DREW

PAPERS

THE

Brian T. Stahl

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

24

Blunting the Spear

Why Good People Get Out
Air University

Steven L. Kwast, Lieutenant General, Commander and President

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Thomas D. McCarthy, Colonel, PhD, Commandant and Dean
AIR UNIVERSITY 

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

Blunting the Spear

Why Good People Get Out

Brian T. Stahl

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Drew Paper No. 24

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
ii

Project Editor

Jeanne K. Shamburger

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stahl, Brian T., 1978–

Blunting the spear : why good people get out / Brian T. Stahl, 

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.

 pages cm. — (Drew paper, ISSN 1941-3785 ; no. 24)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-237-1

1. United States. Air Force—Recruiting, enlistment, etc. 2. Air 

pilots, Military—Salaries, etc.—United States. I. Title. II. Title: 

Why good people get out. 

UG883.S73 2014

358.4'1114—dc23

2014038721

Published by Air University Press in March 2015

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the organizations with which 

they are associated or the views of the School of Advanced Air 

and Space Studies, Air Force Research Institute, Air University, 

United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. This publication is cleared for public release 

and unlimited distribution.

This Drew Paper and others in the series are available electronically 

at the AU Press website: http://aupress.au.af.mil.

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iii

The Drew Papers

The Drew Papers are award-winning master’s theses selected for publication by the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama. This series of papers commemorates the distinguished career 

of Col Dennis “Denny” Drew, USAF, retired. In 30 years at Air University, 

Colonel Drew served on the Air Command and Staff College faculty, directed 

the Airpower Research Institute, and served as dean, associate dean, and professor of military strategy at SAASS. Colonel Drew is one of the Air Force’s 

most extensively published authors and an international speaker in high 

demand. He has lectured to over 100,000 students at Air University as well as 

to foreign military audiences. In 1985 he received the Muir S. Fairchild Award 

for outstanding contributions to Air University. In 2003 Queen Beatrix of the 

Netherlands made him a Knight in the Order of Orange-Nassau for his contributions to education in the Royal Netherlands Air Force.

The Drew Papers are dedicated to promoting the understanding of air and 

space power theory and application. These studies are published by the Air 

University Press and broadly distributed throughout the US Air Force, the 

Department of Defense, and other governmental organizations, as well as to 

leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learning, public-policy institutes, and the media.
iv

Please send inquiries or comments to

Commandant and Dean

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

125 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112

Tel: (334) 953-5155

DSN: 493-5155

saass.admin@us.af.mil
v

Contents

List of Illustrations vii

Foreword ix

About the Author xi

Acknowledgments xiii

Abstract xv

1 Introduction: Dear Boss 1

Overview 5

Problem and Hypothesis Statements 7

Objectives 8

Methodology 9

 2 Rightsizing and Requirements Explained 13

Budgeting and Planning Processes 13

Requirements and Challenges 16

What Do the “Best” Look Like? 21

Methods of Retention 24

Retention since 2000 29

Environmental Influences 31

Summary 32

 3 The Fighter Community 37

Is There a Retention Problem in the Fighter Community? 39

What Are the Risks for the Fighter Community? 47

Findings and Summary for the Fighter Pilot Community 48

 4 The Bomber Community 55

Is There a Retention Problem in the Bomber Community? 56

What Are the Risks for the Bomber Community? 65

Findings and Summary for the Bomber Pilot Community 67

 5 The Remotely Piloted Aircraft Community 75

Is There a Retention Problem in the RPA Community? 78

What Are the Risks for the RPA Community? 86

Findings and Summary for the RPA Pilot Community 88
vi

 6 Synthesis and Statistical Results 95

 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 105

Summary 105

Air Force 107

Combat Air Forces 111

Fighter Community 113

Bomber Community 115

RPA Community 117

Epilogue 121

Appendix A Capt Ron Keys’s Dear Boss Letter 125

Appendix B 2009 Dear Boss Letter 129

Appendix C Gen Mark Welsh’s E-mail to USAFE Fighter Pilots 137

Appendix D Pilot Retention Survey 139

Appendix E Pilot Retention Survey Solicitation E-mail 143

Abbreviations 145

Bibliography 149

CONTENTS
vii

Illustrations

Figure

 1 Communities of interest 6

 2 Influential variables 8

 3 Influential variables for the fighter community 9

 4 Influential variables for the fighter community with solutions 10

 5 Aviator career incentive pay scheduling 26

 6 Aviation continuation pay take rates 30

 7 Pilot losses 30

 8 Fighter pilot losses 40

 9 Fighter pilot ACP take rates 41

10 Bomber pilot losses 57

11 Bomber pilot ACP take rates 58

12 Increased ACP payout effect on retention 64

13 Effect of airline hiring on ACP take rates 65

14 Projected distribution of UAS demographics 79

15 RPA pilot ACP take rates 80

Table

 1 Required flying hours for “experienced” qualification 

by community 18

 2 Example of flying hours required for upgrades 20

 3 WIC entry requirements by community 22

 4 Total survey solicitations/responses by MWS and PME school 39

 5 ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities 

and the fighter community 42

 6 ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities

and fighter major weapon systems 42

 7 Fighter pilot retention variables 44

 8 Fighter synthesis 49

CONTENTS
viii

Table

9 ACP take rate comparison between all rated 

communities and the bomber pilot community 59

10 ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities 

and bomber major weapons systems 60

11 Bomber pilot retention variables 61

12 Bomber synthesis 67

13 ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities 

and the RPA community 81

14 ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities 

and individual RPA systems 82

15 RPA pilot retention variables 83

16 RPA synthesis 88

17 Univariate test comparing mean scores on pilot retention 

for fighter, bomber, and RPA communities 95

18 Pairwise comparison of pilot responses to community 

retention problems 96

19 Synthesis of influential variables among fighter, bomber, 

and RPA communities 97

20 Test of between-subjects effects by community and 

money/ACP 98

21 Pairwise comparison by community and money/ACP 99

22 Test of between-subjects effects on the best rated officers 

leaving active duty 100

23 Correlation of best leaving active duty 100

24 Senior leader understanding of retention problem 101

25 Increased understanding of retention and its impact 

on future Air Force leadership 102

26 Univariate test comparing influential variables over time 102

27 Pairwise comparison of responses pertaining to when 

the best pilots decide to leave compared to ADSC completion 103

28 Total survey solicitations/responses by MWS and PME school 106

29 Synthesis of influential variables among fighter, bomber, 

and RPA communities 108

CONTENTS
ix

Foreword

The Air Force loves to measure “stuff ”; however, the “stuff ” that gets measured does not always yield the information required for sound decision making. For example, the Air Force has historically chosen to reduce pilot shortages by using longer active duty service commitments and bonus payments. 

No one, however, questioned the effectiveness of this approach to see if it actually addressed the reasons pilots separated from the Air Force—no one, that 

is, until now. 

In this study, Lt Col Brian Stahl questions this approach by asking why 

many of the best aviators in the Air Force separate before they become eligible 

for retirement. He challenges the “common sense wisdom” of the Air Force by 

questioning the idea that one need only throw money at the problem to fix it. 

In doing so, he forced me to recall the adage oft attributed to Ben Franklin 

that “nothing is so uncommon as common sense.” His challenge proves to be 

a worthy one. 

Using a combination of rated-officer retention reports, survey data, and 

interviews, he addressed three key issues in his research. First, he asked if 

there really was a retention problem in the combat air forces (CAF). Next, he 

wanted to know what risks were associated with poor retention in the CAF. 

Finally, he sought solutions the Air Force could employ if indeed retention 

was a problem. His study examined three pilot groups in the CAF: fighters, 

bombers, and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). His surveys and interviews expanded the retention discussion beyond compensation issues and included 

Air Force identity, promotion and recognition, family/family stability, operations tempo, and “others.” 

He found that the lack of exit and retention surveys that explored a range 

of issues at different times in a rated officer’s career—not just at separation—

gave the Air Force an incomplete understanding of retention issues, both in 

terms of what those issues were and when they became problems. For the 

current force, the effect of operations tempo on family stability is a key retention factor, especially for midcareer officers—the ones most likely to have 

young children at home. Another interesting finding was concerns for professional development, especially in education opportunities, and that missing 

such prospects could lead to negative effects on recognition and promotion. 

These specific findings support his major argument that retention is not 

merely about compensation. 

A good study leads to insightful recommendations, and Colonel Stahl’s is 

no exception. He recommends that the Air Force begin a systematic process 

for conducting retention surveys across the force at various times during an 
x

officer’s career. The results from these surveys lead to the next recommendation—to tailor retention incentives by Air Force specialties and to vary those 

incentives over time consistent with an officer’s evolving priorities. In other 

words, the Air Force should move away from a “one size fits all” mentality in 

its pilot-retention effort. 

Colonel Stahl produced an exceptional study not only in its quality but also 

in its insights into a key issue—pilot retention. With airline associations predicting a worldwide requirement for some 500,000 pilots in the next 20 years, 

retaining the Air Force’s best pilots will remain a priority for a long time to 

come. As testament to the quality of this study, Colonel Stahl’s Blunting the 

Spear: Why Good People Get Out received the First Command Financial Planning Award for the best SAASS thesis of 2013 in the leadership and ethics 

category. I commend it to you for the value of its analysis as well as for its 

conclusions and recommendations. 

STEPHEN E. WRIGHT, PhD

Education Advisor and Deputy Commandant

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

FOREWORD
xi

About the Author

Lt Col Brian T. Stahl is an Airman and officer in the United States Air 

Force. Prior to attending the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, he 

was a Strategic Policy Fellow in Washington, DC, where he worked in the 

Secretary of the Air Force’s Acquisition Office (SAF/AQP) and the Office of 

the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-P). Colonel Stahl is an F-22 

pilot and has a broad background in fighter operations, with over 1,300 total 

flying hours in the F-22 and F-16CJ. He has deployed several times in support 

of regional security in the Middle East and Asia as part of F-22 theater security packages.

Colonel Stahl holds a master’s degree in aviation and aerospace management from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and a bachelor’s degree in 

behavioral science from the Air Force Academy. He is also a graduate of the 

USAF Air Command and Staff College; Squadron Officer School, where he 

was a Commandant’s Leadership Award recipient; and the Aerospace Basic 

Course. Colonel Stahl currently serves in the Air Force Chief of Staff ’s Strategic Studies Group, Washington, DC.

xiii

Acknowledgments

To all the men and women who served as the impetus behind this study, I 

am honored to have walked beside you and thank you for your service. At the 

completion of this research, I can simply say, I understand.

I would like to thank Dr. Stephen Wright and Dr. James Forsyth for their 

continued guidance and mentorship in the development of this paper. Their 

contributions throughout the year have been instrumental in shaping the final product. I would also like to recognize the entire School of Advanced Air 

and Space Studies faculty for their collective help in getting Class XXII across 

the finish line—thank you.

I would also like to recognize Ms. Sophie Ryan and Ms. Arden Gale. Without their help, the statistical analysis and survey for this project would have 

been much more difficult. Their time has been invaluable to me.

My father has been a sounding board for me. Thank you for always having 

the time to read my work, listen to my thoughts, and continue guiding me in 

my personal and professional development. To the rest of my family, thank 

you for all the support through this year. It has meant the world to me.

To my children, I know this year has been difficult. As always, you have 

amazed me with your resilience. I am blessed to be your father.

Finally, to my wife, you will never know the extent to which I leaned on you 

this year. Thank you for taking things on when I could not, for picking me up 

when I fell down, and for always driving me to do my best. Your patience and 

love are inspiring.

xv

Abstract

This study analyzes the United States Air Force’s retention of the “best” 

rated officers from the combat air forces. Specifically, it addresses the retention of pilots from the fighter, bomber, and remotely piloted aircraft communities and highlights the need for more focused retention methods. This research shows that each rated community within the Air Force has different 

contextual definitions of those variables deemed most influential for retention. Further, the author argues that a failure to negotiate these identified disparities at key points throughout an officer’s career will lead to decreased retention of the best, regardless of monetary payout made available at the 

completion of an active duty service commitment. As such, the author proposes several methods the Air Force can use to address retention contextually, 

starting at the Air Force level and progressing to individual major weapons 

system communities.

1

Chapter 1

Introduction: Dear Boss

“Dear Boss, Well, I quit.” These five words open a poignant two-page letter 

written shortly after the end of the Vietnam War to Gen Wilbur Creech, serving as Tactical Air Command (TAC) commander. The letter succinctly captures a pervasive loss of faith in the USAF’s perceived ability to maintain combat readiness given the bureaucracy, leadership, and lack of mission focus. 

Peppered throughout the text are phrases indicative of a sick organization: 

“poor leadership and motivational ability”; “lower quality people”; and “long 

hours with little support, entitlements eroded, integrity a mockery, zero visible 

career progression and senior commanders evidently totally missing the 

point.” This is not a healthy organizational picture by anyone’s account. The 

letter concludes with the resignation of the author, a skilled fighter pilot, because of job frustration.1

 The pilot in question was a valuable commodity to 

the security of the nation, had done the job asked of him, and still could, but 

he would not—because of the Air Force.

Nevertheless, things are better now, right? Vietnam and the “hollow force” 

that followed were an anomaly—a period burned into the psyche of the 

American military and civilian leadership, full of lessons that, once learned, 

would prevent similar mistakes and similar losses of good people. Closer inspection reveals that the variables affecting the anomalous period following 

Vietnam are eerily similar to those for the Air Force’s current reality.

Exasperation at the tactical level equated to a crisis at the strategic level as 

Air Force leaders struggled to maintain a combat-capable service after Vietnam. Declining budgets, steady cuts in operations, and decreases in sortie 

rates plagued Air Force leaders and limited their ability to prepare for combat 

adequately.2

 James Kitfield addresses these challenges in his book Prodigal 

Soldiers, stating that “on any given day, half of the planes in TAC’s $25 billion 

inventory were not combat ready because of some malfunction, and 220 aircraft were outright ‘hangar queens,’ unable to fly for at least three weeks for a 

lack of spare parts or maintenance.”3

 These shortfalls existed concurrently 

with major modernization programs for the combat air forces (CAF), including the F-15 Eagle and the F-16 Fighting Falcon.4

 Despite the modernization 

of aircraft, the pilot nearest to the flight line still had to make difficult decisions on a daily basis.

Pilots on the flight line continued to perform where they could, walking a 

dangerous line between safety and mission readiness. Not wanting to sacrifice 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

2

mission capability, they flew sorties with limited gas, advanced students before they had demonstrated proficiency in required training, and operated 

aircraft that had been structurally overstressed during an earlier sortie.5

 Angered by these developments, junior officers expressed their frustrations 

among their colleagues and wrote emotional letters to senior leaders, not unlike the Dear Boss letter.6

 Annoyances expressed in text were fueled further by 

an apparent disconnect between junior officers and senior leaders.7

Faith in the leadership’s ability to lead was at a critically low point in the 

years following Vietnam. The mistrust started at the top and worked its way 

into the very culture of the Air Force. Gen Edward “Shy” Meyer, the Army 

chief of staff, coined the term hollow force in 1979 during a brief to President 

Carter at Camp David. His courage in stating the Army’s inability to meet the 

needs of the nation did not reflect the other service chiefs’ opinions, however. 

The Air Force briefing was “far more upbeat, with the chief[s] essentially telling Carter that their forces were willing and able to perform whatever mission 

the president tasked them with.”8

 With rhetoric of capability directly opposed 

to operational reality, many junior officers took their frustrations out in the 

last means available to them—with their resignations from the Air Force.

When the military became an all-volunteer force in 1973, the common 

Soldier, Sailor, Marine, and Airman possessed a greater means of influence. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) needed to retain more of the best people 

because the draft was no longer a continuous source of new recruits. Expressing discontent with their feet after completion of their initial enlistment, 

young warriors departed the armed services for ventures outside of the bureaucratic constraints of the military. Tim Kane observes that such an exodus 

“was a recurrent problem that the Pentagon had struggled with since at least 

the end of World War II, although the shift to an all-volunteer force in the 

1970s and a consequent improvement in the quality of life had, it was thought, 

solved the problem.”9

 Dissatisfaction among Airmen, particularly pilots, was 

worrisome as training sorties continued to decrease and external pressures to 

meet quotas increased. Kitfield describes the rapid departure of aviators: “Pilots—each trained at a cost of roughly $1 million—continued to desert the 

service in droves,” with trends showing “a shortage of over 2,100 pilots . . . by 

the end of 1980.”10 Chronologically, these problems are from the 1970s and 

1980s, but conceptually, they share an equally disturbing similarity with difficulties today.

Taken together, budget cuts, decreasing sortie numbers, exasperation with 

combat capability, disconnection with leadership, an increase in perceived risk 

to pilots, major modernizations to the CAF fleet, and an impending pilot 

shortage could apply as equally in 2013 as in the 1970s. George Santayana 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

3

once wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 

it.”11 In this case, it seems that historical condemnation is knocking at the door.

Nearly 40 years after the original Dear Boss letter, similar issues to those 

that influenced many of the “best” aviators to leave active duty service resonate through current Air Force culture. A 2009 letter that opens with the same 

five words as the Vietnam-era Dear Boss letter is illustrative.12 Written by an 

experienced F-15 pilot, the modern Dear Boss letter speaks of “doing more 

with less,” “poor leadership and micromanagement,” an Air Force suffering 

from an “identity crisis,” limited chance for officer progression unless instilled 

with a sense of careerism and “look[ing] good on paper,” prioritization of 

administrative functions over the mission, and instability.13 The years since 

the modern Dear Boss letter have been fraught with talks of sequestration, 

budget cuts, and personnel downsizing as American forces distance themselves from two decades of nearly continuous battle. Amid the turmoil, a robust media network can quickly capture and distribute mounting aggravation 

from junior officers and senior leaders, increasing the challenges decision 

makers face.

Cast from a similar mold as Vietnam-era headlines, reporting today captures the same woeful sentiments as senior leaders struggle to maintain combat capability. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta remarked in November 

2011 that additional cuts to DOD funding would “lead to a hollow force incapable of sustaining the mission it is assigned.”14 Echoing these remarks, Gen 

Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), more recently 

stated that “sequestration will hollow out U.S. military forces faster than most 

Americans imagine” as money needed for “operations and training” will be 

limited.15 Despite struggling to field a capable force, senior leaders have rallied together to confront the problem. Reminiscent of General Meyer’s outspoken individual bravery during the Vietnam era, the joint chiefs have collectively warned Congress that the nation “is on the brink of creating a hollow 

force.”16 The positive amid all the negative press is that our senior leaders 

share an understanding of the future—unlike in the Vietnam era. 

Cognizant of the challenges and strains experienced in the post-Vietnam 

era, today’s leaders seek to avoid the tribulations they experienced as junior 

officers. By avoiding the inherent “nature of the military man to salute and say 

‘Can do,’ even when they clearly couldn’t do or knew they shouldn’t do,” today’s senior leaders have avoided the initial pitfall Vietnam-era leaders experienced.17 Air Force leaders have taken this a step further, issuing a memorandum necessitating “that the Air Force take immediate action to reduce our 

expenditure rate, especially in our operations and maintenance account[s],” 

in the hopes of staving off a crippling blow to capability.18 Capability and 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

4

money, however, are only a couple of variables affecting retention of the current generation of Air Force pilots. Safety is, and will continue to be, an issue 

aviators—entrusted with advanced aircraft and crews—take seriously. 

Pilots during the post-Vietnam era were fortunate enough to fly the most 

advanced aircraft of their day. The F-15 and F-16 represented monumental 

steps forward in aviation design, allowing pilots to turn harder and fly faster at 

greater altitudes. Increased capability came with greater risk: harder turns 

equated to more gravitational forces exerted on the pilot while higher altitudes 

reached at greater speeds meant more exposure to the dangers of decompression and hypoxia. These challenges have existed for as long as aircraft have 

flown in combat, and men and women accept the risk that goes along with it. 

Current aircraft—for all their technological wizardry—are no different. 

The F-22 has not been immune to similar challenges. Reports pertaining to 

aircraft safety on television shows like 60 Minutes, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board investigations, and high-profile accidents have left the F-22 community not wanting for negative press. These uncontrollable factors take a toll 

on the human psyche, irrespective of the aircraft flown, as pilots balance their 

desire to serve in the armed forces against responsibilities to family. As the 

perceived benefits of serving languish against these responsibilities and the 

pull of a more stable life outside active duty increases, aviators are again 

speaking with their feet in numbers reminiscent of the late seventies.

As United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) commander, Gen Mark 

Welsh addressed the alarming departure rate in an e-mail to combat aircrew 

under his command. He cites the Air Force’s rated personnel management 

system, which predicts a “300 fighter pilot shortfall in FY [fiscal year] 13 that 

could grow to over 1,000 by FY21.” General Welsh goes on to express his “sincere thanks for your service and best wishes for every success in the future” 

and that “it’s been an honor to have served beside you.” However, he voices an 

institutional concern that the Air Force does not “really understand why you 

made the choice” to leave. Welsh acknowledges an “increasing ops tempo, 

fewer fighters, less flying, more non-flying jobs and an unclear sight picture,” 

specifically for the fighter pilot community. Willingness to listen is a sign of 

leadership, but personally asking the right question on behalf of your people 

is visionary. The second part of Welsh’s e-mail encapsulates this vision as he 

attempts to get at the “ground truth as you see it, not the filtered, watereddown” truth.19

General Welsh’s acknowledgement of factors affecting pilot retention, 

paired with his understanding that something else is continuing to drive pilots out, indicates a problem requiring further examination. His solicitation 

of “the best fighter pilot[s]” for candid comments about why they are electing 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

5

to leave active duty serves as the genesis for this paper. Since the Air Force has 

previously encountered problems keeping rated officers and the variables influencing the current environment are strikingly similar to those experienced 

in the past, perhaps a new means of viewing the environment is required. 

According to Tim Kane in his book Bleeding Talent, “higher than normal attrition rates wouldn’t matter so much if it weren’t the young Mitchells, Nimitzes, and Eisenhowers quitting, but in the modern military, the cream of the 

crop,” the best the military has to offer, “tend to leave the fastest.”20 This paper 

seeks to find alternative means to retain the Air Force’s best—to slow the exodus if you will—thereby strengthening the pool of human capital available to 

the nation for the future. 

Overview

The importance of retaining the best rated officers is existential not only to 

the strategic future of the United States Air Force but also to its position as the 

preeminent air force in the world. For this reason, this paper seeks to answer 

three fundamental questions: 

(1) Does the Air Force have a rated officer retention problem?

(2) What are the implications to the future of the Air Force if there is a 

problem?

(3) Is there anything that the Air Force can do to fix the problem if one 

does exist?

To answer these questions, this paper systematically explores the origin of our 

current problem by examining three rated communities.

This paper treats the Dear Boss letters as primary source documents instead of as pejorative texts written by pilots with a sense of entitlement. Treating the documents as such makes it possible to delve into the retention problem from the point of view of a line CAF pilot. By comparing the perceptions 

of these line pilots against those of senior leaders, perhaps the study will lead 

to a better understanding of how to deal with future retention problems. 

To address these disconnects, this study focuses on the fighter, bomber, 

and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) communities. This selection implies neither that they are more important than other rated career fields nor that rated 

career fields are more significant than nonrated career fields. However, as this 

paper’s title suggests, loss of capability due to unavailability of the best human 

capital within the CAF will lead directly to a rapid blunting of the Air Force’s 

combat spear. Critical shortfalls in practically any Air Force career field would 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

6

lead to the same blunting of the spear over time. However, without enough 

rated CAF officers, the analog problem of not having enough “1s” (rated CAF 

aircrew) to offset the “0s” (required CAF billets) will quickly reveal itself. The 

limited scope allows a salient problem within the Air Force to be addressed.

These three communities were chosen to isolate career fields with similar 

variables, thus reducing the disparity inherent with a broader scope of study. 

The narrowed focus keeps relatively constant variables such as education and 

training requirements, active duty service commitments (ADSC), institutional hierarchy, pay rates, bonus availability, and retention methods. Consequently, the analysis of retention trends within and across these communities 

will be more accurate. Figure 1 depicts the communities of interest selected for 

this study in the context of all rated officer career fields within the Air Force.

C2ISR/EWa Navigator

Special

Operations

Combat

Systems

Operator

Mobility

Remotely

Piloted

Aircraft

Rated

Aircrew

Bomber

Fighter

a

command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance/electronic warfare

Figure 1. Communities of interest 

This chapter described the origin of this research project as two letters that 

rated officers wrote during periods of military drawdown following extended 

wars. Chapter 2 clarifies the congressionally mandated budgeting and planning process that directly affects Air Force requirements. It also provides an 

example of what the “best” look like, focusing on the talented men and women 

trained by the Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) at Nellis AFB, Nevada. Finally, a brief discussion about current retention methods leads into retention 

trends for the communities of interest since 2000. 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

7

Chapters 3 through 5 highlight the three selected communities, treating 

each as a singular case study. Retention rates are examined for the fighter 

(chap. 3), bomber (chap. 4), and RPA (chap. 5) communities. Using aviator 

continuation pay (ACP) take rates, historical retention trends, survey results, 

and anecdotal conversations with acting or recently graduated squadron 

commanders provides a clearer picture of the variables influencing retention 

for the current generation of rated officers in each of these communities. 

Chapter 6 synthesizes the aggregate results from all three case studies and 

identifies similarities and differences among the communities of interest 

through statistical analysis. Chapter 7 offers conclusions, recommendations, 

and implications for the Air Force as a whole, the CAF, and the targeted communities. Finally, a third Dear Boss letter, written as an epilogue, addresses 

the need to treat all communities within the Air Force differently with respect 

to retention methods.

Problem and Hypothesis Statements

The Air Force has always experienced cyclical oscillations of rated aircrew 

retention, but the ramifications of current trends could be more severe than 

in the past. Budgetary constraints and manpower reductions are contributing 

to short-term USAF decisions, which in turn directly influence its long-term 

strategic future. As a result, the fear of a hollow force is reemerging. In terms 

of human capital, this fear manifests itself in retention rates of the best rated 

aircrew. As rated aircrew in their tactical prime elect to depart active duty 

upon completing their ADSCs, a hollow force of human capital develops. 

Without the right tactical leaders, the Air Force could develop a hollow force 

in that its available human capital exceeds its technological capability.

The author hypothesizes that the Air Force has a retention problem in the 

CAF and that traditional retention methods like the ACP and Aviation Career 

Incentive Pay (ACIP) programs are insufficient for retaining the best rated 

officers from CAF communities. The author purposefully leaves the definition of the “best” as a vague principle, understanding that the contextual definition of the term is different for each of the communities of interest, scoped 

to include pilots from the fighter, bomber, and RPA weapon systems.

It is the author’s belief that the best rated aircrew within the three case 

studies make the decision to separate well before their Undergraduate Pilot 

Training (UPT) ADSC has expired and well before the bonus becomes available. Consequently, the Air Force needs to reassess its methods for keeping 

the best rated officers by analyzing contextual differences among the commu-
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

8

nities rather than applying a common solution for all. While programs like 

ACP and ACIP are successful in retaining some of the best rated aircrew, they 

do not retain enough of these officers, hampering the tactical future of the 

CAF in the short term as well as the strategic future of the Air Force writ large.

Objectives

This research was conducted to identify factors that influence the best rated 

aircrews to stay on active duty after their ADSCs are complete. The research 

variables presented to the communities of interest are (1) Air Force identity, 

(2) money and compensation, (3) promotion and recognition, (4) family and 

stability, (5) operations tempo, and (6) other life goals. The author postulates 

that influential variables vary in importance depending on the community in 

question (fighter, bomber, or RPA). For example, figure 2 depicts these variables in the context of the fighter community. 

Other Life

Goals

Air Force

Identity

Operations

Tempo

Money

and

Compensation

Family

and

Stability

Promotion

and

Recognition

Fighter

Figure 2. Influential variables 

These variables will also differ at important career and family milestones. 

For instance, factors influencing a lieutenant in a fighter squadron will not be 

the same as those for a major in the same squadron. Identifying specific influences based on community (fig. 3) allows for focused research. 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

9

Other Life

Goals

Air Force

Identity

Operations

Tempo

Money

and

Compensation

Family

and

Stability

Promotion

and

Recognition

Fighter

Figure 3. Example of specific influential variables for the fighter community

Isolating the motivating retention factors by community fosters the development of solutions for the unique problems each one experiences (fig. 4). 

The Air Force aims to retain rated aircrew primarily through the ACP, which 

helps answer only one variable completely (money and compensation) and 

the rest only partially, if at all. By discovering which incentives most influence 

specific communities at precise career points, perhaps the Air Force can establish methods more successful at retaining the best rated officers for our 

nation—as opposed to enough rated officers to fill the billets.

Methodology

The search for answers to these questions occurred through three primary 

methods. The first entails detailed analysis of the Rated Officer Retention 

Analysis reports from FY 2000 through FY 2012 to identify retention rates by 

individual major weapons systems (MWS) communities and the Air Force 

writ large. These reports also identify historical ACP take rates for the MWS 

communities versus the Air Force in toto for the same period and provide 

granular detail by individual aircraft. While this data offers useful historical 

trends of retention within the Air Force, it does little to provide a predictive 

modeling. 
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

10

Other Life

Goals

Air Force

Identity

Operations

Tempo

Money

and

Compensation

Family

and

Stability Promotion

and

Recognition

Fighter

Solution

1

Solution

1

Solution

1

Solution

2

Solution

2

Solution

2

Solution

3

Figure 4. Example of specific influential variables for the fighter community 

with solutions

The second method of analysis leverages a survey administered 11–28 February 2013 to students attending Air War College (AWC), the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Air Command and Staff College 

(ACSC), and the Squadron Officer College (SOC).21 It targets fighter, bomber, 

and RPA pilots taking in-residence professional military education (PME) 

courses at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.22 Solicitation for the survey went to 118 

personnel, with 93 returning a completed survey for a 79 percent response 

rate. The survey pool represents a convenience sample since it consists solely 

of Air University (AU) students and denotes a limitation for the study that 

could admittedly skew the data set.23 Based on the selection process for inresident PME attendance, the author infers that survey respondents are 

among the top of their respective career fields as well as peer groups. Given 

the period for research and the scope of the project, this sample was an accepted limitation. Future studies pertaining to the same topic must include a 

wider sample pool, randomly selected from the entire Air Force, to ensure 

increased statistical validity of the results. 

To offset the bias associated with the sampled community, a third research 

method was included. The author relied on interviews and anecdotal conversations with currently sitting or recently graduated operational squadron com-
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

11

manders from the three communities of interest. Each interview provides invaluable insight into the interworking of an operational squadron from the 

viewpoint of a frontline supervisor tasked to implement, enforce, and work 

within the policies and procedures put in place by the larger Air Force. Their 

contributions were insightful, often bolstering survey findings. However, similar comments from squadron commanders of different communities gave way 

to contextual differences behind the reasons for retention problems. This leads 

the author to believe that there is a need for the Air Force to change its current 

methods of retention by considering contextual differences influencing communities versus relying simply on traditional methods used in the past.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. Capt Ron Keys to Gen Wilbur Creech, commander, Tactical Air Command, letter, 1979. 

Written a few years after the end of the Vietnam War, this letter was an amalgamation of pilot 

concerns at the time. Captain Keys was not personally planning on resigning at the time and 

later became the commanding general of Air Combat Command. See app. A. 

2. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 171.

3. Ibid., 175.

4. The F-15 Eagle first flew in July 1972 and was delivered to the Air Force in January 1974, 

while the F-16 Fighting Falcon first flew in December 1976 and was delivered in January 1979. 

USAF, “F-15 Eagle” and “F-16 Fighting Falcon,” fact sheets. 

5. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 171–73.

6. The author uses “junior officers” to describe company and field grade officers at the rank 

of lieutenant colonel (O-5) and below (i.e., first and second lieutenants, captains, and majors).

7. The author uses “senior leaders” to describe officers at the rank of colonel (O-6), general 

officers (O-7 through O-10), and civilian leaders like the secretary of the Air Force and secretary of defense. 

8. Ibid., 200.

9. Kane, Bleeding Talent, 86.

10. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 175–76.

11. Santayana, Life of Reason, 284.

12. See app. B for the 2009 Dear Boss letter.

13. Maj Brian E. Biebel, F-15C instructor pilot and assistant director of operations, to peers 

in the fighter pilot community, letter, 2009.

14. DOD, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta on Supercommittee Negotiations,” news release. 

15. Jim Garamone, “Sequestration Will Hollow Out Force Fast, Dempsey Says,” 17 January 

2013, DOD website, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119040. 

16. Robert Burns, “Military Leaders Warn Congress of ‘Hollow Force,’ ” Military.com, 17 

January 2013, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/01/17/military-leaders-warn-congres

-of-hollow-force.html. 

17. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 200–201.

18. Morin and Spencer to all MAJCOM commanders, memorandum.
INTRODUCTION: DEAR BOSS

12

19. See app. C for General Welsh’s 25 April 2011 e-mail to all USAFE fighter pilots.

20. Kane, Bleeding Talent, 85.

21. See app. D for the Pilot Retention Survey and app. E for the e-mail solicitation of participants. 

22. Credit is due to Mr. Tim Kane, whose book Bleeding Talent served as the genesis for the 

development of the survey used in this paper. Without his book and kind gesture of sharing his 

survey, development of this project would have exceeded the time allowed. Additional thanks 

to Dr. John Nagl for connecting the dots between Tim Kane and the author. 

23. A convenience sample is a “statistical method of drawing representative data by selecting people because of the ease of their volunteering.” Its advantages are the target population’s 

accessibility and the researcher’s ability to gather data more quickly. Disadvantages are not only 

“the risk that the sample might not represent the population as a whole” but also that “it might 

be biased by volunteers.” Business Dictionary.com, s.v. “convenience sampling,” http://www

.businessdictionary.com/definition/convenience-sampling.html.
13

Chapter 2 

Rightsizing and Requirements Explained

In January of 2013, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Mark A. Welsh 

released his “Vision for the United States Air Force.” In it he articulates the 

necessity for airpower, projected globally by the USAF in the air, space, and 

cyberspace domains. Most notable, however, is his view that “complex security and fiscal challenges demand that our Air Force develop innovative Airmen who find better and smarter ways to fly, fight, and win” (emphasis added), 

acknowledging that status quo thinking is no longer good enough. To flourish, asserts Welsh, the human capital of the Air Force—the Airmen—“have a 

role in ensuring that we remain the most technically proficient, best-educated, 

and best-trained air force in the world.”1

 The experience, education, and training he alludes to in this vision take years to develop and at a significant cost to 

the nation, but the result is a talented pool of the best rated officers. Retention 

of the best personnel possessing the right mix of these skill sets is paramount 

given the time and money invested in each of them. 

Several variables affecting retention of the best rated officers are outside the 

USAF’s scope of control. A key constraint on the Air Force budget and authorized end strengths is the congressional budgeting and planning processes, 

discussed next. 

Budgeting and Planning Processes

The DOD and the services that compose it are civilian-controlled organizations that draw their funding and end-strength authorizations directly from 

Congress. The Air Force provides a recommended budget and desired authorized end strength but ultimately operates within strictly controlled boundaries when developing its budget and force structure. The documents controlling force size and budget are the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) and the National Defense Appropriations Bill. The annual NDAA 

establishes authorized end strengths for military personnel as well as recommended funding levels for each service. While it authorizes a particular budget, appropriation of that money occurs annually through the appropriations 

cycle.

The annual appropriations cycle is the mechanism by which Congress considers funding for numerous activities, to include national defense.2

 The cycle 

begins when the president submits his recommended budget for the next FY 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

14

to Congress for consideration and debate.3 In the case of the national defense 

budget, the House and Senate Appropriations Committee—and in particular 

the defense subcommittees from each—examine the best means to allocate 

funds to their subordinate agencies. Further, agencies that fall underneath the 

defense subcommittees’ jurisdiction—in this case the Air Force—provide detailed justification to both the House and Senate for requested funding, primarily through testimony from agency officials like the secretary of the Air 

Force (SECAF) and CSAF.4

 The timetable to achieve agreement generally involves heavy negotiations to resolve differences between the versions of appropriation bills passed by their respective chambers.5

 Controlling negotiations are specific members of the appropriations subcommittees and full 

committees, who must agree to the entire text of the bill before it reaches the 

president.6

Once these collective bills become law, the Air Force and its sister services 

work to balance their force structures to meet national security strategy requirements based on each one’s appropriated monies and authorized end 

strengths. The influence of the NDAA and the appropriations bill process on 

retaining the best rated officers begins to reveal itself in Air Force planning 

practices—as initiated through the DOD’s annual Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.

To provide a budget request to Congress and the president, the DOD executes the PPBE cycle yearly. Used as a vehicle to turn “vision, policy, strategies 

and plans into products and activities,” the PPBE lays the framework on which 

the services can build their requirements, leading eventually to an annual 

budget. Requirements, however, are not the driving factor behind the size of 

the budget; rather “it is set by the White House’s Office of Management and 

Budget, conceptually in advance of the budget build” (emphasis added).7

 This 

conceptual outline of the budget—also known as fiscal guidance—is then 

conveyed to Air Force leadership. What then does it provide to senior leaders 

when advising them of force structure requirements? The answer lies in Bernard Brodie’s astute observation that changes in the “structure, equipment, 

and organization of our armed forces” are not easy. Rather, he indicates that 

decisions such as these “involve hard choices between costly alternatives 

within the constraints of an always-limited budget. These alternatives must 

operate in terms of their accommodation to both political (in the widest sense 

of the term) and technological realities. The intelligent preparation of each 

decision must require, somewhere along the line, the application of a great 

deal of special knowledge and hard work.” Brodie states that, more simply, 

“strategy wears a dollar sign,” and that Air Force leaders are well aware they 

must advise senior leaders based not on what they would like to have but 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

15

rather on what they can realistically get.8 The responsibilities of determining 

what is realistic and the acceptable levels of risk fall to the Air Force corporate 

structure (AFCS). 

The AFCS is the agency tasked with ensuring that the Air Force strategy 

and vision fit within PPBE guidance. Options that the AFCS develops are 

generally in direct response to guidance from the “Air Force leadership, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Combatant Commands and sometimes 

Congress.” AFCS then provides a recommendation “for CSAF and SECAF 

approval that balances new requirements, current missions, and risk to create 

a new baseline that meets fiscal restrictions” (emphasis added).9

 Balancing 

acceptable levels of risk against required personnel to accomplish this mission 

is a difficult undertaking, and, given the current fiscal environment, it becomes doubly so. The Air Force addresses this risk in its Annual Planning and 

Programming Guidance (APPG).

The APPG is the USAF’s principal programming guidance. Typically classified, the document focuses on core function master plans (CFMP) developed around the Air Force’s 12 core functions.10 The CFMPs “form a reference 

point for helping the service mold its strategic priorities, risks and tradeoffs.”11

One of the biggest areas of risk for any service is rightsizing its active duty 

(AD) manpower. Having too many people means the Air Force pays astronomically high personnel budget costs. Having too few people results in the 

Air Force running the risk of being ill prepared for combat operations. Having too few of the right type of personnel—put differently, the best personnel—puts the Air Force in danger of creating a hollow force of human capital. 

So how does the Air Force address this pending shortage of the best personnel 

when it is simultaneously planning for drastic budget and personnel reductions? It begins with the “hard choices in an always-limited budget” Brodie 

spoke of earlier.12

Hard choices made by “bold leaders at every level who encourage innovation, embrace new thinking, and take prudent risks to achieve mission success,” conveys General Welsh, will ensure that more of the best rated personnel remain on AD to lead the Air Force now and in the future. The foregoing 

explanation of the bureaucratic process controlling the pool of rated officers 

is intended to frame for future innovative leaders the barriers they must work 

around—or as the general puts it, barriers we must go “over, not through.”13

The overview of presidential, congressional, and Air Force procedures as 

established in the NDAA, appropriations and PPBE processes, and APPG is 

not a complete picture of the budgeting and personnel management systems. 

It does, however, serve as a bridge between the complex environment of defense spending and strategic planning and the risks associated with a failure 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

16

to retain the best rated officers on AD. Reviewing the fluidity of requirements 

and funding—subject to change with the environmental realities presented 

during each FY—can mitigate the initial tendency to blame civilian leaders 

for shortfalls in spending and manning. Even for decision makers armed with 

this knowledge, however, the slow nature of the bureaucratic system that governs the funding process can prove exasperating. Nevertheless, it is up to the 

Air Force’s bold, pioneering leaders to work within the system and ensure that 

the hollow force of human capital does not become a reality. Understanding 

the processes that determine authorized end strength serves as a foundation 

for a discussion of current Air Force requirements and challenges. 

Requirements and Challenges

As noted, the Air Force submits recommendations through the NDAA and 

defense appropriations bill each year for desired end strengths and budget 

amounts. In FY 2012 the USAF was authorized 332,800 AD personnel.14 In 

FY 2013 the Air Force requested an end strength of 328,900 personnel, but 

the Committee on Armed Services recommended an additional 1,483 personnel for an end strength totaling 330,383 personnel.15 This represents a decrease of 2,417 personnel from FY 2012 but an increase over the Air Force’s 

FY 2013 request. The increase was a result of Congress ordering that 18 Global 

Hawks originally programmed for retirement remain in operation.16 Deliberations pertaining to FY 2014 end-strength requirements have already 

started for the Air Force, and further reductions are expected.

Given the current fiscal environment, the USAF can expect drastic reductions in authorized end strengths in 2014. Elevated personnel costs and decreased budgets have forced senior leaders to evaluate the risks they are willing to take by downsizing the force to ensure personnel costs do not strip 

away combat capability.17 Make no mistake, however, that the primary way 

the Air Force plans to save money is through the reduction of personnel. It 

has been continuously downsizing over the past decade, with active duty, 

Guard, and Reserve end strengths decreasing by 48,000 personnel.18 The budget cuts threatened in sequestration exacerbated the balance question for 

USAF senior leaders, forcing them to consider more cuts of personnel. 

Continued pursuit of balance between required personnel and combat capability led the CSAF, Gen Norton Schwartz, to ask how many AD personnel 

billets needed elimination to flatline the personnel budget. The answer was an 

astounding 46,467 personnel—nearly the same amount of total billets eliminated from all three components of the Air Force since 2004.19 Abolishing 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

17

that many personnel would be crippling to USAF capability and render the 

service incapable of performing the 12 core functions under its purview. 

This reduction in force would be considered only as a triage measure. 

However, the Air Force is “already moving toward a 17,000 reduction in DOD 

civilian personnel,” thereby levying further responsibilities on an already 

task-saturated uniformed work force.20 Reductions in end strength affect retention of the best rated officers in the Air Force (see chaps. 3–5). Just as 

contributory to the retention problem of rated aircrew is the reduction of 

combat-coded aircraft from the CAF fleet.21

Efforts to rightsize the force have resulted in significant reductions in aircraft numbers while generating multiple service life extensions to combatcoded aircraft in the USAF fleet. The FY 13 budget reduced the number of 

combat-coded fighter squadrons from 60 to 54 and eliminated 123 fighters 

from the inventory.22 Service life extension programs (SLEP) have been put in 

place for the F-16, B-1, and B-52 to extract more capability as the F-35 and the 

long-range strike bomber (LRS-B) struggle to mature as quickly as originally 

planned.23 With limited end in sight for budgetary constraints, reduction in 

the number of available cockpits, and the extension of aging aircraft, rated 

officer concerns begin to focus on job security in the short term and experience levels in the long term. Modernization of the fleet will help solve the 

aging aircraft problem in the long term, but even that will come with negative 

effects for CAF aircrew. 

The USAF is dedicated to modernizing the fleet of CAF aircraft to maintain its technological edge of near-peer competitors and remain the preeminent air force in the world. Former Air Force secretary Michael Donley states 

that “the need for modernization is pervasive across our Air Force.”24 General 

Welsh echoes Secretary Donley, expressing the need to “modernize our capabilities to reduce operating costs while attaining desired effects with greater 

persistence, survivability, longer range, and more versatile payloads.”25 The 

long-term benefits gained through modernization come with both short- and 

long-term costs. 

The advantages achieved through a reduction in future operating costs because of modernization will depend on diminished current expenditures in 

other areas to pay for it. Aforementioned weapon systems like the F-35 and 

the LRS-B—intended to modernize the CAF fleet—received full funding in 

the 2013 NDAA and the 2013 DOD Appropriations Act, totaling $3.1 billion 

and $291.7 million respectively.26 The long-term benefits achieved by funding 

these modernization programs—a priority—come at the short-term costs of 

flying hours and training opportunities. Rated aircrews without such prospects are more apt to depart AD for other ventures. 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

18

Capability gained through training and flying hours for rated aircrews in 

the fighter, bomber, and RPA communities is critical for current tactical competency and future strategic credibility. See table 1 for an example of the hours 

that different CAF communities require for classification as an experienced 

pilot. Both competency and credibility are at risk with reduced training and 

flying hours due to fiscal constraints. Senior leaders have reduced non-missionessential training and nonreadiness flying hours to mitigate current budgetary concerns, but Donley emphasizes that “there is no way not to impact 

training [or] flying hours” if further cuts occur (emphasis added).27 Concerns 

at the Air Force level about training are also resonating with the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS).

Table 1. Required flying hours for “experienced” qualification by community

Community Primary aircraft inventory hours requireda

F-16

(Fighter)

500 total

hours PAI or

1,000 total 

hours

with 300 PAI

or

100 hours PAI and

previously fighter

experienced

B-1

(Bomber)

1,500 

hours

with 300 

PAI

or

1,250 total 

hours

with 500 PAI

or

1,000 total 

hours

with 750 PAI

or

Previously 

experienced

as A/Cb

 and 

150 PAI hours

MQ-9

(RPA)

200 hours 

PAI or

Previously 

experienced 

in another rated 

community and 

100 hours PAI

Developed from a review of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-2F-16, Flying Operations, vol. 1, F-16 Pilot Training, 11 August 

2011; AFI 11-2B-1, Flying Operations, vol. 1, B-1 Aircrew Training, 23 December 2011; and AFI 11-2, MQ-9, Flying Operations, vol. 1, MQ-9—Crew Training, 3 June 2008, which describe aircrew training and qualifying standards.

a

Primary aircraft inventory (PAI) refers to aircraft assigned to meet the primary aircraft authorization. Rated officers can 

accumulate hours in multiple aircraft, but PAI hours are required to obtain the prerequisite experience in specific weapons 

systems for future upgrades in the same system.

b

Aircraft commander (A/C) upgrade is unique to the bomber community. It is the first opportunity for pilots to gain 

responsibility for the entire crew of the aircraft, not just their individual crew position.
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

19

JCS chairman (CJCS) Gen Martin E. Dempsey has expressed dire concern 

about training and future readiness for all of the DOD. He believes that the 

armed services—and the Air Force in particular—will be unprepared in a 

year because of a lack of flying hours and live-fire training. The chairman 

takes this a step further, stating, “We’ve got the people. We’ve got the equipment that we need, but we won’t have the ability to train.”28 Short-term tactical 

incompetency caused by a lack of flying hours and training opportunities is 

recoverable in a relatively short amount of time. Less easy to overcome—and 

with longer lasting effects—is the loss of strategic capability for the Air Force 

writ large as the less experienced rated officers of the CAF today become the 

less experienced senior leaders of the Air Force tomorrow. 

Lack of experience in the future senior officer corps of the CAF will have a 

direct causal link to the projected reduction in current training opportunities 

and flying hours. A major determinant in the progression of fighter, bomber, 

and RPA pilots is milestones associated with flying hours. For example, a pilot 

in a fighter squadron will generally progress through qualifications as a wingman, flight lead, instructor pilot (IP), and evaluator at a rate coincident with 

his or her accumulated flying hours and number of years operating aircraft. 

These milestones ensure upgrading pilots have attained a quantifiable level of 

competency, credibility, and proficiency in their weapons system before moving into a position of increased responsibility. 

Qualitative in nature, but equally as important, is the argument that mandated hours are the minimum required for safe entry into an upgrade. This 

view stems from the adage that the procedures regulating the upgrade and 

operation of combat aircraft are written in blood. That is, many men and 

women have died in this business of flying fast jets, which has resulted in each 

weapons system regulating the minimum hours needed to upgrade safely. See 

table 2 for examples of flying hours required for upgrades by community. As 

alluded to in chapter 1, combat pilots will do many things in the interest of 

accomplishing the mission. But when safety becomes an issue, many will consider grounding themselves or walking away completely. Reduced flying 

hours and training opportunities diminish safety. Similarly, projected reduction in training and hours will moderate the accomplishment of upgrades by 

extending the amount of time required to complete them. 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

20

Table 2. Example of flying hours required for upgrades

Community

Primary aircraft inventory hours required

FLUGa IPUGb MCUGc

F-16

(Fighter) 300 hours PAI 500 hours PAI Squadron commander’s discretion & a 4-ship FLd

B-1

(Bomber)

200 hours PAI and 15 

flights as an A/C

Squadron 

commander’s 

discretion

Squadron commander’s 

discretion

MQ-9

(RPA) n/a 200 hours PAI n/a

Developed from a review of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-2F-16, Flying Operations, vol. 1, F-16 Pilot Training, 11 August 

2011; AFI 11-2B-1, Flying Operations, vol. 1, B-1 Aircrew Training, 23 December 2011; and AFI 11-2MQ-9, Flying Operations, vol. 1, MQ-9—Crew Training, 3 June 2008, which describe aircrew training and qualifying standards.

a

Flight lead upgrade (FLUG) is the first opportunity for rated aircrew to be responsible for multiple aircraft in a formation.

b

Instructor pilot upgrade (IPUG) is the first opportunity for rated aircrew to instruct other rated aircrew going through 

upgrades.

c

Mission commander upgrade (MCUG).

d

Four-ship flight lead (FL) denotes pilots qualified to lead three other aircraft in addition to their own. 

As flying hours and training opportunities decrease, calendar time required to maneuver individual pilots through the linear upgrade program 

will increase. More relative calendar time for these upgrades will have one of 

three effects, each incurring a certain amount of risk. 

(1) Rated officers will miss upgrade opportunities due to a backlog created 

by those currently in or waiting to go into an upgrade. Risk incurred: 

missed upgrade opportunities place talented rated officers behind 

their peers for progression.

(2) Rated officers enter upgrades on a waiver to the established entry minimums to avoid backlogging the system. Risk incurred: allows talented 

rated officers to upgrade on an individual basis, albeit with less experience than desired.

(3) Entry requirements reduced to mitigate the increased amount of time 

spent waiting for entry into, or actively in, an upgrade. Risk incurred: 

decreases the overall experience level of a community to ensure mission readiness.

These effects—and the risks that go along with them—lead to an insidious 

loss of experience that is displayed over time. In any case, an altered definition 

of what comprises the “best” rated officer manifests. This definition affects 

retention of rated officers, as exemplified by some of the best of the CAF—at 

Nellis AFB.
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

21

What Do the “Best” Look Like?

Viewed as a microcosm of USAF culture, Nellis epitomizes what the Air 

Force as a whole has to offer. Many of the most promising officers from the air, 

space, and cyber domains converge there to learn their craft in an aggregate 

environment. Contained within the fences of Nellis is the United States Air 

Force Warfare Center, whose mission is to “shape the way our force fights 

through Advanced Training, Operational Testing, and Tactics Development 

in Air, Space and Cyberspace at the Operational and Tactical levels of war.”29

Specifically leading the CAF charge to shape the fight are the 57th Wing and 

USAF Weapons School (USAFWS). 

Graduates from the Weapons School are the Air Force’s finest instructors 

and tacticians, and as such, their acquired knowledge exemplifies what the 

best of rated officers look like.30 As a result, the process to obtain a slot to the 

Weapons Instructor Course is understandably competitive and the skill sets 

acquired by a graduate highly sought after. In a 2003 address to AFWS graduates, Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche elucidates some of the expectations for “patch wearers” and what they symbolize:31

You will be asked to build more, in less time, with less resources, to a higher degree of 

accuracy than you might have thought possible. As a weapons officer, you will be expected to lead America’s finest through situations that you have yet to even ponder. As a 

weapons officer, you are expected to take every success, every failure, every challenge 

and examine it, analyze it, and debrief it and its possible consequences—and fine-tune 

your skills with what you learned from it.

Many think that tonight is about receiving some type of “master’s of science in airpower.” As someone who has gone through a fairly rigorous series of graduate programs, 

including a doctoral course of study . . . let me assure you, Weapons School is much 

more. There is no master’s recipient that is so universally recognized in the combat air 

forces as an Air Force weapons officer. No master of arts or sciences recipient fully embodies the expertise, teamwork, sense of excellence and warrior-spirit like an Air Force 

weapons officer. And there is no master’s recipient who carries a target on their arm that 

says to all: “ask me, send me, task me, or demand of me” (emphasis in original).32

Demands on the patch wearers of the CAF are certainly immense—a point 

made intimately aware to WIC applicants. They must acknowledge in writing 

their understanding of their obligations if selected. Rated officers desiring one 

of the coveted slots must state that “if selected for WIC, I understand I will be 

required to fulfill 3 years continuous, and 5 years total, Weapons Officer duty. 

I am a worldwide volunteer for any Weapons Officer position required by the 

needs of the Air Force.”33 Knowledge of these requirements up front understandably prevents some from applying, and the reasons for doing so are their 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

22

own. However, those chosen to attend and who then graduate from this prestigious course represent the best of the rated officers used in the CAF. 

This is not to say that the only rated officers worth retaining are graduates 

from the USAFWS. Arguably, as many of the best rated officers do not attend 

the USAFWS as do attend. Since finite slots for the WIC limit the number of 

attendees and graduates per year, some of the best officers are unable to attend. 

Table 3 highlights USAFWS slots available each year by community as compared to the number of rated Air Force officers within the same community.

Table 3. WIC entry requirements by community

Requirements prior to class start date (CSD)

Community Ranka Experience Hours in PAAb Qualifications Maximum 

TAFCSDc

Fighter O-3 Normally 2 

yearsd

300 total hours 

50 IP hours

6 months as IP

 prior to CSD 9 years

Bomber O-2 or 

O-3

2 years in 

PAA

50 hours 

of IP time

6 months as IP 

prior to CSD 10 years

RPA

O-2 

through

O-4

Not 

specified

300 total hours

 75 IP hours

6 months as IP 

prior to CSD 9 years

Developed from Air Combat Command/A3, to all active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command 

(AFRC) USAFWS WIC 2013-B selection board applicants, memorandum, 18 December 2013.

a

0-2 is a 1st lieutenant; 0-3, captain; and 0-4, major.

b

Primary assigned aircraft (PAA) is the weapons system to be operated during training.

c

Total active federal commissioned service date is the amount of time in the military after being commissioned as an 

officer.

d

Normally, it is required that you have a certain amount of time flying the aircraft, but it is not applicable for all platforms. 

For example, the F-22 does not require a specific amount of calendar time operating the weapons system.

It is precisely these rated officers—and those aspiring to be like them—

whom the Air Force should be retaining. Unfortunately, these same officers 

are leaving AD for other opportunities. Reasons for their departure are analyzed in chapters 3–5. Regardless of the community, however, their exodus 

leaves the AD Air Force driving toward short-term tactical mediocrity and a 

long-term deficit of the best strategic leaders. Departure of the best officers is 

already being felt at Nellis and will continue to ripple throughout the CAF as 

time progresses without a change in retention methods. Squadron commanders are the first link in the supervisory chain to shoulder this problem, and 

they are concerned.
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23

Squadron commanders are beginning to feel the strain created by the departure of the best rated aircrew from their ranks. An interview with the commander of the 433d Weapons Squadron, which trains the Air Force’s newest 

F-15C and F-22A WIC students, discussed his experiences and frustrations 

over the past two years. In a four-year period, the 433d graduated 38 AD officers as new patch wearers for the Air Force. Out of those 38 WIC graduates, 

17 (44 percent) elected to leave AD after their first assignment to be instructors for the Guard or Reserve or for other opportunities.34 Further exacerbating his problem is the departure of his Weapons School instructors. 

Those asked to return to Nellis as instructors at the Weapons School are the 

best tactical operators in their respective platforms, with a natural ability to 

teach and lead new WIC students. An F-15C WIC squadron has only eight 

pilots, as compared to an operational F-15C squadron that has between 18 

and 24 pilots. The difference is that each of the WIC squadron pilots has graduated from Weapons School and is a qualified weapons officer, whereas an operational squadron would normally receive only one weapons officer. Loss of 

one WIC instructor can be devastating to the daily operations of a squadron 

at the USAFWS. 

In a one-year period, the 433d commander lost two of his valued WIC instructors to 365-day deployments, except they never went. In both cases, 

these officers elected to leave AD entirely, taking their expertise and future 

leadership capability with them to the Air National Guard (ANG) and leaving 

the 433d commander undermanned.35 This is one of many similar stories, 

repeated all too frequently these days across all weapons systems in the CAF. 

As more aviators of this caliber elect to leave AD, the number of officers with 

the right experience and qualifications to serve in leadership positions—like 

squadron commander—decreases. This has a psychological effect on young 

pilots as well.

Young lieutenants arriving at their first flying squadron will study the career of their new commander, striving to emulate the path that made that officer successful. Two things determine the credibility of a commander in the 

eyes of a new lieutenant.36 The first is leadership style. Whether it be aggressive, passive, angry, or indifferent, these new officers simply want to know if 

their commander is going to take care of them. The second credibility determinant is qualifications—the path trod to become a CAF flying squadron 

commander. If too many of the best leaders have left AD before they reach 

squadron command, the leaders that remain, while satisfactory, may not inspire the same grand aspirations that have made the CAF great. 

Lofty aspirations and the desire to excel—both traits of the best rated officers—become less desirable when viewed as unnecessary. In other words, 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

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these lieutenants may ask themselves, If my commander hasn’t hit these milestones, why should I? A graduated F-22 squadron commander observes that 

if the next generations of instructor pilots are getting out—the high-caliber 

pilots—who makes up the new IPs? It is probably someone who was rushed 

through the upgrade, with half the experience, to start teaching the next 

round of less experienced pilots. At some point, IPs who lack experience, 

training students who lack experience, will degrade capability. He goes on to 

suggest that the pool of high-caliber officers left to take command positions is 

far smaller than it should be, leading to further degradation.37 Failure to retain the best rated officers now will lead to a continued drive toward mediocrity in the future. 

The USAF does not want, nor can it afford, to be stuck in the momentum of this cyclical pattern. In an attempt to oppose the momentum, and 

in the hopes of reversing the trend of departure, the USAF uses monetary 

funds from separate programs to retain as many of the best rated officers 

possible.

Methods of Retention

The two most prominent means of retaining rated aircrew in the USAF 

are the Aviation Career Incentive Pay and Aviator Continuation Pay programs.38 Each program utilizes differing monetary amounts, presented to 

rated aircrew as a supplement to the base pay that the president and Congress have set.39 The use of bonuses to retain rated personnel is not reserved 

solely for pilots or rated aircrew, nor is it unique to the Air Force. The DOD 

uses special and incentive pays across all branches of service, for officer and 

enlisted personnel alike, as a means of enlisting and retaining the most 

qualified personnel. 

DOD use of incentive pay and bonuses to manage the size and composition of its force structure is common—and expensive. From 2006 until 2010, 

the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force accounted for nearly $11 billion dollars in bonuses paid to service members as part of an enlistment or reenlistment package.40 In this period, the Air Force accounted for only 9 percent of 

the total DOD amount contracted, or approximately $1 billion.41 This illustrates that the Air Force may have maneuvering room when requesting additional monies for personnel retention. Interestingly, every service except 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

25

the Army used the preponderance of contracted funds for reenlistments versus initial enlistment. 

More specifically, the Air Force attributes the greater expenditure on reenlistment to competition from the civilian sector, which values the skills 

and experience attained by Airmen in service.42 Understandably, the dollar 

amounts allocated for bonus and incentive funds are a lucrative means for 

any service to retain critical personnel. The ability to offer incentives became 

more challenging as the total amount given to the services for this purpose 

reduced steadily from 2006 until 2010. During this period, the monies Congress allocated for bonus and incentive pay drastically declined across all 

services. In FY 2010 the DOD contracted $1.2 billion as compared to the 

$2.8 billion allocated in 2008, a total reduction of 58 percent.43 These severe 

reductions, however, did not affect the USAF as significantly as the other 

services.

While total monies allocated to the DOD for use as bonuses decreased, the 

USAF experienced an increase of bonus and incentive pay during the same 

period. From 2006 until 2009, the contracted amounts increased from $100 to 

$352 million.44 Critically manned career fields, easily identified within each 

service, benefit the most from the bonus pay. Remarkably, the services have a 

difficult time “identifying the most cost-effective bonus amounts” to award 

these critically manned career fields.45 As the budgetary purse strings continue 

to tighten, ACIP and ACP tactics to retain critical specialties will become increasingly problematic for service leadership to manage. Thus, the USAF will 

have to adjust the way it manages the ACIP and ACP programs.

These programs receive funding through different sources of money, each 

falling under various sections of regulatory guidance that affect their flexibility and utility as retention methods. ACIP is regulated by United States 

Code (USC), Title 37, section 301a, “Incentive pay: aviation career.”46 ACIP 

defines the amount paid to aviation personnel from each of the services based 

on the years of aviation service (YAS). 

Eligibility to receive monthly installments of the ACIP begins the day 

personnel enter aviation training and can extend through 25 YASs; this system has been in use since 1974.47 To maintain eligibility, an officer must 

perform operational flying duties for 96 months (eight years) of the first 144 

months (12 years) and for 144 months (12 years) of the first 216 months (18 

years) of aviation service.48 Figure 5 depicts the current monthly ACIP for 

eligible officers.
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

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Years of Aviation Service

Monthly Monetary Payout

$900

$800

$700

$600

$500

$400

$300

$200

$100

$0

Aircrew

Incentive

Pay

Amount

0 2 4 6 8 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25

Figure 5. Aviator career incentive pay scheduling by years of aviation service. 

(Developed from USC, Title 37, sec. 01a.)

Col Charles E. Metrolis succinctly describes the reason for this bell-shaped 

curve: “The benefits of increased pay in the middle of the scale represent a 

retention method targeting the ‘experienced’ pilots who have completed six 

years of aviation service.” He further notes that as retention rates in the target 

year group of 6–12 YASs continued to decline in the 1980s, the Air Force 

considered several alternative means of increasing retention rates. The resultant decision was the ACP program, instituted in 1989.49

The Aviator Continuation Pay program, while still controlled by USC, Title 

37, diverges from the Aviation Career Incentive Pay program in significant 

ways. Whereas the ACIP program establishes the set amount of monetary 

compensation authorized for all rated officers, regardless of service, section 

301b of Title 37, “Special pay: aviation career officers extending period of active duty,” offers flexibility to individual services for retention.50 The Air Force 

ACP program, governed by Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-3004, authorizes 

the bonus to rated officers who have completed their ADSC, are qualified for 

flying duty and receipt of flight pay, and are below the grade of O-7 with no 

less than six and no more than 24 years of total aviation service.51 Further, 

monetary amounts are at the discretion of the individual services as long as 

total expenditure does not exceed $25,000 per year for each qualifying officer.52 The combination of the ACIP and the ACP was strong in concept but 

still proved less than ideal in retaining targeted personnel. 

Primarily developed as a means of slowing the “mass exodus of military 

pilots to the civilian sector,” the ACP program has experienced tribulation as 

an effective retention method.53 Initially offered in 1989 as a $12,000 yearly 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

27

retention bonus up to the 14th year of commissioned service, the ACP successfully retained only 66 percent of those eligible—the majority of whom 

already had over 10 years of service.54 Notably, the targeted year group of 

young rated officers with less than seven years of service signed the bonus at 

a lowly 35 percent. Realizing this initial shortfall, Air Force leaders would 

restructure the ACP program multiple times in the 1990s to retain the right 

number of rated officers. 

Throughout the 1990s, Air Force leaders continuously adjusted the manner in which the ACP program operated by modifying the payout amounts 

and commitment durations. In 1991 eligible pilots could receive half of their 

total ACP amount up front. In 1998 the total amount offered went from 

$12,000 to $22,000 for a contract signed through 14 years of commissioned 

service.55 That same year, the Air Force offered short-term contracts of one to 

three years valued between $6,000 and $12,000.56

The most sweeping change occurred with the FY 2000 NDAA’s approval of 

ACP agreements to rated officers extending as far as 20 or 25 YASs.57 When 

retroactively applied to earlier year groups, the FY 2000 ACP was now available to over 8,000 personnel at eight times the monetary worth of the FY 1999 

ACP.58 The historical take rate of the ACP program continued to fall throughout the 1990s despite these adjustments, eventually reaching a 30 percent take 

rate in 1998. As we have seen, two of the approaches that the Air Force uses to 

maintain a stable pilot force are ACIP and ACP. A tertiary system attempts to 

control for fluctuations by adjusting required time of service resulting from 

Air Force investment in personnel.

The Air Force’s investment in the form of training, education, and bonuses 

for personnel incurs a predefined ADSC for additional service. Controlled by 

AFI 36-2107, Active Duty Service Commitments, the ADSC system not only 

ensures that taxpayers get an appropriate return for their investment in military personnel but also communicates separation and retirement eligibility 

requirements for Air Force service members.59 Like the ACP program, the 

ADSC system has fluctuated in an attempt to mitigate retention problems.

Investment in rated officers necessitates an adequate amount of payback to 

the Air Force for training received. Increasingly complex and expensive aircraft require better trained pilots to operate them. While not directly linked, 

ADSCs have continued to increase since the early 1960s. Pilots who graduated from UPT and received their wings from the 1960s through the 1980s 

incurred a six-year commitment to the Air Force.60 In 1987 the ADSC for a 

UPT graduate increased to seven years and in 1988, to eight years.61 This 

ADSC remained stable until 1998, when a UPT graduate incurred a 10-year 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

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service commitment.62 With each subsequent increase in ADSC, the Air Force 

created a buffer zone of time to mitigate retention problems.

By increasing the ADSC to 10 years in 1998, the Air Force created a twoyear buffer zone for personnel manning in which very few rated officers were 

able to separate from AD. This buffer zone is at the cusp of elimination as the 

first graduates under the adjusted ADSC enter the window for separation. To 

the Air Force’s dismay, the retention picture may be getting worse as opposed 

to getting better. Limited funds created by budgetary constraints, the threat of 

sequestration, decreased training opportunities, and the potential reduction 

of flying hours all contribute to the impending lack of combat readiness described earlier. Exacerbating the problem is the need to keep qualified rated 

officers in the cockpit to make up for shortfalls. This denies some pilots the 

opportunity for highly valued career broadening opportunities that are in 

some cases a requisite for career progression.

The USAF has long valued depth and breadth of exposure for its officer 

corps, but recent trends indicate that career-broadening opportunities could 

become scarce if aircraft sit pilotless. Career-broadening opportunities like 

professional military education, staff jobs, and joint assignments continue to 

reduce for rated aircrew. While many—if not most—pilots will joke about 

never wanting to leave the cockpit, the necessity placed on completing careerbroadening opportunities strikes close to the heart for all individuals considering the Air Force as a career, and it begins very early.

After completing initial training in a primary weapons system—whether 

an F-22, a B-1, or an MQ-1—the emphasis on broadening elements of a career 

to be competitive for promotion begins. These include, but are not limited to, 

obtaining a master’s degree, completing SOC in correspondence to be competitive for an in-residence slot, and completing SOC in residence to be eligible for ACSC in correspondence. This cycle repeats for future PME schools, 

eroding at an officer’s already limited but highly valued time. Failure to accomplish any one of these requirements at prescribed periods, however, 

places the officer at a statistical disadvantage when vying for promotion.

This situation creates a dilemma that could exacerbate the rated aircrew’s 

decision to separate from AD. Unfilled cockpits and decreased flying hours 

will necessitate that qualified rated aircrew remain with their current weapons system for longer periods to ensure combat readiness and aircrew in aircraft. When rated officers cannot accomplish career broadening because of 

manning shortages, the resultant perception is that career progression is out 

of their control since the prerequisites are unobtainable. This outlook makes 

the decision to separate more practical, and the Air Force loses future leaders 

in the process. 
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Career-broadening opportunities facilitate leadership development. Al 

Robbert from the RAND Corporation states that the “Air Force, like all institutions, tends to draw senior leaders from the core mission of the organization, and that’s flying and fighting.” He adds, “If the fighter pilots are not getting the development in terms of experience in joint staffs and air staff and 

other places . . . they’re not going to be sufficiently prepared to assume senior 

leadership roles in the future”—a statement equally applicable to all rated aircrew given the current operational environment.63

Any one of these factors alone paints a dire picture for the future of the Air 

Force. When viewed in conjunction with their potential effects on the home 

and family, the retention picture problem becomes even bleaker. As a result, 

the Air Force community could experience drastic reductions across all rated 

career fields once officers reach the end of their ADSCs. With the perspective 

of the USAF’s past retention methods (from 1974 until 2000), we move now 

to its current approaches and their effects on the CAF.

Retention since 2000

Since 2000 the Air Force has enjoyed a steady rise in the overall ACP take 

rates among all rated aircrew.64 The overall ACP take rate has increased from 

32 percent in FY 00 to 67 percent in FY 12.65 In that 12-year period, the highest ACP take rate occurred in FY 10, topping out at 76 percent.66 The lowest 

take rate was in FY 01, bottoming out at 30 percent.67 See figure 6 for the 

overall take rates by FY from 2000 to 2012. Statistically speaking, the ACP 

take rate would indicate a healthy rated force, an argument further bolstered 

by the number of rated personnel losses over the same period.

From FY 00 until FY 12, the USAF has seen a continued decrease in the 

number of rated aircrew lost to separations, retirements, promotions to colonel, or groundings.68 A rated crew member who falls into one of these four 

categories, regardless of personal choice in the matter, becomes part of the 

pool of pilots categorized as “eligible for loss.” The highest number of pilots in 

this category was in FY 00, with 2,728 pilots. Of those, 1,637 were actually 

lost, including 1,119 who elected to separate from the Air Force.69 The lowest 

number of pilots categorized as eligible for loss occurred in FY 10, with 1,087 

pilots. Of those, 596 were actually lost, with only 142 electing to separate.70

See figure 7 for the total number of pilots considered eligible for loss, actually 

lost, and lost due to separation from FY 00 to FY 12. Collectively, the ACP 

take rates and pilot losses by fiscal year look promising. The period from 2000 
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30

until 2012, however, presented many contextual challenges for the United 

States, DOD, and USAF that influenced these numbers in different ways. 

Fiscal Year

ACP Take Rate Percentage

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Total ACP

Take Rate

by Fiscal

Year

20002002200420062008

2010

2012

Figure 6. Aviator continuation pay take rates by fiscal year. (Developed from

2000–12 AFPC Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports [see bibliography for 

individual reports].)

Fiscal Year

Number of Pilots

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Number of Pilots

Eligible

Total Pilot Losses

Losses as a Result

of Separation

20002002200420062008

2010

2012

Figure 7. Pilot losses by fiscal year. (Developed from 2000–12 AFPC Rated 

Officer Retention Analysis reports [see bibliography for individual reports].)
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Environmental Influences

Domestic and global events since 2000 have contributed to rated personnel’s decisions to stay in or separate from the Air Force. For instance, prior to 

the events of 9/11, the airline industry held a great deal of sway on the USAF’s 

retention of rated aircrew. A study in 1998 by Capt John H. Kafer indicates 

that at the time, the “major airlines relied on the Air Force to supply nearly 

50% of their pilot hiring needs” and estimated that by the year 2000, the airlines would “employ approximately five times as many pilots” as the Air 

Force.71 Following the events of 9/11, all predictions of future hiring by the 

airlines were set aside as the nation attempted to recover from the devastating 

attacks. 

In the post-9/11 world, environmental shifts for the DOD and Air Force 

were noticeable. The commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan in 2001 and 

Iraq in 2003 accelerated the need for rated aircrew—specifically combat-rated 

aircrew for the CAF. Additionally, initiation of the Air Sovereignty Alert and 

Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) missions required greater CAF operations 

than in preceding years.72 One can surmise that these factors, paired with 

decreased hiring by the airlines, had a great impact on Air Force retention. As 

the first decade of the twenty-first century continued, however, many of these 

trends began to reverse.

Pivotal events from the early years of 2000 experienced a reversal of course 

as the decade wore on. In December 2011, the United States officially withdrew from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and expects to withdraw from 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) completely by 2014. Combined costs 

thus far for OEF, OIF, and ONE total $1.283 trillion.73 Massive war costs left 

the DOD and US government floundering to find ways to control future costs. 

Recalling earlier discussion, one of the primary means levied by all service 

chiefs is the downsizing of their respective forces. Continued economic uncertainty and the threat of sequestration most certainly affect current retention rates.

American families continue to recover from a slumping economy, poor job 

availability, and a slowly rebounding housing market. A pervasive lack of confidence in the future wields undeniable influence over retention rates of rated 

aircrew. Not surprisingly, the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) FY 2011 

rated officer retention report addresses the correlation directly: “Pilot inventory grew by approximately 3 percent [in 2011] due to continued higher than 

normal retention rates. We expect this trend to continue until the economy 

really picks up and the job market improves.”74 Although historic retention 

rates have been high, many of the best continued to leave despite the eco-
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nomic austerity. With an expected improvement in the economic and housing markets, the Air Force should be wary of rapidly decreasing retention 

rates.

As the economic, job, and housing markets recover, the Air Force should 

pay close attention to the rated officer communities. Freddie Mac’s vice president and chief economist, Frank Nothaft, recently remarked that “as the 

broader economy heals, expect to see more good news with house prices continuing their recent upward trend, and home sales and housing starts continuing to post strong growth rates. The macroeconomic recovery through 

2011 helped to forestall further erosion in the depressed housing market. In 

return, housing is now ‘showing some love’ by contributing to economic 

growth, perhaps by adding close to 0.5 percentage points to 2013 GDP 

growth.”75

Further adding to the complex problem for retaining rated officers is the 

burgeoning airline industry. Forecasts for hiring within the aviation industry 

are some of the highest seen in history. A recent Boeing Company estimate 

projects a need for “approximately one million new commercial airline pilots 

. . . by 2031, including 460,000 new commercial airline pilots.”76 Contributing 

to the need for more airline pilots is the growing worldwide demand for air 

travel, rapid growth of travel in Asia, and an increase in commercial airline 

pilot retirements.77 In 2007 the federally mandated retirement age for commercial airline pilots increased from 60 to 65.78 The resultant exodus of pilots 

reaching this milestone began in 2012 and will escalate over the next few 

years.79 If Captain Kafer’s analysis is indicative of the future, the Air Force 

should expect a preponderance of its best rated officers to consider separating 

for a career in the commercial aviation industry.

Summary

Rated officer retention is a problem that haunts senior leaders because it 

affects the core missions of the Air Force; failure to retain enough of the best 

officers could result in dire consequences for the service and nation. Senior 

Air Force leaders work within a bureaucratic system to provide a service capable of projecting global military power through air, space, and cyberspace. 

Often, working within this system requires tough decisions and sacrifices in 

the interest of getting the best Air Force for the money. The current economic 

environment has made these decisions even tougher. Increased personnel 

cuts, fewer training opportunities, and decreased flying hours are a few of the 
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means available to control future costs. These decisions, however, could have 

grave effects on the retention of the best rated pilots for our CAF. 

Rightsizing the force has resulted in fewer available combat-coded aircraft 

and a fleet in desperate need of modernization. As a service, the Air Force is 

dedicated to its modernization efforts, but there is a short-term price to be 

paid. Potentially the Air Force will be non-combat-ready in a short period 

because of the lost flying hours and training opportunities. Failure to attain 

this experience could leave the Air Force lacking in short-term tactical competency. Even more disturbing is the insidious slide toward mediocrity that 

results from a modification of what defines the “best” rated aircrew. This slide 

could leave the Air Force lacking for future strategic leaders unless historic 

retention methods receive needed attention.

Retention methods like the ACIP, ACP, and ADSC programs prove to be 

reactionary when it comes to rightsizing the force. Inconsistent application of 

bonus monies and temporal commitments force a cyclical routine of wait and 

see, never allowing the Air Force to manage proactively the “best” end strength 

possible. As the United States recovers from its economic woes, retention 

threatens to get worse before it gets better.

Indicators within the private sector, while not individually causal, are still 

contributory to future Air Force retention rates. Economic resurgence, an expanding commercial aviation sector, and a recovering housing market could 

result in retention rates similar to those experienced prior to 9/11. Whereas 

increased investment in pilot training was able to quell the problem then, the 

expectation of decreased training opportunities and flying hours because of 

budgetary constraints could make the current problem insurmountable. The 

next three chapters look at a microcosm of the CAF, with the purpose of providing new ways of analyzing the retention problem.

It is the author’s belief that the USAF can no longer afford to apply retention methods broadly across the rated community. Rather, analysis of individual communities within each major command presents variables distinct 

to each, allowing a proactively controlled means of applying retention measures. The following chapters focus on the fighter, bomber, and RPA communities from the CAF as an example of individual community focus, as compared to traditional methods of one-size-fits-all retention assessment and 

programs.

Notes

1. DAF, World’s Greatest Air Force, 1. 

2. Tollestrup, Congressional Appropriations Process, 1.
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34

3. Ibid., 2.

4. Ibid., 3.

5. Ibid., 5.

6. Ibid., 8–9.

7. Headquarters USAF/A8P, “PPBE Executive Training,” 3–4, 9.

8. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, ix, 390.

9. Headquarters USAF/A8P, “PPBE Executive Training,” 14–15.

10. CFMPs refer to plans established to support the USAF’s 12 service core functions. For 

more information pertaining to this topic, see Donley and Schwartz, statements to the Committee on Armed Services, in Department of the Air Force (DAF), United States Air Force 

Posture Statement 2012. 

11. Kwast, briefing, subject: Core Function Lead Integrator (CFLI) Roles/Responsibilities. 

12. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 390.

13. DAF, World’s Greatest Air Force, 3.

14. House Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013, H. R. 4310, 145–46. 

15. Ibid., 146.

16. Ibid.

17. General Welsh covers this point in his “Vision for the United States Air Force” when he 

emphasizes readiness to ensure the highest quality force, regardless of size. DAF, World’s Greatest Air Force, 2.

18. Donley and Schwartz, “Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy,” 2–3.

19. Air Force A8P, “POM Preparation,” 3–4.

20. Ibid., 38.

21. The term combat coded describes aircraft primarily intended for combat action and 

maintained at a level of readiness that would support such action. Some fighter, bomber, and 

RPA vehicles support training functions only and are not coded for combat missions.

22. DAF, United States Air Force Posture Statement 2012, 6, 16. 

23. Ibid., 16.

24. DOD, “Air Force News Briefing by Secretary Donley and General Welsh.” Donley’s new 

job is to “help the Defense Department cut its headquarters budget by $40 billion over the next 

10 years and streamline the Pentagon’s organizational structure.” Moore, “Former Air Force 

Secretary Michael Donley to Lead Pentagon’s Drive for Efficiencies.”

25. DAF, World’s Greatest Air Force, 2.

26. See “FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act Summary,” Air Force Association 

website; and Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Summary: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013.” 

27. DOD, “Air Force News Briefing by Secretary Donley and General Welsh.”

28. Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, “Sequestration Will Hollow Out Force 

Fast, Dempsey Says,” 17 January 2013. 

29. USAF, “U.S. Air Force Warfare Center,” fact sheet. 

30. See the USAF fact sheet “United States Air Force Weapons School” for more information about the school. 

31. WIC graduates are referred to as “patch wearers” because of the distinctive grey shield 

worn on their left shoulder that signifies their position as a graduate of the USAFWS.

32. Roche, address.
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33. Air Combat Command/A3 to USAFWS WIC 2013-B selection board applicants, memorandum. 

34. Lt Col J. Kent (commander, 433d Weapons Squadron, Nellis AFB, NV), interview by 

the author, 25 January 2013.

35. Ibid.

36. Author’s personal opinion as a flight commander and assistant director of operations in 

a fighter squadron based on anecdotal interactions with new lieutenants.

37. Lt Col Pete Fesler (former commander, 27th Fighter Squadron, Langley AFB, VA), interview by the author, 29 January 2013.

38. Pilots refer to ACIP as flight pay and to ACP as the bonus.

39. The DOD defines basic pay as “the fundamental component of military pay. All members receive it and typically it is the largest component of a member’s pay. A member’s grade 

(usually the same as rank) and years of service determine the amount of basic pay received.” 

Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel, and Readiness, “Military Compensation.” 

40. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Military Cash Incentives, 10. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Ibid., 9.

43. Ibid., 5.

44. Ibid., 6.

45. Ibid., 12.

46. 37 USC, sec. 301a, “Incentive pay.” 

47. For a thorough history of the ACIP program, see Colonel Metrolis’s 2003 SAASS thesis, 

“Divergent Stability: Managing the USAF Pilot Inventory.” 

48. The aviation community refers to these monthly goals as “gate months.” As rated aircrew attain these minimum requirements (i.e., 96 months’ flying in the first 144 months of 

aviation service), they have achieved enough time to “open the gate” for continued receipt of 

ACIP. During the yearly records review, Flight Records Management personnel will brief rated 

officers on the number of months they have attained and the number remaining until they have 

reached their next milestone. 

49. Metrolis, “Divergent Stability,” 24, 26–27. Colonel Metrolis was a major at SAASS when 

he wrote his master’s thesis.

50. USC, Title 37, sec. 301b, “Special pay.” 

51. AFI 36-3004, Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP) Program, 3.

52. USC, Title 37, sec. 301b, “Special pay.”

53. Metrolis, “Divergent Stability,” 27.

54. Hock, “Study of the Effectiveness of Aviation Continuation Pay,” 12. See also Metrolis, 

“Divergent Stability,” 27. 

55. Metrolis, “Divergent Stability,” 28.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., 29.

58. Ibid.

59. AFI 36-2107, Active Duty Service Commitments, 5.

60. Metrolis, “Divergent Stability,” 22.

61. Ibid. 

62. Ibid., 23. 

63. Now a senior policy researcher with RAND, from 2004 to 2011 Robbert was the director of the Manpower, Personnel, and Training Program at RAND Project Air Force. Quoted in 
RIGHTSIZING AND REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED

36

Jennifer H. Svan, “Air Force Faced with ‘New Reality’: Fewer Pilots,” Stars and Stripes, 21 September 2011, http://www.stripes.com/news/air-force-faced-with-new-reality-fewer-pilots-1.155793. 

64. The reference to “all rated aircrew” includes pilots from the fighter; bomber; mobility; 

command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; combat search and rescue; 

special operations; and unmanned communities, as well as a general community classified as 

“other.” 

65. Compiled from a review of the Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports from FY 2000 

through FY 2012 provided by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC/DSYA). Reports are itemized individually in the bibliography.

66. AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis, FY 10 report. 

67. Ibid., FY 01 report.

68. AFPC delineates rated aircrew losses into these four categories. It includes a fifth category, labeled as “other,” to encapsulate any losses that do not fit into the original four. 

69. AFPC, Rated Officer Retention Analysis, FY 00 report. 

70. Ibid., FY 10 report. 

71. Kafer, “Relationship of Airline Pilot Demand,” 48, 52.

72. US GAO, Homeland Defense, 2–8.

73. Belasco, Cost of Iraq, 1–5.

74. AFPC, Rated Officer Retention Analysis, FY 11 report.

75. Freddie Mac, “February 2013 U.S. Economic and Housing Market Outlook.” 

76. Boeing, 2012 Pilot and Technician Outlook.

77. Charisse Jones, “Demand for Airline Pilots Set to Soar,” USA Today.com, 21 June 2011, 

http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2011/06/Demand-for-airline-pilots-set-to

-soar/48661596/1. 

78. Charisse Jones, “Pilot Shortage Looms for Airlines,” USA Today.com, 6 January 2013, 

http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/01/06/pilots-shortage-could-start-this

-year-analysts-warn/1566088. 

79. Ibid.
37

Chapter 3

The Fighter Community

With this newly heightened emphasis on realistic training in both the 

Navy and the Air Force, it was finally recognized by airmen for the 

first time in years, at least in American practice, that the pilot and 

his personal attributes and skills, rather than the aircraft or the 

weapon system, constituted the main ingredient in the formula for 

success in air combat.

—Benjamin S. Lambeth

The Transformation of American Air Power

Fighter pilots reflect many of the foundational qualities of the United 

States. Self-confident, aggressive, brash—words often used in the media to 

describe American political policy apply equally to the modern tactical warriors trained to defend it from the air. However, as Gen Robin Olds points out 

in his memoirs, being a fighter pilot is more than “just a description, it’s an 

attitude.”1

 This attitude permeates the very being of the men and women 

tasked to fly fighters, and it influences almost every aspect of their daily lives. 

It is something neither easily walked away from nor easily turned off. Viewed 

from afar, it appears audacious and self-serving. Upon closer inspection, this 

same attitude becomes determinant in a fighter pilot’s success or failure in 

aerial combat. As such, the talents that characterize the best aviators in the air 

are critical for the future of the Air Force in not only the tactical but also the 

strategic arena. 

Talents honed by fighter pilots for aerial combat are invaluable assets to the 

security of the nation. The responsibility, dedication, and decision making 

fighter pilots exhibit—whether brand new lieutenants or seasoned lieutenant 

colonels—extend beyond the cockpit they call an office. Olds further elucidates characteristics of fighter pilots: They have a “streak of rebelliousness and 

competiveness. But there [is] something else; there’s a spark. There [is] a desire to be good, to do well in the eyes of your peers and your commander, and 

in your own mind, to be second to no one.”2

 This incessant drive makes fighter 

pilots a prized commodity, and as of late, the population of fighter pilots possessing this commodity has been diminishing.

So that we can understand why the ranks of the fighter community are 

thinning, this chapter seeks the answer to three specific questions. First, does 

the fighter community have a retention problem? Second, what are the risks 
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

38

to the future of the Air Force if a retention problem does exist? Finally, if a 

problem does present itself, is there anything the Air Force can do to fix it? 

This chapter discusses the first two questions, while chapter 7 addresses the 

third. The author sought answers to these questions by means of retention 

report analysis, historical ACP take-rate analysis, interviews, and an electronically administered survey.

Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports from 2000 through 2012 reveal key 

insights into USAF requirements during this period. Each report summarizes 

the previous fiscal year’s retention trends for rated aircrew, including pilots, 

combat systems operators (CSO), and air battle managers.3

 For this study, the 

focus remains with rated pilots. Also included in the reports are the ACP take 

rates for the previous FY. Graphed over several years, retention and ACP take 

rates provide useful historical data but do little for predictive planning. Interviews with USAF squadron commanders from the communities of interest, 

however, help to bridge this gap. 

Currently sitting or recently graduated squadron commanders offer valuable insights about those they lead. In each community of interest, the squadron commander is the first officer in a rated pilot’s chain of command. Information collected from these interviews is anecdotal and contextually 

susceptible to unique variables of the community, base, weapons system, and 

even individual squadron commander. Nevertheless, such visceral responses 

are not reflected in a historical graph or an analysis of retention rates. 

Survey results gathered from students at Air University provide a tertiary 

means of answering the questions posed above. Students attending PME at 

AU create an opportune community for survey. A simply titled Pilot Retention Survey, administered online 11–28 February 2013, targeted rated officers 

in the fighter, bomber, and remotely piloted aircraft communities attending 

AU courses at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.4

 Directions for the survey, as well as a 

guarantee of anonymity, accompanied the invitation for survey completion 

sent by e-mail to each potential participant.5

In total 118 personnel were solicited for the survey and 93 responded, a 79 

percent response rate (table 4).6

 Of 71 fighter pilots, 64 responded to the 

survey, a 90 percent response rate. The fighter pilot community represents the 

largest surveyed group at AU, comprising 69 percent (64 of 93) of the total 

surveyed community. 

For the 3,899 fighter pilots serving on AD in FY 2012, the sample size 

would need to be 350 to reflect the opinion of all Air Force fighter pilots with 

a 5 percent margin of error. Similarly, of the 71 fighter pilots assigned to AU 

at the time of survey, 61 responses would allow for their accurate representation. With 64 actual respondents, the margin of error for AU fighter pilots 
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

39

achieves a 5 percent margin of error. The remainder of this chapter focuses on 

the fighter community, beginning with the question of retention.

Table 4. Total survey solicitations/responses by MWS and PME school

PME school Fighter Bomber RPA Total 

solicited

Number of 

respondents

Percentage 

of school 

responses

Percentage 

of total 

respondents

SOS 24 10 19 53 37 70% 40%

ACSC 30 6 2 38 32 84% 35%

SAASS 7 6 1 14 12 86% 13%

AWC 10 2 1 13 11 85% 12%

 Total solicited 71 24 23 118 100%

 Respondents 64 16 13 92

 Percentage of

community

responsesa

 Percentage of

total 

respondents 

90%

69%

67%

17%

57%

14% 100%

Final numbers:

118 solicited

92 respondents

78% response rate

Developed from the results of the Pilot Retention Survey given to SOC, ACSC, SAASS, and AWC students 11–28 February 

2013.

a

Percentages for the total community of study come from the number of respondents who completed the survey.

Is There a Retention Problem 

in the Fighter Community?

A majority of those surveyed from the fighter community believe that the 

USAF has a retention problem. Specifically, when asked if their “flying community is currently experiencing, or is expected to have a retention problem 

in the near future,” 96 percent (61 of 64) of respondents agreed or strongly 

agreed.7

 Additionally, 73 percent (47 of 64) of those surveyed believe that 

rated officers leaving before reaching retirement age are among the best officers from their community.8

 This exodus is occurring on the heels of the 

“Great Recession,” a period reminiscent of the Great Depression in both depth 

and breadth of destabilization in the labor and economic markets.9

 In fact, 81 

percent (52 of 64) of respondents believe fighter pilots are leaving active duty 

despite the poor economic environment.10 Analysis of fighter pilot losses in 

the past 12 years shows a period of relative stability punctuated by the beginning of what could equate to greater than normal losses.

From 2000 until 2011, the loss of fighter pilots slowed substantially (fig. 8). 

Over half of the 903 fighter pilots eligible for loss in FY 2000 left the Air Force, 
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

40

with 315 of the 529 pilots separating.11 The loss rate of fighter pilots due to 

separation subsequently decreased to an annual average of 102 through 

2011.12 Despite an anomalous spike of 149 fighter pilot separations in 2007 

because of force shaping measures, losses remained low.13 In 2012, however, 

rated officer losses in the AD Air Force spiked, with 588 more pilots separating or retiring than in the previous year (fig. 8).14 AFPC acknowledges that 

the “increase in separations was to be expected as the number of pilots eligible 

to separate in FY 2012 was much larger than the past two FYs.” The increase 

is attributed to pilots with “8 year Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) Active 

Duty Service Commitments (ADSC) aging out of the system, resulting in a 

separation eligible pool nearly 40 percent greater than in FY 2011.”15 Decreased ACP take rates by fighter pilots in 2012 bolster the concern.

Fiscal Year

Number of Pilots

1,000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Eligible for Loss

Total Fighter

Pilots Lost

Fighter Pilot

Losses to

Separations

20002002200420062008

2010

2012

Figure 8. Fighter pilot losses by fiscal year. (Developed from 2000–2012 AFPC 

Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static 

Reports, http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB

.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.)

Fighter pilots have experienced historically lower ACP take rates as compared to the average ACP take rate of the entire USAF rated community since 

2005 (fig. 9).16 The average ACP take rate for all rated communities in the Air 
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

41

Force was 68 percent from 2005 until 2012.17 In that same period, the fighter 

community averaged an ACP take rate of 62.2 percent.18

Fiscal Year

Number of Pilots

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Fighter Pilots who

Signed ACP

Fighter Pilots

Eligible for ACP

20052006200720082009

2010

2011

2012

66.0% 66.6% 68.4%

58.6%

57.1% 60.0%

59.7%

63.8%

Figure 9. Fighter pilot ACP take rates by fiscal year. (Developed from AFPC/

DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis: Pilot, Combat System Officer and Air 

Battle Manager CCR and TARS FY 12 Report, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static 

Reports, http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB

.default.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.)

The fighter ACP take rate for FY 2012 was 59.7 percent, with 151 of 253 

eligible fighter pilots taking the bonus, whereas the total average across all 

rated communities was 66.5 percent (table 5).19 More interesting is the number of weapons systems experiencing substantially lower ACP take rates when 

compared to the entire rated community. 

Isolating the individual weapons systems from the whole fighter community presents equally interesting and disturbing information. The newest and 

most advanced weapons systems, which arguably require the most training 

but retain a high level of prestige, are undergoing fighter pilot losses in excess 

of those experienced by the fighter and rated communities as a whole. For 

example, the F-15C community experienced a 52.4 percent ACP take rate 

compared to the F-22 community’s astoundingly low take rate of 46.4 percent.20 Of the seven fighter communities included in this survey, four were 

substantially below the overall rated pilot ACP take rate (table 6).21
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

42

Table 5. ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities and the 

fighter pilot community 

All rated pilots Total ACP takers

(Initial 5 yr. and initial 5 yr. 50%) Nontakers Take ratepercentage

Initial 550 277 66.5%

Fighter pilots Initial 5 year Initial 5 year 50% Nontakers Take rate

 percentage

Initial 31 120 102 59.7%

Uncommitted 0 0 13

Developed from “2012 ACP Agreements Finalized by MWS,” sorted by all rated communities and the fighter community. In 

AFPC/DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, accessed 18 December 2012, http://

access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.

Table 6. ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities and fighter 

MWSs

All rated pilots Total ACP takers

(Initial 5 yr. and initial 5 yr. 50%) Nontakers Take ratepercentage

Initial 550 277 66.5%

Fighter pilots by

weapons system Initial 5 year

Initial 5 year

50% percent Nontakers

Take rate

percentage

F-15C 4 18 20 52.4%

Uncommitted 0 0 6

F-15E 5 14 9 67.9%

Uncommitted 0 0 0

F-16 9 45 44 55.1%

Uncommitted 0 0 3

F-22 3 10 15 46.4%

Uncommitted 0 0 0

F-35 0 1 1 50.0%

Uncommitted 0 0 0

A/OA-10 9 26 9 79.5%

Uncommitted 0 0 3

Fighter test pilot 

initial

1 6 2 77.8%

Uncommitted 0 0 1

Developed from “2012 ACP Agreements Finalized by MWS,” sorted by all rated communities and the fighter community. In 

AFPC/DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, accessed 18 December 2012, http://

access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

43

It is important to note that this examination of 2012 ACP take rates is a 

single data point, a snapshot in time. Historically speaking, the Air Force experienced drastically lower ACP take rates from FY 1997 to FY 2002, averaging 35.6 percent.22 From FY 2002 through FY 2011, the ACP take rate increased to an average of 68 percent.23 Comparatively, the 66.5 percent take 

rate experienced in FY 2012 is not far off from the statistical average over the 

past nine years.24 The concern is the initial indication of loss, specifically in 

critical tactical weapons systems. If money is not incentivizing fighter pilots 

to stay on AD, then what variables are driving them out?

The primary variables affecting the retention of fighter pilots fall into two 

distinct categories: operations tempo and family stability. Survey respondents 

rate these two categories as very or quite important at a higher percentage 

than Air Force identity, promotion and recognition, money, and other life 

goals (table 7).25 Notably, of the surveyed fighter pilots, 91 percent rate both 

operations tempo and family stability as either very or quite important to current retention of fighter pilots.26

Interestingly, money and compensation received the least number of very 

or quite important ratings, at only 45 percent.27 Consequently, current methods the Air Force uses to retain rated aircrew, like ACP and the ACIP, may not 

have the desired effect of retaining the best personnel within each community. Given that money is the primary means by which the Air Force attempts 

to retain pilots from each community, it requires its own narrative. First, however, the variables that fighter pilots identify as most influential—operations 

tempo and family—are discussed. 

In a 2012 hearing before the US Senate Subcommittee on Readiness and 

Management Support, Gen Philip M. Breedlove offered testimony about Air 

Force readiness. He stated that in 2013 “we will be the smallest we have been 

since the inception of the U.S. Air Force in 1947. Our aircraft are old, older 

than they have ever been, with the average age of our fighters at 22 years.” The 

means to pay for the modernization of the fleet comes from smaller force 

structure (as discussed in chap. 2). Nonetheless, as General Breedlove describes, the downsizing does nothing to satiate “an increasing demand for air, 

space, and cyber capabilities, which is evident in our Nation’s new DSG [defense strategic guidance].”28 Rebalancing of the force structure to preserve 

readiness while not exceeding deployed-to-dwell ratios across the entire force 

is critical, but current squadron commanders say that it is not working the 

way it should.29
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

44

Table 7. Fighter pilot retention variables

Variable

Scale

Very 

important

Quite 

important

Fairly 

important

Slightly 

important

Not important at allTotal 

responses

Air Force identity 

(AF messaging, 

mission focus, 

competency)

14 20 15 12 3 64

 22% 31% 23% 19% 5%

Money/compensation (base pay, 

COLA, “bonuses,” 

flight pay, benefits, 

etc.)

16 13 25 9 1 64

 25% 20% 39% 14% 2%

Promotion/recognition (master’s, PME) 17 15 17 13 2 64

 27% 23% 27% 20% 3%

Family/stability 

(base location, 

quality of life, 

move timing)

38 20 5 1 0 64

 59% 31% 8% 2% 0%

Ops tempo 

(deployments, 

manning, flying 

opportunities)

40 18 4 2 0 64

 63% 28% 6% 3% 0%

Other life goals 13 25 15 6 3 62

 21% 40% 24% 10% 5%

Summary 138 111 81 43 9

Squadron commanders across the fighter community are dealing with 

manning levels and deployment rates eroding the foundation of their squadrons. A recently graduated F-22 squadron commander comments that a normal 18-primary-aircraft-authorized (PAA) squadron is authorized a 1.25:1 

crew ratio (CR), or 22.5 assigned pilots.30 As part of the Total Force Integration (TFI) initiative, however, his squadron maintains a CR set at 16 AD pilots, plus the commander and director of operations.31 Instead of operating at 
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

45

this authorized number, both squadrons at his base hover between 12 and 14 

assigned AD pilots (75 to 87.5 percent of authorizations), leaving the ANG to 

fill the remaining positions.32 Compared to a typical fighter squadron manned 

at 22.5 pilots, he starts the day eight to 10 AD pilots below this number and 

two to four pilots below his authorization.33 This environment puts the AD 

and the ANG pilots in uncomfortable positions.

With fewer pilots to accomplish the same mission, execution of the daily 

flying schedule occurs on a thin margin. In an 18-PAA fighter squadron, a 

typical daily flying schedule consists of an “8pit8turn6.”34 This requires a minimum of 14 pilots to fly the aircraft and does not include the four additional 

personnel required for safe flying operations. These are squadron leader, operations supervisor (Top 3), supervisor of flying, and safety officer. When 

added to the pilots already required to fly, minimum personnel required increases to 18 for a daily flying schedule—assuming no pilots are sick, on leave, 

or unavailable.35 With 12 to 16 assigned AD pilots, this means at least two to 

six ANG pilots must be available to fill the AD shortfalls in the schedule. 

A preponderance of ANG pilots do not fly with their units as their primary 

profession. Most hold other careers in the civilian sector and fly with their 

units only a few times a month to maintain required currency and qualifications. To account for AD shortfalls as part of the current TFI construct, many 

part-time guardsmen occupy permanent billets within operational wings in 

addition to their part-time flying duties.36 With regulated availability, placement of traditional guardsmen in these positions creates an unenviable constraint of full-time job requirements with limited extra hours. As a result, AD 

pilots pick up these tasks that would otherwise go unaccomplished until the 

guardsman next reported for duty. Just as reduced manning in the flying 

squadrons has increased operations tempo, fewer flying squadrons have increased deployment rotations and dwell rates.

Reductions in the total number of fighter squadrons place an extra burden 

on those remaining to cover the same number of taskings. Reduction from 60 

to 54 combat-coded squadrons “took into consideration the Air Force’s surge 

tempo, the expected future deployment tempo, [and] the need to increase 

means to accumulate fighter pilot experience.”37 In 2010 the expected deployment time increased from 120 to 179 days for most AD Airmen, as 71 percent 

were already deploying outside the 120-day baseline.38 According to interviewed squadron commanders, fighter squadrons are experiencing deployedto-dwell rates as high as 1:2, going against the 1:3 that the USAF desires.39 Just 

as increased dwell rates for fighter squadrons create frustrations for the commander, individual deployments of highly experienced fighter pilots to nonflying positions exact a similar visceral reaction.
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

46

Deployment of experienced fighter pilots to nonflying positions is a growing point of contention throughout the CAF. When the USAFE commander 

asked for reasons for poor fighter pilot retention, one of the causal factors 

provided was the increase in 179- and 365-day temporary duty (TDY) deployments.40 Anecdotally, squadron commanders have also attributed the 

short-notice extension of TDYs to the departure of several WIC graduates 

(see chap. 2).41

Work ethic and experience make patch wearers ideal for many jobs. However, if these jobs do not explicitly require their unique skill sets, the shortterm loss of their expertise while deployed will pale in comparison to the 

long-term loss of their service. Use of these officers must be the exception, 

not the rule. Otherwise, the USAF runs the risk of burning them out too 

soon and losing their skill sets for AD. By one squadron commander’s account, if a Weapons School instructor is selected for a one-year deployment 

at the six-month point of a 32-month assignment (two years, 8 months), the 

officer has essentially been made ineffective as an instructor for the rest of 

that assignment.42 The USAF can no longer afford to invalidate particular 

skill sets and the transfer of critical knowledge in the interest of contributing 

to the joint fight. This type of “all-in” thinking was important for the past 

decade, but it is time for the Air Force to refocus on its core mission of providing airpower for national security while simultaneously addressing an 

operations tempo problem.

Symptomatic of an increased operations tempo is decreased stability for 

families. In response to the USAFE commander’s request for information 

pertaining to poor retention, many fighter pilots stated that “additional duties 

and non-flying training were crowding out both flying proficiency and family 

time” and that “difficulties navigating the Air Force bureaucracy to support 

their families” were increasing.43 Shoring up this account is a graduated F-16 

commander who states, “Operational AD fighter squadrons did not hold the 

appeal for many of the talented pilots because of operations tempo and family 

stability.” As a result, “it always seemed like a greater quantity of the quality 

leaders left AD.”44 Comments from surveyed junior officers reflect these 

squadron commander observations. 

Throughout the AU survey, fighter pilots resoundingly agreed that a symptom of increased operations tempo was decreased family stability, which has 

a direct influence on retention rates. Paraphrasing one fighter pilot, money 

and operations tempo lead back to family life, and if a “pilot’s family is not 

happy or satisfied, nothing will keep him or her in.” Another pilot ties stability 

to family benefits and the poor economy, stating that if you “mess with benefits, add too much strain to my family, value additional duties over primary 
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

47

ones and fail to listen to us [then] we are going to bail.” He further claims that 

the “AF has not realized the full extent of the problem, because our economy 

has been so bad” and that the “airline hiring boom will cause pilots to flee the 

service like they did in the 1990s.”45 Deductive logic would suggest that failure 

to take care of families and address operations tempo would continue to drive 

fighter pilots away from AD. Results from the AU Pilot Retention Survey, the 

AFPC retention analysis reports, and anecdotal comments from squadron 

commander and fighter pilots bolster this conclusion. As the economy improves and airline hiring increases, the Air Force will incur severe risk associated with decreasing retention of their best fighter pilots.

What Are the Risks for the Fighter Community?

When asked specifically about the risk associated with a retention problem 

within the fighter community, the answers were disturbing. Of the surveyed 

fighter pilots, 61 percent (39 of 64) disagreed or strongly disagreed that their 

“squadron has been able to maintain a consistent level of manning at the current rate of pilot separation from the AF.”46 As discussed, fighter squadrons 

are struggling to achieve minimum manning for daily operations training, let 

alone combat mission readiness. 

The decline in combat mission readiness is not lost on the surveyed fighter 

pilots. Sixty-seven percent (43 of 64) disagree or strongly disagree with the 

statement “combat readiness of my squadron has not been affected by the current rate of pilot separations from the AF.”47 The short-term tactical effects of 

poor fighter pilot retention will manifest again in the future as less experienced personnel fill the resulting void. Many of the best fighter pilots depart 

for the Guard and Reserve to dampen the operations tempo while providing 

more stability for their family. Although the TFI construct mitigates the tactical loss of skills and talents, the loss of the best in long-term strategic leadership for AD is worrisome. 

Tactical problems resulting from poor retention of the best officers in the 

fighter community will pale in comparison to the operational and strategic 

problems posed in the future. Survey results show that 55 percent (35 of 64) 

of surveyed fighter pilots believe that the best pilots leaving AD are the same 

officers they expected to see leading the Air Force as commanders at the 

squadron commander level and higher.48 Nearly a third of the respondents 

(19 of 64) express a neutral opinion to this question, perhaps indicating a 

tendency to hope for the best while fearing the worst. Regardless, the com-
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

48

manders who lead at the squadron commander level and above have a significant impact on the security of the United States. 

Leadership at the operational and strategic levels is born out of success and 

experience at the tactical level. While not every Airman who shows tactical 

brilliance is destined to find success as a leader at the higher levels of war, success in the tactical arena is generally a requisite for consideration. When asked 

if the security of the United States would be weaker due to the best officers 

electing to separate from AD versus staying on past their UPT ADSC, 56 percent (36 of 64) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed.49 If departure of the 

best creates the perception of weaker US security, then current senior leaders 

need to be aware of this viewpoint. 

Fighter pilots are not confident that senior leaders have a good understanding of the quantity and quality of rated officers leaving AD. Nearly two 

thirds (41 of 64) disagree or strongly disagree that senior leaders possess an 

accurate picture of the departure of the best fighter pilots.50 One respondent 

observes that while the quantity of pilots leaving is easy for senior leaders to 

gather, the quality of those officers is lost on them.51 Without the full picture, 

any perception of disconnect between senior leaders and the fighter pilots 

they lead will cleave an equally large divide between those who stay and those 

who leave. As a starting point to bridge the divide, the following presents Pilot 

Retention Survey findings for the fighter community.

Findings and Summary 

for the Fighter Pilot Community

The results of this case study reveal that fighter pilots surveyed at AU believe that the most influential variables on their community for retention are 

operations tempo and family stability (table 8). Furthermore, 80 percent (51 

of 64) agree or strongly agree that the variables influencing their decisions to 

stay on or leave AD have changed since they initially completed pilot training.52 Forty-six percent (29 of 63) disagree or strongly disagree that the ACP 

did a good job of retaining the best rated officers from the fighter community.53 That said, the opportunity to fly the newest and most advanced weapons systems did not significantly influence retention either, with 55 percent 

(35 of 64) disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with that statement and another 

16 percent (10 of 64) expressing a neutral opinion.54 To retain more of the best 

officers, surveyed fighter pilots identify areas specific to their community that 

require adjusted focus.
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

49

Table 8. Fighter synthesis

Air Force 

identity

Money & 

compensation

Promotion & 

recognition

Family & 

stability

Operations 

tempo

Other life 

goals

Fighter 

pilots 53.1% 43.3% 50% 90.6% 90.6% 61%

Count 34 of 64 29 of 64 32 of 64 58 of 64 58 of 64 38 of 62

Fighter pilots are clear that more of the best rated officers would remain on 

AD if key items received extra attention. Specifically, 92 percent (59 of 64) 

agree or strongly agree that additional focus on the mission vice administrative action would contribute to increased retention.55 Additionally, 88 percent 

(56 of 64) believe an increased focus on tactical competency as opposed to 

career progression would boost retention of the best.56 While apparent that 

fighter pilots would like to spend more time training for their primary role in 

the Air Force, addressing tactical issues is only part of the solution.

Contributing to fighter pilot malcontent is the perceived dichotomy between Air Force messaging about the mission versus its spending. While only 

53.1 percent identify Air Force identity as an influential retention variable, 63 

percent (40 of 64) agree or strongly agree that closer alignment of Air Force 

messaging and spending would positively affect retention.57 However, the 

moderate response rate concerning messaging pales in comparison to the importance of stability. 

Highlighted previously, family stability tied for the highest ranking of retention influences for this group. If family stability and welfare were better 

than they are currently, 86 percent (55 of 64) of those surveyed agree or 

strongly agree that retention of the best would improve.58 Only 28 percent (18 

of 64) think that the best are leaving for better opportunities in the Guard or 

Reserve, and fewer still, 21 percent (13 of 64), think that the best are leaving 

for better opportunities in the civilian sector.59 These indicators along with 

the others mentioned provide insight as to where the Air Force can begin to 

solve the problem of fighter pilot retention. 

Despite the poor economic environment, fighter pilots are leaving AD as 

indicated by lower than average historical ACP take rates since 2005 and decreased retention rates in FY 2012. Anecdotal comments, survey results, and 

ACP take rates indicate that money is not the issue. Further, the fact that the 

newest and most advanced systems are experiencing the lowest retention 

rates perhaps indicates a greater problem among those hand selected to incorporate new technologies into the Air Force. 
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

50

Retention methods like ACP and ACIP are doing little in their current constructs to slow the exodus of fighter pilots. However, little attention has been 

given to the specific variables influencing retention. Lack of consistency in 

administering exit surveys to separating pilots is one problem. Another is 

insufficient methods for tracking pilots by community and weapons system 

through the first six to 12 years of their careers. Consequently, Air Force leaders are left to rely on historical trends like ACP take rates and retention matrices to speculate about future models. 

Contributing to current levels of poor retention is the ease of transition 

between AD and the Guard or Reserve. The increasing trend of collocated AD, 

Guard, and Reserve units puts all three components in an uncomfortable position. While each serves to accomplish a mission for the United States, they do 

so in very different ways. Thus, their close proximity and sharing of assets create a difficult position for each to navigate. Personnel losses in the tactical regime are essentially a zero-sum game, but the long-term leadership lost in the 

strategic regime is very much a negative sum game for the Air Force. 

Decreased manning in fighter squadrons, increased theater security package deployments, and higher deployed-to-dwell rates increase the rate at 

which fighter pilots reach burnout. Recapitalization of human assets must occur at a rate coincident with our material assets, as exemplified by the use of 

WIC graduates.60 The future of the Air Force relies on these low-density, highdemand officers. Retention of their skill sets is existential to its tactical and 

strategic capability.

Continued loss of flying hours, reduction in training opportunities, increased airline hiring, and frustrations with careerism leave many fighter pilots feeling cornered by a situation that shows no indication of improving. 

The retention of these officers will get worse before it gets better unless underlying reasons for pilot dissatisfaction are addressed by something other than 

a blanket solution such as the ACP/ACIP programs. As the findings in the 

next chapter illustrate, this is a sentiment that bomber pilots share, albeit for 

contextually different reasons.61

Notes

1. Olds, Olds, and Rasimus, Fighter Pilot, 291. 

2. Ibid.

3. AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis, FY 11 report.

4. See app. D for the survey administered to AU students at Maxwell AFB.

5. See app. E for an example of the e-mail sent to each prospective survey respondent.

6. While highlighting survey responses for the entire community of study was necessary, 

the remainder of this chapter and future chapters focus on results from individual communi-
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

51

ties unless specific reference to the larger group is informative. Note that in most cases, percentages reported are whole numbers, which may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 

Percentages for the total community of study come from the number of respondents who completed the survey.

7. Results tabulated from AU Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, question 15, sorted for fighter 

pilot answers.

8. Ibid., question 16.

9. Eichengreen and O’Rourke, “Tale of Two Depressions.” 

10. Results tabulated from AU Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, question 18, sorted for fighter 

pilot answers.

11. Pilots eligible for loss from the operational flying community include those who qualify 

for separation or retirement from AD, advance to colonel (O-6), are grounded, or are subsequently removed from active flying status for other reasons. 

12. Compiled from a review of the AFPC Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports from FY 

2000 through FY 2012. See bibliography for the itemization of each report.

13. The force shaping program is a series of voluntary and involuntary separation initiatives implemented to reduce overall end strength and rightsize overmanned career fields. See 

Elkins, “Force Shaping Board Details Announced.”

14. AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis, FY 12 report, 2.

15. Ibid.

16. AFPC began tracking ACP take rates by individual weapons systems beginning in 

2005. Prior data highlights only the total ACP take rate for all rated communities combined. 

17. AFPC/DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012. 

18. Compiled from a review of the AFPC Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports from FY 

2000 through FY 2012. See bibliography for itemization of reports.

19. AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis, FY 12 report, 4.

20. AFPC/DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012.

21. Ibid.

22. AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis, FY 12 report, 3.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., 4.

25. The following descriptors included with the influential variables helped clarify the categories for survey respondents: Air Force identity (Air Force messaging, mission focus, competency), money/compensation (base pay, cost of living, bonuses, flight pay, benefits), promotion/recognition (master’s, PME), family/stability (base location, quality of life, move timing), 

and operations tempo (deployments, manning, flying opportunities). 

26. Results tabulated from AU Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, questions 7–12, sorted for 

fighter pilot answers.

27. Ibid., question 8.

28. Breedlove, statement, in Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2013, 128.

29. Ibid.

30. PAA is the total number of aircraft assigned to support the unit’s primary mission. CR 

defines the number of pilots required to fulfill operational requirements based on the PAA and 

is established by AFI 38-201, Manpower and Organization, and the unit manning document. 

Multiplying the PAA by the CR gives the number of pilots required for a squadron to maintain 

combat mission readiness.
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

52

31. The commander (first in command) and the director of operations (second in command) do not count against CR, which explains their delineation from other pilots. 

32. Fesler, interview.

33. The math for tracking AD and ANG manning under the TFI construct is complex and 

requires further clarification. For an 18-PAA squadron manned at a 1.25 CR, 18 x 1.25 = 22.5. 

Round up to 23 + CC and DO = 25. In a 21-PAA squadron (both the 27th and 94th Fighter 

Squadrons are now 21 PAA), 21 x 1.25 = 26.25. Round down to 26 + CC and DO = 28. TFI 

reduced manning to 16 + CC and DO. This occurred prior to the change to 21 PAA and did not 

adjust. The numbers were based on a model that fills out three 6-ship unit type codes (UTC) 

and one 3-ship UTC to a 1.5 manning ratio using an alternating AD-Air Reserve Component 

(ARC)-AD-ARC scheme. By this logic, each 6-ship UTC requires nine pilots. UTCs 1 and 3 

require 18 pilots. Hence, the current TFI round table mandated AD authorizations of 16 + CC 

and DO = 18 pilots. Currently, manning in the Langley squadrons hangs in the 12–14 range, 

which equals between 75 and 87.5 percent of authorized.

34. An “8pit8turn6” refers to eight pilots flying the first eight missions in the morning. 

After landing, those aircraft will take on gas in the “hot pit” while still running and then fly a 

second mission midafternoon. Once they land, six of those “turn” to the afternoon missions, 

flown by six different pilots.

35. Air Force instruction mandates these four additional positions for local flying operations. Leadership refers to the squadron commander or designated representative; Top 3 is in 

charge of executing the flight schedule; the supervisor of flying maintains oversight of airborne 

and airfield operations; and the safety officer is available for emergencies. These programs are 

controlled by Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 11-4, Aviation Service; AFI 11-418, Operations 

Supervision; AFPD 91-2, Safety Programs; and AFI 91-202, US Air Force Mishap Prevention 

Program.

36. Introduced in 2004, the TFI initiative utilizes all three components of the Air Force, 

specifically the Regular Air Force or active duty, the ANG, and the Air Force Reserve (AFR) to 

tap into the inherent strength and experience of all three Air Force components to increase 

overall combat capability. 

37. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Posture Statement 2012, 6.

38. Hanson, “Air Force Officials Increase Deployment Times.” 

39. Deployed-to-dwell rates refer to the amount of time an Airman will spend deployed 

versus at home. A 1:2 dwell rate means that for every one month a solider is deployed, he or she 

can expect to spend two at home. Currently, the Air Force controls the dwell rates through the 

Air Expeditionary Force system (see chap. 5). This information comes from Lt Col C. Craddock (commander, 27th Fighter Squadron, Langley AFB, VA), interview by the author, 21 February 2013.

40. Pettus to Welsh, bullet background paper.

41. Craddock, interview.

42. Six months of spin-up training to be proficient as a Weapons School instructor, plus 

three months of deployment preparation, plus 12 months of deployed operations, plus one 

month of reconstitution, plus six months of spin-up training to become proficient as a Weapons School instructor, plus two months of PCS preparation equals 30 months. This leaves two 

months for solid instruction.

43. Pettus to Welsh, bullet background paper.

44. Lt Col C. Steffens (former commander, 14th Fighter Squadron, Misawa AB, Japan), 

interview by the author, 7 February 2013.
THE FIGHTER COMMUNITY

53

45. Anonymous responses, Pilot Retention Survey.

46. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 3, question 22, sorted for fighter 

pilot answers.

47. Ibid., question 23.

48. Ibid., question 24.

49. Ibid., question 25.

50. Ibid., question 26.

51. Anonymous response, AU Pilot Retention Survey.

52. Results tabulated from AU Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 4, question 32, sorted for fighter 

pilot answers.

53. Ibid., question 30.

54. Ibid., question 31.

55. Ibid., question 34.

56. Ibid., question 35.

57. Ibid., question 36.

58. Ibid., question 37.

59. Ibid., questions 38–39.

60. Use of WIC graduates as the example in this paper is not meant to infer they are the 

only officers necessitating recapitalization. Because of the scope of this paper and the level of 

expertise attained by WIC graduates, they constitute a convenient archetype from which further debate about retention can develop.

61. For more information about the fighter community survey, please contact Lt Col Brian 

Stahl at brian.t.stahl.mil@mail.mil.

55

Chapter 4

The Bomber Community

The greatest of all our assets, however, were the wonderful pilots and 

air officers which this country had created. They were filled with enthusiasm, with the full knowledge that air power was the dominating 

factor in the world’s development, and with a perfect willingness on 

their part to give up their lives to demonstrating its usefulness and to 

bringing this great, new development to the point that would make 

America the world’s leader in aviation.

—Gen William “Billy” Mitchell

Winged Defense

“Physical strength, judgment, emotional stamina, dependability, team play, 

discipline, and leadership”: these were the sought-after qualities for a bomber 

pilot during the Air Force’s testing and training programs in World War II.1

They reflect the sustaining attributes that have enabled the United States to 

maintain its preeminent place in the international community. Noteworthy is 

the inference that the Air Force recognized a fundamental difference in the 

traits of a pilot ideally suited for different communities. Whereas fighter pilots 

required rapid eye-hand coordination, aggressiveness, boldness, individuality, 

and a zest for battle, the bomber pilot required something different, something beyond the individual talents.

Bomber and fighter pilots display different characteristic traits, which 

means they see things from contextually different viewpoints. Col John C. 

Flanagan remarked in 1944 that bomber crews would gladly forego the hotshot pilot for one who could quickly assess a problem, recognize the life-ordeath implications for himself and his crew, and come to the best possible 

decision for all.2

 The perceived dissimilarities between the pilot communities 

of that era persist. Thus, variables that influence bomber versus fighter pilots 

should be contextually different even though they share the same semantic 

category. 

This chapter examines the same influential variables discussed in the previous chapter but points out where the two communities differ contextually. 

Analysis of retention survey data, historical ACP take rates, AFPC retention 

statistics, and anecdotal interviews and comments builds a specific picture for 

the bomber community. It serves as the basis for answering the three main 

questions. First, does the bomber community have a retention / potential re-
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

56

tention problem? Second, what are the risks to the future of the Air Force if a 

retention problem does exist? Finally, if a problem does present itself, can the 

Air Force do anything to fix it? The following discussion addresses the first 

two questions, while chapter 7 addresses the third.

Bomber pilots comprise 20 percent (24 of 118) of the rated community 

solicited for the Pilot Retention Survey given to AU students. Of 24 bomber 

pilots surveyed, 16 responded, for a 67 percent response rate. This community represents the second largest surveyed group at AU, with 17 percent of 

total respondents (16 of 93). 3 As a known limitation, the small size of the 

available bomber population at AU will affect data validity. 

Because of the small sample size, the margin of error associated with the 

bomber responses is higher than desired. Using the number of bomber pilots 

serving on AD in FY 2012, which stood at 1,779, this data pool would require 

a sample size of 317 bomber pilots to reflect the opinion of all Air Force 

bomber pilots with a 5 percent margin of error. Similarly, of the 24 bomber 

pilots assigned to AU at the time of survey, 23 total responses would allow for 

accurate representation of bomber pilots assigned to AU with a 5 percent 

margin of error. With 16 actual respondents, the margin of error for AU 

bomber pilots is 20 percent. 

Is There a Retention Problem in the Bomber Community?

Bomber pilots, much like fighter pilots, believe that the Air Force has a retention problem within their community. Of 16 respondents, 82 percent (13 

of 16) agree or strongly agree with the statement, the bomber flying community “is currently experiencing, or is expected to have, a retention problem in 

the near future.”4

 Of those surveyed, 50 percent (8 of 16) agree or strongly 

agree that rated officers electing to leave the Air Force before retirement age 

are among the best from the bomber community.5

 Further, 74 percent (11 of 

16) feel that bomber pilots were electing to leave AD in the midst of the recent 

economic downturn.6

 When combined with the loss of bomber pilots since 

FY 2000, the anecdotal opinions offered by bomber pilots may collectively 

indicate an increasing problem for their retention. 

Analysis of bomber pilot losses from FY 2000 through 2011 shows a less 

stable retention environment than that experienced in the fighter community 

(fig. 10). From FY 2000 through FY 2012, the average number of bomber pilots eligible for loss was 115; 76 were actually lost, 20 of which were due to 

separation 7

 In FY 2000 the most bomber pilots were eligible for loss from the 

operational flying community. Of the 255 eligible, 117 were actually lost, with 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

57

58 attributed to separation.8 The number of bomber pilots eligible for loss 

dropped significantly from FY 2000 to 2002, reaching the lowest number in 

the past 12 years. In 2002, 55 bomber pilots were eligible for loss; 39 were 

actually lost, with only seven attributed to separations.9

 This number would 

jump considerably from 2005 through 2007, attributed to Palace Chase and 

other force-shaping initiatives.10

Fiscal Year

Number of Pilots

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Total Bomber

Pilots Lost

Bomber Pilot

Losses to

Separations

Eligible for Loss

20002002200420062008

2010

2012

Figure 10. Bomber pilot losses by fiscal year. (Developed from AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis: Pilot, Combat System Officer and Air Battle Manager CCR and TARS FY 12 Report, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, 

http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.default

.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.)

Through such efforts Air Force senior leaders and personnel management 

control the size and shape of the force.11 In 2006 Lt Gen Roger Brady, Air 

Force deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel, described these measures as necessary to enable recapitalization of the force while controlling the 

increased operations and investment costs resulting from high operations 

tempo and the war on terror.12 General Brady added, “People are the most 

important thing we have. They are also the most expensive thing we have,” 

which requires continued balance with all other Air Force assets for an effective force.13 After the three-year period of rebalancing, losses of bomber pilots 

fell closer to the 12-year historical average. If recent trends continue, however, 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

58

higher losses attributed to separations could be in the near future, as indicated by decreased bomber pilot ACP take rates.14

Since 2005 the bomber community has seen its pilots accept ACP at higher 

take rates as compared to the rest of the rated community (fig. 11).15 The average ACP take rate for all rated communities in the Air Force was 68 percent 

from 2005 until 2011.16 In that same period, the bomber community averaged 

an ACP take rate of 74.3 percent.17 In 2012 this turned around, with a 62.3 

percent take rate—the lowest in eight years.18 Further exacerbating the concern is the dichotomy between this take rate and that of the rest of the rated 

Air Force.

Fiscal Year

Number of Pilots

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Bomber Pilots who

Signed ACP

Bomber Pilots

Eligible for ACP

20052006200720082009201020112012

76.4%

82.0% 78.9%

62.5%

66.7% 86.7%

62.3%

78.8%

Figure 11. Bomber pilot ACP take rates by fiscal year. (Developed from AFPC/

DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis: Pilot, Combat System Officer and Air 

Battle Manager CCR and TARS FY 12 Report, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static 

Reports, http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB

.default.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.) 

Bomber pilots had a lower than average ACP take rate compared to the 

entire rated Air Force community in FY 2012. While the overall number is 

not as severe as what the fighter community experienced for the same year 

(see chap. 3), the low bomber-pilot take rate continues to indicate a retention 

problem within the CAF writ large. The ACP take rate for bomber pilots was 

62.3 percent in FY 2012—with 33 of 53 eligible bomber pilots signing the 

bonus—compared to a 66.5 percent average take rate across all rated communities (table 9).19 Broad analysis of the bomber community does not tell 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

59

the complete story, however. Further research reveals a wide variation in ACP 

take rates across B-1, B-2, and B-52 pilots.

Table 9. ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities and the 

bomber pilot community

All rated pilots Total ACP takers

(Initial 5 yr. and initial 5 yr. 50%) Nontakers Take ratepercentage

Initial 550 277 66.5%

Bomber pilots Initial 5 year Nontakers Take rate

 percentage

Initial 33 20 62.3%

Uncommitted 0 1

Developed from 2012 ACP agreements finalized, sorted by all rated communities and the bomber community. See AFPC/DSYDT, 

MWS ACP [Aircrew Continuation Pay] Summary, 2012, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, accessed January 2013, 

http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.

Division of the bomber community into its three platforms reveals disunion of ACP take rates between the pilots tasked to operate them. Unequivocally, the bomber community has the oldest aircraft in the CAF, with the 

average age of the bombers hovering around 35 years.20 With over 60 years of 

continued flying service, the patriarch of the bomber community is the B-52, 

with operations projected to continue well into 2040.21 One would think that 

the B-52’s relative age would make it less appealing for pilots than the newer 

B-1 and B-2 and therefore it would have the lowest ACP take rates.22 Counterintuitively, the B-52 community enjoyed the highest pilot ACP take rate of all 

bomber platforms in FY 2012, with 71.4 percent (10 of 14) of eligible pilots 

signing the bonus.23 Comparatively, B-1 pilots had a 57.1 percent take rate (12 

of 21) and the B-2 community a 64.7 percent take rate (11 of 17) during the 

same year (table 10).24 If bonus availability and age of bomber platform are 

not significant variables for bomber pilot retention, what variables are?

Influential variables bear some resemblance to the fighter community, notwithstanding a few nuances (table 11). According to surveyed bomber pilots, 

operations tempo and family stability are the most important retention factors—similar to the fighter community responses. Eighty-eight percent of respondents (14 of 16) rate these two categories as very or quite important to 

retention in their community.25 While responses between fighter and bomber 

communities are similar, the contextual background behind the collective answers varies.
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

60

Table 10. ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities and 

bomber MWSs

All rated pilots Total ACP takers

(Initial 5 yr. and initial 5 yr. 50%) Nontakers Take rate percentage

Initial 550 277 66.5%

Bomber pilots by 

weapons system Initial 5 year Nontakers Take rate percentage

B-1 12 9 57.1%

Uncommitted 0 0

B-2 11 6 64.7%

Uncommitted 0 0

B-52 10 4 71.4%

Uncommitted 0 1

Bomber test pilot 0 1 0%

Uncommitted 0 0

Developed from 2012 ACP agreements finalized, sorted by all rated communities and the specific bomber MWS. See 

AFPC/DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, http://access.afpc.af.mil

/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.

Interviews with bomber squadron commanders provide anecdotal insight 

into the “apple and orange” differences between the fighter and bomber communities.26 Whereas the fighter community generally plans on a permanent 

change of station (PCS) every two years and eight months, bomber pilots tend 

to stay at their bases for longer periods—in some cases five to six years.27 The 

reasons for this are twofold. First, the bomber community’s fewer operational 

bases limit possible PCS locations. It has only five operational wings—two 

B-1, two B-52, and one B-2—all in the continental United States (CONUS).28

Second, the limited PCS locations decrease the frequency needed to move 

aircrew and their families between bases, thereby providing a higher level of 

relative stability.29 Desirability of base location is a retention factor, but given 

the investment in wing infrastructure paired with the likelihood of changing 

locale, this variable is unexpanded. Contextually speaking, the difference in 

mission between fighter and bomber pilots paints a dissimilar picture with 

respect to the influence of operations tempo on retention.
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

61

Table 11. Bomber pilot retention variables

Variable

Scale

Very 

important

Quite 

important

Fairly 

important

Slightly 

important

Not 

important 

at all

Total 

responses

Air Force identity 

(AF messaging, 

mission focus, 

competency)

3 2 7 4 0 16

 19% 13% 44% 25% 0%

Money/compensation (base pay, 

COLA, “bonuses,” flight pay, 

benefits, etc.)

9 3 3 1 0 16

 56% 19% 19% 6% 0%

Promotion/recognition (master’s, PME)

6 6 3 0 1 16

 38% 38% 19% 0% 6%

Family/stability 

(base location, 

quality of life, 

move timing)

10 4 2 0 0 16

 63% 25% 13% 0% 0%

Ops tempo 

(deployments, 

manning, flying 

opportunities)

9 7 0 0 0 16

 56% 44% 0% 0% 0%

Other life goals 4 5 7 0 0 16

 25% 31% 44% 0% 0%

Summary 41 27 22 5 1
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

62

The competing nature of the nuclear and conventional desired operational 

capability (DOC) statements places added strain on bomber aircrew tasked to 

execute them.30 The importance of the nuclear mission puts a different contextual spin on operations tempo for the bomber community as compared to 

the fighter community.31 Even though bomber squadrons have a clear manning advantage, the nuclear mission responsibility drives operations tempo 

differently than in a tactical fighter squadron.32

Inevitably, the nuclear mission—which requires aircrew entry into the personnel reliability program (PRP), as controlled by DOD 5210.42-R, Nuclear 

Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Regulation—elevates operations 

tempo for all involved, regardless of manning.33 Given the unique “policy implications and military importance” of nuclear weapons, selection of personnel is limited to “only the most reliable people” to accomplish associated duties. Because of the inherent need for the “safety, security, control, and 

effectiveness of nuclear weapons,” the additional operational requirements 

levied on nuclear-capable aircrew are substantial.34

Besides the normal requirements imposed on tactical aircrew, the strategic 

mission and PRP program mandate additional medical, mental, physical, personnel, personal, security, and proficiency inspections above and beyond the 

normal inspections for military members seeking a preliminary or continued 

security clearance.35 Further, when negligent or willful action in any of these 

categories threatens the security of nuclear weapons, the entire community—

not just the violating member—suffers increased operational scrutiny.36 One 

example of this collective responsibility, and the ramifications contained 

within, comes from the events following a violation of regulation in 2007.

In 2007 an “Air Force B-52 flew across the central United States with six 

cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads,” creating a maelstrom of repercussive events through the USAF.37 Shortly thereafter, nuclear weapon parts 

were inadvertently shipped to Taiwan in March 2008. The composite result of 

these two events resulted in the firing of the top two senior leaders from the 

Air Force, highlighting the gravity of the collective incidents.38 A resultant 

increase in inspections paired with the standup of Global Strike Command 

(GSC) and the economic downturn equated to a watershed moment where 

many of the best bomber pilots departed AD for the Guard or Reserve.39

While a selective incident, it highlights the intensity of operations tempo associated with the strategic bomber community and its inherent difference 

compared to the tactical fighter community. 

Despite the identification of similar influential variables between communities, the contextual differences driving those rankings are striking and require further study to ensure that accurate application of retention methods 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

63

occurs not only by aeronautical rating but also by community (i.e., bomber, 

fighter, RPA) and weapons systems (B-2, F-16, MQ-1, etc.) as well. In addition 

to stability and operations tempo, the bomber community identifies monetary compensation and promotion as influential retention factors.

Bomber pilots place more emphasis on promotion and recognition than 

fighter pilots do, according to survey results. Specifically, 75 percent (12 of 16) 

of bomber pilots rate these factors as very or quite important for retention.40

Currently, AFPC promotion statistics present a broad overview of promotion 

results, focusing on aeronautical ratings (e.g., pilot, navigator, air battle manager) as opposed to higher fidelity statistics sorted by MWS. Undoubtedly, 

AFPC could run statistical analysis of promotion results by individual MWS 

if required. While statistical promotion results by community are beyond the 

scope of this research, it is noteworthy that the rate of promotion for individual career fields has come under increased scrutiny in recent months (see 

chap. 5’s RPA community discussion).41 If retention rates continue to wane, 

this variable warrants increased granularity in the retention calculus for future studies. Equally interesting are the survey results regarding monetary 

compensation.

Bomber pilots also rate money and compensation higher than seen in the 

fighter survey. Seventy-five percent of bomber pilots (12 of 16) find monetary 

compensation to be very or quite important for retention.42 When contextually combined with the ACP take rate for FY 2012, the implication is that 

current retention methods like ACP and ACIP—while not adequately retaining personnel in their current construct—could be more incentivizing for 

bomber pilots if the payout rates increased.43

Studies show that adjusting the monetary amount affects retention rates. 

For example, citing a 2013 Headquarters Air Force Rated Force Policy (HQ 

USAF/A1PPR) report, Maj Eric Weber highlights the significance of an incremental change of five thousand dollars per year in ACP payout. The difference 

between a $10,000 and $40,000 ACP payout per year is a 40 percent increase 

in projected retention through 20 years of service (fig. 12). 

This is not to say that increased money is the retention solution in lieu of 

addressing other influential variables. Realistically speaking, it is probably not 

feasible given the current economic environment. These statistics highlight, 

however, that a dollar amount exists that would retain a higher percentage of 

the best pilots from all communities, not just the bomber community. It is up 

to the Air Force to define the correct amount by community or suffer through 

continued conjecture, as highlighted in the GAO report from chapter 2.44

Guesswork in the midst of increased airline hiring will have a negative effect 

for the USAF.
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

64

Cumulative Retention Rate

Years of Aviation Service

10-Year ADSC

80% take rate at 11 YOS

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

$40,000

$35,000

$30,000

$25,000

$20,000

$15,000

$10,000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Figure 12. Increased ACP payout effect on retention. (Reprinted from Maj Eric 

Weber, HQ USAF/A1PPR, briefing, subject: ASAM [Advanced Study of Air 

Mobility] ’13 Orientation: Air Staff and ’10 Grads’ Perspective, January 2013.)

Increased airline hiring in the near future necessitates that the Air Force 

gain an accurate sight picture with respect to all potential retention methods

available for use. Otherwise, the service could suffer from inappropriate selection of retention methods or ineffective application of selected techniques 

in a disjointed response to increased pilot departures.45 With airline hiring 

expected to peak between 30,000 and 50,000 total hires in the next 10 years, 

ACP take rates and pilot retention could descend to levels not seen since the 

early 1990s (fig. 13).46 External influences, such as airline hiring rates, combine with factors inside the USAF to create a precarious position for rated 

pilot management.

Fighter pilot shortfalls caused by low projected capacity for fighter pilot 

production exact further stresses on the bomber community.47 To maintain 

USAF mission readiness, bomber pilots may fill fighter pilot shortfall taskings 

such as the MC-12 or air liaison officer (ALO). The requirement to serve as 

gap fillers creates subtle undertones of inequality as bomber pilots feel unfairly overtasked. 

The perception of inequality among pilots of different communities manifests within the bomber community as well but for different reasons. Disparate retention methods between pilots and combat systems operators, tasked 

to perform duties on the same aircraft, create a perceptible retention difference within communities. As of the writing of this paper, CSOs from the B-1, 

B-52, and F-15E communities were not offered ACP while pilots from these 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

65

same communities did receive an ACP offer (see chap. 2).48 While not considered as a factor in the surveyed pool of rated officers, the interaction between 

pilots and CSOs both during the execution of their flying missions and in a 

normal work environment may have driven the monetary response rate 

higher than that seen in the fighter community, which has CSOs only in the 

F-15E.49 One pilot anecdotally comments that “the B-1 community lost half a 

squadron’s worth of weapon systems officers due to separation from the AF in 

2010,” which another survey respondent also notes.50 Additionally, several 

CSOs from SAASS Class XXII comment on the lack of an ACP offering and 

its dichotomous effect within their community.

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

1980198519901995

20002005

2010

2015

2020

50,000 hires

40,000 hires

30,000 hires

~ 30,000

mandatory

airline

retirements

28–47%

58–81%

65–76%

TODAY

Calendar Year

ACP Take Rate

Figure 13. Effect of global/major airline hiring on ACP take rates. (Reprinted 

from Maj Eric Weber, HQ USAF/A1PPR, briefing, subject: ASAM ’13 Orientation: Air Staff and ’10 Grads’ Perspective, January 2013.)

Just as Colonel Flanagan highlights different physical and personality traits 

for fighter and bomber pilots, this discussion has described the contextual 

differences between fighter and bomber communities with respect to how 

they define influential variables. These variances reveal the need to treat individual communities and weapons systems within those communities differently to effect better retention. We turn next to the risks associated with poor 

retention for the bomber community, as reflected by survey results.

What Are the Risks for the Bomber Community?

Bomber pilots are less polarized in their responses to the Pilot Retention 

Survey’s question concerning the future risk of poor retention in their community. They seem less concerned with the future combat capability of the 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

66

bomber community or the security of the United States as a function of 

bomber pilot retention. This is not to say that bomber pilots discount the importance of capability or security. Rather, it suggests that they perceive a lower 

risk associated with retention of the best pilots. As previously indicated, data 

validity would increase with a larger survey. The following raw survey data 

and notable comments allow further insights into this community.

Bomber pilots are not concerned with manning levels within their squadrons. When specifically asked if their “squadron has been able to maintain a 

consistent level of manning with the current rate of pilot separation from the 

AF,” 38 percent agreed (six of 16), while 25 percent disagreed (four of 16).51

Another 25 percent of respondents (four of 16) were neutral. Minimal concern for consistent squadron manning translates to bomber pilot opinions 

about combat readiness.

Regarding the statement “the combat readiness of my squadron has not 

been affected by the current rate of pilot separation from the AF,” bomber 

pilots do not have strong opinions. Only 25 percent (four of 16) agreed, 13 

percent (two of 16) were neutral, and 44 percent (seven of 16) disagreed.52

Overall, more bomber pilots disagree with the statement but not overwhelmingly. As such, the data does not provide prodigious proof that combat readiness is of concern for bomber pilots because of retention. Bomber pilots follow the same middle-of-the-road rejoinder to queries about the best pilots 

separating from the bomber community.

Compared to fighter pilots, bomber pilots seem less concerned about either 

the best pilots from their community leaving before becoming a commander 

at the squadron level or the security of the United States suffering because of 

it. Survey results show that 38 percent (six of 16) agree, 31 percent (five of 16) 

are neutral, and 19 percent (three of 16) disagree with the statement “the best 

rated officers I expected to see leading the Air Force as commanders at the 

squadron commander level and above are leaving AD well before they reach 

that milestone.”53 Following the same bell curve trend, 31 percent (five of 15) 

agree, 25 percent (four of 16) are neutral, and 31 percent (five of 15) disagree 

that the departure of the best pilots from the bomber community after their 

initial ADSC will weaken the security of the United States.54

Remarks from bomber pilots surveyed reinforce this statistical data. One 

pilot observes that while many of the best get out, others clearly do not—but 

those who do elect to separate generally make the decision early, with the 

ACP playing little to no role in the decision.55 Another suggests that many 

bomber pilots are “staying in until the airline hiring bubble begins so they can 

stay current and competitive for those jobs.”56 “There is a 50/50 split of guys 

who are leaving” that would “amount to something later on,” states a third 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

67

respondent. He adds that limited leadership opportunities create fierce competition for those positions, with many choosing to leave when they feel “they 

were [not] given a fair shake.”57 Clearly, limited opportunities external to the 

Air Force currently are keeping bomber pilots in, but if increased external 

opportunities present themselves or prove to be more lucrative, they may be 

inclined to depart at significantly higher rates. In either case, bomber pilots 

share the opinion that Air Force senior leadership is unaware of the quantity 

and quality of rated officers leaving AD.

With respect to risk, the only question that garners polarizing answers 

from bomber pilots pertains to senior leadership awareness. When asked if 

“current Air Force leadership has a good understanding of the quantity and 

quality of rated officers leaving after their initial ADSC, 63 percent (10 of 16) 

of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the premise.58 Interestingly, when asked if future general officers will be less capable because the best 

elected to leave AD early in their careers, bomber pilots return to their typical 

bell curve, with 38 percent (6 of 16) agreeing or strongly agreeing while 56 

percent (nine of 16) were neutral.59 This limited survey population presents 

relatively mild results, with only sporadic perturbations from the mean answer. Findings for the bomber community provide a good starting point for 

further study while simultaneously emphasizing the need for an increased 

sample size to strengthen statistical validity.

Findings and Summary for the Bomber Pilot Community

According to the Pilot Retention Survey, bomber pilots view operations 

tempo and family stability as the most influential retention variables. This 

community also perceives two other variables pertaining to money/compensation and promotion/recognition as notable factors (table 12). Additionally, 

most of the respondents—82 percent (13 of 16)—agree or strongly agree that 

the variables affecting their decision to stay on or leave AD change in the 

years after completing pilot training.60 Opinions about the effectiveness of bonuses on retention are surprisingly less divergent.

Table 12. Bomber synthesis

Air Force 

identity

Money & 

compensation

Promotion & 

recognition

Family & 

stability

Operations 

tempo

Other 

life goals

Bomber 

pilots 31.3% 75% 75% 87.5% 100% 56.3%

Count 5 of 16 12 of 16 12 of 16 14 of 16 16 of 16 9 of 16
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

68

Given that 75 percent of surveyed bomber pilots rate money and compensation as significant to retention, the number of pilots who relay that bonuses 

like the ACP are effective in contributing to retention is surprising. Only half 

(eight of 16) of the respondents agree that the ACP does a good job of retaining the best rated officers from their community. Only two of those officers 

surveyed disagree with this statement, leaving the remaining 38 percent (six 

of 16) neutral in their opinion.61 The gap between the two questions leads the 

author to conclude that while money contributes to bomber pilot retention, 

the ACP program in its current form is not enough to be of significant influence. Perhaps the pull toward the airlines is stronger given the closer similarities between commercial and bomber aircraft, as opposed to fighters or 

RPAs. Regarding aircraft type as an influencing factor on retention, bomber 

pilots had dissimilar responses.

Their views on the correlation between the type of aircraft available to fly 

and retention are mixed. When asked if the opportunity to fly the most advanced weapons systems was enough to stay on AD beyond the completion of 

an ADSC, 57 percent (nine of 16) of those surveyed disagree or strongly disagree with the fundamental premise while 31 percent (five of 16) agree or 

strongly agree.62 The remaining 13 percent are neutral in their opinion. Not 

only are bomber pilots’ views about money and aircraft technology informative but also their perspectives about what would aid in retaining the best 

from their community.

The community voices strong opinions about retention. Almost all respondents—94 percent (15 of 16)—agree or strongly agree that more of the best 

officers would stay if the mission rather than administrative details received 

the most focus.63 Further, 82 percent (13 of 16) agree or strongly agree that an 

increased focus on tactical competency as opposed to career progression 

would enable better retention.64 The future strategic leaders of the Air Force 

may not need to be the best tactical pilots per se. However, failure to retain 

more of the best tactical officers in the short term as a result of the perceived 

diminished mission focus may contribute to a skewed pool of officers from 

which to promote to leadership positions in the future. While mission focus 

and tactical competency are pertinent retention factors for the bomber community, this is not the case for Air Force messaging. 

Air Force messaging plays only a minor role in the retention of bomber 

pilots. Interestingly, surveyed bomber pilots appear to differ in their categorization of Air Force identity and messaging. Just one third (31.3 percent) state 

that identity is an influential variable for retention. However, about two-thirds 

(62 percent, or 10 of 16) agree or strongly agree that a closer alignment of Air 

Force messaging and spending would help to retain the best officers.65 While 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

69

opinions diverge in this area, there is no such division when it comes to the 

topic of stability. 

In keeping with fighter pilots’ high rating of family stability on retention, 

bomber pilots overwhelmingly agree that stability and family welfare are critical to pilot retention. Respondents agree or strongly agree at a 94 percent rate 

(15 of 16) that more of the best would stay if family stability and welfare were 

better.66 Conversely, very few believe that more of the best are leaving for opportunities outside of AD. 

Opportunities beyond the USAF do not seem to be the catalyst driving 

bomber pilots out. Only 31 percent (five of 16) agree or strongly agree that the 

best are going to leave regardless of Air Force incentives for better opportunities in the Guard or Reserve.67 A similar sentiment is expressed when the 

same question is posed about jobs in the civilian sector, with only 37 percent 

(six of 16) agreeing or strongly agreeing that the best pilots will leave regardless of offered incentives because of better opportunities or compensation in 

positions completely removed from the military.68 The author interprets this 

to mean either that bomber pilots have a deep connection to remain on AD 

or do not currently see lucrative outside prospects. Either way, this is a salient 

point not answered by the collected data and requires further development 

for accurate identification.

To achieve greater fidelity with respect to the specific variables that are 

drawing bomber pilots out, future surveys and case studies must encompass a 

broader pool of solicited operators. Data results obtained through small case 

studies will otherwise continue to rely on conjecture and historical systems, 

like the ACP, to identify additional influential variables.

A review of the AFPC/DSYA Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports reflects that the bomber community held a higher than normal ACP take rate 

compared to the entire Air Force from 2006 to 2011. In FY 2012, however, the 

take rate dropped below the USAF average—attributable to a polarized bonus 

signing among the three bomber weapons systems. The B-1 community experienced a drastically lower take rate than their B-52 counterparts, perhaps 

indicating problems more specific to the B-1 versus general problems for the 

entire bomber community.

Contextual differences in communal definitions guide retention. The 

bomber community, for example, highlights operations tempo and family 

stability as two key variables for community retention. Notably, fewer operational bomber bases mean fewer PCS moves and increased stability for the 

family. However, increased deployment rates and requirements due to PRP 

programs have a different contextual effect than seen in other communities, 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

70

such as the fighter community. Contextual differences in communal definitions may reveal themselves in other influential variables, such as promotion.

Bomber pilots value promotion and recognition more than is seen in the 

other case studies. Increased granularity in promotion statistics down to the 

individual weapons system would help identify communities experiencing 

problems, which may reflect in promotion rates. Similarly, the bomber community’s greater emphasis on money necessitates better understanding of 

which pots of money are more or less influential in retention.

Combat system operators, while not part of the case study, arise in interviews and survey comments several times as a critically manned career field 

in the bomber community. Future studies must analyze the empathetic relationship that may exist between operators from the same community with 

different ACP offerings. Manning was of little concern for the bomber community, even with the mention of CSO shortages.

Bomber pilots are not concerned with either manning or their squadrons’ 

combat readiness as a result of the best rated officers leaving AD. Similarly, 

they believe that enough of the best are available to lead bomber squadrons 

and provide for effective national security in the future. The community does 

worry, however, that senior leaders may not be aware of the quantity and 

quality of rated officers getting out. These sentiments resonate with the RPA 

community, but again, the reasons differ because of the contextual differences 

in the communities themselves.69

Notes

1. Miller, Masters of the Air, 285.

2. From ibid., which cites Colonel Flanagan’s “Report on Survey of Aircrew Personnel in 

the Eighth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth Air Forces,” April 1944, 23, Air Force Historical Research 

Agency archives, 141.28B. 

3. See chap. 3, table 4, Total survey solicitations and responses by MWS and PME school, 

for response comparisons. 

4. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, question 15, sorted for bomber 

pilot answers.

5. Ibid., question 16.

6. Ibid., question 19.

7. Pilots eligible for loss from the operational flying community include those who qualify 

for separation or retirement from AD, advance to colonel (O-6), are grounded, or are subsequently removed from active flying status for other reasons.

8. Compiled from a review of AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports, FY 

2000–FY 2012. 

9. Ibid.

10. For further information on force shaping, see the discussion in chap. 3 and Elkins, 

“Force Shaping Board Details Announced.”
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

71

11. Palace Chase is an Air Force program allowing qualified active duty personnel to transfer to the ANG or AFR before the expiration of their current ADSC. Palace Chase falls under 

AFI 36-3205, Applying for the Palace Chase and Palace Front Programs.

12. Gettle, “Force Shaping Necessary.” 

13. Ibid.

14. Palace Chase and force-shaping measures are applicable across all rated communities 

and are contained in this chapter merely as a discussion point. This does not infer that these 

initiatives are more or less influential for bomber pilots as compared to any other rated officer.

15. AFPC began tracking ACP take rates by individual weapons systems beginning in 

2005. Data before this report highlights only the total ACP take rate for all rated communities 

combined. 

16. AFPC/DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012.

17. Compiled from a review of AFPC/DSYA, Rated Officer Retention Analysis reports, FY 

2000–FY 2012.

18. Ibid., FY 12, 3.

19. Ibid., 4.

20. Breedlove, statement, in Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2013, 128.

21. Jeff Schogol, “B-52 Turns 50, but Has Lots of Life Left,” Air Force Times, 21 October 

2012, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/10/air-force-b-52-turns-60-has-lots-life-left

-102112w. 

22. The first production B-1B flew in October of 1984 and the first B-2 in July of 1989, 

which compared to the B-52’s first flight in 1954 constitutes a vast difference in age between 

platforms. For more information, see the B-1, B-2, and B-52 fact sheets, USAF website. 

23. AFPC/DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012. 

24. Ibid.

25. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, questions 10 and 11, sorted for 

bomber pilot answers.

26. Lt Col B. Gallo (commander, 509th Operations Support Squadron, Whiteman AFB, 

MO), interview by the author, 30 January 2013.

27. Maj J. Peterson (SAASS Class XXII student and B-1 pilot), anecdotal conversation with 

the author.

28. The five CONUS bases referred to include Whiteman AFB, Missouri (B-2 Wing); Dyess 

AFB, Texas (B-1 Wing); Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota (B-1 Wing); Barksdale AFB, Louisiana 

(B-52 Wing); and Minot AFB, North Dakota (B-52 Wing). 

29. One survey respondent observes that the B-2 community is an anomaly of the proximity 

and ease of obtaining a position with the ANG. The pilot notes that “one can trade patches and 

fly the same airplane and at the same time buy some family stability.” The irony is that only one 

wing is tasked to fly B-2s, so the definition of “stability” must be contextually different between 

fighter and bomber communities. This comment spurred the contextual discussion in the 

bomber section. 

30. USAF DOC statements determine readiness levels of individual units tasked for a particular mission. As such, bomber communities with dual DOC statements have to maintain 

readiness for both, inevitably increasing operations tempo.

31. While the F-15E platform is also nuclear capable, B-2 and B-52 aircraft within Global 

Strike Command support the majority of fixed-wing nuclear operations. 
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

72

32. It is important to highlight that not all bombers share in the nuclear commitment. The 

B-1 community does not have a nuclear mission, which is why it still falls under ACC. The B-2 

and B-52 possess a nuclear mission; therefore, these two communities fall under Global Strike 

Command.

33. The PRP program is designed to ensure that each member who performs duties involving nuclear weapons meets certain criteria to guarantee the safety, security, and reliability of 

nuclear assets, which requires additional security and training measures above that of an Airman not tasked with the nuclear mission. See Moless, “PRP Program Ensures Airmen Are 

Ready 24/7.” 

34. DOD 5210.42-R, DOD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program, 2.

35. Ibid., 25–30.

36. Ibid., 35–41.

37. Josh White, “In Error, B-52 Flew over U.S. with Nuclear-Armed Missiles,” Washington 

Post, 6 September 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/05

/AR2007090500762_pf.html. 

38. Thompson, “Nuclear Fallout at the Air Force.” 

39. Gallo, interview.

40. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, question 9, sorted for bomber 

pilot answers.

41. Specifically highlighted for the RPA community in sec. 527 of House Armed Services 

Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013, 94. 

42. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, question 8, sorted for bomber 

pilot answers.

43. This observation does not reflect comments from the bomber pilot community. The 

author finds it interesting that a lower than average number of pilots (as compared to the USAF 

average) signed the ACP, but according to current bomber pilots, it is an influential variable.

44. US GAO, Military Cash Incentives, 10. 

45. This point applies equally to all Air Force communities with crew members requiring 

an aeronautical rating of pilot, including fighter pilots as well as RPA pilots who attended UPT. 

Its placement here does not imply it is more or less influential on bomber pilots and is merely 

a point of discussion.

46. Weber, briefing, subject: ASAM ’13 Orientation. 

47. Ibid.

48. However, the author notes that in 2013 (since the writing of this paper), the Air Force 

began offering CSOs the ACP bonus.

49. In 2010 weapons system operators, electronic weapons officers, and navigators were 

combined under a single Air Force Specialty Code, that of a CSO.

50. Anonymous responses, Pilot Retention Survey.

51. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 3, question 22, sorted for bomber 

pilot answers.

52. Ibid., question 23.

53. Ibid., question 24.

54. Ibid., question 25.

55. Anonymous responses, Pilot Retention Survey.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.
THE BOMBER COMMUNITY

73

58. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 3, question 26, sorted for bomber 

pilot answers.

59. Ibid., sec. 4, question 32. 

60. Ibid., question 30.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., question 31.

63. Ibid., question 34.

64. Ibid., question 32. 

65. Ibid., question 31.

66. Ibid., question 37.

67. Ibid., question 38.

68. Ibid., question 39.

69. For more information about the bomber community survey, please contact Lt Col 

Brian Stahl at brian.t.stahl.mil@mail.mil.

75

Chapter 5

The Remotely Piloted Aircraft Community

We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. 

The next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in them at all. 

Take everything you’ve learned about aviation in war, throw it out of 

the window, and let’s go to work on tomorrow’s aviation. It will be 

different from anything the world has ever seen.

—Gen Henry “Hap” Arnold

Research and development of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for military 

purposes have been around almost as long as powered flight. The idea of a 

specialized pilot for these systems, however, is a relatively recent innovation. 

The background information presented on this emergent operational field 

first provides some context for the analysis of the RPA community survey. 

In 1917 Charles F. Kettering launched the Aerial Torpedo “Bug,” thus beginning the American pursuit of UASs.1

 Designed to fly autonomously for a 

predetermined period, the Bug used an internal set of pneumatic and electrical controls to fly toward a target. After reaching the time limit, the wings 

would release, allowing the weapon to plunge to the ground and detonate on 

impact.2

 Pursuit of UASs continued for the next several decades—albeit 

slowly and veiled by secrecy—until the Cold War mandated an increase in 

information collection.3

Competition with the Soviet Union for international preeminence required 

the United States to improve its reconnaissance and information collection 

capability. As a result, the “Red Wagon” program materialized, signed into 

being by the CSAF, Curtis LeMay, for development of an unmanned drone for 

reconnaissance missions in direct response to the shootdown of Francis Gary 

Powers’s U-2 in 1960.4

 Pursuit of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was 

“one of the many avenues that held possibilities for answering the air defense 

challenge,” but ultimately the technological limitations, continued demand 

for secrecy, and rising cost resulted in the post–World War II generation of 

UASs losing out to the burgeoning field of satellites and manned aircraft like 

the SR-71.5

Contributing to the mission loss was an underlying current of parochialism pertaining to unmanned aircraft performing missions previously done by 

manned systems.6

 Despite the initial challenges, UASs would continue to see 

limited action, collecting information on China, North Korea, Russia, and 
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

76

Vietnam in the 1970s.7 After Vietnam, however, UAVs did not regain significant traction until a new organization, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance 

Office (DARO), established centralized control of UAV development.8

Created in 1993, DARO grew from two fundamental propositions: (1) remove the services’ parochial control that limited cheap and effective UAV development, and (2) circumvent the services’ power by centralizing management structure under OSD civilians, accountable directly to Congress.9

DARO controlled the preponderance of UAS budget allocations and equipped 

the services that maintained operational control of the UAV platforms. This 

striation of control—paired with congressional conflict over budgetary loss 

for conventionally manned systems—resulted in the disbandment of DARO 

in 1998, with only one UAS surviving the breakup.10 Known as the RQ-1A 

Predator, that survivor of the DARO system set the stage for all future UAS 

systems.

Military use of UASs like the Predator increased substantially after 1998 as 

low-intensity conflicts and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations supplanted 

warfare fought by large fielded forces, like those seen in Desert Storm. The 

asymmetrical advantage gained by using UAVs in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Libya, and Pakistan continues to bolster the pursuit of increased UAS capability.11 Because of this advantage, senior governmental leaders, combatant 

commanders, and tactical operators argue for increasing numbers of UAV 

combat air patrol (CAP) missions, creating a demand for RPAs that has outpaced traditional Air Force sourcing for manning a weapons system.12

The request for CAPs has increased eightfold since 2005, creating an untenable draw of pilots from manned platforms to operate UASs. In less than 

10 years, the number of requested RPA CAPs has increased from eight in 

2005 to a projected 65 in 2014.13 Two USAF assets—the RQ-1A (now known 

as the MQ-1A) Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper—primarily fly these CAPs.14

The RQ-4 Global Hawk and RQ-170 Sentinel fly additional CAPs not included in the projected numbers above. To ensure sufficient numbers of these 

four aircraft match the growing numbers of CAP requests, the projected Air 

Force inventory of UASs will increase from 340 in FY 2012 to approximately 

650 in FY 2021.15 Given the “unmanned” moniker, the number of human 

operators required to operate each individual aircraft can be lost in the technological capability.

While unmanned in the physical sense, the majority of military UASs continue to have an existential connection to human operators in the loop. Each 

RPA requires an “aircrew that comprises a pilot and a sensor operator at both 

the continental United States–based mission-control element (MCE) and the 

deployed launch-and-recovery element (LRE).”16 One CAP requires 10 of 
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

77

these crews to ensure continuous 24/7 coverage, meaning 65 CAPs in 2014 

would call for a minimum of 1,300 pilots to simply meet requirements.17

When you factor in a normal operations schedule, this number grows to 

nearly 1,700 required RPA pilots.18 This is a huge number of pilots to train in 

a short period, especially for a young career field that until 2009 gleaned all of 

its operators from other manned weapon systems. 

The maturation of the RPA career field has been tumultuous, drawing operators from other weapons systems while the nation has been continuously 

engaged in war. The number of pilots pulled to operate a nonprimary weapons system was unable to meet the growing demand without influencing the 

manned platform experience.19 Before 2009, pilots supplemented RPA units 

in one of three ways. The first was a traditional “ALFA” tour whereby aircrew 

served one assignment in RPAs and then returned to their primary major 

weapons systems.20 The second initiative, TAMI-21 (October 2007 through 

January 2008), pulled overages from the fighter and bomber communities to 

fly RPAs and resulted in 40 permanent pilot reassignments.21 The final method 

sent 244 pilots directly from UPT to RPAs for one assignment.22 While these 

methods gained much-needed personnel, they did little to foster the sense of 

community identity prevalent in the fighter and bomber communities (as 

evidenced in the opening discussions of chapters 3 and 4). 

Conglomerated for short durations from multiple communities, the early 

RPA units had little framework on which to hang a Robin Olds persona as 

their champion. Similarly, they were unable to maintain personnel long 

enough to develop distinguishable RPA traits, like those found in bomber 

pilots of World War II. After 2009, however, the RPA community took its first 

steps towards a champion with distinguishable traits. It became its own 

unique entity, garnering a distinctive Air Force Specialty Code, along with 

assigning 477 pilots on an RPA ALFA tour to remain in the RPA career field 

permanently. Further, the Air Force launched a program to develop a distinct 

UAS training program, separate from traditional Air Force pilot training, 

with the express purpose of teaching skills specifically tailored for UAS operations.23 The first formal Undergraduate RPA Training (URT) class began in 

October 2010.24 As the RPA community develops as a distinct entity within 

the USAF, it will face the trial of retaining those it worked so hard to acquire.

Maturation of the RPA community will come with the same trials and tribulations experienced by the fighter and bomber communities with respect to 

retention. Building on the premise that contextual differences among these 

communities will influence the retention of rated officers within those groups 

differently, the focus now turns to the RPA demographic. The same influential 
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

78

variables are discussed as for the fighter and bomber demographic, along with 

nuances particular to this community. 

While the structural organization of the information presented remains 

the same, the content varies because of the limited data available due to the 

early developmental stage of the RPA community.25 As with the fighter and 

bomber communities, Pilot Retention Survey data and historical ACP take 

rates were analyzed and squadron commanders interviewed. Since AFPC retention statistics are insufficient to be useful, however, an assessment of projected RPA force structure development serves as the conduit for continued 

analysis.26

Despite the limited available data, this research seeks to answer for the RPA 

community the same three questions asked of its fighter and bomber counterparts. First, does the RPA community have a retention problem? Second, 

what are the risks to the future of the USAF if a retention problem does exist? 

Finally, if a problem does present itself, is there anything the Air Force can do 

to fix it? This chapter addresses the first two questions with respect to the RPA 

community while chapter 7 addresses the third for all three communities of 

interest.

RPA pilots comprise 19 percent (23 of 118) of the rated community solicited for the Pilot Retention Survey given to AU students. Only 57 percent 

completed the survey (13 of 23). The smallest surveyed group at AU, RPA pilots comprise just 14 percent of total respondents (13 of 93).27 Similar to the 

bomber community, the small number of RPA pilots participating in the survey affects the statistical validity of this group’s responses. 

The margin of error for RPA responses is higher than desired. The data pool 

of 657 RPA pilots serving on AD in FY 2012 would require a sample size of 

243 RPA pilots to reflect the opinion of all Air Force RPA pilots with a 5 percent margin of error. Correspondingly, of the 23 RPA pilots assigned to AU at 

the time of survey, 22 total responses would allow for accurate representation 

of all RPA pilots assigned to AU with a 5 percent margin of error. With 13 

actual respondents, the margin of error for AU RPA pilots is 20 percent. 

Is There a Retention Problem in the RPA Community?

The RPA community’s perceptions of retention mirror those of the fighter 

and bomber communities. Eighty-five percent (11 of 13) of survey respondents agree or strongly agree that their flying community is experiencing—or 

is expecting—a retention problem in the near future.28 Further, 69 percent (9 

of 13) agree or strongly agree that the best officers from the RPA community 
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

79

are electing to leave the Air Force before retirement age.29 With respect to the 

best officers leaving the RPA community, 69 percent (9 of 13) of respondents 

believe those officers made their decision to separate well before their active 

duty service commitment expired and before the ACP became available.30 The 

RPA community is not only substantially younger than the fighter and bomber 

communities but is also evolving in unique ways, which is informative in 

characterizing the pool of officers that sustains this platform.

Creation of a stable career path for RPA pilots in a distinct career field does 

not immediately quell the diversity within the community. In fact, current projections do not have the RPA community reaching 100 percent manning until 

2017, with historic rates hovering between 70 and 80 percent.31 Forecasts for 

RPA manning require continued supplementation from UPT until FY 2016 

and from ALFA or traditionally trained pilots until 2023 (fig. 14).32 Consequently, attributions of losses from the RPA community are difficult to assess.

Undergraduate RPA

Training Graduates

(18X)

1,800

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

Traditionally Trained Pilots

ALFA Tour

UPT

FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23

UPT ALFA Tour

11/12U (traditional pilots serving as RPA pilots/CSOs) 18X (RPA Air Force specialty code)

Fiscal Year

Number of Pilots

Figure 14. Projected distribution of UAS demographics until FY 2023. (Adapted 

from Maj Theodore “Lucky” Shultz, AF/A3O-AC, briefing, subject: MCE Pilot 

Manning Ratio, Version 4, February 2013, and briefing, subject: RPA Career 

Field Growth, June 2012; and discussions with Lt Col Bryan “Squeeze” Callahan, SAASS Class XXII student and RPA weapons instructor, 2013.)
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

80

The varied backgrounds of pilots comprising the pool of RPA operators 

make assessing actual retention rates for the community at large statistically 

difficult. Statistically relevant retention rate analysis will occur when URT 

graduates outnumber those from other communities—projected to occur in 

or about FY 2016.33 Also, the first graduates from URT have not reached the 

end of their initial ADSCs. The majority of beta test graduates will reach the 

end of their six-year ADSCs in FY 2016, at which point the USAF will be able 

to get a perspective for RPA retention.34 Because of the limited data pertaining 

to RPA retention rates, the only other measure available for analysis is the 

historical ACP take rate since 2007 (fig. 15). Thus far, RPA ACP take rates 

have been sporadic at best. 

Fiscal Year

Number of Pilots

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

RPA Pilots who

Signed ACP

RPA Pilots

Eligible for ACP

200720082009

2010

2011

2012

66.7%

0.0%

75.0%

0.0%

48.6%

100.0%

Figure 15. RPA pilot ACP take rates by fiscal year. (Adapted from AFPC/DSYDT,

MWS ACP Summary, 2012, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, 

accessed 18 December 2012, http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe

?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.)

Until 2012 the irregular results derived from the small number of pilots, 

most often numbering less than five, eligible for the ACP each FY. In FY 2012, 

however, the number of RPA pilots eligible for the ACP jumped dramatically. 

The first indication of ACP’s effectiveness for retaining RPA pilots was poor at 

best. The average ACP take rate for the RPA community in 2012 was 48.6 

percent, versus 66.5 percent for all Air Force rated pilots (table 13).35 While 

FY 2012 was only the first gauge of ACP’s success, these results should still 

create some worry for USAF leadership.
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Table 13. ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities and the 

RPA pilot community 

All rated pilots Total ACP takers

(Initial 5 yr. and initial 5 yr. 50%) Nontakers Take rate percentage

Initial 550 277 66.5%

RPA pilots Initial 5 year Initial 5 year 

50% Nontakers Take rate percentage

Initial 5 12 18 48.6%

Uncommitted 0 0 5

RPA initial 0 0 1 0%

Uncommitted 0 0 0

Adapted from “2012 ACP Agreements Finalized,” sorted by all rated communities and the bomber community, in AFPC/

DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, accessed 18 December 2012, http://

access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.

When expanded to encompass all four of the MWSs that comprise the core 

of the RPA community, the results remain similarly low. Retention rates 

among the different platforms were not notably different. For example, the 

RQ-1A (also known as the MQ-1) had the highest ACP take rate in FY 2012, 

with 60 percent (6 of 10) of eligible pilots electing to sign the bonus.36 The 

RQ-4 Global Hawk (3 of 6) and the RQ-170 Sentinel (1 of 2) tied at a 50 percent ACP take rate among eligible pilots.37 The MQ-9B Reaper split the difference between the aforementioned aircraft, with 54.5 percent (6 of 11) of those 

pilots eligible electing to sign the bonus.38 Table 14 shows a breakout of individual RPAs as compared to the USAF average for 2012. Attributing causal 

reasons for the low ACP take rates is difficult due to limited data.39 What is 

clear, however, is that the surveyed RPA community has a distinct opinion 

about factors that most influence retention. 

Given the diverse backgrounds of individuals currently in the RPA community, one would think that the reasons for retention would vary.40 However, 

this is not the case. Two variables emerge as unequivocally important, with a 

third worthy of mention. Similar to fighter and bomber pilot survey results, 

operations tempo and family stability tiered first and second, respectively, 

with other life goals coming in third. Markedly, 100 percent (13 of 13) of 

those surveyed rank operations tempo as very or quite important to retention, while 92 percent (12 of 13) give family stability these ratings. While 

other life goals as a retention factor received a substantially lower percentage 

of the very or quite important ratings—67 percent (8 of 12)—its inclusion 

may indicate variables that should be explored.41 Table 15 shows all RPA community rankings. The way communities view influential variables is signifi-
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cant, and the operations tempo for RPAs is characteristically unlike that seen 

in other communities.

Table 14. ACP take rate comparison between all rated communities and individual RPA systems

All rated pilots Total ACP takers

(Initial 5 yr. and initial 5 yr. 50%) Nontakers Take rate percentage

Initial 550 277 66.5%

RPA pilots by 

weapons system

Initial 5 

year Initial 5 year 50% Nontakers Take rate percentage

RQ-1A Predator 2 4 4 60%

Uncommitted 0 0 4

MQ-9 Reaper 1 5 5 54.5%

Uncommitted 0 0 1

RQ-4 Global Hawk 1 2 3 50%

Uncommitted 0 0 1

RQ-170 1 1 2 50%

Uncommitted 0 0 0

Adapted from “2012 ACP Agreements Finalized,” sorted by all rated communities and the bomber community, in AFPC/

DSYDT, MWS ACP Summary, 2012, Air Force Personnel Statistics: Static Reports, accessed 18 December 2012, http://

access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0.

Operations tempo for the UAS community does not revolve around multiple deployments or extended periods spent away from family. This is not to 

say that RPA pilots are immune to deployment or to infer a slower operational 

schedule than for other rated communities. RPA pilots are subject to the same 

air and space expeditionary force (AEF) deployment cycle as fighter and 

bomber pilots, and they experience the same draw of personnel to fill shortfall taskings.42 Further, RPA units have similar training cycles, with inspections, computer-based training, and education requirements. The RPA community differentiates from others in the grinding schedule of shift work, with 

no opportunity to enter “steady state” operations.43 This grind—described as 

a long, slow burn as opposed to a short, high-intensity operation—takes a toll 

on an RPA pilot’s quality of life and is exacerbated by personnel shortages and 

continued operations as a result of an unwavering wartime posture.44

The wartime posture for an RPA crew is much different from that experienced by a fighter or bomber pilot. Each requested CAP is active 24 hours a 

day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year and requires a pilot, sensor operator, and 

mission intelligence coordinator.45 Divided among three primary RPA crews, 
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daily shift schedules ensure one crew is manning each CAP for a desired maximum of six hours in the seat.46 Optimally, each CAP has a break crew available, with one standby crew per shift to cover anomalies.47 All told, if a squadron operates in five total CAPs, the total number of crews required per day is 

24.48 Until manning levels reach 100 percent, level of effort required by individual crew members will remain high.

Table 15. RPA pilot retention variables

Variable

Scale

Very 

important

Quite 

important

Fairly 

important

Slightly 

important

Not important at allTotal 

responses

Air force identity 

(AF messaging, 

mission focus, 

competency)

0 4 4 4 1 13

0% 31% 31% 31% 8%

Money/compensation (base pay, 

COLA, “bonuses,” flight pay, 

benefits, etc.)

5 3 4 1 0 13

38% 23% 31% 8% 0%

Promotion/recognition (master’s, 

PME)

2 2 5 3 1 13

15% 15% 38% 23% 8%

Family/stability 

(base location, 

quality of life, 

move timing)

9 3 1 0 0 13

69% 23% 8% 0% 0%

Ops tempo 

(deployments, 

manning, flying 

opportunities)

7 6 0 0 0 13

54% 46% 0% 0% 0%

Other life goals 6 2 3 1 0 12

50% 17% 25% 8% 0%

 Summary 29 20 17 9 2
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As mentioned, the UAS community has been operating between 70 and 80 

percent of its authorized personnel since its inception and does not expect to 

reach the 100 percent manning benchmark until 2017.49 Much like in the 

fighter community, the relative amount of work per RPA pilot (and sensor 

operator) increases with personnel shortages—projected to continue for the 

near future. These RPA manning shortages limit opportunities for PME education, staff jobs, and other career-enhancing opportunities, creating an atmosphere—whether real or perceived—that RPA pilots do not have the same 

opportunity for advancement.

This debate reached the highest levels of political examination as the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 mandated an Air Force investigation and report. Section 527 of that report requires the SECAF and CSAF to 

submit jointly a report identifying why RPA pilots have “persistently lower 

average education and training and promotion rates.” Additionally, USAF senior leaders are to provide an assessment of the long-term impact on the Air 

Force of the sustainment of these lower rates, along with a plan of action to 

raise such rates. The final requirement instructs the Air Force to describe 

near- and long-term actions needed to implement the plan, along with the 

impacts it will have on the USAF’s sustained combat air patrol objectives.50

This final decree speaks to senior leader dependence on UAS information and 

capability and hints that if the mission is negatively affected, the net effect of 

poor career enhancement on an RPA pilot is acceptable. When paired with 

continued operations in a wartime posture, the slow burn increases in intensity. Further complicating the RPA community’s contextual definition of operations tempo is the inability to divest from the wartime effort for reconstitution—unlike its fighter and bomber counterparts—as its unique capability 

keeps it engaged continuously. 

Fundamental to UAS desirability is the ability for RPA crews to operate 

from CONUS-based locations, thereby providing the Air Force cheaper and 

safer operations. Information collected by CONUS-based UAS aircrew 

reaches the end user through the Air Force distributed common ground systems (DCGS), which again primarily reside in CONUS or allied nations.51

This home station presence, however, translates into RPA pilots remaining 

continuously engaged in a wartime posture with no buffer between combat 

operations and normal home life. While fighter and bomber crews maintain 

deployed-to-dwell rates as high as 1:2, there is a period of emotional release 

associated with the reconstitution period. Moreover, while deployed, pilots 

can focus entirely on the mission at hand without the normal external demands of in-garrison operations. Divestment from the wartime posture is not 
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

85

a luxury generally afforded RPA pilots, and the resultant strain caused by this 

contextually different operations tempo affects family stability.

The RPA community has contributed greatly to combat operations as well 

as to the command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

missions. General Welsh remarks that the RPA mission “has revolutionized 

the way we think about warfare.”52 Just as the view of warfare had to change 

because of UASs, so it must change because of the emotional and mental 

baggage associated with this field. The limited separation between wartime 

operations and normal family life that RPA pilots experience markedly affects 

them and their families.53

Interviews with an RPA squadron commander validate the need to understand nuanced differences associated with combat operations using UASs. He 

conveys that notwithstanding a difference in the level of physical risk, RPA 

pilots do things that save lives and influence wars.54 While not physically present in the geographic sense, they can track a potential target for days at a time. 

Compared to an F-16 pilot who views an objective through a targeting pod 

for 20 to 30 minutes, RPA pilots view an objective for hours or even days at a 

time, often observing family interactions and learning daily schedules of their 

mark.55 This investment makes the finality of striking the target more personal. To have a kinetic interaction one hour and then to be home having 

dinner with the family the next creates a difficult emotional and mental discourse for the operator, which could bleed over to the family.56 This brief anecdote exemplifies how contextual differences associated with one influential 

variable can affect another.57 The inclusion of other life goals as an influential 

variable for retention highlights a growing opportunity for RPA operators 

outside the Air Force.

The DOD does not hold a monopoly on RPA development, and congressionally mandated future initiatives will only increase opportunities for UAS 

operators outside the military. In the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 conference report, Congress directs 

the FAA to develop a comprehensive plan that would “safely accelerate the 

integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system” by 30 September 2015.58 Nonmilitary applications for homeland security, border patrol, law enforcement, coastal mapping, hurricane forecasting, 

and even the film industry could provide limitless opportunities for UAS operators in the very near future.59 An RPA hiring boom, similar to the commercial aviation hiring boom discussed earlier, could spell disaster for another critical career field in the USAF.

Tedious shift work schedules, difficulty dividing war posture from home 

life, and increased civilian RPA applications could presage an impending RPA 
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86

pilot exodus. With the first beta group of URT-trained RPA pilots completing 

their six-year ADSCs in 2016 and the mandate to open FAA airspace by September 2016, lucrative offers from burgeoning civilian markets will make it 

difficult for the Air Force to retain UAS operators.60 Comments from the Pilot 

Retention Survey point to future difficulties regarding RPA pilot retention.

Remarks about getting out of the Air Force pervade statements from surveyed RPA pilots. One respondent was a member of an initial RPA beta program and comments that his ADSC was six years, taking him through his 

11th year of active service, and that he was unsure if he would stay or separate. 

A second officer is more direct, stating, “I have witnessed competent aviators 

lose all drive whatsoever from being overworked and burnt-out.”61 These 

comments paired with additional survey data point toward noticeable risks 

within the RPA community. 

What Are the Risks for the RPA Community?

Assessing the risk associated with poor retention in the RPA community is 

challenging given the small survey population and relative age of the community as a whole. Nevertheless, the information collected provides initial 

insight into the level of perceived risk for the RPA community, useable for 

development of future studies. As the community continues to mature as a 

distinct career field, manned primarily with officers specifically trained to be 

RPA pilots, the ability to assess risk accurately will increase. That said, the raw 

data gathered in the Pilot Retention Survey provides some discernment about 

RPA perceptions of risk and retention.

Based on information already presented, it is an acknowledged fact that the 

RPA community has been operating at suboptimum manning in a challenging operational environment. Interestingly, RPA pilots were less concerned 

with the risks associated with retention than about retention itself. When 

asked specifically if RPA squadrons were able to maintain a consistent level of 

manning, 61 percent (8 of 13) of respondents disagree or strongly disagree.62

Similarly, 61 percent disagree or strongly disagree that the combat readiness 

of their squadron was unaffected by the current rate of pilot separation from 

the Air Force.63 Clearly, those surveyed demonstrate a general feeling that 

manning and combat readiness suffer because of current retention—but not 

so overwhelmingly as to indicate mission degradation. 

When asked about the future of RPA leadership at the squadron commander level and above, survey respondents suggest an obvious concern. 

Over two-thirds of all RPA respondents (9 of 13) agree that the best rated of-
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87

ficers they expected to see leading their community at the squadron command level and above are leaving AD well before reaching that milestone.64

However, none of the respondents strongly agree, which could be indicative 

of the current group dynamic. Given the number of pilots that operate RPAs 

as a single assignment and then return to their previous MWSs, it is likely that 

these responses will remain skewed until pilots raised within the RPA community reach squadron command. Equally imbalanced were RPA opinions 

pertaining to US security as it equates to leadership.

Concern about future leadership translated directly into apprehension for 

the future security of the United States. Sixty-nine percent (9 of 13) of RPA 

pilots agree or strongly agree that security would be weaker because of the 

best officers electing to separate from AD after their initial ADSCs.65 Again, it 

is plausible that responses to this question are one-sided given the relative age 

of the community. As the community continues to mature, with leaders developed from within, concern about the best officers and security may normalize to values seen in the fighter and bomber communities. Until homegrown pilots are leading RPA squadrons, the underlying opinion appears to 

be that the RPA community will suffer from senior leader parochialism and 

entrenched thinking. 

Sentiments concerning the depth of senior leadership understanding of 

the RPA community are compelling. An RPA lieutenant colonel observes that 

“there has been a pattern of organization resistance to full integration of RPA 

into USAF culture.”66 This sentiment reflects mildly in survey results, which 

reveal 46 percent (6 of 13) of respondents disagree or strongly disagree that 

current Air Force senior leadership has a good understanding of the quantity 

and quality of rated officers leaving after their initial ADSCs. An additional 31 

percent (4 of 13) are neutral, leaving only 23 percent (3 of 13) to agree.67 To 

effect change, leadership throughout the RPA chain of command must have 

an integral knowledge of the variables affecting crew burnout and retention.

In a separate North Atlantic Treaty Organization report, researchers identify that while “medical resources can advise commanders and help individuals, on the whole . . . policy and line commanders have the greatest influence 

on factors affecting occupational burnout.”68 This suggests that the preponderance of growth for the RPA community will come out of innovative and 

bold line commanders able to translate to senior leaders and encourage positive retention. To effect long-term change in the RPA community, retention of 

these same line commanders to senior leader ranks is critical.
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Findings and Summary for the RPA Pilot Community

Results from this case study indicate that the RPA community is concerned 

with retention and, as such, identifies the variables that have the most effect. 

It pinpoints operations tempo and family stability and adds a third notable 

variable of other life goals (table 16). Most pilots (84 percent [11 of 13]) agree 

or strongly agree that factors affecting the decision to stay on or leave AD 

have changed since completing pilot training.69 Most disagree, however, that 

ACP does a good job of retaining the best from the RPA community; only 31 

percent (4 of 13) of respondents agree or strongly agree with this statement.70

Equally ineffectual as the ACP on retention is the notion of flying new and 

advanced aircraft. RPA pilots do not believe that the opportunity to fly the 

newest weapons systems is enough to keep them on AD beyond their initial 

ADSCs. Of those surveyed, 53 percent (7 of 13) disagree or strongly disagree 

with the premise, with an additional 15 percent (2 of 13) expressing a neutral 

opinion and 30 percent agreeing or strongly agreeing.71

Table 16. RPA synthesis

Air Force 

identity

Money & 

compensation

Promotion & 

recognition

Family & 

stability

Operations 

tempo

Other 

life goals

RPA pilots 30.8% 61.6% 30.8% 92.3% 100% 66.6%

Count 4 of 13 8 of 13 4 of 13 12 of 13 13 of 13 8 of 12

Given that money and the opportunity to fly advanced weapons are not incentives, RPA pilots provide areas specific to their community to increase retention of the best. Most agree (84 percent [11 of 13]) that more of the best 

RPA pilots would stay on AD if the mission were more of the focus and not 

administrative details.72 Further, 76 percent (10 of 13) indicate that more focus 

on tactical competency as opposed to career progression would positively enhance retention of the best past initial ADSC commitment.73 However, mission 

focus and competency are only partial components of the RPA picture.

Also interconnected to retention of the best RPA pilots are Air Force messaging and family stability. When asked if more of the best rated officers who 

leave AD would stay if Air Force messaging were more in line with its spending, 69 percent (9 of 13) of respondents agree or strongly agree.74 The importance of messaging matching action carries over to the service member’s family. Respondents overwhelmingly agree (92 percent [12 of 13]) that more of 

the best would stay if family stability and welfare improved.75 This statistic 

matches the overall opinion held by RPA pilots that family stability is an over-
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

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whelmingly influential variable for retention. As important as messaging and 

stability are, better opportunities elsewhere are equally unimportant.

RPA pilots do not believe that the best rated RPA pilots are leaving because 

of better opportunities. Only 31 percent (4 of 13) think this demographic is 

leaving for the Guard or Reserve, with slightly more—38 percent (5 of 13)—

believing these pilots are leaving for the civilian sector.76 However, this latter 

factor may increase as opportunities there or in other non-DOD government 

agencies expand in the future. These statistical results provide credence to 

opinions offered by RPA pilots and help identify focus areas for retention 

improvement. 

Maturation of the RPA career field has been a long process—one often 

veiled in secrecy and overshadowed by parochialism from manned aircraft 

advocates. Until recently, emphasis on RPA utility was sporadic at best. Recent successes, though, have created an insatiable appetite for the unique capabilities of RPAs, resulting in requirements outpacing capacity. 

The young community sprang from a conglomeration of initiatives meant 

to bolster personnel numbers. However, the success in boosting numbers has 

had a secondary effect, leaving the RPA community without a unique identity 

or internal champion. This effect began to change with the establishment of a 

distinct RPA community in the USAF force structure with its own dedicated 

training pipeline.

Like any military bureaucracy, development of these homegrown officers 

from tactical experts to influential senior leaders will take time. Until a preponderance of the officers within the RPA community are a product of the newly 

established homegrown initiative, accurate assessment of influential retention 

variables on the community will be difficult. Thus, historical assessments like 

ACP will have to suffice but only as a starting point for future studies.

If FY 2012 ACP take rates and the expected opening of civil airspace to 

UASs in FY 2016 are indicators of future retention, loss projections of RPA 

pilots could mirror those seen from manned flight communities to the airlines. This potential is reflected in the importance RPA pilots place on other 

life goals and necessitates further specification and analysis.

Contextual differences in the definitions of operations tempo and family 

stability for RPA pilots are important to understanding retention within the 

community. Being primarily CONUS based and physically removed from 

harm does not remove the mental and emotional stresses unique to the RPA 

mission, which ultimately affect family stability. Additionally, trying shift 

work schedules exacerbated by manning shortfalls and increased CAP requests add strain to an already thin margin for operations tempo and family 

stability.
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90

RPA community contributions to the war effort and elsewhere have unequivocally been substantial. However, overreach by political senior leaders 

with respect to promotion rates and awards may be an aspect of the internal 

Air Force view of the community as a pariah. Forced maturation of a community—whether through investigation of promotion rates or proposed military decorations—has a visceral effect internal and external to the Air Force.77

The concern implied by a congressionally mandated investigation into promotion and training rates for RPA pilots does not resonate in surveyed RPA 

pilot responses. However, because the subject pool is small and those attending AU are among the top of their respective career fields, a larger survey of 

randomly selected RPA pilots would clarify this finding.

RPA pilots are concerned with manning as well as its effect on combat 

readiness. They also view departure of the best as negatively affecting not only 

the future of RPA leadership but also the security of the United States. They 

do not indicate that Air Force senior leadership’s awareness of this exodus is 

problematic.

This study reveals that pay incentives (ACP and ACIP) reflect a limited 

understanding of and approach to pilot retention within the surveyed aviation communities. The importance of developing each community of interest 

separately is evident in the diverse nature of their responses. Broadly speaking, each community identifies similar variables as influencing retention of 

the best—but for contextually different reasons. Discussed next are a synthesis of the three communities and the statistical significance associated with 

their comparison.78

Notes

1. National Museum of the US Air Force, “Kettering Aerial Torpedo ‘Bug,’” fact sheet. 

2. Ibid. 

3. UAV, RPA, and UAS describe the community and the unmanned aircraft it operates. The 

author uses UAV in this paper when referenced specifically as such in a historic context or an 

academic work. When referring to individual unmanned aircraft, the author uses remotely piloted aircraft to denote a singular system, even if not specifically referenced. When referring to 

the aggregate collection of RPAs, the author uses unmanned aerial systems to denote plurality. 

4. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs, 6. 

5. Ibid., 6–9, 43.

6. Ibid., 7, 38.

7. The programs comprising the majority of these missions were Tagboard, Senior Bowl, 

Lightning Bug, Compass Arrow, Combat Dawn, Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance System 

(AARS), and Buffalo Hunter, covered extensively in Dr. Ehrhard’s study (ibid., 8–19, 23–38). 

8. Spinetta, “Remote Possibilities,” 194.

9. Ibid., 187.
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

91

10. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs, 47–49.

11. Gertler, U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, 1.

12. Shultz, briefing, subject: RPA Career Field Growth. 

13. Ibid., slide 2.

14. For information about individual UASs, see the USAF fact sheets, http://www.af.mil

/AboutUs/FactSheets.aspx. 

15. DOD, Aircraft Procurement Plan, 4, 10. 

16. Hardison, Mattock, and Lytell, Incentive Pay, xiii. 

17. Ibid., xiv. The number 1,300 accounts for total pilots required in the MQ-1/9 enterprise 

to fill MCE, LRE, formal training unit, and additional billets (ibid.).

18. Baldor, “Next Top Guns?” 

19. Shultz, briefing, subject: RPA Career Field Growth, slide 2.

20. An ALFA tour refers to a temporary midcareer assignment for pilots to positions such 

as an ALO, flight instructor, or UAV pilot. Because they take pilots away from their primary 

weapons systems, ALFA tours are often nonvolunteer and shied away from by operational CAF 

pilots. See Michael Hoffman, “UAV Pilot Career Field Could Save $1.5B,” Air Force Times, 1 

March 2009, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_030109.

21. Shultz, briefing, subject: RPA Career Field Growth, slide 5. TAMI-21 refers to the 

Transformational Aircrew Management Initiatives for the 21st Century, implemented with the 

intent of providing a one-time adjustment to the overall balance of USAF force structure and 

manning. For more information, see Hebert, “Every Pilot in His Place.” 

22. Shultz, briefing, subject: RPA Career Field Growth, slide 5.

23. Schwartz, keynote address. 

24. Shultz, briefing, subject: RPA Career Field Growth, slide 6.

25. Jacobson to author, e-mails.

26. Further expanding on the limited data, review of the AFPC analysis reports reveals that 

the “Pilot ACP Take Rates by MWS” section did not distinguish RPA take rates until FY 2007 

and only started tracking RPA “Overall Losses” in the FY 2012 report. Maj E. J. Jacobson (RPA 

Capabilities Office, Pentagon) attributes this lack of data to the fact that almost all RPA pilots 

until 2009 were on ALFA tours, “on loan” from other communities. Because these pilots were 

“owned” by other communities, they were not eligible for loss from the RPA community. These 

are relatively new developments (2009 and on), which leads to limited available data.

27. See chap. 3, table 4, Total survey solicitations and responses by MWS and PME school,

for response comparisons.

28. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, question 15, sorted for bomber 

pilot answers.

29. Ibid., question 16.

30. Ibid.

31. Maj Ted J. Shultz (AF/A3O-AC), e-mail discussions with author, 20 March 2013.

32. The rates for UPT supplementation drop to 3 percent of the total UAS manning in 2015 

and fall to zero the next year. ALFA tours currently supplement 40 percent of UAS manning, 

projected to fall to 20 percent in FY 2018 and to 2 percent in 2023. Other traditionally trained 

pilots who are permanently recategorized in the RPA community supplement 20 percent of 

UAS manning, expected to drop to 10 percent in FY 2019 and to 5 percent in FY 2023. Shultz, 

briefing, subject: RPA Career Field Growth, slide 8.

33. Shultz to author, e-mails.

34. Ibid.
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

92

35. AFPC/DSYDT, “MWS ACP Summary,” 4.

36. Ibid. 

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Anecdotally, Colonel Callahan mentions that operations in MQ-9 squadrons have been 

particularly rough. Standing up Holloman was difficult because of the fractioning of the original MQ-9 squadron to stand up additional squadrons. As a result, the sense of community 

within the MQ-9 world is low. Compare this to the original cadre of MQ-9 pilots (the 42nd 

Attack Squadron). Close to half of the WIC graduates flew with the 42nd at some point before 

the split prior to going to WIC.

40. Descriptors included with the influential variables helped clarify the categories for survey respondents. The descriptors used are Air Force identity (AF messaging, mission focus, 

competency), money/compensation (base pay, cost of living, bonuses, flight pay, benefits), promotion/recognition (master, PME), family/stability (base location, quality of life, move timing), and operations tempo (deployments, manning, flying opportunities).

41. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 2, questions 7–12, sorted for RPA 

pilot answers.

42. For more information about the AEF, see AFPD 10-4, Operations Planning: Air and Space 

Expeditionary Force (AEF), 30 April 2009, with Air Force Policy Memorandum 2, 18 July 2013, 

http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afpd10-4/afpd10-4.pdf.

43. “Steady state” refers to a normalized schedule of preparation for deployed operations, 

generally executed in the USAF through the AEF cycle. Whereas the AEF Next cycle allows a 

normal 18-month period to train, spin up, and deploy for operations, AEF rotations consist of 

nine months of on-station training (dwell time) followed by a three-month deployment spinup and a six-month deployment. The RPA community has continuous operations throughout 

the entire AEF cycle, and given the personnel shortage and increased CAP demands, its level of 

required effort is increasing. For more information on the AEF Next cycle, see the AEF Online 

website via the Air Force portal, https://aef.afpc.randolph.af.mil/default.aspx.

44. Lt Col Bryan Callahan (SAASS Class XXII student and RPA weapons instructor), interview by the author, March 2013.

45. Shultz, briefing, subject: MCE Pilot Manning Ratio, slide 6.

46. For more information about the physical and psychological effects of occupational 

stressors associated with the RPA community, see Chappelle, Salinas, and McDonald, Psychological Health Screening.

47. Shultz, briefing, subject: MCE Pilot Manning Ratio, slides 8–10.

48. Daily required crews were calculated as follows: Five total CAPs x 3 crews per CAP = 

15 primary crews. Fifteen primary crews + 6 break crews per day + 3 standby crews per day = 

24 total crews to man five CAPs 24/7 with no consideration for normal overhead, leave, or days 

off. With a desired CAP to crew ratio of 12:1, RPA pilots maintain a five-day-on, three-day-off 

shift schedule. Additional CAPs or reduced manning will drive the shift schedule higher. For 

example, reducing the pilot to sensor operator ratio from 12:1 to 9:1 drives a six-day-on, twoday-off schedule while a 6:1 ratio drives a seven-day-on, one-day-off schedule with no leave, 

PME, or continuation training.

49. Shultz to author, e-mails. 

50. House Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for 2013, sec. 

527 (a) and (b), 94.
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

93

51. DCGSs are primarily CONUS based and provide the “capability to task sensors, process sensor data, exploit sensor data from multiple sources, and disseminate intelligence products” from multiple assets, including, but not limited to, Air Force UAS assets. For more information, see OSD, “Air Force Distributed Common Ground Segment,” FY 2010 Annual Report, 

181–82. 

52. 432d Wing/432d Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, “CSAF Gets Firsthand Look 

at RPA Operations.”

53. Chappelle, Salinas, and McDonald, Psychological Health Screening, 1.

54. The comments in the previous paragraph come entirely from an author interview with 

Col B. Rehm (former RPA squadron commander, currently 732 OG/CC), 31 January 2013.

55. Chappelle, Salinas, and McDonald, Psychological Health Screening, 3.

56. Ibid., 4–10.

57. As an anecdote, Colonel Callahan mentions that “the worst days were when friendlies 

came under attack and RPA pilots were unable to do anything about it. On horrific days, maybe 

you could do something about it. Those are the tough days to go home.”

58. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, House Report 112-381, sec. 332 (a), 63.

59. For a complete discussion about the civilian employment opportunities in the UAS 

industry, see Hardison, Mattock, and Lytell, Incentive Pay for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Career 

Fields, chap. 4.

60. Ibid.; author’s e-mail discussions with Major Shultz; and briefs provided by Major Jacobson, RPA Capabilities Office (AF/A2CU), Pentagon.

61. Anonymous responses, Pilot Retention Survey.

62. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 3, question 22, sorted for RPA pilot 

answers.

63. Ibid., question 23.

64. Ibid., question 24.

65. Ibid., question 25.

66. Callahan, “Force Development and Remotely Piloted Aircraft,” 4.

67. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 3, question 26, sorted for RPA pilot 

answers.

68. Chappelle, Salinas, and McDonald, Psychological Health Screening, 11. 

69. Results tabulated from Pilot Retention Survey, sec. 4, question 32, sorted for RPA pilot 

answers.

70. Ibid., question 30.

71. Ibid., question 31.

72. Ibid., question 34.

73. Ibid., question 35.

74. Ibid., question 36.

75. Ibid., question 37.

76. Ibid., questions 38–39.

77. The “proposed military decoration” alluded to is the Distinguished Warfare Medal, created to recognize the achievements of a small number of service men and women who have an 

especially direct and immediate impact on combat operations using remotely piloted aircraft 

and cyber operations. General reaction to the medal itself was mild; however, its placement 

within the order of merit among other military decorations was highly disputed. As such, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, acting with concurrence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

other service secretaries, recommended having the medal downgraded to a device to quell the 
THE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY

94

debate over precedence, which distracted from its original purpose. DOD, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel.” 

78. For more information about the RPA community survey, please contact Lt Col Brian 

Stahl at brian.t.stahl.mil@mail.mil. 
95

Chapter 6

Synthesis and Statistical Results

The core of the CAF is Airmen.

—Air Combat Command (ACC) website

Key findings for the CAF fighter, bomber, and RPA communities are presented next via a statistical analysis of the collected data.1

 While the results are 

informative, the need for continued studies into the Air Force’s pilot retention 

problem is clearly indicated.

Most surveyed pilots (84 percent) agree that the Air Force has a problem 

retaining the best officers from their respective groups. A one-way betweensubjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) compared the mean scores on pilot 

retention by fighter, bomber, and RPA communities. The groups exhibit a statistically significant difference in their responses (F (2, 89) = 5.198, p < .007, 

partial eta squared = .105). Pairwise comparisons of the three groups show a 

statistically significant difference (p < .006) between fighter and bomber pilots. The raw data further illustrates that 65.1 percent of fighter pilots versus 

18.8 percent of bomber pilots strongly agree that retention is a problem (see 

table 17 for the univariate test results). Despite this study’s small sample sizes, 

this data attests to the severity of the problem among communities.

Table 17. Univariate test comparing mean scores on pilot retention for fighter, 

bomber, and RPA communitiesa

Sum of squares dfb Mean square Fc Significance Partial eta quared

Contrast

Error

 4.479

38.347

 2

89

2.240

 .431

5.198 .007 .105

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

a

Dependent variable: flying community experiencing pilot attrition.

b

Degrees of freedom.

c

The F tests the effect of “what is your background?” This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons 

among the estimated marginal means.

While fighter pilots differ statistically from bomber pilots, RPA pilots are 

not significantly different from either fighter (p < .940) or bomber pilots (p < 

.36). See table 18 for the statistical results from a pairwise analysis. About half 

(53.8 percent) of the RPA pilots strongly agree that their community is experiencing a retention problem. This outcome, compared to the above data, sug-
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

96

gests that fighter pilots presently are more affected by poor retention or are 

more sensitized to the ramifications given the current environment than are 

RPA or bomber pilots. Based on the strength of answers, RPA pilots are close 

behind fighter pilots, with bomber pilots producing the least strong responses. 

The variables each of the communities identify as most influential for retention help to illuminate their similarities and differences.

Table 18. Pairwise comparison of pilot responses to community retention 

problemsa

(I) What is 

your 

background?

(J) What is 

your 

background?

Results 95% confidence 

interval for differenceb

Mean difference 

(I-J)

Std. 

error Sig.b

Lower

bound

Upper 

bound

Fighter pilot Bomber pilot

RPA pilot

 .587c

 .203

.184

.200

.006

.940

.139

-.285

1.036

.691

Bomber pilot Fighter pilot 

RPA pilot

 -.587c

 -.385

.184

.245

.006

.360

 -1.036

-.983

-.139

.213

RPA pilot Fighter pilot

Bomber pilot

 -.203

 .385

.200

.245

.940

.360

-.691

-.213

.285

.983

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Based on estimated marginal means.

a

Dependent variable: pilot responses pertaining to their community experiencing retention problems.

b

Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.

c

The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

Across the surveyed fighter, bomber, and RPA communities, operations 

tempo and family stability emerge as two keys for keeping the best pilots. 

Operations tempo ranks as the top variable with 93.5 percent (87 of 93) of 

respondents rating it very or quite important, followed by family stability 

with 90.3 percent (84 of 93) of these ratings. Table 19 summarizes how these 

communities correlate six factors to pilot retention. 

Statistical analysis reveals that the sample data for variables in the models 

meet assumptions of normality, accomplished by using a multivariate analysis 

of variance (MANOVA) test with the influential variables listed at the top of 

table 19 as the dependent variables and the three groups of pilots as the independent variables. The multivariate test was not statistically significant (Roy’s 

largest root = .117; p < .156). However, due to the small sample size, observed 

power was low (.585), so significant differences among pilot groups could 

potentially exist. Though attitudes on five of the variables were similar, the 

tests of between-subjects effects within the MANOVA resulted in a significant 

difference among pilots groups on the issue of compensation. 
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

97

Table 19. Synthesis of influential variables among fighter, bomber, and RPA 

communities

Community Air Force 

identity

Money &

compensation

Promotion & 

recognition 

Family & 

stability

Operations

tempo

Other life

goals

Fighter pilots 53.1% 45.3% 50% 90.6% 90.6% 61%

Count 34 of 64 29 of 64 32 of 64 58 of 64 58 of 64 38 of 62

Bomber pilots 31.3% 75%

12 of 16

75%

12 of 16

87.5% 100% 56.3%

Count 5 of 16 14 of 16 16 of 16 9 of 16

RPA pilots 30.8% 61.6% 30.8% 92.3% 100% 66.6%

Count 4 of 13 8 of 13 4 of 13 12 of 13 13 of 13 8 of 12

Overall

percentage 46.2% 52.6% 51.6% 90.3% 93.5% 59.1%

Total 43 of 93 49 of 93 48 of 93 84 of 93 87 of 93 55 of 93

Note: Variable percentages were calculated by the total number of respondents from the fighter, bomber, and RPA communities ranking each variable as either very or quite important to retention of the best pilots from their respective communities.

Another MANOVA identified whether monetary compensation influences 

the communities of interest differently. Using money/compensation and ACP 

as dependent variables and background as an independent variable, results 

indicate significant differences (Roy’s largest root = .133; p < .004; observed 

power = .864). Tests of between-subjects effects indicate a statistically significant difference between groups in their views of money (p < .037) versus ACP 

in retaining the best officers (p < .021), as shown in table 20.

Pairwise comparisons reveal the differences between fighter and bomber 

pilot attitudes on these variables; money (p < .044) and ACP have more effect 

on the best officers from the bomber community (p < .027) (table 21). Seventyfive percent of bomber pilots regard money and compensation as very or 

quite important, compared to 44 percent of fighter pilots. Another 40 percent 

of fighter pilots rate money and compensation as only fairly important. There 

is indication, however, that bomber pilots are more likely to see programs like 

the ACP and ACIP as entitlements.

RPA pilots have an equally remarkable anomalous answer that requires 

further attention. All statistical results from the small pool of surveyed RPA 

pilots suggest that the RPA community does not view money, recognition, or 

promotion as significant retention variables. RPA pilots, however, are highly 

motivated by the variable categorized as “other life goals.” The author conjectures that the opening of national airspace in 2015 to unmanned systems and 

corresponding job prospects created in the civilian sector leave RPA pilots 

looking forward to other opportunities. 
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

98

Table 20. Test of between-subjects effects by community and money/ACP

Source Dependent variable

Type III

sum of 

squares

df Mean

square

F Sig.

Partial

eta

squared

Noncent.*

parameter

Observed

powera

Corrected

model

Money/compensation

ACP retains best

 7.582b

 8.046

 2

 2

3.791

4.023

 3.425

 4.063

.037

.021

.072

.085

 6.850

 8.125

 .629

 .709

Intercept Money/compensation

ACP retains best

878.404

530.135

 1

 1

878.404

530.136

793.573

535.363

.000

.000

.900

.859

793.573

535.363

1.000

1.000

Q2 Money/compensation

ACP retains best

 7.582

 8.046

 2

 2

3.791

4.023

 3.425

 4.063

.037

.021

.072

.085

 6.850

 8.125

 .629

 .709

Error Money/compensation

ACP retains best

 97.407

 87.141

88

88

1.107

.990

Total Money/compensation

ACP retains best

1353.000

 821.000

91

91

Corrected

total

Money/compensation

ACP retains best

 104.989

 95.187

90

90

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

*Noncentralized parameter

a

R squared = .072 (adjusted R squared = .051)

b

Computed using alpha = .05

c

R squared = .085 (adjusted R squared = .054)

Data also suggests that RPA pilots want to keep their options open by not 

taking the ACP. Whether it is dissatisfaction with the job or the prospect of 

future opportunities is not clear. What is evident, however, is the need to 

quickly identify the influential variables for this community to avoid losing 

the initial pool of experienced pilots in the near future, a topic addressed in 

the next chapter.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the six variables identified above would 

account for the main influences affecting a pilot’s decision to stay on AD; 

however, this study does not support those assumptions overtly. To determine 

the degree to which these variables motivate pilots to remain on active duty, 

the author used a multiple regression with the statement “the rated officers 

that are currently electing to leave the Air Force before retirement age are 

among the best officers in my community” as the dependent variable. 
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

99

Table 21. Pairwise comparison by community and money/ACP

Results

95% confidence

 interval for 

differencea

Dependent

variable

(I) What is 

your 

background?

(J) What is

your 

background?

Mean difference

 (I-J)

Std. 

error Sig.a

Lower 

bound

 Upper

 bound

Money/

compensation

Fighter pilot Bomber pilot

RPA pilot

 -.734b

 -.407

.295

.321

.044

.624

-1.454

-1.190 

 -.014

 .376

Bomber pilot Fighter pilot 

RPA pilot

 .734b

 .327

.295

.393

.044 

1.000

 .014 

 -.632 

1.454

1.286

RPA pilot Fighter pilot

Bomber pilot

 .407

 -.327

.321

.393

 .624 

1.000

 -.376 

-1.286

1.190

 .632

ACP retains 

best

Fighter pilot Bomber pilot

RPA pilot

 -.746b

 -.448

.279

.304

.027

.431

-1.427 

-1.189

 -.065

 .293

Bomber pilot Fighter pilot 

RPA pilot

 -.746b

 .298

.279

.372

.027

1.000

 .065

 -.609

1.427

1.205

RPA pilot Fighter pilot

Bomber pilot

 .448

 -.298

.304

.372

.431

1.000

 -.293 

-1.205

1.189

 .609

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Based on estimated marginal means.

a

Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.

b

The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

The following three statements presented to survey respondents were the 

independent variables for the same statistical analysis. First, “many of the best 

rated officers would stay if there were more focus on tactical competency as 

opposed to career progression.” Second, “many of the best rated officers would 

leave regardless because of better opportunities/compensation in the civilian 

sector.” Third, “the opportunity to fly the newest and most advanced weapons 

systems is enough for me to stay on Active Duty beyond my initial Undergraduate Pilot Training Active Duty Service Commitment.” Multiple R for 

regression was statistically significant, F (3, 88) = 7.785 (p < .001), and accounts for 21 percent (R2

 = .210) of the explanation for the best officers leaving active duty (see tables 22 and 23). 
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

100

Table 22. Test of between-subjects effects on the best rated officers leaving 

active dutya

Model R

R 

square

Adjusted 

R square

Std. error 

of the

estimate

Change statistics

DurbinWatsonR square 

change

F 

change df1 df2

Sig. F 

change

1 .458b .210 .183 .82063 .210 7.785 3 88 .000 1.976

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

a

Dependent variable: rated leaving are the best pilots.

b

Predictors: (constant), flying new aircraft enough incentive to stay, leave for better opportunities in civilian sector, stay if 

more focus on tactical competence.

Table 23. Correlation of best leaving active dutya

Model

Unstandardized 

coefficients

Standardized 

coefficiens Correlations

B Std. 

error Beta t Sig. Zeroorder Partial Semipartial

1 (Constant) 3.427 .547 .000

6.261

Stay if more 

focus on 

tactical 

competence .329 .099 .320 3.318 .001 .348 .333 .314

Leave for better 

opportunities in 

civilian sector -.146 .077 -.183 -1.901 .061 -.237 -.199 -.180

Flying new aircraft enough 

incentive to stay -.178 .071 -.239 -2.521 .014 -.231 -.260 -.239

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

a

Dependent variable: rated leaving are the best pilots.

Moreover, the data suggests that study participants believe the loss of these 

rated officers reflects senior leader understanding of the retention problem. A 

multiple regression was performed using “current Air Force senior leadership 

has a good understanding of the quantity and quality of rated officers leaving 
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

101

after their initial active duty service commitment” as the dependent variable. 

Two statements served as the independent variables for the same statistical 

analysis. The first is “the rated officers that are currently electing to leave the 

Air Force before retirement age are among the best officers in my community.” The second is “the general officer [GO] ranks will be less capable because the best officers elect to leave active duty early in their career.” Multiple 

R was statistically significant, F (2, 89) = 14.004 (p < .001), and accounts for 

24 percent (R2

 = .239) of their opinion of the degree to which senior leaders 

understand the problem (table 24).

Table 24. Senior leader understanding of retention problema

Model R R square

Adjusted 

R square

Std. error 

of the 

estimate

Change statistics

DurbinWatson

R square

change

F 

change df1 df2

 Sig. F 

change

1 .489b .239 .222 .86824 .239 14.004 2 89 .000 1.934

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

a

Dependent variable: senior Air Force leaders have a good understanding of problem.

b

Predictors: (constant), GO ranks will be weaker from attrition; best officers for leadership are leaving.

Both independent variables made a statistically significant contribution to 

the model. The first statement, “the rated officers that are currently electing to 

leave the Air Force before retirement age are among the best officers in my 

community” (ß = -.272, p < .028, and r = -.444), demonstrates that the number of rated officers electing to leave decreases .272 units for every unit increase in senior leader understanding. The second statement, “the general officer ranks will be less capable because the best officers elect to leave active 

duty early in their career” (ß = -.267, p < .031, and r = -.446), shows that for 

every unit increase in understanding, the perceived capability of GO ranks 

decreases .267 units. The zero-order correlation was negative in both cases, 

demonstrating these inverse relationships. Clearly, pilots believe increased senior leader understanding of the retention problem will strongly impact the 

future quality of Air Force leadership (table 25).
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

102

Table 25. Increased understanding of retention and its impact on future Air 

Force leadershipa

Model

Unstandardized 

coefficients

Standardized

coefficients Correlations

B Std. 

error Beta t Sig. Zeroorder Partial Semipartial

1 (Constant) 4.167 .374 11.153 .000

Best officers for leadership are leaving -.283 .127 .272 -2.230 .028 -.446 -.230 -.206

GO ranks will be 

weaker from attrition -.235 .107 -.267 -2.187 .031 -.444 -.226 -.202

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

a

Dependent variable: senior Air Force leaders have a good understanding of problem.

Surveyed pilots differ significantly as to when the best decide to leave AD. 

A one-way between-subjects ANOVA compared the mean scores on “the best 

pilots make the decision to leave before their ADSC is up” question by fighter, 

bomber, and RPA communities. A statistically significant difference emerged 

between how the groups responded to this question (F (2, 89) = 4.699, p < 

.011, partial eta squared = .096). Compared to fighter pilots, RPA pilots perceive that the decision to leave AD occurs well before the completion of an 

ADSC (p < .037). See table 26 for the univariate test results.

Table 26. Univariate test comparing influential variables over timea

Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance Partial eta squared

Contrast

Error

10.153

96.152

2

89

5.076

1.080

4.699b .011 .096

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

a

Dependent variable: best pilots decide to leave before ADSC is done.

b

The F tests the effect of “what is your background?” and is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons 

among the estimated marginal means.

The pairwise comparison among these three groups failed to reveal any 

other significant comparisons (table 27).

Setting aside the issue of why and when pilots leave active duty, the study 

explored pilot attitudes and predictions of the impact of the retention problem on the Air Force and its mission. Statistical analysis reveals that pilots 

from all three communities believe continued poor retention of the best officers will lead to serious negative implications for the Air Force. Multiple regression analysis performed using the forced entry method with “US security 
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

103

is weaker” as the dependent variable bolsters this finding. Three statements 

served as the independent variables for the same analysis. First, “the rated officers that are currently electing to leave the Air Force before retirement age 

are among the best officers in my community.” Second, “the general officer 

ranks will be less capable because the best officers elect to leave active duty 

early in their career.” Third, “the best rated officers I expected to see leading 

the Air Force as commanders (at the squadron commander level and above) 

are leaving active duty well before they reach that milestone.” These variables 

were a good model for the data as multiple R was statistically significant (F (3, 

88) = 37.309, p < .001). 

Table 27. Pairwise comparison of responses pertaining to when the best 

pilots decide to leave compared to ADSC completiona

(I) What is 

your

background?

(J) What is

 your

background?

Results 95% confidence

 interval for differenceb

Mean difference

(I-J)

Std. 

error Sig.b

Lower 

bound

Upper 

bound

Fighter pilot Bomber pilot

RPA pilot

-.622

 -.810c

.291

.317

 .106

 .037

-1.332

-1.582

 .088

-.037

Bomber pilot Fighter pilot 

RPA pilot

 .622

-.188

.291

.388

 .106

1.000

 -.088

-1.135

1.332

 .760

RPA pilot Fighter pilot

Bomber pilot

 .810c

 .188

.317

.388

 .037

1.000

 .037

 -.760

1.582

1.135

Developed from Pilot Retention Survey data with the assistance of Ms. Sophie E. A. Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Based on estimated marginal means.

a

Dependent variable: best pilots decide to leave before ADSC done.

b

Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.

c

The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

The linear combination of these variables accounts for more than half of 

the explanation (R2 = .560) for the pilot’s predictions of the effect of leadership 

quality on US security. Two of the three variables contributed significantly to 

the prediction that “US security is weaker” because the best officers are leaving AD. These are “the rated officers that are currently electing to leave the Air 

Force before retirement age are among the ‘best’ officers in my community” 

(β= .369, p < .001), and “the general officer ranks will be less capable because 

the best officers elect to leave active duty early in their career” (β= .352, p < 

.001). Therefore, as the loss of the best officers from active duty results in a less 

capable GO cadre, respondents foresee that US security will weaken. 
SYNTHESIS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

104

Questions about combat readiness were less effective in producing quantifiable results. None of the highlighted variables contributed significantly toward predicting combat readiness. As a result, this line of questioning requires modification for future studies. While combat readiness questions 

provided no useable statistical data, the raw data presented in this paper nevertheless highlights the general thinking of pilots within each respective 

community. 

Another wrinkle uncovered by this study is finding that the most compelling reasons to cause a pilot to leave active duty turns out to be a moving target. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA compared the mean scores on the 

question “have the variables affecting your decision to stay on or leave AD 

changed since you completed pilot training” by fighter, bomber, and RPA 

communities. Responses by group did not differ significantly (F (2, 89) = .144, 

p < .866, partial eta squared = .003), indicating all pilots feel similarly. At the 

same time, 79.4 percent of fighter pilots, 81.3 percent of bomber pilots, and 

84.6 percent of RPA pilots agree that their reasons to remain on active duty 

have changed over time.

This discovery highlights three fundamental necessities for future studies. 

First, include a representative sample of each pilot population to generate adequate power to find effects when they truly exist. Second, incorporate a wider 

range of variables than those presented in this study to find the unexplained 

reasons for poor retention. Third, add a temporal component by drawing on 

data spaced at regular intervals as opposed to a single study. This strategy will 

help to capture when, and in what way, the reasons for leaving change for each 

pilot group. The final chapter focuses on conclusions drawn from all three 

case studies, recommendations to improve retention, and implications if retention measures don’t improve.2

Notes

1. Statistical tabulations in this chapter are the result of diligent efforts by Ms. Sophie E. A. 

Ryan, chief, Institutional Effectiveness, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The data used 

comes directly from the Pilot Retention Survey administered to AU students from the SOC, 

ACSC, SAASS, and AWC. 

2. For more information about survey results or for a copy of survey answers, please contact Lt Col Brian Stahl at brian.t.stahl.mil@mail.mil.
105

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

Military people stay in service because they like being part of something 

special. They won’t stay long, however, if families aren’t treated well.

—Gen John M. Shalikashvili

Beyond the Wild Blue

Summary

This study shows that the Air Force has a retention problem in the CAF, as 

substantiated by ACP take rate and historical retention rate examination, survey data analysis, anecdotal conversations, and personal interviews. Further, 

monetary payouts like the ACP and ACIP are not effective in their current 

forms for keeping the best personnel from the respective pilot communities. 

It is the author’s belief that recovery from the negative retention trend is possible, but it necessitates a concerted effort on the part of the USAF and CAF 

to ascertain the most influential retention variables. Their identification cannot occur at the Air Force level because contextual differences in their definitions vary by community, individual weapons systems, and possibly even locale. Thus, the USAF must pursue a more focused means of variable 

identification before it can truly make a substantial change in retaining the 

best within its ranks.

The motivation for this research study was threefold. The underlying current of frustration felt by pilots as captured in the “Dear Boss” letters served 

as the initial impetus to the project. Burgeoning subjective opinions resulting 

from personal observation of the best departing active duty for other opportunities—primarily from a single weapons system—served as the second. The 

third motivation extended from a meeting between a group of Air Force Fellows and the USAFE commander, General Welsh, before his nomination as 

CSAF. He expressed concern about poor retention rates throughout not only 

the fighter community but also the Air Force at large. These catalyzing moments spurred this study and generated three specific questions about the Air 

Force’s current and projected retention environment.

Like the other services within the DOD, the Air Force is trying to figure out 

how to do more with less in times of fiscal austerity. The precarious retention 

environment that has resulted leaves the decisional balance of many CAF pilots resting on a razor’s edge between leaving AD for other opportunities and 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

106

remaining on AD despite current challenges. This atmosphere fueled the development of the three primary research questions: (1) Is there a retention 

problem in the CAF? (2) What are the risks associated with poor retention in 

the CAF? and (3) Is there anything the Air Force can do to solve the problem? 

Answers to these questions would either substantiate or refute the research 

hypothesis. To qualify this hypothesis and answer these questions, a multidisciplined approach drew from several resources to increase research saliency.

The search for answers to the study questions occurred through three primary methods. The first entailed detailed analysis of the rated officer retention analysis reports from FY 2000 through FY 2012 to identify retention 

rates by individual MWS and community and the Air Force writ large. The 

second leveraged a convenience sample survey, administered 11–28February 

2013 (see table 28 for the total survey solicitations and responses for the Pilot 

Retention Survey). The third method relied on interviews and anecdotal conversations with currently sitting or recently graduated operational squadron 

commanders from the three communities of interest. Each interview provided invaluable insight into the interworking of an operational squadron 

from the viewpoint of a frontline supervisor tasked to implement, enforce, 

and work between the policies and procedures put in place by the larger Air 

Force.

Table 28. Total survey solicitations/responses by MWS and PME school

PME school Fighter Bomber RPA Total 

solicited

Number of 

respondents

Percentage 

of school 

responses

Percentage 

of total 

respondents

SOS 24 10 19 53 37 70% 40%

ACSC 30 6 2 38 32 84% 35%

SAASS 7 6 1 14 12 86% 13%

AWC 10 2 1 13 11 85% 12%

 Total solicited 71 24 23 118 100%

 Respondents 64 16 13 92

 Percentage of

community

responsesa

 Percentage of

total 

respondents 

90%

69%

67%

17%

57%

14% 100%

Final numbers:

118 solicited

92 respondents

78% response rate

Developed from the results of the Pilot Retention Survey given to SOC, ACSC, SAASS, and AWC students 11–28 February 

2013.

a

Percentages for the total community of study come from the number of respondents who completed the survey.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

107

The following conclusions begin with those pertinent for all USAF rated 

communities and devolve into discussions about the CAF and, finally, the 

individual communities of interest. Recommendations as well as implications 

are provided where applicable. 

Air Force

Identification of Key Variables

Air Force Conclusion 1. The USAF does not utilize an overarching means 

of tracking pilots in rated communities during their first 10 to 12 years. Surveys in place are either underdeveloped or underutilized as a means of identifying contextual differences among communities of interest down to the 

MWS and basing location level. 

Air Force Recommendation 1.1. The USAF—particularly AFPC and 

Headquarters Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services (HQ USAF/

A1)—should emphasize the survey of representative samples of all rated career fields, or at least those experiencing the lowest retention rates, at key 

points throughout their career.

For example, biennial surveys administered to statistically representative 

pools of rated officers upon completion of their initial aeronautical training 

would contribute to the development of trends pertaining to the most influential variables for retention over time. With enough trend data, senior leaders could sort by time, rank, aeronautical rating, community, and MWS. As a 

starting point, the author proposes expanding the influential variables used in 

this study (table 29) to incorporate more variables of increased granularity, 

thereby facilitating a clearer picture of relative retention throughout the Air 

Force. The scope of future studies should also broaden to incorporate career 

fields outside the CAF, thereby validating the process for a wider population.

Air Force Recommendation 1.2. Expansion of future studies would allow 

the USAF to provide more focused retention methods against specific variables at key points in a rated officer’s career. Identification of key variables 

early in a career would enable leaders to implement solutions at a problem’s 

inception rather than waiting to provide a monetary payout at the end of an 

ADSC in an attempt to solve it. As this study illustrates, multiple reasons lead 

pilots to separate from the Air Force, and the default “fix” of incentive pay 

does not address all of them. 

Air Force Recommendation 1.3. Maj Dale Stanley and the Air Force Expeditionary Center developed a predictive model for USAF retention that 

takes into account dependent variables outside the service. His regression 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

108

modeling uses cumulative continuation rate as the independent variable and 

assigns multiple dependent variables internal and external to the Air Force. 

These dependent variables include airline hiring rates, ACP take rates, marriage rates, force shaping, average airline salary, lieutenant colonel promotion 

rate, and national unemployment. While this list of independent variables is 

extensive, incorporating other variables as needed is feasible.1

Table 29. Synthesis of influential variables among fighter, bomber, and RPA 

communities

Community Air Force 

identity

Money & 

compensation

Promotion & 

recognition

Family & 

stability

Operations 

tempo

Other life 

goals

Fighter pilots 53.1% 45.3% 50% 90.6% 90.6% 61%

 Count 34 of 64 29 of 64 32 of 64 58 of 64 58 of 64 38 of 62

Bomber pilots 31.3% 75% 75% 87.5% 100% 56.3%

 Count 5 of 16 12 of 16 12 of 16 14 of 16 16 of 16 9 of 16

RPA pilots 30.8% 61.6% 30.8% 92.3% 100% 66.6%

 Count 4 of 13 8 of 13 4 of 13 12 of 13 13 of 13 8 of 12

Overall 

percentage 46.2% 52.6% 51.6% 90.3% 93.5% 59.1%

 Total 43 of 93 49 of 93 48 of 93 84 of 93 87 of 93 55 of 93

Note: Variable percentages were calculated by the total number of respondents from the fighter, bomber, and RPA communities ranking each variable as either very important or quite important to retention of the best pilots from their 

respective communities.

Air Force Implication 1. The purpose of identifying Major Stanley’s research is not to imply that he, or his agency, has identified the smoking gun 

for retention of rated CAF aircrew. Rather, it is to suggest that innovative 

means of providing proactive data collection for variable identification are in 

development. Further, these pioneering solutions warrant support from senior leaders to ensure retention of the best human capital for the USAF’s strategic future. Part of the data collection for the proposed proactive prediction 

models should come from exit surveys of rated aircrew who elect to leave AD 

before reaching retirement eligibility.

Air Force Conclusion 2. Surveyed communities believe variables influencing retention vary by community and temporally change over the years. 

Therefore, it is imprudent for the Air Force to believe that a single monetary 

compensation at the end of an initial ADSC will make up for undervalued or 

unaddressed variables that occur earlier in a career or are specific to one particular community. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

109

Air Force Implication 2. Identification of these influential variables, along 

with contextual differences that manifest temporally and communally, is essential to retaining more of the best rated officers in the Air Force. If reliance 

on ACP at the termination of an ADSC continues to propagate into the future, the Air Force will not be able to remove itself from reactive retention 

methods that do not address the underlying problems. 

Exit Surveys

Air Force Conclusion 3. The Air Force does not require all rated officers to 

accomplish exit surveys as they are leaving AD. While exit surveys do exist, 

they are either underdeveloped or underutilized with respect to critically 

manned or high-investment career fields (like pilots). Just as the identification of key variables influencing retention throughout a career is important, 

so too are the variables at the time of separation, whenever that separation, or 

even retirement, occurs. Senior leaders would consequently have information 

about retention variables in the formative years after completion of initial 

training as well as at the decision point of separation. They could identify career points where the Air Force could improve retention methods and also 

where it could not have done anything different.

Air Force Recommendation 3. Thus, the Air Force, and specifically HQ 

USAF/A1, should conduct exit surveys of all rated officers (one could argue 

for all critical and high-investment career fields) who separate from AD. The 

data would supplement the biennial surveys recommended above and prove 

to be invaluable to predictive modeling for future retention. 

Air Force Implication 3. If exit surveys are not administered, the Air Force 

will continue to guess as to the reasons for rated officer separation, as opposed 

to having truth data—used in conjunction with periodic assessments—to 

paint the whole picture of officer retention variables.2

Bonus Payments

Air Force Conclusion 4. Research for this study reveals that money is not 

a significant driver for all surveyed communities. Although the bomber community ranks monetary compensation significantly higher than do the fighter 

and RPA communities, none of the communities ranks it as the most influential variable. However, outright elimination of bonus payouts would likely 

have a substantial negative effect on rated officer retention. 

Air Force Recommendation 4.1. Therefore, a restructuring of the bonus 

program must occur for two reasons. First, bonus payouts do not incorporate 

higher qualifications as part of the calculus, which fails to incentivize those 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

110

who have obtained increased skill sets. Second, application of bonus payments cannot occur equally across all rated pilot communities because they 

don’t experience problems with retention at the same time.

Air Force Recommendation 4.2. Under the current bonus constructs, 

both the ACP and the ACIP bonus payments are awarded based primarily on 

time. The ACP targets select communities at the completion of an ADSC, and 

years of aviation service determine the ACIP amount paid to rated officers. In 

each instance, the bonus payout is independent of the level of attained qualification. Both the ACP and ACIP should incorporate level of qualification 

into the calculus of payout.3

Air Force Recommendation 4.3. Payout of the ACP should not occur 

equally based solely on aeronautical rating. To improve on the current model, 

the ACP should focus on aeronautical rating, community, and weapons system to achieve the most cost-effective use of bonus monies, applied against 

those weapons systems suffering the poorest retention.4

 Monetary payout is 

not the variable identified as most influential on retention. The author postulates that it has little influence in its current form due to a lack of understanding of the actual influential variables on retention. The ACP has become an 

ineffectually applied payout against an insufficiently studied problem.

Air Force Implication 4. A more focused approach of proactively identifying the most affected communities, as well as the correct dollar amounts for 

retention of personnel from those communities, would lead to higher retention rates and more efficient use of scarce dollars overall. The Air Force would 

require direct interaction with Congress to request a change for the ACIP and 

ACP. If the Air Force elects not to change these bonus programs, it will continue to suffer a drive toward mediocrity as the best depart for more lucrative 

offers outside AD, taking their unique skill sets with them. 

Professional Military Education, Training, and Promotion

Air Force Conclusion 5. Pilots are currently operationally deferred from 

attending PME in residence or accomplishing staff jobs due to an operational 

need to man cockpits. With personnel shortfalls necessitating an increased 

focus on mission readiness, the Air Force should modify the importance of 

these requisites with respect to promotion and career advancement. Understandably, accomplishment of the mission is paramount to the success of the 

United States Air Force. 

Air Force Recommendation 5.1. Just as critical to the Air Force’s success, 

however, is the retention of an educated officer corps. Bearing this in mind, 

one of two courses of action should transpire. Either the Air Force invests 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

111

more in PME and advanced training during times of fiscal austerity—thereby 

advancing the future of the remaining corps of officers—or it must decrease 

the level of importance placed on PME and higher education for promotion 

and advancement. The Air Force cannot have both, and if the best officers 

from the rated communities feel as though career progression slows or halts 

by events outside of their control, they will leave AD for other ventures. 

Air Force Recommendation 5.2. As opposed to propagating an “up or 

out” promotion system, the Air Force would be better served by allowing a 

portion of officers to plateau in rank, thereby decreasing the perception that 

requisite accomplishment is a necessity to stay on AD.5

 The plateau would 

provide tactical and operational continuity for the CAF, reduce costs associated with PME and staff job TDYs and PCSs, and drive down long-term costs 

with some officers retiring at a lower rank. 

Air Force Recommendation 5.3. Air Education and Training Command 

(AETC) and Air University should eliminate duplicative accomplishments of 

PME schools by correspondence followed by in-residence attendance.6

 This 

redundant process echoes for SOC, ACSC, and AWC, which in all cases takes 

away valuable time from the Airmen, mission, and family.7

 Notice this argument does not discount the importance of PME; rather, it seeks to optimize 

PME’s contribution to the development of officers while decreasing the negative influence reaped from its repetitive accomplishment. 

Air Force Implication 5. Failure to change PME requirements will leave 

Airmen having to choose between career progression requisites and family 

time. As this study proves, operations tempo and family stability are key drivers for retention, both of which revolve around time available to an Airman.

Combat Air Forces

Geographic Proximity versus Global Reach

CAF Conclusion 1. Senior political and military leaders need to reevaluate the reasons why combat assets deploy and whether benefits gained in the 

current joint and international environment by a CAF squadron’s presence 

are worth the strains levied on its smaller force structure.8

 Fewer available 

squadrons to accept the same number of taskings combined with increased 

deployed-to-dwell rates increase the strain on aircraft and personnel.

CAF Recommendation 1. It is time for the Air Force, and the nation writ 

large, to accept an increased level of risk in deployed locations by reducing the 

requirements for a deployed CAF footprint. To regain control of operations 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

112

tempo, tactical capability, and retention of the best, acceptance of greater risk 

is required in the operational environment. 

CAF Implication 1.1. The short-term risk will equate to a long-term gain 

as squadrons can use saved time and money to organize, train, and equip at 

home for the moment when actual CAF presence is required.9

 If the Air Force 

does not recapitalize its human capital, the nation will lose a critical piece of 

the national security umbrella.

CAF Implication 1.2. Increased emphasis on rapid mobilization and deployment in response to specific threats, as opposed to planned deployment 

as deterrence, will mitigate this problem.10 This idea is not retrenchment. It 

speaks instead to an “airpower-in-being” that uses the defensive and deterrent 

nature of the Air Force’s fielded strategic assets in conjunction with the inherently rapid and offensive nature of tactical, space, and cyber assets to gain 

command of the air, space, and cyber domain.11 Equally important to the operations tempo discussion is the utilization of individual officers.

Low-Density, High-Demand Human Capital

CAF Conclusion 2. The Air Force must reevaluate how it utilizes rated officers with unique skill sets. Many of the best officers (represented by but certainly not limited to WIC graduates) are departing AD because of extended, 

unaccompanied assignments that do not explicitly require their talents. These 

men and women are in short supply, and their use must be the exception and 

not the rule.12 Development and retention of a strong core of talented CAF 

officers are investments in the Air Force’s strategic future, and as such, the 

departure rate of these highly skilled officers demands attention.

CAF Recommendation 2. The Air Force, ACC, and Global Strike Command need to reassess billets currently requiring highly skilled rated officers 

(i.e., WIC graduates). Loss of these officers from the primary skill set for a 

year has a longer-lasting effect on a community than just lost calendar time. 

CAF Implication 2. Instrumental to the refocusing process is the retention 

of a core cadre of airpower experts—the best from all of the Air Force core 

functions—to ensure that short-term force structure reductions do not also 

undercut long-term force capability. Retention of this core of the best begins 

at the lowest levels and requires implicit identification of not only contextual 

differences among communities but also the resulting dissimilar definitions 

they use to define influential retention variables.

All three communities of interest included in this research study identify 

operations tempo and family stability as the most influential variables on retention for their respective communities. The way each community defines 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

113

operations tempo and its subsequent effect on family stability is different, 

however. A perspective of contextual similarities and differences that permeate each of these communities allows a more focused approach toward retention. The findings from these comparisons summarized next reinforce the 

need to identify the most influential variables at the lowest level.

Fighter Community

Operations Tempo

Fighter Conclusion 1. Fighter pilots identify operations tempo as a key 

driver for retention and associate its prominence primarily to fighter squadron manning. As smaller force structures become a reality, the hours required 

per fighter pilot will continue to increase. 

Fighter Recommendation 1. As mentioned, senior leaders across the CAF 

must reduce operations tempo, which begins with manning for the fighter 

community. Further exacerbating the problem is the difficult position AD 

and Guard pilots face when trying to combine into an effective Total Force 

Initiative.

Fighter Conclusion 2. The TFI is a critical piece of USAF force structure, 

but current implementation of the construct has left all parties struggling to 

achieve the desired ends with the means provided by the nation.13

Fighter Recommendation 2. To ensure success for all participants in the 

TFI construct, senior leaders from the active duty Air Force, Guard, and Reserve must reexamine the collective contributions of each and the manning 

requirements that exist as a result. 

Fighter Implication 2. Increased fighter pilot manning would go a long 

way in solving the retention problem currently experienced within the fighter 

community. However, decreased flying hours and training opportunities created by fiscal constraints keep the capacity to train fighter pilots below current 

requirements. As a result, short-term retention will most likely continue to 

drop unless the combat air forces take secondary measures to address operations tempo, which will require increased risk.

Fighter Conclusion 3. As discussed earlier, a force posture that relies more 

on rapid response from in-garrison positions as opposed to a security provided by geographic proximity to the combatant commander would facilitate 

a decreased operations tempo for the fighter community. 

Fighter Recommendation 3.1. Therefore, the recommendation for changing the CAF deployment schedule of fighter and bomber assets (see CAF conclusion 1) rings especially true for the fighter community. ACC and the num-
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

114

bered air forces that provide CONUS-based fighter assets for global use must 

reevaluate when, where, and why these assets deploy in support of regional 

objectives. The balance between geographic presence and tactical capability is 

paramount to this discussion. When long-term combat capability is lost to 

pay for short-term regional presence, the imbalance may be more than the 

Air Force can afford given the current force structure decreases as well as the 

poor fiscal environment.

Fighter Recommendation 3.2. The Air Force—particularly AETC and 

ACC—must explore creative means to balance tactical training and professional education capacity in the long term. Primarily, however, these agencies 

must focus in the short term on the retention of a core cadre of the best fighter 

pilots to ensure talent exists to train the next generation when capacity 

matches requirement. To paraphrase Richard P. Rumelt, quality matters when 

quantity, or capacity to train, is an inadequate substitute.14

Fighter Implication 3. Otherwise, future Air Force generations will inherit a hollow force of human capital, incapable of rapidly reconstituting once 

fiscal constraints and manning shortages pass or, more importantly, should 

the nation require additional forces to face an emergency. This is not to say 

that recovering from this shortage will be impossible but rather to suggest 

that the amount of time required to recover may incur an unacceptable strategic risk for the nation.

Family and Stability

Fighter Conclusion 4. For the AD fighter community in particular, investment in human capital for the long-term strategic future of the CAF is imperative. Continued talks of force reduction, decreases in CAF fighter squadrons, grounding of others, and delays in the delivery of new weapons systems 

have left individual pilots within the fighter community uncomfortable about 

their career prospects.

Fighter Recommendation 4. Finding ways to decrease the burden of operations tempo would simultaneously increase stability for the family. The Air 

Force and ACC thus need to find ways to remove emphatic focus from the 

artifacts that have historically defined Air Force identity and instead reemphasize their most important asset—the Airman. The author understands 

that modernization and recapitalization of weapons systems are paramount 

to the long-term strategic advantage of the USAF. However, as Rumelt also 

observes, “it is of little use to supply advanced machinery to unskilled or 

undertrained workers just as it is useless to educate people for jobs that do not 

exist.”15 Recapitalization of the most important weapons system—the human 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

115

operator exquisitely represented by the Airman in the Air Force—therefore is 

paramount. 

Fighter Implication 4. The repercussions of not addressing operations 

tempo and family stability within the fighter community will have long-term 

effects as the best fighter pilots continue to leave the Air Force in search of 

what they cannot find on AD—personal and professional stability. 

Fighter Conclusion 5. Fighter pilots and their families generally move 

more frequently than their peers from the bomber or RPA communities. This 

transient lifestyle exacts increased stress on these Airmen, as well as the families who support them, and has a negative contributory effect on retention. 

Fighter Recommendation 5. Plausibly, increasing the average move timing from approximately every three years to four or even five years would 

positively affect retention. Given the Air Force’s current understanding of the 

level of influence exacted by different influential variables, making an accurate assessment is impossible. HQ USAF/A1 and the AFPC should research 

the benefits of long assignment durations to increase stability and, ultimately, 

retention.

Fighter Implication 5. Simply increasing the move timing may not be 

enough to change the rate of retention, but until the Air Force researches the 

interrelationship of influential variables by individual communities, completely ascertaining this interrelationship will be difficult. Again, this leads 

back to the fundamental assertion that the Air Force must understand the 

most influential variables by community before it can make any focused 

changes on retention for the fighter community. The basic argument carries 

over to the bomber community but for contextually different reasons.

Bomber Community

Operations Tempo

Bomber Conclusion 1. Similar to the fighter community, bomber pilots 

believe that operations tempo is the most influential variable for retention of 

the best pilots from their community. Contextually, however, their definition 

of operations tempo varies from that of the fighter community, obliging the 

Air Force to address the problem differently if the solution is to be effective. 

Whereas operations tempo contextually revolves around manning shortfalls 

for fighter pilots, bomber pilots see deployments as its key contributor.16

Bomber Recommendation 1. Fewer bomber squadrons necessitate increased deployment rates for longer duration. The integral piece requiring 

attention for the bomber pilot therefore falls directly in line with the previous 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

116

CAF recommendation pertaining to geographic proximity and global reach. 

GSC and ACC must leverage their capabilities for global reach and for holding any target at risk in short order from CONUS basing in lieu of extensive 

deployments. This recommendation serves the same purpose as for the fighter 

community, with the added benefit of decreasing the negative influence of 

operations tempo—identified by the bomber community as the primary 

driver for poor retention.

Family and Stability

Bomber Conclusion 2. Just as operations tempo contributes directly to 

family stability for the fighter community, it does the same for the bomber 

community. Similar to the operations tempo discussion, contextual differences mandate different solutions for bomber pilots as compared to fighter 

pilots. 

Bomber Recommendation 2. Instability because of continued drawdown 

of forces and rising personnel costs does not change from the fighter to the 

bomber community. For the sake of this discussion, it shares the same fundamental arguments and recommendations presented in fighter conclusion, 

recommendation, and implication 4. The only difference is that GSC must 

contribute to the conversation along with ACC.

Bomber Conclusion 3. While not part of this research, the poor retention 

of combat system operators may affect bomber pilot retention. While the response may be only empathetic, the dichotomy of monetary payout between 

pilots and CSOs may induce imbalance among families in the same unit. 

Bomber Recommendation 3. The Air Force, together with ACC and GSC, 

must study the interaction between pilots and CSOs. The author suspects that 

while the “have” and “have-not” debate may appear superficial, until proven 

otherwise, the argument for a symptomatic effect between the two is plausible. 

The impetus for this conjecture is the statistically higher rate at which bomber 

pilots rate money and compensation as influential retention variables. 

Money and Promotion

Bomber Conclusion 4. Bomber pilots rate money and compensation as 

significantly more influential variables than do fighter pilots but not significantly different from RPA pilots. 

Bomber Recommendation 4. As such, the Air Force must identify the 

root cause behind this dichotomy to clarify if the difference originates internal to the bomber community or is because of external influence from the Air 

Force writ large. In either case, establishing key variables is the first step, 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

117

which necessitates additional attention with respect to money and its influence on the retention of bomber pilots. As noted earlier, a discussion of CSO 

retention must occur simultaneously to determine any interrelationship between the retention of one on the other. 

RPA Community

Operations Tempo

RPA Conclusion 1. RPA pilots, similar to pilots from the other studied 

communities, identify operations tempo as the most significant variable on 

retention. As for the other communities, the contextual difference in the definition of operations tempo mandates a solution distinct from those proposed 

for the other groups. Fighter pilots primarily equate operations tempo to 

manning; bomber pilots, to deployments; and RPA pilots, to the monotony of 

shift work and the insatiable appetite of senior leaders for the provided information at lower relative risk. This appetite led to an increased number of requested combat air patrols to barely tenable levels.

RPA Recommendation 1. The Air Force and ACC must separate the necessary from the desired CAPs. Reduction in the number of CAPs would allow 

RPA pilots to enter periods of “steady state” operations, thereby gaining a reconstitution period similar to that experienced by fighter and bomber pilots 

after a deployment. 

RPA Implication 1. Without the opportunity to enter steady state operations, the Air Force could see more RPA pilots depart AD as the grind becomes too much and family life is more affected. Much like the fighter and 

bomber communities, failure to reduce the contextually unique operations 

tempo of the RPA community will lead to family instability and result in 

higher separation rates.

Family and Stability

RPA Conclusion 2. Distinct to the RPA community is the lack of buffer 

between sustained combat operations and family life. Whereas fighter and 

bomber pilots must deploy to accomplish their wartime missions, thereby 

building a geographic barrier, RPA pilots accomplish their mission in garrison and return home shortly thereafter. As such, the separation from combat 

operations to normal life is minimal. While not directly revealed in the data, 

the consequence of continued operations in this manner could be dire. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

118

RPA Recommendation 2. The distinct characteristics of RPA operations 

require further study by ACC. This need is bolstered by requests emanating 

from the RPA community and substantiated through the medical community. Specifically, the author postulates that additional studies into the effects 

of sustained in-garrison combat operations on pilots and, by extension, their 

families would contribute to an increased understanding of the most influential variables on retention for the RPA community.

RPA Implication 2. This issue may be an indicator of a variable requiring 

further attention by ACC and the Air Force to ensure that the mental, physical, and spiritual well-being of RPA Airmen and their families do not become 

subsumed by operational requirements. If this does not occur, the health of 

those who remain in the RPA community may suffer or they may depart AD 

all together for other life goals.

Other Life Goals

RPA Conclusion 3. Burgeoning opportunities in the civilian sector for 

RPA operators created by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 

could signal a mass exodus of the best RPA drivers, similar to that projected 

for manned Air Force systems caused by the increase in commercial aviation 

hiring. Opening of the national airspace to unmanned systems in 2015 could 

provide more lucrative and less stressful opportunities in the civilian sector 

than currently found in the military structure.

RPA Recommendation 3. The Air Force should be mindful of the imminent alternative hiring venues for RPA pilots and use the intervening time to 

identify, test, and validate leading retention factors. This particular community would make an ideal test case for the Air Force since it is on the precipice 

of experiencing unique external influences with the potential to create RPA 

pilot shortfalls. 

RPA Implication 3. If validated, the method described above would empower senior leaders to make broader changes to other communities, including fighter and bomber. More importantly, this process changes the retention 

emphasis from a callous monetary payout awarded at the expiration of time 

served in a position to a more human-focused practice. This proposal considers contextual differences among communities and emphasizes the need to 

retain more of the best rated officers, who exude unique qualities and capabilities integral to the strategic future of the Air Force.

Notes

1. Stanley, briefing, subject: Predicting Pilot Retention. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

119

2. This does not infer that the Air Force will be able to retain all of the best officers from the 

heaviest hit communities in retention. Every officer who leaves the Air Force does so for personal and professional reasons, as does every officer who stays. Rather, this suggests that the 

Air Force can tailor its retention methods very specifically, thereby identifying more of the best 

for retention and addressing their specific concerns earlier than is currently occurring.

3. Ensuring an eight-year WIC graduate receives more money than a 14-year flight lead 

could incentivize aircrew to achieve higher status sooner while simultaneously making remaining on AD more lucrative.

4. This recommendation applies across all rated communities and weapons systems and is 

not unique to the CAF. The mobility, special operations, space, cyber, and enlisted forces could 

all benefit from a more focused approach to bonus payout. Critical to this process is the identification of the correct amount and then determining if it is affordable for the Air Force. If not, 

this argument lends credence to the previously made point that the most cost-effective means 

of retaining the best may not be monetary at all.

5. The argument as to whether or not these opportunities are necessary for the development of all officers is beyond the scope of this paper, except to say that not all lieutenants are 

going to be generals. There are those officers who would thrive on—and strongly desire the 

opportunity for—maintaining active flying status in lieu of career broadening opportunities 

like PME or staff jobs. 

6. Currently, expectations dictate that PME by correspondence is a requisite to attend in 

residence. PME via distance learning utilizes online material, chat room discussions, and selfstudy. In-residence accomplishment of PME takes place in a classroom setting with more emphasis on peer interaction and instruction from professors.

7. In terms of PME levels, SOC is associated with the rank of captain; ACSC, major; and 

AWC, lieutenant colonel or colonel. By correspondence alludes to course accomplishment at 

home station via self-study while in residence implies PME attendance in person at AU.

8. Combatant commanders undoubtedly prefer close geographic proximity of combat assets; however, in times of fiscal austerity and smaller force structures, it is neither feasible nor 

affordable to continue at the rate previously enjoyed.

9. Reminiscent of the pre–Desert Storm era, the majority of fighter squadrons should remain in CONUS, with the purpose of recapitalizing tactical and operational capability. Further, 

bomber squadrons should rely on their global reach capability to influence specific target sets, 

as opposed to forward deploying at the frequency and duration currently experienced. The Air 

Force is in a prime position to return to its enduring principles and capitalize on the unique 

capabilities afforded to Airmen in their exploitation of the air, space, and cyber domains 

through airpower.

10. Enduring principles of airpower like speed, access, precision, economy of risk, and innovation—all implemented by a continuously engaged force—allow the Air Force to respond 

from afar without the need for a large geographic presence.

11. The idea of airpower-in-being builds upon Corbett’s discussion of a “fleet-in-being.” 

While Corbett espouses a primarily defensive role of a fleet-in-being, the enduring principles 

of airpower mentioned above give the Air Force an additional offensive advantage, with the 

unique ability to respond simultaneously through the air, space, and cyber mediums at a time 

and place of its choosing. While there is an acknowledged risk in geographic separation from 

the point of contention, the sustainment of a credible and capable Air Force that focuses on the 

enduring principles of airpower ultimately creates a formidable entity that cannot be over-
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

120

looked by hostile forces during their political and military calculus. Corbett, Some Principles of 

Maritime Strategy, 224–25.

12. As the Air Force departs two theaters of operation, the talents of these men and women 

are required at home, preparing the next generation of CAF leaders for the air, space, and cyber 

domains. 

13. See chap. 3 for a complete discussion of TFI limitations within the fighter community.

14. Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy, 116.

15. Ibid., 118.

16. This is not to suggest that bomber squadrons maintain manning levels coincident with 

requirements because all squadrons experience fluctuations in total manning. Rather, they 

generally have more personnel based on the crew concept, thereby alleviating some of the 

strain found in squadrons that operate single- or dual-manned aircraft. This advantage affords 

bomber squadrons the opportunity to divide work among more people, theoretically decreasing average work time for all. 
121

Epilogue

This paper covers a narrow swath of the Air Force population. The communities included in this study account for less than 10 percent of total rated 

officers in the Air Force and less than 2 percent of the entire Air Force population.1

 That said, retention of a core cadre made up of the best rated officers 

from the fighter, bomber, and remotely piloted aircraft communities is critical 

to the strategic future of the Air Force and, by extension, to the national security of the United States. As such, the author offers a final “Dear Boss” letter: 

Dear Boss, 

Well, . . . I am still here, but many of the best from within our ranks are 

not, and this concerns me immensely. I have watched the finest of my peers 

leave in unimaginable numbers, not because they lacked the technological 

advantage or felt underpaid, but because they were tired. But aren’t we all? 

As a country, as an Air Force, we are exhausted. Nevertheless, what is it 

that makes us so weary that some of the finest would take their talents 

elsewhere? I have yet to hear someone succinctly describe what it is that 

makes so many of the best leave the combat air forces and a promising 

career on active duty for new adventures. Sure, we have all read the letters 

that contain a laundry list of complaints about what makes the job tough, 

but they do not offer many solutions. What is consistent, however, is that 

in each letter the toughness of the job is not what drives them out. Rather, 

the inability of the Air Force to accurately identify and address the underlying problem is what irks rated officers the most. Truth be told, the Air 

Force has not had to identify the problem for quite some time, but those 

times are changing—and rapidly so.

In the current environment, the Air Force does not have the luxury of 

asking vague questions pertaining to retention of the best, just as it does 

not have the luxury of divesting itself of these same officers to pay shortterm bills. I have no doubt that the Air Force is aware of this, but I do not 

think the Air Force knows the right questions to ask, which leads directly 

to the fundamental problem. 

For too long, categorization of rated communities occurred solely by 

aeronautical qualification. As these communities continue to shrink, however, we can see that wings on a pilot’s chest can no longer be the sole 

qualifier for retention. Rather, the contextual differences among communities, weapons systems, and even basing locations must emerge as variables 
EPILOGUE

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of study for retention of the best from each. Otherwise, the Air Force is 

doomed to repeat mistakes of the past, relying on ill-focused methods of 

retention applied against a poorly understood problem.

The “bonus” is not motivating enough for the best to stay on active duty. 

Even though a great deal of these rated officers are taking their talents to the 

Guard or Reserve, thereby preserving a zero-sum game in the tactical 

arena, the loss of these officers from active duty does not posture the Air 

Force for long-term strategic success. As such, identification of the most influential variables by community, weapons system, and location—further 

striated by time—becomes existential to the strategic future of the Air Force.

Even though individual communities might demarcate the same categories of influential variables on retention, the contextual differences that 

exist because of diversified aircraft types, mission sets, and locations make 

these categories fundamentally different. These variances among communities must be the leverage points the Air Force uses to retain more of the 

best from each community.

Use of these leverage points means taking risks at every level of planning. Risk for the Air Force at the strategic level means saying no to regional combat air force presence, relying rather on Air Force global reach 

and global power to do the job. Risk at the operational level means treating 

communities differently and investing in a core of the best to sustain the 

force through hard times, thereby ensuring talent exists to train future talent in the good times. Risk at the tactical level means delegating responsibility for retention down to the lowest levels of leadership, thereby enabling 

solutions to retention at the point of inception rather than explosion. This 

is not to suggest that all retention problems are solvable using this methodology. But it does provide a more focused retention effort sorely lacking in 

the Air Force presently.

I have no doubt that the young men and women tasked to defend our 

nation will do so in grand style when called upon, but I am worried that it 

may be at a cost the country is unprepared to shoulder if more of the best 

are not retained. Whether it be an increased loss of blood, treasure, or both, 

the nation is ill prepared after over 20 years of continuous war to lose more 

of her sons and daughters than is required. I have faith that the Air Force 

can solve this problem, but it means making tough decisions and innovative 

changes to current retention methods. Further, I have to believe that we will 

come out of this current downturn stronger that we have been in the past. 
EPILOGUE

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Why, do you ask? Because I have topped the windswept heights, and I know 

that through every cloudbank, there is a blue sky and that the Air Force—

made up of the best personnel—will be waiting to capitalize on it.

Notes

1. Percentages were calculated from authorized end strength numbers in the 2012 National 

Defense Authorization Act and the total number of Air Force rated officers cited in the Air 

Force Personnel Center static reports “Air Force Strength from FY 1948–2013” and “Regular 

Officer Career Family Career Field Rank Gender,” http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker

.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.default.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0. 

125

Dear Boss,

Well, I quit. I’ve finally run out of drive or devotion or rationalizations or whatever it was that kept me in the Air Force this long. I used to believe in, “Why not the 

best,” but I can’t keep the faith any longer. I used to fervently maintain that this was 

“My Air Force,” as much or more than any senior officer’s . . . but I can’t believe any 

more; the light at the end of my tunnel went out. “Why?” you ask. Why leave flying 

fighters and a promising career? Funny you should ask—mainly I’m resigning 

because I’m tired. Ten years and 2,000 hours in a great fighter, and all the time 

I’ve been doing more with less—and I’m tired of it. CBPO [Central Base Personnel 

Office] doesn’t do more with less; they cut hours. I can’t even entrust CBPO to 

have my records accurately transcribed to MPC [Military Personnel Center]. I 

have to go to Randolph to make sure my records aren’t botched. Finance doesn’t 

do more with less; they close at 15:00. The hospital doesn’t do more with less. 

They cut hours, cut services, and are rude to my dependents to boot. Maintenance doesn’t do more with less; they MND [maintenance non delivery] and SUD 

[supply delete] and take 2.5 to turn a clean F-4. Everybody but the fighter pilot has 

figured out the fundamental fact that you can’t do more with less—you do less. 

(And everybody but the fighter pilot gets away with it. . . . When’s the last time the 

head of CBPO was fired because a man’s records were a complete disaster?) But 

on the other hand, when was the last time anyone in the fighter game told higher 

headquarters, “We can’t hack 32 DOCs [designated operational capability] because we can’t generate the sorties?” Anyway—I thought I could do it just like all 

the rest thought they could . . . and we did it for a while . . . but now it’s too much 

less to do too much more, and a lot of us are tired. And it’s not the job. I’ve been 

TDY [on temporary duty] to every dirty little outpost on democracy’s frontier that 

had a 6,000-foot strip. I’ve been gone longer than most young jocks have been 

in—and I don’t mind the duty or the hours. That’s what I signed up for. I’ve been 

downtown and seen the elephant, and I’ve watched my buddies roll up in fireballs—I understand—it comes with the territory. I can do it. I did it. I can still do 

it—but I won’t. I’m too tired, not of the job, just the Air Force. Tired of the extremely 

poor leadership and motivational ability of our senior staffers and commanders. 

(All those Masters and PMEs [professional military educators] and not a leadership trait in sight!) Once you get past your squadron CO [commanding officer], 

people can’t even pronounce esprit de corps. Even a few squadron COs stumble 

over it. And let me clue you—in the fighter business when you’re out of esprit, 

Appendix A

Capt Ron Keys’s “Dear Boss” Letter*

* This letter was written a few years after the end of the Vietnam War by Capt Ron Keys (as an amalgamation of pilot concerns at the time) to Gen Wilbur Creech, TAC commander. Captain Keys was not personally planning on resigning at the time and later became the commanding general of Air Combat Command.1
APPENDIX A

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you’re out of corps—to the tune of 22,000 in the next five years, if you follow the 

airline projections. And why? Why not? Why hang around in an organization that 

rewards excellence with no punishment? Ten years in the Air Force, and I’ve never 

had a DO [director of operations] or Wing Commander ask me what our combat 

capability is, or how our exposure times are running during ops, or what our air-toair loss and exchange ratios are—no, a lot of interest in boots, haircuts, scarves, 

and sleeves rolled down, but zero—well, maybe a query or two on taxi spacing—

on my job: not even a passing pat on the ass semiannually. If they’re not interested, why should I be so fanatical about it? It ought to be obvious I’m not in it for 

the money. I used to believe—and now they won’t even let me do that. 

And what about career? Get serious! A string of nine-fours and ones as long 

as your arm, and nobody can guarantee anything. No matter that you’re the Air 

Force expert in subject Y . . . if the computer spits up your name for slot C—

you’re gone. One man gets 37 days to report remote—really now, did someone 

slit his wrists or are we that poor at managing? Another gets a face-to-face, nochange-for-six-months brief from MPC . . . two weeks later? You got it—orders in 

his in basket. I’m ripe to PCS—MPC can’t hint where or when; I’ve been in too 

long to take the luck of the draw—I’ve worked hard, I’ve established myself, I can 

do the job better than anyone else—does that make a difference? Can I count on 

progression? NO. At 12–15 hours a day on my salary at my age, I don’t need that 

insecurity and aggravation. And then the big picture—the real reasons we’re all 

pulling the handle—it’s the organization itself. A noncompetitive training system 

that allows people in fighters that lack the aptitude or the ability to do the job. 

Once they’re in, you can’t get them out . . . not in EFLIT [lead-in training], not in 

RTU [replacement training unit], and certainly not in an operational squadron. We 

have a fighter pilot shortfall—didn’t you hear? So now we have lower quality 

people with motivation problems, and the commander won’t allow anyone to jettison them. If you haven’t noticed, that leaves us with a lot of people in fighters, 

but very few fighter pilots, and the ranks of both are thinning; the professionals 

are dissatisfied and most of the masses weren’t that motivated to begin with. 

MPC helps out by moving Lts every 12–15 months or so—that way nobody can 

get any concentrated training on them before they pull the plug. Result: most operational squadrons aren’t worth a damn. They die wholesale every time the Aggressors deploy—anybody keep score? Anybody care? Certainly not the whiz kid 

commander, who blew in from 6 years in staff, picked up 100 hours in the bird, and 

was last seen checking the grass in the sidewalk cracks. He told his boys, “Don’t 

talk to me about tactics—my only concern is not losing an aircraft . . . and meanwhile, get the grass out of the sidewalk cracks!”—and the clincher—integrity. Hide 

as much as you can . . . particularly from the higher headquarters that could help 

you if only they knew. They never will though—staff will see to that: “Don’t say that 

to the general!” or “The general doesn’t like to hear that.” I didn’t know he was paid 

to like things—I thought he was paid to run things . . . how can he when he never 

hears the problems? Ah well, put it off until it becomes a crisis—maybe it will be 

overcome by events. Maybe if we ignore it, it won’t be a problem. (Shh, don’t rock 

the boat.) Meanwhile, lie about the takeoff times, so it isn’t an ops or maintenance 
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late. (One more command post to mobile call to ask subtly if I gave the right time 

because—ahh, that makes him two minutes late, and I will puke!) Lie about your 

DOC capability because you’re afraid to report you don’t have the sorties to hack 

it. “Yes, sir, losing two airplanes won’t hurt us at all.” The party line. I listened to a 

three-star general look a room full of us in the face and say that he “didn’t realize 

that pencil-whipping records was done in the Air Force. Holloman, and dive toss 

was an isolated case, I’m sure.” It was embarrassing—that general looked us in 

the eye and said, in effect, “Gentlemen, either I’m very stupid or I’m lying to you.” I 

about threw in the towel right there—or the day TAC [Tactical Air Command] fixed 

the experience ratio problem by lowering the number of hours needed to be 

experienced. And then they insult your intelligence to boot. MPC looks you 

straight in the eye and tells you how competitive a heart-of-the-envelope three is! 

. . . and what a bad deal the airlines offer! Get a grip—I didn’t just step off the bus 

from Lackland! And then the final blow, the Commander of TAC arrives—does he 

ask why my outfit goes 5 for 1 against F-5s and F-15s when most of his operational 

outfits run 1 for 7 on a good day? (Will anybody let us volunteer the information?) 

Does he express interest in why we can do what we do and not lose an airplane 

in five years? No—he’s impressed with shoe shines and scarves and clean ashtrays. (But then we were graciously allotted only minimum time to present anything—an indication of our own wing’s support of the program. Party line, no issues, no controversy—yes, sir; no, sir; three bags full, sir.) . . . And that’s why I’m 

resigning . . . long hours with little support, entitlements eroded, integrity a mockery, zero visible career progression, and senior commanders evidently totally 

missing the point (and everyone afraid or forbidden to inform them). I’ve had 

it—life’s too short to fight an uphill battle for commanders and staffs who won’t 

listen (remember Corona Ace?) or don’t believe or maybe don’t even care. So 

thanks for the memories, it’s been a real slice of life. . . . But I’ve been to the mountain and looked over and I’ve seen the big picture—and it wasn’t of the Air Force.

“This is your captain speaking . . . on your left you should be able to see Denver, 

Colorado, the mile. . . .”

Note

1. See Anderegg, Sierra Hotel, app. 2, p. 190, for the letter and p. 67 for the circumstances 

surrounding its writing.

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Dear Boss,

Well, I quit. I’ve finally run out of drive or devotion or rationalizations or whatever 

it was that kept me in the Air Force this long. I used to believe that we were the 

finest organization in the world—that combat effectiveness was the only thing 

that really mattered, and that no one on earth was as effective at anything as we 

were at air combat. But I cannot keep faith any longer. The light at the end of my 

tunnel went out. “Why?” you ask. Why leave flying jets and a “promising” career? 

Funny you should ask—mainly I’m resigning because I’m tired. Fourteen years 

and 2,300 hours in the fast jet business and all the time I’ve been doing more with 

less—and I’m tired of it. Fourteen years of 12-hour days and long deployments 

and it turns out that most people around here don’t actually care if we’re any 

good! They only care if we look good. And there is a difference.

I don’t mind the duty or the hours. That’s what I signed up for. I’ve been all around 

the world and been shot at by the bad guys. I’ve had buddies who died in fireballs 

and watched their widows and children cry their eyes out—I understand—it comes 

with the territory. I can do it. I did it. I can still do it—but I won’t. I’m too tired, not of 

the job, just the Air Force. I’m tired of the poor leadership and micromanagement 

of our senior staffers and commanders. All those Masters [sic] and PME [professional military education] grads and not a true leadership trait in sight! Once you 

get past your squadron commander, people can’t even pronounce esprit de corps. 

Even a few squadron commanders stumble over it. And let me clue you—in the 

fighter business, when you’re out of esprit, you’re out of corps. We’ve come to 

value political correctness and feel-good slogans above aggressiveness and warrior spirit. We’ve completely forgotten our roots and what traits made us good in 

the first place. 

The Air Force is in a constant identity crisis. Since I first put on a uniform, we’re 

on our third Air Force emblem, third different flight suit, second battle dress uniform (third if you include the Velcro nametag debacle), and working on our fourth 

service dress! We’ve had so many mission statements, vision statements, and 

core values statements that I can’t keep up. Then we heard the Chief of Staff 

[CSAF] talk about how he wants to instill a sense of our heritage. What heritage? 

We don’t even have a uniform on long enough to become heritage! We are just a 

constantly changing set of buzzwords, clothes, and fads. After the last CSAF left, 

what was the very first thing the new boss did to supposedly refocus us on the 

Appendix B

2009 “Dear Boss” Letter*

* This letter was adapted by an experienced F-15 pilot from the original “Dear Boss” letter (which was an amalgamation of pilot concerns at the time) written by then-captain Ron Keys after the Vietnam War.
APPENDIX B

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mission and instill some Air Force pride? He changed our clothes and made us 

wear blues. Talk about missing the mark! It used to be that our pride came from 

simply being the best. I guess not anymore. And there are the buzzwords. I can’t 

go to a commander’s call without hearing “wingmen,” “mutual support,” and “core 

values” awkwardly thrown around until I’m nauseous. Don’t get me wrong, they 

are fine concepts. But they are just words, over-used and infrequently backed up 

by the actions of our leaders. They have been watered down to the point where 

they lost all meaning. Not long ago, Quality Air Force was all the rage. We did 

surveys and made graphs and nothing got better. Now we have AFSO21 [Air 

Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century] and we have working groups and 

stop light charts and nothing has gotten better. We tag on to civilian business 

management techniques that we don’t truly understand, then think we can simply 

apply a 10-step flow chart process to every problem and come up with the right 

solution. What happened to leadership, creativity and innovation? Give me a bar 

napkin, a pen, and a bottle of whiskey and I’ll solve your problems in one night. 

And I won’t have to remember what step number 7 was in the computer based 

training slides to be able to apply common sense.

And what about career? Get serious! Progression has little to do with leadership 

ability and actual performance, but rather filling a series of squares. A couple 

years back, we had the “no practice bleeding” policy—if you needed a master’s 

degree, the Air Force would send you. Don’t do PME in correspondence unless 

you don’t get picked up to go in-residence. It only made too much sense. But this 

is the Air Force, so the pendulum had to swing back, and now it’s swung so far you 

can hardly see it anymore! They changed the ACSC [Air Command and Staff College] program so that it doubles as a master’s program–but you can’t realistically 

get selected to go in-residence unless you already have a master’s degree. What 

sense does that make? So now you have guys simply finding the easiest, most 

useless online master’s degree program they can find, just to fill the square. And 

the Air Force is stuck paying the bill! Everyone loses in that battle. The Air Force 

is out of the money with no real benefit and its people spend their few free hours 

reading books and writing papers on subjects that are unrelated to what we really 

do. To paraphrase our former Chief of Staff, the Air Force treats a master’s in 

basket weaving in the same exact light as a master’s in quantum physics from 

MIT. Do we want officers who are truly educated in relevant subjects or do we just 

want to be able to flaunt our statistics on how educated we appear? I had a general officer literally tell me that we do this to sift out those who are truly dedicated 

to their career. I guess 60–70 hour weeks spent trying to do well at my actual duties don’t show enough devotion. And now my favorite: you also can’t realistically 

get selected for ACSC in-residence unless you’ve completed it in-correspondence 

first. So you can’t take the course until you’ve taken the course? Huh? We have 

lost our minds! What happened to family time? I work 12 hours or more every day, 

yet I’m expected to come home and work on classes at night and on the weekends just so I can be competitive to re-cover that same material at Maxwell? Just 

when exactly am I supposed to spend time with my wife and kids and recharge my 
APPENDIX B

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batteries? I hardly see my kids as it is. Something has to give. It’s either my job, 

my coursework, or my family. I can’t do all of that well. Does anyone really wonder 

anymore why our folks face pressure from home to get out? Does anyone really 

wonder why our folks are completely burned out?

What am I supposed to tell young lieutenants and captains who come to me asking if they should spend their spare time working on their master’s degree or instead start work on their flight lead upgrade briefs? They don’t have time to do 

both well, and anyone who tells them they need to just manage their time better 

is so far out of touch I can’t take it. By all common sense, young guys should be 

focusing on being tactical experts and knowing everything they can about the 

weapons system they are tasked to employ. But I can’t tell them to prioritize that 

anymore if they plan to stay in the Air Force. I can’t tell them to commit career 

suicide because the fact is that the Air Force doesn’t care if they are tactical experts. It only cares if they have their squares filled. The Air Force has decided that 

the 4-star grooming process begins on day one, and that seems to be our focus. 

We need to have experts at the tactical level—we cannot afford to be generalists 

at the company grade operator level. We were told by a senior officer the other 

day that we now need to be experts in space and cyberspace in addition to being 

experts in the air—this to an audience of mostly junior officers. Are you kidding 

me? We hardly have enough time or training to be true experts in our own lane, 

but now we’re supposed to be experts in everyone else’s? The theory seems to 

be that we need to have a better understanding of how those things work if we 

become “senior leaders.” But we’ve put the cart before the horse once again. 

When our operators are also our officers, we cannot afford to focus only on officer 

development and senior leader grooming when guys are lieutenants and captains. Well, we can, but it’s at the expense of effective operations. And isn’t that 

what it’s really all about? I guess not.

And if that isn’t enough, the Air Force chooses to select its finest not based on 

actual Air Force work, but on how much ancillary stuff a guy does. To be selected 

as a quarterly company grade officer award winner in any wing, the write-up 

needs to include bullets for (1) “Leadership and Job Performance in Primary 

Duty,” (2) “Significant Self Improvement,” and (3) “Base and Community Involvement.” So what happens to the guy who is the best in the world at his actual duty 

and a natural born leader, but doesn’t coach a kid’s soccer team or tutor underprivileged students in his spare time (what spare time)? Answer: he can’t be 

competitive for the quarterly award above the squadron level since he isn’t involved enough in the community. Which means he isn’t competitive for the annual 

award. Which means he doesn’t look as strong on paper, even though he may be 

the very best officer and tactician we have. As we know, it doesn’t matter how 

good you are, it only matters how you look on paper. Why on earth do we prioritize 

non–Air Force work to identify our standout officers? The write-up should end at 

“Leadership and Job Performance in Primary Duty.” Period, dot. Anything else 

means that we are using the wrong measuring stick.
APPENDIX B

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And there are no more carrots left to keep guys motivated, only bad deal after bad 

deal, and hardly a “thank you” for any of it. If I have to listen to another colonel or 

general officer tell me how they understand what it’s like now since they had a 

bad deal once too—then proceed to describe how much fun they actually had on 

that “bad deal” ALO [air liaison officer] tour in Germany in the late 1980s—I’m 

going to lose it. If I have to listen to another commander say that they can’t understand why anyone would want to get out of this great Air Force when the worst 

deal they ever had in their whole career was as a T-38 IP at Willie back in the day, 

I’m going to scream. And then there’s always the lecture about how there really 

aren’t any “bad deals.” Really? Come on. We all know better and it just fuels bitterness when our leaders don’t even acknowledge that. I’m tired of watching my 

buddies dive under desks every time the commander walks down the hall for fear 

that he’s going to drop a 179- or even a 365-day deployment on them with three 

weeks’ notice. Really now, do we have a rash of guys slitting their wrists right 

before they go to the AOR [area of responsibility] or are we that poor at managing? But at least it will come with a pep talk about how it’s good for your “career” 

to get a little war stink on you, even if it’s just the smell of a desk in some rear 

echelon office. Another square checked. Maybe you’ll even earn a medal for updating those PowerPoint slides over there, or whatever worthless job we’ve invented to inflate our numbers and make it look like the Air Force is pulling its 

weight in theater. Oh, and after you get back from that little vacation, you’d better 

be ready for a remote three months later. Sorry, no credit for time served. I’m sure 

the wife will understand. She’ll be comforted by the mere three hour wait and rude 

desk clerks at the base medical clinic when the kids inevitably get sick the day 

after you leave. We’re at war—I get it, I really do. But how on earth can anyone be 

expected to deal with such constant instability in their lives over such a long period of time and take it with a smile?

But the real problem is much bigger than all of that—we have lost the drive to be 

good. We were good for so long that we forgot just what exactly it was that made 

us that way. We have forgotten all of the lessons learned in blood from our predecessors, and focus only on looking good. We held an advantage in both technology and training for a long time and we became complacent. Technology is vital, 

but if we aren’t experts at using it, what good are we? And now any technological 

edge we had is being minimized by any third-world country with a checkbook, as 

cheap electronic attack and air defense systems proliferate. So now we’re down 

to training and experience to carry us through. Not long ago, we used to laugh in 

our intelligence briefs when we heard how little enemy pilots flew per year. It’s not 

so funny anymore, as we struggle to get in the air ourselves. We’ve even resorted 

to using simulator time to make us appear more experienced on paper, but that is 

only a mirage. Sims can be decent training, but they are no substitute for flying, 

no matter how much the bean counters and desk jockeys wish they were! Pilots 

spend entire assignments training and studying for upgrades, only to get shipped 

off to a non-fighter assignment just as they start to “get it.” That makes no sense! 

Why not extend assignments for an extra year and let our guys actually put their 
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133

obscenely expensive training and newly gained experience to use for even just a 

little while? Nope. Instead we move them on to a non-fighter assignment to make 

room for more newbies . . . after all, the Air Force is short on pilots so we need to 

keep training new ones. But what good is it to have a ton of fighter pilots, few of 

whom have much actual experience flying fighters? We have prioritized having 

“fighter experience” in jobs all across the Air Force . . . everywhere, that is, except 

actually in fighters. When we do get an experienced guy in the door, they are always fresh out of the TX course instead of current in the jet. Only one time in the 

last three years have I seen a guy show up who was mission ready—and that 

was the new weapons officer. We have to retrain all of our “experienced” guys 

again from mission qualification training on up, so our schedule is one constant 

upgrade train. Why doesn’t someone do one of those AFSO 21 group hugs and 

analyze how much money we waste constantly retraining guys from the ground 

up every couple of years? All to the tune of fifteen grand per flight hour, I might 

add. Maybe we could use the money saved to buy a new plasma TV to display the 

schedule or another round of new office furniture. Almost never do we get to just 

go out and practice advanced CT [counterterrorism] scenarios, so we spend all 

of our time just trying to stay afloat instead of actually getting better. And the same 

story is true throughout the CAF [combat air forces]. Result: Most operational 

squadrons are not worth a damn. And no one seems to care. 

Fourteen years in the Air Force, and I’ve yet to have an OG [operations group] or 

Wing Commander ask us what our true combat capability is—I mean our true 

skills, not how we look on our SORTS [Status of Resources and Training System] 

report. Lots of questions on dirty boots, low zippers, and crooked patches. Lots of 

questions about why I landed five minutes past my scheduled window on my 

once-a-year fight-tank-fight blue air DCA [defensive counterair] sortie. We’ve 

gotta make the statistics look good, even if they are meaningless, or else someone might have to actually explain to the Wing Commander why I used common 

sense to get that extra setup while we had the airspace and gas. Even our former 

crown jewel, RED FLAG, has become a joke. Instead of getting some folks good 

training, we decided to be all-inclusive and try to get everyone some training. We 

wouldn’t want anyone to feel left out in today’s Air Force, so once again real combat capability suffers.

And then there is queep [undesirable nonflying duties such as infinite paperwork]. 

Oh, the queep. We have no support staff anymore, so we spend our time supporting ourselves administratively instead of improving ourselves tactically. On top of 

that, pilot jobs that used to be manned two or three deep are now single deep at 

best. So instead of young pilots spending their time studying and learning the 

ropes underneath someone’s wing, they are now chiefs of a shop. Yet, rather than 

the chain of command recognizing that fact and refocusing just on what’s actually 

important, the demands on ridiculous queep have only risen. Case in point: have 

you seen an OPR [officer performance report] from 20 years ago? They are full of 

white space and sub-bullets and all sorts of things that are forbidden now. That 

didn’t seem to hold back all of today’s generals much. Now, we have all of these 
APPENDIX B

134

unwritten rules on how to fill out that form that it has become a voodoo art. For 

what? Are we better able to evaluate someone who doesn’t have any white space 

at the end of a line on his performance report? Does it really make a difference if 

I spell out numbers or use digits? Does it really matter if I abbreviate the word 

“squadron” as “sq” and “sqdn” in the same section? Does that somehow change 

the meaning? The real question should be: does it make us more combat capable? Of course not! But, we grind away for hours trying to figure out how to wordsmith in our secret OPR code so that even the bottom feeders look like heroes, 

but it takes a Little Orphan Annie secret decoder pin to figure out what we’re really 

trying to say. We had a report kicked back from the wing the other day to make us 

change the abbreviation “2nd” to “2d.” What on earth was the point of that? It’s 

death by paper cuts, and I don’t have the energy to spend on such ridiculous 

nonsense anymore. Not when I’m saddled with forty other “urgent” nonissues, 

each of which I need to solve right now, yet none of which are actually important. 

I even heard this little gem: “if we could only get our queep perfect, the tactical 

stuff will follow naturally.” What? We’ve got it all backwards! We worry about the 

stuff that doesn’t matter at the expense of what truly does. And the unimportant 

stuff is all I ever hear about from leadership. It doesn’t matter if we can execute 

our increasingly complex tactics, handle EA [electronic attack], or even find our 

sort . . . as long as the statistics look good and our queep is done right, the bosses 

are happy. After all, if the minimum training wasn’t good enough, it wouldn’t be the 

minimum, right? Well we’re going to find out. We’re min-running the entire Air 

Force. God help us if we ever have an all-out air war. We are going to pay the 

price in blood on the backs of the minimally trained and inexperienced. We have 

learned these lessons before. We have been the hollow force. We have seen what 

blind faith in technology with minimal training does to combat success. Have we 

forgotten everything we learned in Vietnam?

Not long ago, I had a general tell me that he wasn’t worried about retention because the airline industry had gone down the toilet. Well I’ve got news for him—

that doesn’t matter. Because, you see, I’m not the only one that feels this way. 

Every guy I know is looking for the door and counting the days until their contract 

is up. Not a single one of them wants an airline job, either. Not one. If they can’t 

get hired by the Guard, then they’ll just go get an MBA with the new GI Bill and 

get a regular job. Anything with a bit of stability will do. It turns out we’ve picked 

up a few nonflying skills along the way, and those are in demand, bad economy 

or not. It’s never been about the money for us, so the bonus isn’t the driver. It’s 

been about the mission. Our rewards are purely in the satisfaction that we’ve 

done a good job, earned the respect of our peers, and made a difference. But it’s 

just too difficult to see how to make a real difference here anymore. Not in this 

climate of yes men and party lines and square filling and image-over-substance. 

We are watching an organization that we once worked so hard to be a part of veer 

off into insignificance as it focuses so frequently on the unimportant, all while it 

kicks us square in the junk and expects us to smile.
APPENDIX B

135

And that’s why I’m resigning . . . long hours with little support, no stability or predictability to life, zero career progression, and senior commanders evidently totally 

missing the point. Our only real heritage—an unfailing drive for excellence—has 

gone by the wayside in favor of a culture of square filling. I’ve had it—life’s too 

short to fight an uphill battle for commanders and staffs who won’t listen or don’t 

believe or maybe don’t even care. So thanks for the memories, it’s been a real 

slice of life. . . . But I’ve been to the mountain and looked over and I’ve seen the 

big picture. It wasn’t all green. But it wasn’t Air Force blue either. 

137

From: Welsh, Mark A III Gen USAF USAFE USAFE/CC 

Sent: Mon Apr 25 20:19:42 2011

Subject: USAFE Fighter Pilots 

To USAFE Fighter Pilots

I need your help. During a recent 4-star meeting, we talked about what appears to be a pending fighter pilot shortage. The AF’s rated personnel management folks are projecting a 300 fighter pilot shortfall in FY13 that could grow to 

over 1000 by FY21. They also told us that the fighter community’s bonus “take 

rate” is 10% lower than the rest of the rated community. Obviously, many of you 

are leaving, or thinking about leaving, the Air Force for other opportunities. If 

you’ve already made the decision to do so, then please accept my sincere thanks 

for your service and best wishes for every success in the future . . . it’s an honor 

to have served beside you. My concern is not that you’ve made the choice to 

pursue a new path, but that we don’t really understand why you made the choice. 

You may have heard the story about a Captain fighter pilot who wrote a letter 

to the Commander of Tactical Air Command a couple of years after the end of the 

Vietnam War. The letter started “Dear Boss, Well, I quit” and went on to list the 

frustrations that he and his peers were experiencing. I just read a more recent 

version, written in 2009. It’s attached to this note. If you believe the author, some 

things may not have changed much in 30 years. Our Air Force is in a dynamic 

state of change and its leaders need to know why some of their most talented, 

highly trained people are leaving. As we transition to a 5th Generation fighter 

force, we simply can’t afford to lose front line fighter pilots at our current rate.

I understand that it’s a busy time to be in the Air Force. The fighter community 

is faced with an increasing ops tempo, fewer fighters, less flying, more non-flying 

jobs and an unclear career sight picture. My gut feeling is that this combination 

contributes to good people leaving, but I doubt these are the only factors. I suspect some of the issues raised in the Dear Boss letter are also in play. But, most 

importantly, I don’t know for sure. And I don’t believe AF leaders can make smart 

fighter pilot force management decisions until we do.

Interestingly, we also have a fighter WSO shortage which will persist for the 

next few years. But the longer term trends for that career field are positive. That’s 

clearly not the case with fighter pilots and I want to know as much as possible 

about what’s causing retention to move in the wrong direction.

So, I have a favor to ask. I’d like to hear your thoughts on what is driving fighter 

pilot retention down. You can send them directly to my CAG at usafe.ccx@

Appendix C

Gen Mark A. Welsh III E-mail to USAFE Fighter Pilots
APPENDIX C

138

ramstein.af.mil. They’ll strip names off the inputs, then pass them to me, unedited. 

I’m looking for the ground truth as you see it, not the filtered, watered-down “this 

is what the boss wants to hear” truth. Once I’ve seen it all, I’ll give you some 

feedback . . . including what I plan to do with the info. 

Let me close by saying “Thank You” to you and your families for all of your hard 

work and sacrifice. You, and so many other great Airmen in so many career fields, 

are the reason we’re the world’s greatest Air Force. But no matter how good we 

are, we need to get better. When your job is to fight and win your Nation’s wars, 

you can never be good enough. I will do everything in my power to make USAFE 

more combat capable; that includes trying to keep our best fighter pilots on Active 

Duty. If you think “best fighter pilot” refers to you, please let me know what you 

think. If you don’t, this note isn’t for you.

R/Boomer
139

Appendix D

Pilot Retention Survey
APPENDIX D

140
APPENDIX D

141

143

Appendix E

Pilot Retention Survey Solicitation E-mail

145

Abbreviations

A1 Manpower, Personnel, and Services

ACC Air Combat Command

ACIP aviation career incentive pay

ACP aviator continuation pay

ACSC Air Command and Staff College

AD active duty

ADSC active duty service commitment

AEF air and space expeditionary force

AEF Next Air Expeditionary Force Next

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFCS Air Force corporate structure

AFI Air Force instruction

AFPC Air Force Personnel Center

AFR Air Force Reserve

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command

ALO air liaison officer

ANG Air National Guard

ANOVA analysis of variance

APPG Annual Planning and Programming Guidance 

ARC Air Reserve Component

AU Air University

AWC Air War College

CAF combat air forces

CAP combat air patrol

CFMP core function master plan

CJCS chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COIN counterinsurgency

CONUS continental United States

CR crew ratio

CSAF chief of staff of the Air Force

CSO combat systems operator

DAF Department of the Air Force

DARO Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

DCGS distributed common ground system
ABBREVIATIONS

146

DOC desired operational capability

DOD Department of Defense

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FS fighter squadron

FY fiscal year

GAO Government Accountability Office

GO general officer

GSC Global Strike Command

IP instructor pilot

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

LRE launch-and-recovery element

LRS-B long-range strike bomber

MANOVA multivariate analysis of variance

MCE mission control element

MWS major weapons system

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

ONE Operation Noble Eagle

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAA primary aircraft authorized

PCS permanent change of station

PME professional military education

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

PRP personnel reliability program

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

RPAS remotely piloted aircraft system

SAASS School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

SECAF secretary of the Air Force

SLEP service life extension program

SOC Squadron Officer College

TAC Tactical Air Command

TDY temporary duty

TFI Total Force Integration

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UPT Undergraduate Pilot Training
ABBREVIATIONS

147

URT Undergraduate RPA Training

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USAFWS United States Air Force Weapons School

USGAO United States Government Accountability Office

UTC unit type code

WIC Weapons Instructor Course

YAS years of aviation service

149

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ISBN: 978-1-58566-237-1 

ISSN: 1941-3785

AFRI

Air Force Research Institute