Filed 8/15/23 In re P.H. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re P.H., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

B324894

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

P.H., 

Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. NJ29899)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

John C. Lawson II, Judge. Affirmed.

Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

P.H., a minor, appeals the sustaining of a Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 602 petition alleging he committed the offense of possession of a firearm 

by a minor in violation of Penal Code section 29610. He contends the juvenile 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the firearm, which

police discovered inside his backpack during an inventory search of the vehicle 

N.H. was driving. We affirm, finding the officers properly impounded 

appellant’s vehicle and the search of his backpack was done in accordance with 

standard police department procedures. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The Stop and Inventory Search1

Gerrit de Jongh, a sergeant in the Long Beach Police Department’s 

(LBPD) motor detail, was on solo patrol on his motorcycle on March 24, 2022 

at 7:00 p.m. De Jongh observed a vehicle with illegally tinted windows and 

no rear license plate driving on Lakewood Boulevard near the traffic circle. 

De Jongh stopped the vehicle on Lakewood, and it parked in an area that was 

an open traffic lane with no parking allowed. 

Appellant was driving the car and two other minors were occupants. 

Appellant did not have a driver’s license, nor did the other minors. According 

to police procedure, if a car had no licensed drivers, de Jongh was required to 

tow the vehicle for the safety of both the occupants of the vehicle and the 

public at large. 

At this point, de Jongh called for additional units. While waiting for 

backup to arrive, de Jongh began to write appellant a citation for three 

1 The facts recited herein are taken from Sergeant de Jongh’s testimony 

at the suppression hearing. 
3

infractions: driving without a license, no rear license plate, and tinted 

windows. All three minors remained in the vehicle and were cooperative. 

Four other officers arrived after about 15 to 20 minutes, and they 

removed the minors from the car. De Jongh conducted a pat search of 

appellant and found nothing. Appellant signed the citation and asked for his 

backpack, money and cellphone. 

While the minors sat on the curb, the other officers conducted a search 

of the car for purposes of inventory. Section 27 of the LBPD Training 

Bulletin (section 27) requires officers to conduct an inventory of an 

impounded vehicle, including “any items found in the glove [compartment], 

trunk[], and other items such as bags and purses.”

2

However, at the suppression hearing, de Jongh did not testify 

regarding any specific policy governing the opening of closed containers 

during an inventory search. 

During the inventory search, Officer Purcell found a handgun in 

appellant’s backpack. De Jongh did not participate in the inventory and did 

not fill out the inventory form, nor did he know whether an inventory form 

was filled out in conformance with LBPD standards. 

Appellant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a minor, and the 

other two minors were released to their parents. De Jongh did not contact 

any of the minors’ parents to see if anyone could drive the car. 

2 No written copy of section 27 was introduced at the suppression 

hearing, although Sergeant de Jongh was shown a written copy during his 

testimony to refresh his recollection. 
4

The vehicle was towed pursuant to Vehicle Code section 226513 and 

LBPD section 27. 

2. Appellant’s Motion to Suppress; Trial Court Ruling

On June 16, 2022, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a onecount section 602 petition alleging that appellant violated Penal Code section 

29610 (minor in possession of a firearm). 

Appellant moved pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 

700.1 to suppress the handgun. He argued the vehicle was not lawfully 

searched under three exceptions to the warrant requirement. First, he 

contended the automobile exception did not apply because there were no facts 

supporting a reasonable belief a crime had been committed; second, the 

search incident to lawful arrest exception did not apply because his arrest 

was illegal; and third, the inventory exception did not apply. 

After hearing argument, the juvenile court took the matter under 

submission and later denied the motion, relying on Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 

479 U.S. 367 (Bertine), People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887 (Steeley), 

and People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309. The court concluded the 

vehicle was towed pursuant to normal police protocols and the caretaking 

function, and the search of containers in the vehicle was part of towing policy. 

After the juvenile court denied the motion to suppress, appellant 

admitted the charge and the court sustained the petition. The court placed 

appellant on probation for six months. 

3 Vehicle Code section 22651 authorizes an impound “[w]hen an officer 

arrests a person driving or in control of a vehicle for an alleged offense and 

the officer is, by this code or other law, required or permitted to take, and 

does take, the person into custody.” (Veh. Code, § 22651, subd. (h)(1).)
5

DISCUSSION

Appellant asserts the vehicle was not properly impounded according to 

the community caretaking function; rather, de Jongh’s search was improperly 

motivated by pretext because Vehicle Code section 22651 makes clear towing 

is discretionary. Further, appellant asserts the search of his backpack 

violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not conducted in accordance 

with any specific standardized procedure relating to the opening of

containers, such as the backpack. We disagree. 

A. Standard of Review

On review of a motion to suppress evidence based upon a violation of 

the Fourth Amendment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution and will uphold the trial court’s factual findings if supported by 

substantial evidence. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) We 

independently determine whether the search or seizure was reasonable. 

(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924.) 

B. The Prosecution Established the Impound and Search of 

Appellant’s Car Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment

1. Legal Principles Governing Inventory Searches 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right against unreasonable 

searches and seizures by the government. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 824, 829.) We presume that a search conducted without a warrant is 

illegal. (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761.) As a result, 

“[w]hen a defendant raises a challenge to the legality of a warrantless search 

or seizure, the People are obligated to produce proof sufficient to show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the search fell within one of the 
6

recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” (People v. Romeo (2015) 

240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.) 

A defendant meets his or her initial burden of challenging the 

constitutionality of a warrantless search or seizure by “simply assert[ing] the 

absence of a warrant and mak[ing] a prima facie showing to support that 

assertion.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130 (Williams).) The 

People then bear the burden of proving that both the impoundment and 

search were constitutionally reasonable under all the circumstances. (Ibid.;

People v. Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) Reasonableness is “the 

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.” (Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 

248, 250.)

An inventory search conducted during the impounding of an automobile 

is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 

(Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 371; People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 

775, 787 (Torres).) Police may search an impounded vehicle to secure and 

protect the vehicle and its contents. (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 

U.S. 364, 373.) This “community caretaking” function permits the impound 

of a vehicle where it poses a threat to safety or the free flow of traffic, or 

where someone other than the defendant cannot move the car to a safe 

location. (Torres, supra, at p. 791; Halajian v. D&B Towing (2012) 209 

Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) 

When impounding a vehicle, police officers generally follow a routine 

system of securing and inventorying its contents. “‘These procedures [were]

developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s 

property while it remains in police custody [citation]; the protection of the 

police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property [citation]; and 
7

the protection of the police from potential danger [citation].’” (People v. Burch 

(1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 172, 177–178.) 

To prevent pretext searches, police discretion in performing an 

inventory search must be “exercised according to standard criteria and on the 

basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” 

(Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 375.) Further, “[t]he policy or practice 

governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.”

(Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 (Wells); Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 

p. 126.)

As explained in Wells, there is no Fourth Amendment obstruction to an 

inventory search of the inside of a closed container if it is done pursuant to 

police department policy. “[P]olicies of opening all containers or of opening no 

containers are unquestionably permissible,” as is a policy “to allow the 

opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are 

unable to ascertain from examining the containers’ exteriors.” (Wells, supra, 

495 U.S. at p. 4.) Finally, as stated in Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. 367, “‘Even if 

less intrusive means existed of protecting some particular types of property, 

it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of 

business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or 

items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit.’ [Citation.]” (Id. 

at p. 375.) 

These principles were illustrated in People v. Needham (2000) 79 

Cal.App.4th 260, where the Tulare County Sheriff’s Department had an oral 

policy for inventory searches based on the Vehicle Code. Consistent with the 

policy, the deputy testified at the suppression hearing that he customarily 

searched bags and other containers before turning them over to the person 

claiming them because of the possibility of concealed weapons. (Id. at p. 267.)
8

Needham found that the sheriff’s department policy was sufficiently 

standardized to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, and the deputy exercised his 

discretion within the standard procedure. (Id. at p. 267.) Further, Needham 

found there was no evidence that the deputy had used the inventory as a ruse 

to search for incriminating evidence. (Id. at p. 266.)

2. The Inventory Search Here Comported with the Fourth 

Amendment

Here, as a threshold issue, appellant complains that the decision to 

impound the car was a pretext for an unlawful search. On the contrary, the 

facts demonstrate the officers’ decision to impound the vehicle was a proper 

community caretaking function and not the product of pretext. The car was 

parked in a traffic lane and in danger of impeding traffic; neither appellant 

nor his passengers had a driver’s license; and the car lacked a license plate. 

Further, the officers were not required to contact the minors’ parents to 

see if one of them could drive the car. (See People v. Williams, supra, 145 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 761–762 [police not required to adopt least intrusive 

means in deciding whether to impound vehicle].) Indeed, the existence of 

other means of protecting the car does not render the impound unreasonable. 

(People v. Steeley, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 892.) In Steeley, the driver had 

a revoked license. The court concluded, “[i]t was not unreasonable for [the 

officer] to conclude that the appropriate way to protect the vehicle was 

impoundment.” (Id. at p. 892.) 

Secondly, appellant argues that section 27 only provides that police 

make an inventory of all containers, including bags, cases, and purses; the 

record was silent whether LBPD policy would permit an inventory that 

included the contents of such containers. We disagree. 
9

Similar to People v. Needham, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th 260, Officer de 

Jongh testified that LBPD had a policy of inventorying containers as well as 

other items found in cars. Pursuant to that policy, it was not unreasonable 

for the officers here to open items that might contain a concealed weapon.

Thus, although we recognize the jurisprudence distinguishes between closed 

containers and open containers, appellant’s argument relying on this 

distinction contravenes the purposes of an inventory search. An inventory 

search does more than catalog the contents of vehicles; the inventory search 

is designed to protect officers from danger, including weapons concealed in 

the vehicle or in closed containers. (People v. Needham, supra, 79 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 266–267.) Furthermore, this distinction is designed to 

address the dangers of indiscriminate rummaging. There was no evidence 

here the officers used the inventory as a ruse to search for incriminating

evidence. Thus, “[t]he relevant question is whether the impounding was 

subjectively motivated by an improper investigatory purpose.” (Torres, 

supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.) Where, as here, there is no such evidence, 

we will uphold the inventory search. 

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//
10

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.