service handbook 

described organizational changes in the Soviet divisional structure as placing 

that force firmly on the road toward full mechanization. The changes indicated 

that the extreme centralization that had characterized the force’s World War 

II operations was being relaxed in favor of a more conventional distribution 

of command responsibility. Observations of large-scale maneuvers likewise 

indicated that the Soviets were improving their ability to integrate the actions 

of infantry, armor, artillery, and air elements into well-coordinated military 

operations.15

14 National Intelligence Estimates, CIA, Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through Mid-1955, 18 

Aug 1953, and Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the U.S. and Key Overseas Installations 

Through 1 July 1957, 17 Aug 1954; Advanced Research Projects Agency, Evolution of Soviet 

Military Forces and Budgets, 1952–1964, Oct 1975. All in CIA Freedom of Information Act 

Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH. 15 DA Pamphlet 30–50–1, Handbook on the Soviet and Satellite Armies, March 1953, p. 4.

Soviet tanks move through the streets of the Soviet sector of Berlin, dispersing the last 

German demonstrators who staged a day of uncontrolled rioting, 17 June 1953.
86 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The U.S. Army’s perception of the Soviet soldier, meanwhile, became much 

less of a caricature than it had been in the past. Instead, the Army’s analysis 

noted that the official image of the ideal Soviet soldier as a dauntless fighter, 

capable of withstanding any degree of hardship was directly contradicted by 

the Soviets’ own management and training literature. These directives and 

regulations took a dim view of the Soviet soldier and depicted him as lazy and 

shiftless and in need of constant supervision. The analysis concluded that the 

Soviet population was obviously too heterogeneous and far-flung to draw such 

easy generalizations of its people. The authors believed, however, that because 

the Soviet Army consisted primarily of peasant stock inured to hard manual 

labor, its soldiers would be used to operating with few creature comforts. One 

of the most important characteristics of the Soviet soldier, especially the Great 

Russians native to central and northeastern portions of the Soviet Union, was 

a deep and abiding patriotism that would be easily aroused by an invasion of 

his homeland. While, in many cases, the soldiers rejected much of the political 

indoctrination they received, their dissatisfaction in no way diminished their 

love of country.16

In summarizing its analysis, the U.S. Army manual concluded that, 

throughout the Soviet Army, a concerted, well-executed, and generally effective program of training had brought efficiency to a high level. Searching for 

shortcomings that the West could exploit, the manual focused on the Soviets’ 

infatuation with their World War II success. Unquestionably, it said, they had 

failed to distinguish between the generally applicable lessons of that experience 

and lessons valid only for that particular kind of war. When the Soviets trained 

for the offensive, as a result, they usually did so against a rigid, immobile defense 

of the type that Hitler had forced on his commanders in the east. Left unsaid 

was the hopeful conclusion that the Soviets would be less prepared to deal with 

the type of active defense that NATO and the West planned to implement.17

Another area of concern for Western planners was the growing size and 

competence of the Soviets’ satellite armies. In April 1953, the HICOG reported 

that the East Germans had 145,000 men in uniform. Although roughly 25,000 

were engaged in border and transportation security missions, more than 110,000 

served as members of the so-called “people’s police,” in essence, the new East 

German Army. The force included two infantry divisions and one armored 

division equipped with Soviet heavy equipment, artillery, and tanks. The 

remaining ten thousand men were almost equally divided between the Soviet 

Zone air force and the embryonic navy. The high commissioner’s office also 

reported ongoing construction of a submarine, a destroyer, numerous patrol 

boats, minesweepers, and coast guard craft for East German “sea police” 

units. Despite the growth in size of these forces, some analysts questioned 

their willingness to fight. They concluded that, while the satellite forces would 

16 Ibid., p. 70. 17 Ibid., p. 4.
Growing Into the Role

probably fight well against traditional enemies, they would be less reliable in 

a conflict against the West.18

Although the soldiers on both sides of the border managed to avoid 

starting a shooting war, relations between U.S. and Communist armed forces 

remained tense. Communist guards continued to harass U.S. soldiers as 

well as West German civilians who strayed too close to the border. In some 

cases, East German or Czechoslovakian troops took potshots at U.S. border 

patrols.19 The Americans were also guilty of their share of provocations. Radio 

networks sponsored and financed by the United States beamed a steady stream 

of anti-Communist programming into the Soviet Union and its satellites. 

U.S. military and civilian aircraft frequently deviated from the authorized air 

corridors leading into and out of Berlin. Although the U.S. border patrols 

generally maintained a high level of discipline while performing their duties, 

other American soldiers, on and off duty, managed to cross the border into 

Communist territory on a regular basis. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission in 

Potsdam, East Germany; the Office of the High Commissioner in Berlin; and 

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, all provided formal channels through which 

both sides communicated and resolved the various violations and incidents.20

Changes in Command and Combat Readiness

As the leaders of USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued to study 

their adversary and to prepare for potential conflict, their focus remained on 

improving combat readiness. This remained true despite another turnover in 

leadership beginning in 1953. General Eddy had long believed that his position 

as USAREUR commander warranted a fourth star. In March, when President 

Eisenhower refused to authorize the promotion and encouraged Eddy to make 

way for a younger officer, Eddy retired.21 General Bolte moved up to replace 

18 “HICOG Says 145,000 in East Zone Army,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Apr 1953; 

James D. Marchio, “Will They Fight: U.S. Intelligence Assessments and the Reliability of Non-Soviet 

Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, 1946–1989,” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 4 (December 2007): 5. 19 William E. Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, 1945–1983, 1984, Military 

History Office, USAREUR, Historians files, CMH; “7 Yanks Vanish at Czech Line,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 6 Jul 1954; “Lt, Pvt Abducted by Czechs, Army Tells State Department,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 19 Sep 1954; Nathan Margolin, “Russ Offered 

Berlin Yanks Bait to Stay,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 May 1953. 20 “Exile Groups Start Beaming Anti-Red Programs at Soviet,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 2 Mar 1953; Memo, Lt Col R. W. Prior, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 

23 Sep 1953, sub: Restriction from the Zonal Border, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP. Memos, Col Karl E. Henion, Ch, USAREUR Civil Affairs Div, for Dep Ch of 

Staff for Opns, 3 Jun 1953, sub: USAREUR’s Channels of Communication to Soviet Authorities 

in East Germany; and Maj James S. Changaris, Asst Sec of the General Staff, for USAREUR 

Civil Affairs Div, 17 Aug 1953, sub: Procedure for Handling Communications from any Soviet 

Source Concerning Military Matters. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 21 Phillips, The Making of a Professional.
88 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

General Eddy as USAREUR commanding general. Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, 

in turn, replaced Bolte as Seventh Army commander. Commissioned as an 

engineer, Hoge had directed the construction of the 1,030-mile-long Alaskan/

Canadian (ALCAN) Highway across northwest Canada to Alaska in 1942. He 

had then commanded the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade on D-Day at 

Omaha Beach and Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, in the defense 

of St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge. It was Hoge, at the head of Combat 

Command B, who had discovered the intact Rhine Bridge at Remagen that had 

enabled the First Army to jump the last barrier to Germany’s defeat. 

The new Seventh Army commander had definite ideas how best to deploy 

his command. He noted that infantry battalions preparing defensive positions 

tended to limit themselves to frontages of 1,200 meters or less. He pointed out 

General Bolte, Commanding General of the Seventh Army, during an inspection tour of 

VII Corps near Heilbronn during Exercise Grand Alliance in January 19
Growing Into the Role

to his commanders that such doctrine was a holdover from World War I and 

that fronts had been considerably longer throughout World War II and Korea. 

He expected his infantry battalions to train to defend positions of up to 5,000 

meters in width and to become more self-reliant, since they could not expect 

to have friendly units to their immediate right and left. The wider frontage, 

Hoge said, required greater coordination of supporting firepower. The infantry 

would have to be in position to locate targets for mortars, artillery, and close 

air support, and to direct those fires rather than wait to engage the enemy with 

its own weapons at closer ranges. Hoge was less inclined to support a policy of 

destroying everything of value as his forces pulled back before a Soviet assault. 

Such actions, he believed, would have little effect on a Soviet advance and only 

enrage the civilian population.22

Hoge implemented similar revisions in the Seventh Army’s offensive doctrine. 

It was generally better, he said, to give a battalion extra maneuver space rather 

than to constrict it to a narrow avenue of attack. With sufficient room to deploy, 

a battalion could advance in one direction to seize an objective, regroup, and 

22 DF, Brig Gen Einar B. Gjelstein to G–3, 27 Jun 1953, sub: Defense Training, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Interv, Lt Col George R. Robertson with Gen William M. Hoge, 16–17 Apr 1974, pp. 1–2, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI.

Marshal of France, Alphonse Juin (left), and General Hoge, Seventh Army, near Frankfurt 

in September 1953
90 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

then move on toward another objective from a different direction. He reminded 

commanders that, with the flexibility they had in their own weapons and 

supporting artillery from higher headquarters, they could engage almost any 

target that they could observe. Also, the larger the space to maneuver that a 

battalion had at its disposal, the more varied types of terrain it might be able to 

exploit in its advance. In order to test the ability of his battalions to adapt to the 

extended frontages that he envisioned, Hoge approved modifications to standard 

infantry battalion training tests that combat units took in other theaters. Seventh 

Army tests placed greater emphasis on the physical conditioning, long-range 

communications, and extended tactical resupply the new doctrine would require.23

For the troops on the ground, the wide frontages inherent in Seventh Army 

plans and training presented different challenges. William E. DePuy, then a 

lieutenant colonel in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry 

Division, described the concept as a squad and platoon war. Noting how thin 

his units would have been on the ground, DePuy remembered that he had about 

one platoon for each paved road in his sector. About a mile or two separated 

the platoons. Each platoon would have a jeep-mounted 106-mm. recoilless rifle, 

23 DF, Col W. W. O’Connor, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, to Seventh Army Training Section, 5 

Aug 1953, sub: Wide Fronts in the Attack, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, 

NACP; Memo, G. I. Lane, Asst Adj Gen, VII Corps, for CG, Seventh Army, 27 Sep 1954, sub: 

Infantry Battalion Tests, VII Corps, 1954, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP. 

A 106-mm. recoilless rifle on guard at a 6th Infantry Regiment roadblock in Berlin, October 1953.
Growing Into the Role

one or two 3.5-inch bazookas, and a few machine guns to defend its position. 

Perhaps they would be assigned a section of tanks, but probably not. They 

would scatter a few mines across the road and get ready to fight.24

In their training as well as their daily routines, soldiers of the Seventh 

Army prepared for the worst-case scenario, a surprise Soviet attack across the 

border between East and West Germany. The memory of the Japanese attack 

at Pearl Harbor still lingered in the minds of many senior officers, so much 

so that the prevention of a surprise attack was incorporated into the service’s 

operational and training manuals. For that purpose, battalions from the three 

armored cavalry regiments maintained a round-the-clock vigil from observation 

points and patrol routes along the border. Jeep and armored car patrols ran 

the length of the border daily, from north of Kassel, where they linked up with 

British elements, down to the point where the Czech and Austrian borders 

intersected the U.S. Zone. In addition, the command inaugurated an extensive 

series of practice alerts and musters to ensure that units could reach their battle 

positions in the shortest time possible. These exercises included assembly of 

personnel and equipment, packing of all basic load shipments of supplies and 

ammunition, and movement to simulated assembly areas within ten miles of 

the kasern. In some cases, units continued the exercise with a movement into 

initial battle positions. It was a Seventh Army requirement that each unit within 

the command maintain such a state of readiness that it could begin movement 

to the field within two hours of an alert.25

New corps commanders brought their own innovations to improving 

combat readiness. When Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin became commander of 

the VII Corps in December 1952, he observed that infantry battalions began 

their training tests from their garrison stations. The troops would eat a hearty 

breakfast and then mount trucks that would take them to the training site. 

Gavin had the battalions begin the exercise with an all-night march. The way a 

lieutenant or captain made decisions after forty-eight hours without sleep and 

an eighteen-mile march, Gavin believed, was quite different from how the same 

lieutenant or captain made decisions walking straight out of the barracks.26

In 1953, as part of an effort to test and to improve unit response times, 

the command instituted periodic exercises known as Handicap Black

Intelligence personnel from USAREUR headquarters would deliver written 

messages simulating enemy contact to patrols, listening posts, observation 

24 Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, interviewers, Changing an Army: An Oral 

History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Military History Institute and U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 

pp. 109–10. 25 Ltr, Gjelstein to Col Wilbur S. Nye, Ch Historian, USAREUR, 27 Nov 1953; and HQ, 

Seventh Army, Training Cir 7, Practice Alerts and Musters, 27 Feb 1953. Both in Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, 

p. 62. 26 Interv, Lt Col Donald G. Andrews and Lt Col Charles H. Ferguson with Gen James M. 

Gavin, 16 Apr 1975, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI.
92 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

posts, company headquarters of the armored cavalry regiments, or anyone else 

who was in position to report an actual enemy attack. Agents dropped off one 

message daily along the border and additional messages to other units within 

the command on a random basis. Units receiving the initial alerts transmitted 

their reports through notification channels to the next higher headquarters. 

Each headquarters in turn pushed the message up the chain of command until 

it reached the Seventh Army. The maximum allowable time the process could 

take from beginning to end was thirty minutes.27 

Combat readiness in the Seventh Army continued to improve as additional

leadership rotations soon brought even more World War II experience to the 

command. In October 1953, General Bolte returned to the United States to 

serve as the Army vice chief of staff. General Hoge moved up to take his place 

as USAREUR commander. To replace him as the Seventh Army commanding 

general, the Army selected Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, then serving as 

the deputy Army chief of staff for operations and administration. McAuliffe 

was one of the most colorful officers in the Army, having earned renown while 

serving as acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne during 

27 Stacy, U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, pp. 91–92.

General Gavin checks map coordinates during Exercise Grand Alliance, January 19
Growing Into the Role

the Battle of the Bulge where he responded “Nuts!” to a German demand for 

surrender. He was known as “The Old Crock” to the men who served under him, 

a title he had won when he remarked that jumping out of an airplane was a hell 

of a business for an old crock like himself. Later in the war he had commanded 

the 103d Infantry Division as it advanced through the Siegfried Line.28

McAuliffe came to the command with a reputation as a soldier’s soldier. 

He disdained formal inspections, reviews, and the typical canned spit and 

polish presentations usually reserved for visits by a general officer. Instead, he 

preferred to see troops in the field conducting regularly scheduled training. He 

expected his commanders to adopt a philosophy of decentralized leadership, 

so that platoon leaders, company commanders, and sergeants could train their 

men without feeling that every move they made was being “supervised by a 

28 First quote from Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, United States Army in 

World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1965), p. 468. Second 

quoted words from “General Anthony C. McAuliffe Dies,” Washington Post, 14 Aug 1975. “Hoge 

to Succeed Bolte at USAREUR,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 29 Sep 1953; Ernie Reed, 

“New 7th Army Commander Made N-U-T-S Famous,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 

Feb 1954. 

Left to right: Brig. Gen. Raymond Bell, V Corps; Lt. Gen. Anthony McAuliffe, Seventh Army; 

Maj. Gen. Ira Swift, V Corps; and French General Marcel Carpentier in October 1953
94 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

hovering senior.” Training supervision, he said, should evaluate results rather 

than process. As with General Hoge before him, McAuliffe also emphasized 

increasing the tempo of tactical training. He believed that this kept interest in 

an exercise high and helped junior leaders learn to think on their feet and to 

make quick but well-reasoned decisions.29

Throughout 1954, Seventh Army training continued to emphasize the integration of various combat arms, understanding that the strengths of one could 

offset the potential weaknesses of another. Infantry regiments experimented 

with different ways to exploit their assigned tank companies, whether to employ 

them in an “overwatch” role, providing covering fire as the infantry advanced, 

or in a convergent attack, with the tanks advancing from one direction and the 

infantry from another. Divisions also reverted to the World War II practice of 

combining infantry, tank, and artillery battalions to form combat teams. This 

allowed commanders to experiment with different ways of controlling the ad 

hoc formations.30

29 Quote from Memo, Col Lynwood D. Lott, Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 28 

Jul 1954, sub: Commanding General’s Letter, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, 

NACP. Ltr, Lt Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe to Maj Gen Charles E. Hart, V Corps Cdr, 26 Jun 

1954, Entry 33511, V Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, NACP. 30 Memos, Brig Gen George E. Lynch, Ch of Staff, for CG, Seventh Army, 28 Aug 1954, 

Training and Deployment of the Tank Company of the Infantry Regiment, Entry 33515, VII 

Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP; and CWO I. L. Roach, V Corps Asst Adj Gen, for CG, 

Elements of 43d Infantry Battalion and 67th Tank Battalion, 2d Armored Division, move 

into attack position, September 1953
Growing Into the Role

Within the small enclaves surrounding U.S. garrisons in Berlin and Trieste, 

and for the occupation forces still remaining in Austria, training and preparations for combat were a bit more problematic. In Trieste, the 351st Infantry 

maintained firing ranges for all but its heaviest weapons and conducted rigorous 

mountain warfare training in the hills surrounding the city. Soldiers of the 

6th Infantry in Berlin had similar ranges in the city’s extensive “Grunewald” 

parklands. They also practiced riot control, urban combat techniques, and other 

subjects specific to their circumstances. The limited amount of land available to 

both regiments, however, forced the troops to travel at least once a year to major 

Seventh Army, 28 Oct 1954, sub: Organization of Battalion Combat Teams, Entry 33511, V 

Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, NACP.

A heavy tank company from 6th Infantry in Grunewald, October 1953
96 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

maneuver areas in West Germany for more extensive training. In Austria, the 

troops of the 350th Infantry had more training space, but administrative duties 

limited the amount of time available for training. The U.S. Army, Europe, and 

the Seventh Army provided transportation, logistical support, and supplemental 

attachments of tanks, artillery, or engineers to assist with training whenever 

these units deployed to Grafenwöhr. Although elements from each command 

often participated in major training exercises, none were able to take part in 

events greater than battalion strength due to the need to maintain the bulk of 

each unit on standby in garrison.31

Reasoning from their experiences in World War II and Korea, Army 

leaders believed that one way to offset the Soviet advantage in numbers would 

be to exploit American airpower, specifically the Twelfth Air Force, under 

the command of Maj. Gen. Dean C. Strother. Its headquarters had been in 

Wiesbaden since 1951, but midway through 1953, it moved to Ramstein Air 

Force Base, outside of Kaiserslautern. In January 1953, it consisted of three 

fighter-bomber wings flying F–86F Sabres, a light bomber wing using B–26B 

Invaders, a tactical reconnaissance wing with RF–84F Thunderflashes, and 

two troop carrier wings flying C–54 Skymasters and C–119 Flying Box Cars. In 

addition to providing support for U.S. forces in Europe, most of the numbered 

Air Force wings were integrated into NATO’s air arm, the Fourth Allied 

Tactical Air Force. To integrate combat actions on the ground with U.S. Air 

Force operations, USAREUR and the Seventh Army focused their attention 

on three areas where the Army had a significant interest.32

The first was close air support. From the Seventh Army’s earliest training, 

commanders had made coordination with their Air Force counterparts a 

high priority. To that end, USAREUR and Seventh Army planning staffs 

incorporated tactical air support into each major exercise. Despite the U.S. 

Air Force’s growing emphasis on its strategic forces and a doctrine of massive 

retaliation, the Twelfth Air Force in Europe continued to rehearse and to refine 

its procedures for close air support. The interest of NATO and the supreme allied 

commander, first General Ridgway and later General Alfred M. Gruenther, 

in providing close air support to alliance ground units helped to keep U.S. Air 

Force units in Europe involved in such training. Twelfth Air Force aircraft 

31 Memos, CWO W. E. Loomis, Asst Adj Gen, for Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR), 3 May 1954, sub: Support of 6th Infantry Regiment for Grafenwöhr 

Training, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; and Brig Gen Douglas V. 

Johnson, Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, for CINC, 23 Dec 1954, sub: Annual Command Inspection 

of Berlin Command, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; Training Memo 8, HQ, Trieste United States Troops, 26 Jul 1954, War Department 

Decimal 300.6, Training Memos, RG 334, NACP; Memo, Col Paul A. Gavan, OPOT Div, for 

Trieste Distribution, 7 Jul 1950, sub: Notes on Joint EUCOM-TRUST Conference Pertaining 

to Fall Training 1950, Entry 1416, TRUST Training, RG 353, NACP. 32 Strategic Guidance Directive 1, SHAPE/54/51, 19 May 1951, SHAPE Historical Office, 

Historians files, CMH; Schlight, Help from Above, pp. 182–219.
Growing Into the Role

participated in almost every major Seventh Army field exercise as well as many 

conducted by the corps and divisions.33

By 1953, the most pressing problem that U.S. commanders had identified 

with close air support was the lack of a full-time direct liaison between the 

Twelfth Air Force and Seventh Army maneuver units. The Air Force command 

took steps to remedy the situation early that year when it activated a tactical 

air control squadron with sufficient control parties to assign to major ground 

units, including corps, divisions, brigades, and sometimes battalions. These 

two- or three-person teams advised ground commanders on the best employment 

of air support and provided radio communications between ground units, 

aircraft, and the combat operations center or air support operations center, 

usually located with the Seventh Army headquarters. To man this center, 

the Twelfth Air Force provided a combat operations section, containing 

both fighter and reconnaissance elements. It included two officers from the 

Seventh Army intelligence and operations sections and maintained constant 

direct communications with the Seventh Army, all major Air Force units, and 

tactical air control centers. In practice, tactical air control parties would relay 

requests for air support to the combat operations center, which would approve 

the mission and assign it to available aircraft. Once the aircraft arrived on 

station, the tactical air control parties would guide them onto their targets. As 

an additional coordination measure, the Army permanently assigned ground 

liaison officers to each fighter-bomber and reconnaissance wing while the Air 

Force assigned officers to each Army corps and division.34

Concerns about the coordination of close air support were exacerbated by 

the incompatibility of some Army and Air Force communications equipment. 

Neither USAREUR nor the Twelfth Air Force possessed a sufficient number of 

the very high frequency (VHF) or ultra-high frequency (UHF) radios required 

to communicate with advanced aircraft. Although partially resolved when 

Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties with the proper radios linked up with 

Seventh Army units, communications shortages persisted.35

The second aerial activity in which USAREUR and the Seventh Army 

invested considerable interest was air defense. Given the distinct possibility 

that incoming enemy aircraft might be delivering atomic weapons, the Army 

placed increased emphasis on tracking them and shooting them down. It was 

difficult to develop trained antiaircraft artillery crews because the only firing 

33 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 32, Historians files, CMH. 34 Ltr, Eddy to Gen John E. Hull, Vice Ch of Staff, 13 Feb 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, 

HQ, USAREUR, pp. 246–47, Historians files, CMH; Ralph D. Bald, U.S. Air Force Historical 

Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Air Force Participation in Joint Army–Air 

Force Training Exercises, 1951–1954, 1957, pp. 36–46, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 35 Memo, Brig Gen Douglas V. Johnson, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for USAREUR Ch of Staff, 

27 Aug 1953, sub: Aspect of Joint Interest or Problems Presented by the 1953 Fall Maneuvers 

Schedule, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 246–47.
98 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

ranges available for use by most antiaircraft weapons were in the British Zone 

along the North Sea coast. Long travel distances for participating units, conflicts 

with adjacent NATO ranges, and relatively brief periods of weather suitable 

for training hampered progress in this area. 

Throughout 1953 and 1954, the Army and the Air Force engaged in 

protracted and often heated discussions over operational control of weapons 

and aircraft devoted to the air defense mission. It was the Seventh Army’s 

position that the field army commander should have operational control over 

supporting tactical air forces while Air Force commanders were loath to give 

up any level of authority over their aircraft. The two commands also differed 

over the alert status and rules of engagement for air defense weapons. Fearing 

for the safety of their own aircraft, air commanders preferred a hold-fire status, 

which required ground units to obtain command authorization before engaging 

targets. Ground officers, however, preferred preapproval so that they could 

engage any aircraft that violated established friendly approach corridors. 

Control of the air space above the battlefield became as important an issue as 

control of the supporting aircraft. Despite ongoing discussions, neither issue 

was ever fully resolved.36

Beginning in 1954, air defense units in Europe began to receive new equipment. The first was a radar-guided 75-mm. gun known as the Skysweeper. 

Although it was a marked improvement over visually guided weapons, it took 

troops more than four months of training to learn the intricacies of the new 

system. Also in 1954, the USAREUR commander received advanced notice 

of the conversion of six of his antiaircraft gun battalions to Nike missile units. 

His instructions included logistical and real estate requirements for the fixed 

installations the missiles would occupy. Although the guidance directed no 

immediate action on the part of USAREUR, the command began preliminary 

searches for suitable sites for the installations and a firing range where it could 

test the missiles.37

By mid-1954, Seventh Army commanders also began to experiment with 

a third type of aerial operation. For some time, infantry units had cooperated 

with the Air Force on air transport training. In many cases this simply involved 

briefings on proper procedures for loading equipment onto transport aircraft. 

Some units, however, underwent more advanced training, learning to conduct 

36 Memos, Col Walter E. Kraus, Ch, USAREUR Training Br, for Col Dolph, 15 Sep 1953, 

sub: 90mm AA Training; and Maj Fred E. Hansard, Asst Adj Gen, for CINCUSAREUR, 

12 Feb 1953, sub: The Army’s Role in Air Defense. Both in Entry 2028, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP. Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, 

USAREUR, p. 236; Schlight, Help from Above, p. 220. 37 Ltr, Col Donald C. Tredennick, Dep Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, to Maj Gen Stanley R. Mickelsen, AAA and Guided Missile School, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1958, RG 549, NACP; Msg, DA, Dep Ch of Staff for Logistics, to CINCUSAREUR, 

12 Nov 1954, Ref #DA–970925, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, 

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (NADC); Annual Hist Rpt, 

1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 166–70, Historians files, CMH. 
Growing Into the Role

an air assault, albeit one from fixed-wing aircraft into an established airhead. 

In June 1954, the Seventh Army attached the 328th Helicopter Company to the 

VII Corps. Equipped with the H–19 Chickasaw, the Army’s first true transport 

helicopter, the new unit presented the Seventh Army with an opportunity to 

develop a more ambitious air assault doctrine. The Seventh Army’s Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, requested that 

the VII Corps develop tactics and techniques for the use of the helicopters 

in a number of roles. He included among those the vertical envelopment of 

an enemy defensive position, an attack across a severe terrain obstacle, the 

evacuation of isolated units, the quick positioning of a blocking force to meet an 

enemy penetration, and the evacuation of wounded. The number of helicopters 

available was small, but VII Corps infantry units were able to begin training 

with them on a limited basis.38

The Seventh Army Goes Nuclear

Although their training efforts and doctrine continued to reflect a conventional orientation, USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders were beginning 

to consider the implications the use of atomic weapons would have for their 

battle plans. Even more than conventional air support, atomic weapons offered 

the greatest potential for offsetting the Soviets’ numerical advantages. The 

Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy made it clear that the United 

States would employ them in any general war with the Soviet Union. If that 

occurred, the Strategic Air Command would have the primary responsibility to 

drop atomic bombs on targets deep within the Soviet Union. Without a means 

of delivering atomic munitions of its own, the Seventh Army had to rely on 

whatever bombs the Air Force was willing to divert to tactical support. Some 

within the Army, however, were skeptical about receiving any level of Air Force 

support. In a critique of atomic weapons play during Exercise Spring Tide 

May 1953, for example, the USAREUR commander, General Bolte, questioned 

the use of atomic weapons in support of frontline operations, noting that the 

Army and Air Force in Korea had been unable to identify suitable targets near 

the front lines. Bolte also warned Seventh Army leaders to carefully consider 

what targets merited attack by atomic weapons. Participants in the Command 

Post Exercise (CPX), he said, “were often guilty of using a hammer to kill a fly.”39

38 Memo, Brig Gen Hamilton H. Howze for CG, VII Corps, 29 Jun 1954, sub: 328th Helicopter 

Company, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Jack Blood, “Helicopters 

Speed Medical Evacuation,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 May 1954; “9th Division 

Troops Practice Air Assault,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Aug 1954. 39 Rpt, Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 May 1953, sub: Revision 

of Information for General Ridgway on Availability of Atomic Weapons (JCS2220/19), Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH. Quote 

from Memo, Col Donald C. Tredennick, Dep Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Maj Gen Claude B. 

Ferenbaugh, 3 Jun 1953, sub: Critique of Spring Tide CPX, Entry 2060, USAREUR Assista

Chief of Staff, G3 Operations, General Correspondence Decimal File, RG 549, NACP.
100 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Extensive criticism during the discussions that followed CPX Spring T

reflected the inexperience of most of the staffs in dealing with these issues. 

One Seventh Army intelligence observer commented that most staff sections 

involved in the exercise seemed to have little appreciation for the impact of a 

twenty-kiloton detonation in their vicinity. He also noted extreme delays in 

processing information on potential atomic targets, and added that communications encryption procedures were so slow and cumbersome that they created 

bottlenecks in the flow of information. Another officer commented that staff 

sections had no idea how the command would reconstitute units or command 

posts that had been devastated by atomic attack.40

Whatever their doubts, by conducting a number of staff and command post 

exercises during 1953, USAREUR’s commanders began to consider how best 

to incorporate friendly atomic munitions into their planning. At the same time, 

they also began to consider the effects enemy strikes might have on their own 

forces. Maneuver forces would have to learn to fight dispersed, while retaining 

the mobility to mass whenever an opportunity to attack presented itself.41

40 DF, Col Albert S. Britt, Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, to Seventh Army Staff, 17 Jul 1953, sub: 

Critique of CPX Spring Tide for Seventh Army Staff, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–196

RG 338, NACP. 41 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, Seventh Army, Entry 33503, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.

43d Infantry Division patrol conducting reconnaissance with “westland” forces in the 

village of Gresenhren
Growing Into the Role 

The command’s first in-depth experiment with atomic warfare came in 

September 1953, when the Seventh Army participated in Exercise Monte Carlo

a NATO free-maneuver war game. About 175,000 troops, including 120,000 

Americans, 27,000 Belgians, 22,000 French, and 6,000 British participated in 

the effort, the largest inter-allied maneuver since World War II. The official 

objectives of the exercise were to test liaison between allied commands, to 

emphasize offensive operations, to perfect air-ground techniques, and to make 

effective use of mines and demolitions. Without a great deal of public comment, 

however, NATO and USAREUR planners also designed the maneuver to 

focus on the development of atomic warfare techniques and the employment 

of atomic weapons. One purpose of the effort, they said, would be to instill in 

participating soldiers an “atomic mindedness” and to dispel misconceptions 

about the use of atomic or chemical weapons.42 To do that, the maneuver 

would test the ability of ground forces to communicate with air units capable 

of delivering atomic weapons, to concentrate quickly from widely dispersed 

positions, and to coordinate their movements with fire support because an 

atomic bomb explosion could disrupt an attacking armor formation. Since 

atomic weapons could also rupture the strongest enemy defenses, attacking 

42 James Quigley, “175,000 Men Open Monte Carlo Today,” Stars and Stripes, Europea

Edition. 10 Sep 1953. Quote from Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, 

pp. 244–49. 

Soldiers of Company K, 110th Infantry, move through the outskirts of Gerberstein, 

Germany, during Exercise Monte Carlo in September 1953
102 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

ground units would also attempt to synchronize their movements with aircraft 

delivering atomic munitions in the final phases of an assault.43

The maneuver identified many of the same deficiencies seen in earlier 

command post exercises, but, because it involved live troops, it also revealed 

entirely new problems. Staff officers reported that the overall flow of information was generally superior to previous exercises, most likely due to the exchange 

of liaison officers between many of the staffs and headquarters involved. 

Nonetheless, communications between Seventh Army headquarters and those 

of participating allied forces were inadequate and slow. The staff critique also 

noted that the logistics scenario was generally not realistic. A large percentage 

of the rations and fuel supplies required for the exercise was prestocked prior 

to the maneuver, and not replaced on the basis of daily consumption. Exercise 

planners pointed out that this procedure was necessary, however, because the 

Seventh Army lacked sufficient truck transport units to move all the supplies 

while, at the same time, supporting corps and division operations. The most 

illuminating aspect of the critique, however, was the absence of comments 

regarding atomic matters. Among its major points, the critique noted that the 

Seventh Army had not received firm guidance regarding the atomic aspects 

of the exercise until 7 September, leaving insufficient time for coordination 

and planning at its level. Although ground units had maneuvered, in many 

cases, in response to simulated atomic strikes, the report made no mention of 

coordination issues with the Twelfth Air Force. The report did note that poor 

weather had prevented many aircraft from flying and that the Twelfth Air 

Force had not established a Tactical Air Control Center at the Seventh Army 

command post for the exercise.44

The Army took steps toward breaking its dependency on the Air Force for 

atomic support in Europe in October 1953, when two 280-mm. atomic cannons 

belonging to the 868th Field Artillery Battalion arrived in Germany. The 

Army had developed the artillery pieces in 1952 and tested them in the Nevada 

desert on 25 May 1953, with the successful firing and detonation of an atomic 

projectile.45 Weighing eighty-eight tons, each enormous weapon required two 

heavy tractor trucks to move it, one to its front and the other to its rear. The 

section had a top speed on the highway of thirty-five miles per hour. Although 

relatively slow and ungainly, the pieces could be emplaced and put into action 

in about the same amount of time that conventional heavy artillery required. 

The guns lacked the range and flexibility of aircraft delivered munitions, but 

43 DA FM 100–31, Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons, November 1951; “What Atomic Firepower Means in Combat,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 25 Mar 1953; Memo, Johnson for 

USAREUR Ch of Staff, 4 Aug 1953, sub: Guidance on Atomic Matters, Entry 2028, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP. 44 Memo, Lt Col Frank D. Jones, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 26 Oct 1953, sub: 

Staff Critique—Exercise Monte Carlo, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 33, NACP. 45 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, Seventh Army; “Army to Fire A-Shell fo

Time in Tests,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 9 Mar 1953; “Army’s ‘Amazon Annie’ 

Arrives in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Nov 1953.
The men of the 1st Gun Section, Battery B, 59th Field Artillery Battalion, prepare to fire a 

280-mm. gun, May 1956.

A 280-mm. cannon, October 1955
104 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

they provided a far greater measure of accuracy and reliability. Most important, 

unlike the Air Force, they could provide atomic fire support to Army ground 

units at night and in any kind of weather.46

The message implicit in the delivery of the new weapons was as important 

as the tactical capabilities they represented. As the guns arrived, Army leaders 

made a great show of displaying the ordnance for the American and European 

press.47 The cannons symbolized the Eisenhower administration’s commitment 

to defend Europe with atomic weapons while also giving the Seventh Army 

the ability to provide its own atomic fire support without having to rely on the 

Air Force. 

By the end of June 1954, five battalions of the atomic artillery had arrived 

in Europe and were becoming more firmly established as essential components 

of any proposed defense in Western Europe. Assigned to the 42d Field Artillery 

Group at Baumholder and placed under Seventh Army control, these battalions 

were the 59th, located at Pirmasens, the 264th at Bad Kreuznach, the 265th at 

Baumholder, the 867th at Kaiserslautern, and the 868th at Baumholder. In its 

annual training guidance, the U.S. Army, Europe, directed the Seventh Army 

to employ them throughout division, corps, and army-level maneuvers. The 

USAREUR commander, General Hoge, and the Seventh Army’s commander, 

General McAuliffe, both acknowledged the increased level of emphasis on 

atomic doctrine and training throughout their organizations. Hoge told news 

reporters that the Soviets would not hesitate to use atomic weapons on the 

battlefield and that his command had to be prepared for them. McAuliffe told 

a similar audience that he planned to broaden the atomic training program 

throughout the Seventh Army and would increase that emphasis as the 

command received information and guidance from actual atomic tests in the 

United States. In an article for military journals, McAuliffe wrote that his men 

had tried to envision the possibilities of atomic warfare and had emphasized in 

their training a rapid exploitation of the effects of atomic weapons in the attack. 

Personnel had also trained extensively, he said, on measures to minimize the 

effects of radiation, blast, and heat caused by enemy atomic weapons.48

The 280-mm. cannon battalions dragged their big guns all over Germany as 

they participated in field exercises from division- to NATO-level maneuvers.49

As a result of this training, the Seventh Army developed standard operating 

46 Ltr, Johnson to Brig Gen James F. Brittingham, Asst Commandant, Field Artillery School, 18 

Aug 1953, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP; “Ármy 

Unveils World’s First Atom Artillery Piece,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Oct 1952. 47 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 220. 48 Ibid., pp. 219–21; Joseph W. Grigg, “Hoge to Push Training in A-War Tactics,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 3 Oct 1953; Richard K. O’Malley, “McAuliffe Planning to Broaden 

Atomic Training for Seventh Army,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 25 Oct 1953; “Seventh 

Army Emphasizing A-Training: McAuliffe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 May 1954. 49 Msg, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, for G–3, 16 Aug 1954; Ltr, Gen William M. Hoge, 

Cdr, Seventh Army, to Gen Thomas T. Handy, Dep Cdr, U.S. EUCOM, 6 Mar 1954. Both in 

Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. Omer Anderson, “280-mm 
Growing Into the Role 

procedures that integrated atomic fire support into its battle doctrine. Artillerymen 

and engineers learned, for example, to address some of the complications the new 

weapons entailed. Engineers, in particular, had to conduct a route reconnaissance 

prior to their movement of the big guns to ensure that bridges and roadways along 

a route could bear the weight. In many cases, they had to avoid small villages 

because their corners were too tight to negotiate without damaging property.50

John C. Gazlay, an infantryman with the 13th Armored Infantry Battalion, 

remembered that, when traveling down the narrow, high-crowned roads in 

Germany, the lead tractor would travel on the right side of the road, while the 

rear tractor traveled on the left. This arrangement would present a frightening 

sight for oncoming traffic, which had to take to the shoulders to allow the moving 

roadblock to proceed. Gazlay remembered one particular gun section that had 

approached their task with a sense of humor. On the lead tractor the cannoneers 

had stenciled the name SHAKE, the gun and carriage had been stenciled with 

a pair of dice and the name RATTLE, and the rear tractor bore the stenciled 

name ROLL.51

Representatives from USAREUR and the Seventh Army met with allied 

officers from NATO’s Northern Army Group and the First French Army to 

discuss apportioning the weapons during combat. As a result, USAREUR agreed 

to prepare two battalions, tentatively the 264th and 265th, for attachment to the 

Northern Army Group and one battalion, tentatively the 59th, for attachment to 

the First French Army. The two remaining battalions would stay under Seventh 

Army control. Although USAREUR directed the Seventh Army to make the 

battalions as self-sustaining as possible, the command announced that it would 

control rates of fire and resupply for both conventional and atomic ammunition. 

In order to assist allied commanders, USAREUR established Atomic Liaison 

Units in all NATO ground force headquarters at the corps level and above.52

Maneuvers and exercises for the rest of the year included extensive atomic 

training. The big gun battalions participated in both the NATO Central Army 

Group Exercise Indian Summer and the Northern Army Group Exercis

Battle Royal. To support them, Army technicians constructed pyrotechnic

that simulated atomic detonations, so that troops would recognize when to 

Guns to Take Part in NATO Games,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Jun 1954; James 

Quigley, “A-Shells Hurled at Foe in Games,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Sep 1954. 50 Memos, Maj G. I. Lane, Asst Adj Gen, for Commanding Officer (CO), 115th Engr Gp, 15 

Sep 1954, sub: Support of 280mm Gun, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP; 

and Lt Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe, Cdr, Seventh Army, for CGs, V and VII Corps, 22 Apr 

1954, sub: Support of Training March of the 265th FA Battalion, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 51 Donald M. Buchwald, ed., Tales from the Cold War: The 13th Armored Infantry Battalion 

on Freedom’s Frontier (Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2004), p. 142. 52 Memo, Brig Gen Leo V. Warner, Adj Gen, USAREUR, for CG, Seventh Army, 9 Mar 1954, 

sub: Employment of 280mm Battalions, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 

549, NACP; Ltr, Hoge to Maj Gen James E. Moore, Army War College, 19 Dec 1953, USAREUR 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations), General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP.
106 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

take appropriate actions.53 Observers and evaluators directed their comments 

toward improving survivability in an atomic environment and streamlining 

procedures for identifying and attacking likely targets. They also addressed 

needs for better camouflage and increased dispersion because American atomic 

forces would be high-priority targets for the other side’s weapons. Other officers 

found the process for identifying targets and forwarding the information to 

atomic delivery units to be cumbersome and time consuming. As had been the 

case in previous exercises, communications proved to be a consistent problem as 

units worked to streamline procedures for coordinating atomic fire support. At 

a Seventh Army Signal Conference during August 1954, commanders discussed 

possible personnel additions and equipment improvements to division signal 

companies to facilitate communications between the widely dispersed elements 

of the force.54

By the end of 1954, USAREUR and the Seventh Army were well on their 

way toward developing an operational doctrine based on the use of atomic 

weapons. Much, however, remained to be done. The 280-mm. guns remained 

the only atomic capable weapons system under Army control. A July inspection 

by a team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces noted continued 

deficiencies in procedures for employing aerial-delivered atomic weapons 

in support of ground combat operations. The observers noted that these 

shortcomings stemmed from an absence of a jointly accepted doctrine between 

the Army and Air Force to determine the number of weapons to be allocated 

to ground support and the types of targets to be attacked.55 For the time being, 

without a firm commitment from the Air Force to devote some of its munitions 

to targets in the battle area, most of the command’s available combat power 

remained conventional in nature.

Manning the Force: USAREUR’s Personnel Pipeline

Regardless of how the Army chose to fight the battle in Europe, it required 

a steady stream of soldiers to maintain its force there. Many of the troops who 

had arrived in the initial augmentations in 1951 and 1952 had been draftees 

53 Memo, CWO W. E. Loomis, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, V Corps, 23 Sep 1953, sub: Simulated 

Atomic Bursts in FTX Power Play; DF, Col William W. O’Connor, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, 

Ch of Staff, 7 Dec 1953, sub: Requirement for Demonstration on Atomic Effects. Both in Entry 

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. “Battle Royal to Use Tactics of A-War,

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Sep 1954. 54 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, Historians files, CMH; Memo, 

Lt Col R. W. Prior, Asst Adj Gen, Seventh Army, for General Distribution, 1 Jul 1954, sub: 

Seventh Army Staff Critique, CPX Counter Thrust, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965

RG 338, NACP; Robert Dunphy and William Mahoney, “Indian Summer Test, Air Games

End Today,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 Sep 1954; Memo, Col Marion W. Schewe, 

Ch of Staff, 4th Inf Div, for CG, Seventh Army, 8 Oct 1954, sub: Reorganization of Division 

Signal Company, Entry 33511, V Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, NACP. 55 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 244.
Growing Into the Role 

and reservists with little time left in service. Their departure in 1952 and 1953 

exacerbated an already high rate of turnover, especially in the Seventh Army. 

With that in mind, bringing enough soldiers into the command to keep up with 

the losses and then assigning them to positions that matched their skills with 

unit requirements proved to be a daunting task.56

Procedures for identifying personnel shortages, requisitioning individual 

replacements, and placing them into units had evolved over time as the Army’s 

organization and infrastructure in Europe had grown more complex. In 1951, 

General Eddy had complained that the Seventh Army had little control over 

the number of replacements it might receive in a given period and no control 

over unit selection and placement. An Army Field Forces inspection team 

noted that EUCOM was assigning individuals into branches other than those 

in which they had received their basic training and that those who had received 

specialized training were often not assigned to positions where that training 

could best be employed. EUCOM and the Seventh Army responded that they 

had based all replacement assignments on their own priorities and in the light 

of known military occupation specialty shortages. To compensate for this, 

on-the-job training and USAREUR, Seventh Army, and unit schools attempted 

to prepare individuals for their new assignments.57

In August 1952, the Department of the Army began to test a system that 

combined four-man teams of replacements into companies for shipment 

overseas. The enlisted men were grouped in teams early in their training with 

the expectation that they would remain together throughout their tours. In 

theory, this would help to improve unit morale and cohesion. For the trip 

overseas, the Army planned to incorporate the teams into “carrier companies,” 

temporary organizations that would move the troops to their new assignments. 

These units would consist of 165 privates, 4 officers, and 4 noncommissioned 

officers. An additional officer and enlisted man would serve as escorts for the 

deployment. The experiment sought to determine the administrative value and 

general desirability of retaining men in such provisional units through the later 

stages of basic training. To that end, the Department of the Army would seek 

to keep the groups together as much as possible so that the four members of 

each team might end up in the same squad or platoon.58

In an initial test, the first company arrived in Europe in September 1952 

and joined the 28th Infantry Division. Observers who monitored its progress 

found that the carrier companies presented several administrative advantages. 

56 Ltr, Eddy to Collins, 5 Nov 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 57 Office, Ch of Army Field Forces, Report of Visit of 1953 European Team to U.S. Army, 

Europe, 24 Nov 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; Cmd Rpt, 1951, HQ, Seventh Army (hereafter cited as Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951), 

Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, Historical Section, 1951, RG 338, NACP. 58 Ltr, Collins to Gen Thomas T. Handy, CG, USAREUR, 23 Jun 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
108 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Since personnel could travel on a single order, administrative officers had fewer 

entries to make in personnel records. Processing at the port of debarkation was 

simpler because the members of each team all had similar military occupational 

specialties and could be classified quickly. Morale and discipline throughout 

the transition was good because the troops were already familiar with the cadre 

in charge. USAREUR endorsed the process, but recommended its restriction 

to combat specialties. Leaders believed that the buddy teams would not be 

practical for lower-density specialists such as mechanics and medics, in cases 

where a given unit would have fewer holes to fill.59

Official implementation of the program began to great fanfare in September 

1953, when the first carrier companies began arriving at Bremerhaven and went 

directly to their divisions without having to process through the USAREUR 

replacement depot at Zweibrücken. After that, however, the approach began 

to break down. The divisions assigned intact four-man teams to regiments, but 

the regiments frequently broke up the teams to assign soldiers as they saw fit 

because individual squads or platoons rarely had blocks of four vacant slots 

to fill at any given time.60 

An Army Field Forces inspection report summarized the advantages and 

disadvantages of the system. In addition to the administrative streamlining 

the system demonstrated, the carrier companies also provided better control 

over replacement deployments and cut processing time in the pipeline by two 

or three days. The report also confirmed an improvement in troop morale, 

commenting that establishing destinations well in advance of the actual transfer 

of personnel helped to improve mail service from home. The process, however, 

was not without its disadvantages. Assignment of the four-man teams to squads, 

for example, was impractical because most existing squads could not absorb 

four replacements at one time. The approach, moreover, threw off established 

ratios for racial integration, education, and aptitude that higher headquarters 

required. The report also warned that breaking up the teams at lower echelons 

could negate any increase in morale the program achieved since soldiers might 

conclude that the Army had broken its promise to keep them together for the 

duration of their tour of duty.61

Those misgivings notwithstanding, late in 1953, the Department of the 

Army announced that it would expand the carrier company program to include 

field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, armor, and engineer replacements. With 

USAREUR comprising the largest concentration of American soldiers overseas, 

59 Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in 

Europe, 1945–1963, 1964, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; HQ, USAREUR, 

Monthly Conference with Post Commanders, 29 Sep 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 60 “1st Buddy Teams Assigned to Zone Arrive at BPE,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

23 Sep 1953; James McCulla, “Buddy Teams Join Three Divisions In Army’s Newest Experiment,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Oct 1953. 61 Office, Ch of Army Field Forces, Report of Visit of 1953 European Team to U.S. Army, 

Europe, 24 Nov 1953. 
Growing Into the Role 

it served as the test bed for the program when the first of the experimental 

companies arrived in February 1954. In most cases, the Seventh Army could not 

assign carrier companies to a single division because their strength in particular 

military specialties often exceeded the authorized number of troops in those 

areas. When that happened, the companies were inactivated after they reached 

Bremerhaven, and their personnel were assigned individually or in groups to 

whatever units could take them.62

Independent of the carrier company program, in November 1953, the 

Department of the Army initiated a plan to train, process, and ship complete 

infantry platoons on an experimental basis. The purpose of the test was to 

provide overseas theaters with well-trained lieutenants, noncommissioned 

officers, and infantry squads in preassembled platoons. The Army limited 

the trial to twenty-eight units, the first four of which began training at Fort 

Jackson, South Carolina, on 16 November 1953. One junior officer, one senior 

noncommissioned officer, and four leadership course graduates who would 

serve as squad leaders were assigned to each platoon. The remainder of the 

group consisted of troops who had completed eight weeks of basic training. 

The plan called for the lieutenant and the noncommissioned officer cadre to 

lead the unit through eight weeks of advanced individual training and then 

through processing and shipment overseas.63

Once the platoons arrived overseas, USAREUR and the Seventh Army 

continued the experiment. For the purposes of the test, the Department of 

the Army had instructed the commands to retain each platoon’s unit integrity 

through its assignment to a division and its subordinate units. In that way, 

it sought to determine the general level of training within the platoons, the 

initiative and abilities of their leadership, and whether the training level of 

each platoon was such that the unit could begin participation in company-level 

training immediately upon arrival in theater. Between January and May 1954, 

the Army shipped eleven of the units to USAREUR, which in turn assigned 

three platoons each to the 1st, 4th, and 28th Infantry Divisions, and two to the 

43d. The Seventh Army directed the divisions to retain the platoons intact at 

least through the test period and set 1 July 1954 as the target for the submission 

of test results, comments, and recommendations.64

62 HQ, Seventh Army, Weekly Staff Conference, 4 Dec 1953, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe, 1945–1963, 1964. 63 Msg, CSA to CINCUSAREUR, 26 May 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Maj Gen William E. Bergin, TAG, for CINCUSAREUR, 12 Nov 1953, sub: Experimental Infantry Platoon, Training and Replacement 

Plan, Entry 33511, V Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, NACP. 64 Memo, Lt Col James Hargis, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, V Corps, 25 Jan 1954, sub: Experimental Infantry Platoon, Training and Replacement Plan, Entry 33511, V Corps, 1949–1966, 

RG 338, NACP; “Packet Platoons in Zone Mark New Experiment,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 7 Mar 1954; “Tankers Assigned to 19th Armor Group, 2d and 4th Divisions,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Mar 1954.
110 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The divisions found the performance of the new platoons to range from 

average to slightly above average. The units demonstrated outstanding morale, 

but their efficiency suffered because their newly designated squad leaders lacked 

experience in dealing with their soldiers and with the tasks required of their 

new positions. As a result, commanders rated the platoons as unready to begin 

company training immediately upon arrival. Although the divisions considered 

the experiment a success, they recommended the assignment of more experienced 

noncommissioned officers to the platoons.65 Corps commanders, for their part, 

expressed doubts about keeping platoons intact within established companies 

and noted that the new units would lack the experienced veteran personnel 

distributed throughout the rest of the company. Absorbing the new platoons 

intact, moreover, would cause considerable disruption by forcing company 

commanders to disband existing platoons and to redistribute their personnel 

throughout a company. Ultimately, USAREUR reported to the Department 

of the Army that while the assignment of entire platoons to infantry companies 

might be desirable, battalion commanders should have the leeway to reassign 

personnel as they saw fit. Although it deemed the tests successful, the Army 

rejected the platoon replacement system because it was less flexible than the 

existing carrier company approach.66

Throughout the spring and summer of 1954, USAREUR hosted similar tests 

with experimental armor platoons. The Seventh Army received nine platoons for 

testing and placed one each in the 1st, 28th, and 43d Infantry Divisions, three 

in the 2d Armored Division, and one each in the 2d, 6th, and 14th Armored 

Cavalry Regiments. Unlike their infantry counterparts, each armor platoon 

contained one officer, one senior noncommissioned officer, and five four-man 

tank crews. The evaluations, however, produced results similar to those found in 

the infantry platoon tests. The junior leaders in the platoon lacked the experience 

to play an immediate role in more advanced unit training. After completion of 

the testing, the Army discontinued the armor platoon program as well.67

Adding to the personnel turbulence prevalent throughout the command 

was the ongoing process of racial integration. Presidential Executive Order 

65 Memo, Lt Col E. C. Hoge, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, Seventh Army, 30 Jun 1954, sub: Experimental Infantry Platoon, Training and Replacement Plan, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, 

RG 338, NACP. 66 Memos, Col William W. O’Connor, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 23 Dec 1953, 

sub: Experimental Infantry Platoon, Training and Replacement Plan; and O’Connor for Ch of 

Staff, 7 Dec 1953, sub: Experimental Infantry Platoon, Training and Replacement Plan. Both in 

Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NADC. Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, 

The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe, 1945–1963, 1964. 67 Memos, Hargis for CG, VII Corps, 19 Mar 1954, sub: Experimental Armor Platoon, 

Training and Replacement Plan, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Maj 

R. A. Ziegler, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, V Corps, 17 May 1954, sub: Experimental Armor Platoon, 

Training and Replacement Plan, Entry 33511, VII Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, NACP; and Maj 

Ward W. Williamson, Asst Adj Gen, 5th Inf Div, for CG, VII Corps, 16 Jun 1954, sub: Experimental Armor Platoon, Training and Replacement Plan, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, 

RG 338, NACP.
Growing Into the Role 

9981, issued by President Truman in July 1948, declared a policy of equality of 

opportunity and treatment in the armed services. Army regulations that followed 

in January 1950 directed units to assign and use personnel according to skills 

and qualifications without reference to race or color. While the regulation did 

not explicitly commit the Army to a policy of integration, leaders perceived it 

to be a step in that direction. As an additional step, on 27 March, the Army 

abolished the recruiting quota system for enlistments that had limited the 

percentage of blacks in the Army to 10 percent of the total.68

In December 1951, EUCOM submitted to the Department of the Army 

its plan for the integration of black and white soldiers under its command. By 

definition, integration meant the elimination of all-black units. Some would 

be inactivated while others would be replaced by similar units consisting of 

integrated personnel. The percentage of blacks in all units was to approach 

10 percent, the overall percentage of black soldiers throughout the command. 

One of the basic tenets of the plan was that units would retain their combat 

effectiveness throughout the integration process. Integrated blacks would be 

expected to maintain the same standards of performance as white troops. The 

command would not implement the plan, however, until the Department of 

the Army approved it.69

Most commanders in Europe met the proposed integration with considerable skepticism. They feared the disruptions within their units and the social 

problems that would arise within the civilian population. The commanding 

general of the Seventh Army, General Eddy, had mixed feelings on the subject. 

He had observed unsatisfactory performance in many of his all-black units and 

had concluded that integration was desirable not only for the sake of his own 

mission but for the Army’s efficiency as a whole. Still, in 1951, General Eddy 

wrote to EUCOM Commander General Handy that blacks were suitable for 

truck companies, ammunition companies, and engineer and quartermaster 

service units but had not displayed the high degree of initiative required for 

service in infantry, armor, and combat engineer organizations. He recommended 

the integration of Seventh Army units on the basis of one black soldier for every 

nine or ten whites. He also added that he believed that black officers posed a 

special problem because they were unsuited to command white soldiers.70

Despite such reservations, the Army carried on with its program of 

desegregation and on 1 April 1952, the European Command began a phased 

integration of all of its Army elements. At that time, most blacks in USAREUR 

68 HQ, USAREUR, Integration of Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army, Europe, 

1952–1954, 1956, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. For integration throughout 

the U.S. armed forces, see Morris J. MacGregor Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965, 

Defense Studies Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981). 69 HQ, USAREUR, Integration of Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army, Europe, 

1952–1954, 1956; Memo, CINC, EUCOM, for CSA, 14 Dec 1951, sub: Racial Integration in 

Combat Units, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 70 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 451.
112 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

were still serving in segregated units. Only about 7 percent of total black enlisted 

strength, some two thousand black specialists, served in integrated units. Of 139 

black units in the command, 113 were service elements, such as transportation 

or supply units, while only 26 were part of the combat arms.Because EUCOM 

directed that combat units would be integrated first, the focus of initial efforts 

was on the Seventh Army. General Eddy directed that the changeover would 

occur through individual transfers and adjustment of assignments within the 

stream of incoming replacements. Any mass transfer of black personnel into 

white units was to occur only with his prior approval. Seventh Army guidance 

also required personnel to be integrated into existing companies, platoons, and 

squads, and not organized into separate all-black elements. The eventual goal 

of the integration program was that the percentage of black strength in all units 

would approximate the overall percentage of blacks within the command.71

In February 1953, the Army’s new chief of staff, General Ridgway, requested 

information from USAREUR on segregation in the armed forces for his own 

reference. In its reply, the command reported that it was almost 18 percent black, 

with a current strength of 194,724 whites and 34,446 blacks. The integration of 

previously segregated combat units was 86 percent complete with the remainder 

expected to be done by the end of March 1954. While USAREUR noted some 

instances of racial discrimination by German proprietors of clubs and other 

establishments, it found no evidence of racial segregation in local housing 

policies, athletics, or recreational areas. No serious disciplinary problems had 

resulted from the integration of whites and blacks in the same units.72

Despite the headquarters’ optimistic assessment, integration of the Army’s 

units in Europe did not occur without at least some opposition. Complaints 

from white, Southern soldiers integrated into a previously all-black transportation battalion, for example, prompted Senator Russell of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee to request an investigation. Commanders attributed most 

problems to differences in educational levels and competition for the attention 

of Germany’s female population. They also noted that in many locations 

off-duty soldiers still lacked diversions and that alcohol often contributed to 

disturbances. To a great extent, off-duty blacks and whites self-segregated, 

establishing de facto black and white bars and establishments in many 

German communities. Despite inevitable frictions, few on-duty altercations 

occurred.73

71 HQ, USAREUR, Integration of Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army, Europe, 

1952–1954, 1956; HQ, Seventh Army, Cir 12–15, Racial Integration of EUCOM Army Units, 

4 Apr 1952, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 72 Memo, Brig Gen Frederic J. Brown, Dep Ch of Staff, U.S. EUCOM, for CINCUSAREUR, 10 Feb 1953, sub: Segregation in the Armed Forces, Entry 2105, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 73 Ltr, Col Creswell G. Blakaney, Office, Ch of Legislative Affairs, to Adj Gen, EUCOM, 

23 Apr 1953, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Memos, Capt Justin R. 

Ormsby, Investigating Ofcr, for CO, 552d Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Gun Bn, 13 Jun 1951, sub: 
Growing Into the Role 

To some extent, the pace of integration was accelerated by the attitudes 

and response of the German civilian population. Raymond Pace Alexander, a 

distinguished lawyer and civil rights advocate traveling in Europe, reported to 

Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall in 1951 that people across Germany, 

including mayors and officials, had asked him again and again how a free, 

liberal, and democratic country like America could maintain a segregated 

army. Black soldiers serving in Germany often experienced more personal 

freedom than they could in many places in the United States. While serving as 

a lieutenant in Germany during the late 1950s, Colin L. Powell remembered 

that “for a black man, especially those out of the South, Germany was a breath 

of freedom.”74 They could go where they wanted, eat where they wanted, date 

whom they wanted, just like other people. The dollar was high, the beer was 

good, and the German people were friendly.

As the process continued, the EUCOM leadership had to adjust the ratios 

upward because the percentage of blacks in Europe continued to rise. By 

mid-1953 black soldiers accounted for 16 percent of Army personnel in Europe. 

Nonetheless, by November 1953, the integration of combat units was complete. 

As for service units, the process was delayed in many cases because of the high 

percentage of black truck drivers in the command’s transportation units and a 

corresponding shortage of white personnel with the same skill classifications. 

Still, by March 1954, only twenty transportation units remained to be integrated. 

Throughout the spring, USAREUR received an influx of white drivers, leading 

on 9 July 1954, to the integration of the last all-black transportation unit in the 

Seventh Army.75 On 11 August 1954, the 68th Transportation Company in the 

USAREUR Communications Zone became the final element in USAREUR 

to integrate. The inactivation of the command’s last all-black unit, the 94th 

Engineer Battalion, came three months later on 27 November 1954, completing 

the process. Although not every single element in Europe had yet reached a 

proportional representation of the races, the segregation represented by the 

all-black units was gone.76

Given the level of personnel turbulence throughout the force, particularly 

that of soldiers rotating in and out of Europe at a rapid pace, the Army took 

steps to ensure that each soldier understood the importance of his mission and 

the righteousness of the cause in which he served. To that end, USAREUR 

Report of Investigation; and Brig Gen John M. Lentz, Ch of Staff, for CG, 4th Inf Div, sub: Racial 

Friction at Schweinfurt. Both in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 74 Maria Hohn and Martin Klimke, A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African 

American GIs, and Germany (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 83, and see also pp. 78–82. 75 Memo, Maj Gordon L. Smith, USAREUR Enlisted Section, for TAG, 30 Sep 1953, sub: 

Racial Integration in USAREUR Units, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NADC; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR. 76 Memo, WO (jg) Morris R. McKee, for CG, USAREUR COMZ, 5 Dec 1953, sub: Racial Integration of Transportation Units, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NADC; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 

83–84; MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 452.
114 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and the Seventh Army sponsored an extensive troop information program, 

designed to convince each soldier that he and his unit had an important role to 

play in preserving the security and values of the United States of America. The 

program also gave each soldier an understanding of those American principles 

and values, as well as the threat posed to them by the spread of communism.77

In its application, the troop information program was a command function 

at all levels. Higher headquarters directed the topics to be addressed each 

month, based on suggestions provided by the Department of the Army; the 

responsibility for troop instruction lay with the company commander or his 

designated representative. Areas of troop information to be stressed included 

national and international affairs, general military subjects, standards of 

conduct, and the history and mission of the U.S. Army. During the third 

quarter of 1954, for example, the Department of the Army provided materials 

for discussions on the military strength of Red China, Communist treatment of 

U.S. prisoners of war, the soldier and the reserves, and the high price of going 

absent without leave (AWOL).78

77 Memo, Maj Gen John A. Klein, TAG, for CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jun 1954, sub: Troop 

Information Guidance for Regimental and Lower Commanders, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 78 Memo, Maj Gen William E. Bergin, TAG, for CINCUSAREUR, 5 Nov 1953, sub: Troop 

Information Guidance, Third Quarter, FY54, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. For an overview of the Army’s program for political indoctrinaA gun crew of the 91st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, September 1953
Growing Into the Role 

In addition to the monthly indoctrination classes, other aspects of the 

troop information program involved raising the general level of education 

among the troops. The Army encouraged commands to teach English to their 

non-English–speaking soldiers, and to bring each member of the command to at 

least a fourth-grade level of education. Off-duty classes and self-study materials 

were also made available to assist those who wished to advance to higher levels.79

tion, see Christopher S. DeRosa, Political Indoctrination in the U.S. Army from World War II 

to the Vietnam War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006). For another point of view, 

see Lori Lyn Bogle, The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War (College 

Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004). 79 Memo, Bergin for CINCUSAREUR, 30 Oct 1953, sub: Statement of Policy on Troop 

Information and Education, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 

549, NACP.

Battery B, 26th Field Artillery, 9th Infantry Division, was an integrated unit during Exercise 

Cordon Bleu in October 1955
116 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Additions and Subtractions: Organizational Changes in USAREUR and 

the Seventh Army

Along with the personnel turbulence caused by the integration program and 

the constant rotation of replacements into and out of the command, USAREUR 

also experienced a number of organizational changes during the period between 

January 1953 and December 1954. In January 1953, the Army activated the 42d 

Field Artillery Group and assigned it to the Seventh Army. At the time, the group 

consisted of only a headquarters and headquarters battery, but it provided the 

command structure and administrative support for the 280-mm. artillery battalions 

as they arrived in the theater. Also in January 1953, the 19th Armored Cavalry 

Group, later redesignated as the 19th Armor Group, arrived in Germany and joined 

the V Corps. The group headquarters, stationed at Frankfurt, assumed control of 

three heavy tank battalions and one armored infantry battalion that were already 

present in the theater, assigned directly to V Corps headquarters. These units, the 

141st Tank Battalion at Hanau, the 322d Tank Battalion at Hammelburg, the 

510th Tank Battalion at Mannheim, and the 373d Armored Infantry Battalion at 

Wildflecken served as a mobile reserve for the corps.80

In November of the same year the Army assigned the 10th Special Forces 

Group (Airborne) to USAREUR and the Seventh Army. The Army had activated 

the group in May 1952 to conduct partisan warfare behind enemy lines in the event 

of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. In the tradition of the Office of Strategic 

Services (OSS) and Jedburgh teams that had operated during World War II, the 

Special Forces inherited the mission to organize and train indigenous personnel 

inside enemy territory and to coordinate resistance movements. To accomplish 

these missions, the 10th Group deployed to Europe with a unique organization. The 

basic operational element was the A Team, with eight to twelve noncommissioned 

officers and one commissioned officer. For administrative purposes, ten A teams 

comprised a company, with a senior captain commanding. Three companies made 

up a battalion, commanded by a major with a small staff, collectively called a B 

Team. The 10th Group, commanded by a colonel, consisted of three battalions.81

Finding the soldiers to fill out the group proved to be a challenge. Each 

prospective trooper had to cross train on a wide range of skills, including 

light and heavy weapons operation, communications, hand-to-hand combat, 

demolitions, and first aid. Most would have to learn at least one language in 

addition to their native tongue, and all would have to qualify as paratroopers.82

80 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 18; “19th Armor Gp Ready 

for Quick Action as Fast, Hard Hitting Independent Unit,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

31 Mar 1955. 81 Eugene G. Piasecki, “The Psywar Center, Part II,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History 8, no. 1 (2012): 103–11; Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, 10th Special Forces Gp, MLR 

UD37042, Unit Histories, 1943–1967, RG 338, NACP; Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: 

The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986), pp. 160–61. 82 Piasecki, “The Psywar Center, Part II,” pp. 103–11. 
Growing Into the Role 

The new unit required a unique type of soldier. When its first commander, 

Col. Aaron Bank, reported to the group’s new headquarters at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, he found one warrant officer and seven enlisted men assigned. 

Recruiters scoured the Army for airborne, ranger, and OSS veterans who might 

be interested in this new endeavor. To supplement those it could find within 

its own ranks, the Army also turned to another source for volunteers. The 

Lodge-Philbin Act passed by Congress on 30 June 1950, commonly referred 

to as the Lodge Act after its primary sponsor Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 

(R-Mass.), authorized the voluntary enlistment of up to twenty-five hundred 

foreign national males into the U.S. Army. Although the act failed to provide 

enough soldiers to create the Volunteer Freedom Corps the senator had 

envisioned, it did encourage more than one hundred Eastern Europeans to 

sign up for the Army Special Forces and Psychological Warfare units between 

1951 and 1955. With their knowledge of the people, languages, customs, and 

terrain in which the 10th Group was to be employed, the Lodge Boys, as they 

came to be called, were ideal Special Forces recruits. Accustomed to hard living 

in post–World War II Eastern Europe, they took easily to Army training. Sfc. 

Henry M. Koefoot, one of the recruits’ initial trainers, remembered that there 

were no “whys” or “ifs” when you told the new soldiers to do something. All 

you saw was a streak of lightning and the job was done. Nor was physical fitness 

a problem. The men were in their twenties and early thirties and had lived a 

hard life. They were happy to be soldiers.83

The story of Rudolf G. Horvath, a refugee from Hungary, was fairly 

typical for the émigrés from Eastern Europe. In July 1950, motivated by Voice 

of America radio broadcasts that described the opportunity provided by the 

Lodge Act, Horvath made his way through Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and 

the Russian-controlled zone of Austria to the Danube River. There he swam 

across the Danube River at night, into the U.S. Zone of Austria, and made 

his way to Linz, where he flagged down the first vehicle he saw, an American 

military police jeep. After several months of dealing with a series of German 

civil authorities and American military officials who had never heard of the 

Lodge Act, Horvath encountered an American clerk-typist who was familiar 

with the law. Finally, in September 1951, after passing a series of language 

and mathematics tests, Horvath received his orders to report to Sonthofen, 

Germany, for induction into the U.S. Army. Then, along with about fifty other 

Lodge Act enlistees, he boarded a ship for transfer to the United States and 

basic training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Throughout the next year, Horvath 

graduated from basic training, completed initial Special Forces training at 

Fort Bragg, and survived airborne school at Fort Benning, Georgia. By the 

83 Ibid.; Charles H. Briscoe, “America’s Foreign Legionnaires: The Lodge Act Soldiers, Part 

1,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History 5, no. 1 (2009): 34–46; Bank, From OSS 

to Green Berets, pp. 168–89.
118 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

end of September 1952, he returned to Fort Bragg as a fully qualified member 

of the 10th Special Forces Group.84

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved plans that employed the 

10th Special Forces Group in Europe, they had waited for the right opportunity 

to order the deployment. That chance came in June 1953 when construction 

workers in East Germany initiated an uprising against the Communist government in East Berlin. The depth to which the revolt spread throughout East 

Germany encouraged U.S. military planners to deploy the 10th Group, which 

specialized in fomenting just such resistance movements. In late November 1953, 

782 soldiers of the 10th Special Forces Group boarded the USNS General A. 

W. Greely for passage to Bremerhaven. Because the existence of the group was 

still classified, the troops wore sterile uniforms without visible patches, stripes, 

or insignia. After enduring catcalls and jeers from those new recruits already 

on board, the 10th Group soldiers reappeared on deck after a few hours at sea 

in uniforms complete with patches, rank, and parachute badges.85

When the group arrived at its new home in Bad Tölz, Colonel Bank discovered that it was assigned to the Seventh Army for administration, supply, and 

training, and to USAREUR for operations. He also quickly learned that neither 

the Seventh Army nor USAREUR staffs had clear understandings as to proper 

employment of his organization. He felt that the senior headquarters perceived 

the Special Forces as some sort of all-purpose, super-commando outfit, rather 

than the organizers of a stay behind resistance operation. Bank and his staff 

took pains to explain their organization, its mission, and its capabilities to the 

senior staffs and commanders, but it took some time to overcome the healthy 

suspicions the conventional officers had for the special operations soldiers.86

Although the Seventh Army allowed the Special Forces considerable leeway 

in developing its own training schedule, higher headquarters occasionally had 

to rein in some of the group’s more ambitious undertakings. In May 1954, for 

example, the 10th Special Forces planned a series of night parachute drops 

into areas not normally available for military training. Seventh Army and 

USAREUR training staffs insisted that the exercise be modified on the grounds 

that jumps into areas not accustomed to military exercises might cause panic 

among the civilian population. The risk of having soldiers chased and shot at 

by German police uninformed of the exercise was too much, on the one hand, 

for planners to accept. On the other hand, if the group publicized its nighttime 

operations, a surprise airdrop by enemy parachutists could be mistaken for a 

84 Rudolf G. Horvath, “Escape from Behind the Iron Curtain: The Odyssey of a Lodge Act 

SF Soldier,” Special Warfare: The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 

Center and School 16 (April 2003): 36–45. 85 Piasecki, “The Psywar Center, Part II,” pp. 103–11. 86 Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, pp. 192–200.
Growing Into the Role 

friendly training exercise. In the end, the USAREUR chief of staff directed the 

group to use established military drop zones for its training.87

Another change of particular importance to the Seventh Army was the 

return of the two National Guard units, the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, 

to the United States. Because most of the reservists who had returned to active 

duty and deployed with the division had ended their service and gone back to 

civilian life, the two units were no longer representative of the states from which 

they entered federal service. Moreover, as USAREUR Commander General 

Bolte pointed out in August 1953, the armistice in Korea was likely to cause 

various congressmen to call for the return to state control of those divisions 

the Army had called to active service for the duration of the conflict. Bolte 

suggested that, to preclude such actions, which might result in a reduction in 

the total number of divisions deployed to Europe, the Army could replace the 

numerical designations of the two units with those from regular divisions that 

had been active in the European theater during World War II.88

Following Bolte’s advice, the Army reorganized the Seventh Army, albeit 

mostly on paper. On 7 May 1954, the Army released the 28th Infantry Division 

from its assignment to USAREUR and returned its colors to state control in 

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. To take its place, the service reactivated the 9th 

Infantry Division, which General Eddy had commanded during World War 

II, and transferred the unit to Germany without personnel or equipment. Most 

of the battalions of the old 28th Division received new designations to units 

associated with the 9th Division. For example, the 110th Infantry of the 28th 

Division became the 47th Infantry under the 9th Division. In the same manner, 

the colors of the 43d Infantry Division returned to the three New England states 

from which the unit had been drawn. Taking its place was the reactivated 5th 

Infantry Division, which, like the 9th Division, had fought its way across Europe 

in 1944 and 1945. Both new divisions assumed the duties and missions that had 

been assigned to their predecessors, using the same troops and equipment.89

Although the U.S. garrison in Trieste was not part of USAREUR or U.S. 

EUCOM because it reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its inactivation 

and the redeployment of its troops marked an important milestone in the evolution 

87 Memo, Brig Gen Douglas V. Johnson, Asst Ch of Staff, for CINC, U.S. EUCOM, 14 May 

1954, sub: Special Forces Training, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, 

NACP. 88 Memo, Col Robert H. Adams, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Ch of Staff, sub: Enlisted Turnover in Newly Arrived Units, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Ltr, 

Gen Charles L. Bolte, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, CSA, 18 Aug 1953, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 

Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 21. 89 Msgs, DA, from Chief Information Officer (CINFO), to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Apr 1954, 

Ref # DA–960146, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; and USAREUR to Seventh Army, 7 May 1954, Ref # SCI9835, Entry 33509, Seventh 

Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “Here’s What Happens to 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 25 May 1954.
120 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

of the U.S. Army’s mission in Europe. Under the terms of the Italian Peace 

Treaty, signed in September 1947, the city of Trieste and the land surrounding 

it became a free territory and a ward of the United Nations. Situated on the 

border between Italy and Yugoslavia, the territory was divided into two zones, 

with the United States and Great Britain administering the city itself and the 

land to the north, and with Yugoslavia controlling the area to the south of the 

city. For the next several years, the United States and Great Britain maintained 

garrisons in their zones to prevent encroachment from the Communist forces of 

Yugoslavia. The American force, known as Headquarters, Trieste, U.S. Troops 

(TRUST), included the 351st Infantry, an artillery battery, a reconnaissance 

company, an engineer company, and other supporting troops.90

In the early 1950s, Yugoslavian leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s break with

the Soviet regime led to a period of rapprochement with the West. Seeking to 

take advantage of the situation and to eliminate the needless source of tension 

that Trieste had become, the United States and Britain renewed efforts to find 

a political solution for the stalemate there. In October 1954, the United States, 

Great Britain, Italy, and Yugoslavia reached an agreement that essentially 

recognized the status quo. The pact returned Zone A of the disputed territory, 

the area occupied by the Americans and the British, to Italy and ceded Zone B, 

the area controlled by Yugoslavia, to that nation. Within weeks TRUST was 

inactivated and its personnel reassigned to the U.S. Forces, Austria; to U.S. 

Army, Europe; or to other commands in the United States.91

The withdrawal of the Trieste garrison removed one regiment from the 

initial U.S. commitment to NATO in the event of war. In exchange for this, 

however, the West gained the neutrality of Yugoslavia, and the United States 

was able to conclude negotiations with Italy concerning other bases for both 

U.S. and NATO troops. Although President Eisenhower expressed the hope 

that other European allies would commit additional forces to reinforce what he 

considered the southern flank, no immediate troops were forthcoming. Over the 

course of the next year, however, the allied occupation in Austria would also 

come to a close and the new bases in Italy would provide the logical destination 

when U.S. forces in Austria began to redeploy.92

90 For the full treatment of the U.S. position in Trieste, see Roberto G. Rabel, Between 

East and West: Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941–1954 (Durham, N.C.: Duke 

University Press, 1988). 91 Msgs, DA, PSYWAR, to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jul 1954, Ref # DA–965344; and TRUST 

to CINCEUR, 5 Oct 1954, Ref # TRB–246. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 

1953–1963 (HQ, USAREUR, 1964), p. 28, copy in Historians files, CMH; “Italy, Yugoslavia to 

Sign Trieste Settlement Today,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Oct 1954; “U.S. Troops 

to Begin Trieste Exit at Once,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 Oct 1954; Douglas Jennings, “Trieste—Still a Problem, But a Peaceful One,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 

May 1953. 92 Memo, Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, for Exec Sec, National Security Council (NSC), 3 Aug 

1954, sub: Redeployment of United States Forces in Trieste; Memo of Conference in Presi-
Growing Into the Role 

Hardening the Support Structure

By the end of 1952, the growth of USAREUR and the Seventh Army in 

Europe added responsibilities for the Communications Zone and prompted 

changes in its organization. A letter of instructions approved by the USAREUR 

commander, General Eddy, on 16 September 1953, consolidated and clarified 

previous directives and guidance. Foremost was a mission to continue to 

develop a line of supply across France along an axis that ran from French 

ports near Bordeaux, through Poitiers, Orléans, and Verdun to Metz. This line 

would provide logistical and administrative support for U.S. forces in France; 

partial peacetime logistical support for U.S. forces in Germany; facilities for 

the receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance of USAREUR theater reserve and 

command stocks; and, in time of war, the basic structure for expansion into 

a fully developed Communications Zone capable of furnishing logistical and 

administrative support for all U.S. forces in Western Europe. Priorities for 

construction as part of this development included communications facilities, 

headquarters buildings, pipelines, hospitals, storage depots, and maintenance 

workshops. Housing for troops and their families, and associated dependent 

support facilities, would come later as time and resources permitted. In the 

meantime, many soldiers serving in the Communications Zone lived on the 

French economy or in vast colonies of tents or other temporary shelters.93

Although the development of the line of communications through France 

made slow but steady progress, by the end of 1953 the majority of supplies for 

U.S. forces in Germany continued to enter the theater through Bremerhaven. 

In December, after a careful evaluation of three courses of action proposed in a 

USAREUR study, the Department of the Army approved that part of the plan 

labeled “Concept C,” which called for continued development of the French 

supply line until all items necessary for the support of combat operations could 

come through France. Nonessential items would come through Bremerhaven. 

The goal was for 70 percent of USAREUR’s supplies to arrive through French 

ports by the end of 1957.94

dent’s Office, 18 Oct 1954, sub: U.S. Troops Being Deployed From Trieste to Leghorn. Both in 

Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH. 

Rabel, Between East and West, pp. 155–61; “Tactical Unit Leaves Trieste for Leghorn,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Oct 1954. 93 Memo, Eddy for CG, USAREUR COMZ, 16 Sep 1953, sub: Letter of Instructions (LOFC) 

France, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Jean R. 

Moenk, The Line of Communications Through France, 1952–1953, 1955, Historical Manuscript 

Collection, CMH Archives. 94 HQ, USAREUR, Briefing to Asst Sec Def Thomas P. Pike, G–4 Portion, 4 Feb 1955, 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, CWO 

Eldon M. Schmidt for Comptroller of the Army, 22 Oct 1953, sub: The USAREUR LOC, Entry 

2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Hickman, The United 

States Army in Europe, pp. 153–54.
122 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The effort to reposition war reserve stocks of fuel, ammunition, and other 

supplies along the line of support also continued apace. In addition to moving 

depots away from the probable axis of a Soviet advance, USAREUR leaders 

also worried about the vulnerability of their support installations to aerial 

attack and sabotage. Important facilities had to be dispersed and hardened so 

that they might be shielded from enemy bombs and missiles. Spreading them 

out, leaders hoped, would make them harder for enemy observers to identify 

while preventing attackers from focusing their efforts.95

By the end of 1954, roughly 80 percent of the required stocks were on hand 

in the theater. According to USAREUR’s planning for wartime support, the 

command’s goal was to locate fifteen days of ammunition supply in prestock 

points east of the Rhine, thirty days of supply in Germany west of the Rhine, 

95 Memos, Bergin for CINCs, Far East and EUCOM, 28 Jan 1952, sub: Final Report of the 

Army Logistic Support Panel, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Ops, Plans and Training, RG 549, 

NACP; and Lt Col Lowell E. Thompson, Combat Developments Br, for Col Quackenbush, 3 

Apr 1953, sub: Inspection Trip, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, 

RG 549, NACP. Ltr, Maj Gen Edward T. Williams, USAREUR Ch of Staff, to Maj Gen 

Robert K. Taylor, U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. EUCOM Ch of Staff, 3 Jan 1953, Entry 2105, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

Rows of 5-gallon gas cans ready for stacking into pyramids like those in the background. 

Each hardstand holds 4 pyramids of 5,000 cans each.
Growing Into the Role 

thirty days in the Communications Zone Advance Section, and thirty days in 

the Base Section. For other items, twenty days of supply would be stored in 

Germany, with fifteen days in the Advance Section and twenty-five in the Base 

Section. In many cases, construction workers had to rush to complete storage 

facilities before the vast piles of stocks they were to house began to deteriorate.96

The transportation and storage of fuel and petroleum products posed their 

own special problems. In 1952, the total issue to EUCOM and USAREUR 

was well over 100 million gallons. USAREUR logistical experts calculated that 

port facilities would need to receive a daily average of 39,000 barrels of bulk 

petroleum products in peacetime and up to 77,000 barrels initially during a war 

emergency. This would maintain a 60-day special reserve of aviation fuel for 

the U.S. Air Force in France and Germany, a 40-day special reserve of military 

gasoline for all U.S. military forces in France and Germany, a 50-day peacetime 

level stock of aviation fuels, a 50-day peacetime level stock of gasoline for U.S. 

military forces in France, a 30-day supply for U.S. military forces in Germany, 

and a 30-day supply of diesel, kerosene, and other special fuel products for all 

U.S. forces in France and Germany. Tankers delivering these supplies docked 

at piers in North Germany’s Weser River between Bremen and Bremerhaven. 

From there, technicians pumped the fuel into a 79-million-gallon underground 

fuel storage depot at Farge, part of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.97

A former Nazi complex that had survived World War II and was well 

protected, the facility at Farge still lay too close to the line any Soviet advance 

would follow. With that in mind, the European Command had begun 

negotiations with the French early in 1951 for the construction of a 10-inch 

petroleum pipeline that would run from the port of Donges on the Loire 

Estuary in western France to Melun, located between Paris and Fontainebleau. 

The negotiations dragged on for two years, largely due to disagreements over 

the size of the pipeline and the amount of flow that would be reserved for the 

French. Initially, the commanding general, Communications Zone, represented 

U.S. Army interests in the negotiations, but the commander, U.S. European 

Command, took his place late in 1952. Finally, in April 1953, U.S. Secretary 

of Defense Wilson and French Minister of National Defense Rene Pleven 

reached an agreement that allowed the construction of an even longer pipeline 

that would connect the port of Donges to the city of Metz in eastern France 

near the German border. Under the terms of the agreement, the French agreed 

to pay for the acquisition of the land and necessary rights of way. The United 

States would determine specifications, construct and operate the pipeline, and 

96 HQ, USAREUR, Briefing to Asst Sec Def Thomas P. Pike, G–4 Portion, 4 Feb 1955; Ltr, 

Maj Gen Samuel D. Sturgis, COMZ Cdr, to Eddy, 7 Jan 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 97 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 250; Memo, CWO Carl E. Sabo, 

Asst Adj Gen, for CG, USAREUR COMZ, 22 Aug 1952, sub: Petroleum Pipeline and Storage 

System, LOC, France, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; “Vast Underground Depot,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Apr 1957.
124 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

guarantee that the French would receive an average of 5 percent of the flow for 

their own use, as long as that did not interfere with U.S. military requirements. 

Construction on the line began within a month.98

As USAREUR and the Communications Zone continued to refine their 

support capabilities, the Seventh Army approached logistical self-sufficiency. 

By March 1953, the command had achieved the ability to support itself in all 

areas except two, medical and quartermaster support. There was a shortage 

of qualified professional personnel and a need to provide support existed not 

only for the force’s own troops but also for military dependents and U.S. 

government workers. As a result, EUCOM and the Seventh Army agreed that 

area commands would retain responsibility for dispensary and hospital care 

and for maintenance of medical goods and equipment. Seventh Army doctors 

and medics would run their own aid stations in garrison and serve as combat 

medics in the field. 

Quartermaster support was more troublesome. The limited number of 

supply units assigned to the Seventh Army had to service both the fixed installations and troops in the field spread across a wide geographic area. This was 

compounded when the Seventh Army deployed because the infantry divisions 

often used their own quartermaster truck companies to transport troops. In the 

end, commanders decided that Seventh Army quartermaster units could not 

service both fixed installations and units in the field because the division of labor 

involved would hamper their ability to remain prepared for emergency missions. 

For that reason, supply support for the Seventh Army’s units became the job 

of the military posts that housed them while quartermaster units assisted where 

they could. The lack of sufficient truck companies to satisfy both logistical and 

troop transport requirements would remain a concern for some time to come.99

Maintenance throughout the Seventh Army was generally good but required 

constant command emphasis, particularly on first-level, operator care of motor 

vehicles. Early concerns about vehicles taken out of service, or deadlined, 

because of a lack of spare parts were alleviated by having depots issue frequently 

requested spare parts in advance, rather than waiting for requisitions. Command 

Maintenance Inspection Reports for the V Corps included evaluations of fifty 

battalions and separate companies in 1953 and forty-three in 1954. Of these, 

seventy received ratings of superior or excellent, fourteen received ratings of 

satisfactory or very satisfactory, and only nine received ratings of unsatisfactory. 

When, in November 1954, the 14th Armored Cavalry reported a deadline rate 

of 5 percent of general purpose vehicles and 14 percent of combat vehicles, the 

regimental commander, Col. Maxwell A. Tincher, received a scathing letter from 

98 Msgs, Paris, signed Dillon, to State Dept, 15 Jun 1953; and CINCUSAREUR to USAREUR 

COMZ, 6 Apr 1953. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 

549, NACP. Moenk, The Line of Communications Through France, 1952–1953, 1955. 99 HQ, Seventh Army, Attainment of Logistical Self-Sufficiency, 29 Apr 1954, Entry 33509, 

Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Msg, Seventh Army, signed Hoge, to CINCALFCE, 

28 Sep 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Growing Into the Role 

Lt. Gen. Charles E. Hart, the V Corps commander, inviting him to correct the 

situation without delay. For the Seventh Army as a whole, the assistant chief of 

staff, G–4, reported that, for a nine-month period beginning in October 1953, 

the Army had maintained an average deadline rate of just over 2 percent for 

tanks and armored vehicles, 1 percent for field artillery pieces, and 2 percent 

for antiaircraft artillery.100

Toward the end of 1954, however, it was becoming apparent that the 

wheeled vehicles in the theater were becoming a maintenance concern. In July 

1954, the VII Corps inspector general reported that during the previous three 

months, seven company-size units out of twenty-nine inspected had been rated 

unsatisfactory for wheeled-vehicle maintenance. The Seventh Army assistant 

chief of staff, G–4, later noted that those general purpose vehicles that had 

accompanied deploying units to Europe in 1951 and 1952 were now well over 

four years old. Because of the mission in Europe, the wear and tear on the 

vehicles greatly exceeded that anticipated by the manufacturers. Because units 

could expect no mass replacements for the vehicles, he urged commanders at all 

levels to pay greater attention to preventative maintenance to bring the vehicles 

up to required standards.101

Far and away the greatest maintenance headaches during this period, 

however, resulted from the fielding of the new M47 Patton tank. As early as 

October 1951, tests conducted by the Army Field Forces Board disclosed a 

number of deficiencies in the fire control and turret components of the tank, 

which made it unacceptable for issue to troops. After several months spent 

working out the faults, the Army deployed the first of the new tanks to Europe 

in May 1952. It did not take long for new problems to arise. At the August 

1952 Seventh Army Commanders Conference, the assistant chief of staff, G–4, 

reported on the numerous deficiencies operators had identified in the new tanks. 

These included failures of the connecting rods in the auxiliary engines, faulty 

shock absorbers, defective master junction boxes, and excessive wear on the 

rubber track. He indicated that technical representatives from the manufacturers 

and ordnance depots throughout USAREUR were working on potential solutions to the problems. Just a year later, in September 1953, the Seventh Army 

ordnance section reported that seventy-four M47 tanks had been deadlined for 

failure of final drive assemblies during Field Training Exercise Monte Carlo

100 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1951, 1st Inf Div, Entry NM3429, Army-AG Command 

reports, 1949–1954, RG 407, NACP; Memo, Brig Gen Raymond E. Bell, Ch of Staff, for CG, 

Seventh Army, 8 May 1954, sub: Administration, Entry 33511, V Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, 

NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen Charles E. Hart, V Corps Cdr, to Col Maxwell A. Tincher, Cdr, 14th Armd 

Cav Rgt, 24 Dec 1954, Entry 33511, V Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, NACP; Deadline Status 

Report of Tanks, Armored Cars, Artillery, and Anti-Aircraft, 1 Jul 1954, Entry 33509, Seventh 

Army, 1954–1965, G4 Admin Reports, RG 338, NACP. 101 Memo, Lt Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe for CINCUSAREUR, 28 Jun 1954, sub: Quarterly 

Report of Inspector General Activities, 4th Quarter, FY 54; Rpt, HQ, Seventh Army, 30 Sep 

1955, sub: Army Commanders Conference. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP.
126 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

He indicated that depots had initiated a crash program to rebuild damaged 

assemblies and to requisition new ones to bring the tanks back on line. By 

October, it was clear throughout the Army that the tank was still unsatisfactory. 

The Army assistant chief of staff, G–4, proposed to USAREUR a new plan 

to rehabilitate and store the M47 tanks as new M48 tanks, a reworked and 

improved version of the original Patton tank, were received from the United 

States. The rebuilt M47s, he concluded, would go to European allies through 

the Military Defense Assistance Program.102

By the end of 1954, a vast network of maintenance, supply, transportation, 

and other logistical facilities had developed to support the combat units of the 

Seventh Army. As much as the fighting forces, the presence of that huge logistical 

infrastructure in Europe represented a commitment to the continent and served 

as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. Even if the airfields, depots, pipelines, and 

roads that made up the supply network presented tempting targets to Soviet 

102 “First M47 Patton II Tanks Arrive in EC,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 9 May 

1952. Memo, Brig Gen George Read Jr., Ch of Staff, for CG, Seventh Army, 11 Oct 1951, sub: 

Tank, 90mm Gun, M47; Rpt, HQ, Seventh Army, Army Commanders Conference, Aug 1952; 

Rpts, Operations of Seventh Army Ordnance Section, Jun 1952 and Sep 1953. All in Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, Ordnance Division, The 

European Story of the M47 Tank, 28 Jul 1953; Memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Henning, Asst Ch of 

Staff, G–4, for Ch of Staff, USAREUR, 15 Oct 1953, sub: M–47 Tank Rebuild Program. Both 

in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

M47 tank, September 1953
Growing Into the Role 

military planners, they also sowed second thoughts about the consequences 

an attack might incur. With so much invested in the support of allied military 

forces in Western Europe, the U.S. commitment to the defense of the region 

could not be taken lightly.

Settling in for the Long Haul

When President Eisenhower used the term “for the long haul” to describe his 

approach to defense spending and national strategy, his intent was to establish 

a program that the nation could sustain indefinitely, without succumbing to the 

peaks and valleys approach of previous administrations. It was not his idea that 

the term might come to describe the commitment of American soldiers to the 

defense of Europe. He had hoped that most of that burden would be borne by the 

Europeans themselves. Nonetheless, it was clear by 1953 that USAREUR was 

beginning to develop the physical infrastructure and the personal relationships 

it would require for an extended stay on the continent.

Very early in the Army’s transition from an occupation force to a forwarddeployed line of defense in Europe, leaders recognized the importance that 

dependents had in maintaining troop morale. General Eddy noted in 1952 

that although the presence of families in a theater that might erupt in conflict 

on short notice was a challenge, it was outweighed by the prospect of so many 

servicemen serving overseas with only intermittent contact with their loved 

ones. He also expressed a belief that the arrival of American civilians had been 

a steadying influence on the people of Western Europe. The families offered 

examples of American life to the German people and fostered a more informal 

atmosphere for developing better relations with them. Furthermore, their 

presence might also serve to reassure the Soviets that the U.S. Army was there 

only as a defensive force.103

Early USAREUR policies had discouraged soldiers from bringing their 

wives and families to Europe. Housing in the German communities surrounding 

American military installations was scarce, and in most places U.S. government 

quarters were nonexistent. This was particularly true in some of the smaller cities 

such as Heilbronn, Ulm, and Augsburg, which had not had to support large 

populations of American soldiers prior to the 1952 troop augmentation. For the 

most part, the command authorized only officers, noncommissioned officers, 

and senior government civilians to bring their families overseas. Even they 

usually endured a waiting period of six months or more before quarters became 

available. When some soldiers brought over families at their own expense, their 

presence in the theater created economic, political, and security problems with 

103 Ltr, Brig Gen Einar B. Gjelstein, Seventh Army Ch of Staff, to Maj Gen Edward T. Williams, USAREUR Ch of Staff, 11 May 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

Office of the Commanding General, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Donna Alvah, Unofficial 

Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946–1965 (New York: 

New York University Press, 2007), pp. 139–40.
128 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

which the command was not yet ready to deal. The German government, in 

particular, discouraged the practice because it placed additional stress on an 

already limited civilian housing market. Forced to search for housing farther 

and farther away from their barracks areas, soldiers found themselves too far 

away to respond to alerts within required time standards. As a result, in March 

1952, USAREUR limited the visas of dependents coming to Germany to a 

period of 90 days and required those who had exceeded that limit to return to 

the United States. Although guidance allowed for some command discretion 

where government housing might be available, it advised that such latitude had 

to be used with caution.104

By late 1953, however, morale issues had reached such a point that General 

Hoge, USAREUR Commander, decided policies on dependents had to change. 

Many of the personnel who had initially come to Germany with the new 

divisions had been mobilized national guardsmen who had chosen to leave 

their families at home during their short deployments. Their departure left the 

Seventh Army with a much higher percentage of Regular Army noncommissioned officers. Serving longer periods of deployment, those soldiers expected 

to be accompanied by their families. This posed a problem for Hoge. Although 

construction programs had alleviated the housing problem in some areas, it 

remained an issue throughout most of Germany and almost all of France. In 

Germany, the average wait time for housing was 7.3 months for officers and 

11.7 months for enlisted personnel. In France, the average wait time was 4.1 

months and 8.6 months for officers and enlisted, respectively. With these delays 

in mind General Hoge authorized all those eligible to sponsor families overseas 

to bring them to Europe, whether or not government housing was available, 

as long as they could find housing somewhere in the local communities. As the 

number of civilian dependents waiting to come to Europe continued to grow 

through the rest of the year and into 1954, USAREUR accelerated housing 

construction throughout Germany and France. (See Map 7.)

105

The large-scale construction programs provided masonry apartment 

buildings and individual dwellings grouped together in American complexes 

104 Memos, Maj Gen Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, Cdr, 28th Inf Div, for CG, Seventh Army, 22 

Jun 1953, sub: Dependent Housing, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; 

and Brig Gen John B. Murphy, Dir, Personnel and Administration, for Sec, General Staff, 18 

Feb 1952, sub: Monthly HICOG-CINCEUR, Major Unit and Post Commanders Conference, 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen 

Charles L. Bolte, USAREUR Cdr, to Lt Gen William M. Hoge, Seventh Army Cdr, 24 Jul 1953, 

Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 105 Memo, Schuyler for CG, Seventh Army, 22 Jun 1953, sub: Dependent Housing, Entry 

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. Memo, 1st Lt Daniel W. Noce, Installations 

Branch, G–4, for Ch of Staff, 28 Feb 1853, sub: The Troop Housing Situation Within the Jurisdiction of USAREUR; HQ, USAREUR, HICOG-CINCUSAREUR Monthly Conference, 26 Oct 

1953. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 

Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 115; “2,200,000 Housing Units 

to Rise in West Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 4 Dec 1953; “10,500 Housing 

Units Under Way; 11,500 More Planned,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Jun 1954.
Growing Into the Role 

with schools, libraries, chapels, and recreation facilities conveniently located 

within each community. In Germany, some fifty-nine community areas 

evolved, including those in Berlin and near Bremerhaven. Other larger areas 

included those near Munich, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg where some of the 

greater concentrations of American forces were to be found. In Heidelberg, for 

example, Mark Twain Village was located immediately adjacent to USAREUR 

headquarters, and a second, even larger facility—Patrick Henry Village—was 

outside the city. In Munich, where the American housing complexes were 

widely dispersed, USAREUR established two separate shopping centers, each 

consisting of a supermarket-type commissary, a post exchange of department 

store proportions, a snack bar, an automobile parts store, laundry and dry 

cleaning, a beverage shop, a banking facility, and other convenience shops. 

When completed, each housing area had all the aspects of a “little America,” 

set off from the local community. Smaller and more limited communities arose 

in France where less land was available for development. As a result, many 

American families had to find housing in the local French communities.106

It did not take long for some back in the United States to call into question 

the amount of money being spent on soldiers and their dependents in Europe. On 

3 January 1953, Senator Olin D. Johnston (D-S.C.), stated in a public interview 

106 Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, pp. 209–10.

Housing project completed in the summer of 1952 at Gelnhausen.
LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SWITZERLAND A USTRIA

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

DENMARK

EAST GERMAN Y

LIECHTENSTEIN

WESTERN AREA

SOUTHERN AREA

H Q

AREA

NORTHERN AREA WIESBADEN

MILITAR Y POST

Neubrücke

Idar-Oberstein

Baumholder

Zweibrücken

Landstuhl

Pirmasens

Vogelweh

Münchweiler

Kaiserslautern

Heidelberg

Mannheim

Karlsruhe

Worms

Frankfurt

Wetzlar

Giessen

Bad Nauheim

Büdingen

Gelnhausen

Hanau Bad Kreuznach

Oppenheim

Kirchheimbolander

Babenhausen

Darmstadt

Mainz

Fritzlar

Hersfeld

Würzburg

Aschaenburg

Wertheim Kitzingen

Bamberg

Stuttgart

Vaihingen

Nellingen

Bad Cannstatt

Ludwigsburg

Möhringen

Böblingen

Heilbronn

Schwäbisch Hall

Crailsheim

Ellwangen

Schwäbisch Gmünd

Göppingen Scheyern

Bad Tölz

Landshut

Munich

Garmisch

Straubing

Hohenfels

Regensburg

Schwabach Ansbach

Herzogenaurach

Fürth Nuremberg

Berlin

Bremerhaven

Neu Ulm

Leipheim

Gablingen

Augsburg

Erfurt

Dresden

BERLIN

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

Rhine R

Elbe R

NORTH

SEA

Rhine R

WEST GERMANY

FA MILY HOUSING

U .S. ARMY, EUROPE

30 June 1953

Area Command Boundary (approximate)

Family Housing Project Site

Other Project Site

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 7
Growing Into the Role 

that U.S. government workers serving overseas lived in expensive apartments 

or houses, employed three or four domestic servants, and received salaries and 

cost-of-living expenses far in excess of those in the United States. Picking up 

on the U.S. news reports, newspapers throughout West Germany published 

stories about the luxurious living of Americans abroad. The USAREUR public 

information officers reported to U.S. EUCOM that the articles created the 

erroneous perception that U.S. employees and, by implication, U.S. military 

personnel were living in ostentatious luxury. Public affairs staffs and senior 

military leaders took pains to point out the inaccuracies in many of the senator’s 

statements.107

Just a few weeks later, in March, Congressman Walter F. Horan (R-Wash.) 

initiated another investigation based on letters he had received from constituents 

complaining about money being spent to maintain luxurious recreation areas 

at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden. In reply, USAREUR pointed out that those 

areas were the only locations outside of military communities where soldiers 

could spend leave time at a relatively low cost and with recreation facilities 

comparable to what they might find at home. While there, a soldier could stay 

in a comfortable but modest hotel, eat familiar American food, and participate 

in a variety of summer and winter sports and activities. The command also 

pointed out that, while at the Army-run rest centers, soldiers were still under 

military control and were readily available in case of an emergency. While 

soldiers using the facilities paid reasonable prices for their food, lodging, and 

entertainment, most of the money to maintain the facilities came from the 

German government. Despite these assurances, politicians and civilians back 

in the United States continued to question expenditures in Europe that they 

considered frivolous. With political leaders looking for ways to trim the defense 

budget many expenditures in Europe seemed to be fair game.108

Despite these concerns, the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in 

Germany continued. After housing, the most critical element for dependent 

families was schools. Average enrollment in grades 1–12 rose from 7,000 for 

the school year ending in June 1952 to 12,000 for the school year ending in 

June 1953. By the end of the school year in 1954 the number exceeded 20,000 

and USAREUR was operating 95 elementary schools and 11 secondary 

schools in Germany and France. It employed more than eleven hundred 

teachers, librarians, and principals. During this period, the command faced 

increasing difficulties in recruiting new teachers and holding on to established 

employees. The problems grew out of disparities in pay and working conditions 

107 “Senators Assail U.S. Aides’ ‘Luxury,’” New York Times, 3 Jan 1953; Memo, Lott, USAREUR 

Public Information Ofcr, for Public Information Ofcr, U.S. EUCOM, 22 Jan 1953, sub: Impact of 

Senator Johnston’s Remarks concerning Overseas Employees, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 108 Memo, Murphy, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Ch of Staff, 18 Mar 1953, sub: Recreation 

Center at Garmisch, Germany, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP.
132 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

between teachers in public schools in the United States and those employed by 

USAREUR. Population growth in the United States had led to a shortage of 

qualified teachers there, forcing USAREUR to compete with stateside systems 

where conditions of employment were superior to those in Europe. In addition, 

most U.S. school systems did not recognize service in Army schools for promotion or retirement purposes. Indeed, the lack of adequate retirement provisions 

for USAREUR-employed teachers as compared with other civil service 

employees was another obstacle to recruiting competent personnel. Although 

the command forwarded proposals for removing its teachers from some of the 

more restrictive regulatory requirements of the Civil Service Commission, it 

received no response before the beginning of the 1955 recruitment period.109

During this time, an increase in the number of dependent children and 

a rising concern for the problem of juvenile delinquency, reflected both in 

the United States and overseas, prompted USAREUR leaders to turn their 

attention to leisure and recreation facilities for both soldiers and their families. 

In April 1953, the USAREUR commander, General Bolte, wrote to the Army 

chief of staff, General Collins, to express his concern that senior Army officials 

considered construction of such facilities as bowling alleys, gymnasiums, and 

athletic fields to be “unessential.” To the contrary, he said, he considered 

an effective recreation program the greatest single deterrent to disciplinary 

infractions and serious incidents that might otherwise reflect discredit on the 

United States and its armed forces.110

In the end, American military leaders realized that it was critical to maintain 

a high level of morale throughout their forces if they were to carry out their 

long-term mission in Europe. With that in mind, the command sponsored the 

construction of facilities and initiated programs throughout the theater that 

would keep the troops occupied and entertained when they were not engaged 

in military training. This was particularly true around major metropolitan 

areas, such as Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Kaiserslautern, and Stuttgart, where large 

concentrations of U.S. forces led to the development of extensive dependent 

housing areas and military communities. Most of these boasted at least one 

movie theater, a library, a bowling alley, and other comforts soldiers and their 

families might expect to find in any reasonably sized community back home. 

The European Motion Picture Service provided movies for the more than three 

hundred cinemas throughout the theater. Many were first-run films available 

within a month or two of their initial release. Bowling drew more participants 

than any other sport. By the end of 1954, almost one thousand bowling lanes 

with more than three hundred sanctioned leagues were in operation throughout 

109 Ltr, Maj Gen Claude B. Ferenbaugh, USAREUR Ch of Staff, to Lt Gen George H. Decker, 

Comptroller of the Army, 17 Dec 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 

119–20. 110 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 120; Ltr, Bolte to Collins, 

30 Apr 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Growing Into the Role 

USAREUR. The command also maintained two hundred large libraries and 

another one hundred fifty smaller book collections that it rotated through small 

facilities and outposts. Similar in many ways to the service clubs, the libraries 

often hosted group discussions, slide shows, story hours for children, travel 

talks, and music appreciation programs. Many also had soundproof rooms 

where soldiers could listen to the latest Broadway shows, classical music, or 

dramatic readings.111

The USAREUR Special Services office, under the direction of the Special 

Activities Division of the command’s headquarters, organized and supervised 

athletics, recreation, and entertainment programs throughout the command. 

It ran more than one hundred twenty service clubs with facilities for shuffle 

board, pool, ping-pong, and playing cards. Most also maintained music rooms 

stocked with instruments so that soldiers could hold informal jam sessions. 

Club directors planned and conducted tournaments and contests, arranged 

for guest speakers and group discussions, and sponsored movies, concerts, 

theatrical plays, and dances. Many clubs also sponsored weekly sightseeing 

excursions and set up travel sections that assisted soldiers in planning leaves 

and tours. Located in cities, kasernes, and even training areas like Grafenwöhr, 

Baumholder, and Hohenfels, where they could benefit the largest number of 

troops, the clubs were open twelve to fourteen hours a day, seven days a week.112

Craft shops and photography labs also run by Special Services were almost 

as numerous as the service clubs. The shops provided working space, tools, 

and materials for a wide range of hobbies, including electronics, graphic arts, 

painting, sculpture, wood and leather working, metal crafts, ceramics, cooking, 

and automotive mechanics. Customers paid only a small fee for the materials 

they used. Photography labs provided equipment for processing both color 

and black-and-white pictures. Both types of facilities were staffed with fulltime instructors to assist hobbyists with any problems they might encounter. 

USAREUR also sponsored numerous exhibitions, competitions, and shows 

where craftsmen and hobbyists could display their work.113

Also available to soldiers overseas were the radio programs of the American 

Forces Network (AFN). Run by the Armed Forces Radio Service, the network 

had originated in London during the early days of World War II. By 1954, it had 

grown to seven studio outlets and more than thirty transmitters, broadcasting 

its program schedule to nearly 50 million people across the continent. While the 

primary station was located in Frankfurt, the network also maintained stations 

111 Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, pp. 99–114; “Speed Work for Forces in 

Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Jun 1954. 112 Memo, Williams for Dep CINC, U.S. EUCOM, 9 Mar 1953, sub: Status of Morale, United 

States Army, Europe, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, p. 105. 113 Memo, Williams for Dep CINC, U.S. EUCOM, 9 Mar 1953, sub: Status of Morale, United 

States Army, Europe; Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, pp. 99–114; Annual Hist 

Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 125.
134 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

in Berlin, Bremerhaven, Munich, Stuttgart, Nuremberg, and Kaiserslautern. 

Because it was the only English-speaking American network in Europe, AFN 

tried to present a wide range of programs appealing to all ages and types of 

people. At various times during the day, troops or their families could tune 

in to The Bob Hope Show, Fibber McGee and Molly, The Adventures of Ozzie 

and Harriet, the daily news, or the weekly baseball game. Voice of America 

broadcasts were also available throughout most of Europe and featured a variety 

of news, information, and public service programs.114 Although a major share of 

its programming consisted of shows provided by stateside radio networks, much 

of its most popular material was generated locally. In Stuttgart, for example, 

the Seventh Army Special Services Section produced half-hour segments that 

featured singers and musicians from within the command.115

114 “AFN Shuffles Its Schedules, Will Introduce 13 New Shows,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 10 May 1953; “The Voice of America,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Aug 

1951. 115 “AFN Starts Its 12th Year on the Air in Europe Today,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 4 Jul 1954; Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, p. 112; Memo, CWO Charles 

L. Landry, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, V Corps, 26 Oct 1954, sub: Seventh Army Radio Program, 

Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 

Stars and Stripes was available in all PXs, R&R stations, and other convenient locations.
Growing Into the Role 

Especially popular with enlisted soldiers, but much less so with the 

USAREUR leadership, was the independent newspaper Overseas Weekly. 

Distributed in Europe since 1950 by its publisher and editor, Marion von 

Rosbach, the newspaper took great pleasure in tweaking military leaders 

throughout USAREUR. Known both as the G.I.’s newspaper and the 

“Oversexed Weekly,” the newspaper presented a regular mix of sports; 

court-martial testimony, particularly those containing lurid or sexually explicit 

details; and descriptions of the hardships of enlisted life caused by what the 

paper considered incompetent or corrupt leadership. Although the paper was 

beloved by most junior enlisted men, it drew the wrath of the USAREUR 

leadership, who had it banned from military newsstands in 1953. Nonetheless, its 

continued publication and distribution throughout Europe caused consternation 

throughout the command and often raised eyebrows in the German civilian 

population.116

The mercantile center of most installations was the post exchange. By 

January 1953, the European Exchange System maintained more than 2,300 

shops and outlets of all types throughout Germany, France, and Austria. 

Although the various cafes and snack bars located on military posts and along 

the autobahn were the most popular services provided, large installations 

also offered barber and beauty shops, laundry and dry cleaning, tailors, shoe 

repair, flower shops, and photo studios. Exchange garages and service stations 

dotted the major road networks. Profits from the system were a primary source 

of revenue for a command welfare fund that supported many recreation and 

soldier assistance programs throughout USAREUR.117

While popular with American soldiers, the exchange system was less so with 

German merchants. The West German Retail Association had charged in 1952 

that soldiers were purchasing goods such as cameras at reduced prices and then 

reselling them for a profit. It also questioned whether special stores for military 

personnel should be allowed to replace retail establishments that contributed to 

the German economy. The Exchange Service responded that while its stores did 

indeed charge less than local retailers, it purchased the cameras from German 

manufacturers who made a respectable profit. In the end, the exchange stores 

continued to offer significant bargains to soldiers on some high-dollar items, but 

116 Msgs, Office of the Chief of Information to CINCUSAREUR, for Bolte, 23 Jul 1953; 

and CINCUSAREUR, signed Bolte, to Chief of Information, 27 Jul 1953. Both in Entry 2277, 

General Correspondence, USAREUR Public Information Division, RG 549, NACP. Ltr, Bolte 

to Jerome Joachim, Business Manager, The Freeman, Entry 2211, USAREUR Judge Advocate 

General General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; Charles C. Moskos Jr., The American Enlisted 

Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp. 102–03; “The G.I.’s Friend,” Time, 9 Jun 

1961, online archive. 117 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 111; Office of the Chief, European 

Exchange Service, High Lights of EES Operations, Calendar Year 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Williams for Dep CINC, U.S. 

EUCOM, 9 Mar 1953, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe.
136 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

German retailers soon learned to compete successfully in other areas by offering 

a wider variety of many products than the exchanges could afford to stock.118

As the increasing number of civilians and the expansion of recreational 

facilities gave a clear indication that the command was settling in for an extended 

stay, soldiers began to question some of the administrative and regulatory 

policies the U.S. command had put into place to allow for a rapid response to 

any threat. The normal duty day in USAREUR began at 0800 and lasted until 

1700 Monday through Friday. Saturday was usually a work day but in many 

cases only until 1200. Unit commanders always had the option of extending 

work hours to whatever extent necessary to complete training or other requirements. When the troops were in garrison and worked normal duty hours, they 

were still subject to commandwide curfew, which required them to be off the 

streets and out of public places by 2400 Monday through Saturday, and by 

0100 Sunday. Although officers and enlisted soldiers of the upper three grades 

on leave or pass were exempt from the curfew, they were expected to abide by 

the spirit of the order and not to loiter in the streets, bars, or restaurants during 

the designated time periods. Units tracked compliance with the order through 

regular bed checks. In May 1953, expressing the belief that he could trust the 

people in his command regardless of the hour, the USAREUR commander, 

General Bolte, rescinded the curfew. Bolte, however, delegated authority to his 

unit commanders to continue to enforce the measure as a disciplinary action 

when appropriate.119

The command’s commitment to combat readiness had also limited the 

percentage of troops who could be on leave or pass at any given time. Since 

all units in the Seventh Army had to be prepared to depart from their home 

stations for emergency positions within two hours of alert notification, no 

more than 15 percent of a unit’s present-for-duty strength could take leave or 

receive a pass at any one time. Everyone else had to be available for duty within 

two hours, with at least half capable of reporting within thirty minutes. While 

commanders understood the adverse effect on morale that such restrictions 

would impose, they hoped that their recreational programs and associated 

facilities would compensate.120

Although Sunday was supposed to be a day off, the command noted that 

training schedules were tight and that Sunday mornings were often the only 

time that commanders might have to tie up loose ends. In 1954, however, 

118 “German Stores Blast EUCOM PX’s,” Army Times, 23 Aug 1952. 119 Memos, Lott for USAREUR Distribution, 27 Aug 1952, sub: Curfew; and Brig Gen L. V. 

Warner, Adj Gen, to USAREUR Distribution, 2 Oct 1952, sub: Curfew and Bedchecks. Both in 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. HQ, USAREUR, 

Guidance for Use of Commanders in Answering Questions Pertaining to the Lifting of the Curfew, 

26 May 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; 

Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 100. 120 HQ, Seventh Army, Practice Alerts and Musters, 27 Feb 1953, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; HQ, 4th Inf Div, Welcome Packet, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 109.
Growing Into the Role 

USAREUR chaplains revolted. When Chief of Army Chaplains Maj. Gen. 

Patrick J. Ryan toured the command, he was besieged by complaints that 

commanders were scheduling maneuvers and other training on Sundays. In a 

letter to the USAREUR commander, General Hoge, Ryan acknowledged the 

requirement to maintain combat readiness but he observed that one battalion 

had gone to the field on thirteen consecutive Sundays for maneuvers that the 

chaplains and the men felt were not vital. Hoge agreed that such training was 

excessive and directed his subordinate commanders to curtail Sunday training.121

Another area in which the command began to relax its requirements was in 

the wearing of civilian clothing during off-duty hours. U.S. Army regulations 

required soldiers in occupied areas to be in uniform at all times. By 1953, soldiers 

and officers were questioning what they considered to be an infringement on 

their personal freedom. In April the USAREUR staff canvassed senior leaders 

at all levels to gauge their positions on the matter and determined that many did 

not favor the change. The command’s Deputy Provost Marshal, Col. Shaffer F. 

Jarrell, expressed many of the concerns that surfaced. He feared a loss of control 

over military personnel due to nonrecognition. It would be more difficult to police 

off-limits areas, to enforce curfews, and to identify personnel entering barracks, 

exchanges, clubs, or other areas limited to military access. He cautioned that 

the lack of uniforms might also encourage a breakdown in the officer-enlisted 

relationship. Finally, he warned of an increase in barracks larceny because troops 

would not be able to fit all of their belongings in wall lockers.122

Lt. Col. Ralph E. Nelson, Deputy Provost Marshal for U.S. Forces in 

Austria, presented another side of the argument. Soldiers in that command had 

worn civilian clothes during off-duty hours since early in 1952. Nelson pointed 

out that the change had improved relations between soldiers and local civilians 

because it placed them on a more equal footing. He added that the privilege 

had strengthened morale throughout the command and served as an incentive 

for good behavior on the part of troops who did not want to lose it. Enlisted 

men reported that it was easier to maintain their military clothing since they no 

longer had to wear it after duty hours. The use of civilian clothing also reduced 

the number of minor incidents requiring military police intervention, including 

such infractions as the wearing of unbuttoned blouses or jackets, improper head 

gear, hands in pockets, or failure to render military courtesies to superiors.123

121 HQ, 4th Inf Div, Welcome Packet; HQ, EUCOM, Monthly Post Commanders Conference Notes, 4 Feb 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; Ltrs, Maj Gen (Chaplain) Patrick J. Ryan to Hoge, 30 Dec 1954; and Hoge to Ryan, 

17 Jan 1955. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, 

NACP. 122 Memo, Col Shaffer F. Jarrell, Dep Provost Marshal, for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 

USAREUR, 22 Apr 1953, sub: Telephone Conversation Between General O’Neil and Colonel 

Jarrell, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 123 Ltr, Lt Col Ralph E. Nelson, Provost Marshal, U.S. Forces in Austria, to Brig Gen Jeremiah P. Holland, Provost Marshal, USAREUR, 14 Apr 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
138 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The USAREUR commander, General Bolte, hesitated to implement the 

change because he had already decided to eliminate the mandatory curfew. He 

wanted time to evaluate the effects of that action before addressing the uniform 

policy. Still, support for the measure spread throughout the command. As a 

result, in October 1953, USAREUR obtained permission from the Department 

of the Army to allow troops to wear civilian clothes during off-duty hours. 

The new privilege did not come, however, without restrictions. Enlisted men 

below the rank of sergeant could not take advantage of the change until they 

had served in the theater for thirty days. Soldiers, moreover, had to maintain 

a standard of appearance and good taste appropriate for members of the U.S. 

armed forces.124

The new policy went into effect on 1 November with mixed results. For 

the next several years, USAREUR leaders worked to interpret and define 

standards for the wearing of civilian clothing. While the post exchange system 

struggled to stock enough civilian clothing to meet the newly created demand, 

the headquarters received complaints from German restaurants and hotels about 

American soldiers and their dependents wearing attire that they considered 

to be in poor taste. In August 1954, USAREUR issued additional guidelines 

for dependents. The directive forbade bare midriffs, strapless or low-cut 

dresses, shorts on teenagers or women, and blue jeans on mature women. In 

an attempt to improve the appearance of American women in public places, 

the regulation also prohibited the wear of pin curlers or any curlers in the hair 

without a suitable scarf or headgear. Women dressed improperly, the directive 

concluded, could not enter U.S. installations or facilities such as post exchanges, 

commissaries, theaters, and service clubs. Despite the furor raised by many 

women and dependents, the overall effect of the new policies was to raise the 

morale of most soldiers throughout the command.125

Noncombatant Evacuation Exercises

The steadily increasing number of dependents in the theater forced 

USAREUR leaders to add still another dimension to their emergency planning. 

In the event that hostilities between the Soviets and the West grew imminent, 

124 HQ, USAREUR, Monthly HICOG-Commanders Conference Notes, 4 Jun 1953, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Col Weston 

A. McCormac, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 6 Oct 1953, sub: Two 

Items for Seventh Army Weekly Directive, Uniform Regulations, Civilian Clothes, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 125 HQ, Seventh Army, Extract-Seventh Army Weekly Directive 43, 23 Oct 1953, Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, 

HQ, USAREUR, p. 100; “Off-Duty Civvies OK in Zone After November 1,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 8 Oct 1953; “USAREUR Draws Rules on Dependents’ Clothing,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 6 Aug 1954. For more on the impact of American dependants 

on German communities, see Anni P. Baker, American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military 

Presence (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004); Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors.
Growing Into the Role 

the command would have to evacuate thousands of wives, children, and other 

civilians from the immediate combat area. A well-designed evacuation plan 

would serve an additional purpose, however, for its execution during a period 

of escalating tensions would both act as a sign of increased readiness and make 

the Soviets think twice about beginning any hostilities. Just as the presence 

of families and children sent a signal to the Soviets that U.S. intentions were 

peaceful, their removal would send an equally strong indication that the Army 

in Europe took its business seriously.

In September 1952 USAREUR had directed the Communications Zone to 

review existing plans and personnel requirements to support the evacuation of 

noncombatants in Germany through France to staging areas at Bordeaux and 

La Pallice. The request indicated that, upon implementation of an evacuation 

order, the Communications Zone could expect to receive 60,000 noncombatants, 

riding in 25,000 civilian vehicles and entering France at 8 designated border 

crossing points. In particular, USAREUR asked the Communications Zone 

commander to assess plans for traffic control, for feeding and billeting the 

evacuees, and for their final movement out of the theater.126

The resulting study made some bleak observations about the U.S. Army’s 

readiness to carry out the evacuation. Although some plans existed for Base 

Section Headquarters—the component of the Communications Zone that 

oversaw ports and supply depots in western France—none were available for 

its subordinate units. Also, while the U.S. State Department was charged with 

the evacuation of U.S. tourists from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 

Luxembourg, the Army had no assurance that it would not be called on to 

assist in their movement as well. Neither had the Navy provided any guarantee 

that ships would be available to return the personnel to the United States. No 

one had earmarked rations, tents, or medical supplies for use by evacuees. 

Measures to ensure adequate traffic control by military police along the route 

were untested and lacked detailed plans for movement control. The 508th 

Military Police Battalion, which was responsible for traffic control along the 

southern portion of the evacuation route, could not reach the French-German 

border until four hours after the first groups of dependents began crossing into 

France. In its conclusions, the study recommended establishment of a special 

planning group of representatives from USAREUR, the Seventh Army, and 

the Communications Zone to isolate specific problems and come up with a 

revised plan for noncombatant evacuation.127 

The group met early in 1953. By May it had prepared a draft plan, 

Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) 1–53. Dubbed “Safehaven,” it called 

126 Memo, Lt Col A. W. Johnson, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, USAREUR COMZ, 18 Sep 1952, 

sub: Personnel Requirements in Support of NEO, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954, RG 549, NACP. 127 Memo, Col Robert G. Kyser, Dep Dir of Logistics, for Ch of Staff, USAREUR, 14 Nov 

1952, sub: Evacuation of Non-Combatants, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
140 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

for the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants from Germany and France to a 

staging area on the southwest coast of France near Bordeaux and La Pallice, 

where they would await transport to Great Britain or the United States. A 

supplement to the plan, published on 1 July 1953 and labeled NEO 2–53–3, 

outlined procedures for extending the ground movement of some of the people 

into the Iberian Peninsula. Both plans assigned responsibility for transporting 

evacuees to safe havens in Great Britain or back to the United States to the 

U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and to the U.S. Air 

Force, Europe.128 USAREUR’s chief of staff approved the plan on 7 May and 

assigned planning responsibility to the assistant chief of staff for operations, 

plans, and training.129 

With the groundwork well under way, U.S. forces in Germany and France 

began preparations for the testing and implementation of the evacuation plan. 

Military communities established a block warden system and a process for 

notifying residents once an alert occurred. Units with evacuation missions 

received training and any additional equipment they needed to perform their 

assignments. The command positioned stockpiles of supplies along evacuation 

routes, near assembly areas, and in the Bordeaux–La Pallice staging area. In the 

summer of 1953, USAREUR arranged for a test of the plan, which it named 

Exercise Roadbound. The commanding general, Seventh Army, took overall

control and supervision of the effort and of coordination with the U.S. Air 

Force, Europe. The commanding general, USAREUR Communications Zone, 

oversaw the exercise in France and was responsible for coordination with the 

French authorities.130

The exercise commenced on the morning of 12 November 1953 with the 

announcement of a USAREUR-wide alert. Approximately one thousand 

military personnel and five hundred vehicles departed home stations in Germany 

for staging areas in the vicinity of Bordeaux. Area commands, districts, and 

detachments simulated their duties by dispatching a single vehicle to represent 

each convoy element of one hundred fifty vehicles. At least thirty vehicles 

traveled over each of the evacuation routes. Each of the ten field hospitals 

128 HQ, USAREUR, NEO 1–53, Noncombatant Evacuation Order, 7 May 1953, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, NEO 

2–53–S, Noncombatant Evacuation Order (Safehaven), 1 Jul 1953, Entry 2130, USAREUR

General Letters, 1953, RG 549, NACP; Memos, Maj Henry A. Grace, G–1 Plans Ofcr, for CINC, 

U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1 Oct 1953, sub: Rapid Phase-Out of 

Dependents; and Grace for CINC, U.S. Air Force, Europe, 1 Oct 1953, sub: Rapid Phase-out 

of Dependents. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP. 129 Memos, Col Lyle W. Bernard, Chairman, Special NEO Planning Gp, for CINCUSAREUR, 

14 Jan 1953, sub: Final Report of Special NEO Planning Group; and Brig Gen Robert G. Gard, 

Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, for G–4, 24 Jun 1953, sub: NEO Planning. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 130 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 175–79; HQ, USAREUR 

COMZ, NEO OPORD, 15 Jul 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP.
Growing Into the Role 

involved dispatched an ambulance-type bus to simulate patient evacuation. 

Columns using the northern evacuation routes completed their journey to the 

staging area in forty-nine hours. Along the longer southern routes, evacuees 

took seventy-two hours to complete the journey. The exercise revealed numerous 

flaws in the plan and in its overall execution. A failure to issue strip maps to 

participants caused considerable confusion, especially in France because route 

markings in several places were difficult to follow. Rest and resupply areas 

also lacked toilet facilities. Evaluators concluded that all personnel involved 

needed additional training, especially in traffic control and communication. 

They recommended the scheduling of another exercise for the following year.131

Before it could conduct another test, however, the command had to make 

a number of changes to the overall plan. Because the number of military 

personnel available to assist the evacuation effort was limited, USAREUR 

assigned volunteer male civilian employees of the Department of the Army 

as block wardens and drivers for the evacuation columns. When the block 

warden system broke down due to its voluntary nature, the command issued 

the assignments on military orders. Because of a lack of available drivers and 

the lengthy trip required at least one assistant driver in each vehicle, the Army 

encouraged civilian nondrivers and high school students to apply and qualify 

for drivers permits.132

The second exercise, Roadbound II, began on the morning of 12 Octob

1954, with another USAREUR-wide general alert. This time, observers noted 

another major problem: it took forty-five minutes for area commands to 

receive notification of the alert and ninety minutes before all military service 

units got the word. Signal communications between the Seventh Army and 

the Communications Zone Advance Section were so inadequate that the two 

headquarters had difficulty coordinating their actions. Once the evacuation 

began, drivers found that they still lacked sufficient strip maps for their 

entire journey and found many of the maps they did receive were inaccurate. 

Meanwhile, some of the wreckers and other heavy vehicles assigned to assist 

the movement could not maintain the prescribed speed. Complicating matters 

further, unfamiliarity with convoy procedures and, at times, an inability to 

follow fairly simple guidance meant that many units arrived at designated 

checkpoints too early or too late, causing traffic congestion and backups all 

along the route. On the plus side, evaluators noted that the construction of the 

tent camp in the Communications Zone Base Section was particularly efficient.133

After the exercise was completed, USAREUR planners agreed that 

movement plans were still not coordinated. Although the command had made 

a noticeable improvement from the previous year’s test, the evacuation plans 

still had a long way to go. Commanders and staff acknowledged that more 

training and further testing would be required before they could feel comfortable 

131 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 179–80. 132 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 211. 133 Ibid., p. 212.
142 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

with the overall plan. It had also become clear what a massive undertaking an 

evacuation would be if the command ever had to put the plan into effect.134

A Steadying Influence

By the end of 1954, the U.S. Army in Europe had come to grips with many 

of the challenges that its mission as a forward-deployed force had posed. 

Although its leaders would never be completely comfortable with the balance 

of conventional forces between East and West, they believed that their training, 

equipment, and doctrine would enable them to put up a good fight. Moreover, 

the addition of atomic artillery to the Seventh Army’s arsenal presented even 

graver risks to potential attackers. It seemed clear to leaders throughout 

USAREUR that such advanced weapons would play an even greater role in 

their war planning in the years to come.

The Army had grown into its role in Europe in other ways as well. Although 

work continued in many areas, the Communications Zone and the line of 

support through France were well established. Almost all of the vital supply 

depots and maintenance shops had been moved away from the immediate battle 

area. Meanwhile, USAREUR had made significant progress in reducing its 

personnel turbulence and in creating a long-term institutional memory in its 

units. The arrival of an increasing number of families throughout the command, 

and the steady growth of housing and recreation and welfare facilities to support 

their presence, likewise contributed to an emerging sense of stability.

134 Ibid., p. 213.
The U.S. Army’s primary contribution to Western European defense 

had been the reactivation of the Seventh Army and the development of the 

command and control and logistical support headquarters that accompanied 

it. The service also helped to strengthen the NATO alliance through the 

integration of its forces into the NATO command structure and through 

its administration of military assistance programs for the various member 

nations. Even before the completion of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United 

States had initiated a series of military assistance programs for European 

nations standing in the path of Soviet expansion. Beginning with aid to Greece 

in 1947, the Truman administration dispatched money, military equipment, 

and advisers to the various countries involved. The Mutual Defense Assistance 

Act of 1949 formally assigned the vast majority of U.S. military aid to the 

NATO allies. With a preponderance of forces in the theater, the Army became 

the primary sponsor for most of these military aid programs. Its depots 

and repair shops rebuilt World War II–era equipment to be included in the 

assistance packages and provided training and maintenance teams to help 

allied military forces learn how to use it. 

Smaller components within USAREUR also strengthened the alliance in 

their own way. As the relationship between the United States and the Soviet 

Union deteriorated after World War II, both sides desired a mechanism to 

oversee their interests in the other’s zone of control, and to resolve conflicts 

between opposing forces before they could escalate into more serious confrontations. The military liaison missions—originated in a 1947 agreement between 

Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, Deputy Commander, European Command, and 

Col. Gen. Mikhail Malinin, Chief of Staff, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces 

in Germany—helped USAREUR manage its relationship with the Soviet Army 

and later became a vital source of intelligence as the Cold War threatened to 

become a shooting war.

Building NATO’s Military Capabilities

Although the North Atlantic Treaty committed each of the signatories to 

a mutual defense, no mechanism existed in 1949 to translate political goals 

into a military strategy. Likewise no unified command structure directed the 

combined military forces of the member nations. The five nations of the Western 

4

Strengthening the Allianc
144 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

European Union had conducted military planning through a committee of their 

respective chiefs of staff, reporting to another committee of the five defense 

ministers. This arrangement would serve as a point of departure for planning 

NATO’s military organization.1

In September 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of 

Defense Louis A. Johnson had presented to President Truman their thoughts 

on the structure and organization of a NATO military defense force. They 

agreed that it should consist of national contingents operating under their own 

commanders, but responsive to overall NATO control. The two secretaries 

also concluded that one overall commander should have sufficient authority 

to organize and train the various elements within the structure and to exercise 

the full powers of a supreme allied commander in time of war. To support 

that officer, they recommended an international staff representing the military 

services of all participating nations. Acheson and Johnson agreed that an 

American officer should fill the position of supreme allied commander, but 

only with the full approval of the European nations. In the strongest terms, 

the two also stated that the United States should proceed “without delay” in 

the formation of West German military units that would play an essential role 

in the defense. Truman favored many of the recommendations and forwarded 

the letter to the National Security Council for further consideration. On 11 

September 1950, after considering the council’s views, Truman approved the 

memorandum, making it the basis for the American position when the United 

States participated in European defense planning.2

On 19 December 1950, at the sixth meeting of the North Atlantic Council 

in Brussels, Belgium, representatives from the twelve treaty nations formally 

approved and announced the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower 

as the supreme commander of an integrated allied force for the defense of 

Western Europe. The general immediately named the Army’s deputy chief of 

staff for plans and operations, Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, to be his chief 

of staff in the new command. The two officers had been close personal friends 

since the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers when they had both served on the staff of 

the Third U.S. Army under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. Also on 19 December, 

Secretary of the Army Frank Pace and Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton 

Collins announced that all U.S. forces in Germany would come under the 

operational command of General Eisenhower. Shortly thereafter, the French 

Minister of Defense, Jules S. Moch, placed the three French divisions serving 

1 Douglas L. Bland, The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of 

Structure and Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 93–96. 2 United States Position Regarding Strengthening the Defense of Europe and the Nature of 

Germany’s Contribution Thereto, 11 Sep 1950, A Report to the National Security Council by the 

Executive Secretary, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
Strengthening the Alliance 14

in Germany at Eisenhower’s disposal and promised two additional divisions 

in the coming year.3

Despite such promising initial commitments, no command structure as 

yet existed to plan and coordinate the actions of NATO’s military forces. 

General Gruenther assembled a handful of U.S. military officers, who began 

at once to study the problems of organization and command. Because of its 

central location and excellent communications, Eisenhower and Gruenther 

decided that Paris would be the initial home of the new headquarters, despite 

some resistance from British representatives who decried the movement of the 

headquarters from London. Early in 1951 Gruenther’s planning staff joined 

representatives of eight other NATO nations in Paris to form the Supreme 

Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), Planning Group. Because 

military staff systems differed among the member nations, the planning staff 

debated how to structure the headquarters so that staff appointments were 

distributed fairly. In the end, it elected to follow many of the precedents that 

had been established by the Western European Union. The old headquarters 

had already studied many of the organizational problems now faced by the 

SHAPE planners and had bequeathed to them plans that served as the basis 

for their discussions. More important, the previous headquarters had helped to 

develop a number of officers of different nationalities with experience working 

together as an allied team.4

In April, General Gruenther disclosed that the headquarters organization would resemble the American model with four primary staff bureaus: 

administration, intelligence, plans and operations, and logistics. Unlike the 

American model, however, SHAPE would have a fifth section devoted to 

organization and training. The staff would also include several special sections 

to deal with areas such as communications and finance. Complicating the 

process of creating a staff organization was the need to avoid offending various 

member nations, many of whom had long and glorious military traditions. 

Accordingly, Gruenther created spaces for two permanent deputy chiefs of 

staff, one—normally a French officer—to deal with logistics and administration, 

and a British officer to handle plans and operations. General Eisenhower also 

named three primary assistants to aid him in the overall direction of the force: 

British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery to serve as deputy supreme 

commander, British Air Chief Marshal Hugh W. L. Saunders to serve as air 

deputy, and French Admiral Andres G. Lemmonier to be naval deputy.5

3 Ismay, NATO, pp. 34–37; “Eisenhower Gets Command as West OK’s Pact Army; U.S. to 

Send More Troops,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Dec 1950. 4 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington: 

University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 169; Ismay, NATO, pp. 37–38; Bland, The Military 

Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance, pp. 109–10. 5 Ismay, NATO, p. 70; Kaplan, The United States and NATO, p. 169; William Richardson, 

“Setup for SHAPE Outlined by Gruenther,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Feb 1951; 

“Ike Officially Takes Over Pact Forces,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Apr 1951. 
146 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The next step for the planning group was to divide the theater into subordinate 

elements that individual commanders in chief could manage (Chart 4). Three 

separate commands would deploy north to south according to the continent’s 

natural geographic features. In the north, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, 

under the command of British Admiral Eric J. P. Brind, was responsible 

for an area that included Scandinavia, the North Sea, and the Baltic. In the 

south, Italy and the areas around the Mediterranean fell under Allied Forces, 

Southern Europe, commanded by U.S. Admiral Robert B. Carney. Because of 

the overwhelming importance of the central sector, Eisenhower decided that, as 

supreme commander, he would retain control over its operations. To assist him, 

he appointed French General (later Marshal) Alphonse P. Juin to be Land Forces 

commander, U.S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad as Air Force commander, 

and French Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard as Flag Officer (senior naval officer) 

Western Europe. In 1952, after Greece and Turkey had joined NATO as part 

of its southern flank, SHAPE created a separate command for naval forces in 

the Mediterranean, under the leadership of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. 

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

Paris

Allied Forces

Northern Europe

Oslo

Allied Land

Forces Norway

Oslo

Source: Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954 (Paris, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954).

Chart 4—Allied Command Europe

Allied Land

Forces Denmark

Copenhagen

Allied Air Forces

Northern Europe

Sandvika, Norway

Allied Naval Forces

Northern Europe

Oslo

Allied Forces

Central Europe

Fontainebleau

Allied Land Forces

Central Europe

Fontainebleau

Allied Air Forces

Central Europe

Fontainebleau

Allied Naval Forces

Central Europe

Fontainebleau

Allied Forces

Southern Europe

Naples

Allied Land Forces

Southeastern Europe

Izmir, Turkey

Allied Land Forces

Southern Europe

Verona

Allied Air Forces

Southern Europe

Naples

Naval Striking and 

Support Forces

Southern Europe

Naples

Allied Forces

Mediterranean

Malta

Gibraltar

Area

Gibraltar

Western

Mediterranean Area

Algiers

Central

Mediterranean Area

Naples

Eastern

Mediterranean Area

Athens

Northeastern

Mediterranean Area

Ankara

Southeastern

Mediterranean Area

Malta
Strengthening the Alliance 14

Later, in 1953, NATO leaders decided that the Central Command needed its own 

commander in chief and appointed Marshal Juin to that position. He, in turn, 

named General Marcel M. Carpentier to serve as commander of Allied Land 

Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE).6

The connection between the political leadership of NATO and the military 

command structure of SHAPE was provided by the Military Committee. 

Although an advisory committee outside of NATO’s command structure, the 

committee disseminated guidance to the supreme headquarters, and military 

expertise and advice to the North Atlantic Council. As agreed in 1949, each 

signatory nation contributed one military representative to the committee, 

normally its chief of defense. In the case of Iceland, which had no armed forces, 

the committee extended membership to a civilian official. Although the full 

committee met infrequently, much of its business was conducted by designated 

representatives or by the international military staff. The latter’s role was to 

serve as the executive agency for the Military Committee and to ensure that 

its policies and directives were implemented as intended. The staff consisted of 

6 Ismay, NATO, pp. 72–73; The Reports of the Temporary Council Committee, 23 Feb 1952, 

in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 5, Western European Security, pt. 1, pp. 220–30.

Left to right: Brig. Gen. George Rehn, Army Chief of Staff for Plans, Seventh Army; General 

Lauris Norstad, Commanding General, USAF, Europe; and Maj. Gen. Dean Strother, 

Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
148 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

431 military and civilian personnel divided into six directorates: intelligence, 

plans and policy, operations, logistics and resources, communications and 

information systems, and armaments and standardization.7

The armaments and standardization directorate reflected recognition 

among all member nations that they could more efficiently provide for their 

mutual defense with common standards for tactics, procedures, weapons, and 

equipment. Although agreements concerning tactics and procedures developed 

relatively quickly, the standardization of weapons and equipment among the 

military forces of the member nations proved to be harder to achieve. At least 

initially, a de facto measure of standardization was achieved because so many 

countries used American weapons and equipment supplied under the military 

aid program. However, as those items became obsolete, many countries 

expressed some reluctance to remain dependent on others for their military 

equipment. They replaced American items with models of their design, thus 

increasing rather than reducing the types of ammunition, tools, and spare 

parts required. Each nation had its own internal standards for screw threads, 

the caliber of armaments, electronics, and other subcomponents of military 

weapons and equipment. Even when states reached an agreement regarding a 

particular piece of equipment, as when they adopted the Belgian FN rifle as a 

standard item of NATO equipment, it was seven or eight years before British 

troops in Germany received their complement.8

As the command structure came together, NATO’s military leaders turned 

their attention to developing sufficient military strength to counter the Soviet 

threat. Neither the United States nor the rest of the NATO allies were prepared 

to match Soviet military strength. With its forces already deeply committed 

to the war in Korea, the United States had little to offer in readily available 

forces. Instead, it exerted considerable political pressure on its allies, calling 

on them to provide a greater share of the conventional forces required. At 

the February 1952 NATO conference in Lisbon, U.S. officials could promise 

a reinforcement of only two divisions within thirty days of initiating full 

national mobilization. Any further divisions would not be available for at 

least 180 days. British reinforcements were similarly constrained. Although 

French and Italian representatives promised an additional seven and five 

divisions, respectively, within thirty days, many American military leaders 

were skeptical of their ability to meet those commitments. In total, member 

nations pledged to provide 53 2/3 divisions to be available within thirty days 

of mobilization by the end of the year, and 89 2/3 by the end of 1954. While 

the American commitment would remain relatively stable, rising from the 

existing 5 2/3 divisions in 1952 to a total of 9 2/3 in 1954, the agreement called 

for considerable increases on the part of the European allies. For nations 

7 Bland, The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance, pp. 168–95. 8 F. W. Mulley, The Politics of Western Defense (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 193–94; 

Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Before the Korean War, April 1949–June 1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent 

State University Press, 2013), p. 110.
Strengthening the Alliance 14

whose economies were still recovering from World War II, this was going to 

be a tough sell to their populaces.9

General Eisenhower worked tirelessly for the remainder of his time as 

SACEUR to convince the Europeans to provide the agreed on forces. Until 

they delivered, however, the U.S. Army in Europe, along with its NATO allies, 

had to fight the battle with whatever forces they had on hand. They would have 

to hold on long enough for the strategic bombing campaign and U.S. atomic 

bombs to knock the Soviets out of the war.

Eisenhower departed Europe on 1 June 1952, and was replaced as Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe, by General Ridgway. It was Ridgway who 

proposed to the Joint Chiefs a new organization that would place the U.S. 

officer designated as the overall allied commander in Europe in the position 

of a unified commander with authority over all U.S. forces in the theater. As 

its principal mission, the new, unified U.S. European Command supported 

SACEUR and U.S. policies in Europe. To this end, the command received the 

9 Ismay, NATO, pp. 47–48; Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952, 

pp. 126–52.

General Ridgway, SHAPE Commander, inspects French troops at Baderces. General Noiret, 

commander of French Forces in Germany, is with him.
150 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

responsibility for coordinating joint logistics and for administrative issues, such 

as procurement, negotiations for base rights, and administration of military 

aspects of the Mutual Security Program for Europe. It also provided military 

representation to all NATO, international, and U.S. agencies in Europe. At 

the same time, the old European Command (EUCOM) became U.S. Army, 

Europe (USAREUR), and retained all of its original responsibilities.10

By 1953, the sense of urgency that had bolstered the determination of the 

European allies had begun to wane with NATO’s military strength still far short 

of the goals the alliance had set at the Lisbon Conference in 1952. When, in 

10 Capt Russell A. Gugeler, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Redesignation of Headquarters European Command as Headquarters United States Army Europe 1952, 1954, Historical 

Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, 

p. 1, Historians files, CMH; Msg, U.S. Liaison Ofcr (USLO), SHAPE, from Gen Matthew 

B. Ridgway, to CINCEUR, for Gen Thomas T. Handy, 8 Jul 1952, Ref Number ALO–1328, 

Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Lt Gen 

Manton S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, for Ch of Staff, 10 Sep 1952, sub: Logistical Coordination 

in Central European Command, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP.

General Gruenther, SACEUR, inspects the 2d Armored Division Honor Guard during a visit 

to Germany in 1953.
Strengthening the Alliance 15

August, General Gruenther became SACEUR, he called for a reappraisal of 

NATO’s military strategy with the understanding that the conventional forces 

available to SHAPE would not be sufficient to stem a determined Soviet assault. 

As a close friend of the new president, Gruenther shared many of Eisenhower’s 

ideas regarding the primacy of atomic weapons. Only by making them available 

to NATO’s military commanders, he believed, could the alliance plan for a 

credible defense of Western Europe. On 20 August, he directed Air Marshal 

Walter L. Dawson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, to establish 

an ad hoc committee to study how atomic weapons should be integrated into 

NATO’s defense plans. From that point forward, the alliance would base 

its plans on an assumption that its military commanders would have atomic 

weapons at their disposal, and would use them in the event of a Soviet attack.11

Integrating USAREUR into the NATO Command Structure

As the alliance began to develop its military command structure, the member 

nations had to determine which military units to assign to NATO, and the 

manner in which national forces would connect to an international chain of 

command. Although the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 

(SHAEF), in Europe during World War II offered a model of sorts, the idea 

of such an organization during a time of peace added a degree of complexity.

The links between the U.S. Army’s command structure in Europe and 

NATO’s military headquarters took some time to develop. Beginning on 2 

April 1951, the Army placed EUCOM and the Seventh Army under the control 

of the SACEUR. General Eisenhower exercised this command through the 

intermediate headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe. 

On 24 September, ALFCE announced the provisional organization of the 

Interallied Tactical Study Group, composed of representatives from France, the 

United States, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The objective of 

the group was to establish common doctrine and procedures that would enable 

the military forces of different nations to work together and to integrate units 

where necessary. The group intended none of its work to replace or amend 

existing national regulations or guidance. It would instead establish a common 

vocabulary, provide common definitions, and assist commanders to understand 

the principal tendencies of the allied forces under their control. In pursuit of 

these goals, the headquarters authorized members of the group to deal directly 

with any of the allied commands in Germany and to attend exercises or training 

events conducted by their units. Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central 

Europe, also directed the group to prescribe to its forces in Germany tactical 

exercises or experiments in support of its studies. Among the issues its members 

11 Ltr, Ridgway, SHAPE Cdr, to Gen Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 

Jun 1953, Box 75, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, MHI; Honick and Carter, SHAPE Histories, 

pp. 1–27; Ingo W. Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited 

War, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 36–46.
152 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

chose to examine were the effects of new weapons on tactical operations, means 

of controlling forces along extended frontages, and the parameters within which 

German forces might be employed in the future.12

One of the study group’s primary tasks was to produce a volume of Tactical 

Instructions that would provide commanders and staffs with a single source for 

guidance on operational doctrine. By January 1953, the group had prepared 

a draft and distributed it to the various allied commands for comment. In 

response, USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. Robert 

G. Gard, underscored issues that remained unresolved. Questioning some of 

the defensive concepts expressed in the manual, Gard noted differences between 

the British and American approaches, particularly British discomfort with the 

rearward movement involved in a mobile defense, and recommended that an 

entire chapter be devoted to the subject. He also criticized the omission of any 

consideration of the refugee problem and the control measures necessary to 

prevent fleeing civilians from interfering with defensive plans. The study group 

continued its work for the next several years, but its influence and importance 

waned as the various allied military contingents gained experience in working 

with each other through combined exercises and training.13

In November 1952, SHAPE attempted to clarify command relationships 

within the theater by announcing the creation of two new army group headquarters in central Europe. In the northern sector, British General Sir Richard 

N. Gale, Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, took command 

of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). In the southern sector of the 

theater, General Eddy, USAREUR commander in chief, became the Central 

Army Group (CENTAG) commander. In that position—directly subordinate to 

General Juin, the ALFCE commander—he controlled the U.S. Seventh Army 

and the French First Army. Although USAREUR headquarters maintained 

a separate planning element for its NATO mission, in many cases staff officers 

held two positions, splitting time between USAREUR and CENTAG. NATO 

war plans served as the basis for both CENTAG and USAREUR emergency 

wartime planning. The CENTAG plans section and the USAREUR operations 

staff developed an annual planning cycle to update the concept of operations 

12 Memos, Gen Marie de Lassus St. Genies, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE), 

Ch of Staff, for Gen Alphonse P. Juin, ALFCE Cdr, 24 Sep 1951, sub: Provisionary Organization of the Interallied Tactical Study Group; de Lassus St. Genies for Distribution, 28 Oct 

1951, sub: Directive for the Interallied Tactical Study Group; and Maj Alfred L. Toth, G–3, for 

CINCUSAREUR, sub: Report on the Interallied Tactical Study Group Conference 27–28 Jan 

1953. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 13 Memos, Toth for CINCUSAREUR, sub: Report on the Interallied Tactical Study Group 

Conference 27–28 Jan 1953; Brig Gen Robert G. Gard, USAREUR Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 

for CG, Interallied Tactical Study Gp, 26 Mar 1953, sub: Comments on Part I of Tactical Instructions; and Gard for CG, Interallied Tactical Study Gp, 20 Apr 1953, sub: Comments on 

Draft Instruction for the Tactical Employment of Large Interallied Units. All in Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NADC.
Strengthening the Alliance 15

and annexes devoted to command and 

control, intelligence, and logistics.14

With an international chain of 

command in place, Allied Land Forces, 

Central Europe, began to exert its 

influence over USAREUR’s operations 

and training. USAREUR received 

increasing guidance from that headquarters and, in return, submitted a 

number of concerns to it for resolution. 

Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, 

also provided training guidance on 

a number of subjects to its various 

subordinate units. Its coordination with 

USAREUR included the implementation of atomic defense training and 

scenarios and missions to be highlighted 

in upcoming maneuvers. Although 

SHAPE seldom interfered with the dayto-day operations of its subordinate 

elements, it did instruct the Seventh Army to provide direct feedback from its 

important exercises and maneuvers, including tactical and logistical lessons 

learned, problems with communications, command post performance, and any 

other matters warranting the supreme allied commander’s attention.15

As part of the growing relationship between USAREUR and SHAPE, U.S. 

Army units in Germany participated in extensive training exercises involving 

other allied forces and supervised by NATO headquarters. In mid-May 1952, 

EUCOM and the French First Army conducted Command Post Exercise 

Maytime. Other participating headquarters included the U.S. Twelfth Air

14 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 4; Memos, Gen Henri E. Navarre, 

ALFCE Ch of Staff, for Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (CINCALFCE), 23 Dec 1952, sub: Designation of the two Army Groups, Entry 2045, USAREUR 

G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP; and USAREUR G–3 for Heads of all Staff 

Divs, 8 Mar 1954, sub: USAREUR Planning Program, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 

1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Interv, Lt Col James E. Shelton and Lt Col Edward P. Smith with 

Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., USAREUR G–3 Plans Officer, 27 Jan 1976, pp. 364–65, Senior Officer 

Debriefing Program, MHI; “SHAPE Forms 2 Group Hqs in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 29 Nov 1952. 15 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 4; Memos, de Lassus St. Genies for 

Distribution, 12 Jul 1952, sub: ALFCE Training Memorandum on Atomic Defense Training, 

Entry 2049, USAREUR Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP; Brig Gen Edward T. 

Williams, USAREUR Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, for CINCALFCE, 20 Mar 1952, sub: Interallied 

Maneuvers 1952, Entry 2051, USAREUR General Classified Correspondence, 1952, Operations, 

Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP; and Handy, Dep Cdr, EUCOM, for CG, Seventh Army, 

Aug 1952, sub: Maneuver and Exercise Reports for SACEUR, Entry 2060, USAREUR Decimal 

File, Maneuver Branch, 1952, RG 549, NACP.

Marshal of France, General Juin
154 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Force, the French First Air Division, the Seventh Army, and both the V and VII 

Corps. In the Maytime concept, an aggressor invaded western Germany. Allied

forces withdrew to a Rhine River defensive line and, following friendly reinforcement, counterattacked while supported by fighters and fighter-bombers.16

In addition to testing air-ground communications and procedures for all 

elements involved, Maytime prepared the various headquarters for participation in a larger exercise in July—Grand Alliance—directed jointly by Allie

Land Forces, Central Europe, and Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. Held 

in France and Germany, the exercise included the British Army of the Rhine, 

the I Belgian Corps, and the Second Allied Tactical Air Force as Army Group 

A; and EUCOM, the French First Army, the Seventh Army, and the Fourth 

Allied Tactical Air Force as Army Group B. In its scenario, an enemy attacked 

on a wide front. Allied forces delayed the aggressor with maximum use of 

demolitions at certain strategic rivers and, after a withdrawal, launched a 

counteroffensive. The final report on the event indicated that all concerned had 

much to learn about communications and coordination between participating 

units and the control of such large combat forces in the field. In addition to 

some of the expected language challenges, participants found that terminology, 

abbreviations, and acronyms used in orders and communications varied from 

nation to nation. A special report prepared by the 307th Communication 

Reconnaissance Battalion indicated that communications security was a major 

problem, particularly within the Seventh Army. The battalion had been able 

to prepare an almost complete order of battle for the Seventh Army simply by 

listening to its unsecure radio transmissions.17

Two operations in September 1952 allowed elements of the U.S. Seventh 

Army and the French First Army to maneuver across most of West Germany 

and tested their ability to coordinate their actions. In Operation Rose Bush, hel

between 6 and 8 September, the U.S. V Corps, with the 4th Infantry Division 

and the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the French II Corps, with its 

3d Infantry Division and one regiment of the French 1st Armored Division, 

defended against an attack by the U.S. 2d Armored Division and the remainder 

of the French 1st Armored Division. Altogether more than seventy-five 

thousand troops were involved in one of the largest exercises conducted up to 

that time. Two weeks later, between 17 and 19 September, Exercise Equino

pitted the French I Corps, the U.S. 43d Infantry Division less one regimental 

combat team, the French 5th Armored Group, and the French 2d Infantry 

16 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 203–04; Memo, Gen Alfred M. 

Gruenther, SHAPE Ch of Staff, for NATO Distribution, 8 Feb 1952, sub: Tactical and Mobilization Plans for 1952–1953, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, 

RG 549, NACP. 17 Memo, Lt Col E. R. Gray Jr., Asst Adj Gen, EUCOM, for Cdr, ALFCE, 26 Jul 1952, sub: 

Central Army Group Comments on Grand Alliance, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations,

Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP; Rpt, 307th Communication Reconnaissance Bn, 16–18 

Jul 1952, sub: Counter Communications Intelligence Report, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
Strengthening the Alliance 15

Division against the U.S. VII Corps, the U.S. 28th Infantry Division, the French 

4th Infantry Division, and one airborne group of the French 25th Airborne 

Division. As part of the exercise, friendly forces led by the French I Corps fought 

a delaying action against the attacking U.S. VII Corps. In both maneuvers 

evaluators indicated that operational liaison between U.S. and French forces 

had shown marked improvement over the previous year, and General Juin 

himself expressed his satisfaction with the improved coordination he had seen. 

Nonetheless, a Seventh Army critique noted that coordination between units, 

particularly along adjacent boundaries, still needed work.18

Subsequent exercises allowed Seventh Army units to operate not only with 

their CENTAG counterparts, but also with the British, Canadian, Dutch, and 

Belgian forces of NORTHAG. Exercise Battle Royal in September 1954, fo

example, mixed units from both groups for six days of maneuvers that ranged 

across the NORTHAG zone and emphasized the use of the newly arrived 

280-mm. atomic cannons. Involving nearly 140,000 troops from five nations, 

the maneuver was larger than anything USAREUR or CENTAG had held up 

to that time.19

Despite the occasional large-scale field maneuver, NATO more often chose 

to evaluate subordinate elements through command post exercises that sent 

only headquarters sections to the field. Such exercises employed fewer troops 

and were less expensive to support. Tests such as Draw Bridge in Aug

1953 and Counter Thrust in January 1954 continued SHAPE’s efforts t

develop smooth working relationships between allied staffs and to improve 

communications between the various headquarters. Communications between 

U.S. and French units continued to be a sticking point. After one exercise, 

General Bolte commented that difficulties arose from a lack of understanding 

of communications procedures on the part of liaison officers. He believed that 

many of them preferred to use their own personal radios and telephones rather 

than to employ the formal communications system.20

As U.S. doctrine increased its emphasis on atomic weapons, USAREUR 

leaders considered how best to share their knowledge with their NATO counterparts without violating security restrictions. At the highest levels, General 

18 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 205; HQ, Seventh Army, Critique 

of Exercise Rose Bush for Subordinate Seventh Army Units, Box 1727, V Corps Comman

Reports, RG 407, NACP; “Juin Terms Strategy Realistic as Rosebush Maneuvers End,” Stars

and Stripes, European Edition, 9 Sep 1952. 19 “Allied A-Maneuvers to Begin Wednesday,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 

Sep 1954; James Quigley, “Planes Hunt Big Guns as Battle Royal Ends,” Stars and Stripes

European Edition, 28 Sep 1954. 20 Memos, Col Lynwood D. Lott, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 3 Jun 1953, 

sub: Command Post Exercise Draw Bridge, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Corresponden

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; and Col E. T. Henry, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 4 

Nov 1953, sub: Command Post Exercise Counter Thrust, Entry 2130, USAREUR General Letters, 1953, RG 549, NACP; MFR, Brig Gen Einar B. Gjelstein, Ch of Staff, G–3, Central Europe

30 Jun 1953, sub: CPX Comments, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
156 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Ridgway, Supreme Allied Commander, and Field Marshal Montgomery, his 

deputy, and their staffs received briefings on the new weapons and how to 

employ them. USAREUR also prepared and sponsored a Special Weapons 

Orientation Course for senior officers and staff assigned to NATO forces. 

Initially, the USAREUR commander served as a deputy for atomic matters 

to the ALFCE commander. In 1953, however, the USAREUR commander at 

that time, General Bolte, pointed out that this was a dubious approach since, 

in the event of hostilities, he would be fully engaged directing the Central Army 

Group. As an alternative, he suggested appointing a senior U.S. Army general 

as a permanent member of the Allied Land Forces staff, acting as adviser for 

atomic operations. Bolte’s successor, General Hoge, carried this approach one 

step further by providing liaison teams to all allied headquarters, corps and 

above, to advise their commanders on the employment of atomic weapons.21

Although the supreme allied commander and the SHAPE staff took an 

obvious interest in the training and readiness of the various allied forces, 

they focused to an even greater extent on the development of the USAREUR 

Communications Zone and the line of communications through France. 

Because much of NATO’s wartime resupply and reinforcements would have 

to come from the United States, it was clear to both Eisenhower and Ridgway 

that the U.S. Army’s supply facilities and logistical network would support the 

military forces of the entire alliance. Ridgway, in particular, closely monitored 

the construction of depots and supply points throughout the Communications 

Zone and took great interest in the construction of the petroleum and lubricants 

pipeline from the French ports to the Rhine. The SACEUR emphasized the 

point by directing his immediate deputy, General Handy, to get all senior 

leaders involved in supporting the project and to provide “ceaseless command 

supervision” to ensure that the job got done on time.22

Thus, by 1954, the U.S. Army’s role as a deterrent to Soviet expansion in 

Europe—indeed the service’s very existence—was thoroughly intertwined with 

the success of the NATO alliance. The Army as an institution had moved into a 

critical period as the nation adopted a military and strategic policy that not only 

21 Memos, Brig Gen Raleigh R. Hendrix, Seventh Army Artillery Ofcr, for Bolte, 18 May 1953, 

sub: 280 Briefings; and Brig Gen Douglas V. Johnson, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for USAREUR 

Ch of Staff, 4 Aug 1953, sub: Guidance on Atomic Matters. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1958. Ltr, Eddy to Lt Gen Charles L. Bolte, Seventh Army Cdr, 

15 Jan 1953; Memo, Col E. T. Henry, Asst Adj Gen, USAREUR, for Supreme Allied Cdr, 26 

Oct 1953, sub: Revision of NATO Special Weapons Orientation Course; Ltr, Gen William M. 

Hoge, USAREUR Cdr, to Maj Gen James E. Moore, Army War College, 19 Dec 1953. Last 

three in Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958. All in RG 549, NACP. 

For more information on the NATO-USAREUR view of atomic warfare, see Trauschweizer, 

The Cold War U.S. Army. 22 HQ, EUCOM, Agenda for SRE-CINCEUR Meeting, 12 Feb 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Ridgway, Supreme Allied Cdr, to 

Handy, Dep CINC, EUCOM, 24 Dec 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Strengthening the Alliance 15

turned increasingly toward air power and atomic weapons, but also questioned 

the cost and utility of large conventional forces. For the next several years, 

service leaders experimented with innovations in technology, organization, 

and doctrine as they attempted to prove to the Eisenhower administration 

that the Army had a role to play on the modern atomic battlefield. For much 

of that time, it was primarily the commitment of USAREUR and the Seventh 

Army to Europe and NATO that kept alive the Army’s tradition as a ground 

combat force.23

Army Support for Military Assistance Programs in Europe

Before the alliance could deploy a credible defense against the Soviet Union, 

however, most of its member nations required assistance in building up their 

own military strength. Of the member nations, only the United States was in 

a position to supply military materiel and economic assistance to the rest. As 

the United States military representative for military assistance in Europe, 

the EUCOM commander inherited responsibility for the coordination of 

Department of Defense activities in support of the Mutual Defense Assistance 

Program in Europe authorized by President Truman in 1949. The Joint Chiefs 

established military missions representing the Army, the Navy, and the Air 

Force to advise the various governments receiving U.S. military aid, and 

prepared to deploy them early in 1950. It was the duty of those missions, called 

military assistance advisory groups (MAAG), to assist host governments in 

preparing requests for military aid and in forwarding them with appropriate 

recommendations to the United States. They would also help to develop and 

to implement training plans for the introduction of new equipment.24

Further details of the European Command’s role in the implementation 

of the program came together in early 1950. It assumed responsibility for 

providing administrative assistance to advisory missions; for opening its training 

facilities to allied military students; and for coordinating the storage, repair, 

processing, and delivery of vehicles, weapons, and equipment that would go to 

foreign defense forces. The Joint Chiefs also assigned to EUCOM the tasks of 

supervising the groups’ internal organization, supplying administrative services 

23 Memorandum of Discussion at the 227th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, 

3 Dec 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 2, National Security Affairs, pt. 1, pp. 803–06; Watson, The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954, pp. 61–66. For additional information on 

the effect of the New Look on NATO strategy, see Ronald E. Powaski, The Entangling Alliance: 

The United States and European Security, 1950–1993 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994). 24 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 135–45, Historians files, 

CMH; Huston, Outposts and Allies, pp. 145–46. For additional information on the origins of 

the Military Assistance Program in Europe, see Chester J. Pach Jr., Arming the Free World: The 

Origins of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North 

Carolina Press, 1991); Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military 

Assistance Program, 1948–1951 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, 1980).
158 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

for their military and civilian personnel, and arranging for logistical support 

that was not provided by the State Department.25

To coordinate the various advisory missions throughout Europe, the 

Joint Chiefs established the Joint American Military Advisory Group. At 

an orientation meeting in London in January 1950, representatives from the 

various agencies involved in setting up military assistance programs in Europe 

agreed to include the Joint American Military Advisory Group and advisory 

group personnel within the authorized troop strength of EUCOM as part of the 

EUCOM staff. In March, the joint advisory group published a basic directive to 

all military assistance advisory groups, setting forth policies to govern missions, 

organization and operations, reporting channels, signal communications, and 

matters such as decorations and publicity.26

As military assistance programs for Europe got underway, responsibility 

for delivering military equipment to the recipient nations fell to EUCOM. 

During the initial years of the program, shipments were to include equipment 

excess to the needs of U.S. forces. The first priority was to provide equipment 

to meet maintenance and training requirements of existing allied forces and 

then to fill unit materiel deficiencies or to modernize materiel for their forces 

in being. Only then would the program shift to providing equipment for new 

allied units that were part of the planned force buildup. The initial shipments 

programmed for the NATO allies included about forty-two thousand tons of 

vehicles, ammunition, and equipment.27

American efforts to support and equip NATO allies benefited, in part, 

from the stockpiles of World War II vehicles and equipment that U.S. armed 

forces still retained under their control. Late in 1951, the Department of the 

Army proposed a large-scale endeavor known as the “World War II Vehicle 

Replacement Program,” designed to refurbish older vehicles in the hands of 

American forces and prepare them for shipment to allied nations after they 

were replaced with more modern equipment. As a result of the initiative, the 

European Command agreed to recondition approximately 25,500 World War 

II vehicles during the period between October 1951 and the end of 1952. The 

exchange got off to a slow start, however, because delays in shipping the newer 

vehicles to Europe left American units reluctant to turn in their old equipment 

until replacements were on hand. After a directive from the president in 

January 1952 to accelerate deliveries to recipient nations, EUCOM increased 

the emphasis placed on the program. At the monthly meeting between senior 

25 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 135–45.

26 Ibid.

27 Rpt, Handy, Dep CINC, U.S. EUCOM, for U.S. Congressional Hearings on the Mutual 

Security Program, FY 1954, 26 May 1953, sub: U.S. Military Organization and Procedures for 

Handling Military Aspects of Military Assistance in Western Europe, Entry 2105, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s 

Weekly Staff Conference Notes, 31 Jan 1950, Entry 211, EUCOM General Correspondence, 

RG 549, NACP.
Strengthening the Alliance 15

EUCOM leaders and the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) in 

February 1952, Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw Jr., EUCOM Chief of Logistics, 

reported that the delay in transferring old vehicles to the repair facility had 

become a serious bottleneck in the system. He warned U.S. commanders that 

if they could not keep pace in turning in the older vehicles, the new items would 

go directly to NATO countries. As a result of this new emphasis, EUCOM 

shops and depots had rebuilt and delivered 41,200 vehicles to NATO countries 

by 31 December 1952.28

Also in response to the president’s directive, the Department of the Army 

and the European Command decided to divide the vehicle transfer program 

into two parts and to run the exchange of tracked vehicles separately. Late in 

1951, the Army notified EUCOM that it would ship new M47 Patton tanks to 

Europe in the coming year to replace older M26 Pershing models in use by the 

troops. The Department of the Army expected the command to deliver one 

older tank to selected NATO countries for each new model it received. Because 

American forces did not yet have their full complement of tanks, however, 

the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, authorized the command to retain 

its older tanks until it had reached its full authorization of 1,640. Once it did, 

American units would begin turning in one older M26 for each new M47 they 

received. By the end of 1952, the command had all of its M47 tanks in place and 

had rebuilt 988 older M26 tanks for delivery to France, Belgium, and Italy.29

The wheeled and tracked vehicle rebuilding efforts were only part of the 

overall military assistance the United States provided to its allies. By the end 

of 1952, Army units had collected, rebuilt, and delivered almost ten thousand 

radios and more than one thousand pieces of engineer equipment. Meanwhile, 

an ordnance small-arms program had restored more than twelve thousand 

weapons and placed them in stockpiles for future delivery.30

The redesignation of EUCOM as USAREUR in August 1952 and the 

establishment of the new headquarters, U.S. European Command, brought 

about a shift in the responsibilities for carrying out the Mutual Security 

Program. The U.S. European Command assumed the role as the senior U.S. 

military headquarters in the theater, reporting directly to the Department of 

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the reorganization, the functions 

of the Joint American Military Advisory Group were to be absorbed by the 

military assistance division of U.S. EUCOM headquarters. Once the new 

headquarters was established, however, the division delegated many of those 

responsibilities back to USAREUR, including budgeting, funding, civilian 

28 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 298–301; Memo, Maj Gen Aaron 

Bradshaw Jr., USAREUR Dir of Logistics, for CINC, 31 Aug 1952, sub: Rebuild and Rehabilitation of World War II Types Equipment for MDAP; HQ, EUCOM, CINCEUR-HICOG 

Conference, 25 Feb 1952. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP. 29 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 301–04.

30 Ibid., pp. 304–05.
160 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

personnel administration, and related reporting requirements. The USAREUR 

headquarters retained responsibility for carrying out the Army portion of the 

military assistance program.31

The wheeled vehicle program drew to a close in 1953 and the tracked 

vehicle program a year later. By mid-1954, USAREUR had no more World 

War II–vintage vehicles, weapons, or equipment to refurbish. By the end of the 

year, of the fourteen shops that had started working on items in September 

1951, only four remained open: the rebuild depots at Schwäbisch-Gmünd, 

Ober-Ramstadt, Böblingen, and Mainz. Subsequent mutual aid deliveries 

would come directly from the United States without needing major restoration 

in Europe. The U.S. Army, Europe, however, continued to play a role in the 

reception, initial storage, and minor maintenance of military equipment in the 

course of delivering it to recipient nations. For example, most of Stockpile A, 

approximately 227,000 tons of materials reserved for Austria once it regained 

its sovereignty, was stored at the Fontenet Ordnance Depot in France. Smaller 

amounts resided in warehouses in Austria maintained by U.S. forces there.32

In a report early in 1953 to General Ridgway, General Handy wrote that the 

effectiveness of every piece of equipment, no matter how modern, depended on 

the ability of its operators to use and to maintain it properly. For that reason, 

he said he believed that the additional training and technical assistance U.S. 

Army personnel provided to the NATO allies were at least as important as the 

equipment itself. In addition, the training gave the United States an opportunity 

to teach sound military doctrine and procedures, the value of which would 

outlast the equipment furnished.33

For that reason, the EUCOM operations, plans, and training staff and 

the Joint American Military Advisory Group developed plans from the very 

beginning of the program to teach people how to use the equipment properly. As 

early as February 1950, Department of Defense guidance stipulated that foreign 

governments had to request training to receive it, and then only if U.S. military 

assistance advisory groups certified that a nation was unable to do the job on 

its own. The principal objective of the effort was to develop a cadre of foreign 

instructors who could then assume responsibility for the rest of the program 

in their country. The plan included the assignment of foreign students to U.S. 

31 Ibid., pp. 310–11; Memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Henning, EUCOM Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, for 

Secretary of the General Staff (SGS), 6 Apr 1953, sub: USAREUR Responsibility for MAAGS, 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 32 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 364, 372, Historians files, 

CMH; HQ, USAREUR, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 12 Nov 1952, Entry 

2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “Germersheim Ord 

Park Processes Military Vehicles for America’s Allies,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 25 

Sep 1953; “Army Reducing Program, Will Close 4 More Depots,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 11 May 1954. 33 Memo, Brig Gen William S. Biddle, Dir, USEUCOM Military Assistance Div, for Distribution, 26 May 1953, sub: Letter of Transmittal, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Strengthening the Alliance 16

tactical units to gain on-the-job experience and to attend selected schools and 

centers within the command.34

Instruction opened at EUCOM training centers in May and offered 

forty-seven courses ranging in length from one to ten weeks. More than fifteen 

hundred foreign students received training under the primary 1950 program 

with an additional ninety-nine included in a supplemental summer program. 

Students from Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 

and Norway received instruction at various EUCOM schools, including the 

Signal School at Ansbach, the Engineer School at Murnau, the Ordnance School 

at Eschwege, the Transportation Corps Training Center at Hammelburg, and 

the Tank Training Center at Vilseck. Others joined elements of the 1st Infantry 

Division or the U.S. Constabulary at Grafenwöhr, Sonthofen, Vaihingen, or 

Fuesson to observe training and to receive on-the-job instruction. In addition, 

sixty-six students from eight countries attended the fall maneuver, Exercise

Rainbow, where they were attached to participating units to gain familiarit

with U.S. doctrine and methods in the field.35

By 1954, fourteen nations allied with the United States as part of the 

NATO treaty or other security agreements had participated in Mutual Defense 

Assistance Program training. Although USAREUR schools continued to 

offer instruction to foreign students, discussions with country representatives 

revealed that instead of classroom instruction, students were more interested 

in seeing how the U.S. Army operated in the field. The Seventh Army and 

USAREUR indicated that they could support some additional, limited training, 

as long as the assistance required did not interfere with their own training or 

operational readiness. Seventh Army leaders, in particular, requested that 

visits be coordinated at least three months in advance, that no more than five 

visitors would join a battalion at any one time, and that their visits would last 

no more than three weeks. In addition, Army officials expected visitors to have 

knowledge of conversational English and at least three months of training in 

their own army prior to their visits. Despite a number of requests, USAREUR 

and Seventh Army commanders refused to authorize the creation of traveling 

training assistance teams because the extensive amount of time the teams would 

be on the road would adversely affect readiness and training in their own units.36

34 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 136–41; Memo, Lt Col 

Clarence F. Nelson, Ch, Schools Section, for Dir, EUCOM OPOT, 15 Feb 1950, sub: Status 

of Plans for MDAP Training to Be Conducted in EUCOM, Entry 2062, USAREUR Training 

Branch, General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 35 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 141–42; Memo, Lt Col 

Louis W. Jackson, Asst Adj Gen, for Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, DA, 14 Jan 1950, sub: Preliminary 

Report of MDAP Training in European Command During Fiscal Year 1950, Entry 211, EUCOM General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; Harold Scarlett, “EUCOM Helps Train West 

Europe’s Soldiers,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Jun 1950. 36 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 370–71. Memos, 1st Lt W. 

H. Schuttler, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, Seventh Army, 8 Feb 1952, sub: Training of Allied Personnel; and Lt Col Hugh M. Exton, Ch, Training Div, for Dir, OPOT, 1 Mar 1951, Informational 
162 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

At the end of 1954, U.S. military assistance programs had been active in 

Europe for five years. During that time, EUCOM, USAREUR, and Army units 

throughout Europe had participated in the transfer of vast quantities of military 

equipment to allied nations and in the training of allied personnel to use the 

goods they had received. In so doing, the service made a significant contribution 

toward the creation of a viable defense force for Western Europe, and to some 

extent, had helped to standardize the way NATO military forces trained and 

maintained their equipment. Despite this progress, American political and 

military leaders pointed out that only the participation of a restored West 

German military component could provide the alliance with the manpower 

necessary to stand up to a Communist attack. 

The Military Liaison Missions and the USAREUR Soviet Relations 

Advisory Committee

While the enormous Mutual Defense Assistance Program provided millions 

of dollars worth of military aid to allied nations, smaller USAREUR enterprises 

also made significant contributions to Western European security. Consisting 

of no more than fourteen people, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission not only 

provided an expedient means of communicating with Soviet occupation officials, 

but also served the allies as a valuable set of eyes behind the Iron Curtain.

By April 1947, both sides recognized the need for a mechanism to protect 

their interests in each other’s zones of control and to address issues that arose 

between their military forces before they could evolve into serious confrontations. The Soviets had already reached agreements with the British and the 

French, establishing liaison teams in their respective zones. The British had 

signed the initial agreement with the Soviets on 16 September 1946, calling for 

the accreditation of teams of thirty-seven to each side. The French had also 

signed an agreement with the Soviets on 3 April 1947, allowing for the exchange 

of eighteen personnel.37

The United States and the Soviet Union reached a similar agreement 5 

April 1947, when General Huebner and General Malinin signed an agreement 

authorizing an exchange of military liaison missions accredited to the commander 

in chief of each nation’s occupation forces. In the Soviet Zone, the U.S. mission 

would be stationed in Potsdam, while the Soviet mission would be based at 

Frankfurt in the U.S. Zone. The agreement authorized members of each mission to 

Pamphlet on MDAP Training; HQ, EUCOM, EUCOM Policy on MDAP Training for FY 

1952. Last three in Entry 2062, USAREUR Training Branch, General Correspondence, RG 

549, NACP. Memos, Col Joseph G. Felber, Ch, Training Br, for TAG, DA, 15 Dec 1954, sub: 

MDAP Observer Training, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; 

and Col Raymond E. Bell, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 23 Feb 1952, sub: Training 

of Allied Personnel, Entry 33508, Seventh Army G3 Training Decimal File, RG 338, NACP. 37 Timothy A. Seman, “Cold War Intelligence: The United States Military Liaison Mission 

in East Germany, 1947–1990” (Master’s thesis, American University, 1994), p. 17.
Strengthening the Alliance 16

travel anywhere within the zone in which they were stationed, except for military 

facilities, without escort or supervision. In addition to establishing a liaison to the 

Soviet headquarters, the functions assigned to the U.S. team included providing 

aid to U.S. personnel in the Soviet Zone, assisting in implementing agreements 

related to graves registration, extraditing prisoners for trial in the U.S. Zone, and 

protecting U.S. trains from pilferage in crossing the Soviet Zone.38

The U.S.-Soviet agreement limited the respective missions to fourteen 

personnel. The U.S. contingent was composed largely of Army officers with a 

few enlisted drivers, but it also included one representative each from the U.S. 

Navy and the U.S. Air Force. The relatively small size was primarily the result 

of vocal opposition from U.S. counterintelligence agencies to the presence of 

many Soviets roaming freely in the U.S. sector of Germany. Accredited mission 

members carried Soviet travel and identification cards, printed in German and 

Russian, allowing them freedom of travel throughout the Soviet Zone. By the 

letter of the agreement, all members were to be military, with “no political 

representation.”39 

To support the fourteen mission members accredited to the Soviet Union, 

USAREUR also maintained a rear echelon office in the U.S. sector of Berlin. 

Staff there included an operations and security control officer, an operations 

sergeant, an administrative sergeant, two stenographers, and a driver. The 

Berlin office maintained liaison with the U.S. commander in Berlin and stored 

files of classified documents not allowed in the main compound in Potsdam. 

The office also provided some administrative support to the mission, although, 

in accordance with the agreement, most routine administrative and logistical 

support remained the responsibility of the Soviet Army.40

When not touring East Germany, mission members split their time between 

the headquarters in Potsdam and West Berlin. Most of the U.S. mission officers 

were married, and their families lived in the American sector of West Berlin, 

where housing and educational and recreational facilities were superior to those 

that the Soviets provided in their zone. Nonetheless, USAREUR encouraged 

officers and their families to spend weekends at the Potsdam House, as the 

mission headquarters in the Soviet Zone came to be called. The Soviets and 

East Germans also allowed them to travel in the Soviet Zone and to stay in East 

German hotels. As a result, many were able to observe the disparity between 

the standards of living prevalent on each side. The enlisted drivers for the 

38 Agreement on Military Liaison Missions Accredited to the Soviet and United States Commanders in Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany, 5 Apr 1947, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Handy, EUCOM Cdr, to Ch, 

U.S. 7893d U.S. Military Liaison Mission, 2 Aug 1950, sub: United States Military Liaison 

Mission, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 39 Ibid.; Anya Vodopyanov, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford 

University, A Watchful Eye Behind the Iron Curtain: The U.S. Military Liaison Mission in East 

Germany, 1953–1961, 2004, p. 24. 40 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Entry 429, AG Command Reports, 

1949–1954, RG 407, NACP.
164 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

mission were mostly young and unmarried. They lived in the Potsdam House for 

several months at a time, with periodic reliefs for less strenuous service in West 

Berlin.41 

The breakdown of postwar joint allied occupation machinery for Germany, 

the Berlin blockade, and the division of Europe into Eastern and Western camps 

created an environment radically different from that which had prevailed prior 

to the signing of the Huebner- Malinin Agreement. Military and civilian leaders 

on both sides looked for ways to increase their understanding of the other side’s 

capabilities and intentions. Allied commanders demanded improved intelligence 

capabilities to better understand the training, organization, and capabilities of 

Soviet military forces, particularly the estimated twenty-two divisions that made 

up the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. That was the largest 

Soviet military force outside the Soviet Union and would be the vanguard of 

any advance against the West.42

It did not take Western leaders long to recognize that the officers of the 

military liaison mission, with their legal and theoretically unlimited access to the 

Soviet Zone of Germany, were ideally positioned to collect exactly the kind of 

information that Western commanders required. As the tensions between East 

and West increased, both sides began to use their missions to gather intelligence 

and monitor military movements within their respective zones. Although 

subsequent agreements had established secured areas that were off limits to 

the missions, both sides engaged in a sort of cat-and-mouse game, seeking to 

gather intelligence with their own personnel while attempting to suppress the 

movements and information gathering of the other side.43

While U.S. officials formally protested any limitations placed on their 

mission in East Germany, they also directed American soldiers to monitor the 

movements of the Soviet mission at all times. Whenever U.S. troops encountered 

a Soviet team, they were to forward a spot report through intelligence channels 

to USAREUR headquarters. Reports were to include information on the date 

and time of the sighting, location, a description of the vehicle and the occupants, 

and the direction of travel. Although the soldiers were specifically ordered not 

to attempt to impede the Soviets in any way, incidents did occur. One soldier 

recalled that occasionally an American tank might “accidentally” push a Soviet 

vehicle off the narrow German roads.44

Early attempts at military espionage by U.S. mission personnel were, by 

most accounts, fairly amateurish. Initially, there was little coordination of effort 

41 Paul G. Skowronek, “U.S.-Soviet Military Liaison in Germany Since 1947” (Ph.D. diss., 

University of Colorado, 1976), pp. 60–61. 42 Vodopyanov, A Watchful Eye Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 22–23.

43 Ibid., p. 23; HQ, Seventh Army, G–2 Training Notes, 26 Mar 1956, Entry 33509, Seventh 

Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 44 HQ, Seventh Army, G–2 Training Notes, 26 Mar 1956; HQ, Seventh Army, Army Commanders Conference Notes, Sep 1953, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; 

John C. Gazlay’s vignette, in Tales from the Cold War, ed. Buchwald, p. 217.
Strengthening the Alliance 16

with other missions and no clearly established network for the consolidation 

and evaluation of reports. Most officers lacked any formal intelligence training, 

and almost none spoke Russian at more than a rudimentary level. By 1950, 

however, the mission began to coordinate its intelligence-gathering efforts with 

its British and French counterparts, and after the dissolution of the military 

occupation government in Germany, it submitted its reports to the USAREUR 

deputy chief of staff for intelligence. After 1951, all officers assigned to the U.S. 

mission received a two-year course of instruction in German and Russian. In 

addition, members received compulsory intelligence training and follow on 

instruction in photography and memory enhancement.45

Mission officers also received improved equipment to facilitate their new 

assignments. Sturdy Chevrolets, better suited to mission tours in East Germany, 

replaced the smaller, more fragile Opels. Each sedan averaged about forty 

thousand miles per year, mostly in the Soviet Zone. The heavier cars held up 

better during drives that frequently included maneuvering off asphalted roads 

onto forest trails, across streams, and through ditches in order to observe 

restricted military installations or to hide while watching passing military 

convoys. Externally, the vehicles were standard U.S. military sedans, painted 

olive, with clearly identifiable license plates. Later models would include product 

improvements such as additional fuel tanks, heavy-duty shock absorbers, and 

switches enabling independent control of brake lights to confuse Soviet or East 

German agents who frequently tailed the U.S. tours.46

Most of the key priorities for military intelligence collection in East 

Germany were established by USAREUR and NATO. Of primary importance 

to Western analysts was an assessment of readiness and capabilities of Soviet 

forces in Germany for offensive action against Berlin, West Germany, or all of 

Western Europe. Mission observers reported on troop training, deployment, 

mobilization, armament, enhancement of communications capabilities, and 

changes in logistics, any of which might provide indications of an impending 

attack. Although most reports focused on Soviet military activities, the mission 

also provided information on East German forces as they grew in strength 

and capability. Observers took particular note of new weapons or equipment, 

especially any that involved atomic or chemical warfare. Mission reports 

suggested a particular interest in whether units returned to home station 

once exercises were complete. Failure to do so would have indicated a shift in 

disposition, or more important, a potential for hostile action.47

U.S. mission members conducted their assignments, or tours, in teams 

usually consisting of a driver and an observer. Tours could last anywhere from 

45 Vodopyanov, A Watchful Eye Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 25–26; John A. Fahey, Licensed 

to Spy: With the Top Secret Military Liaison Mission in East Germany (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 

Institute Press, 2002), p. 6. 46 Vodopyanov, A Watchful Eye Behind the Iron Curtain, p. 46; Fahey, Licensed to Spy, p. 

22; Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, U.S. Military Liaison Mission. 47 Vodopyanov, A Watchful Eye Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 30–37. 
166 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

part of a day to several days, although the average trip lasted about forty-eight 

hours. To begin the journey, the driver would pick up his officer or observer 

in West Berlin, at his home or at the rear echelon headquarters. First was the 

challenge of leaving West Berlin. In January 1952, the Soviets closed most 

checkpoints into and out of Berlin. The only access point that was open to 

U.S. traffic, including U.S. mission personnel, was the checkpoint that marked 

the end of the autobahn leading into Berlin. To arrive at the checkpoint, all 

vehicles leaving Berlin had to cross the Potsdam Bridge. It was thus a simple 

matter for Soviets or East Germans, assigned to tail the mission vehicles, to 

wait for their quarry to cross the bridge. What usually followed was a car chase 

straight out of Hollywood as the U.S. mission team would attempt to lose their 

pursuers. With the more powerful automobiles and more experienced drivers, 

it was usually only a matter of time before mission personnel were successful.48

Although the Soviets occasionally conducted their own surveillance, it 

was usually the East Germans who tried to follow the U.S. tours. However, 

when East German agents detained U.S. mission personnel, they immediately 

transported them to the local Soviet commandant. In most cases the Soviet 

officer dismissed the East Germans at once. After a pro forma lecture on 

maintaining the terms of the agreement and not pushing their privileges of access 

too far, the Americans were usually quickly released. The Soviet recognition of 

East German sovereignty had no effect on the military liaison missions. They 

continued on as if the occupation were still in effect. Neither East nor West 

Germany had any standing when it came to the U.S.-Soviet agreement.49

At times, surveillance and harassment efforts took a harder edge, as the 

Communists attempted to detain or damage an American vehicle. Col. August 

E. Schanze, the U.S. chief of mission, described one such encounter in a letter 

of protest he filed with Col. Gen. Semion Ivanov, the deputy chief of staff for 

the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany. On a mission beginning 19 

March 1952, U.S. personnel drove to Stralsund, on the northern coast of East 

Germany, where they stayed the night. The Americans were followed by four 

Soviets dressed in civilian clothes for the entire trip. While they stayed overnight 

in a hotel, two of the Soviets remained in the car while the other two sat in the 

hotel lobby. The next morning the Soviet vehicle was joined by another, also 

carrying four men in civilian clothing. As the Americans traveled along the 

autobahn, one of the Soviet cars began aggressively passing the mission car, 

driving for extended periods in the oncoming lane and occasionally bumping 

them. At one point the driver threw a bottle out his window onto the pavement 

ahead of the American car, and U.S. officers reported that he appeared to be 

intoxicated. In a format long established by both sides, Schanze reminded the 

48 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, U.S. Military Liaison Mission; Seman, “Cold War Intelligence,” p. 23.

49 Skowronek, “U.S.-Soviet Military Liaison in Germany Since 1947,” p. 79; Seman, “Cold 

War Intelligence,” p. 37.
Strengthening the Alliance 16

Soviet officer that such actions were a discredit to the Soviet Army and not in 

accordance with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.50

Despite the eagerness with which the mission officers embraced their new 

assignments, it was important that they retain at least the façade of fulfilling 

their official liaison responsibilities. When the Stars and Stripes printed a 

story that referred to the Soviet Military Liaison Mission as spies, the chief 

of the U.S. mission responded sharply in a letter to the chief USAREUR civil 

affairs officer. In his letter, he warned that such references were inaccurate and 

objectionable, and would lead to the Soviets applying a similar description to 

his own activities. Continuation of such accusations and rhetoric could well 

make his situation in East Germany untenable.51

In September 1952, as incidents involving the military liaison missions 

increased, USAREUR established a formal Soviet Relations Advisory 

Committee to handle the staff actions that resulted. The committee consisted 

of the director, intelligence division; the director, civil affairs division; and the 

chief, public information division. The director, operations, plans, organization, 

and training division and the political adviser were also regular participants 

in meetings of the committee. Official functions of the committee included 

preparing USAREUR policy with regard to the military liaison missions, 

adapting plans to counter various actions of the Soviet mission, and responding 

to protests filed by the Soviet authorities. Unspoken and unofficial was the 

additional function of recommending to the U.S. mission those areas in which 

they were to focus their efforts to gather information.52

Both sides were careful not to take actions so serious that they might be 

deemed justification for abrogating the agreement. Reciprocity became the most 

important theme in dealing with each other’s liaison teams. When, in August 

1952, the Soviets declared three U.S. mission members persona non grata and 

expelled them from East Germany, the Americans reciprocated by relieving 

three members of the Soviet Military Mission in Frankfurt. When the Soviets 

denied the American chief of mission access to a crossing point more convenient 

than the Helmstedt checkpoint, the Americans denied a similar request from 

the Soviet mission at their earliest opportunity. At times, the policy seemed 

to get in the way of effective liaison between the two sides. In June 1953, an 

exasperated Colonel Schanze wrote to the chief of the USAREUR civil affairs 

division that he needed help in reining in the actions of the U.S. military police 

50 Ltr, Col August E. Schanze, Ch of Mission, to Col Gen Semion Ivanov, Dep Ch of Staff, 

Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, 21 Mar 1952, Entry 429, AG Command Reports, 1949–1954, RG 407, NACP; Seman, “Cold War Intelligence,” p. 35. 51 Memo, Capt Richard H. Wendland, Adj, U.S. Military Liaison Mission, for Dir, USAREUR 

Civil Affairs Div, 22 Sep 1952, sub: Stars and Stripes Story, Entry 429, AG Command Reports, 

1949–1954, RG 407, NACP. 52 Memos, Brig Gen Mark McClure, Dir of Intel, for Ch of Staff, 17 Sep 1952, sub: Establishing Mechanism for Handling Soviet Mission Problems; and Maj Gen Edward T. Williams, Ch 

of Staff, for Staff, 7 Oct 1952, sub: USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. Both in 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
168 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and the West German police against members of the Soviet mission. Each 

time that he went to the Soviets to complain about the way his personnel had 

been treated, he said, he found that the Western police had done something to 

completely nullify his complaints. The end result, he concluded, was that they 

were annoying the Soviets and causing them to submit his own personnel to 

longer and more stressful detentions.53

Although the expansion of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission’s intelligence 

role downgraded the liaison function to secondary status, the responsibilities 

did not disappear entirely and, in fact, also contributed to the overall picture of 

Soviet outlook and intentions. Mission members used their periodic contact with 

Soviet senior officers to develop biographic sketches of each officer and to elicit 

as much as possible their views on current events and the East-West relationship. 

In addition to those contacts brought about by professional requirements, each 

side also hosted social events designed to foster improved relations between 

the two forces. The U.S. mission hosted three large functions at the Potsdam 

House each year. These included a celebration commemorating the anniversary 

of the meeting of U.S. and Soviet forces at Torgau in 1945, an Independence 

Day picnic, and a Thanksgiving Day dinner. These were usually lavish events 

and often included wives and families. Engagements sponsored by the Soviet 

forces allowed U.S. mission officers to form impressions of morale-boosting 

activities among the Soviet troops, including housing conditions and provisions 

for dependents and the support and recreational facilities available to them.54

Even though U.S. and Soviet personnel formed few real friendships as a result 

of this regular interaction, both sides were able to maintain a cordial working 

relationship even during politically tense periods. The relationship survived any 

number of detentions and incidents, some of them quite serious, because each 

side recognized the useful arrangement it stood to lose if disagreements escalated 

to Washington and Moscow. Every now and then, however, signs of genuine 

kindness shined through the official rhetoric. In May 1953, Colonel Schanze 

learned through a casual conversation that Senior Lieutenant Makarov, an officer 

with the Soviet External Relations Branch, had developed a fondness for singer 

Patti Page’s rendition of “Doggie in the Window.” Schanze arranged through 

a colleague at the local armed forces radio station to send a copy of the record 

to Makarov.55

The relationship between the U.S. Mission and the East Germans was 

usually more troublesome. The East Germans held the opinion that cessation of 

53 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, U.S. Military Liaison Mission; Seman, “Cold War Intelligence,” 

p. 3. Ltrs, Schanze to Maj Litvin, External Relations Br, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces 

in Germany, 23 Jul 1952; and Schanze to Col Henry C. Burgess, Dep Ch, USAREUR Civil Affairs Div, 4 Jun 1953. Both in Entry 429, AG Command Reports, 1949–1954, RG 407, NACP. 54 Seman, “Cold War Intelligence,” pp. 38–40. 

55 Skowronek, “U.S.-Soviet Military Liaison in Germany Since 1947,” p. 110; Vodopyanov, 

A Watchful Eye Behind the Iron Curtain, p. 40; Ltr, Schanze to Senior Lt Makarov, External 

Relations Br, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, 28 May 1953, Entry 429, AG 

Command Reports, 1949–1954, RG 407, NACP. 
Strengthening the Alliance 16

major parts of the Potsdam Agreements, the breakdown of the Allied Control 

Council in Berlin, and the formation of two German states had voided the 

basis for the existence of the Allied missions on their territory. Although East 

Germany’s political leaders and, by extension, its police forces, denied the 

legitimacy of the U.S. mission, Soviet forces stationed throughout the country 

ensured enforcement of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. In most cases, East 

German authorities detaining U.S. mission personnel quickly turned them over 

to the Soviets, who then released the detainees once the pro forma warnings 

and lectures had been dispensed with.56

In retrospect, both the U.S. and the Soviet military missions served an 

important role in preventing minor disagreements from escalating into more 

dangerous confrontations. Their presence behind enemy lines gave assurances 

to each side that the other was not preparing for imminent hostilities. Initially 

designed to provide a channel for communications between the two occupation 

forces, the missions gradually evolved into a kind of mutual inspection system, 

which greatly reduced the possibility of armed conflict. The U.S. Mission served 

as a point of contact with the Soviets in East Germany that kept open a channel 

for quiet negotiations and helped to avoid irresponsible military actions by either 

side. Ultimately, the missions provided an example of East-West cooperation 

from which later efforts toward détente and arms control might evolve.57

Moving the Alliance Forward

The creation of a military command structure for NATO and the replenishment of allied armed forces were important initial steps in building security for 

Western Europe. They symbolized the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty 

from a political agreement to a true military alliance. At the same time, NATO 

military leaders understood that these preparations would be meaningless if they 

could not take further steps to close the gap between their military forces and 

those available to the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Despite the best of intentions, 

it was unlikely that the nations of Western Europe would be able to follow 

through on their commitments made at the Lisbon Conference. One source of 

military power, however, remained as yet, untapped. A rearmed West Germany 

might just provide the manpower and hardware to bring NATO’s forces into 

relative balance with those of the Soviet bloc. As the alliance moved forward, 

most realized that achieving that goal would not be easy.

56 Christopher Winkler, Anna Locher, and Christian Nuenlist, eds., Allied Military Liaison 

Missions, 1946–1990, 2005, Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Washington, D.C., p. 4. 57 Skowronek, “U.S.-Soviet Military Liaison in Germany Since 1947,” pp. 208–14; Vodopyanov, A Watchful Eye Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 60–72.

Despite the commitments the NATO allies had made at Lisbon in 1952, 

it was clear to alliance leaders that they would be unable to provide sufficient 

forces for a conventional defense of Western Europe without the participation of 

West Germany. Throughout the early 1950s, member nations struggled to find 

a way to integrate German manpower into NATO defenses without renewing 

fears of German militarism that had plunged Europe into war three times in 

the previous century. When, in 1954, the European Defense Community (EDC) 

failed to win approval in the French National Assembly, the Americans began 

a unilateral effort to bring a rearmed Germany into the NATO alliance.

Working Toward a German Contribution to Western European Defense

In retrospect, it is remarkable how quickly U.S. policy toward German 

rearmament underwent a complete reversal. Although a plan by Secretary 

of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau Jr. for the complete pastoralization of 

Germany had been rejected as overly harsh, demilitarization and control over 

heavy industry remained a key element of the Allied occupation during its initial 

years. In 1947, U.S. policy shifted to reconstruction and economic assistance 

as exemplified by the Marshall Plan. The Soviet blockade of Berlin beginning 

in June 1948 and extending through May 1949 stoked allied concerns for the 

security of Western Europe. When the United States joined the NATO alliance 

in April 1949, it committed its armed forces to a defense of Western Europe in 

the event of a Soviet attack.1

By 1950, U.S. military and political leaders had begun to consider seriously 

a shift in policy toward German rearmament. In February, the CIA reported 

that East German “Alert Police” were conducting intensive military training 

under the watchful eye of Soviet officers. This force of thirty-five thousand 

men was organized into battalion-size units and included specialized artillery, 

tank, signal, and engineer units. The CIA concluded that the only reasonable 

purpose for such a force was to serve as the nucleus for a restored East German 

Army. Although the West Germans had also established substantial police and 

security elements, albeit without tanks and artillery, American leaders denied 

1 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp. 102–08.

5

Rearming the Germ
172 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

any formal consideration of West German rearmament. On 2 May, however, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the secretary of Defense that “from the military 

point of view, the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of 

fundamental importance to the defense of Western Europe against the USSR.” 

Concerned that talk of German rearmament was premature and would disrupt 

Western European unity, President Truman was not open to the advice. In a 

16 June 1950 memo to the secretary of State, he referred to it as “militaristic” 

and “not realistic with present conditions.”2

The North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 cast the 

question of German rearmament into an entirely new light. Many American 

political leaders saw a connection between the attacks in Korea and the perilous 

situation in Western Europe. Sentiment grew in Congress to encourage the 

Germans to take a hand in their own defense. In September, as U.S. soldiers 

in Korea fought to maintain defensive positions around the port city of Pusan, 

the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, traveled to 

Washington to discuss with the president the creation of a West German defense 

force. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson announced his 

support for rearmament, saying that the United States needed to find a way for 

the Germans to contribute to the defense of Western Europe. By early 1952, 

General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, informed his senior staff that 

he regarded German rearmament and the integration of German forces into 

Western European defenses as his highest priority. As one German scholar later 

noted wryly, while the Korean War may not have been the father of German 

rearmament, it certainly proved to be the obstetrician.3

Evidence of U.S. military support for German rearmament began to 

appear in USAREUR’s burgeoning relationship with the West German border 

police, the Bundesgrenzschutz. The Department of the Army and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff discouraged any official USAREUR support for the German 

police that might be interpreted by the Soviets as encouraging some form of 

2 CIA, Probable Developments in Eastern Germany by the End of 1951, 28 Sep 1950, CIA 

Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH; Daniel 

De Luce, “Russians Train East German Army of 45,000,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

21 Feb 1950; “U.S. Lists 42,000 German Cops,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 Apr 1950; 

Ted Stoil, “McCloy Says No Bonn Army,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 22 Apr 1950. 

First quote from Rpt, Extracts of Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff With Respect to Western 

Policy Toward Germany, 8 Jun 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 4, Central and Eastern Europe; The 

Soviet Union, p. 687. Remaining quotes from Memorandum by the President to the Secretary 

of State, 16 Jun 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 4:688. 3 “McCloy View Sought on Arming Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Sep 

1950; “Acheson Supports Bonn Defense Role,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 Sep 1950; 

Benjamin Welles, “Eisenhower Urges Army Pact by May 1,” New York Times, 25 Mar 1952; 

Gunther Mai, Westliches Sichersheitpolitik im Kalten Krieg [Western Security Policy in the Cold 

War] (Boppard am Rhein, Germany: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1977), pp. 2–6; Andrew J. Birtle, 

Rearming the Phoenix: U.S. Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1960

(New York: Garland Publishing, 1991), p. 31.
Rearming the Germans 

remilitarization. Nonetheless, the command’s leaders and units steadily forged 

a close relationship that began to lay the groundwork for a new German Army.

In September 1950, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had taken 

the first steps to establish a federal police force that would provide customs 

and border control and serve as a counter to the East German paramilitary 

Volkspolizei. He envisioned a highly mobile force of some twenty thousand 

men, equipped with light arms and machine guns. German officials informed 

EUCOM that, under those limitations, the police force could in no way be 

considered an army, but they did allow that it might eventually become the 

nucleus of a German contribution to a European Defense Force.4

Regular communication and coordination between the organization and 

U.S. military units had begun almost immediately after its formation in 1951. 

In July, Maj. Gen. George P. Hayes, Deputy United States High Commissioner 

for Germany, relayed a request to the European Command for armored cars to 

be used by the border police. Hayes indicated that, while he would not approve 

the issue of the medium weight cars the Germans requested, he would agree to 

deliver up to sixty light M8 armored cars if EUCOM could provide them in a 

reasonable amount of time. He also asked EUCOM to supply a limited number 

of 60-mm. mortars with training ammunition. The headquarters responded 

that it had the equipment on hand and would turn it over to the Germans once 

it had approval from the Department of the Army. That came in November. 

When the German police began active patrolling along the border, early in 

1952, they had M8 armored cars at their disposal.5

Late in 1951 and early in 1952, representatives from EUCOM, the Seventh 

Army, and the Bundesgrenzschutz held a series of meetings to clarify the role 

the Germans would play in border security and to establish coordination 

measures between the three commands. Officially, they agreed that it was 

undesirable for the police to indulge in intelligence-gathering activities. Capt. 

J. R. Haines, Director, Frontier Inspection Service in the British Zone, pointed 

out, however, that the Germans were “keen young men” who would be eager 

to provide whatever assistance they could. Furthermore, they would be able to 

4 Allied High Commissioner for Germany, Political Affairs Committee, German Proposals for 

the Creation of a Federal Frontier Protection Authority, 20 Jan 1951, Entry 2051, USAREUR 

Operations, Planning, Organization, and Training Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, 

RG 549, NACP; Memo, Felicien A. Fraser, Special Agent, Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), 

for CG, Seventh Army, 15 Jan 1951, sub: Security Survey of US-Soviet Zone Border, 15th Constabulary Squadron Area, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 

549, NACP; HQ, EUCOM, Defense of Western Germany, 13 Sep 1950, Entry 2105, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 5 Ltr, Maj Gen George P. Hayes, Dep U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, to Gen Thomas 

T. Handy, CINC, EUCOM, 28 Jul 1951; Memos, Brig Gen Edward T. Williams, Dep Ch of 

Staff for Opns, for Dir, OPOT Div, 31 Jul 1951, sub: Equipping of German Border Police; and 

Lt Col Ritchie Garrison, EUCOM Intel Div, for Col Philp [sic], 7 Nov 1951, sub: Meeting with 

Representatives of the Bundesgrenzschutz. All in Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, 

Organization, and Training Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP.
174 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

collect intelligence by whatever means were at hand in the normal execution of 

their duties. Seeing an opportunity that was too good to pass up, the Germans 

and Americans set up procedures for passing information, both to the allied 

powers and to the German authorities.6

The meetings also established procedures for settling border violations. The 

German police took responsibility for control of illegal crossings by civilians 

and by military personnel from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other 

Eastern European countries. The Americans meanwhile retained responsibility 

for apprehending, disarming, and detaining Soviet military personnel violating 

the border. By February 1952, the German police and Seventh Army border 

units had established effective liaison and working relationships.7

As the relationship matured, in January 1952, the chief of the operations 

branch, Col. Guy L. Pace, complained about restrictions regarding the sharing 

of classified allied information with the German border guards. He argued that 

greater integration of operations between the Germans and Seventh Army could 

increase border security, improve the exchange of intelligence information, 

and eliminate misunderstandings between the two organizations. The Seventh 

Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Col. Charles H. Valentine, 

made an even more compelling argument. Anticipating that, in emergency 

operations, the border police would come under Seventh Army control with 

a clearly defined role in its overall mission, he asserted that USAREUR and 

the Seventh Army needed to be able to share classified plans and information 

with the Germans.8

At the same time, the Bundesgrenzschutz was itself developing a more martial 

orientation. Its organization followed familiar military patterns, with twelve 

battalions of four companies each. In addition, the Germans formed a naval unit 

for patrolling their coastlines and a technical battalion that included engineer, 

signal, and ordnance elements. The Germans established centralized schools to 

train officers, noncommissioned officers, vehicle drivers, radio operators, and 

technicians. All units trained initially with carbines, machine guns, and pistols, 

and with the light mortars and the M8 scout cars when they arrived. The U.S. 

command encouraged the Bundesgrenzschutz to use the American facilities as 

long as they did not interfere with the training of U.S. forces. To that end, a 

6 HQ, EUCOM, Minutes of Conference Held at Headquarters, Intelligence Division, Wahnerheide, 14 Nov 1951, Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training 

Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP. 7 Ltr, Federal Minister of Interior to Grenzschutz Liaison Ofcr, 10 Apr 1952; Memo, Lt 

Col Benjamin F. Taylor, Ch, Special Plans Br, for Ch, Opns Br, 8 Feb 1952, sub: West German 

Frontier Police. Both in Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training 

Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NADC. 8 Memos, Col Guy L. Pace, Ch, Opns Br, for Ch, Special Plans Br, 5 Jan 1952, sub: West 

German Frontier Police, Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training 

Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP; and Col Charles H. Valentine, 

Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, for Ch of Staff, sub: Items of Interest to the Headquarters for Discussion 

with USAREUR, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
Rearming the Germans 

liaison team located in Seventh Army headquarters coordinated the use of small 

arms ranges with them.9

Publicly, American forces remained reluctant to be seen as too closely 

associated with Bundesgrenzschutz training. When Germany’s minister of the 

interior requested a joint U.S.-German exercise in September 1952, for example, 

USAREUR headquarters declined. Responding to a Seventh Army request to 

participate, the command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. 

Robert G. Gard, wrote that extreme caution was to be the norm in any move 

that might be interpreted as an effort to develop the Bundesgrenzschutz into 

a paramilitary force. Although the proposed exercise involved only normal 

police functions, he continued, the mere participation of the United States 

could be interpreted as containing a hidden motive. Prudence, however, did 

not prevent USAREUR and Seventh Army from assisting the Germans in 

more surreptitious ways. The Seventh Army, for example, provided copies of 

its training manuals on civil disturbances, mountain operations, and operations 

against guerrilla forces for use in training.10

During the next year, the relationship between the Americans and the 

Bundesgrenzschutz grew less circumspect. On 26 March 1953, the Germans 

conducted an exercise at the Wildflecken training area in which the U.S. 373d 

Armored Infantry Battalion participated. The event featured a series of attacks 

on a pillbox by Bundesgrenzschutz infantry and armored cars, supported by 

U.S. tanks and heavy mortars. Observers included Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, 

U.S. VII Corps Commander, and Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer of the U.S. 

Southern Area Command. Brig. Gen. Einar B. Gjelstein, Seventh Army Chief 

of Staff, expressed concern over the implied approval of such obvious military 

training, but allowed it to proceed lest a cancellation cause more adverse 

publicity than the exercise itself would generate. In his report to USAREUR, 

he said he believed that no harm had been done. Ironically, the Germans had 

also invited Gjelstein’s superior, Seventh Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Charles 

L. Bolte, to witness the training two weeks earlier. The general expressed his 

written regrets to the Bundesgrenzschutz commander, adding that he looked 

forward to attending similar functions in the future.11

9 Memos, Garrison for Philp [sic], 7 Nov 1951, sub: Meeting with Representatives of the 

Bundesgrenzschutz; and Capt John E. Kempf, Liaison Ofcr, for CG, Seventh Army, 21 Apr 

1952, sub: Use of Rifle Ranges by Bundesgrenzschutz, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, 

RG 338, NACP. 10 Memos, Brig Gen Einar B. Gjelstein, Ch of Staff, for CINCUSAREUR, 20 Sep 1952, sub: 

Bundesgrenzschutz Request for Joint Exercise; Brig Gen Robert G. Gard, Dep Ch of Staff for 

Opns, for CG, Seventh Army, 21 Nov 1952, sub: Bundesgrenzschutz Request for Joint Exercise; and 1st Lt Harry L. McFarland, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, Seventh Army, 28 Nov 1952, sub: 

Use of Field Manuals by German BGS. All in Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, 

Training, RG 549, NACP. 11 Ltrs, Gjelstein, Ch of Staff, to Maj Gen Edward T. Williams, 6 Apr 1953; Cdr Grasser, 

Border Security Office South, to Lt Gen Charles L. Bolte, Seventh Army Cdr, 9 Mar 1953; and 

Bolte to Grasser, 18 Mar 1953. All in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
176 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

USAREUR headquarters tried to hold the line on further militarization 

of the German police. In a letter to the deputy U.S. High Commissioner for 

Germany, Samuel Reber Jr., General Gard recommended that a request by the 

German chancellor for 37-mm. antitank guns, heavier mortars, and aircraft be 

disapproved. He added that it was no longer possible to provide excess military 

equipment to the Germans as the command had committed all excess stocks 

and spare parts to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and earmarked 

them for contingents of allied defense forces.12

As the inevitability of eventual West German sovereignty became clear, 

Army leaders no longer saw any need for subtlety in the USAREUR relationship with the Bundesgrenzschutz. Just one month later, an officer from the 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment reported on a German maneuver he had 

observed. He described a controlled exercise in which the police units operated in battalion- and regimental-size units in the attack and on the defense. 

Their tactical performance, he said, was splendid. “Their operations strongly 

resembled those of the best World War II German infantry.” He noted that 

their combat effectiveness was only impaired by the absence of heavy weapons, 

adequate communications equipment, and a developed supply system. He 

concluded that all Bundesgrenzschutz troops bore the hallmarks of first-class 

professional units.13

The ease and swiftness with which the Germans transformed the 

Bundesgrenzschutz into a military organization in all but name indicates the 

degree to which its members were already prepared for service. Many were World 

War II veterans who had been military professionals for most of their lives. It 

seems clear that USAREUR and the Seventh Army were willing participants in 

this process, even though it violated guidance from the Department of the Army 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nonetheless, the soldiers in Europe recognized 

who the Bundesgrenzschutz were and what they were going to become, and 

they played an important role in the transition.

Designing a Structure for German Integration— 

The European Defense Community

Before the Western Allies could consider the addition of German military 

units to their overall defense force, it was first necessary to create a structure 

where the Germans could be integrated into the force without rekindling fears 

of militarism. Several nations who had so recently suffered at the hands of the 

German Wehrmacht were more than a little reluctant to see it reborn in any form.

12 Ltr, Gard, Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, to Samuel Reber Jr., Dep U.S. High Commissioner 

for Germany, 29 Apr 1953, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 

549, NACP. 13 Memo, Lt Col Dewitt C. Armstrong III, Cdr, 1st Bn, 2d Armd Cav, for Cdr, 2d Armd 

Cav, 9 Oct 1954, sub: Observation of Bundesgrenzschutz Maneuver, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1966, RG 338, NACP.
Rearming the Germans 

Whatever reservations about renewed German militarism some Western 

European nations might have had, the case for rearming the Germans had become 

too compelling to ignore. If the Soviet Army was to attack, all concerned preferred 

a military strategy that included a strong initial stand along a line as far to the 

east as possible, preferably on the Elbe River which ran through East Germany. 

Allied military leaders doubted that NATO could muster the forces necessary to 

defend the line without resorting to German rearmament. With the Americans 

unable or unwilling to increase their commitment, only the Germans could make 

up the shortfall. In addition to the nation’s soldiers, the alliance anticipated the 

support of German industry as well. U.S. Ambassador to France David K. E. 

Bruce wrote to the secretary of state that it would be ridiculous for the Germans 

to be free to manufacture consumer goods for their own profit while the rest of 

Europe was making sacrifices to strengthen the defense effort.14

Despite the growing clamor in the United States and among NATO military 

leaders for German rearmament, many Europeans, particularly the French, were 

reluctant to remilitarize their former foe. In October 1950, only slightly more 

than five years had passed since the end of World War II. Heads of government 

throughout Europe had suffered at the hands of Nazi aggression. The French 

Defense Minister, Jules Moch, whose son had been garroted by the Germans 

during the war for aiding the resistance, threatened to resign and bring down 

the French government if German participation in Western European defense 

was allowed. Moch warned that a rearmed Germany would soon abandon the 

Western alliance and side with the superior military strength of the Soviets.15

Nonetheless, the French realized that they could not long resist American 

pressure to add German divisions to the defenses of Western Europe. On 24 

October 1950, French Premier Rene Pleven presented to the French Assembly a 

plan to integrate German units into a new, experimental NATO force. German 

manpower, no larger than battalion size in strength, would be assigned to cadres 

withdrawn from existing French divisions to form new, composite units. As 

part of his proposal, Pleven asked for guarantees from the United States and 

Great Britain that they would not allow Germany to create a national army. 

Defense Minister Moch also made it clear that France would not tolerate a 

German Defense Ministry, a general staff, or German divisions.16

14 Executive Secretary, National Security Council, Definition of United States Policy on 

Problems of the Defense of Europe and the German Contribution, 2 Aug 1951, Pentagon Library Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Doris M. Condit, History of 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 2, The Test of War, 1950–1953 (hereafter cited as The 

Test of War) (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), p. 

317; “West Rushes Plans for Europe Force, Including Germans,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 5 Dec 1950. 15 Condit, The Test of War, p. 321; Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 

17 Oct 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 3, Western Europe, p. 384. 16 Condit, The Test of War, p. 326; Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in 

France, 27 Oct 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 3:410–12; Harold Callender, “France Is Aroused by Fears 

of Armed Germany,” New York Times, 17 Feb 1952.
178 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

American diplomats and senior military staff recognized immediately the 

difficulties inherent in such a plan. If German participation was to be dependent 

upon an integrated European defense establishment, it would be subject to 

innumerable delays while the allies debated and negotiated the details of that 

organization. Almost all of the NATO military leaders agreed that attempting to 

form effective military forces by mixing regiments, battalions, or companies of 

different nationalities was militarily unsound and could not produce a fighting 

army. In addition, the approach seemed to consign Germany permanently to 

a second-class status with no control over its military units once they had been 

raised and turned over to the European Defense Community, as the proposed 

organization came to be called. In describing the proposal, Secretary Acheson 

observed that while the German people might be willing to participate in a 

true European army in which all nations were treated equally, they would not 

participate in a plan where they were openly and blatantly treated as inferiors. 

Indeed, one German weekly newspaper observed that what the French truly 

wanted was German forces superior to the Soviet Army, but inferior to the 

French Army.17

French reluctance was not the only obstacle on the path to German 

rearmament. Many Germans themselves were reluctant to remilitarize. Some 

feared that restoration of a German army would only provoke a Soviet attack, 

resulting in the complete devastation of their homeland. Others had been 

genuinely relieved to be rid of the Prussian-based military caste and worried 

that rearmament would resurrect the remnants of that military state. Perhaps 

the most prevalent concern was that, by restoring their armed forces and casting 

their lot so firmly with the West, they would indefinitely postpone the national 

reunification that remained the strongest political motivation in Germany. This 

desire was so obvious to Western analysts that some expressed unease that, as 

the Germans’ influence and strength within the alliance grew, they might argue 

that NATO’s objectives should extend to the reunification of their nation.18

Of particular concern to those eager to incorporate German soldiers into the 

defenses of Western Europe was the attitude of those officers and men who had 

fought in the Wehrmacht during World War II. In many cases the initial response 

had been described as ohne mich (without me). However, encouraged by former 

leaders such as Hasso E. F. von Manteuffel, Franz Halder, and Hans Speidel, 

this reluctance began to change. One by one, various veterans’ organizations 

began to express their grudging support for German participation in Western 

17 Fursdon, The European Defense Community, pp. 89–92; Alfred Grosser, “Germany and 

France: A Confrontation,” in France Defeats EDC, ed. Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New 

York: Praeger, 1957); Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 27 Oct 1950, 

in FRUS, 1950, 3:410–12; C. L. Sulzberger, “Alternative to Europe Army Held a Big Problem 

for U.S.,” New York Times, 5 Dec 1951. 18 HQ, USAREUR, HICOG-CINCUSAREUR Monthly Conference, 17 Jan 1955, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; CIA, German Attitudes 

on Rearmament, 15 May 1951, Pentagon Library, Declassified Documents Reference System, 

copy in Historians files, CMH.
Rearming the Germans 

defense. Although many still expressed fears that they might, at some point, be 

abandoned by their erstwhile allies, those concerns were overridden by a desire 

not to be left out of the planning process altogether.19

On 27 May 1952, after more than a year of negotiations and under strong 

encouragement from the United States, representatives from France, Italy, West

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the European 

Defense Community Pact, which began the process of integrating the military 

and economic resources of Western Europe. The resulting structure, the 

European Defense Community, would strengthen NATO and support the 

sort of internationally integrated military force that would ease Germany’s 

transition into the alliance. Under the terms of the agreement the Germans 

could organize up to twelve divisions each with a wartime strength of twelve 

thousand to fifteen thousand men. These units would combine with similar-size 

elements from other EDC members to form integrated corps. With the signing 

of the pact, the nations entered a two-year period of planning for military and 

economic integration. This allowed time for the various national parliaments 

to debate and then to ratify the treaty.20

The delegations that drew up the treaty formed an ad hoc body, the 

European Defense Community Interim Committee, which continued to meet to 

study and resolve any problems that might arise during the ratification period. 

The group contained four subcommittees: military, economic, political, and 

legal. Each would develop basic plans in its area of responsibility for use in the 

event that all nations ratified the agreement. In order to maintain liaison between 

his headquarters and the interim commission, the U.S. EUCOM commander, 

General Ridgway, created a small staff known as Detachment A, which would 

later form the nucleus of a Military Assistance Advisory Group to Germany. 

For the most part, the group’s contribution was limited to providing information on U.S. military organization and procedures to German members of the 

commission. Because of French reluctance to establish closer contact with the 

Germans, however, each potential subject for discussion had to be cleared by 

the entire commission before it could be discussed with the Germans.21 

19 Extract from Information Memo 84, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) 

Ofc of Intel, Aug 1951, sub: Veterans Attitude Toward Rearmament, Entry 2050, USAREUR 

G3 OPOT, Combat Developments Branch, Psy War Section, 1950–52, RG 549, NACP. This 

subject is addressed in detail in Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and 

the Debate on Rearmament,1949–1959 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), and Jay Lockenour, 

Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945–1955

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001). 20 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 

1955, pp. 1–3, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Condit, The Test of War, p. 

391; “Bonn Officials Report 30,000 Applications to Join Proposed Army,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 6 Jan 1953. 21 Msg, HICOG, signed Reber, to State Dept, 12 Jan 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, HICOG-CINCUSAREUR 

Monthly Conference, 17 Jan 1955; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for 

German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 1–3.
180 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

For the United States, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, 

had responsibility for administering the Mutual Security Program in Europe 

and for preliminary plans regarding military assistance to West Germany. He 

delegated the task of providing facilities required by initial German training 

cadres to his component commanders, the commanders in chief of the 

USAREUR, USAFE, and USNAVFORGER.22

The supreme allied commander delegated to the commander, Central 

Army Group, responsibility for coordinating stationing plans for German 

contingents in the U.S. and French zones based on Allied Land Forces, Central 

Europe’s designs for deploying those units. To that end, on 17 March 1953, 

Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, in his role as commander in chief, Central Army 

Group, hosted a conference in Heidelberg to begin developing those plans. 

He directed separate working groups from the U.S. Army, Europe, and the 

French Forces in Germany to study the availability of installations, facilities, 

and training areas for use by German contingents. The Central Army Group 

(CENTAG) headquarters would monitor their work and keep Headquarters, 

Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, and the European Defense Community 

Interim Committee informed of their progress.23

At this initial meeting, representatives for both sides considered how to 

reconcile the needs of the future German forces for barracks and training 

space with the requirements of the American troops already present. Guidance 

from the Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE), emphasized that the 

positioning of the combat elements of the proposed German forces had to 

conform with already approved deployment plans, while service elements might 

be stationed elsewhere. The proposed German force was represented by officials 

from the Dienststelle Blank, an office named for its chief, Theodor Blank, who 

the chancellor had designated to deal with questions related to military forces 

in Germany. The chief German delegate, Col. Bogislaw Von Bonin, described 

a two-phased approach to the activation of German contingents. Cadre units 

would form first. Once fully trained, they would become the nucleus for full 

divisions with supporting troops. The USAREUR representative, Lt. Col. Jack 

A. Requarth, cautioned that American requirements for troop housing and 

training areas had themselves yet to be fully met. While he acknowledged the 

22 Memo, Maj Gen Claude B. Ferenbaugh, Ch of Staff, for USAREUR Staff, 28 Oct 1953, 

sub: Policy on Requests or Queries Concerning the German Contingent of the European Defense 

Forces, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 

1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 359–60, Historians files, CMH. 23 Memos, Ferenbaugh for USAREUR Staff, 28 Oct 1953, sub: Policy on Requests or Queries Concerning the German Contingent of the European Defense Forces; and Col Lynwood 

D. Lott, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 27 Mar 1953, sub: Minutes of the Central 

Army Group Conference Conducted at Heidelberg on 17 Mar 1953 Relative to Initiation of 

Studies on the Stationing of EDC (German) Land Forces in the United States and French Zones 

of Germany, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP.
Rearming the Germans 

German force’s needs in principle, he argued that barracks and training areas 

might not be available in all the locations the Germans wanted.24

That warning notwithstanding, the United States tried to make the program 

work. During 13–18 April, a team of personnel from USAREUR and the 

Dienststelle Blank conducted a detailed survey of installations and training areas 

throughout the U.S. Zone that USAREUR had designated for possible use by 

the Germans. It found a new camp at the U.S. training area at Grafenwöhr that 

could accommodate up to five thousand troops and be available by October 

1953. Another site at Hohenfels could accommodate around twenty-five 

hundred men. The team also investigated a number of smaller billet areas, most 

of them former Wehrmacht kasernes occupied by American units or German 

civilians. The Americans agreed to study the requests and to decide which of 

the facilities could be turned over to the Germans. The two sides continued 

to meet on a monthly basis for the next year, identifying potential sites to be 

transferred to the German armed forces and trying to anticipate and resolve 

problems that would arise with the implementation of the European Defense 

Community.25

In June 1954, the Germans unveiled a plan that would accommodate all of 

their forces. It depended on several factors: the number of facilities relinquished 

by the U.S. and French forces, the acquisition of necessary land from the 

Federal Republic, and the availability of construction funds. Initially, the new 

units would occupy rebuilt Wehrmacht kasernes as well as some tent camps 

so that troops could be near training sites. The construction of additional 

maneuver areas in Germany would be contingent on EDC approval as well as 

the availability of necessary funds. Until the Germans could construct their 

own training areas, they expressed the hope that USAREUR could fill in the 

gap. As the summer drew to a close, the two sides moved closer and closer to 

an agreement that would facilitate the activation and stationing of the new 

German Army.26

By the summer of 1954, only the French had failed to ratify the European 

Defense Community agreement. Opposition in that country had intensified 

throughout 1953, so much so that none of the successive French governments 

that held office during that time dared to submit the treaty to the National 

Assembly. Influential in their opposition were General Charles de Gaulle, who 

had left office but nonetheless wielded considerable personal influence, and 

24 Memo, Lott for USAREUR Distribution, 27 Mar 1953, sub: Minutes of the Central Army 

Group Conference Conducted at Heidelberg on 17 Mar 1953 Relative to Initiation of Studies on 

the Stationing of EDC (German) Land Forces in the United States and French Zones of Germany. 25 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 360–61; Memo, Lott, 

Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 28 Apr 1953, sub: Report of Third Meeting of 

USAREUR Working Group on EDC (German) Deployment, Entry 2105, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Bolte, USAREUR Cdr, to James B. Conant, 

U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 7 Mar 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 26 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 360–61.
182 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Marshal Alphonse P. Juin, the commander in chief of NATO’s central region. 

Although the French insisted that Germany’s armed forces be under European 

control, many in France were unwilling to submit their own military to the 

same requirements. Meanwhile, French Communists exploited fears of German 

and American intentions and portrayed Soviet intentions as peaceful. Premier 

Pierre Mendes-France finally put the treaty before the National Assembly on 

28 August 1954. It was voted down two days later by a margin of 319–264. The 

European Defense Community was dead.27

USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance

In the wake of the French rejection, officials in the U.S. Department of 

Defense decided to accelerate the process of creating a new German armed force 

with or without French cooperation. The Americans assumed that, although 

the French had rejected the European Defense Community plan, they would 

not actively oppose a joint Anglo-American effort. As the predominant U.S. 

military headquarters in Germany, it would fall to USAREUR, in coordination 

with a nascent German defense establishment, to prepare the detailed plans 

that would begin the process of creating a new German Army.

On 2 September 1954, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson 

directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare recommendations for U.S. military 

assistance to West Germany. The Department’s guidance to the Joint Chiefs 

included assumptions that force totals for the new German military would 

closely resemble the goals originally proposed in the European Defense 

Community treaty. As such, Germany’s armed forces would be limited to an 

overall strength of 12 divisions, 1,326 aircraft, and 300 naval vessels. United 

States military assistance to the Germans would include preparation and 

training that began at the cadre stage and extended to the attainment of combat 

ready units.28

Since the German armed forces would join the defense scheme of the West 

through NATO rather than the European Defense Community, the United 

27 Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954, pp. 306–08; Telegram, The 

Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State, 31 Aug 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, 

vol. 5, Western European Security, pt. 1, pp. 1092–94; Memorandum by the Second Secretary of 

Embassy in France: Post-Mortem on the Rejection of the EDC Treaty, 16 Sep 1954, in FRUS, 

1952–1954, vol. 5, Western European Security, pt. 1, pp. 1094–1113. For a detailed discussion of 

French rejection, see Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defense Community: AngloAmerican Relations and the Crisis of European Defense, 1950–1955 (London: Macmillan, 2000); 

Fursdon, The European Defense Community; and Lerner and Aron, eds., France Defeats EDC. 28 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, 

pp. 3–5; Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff for Sec Def, 22 Sep 1954, sub; Strategic Issues Confronting the U.S. in Europe, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in 

Historians files, CMH; “Allies Sign Accords to End Occupation, Arm Bonn as West Defense 

Partner,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Oct 1954; Arthur Gavshon, “New Pacts Spell 

Out West Germany’s Defense Role,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 25 Oct 1954.
Rearming the Germans 

States, as the leading NATO power, assumed the primary role in their formation 

and training. The United States was also the only NATO member in a position 

to provide the massive amounts of arms and equipment needed to get the new 

German formations off the ground. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended 

that the Department of the Army assign overall responsibility for training the 

German armed forces to the commander of U.S. European Command, who 

would delegate specific responsibilities to his component commanders.29

With a German contribution to Western defense moving toward realization, 

NATO military leaders discussed with members of the Dienststelle Blank the 

composition of the new German Army. Original German planning called for 

twelve tank divisions, organized into six corps, with the potential to expand 

to eighteen divisions. Officers from SHAPE headquarters argued for a more 

balanced force. For the six divisions earmarked for the Center Army Group, 

General McAuliffe preferred an organization composed of four infantry 

divisions and two armored divisions. The Northern Army Group commander, 

British General Sir Richard N. Gale, agreed with McAuliffe’s proposal, but 

preferred smaller division organizations than those envisioned by the Germans 

and the Americans. Both officers requested additional information on German 

tactical and operational concepts before commenting further on the potential 

organization of forces.30

The Germans did indeed have some thoughts about NATO’s strategic and 

operational concepts. In a 1948 paper summarizing the West’s need for German 

participation, former Wehrmacht general Hans Speidel had said that allied 

weaknesses made a defense along the Rhine, let alone the Elbe, questionable. 

German divisions would offset this weakness, but only with a change in strategy. 

In another memo drafted by Speidel and another former Wehrmacht general, 

Adolph Heusinger, the Germans rejected the concept of a defense along the 

Rhine because it would mean the abandonment of Western Germany, Austria, 

and Switzerland to the Soviets. The paper, later endorsed by Adenauer, made 

clear that the change in strategy would be the cost of German participation in 

Western European defense.31

In November 1954, the Germans presented a new plan for their eventual 

contribution to the NATO defense system. It was based on an army consisting of 

six infantry and six armored divisions, as well as three armored, two mountain, 

29 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 

1955, pp. 3–5; John A. Reed Jr., Germany and NATO (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

University Press, 1987), pp. 69–70. 30 Stanley M. Karanowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

National Defense University Press, 1982), pp. 41–42; David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: 

West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 

Press, 1996), pp. 49–50; MFR, Brig Gen John C. Oakes, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, sub: Meeting 

Between General McAuliffe and General White, G3, SHAPE on the Speidel Plan, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 31 Large, Germans to the Front, pp. 49–50; Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, 

and the Debate on Rearmament, pp. 34–36.
184 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and two airborne brigades. Under this proposal, the training period for the new 

German Army would expand from twenty-four to thirty-six months. Over the 

first eight months, USAREUR instructors would focus primarily on training 

German officers and noncommissioned officers. After that, various units would 

become partially manned by the phasing in of volunteers and, somewhat later, 

draftees. By the end of the process, the field army would reach its full strength 

of 375,000 men. With this in mind, in December 1954, General Gruenther, 

Supreme Allied Commander, in his role as the commander of the U.S. European 

Command, assigned to USAREUR the responsibility for training and assistance 

to the entire German Army.32

The USAREUR staff was already planning for that mission. Its assistant 

chief of staff for operations had assumed overall supervision of the project, 

which the Plans Section of the Center Army Group had transferred to the 

USAREUR Operations Staff’s Advance Planning and Training Section. 

Meanwhile, USAREUR’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj. Gen. 

Robert G. Gard, had directed all of the command’s staff divisions to begin 

developing plans based on their areas of responsibility. With this initial work 

in place, USAREUR was prepared to move forward with the task almost as 

soon as it received the assignment.33

After several exchanges of draft proposals, on 1 December 1954, the 

commander in chief, U.S. European Command, issued a letter of instruction 

defining USAREUR’s role in the program. For the most part, this was to consist 

of providing training for German cadres and specialists, furnishing logistical 

support, and administering the project’s budget. To facilitate German planning, 

USAREUR was to supply information and technical advice in accordance 

with current security regulations and U.S. EUCOM directives. German 

instructor cadres were to be trained by U.S. personnel from by the Department 

of the Army and USAREUR. The U.S. Army, Europe, was also to allocate 

spaces for German students in its branch and technical schools. Until such 

time as the German Army’s logistical organization was capable of assuming 

responsibility, USAREUR was also to provide assistance in the reception, 

storage, maintenance, and distribution of vehicles, weapons, and equipment 

that arrived as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Although 

USAREUR took the position that it could not assume any tasks that would 

affect its combat efficiency, U.S. EUCOM responded that it had no authority 

32 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 325–26, Historians files, 

CMH; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 

1955, pp. 13–14; Reed, Germany and NATO, pp. 69–70. 33 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, 

pp. 13–14; Reed, Germany and NATO, pp. 69–70; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, 

USAREUR, pp. 323–24; Memo, Maj Gen Robert G. Gard, Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, for Asst 

Chs of Staff, 2 Sep 1954, sub: Planning in USAREUR for Assistance in the Formation of the 

German Army, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
Rearming the Germans 

to rescind or mitigate any of the taskings but would forward to the Department 

of the Army requests for additional funding, personnel, or resources.34

Final Plans for Training the New German Army

By the end of 1954, the U.S. Army in Europe had made substantial progress 

in preparing to help train and develop the new German Army. Assuming that 

mission, however, required the USAREUR headquarters to establish the 

staff and infrastructure that could coordinate the plans and turn them into a 

functioning program. Once in place, those organizations cooperated with their 

German counterparts to work out the remaining details and to develop a final 

plan for training.

U.S. EUCOM had originally directed USAREUR to submit a final draft 

plan for training assistance by 1 February 1955. To coordinate preparation 

of the program, USAREUR established an advanced planning and training 

section within the training branch of the assistant chief of staff for operations. 

The Department of the Army assigned Col. John A. Heintges to head the 

organization. Toward the end of December, staff sections responsible for 

portions of the USAREUR document realized that they needed clarification of 

corresponding German plans before they could complete their work. German 

plans, for example, called for complete battalions of infantry, armor, and field 

artillery to demonstrate American tactics and doctrine. Heintges realized that 

such a requirement could never be supported. To resolve such differences, 

in January 1955, USAREUR asked for and received an extension for the 

submission of the final draft plan.35

Titled the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, the final draft was 

complete by 17 March, with concurrence by contributing general, technical, 

and administrative divisions. It opened by restating the mission as USAREUR 

understood it. In addition to providing training assistance during the first formal 

year of the program, the command would use Mutual Defense Assistance 

Program funds to render all required logistical support. It expected to continue 

34 Msgs, USAREUR to DA, for G–3, 7 Sep 1954, Reference Number SX–2084; and USAREUR 

to CINCEUR, 14 Oct 1954, Reference Number S–2695. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, RG 549, NADC. Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, 

p. 325. 35 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 

1955, pp. 22–25. Memos, Maj Gen Elwyn D. Post, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Dep Ch of Staff 

for Opns, 2 Feb 1955, sub: Outline Plan for USAREUR German Army Assistance; and Brig Gen 

John C. Oakes, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 9 Mar 1955, sub: Activities 

of the Advanced Planning Training Section—Period 20 January to 9 Mar 1955. Both in Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. Interv, Maj Jack A. 

Pellicci with Lt Gen John A. Heintges, 1974, p. 473, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI.
186 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the effort until the Germans were capable of training their own units, with the 

objective of phasing out U.S. involvement by 1 April 1957.36

In order to oversee the implementation of the plan and to coordinate 

training, USAREUR established the Control Office, German Training 

Assistance Group (GTAG). This group—consisting of twelve officers, three 

enlisted men, and three Department of the Army civilians—was actually a 

redesignation of the advanced planning and training section that had operated 

under Colonel Heintges and had developed the support plan. The office would 

also serve as the single point of contact between the USAREUR commander and 

the MAAG, Germany, on all matters pertaining to the provision of assistance 

for the German Army.37

The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Germany, came into existence 

in December 1955 after the German government ratified a formal military 

assistance agreement with the United States. Headquartered in Bonn, the 

group initially consisted of members of the old Advance Planning Group that 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established under the U.S. European Command 

to coordinate military assistance planning with the Germans after the collapse 

of the European Defense Community. Once formalized as a MAAG, the 

organization added U.S. Air Force and Navy components in a fashion similar 

to other European assistance groups. In addition to providing a direct link 

between senior U.S. military headquarters and the Dienststelle Blank, the office 

responsible for planning the new German armed forces, MAAG, Germany’s 

mission was to assist the German government in preparing requests for aid 

under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Under its first 

commander, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group, Germany, reported to the U.S. ambassador on matters related 

to the overall mutual security program and its coordination with American 

foreign policy. The group reported to the U.S. European Command on the 

strictly military aspects of the program.38

Once training began, twenty-two training and maintenance teams would 

operate under the supervision of the Control Office, German Training Assistance 

Group. Fifteen would provide training directly to German personnel. These 

included armor, armored reconnaissance, armored infantry, field artillery, 

antiaircraft artillery, infantry, antitank, engineer, aviation, military police, 

ordnance, quartermaster, medical, transportation, and signal teams. Their 

primary mission would be instruction on U.S. weapons and equipment. In 

addition, teams would offer advice and guidance on U.S. organization and 

tactics, training, staff procedures, and field communications. Each team would 

include individuals with the sort of military specialty skills and experience 

36 HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 29 Mar 1955, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, NACP. 37 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 

1955, pp. 24–25; HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 29 Mar 1955. 38 Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix, pp. 315–16.
Rearming the Germans 

necessary to handle instruction on the great variety of U.S. weapons and 

equipment the German Army would receive. Separate engineer maintenance, 

ordnance maintenance, and signal maintenance teams would help to repair and 

keep in running order vehicles and equipment used by the Germans and the 

trainers. As a secondary responsibility, when requested, they would also provide 

guidance to the Germans on maintenance problems. Two teams, the Materiel 

Reception Groups North and South, helped organize storage depots receiving 

Mutual Defense Assistance Program items while supplying on-the-job training 

for German depot personnel. They also provided advice on U.S. maintenance 

and logistics practices. A driver instruction team trained tracked-vehicle drivers 

and a military academy team conducted training on U.S. weapons, equipment, 

and tactics for both the German Instructor Course and the German Military 

Academy.39

Personnel to man the training groups would come from several sources. 

The U.S. Army, Europe, would provide 76 officers, 365 enlisted men, and 1 

civilian, most of whom would come from the Seventh Army. An additional 94 

officers, 49 enlisted men, and 2 civilians would be from the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group, Germany. The remaining U.S. personnel, 54 officers and 213 

enlisted men, would arrive on temporary duty from the United States. One 

hundred interpreters recruited from the German population would also assist 

the Control Office and teams.40

In addition to the teams, the plan also provided for on-the-job training with 

U.S. units and for Germans to attend USAREUR schools. It also described a 

series of demonstrations by American units, including presentations on most of 

the vehicles and weapons used by the U.S. Army. The command designed the 

demonstrations with a view toward the rank of the invited observers. Generals 

and senior commanders witnessed operations suitable to their levels of authority. 

Junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and other enlisted personnel attended 

programs more suitable to their needs.41

As USAREUR prepared to begin training, it became apparent that problems 

still remained. The command had made no provisions in the original plan for 

German language courses for American personnel because it had assumed that 

civilian interpreters would participate. As preparations continued, however, 

officers in the Control Office recognized that even if interpreters were present, 

ignorance of the German language on the part of the trainers would seriously 

diminish the effectiveness of the entire program. As a result, USAREUR 

proposed to the Department of the Army that more than one hundred trainers, 

especially MAAG personnel, should receive a sixteen-week course in German at 

the Army language school in Monterey, California. A lack of funds, however, 

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.; Memo, Capt Harold A. Van Hout, Asst Sec of the General Staff, for SGS, 1 Jun 

1955, sub: Commanders Conference—31 May 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
188 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and the inability of the school to admit such a large body of students on short 

notice precluded this. Instead, USAREUR proposed to send the group to its 

Intelligence School in Oberammergau, Germany, for a twelve-week course. 

The Department of the Army approved this approach, and all of the students 

were able to complete the course before beginning their training assignments. 

The U.S. Army also went ahead with its plan to hire civilian interpreters and 

added them through its regular personnel channels.42

Another challenge arose in December 1955 when the Department of the 

Army informed USAREUR that, except for the complement from the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group, all personnel requirements would have to come 

from the command’s own resources. On the basis of this decision, USAREUR 

revised the personnel section of the plan and informed the Seventh Army, 

the Communications Zone, and the technical service commands of the new 

requirements. At the same time, the commands received more specific guidance 

on selection criteria. Candidates for both officer and enlisted slots had to 

demonstrate high moral character and leadership traits, professional competence in their assigned military specialties, and outstanding ability as military 

instructors. Although proficiency in the German language was desirable, it 

was not a prerequisite. To ensure that all of these requirements were met, the 

USAREUR commander directed that a general from each command interview 

each enlisted man selected from his command before placing him on a team.43

Another problem facing the U.S. planners was an inability to release 

classified information to the Germans. This occurred because security clearance 

procedures were based on NATO standards, with the Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Powers, Europe, retaining final authority over who could have access 

to classified information. By December 1954, only 43 of the 800 employees 

of the Dienststelle Blank had been cleared for even the lowest categories of 

classification. Complicating matters even further, Department of the Army 

security regulations required that no classified information be released to the 

Germans. Since, by agreement with German authorities, the plan the Germans 

had prepared for reactivating their armed forces was classified top secret, 

this had the absurd effect of barring U.S. personnel from discussing the draft 

with its authors. In the spring of 1955, after a series of conferences among 

representatives of U.S. EUCOM, HICOG, and USAREUR, the Department 

of the Army established a new policy for delegating disclosure authority. This 

allowed USAREUR planners to share operational and logistical planning of 

direct concern to the Federal Republic. In particular, it included permission 

42 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 12–15, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. Msgs, Advanced 

Planning Group (APG), from Bonn, to CINCEUR, 28 Jul 1955, Ref# APG–336; and DA, from 

G–1, to CINCEUR, 18 Aug 1955, Ref# DA–986979. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 43 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 3–4.
Rearming the Germans 

to share information regarding military organization, maintenance of U.S. 

equipment, and basic tactical doctrine required to begin training. Later that 

same year, the Germans and Americans agreed to downgrade the overall 

classification of the plan from secret to confidential, making it available to a 

wide group of planners on both sides.44

Building a New German Army

With plans in place, both USAREUR and West German military representatives were ready to take the next step. As they began implementing the 

German training plan, both sides identified significant issues still to be resolved. 

With start-up dates for actual training drawing near, the two groups continued 

negotiations to work out differences that remained.

Since early in 1952, when a German contribution to Western defense had 

first come under consideration, USAREUR had studied the problem of making 

major training areas available to allied contingents. Throughout the period 

when the European Defense Community Treaty was under consideration, 

negotiations between USAREUR and representatives of the Dienststelle Blank 

on the release of barracks areas to the Germans had gone smoothly.45 All sides 

believed that they could share local areas and firing ranges equitably. The U.S. 

Army, Europe, insisted, however, that German troops stationed in the U.S. 

Zone could only use the major training areas at Grafenwöhr, Wildflecken, 

Baumholder, and Hohenfels on a “space available” basis. Any other policy, 

the command felt, would detract seriously from its own combat readiness. To 

the north, the imminent withdrawal of contingents of the British Army of the 

Rhine made the sharing of training facilities less of a challenge. Nonetheless, 

competition for training time at the Belsen-Hohne Tank Training Area, the only 

full-scale tank range in Germany, remained intense. Based on earlier agreements, 

the British represented U.S. interests in negotiations with the Germans over 

training sites in their area. In the end, despite extensive negotiations, the Federal 

Republic refused to release enough land to create new division-size training areas 

for the German Army. Faced with the reality that the West’s overall combat 

44 Ibid.; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 30–33. Memos, Brig Gen John C. Oakes, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Dep Ch 

of Staff for Opns, 28 Apr 1955, sub: Activities of the Advanced Planning and Training Section 

Week 25–30 April 1955; and Oakes for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 12 May 1955, sub: Activities 

of the Advanced Planning and Training Section Week of 9–13 May 1955. Both in Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 45 HQ, USAREUR, Summary of the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the USAREUR Working Committee-Deployment of EDC (German) Land Forces in the US Zone of Germany, 15 

Jul 1953; HQ, USAREUR, Report of the Seventh Meeting of USAREUR Working Committee 

on EDC (German) Deployment, 10 Sep 1953. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
190 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

effectiveness would be greatly enhanced by the addition of trained German 

divisions, USAREUR had little choice but to agree to share its facilities.46

In its letter of instructions, U.S. EUCOM had assigned two major logistical 

responsibilities to USAREUR: to provide administrative and logistical support 

to the U.S. training teams and to assist the German Army in the reception, 

storage, distribution, and maintenance of weapons, vehicles, and equipment 

obtained through the military assistance program. The second of these two 

requirements posed a problem for the command. General Hoge, USAREUR 

Commander, argued that storage facilities west of the Rhine were already filled 

with USAREUR’s own equipment and supplies, and those east of the river 

were too vulnerable to a potential Communist attack. General Heintges later 

recalled that the Army staff in Washington got a little ahead of itself in shipping 

vehicles and equipment to Germany. Before the Germans had any place to store 

them, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces were stacked up 

all over Bremerhaven. As a partial solution, U.S. EUCOM suggested finding 

German civilian contractors who could provide temporary storage space for 

the incoming goods. Accepting the proposal, the Department of the Army 

supplied the necessary funds and USAREUR made the arrangements. The U.S. 

European Command also coordinated with the Department of the Army to 

hold some stockpiles of equipment in the United States until USAREUR called 

for them. This minimized the amount of time USAREUR would have to store 

supplies and equipment in its depots. Ultimately, most of the equipment bound 

for German use remained in the United States until the German Army’s own 

depots at Luebberstedt, near Bremerhaven, and Eberstadt, near Darmstadt, 

were prepared to receive it.47

As mobilization of the new force got underway, in June 1955, representatives 

of the Defense Ministry traveled to the United States for a 25-day tour of 

military installations. After visiting the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 

New York; the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Field Artillery 

Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, 

the officials announced that they were greatly impressed with American training 

46 Msg, CINCUSAREUR to Department of the Army (DEPTAR), for G–3, 20 Apr 1954, 

Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Historical Division, USAREUR, 

USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 33–38; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 

1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 186–90, Historians files, CMH; Memos, Col Carl N. 

Smith, Ch, Civil Affairs Div, for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 22 Oct 1955, sub: Briefing of General 

McAuliffe on Seventh Army Permanent Training Area Problem, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; and Col Edgar H. Snodgrass, Judge Advocate, 

for USAREUR Asst Ch of Staff, 4 Jun 1953, sub: National Military Areas in Germany After 

Establishment of Contractual Relationship, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 47 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 325; Historical Division, 

USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 38–42; Historical 

Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 

15–19; Interv, Pellicci with Heintges, 1974, p. 478.
Rearming the Germans 

methods and equipment. All former Wehrmacht officers, they indicated that the 

new German force would adopt much of what they had observed.48

The revival of the German military now went into high gear. On 12 

November 1955, the Bundeswehr swore in its first contingent of commissioned 

and noncommissioned officers. The date was symbolic, for it marked the two 

hundreth anniversary of the birthday of General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, 

the great Prussian military reformer of the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth 

century. In a sweeping reorganization of the Defense Ministry, the government 

set up four new departments, one for the armed forces as a whole and one each 

for the army, navy, and air force. Lt. Gen. Adolf Heusinger, former Chief of 

Operations for the World War II Wehrmacht, became Chairman of a Supreme 

Military Council, which consisted of the heads of the four departments. Lt. Gen. 

Hans Speidel, Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in France, took 

charge of the Armed Forces Department. Both officers had been implicated in 

48 William Mahoney, “West German Army to Adopt U.S. Methods,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 8 Jun 1955.

General Hodes, Commanding General USAREUR, greets General Heusinger, Chairman of 

German Armed Forces, at Heidelberg Airstrip, 21 June 1956.
192 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the 1944 plot to assassinate Adolph Hitler and arrested by the Gestapo. Speidel 

had escaped from his imprisonment and remained in hiding until he could 

surrender to the French. Heusinger had been injured in the attempt on Hitler’s 

life and had been released by the Gestapo due to lack of evidence against him. 

Both appeared sufficiently anti-Nazi to lead the new German armed forces. To 

celebrate the occasion, the Defense Ministry held a review in its garage, for the 

Bundeswehr did not yet have a parade ground.49

Even before the Federal Republic had completed legislation that would 

authorize the formation of its new armed forces in May 1955, German military 

planners had begun informal discussions with their American counterparts 

on early activation of a few token companies to serve as cadres for training 

subsequent organizations. In October, the German defense minister formally 

requested U.S. training support for seven companies that would form by 31 

December. Numbering eight hundred men in all, they included four companies 

of mixed combat specialties, one military police company, one service company, 

and one band. The mixed companies would consist of four platoons each, for a 

total of sixteen: two infantry, two armored infantry, two engineer, two signal, 

two antiaircraft artillery, two field artillery, one armored reconnaissance, one 

armored antitank, one armored, and one ordnance.50

The Germans wanted the troops involved to begin reporting on 1 December 

1955 to a training facility at Andernach, Germany, twenty-five miles south of 

Bonn on the Rhine. The units would reach full strength and begin training 

by 2 January 1956. After two months of basic infantry training, the platoons 

would break up for three months of special, branch-oriented instruction. The 

Germans expected that once the units were fully trained, the platoons would 

separate to form cadres for their own school training battalions. The German 

Defense Ministry requested three officers and twenty-four enlisted men from 

USAREUR to conduct the initial training. It also asked for basic weapons to 

arm the trainees and for a few vehicles to support the effort.51

The U.S. EUCOM and USAREUR approved the plan and began preparations to supply training personnel and equipment. When representatives from 

49 HQ, USAREUR, Ambassador-Commanders Conference, 21 Nov 1955, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Birtle. Rearming the Phoenix, p. 227; “West German Forces Come to Life,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Nov 

1955; “First Bonn Soldiers Go into Uniform Today,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 

Nov 1955; “Heusinger Named to Head New Bonn Military Staff,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 24 Nov 1955. 50 Memo, Col Joseph G. Felber, Ch, Training Br, for Oakes, 7 Oct 1955, sub: New German 

Plans for Early Activation of Seven Companies, 1 January 1956; Msg, HICOG, signed Conant, 

to CINCEUR, 16 May 1955, Ref 732. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 51 Ibid.; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 19–24; Memo, Capt Leslie N. Shade for Col John T. Corley, 19 Oct 1955, 

sub: Meeting to Discuss Plans for Activation of the German Army, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
Rearming the Germans 

GTAG inspected the Andernach training facility and found it to be adequate, 

company grade officers and enlisted men received quarters in the camp. On 19 

December 1955, USAREUR activated the U.S. training team for Andernach 

at Patton Barracks in Heidelberg. The group spent three weeks preparing 

lesson plans, rehearsing instruction, and attending briefings on the details of 

its mission. On 9 January 1956, it moved to Andernach and went to work.52

Completing the German Army Assistance Program

With West Germany becoming a full-fledged member of the NATO 

alliance, and with much of the West’s defensive strategy dependent upon the 

incorporation of German manpower, USAREUR and the Seventh Army 

continued to move forward with assistance and training support for the new 

German Army. The daily contact between German students and their American 

instructors often revealed differences in the military traditions of the two 

nations. Nonetheless, the process developed a close bond between the two that 

helped to strengthen the overall alliance.

The Andernach training program, which began on 9 January 1956, served 

as an excellent rehearsal for the implementation of the overall assistance plan 

later in the year. Because none of the personnel from the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group had yet completed language training at Oberammergau, the 

training team commander recommended that eight to ten interpreters should 

join the project for its duration. Once U.S. instructors began work, however, 

they discovered that approximately 80 percent of the students could speak and 

understand some English. As a result, the expected language problem did not 

materialize. Arrangements for feeding the Americans, however, proved to be 

an unforeseen challenge. The standard German diet did not meet U.S. military 

standards in terms of quantity or caloric content. Yet, for political reasons, the 

team commander felt it desirable for U.S. personnel to eat with their German 

colleagues. In the end, although officers ate all three meals with the Germans, 

enlisted men shared only the noon meal. By the end of the training, none seemed 

to have suffered for it.53

52 Memos, Oakes for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 14 Nov 1955, sub: Activities of the German Training Assistance Group Week 7 November to 10 November 1955, and 21 Nov 1955, 

sub: Activities of the German Training Assistance Group Week 14 November to 19 November 

1955. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 

Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 

1958, pp. 20–21. 53 Msgs, HICOG, Bonn, to CINCEUR, 16 May 1955; and APG, from Bonn, signed Conant, 

to CINCEUR, 28 Jul 1955, Ref # APG–336; Memo, Felber, Ch, Training Br, for Maj Gen 

John C. Oakes, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, USAREUR, 7 Oct 1955, sub: New German Plans for 

Early Activation of Seven Companies. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP, Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance 

to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 19–24.
194 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The Andernach team began formal instruction on basic infantry weapons 

on 16 January 1956. Four officers and twelve enlisted men taught morning 

classes to five German officers and forty noncommissioned officers. The 

Germans insisted, however, that their own leaders should train their junior 

enlisted soldiers. Therefore, after receiving instruction in the morning, German 

personnel would lead the classes in the afternoon, with the Americans standing 

by to serve as assistant instructors. In the end, this process proved to be too 

time consuming. The training team members returned as the primary instructors 

after three weeks.54

The team completed its mission at the end of April 1956. Altogether, it had 

conducted fifty-five hours of training on basic U.S. weapons and one hundred 

seventy hours on more specialized arms and equipment peculiar to the various 

branches of the service. More important, the effort seemed to have developed 

an attitude of mutual respect and friendship between the instructors and the 

students. General Heintges told a story about a group of U.S. trainers who had 

gone out to a restaurant with some of the German noncommissioned officers. 

There, a table of teenage boys began to make fun of the new German soldiers 

and the uniforms that they wore. While the Germans were far too disciplined to 

54 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 19–24.

A group of German Army trainees attend class on the American carbine at Andernach 

Training Center, January 1956.
Rearming the Germans 

respond, the Americans went over and “cleaned up on the youngsters.” When 

Heintges told the German general in charge of personnel that he planned to 

discipline the soldiers, the German begged him not to. “Don’t punish them,” 

he said, “They fought for us and I am going to give them a medal.”55 In that 

light, planners hoped that the initial effort had set the stage for success in the 

larger program.

In March 1956, USAREUR activated the first of its planned branchoriented training teams. On 15 March, the armored reconnaissance training 

group assembled and began preparations at Mangin Kasern in Mainz. It was 

organized into four parts: a weapons section to teach the use of small-arms 

and crew-served weapons, an automotive section to provide instruction on 

the M41 tank and the M47 recovery vehicle, a communications section, and a 

tank gunnery section. During rehearsals, the instructors discovered that the use 

of interpreters extended class times up to twice as long as indicated on lesson 

plans. Classroom leaders had to take this into account when they organized 

their schedules.56

55 Ibid., p. 23. Quotes from Interv, Pellicci with Heintges, 1974, p. 482.

56 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 25–26; HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 

1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

An American instructor holds class on the carbine for German Army trainees at the 

Andernach Training Center, 1956.
196 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Upon completing its preparations and rehearsals, the team moved to Grohn 

Kasern, a German Army installation near Bremen, on 25 and 26 April. There it 

began working directly with a German training battalion. On 18 June, it began 

a new course of instruction for German officers and noncommissioned officers 

who would serve as faculty for the Bundeswehr reconnaissance school. The first 

classes for students at the school began on 3 July. The team divided its time 

between working directly with school cadre and assisting them with students.57

German Army doctrine gave company commanders considerable leeway 

in training matters, particularly regarding subjects and the amount of time to 

devote to each. As a result, the quantity of instruction delivered by the Americans 

fluctuated considerably. One company, for example, might request and receive 

twenty-two hours of U.S. training, while another received none, preferring to 

be taught by German cadre who had received earlier instruction. In other cases, 

the Germans requested classes in the operation but not the maintenance of U.S. 

communications equipment. Although the U.S. team pointed out the need for 

teaching soldiers how to install, tune, and take care of the equipment, German 

company commanders considered the training unnecessary. Later, the same 

officers complained that their radio systems lacked the sending and receiving 

range that the Americans had promised. When U.S. operators demonstrated 

how to maintain and adjust them, however, they functioned according to their 

specified distances.58

By the end of 1956, the armored reconnaissance team had provided a total 

of 1,096 hours of formal instruction on maintenance, communications, tactics, 

and tank and mortar gunnery, and had spent another 500 hours advising on 

the firing range. It had presented instruction equivalent to that received by 

U.S. basic trainees to the entire cadre of the German armored reconnaissance 

school as well as to elements of three line battalions. The team also assisted 

with the training of three complete cycles of students at the reconnaissance 

school. The only real drawback it encountered was an inability to teach a cadre 

of German instructors how to perform advanced training on U.S. equipment. 

Initial organizational problems as well as shortages of personnel and equipment 

prevented German units from releasing their own personnel long enough for 

the intensive training required to produce qualified instructors.59

The activation and operation of the other six combat branch training teams 

followed the same pattern. During March 1956 the armored infantry team 

began instruction at the German school at Munsterlager, about thirty miles 

south of Hamburg. The armor team also began training at Munsterlager; the 

infantry team at the German infantry school at Hammelburg; the antitank team 

at Bremen; the antiaircraft team at Rendsburg, fifteen miles west of Kiel; and 

the field artillery team at Idar-Oberstein, fifty miles southwest of Frankfurt. 

At each location, the U.S. training team would first provide instruction for the 

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
Rearming the Germans 

school battalion, composed of officers and enlisted men who would provide staff 

and faculty for the branch school. Once those men had been trained, the team 

would assist the school cadre in the classes it sought to provide on equipment, 

organization, and tactics. The level of American involvement varied with the 

degree of expertise the German instructors had developed. In most cases the 

Americans also ran firing ranges and taught weapons courses at those sites. 

Most teams also provided mobile training elements that worked with German 

line battalions as they organized.60

American instructors at the various locations reported many similar observations. They perceived, for example, that experienced Wehrmacht veterans, 

particularly the tankers, had little difficulty mastering weapons and gunnery 

skills. Younger students often focused intently on theoretical aspects of the 

training rather than practical applications and were slower to master techniques. 

Most teams also reported reluctance on the part of the Germans to embrace 

any instruction related to maintenance of the equipment. It seemed as if the 

Teutonic culture that revered the warrior did not feel the same enthusiasm for 

the mechanic or the technician. American advisers attempted to introduce the 

U.S. Army concept that the unit commander was directly responsible for the 

maintenance of his unit’s equipment. Nonetheless, the issue of organizational 

maintenance, typically done in American units at the company and battalion 

level, emerged as a recurring problem with German veterans who had no such 

tradition.61

A larger problem for the Americans was the need to create a logistical 

system for the German Army from the ground up. With the exception of a few 

civilians and Labor Service personnel employed by the U.S. Army, Germany 

had no personnel experienced in maintaining U.S. equipment. The Adenauer 

government’s decision to create tactical units as quickly as possible aggravated 

the situation by limiting the amount of time personnel could spend in orientation 

and training. Germany also lacked the technicians, depots, repair shops, and 

doctrine required to establish a logistics system. It was difficult for the U.S. 

training team, for example, to conduct logistics classes before the German 

quartermaster department had established its basic service regulations. In 

other cases, a lack of available spare parts for the U.S.-supplied equipment 

compounded the problem. It would require time and training before a German 

requisition system could develop to generate the steady stream of equipment 

and spare parts necessary to maintain the new force.62

60 Ibid.; “Bonn Getting 13 More Training Units,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 

Apr 1956; “800 USAREUR Soldiers Mold W. German Army as GTAG Instructors,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 29 Nov 1956; Brendan Mulready, “Live Fire Training for German 

Infantry,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Jul 1958. 61 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 31–32; Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix, pp. 266–74. 62 Ibid.
HUSUM Military Academy #2

RENDSBURG

Anti-Aircraft School

BREMEN Antitank School

Armored Recon School

HESEDORF Materiel Receiving Group

(Depot North)

HANNOVER Military Academy #1

MUNSTERLAGER Armored School

Armored Infantry School

ANDERNACH Quartermaster School Transportation School

HAMMELBURG

Infantry School

IDAR-OBERSTEIN

Field Artillery School

MEMMINGEN

Army Aviation School

SCHONGAU Airborne School

SONTHOFEN Military Police School

Ordnance School

Signal School

MUNICH Engineer School

DEGERNDORF

Medical School

BERLIN

Rhine R

Danube R

Elbe R

Main R

Rhine R

B A L T I C S E A

NORTH

SEA

POLAND

SWEDEN

BELGIUM LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

N E T

H E R L A N D S DENMARK

EAST GERMAN Y

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

School

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

TROOP TRAINING SCHOOLS

U .S. ARMY TRAINING CADRES

WEST GERMAN ARMY

1956

Map 8
Rearming the Germans 

U.S. training teams for other technical specialties experienced similar 

problems as they began operations in March 1956 (Map 8). The signal team 

began working with the German signal school battalion at Sonthofen, seventy 

miles southwest of Munich near the Austrian border. The engineer team moved 

to Munich, the home of the German engineer school battalion. Because of 

the highly technical nature of the subject, USAREUR specialists gave specific 

instruction to the interpreters assigned to the teams and helped to translate 

equipment nomenclature. Signal classes, in particular, were hampered by a 

lack of instructional equipment and training aids.63

In order to service communications and engineer equipment at the 

German schools until school personnel could perform their own maintenance; 

USAREUR activated two signal teams and one engineer maintenance team. 

One of the signal teams moved to Munsterlager to provide maintenance support 

to the armored and armored-infantry schools there and to the antiaircraft 

school at Rendsburg. The second team set up shop in Sonthofen, where it 

assisted the U.S. signal training team and the German school. Repairmen from 

this group also worked with a U.S. detachment at Grafenwöhr, checking and 

repairing equipment for the German units assembling there. The technicians 

quickly found that when they exhausted the spare parts that came with the 

initial issues of equipment, inefficiencies in the German logistical system 

caused delays of several months before replacement components arrived. The 

engineer maintenance team, operating out of the Rhine Engineer Depot at 

Kaiserslautern, experienced similar difficulties. The team leader reported in 

his year-end report that the German engineers he accompanied did not seem 

to understand the importance of a reliable spare-parts system.64

Additional training teams became operational as German school battalions 

mobilized and training facilities began to receive students. Originally planned as 

two separate elements, the quartermaster and transportation teams combined 

in January 1956 because the German Army would soon consolidate those two 

service branches. Instruction began at the training site at Andernach in July. At 

that time, transportation instructors found that a shortage of space limited their 

ability to conduct training in vehicle maintenance, driver testing, and convoy 

operations. Although quartermaster instructors were able to demonstrate U.S. 

field kitchens and laundry and shower units, the lack of established logistical 

63 HQ, USAREUR, Standing Operating Procedures for the Operation of GTAG [German 

Training Assistance Group] Signal Maintenance and Training Teams, 1 Feb 1957, Entry 2035, 

USAREUR Administrative Memos, 1956–1957, RG 549, NACP; Historical Division, USAREUR, 

USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 40–41; Henry B. Kraft, 

“Training German Engineers,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Jul 1956; “Signal School 

Trains First German Group,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 Apr 1956. 64 HQ, USAREUR, Standing Operating Procedures for the Operation of GTAG Signal 

Maintenance and Training Teams, 1 Feb 1957; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR 

Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 42–45.
200 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

doctrine within the German Quartermaster Corps limited their ability to conduct 

detailed training on those subjects.65

Other training teams became active later in 1956: the medical troop training 

unit at Degerndorff, about fifteen miles south of Munich; the ordnance troop 

training team at Sonthofen; the military police team, also at Sonthofen; and the 

aviation training team at Memmingen Airfield, fifty miles west of Munich. Each 

team experienced challenges similar to those faced by earlier groups, but new issues 

unique to their own situation also often arose. In particular, since the concept of 

a military police corps was new to the German Army, the mission of the training 

team for that subject had to be expanded to include basic organization and 

functions. The team discovered that German law did not grant jurisdiction to its 

military police in matters pertaining to criminal investigation or the operation of 

military prisons. Instead, the German Defense Ministry asked the team to focus 

on traffic control and patrol operations. The military police school also suffered 

initially from a lack of doctrinal manuals and service regulations.66

65 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 42–45. 66 “MAAG Team Trains German Medics,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Aug 

1957; “Bonn Getting 13 More Training Units”; “U.S. MP Training Unit Hailed by German 

General,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 Dec 1956.

Small-unit tactics being taught at German Army Officer Candidate School in Hannover
Rearming the Germans 

The U.S. command activated a team to assist the German military academy 

at Hannover in May 1956. This unit experienced more strenuous preparation 

than most and held its personnel to higher standards of conduct and appearance. 

Any suspicion of alcohol problems, financial or family issues, a poor attitude, 

or anything less than the highest ability to train soldiers was cause for removal. 

Only the highest U.S. Army standards were acceptable at a school for future 

German officers. Despite the language barrier, the Americans found the German 

staff so competent that it required only a minimum of professional assistance. 

As a result, after less than five months, the entire team, less one liaison officer, 

moved to a second German academy at Husum on the North Sea coast, where 

it began an assistance program similar to the one it had just completed.67

Aside from its training responsibilities, USAREUR had a second mission 

included in the German Assistance Program: to assist in the reception, storage, 

and issue of weapons, vehicles, and equipment for German Army units as the 

materiel arrived in theater. Although USAREUR had originally planned to 

provide two materiel receiving groups, efficiencies in the German buildup plan 

reduced the requirement to one. A team of nineteen officers and twenty-three 

enlisted men reported to the German Army depot at Hesedorf, fifteen miles 

67 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 59–60; “28 Yanks to Help Start Bonn Army Academy,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 3 Apr 1956. 

Study of engineer technique at German Army Officer Candidate School in Hannover
202 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

southwest of Hamburg, in May 1956. As had been the case for most of the 

German logistical system, organization and doctrine for the groups were still 

evolving. For that reason, the team could not use much of the classroom and 

field training it had prepared prior to deployment. Instead, it conducted a 

series of on-the-job training events designed to demonstrate and explain the 

American system of depot storage. The team helped the Germans to establish 

stock control and accounting systems and provided instruction on the basic 

weapons and ordnance material stored in the depots. When requested by the 

Germans, it also sent detachments to other installations and field sites to assist 

with maintenance and supply training and to provide guidance on the storage 

and handling of ammunition.68

Although they represented a significant commitment on the part of 

USAREUR, the training teams were, by no means, the command’s only 

contribution to the mobilization and training of the West German Army. 

Even before the ratification of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact, members 

of the Bundeswehr planning staff were attending U.S. Army exercises and 

demonstrations. The USAREUR plan for German Army assistance included 

a detailed schedule of demonstrations. These involved static displays of 

weapons, vehicles, and equipment; demonstrations of their employment; and 

platoon, company, and battalion exercises that illustrated American tactics 

and doctrine. The command also invited senior German officers to attend 

major U.S. and NATO exercises to observe higher-level operations and staff 

functions. Lower-ranking personnel attended Seventh Army training sites, both 

in garrison and in the field.69

In line with U.S. European Command’s guidance, USAREUR also opened 

up its school system to attendance by West German military personnel. During 

the first year of the program, it allocated 530 spaces for German students in its 

technical service schools. Meanwhile, the Seventh Army also allotted 200 spaces 

for German students at its Tank Training Center in Vilseck. In addition, the 

command allowed other German personnel to observe training in its schools 

and depots without actually admitting them as students. Technicians, for 

example, visited American ordnance facilities in order to try and close the gap 

68 HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 1955; Joseph W. 

Grigg, “U.S. Arms Spark Bonn Forces Buildup,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 Sep 

1956; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 57–58. 69 HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 29 Mar 1955; HQ, USAREUR, 

GTAG Memo 20, 24 Aug 1956, Entry 2035, USAREUR Admin Memos, 1956–1957, RG 549, 

NACP; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 10–11; Ernie Reed, “U.S. Army Trains German Artillerymen,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 8 Feb 1957; Henry B. Kraft, “German Officers Study U.S. Weapons,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 26 Jun 1956; “417 of Bonn Army Cadre to Study U.S. Training,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Mar 1956.
Rearming the Germans 

in maintenance and engineering expertise that had developed over ten years of 

military inactivity.70

In October 1956, German authorities submitted their requirements for 

training assistance for the following year. Their requests shifted the emphasis of 

the training program from assistance to schools to direct aid to major tactical 

units. Representatives from USAREUR and the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group met later that year to coordinate a revised letter of instructions that 

the U.S. European Command then published. The MAAG would assume 

operational control of the entire training assistance program on 1 July 1957. 

In the meantime, USAREUR would not only continue to provide the school 

training teams, but would also activate additional field teams to furnish advice 

to German tactical units. The USAREUR commander, General Hodes, wrote 

to the new MAAG commander, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, that he had no 

objection to providing the additional support as long as sufficient funds were 

available and the requirements did not detract from his primary mission of 

readiness for combat.71

In order to support the new emphasis on training German units, USAREUR 

activated eleven additional training teams and heavily reinforced the maintenance teams. It redesignated the existing teams as school teams. Although they 

had largely completed their work with the school battalions by the end of 1956, 

the school teams remained in place to provide advice and assistance to German 

instructors and cadre. Meanwhile, signal and ordnance maintenance teams 

separated into regional detachments to better support widely dispersed German 

elements. They continued to provide field maintenance, on-the-job training, and 

professional advice concerning U.S. equipment used by the Germans. The new 

U.S. training teams also spread themselves across the country to lend training 

support to their German counterparts (Map 9).72

The transfer of control of the training program from the USAREUR German 

Training Assistance Group to the Military Assistance Advisory Group began 

in September 1956 when operational control of the Material Receiving Group 

and Ordnance Maintenance Team Number 3 passed to the Army section of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group. After the transfer of control, the two were 

70 “6 German Armament Experts Inspect U.S. Depot at Mainz,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 15 Nov 1955; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the 

West German Army, 1958, pp. 10–11; HQ, Seventh Army, Letter of Instruction #2 to USAREUR 

German Army Assistance Plan, 20 Apr 1956, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, 

NACP. 71 Ltr, Gen Henry I. Hodes, USAREUR Cdr, to Maj Gen Clark L. Ruffner, Ch, Military 

Assistance Advisory Gp, 28 Aug 1956, Entry 2169, USAREUR Civil Affairs General Correspondence, 1952–1956, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, GTAG Memo 25, 6 Dec 1956, Entry 

2035, USAREUR Admin Memos, 1956–1957, RG 549, NACP; Historical Division, USAREUR, 

USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 62–66. 72 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 197–98; HQ, USAREUR, 

GTAG Memo 25, 6 Dec 1956; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance 

to the West German Army, 1958, p. 65. 
HAMBURG 3d Armored Division 

GIESSEN 2d Grenadier Division

ESSLINGEN

Airborne Division

LUDWIGSBURG Ordnance Maintenance (South)

HANNOVER 1st Grenadier Division

MUNSTERLAGER Signal Maintenance (North)

Ordnance Maintenance (North)

SONTHOFEN Signal Maintenance (South)

REGENSBURG 4th Grenadier Division

GRAFENWÖHR

5th Armored Division

MITTENWALD

Mountain Division

BERLIN

Rhine R

Danube R

Elbe R

Main R

Rhine R

B A L T I C S

NORTH E A

SEA

POLAND

SWEDEN

BELGIUM LUXEMBOURG

LIECHTENSTEIN

N E T

H E R L A N D S DENMARK

EAST GERMAN Y

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

Division Team Headquarters

Maintenance Team Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 150 Miles

100 150 Kilometers

WEST GERMAN DIVISIONS

U .S. ARMY

TAC TICAL AND MAINTENANCE TEAMS

February–June 1957

Map 9
Rearming the Germans 

consolidated and redesignated as the U.S. Advisory/Liaison Team (Logistics). 

U.S. Army, Europe, agreed to augment the organization with temporary duty 

personnel and to continue to provide administrative and logistical support.73

Because the increased number of teams had begun to strain the German 

Training Assistance Group’s ability to maintain administrative control, the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group agreed to assume operational control of 

the service school units. Following approval from the U.S. European Command, 

fifteen teams, totaling forty officers and eighty-four enlisted men, shifted to 

Military Assistance Advisory Group control on 15 February 1957. Once the 

transfer was complete, the German Training Assistance Group remained 

responsible for thirteen teams: two signal maintenance and training teams, two 

ordnance company teams, the military academy team at Husum, the antiaircraft 

school team, and seven field training teams.74

On 26 June 1957, U.S. EUCOM approved a Military Assistance Advisory 

Group plan to assume control of the remaining teams. Although USAREUR 

turned over the responsibility for training assistance to the MAAG on 1 July 

1957, it continued to provide administrative and logistical support. Its units 

also provided temporary duty personnel, on a diminishing basis, until the 

German Army was prepared to meet all of its own training requirements. The 

command’s maintenance responsibilities were also substantially reduced, but 

its schools continued to accept German students on a space-available basis. In 

the end, with its responsibilities complete and its functions in the hands of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, USAREUR closed the German Training 

Assistance Branch of its operations division.75

Of all the contributions of the U.S. Army in Europe during the Cold War 

period, its role in the reconstitution and training of the new German Army 

is perhaps the most significant. Within the span of ten years the U.S. view of 

Germany had evolved from despised enemy to valued ally. Throughout this 

period of transition, it was the officers and men of USAREUR who served as 

the primary point of contact between the two nations. It would not take long 

before the Germans were fielding their own vehicles, weapons, and equipment, 

and developing procedures and doctrine more suited to their own experiences 

and military traditions. Nonetheless, as U.S. soldiers helped to prepare the 

nascent German forces for their role as bulwark of the NATO alliance, they also 

generated a sense of cooperation and mutual respect between the two armies 

that contributed to the growing bond between the two nations.

73 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 66–68. 74 Ibid.; Warren Franklin, “Training the Best German Soldier in History,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 18 Dec 1957. 75 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German 

Army, 1958, pp. 74–75; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 172, 

Historians files, CMH; Warren Rogers Jr., “German Army to Handle Own Training in 1958,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Jul 1957.

By 1955, ten years had passed since the end of World War II. At first glance, 

little had changed. Two great military powers still faced one another along what 

had come to be called the Iron Curtain. Even so, the West felt a renewed sense 

of hope. The American military commitment to Europe as part of the NATO 

alliance had alleviated fears of impending Communist advances. For a time 

calm settled over the East-West confrontation. In June, the foreign ministers 

of the four occupying powers announced the completion of arrangements for 

a summit meeting beginning on 18 July in Geneva, Switzerland. Although 

attendees resolved little of any substance, both sides seemed to draw optimism 

from the ensuing “Spirit of Geneva.”1

Although the calm proved to be short-lived, the sense of transition in the 

relationship between East and West would not. Until 1955, most American 

activity in Europe had taken place in response to perceived provocations by 

the Soviet Union. The reactivation and reinforcement of the Seventh Army, the 

establishment of the logistical support line across France, and the development 

of a combat doctrine to counter anticipated Communist aggression were, in a 

sense, all reactions to military and political activity behind the Iron Curtain. 

In 1955, however, the initiative passed to the West. The restoration of West 

German sovereignty and the acceptance of that nation into the NATO alliance, 

the rebirth of West German armed forces as the Bundeswehr, and the evolution 

of U.S. Army organization and doctrine in response to the strategic policies 

of President Eisenhower’s “New Look” all created a new set of challenges to 

which the Soviet Union would have to respond.

The New Look Comes to USAREUR

For the U.S. Army in Europe, change was driven by the strategic policies of 

the administration in Washington. By 1955, President Eisenhower had begun to 

implement some of his national security policy, called the New Look. Believing 

that a sound economy was fundamental to the nation’s security, Eisenhower 

1 Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 451; Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev 

Remembers, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 390–400. For 

a more complete treatment of the 1955 summit, see Gunter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds., Cold 

War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

6

1955: A Year of Transit
208 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

directed the services to prepare a military posture that the United States could 

sustain over an extended period of uneasy peace, for the long haul as he put 

it, rather than to expand forces at a greater cost each time an international 

crisis arose. The president believed that the nation should avoid entanglement 

in small brushfire conflicts and rely on its atomic arsenal to retaliate against 

any foe that directly threatened national interests. Eisenhower’s Secretary 

of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, therefore instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to prepare a defense budget that would provide reasonable security without 

causing financial and economic unrest at home, without raising fear abroad 

that the United States was preparing to unleash global war, and without raising 

apprehensions among allies that we were reneging on overseas commitments.2

With all four services competing for larger shares within a more constrained 

defense budget, the American commitment to Western Europe emerged as a 

point of contention. In a 1954 staff paper describing the basic tenets of the 

New Look, Admiral Arthur W. Radford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed 

that the United States had deployed a “disproportionately large” portion of 

its forces to overseas areas. While those dispositions had helped to strengthen 

the determination of the nation’s allies to resist communism, they had placed 

excessive demands on its armed forces, which were now overextended. The 

Joint Chiefs suggested that the deployments to Europe and Korea were not 

only costly, but precommitted the United States to fighting wars in those 

regions, whether it wanted to or not. The paper recommended a reduction in 

the American commitment overseas and a shift of more of the burden to allied 

forces. The United States’ primary contribution, the Joint Chiefs said, came 

from its air forces, which were armed with atomic weapons and dwarfed any 

power ever before created by any nation.3

As a result of these strategic priorities, the defense budget for 1955 

established new force objectives that placed greater emphasis on Air Force 

and Navy airpower. The Army, meanwhile, faced a reduction in the number 

of its active divisions from twenty to fifteen, and a drop in its personnel ceiling 

from 1.5 million to 1.1 million, to be achieved by the end of 1956. General 

Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, bitterly contested the reductions and opposed 

the increased reliance on atomic weapons inherent in the new strategic policy. 

His protests received little support from Admiral Radford, Secretary Wilson, 

or the president. Instead, Ridgway’s stance earned him pariah status both at the 

White House and within the Department of Defense. Frustrated by his inability 

2 Notes for Discussion With Canadian Representatives, 4 Mar 1954, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH; 

Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 205. For further information on Secretary 

Wilson and his role in implementing the policies of the New Look, see Geelhoed, Charles E. 

Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon. More general studies on the New Look include Dockrill, 

Eisenhower’s New Look National Security Policy; Craig, Destroying the Village. 3 Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954, p. 15; Leighton, Strategy, 

Money, and the New Look, p. 205. Quote from Notes for Discussion With Canadian Representatives, 4 Mar 1954, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
1955: A Year of Transition 

to influence the discussion, Ridgway retired at the end of his first tour as Army 

Chief of Staff in June 1955. In his memoirs and in later interviews, the former 

paratrooper maintained that he had always planned to retire when he completed 

his tour. Nonetheless, it was fairly clear throughout the administration, the 

Department of Defense, and even the Army Staff that President Eisenhower 

would not have retained him.4

The impact on USAREUR of the cuts in personnel that Ridgway had 

opposed was initially quite small. In February 1955, the Department of the 

Army imposed a reduction of 2,075 spaces in the command’s personnel ceiling 

and directed it to submit recommendations for changes to achieve the new 

manning level. In its response, USAREUR noted that it had already given up 

1,248 enlisted spaces as a result of a recent reorganization and consolidation 

of supply depots in Germany and France. It further proposed to inactivate 

three armored field artillery battalions, the 70th, 74th, and 517th, assigning the 

firing batteries to the three armored cavalry regiments. This would achieve a 

personnel savings of 872 spaces through the elimination of headquarters and 

service batteries. In anticipation of additional cuts during the coming year, the 

Seventh Army assistant chief of staff for personnel directed his section chiefs 

to look for ways to consolidate tasks in order to reduce their own personnel 

requirements.5

The Seventh Army G–1 was prescient. By the end of 1955, USAREUR had 

to prepare to make even greater reductions in troop strength. It would have 

to eliminate personnel spaces, for example, to compensate for new artillery 

units that would be arriving in Europe later that year. The command proposed 

to achieve those savings through a reorganization and reduction of the 10th 

Special Forces Group from almost nine hundred officers and enlisted men to 

approximately two hundred fifty. The USAREUR assistant chief of staff for 

operations, Brig. Gen. John C. Oakes, warned, however, that the cuts would 

have to be carefully considered due to the cellular structure of the Special 

Forces units and the specialized skills of many detachment members. At the 

4 Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 6, The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and National Policy, 1955–1956 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Joint Staff, 1992), pp. 

41–43; James Reston, “The Defense Dispute,” New York Times, 26 Jun 1956; Interv, Col John 

M. Blair with Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, 24 Mar 1972, pp. 28–29, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, MHI; Arthur W. Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral 

Arthur W. Radford, ed. Stephen Jurika Jr. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 

330; Eisenhower Diary Entry, 26 Mar 1955, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. Alfred 

D. Chandler, Louis Galambos, and Daun Van Ee, 21 vols. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1970–2001), 16:1636. 5 Memos, Maj Gen Elwyn D. Post, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 9 Feb 1955, sub: 

Reduction in USAREUR Troop Ceiling for FY 1955 and FY 1956; and Brig Gen John C. Oakes, 

Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 28 Feb 1955, sub: Status of Command 

Contingency. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP. Memo, Col John T. Corley, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Dep Ch of Staff, Admin, 10 Nov 

1955, sub: Reduction in Strength of the Headquarters, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP.
210 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

end of the year, the proposed reductions in the Special Forces group were still 

under deliberation.6

While many aspects of the New Look were troubling to the European allies, 

the specter of U.S. force reductions on the continent was most disturbing, for 

talk of troop withdrawal from Europe reinforced fears that U.S. interest in the 

region was transient and that the Americans might at any time return to a more 

isolationist foreign policy. Chancellor Adenauer expressed particular concern 

that the United States might use the introduction of German divisions into 

NATO’s defenses as a justification for reducing its own contributions. Publicly, 

President Eisenhower tried to reassure his allies that the United States had no 

intention of reducing its commitment. Privately, however, he complained that 

he had never intended or desired the American deployment to Europe to be 

permanent.7

Whatever force the Army retained in Europe would take on an even 

greater significance as, in addition to its role within the Western Alliance, it 

came to represent the very survival of the service. Given military policies that 

emphasized airpower and atomic weapons, the Air Force and, to a lesser extent, 

the Navy absorbed the largest part of the defense budget, played the greatest 

role in strategic planning, and seemed to carry the most prestige. Meanwhile, 

the Army struggled to remain relevant, both in national security affairs and in 

the eyes of the American public. The new Army chief of staff, General Maxwell 

D. Taylor, waged a concerted campaign to improve the service’s image and to 

demonstrate that it had a role to play on the modern battlefield. He told the 

USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, that he was troubled to see the 

Army depicted as hidebound, backward-looking, and outmoded. He urged 

McAuliffe to help him sell the idea to the American public and to Congress 

that the service was a versatile and flexible member of the defense team and 

that, while it was developing its own family of powerful atomic weapons, it 

also retained the ability to vary the application of military force to the needs 

of the moment.8

6 Memos, Col William R. Peers, Ch, Unit Requirements Section, for Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, 

19 Feb 1955, sub: Report of G3 Staff Visit to USAREUR; and Oakes for Ch of Staff, 4 Oct 

1955, sub: Proposed Message to DA on Reorganization of the 10th Special Forces Group; Msg, 

DA, from Dep Ch of Staff, Logistics, to CINCEUR, 30 Dec 1955, Ref DA–994588. All in Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 7 C. L. Sulzberger, “Defense Pull-Backs Worry West Germany,” New York Times, 3 Jan 1954; 

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to 

the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy), 1 Feb 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 5, Western 

European Security, pt. 1, pp. 482–84; Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary 

of State for European Affairs (Merchant), 3 Nov 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 5, pt. 1, pp. 

532–33; “Yanks to Stay Here Until Cold War Thaws, Conant Says,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 14 Jun 1955; Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell) 

for the Secretary of State, 28 Apr 1956, in FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 26, Central and Southeastern 

Europe, pp. 144–49. 8 Ltr, Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, CSA, to Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe, USAREUR Cdr, 15 

Sep 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. For 
1955: A Year of Transition 

McAuliffe responded that he was in complete agreement with Taylor’s 

sentiments. He pointed out that in the past year USAREUR had been the 

subject of favorable articles in such popular mass publications as Look, U.S. 

News and World Report, Saturday Evening Post, and Newsweek. The U.S. Army 

in Europe provided about one-third of all material appearing on the service’s 

weekly Big Picture television show and on Army Hour radio show. Moreover, 

NBC News had just completed a special television presentation on the units 

patrolling the border. While the command’s relationships with the U.S. press 

were “splendid,” McAuliffe could only note that reporters seldom visited Army 

installations in Europe. The Air Force had flown correspondents into the theater 

for brief visits, he said, but those individuals rarely met with the Army.9

McAuliffe also made sure that the need to publicize the Army’s success in 

Europe was clear to his subordinate commanders. He urged the Seventh Army 

commander, Lt. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, to use every means at his disposal to tell 

the Army’s story frequently and accurately. Accordingly, the Seventh Army 

relied on an organized public information program that used publications, 

hometown news releases, local newspapers, and radio and television broadcasts 

to tell its story. Maj. Gen. Numa A. Watson, commander of the Southern Area 

Command, assured his superiors that he had made the issue one of his highest 

priorities, and he identified the Army’s Home Town News Center, a public 

information project to relay news about individual soldiers back to their local 

newspapers, as a valuable instrument in getting the word out. He suggested 

that if the command devoted additional personnel to the effort to promote the 

Army, it would get even better results.10

Thus, with U.S. ground forces drawing down in most areas around the 

world and with a potential conflict with the Soviet Union the primary threat 

to U.S. national security, USAREUR found itself as the Army’s best hope for 

selling its message to the American public. In many ways, USAREUR and 

the Seventh Army became the public face of the service. At the USAREUR 

commander’s weekly staff meeting on 19 April 1955, the public information 

officer admonished attendees that they could not rely solely on military media 

such as the Stars and Stripes and Armed Forces Network to get out their 

message. If they were to reach the more than four hundred million people that 

made up the populations of the United States and the NATO allies, they would 

have to publicize their activities on the national wire services and television 

more detail on Taylor’s efforts to “sex up” the Army, see Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. 

Army; Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam 

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986). 9 Quote from Ltr, McAuliffe to Taylor, 21 Sep 1955. Ltr, Taylor to McAuliffe, 14 Oct 1955. 

Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 10 Ltrs, McAuliffe to Lt Gen Henry I. Hodes, Seventh Army Cdr, 23 Nov 1955; and Maj 

Gen Numa A. Watson, Southern Area Command Cdr, to McAuliffe, 2 Dec 1955. Both in Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. HQ, Seventh Army, 

Seventh Army Public Information Program, FY 1956, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP. 
212 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and radio networks. Only in that way could the service hope to overcome the 

stranglehold the Air Force and Navy were placing on the defense budget and 

military policy.11

Striving for Combat Readiness

The increased emphasis on the use of atomic weapons in American strategic 

policy influenced the preparations of American forces for combat against the 

Soviet Union. Because the Eisenhower administration had little interest in 

funding research and development aimed at improving conventional weapons, 

the Army focused much of its attention on developing and procuring rockets, 

missiles, and artillery munitions capable of delivering an atomic warhead. That 

focus manifested itself in Europe in reduced funding for gasoline, ammunition, spare parts, and other conventional training requirements. In response, 

USAREUR and the Seventh Army began a serious consideration of how to 

integrate atomic weapons into their plans for the defense of Western Europe.

In reality, USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders had little choice but to 

place a greater reliance on atomic weapons.12 President Eisenhower’s New 

Look strategic policies pushed the early use of atomic weapons and encouraged 

commanders to regard them in the same way as any other conventional weapon. 

A study prepared by NATO’s Military Committee showed that most European 

nations had not met the conventional force goals they had set for themselves 

in 1952. As a result, the only way Western forces would be able to prevent a 

rapid conquest of Europe would be to employ both tactical and strategic atomic 

weapons as early as possible. With that analysis in mind, General Gruenther, 

the supreme allied commander, told his staff that he considered his number one 

requirement to be perfecting procedures for the delivery of atomic weapons. 

He wanted those procedures to be tested in all major NATO training events.13

To support this approach, U.S. European Command contingency plans 

directed USAREUR to provide atomic-capable artillery units with accompanying logistical elements to designated NATO forces and to assign staff 

to allied headquarters to assist in planning for the battlefield employment of 

atomic weapons. Seventh Army units had already tested plans to allocate two 

battalions of 280-mm. cannons to British forces in the Northern Army Group as 

part of Exercise Battle Royal in 1954. In August 1955, USAREUR approve

11 HQ, USAREUR, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 19 Apr 1955, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 12 Ltr, McAuliffe, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen Alfred M. Gruenther, SACEUR, 8 Jul 1955; 

Memo, Oakes, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for CINC, 23 Aug 1955, sub: SHAPE Exercise Calendar. 

Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 13 Honick and Carter, SHAPE Histories, p. 104; North Atlantic Military Committee, The Most 

Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years, 22 Nov 1954, Pentagon 

Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Memo, Oakes for CINC, 23 

Aug 1955, sub: SHAPE Exercise Calendar, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

another request from NORTHAG to contribute one battery of 280-mm. guns 

and one battery of Honest John rockets for Exercise Stormvour. The command

also prepared plans to attach one battalion to the First French Army as well.14

Meanwhile, in the Seventh Army, much of the operations and planning 

staff became engaged in preparing doctrinal literature and plans for the conduct 

of atomic warfare. Atomic artillery units participated in almost every major 

field-training exercise, from division-size to NATO maneuvers. Although it 

was difficult to fire even conventional rounds from the huge, 280-mm. guns 

due to a lack of suitable firing ranges, Seventh Army technicians constructed a 

pyrotechnic device that simulated an atomic explosion for use in field training. 

Command post exercises began to focus almost exclusively on coordinating the 

14 Memo, Brig Gen Leo V. Warner, Adj Gen, for CG, Seventh Army, 9 Mar 1954, sub: Employment of 280mm Battalions, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; 

Omer Anderson, “280-mm Guns to Take Part in NATO Games,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 24 Jun 1954; HQ, USAREUR, Mission Register, 1 Jul 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, Monthly Report of 

Operations, G–3 Section, Jul 1955, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; 

Memo, Oakes for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 31 Aug 1955, sub: 280mm Firing in Conjunction 

with NORTHAG Exercises, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 

549, NACP. For a good description of the role of atomic weapons in Exercise Battle Royal

see Maloney, War Without Battles, pp. 90–93.

An Honest John and launcher on display at Darmstadt on Armed Forces Day in May 1956
214 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

movement of the atomic artillery, locating suitable targets and setting up the 

complex communications channels necessary for verifying target information 

and authenticating release of the weapons from higher headquarters. Right 

away, observers noted that these procedures were entirely too cumbersome and 

slow to engage targets in a timely manner. In Exercise Fox Paw during Octob

1955, forward units identified and nominated twenty targets for attack with 

atomic weapons but were unable to engage any, usually because the enemy 

forces had dispersed before they could be fired on.15

The exercises were successful, however, in illustrating to the troops the 

destructive power of atomic weapons. During Exercise Cordon Bleu i

September, a NATO army consisting of the U.S. VII Corps and France’s 5th 

Armored and 7th Light Mechanized Divisions under the overall command 

of Lt. Gen. George H. Decker, VII Corps Commander, defended against an 

aggressor attack conducted by the U.S. 2d Armored Division and the French 

1st Armored Division. Although much of the maneuver was highly scripted, 

the twelve hundred umpires who ran the exercise assessed heavy casualties, 

especially in connection with notional atomic strikes. The men learned that even 

if it was not precisely on target, a single atomic weapon could destroy an entire 

command post. In one instance, eighteen hundred simulated casualties entered 

the VII Corps medical chain of evacuation. This was a far greater number than 

U.S. units had encountered in previous maneuvers but represented what many 

believed to be an accurate estimate for an atomic conflict. Umpires and observers 

noted that medical support was spread much too thin for effective evacuation 

of casualties. In one case, where a simulated atomic strike had wounded almost 

six hundred men, two aid men showed up to handle their evacuation. Because 

insufficient litter jeeps were available, it took almost ten hours to transport the 

casualties to medical facilities. As a by-product of the exercise, Seventh Army 

training literature began to caution troops that, in many cases, they would have 

to perform their own first aid and transport their own wounded.16

Other exercises, especially early in the year, tested the ability of divisions and 

corps to implement the “wide-front” defense that had become an integral part 

of Seventh Army’s doctrine. In February 1955, the Seventh Army conducted 

CPX Sting Ray that included all of its headquarters and command po

elements down to battalion level. The primary aim of the effort was to test the 

ability of the staffs involved to establish communications up and down the line 

15 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 220, Historians files, CMH; 

HQ, Seventh Army, CPX Wolf Call, 19 Jul 1955, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG

338, NACP; Memo, Oakes for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 6 Oct 1955, sub: Comments on Exercise 

Fox Paw, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 16 Jon Hagar, “Cordon Bleu Taught Many Valuable Lessons,” Stars and Stripes, Euro

Edition, 28 Oct 1955. Ltr, Cpl George A. Hefferson, Office of the Surgeon, to Col Brunshaw, 26 

Oct 1955, sub: Comments of Medical Umpires FTX Cordon Bleu; Memo, Lt Col R. W. Prior

Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 11 May 1955, sub: First Aid in Atomic Warfare. 

Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. For a detailed account of 

Exercise Cordon Bleu, see Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 85–8
1955: A Year of Transition 

while also controlling the maneuver of their dispersed elements. In particular, 

the command wanted to learn how to maintain communications with logistics 

and other support elements positioned well to the rear, and how to best link up 

with higher headquarters and other units along the line to facilitate planning 

and coordination.17

Despite the growing interest in atomic warfare, up until early 1955, 

USAREUR had only six 280-mm. cannon battalions, each with three two-gun 

batteries, to provide all of its organic atomic fire support. Moreover, the guns 

themselves were controversial. Critics pointed to the difficulty in transporting 

them through European villages and along narrow roads and bridges. American 

newspapers published articles and showed pictures of guns that had skidded 

off roads and gotten stuck in ditches. Artillerymen defended the performance 

of their weapons and praised their performance but nonetheless conceded that 

more agile systems were needed.18

Reinforcements were already on the way. Late in 1954, the first battery of 

Honest John rockets arrived in Europe. Seventh Army demonstrators unveiled 

17 Memo, Col Eugene E. Lockhart, Ch, Maneuver Div, for G–3, 10 Feb 1955, sub: Initial 

Instructions, CPX Sting Ray, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 18 Msgs, DA, Ch of Information, to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Sep 1955, Ref DA–351241; a

USAREUR to DA, for Ch of Information, 10 Oct 1955, Ref SC–29016. Both in Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

General Hart (left), Commanding General V Corps and the chief umpire and deputy 

director of Exercise Cordon Bleu, discusses the exercise briefing with General Hodes of

the Seventh Army.
The controller crew makes final checks before firing a Corporal missile at White Sands, 

New Mexico, October 1955.
1955: A Year of Transition 

the new weapons to the European press in January the following year. The 

truck-mounted, surface-to-surface rocket was unguided and had a maximum 

range of about fifteen miles. It was considerably more mobile and could be 

prepared to fire in less time than the 280-mm. cannon. Corporal guided missile 

battalions followed shortly thereafter in February 1955. The Corporals were 

liquid-fueled, surface-to-surface guided missiles with an approximate range 

of seventy-five miles. Although these weapons were capable of firing both 

conventional and atomic warheads, their inaccuracy when compared with 

conventional heavy artillery made them poorly suited for nonnuclear use. 

They did, however, provide the Seventh Army with new options for atomic fire 

support. The command assigned Honest John batteries to the V and VII Corps 

headquarters as part of their artillery support assets. The Corporal missiles 

remained under Seventh Army control because they could reach targets beyond 

the corps boundaries.19

A lack of available firing ranges hampered training with the new weapons. 

By the middle of 1955, the Seventh Army had launched only two Honest John 

rockets, using ranges at Grafenwöhr, the largest U.S. training area in Germany. 

By the end of the year, USAREUR and U.S. European Command were still 

negotiating to obtain suitable facilities in Africa where the units could train. 

As a result, although the addition of rocket- and guided-missile units increased 

the Seventh Army’s options for atomic firepower and helped to diminish its 

reliance on Air Force–delivered munitions, the lack of firing ranges limited 

the command’s ability to train its soldiers to use and support the weapons.20

As a further upgrade to the flexibility of its atomic arsenal, USAREUR 

received word in May 1955 that the Army had developed an atomic shell for 

its 8-inch howitzer. At thirty-five tons, the artillery piece was less than half the 

weight of the more cumbersome 280-mm. cannon. The 8-inch guns could fire a 

shell out to a range of almost twenty miles and were already deployed to Europe 

in substantial numbers. Although none of the new projectiles reached Europe 

by the end of the year, and the 280-mm. cannons remained the mainstay of the 

Seventh Army’s atomic arsenal, it was clear that the command was expanding 

its options as it prepared for an atomic conflict.21

In contrast to the growing infatuation with atomic weapons at higher 

echelons, combat battalions in the Seventh Army continued to emphasize 

conventional tactics and doctrine in their training. Infantry and armor battalions 

19 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 220–21; Memo, Lt Col 

R. W. Prior, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 21 Jan 1955, sub: Release of Information to Allies and Press on Honest John Rocket, Corporal Missile, and 280 mm Gun, Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; John Neumyer, “Europe Gets First Look 

at Honest John,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 Jan 1955; “BPE Greets 1st Guided 

Missile Bn,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Feb 1955. 20 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 220–21. 21 Msg, USAREUR to Seventh Army, exclusive for Hodes, 25 May 1955, Ref SX–3464, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Elton C. Fay, “Army 

Said Developing A-Shell for 8-Inch Gun,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Sep 1955.
Tanks of the 1st Battalion, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, defend against attacking 

NATO forces during Exercise Cordon Bleu in October 1955

Aggressor forces move through Dinkelsbühl during Exercise Cordon Bleu in October 1955
1955: A Year of Transition 

spent weeks at Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken, and in local training 

areas, perfecting defensive operations along an extended front, and practicing 

delaying actions as part of a mobile defense. The command’s training literature 

stressed the integration of infantry, tanks, and artillery into combat teams and 

directed that each of those branches would prepare to work closely with the 

other two. To evaluate their level of readiness, divisions administered tests to 

the companies and battalions under their command. A typical exercise would 

combine an armored infantry battalion with a tank company, an engineer 

platoon, and forward observers linked to an artillery battalion. That force would 

then attempt to carry out its assigned missions against a slightly smaller but 

similarly organized opponent. Operating on a front of approximately six miles, 

infantry battalions might begin the test with a delay and withdrawal mission, 

pulling back as far as fifteen miles. In the next phase, the battalion would 

construct a more traditional perimeter defense but almost immediately begin 

planning a counterattack, which it would execute within twenty-four hours. 

Tank and armored cavalry battalions conducted similar tests, but covered even 

greater distances due to their mobility.22

Artillery battalions underwent training evaluations designed to validate 

their own unique capabilities. Seventh Army guidance for the administration 

of battalion tests was accompanied by reams of checklists, designed to assist 

umpires in verifying that units performed required tasks by the numbers. The 

exercises placed the highest emphasis on the speed and accuracy of indirect fire. 

Each one included a number of required missions with strict time and accuracy 

standards for each. Umpires graded procedures along the gunline, computations 

in the fire direction center, and accuracy of fires in relation to the assigned 

target. The tests also evaluated the unit’s ability to move and establish a new 

firing position, to communicate, to defend itself against aggressor attacks, and 

to supply and maintain itself in the field. Upon completion of the evaluation, 

units received grades of excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. Seventh Army 

after action reports indicated that out of forty-six battalions tested the previous 

year, forty had received ratings of satisfactory or excellent. The remaining six 

battalions successfully completed retests later that year, or early in 1955.23

22 HQ, Seventh Army, Training Cir 1, 1 Nov 1954–30 Oct 1955; Memo, Lt Col Charles T. 

Krampitz, Acting Ch of Staff, for 2d Armd Div, 6 Apr 1955, sub: Training Program 5 June–7 

August 1955. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. Memos, Brig 

Gen George E. Lynch, Ch of Staff, for CG, 9th Inf Div, 21 Jun 1955, sub: Reinforced Infantry 

Battalion Test of the 2d Bn, 47th Inf; and CWO Robert M. George, Asst Adj Gen, for VII Corps, 

12 May 1955, sub: Tank Battalion Tests—1955. Both in Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, 

RG 338, NACP. 23 Memos, Lt Col R. W. Prior, Asst Adj Gen, for Distribution, 7 Mar 1955, sub: Field Artillery Battalion Tests, Entry 33309, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; CWO Robert M. 

George, Asst Adj Gen, for Distribution, 10 May 1955, sub: VII Corps Field Artillery Battalion 

Tests 1955, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP; and Lt Col Frank D. Jones, 

Asst Adj Gen, for CG, VII Corps, 10 Dec 1954, sub: Emphasis in Training of Field Artillery 

Units, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 
220 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The after action reports noted, however, that almost half of the units tested 

demonstrated shortcomings in speed or accuracy of fires. Umpires attributed 

these shortcomings to a lack of fire discipline in the firing batteries, improper 

gunnery techniques used in the fire direction centers, and errors in survey. As 

a result, observers from Seventh Army and the two corps headquarters made 

those areas of particular concern for inspections and evaluations held in 1955.24

The Seventh Army’s training also retained much of the emphasis on 

individual and small-unit skills that had been instituted by General Eddy 

years before. Senior officers urged company and battalion commanders to 

improve map reading, marksmanship, and basic troop-leading procedures in 

their squads and platoons. Emphasizing that any unit capable of being located 

and identified could be destroyed by an atomic attack, leaders also stressed 

training in dispersion, camouflage, and communications security. Because ten 

years had passed since the end of World War II and almost five years since the 

heaviest fighting in Korea, the command placed increased weight on developing 

its lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers. Although many veterans 

of those conflicts remained in USAREUR and the Seventh Army, most had 

progressed to more senior ranks. Division noncommissioned officer academies 

provided a structured environment for training those junior leaders. Many units 

also depended on more informal systems for passing on combat experience.25

During this period, USAREUR and the Seventh Army also continued to 

harness developing technologies to expand the range of tactical options available 

to their commanders. Aircraft had been an integral part of the Army since prior 

to World War II. For the most part, however, they had been assigned to field 

artillery units and employed for reconnaissance and for target identification. 

The use of helicopters in Korea, not just for reconnaissance, but also to deliver 

supplies and to evacuate casualties from the battlefield had demonstrated the 

utility of that new technology in a wider range of roles. As a result, when the 

Seventh Army reorganized under a new Table of Organization and Equipment 

(TOE) in 1953, several fixed-wing and rotary aircraft were assigned to each 

division. These included the H–19 Chickasaw helicopter for training and light 

transport, the H–13 Sioux helicopter for observation and medical evacuation, 

the L–19 Birddog airplane for observation, and the L–20 Beaver airplane for 

liaison and light transport. This development created an immediate shortage 

of trained pilots in the theater. In March 1954, the Seventh Army headquarters 

organized an aviation section to supervise flight operations and training 

throughout the command. A short time later, on 1 July 1955, it established 

24 Memo, Jones for CG, VII Corps, 10 Dec 1954, sub: Emphasis in Training of Field Artillery 

Units. 25 Ltrs, McAuliffe, USAREUR Cdr, to Gruenther, SACEUR, 8 Jul 1955, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Lt Gen George H. Decker, 

VII Corps Cdr, to Maj Gen H. G. Maddox, CG, 9th Inf Div, 10 Nov 1955; Maddox to Decker, 

6 Dec 1955; and Maj Gen W. T. Sexton, CG, 5th Inf Div, to Decker, 22 Nov 1955. Last three 

in Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1955, RG 338, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

the Seventh Army Aviation Training Center at the Stuttgart airfield to provide 

locally trained pilots.26

Later that same year, USAREUR also created an aviation branch within 

its transportation division to coordinate organization, training, operations, and 

employment of the command’s growing aviation resources. The new organization immediately went to work planning for the addition of six companies of 

H–13 and H–19 helicopters to USAREUR and the Seventh Army. Although 

the Army normally designated aviation companies as service elements, the six 

coming to Germany were categorized as combat units. While the rotary aircraft 

were suitable for movement of small units over difficult terrain or emergency 

resupply of combat units, their limited operating radius and lift capacity made 

them unsuitable for large-scale logistical operations or tactical maneuvers. Even 

so, they proved to be particularly useful in transporting troops through the 

mountainous terrain in Austria and southern Germany and offered commanders 

the potential ability to shift troops quickly to trouble spots, to support actions 

on their flanks, or to carry soldiers behind enemy lines. The arrival in late 

26 D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963 (HQ, USAREUR, 1964), 

p. 144, copy in Historians files, CMH; Memo, CWO Charles L. Landry, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, 

VII Corps, 27 Dec 1955, sub: Training Program for Helicopter Units, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 

1953–1966, RG 338, NACP.

A real injury is evacuated during Exercise Cordon Bleu. The soldier’s hand was badly

damaged by an exploding artillery simulator.
222 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

1955 of the larger capacity H–34 Choctaw helicopters allowed planning for 

movements up to company size in strength.27

On the ground, USAREUR infantrymen also looked to increase their 

mobility through the introduction of fully tracked armored personnel carriers. 

World War II–vintage half-tracks had provided them with some flexibility and 

protection from small-arms fire, but the vehicles tended to bog down in difficult 

terrain and offered no overhead cover. The newer M75 was fully tracked, and 

its fully enclosed troop compartment offered some protection from shrapnel, 

small-arms fire, and the thermal or radiation effects of an atomic explosion. 

The USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, however, cautioned against 

wholesale conversion to the carriers in Seventh Army infantry divisions. He 

pointed out that the limited visibility they afforded the crews made the vehicles 

less than ideally suited for operations in heavily wooded or built-up areas. He 

believed that the carriers required improvements and modifications before they 

could be employed throughout the command.28

By the end of the year, USAREUR and the Seventh Army were well on 

the way to establishing a doctrine based on atomic weapons. Although unit 

organizations still retained their conventional forms, most training exercises 

and war plans took for granted that atomic weapons would be used by both 

sides. With their new weapons and equipment, and their preparations to fight 

a widely dispersed and mobile battle, American soldiers in Europe presaged 

changes that would occur throughout the service.

Operation Gyroscope

Although the command had made significant progress in developing its 

combat doctrine, finding an efficient way of rotating troops into and out of 

Europe remained an elusive goal. Even after several years of experiments with 

different methods, USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued to suffer 

high rates of personnel turnover. Soldiers reported to and departed from the 

command so quickly that it was difficult for leaders to develop the teamwork 

and unit cohesion necessary to build strong units. Experiments with rotating 

entire platoons of infantry and armor had shown some promise but had not 

completely solved the problem. They did, however, set the stage for a much 

more ambitious program that was to begin in 1955.

27 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 14; Ltrs, Brig Gen Hamilton H. Howze, Ch, Army Aviation Div, to Maj Gen Elwyn D. Post, G–3, USAREUR, 24 Mar 

1955; and Maj Gen Hamilton H. Howze, Ch, Army Aviation Div, to Maj Gen Elwyn D. Post, 

Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, USAREUR, 20 Oct 1955; Memo, Oakes for Ch of Staff, 3 Feb 1955, 

sub: The USAREUR Helicopter Program. Last three in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 28 Ltr, McAuliffe to Garrett Underhill, 7 Jun 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

Late the previous year, the Army had begun to develop a concept that 

would interchange divisions, separate regiments, or battalions between overseas 

locations and their permanent stations in the United States. Under this system, 

a division would serve a two- to three-year tour in Europe and then change 

places with a similar force in the United States. The units, with dependents if 

possible, would move in their entirety from the old station to the new. Then, 

after another two to three years, they would change places again. Most vehicles 

and heavy weapons would remain in place, with each unit using its predecessor’s 

equipment and facilities.29

The program, dubbed Operation Gyroscope, had three primary goals: 

improve morale, increase combat effectiveness, and reduce costs. The Army’s 

chief of staff at the time, General Ridgway, believed that Gyroscope’s greatest 

benefit would be better troop morale due to more stable enlisted assignments. 

In effect, soldiers would know well in advance when they would rotate to 

Germany and when they would return. Because most units would return to 

the same station in the United States from which they had departed, military 

families could buy homes and establish roots in familiar American communities. 

The plan also promised that soldiers and their families would move overseas 

together whenever possible, minimizing the sort of long separations that almost 

inevitably harmed troop morale. Planners also hoped that Gyroscope would 

reduce the turbulence caused by frequent personnel changes and that keeping 

soldiers in the same unit over longer periods of time would enhance esprit de 

corps. Overall, Army leaders hoped that the improved morale resulting from 

Gyroscope would influence public perceptions of military service in general 

and of the Army in particular.30

Service leaders also believed that, in addition to improving morale, 

the new rotation plan would produce more tangible military advantages. 

Under traditional rotation systems, units experienced a complete turnover in 

personnel over three years. At times, the turbulence was even more dramatic, 

as when a mass exodus of reservists and draftees occurred after the 1951–1952 

augmentation. Army personnel officers hoped that the improvement in morale 

they expected from Gyroscope would stem the loss of experienced manpower, 

thereby decreasing the necessity to train new replacements. In addition, by 

allowing men to spend most of their careers in the same units with their friends, 

the plan would improve teamwork and trust. Gyroscope would also conserve 

manpower by eliminating the extensive network of personnel reception and 

processing stations. Soldiers manning those stations could serve other purposes, 

and the time the troops spent in the processing pipeline would be at a minimum. 

29 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 87; David A. Lane, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 

1957, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. 30 Ibid.; “Gyroscope Booms Reup Applications in 10th Division,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 16 Jan 1955; “Gyroscope Plan Spurs Army Reenlistments,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 11 Apr 1955.
224 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

It went without saying that the planning and execution of movements involving 

large bodies of troops also provided excellent preparation and training for 

emergency wartime deployments.31

With the Eisenhower administration cutting deeply into the Army’s 

budget, Gyroscope’s predicted monetary savings proved most appealing of 

all. By making military service more attractive, Army officials hoped that the 

program would limit personnel turnover by increasing the reenlistment rate. 

This would reduce the paperwork, processing time, clothing distribution, and 

training costs associated with bringing in new recruits. The mass movement of 

personnel overseas would also result in considerable savings. Brig. Gen. William 

C. Westmoreland, the Department of the Army’s deputy assistant chief of staff, 

G–1, for manpower control, estimated that the cost of relocating a division 

from its home station in the central United States to a port of embarkation on 

the coast would be lowered by more than $1 million, as opposed to transfer 

overseas of the same personnel as individuals. Mass packing would reduce 

shipping costs, and the consolidation of preparations for overseas movement for 

personnel would enable the Army to provide those services more expeditiously 

and efficiently. Planners also hoped that the requirement for departing units to 

transfer vehicles, heavy weapons, and organizational equipment to incoming 

units would encourage commanders to demand more careful maintenance, 

which might cut down on replacement costs.32

In the spring of 1955, the Army moved the 216th Field Artillery Battalion 

to Germany as a test of the plans for the larger unit rotation. This “Little 

Gyroscope” included 156 dependents of military personnel, a major innovation 

in peacetime rotation policies. The ship carrying the unit docked at Bremerhaven 

on 25 March 1955. Within twenty-four hours, all the new arrivals were at their 

posts in Darmstadt, two hundred miles to the south. Sponsors from the 760th 

Field Artillery Battalion prepared quarters for the incoming families, an effort 

that included providing food for three days and completing commissary, post 

exchange, and alcoholic beverage purchase documentation.33

The first full-scale Gyroscope exchange with USAREUR troops involved 

replacing the 1st Infantry Division at Darmstadt with the 10th Infantry Division 

from Fort Riley, Kansas. Even before the first elements packed their bags, the 

rotation began to generate positive effects. Recruiting offices in the United 

States reported that they were swamped with requests from men who wanted 

to volunteer for service with the 10th Division. The Seventh Army invited the 

division’s commander and key personnel to observe a V Corps maneuver, 

Spring Shower, in March, to familiarize them with corps war plans pr

31 Lane, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957. 32 Ibid.; “Gyroscope Plan Spurs Army Reenlistments.” 33 Lane, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957; Memo, Maj 

Gen Aubrey S. Newman, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Ch of Staff, 11 Mar 1955, sub: News Release—Arrival of the 216th FA Battalion; Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

to their deployment. After an exchange of advance parties in May, the main 

movement began on 2 July 1955, when the first increment of the 10th Division 

sailed from New York Harbor. The group, consisting of elements of the 86th 

Infantry, arrived at Bremerhaven ten days later on 12 July. The troops began 

moving into barracks vacated by the 1st Division’s 16th Infantry the next day. 

That evening, the soldiers of the 16th Infantry prepared for departure on the 

same boat that had carried their replacements.34

The rotation continued throughout the summer, but it did not go without 

incident. General McAuliffe, the USAREUR commander, reported to the 

Army chief of staff, General Taylor, that the initial shipments had arrived at 

considerably less than the 110 percent strength the plan had required. General 

Taylor acknowledged the shortage and promised that it would be made up in 

the next increment.35 In addition, logistics personnel reported that many young 

officers within the 10th Division had gotten married in the weeks prior to the 

deployment, complicating an already critical housing shortage. In June, as a 

result, the USAREUR chief of staff notified the 10th Division that delays in the 

housing construction program would cause seventy-three families assigned to 

the Aschaffenburg area, thirty miles east of Darmstadt, to be housed temporarily 

in government-leased quarters in nearby communities.36

The first elements of the 1st Division reached Kansas at the end of July 

1955. On the thirtieth of that month, Headquarters, 1st Division Artillery, 

cased its colors and handed its mission to the 10th Division Artillery. By 27 

September, with the rotation past its midpoint, the 1st Division’s commanding 

general, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy Jr., departed for the United States, and the 

10th’s commander, Maj. Gen. George E. Martin, formally assumed charge of 

his predecessor’s area, responsibilities, and mission. The final elements of the 

10th Division arrived in Germany at the end of November. The last of the 1st 

Division departed shortly thereafter. Stars and Stripes labeled the move the 

“Biggest Switch” in the Army’s history.37

34 “Gyroscope Booms Reup Applications in 10th Division”; Memos, Maj Gen Guy S. Meloy 

Jr., Cdr, 1st Inf Div, for Cdr, Seventh Army, 30 Oct 1954, sub: Rotation Plan—1st Inf Div, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; and Brig Gen Raymond E. Bell, Ch of 

Staff, for CG, 10th Inf Div, 7 Jan 1955, sub: Attendance at War Game, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; William Mahoney, “First 10th Division 

Contingent Lands in Operation Gyro,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Jul 1955. 35 Ltr, McAuliffe to Taylor, 20 Jul 1955; Memo, Col Lester S. Bork, Acting Asst Ch of Staff, 

G–1, for Ch of Staff, 21 Jul 1955, sub: Understrength in Initial Elements of the 10th Division; 

Ltr, Taylor to McAuliffe, 16 Aug 1955. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 36 “Full Scale Shift of 1st, 10th Divisions Starts July 2,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

23 Jun 1955; HQ, USAREUR, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 21 Jun 1955, 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 37 “Last Units of 86th Regiment Arrive in Schweinfurt as 1st Infantry Division Families Settle 

at Ft. Riley, Kansas,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 30 Jul 1955; Jon Hagar, “10th Assumes 1st Division’s Job,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 28 Sep 1955; “Army Finishes 

Biggest Switch in Its History,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 28 Nov 1955.
226 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Meanwhile, the Army also experimented with a regimental-size Gyroscope

exchange between the 2d Armored Cavalry, stationed at Nuremberg, and the 

3d Armored Cavalry at Fort Meade, Maryland. In preparation for an August 

rotation, the two units exchanged advanced-planning groups in January 1955. 

The most significant difficulty the rotation posed had to do with USAREUR’s 

commitment to maintain three companies on border patrol throughout the 

exchange period. Leaders in both organizations feared that they would have 

insufficient time to conduct technical inspections and property inventories 

before transferring responsibility for the mission to the incoming regiment. In 

the end, they solved the problem by staggering the rotation so that an advanced 

party and two battalions completed their exchanges before the third battalion 

and headquarters elements arrived and took command. In effect, for a brief 

period, units of the 3d Armored Cavalry took over border operations under 

the command of the 2d Armored Cavalry. This enabled the two regiments to 

execute the turnover with minimal disruption.38

With several further Gyroscope exchanges in planning for the coming 

months, the Army began to study concerns that had emerged from the first 

swaps. Not enough ships had been available during the busy summer months 

to handle the large number of people involved in the transfer. USAREUR had 

received only 18 percent of the cabin space it required for soldiers and their 

families crossing the Atlantic. The command warned future participants in the 

program that such requirements would have to be filled by air transport, and 

that families who desired surface transport for medical or personal reasons might 

experience delays in their passage overseas. Although the transfer of property 

went smoothly, unexpected challenges did arise. Throughout its twelve-year 

stay in Europe, the 1st Division had accumulated a great deal of property never 

accounted for on TOE. After an evaluation, USAREUR provided a loan to 

the 10th Division so that it could purchase the equipment outright from the 

departing units.39

The need to transfer divisions to Europe at a greater-than-authorized 

strength to allow for attrition during the transition and to transfer divisions 

back home that were up to strength and combat ready placed enormous burdens 

on personnel systems in both the United States and Germany. In preparing 

to deploy overseas, Gyroscope units continued to add troops to their rosters 

right up until the moment of deployment. This caused many soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers to miss essential orientation and training they 

should have received prior to departure. It was impossible, moreover, to deploy 

38 Lane, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957; Memo, Maj 

James W. Hajek, Adj, for CG, Seventh Army, 27 Jan 1955, sub: Rotation Plan, 2d Armd Cav, 

Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “3d Cav Members Hail Gyroscope

in Magazine Stories,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Dec 1955. 39 HQ, USAREUR, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 7 Jun 1955, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Lane, Operation Gyroscope

in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957.
1955: A Year of Transition 

an entire division with personnel who had two to three years of time in service 

remaining. Almost as soon as they arrived in Germany, the divisions began 

receiving replacements to make up for soldiers who were preparing to depart. 

To conserve on moving costs, the Department of the Army also directed that 

soldiers already stationed in Europe serve a minimum of two years. In order to 

avoid sending soldiers back too early, or to maintain required quotas of Regular 

Army personnel, units returning to the United States had to exchange troops 

with other units in the Seventh Army and USAREUR. The resulting personnel 

turbulence negated much of the improvement in morale and combat efficiency 

that Gyroscope was intended to provide.40

The most troublesome and controversial problem revealed in the initial 

rotations was the lack of adequate dependent housing throughout Europe. 

One of Gyroscope’s supposed advantages was that, consistent with the 

availability of transportation and housing, dependents would accompany 

40 Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in 

Europe, 1945–1963, 1964, pp. 48–54, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; HQ, 

Seventh Army, Army Commanders Conference, 4 Apr 1955, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

Troops of the 25th Signal Battalion board a train at Bremerhaven to take them to 

Kaiserslautern.
Soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division arrive in Bremerhaven as part of Operation 

Gyroscope

A soldier of the 25th Signal Battalion and his family are met by Maj. Gen. E. D. Post, 

Commander, Western Area Command, at the Kaiserslautern train station.
1955: A Year of Transition 

units overseas. After the first rotations, however, USAREUR concluded 

that family housing in each of the areas designated for Gyroscope units fell 

short of minimum requirements. A staff analysis concluded that units had not 

heeded qualifying conditions for concurrent travel and that each was arriving 

with more married personnel and more dependents than the command could 

house. As an example, the report cited the 3d Armored Cavalry, to which 

USAREUR had allocated 461 sets of quarters in the area around Nuremberg 

prior to deployment, had arrived in Germany with 527 married personnel. 

This left sixty-six military couples and families unable to obtain quarters in the 

foreseeable future. Although USAREUR recommended limiting the number 

of married personnel within deploying units, the Army rejected the proposal 

as unworkable and contrary to the family stability objectives the program 

was supposed to foster. The USAREUR personnel staff also discovered 

that the operations staff had made plans to move a considerable number of 

families from Austria into billets that it had allocated to Gyroscope. The 

situation prompted the USAREUR chief of staff, Maj. Gen. John F. Uncles, 

to admonish the chiefs of all staff divisions to improve coordination between 

sections and specifically to recheck their plans regarding Operation Gyroscope

to avoid such conflicts in the future.41

41 Memo, Maj Gen Aubrey S. Newman, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for SGS, 19 Oct 1955, sub: 

Subjects for Discussion at Army Commander’s Conference, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Lane, Operation Gyroscope in the United States 

Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957, p. 19; Memos, Ch of Staff for Chs of All Staff Divs, 13 Jun 1955, 

Aerial view of the housing area at Böblingen, August 1955
230 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Still, the command considered the Gyroscope experiments successes and 

planned for several more in the upcoming years. In March 1955, the Department 

of the Army directed USAREUR to prepare to rotate two more divisions in 

1956. The plan called for the 11th Airborne Division to replace the 5th Infantry 

Division in January and for the 3d Armored Division to replace the 4th Infantry 

Division in May. In both cases the USAREUR staff had to consider how to 

conduct equipment exchanges between different types of units. In the case of 

the 11th Airborne Division, the incoming and outgoing divisions both agreed 

that the incoming organization would bring with it all items that were unique 

to an airborne unit. The Department of the Army also directed the 11th to 

bring with it thirty days of supplies peculiar to an airborne division. After that, 

the USAREUR technical services would provide a 180-day supply of spare 

parts for each new item introduced into the theater. The exchange of the 3d 

Armored Division with the 4th Infantry Division required the shipment of up 

to seven hundred additional tanks and other vehicles to Europe in advance of 

the personnel rotation. The Seventh Army, however, opposed a plan to store the 

vehicles at its own kasernes due to its inability to evacuate them in the event of 

an emergency. The USAREUR logistics staff and Seventh Army leaders were 

still working on a solution to the problem when the year ended.42

The End of the Occupation in Austria

The Gyroscope effort was not the only major challenge facing USAREUR 

personnel officers during 1955. The imminent redeployment of troops assigned 

to U.S. Forces, Austria, complicated the already turbulent movement of units 

into and out of USAREUR. In April 1955, after years of wrangling with the 

Western allies, the Soviet Union announced that it was ready to sign a peace 

treaty with Austria and to restore the nation’s independence. Officials in the 

U.S. State Department interpreted the offer as an attempt by the Soviets to 

take the Austrian issue off the table before dealing in more detail with issues 

regarding Germany. Even so, the offer did not come without a price. In return, 

the Austrians had to agree to maintain a policy of strict neutrality, to permit 

no foreign military bases on their soil, and to pay the Soviet government $160 

million annually for the next ten years. Despite these conditions, the Austrians 

were eager to end the occupation. For the United States, Great Britain, and 

France, the agreement had the benefit of removing Soviet troops from Austria, 

sub: Illustrations of Type Staff Failures; and Newman for G–3, 6 May 1955, sub: Gyroscope

Responsibility. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 

549, NACP. HQ, USAREUR, Weekly Commanders Conference, 10 Jan 1956, Entry 2135, 

USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP. 42 Memo, Ofc of the Adj Gen, DA, for CINCUSAREUR, 29 Mar 1955, sub: Letter of Instructions (Rotation Instructions Number 2), Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; 

HQ, USAREUR, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conferences, 9 Aug 1955 and 20 Dec 1955. 

Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

a political victory of sorts. It was also probably the best deal they were going 

to get. On 15 May 1955, the four nations signed a treaty that granted Austria 

its independence.43

By mid-July all four occupation powers had ratified the treaty, setting into 

motion a stipulation that all foreign troops be out of Austria within ninety 

days. Soviet forces began withdrawing at a rate of almost one thousand troops 

a day. Meanwhile, USAREUR technical services screened U.S. supply stocks 

in Austria and began evacuating selected items to depots in Germany and 

France. Among the U.S. occupation units transferred to Germany were the 

70th Engineer Battalion, the 510th Field Artillery Battalion, and elements of 

the 350th Infantry, all of which were attached to the Seventh Army. The 4th 

Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion was inactivated, but the Army 

43 Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of 

State, 23 Mar 1955, in FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 5, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign 

Ministers Meetings, 1955, p. 13; Interv, Col Warren R. Stumpe with Lt Gen William H. Arnold, 

Aug 1975, pp. 272–85, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI; “Big Four Reach Accord on 

Austria Treaty,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 May 1955; “Treaty Signing Frees 

Austria,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 16 May 1955.

Troops of the 350th Infantry prepare to case the unit colors for the last time on Austrian 

soil, August 1955.
232 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

transferred its history and lineage to the 19th Armor Group which it then, on 

1 July 1955, redesignated as the 4th Armor Group. By the end of October 1955, 

all of the sixteen thousand U.S. troops and their dependents stationed in Austria 

had withdrawn to bases in Germany or Italy, or had departed the theater for 

new assignments in the United States. Any remaining U.S. property, facilities, 

or supply stocks went to the Austrian government.44

Even before the signing of the Austrian treaty, the United States had begun 

planning for the activation of a new command in Italy. Known as the Southern 

European Task Force (SETAF), the new organization would compensate 

for the loss of forward positions in Austria and assist the Italian Army in 

confronting a potential invader along NATO’s southern flank. Troops who 

redeployed from Austria to Italy went first to Camp Darby at Livorno, on 

the coast of the Ligurian Sea and one hundred fifty miles north of Rome, and 

later moved to northwest Italy, settling in at Camp Passalaqua at Verona, one 

hundred miles east of Milan, and Ederle Kasern at Vicenza, twenty miles farther 

east. These troops included the 1st Battalion, 350th Infantry; the 85th Field 

Artillery Battery (Honest John); the 409th Antiaircraft Artillery Battery; the 

532d Combat Engineer Company; and several other smaller support elements. 

The task force became operational on 25 October 1955 under the command of 

Brig. Gen. John H. Michaelis.45

The new organization had a complicated chain of command, reporting to 

NATO’s Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe, for operational matters, to the 

U.S. Department of the Army for administration, and to Headquarters, U.S. 

European Command, for international and civil affairs. Since it was organized 

to provide support to friendly forces, U.S. military planners considered it a 

prototype for the kind of deployable ground force envisioned by the Eisenhower 

administration. Once in place, it began demonstrating the Honest John rockets 

to its Italian allies and training selected officers and noncommissioned officers 

on their employment. In September, the U.S. European Command requested 

an addition of three demolition teams to SETAF’s organization. The teams 

would be assigned to the force engineer and plan and execute demolition and 

barrier missions along primary avenues of approach for the enemy. As with the 

Honest John battery, the demolition specialists also prepared to assist allied 

forces in the theater.46

44 “Treaty Signing Frees Austria”; Msg, DA, G–2, to USAREUR G–2, 19 Aug 1955, Ref 

DA–987069; HQ, USAREUR, Commander’s Weekly Staff Conference, 30 Aug 1955; Memo, 

Newman, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Ch of Staff, 10 Jun 1955, sub: Personnel Absorption, 

USAREUR from USFA. Last three in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, p. 32. 45 Msg, CINCEUR to U.S. Forces, Austria (USFA), USAREUR, 26 Jul 1955, Ref EC–9–3819, 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “U.S. Pact With 

Italy Cleared Troop Shift,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 Sep 1955; “Verona Gets 

First Yanks,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Oct 1955. 46 HQ, USAREUR, G–4 Plans, Peacetime Planning Responsibilities and Wartime Command 

Relationship Between USAREUR and SETAF; Msg, CINCEUR to DA, G–3, 16 Sep 1955, Ref 
1955: A Year of Transition 

The Effect of German Sovereignty on U.S. Forces in Europe

The peace treaty with Austria and the withdrawal of U.S. forces brought to 

an end the American occupation mission there. The more significant political 

change for U.S. forces in Europe, however, and the event that would truly 

mark 1955 as a year of transition was the restoration of sovereignty to West 

Germany. Only then could the United States and NATO begin the process of 

rebuilding the German armed forces and integrating them into their plans for 

Western European defense.

The Western allies had begun laying the groundwork for a sovereign 

Germany in 1952 with negotiations that culminated in the signing of the 

so-called Contractual Agreements, or Bonn Conventions. These agreements 

mapped out West Germany’s transition from occupied nation to sovereign 

state and were to go into effect with the passing of the European Defense 

Community Treaty. After the French Assembly rejected that compact in August 

1954, however, the allies entered into another round of negotiations and, in 

October, signed a new pact known as the Paris Accords. The new agreements 

included a “Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the 

Federal Republic of Germany,” which stipulated that the Bonn Conventions 

would go into effect upon the termination of the allied occupation rather 

than on the establishment of the European Defense Community, as originally 

planned. The protocol included a series of amendments enumerating the rights 

and responsibilities of the allied military forces that would remain in Germany. 

Others defined the contributions West Germany would make in support of 

the defense effort and laid the groundwork for a status-of-forces agreement 

conforming to NATO standards.47

After ratification by the German government, the Paris Accords went into 

effect on 5 May 1955, bringing to an end the allied occupation and establishing 

the Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany, as a sovereign nation. 

Shortly thereafter, on 9 May, the Federal Republic’s flag was raised in front of 

the SHAPE headquarters building in the Versailles suburb of Paris, symbolizing 

the nation’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the same 

time, President Eisenhower signed an executive order abolishing the U.S. 

High Commissioner for Germany and replacing the office with a U.S. mission. 

EC–9–4773. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP. Henry B. Kraft, “SETAF—NATO’s Army of Tomorrow,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 25 Aug 1956; “75 Italian Officers See Honest John at Work,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 31 Dec 1955. 47 Memo, Maj Gen Claude B. Ferenbaugh, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 29 May 

1953, sub: National Military Areas in Germany After Contractual Agreements, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 

1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 316–17; Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 

pp. 10–11. For a detailed discussion of the events leading to sovereignty for the Federal Republic 

and its entrance into NATO, see Steven J. Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance 

Under Pressure, 1953–1960 (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 97–139.
234 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

James B. Conant, former president of Harvard University and the sitting High 

Commissioner, was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as 

the first U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic. Conant assumed traditional 

ambassadorial authority with respect to responsibilities and governmental 

functions of the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany. U.S. 

military authority in Germany, however, flowed through NATO and SHAPE. 

The commander in chief, U.S. European Command, as the senior American 

commander in Europe, retained all of his duties with respect to U.S. military 

functions in West Germany. Since Berlin was not part of West Germany 

and therefore not subject to the agreements, however, USAREUR and the 

Seventh Army continued the military occupation of the American sector of 

the city. Ambassador Conant met with USAREUR leaders on a monthly basis 

and maintained direct liaison with the command on matters related to troop 

relations, public information, and peacetime psychological warfare.48

German sovereignty had an immediate monetary impact on USAREUR. 

Under a 1952 agreement between Germany and the allies, the West German 

government had provided deutsche marks equivalent to $142.9 million per 

month to support allied forces stationed on its soil. Of that, the average U.S. 

share came to $63.5 million, most of which went to USAREUR. With those 

funds, the command paid the salaries of more than one hundred twenty thousand German civilian employees, financed a large number of its construction 

projects, and procured a multitude of support items and services. For the first 

twelve months after gaining sovereignty, the Federal Republic agreed to pay 

an average of $63.3 million per month in deutsche marks for the support of 

all allied forces. Of that total, U.S. forces would receive an average of $24.7 

million per month, roughly 40 percent of the previous amount. Any payments 

after the first year would have to be renegotiated, taking into consideration the 

extent of the German defense contribution to NATO at that time.49

The reduced contribution of deutsche marks forced USAREUR to take 

aggressive action to curb its expenses. As an added complication, the secretary 

of defense decreed that no U.S. appropriated funds would pay for goods or 

services that U.S. forces had normally purchased with deutsche marks. This 

prompted the command to discharge several thousand German workers, to 

48 Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, pp. 11–12; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 

Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 312–13; Memo, Maj Gen Elwyn D. Post, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, 

for Ch of Staff, 5 Jan 1955, sub: Post-Contractual Military Liaison with the Federal Republic 

of Germany; Ltr, James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, to Gen William M. 

Hoge, USAREUR Cdr, 31 Mar 1954. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Elie Abel, “Eisenhower Act Ends Occupation,” New York Times, 

6 May 1955. 49 Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, pp. 11–12; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 

Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 28–31; HQ, Seventh Army, Army Commanders Conference, 6 

May 1955, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, Briefing 

to Asst Sec Def Thomas P. Pike, 4 Feb 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

reduce the procurement of locally produced items that it had traditionally 

purchased on the German economy, to eliminate many custodial services, to 

cut utility and engineer expenditures, and to freeze laundry and dry-cleaning 

services at existing levels. When these reductions proved insufficient, a second 

cutback in local workers followed. The reduction affected custodians, drivers, 

caretakers, housekeepers, kitchen workers, and troop mess attendants. Of more 

importance, the ruling left the Army’s Fiscal Year 1955 building program in 

Europe only 52 percent funded and postponed the construction of $23 million 

worth of troop facilities meant to replace those being returned to the Germans. 

In effect, USAREUR had to pay rent on those facilities until it could obtain 

the funding to build its own.50

Delays in housing construction complicated the Army’s relationship with 

its German hosts in another area. Even before the Bonn Conventions went 

into effect, USAREUR leaders recognized that the requisition and retention of 

German-owned properties had become a major source of friction between U.S. 

forces and the local population. At the end of World War II, U.S. Army units 

had seized German hotels, businesses, and residences for use as headquarters 

and troop billets, and for other purposes. Although the Army had returned 

many buildings to their owners and paid rental fees on most of those it still 

occupied, the commanding generals of the Seventh Army; U.S. Army, Europe; 

and the U.S. European Command received numerous letters of complaint from 

German citizens demanding the return of their homes, businesses, and other 

commandeered possessions. Although USAREUR made an honest effort to 

return properties as soon as possible, the need for housing, billets, kasernes, 

and training areas to support the flourishing Seventh Army made it impossible 

to meet all of the demands. In late 1955, it prepared a list of 5,347 properties 

required by the Army and Air Force under a provision of the Bonn Conventions. 

Of these, 2,538 were houses in Bremerhaven, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Stuttgart, 

and other cities where U.S. forces were concentrated. Buildings used for unit 

headquarters, warehouses, and training sites made up most of the remaining 

properties. Negotiations between the United States and Germany over the 

continued use of these facilities went on through the end of the year.51

Germany’s return to sovereignty also meant a change in the status of U.S. 

soldiers, their dependents, and government civilians stationed there. Under a 

1952 agreement between the United States and Germany, known as the Forces 

50 HQ, USAREUR, Monthly Ambassador-Commanders’ Conference, 31 May 1955; Msg, 

USAREUR to Area Commands, 16 May 1955, Ref SX–3300; Memo, Maj Gen Oliver P. Newman, USAREUR Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, for Ch of Staff, 16 Aug 1955, sub: Construction 

in Germany. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP. Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 31–34: HQ, Seventh 

Army, Army Commanders Conference, 6 May 1955. 51 Memo, 1st Lt William D. Dulaney, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 8 Apr 

1955, sub: Coordination of Release of Requisitioned Properties; HQ, USAREUR, AmbassadorCommanders’ Conference, 30 Jun 1955. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NADC. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, pp. 17–18.
236 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Convention, every member of “the forces”—including military personnel, 

non-German employees of the U.S. armed forces, and non-German dependents 

of both—was required to observe German law, except as specifically delineated 

in the Bonn Conventions or other agreements. It required all non-German 

personnel to carry serially numbered identification cards that were subject to 

review by German authorities on request. Although the German police had 

no power to arrest allied personnel or dependents, they could apprehend and 

search them and would deliver them to U.S. custody if they were suspected of 

acts of espionage or threats to persons or property, or disruptions of the peace. 

Germans could also bring civil actions against American military personnel, 

their dependents, or military civilians working in Germany without first 

obtaining the consent of U.S. authorities. The agreements likewise guaranteed 

the rights of members of the forces to travel freely throughout the Federal 

Republic, exempted them from most German taxes and customs controls, and 

allowed them to maintain automobiles under U.S. licensing and registration.52

The USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, took a number of steps 

to inform his soldiers of their new rights and responsibilities. Referring to a 

detailed report published in the 6 May 1955 edition of the European Stars and 

Stripes titled “YOUR Status in Germany Has Changed,” he directed his officers 

to use the article to educate their personnel. Overall, the article endorsed the 

new relationship with Germany as a great opportunity for U.S. personnel to 

share with the German people, on a basis of friendship and equality, the task of 

common Western defense. Four months later, USAREUR revisited the same 

subject with an information bulletin, titled “Your Rights and Obligations in 

Germany,” that was to serve as a teaching aid for public information classes 

throughout the command. The pamphlet provided background on the Bonn 

Conventions and the emergence of the Federal Republic, and then laid out 

the rights and obligations of American servicemen and their families in West 

Germany.53

Once West Germany had regained its sovereignty and had been admitted 

as a full member of the NATO alliance, circumstances required a more formal 

status-of-forces treaty than the 1952 agreement. The Germans, in particular, 

were anxious to ensure that their nation would not receive less advantageous 

treatment than other NATO countries. Negotiations conducted by civilian 

diplomats rather than military officers began in October 1955. They included 

representatives from France, the United Kingdom, and other nations that 

would continue to station troops in West Germany as part of NATO’s forward 

defense. The Army’s role was limited to providing technical information upon 

52 “YOUR Status in Germany Has Changed,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 May 

1955. 53 Ibid.; HQ, USAREUR, Monthly Commanders’ Conference, 2 May 1955, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, 

USAREUR Information Bull, Your Rights and Obligations in Germany, 9 Sep 1955, Entry 

2282, USAREUR Information Division General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

request. Although all sides hoped to conclude the talks within six months, the 

talks ran several more years before agreement could be reached.54

Germany’s elevation to the role of full partner in the NATO alliance also 

produced significant changes in the way USAREUR prepared for its combat 

mission. Many decisions its commanders had made unilaterally now required 

consultation with their German allies. Although the Forces Convention 

included language that guaranteed access for U.S. military units to training 

sites, the timing and locations for maneuvers would now have to be more 

closely coordinated with German authorities. The Americans would also have 

to take greater care to minimize interference with civilian traffic and damage 

to properties, crops, and land as the result of training. General McAuliffe, 

warned the Seventh Army commander, General Hodes, that he would have to 

be satisfied with less than the amount of land he desired for permanent training 

areas. Concerned that his units would not have sufficient space to train at the 

dispersed distances specified in their doctrine, Hodes groused in response that 

he was “sore” at whatever agency let the Germans have their sovereignty before 

all of the Seventh Army’s training area requirements had been met.55

West Germany’s new membership in NATO required major revisions in 

the alliance’s plans for the defense of Western Europe. Although the American 

and other NATO forces had markedly improved their level of training and 

combat readiness since 1949, and had begun to incorporate atomic weapons 

into their defense plans, the Soviet’s numerical advantage remained a concern. 

With a West German contribution still in the planning stage, NATO counted 

at best eighteen full-strength divisions with some smaller formations. The 

Northern Army Group consisted of, north to south, the I Dutch Corps with two 

divisions, the I British Corps with four divisions, and the I Belgian Corps with 

two divisions. Canada and Luxembourg provided brigade-size contributions. 

In CENTAG, the five U.S. divisions of the V and VII Corps still constituted 

the main line of defense. Although the five divisions of the French First Army 

reinforced the line on paper, their contribution was becoming problematic. By 

June, the French had shifted the equivalent of two and one-half divisions from 

eastern France to Algeria. When the United States and other alliance members 

challenged this transfer of forces, General Jean-Etienne Valluy, the French 

representative on the NATO Standing Group, argued that the insurrection in 

54 Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, p. 20; Memo, Brig Gen George W. Gardes, 

Judge Advocate, for McAuliffe, 28 Sep 1955, sub: Jurisdictional Problems in Germany Under 

NATO SOF Agreement, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP; “Accord Due on Forces in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 May 1955. 55 State-Defense Steering Committee, German Forces Arrangements Negotiations—Maneuver 

Rights of a Force, 25 Jan 1955; Memo, Col Carl N. Smith, Ch, Civil Affairs Division (CAD), for 

Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 22 Oct 1955, sub: Briefing of General McAuliffe on Seventh Army 

Permanent Training Area Problem. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
238 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

North Africa was merely another front for NATO’s struggle against the spread 

of communism.56

Up through 1955, most war plans called for a main line of defense along 

the Rhine River in Germany and the Ijssel River in the Netherlands, but that 

would change. General Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, noted that 

NATO could not defend West Germany from its westernmost boundary. If the 

West Germans were to be part of the alliance and were to contribute substantial 

troops for its defense, then NATO had to plan to defend all of West Germany. 

A NATO planning document published in November 1954 stated that the 

combination of new tactical atomic weapons and a substantial German defense 

contribution would allow the alliance to contemplate a real forward strategy 

with a main line of defense well to the east of the Rhine. The Seventh Army’s 

atomic artillery could target concentrations of Soviet armor, thus offsetting 

the Soviet Army’s most significant advantage. Additionally, some analysts also 

believed that the strengthening of NATO’s defenses with additional German 

units made the possibility of a surprise attack more remote. If war came, they 

said, the likelihood was for a more deliberate attack, probably launched in 

conjunction with bombardment of key positions and installations by atomic 

weapons. They called for a re-examination of alert measures to allow greater 

time for decision making at the national level and for more training of NATO 

forces in how to absorb and survive an atomic attack (Map 10).57

Successive plans moved the defense forward, eventually settling on a line 

defined by the Lech River in the south and the Weser in the north. Ultimately, 

while the addition of German divisions would help to make a forward defense 

possible, many leaders believed that they might require even more reinforcements to enable such a strategy. To them, the Rhine still appeared to be the best 

place to establish the main line of defense. The USAREUR commander, General 

McAuliffe, allowed that his command would no longer have to double-time back 

to the Rhine River, and he guaranteed that it could make an act of aggression 

against West Germany a very costly venture.58

56 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, pp. 136–41. 57 Memo, J. E. Stephens, B. R. Eggeman, Joint Secretariat, for Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint 

Strategic Plans Group, 26 Mar 1953, sub: Revision of Format of Part B of JSCP, Pentagon 

Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH; “Gruenther 

Says German Forces to Give NATO Depth,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Mar 1955; 

Memo, Maj-Gen Llewelyn (Ll.) Wansbrough-Jones, British Army, Principal Staff Ofcr (PSO) 

to Dep SACEUR, for Dep Ch Plans Ofcr (DCPO), 11 Aug 1954, sub: Emergency Defense Plan, 

1955, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH; Report by the Military Committee to 

the North Atlantic Council on the Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the 

Next Few Years, 18 Nov 1954, NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969, Historians files, CMH. 58 Richard L. Kugler, NATO’s Future Conventional Defense Strategy in Central Europe: Theater 

Employment Doctrine for the Post–Cold War Era (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Arroyo Center, 

1992), p. 11; James Quigley, “McAuliffe Says Buildup Moves Defense Line East of Rhine,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Apr 1955. For more detail on SHAPE and USAREUR 

considerations regarding the effect of a West German contribution on NATO battle plans, see 

Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 37–42.
Weser R

Lech R

Rhine R

Elbe R

NORTH

SEA

Rhine R

Erfurt

M Hannover inden

Leipzig

Augsburg

BERLIN

Kassel

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne Dresden

BONN

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

DENMARK

EAST

GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LIECHTENSTEIN

LECH–WESER LINE

N AT O/USAREUR W AR PLAN

WEST GERMANY

1955

Line of Defense (approximate)

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 10
240 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The plan to withdraw to the Rhine was vexing to the Germans in another 

way. U.S. forces had prepared detailed demolition plans for use in the event 

of a Soviet attack. Prior to their withdrawal, Seventh Army units expected to 

destroy as much usable war material and transportation infrastructure as they 

could, to demolish bridges, airfields, oil supplies, and anything else that might 

be of military value to the enemy. Especially critical targets for demolition 

were bridges over major rivers and hard-surfaced aircraft runways over three 

thousand feet in length. If hard structures such as these were to be destroyed 

expeditiously, they had to be prepared ahead of time. Engineers had to bore 

special holes, called chambers, in locations where they could place the explosive 

devices to produce the most damage. In many cases, German civilians in the 

vicinity of the projects bitterly opposed the activity because the preparations 

seemed a clear indication that the Americans were going to abandon them. 

Others protested the destruction of such important landmarks and transportation arteries under any circumstances. In several cases protesters damaged 

construction equipment on a site or sabotaged the chambers themselves.59

Under these pressures, USAREUR revised its policies and adopted a more 

conciliatory attitude. General Hoge met with Gebhardt Mueller, Minister 

President of Baden-Württemberg, and agreed to defer work on twelve projects in 

Stuttgart, Mannheim, Heilbronn, and Heidelberg. In Wetzlar, a mob of eighty 

persons destroyed partially completed chambers on two bridges, leading Hoge 

to defer work on those as well. When the Minister President of Bavaria, Hans 

Erhard, also requested a delay in chambering programs, USAREUR tried to 

draw a line. The command considered demolition preparations for three bridges 

over the Main River in the vicinity of Bamberg to be essential to its defense 

plans. Nevertheless, negotiations with German local authorities and political 

leaders proved fruitless and, once the Federal Republic of Germany gained 

sovereignty, advance preparations for demolitions came to an end. After some 

consideration, USAREUR shifted much of the responsibility for preparing 

demolition sites to the new German Army. By that time, USAREUR had 

completed 322 of the 381 projects it considered essential to its defensive plans.60

The issue of greatest concern to many Germans was NATO’s increasing 

reliance on atomic weapons as the cornerstone of its defensive plans. For several 

years, Communist propaganda had played on Europeans’ fears of what an 

atomic war might mean for their homelands. If any doubt remained, NATO 

59 Memos, Oakes for Ch of Staff for Opns, 29 Mar 1955, sub: Demolition Planning, Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; and Lt Col James A. 

Hudson, Engr Div, for Maj Gen Aubrey S. Newman, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, 22 Aug 1955, sub: 

Demolition Preparations, Entry 2031, USAREUR Organization Planning Files, 1955–1959, RG 

549, NACP; Interv, Lt Col George R. Robertson with Gen William M. Hoge, 16–17 Apr 1974, 

p. 1, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI. 60 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 206–08; Memo, Col Bruce 

D. Rindlaub, Acting Engr, for Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, 22 Aug 1955, sub: Demolitions Preparations 

(Chambering), Entry 2031, USAREUR G3 Operations, Organization Planning Files, 1955–1959, 

RG 549, NACP.
1955: A Year of Transition 

Exercise Carte Blanche in June 1955 erased it. In what was predominantl

an air maneuver designed to test communications, command and control, air 

defense, and counterstrike doctrine, opposing forces dropped 335 atomic bombs 

in a mock battle in West Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 

Netherlands. Exercise umpires estimated that the simulated attacks resulted 

in almost 2 million dead and 3.5 million wounded even before the effects of 

radioactive contamination came into account.61

The estimate aroused a firestorm. Up until Carte Blanche, there had bee

little public comment about the implications of a potential defense of Western 

Europe based on tactical atomic weapons. After it, however, the floodgates 

opened. Substantial discussion began among the European allies and within 

the international media on what would occur. Fritz Erler, the opposition 

Social Democratic Party speaker in the German Parliament questioned the 

relevance of German participation in Western Europe’s defense if Germany 

was going to be devastated by atomic weapons anyway. Chancellor Adenauer 

called the Carte Blanche report “frightening,” and felt he was being stabbe

in the back by his potential allies as he worked to make German participation 

in NATO a reality. In critiques of subsequent NATO exercises, the Germans 

questioned the excessive use of atomic weapons against what they considered 

inappropriate targets. They expressed particular concern about their use in 

areas where NATO policy had encouraged civilians to remain in their homes 

to prevent large flows of refugees.62

For their part, many Americans appeared callous or indifferent to German 

concerns. One USAREUR political adviser, Allen B. Moreland, warned that the 

command had to be more careful in publicizing exercises like Carte Blanc

because it would embarrass Federal Republic authorities who were trying to 

pass legislation authorizing a German armed force. He noted that the German 

people were sensitive to discussions of the potential use of atomic weapons. 

While a sound argument could be made that they needed to be educated to the 

facts of life, he said, it might be a little too early to begin the lessons. Moreland 

concluded by noting that he was only recommending the limitation of publicity, 

not any modification of the exercises themselves.63

61 Monthly Activities Rpt, HQ, Seventh Army, Ofc of the Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, Air Div, 7 

Jul 1955, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Thomas Brady, “Atomic 

Air War Ends in Confusion,” New York Times, 28 Jun 1955; “A-Raid Opens Carte Blanche,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Jun 1955. 62 Msg, American Ambassador, Bonn, to Sec of State, 8 Dec 1955, Ref 288, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Drew Middleton, “Soviet 

Peace Drive: Impact on West Europe,” New York Times, 10 Jul 1955; Michael S. Handler, 

“Adenauer Yields on His Army Bill,” New York Times, 5 Jul 1955. Quote from Grosser, The 

Western Alliance, p. 167. Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, p. 195, 

Historians files, CMH. 63 Memo, Allen B. Moreland, Political Adviser, for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 20 Aug 1955, 

sub: Elimination of Publicity in Germany on Atomic Destructiveness, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
242 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Highlighting West Germany’s sovereign independence, Chancellor 

Adenauer embarked on a trip to Moscow in September 1955 to establish full 

diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In the process, he not only laid 

the groundwork for future trade negotiations, he also secured the release of 

more than nine thousand German prisoners of war. The release was of such 

importance to the German people that it increased the chancellor’s political 

stature in both East and West Germany. Western intelligence analysts concluded 

that if Adenauer had made no secret concessions to the Soviets, West Germany’s 

position within the alliance remained secure. That said, it was equally clear 

that the nation’s automatic compliance with all Western policies and initiatives 

could no longer be taken for granted.64

Reaching an Uneasy Equilibrium

Up until 1955, much of the U.S. military activity in Europe had come in 

response to Soviet provocations. During most of that time, the Soviets seemed 

to have the initiative in the ongoing East-West confrontation. Throughout 1955, 

however, USAREUR’s continued development of a doctrine based on the use 

of atomic weapons, its buildup of atomic-capable units, and the recognition, 

imminent rearmament, and almost immediate acceptance of West Germany 

into the NATO alliance put the Soviet Union at enough of a disadvantage that 

it had to respond.

Its initial response was political, to create its own alliance for mutual defense. 

On 14 May 1955, only four days after the Western allies formally recognized 

West Germany, the Soviet Union announced the formation of an East European 

alliance system known as the Warsaw Pact. The nations of Albania, Bulgaria, 

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania signed a multinational Treaty 

of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was identical to 

their existing bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union. Although the alliance 

only legitimized military relationships that already existed, it provided the 

Soviet Union with a more efficient structure for dealing with its allies and an 

official counterweight to NATO in East-West diplomacy. Four months later, 

on 20 September, representatives from the German Democratic Republic and 

the Soviet Union signed a treaty restoring sovereignty to East Germany.65

64 HQ, USAREUR, Ambassador-Commanders’ Conference, 26 Sep 1955, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Col Robert Totten, 

Acting Dep Dir for Intel, for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 Sep 1955, sub: Russo-West 

German Agreement, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in 

Historians files, CMH; Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer, pp. 133–39. 65 Karl W. Soper, Appendix C, The Warsaw Pact, in Soviet Union, a country study, ed. Raymond E. Zickel (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1991); 

Draft Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward the 

Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, 3 Jul 1956, in FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 

pp. 191–94; Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, 12 Oct 1955, 

in FRUS, 1955–1957, 26:540–42. A brief description of events from the Soviet point of view is 
1955: A Year of Transition 

From that point on, Western recognition of the German Democratic 

Republic became one of the most important aims of Soviet foreign policy. The 

Soviets believed that this would achieve two important goals. First, it would 

formally end the occupation period and terminate the rights of the Western 

powers in Berlin. Second, it would officially recognize the existence of two 

German states and would postpone indefinitely, if not permanently, movements 

for German unification. In the end, it was this latter point that became the most 

important. The U.S. ambassador to West Germany, Conant, reported that, at 

a July summit conference in Geneva, the Soviets were unwilling even to discuss 

the prospect or to make any concessions that related to German unification.66

Whatever temporary hopes the “Spirit of Geneva” had engendered 

dissipated in renewed conflict and controversy over Berlin as the Soviets tried 

to force the West to recognize the eastern sector of the city as the capital of the 

German Democratic Republic. Thus, they could argue that East Berlin was no 

longer occupied, and that, henceforth, all people entering East Berlin would 

be subject to the laws of East Germany. The Soviets also turned over to the 

East Germans control over their own frontiers, including the border between 

East and West Germany, access points into Berlin and between East and West 

Berlin, and lines of communications between West Berlin and West Germany. 

The three Western allies responded that the agreements between the Soviet 

Union and the German Democratic Republic did not relieve the Soviets of 

their obligations and responsibilities under the existing four-power agreements 

pertaining to Germany and Berlin.67

Although the Soviets continued a propaganda campaign designed to 

enhance the prestige of the East German government and to force international 

recognition, their actions consistently stopped short of any direct violation of 

the four-power agreements. In early December, for example, when the East 

Germans arrested two U.S. soldiers involved in a street fight in East Berlin, 

they quickly turned their prisoners over to Soviet military authorities. Three 

days later, after the customary exchange of protests and accusations, the 

Soviets released the two men to U.S. custody. When Communist propaganda 

in Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe 

Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 195. 66 Progress Report on United States Policy Toward the Federal Republic of Germany, 17 

May 1956, in FRUS, 1955–1957, 26:99–106; HQ, USAREUR, Ambassador-Commanders’ 

Conference, 27 Jul 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 

549, NACP; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 197–98. 67 Msg, Bonn, signed Conant, to State Dept, 9 Dec 1955, Ref Ger–2041; Memo, Col Carl N. 

Smith, Ch, Civil Affairs Div, for Ch of Staff, 13 Dec 1955, sub: Notes on Berlin Situation for 

Use by the Commander-in-Chief at the US EUCOM Commanders Conference on 14 December. 

Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, Historical 

Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. Soviet concerns with respect to Berlin are summarized 

in Vladislav M. Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962), Working Paper 6, Cold 

War International History Project, 1993, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 

pp. 1–5, Washington, D.C.
244 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

raised the possibility of an air and land blockade of West Berlin, the Western 

allies initiated plans for a new airlift but considered such a move by the Soviets 

unlikely, given the growing East German dependence upon West German 

products, particularly coal and steel. Despite the continued bluster, Western 

intelligence sources foresaw no imminent outbreak of hostilities.68

Nonetheless, U.S. intelligence analysts continued to keep a watchful eye on 

military developments in the Soviet Union and East Germany. The size of the 

Soviet Army and its mobilization potential remained stable, with 175 combat 

ready divisions and a capability to raise and equip an additional 125 from trained 

reserves and existing stocks of equipment. Analysts noted that, since World 

War II, Soviet production of modern weapons and equipment had continued 

at a much higher level than what the nation required to replace its losses. As a 

result, they said, the Soviets had accumulated sufficient stockpiles to support 

175 divisions in combat for a period of one year without drawing from current 

production. In addition to stationing twenty-two of their own divisions in the 

German Democratic Republic, the Soviets provided modern tanks, armored 

vehicles, equipment, and training to an East German Army whose numbers 

exceeded one hundred thousand.69

The Soviet military also found it necessary to respond to U.S. initiatives 

in the area of military doctrine. As with the Americans, the Soviets started to 

emphasize the use of atomic weapons in their organization and training. They 

had reduced the size of their divisions from ten thousand to seven thousand 

men and had begun training in smaller, more mobile formations designed to 

operate in an atomic environment. They replaced older World War II–vintage 

towed-artillery and heavy mortars with more mobile rocket launchers, recoilless 

guns, and armored self-propelled guns. Documents obtained by U.S. intelligence 

agencies indicated that Soviet units in East Germany were training in both 

offensive and defensive operations in a simulated atomic environment.70

68 Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962; HQ, 

USAREUR, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 19 Apr 1955; HQ, USAREUR, 

Europe, Weekly Staff Conference, 6 Dec 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “Two Yanks Arrested by East Berlin Police,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 8 Dec 1955; “2 Seized Yanks Freed in Berlin After 4th Protest,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 11 Dec 1955. 69 Memo, R Adm Edwin T. Layton, Dep Dir for Intel, for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

15 Feb 1955, sub: Soviet Ground Forces Mobilization Potential, Pentagon Library Declassified 

Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH; “Bonn Reports Russ Increasing 

Strength of East German Army,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Feb 1955. For a more 

nuanced appraisal of Soviet attempts to coordinate the military efforts of its disparate Warsaw 

Pact allies, see Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma, eds., NATO and the Warsaw Pact: 

Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2008). 70 Msgs, DA, G–2, to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Aug 1955, Ref DA–986091; and USAREUR to 

Standard Distribution, 8 Aug 1955, Ref SX–1670. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. “Buildup of A-Army Reported in E. Zone,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 19 Nov 1955.
1955: A Year of Transition 

By 1955, the dividing line between East and West Germany, as well as the 

border between West Germany and Czechoslovakia, had become clearly defined 

with fences, minefields, patrols, and signs warning approaching personnel. 

Nonetheless, violations on both sides were commonplace. Spot reports filed 

by U.S. border patrols or the German Bundesgrenzschutz described frequent 

incursions by Communist military personnel, usually to harass civilians working 

nearby, with occasional shots being fired. U.S. soldiers were also guilty of illegal 

border crossings, sometimes to taunt East German guards, at others to take 

pictures of themselves in Communist territory. In extreme cases, the Americans 

would find themselves in the custody of Soviet or East German military 

authorities. In many cases, the incident would escalate to such proportions 

that it would have to be resolved by senior military and diplomatic officials.71

To many USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders, it was clear that the 

East-West confrontation had evolved. Although the two great military machines 

faced each other across the inter-German border, the Cold War had become 

more of a political struggle than military. It was time to rein in some of the 

more free-spirited behavior of the U.S. soldiers. In response to complaints 

about U.S. infractions along the autobahn leading into Berlin, General Uncles, 

the USAREUR chief of staff, promised a re-emphasis on regulations for those 

traveling to Berlin and harsher punishments for violations. The USAREUR 

Information and Education Division produced a bulletin describing the risks 

involved in illegal border crossings and directed unit commanders to present 

the instruction to all of their troops. An American soldier, the lesson concluded, 

was of little value to his country while spending time in a Communist prison.72

General McAuliffe captured something of the Army’s new role when he 

wrote to the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, requesting a change in his 

instructions. While he recognized the traditional duty of a soldier to escape 

after capture by an armed enemy, he pointed out that the situation in Europe 

differed greatly from a shooting war. The United States, just as it controlled 

its own borders, recognized the right of Soviet and satellite governments 

to prescribe who might or might not enter their territory. Therefore, it was 

unrealistic to instruct U.S. personnel to attempt to escape from police or military 

authorities who had jurisdiction over those geographic areas. Moves of the 

sort, he said, might result in acts of violence that could render negotiations for 

return impossible and lead to more serious confrontations. Taylor concurred 

in McAuliffe’s assessment, allowing only that USAREUR had to take special 

71 Msg, CG, Seventh Army, to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Oct 1955; Ltr, Riedl, Ministerialrat, 

to American Consulate General Section for Public Safety, 22 Sep 1955; Memo, Col Gilbert J. 

Check, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, for Ch of Staff, 20 Oct 1955, sub: Border Incident. All in Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 72 Ltrs, Maj Gen Charles L. Dasher, U.S. Cdr, Berlin, to Maj Gen John F. Uncles, USAREUR 

Ch of Staff, 21 Nov 1955; and Uncles to Dasher, 14 Dec 1955. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. HQ, USAREUR, Information Branch, 

Attention: 50 Meters to Border, 2 Sep 1955, Entry 2282, USAREUR Information Division 

General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 
246 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

precautions to keep individuals with knowledge of sensitive information from 

putting themselves into positions where they risked detention.73

Thus, while the U.S. Army in Europe carried on with its mission to prepare 

for war against the armies of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the 

nature of the confrontation had begun to change. While the threat had always 

been more political than military in nature, the increasing readiness of U.S. 

and NATO forces in Europe had made the chances for armed conflict appear 

even more remote. The West’s increasing reliance on atomic weapons and the 

imminent arrival of reinforcements in the form of German divisions raised the 

stakes in any Communist calculation of what would constitute a successful 

attack. Although few could foresee a circumstance where the Soviets would 

actually risk military action, the West’s increased military strength would also 

make it less vulnerable to the threats and intimidation that had become a staple 

of Communist foreign policy.

73 Msgs, CINCUSAREUR, signed McAuliffe, to DA, for Taylor, 20 Jul 1955, Ref SX–1362; 

and DA, from Ch of Staff, to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Aug 1955, Ref DA–986344. Both in Entry 

2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
As early as 1953, USAREUR and Seventh Army training exercises had 

aimed to instruct commanders and their staffs in the employment of atomic 

weapons and to instill in the troops an atomic mindedness that accepted the 

munitions as part of the modern battlefield. Under President Eisenhower, 

the Army had tried to make a virtue out of necessity, emphasizing the use of 

rockets and missiles with atomic warheads as a way to achieve more battlefield 

killing power for less money, quite literally a bigger bang for the buck. Then, in 

1956 and 1957, the service took the next logical step, designing its entire force 

structure around its atomic arsenal. Although the Army conducted a series 

of tests of the new pentomic division in the United States, the logical proving 

ground for the new organization was Europe, where the troops of the Seventh 

Army had already begun preparing to use atomic weapons in a defense against 

Soviet invasion. With the reorganization of its divisions designed to function on 

an atomic battlefield, the Seventh Army began a series of tests that epitomized 

its search for a way to fight outnumbered and win.

The “Spirit of Geneva” Evaporates

The four-power summit in Geneva in July 1955 had caused some to 

anticipate a thaw in relations between the East and the West. American intelligence analysts believed that the hardening of Western will and resistance to 

Communist expansionism had forced a shift in Soviet foreign policy. Local 

military aggression in Europe or in some other theater would lead to general 

war, which was something Soviet leaders wished to avoid. The analysts noted 

the recent conclusion of the peace treaty with Austria, signs of a willingness to 

accept some Western positions on disarmament, a reduced hostility in Soviet 

propaganda, and increased Eastern bloc contacts with the West as indications 

that the Soviets wished better relations. NATO military planners, as well, 

perceived a somewhat diminished threat, at least until Soviet nuclear strength 

achieved relative parity with the United States.1

1 National Intelligence Estimate 100–7–55, World Situation and Trends, 1 Nov 1955, in 

FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 19, National Security Policy, p. 132; NATO Joint Planning Staff, The 

Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years, 3 Sep 1954, Parallel 

History Project on Cooperative Security, Historians files, CMH. 

7

Achieving Atomic Mindednes
248 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

As if to demonstrate their good intentions, in June 1956, the Soviets 

announced major troop reductions throughout their entire armed forces 

and withdrawals from East Germany. The move included the elimination of 

sixty-three divisions and brigades and an overall reduction of approximately 1.2 

million men. At the same time, allied leaders received formal invitations from 

the Soviets to observe the withdrawal of 33,500 troops from East Germany at 

the end of the month.2

Western analysts and military leaders, however, placed little stock in the 

partial demobilization. The massive Soviet ground force, they believed, could 

easily absorb such a reduction without losing any significant offensive capability. 

Moreover, they assured civilian political leaders that Soviet air defense systems, 

submarine forces, and long-range aviation would take no such losses. In his turn, 

the chairman of West Germany’s Supreme Military Council, General Adolf 

Heusinger, called the withdrawals from East Germany of no real importance. 

The divisions involved, he said, could easily return to Germany on very short 

notice.3

Events in Eastern Europe during the second half of 1956 made clear just 

how illusory any post-Geneva spirit of goodwill might have been. In late June, 

2 “Allies in Germany Get Formal Soviet Bids to Withdrawal,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 17 Jun 1956. 3 Memo, R Adm Edwin T. Layton, Dep Dir for Intel, Joint Staff, for Asst to the Sec Def 

(Special Opns), 15 Jun 1956, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy 

in Historians files, CMH; “Heusinger Discounts E. Zone Pullout,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 22 Jun 1956.

Soviet tanks in the streets of Budapest, 1956
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 24

Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, serving as Poland’s Minister of 

National Defense, ordered his armed forces to put down labor strikes that had 

broken out in Poznan. In doing so, the Communist forces killed between fifty 

and one hundred workers while wounding hundreds more. More than three 

hundred, whom the Communists believed to be leaders and instigators of the 

strike, were arrested.4

Four months later, emboldened by Poland’s struggle for more independence 

and inspired by U.S.-sponsored Voice of America and Radio Free Europe 

broadcasts, Hungarians rose up in rebellion against their own Soviet-controlled 

government. Instigated by university students in Budapest but soon spreading 

to cities and citizens across Hungary, the revolt quickly expanded beyond 

the point where it could be controlled by the Hungarian Army or by Soviet 

military forces stationed there. When a new provisional government threatened 

to conduct free elections and to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets 

intervened in force. On 4 November, under the direction of Marshal Georgy 

Zhukov, Soviet Defense Minister, and Marshal Ivan Konev, Commander in 

Chief of Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, Soviet tank divisions entered Hungary 

4 “Poles Arrest 300 Riot Leaders; Shelling of Holdouts Reported,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 1 Jul 1956.

Tanks and wreckages outside the Killian Barracks in Budapest where there had been fierce 

fighting during the Soviet suppression of the anti-Communist revolution
250 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

to regain control. Soviet troops occupied all major cities and seized control 

of airports and train stations, radio stations, supply and weapons depots, 

and other military and strategic objectives. Hungarian resistance ended on 10 

November with approximately twenty-five hundred killed and more than two 

hundred thousand refugees.5

Despite pleas for assistance from resistance leaders within Hungary, 

President Eisenhower chose not to intervene. He believed that any overt 

support to the resistance might prompt an even more severe response from the 

Soviets. Instead, he preferred to rely on propaganda, psychological warfare, 

and occasional covert operations to maintain pressure on the Soviets. Given 

Hungary’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and the inability of 

U.S. forces to reach that nation without traversing neutral Austria, Titoist 

Yugoslavia, or Communist Czechoslovakia, the United States could do little. 

The North Atlantic Treaty bound its members to come to each other’s mutual 

defense; it contained no provision for taking offensive action. Without national 

or international support, USAREUR had few options. Other than some 

humanitarian support for refugees fleeing the embattled Eastern European 

countries, U.S. forces in Europe took no action in response to the Soviet 

crackdown.6

Adding a further complication, on 31 October, French and British military 

forces began a joint operation to seize the Suez Canal and to assist Israeli 

military operations against Egypt. Eisenhower believed the attacks were illadvised and vowed that there would be no U.S. involvement in the hostilities. 

The participation of two NATO allies in the adventure caused some in the U.S. 

Congress to question the future of the alliance.7

5 National Intelligence Estimate 12–5–55, Current Situation and Probable Developments 

in Hungary, 29 Mar 1955, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians 

files, CMH; “Revolt Sweeps Hungary; Soviet Troops Called Out,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 25 Oct 1956; Ltr, Marshal Georgy Zhukov to Nikita Khrushchev, 4 Nov 1956, Cold 

War International History Virtual History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, Historians files, CMH; National Security Council, Interim U.S. Policy on Developments 

in Poland and Hungary, 13 Nov 1956, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, 

Historians files, CMH. Khrushchev’s interpretation of events in Czechoslovakia and Hungary 

is in Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (1970), pp. 415–29. For another Soviet interpretation, 

see Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 186–87. 6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, vol. 2, Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (Garden 

City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 64–90. For more information on President Eisenhower’s belief 

in information warfare, see Osgood, Total Cold War. The uprising in Hungary did prompt a 

reexamination of U.S. military options in the event of a popular uprising in Poland. See James 

D. Marchio, “Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency 

Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising,” Journal of Military History

66 (July 2002): 783–811. 7 “UK, France Attack in Suez,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Nov 1956; “Israelis 

Say Egyptians Routed, Ike Vows No U.S. Involvement,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

2 Nov 1956. For an in-depth study of Eisenhower’s response to the Suez operation, see David 

A. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis—Suez and the Brink of War (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 25

The crises in Hungary, Poland, and the Middle East caused American 

political and military leaders to reassess not only the United States’ relationships with its European allies and the Soviet Union, but also the mission of 

U.S. military forces in Europe. The NATO allies agreed that Soviet actions 

were as brutal as ever and had dissipated any illusion of reduced tension in 

Europe. American analysts argued that the harsh response in both countries 

underscored just how much Soviet control throughout its sphere depended on 

the presence of Soviet armed forces. It was, therefore, in the best interests of the 

United States to encourage any developments that might lead to the withdrawal 

of those forces from the satellite nations. U.S. policies should continue, they 

said, to promote movements in Eastern Europe that worked toward greater 

freedom without going so far as to provoke counteractions that would result 

in the suppression of “liberalizing” influences.8

As if to preclude any spread of revolutionary spirit into East Germany 

and Berlin, Soviet and East German military officials in Berlin introduced 

tighter controls on rail and road access from West Germany into the city. 

Increased harassments included searches of cargo on trains entering and 

leaving Berlin, removal of mailcars, confiscation of parcel post and freight 

shipments, and new demands for special clearances and paperwork for trains 

other than regularly scheduled shuttles for assigned personnel into and out of 

the city. On the autobahn, Soviet guards subjected Western traffic to intensive 

searches and delays. By the beginning of 1957, the guards were demanding to 

see identification cards for all travelers, a requirement that USAREUR had 

traditionally refused to observe. The U.S. command insisted that identification 

for the officer in charge of the convoy, proper travel orders, and troop manifests 

were all that inspectors needed to see. The showdown continued through 1957 

with USAREUR limiting convoys into Berlin to the minimum necessary to 

maintain units stationed there.9

To Western observers, the situation in Berlin was becoming more ominous 

by the day. Visitors to the Western sector of the city reported a bustling 

economy, new housing and other construction springing up in all directions, and 

a population that was well-dressed, well-fed, and confident. In contrast, East 

Berlin seemed to be covered by a “thick, murky cloud of doom.”10 People still 

lined up on a regular basis for rations of daily necessities. Buildings, streets, and 

8 Telegram From the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Ministerial Meeting to 

the Department of State, 11 Dec 1956, in FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 4, Western European Security 

and Integration, pp. 106–07; National Security Council, Interim U.S. Policy on Developments 

in Poland and Hungary, 13 Nov 1956. 9 HQ, USAREUR, Chief of Staff Weekly Meeting, 28 Nov 1956, Entry 2135, USAREUR 

Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP; Memo, CINCEUR for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

16 Nov 1957, Ref # EC 9–6296, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, 

NACP; Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, 

Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. 10 European Observations Rpt of Leon H. Gavin of Pennsylvania, 11 Jan 1956, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, NACP.
252 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

transportation facilities were run-down and shabby. Of even greater significance, 

thousands of refugees continued to stream through the city to find safe haven 

and greener pastures in the West. In November 1957, operatives of both the 

State Department and CIA reported persistent rumors that the East Germans 

intended to seal off the perimeter of West Berlin, isolating it from the eastern 

sector of the city as well as the rest of East Germany. The intent of such an 

action, they said, would be to “dissuade” Soviet Zone and Sector residents from 

entering West Berlin, and to route traffic from the Soviet Zone directly to East 

Berlin rather than through the western portion of the city. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff acknowledged that they had no specific plans for dealing with a restriction 

on freedom of circulation within the city but seemed to dismiss its importance, 

asserting that neither the allies nor the citizens of West Berlin would be greatly 

hampered by the denial of facilities in East Berlin.11

In summing up the situation in Europe at the end of the year, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff reported to the secretary of defense that the Hungarian revolt, 

the situation in Berlin, and the Soviet Union’s resumption of policies of threat 

and intimidation had created a much less favorable climate for further East-West 

negotiations in Europe. Instead, the hardening Soviet attitude seemed to call 

for increased vigilance and the continued modernization of U.S. and NATO 

military forces.12

Eisenhower Versus the Generals: The Army Struggles to Find a Role 

Within the New Look

Meanwhile, back at home, the Army struggled to compete with the Navy 

and Air Force for funding, personnel, and a significant role in the Eisenhower 

administration’s national security establishment. Between the end of the 

Korean War in 1953 and the end of 1956, active Army strength had fallen from 

over 1.5 million to just over 1 million, and the doctrine of massive retaliation 

and its reliance on strategic nuclear forces had left the service with a steadily 

decreasing portion of the national defense budget. Between 1953 and 1955, 

the Army chief of staff, General Ridgway, had fought a losing battle against 

11 Memos, Huntington D. Sheldon, Asst Dir of Current Intel, for Dep Dir, CIA, 1 Nov 1957, 

sub: The Berlin Situation, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP; 

and Brig Gen Richard D. Wentworth, USAF, for Gen Nathan F. Twining, 20 Nov 1957, sub: 

Berlin Situation, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP. Khrushchev’s 

growing dismay with the disparity between East and West Berlin is in Vladislav M. Zubok, 

Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962), Working Paper 6, Cold War International History Project, 1993, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, pp. 2–6, Washington, 

D.C. The East German perspective, particularly that of Walter Ulbricht, is in Hope M. Harrison, 

Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton, N.J.: 

Princeton University Press, 2003). 12 Memo, Gen Nathan F. Twining, Ch of Staff, USAF, for Sec Def, 26 Apr 1957, sub: U.S. 

Military Position on European Security and German Reunification, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 25

President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in an effort 

to preserve the Army’s role in national defense.13

Ridgway’s successor as Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, 

faced the same challenges. To an ever-increasing extent, the Army’s senior 

officers believed that they were engaged in a struggle for the service’s survival. 

Their fears seemed justified in July 1956 when Anthony Leviero, a columnist 

for the New York Times, revealed a plan proposed by the chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur E. Radford, to cut the armed forces of 

the United States by eight hundred thousand men. In his position as Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs, Radford had become one of the most visible and vocal 

spokesmen for President Eisenhower’s strategic policies. His approach, which 

media commentators dubbed The Radford Plan, would reduce the Army by 

almost half, leaving it with the primary mission of keeping order within the 

United States in the event of an enemy atomic strike. Radford expected the 

NATO allies to provide the manpower for ground warfare, while USAREUR 

retained only small token forces armed with atomic weapons. He even 

questioned the Army’s expenditures on continental air defense, saying that 

the money would be better spent on improving early warning systems and 

retaliatory capabilities.14

Notwithstanding Radford’s positions, the president’s most influential 

advocate for his vision of national defense was the secretary of defense. A highly 

successful businessman and former chief executive officer of General Motors, 

Wilson enthusiastically supported the president’s belief that defense spending 

should never be allowed to imperil the economic vigor of the nation. He seized 

on the Soviet force reductions to defend his own budget proposals and explained 

that the U.S. Army needed to reduce its size and to take advantage of new 

technologies and modern weapons. At the same time, he rejected requests to 

replace or update stocks of conventional weapons, vehicles, and equipment and 

13 Interv, Col John M. Blair with Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, 24 Mar 1972, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI; Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway As 

Told to Harold H. Martin (New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 266–73, 286–302; Elie Abel, “Ridgway 

Cool to New Look and Doctrine of Retaliation,” New York Times, 16 Apr 1954; “Ridgway Has 

Reservations on Slash in Army Strength,” New York Times, 16 Mar 1954; “Ridgway Warns of 

Cuts in Army,” Washington Post and Times Herald, 24 Feb 1955. 14 Notes on General Eisenhower, 23 Jun 1981, box 29, James M. Gavin Papers, Army 

Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; Anthony Leviero, “Radford 

Seeking 800,000-Man Cut; 3 Services Resist,” New York Times, 13 Jul 1956; Anthony Leviero, 

“Radford’s Views Pose Basic National Security Issue,” New York Times, 15 Jul 1956, Marquis 

Childs, “Radford Directive Stirs Controversy,” Washington Post, 3 Oct 1956; Memos, Adm 

Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for Sec Def, 25 Apr 1957, sub: Formulation 

of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan; and Radford for Sec Def, 16 Jul 1957, sub: Force Tabs for 

JSOP 61. Both in Chairman’s Files, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NACP. For 

further detail concerning Radford’s views as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, see Radford, From 

Pearl Harbor to Vietnam.
254 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

encouraged the new Army chief of staff, General Taylor, to submit requests for 

weaponry that were more in step with the administration’s strategic outlook.15

To Taylor, the Army’s greatest challenge was to demonstrate to the 

president, Congress, and the American public that the Army was a modernized 

force that had an important role to play on the atomic battlefield. At the same 

time, the general also firmly believed that the service had to retain and update 

its conventional forces in order to respond to confrontations short of general 

war. In this respect, he had to walk a fine line, extolling before Congress and 

the American public the force’s flexibility and responsiveness to smaller brushfire wars while also remaining well aware of the president’s guidance that he 

would authorize the use of tactical atomic weapons in any conflict in which the 

United States became engaged. In the face of continued personnel and budget 

reductions, Taylor struggled to limit the damage and to find new service roles 

that would justify additional funding.16

15 “Text of Wilson’s Statement on Defense and Excerpts from his Senate Testimony,” New 

York Times, 30 Jun 1956; “Excerpts from Wilson’s Testimony Upholding Defense Program,” 

New York Times, 3 Jul 1956; Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. 

Norton, 1972), p. 171; Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, p. 56; Interv, Col Richard A. 

Manion with Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, 16 Feb 1973, pp. 7–8, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 

MHI. For more information on Wilson’s tenure as secretary of defense, see Geelhoed, Charles 

E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon. 16 Memo, Maj Gen John A. Klein, TAG, for Each Officer Assigned to the Army Staff, 7 Jul 

1955, sub: Remarks by the Chief of Staff, Selected Speeches, Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, National 

Chief of Staff of the Army General Taylor (right) inspects the honor guard at Baumholder 

with 1st Lt. Robert C. Breckenridge (center) and Brig. Gen. Stanton Babcock (left).
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 25

To an extent, he seized on the administration’s fascination with modern 

weaponry to ensure that, at the very least, Army research and development 

projects could go forward. Recalling his service’s post–World War II round 

up of German scientists as part of Operation Paperclip, he publicized Army

progress in the development of surface-to-surface missiles such as the Redstone 

and Jupiter. Noting that modern aircraft would soon fly too high to be engaged 

by conventional antiaircraft weapons, he also promoted funding for the 

service’s search for an effective response. The Nike surface-to-air missile was 

the result. Although some of the Army’s missile projects competed with similar 

programs underway in the Navy and Air Force, most generated enough interest 

in Congress and in the Defense Department to allow the service to continue 

its research.17

Years of intense interservice debate, however, forced Secretary of 

Defense Wilson to clarify the various services’ roles and responsibilities in 

the employment of missiles and other long-range weapons. In a November 

1956 memorandum issued to the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the 

secretary settled a number of issues. He limited Army development and use 

of surface-to-surface missiles to those with a range of two hundred miles or 

less, with the idea that such weapons would be employed within the army and 

corps boundaries. The Air Force gained exclusive control over the operational 

employment of long- and intermediate-range missiles, but the secretary 

allowed Army research and development on its intermediate-range ballistic 

missile, the Jupiter, to continue. Wilson’s decision also expanded the Army’s 

role in antiaircraft defense, assigning it responsibility for the development, 

procurement, and manning of air-defense missiles with a horizontal range of 

one hundred miles or less for close-in defense. This ruling cleared the way for 

further improvements in the Army’s Nike family of missiles and, for the first 

time, gave the service a major role in providing air defense for the continental 

United States.18

It was equally important to the Army chief of staff to show how an atomic 

age Army could fight on the modern battlefield. With this in mind, the service 

also introduced the Lacrosse guided missile, the Little John rocket, and the 

Defense University, Fort McNair, D.C.; Memo of Conference with the President, 24 May 1956, 

Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Edwin L. Dale Jr., 

“Dulles Says Cut in Armed Forces Is Up to Military,” New York Times, 19 Jul 1956; Statement 

by General Maxwell D. Taylor, CSA, on Department of Defense Presentation at the National 

Security Council, 25 Jul 1957, Selected Speeches, Maxwell D. Taylor Papers. 17 Statement of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Before the 

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 9 May 1956, Speech File, 

March 1956–May 1956; Minutes of Press Conference Held by General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief 

of Staff, U.S. Army, 10 Jan 1956, Selected Speeches. Both in Maxwell D. Taylor Papers. 18 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, pp. 59–72; John G. Norris, “Army Is Assigned Antiaircraft Arms; Cutback Is Ordered in 137-Wing Force,” Washington 

Post, 27 Nov 1956; “AA Missiles Assigned to Army, Others to Air Force,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 28 Nov 1956.
256 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Dart guided antitank missile. The addition of these weapons to the inventory, 

and the Army’s focus on developing even more, led some observers to predict 

the imminent demise of traditional field artillery. The service also developed 

improved versions of many of its conventional vehicles and equipment, 

including new models of tanks and armored personnel carriers, but those drew 

considerably less interest from the public and the administration.19

While the new weapons were still in their early stages of development, the 

Army had already begun work on redesigning its force structure to demonstrate 

its atomic capabilities and potential. Under pressure from the Department of 

Defense to reduce the size of the Army’s units and its overall manpower in 

1954, General Ridgway had directed the chief of Army Field Forces, General 

John E. Dahlquist, to study the problem with several objectives in mind. Those 

19 “Army Bares New Atom Rocket, Shell,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Oct 1956; 

Elton C. Fay, “Missiles Seen Ending Era of Army Artillery,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 1956; “9 New Weapons Sharpen Army, AF Punch,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 7 Oct 1956. The Army’s efforts to develop and justify its role on the modern battlefield 

are in John P. Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945–1980 (Boulder, Colo.: 

Westview Press, 1980) and Paul C. Jussell, “Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic 

Army, 1956–1960” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2004).

Paul W. Simmon, consultant to the Heidelberg City Government, and Herman Hagen, 

Heidelberg Burgermeister, view the Nike missile display at Campbell Barracks in 

Heidelberg, June 1956.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 25

included increasing the ratio between combat and support units, achieving 

greater flexibility and mobility in combat units, maximizing the effects of 

technological advancements, and improving the force’s capability to sustain 

itself for extended periods in combat. Ridgway reinforced the idea that Army 

commanders were assured the use of available atomic weapons support. By the 

fall of 1954, Army Field Forces had produced the outline for a new division 

structure that it labeled the Atomic Field Army (ATFA).20

The ATFA studies produced mixed results. The experimental organization 

reduced and consolidated many of the service and support elements, reduced 

the size of the division artillery, and cut the number of infantry battalions in 

the infantry division from nine to seven. Instead of the previous organization of 

three infantry regiments, infantry divisions were to create task forces as the situation required, under the direction of smaller combat command headquarters. 

The reorganization cut nearly four thousand men from the infantry division 

and almost twenty-seven hundred from the armored division. In 1955, tests of 

the 3d Infantry Division in Exercise Follow Me and the 1st Armored Divisi

in Exercise Blue Bolt indicated that, while the concepts held some promise

they required a great deal of new equipment, especially radios and personnel 

carriers, before the Army could implement a complete reorganization. Also, 

many officers throughout the service were reluctant to let go of traditional 

organizations and doctrines with which they were more familiar. Nonetheless, 

the ATFA studies served as a point of departure for Taylor’s own consideration 

of a new organization and doctrine for the Army. His experience during the 

Korean War had already caused him to consider potential changes in the Army’s 

combat structure. As chief of staff, he now faced the dilemma of maintaining as 

much of the Army’s combat strength as possible in the face of looming budget 

and personnel cuts.21

The result was the pentomic organization. Instead of the traditional three 

regiment triangular division of World War II, or the even older four-regiment 

square division of World War I, General Taylor envisioned a division 

composed of five self-contained formations called battle groups. Smaller than 

a regiment but larger than a battalion, each of these groups would consist of 

four rifle companies, a 4.2-inch mortar battery, and a company containing 

headquarters and service support elements. An infantry battle group would 

have an authorized strength of 1,356 soldiers while an airborne battle group 

would be slightly larger at a strength of 1,584. The new pentomic division 

would consolidate the division artillery into two battalions. One would be a 

20 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 264–65; Ltr, Gen John E. 

Dahlquist, CG, Continental Army Command, to Lt Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe, USAREUR 

Cdr, 14 Feb 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, NACP; 

Jussell, “Intimidating the World,” p. 46. 21 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 226–30, 265–66; Jussell, “Intimidating the World,” 

pp. 57–61.
258 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

105-mm. howitzer battalion with five batteries, the other a mixed battalion 

fielding two 155-mm. howitzer batteries, an 8-inch howitzer battery, and an 

Honest John rocket battery. The latter two were nuclear systems that would 

give the division its primary offensive punch. One of the most important 

principles of the restructuring was the elimination from division control of all 

nonessential elements by removing much of the force’s support base, including 

transportation, supply, and aviation, which became the responsibility of corps 

and higher headquarters. Given anticipated personnel cuts, perhaps the most 

important result of the restructuring, in General Taylor’s view, would be a 

reduction of the authorized strength of the Army’s infantry and airborne 

divisions. Under the new organization, the infantry division would shrink from 

18,804 to 13,748 men and the airborne division from 17,490 to 11,486. Because 

Army leaders believed that the capabilities of the armored divisions already 

met the requirements of the atomic battlefield, the strength and organization 

of those units would change little.22

Taylor saw the pentomic organization as ideally suited for fighting an atomic 

war. The five subordinate battle groups in each of its divisions enabled the force 

to disperse in greater width and depth than was possible with a traditional, 

more compact, three-regiment organization. Companies within the battle 

groups could also spread out, so that no single element presented a lucrative 

target for an atomic attack. Taylor believed that improved communications 

equipment would allow division commanders to exert more direct control over 

their separated units than in the past. He also contended that new armored 

personnel carriers that would soon join the force would afford the mobility to 

enable the formations to converge rapidly and to exploit opportunities provided 

by atomic fire support.23

Although other senior officers in the Army questioned whether the new 

equipment could deliver what Taylor expected, the general pushed on with 

his plans. The first division to undergo reorganization under the pentomic 

concept, the newly reactivated 101st Airborne Division, began its training 

in the fall of 1956 at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. After a series of tests and 

exercises in the United States, Taylor announced in May 1957 that all infantry 

and airborne divisions would complete a conversion to the pentomic model by 

the middle of 1958. Once again, many officers remained reluctant to embrace 

the new organization and the changes in doctrine it entailed. Taylor and his 

22 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 226–30, 270–78; Interv, Lt Col Dan H. Ralls with Gen 

George H. Decker, 18 Dec 1972, pp. 65–66, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI; Bacevich, 

The Pentomic Era, pp.103–27; “Army Bares 11,500-Man A-Age Division,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 25 Mar 1956. 23 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 270–78; Theodore C. Mataxis and Seymour L. 

Goldberg, Nuclear Tactics, Weapons, and Firepower in the Pentomic Division, Battle Group, and 

Company (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1958); Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 

pp. 71–102; Theodore H. White, “An Interview with General Gavin....Tomorrow’s Battlefield,” 

Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (March 1955): 20–23; Charles Corddry, “Army Forms Fire 

Brigade of Air Troops,” Washington Post and Times Herald, 25 Mar 1956.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 25

staff actively engaged in a campaign to convince them. In a meeting with 

Army school commandants to sell them on the reorganization he noted that 

the doctrine of massive retaliation had reduced the likelihood of a general 

nuclear war, but there was still a chance that smaller, nonnuclear conflicts 

would arise out of local aggression. The Army had to be prepared for these 

small wars as well as for nuclear confrontations. Taylor believed that the new 

divisions, although controversial, could meet both challenges. Left unsaid was 

his conviction that the new organization would show the American public a 

modern, forward-thinking Army and restore the service to a meaningful place 

in New Look defense policy.24

New Leadership in USAREUR

In Europe, the challenge of adapting to the fiscal and strategic policies of 

the New Look had passed on to new leaders. Most of the original leadership 

that had brought the Seventh Army back to Europe had long since moved on. 

Their successors, however, possessed equally impressive credentials and had 

served with distinction during World War II and the Korean War.

In the Seventh Army, General Henry I. Hodes had taken command in 

December 1954. Like his predecessors, he had considerable combat experience. 

He had commanded the 112th Infantry of the 28th Infantry Division throughout 

the campaigns in France and Germany and then led the 24th Infantry Division 

in Korea. After serving as the commandant of the Command and General 

Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he had come to Europe in March 

1954 to command the VII Corps. Eight months later, when General McAuliffe 

moved on to USAREUR, Hodes assumed command of the Seventh Army. 

After eighteen months in that position, in May 1956, he followed the normal 

progression and succeeded McAuliffe as USAREUR commander.25

Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke succeeded Hodes as commander of the Seventh 

Army. Clarke had led combat commands in the 4th and 7th Armored Divisions 

during World War II and had earned praise during the Battle of the Bulge for his 

defense of the area around St. Vith in the face of multiple German attacks. He 

had also commanded the 2d Constabulary Brigade in occupied Germany from 

August 1949 through March 1951. There, he was instrumental in establishing 

the Constabulary Noncommissioned Officers Academy, which became a model 

24 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 279; Jussell, “Intimidating the World,” p. 177; “And 

Now—The Atomic Army, Exclusive Interview with General Maxwell D. Taylor,” U.S. News 

& World Report, 3 Feb 1956, pp. 64–73; “CG of New Atom-Age Div Says Unit Will Combine 

Speed, Punch,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 Mar 1956; “Gen Taylor Says All Inf, 

Abn Divs To Be Pentomic by Middle of 1958,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 31 May 

1956; Interv, Lt Col James E. Shelton and Lt Col Edward P. Smith with Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., 

USAREUR G–3 Plans Officer, 27 Jan 1976, p. 375, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI. 25 HQ, USAREUR, Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, 10 May 1956, Entry 2135, 

USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP.
260 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

for later enlisted service schools throughout the Army. He later commanded 

the I Corps in Korea.26

One of the most colorful general officers in the Army, Clarke was also one of 

the most polarizing. His supreme confidence in his own capabilities as a trainer and 

his conviction that his methods were the best way to develop combat readiness left 

little leeway for opposing philosophies or independent approaches. His frequently 

cited credo was that a unit only did well those things that the commander checked. 

Toward that end, Clarke expected each commander to carry with him at all times 

a detailed assessment of his unit. They were to update this assessment daily in 

more than thirty areas, including training, discipline, maintenance, morale, and 

community relations. During his frequent visits to subordinate units, he personally 

inspected the assessments and ensured that each commander forwarded a copy of 

the self-appraisal to the next higher headquarters. He instructed his subordinate 

commanders to use the self-appraisals as a checklist when preparing efficiency 

reports on their junior officers.27

26 William D. Ellis and Thomas J. Cunningham Jr., Clarke of St. Vith: The Sergeants’ General

(Cleveland, Ohio: Dillon/Liederbach, 1974), p. 170. 27 Ibid.; Interv, Col Francis B. Kish with Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, pp. 174–75, 

Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI. Memo, Col Harold H. Newman, Adj Gen, for COs 

of Each Combat Command, Group, Regiment, Battalion, Separate Company, and Battery, 14 

Aug 1956, sub: Report of Unit Commanders to the Army Commander; HQ, Seventh Army, 

Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker is met by USAREUR Commander, General Hodes, as 

he arrives at Rhein-Main Air Base, 24 July 1956.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 26

Clarke’s various checklists soon became famous throughout the Seventh 

Army. In October 1956, after only a few months in command, he distributed 

a detailed, multipage checklist to be used by units during field training. He 

directed unit commanders to use the checklist in preparing for training tests 

and to have umpires, controllers, or other staff officers use such forms to 

evaluate training each time the unit went to the field. The checklists were to be 

completed in duplicate, with one copy going to the unit commander and the 

other to the next higher headquarters. The general also had detailed checklists 

for conducting unit training tests and for preparing operational orders. He told 

his officers that a detailed checklist would prove invaluable in a time of pressure 

by enabling commanders to plan with speed instead of haste.28

Remarks by the Army Commander, Army Commanders’ Conference, 12 Oct 1956. Both in 

Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 28 Memos, Maj Gen William W. Dick, Ch of Staff, for Seventh Army Distribution, 6 Jun 

1956, sub: Remarks by the Army Commander; Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army Cdr, 

for Distribution, 8 Oct 1956, sub: Field Training Exercise Checklist; and Capt Albert Emry Jr., 

General Clarke, the commander of the Seventh Army, arrives at Hohenfels to observe 

USAREUR marksmanship competition.
262 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Clarke believed that his greatest contribution to the training of the Seventh 

Army would be to make it more realistic. To that end, instead of generating the 

Army-wide practice alerts from his own headquarters, he saw to it that initial 

alarms originated from border outposts, which would be the first to observe 

an actual attack. At the same time, he applied many traditional educational 

concepts, breaking the training process into four steps: explanation, demonstration, practical application, and examination. He felt that the Army did well on 

the first two but spent too little time on practicing a desired skill and almost none 

on examination. Throughout his tour he pushed individual soldiers and units 

to show that they had thoroughly mastered the tasks they had been taught.29

 Many officers found Clarke’s manner to be abrasive and felt his approach 

left little room for initiative from his subordinates. Clarke’s successor, General 

Clyde Eddleman, had little use for the leadership philosophies and aphorisms 

his predecessor had posted on walls throughout his command. When briefed on 

Clarke’s system of imposed self-evaluations, Eddleman wondered aloud why 

the general bothered to inspect at all. Clarke’s chief of staff, the future Army 

chief of staff, Harold K. Johnson, perhaps summed up his boss best when he 

observed that General Clarke knew more about training than any officer he 

had ever known, and practiced it less.30

The Effect of Funding Cuts on USAREUR

In 1956, after four years of the Eisenhower administration, the Army was 

beginning to feel the full effects of the personnel and budget cuts the New 

Look had established. Although the Army did its best to shield the force in 

Europe from the worst of the reductions, USAREUR stood out as one of its 

largest and most expensive commands. Its new leaders would have to deal with 

reduced resources as they continued to prepare the command for the defense 

of Western Europe.

Major cuts came twice in 1956. In May, the Department of the Army 

imposed an enlisted manning level of 92.2 percent of USAREUR’s authorized 

strength. This amounted to a reduction of more than eleven thousand troops. 

Six months later, the level fell to 85.3 percent of authorized strength. The 

USAREUR commander, General Hodes, applied the cuts equally over all units 

but exempted the five divisions of the Seventh Army: the 4th and 10th Infantry 

Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 15 Feb 1957, sub: Seventh Army Field Artillery 

Battery Test; HQ, Seventh Army, Comments on Infantry Battalion Tests Conducted Recently, 

9 Oct 1956; HQ, Seventh Army, The Planning of a Battalion Attack, 12 Oct 1956. All in Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. Interv, Lt Col Lowell G. Smith and Lt Col 

Murray G. Swindler with Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 31, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, MHI. 29 Interv, Kish with Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, pp. 175–76; HQ, Seventh Army, Remarks by the 

Army Commander, Army Commanders’ Conference, 31 Jul 1956, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 30 Interv, Smith and Swindler with Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 31.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 26

Divisions, the 11th Airborne Division, and the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions, 

and the 6th Infantry in Berlin.31

With the divisions exempted, the cuts fell heavily on headquarters and staff 

sections. Both USAREUR and the Seventh Army canvassed their extensive staff 

elements to identify where the cuts should occur. Then, on 1 January 1957, the 

Department of the Army reduced the USAREUR headquarters authorization from 

2,971 spaces to 2,438, a cut of 15.8 percent in military personnel and 20.5 percent 

in civilians. Subsequent reductions by the Department of Defense lowered this 

figure even further, leaving USAREUR headquarters with an authorized strength 

of 1,929 by the end of 1957. The Seventh Army’s and the Communications Zone’s 

headquarters and staffs experienced similar reductions. In all, USAREUR fell from 

over 246,000 troops in July 1956 to around 224,000 by December 1957.32

The most significant effect of the Army’s budget cuts on U.S. forces in 

Europe, however, was a limit on the amount of gasoline USAREUR could 

purchase. Although the commands had no real shortage of fuel as a commodity, 

and no shortages in war reserve stocks, USAREUR and the Seventh Army 

had to cut their consumption of gasoline due to a lack of funds to pay for it. 

In April 1956, the USAREUR assistant chief of staff for logistics directed a 60 

percent reduction in the command’s fuel consumption. A short time later, by 

transferring funding from other sources he was able to increase the availability 

of fuel up to 70 percent of normal usage.33

The restrictions had an enormous effect on unit readiness and training. The 

Seventh Army was forced to cancel many of its monthly practice alerts and to 

limit vehicle movement during its training exercises. In September 1957, the 

Seventh Army chief of staff directed units to allow only wheeled vehicles to 

participate in practice alerts. Since tracked vehicles burned far more fuel, they 

were left at home until restrictions could be lifted. Looking for additional ways 

to conserve gasoline, the Seventh Army commander, General Clarke, instructed 

units to limit administrative trips and to combine and consolidate those that 

absolutely had to be made.34

31 Annual Hist Rpts,1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 38–39, and 1 Jul 1957–30 

Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 46–56, both in Historians files, CMH; Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 

14 Jun 1956, sub: Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, Entry 2135, USAREUR Weekly 

Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP. 32 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 51–52; “USAREUR Hq 

Orders Trim in Spending,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Sep 1957; Memos, Lt Gen 

Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army Cdr, for Brig Gen Gerald F. Lillard, Arty Ofcr, 22 Apr 1957, 

sub: Reduction in Strength of Headquarters, Seventh Army; and Maj Gen John C. Oakes, Dep 

CG, for CG, 18 Jun 1957, sub: Reduction in Headquarters, Seventh Army. Both in Entry 33509, 

Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 33 Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 25 Apr 1956, Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, Entry 2135, 

USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP; Transcript, HQ, Seventh Army, 

20 Dec 1956, sub: Remarks by the Army Commander, Army Commanders’ Conference, Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 34 Memo, Col Milburn N. Huston, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 26 Sep 1957, sub: 

Movement of Vehicles During Practice Alerts, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, 
264 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The budget cuts also created shortfalls in funds available for the maintenance and upkeep of Army facilities in Europe. In October 1956, USAREUR 

announced a 10 percent reduction in money available for repairs and utilities 

in the upcoming fiscal year. Leaders throughout the command promoted 

conservation campaigns designed to reduce the use of heat, lights, fuel, and 

water. In a command letter, General Clarke reminded his soldiers that the 

cost of coal, electricity, and fuel was considerably higher in Europe than in the 

United States. He directed the appointment of a conservation officer in each 

group, regiment, and battalion to educate the troops and to enforce reductions 

in energy consumption. With less money available for basic upkeep, inspectors 

soon noted increases in buildings needing paint, light bulbs that needed to be 

changed, and other assorted repairs that remained uncompleted.35

At first glance, the cuts seemed likely to have a serious effect on the 

USAREUR service school system. Indeed, in July 1956, the command learned 

that it would receive funding for twenty thousand students for the coming fiscal 

year, against a projected requirement of thirty-two thousand. Working to resolve 

the shortfall, however, the USAREUR staff noted that as much as 10 percent 

of each quarter’s school allocations went unfilled. To remedy this, rather than 

assign quotas directly to units that often did not fill them, the command passed 

control over admissions to the schools themselves. The staff also canvassed 

unit commanders to determine which courses or schools could be eliminated 

or curtailed without a serious impact on readiness. It was then able to achieve 

further savings by reducing overhead costs, cutting the length of some classes, 

eliminating others, and consolidating several service schools. As a result, the 

school system was able to operate within its budget and graduated an average 

of over twenty thousand students each year.36

Training for Atomic Warfare

Shortly after assuming his position as Army chief of staff, General Taylor 

sent word to USAREUR communicating his desire to stress training in atomic 

warfare at all levels of command. Department of the Army guidance for the 

fiscal year 1957 training program in Europe was to base all training exercises on 

NACP; Rpt, HQ, VII Corps, 28 Jan 1957, sub: Corps Commander’s Conference, Entry 33515, 

VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP. 35 Transcript, HQ, Seventh Army, 12 Oct 1956, sub: Remarks by the Army Commander, 

Army Commander’s Conference; Memos, Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army Cdr, for All 

Cdrs, Seventh U.S. Army, 28 Mar 1957, sub: Conservation; and Brig Gen Gerald F. Lillard, 

Arty Ofcr, for Ch of Staff, 5 Sep 1956, sub: Problems Raised by Units During Recent Visit of 

the Army Commander. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 36 Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 19 Jul 1956, sub: Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, Entry 2135, 

USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP; Transcript, HQ, USAREUR, 12 

Aug 1957, sub: Comments of Commander-in-Chief at Ambassador-Commanders Conference, Entry 

2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpts, 1 Jul 1956–30 

Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, p. 185, and 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 161–62.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 26

situations where both U.S. and aggressor forces had tactical atomic weapons. 

At NATO headquarters, the supreme allied commander, General Norstad, 

had also begun to revise his battle plans around the early and optimum use 

of atomic weapons by all forces at his immediate disposal. The U.S. Army, 

Europe, had already anticipated the shift in doctrine and had included the 

employment of simulated atomic weapons and guided missiles in all of its major 

field exercises and maneuvers. Among other responsibilities, units had to be able 

to operate and protect themselves in a contaminated environment, exploit the 

opportunities provided by friendly atomic strikes, and conduct operations in 

widely dispersed formations in anticipation of enemy fire. Soldiers also learned 

how to decontaminate themselves and their equipment once they had cleared 

a contaminated area.37

Because knowledge of the tactical use, effects, and exploitation of atomic 

weapons was so important, particularly at lower echelons, the USAREUR 

assistant chief of staff for operations formed an ad hoc committee to study 

atomic training requirements and to make recommendations. The committee 

screened training tests and lesson plans from stateside service schools for 

materials it could use to improve USAREUR atomic training. It published 

a special circular on atomic warfare training that prescribed the standards of 

proficiency each individual was to have at his level of responsibility. It also 

produced a memorandum that specifically identified the responsibilities of each 

staff section if atomic warfare occurred. Throughout 1956, USAREUR and the 

Seventh Army hosted conferences highlighting the command’s atomic-capable 

weapons systems and providing attendees with opportunities to exchange ideas 

on the best ways to employ them.38

The Seventh Army also produced training literature outlining how it planned 

to fight an atomic war. In Tactical Guidance for Atomic Warfare, published in 

April 1956, leaders identified the requirements for dispersion and all-round 

security in an atomic environment. The document prescribed a mobile defense 

with battalions dispersed along dominant terrain, but prepared to concentrate 

rapidly to counterattack the enemy. Above all, defensive positions were to be 

37 HQ, USAREUR, FY 1956 USAREUR Training Plan, Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Lt Col Golden F. Evans, Asst Adj Gen, 

for Seventh Army Distribution, 11 Sep 1956, sub: Atomic Warfare Training, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; SACEUR’s Emergency Defense Plan 1957, SHAPE 

57–67, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 

1957, HQ, USAREUR, p. 179. 38 HQ, Seventh Army, Training Cir 20–2, Advance Copy, 1 Sep 1956, an. 3, Atomic Warfare, 

Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Memo, Maj Gen John F. Uncles, 

Ch of Staff, for USAREUR Staff, 19 Jul 1956, sub: Staff Responsibilities for Special Weapons 

(Atomic) Activities, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP. HQ, 

Seventh Army, Resume of Guided Missile Conference on 10 August, 15 Aug 1956; Memo, Lt 

Col Golden F. Evans, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 29 Oct 1956, sub: Artillery 

Conference. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. Annual Hist Rpt, 

1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 180–81.
266 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

supported with integrated conventional and atomic fire support. Commanders 

would coordinate counterattacks with atomic strikes aimed to break up enemy 

concentrations.39

The Seventh Army’s increasing reliance on atomic firepower was evident in 

its conduct of field training exercises during the latter months of 1956. In early 

November, the V Corps participated in Exercise Sabre Knot, which sought t

train individuals and small units in the offensive and defensive use of atomic 

weapons and the evacuation of mass casualties caused by enemy attacks. The 

corps attached one 280-mm. gun battalion to each division and also placed one 

Honest John battery in direct support. Early phases of the exercise also included 

simulated detonation of atomic demolition munitions to create barriers and to 

help delay the enemy advance. As the five-day exercise proceeded, division and 

corps commanders launched thirty-six atomic strikes against aggressor forces. 

One month later, the VII Corps conducted a similar exercise, War Hawk, wit

the same training goals. In both cases, observers reported the usual deficiencies 

in communications, camouflage, and security. Observers and umpires also 

expressed special concern about the movement and logistical support of atomic 

units in such a potentially lethal environment. Their most significant finding 

was that control of atomic strikes had to be decentralized to division and corps 

39 Memo, Lt Col Golden F. Evans, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 2 Apr 

1956, sub: Tactical Guidance for Atomic Warfare, Vertical File, MHI.

The 868th Field Artillery 280-mm. gun loaded onto British raft “Alice” prepares to sail the 

Rhine River.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 26

commanders. Control at higher levels prevented atomic support from keeping 

up with the tactical situation on the ground.40

The extensive use of the 280-mm. guns throughout the training exercises 

also revealed serious shortcomings in the command’s ability to keep them in 

service. Maintenance of the guns and their transporters proved to be a chronic 

and difficult problem. Due to the rotation of trained personnel and the absence 

of a formal training program for specialists in both the artillery and supporting 

ordnance battalions, many units lacked the qualified mechanics needed to 

keep the equipment running. As a stopgap solution, General Hodes directed 

the 42d Field Artillery Group to conduct a one-time unit school using its own 

ordnance instructors. That course of instruction, leaders hoped, would provide 

a large enough cadre of trained mechanics to cross-train personnel back in 

their original units and keep the equipment operational until they could adopt 

a more formal solution.41

40 Memo, Capt Albert Emry Jr., Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 21 Mar 1957, 

sub: Final Report on FTX’s Sabre Knot and War Hawk, AHEC; HQ, Seventh Army, Comments of Seventh Army Staff Members on Sabre Knot, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–196

338, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, Operation Plan, FTX War Hawk, 8 Oct 1956, Entry 33509

Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; HQ, VII Corps, Corps Commanders Conference, 16 

Nov 1956, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 

Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 196–97. 41 Memo, CWO Charles L. Landry, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, VII Corps, 15 Oct 1955, sub: 

Special Training in Maintenance of 280-mm Guns and Transporters, Entry 33509, Seventh 

Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 

The V Corps communication center during Command Post Exercise Summer Stock, 9 July 19
268 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Because so much atomic doctrine depended on communication and coordination between headquarters, staff elements, and support units, command post 

exercises were a particularly important component of USAREUR’s training. 

Exercise Bear Claw, a SHAPE-sponsored command post exercise held on 6

March 1956, appeared to substantiate ground commanders’ views that they 

needed greater authority over the use of atomic weapons allocated to them. 

The process for passing the release of atomic weapons down to the army and 

corps level was still too cumbersome. In July 1956, the Seventh Army conducted 

Command Post Exercise Summer Stock, involving all regimental and highe

headquarters and including those of the atomic delivery units. During the exercise, the Seventh Army tested the concept of a tactical support center with the 

intelligence, operations, and fire support staff sections all collocated in the same 

tent. Consolidation of the fire support coordination center for army artillery, 

the antiaircraft operations center, the Army aviation section flight operations 

center, the Army signal section electronic warfare center, the chemical weapons 

center, and the intelligence and operations air staffs, meanwhile, facilitated air 

support and antiaircraft operations. In August, Command Post Exercise Clea

Sweep tested the ability of the Central Army Group and the Seventh Army t

coordinate their staff functions in an atomic environment. Evaluators judged 

much of the training to be ineffective because of an unrealistic portrayal of the 

effects of enemy atomic weapons strikes. They declared estimates of projected 

losses to be untrustworthy because of the difficulty in gauging the effects of an 

enemy atomic attack. In response, Seventh Army leaders vowed that future 

exercises would incorporate much more severe losses and destruction.42

Not all of the Seventh Army’s training, however, dealt with atomic warfare. 

At lower levels, particularly within the infantry and armored battalions, much of 

the training remained focused on traditional operational concepts. Throughout 

the first half of 1956, for example, the 39th Infantry, 9th Division, engaged in 

a series of tests to evaluate possible ways to reorganize the infantry battalion. 

The goals of the project were to simplify training, tactics, and supply without 

increasing the size of the unit, and to reduce the types of weapons it employed 

without reducing its combat effectiveness. As part of the test, the regiment 

reorganized its 3d Battalion into several different configurations with varying 

complements of weapons. Based on their observations, division and regimental 

leaders forwarded several recommendations to Seventh Army headquarters. 

Although they tested companies with four rifle platoons, they concluded that 

problems with communications, command, and control greatly outweighed the 

additional firepower the extra platoon provided. Instead of assigning mortar 

42 Memos, Maj Gen John F. Uncles, Ch of Staff, for USAREUR Distribution, 26 Jun 1956, 

sub: Participation in Seventh Army CPX Summer Stock; and Maj Gen Halley G. Maddox, C

of Staff, for USAREUR Distribution, 20 Sep 1956, sub: Participation of USAREUR Units With 

Seventh Army in CPX Whip Saw. Both in Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–196

RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 193–94; Honick 

and Carter, SHAPE Histories, p. 119.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 26

and antitank sections directly to the rifle platoons, observers recommended 

retaining a heavy weapons company, consisting of two 81-mm. mortar platoons 

and one antitank platoon, within each infantry battalion.43

The group’s most important recommendations concerned what weapons, 

vehicles, and equipment the Army should normally assign to a battalion. The 

increased range and power of the 81-mm. mortar, it concluded, eliminated 

the need for the smaller 60-mm. mortar previously assigned to rifle platoons. 

The evaluators were almost unanimous in their suggestion that the .30-caliber 

carbine be eliminated and replaced by standard M1 rifles. Officers, they said, 

should only carry pistols because they had more important combat leadership 

tasks than acting as riflemen. Considerable debate arose concerning appropriate 

antitank weapons for the battalion. The new 106-mm. recoilless rifle was 

praised for its range and accuracy, but observers suggested that it was too 

hard to set up and too difficult to displace once it had revealed its location 

by firing. They agreed that rifle platoons needed a heavy line-of-sight weapon 

to engage enemy machine gun positions, but most believed that the smaller 

57-mm. recoilless rifle was the best fit for that element. The test revealed other 

shortages in communications equipment and transport, and the evaluators 

suggested additional radios, antennae, and trucks to alleviate those concerns.44

43 Memos, Lt Col Howard H. Featherston, Cdr, 3d Bn, 39th Inf, for Cdr, 39th Inf, 14 May 

1956, sub: Reorganization of the Infantry Battalion; and Capt Garnard E. Harbeck, Asst Adj, 

VII Corps, for CG, Seventh Army, 20 Jul 1956, sub: Reorganization of the Infantry Battalion. 

Both in Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP. 44 Ibid.

White phosphorus explosion from a 3.5-in. rocket during 3d Artillery Division training 

at Grafenwöhr. 
270 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

American units also tested their readiness to work alongside their NATO 

allies. In March 1957, U.S. Army headquarters down to division and separate 

regiment level participated in NATO Exercise Lion Noir, designed to train al

contingents in the Central European area in basic procedures and to test plans 

for bringing the international force up to a full wartime footing. This would also 

be the last major CENTAG exercise before Seventh Army divisions began their 

conversion to the pentomic organization. Also participating were headquarters 

and staff elements from the Central Army Group, the Fourth Tactical Air 

Force, the Portuguese 3d Infantry Division, a Luxembourg regimental team, 

and, for the first time, representatives from the nascent II German Corps. A 

critique conducted by CENTAG indicated that all staff elements needed more 

frequent participation in atomic planning to ensure greater familiarity with the 

procedures and the potential results. The review added that USAREUR did 

not allocate enough atomic weapons to allied and subordinate commands to 

allow for training at all levels. More ominous were observations that CENTAG 

defenses might not maintain their organization and cohesion in the face of 

atomic attacks expected ahead of a Soviet offensive.45

45 OPLAN CPX Lion Noir, HQ, Seventh Army, 18 Mar 1957, Entry 33509, Seventh Army

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, p. 

194; Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 85–87.

A gun jeep with a 106-mm. recoilless rifle from Company B, 1st Battle Group, 28th Infantry, 

8th Infantry Division, covers the road and valley during Exercise Sabre Hawk in February 1958
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 27

Although most of the Central Army Group’s comments on the exercise were 

fairly bland, those of representatives of the German Ministry of Defense were 

almost scathing. Participating for the first time in a full-scale NATO exercise, the 

Germans used Lion Noir as the basis for a comprehensive review of their ow

plans, procedures, and organization. They complained that the Seventh Army 

imposed excessive reporting requirements not in keeping with what was expected 

of other national forces. Furthermore, they said the exercise showed that supply 

levels for German forces were unrealistic and that the rapid enemy capture and 

destruction of Germany’s production base would require the nation’s forces 

to depend on other sources for logistical support. The Germans reserved their 

most pointed commentary, however, for the excessive use of atomic weapons 

throughout the simulation. In contrast to the U.S. critique that too few had 

been allocated, the Germans asked why atomic weapons would be used at 

all when the scenario presented no clear targets for them. Particularly vexing 

was U.S. and NATO reliance on atomic weapons on German territory when 

it was the alliance’s policy to limit the number of refugees and to encourage 

local populations to remain in their homes. The Germans expressed the belief 

that the United States and NATO should use atomic weapons only to attain a 

tactical objective that they could not take by other means.46

By the end of 1956 and into 1957, the United States and West Germany 

appeared to be going in opposite directions on the defense of Western Europe. 

With German infantry and armored divisions beginning their formal training 

and preparing to take their place in NATO’s defense plan, the Federal Republic 

expressed concerns about American reliance on atomic weapons. For their part, 

the Americans, constrained by the economics and force structure imposed by 

the Eisenhower administration’s strategic vision, had little choice but to become 

even more wedded to their atomic firepower.

Pentomic Reorganization

In March 1957, the Army announced plans to begin the conversion of its 

divisions in Germany to the new pentomic structure. Because of the successful tests 

conducted by the 101st Airborne Division in the United States, officials selected 

the 11th Airborne Division, a similar organization, to be the first USAREUR unit 

to convert. The 11th completed its restructuring by the end of April, forming five 

completely air-transportable battle groups. In so doing, however, it lost much of 

its heavy equipment and experienced a strength reduction of 5,500 men, falling 

from around 17,000 to approximately 11,500. Most of the surplus equipment 

and personnel were reassigned within the theater.47

46 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, p. 195. 47 Memo, CSA for Joint Chiefs of Staff, on U.S. Forces in Germany, 11 Feb 1957, JCS 

2124/183, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Files, 1957, RG 218, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, 

G–3 Training Jnl, Test of Airborne Capability of 11th Airborne Division Combat Groups, 26 

Apr 1957, Entry 33505, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 
272 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Less than one month later, the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, 

11th Airborne Division, began a series of squad, platoon, and company exercises 

at the Hohenfels maneuver area. The training emphasized maneuvers in street 

and village fighting and provided troop leaders with some experience in dealing 

with the larger squads and platoons the new organization employed. In a 

departure from previous procedures, squad leaders took direct responsibility 

for the employment of platoon weapons such as machine guns and rocket 

launchers. Likewise, rifle platoon leaders experimented with direct command 

over sections of recoilless rifles and medium mortars. Leaders from Seventh 

Army headquarters and the other divisions observed these and other training 

exercises in preparation for the reorganization of the rest of the force.48

Reorganization of the Seventh Army’s other divisions took place even as 

those units continued their rotations as part of Operation Gyroscope. After the 

switch of the 3d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions in the summer of 1956, 

the Army returned to the effort’s original scheme, with the exchange of two 

like divisions. In October 1956, the 8th Infantry Division from Fort Carson, 

Colorado, took over from the 9th Division in the area around Göppingen. In 

1957, USAREUR used the rotation of the 4th and 2d Armored Divisions to 

reorganize the Seventh Army and to deploy its more mobile armored divisions 

forward. As part of a three-way rotation, units of the 4th Armored Division 

began arriving in Germany in November 1957 and moved into billets around 

Göppingen, formerly occupied by the 8th Infantry Division. At the same time, 

the 8th Division moved to Bad Kreuznach, taking over facilities vacated by 

the 2d Armored Division when it departed for the United States. When the 

movement was complete, the 8th became a part of the V Corps, joining the 

10th Infantry and the 3d Armored Divisions. The 4th combined with the 11th 

Airborne Division to form the VII Corps.49

With Gyroscope rotations complete, the divisions in Europe went on with 

their transformation to the pentomic model. The experiences of one unit, the 8th 

Infantry Division, indicated some of the concerns faced by unit commanders. 

The division’s commander, Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Watlington, took particular 

care in preparing his officers and noncommissioned officers for tactical 

1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 134–35; “New Pentomic Data Expected,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 17 Mar 1957. 48 “1st Small Unit Exercise in Europe Held by 503d,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

9 May 1957; “49 Visitors Study Pentomic Setup of 11th Airborne Division,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 27 Jun 1957; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 263–86. 49 David A. Lane, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Operation Gyroscope in the United 

States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; HQ, 

USAREUR, Comments of Commander in Chief at Ambassador-Commanders Conference, 4 

Feb 1957, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Maj 

Gen John A. Klein, TAG, for Cdr, USAREUR, 27 Jan 1956, sub: Letter of Instructions, Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “Stationing Plans Listed in Switch of 8th 

Inf Div, 4th Armd in November,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 Oct 1957; “Operation 

Gyroscope: An Army on the Move,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 Nov 1957.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 27

operations under the new organization. During the month prior to the unit’s 

reorganization, he directed each of his regiment and battalion commanders to 

conduct a series of lessons for the officers under their command. In a minimum 

of six hours of instruction, each leader was to discuss battle group operations in 

the attack, on the defensive, and in retrograde operations. Additional periods 

of instruction dealt with the organization of the division artillery, the division 

tank battalion, and the division cavalry reconnaissance squadron. The general 

assigned even more responsibilities to his infantry battalion commanders, 

directing them to conduct training for company-grade and noncommissioned 

officers in rifle company tactics, fire support planning, and logistical support.50

By the end of August, the division’s transformation was complete and the 

unit had begun training under its new configuration. Individual battle groups 

rotated through the major training site at Hohenfels to conduct squad and 

platoon exercises and range firing for crew-served weapons, such as machine 

guns, recoilless rifles, and mortars. The division headquarters and staff carried 

out Command Post Exercise Swan Song to test and practice the use of divis

communications nets, command and control techniques during displacements, 

and the concept of a pentomic infantry division in the attack.51

By the end of 1957 the Seventh Army had completed its transformation. Under the new organizations, the infantry divisions were reduced by 

approximately 3,400 men to an authorized strength of about 13,750 men. 

The division artillery lost one 155-mm. and two 105-mm. howitzer battalions 

in exchange for one composite unit, consisting of two 155-mm. howitzer 

batteries, one 8-inch howitzer battery, and one Honest John rocket battery. 

While the infantry divisions lost their regimental tank companies, the former 

reconnaissance company was replaced by an armored cavalry battalion. Each 

division also lost one antiaircraft artillery battalion. The battalions involved, 

however, remained as nondivisional units, assigned to the corps or the army 

headquarters. To meet the requirements for reduced personnel strength, the 

organization pooled elements not habitually needed at the division level with 

corps and army echelons. Besides the armor and antiaircraft units, these 

included transport, supply, and some engineer units previously assigned to the 

division. The three armored cavalry regiments and the 4th Armored Group 

also underwent changes in keeping with the pentomic concept. They received 

50 Memo, Maj Gen Thomas M. Watlington, 8th Inf Div Cdr, for CG, Div Arty, and CO, 

Each Regiment and Separate Battalion, 9 Jul 1957, sub: Training in Operations of Combat Elements of the ROCID [Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division] Division; Monthly Unit 

Chronology, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 5th Inf, 8th Inf Div, 2 Aug 1957; Memo, Col Lynn D. Smith, 

Ch of Staff, for All Staff Sections and Cdrs of Separate Companies, 24 May 1957, sub: Instruction on ROCID Organization. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 51 Training Memo 3, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 13th Inf, 28 Aug 1957; Memo, CWO Lenual C. Neal, 

Asst Adj, for CG, 8th Inf Div Arty; CO, Each Battle Group, Separate Battalion, and Separate 

Company; and Ch, Each General and Special Staff Section, 17 Aug 1957, sub: Initial Instructions 

Number 1, CPX Swan Song. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, N
274 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

ordnance-maintenance support and armored engineer units to give them an 

increased capacity for independent operations.52

As the transition to the pentomic division progressed, some officers 

expressed doubts about some of the leadership responsibilities and personnel 

issues the new organization entailed. With helicopter companies and armored 

personnel carrier units moving from the division to the corps and army levels, 

leaders within the transportation corps suggested that their branch ought to 

control the administration and employment of those units. The USAREUR 

commander, General Hodes, countered that he considered both types of 

units to be combat oriented. As such, he said, they should be manned by 

people trained and experienced in the arts of firepower and maneuver. He 

accused the transportation corps of empire building. Armor officers expressed 

concern about logistical support for the separate tank battalions included 

in the pentomic infantry division. The division lacked the ammunition and 

fuel-hauling capacity that the armored elements required. The tankers also 

worried that infantry commanders would not understand how best to employ 

their assigned tanks.53

Whatever reservations he might have had, Hodes did his best to encourage 

support for the new concepts throughout his command. He told his senior 

commanders that concerns about the new organization were unfounded and 

reflected a lack of understanding of its true capabilities. He assured them that the 

Army’s leaders had made the decision to reorganize only after careful analysis 

and that they recognized the United States could not fight World War III with 

the same organization and equipment it had employed during World War II. 

The Army’s decision to reduce manpower in favor of modern weaponry, he 

said, had been a conscious choice, for one atomic weapon had the same effect as 

several hundred battalions of conventional artillery fired at once. In that light, 

the reorganization of the divisions was a necessary and desirable move toward 

solving the problems of the atomic battlefield. Seventh Army and USAREUR 

exercises over the next few years would reveal whether or not the general’s 

optimism was warranted.54

52 Ltr, Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke to Col (Ret.) Wesley W. Yale, 5 Nov 1957, Entry 33509, 

Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, 

USAREUR, pp. 134–35; “7th Streamlined as First Pentomic Army in Free World,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 2 Oct 1957; “Pentomic Reorganization Highlight of 7th Army’s 

Year,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 31 Dec 1958. 53 Memo, Maj Gen Ralph C. Cooper, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 13 Dec 1957, 

sub: Branch Control of Armored Personnel Carrier Units and Helicopter Companies, Entry 

2031, USAREUR Organization Planning Files, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen Charles E. Hart, 

CG, U.S. Army Air Defense Command, to Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Ch of Staff, 16 Dec 

1957, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University, Fort McNair, D.C.; Final Rpt, 

HQ, V Corps, Seventh Army Armor Conference, 8–10 Oct 1957, MHI. 54 HQ, USAREUR, Comments of Commander in Chief at Ambassador-Commanders 

Conference, 4 Feb 1957.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 27

Adapting the Logistical Support Structure to Atomic Warfare

With the new developments in organization, doctrine, and training, 

USAREUR’s combat units were well on their way toward preparing for atomic 

warfare. At the same time, service leaders re-examined the command’s logistical 

structure in the light of the new emphasis on atomic weapons. Infrastructure 

designed to support a World War II–style defensive effort would not necessarily 

meet the demands of a modern atomic war.

The continued development of the Communications Zone and the line 

of support across France had remained essential to USAREUR’s combat 

readiness, but Concept C, the USAREUR goal of importing 70 percent 

of the command’s wartime needs through French ports and the lines of 

communications, had yet to be achieved. Although USAREUR found it more 

economical to bring most of its supplies through Bremerhaven or the Dutch 

port of Rotterdam, the command’s logisticians realized that it was essential 

for wartime preparedness to maintain a functioning supply line leading back 

to the French ports. In addition to many language and cultural problems with 

French construction firms, the USAREUR logistical staff reported that the 

command’s own structure hampered its ultimate goals. Since 1951, the technical 

services—quartermaster, engineer, ordnance, signal, medical, transportation, 

and chemical—constituted subordinate divisions under EUCOM/USAREUR. 

The chief of each division was that service’s senior staff officer, who acted as 

commander of troops, installations, and activities assigned to his control. Each 

commanded depots and oversaw logistical functions in Germany and supervised 

supply and stock control functions throughout USAREUR. The commanding 

general, Communications Zone, however, directed the operations of the depots 

in France through his subordinate commanders in the Base Section and the 

Advance Section. A new section formed in 1954, the Seine Area Command, 

provided administrative and logistical support to international and U.S. 

elements of SHAPE and its subordinate allied headquarters; to Headquarters, 

U.S. European Command; and to several other attached organizations.55

In September 1955, the USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, initiated 

a study to examine how logistical responsibilities were aligned throughout his 

command and how that alignment related to his wartime mission. The study 

indicated that under the existing system, the Communications Zone was not 

performing its wartime mission. The current location of USAREUR logistical 

headquarters in Heidelberg was too far removed from the geographical center 

of wartime supply operations in France and so far forward as to be vulnerable 

55 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 33, Historians files, CMH; HQ, 

USAREUR, Briefing to Asst Sec Def Thomas P. Pike, 4 Feb 1955; HQ, USAREUR, Office of 

the Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, Concept C Goals for Implementation, 31 Mar 1955; Memo, Maj Gen 

Harry P. Storke, Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, for Ch of Staff, 19 Sep 1955, sub: USAREUR Logistical Structure—Staff Study. Last three in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
276 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

to enemy action. The report concluded that the transition from the present 

peacetime alignment to a wartime posture would require a complete realignment 

of USAREUR logistical responsibilities, movement of the USAREUR technical 

services to France, and assumption of the full USAREUR logistical mission 

by the Communications Zone. Based on the findings of the study, General 

McAuliffe proposed to place control of all depots, USAREUR supply and 

stock management, and all other wartime logistical activities in the theater under 

the Communications Zone’s commander. The change would have the effect of 

making the Communications Zone the logistical command for all of USAREUR. 

To reinforce this point, McAuliffe indicated that the technical service division 

chiefs and the majority of their support personnel would move from USAREUR 

headquarters to the Communications Zone.56

McAuliffe’s proposal prompted serious disagreement between the directors 

of the technical services and the commander of the Communications Zone, 

Maj. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher. Under the original proposal, once the technical 

service chiefs came under Gallagher’s control they would assume command 

of their respective depots. General Gallagher argued that if World War II 

was any lesson, the depots should remain under the direction of the Base and 

Advance Section commanders. He preferred the more decentralized command 

structure because of the distances involved, communications difficulties, and the 

requirement for dispersal in the face of threatened atomic attack. The debate 

forced USAREUR to postpone implementation of the realignment until it 

could resolve most of the differences in the following year.57

After several months of planning, USAREUR began the realignment of its 

support base on 1 July 1956. Included in the action was the transfer of more 

than twenty-four thousand personnel and dozens of depots and support units 

to the Zone’s control. As part of the realignment, the commanding general 

of the Communications Zone inherited the responsibility for all supply to the 

Seventh Army and to the area commands. Depots and other logistical support 

facilities throughout USAREUR came under the control of the section or 

area commanders. For their part, the USAREUR chiefs of technical services 

relinquished their command responsibilities and assumed a greater role in 

planning and supervising within their areas of specialization. The reorganization 

eliminated the command structures set up by the technical services to control the 

various units under their supervision. By the end of 1957, only two remained, 

the U.S. Army Signal Command, Europe, at Heidelberg, which consolidated 

military communications throughout the European theater, and the U.S. Army 

56 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 17–20, Historians files, 

CMH; Ltr, Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen Williston B. Palmer, Vice Ch 

of Staff, U.S. Army, 16 Sep 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP. 57 Memo, Storke for Ch of Staff, 19 Sep 1955, sub: USAREUR Logistical Structure—Staff Study.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 27

Petroleum Distribution Command, Europe, at Fontainebleau, which retained 

control over the fuel distribution facilities.58

Despite the consolidation, USAREUR commanders continued to express 

frustration at the complexity of the support apparatus. General Hodes, for one, 

complained in October 1957 that if the command had as many people handling, 

distributing, and maintaining supplies as it did handling the paperwork in 

connection with them, there would be no problem. With that in mind, his 

command continued to consolidate procedures in the Communications Zone 

and studied how to simplify logistical functions further while still maintaining 

accountability for supplies and equipment.59

The logistical support structure was evolving in the Seventh Army as well. 

In 1957, General Clarke concluded that supporting elements of his command 

had become so large and diverse that his technical staff could no longer 

control them effectively. Various units under the Chemical Command, the 

Transportation Command, and the Engineer Command reported directly to the 

head of the corresponding division on the Seventh Army staff, while medical, 

quartermaster, and signal groups reported directly to him. Clarke proposed 

the formation of an overarching Seventh Army Support Command that could 

exert effective control over all those elements while relieving the chiefs of his 

staff sections from having to command technical services. In response, the 

U.S. Army, Europe, activated the Seventh Army Support Command. The new 

organization contained a chemical battalion; an engineer group; three medical 

groups; a military police battalion; three ordnance groups; a quartermaster 

group; a signal company; two transportation groups; and a number of smaller 

finance, postal, and personnel units. The Seventh Army’s commander retained 

operational and technical control over the attached units, but the commanding 

general of the new Support Command was responsible for discipline, security, 

public affairs, housekeeping, welfare, and morale throughout his organization.60

In addition to the many staff and organizational changes in the logistical 

support structure, USAREUR planners also began to reassess the physical 

infrastructure. One of the first issues requiring attention was a dispersal of 

58 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 210–14. HQ, USAREUR, 

Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conferences, 19 Jun 1956, 27 Jun 1956, 11 Sep 1956. All in Entry 

2135, USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP. “COMZ to Handle More 

USAREUR Logistics,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 28 Jun 1956; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 

Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 190–91. 59 HQ, USAREUR, Commanders’ Conference, 7 Oct 1957, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR COMZ, Minutes of Commanders 

Conference, 12 Nov 1957, Entry 2001, USAREUR Commanders Conferences, 1958–1960, RG 

549, NACP. 60 Ltrs, Clarke to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Oct 1957; and Clarke to Gen Willard G. Wyman, 

CG, U.S. Continental Army Command, 20 Dec 1957; Memo, Brig Gen Harold K. Johnson, Ch 

of Staff, Seventh Army, for Brig Gen Stephen M. Mellnik, 34th AAA Bde, 19 Dec 1957, sub: 

Letter of Instructions. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. Annual 

Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 11.
278 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

depots and logistical facilities throughout the theater. As they stood, some of 

the larger consolidated support installations presented lucrative targets for 

Soviet atomic or chemical attacks. Forty miles to the west of Heidelberg, the 

Rhine Engineer Depot at Kaiserslautern, the Pirmasens Signal Depot, the 

Germersheim Ordnance Vehicle Park, and the Miesau Ammunition Depot 

all occupied vast tracts of land within twenty to thirty miles of each other. As 

early as March 1953, in preparation for a briefing to the then-commander of 

the U.S. European Command, General Ridgway, officials from the Operations 

Research Office and the Combat Developments Branch conducted an inspection 

of depot storage facilities around Kaiserslautern to determine their vulnerability 

to atomic attack. They reported that three properly placed atomic bombs could 

put the entire area out of action for at least two days. Furthermore, while the 

facilities might be restored in as little as two days, they would have no more 

than 15 to 20 percent of their pre-attack capacity. The report went on to say 

that an attacker could combine low-yield nuclear weapons with conventional 

incendiaries to achieve very good results. The authors added that the most 

effective attacks might include chemical agents to contaminate equipment and 

kill personnel.61

For that reason, in 1955, USAREUR and the Communications Zone began 

efforts to disperse logistical support facilities in order to improve their chances 

of survival in an atomic attack. Their plans were complicated by congestion at 

existing depots, difficulties in obtaining more real estate, and a need for extra 

funds. As a temporary alternative, USAREUR’s logistical planners recommended 

the adoption of a balanced, multistorage depot system in which stocks from each 

class of supply would be housed in every facility. In that way, the destruction of 

storage sites for single classes of supply would not eliminate an entire reserve stock. 

A Communications Zone plan for reorganizing depot functions provided for 

storing each combat-essential item or commodity in a minimum of two locations 

in the Base Section and three locations in the Advance Section. Existing facilities 

could be used with only minor modifications, but future construction would 

conform to changes required to support atomic operations. By the end of 1957 

the Communications Zone had established general depots at Bussac, France, in 

the Base Section, and Nancy, France, and Kaiserslautern in the Advance Section. 

Other major facilities in the Communications Zone included ammunition depots 

at Captieux and Trois-Fontaines; ordnance depots at Fontenet and Braconne; 

quartermaster depots at Ingrandes, Périgueux, and Metz; signal depots at 

Verdun and Saumur; engineer depots at Chinon and Toul; and medical depots 

at Croix-Chapeau and Vitry-le-François.62

61 Memo, Lt Col Lowell E. Thompson, Combat Developments Br, for Col Robert E. Quackenbush, Ch, Combat Developments Br, 3 Apr 1953, sub: Inspection Trip, Entry 2028, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP. 62 Annual Hist Rpts, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 247, and 1 Jul 1957–30 

Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 216; U.S. Army Directory and Station List, Dec 1957, Historians 

files, CMH.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 27

As efforts to disperse and protect storage depots continued, in August 1957, 

USAREUR directed the Communications Zone to use specially constructed 

bunkers that took advantage of natural terrain at storage sites to protect stocks 

from atomic attack. At each facility, engineers were to disperse the bunkers to 

the greatest extent possible and to shield them further with dirt and concrete. 

Buildings were to be dispersed so that no more than two thousand square feet 

of storage space would be destroyed by an atomic blast from any direction. By 

the end of 1957, USAREUR and Communications Zone engineers were still 

looking for appropriate sites on which to begin construction.63

The storage and security of USAREUR’s atomic weapons presented 

further challenges, for in addition to the segregation and protection required 

for all ammunition storage sites, security regulations required that atomic 

weapons be maintained in a controlled-access environment. To that end, 

the USAREUR ordnance officer was responsible for all atomic storage sites 

assigned to the Ordnance Command, and the Seventh Army commander and 

the commanding general, USAREUR Communications Zone, controlled 

access to classified sites in their respective areas. Personnel assigned to the 

facilities required special security clearances and wore tamper resistant 

identification cards. The sites themselves were constructed so that weapons 

and warheads were surrounded by concentric circles of increasing levels of 

security. Perimeter fences, special lighting fixtures with emergency power 

backups, and guard forces supported by a readily deployable reaction force 

offered additional protection.64

Military police guard units generally provided security at the atomic 

weapons storage sites. Living conditions at the sites were spartan and the guards 

endured boredom, loneliness, and during the winter months, frigid weather 

throughout their tours of duty. The military police (MPs) spent hours patrolling 

and watching fence lines where nothing happened. As a result, many guards 

picked out a tree or deer family and watched it grow throughout their tour. 

Because of the critical nature of their work, MPs on duty in the watchtowers 

were forbidden from any other activities such as listening to a radio or reading 

a book. Since most storage depots were located in isolated areas, usually few 

diversions were available for off duty time as well. Overindulgence in alcohol 

and, later, drugs, plagued site commanders.65

63 Annual Hist Rpts, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 209–10, and 1 Jul 1957–30 

Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 216–18. 64 Memos, Maj Gen James H. Phillips, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, for Ch of Staff, 28 Jun 1956; 

and Maj Gen Halley G. Maddox, Ch of Staff, for Command Distribution, 25 Sep 1956, sub: 

Security Requirements for Handling Special Weapons in the United States Army, Europe. Both 

in Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 

1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 199–206; Grathwol and Moorhus, Building for Peace, 

p. 131. 65 Robert L. Gunnarsson, American Military Police in Europe, 1945–1991: Unit Histories

(Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011), pp. 295–96.
280 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Despite the critical nature of their work, senior leaders decreed that the 

guard units did not have a need to know the nature of the ammunition they were 

protecting. In many cases, guards never learned why their assignment was so 

important until long after they had departed. A soldier from the 558th Military 

Police Company, watching over one special weapons depot recalled that his 

unit had secured a mix of Corporal, Honest John, Nike, 280-mm., and 8-inch 

rounds, each with yields equal or greater to the detonations at Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki. He noted that the policy that the MPs had no need to know was a 

serious mistake. They needed to understand the importance of defending the 

site. It is probably no surprise that a large percentage of the MPs who were 

assigned to the weapons storage sites left the Army after the experience.66

In addition to hardening, dispersing, and securing the ammunition storage 

sites, commanders recognized a need to examine the transportation network 

required to deliver special munitions to missile and artillery units on the front 

line. They wanted to know, for example, if local roads would support the movement of supply convoys forward, and if those movements could be concealed 

from enemy observers. Most important, commanders had to determine whether 

or not they could bring atomic ammunition forward quickly enough to meet 

time limits for engaging a target. Complicating matters further, Exercise Sabr

Knot in 1956 revealed that artillery and missile units were not realistically

anticipating their resupply requirements. While VII Corps logisticians had 

submitted a required supply rate of 2,832 tons of ammunition for the exercise, 

artillery units had requested only 650 tons. To observers, this suggested that 

they were not replenishing their ammunition stocks once they had expended 

their basic loads. As a result, the system for resupplying forward elements from 

ammunition supply point stocks was not being fully tested.67

Development also continued on other critical infrastructure programs. 

Construction on a petroleum pipeline across France had begun in 1953. By 

June 1957, the main section between the French channel ports and Metz, near 

the border with Germany, was complete. It included tank farms and storage 

facilities at various points along the way, with railhead and truck-loading 

racks so that operators could transfer fuel to other means of transport. When 

completed, the line ran 380 miles, almost all of it at least 40 inches below 

ground. It could transport three types of fuels—jet fuel, gasoline for tanks 

and vehicles, and gasoline for piston-driven aircraft—as long as engineers ran 

a mechanical scrubber the length of the line between transitions. At Metz, the 

pipeline connected to a NATO system that could pump the fuel to USAREUR 

and allied installations as far as the east bank of the Rhine in Germany.68

66 Ibid., pp. 326, 336. 67 HQ, Seventh Army, Comments of Seventh Army Staff Members on Sabre Knot. 68 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 231–33; Brendan P. Mulready, “Army Pushes 380-Mile Pipeline Across Europe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition

21 Jun 1958; Henry B. Kraft, “Armed Forces Supplied with Fuel by 500-Mile France-Germany 
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 28

In 1956, the Communications Zone opened a school at the Chinon Engineer 

Depot, about 120 miles southwest of Paris, to train those who would operate or 

maintain the pipeline. There, the 543d Engineer (Pipeline) Company conducted 

month-long sessions for engineer units from throughout Germany and France. 

Engineer officers from Great Britain, Turkey, and West Germany also took 

part. Subjects included storage tank and pump station construction, hydraulics, 

safety measures, and the operation of special equipment for pipeline construction. After three weeks of lectures, films, and practical applications, the course 

concluded with a five-day field problem during which the unit in training built, 

operated, and dismantled an entire pipeline system.69

Just as older projects such as the petroleum pipeline were nearing completion, others were just getting started. In August 1956, the Department of the 

Army instructed USAREUR and the Seventh Army to begin planning to receive 

six battalions of Nike antiaircraft guided missiles. Each battalion consisted of 

four separate batteries in addition to its headquarters elements. Because the 

missiles had ranges of forty kilometers and were designed to protect large areas, 

batteries were generally well dispersed and often several miles apart. Each 

battery site required three separate areas—a control area, a launch area, and 

an administrative area. The Seventh Army selected six 90-mm. antiaircraft gun 

battalions to be exchanged for the new missile system and identified twentyfour potential locations for individual firing batteries. These initial positions 

were designed to protect the air approaches to the large logistics complex at 

Kaiserslautern, airfields in the Bitburg-Spangdahlem area, and Rhine River 

bridges between Mainz and Karlsruhe. Additional criteria for position selection 

included suitability for attached radar stations and proximity to existing U.S. 

installations. Since Nike personnel had to be ready to launch missiles at any 

time of the day or night, planners gave primary consideration to locating each 

site near troop housing areas.70

With potential sites for the missiles identified, USAREUR officials set about 

negotiating with the Germans for acquisition of the land required. They had 

already briefed key German officials on U.S. plans to deploy the missiles, and, 

in June 1956, an Army team began a series of exhibitions throughout Germany, 

showing off a prototype of the missile and its associated equipment. Almost 

immediately, the program ran into determined local opposition, largely over the 

potential loss of agricultural land, a belief that the installations would increase 

the likelihood of enemy air attack, and widespread opposition to rearmament. 

Pipeline,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 31 Oct 1958; Grathwol and Moorhus, Building 

for Peace, pp. 111–12. 69 Nicholas Raymond, “COMZ Pipeline School Fitted for Job,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 6 Mar 1957. 70 Memo, Maj Gen John F. Uncles, Ch of Staff, for USAREUR Distribution, 13 Feb 1956, 

sub: Construction—Special AAA Program—Germany, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 

166–68; Huston, One for All, p. 167.
282 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

By April 1957, USAREUR had acquired only six of twenty-four planned sites, 

and German representatives declared that they would be unable to deliver any 

more in the foreseeable future. Work began on construction of the first two 

sites toward the end of the year.71

As the physical infrastructure of USAREUR’s support base began to reach 

maturity, Army leaders took a closer look at some of the processes that drove 

logistical support of the command’s forward-deployed forces. This seemed to 

be particularly important because of the stringencies the Army was experiencing 

under the Eisenhower administration. With this in mind, in December 1955, 

the Department of the Army directed USAREUR and Seventh Army to test a 

new system for moving supplies and repair parts from the continental United 

States to units in active Army areas. The basic principle of Project Modern 

Army Supply System (MASS) was to stock only the most frequently needed 

items with the organization that used them, while retaining less frequently used 

items farther to the rear. Seldom used items were to be stored outside of the 

combat zone until requested.72

In theory, employing the latest methods of communication, data processing, 

and transportation, logisticians would be able to identify, locate, and deliver 

parts stored in the rear, or even in the continental United States, to the mechanic 

at the front within a reasonable period of time. Tactical units would stock only 

a small amount of frequently needed parts plus some critical insurance items. 

At the next higher level, direct support maintenance units, usually at division or 

corps, would carry a stock of parts to replenish those units as well as to conduct 

their own support activities. The unit would also maintain formal stock control 

records and would be responsible for the accuracy of the requisitions sent 

forward for supply action. An Army depot would be the final source of repair 

parts within the theater. Reflecting a careful analysis of demand experience, its 

stocks would be able to fill 85 percent of all requisitions made by Seventh Army 

units. Requisitions for items it did not have on hand would be routed to the 

United States by high-speed electronic communications. Receiving top priority, 

the orders would be filled and shipped to Europe by the fastest available means.73

While the new system cleaned out warehouses and streamlined operations 

at some levels of the supply system, it also placed a good deal of stress on 

USAREUR and Seventh Army transportation units. Because of the large 

71 Annual Hist Rpts, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 168–71, and 1 Jul 1957–30 

Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 206–08; “Nike Units Set for Europe,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 6 Jan 1956; “Nike Missiles Shown 1st Time in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 2 Jun 1956. 72 Memo, Maj James A. Parker, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 21 Dec 1955, 

sub: Project MASS (Modern Army Supply System), Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, NACP; “7th Army to Test MASS Speedup Supply System,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Apr 1956. 73 HQDA, Procedures for Conducting a Test of a System for Overseas Supply of Repair 

Parts, Dec 1955, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “7th Army’s MASS 

Making Supply History,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Aug 1956.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 28

number of deliveries required and the great dispersion of direct support 

companies, it was not feasible for the Seventh Army to assign responsibility for 

administrative and logistical support to any specific unit or location. Instead, the 

command’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. William W. Dick Jr., directed all units to 

render maximum support to drivers moving supplies. This included providing 

overnight billeting and messing for drivers, security for cargo and vehicles, and 

wrecker service for disabled trucks.74

In February 1957, after seven months of testing, General Clarke appointed 

a board of senior officers to assess the operation. The commander of the 10th 

Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, chaired the group. Clarke 

recognized that his command was serving as a test bed for the project, but 

he insisted that the purpose of the system was to support Seventh Army and 

not the other way around. In particular, he wanted the board to examine the 

degree to which the operation had benefited the units down to company level, 

the effect it had on the number of inoperable vehicles and equipment, and the 

amount of time required to return them to service. He also wanted to know 

how the system would make a transition to wartime requirements, and how 

long it would take to receive repair parts under Project MASS as opposed to 

previous systems.75

The board’s report identified several deficiencies that had kept the Seventh 

Army from receiving the full benefit from the new system. To begin with, the 

command’s stocks of repair parts at the onset of the experiment had been 

insufficient to support the test. Lacking a clear understanding of the concept and 

having little confidence in its effectiveness, maintenance and supply personnel at 

all levels requisitioned more parts than the program authorized and maintained 

unauthorized reserves. Meanwhile, the board charged that the Department of 

the Army had provided insufficient funds to support an unhampered and valid 

test. The time allotted for resupply, moreover, was not adequate to keep up with 

demand. Most important, the preponderance of old vehicles and equipment 

throughout Seventh Army and the exceptionally high tempo of operations it 

maintained during the year created an abnormally high demand for both parts 

and funds and did not reflect usage rates in other parts of the service.76

The report also addressed the specific questions raised by General Clarke. 

It concluded that the test itself had caused considerable problems for Seventh 

Army units, primarily due to a lack of sufficient funding to test the program 

fully and a lack of initial orientation and training for participating personnel. 

74 HQ, Seventh Army, Logistical Support for Project MASS, 24 Jul 1956, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “Army Truckers Keep Project MASS Rolling,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 21 Dec 1956. 75 Memo, Clarke for Maj Gen Barksdale Hamlett, 7 Feb 1957, sub: Survey of the Functioning 

of Operation MASS in the Seventh United States Army, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP. 76 HQ, Seventh Army, Board Rpt on the Test of Modern Army Supply System in Seventh 

United States Army, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist 

Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 238–40.
284 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The group’s analysis indicated that the program had little overall effect on the 

amount of inoperable time for the Seventh Army’s vehicles and equipment. 

The report also indicated that Project MASS would be adaptable to combat 

operations only if an adequate stock of spare parts was available in the area to 

cushion against the expected losses in transportation assets and supply depots, 

and the increase in demands that an outbreak of hostilities would engender. In 

conclusion, the report acknowledged that the new system had great potential 

but that planners would have to alter the program to compensate for its 

deficiencies.77

The Department of the Army considered the report invaluable because it 

highlighted crucial problems that the service needed to fix before it could extend 

MASS to other units overseas. Since the consensus was that the problems 

identified could be corrected, the Army concluded that the test had proven the 

feasibility of the new system. As a result, USAREUR extended the program 

into the next year throughout the command.78

By the end of 1957, most of USAREUR’s logistical support base was in 

place. Supply, maintenance, ordnance, and other staff personnel had laid the 

groundwork for sustaining the Army’s first full-time, forward-deployed force. 

What remained to be seen, however, was how well the system could keep up, 

given the demands of the new combat organization and doctrine that remained 

relatively untested. Throughout the coming year, logisticians would have to 

work side by side with their frontline counterparts to determine how successful 

the system would be.

Complications of Alliance Defense Planning

Since the early days of the Western European Union, Western military 

leaders had been forced to develop their defense plans based on the political 

and strategic requirements of the various allied nations. Up until 1955, however, 

most of NATO’s member states had already experienced coalition warfare as 

part of the World War II alliance against the Axis. The admittance of Germany 

into NATO added a new dimension to the complexity of planning for Western 

Europe’s defense.

Although officials of the German Defense Ministry had represented their 

government at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, since 1955, it 

was not until July 1957 that the first of the Bundeswehr’s ground forces—three 

infantry divisions and two corps headquarters—officially came under NATO 

control. The 1st, 2d, and 4th Infantry Divisions had only reached 60–80 percent 

of their wartime strength and still needed substantial training before they 

would be ready for combat. The 1st Infantry Division set up its headquarters 

77 HQ, Seventh Army, Board Rpt on the Test of Modern Army Supply System in Seventh 

United States Army. 78 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 228–31; Jack Walters, 

“Project MASS Proves Its Worth in Test,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 29 May 1958.
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 28

in Hannover, the 2d Division in Giessen, and the 4th Division in Regensburg. 

The II and III German Corps staffs had already begun their participation in 

NATO planning and exercises, and they established their headquarters in Ulm 

and Koblenz. As units of the III German Corps began active training in the 

sector to the north of the U.S. V Corps, formerly occupied by French forces, 

the U.S. Seventh Army withdrew the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment from 

the forward security screen there. On 8 November 1957, German units assumed 

that mission.79

The arrival of these formations represented the first installment of the 

German plan for participation in the defense of Western Europe. The initial 

program presented by the Germans to the Advanced Planning Group in 1954 

had called for a defense contribution of five hundred thousand men with a 

ground force of twelve divisions, six armored and six infantry. Both German 

and American military planners had expected to recruit and mobilize the entire 

force within thirty-six months. By the end of 1957, however, fewer than one 

hundred forty thousand troops were under arms, and it was clear that the 

buildup would fall short of those goals. General Hodes noted that the German 

corps lacked sufficient artillery support and adequate communications equipment. He recommended a priority for those items in future military assistance 

program shipments.80

The German Army patterned the organization of its divisions after a U.S. 

model. The basic infantry division structure included three combat commands, 

each consisting of three motorized infantry battalions and an armored battalion. 

Combat support elements included a division artillery regiment and antiaircraft, 

engineer, and reconnaissance battalions. Armored divisions differed only in 

the organization of the three combat commands, which were tank heavy, each 

containing two armored and two infantry battalions. The artillery regiment 

was also mechanized. In both cases, the divisions numbered between eleven 

thousand and thirteen thousand men. In order to keep the maximum fighting 

strength forward, planners kept the support structure small and reliant on 

territorial reserves and the civilian sector. Even as the Germans were going 

forward with these initial deployments, however, there were indications that 

the initial organizations would not last for long. Led by the new German 

defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, senior German leaders, both civilian 

and military, were already pushing for a leaner, more mobile force structure 

that employed German-designed weapons and equipment rather than surplus 

American items.81

79 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 121–23; Don Walter, “New 

Role for Germans at SHAPE,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Aug 1957; “NATO Given 

1st West German Ground Units,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Jul 1957. 80 Karanowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, p. 46; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 

Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 124. 81 Karanowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, p. 44; Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix, 

pp. 325–30; Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold 
XXX

V

XXX

VII

X X

8

X X

10

X X

11

X X

3

X X

4

SEVENTH

XXXX

Frankfurt

Stuttgart

Göppingen

Augsburg

Würzburg

Bad Kreuznach

Rhine R

Elbe R

Rhine R

EAST GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LIECHTENSTEIN

Erfurt

Nuremberg

Munich

Dresden

BERLIN

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

BONN

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

WEST GERMANY

SEVENTH ARMY COMMAND

U .S. ARMY, EUROPE

1957

Major Unit Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 11
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 28

With the promise of German divisions to reinforce NATO rapidly becoming 

a reality, SHAPE defense plans evolved in acknowledgment of the German 

contribution (Map 11). For the Seventh Army, this meant that its initial contact 

with an advancing enemy would be even farther forward than in previous 

plans and that its forces would be fully committed to the battle well east of the 

Rhine. In the northern half of the Seventh Army sector, the V Corps devoted its 

priority of defensive effort to a possible approach from the northeast through 

the Fulda Gap toward Frankfurt and Mainz. In the southern portion of the 

zone, the VII Corps defended against an advance through the Hof Gap toward 

Nuremberg and then straight west toward Mannheim. Battle plans indicated 

an objective of delaying, neutralizing, and destroying enemy forces along their 

main axes of penetration in order to create conditions necessary for a NATO 

counteroffensive.82

Covering forces composed of armored cavalry units would make contact 

with the invader’s lead elements as far to the east as possible to delay his 

advance. Additional forces composed of detached elements from the infantry 

and armor divisions would deploy along Phase Line Toulouse, which ran

roughly from Kassel in the north, south to Fulda, southeast to Bamberg, jogged 

west of Nuremberg and then turned back to the east of Augsburg and Munich 

before heading south along the Inn River to the Swiss border. Delaying actions 

beginning along this line would trade space for time, while disrupting enemy 

formations and inflicting on them as many casualties as possible. The Seventh 

Army would use the time gained through these operations to complete the 

evacuation of noncombatants, to cover the deployment of its remaining forces, 

and to carry out planned demolitions and barrier construction.83

Additional forces from the two corps would join the delaying action at Phase 

Line York, which ran from a line about twenty miles west of Bad Hersfeld south

to Würzburg, farther south through Ulm, and then south along the Iller River 

to the Swiss border (Map 12). Forces engaged along Phase Line York were

supposed to hold until ordered to withdraw by the Seventh Army commander. 

This was a critical point in the defense as it would allow remaining forces to 

complete final preparations along the main line of defense. In the northern 

portion of the American sector, attackers would have less than 100 miles to 

advance before reaching the outskirts of Frankfurt. In the south, the greater 

War (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1993), p. 72; Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. 

Army, p. 102. 82 General Alert Order (GAO) 1–57, HQ, Seventh Army, 15 Dec 1957, Records of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Emergency Plans, Entry 50353, Seventh Army, 1954–1964, 

RG 338, NACP; Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 91–92. 83 GAO 1–57, HQ, Seventh Army, 15 Dec 1957. For some discussion of changes made to battle 

plans based on the addition of German divisions, see Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, 

“The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and 

Policy Options, 1945–1963,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 399–429.
N O R T H A G

C E N T A G

Rhine R

Elbe R

Rhine R

EAST GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LIECHTENSTEIN

Erfurt

Nuremberg

Frankfurt

Munich

Stuttgart

Dresden

BERLIN

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

BONN

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

WEST GERMANY

SEVENTH ARMY DEFENSE LINES

U .S. ARMY, EUROPE

1957

Phase Line TOULOUSE

Phase Line YORK

Phase Line RICHMOND

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 12
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 28

distance between the border and major cities along the Rhine allowed more 

room for the delaying action.84

Throughout this portion of the fight, the 8th Infantry Division would 

remain well to the rear, serving as the Seventh Army reserve. Its primary role 

would be to provide rear-area security, guarding the Rhine River crossings and 

protecting airfields and supply depots from sabotage or airborne attack. Its 

units had to be prepared to support either the V or VII Corps or the German 

III Corps once the fight reached the main battle line.85

The expectation of a strong German contribution also allowed western 

leaders to draw the main line of defense to the east of the Rhine, in an effort 

to retain the industrial areas around Frankfurt and the Ruhr Valley. Phase 

Line Richmond, the main battle line, ran from just northwest of Giessen

southeast to Hanau, south along the Main River to Heilbronn, and then south 

to Stuttgart and along the Neckar River to the Swiss border. Once the forward 

delaying actions were completed, all available forces would join the defense of 

the Richmond line. The V and VII Corps would be joined by the II German

Corps to the south and the III German Corps to the north. Seventh Army 

leaders hoped that a well-prepared defense along this line could be held. Even 

so, Seventh Army plans acknowledged that Phase Line Toronto, along the

Rhine, was still an option as a last-ditch defensive position.86

The plans showed little expectation of reinforcements from the United 

States. Although the United States had committed itself to providing up to 

twelve additional divisions to NATO defenses if hostilities broke out in Europe, 

only one or two might be available within thirty days of mobilization. Most 

were National Guard divisions that required at least six months of training 

before being ready to deploy. More to the point, President Eisenhower firmly 

believed that the West could not win a war with the Soviets with conventional 

means, and he had no intention of sending large-scale reinforcements to Europe. 

In March 1956, he had approved a National Security Council paper indicating 

that the United States would consider nuclear weapons as conventional and 

would use them in any general war and in military operations short of general 

war. He amplified this position two months later in conversations with Admiral 

Radford and General Taylor, when he defined general war as a conflict between 

the United States and the Soviet Union and emphasized that the United States 

would use nuclear weapons without restriction from the outset. NATO’s 

strategic plan also reflected this approach as it regarded conventional forces 

as a shield, to protect as much of Western Europe as possible and to guard the 

84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.; Order for the Defense of the Rhine (ODOR), Seventh Army, 15 Dec 1957, Records 

of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Emergency Plans, Entry 50353, Seventh Army, 

1954–1964, RG 338, NACP.
290 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

alliance’s atomic retaliatory forces. Those forces were the sword, which would 

strike the major blow against the Soviet Union.87

As units of the new West German Army prepared to take their place in 

NATO’s defense structure, USAREUR and the Seventh Army prepared to 

work alongside their new allies. In March 1957, the Seventh Army commander, 

General Clarke, made history when he attached the 14th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment to the German II Corps as part of the seven-day NATO command 

post exercise, Lion Noir.It was the first time that U.S. troops of any sort serv

under German command. The cavalry regiment’s commander, Col. Wilson M. 

Hawkins, praised the newly formed German staff for the smoothness and ease 

with which it accepted his unit into its operations. Following a similar exercise, 

Lion Bleu, the next year, a Seventh Army after action report nonetheles

noted that language issues remained a problem when allied units became part 

of German operations. It also recommended the attachment of a U.S. signal 

support unit to the German II Corps to facilitate communications between the 

two organizations.88

For USAREUR, the successful integration of the Bundeswehr into Western 

Europe’s defenses was not without cost. In addition to the manpower and 

training time the Americans had devoted to preparing the new German army for 

deployment, they now faced increased competition for the dwindling land that 

could be devoted to billets and training areas. West Germany’s rapid postwar 

recovery and industrial development meant that fewer tracts of land would be 

available for military use. As German troop strength began to build, U.S. and 

French forces turned over to the Federal Republic many of the billets, ranges, 

and other military facilities they had occupied since the end of World War II. 

With no room for the creation of new, large-scale maneuver areas, the Seventh 

Army had to share access to many sites with German units and had to compete 

with both the Germans and other NATO allies for access to firing ranges for 

tanks, artillery, and air defense weapons. In order to strengthen the relationship 

with their new German partners, USAREUR recommended language training 

for its officers and authorized on-duty time for classes.89

87 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, pp. 19, 139–41; Byron 

R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 7, The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000), pp. 7–16; “Ike Opposes Increasing Force in Europe 

Over Berlin Crisis,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Mar 1959; Memo of Conference with 

the President, 24 May 1956; Final Decision on MC 48/2: A Report by the Military Committee on 

Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept, 23 May 1957, NATO Electronic Archives, copy 

in Historians files, CMH. For Eisenhower’s dismissal of a conventional option in Europe and 

his reliance on the nuclear option, see Craig, Destroying the Village, and Dockrill, Eisenhower’s 

New Look National Security Policy. 88 “German Commands Yanks,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Apr 1957; Monthly 

Rpt of Opns, HQ, Seventh Army, Signal Section, Mar 1958, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 89 Msg, Bonn to Sec of State, 5 Nov 1956, sub: German Troop Accommodations Problem, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic Files, 1957, RG 218, NACP; Memo, Capt William S. Wood, 
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 29

Although discussions on the alliance’s strategy for Western European 

defense usually took place at levels of command well above USAREUR and the 

Seventh Army, the two commands found themselves in the center of interallied 

debates over the role of atomic weapons in defense plans, locations for storing 

atomic warheads, and sharing of atomic weapons and warheads with the NATO 

allies. In January 1956, a State Department Policy Planning Staff paper mused 

that sharing control over the use of atomic weapons might convince NATO 

allies that the United States would use atomic weapons only for defense and 

only as necessary. Allied hostility to atomic weapons, the memorandum noted, 

was based primarily on a fear that their use would destroy the social order of 

all concerned. To remedy that, the United States had to stress the deterrent 

value of the weapons rather than their use.90

Despite their misgivings, or perhaps because of them, leaders among the 

NATO allies called for access to tactical atomic weapons as essential to their 

own self-defense. In response, the U.S. Departments of Defense and State 

began working on plans to assist selected allies in achieving their own atomic 

capabilities. At the same time, planners also noted that a dispersal of atomic 

weapons stockpiles outside the United States and the storage of weapons near 

where they would be needed seemed to be militarily desirable. NATO allies, 

many of whose populations actively opposed plans to position atomic weapons 

within their borders, might accept and support such storage more readily if the 

weapons involved included some that would be designated for their own use in 

time of emergency. German membership in NATO, however, raised a special 

problem. Although the Germans were forbidden by treaty from manufacturing 

their own atomic weapons, they were not prohibited from obtaining them from 

the United States or any other ally. Nonetheless, the French would surely resist 

any move to equip German forces with nuclear weapons.91

The Germans, for their part, seemed to walk both sides of the issue. In meetings of the NATO defense ministers, they supported the distribution of tactical 

atomic weapons down to division level. One of the first objectives of a restored 

German munitions industry was to develop an artillery piece, capable of firing 

American atomic munitions, that was lighter and more maneuverable than the 

U.S. guns. Chancellor Adenauer, however, was more ambivalent. He expressed 

Real Estate Section, for USAREUR Liaison Ofcr, 22 Sep 1956, sub: Troop Facilities Released 

to the German Federal Republic, Entry 2169, USAREUR Civil Affairs Division Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, 9 Aug 1956, 

Entry 2135, Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP; “Officers Asked to Acquire a 2d 

Language,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Sep 1957. 90 Memo, State Dept, Policy Planning Staff, for Sec of State, 4 Jan 1956, sub: Sharing of 

Control of Atomic Weapons, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians 

files, CMH. 91 “NATO Allies Demand U.S. Tactical A-Arms,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 

Dec 1956; Memo, Bureau of European Affairs (EUR)—Mr. Beam for Sec of State, 16 Oct 1956, 

sub: Program to Increase NATO Nuclear Capability and Secure Certain Base Rights, Pentagon 

Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
Troops of SETAF’s 543d Field Artillery Missile Battalion prepare a Corporal missile for firing 

during NATO Exercise Counterpunch, September 195
Achieving Atomic Mindedness 29

concerns that the alliance had placed too much emphasis on atomic weapons 

in its plans for Western defense and that it might thus have no other credible 

options beyond their use if a confrontation with the Eastern bloc occurred. He 

was particularly concerned that the American shift toward an atomic-based 

strategy might cause the United States to reduce its military commitment to the 

continent. With an eye always to ultimate German unification, he also worried 

about the impact NATO’s atomic strategy would have on future negotiations 

with the Soviet Union.92

The American shift toward an atomic-based doctrine raised numerous 

issues throughout the NATO alliance and caused some to question the ultimate 

purpose of ground-based, conventional forces. Facing economic concerns even 

greater than those of the United States, British officials, in particular, argued 

that if a “shield” of ground combat units was still required, it was no longer the 

alliance’s principal military protection. Allied conventional forces need not be 

capable of winning a major land battle, but only of preventing local infiltration 

and political intimidation. The alliance’s “sword” was now the nuclear arsenal 

of bombs and missiles that it could deliver against the Soviet Union over the 

heads of any land armies assembled on the ground below.93

By the end of 1957, atomic weapons had come to dominate U.S. and NATO 

thinking where the defense of Europe was concerned. Adopting a strategic policy 

based on airpower and atomic weapons, President Eisenhower had turned the 

U.S. armed forces away from traditional concepts of conventional warfare. 

Putting aside its doubts and struggling to secure a role in the national defense 

effort while balancing the necessity for atomic weapons against an abhorrence 

of actually having to use them, the Army searched for new organizations, 

weapons, and missions that would complement that approach. For their part, 

USAREUR and the Seventh Army completed the conversion of their forces to 

the pentomic concept and began to test the viability of the new organization. 

Only time would tell whether they would or could succeed.

92 Telegram From the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial 

Meeting to the Department of State, 14 Dec 1956, in FRUS, 1955–1957, 4:149–56; “Adenauer 

Forecasts Small A-Arms for All Future Land Forces,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 

Jan 1957; “Report on A- Weapons Stirs German Furor,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

16 Mar 1957; Memo, John Foster Dulles for the President, 24 May 1957, sub: Your Talks With 

Chancellor Adenauer, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, 

CMH. 93 Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, 18 Jul 1956, in FRUS, 1955–

1957, 4:90–92; A Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on Measures 

to Implement the Strategic Concept, 15 Mar 1957, NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969, 

NATO Archives online, copy in Historians files, CMH.

The latter years of President Eisenhower’s second term produced a reassessment of U.S. strategic policy as military and political leaders alike began 

to reconsider the implications of massive retaliation. The successful launch 

of an earth-orbiting satellite by the Soviet Union in October 1957 prompted 

many to re-evaluate the policy in the light of what they perceived as a shift 

in the strategic balance. At the same time, U.S. Army leaders across Europe 

engaged in a series of exercises and tests to prepare their units for combat under 

the new atomic-oriented pentomic organization. Initial shakedowns under the 

new structure indicated that a number of problems remained to be resolved. 

Nonetheless, USAREUR continued to consolidate its presence in Europe, 

seeing existing projects through to their conclusion while launching new efforts 

aimed at modernization and expansion. Despite its continuing introspection 

and its efforts to resolve whatever doubts it might have had about its readiness 

for combat, the U.S. Army in Europe presented a strong public face to its allies 

and foes alike as the United States and the NATO alliance worked through 

some of the prickliest diplomatic and foreign policy challenges they would face 

in the twentieth century.

The “New Look” Gets a New Look

Despite calls from his service chiefs and many in Congress for more military 

spending, President Eisenhower remained true to his conviction that a strong 

economy was the nation’s most potent form of defense. At the core of the 

president’s strategic philosophy was a firm belief that any conflict between the 

United States and the Soviet Union would be a total or general war that would 

be decided by an exchange of atomic firepower. He had little use for arguments 

that called for increasing expenditures on conventional forces capable of fighting 

limited wars. The new secretary of defense, Neil H. McElroy, echoed the 

president’s sentiments when he said that if two major opponents were involved 

in a conflict, they could hardly avoid an all-out military struggle.1

1 Memorandum of Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the National Security Council, 1 May 

1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 3, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, pp. 

79–97; Jack Raymond, “McElroy in Doubt on Limited Wars,” New York Times, 22 May 1958.

8

Second Though
296 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Despite Eisenhower’s convictions, the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, 

continued to argue for increased funding to support his service’s conventional 

forces. In tones more measured and less provocative than those of his predecessor, General Ridgway, Taylor pressed many of the same points in challenging 

the president’s military views. Repeated cutbacks in manpower, he said, had 

sapped the Army’s ability to meet the requirements of all of its assigned missions. 

As for the issue of potential American involvement in limited conflicts, he 

disagreed vigorously with President Eisenhower and was particularly critical of 

the United States’ lack of sufficient transport aircraft to deliver Army combat 

units to overseas trouble spots. Despite his less confrontational approach, by 

the end of his fourth year Taylor had become every bit the pariah within the 

Defense Department that Ridgway had been. Although he was three years shy 

of sixty years old, the normal retirement age for generals, Taylor retired when 

his term as chief of staff expired in July 1959. He would continue his crusade 

against the Eisenhower defense policies with the publication of his first book, 

The Uncertain Trumpet, in 1960.2

Taylor was not the only senior Army officer to leave the service in frustration 

over military funding. In January 1958, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, the Army’s 

chief of research and development, announced his own plans to retire from 

the service. When questioned about the rather abrupt and premature nature 

of his decision, Gavin told a Senate subcommittee on military preparedness 

that he saw his Army deteriorating while the Soviet Army was growing. Under 

those conditions, he could not go to Capitol Hill and defend a budget in which 

he did not believe. He told reporters that he felt he could contribute more to 

national defense from the outside than from within. Gavin’s decision, and the 

well-orchestrated publicity that accompanied it, provided fresh ammunition to 

Democrats in Congress who were already more than willing to challenge the 

president’s strategic policies.3

The most basic of Eisenhower’s assumptions—American nuclear superiority—had already taken a serious blow in October and November 1957 when 

the Soviet Union successfully placed two Sputnik satellites into Earth’s orbit. 

The same ballistic missiles that had launched the satellites could be fitted with 

nuclear warheads targeted on the continental United States. Americans who 

had counted themselves as safe from a technologically inferior Soviet bomber 

2 Ibid.; Memorandum of a Conference With the President, 24 May 1956, in FRUS, 1955–1957, 

19:311–15; Bem Price, “Why General Taylor Is Unhappy Over Our Defense,” Washington Post, 

5 Jul 1959; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 174–77. 3 Rpt, Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Gen Taylor, sub: Gavin’s Resignation, Messages Sent 

by General Lemnitzer, 1958, box 15, Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University; “Gavin 

Will Resign from Army; Plans to Speak Out on Defense,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

6 Jan 1958; “Gavin Calls Decision to Retire Final,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 9 Jan 

1958. Gavin also criticized the administration’s defense priorities in War and Peace in the Space 

Age (New York: Harper, 1958).
Second Thoughts 2

force now faced the threat of seemingly unstoppable intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBMs) capped with atomic warheads.4

This realization produced misgivings in Western Europe as well. America’s 

NATO allies questioned whether or not the United States was prepared to use its 

nuclear weapons in defense of Europe if the Soviets did not attack the American 

homeland itself. With an atomic stalemate in place, they feared that the U.S. 

deterrent no longer applied to NATO and that the Soviets, with their greater 

conventional forces, would gain the upper hand. The U.S. State Department 

instructed its representatives to assure the NATO nations that the United States 

would live up to its pledges and that an attack on one would be regarded as an 

attack against all. U.S. officials referred to the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin 

airlift, and the intervention in Korea, not to mention the physical presence of 

large numbers of American troops in Europe, as clear evidence of America’s 

commitment. At NATO headquarters, General Norstad reminded the European 

allies that the alliance forces presented a shield, organized, equipped, trained, 

and deployed to respond promptly and effectively with either conventional or 

atomic weapons, thus providing other options than an all-or-nothing response. 

Norstad described NATO’s conventional capabilities as a firebreak that if 

strengthened, could deflect minor incursions and allow time for diplomatic 

solutions before defenders would have to resort to nuclear options.5

Although the president continued to express his doubts that mutual deterrence provided an umbrella under which a conflict might be waged in Europe 

without escalating to general nuclear war, he acknowledged that the matter 

required further study. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, long a champion 

of massive retaliation, conceded to the German Minister of Defense, Franz 

Josef Strauss, that the alliance had to be prepared to deal with limited situations 

without all-out war. It would be awkward, he said, if the alliance were forced 

to choose between attempting to repel a Soviet incursion with conventional 

weapons or employing the full force of America’s strategic nuclear arsenal. 

He believed that small, clean atomic weapons producing lower levels of fallout 

represented a third option, particularly for such limited situations.6

4 Fairchild and Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960, pp. 17–19; 

Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Westport, Conn.: 

Praeger, 1999), pp. 65–76. 5 Telg, Sec of State Christian A. Herter to All NATO Capitals, 10 Jul 1958, Pentagon Library, 

Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Brief History of SHAPE: November 

1956–December 1962, SHAPE 130–63, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH; Detlef 

Junker, ed., The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1968: A Handbook, 

vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 23; Reed, Germany and NATO, p. 92. 

For more information on Norstad’s role as SACEUR, see Richard S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War 

NATO Supreme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 6 Memo, Donald A. Quarles, Dep Sec Def, for Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

9 May 1958, sub: Basic National Security Policy: Points Raised by the President, Pentagon 

Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH; Memo of 

Conversation, State Dept, 5 Mar 1958, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, 

Historians files, CMH.
298 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Thus, despite the carnage within its senior leadership, the Army was 

beginning to find fertile soil for its arguments that the nation’s conventional 

forces needed strengthening. In late 1957, the Security Resources Panel of the 

president’s Science Advisory Committee delivered a report suggesting that 

U.S. and allied forces required greater strength and mobility for the conduct 

of limited operations. The Gaither Report, named for the panel chairman, 

Horace Rowan Gaither, a Ford Foundation trustee and a cofounder of the 

Rand Corporation, concluded that America’s armed forces needed the ability 

to deter or suppress small wars before they became big ones. Congressional 

critics of administration policies also increased their attacks. In August 1959, 

Senator John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.) accused the administration of putting the 

United States in a box where it would have no option less than a massive nuclear 

attack to respond to limited Soviet aggression. Overseas, both the supreme allied 

commander in Europe, General Norstad, and the commander in chief of Allied 

Forces in Central Europe, French General Jean E. Valluy, called for heavier 

conventional forces to increase NATO’s flexibility. The new Army chief of 

staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who replaced General Taylor in July 1959, 

came to that position with a reputation as a skilled negotiator with experience 

in dealing with a wide range of conflicts. He eagerly took up the Army’s cause 

but was able to deal with its adversaries in the Defense Department and the 

Eisenhower administration in a more collegial manner than his predecessors.7

Finally, scholars and analysts outside of military circles were also beginning 

to devote serious thought to the implications of strategy in the era of atomic 

weapons. Two seminal works on the subject appeared in 1957 to add depth to 

the strategic discussions. Robert E. Osgood’s Limited War: The Challenge to 

American Strategy and Henry Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

both challenged strategic assumptions made by the Eisenhower administration 

and argued for a greater flexibility in American military options.8

Thus, as the Eisenhower presidency drew to a close, debate continued over 

America’s ability to conduct military operations beneath the level of full-scale 

nuclear war. The president continued to believe that the country could not 

afford to deploy military forces to support every contingency, and that the 

threat posed by America’s nuclear arsenal would be enough, in most cases, 

7 Memorandum of Discussion at the 352d Meeting of the National Security Council, 22 Jan 

1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 3:26–30; “Lemnitzer Named Chief of Staff,” New York Times, 19 

Mar 1959; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Battle Over Defense,” New York Times, 22 Jan 1959; Jack 

Raymond, “Strategic Views of Army Gaining,” New York Times, 2 Jun 1958; “Sparkman Says 

Neglect of Army Cutting U.S. Limited War Potential,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 

Aug 1959; “Norstad Says NATO Reliant on A-Forces,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 

Apr 1959; “Heavier Conventional NATO Forces Asked,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

1 Jul 1959. For more information on the career and qualifications of General Lemnitzer, see L. 

James Binder, Lemnitzer: A Soldier for His Time (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Books, 1997). 8 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University 

of Chicago Press, 1957); Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: 

Harper, 1957).
Second Thoughts 2

to deter foreign aggression. His opponents argued that stronger conventional 

forces were required to protect American interests from threats that might 

seem beneath the threshold of nuclear retaliation. What role, if any, nuclear 

weapons might play in such a limited conflict remained a matter of discussion. 

Meanwhile, Army leaders in Europe grappled with the same questions as they 

tried to reconcile traditional battle plans and concepts of land warfare with the 

pentomic organization and atomic weapons–based doctrine that the service 

had thrust on them.

Putting Pentomic to the Test

By 1958, the Army was ready to begin converting its divisions in Europe 

to the new pentomic organization. Its leaders had designed the new division 

specifically to operate on an atomic battlefield, and Europe was the theater 

where such a conflict was most likely to take place. Successful implementation 

of the new organization would be an important step in the evolution of NATO 

and USAREUR plans for the defense of Western Europe.

Despite General Taylor’s enthusiasm for the pentomic reorganization, early 

evaluations revealed flaws in the concept even before the divisions in Europe 

began to convert. In the United States, the Army had tested the concept in 

multiple exercises and had referred the new organization to its various branch 

schools for study and comment. One of the most traumatic and controversial 

aspects of the pentomic concept was the elimination of the traditional regimental 

affiliations. Soldiers of all ranks were uncomfortable giving up unit identities 

that had contributed to morale, discipline, and cohesion throughout the Army’s 

history. It was also apparent that, while the organization depended on new 

technologies for its survival on the battlefield, many of those items were not yet 

available. Of particular concern were shortages in improved armored personnel 

carriers and radios with increased range, absolute requirements for a doctrine 

that relied on dispersion and mobility for its battlefield survival. Platoon and 

company leaders were left to ask if they were expected to defend their positions 

with a due-out slip for the new equipment.9

Other deficiencies were also apparent even before the concept moved to 

Europe. Small-unit leaders expressed concerns over the extended frontage the 

Army expected them to defend as part of the pentomic doctrine. Proponents of 

the concept explained that atomic weapons gave those units greatly increased 

firepower, but only if the units actually employed them. Without the atomic 

fire support, ground units appeared to be seriously undergunned. More senior 

leaders questioned the ability of higher headquarters to sustain the new divisions 

logistically. The pentomic reorganization had stripped much of those capabilities from the division, without a corresponding increase in the capabilities of 

9 Paul C. Jussell, “Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956–1960” 

(Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2004), pp. 180–94.
300 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

corps-level support units. All in all, many in the Army suspected that the new 

organization had marginally improved the division’s ability to operate on an 

atomic battlefield, but had seriously degraded its conventional capabilities.10

Officers in Europe had also voiced their concerns long before the conversion. 

As early as 1954, the USAREUR commander, General Hoge, had written 

to the Chief of Army Field Forces, General John Dahlquist, to express his 

misgivings. The proposed elimination of infantry regiments in favor of combat 

command–type organizations, he wrote, did not present any material advantages 

but posed several serious disadvantages. He believed that it was simpler to 

make attachments and detachments to existing regiments rather than to discard 

traditional formations altogether. Consolidating the administrative and service 

support for the three battalions in a regiment, he added, seemed to be more 

economical than providing the same support for three separate battalions. 

Moreover, he said, the Army’s regiments had long, proud traditions which 

were invaluable in the development of morale, esprit de corps, and teamwork. 

They should not be lost.11

General Hoge went on to assess other aspects of the proposed division 

design. Reductions in the amount of conventional artillery posed a particular 

concern. Means must be available, he said, to attack infiltrating forces when 

they were too small to present profitable targets for atomic weapons. This was 

particularly true when battle groups were, by necessity, spread across a wide area 

where infantry weapons lacked the range to cover the gaps between defensive 

positions. Also, supporting artillery could not use atomic munitions when 

frontline forces were engaged in close combat without endangering friendly 

troops. Hoge did support the proposed reduction in a division’s support base 

and the transfer of many such functions to higher levels. Elimination of some 

frills, he said, would make the division less unwieldly.12

Despite these early concerns, the reorganization in Europe went forward 

and, by the beginning of 1958, the Army had reorganized all five of its divisions 

in USAREUR to fit the pentomic concept. At that point, following a series of 

unit rotations, the Seventh Army consisted of the 11th Airborne Division, with 

its headquarters in Augsburg; the 3d and 4th Armored Divisions in Frankfurt 

and Göppingen, respectively; and the 8th and 10th Infantry Divisions in Bad 

Kreuznach and Würzburg, respectively. In the V Corps area, the 14th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment provided a security screen from Bad Hersfeld in the north 

to Bad Kissingen in the south for the forward positions of the 8th and 10th 

Infantry Divisions. The 3d Armored Division was in reserve, prepared to 

reinforce or counterattack. Farther south, in the VII Corps area, the 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, in the vicinity of Nuremberg and the 11th Armored Cavalry 

10 Ibid. 11 Ltr, Gen William M. Hoge, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen John E. Dahlquist, Ch of Army Field 

Forces, 13 Sep 1954, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 12 Ibid. 
Second Thoughts 3

Regiment in the vicinity of Regensburg and Straubing, patrolled in front of the 

forward positions of the 11th Airborne Division and the 4th Armored Division.13

Although the pentomic reorganizations were to be servicewide, no command 

in the Army was in a better position to test the new concept than USAREUR. 

Its five combat divisions, three armored cavalry regiments, and heavy support 

structure made it the largest assemblage of fighting power in the service. 

Moreover, the pentomic structure and its accompanying atomic doctrine were 

specifically designed to deal with the Soviet Army. By 1958, with the U.S. 

Army prepared to adopt the organization throughout the service, it was up to 

the officers and soldiers of USAREUR to determine whether or not the new 

concept would actually work.

Once the reorganizations were complete, USAREUR instructed the Seventh 

Army to evaluate the new pentomic infantry division and to recommend changes 

it deemed necessary to the unit’s TOE. With a major Seventh Army training 

event, Exercise Sabre Hawk, scheduled to begin in February 1958, the comma

requested an extension of the deadline for the submission of its report until 

after it had completed that test. In an interim response, however, it suggested 

that, based on its study of the new organization to that point, augmentations 

to the division artillery and the battle group engineer platoon were desirable, 

along with the addition of a security platoon to each battle group.14

With the extension approved, the Seventh Army put the new organization 

to the test. Beginning on 10 February, Sabre Hawk fielded more than 125,0

soldiers for the largest maneuver yet in the history of the force. The V Corps 

maneuvered against the VII Corps in an area bordered roughly by Fulda, 

Giessen, Schwäbisch-Gmünd, and Gunzenhausen, and encompassing parts of 

Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden-Württemberg. The maneuver included a series of 

attack, defend, delay, and withdraw scenarios while controllers accompanied 

each unit to evaluate training and to assist commanders in keeping up with 

movements and actions scheduled in the event’s master plan. The 72d Field 

Artillery Group—organized for this exercise with one battalion of Honest John 

rockets, one battalion of 280-mm. cannons, and one separate battery of Honest 

Johns—provided general support to the VII Corps and was prepared to deliver 

atomic fires on call. A similar collection of atomic-capable units under the 

direction of the 18th Field Artillery Group supported the V Corps. Elements 

of the Twelfth Air Force provided simulated atomic air support to supplement 

the firepower of ground units on both sides. The maneuvers tested atomic 

weapons employment, target acquisition, resupply, and aerial troop movement 

13 David A. Lane, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Operation Gyroscope in the United 

States Army, 6 Sep 1957, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Memo for Sec Def, 

23 Jan 1957, sub: Order of Battle Report to SACEUR of U.S. Forces Assigned, Earmarked for 

Assignment, and Earmarked for Assignment on Mobilization, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic 

Files, RG 218, NACP. 14 Msgs, CG, Seventh Army, to CG, VII Corps, 6 Dec 1957; and CG, Seventh Army, to CG, 

USAREUR, 30 Jan 1958. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 
302 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

while emphasizing individual and small-unit training under cold-weather 

conditions. As the initial defending force, the V Corps also experimented with 

stay-behind patrols, trained for long-range reconnaissance, and equipped to 

identify potential targets for the corps’ long-range atomic weapons.15

The critique of the exercise by the Seventh Army’s operations and planning 

staff identified training deficiencies traceable to flaws in the new organization. 

Divisional transportation and support units, for example, lacked sufficient 

personnel, vehicles, and equipment to ensure timely delivery of atomic weapons 

to forward artillery units. In response, the Seventh Army operations staff 

informed major combat units that they had to be prepared to provide emergency 

reinforcements to defend atomic weapons support and delivery installations 

15 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 171, Historians files, CMH; 

OPLAN 1, FTX Sabre Hawk, HQ, 28th Inf, 3 Feb 1958, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1950–196

RG 338, NACP; Henry B. Kraft, “7th Army to Launch Pentomic Test Monday,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 9 Feb 1958; idem, “Stronger than Ever After Games: Clarke,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 19 Feb 1958; Andrew J. DeGraff, “LRRP and Nuclear Target 

Acquisition,” Military Review 40 (November 1960): 15–21.

An M59 armored personnel carrier of the 55th Engineer Battalion in Miltenberg during 

Exercise Sabre Hawk, February 195
Second Thoughts 3

against guerrilla or direct attack. Exercise controllers also admitted that they 

were unable to comply with the U.S. Army Continental Army Command’s 

guidance that each corps should plan to evacuate two thousand casualties 

per day. Incorporating that level of casualties into the exercise scenario, they 

contended, would have forced commanders to devote major resources to mass 

casualty evacuation and treatment to the extreme detriment of tactical training 

objectives. Medical evacuation and treatment of atomic warfare casualties, they 

said, would have to be the focus of other training exercises.16

General Clarke, the Seventh Army commander, voiced his own concerns. 

He believed that the exercise showed that the division artillery was not strong 

enough to provide adequate conventional or atomic firepower. Nor did the 

4.2-inch mortar have sufficient firepower as a direct-support weapon for the 

battle group. Most important, the new organization lacked any centralized 

command and control over the artillery at the division level. He believed that 

it was important for the division to be able to mass the fires of all its assigned 

16 Memos, Col Milburn N. Huston, G–3, for Seventh Army Staff Sections, 12 Mar 1958, 

sub: Actions to be Taken as a Result of FTX Sabre Hawk Critique; and Huston, G–3, for 

of Staff, 9 Jan 1958, sub: Casualty Play in Sabre Hawk. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Ar

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

Soldiers of the 504th Assault Group, 11th Airborne Division, board an H–34 helicopter 

during Exercise Sabre Hawk
304 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

artillery, although that concept ran counter to the pentomic philosophy of 

dispersed, semi-independent operation of battle groups.17

In March 1958, Seventh Army units down to division level participated 

in Command Post Exercise Lion Bleu, which focused attention on atomi

response capabilities throughout NATO. The exercise identified conflicting 

priorities between the Army and the Air Force. Air commanders favored 

the early employment of most of their atomic weapons, leaving very little for 

subsequent support of ground units. The services also differed on what approach 

to targeting would best support ground offensives. Air Force leaders favored 

an interdiction campaign that would impede the enemy’s movement by hitting 

rail lines, bridges, and other related targets. Ground commanders preferred to 

destroy enemy troop and vehicle formations first. They believed that the destruction of the transportation network would only impede their own movement 

when they moved to counterattack. Lion Bleu also demonstrated that groun

units needed to spread out to a far greater width and depth than originally 

planned in order to avoid presenting tempting targets for the enemy’s atomic 

weapons. At the same time, however, units had to retain sufficient mobility 

to come together quickly to counterattack when the opportunity presented 

itself. Older concepts of established lines, protected flanks, and mass attack 

17 Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 107–08.

A Corporal erector of the 558th Missile Battalion moves through Rütschenhausen during 

Exercise Sabre Hawk
Second Thoughts 3

were best forgotten. Finally, as the first major exercise in which the German 

II Corps headquarters took part, the test identified communication problems 

arising from language differences and established a requirement for stationing 

a permanent U.S. signal support detachment with the German headquarters.18

With two major exercises under its belt, the Seventh Army headquarters 

requested an evaluation of the new force structure and doctrine from its 

18 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 168–70; Monthly Rpt of 

Opns, HQ, Seventh Army, Signal Section, Mar 1958, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP; Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, p. 94.

Corporal missile ready for launch during Exercise Sabre Hawk
306 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

subordinate unit commanders. Initial comments reflected some uncertainty 

about tactics and techniques that were best suited to the new formations. 

Division and battle group commanders requested more specific guidance in a 

number of areas, including the employment of aviation units, the availability 

of battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and the placement of 

boundaries and other control measures to align forces and to orient their 

movements. The most urgent need, commanders noted, was more specific 

guidance on the degree of control and the amount of authority they would 

have at lower levels over the division’s “on-call” atomic firepower. Overall, 

many of those questioned expressed a belief that as their experience with the 

new organization deepened, they would gain more insights into the tactics 

and techniques it would require.19

Combat unit commanders, in particular, expressed concern that many of the 

weapons, vehicles, and other technologies available to them did not adequately 

support the new mobile forces concept. For example, the maximum range of 

the 4.2-inch mortar, the only indirect-fire weapon assigned specifically to the 

battle group, was only about four thousand meters, too short to support the unit 

under the widely dispersed deployments planners envisioned. Forward observers 

detailed in support of the rifle companies, unit commanders added, were unable 

to cover the entire frontage of their units. Further compounding that problem, 

they said, was an overall lack of sufficient conventional artillery support for 

their divisions. In the V Corps, unit commanders tried to resolve the shortage 

by breaking up three battalions of supporting corps artillery to supplement the 

existing 8th Infantry Division Artillery, creating one composite battery for each 

battle group. Doing so, however, diminished the amount of artillery available to 

the division or the corps for other missions. Divisions also lacked any credible 

means of defending themselves against attacks by enemy aircraft. At the battle 

group level, moreover, radios and other communications equipment were 

unreliable, heavy, and lacked sufficient range to connect headquarters with their 

scattered companies and platoons. Finally, unit leaders pointed out that battle 

groups lacked any self-contained capability for rapid, cross-country movement. 

The division headquarters did have armored personnel carriers consolidated 

in its transportation battalion, but only enough to move one battle group at a 

time. For an organization whose battlefield survival depended on its ability to 

disperse widely when on the defense and then to concentrate its forces rapidly 

when preparing to attack, the shortfalls in communications and mobility were 

particularly troubling.20

The new division’s peculiar five-sided structure and streamlined chain of 

command also produced unforeseen complications. Without superior commu19 Memo, Cdr, VII Corps, for Cdr, Seventh Army, Apr 1958, sub: Evaluation of Mobile 

Forces Concept, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP. 20 Ibid.; Memo, Maj William F. Gunkel, Adj, for CG, 8th Inf Div, 4 Mar 1958, sub: Monthly 

Chronology Report, 8th Infantry Division Artillery, RG 338, NACP; Wilson, Maneuver and 

Firepower, p. 276.
Second Thoughts 3

nications, division commanders found it difficult to control the actions of five 

distinct maneuver elements. Moreover, the lack of intermediate headquarters 

between the division commander and the battle groups forced division staffs 

to monitor the communications of as many as sixteen subordinate elements at 

once. Lacking an intermediate battalion headquarters, company officers found 

themselves reporting directly to the battle group commander, a colonel. Without 

an assigned direct-support field artillery battalion, the battle group commander 

was forced to rely on his mortar battery commander as a senior fire support 

coordinator, a responsibility for which most lacked both the experience and 

the training.21

The implementation of the new organization in Europe revealed other 

unintended consequences. Aside from the challenges it posed for command and 

control, the extended span of control also limited the professional development 

of many mid-level officers. The new infantry and airborne divisions contained 

no command-level position for lieutenant colonels, the traditional battalion 

commanders. Only the armored divisions retained command slots at that 

particular level. The lack of command positions for infantry lieutenant colonels 

limited opportunities for those officers to gain experience and upset traditional 

career progression paths.22

Even as USAREUR carried on with its evaluation of the pentomic structure 

and doctrine, the command continued to experience personnel, equipment, 

and spare parts shortages that the reorganization was supposed to alleviate. At 

the end of May 1958, the Seventh Army reported that, of its forty-nine atomic 

artillery and missile units and the ordnance support units that supported them, 

twenty-one were considered operationally ready, twenty-two as marginally 

ready at reduced capability, and six unready. Although technically competent, 

most units lacked sufficient personnel and were experiencing shortages in 

essential electronics, spare parts, and communications equipment. The source 

of these deficiencies was clear. The Army was devoting to research and development funds that might have otherwise gone to eliminating them. In his annual 

historical report, the commander in chief, U.S. Army, Europe, General Hodes, 

pointed out that the continuous development of new missile systems made it 

very difficult to maintain combat readiness on a day-to-day basis. Nonetheless, 

he said that USAREUR was committed to atomic warfare doctrine. In a staff 

memorandum outlining major objectives for the command in the upcoming 

year, Hodes identified his number one imperative as the establishment of an 

atomic and missile combat capability for U.S. and NATO land forces. The 

21 Memos, Cdr, VII Corps, for Cdr, Seventh Army, Apr 1958, sub: Evaluation of Mobile 

Forces Concept; and Gunkel for CG, 8th Inf Div, 4 Mar 1958, sub: Monthly Chronology Report, 

8th Infantry Division Artillery; Intervs, Lt Col Lowell G. Smith and Lt Col Murray G. Swindler 

with Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, pp. 28–29; and Smith and Lt Col Hatcher with Gen 

Donald V. Bennett, 21 Apr 1976, p. 12. Both in Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI. 22 Bacevich. The Pentomic Era, p. 134.
308 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

objective, he wrote, was 100 percent 

atomic capability at all times.23

On 1 July 1958, General Clarke 

returned to the United States to take over 

the Continental Army Command, and 

Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman succeeded 

him as Seventh Army commander. 

Eddleman had served as assistant chief 

of staff for operations for General 

Walter Krueger in the Pacific Theater 

throughout World War II, earning 

citations for bravery during the Leyte 

and Luzon campaigns and receiving 

his promotion to brigadier general on 

the Leyte beachhead. After the war, he 

had served as deputy commander of 

U.S. Troops in Trieste; as chief of the 

Army Plans Division; and as assistant 

chief of staff for operations, G–3. After 

serving briefly as commanding general 

of the 4th Infantry Division in Europe 

from May 1954 until May 1955, he returned to the United States to become 

commandant of the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He 

had been in that assignment for only four months when, in September 1955, 

the new chief of staff, General Taylor, asked him to serve as his deputy chief 

of staff for plans.

Eddleman and Clarke presented as striking a contrast in leadership styles 

as could be imagined. Clarke, an armor officer, was an outspoken, seat-of-thepants micromanager who believed firmly in checking into all the details at the 

lowest echelon of command. Eddleman, an infantryman, was reserved, by the 

book, and more interested in efficient staff work and the chain of command than 

in personal inspections of every unit in his command. In describing Eddleman, 

Clarke called him a faceless general who lacked imagination. For his part, 

Eddleman expressed gratitude for the smooth transition the departing Seventh 

Army commander had arranged, and the outstanding staff he had left in place, 

but he had to note that his predecessor’s methods of training and leadership 

could not have been more different from his own.24

23 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 176–77; Staff Memo 

11–5–4, Maj Gen John M. Willems, Ch of Staff, for USAREUR Distribution, 12 Jun 1958, sub: 

Command Objectives, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP. 24 Intervs, Smith and Swindler with Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, pp. 30–32; and Col Francis B. 

Kish with Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, p. 198, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI; 

MFR, Maj W. H. Vinson, Asst Sec of the General Staff, 24 Dec 1959, Commander in Chief’s 

General Eddleman
Second Thoughts 3

As one of the principal architects of the pentomic structure during his tenure 

as deputy chief of staff for military operations, Eddleman joined readily in 

discussions assessing the atomic organization. He pointedly described the new 

division organization as “not exactly what we want, but on the right track” and 

predicted that it would be discarded within five years in favor of some more 

capable type of unit.25 In an article for Army Information Digest, Eddleman 

commented on the discrepancies between what equipment and technologies 

were required and what the Army could get at the moment. First and foremost 

was sufficient ground and air transport to allow each battle group to move 

independently. The full development of the pentomic concept, he said, was 

incompatible with foot speeds. The general also noted the lack of progress in 

adapting logistical support systems to keep up with the requirements of the 

mobile atomic battlefield. He challenged his officers to increase their emphasis 

on unit training programs, schools, and orientation courses so that soldiers 

might be better prepared for the challenges that the new organization and the 

doctrine that accompanied it would inevitably raise.26

At a Seventh Army Artillery Conference held at V Corps headquarters in 

Frankfurt in November 1958, Eddleman summarized the deficiencies in artillery 

support inherent in the new division. Because of the greater dispersion of units 

and the increased depth of the division battle zone, he said, the area that artillery 

had to cover was much larger, but the pentomic conversion had greatly reduced 

the number of tubes available in a division to support the infantry. Further, 

the absence of direct-support battalions left battle group commanders without 

an experienced artillery adviser and without an organization that could plan, 

control, and readily communicate with whatever additional artillery might be 

needed. As a result of Eddleman’s review, the Seventh Army recommended 

to the Department of the Army that the division artillery for the pentomic 

infantry division should increase from two battalions to five 105-mm. howitzer 

battalions—consisting of two batteries each—and a composite battalion, 

consisting of three 155-mm. howitzer batteries and one battery of 8-inch 

howitzers. These additions would provide a direct-support artillery battalion 

for each battle group and a larger, more powerful battalion of artillery giving 

general support to the division. The division could also achieve some personnel 

savings, the proposal noted, by combining the headquarters and service batteries 

of each battalion into a single element.27

Comments to Staff Division Chiefs on 23 December 1959, Entry 2002, USAREUR Secretary 

of the General Staff Conferences, 1959–1961, RG 549, NACP. 25 “Army’s Pentomic Structure Called Good for Five Years,” Army Times, 23 Aug 1958. 26 Interv, Smith and Swindler with Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 29; Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, 

“The Pentomic Reorganization—A Status Report,” Army Information Digest 13 (September 

1958): 3–11. 27 HQ, USAREUR, Memo 1–20–27, Comments of the Commander in Chief, Aug 1958, 

Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP. Transcript, HQ, Seventh 

Army, Opening Address by Lieutenant General Clyde D. Eddleman, Seventh U.S. Army Artillery Conference, 12 Nov 1958; Memo, Col Lewis A. Hall, Exec Ofcr, for G–3, 8 Nov 1958, sub: 
310 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Later exercises and maneuvers identified more flaws in the pentomic 

organization. In the summer of 1958, the Seventh Army participated in Ful

Play, a SHAPE-sponsored, combined atomic warfare and air defense exercise

that evaluated all elements involved in the effort’s logistical support. The exercise 

revealed that ordnance and transportation units responsible for supporting the 

delivery of atomic weapons to the Seventh Army were unprepared to carry 

out their assignments. Soldiers in those units lacked sufficient training in their 

responsibilities and the communications necessary to coordinate the transport 

of atomic weapons from storage sites to the units that would fire them. As Sabr

Hawk had already indicated, the divisions lacked the personnel and vehicles t

assist with the movement of those munitions.28

As USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders continued to assess the effects of 

the pentomic reorganization through the remainder of 1958, training emphasis 

shifted from tactical operations to logistical support and to the security and 

movement of atomic weapons. In October, USAREUR conducted Quick Serve

a command post and maneuver exercise designed to test the ability of atomic 

munitions support units to deploy rapidly and to guard, transport, and deliver 

atomic weapons to firing units at the expenditure rate expected in an atomic war. 

Participating artillery and missile units fired 141 simulated atomic warheads 

during a three-day period. In the end, reviews of the exercise indicated that 

procedures for authenticating presidential release of nuclear weapons, and for 

transmitting that release authority from the supreme allied commander down 

to the Seventh Army commander, were too cumbersome. Also, ammunition 

supply points were too far from firing units to deliver munitions forward in a 

timely manner. In their final reports, both the Seventh Army and USAREUR 

recommended that ammunition supply points be located in urban areas along 

readily accessible road networks and close to the units they supported. In 

that way, they said, ammunition vehicles could travel to the supply points, 

load, and return to their units during hours of darkness. The commands also 

recommended that initial ammunition loads for Honest John units should be 

increased to compensate for the long distances between units and their supply 

points. The Seventh Army also complained about strings higher headquarters 

placed on many weapons, reserving them for use against specific targets. The 

command wanted to keep these restrictions to a minimum to reduce time spent 

waiting for the release of the weapons. Overall, the exercise proved so valuable 

as a gauge of the logistical readiness of atomic support units that USAREUR 

made plans to repeat it on a regular basis.29

CONUS Proposal for Reorganization of the Inf Div Artillery. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh 

Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 28 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 170–71; Memo, Huston 

for Seventh Army Staff Sections, 12 Mar 1958, sub: Actions to be Taken as a Result of FTX 

Sabre Hawk Critique. 29 Memos, Gen Henry I. Hodes, USAREUR Cdr, for Distribution, 15 Sep 1958, su

USAREUR Directive No. 1, Exercise Quick Serve; Lt Col Harry W. Bues Jr., Asst Adj Gen
Second Thoughts 3

The final big Command Post Exercise of 1958, Bounce Back, reflecte

the approach toward atomic warfare that the Army was beginning to adopt. 

Because the exercise was designed to test rear-area security and damage-control 

operations, the scenario depicted an initial aggressor strike employing forty-nine 

separate atomic warheads with yields ranging from 5 to 100 kilotons against 

NATO military installations. Observers noted that after the strike it was difficult 

to generate a sense of realism for the exercise’s participants. What had started in 

the early 1950s as an honest attempt to portray and understand the realities of 

atomic warfare had, by 1958, come to resemble the plot of a Hollywood science 

fiction thriller. As the exercise demonstrated, the idea of a doctrine based on 

atomic weapons had grown increasingly abstract because much of the effort 

seemed to involve mathematical calculations of how much of the force would 

remain after the initial strikes. Evaluators noted in their reports that personnel 

no longer seemed to be taking the training seriously. Following one simulated 

atomic strike, commanders ordered a field hospital to evacuate because it was 

in the middle of a predicted fallout pattern. When the Seventh Army surgeon 

countermanded the order, deeming the move impractical, controllers declared 

the hospital and all its personnel lost due to radiation exposure.30

Some of the surrealism of the moment was captured by the operations 

section of V Corps in a booklet it distributed at that time. Titled “Tips on 

Atomic Warfare for the Military Leader,” the manual reduced atomic tactics 

to comic book form as a voluptuous Atomic Annie offered to tell soldiers all 

about the atomic facts of life. It depicted soldiers who, after surviving an atomic 

strike, rallied those who remained and continued the mission as the ghosts of 

their dead comrades waved farewell in the background. Annie also assured 

her readers that they had nothing to fear from radiation, as long as they took 

proper precautions before they attacked through a contaminated area.31

The surrealism of atomic warfare was sinking in throughout the Army. 

Lt. Gen. Arthur S. Collins Jr., an instructor at the Army War College during 

the period, remembered that typical maneuvers or map exercises assumed that 

the United States would fight conventionally until it began to lose, and then 

let loose several nuclear weapons to reverse the tide. He questioned whether 

anyone involved had any idea the amount of damage that would result. Having 

seen what one small 20-kiloton bomb had done to Hiroshima, he could only 

imagine what the weapons employed in the defense of Germany would do to 

for CINCUSAREUR, 25 Nov 1958, sub: Final Report, Exercise Quick Serve; and CWO A. D

Scritchfield, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 21 Apr 1959, sub: Exercise Quick Serve

Final Report. All in Entry 2044, USAREUR G3 Training Operations Files, RG 549, NACP. 30 Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, Results of Aggressor Atomic Strikes on CENTAG/USAREUR 

Installations, D-Day through D+4, 5 Dec 1958; Memos, Maj Gen Henry R. Westphalinger, 

G–4, for G–3, 17 Dec 1958, sub: Preliminary Report, Exercise Bounce Back; and Col Robert H

Christie, Dep Adj Gen, for CINC, U.S. EUCOM, 22 Oct 1959, sub: Composite Report, Exercise 

Sidestep. All in Entry 2044, USAREUR G3 Training Operations Files, RG 549, NACP. 31 Memo, Huston, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 30 Jan 1958, sub: Tips on Atomic Warfare, Entry

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
312 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the cities, towns, and countrysides we were trying to defend. To him, at least, 

the whole concept no longer made any sense.32

By the end of the year, it was clear that the pentomic organization and the 

atomic training and doctrine that accompanied it were neither realistic nor 

appropriate responses to the military threat in Europe. The concept continued to 

unravel as observers identified new shortcomings with each successive training 

exercise. Under the pentomic organization, infantry divisions retained only 

enough armored personnel carriers to move one reinforced battle group at a 

time. For an organization whose very existence depended on mobility, this was 

an extraordinary deficiency. In addition, since the organization consolidated 

armored personnel carriers at the division level and parceled them out as 

required, drivers could not consistently train with the companies and squads 

they supported. Communications and command and control assets were likewise 

inadequate to manage so many dispersed subelements. With no intervening 

headquarters between the company and the battle group, the organization had 

too few experienced mid-level leaders. Without them, it was impossible for the 

commander to maintain effective control. As the maneuvers and command post 

exercises revealed, the pentomic division lacked the transportation and support 

assets to sustain itself over any extended deployment.33 The structure was so 

deficient in support units, one division commander noted, it was necessary to 

take personnel and equipment from line units to make up the difference.34

The USAREUR commander, General Hodes, summarized his concerns in a 

message he sent to the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, in September 1958. In 

what he labeled as a realistic appraisal of the combat readiness of his command, 

Hodes informed Taylor that USAREUR had “reached a point of calculated 

risk” beyond which he could not recommend proceeding without a complete 

re-evaluation of the mission and purpose of the command. He described 

the reductions that he had made in service and support elements in order to 

maintain a superficial appearance of combat readiness in the fighting units. 

Support organizations in the Communications Zone, he said, now consisted 

of more than 50 percent local civilian labor. The command had been forced 

to compensate for the lack of capabilities in its rear zone by pre-stocking large 

amounts of supplies in the Seventh Army area. Personnel restrictions imposed 

by the Army had required USAREUR to inactivate the equivalent of ten 

battalions of conventional artillery. Antiaircraft artillery battalions had also lost 

32 Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, p. 133; Interv, Col Chandler Robbins III with Lt Gen Arthur 

S. Collins Jr., 1982, pp. 240–41, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI. 33 Memos, Cdr, VII Corps, for Seventh Army CG, Apr 1958, sub: Evaluation of Mobile 

Forces Concept, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP; and Maj Gen Ralph C. 

Cooper, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 13 Dec 1957, sub: Branch Control of Armored 

Personnel Carrier Units and Helicopter Companies, Entry 2031, USAREUR Organization Planning Files, RG 549, NACP; Eddleman, “The Pentomic Reorganization—A Status Report,” pp. 

3–11; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 270–85. 34 Interv, Lt Col Robert T. Reed with Gen Hamilton H. Howze, 14 Oct 1972, p. 7, Senior 

Officer Oral History Program, MHI. 
Second Thoughts 3

personnel. Complicating the problems caused by force reductions, the general 

concluded, numerous technical problems plagued some of the new weapons 

and equipment that were supposed to offset the shortages. The Corporal and 

Redstone missiles were too immobile and took too long to put into action, the 

Honest John was not sufficiently accurate, and communications and electronic 

equipment lacked both range and reliability. Although Hodes promised to use 

his resources to the best of his ability, he warned that the accomplishment of 

his wartime mission was no longer a “foregone conclusion.”35

Other Training

Despite the emphasis on preparing for atomic warfare and implementing 

the pentomic reorganization, units throughout USAREUR and the Seventh 

Army continued to hone their readiness through more traditional training as 

well. For the most part, planning for atomic warfare remained a concern for 

senior commanders and their staffs. At lower levels, units practiced those skills 

that would allow them to make their own contributions to the defense in the 

event of a Soviet attack.

Notwithstanding some emphasis on surviving in an atomic environment, 

combat units tended to focus their training efforts on the same attack and 

defend scenarios practiced by their World War II counterparts. Infantry battle 

group and company commanders struggled to adjust to the opportunities and 

limitations offered by the new organization even as their main effort remained 

fixed on the traditional roles and missions of small units in combat. In contrast, 

the armored divisions had undergone little reorganization, so their training 

remained much as it had always been, emphasizing the mobility, firepower, 

and shock associated with those types of units. Armored commanders made 

a point of emphasizing the continuity in their doctrine. Col. Richard L. Irby, 

commander of Combat Command A, 3d Armored Division, directed his 

officers to study the armored tactics and doctrine as spelled out in the armored 

series field manuals. He reminded them that their tactics were to be those of an 

armored division, not of a battle group.36

Battle groups and battalions continued to conduct most of their tactical 

training at USAREUR’s major maneuver areas. Although divisions occasionally deployed in their entirety to Grafenwöhr, the command’s largest site, more 

often than not they rotated battle groups or combat commands through any 

of the four major training areas at Baumholder, Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, and 

Wildflecken. In a typical rotation squads and platoons spent two weeks working 

35 Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DEPTAR, Exclusive for Taylor, 18 Sep 1958, Message # 

SX–6738, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP. 36 Memo, Col Richard L. Irby, Cdr, Combat Command A, for Distribution, 29 May 1959, 

sub: Commanders and Staff Conference, Entry 37042, 3d Armored Division, RG 338, NACP; 

HQ, USAREUR, Memo 1–20–28, Comments of the Commander in Chief, Nov 1958, Entry 

2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP.
314 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

on small-unit tactics and qualifying with machine guns, mortars, recoilless 

rifles, and rocket launchers that they could not fire in local training sites near 

their kasernes. Squad and platoon problems covered day and night attack 

and defense, combat in urban areas, and withdrawal from contact. Combat 

proficiency courses tested the ability of squad and fire team leaders to deploy 

and control their men. Training emphasized fire and movement, breaching 

obstacles, tank-infantry coordination, and individual leadership skills. Unlike 

major division-level maneuvers, where leaders often felt compelled to follow 

a scenario, smaller unit exercises encouraged sergeants and junior officers to 

think for themselves and to develop innovative solutions for the problems an 

exercise posed.37

In order to evaluate the level of training at each echelon, Seventh Army 

training guidance required unit commanders to conduct unit training evaluations once a year. Battalions, battle groups, and division artillery conducted tests 

for each squad, section, platoon, company, and battery under their command. 

Smaller units tested first, with individual squads perfecting tactics at that level 

before advancing to platoon- and company-level evaluations. The exercises 

occurred under combat conditions as much as possible and, at the company 

level, against a live opposing force. Unit commanders received orders and 

terrain overlays twenty-four hours before the start of the evaluation. Umpires 

from a higher headquarters then graded each platoon and company according 

to checklists devised for each type of test. In addition to deploying their own 

forces, company commanders had to plan on receiving tanks, armored personnel 

carriers, mortars, or other attachments as required by the mission and scenario 

in their particular test.38

Battalion or battle group tests were even more complex and were generally 

the most significant event in a unit’s training year. The two corps headquarters 

had the responsibility to plan and administer the exercises to all battle group 

and battalion-size units under their command. For infantry and armor units, 

they still emphasized conventional missions and tactics because battle groups 

had no atomic-capable weapons of their own and planning for friendly atomic 

strikes usually occurred at a higher level. Any focus on atomic matters was 

37 HQ, USAREUR, Cir 350–2, Education and Training: Major Training Areas, 22 Dec 1959, 

Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Memos, Maj Ellis L. Fuller, Adj, for 

CG, 8th Inf Div, 2 May 1958, sub: Chronology, April 1958, Entry 37042, 8th Infantry Division, RG 338, NACP; and CWO2 Leon E. Terry, Asst Adj, for Distribution, 17 Oct 1958, sub: 

Training Memorandum No. 10, Baumholder Training: 12–16 November 1958, Entry 37042, 

8th Infantry Division, RG 338, NACP; HQ, VII Corps, Supplementary Corps Commanders 

Conference Notes, 23 Jan 1959, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP. 38 HQ, Seventh Army, Training Cir 20–1, Seventh United States Army Training Directive, 4 

Feb 1960; Memo, Col Lynn D. Smith, Ch of Staff, for Distribution, 1 Jan 1959, sub: Training 

Memorandum No. 1, Training Program 1959; Training Plan, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 5th Inf, 8th Inf 

Div, Interior Rifle Platoon in the Attack, 1958. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP. Training Memo 6, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 13th Inf, Baumholder Training: 6–24 

May 1958, 14 Apr 1958, Entry 30742, 8th Infantry Division, RG 338, NACP.
Second Thoughts 3

limited to testing a unit’s ability to take protective measures against and to 

recover from enemy chemical or atomic attacks. The crucial element of the 

infantry test was the ability of a battle group to concentrate its forces from 

dispersed positions in order to launch an attack. Troops would usually have 

the assistance of tanks, trucks, or armored personnel carriers from elsewhere 

in the division. Because most vehicles were no longer permanently assigned to 

the infantry, however, troops were unable to work with the same drivers each 

time they trained, making it difficult to develop teamwork and coordination 

of fire and movement.39

In artillery battalions, training tests generally emphasized the speed 

with which a unit could respond to a call for fire and the accuracy of the 

rounds it delivered. In 1958, however, artillery battalions in the 4th Armored 

Division—with the support of the division commander, a former artilleryman, 

Maj. Gen. Andrew P. O’Meara—developed new tests that placed increased 

emphasis on keeping pace with fast-moving armored operations. The tests 

evaluated how long it took for a battery to occupy a position and prepare to 

fire. They also required a battery to respond to a call for fire while on the march. 

It would have to move into firing position without the benefit of a survey or 

reconnaissance and deliver rounds on target within ten minutes. As a result of 

the new approach, a battery’s junior officers and section leaders had to make 

critical decisions under pressure in an atmosphere that senior leaders hoped 

would approximate the stress of real combat.40

As more helicopter units joined USAREUR and the Seventh Army, 

commanders devoted an increasing amount of time to airmobility training. 

Instead of using helicopters to move small numbers of soldiers to isolated tactical 

engagements, they could now move entire battle groups by air. In January 1958, 

for example, forty-seven H–34 Choctaw helicopters transported 950 men of the 

1st Battle Group, 28th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, from Heilbronn to the 

training area at Baumholder in an exercise designated Operation Lion Lift. I

addition to the troops, the helicopters carried some fifteen tons of weapons and 

equipment into the landing zone. Six months later, eight hundred men of the 1st 

Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, moved into the 

Hohenfels training area, using a combination of ten H–34 Choctaw helicopters 

and twenty U–1A Otter fixed-wing aircraft. Both exercises demonstrated the 

potential for rapid mobility that massed helicopter airlift could provide.41

39 OPORD 1–4, Battle Group Test, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 13th Inf, 16–18 Aug 1958, Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Memo, Smith for Distribution, 1 Jan 1959, 

sub: Training Memorandum No. 1, Training Program 1959; HQ, 3d Armd Div, Commanders 

Conference, 28 May 1959, Entry 30742, 3d Armored Division, RG 338, NACP. 40 “Tough, New Artillery Training Test,” Army Times, 8 Nov 1958. 41 Thurston Macauley, “Move Is Biggest Pentomic Test in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 22 Jan 1958; Howard Coley, “Infantry Mobility Shown in Mass Copter Airlift,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Jul 1958.
316 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Since the Soviets had a reputation as skilled night fighters, a large portion 

of U.S. training concentrated on night operations. As part of that emphasis, 

in April 1957, USAREUR and the Seventh Army directed that all infantry, 

armored infantry, and reconnaissance units should conduct ranger training 

programs that stressed patrolling, small-unit tactics, and night operations. As 

a result of that directive, by 1958, most units had created specialized sections or 

platoons within their organizations that had trained for long-range patrolling, 

night movements, and actions behind enemy lines. Often with the assistance 

of personnel from the 10th Special Forces Group, these specialized units also 

trained to conduct unconventional warfare operations and to assist local 

indigenous resistance groups. Even the 6th Infantry in Berlin organized a Ranger 

unit. It practiced its craft in the wilderness of the city’s Grunwald Park. The 

West Berlin Zoo obligingly loaned the soldiers nonpoisonous snakes so that 

they could get used to dealing with them in the wild.42

42 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 156; Training Memo 1, HQ, 

8th Inf Div, Training Program for 1959, 1 Jan 1959, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, 

RG 338, NACP; “11th Cav Unit Attacks Behind Enemy Lines,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 20 May 1958; “Guerrilla Games to Team Special Forces, 24th Div,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 15 Sep 1959; Memo, USAREUR for CG, USAREUR COMZ, 22 Nov 1957, 

sub: Assignment of Responsibilities and Missions in Support of Unconventional Warfare Operations, Entry 2011, USAREUR Mobilization Planning Files, RG 549, NACP; “6th Infantry 

Rangers,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 27 Aug 1958.

A Seventh Army H–34 helicopter airlifts a 105-mm. howitzer during Exercise Sabre Hawk
Second Thoughts 3

The long-range patrol units also served another important purpose. As early 

as 1955, Seventh Army intelligence officers had recognized a need for small units 

to gather information related to potential targets for atomic weapons. Col. 

Gilbert J. Check, the Seventh Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, suggested 

that commanders should develop the capability to patrol to the limits of the 

weapons supporting their units. At the corps level, for example, that would 

require sending scouts out to a distance of about fifteen miles to identify targets 

within range of the Honest John rockets in direct support to the corps. Seventh 

Army patrol units would have to operate to the more extended range of the 

Corporal missile. Check noted that such extended-range patrols might have 

to be inserted by helicopter or airplane and parachute. He also identified the 

requirement for lightweight, long-range radios and all-weather, silent-running 

helicopters before the long-range patrols would be completely practical.43

43 Memo, Col Gilbert J. Check, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, for CINCUSAREUR, 18 May 1955, 

sub: Problem for Discussion, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

Soldiers of the 11th Airborne Division attach a 1⁄4-ton jeep with recoilless rifle to an H–34 

helicopter for air assault during Exercise Sabre Hawk
318 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

In 1959, the Seventh Army headquarters directed both the V and VII Corps 

to conduct field tests of their long-range reconnaissance patrols to determine 

the optimal makeup of the patrols and any factors limiting their effectiveness. 

Seventh Army evaluators determined that three men could operate efficiently for 

a brief period of time, but that six was the ideal number. Patrols could operate 

efficiently for about four days before beginning to lose effectiveness. Leaving 

patrols in place as the main body withdrew was deemed the least risky means 

of getting personnel into the patrol area. Insertion by parachute or helicopter 

involved a greater risk of detection and, in the case of the former, required 

trained parachutists.44

The soldiers of the 10th Special Forces Group continued their own highly 

specialized training as well. Individuals and teams underwent cross-training 

in demolitions, communications, medical treatment and first aid, and in the 

organization and development of guerrilla forces. In addition to providing 

instructor cadre for USAREUR service schools, the group also provided 

instruction in long-range patrolling to various Seventh Army units. Group 

exercises involved cold weather indoctrination, cross-country movement, and 

survival techniques. One such exercise, held in 1958, required each soldier to 

cross forty miles of mountainous terrain in seventy-two hours with a compass 

and a 1:100,000-scale map. Since each Special Forces trooper was also airborne 

qualified, many field exercises also included tactical parachute jumps.45

Training for soldiers in Europe frequently involved orientation on new 

types or models of weapons and equipment. In addition to experimenting 

with helicopters for massed troop movements, some in USAREUR began to 

contemplate using them as weapons platforms in support of ground operations. 

In 1958, the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, requested permission 

from the Army to arm the helicopters operating under his command. Following 

Department of the Army approval early in 1959, the Army’s light H–13 Sioux 

helicopter, sporting twin .30-caliber machine guns mounted on its landing 

skids, began appearing in European skies. Later that year, Brig. Gen. Clifton 

F. Von Kann, director of Army aviation, proposed arming the aircraft with 

light guided missiles to create a fleet of airborne tank killers. At the same time, 

troops in infantry units began qualification testing on a new rifle, the M14, 

and a new machine gun, the M60. Both were designed to fire NATO’s newly 

standardized small arms round, the 7.62-mm. cartridge. By then, the Army’s 

extensive research and development in short- and medium-range missiles also 

paid dividends. Units employing Lacrosse surface-to-surface and Hawk surfaceto-air missiles began preparing for deployment to Europe. The 5th Missile 

Battalion, 42d Artillery (Lacrosse), completed its movement to USAREUR in 

44 HQ, Seventh Army, G–2 Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Conference, 14 Oct 

1959; Memo, CWO Jack H. Johnson, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 30 Nov 

1959, sub: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Study. Both in Vertical File, MHI. 45 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 159.
Second Thoughts 3

March 1960. The first Hawk battalion, the 4th Missile Battalion, 57th Artillery, 

did not arrive in Germany until 1961.46

Rethinking Concept C and COMZ Realignment

The pentomic reorganization had little effect on the organization or function 

of the USAREUR Communications Zone. Nonetheless, the line of support 

across France continued to evolve as the USAREUR headquarters moved to 

streamline logistical support throughout the command.

With an eye toward cutting costs and further reducing manpower requirements, in February 1958 USAREUR continued the realignment of logistical 

functions and technical staff responsibilities it had begun the previous year. As 

a result of the elimination of logistical operations from its headquarters and the 

decrease in technical service staffs, USAREUR transferred responsibility for 

supervision of field maintenance operations in all of its subordinate commands 

in Germany and France to the commander of the Communications Zone. 

Other responsibilities that went to the Communications Zone included staff 

supervision over ammunition operations throughout the theater; the monitoring 

of engineer construction and modification programs; and oversight of commissaries, laundries, dry cleaning facilities, and other quartermaster operations.47

To clarify lines of communications and authority between logistical facilities 

and the Communications Zone headquarters, and to convert the Advance Section 

(ADSEC) and Base Section (BASEC) to a standard TOE status, those latter 

two organizations were reorganized and renamed as the 4th and 5th Logistical 

Commands, respectively. The headquarters for the 4th Logistical Command, the 

former Advance Section, remained at Verdun, while the headquarters of the 5th 

Logistical Command, the former Base Section, remained at Poitiers. The change 

had little effect on the day-to-day operations of USAREUR logistics, however, 

as the duties of the two headquarters remained unchanged and most orders and 

reports continued to refer to them as the ADSEC and BASEC.48

46 “May Arm Copters in Europe,” Army Times, 27 Sep 1958; Marty Gershen, “A New Weapon 

Is Born as Army Arms Copters,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Jan 1959; “Tank-Killer 

Copters Called Support Aid,” Army Times, 21 Nov 1959; HQ, 3d Armd Div, Commanders Conference, 20 Mar 1959, Entry 30742, 3d Armored Division, RG 338, NACP; Ernie Weatherall, 

“Rough Game, Rougher Weapon,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Oct 1959; “First 

Hawk Unit Set for Europe,” Army Times, 14 Nov 1959; HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR Hawk 

Deployment Plan, chg 1, Revision, 23 Oct 1961, AHEC. For more information on NATO’s 

largely unsuccessful effort to standardize ammunition, see Huston, One for All. 47 Memos, Capt Virgil W. Bolton, Asst Adj Gen, for Distribution, 28 Feb 1958, sub: Realignment of Logistical Functions, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; and 

Brig Gen Stephen M. Mellnik, Cdr, Seventh Army Support Command, for CG, Seventh Army, 

8 Sep 1958, sub: SUPCOM Progress Report for 1 Jul–31 Aug 1958, Vertical File, AHEC. 48 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 13; Memo, Maj Wilbur 

H. Vinson, Asst Sec of the General Staff, for CG, COMZ, 21 Oct 1959, sub: Briefing for the 

CINC by COMZ CG on the Headquarters Reorganization Plan, Entry 2002, USAREUR SGS 

Conferences, 1959–1961, RG 549, NACP.
Field maintenance shop in Rheinau, Germany, 1959
Second Thoughts 3

As these efforts continued, USAREUR and Seventh Army soldiers had once 

again to adjust to a new chain of command. On 1 April 1959, General Hodes, 

whose three years as USAREUR commander far exceeded that of any of his 

predecessors, departed for retirement in the United States. After less than a 

year in command of the Seventh Army, General Eddleman received his fourth 

star and became USAREUR Commander. At the same time, the V Corps 

Commander, Lt. Gen. Frank W. Farrell, took command of the Seventh Army. 

Farrell was an infantry officer who had served as chief of staff and artillery 

commander for the 11th Airborne Division during World War II. As such, he 

had participated in amphibious landings and other combat operations in the 

Philippines. After the war, he held a number of positions related to airborne 

operations, culminating in a two-year tour as commander of the 82d Airborne 

Division from October 1953 to July 1955. He had served for almost two years 

as the V Corps commander in Europe before taking over the Seventh Army.49

49 “Eddleman to Succeed Gen Hodes; Farrell Gets 7th, Adams V Corps,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 13 Feb 1959; Interv, Col Richard C. Cole and Col William L. Golden with 

Gen Melvin Zais, 20 Jan 1977, p. 391, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI. 

Corpsman from the 6th General Dispensary administers the Salk vaccine to U.S. 

dependents at Poitiers.
322 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Once he replaced Hodes, General Eddleman quickly demonstrated that he 

had his own ideas about how to simplify and consolidate logistical support. 

Hodes had transferred responsibility and command authority over support units 

from USAREUR technical staffs to the commander of the Communications 

Zone. As a logical extension of that decision Eddleman proposed to move the 

staff sections themselves, and, in August 1959 he transferred the ordnance, 

transportation, and quartermaster divisions of the USAREUR staff from 

Heidelberg to the Communications Zone headquarters in Orléans, France. 

While at most only eighty people were involved, Eddleman viewed the transfer 

as the first step in a greater readjustment of the USAREUR staff between 

Heidelberg and Orléans. He intended to create a single logistical command to 

direct the Communications Zone and to support the theater army if the force 

went on a wartime footing. The general was concerned that, as commander of 

NATO’s Central Army Group, he could not also direct the theater’s logistical 

support structure if war occurred. As part of his proposed reorganization, he 

therefore recommended to the new Army Chief of Staff, General Lemnitzer, 

that the position of commanding general, U.S. Army Communications Zone, 

should be upgraded from major general to lieutenant general. The officer who 

held that position would become his deputy with command responsibility for 

all USAREUR logistical staff functions that relocated to France. He also 

proposed to move his deputy chief of staff for advanced weapons and guided 

missiles to Orléans. Becoming the Communications Zone chief of staff, that 

officer would oversee the buildup of NATO’s atomic and missile capabilities. 

The Department of the Army approved the designation of the Communications 

Zone commander as USAREUR deputy commander but did not upgrade the 

associated rank to lieutenant general.50

The U.S. Army Southern European Task Force

In another organizational change, on 1 January 1958, the U.S. Army 

Southern European Task Force (SETAF), moved from the jurisdiction of 

the U.S. European Command to that of USAREUR. The task force, which 

had come into existence upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Austria in 

October 1955, had its headquarters in Verona and most of its units under the 1st 

Missile Command at Vicenza. The missile command consisted of two Honest 

John rocket battalions, the 159th and 510th Field Artillery Rocket Battalions; 

two Corporal missile battalions, the 543d and 570th Field Artillery Missile 

Battalions; the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, trained and designated as sky 

cavalry; and various support elements. In addition to providing an atomic and 

50 MFR, HQ, USAREUR, 11 Aug 1959, sub: Full Staff Conference; Memo, Maj Betty T. 

McCormack, Asst Adj Gen, for Distribution, 22 Sep 1959, sub: USAREUR Commanders’ 

Conference Notes; Ltr, Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 

CSA, 8 Oct 1959. All in Entry 2002, Secretary of the General Staff Conferences, 1959–1961, RG 

549, NACP. 
Second Thoughts 3

missile capability for NATO’s southern flank, SETAF provided administrative 

and logistical support for U.S. forces in the Mediterranean theater. It also had 

responsibility for training cadre personnel for Italian Honest John battalions.51

When SETAF was assigned to USAREUR, both its annual budget and its 

nearly six thousand military personnel became a part of overall USAREUR 

authorizations. USAREUR, however, received no corresponding increase in 

either its funding or its troop ceiling of roughly 226,000. Moreover, it already 

faced a reduction of nineteen hundred spaces in U.S. military personnel by 

the end of 1959. General Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 

informed both the USAREUR commander at the time, General Hodes, and the 

Department of the Army, that the only way to maintain the combat potential 

of Army forces in Germany would be to offset the manpower reductions by 

turning a comparable portion of SETAF over to the Italians, a process he 

referred to as “indigenization.” Although USAREUR and the Department of 

the Army agreed with Norstad’s recommendation, the Department of State 

51 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 13–14; “SETAF’s Logistical Command at Camp Darby,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Dec 1958.

SETAF helicopter from the 202d Transportation Company helps transport a small chapel 

to the summit of Mt. Grignone, Italy.
324 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

was reluctant to begin negotiations with the Italians on the subject because of 

impending elections in the summer of 1958. This tabled discussions for a year.52

In response, the Department of the Army submitted a plan for an 

incremental indigenization that called for the replacement of two thousand 

Americans with Italians by the end of 1959. A reorganization of the command 

was completed during the year, but not on the basis of the space-for-space 

replacement of Italians for Americans that Army leaders had envisioned. In 

order to achieve personnel savings, the command inactivated two Honest John 

battalions and three infantry security companies, and it reduced some support 

battalions to company size. Reductions in the headquarters of SETAF, the 1st 

Missile Command, and the SETAF Logistical Command provided additional 

spaces. These losses were partially offset by the activation of two Italian Honest 

John battalions that were in an advanced state of training and by a promise 

from NATO’s Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe, to provide Italian infantry 

security companies. The reorganization also assigned Italian Army personnel 

to the SETAF general staff to assist with binational responsibilities.53

52 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 133–34. 53 HQ, USAREUR, Memo 1–20–26, Jun 1958, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 

1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 

R. Adm. Sherman R. Clark (right) and Maj. Gen. John P. Daly (left) meet at SETAF 

headquarters.
Second Thoughts 3

After these moves, the SETAF commander, Maj. Gen. John P. Daley, 

warned that plans for further Italianization were not acceptable. Removing the 

Corporal battalions would cause great concern to the Italians, he said, and the 

removal of any more U.S. combat troops from Italy in the near future would 

weaken NATO’s posture in southern Europe by greatly reducing the U.S. 

Army’s influence on the Italian Army. He recommended that U.S. forces levels 

remain unchanged for the next few years. General Eddleman, the USAREUR 

commander, supported these recommendations and asked the Department of 

the Army to reconsider its plans for further inactivations of U.S. Army units 

in Italy. As a result, the Army made no further force reductions in SETAF 

that year.54

Tying Up Loose Ends

As USAREUR neared the tenth anniversary of its activation, a number 

of its programs and associations began to reach maturity. The comradeship 

that the Seventh Army started to forge with the new Bundeswehr continued 

to thrive. The relationship between U.S. forces in Europe and the Federal 

Republic of Germany also moved to a new level. Within the command, new 

units and weapons systems arrived to replace older components, while the 

Army’s experiment with large-unit rotation came to a close.

Although the U.S. Army’s formal participation in the training and development of the new German Army had ended in 1957, the close relationships 

between German trainees and their American instructors flourished, as fully 

trained units of the Bundeswehr continued to join NATO’s military force. By 

the end of 1958, four more divisions—the 3d and 5th Armored, the 1st Airborne, 

and the 1st Mountain—joined NATO’s defense force. The II German Corps, 

with the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Mountain Division, held Central 

Army Group’s southern flank in southern Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, 

immediately to the south and on the right flank of the U.S. VII Corps. The 

III German Corps, with the 2d Infantry Division and 5th Armored Division, 

occupied a sector formerly held by the French I Corps and covering the northern 

portion of the Fulda Gap. It sat on the left flank of the U.S. V Corps and on 

the right flank of the I Belgian Corps. The supreme allied commander assigned 

the 1st Airborne Division to Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, as its primary 

reserve. The German 1st Infantry Division and 3d Armored Division went to 

NATO’s Northern Army Group to serve under the I German Corps, which 

had yet to deploy.55

Throughout 1959, the German forces earmarked for Central Army Group 

remained two corps headquarters and five divisions: one mountain, one airborne, 

65–67; U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF), Public Affairs Office, SETAF 

Through the Years, 25 Oct 2005, Historians files, CMH. 54 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, p. 67. 55 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 121–23.
326 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

one armored, and two infantry. With its divisions stationed on each flank of 

the American positions, the German Army strengthened the close relationship 

it had already begun to form with the U.S. Army. Seventh Army units worked 

alongside their German counterparts during NATO maneuvers and supported 

them during their own internal exercises. More so than many of the other NATO 

allies, the Germans and Americans were able to overcome language differences 

and soon grew comfortable with their developing partnership.56

In much the same manner as the Americans were beginning to reconsider 

the recently adopted pentomic formations, the Germans, by 1959, were already 

rethinking the organization of their divisions. Like the Americans, German 

military leaders recognized that the atomic battlefield required dispersion and 

smaller maneuver units. They preferred a brigade structure, however, in which 

battalions were the primary maneuver units. To create a greater number of 

maneuver and support units, the divisions split tank and artillery battalions 

in half and brought each of the halves up to full battalion strength with new 

personnel. They also removed one-third of the personnel from each infantry 

battalion, combining them to create a fourth battalion from every three. 

The Germans redesignated their infantry divisions as armored infantry and 

subdivided them into brigades rather than the regiments and combat groups they 

had employed earlier. The new armored infantry divisions consisted of one tank 

and two infantry brigades, with an increased strength of about fifteen hundred 

men. The armored divisions consisted of one infantry and two tank brigades, 

with an increase of about twelve hundred personnel. The German brigades 

were largely self-sufficient and were grouped on an ad hoc basis under existing 

divisions, which served as administrative headquarters. The reorganization 

coincided with the release of some twenty-four thousand draftees at the end of 

March 1959, causing many of the new units to remain understrength for the 

remainder of the year.57

West Germany’s new military leaders also called on the nation’s expanding 

industrial base to replace some of their purchased American equipment with 

German-produced armaments more to their liking. Based on its World War 

II experience, the German Army wanted its infantry to move and fight from 

tracked armored vehicles. American doctrine, on the other hand, still called for 

its infantry to fight on foot. Consequently, American personnel carriers did not 

provide the weapons or armored protection suitable to the Germans’ needs. 

Similarly, German doctrine called for tanks with high mobility and firepower, 

56 Ibid., pp. 121–22; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 70–71, 

Historians files, CMH; Memo, CWO M. F. Rice, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, V Corps, 15 Aug 

1958, sub: U.S. Army Participation in III German Corps Exercise, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “U.S., German Army Units to Join in Erlangen Fete,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 17 Apr 1959; “Yanks Team With Germans on Maneuver,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 18 Dec 1959. 57 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 70–71; Trauschweizer, 

The Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 102–04.
Second Thoughts 3

rather than the heavy armor found on the American and British tanks. As a 

result, German manufacturers began development of Leopard tanks and Marder 

armored personnel carriers to replace the American equipment.58

Somewhat more contentious than the development of the Bundeswehr 

were negotiations that in August 1959 finally led to the signing of a formal 

Status of Forces Agreement between West Germany and the six NATO 

countries—the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 

and Canada—that had military forces stationed in the Federal Republic. 

Although extensions of the 1952 Bonn Conventions had covered the rights 

and obligations of all parties while negotiations were in progress, the Germans 

signaled after their 1957 elections that they were not willing to extend indefinitely 

either the convention or the negotiations. The most difficult problems to resolve 

involved the availability of training areas to USAREUR and other NATO 

forces. Although the increasing number of military units at NATO’s disposal 

required larger tracts of land for training than in the past, West Germany’s 

postwar economic growth placed a premium on whatever space existed. By 

1958, the construction of highways, factories, and housing was absorbing an 

average of nearly two hundred acres per day. In an effort to reach a satisfactory 

agreement with the Germans on this issue, the U.S. European Command 

directed USAREUR to establish a training area survey and negotiation board 

to gather data and to refine U.S. requirements for future negotiations with the 

German Defense Ministry.59

Other areas of conflict involved fees for telecommunications, insurance 

and taxation, and criminal jurisdiction. The agreement made no changes to the 

serviceman’s tax status but called for Americans to pay the same basic rate as 

the Germans for telephone service. Where crime was concerned, the Germans 

agreed to waive their right to bring American servicemen or their dependents to 

trial except in cases of homicide, rape, robbery, or assault. Moreover, American 

personnel would remain in U.S. custody until the completion of a trial or other 

criminal proceedings in the German courts. Even though all parties signed the 

agreement in August 1959, it took four more years for the treaty to be ratified 

by all seven nations involved, and it did not go into effect until July 1963.60

Also drawing to a close in 1958 was the Gyroscope plan for rotating complete 

units between the United States and Germany. In March and April 1958, the 

3d and 10th Infantry Divisions completed the final full-division swap, with the 

3d Division taking over its duties in Germany on 24 April. As before, the units 

58 Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix, p. 344; Reed Germany and NATO, p. 71; Ingo W. Trauschweizer, “Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War,” Journal 

of Military History 72 (April 2008): 477–508. 59 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 277–80. 60 Ibid.; “Bonn, Allies Nearing Completion of Status-of-Forces Agreement,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 6 Sep 1958; “Servicemen Will Hardly Notice Effect of Status of Forces Treaty,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 15 Aug 1959; D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in 

Europe, 1953–1963 (HQ, USAREUR, 1964), p. 20, copy in Historians files, CMH.
328 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

of the 3d Division moved into billets vacated by the units of the 10th Division, 

with the division headquarters located in Würzburg and the subordinate units 

stationed between Aschaffenburg and Bamberg. Even before that exchange was 

complete, however, the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, announced that 

future rotations would take place between battle groups rather than divisions. 

In justifying the change, Taylor said that it had not been possible to keep enough 

full-strength divisions in the United States to support the program. He also noted 

that it had proved difficult for divisions in Germany to maintain high levels of 

readiness and combat effectiveness throughout the process.61

The Army began testing the new approach almost immediately. In July 

1958, it redesignated the 11th Airborne Division as the 24th Infantry Division 

and announced the planned rotation of its airborne battle groups out of Europe 

by the end of the year. Because of contingency plans requiring the Seventh 

Army to maintain an airborne capability, another USAREUR division, the 

8th Infantry Division, was reorganized as a composite division with two battle 

groups of airborne and three of standard infantry. When all of the movements 

were complete, the 8th Infantry Division submitted its evaluation of the battle 

group rotation. It reported that the combat effectiveness of the outgoing battle 

groups began to decrease from the moment the two units exchanged advanced 

parties. Although the incoming personnel were technically qualified to take 

the field and function as an integral part of the unit, their duties in paving 

the way for the rest of the rotation precluded such involvement. Battle group 

commanders also noted a shortage of specialists and junior noncommissioned 

officers in the contingents that arrived from the United States. They attributed 

this to an inability on the part of U.S. specialist training schools to keep up 

with the bulk requirements of a Gyroscope rotation. Unit leaders noted that 

inspections and turnover of equipment drew an inordinate number of troops and 

noncommissioned officers away from their normal duties and missions. Because 

of the drop in unit effectiveness throughout the rotation period, each of the 

battle group commanders suggested that the Army should end the program.62

Based, in part, on those reports General Eddleman recommended in September 

that Gyroscope should cease. He observed that USAREUR had instituted an 

automated enlisted replacement system in 1956 that seemed to work well for 

senior noncommissioned officers on assignment to Europe. Replacements for 

lower ranks, he said, could return to the system of four-man teams organized into 

61 Howard Coley, “3d Infantry Division Takes Over Duties, Mission in Germany of Gyroscoping 10th Division,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Apr 1958; “Taylor Confirms Gyro 

Change to Small Units,” Army Times, 15 May 1958. 62 “Army Plans New Division,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Mar 1958; “8th Inf 

Div to Reorganize as an Infantry, Airborne, Composite Unit by Jan. 1,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 29 Jun 1958; HQ, USAREUR, Memo 1–20–29, Comments of the Commander 

in Chief, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Marty Gershen, 

“8th Division Is Going Composite,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Dec 1958; Memo, 

Col Lynn D. Smith, Ch of Staff, for CG, V Corps, 20 Apr 1959, sub: Evaluation of Battle Group 

Rotation, Entry 30742, 8th Infantry Division, RG 338, NACP.
Second Thoughts 3

carrier companies that the Gyroscope program had replaced. The Department 

of the Army approved Eddleman’s recommendations. In October 1959, the first 

planeload of replacements organized as a carrier company arrived in Frankfurt.63

Ultimately, Gyroscope died because its drawbacks were considerable while 

the benefits it had promised proved to be less significant than anticipated. 

Although the improvement in unit integrity and the increased stability of family 

life that it provided did increase morale, those gains were more than offset by the 

enormous loss in readiness and combat effectiveness of units as they went through 

the rotation process. Furthermore, the effort to keep both incoming and outgoing 

units up to full strength in the period leading up to an exchange caused as much 

personnel turbulence in the rotating units as was found in non-Gyroscope units. 

Moreover, if financial advantages stemmed from the full use of transportation 

facilities that accompanied the movement of large groups of men and dependents, 

the nonavailability of housing and the need to provide transient quarters for 

soldiers and their families that came with these moves negated most of the savings. 

If Gyroscope proved to be less than fully successful as a means of normal troop 

rotation, however, it did demonstrate the feasibility of large-unit rotation. It was 

the forerunner of more successful exercises for the rapid augmentation of forces 

in Germany that began a few years later.64

Even as Gyroscope was drawing to a close, other initiatives in Europe were 

just getting under way. One project of particular interest to SHAPE and the rest 

of NATO was the installation of Nike Ajax air defense missiles to protect airfields 

and major logistics installations throughout Western Europe. Acquisition of the 

first missile launching sites in Germany had begun in 1957. By June 1958, while 

many potential sites had been identified, construction had begun on only a few, 

and only two were completed and occupied by active missile batteries. Those 

two sites, to the northeast and southeast of Kaiserslautern, were part of the 

planned ring of sites designed to protect the massive American logistical center 

there. Most of the delays were the result of difficult negotiations with the various 

West German states over the acquisition of land in areas where the missile sites 

would be most effective. Because the purchase of real estate and permanent site 

construction had not progressed enough to accommodate the six antiaircraft 

battalions that were to be converted to Nike missile units, USAREUR initiated 

a plan to build temporary sites. The command diverted money from already 

approved repair and utilities maintenance projects to finance the construction. 

All sites were located on U.S. Army– or French-controlled property in order to 

63 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 69–70; Historical Division, 

HQ, USAREUR, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe, 1945–1963, 1964, 

Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Robert Dunphy, “Army Replaces Europe 

Gyroscope System,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Sep 1959; Paul Kackley, “1st Carrier 

Unit Arrives,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 25 Oct 1959. 64 Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in 

Europe, 1945–1963, 1964; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Why Gyroscope Failed: Army’s Readiness at 

1949–50 Low,” Army Times, 19 Sep 1959.
330 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

eliminate the need to negotiate with the German government for approval, and 

all of the work was completed by mid-1958, when Nike cadres and equipment 

began arriving from the United States (Map 13).65

65 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 206–08; “U.S. Nike Ajax 

Batteries Now in Operational Sites for German Air Defense,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 29 Mar 1958.

Mosel R

Main R

Rhine R

Rhine R

Cologne

BONN

Koblenz

Stuttgart

Karlsruhe

Frankfurt

Mannheim

Bitburg

Kaiserslautern

Saarbrücken

Strasbourg

FRANCE

BELGIUM

L UXEMBOUR G

NIKE MISSILE SITES

WEST GERMANY

30 June 1958

Planned Sites

Acquired Land

Under Construction

Construction Complete

Based on a sketch and all positions are approximate

Map 13
Second Thoughts 3

In the spring of 1959 the first battalion-size package of Nike–Herculestrained personnel arrived in Europe to convert four batteries of the original 

Nike Ajax system to a newer model with an atomic capability. Because the Army 

could convert only those units that were located on permanent sites, only two 

units completed the changeover during 1959. Located at Wackernheim, a few 

miles west of Mainz, and Landau, about twenty miles northwest of Karlsruhe, 

both sites were positioned to protect allied depots as well as major bridges 

over the Rhine. Incomplete construction at the other permanent sites delayed 

deployment of the other two batteries.66

Managing Dependents

Although USAREUR and Seventh Army commanders generally described 

morale in their units as good, they also almost invariably reported that the 

most important factors weighing on troop morale were shortages in government housing and the length of waiting periods for married personnel whose 

families had not accompanied them overseas. In January 1958, USAREUR 

headquarters reported that the Army had approved only slightly more than 

half of all requests for concurrent travel of dependents the previous month. 

Recognizing that this was an important component of the command’s overall 

readiness, USAREUR’s leaders looked for ways to make it easier for soldiers 

to bring their families with them to Europe.67

The problem in most cases was housing. The command could not allow most 

soldiers to bring their families with them overseas until government-supplied 

quarters were available for them. Despite efforts to increase the amount of 

housing, the Army in Europe never seemed to have enough. A 1954 dependents 

housing project that provided quarters for more than twenty-two thousand 

families in American dependent communities throughout Germany had been 

completed in November 1957. Another construction effort that built some 1,250 

apartments and 1,450 single and duplex homes was completed in January 1958. 

By that time, a proposal to build an additional fifty-two hundred housing units 

in Germany had gone to the Department of the Army and was awaiting action 

by the Department of Defense and Congress. Despite all that work, however, 

waiting times for quarters hovered for as long as a year in housing areas, 

such as those supporting U.S. installations in Mainz, Karlsruhe, Pirmasens, 

Baumholder, and Idar-Oberstein.68

Midway through 1958, USAREUR announced an all-out drive to boost 

the rate of concurrent family travel to 97 percent for Germany and France by 

the end of 1959. Although the Army could find no additional funds to support 

66 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, p. 65. 67 Memo, Col Walter F. Ellis, G–1, for G–3 and G–4, 27 Jan 1958, sub: Dependent Housing 

in Germany, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 68 Ibid.; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, p. 254; John Wiant, 

“Concurrent Travel to Germany Drops,” Army Times, 20 Sep 1958.
332 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

new construction, the command looked for other ways to increase the number 

of available quarters for U.S. military dependents. One of the first initiatives was 

an effort to convert several hundred unused maids’ rooms and excess bachelor 

officer quarters into temporary housing. A second was the establishment of 

military rental agencies to carry listings of satisfactory housing available on 

the German economy and to provide legal assistance and an interpreter for 

negotiations between families and potential German landlords. Later in the 

year, USAREUR authorized a temporary lodging allowance for up to eighty 

days for newly assigned personnel and their families to stay in hotels when they 

first arrived in theater. The command ordered unit leaders to correspond directly 

with personnel newly assigned to their units before they arrived to assist them in 

locating accommodations on the German economy. Commanders also assigned 

sponsors to incoming personnel. Those individuals wrote to inform the newcomers 

of local housing conditions, provided lists of available accommodations, and 

identified nearby hotels where they could find temporary lodging.69

For a time these measures seemed to succeed. Concurrent travel averaged 

more than 80 percent during the final months of 1958. Then, in February 1959, 

the Department of Defense rejected USAREUR requests for construction of 

more than ten thousand housing units in 1959 and 1960. The next month, the 

command had to stop approving travel for dependents planning to stay in 

German hotels until they could find suitable housing because it had found that 

as much as 95 percent of families coming to Germany were going into hotels 

where many incurred expenses far beyond their means. With the tourist season 

approaching, rates rising, and the number of available hotel accommodations 

falling, the command could no longer approve concurrent travel for dependents 

unless government housing was available or a family could verify that it had 

obtained a German house or apartment.70

Hard on the heels of the announcement that USAREUR was cutting off 

funding for temporary accommodations came word in May that further cutbacks 

in the command’s annual budget, rising costs of services and spare parts, and 

readiness priorities would force even those dependents already in government 

quarters to tighten their belts. Although housing itself would not be affected, the 

command announced that less money would be available for maintenance of 

quarters, support of the school system, and some commissary services.71

Even as they were eliminating funds for dependent housing in Europe, 

U.S. military and political leaders acknowledged the valuable contributions 

that U.S. civilians, particularly military dependents, could make toward 

69 Hazel Guild, “Area Commands Act to Ease Housing Pinch in Germany,” Army Times, 8 

Mar 1958; “USAREUR Moves to Increase Concurrent Travel,” Army Times, 23 Aug 1958. 70 “Housing Situation in Europe Tight Now, and on Downgrade,” Army Times, 21 Feb 1959; 

“USAREUR Details Policy on Concurrent Travel,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 

Apr 1959; “Concurrent Travel to Europe Cut by Ban on Hotel Housing,” Army Times, 30 May 

1959. 71 “Families in Europe Must Tighten Belts,” Army Times, 9 May 1959.
Second Thoughts 3

the NATO effort. Official military guidebooks and orientation material for 

dependents urged American family members abroad to consider themselves as 

unofficial ambassadors who represented the United States and the American 

way of life. In a late 1959 paper that recommended American responses to the 

Communist challenge in Europe, the Joint Staff pointed out that U.S. armed 

forces personnel, civilian employees, and military dependents stationed overseas 

comprised the largest single group of Americans in a position to contribute 

to allied standing in the Cold War. Those individuals, exercising the closest 

contact with America’s allies and within view of the nation’s adversaries, 

were in a position to reinforce and support the political, cultural, economic, 

technological, ideological, and psychological advantages of the West in general 

and the United States in particular. The paper’s authors concluded that the 

U.S. armed forces should inculcate their personnel and their dependents with an 

improved understanding of the language, customs, and traditions of the regions 

where they would live. Presenting a positive impression of Western democracy 

required Americans to improve their behavior and attitudes toward the forces 

and peoples of U.S. allies with whom they were in contact.72

Reconsiderations

December 1959 marked the start of the tenth year since the reactivation of 

the U.S. Seventh Army in Europe and the confirmation of an American commitment to defend Western Europe against Communist provocation and expansion. 

As U.S. Army leaders in Europe began to sort out the reconsiderations and 

second thoughts of the previous two years, however, they acknowledged that 

much had changed. Although Soviet conventional forces remained numerically 

superior to those of the West, the U.S. commitment, a rearmed West Germany, 

and a unified NATO provided some measure of assurance that the Soviets 

would have to think twice before launching an attack.

Underlying the entire military balance in Europe was the specter of atomic 

warfare. The Eisenhower Doctrine of massive retaliation matched against Soviet 

achievements in ballistic missiles created a strategic stalemate that planted 

the seeds for mutual deterrence. If nothing else, the tests and exercises run 

by USAREUR and the Seventh Army during 1958 and 1959 caused military 

leaders on all sides to reassess their perceptions of atomic weapons and their 

value. Most of the senior officers of the U.S. Army in 1959 had served in World 

War II. Their generation had used atomic weapons to end the war and, for at 

least a while, they considered them to be just a larger, more powerful battlefield 

72 Donna Alvah, “U.S. Military Families Abroad in the Post–Cold War Era and the New 

Global Posture,” in Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to 

the Present, ed. Maria Hohn and Seungsook Moon (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 

153; Memo, Brig Gen H. L. Hillyard, Sec, for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 Nov 1959, sub: Military 

Activities During the Cold War, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, 

copy in Historians files, CMH. 
334 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

weapon. The atomic warfare exercises and tests of the pentomic structure 

changed that. By the end of 1959, it was clear to most that an atomic war in 

Europe would be a futile exercise that would leave little worth defending in its 

wake. While they had considerable value as a deterrent, the weapons were of 

questionable worth on the battlefield.73

What was clear by 1959 was that USAREUR needed to prepare itself 

for the long haul. While the command’s military strength certainly helped 

to restrain any Communist thoughts of expansion into Western Europe, its 

greatest contribution lay in other areas. First and foremost, it provided a strong 

indication that the United States was committed to Western Europe and the 

NATO alliance. The forward deployment of a complete field army, the creation 

of a system of logistical facilities and depots to support it, and the growing 

network of dependent communities indicated that the Americans were there 

to stay. The U.S. Army’s presence in West Germany also allowed the West 

to call the bluff on Soviet threats and bluster. Behind that bulwark, Western 

Europe’s economies could recover and its societies could flourish. Finally, the 

presence of so many American families spread throughout the theater belied 

official Communist propaganda about the West’s hostile intentions.

73 Donald A. Carter, “Wargames in Europe: The U.S. Army Experiments with Atomic Doctrine,” in Blueprints for Battle: Planning for War in Central Europe, 1948–1968, ed. Jan Hoffenaar 

and Dieter Kruger (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), pp.131–53.

A 2d ACR trooper checks an East German guard tower near Hof, Germany.
Even as the United States Army, Europe, struggled to adapt to the military 

and economic policies of the Eisenhower administration, the strategic environment that had shaped those policies was itself undergoing dramatic changes. 

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union was slowly emerging 

from the shadows of Joseph Stalin’s paranoia, but it remained a formidable 

and seemingly implacable foe of the West. Still, it was time to reconsider some 

of the assumptions regarding the Soviets that had driven U.S. policy since the 

start of the Cold War. Stalin’s successor, Nikita S. Khrushchev, had, in his 

own way, tried to improve Soviet relations with the United States and Western 

Europe. In November 1958, however, Khrushchev declared that the time had 

come to give up the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin, and, to that 

end, he threatened to hand over to the East Germans all of those remaining 

functions that the Soviet Union still exercised in the divided city. A three-year 

exercise in brinksmanship followed as East and West jockeyed for control and 

influence in Berlin. Meanwhile, USAREUR held its position on the front line, 

trying to keep the confrontation from escalating. 

Re-evaluating the Enemy

Just as U.S. and NATO military capabilities had evolved and improved over 

the previous few years, so too had those of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 

Pact. Western intelligence sources took great pains to monitor developments 

on the other side of the Iron Curtain and to pass that information along to 

USAREUR’s commanders.

An analysis of trends in Soviet capabilities and policies by the CIA in 

December 1958 presented a picture of a Soviet Union starkly different from 

the studies that it had produced ten years earlier. The report made it clear 

that, although the Soviets had not yet fully recovered from the devastation of 

World War II, they had closed the gap with the United States and the West 

in many areas. The most significant advances were in scientific research and 

development. Soviet successes with ballistic missiles and earth-orbiting satellites 

challenged perceptions of Western technological superiority. More important, 

the interaction of Western scientists with their Soviet counterparts during 

studies, conferences, and exchanges as part of the 1957–1958 International 

Geophysical Year revealed Soviet equality and even superiority in many fields 

9

Approaching Stalem
336 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

of research. Although the agency estimated that Soviet industrial technology 

still lagged behind that of the United States, it warned that most modern Soviet 

plants were already on par with those in the United States and that the Soviets 

were making striking advances in areas of automation and engineering.1

The most obvious change in the strategic balance since the beginning of the 

Cold War was the rise of the Soviet Union to a position of rough nuclear parity 

with the United States. Although the United States still retained a significantly 

larger stockpile of atomic weapons, the report’s authors estimated that the 

Soviet Union’s launch of an earth satellite demonstrated its ability to have 

operational prototypes of intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear 

warheads ready sometime in 1959. Moreover, Western scientists estimated that 

the Soviets were capable of achieving considerable further improvements in 

nuclear weapons technology. In that light, the CIA’s analysts expressed a belief 

that the Soviets’ own nuclear capabilities were so advanced that they posed a 

powerful military deterrent to the United States. As a result, it seemed unlikely 

that either side would deliberately launch an all-out war unless vital national 

interests were at stake.2

1 National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–58, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 

1958–1963, 23 Dec 1958, George Washington University, National Security Archives, Historians 

files, CMH. 2 Ibid. 

Two large missiles towed behind troop carriers are on display in Moscow during the 

fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Western observers described the 

missiles as “overgrown V–2 single stage rockets” about 75 feet long and with a range of 

only a few hundred miles.
Approaching Stalemate 

USAREUR’s analysts doubted that Soviet leaders would use their armed 

forces directly to achieve their political objectives. The Soviets appeared to be 

shying away from military confrontation in order not to disturb the atmosphere 

of relaxed tension that Khrushchev was trying to promote. In all likelihood, 

they would consolidate economic and political gains they had made and exploit 

what they believed to be their growing scientific and technological advantages. 

Believing in the inevitability of the triumph of communism, they anticipated a 

decline in Western unity and political influence and an easing of West German 

intransigence with the passing of the nation’s aging hard-line chancellor, 

Konrad Adenauer. As for the Soviet Army, it would remain where it was, in 

a position to intimidate its erstwhile allies and to serve as a bargaining chip in 

negotiations with the West.3

Also of some interest to Western observers was an emerging rift between 

the Soviet Union and Communist China. Although the connection between the 

two had probably never been quite as warm as the West had at first believed, 

it was clear by the end of the 1950s that China was beginning to move off in 

its own direction. While the Soviets appeared to be striving toward better 

relations with the West, Chinese propaganda was becoming all the more 

militant. American intelligence analysts asserted that the Soviets regarded 

3 USAREUR/CENTAG Intelligence Estimate, 1 Jan 1960, HQ, USAREUR, Ofc of Asst Ch 

of Staff, G–2, International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Center for Security Studies, 

Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, Historians files, CMH.

View of Moscow’s Red Square during the fortieth anniversary of the Communist seizure of 

power.
338 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

China’s increasing military capabilities with mixed feeling, for if Soviet leaders 

feared the cost of subsidizing the growth and modernization of China’s armed 

forces, they seemed even more apprehensive about the development of a large 

and independent Chinese arms industry. For their part, Chinese leaders viewed 

Khrushchev’s efforts to improve relations with the West with suspicion and 

not a small amount of contempt. While the Soviets would continue to assist the 

Chinese military and to provide it with equipment, the Soviet Union took an 

unusually neutral stance toward China’s border dispute with India at the close 

of 1959, and the Chinese Communists gave considerably less than enthusiastic 

support to Soviet efforts to mediate.4

The primary interest of most analysts, however, remained in the Soviet 

military posture. American intelligence had confirmed considerable reductions 

in the Soviet Army since the end of the Korean War. In fact, the Soviets had 

devoted a great deal of publicity and propaganda to personnel cuts of almost 

two million men in their armed forces between 1955 and 1957. At the same 

time, however, Western intelligence noted little, if any, inactivation of major 

units and was fairly certain that units withdrawn from satellite areas over 

the previous years had merely moved to locations within the Soviet Union. 

Any actual reductions had probably come from eliminating nonessential 

supporting and administrative units, from small cuts in some other units, and 

from transferring large numbers of labor troops to nonmilitary status. Overall, 

Western intelligence agencies estimated that Soviet military manpower was little 

changed and remained in the area of 4 million men: approximately 2.5 million 

in the ground forces, about 835,000 in the air forces, and another 760,000 in 

naval units. Given the state of the Soviet Union’s relations with the West, it 

seemed unlikely that further reductions would occur in the immediate future.5

In December 1959, Western defense leaders reported that the Soviet Union 

had established a fourth branch to its armed forces, the Strategic Rocket 

Forces. With an approximate strength of two hundred thousand men, the new 

force was responsible for manning a growing number of intercontinental and 

intermediate-range missile sites scattered throughout the Soviet Union. Its 

commander controlled all missile sites as well as the factories that manufactured 

atomic weapons, rockets, and guided missiles.6

Although Soviet doctrine contemplated the tactical use of atomic weapons 

by ground, air, and naval forces, the CIA concluded that few weapons were 

available for tactical use. Considering the estimated availability of fissionable 

4 Ibid.; National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–58, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1958–1963, 23 Dec 1958; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 200–201. 5 National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–58, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 

1958–1963, 23 Dec 1958; Matthew Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army?” Khrushchev’s 

Troop Reductions, Working Paper 19, Cold War International History Project, 1997, Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.; “Red Army Estimated at 2.5 Million Men,” Army Times, 14 Jun 1958. 6 “Soviet Forms 4th Arm of Military to Handle A-Arms, NATO Told,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 18 Dec 1959.
Approaching Stalemate 

materials, analysts believed that the Soviets possessed sufficient weapons to 

support long-range attacks against the United States but not enough for tactical 

missions or air defense. Instead, the Soviet Army trained extensively in the 

use of chemical and, to a lesser extent, biological weapons on the battlefield. 

It retained from World War II a large number of chemical munitions, mostly 

artillery rounds containing nerve agents, and research was underway to develop 

nonlethal, incapacitating agents. The CIA indicated that Soviet capabilities in 

these areas were at least comparable to those of the major Western nations and 

that the Soviet Union’s civilian populations as well as its military personnel 

had trained in defensive techniques against such weapons.7

The Soviets maintained about 175 divisions. Although many were at less 

than 50 percent of authorized wartime strength, analysts noted improvements 

in their readiness, stemming from an extensive program to modernize ground 

units to meet the requirements of modern warfare. Reorganizations in the 

Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, which contained most of the Soviet 

Union’s forward-deployed divisions in Europe, produced a new type of unit, 

the motorized rifle division. This formation added tanks, armored personnel 

carriers, and mobile rocket launchers to standard infantry divisions to produce 

a more mobile and hard-hitting unit. The reorganizations also resulted in the 

creation of “Tank Armies” composed exclusively of tank divisions and designed 

for rapid, deep exploitation into enemy rear areas once initial assault echelons 

had punched a hole in the West’s frontline defenses. The modifications stressed 

firepower, mobility, initiative, and personnel protection for operations on an 

atomic battlefield. While the new formations might employ nuclear weapons 

in support of tactical operations, conventional artillery and unguided rockets 

continued to provide the majority of fire support.8

The CIA’s analysis of the Soviet air force and naval units had important 

implications for USAREUR. Russian tactical aviation units included some 

forty-seven hundred jet fighters and twenty-eight hundred light bombers 

devoted to air support for units on the ground. Another ten thousand fighters 

were assigned to units with a primary mission of air defense. Although their 

numerical strength was impressive, most of the Soviet aircraft had limited range 

and combat ceilings, and were designed for defense of the Soviet homeland. 

Since the strategic air forces had few aircraft capable of long-range interdiction, 

a requirement for operations over the North Atlantic, the air units would be 

7 National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–58, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 

1958–1963, 23 Dec 1958. 8 Ibid.; Joseph W. Grigg, “Soviet Streamlining Its 22 Divisions in East Germany,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 27 Sep 1957; Hemen Ray, “East Zone Starts A-Training,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 14 Jul 1959. Sources on the evolution of Soviet military doctrine and 

capabilities throughout this period include Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New York: 

Macmillan, 1982); Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR; Savkin, The Basic Principles 

of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View); and Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet 

Army.
340 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

unable to interfere significantly with reinforcements moving to Europe from 

the United States.9

The Soviet Navy was a different matter. Although it had about three 

hundred surface ships, mostly cruisers and destroyers stationed in the Baltic 

and Black Seas and along Russia’s Pacific coast, its real strength lay in its 

submarines. An increase in worldwide contacts with unidentified submarines 

noted in a 1958 intelligence estimate seemed to reflect an increased level of 

training and expertise in the undersea fleet. Its four hundred boats would present 

a definite threat to any attempt to reinforce and resupply Europe by sea.10

Any discussions of Soviet military strength also had to take into consideration the military potential of its satellite states. The most powerful of these 

was East Germany, whose ground forces included seven divisions comprising 

about seventy-five thousand soldiers. These were supplemented by another 

forty-five thousand troops organized into border police and internal security 

troops. As with the Soviets, the East Germans had mechanized their rifle 

divisions and modernized much of their equipment. The East German Navy 

was small, consisting mainly of mine layers and patrol craft. The East German 

Air Force possessed 175 modern MIG–15 and MIG–17 jet fighters, as well as 

a small number of transports and training aircraft. Most of the other satellite 

nations fielded slightly larger ground forces due to policies of compulsory 

military service, which the East Germans chose not to implement in order to 

score propaganda points in the West. Of the satellites, only the Polish Army, 

frequently included in combined exercises with Soviet and East German forces, 

approached their level in training, organization, and readiness of weapons and 

equipment.11

Satellite military contributions did not come without economic and political 

costs. More than ten years after World War II, the Soviets had extracted all of 

the reparations and seized as much of the industrial infrastructure as they were 

going to get. In many cases, the cost to prop up the satellites’ economies and to 

support their armed forces was far greater than any return on the investment. 

It was the assessment of American intelligence and diplomatic analysts that 

“Stalin’s death left a legacy in Eastern Europe of inefficient maladjusted 

economies and of hatred for Soviet domination.” While this might have been 

a bit overstated, the revolts in Hungary and Poland during 1956 confirmed 

the underlying premise. Although a combination of increased Soviet military 

presence, political indoctrination, and slowly improving standards of living 

9 National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–58, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 

1958–1963, 23 Dec 1958. 10 Ibid. 11 Memo, Chairman’s Staff Group for Gen Nathan D. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 9 Mar 1959, sub: East German Armed Forces, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; DA Pam 30–50–2, Handbook on the Satellite Armies, April 

1960, copy in Historians files, CMH; James D. Marchio, “Will They Fight?: U.S. Intelligence 

Assessments and the Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, 1946–89,” Studies 

in Intelligence 51, no. 4 (December 2007), online only.
Approaching Stalemate 

had diminished some public resentment, the reliability of satellite military 

forces remained questionable. Military planners in USAREUR were quick to 

note, however, that even if the Soviet Army could not rely on its satellite allies 

to support a drive into the West, it could reasonably expect them to oppose 

and delay any Western counterattack, for they controlled all of the traditional 

routes through which Russia had been invaded in the past and thus provided 

a buffer between it and its potential enemies.12

That being the case, U.S. intelligence analysts could only conclude a 

major December 1958 estimate by noting that, if popular resentment of the 

Communist system remained in many places, it had been reduced in others 

where a gradual improvement in living standards had occurred. Overall, active 

unrest did not seem to be a problem, except in Poland where strikes and riots 

were still possible, and in East Germany where continuing emigration to the 

West indicated active discontent and remained a seemingly insoluble problem 

for the Soviet and East German regimes.13

USAREUR’s Role in the American Intervention in Lebanon

With the confrontation in Europe nearing a state of relative equilibrium, 

the United States looked to contain Soviet adventurism on other fronts. Over 

the next several years, the two sides would face one another through a series 

of proxy confrontations but would avoid direct clashes between their own 

military forces.

Claiming that Soviet leaders had long coveted control over the Middle East, 

President Eisenhower, in a 5 January 1957 message to Congress, called for its 

approval of a policy to send economic and military aid to Middle East nations 

to assist them in their fight against communism. In response, on 9 March, 

Congress approved a joint resolution promising such support and pledging 

to intervene with military force if the president deemed it necessary to help 

any Middle Eastern country requesting assistance. The policy, known as the 

Eisenhower Doctrine, committed the U.S. armed forces to possible intervention 

in the Middle East and prompted them to begin planning for that contingency.14

In response to the president’s appeal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the 

U.S. European Command to develop a joint operations plan for the support 

12 Quote from National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–58, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities 

and Policies 1958–1963, 23 Dec 1958. HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR Information Bull, Pawns 

of the Kremlin, 1959, Entry 2112, USAREUR Bulletins, 1959–1966, RG 549, NACP. 13 Ibid. 14 Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 5 Jan 1957, in Public 

Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 6–16. For more information on the growth of American 

influence and interest in the region, see Irene L. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States 

Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 

1997) and Erika Gerd Alin, “The 1958 United States Intervention in Lebanon” (Ph.D. diss., 

American University, 1990).
342 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

of a specified Middle Eastern command, which would be activated when it was 

needed. Planning involved a joint effort by the U.S. Sixth Fleet; the U.S. Marine 

Corps; the U.S. Air Force, Europe; the Military Sea Transport Service; the 

Military Air Transport Service; and the U.S. Army, Europe. The USAREUR 

contribution to this effort was Emergency Plan (EP) 201, governing the movement of an Army task force from Europe to the Middle East.15 Labeled EP 

201, the plan identified specific tasks for each of the command’s subordinate 

elements in the event that Arab-Israeli hostilities or Communist-inspired 

aggression against friendly Middle Eastern states required U.S. military 

action to protect American lives and interests and to bring about a cessation 

of hostilities. The plan required USAREUR to provide an Army Task Force 

(ATF 201)—consisting of two airborne battle groups, reinforced with minimum 

essential combat and service support elements—to a joint commander specified 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Seventh Army would contribute most of the 

personnel for the task force. In addition to the two battle groups, the troop list 

would include a tank battalion, an engineer battalion, two artillery batteries, 

an Honest John rocket battery (less two launchers), and a number of medical, 

maintenance, and supply units. USAREUR would coordinate movement of the 

task force to the airfield or port of departure and provide logistical support for 

thirty days, or until the Department of the Army assumed that responsibility.16

The plan also included support from USAREUR’s other subordinate 

commands. The Communications Zone would supply support units, mostly 

engineer, medical, and transportation personnel; move troops to departure 

points; provide logistical support to the deployed troops; and furnish emergency 

personnel replacements for the task force. The 7th Engineer Brigade, a unit 

assigned directly to USAREUR to assist with building projects throughout the 

command, was to assign one reinforced engineer construction company to U.S. 

Air Force, Europe, to help with airfield development in the area of deployment.17

The plan broke the task force’s troop list into five components: Forces 

Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo. Force Alpha consisted of the first battle 

group, an airborne engineer platoon, a medical platoon, and a section from 

the task force headquarters. It was to be prepared to move out from departure 

airfields within twelve hours’ notice of an initial alert. Force Bravo, consisting 

of the second battle group, another airborne engineer platoon, and additional 

elements from the task force headquarters, had to be able to take off from 

the departure point within twenty-four hours of notification. Force Charlie 

contained most of the combat support elements, including an airborne recon15 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959, Historians 

files, CMH. 16 HQ, USAREUR, Emergency Plan 201, 26 Feb 1958, Entry 2042, USAREUR G3 Troop 

Operations, RG 549, NACP; MFR, Capt Burl A. Wood, 9 Jan 1958, sub: Personnel Replacements for Army Task Force 201, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, 

NACP. 17 Ibid.
Approaching Stalemate 

naissance troop, two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers, an Honest John section, 

the advance components of an engineer battalion, a maintenance section, and 

the rest of the task force headquarters. Force Delta contained the logistical and 

service support units, including the remainder of the engineer battalion; the rest 

of the Honest John battery; an antiaircraft battery; a military police company; 

and various chemical, medical, engineer, ordnance, signal, and quartermaster 

sections necessary to sustain the task force for an extended period of time. The 

final component, Force Echo, was a medium tank battalion. Although the plan 

identified specific units assigned to each force, it was flexible enough for units to 

be added, subtracted, substituted, or moved between components as needed. It 

also allowed for the deployment of either the entire task force or only selected 

elements, and a move could be executed by air or by sea, depending on the 

situation at hand. Units tentatively assigned to the task force had to maintain 

a state of readiness consistent with the timetable included in the plan.18

Commanders reviewed the lists of unit and individual equipment that troops 

would need to carry as part of the deployment. Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, 

assistant division commander for the 11th Airborne Division, noted that some 

items made less sense than others. He was particularly struck by the inclusion of 

pith helmets, which had been rejected by Army testers as early as 1934. Despite 

deleting them from the list of required equipment, the unit received a shipment 

of the helmets anyway. The general recalled that the command made excellent 

use of them by issuing them to lifeguards at local swimming areas.19

It did not take long for events in the Middle East to set U.S. contingency 

plans in motion. Early in 1958, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought 

to add Lebanon, viewed by the United States as pro-Western, to his United 

Arab Republic. Partly in an effort to ward off Nasser’s influence, the Lebanese 

president, Camille Nimr Chamoun, attempted to effect a change in his country’s 

constitution that would allow him to seek a second term in office. As his 

popularity waned in the face of political opposition from several rebel leaders 

financed and supported to various extents by Egyptian and Syrian agents, 

Chamoun’s control over the government became precarious. Radio stations 

in Cairo and Damascus called on the Lebanese to revolt against the “forces of 

imperialism and its agents.” By the middle of May, with disorder growing, the 

Lebanese government prepared to ask its parliament for emergency powers, 

to include a declaration of martial law.20 

In Washington, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles 

watched the situation in Lebanon with growing concern. On the one hand, 

18 Ibid.; HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959. 19 David W. Gray, The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander’s Reminiscence

(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), pp. 2–3. 20 Quote from HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 

1959, p. 5. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 20 Mar 1958, 

in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 11, Lebanon and Jordan, pp. 18–19; Telegram From the Embassy in 

Lebanon to the Department of State, 7 May 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:31–33 .
INCIRLIK

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Map 14
Approaching Stalemate 

they believed that it was in the United States’ interest to maintain the 

independence and integrity of Lebanon in accord with the president’s Middle 

East Doctrine, and considerable congressional backing already existed for an 

American intervention in the region. On the other hand, both men recognized 

that Arab nations would bitterly oppose any introduction of U.S. armed 

forces into Lebanon. They were concerned that interruptions in oil supplies, 

closing of the Suez Canal to American shipping, and political unrest in Middle 

East nations normally friendly to the United States would be the inevitable 

result. Eisenhower suspected Soviet involvement behind much of the Arab 

unrest and believed the Soviets would continue to push unless the United 

States chose to intervene. Based on concern over Arab reaction in the region, 

however, Eisenhower ordered that U.S. forces would intervene only if President 

Chamoun requested them, and only with Chamoun’s full understanding 

that the Americans were there only to help maintain order and the stability 

of the government and not to back him for a second term as president.21

 With that guidance in mind, the State Department instructed the embassy 

in Lebanon to inform President Chamoun of the conditions under which the 

United States would be willing to intervene. Chamoun must first file a complaint 

against external interference in its affairs with the United Nations Security 

Council. Then, Lebanon was to seek public support from the governments of 

other nations including at least some Arab states. Only then might the United 

States intervene. Other than acting in their own self-defense, U.S. forces were 

not to engage any of the opposing factions. Although President Chamoun 

received the message, he chose not to make a formal request for assistance at 

that time (Map 14).22

The situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate, however, as rebel 

factions instigated riots in Beirut and called for general strikes across the nation. 

In response to an appeal from Chamoun’s government, the United Nations sent 

a team of observers to Lebanon on 11 June to ensure that outside nations were 

not aiding rebel forces with arms, equipment, or men. The team reported that 

the Lebanese Army controlled only a small portion of the country’s border with 

Syria. Because rebel forces denied the observers access to most points along 

the border, the team was unable to make any determination about possible 

Syrian infiltration.23

Events in July conspired to force President Eisenhower’s hand. On 9 July 

1958, President Chamoun announced that he would leave office at the end of 

21 Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, D.C., 13 May 1958, 5:50 p.m., 

in FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:45–48; Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower 

Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 224–25. 22 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 13 May 1958, in 

FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:49–50; Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of 

State, 14 May 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:51–52; Roger J. Spiller, “Not War But Like War”: 

The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Papers 3 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), p. 15. 23 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959.
346 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

his term without seeking re-election. Despite the announcement, rebel forces 

declared they would continue their opposition to the Lebanese government. 

Then, on 14 July in nearby Iraq, a group of young army officers executed a 

coup against the Iraqi royal family, establishing what the Americans perceived 

to be a leftist regime. This proved to be the last straw for the increasingly edgy 

Lebanese president. Upon learning of the coup in Iraq, Chamoun summoned 

the American ambassador to his office and angrily accused the United States 

of underestimating the danger in the Middle East. He dismissed U.S. assurances and told the ambassador that he would judge America’s intentions by 

its deeds. He demanded that U.S. military forces intervene within forty-eight 

hours. President Eisenhower met with his cabinet, the Joint Chiefs, and key 

congressional leaders that same day. After those discussions, he issued orders 

to land an advanced contingent of marines in Lebanon the following afternoon, 

to move elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean, and 

to put contingency plans into effect to move two USAREUR battle groups 

into the country.24

Approximately 1500 on 15 July, some five thousand marines of Task 

Force 61 began moving ashore on the beaches of Beirut. They encountered 

little opposition and by nightfall had secured the Beirut International Airport. 

Marines took charge of the control tower, hangars, and service installations 

and, in light of previously threatened rebel attacks, formed a defensive perimeter 

around the airport. Within twenty-four hours of its arrival, the task force began 

submitting requests for logistical support directly to USAREUR. Brig. Gen. 

Harold K. Johnson, the Seventh Army chief of staff, noted that his command 

had rehearsed well in advance and was prepared to provide the force with 

whatever it needed.25

Meanwhile, at 0530 on 15 July, the commander in chief, U.S. European 

Command, General Norstad, notified the USAREUR commander, General 

Hodes, of the imminent operation and directed him to prepare one battle group 

for deployment to Beirut. Although Hodes had already put the 24th Infantry 

Division on notice that it might be called on to intervene in Iraq, his warning 

order caught many of the division’s staff officers by surprise. Many were busily 

preparing for an already scheduled exercise near Bad Tölz, Germany. Moreover, 

the 1st Battle Group, 503d Airborne Infantry, which had been designated by the 

24 Ibid.; Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 14 Jul 1958, 

in FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:207–08; Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White 

House, Washington, 14 Jul 1958, 10:50 a.m., in FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:211–15; Memorandum of 

a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, 14 Jul 1958, 2:35 p.m., in FRUS, 

1958–1950, 11:218–26. 25 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; “5,000 

Marines Sent to Lebanon to Back Regime, Defend Yanks,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 16 Jul 1958; Interv, Col Richard Jensen and Lt Col Rupert F. Glover with Gen Harold K. 

Johnson, 1 Dec 1972, p. 8, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI; “Record Airlift Supplies 

U.S. Lebanon Troops,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Aug 1958; Yaqub, Containing 

Arab Nationalism, pp. 228–29.
Approaching Stalemate 

24th Division as Force Alpha in the original contingency plan, was preparing 

to participate in the same exercise and was in no condition to reconstitute itself 

in time to go to Lebanon. As a result, the division decided to substitute the 1st 

Battle Group, 187th Airborne Infantry, as a new Force Alpha. A few hours 

later, when the division received another call from USAREUR headquarters 

raising the alert status another level, the assistant division commander and 

designated commander of Task Force 201, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, began to 

assemble his troops and to prepare weapons and equipment for deployment.26

The effort soon revealed that the planning process had failed to take 

several important factors into consideration. The first had to do with actually 

assembling the task force. The battle group for Force Alpha was to be deployed 

at 110 percent of its full strength. Since units in the 24th Infantry Division were 

maintained at less than full strength due to personnel and budget restrictions 

imposed on USAREUR, General Gray had to augment his force with soldiers 

from across the division. To fill the required officer and noncommissioned 

officer slots, he received instructions to select the best and most experienced 

in the division. The 24th Infantry Division also had to provide personnel 

and equipment to prepare and load the task force at the point of departure, 

Fürstenfeldbruck airfield, near Munich. In essence, it had to cannibalize itself 

to deploy one battle group with supporting elements to Beirut. This diminished 

the unit’s capability to carry out its primary mission in Western Europe by 

almost 60 percent.27

As the task force prepared for deployment, leaders also realized that the 

reflagging of the division from the 11th Airborne to the 24th Infantry had 

unforeseen consequences. As long as the division remained an airborne unit, 

it was simple to detail individuals and units familiar with airborne marshaling 

and departure tasks. As the division gradually converted to an infantry unit, it 

lost many of its airborne-qualified personnel and much of its ability to deploy its 

units quickly and effectively. The change in the division’s TOE had also reduced 

the number of parachute riggers required to prepare individual parachutes and 

the heavier equipment drop packages. As a result troops from the two battle 

groups had to assist in rigging their own equipment.28

The change in TOE did have certain positive effects for other units who 

were deploying. Maj. Gen. Robert H. Forman, then a battery commander in 

the 24th Infantry Division, remembered that the organizational change had 

increased the number of men authorized in his battery from 97 to 137. Up until 

the deployment was announced, however, he had received no new equipment 

26 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; Spiller, 

“Not War But Like War.” 27 Spiller, “Not War But Like War”; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, 

pp. 32–42, Historians files, CMH. 28 Gray, The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958, p. 10; Gary H. Wade, Rapid Deployment 

Logistics: Lebanon, 1958 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, 1984), p. 20.
348 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

or people. When the alert was called, his battery was understrength and 

underequipped, based on the new TOE. It was remarkable, he recalled, seeing 

all of the new radios, trucks, and people that arrived within a 24-hour period, 

ready to deploy with his battery.29

The assembled force began movement to the airfield on 15 July at 1400. All 

elements were at the air base by 1900. Troops started loading the aircraft almost 

immediately and were prepared to depart by 0800 the next morning. The first 

plane departed the airfield at 0817 and all elements of the force were airborne by 

2248 on 16 July. Because the situation on the ground in Beirut was still unstable, 

aircraft were loaded so that the troops could make a parachute assault. By the 

time they made an intermediate stop in Adana, Turkey, however, officials had 

confirmed that an air landing at Beirut Airport was safe and feasible. Planes 

began arriving early on 19 July and by that evening Force Alpha had assembled 

in an area southeast of the airport and was prepared to act as a reserve force.30

29 Interv, Col Richard O. Hahn with Maj Gen Robert H. Forman, 29 Feb 1984, p. 2, Senior 

Officer Oral History Program, MHI. 30 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; “24th 

Division Unit Flying to Mideast,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Jul 1958; “Marine 

Forces in Beirut Doubled; 1st Airborne Group Due,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 19 

Jul 1958.

Vehicles and equipment of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, 24th Infantry 

Division, arrive and unload west of the Beirut city limits.
Approaching Stalemate 

With the initial task force deployed, USAREUR made ready to deliver the 

remainder of the contingency forces to Lebanon. Force Bravo, consisting of the 

1st Battle Group, 503d Airborne Infantry, remained on alert and prepared to 

move to the airfield within twelve hours of notification. When it became clear 

in the days that followed that there was little chance combat would develop 

in Lebanon, USAREUR increased the battle group’s alert requirement to 

forty-eight hours. The force would remain in Europe for the duration of the 

operation in Lebanon.31

The troops in Lebanon, however, required the headquarters, administrative, 

and support elements of the other follow on forces. Force Charlie, including the 

task force headquarters, moved to Fürstenfeldbruck airfield on the afternoon of 

17 July. Because of the complications involved in loading such diverse units and 

an outbreak of severe thunderstorms, the first aircraft did not depart for Adana 

until early 19 July. Some elements of the force gathered at other air bases in 

Germany and France, while a small detachment of vehicles and guard personnel 

went to Bremerhaven for movement by sea. All personnel and equipment except 

for the seaborne contingent reached Beirut by the evening of 24 July. Force 

Delta, consisting of additional support units, left Bremerhaven by sea on 26 

31 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; HQ, 

USAREUR, Emergency Plan 201, 26 Feb 1958.

Soldiers of the 1st Airborne Battle Group move out to their position after landing at 

Beirut airport.
350 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

July and arrived in Beirut between 3 

and 5 August. Force Echo, consisting 

of the 3d Medium Tank Battalion, 35th 

Armor, moved to Bremerhaven for sea 

transport by 21 July. It arrived in Beirut 

on 3 August.32

According to the original plan, an 

Honest John section of two launchers 

was to be part of Force Charlie, with 

the battery headquarters following as 

part of Force Delta. Prior to departure, 

however, the Army Staff directed that 

the launchers be deleted from Charlie 

and added to Delta. Four days later, 

however, as Force Delta prepared to 

load, the Joint Chiefs decided that 

political considerations made deployment of the atomic-capable rockets 

into Lebanon inadvisable. The equipment was unloaded and remained at 

Bremerhaven. To fill the gap, the 24th 

Infantry Division assumed the mission 

of maintaining one launcher on twelve-hour alert for movement to Beirut by 

air or water.33

By the time all of the Army troops of Task Force 201 had arrived, more than 

ten thousand soldiers and marines were on the ground in Lebanon. Admiral 

James L. Holloway Jr., the commander in chief, Specified Command, Middle 

East, in charge of the overall intervention, recognized that he needed a single 

ground commander to coordinate the activities of Army and Marine units. To 

that end, the Joint Chiefs approved the admiral’s recommendation that they 

appoint a joint ground force commander. The Army chief of staff, General 

Taylor, selected Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, then serving as commanding general 

of the Northern Area Command in Germany, for the position. Although the 

marines expressed disappointment that one of their own had not been selected, 

Army representatives explained that Admiral Holloway had requested an officer 

of major general rank so that he would not be outranked by his Lebanese 

counterpart. Adams was already close to the scene in Europe, had just completed 

a tour of duty in the Middle East, and was a logical choice for the position. 

Accompanied by only his personal staff, the general arrived in Lebanon on 24 

July and, two days later, assumed command of all U.S. land forces in Lebanon.34

32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.; Gray, The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958, pp. 22–23. 34 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; Spiller, 

“Not War But Like War”; Interv, Col Irving Monclova and Lt Col Marlin Lang with Gen Paul 

General Adams, 1956
Approaching Stalemate 

Because Adams had no time to assemble a staff prior to his departure, he 

decided that he would have to use personnel already in Lebanon. Although the 

simplest solution might have been to merge his staff with that of the Army task 

force, he rejected that approach because the Army elements would need their 

own operational staff in the event of hostilities. Instead, he drew 31 officers and 

108 enlisted men from the task force staff and received another 8 officers and 

some clerical personnel from the marines. To demonstrate that his headquarters 

should accurately reflect the integrated nature of the command, he requested 

and received a Marine officer to serve as his chief of staff. Adams’ experience 

in USAREUR and the predominance of USAREUR personnel on his staff 

simplified communications and procedures, allowing the entire contingency 

force to draw support from the Army in Europe rather than having to rely on 

a line of communications all the way back to the United States.35

General Adams made it his first priority to explain to his men exactly what 

it was they were supposed to do. President Eisenhower had said that their 

broad mission would be to protect American lives and interests and to sustain 

the independence of Lebanon, but the new commander needed to express 

those goals in terms of military tasks and objectives. To that end, he directed 

his ground units to maintain security around the airport, the port, and the 

embassy and to keep open principal routes of communication by establishing 

checkpoints and conducting frequent patrols. His units were to protect the city 

from harassment, raids, or incursions by rebel forces and to maintain infantry 

and tank reserves so that they could come to the assistance of any U.S. forces 

that needed backup. Adams emphasized to his troops that they were there to 

break up fights, not contribute to them. The rules of engagement for the troops 

were simple. They were not to fire unless fired on. If they were fired on, they 

were to establish fire supremacy quickly and put a stop to the engagement. A 

rifle shot would be met with a machine gun burst and a machine gun with a 

round from the 90-mm. main gun on one of the force’s M48 Patton tanks. It 

was doubtful that the rebels could raise the ante from there.36

By 1 August, soldiers had taken over the mission of the marines in securing 

the airport and the high ground surrounding it, the landing beach, and southern 

routes into the city (Map 15). The marines, in turn, took responsibility for the 

security of the city itself and the roads leading into it from the north and east. 

During the first three weeks of August, the troops were subjected to harassing 

fire from those portions of the city controlled by rebel forces. Several vehicles 

were hit, and one American soldier was wounded by a rebel gunman. General 

Adams lodged a protest with the Lebanese Army leader, Maj. Gen. Fuad 

D. Adams, 7 May 1975, pp. 21–22, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI; “General Adams 

Commands in Middle East,” Army Times, 2 Aug 1958. 35 Ibid.; Memo, Lt Col John E. Stephens, Opns Br, for Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, sub: Report of 

Trip to Beirut, 31 Jul to 3 Aug 1958, Entry 2041, USAREUR Mobilization Planning Files, RG 

549, NACP. 36 Interv, Monclova and Lang with Adams, 7 May 1975, pp. 24–28.
X X

AMLANFOR

AIRPORT

BLUE BEACH

YELLOW BEACH

GREEN BEACH

RED BEACH

D A M A S C U S

R O A D

Olive Groves

Olive Groves

Borj el Brajné

Ouadi Chahrour Kafr Shīmā

Ech Chouaïfât

Al  ̧ a H dath

BEIRUT

BEIRUT AND VICINIT Y

 LEBANON

 1958

Headquarters

Based on a sketch

Map 15
Approaching Stalemate 

Chehab, and threatened to dismantle strongpoints in rebel-controlled sections 

of the city if the Lebanese Army was unable to control the situation. American 

troops followed up by establishing roadblocks on supply routes leading into 

rebel areas.37

Following their rules of engagement, the troops developed their own 

methods for dealing with harassment. General Adams told a story of finding 

two soldiers at one checkpoint deployed in prone firing positions on a sand dune 

overlooking rebel-controlled ground. When the general stopped to investigate, 

the lieutenant in charge told him that his position had been fired on by a machine 

gun in a distant bunker. The officer noted that responding with tank fire would 

undoubtedly cause heavier casualties than the general would accept. Instead, 

he placed two of his best marksmen in a vantage point where they could see the 

backside of the bunker. Each night, he continued, his troops had seen a light 

emanating from the position. Sure enough, on the evening after they set up 

the site, the light came on about 2100 and each of his riflemen fired one round, 

extinguishing the illumination. The next morning a messenger approached the 

American under a white flag and promised the lieutenant that the rebels would 

not fire on his position again. Adams took great pleasure in relating the story 

because it reflected the difficult situation his soldiers faced and the skill and 

ingenuity with which they responded.38

For the most part, life for the soldiers settled into a routine with little to 

do outside of their military duties. They could go to the beach to swim in small 

groups, but since trucks and jeeps were in short supply, the two-mile walk there 

in the broiling sun deterred all but the most enthusiastic swimmers. Mealtimes, 

as well, were nothing to look forward to. The men ate C-rations for breakfast, 

lunch, and dinner. After a few weeks, mess personnel were able to supplement 

most meals with fresh fruit and vegetables purchased at local markets, but it 

was not until September that the troops began to receive meals similar to those 

soldiers received in Europe. In mid-August, regular shipments of ice cream that 

began to arrive by ship from Italy did much to improve morale.39

In order to maintain some level of combat readiness, and to help relieve 

the boredom, task force commanders prepared a five-week training program 

for their units. Beginning on 1 September, the program emphasized individual 

and small-unit training, physical fitness, and instruction on individual- and 

crew-served weapons. The staff coordinated with the Lebanese Army for use of 

live-fire ranges. Targets and enough supplies to equip five new ranges arrived by air 

from USAREUR. Troops from the airborne battle group also conducted training 

37 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; “Troop 

C—Army’s Eyes at Beirut,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Aug 1958. 38 Interv, Monclova and Lang with Adams, 7 May 1975, pp. 27–29. 39 John Wiant, “GI’s Fight Boredom in Lebanon,” Army Times, 2 Aug 1958; “Kilroy’s With 

Troops in Lebanon,” Army Times, 9 Aug 1958; “Troops in Lebanon Getting Garrison Rations,” 

Army Times, 13 Sep 1958; Memo, Stephens for Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, sub: Report of Trip to 

Beirut, 31 Jul to 3 Aug 1958.
354 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

jumps, landing in a drop zone located near the north end of the airport. The task 

force likewise prepared a forty-hour training program for the commissioned and 

noncommissioned officers of the Lebanese Army. Lebanese leaders, however, 

considered the program too ambitious and indicated that they could not spare 

the personnel to be trained. Instead, they preferred to observe American training, 

and throughout August and September they attended numerous demonstrations 

and exercises conducted by the task force’s soldiers.40

On 31 July the Lebanese Parliament elected a new president, General 

Chehab, the Lebanese Army commander. Although the choice offered a 

glimmer of hope for national reconciliation and was supported by most of 

the rebel leaders, sporadic violence continued throughout the country. Early 

in August, both President Chamoun and President-elect Chehab advised the 

U.S. ambassador that a token withdrawal of U.S. forces would provide a 

bargaining chip in negotiations with rebel forces. U.S. officials also noted that 

if such action could take place prior to a scheduled United Nations General 

Assembly meeting on 13 August, it would preempt protests by the Soviets and 

keep them from claiming any credit for the withdrawal. With that in mind, one 

of the two Marine battalion landing teams began to re-embark on 12 August 

and was completely out of the country within three days. With little fanfare, 

40 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; John M. 

Wright, “Lebanese Spectators View U.S. Exercise,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 22 Sep 

1958.

Soldiers catch up on the news in a foxhole near Beirut airfield.
Approaching Stalemate 

the remaining marine units gradually began returning to their ships until, by 

the end of September, all were gone.41

President Chehab took office on 23 September and went about trying to 

form a government that would be acceptable to all of the various factions. The 

only action that seemed to have their complete support was the total withdrawal 

of U.S. forces from Lebanon. Therefore, on 8 October, the State Department 

announced that, by agreement with the government of Lebanon, the United 

States would withdraw all of its remaining troops by the end of the month. 

41 Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 31 Jul 1958, in FRUS, 

1958–1960, 11:415–18; Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 

5 Aug 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:432–33; Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the 

Department of State, 7 Aug 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 11:437–39; HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959.

A lifeguard on a stand made of cartons of C-rations keeps an eye on U.S. service members 

enjoying a swim in the Mediterranean at a beach near Beirut’s international airport.
356 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Through the end of September and into the early days of October, although 

reconnaissance patrols continued, most of the troops moved into marshaling 

areas and prepared to leave. Loaded planes began departing Beirut Airport 

on 15 October. By the end of the month, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon 

was over.42

Even as President Eisenhower sent his congratulations to the returning 

troops for a job well done, USAREUR leaders were drawing up a more sober 

assessment of the mission. Although the command had requested and the 

Department of the Army had agreed to a rapid replacement of personnel lost to 

the deployment, additional troops had not been forthcoming. For the duration 

of the intervention, the 24th Infantry Division in Europe was without 20 percent 

of its infantry strength and a large portion of its support force. The Seventh 

Army commander, General Eddleman, pointed out that if Force Bravo had 

also deployed, the division would have lost almost half of its infantry. Both 

Eddleman and the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, questioned the 

wisdom of assigning responsibility for contingency missions in the Middle East 

42 Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 4 Oct 1958, in FRUS, 

1958–1960, 11:597–99; HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 

1959; “Paratroopers Leave Lebanon,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Oct 1958; Ernie 

Weatherall, “Mass Airlift Flying Troops Back to Beirut,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

23 Oct 1958.

Soldiers lay wire in Lebanon with the help of “Airborne Annie,” a mule purchased in Beirut 

for twenty dollars.
Approaching Stalemate 

to USAREUR. The requirement for the command to maintain such a capability 

seemed difficult to reconcile with the fact that the XVIII Airborne Corps at 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, designated as the Army’s Strategic Army Corps 

(STRAC), was specifically organized, trained, equipped, and located for such 

missions. For USAREUR to have to duplicate those capabilities, the generals 

argued, was a diversion from its primary responsibilities.43

The commander in chief, U.S. EUCOM, General Norstad, reviewed the 

generals’ comments and informed the Department of the Army and the Joint 

Chiefs that he agreed and recommended that Middle East contingency missions 

be assigned to the Strategic Army Corps. The Joint Chiefs agreed to study the 

issue, but no immediate changes were forthcoming. In due course, the Army 

rotated the 24th Infantry Division’s airborne battle groups out of Europe as part 

of Operation Gyroscope and replaced them with conventional infantry units. 

Since USAREUR, for the time being, still had to prepare for rapid deployment 

contingencies, however, two infantry battle groups of the 8th Infantry Division 

were converted to airborne. By the end of 1959, the 8th Division had completed 

43 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 35–38; HQ, USAREUR, 

G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959.

Members of the 187th Infantry, 1st Airborne Battle Group, patrol through the village of 

Chiah, August 1958
358 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the conversion, tested its rapid-deployment capabilities, and was prepared to 

assume the contingency mission.44

The combat units that deployed to Lebanon had learned some lessons 

of their own. After the difficulties in getting the task force mobilized, the 8th 

Infantry Division, which had assumed the contingency mission after the airborne 

battle groups of the 24th Infantry Division rotated back to the United States, 

maintained one rifle company on two-hour alert with its heavy loads rigged 

and prepared to load onto the aircraft. The heavy-drop platoon, the division’s 

parachute-rigging specialists, lived in barracks near the airborne battle groups 

to facilitate instruction on rigging procedures. The division created a complete 

scale model of a departure airfield that could be transported throughout the unit 

to train personnel on mobilization operations. The division tested its procedures 

in the spring of 1959 with a training exercise that dropped an entire battle 

group to seize an airfield and to conduct antiguerrilla operations. By the end 

of 1959, the 8th Infantry Division was better prepared to execute the airborne 

contingency missions than the 24th Infantry Division had been a year earlier.45

Officers in charge of the logistical support for the deployed troops reported 

their own lessons learned. Col. Dan K. Dukes, deputy commander of the 201st 

Logistical Command in Lebanon, recalled the initial period of the deployment 

as mass confusion. Instead of being able to play a supporting role, his unit was 

a liability and spent the first few weeks trying to get organized. It took several 

weeks to sort out the various disparate units and assign specific duties to each. 

The experience showed him that the logistical units had to train regularly with 

the tactical units they supported, under conditions they might expect to face 

in an actual situation. Also, the logistical base had to have greater flexibility, 

so that its leaders could tailor the support elements to the size and needs of the 

combat forces. The experiences in Lebanon gave leaders within the USAREUR 

Communications Zone food for thought as they continued to experiment within 

the organization.46

The 1958 Berlin Crisis

Lebanon was hardly the only problem confronting U.S. forces in Europe 

during the late 1950s. Berlin remained a point of contention between the Soviet 

Union and the West, one that Khrushchev was determined to resolve.

In November 1957, Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, 

forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an assessment of the Berlin situation 

that the State Department had prepared in coordination with the CIA and the 

Department of Defense. The purpose of the study was to examine Berlin’s status 

44 Ibid.; Final After Action Rpt, FTX Heaven Sent, HQ, 8th Inf Div, 16 Nov 1959, Entr

2042, USAREUR G3 Troop Operations, RG 549, NACP. 45 Gray, The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958, p. 28. 46 Interv, Col Richard O. Hahn with Col Dan K. Dukes, 11 Feb 1984, pp. 9, 33, Senior Officer 

Oral History Program, MHI.
Approaching Stalemate 

as a city still occupied by the four World War II Allies almost fifteen years after 

the war’s end, and to evaluate problems connected with continued Western 

access to the city. It assessed the possible incorporation of East Berlin into 

the Soviet-controlled German Democratic Republic; the current level of East 

German interference with travel between East and West Berlin; the disruption 

of German traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic; and the intermittent 

denial of Allied access to Berlin by road, rail, and air.47

Although the paper considered the potential for several particularly serious 

actions that the Communists might take to complicate the allied position 

in the city, it generally concluded that Western policy was appropriate and 

adequate to meet any challenges. On the subject of possible incorporation of 

the Soviet sector of Berlin into the Soviet Zone, it recounted the large numbers 

of refugees that continued to defect to the West but discounted as speculation 

intelligence reports that indicated that East Germany intended to seal off East 

Berlin’s borders with West Berlin. It added that, for years, the city had planned 

a reorganization of transportation, utilities, and city services in the event of a 

denial of access to the Communist sector’s facilities. As a result, the residents 

of West Berlin would not be greatly inconvenienced. The study concluded that 

the East Germans would have little choice but to continue to rely on spot checks 

coupled with threats and other psychological pressures in order to limit the 

flow of refugees to the West. As for the possibility that the Communists might 

attempt to restrict travel between East and West Berlin, the report concluded 

that no plans existed to deal with that eventuality. Instead, the Allies would 

meet any move in that direction by lodging protests at the appropriate levels.48

The State Department’s analysis notwithstanding, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff expressed concern over the ongoing harassment of traffic into and out 

of Berlin and the Soviet–East German ability to seal off the western sectors. 

Early in November 1957, the Joint Chiefs requested from U.S. EUCOM an 

estimate of the situation, of the most probable courses of action the Soviets 

and East Germans would adopt, and of the allied ability to counter them. In 

response, General Norstad indicated that recent episodes of rail, highway, 

and air traffic harassment had underscored the ability of the Soviet Union to 

interfere with the movement of allied personnel and freight and had highlighted 

the vulnerability of West Berlin. He expressed his belief that Soviet actions were 

motivated by three immediate objectives: to force the allies to deal with East 

German authorities, thus achieving de facto recognition of their government; to 

embarrass the United States in Berlin and to emphasize the Soviet position of 

47 Ltr, Robert D. Murphy, Dep Under Sec of State, to Gen Nathan D. Twining, Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 Nov 1957, sub: Current Berlin Situation and Access Problems, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP. 48 Ibid.; Msg, Huntington D. Sheldon, Asst Dir for Current Intel, to Dep Dir, CIA, 8 Nov 

1957, sub: The Berlin Situation, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP. 

For more information on the growing flight of refugees from East Berlin and Communist efforts 

to stem the tide, see Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall.
360 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

strength; and to encroach on the allies’ access to the city to such an extent that 

they would resort to a self-imposed blockade rather than submit to humiliating 

controls. Norstad expected that the harassment would continue and suggested 

the possibility that the Soviets would relinquish control of rail and autobahn 

checkpoints to the East Germans, forcing the allies either to deal with them 

directly or to discontinue travel.49

Norstad expressed guarded optimism over his ability to deal with a 

crackdown on travel. He did not believe that the Soviets were planning an all-out 

crisis over Berlin and he suggested that a firm and united allied response would 

prevent them from gaining any major advantages. He cautioned, however, 

that a provocative or unyielding U.S. response would deny the Soviets latitude 

for negotiations and could bring on a real crisis. Norstad reminded the Joint 

Chiefs that the security of the American garrison in Berlin was limited to the 

capabilities of its available forces. Those in the city consisted of the 6th Infantry 

and two military police companies, with a total assigned strength of 3,272. In 

the event of another blockade, he reported that the allied stockpile in Berlin 

included 180 days worth of rations, some 300 days worth of gasoline and 

associated petroleum products, and a 30-day supply of ammunition. A stockpile 

accrued for German civilians included a year’s worth of various heating fuels 

and gasoline, a twelve-month supply of food, and enough medical supplies to 

last about six months.50

In May 1958, the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, met with the 

Soviet Commandant in Berlin, General of the Army Nikolai F. Zakharov, in 

an attempt to diffuse some of the tension “as one soldier to another.” Hodes 

reminded the Soviet general that, as a military garrison, the U.S. troops in 

Berlin had to be resupplied on a regular basis. Unfortunately, he continued, 

Soviet guards had implemented a number of new procedures that appeared to 

be harassment for convoys entering or leaving Berlin. Guards were demanding 

to see a list of all personnel in the convoy and personal identification cards. 

Hodes believed that a simple movement order presented by the officer in 

charge should be sufficient to allow the convoy to pass. Zakharov appeared to 

agree with the Hode in this matter but held to the Soviet position that supply 

convoys attempting to enter Berlin should present a list of the types of cargo 

that they were carrying. General Zakharov promised to investigate the matter 

further. For a short time, confrontations at the crossing points diminished, 

but they soon resumed as diplomats and politicians continued to debate the 

documentation issue.51

49 Msgs, Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCEUR, 5 Nov 1957; and CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 16 Nov 1957. Both in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP. 50 Msg, CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 Nov 1957. 51 Telegram From the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (Hodes), to the Berlin 

Commandant (Hamlett), 23 May 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 8, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, 

pp. 24–26; Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany, 30 Jun 1958, in 

FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:27–30.
Approaching Stalemate 

For its part, USAREUR continued to plan for an emergency reinforcement 

of the Berlin garrison. The garrison’s main contingent, the 6th Infantry, had 

reorganized into two battle groups and one company of tanks in June 1958, 

as part of USAREUR’s conversion to a pentomic structure. This action made 

no significant change in the number of troops assigned to the command. The 

reinforcement plan called for two additional infantry companies or one battle 

group with a few essential light vehicles to be airlifted from Rhein-Main Air 

Base, near Frankfurt, to Tempelhof, Gatow, or Tegel airfields in Berlin. The 

U.S. Commander, Berlin, would assume control of the reinforcements on their 

arrival and was authorized to use them as he saw fit. Planners were under no 

illusions that the reinforcements would provide the Berlin Command with 

the capability to withstand a Soviet or East German military attack. Rather, 

the plan was based on the premise that additional units might be required to 

deal with an increase in civil disorder or rioting in the city. It did, however, 

offer a way for USAREUR to demonstrate its commitment to the city and 

an increased state of readiness to the Communists without resorting to direct 

military engagement.52

In light of the ever-present threat that the Soviets or East Germans would 

block Western access to Berlin, USAREUR also drafted a contingency plan, 

labeled Emergency Plan 103, for reopening closed access routes. It was to be 

implemented only when all other moves short of military action had failed to 

end restrictions. The plan provided two options for the USAREUR commander, 

depending on the level of risk he was willing to assume. The first was labeled 

“determine intentions.” In this case, the Seventh Army would provide one 

platoon-size, tank-infantry force and a convoy of five trucks to test Soviet 

intentions to resist passage through the checkpoint at Helmstedt on the East 

German border. At the same time, the Berlin Command would provide a similar 

force to test Communist intentions at the Babelsberg checkpoint, where the 

autobahn entered West Berlin. In the event that guards denied passage to either 

force, the task force commander was to indicate both orally and in writing 

his intention to use force to pass the checkpoint. If, after thirty minutes, the 

guards continued to deny passage, the commander was to direct his force to 

crash through the barrier and proceed to the opposite end of the corridor. The 

commander was to withdraw, however, if the Soviets opened fire on his force 

or if he encountered an obstacle he could not breach.53

The second option was to reopen access by force. In this case, the units 

involved were to be larger and prepared to fight. At Helmstedt, the Seventh 

Army was to provide a task force of up to battalion-size strength including 

52 “6th Infantry in Berlin to Go Pentomic,” Army Times, 19 Apr 1958; HQ, USAREUR, 

USAREUR Berlin Reinforcement Plan, 5 Dec 1957, Joint Chiefs of Staff Central Decimal File, 

1958, RG 218, NACP. 53 HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR Plan for Reopening Access to Berlin, 3 Oct 1958, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 

Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 24–25.
362 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

tanks and infantry. A general officer would be in overall command. At its 

end, the Berlin Command was to provide a company-size force, commanded 

by a colonel. After presenting proper credentials and waiting thirty minutes 

for a response, the two task force commanders were to proceed through the 

checkpoints regardless of any opposition they encountered. When the two 

forces met, they would proceed to Berlin, where they would come under the 

control of the U.S. commander. The plan noted that any air support would 

require overflight of East German territory outside the authorized air corridors. 

Since this would violate existing treaties with the Soviet Union, as opposed 

to the ground action that was designed to reopen corridors already subject to 

international agreement, a decision to employ air support would be reserved 

for the Commander, U.S. European Command. Interestingly enough, a 

corresponding plan for the evacuation of U.S. trains detained in East Germany 

was surprisingly less bellicose and called primarily for the lodging of official 

complaints and for providing on-call assistance to detained personnel.54

Despite the detailed planning, the ability of USAREUR to implement a 

forced reopening of the Berlin access corridor was questionable. In September 

1958, the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, expressed serious concern 

over the combat readiness of his command in the light of force reductions it 

had experienced and shortcomings its officers had identified in the pentomic 

reorganization. He told the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, that the 

reductions had brought his command to a point of calculated risk beyond which 

he could not recommend proceeding without a complete re-evaluation of its 

mission. In order to maintain superficial readiness in his combat units, he had 

drastically reduced the size and number of service and support elements that 

would be available in any conflict. A severe shortage of conventional artillery 

also existed, along with a complete lack of electronic warfare capability. As 

if that were not enough, the forces necessary to carry out noncombatant and 

refugee evacuations were insufficient. It was, in short, hardly a time for U.S. 

policy on Berlin to be overly provocative.55

On the other hand, the Soviets and East Germans had considerable incentive 

to confront the Western allies on Berlin. In the first six months of 1958, more 

than thirteen hundred teachers as well as four hundred fifty doctors and dentists 

had fled to West Germany through West Berlin. The Soviets also regarded 

the Western sectors of the city as an advanced base from which the United 

States and its allies could launch all manner of subversive activities against 

East Germany and the Soviet Union.56 Walter Ulbricht, first secretary of the 

54 Ibid.; HQ, USAREUR, Emergency Plan EP 105, USAREUR Emergency Plan for the 

Evacuation of U.S. Trains Detained in East Germany, 15 Apr 1958, Entry 2041, USAREUR 

Mobilization Planning Files, RG 549, NACP. 55 Msg, CINCUSAREUR to CSA, 18 Sep 1958, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 

1958, RG 218, NACP. 56 “East Germany Tries to Halt Brains Exodus,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 16 Jun 

1958; Note by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of 
Approaching Stalemate 

Communist Central Committee in East Germany, helped to ratchet up the level 

of tension in October by declaring that all of Berlin belonged to East Germany 

and that the allied forces were there illegally. Some Western observers even 

suspected that Ulbricht’s Party of German Unity (SED) encouraged people 

to flee to West Berlin in order to give them a pretext to tighten the screws. In 

Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s colorful metaphor, Berlin had become a festering 

sore that the Communists could no longer afford to ignore.57

On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev launched a new salvo in the Soviet 

offensive. Speaking at a Moscow rally for visiting Polish Communist dignitaries, 

he once again called for an end to the four-power division of Berlin and then 

announced that, for its part, the Soviet Union would hand over those functions 

still under its control in Berlin to the East German government. If the British, 

French, and Americans wished to retain their presence in Berlin, he said, let 

them form their own relations with the German Democratic Republic and 

reach a new agreement. They had long ago, he concluded, abolished the legal 

basis on which their stay in Berlin rested. The U.S. ambassador to the Soviet 

Union, Llewellyn E. Thompson, meanwhile reported to the State Department 

his own opinion that Khrushchev, having concluded he could not achieve his 

objectives through negotiations with the present American administration, 

intended to see what effect strong pressure and increased tension would have 

on the cohesion of the Western alliance.58

Two weeks later, on 27 November, in an extensive note to the governments 

of the United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany, the Soviet 

Union expanded on the course of action proposed by Premier Khrushchev. The 

note repeated the accusation that the Western allies themselves had violated 

the original Potsdam Agreements and had turned West Berlin into a state 

within a state from which they pursued subversive activity against the German 

Democratic Republic. In view of this fact, the letter continued, the Soviet 

Union considered the original Protocol of Agreement between the four powers 

regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Berlin 

to be null and void. With that in mind, it intended to enter into negotiations 

with the German Democratic Republic to transfer all functions that had 

been performed by Soviet authorities as part of the occupation. Although the 

Soviets insisted that the most correct solution to the Berlin problem would be 

to absorb West Berlin into the German Democratic Republic, they proposed 

the United States of America on the Situation in Berlin, 27 Nov 1958, in Documents on Berlin, 

1943–1963, ed. Wolfgang Heidelmeyer and Guenther Hindrichs (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1963), 

pp. 180–96; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 196. 57 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, p. 25; Khrushchev, Khrushchev 

Remembers: The Last Testament (1974), pp. 501–04. 58 “End Berlin Occupation, Russ Ask: Khrushchev Raps West’s Access Rights,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 11 Nov 1958; Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to 

the Department of State, 11 Nov 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:47–48; Vladislav M. Zubok, 

Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962), Working Paper 6, Cold War International History Project, 1993, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
364 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

as an alternative its designation as a demilitarized free city. That option would 

require, of course, the removal of all Western military forces from West Berlin, 

while East German satellite forces remained in the Communist portion of the 

city. With the understanding that German authorities on both sides might 

require some time to resolve questions that would arise, the Soviets proposed to 

make no changes in the existing procedures for Allied military traffic entering 

and leaving Berlin for a period of six months.59

The allies believed they had no alternative but to maintain their garrisons 

in Berlin. If they agreed to deal with the East Germans, they would seriously 

undermine the existing basis for allied occupation of the city. Any de facto 

recognition of the East German regime would be a deviation from the assumptions that underlay the four-power agreements at the end of the war. Surely, if 

the allied garrisons departed, they felt, Berlin would be gobbled up quickly by 

the Communists. Leaders from Germany and the three Western powers agreed 

that the potentially dangerous situation would become even more perilous if 

they failed to adopt a firm and united front in the face of the threat. Diplomats 

representing the four countries debated for two weeks over where discussions 

regarding the ultimatum should take place before agreeing to hold talks in 

Paris as part of the upcoming North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meetings in 

December.60

Military planning accelerated in response to the growing tension. On 23 

November, in response to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for his views 

on the Soviet proposal, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, 

General Norstad, insisted that the allies had either to stress their willingness 

to use force to defend their access to Berlin or “begin a humiliating process 

of yielding step by step to the German Democratic Republic.”61 Five days 

later, a combined working group formed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

departments of State and Defense submitted a series of possible responses 

and recommendations. The first was for the three ambassadors in Moscow to 

inform the Soviet government that the Allies would not tolerate any interference 

with their traffic into and out of Berlin. If the Soviets withdrew their personnel 

from the checkpoints, the group recommended that the allies send convoys and 

military trains through the entryways as usual to determine the intentions of East 

59 Note by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of 

the United States of America on the Situation in Berlin, 27 Nov 1958, in Heidelmeyer and Hindrichs, Documents on Berlin, pp. 180–96; Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom 

to the Department of State, 28 Nov 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:134–35; Operations Division, 

HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. 60 Memo of Conversation, 12 Nov 1958, sub: Khrushchev Statement on Berlin, Pentagon 

Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Telegram From the Embassy 

in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, 28 Nov 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:134–35; 

Memorandum of Conversation, 28 Nov 1958, sub: Berlin, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:137–38. 61 Msg, CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 Nov 1958, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP. 
Approaching Stalemate 

German officials. If the guards refused passage under established procedures, 

the group advised terminating military train traffic and attempting to reopen 

access along the autobahn through the use of limited military force. It noted, 

however, the probable extreme reluctance on the part of the French and British 

as well as some of the other NATO countries to approve the use of force rather 

than to accede to whatever new documentation or identification requirements 

the East Germans might initiate.62

In a separate annex, the group assessed the implications of any attempt to 

force open the roadway into Berlin. Allied ground forces in Berlin comprised 

some eleven thousand men, it noted, including about three thousand West 

Berlin policemen. Within East Germany alone, the Soviets had stationed twenty 

divisions, with four in the immediate vicinity of Berlin. The Communists could 

supplement those forces with seven East German divisions and a well-equipped 

police force in Berlin. While the allies could probably maintain their position by 

force if faced only by East German forces, the group believed such an engagement to be unlikely. Rather, any such conflict would bring Soviet intervention 

and probably lead to general war. Therefore, it concluded, it was not militarily 

acceptable to commit a large proportion of U.S. forces to a fight for Berlin.63

That being the case, the allies’ best course of action would be to bluff. The 

authors of the analysis suggested that, as long as it appeared the Soviets did 

not want to fight an all-out war, the best option would be to convince them 

that the West would risk such a conflict to maintain its position in Berlin. 

The allies could signal such a position by placing their forces on a higher alert 

status, redeploying air and ground units to support potential conflict in the 

area, canceling military leaves and passes, and simulating operational traffic 

on tactical radio nets. Almost as an afterthought, the report noted that, if 

the Soviets did not back down and instead resorted to determined military 

opposition, the situation could rapidly develop into a general war.64

In a well-publicized visit to West Berlin just three days after the delivery 

of the Soviet ultimatum, USAREUR’s commander in chief, General Hodes, 

declared that the garrison in West Berlin was prepared for any trouble with the 

Communists, that the Army’s forces in Berlin were a symbol of the nation’s 

support for the city, and that any infringement on their rights of access would 

be an action against the United States. The commander of the U.S. Army, 

Berlin, Maj. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, also expressed his command’s readiness, 

62 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, p. 27; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

State-Defense-JCS Ad Hoc Working Group Report on Possible Courses of Action on Berlin, 

JCS 1907/158, 28 Nov 1958, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP; 

National Intelligence Estimate 100–13–58, CIA, Soviet Objectives in the Berlin Crisis, 23 Dec 

1958, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Interv, Jensen 

and Glover with Johnson, 1 Dec 1972, p. 9. 63 Ibid.; Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Meeting, 21 Nov 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:99–103. 64 Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Meeting, 21 Nov 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:99–103.
366 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

remarking that he had spent the last seventeen years in a state of suspense of 

one type or another, so that he was accustomed to situations such as this.65

Almost at the same time that General Hodes was expressing his confidence 

in the Berlin defenses, however, he was also requesting men, tanks, and other 

weapons to fill vacant Seventh Army positions and to strengthen the defense 

of the city. The Army chief of staff, General Taylor, supported Hodes request, 

going so far as to suggest that the president should consider calling up the 

reserves. President Eisenhower opposed any such increases, asking what good 

it would do to send a few more U.S. Army divisions to Europe when they would 

still be greatly outnumbered by Communist forces. He believed that any war 

with the Soviet Union would quickly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, 

and he doubted that the Soviets would be foolish enough to start a war over 

Berlin.66 Here, even more so than in the past, the U.S. Army garrison in Berlin 

was a pawn in a much larger political game of brinkmanship. A symbol of the 

American commitment to Germany, it had become a clearly defined tripwire 

in President Eisenhower’s concept of a nuclear-based strategy for the defense 

of Europe.

The Army’s request for additional forces and the president’s subsequent 

rejection ignited a lengthy debate in American military and civilian newspapers 

and magazines. Some commentators expressed shock and outrage that the 

president would so openly denigrate the ability of U.S. soldiers to hold their 

position in Europe. Others, more realistically, discussed the ramifications of 

sending additional troops, and what good they might do if sent. Returning 

in January 1959 from an inspection tour of U.S. military bases in Europe, 

two American congressmen, F. Edward Hebert (D-La.) and William E. Hess 

(R-Ohio), reported that despite a tendency on the part of the media to highlight 

minor setbacks, U.S. forces in Europe remained the best the nation had ever 

fielded. While the two legislators admitted that the Soviets could probably 

overrun Berlin in a relatively short time, they doubted that the Soviets were 

willing to risk the all-out war that would ensue. More likely, they thought, 

would be continued Communist efforts to destabilize the population in West 

Berlin through propaganda and civil disorder. American military authorities, 

65 Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, 23 Dec 1958, in FRUS, 

1958–1960, 8:220–22; “Hodes Declares Troops Ready for Any Trouble With Reds,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 1 Dec 1958; Jean E. Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore, Md.: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), pp. 185–86; “Berlin Commander Calm in Crisis,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Dec 1958. 66 Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower, 29 Jan 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 

8:299–305; “Ike Opposes Increasing Forces in Europe Over Berlin Crisis,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Mar 1959; “Taylor Asks Firmness to Foil Russ on Berlin,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 15 Mar 1959; “Hodes Asking More Troops,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 16 Mar 1959.
Approaching Stalemate 

they concluded, were as well-prepared as could be expected to deal with the 

challenges around Berlin.67

Meanwhile, the West countered Soviet propaganda with its own public 

information programs. The USAREUR headquarters made “The Berlin Story” 

the subject of its first Troop Information Bulletin in 1959. Designed to be used as 

the source document for classes taught by unit commanders to their troops, the 

publication described the historical background leading up to the present crisis. 

Although it claimed to explain the position of both sides in the confrontation, 

it ridiculed the Soviet proposal to make Berlin a demilitarized free city, calling 

the offer an ultimatum and threat of war thinly veiled in diplomatic language. 

Was anyone so gullible or plain stupid, it asked, as to believe that Berlin would 

remain free while surrounded by East Germany’s 100,000-man armed force 

plus the Soviet Army’s divisions?68

In January 1959, the Soviet Union submitted a proposed peace treaty 

with Germany to the three Western allies and stated its intention to convene 

a conference to consider the draft and sign an agreed-on text. The allies, after 

discussing the Soviet ultimatum at the mid-December ministerial meetings, 

reiterated their position that a peace treaty could be negotiated only with 

a united Germany and that the Berlin question had to be settled within the 

framework of a comprehensive agreement on Germany. They announced that 

they were ready to participate in a four-power conference of foreign ministers 

to deal with the German problem in all of its aspects. The Soviets agreed to a 

meeting in May, in Geneva, at which representatives of both Germanys would 

be present as advisers.69

As the six-month Soviet deadline drew near, Khrushchev warned that there 

would be war if the Western powers tried to force their way into Berlin after the 

transfer of Soviet functions to the German Democratic Republic. He offered 

to extend the deadline, however, if negotiations for a Berlin settlement were 

promising. Seizing that opening, President Eisenhower stated that, regardless 

of the deadline, the United States would not be the first to shoot. On 11 May 

1959, the foreign ministers conference opened in Geneva and, sixteen days later 

the Soviet six-month deadline quietly expired.70

67 Gene Famiglietti, “U.S. Forces in Europe Termed Effective but Understrength,” Army 

Times, 21 Jan 1959; George Fielding Eliot, “Will Berlin Crisis Explode in 1961?” Army Times, 

21 Feb 1959; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Heart of the Matter,” Army Times, 21 Mar 1959; George 

Fielding Eliot, “Should We Increase Troops in Germany,” Army Times, 23 May 1959. 68 HQ, USAREUR, Information Division, The Berlin Story, 10 Jan 1959, Entry 2112, 

USAREUR Bulletins, 1959–1966, RG 549, NACP. 69 Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the 

Department of State, 17 Dec 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:208–16; Operations Division, HQ, 

USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, pp. 23–27; D. J. Hickman, The 

United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963 (HQ, USAREUR, 1964), pp. 41–42, copy in Historians 

files, CMH; “No Berlin Compromise, Herter Tells U.S.,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

24 Jun 1959. 70 Ibid.
368 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The conference at Geneva lasted almost three months. Throughout the 

meetings, each side presented numerous proposals and counterproposals 

concerning Berlin. Taking note of the Soviet announcement that it would 

withdraw its forces from East Berlin, the Western allies proposed to limit their 

forces in West Berlin to existing levels. The Russians rejected the offer and 

charged the United States with using West Berlin for the release of anti-Soviet 

propaganda. When the Western allies offered to invite United Nations observers 

to report on propaganda activities that disturbed the public order, the Soviets 

rejected that proposal as well. Despite a recess between 20 June and 13 July 

to clarify and re-examine their positions, the two sides were unable to reach 

any substantive agreement. In the course of the discussions, however, Soviet 

Premier Khrushchev accepted an invitation from President Eisenhower to visit 

the United States in September 1959. The meeting, when it occurred, seemed to 

ease international tensions and, for a while at least, confrontation over Berlin 

appeared less imminent.71

Learning to Live with the Status Quo

By the end of 1959, World War II in Europe had been over for almost 

fifteen years. It had been ten years since the end of the Berlin blockade and 

nine years since the reactivation of the Seventh Army and the creation of the 

forward-deployed U.S. defense force in Germany. Armies on both sides of the 

Iron Curtain had grown proficient in their craft and, with the introduction of 

battlefield atomic weapons, had gained an even greater measure of destructive 

power. Still, although USAREUR became a bargaining chip in the superpower 

tug-of-war over Berlin, there was an increasing sense that the time of crisis had 

passed. In the United States, intelligence analysts, diplomats, and politicians 

started to believe that the threat of general war was receding, for despite their 

saber rattling, Soviet leaders seemed less willing to push the West so close 

to the brink. Although a myriad of conflicts remained, both sides seemed to 

recognize that from almost every vantage point, the status quo was preferable 

to the prospect of a nuclear war in Europe.72

71 Ibid.; Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Palais Des Nations, 

Geneva, 15 Jun 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:897–900; Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting 

of Foreign Ministers, Palais Des Nations, Geneva, 19 Jun 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:921–26. 

For additional information concerning Khrushchev’s 1959 visit to the United States, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961, and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1984). For Soviet perceptions of the visit, see Zubok and Pleshakov, 

Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. 72 CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate, Soviet Tactics on Berlin, 11 Jun 1959, Pentagon 

Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH.
Beginning in 1950, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, John J. 

McCloy, and the EUCOM commander, General Thomas T. Handy, held a series 

of conferences to discuss German-American relations. These meetings were not 

necessarily because of tensions between the two nations. Instead, they seem to 

have reflected McCloy’s desire to use the armed services as a missionary force in 

his objective of democratizing the German people. As a result of these consultations, on 4 August 1950, General Handy issued a directive to his commanders 

identifying a pressing need for American troops to change their attitude toward 

service in Germany. The directive called for a re-education of American personnel 

to reflect their change of mission in Germany from occupation to defense. It also 

proposed a program for the joint use of recreational facilities and for increased 

interaction between Germans and Americans wherever possible.1

For the alliance to succeed, it was important for the Americans and the 

Europeans to learn to peacefully coexist. As the number of U.S. troops stationed 

on the continent increased and as their bases, barracks, and training facilities 

expanded, conflicts with neighboring communities were inevitable. The rapid 

growth in the number of American dependents accompanying soldiers to Europe 

only added to the potential for conflict. To limit these confrontations and to 

resolve them when they did occur, USAREUR turned to its extensive civil affairs 

and public information organizations. Those units monitored public opinion in 

the European press and established programs to familiarize U.S. soldiers with 

the customs and culture of their hosts. Throughout USAREUR, but especially 

in the units of the Seventh Army, leaders worked to build goodwill in local 

communities and to solidify the relationship with their neighbors. Over time, 

the occupiers became guests, then allies, and then, finally, friends.

The Transfer of Military Liaison Functions from the Office of the High 

Commissioner to the European Command

Before this path to friendship could begin, however, the Army in Europe had 

to develop an organizational structure through which it could more effectively 

relate to the German population. EUCOM and Seventh Army headquarters 

1 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 171–72, Historians files, CMH.

10

Getting Along with the Neigh
370 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

needed a designated office to deal with the kinds of issues that would arise from 

increased contact with the civilian community.

As part of the lengthy transition from occupation of a conquered enemy 

to diplomatic relations with a sovereign state, in August 1951, the Western 

allies began to dismantle some of the formal structure of the occupation and 

to move their relationship with the Germans to more of a contractual status 

between equals. Although plans for the process called for the Office of the 

High Commissioner for Germany to withdraw from many of its oversight 

responsibilities and to reduce its field organization, the U.S. military would 

require a mechanism for maintaining firsthand daily liaison with German 

authorities. EUCOM therefore established a joint working group with the 

High Commissioner’s office to develop procedures for direct military liaison 

with the Germans. In the meantime, the command agreed to develop a plan 

for assuming the liaison mission at the earliest practical date.2

As the transition began, McCloy laid out his concept of the new relationship. 

He assured General Handy that their two offices would maintain an effective 

working relationship. He reminded the general that the High Commissioner’s 

office would bear the primary responsibility for U.S. policy in Germany. 

Nonetheless, he pointed out many practical reasons for direct relations between 

U.S. military authorities, agencies of the German federal government, and 

officials in Hesse, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg, the three German states 

under U.S. control. While McCloy would help the military in establishing 

contacts and advise and assist in every way possible, he did not foresee his 

involvement on a day-to-day basis. To the contrary, he would intervene only 

when a disagreement occurred or when matters of a significant political nature 

were at stake. At the state level, consul generals would bear the burden of overall 

relations with the Germans in their respective areas but would not interfere in 

normal civil-military relations. McCloy made it clear that EUCOM and the 

U.S. Embassy in Bonn needed to maintain close contact and to keep each other 

informed so the two could speak with one voice to the German population.3

With that guidance in mind, EUCOM set up its organization to manage 

civil-military relations with both the German government and local communities. 

In March 1952, the headquarters directed all sixteen military post commanders 

2 Memo, Maj Gen Robert M. Montague, Dir, OPOT Div, for Gen Thomas T. Handy, EUCOM Cdr, 23 Jan 1952, sub: Transfer of Military Liaison Functions from the HICOG Field 

Organization to EUCOM, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training Files, 

RG 549, NACP. 3 Ltrs, John J. McCloy, HICOG, to Handy, EUCOM Cdr, 29 Oct 1951, Entry 2050, 

USAREUR G3 OPOT, Combat Developments Branch, PsyWar Section, 1950–1952, RG 549, 

NACP; and McCloy to Handy, 25 Mar 1952, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans 

and Training, RG 549, NACP. For more information on McCloy’s role as high commissioner 

for Germany, see Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); Kai Bird, The 

Chairman: John J. McCloy and the Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon 

& Schuster, 1992); and Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

to begin planning for the addition of full-time, civil-military representatives 

on their staffs and at those subposts that required direct military liaison. The 

directive indicated that candidates for the new positions had to possess tact, 

common sense, an ability to exercise diplomacy, and a well-rounded military 

background. The headquarters also announced plans to begin training selected 

civil affairs personnel in their new duties under the general supervision of the 

Civil Affairs Division staff. Training would consist of an orientation conference 

at EUCOM headquarters and on-the-job training at the local level by State 

Department representatives.4

The EUCOM instructions included a tentative organization for conducting 

American military relations with the Germans, as well as a detailed analysis 

of responsibilities and duties that organization would inherit. The director, 

EUCOM Civil Affairs Division, would oversee all liaison efforts with the 

German government and civilians. In addition to branches for command 

and control, operations, and planning, the division would include separate 

sections to maintain liaison between the U.S. military and the German federal 

government and to monitor relations with each of the three German states in 

the U.S. Zone.5

An analysis by the EUCOM headquarters grouped the command’s new 

military liaison responsibilities into seven broad areas. The first dealt with 

the exchange of each other’s needs, aims, and plans in order to maintain 

good relations between the Germans and the American military community. 

The second envisioned EUCOM headquarters as the single point of contact 

for matters related to the acquisition or release of real estate. This included 

negotiations regarding additional land for training as well as coordination of 

the release of requisitioned properties back to the Germans. Because German 

customs and laws regarding public safety, health, and legal matters differed 

significantly from those of the Americans, the third mission included liaison 

in such areas as water purification, venereal disease control, highway traffic 

management, black market control, and assistance to both German civilians and 

members of the U.S. military in legal complaints between them. In the fourth 

broad area, the civil-affairs units coordinated American and German security 

responsibilities in accord with allied directives or emergency plans. The fifth 

function consisted of general civil-military liaison in such areas as assistance 

to youth activities, mutual celebrations, ceremonies, educational projects, and 

the resolution of incidents involving U.S. soldiers and German civilians. Under 

the sixth functional area, hunting and fishing, the new civil affairs sections were 

also to assist U.S. personnel in obtaining hunting and fishing licenses and in 

securing access to German-owned streams and hunting grounds. In the final 

functional area, repatriation, U.S. officials were to assist German authorities 

4 Memo, HQ, EUCOM, for All Military Post Cdrs, 11 Mar 1952, sub: Military Liaison 

with German Governmental Authorities, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 5 Ibid.
372 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

and other official agencies in the return of war prisoners still held captive by 

the Soviets, as well as the exhumation of Allied war dead.6

Orientation for civil affairs personnel began on 14 May 1952. More than 120 

attendees participated in the training, including soldiers from each of the sixteen 

military posts designated for civil affairs positions as well as representatives 

from EUCOM staff divisions with interest in the covered subjects. For the 

most part, the instruction dealt with the functions and responsibilities of the 

new civil affairs sections. Col. William T. Goodwin, Chief of the Governmental 

Affairs Branch, EUCOM Civil Affairs Division, stated that members of the 

civil affairs staff sections needed to coordinate with members of other staff 

sections concerning mutual problems and to develop standard operating 

procedures to ensure that they could deal with public relations problems 

swiftly and smoothly. He emphasized to the attendees, however, that their most 

important contributions would come at local levels, where the greatest volume 

of contacts with German civilians and governmental authorities would occur. 

He urged section leaders to establish offices in places readily accessible to the 

local civilian population. This would require locating offices outside of military 

headquarters areas because civilians would be far less likely to bring issues to 

the attention of the authorities if they had to pass through guarded gates or 

present special passes to gain access to military-controlled facilities. At the end 

of the briefing, Colonel Goodwin advised members of the group to compile lists 

of key government and civilian organizations in their areas and the names and 

addresses of those leaders in public and private life with whom they would be 

dealing. The sooner they could learn about issues that were troubling the local 

population, the quicker they could begin resolving them.7

During the summer of 1952, the new EUCOM apparatus swung into 

action. The U.S. Resident Offices that represented the Office of the High 

Commissioner for Germany closed on 5 June. Anticipating this change, the 

European Command had established civil affairs offices at sixteen military 

posts and most subposts for the conduct of civil-military relations at levels 

below that of the German states. The Offices of the State Commissioners in 

Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and the separate U.S. enclave around 

Bremen closed on 30 June, with EUCOM civil affairs sections assuming their 

responsibilities the following day. In addition to dealing directly with German 

civilians and local governments up to the state level, EUCOM also established 

a separate liaison group in Bonn to deal directly with the Office of the U.S. 

Ambassador and the German federal government. This group was under the 

6 Ibid.

7 HQ, EUCOM, Conference on Civil Affairs U.S. Military-German Relations, Instructors 

Manuscript, 16 May 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955; Memo, 

Capt W. P. Burt, Civil Affairs Control Ofcr, for EUCOM Staff Divs, 2 May 1952, sub: Civil 

Affairs, U.S. Military-German Relations Conference, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, 

Plans and Training. Both in RG 549, NACP.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

direction of a senior officer and consisted of representatives of EUCOM staff 

divisions that dealt full- or part-time with officials in the West German capital.8

By December 1952, the command’s civil affairs structure was in place and 

had already begun a series of initiatives to promote better relations between 

the German people and American soldiers. General Eddy, the USAREUR 

commander, reminded civil affairs staff members that the Christmas season 

offered an opportunity to contribute to community festivals, religious services, 

recreational activities, Christmas charities, and many other worthwhile 

endeavors. As those efforts proceeded, civil affairs officers reported closer 

cooperation with German officials in a number of cases, including coordination 

between post commanders and local police in resolving traffic problems and 

in controlling the spread of venereal diseases. They also sponsored tours of 

military installations and civilian business establishments as a means of allowing 

Germans and Americans to gain an understanding of each other’s problems.9

In April 1952, General Eddy, as commanding general of the Seventh Army, 

had suggested to EUCOM that the Army Advisory Committee Program, which 

had been in effect throughout the United States for approximately four years, 

might also be successful in Germany. In the United States, the program brought 

Army leaders together with local community officials to discuss issues of mutual 

concern. Although EUCOM’s commander, General Handy, believed that the 

new civil affairs establishment would be sufficient for the time being, he did 

instruct the director of the Civil Affairs Division to coordinate with the Seventh 

Army’s civil affairs officer to prepare recommendations on General Eddy’s 

proposal. On the basis of its findings, the division recommended the creation of 

councils at three distinct levels: the Kreis, representing German municipalities 

and U.S. military posts and subposts; the Land, or state, representing Bavaria, 

Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, and the Bremen enclave; and the federal level, 

representing the EUCOM commander and the leaders of the newly formed 

West German government. At each level, the councils would meet monthly to 

bring together leaders of the local German community and appropriate U.S. 

Army and Air Force representatives to discuss mutual concerns. General Handy 

directed his post commanders to begin activating the councils right away.10

8 Memos, Col Karl E. Henion, Dir, Civil Affairs Div, for EUCOM Dep Ch of Staff for 

Opns, 1 May 1952, sub: Liaison at Bonn; and Henion for EUCOM Land Relations Ofcrs, 2 

Jul 1952, sub: Land Level Civil Affairs; Ltr, Handy, EUCOM Cdr, to Hans Ehard, Bayrische 

Staatskanzlei, 10 Jul 1952. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP. 9 Memos, Henion for USAREUR Distribution, 14 Nov and 10 Dec 1952, sub: Civil Affairs 

Information Bulletin, both in Entry 2070, USAREUR Civil Affairs Staff Memos, RG 549, 

NACP. 10 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 372, Historians files, CMH. Memos, 

Col Lynwood D. Lott, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 12 May 1953, sub: U.S. 

Military-Community Advisory Council Program, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955; and Lott for CGs and Military Post Cdrs, 8 Jul 1952, sub: Monthly Post 
374 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Handy’s directives only formalized activities that had been in operation 

for several years. Beginning in the late 1940s, German-American men’s and 

women’s clubs had appeared in many garrison towns across Germany. In their 

early stages, the clubs concentrated on raising funds for local charities, especially 

those aiding German children. Elites of both communities often held at least 

nominal membership in the clubs, but the core of the active members consisted 

of individuals committed to fostering good German-American relations. In the 

early 1950s USAREUR began to establish more formal German-American 

friendship committees to aid in the resolution of local conflicts between the 

command and local communities. Issues brought before the committees 

included concerns over drunken soldiers who were pulling flowers from the 

windowboxes of German townspeople and the question of whether German 

children should be allowed to use the playgrounds belonging to the American 

housing areas. In 1953, the federation of German-American Clubs sponsored 

the first German-American Friendship Week, a celebration that would grow 

into one of the major events both in USAREUR and the German community.11

Commanders’ Conference Notes, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955. 

Both in RG 549, NACP. 11 Anni P. Baker, “U.S. Military Bases and the Rehabilitation of West Germany in the 1950s,” 

in Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges, ed. Luis Rodrigues and 

Sergiy Glebov (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press, 2009), pp. 92–97; Maria Hohn, GIs 

Old World meets Old West as a lederhosen-clad German boy exchanges greetings with a 

man portraying a Native American at a festival in Mannheim.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

In the meantime, the Seventh Army established its own civil affairs section. 

Located within the command’s headquarters at Stuttgart, the organization was 

much smaller than that of EUCOM and contained only three officers, four 

enlisted men, and one German civilian who served as secretary. The section 

had two primary functions. The first was to develop contingency plans for 

the control of refugees and local security in the event of an increased state of 

alert or the outbreak of hostilities. Its second and far more time-consuming 

responsibility would be the overall supervision of a German Youth Activities 

program throughout the Seventh Army area. The United States had officially 

inaugurated the project in 1946 to keep German children busy during the 

occupation and to demonstrate democratic principles in planning and 

carrying out their activities. At its peak in the early 1950s, it had expanded to 

include approximately three hundred fifty activity centers. Budget reductions, 

however, had forced the command to close so many of the facilities that by 

1953 only seventy-three remained, thirty of which were sponsored directly by 

Seventh Army units. When neither the Department of the Army nor the U.S. 

State Department allocated funds to support the activity, the USAREUR 

commander, General Bolte, authorized the solicitation of sponsors among 

German businesses and civic groups as well as U.S. troop units. Through that 

effort, twenty-seven centers were able to remain open. These included the center 

at Bad Brückenau, jointly supported by the 373d Armored Infantry Battalion 

and the city council, and four in the Stuttgart area, cosponsored by Seventh 

Army units and the local German communities.12

Monitoring and Controlling the Message

Other sections of the EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters also had 

important roles to play in improving relations between the Americans and the 

Germans. Through its public information and public affairs staffs, the U.S. 

headquarters monitored German perceptions of American troops stationed 

in Europe and did its best to present those troops in the most favorable light 

possible.

Since the early days of the occupation, the Public Information Division had 

been monitoring German newspapers and magazines as a means of assessing 

the moods of civilians and their attitudes toward U.S. troops. U.S. commanders 

were sensitive to articles and stories that portrayed their soldiers in a negative 

light. For that reason, public information officers often worked closely with 

intelligence personnel to identify leaders and political organizations behind 

particularly inflammatory publications. In less extreme cases, the Americans 

complained about stories based on flimsy fragments of information or pure 

and Frauleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany (Chapel Hill: University 

of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 66–67. 12 HQ, Seventh Army, Civil Affairs Briefing for the Commanding General, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
376 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

fabrication, noting that publications rarely printed retractions or corrections of 

errors. An analysis by the USAREUR public information officer suggested that 

reporters and editors were interested primarily in selling newspapers; the more 

sensational the news, the more profitable the edition. Events that represented 

normal or satisfactory progress were not ordinarily accepted as news. The 

USAREUR chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Edward T. Williams, encouraged his 

information officers to “beat the press to the punch” by issuing factual, balanced 

announcements ahead of time on matters that might otherwise become subject 

to sensational news treatment.13

One branch of the Public Information Division, the German Relations 

Branch, prepared more methodical analyses of German press attitudes on a 

weekly and monthly basis. For each period, the section translated German 

newspaper articles and editorials related to the American presence and identified 

the percentages of those that were favorable, unfavorable, and neutral in their 

treatment of the U.S. armed forces. Stories that presented the Americans in a 

favorable light usually dealt with cultural exchanges and activities or incidents 

where U.S. troops came to the assistance of German civilians or communities in 

need. Stories that portrayed the United States in a less favorable light included 

those on property requisition, traffic accidents, troop maneuvers, and violent 

or criminal actions by American soldiers.14

Seventh Army and USAREUR leaders took these reports very seriously 

and used them as a tool to gauge their progress in improving relations with local 

communities. One Seventh Army staff report in January 1953 noted that while 

the U.S. image was improving, the command was still receiving unfavorable 

press coverage. The Seventh Army chief of staff encouraged local commanders 

to get to know German publishers and editors. He suggested that meetings of 

the German-American Advisory Councils were good places to do so.15

Public affairs personnel likewise kept close watch on German attitudes 

toward the U.S. Army. Early in 1953, the public affairs staff of the Office of 

the High Commissioner administered a survey to almost sixteen hundred West 

German citizens to determine their feelings about the U.S. troops stationed in 

their country. The survey noted an improved rapport between Germans and 

13 Memo, Col Stanhope B. Mason, Cdr, 26th Inf, for CG, Seventh Army, 12 Jan 1952, sub: 

Interim Report on Inflammatory Articles Appearing in Bamberg Newspapers, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955. Quote from Memo, Col Bjarne Furuholmen, Ch, Public Information Div, for Ch of Staff, 8 Jan 1953, sub: Inaccurate News Stories, 

Entry 2277, USAREUR Public Information Division General Correspondence. Both in RG 

549, NACP. 14 HQ, USAREUR, Public Information Div, Analysis of German Press, 9 Sep 1952, 13 Nov 

1952, 22 Dec 1952, 26 Dec 1952, 16 Feb 1953, 16 May 1953. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 15 Memo, Brig Gen Leo V. Warner, Adj Gen, for Heads of All Staff Divs, 24 Jan 1953, sub: 

Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, 

RG 549, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, Army Commanders Conference, Oct 1952, Entry 33508, 

Seventh Army, RG 338, NACP.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

Americans over previous years and upward trends in estimates of the American 

soldier in almost every area where comparisons were available. The Germans 

noted a friendlier approach on the part of the Americans, with the soldiers more 

likely to “pass the time of day” with them. Their impression of the fighting 

qualities of the troops as compared to previous surveys was also better. More 

than 50 percent of those questioned believed that the U.S. troops would fight 

well against a Communist invader.16

That was not to say that the Germans did not have their share of complaints. 

The USAREUR assistant chief of staff for personnel noted that many of the 

same problems that existed in communities adjacent to military posts in the 

United States were sources of irritation for the Germans: overindulgence in 

alcohol, illicit relations with local women, unmilitary bearing of soldiers when 

off duty, and discourteous driving habits of U.S. personnel. Other issues, 

however, were more specific to the American presence in Germany. The high 

rate of pay enjoyed by U.S. servicemen allowed them to purchase many luxuries 

that the average German citizen could not afford, and the failure of some 

soldiers to honor just debts offended German merchants. The public appearance and activities of many U.S. dependents, moreover, often alarmed their 

more conservative German neighbors, as did the troops’ sometimes boisterous 

behavior and off-color language in public places. Perhaps most important, the 

language barrier made it difficult for Americans to establish social relationships 

with local civilians. In evaluating the results of the surveys, American leaders 

expressed the belief that soldiers lacked an understanding of and respect for 

many of the customs and standards of the German people. They judged efforts 

to provide troops with an orientation to Germany before they began their tours 

of duty in Europe as substandard and unsuccessful.17

The effort to monitor the attitudes of the German people, however, was 

only one-half of the equation. Beginning late in 1951, EUCOM also conducted 

a series of surveys to determine the attitudes of American soldiers toward their 

mission in Europe and their relationships with the Germans and the French. 

Officers who participated in the study appeared to be well informed about 

Germany, while enlisted personnel did not. Only 44 percent of the enlisted, for 

example, could identify Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor of West Germany. 

While the attitudes of most toward the German people also seemed to be 

favorable, a degree of distrust existed nonetheless. Nearly three-quarters of 

both officers and enlisted responded that they liked Germans “all right” or 

“very much,” but roughly half of both groups felt that Germany was not yet 

trustworthy as an ally against communism. On separate questions regarding 

16 Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of Public Affairs, The American Soldier as Appraised by the West German People, 11 Mar 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 17 Memo, Col Weston A. McCormac, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 

7 Mar 1953, sub: Survey Showing German Public Attitude Toward American Soldiers, Entry 

33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 
378 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

eventual German rearmament, almost all respondents favored some form of 

German involvement in Western European defense.18

Responses concerning relations with the French were more troubling. Only 

one-third of those enlisted men questioned could identify Vincent Auriel as the 

President of the French Republic. Although the enlisted expressed generally 

favorable views toward the French people, officers ranked the French lower 

than the Germans and were much more likely to say that they liked them “very 

little.” Both officers and enlisted believed that the French would be a useful ally 

against communism, but more than a third of the officers responding described 

them as untrustworthy.19

Bones of Contention: Major Points of Friction Between German 

Civilians and the U.S. Army

American military leaders had good reason for concern over the relationship 

between German civilians and the U.S. Army. The transition of the soldiers 

from an occupation force to allies in the struggle against Communist expansion 

was not without its sticking points. Both sides had to overcome a number of 

prejudices and preconceived perceptions so that they could work through the 

very real conflicts that threatened a successful long-term relationship.

Although most of the conflicts and misunderstandings between Germans 

and Americans involved cultural differences or the misbehavior of off-duty 

American soldiers, matters of official U.S. policy also caused concern both for 

German civilians and for local governments. By 1952, the most significant of 

these was the continued requisition of German homes, businesses, or other real 

estate for use by U.S. forces. In 1951, even though the size of the U.S. force was 

increasing, EUCOM had announced a policy ending new requisition of living 

quarters for dependents. Its retention of previously requisitioned living quarters, 

however, was a particularly hot issue with the German people. It remained a 

sore point even when the consulate general in Munich released figures to the 

German press in November 1952, proving that for every dwelling occupied by 

U.S. dependents, the United States had provided two new dwellings through 

monetary aid to the Federal Republic.20

The Americans made steady progress in returning real estate to its original 

owners, but when Germany regained its sovereignty in May 1955, thousands 

of properties still remained in American hands. The USAREUR headquarters 

18 HQ, EUCOM, Armed Forces Information and Education Div, Troop Attitudes Concerning the European Mission and European Nations, Jun 1952. Quotes from Memo, Col Maurice 

G. Stubbs, Ch, Armed Forces Information and Education Div, for Ch of Staff, USAREUR, 30 

Sep 1952, sub: Troop Attitudes on European Mission. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General 

Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 19 HQ, EUCOM, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, Troop Attitudes Concerning the European Mission and European Nations, Jun 1952. Quote from Memo, Stubbs for 

Ch of Staff, USAREUR, 30 Sep 1952, sub: Troop Attitudes on European Mission. 20 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 376.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

coordinated with the West German government to identify housing that the 

Americans no longer needed and to prioritize properties according to the 

order of their return. It established quotas for major cities within each area 

command and encouraged commanders to release an even greater number of 

dwellings if surpluses developed. Quotas were based on inventories done by area 

commanders in January 1955, and varied from forty-five units to be returned 

by the Western Area Command around Bad Kreuznach to more than fifteen 

hundred units to be returned by the Northern Area Command in the area around 

Frankfurt alone. In some cases, USAREUR faced the problem of having to evict 

squatters from derequisitioned buildings before it could return the properties 

to their owners. Even that effort was complicated by German laws, which 

required the government to find adequate housing for the squatters before it 

could move them. Nonetheless, German owners lodged frequent complaints 

with USAREUR headquarters and the German government, demanding the 

return of their homes. Pressure groups adopting names such as “The League 

of Occupation Sufferers,” or the “Occupation Evictees” kept the issue alive by 

clamoring at all levels of government for the release of their properties or for 

increased payments for their continued use.21

From May 1955 through December 1956, the Americans retained their 

requisitioned properties under German legislation that had extended the status 

quo. On 1 February 1957, however, a new Federal Requisition Law became 

effective, requiring the occupiers to return requisitioned housing to owners 

by 30 September. The Americans could retain commercial properties for two 

additional years. The new law assured U.S. forces of the continued use of needed 

real estate through lease, purchase, or alternate construction. As a last resort, 

requisition was possible, but in that case the takeover was to be accomplished 

by the German federal government rather than the U.S. armed forces. For their 

part, the Americans tried to distance themselves from the process as much as 

possible. General John F. Uncles, the USAREUR chief of staff, directed that 

the command would no longer use the terms requisition or confiscated to describe 

property obtained from the Germans, since the newly sovereign populace found 

the words distasteful. The Americans would replace the terms with the phrase 

rent-free property.

22

21 Memo, 1st Lt William D. Dulaney, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 8 Apr 

1955, sub: Coordination of Release of Requisitioned Properties; HQ, USAREUR, AmbassadorCommanders’ Conference, 30 Jun 1955; Ltr, CWO William M. Ryerson, Asst Adj Gen, to Direktor Paul Hubert, 19 Dec 1955; Memo, Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, for Ch of Staff, 27 Sep 1955, sub: 

Unauthorized Occupancy. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, 

RG 549, NACP. Memo, Charles D. Winning, for Cdr J. S. Dowdell, Ch of Information, U.S. 

EUCOM, 1 Feb 1956, sub: Country Report—Germany, Entry 2169, USAREUR Civil Affairs 

Division, General Correspondence, 1952–1956, RG 549, NACP; “MPs End 3.5 Day Vigil at 

Occupied House,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Jun 1956. 22 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 291–92, Historians files, 

CMH. Memo, Knox Lamb, General Counsel, for State Dept, 11 May 1956, sub: Federal Legislation to Extend Occupation Requisitions Beyond May 5, 1956, Entry 2169, USAREUR Civil 
380 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Another issue that gained prominence during this period was the damage 

done to German roads, bridges, forests, and agricultural lands as a result of 

U.S. military exercises and maneuvers. The movement of tanks and heavy 

trucks along the country’s roads often caused damage to their pavement or 

collapsed their shoulders and adjacent drainage ditches. Misjudgments of the 

widths of bridges, their weight capacity, or the heights of underpasses often 

led to damage to those structures as well. German forestry methods resulted 

in the cultivation of trees in soft ground without deep tap roots, making them 

easy to knock down when the Americans tried to use them as anchors for winch 

lines. Most disturbing was damage to German crop lands when U.S. troops 

moved cross-country. Vehicles plowing through farm lands damaged crops and 

disturbed topsoil, often leaving ruts that accelerated erosion.23

As the occupation ended and Germany moved to regain its sovereignty, the 

troops of the Seventh Army began to lose some of their freedom of movement 

during military training. With Germany no longer a conquered foe but fast 

becoming a valuable ally, it became politic to compensate citizens and local 

communities for damages done. In 1955 USAREUR responded to thirty-six 

thousand claims for compensation from German citizens. Most of the payments 

that resulted, amounting to more than $5 million, had to come from the 

command’s training budget. In August, the Seventh Army commander, General 

Hodes, issued new instructions regarding the conduct of major maneuvers. As 

a general rule, he ordered units to confine all movement by tracked vehicles 

outside of recognized training areas to major roads whose construction would 

allow for the passage of the heavy vehicles. Units would confine any unavoidable 

cross-country movement to periods between crops, preferably when the ground 

was frozen. Any training conducted outside of recognized areas would have to 

be approved by a general, and any units conducting such training would have 

to provide damage-control and repair teams from each participating unit down 

to company level. The Seventh Army took additional action to mollify German 

concerns by canceling or postponing exercises that conflicted with planting or 

harvest times, or that would cause unreasonable stress on lands used during 

the maneuvers.24

Affairs Division General Correspondence, 1952–1956; HQ, USAREUR, Weekly Staff Conference, 8 Feb 1956, Entry 2135, USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956. Both in RG 549, 

NACP. “Bonn Deputies Demand Allies Return Homes,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

18 Apr 1956. 23 HQ, USAREUR, Public Information Div, Maneuvers, Jul 1956, Entry 2282, USAREUR 

Information Division General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; Memo, CWO W. E. Loomis, 

Asst Adj Gen, for CG, VII Corps, 5 Feb 1954, sub: Roads Used by U.S. Army Tanks, Entry 

33511, V Corps, 1949–1966, RG 338, NACP. 24 Memos, Lt Gen Henry I. Hodes, Seventh Army Cdr, for CG, VII Corps, 22 Aug 1955, sub: 

Maneuver and Training Damages; and CWO T. R. Cheezum, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, USAREUR, 

24 Aug 1955, sub: Maneuver Damage. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, 

NACP. “7th Army Sees $1.2 Million Saved by Maneuver Damage Program,” Stars and Stripes, 
Getting Along with the Neighbors

Over time, the Americans learned to coordinate their maneuvers more 

closely with German authorities and even obtained assistance from local 

police in controlling traffic flow and directing movement along desired routes. 

The German police also assisted in keeping civilian traffic away from military 

columns during exercises. For their part, the Germans gained some appreciation 

for the Americans’ efforts to avoid damages and to repair them when they 

occurred. When a German newspaper report accused one U.S. unit, the 25th 

Signal Battalion, of causing wanton damage in the forest area of Lorsch, just 

north of Mannheim, during a recently completed field exercise, officials in the 

local communities leapt to the Americans’ defense. The chief forester of the 

region acknowledged that some damage to local roads had occurred, but that 

it had been more than offset by the fact that, during the exercise, the units had 

helped to prepare several acres of land for cultivation. The mayors of Lorsch 

and Rinhausen, another local community, also confirmed that the Americans 

had avoided roads that were most heavily used by civilians and had assisted 

in the repair of those they had damaged. Overall, the local authorities agreed 

that the value of the work performed by the soldiers far exceeded any damage 

they had done.25

While U.S. officials could compensate the Germans for damage to property, 

dealing with personal injuries and deaths caused by the all-too-frequent traffic 

accidents proved to be more problematic. In 1952, with most units of the Seventh 

Army deployed to Europe, the USAREUR provost marshal reported 4,840 

vehicle accidents, with 344 fatalities. That number remained fairly constant 

in subsequent years, so that in 1958, 424 persons lost their lives as the result 

of accidents involving Army and privately owned motor vehicles. Accidents 

involving privately owned vehicles of USAREUR personnel caused 304 deaths, 

including those of 201 German and French civilians. In an effort to reduce the 

number of traffic accidents and fatalities, USAREUR expanded the authority 

of unit commanders, requiring junior enlisted personnel to obtain command 

approval before they could apply for an operator’s license. The directive also 

gave unit commanders the authority to suspend the license of any member of 

their unit who committed two or more minor traffic offenses within a ninety-day 

period. Despite these and other disciplinary measures, the traffic issue never 

completely went away and remained a sensitive problem between allies.26

European Edition, 9 Jul 1956; “German Exercise Damage Claims Reported Cut 25 Per Cent in 

Year,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Jul 1956. 25 Memos, Col Harold H. Newman, Adj Gen, for German Federal Defense Ministry, 21 

Dec 1955, sub: German Police Assistance During Training Exercise, Entry 33509, Seventh 

Army, 1954–1965; and CWO W. E. Loomis, Asst Adj Gen, for Land Relations Ofcr, Bavaria, 

23 Dec 1958, sub: German Harvest and Fall Maneuver Planning, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966; HQ, VII Corps, Corps Commanders Conference, 30 Jun 1959, Entry 33515, VII 

Corps, 1953–1966. All in RG 338, NACP. Henry B. Kraft, “Two German Towns Praise 25th 

Bn Unit,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 Sep 1957. 26 Memo, Maj M. M. Murray, Adj, for Provost Marshal, Northern Area Command, 3 Sep 

1953, sub: Statistical Charts, Entry 2269, USAREUR Provost Marshal General Correspon-
382 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Occasionally, conflicts between German civilians and the U.S. military 

intruded into emergency war planning. Although, for the most part, the United 

States and NATO rejected the idea of a scorched earth withdrawal in the face of 

a Soviet attack, the allies did plan to destroy key bridges and airfields that would 

otherwise help speed an enemy advance. In anticipation of such actions, U.S. 

engineers made arrangements with local authorities to prepare for demolition of 

those bridges they intended to blow up in an emergency. Frequently, however, 

local communities surrounding the proposed projects objected on the grounds 

that destroying the bridges would have little military value but would prevent 

the movement of civilian refugees and disrupt local utilities dependent upon the 

structures. Frustrated by extended delays to its war preparations, USAREUR 

revised its policy and published a letter of instructions in November 1954. The 

new approach adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward the local communities and prescribed that, where local authorities refused to allow preparations, 

the engineers should forward cases to the German federal government with a 

request for assistance in obtaining final approval. Once West Germany became 

a sovereign nation and joined the military alliance, the Americans transferred 

all responsibility for peacetime demolition preparations to the German Army.27

Learning to Get Along at the Local Level: Orientation and Goodwill 

Programs

Official policies and government liaison aside, any real progress in improving 

German-American relations would have to take place in local communities, 

where U.S. soldiers dealt with German civilians on a daily basis. The problem 

was that many of the soldiers, particularly the more experienced noncommissioned officers, had fought the Germans during World War II and had come 

to perceive them as a vanquished people. If the Germans were to become allies, 

U.S. soldiers had to learn how to deal with them as equals. 

As he prepared to address this issue, General Eddy identified a number of 

potential sources of friction between U.S. troops and the civilian population. 

He noted the difficulty that Americans and Germans had in making personal 

contact outside the realm of bars and brothels. Officers and enlisted men with 

families were especially lax in pursuing friendships with German families, 

preferring to remain safely in their own community circles. Many soldiers, 

dence, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 96–98, 

Historians files, CMH. 27 Memos, Lott, Asst Adj Gen, for Distribution, 25 May 1953, sub: Demolition Plans, Entry 

2130, USAREUR General Letters, 1953; and Lt Col Mason F. Goodloe, Asst Adj Gen, for 

Distribution, 5 Oct 1954, sub: Monthly HICOG-Commanders Conference Notes, Entry 2105, 

General Correspondence; Ltr, Col Terence J. Smith, Dep Adj Gen, to Civil Military Relations 

Ofcr, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, 1 Mar 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1953–1955; Memo, Engr Div for Maj Gen Oliver P. Newman, 22 

Aug 1955, sub: Demolition Preparations (Chambering), Entry 2031, USAREUR Organization 

Planning Files, 1955–1959. All in RG 549, NACP.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

he said, also lacked an understanding of German customs and traditions, 

leading to careless displays of bad feeling on both sides. Infractions typical of 

young off-duty soldiers, such as alcohol abuse, debt, traffic incidents, offensive 

language, and mistreatment of local women were magnified by the cultural 

differences between the two societies. Resolving these sources of conflict, the 

general concluded, would require greater emphasis throughout his command 

and also within the local communities.28

For the American troops, the re-education process began almost as soon 

as they entered the theater. As part of its orientation for newly arrived officers, 

the Seventh Army included a block of instruction on community relations. 

The briefer stressed in his opening remarks that the occupation was over and 

that Germans in all walks of life expected decent treatment. Although the 

training still reflected some of the stereotypes the Americans associated with 

the Germans—the Germans were described as a naturally gregarious people 

and the “country folk” as peasants not as progressive as America’s own rural 

population—it did try to identify and explain portions of the culture and 

traditions with which Americans might not be familiar. It emphasized the 

formality and courtesy that veterans had perceived to be important parts of 

German interpersonal relationships. The briefers also reminded their students 

that they earned considerably more money than many Germans and that 

extravagant displays of this wealth were sure to offend the local community. 

The most important point the instruction made, however, was the idea that 

the Germans were people well worth getting to know and could become firm 

friends once Americans learned to understand and to respect their customs 

and traditions.29

Early in 1955, the USAREUR Information and Education Division tied 

everything together in a three-hour orientation course on Germany that every 

soldier who joined the command received when he arrived. Every troop unit 

already in Europe also took the course as part of the command’s monthly 

information and education program. The instruction consisted of three one-hour 

components. The first was devoted to a review of historical events that had 

led up to the American presence in Germany. The second was a discussion of 

Germany and the German people, and the third hour highlighted the opportunities available to an American soldier in Europe and the responsibilities that 

came with them. The historical dialogue of the first hour led to the conclusion 

that NATO needed the Germans to help keep the alliance strong. Therefore, 

it was imperative for each U.S. soldier to act as a personal ambassador to 

28 HQ, EUCOM, Briefing by Maj Gen Withers A. Burress, Troop-German Civilian Relations, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, 

Lt Col Fred J. Martineau, Adj Gen Div, for CINC, EUCOM, 20 Nov 1951, sub: U.S. TroopsCivilian Population Relationships, Entry 33508, Decimal File 008, General Eddy, Seventh Army, 

1950–1966, RG 338, NACP. 29 Memo, Lt Col Frank D. Jones, Asst Adj Gen, for Distribution, 5 Aug 1954, sub: Orientation for Newly Assigned Officers, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
384 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

this important ally. In the end, each soldier would be making friends for 

democracy. The second section dealt with the Germans as a people and, in 

contrast to earlier instruction, tried to convey the idea that they were more like 

Americans than different. It pointed out that many Americans were descended 

from German stock and that many of the differences in customs and culture 

between the two nations reflected traditions found among other European 

allies. The third portion of the instruction highlighted the advantages of a tour 

in Europe, particularly the opportunity to travel. The class was quick to point 

out, however, that travel was restricted to Western Europe, as Americans who 

wandered into East Germany or Czechoslovakia were sometimes never heard 

from again. As with the other two hours, this part of the lesson concluded by 

reminding the soldiers that they were carrying the ball in the game of public 

relations. It was up to them to reflect the best of American democracy in the 

face of Soviet propaganda.30

The European edition of Stars and Stripes, an unofficial armed forces 

publication printed under the supervision of the EUCOM Information and 

Education Division, also helped to promote better understanding between 

the Germans and the Americans. For several years the newspaper encouraged 

its readers to improve their language skills by carrying a daily list of common 

German phrases and their English translations. It also frequently printed articles 

and columns by its own staff writers describing how American soldiers and 

their families could become better friends with their German neighbors. These 

pieces explained some of the history behind German traditions and sought to 

help young troops feel less intimidated by the customary formality and reserve 

expressed by many older Germans at first meeting. One particularly eye-opening 

article, written by a German newspaper editor in May 1953 and carried in Stars 

and Stripes, described how Americans looked through German eyes. The writer 

encouraged soldiers to get out of their posts and military communities and get 

to know the Germans on their own grounds.31

Not surprisingly, sports and athletic contests proved to be an effective means 

of bringing soldiers and German civilians together. The Army sports program 

in Europe was extensive, with multiple leagues for most team sports and opportunities for competition in individual pursuits. It was not long before groups 

of Americans were challenging some of their German neighbors to friendly 

competitions. Initial contests were limited to those sports most familiar to the 

Germans: boxing, track and field, and swimming were particularly popular. 

Over time, as the Americans learned how to play soccer and the Germans 

gained some experience with baseball and football, they met in these sports 

30 HQ, USAREUR, Information and Education Div, Orientation Course for Germany, Mar 

1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 31 William Mahoney, “You and the Germans,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 4 Jul 1954; 

Ralph Kennan, “How to Make Friends and Influence Germans,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 25 Aug 1959; Otto H. Fleischer, “How Americans Look Through German Eyes,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 31 May 1953.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

as well. Despite the vigorous competition, the American soldiers made many 

friends by providing buses and trucks to pick up their German opponents who 

could not afford their own transportation. Soon, almost all local community 

fests and celebrations included some sort of athletic competition with nearby 

military personnel.32

U.S. military bands also proved to be effective ambassadors in furthering 

the cause of U.S.-German, civil-military relations. The Seventh Army band, 

many of whose members had played in top bands in the United States, toured 

Germany, playing at least one engagement each weekend during the summer 

months. Smaller contingents of the group formed combos or dance bands and 

performed for military and civilian affairs year-round. The 3d Armored Division 

sponsored both a 51-person division band and a 37-man chorus that entertained 

at many different functions. Some groups even took crash courses in German 

so that they could sing traditional German Christmas carols for performances 

in local churches. Concerts and other cultural performances helped to show 

the Germans another side to the Americans and to personalize the growing 

relationship between the two nations.33

The effort to build trust and understanding between the U.S. Army and 

local communities also involved demonstrating to the Germans that the U.S. 

military knew its business and was a credible partner in the effort to defend 

Western Europe. American civil affairs officers took care to invite local 

officials to parades, retreats, and other martial demonstrations. Seventh Army 

posts and facilities frequently celebrated traditional military holidays such as 

Armed Forces Day or Veterans Day with open houses and extensive military 

demonstrations. These events provided civilians from local communities with an 

opportunity to talk to soldiers and to get a closeup view of vehicles, weapons, 

and equipment. Giving local children a chance to climb on a tank or to ride 

in a real Army truck did more to improve the image of the U.S. military than 

any number of meetings and speeches.34

Children proved to be a common denominator that drew together the two 

nations in other ways as well. As an extension of the German Youth Activities 

32 “U.S. Boxers Defeat Germans at Augsburg,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 Dec 

1953; Larry Kaufman, “7th Army Cindermen Run Over German Team in All-Star Meet,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Sep 1953; “Sports Make Friends at Neubrucke Army Hospital,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Dec 1955; Hohn, GIs and Frauleins, p. 67. 33 Memo, CWO Charles L. Landry, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, 9th Inf Div, 3 Sep 1954, sub: 

Seventh Army Symphony Orchestra, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 549, NACP; 

“7th Army Symphony to Tour North Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 4 Feb 

1956; Thurston Macauley, “The 3d Armored Division’s Musical Envoys to Germany,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 3 Apr 1958; “Busy Yule for GI Singers,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 7 Dec 1958. 34 “Ordnance Corps Observes 142d Anniversary Today, Depots, Shops in Germany to Host 

Visitors Tomorrow,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 May 1954; “60 Installations in 

USAREUR to Hold Open House Celebrations,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 May 

1955; “Yanks Celebrate Armed Forces Day in Berlin,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 

May 1958.
386 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

program, U.S. Army units sponsored German boys in soap box derby races 

across the country. The sponsoring units provided materials to build the race 

cars, prizes, and expense money for local winners to participate in a national 

championship race. On several occasions, U.S. and German school teachers set 

up exchange programs, visiting each other’s classrooms and learning each other’s 

teaching methods. Students switched classrooms as well. In that way, German 

children learned the origins and traditions of an American Thanksgiving, and, 

a little later, U.S. students participated in the German Fasching celebration, 

a pre-Lenten carnival similar to the American Mardi Gras. Although most 

of the German students were fluent in English, few of the American children 

could speak German. The exchange visits offered them an opportunity to begin 

learning the language through conversations with their counterparts.35

In the end, it became clear that the key to building a relationship between 

U.S. soldiers and German civilians was getting the Americans out into the 

local communities to meet the Germans on their own terms. The Army chief 

of staff, General Taylor, expressed this belief in 1956 when he told an audience 

that Americans living abroad had a tendency to insulate themselves in “little 

Americas.” He advised officers and soldiers going to Germany to learn as much 

of the language as they could and to use that knowledge to get to know the 

neighbors. Ambassador David K. E. Bruce told soldiers the same thing. He 

encouraged them to be good guests of the German people and to remember their 

hosts were as tenacious in defending their traditions as the Americans were in 

supporting their own. Bruce added that the efforts of U.S. military leaders in 

Europe were paying off and that the soldiers were becoming welcome members 

of the German community.36

Maintaining the Relationships

Despite the best efforts of unit leaders and civil affairs staffs throughout 

Germany, and wherever else U.S. troops were stationed, maintaining smooth 

community relations was not always easy. Many of the soldiers were 18- to 

21-year-old men with the usual vices that seem characteristic of that age group. 

The command did its best to keep the soldiers busy, and when they were in the 

field, they were less likely to get into trouble. Inevitably, however, troops had 

off-duty time, and the local communities beckoned with plenty of diversions to 

offer a young soldier and many opportunities for him to misbehave. General 

Eddy reminded his junior officers in September 1951 that the undisciplined or 

35 “GYA Racers Win at Augsburg,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 9 Jun 1954; “Yanks, 

Germans Swap Aschaffenburg Classes,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 Mar 1955; Henry 

B. Kraft, “Getting Acquainted: U.S. German Classes,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 11 

Dec 1958. 36 Quote from “Taylor Raps Yank Colony Living,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

12 Jun 1956. Warren Franklin, “Bruce Discusses Role of Americans in Germany,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 4 Feb 1958.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

criminal behavior of even one Seventh Army soldier presented a serious obstacle 

to German-American relations and could easily destroy the good reputation that 

units had built up in a local community over a long period of time. However, 

with more than two hundred fifty thousand military personnel and almost 

sixty thousand dependents, USAREUR comprised a population equal to that 

of a moderately sized American city. Provost marshal records from the period 

reflect comparable statistics for most categories of major and minor offenses.37

Far and away the most common cause for soldier misconduct and 

subsequent difficulties with neighbors was alcohol consumption. Senior 

officers acknowledged that, with the expansion of the force in 1951, many 

of USAREUR’s new soldiers were young men away from home for the first 

time. The command had developed an extensive program of movies, service 

clubs, athletics, and social activities to keep off-duty troops entertained, but 

many still complained of boredom and a lack of things to do. The command 

was reluctant to deny younger soldiers the same privileges it accorded to the 

older men, so they were generally free to drink during their nonduty hours. 

Moreover, German barkeepers were seldom willing to turn down a sale, even 

to those soldiers who had obviously had enough. With beer and other alcoholic 

beverages readily available in enlisted clubs and in gasthauses throughout the 

German community, few restraints existed to keep soldiers from overindulging.38

Leaders took steps when they could to limit the abuse. After he became 

USAREUR commander, General Eddy, directed service clubs to eliminate 

the practice of serving double-shotted drinks. He also banned pre-closing 

sales and instructed club managers to place more emphasis on the sale of 

soft drinks and snacks than on liquor. Although he also threatened to place 

off-limits those German establishments that continued to sell alcohol to already 

intoxicated soldiers, or that otherwise encouraged troops to drink too much, 

Eddy acknowledged that the subject was touchy and would require close 

coordination with the responsible German officials. Subsequent commanders 

continued most of General Eddy’s policies for the serving of alcohol in clubs, 

37 Ltr, Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy to Capt Joseph T. Adanrro, 75th Signal Air-Ground Liaison 

Co, 18 Sep 1951, Entry 33508, Decimal File 008, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; 

Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 32, Historians files, CMH; 

Memos, Lt Col Vern E. Johnson, Ch, Personnel and Admin Br, for Distribution, 12 May 1954, 

sub: Provost Marshal Data in Monthly Statistical Report, USAREUR, March 1954, Entry 

2269, USAREUR Provost Marshal General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; and Murray for 

Provost Marshal, Northern Area Command, 3 Sep 1953, sub: Statistical Charts. 38 Memo, Murray for Provost Marshal, Northern Area Command, 3 Sep 1953, sub: Statistical Charts; Ltr, Eddy to William A. Lord, 2 Jun 1951, Entry 33508, Decimal File 008, Seventh 

Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; “Germans, Yanks in Bavaria Act to Improve Relations,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 6 Apr 1952; “GI-German Incidents Decline in Mannheim,” 

Army Times, 2 Mar 1957; Hohn, GIs and Frauleins, p. 66.
388 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

but the problem of drunk and disorderly soldiers and the disturbances they 

caused in local communities would never completely disappear.39

The U.S. Army during the 1950s was overwhelmingly a male institution, 

and the force in Europe was no exception. As late as 1958, the Seventh Army 

boasted one member of the Women’s Army Corps who served as the personal 

secretary to the Army commander. For the thousands of single 18- to 24-yearold men who made up the U.S. Army in Europe, the most popular recreational 

activity in theater was the pursuit of European women. During the occupation, 

the widespread sexual relations between soldiers and German women, and the 

thriving entertainment and sex industry that catered to the soldiers, had been 

deeply upsetting to many Germans. German social scientists reported that the 

number of sex crimes in West Germany tripled between 1948 and 1951. They 

also expressed alarm at an influx of risqué or pornographic magazines, books, 

and movies that seemed to be flooding the country.40

The transition from occupation to partnership had not alleviated any 

of the Germans’ concerns. Throughout the early 1950s, as the U.S. military 

buildup took place, newly established American garrison towns lacked the law 

enforcement capabilities to deal with the influx of so many young men and the 

social problems associated with such a large military presence. Exacerbating the 

problem was the fact that fewer than 30 percent of the soldiers sent to Germany 

were married and even fewer had brought their wives. German authorities 

outlawed prostitution in many of the smaller garrison communities, and German 

police and American MPs collaborated on joint vice raids to round up violators. 

Unfortunately, the random raids also apprehended plenty of “decent German 

girls” who ended up in government health offices for gynecological exams. To 

avoid such embarrassment, local communities began to limit the vice raids, 

choosing to express their displeasure primarily toward the growing number of 

interracial liaisons.41

The reported rate of venereal disease among USAREUR soldiers usually 

varied between fifty and ninety soldiers per thousand per month. Although this 

39 HQ, USAREUR, Monthly Conference with Post Commanders and Selected Seventh Army 

Commanders, 29 Sep 1952; HQ, USAREUR, Monthly CINCUSAREUR-HICOG Conference, 

31 Aug 1953. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, 

NACP. HQ, USAREUR, Monthly Post Commanders’ Conference Notes, 3 Oct 1952, Entry 

2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Lt Col Mason 

F. Goodloe, Asst Adj Gen, for Distribution, 5 Aug 1954, sub: Placing of German Establishments 

or Areas “Off Limits” to Military Personnel, Entry 2211, USAREUR Judge Advocate General 

General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP. 40 “Seventh Army’s Only Wac,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 28 Jul 1958; Hanns 

Neuerbourg, “Sex Crimes on Increase in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 May 

1951; “Sex Crimes in West Germany Rising, Church Group Says,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 15 Jun 1952. 41 Maria Hohn, “You Can’t Pin Sergeant’s Stripes on an Archangel: Soldiering, Sexuality, 

and U.S. Army Policies in Germany,” in Over There, ed. Hohn and Moon, pp. 125–30. For more 

detailed information on relationships between U.S. soldiers and German women, see Hohn, GIs 

and Frauleins.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

was higher than the overall Army rate, it was consistently lower than that of the 

total overseas force. German and American authorities attempted to control 

the spread of venereal diseases by licensing and closely monitoring prostitution 

and by offering free medical treatment to infected persons. The U.S. Army, 

Europe, also offered special passes to units that remained free of the diseases 

for specified periods of time.42

On a more positive note, the number of marriages between European women

and American soldiers also continued to rise. In May 1953, the Department 

of the Army lifted security restrictions that had previously prohibited soldiers 

who had married German nationals from returning to the European Command 

for subsequent tours. Shortly thereafter, USAREUR adjusted its own policies, 

allowing more time than in the past for newly married soldiers to prepare for 

redeployment back to the United States. In 1955, USAREUR inherited from 

the American consul at Frankfurt responsibility for interviewing prospective 

spouses, conducting security reviews, and providing medical examinations. A 

steady stream of couples appearing before one Berlin official to obtain marriage 

licenses caused him to complain that U.S. soldiers were depriving Germany 

of all its pretty girls. While the vast majority of women were “knockouts,” 

he said, “some of the men were not so handsome.” Many German women, it 

seemed, preferred the prospect of life in the United States to settling down in 

postwar Germany.43

One issue that had both positive and negative effects on the GermanAmerican relationship involved the amount of money the soldiers and their 

dependents had to spend in a German economy that was still recovering from 

the war. One report in 1952 suggested that the thousands of American troops 

stationed in West Germany would provide an “army of free-spending tourists” 

for the state. At the same time, however, German merchants complained that 

discounted purchases made by the troops at post exchanges threatened their 

own bottom lines. They accused some soldiers of buying goods in bulk to resell 

elsewhere at a profit. The U.S. Exchange Service pointed out that while the U.S. 

stores did sell German cameras at prices lower than those found in German 

shops, the manufacturers continued to make a profit.44

42 Annual Hist Rpts, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 118; and 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, 

HQ, USAREUR, pp. 141–42, Historians files, CMH. 43 Quote from Joseph Fleming, “Official Says GIs Deplete Beauty Crop,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 11 Apr 1951. “Marriages Rise Among EC Troops,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Jul 1952; “Army Lifts Restrictions on War II Enemy Wives,” Army Times, 

16 May 1953; HQ, USAREUR, Monthly HICOG-CINCUSAREUR Conference, 28 Sep 1953, 

Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Col John 

T. Corley, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Adj Gen, 30 Sep 1955, sub: Policy Guidance on Marriage 

Applications, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 44 Quote from Omer Anderson, “Yanks Strengthen German Economy,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 14 Sep 1952. “Army’s Purchasing Policies Changing European Habits,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Mar 1955; “German Stores Blast EUCOM PX’s,” Army Times, 

23 Aug 1952.
390 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

German merchants had a more serious issue with U.S. soldiers failing to pay 

their debts. During one six-month period in 1957, USAREUR headquarters 

received approximately twenty-five hundred letters complaining about unpaid 

debts. In part, U.S. commanders blamed the Germans themselves for extending 

excessive amounts of credit to irresponsible young men. Moreover, the Army 

had always taken the position that it was not a collection agency. While 

commanders took what actions they could against soldiers with delinquent 

debts, they also worked through the local German-American associations to 

convince vendors to be somewhat less generous with the credit they extended, 

particularly to lower-ranking soldiers who could not earn enough money to 

pay back large debts on time.45

That is not to say that the Germans were unable to profit from the influx 

of American soldiers and their ready supply of cash. Taxi drivers around cities 

such as Giessen and Baumholder later told stories of the “Golden Fifties” when 

Americans were so well-off that they could afford a taxi to transport them 

from one bar to another, even if the distance was a mere fifty yards. One young 

woman used all her savings to buy a Volkswagen Beetle, which she rented to 

U.S. soldiers for DM 45 a weekend. In a few years she was the proud owner of 

a fleet of twenty-five cars that she rented to Americans because few Germans 

could have afforded her fees. Another enterprising young man sold sodas and 

sandwiches in front of U.S. military barracks. He soon made enough money 

to support himself while attending the university.46

The recovery of the German economy and the increasing prosperity of 

the German middle class helped to eliminate another of the major vices of the 

occupation period, the black market. During the early days of the occupation, 

an American surplus in almost all goods coupled with an exhausted German 

economy provided U.S. soldiers with an opportunity to trade excess commodities for art objects, cameras, jewelry, other luxury articles, and local currency. 

By 1951, however, the recovery of the German economy had brought such 

large amounts of consumer goods into the market that most black marketing 

ceased to be profitable. That, plus the increased attention of the U.S. military 

and German police, border guards, and customs officials, ended the illegal 

traffic in most commodities. Despite that enforcement, however, a black market 

continued in cigarettes and coffee. A generous American monthly ration, 

relatively inexpensive prices, and a 50 percent German luxury tax on these items 

offered lucrative profits to those willing to take the chance. American officials 

responded in June 1952 by decreasing the coffee ration from seven pounds to 

five pounds per person per month for soldiers with families. Single troops living 

in the barracks saw their ration reduced from four pounds to two pounds per 

45 HQ, USAREUR, Commanders’ Conference, 16 Dec 1957, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, Commanders’ Conference Notes, 11 

Dec 1959, Entry 2002, USAREUR Secretary of the General Staff Conferences, 1959–1961, RG 

549, NACP. 46 Hohn, GIs and Frauleins, pp. 46–47.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

month. When the illicit trade continued, it became a political football, with the 

German press and the American military media trading accusations about where 

to lay the blame. Although the practice eventually declined due to the increased 

vigilance of the authorities, stiffer penalties for black marketers, and a declining 

value of the dollar against the DM, it was never completely eradicated.47

In addition to the normal penalties available through the military discipline 

system and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, USAREUR leaders had a 

number of less punitive options at their disposal to assist in maintaining order 

among the troops during their off-duty time. First and foremost was the curfew. 

Unless on official leave or pass, soldiers had to be in their quarters by 2400 on 

evenings prior to a duty day and by 0100 on evenings prior to a non-duty day. 

In many cases, however, noncommissioned officers were exempt from curfew 

restrictions, and, over time, enforcement grew somewhat lax. The rising number 

of incidents involving soldiers and German civilians during the summer of 1956 

led the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, to order strict enforcement of 

the curfew and a re-examination of pass privileges throughout the command. 

When teenage military dependents sparked incidents through their disorderly 

public conduct in 1959, USAREUR leaders warned that the curfew applied to 

them as well and would be enforced. Dependents who violated the restrictions 

could expect a quick departure from the theater.48

Military police patrols tried to anticipate problems and to intercede before 

they became major incidents. In many areas, local German police units patrolled 

jointly with their American counterparts. The two groups learned to work 

together to defuse situations from each side before major conflicts erupted. 

Seventh Army units also sent courtesy patrols into communities at night to keep 

an eye out for disruptive or unruly soldiers and to head off incidents before they 

became matters for the military police. The courtesy patrols carried no weapons 

and relied solely on the prestige of the senior noncommissioned officers assigned 

to the details. They visited bars, gasthauses, and traditional soldier hangouts 

on a regular basis, checking for proper wear of uniforms, correct identification 

cards and passes, and the occasional overindulged soldier who might need a 

ride back to the barracks.49

47 Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, pp. 115–17; Ltrs, Eddy to Col 

Dean Schamber, CO, 31st Medical Gp, 5 Dec 1951, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, 

RG 338, NACP; and Col Bjarne Furuholmen, Ch, Public Information Div, to Brig Gen Frank 

Dorn, Dep Ch of Information, 29 Jul 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “Frankfurt Police See Decline in Black Mart,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 22 Sep 1952. 48 “Hodes Takes New Action to Cut Down Incidents,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

19 Jul 1956; HQ, 3d Armd Div, Commanders Conference, 18 Jun 1959, Entry 30742, 3d Armored 

Division, RG 338, NACP. 49 Memo, Lt Col William D. Mouchet, Dep Ch of Staff, Civil Affairs Div, for Asst Ch of 

Staff, G–1, 23 Aug 1956, sub: Improving Conditions in Areas Adjacent to Military Installations, 

Entry 2109, USAREUR Civil Affairs Division, General Correspondence, 1952–1956, RG 549, 

NACP; Marty Gershen, “Saturday Night Beat,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Aug 
392 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Although maintaining a good relationship between the Americans and their 

German neighbors was an important goal for every senior officer who served 

with USAREUR, none took the issue more seriously or had a greater impact 

than General Clarke. As Seventh Army commander from May 1956 to July 1958, 

Clarke made enhancing relations with the neighbors second in importance only 

to maintaining the combat readiness of the Seventh Army. He took command 

of the force at a time when relations between soldiers and civilians were at a 

low point. Local news media had played up racial friction, drunkenness, and 

misbehavior by American troops to the point that the Army leadership in 

Washington expressed genuine concern over the viability of maintaining troops 

in Europe. In response, soon after he arrived in theater, Clarke set out to visit 

local officials in all of the German communities surrounding Seventh Army 

installations. In doing so, he also met with more than one thousand community 

and municipal leaders in an effort to get to know them and to demonstrate that 

he cared about their concerns.50

Clarke believed in two primary causes for the rise in serious incidents, 

the ready availability of liquor and the extended hours in which soldiers were 

allowed to roam the streets. As a first step toward addressing the issues, he 

proposed to halt the sale of alcoholic beverages by midnight and to make sure 

that troops were in their quarters by then. He also prevailed on German bar 

owners to stop selling drinks to U.S. soldiers on credit and before they became 

dangerously intoxicated. He likewise asked them to explore the possibility of 

closing their establishments at times when soldiers should be back in their billets. 

The general stressed as well the leadership responsibilities of troop officers and 

section leaders. He demanded that officers and noncommissioned officers set a 

positive example and established harsh penalties for those who could not live 

up to the standard he expected. Finally, to provide perspective, he reminded 

Germans and Americans alike of the many positive programs the command had 

put in place and the contributions soldiers had made to Germany’s economy 

and to improving the everyday lives of its citizens.51

Echoing General Taylor’s concern that American families were setting 

up isolated colonies in Europe, Clarke also encouraged soldiers and their 

dependents to get out among the Germans to learn more about them as people. 

He told his division commanders that it was far better to create positive publicity 

than to attempt to prevent unwanted attention that had arisen from unfavorable 

incidents. To that end, he urged them to provide the troops with opportunities 

1956; “Courtesy Patrols Stop Trouble Before It Can Start,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

24 Jun 1958. 50 Intervs, Lt Col Lowell G. Smith and Lt Col Murray G. Swindler with Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 17, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI; and Col. Francis B. Kish with 

Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, pp. 172–73, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI. 51 HQ, Seventh Army, Extension of Remarks by Army Commander, 1 Jun 1956, Entry 33509, 

Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “Clarke Pushes Campaign to Curb Incidents,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 6 Sep 1956.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

to interact with local citizens in a positive manner. Ways to generate favorable 

notice, he said, included athletic competitions between American and German 

teams, open houses at Army affairs, initiation of unit-sponsored charities such 

as the adoption of orphanages, and prompt investigation and punishment where 

appropriate whenever negative incidents occurred. Clarke called his initiative 

“Good Neighbors to Our German Good Neighbors” and he continued to meet 

with German and American leaders on a regular basis to reinforce his message.52

Ultimately, the general’s programs succeeded. Under his command, the 

Seventh Army received the Silver Anvil Award from the American Public 

Relations Association for its efforts to improve German-American relations. 

As a capstone to his efforts, the German city of Heidelberg made Clarke an 

honorary senator.53

Fitting in with the French

The Germans were not the only local population with whom the Americans 

had to learn to get along. In much smaller numbers, U.S. soldiers also served in 

other European nations including Italy and Austria. It was France, however, 

that presented the greatest challenge for U.S. soldiers and their families. 

Having just evicted the Germans after years of occupation, many of the 

French were righteously indignant at the very idea of having another nation’s 

soldiers stationed on their soil. Nonetheless, in November 1950, after a year 

of negotiations, U.S. troops began moving into camps around the country to 

begin construction of the USAREUR Communications Zone.

As they had in Germany, Army leaders required all newly assigned units 

entering France to receive an orientation on their new assignment. During 

the first hour, troops learned about the Army’s mission in France and the 

importance of establishing a line of support. Because the reason for stationing 

troops in France seemed to be less obvious than their purpose in Germany, 

the command was careful to explain in detail the logistical requirements of the 

forward defense forces. In addition, briefers tried to prepare the newcomers 

for the spartan conditions they would encounter during their tour. During 

the initial period of development in France, housing, recreational facilities, or 

other creature comforts were mostly unavailable for the troops. For the time 

being, the construction of depots, pipelines, and logistical facilities had a higher 

52 HQ, Seventh Army, Extension of Remarks by the Army Commander, 1 Jun 1956; Extract 

from Remarks by Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke, CG, Seventh Army, to the Class of 1957, United 

States Military Academy, 11 Mar 1957, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 549, NACP; 

“Seventh Army Emphasizing G-A Good Neighbor Policy,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

8 Sep 1956. 53 “Seventh Army Acts on Offenders, Clarke Avers,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

29 Jun 1956; Interv, Kish with Clarke, 23 Feb 1982.
394 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

priority. Those who balked at the prospect of a lower standard of living were 

reminded that conditions were a lot worse in Korea.54

It was particularly important for briefers to emphasize that the nature of the 

American presence in France was something special. France was not a nation 

that the United States had defeated in war, and U.S. forces were not there as an 

army of occupation. To the contrary, France was a free and sovereign nation 

and a partner in the NATO alliance. The troops were made to understand that 

some of the liberties they had taken during the early days of the occupation of 

Germany would not be tolerated in this new environment.55

The second hour of the orientation course covered the customs and traditions 

of the French people and advised the soldiers on how to get along with their 

new neighbors. First and foremost was a recommendation to begin learning the 

language as soon as possible. Troop information and education officers provided 

French phrase books and English-French dictionaries to help servicemen get 

started. One veteran of previous service in France warned that Frenchmen 

were intensely proud of their language and that, although many spoke excellent 

English, they seldom volunteered to speak it or to practice their skills with visitors. 

Additionally, he said, the French emphasized a rigid adherence to traditional 

courtesies. Formal handshakes and greetings were an important part of everyday 

life. Ignoring such niceties could cause cool indifference to become outright 

hostility. The orientation also emphasized the influence of the Roman Catholic 

Church throughout the country and warned that many communities were more 

conservative than the popular image of Paris.56

The command was also careful to warn incoming soldiers about another 

peculiarity of their service in France. Unlike the situation in West Germany, the 

Communist Party played an active role in French politics. Left wing political 

parties publicized any incidents that portrayed the Americans in a bad light 

and that might cause friction between the two allies. Commanders cautioned 

soldiers to avoid public comment on political issues that could be misconstrued 

or misrepresented by news media sympathetic to the Communist cause.57

The most serious challenge to U.S.-French, civil-military relations came 

in November 1953 when legislation passed by the French National Assembly 

made male aliens residing in France for more than a year subject to conscription into the French armed services. This law specifically targeted the United 

States, which had drafted French nationals into military service even though 

they had already served in their own armed forces. Alarmed by the prospect of 

54 Memo, Information Div, HQ, EUCOM COMZ, for CG, Base Section, 3 Mar 1952, sub: 

Orientation of Military Personnel, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, 

RG 549, NACP. 55 HQ, USAREUR, Orientation Course for France, Sep 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR 

General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. 56 Ibid.; Charles C. Glasgow, “All Is Not Oo-La-La for Soldier in Paris,” Army Times, 20 

Jun 1959. 57 Msg, USAREUR to Area Commands, 18 Mar 1955, Ref # SC–22034, Entry 2000, 

USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

U.S. dependents living in France subject to conscription, USAREUR began 

making arrangements to return all military personnel with eligible dependents 

to the United States if they could not transfer to other duties in Germany or 

Great Britain. In response to the growing controversy, the U.S. Congress 

passed legislation in 1955 exempting from selective service requirements any 

foreign nationals who had already completed military service in their own 

country. The French government reciprocated by exempting U.S. citizens from 

its own conscription if they had already met their military obligations. Male 

dependents who had not yet served in the military remained legally subject to 

French conscription, but French officials indicated that they would abstain 

from drafting those individuals.58

Although the principle of having foreign troops stationed on French 

soil remained a controversial issue in French politics at the national level, 

U.S. troops managed to coexist peacefully with their neighbors in the local 

communities. American servicemen reached out to civilians in a manner similar 

to their counterparts in Germany with comparable results. In a letter to General 

Handy, General Eddy wrote that increased participation by the French in 

community relations programs had helped to diminish anti-American feeling 

and had contributed to a growing anti-Communist sentiment in the French 

population. As the decade proceeded, good relations remained an issue of 

the highest importance for the Communications Zone leadership. Maj. Gen. 

Edward J. O’Neill, commander of the U.S. Communications Zone, Europe, 

in 1957 promised to do anything in his power to maintain the best possible 

relationship with the French. There was nothing, he said, on which he placed 

more emphasis.59

In most cases, U.S. troops serving in Italy found a much warmer reception 

than those in France, but also suffered a daunting cost of living. Since the 

U.S. Army contained a relatively high percentage of Italian-Americans, many 

soldiers and their families found more familiar circumstances in Italy than they 

had in France or Germany. As in France, however, no government furnished 

quarters were available in Verona, Vicenza, and Livorno, where most of the 

U.S. troops served. Although the U.S. headquarters leased a small number of 

buildings for transient housing, most military families arriving in Italy had to 

find their own housing on the Italian economy. By 1958, however, the Army 

began construction of military housing for four hundred families near Vicenza. 

Shortly thereafter, many of the American units assigned to the Southern 

58 Memo, CWO William M. Ryerson, Asst Adj Gen, for TAG, 13 Dec 1954, sub: French Army 

Draft of Foreigners on a Reciprocal Basis, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 

1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 

332–33. 59 HQ, USAREUR COMZ, Minutes of Commanders Conference, 15 Jan 1958, Entry 2001, 

USAREUR Commanders Conferences, 1958–1960, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Eddy to Handy, 18 Feb 

1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “Yanks 

Visit French Rotarians,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 11 Mar 1955; “Army Bands to 

Serenade Christmas in France, Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 16 Dec 1957.
396 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

European Task Force were inactivated, with their missions and responsibilities 

turned over to Italian units.60

Charities and Disaster Relief: Being a Good Neighbor When It Counted

As U.S. leaders worked to strengthen the NATO alliance, it was important 

to demonstrate to other member nations that they could count on the United 

States during times of trial. For American troops stationed in Europe, this 

meant lending a hand when natural disasters or other misfortunes threatened 

civilian populations across the continent. U.S. assistance during these times not 

only reinforced the ties of the alliance, but also allowed U.S. troops to garner 

a measure of respect and admiration from those they assisted.

In February 1953, for example, heavy rains and flooding sent refugees 

scurrying for higher ground in coastal towns in Britain, Belgium, and the 

Netherlands. Hurricane-force winds and waves battered the Dutch dikes and 

pushed flood waters across a 1,000-square-mile area of the Netherlands. The 

SHAPE commander, General Ridgway, instructed the USAREUR commander, 

General Eddy, to take charge of U.S. relief efforts in the flood stricken area. 

The Army’s initial response included sending a detachment of the 39th Engineer 

Group to serve as forward headquarters for the U.S. relief effort, an engineer 

dump truck company with three hundred thousand sandbags, and a number 

of water purification units. The command also dispatched six helicopters and 

fifteen small reconnaissance planes to assist in searching for survivors. As Eddy’s 

team began to grasp the full scope of the disaster, more support units—including 

engineers, amphibious truck companies, aerial supply companies, and additional 

helicopters—rushed to the stricken region. The helicopters and amphibious 

trucks proved to be invaluable, repeatedly rescuing victims stranded in isolated 

sections of the flooded region. Engineer companies reinforced dikes, while 

transportation companies delivered tools to emergency workers fighting the 

floods and clothing and food to the thousands of refugees. Signal units worked 

to restore communications necessary for relief efforts, while medical teams 

helped treat thousands of displaced people. Before the emergency was over, 

more than two thousand American troops were engaged in the effort.61

When other natural disasters or emergencies hit Western Europe, USAREUR 

was there to lend a hand. In 1954 when flood waters destroyed bridges in Austria, 

60 “Housing Improves in SETAF,” Army Times, 23 May 1959; “U.S. Housing Started in 

Italy,” Army Times, 6 Sep 1958; “Italian Quarters Are Unfurnished; Cost of Living High, Says 

Reader,” Army Times, 6 Sep 1958; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, 

p. 66, Historians files, CMH. 61 Msg, The Hague to State Dept, 1 Feb 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, 

pp. 490–501; Campbell Sanders, “Europe Flood Deaths Rise to 905,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 3 Feb 1953; “Relief Wheels Rolling, Eddy Says,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

4 Feb 1953; “2,000 Yanks Continue Fight to Patch Dikes,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

13 Feb 1953. 
Getting Along with the Neighbors

engineers from the U.S. garrison there helped to repair the damage. The eagerness 

of many American troops to help prompted USAREUR commanders to impose 

limits lest the relief efforts interfere with maintaining combat readiness. When 

General Hoge observed that Army units had been committed to emergency work 

in flooded areas of Bavaria while local resources went unutilized, he revised the 

command’s policies regarding civil disasters by directing that USAREUR should 

not become involved in large-scale relief efforts unless local resources and those 

of the Red Cross were insufficient or unavailable.62

Nonetheless, American troops continued to help out where they could. In 

1956, when the coldest winter in fifty years gripped much of Europe, USAREUR 

units helped to restore water supplies cut off by frozen pipes and rescued a 

10-ton ferry that had become frozen in the middle of Germany’s Main River. 

Supply units also assisted U.S. Air Force elements in delivering needed food 

and supplies to snowbound villages in Germany and Italy.63

In other cases, USAREUR mobilized its forces to provide humanitarian 

assistance outside of the immediate theater. President Eisenhower directed 

U.S. forces to take no actions to support uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 

1956, but when thousands of Hungarian refugees began fleeing into Austria, 

USAREUR once again stepped up to help. As part of Operation Mercy—a U.S.

Air Force, Europe, mission to establish refugee camps in Austria—USAREUR 

furnished blankets, cots, and field kitchen equipment. In December, General 

Norstad, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, instructed General 

Hodes, the USAREUR commander, to prepare a staging area in Munich for the 

airlift of some fifteen thousand refugees to the United States. Almost overnight, 

soldiers set up a reception facility with cots and mattresses to accommodate up 

to five hundred refugees a day while they awaited their flights. Army doctors, 

nurses, and enlisted personnel set up a medical dispensary to take care of the 

sick. On 11 December, Hodes boarded an aircraft at Munich-Riem Airport 

to bid farewell to the first group of refugees departing for the United States.64

Often, USAREUR units were able to assist local communities while, 

at the same time, providing a training benefit for their troops. Engineer 

units, in particular, worked on numerous local improvement projects 

that happened to coincide with their military specialties. In May 1952, 

for example, engineers from the 4th Infantry Division built a wooden 

trestle bridge across a stream near Hanau to connect a local neighborhood 

62 HQ, USAREUR, Monthly HICOG-Commanders Conference Notes, 29 Jul 1954, Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “USFA Engineers Help Rebuild FloodDamaged Bridges,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 Sep 1954. 63 “Army Responding to German Calls for Help in Freeze,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 16 Feb 1956; “Italy to Decorate 301 Yanks for Aid in Snow Crisis,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 7 Jul 1956. 64 Annual Hist Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, p. 298; Ernie Reed, “Army 

Plays Host to Haven Refugees,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 11 Dec 1956; Ernie Reed, 

“Hodes Sees Hungarians Off, Wishes Them Happy Future,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Dec 1956.
398 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

with a community swimming pool. For soldiers used to throwing spans 

across the Main River only to have to retrieve them days later, the task 

was a welcome change of pace. A few months later, in May 1953, units 

from the 555th Engineer Group in Karlsruhe constructed playgrounds 

and athletic fields for neighboring German communities. American units 

in France played the good neighbor as well. Motorized cranes from the 

7373d Transportation Group, stationed near St. Lô in Normandy, rolled 

out on a regular basis to winch civilian trucks and other large vehicles 

out of ditches and streams. In these and hundreds of other cases, local 

communities were thankful for the help, and commanders and soldiers 

alike were happy to put their military expertise to good use.65

Throughout the 1950s, American soldiers and their dependents opened their 

hearts and pocketbooks in hundreds of small ways to Germans still struggling 

to recover from the devastation and depredations of World War II. The 

German Youth Activities Program sent thousands of children to summer camps 

through donations from the troops and their families. Officers and enlisted men 

also gave money as well as time to help initiate or restore youth baseball and 

scouting programs in a number of German communities. Later, when German 

hospitals experienced a need for increased supplies of blood and plasma, their 

requests were answered by thousands of American servicemen and civilians 

who donated to the German Red Cross. The isolated enclave in West Berlin 

also presented opportunities for acts of kindness. Beginning in 1953, Army 

families opened their homes to children from Berlin, offering them “vacations” 

from their surrounded city. Participating in a USAREUR program entitled 

Operation Friendly Hand or in an Air Force program known as Operatio

Kinderlift, USAREUR and U.S. Air Force, Europe, families joined local

German communities in hosting the visitors for five-week vacations.66

Some of the Army’s most effective community relations efforts sprang 

not from official programs or policies but from the basic decency and good 

nature of the American soldier. In December 1951, little more than a year after 

the reactivation of the Seventh Army, every major unit within the command 

sponsored Christmas parties and entertainment with gifts of toys, clothing, and 

shoes for thousands of German and non-German refugee children. The 26th 

Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, provided assistance for more than two thousand 

orphaned children and thirty-two needy families in the Bamberg area through 

voluntary soldier donations. The following year, with most of its augmentation 

65 “Engineers Build Span for Kids,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 May 1952; “555th 

Engineers Combine Training With Civic Relations Program,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 7 May 1953; Arthur Diggle, “Alors, Those Americans,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 11 Dec 1955. 66 “10,000 Go Camping on Yank $$,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 Aug 1952; 

“Drive Under Way to Get European Kids in Ruth Loop,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

13 Apr 1958; “U.S. Donations Swell German Blood Banks,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

3 Nov 1959; “Deadline Extended for Friendly Hand,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1

May 1955; “Kinderlift Heads for Home,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 1957
Santa visits the children of Friedberg Kinderheim at a party given by Company B, 705th 

Ordnance Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, in December 1955.

The Red Diamond (5th Infantry Division) chorus and German orphans sing Christmas 

carols during a party in December 1955.
400 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

units in place, the Seventh Army sponsored Christmas parties for some fifty 

thousand children. Meanwhile, throughout the entire U.S. Zone of Germany, 

more than two hundred thousand refugees, orphans, elderly, and needy families 

received clothing and gifts made possible largely through donations from the 

U.S. soldiers and their families.67

Although the holiday season always placed a spotlight on the soldiers’ 

charitable efforts, unsung Army personnel contributed millions of dollars in 

cash, goods, and services to local charities and causes throughout every year. 

Many units provided year-round support for local orphanages, including 

money, coal, and vacations at seaside or mountain resorts for underprivileged 

children. Army engineer units donated time and equipment to help construction 

projects to assist local communities. In one case in 1956, a group of nuns in the 

city of Würzburg asked for fuel to run equipment removing rubble from nearby 

grounds so that they could plant vegetable gardens there. When soldiers from 

the nearby 10th Infantry Division learned that Army regulations prevented 

them from donating gasoline, they responded with enough money to keep the 

equipment running. As if that were not enough, soldiers joined clearing crews 

during their off-duty time, wielding air hammers, picks, and shovels to help 

clear the area. More than the civil affairs groups, the friendship councils, and 

command guidance on German-American relations, it was the thousands of 

small acts of kindness on the part of units and soldiers throughout Europe that 

generated a general atmosphere of goodwill toward the American military.68

A Convergence of Cultures—Elvis Goes to Europe

Perhaps no other event came to symbolize the emerging integration of 

American culture, the U.S. Army, and German society as well as the assignment, 

in October 1958, of Pvt. Elvis Aron Presley to Company D, 1st Medium Tank 

Battalion, 32d Armor, 3d Armored Division. Because the draft continued 

throughout the early Cold War period, many celebrities, movie stars, and 

professional athletes served time in the military. Most, however, remained in 

the United States, often performing under the auspices of Special Services or 

67 HQ, USAREUR, Civil Affairs Information Bull, 10 Dec 1952, Entry 2170, USAREUR 

Civil Affairs Staff Memos, RG 549, NACP; HQ, VII Corps, Corps Commanders Conference, 24 

Nov 1959, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP; “Seventh Army Plans Parties 

for Kids,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 22 Dec 1951; “Yanks Fete 200,000 Germans 

for Yule,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 Dec 1952; “Yanks in Europe Playing Yule 

Host to 250,000 Kids,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Dec 1951. 68 “Charity’s Best Neighbor in 1956: Big Hearted GI Joe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Dec 1956; Henry B. Kraft, “Battle Scarred Division Has Soft Heart,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 9 Aug 1956; John Neumyer, “Living Symbol of German-American Relations,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Oct 1956.
Getting Along with the Neighbors

playing for Army sports teams. For his own reasons, Presley opted for life as 

a soldier.69

By most accounts, the singer was a model enlisted man. Although authorities 

allowed him to live off post with his father, his grandmother, and various 

members of his business staff, he declined most special privileges and performed 

kitchen police duty, took part in the all-night GI parties to prepare billets for 

inspection, and spent the requisite days and nights in the field, undergoing the 

division’s extensive training program. During his off-duty hours, he tried to 

answer some of the five thousand to ten thousand fan letters he received each 

week, many from Germany.70

Elvis turned out to be every bit as popular among the Germans as he 

was in the United States. As he came down the gangway off the troopship at 

Bremerhaven, a horde of screaming teenaged fans broke through a police line 

to get a closer look. Civilian reporters and photographers chronicled most of his 

69 “Elvis Stars $78-a-Month Role Today,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Mar 1958; 

Marty Gershen, “Hundreds Greet Singer on Arrival in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 2 Oct 1958; Harold Heffernan, “L.A. Fan Reports on Excellent Soldier Elvis,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 6 May 1958. 70 Joseph McBride, “Presley: Army Makes You Mature,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Oct 1958; “Elvis Does His Share,” Army Times, 8 Aug 1959; Hazel Guild, “Little Time 

for Money in the Army Work Day of Pfc Elvis Presley,” Army Times, 28 Mar 1959.

Sgt. Elvis Presley briefs his reconnaissance team during Exercise Wintershield in 196
402 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

movements. When he went on maneuvers, opposing unit commanders offered 

$50 and a three-day pass to any soldier who could capture the famous singer.71

Although officers from his company commander up to the commanding 

general of the V Corps asked him to perform for the troops, the singer always 

politely declined. Lt. Gen. Frank W. Farrell, the V Corps commander, told 

reporters that Elvis felt he had an obligation to his country and simply wanted 

to pay it like anybody else. Initially identified for duty as a tank crewman, 

Presley was instead assigned to a scout platoon where he served as a jeep driver. 

By the end of his tour, he had been promoted to sergeant and was serving as 

a reconnaissance squad leader. In March 1960, he returned to Fort Dix, New 

Jersey, where he mustered out of the service and drove away with his manager, 

Col. Tom Parker, in a chauffeured limousine.72

Although the U.S. Army’s role in Germany began as one of occupation, it 

did not take long for the troops to become accepted as friends by the majority 

of German citizens. The Berlin airlift and the initial American stand against 

Communist expansion had generated a basis for goodwill toward the soldiers 

that charitable work and the basic decency of the troops only expanded. 

Nonetheless, U.S. Army installations in Germany presented all of the same 

concerns to their neighbors that Army bases in the United States posed for 

their local communities, amplified by differences in language, heritage, and 

culture. The American soldiers brought many hardships and inconveniences 

to German communities, but they also brought an unprecedented prosperity 

to local economies and contributed immeasurably to postwar recovery. That 

Germans and Americans would emerge not just as formal allies but as genuine 

friends is a tribute to the patience, forbearance, and foresight of leaders on both 

sides. This would become even more important during the coming months, as 

the U.S.-Soviet stalemate over Berlin threatened to escalate the Cold War into 

something a bit warmer.73

71 Wally Beene, “New Chapter in the Life of Elvis,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 

Mar 1960. 72 “Presley Would Rather Soldier,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 28 Dec 1958; “Elvis 

Assigned to Drive Jeep After Interview With His CO,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 

Oct 1958; “Elvis Presley Earns Boost to Sergeant,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Feb 

1960; “Elvis Takes Discharge, Drives Off in Limousine,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

7 Mar 1960. 73 Hohn, GIs and Frauleins, p. 19.
The election of a new President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 

renewed the East-West confrontation over Berlin that had continued to simmer 

since the 1959 conference of foreign ministers in Geneva. In June 1961, five 

months after taking office, President Kennedy traveled to Vienna, Austria, 

to meet with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The Soviet leader took the 

opportunity to reissue his ultimatum, threatening to sign a unilateral peace 

treaty with the German Democratic Republic and thus terminate Western access 

rights to Berlin guaranteed by the original Potsdam Agreement. He once again 

offered the concession of making Berlin a free city, but only on the condition 

that the West would recognize the existence of two German states, both of which 

would join the United Nations. Once the treaty was signed, Khrushchev said, 

the German Democratic Republic would be a sovereign state. The Soviet Union 

would regard any violation of that sovereignty as an act of open aggression 

against a peace-loving country and would respond accordingly.1

“A Bone in the Throat”

The Soviet premier’s message should have come as no surprise to the new 

American president. The Soviet position on West Berlin had changed little since 

Khrushchev had issued his initial ultimatum in 1958. At that time, the Soviet 

leader had told Llewellyn E. Thompson, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 

that West Berlin was a “bone in the throat” of Soviet-American relations.2

With the new year and the new administration, the confrontation heated up 

once more. In February 1961, Thompson reported to the State Department that 

the Soviets remained deeply concerned over West Germany’s military potential 

and feared that its restored armed forces would eventually take action to force 

the Soviets out of East Germany. As it was, Berlin remained a convenient and 

1 Memorandum of Conversation, 4 Jun 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 14, Berlin Crisis, 

1961–1962, pp. 87–96; Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (1974), pp. 

487–502. 2 Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 4 Feb 1961, 

in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:6–7.

11

The Berlin Crisis
404 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

forceful means of leverage for the Soviets and an issue in which Khrushchev’s 

personal prestige had become directly involved.3

Less clear to the allies was the influence that East German First Secretary 

Walter Ulbricht would have on Khrushchev’s actions. To the East Germans, 

West Berlin had become an escape route to the West and a base for Western 

espionage and propaganda activities. Ulbricht urged Khrushchev to resolve 

the situation in Berlin before it threatened the very viability of the East 

German state. As he agitated for the removal of the Western allies from Berlin, 

Ulbricht reminded Khrushchev that one of his early rivals, Lavrentiy Beria 

had been executed as a traitor for suggesting that the Soviet Union abandon 

East Germany in order to normalize relations with the West. Finally, the East 

German pointed out that other Communist states, particularly the Chinese, 

would take great interest in how the Soviet leader dealt with the situation in 

Berlin. East Germany’s strategic location and the threat posed by the ongoing 

exodus of refugees gave him considerable leverage, and Ulbricht’s demands 

exerted increasing influence on Khrushchev’s actions as the crisis intensified.4

Western intelligence analysts believed that Berlin was primarily a bargaining 

chip the Soviets were using in pursuit of larger strategic goals. Although the 

elimination of the Western enclave deep in the heart of East Germany was 

desirable, they noted, the city’s status did not directly threaten the security of 

the Soviet homeland. The growing military strength of West Germany was of 

far greater concern to the Soviets, as was the continued solidarity of the NATO 

alliance. In that light, if the challenge to Western access rights in Berlin could 

foster discord among the Western allies, the Soviet position in Central Europe 

would only grow stronger. The analysts added that the specter of a reunified 

Germany haunted Soviet leaders, who feared its restored military potential. 

The more they pushed for Western recognition of East Germany as a sovereign 

state, they reasoned, the longer they could ensure retention of the status quo 

that maintained that country as a buffer zone between the East and the West.5

Therein, the analysts continued, lay the key to the Soviet threat to sign 

a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. Although 

the Soviets could not expect to gain Western acceptance of a two-Germanies 

solution, they hoped to extract concessions through negotiations that would 

enhance the international standing of the German Democratic Republic. 

Western acknowledgment of East German control over access rights to Berlin 

would constitute a de facto recognition of the East German regime. While the 

Soviets almost certainly wished to avoid a serious risk of general war, they 

3 Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 10 Mar 1961, 

in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:18–20. 4 Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall, pp. 142–43. 5 Dir of Central Intelligence, Probable Soviet Courses of Action Regarding Berlin and Germany, 

24 Feb 1959, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
The Berlin Crisis 405

clearly considered their military strength as a factor increasing the likelihood 

that they would obtain their goals by political means.6

As President Kennedy prepared for his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, 

he reviewed the main points of the U.S. position on West Berlin. First and 

foremost, the United States was in Berlin by virtue of its role in the victorious 

World War II alliance. Its presence in the city was guaranteed, moreover, by 

an agreement signed by the four Allies at Potsdam that the Soviet Union could 

not unilaterally abrogate. Just as important, American forces were in West 

Berlin with the overwhelming approval of the West Berliners. The United States 

had no intention of being forced out of the city and would use all means at its 

disposal to maintain its position there. The president and his advisers decided 

that only three U.S. interests in Berlin were worth a risk of nuclear war: the 

allied presence in West Berlin, allied access to West Berlin on land and by air, 

and the freedom and viability of West Berlin itself. Although the president was 

willing to negotiate on Berlin, the United States would not recognize the East 

German regime or agree to any other step that might threaten U.S. access to 

the city. A position paper prepared by the State Department advised Kennedy 

that the United States should suggest to Khrushchev that, while the situation 

in Berlin was unsatisfactory to both sides, it was at least tolerable and should 

be left alone.7

U.S. intelligence analysts tried to predict how the Soviets would respond 

to a number of Western initiatives on Berlin. Although both sides had already 

engaged in extensive discussion and maneuver, neither had as yet clearly defined 

its position. Complicating matters further, propaganda and diplomacy seemed 

inseparably intertwined. Even so, the experts believed that the Soviet Union 

and East Germany would not explicitly deny the allies access to West Berlin. 

Instead, the Communists would most likely continue to impose additional 

conditions or requirements beginning with the replacement of Soviet guards 

at the checkpoints with East German controllers. It would be up to the West 

to decide when a particular interference justified the use of force. Should the 

United States or another Western power attempt to reopen access to the city 

by military action, U.S. intelligence analysts believed that the Soviets would 

respond in kind. They might leave initial resistance to East German forces, 

but they would reinforce quickly with their own local units if they thought it 

was necessary.8

Although some U.S. military planners felt that the Soviets might choose to 

limit their participation in a ground conflict over access in hopes of avoiding 

escalation to a larger, possibly nuclear war, the Soviets retained sufficient 

6 Ibid.

7 Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 25 May 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 

14:71–75; William R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 150–51. 8 Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis, 6 Apr 1959, 

CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH.
406 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

military strength in the immediate battle area to influence the action. Soviet 

forces in East Germany included six armies consisting altogether of ten tank 

and ten motorized rifle divisions amply supported by artillery, engineer, and 

air defense elements. The autobahn itself served as the boundary between the 

3d Shock Army to the north and the 1st Guards Tank Army to the South. 

Along the route between Helmstedt in West Germany and Berlin stood the 

26th Guards Tank Division at Mägdeberg, the 7th Guards Tank Division at 

Rosslau, and the 6th Guards Tank Division at Wittenberg. Just outside of 

Berlin, the 10th Guards Tank Division had its headquarters at Krampnitz, 

and the 1st Motorized Rifle Division at Dallgow. In addition to the ground 

forces, the Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army in East Germany totaled more than 

one thousand aircraft capable of ground support, air defense, and interdiction 

missions. In the event that the Soviets chose to reinforce any of their units in 

East Germany, they had ample ground and air forces available in neighboring 

satellite nations as well as in the Soviet Union itself.9

Even if left unsupported, East Germany’s forces were a formidable 

opponent. The army consisted of two tank and four motorized rifle divisions, 

two artillery regiments, two antiaircraft artillery regiments, and service support 

elements for a total of some seventy thousand men. Additional security forces 

included eight Border Security Police brigades and ten Security Alert Police 

regiments, all of which were fully motorized and organized into formations 

similar to those of the military. Western observers believed the East Germans 

were fairly well-trained but lacking in heavy artillery and logistical support. 

As a result, they would be unable to offer any serious resistance to a Western 

advance without significant Soviet assistance in those areas. Other intelligence 

reports indicated that, by mid-1960, the East German Army had discharged 

almost all of its officers who had served in the Wehrmacht during World War 

II. Although that action undoubtedly diminished the overall experience level 

throughout the force, it did allow for the replacement of those officers with 

more politically reliable individuals.10

Allied forces in West Berlin were not nearly so imposing. The U.S. Army 

Garrison, Berlin, consisted of the 6th Infantry’s 2d and 3d Battle Groups, 

Company F of the 40th Armor, and some smaller assorted support units. The 

entire force totaled around six thousand men. The troops were stationed at 

four large military installations—McNair, Andrews, Roosevelt, and Turner 

Barracks—in Zehlendorf, a borough in the southwest corner of the city. They 

trained regularly in the Grunewald, the large park near the U.S. barracks. Since 

that local training area lacked adequate ranges for most heavy weapons and 

9 Memo, EUCOM for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 Jul 1961, sub: Revision of U.S. 

Unilateral Berlin Contingency Plans, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, 

NACP; Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, p. 24. 10 Ibid.; Msg, CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 Jun 1961, Msg # ECJBA9–100505, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP; USAREUR Intelligence Estimate–1961, 1 Jan 1961, Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, Historians files, CMH.
The Berlin Crisis 407

sufficient space for large-scale units, troops also engaged in annual training 

exercises at the Wildflecken training area and at the British tank range at 

Belsen-Hohne. In addition to the Americans, the British and French also 

maintained garrisons in Berlin, about three thousand strong for the British and 

two thousand for the French. Although the three Western powers maintained 

substantial stocks of ammunition, fuel, and supplies, they were no match for 

a serious assault if the Soviets chose to intervene in force.11

Khrushchev Renews His Ultimatum

Fully aware of the imbalance of military forces surrounding Berlin, 

Khrushchev continued to ratchet up the diplomatic pressure concerning 

the allied presence in the city. The conference in Vienna would give him the 

opportunity to size up the new American president and to see just how far he 

could press his military advantage. 

During his first meeting with Kennedy in Vienna on 4 June, Khrushchev 

handed the president an aide-memoire that seemed to dare him to oppose Soviet 

intentions. The missive accused the Federal Republic of Germany of cultivating 

“sabre-rattling militarism” and of advocating revisions to borders the Allies had 

established after World War II. Only a permanent peace treaty that recognized 

the sovereignty of both Germanies as they had evolved would guarantee 

that they would not again threaten the European peace. The conclusion of a 

German peace treaty, the document went on, would also solve the problem of 

normalizing the situation in West Berlin. The memorandum then once more 

raised the prospect of making Berlin a demilitarized free city, duly registered 

by the United Nations. Naturally, it observed, any treaty, whether the United 

States signed it or not, would terminate Western occupation rights in the city.12

Later that afternoon, Kennedy asked to meet privately with Khrushchev in 

one last effort to impress on the Soviet leader the importance that the United 

States placed on its commitment to the people of West Berlin and its right of 

access to the city. Khrushchev replied that he appreciated the frankness of 

Kennedy’s remarks, but if the United States insisted on maintaining its presence 

in Berlin after a treaty was signed, the Soviet Union would have no choice but 

to assist the German Democratic Republic in defending its borders. His decision 

to sign the treaty, he added, was irrevocable. The Soviet Union would sign it in 

December if the United States refused an interim agreement. In a statement that 

11 Memo, Maj Gen John M. Reynolds, Vice Dir, for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

3 May 1962, sub: Information on Allied Military Forces and Status of Supplies in Berlin; Msg, 

CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Jun 1961, sub: Berlin Status Report. Both in Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP. Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, 

Berlin, pp. 42–43, Historians files, CMH. 12 Aide-Memoire From the Soviet Union to the United States, Handed By Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy at Vienna, 4 Jun 1961, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1961, Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 1st sess., December 1961, pp. 642–46.
408 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

was not recorded in the official Soviet or American transcripts because it was 

too provocative but that was reported later by Soviet participants, Khrushchev 

told Kennedy that if the United States wanted to unleash a war it should do 

so now before both sides developed more terrible weapons. As he departed, 

President Kennedy concluded the conversation by observing that it would be 

a cold winter.13

Immediately after the conclusion of the Vienna summit, Khrushchev

repeated his demands on Soviet television, telling his people that the Soviets 

would sign a peace treaty whether the West was ready to do so or not. During 

an unprecedented fireside chat he said that the Soviets would oppose any violations of East Germany’s sovereignty. In a 15 June press conference, Ulbricht, 

the East German leader, stated explicitly that a separate peace treaty with the 

German Democratic Republic would give East German authorities control 

over the access routes to Berlin. He warned the West to negotiate its use of 

access routes with his country or risk interruptions. Ulbricht made it clear that 

the Communists wanted the Western allies out of Berlin so that they would no 

longer be in a position to lure refugees from the East.14

Kennedy and his military advisers weighed their options in light of 

Khrushchev’s increasing belligerence. Understanding that the Communists’ 

initial actions would include cutting off Western access to Berlin, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff refined plans for various military probes of the autobahn 

corridor. They also instructed General Norstad, the commander of the U.S. 

European Command, to review supply levels in Berlin and to determine what 

commodities, if any, were needed to prepare for an emergency. Although they 

were prepared to mount an airlift into the city similar to the one that had broken 

the blockade in 1949, they privately decried the lack of options available to 

them for dealing with the impending crisis. They informed the president and the 

new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, that the allies’ lack of military 

strength in Europe allowed only limited probes which, if turned back by superior 

Communist forces, would result in a choice between accepting humiliation or 

initiating nuclear war. To keep that from happening, they urged the president 

to begin a buildup of U.S. military power in Europe and to encourage the 

NATO allies to do the same.15

From Europe, General Norstad also lobbied for increasing the U.S. military 

presence in the theater. He praised the Seventh Army as the best peacetime 

force the United States had ever fielded and commended the dedication and 

13 Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 153; Memorandum of Conversation, 4 Jun 1961, in FRUS, 

1961–1963, 14:96–98; Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall, pp. 176–77. 14 “Khrushchev Demands 1961 Germany Pact,” and “Ulbricht Gives Warning on Berlin 

Access Route,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 16 Jun 1961; Harrison, Driving the Soviets 

Up the Wall, pp. 178–80. 15 Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff for the President, 14 Jun 1961, sub: Supply Levels in Berlin; 

Note, the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Improved Position Anticipated from U.S. and 

Allied Build-up, 14 Jul 1961. Both in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, 

NACP.
The Berlin Crisis 409

commitment of NATO units, but he stressed the overwhelming number of Soviet 

tanks, aircraft, and men arrayed against those forces. He urged the president 

to call up additional reserve units and to deploy additional battle groups to 

Europe under the guise of training exercises. He also wanted the president and 

the Joint Chiefs to position additional American naval and air forces where they 

could contribute to theater readiness, and he suggested that the Seventh Army 

should conduct more exercises that would require its divisions to move into 

their alert positions. Those steps, combined with an increase in U.S. military 

strength in Europe, would give the United States greater freedom of action, the 

general said, and provide alternatives short of nuclear war.16

After several weeks of discussions with his cabinet, the National Security 

Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a variety of other advisers, President 

Kennedy made his decision. At 2200 on 25 July, in a speech broadcast on 

television and radio from the Oval Office, he addressed the nation on the 

situation in Berlin. After summarizing the course of events since his meeting 

with Khrushchev, he stated that the United States would never allow the Soviet 

Union to drive it out of the city, either gradually or by force. The president then 

announced a series of steps he was taking to increase military readiness. First, he 

would request from Congress an immediate additional defense appropriation of 

$3.2 billion, about half of which would go to the procurement of conventional 

ammunition, weapons, and equipment. He would then request an increase in 

the total authorized strength of the Army from 875,000 to 1 million men, and 

augmentations of 29,000 and 63,000, respectively, in Navy and Air Force active 

duty strength. He also called for doubling and tripling draft calls in the coming 

months; activating some reservists and certain ready reserve units; and extending 

the tours of duty for soldiers, sailors, and airmen scheduled to leave the service 

in the near future. Finally, he postponed programs to retire or mothball older 

ships and aircraft, and he delayed the inactivation of a number of B–47 bomber 

and aerial refueling wings. Shortly thereafter, Secretary McNamara announced 

that 50 percent of the Strategic Air Command’s bomber wings would go on 

15-minute ground alert and that three of the Army’s divisions in the United 

States would be relieved of training duties and prepared for emergency deployment to Europe.17

16 Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad), to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 27 Jun 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:136–38; Msg, CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

2 Jun 1961, Msg # ECJCO–9–88008, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 

218, NACP; “Norstad Urges Quiet Buildup,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 Jul 1961; 

Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (New York: St. Martin’s 

Press, 2000), pp. 168–69. 17 Memorandum of Meeting on Berlin, 18 Jul 1961, 14:215–16; Memorandum of Minutes 

of the National Security Council Meeting, 19 Jul 1961, 14:219–22; National Security Action 

Memorandum No. 62, 24 Jul 1961, 14:225–26. All in FRUS, 1961–1963. Radio and Television 

Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the 

United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), 
410 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

The Wall

In Berlin the situation continued to deteriorate. Soviet and East German 

soldiers increased their harassment of U.S. vehicles and trains trying to enter 

the city, and Soviet authorities periodically renewed attempts to inspect allied 

vehicles as they crossed checkpoints into and out of Berlin. The Soviets also tried 

to institute new restrictions on flights approaching the city, while allowing their 

fighters to buzz allied aircraft flying through the approved access corridors. A 

year earlier, in May 1960, Soviet fighter aircraft had forced down an American 

C–47 transport that had strayed off course on a flight from Copenhagen to 

Hamburg. Although the Communists had released the airplane and its crew 

a few days later, the incident had heightened the tension for pilots flying the 

routes into and out of Berlin. Border officials slowed barge traffic as well, 

implementing new inspections and controls.18

U.S. forces in the city responded by altering the content and increasing the 

tempo of their training. In West Berlin’s expansive Grunewald Park, the sector’s 

only open space where units could train, the 6th Infantry’s battle groups tested 

each other’s readiness to attack and defend. Maj. Gen. Albert Watson II, U.S. 

Commander, Berlin, directed battle group commanders to modify platoon 

training tests to cover riot control and combat in cities. Companies donned 

civilian clothing and acted as rioters to test the ability of their compatriots to 

maintain order in the face of Communist-inspired civil disturbances.19

In some cases, U.S. commanders went out of their way to ensure that the 

Soviets knew exactly what they were doing. It was an essential element in the 

effort to convince the Soviets that the United States would fight for West Berlin 

and that, while U.S. forces might not be able to hold the city, they would inflict 

unacceptable losses on the attacker. To that end, the Americans built a mock 

town in the Grunewald training area, within easy visibility of the East Berlin 

border. In response, the East Germans built an observation tower to get a better 

view of the training. One U.S. lieutenant colonel commented that he did not 

mind the close surveillance. As a matter of fact, he said, “We want them to 

know that we’re here to stay.” Feature stories in Stars and Stripes reminded the 

Soviets that capturing Berlin in 1945 had cost them dearly and that any future 

assault would be equally bloody.20

pp. 533–40; “Kennedy Asks Power to Extend Terms of Servicemen Due Out in Next Year,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 27 Jul 1961. 18 Grathwol and Moorhus. American Forces in Berlin, p. 80; “Soviets Delay U.S. Train on 

Berlin Route,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 27 Mar 1960; “Reds Say C47 Down in East 

Zone,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 May 1960; “Russian Downed C47 Flies Out of 

East Zone,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 May 1960; Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, 

U.S. Army, Berlin, pp. 32–35. 19 Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, p. 43. 20 Quote from “Tough Training in West Berlin,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 

Apr 1961. George Fielding Eliot, “Will Berlin Crisis Explode in 61?” Army Times, 21 Feb 1959; 

Ernie Weatherall, “Uniform of the Day: Rabble Rousing Clothes,” Stars and Stripes, European 
The Berlin Crisis 411

For the Communists, however, time was apparently running out. 

Khrushchev’s repeated threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with East 

Germany spurred an increase in the already considerable number of refugees 

heading west. Well over three million people had fled from East Germany since 

1945. German authorities recorded that more than half of those had come 

through West Berlin, unmistakably marking the city as the “escape hatch” from 

the Soviet Zone. In 1960, manpower shortages in East Germany had reached 

a point where the German Democratic Republic experienced difficulties in 

completing winter planting and harvesting. The East German regime admitted 

to a shortage of a half million workers of all types in East Berlin alone. By the 

end of the year, only 380 dentists remained in the Soviet sector, as compared to 

700 the year before. Complicating matters further, some twenty thousand of the 

one hundred fifty thousand refugees who entered West Berlin were of military 

age, a serious loss in East German military manpower. The trend accelerated 

in 1961. During February, the exodus averaged 2,650 persons per week. By the 

end of May, this figure had risen to 3,200. In June, 20,000—and in July, more 

than 30,000—refugees crossed over to the West, the largest monthly totals 

since 1953. Planes flying the air corridors from Berlin to West Germany were 

so full of refugees that extra flights were necessary. In an appeal broadcast to 

its own citizens, the East German government said that the mass migration 

was disrupting the economy, damaging the nation’s standing abroad, and 

threatening its future.21

Communist efforts to stem the tide grew desperate. The East Germans 

employed more than five thousand police to guard the borders around West 

Berlin. When that proved to be insufficient, they began drafting members 

of the “Free German Youth,” a Communist political organization, to assist 

transportation police in checking buses and trains at crossing points. Party 

officials took steps to force East Berliners working in West Berlin to give up 

their jobs. Vigilante groups sanctioned by the Communist government turned 

in persons suspected of planning flight or of helping others to do so. Increased 

propaganda meanwhile labeled refugees as traitors and accused the West of 

plotting to sabotage the East German economy through blackmail and slave 

trade. Ulbricht told Soviet officials that the flood of refugees was disorganizing 

the entire life of the Republic. If the present situation of open borders remained, 

collapse was inevitable.22

Edition, 17 Sep 1960; “Berlin Units Wind Up Exercise Ever Ready,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 15 Apr 1961. 21 Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, p. 

31, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, 

Berlin, p. 40; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 157; “East Zone Pleads for Stop in Refugee Flow,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 30 Jul 1961. 22 Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, p. 

31; Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, p. 40; “East Zone Pleads for Stop in Refugee 

Flow,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 30 Jul 1961; State Dept, Berlin 1961, European and 

British Commonwealth Series 64, 1961, p. 26; “Vigilantes Cut Refugee Flow, Russ Says Berlin 
412 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

On 5 August, the Soviets made one last effort to settle the Berlin question. 

On the eve of ministerial meetings in Paris between the United States, France, 

Great Britain, and West Germany, the Soviet Union delivered a note to the 

embassies of the four nations indicating that it wished to consider and to 

discuss proposals for the conclusion of a German peace treaty and resolution 

of the situation in West Berlin. For the most part, the communication was a 

restatement of the Soviet position as Khrushchev had presented it to Kennedy 

in Vienna two months earlier. Although a note to the British contained an 

invitation to put a new proposal on the table, no similar offer appeared in the 

communication to the United States. While the British Prime Minister, Harold 

Macmillan, indicated a willingness to talk, he also reiterated that the West would 

neither abandon West Berlin nor be party to a final treaty that recognized a 

divided Germany. As the ministerial discussions came to a conclusion on 8 

August, the four nations agreed to seek further negotiations with the Soviet 

Union but to maintain a firm and united position regarding Western access to 

Berlin and to continue the buildup of NATO forces.23

Some Western leaders appeared to understand the implications of the Soviet 

and East German dilemma. On a 30 July Sunday morning television talk show, 

Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) suggested that the best way for the 

Soviets to reduce tensions in the Berlin Crisis would be to close the West Berlin 

escape hatch. Certainly, he said, the Soviets had the power to close it. Despite 

the uproar caused by the Senator’s remarks, the president never refuted them. 

Early in August, Kennedy mused with his friend, economist Walt Rostow, 

about the likely outcome in Berlin. Khrushchev had to do something to stop 

the flow of refugees, or else all of Eastern Europe might fall. Perhaps a wall 

might be necessary, he said, and the United States could do nothing to prevent 

it. The Western alliance would act to defend West Berlin, but it would not act 

to keep East Berlin open.24

The tension continued to build. In Berlin, the chief of the U.S. Military 

Liaison Mission, Col. Ernest von Pawel, reported to the U.S. headquarters 

that four Soviet divisions had moved out of their usual garrison areas in East 

Germany and surrounded Berlin. Lt. Col. Thomas F. McCord, the head of the 

U.S. Army’s 513th Military Intelligence Group in Berlin, also cited reports of 

large quantities of construction materials—concrete blocks, barbed wire, and 

other supplies—stockpiled near the city’s dividing line. Nonetheless, the deputy 

Talk a Must,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Aug 1961; “Reds Increase Restrictions to 

Slow Refugee Flow,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Aug 1961; Harrison, Driving the 

Soviets Up the Wall, p. 185; Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most 

Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2011), p. 328. 23 Note From the Soviet Union to the United States, Concerning a Peace Treaty With Germany, 3 Aug 1961, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1961, pp. 704–14; “Russ Offer to Negotiate,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Aug 1961; Paper Prepared by the Four-Power Working 

Group on Germany and Berlin, 8 Aug 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:316–18. 24 Kempe, Berlin 1961, pp. 315–16.
The Berlin Crisis 413

chief of the CIA base in Berlin dismissed the notion, saying that it would be 

political suicide for Ulbricht to build a wall.25

Not long after, the Soviets acted. On 12 August, the East German regime 

announced that it would close to both vehicular and pedestrian traffic at all 

but 13 of the 120 border crossing points between East and West Berlin. Then, 

in the predawn hours of 13 August, East German police, armored cars, and 

tanks deployed along the entire border of the Soviet sector of the city. Workers 

set up barbed wire barricades and began construction of more substantial 

cement block walls. In some places, they removed sections of the cobblestone 

streets. Although West Berliners and allied personnel could still travel into and 

out of East Berlin through a few well-guarded checkpoints, decrees from the 

East German government forbade its citizens from entering West Berlin. As a 

precaution against an internal uprising in East Berlin, the Soviet 10th Guards 

Tank Division and the 19th Motorized Rifle Division deployed to the north and 

south of the city, and Soviet tanks moved into East Berlin to take up positions 

at various points in the city. Hiding under a bridge in East Germany, one of 

Colonel von Pawel’s men reported seeing an entire Soviet division rumbling 

down the autobahn. To Western reporters and military personnel who could 

still move about East Berlin, it was clear the Soviets wanted no recurrence of 

the uprisings that had taken place in Hungary in 1956.26

25 Ibid., pp. 356–57. 26 Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, 

p. 32; State Dept, Berlin 1961, p. 26; “Reds Block East Germans From Entering West Berlin,” 

Construction during the erection of the wall around Brandenburg Gate, 20 November 1961
414 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

On 14 August, over ten thousand West Berliners gathered on 17 Junistrasse 

in front of the famous Brandenburg Gate. The crowd whistled and jeered as 

East German security police formed a cordon across the gate. West Berlin police 

were able to control the demonstrators except for a few acts of physical violence, 

but the East German authorities took advantage of the situation to claim 

provocations by the West Berliners. In response, they closed the Brandenburg 

Gate to all traffic, reducing the number of authorized crossing points to twelve.27

Over the course of the next several days, the East Germans worked to 

complete the isolation of West Berlin. Some citizens could still escape by 

leaping across barriers or by finding a way through old houses along the 

sector border, but police sealed those routes as fast as they could find them. 

The Soviet Transport Ministry announced a reorganization of train traffic 

so that direct service between the two parts of the city would no longer exist. 

In the future, travelers would have to change trains and submit to identity 

checks before entering the eastern sector. Trains from West Germany into 

West Berlin would travel as normal, but they could no longer continue into 

the Communist sector. Local commuter trains and buses from outside the 

city limits, as well as those originating in East Berlin were also prevented 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 Aug 1961; George Boultwood, “East German Guns 

Point East as Barbed Wire Barricades Rise,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 Aug 1961; 

Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, pp. 25–26; Kempe, Berlin 1961, p. 357. 27 HQ, USAREUR, Record of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 142, Historians files, CMH.

The “Wall of Shame” looking from East Berlin into West Berlin, 5 May 1962
The Berlin Crisis 415

from entering West Berlin. Even the pleasure boats that transported tourists 

from lakes in East Berlin to the Havel River in the Western sectors were 

discontinued. Within a week, the East Germans designated the crossing point 

at Friedrichstrasse in the American sector as the only point of entry into East 

Berlin for the Allies and other foreign nationals. As East German police and 

workmen sealed off doors and windows in buildings along the barricade and 

replaced barbed wire with concrete, the grim reality of a divided city began 

to sink in to citizens on both sides of the wall (Map 16).28

Politicians in West Berlin urged U.S. commanders to remove the barriers 

by force, and officers within the Berlin garrison drew up a plan to knock down 

the barricades with bulldozers. Those moves, however, were overruled by the 

troop commander, Brig. Gen. Frederick O. Hartel, who reminded his men that 

the Communists had constructed the obstacles a few feet inside East Germany. 

U.S. forces would have to go into East Berlin to tear them down—and they 

28 “East Berlin Keeps Peace With Tear Gas, Hoses,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 15 

Aug 1961; “Angry Crowds Mass, Jeer at Berlin Border,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

14 Aug 1961; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 160.

Checkpoint

CHARLIE

Checkpoint

BRAVO

BRITISH

SEC T O R

FRENCH

SEC T O R

SOVIE T

SEC T O R

A MERICAN

SEC T O R

Potsdam

Checkpoints for Non-Germans Only

Checkpoints for West Germans

1961

CROSSING POINTS

BERLIN 

0 5

Miles

Map 16
416 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

were not going to do that because it would put them in the position of being 

the aggressor.29

Despite the long-simmering crisis and repeated indications that the 

Communists would have to do something to contain the exodus of refugees, 

the Americans were unprepared to launch an immediate response when the 

time came. On 11 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the services 

to prepare plans for the deployment to Europe of twenty-eight squadrons of 

tactical aircraft and up to six Army divisions. On 12 August, the day before 

construction of the wall began, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 

Lyman L. Lemnitzer, circulated a memorandum through the Joint Chiefs and 

the major military commands, seeking to update contingency plans for Berlin. 

In the paper he stated that the United States had to develop plans to initiate 

military action at any time the situation dictated. Even at that late date, staff 

officers based their planning on Communist harassment of allied personnel or 

threats to allied access rights in West Berlin. Other communications among the 

Joint Chiefs raised the issue of how they might support spontaneous uprisings 

in East Berlin. The possibility that the East Germans might establish a blockade 

to keep their own people from crossing over to the West had not been part of 

the American planning process.30

Although the United States immediately lodged a protest with the Soviets 

and East Germans, its initial response to the construction of the wall was 

surprisingly understated. The president’s special assistant for national security 

affairs, McGeorge Bundy, summed up the sense of many in the president’s 

cabinet that the action was something the East Germans were bound to do 

sooner or later. It was just as well, he said, that it happened early and was so 

clearly a unilateral action on their part. In response to that assessment, Kennedy 

asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk what steps the United States could take to 

exploit the development “politically propagandawise.”31 The situation offered, 

he believed, a very good stick to use against the Soviets, one that they would 

most certainly use against the United States if the situation were reversed. 

Kennedy and Rusk concluded that the decision to close the border had eased 

the Berlin crisis by solving the Communists’ most urgent problem without 

threatening Western access to the city. Kennedy told one of his advisers that 

29 Interv, Jerry N. Hess with Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 14 Jan 1970, p. 11, Truman Presidential 

Museum and Library, Independence, Mo.; Henrik Bering, Outpost Berlin: The History of the 

American Military Forces in Berlin, 1945–1994 (Chicago: Edition Q, 1995), p. 157. 30 Memos, Joint Chiefs of Staff for CINCEUR et al., 11 Aug 1961; Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for CSA et al., 12 Aug 1961, sub: U.S. Contingency Planning for 

Berlin; and Chief of Naval Operations for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 Aug 1961, sub: Possible Uprisings in East Germany. All in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP. 31 Memorandum From President Kennedy for Secretary of State Rusk, 14 Aug 1961, in FRUS, 

1961–1963, 14:332.
The Berlin Crisis 417

the East German action was not a very nice solution, but “a hell of a lot better 

than a war.”32

Political opportunities of the sort were of little comfort to West Berliners, 

whose leaders complained bitterly to the Americans over the lack of a more 

forceful response. They were equally distressed at West Berlin Mayor Willy 

Brandt for issuing high-minded statements of protest while taking no concrete 

steps against the Communists. The deputy chief of mission at Berlin, Edwin 

Allan Lightner Jr., warned the State Department that unless the United States 

responded more firmly to the construction of the wall, morale in the city would 

plummet and along with it, support for the United States. No one there, he 

said, was asking for a violent response, only for some indication that this was 

not to be a replay of “Hitler’s takeover of the Rhineland.”33

After several days of high-level consultation and public condemnation of 

the wall, Kennedy elected to continue the military buildup he had initiated 

following his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. On 17 August, the secretary 

of the Army, Elvis J. Stahr Jr., announced a freeze in service for more than 

eighty-four thousand enlisted men whose time in service was scheduled to end 

between 1 October 1961 and 30 June 1962. He also extended tours of duty 

for Army personnel in Germany and Japan by six months and confirmed the 

activation of 113 reserve units, a move that called to active duty more than 

twenty-three thousand soldiers. Finally, Stahr indicated that he would bring the 

Seventh Army and other U.S. units committed to NATO up to full strength by 

sending three thousand more troops to Europe. A day later, the White House 

announced that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson would fly immediately to 

Europe to meet with West German Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt. 

Accompanying the vice president would be retired general Lucius D. Clay. 

Because Clay had been the Allied commandant in Berlin during the 1948–1949 

blockade, it was his presence, much more than Johnson’s, that helped to restore 

morale and to reassure West Berliners that they had not been abandoned.34

In addition to dispatching Johnson and Clay to Berlin, Kennedy decided on 

17 August to make the American commitment to West Berlin absolutely clear 

to the West Berliners and the Communists by instructing the chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs, General Lemnitzer, to send a reinforced battle group from the U.S. 

forces in Germany into Berlin to augment the forces already there. Lemnitzer, 

McNamara, and General Norstad all expressed reservations on grounds that the 

move would weaken existing defenses in West Germany while adding little to 

32 Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for 

President Kennedy, 14 Aug 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:330–31. Quote from Smyser, From 

Yalta to Berlin, p. 161. 33 Telegrams From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, 14 Aug 1961 and 16 

Aug 1961 (contains quote), in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:332–33 and 339–41, respectively. 34 “Army Freezes 84,000 on Duty, 113 Reserve Units Put on Alert,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Aug 1961; “Johnson Flying to Berlin,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 19 

Aug 1961; Bering, Outpost Berlin, p. 165; Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor 

Brandt, 18 Aug 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:352–53.
418 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the capabilities of the West Berlin garrison. Kennedy set aside their objections, 

noting that he had made the decision for political, psychological, and morale 

purposes. The guidance Norstad and the USAREUR commander, General 

Clarke, received corresponded to contingency plans the command had prepared 

for a probe along the access route into Berlin. Under that scenario, advancing 

forces would bypass administrative checkpoints and undefended obstacles. 

If the column met a superior military force, it would halt and defend itself as 

necessary in an attempt to remain in place. The commander had the authority 

to disengage if he believed he was in danger of being cut off or overrun.35

General Clarke alerted the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry 

Division, just before 2400 on 18 August. In order to meet the time schedule 

established by the president, he bypassed the Seventh Army, V Corps, and the 

8th Infantry Division headquarters and issued orders directly to the battle group

commander, Col. Glover S. Johns Jr. At 0530, 19 August, the battle group left 

its home station at Coleman Barracks, Mannheim, and moved to a bivouac 

area near the American checkpoint at Helmstedt. In addition to the infantry 

battle group, the reinforcements included an attached engineer company, an 

35 Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group, 17 Aug 1961; Message From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 Aug 1961. Both in 

FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:347–51. Msgs, JCS 1168, Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to 

CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 18 Aug 1961; and JCS 1185, Lemnitzer to CINCEUR and 

CINCUSAREUR,19 Aug 1961. Both in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 

218, NACP.

Part of the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, passes Helmstedt checkpoint, August 1961
The Berlin Crisis 419

artillery battery, and a provisional military police platoon to help direct traffic 

as the force moved forward on the autobahn. Promptly at 0630, 20 August, the 

first set of vehicles stopped at the Soviet checkpoint at Marienborn, where the 

autobahn entered East Germany. Although the Soviet guards raised perfunctory 

challenges, the initial convoy, followed by the rest of the battle group, cleared 

the checkpoint in a short time and made a triumphant entry into West Berlin 

that afternoon. Colonel Johns demonstrated a flair for the dramatic as he led 

his battle group into the city. He instructed his company commanders to stand 

in their vehicles as they made their entrance to pretend that they were Caesar 

going into Rome. In full battle gear, the troops paraded through the center of 

the city to be reviewed by Vice President Johnson and General Clay.36

Not all who witnessed the arrival of the battle group were impressed. Sgt. 

Vern Pike, military police, was already displeased. Like many of the soldiers 

in Berlin, he believed that the United States could simply have torn down the 

wall without any response from the Soviets. As for the arriving battle group, 

36 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 143; Note, Secretaries 

to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 Sep 1961, sub: Clearance of the First Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 

Convoy Through the Soviet Checkpoints at Marienborn and Babelsberg, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP; David H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman, About 

Face (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 383; Herb Scott, “U.S. Battle Group Rolls to 

Helmstedt,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Aug 1961; “1,500 U.S. Troops Sent to 

Bolster Berlin Force,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Aug 1961; Annual Hist Rpt, 

1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, p. 57; Grathwol and Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin, p. 90.

March group of 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, waits at the Soviet checkpoint at 

Helmstedt, August 1961.
420 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Pike considered it a “rotten lousy outfit” that was unfit for battle. When the 

new arrivals came to stay in Roosevelt Barracks, they rubbed the long-resident 

soldiers the wrong way, claiming they had been sent to rescue them after their 

failure to stop the border closure. Pike noted that the new arrivals would 

only be there for ninety days before they returned to their garrisons in West 

Germany. The new troops were drunk and disorderly and often caught fighting 

and resisting arrest. Pike thought it was a measure of the Berliner’s despair that 

they would so loudly cheer such a token gesture.37

Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie

The Kennedy administration had intended the reinforcement as a political 

gesture designed to reassure the nervous West Berliners. In that respect, the 

reinforcement, and particularly the return of General Clay, helped to restore 

morale throughout the city. As might be expected, however, the U.S. actions 

elicited a response from the Soviets as well. 

On 22 August, taking advantage of allied hesitation regarding the building 

of the wall, the Soviets announced that the border crossing at Friedrichstrasse 

would remain the only checkpoint where allied military traffic could enter East 

Berlin. The crossing had previously been somewhat of an open gateway into 

East Berlin, and U.S. military police checked the location several times a day. 

However, once the Soviets began constructing the wall, the 287th Military 

Police Company manned the site on a round-the-clock basis. To support the 

checkpoint, on 1 September, the Berlin Command requisitioned space at 207 

Friedrichstrasse for use as a military police desk. When they added a base radio 

to the facility, military police designated the location as Charlie, a natural 

extension of the phonetic alphabet after the use of points Alpha and Baker 

on the autobahn. By mid-September, the Americans had placed a military 

semitrailer in the center of the roadway as a control point and Checkpoint 

Charlie began operations.38

Even before the advent of Checkpoint Charlie, the allies were responding 

to the Soviet announcement limiting their points of entry into East Berlin. On 

23 August, as a display of force and to indicate their intent to retain freedom of 

action in the city, the three allied commandants in Berlin placed their military 

garrisons on alert, established checkpoints near border crossing sites, and began 

extensive patrolling along the newly constructed barriers. Two U.S. tanks with 

infantry support guarded the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, while British and 

French forces also deployed to various points along the border. Two companies 

of the 2d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, ran patrols, while three others remained 

in reserve at Tempelhof Airport. On 30 August, East German police detained a 

U.S. military sedan in East Berlin. A mobile reserve of five mechanized infantry 

37 Quote from Kempe, Berlin 1961, p. 388, and see also p. 389. Gunnarsson, American Military 

Police in Europe, pp. 90–91. 38 Gunnarsson, American Military Police in Europe, p. 90.
The Berlin Crisis 421

squads moved to the crossing point, at which time the East Germans released 

the sedan. By 1 September, the U.S. Berlin Command was running three patrols 

along the border each day while also retaining a mobile reserve of a few tanks 

and one rifle platoon mounted in armored personnel carriers at the airport. 

Gradually, through successive reductions, forces deployed along the boundary 

between East and West Berlin withdrew to garrison locations. On 26 September 

the command handed over the border security mission to the West Berlin police, 

ceased all patrolling, and returned all troop units to their barracks.39

Because of the continuing tensions in Berlin and, in part, to encourage 

the Communists to reopen negotiations, Kennedy appointed General Clay 

to be his personal representative in Berlin with the rank of ambassador. He 

told Clay that he would be the senior American official in Berlin and would 

communicate directly with him and with the secretary of State. Kennedy’s initial 

impulse had been to appoint Clay as commander of U.S. Forces in Berlin, but 

McNamara and Lemnitzer advised against such a move on the grounds that it 

would complicate and strain existing command relationships. Nonetheless, the 

president looked to Clay as his primary representative in Berlin, so much so that 

39 Msg, Clarke to Lemnitzer, 16 Jan 1962, Msg # HBG 131, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central 

Decimal File, 1962, RG 218, NACP; “U.S. Armor Lines Up Along Berlin Border,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 24 Aug 1961; Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, pp. 

58–59.

U.S. MPs on the West Berlin side of Wilhelmstrasse, August 1961
A U.S. armed patrol escorts a USAREUR-registered civilian vehicle into East Berlin 

on 27 October 1961.
The Berlin Crisis 423

General Norstad and General Clarke were at times excluded from decisions 

affecting the U.S. military in the city.40

Given the forceful personalities involved, it did not take long for a 

confrontation to erupt. Shortly after his return to Berlin on 19 September, Clay 

found himself in conflict with General Clarke, who protested Clay’s direction 

of American troops without consulting the commanders of USAREUR or 

the U.S. European Command. After Clay had used USAREUR troops and 

helicopters to fly into the isolated western enclave of Steinstucken, Clarke 

instructed his subordinates to take no further orders from Clay. He then stormed 

into Clay’s office and, pointing to the red telephone on his desk, challenged 

him to call President Kennedy, or to “take his cotton-picking fingers off my 

troops.” Clay responded that he could see that he and Clarke were not going 

to get along. Despite Clarke’s protests, most decisions and policies on Berlin, 

including the deployment of U.S. forces there, would be made in Washington 

after consultations with General Clay or with General Norstad.41

The Americans would have confrontations enough along the sector borders 

without the discord in their own ranks. On 21 September, East German 

Volkspolizei (Vopos, or People’s Police) began harassing American and other 

allied personnel traveling along the autobahn to Berlin, especially U.S. military 

who were not in uniform but were in clearly marked occupation vehicles. 

The police stopped cars, made the Americans get out, threatened them, and 

refused to let them proceed. They sometimes interrogated the Americans or 

held them for hours. In response, Clay ordered U.S. radio-equipped courtesy 

patrols to travel back and forth along the autobahn every hour or so to help 

any Americans stopped by the East Germans. When the Soviets attempted to 

block the patrols, Clay replaced them with convoys of military vehicles that 

ran back and forth at random hours several times a day. Clay also restored the 

U.S. military patrols along the U.S. sector border.42

The next escalation in the crisis began on the evening of 22 October, when 

Allan Lightner, the senior U.S. diplomat in Berlin, wanted to pass through 

Checkpoint Charlie to attend the opera in East Berlin. The East Germans 

denied Lightner entrance to East Berlin when, following U.S. policy, he 

refused to show his identity papers to anyone but the Soviets. After the guards 

refused Lightner’s request to see a Soviet officer, the American command sent 

40 News Conference Statements by President Kennedy, Concerning Berlin and the Appointment of General Clay, 30 Aug 1961, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1961, pp. 763–66; Letter 

From President Kennedy to His Special Representative in Berlin (Clay), 8 Oct 1961, in FRUS, 

1961–1963, 14:484–86; Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara for President Kennedy, 24 Aug 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:369; Ingo W. Trauschweizer, “Tanks at Checkpoint 

Charlie: Lucius Clay and the Berlin Crisis, 1961–62,” Cold War History 6 (May 2006): 205–28. 

On the growing tension between Kennedy as president and Norstad as NATO supreme commander, see Jordan, Norstad, pp. 195–200. 41 Quote from Kempe, Berlin 1961, p. 407. Smith, The Defense of Berlin, p. 315; Ellis and 

Cunningham, Clarke of St. Vith, pp. 268–69. 42 Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, pp. 169–70.
424 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

a tank-infantry team to the checkpoint. While the team remained in position, 

an armed military police squad escorted Lightner through the access point into 

East Berlin.43

Clay viewed the challenges at the crossing point as an opportunity to bring 

Moscow out into the open. He believed that the Soviets did not wish to go to 

war over Berlin. By openly challenging East German efforts to limit access to 

East Berlin, the general believed he could demonstrate that it was, in fact, the 

Soviets who were in charge and that East German sovereignty was a sham. 

When U.S. troops in civilian clothes riding in a USAREUR-licensed vehicle 

were again denied entry into East Berlin on 24 October after refusing to show 

the East German police their identity papers, Clay directed the formation of 

three tank-infantry teams to support a series of probes to test U.S. access rights 

at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. Team Alfa consisted of five M48 tanks, 

two infantry squads, an engineer squad, and a medical aid team; Team Bravo 

had one tank platoon; and Team Charlie included one rifle platoon and one 

43 Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, pp. 61–62; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 

173; Bob Greabell, “Protest on Vopos Going to Kremlin,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 

27 Oct 1961.

Reinforced rifle squad preparing to set up on border, 25 August 1961
Friedrichstrasse, allied entry point to East Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie, 26 October 1961
426 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

tank platoon. These three teams deployed to Tempelhof Central Airport during 

the early morning hours of 25 October.44

At 0635 Clay began a series of tests at the crossing point, using USAREURlicensed privately owned vehicles. The first attempt to cross went unchallenged. 

After a second was stopped by East German police, the Americans lodged a 

protest with the Soviets. When, at 1010, he sent a third probe to the crossing 

point, Clay moved Team Alfa forward to the checkpoint and had a squad of 

military police escort the car through the crossing point. The command repeated 

the tests a day later on 26 October. They likewise succeeded only when escorted 

by military police, supported by combat ready forces.45

The Americans attempted to repeat the process again on 27 October, but 

this time the Communists were ready for them. After the civilian vehicle passed 

through the checkpoint, once again with a military police escort, ten Soviet tanks 

moved into position on the East German side of the Friedrichstrasse access point. 

While U.S. leaders boasted that they had once again demonstrated their right 

of access into East Berlin, and General Clay announced that the presence of the 

Soviet tanks indicated Soviet responsibility for the harassment at the checkpoint, 

armed tanks and infantry faced each other across three hundred yards of an urban 

no-man’s-land, each waiting for the other to make the next move.46

With the U.S. command on general alert, the standoff lasted for seventeen 

hours. Then, at 1045 on 28 October, having made their point, the Soviets 

withdrew their tanks from the border crossing. A little more than an hour later, 

the U.S. tanks and most of the infantry pulled back as well. General Clay told 

President Kennedy that the tank deployment was a sign that the Soviets did not 

trust Ulbricht or the East Germans and would take over whenever the risk of 

conflict grew too great. Meanwhile, the U.S. mission asked that all Americans in 

civilian clothing, except news reporters, refrain from trying to enter East Berlin 

through the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint. After twenty-four hours civilians were 

once again allowed to cross the boundary, but U.S. military leaders in Berlin 

directed servicemen and official U.S. personnel to continue to avoid travel 

into East Berlin. The Americans maintained one battle group on standby alert 

status for the next two weeks. Although the force continued regular patrols 

along the sector border, it stopped testing access rights and making armored 

demonstrations at Checkpoint Charlie.47

44 Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 174; Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, pp. 61–62. 45 Ibid. 46 Bob Greabell, “Soviet Tanks Face U.S. Armor Across Berlin Sector Border,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 28 Oct 1961; Trauschweizer, “Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie,” pp. 

205–28. 47 Annual Hist Rpt, 1961, HQ, U.S. Army, Berlin, pp. 62–63; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 

p. 175; Bob Greabell, “Russ, U.S. Withdraw Armor From Berlin Crossing Point,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 29 Oct 1961; Gene Donner, “Onlookers Keep Curiosity Vigil at Berlin 

Checkpoint,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 31 Oct 1961.
The Berlin Crisis 427

Winding Down the Confrontation

The standoff at Checkpoint Charlie signaled the high-water mark of the 

diplomatic confrontation over Berlin. For the Communists, the wall alleviated 

the hemorrhage of refugees that had threatened the viability of the East German 

state. In the West, diplomats and military leaders alike were relieved to have 

the perennial bone of contention mitigated, if not completely resolved. It took 

some time, however, for both sides to wind down the confrontation.

The Kennedy administration continued with its plans to increase defense 

spending and to strengthen the U.S. position in Europe. In September, the 

Department of Defense agreed to Army requests for additional personnel 

to fill out the Seventh Army’s line units to their required strengths and for 

nondivisional support units to meet shortfalls in the Communications Zone. 

By mid-October the first of forty thousand reinforcements landed in France 

to begin Kennedy’s buildup in Europe. In addition to the individual fillers and 

support units, the president also ordered the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to 

deploy from its base at Fort Meade to Germany. The unit, with its 2,700 soldiers 

and 122 tanks, began arriving at Bremerhaven in mid-November and became 

operational in Kaiserslautern by the end of the month. General Norstad also 

directed USAREUR to rotate new battle groups into West Berlin every two 

to three months to replace the reinforcements it had sent in August. The Joint 

Chiefs approved the change, but with the understanding that no more than 

three battle groups would be present in the city at any one time. With that in 

mind, on 7 December, elements of the 1st Battle Group, 19th Infantry, 24th 

Infantry Division, began to replace the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th 

Infantry Division, that had moved into the city earlier that year.48

Not satisfied with the extent of the buildup to that point, McNamara and 

Norstad continued to press for the deployment of additional combat divisions to 

Germany. Although the president remained reluctant to go beyond the reinforcements he had already approved, he did authorize the services to begin planning 

for such a possibility. In particular, they could begin pre-positioning enough 

vehicles, weapons, and equipment in Europe to completely outfit two U.S. 

divisions, which would move by air from the United States in a time of crisis. On 

12 October 1961, USAREUR received a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to begin preparations to obtain and store equipment. The plan called for the 

command to secure approximately 125,000 short tons of equipment and supplies 

48 Robert W. Coakley, Walter G. Hermes, James F. Schnabel, and Earl F. Ziemke, U.S. 

Army Expansion, 1961–62, 1963, pp. 102–07, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; 

Morton P. Gudebrod, “Build Up Units Land in France,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 

Oct 1961; Herb Scott, “2,700 3d Cav Troops Arrive in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 10 Nov 1961; Memo, Lemnitzer for Sec Def, 29 Sep 1961, sub: Rotation of the Berlin 

Augmentation Battle Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP; 

“First 19th Infantry Troops in Berlin After Quiet Trip,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 

Dec 1961.
428 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

for forty-three units. Vehicles and equipment to outfit one infantry division 

and one armored division would be pre-positioned in nine separate locations. 

To meet this requirement, USAREUR established storage sites at Mannheim, 

Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Pirmasens, Germersheim, Idar-Oberstein, and 

Worms. Each location stored all of the vehicles and equipment required for a 

particular unit, giving the new program its descriptive name—Pre-positioned 

Organizational Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS). By 7 December, 

USAREUR had received and positioned sufficient equipment to outfit the two 

divisions. Meanwhile, through November and December 1961, U.S. Army and 

Air Force officials debated the requirements to move the necessary personnel 

and, bit by bit, developed a contingency plan.49

Rapid deployment to USAREUR had been under consideration for 

some time. In September 1960, the Joint Chiefs had already proposed a test 

of strategic mobility that would deploy three battle groups from the United 

States to Germany. Although the initial effort, scheduled for April 1961, was 

canceled because of a crisis in Laos, planners rescheduled it for January 1962 

and tailored it to supplement the ongoing reinforcement of the Berlin garrison. 

In an exercise labeled Operation Long Thrust II, beginning on 16 January, t

battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division flew from Fort Lewis, Washington, 

to Germany, where they took possession of pre-positioned equipment at the 

Mannheim storage site and prepared for field training. At the end of the exercise, 

the 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry, turned in its equipment and returned to 

its home station; the 2d Battle Group, 47th Infantry, reinforced the Berlin 

Garrison; and the 2d Battle Group, 39th Infantry, remained in Germany as a 

temporary reinforcement for the Seventh Army. In addition to providing part of 

the buildup during the Berlin crisis, the exercise proved that rapid deployment 

plans and the issue of pre-positioned equipment were feasible.50

Despite those successes, the crisis in Berlin also exposed a redundancy in 

the Army’s command structure that complicated the flow of information and 

directives from higher headquarters. Since 1952, U.S. military responsibilities 

in the city had been assigned to two agencies, both reporting to the USAREUR 

commanding general: the Berlin Command, a USAREUR headquarters with 

a tactical mission; and the Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin, who was the 

49 Memo, Lt Gen Earle G. Wheeler, Dir, Joint Staff, for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 Oct 1961, 

sub: Movement Plans—USCINCEUR Augmentation; Note to Control Division, R Adm F. 

J. Blouin, Sec, 23 Oct 1961, sub: Berlin Buildup; Memo, Ch of Staff, USAF, for Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 8 Dec 1961, sub: Concepts for the Deployment of Army Forces. All in Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP. HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, 

Oct 1960–Apr 1962, pp. 125–27. 50 “6,000 Troops in U.S. Wait Long Thrust,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 29 A

1961; “White House Calls Off Operation Long Thrust,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition,

May 1961; Msg, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCEUR, 11 Oct 1961, Msg # JCS 

1848, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 

Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, Historians files, CMH; D. J. Hickman, The United States 

Army in Europe, 1953–1963 (HQ, USAREUR, 1964), p. 148, copy in Historians files, CMH.
The Berlin Crisis 429

U.S. member of the Allied Kommandatura and, by direction, the single point of 

U.S. military contact in Berlin with the Soviet mission and allied representatives 

participating in the occupation of the city. Even before the onset of the August 

crisis, the USAREUR commander, General Clarke, had expressed concern 

about the overlapping functions and responsibilities of the two organizations. 

He found that as the crisis intensified, directives from USAREUR to the Berlin 

Command frequently impinged on the responsibilities of the U.S. commander, 

Berlin, and sometimes precluded both the rapid execution of orders and the 

reporting of results. Therefore, on 1 December 1961, Clarke consolidated all 

of the U.S. Army forces in Berlin into a single overall command named U.S. 

Army, Berlin, and designated the headquarters as a major subordinate command 

of USAREUR. Without relinquishing any of his former responsibilities or 

authority, the U.S. commander, Berlin, became the commanding general, 

U.S. Army, Berlin. The tactical units that had formerly constituted the Berlin 

Command became elements of a new subordinate command designated as the 

Berlin Brigade.51

By the end of 1961 a calm settled over the city as both sides moderated their 

military activities near the border. Having the wall in place, the Communists 

stemmed the flow of refugees that threatened to deplete their workforce and 

military manpower. Meanwhile, with the recent confrontation at Checkpoint 

Charlie fresh in memory, the Americans avoided overt challenges of the East 

German authorities while maintaining their refusal to recognize the regime. The 

United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union then entered into a new round 

of negotiations concerning the future of Germany. Slowly, at first, but with 

increasing clarity, U.S. military and political leaders began to recognize that 

if Western access to Berlin was a vital interest for the United States, access to 

East Berlin, while important, was hardly vital enough to justify the use of force. 

In describing the policy that was evolving, Col. Lawrence J. Legere, assistant 

to General Maxwell Taylor—who had recently been appointed as a special 

military representative to the president—wrote to the general that the country 

would not shoot its way into East Berlin because even a successful operation 

would have little effect on the greater confrontation.52

To some, however, the calm that had settled over the city was artificial 

at best. On 17 August 1962, a young East German boy named Peter Fechter 

tried to scale the wall about one hundred yards from the U.S. checkpoint on 

the Friedrichstrasse. As he climbed, East German guards shot him repeatedly. 

51 Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, 

pp. 334–35; Ltr, Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen George H. Decker, CSA, 17 

Nov 1961, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH. 52 Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Norstad), 

25 Aug 1961, 14:370–71; Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere for the President’s 

Military Representative (Taylor), 11 Nov 1961, 14:583–84; Memorandum From the President’s 

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) for President Kennedy, 22 Nov 1961, 

14:619. All in FRUS, 1961–1963. Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 151.
430 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

He fell to the ground, wounded, in East German territory. He could not get 

up and lay on the ground calling for help. Despite his pleas, the commanding 

general, U.S. Army, Berlin, General Watson, fearing the risk of escalation, 

would not allow U.S. medical personnel to come to the boy’s aid. After two 

hours, Fechter bled to death. The event spurred outrage throughout West 

Berlin and West Germany. The next day the newspapers showed photos of 

U.S. military police watching the situation unfold, with the caption, “They 

did nothing.” As one lieutenant recalled, it was an indictment that, politically, 

they did not deserve. Morally, however, it was another issue. Fechter’s death 

was a pointed reminder that little, if anything, had really been resolved.53

In October 1962, the focus of the Cold War made a dramatic shift from 

Berlin to Cuba where U–2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered that the Soviet 

Union had begun construction of missile sites capable of launching medium- and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles at targets across most of the southeastern 

United States. As President Kennedy and his advisers worked their way through 

alternative courses of action, however, they remained aware that a misstep in 

their reaction to the Cuban missiles could at any time provoke offensive action 

by the Soviets against Berlin. In the end, although the Americans essentially 

traded removal of obsolete missiles in Italy and Turkey for the removal of 

Soviet weapons from Cuba, the public perception of the outcome was that the 

Soviets and Premier Khrushchev had backed down. Khrushchev remained in 

power for another two years, but the outcome of the missile crisis weakened 

his hold over the Politburo, which forced him into retirement in 1964. As for 

Berlin, negotiations continued to resolve the city’s fate, but with the flood of 

refugees effectively plugged, the Communists no longer viewed the situation 

as a crisis. With nuclear war in Cuba averted and with insurgencies brewing in 

Southeast Asia and the Belgian Congo, the Cold War adversaries had already 

begun to shift their attention elsewhere. As the Kennedy administration began 

to fine-tune its foreign policies and strategic outlook, the U.S. Army would 

have to adjust its own focus as well.54

53 Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 184; Gunnarsson, American Military Police in Europe, p. 93. 54 Record of Meeting of the Military Sub-Group of the Washington Ambassadorial Group, 

22 Oct 1961, 14:392–94; Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, 5 Nov 

1961, 14:408–10; Memorandum From the Chairman of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee (Nitze) 

for President Kennedy, 14:411–19. All in FRUS, 1961–1963. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, pp. 

184–85, 204.
On 30 January 1961, ten days after his inauguration, President Kennedy 

delivered his first State of the Union address. He used the opportunity to 

announce a reappraisal of the country’s entire defense strategy and, in particular, 

a modernization of its limited war and nonnuclear capabilities. Two months 

later, in a Special Message to Congress on the Defense Budget, Kennedy 

outlined his basic defense policies. He argued that America’s military posture 

must be sufficiently flexible to respond to challenges across a wide spectrum of 

threats. Although he expressed support for the continued development of the 

country’s nuclear arsenal, he noted that since 1945, nonnuclear and guerrilla 

wars had constituted the most active threat to free world security. With that 

in mind, he asked Congress to strengthen the military’s capacity to engage in 

such conflicts and to expand research and funding for nonnuclear weapons.1

The Army’s leaders noted the president’s shift in focus, especially its 

similarity to proposals previously presented by General Taylor as part of his 

concept of flexible response. As if to reinforce this connection, the president went 

even further in July 1961. After an American-supported invasion of Cuba by 

refugees and exiles failed spectacularly at the Bay of Pigs, he appointed Taylor 

to a position as Special Assistant to the President for Military Affairs. Little 

more than a year later, in October 1962, Kennedy called Taylor out of retirement 

to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor’s defense concepts 

took nothing away from the strong base of strategic weapons the country had 

developed under President Eisenhower. He was particularly supportive of the 

Navy’s new Polaris missile program, which gave the nation a mobile, concealed, 

and virtually invulnerable strategic deterrent. Where the general had always 

differed with the philosophy of the New Look was in its lack of consideration for 

conventional forces. In his eyes, the overreliance on strategic nuclear weapons 

limited the nation to only one choice when faced with a military challenge. To 

support his position, he cited the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. 

“For all of our massive nuclear power and our professions of reliance upon 

1 Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 30 Jan 1961, pp. 19–26; Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget, 28 Mar 1961, pp. 229–40. Both in Public 

Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961; Rpt of Senator Kennedy’s 

National Security Policy Committee, 9 Nov 1960, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security 

Archive, Historians files, CMH.

12

From New Look to Flexibl

Respon
432 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

it,” he said, “government deliberations over possible U.S. action resulted in a 

decision to do nothing.” With a new administration clearly more sympathetic 

to the Army’s point of view, service leaders prepared to move the force in a 

new direction.2

Looking Beyond Berlin: The Strategic Environment in 1961

Although the confrontation surrounding Berlin dominated national security 

considerations throughout the first two years of the Kennedy administration, 

other issues also came to bear on how the Army in Europe was evolving. Even 

as U.S. and Soviet tanks faced off at Checkpoint Charlie, military and political 

leaders on both sides pondered the implications of a full-scale war between the 

two superpowers. Considerations of nuclear warfare still dominated strategic 

thought on both sides. If a ground battle were to erupt in Europe, many 

concluded, it would be only a few hours or even minutes before “the great 

intercontinental exchange of nuclear blows” began. As a result, thousands of 

American homeowners rushed to build fallout shelters, hoping to ride out a 

potential nuclear strike.3

As part of the Eisenhower administration’s New Look policies, the United 

States had made great strides in the development of its strategic weapons 

systems. In addition to atomic bombs, the nation’s fleet of B–52 bombers carried 

Hound Dog cruise missiles, tipped with atomic warheads and capable of hitting 

targets up to eight hundred miles from their release point. Submarine-launched 

Polaris missiles entered the U.S. inventory in 1960, adding a new dimension 

to the nation’s tactical arsenal. By 1962, the Air Force had deployed its first 

Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, completing what became known 

as the United States strategic triad.4

On the Communist side, the Soviets had hardly been idle, as their propaganda made clear. They made the most of their successful Sputnik satellite 

launch in 1957, emphasizing the power of their intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

Under Khrushchev, the Soviets also ran an extensive nuclear testing program, 

culminating in the detonation of a 58-megaton device in October 1961. The 

Soviet premier warned that his scientists were working on an even larger, 

100-megaton super bomb. He threatened to test the device in the near future 

if prospects for peace with the West did not improve. In another ultimatum, 

2 Quote from “U.S. Strategy Shift to Span Several Years, Taylor Says,” Army Times, 27 Jan 

1962. Memo, Gerard C. Smith, Policy Planning Staff, for Sec of State, 17 Feb 1960, sub: Major 

General Bonesteel’s Briefing of Department Personnel on Army Strategy, Pentagon Library, 

Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Bem Price, “Kennedy Echoes Taylor’s 

Defense Concept,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 30 Mar 1961. 3 Ltr, Thomas K. Finletter, Ch of Mission, U.S. Mission to NATO, to Dean Acheson, 2 Aug 

1961, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH. 4 MFR, George W. Rathjens, Technical Asst, President’s Science Advisory Committee, 

21 Sep 1960, sub: The General Balance of Strategic Forces and Their Relation to the FY 1962 

Budget, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH. 
From New Look to Flexible Response

Khrushchev threatened to continue experimenting with even bigger weapons 

unless the United States halted its own program. In both 1961 and 1962 Soviet 

nuclear testing totaled more than 200-megatons. The Soviet leader ridiculed the 

American fallout shelter program, saying such constructions were “absolutely 

worthless” against his super bombs.5

Despite administration assurances to the contrary, U.S. newspapers 

decried the apparent “missile gap” they perceived in the capabilities of the two 

superpowers. The subject had, in fact, become a major issue in the Democratic 

campaign during the 1960 election. Whether or not the Soviets had pulled ahead 

in the nuclear arms race was, in fact, less relevant than the realization that they 

had developed a capability to hit the United States with atomic weapons—a 

capability against which there was no defense.6

This emerging nuclear parity between the two superpowers had implications 

for Europe, in light of the Communist edge in conventional forces. The Soviets 

continued to maintain twenty combat ready divisions in East Germany—ten 

armored and ten mechanized infantry. Another seventy-four divisions were 

available west of the Urals, most capable of reaching combat ready status 

within a week. This number also included six airborne divisions that NATO 

intelligence officers expected the Soviets to employ in attacks against airfields, 

communications centers, and nuclear delivery units. The Warsaw Pact nations 

could also contribute up to thirty-five divisions within a few days of mobilization. Although Western analysts believed that the primary role of Soviet military 

forces was to allow the Kremlin to conduct its foreign policy from a position of 

strength, they could not ignore the potential threat inherent in the Communist 

numerical superiority.7

In the capitals of Western Europe, the combination of strategic parity 

and conventional imbalance raised concerns that threatened to undermine 

the NATO alliance. American intelligence analysts noted that while NATO’s 

European members wished to retain the protection afforded by U.S. strategic 

nuclear forces, the growth of Soviet nuclear missile forces had created an interest 

in developing European deterrent forces as well. The emerging superpower 

atomic equivalence and the growing assertiveness of France and West Germany, 

the experts said, would soon almost certainly cause those countries to demand 

greater influence in the military and political affairs of the alliance. Under the 

leadership of Charles de Gaulle since 1958, France, in particular, called into 

question the dominance of the United States and Britain in the development 

5 “Khrushchev Warns Super Bomb Possible,” 10 Aug 1961; “Russ Fire Mightiest Bomb,” 

24 Oct 1961; “Russ Threaten 100-Megaton Bomb Test,” 18 Dec 1961. All in Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition. Zaloga, Target America, p. 233. 6 Jack Raymond, “Twining Says U.S. Surpasses Soviet in Military Might,” New York Times, 

20 Sep 1958; idem, “Pentagon Chiefs Call U.S. Leader in Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, 20 

Jan 1960; idem, “President Errs on Soviet Might, Ex-Advisor Says,” New York Times, 25 Feb 

1960.7 SACEUR’s Emergency Defense Plan, SHAPE/144–B/61, 13 Dec 1961, SHAPE Historical 

Office, Historians files, CMH.
434 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

of NATO nuclear policy. Despite continuing reassurances of the firmness of 

America’s NATO commitment, Europeans increasingly feared that the United 

States might not be willing to risk its own nuclear devastation to counter Soviet 

aggression.8

The analysts’ words seemed prophetic when, in November 1960, leading 

lawmakers from a number of NATO countries announced their intention to 

seek more political authority over the use of nuclear weapons in the defense 

of Western Europe. They urged the United States and the NATO council to 

develop an independent NATO nuclear force. General Norstad, Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), heartily endorsed the idea, saying 

that the alliance needed a greater voice in the release of nuclear weapons if 

it was to have any life or meaning. Although the United States had already 

begun stockpiling atomic weapons in Europe for potential use by NATO 

commanders, it retained custody and control over the weapons until they were 

released by the president. Only then would NATO commanders gain access 

to the atomic firepower allocated to them. The Army also deployed some five 

thousand soldiers to Europe in July 1960 to serve as custodians and guards for 

the atomic shells and warheads set aside for NATO. Those same soldiers were 

trained to assist allied personnel in assembling and launching the weapons. In 

his General Defense Plan for 1961, the NATO commander asserted that, for 

any sustained defense of Western Europe to be possible, the alliance must take 

the initiative in the employment of nuclear weapons.9

President Kennedy and many of his advisers were reluctant to relinquish 

any control over the release and use of atomic weapons, and the issue sparked 

an enormous alliance debate that would last for years. The American strategic 

deterrent and SACEUR’s reliance on a nuclear response to most provocations 

also caused many Europeans to question the viability of any conventional 

defense. They asked why they should have to devote so many resources to 

prepare for a type of war that would never take place. As a result, some member 

governments became unwilling to provide sufficient appropriations to meet 

8 CIA, Problems Affecting the North Atlantic Alliance, 1 Nov 1960, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH; George Fielding Eliot, 

“Why Europe Wants Nuclear Weapons,” Army Times, 18 Aug 1962. For further information 

on de Gaulle’s growing disenchantment with the NATO military structure, see Frederic Bozo, 

Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (New York: 

Rowman and Littlefield, 2001) and Erin R. Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe

(New York: Macmillan, 2002). 9 SACEUR’s Emergency Defense Plan, SHAPE/144–B/61, 13 Dec 1961; NATO in the 1960s, 

National Security Council, 8 Nov 1960, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, 

Historians files, CMH; “Political Voice on A-Arms Use Asked for NATO,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 27 Nov 1960; “Norstad Asks NATO Be 4th A-Power,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 13 Oct 1960; Jack Raymond, “Army Straining to Meet Demands Despite 

Cutback,” New York Times, 18 Jul 1960.
From New Look to Flexible Response

NATO military goals. Others adopted reduced periods of conscription, making 

it difficult to develop and maintain adequately trained, combat ready forces.10

In November 1960, a joint State and Defense Department report on the 

future of the alliance in the 1960s laid out the difficulties the United States 

faced. It was critical, the analysis warned, for NATO forces to be able to 

respond to Communist aggression across a broad spectrum of capabilities; yet, 

since Europeans would perceive a trip-wire strategy as leaving NATO entirely 

reliant on strategic retaliation for deterrence, their confidence in that expedient 

would almost certainly decline as Soviet missile capabilities increased. Similarly, 

Europeans would regard a strategy that relied primarily on nonnuclear forces 

for deterrence as an invitation for the Soviets to threaten or engage in limited 

attacks. Indeed, any action on the part of the United States that implied a 

lessening of the American commitment would seriously undermine support 

for NATO throughout Europe—a condition, the report concluded, that the 

Soviets would surely exploit to their fullest advantage.11

A more positive development for the alliance and for the American forces in 

Europe was the continued development of the West German Army. By October 

1961, that force numbered 232,000 officers and men in twelve divisions. Eight 

of these units—the 1st, 2d, 4th, and 6th Armored Infantry Divisions; the 3d 

and 5th Armored Divisions; the 1st Airborne Division and the 1st Mountain 

Division—had completed their training and were on assignment to NATO. 

Three more—the 7th, 10th, and 11th Armored Infantry Divisions—were still in 

training but would join the force by the end of 1962. This would make available 

eleven of the twelve divisions West Germany had committed to the NATO 

alliance. Another, the 12th Armored Division, would not complete its initial 

organization and predeployment training until after 1962.12

The addition of these forces not only strengthened and added depth to 

NATO’s defenses, it also prompted revisions in the alliance’s overall concept for 

defense. Since the additional divisions allowed commanders to consider holding 

in place against opening enemy assaults, the allies abandoned all thought of an 

immediate withdrawal to the Rhine. The Germans began plans to build new 

peacetime cantonments for their divisions farther to the east, within seventy 

miles of the border. Initial estimates placed the II German Corps, including 

the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Mountain Division, around Regensburg 

in the south; the III German Corps, including the 2d Infantry Division and the 

5th Armored Division, defended in the center near Kassel and Würzburg; and 

10 For more information on the growing controversy within NATO over nuclear 

strategy and nuclear weapons sharing, see Kaplan, The Long Entanglement; Grosser, 

The Western Alliance; and Powaski, The Entangling Alliance. 11 NATO in the 1960s, National Security Council, 8 Nov 1960; CIA, Problems Affecting the 

North Atlantic Alliance, 1 Nov 1960; Msg, Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCEUR, 24 Aug 1961, 

Msg # JCS 1226, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP. 12 “Bonn Armed Forces Now Top Planned Final Strength,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 3 Oct 1961; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Army Advances Europe Frontline,” Army Times, 14 

Jul 1962; Karanowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, pp. 52–54.
436 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the I German Corps, including the 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions and the 3d 

Armored Division, operated in the north in the vicinity of Hannover, Hamburg, 

and Bremen (See Maps 17 and 18).13

NATO strategy presumed that the defenders would receive early release 

to use the tactical nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Although planning was 

moving away from what many had considered to be an overdependence on 

nuclear weapons and massive retaliation, the alliance’s conventional forces 

were still no match for Soviet numbers. Under General Norstad, NATO 

had begun to depict its defensive posture as a sword and shield, the shield 

being the forward-deployed conventional forces and the sword being the 

atomic bombs and missiles of the U.S. strategic arsenal. Norstad hoped 

that his conventional shield would be strong enough to contain minor 

incursions or to cause a pause in a larger assault, allowing both attackers 

and defenders to consider their options and the consequences of escalating 

to a full atomic response. He worried, however, that without access to 

tactical atomic weapons, the shield would not be able to provide the pause 

he wanted. With that requirement in mind, the general continued to press 

President Kennedy to allocate a stockpile of atomic weapons specifically 

for his use as NATO commander.14

Norstad’s battle plan called for the ground forces of NATO’s Central 

Army Group (CENTAG) to “defend the territories of Allied Command 

Central Europe as close to the Eastern frontier as possible.” The plan 

assigned particular importance to the defense of nuclear delivery forces and 

airfields. It made the CENTAG commander responsible for the defense of the 

vital industrial areas of the Ruhr and for approaches to the Rhine between 

Wesel and Bonn in the north and between Wiesbaden and Karlsruhe in the 

southern portion of his sector. He was not to withdraw his forces for any 

reason, except to the extent necessary to preserve the integrity of major 

combat formations for the main defensive battle, which would be fought as 

far forward as possible. As soon as SACEUR received presidential authority 

to employ nuclear weapons, CENTAG units would participate in the overall 

nuclear counteroffensive.15

The Kennedy administration, however, remained reluctant to place U.S. 

atomic weapons under NATO control. The president wished to retain tight 

control over the U.S. atomic arsenal while, at the same time, pursuing a 

national military policy based on the concept of flexible response and aimed 

at limiting conflicts before they escalated into full-scale war. Norstad, for his 

part, refused to back away from his support for NATO as an independent 

nuclear power. Disagreement on this issue exacerbated a lack of trust between 

13 John Wiant, “No Cuts Seen for European Forces,” Army Times, 16 Jan 1960; “Bonn Armed 

Forces Now Top Planned Final Strength”; Bourjaily, “Army Advances Europe Frontline”; 

Karanowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, pp. 52–54. 14 Jordan, Norstad, pp. 208–09. 15 SACEUR’s Emergency Defense Plan, SHAPE/144–B/61, 13 Dec 1961.
X X

8

X X

3

X X

24

XXX

V

XXX

VII

SEVENTH

XXXX

X X

3

X X

3

X X

4

Frankfurt

Stuttgart

Göppingen

Augsburg

Würzburg

Bad Kreuznach

Kaiserslautern

Möhringen

Rhine R

Elbe R

Rhine R

Erfurt

Nuremberg

Munich

Dresden

BERLIN

Hannover

Hamburg

Bremen

Cologne

BONN

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Innsbruck

Leipzig

EAST GERMAN Y

LUXEMBOURG BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LIECHTENSTEIN

WEST GERMANY

SEVENTH ARMY DISPOSITIONS

U .S. ARMY, EUROPE

1962

Major Unit Headquarters

0 50

0 50 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 17
XXX

II WEST GERMANY

XXX

II FRANCE

XXX

III WEST GERMANY

XXX

V U.S.

XXX

VII U.S.

XXX

I WEST GERMANY

XXX

I UNITED KINGDOM

XXX

I BELGIUM

XXX

I NETHERLANDS

X X X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X X

A L L I E D F O R C E S

N O R T H E R N E U R O P E

A L L I E D F O R C E S

C E N T R A L E U R O P E

NORTHERN ARMY GROUP

CENTRAL ARMY GROUP

Mosel R

Rhine R Danube R

Elbe R

Rhine R

Munich

Stuttgart

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Erfurt

BERLIN

PRAGUE

Cologne

BONN

FRANCE

A USTRIA SWITZERLAND

POLAND

EAST

GERMAN Y

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DENMARK

SWEDEN

BELGIUM LUXEMBOURG

N E T

H E R L A N D S

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED FORCES, CENTRAL EUROPE

1962

0

0 150 Miles

150 Kilometers

NATO Signatories

Soviet Bloc

Map 18
From New Look to Flexible Response

the two that had been festering since the Berlin crisis. Weary of the confrontation, Kennedy and Secretary McNamara urged the Air Force general into 

retirement in December 1962, replacing him as SACEUR with Army General 

Lyman L. Lemnitzer.16

For all of Kennedy’s commitment to flexible response, the Army in 1961 

found itself unprepared in many ways to fight in a limited war. Eight years 

of adapting to Eisenhower’s New Look had depleted many conventional 

weapons programs and rendered numerous training approaches and 

contingency plans obsolete. A study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 

December 1960 revealed that the Army based most planning for the support 

of limited combat operations on a resumption of hostilities in Korea. While 

Army forces were sufficiently equipped to engage in limited combat there, 

only about half possessed the up-to-date weapons and equipment required 

for a war in Europe. Even more important, the study revealed that the Air 

Force had fewer than half of the transport planes it would need to fly a 

full division of seventeen thousand men to a combat area and sustain it for 

thirty days. As a result, although the United States had seven combat ready 

divisions—four Army and three Marine—it did not have the ability to put 

them into the field swiftly. Likewise, the report concluded, planners would 

have to make up for shortages in cargo and troop transport ships through 

the use of allied vessels.17

The nation’s growing commitment to battling a Communist insurgency 

in South Vietnam made these issues even more compelling. In October 1961, 

President Kennedy sent a team led by General Taylor, his special military 

representative, and Walter W. Rostow, his deputy special assistant for national 

security, to Vietnam to recommend a comprehensive course for American 

action there. In its report, the team recommended an expansion of the U.S. 

effort in Vietnam, with the United States moving beyond its advisory role 

to active participation in administration, intelligence, military planning, and 

operations. Even as the crisis in Berlin faded, the administration’s attention 

was shifting from Europe to the conflict in Southeast Asia.18

16 Jordan, Norstad, pp. 3–14. 17 Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff for Sec Def, 9 Dec 1960, sub: Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture 

for Limited Military Operations, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, 

copy in Historians files, CMH; Min, Policy Planning Staff–JCS Joint Staff Meeting, 6 Oct 1960, 

Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Gene Famiglietti, 

“Major Tasks Face Secretary Vance,” Army Times, 30 Jun 1962; John J. Ford, “More Modern 

Army Pushed,” Army Times, 7 May 1960; “Study Indicates U.S. Would Suffer Brushfire-War 

Transport Woes,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Mar 1961. 18 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960, United States Army 

in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985); Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, United States Army 

in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), pp. 3–20; Homer 

Bigart, “A Very Real War in Vietnam—and Deep U.S. Commitment,” New York Times, 25 Feb 

1962; idem, “U.S. Helicopters Lead Vietnam Attack,” New York Times, 27 May 1962.
440 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Creating a New Division

As the U.S. Army considered the implications of military operations in 

Southeast Asia, its leaders grew less and less enamored of the pentomic division. 

By 1961, it had become clear that the new organization was cumbersome, at 

best, in Europe, and completely unsuited for combat operations in most other 

potential theaters.

Ever since its experiments with the pentomic force in Europe during the late 

1950s, the Army had been well aware of the shortcomings of its atomic-oriented 

division organization. As early as 1959, General Clarke—who as commanding 

general of the U.S. Continental Army Command was responsible for developing 

the Army’s operational concepts and doctrine—directed preparation of a new 

study titled Modern Mobile Army (MOMAR) 1965–1970. Fresh from his 

recent assignment as the commanding general of the Seventh Army in Europe, 

Clarke had clear ideas about what kind of organization the service needed. 

He maintained that the Army of the future had to be capable of operating 

effectively on both nuclear and nonnuclear battlefields against a variety of 

threats anywhere in the world. Units had to be prepared to take independent 

action or to combine with others to form more powerful combat teams. His 

experience with the pentomic organization in Europe had led him to believe 

that the new divisions needed additional conventional firepower and greater 

tactical mobility. Both, to his mind, would come through increased emphasis 

on armor-protected vehicles and aircraft.19

Clarke’s influence was readily apparent in the new design produced by 

the study. In an effort to streamline the chain of command, it eliminated the 

corps echelon and had divisions report directly to a field army headquarters. 

The concept also envisioned a simplified division structure with only two 

variations—a heavy and a medium division. The heavy organization would be 

strong in tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, while the medium 

would have fewer heavy components but would still be well-equipped for 

sustained mobile combat. Both types would include five combat commands, 

with each command containing three task force headquarters to which leaders 

could assign a mix of tank, infantry, and support companies. Within the 

companies, rifle squads would have only seven men equipped with automatic, 

semiautomatic, and area-fire weapons. Every man and every piece of equipment 

in both types of divisions would ride in or on a vehicle.20

19 Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76, Leavenworth 

Papers 1 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, 1979), p. 19; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 291–93. 20 Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, p. 19; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 291–93; James J. Carafano and Glen R. Hawkins, Prelude to Army XXI: U.S. Army 

Division Design Initiatives and Experiments, 1917–1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, 1997), p. 15; Ken Thompson, “New, Light Army on Way,” Army Times, 

13 Aug 1960; Jack Raymond, “G.I. Won’t Walk if Army Has Way,” New York Times, 10 Aug 

1960.
From New Look to Flexible Response

Despite interest in many of the ideas the new organization incorporated, 

the Department of the Army rejected the concept in December 1960. The vice 

chief of staff, General Eddleman, having just returned to the United States from 

a tour as USAREUR commander, wrote that the divisions envisioned by the 

MOMAR study lacked the simplicity, homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility 

that the Army needed to fulfill its worldwide responsibilities. While they might 

be well suited for armored combat in Europe, they would have great difficulty 

adapting to conflicts in other environments. Eddleman directed General Herbert 

B. Powell, who had replaced Clarke as commander of the Continental Army 

Command, to take another look at redesigning the divisions for the period of 

1961–1965.21

As with Clarke before him, Eddleman’s guidance reflected the lessons he 

had learned while serving as Seventh Army and USAREUR commander. The 

vice chief wanted the new study to consider infantry, armored, and mechanized 

divisions. The heart of the mechanized divisions was to be armored infantry 

units with the mobility and survivability to operate on a nuclear battlefield. All 

of the divisions, however, had to be able to operate effectively in both nuclear 

and nonnuclear war. Eddleman instructed the planners to weigh the retention 

of battle groups against their replacement with infantry battalions. Noting the 

many areas around the world where the Army might have to operate, the general 

suggested that divisions be tailored for different environments. To accomplish 

this and to increase the overall flexibility of each formation, he suggested the 

possibility of interchanging battalion-size armor, infantry, mechanized infantry, 

and artillery units within divisions.22

General Powell and his staff set out to translate those ideas into a workable organization. In less than three months they submitted a study entitled 

Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) 1961–1965, to the new 

Army chief of staff, General George H. Decker. The study offered reinterpretations of three standard divisions—infantry, armored, and mechanized infantry. 

It called for all three to have a common base to which commanders could assign 

a varying number of combat battalions. Whichever type of battalion—infantry, 

mechanized infantry, or tank—made up the bulk of the division determined its 

designation. The common base for every division consisted of a headquarters 

element, three brigade headquarters, a military police company, a reconnaissance squadron with an air troop and three ground troops, division artillery, a 

support command, and aviation, engineer, and signal battalions. The division 

artillery included three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, an Honest John battalion, 

and a composite battalion containing one 8-inch and three 155-mm. howitzer 

batteries. The support command consisted of a headquarters and headquarters 

21 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 293–96. 22 Interv, Lt Col Lowell G. Smith and Lt Col Murray G. Swindler with Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 29, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI.
442 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

company; an administration company; a band; and medical, maintenance, and 

supply and transport battalions.23

While the exact makeup of the division depended on the types of maneuver 

battalions added, an infantry division usually consisted of eight infantry and 

two tank battalions. A mechanized division normally had seven mechanized 

infantry and three tank battalions, and an armored division had six tank and 

six mechanized infantry battalions. The new division structures also included 

three brigade headquarters, each capable of controlling from two to five combat 

battalions. Brigade commanders could create combined-arms task forces by 

exchanging tank and infantry companies between different battalions. With 

the ability to tailor the organization of a division, brigade, or battalion, the 

Army would possess the most flexible organizational structure it had ever had. 

Ironically, the new division structure came very close to matching the German 

model established with the Bundeswehr’s reorganization a few years earlier. 

Still, with its roots in the triangular divisions of World War II, most observers 

agreed that the force was returning to a structure that had already stood the 

test of combat.24

Perhaps the most memorable aspect of the new division structure was the 

introduction of a new weapon, the Davy Crockett battlefield missile, to infantry 

battalions and reconnaissance squadrons. Whether mounted on small trucks 

or armored personnel carriers, or set up on ground tripods, the weapon looked 

like a short recoilless rifle with a large bulb attached at the end. The “bulb” 

was a low-yield atomic warhead that the operator could launch from either of 

two tubes: the 4-inch (120-mm.) with a range of 2,000 meters, or the 6.1-inch 

(155-mm.) with a range of 4,000 meters. Army publications advertised the Davy 

Crockett as the “Sunday Punch” of the ROAD divisions. The weapon showed 

poor accuracy during testing, particularly worrisome with its very short range 

that left the crew exposed to both blast and radiation effects. Moreover, the idea 

of small units, led by lieutenants and sergeants, running around the battlefield 

with portable atomic weapons troubled some of the Army’s leaders as well as 

those in the Kennedy administration. Like all atomic weapons in the Army’s 

inventory, the weapons were to be released only on direct authorization from 

the president.25

The proposed division structure was not without its detractors. Some, like 

Maj. Gen. James H. Polk, 4th Armored Division commander, and later V Corps 

commander, objected to the rigidity of the standardized divisions. Despite 

23 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 296–97; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Division Revamp 

Planned,” Army Times, 27 May 1961. 24 Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, pp. 22–23; Monte Bourjaily Jr., 

“Division Remake Reset,” Army Times, 3 Jun 1961; Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, 

p. 106. 25 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 297–308; Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, pp. 95–96; 

Ltr, Sec of State Dean Rusk to Sec Def Robert S. McNamara, 16 Jun 1962, Pentagon Library, 

Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
From New Look to Flexible Response

the concept of using battalions as interchangeable parts, they could not move 

from one division without adversely affecting the makeup of another. General 

Paul D. Adams, the commander of the U.S. Strike Command and the former 

commander of U.S. ground forces in Lebanon in 1958, complained at a meeting 

of the Association of the United States Army that the new division contained 

far too much extraneous equipment. He simply could not be convinced, he 

said, that it took 3,318 radios—an average of one per 4.77 persons—to run a 

division. While Adams’ complaints were largely about the excessive amount of 

equipment involved, the former Army chief of staff, General Taylor, did not think 

it was appropriate to introduce a new organization so soon after the pentomic 

conversion. Taylor believed that the shortcomings of the pentomic division could 

have been alleviated by adding attached or reinforcing elements rather than by 

throwing out the entire concept. Nonetheless, General Paul L. Freeman, who 

would assume command of USAREUR in May 1962, expressed the relief of many 

when he told an interviewer that the only thing he could say about the pentomic 

division was “Thank God we never had to go to war with it.”26

Ultimately, the supporters of the new organization triumphed. On 4 April 

1961, the Continental Army Command staff briefed the Army Chief of Staff, 

26 Interv, Col James Ellis with Gen Paul L. Freeman Jr., 16 Apr 1974, p. 30, Senior Officer 

Debriefing Program, MHI. See also Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, p. 118; Interv, 

Smith and Swindler with Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975; “Divisions Too Heavy, Adams Tells AUSA,” 

Army Times, 13 Oct 1962; Ltr, Gen Maxwell D. Taylor to Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 16 Jun 1961, 

Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

The Davy Crockett was capable of firing atomic or conventional warheads. Here it is 

shown in Jeep mounted mode in 1960.
444 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

General Decker, on the plan for the ROAD divisions. Decker formally approved 

the reorganization a week later, and, on 25 May 1961, President Kennedy 

announced his approval in a special message to Congress. In recognition of 

his desire for a strategy that provided a wider range of military options—a 

flexible response—the president announced that he had directed the secretary 

of defense to undertake the reorganization and modernization of the Army’s 

divisional structure. Such a change was necessary, he said, to increase the force’s 

nonnuclear firepower, to improve its tactical mobility in any environment, to 

ensure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat, and to facilitate its 

coordination with the nation’s major allies.27

27 Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs, 25 May 1961, in Public Papers 

of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 40; Carafano and Hawkins, 

Prelude to Army XXI, p. 15.

A three-man crew prepares to fire a Davy Crockett at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 

December 1959.
From New Look to Flexible Response

Although the Army initially planned to begin its transition to the ROAD 

model early in 1962, and to finish the conversion by the end of 1963, it delayed 

completion of the effort for a number of reasons. After two units, the 5th 

Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, and the 1st Armored Division at 

Fort Hood, Texas, completed their changeovers in the spring of 1962, planners 

decided to delay further reorganizations until they could test the concept in the 

field. In addition, much of the equipment necessary to outfit the new divisions 

was not available in the quantities required. Some Army leaders also suggested 

that Defense Department officials had pushed for the delay in order to complete 

studies on how the ROAD structure would affect personnel, ammunition, and 

fuel requirements over the next five years.28

Meanwhile, although the Army intended the divisions in Germany to 

be among the last to reorganize, they got a head start in August 1961, when 

Secretary McNamara approved the transfer of three thousand soldiers and 

almost fifteen hundred new M113 armored personnel carriers to the Seventh 

Army in order to complete the mechanization of its three infantry divisions. 

The Army had begun development of the M113 armored personnel carrier 

in 1956 to help meet the demands of the nuclear battlefield. It had the ability 

to keep pace with the tank during cross-country movement and could carry 

a squad of ten armed soldiers into combat with some protection from smallarms fire. Only half as heavy as the older M59 that it replaced, it was both 

air transportable and amphibious. The new armored personnel carrier was 

an essential element in converting the Seventh Army’s infantry divisions into 

mechanized units. Ironically, the new carriers gave the divisions the kind of 

mobility the pentomic concept had envisioned, but not in time to prevent the 

pending reorganization. The additional equipment and personnel provided 

each battle group with more than one hundred armored personnel carriers, 

enough to transport all of its rifle and weapons squads, as well as its company 

and battle group headquarters. The augmentation also allotted fifty armored 

personnel carriers to the divisions’ combat engineer battalions, giving those 

units an armor-protected mobility as well. 

Throughout 1961 and 1962, USAREUR and the Seventh Army conducted 

training to integrate the new vehicles and personnel into their units. Exercises 

placed special emphasis on the use of the armored personnel carriers in 

various infantry scenarios. By March 1962, the Department of the Army and 

USAREUR had redesignated the 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions as 

mechanized units. The divisions retained their pentomic structure, however, 

until mid-1963, when the battle groups were replaced by brigades as part of 

the transition to the ROAD organization.29

28 “ROAD Conversion Still Undecided,” Army Times, 9 Jun 1962; Memo, Seventh Army Ch 

of Staff for Chs, General and Special Staff Sections, 14 Jul 1961, sub: Staff Responsibility for 

ROAD Reorganization and Action, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 29 Msg, ECJCP 9–91443, CINCEUR, to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 Aug 1961, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff General Correspondence, 1962, RG 218, NACP; Elliott V. Converse III, History of Acquisi-
446 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Equipping the Force for Flexible Response

President Kennedy’s call for a reappraisal of America’s defense strategy 

and renewed emphasis on nonnuclear war capabilities provided new impetus 

for Army equipment and weapons development programs that had languished 

under the Eisenhower administration. In one of its first moves on entering office, 

the Kennedy administration added almost 12 percent to Eisenhower’s proposed 

$41.8 billion defense budget for 1962. Although the Air Force’s Minuteman 

and the Navy’s Polaris missile programs continued to receive their share of 

funds, the budget included sizable increases for modernization of the Army’s 

conventional forces. As a result, the service was able to begin procurement of 

a greater number of weapons, vehicles, and items of equipment it had been 

forced to defer under the previous administration.30

In Europe, the soldiers of the Seventh Army had already begun receiving 

the initial issue of a new family of small arms in 1960. One of the first of those 

was the M14 rifle. The new weapon weighed nine pounds and fired 7.62-mm. 

ammunition, which the alliance had adopted as its standard small-arms 

ammunition in 1954. The M14 replaced four weapons that fired different 

types of ammunition—the .30-caliber M1 rifle, the .30-caliber M2 carbine, the 

.45-caliber M3 submachine gun, and the .30-caliber Browning automatic rifle. 

The Army began issuing the new weapon in 1960, but once Congress and the 

Department of Defense made additional funds available in July 1961, the service 

expedited manufacture and added a third production source for the new rifle. 

In 1960, a new machine gun, the M60, began replacing older models in Europe 

as well. It also fired the NATO standard 7.62-mm. round and took the place 

of three types of Browning .30-caliber machine guns. The substitution of two 

new weapons firing common ammunition for several diverse weapons, each 

with its own special requirements, was expected to ease maintenance, supply, 

and ammunition problems for USAREUR and Seventh Army forces. It also 

supported one of the NATO alliance’s earliest efforts to bring some order to 

the diverse requirements of its member armed forces. In the late summer of 

1962, USAREUR began to receive shipments of an additional weapon for its 

rifle squads, the new M79 grenade launcher. The aluminum-barreled 40-mm. 

weapon resembled a large-bore, break-action, sawed-off shotgun. With a 

maximum range of 400 meters, it filled a gap in range between hand grenades 

tion in the Department of Defense, vol. 1, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960 (Washington, 

D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012), p. 601; Paul Spiers, “Army 

Explains New Revision,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 26 May 1961; “Division Reform 

Shadowy,” Army Times, 11 Nov 1961; HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 

1962, pp. 80–81, Historians files, CMH. 30 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, History of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, vol. 5, The McNamara Ascendency, 1961–1965 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), pp. 52–67; Jack Raymond, “Non-Atomic 

Arms Get Added Stress,” New York Times, 11 Feb 1961.
From New Look to Flexible Response

and mortars. Special rounds that left the muzzle as buckshot also made the 

weapon useful for fighting at close quarters.31

The focus on conventional forces also increased the pace of modernization 

for USAREUR’s larger weapons and vehicles. In 1960, the Army began 

production of a new main battle tank, the M60. Because the M60 was not a 

completely new design, but rather a product improvement on the older M48 

Patton, the Army did not assign it a new designation. Instead, throughout its 

deployment, most troops referred to it simply as the M60. U.S. Army units 

in Germany did not begin receiving the new tank until late in 1961. By the 

end of 1962, however, the Seventh Army had replaced all of its tanks except 

those belonging to the three armored cavalry regiments, which the command 

scheduled for exchange the following year. The new tank fired a high-velocity, 

105-mm. main gun while the older model mounted a 90-mm. main gun. Its 

diesel engine had a cruising range of some 350 miles, a significant advantage 

over the M48’s gasoline-powered engine and its range of less than 200 miles. 

The only U.S. Army units in Europe that would retain the old M48 series tanks 

would be those belonging to the Berlin Brigade. Because the city retained large 

quantities of prestocked 90-mm. ammunition and because the reduced cruising 

range would not be a significant factor in the confines of Berlin, General Clarke, 

the USAREUR commander, announced that the M48 would be fully adequate 

for the time being. To further enhance the capabilities of its armored force, 

in the fall of 1961 USAREUR and Seventh Army units also began receiving 

the new M88 tank-recovery vehicle, which could rescue and retrieve disabled 

tanks on the battlefield or winch them back to stable ground when they became 

hopelessly stuck in heavy mud.32

The process of fielding the new vehicles and equipment did not always go as 

smoothly as USAREUR leaders might have hoped. Although manufacturers 

had designed the M113 armored personnel carrier to swim across rivers and 

other water obstacles, the operation required entering the water on a very 

gentle gradient not usually associated with rivers in Western Europe. Unit 

commanders often ignored maintenance instructors who provided orientation 

on the new equipment. One rifle platoon leader remembered how the warrant 

officer assigned to train his platoon on the new vehicles had warned them 

not to repeatedly start and shutdown the engines, or “some gizmo would go 

bonkers from carbon accumulation.” The battalion headquarters ignored the 

31 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 117; Paul Kackley, “The 

New M14: A Boon to the Heavy Laden GI,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Feb 1960; 

“Army Acts to Speed Up Production of M14’s,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Jul 

1961. 32 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 118; Annual Hist Rpt, 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, p. 5-7, Historians files, CMH; Converse, Rearming for 

the Cold War, p. 602; “The Iron Beast Is a Baby,” Army Times, 19 Mar 1960; “New Army M60 

Tank Goes Into Production,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 May 1960; “All Armor 

Units in Europe to Get M60 Tanks Soon,” Army Times, 11 Nov 1961; Herb Scott, “Clarke Tells 

Priority on New Arms,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 Nov 1961.
448 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

instruction and directed that all engines be started up once before and once after 

midnight. “The gizmo went bonkers and, since there was a shortage of gizmos 

in the theater, we had to park the machines for weeks to wait for gizmos.”33

Other new vehicles turned out to be potentially dangerous until troops 

learned to operate them correctly. A new quarter-ton truck, the M151, heir 

apparent to the ubiquitous jeep of World War II and Korea, entered the 

theater in 1961. Lighter but with comparable horsepower to earlier models, the 

M151 proved to be a bit of a safety hazard because it had more sensitive and 

responsive steering and braking mechanisms than its predecessor. The Seventh 

Army safety officer noted that the command could reduce its accident rate if 

drivers simply drove more slowly.34

The 1960s also saw rapid expansion of the Army’s use of helicopters in 

a wide range of roles. A special board directed by Secretary McNamara and 

chaired by the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. 

Howze, met in 1962 to make a thorough re-examination of Army aviation 

requirements. The Howze Board made recommendations that ultimately led 

to the service’s creation of its first airmobile division. In the meantime, U.S. 

forces in Europe were already incorporating new aircraft into their aviation 

units. Bell UH–1 Iroquois utility helicopters began arriving in 1961, giving the 

Seventh Army a more versatile aircraft than previous models. In May 1962, 

the 4th Armored Division began organizing an air cavalry troop, consisting 

of a troop headquarters, an operations section, an aero weapons section with 

helicopters mounting machine guns, an aero scout platoon to conduct wideranging reconnaissance, a service platoon, and an aero rifle platoon that could 

transport four squads of infantry to trouble spots on short notice. As Seventh 

Army planning staffs considered how to best employ the new formation, the 

troops began air gunnery exercises at the Hohenfels training area in December.35

Despite the renewed emphasis on conventional forces and equipment, 

USAREUR also received a series of new rockets and missiles to replace weapons 

systems it had employed since the early 1950s. In September 1960, the Army 

announced that the Sergeant medium-range guided missile would replace the 

older, less mobile Corporal system. A prototype of another solid-fuel ballistic 

missile, the Pershing, arrived in Germany at almost the same time. USAREUR 

featured the Pershing in demonstrations with the intent of replacing older liquidfueled Redstone missiles in the near future. In order to improve protection of 

key installations and airfields from Soviet air attack, USAREUR received six 

33 Henry G. Gole, Soldiering: Observations from Korea, Vietnam, and Safe Places (Dulles, 

Va.: Potomac Books, 2005), p. 113. 34 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 118; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 

Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, p. 2-26. 35 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, p. 1-36; “Army Air Expansion 

Expected in Howze Board Proposals,” Army Times, 1 Sep 1962; Memo, Col A. E. McCollam, 

Seventh Army Engr, for G–3, 12 Sep 1962, sub: Howze Board, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
From New Look to Flexible Response

battalions of the new Hawk antiaircraft missile as well as improved versions of 

the Nike-Hercules missile. Difficulties in procuring sites for the new weapons 

and disagreements with U.S. Air Force commanders in Europe over priorities 

for air defense complicated the deployment of the new units.36

As the end of 1962 approached, the Army announced other new weapons and 

equipment that were either in development or would be ready for deployment 

in the near future. A guided surface-to-surface missile, the Shillelagh, held great 

promise as a weapon for use against Soviet tanks. The Redeye, a shoulder-fired. 

ground-to-air missile would offer infantry units their own defense against lowflying jets and conventional aircraft. Perhaps most important, the development of 

a 6-inch atomic artillery shell that the Army could fire from its existing 155-mm. 

howitzers spelled the death knell for both the ponderous 280-mm. atomic cannon 

and the inaccurate and politically sensitive Davy Crockett.37

New Priorities

The adoption of a doctrine of flexible response was not a complete refutation 

of atomic warfare. To the contrary, atomic weapons remained an important 

component of America’s arsenal. For the Army in Europe, the new approach 

meant preparing for contingencies that might not escalate all the way to a general 

nuclear exchange while still maintaining the capability to fight and survive on 

an atomic battlefield. Training in USAREUR and the Seventh Army reflected 

the shift in priorities as well as the adaptation to new equipment and the new 

organizational structure.

Along with these changes, the Army’s normal career progression, promotion, and retirement policies brought new leadership to USAREUR and the 

Seventh Army. In July 1960, the Seventh Army commander, General Farrell, 

reached retirement age and was replaced by the superintendant of the U.S. 

Military Academy, Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson. As a second lieutenant, 

Davidson had served as the head coach of the West Point football team from 

1933 through 1937, compiling a record of thirty-five wins, eleven losses, and 

one tie. He had a distinguished career as an engineer officer throughout World 

War II and Korea. At age 39, in 1943, he was promoted to brigadier general, 

becoming one of the youngest general officers in the Army. One of his first 

assignments as a new general was command of the Seventh Army in early 

36 Murray M. Moller, “U.S. Army Recruits Deadliest Sergeant,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 26 Sep 1960; Herb Scott, “Army’s Pershing Missile Arrives in West Germany,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Aug 1960; “Europe’s Missile Strength Grows,” Army Times, 

7 Jan 1961; “Army Hawk Unit Stands Alert in Range of Reds Artillery,” Army Times, 30 Jun 

1962; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, pp. 6-1–6-10. 37 Memo, CSA for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 Jun 1957, sub: Development of a 155-mm Atomic 

Artillery Shell, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians 

files, CMH; Ken Thompson, “Overseas Forces to Get New Arms,” Army Times, 13 Feb 1960; 

“6-Inch Shell Developed to Support Front Line Troops,” New York Times, 10 Dec 1963; Jack 

Raymond, “Army May Drop Atom Field Piece,” New York Times, 9 Nov 1964.
450 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

1944, when General George S. Patton 

departed after the end of the Sicily 

campaign and Davidson took over 

leadership of the reduced planning 

headquarters.38

When he returned to the Seventh 

Army in 1960, Davidson brought a 

down-to-earth, matter-of-fact attitude 

reminiscent of the leadership styles 

of Generals Eddy and McAuliffe. In 

one of his initial messages to his new 

command, he announced an end to 

“eyewash,” pointless spit and polish 

meant to impress inspectors but with 

little real value for readiness. He 

regarded traditional inspection preparations—polishing vehicles, painting 

helmets, and chroming mess kits—as 

a waste of time. Henceforth, he said, 

equipment would be judged solely 

on its ability to perform its intended 

functions. Believing that overcentralization had become a hazard to combat 

readiness, he also moved to return more 

authority and responsibility to junior 

commanders and noncommissioned 

officers. To that end, he instructed his subordinates to emphasize squad-, 

platoon-, and company-level training and to allow sergeants, lieutenants, 

and captains leeway in deciding how best to carry out their assignments. His 

intention, he said, was to get away from the detailed guidance, checklists, 

and overemphasis on statistical comparisons between units that had come to 

characterize Army training. Although young leaders would make mistakes, 

he added, errors would be easier to correct in training rather than on the 

battlefield.39

In evaluating training throughout his command, the general found that 

giving authority back to junior leaders was not enough. They had to have as 

many of their soldiers as possible present for duty for their commands to receive 

38 “President Names New 7th Army CG,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 14 May 1960; 

Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, p. 1-6. 39 Wellington Long, “7th Army CG Sounds Taps for Spit and Polish,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 4 Apr 1961; “7th Army Offers Freer Hand to Junior Cos,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 26 Jun 1961. For more information on the Army’s efforts to allow subordinate 

leaders greater responsibility and freedom of action, see William M. Donnelly, “Bilko’s Army: 

A Crisis in Command?” Journal of Military History 75 (October 2011): 1183–1215.

General Davidson, May 1962
From New Look to Flexible Response

the maximum benefit from the instruction. Unless the entire unit could train 

as a team, Davidson believed it would be of little use if it had to go into battle. 

Although team sports offered morale and physical fitness benefits, the Seventh 

Army commander found that the command’s extensive athletic program drew 

too many soldiers away from their units for extended periods of time. To 

remedy that, he directed increased emphasis on company-level sports with only 

football, baseball, and basketball teams organized at division level. Moreover, 

soldier-athletes had to limit themselves to one major organized sport per year. 

Davidson also noted that he lost more than four thousand soldiers at any given 

time to full- and part-time duties such as housekeeping and garrison support. 

While he admitted that he had not solved the problem yet, he did endorse a 

USAREUR initiative to assign all such duties to one company-size element 

in a battalion at a time. In that way, the other companies would retain the 

maximum number of soldiers for regular training.40

A stickler for physical conditioning since his days as the West Point football 

coach, Davidson “declared war” on overweight and out-of-shape Seventh Army 

soldiers. It was no good, he said, to have well-trained people if they could not 

stand-up physically to the demands of combat. He directed that each soldier 

in the command would take two standard Army physical training tests a year, 

in addition to a physical ability test that emphasized specific skills required in 

combat. He promised to ship overweight soldiers who refused to slim down 

as far to the rear as he could send them. As if to demonstrate his commitment 

to shaping up the troops, Davidson sponsored a visit to USAREUR by the 

director of physical education at West Point to evaluate his program and to 

recommend ways to help soldiers meet physical fitness standards.41

Many of Davidson’s innovations seemed to contradict those of General 

Clarke, who arrived back in Europe in October 1960, this time to command 

USAREUR. Clarke’s style of top-down leadership made for an interesting 

contrast with Davidson’s inclination to push authority and responsibility down 

to the lowest level. Shortly after taking command, Clarke published a 55-page 

pamphlet entitled Training Guidelines for the Commander. His publicists at 

USAREUR headquarters trumpeted the publication as “the greatest pearls of 

wisdom” on Army training ever compiled. The general’s supporters ensured 

that the document went to every leader in the command down to company level. 

For the most part, however, the new USAREUR commander had the larger 

issues of his own command to manage and left most of the task of running 

the Seventh Army to Davidson. Clarke, in particular, supported efforts to 

40 Ralph Kennan, “Units Must Train as Units, Gen Davidson Declares,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 12 Jul 1961; “Europe Sports Program Cut,” Army Times, 4 Mar 1961; “Mass 

Sports Encouraged in New 7th Army Program,” Army Times, 22 Apr 1961. 41 Quote from Ralph Kennan, “Davidson Declares War on Tubby Troopers,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 13 Jul 1961. Herb Scott, “Experts Urge Soldiers to Shape Up for 

New PT Tests,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 Oct 1961; “7th Army Fitness Pushed 

by CG,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 4 Oct 1961.
452 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

improve physical fitness throughout the command and encouraged his own 

headquarters to devote more time to exercise and physical training. As he had 

throughout his career, the general railed against wasting soldiers’ time and the 

hurry-up-and-wait pace of many military functions. He directed his commanders 

to plan for side training sessions that they could conduct while troops waited 

for their turn on firing ranges or at other training facilities. 

Despite their differences, both men understood that the combat readiness 

of U.S. Army forces in Europe was their first priority. As the confrontation 

surrounding Berlin continued to escalate, concerns that USAREUR and the 

Seventh Army might have to intervene in some way became all the more real. 

Even more so than it had been in the past, it was imperative to condition U.S. 

soldiers for combat. As he prepared the Seventh Army for an uncertain future, 

General Davidson gave his command a new motto that reflected his goal to 

achieve a continual state of combat readiness—Anyone, Anywhere, Anytime, 

Bar None!42

The Seventh Army’s training guidance reflected its commander’s determination to decentralize. It dictated that training would focus at the company, troop, 

and battery level to the greatest extent possible and that unit leaders would 

have the responsibility and the authority they needed to get the job done. The 

policy did not, however, relieve higher headquarters of their responsibility for 

supervision of training within their subordinate elements. To the contrary, the 

guidance pointed out that a decentralized approach demanded of battle group 

and division commanders even closer observation and broad professional 

knowledge to understand the decisions of subordinates and to provide effective 

guidance and supervision without dampening initiative and enthusiasm.43

The directive’s field training requirements were not so strict, reflecting 

increasingly imperative financial considerations. It specified that company-size 

units would hold at least one 24-hour field exercise each month, that battalions 

and battle groups would conduct at least one 72-hour exercise semiannually, 

and that divisions would conduct one major exercise of unspecified duration 

per year. In contrast, ten years earlier, General Eddy had ordered Seventh 

Army units to spend at least one-third of their time training in the field at or 

near their emergency positions. The difference in field requirements reflected 

the tightening of USAREUR’s training budget; the increased cost of fuel, 

ammunition, and repair parts; the reduced amount of land available on which 

units could maneuver; and the need to share ranges and maneuver areas with 

the Germans and other allied units.44

42 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, p. 1-7; “Seventh Army Gains in 

Power, Size in 1961,” Army Times, 13 Jan 1961. 43 Memo, Col Albin F. Irzyk, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Seventh Army Distribution, n.d. 

(1962), sub: Revision of Seventh Army Training Circular 20–1, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 

1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 44 Ibid.; Ltr, Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy, Seventh Army Cdr, to Maj Gen John E. Dahlquist, V 

Corps Cdr, 19 Jul 1952, Entry 33509, G3 Training Decimal File, Seventh Army, RG 338, NACP.
From New Look to Flexible Response

Major exercises throughout the Seventh Army began to reflect the changes 

in military policy and doctrine that were emerging at higher levels. In June 

1960, the 8th Infantry Division conducted Bayonet Blue, in which its infantr

battle groups maneuvered against aggressors provided by the divisional cavalry 

squadron. Held in the rolling hills and woodlands between Kaiserslautern and 

the Rhine River valley, the exercise featured a simulated atomic strike and tested 

the infantrymen’s ability to recover from the attack and to thwart a subsequent 

enemy ground advance. In August, the 24th Infantry Division held Exercise 

Summer Shield in and around the major training area at Hohenfels in centra

Bavaria. The exercise pitted battle group against battle group in a series of 

attacks, raids, patrols, and helicopter assaults. The maneuver scenario also 

featured the use of some atomic weapons, but such elements were, by then, 

beginning to diminish in frequency and in emphasis because units were more 

focused on conventional tactics and operations. The armored divisions held 

their own field training as well: Peace Maker for the 4th Armored Division i

October 1961 in the area around Bamberg and the Grafenwöhr training area, 

and Brandywine for the 3d Armored Division in November in open area

south and east of Frankfurt. As with those of the infantry, these maneuvers 

combined some elements of atomic warfare with more robust emphasis on the 

conventional firepower and mobility of armored warfare.45

To many of the leaders in USAREUR and the Seventh Army, however, 

the larger corps- and army-level maneuvers were beginning to outlive their 

usefulness. The tremendous costs of fuel for transporting troops and equipment 

to maneuver areas and for the exercises themselves were becoming prohibitive. 

Although the Kennedy administration had increased funds for the procurement 

of conventional weapons and equipment, money to support training and 

day-to-day operations remained limited. The larger exercises also caused a 

considerable amount of damage to roads and crops, requiring the Army to 

pay for repairs and cutting into its training budget. Finally, the rapid growth 

of Germany’s industrial centers and the transformation of much of its open 

land to cultivated farmland left little room for maneuvers on so grand a scale. 

The Seventh Army, for example, held two major exercises, Winter Shiel

in February 1960, and Winter ShieldII in February 1961, to test the abili

of commanders to control their units through the various phases of combat 

operations. The maneuvers were some of the largest held by USAREUR and 

included French and German divisions as well as almost all of the Seventh Army. 

Yet, while troops and tanks moved along road networks throughout much of 

45 Quarterly Training Status Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 20 Oct 1960, Entry 2038, USAREUR G3 

Training Operation Files, 1958–1961, RG 549, NACP; “8th Infantry Division Holds Bayone

Blue,” Army Times, 11 Jun 1960; “24th Infantry Division Ends Summer Shield Exercises

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 22 Aug 1960; Peter Foley, “4th Armored Traps Enemy in 

Maneuvers,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 28 Oct 1961; Peter Foley, “Aggressors Driven 

Back in Exercise,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 Nov 1961.
454 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

southern Germany, almost all of the simulated combat operations took place 

within the major training areas at Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels.46

After observing Exercise Winter ShieldII and reviewing its achievement

General Clarke decided to eliminate large-scale, free-maneuver events of the 

sort from future training programs. In addition to the overwhelming logistical, 

financial, and administrative burdens the large exercises had imposed, the 

general concluded that they had failed to provide sufficient training to the 

individual soldier and the small unit and its leaders. Also troubling were the 

competing priorities such exercises placed on senior headquarters. In the larger 

corps-level maneuvers, for example, the corps staff had to participate in the 

exercise itself as a senior headquarters while, at the same time, stretching to 

oversee all of the planning and administrative and logistical support for the 

whole operation. Based on those concerns, Clarke directed the Seventh Army 

headquarters to revise its field training program for 1962 to eliminate large 

46 Quarterly Training Status Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1961, Entry 2038, 

USAREUR G3 Training Operation Files, 1958–1961, RG 549, NACP; “Seventh Army Moves 

by Many Means to Winter Shield Maneuver Area,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21

Jan 1960; “Operation Winter Shield Result of Year-Long Planning,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 27 Jan 1960; Bob Hoyer, “Winter Shield Unfolds in Historical Region,” Star

and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Feb 1961; “Winter Shield Operations Scenario No Secret,”

Army Times, 21 Jan 1961.

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 2d Artillery, 8th Infantry Division, in position and ready to fire 

during Exercise Wintershield II, 8 February 
From New Look to Flexible Response

maneuvers and to substitute division-size field training efforts. With scenario 

control and direction coming from corps headquarters, the division commanders 

and staffs would be able to concentrate on the command and supervision 

required for the successful completion of the exercise. As an added benefit, 

the smaller scope of these efforts would increase emphasis on training at the 

small-unit level.47

The Seventh Army’s approach to its annual training tests for combat battalions also came to reflect General Davidson’s decentralized philosophy. Although 

units undergoing the tests had been maneuvering against live opposing forces 

since the late 1950s, many of the problems still reflected the checklist-oriented, 

canned-scenario approach of earlier days. In response, Davidson eliminated the 

checklists and numerical scores entirely and directed that umpires assign only 

two grades to participating units—Combat Ready or Not Combat Ready. He 

also replaced the previous 72-hour Army Training Test with new evaluations 

for battle groups. These combat readiness tests could last as long as ten days. 

The problems posed also changed so that they now included not only the battle 

group to be tested, but also the artillery, tanks, engineers, aviation, and other 

supporting elements that would normally be attached to that force. The battle 

group headquarters administered shorter tests to companies and platoons. 

These pitted each unit against live and constantly changing opponents who 

forced them to react to a range of unpredictable challenges and situations.48

As it evolved, the Seventh Army training program also reflected the Army’s 

renewed interest in aerial mobility, either by parachute or by helicopter. The 

airborne battle groups of the 8th Infantry Division continued parachute training 

on a regular basis, with their soldiers making as many as twelve thousand jumps 

during one three-month period. In one exercise during July 1961, more than 

three hundred soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 2d Artillery, parachuted into the 

Baumholder training area along with their 105-mm. howitzers, ammunition, 

and supporting equipment. Other events, such as Fer de Lance in March 196

and Golden Arrow in May 1960, tested the effectiveness of small airborn

units deployed in isolated missions over unfamiliar terrain. Meanwhile, infantry 

and artillery units that were not parachute qualified made extensive use of the 

helicopters that were arriving in Germany in ever growing numbers. Aviation 

units airlifted infantry in a number of maneuvers and simulations. As the 

quantity of aircraft in the command continued to increase, divisions learned to 

deploy entire battle groups of a thousand men or more in heliborne assaults.49

47 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, pp. 106–07; “USAREUR 

Alters Scale of Exercises,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Apr 1961. 48 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 112; “New 3d Armored 

Testing Assures Realistic Combat Environment,” Army Times, 25 Mar 1961; “24th Division 

Lauds New Type ATT,” Army Times, 8 Apr 1961; “Spearheaders to Increase Battalion-Size 

Exercises,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 Feb 1962. 49 Quarterly Training Status Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 26 Jul 1960; Msg, SX–3215, CINCUSAREUR, to CINCEUR, 9 May 1960. Both in Entry 2038, USAREUR G3 Training Operation 

Files, 1958–1961, RG 549, NACP. Henry B. Kraft, “Air Dropping an Artillery Battalion,” 
456 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Perhaps the most significant shift in training emphasis during this period 

resulted from a growing awareness of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Although 

the United States Army had yet to become fully engaged in Vietnam, its leaders 

were already preparing the force for its potential involvement. President Kennedy 

himself had taken a special interest in counterinsurgency, unconventional 

warfare, and in the Army’s Special Forces units. In an August 1962 training 

circular, the Seventh Army headquarters identified the command’s interest in 

developing an unconventional warfare capability. Since the end of World War 

II, it noted, active insurgencies and guerrilla warfare campaigns had occurred 

in more than twenty-five countries around the world. Counterinsurgency and 

counterguerrilla operations were becoming the Army’s business, and all elements 

of the force would have to develop a proficiency in this type of warfare.50

As a result, although the Seventh Army’s primary mission remained combat 

readiness in anticipation of a conventional or atomic conflict with forces 

of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the command acknowledged its 

responsibility for preparing its officers and soldiers for a worldwide role. To 

that end, commanders emphasized that the Seventh Army’s combat readiness 

mission already contained a special warfare component because the execution 

of emergency defense plans might require forward area personnel to engage 

in operations against hostile airborne forces. Units with rear-area security 

tasks, they added, would also have a special need for training in counterguerrilla tactics and techniques because radio relay stations, bridges, fuel and 

ammunition stockpiles, and nuclear weapons storage sites would all be prime 

targets for saboteurs or airborne attackers. Individuals and small groups might 

become isolated or cut off during an enemy advance. In such cases, the more 

they knew about partisan warfare the better, for they had to be prepared to 

sustain themselves behind enemy lines and to fight as guerrillas while evading 

or escaping capture.51

With those concerns in mind, special warfare training received increased 

emphasis in the Seventh Army, which established an intensive school program 

and furnished mobile orientation teams, tactical training, and a vigorous 

troop information program. On 2 April 1962, USAREUR augmented those 

efforts by opening a paramilitary operations course at the Intelligence School 

at Oberammergau. Available to officers with a rank of captain or higher, the 

program lasted seven weeks, imparted specific information on military and 

paramilitary techniques to combat an active insurgency, and supplied guidance 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 22 Jul 1961; “8th Infantry Division Units Jump in France 

Maneuvers,” Army Times, 19 Mar 1960; Joe McBride, “Golden Arrow Stars With Mass Ai

Drop,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20 May 1960; “Battle Group From 24th Infantry 

Division Airlifted in Operation Black Lion,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 30 Nov 1960

Pete Foley, “3d Infantry Division Troops Airlifted by Copters in Exercise,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 4 May 1961. 50 HQ, Seventh Army, Training Cir 31–1, Special Warfare Training, 31 Aug 1962, Entry 

33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. 51 Ibid.
From New Look to Flexible Response

on how to identify and eliminate sources of unrest within local populations. 

A mobile training team consisting of officers from the Seventh Army Training 

Division and the 10th Special Forces Group conducted briefings for key officers, 

and a training circular provided additional guidance to field commanders on 

how to integrate special warfare into training programs.52

The burgeoning interest in counterinsurgency and special warfare played 

to the strengths of the troops who made up the 10th Special Forces Group at 

Bad Tölz. Throughout the late 1950s, the group had developed its expertise 

in organizing partisan units behind enemy lines and in combating guerrilla 

forces by training with special operations units throughout NATO and in other 

allied nations. Exercises with familiar counterparts in England, France, and 

Norway—in addition to opportunities to train alongside troops in Turkey, 

Pakistan, Iran, and Jordan—provided 10th Special Forces Group soldiers with 

invaluable experience. The group also deployed teams for operations outside 

of its European mission area, as in 1960, when a small group of Special Forces 

troopers accompanied a flight of Army helicopters to the Belgian Congo to assist 

in the evacuation of American and European civilians from the violence-torn 

country.53

Distractions

No military organization operates in a self-contained environment, where 

its only concern is to prepare for its operational mission. Instead, units must 

deal with all the distractions, complications, and formalities that come with 

existing in the real world. In Europe, USAREUR and the Seventh Army had 

more than their share of competing issues that demanded their attention.

The distraction with the greatest potential to undermine the combat readiness of the American troops in Europe was the recurring shortage of suitable 

local and major training areas and facilities. The growing German economy 

continued to encroach on existing sites, and U.S. forces faced increasing 

pressure to restrict their use of local training areas or to terminate their use 

altogether and turn the land over to local governments. This was particularly 

true of those sites located in or around large urban districts. For several years, 

the Seventh Army had been free to maneuver across most of West Germany 

during its major exercises. The growing urban sprawl around major cities and 

the excessive costs incurred in compensating Germans for damage to property 

and crops had greatly curtailed that freedom of maneuver. The Americans 

retained control over their four major training sites—Grafenwöhr, Baumholder, 

Hohenfels, and Wildflecken—but those no longer met the growing requirements 

for maneuver space and firing ranges. The mechanization of the three infantry 

divisions only added to the problem by increasing the amount of space those 

52 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, pp. 4-73–4-76. 53 Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years (Novato, Calif.: 

Presidio Press, 1983), pp. 47, 77–81.
458 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

units had to have to deploy and to train. American forces were also in need of 

additional sites for armor and river-crossing training, and for parachute drop 

zones. Demands from the Bundeswehr and from French forces in Germany for 

access to existing maneuver areas complicated matters further by drastically 

reducing facilities and training time available to U.S. forces.54 

The continued influx of new long-range weapons systems also complicated 

USAREUR’s ability to train many of its soldiers. In its regular training status 

reports, the Seventh Army pointed out that it lacked range facilities for many 

of its new weapons, including its Nike and Hawk air defense missiles and 

its Corporal, Lacrosse, Redstone, and Sergeant surface-to-surface missiles. 

Although the command had discussed building a range for NATO use on the 

island of Crete, it had not yet begun construction.55

In July 1962, with new commanders in place at both USAREUR and 

Seventh Army headquarters, the command made one more attempt to obtain 

additional space for training. Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, who had taken command 

of the Seventh Army in March, sent a letter to General Freeman, who had 

replaced General Clarke in May, suggesting that USAREUR organize a 

comprehensive study to determine long-range requirements and to propose 

solutions. He pointed out that problems with training sites were shared by all 

NATO nations and had potentially far-reaching implications. A piecemeal 

approach to resolving the issue had not been effective in the past, he added, and 

would not be in the future. Freeman declined to sponsor the study at his level, 

saying that it was primarily a Seventh Army problem and that a USAREUR 

effort to determine long-range NATO requirements might only open the 

door for increased requests from alliance forces. The general authorized the 

Seventh Army to begin a study at its level to determine future requirements 

and additional facilities or sites that might become available.56

Other distractions arose from the hazardous nature of military training 

itself. Although safety issues had been a major concern for USAREUR since 

the activation of the command, accidents were an inevitable by-product of daily 

activities that included heavy machinery, live ammunition, and men working 

under conditions of extreme stress and fatigue. Nonetheless, the explosion 

of an 8-inch howitzer shell in the middle of a Grafenwöhr bivouac area on 2 

September 1960 caught the attention of everyone in the theater and served as a 

reminder of the deadly nature of the Army’s business. The investigation which 

followed showed that artillerymen of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery, had loaded 

the projectile with an excessive powder charge, causing the shell to overshoot 

54 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, p. 4-57; Quarterly Training Status 

Rpts, HQ, USAREUR, 1 Apr–30 Jun 1960 and 1 Jul–30 Sep 1960, Entry 2038, USAREUR G3 

Training Operations, 1958–1961, RG 549, NACP. 55 Quarterly Training Status Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1960, Entry 2038, USAREUR 

G3 Training Operations, 1958–1961, RG 549, NACP. 56 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, pp. 4-57–4-64.
From New Look to Flexible Response

its target by some two thousand yards. It hit a tent area occupied by members 

of the 3d Reconnaissance Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 3d Armored Division.57

On the scene at the time was 1st Lt. Colin L. Powell, executive officer for 

Company D, 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry. Powell watched as the shell detonated; 

dismembered arms, legs, and hands thumped to the ground around him. Inside 

the tent he zipped open a sleeping bag to find what looked like “an illustration 

of viscera in a medical textbook.”58 The explosion killed sixteen soldiers and 

wounded dozens more, making it the worst postwar training accident that U.S. 

troops in Germany had ever suffered.

After an extensive investigation, the Army brought formal charges of 

negligent homicide against three men, the battery executive officer, the battery 

safety officer, and the powder man in the gun crew. It charged the chief of the 

gun crew with dereliction of duty. The battery safety officer was found guilty of 

negligent homicide, fined $300, reprimanded, and suspended from any command 

position for one year. The court found the other defendants not guilty on all 

counts. A senior artillery officer testifying during the mitigation phase of the trial 

noted that it was inherently unsafe to bring the higher charges to Grafenwöhr, 

since the ranges there were not large enough to contain them. He admonished 

all present that officers running the firing ranges had to stop acting out of habit 

and keep thinking all the time. The accident prompted the Army to review its 

firing range safety procedures for all weapons and brought about increased 

training requirements for personnel appointed as range safety officers.59

While the tragic accident and the subsequent investigation attracted 

attention throughout USAREUR, the rather arcane details of field artillery 

gunnery and safety procedures failed to capture the interest of most in the 

United States. On the other hand, the investigation of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. 

Walker, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, for his controversial program 

of anti-Communist indoctrination and his relationship with the John Birch 

Society fostered considerable debate in Congress, the newspapers, and among 

the general public.

The case raised the specter of a war hero who had gone too far in his 

anti-Communist zeal. Walker, a 1931 U.S. Military Academy graduate, had 

commanded the First Special Service Force during World War II and the 3d 

Infantry Division’s 7th Infantry during the Korean War. He had served as 

the commander of the 24th Infantry Division in Europe since 1959. In April 

1961, the Overseas Weekly printed a story alleging that a troop indoctrination 

57 “Howitzer Overshoot Kills 15, Injures 27 at Grafenwöhr,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 3 Sep 1960; “Shell Blast Claims 16th Life,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 4 Sep 

1960; “Long Round Kills 16 in Germany,” Army Times, 10 Sep 1960. 58 Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 49–50. 59 “Army Charges 3 in Deaths at Grafenwöhr,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Dec 

1960; Gene Donner, “Testimony Ends in 1st Grafenwöhr Trial,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 15 Dec 1960; idem, “Kempf Fined, Suspended in Rank for Year,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 16 Dec 1960; “Gun Crew Chief Wins Acquittal in Overshoot Trial,” Stars 

and Stripes, European Edition, 22 Jan 1961.
460 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

program Walker had established to inform his division about the “enemies who 

would destroy us,” had been based on the philosophies of the controversial 

John Birch Society. The newspaper had also quoted the general as saying that 

President Truman, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Eleanor 

Roosevelt were Communist sympathizers. General Walker responded to the 

news story by calling the Overseas Weekly “immoral, unscrupulous, corrupt, and 

destructive.” As one reporter noted, however, he did not specifically deny that 

he had made the statements in question. Newspapers across the United States 

reported the confrontation in detail and raised eyebrows in Congress, where 

various senators demanded that the Army investigate. Generals were entitled 

to whatever lunatic private views they wished to espouse, one said, but they 

were not entitled to use the machinery of the U.S. Army to corrupt the troops.60

 The Army could not withstand the public outcry for long. On 18 April 

1961, Secretary of the Army Stahr directed General Clarke, the USAREUR 

commander, to relieve Walker of his command and transfer him to USAREUR 

headquarters pending a formal investigation. Clarke appointed Lt. Gen. 

Frederic J. Brown, the V Corps commander, to investigate the case as an acting 

inspector general. Two months later, on 12 June, the Army announced the 

results of General Brown’s investigation. Based on the evidence, General Clarke 

concluded that Walker had made derogatory remarks of a serious nature about 

several prominent American political leaders and members of the press. He also 

observed that the general had failed to heed cautions by his superiors regarding 

“controversial activities which were contrary to long standing customs of the 

military service.” In the end, Clarke administered a formal admonishment to 

Walker, notified him that the Army had revoked his pending assignment as 

commanding general of the VIII Corps in Austin, Texas, and directed him to 

remain in Heidelberg until he received further orders. Walker returned to the 

United States in October 1961 and, on 2 November, announced his resignation 

from the Army.61

The general’s resignation prompted a backlash in Congress. Senators Barry 

M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and J. Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.) argued that Walker 

had been muzzled by the Pentagon. Other political leaders, including Senator J. 

William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and Secretary McNamara countered that the rights 

of all service members were protected, but that the military was an instrument, 

60 First quote from “Walker Defends Pro-Blue Troop Program,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 15 Apr 1961. Second quote from “Statement by Gen Walker Assails Overseas Weekly,” 

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Apr 1961. Sydney Gruson, “Birch Unit Ideas Put to 

U.S. Troops,” New York Times, 14 Apr 1961; “General Walker Denies Charge of Link to John 

Birch Society,” New York Times, 15 Apr 1961. 61 Quote from “Walker Admonished After Army’s Probe,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 13 Jun 1961. Interv, Col Francis B. Kish with Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, pp. 

214–15, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI; Paul Spiers, “General Walker Transferred 

Pending Probe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18 Apr 1961; Russell Baker, “Walker Is 

Rebuked for Linking Public Figures to Communism,” New York Times, 13 Jun 1961; “General 

Walker Quitting Army,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Nov 1961. 
From New Look to Flexible Response

not a shaper of U.S. policy. Military leaders, they said, did not have the right 

to use the military establishment to advance partisan positions or to alter the 

decisions of the elected representatives of the people.62

In addition to resurrecting the traditional debate over political expression in 

the military, however, the Walker case also revealed a nation that was beginning 

to move beyond the list-waving, loyalty-oath approach to anticommunism that 

had been exemplified by former Senator Joseph McCarthy. In many respects, 

the Army’s concerns were less about the general’s right to express his political 

views and more about the ham-handed way in which he expressed them. The 

service had been on the receiving end of McCarthy’s witch-hunt when he 

prompted a Senate investigation into its promotion policies. The live televised 

hearings helped expose the senator’s accusations as unfounded and his tactics 

as little more than bluff and bullying. Having played such a significant role in 

the destruction of one anti-Communist demagogue in the 1950s, the Army was 

in no mood to embrace another as the new decade began.

On 16 November 1960, President Eisenhower dropped a bombshell that 

proved to be the greatest distraction of all to the troops in Europe and, in many

ways, to the Army as a whole. Less than a week after the election of his successor, 

John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower ordered the recall, beginning in January 1961, 

of some 284,000 dependents of U.S. troops stationed overseas. The president 

was deeply concerned about a serious deficit in the balance of payments and 

the outflow of gold from the national treasury. By bringing more than half 

of U.S. military dependents deployed overseas back to the United States, he 

hoped to curtail the spending of American dollars in foreign markets. With 

that goal in mind, Eisenhower also directed U.S. agencies abroad, including 

the U.S. military, to purchase a greater percentage of the goods and services 

they needed from American vendors.63

The damage to troop morale in Europe was immediate and overwhelming. 

Just within the previous few months, the Army had taken steps to lengthen 

overseas tours and to allow some junior enlisted men to have their families 

accompany them in Europe. One Army spokesman declared that no soldier 

could be expected to remain in the service when he could not rely on the Army 

to maintain consistent policies regarding his family. Newspapers and magazines, 

both military and civilian, were swamped with letters of protest from soldiers 

and their families. Army personnel officers predicted that resignations would 

increase in both officer and enlisted ranks, that reenlistment rates would 

62 John J. Ford, “McNamara Backs Walker Case Findings, Denies Muzzling,” Army Times, 

16 Sep 1961; idem, “Senate Group to Investigate Officer Muzzling Charges,” Army Times, 14 Oct 

1961; Herb Scott, “Symington in Germany; Seeks Data on Walker,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 8 Nov 1961; Jack Raymond, “Military’s Role in Politics Stirs an Old Debate,” New 

York Times, 17 Sep 1961. For more information on the Army’s attempts to indoctrinate soldiers 

about Cold War issues, see DeRosa, Political Indoctrination in the U.S. Army. For another point 

of view, see Bogle, The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind. 63 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 48; “284,000 U.S. Dependents Ordered to Return Home,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Nov 1960.
462 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

drop, and that the service would need to expand draft calls to make up for the 

departures of experienced troops.64

The Department of Defense and the Army took immediate steps to try and 

mitigate the impact of the directive. The day after the president’s order, the 

Defense Department announced that it would meet most of the fifteen thousand 

per month reduction by halting future movement of dependents overseas rather 

than by forcing those already there to return ahead of their scheduled departure 

dates. For his part, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. expressed little 

sympathy for the plight of the troops. He told reporters that soldiers were 

accustomed to sacrifice and that it was traditional for them to be separated 

from their families. While the policy might require strong leadership, he said, 

soldiers were dedicated people who understood the decision. In response, one 

soldier told Stars and Stripes that the secretary did not speak for the troops, 

who had pledged their lives for the preservation of the nation, not to save its 

gold reserves.65

Before the Army and the Defense Department could begin the reductions, 

in one of his first official acts after taking office, President Kennedy rescinded 

Eisenhower’s directive, but with a string attached. Announcing the reprieve, 

Secretary McNamara asked that, as part of an overall campaign to reduce 

the gold outflow, each individual residing overseas reduce by $80 per year his 

purchase of foreign goods. In Europe, General Clarke immediately endorsed 

the move and urged soldiers and their families to cut their spending beyond the 

$80 goal. He also supported a continuing campaign for the monthly purchase 

of savings bonds as a way to stem the flow of dollars into the European 

economy. For its part, USAREUR took a number of steps to reduce its own 

foreign expenditures. It canceled several contracts for services or supplies from 

European vendors and began issuing procurement requests in the continental 

United States for fulfillment by American companies. The command also 

reduced the amount of depot-level maintenance in Europe, shifted the rebuilding 

of major items to facilities in the United States wherever practical, canceled 

many construction projects to avoid the excessive transfer of funds to foreign 

firms, and eliminated more than one thousand local hire employees, often 

replacing them with military dependents or off-duty military personnel.66

64 “Army Acts to Ease Family Worries,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 May 1960; 

“Revised Pentagon Policy Liberalizes Privileges for Dependents of Army E4s,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 10 Jun 1960; “Dependent Status Authorized for E-4s Families Overseas,” 

Army Times, 11 Jun 1960; “Many Seen Getting Out,” Army Times, 26 Nov 1960. 65 Paul Spiers, “U.S. to Meet Cutback Order by Holding Dependents Home,” Stars and 

Stripes, European Edition, 18 Nov 1960; “Order to Return Dependents Stirs Bitter Replies,” 

Army Times, 26 Nov 1960. 66 HQ, USAREUR, Report of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr-1962, p. 48; “Pentagon Cut Canceled,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 2 Feb 1961; Paul Spiers, “Pentagon Asks Americans 

Abroad to Trim Spending by $80 a Year,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 Feb 1961; 

“Service Families Hunt Ways to Make $80 Cut,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 4 Feb 1961; 
From New Look to Flexible Response

In another attempt to reduce the expenditure of U.S. dollars in Europe, the 

Army briefly experimented with a unit replacement plan similar in concept to 

the earlier Gyroscope. Dubbed ROTAPLAN, the concept involved rotating 

battle groups from the United States to Germany for six month tours without 

dependents. Each of these units would replace a USAREUR battle group, which 

would return to the United States with its dependents. In the initial rotation, 

which began 15 October 1962, the 2d Infantry Division’s 1st Battle Group, 38th 

Infantry, from Fort Benning, Georgia, exchanged places with the 8th Infantry 

Division’s 1st Battle Group, 26th Infantry, in Baumholder. The evaluation that 

followed revealed that preparing the battle groups for rotation and shipping 

them overseas cost more than normal replacement programs and resulted in 

no apparent decrease in the flow of gold overseas. Meanwhile, the separation 

of soldiers from their families caused increased morale problems and, without 

accompanying per diem payments, led to financial hardships for many in the 

lower ranks. In the light of these findings, officials in USAREUR concluded 

that they could not use ROTAPLAN to maintain long-term deployment of 

forces in Europe and recommended cancellation of the program.67

Taken as a whole, the efforts to reduce overseas expenditures began to 

show some results by the end of 1962. In June, a letter from USAREUR to the 

Seventh Army cited a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, which indicated 

that Army-sponsored individuals in Europe had averaged a $50 reduction in 

gold flow savings over the preceding year. The command established a new 

goal of $100 per person for the following year. In response, the Seventh Army 

established a gold flow committee to consider further actions the organization 

could take to reduce expenditures.68

Looking Toward the Future

The years 1960 through 1962 were a period of turbulence and transition 

for the U.S. Army in Europe. The force had endured the benign neglect of 

President Eisenhower’s strategic priorities but had not yet fully incorporated 

the changes in organization, equipment, and doctrine necessary to implement 

completely President Kennedy’s more flexible approach to military policy. If, 

moreover, the Seventh Army divisions still retained their pentomic structure at 

the end of 1962, philosophically they had already begun to convert to a more 

versatile orientation. The years also marked an important milestone, with the 

Seventh Army, in 1961, celebrating the tenth anniversary of its reactivation. 

Herb Scott, “Clarke Stresses Need to Speed Pace of Thrift Drive,” Stars and Stripes, European 

Edition, 23 Jan 1961. 67 Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in 

Europe, 1945–1963, 1964, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; George Fielding 

Eliot, “Unit Rotation to Europe,” Army Times, 11 Aug 1962; “ROTAPLAN Group Exchanges 

Begin,” Army Times, 20 Oct 1962. 68 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, pp. 2-2–2-4.
464 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

During that time, its presence had helped to allay European concerns over 

Communist expansion; the East-West confrontation had reached a climax 

over the construction of the Berlin Wall; and, for a moment, U.S. and Soviet 

tanks had faced each other at point blank range across the no-man’s-land of 

Checkpoint Charlie. Then, with those crises resolved, both sides paused to 

take a breath.

For USAREUR and the soldiers of the Seventh Army, ominous news was 

beginning to emanate from Southeast Asia. Even as their forces reorganized 

and recovered from the pentomic–atomic weapons fixation, USAREUR’s 

leaders considered what effect the growing conflict in Vietnam might have 

on their own command. Service news publications reported that U.S. Army 

helicopters were flying cover for troop-carrying aircraft in South Vietnam. 

The Army Times reported in February 1962 that, while the United States had 

not officially committed troops to combat in the theater, it was well known 

that more than four thousand soldiers, sailors, and marines were engaged in 

advisory and assistance activities there. Almost lost in the frenzy caused by the 

buildup of U.S. forces in Europe to meet the crisis in Berlin was a notification 

that President Kennedy had sent General Taylor to South Vietnam to determine 

how best to strengthen that government against Communist attack. Finally, 

observers in the news media noted the increased attention the administration 

was beginning to pay to the capabilities of the Army’s Special Forces units, 

especially as a means of dealing with an emerging mission—counterinsurgency.69

For ten years, the Army in Europe had accomplished what it had been sent 

to do, maintaining the peace by being at all times prepared for war. By the end 

of 1962, however, it appeared that an era of single-minded focus was drawing 

to a close and that a broader array of challenges lay ahead.

69 “New U.S. Moves in Vietnam Draw Line on Red Expansion,” Army Times, 17 Feb 1962; 

“Copters Fly Cover,” Army Times, 27 Oct 1962; “Taylor Being Sent to Vietnam,” Stars and Stripes, 

European Edition, 12 Oct 1961; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Army Has New Cold War Job,” Army 

Times, 14 Apr 1962; idem, “Glamor Outfit Is at Hand,” Army Times, 11 Mar 1961.
By 1962, USAREUR had achieved almost all of the goals that service 

leaders had set for it more than ten years earlier. First and foremost, its very 

existence offered a measure of security in the face of the large Soviet military 

presence in Eastern Europe. Even though American military strength in Europe 

never approached parity in numbers with the Soviets, the five plus divisions 

and supporting elements that made up the U.S. Seventh Army were enough to 

raise the ante to a point where no attacker could assume an easy victory. More 

important, the presence of so many U.S. soldiers in the path of a Communist 

advance raised the specter of an American nuclear response. Finally, even if the 

Communists never crossed the inter-German border, those forces provided a 

counterweight to Soviet political pressure and coercion and helped to reassure 

the nations of Western Europe that the United States would stand by them.

The tangible strength of the U.S. Army in Europe was in itself formidable. 

By the end of 1962, the composition and deployment of the Seventh Army 

had remained fairly stable since the end of the Gyroscope rotations in 1958. 

The Seventh Army headquarters continued to occupy at Patch Barracks, near 

Stuttgart, with the V Corps headquarters at the old I. G. Farben complex in 

Frankfurt and the VII Corps headquarters at Nellingen Barracks, also near 

Stuttgart. In the V Corps sector, the 3d Infantry Division occupied barracks 

around Würzburg, the 3d Armored Division around Frankfurt, and the 8th 

Infantry Division around Bad Kreuznach. The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment 

screened the corps front, covering the primary Soviet approach through the 

Fulda Gap. Farther south in the VII Corps area, the 24th Infantry Division 

stayed in the area around Augsburg and the 4th Armored Division around 

Göppingen and Neu Ulm. The 2d and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments 

provided forward security along the border with Czechoslovakia, covering the 

approach through the Hof Gap. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment remained 

in Kaiserslautern after its deployment to Germany during the Berlin crisis and 

served as the Seventh Army’s primary reserve.1

Although the combat strength of the command would always be important, 

the true value of USAREUR lay in its role as a symbol of the American 

commitment to the long-term defense of Western Europe. The return to Europe 

1 U.S. Army Directory and Station List, 17 Dec 1962, Historians files, CMH.

13

Conclusion: Defining an E
466 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

of a complete field army and the development of the command and control, 

administrative, and logistical infrastructures to support it sent a clear signal 

to the Soviets. Whether the force represented a credible forward defense in 

and of itself or merely served as a trip wire for a nuclear response was never 

particularly relevant. It represented the American commitment to the continent 

for the long haul.

Despite the nation’s intervention in Korea in 1950, American military and 

political leaders had always regarded Western Europe as the linchpin in their 

struggle to contain the spread of communism. As a result, the Army designed 

its organization, its doctrine, and its weapons in anticipation of ground combat 

against the forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Early Seventh 

Army commanders such as Generals Eddy and McAuliffe looked to the German 

Army’s experience in World War II against the Red Army as a model on which 

to develop a doctrine for combat in Europe. That analysis, layered on the U.S. 

Army organization and equipment that emerged after the war, provided the 

basis for the force’s battle plans in Europe. 

The enormous amounts of manpower and equipment available to the 

Soviets always stood as a dilemma facing those officers in USAREUR charged 

with defeating a Communist advance. The challenge to find a way to fight 

outnumbered and win became a mantra for the U.S. Army in Europe. During 

the early 1950s, concepts of mobile defense with an emphasis on the firepower 

of artillery and the mobility of armor began to give way to a doctrine based 

more on the exploitation of atomic weapons. The need to be able to break up 

large Soviet formations of tanks and armored vehicles prompted the service 

to develop its own atomic firepower. Army leaders understood that the Air 

Force’s priorities lay in strategic bombing and in the battle for air superiority 

over Europe. They could not count on air-delivered atomic weapons or even 

conventional close air support to break up enemy assaults. The deployment to 

Europe of artillery, rockets, and missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads 

provided an answer, giving USAREUR and the Seventh Army a capability to 

overcome the Soviets’ numerical advantage. 

The Army’s obsession with atomic weapons reached a pinnacle in the 

mid-1950s with the development and fielding of the pentomic division. 

Although the organization was, in some ways, a response to the Eisenhower 

administration’s doctrine of massive retaliation, it also seemed to present the 

best option for defeating the numerically superior Communist forces in Europe. 

Almost as soon as the Seventh Army reorganized its divisions to fit the pentomic 

concept, however, its leaders identified fatal shortcomings in the concept. The 

expanded span of control for division and battle group commanders proved to 

be excessive, and the Army had yet to field many of the vehicles and equipment 

that would give the organization the mobility and communications it needed to 

operate on an atomic battlefield. At the same time, military and political leaders 

across Western Europe began to have second thoughts about an overreliance 

on tactical atomic weapons. By the end of the decade, most had come to the 

conclusion that any atomic exchange in Europe would leave behind little more 
Conclusion: Defining an Era 4

worth defending than radioactive piles of rubble. In other words, while atomic 

weapons might help to deter war, they were not a viable means for fighting one.2

As it began to pull back from its atomic infatuation, the U.S. Army of the 

1960s returned to what it understood best and began re-equipping its forces in 

Europe with a new generation of small arms, armored vehicles, and artillery. 

With the pentomic experiment behind it, the service was also well on its way to 

restoring a more balanced organization and doctrine. Although USAREUR 

would continue to maintain its readiness for combat in Europe, many of its 

leaders now paused to consider the nation’s growing commitment in Southeast 

Asia, and how deep that commitment might come to be. In the same manner, 

many of the troops who would go to war in Vietnam received their early 

training in Europe. Since USAREUR and the Seventh Army made up such a 

large portion of the overall force, levies for experienced soldiers to fill out units 

heading to Vietnam would have to come from those commands.

While, in many ways, the Army in Europe in 1962 looked very much 

like the Army of 1952, the officers and soldiers who made up the force were 

different. In 1952, almost all of the senior officers and noncommissioned officers 

in USAREUR were veterans of World War II. With that experience came a 

certain amount of resolve and resignation. Although no one looked forward 

with any eagerness to a conflict with the Soviets, the veterans had survived the 

greatest war in history and acknowledged a need to prepare for future conflict. 

For the most part, however, their preparations lacked the sort of apocalyptic 

anticipation that would come to characterize future visions of modern war. To 

the extent that they thought about atomic weapons at all, the World War II 

generation considered them as more powerful versions of the weapons already 

used. The United States had employed atomic weapons against the Japanese, 

and it would use them against the Soviets, if need be. By 1962, the change was 

significant. Only the most experienced noncommissioned officers were World 

War II veterans, and only the Seventh Army commander and some of his 

senior leaders had significant combat experience. The threat of widespread 

employment of atomic weapons cast warfare into an entirely different light. The 

actual dangers were significant enough, but the negative symbolism of atomic 

weapons had become even greater. Although no less dedicated and dutiful than 

their predecessors, the soldiers of the 1960s approached their mission with a 

greater degree of skepticism and uncertainty. 

Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents released after the collapse of the 

Soviet Union indicate an almost parallel line of thinking regarding warfare in 

Western Europe. Nearly all Soviet war plans envisioned a conflict beginning 

with a NATO attack on East Germany. The initial Soviet response included a 

barrage of some 131 tactical nuclear missiles and bombs against NATO airfields, 

communications centers, supply depots, and troop concentrations. Plans for 

2 For a detailed discussion on NATO’s concurrent move away from an overreliance on 

atomic weapons, see John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional 

Force Posture (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995).
468 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

the Warsaw Pact’s counteroffensive against the Western aggressors included a 

primary strike across the North German Plain, turning north to the Netherlands 

and the Danish peninsula. A supporting attack emerging from Czechoslovakia 

would advance through the Fulda and Hof Gaps with a goal of crossing the 

Rhine within seven days. Interviews with Warsaw Pact leaders, particularly 

commanders of allied formations, reflected skepticism toward the utility of 

nuclear weapons akin to that expressed by Western officers. Nuclear war was 

impossible, they believed, because both sides would annihilate each other.3

In this climate of mutual uncertainty, the presence of so many civilians and 

dependents in the theater, and the growth of facilities needed to support them, 

served as an important barometer of American intentions. Whatever fears the 

Soviets might have harbored regarding the rearming of West Germany were 

mitigated to some extent by the growing American civilian community there. 

As long as U.S. dependents remained in the middle of what would be the main 

battle area, the Soviets could be reasonably certain that neither the Americans 

nor the West Germans would initiate hostilities or take any actions that might 

provoke a military response. On the other hand, the noncombatant evacuation 

exercises that USAREUR staged on a regular basis provided the West with a 

means to send a clear and powerful signal that, if necessary, it was prepared to 

raise its level of readiness by clearing the field for war.

Even if deterrence succeeded and the Soviet Army did not cross the frontier, 

the presence of U.S. forces in Europe served a political as well as military 

purpose. By the early 1950s, intelligence analysts had concluded that, despite its 

threats and bluster, the Soviet Union had no more desire for war than the rest 

of Europe. What Western leaders feared, however, was that the Communists 

would use their tremendous military strength to coerce concessions and political 

cooperation from Western European countries still recovering from the war. The 

U.S. Army that remained in Europe after 1945 and the troops that followed in 

the 1950s served to shield Europe from such threats and to reassure Europeans 

of the American commitment. This allowed Europe’s economies to recover 

and thrive, setting them on independent, if not always pro-American, lines of 

foreign policy and economic development. By 1962, with crises over Berlin under 

control, Western Europe could lapse into a period of relative calm as the two 

superpowers developed new, less dangerous fields for competition elsewhere.

The Army in Europe thus contributed substantially to the structural, 

economic, and spiritual recovery of the continent. Germany in 1951 was still 

3 Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day? The 1964 Warsaw Pact Plan for a Nuclear War in Europe 

and Related Documents, May 2000; and Oral History Interviews with Polish Generals, Sep 2002. 

Both in Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Washington, D.C., Historians 

files, CMH. CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Soviet Military Thought on Future War, 3 

Apr 1962, copy in Historians files, CMH. For one German perspective on the potential fight in 

Europe, see F. W. von Mellenthin, Erick Sobik, and Russel H. S. Stolfi, NATO Under Attack: 

Why the Western Alliance Can Fight Outnumbered and Win in Central Europe Without Nuclear 

Weapons (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984).
Conclusion: Defining an Era 4

an occupied nation. Allied forces had rooted out most remnants of the Nazi 

regime and had confiscated what remained of the German war machine, but 

the former foe was still unprepared to regain sovereign status. Through their 

military government and civil affairs components, the European Command and 

USAREUR worked with German governments at local, state, and national 

levels to restore civil administration and public works. Through thousands of 

acts of individual and collective goodwill, American soldiers and units helped 

to rebuild schools, playgrounds, and other facilities needed to return civilians 

to some semblance of normal life. Although it served officially as an occupation 

force until 1955, by 1951 the Army was acting more as an ally in helping to 

manage Germany’s gradual transition toward sovereignty. Across the nation 

but particularly in West Berlin, the reassuring presence of American soldiers 

helped provide a measure of stability and confidence for civilians working to 

rebuild their lives. As a result, free from the intimidation and threats posed 

by its Communist neighbors, the West German economy was able to recover 

and thrive.

Even as West Germany was emerging from its occupied status, it was 

becoming clear to Western military and political leaders that they could not 

create a viable defense of Western Europe without the participation of German 

armed forces. The U.S. Army’s role in helping to arm, train, and guide the 

Bundeswehr to where it could take its place in the front lines of NATO’s defenses 

was perhaps its greatest contribution to Western security. American forces 

established schools for training the new soldiers and provided teams to assist 

German units learning to use American weapons and equipment. Although the 

new German Army soon discarded many elements of the American organization 

and doctrine and began to procure German weapons and equipment as soon 

as the nation’s economy was able to produce them, it integrated American 

concepts of military professionalism subordinate to civilian control into its 

own long-established traditions. As a result, Germany’s new armed forces bore 

scant resemblance to their Prussian forebears. 

The relationship between the U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr continued 

to grow as they trained together during numerous USAREUR and NATO 

exercises. American units served under German control on some occasions 

while German troops operated under USAREUR and Seventh Army command 

at others. The result was an exceptionally close working relationship between 

the two forces that helped to solidify the ties between the two nations and the 

bonds uniting the NATO alliance.

Finally, for the U.S. Army as a whole, the mission in Europe served as 

a means to preserve the service’s traditions as a ground combat force while 

its leaders grappled with a presidential administration far more interested in 

strategic air and sea power. Although Eisenhower had always intended that the 

Europeans would provide the bulk of the ground force in Europe and frequently 

expressed his wish to bring home the majority of U.S. troops deployed there, 

his concerns about the effect American troop withdrawals might have on allied 

morale and the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance outweighed his desire to 
470 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

limit the U.S. ground commitment. When the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Admiral Radford, proposed the virtual elimination of the Army’s ground 

combat mission, the return of almost all Army ground forces from Germany, 

and their assignment to a domestic security role, public and congressional 

support for the Army’s continued presence in Europe eliminated any chance for 

the plan’s approval. The continued commitment in Europe shaped the Army 

as a ground combat force. 

Thus, throughout the early Cold War, the troops in Europe came to define 

the way the Army saw itself and the way it portrayed itself to others. As the 

guardians of freedom along the Iron Curtain and across the Fulda Gap, the 

soldiers of USAREUR and the Seventh Army characterized the Army in the 

same way as the stubble-faced G.I. Joe of World War II and the heliborne 

grunt who would come to exemplify the war in Vietnam. From the end of the 

Korean War through the beginning of Vietnam, when the American public 

thought about the U.S. Army, it was the force in Europe that came to mind.
National Archives and Records Administration

The vast majority of primary source material for this period comes from 

four record groups at the National Archives at College Park: RG 218, Records 

of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; RG 338, Records of U.S. Army Operational, 

Tactical, and Support Organizations (WWII and After); RG 407, Records of 

the Adjutant General’s Office; and RG 549, Records of the U.S. Army, Europe. 

The most important records relevant to the period are included in RG 549. It 

contains literally thousands of archive boxes of records roughly organized by 

headquarters or staff section. The most valuable are large collections of classified 

and unclassified correspondence, decimal files, and records from the Operations, 

Plans, Organization, and Training Section of the G–3 Staff. Although the archives 

has transferred most records relevant to the U.S. Army in Europe after World 

War II to RG 549, some still remain under their original record group 338 or 407. 

These are largely unit history files for Seventh Army and for the divisions assigned 

to it. The Seventh Army files, located in RG 338 at the time of research, were 

particularly voluminous and helpful. They included yearly command reports, after 

action reports from major training exercises, and large sections of correspondence. 

The records in RG 218 pertain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the Chairmans’ 

Files and the Geographic Files contain a great deal of planning documents and 

correspondence related to the various confrontations in and around Berlin.

In 2001, the National Archives began a project to reallocate many of its 

RG 338 records into new record groups. As a result, many source documents 

listed as RG 338, or even RG 407 have since been changed to RG 549. In some 

cases, the physical locations of the records in the archives storage vaults has 

changed as well. The most reliable constant seems to be the Master Register 

Entry Number assigned to each series of records. It has remained constant 

despite the physical and notional movement of the records and is the best way 

to identify a particular set of records for retrieval. In a few cases, records did 

not have an assigned entry number. In those instances, the series, hierarchy, and 

record group identification should be sufficient to retrieve the correct boxes.

U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center 

As the Army’s primary repository for the personal paper collections of 

its senior officers, the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania, also provided useful resources for this study. Most of the 

Bibliographica

Note
472 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

personal papers collections consist of scrapbooks, records of social engagements, 

and materials not related to the officer’s time in Europe. General Matthew B. 

Ridgway’s collection contains some material from his time as SACEUR, while 

those of Generals Manton S. Eddy and Bruce C. Clarke include some personal 

correspondence collected during their tours as Seventh Army and USAREUR 

commander. General James M. Gavin’s papers include a copy of “Beyond the 

Stars,” an autobiography he intended to publish but never completed. It includes 

some material covering his tour as VII Corps commander in Europe. Most other 

relevant collections are relatively small and contain little of value. Of considerably 

more interest to this project was the collection of oral histories on file at Carlisle as 

part of the center’s Senior Officer Debriefing Program, also known as the Senior 

Officer Oral History Program. Of the referenced interviews, those of Bruce Clarke 

and Thomas T. Handy stand out for the insights they provide into those two 

officers, while those of Bruce Palmer and Paul D. Adams are notable for their 

thoughtful observations on the evolving command structure in Europe and the 

intervention in Lebanon. Copies of almost all the senior officer interviews are 

also on file at the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Interviews cited:

General Paul D. Adams

Lieutenant General William H. Arnold

Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton

General Donald V. Bennett

General Charles L. Bolte

General Bruce C. Clarke

Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins Jr.

General J. Lawton Collins

General George H. Decker

General William E. DePuy

Colonel Dan K. Dukes (Lebanon)

General Clyde D. Eddleman

Major General Robert H. Forman (Lebanon)

General Paul L. Freeman Jr.

General James M. Gavin

General Andrew J. Goodpaster

General Barksdale Hamlett Jr.

General Thomas T. Handy

Lieutenant General John A. Heintges

General William M. Hoge

General Hamilton H. Howze

General Harold K. Johnson

Brigadier General Adam W. Meetze (Lebanon)

General Bruce Palmer Jr.

General Williston B. Palmer
Bibliography 47

General Matthew B. Ridgway

General Maxwell D. Taylor

General Melvin Zais

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Some of the most important source material for this period is contained in a 

series of monographs prepared by the USAREUR Historical Office and on file 

at the Center of Military History. These very detailed studies cover such topics as 

the construction of the line of communications across France, replacement and 

augmentation systems in Europe, and the role of USAREUR in training and 

equipping the new German Army. The Center also possesses an almost complete 

set of annual historical reports for the U.S. Army, Europe. Those histories not only 

serve as detailed primary source material in their own right, but their documentation 

also points the way to original documents used in their preparation.

USAREUR Monographs cited:

Glasgow, Lt Col William M. Jr. Attitude of USAREUR Commanders and Troops 

Toward the ROAD Organization. USAREUR Historical Section, 1964.

Gugeler, Capt Russell A. The Redesignation of Headquarters European 

Command as Headquarters United States Army Europe 1952. USAREUR 

Historical Division, 1954.

Hickman, D. J. The United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963. USAREUR 

Historical Section, 1964.

Moenk, Jean R. Establishment of Communications Through France, 

1950–1951. USAREUR Historical Division, 1952.

Integration of Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army, Europe, 1952–1954. 

 USAREUR Historical Division, 1956.

Lane, David A. Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe. 

USAREUR Historical Division, 6 Sep 1957.

Reorganization of Tactical Forces, V-E Day to 1 January 1949. EUCOM 

Historical Division, 1950.

Stacy, William E. U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, 1945–1983. 

USAREUR Military History Office, 1984.

The Line of Communications Through France, 1952–1953. USAREUR 

Historical Division, 1955.

The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe, 1945–1963. 

USAREUR Historical Division, 1964.

The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961. USAREUR Operations Division, Dec 1962.

The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon. USAREUR Historical Division, 1959.

USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance. USAREUR Historical 

Division, 1955.

USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army. USAREUR 

Historical Division, 1958.
474 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Other Records Repositories

Two other government facilities provided relevant information. At the 

Eisenhower Presidential Library, the Ann Whitman collection, the National 

Security Council Series, and the papers of General Alfred M. Gruenther helped 

to establish the parameters of the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” 

defense policies. Microfilm copies of many of Eisenhower’s papers are also 

available at Carlisle. The papers of Generals Maxwell D. Taylor and Lyman 

L. Lemnitzer are on file at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, 

D.C. Taylor’s papers contain a great deal of correspondence regarding his tour 

as Army chief of staff and his support for the pentomic division. Lemnitzer’s 

papers contain some interesting documents concerning his time as chief of staff 

and chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Berlin crisis.

Internet Sources

The internet hosts a number of Web sites that provided excellent information, particularly almost everything related to intelligence analysis of the Soviet 

military. Three sites—the Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Freedom 

of Information Act Reading Room, the Digital National Security Archives, 

and the Gale Primary Source Media site for Declassified Documents—supply 

electronic copies of government documents dealing with a wide range of subjects. 

Of particular interest for this project were intelligence summaries and estimates 

found on all three sites. The SHAPE historical office in Belgium has recently 

started posting key documents on its Web site, including many of the studies and 

decision papers prepared by the military and standing committees concerning 

alliance defense policies. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

Cold War International History Project and the Swiss-sponsored Parallel History 

Project on Cooperative Security have also produced Web sites containing useful 

original documents and interpretative publications. ProQuest, available through 

the Pentagon library Web site, provides access to historical copies of a number of 

daily newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Post. Daily 

coverage of the Eisenhower administration’s military policy and accompanying 

editorials give useful context for events as they transpired in Europe.

Army News Publications

The European edition of the Army-sponsored newspaper, the Stars and 

Stripes, provided a surprising amount of detailed information on the day-to-day 

activities of soldiers in USAREUR as well as coverage of major exercises and 

events within the command. The paper’s coverage is in such detail that it caused 

one USAREUR commander to complain that it was giving, for free, more 

detailed intelligence information to the enemy than his own intelligence service. 

The paper’s daily chronology of events in USAREUR provided the framework 

on which the rest of the volume is built. The Army’s weekly news publication, 
Bibliography 47

Army Times, also had a running account of issues facing the service at-large 

during this period and some useful insight as to how soldiers perceived them.

Published Primary Sources

The State Department publication, Foreign Relations of the United 

States, contains a wealth of presidential, National Security Council, 

and Department of Defense correspondence covering the U.S. military 

commitment to Europe. Volumes on Germany, Western Europe, and 

National Security are particularly helpful. Other primary sources include the 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States for Presidents Truman, 

Eisenhower, and Kennedy, published by the Government Printing Office. 

The published minutes of the Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and 

Armed Services Committees on the Assignment of Ground Forces of the United 

States to Duty in the European Area, held in January and February 1951, 

establish in great detail the parameters for the American military mission 

in Western Europe. Several publications by the Operations Research Office 

at Johns Hopkins University also provided useful information on various 

Army tests and evaluations.

Secondary Sources—Books

Abenheim, Donald. Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the 

West German Armed Forces. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 

New York: Norton, 1969.

Alvah, Donna. Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas 

and the Cold War, 1946–1965. New York: New York University Press, 2007.

Bacevich, Andrew J. The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and 

Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986.

Baker, Anni P. American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence. 

Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004.

Bald, Ralph D. Air Force Participation in Joint Army–Air Force Training Exercises, 

1951–1954. Montgomery, Ala.: U.S. Air Force Historical Division, 1957.

Bank, Aaron. From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces. Novato, 

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986.

Barnet, Richard. The Alliance—America, Europe, Japan: Makers of the Postwar 

World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.

Bering, Henrik. Outpost Berlin: The History of American Forces in Berlin, 

1945–1994. Chicago: Edition Q, 1995.

Biggs, Bradley. Gavin. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1980.

Binder, L. James. Lemnitzer: A Soldier for His Time. Washington, D.C.: 

Brassey’s Books, 1997.

Bird, Kai. The Chairman: John J. McCloy and the Making of the American 

Establishment. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
476 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Birtle, Andrew J. Rearming the Phoenix: U.S. Military Assistance to the Federal 

Republic of Germany, 1950–1960. New York: Garland Publishing, 1991.

Bischof, Gunter, and Saki Dockrill, eds. Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit 

of 1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000.

Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953. New York: 

Times Books, 1987.

Bland, Douglas L. The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A 

Study of Structure and Strategy. New York: Praeger, 1991.

Boettcher, Thomas D. First Call: The Making of the Modern U.S. Military, 

1945–1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992.

Bogle, Lori Lyn. The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold 

War. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004.

Bowie, Robert R., and Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower 

Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 

1998. 

Bradley, Omar N., and Clay Blair. A General’s Life: An Autobiography. New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.

Brady, Steven J. Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance Under 

Pressure, 1953–1960. Plymouth, U.K.: Lexington Books, 2010.

Buchwald, Donald M., ed. Tales from the Cold War: The 13th Armored Infantry 

Battalion on Freedom’s Frontier. Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2004.

Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., and Louis Galambos, eds. The Papers of Dwight 

David Eisenhower. 21 vols. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1970–2001.

Condit, Doris M. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 2, The 

Test of War, 1950–1953. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, 1988.

Condit, Kenneth W. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 6, The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, 

Joint Staff, 1992.

Converse, Elliott V. III. History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense, 

vol. 1, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960. Washington, D.C.: Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, 2011.

Cosmas, Graham A. MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 

1962–1967. United States Army in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 2006.

Craig, Campbell. Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War. 

New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 

Davies, Edward J. II, and Ronald M. Smelser. The Myth of the Eastern Front: 

The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture. New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2008.

DeRosa. Christopher S. Political Indoctrination in the U.S. Army from World 

War II to the Vietnam War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.

Dockrill, Saki. Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961. 

New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.
Bibliography 47

Duffield, John S. Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force 

Posture. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Duke, Simon W., and Wolfgang Krieger, eds. U.S. Military Forces in Europe: 

The Early Years, 1945–1970. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993.

Eisenberg, Carolyn. Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide 

Germany, 1944–1949. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years, vol. 1, Mandate for Change, 

1953–1956. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963.

Ellis, William D., and Thomas J. Cunningham Jr. Clarke of St. Vith: The 

Sergeants’ General. Cleveland, Ohio: Dillon/Liederbach, 1974.

Epley, William W., ed. International Cold War Military Records and History: 

Proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War Military Records 

and History. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996.

Fahey, John A. Licensed to Spy: With the Top Secret Military Liaison Mission 

in East Germany. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

Fairchild, Byron R., and Walter S. Poole. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

vol. 7, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960. Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 2000.

Frederiksen, Oliver J. The American Military Occupation of Germany, 

1945–1953. Darmstadt, Germany: USAREUR Historical Office, 1953.

Fursdon, Edward. The European Defense Community: A History. New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 1980.

Gaddis, John L. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 

American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

———. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1997.

Gavin, James M. War and Peace in the Space Age. New York: Harper, 1958.

Geelhoed, E. Bruce. Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 

1953–1957. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1979.

Gendzier, Irene L. Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in 

Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958. New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1997.

Gole, Henry G. General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern 

War. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2008.

———. Soldiering: Observations from Korea, Vietnam, and Safe Places. Dulles, 

Va.: Potomac Books, 2005.

Gott, Kendall D. Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary 

in Germany, 1946–1953. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 11. Fort 

Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.

Grathwol, Robert P., and Donita M. Moorhus. American Forces in Berlin: Cold 

War Outpost, 1945–1994. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994.

———. Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991. U.S. 

Army in the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2005.
478 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Gray, David W. The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander’s 

Reminiscence. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, 1984.

Grosser, Alfred. The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 

1945. New York: Random House, 1982.

Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Actions in Korea. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1954.

Gunnarsson, Robert L. American Military Police in Europe: 1945–1991: Unit 

Histories. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011.

Hackworth, David H., and Julie Sherman. About Face. New York: Simon & 

Schuster, 1989.

Halperin, Morton H. Limited War in the Nuclear Age. New York: Wiley, 1963.

Haslam, Jonathan. Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall 

of the Wall. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2011.

Heidelmeyer, Wolfgang, and Guenther Hindrichs, eds. Documents on Berlin: 

1943–1963. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1963.

Heiss, Mary Ann, and S. Victor Papacosma, eds. NATO and the Warsaw Pact: 

Intrabloc Conflicts. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2008.

Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. United States Army in the 

Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966.

Hoffenaar, Jan, and Dieter Kruger, eds. Blueprints for Battle: Planning for War 

in Central Europe, 1948–1968. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012.

Hohn, Maria. GIs and Frauleins: The German–American Encounter in 1950s 

West Germany. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

Hohn, Maria, and Martin Klimke. A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights 

Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany. New York: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2010.

Hohn, Maria, and Seungsook Moon, eds. Over There: Living with the U.S. 

Military Empire from World War Two to the Present. Durham, N.C.: Duke 

University Press, 2010.

Honick, Morris and Edd M. Carter. SHAPE Histories: The New Approach, 

July 1953–November 1956. Brussels, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Powers Europe, 1976.

House, Jonathan M. A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962. Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 2012.

Huston, James A. One for All: NATO Strategy and Logistics through the 

Formative Period (1949–1969). Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984.

———. Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945–1953. 

Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988.

Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World 

They Made. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986.

Isby, David C. Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. London: Janes 

Publishing Company, 1981.

Ismay, Hastings Lionel. NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954. Paris: North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954.
Bibliography 47

Jordan, Robert S. Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander—Airman, 

Strategist, Diplomat. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.

Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin, 2005.

Junker, Detlef, ed. The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 

1945–1968, A Handbook, vol. 1. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military 

Assistance Program, 1948–1951. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, 1980.

———. The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years. Westport, Conn.: 

Praeger, 1999.

———. NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance. Lanham, Md.: 

Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.

———. NATO Before the Korean War, April 1949–June 1950. Kent, Ohio: 

Kent State University Press, 2013.

———. The United States and NATO: The Formative Years. Lexington: 

University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

Kaplan, Lawrence S.; Ronald D. Landa; and Edward J. Drea. History of 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 5, The McNamara Ascendancy, 

1961–1965. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2006.

Karanowski, Stanley M. The German Army and NATO Strategy. Washington, 

D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982.

Kempe, Frederick. Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous 

Place on Earth. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2011.

Khrushchev, Nikita. Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed. Khrushchev Remembers. 

Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970.

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Acronyms 487

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery

ADSEC Advance Section

AFN Armed (or American) Forces Network

AHEC Army Heritage and Education Center

ALCAN Alaskan/Canadian Highway

ALFCE Allied Land Forces, Central Europe

ATF Army Task Force

ATFA Atomic Field Army

AWOL Absent Without Leave

BASEC Base Section

BGS Bundesgrenzschutz (West German Border Police)

CAD Civil Affairs Division

CBR Chemical, Biological, Radiological

CENTAG Central (or Center) Army Group

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIC Counter-Intelligence Corps

CG Commanding General

CINC Commander in Chief

CINCALFCE Commander in Chief Allied Land Forces, Central

Europe

CINCEUR Commander in Chief, Europe

CINCUSAREUR Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe

CMH Center of Military History

COMZ Communications Zone

CPX Command Post Exercise

CWO Chief Warrant Officer

DCPO Department Chief Plans Officer

DEPTAR Department of the Army

DM deutsche mark

EDC European Defense Community

EDP Emergency Defense Plan

EP Emergency Plan

ETO European Theater of Operations

EUCOM European Command

Acronyms
488 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

FA Field Artillery

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States

FTX Field Training Exercise

FY fiscal year

G–1 General Staff Officer for Personnel

G–2 General Staff Officer for Intelligence

G–3 General Staff Officer for Operations and Training

G–4 General Staff Officer for Logistics

GTAG German Training Assistance Group

HICOG U.S. High Commissioner for Germany

ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missiles

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

LRRP Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol 

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MASS Modern Army Supply System

MHI Military History Institute

MOMAR Modern Mobile Army

MP Military Police

NACP National Archives, College Park

NADC National Archives, Washington, DC

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Order

NORTHAG Northern Army Group

ODOR Order for the Defense of the Rhine

OPORD Operations Order

OPOT Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training

ORA Order for Reinforced Alert

OSS Office of Strategic Services

POL Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants

POMCUS Pre-positioned Organizational Material Configured to 

Unit Sets

PX Post Exchange

ROAD Reorganization Objective Army Divisions
Acronyms 489

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SED Party of German Unity

SETAF Southern European Task Force

SGS Secretary of the General Staff

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

SOB Supply over the Beach

STRAC Strategic Army Corps

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment

TRUST Trieste United States Troops

UHF Ultra-High Frequency

USAFE United States Air Force, Europe

USAREUR United States Army, Europe

USNAVFORGER United States Naval Force, Germany

U.S. EUCOM United States European Command

VHF Very High Frequency

Abbreviations 49

Map Symbo

X X

3

III

2

X X X

U.S.

X X

3

X X

11

V

XXXX

SEVENTH

XXX

XXXX

III

X X

X

ARMOR

CAVALRY (ARMORED) 

INFANTRY

INFANTRY (AIRBORNE)

Seventh Army

3d Infantry Division

11th Infantry (Airborne) Division

3d Armored Division

2d Cavalry Regiment

7th U.S. Corps

REGIMENT OR GROUP

BRIGADE

DIVISION

CORPS

ARMY

CARTER COLD WAR

Index 493

Acheson, Dean G., 144, 172, 178, 459–60

Adams, General Paul D., 350–51, 353, 442–43

Adana, 348, 349–50

Adenauer, Konrad, 173, 183, 197, 210, 

241–42, 291, 293, 337, 377–78, 417

Air Force, Twelfth, 32, 51–52, 64–65, 96–97, 

102, 153–54, 301–02

Air Force, U.S., 30, 32, 64–65, 123, 146–47, 

157, 163, 186, 208–09, 210–12, 235, 

252–53, 255, 373, 397–98, 409, 428, 439

and atomic weapons, 96–100, 102, 104, 

106, 217, 304–05, 432, 448–49, 466

and close air support to ground forces, 

51–52, 56–57, 78, 217, 466

See also Tactical Air Control Center; 

United States Air Force, Europe 

(USAFE).

Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties, 97

Airborne Divisions 

1st, 325

11th, 55, 230, 262–63, 271–72, 300–301, 

321, 328, 343, 347

101st, 258–59, 271

Aircraft, fixed-wing

B–26B Invaders, 96

B–52 bombers 432

C–47, 410

C–54 Skymasters, 96

C–119 Flying Box Cars, 96

F–86F Sabres, 96

L–19 Birddog, 220–21

L–20 Beaver, 220–21

MIG–15 and MIG–17 jet fighters, 340

RF–84F Thunderflashes, 96

U–1A Otter, 315

Albania, 4, 35, 242

Alexander, Raymond Pace, 113

Allied Air Forces, Central Europe, 154

Allied Forces, Northern Europe, 146–47

Allied Forces, Southern Europe, 146–47

Allied Kommandatura, 428–29

Allied Land Forces, Central Europe 

(ALFCE), 66, 146–47, 151–53, 154, 

156, 180–81, 325 

Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe, 232, 

324

Allied Staff, Berlin, 77–78

Allied Tactical Air Forces

Second, 154

Fourth, 96, 270

American Forces Network (AFN), 133–34

Andernach, 192–94, 199

Anderson, Robert B., 182

Ansbach, 161

Antiaircraft Artillery Battery, 409th, 232

Armed Forces Radio Service, 133–34

Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing 

Agency, 69

Armor Groups

4th, 231–32

19th, 116, 231–32

Armor regiments

32d, 400–401 

35th, 349–50

40th, Company F of, 406–07

Armor Center, Fort Knox, 190–91

Armored Divisions 

2d, 18, 49–50, 52, 110, 154–55, 214, 263, 

272, 465

3d, 230, 263, 300–301, 313, 385, 400–401, 

453, 458–59, 465

4th, 272, 300–301, 315, 442–43, 448, 453, 465

Armored Cavalry Group, 19th, 116

Armored Cavalry Regiments 

2d, 10, 15–16, 20–21, 46, 48, 110, 176, 226, 

465

3d, 55, 226, 229, 300–301, 427, 465

6th, 15–16, 20–21, 46, 48, 110

11th, 300–301, 465

14th, 10, 15–16, 20–21, 23, 46, 110, 124–25,

154–55, 284–85, 290, 300–301, 465

Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion, 

4th, 231–32

Armored Field Artillery Battalions

70th, 20–21, 209

74th, 20–21, 209

517th, 209

631st, 20–21

Armored Infantry Battalions

13th, 105

52d, 322–23

370th, 20–21

371st, 20–21

373d, 20–21, 116, 175, 375

Index
494 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Armored personnel carriers, 190, 255–56, 

258, 299, 306, 312, 314–15, 339, 

420–21, 440, 442

M59, 445 

M75, 222

M113, 445, 447–48

Marder (German), 326–27

Army, U.S. Seventh, 19, 142, 143, 161, 207, 

245, 328, 388, 463 

and air assault, 98–99

and air defense, 97–98

and atomic weapons, 55–57, 99–102, 

104–06, 157, 212–15, 217, 222, 238, 

247, 265–67, 268, 274, 279, 291, 

301–06, 307–08, 310, 317, 333–34, 

466–67

Aviation Training Center, Stuttgart, 

220–21

and Berlin, 233–34, 361–62, 366, 417, 418

and border security, 21, 23, 173–74

and the Bundesgrenzschutz, 174–76

and the Bundeswehr, 325–26, 469

and close air support, 51–52, 96–97

command relationships, 151–53

commanders, 14, 17, 30, 88–89, 92–93, 

259–61, 308, 321, 449–50, 458

communications, 106, 141, 154

and developing technologies, 220–22, 281, 

282, 445, 408–09, 445–47, 448

and German-owned properties, 235, 237, 

240, 380

and German Youth Activities program, 

375, 385–86, 398

and Kennedy’s military policy, 463–64

and Lebanon intervention, 342, 346, 

356–57

and logistical support, 15, 32, 65, 69, 

70–74, 121, 124, 126–27, 263, 276–77, 

279, 282–84, 312–13, 346

maintenance, 124–26

medical support, 124, 214, 302–03, 311

missions, 15, 121, 284–85, 456

morale, 128, 136, 331

and noncombatant evacuation, 139–41, 

287

operational doctrine, 40–42, 44–45, 48, 

49, 57, 87–91, 104–05, 106, 213, 222, 

265–66, 287, 289, 305–06, 466

and pentomic reorganization, 272, 

273–74, 293, 300–310, 312–13, 466–67

and Phase Lines, 287, 289

and physical fitness, 450–51

public information program, 211–12

racial integration of, 111–13

receiving, processing, and locating troops, 

18, 25

recreation, 133–34

and relations with German communities, 

369–70, 373, 375, 376, 381, 383, 385, 

386–87, 391–93, 398, 400

replacements and troop rotations, 24–25, 

34, 107, 108–10, 222, 224–27, 230, 272, 

427, 445, 465

shortages, 26, 70, 78, 107, 307–08

Signal Conference, 106

and Soviet forces, 36, 40, 49–50, 238, 240, 247

Special Services Section, 134

strength, 23, 78, 209–10, 262–63, 273–74, 

417, 465

Support Command, 277

training areas, 26–28, 237, 290, 457–58

training and exercises, 29–30, 42–44, 50,

52, 56, 57, 91–92, 94, 96–97, 100–102, 

104–05, 118–19, 140–41, 153–55, 

202–03, 214–15, 217, 219–20, 247, 

261–62, 263, 266–72, 290, 301–05, 

310–11, 313, 314, 315, 316, 318, 325–26, 

380, 408–09, 428, 445, 448, 449, 452–57

training the German Army, 187–88, 193, 

202–03

troop housing, 27–28, 235, 331

troop information program, 113–14, 383

units, 15–16, 18, 20–21, 116, 118, 119, 

231–32, 300–301

Army Advisory Committee Program, 373

Army Field Forces, Chief of, 25, 256–57, 300

Army Field Forces inspections, investigations, and publications, 42–43, 106–07, 

108, 125–26, 256–57

Army Information Digest, 309

Army Times, 464

Army Training Test, 455

Army’s Home Town News Center, 211

Artillery regiments

2d, 455

18th, 458

Artillery Battalions

1st, 2d Artillery, 455

3d, 18th Artillery, 458

Aschaffenburg, 225, 327–28

Atomic Field Army (ATFA) studies, 256–57

Atomic weapons 

and the Air Force, 56–57, 217

analysis of exercises related to, 68, 100, 

102, 105–06, 240–41, 270–71, 302–04

and antiaircraft weapons, 97–98

and the Army budget, 208–09, 210, 

252–54, 256–57
Index 495

artillery, missile, and rocket delivery of, 

development and testing, 56–57, 102, 

104–05, 212–13, 215, 217, 255–56, 

296–97, 331, 442, 449, 466

and Berlin, 366, 405–06, 408

doctrine and battle plans, 44–46, 49–50, 

55, 57, 78, 99, 104–05, 106, 222, 

311–12, 466

exercises related to, 55, 56, 57–58, 99, 

101–02, 105–06, 155, 212–14, 240–41, 

266–67, 268, 301–02, 304–05, 310, 311, 

453

and flexible response, 431–32, 449

and German Army organization, 326

identifying potential targets for, 317

and logistics, 275–80, 322

and NATO, 105–06, 149, 151, 155–57, 

165, 237–38, 240–41, 264–65, 289–90, 

291, 293, 297, 322–23, 409, 433–35, 

436, 439

and New Look, 81, 99, 207–09, 210, 246, 

295, 432

and pentomic organization, 257–59, 274, 

298–301, 305–09, 310, 312–13, 466–67

and redesigning divisions, 441, 445

and SHAPE, 153, 310

and the Soviets, 13–14, 38, 242, 244, 

296–97, 336, 338–39, 368, 432–33 

tests, 12, 13, 55–56

training related to, 220, 247, 264–66, 

314–15, 456

value reassessed, 333–34, 467–68

Augsburg, 15–16, 20, 32, 127, 287, 300, 465

Austria, 1, 3, 7–8, 9, 16, 21, 32, 36, 95–96, 

117, 120, 135, 137, 160, 183, 221–22, 

229–33, 247, 250, 322–23, 393, 396–97, 

403

Babelsberg, 361

Bad Brückenau, 375 

Bad Hersfeld, 287, 300

Bad Kreuznach, 18, 104, 272, 300, 379, 465

Bad Mergentheim, 71, 74

Bad Tölz, 7, 118, 346, 457 

Baden-Baden, 1

Baden-Württemberg, 1, 3, 240, 301, 325, 370, 

372–73

Bamberg, 20–21, 32, 240, 287, 327–28, 398, 

453

Battle Groups

1st, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 

418–19, 427

1st, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, 

427

1st, 22d Infantry, 428

1st, 26th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 

463 

1st, 28th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 

315

1st, 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, 

463

1st Airborne, 187th Infantry, 24th 

Infantry Division, 315, 346–47

1st Airborne, 503d Infantry, 11th 

Airborne Division, 272, 346–47, 349

2d, 6th Infantry, 406–07, 420–21

2d, 39th Infantry, 428

2d, 47th Infantry, 428

3d, 6th Infantry, 406–07

Baumholder, 18, 27–28, 72, 104, 133, 189, 

313–14, 315, 331, 390, 455, 457–58, 463

Bavaria, 1, 3, 27, 240, 301–02, 325, 370, 

372–73, 397, 453

Bay of Pigs, 431

Beirut, 345–50, 356

Belgian Congo, 430, 457

I Belgian Corps, 154, 237–38, 325

Belgium, 5–6, 40, 101–02, 139, 144–45, 

151–52, 155, 159, 161, 179, 240–41, 

327, 396

Belsen-Hohne Tank Training Area, 189–90, 

407

Berchtesgaden, 131

Beria, Lavrentiy, 83, 404

Berlin, 8, 9, 14, 32, 40, 68, 87, 95–96, 129, 

133–34, 168–69, 234, 245, 262–63, 335, 

389, 447, 452, 468

airlift, 5, 297, 402

blockade, 5, 13, 58, 164, 171, 368, 408, 

417

and Checkpoint Charlie, 420, 423–24, 

426–27, 432, 464

crisis, 358–68, 403–21, 423–24, 426–30, 

465

East, 3, 77, 83–84, 118, 243–44, 251–52, 

358–59, 368, 410–16, 420–21, 423–24, 

426, 429

wall, 410–21, 429–30, 464

West, 3–4, 13, 74–78, 163–66, 243–44, 

251–52, 316, 358–68, 398, 403–08, 

410–21, 427, 429–30, 469

Berlin Brigade, 429, 447

Berlin Command, U.S., 32, 76, 361–62, 

420–21, 428–29

“The Berlin Story,” 367

Bitburg, 281

Blank, Theodor, 180–81

Böblingen, 72, 74, 160
496 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Bolte, Lt. Gen. Charles L., 30, 87–88, 92–93, 

99, 119, 132, 136, 138, 155–56, 175, 375

Bonn, 3, 186, 192, 370, 372–73, 436

Bonn Conventions of 1952, 233, 235–36, 327

Bordeaux, 60, 62, 63, 65, 121, 139–41

Braconne, 278

Bradley, Maj. Gen. Joseph S., 186

Bradshaw, Maj. Gen. Aaron, 159

Brandenburg, 1 

Brandenburg Gate, 414

Brandt, Willy, 417

Bremen, 1, 123, 196, 372–73, 435–36

Bremerhaven, 1, 12, 29, 32, 58, 69, 108–09, 

118, 121, 123, 129, 133–34, 190, 

224–25, 235, 275, 349–50, 401–02, 427

Brind, Admiral Eric J. P., 146

British Army units. See Great Britain.

British Zone, 1, 3, 72–73, 97–98, 162, 173–74

Brown, Lt. Gen. Frederic J., 460

Bruce, David K. E., 177, 386

Brussels, 5–6, 144–45

Budapest, 249–50

Bulgaria, 4, 35, 242

Bundesgrenzschutz (border police). See West 

Germany (German Federal Republic).

Bundeswehr. See West German Army 

(Bundeswehr); West Germany 

(German Federal Republic).

Bundy, McGeorge, 416–17

Burress, Maj. Gen. Withers A., 19–20

Canada, 5–6, 155, 237, 327

Cannon, 280-mm., 56, 102–06, 116, 155, 

212–17, 266–67, 280, 301–02, 449

Captieux, 63, 278

Carney, Admiral Robert B., 146

Carpentier, General Marcel M., 146–47

Cassidy, Col. John F., 32

Central Army Group (CENTAG), 45–46, 

49–50, 52, 105–06, 152–53, 155–56, 

180, 237, 268, 270–71, 322, 325, 436

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 13–14, 

35–36, 38, 82–83, 171–72, 251–52, 

335–36, 338–39, 358–59, 412–13

Chamoun, Camille Nimr, 343, 345–46, 354–55

Check, Col. Gilbert J., 317

Chehab, Maj. Gen. Fuad, 351, 353, 354–56

Chinon Engineer Depot, 278, 281

Clark, General Mark W., 25

Clarke, Lt. Gen. Bruce C., 259–64, 277, 

283–84, 290, 303–04, 308, 392–93, 

417–19, 421, 423, 428–29, 440–41, 447, 

451–52, 454–55, 458, 460, 462

Clay, Lucius D., 417–21, 423–24, 426

Collins, Lt. Gen. Arthur S., Jr., 311–12

Collins, General J. Lawton, 16, 23–24, 42, 

132, 144, 159

Command Post Exercise (CPX). See

Exercises.

Communication Reconnaissance Battalion, 

307th, 154

Communications Zone, EUCOM, 62–65, 68 

Advance Section, 62–63

Base Section, 62–63, 65

Orléans Area Command, 62–63

See also European Command (EUCOM); 

Line of communications.

Communications Zone, Europe, 395

Communications Zone, USAREUR, 71, 113, 

121, 122–24, 139–42, 156, 188, 263, 

275–77, 278–79, 281, 312–13, 319, 322, 

342, 358, 393, 395, 427 

Advance Section (ADSEC), 122–23, 141, 

275–76, 278, 319

Base Section (BASEC), 122–23, 139, 141, 

275–76, 278, 319

Seine Area Command, 275

See also Logistical Commands.

Communist Central Committee, 362–63

Communist expansionism, 4–6, 12–13, 

37, 60, 80, 82, 114, 119–20, 207–08, 

237–38, 247, 333, 334, 337–38, 341–42, 

378, 394, 402, 439, 466

Conant, James B., 233–34, 243

Concept C, 121, 275

Congress, 14, 16, 117, 172, 210, 250, 254–55, 

295, 296, 331, 341, 394–95, 409, 431, 

443–44, 446, 459–61

Conner, Brig. Gen. Fox, 79

Constabulary, U.S., 7, 161

combat readiness training, 10

placed under Seventh Army, 14

reorganizing, 9, 15, 16, 78

units, 9–10, 34

Continental Army Command, U.S. Army, 

303, 308, 440–41, 443–44

Contractual Agreements. See Bonn 

Conventions of 1952.

Copenhagen, 410

Corps 

V, 18–20, 29–30, 40, 52, 116, 124–25, 

153–55, 224–25, 266–67, 272, 284–85, 

287, 300–302, 306, 311, 321, 325, 402, 

418–19, 460, 465

VII, 19–21, 40, 45, 54–55, 57–58, 73, 91, 

98–99, 125, 153–55, 175, 214, 217, 

237–38, 259, 266–67, 272, 280, 287, 

289, 300–301, 318, 325, 465
Index 497

Cramer, Maj. Gen. Kenneth F., 20, 32, 175

Crete, 458

Croix-Chapeau, 278

Czechoslovakia, 4–5, 20–21, 35, 40, 117, 174, 

242, 245, 250, 383–84, 465, 467–68

Dahlquist, General John E., 18–19, 52, 256–57

Daley, Maj. Gen. John P., 325

Dallgow, 406

Danube River, 117–18

Danzig, 83–84

Darmstadt, 72, 190, 224–25

Davidson, Lt. Gen. Garrison H., 449–52, 455

Dawson, Walter L., 150–51

De Gaulle, General Charles, 181–82, 433–34

Decker, General George H., 214, 441, 443–44

Degerndorff, 200

Department of the Army, 14, 41, 42–43, 

70, 114, 121, 138, 141, 189, 190, 224, 

226–27, 232, 281, 282, 283, 284, 309, 

318–19, 322–23, 324, 325, 331, 342, 

356–58, 375, 389, 441, 445

and atomic warfare, 57, 68, 264–65

and racial integration, 111

and replacement and rotation systems, 

107, 108–10, 230, 329

and support for the Bundesgrenzschutz, 

172–73, 176

and training of German armed forces, 

182–88

and USAREUR personnel reductions, 

209, 262–63

and World War II Vehicle Replacement 

Program, 158–59

Department of Defense, 157, 159–61, 182, 

208–09, 255, 256–57, 263, 296, 298, 

331–32, 358–59, 364–65, 427, 435, 445, 

446, 462

DePuy, Lt. Col. William E., 90–91

Dick, Maj. Gen. William W., Jr., 283

Dienststelle Blank, 180–81, 183, 186, 188–90

Doctrine, 161–62, 185, 188–89

air assault, 98–99

Air Force, 51–52, 78, 96–97

ALFCE, 151–52

atomic warfare, 55, 57, 104–05, 106, 

155–56, 213–14, 222, 240–41, 242, 

252–53, 258–59, 264–66, 268, 284, 

289–90, 293, 299–300, 301, 305–09, 

311–12, 466–67

conventional, 40–42, 44–45, 48, 49, 87–91, 

214–15, 217, 219, 237, 257, 287, 313, 

326–27, 466 

flexible response, 449, 453, 463–64, 467

German Army, 196, 197, 199–202, 205, 

326–27, 469

Soviet, 37, 244, 338–39

See also Eisenhower Doctrine; Truman 

Doctrine.

Dodge, Joseph M., 79–80

Draft circular, “Staff Organization and 

Procedures for Tactical Atomic 

Warfare,” 56–57

Draft training circular, “Combined Arms 

Units in Atomic Warfare,” 57

Dresden, 36

Dukes, Col. Dan K., 358

Dulles, John Foster, 297, 343–44

Dutch Corps, I, 237–38

East German Air Force, 340

East German Navy, 340

East German police units

Border Security Police, 406

sea police, 86–87

Security Alert Police, 13, 171, 406

Volkspolizei (People’s Police), 86–87, 173, 423

East Germany (German Democratic 

Republic), 21, 36, 40, 78, 177, 403–04, 

412–13, 467

construction of a wall, 413–17, 427, 

429–30

demonstrations in, 83–84

demonstrations by, in West Germany, 74, 76

harassment and arrest of U.S. and allied 

personnel, 76–77, 87, 166–69, 243–44, 

245, 384, 423

illegal border crossings, 174, 245

intelligence on military strength of, 13–14, 

35, 86–87, 171–72, 244, 340, 367

plan for reopening closed access routes to, 

361–62

refugees streaming into West from, 

251–52, 341, 359–60, 362–63, 404, 411

restoring sovereignty to, 242–44

restricting travel between East and West, 

76, 251, 359–60, 364–65, 405, 410, 413, 

420–21

revolt against government in East Berlin, 

118

Soviet troop reductions in, 248

transfer of remaining Soviet functions to, 

335, 363–64, 408

U.S. mission personnel intelligence 

gathering in, 163–68

U.S. testing access to, 418–21, 424–26

West refuses to recognize sovereignty of, 

404–05, 429
498 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Eberstadt, 190

Eberswalde, 36

Eddleman, General Clyde D., 262, 308–09, 

321–22, 325, 328–29, 356–57, 441

Eddy, Lt. Gen. Manton S., 14, 16–18, 

23–27, 30, 34, 42, 44, 49, 51–52, 71, 

73, 87–88, 107, 111–12, 119, 121, 

127, 152–53, 180, 220, 373, 382–83, 

386–88, 395–96, 450, 452, 466

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 30, 34, 

87–88, 120, 127, 209, 250, 296, 397, 

461–62, 463, 469–70

and atomic weapons, 104, 156–57,

247, 252–53, 271, 289–90, 293, 295, 

298–99, 333–34, 366–67, 466–67

and confrontation over Berlin, 366–68

and Lebanon intervention, 341, 343,

345–46, 351, 356–57

New Look policy, 79–81, 99, 207–08,

210, 212, 262, 431–32, 439

as SACEUR, 144–47, 149, 151, 172,

Eisenhower Doctrine, 333–34, 341, 343,

345

Elbe River, 3, 19, 177

Engineer Brigade, 7th, 342

Engineer Groups

39th, 396

555th, 397–98

Engineer Battalions

70th, 231–32

94th, 113

Engineer Companies

532d Combat, 232

543d (Pipeline), 281

Engineer School, Murnau, 161

Equipment modernization, 98, 102,

104–05, 126, 159, 165, 215, 217, 

221–22, 255–56, 442, 446–49, 458

Erhard, Hans, 240

Erler, Fritz, 241

Eschwege, 161

Esslingen, 72

European Command (EUCOM), 1, 30

7964th Area Command, 60, 62–63

7965th Area Command, 60, 62–63

7966th EUCOM Detachment, 60, 62–63

and atomic warfare procedures, 56–57

and Berlin Command, 76

border mission guidance, 21

Civil Affairs Division, 370–72

Class I supply issues (food), 68–69, 72

Class III product issues (POL), 68–69,

72, 123

Class V materiel issues, 68–70, 72–73

commanders, 14, 30

depots and maintenance facilities,

72–73

equipment issues, 25, 49

and France, 58, 60, 62–65, 153–54

and German-American relations,

369–73, 375–76, 377–78, 384

Graves Registration Command,

European Area, 60, 62

housing issues, 10, 25, 378

and Korean War impact, 13, 26

land requirements and issues, 26–27, 28

and legal issues, 16

Logistics Division, 58, 65–66, 68–69

and medical goods and equipment, 124

and public affairs issues, 129, 131

and racial integration, 111–12, 113

redesignated as U.S. Army, Europe

(USAREUR), in August 1952, 76, 

150, 159–60

and replacements, 107

responsibilities, 7, 14, 32, 157–60

under SACEUR, 151

and Seventh Army logistical support,

70–71

and Seventh Army manpower, 15–16

shortage of logistical support base, 12

and technical service divisions, 275

troop strength, 23

unit combat readiness improvement

efforts, 9–10

vehicle transfer program, 158–62

and West German border police,

173–74

See also Communications Zone, 

EUCOM; United States Army, 

Europe (USAREUR).

European Defense Community (EDC), 

171, 178–83, 186, 189–90, 233

European Motion Picture Service, 132–33

Exercises 

Battle Royal, 105–06, 155, 212–

Bayonet Blue, 4

Bear Claw, 

Blue Bolt, 2

Bounce Back, 3

Brandywine, 4

Carte Blanche, 240–

Clean Sweep, 

 Combine, 

 Cordon Bleu, 

 Counter Thrust, 

critiques, 51–52, 65–66, 68, 100, 102,

280, 302–04
Index 499

Desert Rock, 55–

Draw Bridge,

Equinox, 52, 54–55, 154–5

 Fer de Lance, 

 Follow Me,

 Fox Paw, 21

Full Play, 3

German-conducted, 175–76

Golden Arrow, 4

Grand Alliance, 52, 15

 Handicap Black, 91

Harvest, 9–1

Indian Summer, 105–

 Lion Bleu, 304

 Lion Lift, 

 Lion Noir, 270–71, 

 Long Thrust II,

 Maytime, 153–

 Monte Carlo, 101–02, 125

 Normal, 9–

 North Wind, 57–

 Peace Maker, 

 Quick Serve, 

Rainbow, 10, 16

 Roadbound, 140–

 Roadbound II, 14

 Rose Bush, 52, 54, 154

 Sabre Hawk, 30

 Sabre Knot, 266–67, 

 Snowfall,

 Spring Tide

 Springtime,

 Sting Ray, 21

 Stormvour, 212–

 Summer Shield, 

 Summer Stock, 

 Supply over the Beach (SOB), 

 Swan Song

War Hawk, 266–

Winter Shield II, 454–5

Families, 224, 369

and accompaniment, 10, 127–28,

331–32, 461–62

and Berlin, 77

and clothing restrictions, 138

and community relations, 332–33,

392–93, 398, 400

and French conscription, 394–95

and health care, 124

and housing, 69, 121, 128, 227–29, 329,

331–32, 378

and money spent in Europe, 129, 131,

389, 461–62, 463

and noncombatant evacuation, 138–40,

468

and public behavior, 377, 391

and recreation, 132–33

and schools, 131–32

and West German sovereignty, 235–36,

237

Farge, 123

Farrell, Lt. Gen. Frank W., 321, 402, 449

Fechter, Peter, 429–30

Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, 190–91

Field Artillery Groups 

18th, 301–02

42d, 104, 116, 267

72d, 301–02

Field Artillery Battalions

59th, 104, 105

85th (Honest John), 232

216th, 224

264th, 104, 105

265th, 104, 105

510th, 231–32

760th, 224

867th, 104

868th, 102, 104

Field Artillery Battery (Honest John),

85th, 232

Field Artillery Missile Battalions

543d, 322–23

570th, 322–23

Field Artillery Rocket Battalions

159th, 322–23

510th, 322–23

Field Manual 100–31, Tactical Use of 

Atomic Weapons, 55

Flexible response, 431–32, 436, 439, 

443–44, 446, 449, 463–64

Fontainebleau, 123–24, 276–77

Fontenet, 278

Fontenet Ordnance Depot, 160, 278

Forman, Maj. Gen. Robert H., 347–48

Fort Benning, 117–18, 190–91, 463

Fort Bragg, 117–18, 356–57

Fort Campbell, 258–59

Fort Carson, 272, 445

Fort Dix, 117–18, 402

Fort Hood, 18, 445

Fort Jackson, 109

Fort Knox, 190–91

Fort Leavenworth, 259

Fort Lewis, 428

Fort Meade, 226, 427

Fort Riley, 224–25

Fort Sill, 190–91
500 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

France, 1, 3, 4–6, 19, 32, 40, 45, 68–69, 76, 

191–92, 259, 290, 322, 329–30, 349–50, 

427, 433–34, 457–58

and allied training exercises, 52–55, 

101–02, 153–55, 212–13, 214, 240–41, 

453–54, 457

and Berlin, 74, 77–78, 363–65, 406–07, 

412, 420–21

and developing common procedures and 

doctrine with allies, 151

and European Exchange System, 135 

and evacuation of noncombatants, 139–41

and French-American Fiscal Liaison 

Office, 60

and fuel and POL storage and transportation, 123–24, 156, 280–81

and German remilitarization, 177–79, 

181–82

and instruction at EUCOM training 

centers, 161

and intelligence gathering, 164–65

and a line of communications, 58, 60, 

62–65, 78, 121, 142, 156, 207, 209, 

275–76, 278, 319

and NATO, 148–49, 171, 237–38, 284–85, 

291, 298

and Paris Accords, 233–34

schools in, 131–32

and SHAPE, 144–46

and status of forces agreement with West 

Germany, 236–37, 327

and Suez Canal and Egypt operations, 

250

and treaty with Austria, 230–32

troop and family housing in, 128–29, 

331–32

and U.S. relations, 378, 381, 393–95, 398

and the vehicle transfer program, 159

See also French armed force units; French 

Forces in Germany; French Zone.

Frankfurt, 17–18, 25, 28, 30, 32, 38, 40, 116, 

129, 132, 133–34, 162–63, 167–68, 

196–97, 235, 287, 289, 300–01, 309, 

328–29, 361, 378–79, 389, 453, 465

“Free German Youth” communist political 

organization, 411

Freeman, General Paul L., 442–43, 458

French armed force units

First Army, 105, 152–55, 212–13, 237–38

I Corps, 49–50, 54–55, 154–55, 325

II Corps, 49–50, 52, 154–55

First Air Division, 153–54

1st Armored Division, 52, 154–55, 214

2d Infantry Division, 154–55

3d Infantry Division, 154–55

4th Infantry Division, 54–55, 154–55

5th Armored Division, 214

7th Light Mechanized Division, 214

25th Airborne Division, 54–55, 154–55

5th Armored Group, 154–55

French Forces in Germany, 180

French National Assembly, 394–95

French Zone, 1, 3, 27–28, 72, 162, 180

Friedrichstrasse checkpoint, 415, 420–21, 

424, 426, 429–30

Fritzlar, 15–16

Fuchs, Klaus, 12

Fuesson, 161

Fulbright, J. William, 412, 460–61

Fulda, 27, 287, 301–02

Fulda Gap, 40, 45–46, 287, 325, 465, 467–68, 470

Fulda River, 45–46

Fürstenberg, 36

Fürstenfeldbruck, 347, 349

Gaither, Horace Rowan, 298

Gaither Report, 298

Gale, General Sir Richard N., 152–53, 183

Gallagher, Maj. Gen. Philip E., 276

Gard, Maj. Gen. Robert G., 152, 175–76, 184

Garmisch, 32, 131

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 462

Gatow airfield, 361

Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., 91, 175, 296

Gazlay, John C., 104–05

General A. W. Greely, USNS, 118

Geneva, 207, 243, 247, 367–68, 403

German-American Advisory Councils, 376

German Defense Ministry, 177, 192, 200, 

284–85, 327

German Democratic Republic. See East 

Germany (German Democratic 

Republic).

German Federal Republic. See West 

Germany (German Federal Republic). 

German Military Academy, 186–87

German Red Cross, 398

German Training Assistance Group 

(GTAG), 186–87, 192–93, 203, 205. 

See also Training.

Germersheim, 428

Germersheim Ordnance Vehicle Park, 

277–78

Giessen, 284–85, 289, 301–02, 390

Gjelstein, Brig. Gen. Einar B., 175

Goldwater, Barry M., 460–61

“Good Neighbors to Our German Good 

Neighbors” initiative, 392–93 
Index 501

Goodwin, Col. William T., 372

Göppingen, 272, 300–301, 465

Grafenwöhr, 9, 12, 27–28, 72, 96, 133, 

161, 181, 189, 199, 217, 219, 313–14, 

453–54, 457–59

Gray, Brig. Gen. David W., 343, 346–47

Great Britain, 1, 3, 5, 7–8, 28–29, 60, 74, 76, 

91, 119–20, 139–40, 151, 177, 230–31, 

281, 326–27, 394–95, 396, 433–34

British Army of the Rhine, 40, 152–53, 

154, 189–90

I British Corps, 237–38

and allied training exercises, 101–02, 154, 

155, 212–13

and Berlin, 77–78, 363–65, 407, 412, 

420–21

and German remilitarization, 183

and intelligence gathering, 165

and NATO, 148–49, 237–38, 293

and SHAPE, 145–46, 152–53

and Suez Canal and Egypt operations, 

250

and training areas, 189–90

See also British Zone; United Kingdom.

Grenade launcher, M79, 446–47

Griesheim, 72–73

Gruenther, General Alfred M., 96–97, 

144–45, 150–51, 183–84, 212, 238

Grunewald, 95–96, 406–07, 410

Guillaume, General Augustin, 27–28

Gyroscope, Operation, 223–27, 229–30, 272, 

327–29, 357–58, 463, 465

Haines, Capt. J. R., 173–74

Halfmoon, emergency war plan, 1

Halle, 83–84

Hamburg, 1, 410, 435–36

Hamlett, Maj. Gen. Barksdale, 283, 365–66

Hammelburg, 20–21, 28, 116, 161, 196–97

Hanau, 116, 289, 397–98

Handy, General Thomas T., 7, 9–10, 14, 26, 

30, 49, 64–65, 111, 156, 160, 369–70, 

373–74, 395

Hannover, 28–29, 201, 284–85, 435–36

Hart, Lt. Gen. Charles E., 124–25

Hartel, Brig. Gen. Frederick O., 415–16

Hartness, Maj. Gen. Harlan N., 18–19

Hawkins, Col. Wilson M., 290

Hayes, Maj. Gen. George P., 173

Hebert, F. Edward, 366–67

Heidelberg, 7, 25, 32, 128–29, 132–33, 180, 

193, 235, 240, 275–78, 322, 393, 460

Heilbronn, 40, 127–28, 240, 289, 315

Heintges, Col. John A., 185–86, 190, 194–95

Helicopter Company, 328th, 98–99

Helicopters

H–13 Sioux, 220–22, 318–19

H–19 Chickasaw, 98–99, 220–22

H–34 Choctaw, 221–22, 315

UH–1 Iroquois, 448

Helmstedt, 77, 166–67, 361–62, 405–06, 

418–19

Henning, Brig. Gen. Frank A., 65–66, 68–69

Hesedorf, 201–02

Hess, William E., 366–67

Hesse, 1, 301–02, 370, 372–73

Hessian Corridor, 38, 40

Heusinger, Lt. Gen. Adolf, 183, 191–92, 248

High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), 

U.S., 3, 4, 26, 32, 76, 86–87, 158–59, 

172–73, 176, 188–89, 233–34, 369–70, 

372–73, 376–77

Hiroshima, 280, 311–12

Hiss, Alger, 12

Hof Gap, 40, 45–46, 287, 465, 467–68

Hoge, Lt. Gen. William M., 87–90, 92–94, 

104, 128, 136–37, 155–56, 190, 240, 

300, 396–97

Hohenfels, 28, 133, 181, 189–90, 217, 219, 

272–73, 313–14, 315, 448, 453–54, 

457–58

Hohne, 28–29

Holloway, Admiral James L., Jr., 350

Honest John rocket, 212–13, 215, 217, 232, 

257–58, 266–67, 273–74, 280, 301–02, 

310, 312–13, 317, 322–33, 324, 342–43, 

350

Horan, Walter F., 131

Horkan, Maj. Gen. George A., 69

Horridge, Col. Joseph, 73

Horvath, Rudolf G., 117–18

Housing, 121, 142

construction, 28, 235, 331–32

family, 68–69, 132–33, 225, 227–28, 329, 

331–32

in France, 27–28, 63, 129, 393–94

in Italy, 395–96

racial segregation in, 112

of Soviet troops, 168

for U.S. troops, 10, 18, 25, 27, 63, 68–69, 

127–28, 180–81, 281, 329, 331–32, 369

in West Berlin, 251–52

in West Germany, 127–28, 129, 163–64, 

189, 235, 327, 331–32, 378–79

Howze, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H., 98–99, 448

Huebner, Lt. Gen. Clarence R., 143, 162–63

Huebner-Malinin Agreement, 143, 162–63, 

164, 166–69, 363–64, 403
502 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Humphrey, George M., 79–80

Hungary, 4–5, 35–36, 117–18, 242, 249–50, 

251, 340–41, 397, 413

Husum, 201, 205

Idar-Oberstein, 196–97, 331, 427–28

Illesheim, 72–73

Infantry Divisions 

1st, 7–10, 14, 15–16, 18, 20–21, 46, 71,

73–74, 109–10, 161, 224–25, 398

2d, 463

3d, 257, 327–28, 445, 465

4th, 18, 20–21, 29, 46, 90–91, 109, 154–55,

230, 272, 308, 397–98, 428

5th, 119, 230, 445

8th, 272–73, 289, 300–301, 306, 315, 328,

357–58, 418–19, 445, 453, 455, 463, 

465

9th, 119, 268–69, 272

10th, 224–25, 272, 283, 300–301, 327–28,

400

24th, 315, 328, 346–48, 350, 356–58, 427,

445, 453, 459–60, 465

28th (National Guard), 19–21, 29, 43–44,

46, 54–55, 107–10, 119, 154–55

43d (National Guard), 19–21, 29, 46,

54–55, 109–10, 119, 154–55

45th, 43–44

Infantry regiments

6th, 76, 95–96, 262–63, 316, 360–61,

406–07, 410, 420–21

8th, 90–91

18th, 418–19, 427

19th, 427

22d, 428

26th, 398, 400, 463

28th, 315

38th, 463

39th, 268–69, 428

47th, 428

48th, 459

187th, 315

350th, 95–96, 231–32

351st, 95–96

503d Airborne, 272, 346–47, 349

Infantry Battalions

1st, 350th Infantry, 232

2d, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division,

90–91

2d, 48th Infantry, 459

3d, 39th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division,

268–69

Infantry Center, Fort Benning, 190–91

Ingrandes, 278

Intelligence School, Oberammergau, 456–57

Irby, Col. Richard L., 313

Isle of Sylt, 28

Italian Peace Treaty, 119–20

Italy, 5, 12–13, 119–20, 146–47, 159, 161, 

179, 231–32, 325, 353, 393, 395–96, 

397, 430

Ivanov, Col. Gen. Semion, 166–67

Jarrell, Col. Shaffer F., 137

Jaujard, Vice-Admiral Robert, 146–47

Jena, 83–84

Johns, Col. Glover S., Jr., 42–43, 418–19

Johns Hopkins University Operations 

Research Office, 42–43

Johnson, Brig. Gen. Harold K., 262, 346

Johnson, Louis A., 144

Johnson, Lyndon B., 417–19

Joint American Military Advisory Group, 

158, 159–61

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7–8, 12–13, 30, 32, 

58, 79, 118, 119–20, 149–50, 157–60, 

171–73, 176, 182–83, 186, 207–08, 

252–53, 341–42, 346, 350, 357–60, 

364–65, 408–09, 416, 417–18, 427–28, 

431, 439, 469–70

Juin, Marshal Alphonse P., 146–47, 152–55, 

181–82

Kaiserslautern, 32, 72, 96, 104, 132, 133–34, 

199, 278, 281, 329–30, 427–28, 453, 

465

Karlsruhe, 40, 281, 331, 397–98, 427–28, 436

Kassel, 40, 91, 287, 435–36

Kennan, George F., 4–6

Kennedy, John F., 430, 432, 461–62

and the Army budget, 446, 453–54

and atomic weapons, 434–36, 439, 442

and flexible response, 431, 436, 439,

443–44, 446, 463–64

and military buildup in West Germany,

409, 417–18, 420, 427–28

and reopening negotiations with

Communists over Berlin, 421–23

and Soviet efforts to drive U.S. out of

Berlin, 403, 405, 407–09, 412

and standoff at Checkpoint Charlie, 426

and unconventional warfare, 456, 464

and the wall, 416–17

Khrushchev, Nikita, 83, 335, 337–38, 358, 

362–64, 367–68, 403–05, 407–09, 

411–12, 417, 430, 432–33

Kiel, 28, 196

Koblenz, 49–50, 284–85
Index 503

Koefoot, Sfc. Henry M., 117

Königshofen, 23 

Korean War, 13–14, 19–20, 26, 42–44, 69–70, 

79–82, 88–89, 96, 99–100, 119, 148–49, 

172, 208, 220, 252–53, 257, 259–60, 

297, 338, 393–94, 439, 448, 466, 470

Kornwestheim, 72–73

Krampnitz, 405–06

La Pallice, 60, 62, 139–40

La Rochelle, 62

Landshut, 20–21

Le Havre, 69

Legere, Col. Lawrence J., 429

Lemmonier, Admiral Andres G., 145

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 298, 322, 

416–18, 421, 423, 439

Leviero, Anthony, 253

Line of communications, 58, 60, 62–65, 78, 

121, 142, 156, 207, 209, 275–76, 278, 

319, 351

Linz, 117–18

Lisbon, 148–51, 169, 171

Little John rocket, 255–56

Livorno, 232, 395–96

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 117–18

Lodge-Philbin Act of 1950, 117–18

Logistical Commands

4th, 319

5th, 319

201st, 358

See also Southern European Task Force 

(SETAF), U.S. Army.

Logistics. See Army, U.S. Seventh; 

European Command (EUCOM); Line 

of communications; United States 

Army, Europe (USAREUR).

London, 41–42, 133–34, 145, 158

Lorsch, 381

Lower Saxony, 1

Luckenwalde, 36–37

Ludwigsburg, 72–73

Luebberstedt, 190

Luxembourg, 5–6, 139, 161, 179, 237–38, 

240–41, 270

MacArthur, General Douglas, 79

Machine gun, M60, 318–19, 446–47

Macmillan, Harold, 412

Mägdeberg, 36, 83–84, 406

Mainz, 18, 160, 195, 281, 287, 331

Malenkov, Georgi M., 82–83

Malinin, Col. Gen. Mikhail, 143, 162–63, 

164, 166–69

Maneuvers. See Exercises; Training.

Mannheim, 40, 72–74, 116, 240, 287, 381, 

418–19, 427–28

Mao Zedong, 12

Marienborn, 418–19

Marine Corps, U.S., 341–42, 345–46, 350–51, 

354–55, 439, 464

Marshall, General George C., 4–5, 79, 113, 

171

Marshall Plan, 171

Martin, Maj. Gen. George E., 225

Materiel Reception Groups North and 

South, 186–87

Mathewson, Maj. Gen. Lemuel, 76

McAuliffe, Lt. Gen. Anthony C., 92–94, 104, 

183, 210–11, 222, 225, 236–38, 245–46, 

259, 275–76, 450, 466

McCarthy, Joseph, 12, 461

McCloy, John J., 3, 26, 172, 369–70

McCord, Lt. Col. Thomas F., 412–13

McElroy, Neil H., 295

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 1–2

Mellrichstadt, 40

Meloy, Maj. Gen. Guy S., Jr., 225

Melun, 123–24

Memmingen, 200

Mendes-France, Pierre, 181–82

Metz, 62, 121, 123–24, 278, 280

Michaelis, Brig. Gen. John H., 232

Miesau, 72 

Miesau Ammunition Depot, 277–78

Milan, 232

Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W., 8

Military Air Transport Service, 341–42

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

(MAAG), Germany, 179, 186–87, 188, 

193, 203, 205

Military assistance advisory groups, 157–58, 

160–61

Military assistance programs, 143, 157–60, 

162, 190, 285

Military Intelligence Group, 513th, 412–13

Military Police Battalions

508th, 139

759th, 76

Military Police Companies

287th, 420

558th, 280

Military Sea Transport Service, 341–42

Missile Command, 1st, 322–23, 324

Missile Battalions

4th, 57th Artillery, 318–19

5th, 42d Artillery (Lacrosse), 318–19

See also Field Artillery Missile Battalions.
504 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Missiles

Corporal, 217, 280, 312–13, 317, 322–23, 

325, 448–49, 458

Dart guided antitank, 255–56

Davy Crockett, 442, 449

Hawk antiaircraft, 318–19, 448–49, 458

Hound Dog cruise, 432

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs), 296–97

Jupiter, 255

Lacrosse guided, 255–56, 318–19, 458

Minuteman intercontinental ballistic, 432, 

446

Nike, 98, 255, 280, 281, 458

Nike Ajax, 329–31

Nike-Hercules, 331, 448–49

Pershing, 448–49

Polaris submarine-launched, 431–32, 446 

Redeye, 449

Redstone, 255, 312–13, 448–49, 458

Sergeant medium-range guided, 448–49, 

458

Shillelagh, 449

See also Honest John rocket; Little John 

rocket.

Moch, Jules S., 144–45, 177

Modern Army Supply System (MASS), 

Project, 282–84

Modern Mobile Army (MOMAR) 

1965–1970, 440–41

Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard Law, 

145, 155–56

Morale, 260, 277, 353 

and dependents, 10, 127, 128, 331, 461–62, 

463

and new replacement systems, 107–08, 

110, 223–24, 227, 329

and pentomic reorganization, 299–300

and recreation, 132–36, 450–51

and wearing civilian clothing, 137–38

Moreland, Allen B., 241

Morgenthau, Henry J., Jr., 171

Mortar, 81-mm. versus 60-mm., 269

Moscow, 242, 363–64

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 146–47

Mueller, Gebhardt, 240

Muller, Maj. Gen. Walter J., 66

Munich, 7, 19–21, 32, 72, 128–29, 133–34, 

199–200, 287, 347, 378, 397

Münster, 72–73

Munsterlager, 196–97, 199

Murnau, 161

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 6–7, 

143

Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 157–58, 

161–62, 176, 184–87, 202

Mutual Security Program for Europe, 32, 

149–50, 159–60, 180, 186

Nagasaki, 280

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 343

National Security Council, 79–80, 144, 

289–90, 409

Navy, U.S., 30, 139, 157, 163, 186, 208–12, 

252, 255, 409, 431–32, 446. See also

Missiles; United States Naval Force, 

Germany (USNAVFORGER); U.S. 

Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and 

Mediterranean.

Neckar River, 45–46, 289

Nellingen, 72–73, 465

Nelson, Lt. Col. Ralph E., 137

NEO 1–53 (draft), Safehaven, 139–4

Netherlands, 5–6, 40, 139, 151–52, 155, 

161, 179, 238, 240–41, 275, 327, 396, 

467–68. See also Dutch Corps, I.

Neu Ulm, 465

New York Times, 253

Noiret, Lt. Gen. Roger J., 54–55

Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) 

2–53–3, July 1953, 139–40

Normandy, 19, 65, 397–98

Norstad, General Lauris, 146–47, 264–65, 

297–98, 323–24, 346–47, 357–60, 

364–65, 397, 408–09, 417–18, 421, 423, 

427–28, 434, 436, 439

North Atlantic Treaty, 6, 143–44, 169, 250

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 6–7, 12–14, 15, 86, 120, 

143, 157, 246, 295, 299, 318, 332–35, 

383–84, 394, 396, 446, 457

and air defense missiles, 329–30

and atomic weapons, 38, 101–02, 104–06, 

150–51, 155–56, 212–14, 240–41, 

264–65, 271, 291, 293, 297, 304–05, 

307–08, 311, 322–23, 433–36

Central Command, 146–47

and close air support, 96–97

command relationships, 30, 66, 78, 

151–53, 232

and conventional forces, 297–98, 436

and East Germans, 364–65

exercises, 52, 66, 101–02, 104–06, 153–54, 

155, 202, 212–14, 240–41, 270–71, 290

defense plans, 287, 289–90, 382, 436, 469

intelligence, 35–37, 165, 433

and the Italian Army, 324–25

line of communications, 156, 280
Index 505

military assistance programs, 158–60, 162

Military Committee, 147–48, 212

military strength, 148–51, 169, 171, 

177–79, 210, 232, 237–38, 253, 325–26, 

408–09, 412, 417, 435–36, 469–70

Mutual Defense Assistance Program 

training, 161

North Atlantic Council, 147–48

and organization of its military defense 

force, 144–48, 151–53

and Soviet attitudes toward Europe, 247, 

250–52, 467–68

and Soviet strength, 40–41, 49–50, 433

and training areas, 26–27, 97–98, 290, 

327, 458

and West German rearmament, 

sovereignty, and membership, 177–79, 

181–84, 188–89, 193, 205, 207, 211, 

233–34, 236–38, 242, 284–85, 287, 327, 

404, 435–36

See also Allied Air Forces, Central 

Europe; Allied Forces, Northern 

Europe; Allied Forces, Southern 

Europe; Allied Land Forces, Central 

Europe (ALFCE); Allied Land Forces, 

Southern Europe; Allied Tactical 

Air Forces; Central Army Group 

(CENTAG); Northern Army Group 

(NORTHAG); Southern European 

Task Force (SETAF), U.S. Army.

North German Plain, 28–29, 40, 467–68

North Rhine-Westphalia, 1

Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), 

105–06, 152–53, 155, 183, 212–13, 

237–38, 325

Nuclear weapons. See Atomic weapons.

Nuremberg, 9–10, 20–21, 25, 32, 40, 73, 

133–34, 226, 229, 287, 300–301

Oakes, Lt. Gen. John C., 209–10, 458

Ober-Ramstadt, 160

Oberammergau, 187–88, 193, 456–57

Oberursel, 72–73

Occupation Statute, 3

Offtackle, Joint Outline Emergency War

Plan, 12–13

Ogden, Brig. Gen. David A. D., 44

Olympic Stadium, 77–78

“Operation Buddy,” 43–44

Operation Friendly Hand, 3

Operation Gyroscope. See Gyroscope, 

Operation.

Operation Kinderlift (U.S. Air Force

program), 398

Ordnance Groups

47th, 72–73

50th, 72–73

57th, 72–73

Ordnance Battalion, 37th, 72–73

Ordnance Ammunition Battalion, 82d, 72–73

Ordnance Maintenance and Supply 

Battalions

8th, 72–73

19th, 72–73

38th, 72–73

71st, 72–73

80th, 72–73

85th, 72–73

Ordnance School, Eschwege, 161

Orléans, 60, 62–63, 121, 322 

Overseas Weekly, 134–35, 459–60

Pace, Frank C., 56–57, 144–45

Pace, Col. Guy L., 174

Palmer, Maj. Gen. Williston B., 18–19

Paris, 6–7, 60, 123–24, 145, 281, 364, 394, 412

Paris Accords, 233–34

Party of German Unity (SED), 362–63

Pentomic organization, 247, 257–59, 270–74, 

293, 295, 299–301, 303–04, 307–10, 

312–13, 319, 326, 333–34, 361, 362, 

440, 442–43, 445, 463–64, 466–67

Périgueux, 278 

Perry, Brig. Gen. Basil H., 32

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), 69

Pike, Sgt. Vern, 419–20

Pirmasens, 104, 331, 427–28

Pirmasens Signal Depot, 277–78

Pleven, Rene, 60, 123–24, 177

Pointe de Grave, 65

Poitiers, 121, 319

Poland, 4–5, 35–36, 242, 248–50, 251, 

340–41, 397

Polk, Maj. Gen. James H., 442–43

Portuguese 3d Infantry Division, 270

Potsdam, 87, 162–64, 168, 405

Potsdam Agreement. See Huebner-Malinin 

Agreement.

Potsdamer Platz, 83

Powell, 1st Lt. Colin L., 113, 459

Powell, General Herbert B., 441–42

Pre-positioned Organizational Material 

Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS), 

427–28

Presley, Pvt. Elvis Aron, 400–402

Project Modern Army Supply System 

(MASS), 282–84

“Project Solarium,” 80
506 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Pusan, 172

Putlos, 28–29

Pyrenees, 12–13

Quartermaster Groups

2d, 72

7th, 72

Quartermaster Battalions

14th, 72

15th, 72

35th, 72

56th, 72

327th, 72

Racial integration, 108, 110–13

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., 208–09, 

253–54, 289–90, 469–70

Radford Plan, 253

Radio, SCR–506 AM, 23

Radio Free Europe, 249–50

Ramstein Air Force Base, 96

Reber, Samuel, Jr., 176

Reconnaissance Squadron, 3d, 12th Cavalry, 

3d Armored Division, 458–59

Recovery vehicle, M47, 195

Recreation and entertainment, 369 

accusations of frivolous government 

spending on, 131

and alcohol and prostitution, 387–89

and American Forces Network, 133–34

construction of facilities for, 27–28, 

128–29, 132–33, 142

engaging with West Germans in, 373, 

385–86, 398, 400

and European Exchange System, 135–36

in France, 393–94

and Overseas Weekly, 135

and racial integration, 112

and the Soviet Zone, 163–64, 168

and the West German Retail Association, 

135–36

Regensburg, 20–21, 28, 284–85, 300–301, 

435–36

Regimental Combat Team, 278th, 55

Rendsburg, 196–97, 199

Reorganization Objective Army Divisions 

(ROAD) 1961–1965, 441–42, 443–45

Requarth, Lt. Col. Jack A., 180–81

Rhine Engineer Depot, Kaiserslautern, 199, 

277–78

Rhine River, 1, 18, 49–50, 153–54, 238, 281, 

289, 453

Rhineland-Palatinate, 1

Rice, M. Sgt. William T., 77

Ridgway, General Matthew B., 30, 64–65, 

82, 96–97, 112, 149–50, 155–56, 160, 

179, 208–09, 223, 252–53, 256–57, 

277–78, 296, 396

Rifles

106-mm. versus 57-mm. recoilless, 269

Belgian FN, 148

Browning .30-caliber automatic, 446–47

M1, 269, 446–47

M2 carbine, 446–47

M4, 446–47

M14, 318–19, 446–47

Rinhausen, 381

Rockets. See Honest John rocket; Little John 

rocket.

Rokossovsky, Marshal Konstantin, 248–49

Romania, 4–5, 35–36, 242

Rome, 232

Rosslau, 405–06

Rostow, Walter W., 412, 439

ROTAPLAN, 463

Rotation and replacement, 78, 92–93, 116, 

300

of battle groups, 327–28, 463

Gyroscope, 222–27, 229–30, 272, 325, 

327–29, 357–58, 463, 465

of complete platoons, 109–10

of personnel deployed to Lebanon, 

356–57

and racial integration, 111–12

with soldiers with little time remaining on 

enlistments, 24

of mechanics, 267

and USAREUR’s Communications Zone, 

342 

using four-man teams combined into 

carrier companies, 107–09, 110, 328–29

Rotterdam, 275

Ruhr Valley, 289, 436

Rusk, Dean, 416–17

Russell, Richard B., 82, 112

Ryan, Maj. Gen. Patrick J., 136–37

Saarland, 1

Saumur, 278

Saunders, Hugh W. L., 145

Saxony, 1

Saxony-Anhalt, 1

Schanze, Col. August E., 166–68

Schleswig-Holstein, 1

Schwäbisch-Gmünd, 160, 301–02

Schwäbisch Hall, 71, 73–74

Service Battalion, 7780th Composite, 77

Short, Dewey J., 82
Index 507

Signal Battalion, 25th, 381

Signal School, Ansbach, 161

Skysweeper, radar-guided 75-mm. gun, 98

Sonthofen, 117–18, 161, 199–200

Southern European Task Force (SETAF), 

U.S. Army, 232, 322–25

Soviet air forces, 35, 38, 338, 339–40, 405–06

Soviet armed force units

Central Group of Forces in Austria, 36

Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, 339

Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in 

Germany, 36–37, 143, 164, 166–67

Northern Group of Forces in Poland, 36

Southern Group of Forces in Romania, 36

Strategic Rocket Forces, 338

1st Guards Tank Army, 36–37, 405–06

2d Guards Tank Army, 36–37

3d Guards Mechanized Army, 36–37

3d Shock Army, 36–37, 40, 405–06

4th Guards Mechanized Army, 36–37

8th Guards Army, 36–37, 40

24th Tactical Air Army, 405–06

6th Guards Tank Division, 405–06

7th Guards Tank Division, 405–06

10th Guards Tank Division, 405–06, 413

26th Guards Tank Division, 405–06

1st Motorized Rifle Division, 405–06

19th Motorized Rifle Division, 413

Soviet Military Liaison Mission, 162–63, 

167–69

Soviet Navy, 35, 340

Soviet spies, 12

Soviet Transport Ministry, 414–15

Soviet Union, 1, 3, 4–5, 79, 82, 211–12, 

253–54, 354–55, 383–84

armed forces in East Germany, intelligence on, 13–14, 35–38, 84–85, 244, 

365, 405–06, 433

and atomic warfare, 13–14, 38, 104, 244, 

296–97, 335–36, 338–39, 432–34, 

467–68

and Austria, 230–32

and battle doctrine, 37–38, 86, 467–68

bloc nations armed forces, intelligence on, 

35–36, 86–87, 340–41, 406, 433

conventional superiority, 13–14, 35, 

40–41, 70, 78, 80, 84–85, 96, 99, 

148–49, 157, 169, 237–38, 248, 333, 

338, 339–40

and Cuba, 430

and Eisenhower’s New Look policy, 81, 

99, 295–97, 366

expansionism, 4–5, 80, 82, 143, 156–57, 

247, 341, 345

and forcing acceptance of East German 

sovereignty, 242–44, 335, 359–60, 

363–64, 367–68, 403–05, 407–08

and German lessons from World War II, 

41–42, 44

harassment of Americans in East 

Germany, 76–77, 87, 166–67, 245

and Hungary, 249–50, 340–41

logistical infrastructure as deterrent to, 

126–27, 334, 465–66

military training of East Germans, 171–72

and Poland, 248–49, 340–41

and possible avenues of advance, 25, 

29–30, 38, 40, 122, 123, 465 

pressure on Berlin and Western access 

rights, 5–6, 13, 74, 243–44, 251–52, 

358–63, 364–68, 402, 403–05, 407–21, 

423–24, 426, 429

propaganda, 76, 243–44

and the rearming and sovereignty of West 

Germans, 177–78, 207, 242, 371–72, 

403–04

and relations with Communist China, 

337–38

and riot in East Berlin, 83–84

and U.S. and alliance battle plans, 12–13, 

45–46, 48–50, 69–70, 77–78, 89, 91, 

116, 138–39, 149, 150–51, 177, 212, 

238, 240, 246, 247, 270, 289–90, 293, 

297–98, 301, 313, 316, 333–34, 361, 

382, 435, 436

and U.S. concern over possible capture or 

attack of resources, 71, 73, 277–78

and the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, 

162–69 

and West German defense strategy, 183, 

293

and Yugoslavia, 120

and zonal and satellite border issues, 21, 

27, 87, 174

Soviet Zone, 1, 3, 12, 20–21, 27, 40, 77, 

86–87, 162–65, 251–52, 359, 411

Spain, 45

Spangdahlem, 281

Sparkman, John J., 298

Special Forces, 456, 464

Special Forces Group (Airborne), 10th, 

116–19, 209–10, 316, 318, 456–57

Special Message to Congress on the Defense 

Budget, 431, 443–44

“Spirit of Geneva,” 207, 243, 247

Sputnik satellites, 296–97, 432–33

St. Lô, 397–98

Stahr, Elvis J., Jr., 417, 460
508 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Stalin, Joseph, 79, 82–83

Stars and Stripes, 167, 211–12, 225, 236, 384, 

410, 462

State Department, 4–5, 12, 139, 157–58, 297, 

403–04, 435

and Austria occupation, 230–31

and civil affairs, 370–71, 375

and Italy, 323–24

on Khrushchev, 363

and Lebanon intervention, 345, 355–56

negotiations with France for line of 

communications, 58, 60

Policy Planning Staff paper and atomic 

weapons, 291

and West Berlin, 251–52, 358–59, 405,

417

Stralsund, 166–67

Strasbourg, 49–50

Strategic Air Command, 99

Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), 357–58

Straubing, 15–16, 300–301

Strauss, Franz Josef, 285, 297

Strickler, Maj. Gen. Daniel B., 19–20

Strother, Maj. Gen. Dean C., 51–52, 96

Sturgis, Maj. Gen. Samuel D., Jr., 64–65

Stuttgart, 7, 14, 19–20, 25, 32, 72, 132–34, 

220–21, 235, 240, 289, 375, 465

Submachine gun, M3, 446–47

Suez Canal, 250, 345

“Sunday Punch.” See Missiles.

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 

(SACEUR). See Eisenhower, General 

Dwight D.; Gruenther, General 

Alfred M.; Lemnitzer, General 

Lyman L.; Norstad, General Lauris; 

Ridgway, General Matthew B.; U.S. 

European Command (U.S. EUCOM).

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, 

Europe (SHAPE), 30, 32, 45–46, 

145–48, 150–54, 156, 183, 188–89, 

233–34, 268, 275, 284–85, 287, 310, 

329, 396

Tactical Air Control Center, 102

Tactical Guidance for Atomic Warfare, April 

1956, 265–66

Tank Battalions

1st Medium, 400–401

3d Medium, 349–50

141st, 116

322d, 116

510th, 116

Tank recovery vehicle, M88, 447

Tank Training Center, Vilseck, 161, 202–03

Tanks

Leopard (German), 326–27

M24, 9

M26 Pershing, 159

M41, 195

M47 Patton, 125–26, 159,

M48 Patton, 125–26, 351, 424, 447

M60, 447

Task Force 61 (marines), 346, 351. See also

Marine Corps, U.S.

Taylor, General Maxwell D., 210–11, 225, 

245–46, 253–54, 257–59, 264–65, 

289–90, 296, 298, 308, 312–13, 

327–28, 350, 362, 366, 386, 429, 

431–32, 439, 442–43, 464

Tegel Airfield, 77–78, 361

Tempelhof, 77–78, 361, 420–21, 424, 426

Thompson, Llewellyn E., 363, 403–04

Thuringia, 1

Timberman, Maj. Gen. Thomas S., 19

Tincher, Col. Maxwell A., 124–25

“Tips on Atomic Warfare for the Military 

Leader,” 311

Tito, Marshal Josip Broz, 120

Torgau, 168

Toul, 278

Tractors

M4, 25

M8, 25

Training, 15, 467

and air assault, 98–99

and air defense, 96–98

and Air Force participation in, 51–52,

96–99

and ammunition, 26, 72–73, 78, 173, 212

of artillery, 219–20, 315

and atomic weapons, 56–58, 97–98,

104–06, 153, 212–14, 222, 232, 238, 

244, 247, 264–68, 270, 310–12, 331, 

434

and aviation assets, 220–22, 315, 448, 455

and battalion tests, 455

and budget cuts, 263, 452

and Berlin, 410, 428

of civil affairs personnel, 371, 372

Clarke’s checklists and philosophy of,

260–62

cold weather, 9–10, 301–02

and combat arms employment, 94

on community relations with Germans,

383

and conventional warfare, 57–58, 212,

217, 219, 268, 313–15, 453–54

to defend wider frontages, 88–91
Index 509

deployment of additional military force

under the guise of, 408–09

development of NATO command

structure for continuity in, 144, 145, 

151–54

and duty hours, 136–37

and East Germans, 406

of East Germans by Soviets, 171–72, 244

and evacuation missions, 140–42

and flexible response, 449

hazardous nature of, 458–59

for headquarters and division-level staffs,

52

and improvement projects in West

Germany, 397–98

to increase grade level of education, 24

and intelligence gathering on Soviet

military, 164–65

and Italian military, 232, 323–24

and Korean War, 26, 42–44

and leadership decision-making testing,

91, 93–94, 450–55

and Lebanese Army, 353–54

and long-range reconnaissance patrol

tests, 318

and military assistance programs, 143,

157–58, 160–62

on mobilization operations, 358

with new equipment and weapons,

318–19, 445, 447–48

and New Look, 439

in night operations, 316

and parachute jumps, 455

and pentomic organization, 258–59,

272–73, 301–03, 307, 310–12

and the petroleum pipeline, 281

and physical fitness, 450–52

and Project MASS, 283–84

and rapid deployment, 428

of recruits, 18, 29

and reduced usable service once

deployed, 24, 29

and replacement assignments and

systems, 107–10, 223–24, 226–27, 328

small-unit and individual, 17–18, 26, 50,

52, 54, 73–74, 93–94, 220, 272–73, 

301–02, 309, 353–54, 450–52, 454–55

and Soviet soldier image in literature, 86

for Soviet surprise attack, 91

and Soviets, 338–40

and Special Forces, 116–19, 318, 456–57

and supply operations, 65–66, 68, 358

and supply shortages, 78, 212

tactical, 8, 9–10, 72, 93–94, 313–15

and tank maintenance, 125–26

timing and location of, coordinated with

West Germans, 237

and transportation, 73, 310

troops unavailable for, 29–30, 44–45,

95–96

and unconventional warfare, 456–57

and unit response time testing, 91–92

for U.S. and alliance forces, 52, 54–55,

212, 238, 270

and U.S. reserve divisions, 289–90

and West German concerns about atomic

weapons, 271

and West German police and military,

174–75, 182–97, 199–203, 205, 

284–85, 325, 435, 469

See also Exercises.

Training areas, 313–14

and large-scale maneuvers and largecaliber ranges issues, 26–29, 42, 78,

95–96, 217, 290, 406–07, 458

returned to West Germans, 235, 371–72

shared with French, 27–28, 72

shortage of, 10, 12, 20, 26, 78, 327,

457–58

and West Germans, 174–75, 180–81,

189–90, 192–93, 237, 290, 371–72, 

380, 457–58

See also Baumholder; Belsen-Hohne 

Tank Training Area; Grafenwöhr; 

Hohenfels; Wildflecken.

Training Guidelines for the Commander, 

451–52

Transportation Corps Training Center, 

Hammelburg, 161

Transportation Groups

10th, 73

7373d, 397–98

Transportation Battalions

27th Separate, 73

29th Separate, 73

122d Separate, 73

Transportation Company, 68th, 113

Treaty of Brussels, 5–6

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and

Mutual Assistance, 242

Trieste, 1, 7–8, 16, 32, 95–96, 119–20

Trieste United States Troops (TRUST), 

7–8, 119–20

Trois-Fontaines, 278

Truck, quarter-ton M151, 448

Truck Battalions

38th, 73

411th, 73
510 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Truman, Harry S., 4–5, 6–7, 14, 79, 80, 

110–11, 143–44, 157, 171–72, 459–60

Truman Doctrine, 297

Ulbricht, Walter, 362–63, 404, 408, 411, 

412–13, 426

Ulm, 19–20, 73, 127–28, 284–85, 287

Uncles, General John F., 229, 245, 379

Unconventional warfare, 42, 116–19, 175, 

316, 318, 456–57

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 391

United Kingdom, 5–6, 12–13, 38, 45, 236–37. 

See also Great Britain.

United Nations, 119–20, 345, 354–55, 368, 

403, 407

United States Air Force, Europe (USAFE), 

7, 30, 139–40, 180, 341–42, 397, 398

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), 

7, 8, 41, 152, 381, 423, 460

and aid to local German communities, 

397–98, 468–69

and aircraft and helicopters use, 220–22, 

315, 318

and ammunition, 69–70, 122–23, 446–47, 452

Army Task Force 201, 341–43, 346–50

and atomic weapons, 78, 99–102, 104–06, 

142, 153, 155–56, 212–13, 215, 217, 

241, 242, 247, 253, 264–65, 268, 270, 

279, 291, 307–08, 310, 333–34, 466

and Austria occupation, 230–32

and Berlin border violations, 245–46

and Berlin Command, 32, 76, 428–29

and the Bundesgrenzschutz, 172–76

and the Bundeswehr, 290, 469

commanders, 87–88, 92–93, 259, 321, 443, 

449–52

and Communications Zone responsibilities, 71, 121, 140–42, 322

coordinate operations with Air Force, 

96–98

and disaster relief and humanitarian 

assistance efforts, 396–97

and Emergency Plan (EP) 201, 341–43

EUCOM redesignated as, in August 1952, 

30, 76, 150

and dependents, 127–29, 138–39, 227, 229, 

331–32, 334, 391, 394–95

duty hours and off-duty hours, 136–38

and flexible response, 449

functions transferred to Seventh Army, 

14, 15–16

German armed forces training and 

training facilities assistance, 180–81, 

183–90, 192–93, 195, 199, 201–03, 205

and German-owned properties issues, 235, 

378–79

and housing, 128–29, 227, 229, 331, 332

and Hungary crisis, 250

and impact of West German sovereignty, 

233–35, 236, 237, 380, 382

intelligence on possible avenues of Soviet 

advance, 38

intelligence on Soviet armed forces, 

339–41

intelligence on Soviet desire for military 

confrontation, 337

and large-scale maneuvers, 453–54

and Lebanon intervention, 346–47, 349, 

351, 353–54, 356–57, 358

and the line of communications through 

France, 121, 156, 275, 319, 393

and logistical responsibilities realignment, 

275–77, 319

and maintenance of order among troops, 391

and military liaison missions, 143, 162, 

163–65, 167–68

and missiles, 281–82, 307–08, 312–13, 

318–19, 329–30, 448–49

and MOMAR study, 441

and National Guard units, 119

and NATO, 156–57

and new weapons and vehicles, 125–26, 

222, 445–49

and noncombatant evacuation, 139–42, 

468

Northern Area Command, 32, 350, 379

Ordnance Command, 279

organizational changes and unit assignments, 32, 34, 116, 118, 322

and pentomic organization, 271–72, 274, 

293, 299, 300–301, 443, 445

personnel and budget cuts, 209–10, 

262–64, 312–13, 323–24, 325, 332, 347, 

356–57

and POL, 69, 123, 263, 280, 452, 453

and Project MASS, 282–84

and publicizing Army’s success in Europe, 

210–12

and racial integration, 111–13

and recreation and leisure, 132–33, 135

and reducing purchases of foreign goods, 

462–63

and reinforcement of Berlin garrison, 361, 

427–28

and relations between Germans and U.S. 

soldiers, 369, 374–77, 390, 392

and release of classified information to 

Germans, 188–89
Index 511

and reopening closed access routes to 

Berlin, 361–62, 365, 418, 424–26

replacement and rotation systems, 

107–10, 222, 224–27, 230, 328–29, 463

and reports of luxurious living, 131

responsibilities, 32, 159–60, 182, 184–85, 

190, 389

and safety issues, 458–59

and schools, 131–32

and SETAF, 322–24, 325

and SHAPE command relationships, 

152–53

and shortage of storage facilities, 63

and soldier misconduct, 386–87

and Soviet chemical and biological agents, 

38

Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, 

167

and Soviet restriction of travel into Berlin, 

252, 360

and Special Forces, 116, 118–19, 318, 

456–57

and STRAC, 357–58

and studies on and lessons from the 

Korean War, 42–44

and technical service divisions, 275

and training, 66, 68, 91–92, 107, 153–56, 

161–62, 313–14, 316

and training areas issues, 217, 327, 380, 

452, 458

and troop information program, 114, 367, 

383–84

U.S. Advisory/Liaison Team (Logistics), 

205

U.S. Army Petroleum Distribution 

Command, Europe, 276–77

U.S. Army Signal Command, Europe, 

276–77

and U.S. Commander, Berlin, 76, 361, 

428–29

and venereal disease, 388–89

and Vietnam conflict, 464, 467

and vulnerability of support installations, 

122, 277–79

and war plans for Soviet invasion, 238, 

240

and World War II vehicle, weapons, and 

equipment refurbishment, 160, 162

United States Naval Force, Germany 

(USNAVFORGER), 7, 180

Urals, 433

U.S. Army, Berlin, 365–66, 428–30

U.S. Army Garrison, Berlin, 76, 95–96, 366, 

406–07

U.S. Army Southern European Task Force 

(SETAF). See Southern European 

Task Force (SETAF), U.S. Army.

U.S. Commander, Berlin, Office of the, 76, 

361, 410, 428–29

U.S. Constabulary. See Constabulary, U.S. 

U.S. European Command (U.S. EUCOM)

commanders, 179, 357–58

information disclosure policy, 188–89

and MAAG responsibilities, 205

mission, 149–50

and sealing off of western sectors by 

Soviets and East Germans, 359–60 

and USAREUR responsibilities, 159–60, 

184–85, 190, 192–93

See also Military Assistance Advisory 

Group (MAAG), Germany.

U.S. Exchange Service, 389

U.S. Forces, Austria, 7–8, 120, 230–31

U.S. Military Academy, 190–91

U.S. Military Liaison Mission, 87, 162–69, 

412, 426

U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and 

Mediterranean, 30, 139–40 

U.S. Strike Command, 442–43

U.S. Zone, 1, 3, 7–10, 15–16, 21, 25, 27–29, 

40, 72, 91, 117–18, 162–63, 181, 

189–90, 371, 400

Vaihingen, 7, 161

Valentine, Col. Charles H., 174

Valluy, General Jean-Etienne, 237–38, 298

Van Houten, Brig. Gen. John G., 43–44

Verdun, 62, 121, 278, 319

Verona, 232, 322–23, 395–66

Versailles, 233–34

Vicenza, 232, 322–23, 395–96

Vienna, 403, 405, 407–08, 412, 417

Vietnam conflict, 439, 456, 464, 467, 470

Vilseck, 161, 202–03

Voice of America, 117–18, 134, 249–50

Von Bonin, Col. Bogislaw, 180–81

Von Kann, Brig. Gen. Clifton F., 318–19

Von Pawel, Col. Ernest, 412–13

Von Rosbach, Marion, 135

Wackernheim, 331

Walker, Maj. Gen. Edwin A., 459–61

Warsaw Pact, 242, 246, 249–50, 335, 433, 

456, 466, 467–68

Watlington, Maj. Gen. Thomas M., 272–73

Watson, Maj. Gen. Albert, II, 410, 430

Watson, Maj. Gen. Numa A., 211

Weimar-Nohra, 36
512 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1

Weser, 3, 45–46, 58, 123, 238

West German Army (Bundeswehr) 

I German Corps, 325, 435–36

II German Corps, 270, 284–85, 289, 325, 

435–36

III German Corps, 284–85, 289, 325, 

435–36

1st Airborne Division, 325, 435

3d Armored Division, 230, 325, 435–36

5th Armored Division, 325, 435–36

12th Armored Division, 435

1st Armored Infantry Division, 435

2d Armored Infantry Division, 435

4th Armored Infantry Division, 435

6th Armored Infantry Division, 435

7th Armored Infantry Division, 435

10th Armored Infantry Division, 435

11th Armored Infantry Division, 435

1st Infantry Division, 230, 325, 435–36

2d Infantry Division, 435–36

4th Infantry Division, 435–36

6th Infantry Division, 435–36

1st Mountain Division, 325, 435–36

Quartermaster Corps, 199–200

West Germany (German Federal Republic), 

1, 3, 25, 32, 248, 333–34

and aid from U.S. soldiers and dependents to local communities, 397–98, 

400, 468–69

and allied defense plans, 45–46, 49–50, 

77–78, 91, 183, 237–38, 240, 284–85, 

287, 289–90

and Army food service program, 69

and atomic weapons in European defense, 

104, 240–41, 246, 271, 291, 293, 297, 

311–12, 366

attitudes toward U.S. personnel, 375–77

attitudes of U.S. personnel toward, 377–78

Bundesgrenzschutz (border police), 9, 21, 

172–76, 245

Bundeswehr, 191–92, 196, 202, 207, 

284–85, 290, 325, 327, 442, 457–58, 469

civil-military relationship with U.S., 

370–73

Communist harassment of citizens near 

borders of, 76, 87, 245

currency reform, 4, 5

defense concepts and World War II 

experience used in U.S. battle plans, 

41–42, 44, 466

and East Berlin, 83–84

and East German refugees, 362–63, 411

and evacuation of U.S. noncombatants 

from, 139–41

Federal Requisition Law, 379

firing ranges, 28–29, 217, 290, 452

and German-produced armaments, 

326–27

housing, 127–29, 235, 331–32

and Interallied Tactical Study Group, 

151–52

law and U.S. military and civilians, 

235–36, 327, 371–72, 391

logistical line of support in, 12, 58, 121–23

and logistics system for German Army, 

197, 199–202

and luxurious living of Americans in, 129, 

131

and military reorganization, 326, 442

and missile sites, 281–82, 329–30

and NATO and U.S. exercises, 270–71, 

304–05, 453–54

new line of communications from France 

to, 60, 62, 63, 121, 123–24, 280–81

purchasing of goods by Americans in, 

135–36, 389–90

and racial discrimination or segregation, 

112–13

rearmament and military training, 

171–73, 176–97, 199–203, 205, 469

relations with Americans, 127, 135, 138, 

325–26, 369, 373–75, 380–93

role in NATO military defense and 

membership, 144, 162, 169, 171, 177, 

179, 182–84, 207, 210, 233–34, 236–37, 

246, 291, 325–26, 433, 435–36

schools, 131–32

and similarities and dissimilarities to 

Korean War, 13, 44

Soviet avenues of advance through, 38, 40

Soviet concerns over military strength of, 

403–04, 468

Soviet demand for reparations from, 4–5, 

35

and Soviet military mission, 166–67

Soviet threat to security of, 5–6, 13–14, 

337

and Special Forces, 117–19

and support depots and storage sites, 

73–74

training areas issues, 9–10, 12, 19–20, 

26–28, 95–96, 180–81, 189–90, 290, 

327, 371–72, 380–81, 452, 453–54, 

457–58

transition to and as sovereign nation, 76, 

83, 176, 207, 233–34, 242, 469

and U.S. retention of German-owned 

properties, 235, 371–72, 378–79
Index 513

and West Berlin, 74, 76, 233–34, 243–44, 

251, 358–59, 362–64, 367, 407, 412, 

414, 417–18, 429–30

See also Exercises; German Training 

Assistance Group (GTAG); High 

Commissioner for Germany (HICOG); 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

(MAAG), Germany.

Western Union Defense Organization, 5–6

Wetzlar, 240

Wiesbaden, 32, 96, 436

Wildflecken, 20–21, 27–28, 116, 175, 189–90, 

217, 219, 313–14, 406–07, 457–58

Williams, Maj. Gen. Edward T., 10, 375–76

Wilson, Charles E., 81–82, 123, 207–09, 

252–54, 255

Wittenberg, 405–06

World War II Vehicle Replacement Program, 

158–59

Worms, 427–28

Würzburg, 32, 73–74, 287, 300–301, 327–28, 

400, 435–36, 465

“Your Rights and Obligations in Germany,” 

236

Zakharov, General of the Army Nikolai F., 

390

Zehlendorf, 406–07

Zirndorf, 73

Zones of occupation, 1, 363–64. See also

British Zone; French Zone; Soviet 

Zone; U.S. Zone.

Zweibrücken, 108